se Tears Re “) 3S Gary CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM Tre Estate of 7.2. Schurman Cornell University Library JX 1393.R8T13 1908 Will i ii INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE JAPANESE PRIZE COURTS BY SAKUYE TAKAHASHI S MEMBER OF THE I. J. ACADEMY; LL.D. (HOGAKUHAKUSHI) PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO} FORMER PROFESSOR OF THE I. vy. NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE; VICE-PRESI- DENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, LONDON; LEGAL ADVISER TO THE JAPANESE FLEET DURING THE CHINO- JAPANESE WAR; MEMBER OF THE LEGAL COMMITTEE IN THE I. J. DEPARTMENT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS DURING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR; AND THE AUTHOR OF THE ‘CASES ON INTER- NATIONAL LAW DURING THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR”’ (AMERICAN EDITION) NEW YORK THE BANKS LAW PUBLISHING CO. 23 PARK PLACE 1908 & aS f q x Ss S F PA ISVF 7 R CopyYyRIGHT, 1908, BY SAKUYE TAKAHASHI THE TROW PRESS, NEW YORK JA AMR OO yr fen he Vp Aa PREFACE. Tue Russo-Japanese War is significant as one of the most important events the world ever witnessed. Especially is it an epoch-making event in the evolution of International Law. This war, in fact, has afforded innumerable cases that illus- trate almost every article of The Geneva and The Hague Con- ventions relating to Laws and Customs of Land and Naval Warfare, and, furthermore, has presented cases without prece- dents, suggesting the desirability of a thorough revision of the present laws. International Law may be studied in two different ways; namely, the inductive method, which discovers principles from accumulated facts; or the deductive method, which, after estab- lishing certain principles, collects facts necessary to maintain them. In my present treatise I have made use of both methods. Readers are cautioned against regarding this work as being too descriptive. It has been my aim to avoid theoretical con- troversies on all principles generally agreed to be correct. In such cases I have merely quoted the facts relating to these principles, and intentionally refrained from making many foot- notes reciting authorities. Every specialist on International Law has been called upon to express his views, so as to aid as much as possible in the solution of such problems as the establishment of hospital liners in the blockaded ports, the disarmament of belligerent warships and internment of belligerents in neutral ports, the destruction of captured merchantmen, the relation of the support of pris- oners to their employments, ete., all of which questions have heretofore been either inadequately treated or not referred to. I have never hesitated to publish my personal opinions on these problems, expecting that they might be freely criticised. v vi PREFACE. On the commencement of the war, Dr. Terao, Dr. Nama- mura, and myself—three of the seven advocates for war—were commissioned by the Department for Foreign Affairs to make certain investigations, and to answer various important ques- tions during the course of hostilities. One year’s experience in such a position, together with three years of study on the subject, has enabled me to become fully acquainted with every detail of the international contest, and it is not from a desire for personal glory, but from a sense of duty that I have com- piled the present treatise. Some years ago I published a volume entitled “Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War.” This was after I had served as legal adviser to the Commander- in-Chief of the Japanese Fleet during that conflict. In the former treatise I refrained from discussing matters pertaining to the war on land, because I was not in a position to do the work thoroughly. In the present volume I have included all matters, both naval and military, which occurred during the late war, for my official position enabled me to study both branches. Now I am permitted to publish what I believe will be a material aid