Indonesia Free A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta Mavis Rose Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph SeriesIndonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad HattaMavis Rose Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta Southeast Asia Program Publications Southeast Asia Program Cornell University Ithaca, New York 1987 SEAPEditorial Board Benedict R. O'G Anderson Tamara Loos Stanley O'Connor K. W. Taylor Andrew Willford Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications 640 Stewart Avenue, Ithaca, NY 14850-3857 Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, Number 67 © 1987 Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Second printing, 2002. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, no part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Printed in the United States of America ISBN 0-87763-033-XCONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................................................... v PROLOGUE .............................................................. 1 1 THE ALAM MINANGKABAU............................................... 3 2 THE IRRESISTIBLE CHALLENGE ....................................... 17 3 PROVOCATION AND REPRISAL.......................................... 30 4 DIVERSITY WITHOUT UNITY .......................................... 46 5 THE NEW PNI....................................................... 59 6 EXILE............................................................. 76 7 THE JAPANESE INTERREGNUM ......................................... 92 8 INDEPENDENCE PROCLAIMED ......................................... 108 9 INDEPENDENCE DEFENDED ........................................... 124 10 PRIME MINISTER....................................................143 11 FROM DWITUNGGAL TO DWITANGGAL.....................................169 12 NON-COOPERATOR....................................................188 13 THE UNACHIEVED FREEDOM............................................212 INDEX.................................................................231 111ILLUSTRATIONS Mohammad Hatta Frontispiece Following page 16 1. Hatta holding reins outside h1s home 1n Buklt T1ngg1 2. Early teens 3. Members of the Perhimpunan Indonesia 4. At Mont Blanc, 1924 5. On Praes1d1um of League against Colonialism Congress, 1927 6. Four students on trial 7. The New PNI group at Boven Digul 8. Exiles on Banda Neira Following page 142 9. Proclamation of Independence 10. L1nggajat1 discussions 11. Sjahrlr, Sukarno, Hatta being taken prisoner by Capt. Vosveld of Dutch Military Intelligence, Yogyakarta, December 19, 1948 12. Family members and staff at Presidential Palace as Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrlr are driven away, December 19, 1948 13. Hatta on Bangka, April 1949 14. Transfer of sovereignty 15. Hatta with h1s wife and daughters 16. At Sjahrlr1s graveside, 1966 17. With h1s family, following conferral of honorary doctorate at Univer- sity of Indonesia, 1975 18. At Panca Si!a commemoration conference, June 1977 19. Hatta as Prime Minister ivINTRODUCTION Generally speaking, biographies are only written for Idolising a hero. The more Inferior the biography 1s, the greater will be the 1dol1sat1on of the great man the biography describes. ... So far as I am concerned, I am more likely to hear or read statements showing my failures and my shame rather than praise and eulogy. Mohammad Hatta, "On Character," 1n VoKtKoJUt a VaVUat Mohammad Hatta, the first Vice-President and joint proclalmer of the Republic of Indonesia, was a man who devoted almost h1s entire life to an Ideal. From h1s early years until h1s death 1n 1980* the Issue of Indone- sian freedom overshadowed all other aspects of h1s life. Hatta’s biog- raphy depicts the dogged determination, courage, and optimism, required by an Indonesian leader 1f he were to confront a colonial power and win h1s country’s Independence. H1s life history also portrays the disillu- sionment and frustration a leader experiences when h1s Hfe-long democratic Ideal 1s shattered and the new nation reverts to a type of government similar to the one he had dedicated h1s life to transforming. Indonesian freedom meant more to Hatta than the attainment of national sovereignty; 1t also demanded an element of social reform. Freedom for Indonesia must also ensure the people’s participation 1n their country’s government. Independence must not bring to birth a nation 1n which the majority of the people would be powerless, as 1n the colonial period. Hatta’s concept of democratic government and soda! and economic betterment for the people he named fudaulatan Jiakyat, people’s sovereignty. Hatta’s revolutionary activism began 1n West Sumatra 1n a society with a traditional form of government which was unusually egalitarian. The culture, philosophies, process of modernization, and spirit of revolt of h1s Mlnangkabau ethnic group all played a part 1n shaping h1s concepts of freedom. By the time of Hatta’s birth, the tradition of democracy 1n the Mlnangkabau, where the local clans governed the nagasU or village states, had almost crumbled, and had been replaced by an autocratic system of rule centered on Batavia. The authority of the pznghuLu (or family heads) had been transferred Into the hands of Dutch officials and their salaried assistants. Why did a quiet, studious young man like Mohammad Hatta enter the stressful, hazardous, cloak-and-dagger milieu 1n which a purposeful revolutionary must operate? Clearly his motivation was sufficiently compelling to overcome any natural aversion to such a lifestyle. Hatta also grew up 1n an unsettling epoch, a period of accelerated technological change, Aslan renaissance, global warfare, colonial unrest, and class struggle. Reverberations from these upheavals Impinged on him, converting general dissatisfaction Into open revolt. There was a deep-seated religious element 1n Hatta’s activism, a conviction that h1s struggle for ktdaulatan Kakyat constituted a divine vcommissioning. He was as much a religious as a revolutionary ascetic. Hatta was an eclectic Muslim—Modernist, Suflst, and Wahhablst—while h1s Dutch schooling had drawn him philosophically closer to the West than the Middle East. Hatta, like many of h1s Mlnangkabau fellow nationalists, was also fascinated by Marx, responding to h1s call for social justice and Intrigued by h1s economic theories. Hatta1s mercantile background made him very conscious of the economic factors Influencing soda! transformation and the colonial system. He was always a strong supporter of cooperative systems, which he saw as a practical means of strengthening the weakest Indonesian sectors, and at the same time developing a spirit of Independence and self-reliance. The Soviet Union’s collectivist system, 1n Hatta’s opinion, dampened Initiative and contravened Islamic law by discouraging private enterprise. Hatta rose to prominence as a leader through h1s organizational abili- ties, h1s drive, h1s creative thinking and provocative writings. He laid great stress on political education through the use of cadres and party newspapers. Hatta himself was not always an effective classroom teacher; he was more successful as the provider of Ideas and material. The academic way In which he expressed h1s concepts made 1t difficult for many people to understand him. He tended to be more eloquent with h1s pen than with h1s voice, being too reserved and Inhibited to use dramatic effect 1n h1s public speaking or to unleash h1s passions before an audience. It was during the Japanese Occupation and the Revolution that Hatta gained widest acceptance as a national leader. In these critical periods, h1s cool levelheadedness and his ability to plan carefully and act shrewdly Impressed h1s fellows. Hatta would have liked to step Into the role of national leader 1n periods of crisis 1n the post-Dutch period. That he had no opportunity to do so was a source of frustration to him, as he saw the parliamentary system lose credibility through mismanagement and Irresponsible behavior on the part of the rival parties. Hatta’s relationship with Sukarno provided the major drama 1n h1s political life, affecting h1s close ties with h1s ally, Sjahrlr. For a man like Hatta, dedicated to steering Indonesia away from the Javanese/ colonial hierarchical system of government 1n the direction of kzdaulatan nakyat, h1s dependence on Sukarno’s patronage to gain acceptance on Java was an anathema. It also proved to be h1s Achilles heel. H1s resignation from the v1ce-pres1dency 1n 1956 combined elements of anger and relief. Hatta had a tendency to be ambivalent 1n h1s statements about Sukarno, being at times protective and affectionate, on other occasions pouring out bitterness and condemnation on Sukarno’s head. Hatta saw Sukarno, along with the Communists, as responsible for thwarting the advancement of h1s social and economic goals. Yet the two leaders achieved much when they worked 1n partnership, together proclaiming Independence and successfully warding off serious challenges within and without the Republic of Indonesia during the Revolu- tion. There was wide support and loyalty for the VwZ Tunggal throughout the archipelago, with a recognition that the two men complemented each other. Hatta needed Sukarno’s charm and ability to communicate with the Javanese masses. Sukarno benefltted from Hatta’s discipline, Integrity, and economic sense. When Hatta resigned from the v1ce-pres1dency, h1s political Impact weakened and he never regained the power he had possessed as a member of the Vwl Tunggal. Likewise, without Hatta’s steadying Influence and v1dedication to a principle rather than to personal ambition, Sukarno’s political performance deteriorated, and h1s regime ended 1n political and economic disaster. To remain at the apex of power, Hatta would have had to modify h1s ideals. This he was not prepared to do, believing that, within the frame- work of k&dcuiLatan Kokyat, both the Old and New Orders were counter-revolu- tionary. From 1960 to the end of h1s life, Hatta’s political activism reverted to being covert. H1s efforts to regain a leadership position 1n the New Order regime were thwarted by Suharto’s decision to ban the Islamic socialist party which Hatta formed to replace the banned Masjuml and PSI parties. Although Hatta never achieved the same degree of International recogni- tion as Sukarno, he did play a major and significant role 1n the founding of Indonesia and 1n drawing attention to the needs and oppression of Its people. He was undoubtedly a statesman of the highest caliber, prepared to sacrifice ambition, wealth, and high office for his Ideals. H1s leadership role must be assessed as much for Its ethical qualities as for its attainment of political power. Writing Hatta’s biography has been for me an Immensely satisfying experience. Since reading h1s anthology VokZkoJA a Pa&Uot as a first-year undergraduate, my curiosity to discover more about Hatta has compelled me to research the life of this complex leader who walked 1n Sukarno’s shadow but yet was a ’’powerhouse” in h1s own right. I have been aware that 1t was Impossible to discover the whole truth about Hatta, for only a fraction of h1s life could be uncovered and recorded. There are also formidable barriers dividing me from Hatta, as I am neither an Indonesian nor a Muslim. I have tried to break down some of these obstacles by Interaction with Indonesian people, by extensive reading of Indonesian texts, and by a study