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THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA, G.C.B., 0.M., G.C.V.O.
THE GRAND FLEET
1914-1916
ITS CREATION, DEVELOPMENT AND WORK
BY
ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE
OF SCAPA
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, PLANS AND DIAGRAMS
NEW wp YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
COPYRIGHT, 1919,
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO MY COMRADES
OF THE GRAND FLEET
PREFACE
In the following pages the work of the Grand Fleet, from
the outbreak of war until the end of November, 1916,
is described.
The writing of this record of the work of the Grand
Fleet, of which little has been heard by the nation
hitherto, has helped to fill in days of leisure. The manu-
script was finished by the autumn of 1918, but publication
was deferred for obvious reasons. When the armistice
had been signed and the German Navy had, for all prac-
tical purposes, ceased to exist, I felt free to issue the book.
The final revision has been done hastily owing to my early
departure for the Dominions, and in the circumstances I
hope I may rely on the indulgence of readers if any clerical
errors have escaped me. In order to minimise the chances
of such errors Mr. Archibald Hurd has kindly read the
proofs, and I am much indebted to him.
The narrative necessarily includes an account of the
gradual organisation and development of the Grand Fleet,
and its bases, by successive steps, after the hoisting of my
flag on the outbreak of hostilities; and the manner in
which the changing conditions of naval warfare were met
is also dealt with.
Admiral Mahan, amongst others, has truly said that
whilst the principles of naval strategy are unchangeable,
experience in war and changes in the weapons with which
war is waged may profoundly affect the application of
those principles.
vil
Vill PREFACE
The truth of this statement was shown in the Russo-
Japanese war; in the short interval between 1904 and 1914
further great advances took place in the technique of
warfare; these produced a striking influence on strategy
and tactics during the late war.
The reasons which made it necessary, during the war,
to hide from public view the work of the Grand Fleet
no longer exist, and it will no doubt be of interest to the
nation to learn something of its operations, especially as,
for various justifiable reasons, few despatches were issued
dealing with its activities. So far as the Battle Fleet
was concerned, the Battle of Jutland was the one
exception, and that despatch was written and published
when it was necessary to conceal a good deal from the
enemy.
As is inevitable, much of the information in this
volume is of a technical character and, though interesting
to seamen, may prove less so to the general reader. Those
who take this view may decide that Chapters IV to X,
‘inclusive, require only to be glanced at. Confidential
matter, which it is still undesirable to make public, has
been excluded from the book. Some of this may see the
light in later years.
The main portion of the book is written in narrative
form, but where it is thought that an explanation may
be useful, as to the reasons which governed any particular
movement or decision, such reason is given in order that
opportunity may be afforded the reader of understanding
the purpose in view and the manner in which it was hoped
to achieve it.
In some parts of the book reference is made to the
Germans being superior to us in matériel. There were
many directions, however, in which war experience
showed the correctness of our views and the wisdom of
PREFACE ix
our pre-war policy. We did, in fact, obtain a margin of
safety in the most essential type of vessel, the capital
ship, and we did gain advantage from the heavier calibre
of our guns. Naval policy is pursued in peace conditions
under inevitable disadvantages in a democratic country,
because there are many claims on the Exchequer. Re-
viewing our pre-war programmes of ship construction and
equipment, and bearing in mind the unconsciousness of
the nation generally as to the imminence of war, it is
matter for satisfaction that the Boards of Admiralty
from the beginning of the century were able to achieve so
much, and that when at last war became inevitable the
nation had in control of its destinies at Whitehall a First
Lord and a First Sea Lord who, accepting their responsi-
bility, mobilised the Fleet before war was actually
declared, thus securing for us inestimable advantages, as,
I hope, I have demonstrated in my record of the Grand
Fleet. The years of strenuous work and training carried
out by the officers and men of the Fleet, which should
never be forgotten, had made of it a magnificent fighting
machine, and bore ample fruit during the war.
The Germans, in creating their Fleet, followed
generally the British lead. In this book reference is made
to the general efficiency of the German Navy and of the
good design and fine equipment of their ships. These
points were never questioned by British naval officers,
and the shameful surrender of the host of the German
ships in 1918 did not alter the opinions previously formed.
That surrender was the result of broken moral.
More than a hundred years after the Battle of Trafal-
gar, and after a century of controversy, the Admiralty
considered it desirable to appoint a committee to decide
whether that action was fought in accordance with the
original intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, as em-
x PREFACE
bodied in his famous Memorandum. It is hoped that
the facts recorded in this book, and the comments
accompanying them, constitute a clear statement of
the making of the Grand Fleet and the manner in which
it endeavoured, whilst under my command, to fulfil its
mission.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I Twe Opentnc or tHE WaR ..... . 1
II Genera Navat Stratecy In Home Waters’ 12
III Tse Granp Freet anpItsBases .. . . 34
IV Decnarationor Wark... .... . 88
V Tue Supmarine aND Mine MENACE IN THE
Norto Sra ...... . . . . 105
VI Inciwents at Sza—NovemBer 1 to DECEMBER
SIs 9A we ae ee Ow we Oe ee TS
VII THe Doacerr Bank AcTION . . . . . . 187
VIII German Mines AND SUBMARINES... 221
TX Controtuinc THE NortHSeaA . . . . . 249
X Arrempts to Entice THE;ENEMy To ACTION . 264
XI Tue Navat Srrvation In May, 1916 . . . 300
XIT Tue BatttrorJutnanp . . . . . . . 304
XIII Tue Battie or Jurnann (continued). . . . 341
XIV Tue Bart.e or Jurann (continued). . . . 370
XV _ REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE oF JUTLAND . . 390
XVI Tue Lessons or Experience; Lorp KitcHENER’sS
FAREWELL. . . .. .. .. . « 415
XVII Tue SupMaRINE Peri TO MERCHANT SHIPPING;
ReEcALL TO THE ADMIRALTY . . . . . «445
AppenpiIx] . . . . 1. 1 6 © ee 468
AppenpixII. . ....... . +. 490
ILLUSTRATIONS
ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE, OF Scapa, G. C. B.,O.M.,
G. C. V. O. Frontispiece
FACING PAGE
DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE First OccaAsION OF
A SUBMARINE Brine Reportep InsipE Scapa FLow
Tue First OpstrRuctIon aT Scapa Fiow .
Smoke ScREEN Mapr By DESTROYERS .... .
A Dummy Bartuesuip, Marcy, 1915... .. .
Toe ComMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET
(CommoporeE LioneL Hatsey), AND THE Fiag Liev-
TENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT FITZHERBERT)
on Boarp H.M.S. [Ron DUKE .
Tue Bartte or JuTLAND as Depicrep By A GERMAN
Antist (colour). 2. 2. 1. 1 we ee
H.M.S. Tron DUKE anpD 83RD DIvIsION OF THE BATTLE
FiLeet DEPLOYING AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
H.M.S. Jron DUKE Openine Fire at tHE BATTLE OF
JUTLAND
H.M.S. SuPerB OreninG FIREAT THE BaTTLEOF JUTLAND
xiii
28
28
68
68
96
336
342
346
366
PLANS AND DIAGRAMS
PLANS
PLAN FACING PAGB
1. Scapa Fhow AND THE ORKNEYS. . . . . . . = 48
9, AREA OF OPERATIONS OF 10TH CRUISER SQUADRON . 74
3. Typtcan SwHEp, SEPTEMBER 8TH-l1TH, 1914. . . 128
4, APPROXIMATE Dispositions, OcTOBER 3RD-11 TH, 1914,
Wuttst Canapian Convoy Was Crossine . . 188
5. Movements oF FLEET, JANUARY 23RD-25TH, 1915 . 196
6. OPERATIONS OFF Horn Reer, May 2np-5TH, 1916 . 290
7. OPERATIONS OF BatTLE CRUISER FLEET, 2 P.M. TO 6.15
p.m., May 31st, 1916... ..... =. 816
8. AppRoxIMATE Position oF SHips OF GRAND FLEET,
6.45 p.M., May 31st, 1916 . . . . . . . 850
9. APPROXIMATE PosiTION OF SHIPS OF GRAND FLEET,
7.15 p.m., May 31st, 1916 . . . . . . . 858
DIAGRAMS
DIAGRAM
1. Berore aND ArrerR DEPLOYMENT OF THE BaTtLE FLEET,
May 3ist, 1916.
2. SHowine AN Imacinary DEPLOYMENT ON THE STARBOARD
Wine Cotumn.
3. BattLe oF JUTLAND, MovEMENTS OF BaTTLE FLEET AND
Battte CRUISERS.
4. Operations Durine tHE Nigut or May 3l1st-JuUNE 1st,
AND ON JUNE Ist, 1916.
xiv
THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
CHAPTER I
THE OPENING OF THE WAR
Ek y in 1914, whilst serving at the Admiralty as Second
Sea Lord, I had been offered and had accepted the com-
mand of the Home Fleets, which in the ordinary course
would have become vacant in the following December on
the expiration of Admiral Sir George Callaghan’s term
of command, and public announcement was made of the
intended appointment.
Sir George Callaghan was my senior by seven years,
and he and I had served together in China fourteen years
before, when I was Flag Captain to Admiral—afterwards
Admiral of the Fleet—Sir Edward Seymour. He had
since had what is probably a unique period of sea service,
passing from one appointment to another without an
interval of half pay. Soon after his promotion to flag
rank he had become Rear-Admiral in the old Channel
Fleet; thence he had gone on to the 5th Cruiser Squadron
in 1907; two years later he became second in command
in the Mediterranean, and on the expiration of his term
there, in 1910, he returned to take up the appointment
of Vice-Admiral commanding the Second Division of the
Home Fleets, succeeding to the position of Commander-
in-Chief in 1910. The usual period for which the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet was supposed to fly
1
2 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
his flag was two years, but in 1913 the Admiralty,
accurately interpreting the sentiment of the whole Service,
extended Sir George Callaghan’s appointment. And it
was the approaching termination of this further period of
command—to the regret of the Admiralty, for which I
can speak from personal knowledge, and to the regret
also of the officers and men of the Home Fleets—which
led to my nomination in the spring of that year.
In the latter part of July, when the situation in Europe.
had assumed a threatening aspect, Mr. Churchill, the First
Lord, informed me that in the event of hostilities occur-
ring involving this country, it was considered necessary
that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets should
have the assistance of a second in command, and he added
that I had been selected for the appointment, and it was
desired that I should arrange with Sir George as to the
ship in which I should fly my flag.
Sir George Callaghan visited the Admiralty very
shortly afterwards, and it was decided between us that
the battleship Centurion should be my flagship. We
discussed the slight reorganisation that this would involve
in the Fleet, and I selected my staff, which comprised:
Captain R. W. Bentinck as Chief of the Staff; Lieut. H.
Fitzherbert as Flag Lieutenant; Lieut.-Commander E.
Hardman Jones as Signal Officer; Lieut.-Commander
R. L. Nicholson as Wireless Officer; Lieut.-Commander
(N.) A. F. B. Carpenter as War Staff Officer, and Fleet
Paymaster H. H. Share as Secretary.
On July 28th, with no premonition of coming events,
I was present at a dinner party given by Lord Morley at
the United Services Club. The party was interesting,
as it comprised Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, Mr.
Churchill, Lord Haldane, Lord Bryce, and others who
figured later prominently in the War.
THE OPENING OF THE WAR 3
During the two following days conferences took
place at the Admiralty as to the disposition of the Fleet,
etc., and, in view of the threatening political situation,
the work of demobilisation after the King’s inspection
at Spithead and the subsequent short fleet exercises were
suspended, pending further developments. I met Lord
Kitchener, who was about to return to Egypt, on one or
two occasions at the Admiralty during these days.
On July 30th I turned over the duties of Second
Sea Lord, which I had discharged since December, 1912,
to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton, K.C.B., and
made my final preparations for joining the Fleet as second
in command.
I spent some hours at the Admiralty on the following
day, and during a conversation with Mr. Churchill and
the Marquis of Milford Haven, the then First Sea Lord,
it was intimated to me that, in certain circumstances, I
might be appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to
Sir George Callaghan.
This intimation came upon me as a great surprise,
and I protested against such an appointment being made
on what might possibly be on the very eve of war.
Nothing definite was settled. I left, however, with the
impression that the change was not one that had been
finally decided upon, but that it might take place. I
left London the same night by the mail train for Wick,
the Commander-in-Chief having informed me that he
would send a vessel to meet me there.
The idea that the change might be made occupied
my thoughts during the journey to the North. As I
thought over the possibility of a transfer of command at
such a moment, the stronger appeared the objections.
During the ensuing forty-eight hours I sent several
telegrams to both the First Lord and the First Sea
4 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Lord on the subject. I dwelt strongly upon the danger
of substituting, at such a juncture and at such short no-
tice, an admiral who was not in touch with the Fleet, for
a Commander-in-Chief with long experience of the Com-
mand. I mentioned, also, the strong feeling of admira-
tion and loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief that existed,
and suggested as an alternative that I should act as his
assistant on board the Fleet-Flagship. I had in mind
that I might act somewhat in the capacity of his
Chief of the Staff. In spite of the First Lord’s reiterated
opinion, my views remained unaltered, although it
did not occur to me that some anxiety might be felt
that Sir George Callaghan’s health would not stand
the strain of commanding the Fleet in the event of
war. That, however, was a matter on which the Admiralty
would be better informed than myself, and I had no hesi-
tation in urging the opinions expressed in my successive
telegrams.
A thick fog prevailed at Wick, and the Boadicea, the
ship in which I made the passage to Scapa Flow, was
not able to leave until late in the forenoon of August 2nd,
and arrived at Scapa Flow in the afternoon.
When I reported myself to the Commander-in-Chief,
the knowledge of the event which was apparently
impending made the interview both embarrassing and
painful, as I could see that he had no knowledge of the
possibility of his leaving the Fleet, and obviously I could
not tell him.
We discussed various arrangements, including the
question of the defence of Scapa Flow, for which tem-
porary but naturally inadequate measures were being
energetically taken with the limited resources at the dis-
posal of the Fleet.
At about 4 a.m, on August 4th, I received Admiralty
THE OPENING OF THE WAR 5
orders to open a secret envelope which had been handed
to me in the train as I was leaving London, by an officer
from the Admiralty. This envelope contained my
appointment as “Commander-in-Chief of the Grand
Fleet”—a new designation which must be explained
later.
On this order I was obliged to act, and I proceeded
on board the Iron Duke and found that the Commander-
‘in-Chief had received orders to turn over the command
to me.
Sir George Callaghan had been my Commander-in-
Chief during my command of the 2nd Battle Squadron.
He was, in addition, a personal friend, and I, like all those
with whom he had been in contact, had the most profound
respect and admiration for him. The idea of taking over
his command at the moment of his life naturally caused
me feelings of the greatest pain, and, moreover, it was
impossible to dismiss the fear that the Fleet might con-
clude that I had been in some measure responsible for
the change. This possibility had, of course, been present
in my mind from the moment I left London, and it
appeared to add to the objections to a change of com-
mand at such a juncture, since any idea of this nature
prevalent in the Fleet must affect the feeling of loyalty
to me as the new Commander-in-Chief.
It is unnecessary to dwell on the matter, but I cannot
close this portion of my narrative without paying a warm
tribute to the manner in which Sir George accepted the
Admiralty decision, which obviously came as a great
shock to him. He behaved, as always, as a most gallant
officer and gentleman, and his one desire was to make
the position easy for me, in entire disregard of his own
feelings.
It was decided that I should take over the Command
6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
on the following day, but a telegram having been received
from the Admiralty ordering the Fleet to proceed to sea
at once, I returned to the Iron Duke, and Sir George
Callaghan arranged to leave the Fleet in the Sappho
before its departure at 8.30 in the morning.
At that hour I took over the Command from Sir
George Callaghan, who then struck his flag.
The following ten or fourteen days were a period of
great strain and anxiety. To assume so heavy a responsi-
bility as the command of the Grand Fleet at such short
notice on the eve of war was in itself a matter not to be
taken lightly; it became necessary to gather together
the strings of the whole organisation, to ascertain the
dispositions already made and those immediately required,
and the whole problem was largely complicated by the
fact that the port on which the Fleet was based was open
to attack both by destroyers and by submarines, the only
obstacle to such attack being the navigational difficulties
of the Pentland Firth. Though considerable, these were
by no means insuperable.
Added to this was my feeling of deep regret at super-
seding a valued chief and friend at such a moment. The
one thing that helped me through this period was the
great and most loyal assistance rendered to me by the
staff of Sir George Callaghan, who, notwithstanding their
intense personal regret at his departure, gave me their
very warm support, and concealed from me any trace of
the feelings which they must have experienced at my
presence amongst them under such exceptional and try-
ing conditions. They behaved as naval officers always
behave—in a true spirit of comradeship. The same may
be said of the flag officers and captains in the Fleet, and
indeed of every officer and man.
Sir George Callaghan left his whole staff with me, with
THE OPENING OF THE WAR 7
the exception of his flag lieutenant, who accompanied
him to London. This staff included: Commodore A. F.
Everett, C.B., Captain of the Fleet; Captain R. N.
Lawson, Flag Captain; Commander Roger Backhouse,
C.B., Flag Commander; Fleet Paymatser C. F. Pollard,
C.B., Secretary; Commander the Hon. Matthew Best,
War Staff Officer; Commander R. W. Woods, Signal
Officer; Lieut.-Commander J. S. Salmond, Wireless
Officer; Lieut.-Commander R. M. Bellairs, War Staff
Officer; Lieut. W. D. Phipps, Signal Officer.*
When it became certain that I was to take command
of the Fleet, I asked the Admiralty to appoint Rear-
Admiral Charles Madden as Chief of the Staff; and I
was thus able to transfer Captain R. W. Bentinck to
act as Chief of the Staff to Vice-Admiral Sir George
Warrender, the next senior flag officer in the Fleet.
The composition of the Grand Fleet was:
Fleet-Flagship—H.M.S. Iron Duke.
Attached Ships—H.M.S. Sappho, H.M.S. Oak.
BATTLE FLEET
Ist Battle Squadron:
Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B. (in command).
Rear-Admiral H. Evan Thomas (2nd in command).
Battleships Marlborough (Flag), St. Vincent (Rear Flag), Colossus,
Hercules, Neptune, Vanguard, Collingwood, Superb, Bellona
(attached Light Cruiser), Cyclops (repair ship)
2nd Battle Squadron:
Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., K.C.B.
(in command).
* Later, Commodore L. Halsey, C.M.G., became Captain of the Fleet, Captain
F. C. Dreyer, C.B., Flag-Captain; Gommander C. M. Forbes, Flag-Commander,
and Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T. Weekes, Additional Secretary.
8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart. (2nd in
command).
Battleships King George V. (Flag), Orion (Rear Flag), Ajaz, Auda-
cious, Centurion, Conqueror, Monarch, Thunderer, Boadicea
(attached Light Cruiser), Assistance (repair ship).
4th Battle Squadron:
Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, K.C.V.O.
(in command).
Battleships Dreadnought (Flag), Temeraire, Bellerophon, Blonde
(attached Light Cruiser).
8rd Battle Squadron:
Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, C.V.O. (in command).
Rear-Admiral M. E. Browning (2nd in command).
Battleships King Edward VII. (Flag), Hibernia (Rear Flag),
Commonwealth, Zealandia, Dominion, Africa, Britannia, Hin-
dustan, Blanche (attached Light Cruiser).
Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron:
Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir David Beatty (in command).
Battleships Lion (Flag), Princess Royal, Queen Mary, New Zea-
land. :
2nd Cruiser Squadron:
Rear-Admiral the Hon. 8. Gough-Calthorpe
(in command).
Cruisers Shannon (Flag), Achilles, Cochrane, Natal.
3rd Cruiser Squadron:
Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B. (in command).
Cruisers Antrim (Flag), Argyll, Devonshire, Roxburgh.
Ist Light Cruiser Squadron:
Commodore W. E. Goodenough (in command).
Light Cruisers Southampton (Flag), Birmingham, Lowestoft, Not-
tingham.
THE OPENING OF THE WAR 9
Destroyer Fiotiuuas
Second Flotilla:
Captain J. R. P. Hawkesley (in command in Active).
Destroyers Acorn, Alarm, Brisk, Cameleon, Comet, Fury, Goldfinch,
Hope, Larne, Lyra, Martin, Minstrel, Nemesis, Nereide,
Nymphe, Redpole, Rifleman, Ruby, Sheldrake, Staunch.
Fourth Flotilla:
Captain C. J. Wintour (in command in Snift).
Destroyers Acasta, Achates, Ambuscade, Ardent, Christopher, Cocka-
trice, Contest, Fortune, Garland, Hardy, Lynz, Midge, Onl,
Paragon, Porpoise, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Spitfire, Unity,
Victor.
Mine-Sweeping Gunboats:
Commander L. G. Preston (in command).
H.M. Ships Skipjack (S.O. Ship) (absent at first), Circe, Gossamer,
Leda, Speedwell, Jason, Seagull.
Shetland Patrol Force: Forward (Scout) and four destroyers of the
River class.
The above vessels formed the Fleet under the im-
mediate command of the Commander-in-Chief at the
outbreak of hostilities. In addition, there were in
southern waters, and also under the command of the
Commander-in-Chief, the following vessels:
THE HARWICH FORCE
This force, although an integral portion of the Grand
Fleet, was based on Harwich. It was intended that it
should join the Grand Fleet at sea, if possible, in the
event of a fleet action being imminent, and for this
reason it was included in the organisation of the Fleet
for battle; but the force did not, in actual fact, ever so
10 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
join the Fleet, nor did I expect that it would be able
to do so. At the outbreak of war it was commanded
by Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt in H.M.C. Amethyst
and comprised:
1st Flotilla
Commanded by Captain W. Blunt in Fearless with
20 destroyers.
3rd Flotilla
Commanded by Captain C. H. Fox in Amphion with
15 destroyers.
Included also in the organisation of the Home Fleets,
which Sir George Callaghan had commanded-in-chief,
were the Second and Third Fleets:
SECOND FLEET
(under command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.).
Fleet-Flagship Lord Nelson, Rear-Admirals Stuart-Nicholson and
Bernard Currey (commanding Battle Squadrons).
5th Battle Squadron:
Prince of Wales (Flag), Agamemnon, Bulwark, Formidable, Im-
placable, Irresistible, London, Queen, Venerable.
6th Battle Squadron:
Russell (Flag), Cornwallis, Albemarle, Duncan, Exmouth, V. engeance.
5th Cruiser Squadron:
Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart (in command).
Carnarvon (Flag), Falmouth, Liverpool.
6th Cruiser Squadron:
Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant tin command),
Drake, Good Hope, King Alfred, Levathan.
THE OPENING OF THE WAR 11
(These last two Cruiser Squadrons were, however,
broken up immediately, and the ships transferred to other
duties. )
Minelayer Squadron, commanded by Captain M. H. Cobbe.
H.M. Ships Naiad (S.O.’s ship), Andromache, Apollo, Intrepid,
Iphigenia, Latona, Thetis.
THIRD FLEET
This Fleet comprised the 7th and 8th Battle
Squadrons, consisting of our oldest battleships, and the
7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Cruiser Squadrons, com-
prising our oldest cruisers.
But the only vessels of this Fleet which were ever
associated with the Grand Fleet were the ships of the
10th Cruiser Squadron, which, under the command of
Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, joined the Grand Fleet
shortly after the outbreak of war, the Squadron being
employed mainly on blockading duties. It was com-
posed as follows:
Crescent (Flag), Edgar, Endymion, Gibraltar, Grafton, Hanke,
Royal Arthur, Theseus.
All submarines, except those of the B and C classes
which were detached for the protection of our coast and
ports from Rosyth southwards, were worked, in accord-
ance with Admiralty policy, from Harwich, and were not,
therefore, under my command. The C class submarines
were unfit for oversea work, and our operations in enemy
waters were therefore confined to boats of the D and E
classes, of which we possessed a total of 8 D’s and 9 E’s,
as against the German total of 28 boats of the U class.
CHAPTER II
GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS
Ir is hardly surprising if the work and purpose of the
Navy had somewhat faded from public interest durmg
the century that had elapsed since the Napoleonic Wars,
the last occasion on which the inhabitants of this country
had felt that their safety depended on maritime power.
Indeed, it had fallen to the lot of a distinguished officer in
a foreign navy, Captain Mahan, to awaken interest in this
matter, and to point out the all-important influence which
Sea Power had exerted, and would exert, on history.
Associations such as the Navy League had been
formed, having as their object the enlightenment of our
countrymen, and although a great work was done in this
direction, the mere necessity for such work is an indication
of the extent to which the nation had forgotten the lessons
of the past.
I therefore offer no apology for making some refer-
ence to the use and purpose of the British Navy.
The main objects for which our Navy exists may be
shortly summed up under four heads:
1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use
of the sea, this being vital to the existence of
an island nation, particularly one which is
not self-supporting in regard to food.
2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic
pressure to bear on our adversary by deny-
12
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 13
ing to him the use of the sea, thus compell-
ing him to accept peace.
3. Similarly in the event of war to cover the
passage and assist any army sent overseas,
and to protect its communications and sup-
plies.
4, To prevent invasion of this country and its
overseas Dominions by enemy forces.
The above objects are achieved in the quickest and
surest manner by destroying the enemy’s armed naval
forces, and this is therefore the first objective of our Fleet.
The Fleet exists to achieve victory.
But history has always shown that it is a very difficult
matter to impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary,
and that, instead of giving us the opportunity of destroy-
ing his armed naval forces, he usually keeps the main
body of those forces—the Battle Fleet—in positions of
safety in fortified harbours, where they are a constant
threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval
Power, and force upon that Power a watching policy so
that the enemy may be engaged, should he put to sea,
before he is able to gain any advantage.
The watching policy in the great wars of the
Napoleonic era was carried out by keeping our squadrons,
through fair or foul weather, in the vicinity of those ports
of the enemy in which his fleet lay. Occasionally our
ships were driven off by stress of weather, but they
regained their stations as soon as conditions permitted.
During this war, however, the advent of the submarine
and destroyer, and, to a lesser extent, the use of the
mine rendered such dispositions impossible.
No large ship could cruise constantly in the vicinity
of enemy bases without the certainty that she would fall
an early victim to the attacks of submarines. Destroyers
14 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
could, it is true, afford some measure of protection, but
destroyers have a very limited range of action, and could
not keep the sea off the enemy’s distant coast even in
good weather for a sufficient length of time. Periodical
relief of the destroyers was an impossibility, owing to the
great numbers that would be required for this purpose.
Moreover, even if the submarine danger could be over-
come, the heavy ships would be so open to attack by.
enemy destroyers at night, if cruising anywhere near
enemy bases, that they would certainly be injured, if not
sunk, before many days had passed.
These facts had been recognised before the War and
a watching policy from a distance decided upon, the watch’
being instituted for the purpose of preventing enemy
vessels from gaining the open sea, where they would con-
stitute a danger to our sea communications. Now a watch
maintained at a distance from the port under observation
is necessarily only partial, except in circumstances where
the enemy has to pass through narrow straits before gain-
ing open water.
The chances of intercepting enemy ships depend
entirely on the number of watching vessels and the dis-
tance that those on board them can see. At night this
distance is very short—on a dark night not more than
a quarter of a mile, and even in daylight, under the
average conditions of visibility obtaining in the North Sea,
it is not more than six to eight miles.
The North Sea, though small in contrast with the
Atlantic, is a big water area of about 120,000 square miles
in extent. The width across it, between the Shetland
Islands and Norway (the narrowest portion), is 160 miles,
and an additional 40 miles (the Fair Island Channel)
would need to be watched also if a patrol were established
along this line.
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS | 15
A consideration of all the circumstances had led to
the adoption by the Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the
Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the Admiralty had
determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in
the event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that
the Grand Fleet would control the North Sea, and that
the Channel Fleet would watch the English Channel, thus,
in combination, holding the enemy’s main force.
To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main
Batile Fleet should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a
strategic position in the North Sea where it would act in
support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying out sweeps to the
southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be
favourably placed for bringing the High Sea Fleet to
action should it put to sea.
This policy of cruiser sweeps had been adopted as the
result of experience in the various naval manceuvres
carried out in previous years in the North Sea. These
had demonstrated quite clearly that the alternative
policy of stretching cruiser patrol lines across the North
Sea for the purpose of watching for the enemy was an
impracticable one, it having been shown on many occa-
sions that evasion of a single patrol line during the hours
of darkness, or even daylight, under the conditions of
visibility that usually prevail in the North Sea, is a very
simple matter. Further, a line of cruisers occupying
regular patrol positions is always in peril of successful
submarine attack; the loss of the cruisers Hogue, Cressy
and Aboukir showed this. It is also open to a concen-
trated attack by surface vessels.
The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Grand Fleet were based, therefore, on this general
idea, and when the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea in com-
pliance with Admiralty orders at 8.30 a.m. on August
16 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
the 4th, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying out
this general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the com-
mand of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in
the Channel in accordance with the general strategic
dispositions.
The vessels engaged in this first move of the Grand
Fleet comprised the Ist, 2nd, 38rd and 4th Battle Squad-
rons, with their attached cruisers; the 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron, with its Light Cruiser Squadron, strengthened
by the addition of the Falmouth and Liverpool; the 2nd
Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. These
dispositions continued in force for some three weeks,
when the strong influence of the submarine on naval
strategy began to make itself apparent.
The ideas held in pre-War days as to the capabilities
of submarines were found, after a short experience of
war, to need modification. In the first place, it became
quickly apparent that the German submarines possessed
a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably
greater than those of our own submarines. It had been,
for instance, looked upon as a considerable achievement
for our submarines to keep the sea for a period of five to
seven days, and they had not operated at any great dis-
tance from the coast. It is true that submarines had on
occasion made long voyages such as to Australia, but
they were then usually escorted, or even towed, and the
number of days from port to port did not approach the
length of time for which German submarines remained
at sea. Further, it was known that the Germans pos-
sessed a considerable superiority in the number of sub-
marines which were capable of operating overseas, and
the frequent sighting of enemy submarines as far north
as the Orkney and Shetland Islands early in the War,
combined with the fact that it appeared that the enemy
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS | 17
had established a regular submarine patrol in the centre
of the North Sea, made it evident that the German sub-
marines would constitute a very serious menace to our
heavy ships.
The comparative strength in submarines in Home
Waters at the outbreak of war was as follows:
German—
U Boats 28 of which U 1 to U 4 were hardly fit for oversea
work, but were as good as our D class.
British—
of which D,1 was unreliable and the remaining
D Class 8 units of the D class were not equal to the U
boats.
E Class 9
C Class 34
B Class 3
The Germans also had at least 24 submarines under
construction, whilst we were building 19, apart from two
experimental vessels of which nothing resulted.
Of these 19 submarines, several were of new type, in
pursuance of a policy introduced by the Admiralty in
1913-14 of widening the area of supply of these vessels.
This policy had far-reaching and beneficial results on the
subsequent output of this class of vessel, as it enabled us
to increase our submarine flotillas more rapidly than would
otherwise have been the case.
A change in previous naval practice was considered
necessary at an early period, because vessels moving at
anything but high speed, particularly in the case of a
number of ships in company, ran very considerable risks
in waters where we might expect enemy submarines to be
operating, unless screened by a strong force of destroyers.
This conclusion affected the movements and operations
of the Battle Fleet, since the number of destroyers we
Unfit for oversea work and used only for local de-
fence of the coast or in the Channel.
18 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
possessed was quite inadequate to form a screen for a
Battle Fleet and a Battle Cruiser Squadron which con-
stantly kept the sea. The number required, for such a
screen to be effective, was at least 40 for the Battle
Fleet alone as then constituted, and that number, 40, was
all that we had stationed at the Northern Base. The fuel
capacity of destroyers was only sufficient for them to
remain at sea in company with a fleet for some three days
and nights, whereas the Fleet itself could remain out for
three or four times that period. Moreover, the destroyers
could not be kept nearly so constantly at sea as the large
ships owing to their requirements in the way of boiler-
cleaning and the refit and adjustment of their more
delicate machinery, and the necessity for giving not only
the machinery, but the personnel, periods of rest. ‘The
heavy ships, then, had two alternatives, either to remain
at sea without a destroyer screen or to return to harbour
with the destroyers. In the early days the first alternative
was adopted, the risk being accepted, but minimised as
far as possible, by keeping the ships in the northern part
of the North Sea.
A further danger soon made itself apparent. It
became evident at an early period, as many naval
officers had expected, in view of German language at the
Hague Conference, that our enemy intended to throw
overboard the doctrines of international law when he could
gain any advantage by doing so. He accordingly pro-
ceeded at once to lay mines in positions where he thought
they would be advantageous to his operations, in utter dis-
regard of the safety, not only of British, but also of neutral
merchant ships. It was, therefore, thought very probable
that he would elaborate this practice by laying mines in the
North Sea in positions where he anticipated they might
prove effective against the Grand Fleet, and that he would
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS | 19
do this without issuing any warning to neutral countries.
Consequently, if the main Battle Fleet were kept moving
continuously in the central and southern waters of the
North Sea, in which waters the enemy could easily lay
mines with little danger of his operations being witnessed
(as he could carry them out under cover of darkness),
it was evident that considerable risks might be in-
curred without our being aware of the fact. The policy
of attrition of our Battle Fleet might thus be carried
out with such success as to produce equality, or even
inferiority, on the part of the British Fleet as compared
with the German, in a comparatively short space of time.
The only safeguard against such action which we could
take would be to keep mine-sweepers constantly working
ahead of the Battle Fleet. But the number of mine-
sweepers that we possessed was wholly inadequate for
such a task; and even if this had not been so, to carry out
such an operation would have necessitated the speed of
the Battle Fleet being reduced to some 10 knots, the
maximum sweeping speed of mine-sweepers, and it would
have been forced also to steer a steady course without
zigzagging, conditions rendering the battleships exceed-
ingly vulnerable to submarine attack.
The first effect, therefore, of the submarine menace,
combined with possible German action in regard to mine-
laying, was to cause the Battle Fleet to confine its move-
ments wnder ordinary conditions to the more northern
waters of the North Sea, where the risk might be taken
of cruising without the presence of a screen of destroyers,
and where it was improbable, owing to the depth of water
and the distance from enemy bases, that the Germans
would be able to lay mines without discovery.
The fact that this course of action would be forced
upon us as the submarine and destroyer menace grew had
20 THE GRAND FLEET, 1r914-1916
often been present in my mind in pre-War days, when I
had expressed the view that the beginning of a naval war
would be a conflict between the small craft, whilst the
larger and more valuable vessels were held aloof. I have
no doubt that this opinion was very generally held by
officers of experience.
The northward movement of the Battle Fleet was
combined with the establishment of certain cruiser patrol
areas in the North Sea. ‘These areas, which were pur-
posely made large, were watched on a regular, organised
plan by our Cruiser Squadrons, moving at fairly high
speed in such a manner as to reduce the submarine risk
to the cruisers to a minimum, whist at the same time they
kept as effective a watch as possible, first, to intercept
German war vessels that might be covering a raid on our
coasts or transports, or trying to reach the open sea to
operate against trade, and, secondly, to ensure that all
merchant ships entering or leaving the North Sea should
be closely examined in order to enforce the blockade.
This patrol policy was associated with periodical
sweeps of cruisers, supported by the Battle Fleet, down
into the southern waters of the North Sea, the object
being to catch the enemy’s fleet at sea, if possible, and
in any case, owing to our movements being probably re-
ported to the Germans by neutral merchant ships, to
make them feel that they could never move a force to
sea without the possibility of encountering our Fleet
engaged in one of these southern sweeps, which we car-
ried out at irregular intervals. A typical sweep is illus-
trated in accompanying plans. On these occasions the
Battle Fleet was kept strictly concentrated during the
southern movement, and was screened as far as possible
by destroyers against submarine attack; and at times
mine-sweepers were directed to work ahead of the Battle
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS a1
Fleet. When this was not possible, owing to the small
number of mine-sweepers available or the state of the
weather, some of the older battleships of the 6th Battle
Squadron, if they were in company, were stationed
ahead of the main Battle Fleet in order that, should a
minefield be encountered, these older ships would be the
first to strike the mines, thus giving sufficient warning
to enable me to manceuvre the more valuable ships clear
of the field.
This general policy was continued until the attack on
the Theseus and loss of the Hawke, belonging to the
10th Cruiser Squadron, by submarine attack on
October 15th, 1914, showed that even under the disposi-
tions then adopted, our larger cruisers were being risked
to too great an extent when working without destroyers
in the central part of the North Sea.
The next move, therefore, was the withdrawal of the
cruiser patrols to a safer position farther to the northward
and eastward of the Shetland Islands, this being com-
bined with a watch by the smaller craft on the Fair Island
Channel, and on the Pentland Firth approaches to the
North Sea. Under these conditions the Battle Fleet
was often kept either in a position westward of the
Orkneys, where it was in support of the cruisers and at
the same time formed a second blockade line, or it cruised
to the north and east of the Shetland Islands, the cruiser
patrols working farther south.
In all the dispositions which were made for a watch on
the northern entrance to the North Sea, the principle
kept in mind was the necessity for such an organisation
of the patrols as to have, in so far as numbers permitted,
two lines, or two areas, watched. The two areas were
at such a distance apart that vessels moving in or out
of the North Sea were forced, so far as all human fore-
22 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
sight could provide, to pass through the waters occupied
by one of the two groups of ships during daylight hours;
the distances apart were regulated according to the length
of the night at the different seasons of the year.
As the Battle Fleet worked farther to the northward
and westward, it became possible to make use of the
heavy ships to assist in blockade work without running
undue risks from submarines, and the blockade increased
correspondingly in effectiveness. As time went on, how-
ever, the provision by the Admiralty of a larger number
of armed merchant cruisers enabled us to establish an
effective blockade line by the use of these vessels alone,
backed up by Cruiser Squadrons when such were available.
The withdrawal of the Battle Fleet to more northern
and western waters first took effect when the Fleet Base
was shifted temporarily from Scapa to Lough Swilly.
When this occurred, it did not affect the policy of fre-
quent cruiser sweeps into the southern portion of the
North Sea, supported by the Battle Fleet, which were still
continued.
The dispositions that have been described took account
naturally of two other very important factors.
The first was the transport of our Expeditionary Force
to France. It was highly probable that the enemy would
endeavour to interfere with this movement, and in the
early days of the War it would not have been a difficult
matter for him to cause us some loss. His failure to make
at least some attempt in this direction showed a lack of
enterprise which surprised me, as I think it surprised most
naval officers.
The conditions for him were distinctly favourable.
Our main Fleet was based, as he must have been aware,
far away to the northward, and if he had timed an attack
on the cross-Channel traffic for a period during which he
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 23
reckoned that the Grand Fleet, or at least the destroyers,
were returning to the base to fuel, he would have stood a
good chance of making the attack and returning to his
base before that Fleet could intervene. Consequently, he
would only have had to deal with the comparatively light
forces based in southern waters. On the other hand,
if our Fleet arrived on the scene without destroyers, the
Germans would have possessed no mean advantage.
The enemy was provided with a large number of
modern destroyers, and some of them would have been
well expended over a Channel dash, which would in all
probability have met with some success. During the
transport of the Expeditionary Force the heavy ships of
the Grand Fleet kept the sea as far as possible in order
to cover the movement, but the destroyers were constantly
returning to the base to fuel.
The second factor which had considerable influence on
Fleet dispositions was the possibility of an attempt at a
raid or invasion by the enemy. Such a move was not
very likely in the earliest days of the War, when the
nights were comparatively short and the Expeditionary
Force had not left the country. It is also probable that
the enemy had few troops to spare for the purpose. But
the chances became greater as we denuded the country of
men, and the conditions in other respects became more
favourable. In October and November, 1914, I held and
expressed the opinion that, if raids were attempted,
landings would probably be effected in the rivers on the
East Coast, the entrances to which were either unpro-
tected or inadequately protected. A beach landing on
our East Coast can only be carried out in fine weather,
and the chances of encountering favourable conditions on
arrival off the coast are not great, and I always doubted
the attempt being made. In our rivers the opportunities
24 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
are greater, and are not so dependent on fine weather,
and I suggested to the Admiralty that a simple preventive
in this case was to place merchant ships in position ready
to be sunk across the channels (which are narrow and
shallow), the ships being fitted with explosive charges
below ready to blow out the bottoms in case of necessity.
I mentioned the names of certain retired naval officers
who, I felt certain, would make all the necessary prepara-
tions in a very few days. I believe that my proposals
were carried out.
The danger of raids, however, and the consequent
responsibility thrown upon the Admiralty for their pre-
vention, during a period when we had very little military
force in the country, led to a division of the Fleet by
Admiralty direction, which, however necessary, had cer-
tain disadvantages from a strategic point of view.
The 8rd Battle Squadron, consisting of eight ships of
the “King Edward VII.” class, and the 8rd Cruiser
Squadron of four ships of the “County” class, were or-
dered to be based on Rosyth, together with destroyers
for screening purposes. The eventuality that had then
to be faced was that of the remainder of the Grand Fleet
having to engage the High Sea Fleet, since concentra-
tion with the 8rd Battle Squadron could probably not be
effected without the risk of losing the opportunity of
engaging.
At this time the battle cruisers Princess Royal, In-
vincible, and Inflewible were in the Atlantic operating
against Von Spee’s squadron; and the Australia, Indomi-
table had not joined the Grand Fleet. The Tiger was not
yet ready, so that at times our battle cruiser force con-
sisted of only three ships, the Lion, Queen Mary, and
New Zealand.
Throughout the War the responsibility of the Fleet
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 25
for the prevention of raids or invasion was a factor which
had a considerable influence on naval strategy.
If the Fleet, with destroyers, carried out a sweep in
the North Sea, or if it was at sea for a cruise having
exercises for its main object, there was bound to be
present in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief the chance
that he might be required suddenly to move south to en-
gage the High Sea Fleet which had put to sea to cover a
landing. If his destroyers were short of fuel at such a
moment very serious consequences might ensue, and
therefore all cruiser sweeps or other operations had to be
curtailed to prevent such a situation arising.
One other factor exercised a cramping effect upon our
naval strategy throughout the War, namely, the bom-
bardment of our undefended towns on the East Coast.
Such bombardments were of no immediate military value
to the enemy, but, in spite of the fact that the majority
of the Press, and the public, realised that the Navy should
not be led into false strategy because of these bombard-
ments, it was difficult for the Fleet to ignore them, and
I have no doubt that the Germans relied upon this fact.
Whilst the Fleet was based at Scapa Flow, it was
quite impossible to ensure that the enemy would be
brought to action after such an operation, since to attain
this end it would have been necessary for the Fleet, or
a portion of it, to be constantly cruising in the southern
portion of the North Sea. This was not practicable, even
had it been desirable, because of the impossibility of keep-
ing destroyers with the heavier ships, and in any case it
was false strategy to divide the Battle Fleet, as such a
course might well have resulted in disaster.
The usual course adopted was to base the Battle
Cruiser Fleet on Rosyth, and for that Fleet to cruise
from that neighbourhood, The speed of the battle
26 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
cruisers enabled them to get away from a decidedly
superior enemy force of battleships if encountered, but
there was always some risk in this case of a ship being
disabled; the flag officer in command would then have
been faced with the unpleasant alternative of abandoning
her or of risking his whole force to cover her retreat.
Had we been able to keep an effective look-out off the
enemy ports, so as to obtain warning of their ships leav-
ing, the difficulty would not have been so great, but our
submarines in those days (the only class of vessel which
‘could be used for such a purpose) were not fitted
with wireless installations with which they could signal
from the required positions, or indeed from positions any-
where near the enemy’s coast, and, in any case, it must be
borne in mind that at night the exit of enemy vessels unob-
served, even under the conditions of a close submarine
look-out, is a comparatively easy matter.
At this stage it is convenient to remark upon the con-
dition of British naval bases. As is well known, the
Grand Fleet was moved to Scapa Flow during the latter
days of July, 1914, and the defenceless condition of the
Base, both against destroyer attack and submarine attack,
was brought very .strongly into prominence by the pres-
ence of so valuable a Fleet at this Base.
The anchorage known as Scapa Flow has three main
entrances navigable by all ships, the Hoxa, the Switha,
and Hoy Channels, and, in addition, has some more
narrow, shallow and tortuous entrances on the eastern
side, the main one being Holm Sound. The question of
providing gun defences for this Base, which the Ad-
miralty had decided a year or two before the War was
to be the main Fleet Base, had been discussed on more
than one occasion, after examination by a committee of
officers on the spot; but, since finance governs defence,
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 27
and the Admiralty from year to year had insufficient
money for even more urgent needs, no action had been
taken. Scapa Flow lies some 450 miles from the German
naval bases, and was, therefore, open to an attack by
enemy’s destroyer flotillas as well as, of course, by sub-
marines. Its main, indeed its only, safety against such
attacks by submarines lay in the navigational difficulties
attendant upon entry into the harbour, combined, as re-
gards destroyer attacks, with the possibility of an enemy’s
force being intercepted on its outward or homeward
passage, or of its being successfully engaged in the
vicinity of the base. The sailing directions laid great
stress upon the difficulties of navigations in the approaches
to this Base, due to the very strong and varying cur-
rents, but the Germans were well acquainted with
the Orkney and Shetland Islands. They had indeed
made it a practice to send ships to visit these islands fairly
frequently before the War, and they were, therefore, as
well able to judge of the difficulties of entry into Scapa
Flow as we were; and seeing that we used it as a main
Fleet Base, they could deduce the fact, if they did not
know it already, that the difficulties of entry were not
insuperable.
Sir George Callaghan, under these conditions, on the
arrival of the Fleet at Scapa Flow at the end of July,
took immediate steps, with the resources at his disposal
in the Fleet, to improvise defences for the Base against
destroyer attack. All that he could do was to land some
12-pounder guns from the ships of the Fleet and mount
them at the entrances. No searchlights could, however,
be provided, so that the guns were not of much value at
night. Arrangements were also made for placing light
cruisers and destroyers at the various entrances to assist
these defences. The further step, of course, was taken
28 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
when the Fleet was present at the Base of placing patrols
to the eastward of the Pentland Firth. It was not felt in
the Fleet, however, that these measures gave much
security even against destroyer attack on a dark night, and,
it gave no security whatever against submarine attack.
Nothing but obstructions of some kind could give that
security. The matter was frequently discussed. Although
many brains had been at work, no satisfactory anti-sub-
marine obstruction had been devised. Under the urgent
pressure of war the solution was found. The conclusion
generally held by experienced submarine officers was that,
whilst the least important entrances, such as the Hoy,
the Switha and the Holm Sound Channels, would be ex-
tremely difficult for the passage of a submarine, entry by
the Hoxa Sound Channel was quite practicable by a de-
termined submarine officer. So much for the Base at
Scapa Flow.
At Cromarty the conditions were somewhat better.
The only entrance to this Base is comparatively narrow,
and was defended against the entry of destroyers and
larger vessels by guns, which had been mounted by the
Admiralty before war broke out. There was, however,
no boom protection against the entry of destroyers, and
the conditions in regard to submarine attack were the
same as at Scapa Flow, there being no obstructions.
At Rosyth the same conditions prevailed as at
Cromarty, namely, the harbour was defended by guns
only against attack by destroyers. In this case, the guns
were manned by the military, and not by marines, as at
Cromarty; again the harbour was quite open to sub-
marine attack.
Consequently, the anxiety of officers in command of
Fleets or Squadrons at anchor in any of the Bases used
by the Grand Fleet was immense. For my part, I was
DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A
SUBMARINE BEING REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW
THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 29
always far more concerned for the safety of the Fleet
when it was at anchor in Scapa Flow during the exceed-
ingly brief periods which were spent there for coaling in
the early days of the War, than I was when the Fleet
was at sea, and this anxiety was reflected in the very short
time that the Fleet was kept in harbour. It was also the
cause of my taking the Fleet to sea very hurriedly on more
than one occasion owing to the reported presence of a
submarine in the anchorage, and considerable risks were
accepted in getting the Fleet to sea in very thick weather
at night on at least one of these occasions.
I have often wondered why the Germans did not
make greater efforts to reduce our strength in capital ships
by destroyer or submarine attacks on our bases in those
early days. They possessed, in comparison with the uses
for which they were required, almost a superfluity of
destroyers, certainly a superfluity as compared with our-
selves, and they could not have put them to a better use
than in an attack on Scapa Flow during the early months
of the 1914-1915 winter.
In August, 1914, Germany had 96 destroyers in home
waters fit for such an operation, all with a speed of, or
exceeding, 30 knots, this number being in addition to a
total of 48 more destroyers, rather smaller and with speeds
varying between 26 and 30 knots, which were quite fit for
work in the Baltic or in the vicinity of German bases in
the North Sea.
This country had in home waters at the same period
only 76 destroyers that could be compared with the Ger-
man vessels in view of modern requirements, and 33 of
these had a speed of only 27 knots. Of the 76 destroyers,
40 were allotted to the Grand Fleet proper, the remaining
36 being based on Harwich. We had in addition 11 large
and fast destroyers of the “Tribal” class which, owing to
30 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
their small fuel capacity, were only of use in southern
waters and were appropriated to Dover. And we pos-
sessed 25 destroyers of the “River” class, of a nominal
speed of only 25 knots, as well as the old 30-knot de-
stroyer; the latter class was only fit for patrol work in
the vicinity of the coast.
It may be said that similar reflections to those I have
mentioned might be made by the Germans as regards our
own movements, and that they were surprised that we
did not attack their Fleet at anchor. The answer is
obvious to those aware of the conditions. We were very
short of destroyers for fleet work, and we were well aware
of the thoroughness of the defences of the German naval
bases. We knew that they not only possessed the most
powerful and ample artillery defences, but we knew also
that the Germans had a very efficient mining service, and
we were justified in assuming that they had protected their
naval bases by extensive minefields. We, on the other
hand, were entirely unprovided with this particular form
of defence.
In view of the known quality of German artillery and
mine defences and the thorough nature of their organisa-
tion, my own view was that they also possessed, in all
probability, anti-submarine defences. For these reasons,
together with the important fact that the German rivers
are so shallow that our submarines could not enter them
in a submerged condition, it appeared to me that an attack
on their ships in harbour would meet with no success,
and that we could not afford to expend any of our exceed-
ingly limited number of destroyers, or submarines, in
making an attack which would, in all human probability,
be foredoomed to failure. Later knowledge of the
German defences proved the correctness of this view.
I can only imagine that the Germans credited us, also,
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS — 31
with possessing harbour defences and obstructions which
in our case were non-existent, although we did our
best in the Fleet to give the impression that we had ob-
structed the entrances, for, pending the provision of proper
obstructions, we improvised various contrivances. It
may have seemed impossible to the German mind that we
should place our Fleet, on which the Empire depended for
its very existence, in a position where it was open to sub-
marine or destroyer attack.
This view, however, did not relieve the minds of those
responsible for the safety of our Fleet from the gravest
anxiety whenever the more valuable ships were in the un-
defended harbours.
A comparison of numbers between the Grand Fleet
and the High Sea Fleet in the early part of the War shows
the following figures. Only ships that had completed
their training and were fit to fight in the line are included:
BATTLESHIPS
(B., British; G., German)
Pre- - De- :
Dread- Battle | Light Air- .
Date noughts Ae cruisers |cruisers — ~ | ships comes
August 4th, 1914
Be eii a eee eee 20 8 4 12 42 = 9
Gite dance ee 13 16 3 15 88 1 z
October Ist, 1914
Bivcica’s strane neavers 20 12 6 12 42 _ 10
Giese eoRey 15 16 8 14 88 3 2
January Ist, 1915
Discs cor ehnsewae 21* 8 6 17 44 _ 14
Gites rs 16 16 4 12 88 6 1
April Ist, 1915
Becivevcvcecesss 23 8 9 18 54 _ 17
Grgeecrev es vsa0% 17 16 4 14 88 6 _-
October Ist, 1915
Biggie ae aeks 25 10 10 25 66 _ 15
Gicesseae stax seve 17 16 4 15 88 12 _
* 21 completed, but two of these (Monarch and Conqueror) were seriously damaged
and one other battleship was refitting.
32 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
The above list gives the vessels nominally available.
In comparisons of the strength at Germany’s selected
and our average moment, the following facts should be re-
membered, and were necessarily taken into account by me
at the time:
(a) We usually had at least two battleships, one or two
light cruisers, six destroyers, one or two cruisers, and per-
haps one battle cruiser under refit, in addition to any other
vessels that might be temporarily disabled.
(b) Germany would see to it that none of her ships was
refitting when planning an operation, and she could rein-
force her Fleet by several light cruisers and two or more
flctillas of destroyers from the Baltic.
(c) The pre-Dreadnoughts were not a very important
factor on either side owing to inferiority of speed, and, in
the case of our ships, the comparatively short range of
their guns, due to the small amount of elevation of which
their mountings admitted.
(d) The German Zeppelins, as their numbers in-
creased, were of great assistance to the enemy for scouting,
each one being, in favourable weather, equal to at least two
light cruisers for such a purpose.
(e) Account is not taken in the British figures of the
Harwich force, as this force could not be counted upon to
effect concentration with the remainder of the Grand Fleet
at the German selected moment.
(f) The British cruisers, not being very modern, lacked
the speed necessary for efficiency as scouts. They were
very slightly faster than the battleships of the “Dread-
nought” type, and, owing to their lack of speed, they
were awkwardly placed if they came within range of an
enemy Battle Squadron or Battle Cruiser Squadron. On
the other hand, they were very superior in fighting
qualities to the German light cruisers.
STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 33
It will be seen from the above statements that the
enemy had by far his best opportunity from the naval
point of view in the early months of the War, as he was
then much nearer equality of strength with the Grand
Fleet than at any later period. A carefully laid trap,
which included minefields and submarines, with the High
Sea Fleet as a bait, might have been very effective at
any period of the War in inflicting considerable losses on
us. The Germans had their best opportunities between
November, 1914, and February, 1915. After April, 1915,
the situation got steadily worse for the enemy.
The lesson of vital importance to be drawn from this
review of relative naval strength, is that if this country
in the future decides to rely for safety against raids or
invasion on the Fleet alone, it is essential that we should
possess a considerably greater margin of superiority over
a possible enemy in all classes of vessels than we did in
August, 1914,
CHAPTER III
THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES
Tue Grand Fleet may be said to have come into being
only at the outbreak of the War, when it was so christened.
As with the name, so with the organisation.
The great majority of the really effective ships in the
Grand Fleet were the outcome of the policy initiated by
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone when
he took up the appointment of First Sea Lord in 1904
in the Administration of the Earl of Selborne. One of
Lord Fisher’s first acts—and he carried through a num-
ber of other changes which reacted favourably on the
efficiency of the Fleet for war—was the introduction of
the “all-big-gun” type of battleship, of which the Dread-
nought, laid down at Portsmouth on October 2nd, 1905,
was the earliest example. She was closely followed
by the three “all-big-gun” battle-cruisers of the “In-
vincible” class, which were of the same programme
—1905-6. Much criticism was levelled at _ the
Dreadnought, but even more at the principle em-
bodied in the battle-cruisers—ships with the speed of
cruisers, but the same calibre armament as_battle-
ships. The War has fully justified Lord Fisher’s
conception.
Our superiority in capital ships at the outbreak of
war was due to the efforts of the Boards presided over by
Lord Selborne and his successors from 1904 onwards, and
Lord Fisher held the post of First Sea Lord for five and
34
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 35
a half years of that period. At the beginning of 1909,
during Mr. McKenna’s tenure of office as First Lord,
great efforts were necessary to ensure the maintenance
of a sufficient standard of superiority in capital ships over
Germany, and to make good our deficiencies in destroy-
ers. The nation has good reason for the most profound
gratitude to Mr. McKenna for the very strong attitude
he assumed at this highly critical period. Reference to
the table on page 31 will show the position that would
have arisen if the four additional ‘““Dreadnoughts” had
not been included in the 1909-10 building programme.
In the later Administration, presided over by Mr.
Churchill, continued efforts were necessary, and were
made, and steps were also taken with a view to meet-
ing the crying need for modern light cruisers; Lord
Beresford had for some years been pointing out how
essential it was to add largely to our programmes of light
cruisers and destroyers.
So much for construction in pre-War days when the
Germans were carrying out their Navy Acts, one follow-
ing the other in rapid succession.
It is also of interest to note the part which Lord
Fisher took in buildmg up the Fleet organisation that
existed in 1914. He introduced the system of manning
the older ships, not in the first line, with nucleus crews
composed of the principal officers and ratings. These
ships were thus rendered capable of being put, in a very
short time, into a condition in which they were fit to
fight. 'This system superseded the old arrangement, by
which ships not in full commission were not manned at
all. Although it naturally led to a reduction in the total
number of fully-manned ships, a disadvantage which was
minimised by reducing squadrons abroad, it is probably
accepted now that in the circumstances existing at the
36 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
time the nucleus crew system is far preferable; it raised
the general standard of the whole Navy in British waters,
and facilitated the use of the Royal Fleet and Naval Re-
serves on the outbreak of war.
I.—Tue DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND FLEET
In the organisation existing before the War, the
Home Fleets comprised the First, Second and Third
Fleets—in fact, practically all ships in home waters which
it was intended to mobilise on the outbreak of war.
The war organisation, as carried out, divided the Home
Fleets into two parts.
The First, the Grand Fleet, included the First Fleet,
comprising the latest-built ships; the force stationed at
Harwich; four ships of the 6th Battle Squadron; the 6th
and 10th Cruiser Squadrons from the Second and Third
Fleets respectively; and the mine-laying Squadron from
the Second Fleet.
The Second, or Channel Fleet, included the older
battleships, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons,
the 5th and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, and a sweeping
flotilla with torpedo boats. This force was commanded
by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney until the end of 1914,
when he joined the Grand Fleet. It was independent of
the Grand Fleet.