to the study of Diplomacy and International Law. I hereby acknowledge the fact that I am under obligation to Messrs. W. M. Vories, M. 8. Vail, P. B. Waterhouse, H. B. Schwarz, Ch. E. McPeek, and F. A. Mosher for kind assistance in correcting my English and in reading the proof-sheets. Many of the official documents which appeared in the Official Gazette, Tokyo, at the time, and which have been incorporated in this treatise, were kindly translated by Messrs. H. Kotani, Y. Nakagawa, T. Chiba, S. Henmi, and so on. Sakuyb TAKAHASHI, On the 10th of April, 1908, the 325th Anniversary of Hugo Grotius’ birthday. CONTENTS. PART I. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, AND ITS EFFECTS. Sect. I. Sect. II. Sect. III. CHAPTER I. THe OvursREAK oF War. General statements : ‘ ‘ The Russian protests and the Japanese answer A personal observation on the Russian declaration (1) Data concerning the outbreak of the war. (2) Hos- tilities need no precursive notice. (3) On the Rus- sian manifesto concerning Korea. CHAPTER II. Tue Prorectrion or SuBsects oF ONE BELLIGERENT AND THEIR PROPERTY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER, ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. Sect. I. Sect. II. Sect. III. The days of grace allowed the enemy’s subjects . (1) Japanese attitude. (2) The Russian attitude. The protection of Catholics and Catholic Missionary Institutions in the Far East by the Japanese Govern- ment ‘ 7 . : 7 . . The American protection of Japanese in Russian terri- tories ‘ ‘ : i: ; ; . : 3 ‘ (1) The withdrawal of the Japanese from Vladivostock. (2) From Port Arthur. (3) FromOdessa. (4) Through Europe. CHAPTER III. Days or Grace ALLOWED THE ENEMyY’s VESSELS AT THE OvuTBREAK OF WAR vii PAGE 14 26 38 42 59 viii CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. PAGE Errect or THE OUTBREAK OF WAR ON FOREIGNERS IN THE BELLIGERENT STaTES; War TAXES ON FOREIGNERS . . 70 CHAPTER V. TRADING WITH THE ENEMY, AND PROHIBITION OF THE EXXPoRTA- TION oF Goops SUITABLE FoR WARLIKE PURPOSES : . 82 PART II. LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF LAND WARFARE. CHAPTER I. CoMBATANTS. Qualifications of a combatant; The Japanese principle during the Chino-Japanese War, and the Russo-Japanese War; Russian principles 2 a ; , 89 CHAPTER II. PRISONERS OF WAR. Sect. I. Treatment of Prisoners. ‘ ‘ Z . 94 (1) Personal investigation by Mr. Smith, U. S. Vice-Consul at Moskow. (2) Treatment of the Russian prisoners in Japan. Sect. II. Parole necessary for free outdoor exercise . 107 Sect. III. Prison barracks : - : 113 Sect. IV. Bureau of information for piséhers ‘4 114 Sect. V. Restoration of ee Poe left by Rigeian soldiers 3 ‘ . 118 Sect. VI. Postal regulations . 2 : § « 122 Sect. VII. Support and pay of prisoners of war . 3 123 Sect. VIII. Labour of prisoners of war . 5 : ; . 124 Sect. IX. Wearing of swords by prisoners . é « 127 Sect. X. Prisoner’s offences . 3 129) Sect. XI. The sick, wounded and ficecused 132 Sect. XII. Crews of merchantmen . 138 Sect. XIII. Russians in medical service, pon Seibadents re deceased : ‘ ‘ 3 : . 140 Sect. XIV. Delivering of prisoners of war 2 , 142 Sect. XV. Prisoners and religion . x ‘ ; ; 146 CONTENTS. ix CHAPTER III. Tur TREATMENT OF THE KILLED. PAGE Baron Suyematsu’s article on the subject. Regulations for clearing the field after an engagement, and for burying those who have been killed, or have died of disease . ‘ . 148 CHAPTER IV. Means or Insuring THE ENEMY. Sect. I. False accusations of the Russian Government against the Japanese Army refuted . 2 , 155 (1) Concerning the Japanese soldiers fixing feces a Russian train flying the Red Cross flag near Pulan- tien. (2) The false accusation of the Japanese troops’ firing upon the Russian Red Cross flag. (3) The false accusation of the Japanese troops’ firing at the Russian Red Cross Hospital in Port Arthur. (4) The report that Japanese soldiers abused the Red Cross flag in a conflict near Chong-ju. (5) The false accusation of a Russian surgeon treated unjustly at Tashichiao. (6) Slander on Japan’s treatment of Russians killed and wounded. Sect. II. Russian breaches of the rules of war ‘ . 