, A rer tr ee Soca peer et ti nies op stati (cyte ep tae egress . - SOL ee eennent apy aannnre . cores . aeRO COLL Ltshivitasts Deparment enn aaa Orr ras reins oar > pea aan ; : op SOO OOOuG RECO ONOOD use den Qer ry sralar ote : ‘eat’ TE4% \A\q CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY UNDERGRADUATE LIBRARY aM Date Due PRINTED IN|U, >. a, (hay GAT.|NO. 23233 ee <= ‘ 5 i918 se Library | D 581.48 19 | d fleet, 1914-1916; its c | ‘wii wna | | THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA, G.C.B., 0.M., G.C.V.O. THE GRAND FLEET 1914-1916 ITS CREATION, DEVELOPMENT AND WORK BY ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O. WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, PLANS AND DIAGRAMS NEW wp YORK GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO MY COMRADES OF THE GRAND FLEET PREFACE In the following pages the work of the Grand Fleet, from the outbreak of war until the end of November, 1916, is described. The writing of this record of the work of the Grand Fleet, of which little has been heard by the nation hitherto, has helped to fill in days of leisure. The manu- script was finished by the autumn of 1918, but publication was deferred for obvious reasons. When the armistice had been signed and the German Navy had, for all prac- tical purposes, ceased to exist, I felt free to issue the book. The final revision has been done hastily owing to my early departure for the Dominions, and in the circumstances I hope I may rely on the indulgence of readers if any clerical errors have escaped me. In order to minimise the chances of such errors Mr. Archibald Hurd has kindly read the proofs, and I am much indebted to him. The narrative necessarily includes an account of the gradual organisation and development of the Grand Fleet, and its bases, by successive steps, after the hoisting of my flag on the outbreak of hostilities; and the manner in which the changing conditions of naval warfare were met is also dealt with. Admiral Mahan, amongst others, has truly said that whilst the principles of naval strategy are unchangeable, experience in war and changes in the weapons with which war is waged may profoundly affect the application of those principles. vil Vill PREFACE The truth of this statement was shown in the Russo- Japanese war; in the short interval between 1904 and 1914 further great advances took place in the technique of warfare; these produced a striking influence on strategy and tactics during the late war. The reasons which made it necessary, during the war, to hide from public view the work of the Grand Fleet no longer exist, and it will no doubt be of interest to the nation to learn something of its operations, especially as, for various justifiable reasons, few despatches were issued dealing with its activities. So far as the Battle Fleet was concerned, the Battle of Jutland was the one exception, and that despatch was written and published when it was necessary to conceal a good deal from the enemy. As is inevitable, much of the information in this volume is of a technical character and, though interesting to seamen, may prove less so to the general reader. Those who take this view may decide that Chapters IV to X, ‘inclusive, require only to be glanced at. Confidential matter, which it is still undesirable to make public, has been excluded from the book. Some of this may see the light in later years. The main portion of the book is written in narrative form, but where it is thought that an explanation may be useful, as to the reasons which governed any particular movement or decision, such reason is given in order that opportunity may be afforded the reader of understanding the purpose in view and the manner in which it was hoped to achieve it. In some parts of the book reference is made to the Germans being superior to us in matériel. There were many directions, however, in which war experience showed the correctness of our views and the wisdom of PREFACE ix our pre-war policy. We did, in fact, obtain a margin of safety in the most essential type of vessel, the capital ship, and we did gain advantage from the heavier calibre of our guns. Naval policy is pursued in peace conditions under inevitable disadvantages in a democratic country, because there are many claims on the Exchequer. Re- viewing our pre-war programmes of ship construction and equipment, and bearing in mind the unconsciousness of the nation generally as to the imminence of war, it is matter for satisfaction that the Boards of Admiralty from the beginning of the century were able to achieve so much, and that when at last war became inevitable the nation had in control of its destinies at Whitehall a First Lord and a First Sea Lord who, accepting their responsi- bility, mobilised the Fleet before war was actually declared, thus securing for us inestimable advantages, as, I hope, I have demonstrated in my record of the Grand Fleet. The years of strenuous work and training carried out by the officers and men of the Fleet, which should never be forgotten, had made of it a magnificent fighting machine, and bore ample fruit during the war. The Germans, in creating their Fleet, followed generally the British lead. In this book reference is made to the general efficiency of the German Navy and of the good design and fine equipment of their ships. These points were never questioned by British naval officers, and the shameful surrender of the host of the German ships in 1918 did not alter the opinions previously formed. That surrender was the result of broken moral. More than a hundred years after the Battle of Trafal- gar, and after a century of controversy, the Admiralty considered it desirable to appoint a committee to decide whether that action was fought in accordance with the original intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, as em- x PREFACE bodied in his famous Memorandum. It is hoped that the facts recorded in this book, and the comments accompanying them, constitute a clear statement of the making of the Grand Fleet and the manner in which it endeavoured, whilst under my command, to fulfil its mission. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I Twe Opentnc or tHE WaR ..... . 1 II Genera Navat Stratecy In Home Waters’ 12 III Tse Granp Freet anpItsBases .. . . 34 IV Decnarationor Wark... .... . 88 V Tue Supmarine aND Mine MENACE IN THE Norto Sra ...... . . . . 105 VI Inciwents at Sza—NovemBer 1 to DECEMBER SIs 9A we ae ee Ow we Oe ee TS VII THe Doacerr Bank AcTION . . . . . . 187 VIII German Mines AND SUBMARINES... 221 TX Controtuinc THE NortHSeaA . . . . . 249 X Arrempts to Entice THE;ENEMy To ACTION . 264 XI Tue Navat Srrvation In May, 1916 . . . 300 XIT Tue BatttrorJutnanp . . . . . . . 304 XIII Tue Battie or Jurnann (continued). . . . 341 XIV Tue Bart.e or Jurann (continued). . . . 370 XV _ REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE oF JUTLAND . . 390 XVI Tue Lessons or Experience; Lorp KitcHENER’sS FAREWELL. . . .. .. .. . « 415 XVII Tue SupMaRINE Peri TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; ReEcALL TO THE ADMIRALTY . . . . . «445 AppenpiIx] . . . . 1. 1 6 © ee 468 AppenpixII. . ....... . +. 490 ILLUSTRATIONS ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE, OF Scapa, G. C. B.,O.M., G. C. V. O. Frontispiece FACING PAGE DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE First OccaAsION OF A SUBMARINE Brine Reportep InsipE Scapa FLow Tue First OpstrRuctIon aT Scapa Fiow . Smoke ScREEN Mapr By DESTROYERS .... . A Dummy Bartuesuip, Marcy, 1915... .. . Toe ComMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (CommoporeE LioneL Hatsey), AND THE Fiag Liev- TENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT FITZHERBERT) on Boarp H.M.S. [Ron DUKE . Tue Bartte or JuTLAND as Depicrep By A GERMAN Antist (colour). 2. 2. 1. 1 we ee H.M.S. Tron DUKE anpD 83RD DIvIsION OF THE BATTLE FiLeet DEPLOYING AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND H.M.S. Jron DUKE Openine Fire at tHE BATTLE OF JUTLAND H.M.S. SuPerB OreninG FIREAT THE BaTTLEOF JUTLAND xiii 28 28 68 68 96 336 342 346 366 PLANS AND DIAGRAMS PLANS PLAN FACING PAGB 1. Scapa Fhow AND THE ORKNEYS. . . . . . . = 48 9, AREA OF OPERATIONS OF 10TH CRUISER SQUADRON . 74 3. Typtcan SwHEp, SEPTEMBER 8TH-l1TH, 1914. . . 128 4, APPROXIMATE Dispositions, OcTOBER 3RD-11 TH, 1914, Wuttst Canapian Convoy Was Crossine . . 188 5. Movements oF FLEET, JANUARY 23RD-25TH, 1915 . 196 6. OPERATIONS OFF Horn Reer, May 2np-5TH, 1916 . 290 7. OPERATIONS OF BatTLE CRUISER FLEET, 2 P.M. TO 6.15 p.m., May 31st, 1916... ..... =. 816 8. AppRoxIMATE Position oF SHips OF GRAND FLEET, 6.45 p.M., May 31st, 1916 . . . . . . . 850 9. APPROXIMATE PosiTION OF SHIPS OF GRAND FLEET, 7.15 p.m., May 31st, 1916 . . . . . . . 858 DIAGRAMS DIAGRAM 1. Berore aND ArrerR DEPLOYMENT OF THE BaTtLE FLEET, May 3ist, 1916. 2. SHowine AN Imacinary DEPLOYMENT ON THE STARBOARD Wine Cotumn. 3. BattLe oF JUTLAND, MovEMENTS OF BaTTLE FLEET AND Battte CRUISERS. 4. Operations Durine tHE Nigut or May 3l1st-JuUNE 1st, AND ON JUNE Ist, 1916. xiv THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 CHAPTER I THE OPENING OF THE WAR Ek y in 1914, whilst serving at the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord, I had been offered and had accepted the com- mand of the Home Fleets, which in the ordinary course would have become vacant in the following December on the expiration of Admiral Sir George Callaghan’s term of command, and public announcement was made of the intended appointment. Sir George Callaghan was my senior by seven years, and he and I had served together in China fourteen years before, when I was Flag Captain to Admiral—afterwards Admiral of the Fleet—Sir Edward Seymour. He had since had what is probably a unique period of sea service, passing from one appointment to another without an interval of half pay. Soon after his promotion to flag rank he had become Rear-Admiral in the old Channel Fleet; thence he had gone on to the 5th Cruiser Squadron in 1907; two years later he became second in command in the Mediterranean, and on the expiration of his term there, in 1910, he returned to take up the appointment of Vice-Admiral commanding the Second Division of the Home Fleets, succeeding to the position of Commander- in-Chief in 1910. The usual period for which the Com- mander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet was supposed to fly 1 2 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 his flag was two years, but in 1913 the Admiralty, accurately interpreting the sentiment of the whole Service, extended Sir George Callaghan’s appointment. And it was the approaching termination of this further period of command—to the regret of the Admiralty, for which I can speak from personal knowledge, and to the regret also of the officers and men of the Home Fleets—which led to my nomination in the spring of that year. In the latter part of July, when the situation in Europe. had assumed a threatening aspect, Mr. Churchill, the First Lord, informed me that in the event of hostilities occur- ring involving this country, it was considered necessary that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets should have the assistance of a second in command, and he added that I had been selected for the appointment, and it was desired that I should arrange with Sir George as to the ship in which I should fly my flag. Sir George Callaghan visited the Admiralty very shortly afterwards, and it was decided between us that the battleship Centurion should be my flagship. We discussed the slight reorganisation that this would involve in the Fleet, and I selected my staff, which comprised: Captain R. W. Bentinck as Chief of the Staff; Lieut. H. Fitzherbert as Flag Lieutenant; Lieut.-Commander E. Hardman Jones as Signal Officer; Lieut.-Commander R. L. Nicholson as Wireless Officer; Lieut.-Commander (N.) A. F. B. Carpenter as War Staff Officer, and Fleet Paymaster H. H. Share as Secretary. On July 28th, with no premonition of coming events, I was present at a dinner party given by Lord Morley at the United Services Club. The party was interesting, as it comprised Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, Mr. Churchill, Lord Haldane, Lord Bryce, and others who figured later prominently in the War. THE OPENING OF THE WAR 3 During the two following days conferences took place at the Admiralty as to the disposition of the Fleet, etc., and, in view of the threatening political situation, the work of demobilisation after the King’s inspection at Spithead and the subsequent short fleet exercises were suspended, pending further developments. I met Lord Kitchener, who was about to return to Egypt, on one or two occasions at the Admiralty during these days. On July 30th I turned over the duties of Second Sea Lord, which I had discharged since December, 1912, to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton, K.C.B., and made my final preparations for joining the Fleet as second in command. I spent some hours at the Admiralty on the following day, and during a conversation with Mr. Churchill and the Marquis of Milford Haven, the then First Sea Lord, it was intimated to me that, in certain circumstances, I might be appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to Sir George Callaghan. This intimation came upon me as a great surprise, and I protested against such an appointment being made on what might possibly be on the very eve of war. Nothing definite was settled. I left, however, with the impression that the change was not one that had been finally decided upon, but that it might take place. I left London the same night by the mail train for Wick, the Commander-in-Chief having informed me that he would send a vessel to meet me there. The idea that the change might be made occupied my thoughts during the journey to the North. As I thought over the possibility of a transfer of command at such a moment, the stronger appeared the objections. During the ensuing forty-eight hours I sent several telegrams to both the First Lord and the First Sea 4 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 Lord on the subject. I dwelt strongly upon the danger of substituting, at such a juncture and at such short no- tice, an admiral who was not in touch with the Fleet, for a Commander-in-Chief with long experience of the Com- mand. I mentioned, also, the strong feeling of admira- tion and loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief that existed, and suggested as an alternative that I should act as his assistant on board the Fleet-Flagship. I had in mind that I might act somewhat in the capacity of his Chief of the Staff. In spite of the First Lord’s reiterated opinion, my views remained unaltered, although it did not occur to me that some anxiety might be felt that Sir George Callaghan’s health would not stand the strain of commanding the Fleet in the event of war. That, however, was a matter on which the Admiralty would be better informed than myself, and I had no hesi- tation in urging the opinions expressed in my successive telegrams. A thick fog prevailed at Wick, and the Boadicea, the ship in which I made the passage to Scapa Flow, was not able to leave until late in the forenoon of August 2nd, and arrived at Scapa Flow in the afternoon. When I reported myself to the Commander-in-Chief, the knowledge of the event which was apparently impending made the interview both embarrassing and painful, as I could see that he had no knowledge of the possibility of his leaving the Fleet, and obviously I could not tell him. We discussed various arrangements, including the question of the defence of Scapa Flow, for which tem- porary but naturally inadequate measures were being energetically taken with the limited resources at the dis- posal of the Fleet. At about 4 a.m, on August 4th, I received Admiralty THE OPENING OF THE WAR 5 orders to open a secret envelope which had been handed to me in the train as I was leaving London, by an officer from the Admiralty. This envelope contained my appointment as “Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet”—a new designation which must be explained later. On this order I was obliged to act, and I proceeded on board the Iron Duke and found that the Commander- ‘in-Chief had received orders to turn over the command to me. Sir George Callaghan had been my Commander-in- Chief during my command of the 2nd Battle Squadron. He was, in addition, a personal friend, and I, like all those with whom he had been in contact, had the most profound respect and admiration for him. The idea of taking over his command at the moment of his life naturally caused me feelings of the greatest pain, and, moreover, it was impossible to dismiss the fear that the Fleet might con- clude that I had been in some measure responsible for the change. This possibility had, of course, been present in my mind from the moment I left London, and it appeared to add to the objections to a change of com- mand at such a juncture, since any idea of this nature prevalent in the Fleet must affect the feeling of loyalty to me as the new Commander-in-Chief. It is unnecessary to dwell on the matter, but I cannot close this portion of my narrative without paying a warm tribute to the manner in which Sir George accepted the Admiralty decision, which obviously came as a great shock to him. He behaved, as always, as a most gallant officer and gentleman, and his one desire was to make the position easy for me, in entire disregard of his own feelings. It was decided that I should take over the Command 6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 on the following day, but a telegram having been received from the Admiralty ordering the Fleet to proceed to sea at once, I returned to the Iron Duke, and Sir George Callaghan arranged to leave the Fleet in the Sappho before its departure at 8.30 in the morning. At that hour I took over the Command from Sir George Callaghan, who then struck his flag. The following ten or fourteen days were a period of great strain and anxiety. To assume so heavy a responsi- bility as the command of the Grand Fleet at such short notice on the eve of war was in itself a matter not to be taken lightly; it became necessary to gather together the strings of the whole organisation, to ascertain the dispositions already made and those immediately required, and the whole problem was largely complicated by the fact that the port on which the Fleet was based was open to attack both by destroyers and by submarines, the only obstacle to such attack being the navigational difficulties of the Pentland Firth. Though considerable, these were by no means insuperable. Added to this was my feeling of deep regret at super- seding a valued chief and friend at such a moment. The one thing that helped me through this period was the great and most loyal assistance rendered to me by the staff of Sir George Callaghan, who, notwithstanding their intense personal regret at his departure, gave me their very warm support, and concealed from me any trace of the feelings which they must have experienced at my presence amongst them under such exceptional and try- ing conditions. They behaved as naval officers always behave—in a true spirit of comradeship. The same may be said of the flag officers and captains in the Fleet, and indeed of every officer and man. Sir George Callaghan left his whole staff with me, with THE OPENING OF THE WAR 7 the exception of his flag lieutenant, who accompanied him to London. This staff included: Commodore A. F. Everett, C.B., Captain of the Fleet; Captain R. N. Lawson, Flag Captain; Commander Roger Backhouse, C.B., Flag Commander; Fleet Paymatser C. F. Pollard, C.B., Secretary; Commander the Hon. Matthew Best, War Staff Officer; Commander R. W. Woods, Signal Officer; Lieut.-Commander J. S. Salmond, Wireless Officer; Lieut.-Commander R. M. Bellairs, War Staff Officer; Lieut. W. D. Phipps, Signal Officer.* When it became certain that I was to take command of the Fleet, I asked the Admiralty to appoint Rear- Admiral Charles Madden as Chief of the Staff; and I was thus able to transfer Captain R. W. Bentinck to act as Chief of the Staff to Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, the next senior flag officer in the Fleet. The composition of the Grand Fleet was: Fleet-Flagship—H.M.S. Iron Duke. Attached Ships—H.M.S. Sappho, H.M.S. Oak. BATTLE FLEET Ist Battle Squadron: Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B. (in command). Rear-Admiral H. Evan Thomas (2nd in command). Battleships Marlborough (Flag), St. Vincent (Rear Flag), Colossus, Hercules, Neptune, Vanguard, Collingwood, Superb, Bellona (attached Light Cruiser), Cyclops (repair ship) 2nd Battle Squadron: Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., K.C.B. (in command). * Later, Commodore L. Halsey, C.M.G., became Captain of the Fleet, Captain F. C. Dreyer, C.B., Flag-Captain; Gommander C. M. Forbes, Flag-Commander, and Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T. Weekes, Additional Secretary. 8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart. (2nd in command). Battleships King George V. (Flag), Orion (Rear Flag), Ajaz, Auda- cious, Centurion, Conqueror, Monarch, Thunderer, Boadicea (attached Light Cruiser), Assistance (repair ship). 4th Battle Squadron: Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, K.C.V.O. (in command). Battleships Dreadnought (Flag), Temeraire, Bellerophon, Blonde (attached Light Cruiser). 8rd Battle Squadron: Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, C.V.O. (in command). Rear-Admiral M. E. Browning (2nd in command). Battleships King Edward VII. (Flag), Hibernia (Rear Flag), Commonwealth, Zealandia, Dominion, Africa, Britannia, Hin- dustan, Blanche (attached Light Cruiser). Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron: Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir David Beatty (in command). Battleships Lion (Flag), Princess Royal, Queen Mary, New Zea- land. : 2nd Cruiser Squadron: Rear-Admiral the Hon. 8. Gough-Calthorpe (in command). Cruisers Shannon (Flag), Achilles, Cochrane, Natal. 3rd Cruiser Squadron: Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B. (in command). Cruisers Antrim (Flag), Argyll, Devonshire, Roxburgh. Ist Light Cruiser Squadron: Commodore W. E. Goodenough (in command). Light Cruisers Southampton (Flag), Birmingham, Lowestoft, Not- tingham. THE OPENING OF THE WAR 9 Destroyer Fiotiuuas Second Flotilla: Captain J. R. P. Hawkesley (in command in Active). Destroyers Acorn, Alarm, Brisk, Cameleon, Comet, Fury, Goldfinch, Hope, Larne, Lyra, Martin, Minstrel, Nemesis, Nereide, Nymphe, Redpole, Rifleman, Ruby, Sheldrake, Staunch. Fourth Flotilla: Captain C. J. Wintour (in command in Snift). Destroyers Acasta, Achates, Ambuscade, Ardent, Christopher, Cocka- trice, Contest, Fortune, Garland, Hardy, Lynz, Midge, Onl, Paragon, Porpoise, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Spitfire, Unity, Victor. Mine-Sweeping Gunboats: Commander L. G. Preston (in command). H.M. Ships Skipjack (S.O. Ship) (absent at first), Circe, Gossamer, Leda, Speedwell, Jason, Seagull. Shetland Patrol Force: Forward (Scout) and four destroyers of the River class. The above vessels formed the Fleet under the im- mediate command of the Commander-in-Chief at the outbreak of hostilities. In addition, there were in southern waters, and also under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, the following vessels: THE HARWICH FORCE This force, although an integral portion of the Grand Fleet, was based on Harwich. It was intended that it should join the Grand Fleet at sea, if possible, in the event of a fleet action being imminent, and for this reason it was included in the organisation of the Fleet for battle; but the force did not, in actual fact, ever so 10 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 join the Fleet, nor did I expect that it would be able to do so. At the outbreak of war it was commanded by Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt in H.M.C. Amethyst and comprised: 1st Flotilla Commanded by Captain W. Blunt in Fearless with 20 destroyers. 3rd Flotilla Commanded by Captain C. H. Fox in Amphion with 15 destroyers. Included also in the organisation of the Home Fleets, which Sir George Callaghan had commanded-in-chief, were the Second and Third Fleets: SECOND FLEET (under command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.). Fleet-Flagship Lord Nelson, Rear-Admirals Stuart-Nicholson and Bernard Currey (commanding Battle Squadrons). 5th Battle Squadron: Prince of Wales (Flag), Agamemnon, Bulwark, Formidable, Im- placable, Irresistible, London, Queen, Venerable. 6th Battle Squadron: Russell (Flag), Cornwallis, Albemarle, Duncan, Exmouth, V. engeance. 5th Cruiser Squadron: Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart (in command). Carnarvon (Flag), Falmouth, Liverpool. 6th Cruiser Squadron: Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant tin command), Drake, Good Hope, King Alfred, Levathan. THE OPENING OF THE WAR 11 (These last two Cruiser Squadrons were, however, broken up immediately, and the ships transferred to other duties. ) Minelayer Squadron, commanded by Captain M. H. Cobbe. H.M. Ships Naiad (S.O.’s ship), Andromache, Apollo, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Latona, Thetis. THIRD FLEET This Fleet comprised the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons, consisting of our oldest battleships, and the 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Cruiser Squadrons, com- prising our oldest cruisers. But the only vessels of this Fleet which were ever associated with the Grand Fleet were the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which, under the command of Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, joined the Grand Fleet shortly after the outbreak of war, the Squadron being employed mainly on blockading duties. It was com- posed as follows: Crescent (Flag), Edgar, Endymion, Gibraltar, Grafton, Hanke, Royal Arthur, Theseus. All submarines, except those of the B and C classes which were detached for the protection of our coast and ports from Rosyth southwards, were worked, in accord- ance with Admiralty policy, from Harwich, and were not, therefore, under my command. The C class submarines were unfit for oversea work, and our operations in enemy waters were therefore confined to boats of the D and E classes, of which we possessed a total of 8 D’s and 9 E’s, as against the German total of 28 boats of the U class. CHAPTER II GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS Ir is hardly surprising if the work and purpose of the Navy had somewhat faded from public interest durmg the century that had elapsed since the Napoleonic Wars, the last occasion on which the inhabitants of this country had felt that their safety depended on maritime power. Indeed, it had fallen to the lot of a distinguished officer in a foreign navy, Captain Mahan, to awaken interest in this matter, and to point out the all-important influence which Sea Power had exerted, and would exert, on history. Associations such as the Navy League had been formed, having as their object the enlightenment of our countrymen, and although a great work was done in this direction, the mere necessity for such work is an indication of the extent to which the nation had forgotten the lessons of the past. I therefore offer no apology for making some refer- ence to the use and purpose of the British Navy. The main objects for which our Navy exists may be shortly summed up under four heads: 1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use of the sea, this being vital to the existence of an island nation, particularly one which is not self-supporting in regard to food. 2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic pressure to bear on our adversary by deny- 12 STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 13 ing to him the use of the sea, thus compell- ing him to accept peace. 3. Similarly in the event of war to cover the passage and assist any army sent overseas, and to protect its communications and sup- plies. 4, To prevent invasion of this country and its overseas Dominions by enemy forces. The above objects are achieved in the quickest and surest manner by destroying the enemy’s armed naval forces, and this is therefore the first objective of our Fleet. The Fleet exists to achieve victory. But history has always shown that it is a very difficult matter to impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary, and that, instead of giving us the opportunity of destroy- ing his armed naval forces, he usually keeps the main body of those forces—the Battle Fleet—in positions of safety in fortified harbours, where they are a constant threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval Power, and force upon that Power a watching policy so that the enemy may be engaged, should he put to sea, before he is able to gain any advantage. The watching policy in the great wars of the Napoleonic era was carried out by keeping our squadrons, through fair or foul weather, in the vicinity of those ports of the enemy in which his fleet lay. Occasionally our ships were driven off by stress of weather, but they regained their stations as soon as conditions permitted. During this war, however, the advent of the submarine and destroyer, and, to a lesser extent, the use of the mine rendered such dispositions impossible. No large ship could cruise constantly in the vicinity of enemy bases without the certainty that she would fall an early victim to the attacks of submarines. Destroyers 14 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 could, it is true, afford some measure of protection, but destroyers have a very limited range of action, and could not keep the sea off the enemy’s distant coast even in good weather for a sufficient length of time. Periodical relief of the destroyers was an impossibility, owing to the great numbers that would be required for this purpose. Moreover, even if the submarine danger could be over- come, the heavy ships would be so open to attack by. enemy destroyers at night, if cruising anywhere near enemy bases, that they would certainly be injured, if not sunk, before many days had passed. These facts had been recognised before the War and a watching policy from a distance decided upon, the watch’ being instituted for the purpose of preventing enemy vessels from gaining the open sea, where they would con- stitute a danger to our sea communications. Now a watch maintained at a distance from the port under observation is necessarily only partial, except in circumstances where the enemy has to pass through narrow straits before gain- ing open water. The chances of intercepting enemy ships depend entirely on the number of watching vessels and the dis- tance that those on board them can see. At night this distance is very short—on a dark night not more than a quarter of a mile, and even in daylight, under the average conditions of visibility obtaining in the North Sea, it is not more than six to eight miles. The North Sea, though small in contrast with the Atlantic, is a big water area of about 120,000 square miles in extent. The width across it, between the Shetland Islands and Norway (the narrowest portion), is 160 miles, and an additional 40 miles (the Fair Island Channel) would need to be watched also if a patrol were established along this line. STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS | 15 A consideration of all the circumstances had led to the adoption by the Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the Admiralty had determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in the event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that the Grand Fleet would control the North Sea, and that the Channel Fleet would watch the English Channel, thus, in combination, holding the enemy’s main force. To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main Batile Fleet should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a strategic position in the North Sea where it would act in support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying out sweeps to the southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be favourably placed for bringing the High Sea Fleet to action should it put to sea. This policy of cruiser sweeps had been adopted as the result of experience in the various naval manceuvres carried out in previous years in the North Sea. These had demonstrated quite clearly that the alternative policy of stretching cruiser patrol lines across the North Sea for the purpose of watching for the enemy was an impracticable one, it having been shown on many occa- sions that evasion of a single patrol line during the hours of darkness, or even daylight, under the conditions of visibility that usually prevail in the North Sea, is a very simple matter. Further, a line of cruisers occupying regular patrol positions is always in peril of successful submarine attack; the loss of the cruisers Hogue, Cressy and Aboukir showed this. It is also open to a concen- trated attack by surface vessels. The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet were based, therefore, on this general idea, and when the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea in com- pliance with Admiralty orders at 8.30 a.m. on August 16 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 the 4th, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying out this general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the com- mand of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in the Channel in accordance with the general strategic dispositions. The vessels engaged in this first move of the Grand Fleet comprised the Ist, 2nd, 38rd and 4th Battle Squad- rons, with their attached cruisers; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with its Light Cruiser Squadron, strengthened by the addition of the Falmouth and Liverpool; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. These dispositions continued in force for some three weeks, when the strong influence of the submarine on naval strategy began to make itself apparent. The ideas held in pre-War days as to the capabilities of submarines were found, after a short experience of war, to need modification. In the first place, it became quickly apparent that the German submarines possessed a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably greater than those of our own submarines. It had been, for instance, looked upon as a considerable achievement for our submarines to keep the sea for a period of five to seven days, and they had not operated at any great dis- tance from the coast. It is true that submarines had on occasion made long voyages such as to Australia, but they were then usually escorted, or even towed, and the number of days from port to port did not approach the length of time for which German submarines remained at sea. Further, it was known that the Germans pos- sessed a considerable superiority in the number of sub- marines which were capable of operating overseas, and the frequent sighting of enemy submarines as far north as the Orkney and Shetland Islands early in the War, combined with the fact that it appeared that the enemy STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS | 17 had established a regular submarine patrol in the centre of the North Sea, made it evident that the German sub- marines would constitute a very serious menace to our heavy ships. The comparative strength in submarines in Home Waters at the outbreak of war was as follows: German— U Boats 28 of which U 1 to U 4 were hardly fit for oversea work, but were as good as our D class. British— of which D,1 was unreliable and the remaining D Class 8 units of the D class were not equal to the U boats. E Class 9 C Class 34 B Class 3 The Germans also had at least 24 submarines under construction, whilst we were building 19, apart from two experimental vessels of which nothing resulted. Of these 19 submarines, several were of new type, in pursuance of a policy introduced by the Admiralty in 1913-14 of widening the area of supply of these vessels. This policy had far-reaching and beneficial results on the subsequent output of this class of vessel, as it enabled us to increase our submarine flotillas more rapidly than would otherwise have been the case. A change in previous naval practice was considered necessary at an early period, because vessels moving at anything but high speed, particularly in the case of a number of ships in company, ran very considerable risks in waters where we might expect enemy submarines to be operating, unless screened by a strong force of destroyers. This conclusion affected the movements and operations of the Battle Fleet, since the number of destroyers we Unfit for oversea work and used only for local de- fence of the coast or in the Channel. 