Of the ships of the Channel Fleet, the 5th and 6th
Battle Squadrons and the 5th Cruiser Squadron were
manned before mobilisation with nucleus crews, and were
consequently partly trained; these ships assembled at
Portland. The ships of the 7th and 8th Battle
Squadrons and 7th Cruiser Squadron were not manned
until mobilisation, and the crews consequently required
training. This training was carried out near Plymouth,
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 37
and the battleships joined Sir Cecil Burney’s command
on September 3rd, 1914.
The ships of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were employed
as a look-out force in the Straits of Dover during the time
that the Channel Battle Fleet was patrolling to guard the
passage of the Expeditionary Force. They were subse-
quently ordered by the Admiralty to another service, and
three of them, the Hogue, Cressy and Aboukir, were sunk
whilst patrolling the Broad Fourteens off the Dutch coast.
These, then, were the conditions when War opened.
It was only natural that war experience should show
very quickly the many directions in which we had to recast,
or elaborate, our pre-War ideas, or to introduce new ar-
rangements,
Peace manceuvres, however useful, can never be a
substitute for war experience. They are many factors
which render peace manceuvres unreal. In the first place,
the available ships have to be divided so as to form the
opposing fleet, “an enemy”; secondly, a matter of far
greater moment, the manceuvres occupy much too short
a period, and many of the difficulties affecting both
matériel and personnel are not experienced; thirdly, the
conditions of war cannot be reproduced without serious
inconvenience, and even danger, to merchant ships; finally,
in our own manceuvres there was a tendency in the rules
to give the torpedo less than its proper value as a fight-
ing weapon.
But, more than all, it was the conditions under which
war broke out that made it necessary for us in the Grand
Fleet to build up what was almost a new organisation.
(a) The submarine had just become a most formidable
weapon; its development during the War was extraordi-
narily rapid.
(b) The airship as a scout was in its infancv at the
38 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
start, but it also developed with great rapidity, as did the
heavier-than-air machines.
(c) The mine, neglected by us, had been highly de-
veloped. by the enemy, both defensively and offensively.
| (d) The effective range both of the gun and of the
torpedo was quickly shown to be much greater than had
been considered possible before the War.*
(e) Wireless telegraphy developed with great rapidity,
and was put to many uses not dreamt of in pre-War days.
On the other hand, we were very fortunate in having
the Fleet concentrated at the outbreak of war. People
had often pictured war with Germany coming as a bolt
from the blue, and even naval officers feared that when
the occasion did arise, it would be found, as had previously
been the case, that fear of precipitating a conflict might
lead the Government to delay concentration with the re-
sult that our squadrons would be separated when war was
actually declared. Fortunately, the Admiralty in the last
days of July, 1914, placed us at once in a strong strategic
position. For this action the nation should be grateful
to the First Lord and First Sea Lord.
It was curious that, in spite of all the lessons of history,
there was general expectation that a great Fleet action
would at once be fought. No doubt this arose, partly,
from the boastings of German naval officers in pre-War
days, and partly from a knowledge of the great sacrifices
the enemy would incur unless he could dispute effectively
our command of the sea. Most people found it difficult
to imagine that the High Sea Fleet (built at vast
expense, and rightly considered by the enemy to be an
efficient weapon of war) would adopt from the outset a
*In pre-War days our Battle Practice had been carried out at a maximum
range of about 9,500 yards, and only on one occasion, when the Colossus fired
at a target ai 14,000 yards off Portland in 1912, had this range been exceeded.
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 39
purely passive réle, with the inevitable result that Ger-
man trade would be swept from the seas. But there
were two factors tending to make the High Command
adopt this course. First, there was the fear that action
with the Grand Fleet would so weaken the High Sea
Fleet as to cause the command of the Baltic to pass into
Allied hands, with a consequent landing of Russian
troops on German soil as the result. This fear had been
present in the German mind ever since the days of Fred-
erick the Great, when Russia threatened Berlin during
the Seven Years’ War. The second point, no doubt,
was that the German High Command realised that, if
Germany adopted a defensive réle with her Fleet, it
created, by far, the most difficult situation for us. Repug-
nant as this might be to high-spirited German naval offi-
cers, it was unquestionably the worst policy for us, for,
whilst the German High Sea Fleet remained “in being”
as a fighting force, we could not afford to undertake
operations tending to weaken our Grand Fleet, particu-
larly in the earlier period of the War when our margin
of superiority at Germany’s “selected moment” was not
great. The main disadvantage to the Germans, apart from
their loss of trade, lay in the inevitable gradual weaken-
ing of the morale of the personnel of the Navy, and it is
highly probable that this loss of morale was in the end
responsible for the series of mutinies which broke out in
the High Sea Fleet during 1917 and 1918, culminating
in the final catastrophe in November, 1918. In my view,
the passive role was carried much too far.
JIL.—Tue Starr ORGANISATION
To pass to the development of the organisation.
Almost the first question was that of Staff and Staff
work. In the days before the War, the Staff of the Com-
40 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
mander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets consisted of the fol-
lowing officers:
(a) A Personal Staff, comprising a Flag-Commander,
Flag-Lieutenant, and Secretary. The Flag-Captain was
also, in a sense, on the Personal Staff.
(b) A General Staff, comprising a Captain of the
Fleet with his Secretary, a Wireless officer; a Signal offi-
cer, and the clerical staff of the Secretary.
In addition, the organisation provided for the appoint-
ment of two War Staff officers, on mobilisation for war.
This was the Staff which, together with an additional
Signal officer, I found in the Iron Duke, on assuming com-
mand of the Grand Fleet.
It had always been my intention, on relieving Sir
George Callaghan in December, 1914 (as was originally
arranged before the War broke out, as I have explained),
to add to the above, a Captain, for the operational side
of the Staff, leaving the Flag-Captain responsible only
for the Command of the Fleet-flagship, this being, in my
opinion, sufficient work and responsibility to occupy his
whole time; and I had prepared an organisation of the
Staff of the Fleet-flagship in accordance with which the
work should be divided into two distinct branches, the
operations and the matériel side, each with a secretariat.
I had communicated my views to the officers selected for
the Staff. This, in my judgment, was the correct line for
any Naval Staff organisation, and it was later introduced
by me into the Admiralty Naval Staff.
When informed, just prior to the declaration of War,
that I might be required to take over the command of the
Fleet, I decided to ask, as the first step, for the services
of Rear-Admiral Charles E. Madden as Chief of the Staff.
I had brought with me from London on my own Staff,
as Second in Command of the Grand Fleet, a Captain
GRAND FLEET AND BASES AI
(Captain Bentinck), with the title of Captain on the
Staff, a Secretary with assistants, a Flag-Lieutenant, a
Signal officer, a Wireless officer, a War Staff officer, and
a Signal Boatswain. These, with the exception of Cap-
tain Bentinck (who joined Vice-Admiral Sir George War-
render’s Staff), I took to the Iron Duke, and my Staff
then comprised:
A Rear-Admiral as Chief of the Staff.
A Commodore as Captain of the Fleet.
Two Secretaries, with the necessary clerical staff.
A Flag-Lieutenant.
Three Signal officers.
Three Wireless officers (very soon reduced to two).
Three War Staff officers.
Two Signal Boatswains.
A Fleet Coaling officer also joined the Staff.
The main difficulty in providing a Flag officer afloat
with a suitable staff is that of accommodation, and this
difficulty was somewhat serious when I doubled the staff
on board the Iron Duke. However, it was successfully
overcome. The Staff was organised into two branches—
Operations and Matériel—the former directly under the
Chief of the Staff, the latter immediately under the Cap-
tain of the Fleet. On proceeding to sea, however, the
work of the Captain of the Fleet became, of necessity,
very largely reduced, and he joined the operational side,
arrangements being made by which either he or the Chief
of the Staff was always on the bridge in my absence, as
we soon found under the new conditions, consequent on
the advent of the submarine as an important factor in
naval warfare, that it was essential that an officer should
be constantly on the bridge who could take immediate
action in moving the Fleet, or any portion of it, as might
be required,
42 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Even so, the presence of the Commander-in-Chief
was so frequently required, at a moment’s notice, owing
to the swiftness with which a modern fleet moves, that I
never left my sea cabin, which was under the bridge,
to go to the after part of the ship when the Fleet was
at sea,
The duties of my Staff afloat were separated, as
already stated, under two headings. This division, as is
clear from the above remarks, affected their duties in
harbour more than when at sea. In the latter case the
two branches combined, and the whole staff became “opera-
tional.”
The Staff work under these conditions was carried out
in the war-room, situated under protection, below the con-
ning tower. Here the movements of our own ships were
recorded, as well as those of the enemy until we were
nearing contact. All intelligence was sent from the
bridge to this centre by the Signal officers, and the situa-
tion at any moment could be seen by a glance at the charts
kept by the War Staff officer on duty.
When we were nearing enemy vessels or enemy waters,
the work was shifted from the war-room to the Ad-
miral’s shelter on the bridge, so that the situation could
be seen by me more readily; and finally, when, as on
May 81st and August 19th, 1916, the two fleets were
nearing touch with one another, the “plot” of the move-
ments as reported was continually under my obser-
vation.
At ordinary times, in harbour, the Staff officers en-
gaged on the operational side were following the move-
ments of such enemy vessels (chiefly, of course, sub-
marines) as were known to be at sea, as well as those
of our own vessels. (In the latter case frequent orders to
ships were necessary to ensure that they did not meet
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 43
each other at night—when risk of collision would be in-
curred owing to ships not carrying lights, or in thick
weather.) They put into execution the orders given by
myself or the Chief of the Staff, and were engaged
in elaborating plans of future movements and drawing
up the necessary orders for such movements as I had in
contemplation. They were also engaged in arranging all
gunnery, torpedo and other practices and exercises, and
in the constant work of the production, revision and issue
of orders for the organisation and tactical working of the
Fleet.
On the matériel side, the Staff work comprised that of
storing, provisioning and fuelling the Fleet, all questions
of instruction, training, personnel, discipline, mails, refits
and repairs, etc.
In action each member of the Staff had his own
particular duty allotted to him. The secretaries took
notes and recorded proceedings; certain officers had as
their sole duty that of watching and reporting to me every
movement of enemy vessels; one officer was detailed to
attend solely to torpedo attacks made by the enemy,
keeping me informed of their progress and of their pos-
sibilities; another dealt with all questions relating to con-
centration or distribution of fire, bringing to my notice
any signals required to give effect to our preconceived
arrangements; each signal officer had his own special duty,
one being responsible that all signals for tactical move-
ments made visually were also made by “short distance”
wireless telegraphy. One wireless officer worked in the
main office and one in the auxiliary office. The Staff
was so organised as to leave the Commander-in-Chief
free to take a comprehensive survey of the whole posi-
tion, whilst ensuring that nothing that should be done was
left undone. It must, however, be realised that the rapid-
44 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
ity of movement of fleets is so great that, at critical
moments, the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet, or the Flag
Officer Commanding a Squadron, must of necessity make
instant decisions; there is no time for consultation or for
advice.
TII.—PREPARATION OF CRUISING ORDERS
One of the earliest steps taken in organising the Grand
Fleet after the declaration of War was to lay down defi-
nitely the various cruising orders for the Battle Fleet
and its “look-out” screen of battle-cruisers, cruisers and
light cruisers. There had been much discussion for some
years before the War as to the best disposition of cruisers
ahead of a Battle Fleet. None of the arrangements that
had been under discussion was adopted as a whole, but
war experience led to a series of diagrams being drawn
up giving the cruising stations of all the various classes
of cruisers and other light craft under the different con-
ditions that might exist. These included diagrams show-
ing the cruiser disposition with the fleet moving towards
enemy waters, under conditions of ordinary visibility,
by day, or in low visibility by day, both with the Battle
Cruiser Fleet in company and without it; a similar dia-
gram when moving away from enemy water by day (this
being to meet the possible case of an attempted attack
by destroyers as the fleet steered away from enemy
waters) ; diagrams were got out for steering towards or
away from enemy waters at night; and, finally, dia-
grams were prepared, both for day and night, for the
dispositions of the cruisers and other light forces after an
action.
Several different cruising diagrams for the Battle
Fleet itself, both by day and at night, were similarly
drawn up. Some of these were specially designed to give
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 45
such safety from submarine attack as was possible to the
main body of the Fleet, in the not unlikely event of
destroyers being absent, from bad weather, shortage of
fuel, or other causes. The dispositions for use at night
provided for the use of destroyer attack, and were de-
signed to give safety from collision, due to squadrons
inadvertently closing each other in the darkness, when
showing no lights; this was a very possible event during
the course of a long night when a very slight error in
steering, or a slight difference in compasses, will rapidly
bring two squadrons together that started the night five
miles apart. It was necessary to keep squadrons separ-
ated, as a long line of ships greatly facilitated successful
submarine attack, whilst a slight dispersal of squadrons
gave greater freedom of movement in the case of de-
stroyer attack. At the same time it was necessary to
provide for concentrating the Fleet quickly at daylight.
The question of submarine screens was taken up
at the commencement of war. This matter had
naturally been considered before the War, but was in
its earliest stages, and, although an efficient disposition
of a screen of destroyers is a comparatively simple matter
when there is no lack of destroyers, the case is different
when a fleet is very short of the requisite number, as was
our experience, and one destroyer had often to be dis-
posed to endeavour to do the work of two.
Diagrams of submarine screens were, therefore,
drawn up to meet the different conditions resulting from
the presence of varying numbers of destroyers, or a de-
creased number of ships requiring to be screened, and
also providing for the ships being in various formations.
In November, 1916, the number of these diagrams was
seventeen.
Early in the War the danger of successful submarine
46 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
attack on warships at sea, whether in company or pro-
ceeding singly, had impressed on us the necessity of
taking every precaution for safety, and the practice of the
fleet steering zigzag courses was devised and generally
adopted in accordance with my directions. in the case
of a fleet or squadron, the usual practice was to carry out
the alterations of course by turning the ships together;
occasionally the turn was made “in succession,” but this
was exceptional. In small squadrons, the turns were occa-
sionally made at fixed time intervals without signal.
Zigzagging had a very beneficial effect on the manner
in which officers of watches kept station in a fleet, since
there is no better practice than keeping station on a line of
bearing, a far more difficult matter to the novice than
keeping station astern of another ship. I attribute the
excellent manner in which the ships were handled in 1915
and 1916 very largely to this early experience. Much
theoretical investigation was instituted to determine the
method of zigzagging, both in a fleet and in a single ship,
which gave the greatest protection against submarine at-
tack, and actual experiments took place with our own
submarines with a view to forming correct conclusions;
the flag officers of the fleet rendered me much assistance
in this as in all other matters.
The experience of the Grand Fleet was utilised in the
instructions subsequently issued to merchant ships, and
the value of zigzagging in reducing the danger of sub-
marine attack was clearly shown during the year 1917 by
the comparative immunity of merchant ships that com-
plied with the orders as compared with those that did not
do so. Occasionally, of course, zigzagging brought a ship
‘into danger, but this was exceptional as compared with
the general immunity given.
When the convoying of merchant ships through
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 47
the submarine zone was instituted in 1917, after I had
returned to the Admiralty, the Grand Fleet experience
was again of value in the preparation of instructions.
The supremely important question of how best to
handle in action the large and increasing Fleet en-
gaged my attention from the commencement. In
drawing up the various instructions for the conduct of
the Fleet, both when cruising and in action, I availed
myself of the advice and assistance of the experienced
flag officers commanding the various Squadrons. Much
discussion took place on these matters, and many of the
dispositions adopted formed the subject of actual ex-
periment at sea before being incorporated in the
orders.
The successful and rapid deployment of the Battle
Fleet from its cruising formation was a matter of the
greatest importance, and constant practice in carrying cut
this manoeuvre under every varying condition was given
to the Fleet when at sea. Various arrangements were
introduced having as their object the simplification and
shortening of the manceuvre, with a view to bringing
the heaviest possible fire to bear on the enemy’s fleet as
quickly as possible. Orders were drawn up to meet
cases of deployment in thick weather, when the enemy
might be sighted at short range, and immediate inde-
pendent action by a divisional Flag Officer would be
necessary.
In the early part of the War the rapid deployment of
the Fleet for action was complicated by the presence of
the 8rd Battle Squadron of pre-Dreadnoughts—the ves-
sels of the “King Edward VII.” class—as the speed
of the ships of this squadron was some three knots less
than that of the rest of the Battle Fleet. I endeavoured
to solve this problem by practical experience. Much
48 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
depended on the tactics likely to be adopted by the
enemy’s Battle Fleet. The main difficulty Jay in the
fact that if the 8rd Battle Squadron was placed on one
flank of the Battle Fleet when in cruising order and de-
ployment towards that flank became necessary in con-
formity with an enemy movement, thus placing the slow
8rd Battle Squadron in the van, the fleet speed of the
whole Battle Line was necessarily reduced to some 14
knots, in order to have the necessary reserve of speed in
hand. If, on the other hand, the 8rd Battle Squadron
was placed in the centre of the Fleet, the Fleet speed
was again reduced to that attainable by ;this squadron.
It was desirable to devise a cruising order for the Battle
Fleet which would admit of the 8rd Battle Squadron be-
ing in the rear after deployment, in whichever direction
deployment took place. There was still the objection,
which had to be accepted, that a turn of 16 points forced
upon us by the enemy would place this squadron in the
van.
The cruising order eventually adopted placed the pre-
Dreadnought Squadron in rear of the Dreadnought
Squadrons, with a view to the slow squadron turning in
the opposite direction to the remainder on deployment,
and eventually taking station in rear of the Dreadnought
Fleet. This involved accepting some delay in getting the
3rd Battle Squadron into effective action.
The question was not one of importance subsequent
to April, 1915, from which date our superiority in battle-
ships of the Dreadnought type was sufficient to give me
confidence that the High Sea Fleet, engaged under suit-
able conditions, could be crushed in action without the
aid of the 8rd Battle Squadron; but during the winter
of 1914-15, when our superiority in Dreadnoughts was
frequently very slight, and the enemy possessed two pre-
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GRAND FLEET AND BASES 49
Dreadnought Battle Squadrons, our 8rd Battle Squadron
was a necessary addition to the Grand Fleet.
The Battle Orders indicated the position to be
occupied by our battle-cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers
and destroyers on deployment, as well as that of the
fast 5th Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the
“Queen Elizabeth” class, when that squadron joined the
Fleet. The first Battle Orders drawn up and issued
shortly after war commenced were modelled on a Battle
memorandum which I had prepared when in command,
first, of the Atlantic Fleet, and, later, of the 2nd Battle
Squadron. But the changing situation soon made altera-
tions and additions necessary, and the Orders were under
constant revision.
The tactics to be pursued by the different units of
the Fleet in action under all conceivable conditions were
provided for as far as possible.
Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that
the Commander-in-Chief of a large fleet could not after
deployment control the movements of all the squadrons
comprising that fleet under the conditions of modern
action when funnel and cordite smoke, and the great
length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of events,
and increase the difficulty of communication. The neces-
sity for wide decentralisation of command, after the de-
ployment of the fleet for action, was emphasised.
As the Fleet grew in size, increasing stress was laid
on this point. Flag officers commanding squadrons were,
of course, kept fully acquainted with the general ideas
under which the Fleet would act, so that they might be
able to interpret my wishes when acting independently.
Stress was laid on the necessity for keeping a close watch
on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, so that
squadrons could conform to his movements. The general
50 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
lines on which I intended to engage were defined. These
included the range at which it was intended to open the
engagement, the range below which it was not intended to
close under ordinary conditions, on account of the risks
to be apprehended from torpedo fire, and the exceptions to
this rule which might become necessary. Emphasis was
laid on the supreme necessity for a free use of our own
torpedoes when opportunity occurred.
After the experience of the engagement on January
24th, 1915, between the battle-cruisers, and especially as
our superiority increased and the High Sea Fleet gave no
sign of a desire to engage, the conviction became stronger
than in any action between the two fleets, the enemy would
fight a retiring battle. This is the most difficult form of
tactics to counter in these days of submarines, mines
and torpedoes, since a retiring fleet is in a position of
great tactical advantage in the employment of these
weapons. The Tactical Board was in constant use for
a consideration of this problem, both by myself and the
other flag officers.
In the earliest stages of the War, when the German
submarine strength was not great, one of the main prob-
lems to be considered in regard to a fleet action was the
employment of our destroyers and light cruisers to
attack the enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes and to
counter his similar attacks, which, owing to his great su-
periority in destroyers, was a matter of supreme im-
portance. The knowledge, too, that his light cruisers and
destroyers, as well possibly as some of his heavier ships,
were fitted for mine-laying (which was not the case with
us) made it necessary to take into account the probability
that he would use this form of attack at the commence-
ment of a general action, or during the stages leading
up to it. Later, when his submarines increased in num-
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 51
ber, the method of countering the use of such vessels by
the enemy, in the preliminary stages of a fleet action,
had also to be considered, particularly as it was not
until 1916 that the Grand Fleet was provided with any
submarines of this type, and not until 1917 that sub-
marines which could maintain the Fleet-speed at sea be-
came part of the organisation.
The comparative immunity of the van from torpedo at-
tack by the enemy, if the fleets were approximately abeam
of one another, and the risks run by the centre and rear
were pointed out, as were the different conditions pro-
duced in the case of a retiring enemy, or one which had
a position of torpedo advantage.
The influence of the torpedo on tactics became greater
as the War progressed, owing to the advance made in
the technique of these weapons. Before the opening of
hostilities, for instance, torpedoes had a maximum range of
about 10,000 yards. We made many improvements
in our torpedoes as the War progressed, including
a great increase in range, and we had every reason to
believe that the Germans were making similar progress,
and that the range of their topedoes was as much in ex-
cess of the pre-War range as was that of our own
weapons,
The threat of successful torpedo attack even from
battleships in the line was, therefore, an important factor
to be taken into account, with the ships of the opposing
fleets formed in single line at the close intervals which are
necessary for successful co-operation and the concentra-
tion of power afforded by a shortened line. Investigation
into possible alternative formations for fighting a fleet
action was constantly proceeding, but the single line, or
a modification of it, was, under most conditions, the best
that could be devised.
52 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
It was pointed out that, although our Fleet would be
manceuvred for advantage in gunnery position, it might
be necessary to engage under unfavourable gunnery con-
ditions in order to prevent the enemy reaching his own
waters.
Several new manceuvres were introduced and practised
by the Fleet with a view to countering possible tac-
tics on the part of the enemy. ‘These included a
“turn away” or a “turn towards” to counter a serious
attack by torpedoes; a quick method of reversing the
course of the Fleet without impairing its organisa-
tion to meet enemy tactics necessitating such a move;
rapid methods of re-forming single line; etc. Other new
tactical methods were introduced as time progressed
to meet the changing conditions of modern war-
fare.
Detailed orders were drawn up in regard to the con-
duct of the Fleet after an action, so far as it was possible
to foresee the conditions that might arise. The object
was to arrange to continue the attack by light craft,
whilst safeguarding the heavy ships against counter-
attack by light forces.
In the orders which were issued for the guidance of
the destroyers both before, during, and after an action, en-
deavour was made to provide for all these contingen-:
cies. The stations of the flotillas, including the Harwich
flotillas, if they were present, were laid down, and each
had its particular duties assigned to it. General direc-
tions were given for the employment of the destroyers,
wide latitude being reserved to the officers commanding
flotillas.
The treatment of disabled ships was legislated for.
The duties of each class of vessel, battle-cruiser,
cruiser and light cruiser when in cruising order, or in
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 53
action, or after an action, were defined, particular em-
phasis being laid on the necessity for ships in the van,
when in action, gaining a position of torpedo advan-
tage in regard to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, whilst at the
same time engaging enemy vessels of a similar class and
preventing torpedo attacks on our own Battle Fleet from
developing.
Thus it was laid down as the leading principle in the
General Cruiser Instructions, that after gaining touch
with the enemy the first essential was to maintain that
touch. Instructions were also given that in the event of
the enemy’s advanced forces becoming engaged with our
Battle-Cruiser Fleet, the cruisers in our advanced line were
to push on and gain touch with the enemy’s Battle Fleet.
It will be seen later that this situation arose during the
Jutland battle.
The Instructions for battle-cruisers laid down the prin-
ciple that in action their primary function was the de-
struction of the similar enemy vessels if present, and, after
their destruction or in their absence, to attack the van
of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. Prior to action their duty
was defined as giving information as to the enemy’s Battle
Fleet, whilst denying similar information to the enemy.
The Vice-Admiral commanding the Battle-Cruiser
Fleet was given a free hand to carry out these general
instructions.
The Instructions for the 5th Battle Squadron (the
ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class) were drawn up to
provide for the battle-cruisers being either absent or
present. In the former event, this squadron took the
place, and the duties, of the battle-cruisers; with our
battle-cruisers present and in the van, the 5th Battle
Squadron was ordered to take station ahead of the re-
mainder of the Battle Fleet in the case of a deployment
54 THE GRAND -FLEET, 1914-1916
towards Heligoland, and in rear of the Battle Fleet in the
case of deployment away from Heligoland. The object of
this latter disposition was to place the High Sea Fleet
at a disadvantage should it execute a 16-point turn after
deployment. In order to enable the 5th Battle Squadron
to carry out its functions in action, it was stationed be-
tween the Cruiser Line and the main Battle Fleet when
in cruising order.
The Instructions to the light cruisers defined their
duties in action as being to attack the enemy’s light cruisers
and torpedo craft, to support our destroyers, and to at-
tack the enemy’s battle line with torpedoes. For this
purpose most of the light cruiser squadrons were required
to be in the van on deployment.
The Instructions for destroyers laid emphasis on the
fact that they should carry out an early attack on the
enemy’s Battle Fleet, commencing their attacks in clear
weather, as soon as the Battle Fleet were engaged. Un-
der conditions of low visibility, they were instructed to
attack without waiting for the Battle Fleets to be en-
gaged. It was pointed out that destroyers closing the
enemy’s Battle Fleet for the purpose of an attack were
also in the best position for preventing successful attacks
on our own fleets.
As soon as submarine flotillas were attached to the
Grand Fleet, in 1916, instructions for their conduct be-
fore, during, and after action were drawn up. Instruc-
tions for two other classes of vessel, namely, mine-layers
and sea-plane carriers, had been issued earlier, vessels of
the mine-laying type, but of a slow speed, having
been attached to the Fleet from the commencement of
War, and sea-plane carriers, possessing, however, but slow
speed and inferior arrangements, having joined during
1915.
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 55
IV.—Tue TRarnine oF THE FLEET
Inseparable from the question of the management of
the Fleet before and during action was that of the working
together of its units at sea by day and at night. This
matter was, of course, one to which great attention had
been devoted by Sir George Callaghan, who, when he
handed over the Fleet to me, gave me a fighting machine
trained to a very high pitch of perfection by an officer
who was a past master in fleet training.
But it was inevitable that war conditions should make
even greater demands on the skill of the personnel than
had previously been necessary, and in no direction was
this more necessary than at night, the number of ships
in company being far greater than had previously been
usual; and the necessity of abstaining from signalling
added to the difficulties. Further, under peace conditions,
fleets cruising on dark, stormy nights without showing any
lights, did so for comparatively short periods, during
which the more experienced officers could, to a certain
extent, remain on deck.
Under war conditions no ships at sea ever showed
more than a very dim light at the stern, and frequently
not even that, adding greatly to difficulties of fleet cruis-
ing. Consequently provision had to be made for ensuring
safety whilst cruising under these conditions, and con-
siderable foresight and great skill on the part of officers
was necessary
Single ships and squadrons that might by any possi-
bility pass close to one another during hours of dark-
ness were warned beforehand of the danger, and arrange-
ments made so that they should be aware of each other’s
positions. Destroyers, especially, were given directions
so as to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which
\
56 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
otherwise might open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all
sorts were similarly warned so far as this was possible,
but in their case the conditions, owing to difficulties of
communication, were frequently much more embarras-
sing.
Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night
had to be such as to reduce to a minimum the necessity
for signals, whilst giving freedom of action in an emer-
gency. What applied to conditions of darkness applied
equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for en-
suring safety in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren,
could not as a rule be employed, since the blasts might
give warning to the enemy and place the Fleet open
to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the
other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in
close company with the larger ships for screening purposes
against submarines led, in the case of sudden fog, to a
difficult situation, as, before the Fleet could safely carry
out any manceuvre, it was essential to get the destroyers
clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by
the large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued
to meet all these conditions, and the best testimony to
the training of the Fleet prior to the War was the remark-
able freedom from accident during the early months after
the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly
commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by
no means handy vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisa-
tion, was also a source of great gratification to me, and
must have been most satisfactory to the officers and men
concerned.
The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particu-
larly in light craft, the higher speeds attained by its
units, the extreme importance of reducing signalling by
wireless at sea to an absolute minimum, except in the
Z
4
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 57
presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate atten-
tion on the question of the efficiency of our signal ar-
rangements. Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to
be stopped, because by means of directional wireless sta-
tions the positions of ships using wireless telegraphy could
be determined by the enemy. As time went on, we felt
that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and
in some cases even the name of the ship so signalling.
This we deduced from the fact that we ourselves made
progress in this direction. The fact of a German fleet
being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if
much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally
concluded that the enemy could similarly locate any of
our squadrons using the same means of communication.
That was an inevitable inference.
The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in
the first place, to endeavour, by means of carefully com-
piled and elaborate orders, to reduce the amount of sig-
nalling that would ordinarily be required after the Fleet
had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the
Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions
that could be anticipated, and whilst this made the orders
somewhat lengthy so as to meet every possibility, the
object was achieved.
Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea
in daylight, arrangements were made to pass signals in
and out between the most advanced cruisers and the Fleet
Flagship by searchlight, except in the presence of the
enemy, and good organisation gradually reduced the time
occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet
manceuvring when much to the southward of the lati-
tude of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of Aberdeen, was
also carried out by visual signalling.
Owing to the danger of disclosing the position of the
58 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Fleet to enemy submarines or destroyers, it was not pos-
sible to use visual signalling at night, except with carefully
shaded lamps which were only visible at a distance of
about a quarter of a mile, and then only by the ship
addressed, and this problem thus became complicated at
night, in fogs or in very thick weather. Occasional resort
had then to be made to wireless, but by signalling before
dark all expected movements during the night, and by
arranging the course of the Fleet so that few alterations
were necessary, we succeeded in keeping almost absolute
wireless silence. It had to be used, however, when im-
portant information from the Admiralty and elsewhere
was to be transmitted to the Fleet-Flagship, or to senior
officers of squadrons, or to single ships when at sea en-
gaged in operations, etc., and early in the War we had
to devise a method by which this could be done without
calling up the ships in question by wireless, thus neces-
sitating a reply from them, and thus possibly acquainting
the enemy of their position.
After a time a satisfactory and ingenious system of
communicating the required information without causing
the ship herself to divulge her position was devised by
the Fleet Wireless officer, Lieutenant-Commander R. L.
Nicholson. This plan worked excellently and gradually
was greatly extended during the later stages of the War.
It must not be thought that, because wireless sig-
nalling at sea was restricted, it was not intended to make
full use of it when necessary and when silence was no
longer required, such as when the fleets were within
sight of one another. On the contrary, a great advance
was made during the War in the use of wireless tele-
graphy for manceuvring the Battle Fleet, as well as in
every other direction. So proficient did the ships be-
come under the organisation introduced by Lieutenant-
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 59
Commander Nicholson, assisted as he was by the very
efficient wireless officers and wireless personnel, that in
1916 I could handle the Battle Fleet by wireless with as
much ease and rapidity as by visual signals. At the begin-
ning of the War ten minutes to a quarter of an hour would
elapse before I could be sure that all ships had received
a manceuvring wireless signal addressed to the whole
Battle Fleet. In 1916 the time rarely exceeded two to
three minutes. This great improvement was due to new
methods introduced, as well as to incessant practice in
harbour.
Our advance in the use of wireless telegraphy was
very considerable indeed, and I owed a great debt of
gratitude to Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, the other
wireless officers of the Fleet-Flagship, and the wireless
officers and personnel of the whole Fleet. The progress
was the more remarkable since, owing to extreme short-
age of wireless personnel for the expanding Fleet and
the large number of auxiliary vessels commissioned, we
were forced to discharge many of the best operators in
the Fleet as the War progressed and to replace them by
boys trained in the Wireless School established by the
Fleet at Scapa Flow.
A poimt which war experience brought into con-
siderable prominence was the difficulty of distinguishing,
with sufficient rapidity, enemy vessels from our own
ships both before, and, more particularly during, action.
The difficulty applied to all classes of vessels, but was
greatest in the case of torpedo craft and submarines.
Steps were taken to deal with it, and satisfactory arrange-
ments made for certain distinguishing marks visible at
long distances to be worn during daylight by our own
surface bee The question of identification at night
was ae cult, and although we effected improve-
60 THE -GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
ment in this respect also, the results were not so satis-
factory.
Of the original experimental work carried out by the
Fleet at Scapa Flow none was more important than that
connected with the safety of ships from mines. Early
in the War it had become obvious that there was danger
of a serious weakening of the Grand Fleet by successful
mine attack, and no safeguard existed beyond the work
of the mine-sweepers; these vessels could not work far
afield, and in bad weather could not work even close to
their bases, whereas the Fleet might be required to pro-
ceed to sea when mine-sweeping was impracticable.
A solution of this difficulty was required. Com-
mander Cecil V- Usborne, of the Colossus, in these
circumstances proposed to me the trial of an apparatus
which he suggested should be towed from the bows of
ships; it was intended to fend off any mine encountered,
provided the ship did not strike it absolutely “end on.”
I ordered immediate trials; all the necessary matériel was
provided with Fleet labour and appliances, and starting
with trials in a picket boat, they were continued until a
series of experiments commenced in large ships, battle-
ships and cruisers. I placed Rear-Admirals A. L. Duff
and A, C. Leveson in charge of the experiments and
great progress was made, although absolute success was
not obtained.
Lieutenant Dennis Burney, the son of Admiral Sir
Cecil Burney, visited the base at this juncture, and,
knowing his inventive turn of mind, I discussed the
matter with him at considerable length. Lieutenant
Burney soon afterwards put forward proposals for
effecting the required object. His idea was to utilise
apparatus which he had devised earlier for other purposes.
His scheme was of a more elaborate nature than that
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 61
devised by Commander Usborne, and necessitated the
manufacture of appliances by outside manufacturers, I
urged the Admiralty to take up the question at once;
this was done, and the experiments, started at Ports-
mouth, were transferred to Scapa Flow as soon as pre-
liminary success had been obtained.
The two devices were then tried over a considerable
period at Scapa Flow, still under the immediate direction
of Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson, who threw them-
selves wholeheartedly into the task, Rear-Admiral
E. F. A. Gaunt taking up this work in their occasional
absence. After many disappointments the Burney
system was proved to be successful, and I at once re-
quested that manufacture on a large scale should be
proceeded with. The device was of an elaborate char-
acter, and many persons at first were sceptical as to its
value, owing partly to early difficulties in manipulation.
But Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson rendered the
greatest assistance in overcoming objections, and grad-
ually it came to be seen in the Fleet that we had
become possessed of a most valuable safeguard. By
the time I relinquished the Command a very large num-
ber of battleships, battle-cruisers, and cruisers, and some
light cruisers had been fitted, and the gear was working
well, Owing to Lieutenant Burney’s efforts, improve-
ment was constantly being effected, with the result that
during 1917 the fitting was universal. During that year
it was instrumental in saving several warships from dam-
age by mines, and in 1918 the number of ships saved was
also considerable.
The initial idea was that. of Commander Usborne,
and both he and Lieutenant Burney displayed much
energy in working out their respective devices. But it
was through Lieutenant Burney’s ingenuity that final
62 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
success was achieved. Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson
eventually brought the appliance to perfection, with the
result that it was generally adopted. A modified arrange-
ment of the same nature was fitted to merchant ships
during 1917 and 1918, and proved of very great value.
As was inevitable, my thoughts turned at an early
stage of my Command to the necessity for constant
improvement in the fighting efficiency of the Grand
Fleet. My knowledge of the German Navy, which was
considerable, left me under no delusions as to its
character. I had made it my business to keep myself
very fully acquainted with German progress. I had
first been brought into close touch with the modern
German Navy during service in China from 1899 to
1902, which included the Boxer campaign, when I
saw a great deal of its officers and men. I had then
formed a high estimate of its efficiency, and subsequent
touch on many occasions with the German Fleet had
convinced me that in matériel the Germans were ahead
of us, and that the personnel, though lacking the
initiative and resource and seamanlike character of the
British, was highly disciplined, and well educated and
trained. I knew also that the German Fleet was in no
way short of officers; this was the case with us owing to the
constant political pressure in the years before the War,
and I expected that this shortage of officers would be a
great handicap to us as the War progressed. The branch
of the German Navy from which I expected very good
work was the destroyer service. I had seen German de-
stroyers manceuvring.
Finally I knew, perhaps better than most of our
officers, how efficient was the gunnery and torpedo work
of the High Sea Fleet, and how rapid had been its ad-
vance in the year or two before the War. A great in-
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 63
crease had been made in the allowance of ammunition for
practice. Before the War this was much higher than our
own, and there was no doubt in my mind that the German
allowance would be well expended. Indeed, we had ob-
tained information which placed this beyond question.
I was well acquainted personally with many of the
flag officers and captains in the German Navy and had
some idea of their views on naval warfare. Amongst
those whom I knew best were Admiral von Ingenohl,
the then Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet,
Vice-Admiral von Lans, commanding a Battle Squad-
ron, Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of the Naval Staff, who
later succeeded Admiral von Ingenohl, Grand-Admiral
von Tirpitz, Admiral von Holtzendorff, a former Com-
mander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, who succeeded
Admiral von Pohl as chief of the Naval Staff, and Ad-
miral von Usedom, who did conspicuous work in the shore
batteries during the Dardanelles operations. My knowl-
edge of these officers led me to expect good work in the
High Command, and I also expected that they would be
well supported.
It is interesting to record that I took part in a Con-
ference of Allied naval officers in a pagoda at the end
of the Great Wall of China in company with Admiral
von Holtzendorff (the then German Flag Captain in
China) after the capture of the Shan-hai-Kwan forts,
in 1900, and that Admiral von Usedom succeeded me
as Chief of the Staff to Admiral—afterwards Admiral
of the Fleet—Sir Edward Seymour, when I was wounded
during the international expedition for the relief of the
Peking Legations. I had met both these officers on sev-
eral subsequent occasions, as well as Admiral von Lans,
who was in command of the Iltis at the capture of the
Taku forts by the Allies in the Boxer campaign.
64 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
My knowledge of the German Navy was a strong rea-
son, had no others existed, for making me desirous of
doing all that was possible to increase our own gunnery
and torpedo efficiency.
The Germans possessed an excellent practice ground
in Kiel Bay, with every appliance for carrying out gun-
nery exercises, and I felt sure that they had rendered it
safe from any hostile attack, and that the German Fleet
would be able to maintain and improve its efficiency as
time progressed.
We were not in so fortunate a position. There had
been no recent opportunity for carrying out gunnery and
torpedo exercises and practices; Scapa Flow had not been
used as a base for such work in peace time, except for
destroyers, and consequently no facilities existed there,
although the proximity of Cromarty, which had been a
Fleet practice base, neutralised this disadvantage to a
certain extent at a later period. But there was no pro-
tected area outside the harbour where practices could be
carried out in safety, and the harbour itself was not at
first secure against submarine attack. Much use, how-
ever, was made of the Moray Firth outside Cromarty
later when submarine obstructions had been provided,
and the Germans had obligingly laid a mine-field which
protected the practice area from seaward. At the
commencement of the War, then, it was necessary to
depend on fleet resources for the provision of targets for
gunnery practices, and the practices themselves were car-
ried out under conditions which laid the ships open to
submarine attack. This was most unsatisfactory, and the
work suffered considerably as the result. The opportunity
provided by constant sea work in the first months of the
War was, however, utilised to carry out such gunnery
practices as the conditions admitted.
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 65
At first the custom was for the Fleet to use sraall
targets which the ships carried with them. These were
unsuitable; their small size rendered them frequently
invisible at even moderate ranges in any sea, and I felt
that the Fleet could not make progress under such con-
ditions.
Practice at rocks or small islands was next resorted
to, but no really suitable rocks existed, and, in any
case, practice at them eventually involved too much risk
of submarine attack, as the German submarines began
to find their way to the westward of Scotland. Towards
the end of 1915 it became possible, owing to the increase
in the number of destroyers attached to the Fleet, and to
the provision of submarine obstructions at Cromarty, to
carry out gunnery practices at long ranges at targets in
the Moray Firth, and real improvement dated from that
period.
Later still, battle practice targets were brought to
Scapa Flow, and the long-range firing was carried
out in the Pentland Firth, a still more convenient
place.
Meanwhile Scapa Flow itself had been developed for
all the preliminary gunnery practices which could be
carried out with guns up to 6-inch in calibre, and also
for night firing and for torpedo work. The fine stretch
of water was secure from submarine attack after the
obstructions had been provided, and ships could practise
by day and night without danger of attack. The Flow
was simply invaluable for this purpose. Ships were
firing, running torpedoes, practising fire control exer-
cises, carrying out experiments and exercising in dealing
with attacks by destroyers, day after day, from daylight
until dark.
After dark, night firing was frequently carried out,
66 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
and occasionally a division of battleships was exercised
in steaming in company, without lights, in order to give
the officers of watches practice. Wher the constant sea
work of the earlier months of the War gave place to.oc-
casional cruises, the seagoing and fighting efficiency of
the Fleet was maintained at a remarkably high standard
as a result of the work in Scapa Flow.
During the period 1914-16 a marked advance was
undoubtedly made in gunnery efficiency. At an early
period of the War a memorandum was issued pointing
out the necessity for increased attention to drill and
organisation. Absolute perfection was insisted upon,
and it was obtained, by the strenuous efforts of officers
and men. I knew that we had to deal with an en-
emy who would be as perfect as constant drill could
ensure.
A great extension of the system of Director Firing,
by which one officer or man could lay and fire all the guns,
was made. The situation in this respect before the War
was that a few ships had been fitted for the system, which
had been devised by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. But a
very large number of officers were sceptical as to its value
compared with the alternative system; there was consider-
able opposition to it, and the great majority of the ships
were not fitted. In some cases the system was not fa-
voured even in the ships provided with it.
It had fallen to my lot in 1912 to carry out com-
petitive trials of the Director System and the alterna-
tive system already in use, and the results of these trials
had fully confirmed me in my previous opinion of the
great value of the Director System. I was able to press
these views on my return to the Admiralty at the end
of 1912 as Second Sea Lord, and it was then decided to
provide all the later ships with the arrangement. Little
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 67
progress had, however, been made when the War broke
out, only eight battleships having been fitted.
Early in 1915 arrangements were made, with the as-
sistance of Sir Percy Scott and the warm support of
Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, by which the battle-
ships and battle-cruisers were supplied with this system,
without being put out of action or sent to a dockyard
for the purpose. The necessary instruments were manu-
factured at various contractors’ shops, and the very labori-
ous task of fitting them, and the heavy electric cables,
on board the ships was carried out by electricians sent
to the various bases. ‘The complicated work naturally
took a considerable time, and many vexatious delays oc-
curred; but gradually all ships were fitted, Sir Percy
Scott rendering invaluable assistance at headquar-
ters.
As a first step, the system was fitted to the heavy
guns mounted in turrets, and by the date of the Battle
of Jutland there were few ships that were not supplied
with the system, although six of those last fitted had not
had much experience with it.
The conditions under which that action was fought
converted any waverers at once to a firm belief in the
Director System, and there was never afterwards any
doubt expressed as to its great value.
Further efforts were made later to accelerate the work,
and the system was extended to smaller vessels. This
had been the intention even before the action, but there
were then still many who were unconvinced. However,
during the remainder of 1916 and 1917 the work was
pressed forward, and the system became universal for all
guns and in all classes of ships,
The improvement in what may be termed the applica-
tion of existing methods of fire control may now be men-
68 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
tioned. Throughout the War we had gradually, as the
result of practice, increased greatly the effective range
at which ships could engage, and stress had been laid
on the necessity for bringing the fire rapidly on to the
target in order to obtain early hits. Improvement was
perhaps most rapid in the five or six months following
the Jutland action. In this action the Fire Control In-
struments, as adopted in the Service, which were the out-
come of the work of naval officers, were found to meet
the gunnery requirements most successfully. The only
important improvement that was made was the provi-
sion of additional means for keeping the observation of
Fire Instruments trained on the correct enemy ship. Vari-
ous committees were formed immediately after the battle
in order that full advantage might be taken at once of
our experience. The result was the introduction of new
rules for correcting gunfire; these, in addition to greatly
increasing the volume of fire from a ship, also rendered
it difficult for the enemy vessels to evade punishment
by dodging tactics.
In order to cope more successfully with the latter de-
velopment, more experiments were ordered, having as
their object the determination of the inclination of the
enemy vessel to the line of bearing from us, and various
methods of obtaining this inclination were recommended
to the Fleet. The most promising at the time that I
relinquished command of the Fleet was that proposed
by Lieutenant J. W. Rivett-Carnac, R.N., the range-find-
ing expert of the Grand Fleet, who had investigated this
inclination problem for some years. A great increase
in the rapidity with which the fall of shot were “spotted
on” to a target resulted from all this work. It is not
too much to say that the interval between opening fire
and the moment at which the salvoes began to “strad-
SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS
A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 69
dle” the target was certainly halved, and the rapidity of
fire when the enemy was “straddled” was very greatly
increased. The new firing rules, by standardising the
system of correcting fire, produced a marked increase
in the efficiency of the methods by which the fire of two
ships was concentrated on to one target and gen-
erally paved the way for the solution of many gunnery
problems which the Fleet had previously been unable
to solve completely.
The use of smoke screens was closely investigated as
a result of our experience of the German use of this de-
vice. Prolonged experiments were carried out at Scapa
Flow to ascertain the possibilities and the best method
of using smoke screens, and they were also used during
battle tactics and during range-finder exercises. The
trials included the use of smoke shell as well as funnel
and artificial smoke. ;
In another direction efforts were made to increase
efficiency. The Jutland battle convinced us that our ar-
mour-piercing shell was inferior in its penetrative power
to that used by the Germans, and immediately
after the action I represented this with a view to im-
mediate investigation. A Committee sat to consider the
matter. In 1917, as First Sea Lord, I appointed a second
Committee.
With one of the old type of armour-piercing shells of
a particular calibre as used at Jutland the shell would,
with oblique impact at battle range, break up whilst hol-
ing a certain thickness of plate, and the shell could not,
therefore, reach the vitals of the enemy’s ships. A shell
of the new type, as produced by the 1917 Committee, of
the same calibre would at the same oblique impact and
range pass whole through a plate of double the thickness
before exploding and could therefore with delay action
70 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
fuse penetrate to the magazines of a capital ship. Had
our ships possessed the new type of armour-piercing shell
at Jutland, many of the enemy’s vessels, instead of being
only damaged, would probably not have been able to
reach port. The manufacture of these new type shells
for the Fleet was well advanced before the end of 1917.
The value of the torpedo as a fighting weapon in
action, from ships, from destroyers, and from submarines,
was also greatly increased. ‘The torpedo practices at
Scapa Flow, which were of a realistic character, were of
the greatest possible use.
The real cause underlying the improvement was the
great keenness displayed by officers and men. Their one
idea was to strive for the highest efficiency, and
there was never apparent the least sign of weariness or
staleness in repeating time after time exercises and prac-
tices with which they were so familiar. No tribute
that I can pay to the personnel of the Grand Fleet in
this connection could be sufficiently high. I know that
under my successor the improvement in fighting efficiency
continued,
Owing to the collapse of the moral of the personnel
of the German Navy, culminating in the surrender for
internment of the majority of their capital ships, the
Grand Fleet was given no opportunity of testing in ac-
tion the methods adopted as a result of our experience
during the first two years of war, and perfected by two
years’ further training. Had the German fleet come out
to battle a terrible punishment awaited it!
Mention has been made of the development of aircraft
during the War. The possibilities resulting from the use
of the air for reconnaissance work, for assisting in the di-
rection of gunfire, and, finally, for offensive operations,
were fully recognised in the Grand Fleet; but for a con-
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 71
siderable period the lack of suitable machines hindered
development. The first decisive step taken was the fit-
ting out of the Campania, a passenger ship of the Cunard
Line, as a sea-plane carrier to be attached to the Battle
Fleet. Prior to that, the Harwich Force and, later, the
Battle Cruiser Fleet had been provided with smaller ves-
sels, the Vindew and Engadine, carrying a few sea-planes.
They had been used in operations in the Heligoland
Bight, but without much success, owing to the difficulty
experienced in getting sea-planes to rise from the water
except in the finest weather.
With the arrival of the Campania at Scapa, we were
able to investigate the difficulties attending the use of air-
craft from ships as then fitted and to indicate the direc-
tion in which improvement was desirable and possible. It
was apparent that little improvement could be expected
so long as we were dependent on the machines rising from
the water. The first step, therefore, was tg improve the
arrangements for flying off from the deck of the
Campania. The ship returned to Liverpool at the end
of 1915 in order that the necessary alterations
might be effected; these were not completed until
the late spring of 1916; during the alterations, the
Campania was also, at my request, fitted to carry a kite
balloon.
The advantages to be obtained from the use of kite
balloons had been demonstrated during the Dardanelles
operations, and the Menelaus, kite balloon ship, was sent
to the Grand Fleet. But it was soon obvious that we
could not make profitable use of kite balloons in a fleet
action unless they were flown from the ships themselves,
and experiments were carried out, under the direction of
Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, commanding the
4th Battle Squadron, having as their object the best
72 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
method of fitting and using kite balloons from warships.
Many difficulties were experienced, the principal one
being that of providing wire of sufficient strength to stand
the tension of the balloon during strong winds. The Kite
Balloon Section at Roehampton gradually solved the
difficulties, and by the end of 1916 the majority of the
flagships leading divisions of the Fleet were provided
with kite balloons, and were experiencing their utility.
From this beginning, great developments took place in
providing vessels of all classes, including light cruisers,
destroyers, P boats, and trawlers, with kite balloons; the
balloon was used in the case of the smaller ves-
sels for anti-submarine reconnaissance work, whilst in the
heavy ships it was used for observation and correction
of fire.
Meanwhile, the development of the air-craft carrier
had proceeded, but not with the same rapidity. It was
evident to me in 1916 that for anti-Zeppelin work we
should look towards the aeroplane flying from the deck,
rather than to the sea-plane, although it also could rise
from the deck; but I gathered the time was hardly ripe
for the step, owing to the landing difficulty, and the first
efforts of the Royal Naval Air Service lay in the direction
of providing a type of sea-plane that would fly well off
the deck and climb quickly. These efforts were fairly
successful, but the development of the heavier-than-air
craft machine for use with the Fleet did not begin until
the aeroplane was adopted for the work; and this took
place in 1917, when progress became rapid, and continued
until the end of the War.
There remains the question of the air-ship, which was
also being developed during the period 1914-16, but as
this matter was not within the province of the Fleet, it
is unnecessary to touch upon it here,
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 73
V.—Tue BuocKaDE
The story of the development of the Grand Fleet
would be incomplete without reference to the Blockade,
and, in particular, to the work of the 10th Cruiser Squad-
ron. In the early days of the War, the 10th Cruiser Squad-
ron consisted of the ships of the “Edgar” class—vessels
at least twenty years old; and during August,
1914, the Admiralty commissioned three armed merchant
ships, the Mantua, Alsatian and Oceanic, to strengthen
the squadron for blockade work; the latter ship was lost
by shipwreck in September of that year.
The Blockade in those early days was carried out by
the 10th Cruiser Squadron and by the other cruiser squad-
rons attached to the Grand Fleet. During No-
vember, 1914, the ships of the ‘““Kdgar” class were with-
drawn owing to their unseaworthy condition, and the
ships’ companies utilised to commission a number of ad-
ditional armed merchant cruisers. By the end of De-
cember, 1914, the squadron consisted of eighteen ships,
being raised later to a strength of twenty-four ships. A
very large proportion of the officers and men of the re-
constituted 10th Cruiser Squadron belonged to the Mer-
cantile Marine.
The advent of so large a squadron of these vessels
called for a considerable organisation for their main-
tenance; they were based on Liverpool for all the heavy
work of upkeep, whilst a secondary advanced base at
Swarbachs Minn, on the west coast of the Shetland
Islands, was gradually developed, and obstructed against
submarine attack, The work of organisation was carried
out by Rear-Admiral de Chair, who commanded the
squadron, ably seconded by Rear-Admiral H. H. Stile-
man, the Senior Naval Officer at Liverpool, to whom
74 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
we were much indebted for hearty co-operation and effi-
cient organisation at the base.
The work of the squadron consisted in intercepting
and boarding all vessels bound into or out of the northern
entrance to the North Sea, and this work could obviously
not be carried out in the face of the German submarines
without heavy risk to the ships. The danger was
greatest during the operation of boarding, as the examin-
ing vessel was obliged to stop to lower the boarding-boat.
As the number of German submarines increased, the
squadron was necessarily withdrawn to positions further
removed from the enemy submarine bases, and the Block-
ade line, after the spring of 1915, ran generally from
the Orkneys and Shetlands past the Faroe Islands to
Iceland, and when freedom from ice rendered passage
round the north of Iceland possible, ships operated in that
neighbourhood.
A careful organisation of the movements of the ships
was necessary to cover such an immense area of the sea,
and to provide that all ships should, as far as possible, be
intercepted. Even in the case of ships of such large coal
endurance as the armed merchant steamers, it was not
possible to keep much more than one-half the number in
commission on an average on the patrol line at the same
time. The remainder were either in port refitting and
refueling, or were en route to and from the bases. The
distance from the middle of the patrol line to Liverpool
was some 600 miles, so that two days were occupied in
the passage each way.
When going to or from Liverpool the ships had to run
the gauntlet of enemy submarines, which were passing
down the west coast of the Hebrides and Ireland, and
as no destroyers were available with which to screen them
against attack, the risk was considerable. They had also
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‘GRAND FLEET AND BASES 75
to face the constant danger of snine-fields. Several ships
of the squadron fell victims to submarines or mines with
a resultant heavy loss of life.
Whilst the ships were on patrol, the work of the board-
ing parties was very arduous. The preliminary ex-
amination could not be carried out without boarding,
and the manner in which the boats of the squadron were
handled in the very heavy weather, almost constant in
northern latitudes, was a fine tribute to the seamanship
of the officers and men. In this boarding work the fisher-
men of the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, hardy
and experienced seamen, rendered most conspicuous
service.
The efficiency of the Blockade increased gradually
from its inception, as is well known, and after a time the
percentage of vessels that evaded the ships of the 10th
Cruiser Squadron became so low as to be almost neg-
ligible. The procedure adopted was to snd all ships,
preliminary examination of which at sea aroused any
suspicion, into Kirkwall or Lerwick harbours, where reg-
ular examination services were instituted. The ships were
taken in under the supervision of an armed guard, sent
on board from the boarding-vessel, and these guards un-
derwent many unpleasant experiences. Several lost their
lives in ships which were torpedoed by German subma-
rines, and in many cases, particularly in badly found sail-
ing ships, they underwent great hardships. The guards
were also the means of saving more than one such ship
from shipwreck, by working her themselves when the crew
refused to do so any longer, and in all cases great tact
and discretion on the part of the officer in charge, usually
a junior officer of the Royal Naval Reserve, were neces-
sary in his dealings with the neutral captains. The whole
question of the efficiency of the Blockade—as shown by
76 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
the returns furnished to me from Headquarters—was con-
stantly under review by my Staff and myself.
The fate of the detained ship was decided in London
on receipt of the report of examination. As was perhaps
natural, the sentence on many ships’ cargoes pronounced
in London was not accepted without question from the
Fleet, and a good deal of correspondence passed with
reference to individual ships. We, in the Fleet, were nat-
urally very critical of any suspicion of laxity in passing,
into neutral countries bordering on Germany, articles
which we suspected might find their way into Germany,
and constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the
Admiralty, and, later, to the Ministry of Blockade, when
that Ministry was established. The difficulties with which
the Foreign Office was faced in regard to neutral sus-
ceptibilities were naturally not so apparent in the Fleet
as to the authorities in London, and though many of our
criticisms were perhaps somewhat unjustifiable, and some
possibly incorrect, it is certain that in the main they were
of use. Indeed, they were welcomed in London as giv-
ing the naval point of view. The decisive effect of the
Blockade did not become apparent until the end, when
the final crash came, and it was seen how supreme an
influence on the result of the War this powerful weapon
had exercised. Even those who during the War had
been asking what the Navy was doing, recognised at the
last how victory had been achieved, largely, as the result
of the silent pressure of Sea Power.
VI.—TuE GRranpD FLEET BaAsEs
Mention has been made elsewhere of the unprotected
state of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine attack
in the early part of the War. The matter was one of
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 77
supreme importance, and formed the subject of very
urgent representations to the Admiralty. Many brains
were at work on the problem at the Admiralty, at the
bases, and in the Fleet itself.
The first step was that taken under the direction of
Captain Donald S. Munro, the King’s Harbour Master
at Cromarty, who devised a system of submarine
obstruction which later formed the pattern for the deep-
water obstructions at most of our naval bases. Owing
to his energy and driving power, the entrance to
Cromarty was rendered fairly secure by October 26th,
1914. Whilst he was working out a defence for
Cromarty another officer, Lieutenant Bircham, R.N.V.R.,
under the command of Admiral Sir Robert Lowry,
the Commander-in-Chief of the coast of Scotland,
suggested a method for providing an obstruction for
the Rosyth base. This was fitted in place by
the end of October, 1914, and was also entirely suc-
cessful.
