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DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA:
LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS
GERALD S. MARYANOV
INTERIM REPORTS SERIES
MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, N. Y.
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!ληΩ kL„„J ΛDECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA:
LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS
Gerald S. Maryanov
CORNELL MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT
Department of Far Eastern Studies
102 West Avenue
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
INTERIM REPORTS SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Corne?.l University
Ithaca, N. Y.
1957©	1957 by Gerald S. iiaryanovFOREWORD
(Δ note concerning the Interim Reports Series)
One of the distressing aspects of contemporary scholar-
ship is the substantial interval that often intervenes be-
tween the completion of field research and the first
appearance of writings descriptive of its findings. Ameri-
can scholarship relating to Indonesia has been no exception,
and here this delay has been particulary regrettable inas-
much as the extent of research being undertaken is so
limited. V/ith respect to much of the research carried
out in post-revolutionary Indonesia there has been a lag
of two to three or more years between the termination of
field work and the first publication describing its results.
From this situation stem a number of unfortunate conse-
quences. Scholars and others having a serious interest
in the country, Indonesians as well as Americans, are some-
times required to wait so long before seeing the results
of such research that when finally available its importance
to them has appreciably diminished. Moreover, because
they are kept for so long in the dark as to the course and
character of this earlier but as yet unreported work, they
frequently are obliged to spend time in unnecessarily
laying foundations their predecessors have laid but not
yet divulged and in undertaking analysis of data similar
to that already collected and analyzed or largely analyzed.
Thus all too often contemporary students of Indonesia
waste much precious time and effort in duplicating or
roughtly duplicating what has already been done or is in
the process of being completed, instead of utilizing such
materials, building on them, and possibly refining them.
Parenthetically it might be observed that some of those
perfectionists who insist that their name appear in print
only when attached to a body of material wherein each word
has been given its final polich are deprived of what might
well have been healthy and useful criticism by those who
would have been interested in reading their work at some
earlier stage of its processing. Also this reluctance to
publish findings sooner sometimes puzzles Indonesians, be-
cause frequently for several years they look in vain for
some published account of research for which they smoothed
the way or in which they actually participated. Conse-
quently some of them tend to doubt the usefulness of
American scholars undertaking research in their country.
The object of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project’s
Interim Reports Series is to avoid insofar as possible
the situation described above. Wherever feasible those
undertaking research in connection with our project will
prepare preliminary reports concerning salient aspects of
their study well before publication of their relatively
finished monographs or articles. Our object, then, is to
make available in provisional form what we believe to be
some of the mcr e important of our findings soon enough tobe of maximum usefulness to others engaging in studies re-
lating to Indonesia or having a serious interest in the
topics with which our work is concerned. It is our hope
that by doing so we will be of help both to interested
Indonesians and to students of Indonesia in the United
States and other countries. In thus submitting Interim
Reports for early publication the members of our group will
generally be doing so prior to command of all relevant
data or before this data has been completely analyzed.
Certainly they will be submitting them without having had
an opportunity to cast them in finished written form. It
should therefore be emphasized that these preliminary reports
are to be considered as explicitly tentaive and provisional
in character. It is our expectation that most of them will
be followed by later publications bearing on the same sub-
ject of a less tentative and more solid character. We
hope that our Interim Reports will elicit candid and open
criticism from interested persons reading them. For we
believe that thereby we will benefit, and that in many
cases such criticisms will point the way to better analysis
of the data in hand and/or to further research on facets of
the subject so far not adequately covered. Thus we cor-
dially invite wnd welcome such criticism. We would appre-
ciate it if those inclined to offer it would write to the
author in question, c/o Cornell Modern Indonesia Project,
Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies,
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
George McT. Kahin
Directori
PREFACE
Recent developments in Indonesia have underscored
and dramatized the strength and wide extent of regional
demands for greater autonomy from the central government
and the pressing need for a more effective system of
governmental decentralization.
The need for a system of decentralization providing
for more substantial regional roles in government has been
a major problem in Indonesia ever since its independence.
With the subsequent growth in regional dissatisfaction with
the central government’s actions, or lack of action, this
problem has become progressively more acute; today it is
probably the most pressing and challenging problem con-
fronting the Jakarta government.
With Indonesia's 83,000,000 culturally heterogeneous
people divided among a multitude of large and small islands
stretching across the equator the distance of New York to
San Francisco, federalism might seem to be the appropriate
answer to this dilemma. And it may well be that some kind
of federal answer will emerge. Unfortunately, but under-
standably, among most politically conscious Indonesians the
idea of "federalism” evokes a negative reaction, a response
often carrying strong emotional overtones. For they associ
ate this concept with Netherlands colonial rule. They are
convinced that the effort of the Dutch during 1945-1949 to
create a federal order in Indonesia was primarily a refined
and skilled attempt at divide and rule, one designed to
insure an indirect, but ultimately decisive, Netherlands
control. This is the primary reason (there are, of course,
others) why in confronting the problem of political decen-
tralization Indonesians have so far eschewed a solution
along federal lines. From the outset, this has imposed a
formidable limitation on the possible range of formulas
available for solving the problem, any solution having
to conform to the rather rigid context of a basically uni-
tary political order. Thus, the program originally adopted
by the Indonesian government to solve this problem was
framed in terms of this unitary context and found its ex-
pression in a law passed by the government of the revolu-
tionary Republic in 1948. This law was taken over by the
post-revolutionary governments and, along with subsequent
subsidiary elucidative regulations, provided the basis for
the country’s decentralization program until the beginning
of this year (1957).
This Interim Report was written in the last quarter
of 1956. Subsequently, in mid-January 1957, the Indonesian
Government passed a new law governing decentralization.ii
In its basic features this departs only slightly from the
1948 legislation, that which is analyzed in the body of this
report. A brief analysis of this recent legislation may be
found in the appendix. It should be emphasized that this
new legislation has just been passed and for the most part
has not yet gone into effect. Indeed, most of the new pro-
visions were not scheduled to be implemented for from six
to twelve months. Thus, the regional problems now confront-
ing the government are to be seen against the background
provided by this earlier legislation.
It is our hope that this Interim Report will prove
helpful to an understanding of the system of governmental
decentralization in independent Indonesia as it had
evolved until a few months ago, and that at the same time
it may provide a background useful to an interpretation
of the developments which have taken place subsequently.
This introductory and as yet tentative study by Mr. Gerald
Maryanov will be followed by reports relating to other
aspects of the problem of decentralization in Indonesia.
Mr. Maryanov, after completing his M.A. in Political
Science at the University of Indiana, spent the period
September 1953 to August 1955 in Indonesia as a teacher
in courses for secondary-school teachers in Sumatra and
Java. During the past year he has been at Cornell
University as a research assistant in its Modern Indonesia
Project.
Ithaca, N. Y.
March 10, 1957
George McT. Kahin
DirectorIll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
PREFACE	i
PART I,	INTRODUCTORY	1
1.	The Unitary State	2
2.	Constitutional Basis	4
3.	The Regional	Unit	6
PART II,	STRUCTURE	OF	DECENTRALIZATION	9
1.	Hierarchy	of	Forms	9
2.	Framework of Authority:	Autonomy	13
3.	Framework	of	Authority:	Medebewind	14
4.	Organs of Regional Government	17
5.	Structure of Authority:
The Legislature	20
6.	Structure of Authority:
The Executive Board	22
7.	Structure of Authority:
The Kepala Daerah	24
S.	Regional Civil Service	25
9.	Vertical Relationships	26
10.	Finances	30
PART III, REALIZATION	32
1.	Java and Sumatra: Provinces	33
2.	Provincial Authority	34
3.	Java: Kabupatens and Cities	36
4.	Kalimantan	37
5.	Central Sumatra: Kabupatens	40IV
6.	Note on the Former State of East Indonesia	page 42
PART IV,	THE TRANSITION PERIOD	45
1.	Regional Legislatures	46
2.	Central Government Civil Service	51
3.	Financial Relationships	52
4.	Tensions in the Program	55
APPENDICES:
I.	Swatantras Established in Indonesia
as of October 1956	59
II.	Regional Activities	65
III.	Postscript: January 1957
711
PART I
INTRODUCTORY
On August 17, 1945, the Declaration of Independence
of Indonesia was proclaimed. What was meant by Indonesia
was a juridical unit—that area, formerly under the con-
trol of the Netherlands, known as the Dutch East Indies.
Following the declaration came efforts to establish a
working Indonesian system of government—and this was to
be done for the whole area.
Under the best of circumstances changing governments
while trying to minimize disruption is a difficult task.
And, the Indonesians were certainly not meeting with the
best of circumstances. In the face first of the Japanese,
then the British, then the Dutch, bringing two police
actions and blockade, it wasn’t until five years later
that Indonesia was more or less left alone by outside
powers. It wasn’t until late in 1949 that Indonesian
government was allowed to be relatively unmolested in
running the country.
Independence was claimed for a unit, but the Nether-
lands finally surrendered sovereignty to a federal struc-
ture created by the Dutch themselves during that 1945-1949
period. Further, this structure was forced upon those
Indonesians who had issued and fought for the original
declaration. Whatever logicality there might have been
for the federal structure (and it is by no means a fore-
gone conclusion that this particular federal structure
or any federal structure should have been the logical
choice of wise statesmen) it was ruined by the evident
pressures in its creation. Immediately upon its estab-
lishment, it started collapsing in a movement of the
member states to give up their federated independent
existence. (1) Most of the sixteen states joined themselves
directly to the State of the Republic of Indonesia, which,
while a member state of the federation, was the continu-
ation much diminished in size of the Republic of 1945.
On August 17, 1950, exactly f^ve years after the original
declaration, the unitary Republic of Indonesia was pro-
claimed. The four remaining states of the federation
became one. This was brought about by a change in the
Constitution of the United States of Indonesia based on an
agreement between the federal government representing the
(1) See George iicT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in
Indonesia, Ithaca, N. Y7~^ Cornell University Press,
, especially Ch. XIV, for an account of this
development.2
remaining member states, and the Republic of Indonesia of
Jogjakarta. (2) The juridical unit which is the concern
of this paper could start functioning at last.
The Unitary State
The logic of the choice of a unitary structure cannot
be satisfactorily discussed without including the factor
of attitudes. And, there are at least grounds for believ-
ing that the prevailing sentiment in Indonesia was for
'"kesatuan''—unity. Whether this was originally an anti-
Dutch weapon, or an empty idealistic phrase, or whether,
on the other hand, it was a realistic appraisal of the
domestic situation and needs, need not be deeply considered
here. Whatever the source, articulate opinion favored
it. And, whatever solutions to the problem of extending
authority over the whole archipelago is proposed, the
factor of attachment to the principle of kesatuan must be
taken into account.
There are other factors, however, which are equally
demanding of attention in this matter. There are technical
difficulties which stand as obstacles to any solution—
difficulties vzhich perhaps for a long time to come will
influence the direction proposed solutions could take, and
dictate the speed as well as the course of development.
One of these is the shortage of trained personnel to
operate government. The story of inexperienced and un-
trained officials taking over high and responsible offices
in Indonesia has been reported many times. Those that
formed the Indonesian government have taken this shortage
to mean the necessity of close supervision and control of
government until such time as there is a sufficient amount
of sufficiently trained personnel to permit independent
decision making, Rightly or wrongly, this has been used
as an argument against any federal structure.
In addition to the lack of manpower resources, there
is the problem of a limited amount of financial resources
to be considered in setting up the government structure.
Here again the intent is to corserve and carefully channel
available supplies into uses that would benefit the whole
country. To do this, it was felt, a general view and
control of the total needs and resources was essential,
which could be assured best by centralized authority.
(2) This name is used to designate ihe member state of
the federation, as well as the originally declared
independent Indonesia. This is to differentiate it
from the unitary Republic of Indonesia which came
into being in 1250.3
There is an obvious connection between the two short-
ages. What financial resources are at hand can be used
most effectively only by a capable administrator. And,
the most capable administrator would find it difficult to
operate without sufficient funds. Lacking an adequate
supply of either one complicates the problem, and often
makes the best of intentions seem like nothing more than
pious wishes to the unsuspecting. And, it was suspected
by many thinking Indonesians that the multiplication of
state governments with the concomitant formalization of
the separation would not only aggrevate the shortages,
but also hinder and greatly complicate efforts to overcome
them.
The notion that a federal structure would be "logical”
for Indonesia is usually based on the diversity to be
found in the area. It is certainly true that there are a
plethora of cultural forms varying among themselves to a
greater or lesser degree obtaining in the archipelago.
Further, the level of economic development, the sophisti-
cation of political form, the degree of political aware-
ness, and the level of educational progress differs from
area to area. This very diversity, together with a con-
sciousness that transcending these differences is Indonesia,
is used to strengthen the demand for unity rather than
federalism.
It is felt that there are sufficient divisive tend-
encies in the country; what are needed are unifying tend-
encies to bring the people subject to those varieties of
forms together in the common effort of shaping an Indonesian
future. Divisions and diversity institutionalized in a
federal structure would weaken the attempts to equalize and
advance the whole population, and would stand in the way
of overcoming regional or ethnic prejudices.
"Uniformity" is a term often found in Indonesian
discussions of their problems. By this is not meant the
complete eradication of differences, but rather a balanced
recognition that in some matters· they share the same fate.
A legal system, for example, could be made uniform for the
whole country while preserving the desirable elements of
the diversity of adat law. (3) This does not assume that
all elements of the adat are of*themselves desirable, or
that because of their diversity they should be’preserved.
(3) The *aditional customary rules of behavior, which
vary among the different groups in Indonesia.
See B. ter Haar, Adat Lav/ in Indonesia, New York,
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific
Relations 1943, for a fairly comprehensive treat-
ment of tie subject in English (translated from
the Dutch/.4
It does mean that the adat, as other aspects of Indonesian
life must be made dynamic and adapted to present conditions.
The more backward groups must be helped in catching up with
their more advanced countrymen, not stagnated in their own
backwardness.
Such a demand for uniform development, of course,
meets with opposition, and runs into objections rising
from regional loyalties and prejudices, and voices are
raised charging one group or another with unfair domina-
tion. That such attitudes exist is obvious; to articulate
Indonesians they signify the need to solve problems within
the context of the unitary state for fear that otherwise
they will run out of control. When they are too extreme,
as does happen, they are to be deplored.
Constitutional Basis
The decision was made for the unitary state. From
the beginning Indonesians realized they would have to
face the problem of establishing government in the various
parts that make up the country. In other words, they
realized the probable need to divide the country admini-
stratively and/or politically. And, this would have to
be done in the presence of the difficulties mentioned
above. The program adopted to accomplish this is called
decentralization.
The concept is not entirely a new one to the area.
The Dutch had made some attempts in that direction earlier
in the century. How meaningful that earlier practice—
dating from the decisions of 1903, and more particularly
from the reforms of 1922 and 1925—has been, is not our
concern here. Nor will we make any attempt in this
Interim Report to establish the extent to which pre-war
forms and experience has been drawn upon. Such questions,
while interesting, can safely be set aside for the time
being.
The provisional Constitution of the unitary Republic
of Indonesia provides that: (4)
1) The division of Indonesia into large and small
areas with the right to govern their own affairs,
·' ' 'togeftherewith „th£ form of · government for ’the^e
areas, shall be established by law, keeping in
mind the basis of consultation and representation
as in the system of government of the State.
(4) Article 131, provisional Constitution, Republic of
Indonesia, dated August 15, 1950.5
2) These divisions shall be given the largest possible
measure of freedom to manage their own affairs.
The original Constitution of the Republic of 1945 was not
as specific as to the status of the divisions, providing
only that it be established by law. (5)
Based on the 1945 document, a decentralization law
was passed in 1943 by the Republic of Indonesia of
Jogjakarta, (6) designed to constitute a basis for autono-
mous units of government below the national level. (7)
Implementation of the law was hindered by the seriousness
of the political and military relations with the Dutch,
and it was not until after sovereignty was formally trans-
ferred that the law could be put into effect. That it
need be put into effect was due to the return of the
component states of the federation to the original Republic.
Republican law was made applicable insofar as possible to
these "homecomers, ’’
The State of East Indonesia, a member of the federa-
tion, did not join directly with the now widely expanded
State of the Republic of Indonesia; the Decentralization
Lav/ never came to apply to it. But, in anticipation of the
coming unification, East Indonesia in 1950 passed a law of
its own on the question, (3) which in essence and in much
(5)	Article 13. The text of that Constitution together
with the texts of the Constitutions of the United
States of Indonesia (dated December 14, 1949) and
of the unitary Republic of Indonesia (August 15,
1950) can be found in Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, Tiga
Undang-Undang Dasar (Three Constitutions), Djakarta,
P~. T. Pembangunan, 19343 For a commentary on the
latest form, R, Supomo, Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara
Republik Indonesia (The Temporary Constitution of
the Republic of Indonesia), 4th revised printing,
Djakarta, Noordhof f-IColff N. V.
(6)	Law Ho, 22 dated July 10, 1943, Undang-Undang Pokok
Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Basic Law on Regional
Government). Referred to hereafter as the Decentral-
ization Law, the text can be found in a book of the
same title published in Djakarta by Noordhoff-Kolff
N. V.
(7)	The terms '’autonomy” and "autonomous" are used here
consistent with Indonesian practice. Their impli-
cations should not be prejudged. The specific
functional definitions will, it is hoped, be made
clear by the body of this paper.