18 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 possessed was quite inadequate to form a screen for a Battle Fleet and a Battle Cruiser Squadron which con- stantly kept the sea. The number required, for such a screen to be effective, was at least 40 for the Battle Fleet alone as then constituted, and that number, 40, was all that we had stationed at the Northern Base. The fuel capacity of destroyers was only sufficient for them to remain at sea in company with a fleet for some three days and nights, whereas the Fleet itself could remain out for three or four times that period. Moreover, the destroyers could not be kept nearly so constantly at sea as the large ships owing to their requirements in the way of boiler- cleaning and the refit and adjustment of their more delicate machinery, and the necessity for giving not only the machinery, but the personnel, periods of rest. ‘The heavy ships, then, had two alternatives, either to remain at sea without a destroyer screen or to return to harbour with the destroyers. In the early days the first alternative was adopted, the risk being accepted, but minimised as far as possible, by keeping the ships in the northern part of the North Sea. A further danger soon made itself apparent. It became evident at an early period, as many naval officers had expected, in view of German language at the Hague Conference, that our enemy intended to throw overboard the doctrines of international law when he could gain any advantage by doing so. He accordingly pro- ceeded at once to lay mines in positions where he thought they would be advantageous to his operations, in utter dis- regard of the safety, not only of British, but also of neutral merchant ships. It was, therefore, thought very probable that he would elaborate this practice by laying mines in the North Sea in positions where he anticipated they might prove effective against the Grand Fleet, and that he would STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS | 19 do this without issuing any warning to neutral countries. Consequently, if the main Battle Fleet were kept moving continuously in the central and southern waters of the North Sea, in which waters the enemy could easily lay mines with little danger of his operations being witnessed (as he could carry them out under cover of darkness), it was evident that considerable risks might be in- curred without our being aware of the fact. The policy of attrition of our Battle Fleet might thus be carried out with such success as to produce equality, or even inferiority, on the part of the British Fleet as compared with the German, in a comparatively short space of time. The only safeguard against such action which we could take would be to keep mine-sweepers constantly working ahead of the Battle Fleet. But the number of mine- sweepers that we possessed was wholly inadequate for such a task; and even if this had not been so, to carry out such an operation would have necessitated the speed of the Battle Fleet being reduced to some 10 knots, the maximum sweeping speed of mine-sweepers, and it would have been forced also to steer a steady course without zigzagging, conditions rendering the battleships exceed- ingly vulnerable to submarine attack. The first effect, therefore, of the submarine menace, combined with possible German action in regard to mine- laying, was to cause the Battle Fleet to confine its move- ments wnder ordinary conditions to the more northern waters of the North Sea, where the risk might be taken of cruising without the presence of a screen of destroyers, and where it was improbable, owing to the depth of water and the distance from enemy bases, that the Germans would be able to lay mines without discovery. The fact that this course of action would be forced upon us as the submarine and destroyer menace grew had 20 THE GRAND FLEET, 1r914-1916 often been present in my mind in pre-War days, when I had expressed the view that the beginning of a naval war would be a conflict between the small craft, whilst the larger and more valuable vessels were held aloof. I have no doubt that this opinion was very generally held by officers of experience. The northward movement of the Battle Fleet was combined with the establishment of certain cruiser patrol areas in the North Sea. ‘These areas, which were pur- posely made large, were watched on a regular, organised plan by our Cruiser Squadrons, moving at fairly high speed in such a manner as to reduce the submarine risk to the cruisers to a minimum, whist at the same time they kept as effective a watch as possible, first, to intercept German war vessels that might be covering a raid on our coasts or transports, or trying to reach the open sea to operate against trade, and, secondly, to ensure that all merchant ships entering or leaving the North Sea should be closely examined in order to enforce the blockade. This patrol policy was associated with periodical sweeps of cruisers, supported by the Battle Fleet, down into the southern waters of the North Sea, the object being to catch the enemy’s fleet at sea, if possible, and in any case, owing to our movements being probably re- ported to the Germans by neutral merchant ships, to make them feel that they could never move a force to sea without the possibility of encountering our Fleet engaged in one of these southern sweeps, which we car- ried out at irregular intervals. A typical sweep is illus- trated in accompanying plans. On these occasions the Battle Fleet was kept strictly concentrated during the southern movement, and was screened as far as possible by destroyers against submarine attack; and at times mine-sweepers were directed to work ahead of the Battle STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS a1 Fleet. When this was not possible, owing to the small number of mine-sweepers available or the state of the weather, some of the older battleships of the 6th Battle Squadron, if they were in company, were stationed ahead of the main Battle Fleet in order that, should a minefield be encountered, these older ships would be the first to strike the mines, thus giving sufficient warning to enable me to manceuvre the more valuable ships clear of the field. This general policy was continued until the attack on the Theseus and loss of the Hawke, belonging to the 10th Cruiser Squadron, by submarine attack on October 15th, 1914, showed that even under the disposi- tions then adopted, our larger cruisers were being risked to too great an extent when working without destroyers in the central part of the North Sea. The next move, therefore, was the withdrawal of the cruiser patrols to a safer position farther to the northward and eastward of the Shetland Islands, this being com- bined with a watch by the smaller craft on the Fair Island Channel, and on the Pentland Firth approaches to the North Sea. Under these conditions the Battle Fleet was often kept either in a position westward of the Orkneys, where it was in support of the cruisers and at the same time formed a second blockade line, or it cruised to the north and east of the Shetland Islands, the cruiser patrols working farther south. In all the dispositions which were made for a watch on the northern entrance to the North Sea, the principle kept in mind was the necessity for such an organisation of the patrols as to have, in so far as numbers permitted, two lines, or two areas, watched. The two areas were at such a distance apart that vessels moving in or out of the North Sea were forced, so far as all human fore- 22 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 sight could provide, to pass through the waters occupied by one of the two groups of ships during daylight hours; the distances apart were regulated according to the length of the night at the different seasons of the year. As the Battle Fleet worked farther to the northward and westward, it became possible to make use of the heavy ships to assist in blockade work without running undue risks from submarines, and the blockade increased correspondingly in effectiveness. As time went on, how- ever, the provision by the Admiralty of a larger number of armed merchant cruisers enabled us to establish an effective blockade line by the use of these vessels alone, backed up by Cruiser Squadrons when such were available. The withdrawal of the Battle Fleet to more northern and western waters first took effect when the Fleet Base was shifted temporarily from Scapa to Lough Swilly. When this occurred, it did not affect the policy of fre- quent cruiser sweeps into the southern portion of the North Sea, supported by the Battle Fleet, which were still continued. The dispositions that have been described took account naturally of two other very important factors. The first was the transport of our Expeditionary Force to France. It was highly probable that the enemy would endeavour to interfere with this movement, and in the early days of the War it would not have been a difficult matter for him to cause us some loss. His failure to make at least some attempt in this direction showed a lack of enterprise which surprised me, as I think it surprised most naval officers. The conditions for him were distinctly favourable. Our main Fleet was based, as he must have been aware, far away to the northward, and if he had timed an attack on the cross-Channel traffic for a period during which he STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 23 reckoned that the Grand Fleet, or at least the destroyers, were returning to the base to fuel, he would have stood a good chance of making the attack and returning to his base before that Fleet could intervene. Consequently, he would only have had to deal with the comparatively light forces based in southern waters. On the other hand, if our Fleet arrived on the scene without destroyers, the Germans would have possessed no mean advantage. The enemy was provided with a large number of modern destroyers, and some of them would have been well expended over a Channel dash, which would in all probability have met with some success. During the transport of the Expeditionary Force the heavy ships of the Grand Fleet kept the sea as far as possible in order to cover the movement, but the destroyers were constantly returning to the base to fuel. The second factor which had considerable influence on Fleet dispositions was the possibility of an attempt at a raid or invasion by the enemy. Such a move was not very likely in the earliest days of the War, when the nights were comparatively short and the Expeditionary Force had not left the country. It is also probable that the enemy had few troops to spare for the purpose. But the chances became greater as we denuded the country of men, and the conditions in other respects became more favourable. In October and November, 1914, I held and expressed the opinion that, if raids were attempted, landings would probably be effected in the rivers on the East Coast, the entrances to which were either unpro- tected or inadequately protected. A beach landing on our East Coast can only be carried out in fine weather, and the chances of encountering favourable conditions on arrival off the coast are not great, and I always doubted the attempt being made. In our rivers the opportunities 24 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 are greater, and are not so dependent on fine weather, and I suggested to the Admiralty that a simple preventive in this case was to place merchant ships in position ready to be sunk across the channels (which are narrow and shallow), the ships being fitted with explosive charges below ready to blow out the bottoms in case of necessity. I mentioned the names of certain retired naval officers who, I felt certain, would make all the necessary prepara- tions in a very few days. I believe that my proposals were carried out. The danger of raids, however, and the consequent responsibility thrown upon the Admiralty for their pre- vention, during a period when we had very little military force in the country, led to a division of the Fleet by Admiralty direction, which, however necessary, had cer- tain disadvantages from a strategic point of view. The 8rd Battle Squadron, consisting of eight ships of the “King Edward VII.” class, and the 8rd Cruiser Squadron of four ships of the “County” class, were or- dered to be based on Rosyth, together with destroyers for screening purposes. The eventuality that had then to be faced was that of the remainder of the Grand Fleet having to engage the High Sea Fleet, since concentra- tion with the 8rd Battle Squadron could probably not be effected without the risk of losing the opportunity of engaging. At this time the battle cruisers Princess Royal, In- vincible, and Inflewible were in the Atlantic operating against Von Spee’s squadron; and the Australia, Indomi- table had not joined the Grand Fleet. The Tiger was not yet ready, so that at times our battle cruiser force con- sisted of only three ships, the Lion, Queen Mary, and New Zealand. Throughout the War the responsibility of the Fleet STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 25 for the prevention of raids or invasion was a factor which had a considerable influence on naval strategy. If the Fleet, with destroyers, carried out a sweep in the North Sea, or if it was at sea for a cruise having exercises for its main object, there was bound to be present in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief the chance that he might be required suddenly to move south to en- gage the High Sea Fleet which had put to sea to cover a landing. If his destroyers were short of fuel at such a moment very serious consequences might ensue, and therefore all cruiser sweeps or other operations had to be curtailed to prevent such a situation arising. One other factor exercised a cramping effect upon our naval strategy throughout the War, namely, the bom- bardment of our undefended towns on the East Coast. Such bombardments were of no immediate military value to the enemy, but, in spite of the fact that the majority of the Press, and the public, realised that the Navy should not be led into false strategy because of these bombard- ments, it was difficult for the Fleet to ignore them, and I have no doubt that the Germans relied upon this fact. Whilst the Fleet was based at Scapa Flow, it was quite impossible to ensure that the enemy would be brought to action after such an operation, since to attain this end it would have been necessary for the Fleet, or a portion of it, to be constantly cruising in the southern portion of the North Sea. This was not practicable, even had it been desirable, because of the impossibility of keep- ing destroyers with the heavier ships, and in any case it was false strategy to divide the Battle Fleet, as such a course might well have resulted in disaster. The usual course adopted was to base the Battle Cruiser Fleet on Rosyth, and for that Fleet to cruise from that neighbourhood, The speed of the battle 26 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 cruisers enabled them to get away from a decidedly superior enemy force of battleships if encountered, but there was always some risk in this case of a ship being disabled; the flag officer in command would then have been faced with the unpleasant alternative of abandoning her or of risking his whole force to cover her retreat. Had we been able to keep an effective look-out off the enemy ports, so as to obtain warning of their ships leav- ing, the difficulty would not have been so great, but our submarines in those days (the only class of vessel which ‘could be used for such a purpose) were not fitted with wireless installations with which they could signal from the required positions, or indeed from positions any- where near the enemy’s coast, and, in any case, it must be borne in mind that at night the exit of enemy vessels unob- served, even under the conditions of a close submarine look-out, is a comparatively easy matter. At this stage it is convenient to remark upon the con- dition of British naval bases. As is well known, the Grand Fleet was moved to Scapa Flow during the latter days of July, 1914, and the defenceless condition of the Base, both against destroyer attack and submarine attack, was brought very .strongly into prominence by the pres- ence of so valuable a Fleet at this Base. The anchorage known as Scapa Flow has three main entrances navigable by all ships, the Hoxa, the Switha, and Hoy Channels, and, in addition, has some more narrow, shallow and tortuous entrances on the eastern side, the main one being Holm Sound. The question of providing gun defences for this Base, which the Ad- miralty had decided a year or two before the War was to be the main Fleet Base, had been discussed on more than one occasion, after examination by a committee of officers on the spot; but, since finance governs defence, STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 27 and the Admiralty from year to year had insufficient money for even more urgent needs, no action had been taken. Scapa Flow lies some 450 miles from the German naval bases, and was, therefore, open to an attack by enemy’s destroyer flotillas as well as, of course, by sub- marines. Its main, indeed its only, safety against such attacks by submarines lay in the navigational difficulties attendant upon entry into the harbour, combined, as re- gards destroyer attacks, with the possibility of an enemy’s force being intercepted on its outward or homeward passage, or of its being successfully engaged in the vicinity of the base. The sailing directions laid great stress upon the difficulties of navigations in the approaches to this Base, due to the very strong and varying cur- rents, but the Germans were well acquainted with the Orkney and Shetland Islands. They had indeed made it a practice to send ships to visit these islands fairly frequently before the War, and they were, therefore, as well able to judge of the difficulties of entry into Scapa Flow as we were; and seeing that we used it as a main Fleet Base, they could deduce the fact, if they did not know it already, that the difficulties of entry were not insuperable. Sir George Callaghan, under these conditions, on the arrival of the Fleet at Scapa Flow at the end of July, took immediate steps, with the resources at his disposal in the Fleet, to improvise defences for the Base against destroyer attack. All that he could do was to land some 12-pounder guns from the ships of the Fleet and mount them at the entrances. No searchlights could, however, be provided, so that the guns were not of much value at night. Arrangements were also made for placing light cruisers and destroyers at the various entrances to assist these defences. The further step, of course, was taken 28 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 when the Fleet was present at the Base of placing patrols to the eastward of the Pentland Firth. It was not felt in the Fleet, however, that these measures gave much security even against destroyer attack on a dark night, and, it gave no security whatever against submarine attack. Nothing but obstructions of some kind could give that security. The matter was frequently discussed. Although many brains had been at work, no satisfactory anti-sub- marine obstruction had been devised. Under the urgent pressure of war the solution was found. The conclusion generally held by experienced submarine officers was that, whilst the least important entrances, such as the Hoy, the Switha and the Holm Sound Channels, would be ex- tremely difficult for the passage of a submarine, entry by the Hoxa Sound Channel was quite practicable by a de- termined submarine officer. So much for the Base at Scapa Flow. At Cromarty the conditions were somewhat better. The only entrance to this Base is comparatively narrow, and was defended against the entry of destroyers and larger vessels by guns, which had been mounted by the Admiralty before war broke out. There was, however, no boom protection against the entry of destroyers, and the conditions in regard to submarine attack were the same as at Scapa Flow, there being no obstructions. At Rosyth the same conditions prevailed as at Cromarty, namely, the harbour was defended by guns only against attack by destroyers. In this case, the guns were manned by the military, and not by marines, as at Cromarty; again the harbour was quite open to sub- marine attack. Consequently, the anxiety of officers in command of Fleets or Squadrons at anchor in any of the Bases used by the Grand Fleet was immense. For my part, I was DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A SUBMARINE BEING REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 29 always far more concerned for the safety of the Fleet when it was at anchor in Scapa Flow during the exceed- ingly brief periods which were spent there for coaling in the early days of the War, than I was when the Fleet was at sea, and this anxiety was reflected in the very short time that the Fleet was kept in harbour. It was also the cause of my taking the Fleet to sea very hurriedly on more than one occasion owing to the reported presence of a submarine in the anchorage, and considerable risks were accepted in getting the Fleet to sea in very thick weather at night on at least one of these occasions. I have often wondered why the Germans did not make greater efforts to reduce our strength in capital ships by destroyer or submarine attacks on our bases in those early days. They possessed, in comparison with the uses for which they were required, almost a superfluity of destroyers, certainly a superfluity as compared with our- selves, and they could not have put them to a better use than in an attack on Scapa Flow during the early months of the 1914-1915 winter. In August, 1914, Germany had 96 destroyers in home waters fit for such an operation, all with a speed of, or exceeding, 30 knots, this number being in addition to a total of 48 more destroyers, rather smaller and with speeds varying between 26 and 30 knots, which were quite fit for work in the Baltic or in the vicinity of German bases in the North Sea. This country had in home waters at the same period only 76 destroyers that could be compared with the Ger- man vessels in view of modern requirements, and 33 of these had a speed of only 27 knots. Of the 76 destroyers, 40 were allotted to the Grand Fleet proper, the remaining 36 being based on Harwich. We had in addition 11 large and fast destroyers of the “Tribal” class which, owing to 30 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 their small fuel capacity, were only of use in southern waters and were appropriated to Dover. And we pos- sessed 25 destroyers of the “River” class, of a nominal speed of only 25 knots, as well as the old 30-knot de- stroyer; the latter class was only fit for patrol work in the vicinity of the coast. It may be said that similar reflections to those I have mentioned might be made by the Germans as regards our own movements, and that they were surprised that we did not attack their Fleet at anchor. The answer is obvious to those aware of the conditions. We were very short of destroyers for fleet work, and we were well aware of the thoroughness of the defences of the German naval bases. We knew that they not only possessed the most powerful and ample artillery defences, but we knew also that the Germans had a very efficient mining service, and we were justified in assuming that they had protected their naval bases by extensive minefields. We, on the other hand, were entirely unprovided with this particular form of defence. In view of the known quality of German artillery and mine defences and the thorough nature of their organisa- tion, my own view was that they also possessed, in all probability, anti-submarine defences. For these reasons, together with the important fact that the German rivers are so shallow that our submarines could not enter them in a submerged condition, it appeared to me that an attack on their ships in harbour would meet with no success, and that we could not afford to expend any of our exceed- ingly limited number of destroyers, or submarines, in making an attack which would, in all human probability, be foredoomed to failure. Later knowledge of the German defences proved the correctness of this view. I can only imagine that the Germans credited us, also, STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS — 31 with possessing harbour defences and obstructions which in our case were non-existent, although we did our best in the Fleet to give the impression that we had ob- structed the entrances, for, pending the provision of proper obstructions, we improvised various contrivances. It may have seemed impossible to the German mind that we should place our Fleet, on which the Empire depended for its very existence, in a position where it was open to sub- marine or destroyer attack. This view, however, did not relieve the minds of those responsible for the safety of our Fleet from the gravest anxiety whenever the more valuable ships were in the un- defended harbours. A comparison of numbers between the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet in the early part of the War shows the following figures. Only ships that had completed their training and were fit to fight in the line are included: BATTLESHIPS (B., British; G., German) Pre- - De- : Dread- Battle | Light Air- . Date noughts Ae cruisers |cruisers — ~ | ships comes August 4th, 1914 Be eii a eee eee 20 8 4 12 42 = 9 Gite dance ee 13 16 3 15 88 1 z October Ist, 1914 Bivcica’s strane neavers 20 12 6 12 42 _ 10 Giese eoRey 15 16 8 14 88 3 2 January Ist, 1915 Discs cor ehnsewae 21* 8 6 17 44 _ 14 Gites rs 16 16 4 12 88 6 1 April Ist, 1915 Becivevcvcecesss 23 8 9 18 54 _ 17 Grgeecrev es vsa0% 17 16 4 14 88 6 _- October Ist, 1915 Biggie ae aeks 25 10 10 25 66 _ 15 Gicesseae stax seve 17 16 4 15 88 12 _ * 21 completed, but two of these (Monarch and Conqueror) were seriously damaged and one other battleship was refitting. 