163 (1) Cases of Russians’ firing at the Japanese field hos- pitals. (2) Russian outrages. (3) The use of dum- dum bullets. (4) The wearing of Chinese costumes by the Russian Army; an example of Russian stratagem. (5) Violation of International Law by the Russian Army in Sakhalin. CHAPTER V. SPIEs. Sect. I. Spy. ‘ ‘ ‘ ; . 185 (1) The case ot Gasimil Misoamonei, (2) Chinese spies. (a) The case of Chen, the magistrate of Liao-yang and Wang the ex-magistrate of Haicheng. (b) The case of the president of the bureau of communication at Mukden and fifteen other officers. (c) The case of the magistrate of Kang-ping prefectory. (d) A Chinese spy using doves. (e) Case of Chang. Sect. II. Violation of regulations concerning the protection of military secrets ‘ : : : ‘ : : . 190 CONTENTS. Sect. I. Sect. II. Sect. III. Sect. I. Sect. II. Sect. III. Sect. IV. Sect. V. Sect. I. Sect. II. Sect. III. Sect. IV. Sect. V. Sect. I. Sect. ITI. Sect. III. Sect. IV. Sect. V. Sect. VI. CHAPTER VI. SIEGE AND BoMBARDMENTS. PAGE Alleged bombardment of hospitals in Port Arthur 195 Non-combatants in Port Arthur ‘i . 203 The German officers from Port Arthur 206 CHAPTER VII. THE CAPITULATION. General Stoessel’s proposal to surrender : . 209 Stoessel communicates with the Czar. 3 210 Terms of the capitulation ‘ ‘ _ « QUI The transfer of the forts . : 3 » 215 Russian prisoners at Port Arthur. ‘ ‘ 2 . 218 CHAPTER VIII. ARMISTICES. The protocol of the armistice . ; a : 5 . 219 The armistice in Manchuria 5 ; . . ‘ . 220 The armistice at Port Arthur . P 3 . és 221 The naval protocol of the armistice * ‘ s 222 The armistice in North Korea a ‘ ‘ z » 224 CHAPTER IX. THE OccuPATION OF SAKHALIN. Premeditated plan for the occupation of SakhalinIsland 225 Surrender of the Sakhalin Army 227 The military administration system . 229 Instructions to military administration officers. Treatment of the population of the occupied territory 231 (1) Russian civil officers, their families and the families of military officers at Sakhalin. (2) Russian sub- jects. (3) Exiles. (a) Political exiles. (b) Crimi- nals. (4) Priests. Public and private properties at Sakhalin. ‘ - 239 (1) Forests. (2) Coal mines. (3) Petroleum fields. Application of The Hague Convention, Article LVI . 244 (1) Protection of orphanages. (2) Protection of charity hospitals. (3) Nowmihailovskoe lunatic asylum. (4) Churches. (5) Schools. (6) Museums. (7) Pro- tection of the rights of the inhabitants of Sakhalin Island. CONTENTS. xl Sect. I. Sect. II. Sect. ITI. Sect. IV. Sect. V. Sect. VI. Sect. I. Sect. II. CHAPTER X. Tue OccuPaTION oF MANCHURIA. PAGE Principles and regulations concerning the administra- tion of the occupied territory in Manchuria. The pre-arrangement of the administration of the occu- pied territory in Manchuria . . . 250 The results of administration in the donned forciipiy of Manchuria . - : é . 3 3 . 257 Requisitions and booty . : : . 260 Private properties of Russian inlrstivaniby: . . 262 Protection of historical and religious buildings, liasp tials and others 5 . 263 The protection of subjects of the other Bowens in Manchuria : . 266 (A) Anexample Kolatane 6: Awetienn aitizens, (B) An example relating to British subjects. (C) An ex- ample relating to Austrian subjects. (D) An ex- ample relating to Italian subjects. (E) An example relating to Hollanders. (F) Protection of the Chinese. PART III. LAWS OF NAVAL WARFARE. CHAPTER I. Tue SrinkInc or MERCHANTMEN. The sinking of Japanese vessels ‘ i . 284 (1) The sinking of the Nakonoura uM aru. * (2) The sinking of the Goyo Maru and the Haginoura Maru. (3) The sinking of the Kinshiu Maru. (4) The Okinoshima disaster. (5) The sinking of the Seisho Maru and the Koun Maru. (6) The sinking of the Jizai Maru, Fukuju Maru, Takashima Maru, Kaho Maru and Hokusei Maru No. 2. (7) The sinking of the Japanese sailing ship Hachiman Maru No. 3 and Hokusei Maru No.1. (8) The sinking of the Keisho Maru. (9) The sinking of the Han-yei Maru. The sinking of neutral ships. = 5: . 