(3) Undang-Undang No. 44 Negara Indonesia Timur dated
June 15, 1950.6
of the detail is quite similar to the Jogjakarta law. For
the purposes of this paper, only the 1948 Jogjakarta basic
law will be used for the basic description of the program,
except where major differences in the East Indonesia law
demand attention.
The Regional Unit
The entity established to fulfill the intentions of
the decentralization program is called a ’’Swatantra,”
which is a generic term meaning self-government. Some
attempts have been made to restrict the term to those
units established on the basis of the decentralization
laws, (9) and that is the practice followed in this paper.
We here must distinguish three types of area in order
to understand the various divisions of the country as it
stands in the period of our concern. There is a distinc-
tion between a swatantra (thus autonomous in the meaning
of the constitution) and an Administrative Area. This
latter is a territorial division which has not yet been
given the right to manage its own affairs. The Administra-
tive Area has been called the first step in acquiring
autonomous status, (10) to be followed by the delegation
of autonomy for the same extent of territory. This would
seem to be accurate in that the intent is clearly that the
whole territory of the country is ultimately to be divided
into some autonomous form. (11) But, the sequence of
steps seems more to be a logical than an historical con-
clusion. The whole country has been divided into large
administrative units since the last days of the United
States of Indonesia. (12) There is not much concern for
establishing new administrative areas, but for transforming
existing ones into swatantras.
(9)	See, for example, R. Soenarko, Susunan Negara Kita
(The Organization of Our State),·-Vol. IV, Djakarta,
Djambatan, 1955, p. 4». Prof. Soenarko teaches
constitutional law in Malang, East Java.
(10)	G. J. Wolhoff, Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Tata Negara
Republik Indonesia (Introduction to the Study of
the Constitutional Law of the Eepublic of Indonesia),
Timun Mas'X'.V., 1955," p. 265. '—:-----------------
(11)	This is explicitly stated in the official clarifi-
cation attached to the Decentralization Law. See
Decentralization Law, Law No. 22, 1948, op. cit.,
p. 26: "There will be only autonomous regions (with
the right to manage their own affairs) in the territory
of the Republic of Indonesia. Aside from then, there
will be no area with a different status.”
(12)	By Government Regulation 21, 1950.7
In any case, the Administrative Area has only a tem-
porary existence, to be replaced by a structure with the
formal attributes of autonomy. Many of the still present
areas of that type have developed characteristics and
forms which closely resemble those of a swatantra, but
such developments remain informal rather than legal. The
major examples of Administrative Areas are the three
provinces that made up the former State of 3ast Indonesia:
Sulawesi (the Celebes), Nusa Tenggara (the Lesser Gundas),
and Maluku (the Moluccas).
Special consideration had to be given to those areas
which in the former Netherlands Indies were governed
according to special agreements, or contracts. These
were the principalities which theoretically had some
measure of self-government, exercised by inherited rights
by royal chiefs of state. These sultanates and so forth
are grouped together under the term "Swapradja." (13)
The constitution provides (14) that the position of
swapradjas is to be regulated by law, with the proviso
that the consultative and representative basis of the
State must be followed, and that the provisions for auto-
nomy are to be applied. Further, the elimination or
reduction in size of a swapradja is prohibited, except
by a law specifying that the public interest demands it.
It is interesting to note that the federal system provided
for the position of these units to be arranged by contract
between the principality and the component state containing
it. (15) This recalls the Dutch legal fiction of the
contractual relationship. The constitution of the unitary
state substitutes law for contract, and brings the
swapradjas integrally into the State system, and further
demands the democratization of their governments, and
their inclusion in the system of autonomy. (IS)
For our purposes, the status of the swapradja will
not be a major concern. Those swapradjas given autonomy
based on the decentralization laws will be treated as
swatantras (which they thus become), except to note formal
differences where they exist. There is however, one
terminological distinction which should be mentioned now.
(13)	This is also a generic term meaning self-government,
but its use is fairly well restricted now to the
principalities only.
(14)	Article 132.
(15)	Article 65, constitution of the United States of
Indonesia.
(16)	Suporao, op. cit., p. 144,ο
Δ swapradja becoming a swatantra is usually given the name
Baerah Istimewa (Special Region)—though this need not be
the case.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the decentral-
ization program in its formal structure and realization.
Its proper subject, then, is the basic decentralization
law, and the subsequent laws and regulations in implemen-
tation of it. The time period covered is roughly 1950 to
1956. It is my hope that in this paper a picture will be
given of what Indonesia has described for itself as a
solution to its problem of regional government. It is not
necessarily the final solution, nor is it immutable, but
it is the one that has been in operation since the unitary
state was formed. This picture, it is felt, must be avail-
able as a basis for comparison before any consideration of
regional practices and activity can be made meaningful;
discussion of regional activity and attitudes and the
political problem known as "regional autonomy" without
reference to this picture would be largely out of context,
and misleading.
This is not the place to discuss the importance of the
decentralization program in the development of a stable
and viable Indonesian political system. The experiences
met in the functioning of the program have not been entirely
satisfactory, and there have been many complaints in
Indonesia about the slowness of the project, with resultant
dissatisfaction in the regions. But, before the experi-
ences can be evaluated, and the importance measured, and
the dissatisfaction understood, we must know what it is
that is being discussed.9
PART IX
STRUCTURE OF DECENTRALIZATION
In keeping with the unitary character of the state,
the creation of autonomous units of government within the
state takes the form of an authorization, a delegation of
authority on the part of the central government. The
Constitution speaks of a division of territory, but it
has been pointed out (17) that what is involved is the
creation of legal institutions, the setting up of political
divisions. It might be said that the Lav/ No* 22 of 1943
is the incomplete constitution of these divisions.
Each division must be created by law, passed specifi-
cally for that purpose, (13) thus requiring the agreement
of the central Parliament. Such a law would complete
the "constitution" of the s»vatantra. And, the law creating
the region further endows it with a name, territorial
limits, and right and responsibilities. (IS) It is endowed
by implication with legal personality, subject to the
courts. These attributes are cast in the mold provided
by the basic law, which authorizes the framework for the
delegation of the rights and responsibilities, and outlines
the structure and organs that will carry them out.
Hierarchy of Forms
The swatantra is also invested by the law creating
it with a place in a hierarchy of forms. While the Con-
stitution specified division into large and small areas,
the law of 1943 makes it explicit (20) that there are to
be three levels below the central government. The East
(17) J. H. A. Logemann, Het Staatsrecht Van Indonesie
(The Constitutional Law of Indonesia), *s-Gravenhage,
Bandung, T73 Van Hoeve, IS54, pi 153.
(13) Article 1, Law No. 22, 1943. It might be pointed
out here that there are three important types of
central government regulation that will be mentioned:
laws, emergency laws, and government regulations.
Emergency laws can be issued before the agreement
of parliament is secured. Government regulations,
which cannot supersede laws, do not need the approval
of parliament. Of still lower order are the deci-
sions of individual ministers.
(19)	Article 1, paragraph 3, law No. 22, 1943.
(20)	Article 1, paragraph 1.10
Indonesia law, on the other hand, provided for two levels,
with the possibility of a third. Since these would all
cone below the present administrative first level, in
effect there are four. This nay be one of the obstacles
in obtaining one uniform law for the whole country.
That the arrangement is hierarchic is clear from
several provisions of the basic law which mention super-
visory or other relations between a region and those under
it. There is the expectation already mentioned that the
whole territory of Indonesia will be divided into first
level swatantras, and then the further sub-divisions would
be subject to that higher unit encompassing it. This ex-
pectation has already been put into effect by the division
of the country early in 1950 into ten administrative pro-
vinces, (21) most of which have subsequently been made into
first level swatantras. Thus, each village would be in-
cluded in a regency, which in turn would be included in a
province. Still, while there is no indication of any area
being left out of this arrangement, (22) this would not
be impossible under the present terns of the basic law.
The three levels are specified as Province (Propinsi),
Kabupaten, and Village (Desa). Cities which are given the
juridical title of Kota Besar (large city) are equated
with kabupatens, at the second level. Towns, legally
named Kota Ketjil (small city) are put at the third level.
And, since "desa” is not known throughout Indonesia, it
is pointed out that the third level includes the equivalent
units in the various parts of the country, such as nagari
and marga in Sumatra.
The Province as a self-contained or autonomous poli-
tical form was unknown in the Netherlands Indies until the
1920*s* It is a modern construct rather than a traditional
form. In the short time the Dutch had to effect their de-
centralization program (1925-1942) only three provinces
were created, in Java. The provinces were abolished
during the Japanese occupation, and were not immediately
revived by the new Indonesian government. Provinces
established under the authority of the Decentralization
Law of 1943 are not considered the continuations of the
pre-war units.
The usefulness of this level in present Indonesian
practice seems to be to bring coordination efforts down
(21)	By Government Regulation 21, 1950.
(22)	V/ith the exception of the municipality of Greater
Djakarta. This city, given separate status under
the federation, was kept separate after the crea-
tion of the unitary state.11
to a manageable size. Here is to be the highest locus of
regional decision making. Here is to be a unit small
enough to understand and manage purely local affairs, yet
large enough to present a somewhat-more unified view, and
mature leadership. Here, presumably , is the balance
between local interests and national needs.
The kabupaten (23) (also known as regency) in the
Netherlands Indies existed in Java, with somewhat equi-
valent units in a few other places. In Java they consti-
tuted the highest '’native" level of administration, ruled
by the native aristocracy, and their domain was primarily
rural. The governance of cities, both large and small,
were primarily the preserves of the Europeans. This
level begins to bring the problems of government into
direct contact with the bulk of the population who live
in villages. The kabupaten, perhaps more than any other
locus, has the responsibility of translating "modern"
government into terms understandable to the individual, or
at least to the basic unit of the village.
The village was eminently the locus of "native Indo-
nesia, "isolated, backward in terms of modern political
life, and the key to the problems of Indonesian aspira-
tions. Ruled according to special ordinances, and tied to
adat law, the village was to all intents and purposes
outside- the stream of national politics.
One of the major purposes of the Indonesian Republic’s
decentralization program is to revise this characteriza-
tion. "...The Desa is placed within the circle of modern
government, not drawn out of it as was the case in the
past" explains the official clarification of the Decen-
tralization Law. (24) It further comments that the village
had been bound, under Dutch practice,-by adat -rules which
were in reality already dead, and that it often happened
that dead rules were brought to life again. It is perhaps
appropriate to observe here that the struggle in Indonesian
life for an adjustment between tradition and innovation
(23) Before the Second World-War,. Java, except for the
principalities of Jogjakarta and Surakarta, was
divided into 7G kabupatens. On the average, a
kabupaten would cover about 670 square miles, and
include somewhat less than a half million people—
though there was (and is) great variation in this,
with some ranging over a million. At present,
there are CO kabupatens - in Java, including the
former principalities. The same unit in other areas
of Indonesia at the present time would, with a few
exceptions, cover more territory and less people.
(24) Law No. 22, 1943, op. cit., p. 29.12
is probably not going to be resolved by a clear cut victory
of one or the other. It does seen self-evident, however,
that if Indonesian aspirations for a "just and prosperous”
state are to be fulfilled, the village cannot be allowed
to stand still. Whatever the values of the adat system
and the village community to a colonial structure, some
of them may have to be sacrificed in the building of a
self-reliant state.
It was not envisaged that the villages as they exist
or existed could automatically or immediately be transposed
into the legal institutions proposed by the Decentraliza-
tion Law. The designers of the law evidently had in mind
a broadened, more viable village, brought about by the
possible joining together of two or more of the existing
ones. (25) And, it was acknowledged that this would be
no easy task, and one which would demand considerable time.
Nor could the establishment of these reorganized villages
take place all at once because of the need for careful in-
vestigation of the conditions in each one. (26)
In line with the consideration that the whole terri-
tory of the state constitutes a single unit, thus elimi-
nating the pre-war practice of distinguishing between
directly and indirectly governed lands, swapradjas, too,
are to be brought into the hierarchy. (27J	1livestigation
is felt to be necessary first, to determine the capacities
of each one in order to determine at which level it is to
be placed. If given a position lower than province, it
comes under the jurisdiction of the next higher level
containing it, as would be the case with any swatant: a. (20)
A swapradj a thus brought into the system is given the
name "Daerah Istimewa” (Special Region). There is, however,
no necessity that a swapradja be given the status of
Daerah Istimewa, and it may be made into a regular
swatantra^ (29)
(25)	See the official clarification of the law. Ibid.,
p. 35.
(26)	Ibid., p. 39.
(27)	Article 1, paragraph 2, Decentralization Law.
(23) Official clarification, Law No, 22, 1943,op. cit.,
p. 35.
(29) Ibid., p. 41.13
Framework of Authority: Autonomy
The Constitution has stated that the regions are to
have the right to manage their own affairs. This is
essentially the definition of autonomy to be used, and
care must be exercised in using it. It must be left to
the Decentralization Law to start outlining the limits
of the intention of the definition, and to political
practice to give it any kind of finality. It must be
remembered that Indonesia is a unitary state with the
central government ultimately responsible for all affairs.
A system of controls is included in the law which reserves
for the central government powers of supervision and in-
terference over any act of a region. Thus, while "auto-
nomous" implies the possiblity of variation in admini-
stration, and even in law, based on the exigencies of
local situations, and permits a (still undefined) measure
of local determination of decisions, it is not a guaran-
teed locus of jurisdiction as is the case with an American
state.
This constitutional prescription, of course, gives
immediate rise to the question of what is to be considered
as the "affairs" of a region. In general, this kind of
term does not lend itself to an immutable definition, but
rather it is subject to continual growth and interpreta-
tion. It can be approached, however, from different
directions. The "affairs" of a region could be considered
as including only explicitly enumerated functions or powers,
thus restricting the authority of a region to those
matters specifically assigned to it. Or, "affairs" can
be interpreted in a wider sense of implying the right to
govern all matters necessary for the welfare or develop-
ment of the region (usually limited, however, by the
activities of higher authorities). In either case, some
method of differentiating the jurisdictions of the differ-
ent levels of government is necessary.
The Decentralization Law does not clearly decide
which direction it will follow, and seems to leave the
possibility of development open to both of them. The
need for enumeration of regional powers and authority is
implied in the provision that "matters to be considered
in the affairs (of a region) are determined by the law
creating each region." (30) Yet, in the official clari-
fication, it is stated that the regional legislature
(which is given authority over these autonomous affairs)
"has the right (because of that authority) to attend to
all interests and activities in its region, provided only
that it not conflict with the general interest of the
(30) Article 23, paragraph 2.14
state, nor a central government regulation," (31) which
is a much broader concept of the function of the region.
This broader answer is further supported in other places
in the lav/ (32) where the concept of regional affairs
seeras to be equated with the general terra, "regional
interests."
Actually, the seeming contradiction between a specific
listing of regional authority as implied in article 23 of
the law, and the broad concept of "regional interests"
implied elsewhere, is only apparent at the level of general
ization. There is nothing to prevent the inclusion, in a
law creating a swatantra, of a provision granting a broad
delegation of unspecified power such as might be suggested
by the concept of "interests." (33) Further, since each
swatantra can be created separately, it is possible to
have varying compasses of power from region to region.
Such a development perhaps ought to be considered desirable
in view of the varying levels of capacity from region to
region.
Framework of Authority: Medebewind
In addition to the right to manage their own affairs,
the Constitution (34) goes on to provide the regions with
another framework of authority. Functions and activities
maintained by the central government as part of its ov/n
domain will need to be carried out in the territory of the
region. The swatantra government can be given the respon-
sibility of executing these activities, though they are
not included within the scope of the regions "affairs."
The definition of the program, or the determination of the
general policy is made by the central government. The
execution of the policy is shared with the region. This
sharing in the fulfillment of a central government function
(31)	Law No. 22, op. cit., p. 51.
(32)	Article 23, paragraph 1.
(33)	As will be seen later, this is what actually
happened in several of the laws.
(34)	Article 131, paragraph 3.15
is called "medebewind.11 (35)
More specifically, the official clarification of the
Decentralization Law makes the distinction as follows: (36)
"(Autonomy is) the complete assignment of a function;
that is, both in regards to the principles and the
methods of fulfilling it, the function is given over
totally to the region.
"(Medebewind is) the incomplete assignment of a
function, whereby only the methods of execution are
given over to the region, while the principles are
determined by the central government itself."
Thus, while the region can act on its own initiative in
regards to autonomous activities, it must wait for a cen-
tral government regulation determining principles, in
regards to any medebewind activities. (37)
The field of regional activity in medebewind will
effectively be determined only by a growing body of ex-
perience. But, in principle, the clarification of the
law claims that "it is not intended that the right of
medebewind be given the narrow meaning of only carrying
out orders from above...for the regional government has
the right to arrange the executive procedures according to
its own considerations, thus still having autonomy, although
only in methods," (33) Notwithstanding this clear state-
ment of expectation, the possibility exists of a reverse
situation, whereby all meaningful decisions relating to
the effectuation of these functions would remain with the
central government, through its attaching of conditions
and restrictions to the part assigned to the regions. (39)
(35)	There is no good analogous English term for this
Dutch word which literally means "joint government,"
or "cooperating government," The concept itself
comes from Dutch practice. In older Dutch liter-
ature, the English term "self-government" is often
used. But, this, as a translation, would be mis-
leading. For a general discussion of the concept in
relation to Indonesia, see Logemann, op. cit.,
pp. 173 if. and Soenarko, op. cit., ρρζ 36 ff.