32 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 The above list gives the vessels nominally available. In comparisons of the strength at Germany’s selected and our average moment, the following facts should be re- membered, and were necessarily taken into account by me at the time: (a) We usually had at least two battleships, one or two light cruisers, six destroyers, one or two cruisers, and per- haps one battle cruiser under refit, in addition to any other vessels that might be temporarily disabled. (b) Germany would see to it that none of her ships was refitting when planning an operation, and she could rein- force her Fleet by several light cruisers and two or more flctillas of destroyers from the Baltic. (c) The pre-Dreadnoughts were not a very important factor on either side owing to inferiority of speed, and, in the case of our ships, the comparatively short range of their guns, due to the small amount of elevation of which their mountings admitted. (d) The German Zeppelins, as their numbers in- creased, were of great assistance to the enemy for scouting, each one being, in favourable weather, equal to at least two light cruisers for such a purpose. (e) Account is not taken in the British figures of the Harwich force, as this force could not be counted upon to effect concentration with the remainder of the Grand Fleet at the German selected moment. (f) The British cruisers, not being very modern, lacked the speed necessary for efficiency as scouts. They were very slightly faster than the battleships of the “Dread- nought” type, and, owing to their lack of speed, they were awkwardly placed if they came within range of an enemy Battle Squadron or Battle Cruiser Squadron. On the other hand, they were very superior in fighting qualities to the German light cruisers. STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 33 It will be seen from the above statements that the enemy had by far his best opportunity from the naval point of view in the early months of the War, as he was then much nearer equality of strength with the Grand Fleet than at any later period. A carefully laid trap, which included minefields and submarines, with the High Sea Fleet as a bait, might have been very effective at any period of the War in inflicting considerable losses on us. The Germans had their best opportunities between November, 1914, and February, 1915. After April, 1915, the situation got steadily worse for the enemy. The lesson of vital importance to be drawn from this review of relative naval strength, is that if this country in the future decides to rely for safety against raids or invasion on the Fleet alone, it is essential that we should possess a considerably greater margin of superiority over a possible enemy in all classes of vessels than we did in August, 1914, CHAPTER III THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES Tue Grand Fleet may be said to have come into being only at the outbreak of the War, when it was so christened. As with the name, so with the organisation. The great majority of the really effective ships in the Grand Fleet were the outcome of the policy initiated by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone when he took up the appointment of First Sea Lord in 1904 in the Administration of the Earl of Selborne. One of Lord Fisher’s first acts—and he carried through a num- ber of other changes which reacted favourably on the efficiency of the Fleet for war—was the introduction of the “all-big-gun” type of battleship, of which the Dread- nought, laid down at Portsmouth on October 2nd, 1905, was the earliest example. She was closely followed by the three “all-big-gun” battle-cruisers of the “In- vincible” class, which were of the same programme —1905-6. Much criticism was levelled at _ the Dreadnought, but even more at the principle em- bodied in the battle-cruisers—ships with the speed of cruisers, but the same calibre armament as_battle- ships. The War has fully justified Lord Fisher’s conception. Our superiority in capital ships at the outbreak of war was due to the efforts of the Boards presided over by Lord Selborne and his successors from 1904 onwards, and Lord Fisher held the post of First Sea Lord for five and 34 GRAND FLEET AND BASES 35 a half years of that period. At the beginning of 1909, during Mr. McKenna’s tenure of office as First Lord, great efforts were necessary to ensure the maintenance of a sufficient standard of superiority in capital ships over Germany, and to make good our deficiencies in destroy- ers. The nation has good reason for the most profound gratitude to Mr. McKenna for the very strong attitude he assumed at this highly critical period. Reference to the table on page 31 will show the position that would have arisen if the four additional ‘““Dreadnoughts” had not been included in the 1909-10 building programme. In the later Administration, presided over by Mr. Churchill, continued efforts were necessary, and were made, and steps were also taken with a view to meet- ing the crying need for modern light cruisers; Lord Beresford had for some years been pointing out how essential it was to add largely to our programmes of light cruisers and destroyers. So much for construction in pre-War days when the Germans were carrying out their Navy Acts, one follow- ing the other in rapid succession. It is also of interest to note the part which Lord Fisher took in buildmg up the Fleet organisation that existed in 1914. He introduced the system of manning the older ships, not in the first line, with nucleus crews composed of the principal officers and ratings. These ships were thus rendered capable of being put, in a very short time, into a condition in which they were fit to fight. 'This system superseded the old arrangement, by which ships not in full commission were not manned at all. Although it naturally led to a reduction in the total number of fully-manned ships, a disadvantage which was minimised by reducing squadrons abroad, it is probably accepted now that in the circumstances existing at the 36 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 time the nucleus crew system is far preferable; it raised the general standard of the whole Navy in British waters, and facilitated the use of the Royal Fleet and Naval Re- serves on the outbreak of war. I.—Tue DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND FLEET In the organisation existing before the War, the Home Fleets comprised the First, Second and Third Fleets—in fact, practically all ships in home waters which it was intended to mobilise on the outbreak of war. The war organisation, as carried out, divided the Home Fleets into two parts. The First, the Grand Fleet, included the First Fleet, comprising the latest-built ships; the force stationed at Harwich; four ships of the 6th Battle Squadron; the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons from the Second and Third Fleets respectively; and the mine-laying Squadron from the Second Fleet. The Second, or Channel Fleet, included the older battleships, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons, the 5th and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, and a sweeping flotilla with torpedo boats. This force was commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney until the end of 1914, when he joined the Grand Fleet. It was independent of the Grand Fleet. Of the ships of the Channel Fleet, the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons and the 5th Cruiser Squadron were manned before mobilisation with nucleus crews, and were consequently partly trained; these ships assembled at Portland. The ships of the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons and 7th Cruiser Squadron were not manned until mobilisation, and the crews consequently required training. This training was carried out near Plymouth, GRAND FLEET AND BASES 37 and the battleships joined Sir Cecil Burney’s command on September 3rd, 1914. The ships of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were employed as a look-out force in the Straits of Dover during the time that the Channel Battle Fleet was patrolling to guard the passage of the Expeditionary Force. They were subse- quently ordered by the Admiralty to another service, and three of them, the Hogue, Cressy and Aboukir, were sunk whilst patrolling the Broad Fourteens off the Dutch coast. These, then, were the conditions when War opened. It was only natural that war experience should show very quickly the many directions in which we had to recast, or elaborate, our pre-War ideas, or to introduce new ar- rangements, Peace manceuvres, however useful, can never be a substitute for war experience. They are many factors which render peace manceuvres unreal. In the first place, the available ships have to be divided so as to form the opposing fleet, “an enemy”; secondly, a matter of far greater moment, the manceuvres occupy much too short a period, and many of the difficulties affecting both matériel and personnel are not experienced; thirdly, the conditions of war cannot be reproduced without serious inconvenience, and even danger, to merchant ships; finally, in our own manceuvres there was a tendency in the rules to give the torpedo less than its proper value as a fight- ing weapon. But, more than all, it was the conditions under which war broke out that made it necessary for us in the Grand Fleet to build up what was almost a new organisation. (a) The submarine had just become a most formidable weapon; its development during the War was extraordi- narily rapid. (b) The airship as a scout was in its infancv at the 38 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 start, but it also developed with great rapidity, as did the heavier-than-air machines. (c) The mine, neglected by us, had been highly de- veloped. by the enemy, both defensively and offensively. | (d) The effective range both of the gun and of the torpedo was quickly shown to be much greater than had been considered possible before the War.* (e) Wireless telegraphy developed with great rapidity, and was put to many uses not dreamt of in pre-War days. On the other hand, we were very fortunate in having the Fleet concentrated at the outbreak of war. People had often pictured war with Germany coming as a bolt from the blue, and even naval officers feared that when the occasion did arise, it would be found, as had previously been the case, that fear of precipitating a conflict might lead the Government to delay concentration with the re- sult that our squadrons would be separated when war was actually declared. Fortunately, the Admiralty in the last days of July, 1914, placed us at once in a strong strategic position. For this action the nation should be grateful to the First Lord and First Sea Lord. It was curious that, in spite of all the lessons of history, there was general expectation that a great Fleet action would at once be fought. No doubt this arose, partly, from the boastings of German naval officers in pre-War days, and partly from a knowledge of the great sacrifices the enemy would incur unless he could dispute effectively our command of the sea. Most people found it difficult to imagine that the High Sea Fleet (built at vast expense, and rightly considered by the enemy to be an efficient weapon of war) would adopt from the outset a *In pre-War days our Battle Practice had been carried out at a maximum range of about 9,500 yards, and only on one occasion, when the Colossus fired at a target ai 14,000 yards off Portland in 1912, had this range been exceeded. GRAND FLEET AND BASES 39 purely passive réle, with the inevitable result that Ger- man trade would be swept from the seas. But there were two factors tending to make the High Command adopt this course. First, there was the fear that action with the Grand Fleet would so weaken the High Sea Fleet as to cause the command of the Baltic to pass into Allied hands, with a consequent landing of Russian troops on German soil as the result. This fear had been present in the German mind ever since the days of Fred- erick the Great, when Russia threatened Berlin during the Seven Years’ War. The second point, no doubt, was that the German High Command realised that, if Germany adopted a defensive réle with her Fleet, it created, by far, the most difficult situation for us. Repug- nant as this might be to high-spirited German naval offi- cers, it was unquestionably the worst policy for us, for, whilst the German High Sea Fleet remained “in being” as a fighting force, we could not afford to undertake operations tending to weaken our Grand Fleet, particu- larly in the earlier period of the War when our margin of superiority at Germany’s “selected moment” was not great. The main disadvantage to the Germans, apart from their loss of trade, lay in the inevitable gradual weaken- ing of the morale of the personnel of the Navy, and it is highly probable that this loss of morale was in the end responsible for the series of mutinies which broke out in the High Sea Fleet during 1917 and 1918, culminating in the final catastrophe in November, 1918. In my view, the passive role was carried much too far. JIL.—Tue Starr ORGANISATION To pass to the development of the organisation. Almost the first question was that of Staff and Staff work. In the days before the War, the Staff of the Com- 40 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 mander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets consisted of the fol- lowing officers: (a) A Personal Staff, comprising a Flag-Commander, Flag-Lieutenant, and Secretary. The Flag-Captain was also, in a sense, on the Personal Staff. (b) A General Staff, comprising a Captain of the Fleet with his Secretary, a Wireless officer; a Signal offi- cer, and the clerical staff of the Secretary. In addition, the organisation provided for the appoint- ment of two War Staff officers, on mobilisation for war. This was the Staff which, together with an additional Signal officer, I found in the Iron Duke, on assuming com- mand of the Grand Fleet. It had always been my intention, on relieving Sir George Callaghan in December, 1914 (as was originally arranged before the War broke out, as I have explained), to add to the above, a Captain, for the operational side of the Staff, leaving the Flag-Captain responsible only for the Command of the Fleet-flagship, this being, in my opinion, sufficient work and responsibility to occupy his whole time; and I had prepared an organisation of the Staff of the Fleet-flagship in accordance with which the work should be divided into two distinct branches, the operations and the matériel side, each with a secretariat. I had communicated my views to the officers selected for the Staff. This, in my judgment, was the correct line for any Naval Staff organisation, and it was later introduced by me into the Admiralty Naval Staff. When informed, just prior to the declaration of War, that I might be required to take over the command of the Fleet, I decided to ask, as the first step, for the services of Rear-Admiral Charles E. Madden as Chief of the Staff. I had brought with me from London on my own Staff, as Second in Command of the Grand Fleet, a Captain GRAND FLEET AND BASES AI (Captain Bentinck), with the title of Captain on the Staff, a Secretary with assistants, a Flag-Lieutenant, a Signal officer, a Wireless officer, a War Staff officer, and a Signal Boatswain. These, with the exception of Cap- tain Bentinck (who joined Vice-Admiral Sir George War- render’s Staff), I took to the Iron Duke, and my Staff then comprised: A Rear-Admiral as Chief of the Staff. A Commodore as Captain of the Fleet. Two Secretaries, with the necessary clerical staff. A Flag-Lieutenant. Three Signal officers. Three Wireless officers (very soon reduced to two). Three War Staff officers. Two Signal Boatswains. A Fleet Coaling officer also joined the Staff. The main difficulty in providing a Flag officer afloat with a suitable staff is that of accommodation, and this difficulty was somewhat serious when I doubled the staff on board the Iron Duke. However, it was successfully overcome. The Staff was organised into two branches— Operations and Matériel—the former directly under the Chief of the Staff, the latter immediately under the Cap- tain of the Fleet. On proceeding to sea, however, the work of the Captain of the Fleet became, of necessity, very largely reduced, and he joined the operational side, arrangements being made by which either he or the Chief of the Staff was always on the bridge in my absence, as we soon found under the new conditions, consequent on the advent of the submarine as an important factor in naval warfare, that it was essential that an officer should be constantly on the bridge who could take immediate action in moving the Fleet, or any portion of it, as might be required, 42 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 Even so, the presence of the Commander-in-Chief was so frequently required, at a moment’s notice, owing to the swiftness with which a modern fleet moves, that I never left my sea cabin, which was under the bridge, to go to the after part of the ship when the Fleet was at sea, The duties of my Staff afloat were separated, as already stated, under two headings. This division, as is clear from the above remarks, affected their duties in harbour more than when at sea. In the latter case the two branches combined, and the whole staff became “opera- tional.” The Staff work under these conditions was carried out in the war-room, situated under protection, below the con- ning tower. Here the movements of our own ships were recorded, as well as those of the enemy until we were nearing contact. All intelligence was sent from the bridge to this centre by the Signal officers, and the situa- tion at any moment could be seen by a glance at the charts kept by the War Staff officer on duty. When we were nearing enemy vessels or enemy waters, the work was shifted from the war-room to the Ad- miral’s shelter on the bridge, so that the situation could be seen by me more readily; and finally, when, as on May 81st and August 19th, 1916, the two fleets were nearing touch with one another, the “plot” of the move- ments as reported was continually under my obser- vation. At ordinary times, in harbour, the Staff officers en- gaged on the operational side were following the move- ments of such enemy vessels (chiefly, of course, sub- marines) as were known to be at sea, as well as those of our own vessels. (In the latter case frequent orders to ships were necessary to ensure that they did not meet GRAND FLEET AND BASES 43 each other at night—when risk of collision would be in- curred owing to ships not carrying lights, or in thick weather.) They put into execution the orders given by myself or the Chief of the Staff, and were engaged in elaborating plans of future movements and drawing up the necessary orders for such movements as I had in contemplation. They were also engaged in arranging all gunnery, torpedo and other practices and exercises, and in the constant work of the production, revision and issue of orders for the organisation and tactical working of the Fleet. On the matériel side, the Staff work comprised that of storing, provisioning and fuelling the Fleet, all questions of instruction, training, personnel, discipline, mails, refits and repairs, etc. In action each member of the Staff had his own particular duty allotted to him. The secretaries took notes and recorded proceedings; certain officers had as their sole duty that of watching and reporting to me every movement of enemy vessels; one officer was detailed to attend solely to torpedo attacks made by the enemy, keeping me informed of their progress and of their pos- sibilities; another dealt with all questions relating to con- centration or distribution of fire, bringing to my notice any signals required to give effect to our preconceived arrangements; each signal officer had his own special duty, one being responsible that all signals for tactical move- ments made visually were also made by “short distance” wireless telegraphy. One wireless officer worked in the main office and one in the auxiliary office. The Staff was so organised as to leave the Commander-in-Chief free to take a comprehensive survey of the whole posi- tion, whilst ensuring that nothing that should be done was left undone. It must, however, be realised that the rapid- 44 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 ity of movement of fleets is so great that, at critical moments, the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet, or the Flag Officer Commanding a Squadron, must of necessity make instant decisions; there is no time for consultation or for advice. TII.—PREPARATION OF CRUISING ORDERS One of the earliest steps taken in organising the Grand Fleet after the declaration of War was to lay down defi- nitely the various cruising orders for the Battle Fleet and its “look-out” screen of battle-cruisers, cruisers and light cruisers. There had been much discussion for some years before the War as to the best disposition of cruisers ahead of a Battle Fleet. None of the arrangements that had been under discussion was adopted as a whole, but war experience led to a series of diagrams being drawn up giving the cruising stations of all the various classes of cruisers and other light craft under the different con- ditions that might exist. These included diagrams show- ing the cruiser disposition with the fleet moving towards enemy waters, under conditions of ordinary visibility, by day, or in low visibility by day, both with the Battle Cruiser Fleet in company and without it; a similar dia- gram when moving away from enemy water by day (this being to meet the possible case of an attempted attack by destroyers as the fleet steered away from enemy waters) ; diagrams were got out for steering towards or away from enemy waters at night; and, finally, dia- grams were prepared, both for day and night, for the dispositions of the cruisers and other light forces after an action. Several different cruising diagrams for the Battle Fleet itself, both by day and at night, were similarly drawn up. Some of these were specially designed to give GRAND FLEET AND BASES 45 such safety from submarine attack as was possible to the main body of the Fleet, in the not unlikely event of destroyers being absent, from bad weather, shortage of fuel, or other causes. The dispositions for use at night provided for the use of destroyer attack, and were de- signed to give safety from collision, due to squadrons inadvertently closing each other in the darkness, when showing no lights; this was a very possible event during the course of a long night when a very slight error in steering, or a slight difference in compasses, will rapidly bring two squadrons together that started the night five miles apart. It was necessary to keep squadrons separ- ated, as a long line of ships greatly facilitated successful submarine attack, whilst a slight dispersal of squadrons gave greater freedom of movement in the case of de- stroyer attack. At the same time it was necessary to provide for concentrating the Fleet quickly at daylight. The question of submarine screens was taken up at the commencement of war. This matter had naturally been considered before the War, but was in its earliest stages, and, although an efficient disposition of a screen of destroyers is a comparatively simple matter when there is no lack of destroyers, the case is different when a fleet is very short of the requisite number, as was our experience, and one destroyer had often to be dis- posed to endeavour to do the work of two. Diagrams of submarine screens were, therefore, drawn up to meet the different conditions resulting from the presence of varying numbers of destroyers, or a de- creased number of ships requiring to be screened, and also providing for the ships being in various formations. In November, 1916, the number of these diagrams was seventeen. Early in the War the danger of successful submarine 46 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 attack on warships at sea, whether in company or pro- ceeding singly, had impressed on us the necessity of taking every precaution for safety, and the practice of the fleet steering zigzag courses was devised and generally adopted in accordance with my directions. in the case of a fleet or squadron, the usual practice was to carry out the alterations of course by turning the ships together; occasionally the turn was made “in succession,” but this was exceptional. In small squadrons, the turns were occa- sionally made at fixed time intervals without signal. Zigzagging had a very beneficial effect on the manner in which officers of watches kept station in a fleet, since there is no better practice than keeping station on a line of bearing, a far more difficult matter to the novice than keeping station astern of another ship. I attribute the excellent manner in which the ships were handled in 1915 and 1916 very largely to this early experience. Much theoretical investigation was instituted to determine the method of zigzagging, both in a fleet and in a single ship, which gave the greatest protection against submarine at- tack, and actual experiments took place with our own submarines with a view to forming correct conclusions; the flag officers of the fleet rendered me much assistance in this as in all other matters. The experience of the Grand Fleet was utilised in the instructions subsequently issued to merchant ships, and the value of zigzagging in reducing the danger of sub- marine attack was clearly shown during the year 1917 by the comparative immunity of merchant ships that com- plied with the orders as compared with those that did not do so. Occasionally, of course, zigzagging brought a ship ‘into danger, but this was exceptional as compared with the general immunity given. When the convoying of merchant ships through GRAND FLEET AND BASES 47 the submarine zone was instituted in 1917, after I had returned to the Admiralty, the Grand Fleet experience was again of value in the preparation of instructions. The supremely important question of how best to handle in action the large and increasing Fleet en- gaged my attention from the commencement. In drawing up the various instructions for the conduct of the Fleet, both when cruising and in action, I availed myself of the advice and assistance of the experienced flag officers commanding the various Squadrons. Much discussion took place on these matters, and many of the dispositions adopted formed the subject of actual ex- periment at sea before being incorporated in the orders. The successful and rapid deployment of the Battle Fleet from its cruising formation was a matter of the greatest importance, and constant practice in carrying cut this manoeuvre under every varying condition was given to the Fleet when at sea. Various arrangements were introduced having as their object the simplification and shortening of the manceuvre, with a view to bringing the heaviest possible fire to bear on the enemy’s fleet as quickly as possible. Orders were drawn up to meet cases of deployment in thick weather, when the enemy might be sighted at short range, and immediate inde- pendent action by a divisional Flag Officer would be necessary. In the early part of the War the rapid deployment of the Fleet for action was complicated by the presence of the 8rd Battle Squadron of pre-Dreadnoughts—the ves- sels of the “King Edward VII.” class—as the speed of the ships of this squadron was some three knots less than that of the rest of the Battle Fleet. I endeavoured to solve this problem by practical experience. Much 48 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 depended on the tactics likely to be adopted by the enemy’s Battle Fleet. The main difficulty Jay in the fact that if the 8rd Battle Squadron was placed on one flank of the Battle Fleet when in cruising order and de- ployment towards that flank became necessary in con- formity with an enemy movement, thus placing the slow 8rd Battle Squadron in the van, the fleet speed of the whole Battle Line was necessarily reduced to some 14 knots, in order to have the necessary reserve of speed in hand. If, on the other hand, the 8rd Battle Squadron was placed in the centre of the Fleet, the Fleet speed was again reduced to that attainable by ;this squadron. It was desirable to devise a cruising order for the Battle Fleet which would admit of the 8rd Battle Squadron be- ing in the rear after deployment, in whichever direction deployment took place. There was still the objection, which had to be accepted, that a turn of 16 points forced upon us by the enemy would place this squadron in the van. The cruising order eventually adopted placed the pre- Dreadnought Squadron in rear of the Dreadnought Squadrons, with a view to the slow squadron turning in the opposite direction to the remainder on deployment, and eventually taking station in rear of the Dreadnought Fleet. This involved accepting some delay in getting the 3rd Battle Squadron into effective action. The question was not one of importance subsequent to April, 1915, from which date our superiority in battle- ships of the Dreadnought type was sufficient to give me confidence that the High Sea Fleet, engaged under suit- able conditions, could be crushed in action without the aid of the 8rd Battle Squadron; but during the winter of 1914-15, when our superiority in Dreadnoughts was frequently very slight, and the enemy possessed two pre- Rack ’ 20 Prohibited ing Anch+ruge |} hy pais 37 gory roman begs SN flr ee a = I been “aw w THURSO BAY a wo 6F oy 6 gma seein =a See plan PIres: Be Mopprpp AO hfnppe> pit cat Ss 2 wer a 27 Broug a h Bay PY aie | ttn L Ban pong mrewn beges Sth Tghtore aed oO = 6 ae r £ m a . “SCAPA FLOW = 7 * gs Sgt eh te on Op Sse ; fren ePagky oye fof Cave “ Fs i: _ Coby VILE 40rt vs, jae en ‘ir the Fleet aw KS? 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The Battle Orders indicated the position to be occupied by our battle-cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers on deployment, as well as that of the fast 5th Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, when that squadron joined the Fleet. The first Battle Orders drawn up and issued shortly after war commenced were modelled on a Battle memorandum which I had prepared when in command, first, of the Atlantic Fleet, and, later, of the 2nd Battle Squadron. But the changing situation soon made altera- tions and additions necessary, and the Orders were under constant revision. The tactics to be pursued by the different units of the Fleet in action under all conceivable conditions were provided for as far as possible. Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of a large fleet could not after deployment control the movements of all the squadrons comprising that fleet under the conditions of modern action when funnel and cordite smoke, and the great length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of events, and increase the difficulty of communication. The neces- sity for wide decentralisation of command, after the de- ployment of the fleet for action, was emphasised. As the Fleet grew in size, increasing stress was laid on this point. Flag officers commanding squadrons were, of course, kept fully acquainted with the general ideas under which the Fleet would act, so that they might be able to interpret my wishes when acting independently. Stress was laid on the necessity for keeping a close watch on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, so that squadrons could conform to his movements. The general 50 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 lines on which I intended to engage were defined. These included the range at which it was intended to open the engagement, the range below which it was not intended to close under ordinary conditions, on account of the risks to be apprehended from torpedo fire, and the exceptions to this rule which might become necessary. Emphasis was laid on the supreme necessity for a free use of our own torpedoes when opportunity occurred. After the experience of the engagement on January 24th, 1915, between the battle-cruisers, and especially as our superiority increased and the High Sea Fleet gave no sign of a desire to engage, the conviction became stronger than in any action between the two fleets, the enemy would fight a retiring battle. This is the most difficult form of tactics to counter in these days of submarines, mines and torpedoes, since a retiring fleet is in a position of great tactical advantage in the employment of these weapons. The Tactical Board was in constant use for a consideration of this problem, both by myself and the other flag officers. In the earliest stages of the War, when the German submarine strength was not great, one of the main prob- lems to be considered in regard to a fleet action was the employment of our destroyers and light cruisers to attack the enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes and to counter his similar attacks, which, owing to his great su- periority in destroyers, was a matter of supreme im- portance. The knowledge, too, that his light cruisers and destroyers, as well possibly as some of his heavier ships, were fitted for mine-laying (which was not the case with us) made it necessary to take into account the probability that he would use this form of attack at the commence- ment of a general action, or during the stages leading up to it. Later, when his submarines increased in num- GRAND FLEET AND BASES 51 ber, the method of countering the use of such vessels by the enemy, in the preliminary stages of a fleet action, had also to be considered, particularly as it was not until 1916 that the Grand Fleet was provided with any submarines of this type, and not until 1917 that sub- marines which could maintain the Fleet-speed at sea be- came part of the organisation. The comparative immunity of the van from torpedo at- tack by the enemy, if the fleets were approximately abeam of one another, and the risks run by the centre and rear were pointed out, as were the different conditions pro- duced in the case of a retiring enemy, or one which had a position of torpedo advantage. The influence of the torpedo on tactics became greater as the War progressed, owing to the advance made in the technique of these weapons. Before the opening of hostilities, for instance, torpedoes had a maximum range of about 10,000 yards. We made many improvements in our torpedoes as the War progressed, including a great increase in range, and we had every reason to believe that the Germans were making similar progress, and that the range of their topedoes was as much in ex- cess of the pre-War range as was that of our own weapons, The threat of successful torpedo attack even from battleships in the line was, therefore, an important factor to be taken into account, with the ships of the opposing fleets formed in single line at the close intervals which are necessary for successful co-operation and the concentra- tion of power afforded by a shortened line. Investigation into possible alternative formations for fighting a fleet action was constantly proceeding, but the single line, or a modification of it, was, under most conditions, the best that could be devised. 