310 (1) The sinking of the Knight Banonunden. (2) The sinking of the German S. S. Thea. (3) The Hipsang incident. (4) Disaster to merchantmen inflicted by xii CONTENTS. Sect. III. Sect. I. Sect. II. Sect. ITI. Sect. IV. Sect. V. Sect. I. Sect. II. Sect. III. Sect. IV. Sect. V. Sect. I. Sect. II. PAGE the descent of the Baltic fleet. (a) The sinking of the St. Kilda. (b) The sinking of the Ikona. (c) The destruction of the Old Hamia. (d) The sinking of the Tetatos. An observation on the destruction of merchantmen . 310 CHAPTER II. INCIDENTS WITH BEarRING ON Prize Law. The Datjin Maru incident ‘ : 3 : . 337 The Prometheus case . 2 340 The ships for scientific eeplowtian taverns fie North Pole . ij ; , ; : : ‘ . 853 The Independent atin : 3 ‘ : . 854 Claims for damages caused by eapture ‘ ‘ : . 855 (1) The Crusader. (2) The Hastry. CHAPTER III. Tue BuockaDE oF THE LisoTuNG PENINSULA. Details of the blockade ; . 859 Medicines and medical stuffs dented fon Bort Geta 361 On the establishment of a hospital liner és : . 870 Blockade runners ‘ 371 A legal problem involved in y ihe blockade. of Tyee uae 373 CHAPTER IV. ConcEerRNING FLoatina Hospita.s. Negotiations about Japanese floating hospitals . . 375 Opinions of the master and chief physicians of hospital vessels, in question relating to The Hague Conven- tion for the application of The Geneva Con- vention to maritime warfare. . 376 (1) Reprehensibility of the omission of avtiols X. (2) How to make a hospital ship recognisable by night. (3) Is there any need of colouring a neutral hospital-ship otherwise than green or red? (4) Is it justifiable for a hospital-ship or a ship not a hospital to rescue the sick and wounded by venturing, during the battle, into the place of combat? Or is such conduct to be allowed only after the battle? (5) The disposal of the wounded and sick received on a neutral ship. CONTENTS. xiii CHAPTER V. PAGE War CORRESPONDENTS OF ForEIGN NEWSPAPERS AND CORRE- SPONDENTS’ SHIPS z : , - 386 CHAPTER VI. THE Coast BoMBARDMENT. Bombardments of Kaiping and Kinchow; Bombardments of Kai- ping and neighbourhood; The San-shan Island affair . . 407 PART IV. NEUTRALITY. CHAPTER I. Russian WarsHiIPs IN NEUTRAL Ports. Sect. I. Russian warships at Shanghai : 418 (1) The Mandjur affair. (2) The Asholi a the Grozovot at Shanghai. (3) The Bodri and the Russian transports. Sect. II. The Russian warships at Chefoo . 437 (1) The Ryeshitelni affair. (2) The Budsionmpety affade, (3) Russian warships which escaped into Chefoo after the fall of Port Arthur. Sect. I. Russian warships at Kiaochow 2 . 447 Sect. IV. Russian warships at Manila ‘ ! . 452 Sect. V. The Diana at Saigon ‘ ‘ 4 . 453 Sect. VI. The sojourn of the Russian suailiary cruiser Lena in the harbour of San Francisco : ‘ . 455 Sect. VII. The Terek at Batavia - 457 CHAPTER II. THe TREATMENT OF BELLIGERENTS IN NEUTRAL Ports. Sect. I. General observations 2 . 459 Sect. II. Chemulpo incidents . . 462 Sect. III. Breaches of parole by Russian ifeens . 467 Sect. IV. The Russian eee Bluni stranded at Wei- hai-wei P 5 3 . 473 Sect. V. The Shanghai andere case : : i . 476 Sect. VI. The crew of the Lena at San Riunatend : ; “ . 482 Xlv CONTENTS. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. VII. CHAPTER III. Tur SALE orf VEssELs BY NEUTRALS TO BELLIGERENTS. I. II. Til. Iv. I. II. II. IV. Vv. VI. PAGE Sale of warships by a neutral Government to abelligerent 485 Sale of war vessels from neutral firms to a belligerent 487 Sale of vessels other than war vessels from neutral firms to a belligerent State . i 488 Sale of merchantmen by neutral exlgecta to belligerent subjects. ‘ . 488 CHAPTER IV. ConTRABAND OF Wak. The Japanese attitude ‘ : 7 ‘ 490 The Russian attitude : : 495 The bean-cake question ‘ 515 About rice. : 7 ‘ ‘ 520 About tea. e 520 About kerosene oil " 523 About cotton ‘ i : ; i . 