As soon as the Cromarty scheme was in train, I re-
quested that obstructions on similar lines should be
fitted to the three main entrances to Scapa Flow, the
Hoxa entrance (by far the most likely to be attempted)
being taken in hand first. Exasperating delays in the
supply of the necessary material were experienced,
and the first line of obstructions in the Hoxa entrance
was not completed until December 29th, 1914, the first
line in Switha Sound by January 12th, 1915, and that
in Hoy Sound by February 19th, 1915. Meanwhile offi-
cers and men of the Fleet had improvised obstructions,
first at Lough Swilly and Loch na Keal, and later at
Scapa Flow, which, while not giving thorough security
against a determined attempt at entry, had a psychologi-
cal value. These obstructions, which were kept in exist-
78 +$THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
ence even after the completion of the more efficient meth-
ods of dealing with the problem, involved much labour.
Towards the end of 1915, or early in 1916, the disad-
vantages attendant on basing the Fleet so far north as
Scapa Flow, were discussed between Sir Henry Jackson
(then First Sea Lord) and myself. We both felt that,
with the Fleet at the northern base, the difficulties of
intercepting the High Sea Fleet during coast raids, and
of dealing with landing raids covered by the High Sea
Fleet, were so considerable as to make it eminently de-
sirable to base the whole Fleet farther south, if this were
feasible. A discussion took place at Rosyth, and as the
result I suggested a scheme of submarine obstructions
across the Firth of Forth, which would admit not only
of berthing the whole Grand Fleet in that anchorage, but
would also allow of gunnery and torpedo practices being
carried out with a considerable degree of safety in the
Forth, so that the Fleet, if based there, could keep up its
fighting efficiency. Many senior officers in the Grand
Fleet were not in favour of the idea, for two reasons:
first, that the Fleet could be mined in by the enemy
with much greater ease when in the Forth than when at
Scapa; and, secondly, that practices could not be so effi-
ciently carried out in the Forth. There was much weight
in both these objections, although the difficulties of carry-
ing out practices in the Forth were exaggerated; but the
strategic advantage, in my opinion, outweighed them, and
the scheme was proceeded with as proposed.
That part of the scheme which admitted of the safe
carrying out of practices was completed by December,
1916, and the whole of the new obstructions were in place
by July, 1917, nearly a year later, it is true, than the
anticipated date. The result certainly justified the con-
clusion arrived at. When the conditions made it at
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 79
all probable that the High Sea Fleet might put to
sea for an operation in southern waters, the Grand
Fleet assembled in the Firth of Forth, and the undoubted
disadvantages of the southern base were neutralised by
skilful dispositions on the part of the flag officers respon-
sible.
The protection of the Grand Fleet bases against sub-
marine attack was only one of the many factors necessary
for their development. In pre-War days, although it
had been decided that the use of northern bases would
be necessary in the event of a war with Germany, the
bases had not been prepared to meet the new situation. It
is, perhaps, desirable to remove any misunderstanding as
to the causes of this failure. .
(a) The decision had not long been taken, and
(b) The necessary financial provision was lacking.
Under the first of these headings the base at Scapa
Flow was affected, and, under the seccnd, that at Rosyth,
where for some time progress in the development of the
base had been arrested.
The Admiralty had taken steps to make some prepara-
tions at Cromarty, in so far as the provision of gun
defences against attack by surface vessels was concerned,
but nothing had been done for the upkeep of a fleet be-
yond a decision to transfer to Cromarty, during war, one
of the floating docks at southern yards.
In fact, the situation was that, whilst we had shifted
our Fleet to the north, all the conveniences for the main-
tenance of that fleet were still in the Channel ports. The
first step was the transference of the large floating dock
from Portsmouth to Invergordon, in the Cromarty Firth,
together with a staff of dockyard workmen, who were
housed in a merchant ship captured from the Germans.
Workshops were fitted up on shore under the energetic
80 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
superintendence of Rear-Admiral Edmund R. Pears and
his able staff of dockyard officers. It can be said with
great emphasis that this floating dock was simply invalu-
able to the Grand Fleet.
Invergordon gradually developed into a great repair-
ing base. A second and smaller floating dock was pur-
chased early in 1916 at my request and placed there, and
by the middle of that year the base had attained large
proportions; work of all kinds was carried out with rapid-
ity and success, including the repairs of battleships
after the Jutland battle, and the great extension in
armoured-deck protection fitted to ships after the same
action.
Ordinary refits of battleships had been carried out at
Invergordon since the autumn of 1914. At Scapa Flow
the same possibilities as a repairing base did not exist,
although a floating dock for destroyers, for which many
requests had been made, was eventually obtained and
placed there.
But the base at Scapa Flow had extended out of all
knowledge in other directions. In August, 1914, the
base organisation consisted only of the seagoing Fleet re-
pair ships Cyclops and Assistance. At an early stage the
Cyclops was connected to a shore telegraph cable off the
village of Scapa, and she became at the same time a
floating post office and a base for the auxiliary vessels (a
few drifters) which were first requisitioned. Rear-Ad-
miral Francis 8. Miller was appointed to her as the Senior
Naval Officer at the base. The manner in which the great
demands on her accommodation were met was a standing
wonder to me. In the early part of the War, officers on
Admiral Miller’s staff and others were obliged to make
their sleeping berths, as best they could, on the deck or
on top of their writing-tables, and it was surprising that
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 81
the overcrowding in all directions did not affect health.
But the work went on very successfully in the most in-
convenient circumstances.
Towards the end of 1914 it became necessary, owing
to the weather conditions, to move the base organisations
from the north to the south-west side of Scapa Flow.
The anchorage at Long Hope was selected, whilst the
Fleet itself lay off the north side of the Island of Flotta,
and the numerous larger auxiliaries, colliers, oilers, store
ships, and the ammunition ships lay between Long Hope
and Hoy Sound. Prior to this, the importance of the
organisation in the Orkneys and Shetlands had increased
to such an extent that I had asked for the appointment
of a Senior Flag Officer in general command
of the whole district, and of the defences in par-
ticular.
So much of my time was being occupied in deciding
and pressing forward the work of organisation of the base
and its obstructions and defences, in dealing with the
numerous questions relating to the patrol of the coast by
coast watchers, in arranging for the disposal of merchant
ships sent in for re-examination, and for guarding ‘such
vessels, in considering questions affecting the occupation
of land for the erection of defences, in the requisition-
ing of trawlers and drifters, etc., that it was becoming
difficult to deal with the fast accumulating Fleet work
proper. Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, who sug-
gested that he should waive his seniority in order to serve
as my junior officer, was appointed Vice-Admiral Com-
manding the Orkneys and Shetlands. This left Rear-Ad-
miral Miller free to devote himself to the increasingly
heavy work of base organisation proper, relieved me of
a mass of work outside the Fleet, and was of the greatest
possible benefit in every way. Under Sir Stanley Col-
82. THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
ville’s most able direction, the completion of the organi-
sation for the general defences of the Islands, the work
of patrol craft and mine-sweepers, and the provision of
submarine obstructions was effected, and the work pushed
forward. Captain Stanley Dean Pitt, R.N., an officer of
very wide experience, was appointed to superintend the
work of laying the submarine obstructions, and under
his able direction, in the face of the greatest difficulties
due to bad weather and strong tides, the entrances to
Scapa Flow were either blocked by sunken ships or ob-
structed by nets, mines, and other devices.
The gun defences at Scapa, which at the beginning
of the War consisted of 12-pounder and 3-pounder guns
landed from the Fleet, were gradually reinforced by four-
inch and six-inch guns obtained from abroad, the whole
being manned by Royal Marine pensioners under Lieut.-
Colonel Gerald N. A. Harris, R.M.A. The garrison was
housed in huts, erected temporarily for the pur-
pose, and although with the handiness which charac-
terises a Royal Marine in all circumstances, the
officers and men eventually made themselves comfortable
even under such weather conditions as are experienced at
Scapa Flow, they endured a very considerable amount of
hardship in the early days with their accustomed cheer-
fulness.
And here I cannot fail to mention the endurance and
staying qualities of the crews of the trawlers that sup-
ported the submarine obstructions, particularly those at
Scapa Flow. These trawlers were moored in positions in
which they were exposed to the whole fury of northerly
and southerly gales; in many cases they were within a
few yards of a rocky coast, heavy seas breaking over them
and bringing on board tons of water. The skippers knew
that they had to stick it out for the sake of the safety of
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 83
the Fleet and the maintenance of the obstruction, and
under these conditions they did their duty in a manner
which calls for the highest praise.
Meanwhile the development of the base proper pro-
ceeded apace. One of the earlier arrivals was the old
cruiser Impérieuse, which was used. as a post office, depot,
and general overflow ship to the Cyclops. The number of
trawlers and drifters, which had their home at
Scapa Flow and which were engaged on patrol or mine-
sweeping work, attendance on the Fleet, garrison, or on
the mass of Fleet auxiliaries, increased with great rapidity
during the winter of 1914-15; on September Ist, 1914,
the number was nil, and it reached a total of some four
yachts, eighty-five trawlers, and twenty-seven drifters by
the summer of 1915. These vessels all looked to the
Cyclops, Assistance and Impérieuse for refit, pay, food,
and for every conceivable want. Gradually the number of
base ships was increased, culminating in the arrival of
the old battleship Victorious about March 6, 1916, as the
“home” of some 500 dockyard workmen working in the
Fleet, fitting the Director System, increasing the protec-
tion to decks and magazines, carrying out minor
repairs, retubing condensers, and many other urgent
tasks.
Mention has been made of the large number of colliers,
oilers, store ships, ammunition ships, etc., that were used
by the Fleet. At one time this caused some criticism,
based principally on the time spent by the colliers at the
Fleet Base. It may be as well to explain the
necessity for this. There were no facilities at the base
for the storage of coal, either in lighters or on shore.
Consequently, the whole of the coal required at the base
was necessarily kept on board the colliers. The actual
number of colliers which I deemed it necessary to keep
84 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
at the base during the first two years of war was
determined by the necessity for coaling the Fleet and
getting it to sea again with the utmost possible rapidity.
We could not contempiate such a situation as the Fleet
arriving short of fuel, and being delayed in completing
owing to shortage of colliers, with the possibility of in-
formation being received simultaneously that the High
Sea Fleet was at sea and covering a landing raid on our
coast! Rapidity of fuelling was of vital importance to
the Empire.
Therefore, in stating my requirements of colliers, I
gave the number necessary to enable almost the whole
Fleet to be fuelled simultaneously; in other words,
the number of colliers was depe:dent on the number of
coal-burning ships in the Fleet. Some slight reduction
was found possible, to allow for the probable case of some
ships requiring less coal than others, thus admitting of
two such ships using one collier in succession; but,
broadly speaking, the requirements were as_ stated.
When the cargo of colliers fell below a certain minimum,
they return to Cardiff to refill to economise ton-
nage.
At Rosyth the situation was eased by the transport of
coal by rail to Grangemouth and its transshipment to
colliers there. As we needed colliers as coal-storing ships,
so also we required ammunition ships to carry a propor-
tion of the reserve ammunition for the Fleet. There
were no facilities at Scapa or Cromarty for storage on
shore. The number of ships required for this service was,
however, much smaller.
Floating storage of all sorts possesses one great ad-
vantage over shore storage; should strategic conditions
necessitate a change of base, the coal, ammunition and
other auxiliaries can move with the Fleet. The
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 85
same argument applies in a lesser degree to floating
docks.
A consideration of all these facts connected with the
development of fleet bases will show that this question
necessarily required a good deal of attention on the part
of my Staff and myself, and was incidental to the de-
velopment of the Grand Fleet.
VII.—TuHEeE PERSONNEL AND ITS WELFARE
Another factor in the development of the Fleet, by
no means the least important, was that of the moral and
spirit of the personnel. It is, of course, impossible to
exaggerate the importance of this question as an element
in the efficiency of the Fleet. In the early months of
war, when the Fleet was continually at sea, the few hours
spent in harbour were fully occupied in coaling and stor-
ing the ships; but these conditions could not be continued
indefinitely. As the months passed with no sign of en-
emy vessels at sea and time in harbour increased as com-
pared to that spent at sea, it became necessary to find
some diversion for the minds of the officers and men.
The first step taken at Scapa Flow was carried out
under the superintendence of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis
Bayly, then commanding the Ist Battle Squadron.
Always alive to the necessity for providing occupation,
recreation, and exercise for officers and men, he started
considerable works on Flotta Island, works of such a
divergent nature as batteries for the defence of the sub-
marine obstructions then in progress, football grounds
for the men, a golf course for the officers, and landing
Piers on the beach. These schemes grew and were eventu-
ally divided out amongst the various squadrons, A rifle
and pistol range were also constructed, and several piers
86 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
built. The whole of the work was carried out, I may
add, by means of Fleet labour. Later a “Canteen” ship,
the s.s. Ghourko, was fitted up by the Junior Army and
Navy Stores, and this vessel played an important part
in the harbour life of the Grand Fleet. She carried stores
and provisions of all sorts, available for use by all ships,
but particularly of the smaller vessels which could not
send their mess stewards far afield in search of a change
of diet. She was provided with a stage, and theatrical
and cinema entertainments took place on board fre-
quently. She was also fitted with a boxing ring, and
squadron boxing competitions were held on board with
great frequency. Finally, she was utilised for lectures
of all sorts, and for the Church services of Roman Catho-
lics and Nonconformists.
The system of lectures was encouraged to the utmost.
Officers lectured on board their ships to the ships’ com-
panies on every subject, the War included, and much
good resulted.
Education was freely developed. The Admiralty
provided, at my request, schoolmasters in large numbers,
and classes for the boys and voluntary classes for the men
in the evenings in harbour were very well attended.
And, finally, exercise of all sorts was encouraged to
the utmost extent possible. This took the form princi-
pally of football, rowing regattas, athletic sports and box-
ing. ‘The keenness displayed in all these sports was a
certain indication that the personnel was showing no sign
of staleness.
The Englishman’s love of sport helps him to tide over
periods of tedium and weariness, which are most calcu-
lated to undermine discipline. Occupation and interest
are the surest antidotes to discontent and unrest, and
never during the first two and a half years did I see signs
GRAND FLEET AND BASES 87
of either. On the contrary, the men, I believe, were thor-
oughly happy and contented, treated the War as being
in the day’s work, and looked forward eagerly to the day
on which their enemy would give them the opportunity
for which they were waiting, and for which they kept
themselves thoroughly efficient and fit.
In those days the officers got to know the men even
better than they had done before, and the spirit of com-
radeship between all ranks became correspondingly closer.
Certainly no Commander-in-Chief could ever have desired
to see in the force under his orders a finer spirit than
that which animated the officers and men of the Grand
Fleet.
CHAPTER IV
DECLARATION OF WAR
AT 8... a.M. on August 4th, 1914, the Grand Fleet pro-
ceeded to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders. The
ships accompanying the Fleet-Flagship Iron Duke were
the vessels of the Ist, 2nd, 8rd and 4th Battle Squadrons,
the light cruisers Southampton, Birmingham, Boadicea,
Blonde and the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla; the cruisers
Shannon, Natal and Rowburgh, and the light cruisers
Nottingham, Falmouth and Liverpool, which were at
Rosyth with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, were directed to
meet the Fleet at a rendezvous in Lat. 58.40 N., Long.
1.80 E. The light cruisers Bellona and Blanche were left
behind to coal.
A report received from the Admiralty that three Ger-
man transports had passed the Great Belt on the even-
ing of August 1st had led to the 8rd Cruiser Squadron,
with the cruisers Cochrane and Achilles, and the 1st
Battle Cruiser Squadron, being ordered to sea on the
evening of August 3d to cruise to the southward of the
Fair Island Channel during the night.
The orders under which the Fleet acted were to sweep
east as far as Long. 2 E. and, then, for the cruisers
to carry out a wide sweep to the southward and south-
westward. These orders were in conformity with the
general strategical ideas embodied in the War Orders for
the Grand Fleet, which, as already indicated, aimed at
establishing a blockade; at preventing the enemy forces
from getting into the Atlantic to interfere with the opera-
88
DECLARATION OF WAR 89
tions of our cruisers engaged in protecting our own trade
as well as stopping trade on the part of the enemy; and
at asserting control of the North Sea and denying it to
the enemy. Pursuant to these orders, the Ist Battle
Cruiser Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were directed
to sweep the area between Lat. 60 and 61 N., working
eastward from the Shetland Islands to Long. 2 E., arriv-
ing there at 4 P.m., thence to sweep to the S.E. until
5 a.m. on August 5th, when they were on a line drawn
S.W. from Hangesund Light in Lat. 59.25 N. with the
eastern ship 20 miles from the coast. The Antrim and
Argyll, being short of fuel, were detached during the
evening of August 4th to coal at Scapa.
The sweep was prolonged to the westward by the
cruisers and light cruisers from Rosyth; the 2nd Flotilla
was detached to Rosyth to fuel. This first sweep was
begun in northern waters because the North Sea is
narrower at this point, and also because it afforded oppor-
tunity of intercepting vessels which might have left
German ports two days previously in anticipation of
hostilities. The cruiser sweep was supported by the
Battle Fleet, which steamed as far as Long. 2 E., turning
at 3 a.M. on August 5th to the westward.
The 8rd Battle Squadron which had been compelled
to leave Scapa 80 per cent. short of fuel owing to the
paucity of colliers, was detached to that base at 8.30 P.M.
on the 4th, to complete with coal.
During the night information was received by wireless
telegraphy that war had been declared against Germany
at midnight, 4th-5th August, and the following gracious
message was received from His Majesty the King and was
communicated to the Fleet:
“At this grave moment in our National History, I
90 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
send to you and through you to the officers and men of
the Fleet of which you have assumed command, the
assurance of my confidence that under your direction they
will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy,
and prove once again the sure Shield of Britain and of her
Empire in the hour of trial.”
During daylight on the 5th, the Battle Fleet cruised
to the northward of Lat. 57.30 N., in accordance with
Admiralty telegraphic orders; the 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron was sent back to Scapa to coal, as well as four
light cruisers and the Lowestoft, and the 4th Flotilla was
sent to Invergordon for a similar purpose. In the after-
noon, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the cruiser Devon-
shire, as well as the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, were
detached to sweep to the eastward, and the Battle Fleet
turned to the southward at 3 a.m. on the 6th to meet the
8rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron in Lat.
59 N., Long. 1.0 E.
During August 6th the following reports were re-
ceived:
(a) Two German cruisers were reported passing
Trondhjem going north. (This came from the Admiralty.)
(b) Four torpedo-boats had been seen off the north-
west end of the Shetlands going north. (This was a local
report.)
(c) The German liner Kronprinzessin Cecilie was
stated to have passed through the Stronsay Firth, Ork-
neys, bound east, during the night of the 5th-6th. (Local
report.)
The destroyer Oak was despatched to search the
vicinity of the Stronsay and Westray Firths, but obtained
no confirmation of the report.
(d) It was reported that the Germans had established
DECLARATION OF WAR gI
a base in Lat. 62 N. on the Norwegian coast (the exact
position unknown).
A search of the coast by cruisers revealed nothing in
confirmation of the last report, but a British trawler
reported that a large number of German merchant ships
had assembled in the West Fiord and in the harbours of
the Lofoten Islands on the coast of Norway. Reports
as to the Germans having established a base on the Nor-
wegian coast were very persistent during the early days
of the War. These reports were probably to some extent
due to the ideas prevailing before the War as to German
intentions in this respect, thesa views being naturally
coloured by the frequent visits of the German High Sea
Fleet in peace time to Norwegian waters, particularly
to the vicinity of Trondhjem.
In 1911, when I commanded the Atlantic Fleet, ar-
rangements had been made for me to visit Norwegian
ports at the same time as the High Sea Fleet, in order
to bring about a meeting between the two navies, with,
it was hoped, beneficial results. But the Agadir crisis
intervened, and the visit was postponed. The meeting
took place in 1914, when a portion of the 2nd Battle
Squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir
George Warrender, visited Kiel during the regatta week,
very shortly before the outbreak of war.
During daylight of August 6th the Dreadnought
Battle Fleet cruised between Lat. 59 N. and 60 N. and
Long. 1 E. and 1 W.; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the
Ist Light Cruiser Squadron swept to the eastward between
Lat. 58 N. and 60 N., thence to the northward along
the Norwegian coast, and to the Shetlands and Scapa
Flow, the 8rd Battle Squadron being detached to the
N.E. to cover them. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
rejoined the Battle Fleet at sea after refuelling; the
92 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
2nd Flotilla left Rosyth at daylight and swept to the
north-eastward; and the 4th Flotilla left Invergordon with
orders to search the vicinity of the Pentland Firth for sub-
marines prior to the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the 7th.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Scapa at
6 A.M. on the 7th to fuel; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and
the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron arrived at 10 a.m., and
during the day the 8rd Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd
Flotilla, carried out a thorough search of the Norwegian
coast, being covered by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
and 8rd Battle Squadron. No sign of a German base
could be discovered, and the force was ordered back to
Scapa to fuel.
The fuelling of the Fleet was considerably delayed,
owing to the inadequate number of colliers, many of those
present being also unsuitable for the work of rapid coal-
ing. The lack of lubricating oil for the 83rd Battle
Squadron also caused trouble, but these early difficulties,
although a source of considerable anxiety at the com-
mencement of hostilities, were overcome later.
The greatest anxiety constantly confronting me was
the defenceless nature of the base at Scapa, which was
open to submarine and destroyer attacks. Whilst the
Fleet was fuelling the only protection that could be
afforded was to anchor light cruisers and destroyers off
the various entrances and to patrol outside the main
entrance; but these measures were no real defence
against submarines, and the position was such that it was
deemed most inadvisable to keep the Fleet in harbour
longer than was absolutely necessary for fuelling pur-
poses. Accordingly, at 6.30 p.m. on the same day, the
Battle Fleet again proceeded to sea, being screened
through the Pentland Firth to the westward until dark
by the 4th Flotilla, and course being then shaped to pass
DECLARATION OF WAR 93
round the Orkneys into the North Sea. In order to
provide some protection against destroyer attack, a re-
quest was forwarded to the Admiralty asking that two
of the older battleships might be sent up to defend the
main entrances. This measure was approved and a reply
was received that the Hannibal and Magnificent were
being despatched.
The Russell, Albemarle and Eamouth, of the 6th
Battle Squadron, belonging originally to the Channel
Fleet, arrived at Scapa to join the Grand Fleet on the
night of the 7th-8th.
At 9.30 p.m. on the 8th the battleships Orion, Monarch
and A jaa were detached to carry out target practice, and
the remainder of the Fleet proceeded to the south-east-
ward from Fair Island, carrying out Fire Control Exer-
cises; but, on receipt of a report from the Monarch that
a torpedo had been fired at her by a submarine, the prac-
tice was stopped and the ships rejoined, one-half of the
2nd Flotilla being directed to search for the submarine.
At 6.30 p.m. the officer of the watch on board the Iron
Duke sighted a periscope and altered course to ram; the
same periscope was shortly afterwards reported by the
Dreadnought, but was not seen again.
At 4 A.M. on the 9th, the Fleet was in Lat. 58.31 N.,
Long. 1.9 E.
Shortly afterwards the Orion reported a strong smell
of oil, and bubbles were seen on the surface, and the
Birmingham, commanded by Captain A. M. Duff, of
the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been screen-
ing ahead of the Fleet with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron,
claimed to have rammed and sunk the German submarine
U 15, which she had sighted on the surface. This initial
success was hailed with great satisfaction in the Fleet.
Subsequent information showed that the Birmingham
94 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
had been handled with great promptitude. During day-
light of August 9th, the Battle Fleet and Ist Battle
Cruiser Squadron were cruising in company, the noon po-
sition being Lat. 58.41 N., Long. 0.15 W., and as the pres-
ence of submarines was suspected, the Fleet was con-
stantly zigzagging, the ships altering course by “Blue
Pendant” turns, that is, turning together Ly signal.
At midnight, 9th-10th, the position of the Iron Duke
was Lat. 57.51 N., Long. 1.2 E.
On the 9th a telegram was dispatched to the Admiralty
requesting that the movements of the Commodore (T)
and Commodore (S) might be directed from the Ad-
miralty, whilst the Commander-in-Chief with the Fleet
remained in northern waters, as it was not possible to be
sufficiently conversant with the conditions in the south for
the Commander-in-Chief to control these movements.
This plan was adopted and continued throughout the War.
On August 10th, the movements of the Fleet were as
follows:
At 5 a.m. the Iron Duke parted company from the
Fleet and proceeded to Scapa in order that the Com-
mander-in-Chief might communicate by land wire with
the Admiralty and make further arrangements for the
work at the fleet bases. The Iron Duke, with the 2nd
Cruiser Squadron, and the Falmouth, Liverpool and
Bellona, arrived at Scapa at 2.30 p.m., the 2nd Flotilla
forming a submarine screen through the Pentland Firth.
The remainder of the Battle Fleet proceeded north
under the command of Sir George Warrender to a posi-
tion to the westward of the Shetlands, in accordance with
telegraphic directions received from the Admiralty, where
it was considered that the submarine danger in the
North Sea was considerable at this time. The 1st Battle
Cruiser Squadron was detached to sweep a wide area to
DECLARATION OF WAR 95
northward and westward in advance of the Battle Fleet,
which was screened by the 4th Flotilla as far north as
Lat. 60 N.; this flotilla was then detached for opera-
tions on the Norwegian coast in conjunction with the 3rd
Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
The latter force was directed to search for a suspected
German submarine base in the vicinity of Stavanger Fiord.
The Flag officer in command was directed to carry out the
operation of endeavouring to locate this base—if it
existed—with due regard to the susceptibilities of the
Norwegians. Commodore W. E. Goodenough, com-
manding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, visited Stav-
anger in the Southampton and was assured by the
Norwegian authorities that no base had been formed in
that vicinity by the enemy.
The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the Falmouth left
Scapa at 10 p.m. on the 10th to co-operate with the 3rd
Cruiser Squadron, the Hannibal and Magnificent having
arrived at Scapa at 4 p.m. These two battleships were
stationed to defend the Hoxa and Hoy entrances to Scapa
Flow against attack by destroyers.
Rear-Admiral Miller, who arrived in the Hannibal,
was placed in administrative charge of the base and of the
local defences, and arrangements were made for the local
Territorial Force and other inhabitants of the Orkneys
and Shetlands to patrol the coast and watch the harbours.
Telephonic communication round the coast was estab-
lished by degrees.
Reports were received of aeroplanes having been seen
over the Orkneys on the evening of the 10th, and the
Centurion reported having sighted an airship north of the
Shetlands on the same evening. Little credence was at-
tached to these reports, which in the early days of the War
were very frequently received.
96 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
August 11th—The Iron Duke left Scapa and re-
joined the Battle Fleet at 5 p.m. in Lat. 60.8 N., Long.
3.28 W. The Battle Fleet was then exercised in forming
line of battle, and also carried out sub-calibre gun prac-
tice. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron joined after com-
pleting its northern sweep and was detached to Scapa
to fuel at 8 p.m. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron, and 4th Flotilla, having completed
their examination of the Norwegian coast, returned, some
to Scapa and some to Cromarty, to fuel. The 2nd
Cruiser Squadron returned to a position N.E. by E., 30
miles from Kinnaird Head. The Drake, flying the Flag
of Rear-Admiral W. L. ‘Grant, which had joined the
Grand Fleet, was dispatched to search the coast of the
Faroe Islands for possible enemy bases.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the old
cruisers of the “Edgar” class, had by this time been
established on a northern patrol area between the Shet-
lands and the Norwegian coast, under the command of
Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair.
On this day orders were given to establish Loch Ewe,
on the north-west coast of Scotland, as a secondary coaling
base for the Fleet, and Rear-Admiral Richard P. F.
Purefoy was appointed to take charge of the base.
A week of war had now elapsed without any move
whatever being made on the part of the High Sea Fleet;
the only German naval activities had been mine-laying in
southern waters during the first two days of the War,
together with some submarine activity in the North Sea.
The British Fleet during the week had been largely occu-
pied in boarding all merchant vessels sighted, and in insti-
tuting as strict a blockade as was possible.
August 12th.—The Battle Fleet to the westward of the
Orkneys (noon position Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 4.12 W.)
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL HAILSEY),
AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT FITZHERBERT),
ON BOARD H. M. s. “IRON DUKE”
DECLARATION OF WAR 97
was exercised during the forenoon and afternoon at
battle tactics and carried out gunnery practices between 4
and 8 P.M.; it proceeded then to Scapa Flow to fuel,
arriving at daylight on the 15th, with the exception of the
3rd Battle Squadron, which went to Loch Ewe to coal,
and to test the suitability of this base and its capability
for defence against submarine attack.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been
fuelling at Scapa, left before dark on the 12th to cruise
west of the Orkneys with orders to economise fuel in
view of a projected operation to the southward.
The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the Falmouth swept
100 miles to the south-eastward from Kinnaird Head
during the day, and then returned to Cromarty to fuel.
The Bellona and Liverpool swept to the south-east-
ward of the Pentland Firth during the day and night of
the 12th, together with one-half of the 2nd Flotilla as
a guard against destroyer attack on the Fleet whilst coal-
ing.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron remained on the northern
patrol. A report was received from Rear-Admiral Grant,
in the Drake, that the position in the Faroe Islands was
quite satisfactory, neutrality being observed. The Drake
remained on patrol to the north-eastward of the Faroe
Islands, and two ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were
sent to assist her in her work of blockade.
Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears was on this date appointed
in charge of the Fleet Base at Cromarty.
The Admiralty informed me that a neutral steamer
from Hamburg had arrived in England and reported that
there were fourteen enemy battleships at Cuxhaven on
the 9th inst., together with several mine-layers; that
there were 30 destroyers between Cuxhaven and Heligo-
land, and that a large mine-field had been laid outside the
98 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
entrance to the Jade river. This was the first definite
news of the enemy’s main fleet.
August 18th—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet was
coaling at Scapa during the day, and the 8rd Battle
Squadron coaling and storing at Loch Ewe. My object
in providing this alternative base was to expedite entry
into the bases for fuelling, and also to be prepared with
a second base in the event of Scapa Flow becoming
untenable by submarine attack.
The Albemarle relieved the Liverpool and Bellona on
patrol to the eastward of the Orkneys in the evening, these
two ships returning to Scapa to fuel.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was at sea west of
the Orkneys; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty coal-
ing; the 8rd Cruiser Squadron at sea sweeping to the
south-eastward from the Aberdeenshire coast; and the 1st
Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa coaling. The Falmouth
was now attached to this squadron,
The 10th Cruiser Squadron and the Drake were on
the northern and Faroe patrols. During the day the
Commander-in-Chief held a conference with the Flag
officers of the Fleet and explained the operations con-
templated on the 15th and 16th inst. At 7.30 p.m. the
Dreadnought Battle Fleet proceeded to sea to the west-
ward, except two ships which had not finished coaling,
the operation having been again delayed owing to an
insufficient number of colliers being provided. They fol-
lowed later.
The Ajax reported a turret defective, and was sent
back to effect repairs with the aid of the Cyclops.
August 14th.—During the forenoon the Dreadnought
Battle Fleet and battle cruisers were carrying out target
practice. Noon position of the Iron Duke, Lat. 59.11 N.,
Long. 4.27 W.
DECLARATION OF WAR 99
At 2 p.m. all Battle Squadrons, including the 3rd
Battle Squadron from Rosyth and the 6th Battle Squad-
ron, rejoined the Flag, and battle exercises, including de-
ployments, were carried out till 7 p.m.
At midnight the whole Fleet passed through the Fair
Island Channel on its way to carry out a sweep in the
North Sea.
During the night of the 14th-15th all squadrons were
moving towards a concentration rendezvous in the North
Sea, that for the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons being
Lat. 58.52 N., Long. 0.0, and for the Ist Light Cruiser
Squadron Lat. 59.0 N., Long. 0.15 E., at 3 a.m. on the
15th; the rendezvous for the 2nd and 4th Flotillas was
Lat. 59. 7 N., Long. 0.40 W., at 4 a.m. the 15th; for the
mine-sweepers Lat. 58.40 N., Long. 3.45 E., at 6. P.M.
the 15th; four ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron from
the northern patrol joined the Fleet at 6 a.m. on the 15th.
Towards the end of July, 1914, information from a
usually reliable source had been received at the Admiralty
indicating that the Germans intended carrying out a very
extensive mine-laying policy in British waters in the event
of war between the two countries. The actual positions of
many mine-fields were given by our informant, and it was
apparent, provided the information were correct, that
the enemy intended to lay mines regardless of their effect
on mercantile traffic, whether British, Allied, or neutral.
The proceedings of the mine-layer Kéningen Louise
in the first days of war tended to confirm this view, and
consequently it was thought to be quite probable that
mine-fields of an extensive character might be laid in the
North Sea, in positions where they might be expected
to be effective against any movement of our Fleet, par-
ticularly any southward movement.
The small margin of superiority which we possessed
100 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914--1916
over the German fleet, as compared with the immense
difference in our naval responsibilities, made it very nec-
essary that precautions should be taken to safeguard the
most valuable of our ships from such a menace when op-
erating in waters that might be mined.
It was for this reason that the six mine-sweepers
accompanied the Battle Fleet during this sweep, for, al-
though the speed of the Fleet was necessarily reduced by
their presence in order to admit of sweeping operations,
and the danger from submarine attack thereby increased,
and although the sweeping operations could only be car-
ried out in an exploratory fashion, there was the chance
that the danger incurred by taking the whole Fleet over
possible mine-fields might be much reduced.
Later, when it became impossible to take the sweepers
to sea as their presence was more necessary in the vicinity
of the bases, the practice was introduced of placing one of
the older battleships of the 6th Battle Squadron ahead of
each squadron of the Dreadnought Fleet in order that
these less valuable ships might first discover the mines
instead of the Dreadnought battleships. The officers and
men of the 6th Battle Squadron named their Squadron
the “Mine Bumping Squadron” on this account.
August 15th.—At noon the Iron Duke’s position was
Lat. 58.16 N., Long. 1.45 E., the whole Fleet being in
company in cruising order and steering to the eastward,
preparatory to turning south. The plan of operations
included a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea by
cruiser forces comprising some of the older cruisers, to-
gether with the Ist and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich; two
of our submarines had been ordered to be off the Ems
and two off the Jade by 6 a.m. on the 16th.
During the day three sea-planes and two aeroplanes
arrived at Scapa for reconnaissance work from the base.
DECLARATION OF WAR 101
August 16th—At 4 a.m. the Iron Duke was in Lat.
56.43 N., Long. 4.5 E. At 8 a.M., no report having been
received of the sighting of any German vessels, the
Commander-in-Chief directed the cruisers to continue the
sweep until 9.30 a.m. At this time the Fleet-flagship
Iron Duke’s position was Lat. 55.56 N., Long. 4.40 E.,
the battle cruisers being some 40 to 50 miles ahead of
the Battle Fleet. The only enemy vessel seen was one
submarine by the New Zealand at 10.85 a.m. in Lat.
55.45 N., Long. 5.26 E.
The weather was very fine with high visibility, and at
9.30 a.m., the cruisers being then well to the southward
of the latitude of the Horn Reef, the whole Fleet turned
to the northward, the Battle Fleet on a north by west
course, at a speed of 12 knots, zigzagging.
Rear-Admiral Christian, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron,
reported that the sweep of the southern force had been
unproductive.
The cruisers were now disposed on a wide front for
a northerly sweep, spreading from the Norwegian coast,
for a distance of 150 miles, to the westward, with the
Battle Fleet in the centre. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron
swept to Lister, on the Norwegian coast, and then along
that coast as far as Lat. 60 N., thence towards Kinnaird
Head, with the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron prolonging
and supporting. The 8rd Cruiser Squadron extended the
front to the westward, supported by the 3rd Battle
Squadron.
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained in rear of
the Battle Fleet until dusk, and then was stationed 12
miles ahead. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, spread 10 miles
apart, covered the area between the Battle Fleet and the
2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd and 4th Flotillas re-
mained with the Battle Fleet, acting as a submarine
102 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
screen by day, and keeping in rear of the Fleet at night.
The mine-sweepers, which had swept ahead of the
Battle Fleet when on the southerly course, acted as a
submarine screen during the passage to the northward.
During the night of the 16th-17th the 8rd Cruiser Squad-
ron was detached to Cromarty to coal, the 10th Cruiser
Squadron to Scapa to coal, and to resume the northern
patrol, and the 6th Battle Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla
mine-sweepers and 8rd Battle Squadron proceeded to
Scapa to fuel.
August 17th—At 7.15 a.m. the Dreadnought Battle
Fleet altered course to pass through the Fair Island
Channel, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron rejoined,
The 4th Flotilla, which had been disposed astern during
the night, resumed station as a submarine screen at day-
light. The Battle Fleet zigzagged as usual throughout
daylight.
At noon the Iron Duke’s position was Lat. 58.59
N., Long. 1.85 E. At midnight, Lat. 59.27 N., Long.
2.25 W., and at 8 a.m. the 18th, Lat. 58.44 N., Long.
4.47 W.
The 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the northerly sweep
sighted only neutral vessels and proceeded to work in an
area designated as No. 5 (eastward from Kinnaird Head).
Noon position, Lat. 58.42 N., Long. 3.0 E.
This area, No. 5, was designed to cover the approach
to the Pentland Firth, both for blockade purposes and as
an outpost position for the Fleet at Scapa.
At this time, the northern and central parts of the
North Sea were divided into certain numbered areas in
which cruisers could be directed by wireless to work with-
out the necessity of making a long signal.
The various areas were approximately placed as
follows:
DECLARATION OF WAR 103
Area No. 1.—Covering the route round the north end of the Shetland
Islands from the southward and eastward.
““ No. 2.—Covering the Fair Island Channel to south-eastward,
‘working down to the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire.
“ No. 3. South-eastward from the N.E. end of the Orkneys to
Lat. of Kinnaird Head, with a width of about 50 miles
from the line Noss Head—Kinnaird Head.
““ No. 4.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head
—Udsire Lighthouse between 70 and 140 miles from
Kinnaird Head.
“No. 5.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head
—Udsire Lighthouse, between Area 4 and Norwegian
territorial waters.
** No. 6.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head
—Udsire Lighthouse, between 20 and 70 miles from
Kinnaird Head.
“No. 7.—Between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.50 N. and between 50 and
150 miles from the English coast.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron, having coaled, left to
resume the northern patrol; the Drake, and the two ships
acting with her, were ordered to return to Scapa to coal,
and directions were given for the other two ships to rejoin
the 10th Cruiser Squadron subsequently. During the
day the Orion developed serious condenser defects, neces-
sitating retubing her condensers. A telegram was sent
to the Admiralty requesting that new condenser tubes
might be sent at once to Loch Ewe, together with dock-
yard workmen to assist with the retubing. Meanwhile
arrangements were made for giving fleet assistance to the
Orion, and for all suitable spare condenser tubes from
the fleet to be sent to her on arrival.
The situation as regards the coal supply to the Fleet
had by this time become very serious, and was causing
me much anxiety; in reply to strong representations to
the Admiralty, a telegram was received explaining the
position and the efforts being made to rectify matters,
104 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
The Admiralty also informed me of the great impor-
tance that was attached to the efficiency of the northern
patrol, and stated that four armed merchant ships were
being sent to reinforce the 10th Cruiser Squadron.
The constant sea work had by this time shown the
inadequacy of the engine-room implements of all ships
for war conditions, and, in consequence of representa-
tions to this effect, 1,000 R.N.R. firemen were sent to
Scapa for distribution amongst the various ships. The
benefit derived from this measure was very considerable.
Two Fleet messenger vessels, the Cambria and Anglia,
arrived at Scapa on the 17th. These ships were used for
communication between the bases, for carrying maiis and
despatches, and for boarding duties.
August 18th—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet
arrived at Loch Ewe to fuel early in the afternoon; it was
accompanied by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron which was
without the Falmouth and Liverpool. The attached
cruisers were anchored in suitable positions for defending
the entrance against submarine attack, so far as they were
capable of doing it, and the armed steamboats of the fleet
patrolled the entrance.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been detached
to Scapa at daylight to fuel. A coaling base for the 10th
Cruiser Squadron had been by this time established at
Lerwick in order to shorten the distance for the ships
when proceeding to fuel. The Alsatian, an armed mer-
chant ship, joined the 10th Cruiser Squadron.
The Assistance arrived at Loch Ewe as base repair
ship, and was connected to the shore telegraph system.
Aeroplanes were reported off Foula Island, south-west
of the Shetlands, during the night of the 18th-19th. En-
quiry showed this rumour to be false.
The Admiralty informed me on this date that Rear-
DECLARATION OF WAR 105
Admiral Arthur Christian, with his Flag in the Sapphire,
had been placed in command of all forces in the southern
portion of the North Sea, namely, Cruiser force C, the
destroyer and submarine flotillas. As already explained,
these forces were acting under direct Admiralty orders and
were independent of me, unless ordered to join my Flag.
This organisation was dropped later on, after the loss
of the Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue, Cruiser force C being
abolished, and the command of the destroyer and sub-
marine forces reverting to their own senior officers.
August 19th, 21st, 22nd.—The Battle Fleet and 1st
Battle Cruiser Squadron remained in harbour during the
19th, coaling, storing, cleaning boilers, and taking in addi-
tional ammunition up to a maximum storage. With the
exception of the Orion, these ships left on the 20th at 6.30
p.M. for an area to the westward of the Orkneys and
Shetlands, with orders to carry out target practice on the
21st. The battle cruiser New Zealand was ordered to the
Humber to join the Invincible.
As Commodore Keyes reported on this date that our
submarines in the Heligoland Bight were being followed
and watched by German trawlers fitted with wireless, I
informed the Admiralty that I proposed to treat such
vessels as men of war. This was approved. The 2nd and
8rd Cruiser Squadrons were directed to work in Patrol
Area 1 alternately, and to carry out target practice in the
Cromarty Firth, en route to the patrol area.
The practice of the Battle Fleet on the 21st was inter-
fered with by fog and the Fleet did not form up until late
at night, and passed through the Fair Island Channel into
the North Sea during the early morning of the 22nd.
The Battle Fleet was joined off Fair Island by the 1st
Light Cruiser Squadron, was exercised in battle tactics
during the day, and in the afternoon was joined by the
106 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
2nd Flotilla as a submarine screen in Lat. 59.50 N., Long.
1.30 E. The position of the Iron Duke at midnight,
22nd-28rd, was Lat. 59.84 N., Long. 1.58 E., steering to
southward.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been
detained at Scapa by fog during the 21st, carried out
target practice to the westward of the Orkneys on the
22nd, and then proceeded to a position in Lat. 59.15 N.,
Long. 1 E., in readiness to support cruisers of the 3rd
Cruiser Squadron and the 6th Cruiser Squadron, now
comprising the Drake and King Alfred, which were
ordered to work between Scotland and Norway in areas
to the southward of the position named.
There were no reports of enemy ships being sighted
except one submarine in Lat. 55.4 N., Long. 1.35 E.,
on August 20th. The Admiralty informed me on this
date that the Portsmouth floating-dock had left for
Cromarty northabout, in pursuance of the policy decided
on before the War. It was, therefore, suggested that one
of the boy artificers’ floating workshops should be sent
north to work in conjunction with the dock. Steps were
taken to carry out this suggestion, but the ship was lost
on passage in bad weather near Portland.
August 23rd.—The Battle Fleet remained cruising in
the North Sea in support of the Cruiser Squadrons, the
weather being misty, with rain. The 3rd Battle Squadron
was detached to Scapa to coal, to arrive at daylight, the
24th; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and Ist Light
Cruiser Squadron, supported by the Ist Battle Cruiser
Squadron, were sweeping to the southward as far south as
Lat. 56 N.; the Alsatian was sent with the 6th Cruiser
Squadron to look out off Jaederens Point, on the southern
coast of Norway, to ascertain if German merchant ships,
trying to make their own ports, were leaving territorial
DECLARATION OF WAR 107
waters at this point, and, if so, to capture them. One-
half of the 2nd Flotilla was screening the Battle Fleet,
the second half searching for a submarine reported east
of the Orkneys. A submarine was sighted by the Ruby
of the 2nd Flotilla with the Battle Fleet at 5 p.x1., and
course altered to avoid her.
The destroyers Rifleman and Comet collided in a fog,
the latter being considerably damaged.
The Sappho was sent to search North Rona Island, a
statement having been received indicating that it might
possibly have been used by the enemy as a base for air-
craft. She reported, after examination, that the island
was, as expected, unsuitable for such a purpose.
The Ajax reported having burnt out a boiler, and the
Admiralty was asked to instruct the contractors to send
to Scapa men and tubes for retubing it.
The King Edward VII. reported cracks in the inner
A tubes of two of her 12-inch guns.
August 24th—The Battle Fleet cruised between the
Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, and carried out battle
tactics during the forenoon, the weather becoming too
thick in the afternoon.
The Ist Battle Squadron was detached to Scapa to
fuel, as well as the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron, the latter
being relieved by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. The re-
mainder of the cruisers continued their sweeping opera-
tions as on the 28rd.
August 25th—The 8rd Battle Squadron left Scapa to
relieve the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in immediate sup-
port of the cruisers at 6 a.M., and while en route to its
position captured an Austrian steamer, the Attila. The
remainder of the Battle Fleet left its cruising ground,
arriving at Scapa at 7.30 a.m. on the 26th, with the Ist
Battle Cruiser Squadron to fuel. The Agincourt, a new
108 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
battleship which was bought from Turkey when still in
an unfinished state, was met off Noss Head and entered
with the Fleet.
At 5.80 p.m. a submarine was sighted from the bridge
of the Iron Duke, and the Fleet manceuvred clear of the
position. One-half of the 4th Flotilla, which had screened
the 8rd Battle Squadron to sea, joined the Commander-
in-Chief at 5 p.m., and was ordered to search for this
submarine, but without result. The Drake, of the 6th
Cruiser Squadron, left the Norwegian coast for Scapa at
4 a.M., the 25th, owing to condenser trouble.
The Dominion reported two of her 12-inch guns
cracked. The King Edward VII. left Scapa for Devon-
port to change her two guns, which had also cracked,
Vice-Admiral Bradford shifting his flag to the battleship
Dominion.
The weather was thick during the night of the 25th-
26th, but the fog lifted sufficiently for the Battle Fleet
to enter Scapa.
August 26th.—The Iron Duke, the 2nd and 4th Battle
Squadrons, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd Flotilla,
were at Scapa fuelling.
The 1st Battle Squadron, with one-half of the 4th
Flotilla, left to join the 8rd Battle Squadron at sea, their
departure having been delayed for some hours by thick fog.
The 2nd Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 5 p.m. for
Rosyth to coal. .
The 6th Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 8 P.M. to coal,
the King Alfred at Scapa, and the Alsatian at Liverpool;
the arrangements in the large merchant-ships were such
as to render coaling from colliers a difficult and slow
progress.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron, except the Mantua, left
the northern patrol to coal at Scapa.
DECLARATION OF WAR 109
During the day the Admiralty informed me of some
operations which the southern forces were intended to
carry out in the Heligoland Bight on the 28th, and di-
rected that the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron should join in
the operations. I made urgent representations as to the
necessity of supporting the force with battle cruisers, and
informed the Admiralty that I was sending the Ist Battle
Cruiser Squadron to take part. I requested that the
Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the Com-
modore, Ist Light Cruiser Squadron, might be informed
direct by the Admiralty of the positions which the other
ships would occupy, and that the senior officers of the
southern force taking part should also be informed of
the presence of the battle cruisers and Ist Light Cruiser
Squadron.
On this date 1,000 additional seamen ratings arrived
to join the Fleet, experience having shown that the num-
ber of deck complements, as well as the engine-room
complements, required increasing, principally owing to
the heavy guns of the secondary armament being so con-
stantly manned at sea—by day against submarine attack,
and by night against destroyer attack.
August 27th.—On this date I wired to the Admiralty
proposing the erection of two wireless stations in the
Orkneys for local communication, and a directional sta-
tion to assist in locating the positions of German ships
using wireless. The remainder of the Battle Fleet pro-
ceeded to sea at 6 P.M. to join the 1st and 8rd Battle
Squadrons at 7 A.M. on the 28th to the south-eastward of
the Orkneys in Lat. 58.20 N., Long. 0.20 W. The 2nd
Flotilla accompanied the Fleet as a submarine screen.
On this date a patrol of the eastern approaches to the
Pentland Firth was inaugurated by the Mine-laying
Squadron which was not required at the time for mine-
110 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
laying operations, with. the object of ensuring a closer
watch on the mercantile traffic through the Pentland
Firth, and the Oceanic, an armed merchant cruiser, which
had joined the Fleet, was detached to carry out a patrol to
the westward of the Fair Island Channel in order to con-
trol the traffic at this point.
Information was received from the Admiralty of the
existence of mined areas off Harwich, Flamborough Head
and Tynemouth. The positions of the two latter mine-
fields appeared to corroborate the information obtained
prior to the outbreak of war.
A collision occurred at 9.80 p.m. between the Bellero-
phon and the s.s St. Clair, which was passing through
the Fleet. The St. Clair was damaged, but the damage
to the Bellerophon. was not serious.
August 28th.—The weather was misty with a visibility
of 4 to 6 miles until the evening, when it cleared slightly.
The Battle Fleet during the day proceeded to the south-
ward, the noon position being Lat. 58.19 N., Long. 0.21
E., with cruisers in advance.
The Fleet was exercised during the day at battle tac-
tics. The sweep of light forces into the Heligoland Bight
which took place at dawn was successful in bringing enemy
light forces to action. The official despatches relating to
this operation are given in an Appendix. The events may
be shortly described here. At 6.53 a.m. Commodore
Tyrwhitt, commanding the Harwich force, which had
swept into the Heligoland Bight during the night to cut
off enemy vessels, sighted a destroyer and chased her.
From 7.20 to 8 a.m. the Arethusa and the 3rd Flotilla:
were in action with destroyers and torpedo-boats making
for Heligoland, sinking one destroyer. At 7.57 the
Arethusa, Commodore Tyrwhitt’s flagship, which had
been in commission only a few days, sighted two enemy
DECLARATION OF WAR III
light cruisers, and engaged them, assisted a little later
by the light cruiser Fearless. At 8.25 a.m. a hit from the
Arethusa wrecked the fore bridge of one of the enemy
ships, and they both steamed at once for Heligoland,
which was then sighted, and our ships turned to the west-
ward. The Arethusa had been considerably damaged
during the action and had suffered several casualties.
At 10.55 a.m. another German light cruiser was
sighted by the Arethusa, and on being attacked by the
Fearless and destroyers turned away; she reappeared at
11.5 and engaged the Arethusa and Fearless and was
attacked by these ships and by destroyers and again turned
away. Meanwhile Commodore Tyrwhitt had informed
Sir David Beatty of the position, and that officer pro-
ceeded at full speed to his support. The light cruiser
Mainz had been attacking the somewhat disabled Arethusa
and the Fearless at about 11.80 a.m. and had suffered very
severely in the action, being practically disabled. The
arrival of the First Light Cruiser Squadron, under Com-
modore Goodenough, on the scene at about noon secured
her destruction,
Between 12.37 p.m and 1.45 p.m. the Ist Battle
Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron en-
gaged two other German light cruisers, one of which was
sunk; the second was last seen burning furiously and in
a sinking condition.
Even thus early in the War the difference between
the behaviour of British and German seamen was notice-
able. On the British side, in addition to other assistance
rendered to the survivors of the Mainz (which had been
sunk), Commander Keyes, in the destroyer Firedrake,
proceeded alongside and rescued 220 of her crew, many of
them being wounded. A German light cruiser opened
fire on the British destroyers engaged in picking up sur-
112 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
vivors from the German destroyer V187 when that ves-
sel was sunk by our craft, thus making it necessary for
the destroyers to leave behind the boats carrying out the
rescue work. The British submarine E4 afterwards took
our officers and men out of these boats and left some un-
wounded Germans to take the other boats, which con-
tained German wounded, to Heligoland.
In the afternoon of August 28th the 10th Cruiser
Squadron was directed to work in Area No. 6, leaving
the armed merchant cruisers farther to the northward. The
object was to give a better chance of intercepting enemy
vessels or neutral ships carrying contraband of war by
establishing two patrols on the probable exit or entrance
courses, one of which would in all probability be crossed
of necessity during daylight hours, even if the second were
passed through at night.
August 29th.—This was a bright, fine day, with high
visibility. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at
sea with three divisions of the 2nd Flotilla, cruising and
carrying out battle tactics and other exercises.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa to
fuel at 7 P.M., in company with the 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron, the Liverpool being detached to Rosyth to land
the German prisoners captured in the Heligoland Bight
on the 28th.
The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was cruising in Area No. 5,
which the 3rd Cruiser Squadron left during the day for
Cromarty to fuel.
The 6th Cruiser Squadron and 10th Cruiser Squadron
were in Area No. 6; the mine-layers were in Area No. 38.
During the day the Oak arrived from Scapa with tele-
grams and despatches for me and returned with similar
correspondence for the Admiralty. The Oak was usually
employed on this duty while the Iron Duke was at sea
DECLARATION OF WAR 113
during the earlier months of the War, my infrequent
visits to a base rendering this essential.
Some risk from submarine attack was naturally in-
volved during the time that the Iron Duke, or any other
heavy ship, was stopped to communicate. The risk was
recognised, and, as the number of enemy submarines in-
creased, it became undesirable to incur it, and the prac-
tice of stopping ships at sea for any such purpose was
abandoned; the longer time spent in harbour tended to
reduce the necessity for the practice to some extent, but
during the early part of the War this was the only means
of conveying despatches to the Fleet when it was con-
stantly at sea,
The reported increase in enemy mine-laying off our
eastern coasts caused me to suggest to the Admiralty at
this time the desirability of the patrol flotillas working
somewhat farther seaward, and to ask for an increase as
soon as possible in the number of fast light craft to work
off the northern fleet bases. A request for 20 drifters to
work in the approaches to the Pentland Firth was also
forwarded.
The Fleet messenger Cambria was brought out to work
with the Battle Fleet for the purpose of boarding merchant
ships owing to the shortage of light cruisers for this work.
August 30th—In the afternoon the Dreadnought
Battle Fleet shaped course for Scapa, and arrived at 7:
A.M. on the 81st to fuel, the 38rd Battle Squadron being
ordered out to the eastward of the Orkneys to support the
2nd Cruiser Squadron, which was searching the eastern
portion of Area 5.
The patrol of the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons was
continued as usual, the 6th Cruiser Squadron leaving the
Area at 3 A.M. on the 31st to fuel at Scapa.
During the day the Assistance returned to Scapa from
114 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Loch Ewe as base ship, and the Illustrious arrived there
as defence ship for the entrance. I had decided her posi-
tion during my previous visit.
As a result of inquiries of the Admiralty, I was in-
formed that trawlers were being taken up and armed for
patrol duties as rapidly as possible, and that arrangements
for the defences of Scapa, which had formed the subject
of correspondence between the Admiralty and myself, had
been approved, including the laying of certain mine-fields
at the entrances.
August 31st—A sweep towards the Scottish coast
of all vessels at sea, or ready for sea, was carried out in
consequence of information having been received pointing
to the possibility of mine-laying by the enemy in the
vicinity of the Pentland Firth or Moray Firth during the
night of August 31st-September Ist; the sweep was
arranged to intercept the enemy mine-layers on their
return trip. But it was unproductive, no mine-laying
having taken place. The squadrons engaged in the sweep
were the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Battle Squad-
ron, 8rd Cruiser Squadron, 10th Cruiser Squadron.
In consequence of urgent representations as to the
insufficiency of .3803 rifle ammunition for the Army, all
ships disembarked 50 per cent. of their ammunition of
this calibre at the end of August for conveyance to
Woolwich. ‘
Later, still more of the rifle ammunition and all but
a very small number of rifles, as well as many machine-
guns, were landed from the Fleet for use by the Army.
A meeting of all the captains of Dreadnought battle-
ships was held on board the Iron Duke on August 81st in
order to discuss with them the subject of tactics in action.
CHAPTER V
THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA
On September Ist the Dreadnought Battle Fleet with
the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 6th Cruiser Squadron
and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were at Scapa Flow, clean-
ing boilers, storing, and taking in ammunition, etc. The
Fleet was at the usual anchorage off Scapa Pier, on the
north side of the Flow; the ships which were fitted with
torpedo nets had them out, as was customary, unless col-
liers or store-ships were alongside.
The Falmouth, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was
anchored to the westward of Holm Sound, and the re-
mainder of this squadron formed the outer or southward
line of ships, all at two hours’ notice for steam. The
weather during the day was dull and misty, with rain at
times.
At 6 p.m, the Falmouth reported the periscope of a
submarine in sight inside the harbour, and immediately
opened fire, four rounds being fired by this ship; she
reported having probably hit the submarine. Directly
afterwards the Vanguard, one of the outer line of battle-
ships, also opened fire on an object reported as a peri-
scope, as did one of the E class destroyers, which was pa-
trolling between the Fleet and the Hoxa entrance.
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was directed to weigh
immediately steam was ready, which was at 8.30 p.m., and
to endeavour to locate the submarine and keep her under.
The 2nd Flotilla, lying at Longhope, at short notice,
115
116 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
was also instructed to weigh at once and search for the
submarine. The whole of the ships present were ordered
to raise steam with all despatch, and to prepare for tor-
pedo attack, and the small craft, such as drifters, steam-
boats, motor-boats, yachts, etc., which had steam ready
and which could be collected, were at once organised in
detachments to steam up and down the lines at high speed
and outside the Fleet, with the object of confusing the
submarine and endeavouring to ram her, if sighted. Col-
liers and store-ships which had steam ready were directed
to weigh and to go alongside the battleships that were
not fitted with torpedo nets, in order to act as a form of
protection against torpedoes fired at these valuable ves-
sels. All ships in the outer lines were directed to burn
searchlights to locate and confuse the submarine.