52 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 It was pointed out that, although our Fleet would be manceuvred for advantage in gunnery position, it might be necessary to engage under unfavourable gunnery con- ditions in order to prevent the enemy reaching his own waters. Several new manceuvres were introduced and practised by the Fleet with a view to countering possible tac- tics on the part of the enemy. ‘These included a “turn away” or a “turn towards” to counter a serious attack by torpedoes; a quick method of reversing the course of the Fleet without impairing its organisa- tion to meet enemy tactics necessitating such a move; rapid methods of re-forming single line; etc. Other new tactical methods were introduced as time progressed to meet the changing conditions of modern war- fare. Detailed orders were drawn up in regard to the con- duct of the Fleet after an action, so far as it was possible to foresee the conditions that might arise. The object was to arrange to continue the attack by light craft, whilst safeguarding the heavy ships against counter- attack by light forces. In the orders which were issued for the guidance of the destroyers both before, during, and after an action, en- deavour was made to provide for all these contingen-: cies. The stations of the flotillas, including the Harwich flotillas, if they were present, were laid down, and each had its particular duties assigned to it. General direc- tions were given for the employment of the destroyers, wide latitude being reserved to the officers commanding flotillas. The treatment of disabled ships was legislated for. The duties of each class of vessel, battle-cruiser, cruiser and light cruiser when in cruising order, or in GRAND FLEET AND BASES 53 action, or after an action, were defined, particular em- phasis being laid on the necessity for ships in the van, when in action, gaining a position of torpedo advan- tage in regard to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, whilst at the same time engaging enemy vessels of a similar class and preventing torpedo attacks on our own Battle Fleet from developing. Thus it was laid down as the leading principle in the General Cruiser Instructions, that after gaining touch with the enemy the first essential was to maintain that touch. Instructions were also given that in the event of the enemy’s advanced forces becoming engaged with our Battle-Cruiser Fleet, the cruisers in our advanced line were to push on and gain touch with the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It will be seen later that this situation arose during the Jutland battle. The Instructions for battle-cruisers laid down the prin- ciple that in action their primary function was the de- struction of the similar enemy vessels if present, and, after their destruction or in their absence, to attack the van of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. Prior to action their duty was defined as giving information as to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, whilst denying similar information to the enemy. The Vice-Admiral commanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was given a free hand to carry out these general instructions. The Instructions for the 5th Battle Squadron (the ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class) were drawn up to provide for the battle-cruisers being either absent or present. In the former event, this squadron took the place, and the duties, of the battle-cruisers; with our battle-cruisers present and in the van, the 5th Battle Squadron was ordered to take station ahead of the re- mainder of the Battle Fleet in the case of a deployment 54 THE GRAND -FLEET, 1914-1916 towards Heligoland, and in rear of the Battle Fleet in the case of deployment away from Heligoland. The object of this latter disposition was to place the High Sea Fleet at a disadvantage should it execute a 16-point turn after deployment. In order to enable the 5th Battle Squadron to carry out its functions in action, it was stationed be- tween the Cruiser Line and the main Battle Fleet when in cruising order. The Instructions to the light cruisers defined their duties in action as being to attack the enemy’s light cruisers and torpedo craft, to support our destroyers, and to at- tack the enemy’s battle line with torpedoes. For this purpose most of the light cruiser squadrons were required to be in the van on deployment. The Instructions for destroyers laid emphasis on the fact that they should carry out an early attack on the enemy’s Battle Fleet, commencing their attacks in clear weather, as soon as the Battle Fleet were engaged. Un- der conditions of low visibility, they were instructed to attack without waiting for the Battle Fleets to be en- gaged. It was pointed out that destroyers closing the enemy’s Battle Fleet for the purpose of an attack were also in the best position for preventing successful attacks on our own fleets. As soon as submarine flotillas were attached to the Grand Fleet, in 1916, instructions for their conduct be- fore, during, and after action were drawn up. Instruc- tions for two other classes of vessel, namely, mine-layers and sea-plane carriers, had been issued earlier, vessels of the mine-laying type, but of a slow speed, having been attached to the Fleet from the commencement of War, and sea-plane carriers, possessing, however, but slow speed and inferior arrangements, having joined during 1915. GRAND FLEET AND BASES 55 IV.—Tue TRarnine oF THE FLEET Inseparable from the question of the management of the Fleet before and during action was that of the working together of its units at sea by day and at night. This matter was, of course, one to which great attention had been devoted by Sir George Callaghan, who, when he handed over the Fleet to me, gave me a fighting machine trained to a very high pitch of perfection by an officer who was a past master in fleet training. But it was inevitable that war conditions should make even greater demands on the skill of the personnel than had previously been necessary, and in no direction was this more necessary than at night, the number of ships in company being far greater than had previously been usual; and the necessity of abstaining from signalling added to the difficulties. Further, under peace conditions, fleets cruising on dark, stormy nights without showing any lights, did so for comparatively short periods, during which the more experienced officers could, to a certain extent, remain on deck. Under war conditions no ships at sea ever showed more than a very dim light at the stern, and frequently not even that, adding greatly to difficulties of fleet cruis- ing. Consequently provision had to be made for ensuring safety whilst cruising under these conditions, and con- siderable foresight and great skill on the part of officers was necessary Single ships and squadrons that might by any possi- bility pass close to one another during hours of dark- ness were warned beforehand of the danger, and arrange- ments made so that they should be aware of each other’s positions. Destroyers, especially, were given directions so as to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which \ 56 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 otherwise might open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all sorts were similarly warned so far as this was possible, but in their case the conditions, owing to difficulties of communication, were frequently much more embarras- sing. Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night had to be such as to reduce to a minimum the necessity for signals, whilst giving freedom of action in an emer- gency. What applied to conditions of darkness applied equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for en- suring safety in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren, could not as a rule be employed, since the blasts might give warning to the enemy and place the Fleet open to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in close company with the larger ships for screening purposes against submarines led, in the case of sudden fog, to a difficult situation, as, before the Fleet could safely carry out any manceuvre, it was essential to get the destroyers clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by the large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued to meet all these conditions, and the best testimony to the training of the Fleet prior to the War was the remark- able freedom from accident during the early months after the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by no means handy vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisa- tion, was also a source of great gratification to me, and must have been most satisfactory to the officers and men concerned. The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particu- larly in light craft, the higher speeds attained by its units, the extreme importance of reducing signalling by wireless at sea to an absolute minimum, except in the Z 4 GRAND FLEET AND BASES 57 presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate atten- tion on the question of the efficiency of our signal ar- rangements. Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to be stopped, because by means of directional wireless sta- tions the positions of ships using wireless telegraphy could be determined by the enemy. As time went on, we felt that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and in some cases even the name of the ship so signalling. This we deduced from the fact that we ourselves made progress in this direction. The fact of a German fleet being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally concluded that the enemy could similarly locate any of our squadrons using the same means of communication. That was an inevitable inference. The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in the first place, to endeavour, by means of carefully com- piled and elaborate orders, to reduce the amount of sig- nalling that would ordinarily be required after the Fleet had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions that could be anticipated, and whilst this made the orders somewhat lengthy so as to meet every possibility, the object was achieved. Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea in daylight, arrangements were made to pass signals in and out between the most advanced cruisers and the Fleet Flagship by searchlight, except in the presence of the enemy, and good organisation gradually reduced the time occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet manceuvring when much to the southward of the lati- tude of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of Aberdeen, was also carried out by visual signalling. Owing to the danger of disclosing the position of the 58 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 Fleet to enemy submarines or destroyers, it was not pos- sible to use visual signalling at night, except with carefully shaded lamps which were only visible at a distance of about a quarter of a mile, and then only by the ship addressed, and this problem thus became complicated at night, in fogs or in very thick weather. Occasional resort had then to be made to wireless, but by signalling before dark all expected movements during the night, and by arranging the course of the Fleet so that few alterations were necessary, we succeeded in keeping almost absolute wireless silence. It had to be used, however, when im- portant information from the Admiralty and elsewhere was to be transmitted to the Fleet-Flagship, or to senior officers of squadrons, or to single ships when at sea en- gaged in operations, etc., and early in the War we had to devise a method by which this could be done without calling up the ships in question by wireless, thus neces- sitating a reply from them, and thus possibly acquainting the enemy of their position. After a time a satisfactory and ingenious system of communicating the required information without causing the ship herself to divulge her position was devised by the Fleet Wireless officer, Lieutenant-Commander R. L. Nicholson. This plan worked excellently and gradually was greatly extended during the later stages of the War. It must not be thought that, because wireless sig- nalling at sea was restricted, it was not intended to make full use of it when necessary and when silence was no longer required, such as when the fleets were within sight of one another. On the contrary, a great advance was made during the War in the use of wireless tele- graphy for manceuvring the Battle Fleet, as well as in every other direction. So proficient did the ships be- come under the organisation introduced by Lieutenant- GRAND FLEET AND BASES 59 Commander Nicholson, assisted as he was by the very efficient wireless officers and wireless personnel, that in 1916 I could handle the Battle Fleet by wireless with as much ease and rapidity as by visual signals. At the begin- ning of the War ten minutes to a quarter of an hour would elapse before I could be sure that all ships had received a manceuvring wireless signal addressed to the whole Battle Fleet. In 1916 the time rarely exceeded two to three minutes. This great improvement was due to new methods introduced, as well as to incessant practice in harbour. Our advance in the use of wireless telegraphy was very considerable indeed, and I owed a great debt of gratitude to Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, the other wireless officers of the Fleet-Flagship, and the wireless officers and personnel of the whole Fleet. The progress was the more remarkable since, owing to extreme short- age of wireless personnel for the expanding Fleet and the large number of auxiliary vessels commissioned, we were forced to discharge many of the best operators in the Fleet as the War progressed and to replace them by boys trained in the Wireless School established by the Fleet at Scapa Flow. A poimt which war experience brought into con- siderable prominence was the difficulty of distinguishing, with sufficient rapidity, enemy vessels from our own ships both before, and, more particularly during, action. The difficulty applied to all classes of vessels, but was greatest in the case of torpedo craft and submarines. Steps were taken to deal with it, and satisfactory arrange- ments made for certain distinguishing marks visible at long distances to be worn during daylight by our own surface bee The question of identification at night was ae cult, and although we effected improve- 60 THE -GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 ment in this respect also, the results were not so satis- factory. Of the original experimental work carried out by the Fleet at Scapa Flow none was more important than that connected with the safety of ships from mines. Early in the War it had become obvious that there was danger of a serious weakening of the Grand Fleet by successful mine attack, and no safeguard existed beyond the work of the mine-sweepers; these vessels could not work far afield, and in bad weather could not work even close to their bases, whereas the Fleet might be required to pro- ceed to sea when mine-sweeping was impracticable. A solution of this difficulty was required. Com- mander Cecil V- Usborne, of the Colossus, in these circumstances proposed to me the trial of an apparatus which he suggested should be towed from the bows of ships; it was intended to fend off any mine encountered, provided the ship did not strike it absolutely “end on.” I ordered immediate trials; all the necessary matériel was provided with Fleet labour and appliances, and starting with trials in a picket boat, they were continued until a series of experiments commenced in large ships, battle- ships and cruisers. I placed Rear-Admirals A. L. Duff and A, C. Leveson in charge of the experiments and great progress was made, although absolute success was not obtained. Lieutenant Dennis Burney, the son of Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, visited the base at this juncture, and, knowing his inventive turn of mind, I discussed the matter with him at considerable length. Lieutenant Burney soon afterwards put forward proposals for effecting the required object. His idea was to utilise apparatus which he had devised earlier for other purposes. His scheme was of a more elaborate nature than that GRAND FLEET AND BASES 61 devised by Commander Usborne, and necessitated the manufacture of appliances by outside manufacturers, I urged the Admiralty to take up the question at once; this was done, and the experiments, started at Ports- mouth, were transferred to Scapa Flow as soon as pre- liminary success had been obtained. The two devices were then tried over a considerable period at Scapa Flow, still under the immediate direction of Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson, who threw them- selves wholeheartedly into the task, Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt taking up this work in their occasional absence. After many disappointments the Burney system was proved to be successful, and I at once re- quested that manufacture on a large scale should be proceeded with. The device was of an elaborate char- acter, and many persons at first were sceptical as to its value, owing partly to early difficulties in manipulation. But Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson rendered the greatest assistance in overcoming objections, and grad- ually it came to be seen in the Fleet that we had become possessed of a most valuable safeguard. By the time I relinquished the Command a very large num- ber of battleships, battle-cruisers, and cruisers, and some light cruisers had been fitted, and the gear was working well, Owing to Lieutenant Burney’s efforts, improve- ment was constantly being effected, with the result that during 1917 the fitting was universal. During that year it was instrumental in saving several warships from dam- age by mines, and in 1918 the number of ships saved was also considerable. The initial idea was that. of Commander Usborne, and both he and Lieutenant Burney displayed much energy in working out their respective devices. But it was through Lieutenant Burney’s ingenuity that final 62 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 success was achieved. Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson eventually brought the appliance to perfection, with the result that it was generally adopted. A modified arrange- ment of the same nature was fitted to merchant ships during 1917 and 1918, and proved of very great value. As was inevitable, my thoughts turned at an early stage of my Command to the necessity for constant improvement in the fighting efficiency of the Grand Fleet. My knowledge of the German Navy, which was considerable, left me under no delusions as to its character. I had made it my business to keep myself very fully acquainted with German progress. I had first been brought into close touch with the modern German Navy during service in China from 1899 to 1902, which included the Boxer campaign, when I saw a great deal of its officers and men. I had then formed a high estimate of its efficiency, and subsequent touch on many occasions with the German Fleet had convinced me that in matériel the Germans were ahead of us, and that the personnel, though lacking the initiative and resource and seamanlike character of the British, was highly disciplined, and well educated and trained. I knew also that the German Fleet was in no way short of officers; this was the case with us owing to the constant political pressure in the years before the War, and I expected that this shortage of officers would be a great handicap to us as the War progressed. The branch of the German Navy from which I expected very good work was the destroyer service. I had seen German de- stroyers manceuvring. Finally I knew, perhaps better than most of our officers, how efficient was the gunnery and torpedo work of the High Sea Fleet, and how rapid had been its ad- vance in the year or two before the War. A great in- GRAND FLEET AND BASES 63 crease had been made in the allowance of ammunition for practice. Before the War this was much higher than our own, and there was no doubt in my mind that the German allowance would be well expended. Indeed, we had ob- tained information which placed this beyond question. I was well acquainted personally with many of the flag officers and captains in the German Navy and had some idea of their views on naval warfare. Amongst those whom I knew best were Admiral von Ingenohl, the then Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral von Lans, commanding a Battle Squad- ron, Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of the Naval Staff, who later succeeded Admiral von Ingenohl, Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz, Admiral von Holtzendorff, a former Com- mander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, who succeeded Admiral von Pohl as chief of the Naval Staff, and Ad- miral von Usedom, who did conspicuous work in the shore batteries during the Dardanelles operations. My knowl- edge of these officers led me to expect good work in the High Command, and I also expected that they would be well supported. It is interesting to record that I took part in a Con- ference of Allied naval officers in a pagoda at the end of the Great Wall of China in company with Admiral von Holtzendorff (the then German Flag Captain in China) after the capture of the Shan-hai-Kwan forts, in 1900, and that Admiral von Usedom succeeded me as Chief of the Staff to Admiral—afterwards Admiral of the Fleet—Sir Edward Seymour, when I was wounded during the international expedition for the relief of the Peking Legations. I had met both these officers on sev- eral subsequent occasions, as well as Admiral von Lans, who was in command of the Iltis at the capture of the Taku forts by the Allies in the Boxer campaign. 64 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 My knowledge of the German Navy was a strong rea- son, had no others existed, for making me desirous of doing all that was possible to increase our own gunnery and torpedo efficiency. The Germans possessed an excellent practice ground in Kiel Bay, with every appliance for carrying out gun- nery exercises, and I felt sure that they had rendered it safe from any hostile attack, and that the German Fleet would be able to maintain and improve its efficiency as time progressed. We were not in so fortunate a position. There had been no recent opportunity for carrying out gunnery and torpedo exercises and practices; Scapa Flow had not been used as a base for such work in peace time, except for destroyers, and consequently no facilities existed there, although the proximity of Cromarty, which had been a Fleet practice base, neutralised this disadvantage to a certain extent at a later period. But there was no pro- tected area outside the harbour where practices could be carried out in safety, and the harbour itself was not at first secure against submarine attack. Much use, how- ever, was made of the Moray Firth outside Cromarty later when submarine obstructions had been provided, and the Germans had obligingly laid a mine-field which protected the practice area from seaward. At the commencement of the War, then, it was necessary to depend on fleet resources for the provision of targets for gunnery practices, and the practices themselves were car- ried out under conditions which laid the ships open to submarine attack. This was most unsatisfactory, and the work suffered considerably as the result. The opportunity provided by constant sea work in the first months of the War was, however, utilised to carry out such gunnery practices as the conditions admitted. GRAND FLEET AND BASES 65 At first the custom was for the Fleet to use sraall targets which the ships carried with them. These were unsuitable; their small size rendered them frequently invisible at even moderate ranges in any sea, and I felt that the Fleet could not make progress under such con- ditions. Practice at rocks or small islands was next resorted to, but no really suitable rocks existed, and, in any case, practice at them eventually involved too much risk of submarine attack, as the German submarines began to find their way to the westward of Scotland. Towards the end of 1915 it became possible, owing to the increase in the number of destroyers attached to the Fleet, and to the provision of submarine obstructions at Cromarty, to carry out gunnery practices at long ranges at targets in the Moray Firth, and real improvement dated from that period. Later still, battle practice targets were brought to Scapa Flow, and the long-range firing was carried out in the Pentland Firth, a still more convenient place. Meanwhile Scapa Flow itself had been developed for all the preliminary gunnery practices which could be carried out with guns up to 6-inch in calibre, and also for night firing and for torpedo work. The fine stretch of water was secure from submarine attack after the obstructions had been provided, and ships could practise by day and night without danger of attack. The Flow was simply invaluable for this purpose. Ships were firing, running torpedoes, practising fire control exer- cises, carrying out experiments and exercising in dealing with attacks by destroyers, day after day, from daylight until dark. After dark, night firing was frequently carried out, 66 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 and occasionally a division of battleships was exercised in steaming in company, without lights, in order to give the officers of watches practice. Wher the constant sea work of the earlier months of the War gave place to.oc- casional cruises, the seagoing and fighting efficiency of the Fleet was maintained at a remarkably high standard as a result of the work in Scapa Flow. During the period 1914-16 a marked advance was undoubtedly made in gunnery efficiency. At an early period of the War a memorandum was issued pointing out the necessity for increased attention to drill and organisation. Absolute perfection was insisted upon, and it was obtained, by the strenuous efforts of officers and men. I knew that we had to deal with an en- emy who would be as perfect as constant drill could ensure. A great extension of the system of Director Firing, by which one officer or man could lay and fire all the guns, was made. The situation in this respect before the War was that a few ships had been fitted for the system, which had been devised by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. But a very large number of officers were sceptical as to its value compared with the alternative system; there was consider- able opposition to it, and the great majority of the ships were not fitted. In some cases the system was not fa- voured even in the ships provided with it. It had fallen to my lot in 1912 to carry out com- petitive trials of the Director System and the alterna- tive system already in use, and the results of these trials had fully confirmed me in my previous opinion of the great value of the Director System. I was able to press these views on my return to the Admiralty at the end of 1912 as Second Sea Lord, and it was then decided to provide all the later ships with the arrangement. Little GRAND FLEET AND BASES 67 progress had, however, been made when the War broke out, only eight battleships having been fitted. Early in 1915 arrangements were made, with the as- sistance of Sir Percy Scott and the warm support of Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, by which the battle- ships and battle-cruisers were supplied with this system, without being put out of action or sent to a dockyard for the purpose. The necessary instruments were manu- factured at various contractors’ shops, and the very labori- ous task of fitting them, and the heavy electric cables, on board the ships was carried out by electricians sent to the various bases. ‘The complicated work naturally took a considerable time, and many vexatious delays oc- curred; but gradually all ships were fitted, Sir Percy Scott rendering invaluable assistance at headquar- ters. As a first step, the system was fitted to the heavy guns mounted in turrets, and by the date of the Battle of Jutland there were few ships that were not supplied with the system, although six of those last fitted had not had much experience with it. The conditions under which that action was fought converted any waverers at once to a firm belief in the Director System, and there was never afterwards any doubt expressed as to its great value. Further efforts were made later to accelerate the work, and the system was extended to smaller vessels. This had been the intention even before the action, but there were then still many who were unconvinced. However, during the remainder of 1916 and 1917 the work was pressed forward, and the system became universal for all guns and in all classes of ships, The improvement in what may be termed the applica- tion of existing methods of fire control may now be men- 68 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 tioned. Throughout the War we had gradually, as the result of practice, increased greatly the effective range at which ships could engage, and stress had been laid on the necessity for bringing the fire rapidly on to the target in order to obtain early hits. Improvement was perhaps most rapid in the five or six months following the Jutland action. In this action the Fire Control In- struments, as adopted in the Service, which were the out- come of the work of naval officers, were found to meet the gunnery requirements most successfully. The only important improvement that was made was the provi- sion of additional means for keeping the observation of Fire Instruments trained on the correct enemy ship. Vari- ous committees were formed immediately after the battle in order that full advantage might be taken at once of our experience. The result was the introduction of new rules for correcting gunfire; these, in addition to greatly increasing the volume of fire from a ship, also rendered it difficult for the enemy vessels to evade punishment by dodging tactics. In order to cope more successfully with the latter de- velopment, more experiments were ordered, having as their object the determination of the inclination of the enemy vessel to the line of bearing from us, and various methods of obtaining this inclination were recommended to the Fleet. The most promising at the time that I relinquished command of the Fleet was that proposed by Lieutenant J. W. Rivett-Carnac, R.N., the range-find- ing expert of the Grand Fleet, who had investigated this inclination problem for some years. A great increase in the rapidity with which the fall of shot were “spotted on” to a target resulted from all this work. It is not too much to say that the interval between opening fire and the moment at which the salvoes began to “strad- SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915 GRAND FLEET AND BASES 69 dle” the target was certainly halved, and the rapidity of fire when the enemy was “straddled” was very greatly increased. The new firing rules, by standardising the system of correcting fire, produced a marked increase in the efficiency of the methods by which the fire of two ships was concentrated on to one target and gen- erally paved the way for the solution of many gunnery problems which the Fleet had previously been unable to solve completely. The use of smoke screens was closely investigated as a result of our experience of the German use of this de- vice. Prolonged experiments were carried out at Scapa Flow to ascertain the possibilities and the best method of using smoke screens, and they were also used during battle tactics and during range-finder exercises. The trials included the use of smoke shell