(36)	Decentralization Law, op. cit,, p. 27.
(37)	See Soenarko, op. cit., pp. 37-33.
(33) Decentralization Law, op. cit., p. 27. Italics in
original.
(39) Soenarko, op. cit., p. 41, expresses concern over
the possibility of the region being treated, through
this practice, as an "unpaid ’employee of the central
government’."16
It is inevitable that for some time to come conflicts
will have to be adjusted between central reluctance to
grant much scope for regional action, based perhaps on
fears of regional technical shortcomings, and regional
demands for a wider scope.
In this area of activity, as with the autonomous,
the expectation is that time will cure many of the present
shortcomings, so that as regional capacities increase,
more functions could be fulfilled by the region, and with
a freer hand. Nevertheless, in the scheme of the distri-
bution of authority, there will always be an area reserved
exclusively for the central government, and an area for
the cooperative activities in medebewind.
As will be discussed later, the central government
retains, even in regards to autonomous activities, what
might be called the right of review, and the right to re-
verse regional activity. Further, it seems clear that
the government would be able to attach any condition it
wants to a grant of autonomous authority. A question
might well arise as to what useful purpose is served other
than formal description in the distinction between auto-
nomy and medebewind. As has been hinted, a range of
possibilities exists, from no effective difference in
scope of activity, when the central government carefully
controls with detailed instructions the performance of
both types of function, to clear distinction between the
actual exercising of regional judgment in designing
autonomous programs, and sharing in the execution of a
program designed by higher authority.
In the present condition of the country—with the
need to build up a pattern of practice and a body of
experience, as well as material supports, in almost every
field of endeavor—it might be expected that the central
government will not quickly give much room for regional
technical activity. It will rather hold tight rein over
the limited resources. Thus, for some time to come,
perhaps more reional work will be done in medebewind than
is ideally desired. Whether this, rather than autonomy,
will satisfy regional aspiration—well grounded or
otherwise—is a question outside the realm of this dis-
cussion.
To complete the picture of the basis of regional
activity, mention whould be made of a type that lies out-
side the two basic frameworks. Although not specifically
provided for in the Decentralization Law, the possibility
is suggested (40) of the central government asking for
(40) By the official clarification, Decentralization
Law, op. cit., p. 23.17
assistance from a region in carrying out a central govern-
ment task. This is not medebewind, in that the region is
not given scope for independent judgment, but the line
between the two may be dim. A possible danger has been
noted (41) that it might be misused by requesting assist-
ance in cases where there should properly be some assign-
ment of authority.
Organs of Regional Government
The extent to which the Decentralization Law serves
as a "constitution” for regional government is indicated
by the organizational frameowrk it authorizes. The
skeletal structure is determined here, leaving only some
details to be filled in by the laws creating the units,
and, inevitably, leaving to practice the development of
the shape of their lives.
The intent of the lawmakers was to establish a struc-
ture of authority based on popular participation. (42)
It had to be so organized that it could function as a
government for the region concerned—with all the corre-
sponding commitments of responding to local interests,
leading local development, and utilizing local energies—
and, at the same time be integrated in the unitary state
system. The implications of this balance for the structure
of government devised for the swatantras must emerge from
an examination of the organs of government and their
functions as established by the law.
The lav/ provides specifically for two organs, and
assumes the presence of a third institution, which, by
lack of explicit statement, is not considered an organ of
regional government. It is stated that "the regional
government consists of a Regional Legislature and a
Regional Executive Board." (43) The presence of the
institution of the Kepala Daerah (44) is acknowledged by
giving him the ex officio position of "Chairman and member
(41)	Soenarko, op, cit., p. 43.
(42)	See, Decentralization Law, Official clarification,
op. clt., p. 24.
(43)	Article 2, paragraph 1, Decentralization Law. The
terms literally translated would be Board of Public
Representation, and Government Board.
(44)	The term literally means Regional Head. To avoid
confusion—the American term "Chief Executive” would
be misleading—the Indonesian term will be used.12
of the Regional Executive Board.” (45)
Before discussing the relations of these bodies to the
frameworks of authority, a word or two describing then
night be desirable. The size of each Regional Legislature
is determined for the swatantra by the lav/ creating it,
thus by the central government. And, the central authority
is to arrange by law the method of electing it. (46) In-
cumbancy is for five years (47) and it is provided that
the period should be the same for all regions. Thus, the
law creating the regions will determine the period of
office of the first parliament, so that it might last
only as long as the other regions.
The Decentralization Law gives some rather detailed
prescriptions as to membership and operation of the Legis-
lature. It defines the prerequisites for membership (age,
residence, etc.); it lists certain positions incompatible
with membership (cabinet minister, member of a higher level
Regional Executive Board, etc.); and, it provides for
remuneration of members. (43) It also prohibits misuse of
office, threatening suspension from office. The law demands
meetings at least once every three months (open meetings
unless otherwise decided, in which case certain classes
of subject cannot be discussed); majority vote; and, pro-
vides for immunity of members. It does give to the
Regional Legislature itself the duty of providing its own
rules of order.
The Regional Executive Board is chosen by the Regional
Legislature from among its own members (49) on the basis
of proportional representation. The number of members,
again, is specified by the law creating the region. The
members stay in office normally for the sane length of
time as the Legislature, but can be removed by the larger
body. And, if a member ceases to sit in the Legislature,
he must give up his position on the Executive Board.
The Kepala Daerah is the most difficult position to
define, for he serves bo th as an arm of the central govern-
(45)	Article 2, paragraph 3.
(46)	Article 3. There is to be one election law for the
whole country.
(47)	According to the East Indonesia Law No. 44, 1950, it
is for three years.
(42) Articles 4, 5, and 7.
(49) Article 13, paragraph 1. Under the East Indonesian
Law, the members need not be chosen from among the
Legislature.19
ment as well as a functionary of the region. (50) He is
appointed by the President for a first level region, by
the Minister of Internal Affairs for the second level,
and by the head of the province for the third level. (51)
In each case the appointment is to be made from among two
to four candidates proposed by the Legislature of the
region concerned. And, a Kepala Daerah can be suspended
by the appointing agency on the recommendation of the
Legislature of his region. However, such recommendation
need not be followed by the appointing office. (52) As
there is no prevision for a specified tern of office, it
may be presumed that appointment is based on something
like good behavior, or, perhaps, the political policies
of the central government.
The only structural difference between a Special
Region and a regular swatantra is in the provision for
the appointment of the Kepala Daerah, and in the possibil-
ity of there being a Vice-Kepala ' Daer . (53) The Presi-
dent appoints the head of a Special’Region of any level.
His choice is limited to the direct descendants of the
pre-Republic of Indonesia rulers who are still in authority
in their regions. The Special Regions, being formed from
the former principalities, inherit the effects of the
fiction of ’’independence" based on the old contractual
relationship, which meant that regardless of the content
of their authority, the rulers were maintained in certain
forms. Thus, the claims of dynasty are recognized in
these regions. However, the selection must be made with
due reference to the ability and reliability of the
candidate, while keeping in mind the customs of the
area. (5L) A swapradja which is made into an autonomous
region without the application of this provision would
be considered a regular swatantra. There is no requirement
that a swapradja must become a Special Region, nor that
(50)	See official clarification, Decentralization Law,
op. cit., p. 31.
(51)	Article 13. Under the Last Indonesian Law, the
Kepala Daerah of lower levels is chosen by the Regional
Executive Board of the first level.
(52)	Official clarification, Decentralization Law,
op. cit., p. 33. It would seem that while the
appointing office need not follow the recommendation,
it cannot remove without it. This nay be too strict
an interpretation, however.
(53)	Article 13, paragraphs 5-7.
(5L) Ibid. Under the East Indonesian Law, the candidate
must also be nominated by the Regional Legislature.20
it must become a swatantra of any kind. The provision
for a Vice-Xapala Daerah for some Special Regions is to
take care of those regions formed from more than one
swapradja. (55)
The office of the Kepala Daerah, then, is not specif-
ically an organ of the regional government. As a separate
institution, it must be considered part of the central
government, and the several specific delegations of au-
thority to that office contained in the Decentralization
Law can be considered as responsibilities of the central
government. But, the Kepala Daerah is the chairman of
the Regional Executive Board as well as a member. As
such, he is part of a regional organ, so that references
to the activities of the Board must of necessity include
him.
Structure of Authority:
The Legislature
The Decentralization Law provides that "the Regional
Legislature governs the affairs of the region." (56) This
means that according to our previous definition it alone
is responsible for the autonomous activities (which are
transferred to the swatantra as such rather than to any
particular organ of regional government (57)). Theoreti-
cally, in carrying out its responsibilities the Legis-
lature has a free hand, within the framework of the auto-
nomous authority assigned to its region, except for two
important limitations explicit in the law itself.
The central government has the right to determine
how these activities should be carried out "if the regional
government is negligent in governing its affairs to the
point that ouch negligence io damaging to the region or
to the State." (53) This right is given to the central
government only, and not to higher level regions. Y/hile
these higher level swatantras have some supervisory
functions over lower ones within their jurisdictions,
this· important consideration, that a swatantra is not
functioning properly, can be determined only by the highest
authority.
(55.) Official clarification, Decentralization Law,
op. cit., p. 35.
(56)	Article 23, paragraph 1.
(57)	See Logemann, op. cit^, p. 173.
(53) Article 25, paragraph 1.21
A further limitation on the free decisions on the
Regional Legislature has to do with legal punishment.
While it can prescribe punishment for violation of its
regulations, it can be for no more than three months
imprisonment or one hundred rupiah fine. (59)
The central government, of course, also assigns
rights and responsibilities in medebewind to the Legis-
lature. But, here, assignment can also be made directly
to the Regional Executive Board. The direct assignment
of functions to the Executive Board seems to be justified
on the consideration that the Board is an integral part
of the Legislature, Only the Legislature can pass the
necessary regulation for the implementation of these
tasks. Only the Legislature could transfer activities
on to lower levels, including, presumably, those tasks
assigned originally to the Executive Board. Further,
the Executive Board would not seen in any case to be
exempted from its responsibility to the Legislature.
There need be no conflict between Legislature and Execu-
tive Board over activities assigned to the Board by
higher authorities. The direct assignment to the Board
seems to be provided for in the interests of convenience
and more rapid implementation.
The right to pass regulations—to legislate—is
given to the Regional Legislature by the Decentralization
Law, (SO) which also stipulates that before the regulations
go into effect, they must be signed by the Kepala Daerah,
and promulgated. This does not seem to be intended as
furnishing the Kepala Daerah at this point with a veto
over decisions of the Legislature. Giving a direct veto
to the Kepala Daerah would place in an office not a part
of regional government a free opportunity to interfere
with the constitutional right of a region to govern its
own affairs. Latex* in the Law, he is specifically given
the responsibility of preventing a decision from being put
into effect when in his view it conflicts with the public
interest or regulations of a higher authority. (SI) Such
limitations on his discretion are not mentioned in connec-
tion with the requirement for his signature on a regional
regulation.
It has been suggested (G2) that the provision for
the signature of the Kepala Daerah is meant only as a
matter of form, and in exercising this function, the
(59) Article 29.
(SO) Article 20.
(61)	Article 36.
(62)	Soenarko, op. cit., p. 60.22
Kepala Daerah can only ensure that proper procedure has
been followed. Thus, according to this opinion, while he
can prevent a decision from being effectuated by his powers
under article 36, he cannot withhold his signature merely
because he disagrees with the contents. The distinction
can be important in regards to the machinery set to work
under article 36, which would not occur when the Kepala
Daerah fails to sign a bill. But, the requirement of his
signature does give the Kepala Daerah the po er to delay.
Structure of Authority:
The Executive Board
The Regional Legislature's activities are deliberative,
and the concrete results are Regional Regulations and
other decisions necessary for the governance of the swatantra.
A part of the Legislature—to a number fixed by the law
creating the region—is given the added responsibility of
"carrying out the daily government." (63) This is the
Regional Executive Board, and its members are individually
and jointly responsible to the Legislature.
The specific meaning of "carrying out daily govern-
ment," and thus the precise role of the Executive Board
must be defined by practice. And, it is conceivable that
the practice will vary considerably from area to area,
depending on levels of political experience and awareness.
Further, this role cannot be discussed apart from that of
the Kepala Daerah, to the extent that he is the "chief
executive," for he is the chairman of the Board. This
relationship can range from the Kepala Daerah holding all
effective administration in his own hands to the other ex-
treme of all his activities, aside from those as an arm of
the central government, being submerged in the joint respon-
sibility of the Executive Board. (64)
The Law does not indicate how the Board is to carry
out the daily government other than requiring the Legis-
lature to issue a guide for its operation. (65) The prin-
ciple avowed for the internal organization is "colle-
gial," (66) carrying with it the implication of a general
(63)	Article 34, Decentralization Law.
(64)	The clarification of the Decentralization Law warns
that "in arranging the division of work (in the
Executive Board) the Kepala Daerah as chairman holds
not a little influence^ and because of that must use
a great deal of tact so that such division wouldn't
cause difficulties in implementation."
(65)	Article 15.
(66)	Clarification of the Decentralization Law, op. cit.,p. 3023
sharing of authority over the whole of the Board’s task.
The Executive Board is evidently net specifically intended
as a "cabinet” in the usual parliamentary sense, yet the
possibility exists of such a development emerging. (67)
It is difficult to see how it, or something similar to
it, can be avoided, as the sphere of regional activity
expands. It is evident that the Board’s active partici-
pation in the execution of tasks is desired. Lacking
definite spheres of responsibility, the members could
only get bogged down in the problems of multiple head
administration. What, khan, is meant by the "collegial"
form is not yet clear. Δ specifically Indonesian function-
al definition is likely to emerge as the system matures,
and the relationship of the Board to the Kepala Daerah
becomes stabilized—which in turn must wait until the
distribution of fields of activity becomes more complete.
The stipulation that the members of the Executive
Board are to be chosen by proportional representation is
meant to ensure that the most important political elements
of the region are represented on it. Such a device, to
the extent that there are diverse tendencies in the region,
ensures a lack of homogeneity on the Board. The possibly
conflicting values of representativeness and executive
efficiency nay be noted without further comment here, but
the warning qualification must be made that the values
nay differ between Indonesian practice and that of other
countries. Party selection of Board members, together
with the possible development of specific areas of respon-
sibility for individual members, would lead to a decidedly
political role for the Executive Board. An adjustment
between the needs of general administration and political
maneuvering would have to take place. The results would
probably determine the nature of the "collegial government,"
Aside from the possibility of being directly assigned
tasks in medebewind, the Executive Board is given some
explicit work by the Decentralization Law. While it is
the responsibility of the Regional Legislature to defend
the interests of its region to higher bodies, appeals of
this nature can be addressed to the higher Executive
Board. To turn this around, the Executive Board can
directly receive appeals from lower Legislatures. The
Board also represents the region in the courts. These
assignments to the Board, of course, are in the interests
of expeditious action, so that adjustments of conflicts
can be made without waiting for the discontinuous and
cumbersome machinery of the Legislature. But, notwithstand-
ing these areas for action, the Regional Executive Board
(67) This possibility is discussed by Soenarko, op. cit.,
p. 101 ff.24
seems to be designed primarily to carry out the decisions
of the Regional Legislature. (63) It is, as its name im-
plies, the machinery given to the Regional Legislature to
perform executive functions daily.
Structure of Authority:
The Kepala Daerah
The head of the region as such is given no part to
play in carrying out either of the two main types of activ-
ity, though, of course, he participates in his role as
member of the Executive Board. But, he is specifically
mentioned as responsible for some activities by the Decen-
tralization Law. The official clarification of the lav/
refers to this as ’’out of the ordinary medebewind,” (69)
to emphasize that regional tasks are to be carried out
by regional organs. It might be simpler, however, to
refer to these tasks as responsibilities of the arm of
the central government in the region, since in all cases
they are functions ordinarily performed by that highest
authority. These functions are appointment (the head of
a first level swatantra appoints the Kepala Daerah of a
third level swatantra)and supervision (preventing regional
decisions from going into effect under certain condi-
tions). (70) While these activities of the Kepala Daerah
are important, they are largely supervisory.
Other activities of the Kepala Daerah in the realm
of direct administration lie outside the scope of the
Decentralization Law. As has been mentioned, the sphere
of regional activity is determined by national law, and,
for its beginnings, it has been narrow. Until such tii'-le
as regional autonomy is expanded, there will be a largo
number of functions operating in the region under the
direct control of the central government. And, these can
be strictly administrative as well as technical. The
manner in which these functions are administered varies,
but there are some which are coordinated, for example,
through the governors office.