of Islam. Fortunately Hatta and I have perspectives in common which acted as bridges. I regret very much that I never had the privilege of meeting him, as he died just at the time I commenced my research. My other disappointment 1s that I was not allowed access to h1s private papers. In conclusion, I would like to express my thanks to the staff of Cornell University’s Modern Indonesia Project for accepting my script for publication. My thanks go too to Dr. James Walter, Dr. Colin Brown, and Dr. Deliar Noer of Griffith University, Brisbane, who acted as my super- visors while I researched Hatta’s life as a Master of Philosophy thesis. My two Indonesian language teachers, Mrs. Margaret Bocquet-S1ek and Mrs. Christina Whittington, were also most supportive, lending me materials from their private collections. Last but not least I would like to express my deep appreciation to those generous and wonderfully helpful people who allowed me to Interview them and who spoke so unstlntlngly to me about their remembrances and Impressions of Hatta. Mavis Rose School of Modern Aslan Studies Griffith University, Brisbane v11Mohammad HattaPROLOGUE October 1927. For Mohammad Hatta and the three fellow students detained with him in the Cassius-Straat prison in The Hague, a month of gloom—but also of challenge. Winter in Europe was always a daunting prospect, contrasting sharply with the warmth and color of their equatorial homeland. This winter they could expect no homely comforts to ease the damp chill, only the starkness of a cell. As chairman of the Perhimpunan Indonesia [Indonesian Association], Mohammad Hatta was regarded by the Dutch authorities as the ringleader of a Marxist-inspired student activist group which was plotting to oust the Dutch from their most prestigious colony, the Dutch East Indies. The charges against Hatta and his fellow students were that they were Involved 1n revolution and in Incitement against the Dutch Crown.1 The powerful Ministry of Colonies was demanding a harsh sentence; it seemed that these prison walls might enclose them for many years to come. While accepting an offer of legal aid from the Social Democrat1sche Arbeiders Partij [Social Democratic Workers1 Party],2 Hatta was also determined to conduct his own defense.3 No Dutchman could adequately explain the factors which had contributed to h1s deep conviction that he must dedicate his life to freeing his country from colonial rule. He must establish that he and the three other students arrested were not attacking the Dutch Crown pz* but only trying to redress the wrongs perpetrated on the indigenous peoples of the Dutch East Indies, which the students now referred to as ,fIndonesia.” He must explain why Intrinsically law-abiding, studious young men such as himself were advocating the overthrow of the colonial power. Hatta did not have the appearance of a violent Insurrectionist. He was a small, slim young man with thoughtful brown eyes and a grave expres- sion. He was an Introspective person, quiet and self-contained, who seldom allowed h1s emotions to show on the surface. Even in anger he remained cool. Only the knitting of h1s eyebrows and the sting of his comments revealed his displeasure. H1s solemnity sometimes made him appear morose, yet this was deceptive. Under his reserve lurked a warm, gentle, and compassionate nature. When Hatta smiled, the transformation was remark- able, softening h1s stern features with an attractive, boyish grin, bringing a sparkle to his somber eyes. Hatta was the most effective and dedicated leader the Perhimpunan Indonesia had had to date, and the depth of economic and political analysis in h1s writings had brought prestige to the student group, upgrading the association from a social club to a major force 1n the Indonesian national- ist movement.4 Now his pen must assist him to prepare a defense speech which would convince a Netherlands court of the justice of the struggle for independence, so that the Dutch people might realize how adversely colonial policies had affected the lives of the majority of Indonesian people, both materially and spiritually. Hatta began by explaining why Indonesian students could not be as relaxed about issues of government as their European counterparts: 1My Lord Chairman! I would first of all put up a question for discussion which 1s related to the general psychological factor: why Indonesian student youth takes an actlvz part 1n politics. Because 1n the Western countries this 1s regarded as something abnormal, as a morbid symptom.5 Hatta was no doubt visualizing h1s European fellow students at the Rotterdam School of Commerce or at the University of Leiden as they ardently bandied about the socialist Ideas which the 1917 Revolution 1n Russia had stimulated. There was a general wave of disaffection with the European "Establishment” In the aftermath of World War I. Hatta tried to explain that# even before he reached Europe for h1s tertiary education, he had already become Involved 1n a revolutionary movement: In Europe the best part of academic youth shows a warm Interest 1n the great social questions, not 1n an active way, however, but only 1n the ah&tsiact. In the Wait, Intellectual youth 1s pnzpojdjig Itself 1n the universities for political and social activities. In Indonjula, 1t take* pa*.£ 1n 1t already while 1t 1s still at school. ... In a colonial society youth very quickly learns the hard truth; 1t sees with Its own eyes the distress and the misery of the oppressed mass. ... It feels and understands the anguish and the misery of Its people. 6 For Hatta, the Independence struggle had begun 1n West Sumatra, 1n the Alam MlnangkabauJ It was 1n that fertile, productive region that he first became aware that he belonged to a politically subjugated people. In the A lam Mlnangkabau, the concept of freedom was closely associated with the permanent removal of the Dutch and their system of rule, which had destroyed traditional democracy and economic prosperity. 1. A description of the events surrounding the detention of Mohammad Hatta and h1s three fellow students 1s to be found 1n chap. 3 below. 2. The Social Democratic Workers1 Party or SDAP was the main opposition party 1n the Tweede Kamer [Second Chamber] of the Dutch Parliament. For details of Hatta1s acceptance of the offer of legal aid, see Mohammad Hatta, MtmolJi (Jakarta: Tlntamas, 1979), p. 219. 3. Ibid., pp. 219-20. 4. See chaps. 2 and 3 below for de- tails of Hatta’s activities as leader of the Perhlmpunan Indonesia prior to h1s detention. 5. Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia Free,” speech presented to the Dutch Court on March 9, 1929, 1n VoKtKalt a Patriot: Szlzct&d Wilting* by Mohammad Hatta (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), p. 206. 6. Ibid., p. 207. 7. Alam Mlnangkabau literally means the natural world of the Mlnangkabau people, the region they define as their homeland. 2CHAPTER ONE THE ALAM MINANGKABAU In politic*, the>te may he differences of opinion hut national sentiment must be, tied to owe,** Native Land, which, is united and which desires freedom. Much time is devoted to propagating unity *o that Bataks lose their Batakwe**, Minangkahau lose their Minangkahauness, and so that Sundawese and Javanese and Madurese dispense with their narrow national Reeling*. . . . There, are Still many among us who call themselves Indonesian nationalists hut whose social intercourse and spirit are still very much hound to their region and place af hirthA At the time of Mohammad Hattafs birth on August 12, 1902# 1n the Mlnangkabau region of West Sumatra, Indonesia did not exist as a political entity. The International world recognized the series of Islands stretch- ing from Sumatra to West New Guinea as Netherlands India or the Dutch East Indies. To the Indigenous people, ties of loyalty to their region and ethnic group were paramount. Hatta had reason to be proud of the Mlnangkabau who had gained the reputation of being among the most Intellectual and entrepreneurial ethnic groups 1n the archipelago.2 Their name was believed to derive from the words menang kerhau meaning the "Victory of the Buffalo.” These words related to a legendary tale of a Mlnangkabau defeat of the Javanese by the cunning ploy of using a buffalo calf with steel blades hidden 1n Its horns to vie against the large bull buffalo fielded by the Javanese.3 The Mlnangkabau traditionally harbor deep respect for the buffalo, re- flected 1n the architectural styling of their houses and their traditional headdresses. A second Interpretation of the word "Mlnangkabau” claims that 1t derived from pinang kahhu meaning "original home,”4 the mountainous heartland with Its fertile plateaus stretching from the west coast of Central Sumatra across the Buklt Barlsan range. The three core regions of settlement or luhak which formed the "original home"—Agam, Tanah Datar, and Lima Puluh Kota—were separated from each other by high moun- tains and deep gullies. Two different systems of customary law or adat evolved 1n the Alam Minangkahau: the Koto-Piliang and Bodi-Caniago. The clans or suku Identifying with the Koto-Piliang tradition were mainly situated In the luhak of Tanah Datar and to a lesser extent 1n Lima Puluh Kota. Politically, this system supported a monarchy and a hierarchical system of village government.5 The Agam luhak, where Hatta1s maternal and paternal families had their roots, adhered to the Bodi-Caniago tradi- tion, which had an egalitarian style of political organization.6 Under both systems most Mlnangkabau villages or nagari were essentially autono- mous, their councils being led by the penghulu or suku chieftains.7 Islam was firmly established 1n the Alam Minangkahau, where Its reli- gious centers or surau had gained considerable prestige because of their high standard of scholarship, being especially renowned for studies of 3Islamic law.