624 PART V. NEW CASES ON PRIZE LAW ADDED BY THE DECIS- IONS OF THE JAPANESE PRIZE COURTS. Sect. Sect. I. II. Sect. III. I. IL. III. CHAPTER I. GENERAL STATEMENTS. Japanese Prize Court Regulations and apace of the Japanese Prize Courts. e A 527 Vessels captured by the Japanese Navy 537 Japanese principles concerning prize cases 539 Petition by a party not interested 539 Case I. The Manchuria . . 539 Case II. The Mukden . : 541 Petition by an advocate other than a weanacllowatlany of Japan . ‘ ; : 543 Case. The. /’en i 543 Petition by tele. —¢ 544 Case I. The Manchuria . ‘ é ‘ 544 Case II. The Resnik ‘ 549 Case III. The Manchuria ? ‘ - ‘ . 651 CONTENTS. xv IV. Petition to establish prior right against the vessel Case. The Nigretia V. Petition for the release of the peadel: iawlignment ait prior right or payment of claim Case. The Russia VI. Petition for temporary stvadhinent of the price Case. The Mukden VII. Petition in any language other “than Japanese Case I. The M. S. Dollar Case II. The Mukden VIII. Several other principles Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Case. IV. Procedure of cases in the Japanese Pile Courts (1) Reception of case. (2) Examination of crews and passengers. (8) Inspection of goods. (4) Inspec- tion of letters, landing of crews and passengers and the reception of visitors by the crews and passengers. (5) Release of crews and passengers. (6) Advertise- ment of vessels and cargoes. (7) Trial and decision. (8) Fees and stamps. (9) Execution of decisions. (10) Returning ship’s papers. CHAPTER II. Enemy VESSELS. I. Russian vessels Case Ia. The Argun Case Ib. The cargo of the Argun Case II. The Bobrick : Case III. The Ekaterinoslav Case IV. The Juriady Case V. The Kotic Case VI. The Lesnik Case VII. The Manchuria Case VIII. The Mukden Case IX. The Nadajda Case X. The Thalia II. Vessels that assisted hostile operations of the enemy Case. The Aryol III. Vessels employed by the hostile Government and diese navigating with the enemy’s licence ‘ Case I. The Australia CaseII. The Montara Day “A CHAPTER, Vessets CARRYING CONTRABAND PERSONS. The Nigretia PAGE . 551 551 . 574 574 . 576 . 580 . 582 . ool . 593 595 . 596 598 . 604 605 620 620 . 625 625 - 633 . 639 Xvi CONTENTS. Case I, Case II. Case III. Case IV. Case V. Case VI. Case VII. Case VIII. Case IX. Case I. Case II. Case III. Case IV. Case IL Case II. Sect. I. Sect. II. CHAPTER IV. VESSELS CARRYING CONTRABAND Goops, The Aphrodite (British) The Bawtry (British) The M. 8S. Dollar (British) The Henry Bolkow (British) The Lydia (German) The Scotsman (British) The Severus (German) The Tacoma (American) The Vegga (Swedish) CHAPTER V. BiockaDE RUNNERS. The George (French) The Fuping (German) The Veteran (German) The King Arthur (British) CHAPTER VI. UN-NEUTRAL SERVICES. The Industrie The Quang-nam CHAPTER VII. RELEASED VESSELS. Véssels released by the decisions Case I. The Lastry (British) Case II. The Rincluden (British) Case III. The Shishan (British) Case IV. The Hsiping (British) Case V. The Saxon Prince (British) Case VI. The Peiping (Chinese) Case VII. The Aggi (Norwegian) Case VIII. The Helmes (Norwegian) Vessels released by the special ordinance The Hans Wagner (German) The Kow-loon (German) The M. Struve (German) The Arufried (Norwegian) The Barracouta (American) The Centennial (American) PAGE 651 659 664 . 671 674 682 692 694 703 . 711 . 712 . 714 . 721 . 732 . 735 . 739 739 741 742 745 747 749 750 . 752 . 753 . 753 . 754 . 754 . 754 . 754 754 CONTENTS. Xvii II. III. IV. VI. II. III. IV. VI. Vil. VIII. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. APPENDICES. PAGE Speech of Baron Komura on the Manchurian Question . 755 The memorandum of the seven professors ' . . 759 Diary of the war between Japan and Russia . . 761 The Treaty of Peace ‘ . 774 Japanese Regulations Governing Captures at Sea . . 178 Complete list of the vessels captured by the Japanese Navy . ; ‘ ; . 794 TABLES. Table showing the number of Japanese subjects in Rus- sian territories and Manchuria at the outbreak of the war : . . 44-45 Table showing ¢hs aunibee of Binsnlan srleiners living in private houses. 108 Table showing the lopality of aright ‘wabendles, vil the separation of prisoners according to religious sect . 