as well as funnel and artificial smoke. ; In another direction efforts were made to increase efficiency. The Jutland battle convinced us that our ar- mour-piercing shell was inferior in its penetrative power to that used by the Germans, and immediately after the action I represented this with a view to im- mediate investigation. A Committee sat to consider the matter. In 1917, as First Sea Lord, I appointed a second Committee. With one of the old type of armour-piercing shells of a particular calibre as used at Jutland the shell would, with oblique impact at battle range, break up whilst hol- ing a certain thickness of plate, and the shell could not, therefore, reach the vitals of the enemy’s ships. A shell of the new type, as produced by the 1917 Committee, of the same calibre would at the same oblique impact and range pass whole through a plate of double the thickness before exploding and could therefore with delay action 70 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 fuse penetrate to the magazines of a capital ship. Had our ships possessed the new type of armour-piercing shell at Jutland, many of the enemy’s vessels, instead of being only damaged, would probably not have been able to reach port. The manufacture of these new type shells for the Fleet was well advanced before the end of 1917. The value of the torpedo as a fighting weapon in action, from ships, from destroyers, and from submarines, was also greatly increased. ‘The torpedo practices at Scapa Flow, which were of a realistic character, were of the greatest possible use. The real cause underlying the improvement was the great keenness displayed by officers and men. Their one idea was to strive for the highest efficiency, and there was never apparent the least sign of weariness or staleness in repeating time after time exercises and prac- tices with which they were so familiar. No tribute that I can pay to the personnel of the Grand Fleet in this connection could be sufficiently high. I know that under my successor the improvement in fighting efficiency continued, Owing to the collapse of the moral of the personnel of the German Navy, culminating in the surrender for internment of the majority of their capital ships, the Grand Fleet was given no opportunity of testing in ac- tion the methods adopted as a result of our experience during the first two years of war, and perfected by two years’ further training. Had the German fleet come out to battle a terrible punishment awaited it! Mention has been made of the development of aircraft during the War. The possibilities resulting from the use of the air for reconnaissance work, for assisting in the di- rection of gunfire, and, finally, for offensive operations, were fully recognised in the Grand Fleet; but for a con- GRAND FLEET AND BASES 71 siderable period the lack of suitable machines hindered development. The first decisive step taken was the fit- ting out of the Campania, a passenger ship of the Cunard Line, as a sea-plane carrier to be attached to the Battle Fleet. Prior to that, the Harwich Force and, later, the Battle Cruiser Fleet had been provided with smaller ves- sels, the Vindew and Engadine, carrying a few sea-planes. They had been used in operations in the Heligoland Bight, but without much success, owing to the difficulty experienced in getting sea-planes to rise from the water except in the finest weather. With the arrival of the Campania at Scapa, we were able to investigate the difficulties attending the use of air- craft from ships as then fitted and to indicate the direc- tion in which improvement was desirable and possible. It was apparent that little improvement could be expected so long as we were dependent on the machines rising from the water. The first step, therefore, was tg improve the arrangements for flying off from the deck of the Campania. The ship returned to Liverpool at the end of 1915 in order that the necessary alterations might be effected; these were not completed until the late spring of 1916; during the alterations, the Campania was also, at my request, fitted to carry a kite balloon. The advantages to be obtained from the use of kite balloons had been demonstrated during the Dardanelles operations, and the Menelaus, kite balloon ship, was sent to the Grand Fleet. But it was soon obvious that we could not make profitable use of kite balloons in a fleet action unless they were flown from the ships themselves, and experiments were carried out, under the direction of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, commanding the 4th Battle Squadron, having as their object the best 72 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 method of fitting and using kite balloons from warships. Many difficulties were experienced, the principal one being that of providing wire of sufficient strength to stand the tension of the balloon during strong winds. The Kite Balloon Section at Roehampton gradually solved the difficulties, and by the end of 1916 the majority of the flagships leading divisions of the Fleet were provided with kite balloons, and were experiencing their utility. From this beginning, great developments took place in providing vessels of all classes, including light cruisers, destroyers, P boats, and trawlers, with kite balloons; the balloon was used in the case of the smaller ves- sels for anti-submarine reconnaissance work, whilst in the heavy ships it was used for observation and correction of fire. Meanwhile, the development of the air-craft carrier had proceeded, but not with the same rapidity. It was evident to me in 1916 that for anti-Zeppelin work we should look towards the aeroplane flying from the deck, rather than to the sea-plane, although it also could rise from the deck; but I gathered the time was hardly ripe for the step, owing to the landing difficulty, and the first efforts of the Royal Naval Air Service lay in the direction of providing a type of sea-plane that would fly well off the deck and climb quickly. These efforts were fairly successful, but the development of the heavier-than-air craft machine for use with the Fleet did not begin until the aeroplane was adopted for the work; and this took place in 1917, when progress became rapid, and continued until the end of the War. There remains the question of the air-ship, which was also being developed during the period 1914-16, but as this matter was not within the province of the Fleet, it is unnecessary to touch upon it here, GRAND FLEET AND BASES 73 V.—Tue BuocKaDE The story of the development of the Grand Fleet would be incomplete without reference to the Blockade, and, in particular, to the work of the 10th Cruiser Squad- ron. In the early days of the War, the 10th Cruiser Squad- ron consisted of the ships of the “Edgar” class—vessels at least twenty years old; and during August, 1914, the Admiralty commissioned three armed merchant ships, the Mantua, Alsatian and Oceanic, to strengthen the squadron for blockade work; the latter ship was lost by shipwreck in September of that year. The Blockade in those early days was carried out by the 10th Cruiser Squadron and by the other cruiser squad- rons attached to the Grand Fleet. During No- vember, 1914, the ships of the ‘““Kdgar” class were with- drawn owing to their unseaworthy condition, and the ships’ companies utilised to commission a number of ad- ditional armed merchant cruisers. By the end of De- cember, 1914, the squadron consisted of eighteen ships, being raised later to a strength of twenty-four ships. A very large proportion of the officers and men of the re- constituted 10th Cruiser Squadron belonged to the Mer- cantile Marine. The advent of so large a squadron of these vessels called for a considerable organisation for their main- tenance; they were based on Liverpool for all the heavy work of upkeep, whilst a secondary advanced base at Swarbachs Minn, on the west coast of the Shetland Islands, was gradually developed, and obstructed against submarine attack, The work of organisation was carried out by Rear-Admiral de Chair, who commanded the squadron, ably seconded by Rear-Admiral H. H. Stile- man, the Senior Naval Officer at Liverpool, to whom 74 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 we were much indebted for hearty co-operation and effi- cient organisation at the base. The work of the squadron consisted in intercepting and boarding all vessels bound into or out of the northern entrance to the North Sea, and this work could obviously not be carried out in the face of the German submarines without heavy risk to the ships. The danger was greatest during the operation of boarding, as the examin- ing vessel was obliged to stop to lower the boarding-boat. As the number of German submarines increased, the squadron was necessarily withdrawn to positions further removed from the enemy submarine bases, and the Block- ade line, after the spring of 1915, ran generally from the Orkneys and Shetlands past the Faroe Islands to Iceland, and when freedom from ice rendered passage round the north of Iceland possible, ships operated in that neighbourhood. A careful organisation of the movements of the ships was necessary to cover such an immense area of the sea, and to provide that all ships should, as far as possible, be intercepted. Even in the case of ships of such large coal endurance as the armed merchant steamers, it was not possible to keep much more than one-half the number in commission on an average on the patrol line at the same time. The remainder were either in port refitting and refueling, or were en route to and from the bases. The distance from the middle of the patrol line to Liverpool was some 600 miles, so that two days were occupied in the passage each way. When going to or from Liverpool the ships had to run the gauntlet of enemy submarines, which were passing down the west coast of the Hebrides and Ireland, and as no destroyers were available with which to screen them against attack, the risk was considerable. They had also 40° 30° re Plan oO 15° 10° 5° O° - Ns 2. ii ; Ce ae a ae RR RP RR P 3 184 e yi FE ‘ . ¢ wos I ; Z \ 9x s ¢ \ : yy han, ; | | é } + e ee 2. 579 ; e y, ee of \ ° gre wre Ses @ {i Vi 40 ; Is Zz 262 3° YQ? tra, 2 cen IZ qn Pe 143 545 747 iF hi 193 oe aet weet ves 8, V00-s80 os 470 389 1p3 | es RY O 286° 39 | e Bs ste 995 ° 1461 { ib Rs x °° } as ENS poms i “133 m chs 5 5 39” ik e ee g : °° Sipalbiceg ae j oa 67m 87: 97 492 . 71 I rf \ we oe aD 60: 4 8 Pee i : e Lodmunder Fd e | 65"! ow oF Noe Breas Pg yo 700 ‘ aa ; | ae zor °* 309 i oa ng tnt Bay 2 ° Rody F4 437 4004 2602 a LY 65° is La Sneehelds J (47001% ree. * lop 19 gagn cls 2081 1658 IE 568 36g YY aa a9 : + eye 943% ak rE : 144 Buder BE 35; fh v8 eet ¢ Hvalsbak 1832 ; ae 2 oe : i i 783 Faxe Buge 78 A 2 86 200 309 East timit | 1 187 150, “195 Skagen» os re eon a4 190 of Patrol. ; 7 34 ‘1 | 166 $9 40 38 yy As 158 23 438 1001, A ut Revkjyanest 63 732 355 ago ae 308 - 1167 1460 oy ao a2 PS TAS. 79 gael ge ™ 1002 west tee ee : 49802, 135 Y ae BE Be ig Hits 50 Flagg a? ane 980 Ba age A 762 H 1235 1d so om 144° witty ee nade most Y 2 \ ee Biinde KDE a Westmanoe™ ee 250 er 409 2 Centre line 1089 ea S: . s. i iia 194 362 Bai eae 228 aga gniles ne : oar sor Of Patrol. 1 i STZ was 633 486 237 oN el.st 204 cl o> i : ms9 : 180 ' 1136 2 264 308 26 ? y | 2 472 401 ee ai 508 277 & x G FE | ~ M2 es 160 | 1 1 69s = ass] 1052 a4 w+ Nae re Hl 7al 845 \ | izes ea ma a (WW | . 471 28 1080 p45 B oats ico} ! 829 = ozm 978 150 980 720 East limit { i ] ! m1 of Fatroy, NN, | i \ : 79 297|| 650 a | 360 \ ne 78 40%, a ! ] miles 20 *, ;:. SHETLAND 18 5 3orh an od ot " _lasalll 60° aoe tere fe ee 202 ee as ‘ 59 asalE 1 1620 ues \ e20 iq f ou 748 m. 64 3 f 21260 69 : | | oz \ 45 6 | | a4? 1375 er 1096 al eo i i eo * i \ i H 40 bad 60 (yas H 957 i ff ] \ ao 6 | 226 Mw iE / Ch h . : : : hi one\ 21 “as Lewis Cs eo ! r art showing in pecked lines the area in w ich dares aoe 1 7 rs a ; 82 ! | ; th ; 39 the ships of the 10% Cruiser Squadron usually worked lS — a 965 | ) * “| | eT i after about the middle of the year I9I5; the positions Sse Oe a «o * 5 j $ ‘| 395 104 7 50 30 iW a . . 340 Joo 3 { of the ships being constantly changed. - 16 47 7 P & y g rat 4 NORTH, i ! - 200 630 1268 % 43 ee rE f Prior to this the areas were in the vicinity of A.B.C.0.G. 234 800 ve TRA HF ma “ 7 33 e 1800 40 33 = 16. L 55 u a3 a H e H 1500 v for., 2% 2 ew2lh bs f A A 2000 i wetlgs 4 34 1350 2 33 20 ff Se po op Bo Papa et Gp ph ite 30°81 I es Longitude West 20° of Greenwich 1S° ‘GRAND FLEET AND BASES 75 to face the constant danger of snine-fields. Several ships of the squadron fell victims to submarines or mines with a resultant heavy loss of life. Whilst the ships were on patrol, the work of the board- ing parties was very arduous. The preliminary ex- amination could not be carried out without boarding, and the manner in which the boats of the squadron were handled in the very heavy weather, almost constant in northern latitudes, was a fine tribute to the seamanship of the officers and men. In this boarding work the fisher- men of the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, hardy and experienced seamen, rendered most conspicuous service. The efficiency of the Blockade increased gradually from its inception, as is well known, and after a time the percentage of vessels that evaded the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron became so low as to be almost neg- ligible. The procedure adopted was to snd all ships, preliminary examination of which at sea aroused any suspicion, into Kirkwall or Lerwick harbours, where reg- ular examination services were instituted. The ships were taken in under the supervision of an armed guard, sent on board from the boarding-vessel, and these guards un- derwent many unpleasant experiences. Several lost their lives in ships which were torpedoed by German subma- rines, and in many cases, particularly in badly found sail- ing ships, they underwent great hardships. The guards were also the means of saving more than one such ship from shipwreck, by working her themselves when the crew refused to do so any longer, and in all cases great tact and discretion on the part of the officer in charge, usually a junior officer of the Royal Naval Reserve, were neces- sary in his dealings with the neutral captains. The whole question of the efficiency of the Blockade—as shown by 76 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 the returns furnished to me from Headquarters—was con- stantly under review by my Staff and myself. The fate of the detained ship was decided in London on receipt of the report of examination. As was perhaps natural, the sentence on many ships’ cargoes pronounced in London was not accepted without question from the Fleet, and a good deal of correspondence passed with reference to individual ships. We, in the Fleet, were nat- urally very critical of any suspicion of laxity in passing, into neutral countries bordering on Germany, articles which we suspected might find their way into Germany, and constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the Admiralty, and, later, to the Ministry of Blockade, when that Ministry was established. The difficulties with which the Foreign Office was faced in regard to neutral sus- ceptibilities were naturally not so apparent in the Fleet as to the authorities in London, and though many of our criticisms were perhaps somewhat unjustifiable, and some possibly incorrect, it is certain that in the main they were of use. Indeed, they were welcomed in London as giv- ing the naval point of view. The decisive effect of the Blockade did not become apparent until the end, when the final crash came, and it was seen how supreme an influence on the result of the War this powerful weapon had exercised. Even those who during the War had been asking what the Navy was doing, recognised at the last how victory had been achieved, largely, as the result of the silent pressure of Sea Power. VI.—TuE GRranpD FLEET BaAsEs Mention has been made elsewhere of the unprotected state of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine attack in the early part of the War. The matter was one of GRAND FLEET AND BASES 77 supreme importance, and formed the subject of very urgent representations to the Admiralty. Many brains were at work on the problem at the Admiralty, at the bases, and in the Fleet itself. The first step was that taken under the direction of Captain Donald S. Munro, the King’s Harbour Master at Cromarty, who devised a system of submarine obstruction which later formed the pattern for the deep- water obstructions at most of our naval bases. Owing to his energy and driving power, the entrance to Cromarty was rendered fairly secure by October 26th, 1914. Whilst he was working out a defence for Cromarty another officer, Lieutenant Bircham, R.N.V.R., under the command of Admiral Sir Robert Lowry, the Commander-in-Chief of the coast of Scotland, suggested a method for providing an obstruction for the Rosyth base. This was fitted in place by the end of October, 1914, and was also entirely suc- cessful. As soon as the Cromarty scheme was in train, I re- quested that obstructions on similar lines should be fitted to the three main entrances to Scapa Flow, the Hoxa entrance (by far the most likely to be attempted) being taken in hand first. Exasperating delays in the supply of the necessary material were experienced, and the first line of obstructions in the Hoxa entrance was not completed until December 29th, 1914, the first line in Switha Sound by January 12th, 1915, and that in Hoy Sound by February 19th, 1915. Meanwhile offi- cers and men of the Fleet had improvised obstructions, first at Lough Swilly and Loch na Keal, and later at Scapa Flow, which, while not giving thorough security against a determined attempt at entry, had a psychologi- cal value. These obstructions, which were kept in exist- 78 +$THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 ence even after the completion of the more efficient meth- ods of dealing with the problem, involved much labour. Towards the end of 1915, or early in 1916, the disad- vantages attendant on basing the Fleet so far north as Scapa Flow, were discussed between Sir Henry Jackson (then First Sea Lord) and myself. We both felt that, with the Fleet at the northern base, the difficulties of intercepting the High Sea Fleet during coast raids, and of dealing with landing raids covered by the High Sea Fleet, were so considerable as to make it eminently de- sirable to base the whole Fleet farther south, if this were feasible. A discussion took place at Rosyth, and as the result I suggested a scheme of submarine obstructions across the Firth of Forth, which would admit not only of berthing the whole Grand Fleet in that anchorage, but would also allow of gunnery and torpedo practices being carried out with a considerable degree of safety in the Forth, so that the Fleet, if based there, could keep up its fighting efficiency. Many senior officers in the Grand Fleet were not in favour of the idea, for two reasons: first, that the Fleet could be mined in by the enemy with much greater ease when in the Forth than when at Scapa; and, secondly, that practices could not be so effi- ciently carried out in the Forth. There was much weight in both these objections, although the difficulties of carry- ing out practices in the Forth were exaggerated; but the strategic advantage, in my opinion, outweighed them, and the scheme was proceeded with as proposed. That part of the scheme which admitted of the safe carrying out of practices was completed by December, 1916, and the whole of the new obstructions were in place by July, 1917, nearly a year later, it is true, than the anticipated date. The result certainly justified the con- clusion arrived at. When the conditions made it at GRAND FLEET AND BASES 79 all probable that the High Sea Fleet might put to sea for an operation in southern waters, the Grand Fleet assembled in the Firth of Forth, and the undoubted disadvantages of the southern base were neutralised by skilful dispositions on the part of the flag officers respon- sible. The protection of the Grand Fleet bases against sub- marine attack was only one of the many factors necessary for their development. In pre-War days, although it had been decided that the use of northern bases would be necessary in the event of a war with Germany, the bases had not been prepared to meet the new situation. It is, perhaps, desirable to remove any misunderstanding as to the causes of this failure. . (a) The decision had not long been taken, and (b) The necessary financial provision was lacking. Under the first of these headings the base at Scapa Flow was affected, and, under the seccnd, that at Rosyth, where for some time progress in the development of the base had been arrested. The Admiralty had taken steps to make some prepara- tions at Cromarty, in so far as the provision of gun defences against attack by surface vessels was concerned, but nothing had been done for the upkeep of a fleet be- yond a decision to transfer to Cromarty, during war, one of the floating docks at southern yards. In fact, the situation was that, whilst we had shifted our Fleet to the north, all the conveniences for the main- tenance of that fleet were still in the Channel ports. The first step was the transference of the large floating dock from Portsmouth to Invergordon, in the Cromarty Firth, together with a staff of dockyard workmen, who were housed in a merchant ship captured from the Germans. Workshops were fitted up on shore under the energetic 80 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 superintendence of Rear-Admiral Edmund R. Pears and his able staff of dockyard officers. It can be said with great emphasis that this floating dock was simply invalu- able to the Grand Fleet. Invergordon gradually developed into a great repair- ing base. A second and smaller floating dock was pur- chased early in 1916 at my request and placed there, and by the middle of that year the base had attained large proportions; work of all kinds was carried out with rapid- ity and success, including the repairs of battleships after the Jutland battle, and the great extension in armoured-deck protection fitted to ships after the same action. Ordinary refits of battleships had been carried out at Invergordon since the autumn of 1914. At Scapa Flow the same possibilities as a repairing base did not exist, although a floating dock for destroyers, for which many requests had been made, was eventually obtained and placed there. But the base at Scapa Flow had extended out of all knowledge in other directions. In August, 1914, the base organisation consisted only of the seagoing Fleet re- pair ships Cyclops and Assistance. At an early stage the Cyclops was connected to a shore telegraph cable off the village of Scapa, and she became at the same time a floating post office and a base for the auxiliary vessels (a few drifters) which were first requisitioned. Rear-Ad- miral Francis 8. Miller was appointed to her as the Senior Naval Officer at the base. The manner in which the great demands on her accommodation were met was a standing wonder to me. In the early part of the War, officers on Admiral Miller’s staff and others were obliged to make their sleeping berths, as best they could, on the deck or on top of their writing-tables, and it was surprising that GRAND FLEET AND BASES 81 the overcrowding in all directions did not affect health. But the work went on very successfully in the most in- convenient circumstances. Towards the end of 1914 it became necessary, owing to the weather conditions, to move the base organisations from the north to the south-west side of Scapa Flow. The anchorage at Long Hope was selected, whilst the Fleet itself lay off the north side of the Island of Flotta, and the numerous larger auxiliaries, colliers, oilers, store ships, and the ammunition ships lay between Long Hope and Hoy Sound. Prior to this, the importance of the organisation in the Orkneys and Shetlands had increased to such an extent that I had asked for the appointment of a Senior Flag Officer in general command of the whole district, and of the defences in par- ticular. So much of my time was being occupied in deciding and pressing forward the work of organisation of the base and its obstructions and defences, in dealing with the numerous questions relating to the patrol of the coast by coast watchers, in arranging for the disposal of merchant ships sent in for re-examination, and for guarding ‘such vessels, in considering questions affecting the occupation of land for the erection of defences, in the requisition- ing of trawlers and drifters, etc., that it was becoming difficult to deal with the fast accumulating Fleet work proper. Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, who sug- gested that he should waive his seniority in order to serve as my junior officer, was appointed Vice-Admiral Com- manding the Orkneys and Shetlands. This left Rear-Ad- miral Miller free to devote himself to the increasingly heavy work of base organisation proper, relieved me of a mass of work outside the Fleet, and was of the greatest possible benefit in every way. Under Sir Stanley Col- 82. THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 ville’s most able direction, the completion of the organi- sation for the general defences of the Islands, the work of patrol craft and mine-sweepers, and the provision of submarine obstructions was effected, and the work pushed forward. Captain Stanley Dean Pitt, R.N., an officer of very wide experience, was appointed to superintend the work of laying the submarine obstructions, and under his able direction, in the face of the greatest difficulties due to bad weather and strong tides, the entrances to Scapa Flow were either blocked by sunken ships or ob- structed by nets, mines, and other devices. The gun defences at Scapa, which at the beginning of the War consisted of 12-pounder and 3-pounder guns landed from the Fleet, were gradually reinforced by four- inch and six-inch guns obtained from abroad, the whole being manned by Royal Marine pensioners under Lieut.- Colonel Gerald N. A. Harris, R.M.A. The garrison was housed in huts, erected temporarily for the pur- pose, and although with the handiness which charac- terises a Royal Marine in all circumstances, the officers and men eventually made themselves comfortable even under such weather conditions as are experienced at Scapa Flow, they endured a very considerable amount of hardship in the early days with their accustomed cheer- fulness. And here I cannot fail to mention the endurance and staying qualities of the crews of the trawlers that sup- ported the submarine obstructions, particularly those at Scapa Flow. These trawlers were moored in positions in which they were exposed to the whole fury of northerly and southerly gales; in many cases they were within a few yards of a rocky coast, heavy seas breaking over them and bringing on board tons of water. The skippers knew that they had to stick it out for the sake of the safety of GRAND FLEET AND BASES 83 the Fleet and the maintenance of the obstruction, and under these conditions they did their duty in a manner which calls for the highest praise. Meanwhile the development of the base proper pro- ceeded apace. One of the earlier arrivals was the old cruiser Impérieuse, which was used. as a post office, depot, and general overflow ship to the Cyclops. The number of trawlers and drifters, which had their home at Scapa Flow and which were engaged on patrol or mine- sweeping work, attendance on the Fleet, garrison, or on the mass of Fleet auxiliaries, increased with great rapidity during the winter of 1914-15; on September Ist, 1914, the number was nil, and it reached a total of some four yachts, eighty-five trawlers, and twenty-seven drifters by the summer of 1915. These vessels all looked to the Cyclops, Assistance and Impérieuse for refit, pay, food, and for every conceivable want. Gradually the number of base ships was increased, culminating in the arrival of the old battleship Victorious about March 6, 1916, as the “home” of some 500 dockyard workmen working in the Fleet, fitting the Director System, increasing the protec- tion to decks and magazines, carrying out minor repairs, retubing condensers, and many other urgent tasks. Mention has been made of the large number of colliers, oilers, store ships, ammunition ships, etc., that were used by the Fleet. At one time this caused some criticism, based principally on the time spent by the colliers at the Fleet Base. It may be as well to explain the necessity for this. There were no facilities at the base for the storage of coal, either in lighters or on shore. Consequently, the whole of the coal required at the base was necessarily kept on board the colliers. The actual number of colliers which I deemed it necessary to keep 84 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 at the base during the first two years of war was determined by the necessity for coaling the Fleet and getting it to sea again with the utmost possible rapidity. We could not contempiate such a situation as the Fleet arriving short of fuel, and being delayed in completing owing to shortage of colliers, with the possibility of in- formation being received simultaneously that the High Sea Fleet was at sea and covering a landing raid on our coast! Rapidity of fuelling was of vital importance to the Empire. Therefore, in stating my requirements of colliers, I gave the number necessary to enable almost the whole Fleet to be fuelled simultaneously; in other words, the number of colliers was depe:dent on the number of coal-burning ships in the Fleet. Some slight reduction was found possible, to allow for the probable case of some ships requiring less coal than others, thus admitting of two such ships using one collier in succession; but, broadly speaking, the requirements were as_ stated. When the cargo of colliers fell below a certain minimum, they return to Cardiff to refill to economise ton- nage. At Rosyth the situation was eased by the transport of coal by rail to Grangemouth and its transshipment to colliers there. As we needed colliers as coal-storing ships, so also we required ammunition ships to carry a propor- tion of the reserve ammunition for the Fleet. There were no facilities at Scapa or Cromarty for storage on shore. The number of ships required for this service was, however, much smaller. Floating storage of all sorts possesses one great ad- vantage over shore storage; should strategic conditions necessitate a change of base, the coal, ammunition and other auxiliaries can move with the Fleet. The GRAND FLEET AND BASES 85 same argument applies in a lesser degree to floating docks. A consideration of all these facts connected with the development of fleet bases will show that this question necessarily required a good deal of attention on the part of my Staff and myself, and was incidental to the de- velopment of the Grand Fleet. VII.