At about 6.30 p.m. the Drake reported a submarine
in sight from that ship, thus confirming the earlier reports.
The Fleet was directed to weigh by divisions as soon
as steam was ready and to proceed to sea. By 9 P.M. the
weather was exceedingly thick inside the harbour and con-
siderable difficulty was experienced in getting the Fleet
out, as at this time there were no navigational facilities
of any sort for leaving the harbour at night or in thick
weather; but by 11 p.m. all the ships had left the harbour
without accident, and, although there was a dense fog
outside, the Fleet cleared the Pentland Firth successfully.
The Assistance was ordered to Loch Ewe, and left
after the Fleet, reporting having sighted a submarine in
the entrance whilst going out. The 2nd Flotilla was left
behind to locate and, if possible, destroy the submarine,
and the 4th Flotilla was stationed outside the Hoxa and
Hoy entrances during the night, and directed to meet
the Fleet at 7 a.m. on the 2nd. The only ship, as distinct
from destroyers, remaining in the harbour was the
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 117
Cyclops, lying off Scapa with the telegraph and telephone
cables on board, and directions were given to Rear-Ad-
miral Miller to endeavour to locate, by means of the mine-
sweeping gunboats, the submarine reported sunk by the
Falmouth.
No trace of a submarine was discovered, and sub-
sequent investigation showed that the alarm may have
been false, the evidence not being conclusive either way.
The incident, however, made it clear that protection
against submarine attack was an absolute necessity, as
the Fleet could not remain at a base that was as open
to this form of attack as Scapa Flow. The only possible
action, in the event of an alarm being given of the
presence of a submarine, was to take the Fleet to sea,
and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time from
a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of in-
security was created, which would be bad for moral, and
the ships were deprived of opportunities for cleaning
boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which experience was
showing was essential if the steaming efficiency of the
Fleet was to be maintained.
The matter was at once represented to the Admiralty
and proposals were made for blocking all the entrances
to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and Hoy entrances, by
sinking old merchant ships in the channels. Pending
the supply of reliable defences for the main entrance,
Rear-Admiral Miller was directed to requisition a large
number of net-drifters. The plan was to lay drift
nets in the entrance to be watched by the drifters, the
nets having indicator buoys attached to them and floating
on the surface, so that the presence of a submarine might
be indicated by the buoy moving with the net.
The navigational difficulties of the narrower entrances
were, meanwhile, the only obstacles to the passage of
118 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
submarines through them, but it was realised that these
were considerable. The opinion was formed, however,
that the Hoxa entrance presented no insurmountable
difficulty of this nature to a determined submarine
commander, _
By this date the local defence flotilla of destroyers
consisted of vessels of the E class. A request was made
for basing a hunting flotilla of 16 trawlers on Kirkwall,
these vessels being intended to guard the approaches to
the Pentland Firth and to act as submarine hunters
generally. It was also suggested that a monetary
reward should be offered to the personnel of any trawler
through whose agency a submarine was captured or de-
stroyed.
The mine-sweeping force at Scapa had _ been
strengthened by the addition of a flotilla of trawlers, and
the mine-sweeping gunboats and trawlers were continu-
ously employed in keeping certain fixed channels of
approach to the Pentland Firth swept and clear of mines.
These vessels were, therefore, not available for anti-sub-
marine work, except to the detriment of their mine-sweep-
ing duties.
On September 1st the available cruiser squadrons were
employed in Area No. 6, supported by the 3d Battle
Squadron and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
From September 1st to September 5th the Battle
Fleet remained at sea, cruising in the area between the
north-east coast of Scotland and the coast of Norway, in
support of the cruiser squadrons working to the south-
ward, and opportunity was taken to continue the exercises
of the Fleet in battle tactics, together with occasional
gunnery practice. The Orion, of the 2nd Battle Squadron,
was still absent from the Fleet, retubing condensers; the
King Edward VII. rejoined on the 2nd, after exchanging
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 119
defective guns; and the Dominion was then detached to
Devonport to exchange her damaged 12-inch guns.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been strength-
ened by the arrival of the Inflevible from the Mediter-
ranean, and was employed during this period in support
of the cruiser sweeps, the Squadron joining the Battle
Fleet on the 3rd for battle exercises.
During the period under review reports from time to
time of the sighting of enemy submarines appeared to
indicate that they were working on a line Ekersund-
Pentland Firth, the line which they were apparently
occupying during the first few days of the War, when
U 15 was sunk by the Birmingham,
Information received on September 3d suggested that
enemy cruisers might have passed, or might be intending
to pass, into the North Sea via the Skagerrak. The
2nd and 8rd Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron, supported by the Ist Battle Cruiser
Squadron and accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla, were,
therefore, directed to sweep to the entrance to the
Skagerrak, arriving there by noon of September 4th,
starting from a position in Lat. 58 N., Long. 2.36 E.,
at 4.4. M. that day. From the Skagerrak the 2nd and 3rd
Cruiser Squadrons were to make a detour to the south-
westward with the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron, the latter
proceeding then to Rosyth and the Cruiser Squadrons
to Cromarty; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,
with the 2nd Flotilla, was directed to sweep on a wide
front towards the Pentland Firth on the Ekersund-
Pentland line in search of enemy submarines, which it
was hoped might be caught on the surface at night.
Thence the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was to proceed
to Scapa to fuel, and the 2nd Flotilla to the westward of
the Orkneys to search for submarines, returning to
120 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Longhope at 9 p. M. on September 6th. The 4th Flotilla,
which had been with the Battle Fleet, was directed at
the same time to sweep the western portion of the Eker-
sund-Pentland line for submarines, and then to return
to Longhope.
These orders were carried out, but no enemy vessels
of any sort were sighted, except that at 6.30 a.m. on the
5th the Thetis, mine-layer, working south-eastward
of the Orkneys, reported a suspicious vessel, thought
to be a German cruiser. The 2nd and 6th Cruiser
Squadrons and Ist Light Cruiser Squadron closed in on
the position, but the ship was eventually identified as one
of our own vessels.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe
at 4 p.m. on the 5th to coal, two mine-sweeping gunboats
having been previously detached to that base to search
the entrance for mines.
During the early days of September frequent reports
were received of enemy mines having been discovered on
the east coast, and several vessels were sunk, as a conse-
quence, including the gunboat Speedy. It appeared that
the enemy was laying the mines from merchant vessels
flying neutral or even, possibly, British colours, as well
as from regular mine-laying ships. The large number
of vessels trading on the east coast and of fishing craft
at sea, both British and neutral, greatly increased the
difficulty of preventing these operations. The task of
boarding and examining even a considerable percentage
of these vessels involved a heavy strain. Our cruiser
sweeps were showing this daily. The Admiralty’s atten-
tion was drawn to the matter, and the question was raised
of establishing some restrictions, particularly as regards
the areas in which fishing should be permitted.
The extinction of a large proportion of our coast lights
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 121
was also proposed, the burning of which enabled the
enemy to fix his position accurately when engaged in
mine-laying operations. This policy of the extinction of
lights, thus started, gradually became general, and
eventually only the most important lights were exhibited
at night, and the large majority of these were only shown
when requests were made by men-of-war who required
them for entering port, the time of their exhibition being
thus reduced to a minimum.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe
until 6 a.m. on September 7th, and then proceeded to
sea. The Orion was left behind to complete work on her
condensers and rejoined the Fleet at sea on September
9th, having been absent for twenty-one days.
The Agincourt, the new battleship which since com-
missioning had been engaged in gunnery and torpedo
practices either at Scapa or to the westward of the
Orkneys, joined the 4th Battle Squadron at sea on Sep-
tember 7th in order to give her officers experience in
working with the Fleet. There had been great difficulty
in carrying out her practices because she had not been
supplied with “sub-calibre” guns, and this deficiency
could not be made good for some months; this caused
much delay in raising her battle efficiency. However,
she was manned with officers and a ship’s company of
a very high standard and, in spite of all disadvantages,
the early gunnery practices carried out by her in com-
pany with the Fleet showed that she would eventually
prove to be a most valuable addition to the Fleet.
Representations had been made by me to the Ad-
miralty that the presence of a senior Flag officer in
general command of the Orkneys and Shetlands, who
would be responsible for the defences of these islands and
the Fleet bases, was very necessary, the work of actual
122 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
administration of the base at Scapa Flow being sufficient
fully to occupy the time of Rear-Admiral Miller.
Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville accepted
the post, and as it was very desirable that the officer
holding this position should be junior to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, he paid me the compliment
of expressing his desire to be placed junior on the list to
myself, a reversal of our proper respective seniorities.
He was, accordingly, appointed, and came to Loch
Ewe on September 6th, to confer with me before taking
up his appointment. He accompanied me to sea in the
Iron Duke on the 7th in order to talk matters over, was
embarked on board the Oak to the westward of the
Orkneys, and took up his command on arrival. The
result was immediately most beneficial. He was able to
devote his whole time to the questions of defence and
organisation and relieved me of all these matters which
had, as was inevitable under the previous arrangement,
occupied so much of my time in harbour and so much
of my thoughts at sea.
On September 6th the Portsmouth floating dock ar-
rived safely at Cromarty.
During September 7th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet
proceeded northward from Loch Ewe en route to the
North Sea, and passed through the Fair Island Channel
at 10 p.m., being joined at 4 a.m. by the 8rd Battle
Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth
after dark on this date and proceeded to the north-east-
ward, being joined at 4 a.m. on the 8th by the Sappho
and four destroyers of the 4th Flotilla. These smaller
vessels were intended to carry out boarding duties in order
to avoid the danger to the large ships from submarine
attack, consequent on stopping for this purpose. The
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron swept to the south-eastward
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 123
of Area 6 during daylight on the 8th, and during the
night of the 8th and daylight of the 9th was on a patrol
area approximately between Lat. 55 N., Long. 2 E., and
Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 2.40 E., with the object of inter-
cepting possible enemy mine-layers. The Battle Fleet
carried out gunnery practices and exercised battle tactics
during the 8th eastward of the Orkneys, and at dark pro-
ceeded to the southward to support an extensive sweep
into the Heligoland Bight which it had been decided to
carry out on September 10th. The dispositions for this
sweep were generally as follows:
The Ist and 3d Flotillas from Harwich, supported
by the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron and Ist Battle Cruiser
Squadron to the northward, and the 7th Cruiser Squadron
to the westward, swept out the Heligoland Bight from
east to west, commencing from a position some ten to
twelve miles from Heligoland, which position was to be
reached one hour before dawn. The Battle Fleet, with
the 2nd and 8rd Cruiser Squadrons, spread 20 miles
ahead, was in position Lat. 55.9 N., Long. 4.24 E.
at 8 a.m. on September 10th, steering S.S.E. at 12
knots speed of advance.
The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 8rd Cruiser
Squadrons to the southward, cruised to the north-west-
ward of Heligoland until 11 a.m. on the 10th, by which
time it was clear that the sweep had been unproductive.
No German vessel of any sort was sighted, except one
seaplane reported by the 7th Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd
Flotilla was stationed with the Battle Fleet as a submarine
screen, and to assist the attached cruisers in boarding
duties during the day, and the 4th Flotilla, which had been
working with the 2nd and 8rd Cruiser Squadrons, princi-
pally for boarding duties, was also directed to join the
Battle Fleet on the morning of the 10th, but by reason
124 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
of the thick weather did not do so until 2 p.m. Owing
to the large number of trawlers that were met with,
nearly all of which were flying neutral colours, the board-
ing duties were very onerous. Considerable suspicion
attached to these trawlers because frequently Telefunken
wireless signals were noticed to be very strong after the
Fleet had passed these vessels; but close examination
failed to reveal anything suspicious in those that were
boarded, no wireless apparatus being discovered in any
of them.
The conditions on September 10th were very unfavour-
able for the sweep into the Bight. Thick weather pre-
vailed both before and after daylight, and the visibility
varied from between two and five miles. The mist pre-
vented the junction of the 4th Flotilla with the Battle
Fleet for eight hours, a circumstance which would have
had awkward consequences had the High Sea Fleet been
encountered with its full complement of 80 to 100 de-
stroyers, as might have been the case in such close prox-
imity to German ports.
It was noted at the time that the conditions were very
unfavourable for a Fleet action owing to the low visibility
combined with the glare produced by the occasional sun-
shine and absence of wind. A passage in the notes made
on this occasion referred to such conditions as follows:
“The weather conditions . . . were very unfavour-
able for a general action owing to the low visibility and
the glare caused by brilliant sunlight and absence of
wind. . . . The conditions make it impossible for
the Commander-in-Chief in the centre of the Fleet to
know what is going on in the van and rear . . . besides
being entirely favourable to tactics largely based on the
employment of torpedo craft or mine-layers.
“In addition there are great difficulties in concen-
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 125
trating detached ships and flotillas and in forming the
~Fleet prior to battle, also in the recognition of ships and
destroyers.”
This passage is of interest because of its bearing on
the Jutland battle some two years later when somewhat
similar conditions prevailed.
The difficulty of recognition mentioned made so much
impression on my mind that special daylight recognition
devices which could be seen at a considerable distance were
subsequently devised and used by our own light cruisers
and destroyers when in the presence of the enemy.
When it became evident that there were no enemy
vessels to engage, I organised a sweep to the northward
on a large scale, with a view to intercepting any enemy
ships that might be at sea and of closely examining all
merchant ships and fishing vessels which were met with.
The starting-point of the sweep was Lat. 55.30 N.,
Long. 4.0 E., the dispositions being:
The Invincible (which had now joined the Battle Cruisers)
and the Inflexible, to sweep towards Dundee.
8rd Cruiser Squadron towards Aberdeen at 12 knots speed of
advance.
Ist Light Cruiser Squadron towards Pentland Firth at 11
knots speed of advance.
2nd Cruiser Squadron towards Fair Island at 10 knots speed
of advance.
All ships spread as widely as visibility admitted.
The ist Battle Cruiser Squadron (which now once more in-
cluded the New Zealand) to be in general support.
The Battle Fleet with divisions spread four miles apart to ex-
tend the sweep to the eastward.
These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 2.
At 3 A.M. on the 11th the sweep was directed to turn
to N. 16 E., and, later, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was
stationed in a new area, No. 7, between Lat. 55.20 N.
126 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
and 57.80 N., between 50 and 150 miles from the coast.
The 8rd Cruiser Squadron was sent to Cromarty to coal;
the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron rejoined the Battle Fleet, and the Invincible
and Inflexible were sent to Scapa to coal, as well as the
8rd Battle Squadron, a half flotilla of destroyers screening -
these vessels into the base.
During the 11th and 12th the Battle Fleet and Ist
Battle Cruiser Squadron carried out battle tactics and
gunnery exercises, and the Battle Fleet then proceeded to
Loch Ewe, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and Ist
Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa to fuel.
During the passage south and north numerous reports
of floating mines were received. The majority proved to
be fishermen’s bladders which at this time were being
frequently reported by merchant ships as floating mines.
The Admiralty now informed me that a patrol of the
3rd meridian of East Long. between the parallels of
55.30 N. and 53.30 N. had been established by the 1st
and 8rd Flotilla, the patrol consisting of eight destroyers
and one light cruiser, supported by two cruisers of the
“Bacchante” class, the object being to catch enemy
mine-layers. I was also informed that a patrol of the
“Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch coast, was being
maintained to guard the Eastern Channel and Thames
approaches.
On September 11th the Hibernia reported a 12-inch
gun cracked, the fifth since the outbreak of war!
On the same day salvage operations on the armed
merchant-cruiser Oceanic, which had gone ashore in
a fog on Foula Island on September 8th, were
abandoned owing to heavy weather. The vessel broke
up eventually.
Rear-Admiral E. R, Pears reported that the Ports-
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 127
mouth floating dock would be ready for work on Sep-
tember 21st, a very smart piece of mooring work
having been carried out by Captain Munro, R.N., the
King’s Harbour Master.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch
Ewe coaling, storing and cleaning boilers, etc., from
5 P.M. on September 13th until 6 p.m. on September 17th,
and the Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron, except the In-
flexible and Invincible, remained at Scapa until Sep-
tember 18th. Meanwhile the usual cruiser sweeps in the
North Sea in Areas 3, 6 and 7 were carried out by the 2nd,
8rd, 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and the Mine-layer
Squadron, supported by the Invincible, Inflexible and
3rd Battle Squadron, which left Scapa on the morning
of September 14th for the purpose. The armed merchant-
cruisers Alsatian and Mantua were patrolling eastward of
the Shetlands.
Advantage was taken of the stay at Loch Ewe to
make general arrangements with the Admiralty for the
defence of that base, and on September 17th the First
Lord of the Admiralty, with the Chief of War Staff,
the Director of Intelligence Division, Commodores (S)
and (T) arrived at Loch Ewe to confer with me. The
bombardment and capture of Heligoland was also dis-
cussed. The proposals had been previously forwarded to
me by Mr. Churchill, and had been carefully examined by
myself, Rear-Admiral Charles Madden, the Chief of
Staff, and by the Flag officers commanding the Battle
Squadrons. The opinions of these officers against the
operation were unanimous. It had not been suggested
that the Grand Fleet should be used for the operation,
except as a supporting force; the older battleships were
intended for this purpose. But the arguments against
the operation were overwhelmingly strong. It was
128 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
pointed out that ships were no match for heavy fortifica-
tions such as were known to exist on Heligoland; that
direct fire from high-velocity guns with a low trajectory
would be ineffective against well-placed, heavily protected
and well-concealed land guns; that, even if a storm-
ing party were able to land and to capture the
island, it would be quite impossible to hold it, situated
as it was close to German naval bases, for if we could take
it in a fortified condition, it would be far easier for the
Germans to recapture it with the fortifications demol-
ished; that it would be under continuous attack by sea
and air, and that any attempt to hold it, if captured,
would involve keeping the Grand Fleet constantly ‘in
southern waters, which, owing to the number of small
craft then available, was an impossibility. Aircraft
spotting, which would be a necessary adjunct, was at that
time in its infancy, and we had no vessels specially suited
for bombardments at long range, such as the monitors
which, later on, carried out such useful work on the
Belgian coast. After a conference, at which the Flag
officers were present, I thought that the idea would be
abandoned.
This was not the case, however, and the matter was
taken up later at the Admiralty with Vice-Admiral Sir
Cecil Burney, commanding the Channel Fleet. His view
coincided with those expressed by the Flag officers at the
Loch Ewe conference, although he was of course prepared
to carry out any orders that might be given him. The
idea was not finally abandoned for some time. The
opinions of Sir Cecil Burney and myself were identical,
as indeed were those of every Flag officer with whom I
discussed the matter, with one single exception, a junior
Flag officer.
Another subject touched on during Mr. Churchill’s
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Abbreviations
used.
Battle Fleet.
Bottle Cruiser Squadron.
Cruiser Squadron.
Light Cruiser Squadron,
Destrorer Flotilla,
Mine Sweeper.
10
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 129
visit was that of operations in the Baltic, but as no large
operations of this nature could be attempted without the
assistance of Allied battleships, in order to maintain
supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no
steps were taken.
By this date a regular programme of dockings and
refits for all ships was recognised as necessary, and
battleships were now being detached one at a time for
this purpose. For some months after the commencement
of the War, it was not possible to allow ships more than
four days for docking and for the execution of the most
urgent work, except in cases of accident or very serious
defects, as our margin of superiority was none too large,
and we were already experiencing a good deal of trouble
with condenser tubes, necessitating ships being laid up
for the work of retubing; but the work achieved in the
four days was a very fine tribute to the dockyard organisa-
tion and to the industry of the dockyard men.
The Battle Fleet left Loch Ewe on the evening of
September 17th, the Erin, a new battleship bought, in-
complete, from Turkey, being in company for the first
time in order to accustom her officers to working the ship
with the Fleet. Target practice was carried out to the
westward of the Orkneys during the forenoon of the
18th, but was interfered with by bad weather—a frequent
experience. The Battle Fleet then proceeded into the
North Sea, via the Fair Island Channel, the position at
midnight, 18th, being Lat. 59.23 N., Long. 1.18 W., and
course south. The Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa
with the Ist Light Cruiser Squadron on the evening of
the 19th, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty at
the same time, all for the southward for a sweep into
the Heligoland Bight, supported by the Battle Fleet, in
search of the enemy and with a view to carrying out a
130 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
thorough examination of trawlers suspected of acting as
look-out vessels for the enemy.
While on passage south during the 19th the Battle
Fleet was exercised at battle tactics. At midnight on
the 19th the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 58.3 N.,
Long. 2.24 E., and at 8 a.m. on the 20th, in Lat. 57.8 N.,
Long. 3.20 E., having met the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
The 2nd Flotilla had been under orders to leave Scapa
in time to meet the Battle Fleet at 8 a.m. on the 21st,
but, owing to bad weather, the orders were cancelled
and the flotilla returned to Scapa, as did the 4th Flotilla,
which was to have accompanied the battle cruisers.
During daylight of the 20th the Battle Fleet cruised to-
wards the Norwegian coast to the northward of Lat.
57 N., in support of the battle cruisers engaged in ex-
amining trawlers in the vicinity of the Little Fisher
Bank; it turned to the southward at 4 P.M. to rendezvous,
at 5 A.M. on the 21st, in Lat. 56 N., Long. 3.30 E., with
the 8rd Battle Squadron, which had been coaling at
Scapa and had left on the 20th to join the Commander-
in-Chief.
At 7 a.m. on the 21st the Battle Fleet was in position
Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 3.30 E., and the Vice-Admiral of
the battle cruisers having reported at 6.20 a.m. from a
position in Lat. 55.16 N., Long. 4.52 K., that the weather
was too bad to admit of the search of trawlers being
carried out satisfactorily, the operation was abandoned
and the Fleet turned to the northward, as it was con-
sidered that an incomplete examination would do more
harm than good.
During this period the 38rd Cruiser Squadron was
working in Area 7, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in
Area 6, as usual; the Alsatian and Mantua, with the
Drake, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, were sweeping down
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 131
the Norwegian coast and then returned to resume their
patrol east of the Shetlands, where they were joined by
the armed merchant ship Teutonic.
The 2nd and 4th Flotillas left Scapa on the 20th and
‘joined the Battle Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Squadron
respectively on the 21st.
All wireless telegraphy signalling at sea was stopped
between 4 P.M. on the 20th and 4 p.m. on the 21st, in
order that the enemy should not become aware of the
movements of the Fleet, as such knowledge might pre-
vent the High Sea Fleet from putting to sea and possibly
deprive us of our opportunity of catching it.
During the passage of the Fleet to the northward, an
extensive sweep was carried out during daylight of the
21st. The Battle Fleet covered a front of 40 miles, and
battle cruisers and cruisers prolonged the front to the
eastward and westward.
On the evening of the 21st I was informed by
wireless telegraphy from the Admiralty of a report
that a German force of two light cruisers, with
destroyers and submarines in company, had _ been
sighted from Esbjerg on the 20th, proceeding to the
northward. The whole Fleet was turned to the southward
at midnight on the 21st, and spread at dawn to cover a
front of 104 miles from the Norwegian coast westward,
sweeping to the northward, to endeavour to intercept the
enemy vessels if they had continued a course to the north-
ward. The sweep to the northward was continued until
10 am. The Iron Duke was in position Lat. 59 N.,
Long. 2.35 E., when the line was directed to wheel
towards the Orkneys and Shetlands on a course N. 51 W.
During the 22nd, visibility was very good, but no enemy
vessels were sighted, and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet
and battle cruisers passed to the westward of the Orkneys
132 THE GRAND FLEET 1914-1916,
during the night, the 8rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle
Squadron being detached to support the cruisers searching
in the North Sea areas.
At 7.45 A.M. on the 22nd wireless telegraphy signals
from the Cressy were intercepted indicating that the
Aboukir and Hogue had been sunk by submarines in
Lat. 52.18 N., Long. 8.41 E. These vessels were
patrolling the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch Coast,
under Admiralty orders. No further details were re-
ceived, beyond a wireless signal from Commodore (S), at
11.30 a.m., that he was proceeding in the Fearless with
seventeen destroyers to Terschelling to endeavour to inter-
cept the enemy submarines on their way back. The
Commander-in-Chief, thereupon, ordered the 2nd Cruiser
Squadron (from the southern position of Area 7) to pro-
ceed at once to support the Commodore (S). By direc-
tions, however, given by the Admiralty these orders were
cancelled, and the forces returned.
At 10.30 p.m. I ordered the armed merchant-cruisers
to proceed at once to a position off Trondhjem, as a report
had been received that the German liner Brandenburg,
lying at that port, was likely to sail. Constant reports
to this effect were received for several days, and the
Brandenburg was heard using her wireless telegraphy on
September 25th. The patrol was maintained until Sep-
tember 28th, when contradictory reports were to hand—
one that she had been seen at sea on the 27th, and the
other that she was being interned by the Norwegian
Government. The latter report proved to be correct.
The patrol was then moved to a position off the Utvoer
Lighthouse, Lat. 61.38 N., Long. 4.80 E., to intercept
the German destroyer Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm, said to
be leaving a Norwegian port.
During the 23rd the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 133
battle cruisers attempted to carry out gunnery practices,
but thick weather interfered. The force returned to
Scapa to fuel, arriving on the 24th; the 3rd Battle
Squadron arrived for the same purpose on the 25th.
On the 28rd and 24th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron pro-
ceeded from Area 7 to sweep up the Norwegian coast,
thence going to Cromarty to coal. The squadron arrived
there on the evening of the 25th.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa
until the evening of the 25th, when it proceeded out to
the westward of the Orkneys; on the 26th bad weather
again prevented target practice, a heavy westerly gale
being experienced. This moderated on the morning of
the 27th, when the Battle Fleet was to the eastward of
the Shetlands, but increased again to a very strong gale
during that day, with a wind force of 70 miles per hour
and a very heavy confused sea.
A considerable amount of damage was done to wire-
less masts, topmasts, etc., and several ships had boats
damaged or washed away. ‘The ships of the “Iron
Duke” class took in large quantities of water through
their 6-inch gun ports, due to these guns being mounted
at such a low level. The gale continued during the 28th,
veering to the northward, and moderated on the 29th, on
which date the Battle Fleet, which had moved to the
southward during the 28th, returned to Scapa, being met
and screened by destroyers which had not been able to
join the Fleet at sea owing to the bad weather.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the
morning of the 26th, and proceeded to the Norwegian
coast, sweeping dewn as far as the Naze in search of
enemy ships, particularly the s.s. Prinz Friedrich Wil-
helm, reported to be about to leave Bergen. It was also
to support the Drake, Nottingham, Falmouth, and two
134 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
destroyers, which had been sent to the vicinity of the
Naze to meet Submarines E1 and E5. The latter vessels
had been reconnoitring in the Skagerrak and Kattegat for
enemy vessels. The two submarines and the destroyers
experienced very heavy weather on their return across the
North Sea, and some anxiety was felt for their safety.
The 8rd Cruiser Squadron proceeded to Area 2 on the
26th, and on the 29th was sent to watch off the entrances
to Bergen in Norway for the German s.s. Prinz
Friedrich Wilhelm. The squadron returned to Cromarty
on October Ist. On the 28th the Princess Royal left the
Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron (proceeding to Scapa to
fuel, en route) to meet, and protect, a convoy of Canadian
troops about to leave the Dominion for the United
Kingdom. The Invincible and Injflexible, which had
been cruising north of the Faroe Islands, joined the Ist
Battle Cruiser Squadron at sea on the 29th. For the pur-
pose of supporting the cruisers in the North Sea area, the
3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron sailed from
Scapa on the arrival of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet.
Additional precautions against attack by submarines
were taken during the stay of the Fleet at Scapa on this
occasion, as reports indicated the presence of a consider-
ably increased number in the North Sea. These precau-
tions included more numerous patrols by destroyers of the
2nd and 4th Flotillas outside the entrances to Scapa, and
necessarily involved a greatly increased strain on the de-
stroyers.
Further precautions against submarine attack were
also found necessary in the Firth of Forth, and the arrival
of light cruisers at Leith for refit were temporarily sus-
pended by Admiralty orders owing to the presence of
submarines in the vicinity. Two torpedoes were fired at
the destroyer Stag, and another at a torpedo boat off May
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 135
Island on the 25th. The destroyer Cheerful was also
fired at on the 26th.
The month of October, 1914, opened with the
Dreadnought Battle Fleet at Scapa, with the exception
of the Ajax, which was en route to Devonport to refit,
and the Audacious, which was on passage from Devon-
port after refit. The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were
at sea supporting the cruisers, except the Hamouth, of
the 6th Battle Squadron, which was at Devonport
refitting. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the Invin-
cible, and the Inflexible, were at Scapa; the Princess
Royal was cleaning boilers and preparing for her trip to
Halifax.
Of the cruisers, the Devonshire, of the 3rd Cruiser
Squadron, was refitting at Cromarty; the Theseus, of the
10th Cruiser Squadron, was returning from the White
Sea, where she had been to fetch some Russian officers;
the Mantua and Alsatian, armed merchant-cruisers, were
at Liverpool, coaling and making good defects.
Of the destroyer flotillas, the Active and five de-
stroyers of the 2nd Flotilla, and two of the 4th Flotilla,
were absent refitting.
On October Ist regulations were brought into force
under which a large number of coastal navigational lights
were extinguished, as also were regulations closing the
east coast ports to neutral fishing craft; other regulations
were issued to control the movements of fishing vessels
in certain areas. On October 10th further orders, under
which additional coastal navigation lights were extin-
guished (principally in the North of Scotland), became
effective.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa
until 5 p.m. on October 2nd, and then proceeded into the
North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron sailed at
136 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
daylight, October 8rd, and the newly constituted 2nd
Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the Invincible and
Inflexible, with the Sappho and three mine-layers, left at
2 p.m. on October 3rd.
On October 8rd all the ships of the Grand Fleet took
up pre-arranged positions designed to secure a close watch
over the northern portion of the North Sea, partly with
a view to an interception of all traffic, and partly to
ensure that no enemy vessel broke out of the Notth Sea
during the ensuing week. The main object was the pro-
tection of an important convoy of Canadian troops, which
was crossing from Halifax, and which the battle cruiser
Princess Royal and the battleship Majestic had been
sent to meet and to protect. The Princess Royal
arrived at the rendezvous at 8 P.M. on October 7th,
and waited for the convoy, which was two and a half
days late.
The Grand Fleet was disposed for this purpose during
the period Oct. 3rd-11th approximately as follows:
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was watching the Fair Island
Channel from the western side. _
The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with armed merchant-cruis-
ers, the Sappho and three mine-layers, was stationed to the north-
ward and eastward of the Shetland Islands.
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron patrolled the northern portion
of Area No. 4.
The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons patrolled Area No. 5.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron also patrolled Area No. 5.
The mine-sweepers patrolled to the eastward of the Fair Island
Channel.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with its divisions widely spread,
worked to the northward of Area No. 5, and the 3rd Battle
Squadron to the northward of Area No. 4, whilst the 6th Battle
Squadron was utilised to watch the waters between the Dread-
nought Battle Fleet and Norwegian territorial waters.
The destroyers were stationed, some to guard the eastern ap-
MENACE IN NORTH SEA 137
proaches of the Pentland Firth, some to work off the Norwegian
coast, and the remaining available vessels to work with the Battle
Fleet for screening and boarding purposes. They returned to
the bases (Lerwick or Scapa) as necessary for refuelling, and
for shelter when the weather necessitated this.
These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 3.
The Princess Royal met the Canadian convoy in Lat.
49.45 N., Long. 27.5 W., at 8 P.m. on October 10th.
On the 11th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet passed to the
westward of the Orkneys, remaining there until daylight
on the 12th, and then returning to Scapa, the 2nd Battle
Cruiser Squadron, with the Teutonic, being withdrawn
from the patrol north of the Shetlands to a patrol line
north-west from Sule Skerry lighthouse, Lat. 59.6 N.,
Long. 4.24 W., during the night of the 11th and remain-
ing there until daylight on the 13th, when they left for
Scapa. During October 12th all other vessels engaged
in this operation returned to their bases for fuel, except
the 3rd Battle Squadron (the ships of which had coaled
two at a time during the operation) and the cruiser squad-
rons, which had been relieved as necessary to fuel.
Whilst the Fleet was engaged on this service the
following incidents occurred. On October 2nd_ the
Alsatian took six concealed Germans off a Danish
steamer. At 5 a.m. on October 7th a submarine was
reported inside Loch Ewe, being sighted by a collier and
by the Assistance; she was fired at by the latter ship, in
misty weather. On receipt of the report I ordered all
vessels to leave Loch Ewe at once, and sent a division
of destroyers there from Scapa to search for the sub-
marine. Later investigation indicated that the report
was well founded.
On October 9th the Alsatian sighted an enemy sub-
marine in Lat. 61.42 N., Long. 0.50 W.; on the same
138 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
day at 3 p.m. the Antrim, flagship of the 3rd Cruiser
Squadron, when in Lat. 59 N., Long. 4.40 E., was missed
by two torpedoes fired at her by a submarine which the
Antrim just failed to ram after the attack; numervus
reports of enemy aircraft having been sighted on the Hust
and West coasts of Scotland were also received.
On October 10th the Liverpool and one-half of the 4th
Flotilla were sent to the Norwegian coast to examine the
islands in the vicinity of Udsire light, Lat. 59.19 N.,
Long. 4.50 E., to ascertain that they were not being used
as German submarine bases, in view of the attack on the
Antrim in that vicinity on the 9th. The 3rd Cruiser
Squadron supported. Nothing was seen that lent colour
to this idea.
Ships of the Battle Fleet were detached to the north-
ward, two or three at a time, during the operations, to
carry out gunnery practices by day and by night. Thick
fogs were prevalent during the whole period, and ships
detached from the Fleet experienced very considerable
difficulty in rejoining. The foggy weather nearly
resulted in a serious collision between a battleship of the
6th Battle Squadron and one of the Dreadnought Battle
Fleet, the two ships passing within a few feet of each other
on opposite courses.
On the return of the Battle Fleet to Scapa on the
morning of October 12th, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville
reported that a partial submarine obstruction was in place
across the Hoxa entrance. The presence of even a
partial obstruction reduced the danger of submarine
attack on the Fleet whilst coaling, a matter which had
given me much anxiety since the beginning of hostilities.
On arrival in harbour it was found that the condenser
tubes of the Iron Duke were in a bad condition, although
the ship was quite new, and that the condensers would
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THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND _ 317
together with the 38rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the
newly commissioned light cruisers Chester and Canter-
bury, which had been carrying out gunnery and torpedo
practices at Scapa, left that base during the evening of
May 30th, and proceeded towards position (A), Lat.
57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E., having met the 2nd Battle
Squadron en route at 11.15 am. in Lat. 58.13 N.,
Long. 2.42 E. Sir David Beatty had been informed
before sailing that the Battle Fleet would steer towards
the Horn Reef from the position in Lat. 57.45 N.,
Long. 4.15 E.
At 2 p.m. on May 8ist the Battle Fleet was about
18 miles to the north-westward of the position (A),
being actually in Lat. 57.57 N., Long. 3.45 E., in
organisation No. 5. The Fleet had been slightly delayed
for the purpose of enabling the usual and necessary prac-
tice of examining trawlers and other vessels met with en
route to be carried out without causing the examining
vessels to expend unnecessary fuel in regaining station.
We had to be on our guard against scouts. The divi-
sions were in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard
in the order: Ist-6th Divisions (screened by the 4th,
11th, and 12th Flotillas) with the 4th Light Cruiser
Squadron, three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet.
The cruisers, with one destroyer to each cruiser, were
stationed 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, spread six
miles apart on a line of direction N. 40 E. and S. 40 W.;
the cruisers being eight miles apart and their positions
being in the order from east to west:
-) .)
Cochrane Shannon M ane Defence Duke of Edinburgh Black Prince
Warrior
Hampshire (inking ship 6 miles astern of the Minotaur)
318 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
The attached cruisers, the Active, Boadicea, Blanche,
and Bellona, were on the flanks of the Battle Fleet, and
the 8rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the light cruisers
Chester and Canterbury, about 20 miles ahead, the whole
steering S. 50 E., and zigzagging, the speed of advance
being 14 knots.
The disposition of the Battle Fleet is shown below:
Line of Advance.
ist“Div. 2nd Div. 8rd Div. 4th Div. 5th Div.7 6th Div.
King George V.(F.) Orion (F.) Iron Duke (F.F.) Benbow (F.) Colossus (F.) Marlborough (F.)
Ajaz Monarch Royal Oak Bellerophon Collingwood Revenge
Centurion Conqueror Superb (F.) Temeraire Neptune Hercules
Erin Thunderer Canada Vanguard St. Vincent Agincourt
F., Flagships; F.F., Fleet Flagship.
It may be added in further explanation that the
flagships of the Battle Fleet were:
Iron Duke, Fleet-Flagship.—Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (Com-
mander-in-Chief). :
King George V.—Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir M. Jerram, Com-
manding 2nd Battle Squadron.
Orion.—Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, Rear-Admiral in
the 2nd Battle Squadron.
Superb.—Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, Rear-Admiral in
the 4th Battle Squadron.
Benbow.—Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Command-
ing the 4th Battle Squadron.
Colossus.—Flagship of Rear-Admiral E. F, A. Gaunt, Rear-Admiral
in the Ist Battle Squadron.
Marlborough.—Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Com-
manding Ist Battle Squadron and second in command of
the Grand Fleet.
The Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron,
with destroyers, were at 2 p.m. in Lat. 56.46 N., Long.
4.40 E., and had turned to the northward, steering N. by
E., speed 1914 knots, in the order:
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — 319
The Lion and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in single
line ahead, screened by the light cruiser Champion and
10 destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, with the 2nd Battle
Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead three miles E.N.E.
of the Lion, screened by six destroyers.* The 5th Battle
Squadron, in single line ahead, was five miles N.N.W.
of the Lion, being screened by the light cruiser Fearless
and nine destroyers of the Ist Flotilla. The Light Cruiser
Squadrons formed a screen eight miles S.S.E. from the
Lion, ships spread on a line of direction E.N.E. and
W.S.W., five miles apart in the order from west to east:
@nd Light Cruiser 8rd Light Cruiser Ast Light Cruiser
Squadron Squadron Squadron
South @.) —-Nottingh Falmouth (F.) —- Birkenhead Inconstant Galatea (F.)
Birmingham Dublin Gloucester Cordelia Phaeton
It should be added that the flagships were:
Lion.—Battle Cruiser Fleet-Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir David
Beatty.
Princess Royal—Flagship of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock, com-
manding Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron.
New Zealand.—Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. Pakenham, command-
ing 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Barham.—Flagship of Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, commanding
5th Battle Squadron.
The Engadine, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed be-
tween the light cruisers Gloucester and Cordelia, and the
light cruiser Yarmouth acted as linking ship between
the Lion and the light cruiser screen.
The first report of enemy vessels was received from the
Galatea, the flagship of Commodore E. S. Alexander-
Sinclair, commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,
who, at 2.20 p.m., sighted two enemy vessels to the
fe a destroyers belonged to the Harwich force, but happened to be at
osyth,
320 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
E.S.E. apparently stopped and engaged in boarding a
neutral steamer. Sir David Beatty, recognising the possi-
bilities of the situation, immediately turned his fleet to the
S.S.E., the course for the Horn Reef, so as to get
between the enemy and his base.
At 2.85 p.m, the Galatea reported a large amount of
smoke “as from a fleet” bearing E.N.E., followed by a
report that the vessels were steering north. The course
of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was then altered to the east-
ward and N.E. towards the smoke, the enemy being
sighted at 3.81 p.m. and identified as five battle cruisers
accompanied by destroyers.
Meanwhile the 1st and 8rd Light Cruiser Squadrons
changed their direction, and, judging the situation
accurately, spread to the east without waiting for orders,
forming a screen in advance of the heavy ships. Our
Light Cruisers sighted and engaged enemy vessels of a
similar class at long range. The 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron, under Commodore W. EK. Goodenough, with
his broad pendant in the Southampton, came in at high
speed towards the battle cruisers and formed ahead of
them on an E.S.E. course, and at 3.30 p.m. sighted
enemy battle cruisers bearing E.N.E.
On receipt of the Galatea’s report, Sir David Beatty
ordered the Engadine to send up a sea-plane to scout to
the N.N.E. This was the first time that sea-planes had
been used for reconnaissance work with a fleet in an
action, and the event is notable for that reason. The
low-lying clouds made observation difficult, but the sea-
plane, with Flight-Lieutenant F. S. Rutland, R.N., as
pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as
observer, was able, by flying low under the clouds, to
identify and report four enemy light cruisers, the report
being received on board the Lion at 3.30 p.m. The
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — 321
sea-plane was under heavy fire from the light cruisers
during the observation. By this time the line of battle
was being formed, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron
forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with
the destroyers of the 9th and 18th Flotillas taking station
ahead. The course was E.S.E., slightly converging on
the enemy, the speed 25 knots, and the range 23,000
yards. Sir David Beatty formed his ships on a line of
bearing in order to clear the smoke.
The 5th Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the
movements of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, was now bearing
N.N.W., distant 10,000 yards; the weather was favour-
able, the sun being behind our ships, the wind S.E., and
the visibility good.
Meanwhile the wireless reports from the Galatea to the
Lion had been intercepted on board the Iron Duke, and
directions were at once given to the Battle Fleet to raise
steam for full speed, the ships being at the time at short
notice for full speed. The cruisers had been ordered to
raise steam for full speed earlier. At 3.10 p.m. the Battle
Fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and at 3.30 P.M.
I directed Flag Officers of Divisions to inform their ships
of the situation. The earliest reports from the Galatea
had indicated the presence of light cruisers and destroyers
only, and my first impression was that these vessels, on
sighting the British force, would endeavour to escape via
‘the Skagerrak, as they were to the eastward of our vessels
and were consequently not in so much danger of being
cut off as if they turned to the southward. The 8rd
Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was well placed for cut-
ting the enemy off, had the anticipated move taken place,
was ordered to frustrate any such intention; but at 4 P.M.,
on the receipt of the information of the presence of enemy
battle cruisers, it was directed to reinforce Sir David
322 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Beatty. About 3.40 p.m. I received a report from Sir
David Beatty that he had sighted five battle cruisers and
a number of destroyers, and he gave his position at the
same time.
As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was
reported, course was altered in the Battle Fleet to close
our battle cruisers, and speed increased as rapidly as
possible. By 4 p.m. the “Fleet Speed” was 20 knots,
being higher than had previously been obtained. Zig-
zagging was abandoned on receipt of the Galatea’s first
report. The battleships were also directed to keep clear
of the wake of the next ahead in order to prevent loss of
speed from the wash.
At 3.48 p.m. the action between the battle cruisers
began at a range of about 18,500 yards, fire being opened
by the two forces practically simultaneously. At the com-
mencement the fire from the German vessels was rapid
and accurate, the Lion being hit twice three minutes after
fire was opened, and the Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal
all receiving several hits by 4 P.m.; observers on board
our own ships were also of opinion that our fire was
effective at that stage.
At about 4 p.m. it was evident by the accuracy of the
enemy’s fire that he had obtained the range of our ships,
which was then about 16,000 yards. The enemy bore
well abaft the beam, and course was altered slightly to
the southward to confuse his fire control. Course was
altered two or three times subsequently for the same pur-
pose. The German ships frequently zigzagged for the
purpose of confusing our fire control.
At this period the fire of the enemy’s ships was very
rapid and accurate; the Lion received several hits, the roof
of one of her turrets being blown off at 4 p.m. At about
4.6 p.m. the Indefatigable was hit, approximately at the
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 323
outer edge of the upper deck level in line with the after
turret, by several projectiles of one salvo; an explosion
followed (evidently that of a magazine) and the ship fell
out of the line, sinking by the stern. She was again hit
by another salvo forward, turned over and sank.
About this time (4.8 p.m.) the 5th Battle Squadron
came into action, opening fire at a range between 19,000
and 20,000 yards. This slower squadron was some dis-
tance astern of the battle cruisers and, by reason partly of
the smoke of the ships ahead of the enemy vessels and
partly of the light to the eastward having become less
favourable, difficulty was experienced in seeing the
targets, not more than two ships being visible at a time.
At 4.12 p.m, the range of the enemy’s battle cruisers
from our own was about 23,000 yards, and course was
altered from S.S.E. to S.E. to close the enemy. Fire
had slackened owing to the increase in range.
The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing
the line of our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the
periscopes of enemy submarines were also made by more
than one ship.
In accordance with the general directions given by
Sir David Beatty to the destroyers to attack when a
favourable opportunity occurred, the Nestor, Nomad,
Nicator, Narborough, Pelican, Petard, Obdurate, Nerissa,
Moorsom, Morris, Turbulent and Termagant moved out
at 4.15 p.M.; at the same time a similar movement took
place on the part of an enemy force of one light cruiser
and 15 destroyers. Both sides first steered to reach an
advantageous position at the van of the opposing batile
cruiser lines from which to deliver their attack, and then
turned to the northward to attack. 3 Q Shanzon
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APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE
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THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — 351
times to steam at 20 knots, is proof of the necessity for
this reserve.
At 6.14 p.m. the enemy’s salvoes were falling near
ships of the 1st Battle Squadron, and the Marlborough’s
Division of the Battle Squadron became engaged with
some ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at 6.17 P.M.
immediately after turning for the deployment. At this
time fire was opened by the Marlborough on a ship stated
to be of the “Kaiser” class, at a range of 13,000 yards
and on a bearing 20° abaft the starboard beam; this
knowledge enables us to deduce the position of the van
of the German Battle Fleet at this time.
Our rear ships were now able to make out the enemy’s
Fleet steering to the eastward, the battle cruisers leading,
followed by the Battle Fleet in single line, the order
being, four ships of the ““K6nig” class in the van, followed
by ships of the “Kaiser” and “Heligoland” classes, the
rear of the line being invisible. A report that had reached
me at 4.48 p.m. from the Commodore of the 2nd Light
Cruiser Squadron indicated that ships of the “Kaiser”
class were in the van of the Battle Fleet. The order of
the Fleet may have been changed subsequent to this report,
but there is no doubt that ships of the “K6nig” class led
during the Fleet action. The point is not, however, of
importance.
At about 6.38 p.m, the 6th Division was in line and
our deployment was complete.
Enemy shells had been falling close to the Colossus and
her 5th Division since 6.18 p.m., and these ships opened
fire at 6.30 p.m.; but the conditions of visibility made it
difficult to distinguish the enemy’s battleships.
At 6.23 p.m. a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed
down the line, on the starboard, or engaged, side of our
Fleet, apparently partly disabled. Her identity could not
352 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
at the time be clearly established, but her German colours
were flying and she was in a position for attacking the
Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 6.20 p.m. the Iron Duke
fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was fired at with tur-
ret guns by other vessels and was seen to sink at the rear
of the line.
At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most dif-
ficult to distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible
to form an opinion on board the Iron Duke, in her position
towards the centre of the line, as to the formation of the
enemy’s Fleet. The identity of ships in sight on the star-
board beam was not even sufficiently clear for me to per-
mit of fire being opened; but at 6.30 p.m. it became certain
that our own battle cruisers had drawn ahead of the Battle
Fleet and that the vessels then before the beam were battle-
ships of the “Konig” class. The order was, therefore,
given to open fire, and the Iron Duke engaged what ap-
peared to be the leading battleship at a range of 12,000
yards on a bearing 20° before the starboard beam; other
ships of the 3rd and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squad-
ron) opened fire at about the same time, and the van divi-
sions (2nd Battle Squadron) very shortly afterwards;
these latter ships reported engaging enemy battle cruisers
as well as battleships. The fire of the Iron Duke, which
came more directly under my personal observation, was
seen to be immediately effective, the third and fourth sal-
voes fired registering several palpable hits. It appeared
as if all the enemy ships at that time in sight from the Iron
Duke (not more than three or four, owing to smoke and
mist) were receiving heavy punishment, and the second
battleship was seen to turn out of the line badly on fire,
and settling by the stern. A large number of observers
in the Thunderer, Benbow, Barham, Marne, Morning Star
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — 353
and Magic stated afterwards that they saw this ship blow
up at 6.50 P.M.
The visibility was very variable and perhaps averaged
about 12,000 yards to the southward, though much less on
other bearings, but ranges could not at times be obtained
from the range-finders of the Iron Duke at a greater dis-
tance than 9,000 yards, although at 7.15 P.M., in a tem-
porary clear channel through the mist, good ranges of
15,000 yards were obtained of a battleship at which four
salvoes were fired by the Iron Duke before she was again
hidden by smoke and mist. The very baffling light was
caused principally by low misty clouds, but partly also by
the heavy smoke from the funnels and guns of the oppos-
ing Fleets. The direction of the wind was about west-
south-west with a force 2, causing the enemy’s funnel
smoke to drift towards our line, thus further obscuring our
view of his Fleet.
The visibility at the rear of the battle line was appar-
ently greater than in the centre at about 7 P.m., and the
enemy’s fire, which was probably being concentrated on
our rear ships, was more accurate at this period, but quite
ineffective, only one ship, the Colossus, being hit by gun-
fire, although numerous projectiles were falling near the
ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons.
Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the
Battle Fleet could see only three or four enemy vessels at
any one time, those in the ships of the rear division did
occasionally see as many as eight, and were consequently
better able to distinguish the formation and movements
of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It was not possible, owing
to the small number of ships in sight, due to smoke and
mist, to distribute the fire of the battleships by signal in
the customary manner; the only course to adopt was for
354 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
the captains to direct the fire of their guns on to any target
which they could distinguish.
The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south-
east by east, as already stated, but the van had hauled on
to south-east without signal shortly after deployment in
order to close the enemy, and at 6.50 P.M., as the range was
apparently opening, the course was altered by signal to
south “by divisions” in order to close the enemy. The
King George V., leading the van of the Battle Fleet, had
just anticipated this signal by turning to south. The alter-
ation was made “by divisions” instead of “in succession”
in order that the enemy should be closed more rapidly by
the whole Battle Fleet.
This large turn (of four points) “by divisions” in-
volved some small amount of “blanketing” of the rear
ships of one division by the leading ships of that next
astern, and at one time the Thunderer was firing over the
bows of the Iron Duke, causing some slight inconvenience
on the bridge of the latter ship; the “blanketing,” how-
ever, was unavoidable and the loss of fire involved was in-
appreciable.
At 6.45 P.m. one or two torpedoes crossed the track
of the rear of our battle line, and the Marlborough
altered course to avoid one. They were apparently
fired, at long range, by enemy destroyers, which were
barely visible to the ships in rear and quite invisible to
those on board the Iron Duke. They might, however,
have been fired by enemy battleships which were within
torpedo range, or by a submarine, the Revenge reporting
that it was thought that one had been rammed by that
ship. The tracks of some of the torpedoes were seen by
the observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by very
skilful handling of the ships by their captains.
At 6.45 p.m., however, a heavy explosion occurred
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 355
under the fore bridge of the Marlborough, abreast the
starboard forward hydraulic engine-room. The ship took
up a list of some seven degrees to starboard, but continued
in action so effectively that she avoided three more tor-
pedoes shortly afterwards, re-opened fire at 7.38 P.M., and
at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the
“Konig” class, hitting her so frequently that she was seen
to turn out of line.
The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to
his flagship stated that the vessel had been struck by a
“mine or torpedo.” It was assumed by me that a torpedo
had hit the ship, as so many vessels had passed over the
same locality without injury from mine. This proved
to be the case, the track of this torpedo not having been
sufficiently visible to enable Captain Ross to avoid it.
The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy’s tor-
pedoes being visible was a matter of great surprise to me,
and I think to other officers. Reports had been prevalent
that the Germans had succeeded in producing a torpedo
which left little or no track on the surface. The infor-
mation as to the visibility of the tracks did not reach me
until the return of the Fleet to harbour, as although one
torpedo was reported by observers on board the destroyer
Oak to have passed close ahead of the Iron Duke at about
7.85 P.M., finishing its run 2,000 yards beyond that ship,
and a second was observed by the Benbow to pass appar-
ently ahead of the Iron Duke at 8.30 p.M., neither of them
was seen on board the flagship by the trained look-outs
specially stationed for the purpose.
Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to
south, a signal was made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to
take station ahead of the Iron Duke and for the 1st Battle
Squadron to form astern. This signal had, however, been
already anticipated by the vessels ahead of the Iron Duke
356 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
in accordance with the general battle orders giving dis-
cretionary powers to the commanders of squadrons, and
the line had been partly reformed before the signal was
made.
An incident occurred at about 6.47 p.m. which was an
indication of the spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which
it is impossible to speak too highly. The destroyer Acasta,
which had been badly hit aft during her attack on enemy
light cruisers in company with the Shark and had her
engines disabled, was passed by the Fleet. Her command-
ing officer, Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, signalled
the condition of his ship to the Iron Duke as that ship
passed, leaving the Acasta on her starboard or engaged
side. The ship’s company was observed to be cheering
each ship as they passed. It is satisfactory to relate that
this destroyer and her gallant ship’s company were sub-
sequently brought into Aberdeen, being assisted by the
Nonsuch.
Shortly after 6.55 p.m. the Iron Duke passed the
wreck of a ship with the bow and stern standing out of
the water, the centre portion apparently resting on the
bottom, with the destroyer Badger picking up survivors.
It was thought at first that this was the remains of a
German light cruiser, but inquiry of the Badger elicited
the lamentable news that the wreck was that of the Invin-
cible. It was assumed at the time that she had been sunk
either by a mine or by a torpedo, and, in view of the safe
passage of other ships in her vicinity, the latter appeared
to be the more probable cause of her loss. Subsequent
information, however, showed that she was destroyed by
gunfire, causing her magazines to explode, as already
recorded.
At 7 p.m. Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that
the enemy was to the westward.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — 357
Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile,
brought the enemy’s line into view once more, and be-
tween 7.0 and 7.30 p.m. the Battle Fleet was again in
action with battleships and also battle cruisers, as they
could be distinguished in the haze, which at that period
was very baffling. ‘The range varied from as much as
15,000 yards at the van to as little as 8,000 in the rear,
this difference in range indicating that the enemy’s Fleet
was turning to the westward, as shown in the accom-
panying plan facing page 358.
In spite of the difficult conditions the fire of many of
our battleships was very effective at this period. Some
instances may be given. At 7.15 p.m. the Iron Duke, as
already mentioned, engaged a hostile battleship at 15,000
yards’ range and on a bearing 74 degrees from right ahead.
At 7.20 she trained her guns on a battle cruiser of “Lut-
zow” type, abaft the beam, which hid herself by a destroyer
smoke screen; at 7.17 p.m. the King George V. opened
fire on a vessel, taken to be the leading ship in the enemy’s
line at a range of about 13,000 yards; the Orion at a
battleship*; the St. Vincent was “holding her target (a
battleship) effectively till 7.26 p.m., the range being be-
tween 10,000 and 9,500 yards”; the Agincourt at 7.6 P.M.
opened fire at 11,000 yards on one of four battleships that
showed clearly out of the mist, and judged that at least
four of her salvoes “straddled” the target; the Revenge
was engaging what were taken to be battle cruisers, ob-
taining distinct hits on two of them; the Colossus from
7.12 to 7.20 P.M. was engaging a ship taken to be a battle
cruiser, either the Derfflinger or Lutzow, at ranges be-
tween 10,000 and 8,000 yards, and observed several direct
hits, two being on the water line; whilst the Marlborough,
* The Calliope reported at 7.1 Pp.m.: “Two enemy battleships, ‘K6nig’ class,
engaged by Orion’s division, observed to be heavily on fire.”
358 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
as already mentioned, “engaged a ship of the ‘Konig’
class.” Other vessels reported being in effective action
during this period. The Royal Oak, the ship next astern
of the Iron Duke, opened fire at 7.15 P.M. on the leading
ship of three vessels taken to be battle cruisers, at a range
of 14,000 yards; this ship was hit and turned away, and
fire was shifted to the second ship which was lost to sight
in the mist after a few rounds had been fired. It was
difficult to be certain of the class of vessel on which fire
was being directed, but one or more of the enemy’s battle
cruisers had undoubtedly dropped astern by 7 P.M., as a
result of the heavy punishment they had received from our
battle cruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron, and were
engaged by ships of the Battle Fleet.
Both at this period and earlier in the action, the ships
of the 1st Battle Squadron were afforded more opportua-
ities for effective fire than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and
the fullest use was made of the opportunities. This squad-
ron, under the able command of Sir Cecil Burney, was
known by me to be highly efficient, and very strong proof
was furnished during the Jutland battle, if proof were
needed, that his careful training had borne excellent re-
sults. The immunity of the ships of the squadron from
the enemy’s fire, whilst they were inflicting on his vessels
very severe punishment, bears very eloquent testimony to
the offensive powers of the squadron.
At 7.5 p.m. the whole battle line was turned together
three more points to starboard to close the range further;
immediately afterwards two ships ahead of the Iron Duke
reported a submarine a little on the port bow; at 7.10
p.m, a flotilla of enemy destroyers, supported by a cruiser,
was observed to be approaching on a bearing S. 50 W.
from the Iron Duke, and the Fleet was turned back to
south in order to turn on to the submarine and bring the
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND —§ 359
ships in line ahead ready, for any required manceuvre.
A heavy fire was opened on the destroyers at ranges be-
tween 10,000 and 6,500 yards. At the latter range the
destroyers turned and passed towards the rear of the line
in a heavy smoke screen. One destroyer was seen by
several observers to sink from the effects of the gunfire.