® The mystical Suflst form of Islam which took root 1n the Mlnangkabau about the twelfth century AD was remarkably tolerant regarding local customs which, strictly speaking, did not accord with Islamic tenets.9 During the late eighteenth century, International demand for coffee drew more foreign traders to Sumatran ports, creating an economic boom for the Mlnangkabau but also unsettling traditional society. The most ardent opposition to this societal change came from the Islamic leaders. In response to what was seen as a fall 1n moral standards, together with fear of Western Influences, an Islamic revival took place 1n the early nineteenth century, led by a group of pilgrims recently returned from Mecca. While 1n the Holy City, the pilgrims had come under the Influence of the fundamentalist Wahhabis of Arabia,a militant and puritanical group whose Insistence on a stricter adherence to the Islamic behavioral code was making a deep Impression 1n the Middle East, a region disturbed by Europefs revolutionary and Enlightenment trends. On their return to Sumatra 1n 1803, the pilgrims, known as the Padrl, were fired to emulate the Wahhabi movement 1n the Mlnangkabau. Their extremism and militancy, however, led to civil war rather than political stability. The monarchy and those villages which supported 1t became the particular target of Padrl attack, several members of the royal family being slain. Faced with a tide of religious fanaticism, the surviving princes appealed to the Dutch for military assistance 1n return for territorial concessions. The Dutch accepted the offer, hoping to gain access to the economic wealth of the Mlnangkabau. On February 10, 1821, the Dutch signed a treaty with the Mlnangkabau monarchfs nephew which ceded to the Netherlands three royal villages "together with the remaining lands of the State of Man1nkabo,"H land which was not the royal prerogative to give away. The Padrl’s fanaticism had left the ALam Mlnangkabau vulner- able to a foreign take-over. As Hatta commented with some asperity 1n h1s memoirs: "the Padrl forgot that the highest law 1n Islam 1s peace."12 The seriousness of the Dutch threat and the Internal divisions within their homeland alerted the Mlnangkabau people to the need for unity. Foregoing civil war, most of them united their resources under the moderate Padrl leader, Tuanku Imam Bonjol, who organized a dogged campaign to hold back the Intruders. Not having anticipated such a fierce counteraction, the Dutch 1n 1833 Issued a conciliatory statement, referred to as the Plakat PandLfang [Long Declaration]. In this they tried to entice the Mlnangkabau to give up the struggle, assuring the people that they would remain under the rule of their own leaders and that no taxes would be levied.1® Mlnangkabau forces, however, did not give 1n until 1837 when Dutch technological advantage finally broke the resistance, leading to the capture and exile of Tuanku Imam Bonjol. At the time of Hatta's birth 1n 1902, the region had experienced more than half a century of Dutch rule, during which the Dutch had made 1t a major coffee-producing area, Introducing the culAuusutzltzl or system of forced cultivation of crops for the government.14 The people of the region were reluctant to enslave themselves to a system which was aimed at the enrichment of the colonial power to the detriment of the local producers, especially when 1t also Involved corv§e service for building the Infrastructure needed to serve the coffee trade. Yet the adminis- trative job opportunities opened up by the colonial power were tempting to the Mlnangkabau, providing both the lure of an assured salary and a new system of soda! mobility. 1® From their experience 1n Java, the 4Dutch realized that they must have local cooperation to gain maximum benefit. Rather than Impose direct rule on the local people, Dutch policy was slowly to build up a bureaucratic elite whose fortunes were tied to Dutch Interests. As Minister of Colonies J. C. Baud wrote In 1841, the rule of non-interference "must be scrupulously followed until the d&mccsKitsCc principle which 1s the reigning one practically everywhere 1n the Padang highlands, has been supplanted by the asiUt(xc>iukxi or clan. Prestige was also related to one’s religious position and academic standing. It was not unusual for Minang- kabau to be both farmers and businessmen, peasant and bourgeois at the same time. Hatta was aware of a symbiotic relationship between the rural and urban areas 1n h1s own society, an interdependency. "As long as there is a balance between town and village," he was later to write, "there is harmony in economic life."20 In Java there was a wider social gap between the elite and the lower classes and a feudal system was more evident. Indeed, the feudal order had become more Inflexible and less responsible by being propped up by Dutch military might. Hatta made use of h1s first vacation period to explore areas of Europe outside the Netherlands. On Christmas Day 1921 he dined in Hamburg at the home of Le Febvre, a former Resident of West Sumatra. Le Febvre had been prematurely retired from colonial service allegedly because he protected the Minangkabau from rice speculators during a period of food shortages. Although his actions cost him his job, they earned him the epithet of a "government representative whom the people loved."21 Le Febvre had also been one of the few colonial officials to support formation of the Jong Sumatranen Bond. From his memoirs, 1t appears that Hatta valued the friendship of the Le Febvre family, and he returned to Hamburg 1n subsequent vacation periods to visit them. Again, such instances of kindness and understand- ing, although appreciated, created a dilemma. The spontaneous warmth and friendliness shown by Dutch people to the Indonesian students made 1t more difficult for them to view the colonizer as an enemy, dissolving to a degree the dichotomy which existed 1n the Indies. Students such as Hatta had to make a clear distinction. It was not the white people pzz *z whom they hated, only their system of colonial exploitation with its emphasis on race. The student association, Its title changed 1n 1922 to Indoneslsche Vereen1g1ng to reflect the students’ perception of the archipelago, played an Important role 1n offsetting pro-European Influences, keeping the reality of the situation 1n the colony alive. The association was Important for Hatta personally, as most Indies students were pursuing law degrees at the University of Leiden, few taking commercial studies at the Handelshogeschool. Without the student association, Hatta might well have been Isolated. The capacious Leiden flat of law student Subardjo was a favorite meeting place for the students, and Hatta frequently stayed there at weekends, rather than commuting to and from Rotterdam. On the wall hung a large red and white flag, on which was centered a buffalo’s head. 20Subardjo has claimed that he suggested the red and white colors because of their historical association with the ancient kingdom of Majapahlt, the red symbolizing bravery and the white holiness.22 jh© buffalo1s head was regarded as a symbol of the patience, determination, and courage of the Indonesian people, the gentleness and docility of the buffalo belying a hidden strength. Indonesian students were encouraged to stand and meditate momentarily before the flag prior to sitting an examination to remind them that they must pass for the sake of Indonesia. In February 1922, Hatta was again asked to assume the office of treasurer. As a member of the executive committee, he was also expected to serve on the editorial board of the groupfs journal. This was no hardship. Hatta was discovering that he had a natural flair for political comment. As treasurer, he also had to raise sufficient funds to finance a journal. Formerly the paper had been funded by the Indoneslsche Verbond van Studenten [Indonesian Students* League], a federation of Dutch, Chinese, and Indonesian students with Interests 1n the Indies. Now that the new emphasis was on Independence, the students had withdrawn from the league, and taken responsibility for financing their own journal. The journal’s former name, Hlndla VoctJia [Sons of the Indies] was changed to Indonesia MeAdcka [Free Indonesia] to accord with the students’ Insis- tence on non-cooperation with the Dutch and complete Independence for the Indies. Hatta became an ardent supporter of the concept of ’’non-cooperation,” a policy adopted by freedom movements 1n several other countries, Including Turkey and India. Hatta pointed out 1n h1s defense speech that ’’coopera- tion 1s only possible between two groups that have the *amz Klgkt* and obligation* and, furthermore, common IrttzAJUt.''^ He argued: ’’When this condition 1s not fulfilled, cooperation merely means that the strong party bullies the weaker, using the latter as an Instrument to support Its own Interests.”24 Non-cooperation helped to weaken the bonds created by ’’association.” ”It sharpens the colonial antithesis, marks the division between ruler and ruled, outwardly serving as a repellent and Inwardly as a unifier,” asserted Hatta.25 As Hatta’s personal commitment to the nationalist cause deepened, his writings became more fiery and challenging. He himself changed, conforming much more to the model of a totally dedicated revolutionary.26 He disci- plined himself to suppress his natural passions and emotions, concentrating h1s whole being on the achievement of Indonesian freedom. H1s puritan upbringing acted as a prop, giving him the moral support for h1s revolu- tionary asceticism. The wild oats a Mlnangkabau traditionally sows 1n the KanZau became the seeds of revolution. It was not really surprising that Hatta’s life should take this course. From early childhood he had moved 1n circles where patriotism and religion went hand 1n hand, hotly united 1n condemning the Injustices and Indignities which followed 1n the wake of the Dutch Intrusion Into the Mlnangkabau heartland, the deliberate undermining of traditional democracy. While a member of the Jong Sumatranen Bond Hatta sensed the expectation that activist young people like himself should be prepared to forego personal ambition for the sake of the nationalist struggle. Hatta was also aware that Syekh Arsyad expected him to emulate h1s father’s role of service to Allah by moral leadership 1n the community and by continuing to defend Islam from Western domination. Service was being demanded of him from many sides: from h1s God, h1s family, and h1s people. By submit- ting h1s Hfe to the Independence of Indonesia, Hatta could try to fulfill 21these onerous expectations and duties. One might say that the future course of h1s life had been so clearly mapped out for him that there was really no way 1n which he could turn aside without losing self-respect. Although the majority of h1s fellows were genuinely concerned to foster the alms of the nationalist cause, few had that touch of religious zeal which added depth to Hattafs commitment. They were light-hearted students, keen to sample the somewhat frenzied social life of continental Europe 1n the 1920s. Most of them were also Javanese, with a religious outlook less puritanical than Hattafs. Just as many Mlnangkabau 1n the early nineteenth century had chafed under the zealous Padrl curtailment of their traditional leisure-time activities, so there were students who balked at Hatta's homilies, nicknaming him "the pastor.”27 Subardjo recalled that "Hattafs personality was marked by an exacting nature and a strong sense of self-d1sc1pl 1ne, which flowed from h1s puritanical Islamic outlook";2^ that Hatta "could not easily conceal h1s disapproval of the bohemian way of conduct of many members of the Indone- sian Association, who were neglecting their patriotic duties as well as their studies."29 Subardjo was more typical of the average student, a ban vlvant rather than a puritan. Normally conversation centered on social topics—dances, girl friends, the casual exchange of young men—but when Hatta appeared 1n the room, the level of discourse altered. Light- hearted banter switched to deeper, more academic discussion.30 Hatta made no apologies for h1s strait-laced behavior. In h1s defense speech, he contended that, while European students could devote themselves to the "silly-sweet pleasures of youth," the Indonesian must prepare himself for the task of releasing h1s people from distress and misery.31 He tried to explain to the court the sacrificial nature of h1s nationalist activities: The hard struggle for Independence which 1t [Indonesian youth] sees looming before 1t, puts 1t 1n a serious mood and perhaps makes 1t old for its age. . . . For the national Ideal all selfish motives and personal considerations must give way.32 As the students grew accustomed to Hatta’s ways, they accepted h1s asceticism and tendency to preach. He was basically a gregarious person, who enjoyed the many AZlamatan or festive meals which the expatriate Indonesians arranged among themselves. H1s memoirs Indicate that Hatta appreciated good food, although he observed strictly the Islamic rules 1n regard to alcohol. And 