(63) See official clarification of the Decentralization
Law, op. cit., p. 54.
(69)	Ibid., p. 27
(70)	These are functions authorized by article 13,
paragraph 3, and article 36 of the law. Based on
our above discussion of the requirement for the
Kepala Daerah’s signature on a regional regulation,
that function is not considered here, being a minor
matter of form.25
Regional government, it is constantly reiterated,
is meant to be ’'collegial." Whether the introduction into
a regional organ of an element—the Kepala Daerah—essen-
tially uncontrolled by the region violates the concept can
be left an open question until practice gives a much
clearer definition of the concept. (71) The "Chief Execu-
tive" of the region, the head of the Regional Executive
Board, is not responsible to the Legislature, and cannot
be dismissed from office by it. Yet, the Executive Board
itself, which bears the responsibility as a whole for
"operating the daily government" is responsible. Such an
arrangement is perhaps inevitable as long as the need is
felt for a central government appointee actively partici-
pating in the conduct of regional government. How serious
a problem it may be depends in great measure on the role
the Executive Board makes for itself, and the political
relations among the three institutions. There is no legal
redress within the regional government system short of
the central government’s intervention in cases of too
serious conflict.
Regional Civil Service
As the area of regional activity grows, the need
for a regional civil service grows apace. The Decentrali-
zation Lav/ provides specifically for a secretary (who
serves the Legislature, the Executive Board, and the
Kepala Daerah), and in general for the possibility of a
much larger organization. The regulations for a whole
regional civil service, pertaining to their appointment,
suspension, separation, pay, pension, etc., are to be
determined by the Regional Legislature., (72) This opens
the possibility of divergence from similar regulations of
the central government for its personnel, though the
region’s rules are required as far as possible to accord
with the national practice.
As regional government expands, and more and more
functions are turned over to it, the size of the central
government force operating in the region will grow smaller
It is expected that the part of the central government
(71) M. Hasroen says it is illogical and does not accord
with the collegial basis. M. Nasroen, i.iasalah
Sekitar Otonomi (problems Concerning Autonomy),
Groningen, Djakarta, J. B. Wolters, 1951, p. 33.
(72) Article 21, Decentralization Law.26
service known as the pamong pradja (73) will gradually
disappear, leaving only the Kepala Daerah as the admini-
strative representative of the national government. (74)
Until that happens, the Xepala Daerah is the head of the
pamong pradja that still exists.
As to the more technical services, the work of spe-
cialists, provision is made for employees of higher levels
being put at the disposal of lower. (75) This was evident-
ly done in recognition of the shortage of such experts,
and the need to distribute their services as rationally
as possible. Such "detached service" is to be paid for by
the region receiving it.
Evidently there will still be room for central govern-
ment employees operating in regional territory, to carry
out such services that must remain with the national
government. This staff will work directly under the mini-
stries concerned, and not under the Kepala Daerah. (76)
The final outline of the relationships between national
offices in the regions and regional offices will be deter-
mined in time. V/hile the eventual goal may be a uniform
pattern, this will not be achieved for some time to come.
One may suspect that the usual inertia of bureaucracy
will be operative here as in other countries; but, ona
can hope that with wise statesmanship the adjustments
will be made as smoothly as possible.
Vertical Relationships
It has been mentioned that the three rdgicnal levels
are in a hierarchic arrangement, above which, as the apex,
rests the central government. The Decentralization Law
specifies certain vertical relationships between levels.
(73)	As a working definition, we can take the pamong pradja
to be the strictly civil administration force (as
opposed to the technical services). Thus, it would
include the heads, together with their staffs, of
divisions which have not been made autonomous, and of
divisions still existing in practice which are not
mentioned as eligible for autonomy, to the extent
that they are still appointed by the central govern-
ment. It refers, of course, only to central govern-
ment employees.
(74)	See clarification of the Decentralization Law,
op. c i t., p. 37.
(75)	Decentralization Law, Article 22.
(76)	G. J. Volhoff, op. cit., p. 261.27
The most pervasive influence, naturally, is that of
the central government towards all swatantras. It defines
their very existence. But, even once activities are
assigned to the region, where regional judgment presum-
ably becomes decisive, there is still no absolutely free
hand for the regional organization. The central govern-
ment feels responsible for the whole country, and each
level feels responsible for the lower units included in
its territory.
There is a class of activities that is immediately
subject to the supervision of higher authority. The De-
centralization Law specifies that regional regulations
dealing with certain enumerated fields must be validated
from above before going into effect. (77) By higher
authority is meant the President in cases involving the
province, and the next higher Regional Executive Board,
where the other two are concerned. (70) This is called
"preventive supervision." Any decision of a regional
body can be suspended or annulled by the higher authority
if it is "in conflict with the public interest, (central
government) laws and regulations, or regional regulations
of a higher level."(79) This is called "repressive supervision."
A regulation subject to preventive supervision must
be sent to the higher authority for validation before
it is promulgated. This is one of the definite uses, of
the requirement for the Kepala Daerah’s signature on a
regulation. He can ensure that the proper procedure was
(77) The fields are:
Remuneration of members of the Regional Legislature
(article 7);
The guide for the operation of the Regional Executive
Board (article 15);
Honorarium for members of the Regional Executive
Board (article 16);
Regulations governing the Regional Civil Service
(article 21);
Joint regulations (involving more than one region,
and including the amendment and abrogation of these
regulations) (article 27);
Regulations containing legal punishment (article 29);
Borrowing money (article 33);
Fixing the budget (article 39);
Increasing the budget once established (article 31);
(73) Here is an instance of the Executive Board rather
than the Legislature being assigned a specific task.
The reason seems to be efficiency—that regulations
from lower bodies should not be made to wait for
meetings of the Legislature.
(79) Decentralization Law, Article 42.23 .
followed, and ho decision needing higher approval slips by
without it . If the validation is not' immediately granted,
there are two possible results; (30) ^1. jio action is
taken. Here> a three month period is specified, from the
date the validation is.requested, which can be prolonged
for three more months, after which -the regulation can be
put into effect. 2. The decision is rejected, in which
case the higher authority must provide an explanationfor
its action. A second or third level swatantra Can appeal
such rejection to the level higher than the one immediately
over it.
The Kepala; Daerah is given a "watchdog function” over
the Regional Legislature and Executive Board. He has the
right to prevent the carrying out of any decision when
"in his opinion” there is any of the above mentioned con-
flicts with public interest or higher regulations. (31)
A regulation either before or after it has been put into
effect, can be annulled under article 42. This is'evi-
dently meant to be taken in conjunction with that super-
visory function of the Kepala Daerah. Implicitly, the
action of the Kepala Daerah fn stopping a regulation is
the principal method of informing the higher authority
that a situation has arisen requiring—at least in the
opinion of the Kepala Daerah—the intervention from above.
His action must fee reported within seven days both to
the body whose action he is stopping, and to the appro-
priate higher authority. (32) if the higher power takes
no action within three months, the original decision of
the regional body goes into effect. If, on the other
hand, it annuls or postpones the regional decision, it
must so inform the region, and provide reasons. A post-
ponement cannot be for more than six months.-(33)
The higher authority need not depend exclusively on
the reporting from the Kdpda Daerah. It is given the
right to request information from lower bodies, and to
investigate "everything concerning the work of governing
regional affairs." (34) This is done specifically in the
interests of leadership and 'supervision.
Vihile there is the injunction that repressive super-
vision is to be exercised v/ithin the limits of public
(30)	Article 30.
(31)	Article 30.
(32)	Ibid., paragraph 2,
(33)	Article 42, paragraphs 2-5.
(34)	Article 45.29
interest or higher regulations, there is no such frame of
reference in regards to preventive supervision. In its
use of repressive supervision, the higher authority is
not meant to pass judgment on purely local affairs, but
only to apply the test of compatability with the wider
references. (35) But, it can and must take regional cir-
cumstances into account in deciding on the validation of
regional decisions subject to preventive supervision.
Most of these decisions have to do with general admini-
stration and finance. Either they are of particular im-
portance (the regulation providing the guide for the
activities of the Regional Executive Board), or to ensure
that the swatantra is acting within its means (regulations
providing salaries). While these reasons are suggested by
the official clarification of the law (36) as the consider-
ation for subjecting them to supervision, the higher
authority is not bound to them. But certainly, it would
be commenting on strictly regional affairs if it was to
criticize the instructions issued by a regional legis-
lature to its own Executive Board.
Both types of control are ordered so that they operate
only on the level immediately below the supervising unit.
Presumably, then, the central government could not directly
interfere with decisions of a second level swatantra.
But, presumably, it could order the province to act if it
felt that proper supervision was not being given. And,
presumably, the central government, in the laws creating
lower level swatantras, could include provisions that
would make them effectively responsible to it·—though
this might not be in the spirit of the Decentralization
Law.
These controls have been called the "absolute con-
dition to preserve the unitary nature of the state." (37)
But, the division of the controls by levels has been
severely criticized. This is based on the possibility of
confusion stemming from the opportunity for differing con-
ceptions of "public interest" at the various levels. (33)
Another observer claims that "by this system of divided
controls, the necessary harmony between center and regions
(35) See Soenarko, op„ cit., p. 71
(86) Decentralization Law, op. cit., p. 49 and p. 44.
(37) Kenang-Kenangan Konperensi Antar-Propinsi Seluruh
Indonesia (Records of the All-Indonesia Inter-Pro-
vincial Conference)" Bandung, March 7-9, 1955.
Paper read by Moh, Sjafe’i of the West Java Provincial
Government.
(88) Soenarko, op. cit,, p„ 75.30
is not guaranteed, for central government supervision
does not reach below the province(89)
The right of the central government to step in when
a region seriously neglects its affairs has already been
mentioned. This right belongs exclusively to the central
government only in regards to autonomous activities. When
medebewind activities are involved, if a region does not
carry out its assigned tasks not only the central govern-
ment but also a higher level region which has transferred
a function to a lower one has the right to indicate which
bodies are to carry out the work. (90) Further, if con-
flicts arise between regions, the level higher than the
highest one involved settles it. (91)
Finances
It has been recognized that all the provisions for
autonomy, all the rights of managing regional affairs,
would come to nothing without the means to finance them,
and that there must be a guarantee of sufficient financial
resources for the swatantras. These means are enumerated
in the Decentralization Law as follows: (92)
"a. Regional taxes, including fees for government
services;
b.	income from regional (government) owned concerns;
c.	state taxes transferred to the regions;
du others."
By regional taxes are meant "taxes which are not or not
yet levied by the central government. (93) The kind of
services intended for which fees could be demanded include
such things as licensing. The Regional Legislature has
the right to pass regulations on the collection of regional
taxes and fees, but first there is to be a national law
structuring this kind of activity. (94)
(89)	Nasroen, op. cit., p. 36.
(90)	Article 25, paragraph 2, Decentralization Law.
(91)	Article 43, Decentralization Law.
(92)	Article 37.
(93)	Clarification of the Decentralization Law, op. cit.,
p. 56.
(94)	Decentralization Law, article 32. Fees for government
services is a loose rendering of the term "retribusi."31
The kind of business activity a swatantra could enter
upon should be those that "benefit the region and fulfill
social responsibilities,” (95) thus, probably, among
others, public utilities. It has been suggested that
this is not meant to compete with private business. (96)
Taxes collected by the national government remain
the affair of the center, but it can give over all or
part of the receipts of specified levies to the regional
government.
The indefinite category "others" leaves the door
open to the imagination of the region. The official clar-
ification of the law, however, suggests that included
here are such items as loans and subsidies, though em-
phasizing that these suggestions are not exhaustive.
The Regional Legislature is responsible for fixing
the regulations for financial administration, (97) and,
Starting with the second year, for fixing the regional
budget. (The first budget is determined by national
law.) The budget is subject to preventive supervision—
validation by higher authority before going into effect.
The supervisor can accept or reject the budget as a whole.
Any amendments to the budget must likewise be validated.
In case there is no acceptance by January first of the
year concerned, the budget of the previous year is to be
used as a guide.
(95)	Clarification of the Decentralization Law, ibid.,
p. 57.
(96)	Soenarko, op. cit., p. 127.
(97)	Decentralization Law, article 38.32
PART III
REALIZATION
After the official transfer of sovereignty and the
establishment of the federal state, came the 'iovement to
combine. All of Java and most of Sumatra and Kalimantan
(Borneo) joined directly with the State of the Republic
of Indonesia (Jogjakarta). The Decentralization Law,
which might have remained a dead letter for the small
territory left to the Republic by the Round Table Agree-
ment setting up the federation, became applicable again. (93)
Legislation was now needed to bring into existence the
units outlined by that basic law.
The first laws creating swatantras were passed in
March 1950, for the province of East Java, and the Daerah
Istimewa (Special Region) Jogjakarta^(99) which was given
the status of Province. Four months later laws were
passed creating the provinces of Central Java and West
Java. (100) And, to improve the structure before entering
the unitary state, emergency laws were passed creating
the provinces of South Sumatra, Central Sumatra, and
North Sumatra. (101) At that same general time, kabupatens
were created in East Java, Central Java, West Java, and
the Special Region Jogjakarta. (102) Since that time, the
province of Kalimantan was made into a swatantra and
divided into kabupatens and cities, (103) and, still later,
the autonomous province (swatantra) of Central Sumatra
was divided into kabupatens, cities, and towns. (104)
(93) Jogjakarta law was made applicable, insofar as possible,
to these "homecoming” areas by Emergency Law No. 1,
1950, amended by Lav; No. 3, 1950.
(99)	Law No. 2, 1950 for East Java, and Law No. 3, 1950
for Jogjakarta.
(100)	Law No. 10, 1950 for Central Java, and Law No. 11,
1950 for West Java. The four laws creating provincial
level swatantras in Java were put into force by
Government Regulation No. 31, 1950, which provided
August 15, 1950 as the operative date.
(101)	Emergency Laws Nos. 3 (South Sumatra), 4 (Central
Sumatra), and 5 (North Sumatra), 1950.
(102)	Laws Ngb. 12, 13, 14, and 15, 1950.
(103)	Emorgency Laws Nos, 2 and 3, 1953, Lembaran Negara
3 and 9, 1953.
(104)	Laws Nos. 3, 9, and 12, 1956, Lembaran Negara 19, 20,
and 25, 1956.	----------------3 3
In October 1956, the national Parliament passed a
law providing for a separate province for Atjeh, in North
Sumatra, and for dividing Kalimantan into the t'hree pro-
vinces of West, South, and East Kalimantan. Hovzevor, at
the time of this writing, we have no further information
on this development. It will be assumed that aside from
redrawing provincial boundaries, there were no substantive
additions to the decentralization process. Thus, there
will be no further mention of these changes in our dis-
cussion.
The laws passed after 1950 present some differences
in style and practice from those passed by the Jogjakarta
Republic before the establishment of the unitary state.
We will discuss the latter group first, and then compare
the later laws to it.
Java and Sumatra: Provinces
The devinition of the territorial limits of the pro-
vinces in Java and Sumatra was accomplished by the design-
ation of the "residencies" (105) to be included in the
provincial jurisdiction. These provinces, further, are
congruous with the administrative divisions made in 1950
under the United States of Indonesia, based on the agree-
ment between the federation and the Jogjakarta Republic
looking towards the creation of the unitary state. (106)
This regulation, which defines the area to be under the
administration of a governor (of a province), put the
area of East Sumatra—a component state of the federa-
tion which had not joined directly with the Jogjakarta
Republic—within the territory under the governor of
North Sumatra. Subsequently, when the swatantra North
Sumatra was formed by Republican (Jogjakarta) law, the
territory of East Sumatra was included in it, though
Jogjakarta's authority over East Sumatra at the time was
questionable. In practice, however, East Sumatra is now
(105)	The residency has a history as an administrative unit
smaller than a province, but larger than a regency—
that goes back to before the war. This unit was
maintained during the Japanese occupation. It was
the basis of the division of territory undertaken
by the original Republic of Indonesia in 1945. Under
the decentralization plan based on the 1943 law, this
level of administration was not scheduled for auto-
nomous status.
(106)	Governmont Regulation No. 21, 1950 in Lembaran
Negara 59. See also, Mr. Djody Gondokusumo,
Tatahukum Daerah Otonoom (The Law of the Autonomous
Region), Jogjakarta, Menara Pengetahuan, (nd)
pp7 ll ff.34
clearly a part of the Province of North Sumatra. (107) Of
the ten administrative provinces formed by this division,
three have not yet become swatantras. (103)
Djakarta, the capital of Indonesia, is not included
in the territory of West Java. It is governed according
to pre-war regulations plus those new regulations designed
specifically for it. (109) Greater Djakarta is considered a
municipality (kotapradja) and can be considered equivalent
to a swatantra" And, since there is no higher swatantra
over it, it must be considered a first level unit.