At a sufficient interval before it was considered that
the torpedoes fired by the destroyers would cross our line,
a signal was made to the Battle Fleet to turn two points
to port by subdivisions. Some minutes later a report was
made to me by Commander Bellairs (the officer on my
Staff especially detailed for this duty and provided with
an instrument for giving the necessary information) that
this turn was insufficient to clear the torpedoes, as I had
held on until the last moment; a further turn of two
points was then made for a short time. As a result of
this attack and another that followed immediately, some
twenty or more torpedoes were observed to cross the track
of the Battle Fleet, in spite of our turn, the large majority
of them passing the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squad-
rons at the rear of the line. It was fortunate that, owing
to the turn away of the Fleet, the torpedoes were appar-
ently near the end of their run, and were consequently
not running at high speed. They were all avoided by the
very skilful handling of the ships by their captains, to
whom the highest credit is due, not only for their skill in
avoiding the torpedoes, but for the manner in which the
ships, by neighbourly conduct towards each other, pre-
vented risk of collision and kept their station in the line.
The captains were most ably assisted by the admirable
look-out kept by the organisation that existed for dealing
with this danger.
The skill shown could not, however, have prevented
several ships £rom being torpedoed had the range been
360 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
less and the torpedoes consequently running at a higher
speed. Frequent exercises carried out at Scapa Flow
showed conclusively that the percentage of torpedoes that
would hit ships in a line when fired from destroyers at
ranges up to 8,000 yards was comparatively high, even
if the tracks were seen and the ships were manceuvred to
avoid them. One very good reason is that torpedoes are
always a considerable but varying distance ahead of the
line of bubbles marking their track, making it difficult to
judge the position of the torpedo from its track. Many
ships experienced escapes from this and other attacks;
thus the Hercules reported that she “turned away six
points to avoid the torpedoes, one of which passed along
the starboard side and 40 yards across the bow, and the
other passed close under the stern”; the Neptune reported
that “the tracks of three torpedoes were seen from the fore-
top, one of which passed very close and was avoided by
the use of the helm’’; in the Agincourt’s report, a statement
occurred that “at 7.8 p.m. a torpedo just missed astern,
it having been reported from aloft and course altered”;
and again, “at 7.38 p.m. tracks of two torpedoes running
parallel were observed approaching; course altered to
avoid torpedoes which passed ahead; and at 8.25 P.M.
torpedo track on starboard side, turned at full speed;
torpedo broke surface at about 150 yards on the star-
board bow”; the Revenge remarked, “at 7.85 p.m. altered
course to port to avoid two torpedoes, one passed about
ten yards ahead and the other about twenty yards astern,
and at 7.43 p.m. altered course to avoid torpedoes, two
passing astern”; the Colossus stated, “at 7.85 p.m. turned
to port to avoid a torpedo coming from starboard side”;
the Barham at this period reported that “at least four
torpedoes passed through the line close to the Barham”;
the Collingwood reported, “torpedo track was seen 20
.) OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
H. M. 8. “CANADA” ASTERN OF “SUPERB”
H. M, s. “SUPERB
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 361
degrees abaft the beam and coming straight at the ship;
large helm was put on and the torpedo passed very close
astern; at the same time another was seen to pass about
thirty yards ahead.” The captain of the Collingwood, in
remarking on the destroyer’s attack, added, “the great
value of this form of attack on a line of ships is, to me,
an outstanding feature of the Battle Fleet action.”
The first two-point turn was made at 7.23 P.M. and
the Fleet was brought to a south by west course by
7.383 P.M, (that is, to a course one point to the westward.
of the course of the Fleet before the destroyer attack).
The total amount by which the range was opened by the
turns was about 1,750 yards.
The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the 4th and 11th
Flotillas had been delayed in reaching their action station
at the van until about 7.10 p.M., owing to the turns to the
westward made by the Battle Fleet to close the enemy.
In accordance with arrangements made previously to
counter destroyer attacks, these vessels were ordered out
to engage the enemy destroyers, which, according to the
report of the Commodore Le Mesurier, commanding the
4th Light Cruiser Squadron, were steering towards the
head of the division led by the King George V., the van
ship of the Battle Fleet. Although not very well placed
for the first attack for the reason given above, they were
in a very favourable position to counter the second de-
stroyer attack, which took place at 7.25 p.m. The enemy’s
flotilla was sighted bearing 30 degrees before the starboard
beam of the Iron Duke at a range of 9,000 yards and was
heavily engaged by the light forces and the 4th, Ist, and
5th Battle Squadrons. During this attack three enemy
destroyers were reported as sunk by the fire of the battle-
ships, light cruisers and destroyers; one of them, bearing
a Commodore’s pendant, being sunk at 7.50 p.m. by a di-
362 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
vision of the 12th Flotilla, consisting of the Obedient,
Marvel, Mindful and Onslaught, which attacked them
near the rear of our battle line. The Southampton
and Dublin, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, attacked
and sank a second destroyer at this period. At least six
torpedoes were observed to pass ahead of, or through the
track of, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron during their
attack on the German flotilla.
The destroyer attacks were combined with a retiring
movement on the part of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, the
movement being covered with the aid of a heavy smoke
screen. Although this retirement was not visible from the
Iron Duke owing to the smoke and mist, and was, there-
fore, not known to me until after the action, it was clearly
seen from the rear of our line, as is indicated by the fol-
lowing citations:
The Captain of the Valiant stated in his report:
“At 7.23 p.m. enemy’s Battle Fleet now altered
course together away from us and broke off the
action, sending out a low cloud of smoke which
effectually covered their retreat and obscured them
from further view.”
The Captain of the Malaya reported, referring to
this period: “This was the last of the enemy seen in
daylight, owing to their Battle Fleet having turned
away.” :
Sir Cecil Burney stated in regard to this period:
“As the destroyer attack developed, the enemy’s
Battle Fleet in sight were observed to turn at least
eight points until their sterns were towards our line.
They ceased fire, declined further action, and dis-
appeared into the mist.”
The Captain of the St. Vincent said: “The tar-
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 363
get was held closely until 7.26 p.m. (82 minutes in
all), when the enemy had turned eight or ten points
away, disappearing into the mist and with a smoke
screen made by destroyers to cover them as well.”
Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas remarked: “After
joining the Battle Fleet the 5th Battle Squadron
conformed to the movements of the Commander-in-
Chief, engaging the rear ships of the enemy’s battle
line, until they turned away and went out of sight,
all ships apparently covering themselves with artificial
smoke.”
The Captain of the Revenge recorded: “A flotilla
of destroyers passed through the line and made a
most efficient smoke screen. At this period the
enemy’s fleet turned eight points to starboard and
rapidly drew out of sight.”
In the German account of the action at this stage, it
is stated, in more than one passage, that the British Fleet
during this action between the Battle Fleets was to the
northward of the High Seas Fleet. This is correct of the
earlier stages. The account refers to the attacks on our
line by the German destroyer flotillas, and states finally
that in the last attack the destroyers did not sight the
heavy ships, but only light cruisers and destroyers to the
north-eastward. The accuracy of this statement is doubt-
ful, since the destroyers were clearly in sight from our
heavy ships. But the account then proceeds to state that
“the German Commander-in-Chief turns his battle line
to a southerly and south-westerly course on which the
enemy was last seen, but he is no longer to be found.”
This is illuminating. It is first stated that our ships
bore north and north-east from the enemy and then that
the enemy turned to south and south-west, that is, directly
364 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
away from the British Fleet. Thus the fact that the Ger-
man Feet turned directly away is confirmed by Germans.
No report of this movement of the German Fleet
reached me, and at first it was thought that his temporary
disappearance was due to the thickening mist, especially
as firing could be heard from the battleships in rear, but
at 7.41 p.m., the enemy Battle Fleet being no longer in
sight from the Iron Duke, course was altered “by divi-
sions” three points more to starboard (namely, to south-
west) to close the enemy, and single line ahead was again
formed on the Iron Duke on that course.
At this period the rear of our battle line was still in
action at intervals with one or two ships of the enemy’s
fleet, which were probably some that had dropped astern
partially disabled, but by 7.55 p.m. fire had practically
ceased.
At about 7.40 p.m. I received a report from Sir David
Beatty stating that the enemy bore north-west by west
from the Lion, distant 10 to 11 miles, and that the Lion’s
course was south-west. Although the battle cruisers were
not in sight from the Iron Duke, I assumed the Lion to
be five or six miles ahead of the van of the Battle Fleet,
but it appeared later from a report received in reply to di-
rections signalled by me at 8.10 p.m. to the King George V.
to follow the battle cruisers, that they were not in sight
from that ship either. ;
At this time the enemy’s Battle Fleet seems to have
become divided, for whilst Sir David Beatty reported the
presence of battleships north-west by west from the Lion,
other enemy battleships were observed to the westward
(that is, on the starboard bow of the Iron Duke), and
the course of the Fleet was at once altered “by divisions”
to west in order to close the enemy; this alteration was
made at 7.59 P.M.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 365
It will be observed that all the large alterations of
course of the Battle Fleet during the engagement were
made “by divisions” instead of “in succession from the
van, or together.” The reason was that in this way the
whole Fleet could be brought closer to the enemy with
far greater rapidity, and in a more ordered formation,
than if the movement had been carried out by the line
“im succession.”
The objection to altering by turning all ships together
was the inevitable confusion that would have ensued as
the result of such a manceuvre carried out with a very
large Fleet under action conditions in misty weather,
particularly if the ships were thus kept on a line of bear-
ing for a long period.
The battleships sighted at 7.59 p.m. opened fire on the
ships of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had moved
out to starboard of the battle line to engage a flotilla of
enemy destroyers which were steering to attack the Battle
Fleet. The Calliope, the flagship of Commodore Le
Mesurier, was hit by a heavy shell and received some
damage, but retained her fighting efficiency, and fired a
torpedo at the leading battleship at a range of 6,500
yards; an explosion was noticed on board a ship of the
“Kaiser” class by the Calliope.* The ships sighted
turned away and touch could not be regained, although
sounds of gunfire could be heard from ahead at 8.25 P.m.,
probably from our battle cruisers, which obtained touch
with and engaged some of the enemy’s ships very effec-
tively between 8.22 and 8.25 p.m. The Falmouth was
the last ship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet to be in touch
with the enemy, at 8.38 p.m.; the ships then in sight
turned eight points together away from the Falmouth.
* All our battle cruisers felt this heavy explosion which was clearly concus-
sion under water, and may have been caused by the Calliope’s torpedo obtaining
a, hit.
366 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
At 8.30 p.m. the light was failing and the Fleet was
turned “by divisions” to a south-west course, thus re-
forming single line again.
During the proceedings of the Battle Fleet described
above, the battle cruisers were in action ahead as men-
tioned in Sir David Beatty’s report in the Appendix.
At first, touch with the enemy was lost owing to the
large alterations of course carried out by the High Sea
Fleet, but it was regained at 7.12 p.m., the battle cruisers
opening fire at 7.14 p.m., though only for two and a half
minutes, and increasing speed to 22 knots. At this
period the battle cruisers were steering south-west by’
south to south-west, and this course took them from the
port to the starboard bow of the Battle Fleet by 7.12 p.m.
The movements of our battle cruisers, which were at this
time between four and five miles ahead of the van of the
Battle Fleet, could not be distinguished, owing, partly, to
the funnel and cordite smoke from the battle cruisers
themselves, but even more to the funnel smoke from the
numerous cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers which
were attempting to gain their positions ahead of the van.
The movements of the enemy’s fleet could not be dis-
tinguished from our Battle Fleet owing again to their own
funnel and cordite smoke, and, also, to the smoke screens
which ships and destroyers were making to conceal their
movements.
It will be realised that these conditions, which par-
ticularly affected the Battle Fleet, did not apply to the
same extent to our ships ahead of our Battle Fleet. They
had little but the smoke of the enemy’s leading ships to
obscure the view. Farther to the rear, the Battle Fleet
had the smoke of all our craft ahead of it as well as that
of the enemy’s long line of ships.
Conditions which were perhaps difficult ahead of the
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — 367
Battle Fleet were very much accentuated in the Battle
Fleet. Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, in his report,
remarked on this point: “As leading ship, in addition to
the hazy atmosphere, I was much hampered by what I
imagine must have been cordite fumes from the battle
cruisers after they had passed us, and from other
cruisers engaged on the bow, also by funnel gases from
small craft ahead, and for a considerable time by dense
smoke from the Duke of Edinburgh, which was unable
to draw clear.”
The general position at 6.45 P.M. and again at 7.15
P.M. is shown in plans 8 and 9.
At 7.10 P.M., according to remarks from the Mino-
taur, flagship of Rear-Admiral W. L. Heath, command-
ing the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the position as seen from
that ship was as follows: “The 2nd Cruiser Squadron
was in single line ahead three to four miles on the port
side of the King George V., gaining on her slightly, but
with all the destroyers and light craft between her and
the King George V. The battle cruisers were about four
miles distant on the starboard bow of the Minotaur;
owing to their higher speed, the battle cruisers rapidly
increased their distance from the Battle Fleet to some
eight miles,”*
At 7.5 p.m. according to a report from the Shannon,
of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the Shannon’s course was
S. 10 W., “the 2nd Cruiser Squadron endeavouring to
take station on the engaged bow of the Battle Fleet; the
Battle Fleet still engaged, the battle cruisers not en-
gaged and turned slightly to port.” And again at 7.22
P.M. a report says: “The Duke of Edinburgh had now
taken station astern of the Shannon, the battle cruisers
* Judged by reports from other cruisers the positions here described should
be timed at about 6.50 to 7 v.m., and the diagrams show this accordingly.
368 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
were engaged and had wheeled to starboard. Leading
ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron were starting to cross
the bows of the Battle Fleet from port to starboard.
Battle cruisers firing intermittently, light cruisers mak-
ing their way through the destroyer flotillas to attack the
enemy light cruisers.” Rear-Admiral Heath stated:
“At 7.11 p.m. I proceeded with the squadron at 20 knots
to take up station astern of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which
was then engaged with the enemy.” He added: “One
salvo fell short on the starboard bow of the Minotaur and
some others in close proximity”; and later says, “even
when the salvo referred to in the preceding paragraph fell,
no more than the flashes of the enemy’s guns could be
seen.”
Further remarks from the Shannon, at a later stage,
were: “At 8 p.m. Battle Fleet altered course to starboard
to close the enemy, and by 8.15 was lost to sight, bearing
about north by east.”
“At 8.15 p.m. Battle Fleet, out of sight from Shan-
non, was heard to be in action.”
“At 8.30 p.m. the visibility of grey ships was about
9,000 yards.” “At 8.45 p.m. King George V. again
sighted, bearing north-north-east. Visibility had again im-
proved, and her range was estimated at about 10,000
yards. Conformed to her course S. 75 W. to close
enemy.”
At 7.20 p.m, the ships engaged by our battle cruisers
turned away and were lost to sight. They were located
for a moment at 8.20 p.m. with the aid of the 1st and 3rd
Light Cruiser Squadrons, and, although they disappeared
again at once, they were once more located and effectively
engaged between 8.22 and 8.28 p.m. at about 10,000 yards
range. They turned away once more and were finally lost
to sight by the 38rd Light Cruiser Squadron (the last ships
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 369
to keep in touch) at 8.38 P.m., steaming to the westward.
This was the last opportunity which the battle cruisers
had of putting the finishing touch upon a fine afternoon’s
work. They had, under the very able and gallant leader-
ship of Sir David Beatty, assisted by the splendid squad-
ron so well commanded by Admiral Evan-Thomas, gone
far to crush out of existence the opposing Battle Cruiser
Squadron.
It will be seen from the above account that our battle
cruisers experienced great difficulty in locating and hold-
ing the enemy after 7.20 p.m., even when far ahead of the
Battle Fleet, with its small craft, and therefore in a
position of freedom from the smoke of our own vessels and
the enemy’s line. After this time, 7.20 p.m., the battle
cruisers were only engaged for some six minutes. The
enemy turned away on each occasion when he was lo-
cated and showed no disposition to fight.
The visibility by this time had become very bad; the
light was failing, and it became necessary to decide on the
disposition for the night.
CHAPTER XIV
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND— (Continued)
IIlI.—Tue Nieut Action
THE situation, which had never been at all clear to me
owing to the fact that I had not seen more than a few
ships at a time, appeared to be as follows:
We were between the enemy and his bases, whether
he shaped a course to return via the Horn Reef, via
Heligoland direct, or via the swept channel which he was
known to use along the coast of the West Frisian Islands.
I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward
of us. He had been turning on interior lines throughout.
We had altered course gradually during the action from
south-east by east to west, a turn of 13 points, or 146
degrees, in all, and the result must have been to place his
ships well to the westward and ahead of us; although it
was possible that ships, which had fallen out owing to
damage, might be to the northward.
The possibility of a night action was, of course,
present to my mind, but for several reasons it was not
my intention to seek such an action between the heavy
ships.
It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments
against it.
In the first place, such a course must have inevitably
led to our Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a
very large destroyer force throughout the night. No
370
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 371
senior officer would willingly court such an attack, even
if our battleships were equipped with the best searchlights
and the best arrangements for the control of the search-
lights and the gunfire at night.
It was, however, known to me that neither our search-
lights nor their control arrangements were at this time of
the best type. The fitting of director-firing gear for the
guns of the secondary armament of our battleships (a very
important factor for firing at night) had also only just
been begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay
was due to manufacturing and labour difficulties. Without
these adjuncts I knew well that the maximum effect of
our fire at night could not be obtained, and that we could
place no dependence on beating off destroyer attacks by
gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch with the
heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with
no corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were
no effective antidote at night, since, if they were disposed
with this sole object in view, they would certainly be taken
for enemy destroyers and be fired on by our own ships.
But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers,
the result of night actions between heavy ships must
always be very largely a matter of chance, as there is
little opportunity for skill on either side. Such an action
must be fought at very close range, the decision depend-
ing on the course of events in the first few minutes. It
is, therefore, an undesirable procedure on these general
grounds. The greater efficiency of German searchlights
at the time of the Jutland action, and the greater num-
ber of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships, combined with
his superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the
Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the com-
mencement of such an action.
The question then remained as to the course to be
372 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
steered. The first desideratum was to keep the British
Fleet between the enemy and his bases, so as to be in a
position to renew the action at dawn. Daylight was
rapidly disappearing; it was necessary to form the Fleet
for the night as quickly as possible to avoid visual sig-
nalling after dark; and it was also necessary to place
our destroyers in a position where the chances of their
coming in contact with our own ships was reduced to a
minimum, and yet giving them an opportunity of attack-
ing the enemy’s capital ships during the night. The Grand
Fleet was formed at the time in practically a single line,
steering approximately west-south-west. I considered
that a southerly course would meet the situation and
would enable me to form the Fleet very quickly, and,
if I put the destroyers astern, they would fulfil three
conditions: first, they would be in an excellent position
for attacking the enemy’s fleet should it also turn to the
southward with a view to regaining its bases during the
night (which seemed a very probable movement on the
part of the enemy); secondly, they would also be in
position to attack enemy destroyers should the latter
search for our fleet with a view to a night attack on the
heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of our own ships,
and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error
or of our battleships firing on them would be reduced to
a minimum.
Accordingly, at 9 p.m., I signalled to the Battle
Fleet to alter course by divisions to south, informing the
Flag officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and
light cruiser squadrons, and the officers commanding de-
stroyer flotillas, of my movements in order that they
should conform. Shortly afterwards I directed the Battle
Fleet to assume the second organisation and to form
divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to port, with the
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — 373
columns one mile apart. This had the effect of placing
the Battle Fleet as shown in the diagram:
1 mile 1 mile 1 mile
<—_——> | > | ——_>
|
2nd 4th ist sth
Battle Squadrons.
My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was
to ensure that adjacent columns should not lose sight of
each other during the night, and that therefore they would
not mistake our own ships for those of the enemy.
As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly
course the destroyer flotillas were directed to take station
five miles astern of the Battle Fleet. At 9.32 P.M. a
signal was made to the mine-laying flotilla leader Abdiel
(Captain Berwick Curtis) to proceed to lay a mine-field
in a defined area some 15 miles from the Vyl Lightship,
over which it was expected the High Sea Fleet would
pass if the ships attempted to regain their ports during
the night via the Horn Reef. The Abdiel carried out this
operation unobserved in the same successful manner as
numerous other similar operations had been undertaken
by this most useful little vessel; from the evidence of one
of our submarines, stationed near the Horn Reef, which
reported on return to her base having heard several under-
water explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 a.m. on June Ist,
it was judged that some enemy ships had struck mines.
At 10 p.m. the position of the Iron Duke was Lat.
56.22 N., Long. 5.47 E., course south, speed 17 knots,
and the order of the Fleet from west to east was:
Battle Cruiser Fleet (except 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron) ;
Cruiser Squadrons;
374 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Battle Fleet;
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron astern of the 5th Battle Squad-
ron;
4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle Fleet;
llth, 4th, 12th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas disposed from
west to east, in that order, astern of the Battle Fleet.
Shortly before the turn of the Fleet to the southward
for the night a destroyer attack took place on the 2nd
Light Cruiser Squadron at the rear of our Battle line.
This was reported to me shortly after 9 P.M., but imme-
diately afterwards a further report stated that the enemy
had been driven off to the north-west.
At 10.4 p.m. Commodore Hawkesley, in the Castor,
commanding the destroyer flotillas, after dropping astern,
sighted three or more vessels at a range of 2,000 yards
which he took to be enemy battle cruisers. If the German
report is to be believed, the ships were light cruisers and
included the Hamburg and Elbing. The enemy at once
opened a rapid and accurate fire, and the Castor was hit,
and her bridge and wireless telegraphy gear damaged,
making it impossible to signal to the 11th Flotilla, which
the Castor was leading. The damage to the Castor was
slight. The Castor, Magic, and Marne fired torpedoes
at the enemy, but the remaining destroyers of the flotilla
refrained from doing so, not being certain of the identity
of the vessels in sight. The enemy disappeared after a
violent detonation, following on the discharge of the tor-
pedoes, had been felt in the engine-rooms of the destroyers
near the Castor.
At 0.15 a.m. the Castor sighted a German destroyer
on her starboard bow and opened fire with all guns at
point-blank range. She was not seen again.
At 10.20 p.m. the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted
and engaged five enemy vessels, apparently a cruiser with
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 375
four light cruisers, probably of the 4th Scouting Group.
The enemy again opened fire with great rapidity and
accuracy, and concentrated his fire on our two leading
ships, the Southampton and Dublin, at very. short range.
Both vessels suffered considerable damage during the 15
minutes’ engagement and there were fairly heavy casual-
ties; three fires which broke out on board the Southampton
were promptly extinguished by fine work on the part of
the officers and men, in spite of the fact that the hoses had
been much cut up by shell fire.
The enemy squadron disappeared after this short but
fierce engagement, and it is probable that the German
light cruiser Frauenlob, whose loss was admitted by the
enemy, was sunk during this action, which took place in
that case between our own 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
and the German 4th Scouting Group.
At 11.30 p.m. the 4th Flotilla sighted and attacked
enemy cruisers steering a south-easterly course. Again
the vessels sighted opened fire immediately, and the flotilla
leader Tipperary, commanded by Captain Wintour, the
leader of the flotilla, was severely damaged by gunfire
and set on fire forward; the Broke, leader of the 2nd half
Flotilla, received injury to her steering-gear, rendering
her temporarily unmanageable and causing her to ram
the destroyer Sparrowhawk, with the result that it be-
came necessary to abandon the latter destroyer on the
following morning after taking off her crew. The de-
stroyer Spitfire (Lieutenant-Commander C. W. Tre-
lawny), next astern of the Tipperary, fired torpedoes at
a four-funnelled cruiser which appeared to be hit and in
a sinking condition, and the Spitfire then collided with a
German light cruiser and, in scraping along her side, car-
ried off some 29 feet of her skin plating.
The remainder of the 4th Flotilla, after this engage-
@
376 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
ment, while steering to the south-eastward, came into con-
tact at midnight with the enemy’s 2nd Battle Squadron,
and one ship (probably the Pommern) was torpedoed and
sunk either by the Ardent (Lieutenant-Commander Mars-
den) or Ambuscade (Lieutenant-Commander G. A.
Coles) or Garland (Lieutenant-Commander R. S. Goff).
A heavy and accurate fire was opened by the enemy and
the destroyer Fortune (Lieutenant-Commander F. G.
Terry) was sunk.
The flotilla was again in action a little later with some
enemy battleships, and the Ardent attacked, and fired a
torpedo, but the result could not be observed as a very
heavy fire was concentrated on the Ardent, which sank
with colours flying after a very gallant night’s work. It
is sad to record that Lieutenant-Commander Marsden
and one man were the only survivors, being picked up
by a destroyer on June 1st after having been five hours in
the water.
The 12th Flotilla had formed after dark astern of
the 1st Battle Squadron. The 1st Battle Squadron was
somewhat astern of the remainder of the Fleet during
the night, owing to the Marlborough not being able
to keep up 17 knots, although steaming at the revolutions
for this speed. Consequently the 1st Flotilla was also
more than five miles astern of the main portion of the
Battle Fleet. At 11.30 p.m. also this flotilla was obliged
for some little time to steer a south-easterly course, owing
to the movements of another flotilla on the starboard
hand, the identity of which cannot be determined with
certainty. The result was that the 12th Flotilla was prob-
ably some ten miles to the north-eastward of the 1st Battle
Squadron by midnight. The incident was a fortunate one
since it brought the flotilla into contact with one of the
enemy’s battle squadrons.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — 377
At 1.45 a.m, Captain Stirling, leading the flotilla in
the Faulknor, sighted on the starboard bow this battle
squadron, consisting of six ships steering south-east. The
leading ships were thought to belong to the “Kaiser”
class. Captain Stirling altered his course to one parallel
to that of the enemy and increased speed to 25 knots
to draw ahead, with the intention of turning to attack
on a north-westerly course (the reverse of the enemy’s
course), in order to give an opportunity of getting into
close range. This attack was carried out at 2 a.M. at a
range of about 3,000 yards, and all destroyers fired their
torpedoes at the second and third ships in the line. Some
took effect on the third battleship in the line, the explo-
sion being so violent and the flame reaching to such a
height that it appeared to those in our destroyers that
the explosion of the torpedoes must have detonated the
magazine and destroyed the ship.
Our destroyers were then forced to withdraw by the
enemy light cruisers, which were in company with the
battle squadron. The destroyer Maenad (Commander
J. P. Champion) had, however, not turned to the north-
westward with the remainder of the flotilla, as it had
been anticipated that the attack would have been made
with torpedo tubes bearing to starboard, and her tubes
were not ready to fire to port. Commander Champion
held on the south-easterly course and, turning later than
the rest of the flotilla, fired one port tube, then turned
again to south-east, trained his tubes to starboard, and at
2.25 a.m. fired two torpedoes to starboard at the fourth
ship in the line at a range between 4,000 and 5,000 yards,
one of which took effect. In this case, too, the flame of
the explosion reached the mast head, and the ship was
not seen again, although those ahead and astern of her
were visible.
378 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
It is of interest to note that at the time of the first
attack on this squadron six battleships vere visible. After
the first attack only five were seen by Captain Stirling,
and twenty-five minutes later five were sighted by the
Menad, and after the Menad’s attack only four were
visible. The evidence that at least one of the battleships
was sunk was considered at the time to be very strong,
particularly as the reports from the Maenad and from
Captain Stirling were sent to me quite independently,
and Commander Champion was unaware of the fact that
Captain Stirling had reported six ships as the original
number in the battle squadron, and five as the number
remaining after his attack.
When Captain Stirling had located the enemy’s battle
squadron he reported the fact by wireless, but the signal
was, unfortunately, not received by any ship, owing, pre-
sumably, to the strong interference caused by German
wireless signalling at the time.
The destroyers of the 9th, 10th, and 18th Flotillas
took station astern the Battle Fleet in company with the
Champion (Captain Farie), leader of the 18th Flotilla;
the Fearless, leader of the 9th Flotilla, had not been able
to maintain touch with her flotilla. Many of the de-
stroyers of these flotillas lost touch with the Champion
during the night, and the flotillas became somewhat
scattered. .
At 12.30 a.m. a large vessel, taken at first for one of
our own ships, crossed the rear of the flotilla at high
speed, passing close to the Petard and Turbulent. She
rammed the Turbulent and opened a heavy fire on both
the Turbulent and Petard; the Turbulent sank and the
Petard was damaged.
At 2.35 a.m. the destroyer Moresby, of the 18th Flo-
tilla, sighted four battleships of the “Deutschland” class,
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND —§ 379
and attacked, firing one torpedo; an explosion was sub-
sequently heard.
It was impossible to state with certainty which of our
destroyers were actually successful in their attacks. The
enemy, of course, denied that any marked success was
obtained by our attacks, but information obtained after
the action made it certain that at least four battleships
of the “Dreadnought” type were hit by torpedoes, in ad-
dition to the pre-Dreadnought battleship Pommern, which
was admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo, as was the
light cruiser Rostock.
Although the credit for the successful attacks cannot’
be attributed to particular destroyers, the work of the
flotillas as a whole, and particularly of the 4th and 12th
Flotillas, was characterised by the splendid dash, skill and
gallantry for which our destroyers had been conspicuous
throughout the War. ‘They were most ably led and
achieved magnificent work under very difficult conditions.
There is no doubt at all that the German organisa-
tion for night action was of a remarkably high standard.
In the first place, the use of star shell, at that time un-
familiar to us, was of the greatest use to them in locating
our destroyers without revealing their own positions; and,
secondly, their searchlights were not only very powerful
(much more so than ours), but their method of controlling
them and bringing guns and searchlights rapidly on to
any vessel sighted was excellent. It also appeared that
some system of director-firing was fitted to the guns of
their secondary armament.
The increased offensive power given by these devices
did not, however, prevent our destroyers from inflicting
great damage on the enemy during their night attacks,
although they led to the loss of some valuable destroyers
and still more valuable lives. Captain Wintour, leader
380 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
of the 4th Flotilla, an officer of wide experience of de-
stroyer work and a fine leader, was a very heavy loss, and
other splendid officers perished with their gallant crews.
Our destroyer service has, indeed, every reason to be ex-
ceedingly proud of the achievements of the flotillas, both
during the day action of May 31st and during the night
following that action.
Gunfire and under-water explosions were heard at in-
tervals during the night, and, curiously enough, the under-
water explosions, four or five in number, were quite
clearly recorded on a barograph in the Malaya, a ship
well placed for the purpose, as she was in the rear. There
is little doubt that these records showed the explosion of
our torpedoes against enemy ships.
From the Battle Fleet it was evident shortly after dark
that our destroyers were in action. Star shells were fired
with great frequency by the enemy, and they produced
a very brilliant illumination, leaving the enemy ships in
complete darkness and not revealing their positions.
At 11 P.M, the light cruiser Active, astern of the 2nd
Battle Squadron, observed a ship coming up from astern,
and shortly afterwards saw searchlights switched on and
a heavy fire opened against this vessel by a ship, or ships,
on her starboard quarter. She appeared to be heavily hit
and to sink. It is possible that this ship may have been
the Black Prince, which had apparently lost touch with
our fleet during the day action.
Shortly after this incident the Active passed over some
submerged object which she bumped heavily. Subse-
quent examination showed that some 15 feet of her bilge
keel had been torn away. It was not conceivable that
the object struck could have been submerged wreckage
from any ship which had taken part in the action, no
fighting having taken place in the vicinity, and it seemed
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 381
possible that the Active had struck an enemy submarine.
At 11.30 p.m. the Colossus also passed over some sub-
merged object which was felt to scrape along the bottom
of the ship. Subsequent examination showed damage to
both starboard propeller blades. Again there is doubt
as to what the obstruction could have been; it was cer-
tainly not wreckage from any ship that had been in action.
At 2 a.m. on June Ist Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney
informed me that the Marlborough could not maintain
the Fleet speed of 17 knots any longer, on account of the
stress on the bulkheads, and that she had been obliged
to ease to 12 knots. I directed him to order the ship to
proceed to the Tyne or Rosyth, passing south of the
German mined area. Sir Cecil Burney called the light
cruiser Fearless alongside the Marlborough, and was
transferred in her, with his Staff, to the Revenge, the
Fearless being then detached to escort the Marlborough.
Some idea of the area covered by the different engage-
ments which constituted the Battle of Jutland will be
gathered from a consideration of the distances steamed
by our ships during the operations.
The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between
3.48 P.M., the time of opening fire, and 6.17 PrIM., the
time that the Battle Fleet commenced action, and a
further distance of some 57 miles to 9 P.M., when the
Fleet turned to the southward for the night. The Battle
Fleet steamed some 47 miles between the commencement
of their engagement with the High Sea Fleet and the
turn to the southward at 9 P.M.
The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the
period covered by the night action—9 P.M. to 2 A.M.
At 2.47 a.M., as dawn was breaking, the Fleet altered
course to north and formed single line ahead in the order
—2nd Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron, 1st Battle
382. THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Squadron (less the 6th Division). The 5th Battle Squad-
ron rejoined at 8.80 a.m. and stook station ahead of the
2nd Battle Squadron.
The weather was misty and the visibility even less than
on May 38ist, being only some three or four miles, and
I considered it desirable under these conditions, and in
view of the fact that I was not in touch with either my
cruisers or destroyers, to accept the danger of submarine
attack on a long line in order to be ready to meet the
enemy’s Battle Fleet, if suddenly sighted. The 6th
Division of the Battle Fleet was not in sight at daylight,
having dropped astern during the night owing to the
reduction in speed of the Marlborough and the change
of flag from the Marlborough to the Revenge. Partly on
account of the low visibility, and partly because of the
inevitable difference in dead reckoning between ships, due
to their many movements during the action and during
the night, considerable difficulty was experienced in col-
lecting the Fleet. This applied particularly to the de-
stroyer flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and
whose facilities for computing their positions under these
conditions were only slight; but the same difficulty was
experienced with all classes of ships, and, although awk-
ward, the fact did not cause me any surprise. The cruisers
were not sighted until 6 a.m., the destroyers did not join
the Battle Fleet until 9 a.m., and the 6th Division of the
Battle Fleet with the Vice-Admiral of the Ist Battle
Squadron, was not in company until the evening.
The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet
(particularly the destroyers), due to the above causes,
rendered it undesirable for the Battle Fleet to close the
Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my intention when
deciding to steer to the southward during the night.
It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND —§ 383
Fleet and the destroyers before renewing action. By
the time this concentration was effected it had become
apparent that the High Sea Fleet, steering for the Horn
Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German mine-
fields in the early morning on the way to their ports. The
presence of a Zeppelin, sighted at 3.80 a.m., made it
certain that our position at that time would be known
to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the information
obtained from our wireless directional stations during the
early morning showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet
must have passed the Horn Reef on a southerly course
shortly after daylight.
At 3 a.m. the destroyer Sparrowhawk, which was
lying disabled in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted
a German light cruiser two miles to the eastward, steam-
ing slowly to the northward. After being in sight for
about five minutes this vessel slowly heeled over and sank,
bows first. The Sparrowhawk was subsequently sighted
by the Marksman and others of our destroyers, and, being
too seriously damaged for towing back to a base, was
sunk by the Marksman.
Shortly after 3.30 a.m. the report of gunfire to the
westward was audible in the Battle Fleet, and at 3.38
Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier, commanding the 3rd
Light Cruiser Squadron, reported that he was engaging
a Zeppelin in a position to the westward of the Batile
Fleet. Course was altered “by divisions” to west at
3.44 a.M., as it seemed that the presence of the airship
might possibly indicate the presence also of the High Sea
Fleet. At 3.50 a.m. a Zeppelin was in sight from the
Battle Fleet, but nothing else; course was altered back
again to north and fire opened on the airship, which,
however, was too high for the fire to be effective. She
384 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
disappeared to the eastward. She was sighted subse-
quently at intervals,
At 4.10 a.m. the Battle Fleet was formed into divi-
sions in line ahead, disposed abeam to starboard, in order
to widen the front and to reduce the risk of submarine at-
tack, At 4.25 a.m. the cruiser Dublin reported by wireless
that she had sighted an enemy cruiser and two destroyers,
and she gave her position.
At 5.15 a.m. the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle
Fleet in accordance with orders signalled, and was directed
to locate the cruiser reported by the Dublin, whilst the
Battle Fleet searched to the south-eastward for one of
the enemy’s battle cruisers which was thought to be in
a damaged condition and probably, therefore, still making
for a German port. At 4.45 a.m. the Battle Fleet was
in Lat. 55.29 N., Long. 6.02 E.; at 5 a.m. the Commo-
dore of the flotillas (Commodore Hawkesley), with de-
stroyers, reported himself as being in Lat. 55.48 N.,
Long. 6.22 E.; at 5.48 a.m. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was
in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 6.16 E., steering south-east at
18 knots, and at 6.15 a.m. altered course to south. At
6 A.M., not having met the destroyers, the Battle Fleet
altered course to south-east, with the cruisers in company,
steaming at 17 knots, and maintained that course until
7.15 a.M., at which time course was altered to north, the
Battle Cruiser Fleet altering to north-east at 7.30 a.m.
and to north at 8 a.m.
The Dublin was sighted at 7.55 a.m. and reported
having lost sight in a fog, in Lat. 55.28 N., Long. 6.82
E., of the cruiser and torpedo boat destroyers she had
reported, and, in reply to further inquiries, stated that
the cruiser was apparently not disabled and was steaming
fast.
‘At 8.15 a.m. the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.54 N.,
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 385
Long. 6.10 E., steering north at 17 knots, turning at
8.52 A.M. to a south-west course.
Between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. a considerable amount of
wreckage was passed, and the bodies of dead German
bluejackets were seen in the water. The wreckage of the
destroyer Ardent was also passed. Drifting mines in con-
siderable numbers were seen during the whole forenoon
of the 1st June, and there were one or two reports of sub-
marines being sighted. At 10 a.m. the Battle Cruiser
Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the Battle Fleet, and
course was altered to north by west, the destroyers, which
had now joined, being stationed to form a submarine
screen.
At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 56.20
N., Long. 5.25 E., and at 12.30 p.m. the Battle Cruiser
Fleet was in Lat. 56.382 N., Long: 6.11 E.
It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had
either sunk or had passed inside the mine-fields en route
to their bases. It had been evident since the early morn-
ing, from the definite information obtained by our direc-
tional stations, that the enemy’s fleet was returning to
port. All our own injured vessels were also en route for
their bases, and I decided to return with the whole Fleet,
and gave the necessary instructions to the Rosyth force
to return independently. Diagram 4 shows the move-
ment of the Fleet during the night of May 31st and the
forenoon of June Ist.
The Harwich force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had
been kept in port by Admiralty orders on May 31st, and
was despatched to sea on the morning of June 1st, when
I was informed that it was being sent out to join me and
to replace vessels requiring fuel. At 7 a.m. I instructed
Commodore Tyrwhitt to send four of his destroyers to
screen the Marlborough to her base; he informed me at
386 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
2.30 p.m. that he had sighted the Marlborough. At 10.40
A.M. I had reported to the Admiralty that I did not re-
quire the Harwich force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt
to strengthen the Marlborough’s escort and told him that
I did not need his ships. They would have been of great
use at daylight in June Ist had they been on the scene
at that time, and it is needless to add how much I should
have welcomed the participation of the Harwich force in
the action had circumstances admitted of this. I knew
well the extreme efficiency and the fine fighting spirit
of this force which, under its gallant and distinguished
commodore, had rendered such splendid service through-
out the War.
The Marlborough reported at 11 a.m. that a torpedo
had been fired at her and had missed. Some anxiety was
felt about the ship on the morning of June 2nd, as bad
weather set in and her pumps became choked; tugs were
ordered out to meet her, but she arrived in the Humber
at 8 A.M.
The Warrior, which had been taken in tow by the
sea-plane carrier Engadine, was in Lat. 57.18 N., Long.
8.54 E. at 8 a.m. on the Ist June, but the crew was
taken off by the E'ngadine and the ship abandoned later
in the day, as the weather had become bad and it was
evident the ship could not remain afloat. The work of
rescue was very smartly carried out, the Engadine being
skilfully placed alongside the Warrior in a considerable
sea way by her Captain, Lieutenant-Commander C. G.
Robinson, and the large number of wounded transferred
to her. The reports as to the condition of the Warrior
were not clear, and it was feared that she might remain
afloat, and later fall into the hands of the enemy. There-
fore I detached the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and subse-
quently the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, to search for
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 387
_ her. The search continued until the evening of June 28rd,
no trace of the ship being found. It became clear from a
report received subsequently from the Captain of the
Warrior that her condition was such that she must have
sunk shortly after having been abandoned. During the
search for the Warrior, one of the cruisers of the 2nd
Cruiser Squadron sighted a submarine on the surface at
dusk, opened fire, and tried to ram. It was reported
quite definitely that the submarine had been sunk. Later
evidence showed, however, that the submarine was one
of our own vessels of this class, that she had a very narrow
escape, but had dived in time to escape injury. This
was one instance, amongst others, of our own submarines
being mistaken for an enemy, attacked by our own ships,
and considered to be sunk. The difficulty of ascertain-
ing definitely the result of an engagement with a sub-
marine was thereby exemplified, and was one of the
weighty reasons which led the Admiralty during the War
to refrain from publishing any figures giving the results
of engagements with submarines.
Some anxiety had been felt as to the safety of the
destroyer Broke, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was
directed to search for that vessel also, assisted by two
light cruisers. She, however, arrived safely in the Tyne,
having been delayed by bad weather. Other disabled or
partially disabled destroyers requiring assistance to reach
port were the Acasta, towed by the Nonsuch, and the
Onslow, towed by the Defender.
The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2nd, fuelled,
and was reported ready for sea at four hours’ notice at
9.45 P.M. on that date.
Note—In the diagrams embodied in this chapter
there are some slight departures from those which accom-
panied my original despatch to the Admiralty.
388 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
That despatch was sent in under constant pressure
for its early receipt and at a time when I, in common
with my Staff, was very fully occupied with the arrange-
ments connected with the repair of damaged ships, the
constructive alterations which the action had shown to
be necessary in our ships, and the various committees
which I had formed to report on different subjects in
the light of our experience. I was not, therefore, able
to give the personal attention to the reports which later
opportunities have afforded me, and_ such slight
modifications as I have made are due to a closer study
of these reports, and of the signals received during May
31st.
One of my first acts on returning to Scapa was to
send to the King on the morning of June 3rd a message
of humble duty, respectful and heartfelt wishes on His
Majesty’s birthday.
The following reply was received from His Majesty,
and communicated to the Fleet:
“I am deeply touched by the message which you
have sent me on behalf of the Grand Fleet. It
reaches me on the morrow of a battle which has once
more displayed the splendid gallantry of the officers
and men under your command. I mourn the loss of
brave men, many of them personal friends of my
own, who have fallen in their country’s cause. Yet
even more do I regret that the German High Sea
Fleet in spite of its heavy losses was enabled by
the misty weather to evade the full consequences of
an encounter they have always professed to desire,
but for which when the opportunity arrived they
showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND ~— 389
enemy immediately after the opening of the general
engagement robbed us of the opportunity of gain-
ing a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday
amply justify my confidence in the valour and effi-
ciency of the fleets under your command.
“GrorcE R. I.”
The simple duty remained of acknowledging this gra-
cious message, and I added in my telegram to His
Majesty that it was “a matter of the greatest gratifica-
tion to all ranks to receive such an expression of Your
Majesty’s approval and sympathy for the loss of our
gallant comrades.”
CHAPTER XV
REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
THERE has been some discussion on the tactics of the
Jutland Battle, and no doubt there will be more. I have
endeavoured to give the facts, so that future discussions
may take place with adequate knowledge.
It is as well, first, to dispel the illusion, which I have
seen expressed, that the Grand Fleet was divided with
the object of enticing the enemy out to attack the
weaker portion in order to provide the opportunity for
a Fleet action. There was no such intention. On May
3lst the Battle Cruiser Fleet was scouting to the
southward of the Battle Fleet in pursuance of the pol-
icy which had been frequently carried out on previous
occasions.
Many surmises have been made as to the object with
which the High Sea Fleet put to sea on this occasion.
The view which I have always held is that the frequent
light cruiser sweeps, which had taken place down
the Norwegian coast and in the vicinity of the
Skagerrak during the spring of 1916, may have induced
the German Commander-in-Chief to send out a force
with the object of cutting off the light cruisers engaged
in one of these operations, and that he took the Battle
Fleet to sea in support of this force. There is no doubt
that he did not expect to meet the whole Grand Fleet.
If confirmation of this were needed it is supplied in the
German account of the battle, in which it is stated
390
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 391
that “there was no reason for supposing that any
enemy forces were about, much less the entire British
Fleet.”
Consideration of the tactics at Jutland, or indeed of
the whole strategy and tactics of the War, leads natu-
rally to the fresh problems which the advent of new
weapons had introduced. When I took command of
the Grand Fleet one of these problems was that
of how to counter a destroyer attack in a day action.
It had excited more attention in the two or three
years before the War than any other question of
tactics, much attention was devoted to it during the
War, and for that reason it is desirable to discuss it
fully.
It was not, I believe, until the year 1911, during what
were then known as “P.Z. Exercises” (that is, actions
between Battle Fleets as an exercise), that destroyer at-
tacks were actually carried out in the British Navy on
a large scale.
During that year manceuvres took place between the
8rd and 4th Divisions of the Home Fleets, commanded
by Admiral the Marquis of Milford Haven, and the At-
lantic Fleet, commanded by myself; and the first phase
of the manceuvres of that year included some Battle
Fleet “P.Z. Exercises,” during which attacks by con-
siderable forces of destroyers were carried out. Before
this date the risk attendant on such exercises, and the
fact that our Main Fleet exercises frequently took place
without destroyer flotillas being present, had prevented
the matter from being made the subject of thorough
practical experiment on such a scale as to give reliable
guidance. The 1911 exercises brought the question into
greater prominence.
The Fleet manceuvres of 1912 did not throw further
392 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
light on the question, as no Fleet action took place in
which destroyers were engaged; and the subsequent
Battle Fleet exercises did not, so far as I recollect,
include destroyer flotillas amongst the vessels engaged.
During the Fleet action at the close of the 1913 ma-
noeuvres most of the destroyer attacks on the “Red”
Fleet were made from towards the rear of the “Blue”
battle line, and we did not gain much fresh knowledge
from them.
To turn from mancuvre experience; during the
years 1911-14, covering the period of Sir George Cal-
laghan’s command of the Home Fleets, destroyer
attacks were practised in the smaller Fleet exercises that
were constantly being carried out, and officers were
impressed with the supreme importance of the whole
matter.
This was the position when I took over the command
of the Grand Fleet on the outbreak of War, and the mat-
ter immediately engaged my attention. The “counter”
which had usually been favoured by flag officers com-
manding Fleets up to the date named, had been the
obvious one of an attack by our own light cruisers’ tor-
pedo craft on those of the enemy, as the latter advanced
to attack. It was difficult to forecast how far such a
“counter” would be successful in preventing the destroy-
ers from firing their torpedoes. Much depended on the
distance the torpedo could be relied upon to run with
accuracy, and on its speed, both constantly increasing
figures.
The great number of destroyers possessed by the
enemy, the largely increased range of torpedoes, the dif-
ficulty which our light cruisers and flotillas might experi-
ence in reaching a favourable position for meeting and
disposing of the enemy destroyers before the latter could
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 393
discharge their torpedoes, together with the danger at-
tendant on meeting the enemy’s fleet in weather of low
visibility, when a destroyer attack could be instantly and
effectively launched before such a “counter” could take
place, made it essential to consider other means for dealing
with the situation.
Some German documents which came into our pos-
session early in the War proved the importance which
the enemy attached to this form of attack, and emphasised
the gravity of the question.
It was, of course, fully realised that the question had
two sides, and that if our own Battle Fleet was open to
this form of attack, that of the enemy was equally so,
but as against this there were important considerations
to which it was necessary to devote attention.
The first was that the element of chance enters very
largely into torpedo warfare of this nature. A flotilla
of destroyers attacking a Battle Fleet at long range does
so with the idea that a certain percentage of the torpe-
does fired will take effect on the ships, the remainder
passing between the ships. ’
Obviously a torpedo fired at a range of 8,000 yards
having a speed of 30 knots an hour, or, in other words,
of 50 feet per second, is not comparable to a projectile
from a gun which has a velocity at 8,000 yards of say
2,000 feet per second. The torpedo may run perfectly
straight after discharge, but unless the speed and course
of the target have been determined with considerable ac-
curacy, the torpedo will not hit. Let us assume that the
target ship x at position A is steaming at 15 knots, and
that the destroyer attacks from a favourable position on
the bow so that the torpedo with its speed of 30 knots is
discharged on a line at right angles to the course of the
target at a distance of 8,000 yards (see diagram). The
394 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
target ship will advance 4,000 yards along the line 4 B
whilst the torpedo is running 8,000 yards along the line
cD. The time occupied in each case is eight minutes.
It will be seen that if
> the course of the target
/ ship has been misjudged
/ very slightly, or had been
if altered during the passage
/ from A to B, the torpedo
, will pass ahead or astern of
, it. In that case it might
/ hit instead a ship Z ahead or
Zé one y astern of x.
/ There are no means
/ available on board a de-
, stroyer for determining
‘ with any real accuracy
, either the speed or the
; course of a ship at a dis-
/ tance of four or five miles.
/ Hence the difficulty, and
the reason why torpedoes
are fired at a ship a little way down a line of ships, in
expectation that one of the ships in the line will be hit.
The object in view is thus rather to “brown” the
enemy, and the chances of achieving this object are nat-
urally proportional to the target presented by a ship as
compared with the space between adjacent ships.
In the case of a British line of eight battleships at-
tacked “beam on,” the chances of a hit for torpedoes which
reach the British line may be assessed roughly at seven
to nine, taking the length of a ship as 600 feet, and the
distance from the bow of one ship to the bow of her next
astern as two and a half cables, that is 1,500 feet, thus
B
N}
8,000 yards —----- ----------+-———-3
>
Ee we een oe we = - eee ee ee
~
a
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 395
giving a total length of ships of 4,800 feet, and the total
of the interval between them as 6,300 feet.
A German destroyer usually carries six torpedoes,
and at long ranges one may calculate the chances of hits
on the above reasoning at between three and four per
destroyer, provided all the torpedoes are correctly fired
at such a range as to ensure that they reach the British
battle line, and provided that the British ships can take
no effective steps to avoid the torpedoes.*
It has been said that the element of chance is a large
factor in torpedo warfare of the nature herein discussed.
By this it is meant that skill is not a factor that can pro-
duce a decisive effect when dealing with torpedoes, as in
the case of guns dealing with guns. It is true that skilful
manoeuvring may enable a ship to avoid a torpedo, if suf-
ficient warning of its approach is given, and if its position
with reference to any track it is leaving can be correctly
judged. When experience at the Jutland Battle showed
that under favourable weather conditions the track of
German torpedoes was visible for some distance, great
care was taken to avoid all mention of this in the dis-
patches so that future use could be made of the fact.
Another factor in this matter was the knowledge that
our enemy was almost certain to possess a very consider-
able superiority over us in the number of destroyers likely
to be present during a Fleet action. This was a question
which had given rise to anxiety in the minds of the then
First Sea Lord and myself before the War; we had dis-
cussed it on more than one occasion when the destroyer
building programme was being considered.
Our fears were realised, particularly during the first
two years of the War.
* Few British destroyers carried more than four torpedoes up to the yeat
1917, although they mounted a much heavier gun armament than their enemies.
396 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
The relative position of the two Fleets in this respect
at different periods is shown in the following table, so far
as it is known to me:—
British German Additional German
destroyers destroyers destroyers, less than
with the probably 12 years old, that
Date Grand Fleet, attached to | could join the High
including the Sea Fleet at Ger-
Flotilla High Sea many’s selected
Leaders* Fleet moment.
August 4th, 1914............ 42 88 20
October Ist, 1914............ 42 88 20
January Ist, 1915. 42 88 80
April Ist, 1915.. 58 88 —
July 1st, 1915... 65 88 —_
October Ist, 1915............ 65 88 _
January Ist, 1916............ 66 88 50
April Ist, 1916.............. 74 88 _
May 3ist, 1916.............. 80 88 70f
Of the 80 destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet at
the end of May, 1916, 70 were available to go to sea on
May 30th (an unusually large proportion). There hap-
pened, also, to be on this date at Rosyth eight destroyers
belonging to the Harwich force, and these accompanied
the battle cruisers to sea, making a total of 78, of which
47 were with the Battle Fleet and cruisers, and 31 with
the Battle Cruiser Fleet, including the 3rd Battle Cruiser
Squadron. The smaller German Fleet had 88, a far
larger proportion to each ship.
This superiority in numbers on the part of the Ger-
mans arose from three causes:
(a) The formation, by us, of a light cruiser and de-
stroyer force at Harwich, the presence of which
force during a Fleet action was very improbable,
owing to the fact that a Fleet action would, if
* The Harwich force, as a whole, is not included in the figures in column 2,
since I never expected that it would be able to concentrate with the Grand
Fleet.
+ No account is taken in column 4 of German losses in destroyers.
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 397
it took place, probably do so at Germany’s se-
lected moment and not at ours, and to the dif-
ficulty of concentration under such circumstances.
(b) The necessity of utilising a large number of our
destroyers for patrol purposes in the Straits of
Dover and elsewhere.
(c) We had not built an adequate number of de-
stroyers in the years before the War to meet the
many needs that only this class of vessel could ful-
fil, particularly as the enemy developed his sub-
marine warfare against merchant-ships.
The shipbuilding programmes of 1908-09, and fol-
lowing years up to 1912-13, included provision for twenty
destroyers each year. Subsequent to the latter date, the
programme of destroyers was somewhat reduced in order
to provide for light cruisers, a class of vessel in which we
were woefully deficient. In spite of the continual rise in
the Estimates, there was never sufficient money to meet
all the Admiralty’s needs. It was intimated that one or
other of the requirements had to give way at a time when
the Navy Estimates were mounting up year by year, and
as the light cruisers were considered to be even more nec-
essary than the destroyers, the number of the latter class
of vessel was reduced.
Although, in spite of the great destroyer programme
initiated by Lord Fisher at the end of 1914, the shortage
of destroyers was most seriously felt throughout the whole
War, the conditions would probably have been even worse
had the pre-War programme of light cruisers been sacri-
ficed to maintain the output of destroyers to the standard
desired by the Admiralty.
A third consideration that was present in my mind
was the necessity for not leaving anything to chance in a
398 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Fleet action, because our Fleet was the one and only fac-
tor that was vital to the existence of the Empire, as indeed
to the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside the Battle
Fleet which could in any way take its place, should dis-
aster befall it or even should its margin of superiority over
the enemy be eliminated.
The situation was in many respects different from that
with which our Navy was faced in the time of the old wars.
In those days disaster could only come about by reason
of bad strategy or tactics owing to our enemy being in
overwhelming strength when met, or handling his force
better, and, apart from manceuvring, the action was in-
variably decided by gunfire, a well-known and well-tried
weapon.
During the recent War two entirely new features of
the greatest importance were introduced. First, the tor-
pedo could be fired at very long range, up to 15,000 yards,
either from large ships or destroyers, and at shorter range
from submarines, and the mine had been developed; the
invisibility of these weapons made it difficult for it to be
known when they were being employed.
The reasons which make it necessary to be more cau-
tious when dealing with the attack of under-water weap-
ons than with gun attack are the greater damage which
one torpedo hit will cause, which damage may well be
fatal to many ships, in most cases compelling the ship to
reduce speed and leave the line of battle. With the gun, it
is usually different; a ship which is being heavily hit
can—if her own offensive powers will not save her by
crushing the fire of the enemy—so manceuvre as to de-
range temporarily the accuracy of that fire. Therein
lies the whole necessity for the exercise of care when deal-
ing with the underwater weapon.
These considerations led me to introduce measures
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 399
for dealing with destroyer attacks on the Battle Fleet
other than the counter of attack by our light craft on
the enemy’s destroyers. These measures involved a turn
on the part of the ships, either towards the torpedoes or
away from them.
In the first case, the object was to turn the ships so
that they would present as small a target as possible to
the torpedo, and incidentally that the space between the
ships should be correspondingly large. The matter is
very technical, and presents many interesting features,
one of which may be illustrated by an example:
Scale 1 inch =6,000 yards
Generally speaking a safe course to pursue is for ships
to steer direct for the attacking destroyers if the moment
at which the torpedoes are fired can be ascertained,
This course, although applicable to one attack, leads
to difficulties in the case of successive attacks, since fur-
ther turns towards will bring the battle line within effec-
tive range of torpedoes fired from the enemy’s battleships;
occasions will arise when this risk must be accepted.
The accompanying diagram shows that the van and
centre squadrons are not so well safeguarded by a turn
towards the attacking destroyers as is the rear squadron,
for if the enemy’s flotilla is seen to fire torpedoes from c
(a threatening position to the van) and the van squadrop
400 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
turns inwards 4 points, the 4th ship of the squadron will
steer along the line a B.
If the torpedoes have been fired at the rear squadron
instead of the van squadron as supposed, and their ob-
jective is the twentieth ship in the line, they will run along
the line c D, i.e., directly at the fourth ship in the line.
The target presented is, however, small, and the
chances of a flotilla attacking the rear squadron when
in a favourable position for attacking the van are not
great.
The important point in the case of a turn towards is,
however, the necessity for ascertaining the moment of
discharge of the torpedoes.
In the second case, that of turning away, the object
is to place the ships at such a distance from the attacking
destroyers that the torpedoes will not cross their tracks,
but if this object is not achieved the ships are in a good
position for avoiding the torpedoes if their tracks are
visible; the objection to this manceuvre is that the range
of the enemy’s battle line is necessarily opened.
It was my intention in a Fleet action to use one or
other of the manoeuvres should destroyer attacks take
place under conditions which prevented an effective
“eounter” by our own light craft; both manoeuvres were
arranged to be carried out “by subdivisions” as a turn
by divisions of four ships would delay the completion of
the manceuvre to too great an extent.