1n spite of his asperity, he was a generous friend to those 1n need. According to law student Ichsan, "student friends who had problems always came to Hatta to work out a solution."33 A11 Sastroamldjojo, a Javanese law student who worked closely with Hatta, confirmed that he was not as dour as he appeared on first acquaintance: He appeared rather stiff 1n socializing with fellow students. But this was just a superficial Image because for those who came to know Hatta more Intimately, that first Impression disappeared. They came to realize that h1s serious nature and behavior were a result of h1s dedication to the alms of freeing h1s native land, Indonesia. His dedication was so complete and Integral a part of him that he entirely disre- garded h1s own enjoyment and /ale, de, vlvnz as a student.34 It was not surprising that, 1n adopting the demeanor of a paragon of virtue, Hatta should from time to time have had to endure teasing from 22h1s friends# who doubtless felt challenged to break through the sancti- monious exterior to unleash the human frailty beneath. When on a vacation course a personable young Polish student admitted that she was attracted to Hatta, his student friends urged her to try to win h1s affection, promising to keep well out of the way so that Hatta would be left alone 1n her company as much as possible. A few days later they questioned her to find out how the romance was progressing. Total failure, she was forced to adm1tl35 Hatta did not always succeed 1n achieving h1s goals. He often neglected h1s studies, devoting too much time to the student association and to h1s nationalistic writings. This resulted 1n personal dilemmas, as when he failed a unit 1n h1s diploma examination and lost h1s scholarship as a result. Although he was permitted to repeat the failed subject, Hatta was temporarily shaken; he needed a scholarship to finance h1s stay 1n Europe. He was obliged to "associate" and seek assistance from h1s Dutch friend, Van Leeuwen, then on home leave. Van Leeuwen arranged a loan for him from a private fund, the stipulation being that 1t be repaid with Interest once Hatta began to earn a living.36 * * * * The Comintern had already established links with the Indonesian students, one of Its agents being a Mlnangkabau Communist, Tan Mai aka, whom Hatta had met 1n Subardjo's flat 1n Leiden. Hatta recalled that while revisiting Hamburg and the Le Febvre family in the summer of 1922, he was contacted by Darsono, the exiled Vice-President of the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI. Darsono was then working 1n the headquarters of the German Communist Party 1n Berlin, one of the most powerful Communist groups outside Russia and closely linked with the Communist Party of Holland [CPH]. Indonesia was clearly considered to be an Important area of Influence, the Russian leader Bukharin 1n 1926 describing 1t as "the bridge between Europe and Asia."37 it was logical that the Comintern should seek to establish links with activist overseas students who were recognized as potential leaders of Indonesia's struggle for Independence. Both Darsono and the exiled chairman of the PKI, Semaun, were to work very closely with the student association, obtaining funding on Its behalf. Prior to their exile, both Semaun and Tan Mai aka had rejected Haj1 Agus Salim's Insistence at the Sixth National Congress of Sarlkat Islam 1n 1921 that members have only one party affiliation. Preferring to withdraw from Sarlkat Islam than obey the ruling, the PKI established opposition Sarekat Rakyat [People's Unions]. The separation of the PKI from the main nationalist parties was a decision which Hatta would try hard to reverse four years later. While Hatta established a close working relationship with Semaun and Darsono, winning their support, he and h1s fellow Mlnangkabau, Tan Malaka, remained basically opposed on the Issues which tend to separate social democrats and Communists. Hatta favored parliamentary democracy while Tan Malaka supported the one-party system. Where he and Tan Malaka agreed most, according to Hatta's memoirs, was on their mutual dislike of and refusal to bow to Stalin.38 A significant event for Hatta 1n the summer of 1922 was the news that Turkey under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal Pasha had defeated the Greek Army on August 26. This, remarked Hatta with a note of satisfaction, "stirred up the air 1n Europe." "In the hearts of every Aslan, Ankara 23became regarded as a Mecca of the new nationalism which teaches as its basic principle a belief in one's own capability.1^9 It was a strong statement. Mecca was the most sacred place on earth to a Muslim. Hatta was also impressed by the establishment of a parliament in Ankara "based on the principle of People's Sovereignty#” a principle which Hatta believed accorded with the democratic ideal of the Minangkabau# and one which he would promote for Indonesia for the rest of his life. Later events in Turkey forced Hatta to modify his opinion of Mustapha Kemal Pasha and admit that "from the beginning of 1926 Turkey was again governed by a dictatorship#’^9 although this time a secular one. From 1923 onwards# Hatta became the leading propagandist of the Indonesian Student's League# whose name had now changed to the Perhimpunan Indonesia or PI. He established a reputation for hard-hitting journalism# using his newly acquired economic expertise to highlight the flaws in the theories put forward by Dutch colonial economists# even highly respected academics such as Dr. Boeke. "I began to query whether J. H. Boeke was correct in the statements he put forward 1n h1s dissertation Twpl4>ch KclorU&Lz StaatkuuC^kundJt [Tropical Colonial Political Economics] published in 1910#” Hatta recalled, "which suggested that economic laws valid in the West are not valid for the native peoples of the Netherlands East Indies.”41 Boeke considered that there was a basic difference in the outlook of East and West. The average Eastern peasant had simple and limited wants# while 1n the West there was a more acquisitive instinct with unlimited desires. The average Easterner did not possess the ability to organize and did not form large-scale corporations, generally lacking the profiteering nature of the Westerner.42 Boeke's statement implied that the Easterner lacked drive and entrepreneurial spirit. Hatta's own family’s record of enterprise and efficiency negated these economic theories. The Minangkabau economy had been buoyant and well-balanced until the Westerner had entered the region. Hatta pointed out that the returns to foreign investors in the Indies were high because of the considerable effort expended by the Indonesian peasant which left him too exhausted to look after his own interests.43 Hatta also contended that the Javanese peasant had been betrayed by the willingness of his ruling class to cooperate with the Dutch for personal enrichment# citing as an example the abuse of Javanese "coolies” in the East Sumatran planta- tions. "And to whom could the masses complain?" Hatta queried# adding: "They knew nobody but their oppressors."44 Hatta reiterated this theme in his defense speech: "People were punished daily# they were beaten with rattan# deprived of their freedom# undressed and tarred, threatened with death to prevent them from telling about the maltreatment#” he alleged.45 Hatta protested against the statement by a member of the Netherlands Indies judiciary that "this punishment was indispensable 1n the Dutch colonies for the time being."46 "We are absolutely fed up with this kind of ’Dutch civilization,' demon- strated in such a 'brave' way by those who call themselves exponents of Dutch culture."47 Apart from using its paper, Indonesia UeAddta, as a medium for protest# the PI in 1925 also published a Gzdznktiodi, a commemoration of the student association's first fifteen years of existence. The authors laid emphasis on the "non-cooperation" principle and the replacement of the political entity "Dutch East Indies" by "Indonesia." Hatta's two contributions: "Indonesia in the Middle of the Asian Revolution" and "Indonesia in the 24World Community” confidently asserted the 1nfect1ousness of Aslan renais- sance, bolstered by Japanese and Turkish successes and the growing strength of the Indian nationalist movement under Gandhi’s leadership. To the students’ Immense satisfaction, the emergence of the GzdLtnkbadi raised a storm of protest both within the Netherlands and from the colonial government. Subardjo graphically recalled the reaction: ’’Dutch public opinion was 1n uproar, dumbfounded, astonished and variable.”48 For Hatta, there was the added gratification that Westenenck came under attack from the Ministry of Colonies for not perceiving the extent of radicalism building up within the student group. Subardjo recalled that Westenenck’s admonition to the Indies students was: ”It 1s no use thinking that Dutch power will be easily overthrown because 1t Is as Immovable and strong as the mountains of Sumatra and Java.”49 A Ministry of Colonies circular was Issued warning students against participating 1n political or trade union activities on penalty of being denied employment 1n the Indies civil service and withdrawal of government scholarships. In the colony, parents were advised aaalnst sending their sons to the ’’contaminating atmosphere of Europe.”50 it was suggested that a suitable deterrent to dissident sons might be to discontinue parental allowances. As Hatta pointed out 1n h1s defense speech, ”to the sons 1s left the choice ... to Imitate the fathers 1n their dull routine, comfortably and willingly and slavishly carrying out orders from above, renouncing the promotion of any Ideals and only thinking of a career,”51 or to join the nationalist cause. Westenenck was Instructed to Intensify h1s surveillance of the stu- dents' activities, as they were undoubtedly maintaining a close association with left-wing groups. Not only had the exiled PKI leader, Semaun, established an office 1n Amsterdam but both he and a former PI chairman, Iwa Kusuma Sumantrl, represented the Perhlmpunan Indonesia on the Comintern executive. Western education had not produced the type of cultural bonding the Dutch had anticipated between brown and white. Van Leeuwen assured Hatta that h1s loan funding would continue Irre- spective of h1s student activism. Hatta did, however, receive a letter Informing him that the change 1n direction of the Perhlmpunan Indonesia did not accord with the precepts of the Orde der Dlenaren van Indie and that he must either resign from the PI or leave the Order.52 It was not a difficult choice. H1s Increasing Involvement 1n PI activities was steering Hatta away from ’’association” with the Dutch. For him, being a "server of the Indies” meant attending to the needs of the Indigenous people, which he believed entailed ousting the colonial power. Perhaps a more hurtful consequence was that h1s Mlnangkabau roommate, Za1nudd1n, was ordered by h1s father, a respected Padang businessman, to dissociate from Hatta and return home.55 It was disconcerting to be regarded as a "contaminating Influence" by a member of one’s own ethnic group. At the end of 1925 Hatta was nominated for the chairmanship of the Perhlmpunan Indonesia, a tribute to h1s untiring efforts to promote the association. Hatta accepted the position, drawing on to h1s executive as secretary a radical Javanese student, Abdul Madjld, a choice he may later have regretted. For h1s treasurer, he chose a fellow student from the Handelshogeschool, Abutarl. A decision which must have given Westenenck cause for concern was the Inclusion on the PI executive of the PKI leader, Darsono, now closely linked to Moscow. In h1s memoirs, Hatta set down the qualities he was looking for 1n h1s committee: 25I thought the number of members should not exceed five. Among those who sat on the executive, as many as possible must be members who worked for the Association or wrote essays for Indanjula MeAdzka, or who carried out propaganda for PznhAjm- punan Indonuta by correspondence with friends at home, discussing the various problems faced by the nationalist movement. In this way, the activities of Ministry of Colonies advisers, such as the former governor of North Sumatra, Mr. Westenenck, could be prevented from claiming victims.54 The last sentence suggested that Hatta had deliberately chosen a committee capable of outwitting Westenenck. 