The number of members of the provincial Legislatures
is specified in these formative laws, based roughly on the
population of the province, and each province is to have
a Regional Executive Board of five in addition to the
chairman. The capital city for each province is also
designated. (110)
Provincial Authority
The areas of activities of the province, whether
autonomous or in ncdebewind, are in general enumerated in
fifteen titles. (Ill) Then, in a supplement to each law,
ifcho titles arc subdivided in a little more detail. The
responsibilities of the province in the field of general
government (the first two titles) repeat the injunctions
of the Decentralization Law itself, making those activi-
ties such as preparation of budgets, provisions for civil
service regulations, and supervision of lower bodies, ex-
plicitly the responsibility of these swatantras. In
general, this work should give the region a sufficient
basis to start functioning (remembering that the first
(107)See Mr. R. Sastranegara, Hukum Tatanegara Indonesia,
Sedjak Perang Dunia Kc-II (Constitutional Law of
Indonesia since the Second World War), Djakarta,
Neijenhuis & Co. N. B., p. 21 fn. , and 23.
(lOS)Sulawesi (The Celebes), Maluku (The Moluccas), and
Nusa Tenggara (The Lesser Sundas).
(109)	See Sastranegara, op. cit., pp. 23, 33, and Logemann,
op. cit., pp. 165-δζ Its territory was expanded,
Berita 'Negara 13, 1950, and it was placed directly
under the Minister of Internal Affairs, Lembaran
Negara 31, 1950.
(110)	See Appendix I.
(111)	Fourteen, in the cases of West Java and Central
Java. See Appendix II for complete listing.35
budget must cone from the central government).
The other titles are in more or less technical fields,
defining what the province can do for its population,
both regulatory and in providing services. They can be
divided as follows:
General services: vzater works, roads and buildings,
land holdings;
Economic services: faming, fisheries, cooperatives,
cattle, trade and industry, distribution;
Social services; labor affairs, social work, inform-
ation, education and culture, health.
The enumeration is descriptive of limits rather than
prescriptive of immediate duties. Some of the activities
are self-defining, and the swatantra can immediately upon
formation undertake their implementation. This is es-
pecially true in the fields of general government. It
must be remembered, however, that the swatantras are not
created out of a vacuum, nor is it intended that a vacuum
be allowed to develop during the transfer of authorities.
The provinces are a reorganization of existing administra-
tive areas with on-going activities. What is generally
involved is the change of basis for those activities from
central authority to regional authority. The transfer of
authority can take place only when regional abilities are
developed, and the regions are prepared to take them over.
The statement of areas of activities open to the
regions as given in the laws establishing them was not
meant to bo the authorization of transfer of control over
an on-going function. For this, the province had to wait
for a government regulation on the realization of the
transfer. Each such regulation so far issued has dealt
with the work of a single ministry, and each one specifies,
what work of the ministry would be turned over to the
region, how in general the work was to be organized, and
what the relationship would be with the ministry. Also,
provision was generally made for transfers further down
the line to lower units. (112)
(112)Such regulations have already been issued in the fields
of Farming, Cattle, and Fisheries (Government Regula-
tions Nos. 29-49, 1951, contained in Lembaran Negara
4G-GG, 1951); Education and Culture (Government Regu-
lation No. 65, 1951, contained in Lembaran Negara 110);
Social Affairs (Government Regulation No. 53^ Γ932,
contained in Lembaran Negara 73); Public Health
(Government Regulation No. 49, 1952, contained in
Lembaran Negara GO. In the case of this field, a
separate transfer was made to the kabupatens); Public
Works (Government Regulation No. lU^ 1953, contained
in Lembaran Negara 31); and, Industry (Government
Regulation No. 12, 1954, contained in Lembaran Negara 24).36
Java:	Kabupatens and Cities
The three provinces of Java, plus the Special Region
Jogjakarta, were all divided into kabupatens—second level
regions—so that the whole island of Java was subdivided
down to the second level. (113) Certain cities were speci-
fied as kota bosar (large city) by a separate law, (114)
thus equivalent in rank with the kabupaten. It nay be
noted that while a separate and distinct law was used for
each of the provinces, a single lav/ was used for all the
kabupatens in a province, and for all the cities on Java.
Swatantras can be created singly or collectively.
The kabupatens in Java in general are continuations
of the former Netherlands Indies autonomous regencies (115)
(with some adjustment in boundaries in a few cases). But,
the Dutch structure had not applied to the former princi-
palities of Jogjakarta and Surakarta, so that the second
level swatantras in those areas are newer to the concept.
It may be mentioned here that the principality of Surakarta
was considered as having gone out of existence before
1949, thus not longer eligible for the status of Daerah
Istinewa. It has been included in the province of Central
Java by the law creating that province. Also, the several
principalities of North Sumatra were eliminated before
that date, so again, do not qualify for the special status.
The laws for the kabupatens follow the same general
form as those for the provinces. The name and extent is
specified (again by reference to the administrative area
it is replacing). The size of the Regional Legislature
is given for each one, ranging from 20 to 35. The Regional
Executive Boards are allowed at most five members not in-
cluding the chairman,
The powers and responsibilities of the kabupaten
government are listed under the same titles as for the
provinces,, They too are given supervisory functions over
lower areas, and functions to fulfill their own housekeep-
ing needs. As might be expected for the smaller area, the
(113)	The laws were number 12 for East Java, 13 for
Central Java, 14 for West Java, and 15 for the Special
Region Jogjakarta, all of 1950, by the Republic of
Indonesia (Jogjakarta). They were made effective
by Government Regulation No. 32, 1950, which speci-
fied August 15, 1950 as the operative date.
(114)	Law No. 16, 1950, which only mentioned cities in
Java.
(115)See Djody Gondokusumo, op. cit., p. 14, Logemann,
op. cit., p. 160.37
descriptions of anticipated types of activity refer to
work which is closer to the inhabitants and less super-
visory than is the case with the province. The general
population will feel the effects directly of kabupaton
activity, which nay indicate the inportance of this level.
It seens to be much more than a ninor stepping stone be-
tween the province and the population.
The cities—Surabaja, Malang, Madiun, and Kediri in
East Java; Senarang, Pekalongan, and Surakarta in Central
Java; Bogor, Bandung, and Tjiribon in West Java; and,
Jogjakarta—were forner Netherlands Indies autononous
nunicipalities (except, again, for the principality cities,
Surakarta and Jogjakarta). The powers and responsibilities
given to the cities are the sane as for the kabupatens.
The only third level swatantras created were the
towns (kota ketjil). These are Modjokerto, Blitar,
Pasururan, and Probolinggo in East Java; Tegal, Salatiga,
and Magelang in Central Java; Sukabumi in West Java. (116)
The types of activities given over to then resemble those
of the second level, except, of course, there are no
supervisory functions over lower levels. Any further
divisions of the towns would be administrative only. In
1954, Tegal was changed from a town to a city. (117)
There have been no villages formed on the basis of
the Decentralization Lav/ in Java or in Sumatra. In
Sumatra there are units functioning as kabupatens, cities,
and towns though they have not received the legal author-
ization, (113) thus remaining officially administrative
divisions. That this causes some confusion is recognized.
Kalimantan
After 1950, there were no more swatantras created
under the Decentralization Law of 1943 until 1953, when
the province of Kalimantan was formed as a swatantra, and
subdivided into second level units. This province had
been divided on an informal basis since the formation of
the unitary state, according to a decision of the governor,
but difficulties had arisen due to there not being a
legal autonomous province to supervise, and due to the
confusion between the roles of the two levels. That,
(116)	Created by Law No. 17, 1950.
(117)	Law No. 13, contained in Lembaran Negara 40, 1954.
(113)This was true for all three provinces of Sumatra
until 1956, when lov/er level swatantras were legally
established in Central Sumatra^30
together with the desires of the people, gave rise to the
feeling on the part of the government that the situation
must be legalized and formalized on the basis of the
Decentralization Law. Δη emergency lav/ was used instead
of an ordinary law because the government "could not be
responsible for any further postponement" and the formation
had to be determined by a regulation that could go into
immediate effect. (119)
The law states the necessary forms and territory.
Congruous with the administrative province established by
Government Regulation No. 21 of 1950, it includes the resi-
dencies of South, East, and West Kalimantan. (120) The
provincial Legislature is given 30 members, and the Region-
al Executive Board five besides the chairman. The capital
city is put at Bandjarmasin.
For the specifications of the province’s areas of
activities, the law combines features of the laws creating
the provinces of Java and Sumatra with the government
regulations transferring actual authority. The fields
covered explicitly are public health, public works, farm-
ing, cattle, fisheries, education and culture. There are
some miscellaneous areas covered by assigning to the
province certain regulations dating from the Dutch period
which are still valid.
The explicitly mentioned areas* are fewer than the
titles assigned to the earlier provinces, but they do
cover the activities actually transferred to these regions
by government regulation, and in about as much detail.
Provision is made for further transfers, which can be made
by government regulation. (121) To prevent difficulties
that might arise from part of its affairs being defined by
lav/ (thus amendable only with the approval of the national
Parliament) rather than by government regulation, it is
further provided that changes in the assignments contained
(119)	0fficial clarification of Emergency Law No. 2, 1953,
contained in Tambahan Lembaran Negara No. 351. This
clarification contains the argument presented in
this paragraph.
(120)	West Kalimantan had not joined itself directly to
the Republic of Indonesia (Jogjakarta), but had
given over its governance to the federal government.
It was included in the administrative province of
Kalimantan established by Government Regulation
No. 21, 1950. Based on the agreement between the
federal government and the Republic, the Republic’s
Decentralization Law was used for this area. See
Tambahan Lembaran Negara 352.
(121)	Article 74, Emergency Law No. 2, 1953.39
in the lav/ can be effected by regulation.
This procedure brings the newly created province
into line with the older established ones in terns of
v/hat is included in its affairs. Such government regu-
lations transferring authority that came after the estab-
lishment of Kalimantan as a swatantra includes it as one
of the units receiving the authority. (122)
Kalimantan is distinguishable from the other provinces
in that its Regional Legislature is specifically given
the right to govern "matters in the general interest of
the province," (123) though in doing so it must follow
any recommendations the central government may give. It
may be assumed that such a general provision for taking
care of regional interests is implied for all swatantras,
but it is made explicit for Kalimantan. The clarification
of the law creating the province suggests that "the free-
dom of action given in this law is clearly necessary
according to the practice of decentralization in Java and
Sumatra, in order that the practical transfer of rights
and tasks can be carried out smoothly." (124) It is not
clear what "practice" was being referredto, or v/hat changes
are implied for the provinces of those two islands. How-
ever, since any problem that might arise in connection
with this can be resolved by interpretation of the defini-
tion of "regional affairs" as implied in the basic law,
perhaps no further legislation was necessary for those
earlier formed provinces.
The transfer of activities to Kalimantan is made at
the same time the swatantra is created. Theoretically,
this means that for the activities specifical ly mentioned
in the law, the central government from that time on is
no longer active. But, there was the awareness that the
province would probably not be able to assume all its new
burdens at once. Thus, transition arrangements were in-
cluded whereby such tasks as could not immediately be
taken up would be carried out by the staffs of the mini-
stry concerned. (125)
Perhaps also growing out of the experience on Java
and Sumatra, consideration was given to the problem of
(122)	See, for example, Government Regulation Ho. 12, 1954
in Lembaran Negara 24, on transfers of authority in
the field of industry.
(123)	Article 75, Emergency Law No. 2, 1953.
(124)	Tambahan Lembaran Negara 351.
(125)Article C3, Emergency Lav/ No. 2, 195340
what to do if a Regional Legislature oy Executive Board
could not immediately be formed or couldn’t carry out its
tasks. The solution given is that lacking a functioning
Legislature, the Executive Board can act, and, if that
too is missing or incapacitated, the Kepala Daerah can
act, either by himself or together with a committee of
five appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs. (126)
All this can be arranged, if necessary, by a government
regulation.
As has been mentioned, the province of Kalimantan
had been divided since 1950 into units resembling second
level swatantras, based on a decision of the Governor.
This division was formalized after the province was made
a swatantra. (127) Thirteen kabupatens, two cities, and
three Special Regions (128) were brought into the decen-
tralization system as second level swatantras. It is
interesting to note here the case of Sambas, which was
made into an autonomous kabupaten (not a Special Region)
though the territory included in essentially the same as
the swapradja of the sane name. This means that the
Sultan need not be named as the Kepala Daerah.
The usual provisions are included regarding the
structure of the government, with the one variation that
the Regional Executive Board is given a possibility of
three to five members. Present also are the new provisions
for meeting the exigency that the Legislature and Execu-
tive Board are non-existent or non-operative and the
provision for caring for general regional interest.
Central Sumatra: Kabupatens
In March 1956, the autonomous province of Central
Sumatra was divided into lower level swatantras, consist-
ing of 14 kabupatens, 3 cities, and 5 towns. (T29) The
language of the laws creating these swatantras seems to
indicate a tendency to express the terms of the authority
of a region in a more general fashion than was the previous
practice, thus giving wider compass to regional initiative
to determine the extent of regional activity.
In the area of authority to arrange for the proper
(126)	Article 4, Emergency Law No. 2, 1953.
(127)	Emergency Law No. 3, 1953 in Lembaran Negara 9, 1953.
(128)	See Appendix I.
(129)	Laws Nos. 8, 9, and 12, 1956, Lembaran Negara 19, 20,
and 25, 1956.41
functioning of regional government—the housekeeping needs,
such as the establishment of regional offices, and a
regional secretariat—the laws creating swatantras in
Java attempted to list by specific items the proper activ-
ity of the region. Δ change from this formula, evident
in regards to the swatantras of Kalimantan, is carried
further in these laws for Central Sumatra; the swatantras,
keeping in mind the appropriate regulations, are told to
arrange "everything considered necessary to ensure the
smooth operation of the regional government." (130)
In the more technical fields, no actual transfer of
authority is made to these second and third level swatantras
Rather, it is stated that in these fields (131) the regions
will regulate those matters transferred to them by the
province. In the earlier laws setting up second level
swatantras, attempts were made to spell out the authority
to be held by the region in these fields. However, most
of this authority depended on action by the province, so
that the style adopted for the Central Sumatran swatantras
does not seem to present any substantive changes in the
affairs of a second level swatantra. It does, however,
emphasize the responsibility of the province in the ex-
tension ox the decentralization process and makes the
dependence of the second level swatantra on the province
more definite.
The most interesting change in style promoted by
these laws is in the provision granting the right "to
regulate those matters which are not regulated by the cen-
tral government nor by the province of Central Sumatra,
except if later provided otherwise by a regulation Of
higher order." (132) The concept of the "affairs" of a
region, left vague in the Decentralization Law, has ex-
panded considerably. In the first laws establishing
swatantras, the explicit field of regional affairs included
only those matters enumerated as part of the laws them-
selves. The laws creating the autonomous province of
Kalimantan, and its lower level swatantras, indicated the
concept of "matters in the regional interest" as part of
the "affairs" of the swatantras. Finally, by the laws
creating swatantras within the province of Central
(130)	Article 4, in each of the three laws.
(131)	Public Works, Health, Farming, Fisheries, Cattle,
Soo:».uSocia'l. Affairs, and Small Industrye^inrother words,
the fields which have been actually transferred,
by government regulation, to the provinces. It may
be noted that the towns of Central Sumatra are not
mentioned in this connection in regards to farming.
(132)	Article 3, in each of the throe laws.42
Sumatra, the regional government is permitted to take care
of matters not governed by higher levels. While such re-
definitions of regional "affairs" presents the possibility
for an expanded use of regional initiative, it remains
for further investigation to determine the effect on
actual regional practices.
Note on the Former
State of East Indonesia
For the most part, we have been discussing only the
Decentralization Law of 1942 and the territory subject
to it—which means the islands of Java, Sumatra, and
Kalimantan. V/e have thus far mentioned only those swatantras
established on these islands. Me have, however, pointed
to the existence of a separate Decentralization Law operat-
ing in the territory of the former State of Fast Indonesia.
There is not much difference between the two laws in terms
of the structure and procedures authorized by them. Sut,
when it comes to describing the application of the laws
since the establishment of the unitary state, the Fast
Indonesian situation turns out to be rather more compli-
cated. To deal adequately with it, one must discuss in
some detail the events in the area between 1945 and 1950.
One must have a clear picture of the variety of political
forms established during the creation of the State of Fast
Indonesia—forms which in large measure have been inherited
by the present Republic. (133) Since we have made no
attempt, in this Interim Report, to put the decentraliza-
tion process in any historical perspective, we excluded
consideration of the "pre-federal" period. Thus, we felt
that any extended discussion of the swatantras subsequently
established in Fast Indonesia would be confusing. This
means that our discussion of the actual establishment of
autonomous regions, while reasonably complete for Java,
Sumatra, and Kalimantan- dees not indicate the variations
in situations that would become apparent if the whole
country were considered.
There is some justification for using this procedure.
The variety of forms inherited from the State of Fast
Indonesia are gradually being eliminated, and the area is
being brought more and more into line with the rest of
the country. Part of the area has already been transformed
into swatantras by the unitary state and are treated
(133)For a detailed exposition of the legal steps involved
in the creation of the State of Fast Indonesia, see
A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia,
1945-1949, the Hague, Bandung, W. Van Koeve Ltd,,
1955, See also, Π, Soenarko, op. cit., Vol. Ill,
pp, 22-24, and Ch. VII,43
much the same as the autonomous regions of the other islands.
It is clear that the experiences gained in implementing the
1940 law have been used as the basis for this policy.