—TuHEeE PERSONNEL AND ITS WELFARE Another factor in the development of the Fleet, by no means the least important, was that of the moral and spirit of the personnel. It is, of course, impossible to exaggerate the importance of this question as an element in the efficiency of the Fleet. In the early months of war, when the Fleet was continually at sea, the few hours spent in harbour were fully occupied in coaling and stor- ing the ships; but these conditions could not be continued indefinitely. As the months passed with no sign of en- emy vessels at sea and time in harbour increased as com- pared to that spent at sea, it became necessary to find some diversion for the minds of the officers and men. The first step taken at Scapa Flow was carried out under the superintendence of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, then commanding the Ist Battle Squadron. Always alive to the necessity for providing occupation, recreation, and exercise for officers and men, he started considerable works on Flotta Island, works of such a divergent nature as batteries for the defence of the sub- marine obstructions then in progress, football grounds for the men, a golf course for the officers, and landing Piers on the beach. These schemes grew and were eventu- ally divided out amongst the various squadrons, A rifle and pistol range were also constructed, and several piers 86 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 built. The whole of the work was carried out, I may add, by means of Fleet labour. Later a “Canteen” ship, the s.s. Ghourko, was fitted up by the Junior Army and Navy Stores, and this vessel played an important part in the harbour life of the Grand Fleet. She carried stores and provisions of all sorts, available for use by all ships, but particularly of the smaller vessels which could not send their mess stewards far afield in search of a change of diet. She was provided with a stage, and theatrical and cinema entertainments took place on board fre- quently. She was also fitted with a boxing ring, and squadron boxing competitions were held on board with great frequency. Finally, she was utilised for lectures of all sorts, and for the Church services of Roman Catho- lics and Nonconformists. The system of lectures was encouraged to the utmost. Officers lectured on board their ships to the ships’ com- panies on every subject, the War included, and much good resulted. Education was freely developed. The Admiralty provided, at my request, schoolmasters in large numbers, and classes for the boys and voluntary classes for the men in the evenings in harbour were very well attended. And, finally, exercise of all sorts was encouraged to the utmost extent possible. This took the form princi- pally of football, rowing regattas, athletic sports and box- ing. ‘The keenness displayed in all these sports was a certain indication that the personnel was showing no sign of staleness. The Englishman’s love of sport helps him to tide over periods of tedium and weariness, which are most calcu- lated to undermine discipline. Occupation and interest are the surest antidotes to discontent and unrest, and never during the first two and a half years did I see signs GRAND FLEET AND BASES 87 of either. On the contrary, the men, I believe, were thor- oughly happy and contented, treated the War as being in the day’s work, and looked forward eagerly to the day on which their enemy would give them the opportunity for which they were waiting, and for which they kept themselves thoroughly efficient and fit. In those days the officers got to know the men even better than they had done before, and the spirit of com- radeship between all ranks became correspondingly closer. Certainly no Commander-in-Chief could ever have desired to see in the force under his orders a finer spirit than that which animated the officers and men of the Grand Fleet. CHAPTER IV DECLARATION OF WAR AT 8... a.M. on August 4th, 1914, the Grand Fleet pro- ceeded to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders. The ships accompanying the Fleet-Flagship Iron Duke were the vessels of the Ist, 2nd, 8rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, the light cruisers Southampton, Birmingham, Boadicea, Blonde and the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla; the cruisers Shannon, Natal and Rowburgh, and the light cruisers Nottingham, Falmouth and Liverpool, which were at Rosyth with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, were directed to meet the Fleet at a rendezvous in Lat. 58.40 N., Long. 1.80 E. The light cruisers Bellona and Blanche were left behind to coal. A report received from the Admiralty that three Ger- man transports had passed the Great Belt on the even- ing of August 1st had led to the 8rd Cruiser Squadron, with the cruisers Cochrane and Achilles, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, being ordered to sea on the evening of August 3d to cruise to the southward of the Fair Island Channel during the night. The orders under which the Fleet acted were to sweep east as far as Long. 2 E. and, then, for the cruisers to carry out a wide sweep to the southward and south- westward. These orders were in conformity with the general strategical ideas embodied in the War Orders for the Grand Fleet, which, as already indicated, aimed at establishing a blockade; at preventing the enemy forces from getting into the Atlantic to interfere with the opera- 88 DECLARATION OF WAR 89 tions of our cruisers engaged in protecting our own trade as well as stopping trade on the part of the enemy; and at asserting control of the North Sea and denying it to the enemy. Pursuant to these orders, the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were directed to sweep the area between Lat. 60 and 61 N., working eastward from the Shetland Islands to Long. 2 E., arriv- ing there at 4 P.m., thence to sweep to the S.E. until 5 a.m. on August 5th, when they were on a line drawn S.W. from Hangesund Light in Lat. 59.25 N. with the eastern ship 20 miles from the coast. The Antrim and Argyll, being short of fuel, were detached during the evening of August 4th to coal at Scapa. The sweep was prolonged to the westward by the cruisers and light cruisers from Rosyth; the 2nd Flotilla was detached to Rosyth to fuel. This first sweep was begun in northern waters because the North Sea is narrower at this point, and also because it afforded oppor- tunity of intercepting vessels which might have left German ports two days previously in anticipation of hostilities. The cruiser sweep was supported by the Battle Fleet, which steamed as far as Long. 2 E., turning at 3 a.M. on August 5th to the westward. The 8rd Battle Squadron which had been compelled to leave Scapa 80 per cent. short of fuel owing to the paucity of colliers, was detached to that base at 8.30 P.M. on the 4th, to complete with coal. During the night information was received by wireless telegraphy that war had been declared against Germany at midnight, 4th-5th August, and the following gracious message was received from His Majesty the King and was communicated to the Fleet: “At this grave moment in our National History, I 90 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 send to you and through you to the officers and men of the Fleet of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy, and prove once again the sure Shield of Britain and of her Empire in the hour of trial.” During daylight on the 5th, the Battle Fleet cruised to the northward of Lat. 57.30 N., in accordance with Admiralty telegraphic orders; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was sent back to Scapa to coal, as well as four light cruisers and the Lowestoft, and the 4th Flotilla was sent to Invergordon for a similar purpose. In the after- noon, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the cruiser Devon- shire, as well as the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, were detached to sweep to the eastward, and the Battle Fleet turned to the southward at 3 a.m. on the 6th to meet the 8rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron in Lat. 59 N., Long. 1.0 E. During August 6th the following reports were re- ceived: (a) Two German cruisers were reported passing Trondhjem going north. (This came from the Admiralty.) (b) Four torpedo-boats had been seen off the north- west end of the Shetlands going north. (This was a local report.) (c) The German liner Kronprinzessin Cecilie was stated to have passed through the Stronsay Firth, Ork- neys, bound east, during the night of the 5th-6th. (Local report.) The destroyer Oak was despatched to search the vicinity of the Stronsay and Westray Firths, but obtained no confirmation of the report. (d) It was reported that the Germans had established DECLARATION OF WAR gI a base in Lat. 62 N. on the Norwegian coast (the exact position unknown). A search of the coast by cruisers revealed nothing in confirmation of the last report, but a British trawler reported that a large number of German merchant ships had assembled in the West Fiord and in the harbours of the Lofoten Islands on the coast of Norway. Reports as to the Germans having established a base on the Nor- wegian coast were very persistent during the early days of the War. These reports were probably to some extent due to the ideas prevailing before the War as to German intentions in this respect, thesa views being naturally coloured by the frequent visits of the German High Sea Fleet in peace time to Norwegian waters, particularly to the vicinity of Trondhjem. In 1911, when I commanded the Atlantic Fleet, ar- rangements had been made for me to visit Norwegian ports at the same time as the High Sea Fleet, in order to bring about a meeting between the two navies, with, it was hoped, beneficial results. But the Agadir crisis intervened, and the visit was postponed. The meeting took place in 1914, when a portion of the 2nd Battle Squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, visited Kiel during the regatta week, very shortly before the outbreak of war. During daylight of August 6th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet cruised between Lat. 59 N. and 60 N. and Long. 1 E. and 1 W.; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron swept to the eastward between Lat. 58 N. and 60 N., thence to the northward along the Norwegian coast, and to the Shetlands and Scapa Flow, the 8rd Battle Squadron being detached to the N.E. to cover them. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron rejoined the Battle Fleet at sea after refuelling; the 92 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 2nd Flotilla left Rosyth at daylight and swept to the north-eastward; and the 4th Flotilla left Invergordon with orders to search the vicinity of the Pentland Firth for sub- marines prior to the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the 7th. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Scapa at 6 A.M. on the 7th to fuel; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron arrived at 10 a.m., and during the day the 8rd Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd Flotilla, carried out a thorough search of the Norwegian coast, being covered by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 8rd Battle Squadron. No sign of a German base could be discovered, and the force was ordered back to Scapa to fuel. The fuelling of the Fleet was considerably delayed, owing to the inadequate number of colliers, many of those present being also unsuitable for the work of rapid coal- ing. The lack of lubricating oil for the 83rd Battle Squadron also caused trouble, but these early difficulties, although a source of considerable anxiety at the com- mencement of hostilities, were overcome later. The greatest anxiety constantly confronting me was the defenceless nature of the base at Scapa, which was open to submarine and destroyer attacks. Whilst the Fleet was fuelling the only protection that could be afforded was to anchor light cruisers and destroyers off the various entrances and to patrol outside the main entrance; but these measures were no real defence against submarines, and the position was such that it was deemed most inadvisable to keep the Fleet in harbour longer than was absolutely necessary for fuelling pur- poses. Accordingly, at 6.30 p.m. on the same day, the Battle Fleet again proceeded to sea, being screened through the Pentland Firth to the westward until dark by the 4th Flotilla, and course being then shaped to pass DECLARATION OF WAR 93 round the Orkneys into the North Sea. In order to provide some protection against destroyer attack, a re- quest was forwarded to the Admiralty asking that two of the older battleships might be sent up to defend the main entrances. This measure was approved and a reply was received that the Hannibal and Magnificent were being despatched. The Russell, Albemarle and Eamouth, of the 6th Battle Squadron, belonging originally to the Channel Fleet, arrived at Scapa to join the Grand Fleet on the night of the 7th-8th. At 9.30 p.m. on the 8th the battleships Orion, Monarch and A jaa were detached to carry out target practice, and the remainder of the Fleet proceeded to the south-east- ward from Fair Island, carrying out Fire Control Exer- cises; but, on receipt of a report from the Monarch that a torpedo had been fired at her by a submarine, the prac- tice was stopped and the ships rejoined, one-half of the 2nd Flotilla being directed to search for the submarine. At 6.30 p.m. the officer of the watch on board the Iron Duke sighted a periscope and altered course to ram; the same periscope was shortly afterwards reported by the Dreadnought, but was not seen again. At 4 A.M. on the 9th, the Fleet was in Lat. 58.31 N., Long. 1.9 E. Shortly afterwards the Orion reported a strong smell of oil, and bubbles were seen on the surface, and the Birmingham, commanded by Captain A. M. Duff, of the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been screen- ing ahead of the Fleet with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, claimed to have rammed and sunk the German submarine U 15, which she had sighted on the surface. This initial success was hailed with great satisfaction in the Fleet. Subsequent information showed that the Birmingham 94 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 had been handled with great promptitude. During day- light of August 9th, the Battle Fleet and Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron were cruising in company, the noon po- sition being Lat. 58.41 N., Long. 0.15 W., and as the pres- ence of submarines was suspected, the Fleet was con- stantly zigzagging, the ships altering course by “Blue Pendant” turns, that is, turning together Ly signal. At midnight, 9th-10th, the position of the Iron Duke was Lat. 57.51 N., Long. 1.2 E. On the 9th a telegram was dispatched to the Admiralty requesting that the movements of the Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) might be directed from the Ad- miralty, whilst the Commander-in-Chief with the Fleet remained in northern waters, as it was not possible to be sufficiently conversant with the conditions in the south for the Commander-in-Chief to control these movements. This plan was adopted and continued throughout the War. On August 10th, the movements of the Fleet were as follows: At 5 a.m. the Iron Duke parted company from the Fleet and proceeded to Scapa in order that the Com- mander-in-Chief might communicate by land wire with the Admiralty and make further arrangements for the work at the fleet bases. The Iron Duke, with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the Falmouth, Liverpool and Bellona, arrived at Scapa at 2.30 p.m., the 2nd Flotilla forming a submarine screen through the Pentland Firth. The remainder of the Battle Fleet proceeded north under the command of Sir George Warrender to a posi- tion to the westward of the Shetlands, in accordance with telegraphic directions received from the Admiralty, where it was considered that the submarine danger in the North Sea was considerable at this time. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was detached to sweep a wide area to DECLARATION OF WAR 95 northward and westward in advance of the Battle Fleet, which was screened by the 4th Flotilla as far north as Lat. 60 N.; this flotilla was then detached for opera- tions on the Norwegian coast in conjunction with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The latter force was directed to search for a suspected German submarine base in the vicinity of Stavanger Fiord. The Flag officer in command was directed to carry out the operation of endeavouring to locate this base—if it existed—with due regard to the susceptibilities of the Norwegians. Commodore W. E. Goodenough, com- manding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, visited Stav- anger in the Southampton and was assured by the Norwegian authorities that no base had been formed in that vicinity by the enemy. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the Falmouth left Scapa at 10 p.m. on the 10th to co-operate with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, the Hannibal and Magnificent having arrived at Scapa at 4 p.m. These two battleships were stationed to defend the Hoxa and Hoy entrances to Scapa Flow against attack by destroyers. Rear-Admiral Miller, who arrived in the Hannibal, was placed in administrative charge of the base and of the local defences, and arrangements were made for the local Territorial Force and other inhabitants of the Orkneys and Shetlands to patrol the coast and watch the harbours. Telephonic communication round the coast was estab- lished by degrees. Reports were received of aeroplanes having been seen over the Orkneys on the evening of the 10th, and the Centurion reported having sighted an airship north of the Shetlands on the same evening. Little credence was at- tached to these reports, which in the early days of the War were very frequently received. 96 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 August 11th—The Iron Duke left Scapa and re- joined the Battle Fleet at 5 p.m. in Lat. 60.8 N., Long. 3.28 W. The Battle Fleet was then exercised in forming line of battle, and also carried out sub-calibre gun prac- tice. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron joined after com- pleting its northern sweep and was detached to Scapa to fuel at 8 p.m. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and 4th Flotilla, having completed their examination of the Norwegian coast, returned, some to Scapa and some to Cromarty, to fuel. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron returned to a position N.E. by E., 30 miles from Kinnaird Head. The Drake, flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral W. L. ‘Grant, which had joined the Grand Fleet, was dispatched to search the coast of the Faroe Islands for possible enemy bases. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the old cruisers of the “Edgar” class, had by this time been established on a northern patrol area between the Shet- lands and the Norwegian coast, under the command of Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair. On this day orders were given to establish Loch Ewe, on the north-west coast of Scotland, as a secondary coaling base for the Fleet, and Rear-Admiral Richard P. F. Purefoy was appointed to take charge of the base. A week of war had now elapsed without any move whatever being made on the part of the High Sea Fleet; the only German naval activities had been mine-laying in southern waters during the first two days of the War, together with some submarine activity in the North Sea. The British Fleet during the week had been largely occu- pied in boarding all merchant vessels sighted, and in insti- tuting as strict a blockade as was possible. August 12th.—The Battle Fleet to the westward of the Orkneys (noon position Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 4.12 W.) THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL HAILSEY), AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT FITZHERBERT), ON BOARD H. M. s. “IRON DUKE” DECLARATION OF WAR 97 was exercised during the forenoon and afternoon at battle tactics and carried out gunnery practices between 4 and 8 P.M.; it proceeded then to Scapa Flow to fuel, arriving at daylight on the 15th, with the exception of the 3rd Battle Squadron, which went to Loch Ewe to coal, and to test the suitability of this base and its capability for defence against submarine attack. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been fuelling at Scapa, left before dark on the 12th to cruise west of the Orkneys with orders to economise fuel in view of a projected operation to the southward. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the Falmouth swept 100 miles to the south-eastward from Kinnaird Head during the day, and then returned to Cromarty to fuel. The Bellona and Liverpool swept to the south-east- ward of the Pentland Firth during the day and night of the 12th, together with one-half of the 2nd Flotilla as a guard against destroyer attack on the Fleet whilst coal- ing. The 10th Cruiser Squadron remained on the northern patrol. A report was received from Rear-Admiral Grant, in the Drake, that the position in the Faroe Islands was quite satisfactory, neutrality being observed. The Drake remained on patrol to the north-eastward of the Faroe Islands, and two ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were sent to assist her in her work of blockade. Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears was on this date appointed in charge of the Fleet Base at Cromarty. The Admiralty informed me that a neutral steamer from Hamburg had arrived in England and reported that there were fourteen enemy battleships at Cuxhaven on the 9th inst., together with several mine-layers; that there were 30 destroyers between Cuxhaven and Heligo- land, and that a large mine-field had been laid outside the 98 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 entrance to the Jade river. This was the first definite news of the enemy’s main fleet. August 18th—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet was coaling at Scapa during the day, and the 8rd Battle Squadron coaling and storing at Loch Ewe. My object in providing this alternative base was to expedite entry into the bases for fuelling, and also to be prepared with a second base in the event of Scapa Flow becoming untenable by submarine attack. The Albemarle relieved the Liverpool and Bellona on patrol to the eastward of the Orkneys in the evening, these two ships returning to Scapa to fuel. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was at sea west of the Orkneys; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty coal- ing; the 8rd Cruiser Squadron at sea sweeping to the south-eastward from the Aberdeenshire coast; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa coaling. The Falmouth was now attached to this squadron, The 10th Cruiser Squadron and the Drake were on the northern and Faroe patrols. During the day the Commander-in-Chief held a conference with the Flag officers of the Fleet and explained the operations con- templated on the 15th and 16th inst. At 7.30 p.m. the Dreadnought Battle Fleet proceeded to sea to the west- ward, except two ships which had not finished coaling, the operation having been again delayed owing to an insufficient number of colliers being provided. They fol- lowed later. The Ajax reported a turret defective, and was sent back to effect repairs with the aid of the Cyclops. August 14th.—During the forenoon the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and battle cruisers were carrying out target practice. Noon position of the Iron Duke, Lat. 59.11 N., Long. 4.27 W. DECLARATION OF WAR 99 At 2 p.m. all Battle Squadrons, including the 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth and the 6th Battle Squad- ron, rejoined the Flag, and battle exercises, including de- ployments, were carried out till 7 p.m. At midnight the whole Fleet passed through the Fair Island Channel on its way to carry out a sweep in the North Sea. During the night of the 14th-15th all squadrons were moving towards a concentration rendezvous in the North Sea, that for the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons being Lat. 58.52 N., Long. 0.0, and for the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron Lat. 59.0 N., Long. 0.15 E., at 3 a.m. on the 15th; the rendezvous for the 2nd and 4th Flotillas was Lat. 59. 7 N., Long. 0.40 W., at 4 a.m. the 15th; for the mine-sweepers Lat. 58.40 N., Long. 3.45 E., at 6. P.M. the 15th; four ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron from the northern patrol joined the Fleet at 6 a.m. on the 15th. Towards the end of July, 1914, information from a usually reliable source had been received at the Admiralty indicating that the Germans intended carrying out a very extensive mine-laying policy in British waters in the event of war between the two countries. The actual positions of many mine-fields were given by our informant, and it was apparent, provided the information were correct, that the enemy intended to lay mines regardless of their effect on mercantile traffic, whether British, Allied, or neutral. The proceedings of the mine-layer Kéningen Louise in the first days of war tended to confirm this view, and consequently it was thought to be quite probable that mine-fields of an extensive character might be laid in the North Sea, in positions where they might be expected to be effective against any movement of our Fleet, par- ticularly any southward movement. The small margin of superiority which we possessed 100 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914--1916 over the German fleet, as compared with the immense difference in our naval responsibilities, made it very nec- essary that precautions should be taken to safeguard the most valuable of our ships from such a menace when op- erating in waters that might be mined. It was for this reason that the six mine-sweepers accompanied the Battle Fleet during this sweep, for, al- though the speed of the Fleet was necessarily reduced by their presence in order to admit of sweeping operations, and the danger from submarine attack thereby increased, and although the sweeping operations could only be car- ried out in an exploratory fashion, there was the chance that the danger incurred by taking the whole Fleet over possible mine-fields might be much reduced. Later, when it became impossible to take the sweepers to sea as their presence was more necessary in the vicinity of the bases, the practice was introduced of placing one of the older battleships of the 6th Battle Squadron ahead of each squadron of the Dreadnought Fleet in order that these less valuable ships might first discover the mines instead of the Dreadnought battleships. The officers and men of the 6th Battle Squadron named their Squadron the “Mine Bumping Squadron” on this account. August 15th.—At noon the Iron Duke’s position was Lat. 58.16 N., Long. 1.45 E., the whole Fleet being in company in cruising order and steering to the eastward, preparatory to turning south. The plan of operations included a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea by cruiser forces comprising some of the older cruisers, to- gether with the Ist and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich; two of our submarines had been ordered to be off the Ems and two off the Jade by 6 a.m. on the 16th. During the day three sea-planes and two aeroplanes arrived at Scapa for reconnaissance work from the base. DECLARATION OF WAR 101 August 16th—At 4 a.m. the Iron Duke was in Lat. 56.43 N., Long. 4.5 E. At 8 a.M., no report having been received of the sighting of any German vessels, the Commander-in-Chief directed the cruisers to continue the sweep until 9.30 a.m. At this time the Fleet-flagship Iron Duke’s position was Lat. 55.56 N., Long. 4.40 E., the battle cruisers being some 40 to 50 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. The only enemy vessel seen was one submarine by the New Zealand at 10.85 a.m. in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 5.26 E. The weather was very fine with high visibility, and at 9.30 a.m., the cruisers being then well to the southward of the latitude of the Horn Reef, the whole Fleet turned to the northward, the Battle Fleet on a north by west course, at a speed of 12 knots, zigzagging. Rear-Admiral Christian, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, reported that the sweep of the southern force had been unproductive. The cruisers were now disposed on a wide front for a northerly sweep, spreading from the Norwegian coast, for a distance of 150 miles, to the westward, with the Battle Fleet in the centre. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron swept to Lister, on the Norwegian coast, and then along that coast as far as Lat. 60 N., thence towards Kinnaird Head, with the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron prolonging and supporting. The 8rd Cruiser Squadron extended the front to the westward, supported by the 3rd Battle Squadron. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained in rear of the Battle Fleet until dusk, and then was stationed 12 miles ahead. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, spread 10 miles apart, covered the area between the Battle Fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd and 4th Flotillas re- mained with the Battle Fleet, acting as a submarine 102 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 screen by day, and keeping in rear of the Fleet at night. The mine-sweepers, which had swept ahead of the Battle Fleet when on the southerly course, acted as a submarine screen during the passage to the northward. During the night of the 16th-17th the 8rd Cruiser Squad- ron was detached to Cromarty to coal, the 10th Cruiser Squadron to Scapa to coal, and to resume the northern patrol, and the 6th Battle Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla mine-sweepers and 8rd Battle Squadron proceeded to Scapa to fuel. August 17th—At 7.15 a.m. the Dreadnought Battle Fleet altered course to pass through the Fair Island Channel, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron rejoined, The 4th Flotilla, which had been disposed astern during the night, resumed station as a submarine screen at day- light. The Battle Fleet zigzagged as usual throughout daylight. At noon the Iron Duke’s position was Lat. 58.59 N., Long. 1.85 E. At midnight, Lat. 59.27 N., Long. 2.25 W., and at 8 a.m. the 18th, Lat. 58.44 N., Long. 4.47 W. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the northerly sweep sighted only neutral vessels and proceeded to work in an area designated as No. 5 (eastward from Kinnaird Head). Noon position, Lat. 58.42 N., Long. 3.0 E. This area, No. 5, was designed to cover the approach to the Pentland Firth, both for blockade purposes and as an outpost position for the Fleet at Scapa. At this time, the northern and central parts of the North Sea were divided into certain numbered areas in which cruisers could be directed by wireless to work with- out the necessity of making a long signal. The various areas were approximately placed as follows: DECLARATION OF WAR 103 Area No. 1.—Covering the route round the north end of the Shetland Islands from the southward and eastward. ““ No. 2.—Covering the Fair Island Channel to south-eastward, ‘working down to the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire. “ No. 3. South-eastward from the N.E. end of the Orkneys to Lat. of Kinnaird Head, with a width of about 50 miles from the line Noss Head—Kinnaird Head. ““ No. 4.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head —Udsire Lighthouse between 70 and 140 miles from Kinnaird Head. “No. 5.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head —Udsire Lighthouse, between Area 4 and Norwegian territorial waters. ** No. 6.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head —Udsire Lighthouse, between 20 and 70 miles from Kinnaird Head. “No. 7.—Between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.50 N. and between 50 and 150 miles from the English coast. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, having coaled, left to resume the northern patrol; the Drake, and the two ships acting with her, were ordered to return to Scapa to coal, and directions were given for the other two ships to rejoin the 10th Cruiser Squadron subsequently. During the day the Orion developed serious condenser defects, neces- sitating retubing her condensers. A telegram was sent to the Admiralty requesting that new condenser tubes might be sent at once to Loch Ewe, together with dock- yard workmen to assist with the retubing. Meanwhile arrangements were made for giving fleet assistance to the Orion, and for all suitable spare condenser tubes from the fleet to be sent to her on arrival. The situation as regards the coal supply to the Fleet had by this time become very serious, and was causing me much anxiety; in reply to strong representations to the Admiralty, a telegram was received explaining the position and the efforts being made to rectify matters, 104 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 The Admiralty also informed me of the great impor- tance that was attached to the efficiency of the northern patrol, and stated that four armed merchant ships were being sent to reinforce the 10th Cruiser Squadron. The constant sea work had by this time shown the inadequacy of the engine-room implements of all ships for war conditions, and, in consequence of representa- tions to this effect, 1,000 R.N.R. firemen were sent to Scapa for distribution amongst the various ships. The benefit derived from this measure was very considerable. Two Fleet messenger vessels, the Cambria and Anglia, arrived at Scapa on the 17th. These ships were used for communication between the bases, for carrying maiis and despatches, and for boarding duties. August 18th—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe to fuel early in the afternoon; it was accompanied by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron which was without the Falmouth and Liverpool. The attached cruisers were anchored in suitable positions for defending the entrance against submarine attack, so far as they were capable of doing it, and the armed steamboats of the fleet patrolled the entrance. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been detached to Scapa at daylight to fuel. A coaling base for the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been by this time established at Lerwick in order to shorten the distance for the ships when proceeding to fuel. The Alsatian, an armed mer- chant ship, joined the 10th Cruiser Squadron. The Assistance arrived at Loch Ewe as base repair ship, and was connected to the shore telegraph system. Aeroplanes were reported off Foula Island, south-west of the Shetlands, during the night of the 18th-19th. En- quiry showed this rumour to be false. The Admiralty informed me on this date that Rear- DECLARATION OF WAR 105 Admiral Arthur Christian, with his Flag in the Sapphire, had been placed in command of all forces in the southern portion of the North Sea, namely, Cruiser force C, the destroyer and submarine flotillas. As already explained, these forces were acting under direct Admiralty orders and were independent of me, unless ordered to join my Flag. This organisation was dropped later on, after the loss of the Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue, Cruiser force C being abolished, and the command of the destroyer and sub- marine forces reverting to their own senior officers. August 19th, 21st, 22nd.—The Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron remained in harbour during the 19th, coaling, storing, cleaning boilers, and taking in addi- tional ammunition up to a maximum storage. With the exception of the Orion, these ships left on the 20th at 6.30 p.M. for an area to the westward of the Orkneys and Shetlands, with orders to carry out target practice on the 21st. The battle cruiser New Zealand was ordered to the Humber to join the Invincible. As Commodore Keyes reported on this date that our submarines in the Heligoland Bight were being followed and watched by German trawlers fitted with wireless, I informed the Admiralty that I proposed to treat such vessels as men of war. This was approved. The 2nd and 8rd Cruiser Squadrons were directed to work in Patrol Area 1 alternately, and to carry out target practice in the Cromarty Firth, en route to the patrol area. The practice of the Battle Fleet on the 21st was inter- fered with by fog and the Fleet did not form up until late at night, and passed through the Fair Island Channel into the North Sea during the early morning of the 22nd. The Battle Fleet was joined off Fair Island by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was exercised in battle tactics during the day, and in the afternoon was joined by the 106 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 2nd Flotilla as a submarine screen in Lat. 59.50 N., Long. 1.30 E. The position of the Iron Duke at midnight, 22nd-28rd, was Lat. 59.84 N., Long. 1.58 E., steering to southward. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been detained at Scapa by fog during the 21st, carried out target practice to the westward of the Orkneys on the 22nd, and then proceeded to a position in Lat. 59.15 N., Long. 1 E., in readiness to support cruisers of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the 6th Cruiser Squadron, now comprising the Drake and King Alfred, which were ordered to work between Scotland and Norway in areas to the southward of the position named. There were no reports of enemy ships being sighted except one submarine in Lat. 55.4 N., Long. 1.35 E., on August 20th. The Admiralty informed me on this date that the Portsmouth floating-dock had left for Cromarty northabout, in pursuance of the policy decided on before the War. It was, therefore, suggested that one of the boy artificers’ floating workshops should be sent north to work in conjunction with the dock. Steps were taken to carry out this suggestion, but the ship was lost on passage in bad weather near Portland. August 23rd.—The Battle Fleet remained cruising in the North Sea in support of the Cruiser Squadrons, the weather being misty, with rain. The 3rd Battle Squadron was detached to Scapa to coal, to arrive at daylight, the 24th; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and Ist Light Cruiser Squadron, supported by the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron, were sweeping to the southward as far south as Lat. 56 N.; the Alsatian was sent with the 6th Cruiser Squadron to look out off Jaederens Point, on the southern coast of Norway, to ascertain if German merchant ships, trying to make their own ports, were leaving territorial DECLARATION OF WAR 107 waters at this point, and, if so, to capture them. One- half of the 2nd Flotilla was screening the Battle Fleet, the second half searching for a submarine reported east of the Orkneys. A submarine was sighted by the Ruby of the 2nd Flotilla with the Battle Fleet at 5 p.x1., and course altered to avoid her. The destroyers Rifleman and Comet collided in a fog, the latter being considerably damaged. The Sappho was sent to search North Rona Island, a statement having been received indicating that it might possibly have been used by the enemy as a base for air- craft. She reported, after examination, that the island was, as expected, unsuitable for such a purpose. The Ajax reported having burnt out a boiler, and the Admiralty was asked to instruct the contractors to send to Scapa men and tubes for retubing it. The King Edward VII. reported cracks in the inner A tubes of two of her 12-inch guns. August 24th—The Battle Fleet cruised between the Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, and carried out battle tactics during the forenoon, the weather becoming too thick in the afternoon. The Ist Battle Squadron was detached to Scapa to fuel, as well as the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron, the latter being relieved by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. The re- mainder of the cruisers continued their sweeping opera- tions as on the 28rd. August 25th—The 8rd Battle Squadron left Scapa to relieve the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in immediate sup- port of the cruisers at 6 a.M., and while en route to its position captured an Austrian steamer, the Attila. The remainder of the Battle Fleet left its cruising ground, arriving at Scapa at 7.30 a.m. on the 26th, with the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron to fuel. The Agincourt, a new 108 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 battleship which was bought from Turkey when still in an unfinished state, was met off Noss Head and entered with the Fleet. At 5.80 p.m. a submarine was sighted from the bridge of the Iron Duke, and the Fleet manceuvred clear of the position. One-half of the 4th Flotilla, which had screened the 8rd Battle Squadron to sea, joined the Commander- in-Chief at 5 p.m., and was ordered to search for this submarine, but without result. The Drake, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, left the Norwegian coast for Scapa at 4 a.M., the 25th, owing to condenser trouble. The Dominion reported two of her 12-inch guns cracked. The King Edward VII. left Scapa for Devon- port to change her two guns, which had also cracked, Vice-Admiral Bradford shifting his flag to the battleship Dominion. The weather was thick during the night of the 25th- 26th, but the fog lifted sufficiently for the Battle Fleet to enter Scapa. August 26th.—The Iron Duke, the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd Flotilla, were at Scapa fuelling. The 1st Battle Squadron, with one-half of the 4th Flotilla, left to join the 8rd Battle Squadron at sea, their departure having been delayed for some hours by thick fog. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 5 p.m. for Rosyth to coal. . The 6th Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 8 P.M. to coal, the King Alfred at Scapa, and the Alsatian at Liverpool; the arrangements in the large merchant-ships were such as to render coaling from colliers a difficult and slow progress. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, except the Mantua, left the northern patrol to coal at Scapa. DECLARATION OF WAR 109 During the day the Admiralty informed me of some operations which the southern forces were intended to carry out in the Heligoland Bight on the 28th, and di- rected that the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron should join in the operations. I made urgent representations as to the necessity of supporting the force with battle cruisers, and informed the Admiralty that I was sending the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron to take part. I requested that the Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the Com- modore, Ist Light Cruiser Squadron, might be informed direct by the Admiralty of the positions which the other ships would occupy, and that the senior officers of the southern force taking part should also be informed of the presence of the battle cruisers and Ist Light Cruiser Squadron. On this date 1,000 additional seamen ratings arrived to join the Fleet, experience having shown that the num- ber of deck complements, as well as the engine-room complements, required increasing, principally owing to the heavy guns of the secondary armament being so con- stantly manned at sea—by day against submarine attack, and by night against destroyer attack. August 27th.—On this date I wired to the Admiralty proposing the erection of two wireless stations in the Orkneys for local communication, and a directional sta- tion to assist in locating the positions of German ships using wireless. The remainder of the Battle Fleet pro- ceeded to sea at 6 P.M. to join the 1st and 8rd Battle Squadrons at 7 A.M. on the 28th to the south-eastward of the Orkneys in Lat. 58.20 N., Long. 0.20 W. The 2nd Flotilla accompanied the Fleet as a submarine screen. On this date a patrol of the eastern approaches to the Pentland Firth was inaugurated by the Mine-laying Squadron which was not required at the time for mine- 110 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 laying operations, with. the object of ensuring a closer watch on the mercantile traffic through the Pentland Firth, and the Oceanic, an armed merchant cruiser, which had joined the Fleet, was detached to carry out a patrol to the westward of the Fair Island Channel in order to con- trol the traffic at this point. Information was received from the Admiralty of the existence of mined areas off Harwich, Flamborough Head and Tynemouth. The positions of the two latter mine- fields appeared to corroborate the information obtained prior to the outbreak of war. A collision occurred at 9.80 p.m. between the Bellero- phon and the s.s St. Clair, which was passing through the Fleet. The St. Clair was damaged, but the damage to the Bellerophon. was not serious. August 28th.—The weather was misty with a visibility of 4 to 6 miles until the evening, when it cleared slightly. The Battle Fleet during the day proceeded to the south- ward, the noon position being Lat. 58.19 N., Long. 0.21 E., with cruisers in advance. The Fleet was exercised during the day at battle tac- tics. The sweep of light forces into the Heligoland Bight which took place at dawn was successful in bringing enemy light forces to action. The official despatches relating to this operation are given in an Appendix. The events may be shortly described here. At 6.53 a.m. Commodore Tyrwhitt, commanding the Harwich force, which had swept into the Heligoland Bight during the night to cut off enemy vessels, sighted a destroyer and chased her. From 7.20 to 8 a.m. the Arethusa and the 3rd Flotilla: were in action with destroyers and torpedo-boats making for Heligoland, sinking one destroyer. At 7.57 the Arethusa, Commodore Tyrwhitt’s flagship, which had been in commission only a few days, sighted two enemy DECLARATION OF WAR III light cruisers, and engaged them, assisted a little later by the light cruiser Fearless. At 8.25 a.m. a hit from the Arethusa wrecked the fore bridge of one of the enemy ships, and they both steamed at once for Heligoland, which was then sighted, and our ships turned to the west- ward. The Arethusa had been considerably damaged during the action and had suffered several casualties. At 10.55 a.m. another German light cruiser was sighted by the Arethusa, and on being attacked by the Fearless and destroyers turned away; she reappeared at 11.5 and engaged the Arethusa and Fearless and was attacked by these ships and by destroyers and again turned away. Meanwhile Commodore Tyrwhitt had informed Sir David Beatty of the position, and that officer pro- ceeded at full speed to his support. The light cruiser Mainz had been attacking the somewhat disabled Arethusa and the Fearless at about 11.80 a.m. and had suffered very severely in the action, being practically disabled. The arrival of the First Light Cruiser Squadron, under Com- modore Goodenough, on the scene at about noon secured her destruction, Between 12.37 p.m and 1.45 p.m. the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron en- gaged two other German light cruisers, one of which was sunk; the second was last seen burning furiously and in a sinking condition. Even thus early in the War the difference between the behaviour of British and German seamen was notice- able. On the British side, in addition to other assistance rendered to the survivors of the Mainz (which had been sunk), Commander Keyes, in the destroyer Firedrake, proceeded alongside and rescued 220 of her crew, many of them being wounded. A German light cruiser opened fire on the British destroyers engaged in picking up sur- 112 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 vivors from the German destroyer V187 when that ves- sel was sunk by our craft, thus making it necessary for the destroyers to leave behind the boats carrying out the rescue work. The British submarine E4 afterwards took our officers and men out of these boats and left some un- wounded Germans to take the other boats, which con- tained German wounded, to Heligoland. In the afternoon of August 28th the 10th Cruiser Squadron was directed to work in Area No. 6, leaving the armed merchant cruisers farther to the northward. The object was to give a better chance of intercepting enemy vessels or neutral ships carrying contraband of war by establishing two patrols on the probable exit or entrance courses, one of which would in all probability be crossed of necessity during daylight hours, even if the second were passed through at night. August 29th.—This was a bright, fine day, with high visibility. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at sea with three divisions of the 2nd Flotilla, cruising and carrying out battle tactics and other exercises. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa to fuel at 7 P.M., in company with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the Liverpool being detached to Rosyth to land the German prisoners captured in the Heligoland Bight on the 28th. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was cruising in Area No. 5, which the 3rd Cruiser Squadron left during the day for Cromarty to fuel. The 6th Cruiser Squadron and 10th Cruiser Squadron were in Area No. 6; the mine-layers were in Area No. 38. During the day the Oak arrived from Scapa with tele- grams and despatches for me and returned with similar correspondence for the Admiralty. The Oak was usually employed on this duty while the Iron Duke was at sea DECLARATION OF WAR 113 during the earlier months of the War, my infrequent visits to a base rendering this essential. Some risk from submarine attack was naturally in- volved during the time that the Iron Duke, or any other heavy ship, was stopped to communicate. The risk was recognised, and, as the number of enemy submarines in- creased, it became undesirable to incur it, and the prac- tice of stopping ships at sea for any such purpose was abandoned; the longer time spent in harbour tended to reduce the necessity for the practice to some extent, but during the early part of the War this was the only means of conveying despatches to the Fleet when it was con- stantly at sea, The reported increase in enemy mine-laying off our eastern coasts caused me to suggest to the Admiralty at this time the desirability of the patrol flotillas working somewhat farther seaward, and to ask for an increase as soon as possible in the number of fast light craft to work off the northern fleet bases. A request for 20 drifters to work in the approaches to the Pentland Firth was also forwarded. The Fleet messenger Cambria was brought out to work with the Battle Fleet for the purpose of boarding merchant ships owing to the shortage of light cruisers for this work. August 30th—In the afternoon the Dreadnought Battle Fleet shaped course for Scapa, and arrived at 7: A.M. on the 81st to fuel, the 38rd Battle Squadron being ordered out to the eastward of the Orkneys to support the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, which was searching the eastern portion of Area 5. The patrol of the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons was continued as usual, the 6th Cruiser Squadron leaving the Area at 3 A.M. on the 31st to fuel at Scapa. During the day the Assistance returned to Scapa from 114 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 Loch Ewe as base ship, and the Illustrious arrived there as defence ship for the entrance. I had decided her posi- tion during my previous visit. As a result of inquiries of the Admiralty, I was in- formed that trawlers were being taken up and armed for patrol duties as rapidly as possible, and that arrangements for the defences of Scapa, which had formed the subject of correspondence between the Admiralty and myself, had been approved, including the laying of certain mine-fields at the entrances. August 31st—A sweep towards the Scottish coast of all vessels at sea, or ready for sea, was carried out in consequence of information having been received pointing to the possibility of mine-laying by the enemy in the vicinity of the Pentland Firth or Moray Firth during the night of August 31st-September Ist; the sweep was arranged to intercept the enemy mine-layers on their return trip. But it was unproductive, no mine-laying having taken place. The squadrons engaged in the sweep were the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Battle Squad- ron, 8rd Cruiser Squadron, 10th Cruiser Squadron. In consequence of urgent representations as to the insufficiency of .3803 rifle ammunition for the Army, all ships disembarked 50 per cent. of their ammunition of this calibre at the end of August for conveyance to Woolwich. ‘ Later, still more of the rifle ammunition and all but a very small number of rifles, as well as many machine- guns, were landed from the Fleet for use by the Army. A meeting of all the captains of Dreadnought battle- ships was held on board the Iron Duke on August 81st in order to discuss with them the subject of tactics in action. CHAPTER V THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA On September Ist the Dreadnought Battle Fleet with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 6th Cruiser Squadron and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were at Scapa Flow, clean- ing boilers, storing, and taking in ammunition, etc. The Fleet was at the usual anchorage off Scapa Pier, on the north side of the Flow; the ships which were fitted with torpedo nets had them out, as was customary, unless col- liers or store-ships were alongside. The Falmouth, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was anchored to the westward of Holm Sound, and the re- mainder of this squadron formed the outer or southward line of ships, all at two hours’ notice for steam. The weather during the day was dull and misty, with rain at times. At 6 p.m, the Falmouth reported the periscope of a submarine in sight inside the harbour, and immediately opened fire, four rounds being fired by this ship; she reported having probably hit the submarine. Directly afterwards the Vanguard, one of the outer line of battle- ships, also opened fire on an object reported as a peri- scope, as did one of the E class destroyers, which was pa- trolling between the Fleet and the Hoxa entrance. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was directed to weigh immediately steam was ready, which was at 8.30 p.m., and to endeavour to locate the submarine and keep her under. The 2nd Flotilla, lying at Longhope, at short notice, 115 116 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 was also instructed to weigh at once and search for the submarine. The whole of the ships present were ordered to raise steam with all despatch, and to prepare for tor- pedo attack, and the small craft, such as drifters, steam- boats, motor-boats, yachts, etc., which had steam ready and which could be collected, were at once organised in detachments to steam up and down the lines at high speed and outside the Fleet, with the object of confusing the submarine and endeavouring to ram her, if sighted. Col- liers and store-ships which had steam ready were directed to weigh and to go alongside the battleships that were not fitted with torpedo nets, in order to act as a form of protection against torpedoes fired at these valuable ves- sels. All ships in the outer lines were directed to burn searchlights to locate and confuse the submarine. At about 6.30 p.m. the Drake reported a submarine in sight from that ship, thus confirming the earlier reports. The Fleet was directed to weigh by divisions as soon as steam was ready and to proceed to sea. By 9 P.M. the weather was exceedingly thick inside the harbour and con- siderable difficulty was experienced in getting the Fleet out, as at this time there were no navigational facilities of any sort for leaving the harbour at night or in thick weather; but by 11 p.m. all the ships had left the harbour without accident, and, although there was a dense fog outside, the Fleet cleared the Pentland Firth successfully. The Assistance was ordered to Loch Ewe, and left after the Fleet, reporting having sighted a submarine in the entrance whilst going out. The 2nd Flotilla was left behind to locate and, if possible, destroy the submarine, and the 4th Flotilla was stationed outside the Hoxa and Hoy entrances during the night, and directed to meet the Fleet at 7 a.m. on the 2nd. The only ship, as distinct from destroyers, remaining in the harbour was the MENACE IN NORTH SEA 117 Cyclops, lying off Scapa with the telegraph and telephone cables on board, and directions were given to Rear-Ad- miral Miller to endeavour to locate, by means of the mine- sweeping gunboats, the submarine reported sunk by the Falmouth. No trace of a submarine was discovered, and sub- sequent investigation showed that the alarm may have been false, the evidence not being conclusive either way. The incident, however, made it clear that protection against submarine attack was an absolute necessity, as the Fleet could not remain at a base that was as open to this form of attack as Scapa Flow. The only possible action, in the event of an alarm being given of the presence of a submarine, was to take the Fleet to sea, and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time from a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of in- security was created, which would be bad for moral, and the ships were deprived of opportunities for cleaning boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which experience was showing was essential if the steaming efficiency of the Fleet was to be maintained. The matter was at once represented to the Admiralty and proposals were made for blocking all the entrances to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and Hoy entrances, by sinking old merchant ships in the channels. Pending the supply of reliable defences for the main entrance, Rear-Admiral Miller was directed to requisition a large number of net-drifters. The plan was to lay drift nets in the entrance to be watched by the drifters, the nets having indicator buoys attached to them and floating on the surface, so that the presence of a submarine might be indicated by the buoy moving with the net. The navigational difficulties of the narrower entrances were, meanwhile, the only obstacles to the passage of 118 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 submarines through them, but it was realised that these were considerable. The opinion was formed, however, that the Hoxa entrance presented no insurmountable difficulty of this nature to a determined submarine commander, _ By this date the local defence flotilla of destroyers consisted of vessels of the E class. A request was made for basing a hunting flotilla of 16 trawlers on Kirkwall, these vessels being intended to guard the approaches to the Pentland Firth and to act as submarine hunters generally. It was also suggested that a monetary reward should be offered to the personnel of any trawler through whose agency a submarine was captured or de- stroyed. The mine-sweeping force at Scapa had _ been strengthened by the addition of a flotilla of trawlers, and the mine-sweeping gunboats and trawlers were continu- ously employed in keeping certain fixed channels of approach to the Pentland Firth swept and clear of mines. These vessels were, therefore, not available for anti-sub- marine work, except to the detriment of their mine-sweep- ing duties. On September 1st the available cruiser squadrons were employed in Area No. 6, supported by the 3d Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. From September 1st to September 5th the Battle Fleet remained at sea, cruising in the area between the north-east coast of Scotland and the coast of Norway, in support of the cruiser squadrons working to the south- ward, and opportunity was taken to continue the exercises of the Fleet in battle tactics, together with occasional gunnery practice. The Orion, of the 2nd Battle Squadron, was still absent from the Fleet, retubing condensers; the King Edward VII. rejoined on the 2nd, after exchanging MENACE IN NORTH SEA 119 defective guns; and the Dominion was then detached to Devonport to exchange her damaged 12-inch guns. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been strength- ened by the arrival of the Inflevible from the Mediter- ranean, and was employed during this period in support of the cruiser sweeps, the Squadron joining the Battle Fleet on the 3rd for battle exercises. During the period under review reports from time to time of the sighting of enemy submarines appeared to indicate that they were working on a line Ekersund- Pentland Firth, the line which they were apparently occupying during the first few days of the War, when U 15 was sunk by the Birmingham, Information received on September 3d suggested that enemy cruisers might have passed, or might be intending to pass, into the North Sea via the Skagerrak. The 2nd and 8rd Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, supported by the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron and accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla, were, therefore, directed to sweep to the entrance to the Skagerrak, arriving there by noon of September 4th, starting from a position in Lat. 58 N., Long. 2.36 E., at 4.4. M. that day. From the Skagerrak the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons were to make a detour to the south- westward with the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron, the latter proceeding then to Rosyth and the Cruiser Squadrons to Cromarty; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd Flotilla, was directed to sweep on a wide front towards the Pentland Firth on the Ekersund- Pentland line in search of enemy submarines, which it was hoped might be caught on the surface at night. Thence the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was to proceed to Scapa to fuel, and the 2nd Flotilla to the westward of the Orkneys to search for submarines, returning to 120 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 Longhope at 9 p. M. on September 6th. The 4th Flotilla, which had been with the Battle Fleet, was directed at the same time to sweep the western portion of the Eker- sund-Pentland line for submarines, and then to return to Longhope. These orders were carried out, but no enemy vessels of any sort were sighted, except that at 6.30 a.m. on the 5th the Thetis, mine-layer, working south-eastward of the Orkneys, reported a suspicious vessel, thought to be a German cruiser. The 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and Ist Light Cruiser Squadron closed in on the position, but the ship was eventually identified as one of our own vessels. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe at 4 p.m. on the 5th to coal, two mine-sweeping gunboats having been previously detached to that base to search the entrance for mines. During the early days of September frequent reports were received of enemy mines having been discovered on the east coast, and several vessels were sunk, as a conse- quence, including the gunboat Speedy. It appeared that the enemy was laying the mines from merchant vessels flying neutral or even, possibly, British colours, as well as from regular mine-laying ships. The large number of vessels trading on the east coast and of fishing craft at sea, both British and neutral, greatly increased the difficulty of preventing these operations. The task of boarding and examining even a considerable percentage of these vessels involved a heavy strain. Our cruiser sweeps were showing this daily. The Admiralty’s atten- tion was drawn to the matter, and the question was raised of establishing some restrictions, particularly as regards the areas in which fishing should be permitted. The extinction of a large proportion of our coast lights MENACE IN NORTH SEA 121 was also proposed, the burning of which enabled the enemy to fix his position accurately when engaged in mine-laying operations. This policy of the extinction of lights, thus started, gradually became general, and eventually only the most important lights were exhibited at night, and the large majority of these were only shown when requests were made by men-of-war who required them for entering port, the time of their exhibition being thus reduced to a minimum. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe until 6 a.m. on September 7th, and then proceeded to sea. The Orion was left behind to complete work on her condensers and rejoined the Fleet at sea on September 9th, having been absent for twenty-one days. The Agincourt, the new battleship which since com- missioning had been engaged in gunnery and torpedo practices either at Scapa or to the westward of the Orkneys, joined the 4th Battle Squadron at sea on Sep- tember 7th in order to give her officers experience in working with the Fleet. There had been great difficulty in carrying out her practices because she had not been supplied with “sub-calibre” guns, and this deficiency could not be made good for some months; this caused much delay in raising her battle efficiency. However, she was manned with officers and a ship’s company of a very high standard and, in spite of all disadvantages, the early gunnery practices carried out by her in com- pany with the Fleet showed that she would eventually prove to be a most valuable addition to the Fleet. Representations had been made by me to the Ad- miralty that the presence of a senior Flag officer in general command of the Orkneys and Shetlands, who would be responsible for the defences of these islands and the Fleet bases, was very necessary, the work of actual 122 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 administration of the base at Scapa Flow being sufficient fully to occupy the time of Rear-Admiral Miller. Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville accepted the post, and as it was very desirable that the officer holding this position should be junior to the Commander- in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, he paid me the compliment of expressing his desire to be placed junior on the list to myself, a reversal of our proper respective seniorities. He was, accordingly, appointed, and came to Loch Ewe on September 6th, to confer with me before taking up his appointment. He accompanied me to sea in the Iron Duke on the 7th in order to talk matters over, was embarked on board the Oak to the westward of the Orkneys, and took up his command on arrival. The result was immediately most beneficial. He was able to devote his whole time to the questions of defence and organisation and relieved me of all these matters which had, as was inevitable under the previous arrangement, occupied so much of my time in harbour and so much of my thoughts at sea. On September 6th the Portsmouth floating dock ar- rived safely at Cromarty. During September 7th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet proceeded northward from Loch Ewe en route to the North Sea, and passed through the Fair Island Channel at 10 p.m., being joined at 4 a.m. by the 8rd Battle Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth after dark on this date and proceeded to the north-east- ward, being joined at 4 a.m. on the 8th by the Sappho and four destroyers of the 4th Flotilla. These smaller vessels were intended to carry out boarding duties in order to avoid the danger to the large ships from submarine attack, consequent on stopping for this purpose. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron swept to the south-eastward MENACE IN NORTH SEA 123 of Area 6 during daylight on the 8th, and during the night of the 8th and daylight of the 9th was on a patrol area approximately between Lat. 55 N., Long. 2 E., and Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 2.40 E., with the object of inter- cepting possible enemy mine-layers. The Battle Fleet carried out gunnery practices and exercised battle tactics during the 8th eastward of the Orkneys, and at dark pro- ceeded to the southward to support an extensive sweep into the Heligoland Bight which it had been decided to carry out on September 10th. The dispositions for this sweep were generally as follows: The Ist and 3d Flotillas from Harwich, supported by the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron and Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron to the northward, and the 7th Cruiser Squadron to the westward, swept out the Heligoland Bight from east to west, commencing from a position some ten to twelve miles from Heligoland, which position was to be reached one hour before dawn. The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 8rd Cruiser Squadrons, spread 20 miles ahead, was in position Lat. 55.9 N., Long. 4.24 E. at 8 a.m. on September 10th, steering S.S.E. at 12 knots speed of advance. The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 8rd Cruiser Squadrons to the southward, cruised to the north-west- ward of Heligoland until 11 a.m. on the 10th, by which time it was clear that the sweep had been unproductive. No German vessel of any sort was sighted, except one seaplane reported by the 7th Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd Flotilla was stationed with the Battle Fleet as a submarine screen, and to assist the attached cruisers in boarding duties during the day, and the 4th Flotilla, which had been working with the 2nd and 8rd Cruiser Squadrons, princi- pally for boarding duties, was also directed to join the Battle Fleet on the morning of the 10th, but by reason 124 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 of the thick weather did not do so until 2 p.m. Owing to the large number of trawlers that were met with, nearly all of which were flying neutral colours, the board- ing duties were very onerous. Considerable suspicion attached to these trawlers because frequently Telefunken wireless signals were noticed to be very strong after the Fleet had passed these vessels; but close examination failed to reveal anything suspicious in those that were boarded, no wireless apparatus being discovered in any of them. The conditions on September 10th were very unfavour- able for the sweep into the Bight. Thick weather pre- vailed both before and after daylight, and the visibility varied from between two and five miles. The mist pre- vented the junction of the 4th Flotilla with the Battle Fleet for eight hours, a circumstance which would have had awkward consequences had the High Sea Fleet been encountered with its full complement of 80 to 100 de- stroyers, as might have been the case in such close prox- imity to German ports. It was noted at the time that the conditions were very unfavourable for a Fleet action owing to the low visibility combined with the glare produced by the occasional sun- shine and absence of wind. A passage in the notes made on this occasion referred to such conditions as follows: “The weather conditions . . . were very unfavour- able for a general action owing to the low visibility and the glare caused by brilliant sunlight and absence of wind. . . . The conditions make it impossible for the Commander-in-Chief in the centre of the Fleet to know what is going on in the van and rear . . . besides being entirely favourable to tactics largely based on the employment of torpedo craft or mine-layers. “In addition there are great difficulties in concen- MENACE IN NORTH SEA 125 trating detached ships and flotillas and in forming the ~Fleet prior to battle, also in the recognition of ships and destroyers.” This passage is of interest because of its bearing on the Jutland battle some two years later when somewhat similar conditions prevailed. The difficulty of recognition mentioned made so much impression on my mind that special daylight recognition devices which could be seen at a considerable distance were subsequently devised and used by our own light cruisers and destroyers when in the presence of the enemy. When it became evident that there were no enemy vessels to engage, I organised a sweep to the northward on a large scale, with a view to intercepting any enemy ships that might be at sea and of closely examining all merchant ships and fishing vessels which were met with. The starting-point of the sweep was Lat. 55.30 N., Long. 4.0 E., the dispositions being: The Invincible (which had now joined the Battle Cruisers) and the Inflexible, to sweep towards Dundee. 8rd Cruiser Squadron towards Aberdeen at 12 knots speed of advance. Ist Light Cruiser Squadron towards Pentland Firth at 11 knots speed of advance. 2nd Cruiser Squadron towards Fair Island at 10 knots speed of advance. All ships spread as widely as visibility admitted. The ist Battle Cruiser Squadron (which now once more in- cluded the New Zealand) to be in general support. The Battle Fleet with divisions spread four miles apart to ex- tend the sweep to the eastward. These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 2. At 3 A.M. on the 11th the sweep was directed to turn to N. 16 E., and, later, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was stationed in a new area, No. 7, between Lat. 55.20 N. 126 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 and 57.80 N., between 50 and 150 miles from the coast. The 8rd Cruiser Squadron was sent to Cromarty to coal; the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron rejoined the Battle Fleet, and the Invincible and Inflexible were sent to Scapa to coal, as well as the 8rd Battle Squadron, a half flotilla of destroyers screening - these vessels into the base. During the 11th and 12th the Battle Fleet and Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron carried out battle tactics and gunnery exercises, and the Battle Fleet then proceeded to Loch Ewe, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and Ist Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa to fuel. During the passage south and north numerous reports of floating mines were received. The majority proved to be fishermen’s bladders which at this time were being frequently reported by merchant ships as floating mines. The Admiralty now informed me that a patrol of the 3rd meridian of East Long. between the parallels of 55.30 N. and 53.30 N. had been established by the 1st and 8rd Flotilla, the patrol consisting of eight destroyers and one light cruiser, supported by two cruisers of the “Bacchante” class, the object being to catch enemy mine-layers. I was also informed that a patrol of the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch coast, was being maintained to guard the Eastern Channel and Thames approaches. On September 11th the Hibernia reported a 12-inch gun cracked, the fifth since the outbreak of war! On the same day salvage operations on the armed merchant-cruiser Oceanic, which had gone ashore in a fog on Foula Island on September 8th, were abandoned owing to heavy weather. The vessel broke up eventually. Rear-Admiral E. R, Pears reported that the Ports- MENACE IN NORTH SEA 127 mouth floating dock would be ready for work on Sep- tember 21st, a very smart piece of mooring work having been carried out by Captain Munro, R.N., the King’s Harbour Master. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe coaling, storing and cleaning boilers, etc., from 5 P.M. on September 13th until 6 p.m. on September 17th, and the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron, except the In- flexible and Invincible, remained at Scapa until Sep- tember 18th. Meanwhile the usual cruiser sweeps in the North Sea in Areas 3, 6 and 7 were carried out by the 2nd, 8rd, 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and the Mine-layer Squadron, supported by the Invincible, Inflexible and 3rd Battle Squadron, which left Scapa on the morning of September 14th for the purpose. The armed merchant- cruisers Alsatian and Mantua were patrolling eastward of the Shetlands. Advantage was taken of the stay at Loch Ewe to make general arrangements with the Admiralty for the defence of that base, and on September 17th the First Lord of the Admiralty, with the Chief of War Staff, the Director of Intelligence Division, Commodores (S) and (T) arrived at Loch Ewe to confer with me. The bombardment and capture of Heligoland was also dis- cussed. The proposals had been previously forwarded to me by Mr. Churchill, and had been carefully examined by myself, Rear-Admiral Charles Madden, the Chief of Staff, and by the Flag officers commanding the Battle Squadrons. The opinions of these officers against the operation were unanimous. It had not been suggested that the Grand Fleet should be used for the operation, except as a supporting force; the older battleships were intended for this purpose. But the arguments against the operation were overwhelmingly strong. It was 128 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 pointed out that ships were no match for heavy fortifica- tions such as were known to exist on Heligoland; that direct fire from high-velocity guns with a low trajectory would be ineffective against well-placed, heavily protected and well-concealed land guns; that, even if a storm- ing party were able to land and to capture the island, it would be quite impossible to hold it, situated as it was close to German naval bases, for if we could take it in a fortified condition, it would be far easier for the Germans to recapture it with the fortifications demol- ished; that it would be under continuous attack by sea and air, and that any attempt to hold it, if captured, would involve keeping the Grand Fleet constantly ‘in southern waters, which, owing to the number of small craft then available, was an impossibility. Aircraft spotting, which would be a necessary adjunct, was at that time in its infancy, and we had no vessels specially suited for bombardments at long range, such as the monitors which, later on, carried out such useful work on the Belgian coast. After a conference, at which the Flag officers were present, I thought that the idea would be abandoned. This was not the case, however, and the matter was taken up later at the Admiralty with Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, commanding the Channel Fleet. His view coincided with those expressed by the Flag officers at the Loch Ewe conference, although he was of course prepared to carry out any orders that might be given him. The idea was not finally abandoned for some time. The opinions of Sir Cecil Burney and myself were identical, as indeed were those of every Flag officer with whom I discussed the matter, with one single exception, a junior Flag officer. Another subject touched on during Mr. Churchill’s =e Smatls RY 2 "aha nt (west of Len/s) 950 ae a no ff ONRonaldtha et, Pt Sance ao Sy Stronea “oy ORKNEY ISLAND oa - is Ronaldehe Strom , o. + PRentlan: eu Vesa Re te iF C/Montrose ?” a 4 “iy aw Fife Need ay : ees, of Forth 5 gl Bay rt haere efinburgh 12 Inch Kaith to by nties miles\ 0° Seow ; Br’ 498 D a : Kt _Blichsed Be i 5 r Bortagh Vg? mee CARDIGAN BAX ay Resection ; Vite aster he te, . ang Lae an ae Smalls” >" 2 mafors Hy ee Cc Landy 14 5 “Ne e es L'BathleFlect § Bottle, ~~ ~~ Cruisers me ryxercises mn conclusion of Swee, 10 North i 4” F/ot: & M.S. x \ Ne Hamborough RI Y=Rh Grimsb - ber ane, mate = oui _- 7APP = Frock Tenat/} Hock ofHollend SS 2 Ado pedarm, 7 ws Mier te Berane £9 Abbreviations used. Battle Fleet. Bottle Cruiser Squadron. Cruiser Squadron. Light Cruiser Squadron, Destrorer Flotilla, Mine Sweeper. 10 MENACE IN NORTH SEA 129 visit was that of operations in the Baltic, but as no large operations of this nature could be attempted without the assistance of Allied battleships, in order to maintain supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no steps were taken. By this date a regular programme of dockings and refits for all ships was recognised as necessary, and battleships were now being detached one at a time for this purpose. For some months after the commencement of the War, it was not possible to allow ships more than four days for docking and for the execution of the most urgent work, except in cases of accident or very serious defects, as our margin of superiority was none too large, and we were already experiencing a good deal of trouble with condenser tubes, necessitating ships being laid up for the work of retubing; but the work achieved in the four days was a very fine tribute to the dockyard organisa- tion and to the industry of the dockyard men. The Battle Fleet left Loch Ewe on the evening of September 17th, the Erin, a new battleship bought, in- complete, from Turkey, being in company for the first time in order to accustom her officers to working the ship with the Fleet. Target practice was carried out to the westward of the Orkneys during the forenoon of the 18th, but was interfered with by bad weather—a frequent experience. The Battle Fleet then proceeded into the North Sea, via the Fair Island Channel, the position at midnight, 18th, being Lat. 59.23 N., Long. 1.18 W., and course south. The Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa with the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron on the evening of the 19th, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty at the same time, all for the southward for a sweep into the Heligoland Bight, supported by the Battle Fleet, in search of the enemy and with a view to carrying out a 130 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 thorough examination of trawlers suspected of acting as look-out vessels for the enemy. While on passage south during the 19th the Battle Fleet was exercised at battle tactics. At midnight on the 19th the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 58.3 N., Long. 2.24 E., and at 8 a.m. on the 20th, in Lat. 57.8 N., Long. 3.20 E., having met the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd Flotilla had been under orders to leave Scapa in time to meet the Battle Fleet at 8 a.m. on the 21st, but, owing to bad weather, the orders were cancelled and the flotilla returned to Scapa, as did the 4th Flotilla, which was to have accompanied the battle cruisers. During daylight of the 20th the Battle Fleet cruised to- wards the Norwegian coast to the northward of Lat. 57 N., in support of the battle cruisers engaged in ex- amining trawlers in the vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank; it turned to the southward at 4 P.M. to rendezvous, at 5 A.M. on the 21st, in Lat. 56 N., Long. 3.30 E., with the 8rd Battle Squadron, which had been coaling at Scapa and had left on the 20th to join the Commander- in-Chief. At 7 a.m. on the 21st the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 3.30 E., and the Vice-Admiral of the battle cruisers having reported at 6.20 a.m. from a position in Lat. 55.16 N., Long. 4.52 K., that the weather was too bad to admit of the search of trawlers being carried out satisfactorily, the operation was abandoned and the Fleet turned to the northward, as it was con- sidered that an incomplete examination would do more harm than good. During this period the 38rd Cruiser Squadron was working in Area 7, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in Area 6, as usual; the Alsatian and Mantua, with the Drake, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, were sweeping down MENACE IN NORTH SEA 131 the Norwegian coast and then returned to resume their patrol east of the Shetlands, where they were joined by the armed merchant ship Teutonic. The 2nd and 4th Flotillas left Scapa on the 20th and ‘joined the Battle Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Squadron respectively on the 21st. All wireless telegraphy signalling at sea was stopped between 4 P.M. on the 20th and 4 p.m. on the 21st, in order that the enemy should not become aware of the movements of the Fleet, as such knowledge might pre- vent the High Sea Fleet from putting to sea and possibly deprive us of our opportunity of catching it. During the passage of the Fleet to the northward, an extensive sweep was carried out during daylight of the 21st. The Battle Fleet covered a front of 40 miles, and battle cruisers and cruisers prolonged the front to the eastward and westward. On the evening of the 21st I was informed by wireless telegraphy from the Admiralty of a report that a German force of two light cruisers, with destroyers and submarines in company, had _ been sighted from Esbjerg on the 20th, proceeding to the northward. The whole Fleet was turned to the southward at midnight on the 21st, and spread at dawn to cover a front of 104 miles from the Norwegian coast westward, sweeping to the northward, to endeavour to intercept the enemy vessels if they had continued a course to the north- ward. The sweep to the northward was continued until 10 am. The Iron Duke was in position Lat. 59 N., Long. 2.35 E., when the line was directed to wheel towards the Orkneys and Shetlands on a course N. 51 W. During the 22nd, visibility was very good, but no enemy vessels were sighted, and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and battle cruisers passed to the westward of the Orkneys 132 THE GRAND FLEET 1914-1916, during the night, the 8rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron being detached to support the cruisers searching in the North Sea areas. At 7.45 A.M. on the 22nd wireless telegraphy signals from the Cressy were intercepted indicating that the Aboukir and Hogue had been sunk by submarines in Lat. 52.18 N., Long. 8.41 E. These vessels were patrolling the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch Coast, under Admiralty orders. No further details were re- ceived, beyond a wireless signal from Commodore (S), at 11.30 a.m., that he was proceeding in the Fearless with seventeen destroyers to Terschelling to endeavour to inter- cept the enemy submarines on their way back. The Commander-in-Chief, thereupon, ordered the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (from the southern position of Area 7) to pro- ceed at once to support the Commodore (S). By direc- tions, however, given by the Admiralty these orders were cancelled, and the forces returned. At 10.30 p.m. I ordered the armed merchant-cruisers to proceed at once to a position off Trondhjem, as a report had been received that the German liner Brandenburg, lying at that port, was likely to sail. Constant reports to this effect were received for several days, and the Brandenburg was heard using her wireless telegraphy on September 25th. The patrol was maintained until Sep- tember 28th, when contradictory reports were to hand— one that she had been seen at sea on the 27th, and the other that she was being interned by the Norwegian Government. The latter report proved to be correct. The patrol was then moved to a position off the Utvoer Lighthouse, Lat. 61.38 N., Long. 4.80 E., to intercept the German destroyer Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm, said to be leaving a Norwegian port. During the 23rd the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and MENACE IN NORTH SEA 133 battle cruisers attempted to carry out gunnery practices, but thick weather interfered. The force returned to Scapa to fuel, arriving on the 24th; the 3rd Battle Squadron arrived for the same purpose on the 25th. On the 28rd and 24th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron pro- ceeded from Area 7 to sweep up the Norwegian coast, thence going to Cromarty to coal. The squadron arrived there on the evening of the 25th. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until the evening of the 25th, when it proceeded out to the westward of the Orkneys; on the 26th bad weather again prevented target practice, a heavy westerly gale being experienced. This moderated on the morning of the 27th, when the Battle Fleet was to the eastward of the Shetlands, but increased again to a very strong gale during that day, with a wind force of 70 miles per hour and a very heavy confused sea. A considerable amount of damage was done to wire- less masts, topmasts, etc., and several ships had boats damaged or washed away. ‘The ships of the “Iron Duke” class took in large quantities of water through their 6-inch gun ports, due to these guns being mounted at such a low level. The gale continued during the 28th, veering to the northward, and moderated on the 29th, on which date the Battle Fleet, which had moved to the southward during the 28th, returned to Scapa, being met and screened by destroyers which had not been able to join the Fleet at sea owing to the bad weather. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the morning of the 26th, and proceeded to the Norwegian coast, sweeping dewn as far as the Naze in search of enemy ships, particularly the s.s. Prinz Friedrich Wil- helm, reported to be about to leave Bergen. It was also to support the Drake, Nottingham, Falmouth, and two 134 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 destroyers, which had been sent to the vicinity of the Naze to meet Submarines E1 and E5. The latter vessels had been reconnoitring in the Skagerrak and Kattegat for enemy vessels. The two submarines and the destroyers experienced very heavy weather on their return across the North Sea, and some anxiety was felt for their safety. The 8rd Cruiser Squadron proceeded to Area 2 on the 26th, and on the 29th was sent to watch off the entrances to Bergen in Norway for the German s.s. Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm. The squadron returned to Cromarty on October Ist. On the 28th the Princess Royal left the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron (proceeding to Scapa to fuel, en route) to meet, and protect, a convoy of Canadian troops about to leave the Dominion for the United Kingdom. The Invincible and Injflexible, which had been cruising north of the Faroe Islands, joined the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron at sea on the 29th. For the pur- pose of supporting the cruisers in the North Sea area, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron sailed from Scapa on the arrival of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet. Additional precautions against attack by submarines were taken during the stay of the Fleet at Scapa on this occasion, as reports indicated the presence of a consider- ably increased number in the North Sea. These precau- tions included more numerous patrols by destroyers of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas outside the entrances to Scapa, and necessarily involved a greatly increased strain on the de- stroyers. Further precautions against submarine attack were also found necessary in the Firth of Forth, and the arrival of light cruisers at Leith for refit were temporarily sus- pended by Admiralty orders owing to the presence of submarines in the vicinity. Two torpedoes were fired at the destroyer Stag, and another at a torpedo boat off May MENACE IN NORTH SEA 135 Island on the 25th. The destroyer Cheerful was also fired at on the 26th. The month of October, 1914, opened with the Dreadnought Battle Fleet at Scapa, with the exception of the Ajax, which was en route to Devonport to refit, and the Audacious, which was on passage from Devon- port after refit. The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were at sea supporting the cruisers, except the Hamouth, of the 6th Battle Squadron, which was at Devonport refitting. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the Invin- cible, and the Inflexible, were at Scapa; the Princess Royal was cleaning boilers and preparing for her trip to Halifax. Of the cruisers, the Devonshire, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, was refitting at Cromarty; the Theseus, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was returning from the White Sea, where she had been to fetch some Russian officers; the Mantua and Alsatian, armed merchant-cruisers, were at Liverpool, coaling and making good defects. Of the destroyer flotillas, the Active and five de- stroyers of the 2nd Flotilla, and two of the 4th Flotilla, were absent refitting. On October Ist regulations were brought into force under which a large number of coastal navigational lights were extinguished, as also were regulations closing the east coast ports to neutral fishing craft; other regulations were issued to control the movements of fishing vessels in certain areas. On October 10th further orders, under which additional coastal navigation lights were extin- guished (principally in the North of Scotland), became effective. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until 5 p.m. on October 2nd, and then proceeded into the North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron sailed at 136 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 daylight, October 8rd, and the newly constituted 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the Invincible and Inflexible, with the Sappho and three mine-layers, left at 2 p.m. on October 3rd. On October 8rd all the ships of the Grand Fleet took up pre-arranged positions designed to secure a close watch over the northern portion of the North Sea, partly with a view to an interception of all traffic, and partly to ensure that no enemy vessel broke out of the Notth Sea during the ensuing week. The main object was the pro- tection of an important convoy of Canadian troops, which was crossing from Halifax, and which the battle cruiser Princess Royal and the battleship Majestic had been sent to meet and to protect. The Princess Royal arrived at the rendezvous at 8 P.M. on October 7th, and waited for the convoy, which was two and a half days late. The Grand Fleet was disposed for this purpose during the period Oct. 3rd-11th approximately as follows: The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was watching the Fair Island Channel from the western side. _ The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with armed merchant-cruis- ers, the Sappho and three mine-layers, was stationed to the north- ward and eastward of the Shetland Islands. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron patrolled the northern portion of Area No. 4. The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons patrolled Area No. 5. The 10th Cruiser Squadron also patrolled Area No. 5. The mine-sweepers patrolled to the eastward of the Fair Island Channel. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with its divisions widely spread, worked to the northward of Area No. 5, and the 3rd Battle Squadron to the northward of Area No. 4, whilst the 6th Battle Squadron was utilised to watch the waters between the Dread- nought Battle Fleet and Norwegian territorial waters. The destroyers were stationed, some to guard the eastern ap- MENACE IN NORTH SEA 137 proaches of the Pentland Firth, some to work off the Norwegian coast, and the remaining available vessels to work with the Battle Fleet for screening and boarding purposes. They returned to the bases (Lerwick or Scapa) as necessary for refuelling, and for shelter when the weather necessitated this. These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 3. The Princess Royal met the Canadian convoy in Lat. 49.45 N., Long. 27.5 W., at 8 P.m. on October 10th. On the 11th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet passed to the westward of the Orkneys, remaining there until daylight on the 12th, and then returning to Scapa, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the Teutonic, being withdrawn from the patrol north of the Shetlands to a patrol line north-west from Sule Skerry lighthouse, Lat. 59.6 N., Long. 4.24 W., during the night of the 11th and remain- ing there until daylight on the 13th, when they left for Scapa. During October 12th all other vessels engaged in this operation returned to their bases for fuel, except the 3rd Battle Squadron (the ships of which had coaled two at a time during the operation) and the cruiser squad- rons, which had been relieved as necessary to fuel. Whilst the Fleet was engaged on this service the following incidents occurred. On October 2nd_ the Alsatian took six concealed Germans off a Danish steamer. At 5 a.m. on October 7th a submarine was reported inside Loch Ewe, being sighted by a collier and by the Assistance; she was fired at by the latter ship, in misty weather. On receipt of the report I ordered all vessels to leave Loch Ewe at once, and sent a division of destroyers there from Scapa to search for the sub- marine. Later investigation indicated that the report was well founded. On October 9th the Alsatian sighted an enemy sub- marine in Lat. 61.42 N., Long. 0.50 W.; on the same 138 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 day at 3 p.m. the Antrim, flagship of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, when in Lat. 59 N., Long. 4.40 E., was missed by two torpedoes fired at her by a submarine which the Antrim just failed to ram after the attack; numervus reports of enemy aircraft having been sighted on the Hust and West coasts of Scotland were also received. On October 10th the Liverpool and one-half of the 4th Flotilla were sent to the Norwegian coast to examine the islands in the vicinity of Udsire light, Lat. 59.19 N., Long. 4.50 E., to ascertain that they were not being used as German submarine bases, in view of the attack on the Antrim in that vicinity on the 9th. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron supported. Nothing was seen that lent colour to this idea. Ships of the Battle Fleet were detached to the north- ward, two or three at a time, during the operations, to carry out gunnery practices by day and by night. Thick fogs were prevalent during the whole period, and ships detached from the Fleet experienced very considerable difficulty in rejoining. The foggy weather nearly resulted in a serious collision between a battleship of the 6th Battle Squadron and one of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the two ships passing within a few feet of each other on opposite courses. On the return of the Battle Fleet to Scapa on the morning of October 12th, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville reported that a partial submarine obstruction was in place across the Hoxa entrance. The presence of even a partial obstruction reduced the danger of submarine attack on the Fleet whilst coaling, a matter which had given me much anxiety since the beginning of hostilities. On arrival in harbour it was found that the condenser tubes of the Iron Duke were in a bad condition, although the ship was quite new, and that the condensers would = APPROXIMATE as DISPOSITIONS OCT'3” soll 1914. sli WHILST CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING. & Area/ shewn. / oe g énpninaldshe oe _ — — Sestra “Wl er ae ig Gisenae WS 4 ByStronsa ‘é Ku i Siro, Ss ISLANDS a, the . " Rosa xf fo NO i al ss ¢ JktRonoldsha