114 Table showing the number and nature of articles left by Russian deceased ‘ : 121 Table showing the sums of Hone given io Buwsien prisoners 124 Table showing the Giieaeee of the Ehiestate fukoders and punishments administered by Japan . 131 Table showing the number of released prisoners . . 136 Table showing the number of Russian prisoners given ar- tificial limbs and eyes é z ‘ ‘ . 136 Table showing the diseases among prisoners . 137 Table showing the number of released crews 139 Table showing the number of merchantmen visited, eng tured, or sunk by the Russian warships . ' . 275-283 Table showing cases of claims for damages caused by capture ‘ : 355 Table of the Japanese floating hospitals ‘ 375 Table showing Russian warships in neutral ports . 417-418 Table showing the numbers of vessels chartered by Japanese subjects z . 490 Table showing captured wasesle,. orranged scoording to nationality . * 537 Table showing gondenined wwendels, wail reason tok con- demnation . ‘ : ; : : . 538 Xvili CONTENTS. PAGE XVII. Table of vessels adjudicated at various Prize Courts and the Higher Prize Court . ; . 538 XIX. Table showing the number of cases ‘zied belune the Prize Courts . ‘i . 588 XX. Table showing the aunabee Br cases fed hefure the Lower Prize Courts a . 5388 XXI. Table showing the pantie of ‘appeals talker to the Higher Prize Court... . 539 XXII. Table showing all the captured ooenele, arranged aeeoril- ing to the date of captures ‘ : i . 794 PART I. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, AND ITS EFFECTS. CHAPTER I. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. Sect. I. General Statements. Many continental writers insist upon the necessity of a declaration of war;+ but the practice of states during the last three centuries has rarely agreed with this opinion, and there are many publicists, especially in England and the United States, who approve of this practice.” By referring to the history of International Law, we will find several stages in the progress of opinion.® The ancient world recognised the necessity of formal decla- rations of war, the Greeks and the Romans alike being wont to so declare in solemn form after demand and refusal of satis- faction by the opponent; the declaration was publicly conveyed by a herald, whose person was held inviolable, from the offended to the offending state. The determination of the for- malities proper to such declarations was a main function of the Roman Fetial College, and the principles followed were enshrined in the Jus Fetiale. The Roman war practice in this matter lingered after the fall of the Roman Empire; the Roman Church, whose faith subdued the barbarian conquerors, lent its sanction to the cus- tom of making a formal challenge to the foe, which well har- monised with the proud temper of the warriors of the North. 1 Grotius, III., C. 3, § 6; Vattel, III., § 51; Calvo, IV., § 1907; Bluntschli, § 521; Fiore, III., No. 1274; Heffter, § 120. 2Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Publ., I., C. 2; Kluber, § 238; G. F. Martens, § 267; Gareis, § 80; Liszt, § 39; Ullmann, § 145; and many English writers. 3 Walker, A Manual of Public International Law, pp. 104-105. 1 2 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. Accordingly, so long as the ideas of chivalry held sway among men, public declarations of war in’ some form were always issued to the enemy by the opponent sovereign. As late as 1657 a Swedish herald brought a declaration of war to the Court of Copenhagen. During the seventeenth century, however, a wide divergence began more and more to show itself between the statements of legal authority and the facts of practice, Grotius and his fellows asserting under. the Law of Nations, if not under the Law of Nature, the necessity of a formal notice being given to the enemy before making an attack, while belligerents habit- ually neglected to issue such notice, although commonly excus- ing the omission on some special grounds. Gustavus Adolphus declared