The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a great
deal in the way of discussion and instructions on the sub-
ject of torpedo attack in a Fleet action. The duties of
light cruisers and destroyers in this connection were dealt
with at considerable length, and stress was laid on the su-
preme importance both of making early torpedo attacks
on the enemy’s line and of immediately countering such
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 401
attacks, and it was pointed out that an early attack by
our own destroyers would not only tend to stop an enemy
attack, but would place our attacking vessels in the best
position to meet a hostile attack.
The battle stations of both light cruisers and destroy-
ers were so fixed that they should be in the best positions
to effect these two objects, such positions being obvi-
ously in the van of the Fleet; in order to provide against
a 16-point turn on the part of the enemy, or deployment
in the opposite direction to that anticipated, one or two
flotillas, according to the numbers available, and a light
cruiser squadron, were also stationed in the rear.
The probable tactics of the German Fleet had been
a matter of almost daily consideration, and all our ex-
perience and thought led to the same conclusion, namely,
that retiring tactics, combined with destroyer attacks,
would be adopted by them. There were many reasons for
this belief, and some of them were as follows:
1. On each occasion when German vessels were met,
they had immediately retired towards their bases.
2. The tactical advantages of such a move were ob-
vious. They might be enumerated thus:
(a) The retiring fleet places itself in a position of
advantage in regard to torpedo attack on the fol-
lowing fleet. The retiring fleet also eliminates,
to a large extent, danger of torpedo attack by the
following fleet.
(b) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet of
drawing its opponent over a mine or submarine
trap.
(c) Smoke screens can be used with effect to inter-
402 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
fere with the observation of gunfire by the follow-
ing fleet.
(d) Considerations of moral effect will force the
stronger fleet to follow the weaker, and play into
the hands of the enemy.
We were so certain that the enemy would adopt these
tactics that in all the many exercises carried out by the
Fleet during the War, it was the invariable rule to in-
dicate beforehand an asswmed position of Heligoland,
and the Flag officer, representing the Commander-in-
Chief of the High Sea Fleet in these exercises, always
deployed his Fleet in the direction of Heligoland and
adopted retiring tactics. The difficulties resulting from
the employment of these retiring tactics and the best
method to adopt in the circumstances were, therefore, the
subject of constant thought, both by myself and by all the
senior officers in the Fleet, and the subject was very fre-
quently discussed and worked out on the tactical board.
The difficulty is, to a certain extent, insuperable if
retiring tactics are employed in conjunction with a free
and skilful use of under-water weapons.
When, therefore, the two Fleets met on May 81st,
1916, these thoughts were in my mind, and were no doubt
present in the minds of all Flag officers in the British
Fleet. It has been mentioned that the circumstances of
the meeting made it very difficult to ascertain with any
degree of certainty the disposition of the enemy’s Battle
Fleet, and the deployment of our own Fleet took place
under these conditions. Even so, however, the course on
deployment (that is, south-east by east) was to a certain
extent governed by the idea of getting between the enemy
and his base on the supposition that he would be making
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 403
towards it by the shortest route, namely, the Horn Reef
Channel.
The arrival of the 8rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in a
commanding position on the bow of the enemy caused the
enemy to make a large turn to starboard, largely because
this squadron—Rear-Admiral Hood’s—was mistaken for
the British Battle Fleet. The German account, as I have
already mentioned, bears out this view, as it is stated that
at about 5.45 p.m. “dim shapes of enemy battleships are
discerned in a north-easterly direction.” These shapes
were undoubtedly the 8rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The
German account states that their battle cruisers turned
away on sighting these ships. This gave the British Bat-
tle Fleet the chance of placing itself between the enemy
and his base. Advantage was taken of this opportunity,
and the enemy was then forced to pursue his retiring
tactics in a westerly direction. In making the large turns
required to effect our object, we were inevitably placed
in a position of tactical disadvantage owing to the British
Fleet working round on a wide circle outside the enemy.
A careful study of the movements of the two Fleets
will show this at once.* The course of the British Fleet
on deployment was south-east by east. Successive turns
to starboard brought the course through south by west
to south-west and finally to west, a total alteration of 13
points on the outer of two similar arcs, some 12,000 yards
apart, the German Fleet moving on the inner of these two
circles.
The result was that the “overlap,” which the Germans
erroneously thought was in favour of the British Battle
Fleet, but which was always with the enemy, was accen-
tuated, and the Grand Fleet was gradually brought far-
ther and farther abaft the beam of the High Sea Fleet,
* Cf, diagram in the pocket at the end.
404 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
placing the latter in a position of tactical advantage in
regard to torpedo attack. This advantage was increased
by the low visibility, which rendered it difficult to see
flotillas approaching to attack until they were at fairly
short range.
When the first attack by German destroyers took
place and the first of the enemy’s flotillas was seen to be
approaching on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of
the Iron Duke, and had reached a distance of 9,000 yards
or less, the “counter” of a turn “towards” or “away” was
essential. Our own flotillas had been using every en-
deavour to get to the van, but the frequent turns to star-
board and the movement of our battle cruisers across the
bows of the Battle Fleet had delayed their movement, and
it was evident that neither they nor the light cruisers could
prevent the attack from developing.
The moment of discharge of torpedoes could not be de-
termined with sufficient accuracy for a turn “towards”
and therefore the Battle Fleet was “turned away,” in
subdivisions.
Although I was not aware of the fact at the time, co-
incidentally with the destroyer attack the enemy made a
very large turn-away from our Fleet, and thus opened the
range much farther, disappearing entirely from view even
from our rear; this process was repeated on each occasion
of our ships getting back into range. The enemy was,
therefore, continually refusing action.
It may be asked whether it was necessary to turn the
whole line of battle away for this attack, or whether the
leading squadron could not have held the original course.
Such a movement was provided for in the Battle Orders,
but the destroyers were observed at a range of 9,000
yards on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the
Iron Duke, the leading ship of the centre battle squadron,
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 405
and therefore the leading Battle Squadron was as open
to attack by torpedoes as was the centre or rear squadron;
indeed, the destroyers were standing in a direction to at-
tack the van squadron. The rear of the leading Battle
Squadron was also not at the time clear of the van of the
centre squadron, as the turns that had been made had pre-
vented line ahead being re-formed, and the Iron Duke’s
Division could not turn unless the division ahead also
turned. These facts strengthened the reasons which led
me to make the signal general to the Battle Fleet.
According to the reports of the captains of the ships
of the Battle Fleet, a total of at least 20 torpedoes crossed
the line of our Battle Fleet during the 7.10 p.m. destroyer
attack alone, in spite of the turn. The large majority
of these were observed by the ships of the 1st and 5th
Battle Squadrons, but one torpedo is known to have
crossed the line ahead of the Iron Duke, and at least
six crossed the track of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron,
which was moving out to attack the enemy’s flotilla.
In the case of a long line of ships there is always dan-
ger of the torpedo menace to the ships at the rear being
forgotten or minimised by ships that are in the van, owing
to failure to realise how dangerous the torpedo fire of
ships or destroyers abreast of them may be to vessels a
long way in rear, although they themselves are quite
immune from this danger.
The Grand Fleet Battle Orders provided for con-
siderable decentralisation of command, and great stress
was laid on this point in the general instructions for “Bat-
tle Tactics.” The opening paragraphs of this section of
the Battle Orders emphasised this strongly. It was
pointed out that whilst the Commander-in-Chief would
control the movements of the whole Battle Fleet before
and on deployment (except in the extreme case of very
406 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
low visibility rendering it necessary for the Flag officer
of a wing division to take immediate action), he could
not be certain of doing so after deployment, when funnel
and other smoke made both vision and communication dif-
ficult. The necessity for wide decentralisation of com-
mand was then pointed out, combined with a close watch
on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, with which
Flag officers should generally conform.
The Battle of Jutland was the first Fleet action since
Trafalgar if we except the actions in the Russo-Japanese
War, and advantage was naturally taken of the experi-
ence to make some changes in the Battle Orders; but there
were no surprises in the way of enemy tactics, and, there-
fore, no radical alterations were necessary. As the Chief
of the Staff remarked to me during the Battle Fleet en-
gagement, “This is all going according to expectation.”
We did, however, obtain confirmation of our views as to
the probable retiring tactics that would be adopted by
the German fleet.
The principal changes that were made in the Battle
Orders were in the direction of laying still further em-
phasis on the discretionary power which was vested in
Flag Officers commanding squadrons, owing to the dif-
ficulty, always clearly recognised, and confirmed at Jut-
land, which the Commander-in-Chief would experience in
controlling the movements of the whole Fleet in the heat
of action; also in defining still further the different move-
ments that might be adopted to deal with torpedo at-
tacks, whether the torpedoes were fired from battleships
or from destroyers. .
A very exhaustive analysis of the subject of torpedo
attacks in action had been prepared by my Staff during
the spring of 1916, and a memorandum, with diagrams,
had been written showing the various situations that might
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 407
arise and the effect of the different counter-movements in
each case. It is of interest to note that this memorandum
was on the point of issue when the Jutland Battle was
fought. It was dated May 27th, 1916, but it had not
actually been issued.
The experience gained at Jutland was embodied in
the memorandum before it was finally issued to the Fleet.
The questions of the use of the torpedo in action and
the “counter” measures adopted have been dealt with
at considerable length, since this form of attack and its
“counter” have been much discussed in the Service since
1911, and it is a subject on which discussion is likely to
continue. It is also certain that it will form the subject
of much future experiment.
The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any
great effect, and their importance should not be exag-
gerated. The turn of the British Battle Fleet opened
the range some 1,750 yards, but it was not this turn which
led to the difficulty of keeping touch with the enemy.
That difficulty was due to the fact that the German Fleet
made a very large turn to the westward under cover of a
smoke screen at the moment of launching the earliest de-
stroyer attacks. Neither our battle cruisers in the van
which did not turn away at the time, as it was not neces-
sary in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to re-
gain touch until 8.20 p.m. because of the retirement of
the enemy.
The instructions as to my intentions as the Com-
mander-in-Chief, in regard to the ranges at which the
opening phases of the action should be fought, remained
unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the policy
of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside
torpedo range from the enemy’s battle line in ordinary
circwmstances,
408 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
As is very frequently the case when naval actions
do not result in overwhelming material losses by one side
or the other, or the capture or destruction of a large part
of the opposing Fleet, both sides at the time claimed a
victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped to
support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet,
besides influencing neutral, and probably in particular
American, opinion.
The Germans apparently based their claim on two
grounds, the first being that of having inflicted heavier
losses than they received. In order to make good this
contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk one bat-
tleship, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and
five destroyers more than actually were sunk on the Brit-
ish side; and they concealed, until further concealment
was impossible, the sinking of the battle cruiser Lutzow
and the light cruiser Rostock, besides omitting to mention
that the Seydlitz had to be beached to prevent her sinking,
thereby slurring over the point that the Seydlitz would
undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own Warrior
did, had the action been fought as far from German bases
as it was from British bases. They also said nothing of
at least four German battleships being torpedoed, and
of several battleships and all their battle cruisers being
so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of fur-
ther fighting for several months. The case was very dif-
ferent with the British ships, as has been already stated.
If these points are borne in mind, the original German
claim to victory falls to the ground, even on the material
side. After the surrender of the German ships in No-
vember, 1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed
writer on naval matters, stated in the Berliner Tageblatt
of November 18th that ‘‘our Fleet’s losses were severe,”
adding that “on June Ist, 1916, it was clear to every think-
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 409
ing person that this battle must, and would be, the last
one. Authoritative quarters,” he declared, “said so
openly.”
But a victory is judged not merely by material losses
and damage, but by its results. It is profitable to ex-
amine the results of the Jutland Battle. With the single
exception of a cruise towards the English coast on August
19th, 1916—undertaken, no doubt, by such part of the
High Sea Fleet as had been repaired in order to show
that it was still capable of going to sea—the High Sea
Fleet never again, up to the end of 1917, ventured much
outside the “Heligoland triangle,” and even on August
19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet’ made precipitately
for home as soon as it was warned by its Zeppelin scouts
of the approach of the Grand Fleet. This is hardly the
method of procedure that would be adopted by a Fleet
flushed with victory and belonging to a country which
was being strangled by the sea blockade.
Again, in the German account of the “victory” it
is remarked that “as the dawn coloured the eastern sky
on the historic 1st of June, everyone expected that
the rising sun would illuminate the British line de-
ployed in readiness to renew the battle. This expecta-
tion was not realised. As far as the eye could reach the
horizon was clear. Not until the late morning did our
airships, which had gone up in the meantime, announce
that a Battle Squadron consisting of twelve ships was
approaching from the southern part of the North Sea at
full speed on a northerly course. To the great regret of
all concerned, it was too late for our Fleet to overtake
and attack theirs.”
What are the facts? We know now that as the sun
rose, the High Sea Fleet (except such portions as were
escaping via the Skaw) was close to the Horn Reef,
410 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
steaming as fast as the damaged ships could go for
home behind the shelter of the German minefields.
And the Grand Fleet was waiting for them to appear
and searching the waters to the westward and north-
ward of the Horn Reef for the enemy vessels; it main-
tained the search during the forenoon of June Ist,
and the airship, far from sighting the Fleet late in the
morning, as stated, did so, first at 3.30 a.M., and on sev-
eral occasions subsequently during the forenoon. And
if that airship reported only twelve ships present, what
an opportunity for the victorious High Sea Fleet to an-
nihilate them! One is forced to the conclusion that this
victorious fleet did not consider itself capable of engaging
only twelve British battleships.
I cannot conclude these remarks on the Jutland
Battle without mentioning the personnel of the Fleet.
From the second in command, Sir Cecil Burney, to the
youngest boy, who was possibly young Cornwell in the
Chester, the Fleet was imbued with the same high spirit
and determination. Sir Cecil Burney was an old and
trusted friend, a fine seaman who always handled his
squadron—or, in my absence, the Fleet—with marked
skill and ability. Sir Martyn Jerram, who held a high
reputation as a squadron commander; Sir Doveton
Sturdee, the victor at the Falkland Islands, an officer
who had made a special study of tactics; Rear-Admiral
Evan-Thomas, and the other squadron leaders, including
my very old friends and gallant brother officers Sir
Robert Arbuthnot and Rear-Admiral Hood, by whose
deaths the nation and Fleet lost of their best—were all
officers of proved ability, in whom not myself only, but
the Fleet, had absolute confidence.
In Sir David Beatty the Battle Cruiser Fleet pos-
sessed a leader who throughout his Service career had
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE All
shown fighting qualities of the highest order, and he had
imbued his force with his own indomitable spirit.
The Flag officers second in command of squadrons
had all led divisions for a considerable period, and I was
confident that they would handle their divisions as well
in action as they did during exercises, as proved to be
the case.
The officers commanding Light Cruiser Squadrons
and destroyer flotillas had invariably fulfilled every ex-
pectation that I had formed of them. I had always ad-
mired the manner in which the personnel of these vessels
had endured the conditions under which their work was
so frequently performed.
Assisted as I was by a brilliant Staff, with Rear-
Admiral Sir Charles Madden (my righthand man
throughout) and Commodore Lionel Halsey as its chief
members, seconded by such able and experienced Flag
officers, and with captains who had on countless occasions
shown their skill, I was indeed in a fortunate position.
To the above advantages I must add those obtained
by the magnificence of the personnel of the lower ranks.
The officers and ships’ companies were as keen as any
Commander-in-Chief could desire. The long wait had
never produced the slightest feeling of staleness. Offi-
cers and men were day after day striving to perfect the
fighting efficiency of their ships, and well had they suc-
ceeded. The engine room staffs had demonstrated early
in the War that they would respond magnificently to any
demand that I called upon them to make, and they did it
on the occasion of the Jutland Battle. The spirit and
moral of the Fleet never stood higher than at the time
of the Battle of Jutland, and because of that spirit I
knew that the Fleet under my command was the most
formidable fighting machine in the world.
412 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
Of the gallantry shown it is difficult to write with
proper restraint. Whenever and wherever there was op-
portunity, officers and men displayed courage and self-
sacrifice of the highest order. There were innumerable
instances which proved that the personnel of the present
Navy has nothing to learn in this respect from its fore-
fathers. The dead died heroic deaths; the wounded be-
haved with marvellous fortitude. Forty-four years
passed in the Service had given me unbounded faith in,
and admiration for, the British officer and bluejacket,
but they surpassed all my expectations, and so long as
that spirit endures, this country will be fortunate, and
with adequate forces will be safe.
It may not be out of place to quote the memorandum
issued to the Fleet after the Jutland Battle:
Iron Duke,
June 4th, 1916.
H.F. 0022 349.
MEMORANDUM.
I desire to express to the Flag Officers, Captains,
Officers and Men of the Grand Fleet my very high
appreciation of the manner in which the ships were
fought during the action on May 31st, 1916.
2. At this stage, when full information is not avail-
able, it is not possible to enter into details, but quite
sufficient is already known to enable me to state defi-
nitely that the glorious traditions handed down to us
by generations of gallant seamen were most worthily
upheld.
3. Weather conditions of a highly unfavourable
nature robbed the Fleet of that complete victory
which I know was expected by all ranks, which is
REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 413
necessary for the safety of the Empire and which
will yet be ours.
4, Our losses were heavy and we miss many most
gallant comrades, but, although it is very difficult to
obtain accurate information as to the enemy losses,
I have no doubt that we shall find that they are cer-
tainly not less than our own. Sufficient information
has already been received for me to make that state-
ment with confidence.
I hope to be able to give the Fleet fuller informa-
tion on this point at an early date, but do not wish
to delay the issue of this expression of my keen
appreciation of the work of the Fleet, and my con-
fidence in future complete victory.
5. I cannot close without stating that the wonder-
ful spirit and fortitude of the wounded has filled me
with the greatest admiration.
I am more proud than ever to have the honour of
commanding a fleet manned by such officers and men.
J. R. JELLICOE.
Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief.
The Flag Officers, Commodores
and Officers in command of
H..M. ships of the Grand Fleet.
My official despatch on the battle to the Board of
Admiralty was forwarded on June 19th, and the
following letter was afterwards promulgated to the
Grand Fleet:—
414 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
ADMIRALTY,
July 4th, 1916.
Sir,—My Lords Commissioners of the Admir-
alty have considered your reports on the action off
the Jutland Bank between the Grand Fleet under
your command and the German High Sea Fleet on
the 31st May, together with the report of the Vice-
Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and
those of the various Flag Officers and Commanding
Officers of the Grand Fleet.
2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, sea-
men, and marines of the Grand Fleet on this, the
first Fleet action which has occurred since the out-
break of the war, as a result of which the enemy,
severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The
events of the 31st May and Ist June gave ample
proof of the gallantry and devotion which character-
ised all who took part in the battle; the ships of
every class were handled with skill and determina-
tion; their steaming under battle conditions afforded
a splendid testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the
engineering staff; while individual initiative and tac-
tical subordination were equally conspicuous.
3. The results of the action prove that the offi-
cers and men of the Grand Fleet have known both
how to study the new problems with which they are
confronted and how to turn their knowledge to ac-
count. The expectations of the country were high;
they have been well fulfilled.
4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their
full approval of your proceedings on this occasion.
I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
W. Grawam GREENE.
CHAPTER XVI
THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S
FAREWELL
Tue ships which had received damage in the Jutland
Battle had to be repaired without delay. ‘The great
majority of the repairs were completed during June
or by the first week in July, and, whilst under repair,
the opportunity was taken of effecting certain altera-
tions which experience gained in the action had shown
to be desirable. The Marlborough was the only large
ship whose repairs occupied any considerable length of
time, and even she rejoined the Fleet in August, al-
though the work upon her was handicapped to some ex-
tent by being carried out in a floating dock moored in a
somewhat inconvenient position. The light cruiser
Chester was also detained at Hull until July 29th, as
here injuries from gunfire were fairly extensive, and a
great many alterations were carried out. The principal
points affecting matériel to which attention was directed
were:
(a) The urgent need for arrangements to prevent
the flash of cordite charges, ignited by the ex-
plosion of a shell in a turret or in positions be-
tween the turret and the magazine, being com-
municated to the magazine itself. It was prob-
able that the loss of one, if not two, of our battle
cruisers was due to this cause, after the armour
had been pierced.
415
416 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
(b) Better measures were required to prevent the
charges of small guns from being ignited by
bursting shell, and to localise any fires due to this
cause, in the case of guns of the secondary bat-
tery in large ships, and the main armament in
small ships.
(c) Increased deck armour protection in large
ships had been shown to be desirable in order
that shell or fragments of shell might not reach
the magazines. This need was particularly felt
in all our earlier ships of the Dreadnought type,
since their side armour was not carried to the
upper deck level. The long range at which most
modern sea actions are fought, and the conse-
quent large angle of descent of the projectiles
made our ships very vulnerable in this respect.
(d) The pressing need for a better armour-pierc-
ing projectile with an improved fuze was also
revealed.
(e) Improved arrangements for flooding maga-
zines and drenching exposed cartridges had to
be made.
Committees were immediately appointed in the Fleet
to deal with all questions of this nature, as well as the
important matter of possible developments in the fire-
control system with a view to improving the methods of
correction of fire to enable enemy ships to be “straddled”
with greater rapidity. In all these matters, the great
gunnery knowledge and experience of Captain F. C.
Dreyer, my Flag Captain, were of immense assistance,
and he was most ably seconded by the numerous highly
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 417
skilled gunnery officers on the staffs of the Flag officers
and in the ships of the fleet.
The action taken in connection with these matters
was prompt, with the gratifying result that before I re-
linquished the command of the Fleet, the great majority
of the heavy ships had been provided with additional
deck protection on an extensive scale, and with fittings
for rendering their magazines safe. Most of the work
was carried out while the ships were at their usual notice
for steam, much of it being actually done at Scapa Flow
by the dockyard artificers berthed there on board the
Victorious: the work carried out by these artificers and
by the dockyard staff at Invergordon was executed with
most commendable rapidity.
Later, during my period of service at the Admiralty,
as First Sea Lord, and under the immediate direction
of Captain Dreyer, then Director of Naval Ordnance, a
new design of armour-piercing projectile, with a new
type of burster and an altered fuse, was introduced for
guns of 12-inch calibre and above, which certainly doubled
their offensive power.
The investigation into the possibility of further de-
velopment in fire-correction methods, a subject to which
constant attention had been given throughout the War,
was at first carried out by two independent committees.
Their conclusions were considered by a third Committee,
composed of the most experienced and most successful
gunnery officers in the Fleet, and modified rules were, as
the result, drawn up and passed for adoption in the Fleet;
these had already produced a most convincing and most
satisfactory advance in accuracy and rapidity of fire be-
fore I gave up Command of the Grand Fleet. It is no
exaggeration to say that the average time taken to find
418 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
the gun range of the enemy with these new methods was
about one half of that previously required.
Some delay occurred in improving our range-finders.
The majority had been installed in the Fleet before the
great increases in the range of opening effective fire had
come about, as the result of experience during the War.
Our most modern ships at Jutland were provided with
range-finders 15 feet in length, but the majority of the
ships present were fitted with instruments only nine feet
long. During 1917 successful steps were taken to supply
range-finders up to 25 and 30 feet in length; a series of
experiments with stereoscopic range-finders was also in-
stituted in the same year. It had become known that the
Germans used this type of range-finder. It should be
stated, in passing, to prevent any misunderstanding, that
the developments introduced in the fire-control arrange-
ments of the Grand Fleet after the Battle of Jutland
did not affect the instruments already in use, which fully
met our requirements, but the methods of using those
instruments and particularly the system of correction of
fire.
On June 5th the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and
Cruiser Squadrons were re-organised as follows:—
Barrie Cruiser SQuapRoN
Lion (Fleet-Flagship of Battle Cruiser Fleet).
Ist Battle Cruiser Squadron:
Princess Royal (Flag), New Zealand, Tiger.
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron:
Australia (Flag), Indomitable, Inflexible.
Cruiser SquapRons
2nd Cruiser Squadron:
Minotaur (Flag), Duke of Edinburgh, Cochrane, Shannon,
Achilles, Donegal.
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 419
3rd Cruiser Squadron:
Antrim, Roxburgh, Devonshire.
On June 5th Field Marshal Lord Kitchener arrived
at Scapa en route to Archangel. In the morning he
crossed from Thurso in the Oak, and came on board the
Iron Duke on arrival at Scapa. He lunched with me,
and the Flag officers present were invited to meet him.
Before lunch we went round the ship. The officers and
men naturally greeted him with much respect, and he can
have had no doubt of the admiration in which he was held.
During lunch he discussed with me his forthcoming trip,
and said once or twice that he was looking forward to it
as areal holiday. The strain of the last two years, he con-
fessed, had been very great, adding that he had felt that
he could not have gone on without this break, which he
welcomed very much. He was not, however, very
sanguine that he could achieve.much in Russia. He men-
tioned the difficulty which he experienced in dealing with
questions discussed in the Cabinet, a difficulty felt by
most soldiers and sailors, whose training does not fit them
to state or to argue a case, and who frequently find great -
difficulty in doing so. They are, as a rule, accustomed
to carry out their ideas without having first to bring con-
viction to the minds of men who, although possessing
great general knowledge and administrative experience,
have naturally but little acquaintance with naval and
military affairs which in themselves form a lifelong
study.
After lunch conversation turned to the Jutland
action, and Lord Kitchener evinced much interest in
the tactics and the general story of the action.
Lord Kitchener impressed me strongly with the
idea that he was working to a time-table, and that
he felt that he had not a day to lose. He mentioned
420 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
three weeks as the limit of his absence, and I expressed
astonishment at the programme which he had planned
to carry out in the restricted period. He was most
anxious not to lose a moment on the sea trip and
asked me more than once what I thought was the shortest
time in which the passage could be made.
During the day the weather at Scapa, which had
been bad in the morning, gradually became worse,
and by the afternoon it was blowing a gale from the
north-eastward. It had been originally intended that
the Hampshire should take the route which passed
up the eastern side of the Orkneys, following the
channel ordinarily searched by mine-sweeping vessels as
a routine measure; but as the north-easterly gale
was causing a heavy sea on that side, mine-sweep-
ing was out of the question, and it was also obvious
that the escorting destroyers could not face the sea
at high speed. I discussed with my Staff which
route on the west, or lee, side would be the safest,
and finally decided that the Hampshire should pass
close in shore, and not take the alternative route
passing farther to the westward near Sule Skerry
Lighthouse. The reasons which influenced this de-
cision were :—
(a) With a north-easterly wind there would be less
sea and, therefore, more chance of the destroyers
being able to keep up with the Hampshire.
(b) It was practically impossible that this route
could have been mined by any surface mine-
layer owing to the dark period in Northern
latitudes being confined to a couple of hours,
during which no ship could expect to approach
the shore for mine-laying without having first
been sighted.
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 421
(c) The route was one used by Fleet auxiliaries,
and was, therefore, under frequent observation.
At this date, mine-laying by enemy submarines
had been confined to water well to the southward of the
Firth of Forth, presumably because of their small radius
of action. Danger from this source was, therefore, con-
sidered to be very remote.
Finally the weather itself was a protection against
submarine attack which was at that time more to be
feared than the danger from submarine laid mines.
Mine-sweeping on either side of the Orkneys had not
been practicable for three or four days owing to the
weather conditions.
At about 4 p.m. Lord Kitchener proceeded on board
the Hampshire, accompanied by his Staff comprising
Brigadier-General Ellershaw, Sir F. Donaldson, Colonel
FitzGerald, Mr. O’Beirne of the Foreign Office, Mr.
Robertson of the Munitions Department, and Second-
Lieutenant McPherson, Cameron Highlanders. The
Hampshire sailed at 5.30 p.m. escorted: by two destroyers.
Her orders were to proceed at a speed of at least 16
knots, if the weather permitted, and to send the destroyers
back if they could not maintain the Hampshire’s speed.
Experience had proved that high speed was a valuable
protection against submarines.
At about 7 p.m. Captain Savill, commanding the
Hampshire, ordered the two destroyers back to Scapa,
as they were unable to face the heavy seas at the
speed of the Hampshire. Between 7.30 and 7.45 P.M.
the Hampshire struck a mine about 114 miles off shore,
between the Brough of Birsay and Marwick Head;
she sank in 15 minutes, bows first. The incident was
witnessed by observers on shore, and a telephone mes-
422 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
sage was sent to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Ork-
neys and Shetlands that the cruiser was in difficulties.
He at once ordered out patrol vessels and informed me,
with the result that destroyers were sent to the scene
immediately.
The evidence of the few survivors of the Hampshire
showed that Lord Kitchener was below when the ship
was mined, and that an officer escorted him on deck.
Captain Savill was heard to give directions from the
bridge for a boat to be prepared for Lord Kitchener and
his Staff, and Lord Kitchener was seen subsequently
on deck, but was not seen after the ship sank. The
weather conditions prevented any boats being hoisted
out or lowered, although four boats floated clear as the
ship sank.
The scene of the disaster was searched during the night
by destroyers and patrol craft, but the only survivors
were twelve men who drifted ashore on a Carley raft, al-
though many bodies were picked up by the searching
vessels, and many drifted ashore.
The body of Lord Kitchener was not recovered.
At the time of the disaster the Hampshire was
steaming at 1314 knots, the wind being north-north-
west, with a force of 50 miles an hour. The cold water
and the very heavy sea were against even the strongest
swimmers surviving for any time. The wind, which
was north-east at 4 p.m. at Scapa, had become north-
north-west by the time the Hampshire was outside, and
there was, therefore, no lee on the west side of the Ork-
neys, as had been anticipated.
The hours that passed after the receipt of the report
of the Hampshire being in difficulties were most anxious
ones. In spite of the fact that the destroyers had
been sent back, it seemed almost incredible that the
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 423
wind and sea could have risen to such an extent as
was actually the case, as the conditions in Scapa Flow
were not so bad as to indicate so extremely heavy a
sea off the Brough of Birsay; and even when it was
reported that the Hampshire had sunk (a report which
took some time to come through), there was hope that,
at any rate, Lord Kitchener and his mission would be
saved by boat. As the hours passed and no news was
received of the rescue of any survivors, the anxiety
became intense. With the arrival of daylight, and the
certainty that this great man, who had served his
country so faithfully and well in its greatest emergency,
had met his death when under the care of the Navy,
the anxiety turned to consternation and grief. Lord
Kitchener had inspired the Service with confidence
and trust. The Navy had frequently worked under
him in Egypt and in South Africa, and he had been
one of the outstanding figures in the European War
on the side of the Entente. Everyone in the Grand
Fleet felt the magnitude of the disaster that had fallen
upon the nation, and it can well be imagined that the
feelings of the Fleet generally were intensified in me,
on whom lay the main responsibility for his safe
passage to Archangel, so far as such safety could be
ensured.
I have often wondered since that fatal day whether
anything could have been done that was not done,
but short of postponing the departure of the Hamp-
shire altogether, until weather conditions admitted
of a channel being swept ahead of her, nothing could
have been done. Such a decision would have resulted
in two or three days’ delay in starting, and would never
have been agreed to by Lord Kitchener. Moreover,
with the knowledge then at my disposal as to enemy
424 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
mine-laying possibilities, I did not consider the delay
necessary as I should not have hesitated, if need had
arisen, to take the Grand Fleet to sea on the same
night and by the same route as that traversed by
the Hampshire.
My own sorrow for the incident was overwhelming.
There was, at first, doubt in the minds of some people
as to whether the loss of the Hampshire was due to
a mine or to a submarine, but these doubts were set
at rest by the sweeping operations which were under-
taken as soon as the weather admitted. They resulted
in the discovery of moored mines of the type laid in
southern waters by enemy submarines, these mines
being easily distinguishable from those laid by surface
vessels.
During the month of June cruisers were kept con-
stantly patrolling the route to Archangel to protect
shipping against possible enemy raiders, as the traffic
was very heavy at this period. The Donegal, Antrim,
Devonshire and Roxburgh were the vessels employed.
They visited the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of
Stadlandet, en route to and from patrol, with a view to
intercepting vessels carrying ore from Narvick.
The submarines of the 11th Submarine Flotilla
were employed in watching the waters in the Kattegat
and cruised in the Skagerrak and off the Norwegian
coast, looking for enemy submarines and surface craft.
A regular submarine patrol was also begun off the
Horn Reef, and was continued up to the time of my
relinquishing command of the Fleet. At first two,
and later, three, submarines were used for this patrol,
which was of great utility in giving information of the
movements of the few enemy surface vessels that ever
ventured so far from their base, and also proved of
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 425
use for attacking enemy submarines. At the commence-
ment, the efficiency of our submarines for patrol and
look-out purposes was very inferior as compared with
that of the German submarines, by reason of their bad
wireless equipment, which admitted of a range of
some 50 miles only. As soon as submarines were
attached to the Grand Fleet, I represented strongly
the absolute necessity of effecting an improvement in
this particular, stating that I was quite prepared to
sacrifice some of the torpedo armament should this
be necessary, but that it was a vital matter to install
efficient wireless apparatus in the only class of vessel
that could carry out a “watching patrol in the vicinity
of German bases. Eventually arrangements were made
to provide them with a wireless installation which gave
a range of 300 to 400 miles.
When our submarines had been equipped in this
way we were at once able to establish an efficient
chain of outposts off the Horn Reef by the Grand
Fleet submarines; and from Terschelling to the north-
ward the Harwich submarines were on duty, with the
result that in daylight, at any rate, it was very difficult
for the enemy to put to sea unobserved and unreported.
The comparative inefficiency of the wireless installa-
tion in our submarines, and to a lesser extent in our
destroyers, was one of the disadvantages which we had
to face during the first two years of War. It should be
added that while patrolling in the Kattegat, submarine
G 4 sank by gunfire on June 19th, outside territorial
waters, the German steamship Ems, on passage from
Christiania to Liibeck with oil, zine and copper. The
crew were rescued.
The cruiser and light cruiser movements during the
month, other than the usual patrols, were as follows:—
426 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers,
left Rosyth on the 14th for the Naze, thence steered
up the Norwegian Coast to Udsire, and returned to
Rosyth.
The Comus and Constance left Scapa on the 25th,
swept down the Norwegian coast and returned on
the 27th.
The 8rd Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers car-
ried out a similar sweep from Rosyth between the 29th
June and July 1st.
On June 22nd the first mines from a British sub-
marine mine-layer were laid by E 41 in the German
Bight. a
His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet with
a visit on the 14th, arriving at Scapa from Thurso in
the Oak, at 5 P.M., being escorted by the destroyers of
the 11th Flotilla. After steaming round the Fleet in
the Oak, His Majesty proceeded on board the Iron Duke,
where he spent the night. On the following day the
King visited all the flagships, on board of which a large
percentage of officers and men from the various squadrons
were assembled, and left for Thurso in the Oak at 5 P.m.,
proceeded to Invergordon, and thence to Rosyth, hon-
ouring the squadrons at each of these bases with a
visit.
His Majesty addressed a representative gathering
of officers and men from the ships at Scapa, who had
been assembled on board the Iron Duke on the morning
of the 15th in the following terms:—
“Sir John Jellicoe, officers, and men of the Grand
Fleet, you have waited for nearly two years with most
exemplary patience for the opportunity of meeting and
engaging the enemy’s fleet.
“T can well understand how trying has been this period,
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 427
and how great must have been the relief when you knew
on May 81st that the enemy had been sighted.
“Unfavourable weather conditions and approaching
darkness prevented that complete result which you all
expected, but you did all that was possible in the circum-
stances. You drove the enemy into his harbours, and
inflicted on him very severe losses, and you added yet
another page to the glorious traditions of the British
Navy.
“You could not do more, and for your splendid work
I thank you.”
The average weekly report of the 10th Cruiser Squad-
ron during June, gave as the figures :—
No. of ships intercepted, 55 and 22 trawlers; No.
sent in, 20; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports
or en route to a given patrol, 8; No. on special
service, 1.
A great deal of fog and mist was experienced during
the month—especially in the latter half—and this inter-
fered somewhat with the work of the 10th Cruiser Squad-
ron. A very dense fog prevailed in the Pentland Firth
on June 22nd and 28rd. Strong winds, principally from
the northward, were prevalent during the first portion
of the montk, and a northerly gale occurred on the
5th.
No large Fleet movements took place during J une,
as it was known that the greater part of the High Sea
Fleet was under repair as the result of the Jutland
action.
During July the Battle Fleet as a whole only en-
gaged in one cruise, namely, from the 17th to the 20th.
The Ist, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 2nd
and 8rd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squad-
ron, the Campania, with sea-planes, and destroyer
428 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
flotillas left Scapa between noon and 1.80 P.M. on the
17th, and proceeded to the northward and eastward
of the Shetlands. The opportunity was taken of
carrying out a series of battle exercises on the 18th
and 19th; they were based on the experience gained
of enemy tactics during the Jutland action. Some of
the flotillas were re-fuelled at Lerwick during the cruise,
and the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty during
the forenoon of the 20th. Fog was met with as the ships
approached the Pentland Firth, making entry somewhat
difficult.
Cruiser movements during the month comprised:—
(a) A regular patrol of the Archangel route by
Grand Fleet Cruisers to protect trade against
raiders.
(b) The establishment on the 7th of a regular
patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers in an
area well to the northward of the Shetlands, this
patrol taking the place of that of a cruiser and
armed boarding-steamer which had been previous-
ly placed there.
(c) Extensive dispositions were made on_ the
9th to intercept a German raider reported
from neutral quarters, as about to leave for
the Atlantic. These dispositions included a
close patrol by two light cruiser squadrons and
eight destroyers from Rosyth of an area 80 to
100 miles off the Norwegian coast through which
it was expected the enemy would pass; a fur-
ther patrol by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron
and six destroyers was established farther north
to ensure a daylight intercept of hostile vessels;
two cruisers were ordered to patrol north of
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 429
the Shetlands, local patrol vessels being be-
tween these cruisers and the Shetlands; a half
flotilla of destroyers patrolled the Fair Island
Channel.*
(d) Two light cruisers and six destroyers left
Rosyth on the 12th and swept up the Norwegian
coast and back, returning on the 15th.
(e) On the 17th two more light cruisers and six
destroyers repeated the sweep, returning on the
20th.
(f) On the 21st two light cruisers and four destroy-
ers left Rosyth and swept to the southward in
the direction of the Horn Reef from a position
near the Naze, returning on the 28rd, not having
sighted anything.
(g) Two light cruisers and four destroyers re-
peated the sweep of the Norwegian coast on the
24th.
((h) The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four
destroyers, left Rosyth on the 26th, and pro-
ceeded to a position to the westward of the Little
Fisher Bank, thence swept during daylight to
the Naze on the look out for enemy raiders or
Zeppelins, reports having been received of the fre-
quent presence of Zeppelins on this line; the force
turned to the northward from the Naze and swept
along the 100-fathom line to Lat. 59 N., proceed-
ing thence to Scapa. The sweep was again un-
eventful.
The submarines of the 11th (Grand Fleet) Flotilla
were active during the month in the Kattegat and patrol-
ling off the Horn Reef. They reported on the 20th
* The dispositions remained in force until the 14th, no enemy vessels being
sighted; the report was probably incorrect.
430 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
that nothing but enemy submarines and aircraft were
visible.
The attacks by enemy submarines on warships re-
ported during the month were:
The mine-sweeping sloop Rosemary of the Southern
Force was torpedoed on the 4th, but was towed into the
Humber.
The light cruiser Galatea was missed by a torpedo on
the 12th, in Lat. 57.43 N., Long. 1.14 E.
The armed boarding-steamer Duke of Cornwall was
missed by two torpedoes on the 18th, whilst engaged
in boarding a ship south-east of the Pentland
Skerries.
The light cruiser Yarmouth was missed by a torpedo
on the 26th.
Three armed trawlers of the Peterhead patrol were
sunk by the gunfire of four enemy submarines, on the
11th, in Lat. 57.14 N., Long. 1.11 E., their guns being
entirely outranged by the 4-inch guns with which the sub-
marines are armed. This combined attack on the trawl-
ers of the Peterhead patrol, although resulting in the
regrettable loss of the three trawlers, was a great and
well deserved tribute paid by the enemy to the work
of that patrol which had been uniformly successful,
and had proved a great annoyance to the German sub-
marines.
Attempts were made to locate and destroy enemy sub-
marines on the 7th, to the eastward of the Pentland Firth;
on the 12th, two divisions of destroyers were sent from
Scapa to attack the submarine that had fired at the Duke
of Cornwall, the Musketeer dropping a depth charge close
to the periscope of the submarine, and it was thought con-
siderably damaging her; on the 15th, destroyers and sea-
planes from Scapa were sent after a submarine reported
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 431
by the armed boarding steamer Dundee as sighted 10
miles east-south-east of the Pentland Skerries, but she
was not seen again; on the 29th, a division of destroyers
again attempted to locate a submarine in that vicinity,
but failed to do so.
Mines laid by an enemy submarine were discovered
by the sweeping trawlers in the southern channel in the
Moray Firth on the 26th, and were swept up by trawlers
and fleet sweepers before any damage was done.
The weekly average of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
showed:
No. of vessels intercepted, 62 and 84 trawlers; No.
sent in, 23; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or
en route to or from patrol, 10; No. on special service, 0.
The armed merchant-steamer Arlanza, after tem-
porary repairs at Alexandrovsk, arrived at Belfast in July
for refit.
The weather during July was very foggy, fog or mist
being experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on
the 2nd, 8rd, 15th, 18th, 28rd, 24th and 25th.
During the month of August the principal cruiser
movements, apart from those in connection with the Battle
Fleet, were as follows:
(a) The patrol of two cruisers and two destreyers
in an area well to the northward of the Shet-
lands was continued.
(b) The “dark night” light cruiser extended-
patrol seaward of the Fleet bases was main-
tained.
(c) The patrol, of a cruiser on the Archangel route
was continued.
(d) Light cruiser sweeps were carried out as fol-
lows:
432 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
On the 1st, two light cruisers and four destroyers
left Rosyth for a sweep down the Norwegian coast, re-
turning on the 8rd, having sighted nothing of interest;
on the 8th, two light cruisers and four destroyers from
Rosyth swept from Lat. 60 N., Long. 2 E., to Lat. 57.30
N., Long. 5.0 E., and returned to their base on the 10th,
without result. On the 12th the 4th Light Cruiser Squad-
ron, with four destroyers, left Scapa and proceeded to-
wards Udsire Lighthouse, where they met a convoy of
10 British merchant-ships which had been brought out of
the Baltic. These vessels were escorted across the North
Sea to Rattray Head. The convoy arrived safely on
the 14th.
On the night of the 15th the armed boarding-steamers
Dundee and King Orry, which had been disguised as
merchant-ships, left Scapa for operations off the Nor-
wegian coast. It was hoped that they would be able to
close enemy and neutral vessels carrying contraband with-
out exciting suspicion, and that they would stand a better
chance of capturing them than any vessel having the
appearance of a warship. The Dundee operated between
Udsire and Lister, and the King Orry off Stadlandet,
both being localities in which ships were in the habit of
leaving territorial waters. The light cruiser Constance
and two destroyers were sent to support the Dundee,
keeping well to seaward of her, as that ship was operating
in waters in which enemy warships might be found. The
operation resulted in a Norwegian steamer, carrying a
cargo of magnetic iron ore for Rotterdam, being
sent in.
On the 30th the Abdiel left Scapa to lay mines in the
vicinity of the Horn Reef. She carried out the operation
successfully, and without being observed, on the night of
the 31st-Ist.
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 433
The work of the 11th Submarine Flotilla in the Kat-
tegat and in the vicinity of the Horn Reef continued.
The submarines, returning on the 17th, reported having
been attacked by a German decoy trawler in the
Kattegat. On the 80th submarine E 43 sailed to
operate against this vessel, but met with no suc-
cess.
Casualties to war-vessels during the month included:
The light cruiser Cleopatra, of the Harwich force,
which was mined on the 4th near the Thornton Ridge
off the Dutch coast, and reached the Nore to be
repaired; the destroyer Lassoo, also of the Harwich force,
was sunk by mine or submarine near the Maas Light-
ship off the Dutch coast on the 18th; the armed boarding-
steamer Duke of Albany was sunk by a submarine on
the 24th, 20 miles to the eastward of the Pentland Sker-
ries, with considerable loss of life, including Commander
G. N. Ramage, R.N.R. Sixteen destroyers, sea-
planes, and an airship were sent out from Scapa
at once to hunt this submarine, but saw nothing of
her, although the armed boarding-steamer Duke of
Clarence which had stood by the Duke of Albany and
rescued the survivors reported that she had passed
over and struck a submerged object. The light cruiser
Blonde went ashore on the Lowther Rock, Pentland
Firth, in thick weather on the 10th, but was lightened
and towed off on the 11th, having sustained con-
siderable injuries; the battleships Warspite and Val-
iant collided in the Scapa Flow on the night of the
24th, whilst, respectively, returning from and proceed-
ing to the night firing area, both ships being con-
siderably damaged, with the result that they had to
be docked.
On August 3rd mines were laid off the Longstone by
434 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
an enemy submarine, and the departure of the Marlbor-
ough from the Tyne was thereby delayed; the coincidence
that mines were frequently laid in this neighbourhood
when warships were due to leave the Tyne after repairs,
led to suspicion that enemy agents were working in that
locality. On the 4th or 5th August a considerable number
of mines of the submarine type were also laid in the War
channel in the White Sea by enemy vessels.
On August 8rd four “‘C” class submarines left the
Nore in tow of tugs for Archangel, en route by the canal
system for service in the Baltic. These submarines per-
formed very useful work in those waters during the year
1917.
The increase in mine-laying by German submarines
gave rise to anxiety that the movements of the Grand
Fleet might be hampered by mine-fields near the bases
at a critical moment, and, in the absence of any new
mine-sweepers, the mine-sweeping force at Scapa was
strengthened during July by withdrawing a certain num-
ber of trawlers from patrol duty in order to form a mine-
sweeping flotilla; during the latter half of 1916 the Grand
Fleet mine-sweeping force at Scapa or Cromarty com-
prised two flotillas composed of sloops and gunboats, as
well as two flotillas, each consisting of 12 trawlers; in
addition one flotilla of paddle mine-sweepers was based
on Granton in the Firth of Forth. These flotillas were
all additional to the small local sweeping force of trawlers
at the various fleet bases.
On August 18th the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea
for a sweep in southern waters. The presence of an un-
usually large number of submarines in the North Sea—
a phenomenon which had been observed shortly before
the Jutland Battle—had suggested the possibility of
movement on the part of the enemy and a sweep appeared
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 435
desirable. The Iron Duke, after leaving Scapa Flow,
proceeded ahead of the remainder of the Battle Fleet
screened by two destroyers to communicate with the
Royalist, and at '7.55 P.M., as the ships were about to com-
municate, a submarine on the starboard bow, about 250
yards off, fired a torpedo, which passed close astern of the
screening destroyer Onslaught on that bow. Only one
torpedo was seen. Possibly the submarine misjudged the
attack, and did not get into the position intended for at-
tacking the Iron Duke, which was proceeding at high
speed, and zigzagging, and, therefore, fired at the On-
slaught instead. Communication between the Iron Duke
and Royalist was deferred until after dark in consequence
of this attack; the Fleet was warned by signal.
The squadrons from Scapa were opened out to avoid
the submarine, and passed her without further incident,
and the Battle Fleet and cruisers concentrated at day-
light on the 19th, in the vicinity of the “Long Forties,”
. steering to the southward at a speed of advance of 17
knots. The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been ordered to a
position 30 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. At 5.55 a.m.
on the 19th the Nottingham, one of the light cruiser
screen ahead of the battle cruisers, whilst zigzagging at
20 knots speed, was hit by two torpedoes in Lat. 55.34
N., Long. 0.12 E. The submarine was not seen, and the
torpedoes struck the port side almost simultaneously. The
first report indicated that she had been hit by mines or
torpedoes, and, until it was clear that a mine-field did not
exist, it was prudent for the Fleet to avoid this locality,
and course was accordingly reversed until it was ascer-
tained that the damage was due to torpedoes; when this
became clear the southward course of the Fleet was
shaped to pass to the eastward of the submarine. Mean-
while the Dublin cruised at high speed in the vicinity of
436 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
the Nottingham for the purpose of keeping the subma-
rine down so as to prevent further attacks. But at 6.26
A.M. the Nottingham was hit by a third torpedo, and it
became evident that she could not float much longer. Her
boats were lowered, and the majority of the ship’s com-
pany placed in them. The ship sank at 7.10 a.m., just
as the destroyers Penn and Oracle, which had been sent
to her assistance, arrived on the scene. These two de-
stroyers picked up all the survivors, except Captain Mil-
ler, one officer, and several men who remained on board
until the ship sank, and who were rescued by a cutter
from the Dublin. Several torpedoes were fired at the
Dublin and the two destroyers during their work of rescue,
but all fortunately missed.
From 8.24 a.m. onwards Zeppelins were frequently
in sight from both the Battle Fleet, and the Battle
Cruiser Fleet, and were fired at, but they kept at too
long a range for our fire to be effective. The Galatea
sighted the first airship at 8.24 a.m., and the second was
seen by the Battle Fleet at 9.55 a.m.; at 10 a.m, Com-
modore Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the Harwich force,
reported himself in position Lat. 52.50 N., Long. 3.38 E.,
and also being followed by a Zeppelin. He stated later
that his force was shadowed by airships during the whole
period of daylight on the 19th. Reports were also received
from the patrol trawler Ramexo that she had two Zep-
pelins in sight in Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E. It was evident
that a very large force of airships was out. A total of at
least ten was identified by our directional wireless sta-
tions and they appeared to stretch right across the North
Sea.
At 10.10 A.M. a report was received from submarine
E 23, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight, that she had
sighted ships of the High Sea Fleet steering west at
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 437
9.19 a.M.; the position as received in the signal appeared
incorrect, and I rightly assumed it to be Lat. 54.20 N.,
Long. 5.0 E. Information received earlier from our di-
rectional wireless stations also led me to consider that a
ship of the High Sea Fleet was in the position named at
5.30 A.M., instead of at 9.19 a.m. On the return of E 23
to Harwich, her captain reported that he had attacked
the battle cruiser Der fflinger unsuccessfully at 3.13 A.M.
on the 20th. At 5 a.m., in spite of the strong enemy de-
stroyer screen, he succeeded in torpedoing the rear battle-
ship of the first Battle Squadron, a ship of the ““Nassau”
type. This ship turned for home on being torpedoed,
and proceeded under the escort of five destroyers, but
at 7.20 am. E 28 succeeded in again torpedoing her,
and the captain of EK 23 was of opinion that the ship was
sunk. Subsequent information, however, showed that she
reached port in a damaged condition; the persistent ac-
tion of the captain of E 28 in the face of great opposition,
was a finé example of the determined spirit animating our
submarine service.
On receipt of the reports from E 28, and from our
directional wireless stations, speed was increased, and
course shaped to a position at which it was hoped the
High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective of that
fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in
the neighbourhood as appeared possible. My intention
was to make for a position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40
E., where the Fleet would be favourably placed either to
engage the enemy before he closed the coast or to cut him
off from his bases afterwards. From previous experience
of coast raids, I formed the opinion that if that was his
objective the bombardment would be carried out either
shortly before dusk, or at daylight, in order to facilitate
escape afterwards, or approach before, unobserved. In
438 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
the possible alternative of the movement being designed
to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favourably
placed to prevent such an operation. At noon the Battle
Fleet was in position Lat. 55.42 N., Long. 1.04 E. steer-
ing south-south-east. Submarines were sighted by the
cruiser Minotaur at 1.23 p.m., and by the light cruiser
Boadicea at 1.88 p.m.; both these ships were in the vicin-
ity of the Battle Fleet which was manceuvred as neces-
sary to avoid the submarines; this caused some slight delay
in the southward movement.
The 11th Submarine Flotilla had been ordered to sea
in readiness to meet the Fleet, if required, and during
the forenoon of the 19th, was directed to spread on a line
running 180° from Lat. 55 N., Long. 0, where the sub-
marines would be clear of our Fleet and would be in a
position to attack the enemy’s vessels should they pro-
ceed towards our coast north of Flamborough Head; in
such an event the enemy would be between the Fleet and
the submarines,
The Active, with nine destroyers of the newly formed
4th Flotilla in the Humber, which was also at sea, was
directed to join the Battle Fleet.
At 1.45 p.m. I received information by wireless that
directional wireless stations placed enemy vessels at 12.30
P.M. in a position approximately Lat. 54.30 N., Long.
1.40 E. Our Battle Fleet at 1.45 p.m. was in Lat. 55.15
N., Long. 1.0 E., and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was well
ahead. If the High Sea Fleet had continued on the
same course after 12.30 p.m. as it had steered between
5.80 A.M. and 12.30 P.m., which would take them to
Hartlepool, it was evident that it might be sighted at any
moment by the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the distance between
the opposing Battle Fleets being only 42 miles; a signal
was therefore made to the Battle Fleet that the High
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 439
Sea Fleet might be encountered at any moment. The
meeting appeared to be so certain that I arranged the
distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet. On the as-
sumption that the enemy would turn to the eastward on
meeting us, I directed a concentration of fire of ships that
would be ahead of the Iron Duke on deployment, of two
ships on one, leaving the Iron Duke to deal with one
ship singly, as a compliment to her accurate firing at
Jutland. The conditions were eminently favourable to
us. The weather was clear. There seemed to be a very
good prospect that we might, on gaining touch with the
enemy, find that the Grand Fleet was in a position to cut
off the High Sea Fleet from its base, as it was probable
that we should be to the eastward, although farther north.
Our submarines were also well placed should the enemy
elect to make for our coast and try to escape to the north-
ward, where he would have found himself between the
Grand Fleet and the submarines. As time passed, how-
ever, and no reports of enemy vessels being sighted came
in from our light cruisers, it became evident that the High
Sea Fleet had turned back, probably owing to the fact
that the Zeppelins had warned the German Commander-
in-Chief of our presence and movements. On this as-
sumption, at 2.35 p.m. I directed Commodore Tyrwhitt
to steer for a position to the north-westward of Terschel-
ling, so that he might be ready to deliver a night attack
on the enemy’s fleet with the Harwich force.
It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would
leave a trap behind him in the shape of mines or subma-
rines, or both; and, indeed, the numerous submarines al-
ready sighted made it probable that the trap was ex-
tensive; it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters
which he had occupied unless there was a prospect of
bringing the High Sea Fleet to action.
440 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
It was clear that if no enemy vessels were in sight
by 4 p.m., and if he had turned for home, it would be
impossible to bring him to action; I therefore passed a
visual signal out at 3.5 p.m. to Sir David Beatty to the
effect that his force was to turn 16 points, if nothing was
in sight by 4 P.M.
At 3.20 p.m., however, the Rear-Admiral Command-
ing the 8rd Light Cruiser Squadron reported a subma-
rine in sight, and I signalled to Sir David Beatty to turn
at once, as it seemed that my supposition as to the sub-
marines was correct.
At 8.40 p.m. I directed the 5th Battle Squadron and
the cruisers ahead to turn. At this time I received in-
formation from our directional wireless stations that
enemy ships were in Lat. 54.14 N., Long. 2.0 E., at 2.45
P.M. It was evident then that the enemy was returning
to his bases, and was far beyond pursuit. I therefore
turned the Battle Fleet at 3.56 p.m., when in Lat. 54.40
N., Long. 1.01 E., reversing the course to pass up the
searched channel so as to avoid mines.
At 4.52 p.m. the Falmouth of the 3rd Light Cruiser
Squadron in Lat. 54.27 N., Long. 1.15 E., was hit by
two torpedoes, one right forward, and one right aft. The
ship was zigzagging at 23 knots speed at the time, and
the submarine was not seen, although the tracks of the
torpedoes were visible for about 300 yards on the star-
board bow after she had been hit. The Chester, stationed
astern of the Falmouth, proceeded at full speed to zigzag
in the vicinity with the object of keeping the submarine
submerged and preventing further attack. Another tor-
pedo was fired at the Falmouth at 5.14 p.m., but missed.
At 5.20 p.m. the destroyers Pasley, Pelican, and
Negro, detached to assist the Falmouth, arrived on the
scene and the Falmouth, under their escort, proceeded
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 441
towards the coast under her own steam, the Chester then
leaving to rejoin her squadron to the northward.
At 6.55 p.m. the Pelican sighted a periscope, tried
to ram the submarine, but missed. She then dropped six
depth charges and reported that the submarine came to
the surface almost immediately, and then appeared to
sink. Requests for tugs had meanwhile been signalled,
and four more destroyers were detached to assist to screen
the Falmouth, which was proceeding at five knots. The
ship eventually reached the vicinity of Flamborough
Head safely, and was there again hit by two more tor-
pedoes fired from a submarine. She still remained afloat,
and was towed by four tugs, and escorted by nine de-
stroyers until 8 p.m. on the 20th, when she sank in Lat.
54 N., Long. 0.2 W.
At 2.30 p.m. on the 20th, the destroyer Porpoise re-
ported having rammed a submarine that had attacked the
Falmouth.
To return to the Grand Fleet proceedings on the 19th.
From 3.10 p.m. onwards frequent reports were received
of submarines being sighted. The Phaeton, Dublin
(twice), and Southampton all reported submarines in
sight between 3.10 and 4.52 P.m., the time at which the
Falmouth was torpedoed. At 6 p.m. Sir David Beatty
reported that there was a German submarine screen of
several boats extending northeast for some 25 miles from
Lat. 54.19 N., Long. 1.0 E. At 6.7 p.m. Commodore
Tyrwhitt reported that he was following an enemy’s
force of heavy ships steering east, accompanied by two
Zeppelins. A reply was sent giving the position of the
Grand Fleet; the conditions for night attack proved to
be unfavourable, and at 7.30 p.m. the Commodore re-
ported that he had abandoned the pursuit; he returned
with his force to Harwich. At 6.20 p.m. reports received
442 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
from our directional stations showed that enemy ships
were in Lat. 54.16 N., Long. 2.51 E., at 4.52 P.M., giv-
ing clear evidence that the enemy was returning to his
base.