Thus, extended discussion of the East Indonesian Decen-
tralization Lav/ is not necessary to an understanding of
the basic decentralization process. However, for the sake
of completeness, some mention should be made of develop-
ments in the area, even if only to name the swatantras
that have been established.
The former State of East Indonesia was divided into
thirteen regions (dacrah) which wore organized in a variety
of forms, (134) generally involving the combining of two
or more smaller areas, often small swapradjas. V/ith the
establishment of the unitary state, the territory of East
Indonesia was divided into three administrative pro-
vinces, (135) which up to the present time have not been
given autonomous status. The thirteen regions, however,
were considered autonomous according to the East Indonesian
Decentralization Law, (136) which is still valid for the
area.
Some of the regions have remained as they were, oper-
ating under regulations that were in force prior to the
establishment of the unitary state. Some, on the other
hand, have undergone changes since 1950, involving the
dissolution of the region and the establishment in their
place of two or more swatantras (on the basis of law No. 44),
usually at a level equated with kabupaten. Vie will indi-
cate these changes, without further discussion of them.
In 1952, the region South Maluku was divided into the
swatantras Central Maluku and Southeast Maluku. The
region South Sulawesi was divided into the swatantras
Makasar (not including the city Makasar), Bonthain, Bone,
Pare-pare, Mandar, Luwu, and Southeast Sulawesi. The
region Central Sulawesi was divided into the swatantras
Poso and Donggala. In 1953, the region North Sulawesi
was formed into a swatantra, and in 1954, the swatantra
(134)	These were: Sangihe-Talaud, Minahassa, North
Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Bali,
Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Sumba, Timor, South Maluku,
and North Maluku.
(135)	Sulawesi, including the regions Sangihe-Talaud,
Minahassa, and North, Central, and South Sulawesi;
Nusa Tenggara (formerly called Sunda Ketjil—the
Lesser Sundas) including the regions Bali, Lombok,
Flores, Sumbawa, Sumba, and Timor; and, Maluku, in-
cluding the rcgTion^ North andi>South Maluku.
(136)	Article 1, Law No. 44, 1950, State of East Indonesia.44
Bolaang-Mongadow was separated from it. In 1953, the
city of Menado was made into a swatantra, as was the city
of Ambon in 1955. (137)
In August 1956, the territory of West Irian was estab
lished as an autonomous province. This area is presently
occupied by the Netherlands, though Indonesia claims it
as part of the state of Indonesia. A few small parts of
the Administrative Area Maluku were included in the pro-
vince in order for the provincial administration to have
a seat of government, and some territory under Indonesian
control in which to start functioning. The territory of
West Irian itself is still in dispute between Indonesia
and the Netherlands.
(137)These changes were all made by government regulation
The regulations were: for Central Sulawesi, Govern-
ment Regulation No. 33, 1952; for South Sulawesi,
Government Regulation No. 34, 1952; for South Maluku
Government Regulation No. 35, 1952; for North
Sulawesi, Government Regulation No. 11, 1953, and
Government Regulation No. 24, 1954; for the city of
Menado, Government Regulation No. 42, 1953; for the
city of Ambon, Government Regulation No. 15, 1955.45
PART IV
THE TRANSITION PERIOD
Implementation of the Decentralization Program depends
on the creation of autonomous regions, swatantras, and the
transfer to them of various fields of authority. Included
in the system, however, is provision for a period of
transition during which the structures could be built and
put into operation. These transitional arrangements
enable the postponement of certain requirements of the
law and provide for the continuity of government while
awaiting necessary preparatory legislation.
The explicit provisions of the Decentralization Law
for this transition period are: (133)
1.	Existing regions (at the time the law went into
effect) continue in existence until otherwise
provided.
2.	Existing administrative areas continue until
abolished.
3.	As long as there is no election law, and until
such time as an election under such a law can take
place, the method of forming a Regional Legislature
and Regional Executive Board shall be determined
by government regulation.
4.	The appointment of the Kepala Daerah will temporar-
ily be made in exception to the provisions of
article 13.
5.	As long as there is no regional regulation for
determining regional finances, matters will be
arranged according to methods established by
government regulation.
The picture as it has emerged after six years of
practice is still incomplete. At the first level, Java,
Sumatra, and Kalimantan have been brought into the decen-
tralization system—originally divided into seven pro-
vinces plus two areas equivalent to provinces, but more
recently divided into ten provinces plus two equivalent
areas. There remain, however, three provinces which are
still administrative areas: Maluku, Nusa Tenggara, and
Sulawesi. At the second level, all of Java and Kalimantan,
but only part of Sumatra have been divided into swatantras.
The administrative provinces mentioned above have been—
(138)Article 46, Decentralization Law.46
since 1950—partially divided into autonomous regions
but based on a different decentralization law. The
remainder of Sumatra, while not officially subdivided,
has units which are treated much as if they were legal
second level swatantras. Perhaps the most significant
delay in the implementation of the scheme is to be found
at the third level,, VZhile sone towns have been created,
no villages have yet been brought under the provisions of
the law and the ideals of the program.
Regional Legislatures
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of implementation
of the decentralization program,and the transitional
arrangement giving rise to the most controversy, has been
the one regarding the formation of Regional Legislatures.
Throughout the legislation and commentary on regional
autonomy, and prominent in the debates on the subject that
have taken place in the national Parliament and outside
that body, great stress is placed on the need and demand
for democratic forms in the swatantras, symbolized by the
powers and representativeness of the regional parliament.
Yet, given the situation in Indonesia, of confusion and
disruption emerging from the revolution, of illiteracy, of
lack of experience with modern forms, of a lack of trained
administrative personnel, of shaky financial resources, of
a complicated party development, it is not entirely sur-
prising that the process of elections has been slow.
VZhile waiting for regional elections, some kind of body
to perform the functions of such a legislature was felt
to be needed.
The first step in the process of regional elections
comes from the central government. A national law is
required (139) structuring the elections and setting
forth the principles and general procedures to be followed.
Such a law was passed by the Republic of Indonesia (Jog-
jakarta) in June 1950.	(140) Its most notable feature was
the provision for indirect elections, with the general
public choosing an electoral college, which in turn
selected the Regional Legislature members. This law was
actually applied only in Jogjakarta, which consequently
has had the only Elected Regional Legislature among the
swatantras created on the basis of the 1943 decentraliza-
(139)	Article 3, paragraph 4, Decentralization Law.
(140)	Law ITo. 7, 1950.47
tion law. (141) But, the law was not applied in any other
area "for technical and financial reasons" (142) and
subsequently could be considered a dead letter.
Since the election law that had been enacted was not
implemented, some procedure was necessary to form interim
bodies to perform the duties called for in the Decentrali-
zation Law—a "Provisional Regional Legislature" was needed,
just as the central government functioned for six years
with a provisional Parliament.
In April, 1950, a regulation was issued by the Re-
public of Indonesia (Jogjakarta) for the formation of
regional assemblies with members appointed by political
parties, and by labor, farm, women’s, and youth organiza-
tions. The Acting Parliament expressed its disapproval
of this regulation. A second attempt was made in June
1950, this time in the form of an emergency law. This,
too, was rejected by the Acting Parliament. Finally, on
August 14th, the day before the unitary state was formed,
another government regulation appeared on the subject.
On the basis of this regulation (143) many Provisional
Regional Legislatures were actually established.
The regulation provided first for the selection of
members of second level (kabupaten and city) and third
level (town) legislatures» The choice was to be made by
an "electorate" composed of people appointed by those . .
parties and organizations (144) located in all the sub-
(141)	The Minahassa Region, in Sulawesi, which operated
under the authority of the 1950 decentralization Law
of the former State of East Indonesia, has had an
elected Legislature, chosen on the basis of its
own election procedures. The Minahassa election was
"direct" as opposed to the indirect procedure used
in Jogjakarta.
(142)	Indonesisch Bulletin No. 9, 1956, issued by the
Indonesian Information Service, the Hague. See also
the statement by Mr. Assa’at, then Minister of Internal
Affairs, to the acting Parliament, in January, 1951,
Dewan perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia, Risalah
Perundingan 1951, Vol. IX, pp. 3573 ff.
(143government Regulation No. 39, 1950.
(144)The kind of organization able to participate are
specified as labor, farm, youth, women, and social
organizations. The inclusion of the last named type
had an influence on the subsequent history of this
government regulation.
districts (145) of the swatantra. To be able to partici-
pate, however, a party or organization would have to exist
in at least three kabupatens of the province and have been
established in the subdistrict by June 30, 1950. (146) A
candidate was elected to the Provisional Regional Legis-
lature if he received an appropriate number of votes from
the "electorate," based on the division of the number of
electors by the number of seats to be filled. Once the
kabupaten Legislatures were chosen, they in turn acted as
the "electorate" in the selection of members of the provincial
Legislature. The candidates for this latter body were
those whose names were proposed by at least five members
of a kabupaten Provisional Legislature.
This Government Regulation Ho. 39 suffered a fate
similar to its predecessors in the attempt to establish a
basis for creating Provisional Regional Legislatures—
opposition in the national Parliament. A motion, (147)
introduced in that provisional assembly of the newly formed
unitary state, expressed dissatisfaction with the regulation
and requested not only its withdrawal, but also the dis-
solution of those regional bodies already formed under
its authority. (143)
Opposition was based on the charge that Government
Regulation No. 39 did not provide a sufficiently demo-
cratic basis for the regional bodies. The main arguments
presented were concerned with the granting of equal status,
in choosing electors for the "electorate," to social or-
ganizations, which were usually small (and they were
numerous), and to farm and labor organizations* It was
felt that such a procedure would be unfair to the latter
type organization, since it would penalize them for being
(14-5)Under the Dutch system of internal administration on
Java, the kabupaten, or Regency, was divided into
districts "(kewedanaan) and subdistricts (ketjamatan).
The terminology has"spread. At the present time,
these divisions are maintained as administrative areas,
headed by wedanas and tjamats, who are members of ·
the pamong pradja, thus under the hierarchy of the
central government. It is anticipated that these
positions will eventually come entirely under the
authority of the swatantra.
(146)	Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, Government Regulation
No. 39, 1950.
(147)	The Hadikoesoemo Motion, named after its mover,
S. Hadikoesoemo of the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia—
Indonesian National Party).
(143)See, Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia, Risalah
perundingan 1951, Vol. IX, pp. 3520-3624, for tran·7-
scripts of the debates on this motion.'" '·	/ ··	·'··'	’ ;V’·	'· Λ".	'4ζ)
combined in a fei?·-large organizations. Further , the re-
quirement that the organization be located in each sub-
district of the kabupaten;penalized labor organizations)
which were more likely to be concentrated in urban centers,
or near their places of employment, rather than spread
over the whole kabupaten. What was needed, claimed the
proponents of the motion, was a more democratic procedure
based on elections.
The Government’s defense of its actions in utilizing
Government Regulation No. 39 depended not so much on a
defense of the specific provisions of the regulation,
which were admittedly imperfect, but rather on the diffi-
culties of holding elections in the immediate future. Its
main objection to the Hadikoesoemo motion was based on
the requirement for the dissolution of'the already exist-
ing Regional Legislatures.
The passage of the Hadikoesoemo motion by the national
parliament brought about the downfall of the Natsir .
cabinet. (149) The succeeding cabinet was still faced with
the problems of Provisional Regional Legislatures, Govern-
ment Regulation No, 39, and the Hadikoesoemo motion. A
compromise was apparently worked out whereby those regional
bodies already created would continue to function, while
no new ones would be formed under the disputed regula-
tion. (150) ;any case, the existing bodies did continue
in off ice,, .and; there was little further mention of the
Hadikoesoemo. / t ion;
No replacement for Government Regulation No. 39 was
forthcoming. This left a·situation whereby some swatantras
(notably the provinces of East Java and North Sumatra) ”
were without, provisional legislatures. This circumstance
was given formal recognition in 1954, when an emergency
law (151) provided for the exercise of regional authority
by the Kepala Daerah, when the RegionaTiLegislature;-was
non-existent or...non-operative (similar to the provisions
of the law creating the swatantra Kalimantan, which had
been passed the year before).
(149)	The cabinet led by Mohammad Natsir of the Moslem
Masjumi party was the first one formed by the unitary
Republic of Indonesia. It went out of office
March 20, 1951, and was followed by the Sukiaan
cabinet (formed April 26, 1951). Prime Minister
Sukiman was also a member of Masjumi.
(150)	This solution was reported in Herbert Feith,
Towards Elections in Indonesia, Pacific Affairs,
Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (Sept. 1954), pp. 23S-254.
(151)	Emergency Law No. 7, 1954, Lembaran Negara 54, 1954.50
Most swatantras have had provisional legislatures,
usually having used Government Regulation No. 39, before
it was condemned by Parliament, as a guide. These bodies
continued to function (with the exception of the Central
Sumatra Provisional Legislature which had been suspended
in 1951) until July 1, 1956, when by decision of the Mini-
ster of Internal Affairs, they were all suspended. This
step was based on the consideration that these bodies had
in general exceeded their terms of office (152) and could
no longer be considered as accurately reflecting the
various opinions or movements in the region. The five
year term of office was, in fact, stipulated for the first
elected Legislature. To remove any doubt as to the situ-
ation regarding the provisional (non-elected) bodies, a
law was passed (153) setting July 1, 1956, as the date for
terminating the life of the provisional bodies. The deci-
sions of the Minister of Internal Affairs was in implementa-
tion of this law.
The existing Provisional Regional Legislatures were
removed from the scene, but the possibility of holding
regional elections was still at least a year away. The
national Parliament—the first one based on a national
election—was quite concerned that this development would
lead to a "vacuum, in terms of democratic forms, in the
organization of government in the autonomous regions." (154)
Put in other words, the concern was over the emergence of
one-man government, by the Kepala Daerah, in the swatantras.
To prevent this, a bill was introduced and passed (155)
calling forth "Transitional Regional Legislatures," which
would function until elected bodies could be installed, but
at most for one year.
The formation of the new bodies would be based on the
results of the elections for the national Parliament con-
cluded in September 1955, with the parties and organizations
that participated appointing members of the regional
boards in proportion to the votes they received locally
(152)	See, for example, article 3, paragraph 2, of Law
No. 11, 1950, creating the swatantra West Java,
where it is stated that the members of the first
Regional Legislature go out of office on July 15,
1955. A similar provision can be found in most of
the laws creating swatantras,
(153)	Law No. 7, 1956. See Indonesisch Bulletin, op. cit.,
pp. 1-6.
(154)	Ichtisar Parlemen (Parliamentary Summary), issued by
the Ministry of information, No. 62, 1956, p. 505.
(155)For the text, ibid., pp. 503-504.51
in the national election. The details of appointing
election committees for the regions, and determining their
rules of procedure were left to the Minister of Internal
Affairs. The actual appointment of Transitional Legis-
lature members was assigned to that Minister in the case
of the provinces, and to the respective Governors (Kepala
Daerah of a province) in regards to the lower levels.
One problem that had to be settled was the determina-
tion of the regions to be subjected to the new proposal.
At first, the area included in the former State of East
Indonesia was to be exempted, inasmuch as that area had a
separate decentralization law and election regulations
and did not come under Government Regulation No. 39. In
the final form of the law, however, this exclusion was re-
moved, based mainly on the demand during the debate for
more uniformity of treatment and the need for renewing the
Regional Legislatures in East Indonesia as well as in the
rest of the country. But, due to the differences of legal
bases between "East Indonesia" and the other regions, im-
plementation of the law in the former was left to the
discretion of the Minister of Internal Affairs. Further,
the regions of Minahassa, and Sangihe-Taiau d, and the
cities of Macassar and Menado, all in Sulawesi, were ex-
cepted from the law, since they had had direct elections
or such elections were immediately pending. Also, appli-
cation of the law to Jogjakarta was left to the same
Minister, since that region had an elected legislature
whose term of office was not due to expire until December 24,
1956.
This arrangement does not satisfy the demand for
regularly elected regional bodies, and a new election law
was passed, authorizing direct elections, to take place
by July 1957, The transitional bodies, however, do provide
a means for avoiding a situation which is, judging from
the debates, inadmissable—the existence of one-man govern-
ment in the regions, government by the Kepala Daerah alone.
Central Government Civil Service
The procedure specified by th Decentralization Law
for the appointment of the Kepala Daerah—binding the
choice to nominees of the regions—has not been put into
practice yet. This allows the central government to
ignore such nominations when they are made, if it so
chooses. Thus, the emphasis in regards to the dual charac-
ter of the Kepala Daerah, at least during this trasition
period, has been as an arm of the central government.
Until the division of functions between the central govern-
ment and the regions becomes more complete, the lines of
authority will inevitably be confusing. Most activities
performed in the regions are still in the name of the52
central government. For this reason, and where the regions
are still technically incapable of doing without close
supervision, the Kepala Daerah seems to be exercising the
effective leadership, and no great difficulty seems to be
caused by any confusion of his roles. There are signs,
however, of difficulty in those regions anxious to exercise
more of their own initiative, where a bigger voice in the
appointment procedure has been demanded.