1926 was also the year when PKI activi- ties both 1n Java and Sumatra were reaching crisis point. With the decline of Sarlkat Islam, the PKI had become the dominant dissident group 1n the colony. As the PI was an overseas wing of the nationalist movement, Hatta needed to remain close to the PKI, monitoring Its activities, which he could do most effectively by liaising with Darsono and Semaun. Hatta’s Inaugural address as chairman took the form of an analysis of the economic roots of colonialism, which he entitled "The Economic World Structure and the Conflict of Power.1,55 Hatta quoted the theory of Hegel on which Marx had drawn, that the "existence of conflict 1s the first requirement for development."56 (He did not mention that, according to Mlnangkabau adat, conflict was believed to produce kzmajuan or progress, and that 1n the Mlnangkabau world view "history moves towards the attain- ment of harmony of Individual and society."5/ He might not have been conscious of the likelihood that h1s cultural outlook had conditioned him, and also Tan Malaka, to feel drawn to Marx’s dialectical philosophies because of their compatibility with the Mlnangkabau world view.) Hatta stressed that the main cause for conflict 1n Indonesian society was the colonial racial situation, the "antOtktA'U hJttwzzn njuJUm and suited," "between white and colored races."58 Giving expression to the spirit of revolt now reaching a crescendo 1n the nationalist movement, he aggressively asserted: "There will be no freedom without force, because 1t 1s 1n the Interest of the ruler for the colony to be retained at all costs."59 jt was a statement which would be brought against him at h1s trial, compelling him to defend himself from accusations of Issuing a call to arms. Dismissing the various Western theories on the causes of colonialism, Hatta maintained that fear of competition and the desire to establish a monopoly over resources were the real motives. He stressed that colonial- ism had "not the slightest connection with the fundamental concept of right," and was nothing but a "power usurpation euphemistically called right, practised by a nation that has got the power and the desire for 1t." Because of the European Entente which sanctioned hegemony over the colored races, subjugated nations had to create "under their own steam" the right to national existence.50 Hatta, 1n recalling European economic history, pointed to Its depen- dency on tropical products to provide for Western needs. "This dependence 1s the Achilles heel of modern Europe," he contended. "Europe tries to protect this vulnerable spot by conducting an Imperialistic policy." It would be economically disadvantageous for the colonizer to release a colony voluntarily. "Conflict manifests Itself here 1n Its full force," he continued, "because 1t 1s the very basic needs of the two peoples that are opposed here 1n the situation of ruler and ruled."51 26Hatta mapped out a future strategy for the nationalist movement. The non-cooperation policy would be implemented by formation of a "state within a state," following examples set in Turkey and by the Sinn Fein movement 1n Ireland, Indonesians must create their own organizations, their own Institutions—1n other words, return to managing their own affairs. The trade union movement must be strengthened to resist colonial exploitation, because a cheap labor supply was vital to the colonizer. Cooperative societies must be established to compete with overseas corpora- tions 1n order to "bring the colonial machine to a standstill."^2 During h1s 1925 summer vacation, Hatta had toured Sweden, Norway, and Denmark and had become a dedicated supporter of cooperatives, seeing them as a means of building up the weak peasant or small trader Into an economic force strong enough to resist the domination of large corporations. The Mlnangkabau nationalists may have observed correlations between coopera- tives and the family enterprises of their region, for Tan Mai aka, too, had written 1n 1920 on the suitability of cooperatives as a means of combating excessive profits made by middlemen. Hattafs speech essentially advocated an attack which was aimed predomi- nantly at Dutch economic and Institutional targets rather than an armed uprising. Indonesians had economic power, 1f they only realized how to exploit it. He concluded with a remarkably accurate prediction: Although the emphasis of our struggle lies on the destruction of Dutch imperialism, we must not forget for one moment that our struggle 1s Irrevocably connected with the general Pacific problem. As the border land of this great expanse which 1s presently called the Pacific, our country will naturally be Involved 1n the drama to come. We know that this will be the ultimate solution of the racial conflict.64 1. Mohammad Hatta, "National Claims," 1n PonZKait a Patriot, p. 310. First publ 1shed in Indan&iZa MeAde.ka, 1924-25. 2. See Hatta, lizmotA, pp. 101-4, for details of the voyage. 3. Ibid., p. 103. 4. Ibid., p. 104. 5. Ibid., p. 150. Hatta claims to have only attended one meeting of the Order on the eve of h1s departure for West Sumatra. 6. Cited In M. Rasjld Manggls Dt. Radjo Panghoeloe, "Bung Hatta Sepanjang yang Saya Kenal Sampal Menjelang Remaja," in Bung Hatta: PAtbadUnya dalam Kznangan, p. 211. 7. Hatta, "Indonesia Free," 1n PoAtnait a£ a PatAiot, p. 212. 8. Ibid., pp. 211-12. 9. Hatta, Mzmatn, pp. 104-5. 10. Ibid., p. 105. 11. Hatta, "Indonesia Free," p. 217. 12. Hatta, Manat*, p. 105. The term tnlandz* means "native" or "Indigenous." 13. Mohammad Hatta, "The Inheritance of Versailles," 1n Pa*tAcUt a£ a PatAiot, p. 453. First published 1n Pandfl Itlam, 1939. 27 14. In the Dutch tertiary education system, a doctoAandul signifies thecompletion of doctorate course work and 1s roughly equivalent to a master’s degree. To obtain a full doctorate, a thesis must be sub- mitted. 15. See G. Barraclough, An Intro- duction to Contemporary History (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 156. 16. Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia and Her Independence Problem," 1n Portrait o£ a Patriot, p. 170. Lecture given during the Interna- tional holiday course organized by the International League of Women for Peace and Freedom during August and September 1927 1n Gland. 17. See P. Walton and A. Gamble, Prom Alienation to Surplus Value (London: Sheed and Ward, 1972), p. 24. 18. Mohammad Hatta, "Drainage," In Portrait o£ a Patriot, p. 32. First published 1n Hlndla Poetra, No. 6, 1923. 19. See Mohammad Hatta, "Kedudukan Buruh d1 Indonesia," Vaulat Ra'jat, No. 68, July 30, 1933. 20. Mohammad Hatta, "Some Main Features of the World Economy," In Portrait o£ a Patriot, p. 64. First published 1n Sin Tit Po, 1938, Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9. 21. See Danau Totok, "Apalagl pada Masa Kelaparan In1," Oetoetan Mela/oe, No. 102, June 2, 1919. 22. A. Subardjo DjoyoadIsuryo, Ke4adaran National (Jakarta: Gunung Agung: 1978), p. 116. 23. Hatta, "Indonesia Free," p. 246. 24. Ibid. 25. Mohammad Hatta, "Non-Coopera- tion," in Portrait o& a Patriot, p. 341. First published 1n Indonesia Merdeka, No. 4, July 1930. 26. According to Bakunin and Ne- chaev’s Revolutionary Catecklim, a revolutionary should be: "Hard with himself, he must be hard towards others. All the tender feelings of family life, of friendship, love, gratitude and even honor must be stifled 1n him by a single, cold passion for the revolutionary cause." As cited 1n B. Mazllsh, The Revolutionary Ascetic: Evolution ok a Political Type (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 106. 27. St. Rais Alamsjah, ed., 10 Orang Indonesia Terhe&ar, p. 42. 28. A. Subardjo Djoyoadlsuryo, "Inside Story," manuscript partly published 1n Djakarta Time*, July 1970, cited 1n C. L. M. Penders, The Ll^e and Time6 o& Sukarno (London: S1dgw1ck and Jackson, 1974), p. 28. 29. Ibid. 30. Sunarlo, "Bung Hatta dan Keprl- badlnya," In Bung Hatta: Prlbadlnya dalam Kenangan, p. 248. 31. Hatta, "Indonesia Free," p. 207. 32. Ibid., pp. 207-8. 33. Ichsan, "Kenang-Kenangan dengan Bung Hatta," 1n Bung Hatta: Prlha- dlnya dalam Kenangan, p. 258. 34. A 1 1 Sastroam1djojo , "Pengalaman-Pengalaman Saja dengan Bung Hatta," 1n Bung Hatta Mengabdl pada Tjlta-Tjlta Perdjoangan Bangka (Jakarta: Pan1t1a Perlngatan Ulang Tahun Bung Hatta Ke-70, 1972), pp. 389-90. 35. Ichsan, "Kenangan-Kenangan," pp. 259-&0. 36. See Hatta, Memoir, p. 160. It was not until 1950, following a reminder from Van Leeuwen, that Hatta actually settled the debt (with Interest) 1n Indonesian currency. 2837. See George McT. Kahln, Nation- alism and Revolution In Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952) , p. 78. 38. Hatta, Nmoln, p. 137. 39. Hatta, "Objectives and Policy of the National Movement 1n Indo- nesia," p. 113. 40. Mohammad Hatta, "Rlwajat Pendek Tentang Perdjuangan Pol 1t1k d1 Negerl Turkl," In Mohammad Hatta, Kumpulan Kanangan, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Pener- bltan dan Balal Buku Indonesia, 1953) , p. 95. 41. Hatta, Nmoln, p. 129. 42. For a general summary of Boeke’s theories, Including a translation of part of h1s works, see W. F. Wer- thelm, ed., Indonesian Economic*: The Concept o£ Vuall*m In Tkzony and Volley (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1966). 43. Hatta, "Drainage," p. 31. 44. Hatta, "National Claims," p. 311. 45. Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia Free," p. 241, citing from Nltmz RottzAdam*z Counant, November 7 and 24, 1926. 46. Hatta, "Indonesia Free," p. 242, citing from Ve. Tzligtiaa^, December 20, 1925. 47. Hatta, "Indonesia Free," p. 242. 48. Subardjo Djoyoadlsuryo, Kesa- danan National, p. 126. 49. Cited 1n 1b1d., p. 126. 50. See John Ingleson, Penhlmpunan Indonesia and the, Indonesian Nation- alist Movement 1923-1928 (Clayton, V1c.: Monash University Centre of Southeast Aslan Studies, 1975), p. 50. 51. Hatta, "Indonesia Free," p. 208. 52. Hatta, Nmolk, p. 160. 53. Ibid., pp. 159-60. 54. Ibid., p. 190. 55. For full text see Mohammad Hatta, "The Economic World Structure and the Conflict of Power," 1n Pontnalt o& a PatUot, pp. 36-56. 56. Ibid., p. 38. 57. See Tauflk Abdullah, "Moderni- zation 1n the Mlnangkabau World: West Sumatra 1n the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century," 1n Culture and Politic* In Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt et al. (Ithaca: Cornell Uni- versity Press, 1972), pp. 188-89. 58. Hatta, "Economic World Struc- ture," p. 38. 59. Ibid., p. 39. 60. Ibid., p. 44. 61. Ibid., p. 50. 62. Ibid., p. 53. 