a formal notice to the enemy to be necessary in the case of a defensive war, and this conven- ient distinction commended itself alike to belligerents and writers in certain quarters. The practice of issuing such no- tices had in the early days of the eighteenth century become almost entirely obsolete. In December, 1881, and January, 1882, the Board of Trade in England sat on the subject of Channel Tunnel, under the chairmanship of Sir T. Farrer.t_ In the course of the proceed- ings of that committee, Sir T. Farrer asked a series of ques- tions, all connected with the point raised by him, in the fol- lowing words: “Looking upon what we ourselves remember, is it probable that war would be declared against us, as it were, out of a clear sky, without some previous strain or without notice that a quarrel was impending? Has this happened in any single case within the last 50 or 100 years?” To ascertain the facts on this subject, Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Maurice prepared an historical abstract of cases in which hos- tilities have occurred between civilised Powers prior to declaration or warning. He says: “The question has been raised whether « country living in peace with all its neighbours has any reason to fear that war may sud- denly burst upon it. 1J. F. Maurice, Hostilities without Declaration of War; Preface, pp. 3-4. CHAP. I., SECT. 1.] GENERAL STATEMENTS. 3 “Many of the improvements of modern science, where they break down the natural barriers between nations, offer facilities to an in- vading army, which would be confessedly dangerous to national inde- pendence if the two countries whose barriers are removed or pierced were at war. “Tf, however, war and peace are really separated by a distinct line, so that a nation at peace may take for granted that which would happen if it were at war, and that which constitutes war cannot pos- sibly involve peace, then, before war can take the place of peace, a sufficient time must be given during which the necessary changes can be made to suit the attendant altered conditions of life; there will be no reason to fear lest the facilities offered to kindly neighbours should become the means of aggression for bitter foes. “Tt appears, therefore, to be of some importance to ascertain his- torically whether within the last 200 years any cases have occurred in which the warning of coming war has not been very clear, or has not been given long beforehand. For it is not safe that the question should be left to be determined by casual impressions and chance sur- mises; it is necessary that whatever may have been the facts in the past the experience of modern times should be carefully recorded. The most excellent general impressions as to what ought to be the mode of procedure by which statesmen give warning before they make war, will not be an adequate security for the freedom of a kingdom. It is in fact true that under the excitement of popular passion or private ambition, rulers of armies or of armed nations have some- times disregarded all obligations of the kind, and have, in the midst of profound peace, taken advantage of the confidence of their neigh- bours, “Tf such a thing has, under the conditions of modern times, ever happened, it is always possible that it may happen again. Unless na- tional life and security are to be seriously imperilled, provision must be made, not only against that which will certainly happen, but against any danger which the experience of the past shows to be among the chances to be reckoned with. When the, unexpected ‘blow has once fallen, it will be in vain to plead that many previous years have passed during which nothing of the kind has. happened. “It is to clear this doubt as to what the experience of the past in this matter has been, that the following paper has been prepared. A chronological table has been arranged, showing all the circumstances under which hostilities have been commenced by different countries against others, prior to a declaration of war, from the year 1700 to 1871. “The