It will be recalled that the pamong pradja, the cen-
tral government’s administrative service in the regions,
was expected to disappear with the spread of the decentral-
ization system, but there has been little tendency for
this to take place. The central government maintains
administrative divisions not eligible for autonomous
status (15S) and appoints the officials to head them.
These officials have been called administrative assistants
to the heads of autonomous regions. Their influence in the
regions is probably considerable, especially in connection
with activities which continue to be under the direct au-
thority of the central government; for they are officials
of the central government, members of the pamong pradja.
The ultimate fate of these officials and of the areas
in their charge is not clear. The problem may well be
solved by the extension of the authority of swatantras,
and the concommitant withering of the activities of the
pamong pradja. In any case, it does not seem to be of
immediate concern.· There are many more pressing problems
involved in the decentralization process, such as the
formation of regional governing bodies,and the develop-
ment of regional capacities. However, as the process
continues, a decision as to the future role of these
divisions will have to be made.
Financial Relationships
One of the thorniest problems that has developed in
the course of the decentralization process has been that
of financing regional government, and regularizing the
financial relationships between regional and central govern
ment. As was pointed out earlier, certain sources of in-
come were made available to the swatantras, including re-
gional taxes, and State taxes turned over to the regions.
It was expected that a national law would regulate these
matters, specifying which levies would be collected by
the regions, and what share of the State income would be
made available to them. In the absence of such legislation
(156)Under the province is the residency. Under the
kabupaten is the kewedanaan and then ketjamatan,
often called district and subdistriet^53
tax affairs in the regions have been rather haphazard,
based largely on pre-war regulations. Ma?e important,
only a small proportion of the routine expenses of the
swatantras has been covered by a regular regional income.(157)
The result has been that the swatantras have been able
to operate only on the basis of central government sub-
sidy. Further, any major development project desired by
the regional governments requires a grant from Djakarta—
and thus prior approval.
If nothing else, such a system carries with it the
difficulties of straining relations between the center and
the regions, as regional requests come into Djakarta,
and travel from office to office in search of approval.
Whether or not a swatantra could develop its resources
more expeditiously by another system, the dissatisfaction
with the present situation has been manifest. Whatever
the origin of these feelings, there is the demand for
sources of income directly available to the regions, and
a sense of frustration that they have not yet been pro-
vided. This is especially true for those regions which
through their products provide a large share of the nation’s
foreign exchange, but feel that only a small portion of
the benefits return to them.
The fiscal structure that has been in operation in
Indonesia since its independence involves a concentration
of functions in the central government. While there has
been some scope for local tax activity—mostly at the
kabupaten and city level—it has consisted mainly of
"numerous small levies which en toto contribute little to
total revenue, (most of which) are atavistic remnants of
the Dutch colonial tax structure." (158) The major
revenue producing taxes have been administered through
the central government’s fiscal services.
The efficiency of this arrangement has been criticized.
There seems to be general agreement that certain taxes,
such as the rural income tax or the tax on private pro-
perty, could be far more effectively collected by local
(157)It has been estimated that only one per cent of
provincial expenses, and 30 to 40 per cent of
kabupaten expenses have been met by regional income.
See, Kenang-kenangan Konperensi Antar Propinsi,
op. cit., p. 45. There have been other estimates
of these percentages, but they have all been uni-
formly low.
(150)Douglas S. Paauw, "The Tax Burden and Economic
Development in Indonesia,” Ekonomi dan Keuangan
Indonesia (Economics and Finance in Indonesia),
Year VII, No. 9 (Sept.' lS54j, p."'S30'.54
governments, both in terms of assessment as well as in
preventing evasion. (159) But, merely specifying the
taxes that have a local character does not solve all the
problems of this division of authority. Regional experts
will admit (160) ,that the regions do not have sufficient
means—either in manpower or in equipment—to levy and
collect all taxes which might properly fall to their juris-
diction.
The problem, then, is determining which taxes should
be turned over to regional administration, and which ones
should continue to be collected by the central government,
with part of the proceeds being turned back to the regions.
And, it must be decided whether or not the system devised
will meet at least the routine needs of the swatantras,
and what provisions need be made in case it does not. in
search of a solution to these problems, the Nasrun Committee
(named after its chariman, Mr. Mohammad Nasrun), made up
of people from the Ministries of Internal Affairs and
Finance, was appointed in 1952 by the Minister of Internal
Affairs. Its purpose was to make studies and recommenda-
tions .
The Nasrun Committee was concerned mainly with the
existing tax structure. Its recommendations contained
suggested alterations in the distribution of tax admini-
stration and revenues between the central government and
the swatantras; the suggestions were made in the framework
of existing taxes and existing rates. But the committee
doubted whether this redistribution would fully meet re-
gional needs. It went on to recommend three types of
support to be made available by the central government.
These included "payments," which might be considered as
reimbursement for the fulfillment of functions by the
regions; "subsidies," given, for example, in cases of
serious natural disasters; and "contributions," or special
(159)	See, for example J. de Bruine, "Hubungan Keuangan
antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah" ("Financial
Relations between the Central Government and the
Regions"), Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Year VI,
No. 2/3 (FeF'./March 1953), pp. 102-123; and,
Douglas S. Paauw, "The Role of Local Finance in
Indonesian Economic Development," ibid., Year VII,
No. 1 (Jan. 1955), pp. 2-24.
(160)	See, for example, the paper on regional finances
read at the Inter-Provincial Conference, Bandung,
March 1955, by a delegate from the province of
Central Java.. ,-u» <:
55
grants to cover temporary deficits. (161)
Whether or not such a system would accommodate the
demands of the regions and the caution of the central
government cannot be determined in advance. The required
legislation has not yet appeared at the time of this writ-
ing. It may be predicted, however, that if dependence on
central government supports for purely regional development
turns out to be too great, dissatisfaction will continue.(102)
The redistribution of tax administration will give the
swatantras a new area of activity—the assessment and
collection of taxes—which is to be operated for the good
of the region and the State. The danger remains, however,
of misuse, whether stemming from lack of experience in
fiscal matters or otherwise, which the central government
must guard against. Developments in this area of activity
in the immediate future may well be crucial for the general
political stability of Indonesia. A law establishing
financial relationships between the central government
and the regions, and its smooth implementation by both,
can be a major factor in soothing ruffled regional feelings,
which have been more and more in evidence in many swatantras.
Tensions in the Program
The process of decentralization as designed by the
legislation described in this interim Report is not yet
complete. The country has been largely, but not completely,
divided into first and second level swatantras equipped
with regional governments; limited fields of activity
have been transferred to them. These accomplishments have
been attained over a six year period, from the establish-
ment of the first swatantras in 1950 to the last quarter
of 1956.
The process of division has been an arduous one, com-
plicated by the conflicting tendencies of increasingly
insistent demands on the part of the regions for further
autonomy, and the reluctance of the central government to
release activities to the regions. The various steps in
(161)	A summary of the committee's recommendations can be
found in de Bruine, op. cit. A shorter summary, in
English, is in Paauw~op. cit., January 1955.
(162)	A possible alternative, that there is a sizeable
amount of untapped tax capacity in the "rural sector"
of the economy that could be reached by tightening
tax administration and by some shifts in the tax bur-
den, has been suggested by Paauw, op. cit., September
1954. This additional income, if it could be
realized, could accrue to the regions.56
the process have been slow in appearing and, with that
slowness, dissatisfaction has become more and more evident.
The year 1956 saw an intensification of the protests against
the way the central government was handling its relation-
ships with the regions, so that the ’’regional problem”
took a more prominent place on the political stage of
Djakarta. We have not been concerned, in this Interim
Report, with the politics of decentralization, important
as they are to an understanding of the program. But some
mention should be made of some of the questions that have
arisen, if only to indicate some areas of possible further
investigation.
The rationale of the central government’s reluctance
to move at a faster pace in implementing the decentraliza-
tion program is based on technical considerations, the need
for careful investigation and preparation before each step
is taken, the need to develop trained personnel, and the
need for a more uniform development of the whole country.
Further, it has stressed that "provincialism," or ethnic
separatism must be avoided. But as valid as these points
may be, it would be hard to deny that there have been
other factors causing inertia, which have hindered imple-
mentation.
Political life in Djakarta is complicated. There
has been a rapid turnover of cabinets, and each one has
promised as part of its program to carry through the de-
centralization process. But the short terms of office of
thse cabinets have made difficult the extended efforts
necessary for as long range a program as decentralization.
The promises were repeated, but the necessary legislation
was slow in forthcoming,. The extent to which decentrali-
zation has become an issue of national politics may be
left an open question here, but there is no doubt that the
maneuverings of the political parties in Djakarta had
their effects on the rate of growth of stable and active
regional government.
The influence of the central government bureaucracy
on the rate of development of regional affairs has never
been examined. It has often been claimed that any bureauc-
racy is reluctant to release authority once in its hands.
It would be surprising if there were no indications of
this phenomena in Djakarta. The measurement of a region’s
ability to carry a given activity rests with the ministry
concerned. The factors that go into that measurement—
aside from the broad categories of finances and personnel-
are not clear. It is clear, however, that if the regions
themselves were to determine what activities they were
capable of handling, there would be far more activities
transferred to the regions than is presently the case.
This argument, of course, does not mean that the activities
would necessarily be better performed by the regions.57
The relationships between the central government in
Djakarta, and articulate political forces located away
from the capital have not always been smooth. The demand
for regional autonomy has been heard from the first days
of the unitary state to the present. But it is not al-
ways clear where these demands originate, nor what exactly
is being demanded. The discontent and the protests against
the central government do not seem to be a function of
political party attitudes. It is not primarily directed
against the unitary character of the state as such. Eco-
nomic motives can be noted, but they alone are an insuf-
ficient explanation. Put in its best light, regional
dissatisfaction can be called a protest against the small
area of participation allowed to regional initiative in
building up the country, About the only definite conclu-
tion that can be drawn is that further investigation is
necessary in determining the basis and extent of that
dissatisfaction.
Whatever the source, certain areas of dissatisfaction
can be noted. We have already mentioned the problem of
establishing financial relationships among the levels of
government, and we have hinted at the feeling on the part
of the regions that too little meaningful activity has
been entrusted to them. These, certainly, are among the
grounds for discontent in the regions. But these are
matters that could be arranged through supplementary
legislation; no new principles are involved. The reasons
for shortcomings in these matters are not peculiar to the
decentralization program, but must be searched out in
the whole constellation of Indonesian political progress.
There have been, however, areas of protest that are per-
haps more basic, the settlement of which could, to a
greater or lesser degree, change the structure pictured in
this interim Report.
Looking at the island of Java, the division of
territory into provinces and kabupatens seems to create
no difficulties. There are three provinces of approximately
equal size, with a clear enough basis of division to dis-
tinguish them. But, ouside Java, any comparably large
division of territory involves the combination of groups
and forces which historically were kept separate. Thus,
North Sumatra includes the various Batak groups, the
tobacco and rubber areas of East Sumatra, and, until
recently, the various Atjenese groups. Central Sumatra
has been made up of the Minangkabau area, Djambi, and the
many islands of the Riau archipelago. And there is even
more variation in other areas. Over the past six years,
many demands have been heard from one or another of these
groups for provincial status for itself, apart from the
other areas in the province as presently constituted.
Some of these demands have been fulfilled. In October53
1956, Atjeh was made into an autonomous province independent
of the rest of North Sumatra. At the same time, Kalimantan
was divided into three autonomous provinces, with the prom-
ise that within a few years a fourth province, Central
Kalimantan, would come into existence. But there are other
voices, growing louder, such as those in East Sumatra, and
Central Sulawesi, demanding provincial status. It may be
that these demands will be granted or refused within the
structure of the hierarchy of regions as outlined by the
1943 Decentralization Law, But it may be that a re-exam-
ination of the basis and role of the province, and of the
now mandatory three levels of government, is in order. It
is possible that the direction the answer to this problem
will take will be determined in 1957,
The experience of the past six years has indicated
some areas of dissatisfaction with the structure of govern-
ment authorized for the swatantras. In particular, the
relationship of the Kepala Daerah to the region and regional
government has never been sufficiently clear. The Kepala
Daerah, with the dual purpose of exercising controls over
the region in the name of the central government at the
same time that he leads the execution of regional affairs,
is given the difficult task of trying to satisfy two
masters. Control over the appointment of this important
regional official has been closely guarded by the central
government, The regions feel that he should be chosen by
the region itself, or at least that the regions should be
given a larger voice in the matter. Inevitably, friction
has been the result.
The two separate decentralization laws will have to
be replaced by a single law for the whole country. That
law will present ai opportunity for modifying the structure
that has been in existence for the past six years. The
whole decentralization program—both structure and imple-
mentation—is still in the process of development. The
problem of the local government of Indonesia’s extensive
territory cannot yet be called solved. The extent to
which any modifications introduced by a new decentraliza-
tion lav/ can aid in the solution and alleviate the growing
tensions between the central government and the regions
remains to be seen.APPENDIX I
01
m
Swatantras Established in Indonesia as of October 1956
I
Area subject to
Law No. 22, 1943
I Area subject to |
I Law No. 44, 1950 ,
State of East Indonesia and the Nether-
lands
Area in dispute
between Indonesia
WEST JA
JOGJAKARTA
. autonomous provinces which,have been
-■ completely divided into sepond level swatantras
L- } J 3 autonomous provinces not subdivided into swatantras
Π T ΓΊ Administrative Areas partially divided into lower level swatantras
Administrative Area not subdivided into swatantras60
SWATANTRAS ESTABLISHED IN INDONESIA
AS OF OCTOBER 1956
In accordance with Law No. 22, 1948, swatantras have
been established at three levels. The first level includes
provinces and equivalent units (special regions given the
status of province). The second level, which is subject
to the jurisdiction of the next higher level, includes
kabupatens and equivalent units (special regions given the
status of kabupaten), and also cities. The only third
level units thus far established have been towns. They
are subject to the jurisdiction of the kabupaten in which
they are located. By cities (kota besar)and towns (kota
ketjil) are meant those units legally established as such.
WF are listing here only legally established swatantras
as defined in this Interim Report. Y/e do not mention
those units (such as the kabupatens of North Sumatra)
which resemble swatantras^ biit have not yet been legally
designated as such.
Law No. 44, 1950, of the State of East Indonesia did
not use the same terminology of levels as the 1943 law.
However, the government regulations issued by the unitary
Republic of Indonesia establishing swatantras in that
area generally equated the units with kabupatens. The
Administrative Areas of Sulawesi, Maluku, and Nusa Tenggara
are not swatantras; they are mentioned in this list for
identification purposes only.
(The seat of government is indicated in parentheses if
its name differs from that of the swatantra.)ei
ι
Province of West Java
Kabupatens
Tanggerang
Bekasi
Krawang
Purwakarta
Banten
Pandegiang
Lebak
Bogor
Sukabuni
Tjiandjur
Cities
Bandung
Bogor
Tjirebon
(Bandung)
Bandung
Sunedang
Garut
Tasiknalaja
Tj ianis
Tj irebon
Kuningan
Indranaju
Ivladjalengka
Town
Sukabuni (in the kabupaten Sukabuni)
II. λ-^rovince of Central Java (Senarang)
Kabupatens
Senarang	Tjilat jap
Kendal	Purbolinggo
Denak	Bandjarnegara
Grobongan	Magelang
Pekalongan	Tenanggung
Penalang	Wonosobo
Tegal	Purworedjo
Brebes	Kebunen
Pati	Klaten
Kudus	Bojolali
Djepara	Sragen
Renbang	Sukohardjo
Blora	Karanganj ar
Banjunas (Purwokerto)	Wonogiri
Cities
Senarang
Pekalongan
Tegal
Surakarta
Towns
Salatiga (in the kabupaten Senarang)
Magelang (in the kabupaten Magelang)62
III,	Province of East Java (Surabaja)
Lumadjang
Kediri
Tulungagung
Trenggalek
Blitar
Ngandjuk
Mad iun
Ponogoro
Llagetan
Patjitan
Ngawi
Bodjonegoro
Tuban
Lanongan
Kabupatens
Surabaja (Gresik)
Modjokerto
Sidohar djo
D j ombang
Bangkalan
Panekasan
Sumenap
Sanpang
Panarukan
Dj ember
Bondowoso
Banjuwangi
Malang
Pasuruan
Probolinggo
Cities
Surabaja
Malang
Madiun
Kediri
Towns
Modjokerto (in the kabupaten Modjokerto)
Pasuruan (in the kabupaten Pasuruan)
Probolinggo (in the kabupaten Probolinggo)
Blitar (in the kabupaten Bli.tar)
IV.	Special Region of Jogjakarta
Kabupatens
Bantul
Slenan
Gunung-kidul (Wonosari)
Kulon-progo (Wates)
City
3b gj akar t a
V.	Municipality of Greater Djakarta
VI,	Province of West Kalimantan (Pontianak)
Kabupatens
Sambas
Pontianak
Ketapang
Sanggau
Sintang
• Kapuas Ilulu (Putus Sibau)
City
Pontianak63
VII.	Province of South Kalimantan (Bandjarmasin)
Kabupatens
Band j ar (Martapura)
Hulusunggai Selatan (Kandangan)
Hulusunggai Utara (Amuntai)
Barito (Muara Teweh)
Kapuas (Kuala Kapuas)
Kotawaringin (Sampit)
Kotabaru
City
Bandj armasin
VIII.	Province of Bast Kalimantan (Samarinda)
Kabupatens
Kutai Special Region (Samarinda)
Berau Special Region (Tandjung Redeb)
Bulongan Special Region (Tandjung Selor)
IX.	Province of Central Sumatra (Bukittinggi)
Kabupatens
Agam (Bukittinggi)
Padang/Pariaman (Pariaman)
Solok
Pasaman (Lubuk Sikaping)
Sawah Lunto/Sidjundjung (Sidjundjung)
Lima Puluh Kota (Pajakumbuh)
Pesisir Selatan/Kerintji (Sunggai Penuh)
Tanah Datar (Batusangkar)
Kampar (Bangkinang)
Inderagiri (Rengat)
Bengkalis
Kepulauan Riau (Tandjung Pinang)
Merangin (Buara Bungo)
Batang Hari (Djambi)
Cities
Bukittinggi
Padang
Djambi
Towns
Pakan Baru (in the kabupaten Kampar)
Sawah Lunto (in the kabupaten Sawah Lunto/Sidjundjung)
Padang Pandjang (in the kabupaten Agam)
Solok (in the kabupaten Solok)
Pajakumbuh (in the kabupaten Lima Puluh Kota)64
X.