63. See H. A. Poeze, Tan Malaka: Stnljden Moon Indonesia’* Mntfheld, Leven*loop van 1897 tot 1945 (The Hague: Nljhoff, 1976), p. 85, n. 47. Tan Malaka’s article "Verbrulks- cooperatles voor het Javaansche proletariat," was published 1n Net Velje Wooad, May 15, 1920. 64. Hatta, "Economic World Struc- ture," p. 55. 29CHAPTER THREE PROVOCATION AND REPRISAL A* *on* thz country thzm*zlvz*9 thz Indonesian* *tudylng here In thl* country ^zzl thzm*elvz* to hz the rzal rzpo*l- torle* a& thz task, to which thzy ^zzl caJUUtd. In thtm thz people will place more trust, and £rom thtm It will *zzk It* protection. Thzy ^zzl how beautiful l* thz talk o£ thz Intellectual 4 on* a country over which a foreign nation o& another race wield* thz *czptrz. Their ^Inst calling mu*t be to makz their pzoplz *zz It* humiliation a* an Intolerable evil, to Ignite thz urge ^or freedom In It and thu* truly to value thz greatest po**z**lon a£ humanity: national freedom .1 By the time Hatta was elected chairman of the Perhimpunan Indonesia, he recognized that the group was no longer a social organization but had become "an advance post of the Indonesian national movement," a radical political band whose members had resolved that, on their return to the Indies, they would "go to the masses and struggle with the masses."2 In Hatta1s opinion, the PI graduates were more adequately equipped for national leadership than the party leaders in the Indies because they had lived in a democratic society free of colonial rule. This point he reiterated in his defense speech: As the mountaineer, at the top of a hill, has better view of the landscape than the people who live in that landscape, so the Indonesian students in Holland are in a better position to take a view of the colonial situation than their countrymen, who lived under the colonial hypnosis.3 Certainly the overseas students had learned to subordinate their religious and ethnic differences to the Ideal of an integrated modern nation, Indonesia. In the colony, there were still deep divisions among the local nationalists. The Partal Sarlkat Islam had failed 1n 1924 to persuade the PKI and the veteran Javanese party, Budi Utomo, to join with it in forming a front of radical nationalists.^ Hatta visualized the PI graduates as a cohesive factor who, by infiltrating the existing parties, could encourage the local nationalists to disregard parochial Issues in the wider Interests of the independence struggle. Without such cohesion, the "state within a state" concept outlined by Hatta in h1s inaugural speech as chairman of the PI would be difficult to Implement. The Infiltration process was more difficult than Hatta had anticipated. Returning graduates found that their exposure to Western cultural patterns and concepts had alienated them from their compatriots more than they had anticipated. They began to congregate in their own study groups rather than joining existing parties. The two most effective study clubs were 1n Surabaya and Bandung, the former led by an ex-PI chairman and medical graduate, Dr. Sutomo, and the latter formed by a group of Leiden law graduates. 301926 was a year of mounting tensions 1n the nationalist movement. Hatta urged the returned graduates to move closer to the Communists, knowing that the PKI was split and 1n need of strong guidance. In a letter of June 2, to an ex-PI colleague, Sudjadl, now working as a clerk 1n the colony’s Department of Finance, Hatta reproved the Bandung Study Club for closing Its group to PKI members: "Cooperation with the commu- nists does no harm,11 Hatta Insisted, "provided we do not lose sight of our principles, [1t3 strengthens the creation of a national bloc."5 As he further explained, through Sudjadl, the exiled PKI leaders 1n Europe were more prepared to cooperate with the Indonesian nationalists than with fellow Communists: He CSemaun] does not trust h1s Dutch comrades but gives us h1s full trust. He advises us to refuse all cooperation with the Dutch communists. Is this then communism? He will never tolerate the leadership of the Indonesian workers’ movement coming Into the hands of a Dutch communist. Therefore I see no reason 1n relation to our national unity not to cooperate with the Indonesian communists.6 The Bandung Study Club’s ostracism of the PKI was matched by a similar coolness on the part of the local Communists. Since its split with Sarlkat Islam, the PKI had preferred to work alone, for which 1t had earned a rebuke from Stalin 1n May 1925 for not observing the Comintern directive to work within a nationalist group, being accused of "Leftist deviation."7 The PKI was Internally divided. When the central committee ordered Its rural Sarekat Rakyat to disband, suspicious that they contained too many reactionary elements, such as peasant landowners, the conflict within the party heightened. Tan Mai aka, now working as a Comintern agent 1n Southeast Asia, protested strongly against this PKI directive. He also advised the PKI leaders not to consider staging a putsch without the full support of the people.® The Important role now played by the Comintern in the nationalist movement had clearly begun to trouble Hatta. He was also aware that h1s close liaison with Semaun and Darsono might antagonize the Partal Sarlkat Islam and Haj1 Agus Salim, for Semaun had been particularly Influential 1n weakening Sarlkat Islam’s Influence 1n the trade union movement. The dilemma for Hatta and the Perhlmpunan Indonesia was that the Comintern was useful, both 1n terms of financial and moral support and through Its sponsorship of International freedom movements. It was really only 1n extreme left-wing circles that the concept of "Indonesia" was taken seriously and promoted. The moderates and conservatives 1n Western society believed that the Netherlands had a right, through long historical association, to govern the East Indies. It was clear from reports passed on by Sudjadl that the returned graduates saw the need for a new party based on nationalism to play a leadership role 1n the colony. Such a party would have the advantage of attracting ex-PI members who were reluctant to Integrate Into the existing nationalist groups. Hatta strongly supported the proposal, seeing the new party as an extension of the Perhlmpunan Indonesia, with the same goals and with a nationalist Ideology which would, he hoped, override the factionalism 1n Indonesian society. In this way, the political momentum gained by the PI would not be dissipated, but its dynamism transferred to the colony. It was agreed that the Bandung Study Club should serve as the nucleus for the new party. It was a very enthusiastic and responsive group, 1n 31spite of Its refusal to work with the PKI. It also benefited from the support of the two radical leaders of the early Indlsche Partlj* Dr. Tjlpto Mangunkusumo and Douwes Dekker. Hatta proposed that the new party be named the Sarekat Rakyat Naslonal Indonesia [Indonesian National Peoplefs Union],9 as 1f to Indicate a new Sarekat Rakyat based on nationalism rather than communism, at the same time encouraging the PKIfs discarded and aggrieved Sarekat Rakyat to link up with the new party. Once again, events proved that returned PI graduates did not automati- cally assume a leading role 1n nationalist affairs of the colony, even within a group like the Bandung Study Club which was tightly linked to the Perhlmpunan Indonesia. The dominant member In the Study Club appeared to be a Javanese graduate 1n architecture from the Bandung Institute of Technology, named Sukarno. As a high school student, Sukarno had boarded with the Sarlkat Islam leader, Tjokroamlnoto. Thus, like Hatta, he had had a long exposure to radical nationalism, participating 1n Jong Java while a schoolboy. Sukarno was just one year older than Hatta. He had completed his education 1n Dutch schools but had not had the opportunity to undertake overseas study. Nevertheless, he read widely, was Interested 1n International trends, and reportedly also was an admirer of Hattafs writings. While 1t was Hatta’s Intellectual brilliance and total dedication to the Independence struggle which had brought him to the fore as a leader, 1t was Sukarno’s vibrant and dominating personality, accompanied by charm and humor, which drew people to him. He was an eloquent speaker, just as was his mentor Tjokroamlnoto, with the same deft use of language and 1d1om which made the Sarlkat Islam leader appear Hke a messianic figure or Rata Add to the underprivileged Javanese masses.H Sukarno was not prepared to accept that the overseas graduates had a preferential right to leadership of the nationalist movement; In fact he was always to view Hatta1 s goals as too Western rather than shaped by h1s own culture. Sukarno had begun to mount h1s first challenge to Hatta*s leadership* a contest which would have an Immense Impact on Indonesia’s Independence struggle. Hatta was not fully aware of Sukarno’s challenge 1n mld-1926. He was too occupied with devising ways to Improve the Pi’s effectiveness as a nationalist spearhead. He continued the policy of advertising the concept of ’’Indonesia” as widely as possible, delegating a fellow-student* Arnold Mononutu* to represent the Perhlmpunan Indonesia 1n Paris* where his room 1n the Hotel du Progres doubled as a PI branch office. A center of revolt against the Establishment* the Left Bank offered many opportunities for young Indonesian nationalists to win a sympathetic hearing for their cause. Hatta also spent part of the summer vacation 1n France, representing the PI at an International Democratic Congress for Peace held at B1erv1lle 1n August under the cutqU of the French Communist, Mark Sangnler. Hatta admitted that he went to B1erv1lle ’’with a little scepticism*”12 but the gathering turned out to be more rewarding than he had anticipated. There he had an opportunity to Halse closely with other Aslan nationalists* especially with the Indian delegate, K. M. Pannlkar. He joined fellow Aslans 1n drawing up a manifesto which attempted to analyze the colonial problem 1n Asia* which the group considered to center around Britain’s position 1n India.13 In h1s own addresses to the congress* Hatta stressed that* although the concept of ’’brotherhood 1n peace” appealed to Indonesians, the 32Inequality and lack of freedom existing 1n the Indies meant that peace was difficult to achieve. He concluded: f,Our struggle for freedom 1s at the same time a struggle for democracy and for humanity.”14 Hatta would always see the achievement of democracy and humanity as the main goals 1n the Independence struggle, rather than a mere transfer of power from the Dutch to the local people. The strong currents of unrest and dissatisfaction which Tan Malaka had warned the local PKI leaders to control flared up Into open revolt in West Java two months after Hatta returned to the Netherlands for the new academic year. The revolts were followed by similar sporadic uprisings 1n the Minangkabau 1n January 1927.15 Some 13,000 Indonesians were arrested, of whom 823 were later dispatched to a new penal settlement established in the furthermost region of the colony, West New Guinea.16 Hatta, 1n his defense speech, was later to blame Dutch provocation for the uprisings, quoting from an article written by h1s friend, ex-Resident Le Febvre, which claimed that colonial officers were deliberately stirring up trouble to gain recognition and honors.17 The outbreak of the rebellion in November 1926 made Hatta feel the urgent need for a new party to replace the banned PKI. He believed that 1n such a new party, religion