During the passage up the searched channel a
number of submarines were sighted and frequent, and
in some cases, large alterations of course were necessary
to avoid them; if all the reports were correct, the
locality indeed seemed to be a hotbed of submarines.
Reports of submarines being seen were received between
4 p.m. and dark, from the Galatea, Phaeton, Bellona,
Dublin, Southampton, Lion, Royal Sovereign (two sub-
marines), Queen Elizabeth, and Inflewible, the last ship
reporting that two torpedoes had been fired at her at
7.50 p.m., and that both had passed close astern; at this
time the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were in
company.
Zeppelins were also sighted during the afternoon by
the Chatham, Galatea, and Lion, and the trawlers Sea
Ranger and Ramexo; the last-named reported having
sighted a Zeppelin at a low altitude, and having scored
two hits and caused a fire in the forward car.
During the evening the Battle Cruiser Fleet was de-
tached to Rosyth, and the Battle Fleet continued to the
northward. Reports of submarines being sighted to the
eastward of the Pentland Skerries were received at 5
A.M. and 3.30 P.M. on the 20th, and the Battle Fleet was
therefore taken well to the northward to avoid them, and
approached the Pentland Firth from a north-easterly
direction, arriving without incident between 6.380 and
8 P.M.
The experience of August 19th showed that light
cruisers, proceeding at even the highest speed un-
screened by destroyers, ran considerable danger from
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 443
enemy submarines. The enemy’s submarine commanders
were no doubt increasing in efficiency, and risks,
which we could afford to run earlier in the War, were
now unjustifiable. Representations were made to the
Admiralty to the effect that it was considered that in
future light cruisers should be screened by at least one
destroyer per ship; the number of destroyers available
for the Grand Fleet did not at the time admit of
this, but as the total complement of 100 (the number
intended to be appropriated to the Fleet) was reached,
destroyers could be allotted to most of the light cruisers
in the advanced line, provided there were not many
absent from the Fleet carrying out extraneous ser-
vices.
The ease with which the enemy could lay a sub-
marine trap for the Fleet had been demonstrated on the
19th of August; what had constantly puzzled me was
that this had not been done very frequently at an earlier
stage in the War. Since, however, it had been attempted
and with some success, there seemed to be every reason
to expect a repetition of the operation, and it was
clear that it was unwise to take the Fleet far into
southern waters unless an adequate destroyer force
was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships.
If the circumstances were exceptional and the need
very pressing, it would be necessary to accept
the risk.» There was general agreement on this point
between the Flag officers of the Fleet and the
Admiralty.
During the month of August the weekly average of the
10th Cruiser Squadron showed:
No. of ships intercepted, including trawlers, 112;
No. sent in, 35; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports
444 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
or en route to or from patrols, 10; No. on special serv-
ice, 0.
The weather at Scapa and in the neighbourhood was
foggy and misty during a great part of the month. Much
mist or fog was experienced from the 1st to the 6th, the
10th to the 12th, and 13th to 16th.
During the month Grand Fleet submarines were ex-
ercised at Scapa Flow in carrying out attacks on ships
under way, and the destroyer flotillas were similarly
practised in making torpedo attacks, the Battle Fleet
divisions being exercised in countering such attacks
by turning movements. These exercises were continued
for the remainder of the year, and much experience was
obtained from them as to the different methods of deal-
ing with attacks by enemy destroyers during a Fleet
action.
CHAPTER XVII
THE SUBMARINE PERIL TO MERCHANT SHIPPING;
RECALL TO THE ADMIRALTY
Events were to prove that my period of command
of the Grand Fleet was drawing to a close, my transfer
to the Admiralty occurring at the end of November,
1917.
But before coming to that development something
must be said in continuation of the narrative of the work
of the Grand Fleet.
During the month of September, 1916, there was
not much movement by the Fleet as a whole. On the
4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light
Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth,
swept towards the Naze, then down to the southward
of the Little Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. On
the same day three divisions of destroyers from Scapa
endeavoured without success to locate a submarine re-
ported by the Talisman to the eastward of the Pent-
land Skerries. On the 7th a further unsuccessful
search for a submarine was carried out in the same
lozality.
On the 10th the Ist and 4th Light Cruiser Squad-
rons left Rosyth and Scapa respectively to exchange
bases, carrying out a search of the North Sea en route,
and on the 20th two light cruisers and four destroyers
left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on
the 4th.
445
446 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the
eastward made it necessary to move the patrol line of the
10th Cruiser Squadron temporarily farther west.
On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle
Cruiser Squadron, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, Cam-
pania, and the destroyer flotillas left Scapa for a cruise
between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands and the Nor-
wegian coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light
cruisers, and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit.
Battle exercises were carried out during the cruise. A
submarine was reported on the intended track of the fleet
on return, and the base was, therefore, approached by an-
other route, the available local patrol vessels being em-
ployed to keep the submarine submerged during the entry
of the fleet to Scapa.
Submarines were again active during the latter part
of the month in the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the
10th Cruiser Squadron, the position of the squadron being
shifted for that reason.
On the 26th two light cruisers and four destroyers
left Rosyth to search the waters to the southward of the
German North Sea mine-field, returning on the 28th.
On the same date the yacht Conqueror IT., the patrol
trawler Sarah Alice, and two British steamers were tor-
pedoed in the Fair Island Channel by enemy submarines.
On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow, destroyers were
detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against
the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these
waters.
Early on the 30th the Lion, with the Ist and 2nd
Battle Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron, and accompanied by a destroyer escort, left
Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze, then turned
to the northward and proceeded to Scapa.
SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 447
During September the cruiser patrols were continu-
ously maintained to the northward of the Shetlands and
on the Archangel routes, each patrol consisting of a cruiser
and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine patrol,
consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the
Horn Reef, The enemy had presumably found the pa-
trols inconvenient, and German destroyers on several oc-
casions during the month cruised at night in the area pa-
trolled with a view to interrupting our submarines when
recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent
change of position at night. Submarine G 12, when re-
turning from patrol on the 29th, sighted an enemy sub-
marine on the surface, and, being unable to get into posi-
tion to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did
not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged.
The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flo-
tilla (the 10th Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the
month, the base being the River Tees, and the parent ship
the Lucia, with two attendant destroyers. The forma-
tion of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also commenced,
this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be
formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet de-
stroyers to 100.
On the 21st the new battle cruiser Repulse, heavily
armed and of high speed, but with inadequate protection
for a battle cruiser, joined the Fleet at Scapa to work up
gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour protection
of this ship was about equal to that of the Australia and
New Zealand, and she was greatly inferior in this respect
to the Lion, and later battle cruisers. As already stated,
experience during the War had demonstrated very clearly
that our battle cruisers were at a marked disadvantage
in engaging German vessels of the same class, unless they
were provided with better protection than that given to
448 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
the Australia and earlier vessels. Proposals were, there-
fore, forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very con-
siderably to the deck protection of both the Repulse and
her sister ship, the Renown. These proposals were ap-
proved and the work carried out at the Fleet bases. AI-
though the ships were much improved by the alteration,
they were still far inferior in protection to the German
battle cruisers.
On the 28rd a new floating-dock, which had been built
on the Tyne, for light cruisers and destroyers, arrived at
Invergordon, and was a very useful addition to that most
valuable refitting base.
The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser
Squadron during September were:
No. of ships intercepted, 185; No. sent in, 45; No. on
patrol, 15; No. absent at ports or en route to or from
patrol, 9; No. on special service, 0.
The favourable weather and short nights, combined
with the large number of vessels maintained on patrol
were responsible for the increase in the number of ships
intercepted.
The weather as a whole was good during the month.
Fog or mist was prevalent on the 8rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th
and 27th, and a gale occurred on the 18th. Otherwise
the conditions were favourable.
In the early part of October, the activities of the
enemy’s submarines in the White Sea, which had been
considerable during the month of September, became
more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three
Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Slet-
ness, and a British vessel and Russian steamer fell vic-
tims to U 48, in Lat. 70.14 N., Long. 35.3 E. Some
submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in Lat.
69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the at-
SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 449
tack was successful. The Fearless, now a submarine
parent ship, and three submarines started for the White
Sea on October 13th from Scapa to operate from Alex-
androvsk against the hostile submarines. They arrived
on the 20th and began operations at once. During their
stay in the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any
enemy submarines, but there was a marked decrease in
enemy operations, possibly due to the cramping effect of
the presence of our vessels in those waters. The Fearless,
with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return
passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these
waters before the ice began to form.
On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships
of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer
Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to the eastward, returning
on the 4th,
On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and
swept towards the Naze, thence proceeding to a position
to the south-westward of the Little Fisher Bank, in which
our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef patrol had
reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting
suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours
were found there by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron;
three were selected and sent in for examination, but were
found to be in order.
On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left
Scapa to meet at sea the airships stationed at Longside,
near Peterhead, with a view to gaining experience in air-
ships and light cruisers working together. The pro-
gramme arranged could not be completed owing to bad
weather, but was carried out on a subsequent occasion,
and some useful hints were gained. This work was under-
taken as a preliminary to the airships being detailed to
accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south, as the
450 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
number of these craft completing in the near future jus-
tified such a procedure; although we still lacked airships of
the Zeppelin type, it was felt that those of the smaller
class might be able to carry out useful reconnaissance
work ahead of the Fleet if moving south on the western
side of the North Sea. We had already had consider-
able experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German
High Sea Fleet in this respect. That experience had
fully confirmed the views put forward in 1913 on this
subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval
Air Service came under my supervision. These views
were expressed on an occasion when the building of a
fleet of Zeppelins was being urged on behalf of the Navy.
It was then pointed out with emphasis how great would
be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in
connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual
conflict was proceeding as to the relative values of Zep-
pelin and heavier-than-air craft, but the views expressed
were that whatever future there might be for the latter as
development proceeded, there was no likelihood of their
having the radius of action necessary for scouting work
in a fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already
possessed it. My apology for making mention of this
fact is that it controverts the assertion so constantly made
that the senior officers in the Navy were not alive to the
value of air-craft before the War.
On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some
cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of
the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left Scapa to cruise to the
eastward, returning on the 10th.
On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers
left for a sweep, but were recalled on the 16th owing to
bad weather.
On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers
SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 451
sailed from Rosyth for a position to the westward of
Ekersund, and thence swept down to the Little Fisher
Bank and back to Rosyth, withont sighting anything of
interest.
On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight
destroyers left the northern bases to spread on a line be-
tween Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1 E., and Lat. 60 N., Long.
4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags, on a course
approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order
to search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was
repeated during daylight hours on two successive days;
no enemy vessels were sighted.
On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and
the 14th and 15th Flotillas left Scapa for a watching
and exercise cruise to the eastward, returning on the 24th.
During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried
out during the month of October, the Flag officers were
directed to carry out battle exercises based on the tactics
employed by the enemy during the Jutland action, with
a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet
these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from
all Flag officers.
On October 24th a division of destroyers, together
with sea-planes, was sent to the Fair Island Channel
to operate against enemy submarines reported to be using
this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during the
patrol.
On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak
to operate against an enemy decoy vessel reported in
those waters. On the same day the Kildonan Castle,
of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a sub-
marine and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N.,
Long. 18.30 W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol
line was consequently moved temporarily to the west-
452 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
ward, and trawlers were despatched to the neighbour-
hood.
On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers
sailed from Rosyth to carry out a reconnaissance of the
waters south of the German North Sea mine-field. They
returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy
vessels.
On October 81st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th
Flotilla left Rosyth for an observation and exercise
cruise in the central and northern positions of the
North Sea, and returned without incident on November
3rd.
During the month the Northern patrol north of the
Shetlands by one cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer
was continued, as were the patrol on the Archangel
route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn
Reef.
The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron
showed the following figures :—
No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on
patrol, 12; No. absent at ports or en route to or from
patrol, 12; No. on special service, 0.
Bad weather during the month interfered with the
operations of the squadron; gales were experienced on
the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th. There was little fog or
mist.
On November ist I left the Iron Duke at Cromarty
and proceeded to the Admiralty at the request of the
First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was the result of
letters I had written on the subject of the ever-growing
danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and
the necessity for the adoption of most energetic measures
to deal with this danger. It had been for some time my
opinion that unless the Navy could devise effective means,
SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 453
first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly, to pro-
tect our communications more successfully until the sub-
marines could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of
our being forced into making an unsatisfactory peace.
From information furnished to me it was evident that
the Germans were making special efforts to increase
the number of their submarines very largely, and there
did not seem to be much prospect, with the methods we
were at the time employing, of destroying subma-
rines at a rate at all approaching that of their con-
struction.
So far as I was aware there was an _ insufficient
reserve of food in the country to provide against the
consequences of successful action by enemy _ sub-
marines; and the construction of merchant-ships on
an adequate scale to replace those lost had not been
taken in hand, this being obviously an_ essential
measure. JI had written semi-officially for eighteen
months before on the matter.* It seemed to me
questionable whether our organisation at the Ad-
miralty included a sufficiently numerous and impor-
tant staff, having as its sole business the work of
dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem
which was assuming such very serious proportions.
It did not appear that new proposals and inven-
tions for dealing with the submarine campaign were be-
ing pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, pos-
sibly because of the absence of such an _ organisa-
tion, of difficulties connected with labour and matériel;
and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dan-
gers confronting us would be successfully com-
bated.
*The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food supplies or, at that
time, for merchant-ship building.
454 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson,
was alive to the danger, and that it caused him much
anxiety. We had corresponded very freely on all sub-
jects during his tenure of office at the Admiralty,
and I was aware of his views on matters connected
with the War, on which we had always been in complete
agreement. His direction and assistance in connection
with matters concerning the development and employ-
ment of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me,
and invaluable to the nation, and my hope was that
in putting forward my views as to the new and serious
danger confronting us, and the possible methods of
dealing with it, I should be rendering him assist-
ance in combating the menace. One of my suggestions
was the formation of a committee, or department, at
the Admiralty under a senior officer, and composed of
some of the clever and younger officers who had shown
marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole
object would be the development of arrangements for
dealing with the submarine warfare against merchant
shipping, and the production of the necessary material.
I pointed out that our existing methods were not
meeting with the success attained at an earlier period,
and gave the reasons which, in my opinion, were respon-
sible for this result.
I had also formed and expressed the opinion that
the High Sea Fleet would not be risked again in a
Fleet action, at any rate, until the submarine campaign
against merchant shipping had been fully tried and
had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I
suggested to the Admiralty the desirability of reducing
the number of destroyers in the Grand Fleet by one
flotilla for work against the enemy’s submarines in
waters where such action had some chance of success.
SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 455
I pointed out, once again, that offensive action against
submarines in the northern part of the North Sea (the
only waters in which Grand Fleet destroyers could be
used, and yet be available for work with the Fleet in
an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results,
as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water
open to them, always dive and escape. The areas in
which destroyers could act more effectively against
submarines were comparatively narrow and deep waters;
in restricted localities, such as some parts of the
English Channel, where the depth did not allow
of their resting on the bottom, if hunted. My conten-
tion was that it was probably wise to reduce the number
of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen
the force required to deal with the submarine danger,
even if this reduction necessitated sending the Grand
Fleet to sea short of one battle squadron, should
it have to deal with a grave emergency, such as at-
tempted invasion. The alternative, which I felt we
could not face, was to run the graver risk of serious
disaster from successful submarine warfare on merchant
shipping.
It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would
not risk a fleet action for some time, and even if this
Fleet undertook an operation having as its objective some
military advantage, I considered that with the Ist, 2nd
and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had
been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be
engaged with every prospect of success, provided always
that it was well screened from submarine attack and care-
fully handled. The only direction, apart from an attack
on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet
could inflict any material damage on us and which the
Grand Fleet could expect to be in a position to prevent,
456 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
lay in attempted invasion. The bombardment of coast
towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could
not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it hap-
pened to be at sea and in the right position at the right
moment.
The objection which might be raised to this policy,
which was otherwise to my mind correct, was the effect
on the public mind of the High Sea Fleet being at sea
without being brought to action, even if it could achieve
no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised
very fully the force of this objection, and the responsi-
bility involved in disregarding it. On the other hand,
the submarine danger to our shipping was most pressing
and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with at all costs,
and without delay, since the existence of the armies as
well as that of the civil population depended on merchant
shipping.
I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admir-
alty on November 5th.
On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th
Light Cruiser Squadron and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left
Scapa to cruise eastward of the Shetland Islands, return-
ing on November 4th.
On the 3rd the Botha, with four destroyers of the
14th Flotilla, left Scapa for a sweep northward along the
Norwegian coast from a position near Udsire Lighthouse
on the probable track of enemy submarines returning to
their bases. On the same day the Faulknor and six
destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried
out a similar sweep to the northward, starting from the
vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron and eight destroyers of the 18th Flotilla from
Rosyth supported both forces.
At 1.20 p.m., on November 5th, submarine J 1 on
SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 457
patrol off the Horn Reef, sighted four enemy battleships
of the “Kaiser” class in Lat. 56.6 N., Long. 6.53 EK.
A considerable sea was running, making it difficult to
prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had
a strong destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack
were very difficult. But Commander Lawrence succeeded,
in spite of these difficulties, in firing his four bow tor-
pedoes at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them took
effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned
to the southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a con-
siderable period, but unsuccessfully. It was learned sub-
sequently that the two damaged ships managed to reach
port, but this fact does not detract from the great credit
attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack
under exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident
showed, as in previous cases, the efficiency of the German
system of underwater protection in their capital ships.
On the 9th submarine G9 left to operate against
enemy submarines on their expected tracks.
From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was
experienced in northern waters; several merchant ships
were disabled and assistance was rendered to them by the
ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by tugs from
Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the
17th.
On the 18th the Otway, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron,
intercepted the Norwegian steamship Older, which was
found to be in charge of a prize crew from a German sub-
marine. She had on board, in addition, survivors of an
Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the sub-
marine. The Otway recaptured her, but was not in time
to prevent the Germans from exploding several bombs
in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did not, however,
succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway.
458 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
During the period up to November 19th, the weekly
average of work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the
following figures :—
No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on
patrol, 13; No. absent, 11; No. on special service, 0.
The weather throughout the period to the 19th No-
vember was very bad, and the figures showed a corre-
sponding reduction in the number of ships intercepted.
Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th,
16th, 17th and 18th.
On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squad-
rons, Ist and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser
Squadron, and destroyers proceeded to sea for a cruise in
northern waters, during which battle exercises were car-
ried out.
Shortly before the Iron Duke slipped from her buoy,
and whilst the remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its
way out of harbour, I received a telegram from the First
Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post of First Sea
Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I
consulted my chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and
he stated his opinion that I ought to accept the post in
order to be in a position to put into practice the views I
held as to the steps required to deal with the submarine
menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to
leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since
the outbreak of the War, for a position which I knew was
the most difficult that a sailor could be called upon to
fill in war time.
I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to
do whatever was considered best for the Service, and in
accordance with the wish expressed in his telegram, agreed
to meet him at Rosyth.
I then followed the Fleet to sea in the Iron Duke,
SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 459
and having completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned
over the Command of the Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil
Burney (second in command), with directions that the
ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded
in the Iron Duke to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning
of the 27th.
I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the
27th, on the question of taking up the work at the Ad-
miralty, and accepted the appointment. He intimated
to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir
David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the
Grand Fleet, and informed me also of the other changes
in Flag appointments that would be effected. I made
suggestions on some of these matters.
Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started
my preparations for the change of duties and the transfer
of command. I was under no delusion as to the difficulty
of the task before me. The attacks already made upon
the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses due
to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids
on our coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with
the means existing, fully prepared me for what was to
come,
I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the
production of fresh material, could become effective for
a period of at least six to twelve months. Indeed,
I was so certain of the course that events would take,
that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of
the Iron Duke (a very difficult task in view of the in-
tense regret that I felt at leaving them), I said that
they must expect to see me the object of the same
attacks as those to which my distinguished prede-
cessor, Sir Henry Jackson, had been exposed. I was
not wrong in this surmise. I left the Iron Duke with
460 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916
a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and can-
not close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet
during my twenty-eight months’ service as Com-
mander-in-Chief better than by quoting my fare-
well memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so
well.
“In bidding farewell to the Flag officers, Captains,
officers and men of the Fleet which it has been my
privilege to command since the commencement of the
War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all ranks
for their loyal support during a period which I know must
have tried their patience to the breaking-point.
“The disappointment which has so constantly attended
the southern movements of the Fleet might well have re-
sulted in a tendency to staleness and a feeling that the
strenuous efforts made to maintain the highest state of
efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for testing
the result were so seldom provided by our enemy.
“But this is far from being the case. I am proud to
be able to say, with absolute confidence, that the spirit
of keenness and enthusiasm has constantly grown, and I
am convinced that the Fleet gains in efficiency from day
to day. We have benefited by experience, and we have
turned that experience to good account.
“Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest
regret, I do so with the knowledge that officers and men
are imbued with that spirit which has carried their fore-
fathers to victory throughout all ages, whenever and
wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and
whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency,
I am perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they
will meet more than their match, ship for ship in all classes,
and that the result will never be for one moment in doubt.
SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 461
“May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious
victory resulting in a just and lasting peace!
“J. R. JELLICOE,
“Admiral.”
Appendix I
BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH
Iron Duke,
18th June, 1916.
No. 1395 H.F. 0022.
The Secretary
of the ApMIRraLty,
Sir,—
Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31 May,
1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.
2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the
general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left
its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued
by me.
8. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were
as follows:
(a) Those in company with me:
Iron Duke—Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag).
Marlborough—Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of Vice-
Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E.
Percy F. G. Grant, Chief of the Staff).
Colossus—Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound (flying the Flag of Rear-
Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.).
Hercules—Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker.
Neptune—Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard.
Collingwood—Captain James C. Ley.
Revenge—Captain Edward B. Kiddle.
A gincourt—Captain Henry M. Doughty.
463
464 APPENDIX
St. Vineent—Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O.
Bellona—Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton.
King George V.—Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of
Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.).
Orion—Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of Rear-
Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.).
Centurion—Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.
Conqueror—Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill.
Frin—Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C.
Thunderer—Captain James A. Fergusson.
Monarch—Captain George H. Borrett.
Ajaxz—Captain George H. Baird.
Boadicea—Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.
Benbom—Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice-
Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.).
Superb—Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear-
Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B.).
Canada—Captain William C. M. Nicholson.
Bellerophon—Captain Edward F. Bruen.
Temeraire—Captain Edwin V. Underhill.
Vanguard—Captain James D. Dick.
Royal Oak—Captain Crawford Maclachlan.
Blanche—Captain John M. Casement.
Minotaur—Captain Arthur C. S. H. D’Aeth (flying the Flag of Rear-
Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.).
Hampshire—Captain Herbert J. Savill.
Cochrane—Captain Eustace La T. Leatham.
Shannon—Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.
Defence—Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.).
Duke of Edinburgh—Captain Henry Blackett.
Black Prince—Captain Thomas P. Bonham.
Warrior—Captain Vincent B. Molteno.
Invincible—Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
The Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.).
Indomitable—Captain Francis W. Kennedy.
Inflexible—Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O.
Calliope—Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier.
Caroline—Captain H. Ralph Crooke.
Comus—Captain Alan G. Hotham.
APPENDIX 465
Constance—Captain Cyril S. Townsend.
Royalist—Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O.
Canterbury—Captain Percy M. R. Royds.
Chester—Captain Robert N. Lawson.
Active—Captain Percy Withers.
Castor—Commodore (F.) James R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O.
Tipperary—Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour.
Broke—Commander Walter L. Allen.
Shark—Commander Loftus W. Jones.
Acasta—Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron.
Spitfire—Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny.
Sparrowhawk—Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins.
Achates—Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.C.
Ambuscade—Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles.
Ardent—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden.
Fortune—Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry.
Porpoise—Commander Hugh D. Colville.
Unity—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky.
Garland—Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff.
Christopher—Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr.
Contest—Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master.
Onl—Commander Robert G. Hamond.
Hardy—Commander Richard A. A. Plowden.
Midge—Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish.
Ophelia—Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe.
Kempenfelt—Commander Harold E. Sulivan.
Ossory—Commander Harold V. Dundas.
Martial—Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison.
Magic—Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter.
Minion—Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings.
Mystic—Commander Claude F. Allsup.
Mons—Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin.
Mandate—Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C. W. Lawrie.
Michael—Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate.
Marne—Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford.
Milbrook—Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor.
Manners—Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison.
Moon—Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin.
Mounsey—Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre.
Morning Star—Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher.
466 APPENDIX
Faulknor—Captain (D) Anselan J. B. Stirling.
Marksman—Commander Norton A. Sulivan.
Obedient—Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell.
Mindful—Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley.
Marvel—Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb.
Onslaught—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.
Menad—Commander John P. Champion.
Narwhal—Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson.
Nessus—Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter.
Noble—Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer.
Opal—Commander Charles G. C. Sumner.
Nonsuch—Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon.
Menace—Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand.
Munster—Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell.
Mary Rose—Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan.
Mischief—Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O.
Oak—Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O.
Abdiel—Commander Berwick Curtis.
(b) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty:
Lion—Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of
Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.);
Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff.
Princess Royal—Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying
the Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.).
Tiger—Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.
Queen Mary—Captain Cecil I. Prowse.
New Zealand—Captain John F. E. Green (flying the Flag of Rear-
Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.).
Indefatigable—Captain Charles F. Sowerby.
Southampton—Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.
Nottingham—Captain Charles B. Miller.
Birmingham—Captain Arthur A. M. Duff.
Dublin—Captain Albert C. Scott.
Galatea—Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.
Inconstant—Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G.
Phaeton—Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O.
Cordelia—Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish.
Falmouth—Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Ad-
miral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.).
APPENDIX 467
Birkenhead—Captain Edward Reeves.
Gloucester—Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.
Yarmouth—Captain Thomas D. Pratt.
“Barham”—Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear-
Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.).
Warspite—Captain Edward M. Phillpotts.
Valiant—Captain Maurice Woollcombe.
Malaya—Captain The Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B.,
M.V.O.
Champion—Captain (D.) James U. Farie.
Nestor—Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham.
Nomad—Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield.
Narborough—Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett.
Obdurate—Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams.
Petard—Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson.
Pelican—Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie.
Nerissa—Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge.
Onslomw—Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey.
Moresby—Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison.
Nicator—Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta.
Fearless—Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper.
Acheron—Commander Charles G. Ramsey.
Ariel—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet.
Attack—Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James.
Hydra—Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop.
Badger—Commander G. A. Fremantle.
Goshawk—Commander Dashwood F. Moir.
Defender—Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer.
Lizard—Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke.
Lapning—Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye.
Lydiard—Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith.
Liberty—Lieutenant-Commander Philip W. S. King.
Landrail—Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart.
Laurel—Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet.
Moorsom—Commandér John C. Hodgson.
Morris—Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham.
Turbulent—Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart.
Termagent—Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake.
Engadine—Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson.
468 APPENDIX
4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the Ist and 2nd
Battle Cruiser Squadrons, Ist, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons
and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas, supported by the
5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting
to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the
8rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th
Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas.
5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after
the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course
steered by the latter during the first hour of their action with the
enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our
battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets
would never have been in contact.
The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and
admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under
Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times, dis-
advantageous conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with the
best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable advan-
tage in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the German
Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and German battle
cruisers in the matter of protection must not be forgotten. The Ger-
man vessels are in this respect equal to powerful battleships, whereas
our battle cruisers, particularly those of the 2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser
Squadrons, are very lightly protected. The main difficulty with which
our ships had to contend was the bad light. All reports mention the
difficulty experienced in seeing the enemy vessels to the eastward,
whilst remarking on the clearness of the western horizon. A photo-
graph taken from Malaya during the action indicates this fact very
clearly.
During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged
with the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the
advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and
the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting quali-
ties of the personnel.
6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir
David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came
upon the scene:
“At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from Galatea indicating the
presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately
APPENDIX 469
altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force
between the enemy and his base.
“At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the
eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward
and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the
Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly
altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at
3.31 p.m. They appeared to be five battle cruisers.
“After the first report of the enemy the Ist and 3rd Light Cruiser
Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders
spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the battle
cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled
up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at
long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had
come in at high speed and was able to take station ahead of the battle
cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the course on which we first
engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the light cruiser
squadrons was excellent and of great value.
“From a report from Galatea at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the
enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit of light
cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered Engadine to send up a seaplane and
scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by
3.8 p.m. a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as
Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as Observer, was well
under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in Engadine
about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low,
and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had
to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light
cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in
no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-
Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be con-
gratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under
such circumstances are of distinct value.
“At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of
Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the Ist
Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flo-
tillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging
on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed
the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle
Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing
470 APPENDIX:
N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun
behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base,
our situation was both tactically and strategically good.
“At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards,
both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered
to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the
enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.
“Shortly after 4 p.m. Indefatigable, after a violent explosion, fell
out of the line, turned over and sank.
“At 4.8 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened
fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to
slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through a screen
of enemy submarines. The destroyer Landrail of 9th Flotilla, who
was on our port beam trying to take station ahead, sighted the
periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing con-
siderable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of Lydiard and
Landrail undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers from closer sub-
marine attack. Nottingham also reported a submarine on the star-
board beam.
“Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, Nestor, Nomad, Nicator,
Narborough, Pelican, Petard, Obdurate, Nerissa, with Moorsom and
Morris of 10th Flotilla, Turbulent and Termagent of the 9th Flotilla,
having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when oppor-
tunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m. simultaneously with a simi-
lar movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried
out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before
arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an
enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce
engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy
were forced to retire on their battle cruisers, having lost two destroyers
sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sus-
tained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle
ernisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers
having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was there-
fore unfavourable for torpedo attack.
“Nestor, Nomad and Nicator, gallantly led by Commander the
Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of Nestor, pressed home their attack on
the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them at a range of 6,000
and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy’s
secondary armament. Nomad was badly hit and apparently remained
APPENDIX 471
stopped between the lines. Subsequently Nestor and Nicator altered
course to the S.E., and in a short time the opposing battle cruisers
having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of
a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a
terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for
torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at
a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo,
Nestor was badly hit and swung to starboard, Nicator altering course
inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the
last torpedo. Nicator made good her escape and subsequently rejoined
the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. Nestor remained stopped, but was
afloat when last seen. Moorsom also carried out an attack on the
enemy’s battle fleet.
“Petard, Nerissa, Turbulent and Termagent also pressed home
their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after the
engagement with enemy destroyers. Petard reports that all her tor-
pedoes must have crossed the enemy’s line, while Nerissa states that
one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks
were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty’s Navy, and were
worthy of its highest traditions.
“From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle
cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle
Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately at very
long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that
of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third
enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-east-
ward had become considerably reduced and the outline of the ships very
indistinct.
“At 4.26 p.m. there was a violent explosion in Queen Mary; she was
enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of her
officers and men were subsequently picked up by Laurel.
“At 4.38 p.m. Southampton reported the enemy’s Battle Fleet
ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m, the enemy’s
Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in suc-
cession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead
them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers altered
course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. Southampton
with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the southward to ob-
serve. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy battle fleet and
came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. Southampton’s reports
472 APPENDIX
were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an
opposite course and engaging the enemy battle cruisers with all guns.
The position of the enemy battle fleet was communicated to them, and
I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh
Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in Barham, this squadron supported us bril-
liantly and effectively.
“At 4.57 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and
came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet.
Fearless with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle cruisers,
and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. Champion with 13th
Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the Ist and
3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the
southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light
Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.
“The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships
being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the
enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly
at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van
at about 6 p.m. Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a
northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this
time the enemy received very severe punishment, and undoubtedly one
of their battle cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged con-
dition. This came under my personal observation and was corrobo-
rated by Princess Royal and Tiger. Other enemy ships also showed
signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. Onslow and Moresby, who had
been detached to assist Engadine with the seaplane, rejoined the battle
cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of
Lion. At 5.10 p.m. Moresby, being 2 points before the beam of the
leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at the 8rd in their line. Eight
minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to
be the 6th ship in the line. Moresby then passed between the lines
to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined Champon. In corroboration
of this, Fearless reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on
fire at about 5.10 p.m., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke
and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of Queen
Mary and Indefatigable.
“At 5.35 p.M. our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position of
the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-
eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was
gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the
APPENDIX 473
head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his
light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third
Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide Indomitable’s report). Possibly Zep-
pelins were present also. At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted
on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Grand
Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east and
proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy
down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the Commander-in-Chief
that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three
of the enemy battle cruisers were visible, closely followed by battle-
ships of the “Kénig” class,
At about 6.5 p.m. Onslow, being on the engaged bow of Lion,
sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, ap-
parently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. Onslow at once
closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000
to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. Onslow then closed the
enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be
fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell,
with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his
torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at
slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he
closed the light cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The
enemy’s battle fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes
were fired at them; having started correctly, they must have crossed
the enemy’s track. Damage then caused Onslow to stop.
“At 7.15 p.m. Defender, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots,
while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell which
damaged her foremost boiler, closed Onslow and took her in tow. Shell
were falling all round them during this operation, which, however,
was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the en-
suing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two strug-
gled on together until 1. p.m. Ist June, when Onslow was transferred to
tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be
gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander
J. C. Tovey of Onslow, and Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of De-
fender, for special recognition. Onslow was possibly the destroyer
referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 8rd Light Cruiser
Squadron, as follows:
““Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a de-
stroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition
474 APPENDIX
soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again,
and made straight for the Derfflinger to attack her. The incident ap-
peared so courageous that it seems desirable to investigate it further.’ ”
Procervines or Barrie Fieer
7. On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted,
the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying Cruiser and Destroyer
Force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course to close
the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before
the arrival of the battle fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the
older battleships were severely tested. Great credit is due to the
engine-room departments for the manner in which they, as always,
responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess
of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels.
The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral
the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, which was in advance of the battle fleet,
was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. The difference in reckon-
ing between Lion and the Iron Duke, which was inevitable under the
circumstances existing, apparently caused the Third Battle Cruiser
Squadron to press rather too far to the eastward, and it was not until
5.30 p.m. that this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the
sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent the
Chester (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship en-
gaged three or four enemy light cruisers at about 5.45 p.m. The
engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period
Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy
odds, and although the ship suffered considerably in easualties her
fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 p.m.
she rejoined the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron.
The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-west-
ward, and at 6.10 p.m. sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking
station ahead of the Lion at 6.21 p.m. in accordance with the orders of
the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet. He reports as
follows:
“TI ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out
magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action
ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors.
At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Third
Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from
APPENDIX 475
the enemy’s leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her, and »
caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made
a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of the bearing and distance
of the enemy battle fleet. At 6.33 p.m. Invincible blew up.
“After the loss of Invincible, the squadron was led by Inflezible
until 6.50 p.m. By this time the battle cruisers were clear of our
leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3 miles, and I
ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern
and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indiffer-
ent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily
lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the
visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us
than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, en-
abling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite
superiority over them. The damage received by our ships during this
period, excepting the destruction of Invincible, was slight. From the
reports of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the
enemy suffered severely, battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head
of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the
majority of our battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle
Squadron were also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral
Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be
safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.
“From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the
Third Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on
our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 p.m. attacked with
the torpedo. Falmouth and Yarmouth both fired torpedoes at the
leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit,
as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light
Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gun-
fire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fight-
ing efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral
Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack.
Indomitable reports that about this time one of the Derfflinger class
fell out of the enemy’s line.
8. Meanwhile, at 6 p.m., Canterbury (Captain Percy M. R. Royds)
had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on the tor-
pedo-boat destroyer Shark (Commander Loftus W. Jones), Acasta
(Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and Christopher (Lieu-
476 APPENDIX.
tenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this engagement
the Shark was sunk.
9. At 5.45 p.m. the report of guns had become audible to me, and
at 5.55 p.m. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard
beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished and the
position of the enemy’s battle fleet could not be determined. The
difference in reckoning between Iron Duke and Lion mentioned in
paragraph 6 added to the uncertainty of the general situation.
10. Shortly after 5.55 p.m. some of the cruisers ahead, under
Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, were
seen to be in action, and reports received show that Defence, Flagship
(Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and Warrior (Captain Vincent B. Mol-
teno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light cruiser
at this time, which subsequently sank.
11. At 6 p.m. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle cruisers,
were sighted by Marlborough bearing before the starboard beam of the
battle fleet.
At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser
Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle cruisers, and at
6.14 p.m. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.
At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle cruisers
and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to ensure that
our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.
12. I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir
David Beatty’s report, and during deployment the fleets became en-
gaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle cruisers
ahead of the battle fleet.
The divisions of the battle fleet were led by:
The Commander-in-Chief,
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,
Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram,
Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee,
Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff,
Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson.
Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt.
13, At 6.16 p.m. D-fence and Warrior were observed passing down
between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy
fire. Defence was seen to blow up and Warrior passed to the rear
APPENDIX 477
disabled. It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his en-
gagement with the enemy’s light cruisers and in his desire to complete
their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy’s heavy
ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to
the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were
caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when Black
Prince (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk,
but as a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 P.M.
reporting the position of a submarine, it is possible that her loss was
the result of a torpedo attack. There is much strong evidence of the
presence of a large number of enemy submarines in the vicinity of the
scene of the action.
14, The First Battle Squadron, which was in the rear on deploy-
ment, became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening
fire at 6.17 p.m. on a battleship of the “Kaiser” class. The centre
squadron, which had previously been firing at an enemy light cruiser,
opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battleship of the “Kénig” class, and the
van squadron commenced immediately afterwards.
At 6.6 p.m. the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron,
then in company with the battle cruisers, had sighted the starboard
wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of Barham, and the
first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the
remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the direction of deploy-
ment he was compelled to form astern, a manceuvre which was well
executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy battle fleet.
An accident to Warspite’s steering gear caused her helm to become
jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy’s
line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling
enabled Captain Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat
awkward situation.
Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was pos-
sible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy’s battle line. To-
wards the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once.
More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight
to twelve.
The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from
6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, dur-
ing which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from S.E.
by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned
away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks’ and
478 APPENDIX
smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and the altera-
tions, of course, had the effect of bringing the British Fleet (which
commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the
enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line, but at the
same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.
At 6.55 p.m. Iron Duke passed the wreck of Invincible with Badger
standing by. I was not aware of the loss of Queen Mary and Inde-
fatigable until the following day.
15. During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High
Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire
kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet
caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be
constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line, and at
least one to sink. The enemy’s return fire at this period was not ef-
fective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.
Tuer Battie Cruisers IN THE VAN
16. Sir David Beatty reports:
“Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S.
to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them
at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were
two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the ‘Kénig’
class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that
was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved consider-
ably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m.
and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 p.m. my course was S.W.,
speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W.
Again after a very short time the enemy showed signs of punishment,
one ship being on fire while another appeared to drop right astern.
The destroyers at the head of the enemy’s line emitted volumes of
grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of
which they undoubtedly turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight
of them.
“At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squad-
rons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy’s
line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support. We soon
located two battle cruisers and battleships, and more heavily engaged
at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit
repeatedly by Lion and turned away 8 points, emitting very high
APPENDIX 479
flames and with a heavy list to port. Princess Royal set fire to a three-
funnelled battleship; New Zealand and Indomitable report that the
third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling
over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them,
and Falmouth reported they were last seen at 8.38 p.m. steaming to
the westward.
“At 8.40 p.m. all our battle cruisers felt a heavy shock, as if struck
by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however,
examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it
is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel. This
seems a very probable explanation in view of the condition in which the
enemy was last seen.”
17. As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very
much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility
and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a “following”
or “chasing” fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently.fired,
but only one took effect (on Marlborough), and even in this case the
ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. The
menace of effective torpedo attack on a long line, however, ‘in weather
conditions which were ideal for the purpose, contributed to the dif-
ficulty of keeping within effective gun range of the enemy. Two
separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.
Deraits or Barrie Firer Action
18. The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil
Burney, came into action at 6.15 p.m. with the enemy’s Third Battle
Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe
punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle cruisers and light
cruisers which were also engaged. The fire of Marlborough (Captain
George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This ship com-
menced at 6.17 p.m. by firing seven salvoes at a ship of the “Kaiser”
class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she
was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard,
but re-opened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser and at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen
rapid salvoes at a ship of the “Kénig” class, hitting her frequently
until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective
fire was kept up, in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused
by the torpedo, was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example
to the squadron.
480 APPENDIX
The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000
yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy’s
return fire than the remainder of the battle fleet, with the exception of
the Fifth Battle Squadron. Colossus was hit but not seriously damaged,
and othereships were straddled with fair frequency.
In the Fourth Battle Squadron—in which squadron my Flagship
Iron Duke was placed—Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, leading
one of the divisions, the enemy engaged was the Third Squadron and
some of the battle cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light
cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the
fire of the squadron was effective. Iron Duke, having previously fired
at a light cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battle-
ship of the “Kénig” class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was
very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo, and
only ceased when the target ship turned away. The rapidity with
which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent
gunnery organisation of the flagship so ably commanded by my Flag
Captain, Captain Frederic C. Dreyer.
The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed
at enemy battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist.
Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.
The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir
Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the “Kaiser’’ or “Konig”
classes between 6.30 and 7.20 p.m., and fired also at an enemy battle
cruiser which had apparently dropped back severely damaged.
19. During the action between the battle fleets, the Second Cruiser
Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, with
the addition of Duke of Edinburgh of the First Cruiser Squadron,
occupied a position at the van of the battle fleet and acted as a con-
necting link between the battle fleet and the battle cruiser fleet. This
squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an oppor-
tunity of coming into action.
The attached cruisers Boadicea, Active, Blanche, and Bellona car-
ried out their duties as repeating ships with remarkable rapidity and
accuracy under difficult conditions.
The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles
E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack
enemy destroyers at 7.20 p.m. and again at 8.18 p.m. when they sup-
ported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore
James R. P. Hawkesley to attack. On each occasion the Fourth
APPENDIX 481
Light Cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le
Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object
was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the
ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between
6,500 and 8,000 yards. The Calliope was hit several times but did not
sustain serious damage, although, I regret to say, she had several
casualties. The light cruisers attacked the enemy’s battleships with
torpedoes at this time, but were not able to observe the result; an ex-
plosion on board a ship of the “Kaiser” class was seen, however, at
8.38 P.M.
During these destroyer attacks, four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers
were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light cruisers and destroyers.
Nicut Disprosirions
20. At 9 p.m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat
of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching
darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night
with a view to its safety from such attacks whilst providing for a
renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly mancuvred to remain
between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position
in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack
and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy’s
heavy ships.
Nieur Arracss By Fiotiryas
21. During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked,
but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore
Hawkesley and Captains Wintour and Stirling, delivered a series of
very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy
losses.
22. It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth
Flotilla occurred, including that of Tipperary with the gallant leader
of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high
pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the
enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken and many gallant
actions were performed by the flotilla.
Two torpedoes were seen at least to take effect on enemy vessels
as the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from
Spitfire (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the
482 APPENDIX
other from either Ardent (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden),
Ambuscade (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or Garland
(Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S: Goff).
23. ‘The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anse-
lan J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked,
which consisted of six large vessels besides light cruisers, comprised
vessels of the “Kaiser” class, and were almost completely surprised. A
large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and
third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she
was observed to blow up. A second attack made twenty minutes later
by Menad (Commander John T. Champion) on the five vessels still
remaining resulted in the second ship in the line being also hit and
blown up.
The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on
reaching the rear of the line, but Onslaught was the only vessel] which
received any material injuries. In Onslaught Sub-lieutenant Harry
W. A. Kemnis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the
only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out
of action and reached Rosyth.
24. During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, Castor
(Commodore John R. P. Hawkesley) leading, the flotilla engaged and
sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point blank range.
The 13th Flotilla under the command of Captain James U. Farie in
Champion took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At
0.30 a.m. on Thursday, Ist June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the
flotilla at high speed. She passed close to the Petard and Turbulent,
switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire which severely dam-
aged Petard and disabled Turbulent. At 3.30 a.m. Champion was
engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. Moresby re-
ports four ships of “Deutschland” class sighted at 2.35 a.m. at whom
she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by
Moresby and Obdurate.
Abdiel, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out
her duties with the success which has always characterised her work.
There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas;
they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of
them.
Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light
Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for
about fifteen minutes at 10.20 p.m. with a squadron comprising one
APPENDIX 483
enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which period Southampton
and Dublin suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming
and fighting qualities were not impaired. It is reasonable to suppose
that they inflicted considerable damage on their opponents.
ProceEepines on Ist JuNE
25. At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet being then to the south-
ward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in
search of enemy vessels, and for the purpose of collecting our own
cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. Vice-Admiral Sir
Cecil Burney transferred his flag from Marlborough to Revenge, as the
former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed of the squad-
ron. Marlborough was detached by my direction to a base, being un-
successfully attacked en route by enemy submarines. The visibility
early on Ist June (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and
difficulty was experienced in meeting all ships, the torpedo-boat de-
stroyers not rejoining until 9 a.m. The waters from the latitude
of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched,
and some survivors from the destroyers Ardent, Fortune, and Tipper-
ary were picked up, and the Sparrowhawk, which had been in collision
and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken
off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and
at 1.15 p.m., it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded
in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were
reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser
squadron was detached to search for Warrior, which vessel had been
abandoned whilst in tow of Engadine on her way to the base owing te
bad weather setting in, and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no
trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light
cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she
foundered.
26. The fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30
P.M. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.
Lossrs
27. The conditions of low visibility under which the day action
took place, the approach of darkness and the tactics adopted by the
enemy of retiring under cover of torpedo attacks, enhance the diffi-
484 APPENDIX
culty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted, or the
names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful exam-
ination of the evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy
vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of
these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure
gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not
entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, particularly
those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the
vessels sunk it is unquestionable that many other ships were very
seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.
28. The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of
him, and showed humanity in rescuing officers and men from the
water. I particularly admired the conduct of those on board a dis-
abled German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly
after deployment, under a heavy fire which was returned by the only
gun left in action. But after the arrival of the British Battle Fleet,
there appeared to be no desire on the part of the High Sea Fleet to
continue the engagement. The battleships turned away on each occa-
sion of being sighted soon after fire was opened, and although the
British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near
the line of approach to German ports until 11 a.m. on Ist June, in
spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the
danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines
and torpedo craft, the enemy made no sign, and I was reluctantly com-
pelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port.
Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our
position must have been known to the enemy, as at 2.50 a.m. the fleet
engaged a Zeppelin for quite five minutes, during which time she had
ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and
course of the British Fleet.
29. I deeply regret to report the loss of H. M. Ships mentioned
in this despatch, and still more do I regret the resultant heavy
loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as
Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon.
Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse,
Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles
J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished
with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led
officers and men who were equally gallant and whose death is
APPENDIX 485
mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their
duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.
Tuer PerRsonNEL oF THE FLEET
30. The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night
actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them
justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of
the past were most worthily upheld—whether in heavy ships, cruisers,
light cruisers, or destroyers—the same admirable spirit prevailed.
Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that
would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the
wounded was the admiration of all.
I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the
Fleet filled me.
31. I have now given details of the work of the various ships
during action. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude
to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during
action the officers and men of that department perform their most
important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course
of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and
endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they
were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations
under review. Many ships attained speeds that had never before been
reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming ef-
ficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and
many instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the
engine-room departments of injured ships.
32. The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very
largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and
invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing
critical operations and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties,
they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we
owe a deep debt of gratitude.
33. It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the
Battle Cruiser Fleet, the Fifth Battle Squadron, and the flotillas. This
was inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas
mentioned as well as the individual vessels composing them were
handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the Ist, 2nd, and 4th
Squadrons of the battle fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
486 APPENDIX
34. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have named the Command-
ing Officers of all the ships mentioned above, and I desire to place on
record my high appreciation of the manner in which all vessels were
handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and
ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous
throughout the day.
I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by
Vice-Admiral ‘Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand
Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton
' Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander
L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, and Rear-Admiral Ernest
F. A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the battle fleet.
They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney’s
squadron owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy battle
fleet than the squadrons ahead, and under a leader who has rendered
me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did
excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear-
Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David
Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear
of the battle fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.
Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant
leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He ap-
preciated the situation at once on sighting first the enemy’s lighter
forces, then his battle cruisers and finally his battle fleet. I can fully
sympathise with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light
robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manceuvred
and for which the vessels in company’ with him had striven so hard.
The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous
occasions, have been of the very greatest value.
Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded
him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner
in which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron
into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William C.
Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good work
performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command respec-
tively of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, Commodore William
E. Goodenough and Commodore: Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He
states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and
used their forces to the best possible effect. I most fully endorse all
APPENDIX 487
his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report
regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff:
“I desire to bring to your notice the great assistance that I re-
ceived on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the
Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the
greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander,
The Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the
effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the
enemy’s discomfiture; my secretary, Frank T. Spickernell, who made
accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost
value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant-
Commander Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communica-
tions under the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his
signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers
carried out their duties with great coolness on the manoeuvring plat-
form, where they were fully exposed to the enemy’s fire.”
35. I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant
work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden,
K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of twenty-one months of war
his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his
long experience in fleets, special gift for organisation, and his capacity
for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and
have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct
of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet
action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist,
and his judgment never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.
My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey,
C.M.G., the Captain of the Fleet, who also renders me much assistance
in the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation is
largely due the rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and replenished
with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance
to me during the action.
Commander Charles M. Forbes, my flag-commander, and Com-
mander Roger M. Bellairs of my staff, plotted the movements of the
two fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Com-
mander the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my staff, acted as ob-
server aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value.
These officers carried out their duties efficiently during the action.
The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Com-
mander Alexander R. W. Wood, assisted by the other signal officers,
488 APPENDIX
and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions.
My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was
also of much service to me throughout the action.
The high state of efficiency of the W.T. arrangements of the Fleet
and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and after
the action is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out
by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have been in-
valuable throughout the war.
A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all
ships,
My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and
Victor H. T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the
action. Their records have been of much assistance.
To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am in-
debted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout
the operations.
36. In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of
their Lordships the names of other officers and men who did not come
under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of
specially distinguishing themselves.
T an, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) J. R. Juxuicor,
Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.
Enclosure in Home Fleets Letter No. 1395, H.F. 0022, dated
LIST OF
ft tet D>
18th June, 1916.
ENEMY VESSELS CONSIDERED TO BE SUNK,
31st May—lIst June, 1916.
Battleships or Battle Cruisers.
Battleships, “Dreadnought” type .
Battleship, “Deutschland” type é | certain.
Battleship or Battle Cruiser :
Battleship, “Dreadnought” type. } Probable.
Light Cruisers.
Light Cruisers
Heavy ship or Light Cruiser . . }certain
Torpedo-boat Destroyers.
Torpedo-boat Destroyers » . . Certain.
Torvedo-boat Destroyers - . . Probable.
Submarines.
Submarine. . . . . . . «= Certain.
Submarines . «© « « « «© ~~ Possible.
Appendix II
ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA, ON SUNDAY,
24th JANUARY, 1915
ADMIRALTY,
8rd March, 1915.
Tue following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir
David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle
Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday,
the 24th of January, 1915:—
H.M.S. Princess Royal,
2nd February, 1915.
Smr,—I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th Janu-
ary, 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company:
The Battle Cruisers Lion, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O.,
flying my flag; Princess Royal, Captain Osmond de B. Brock, Aide-
de-Camp; Tiger, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.0.; New Zealand,
Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the flag of Rear-
Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.; and Indomitable, Cap-
tain Francis W. Kennedy.
The Light Cruisers Southampton, flying the broad pendant of
Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; Nottingham, Captain
Charles B. Miller; Birmingham, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff; and
Lowestoft, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my
port beam.
Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in Arethusa, Aurora,
Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, Undaunted, Captain Francis G. St.
John, M.V.O., Arethusa, and the Destroyer Flotillas were ahead.
At 7.25 a.m. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly after-
wards a report reached me from Aurora that she was engaged with
490
APPENDIX 491
enemy’s ships. J immediately altered course to S.S.E., increased to
22 knots, and ordered the Light Cruisers and Flotillas to chase S.S.E.
to get in touch and report movements of enemy.
This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed, my
wishes had already been forestalled by the respective Senior Officers,
and reports almost immediately followed from Southampton, Arethusa,
and Aurora as to the position and composition of the enemy, which
consisted of 3 Battle Cruisers and Bliicher, 6 Light Cruisers, and a
number of Destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course
to S.E. From now onwards the Light Cruisers maintained touch with
the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.
The Battle Cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the
southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme
visibility. At 7.30 a.m. the enemy were sighted on the port bow steam-
ing fast, steering approximately S.E. distant 14 miles.
Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position
on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to S.E. parallel to
them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our
speed until we reached 28.5 knots. Great credit is due to the Engi-
neer Staffs of New Zealand and Indomitable—these ships greatly
exceeded their normal speed.
At 8.52 a.m., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear
ship, the Battle Cruisers manceuvred to keep on a line of bearing so
that guns would bear, and Lion fired a single shot, which fell short.
The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with Light Cruisers
ahead and a large number of Destroyers on their starboard beam.
Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.9
a.M. Lion made her first hit on the Blicher, No. 4 in the line. The
Tiger opened fire at 9.20 a.m. on the rear ship, the Lion shifted to
No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvoes.
The enemy returned our fire at 9.14 a.m. Princess Royal, on coming
into range, opened fire on Bliicher, the range of the leading ship being
17,500 yards at 9.35 a.m. New Zealand was within range of Bliicher,
which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. Princess
Royal shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable
damage on her.
Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a
position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our
range with their smoke; but the enemy’s destroyers threatening attack,
492 APPENDIX
the Meteor and “M” Division passed ahead of us, Captain the Hon.
H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this Division with conspicuous ability.
About 9.45 a.m. the situation was as follows: Bliicher, the fourth in
their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gun-
fire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. Lion was engag-
ing No. 1, Princess Royal No. 3, New Zealand No. 4, while the Tiger,
who was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when inter-
fered with by smoke, at their No. 4.
The enemy’s destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen
their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared
to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and
certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader,
thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers,
therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing N.N.W., and pro-
ceed at their utmost speed.
Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack.
Lion and Tiger opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and re-
sume their original course.
The Light Cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port
quarter of the enemy’s line, enabling them to observe, and keep touch,
or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.
At 10.48 a.m. the Bliicher, which had dropped considerably astern
of enemy’s line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list,
on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently
ordered Indomitable to attack enemy breaking northward.
At 10.54 a.m. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I
personally observed the wash of a periscope, two points on our star-
board bow. Immediately turned to port.
At 11.3 a.m. an injury to the Lion being reported as incapable of
immediate repair, I directed Lion to shape course N.W. At 11.20 a.m.
I called the Attack alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11.35
a.m. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the Squadron, and met
them at noon retiring N.N.W.
I boarded and hoisted my flag in Princess Royal at about 12.20
p.M., when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the
Lion fell out of the line, namely, that Bliicher had been sunk and that
the enemy Battle Cruisers had continued their course to the eastward
in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a
Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop bombs on the vessels
which went to the rescue of the survivors of Blicher.
APPENDIX 493
The good seamanship of Lieut.Commander Cyril Callaghan,
H.M.S. Attack, in placing his vessel alongside the Lion and subse-
quently the Princess Royal, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in
the shortest possible time.
At 2 p.m. I closed Lion and received a report that her starboard
engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 p.m. I ordered
Indomitable to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 p.m.
The greatest credit is due to the Captains of Indomitable and Lion
for the seamanlike manner in which the Lion was taken in tow under
difficult circumstances.
The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation
was a conspicuous feature.
I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men
who specially distinguished themselves.
Where all did well it is difficult to single out Officers and Men for
special mention, and as Lion and Tiger were the only ships hit by the
enemy, the majority of these I mentioned belong to those ships.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) Daviv Buzarry,
Vice-Admiral.
INDEX
Abdiel, 289, 373, 483, 465, 484
Aberdeenshire coast, a U-boat rammed
and sunk off, 209
Aboukir, loss of, 15, 37, 105, 182
Acacia, 233
Acasta, 9, 176, 464
in ee battle, 332, 333, 356, 387,
Achates, 9, 464
Acheron, 466
Achilles, 8, 88, 212, 419
accident on, 163
sinks a German raider, 276
Acorn, 9
Active, 9, 184, 144, 145, 318, 380, 381, 439,
464, 482
Admiralty, adopt Scapa Flow as main
Fleet Base, 15
Intelligence Division of, 187
naval policy of, 34, 302
vigorous mine-laying policy adopted
by, 249
Adriatic, battleships withdrawn from,
303
Aeroplane attacks 2nd Cruiser Squad-
ron, 165
Aeroplanes over the Orkneys, 95
substituted for seaplanes, 222, 283
Africa, 8, 266
Agadir crisis, 91
Agamemnon, 10
Agincourt, 108, 152, 241, 308, 318, 463
in Jutland battle, 357, 360
joins 4th Battle Squadron, 121
Aircraft carriers, development of, 72
in warfare, 70, 153
Airships as scouts, 37, 450
Ajaz, 8, 93, 98, 107, 185, 152, 241, 290,
318, 463
Alarm, 9, 142
Albemarle, 10, 93, 98, 212, 237, 249, 266
Alcantara, ae 273
sinking of, 273
Alderson, Captain, 207
Alexander-Sinclair, Commodore E. S.,
203, 320, 466, 489
Alison, Lieut.-Commander Roger V.,
466
Allen, Commander Walter L., 464
Allsup, Commander Claude F., 464
Alsatian, 73, 105, 107, 109, 127, 131, 135,
169
captures concealed Germans, 138
Ambuscade, 9, 176, 286, 464
in Jutland battle, 376, 483
America enters the War, 303
American battleships join Grand Fleet,
303
Amethyst, 10
Ammunition, for Army use, 114
ships, 84
Ampihwn, 10
Amsterdam, 217
Andes, 272, 273
rescues German survivors, 274
Andromache, 11
Anglia, 104
Anti-submarine defences, German, 30
obstructions, 144, 146
obstructions damaged by = gales,
QA7, 267
operations, British, 146, 218 et seq.,
282
Antrim, 8, 89, 1388, 159, 211, 419, 424
Apollo, 11
Arabis, sinking of, 269
Arbuthnot, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert,
8, 191, 334, 342, 410, 463, 477
death of, 335, 410, 487
Ardent, 9, 483
in collision, 250, 286
loss of, 376, 385, 485
Arethusa, 111
in action, 493, 494
Argyll, 8, 89, 223
aground off Scottish coast, 252
Ariel, 209, 466
sinks a submarine, 214
Arlanza, 253, 431
Arley, 233
Armour piercing shells, a new type of,
69, 417
Committees’ investigations on, 69
limitations of British, 306
Armour protection, improved, 417
question of, 394 et seq., 468
Arnot, Midshipman R. G., 484
Asquith, Right Hon. H. H., visits the
Fleet, 237, 241
Assistance, 8, 80, 83, 105, 114, 116, 138,
143, 186, 197
Atkins, Acting-Lieut. P. S., 239, 240
Atlantic, Von Spee’s squadron in, 24, 157,
161
Attack, 466, 496
Attila, capture of, 108
495
496
Audacious, 8, 135, 149, 150, 151
loss of, 148 et seq.