Province of Atjeh (Kotaradja)
no further divisions as yet
XI.	Province of North Sumatra (Medan)
no further divisions as yet
XII.	Province of South Sumatra (Palembang)
no further divisions as yet
XIII.	Province of Irian Barat (Soa Siu)
no further divisions as yet
XIV.	The Administrative Area Sulawesi
Swatantras
Makasar (Sungguminasa)
Bonthain
Bone (V/atampone)
pare-pare
Mandar (Madjene)
Luwu (Palopo)
Sulawesi Tenggara (Bau-bau)
Poso
Donggala (Palu)
Sulawesi Utara (Gorontalo)
Bolaang-Mongadow (Kota-nobagu)
the city of Menado
XV.	The Administrative Area Maluku
Swatantras
Maluku Tengah (Amahai)
Maluku Tenggara (Tual)
the city of Ambon
XVI.	The Administrative Area Nusa Tenggara
has not yet been divided into swatantras.65
APPENDIX II
REGIONAL ACTIVITIES
Each of the laws establishing the autonomous provinces
of Java and Sumatra included a supplement enumerating the
activities which were to belong to the affairs of the
region. It was also specified which among these activities
were to be performed in medebewind. We present here an
unofficial translation of a standardized version of that
supplement in order to give sone indication of the nature
and scope of the field of work envisaged as the proper
domain of the provinces. The list was not meant to pre-
clude the possibility of later additions. It must be
pointed out that many of the natters listed here required
subsequent definition in a government regulation relating
to the actual transfer of authority over the activity. In
other words, inclusion in this list did not mean an
immediate assumption of responsibility on the part of
the region. Such government regulations have appeared in
only a few of the fields listed below. (An asterisk in-
dicates that the activity is in medebewind.)
I.	Affairs relating to general administration include:
1.	matters relating to the preparation and functioning
of the Regional Legislature;
2.	preparation of proposals and estimates for the
regional budget, and any other matters relating
to the budget;
3.	regional financial administration;
4.	regional personnel;
5.	archives and communications;
6.	investigation of budgetary matters of kabupatens
and cities for purposes of validation;
7.	supervision over the finances of kabupatens and
cities.
II. Affairs relating to general government include:
1.	supervision of the execution of provincial regula-
tions;
2.	supervision of regulations relating to public
security, including police affairs; *66
3.	supervision and direction of the activities of
swatantras within the jurisdiction of the province;
4.	effectuation of the fixing or altering of boundaries
of regions within the jurisdiction of the province; *
5.	natters relating to Indonesian citizenship; *
6.	niscellaneous natters relating to, but not specif-
ically included, in these affairs.
III. Affairs relating to land holdings include:
1.	receipt of transfers to the State of property
rights over lands privately owned according to
western law; *
2.	transfer of state lands to national ministries or
agencies, or to autonomous regions; *
3.	granting of permission to transfer rights of
ownership of, and construction on land, if one or
both of the parties to the transfer are aliens; *
4.	supervision of the activities of swatantras within
the jurisdiction of the province relating to land
holdings; *
IV. Affairs relating to waterworks, roads, and buildings
include:
1.	authority over public waterworks (rivers, wells,
lakes, and water conduits) including the encom-
passing lands, shores, and dykes, and over govern-
ment owned establishments at or on the shores of
said waterworks which are used for transporting,
disposing of, or containing water, which are trans-
ferred to the provinces by the central government; *
2.	authority over the use of water from public water-
works which have been transferred to the province
by the central government,for agricultural purposes
and other regional and national interests; *
3.	authority over roads, including adjoining land,
buildings,and trees, which have been transferred
to the province by the central government; *
4.	authority over State buildings which have been
transferred to the province by the central govern-
ment . #67
V. Affairs relating to farming, fisheries, and co-opera-
tives include:
farming	it aau	.
1.	supervision and planning of natters leading to the
awakening of a modern spirit of farming, and make
the farm community more dynamic;
2.	organization of coordination in technical fields; *
3.	organization of central experimental stations for
fruits, vegetables, medicinal plants, and commercial
crops;
4.	direction in combatting plant diseases that extend
to more than one kabupaten;
5.	provision for a center of farm information;
fisheries:
1.	supervision of the regions within the jurisdiction
of the province; *
2.	investigation and compilation of materials relating
to the improvement of the level of inland fisher-
ies, assisting in the work of the Ministry; *
co-operatives:
to be determined at the time of actual transfer of
authority.
VI. Affairs relating to animal husbandry include:
1.	supervision of the work of swatantras within the
jurisdiction of the province in combatting and
preventing contagious diseases, except for labora-
tory research and quarantine matters; *
2.	coordination of the work of swatantras within the
jurisdiction of the province m suppressing non-
contagious diseases;
3.	supervision of veterinary hygiene concerning milk
and meat;
4.	periodic investigation of animals used for trans-
portation purposes;
5.	supervision of efforts against the maltreatment
of livestock;63
6.	supervision of activities relating to hog raising;
7.	implementation of regulations relating to inter-
provincial trade in livestock, and coordination of
trade in livestock within the province;
3.	organization of breeding centers, coordination
and supervision of matters relating to cattle in
regions within the jurisdiction of the province,
combatting the illegal slaughter of cattle.
VII. Affairs relating to industry, internal trade, and
cottage industry:
to be determined at the time of actual transfer of
authority.
VIII. Affairs relating to labor include:
|. collection of information relating to unemployment
from swatantras within the jurisdiction of the
province, to be forwarded to the Ministry of
Labor; *
2.	periodic reporting of statistical information on
unemployment to the Ministry of Labor; *
3.	organization of the mobilization and distribution
of labor power wherever needed in the various
regions of the province; *
4.	improvisation of new fields of work as an effort
to combat unemployment; *
5.	organization of information services regarding
vocational guidance and fields of work; *
6.	organization of vocational training to raise the
level of technical competence of the unemployed,
and of youth in particular; *
7.	supervision of the work of swatantras within the
jurisdiction of the province in the field of labor
affairs. *
Affairs relating to social welfare include;
1. provision of leadership for, and supervision of
the swatantras within the jurisdiction of the
province.
IX.69
X.	Affairs relating to distribution include:
1,	establishment of regulations relating to apportion-
ment applicable to the regions within the juris-
diction of the province;
2.	determination of percentage price increase for
the sale of goods included in the distribution
program in order to meet the expenses of the
program.
XI.	Affairs in the field of public information include:
1.	assistance to the Ministry of Information to
ensure the smooth flow of public information;
2.	organization of local information services.
XII.	Affairs relating to education, instruction, and
culture include:
1.	establishment and organization of elementary
schools, except those schools used for teacher
training purposes, and subsidization of privately
organized elementary schools;
2„ establishment and organization of adult education
courses levels B and C, and subsidization of
privately organized courses of similar type;
3.	operation of public library services;
4.	maintenance of connections between the central
government and youth movements;
5.	provision of leadership and encouragement of
regional art;
6.	establishment of courses for the training of
teachers to be employed in courses leading to
compulsory education,
XIII.	Affairs relating to public health include:
1.	education of technical personnel at the middle
and lower levels;
2.	organization of public hospitals and supervision
over private hospitals;70
3.	nodical exanination relating to the transmigration
services within the jurisdiction of the province;
4.	supervision and coordination of the health offices
of swatantras within the jurisdiction of the
province.
XIV.	Affairs relating to public enterprises include;
1.	enterprises which the province is able to manage.
XV.	Affairs relating to traffic and motor vahicles include:
1.	supervision of matters relating to traffic;
2.	examination of vahicles;
3.	operation of government owned vehicle service
stations which have been transferred to the province;
4.	stockpiling of parts;
5.	organization of transportation facilities for
official purposes;
6.	arrangements for public transportation.71
APPENDIX ΠΙ
POSTSCRIPT:	JANUARY 1957
In January 1957 (after this Interim Report had been
reproduced), Law No. 1, 1957 was promulgated as the replace-
ment for Law No. 22, 1948, and Law No_ 44, 1950 State of
East Indonesia. This is the long awaited decentralization
law valid for the whole country. Basically, with one
important exception, the system of regional government
established by the old laws and described in this Interim
Report has been continued. But, there have been many
textual revisions, and some matters previously implied
are now explicitly state. VZe present here a summary of
the changes brought about in the legal structure by the
new law, based on an unofficial mimeographed text. It
should be pointed out that it is much too early to deter-
mine the effect this new law will have on the immediate
future of regional government in Indonesia, or on the
tensions which have been coming to a climax in central-
regional relations in the past few months.
(Page references here refer to part II of this'interim
Report)
Hierarchy of Forms (pp. 9-12):
The hierarchic arrangement of levels of regional
governments is made explicit by the new law (article 1).
But, instead of three levels being mandatory, there can
now be at most three (article 2). This allows for the
postponement of the creation of third level units. The
levels are not given names as previously; they are now
called first, second, and third level swatantras. The
distinction between city and town is abolished,and the
terms are replaced by "municipality." Municipalities are
included as second level swatantras, but they cannot be
further divided into lower level units. The municipality
of Greater Djakarta is specifically placed at the first
level. The special position of swapradjas is still re-
cognized, but the possibility of making them regular
swatantras is explicitly stated (article 2, paragraph 2).
Framework of Authority: Autonomy (pp. 13-14):
The trend towards a more general description of what
constitutes the "affairs" of a region has been noted in
the various laws establishing swatantras that have been
discussed in this Interim Report. In this new law, the
trend is carried further; the term is left undefined.72
The regional government governs all the "affairs" of the
region (article 31), but in doing so it cannot conflict
with the public interest or higher level regulations. This
prohibition is the only limitation on "affairs" given by
this new law. Thus, any matter not governed by a higher
authority can be considered as belonging to the affairs of a
region until such time as a higher level takes it up, or
decrees otherwise. But, to provide an area of activity for
the region over which there can be no argument, and which
can provide a basis for the immediate functioning of the
regional government, the item by item enumeration of affairs
made at the time of the establishment of the region is
considered as a starting point for regional activity.
Framework of Authority: Medebewind (pp. 14-17):
Regions can be delegated the responsibility of render-
ing "assistance" in the execution of higher level regula-
tions (articles 32, 33). This is called medebewind by the
official clarification of the law, without further defining
the concept. The wording of this responsibility in the
new law, if strictly compared with that of the old law,
would lead to the conclusion that the concept has become
more vague. Previously, a distinction was made between a
regional activity in medebewind, and "assistance" to be
rendered to a central government agency (see pp. 16-17
above). Now, that distinction is gone. Now, medebewind
activities themselves are called "assistance." It would
seem that any time a higher authority calls on a lower to
aid in the execution of a function, regardless of how small
a detail it might be, it may be called medebewind. It is
not clear whether the intent was to redefine the concept
in this way, or whether it was assumed that the notion of
medebewind itself indicates that the region will be expected
to exercise initiative in determining how the assistance
is to be given, as was the case under the old law. In any
case, these provisions are meant to fulfill the constitu-
tional prescription discussed on page 14 above.
Organs of Regional Government (pp. 17-20):
The new law again enumerates the Regional Legislature
and the Regional Executive Board as the two organs of
regional government. Their description is essentially the
same as in the old law, but is given in somewhat more de-
tail. The period of office is for four years instead of
five. Λ new provision is made for the removal of a
member of the legislature from office. There is to be
a vice-chairman of the Executive Board.
The most radical change in structure from the old
law has to do with the position of the Kepala Daerah.73
His dual role as both a central government and a regional
functionary cones to an end. Under the new law, both in
selection and function, he is strictly a regional function-
ary. He is to be elected in accordance with a law to be
passed for that purpose (article 23). Until such tine as
an election can be carried out, he will be chosen by the
Regional Legislature (article 26). According to the
clarification of the law, it is expected that he will be
selected iron anong the members of the legislature, but
it is pointed out that that needn’t be the case. He
continues to be chairman and member of the Regional Execu-
tive Board. His tern of office is for the sane four years
as the legislature.
The immediate applicability of this change of structure
is not clear. In the first place, the Kepala Daerah cannot
be elected by the Legislature until that body itself is
elected, which won’t be before July 1957. According to
the transitional arrangements of article 76 of this law,
the President, with regards to a first level swatantra,
and the Minister of Internal Affairs in the other cases,
appoints the Kepala Daerah until any of the election
procedures can be carried out. Probably, the present
Kepala Daerahs will be continued in office for this transi-
tion period. But, it is not clear how sharply their old
roles as central functionaries will be immediately curtailed.
Kepala Daerahs of Special Regions of the first level
are to be appointed by the President, while the Minister
of Internal Affairs appoints the heads of second and
third level Special Regions. A new feature, however, is
that the choice must be made from candidates nominated
by the Regional Legislature,
the dynastic qualifications.
The candidates still must have
Structure of Authority (pp. 20-26):
The Regional Legislature remains responsible for
autonomous affairs, but nedebewind activities are to be
assigned primarily to the Executive Board (article 36).
Regional legislation no longer requires the signature of
the Kepala Daerah, but the latter is responsible for pro-
mulgating the regulation. The limits on the legal punish
ment that can be prescribed for violations of regional
regulations have been raised.
The Regional Executive Board is explicitly given the
task of executing the decisions of the Legislature
(article 66, paragraph 1), and can be assigned the author
ity to issue regulations for that purpose (article 65).
It is also charged with providing "leadership" in the
daily government of the region. Members of the Board
are collectively responsible to the Legislature, but no74
longer individually. This emphasizes the "collegial”
nature of the Board. The Kepala Daerah as a member of the
Board is definitely included in the joint responsibility.
The change of position of the Kepala Daerah implies
that he no longer carries out functions in the name of
the central government. None of that type of activity
that was assigned to him by the old law is contained in
this new law. The Kepala Daerah's supervisory activities
and his "watchdog" function (see page 28 above) have been
removed.
Vertical Relationships (pp. 26-30):
It seems clear that some changes in the methods of
exercising supervision over the activities of the regions
are necessary, but the details are not included in this
law. The methods are to be established in a subsequent
government regulation (article 69). What the law does
make clear is that while each level is subject to the
"repressive supervision" (see page 27 above) of the next
higher level, all levels are subject to the central govern-
ment's supervision. This is apparently in answer to the
criticisms of the former system of "divided controls."
Further, the controls are now to be exercised, in general,
by the Minister of Internal Affairs (not, as previously,
by the President) in regards to first level swatantras.
The list of matters subject to "preventive supervision"
has been extended. In addition to the matters mentioned
in footnote 77 (page 27 above), regulations concerning
the following subjects are also included: removal from
office of a member of the Regional Legislature (article
11); the rules of order of the Regional Legislature
(article 16); election and recall of the Kepala Daerah
by the Regional Legislature (article 24); remuneration
of the Kepala Daerah (article 28); transfer of regional
affairs to a lower level swatantra (article 31); and,
amendment or cancellation of regional taxes (article 56).
The validation of decisions of first level swatantras
in these matters must come from the Minister of Internal
Affairs in all cases except the appointment and recall of
a Kepala Daerah, in which cases the President exercises
the function.
Already Existing gwatantras:
Swatantras already existing on the basis of Lav/ No. 22,
1948 need not be re-established. They continue under the
new law as first and second level swatantras and Special
Regions. All cities and towns already established continue
as municipalities. Regions based on Law No. 44, 195075
State of Mast Indonesia, or other regulations, continue
under those regulations until changed or eliminated by
a regulation based on this lav/.
Until such tine as the organization of the regional
government can be modified to conform to this new lav/,
the existing regional governments continue in authority.
New elected regional legislatures must be installed within
two years from the date of this law, and within three months
after that, the Kepala Daerah must have been chosen. As
was mentioned, until that can be done, the Kepala Daerah
will be appointed by the President or the Minister of
Internal Affairs. Any other difficulties of transition
from the old law to the new will be arranged by govern-
ment regulation.