and foreign ideology must be subordinate to Indonesian nationalism. It was to ensure the supremacy of nationalism, according to Hatta, that on December 5, 1926, he entered Into a ’’Conven- t1on,f with the exiled PKI leader, Semaun, Informing only a few PI members about h1s strategy.1® Hatta knew that he must be cautious; colonial agitation was at fever pitch 1n the aftermath of the scattered uprisings, and the existence of an agreement between the Perhlmpunan Indonesia and the now Illegal Partai Komunls Indonesia would undoubtedly be misconstrued by the Dutch government. Under the terms of the Convention, Semaun, on behalf of the PKI, recognized that the Perhlmpunan Indonesia should assume the direction of the nationalist movement 1n Indonesia; he assured 1t of full PKI support and agreed that Indonesian Communists would not oppose PI policies as long as they were directed towards the goal of Indonesian Independence. The PKI agreed to allow the PI the use of its printing presses.19 It was a neat package deal; it allowed the students the material benefits of Comintern association without Communist domination of the independence struggle. The Convention did not receive approval from the Comintern and Semaun was Instructed to terminate it on December 19. The rejection was an Indication of Comintern exasperation with nationalist groups which accepted its aid but refused to bow to Its authority, and a year later a new Comintern directive was Issued to Communist parties that they must disso- ciate from nationalist groups. As Hatta commented 1n h1s later years: ’’Stalin was a genuine Russian, his country to him was number one.”20 Communist parties represented Moscow’s interests, nationalist parties did not. Hatta had already held discussions with PI members during the year concerning the format and policies of a new nationalist party. On November 23, 1926, he presented an outline of h1s proposals to a general meeting of the Perhlmpunan Indonesia, where they were accepted as official PI policy.21 On December 20, Hatta received word via Sudjadl that the Bandung Study Club was ready to take the Initiative.22 33In his outline, Hatta proposed that the party should aim at establish- ing an Indonesian government with "a purely democratic basis, with the village community as the central element.”23 Hatta was determined to restore the democracy of the BfrdU-CarUaga system, the traditional type of government 1n the Agam region of West Sumatra before the colonial Intru- sion. He looked to the Institutions of the West to give form to h1s democratic Ideal, suggesting a parliament based on universal suffrage, a replacement for the Impotent Volksraad. Hatta also Included provision for the protection of civil rights, the rights enjoyed by the students 1n Europe but Increasingly denied to Indonesians 1n the colony. To ensure that the new nation rejected the autocracy of the Governor-General and the Javanese ruler, Hatta dispensed with the concept of ’’exorbitant rights.” Hatta’s Inaugural speech as chairman had highlighted the economic motives behind colonialism. A necessary element of building a ’’state within a state” was, then, to break the dominance of European private enterprise. In the economic goals of the new party, Hatta promoted cooperatives as a practical means of enabling Indonesians to fight against the power of the foreign corporation. Hatta would always be a firm believer in cooperatives. To counteract abuse of Indigenous labor, he called for the Introduction of an eight-hour working day 1n line with the policies of the International labor movement. In the soda! alms of the party, Hatta proposed the ’’promotion of national education.” He called for the elimination of usury, which was not only consistent with h1s religious beliefs but also an attempt to relieve the pressures of the Indonesian peasant’s chronic Indebtedness. Finally, h1s plan called for an overall Improvement 1n health facilities. Although Hatta’s concepts for a new party were endorsed by h1s col- leagues in the Perhimpunan Indonesia, the Bandung Study Club was more critical, presenting Hatta with h1s first Inkling that the PI might not remain the new party’s moving spirit and that the nationalists 1n the Indies wanted to take the Initiative themselves.24 when Interrogated 1n prison on why his plan for a new party had been rejected, Hatta answered: I suppose that Sudjadl had objections against this programme because it contained the demand for universal suffrage, which 1n h1s opinion was probably 1n conflict with the principle of non-cooperation, 1n the sense that perhaps Indonesia for the sake of receiving universal suffrage could come to accept seats 1n the Volksraad.25 For Hatta, the Volksraad was a symbol of colonial hypocrisy. H1s vision was of a national parliament developing separately through the convening of national congresses. In a letter of March 9, 1927, to a recently returned PI friend, Gatot Mangkupradja, Hatta defended h1s program as ’’the basis of the forming of a state within a state.” He Informed Gatot that Semaun, the PKI leader, fully supported h1s plans, agreeing with Hatta that they were the only ones which would ’’receive the support of the people.”26 He omitted to mention that Semaun had originally drawn up a much more radical program which Hatta had declined to submit to the Pi’s general meeting 1n November 1926, sensing that armed revolution needed to be played down in favor of more subtle economic strategies. Yet at h1s trial Hatta would find 1t difficult to convince the court that Semaun’s fiery plan was not the 34blueprint for the new party. Hatta would remain, 1n colonial eyes, a Communist revolutionary. Hattafs personal dilemma 1n early 1927 was whether to return to the colony to assist with the establishment and direction of the new party. According to h1s memoirs, he was persuaded to remain on as PI chairman, continuing h1s successful propaganda activities 1n Europe.27 it was not hard for Hatta to yield to this option, for he knew that 1n the Indies he would be restricted by the provisions of the new Penal Clauses. The Bandung Study Club’s rebuff may also have warned him that he could exert more Influence as a nationalist leader overseas, acting as a watchdog not only on the Dutch government but on the progress of the nationalist movement 1n the Indies. The Ministry of Colonies was now mounting a very strict surveillance on student activities, on Westenenckfs advice continuing to exert pressure on the attorney-general to take preventive action against the PI. The ministry Issued dire warnings that ”the agitators1 activities 1n the Netherlands may lead to a bloody collision,” Insisting that ”they may no longer be exempt from punishment 1n one part of the State while Involved 1n conspiracy to undermine Netherlands1 sovereignty In another part.”28 Thus Hatta felt forced to appoint two PI executive committees In 1927, one acting as a screen for the other, to prevent scholarship holders from being victimized by the Dutch authorities. He did, however, disregard Westenenckfs admonitions to students to dissociate from left-wing groups. A new organization, the League against Imperialism, against Colonial Oppression and for National Independence, had just been formed, which, he believed, could be used to gain wider International recognition for Indonesia. Its name alone embodied so much of what the nationalists were fighting for. The league, organized by the German Communist Party under Its leader, W1111 Munzenberg, was scheduled to hold Its first congress 1n Brussels 1n February 1927. The Perhlmpunan Indonesia was Invited to send a delegation, an Invitation Hatta accepted. The congress was attended by a strange medley of international socialists—Communists, social democrats, Fabians, trade unionists, pacifists, together with nationalists from a wide selection of countries. The Soviet Union remained aloof.29 Subardjo, Nazir Pamontjak, and a third student, Gatot Tarumihardja, accompanied Hatta. Semaun attended separately, representing the Sarekat Rakyat. Under Hatta1s plan for a new party, the Sarekat Rakyat In Its title was representative of the Indonesian Communists working 1n close association with Indonesian nation- alists, giving them a sense of continuing Identity. The size of the Indonesian contingent attending a radically anticolonial congress clearly disturbed the Dutch authorities, who were further aggravated by the fact that both Hatta and Semaun were elected to the Presidium of the congress. Coming Immediately 1n the wake of two Communist revolts 1n the Indies, the Involvement of Hatta and Semaun 1n the League’s management committee appeared to present further evidence of continuing subversive activity. It was on this Presidium that Hatta first worked alongside Jawaharlal Nehru of India, whose viewpoint and general outlook he found to accord with h1s own and with whom he was to form a lasting friendship, which was to gain special significance during Indonesia’s struggle for Independence. As a point of Interest, Nehru’s biographer has suggested that this congress was a turning point 1n h1s subject’s mental development because for the first time Nehru articulated a consciousness of the Interlinking of economics and politics, a linkage which Hatta had recognized as a schoolboy 35in Padang. "For the first time, Instead of merely condemning British imperialism, Jawaharlal had tried to understand the motives, manner and methods of its functioning.”30 Perhaps Hatta’s emphasis on the economic roots of colonialism helped to awaken Nehru’s consciousness, since they were thrown closely together through meetings of the Presidium. Like Hatta, Nehru, without committing himself to communism, was enthused by Marx1st/Len1nist revolutionary fervor and Its underlying call for social justice. Both men supported "non-cooperation” and "non-vio- lence.” Both had a high regard for their respective colonizers as people and as technologists, but both could see that colonialism had had a corrupting effect on the colonizer when he wielded despotic power in his colony, rather than permitting the same degree of democracy as was prac- ticed in his metropole. Both Hatta and Nehru were, to some extent, struggling against the cultural stranglehold which their Western education had imposed on them. They were both determined not to allow their cultural bonds to deter them from achieving a restoration of sovereignty and dignity for their people. The congress opened up further propagandist opportunities for Hatta, including an invitation from the International Women’s League for Peace and Freedom to lecture to their holiday course to be held at Gland near Lake Geneva during August and September 1927, a gathering to which Nehru was also invited. The League against Colonialism became an established organization, with headquarters in Paris. Hatta was appointed to represent Indonesia, which allowed him further opportunities to maintain close links with influential international radical socialists, not just Commu- nists. It was also decided to establish local branches of the League against Colonialism, the PI being assigned to organize the Dutch branch. This was to have Its own journal, Rzckt zn Vsujkzld [justice and Freedom], through which Hatta could continue to attack colonial policies. Although for Hatta the congress had proved to be a stimulating exper- ience, 1t had also been very demanding in terms of energy and physical endurance. On his return to the Netherlands he collapsed and was forced