Aurora, 194, 493, 494
Aneralte, 24, 203, 204, 210, 290,
in collision, 285
Austrian steamer captured, 108
Bacg, Captain Eric, 260
Backhouse, Captain Oliver, 463
Backhouse, Commander Roger, 7
Bacon, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald, 154
Badger, 467
rescues survivors, 338, 356, 479
Baird, Captain George H., 463
Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., becomes
First Lord, 453
offers Admiral Jellicoe post of First
Sea Lord, 458
Baltic, the, British submarines in, 434
proposed operations in, 129
Barham, 249, 320, 325, 328, 345, 348, 352,
360, 463, 472, 478
in collision, 258
Barron, Commander J. O., 333, 356, 464,
476
Bashmakoff, M., 275
Bate, Lieut.-Commander C. L., 465
Battle Cruiser Fleet, aircraft attached to,
1
Instructions to, 53
organisation of, 203
title altered, 204
Battle Cruiser Fleet’s action, 316 et seq.
Battle Cruiser Squadron, reorganisation
of, 418
Battle cruisers, function of, 304
question of armour, protection of,
805, 306
Battle Fleet, composition of, 7
aircraft provided for, 71
Battleships, “‘all-big-gun” type of, 34
and Battle Cruisers, British and Ger-
man, 307 et seq.
Battleships, British and German, 31
dummy, 171
Bayano sunk by submarine, 210
Bayly, Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis, com-
mands Ist Battle Squadron, 7,
85, 149
discusses question of blocking Zee-
brugge, 154
exchange of command, 180, 182
Beamish, Captain Tufton P. H., 466
Bear Island, reported enemy base and
wireless station at, 233
Beattie, Lieut.-Commander Kenneth A.,
466
Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, 8, 111,
177, 178, 203, 285, 322, 466, 477, 494
INDEX
Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, and
Jutland battle, 320, 321, 325, 341,
345, 369, 440, 442, 468, 480
despatch on North Sea battle, 493
et seq.
tribute to, 411, 489
Belgian coast, sweeping the, 170
Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander R. M., 7,
359, 490
Bellerophon, 8, 110, 318, 463
Bellona, 7, 88, 94, 97, 98, 173, 202, 318,
442, 463, 482
in collision, 180
Benbow, 169, 173, 186, 318, 352, 355, 463
Bentinck, Captain Rudolf W., 2, 7, 41,
465
tribute to, 489
Beresford, Lord, 35
Berliner Tageblatt, Captain Persius’ ad-
missions in, 408
Bernard, Captain V. H. G., 463
Best, Commander the Hon. Matthew R.,
7, 490
Betty, Captain, 185
Biarritz, 292
Bingham, Commander the Hon. E. B. S.,
324, 463, 470
awarded V. C., 325
Bircham, Lieutenant, 77
Birkenhead, 246, 251, 255, 319, 466
Birmingham, 8, 88, 178, 182, 203, 223,
319, 466, 493
sinks a submarine, 93, 119
Black Prince, 171, 187, 244, 290, 318, 336,
380, 463
uncertainty of her end, 336, 337, 478
Blackett, Captain Henry, 463 :
Blake, Lieut.-Commander C. P., 467
Blanche, 8, 88, 175, 202, 207, 272, 273,
318, 463, 482
Blockade, Ministry of, 76
work of the Fleet, 73 et seq., 96, 97,
189
[see, also, Cruiser Squadron (10th)]
Block-ships sunk in Scapa Flow en-
trances, 167
Blonde, 8, 88, 202, 290
goes ashore, 433
Bliicher, 152, 494, 495 aK
sinking of, 195, 197, 496
Blunt, Captain W. F., 10, 466
Boadicea, 4, 8, 88, 202, 318, 438, 463, 482
damaged by heavy seas, 175
Beene steamers, increased force of,
1
Bonham, Captain Thomas P., 463, 478
death of, 487
Borrett, Captain George H., 463
Botha, 225, 267, 457
Boxer campaign, 62, 63
INDEX
Boxer, Lieut.-Commander Henry P., 465
Boyle ra the Hon. Algernon D. E.
466
Bradford, Vice-Admiral E. E., 8, 48, 108,
176, 179, 208
and Dogger Bank action, 196
Brandenburg, 132
et by Norwegian Government,
Brisk, 9
Britannia, 8, 199
aground in Firth of Forth, 198
British Expeditionary Force; transport
of, 22, 23, 37 {
nbs Mee anxiety for safety of, 28,
British Navy (see Navy)
“Broad Fourteens,” patrolling the, 37,
127, 132 ,
Brock, Rear-Admiral O. de B., 203, 319,
465, 489, 493, 496
Broke, 180, 298, 375, 387, 464
Brooke, Lieut.-Commander Edward, 467
Browning, Rear-Admiral M. E., 8
Bruen, Captain Edward F., 463
Bryce, Lord, 2
Bullen, Lieut.-Commander, 278
Bulwark, 10
Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, 60
clever device by, 61
Burney, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil, 10, 16,
36, 207, 358, 459, 462, 477, 480
and Heligoland, 129
and Jutland battle, 319, 342, 343, 362,
381
exchange of command, 180, 181
flagship damaged, 355, 485
illness of, 182
joins Grand Fleet, 36
resumes command of Ist Battle
Squadron, 185
tribute to, 410, 488
Caldaff, mining of, 150
Callaghan, Admiral Sir George, 55
gives up the command, 5
his Service record, 1
improvises defences at Scapa, 27
strikes his flag, 6
Callaghan, Lieut.-Commander Cyril, 496
Calliope, 227, 272, 277, 365, 464, 482
Cambria, 104, 114, 148
Cameleon, 9
Cameron, Captain John E., 466
Campania, 71, 221, 222, 229, 230, 231,
238, 282, 283, 428, 446
Campbell, Commander G. W. McC., 465
Canada, 308, 318, 463
joins Grand Fleet, 250
Canadian troops, a convoy for, 134, 136
497
Canterbury, 317, 818, 330, 332, 339, 464,
476
Cantlie, Lieutenant, 232
Caribbean, 211, 246
sinking of, 246
Carnarvon, 10
Caroline, 203, 464 .
Gupaiter, Lieut.-Commander (N.) A. F.
2
Carter, Lieut.-Commander Eric Q., 465
Casement, Captain John M., 463
Castor, 374, 464
Cavendish, Lieut.-Commander J. R. C.,
464
Cay, Captain Arthur L., 337, 338, 463
death of, 487
Centurion, 2, 8, 95, 140, 198, 318, 463
Champion, 319, 329, 378, 463, 472, 484
Champion, Commander J. P., 377, 465,
484
Channel Fleet, 15, 16, 36 ‘
change in command of, 182
squadrons manned with nucleus crews,
36
strengthened, 155
Chatfield, Captain A. E. M., 465, 493
Chatham, 443
Cheerful, 135
Chester, 317, 318, 330, 339, 415, 441, 464,
A475
her boy hero, Jack Cornwell, 332, 410
in action, 330 et seq.
China, conference of Allied naval officers
in, 63
Christian, Rear-Admiral, 101, 105
his command, 105
Christopher, 9, 236, 245, 331, 332, 464, 476
Chukovsky, M., 275
Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, 3, 35
and Heligoland, 128
and position of Commander-in-Chief,
Ss
attends conference at Loch Ewe, 127
interview with Sir J. Jellicoe, 3
Circe, 9
City of Oxford, 171
Clan McNaughton, loss of, 205
Cleopatra, 279, 433
Clinton-Baker, Captain Lewis, 462
Coaling the Fleet, 83, 92, 104, 108, 109
Coal strike, a Welsh, 229, 230, 235
Coast lights, extinction of, 121, 136
Coast towns, enemy bombardment of, 25,
287, 456
Cobbe, Captain M. H., 11
Cochrane, 8, 88, 318, 419, 463
Cockatrice, 9, 173
Cole, Commander John F. H., 242
Coles, Lieut.-Commander G. A., 376, 464,
483
498
Colliers at the Fleet Base, 83
insufficient number of, 84, 92, 98
Collingwood, 7, 319, 361, 462
Colossus, 7, 38 (note), 60, 318 319
and battle of Jutland, 351, 353, 357,
360, 381, 462, 481
Columbella, 233, 272
Colville, Commander Hugh D., 464
Colville, Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley, 81,
82, 122, 143, 159, 166, 231, 234, 243
assumes temporary command of Ist
Battle Squadron, 182
Comet, 9, 107, 217
Commonwealth, 8, 186, 199
Comus, 27%, 273, 277, 278, 342, 426, 464
Conqueror, 8, 31 (note), 152, 184, 193, 199,
318, 463
Conqueror II. torpedoed, 446
Constance, 426, 432, 464
Contest, 9, 464
Cordelia, 203, 319, 320, 466
Corlett, Lieut.-Commander Geoffrey, 466
Cornwallis, 10
Cornwell, Jack, of Chester, heroism of,
332, 410
Cowan, Captain Walter H., 465
Crabbe, Commander L. G. E., 464
Craig, Captain Arthur W., 466
Crescent, 11, 205, 255, 277
Cressy, loss of, 15, 37, 105
Cromarty, a fleet practice base at, 64, 65
a floating dock transferred to, 79, 80,
106, 122
and submarine menace, 64
Naval Base at, 28
Rear-Admira] Pears in charge of Base
at, 97
rendered secure from submarine at-
tacks, 77, 146
Crooke, Captain H. Ralph, 464
Cruiser Squadron (8rd), disbandment of,
245
Cruiser Squadron (6th), broken up, 210
Cruiser Squadron (10th) augmented,
181
blockade work of, 73, 158, 193, 201,
205, 214, 220, 228, 233, 243, 247,
253, 257, 261, 268, 275, 281, 288,
294, 427, 431, 444, 448, 452, 458
paid off, 163
patrol areas of, 96, 98, 103, 137, 145,
181, 192, 206, 213, 272, 283
Cruiser Squadrons, reorganisation of,
418, 419
Culme-Seymour, Captain Michael, 463
Cumberland, 198
Currey, Rear-Admiral Bernard, 10
Curtis, Commander Berwick, 373, 465, 484
Cuxhaven, enemy battleships at, 97
Cyclops, 7, 80, 83, 98, 117, 143
INDEX
D’Aeta, Captain Artuur C. S. H., 463
Dahlia strikes a mine, 245
Dampier, Captain, 149
Danchenko, M., 275
Dannreuther, Commander, 337
Dardanelles operations, kite balloons
in, 71
“Dark night” patrols, 261, 264, 432
Dartmouth, 185
Day, Commander Selwyn, 276
De Chair, Rear-Admiral Dudley, 11, 73,
96, 169
Decoy ships (Q-ships), 262
Defence, 191, 318, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340,
463
loss of, 306, 336, 477
Defender, 340, 387, 467, 474
Derfflinger, 197, 357, 437, 474
Destroyer Flotilla (15th), formation of,
447
Destroyer flotillas, 9, 118
detailed orders for, 52
fine work in Jutland battle, 378
Destroyers, Battle Orders for, 52, 54
German, 29, 50, 62
German superiority in number of,
396-7
German v. British, 29
importance attached by Germany to
attack by, 393
in action, 176, 323-5, 339, 340
inadequate number of British, 17, 18,
29, 175, 179, 200, 201, 397
in collision, 245, 246, 280, 286
used for mine-sweeping, 244
welcome additions to force of, 204
work of, 215
Devonshire, 8, 90, 135, 180, 282, 419, 424
Dick, Captain James D., 463
Digby, 233
Director-firing, system of, 66
Displacement, question of, 307
Dobson, Lieut.-Commander, 232
Dock accommodation, absence of, 315,
316
the Kaiser’s comments on, 315
Dockyard men, fine work by, 129, 417
Dogger Bank action, 187 et seq.
Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, 493
et seq.
a cruiser fleet, composition of,
03
battle fleet engaged in, 199
(See also North Sea Battle)
Dominion, 8, 108, 119, 217
Donaldson, Sir F., 421
Donegal, 198, 255, 256, 290, 292, 419,
424, 458
Doughty, Captain Henry M., 463
Dover, Straits of, mining the, 249
INDEX
Drake, 10, 96, 97, 98, 103, 106, 108, 116,
131, 134, 159, 164, 198
Dreadnought, 8, 34, 93, 207, 208, 290, 308
rams a submarine, 207
Dreadnought Squadron, captains of, in
conference, 114
Dreyer, Captain, 7 (note), 342, 416, 417,
462, 481
tribute to, 416, 481
Dryad, 166
see 319, 362, 375, 384, 436, 442, 466,
5
Duff, Captain A. A. M., 93, 466, 493
Duff, Rear-Admiral A. L., 60, 61, 62, 169,
318, 463, 477, 488
tribute to, 488
Duke of Albany, 223, 433
Duke of Clarence, 270, 433
Duke of Cornwall, 430
Duke of Edinburgh, 171, 318, 336, 368,
419, 463, 482
Dumaresq, Captain John S., 463
Duncan, 10
Duncombe, 262
Dundas, Commander Harold V., 464
Dundee, 270, 276, 432, 433
Dunnet Bay, a German mine ashore
at, 266
Dutton, Captain Arthur B. S., 463
East Coast, bombardment of un-
defended towns on, 25
raids on, 156
Ebro, 267
Edgar, 11, 141
Edinburgh, Zeppelin attack on, 282
Edwards, Captain John D., 466
Elbing, 374
Ellershaw, Brigadier-General, 421
Ellis, Captain Stanley V., 463, 477
death of, 487
Emperor of India, 169, 173, 186
Ems sunk by submarine, 426
Endymion, 11
Engadine, 71, 289, 320, 321, 386, 467, 469,
472, 485
England, possibility of invasion of, 23,
456
raids on south-east coast of, 287
English Channel, destroyers in, 455
Erin, 129, 152, 308, 318, 463
Erne, wreck of, 205
Esbjerg, enemy sighted from, 131
Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral H., 7, 320,
466
and Jutland battle, 326, 345, 349, 363,
369, 410, 467, 472, 476, 478
new command for, 243
tribute to, 488, 489
Everett, Commodore A. F., 7, 219
499
Exmouth, 10, 93, 135, 148, 150
Eyre, Lieut.-Commander Ralph V., 465
Fatxuanp Istanps battle, 24, 157, 161,
204, 205
Falmouth, 10, 16, 88, 94, 95, 97, 98, 104,
115, 134, 185, 319, 338, 466
and Jutland battle, 366, 441, 476, 479
sinking of, 441 [484
Farie, Captain (D.) James U., 378, 466,
Faroe Islands, a search for enemy bases
in, 96, 97
Farrington, Captain, 262
Faulknor, 208, 377, 457, 465
Faviell, Lieut.-Commander Douglas, 465
Fawckner, Rear-Admiral W. B., 228
Fearless, 10, 111, 132, 204, 245, 319, 449,
466
and Jutland battle, 328, 378, 381, 472,
473
Fergusson, Captain James A., 463
Field, Captain Frederick L., 463
Filleul, C., awarded D. S. M., 334
Fire control instruments, 68
Fire correction methods, improved, 417
Firedrake, 112
Fisher, Captain William W., 463
Fisher, Lieut.-Commander Leslie, 242
Fisher, Lord, becomes First Sea Lord,
34, 155
destroyer programme of, 408
energy as First Sea Lord, 187
improvements in Fleet organisation
by, 35
Mr. Schwab’s visit to, 151
naval policy of, 34
supports Director System, 67
Fishermen’s bladders as “floating mines,”
126
Fishing areas, question of restriction
of, 121, 136
Fishing vessels attacked by submarines,
228
FitzGerald, Colonel, 421
Fitzherbert, Lieut.-Commander Herbert,
2, 490
Flamborough Head, enemy mines off, 110
Fleet, the, a vital factor tojexistence of
the Empire, 308
concentration of, at outbreak of War,
38
disposition of, 15
(See also Grand Fleet, Navy)
Fletcher, Lieut.-Commander H. U., 465
Floating storage, advantages of, 84
Flotta, Island of, 81
Flying Condor, 148
Food question, the, 453
Forbes, Commander Charles M.., 7 (note),
490
500
Formidable, 10
Forth, Firth of, obstructions against
submarines in, 78
submarine activity in, 185
Fortune, 9, 267, 464, 485
in collision, 250
loss of, 376
Forward, 9
Foula Islands, 105
Fox, Captain C. H., 10
Frauenlob, loss of, 375
Fremantle, Commander G. A., 467
Fremantle, Rear-Admiral S., 254
Fury, 9, 150, 233
Galatea, 203, 290, 319, 430, 466
and Jutland battle, 319, 436, 443, 468,
469
Gamble, Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas, 8,
205
Garland, 9, 286, 376, 464, 483
Garry engages a submarine, 169
Gaunt, Rear-Admiral E. F. A., 61, 319,
462, 477, 488
relieves Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas,
tribute to, 488
General Cruiser Instructions, the, 53
Gentian, 293
George V., King, messages to the Fleet,
89, 234, 288
visits the Fleet, 204, 234, 426
German account of Jutland battle, 363
bombardment of East Coast, 25
breach of international law, 18
disguised raiders, 273, 274
fleet (see High Sea Fleet)
gunnery, efficiency of, 348
merchant steamer intercepted and
sunk, 291
mines and submarines, 221 e seq.
(and passim)
submarine menace, 13, 16, 28, 37, 100,
113, 115 et seq.
German Bight, British submarine lays
mines in, 426
Germans fire on British rescuers, 112
proclaim British waters unsafe for
shipping, 201
rescue British crews, 325, 486
thoroughness of defences of their
naval bases, 30
Germany, destroyer force of, 392, 396,
397
mutinies in Navy of, 39
naval strength of, in early days of
War, 32, 33
Ghourko, 86
Gibraltar, 11
Glen Isla, 262
INDEX
Glossop, Lieutenant Francis G., 467
Gloucester, 185, 203, 290, 320, 466
Goff, Lieut.-Commander R. S., 376, 464,
483
Goldfinch, 9
loss of, 205
Goldsmith, Commander Malcolm L.,
467
Goodenough, Commodore W. E., 8, 95,
112, 194, 203, 320, 326, 341, 344,
466, 489, 493
and Dogger Bank battle, 195
engages the enemy, 178
Good Hope, 10
loss of, 307
Gorleston, hostile battle cruisers sighted
at, 157
Goshawk, 467
Gossamer, 9
See es Rear-Admiral the Hon.
8
Grafton, 11
Graham, Lieut.-Commander E. S., 467
Grand Fleet, a series of misfortunes, 152
a watching policy decided upon, 14
all-round improvement in fighting
efficiency of, 70
and its bases, 26, 28, 34 et seg., 76
et seq., 144
arrival of additional seamen ratings
for, 109
at end of November, 1914, 168
at end of 1914, 185
attempts to entice enemy to action,
264 et seq.
bases: conditions for leaving and re-
turning to, 295 et seq.
battle exercises, 258
Battle Orders, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408
battle tactics exercises, 47
blockade work [see Blockade, Cruiser
Squadron (10th)]
compared with High Sea Fleet, 31
composition of, 7 e¢ seq.
condenser and boiler troubles of, 103,
108, 121, 129, 139, 152, 156, 159,
167, 172, 174, 185, 187, 190
constitution of, in May, 1916, and a
parallel, 300 et seg.
countering retiring battle tactics, 50
cruising formation and deployment,
47, 271
destroyer force of, 396
development of, 36
disposition and movements of, after
declaration of war, 90 et seq.
efficiency of engine-room departments
of, 140, 387
ee movements: a month’s work,
1
INDEX
Grand Fleet, gunnery practice of, 64 e
seq.
inception of, 34
kite balloons provided for, 71, 72
lectures, system of, 86
measures against invasion and raids,
23, 24
messages from the King to, 89, 234,
388
naval instruction and education prob-
lem, 188
new Submarine Flotilla, 447
peace and war conditions compared,
55
personnel and welfare of, 85 et seq.,
410, 487 ;
pre-Dreadnought Squadron of, 47, 48
problem of tactics in Fleet actions, 391
Royal visits to, 204, 233, 426
Russian gentlemen’s visit to, 275
sea-plane reconnaissances of, 221
ships fitted with Director-firing sys-
tem, 67
signalling by, and why reduced, 56
et seq.
spirit of comradeship in, 87
sports, 86
submarines attached to, 303
tables showing armament, protection
and displacement of capital ships
in, 308-310
the Staff Organisation, 39 et seg.
training of, 55 et seq.
work of medical officers, 488
Grant, Captain E. P. F. G., 462
Grant, Rear-Admiral W. L., 10, 96, 97
in command of 8rd Cruiser Squadron,
210
Great War, declaration of, 88
first reports of enemy movements, 90
naval strategy in home waters, 12
et seq.
opening of, 1 et seq.
Green, Captain J. F. E., 466
Greene, W. Graham, 414
Grief, 274
Griffin, W. C. R., a D. S. M. for, 334
Grubb, Lieut.-Commander Reginald W.,
465
Gun power, question of, 306
Gun, range of, 38 (and note)
Gunfire, correction of, 68
Gunnery efficiency: a new departure, 235
work of German High Sea Fleet, 62, 64
Gye, Lieut.-Commander Alex. H., 467
Happocxk, Commoporg, 149, 171, 172
Haldane, Lord, 2
Halsey, Commodore Lionel, 7 (note),
219, 411
sol
Hamburg, 374
Hamilton, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick,
becomes Second Sea Lord, 3
Hamond, Commander Robert G., 464
Hampshire, 198, 230, 257, 259, 420, 463
Kitchener and staff sail for Archangel
in, 421
strikes a mine and sinks, 422
survivors of, 422
Hannibal, 93, 95, 205
Hardman-Jones, Lieut.-Commander E., 2
Hardy, 9, 176, 464
Harris, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald N. A., 82
Harrison, Lieut.-Commander G. C. 465
Harrison, Lieut.-Commander Julian, 464
Hartford, Lieut.-Commander G. B., 465
Harwich, mined areas near, 110
Harwich Force, 9, 385
provided with aircraft, 71
Hawk sinks a submarine, 225
Hawke, 11
loss of, 21, 141
Hawksley, Commodore J. R. P., 9, 374,
384, 463, 477, 482
Heath, Rear-Admiral H. L., 334, 367, 368,
463, 477, 482
Heaton-Ellis, Captain E. H. F., 464
Heligoland, a comprehensive mining
policy urged, 248
fortifications of, 128
proposals for bombardment and cap-
ture of, 128
Heligoland Bight, British submarines fol-
lowed by German trawlers, 105
dispositions for sweeping, 123
enemy light forces in action, 111
mining policy in, 248, 249, 264
projected operations in, 109
Hercules, 7, 281, 318, 360, 462
Hibernia, 8, 127, 254
High Sea Fleet, a comparison with Grand
Fleet, 31, 302
changes in commands of, 200
defensive réle of, 39
destroyer force of, 396
efficiency of, ix, 62, 63
position of, in Jutland battle, 341
probable tactics of, correctly antic-
ipated, 401
superiority of protection in, 307
surrender of, ix, 39, 70
tables showing armament, protection
and displacement of, 308-310
under repair, 428
Hindustan, 8
Hobart, Lieut.-Commander F. E. H.
G., 467
Hodgson, Commander John C., 467
Hogue, sinking of, 15, 37, 105, 132
Hollyhock, 236, 242
502
Holtzendorff, Admiral von, 63
a Lieut.-Commander Edwin A.,
Hood, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace,
219, 327, 330, 332, 337, 410, 463,
474, 475, 489
goes down with Invincible, 338, 487
Hope, 9, 184
Hope, C. C., awarded D. S. M., 334
Hopkins, Lieut.-Commander Sydney, 464
Hotham, Captain Alan G., 273, 342, 464
Howell, T. O. G., awarded D. S. M., 334
Hudson, Lieut.-Commander H. V., 465
Entel Commander Reginald B. C.,
64
Hydra, 467
Illustrious, 114, 146, 157
Iltis and her commander, 63
Impérieuse, 83
Implacable, 10
Inconstant, 208, 319, 466
Indefatigable, 203, 204, 466
loss of, 306, 323, 326, 370
India torpedoed and sunk, 241
Indomitable, 24, 191, 199, 203, 330, 332,
338, 418, 464, 476, 480, 493, 494,
495, 496
and Jutland battle, 330, 332, 338
joins Grand Fleet, 183
takes Lion in tow, 196
Inflexible, 24, 119, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135,
136, 157, 203, 228, 330, 418, 442, 464
and Jutland battle, 332, 338, 339, 475
joins the Fleet, 228
mined in Dardanelles, 314
loss of, 306
Ingenohl, Admiral von, 63, 200
International law, German disregard of,
Intrepid, 11
Invergordon as repairing base, 80
exercise and recreation at, 200
floating docks at, 79, 80, 448
Invincible, 24, 105, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135,
136, 157, 191, 203, 204, 213, 219,
290, 330, 332, 463
loss of, 306, 337-338, 475
survivors rescued by Badger, 356
Iphigenia, 11
Irish mail packets as armed boarding
steamers, 171
Trish Sea, submarine activity in, 198, 209
Iron Duke, 5, 6, 7, 88, 94, 96, 98, 100,
101, 106, 108, 122, 132, 143, 144,
146, 152, 164, 168, 174, 187, 194,
197, 212, 219, 220, 267, 317, 318,
345, 357, 373, 462, 479
Confirmation by Archbishop of York
on, 228
INDEX
Iron Duke, disconcerting discovery on, 139
in action, 349, 352, 353, 357, 481
refitting at Invergordon, 200, 252
Staff of, 39 et seq.
the King’s speech to Fleet, 426, 427
Irresistible, 10
Irvin, Commander (Acting) W. D., 465
Italy enters Great War, 219
Jackson, Apmirau Sir Henry, 78, 460
and the submarine menace, 454
becomes First Sea Lord, 219, 249
James, Lieut.-Commander C. H. N., 466
Jason, 9
Jellicoe, Admiral Sir J. R. (Viscount
Jellicoe of Scapa), 318, 462
accepts command of Home Fleets, 1
and Kaiser’s criticism of dock ac-
commodation, 315
and raids on unfortified towns, 287,
288
and the value of aircraft in war, 450
appointed Commander-in-Chief of
Grand Fleet, 5
as First Sea Lord, 417, 459
Battle Orders of, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408
bids farewell to Fleet, 460
Birthday message to the King, 388
confers with Admiral Sir Henry
Jackson, 219
confers with Premier and Chancellor
of Exchequer, 241
despatches on Jutland battle, 304,
388, 462
embarrassing interview with Sir G.
Callaghan, 4
entertains Lord Kitchener, 419
extensive mining policy of, 249
memorandum to Fleet from, 412, 460
objections to change of Command, 3, 4
proposals for handling Fleet in action
approved by Admiralty, 302
proposes blocking of Zeebrugge, 154
reorganises his Staff, 39 ef seq.
selects his Staff, 2
suggested scheme of submarine ob-
structions by, 78
tribute to personnel of Fleet, 410, 411,
487
visits the Admiralty, 453
wounded in China, 63
Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H.
Martyn, 316, 318, 367, 410, 463,
477, 482
relieves Admiral Warrender, 261
tribute to, 488
Jones, Commander Loftus W., 464, 476
gallantry of, 333
posiomons award of V. C. to, 332,
3
INDEX
Jutland, Battle of, 304 et seq.
Admiral Jellicoe’s memorandum to
Fleet, 412
area covered by different engage-
ments, 381
battle cruiser fleet’s action, 316 et
seq., 479
we fleet in action, 341 et seq., 474,
0
battle opens, 322
despatches on, 304, 388, 462
Director System in use at, 67
disposition of Fleet, 318 et seg.
enemy losses, 486, 492
enemy sighted, 320, 342, 374
German version of, 363, 408, 409
Grand Fleet congratulated by Ad-
miralty, 414
inferiority of British armour-piercing
shell in, 69
night attacks by flotillas, 483
night dispositions, 483
proceedings on Ist June, 485
reflections on, 390 et seq.
repairing and altering ships damaged
in, 415
results of, 409
retiring tactics of enemy, 362, 407, 408
the night action, 370 et seq.
Kaiser, 310
Kemmis, Sub-Lieutenant H. W. A., 484
Kempenfeli, 265, 266, 464
Kennedy, Captain Francis W., 464, 493
Kennedy, Captain Theobald W. B., 493
Kerr, Lieut.-Commander Fairfax M.,
464, 476
Keyes, Commodore, 105, 196
rescues enemy crews, 112
Kiddle, Captain E. B., 462
Kiel, 2nd Battle Squadron’s visit to, 91
Kiel Bay, gunnery exercises in, 64
Kildonan Castle, 452
King, Lieut.-Commander Philip W. S.,
467
King Alfred, 10, 106, 109, 159
King Edward VII., 8, 107, 108, 119
mined and sunk, 264, 265
King George V., 8, 167, 168, 173, 185, 190,
318, 463
and battle of Jutland, 345, 354, 357,
368
King Orry, 246, 432
King Stephen sights sinking Zeppelin, 269
Kitchener, F.-M. Lord, 2, 3
at Scapa, 419
death of, 422
sails on Hampshire, 421
Kite Balloon Section, Roehampton, 72
Kite balloons, 71, 283
593
Knorr, Korvetten-Kapitin von, 240
Kéningen Luise, 99
Kristianiafiord intercepted by Teutonic,
255
Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 90
Kullen, the, a German merchant-steamer
sunk off, 291
LaMiasH, as pre-War practice base, 147
Lcncaster, 210
Landrail, 467, 470
Lans, Vice-Admiral von, 63
Lapwing, 467
Larne, 9
Lassoo, 278
sinking of, 433
Latona, 11
Laurel, 467, 471
Laverock, 27
Lawrence, Commander, 457
Lawrie, Lieut.-Commander E. McC. W.,
464
Lawson, Captain R. N., 7, 331, 464, 475
Leake, Captain F. M., 276
Leatham, Captain Eustace La T., 463
Lecky, Lieut.-Commander A. M., 464
Leda, 9, 143
Legge, Lieut.-Commander Montague C.
B., 466
Leggett, Captain Oliver E., 491
Leith, Zeppelin attack on, 282
Le Mesurier, Commodore, 227, 268, 361,
365, 464, 482
Lerwick, coaling base at, 105
Leveson, Rear-Admiral A. C., 60, 61, 62,
191, 318, 463, 477, 488
tribute to, 488
Leviathan, 10, 159, 169, 171, 191, 198, 210
Ley, Captain J. C., 462
Liberty, 467
Light Cruiser Squadrons, new, 184, 226
Light Cruisers, British deficiency of, 396
Lilac strikes a mine, 242
Lion, 8, 24, 195, 196, 197, 199, 203, 204,
213, 242, 245, 250, 254, 319, 320,
321, 322, 323, 327, 329, 418, 442,
443, 446, 465, 472, 474, 475, 480,
493, 494, 495, 496
and Jutland battle, 322, 323, 329, 480,
495
taken in tow by Indomitable, 496
Liverpool, 10, 16, 88, 94, 97, 98, 104,
113, 138, 148, 150, 165, 168, 174,
200, 203, 228, 251, 255
Lizard, 467
Loch Ewe, a conference at, 128
as coaling base, 96
submarine activity at, 138
Loch-na-Keal, base at, 144
base abandoned, 57
504
Loch-na-Keal, improvised obstructions
at, 77
London, 10
“Long Forties,” the, 275
Long Hope, anchorage at, 81
Lord Nelson, 10
Lough Swilly, anti-submarine obstruc-
tions at,4146
base at, 144
Battle{Squadrons at, 146
diversion at, 147
improvised obstructions at, 77, 146
Louise (Danish steamer), 263
Lowestoft, 8, 90, 203, 493
Lowestoft, enemy bombardment of, 286
Lowry, Admiral Sir Robert, 77, 208, 219
Lucia, 447
Lutzow, 310 (note), 357
loss of, 314, 408
Lyddite shell, suspected, 163
Lydiard, 467, 470
Lynz, 9, 176
sunk by a mine, 238
Lyon, Lieut.-Commander H. I. N., 465
ra, 9
Mactacuian, Captain, 265, 266, 463
Madden, Rear-Admiral Charles E., 7,
40, 128, 411, 459, 490
Menad, 376, 377, 465, 484
Mafeking, 232
Magic, 274, 353, 374, 464
Magnificent, 93, 95, 205
Mahan, Admiral, vii, 12, 302
Mainz disabled in action, 111
her survivors rescued, 112
Majestic, 136
Makin, Lieut.-Commander Robert, 464
Malaya, 270, 328, 362, 380, 466, 468
Manchester Commerce, sinking of, 150
Mandate, 250, 464
Manners, 465
Mantua, 78, 109, 127, 131, 135
Marksman, 383, 465
Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant W. P., 263
Marlborough, 7, 180, 181, 207, 318, 319,
343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 351,
354, 358, 376, 381, 382, 386, 415,
434, 462, 477, 480, 481, 485
in action at Jutland battle, 351, 354,
358
torpedoed, 316, 355
Marne, 266, 353, 374, 465
Marsden, Lieut.-Commander, 376, 464,
483
Martial, 464
Martin, 9
Marvel, 362, 465
Mary Rose, 465
Master, Lieut.-Commander E. G. H., 464
INDEX
Matchless strikes a mine, 255
McKenna, Mr., as First Lord, 35
visits the Fleet, 237, 241
McPherson, 2nd-Lieutenant, 421
Meade, Captain the Hon. Herbert, 464,
495
Mediterranean, ships in the, 300
Medusa rammed and sunk, 278
Melita, 265
Menace, 465
Menelaus (kite balloon ship), 71
Merchant-ships attacked by submarines,
237, 241
camouflaged, 171
commissioned for blockade work, 73
convoying, 46, 433
instructions for safety of, 47
serious loss of, 201, 210
squadron disbanded, 172
submarine peril to, 446 et seq.
Meteor, 495
damaged in Dogger Bank battle, 197
Meteor (German mine-layer) abandoned
and sunk, 239
number of mines laid by, 247
Michael, 280, 265
Michigan, 171
Midge, 9, 237, 464
Milford Haven, Marquis of, 3, 391
succeeded by Lord Fisher, 155
Millbrook, 465
Miller, Captain Charles B., 436, 466, 493
Miller, Rear-Admiral Francis S., 80, 81,
95, 117, 122
Minches, the, submarines reported in, 145
Mindful, 362, 465
“Mine Bumping Squadron,” the, 100
Minelayer Squadron, 11
Mine-layers, increased activity of British,
48,
Instructions to, 54
Mines, British, defective pattern of, 248
experiments to counter, 60
German, 18, 38, 96, 99, 113, 120, 150,
192, 214, 221 et seq.
success of new type of, 249
the Northern Barrage, 249
Minesweepers, 9, 19, 60, 118, 202, 223, 266
chase submarine, 161
in collision, 218
inadequacy of force of, 19, 170
maximum speed of, 19
withdrawn for service abroad, 209, 484
Mine-sweeping force strengthened, 434
Mine-sweeping trawler rams submarine,
165
Minion, 464
Ministry of Blockade, establishment of, 76
Minotaur, 198, 257, 272, 318, 334, 367,
419, 438, 463
INDEX
Minstrel, 9
Mischief, 465
Mocatta, Lieutenant Jack E. A., 466
Moewe lays extensive minefield off
Scottish coast, 265
Moir, Commander Dashwood F., 467
Molteno, Captain, 335, 463, 477
Moltke, 310
Monarch, 8, 31 (note), 93, 148, 184, 193,
310, 318, 463
Monitors, work of, on Belgian coast, 128
Monmouth, loss of, 306
Mons, 464
Moon, 465
Moore, Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon, 169,
171, 191, 493
and Dogger Bank battle, 193
succeeded by Rear-Admiral Paken-
ham, 210
*Moorsom, 324, 325, 467, 470
Moray Firth, a submarine hunt in, 209
gunnery practice in, 65
Moresby, 329, 379, 466, 472, 474
Morley, Lord, dinner party at United
Services Club, 2
Morning Sitar, 259, 353, 465
Morris, 324, 467, 470
Morton, Lieutenant, 232
Mounsey, 465
Muckle Skerry, surrender of U 18 at, 166
Munro, Captain Donald S., 127
devises system of submarine ob-
struction, 77, 146
Munster, 465
rescues crew of Alcantara, 273
Musketeer, 266, 431
Mystic, 464 ‘
NaBakorr, VLADIMIR, 275
Naiad, 11
Napier, Rear-Admiral Trevylyan, 185,
203, 338, 383, 466, 476, 489
engages a Zeppelin, 382
Napoleonic wars, work of the Navy in, 13
Narborough, 324, 366, 370
Narvik, iron ore trade of, 276, 292
Narwhal, 465
Natal, 8, 88, 199
blown up in Cromarty harbour, 260
court-martial on loss of, 260
Naval instructors, reduced number of, 189
Naval manceuvres of 1912, 392
Naval policy, in peace conditions, ix.
Naval situation in May, 1916, 300 et seg.
Navigation lights, extinction of, 121, 136
Navy Acts, German, 35
Navy League, the, formation of, 12
Navy, the, a lesson for the future, 33
composition of, at opening of Great
War, 7 et seq.
595
Navy, the, disposition of, in early days
of Great War, 19 et seq.
grief of, at Kitchener’s fate, 424
partition of, 36
use and purpose of, 12
Naylor, Lieutenant Charles G., 465
Negro, 441
Nemesis, 9, 206, 217
Neptune, 7, 168, 207, 211, 318, 360, 462
in collision, 286
Nerissa, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471
Nessus, 266, 465
Nestor, 323, 324, 466, 470, 471
Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve,
75
New Zealand, 8, 24, 101, 105, 126, 152,
169, 191, 203, 285, 290, 319, 339,
418, 466, 493, 494
and Jutland battle, 480
and North Sea action, 495
Nicator, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471
Nicholson, Captain William C. M., 463
Nicholson, Captain Wilmot S., 493
Nicholson, Lieut.-Commander R. L., 2,
491
organises wireless school, 188
signalling system of, 58
tribute to, 59, 491
Nicholson, Rear-Admiral Stuart, 10
Noble, 465
Nomad, 323, 324, 466, 470
Nonsuch, 356, 387, 465
North American Squadron joined by
Princess Royal, 161
North east coast, Zeppelins on, 290
North Rona Island, a reported enemy
base on, 107
North Sea, area of, 14
controlling the, 249 et seq.
cruiser patrol areas in, 20
drifting German mines in, 199
Fleet in, 15
northern and central areas of, 102,
103
proclaimed a dangerous area, 157
reported mooring of oil drums in, 208
submarine and mine menace in, 17,
96, 116 et seg., 209 et passim
sweeps, 15, 88-9, 99, 116 et seq., 127,
158, 163, 171, 175, 194, 201 ef seq.,
211, 217, 219, 221, 2293, 241, 246,
249 et seq., 264, 267 et seg., 435, 445
et seq., 462 et seq.
the Northern Barrage mine-field,
249
North Sea battle, 187 et seq.
Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, 493
(cf. Dogger Bank)
Norway, German Fileet’s peace-time
visits to, 91
506
Norwegian coast, British patrol of, 193
British submarines’ operations against
enemy on, 258
reported German bases on, 91, 95, 107
steamers sunk, 449
sweeping, 277, 429, 432
Nottingham, 8, 88, 134, 203, 223, 224, 319,
435, 466, 470, 493
torpedoed and sunk, 437
Nugent, Captain R. A., 254
Nymphe, 9
in collision, 206
rams a submarine, 142
Oak, 7, 90, 113, 233, 355, 419, 465
King George V. on, 426
Obdurate, 325, 466, 470, 485
Obedient, 361, 465
O’Beirne, Mr., 421
Observation mine-fields, 228
Oceanic, 110
loss of, 73, 127
Older, German crew on, 458
Oliver, Rear-Admiral Henry F., 186
Olympic, 149, 161
Onslaught, 362, 436, 464, 484
Onslow, 340, 387, 472
heroism of captain and crew of, 340,
473, 474
Onslow, Lieut.-Commander A. G., 465
Opal, 465
Ophelia, 330, 332, 364
Oracle, 336
Orcoma, 253, 256
Orion, 8, 93, 103, 105, 119, 121, 152, 191,
318, 357, 463
Orkneys and Shetlands, defences of, 81,
82, 122
submarine activity in, 166
wireless stations in, 110
Oropesa in collision, 244
Orotava, 206
Orvieto, 217
Oscar II., loss of, 233
Ossory, 464
Otway, 458
Oul, 9, 464
PaxenuaM, Rear-ApMIRAL W. C., 8, 203,
319, 466, 489
succeeds Sir Gordon Moore, 210
Palmer, Lieut.-Commander, 340, 467, 474
Paragon, 9
Parker, Captain Edmond Hyde, 463
Parker, Captain Henry Wise, 463
Parsons, Lieutenant G., 245
Pasley, 441
Patey, Vice-Admiral, proceeds to West
Indies, 210
Patia, 245, 271
INDEX
Patrol engaged by battle cruisers, 177
Patuca, 233
Peace manceuvres, unreality of, 37
Pears, Rear-Admiral Edmund R.., 80, 97,
127
Peking Legations, relief Expedition for, 63
Pelican, 324, 441, 466, 470
Pelly, Captain Henry B., 465, 493
Penn, 436
Penshurst, 262
Pentland Firth, approaches patrolled,
110, 252
gunnery practice in, 65, 281
Persius, Captain, an admission by, 409
Petard, 324, 325, 378, 470, 471, 484
Peterhead, good work of patrol at, 225
patrol sinks a submarine, 293
trawlers sunk by enemy, 430
Phaeton, 217, 320, 442, 466 :
attacks a Zeppelin, 290
Phillpotts, Captain Edward M., 350, 466,
478
Phipps, Lieutenant W. D., 7
Piercy, Lieut.-Commander, 207
Pitt, Captain Stanley Dean, 82
Plover, 147
Plowden, Commander Richard A. A., 464
Plunkett, Flag-Commander the Hon.
Reginald A. R., 489
Pohl, Admiral von, 63, 200
Poignand, Lieut.-Commander C. A., 465
Pollard, Fleet-Paymaster C. F., 7
Pommern, loss of, 314, 376, 379
Porpoise, 9, 259, 464
Trams a submarine, 442
Portrush, German wreckage ashore at,
191
Pound, Captain A. D. P. R., 462
Pratt, Captain Thomas D., 466
Preston, Commander L. G., 9, 242, 251
Prince Charles, 262, 263
sinks a U-boat, 263
Prince of Wales, 10
Princess Louise, 232
attacked by submarine, 232
Princess Margaret, 255, 289
Princess Royal, 8, 135, 186, 190, 195, 198,
418, 473
convoys Canadian troops, 134, 136,
137
in Dogger Bank battle, 203, 493, 494,
495, 496
in Jutland battle, 320, 322, 466, 480
joins North American Squadron, 161,
168
Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm, 134
Prisoners of war, German courtesy to, 240
Prowse, Captain Cecil I., 465
death of, 487
Prudentia, loss of, 267
INDEX
Purefoy, Rear-Admiral Richard P. F., 96
“P. Z. Exercises,” 391
“Q” surprs (see Decoy ships)
Queen, 10
Queen Elizabeth, 219, 442
Queen Mary, 8, 24, 194, 198, 203, 310, 465
loss of, 306, 325, 471
Ramage, ComManpeEr G. N., 434
Ramezo, 437, 443
Ramsey, Commander Charles G., 466
Ramsey sunk by disguised mine-layer, 239
Range of gun and torpedo, 88
Range-finders, improved, 418
Range-finding experiments, 68
Rattler, 185
Rawlings, Lieut.-Commander H. C., 464
Redpole, 9, 184
Reeves, Captain Edward, 466
Rena, 273
Be her deck protection improved,
Repulse, her deck protection improved,
448
joins the Fleet, 447
Retiring tactics, advantages of, 401
Revenge, 318, 354, 357, 360, 363, 381, 462,
486
Ridley, Lieut.-Commander John J. C.,
465
Rifleman, 9, 107, 218
Rivett-Carne, Lieut. J. W., 68
Robertson, Mr., 421
Robinson, Lieut.-Commander
G., 385, 467
Rohilla, wreck of, 153
Roper, Captain (D.) Charles D., 466
Rosehearty, a submarine attack on a
merchant-ship at, 237
Rosemary torpedoed, 430
Ross, Captain George P., 355, 462, 481
Rostock, 379, 409
Rosyth, a conference at, 78
base at, 28
conditions for leaving and returning
to base at, 299
development of base at, 79
German prisoners landed at, 113
interview with Mr. Balfour at, 459
submarine obstructions for, 77
the coal difficulty at, 84
3rd Battle Squadron at, 24, 156
Roxburgh, 8, 88, 199, 223, 277, 282, 420,
425
Charles
hit by torpedo, 224
Royal Arthur, 11, 205
Royal Naval Service, anti-aircraft work
of, 72
Royal Oak, 318, 358, 463
507
Royal Sovereign, 442
Royalist, 217, 435, 464
Royds, Captain Percy M. R., 464, 476
Ruby, 9, 184
Russell, 10, 93, 237
Russell, Lieut.-Commander Spencer F.,
465
Russian steamer sunk, 449
Russians relay their mine-fields, 284
visit Grand Fleet, 275
Russo-Japanese War, advances in tech-
nique in, viii
Rutland, Flight-Lieutenant F.S., $21, 469
St. Clair, 110
St. John, Captain F. G., 493
St. Vincent, 7, 318, 357, 362, 463
Salmond, Lieut.-Commander J. S., 7
Sams, Lieut.-Commander Cecil H. H., 466
Sapphire, 105
Sappho, 7, 107, 122, 136, 137, 171, 181,
193, 217, 218, 251, 258
Sarah Alice torpedoed, 446
Savill, Captain, 422, 463
Scapa Flow, a floating dock placed at, 80
a wireless school established at, 59, 188
adopted as main Fleet Base, 15, 26
arrival of Campania at, 71
arrival of air- and sea-planes at, 100
blocking the channels, 77, 167
defenceless nature of base at, 92, 114,
143
entrances to, 26, 28, 159, 298
gunnery and torpedo practice at, 65,
70, 160
recreation and occupation at, 85-7
reinforcing gun defences of, 82
situation of, 27
submarine menace, 139
submarine obstruction pierced, 181
submarine obstructions at, 144, 170
Scarborough, bombardment of, 176
Schwab, Mr., interviews Sir J. Jellicoe,
151
Schwann, Captain O., 283
Scott, Captain Albert C., 466
Scott, Sir Percy, and Director-firing
system, 66, 67
Scottish coast, Moewe lays minefield on,
submarines on, 153
Seagull, 9
Sea-plane carriers, orders to, 54
sheds wrecked by gale, 160
Seaplanes as scouts, 469
difficulties of, 71, 221, 222, 282-3,
290
first reconnaissance work with Fleet,
321
replaced by aeroplanes, 222, 283
508
Sea Ranger, 448
Searchlights, 162
excellence of German, 379
signalling by, 57
Second Fleet, 10
Selborne, Earl of, 34
Seven Years’ War, 39
Seydlitz, 197, 310, 409
Seymour, Admiral Sir Edward, 1, 63
Pema Lieut.-Commander Ralph W.,
89
Shamrock, 241
Shan-hai-Kwan forts, capture of, 63
Shannon, 8, 88, 168, 318, 368, 419, 463
Share, Fleet Paymaster Hamnet H., 2,
491
Shark, 9, 176, 330, 368, 419, 463
heroism of captain and crew, 333
loss of, 332, 476
survivors awarded D. S. M., 334
Sheldrake, 9
Shetland Patrol Force, 9
Signalling by searchlight, 57
Skipjack, 9, 166
Smith, C. H., awarded D. S. M., 334
Smoke screens, 69, 325, 357, 359, 362,
363, 366, 408, 479
Soudan, 148
South Atlantic, von Spee’s Squadron in,
24, 157, 161, 204
Southampton, 8, 88, 95, 178, 182, 203, 290,
319, 320, 326, 442, 466, 493, 494
and Jutland battle, 362, 375, 471, 472,
485
South-east coast, raids on, 287
Sowerby, Captain Charles F., 466
death of, 487
Sparrowhawk, 9, 205, 464
rammed, 375
sinking of, 383, 485
“Special Service Squadron,” the, 171
Spee, Admiral von, 24, 157, 161, 204, 205
Speedwell, 9
Speedy, loss of, 120
Spickernell, Frank T., 489
Spitfire, 9, 176, 375, 464, 483
Spithead, Naval Review at, 3
Spitzbergen, reported German submarine
base and wireless station at, 233
Stadlandet, patrols off, 276, 292
Stag, 135
Stanistreet, Lieutenant Henry D. C., 467
Stanley, Captain the Hon. Victor A., 463
Star shells, 378, 379
Staunch, 9, 233
Stavanger, Zeppelin destroyed at, 290
Stileman, Rear-Admiral H. H., 73
Stirling, Captain A. J. B., 377, 378, 465,
483
Stoddart, Rear-Admiral A. P., 10
INDEX
Stuart, Lieut.-Commander Dudley, 467
Sturdee, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton, 207,
318, 410, 463, 477, 488
destroys von Spee’s squadron, 204
jn Jutland battle, 482
kite balloon experiments of, 71
succeeds Sir D. Gamble, 205
tribute to, 488
Submarine activity in White Sea, 449
attack under difficulties, 457
C 27 sinks a German U-boat, 232
flotilla, organised as a unit of Grand
Fleet, 294
flotillas, Instructions to, 54
menace, 76, 115, 434, 445, 453 et
passim
obstructions (system cf), 28, 77, 159.
170, 220, 225
patrols, 225, 426
peril to merchant shipping, 445 et seq.
screens, question of, 45
sinks German steamship, 426
surrender of a German, 166
Submarine Flotilla (10th), formation of,
A447
Submarines, attached to Grand Fleet,
54, 425
comparative strength of British and
German, 11, 17
defences against, at Scapa Flow, 27
German, 17
in collision, 289 (note)
reason for suppressing news of en-
gagements with, 387
sunk by Navy, 93, 165, 166, 207, 214,
225, 226, 246, 263
Sule Skerry, a suspicious steamer at, 152
Sulis-Ker Rock, target practice at, 182
Sulivan, Commander Harold E., 464
Sulivan, Commander Norton A., 465
Sumner, Lieut.-Commander Charles G,
C., 150, 465
Superb, 7, 192, 199, 244, 318, 463
Swan, T. W., awarded D. S. M., 334
Swarbachs Minn, as coaling base, 73, 162,
220
defences of, 232
evacuation of, 162
Swift, 9, 141, 142
Symonds, Captain Loder, rams enemy
destroyer, 280
Taxu forts, capture of, 63
Talisman, 267, 294, 445
Taranaki, 232
Tarbet Ness, a submarine reported at, 291
Tay, Bers submarines off entrance to,
7
Taylor, Engineer Captain, killed im
action, 197
ae
Telephonic communications, establish-
ment of, 214
Temeratre, 8, 318, 463
Termagant, 324, 325, 467, 470, 471
Terry, Lieut.-Commander F. G., 375, 464
Teutonic, 181, 137
intercepts a
liner, 255
Theseus, 11, 21, 185, 141, 277
Thesiger, Captain Bertram S., 466
Thetis, 11, 120
Third Fleet, 11
Thomson, Lieut.-Commander E. C. O.,
466
Thornhill, 148, 149
Thunderer, 8, 172, 175, 318, 352, 354, 463
Tiger, 24, 174, 199, 203, 204, 308, 420, 467
in Dogger Bank battle, 196, 493, 494,
495
in Jutland action, 322, 325, 472
joins 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 158
Tipperary, 376, 463, 485
loss of, 483
Tippet, Lieut.-Commander Arthur G.,
466
Tirpitz, Grand-Admiral von, 63
Titania, 294
Tolstoy, Count Alexis, 275
Tondern, Zeppelin sheds at, 278, 289
Torpedo attacks: caution required in,
399
practices at Scapa Flow, 70
range of, 38
warfare: element of chance in, 393,
395
importance attached by Germany to,
Norwegian-American
measures for combating, 359, 399
work of German Navy, 62
Torpedoes, influence of, on tactics, 51
reports on, at battle of Jutland, 360
Tothill, Captain Hugh H. D., 463
Tottenham, Rear-Admiral, succeeds
Rear-Admiral Waymouth, 218
Tovey, Lieut.-Commander J. C., 340,
467, 475
heroism of and tribute to, 340, 374-5
Townsend, Captain Cyril S., 464
Trafalgar, Battle of, 302
Trawlers, German, engaged and de-
stroyed, 278
support marine obstructions at Scapa
Flow, 82
suspicious, 106, 124, 224
Trelawny, Lieut.-Commander C. W. E.,
375, 465, 483
Trewin, Assistant-Paymaster G. S., 321,
469
Trident, 294
Trondhjem, Brandenburg at, 132
INDEX
599
Tee 325, 326, 379, 467, 470, 471,
4
rammed and sunk, 378-80
Turkish battleships, purchase of,
129
Tynemouth, minefields off, 110
Tyrwhitt, Commodore R. Y., 10,
198, 229, 239, 249, 251, 259,
278, 279, 286, 385, 386, 436,
442, 493
a successful haul of German trawlers,
108,
191,
271,
440,
chases a destroyer, 111
orders sinking of Medusa, 278
U-soat losses, 93, 164, 165, 207, 214, 225,
226, 246, 262
Undaunted, 157, 279, 280, 493
Underhill, Captain Edwin V., 468
United Services Club, dinner party at, 2
United States enters the War, 303
Unity, 9, 176, 464
Usborne, Commander Cecil V., 60, 61
Usedom, Admiral von, 63
Utvoer Lighthouse, 133, 270
Vala, 262
Valiant, 275, 328, 862, 466
in collision, 434
Vanguard, 7, 115, 318, 468
Venerable, 10
Vengeance, 10
Victor, 9 ;
Victoria Cross awards, 825, 382
Victorious, 83, 417
Viknor, 192
loss of, 193
Vinder, 71, 289
Visual signalling, 57
Von der Tann, 310
Waxes, Prince or, visits Scapa, 248
Walney Island, submarine attack on, 198
Ward, Lieut.-Commander the Hon. C. A.,
465
Wardle, Captain T. E., 272
Warrender, Vice-Admiral Sir George, in
command of 2nd Battle Squadron,
7, 41, 91, 94, 148, 177, 178, 179
terminates his command, 261
Warrior, 171, 290, 318, 334, 335, 336, 463
abandoned and sunk, 306, 386, 387,
485
in Jutland battle, 385, 477
Warspite, 213, 256, 336, 466
in collision, 258, 434
in Jutland battle, 328, 349, 350, 478
Waymouth, Rear-Admiral Arthur W.,
198
breakdown in health, 213
510
Weekes, Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T., 7
(note), 491
Welsh coal-fields, strike in, 229, 235
ie enemy submarines in, 448,
9
protecting the trade route, 256, 257
Whitfield, Lieut.-Commander Paul, 466
Wiesbaden badly crippled, 335, 340
William II., Emperor, criticises British
dock accommodation, 315
Wilson, Commander W. W., 169
Wintour, Captain Charles J., 9, 376, 464
death of, 380, 483, 487
unpleasant experience of, 142
Wireless school at Scapa, 59, 188
Wireless signalling, and why restricted,
56, 57
Wireless telegraphy, 38, 56 et seg., 110
improved system of, 58, 59, 188
Withers, Captain Percy, 464
Wolf intercepted and sunk, 276
Woods, Commander A. E., 188
Woods, Commander Alexander R. W., 7,
490
Woollcombe, Captain Louis C. S., 463
Woollcombe, Captain Maurice, 466
INDEX
Wynter, Lieut.-Commander Gerald C.,
464
Yarmouth, 185, 203, 320, 430, 466
in Jutland battle, 338, 476
Yegoroff, M., 275
Yorck, sinking of, 157
York, Archbishop of, visits the Fleet, 228
Yorkshire coast mined by enemy, 180
Young, Captain G. B., 272
Young, Captain, of Liverpool Salvage
Association, 187
Zaza, 231
Zealandia, 8, 254, 255
Zeebrugge, blocking of, discussed and
considered impracticable, 154
Zeppelin activity, 436, 437, 442, 443
bombs rescuers, 496
engaged by Fleet in Jutland battle,
486
shed, Tondern, attack on, 278, 289
Zeppelins as scouts, 32, 451
destruction of, 169, 290
raids by, 282
Zigzagging, procedure of, 46
desl
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