to rest for two weeks 1n Subardjo’s flat, attributing h1s illness to the fact that he had been skipping lunch and existing on endless cups of coffee.Nehru, too, complained of fatigue. "I am dead tired after eight or nine days of the Congress here,” he wrote from Brussels. "I have not had a good night’s sleep and hardly a decent meal since I came here.”32 For the next months until the end of the academic year, Hatta was forced to devote more time to studying, for he had to pass the tzntamzn [initial examination] in h1s new stream, Constitutional Law, if he were to be allowed to continue his studies. At the beginning of the summer vacation, he had to travel to Switzerland to tend to a PI colleague, Sumadi, dying of tuberculosis in a sanitorium. While reading a German newspaper in a cafe there, Hatta’s eyes alighted on a news report that Dutch police had searched the residence of the Perhlmpunan Indonesia. Westenenck had finally convinced the attorney-general that warrants for house searches should be Issued,33 and obviously the Dutch authorities saw Hatta’s absence abroad as an opportune time to strike. Raids were made on the residences of the most active PI members, including Hatta, Subardjo, Abdul Madjid, Darsono, and A11 Sastroamidjojo. In his autobiography, A11 describes the chaos and fear caused by the arrival of the Dutch police, "with pistols drawn”: "They went through the house, room by room, cupboard by cupboard, searching very thoroughly for 36something until everything was turned 1ns1de-out and our belongings were scattered everywhere.1’34 A11 explained that he only discovered later that the Dutch police were searching for copies of the Hatta-Semaun agreement. Yet the summer drew to a close without any further police harassment. In August and September, Hatta returned to Switzerland, this time as the guest of the International League of Women for Peace and Freedom. He had over the years attended vacation courses 1n France to try to polish up h1s fluency 1n French and now felt confident enough to address the assembly 1n this language. He chose as h1s subject ’’Indonesia and Her Independence Problem.” Hatta was aware that h1s audience was not wholly sympathetic to h1s viewpoint, that he was 1n fact being monitored by Dutch agents. Responding to the challenge, he declared confidently: ’’The name ’Indonesia1 for us 1s a sacred symbol of a country which 1n the future will be free. It 1s to achieve this Ideal that today we are struggling against Dutch Imperial- ism and sacrificing our personal Interests.”35 Hatta traced the course of Dutch colonization of the archipelago up to the present time, producing statistics to Indicate the huge dividends paid by most European corpora- tions operating 1n Indonesia. Alongside these details, he produced figures of the ’’starvation wages” paid to native labor, giving the details of the Inequitable land rents paid to peasants for the use of their rlcelands. Hatta tried to back up h1s address as much as possible with data based on Dutch sources, Including the works of the tropical economist Boeke. He concluded on a defiant note, as 1f to provoke the Dutch antago- nists 1n h1s audience: ”As for us Indonesian nationalists, we would rather see Indonesia sink to the bottom of the sea than have 1t subjugated by any other nation whatsoever to permanent slavery.”36 It was a phrase he would use again 1n the future. While Hatta was pouring out h1s defiance before left-wing gatherings, a "Committee of Experts" set up by the Dutch government on the advice of the Ministry of Colonies was examining and assessing the materials seized during the raids on PI headquarters 1n June, together with accumulated copies of PI members’ mall. In the conclusion of Its report to the minister of colonies, the committee made the following condemnatory statement: Perhlmpunan Indonesia appears to be an extraordinarily danger- ous organization for the State, an organization which, contrary to Its statutes which states Its aim as the "separation of the Netherlands Indies from the Netherlands State" by all legal means at Its disposal, 1n fact at the same time propa- gates the use of all sorts of Illegal means (e.g., violence, underground action, arousal of racial hatred, etc.).37 The committee, then, saw Semaun's plan for revolution, rather than Hatta’s more moderate program, as the real Intent of the student group. The report was considered sufficiently damning for a case amounting almost to treason to be made against the PI executive. Preventive action was not confined to the Netherlands. In the Indies, the veteran nationalist, Dr. Tjlpto Mangunkusumo, was condemned as the moving force behind the Bandung Study Club and Its establishment of a new party closely associated with the PI and the PKI. He was again sent Into exile, this time to the Moluccan Island of Banda Nelra. 37Hatta sprang to Dr. Tjlpto’s defense, writing an Indignant article 1n Rzcht zn Vzljhzld, the journal of the League against Colonialism, at the same time displaying h1s own deep admiration for the man; H1s stubbornness, his unselfishness, his high spiritedness, his uncompromising honesty, h1s Indestructible Idealism, h1s Indomitable revolutionary sentiment—these all have Inspired and worked upon the builders of the Indonesian Nation, which 1s now 1n the making.38 It 1s Interesting to note that these were the same adjectives that many Indonesians later used to portray the character of Hatta himself, an Indication that they were traits he admired and sought to emulate. Hatta’s article was published 1n RzchX. zn VKijhzzd on September 24, 1927, but he himself was no longer a free man when 1t appeared. The previous day, shortly after h1s return from Switzerland, two Dutch police- men arrived at h1s home bearing an order for h1s arrest. On arrival at Casslusstraat prison, he found that he was not alone; Nazir Pamontjak, All Sastroamldjojo, and Abdul Madjld had also been detained. There were warrants out for the arrest of Subardjo, Gatot Tarumlhardjo, and Arnold Mononutu but, as they were outside the Netherlands, no action could be taken. The charge laid against them was that the Perhlmpunan Indonesia was plotting the violent overthrow of the Netherlands State. Hattafs cell measured approximately two meters by three. It was sparsely furnished: just a table and chair with a bed which folded onto the wall, the hard surface relieved by a straw palliasse. The four students were 1n solitary confinement, but each was permitted two thirty- minute exercise periods a day, morning and evening.39 The day following h1s arrest, Hatta received two unexpected visitors from the Dutch Socialist Workers1 Party, Dr. J. E. W. Duys and h1s associate, Mr. Mobach. Duys was a member of the Dutch Parliament as well as being a lawyer. Both men offered to defend the students free of charge, explaining that they were convinced that the police action taken against them was unjust and unlawful. The Dutch socialists had always taken an Interest 1n the Indonesian students, and Hatta, since his growing disaffection with the Comintern, was beginning to regard the party 1n a warmer light. Previously the reluctance of the Dutch socialists to support absolute Independence, their strong support for continuing 11 asso- ciation,” had always been the stumbling block. The Dutch socialists were no doubt aware of Hatta1s change of attitude towards Moscow and were anxious to encourage 1t. Nevertheless, Hatta was reluctant to hand over h1s defense completely to them. He had to present the Indonesian side of the Independence struggle. As a propagandist, he felt the need to take advantage of the public Interest which the case had raised 1n order to explain just how much damage, both materially and spiritually, the colonial system had done to Indonesia. The four students were subjected to Intense Interrogation over the next three months. Hatta, as PI chairman, had to face eight sessions of questioning between September 23 and December 14. It was clear that his Convention with Semaun was considered the most damaging piece of evidence against the students, because 1t established beyond doubt that the PI and the PKI were 1n partnership and that the PI would take over the struggle 1n the Indies where the banned PKI had Involuntarily ended Its operations. The next most Incriminating document was considered to be Semaunfs draft plan of action for the new party. 38The wide press coverage given to the Hatta-Semaun Convention was an embarrassment to Moscow. It came at a time when, Influenced by the rift between the Kuomlntang and the Chinese Communist Party 1n April 1927, Comintern policies towards nationalist groups were under review. At such a time, the agreement of a Communist party to subordinate Itself to a nationalist group 1n Indonesia was unpalatable. The Comintern Insisted that Semaun Issue a press statement averring that he was confused when he signed the Convention and that h1s action was contrary to Communist principles. Semaun was expelled from the Comintern executive.40 These events worked to Hatta’s advantage. They meant that the prose- cution could no longer claim that he was a Communist agent. Moscow’s heated rejection of the Convention suggested, on the contrary, that he had been trying to curb Communist Influences within the nationalist movement. Suddenly the most damaging piece of evidence against the Perhlmpunan Indonesia had become a damp squib. An Issue on which Hatta was questioned persistently was whether he Incited people to violence 1n h1s speeches and writings. Apart from rejecting Semaun’s party program, Hatta made 1t clear that 1n principle he personally was opposed to violence, stating: I reject 1n the strongest possible terms the suggestion that I have ever advocated violence. My conviction 1s that a people’s freedom 1s never obtained by the advocacy of violence because such advocacy only provokes the situation and of necessity leads to Its own undoing.41 Yet Hatta had stated 1n h1s writings and addresses that he considered that violence was almost Inevitable 1f the colonial ruler did not concede a colony the right to self-determination. In h1s Inaugural address to the PI, he had declared that ’’the only means that nations have at their disposal for the defense of their national rights 1s as 1t was for the primitive peoples: violence, which 1s now called war.”42 This was not a direct Incitement to violence but rather a statement of Its Inevitability If political Injustice prevailed, 1n which case the colonial power must accept the major responsibility. It was on this delicate nuance that Hatta’s case rested. Perhaps for Hatta the most embarrassing Interrogations were those concerning Comintern funding of PI activities, which revealed how thor- oughly PI communications had been monitored by the Dutch. Comintern money obtained through Semaun and Darsono had clearly been used to boost PI funds and to assist students disadvantaged by their refusal to withdraw from the student association. The authorities had Intercepted several letters written 1n code regarding Comintern funding. Hatta admitted that "KtonJU> an Vznk^Lmpunan 45CHAPTER FOUR DIVERSITY WITHOUT UNITY I say this to oJLl Indonzslan young people, who aw. alKzady Kzally awanz that thzy ojul callzd upon to go back to thz,Lk own society and who know how they can kzIzoaz thzlK splKlts J^Kom the Inlluzncz o& colonialism, who ojiz pnzpanzd to Izauz asldz thz way o& li^z o^ blzthZKlands Indies . . . and a>te pKzpaKzd to adjust thzln llvzs to < In with thz llvzs