result of the investigation, as the work has gone on, has 4 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. been to completely change its character. It was commenced under the impression that here and there a casual case might be discov- ered in which the ambition of « Napoleon or of w Frederick had led to some breach of established usage. The result is to show conclu- sively that there has not been, unless in mere theory, and in the tone adopted by historians as to what ought to have been, any established usage whatever on the subject. Circumstances have occurred in which ‘declarations ‘of war’ have been issued. prior to ‘hostilities; “put dur- ing the 171 years here taken (from 1700 to 1870 inclusive), less than ten instances of the kind have occurred. “One or two doubtful instances of previous declaration have not been referred to. “The other cases of previous declaration are mentioned and are chiefly interesting as showing how few of them were due to a punctilious desire to warn an unsuspecting friend that he was about to be treated as an enemy. In one case France issued a declaration of war prior to joining us in a war against Spain; this may be con- sidered as a fair case of giving warning, but in all instances in which the Power warned is already at war, the warning is comparatively valueless. For the country being at war, preparations against sur- prises have already been made; the conditions of war have already taken the place of the conditions of peace. It is only those cases in Which’a country” actually at peace with all its neighbours, has re- ceived warning of coming war, that provide peaceful citizens with adequate precedents on which to build their hopes of security. “In the second case here recorded, political motives led the French convention to declare war against Europe; in the third case, popular excitement led to u similar declaration. “ After the Peace of Amiens, England and France declared war, there being no motive to tempt either to effect a surprise, since both Powers had been preparing for war during nearly all the time of peace, and England, as Napoleon well knew, regarded Napoleon’s acts of aggression against Switzerland as virtually hostilities against herself. “On the other hand, 107 cases are recorded in which hostilities have been commenced by the subjects of European Powers or of the United States of America against other Powers without declaration of war. This number only includes for the European Powers instances of European action in Europe, on the borders of the Mediterranean, or against colonies in possession of European Powers abroad. If the whole history of Indian, Chinese, and extra-colonial wars with savage tribes had been added, the number might have been greatly increased, but the only effect would have been to lengthen the paper without supplying illustrations precisely relevant to the matter in hand. CHAP. I., SECT. I.] GENERAL STATEMENTS. 5 “Tt is also noteworthy that in the course of 171 years, England engaged in hostilities 30 times, France 37 times, Prussia 7 times, Aus- tria 12 times, America 5 times and Russia about 7 times, saying noth- ing of hostilities against Asiatic nations, all these without any prior declaration of war.” Thus, by strength of international usage, a declaration of war need not necessarily precourse belligerent relations, and so if Japan opened the war without any declaration of war, nothing can be said against it. It would be entirely another question if the future was the subject under discussion. It is an indisputable fact that an occurrence in conformity with past precedent cannot be criticised by what was to be hoped of the future. In the second Hague Conference the following Convention was passed : Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, etc.: Considering that, for the security of peaceful relations, it is im- portant that hostilities shall not begin without a previous notice; and That it is likewise important that a state of war shall be made known without delay to the neutral powers; and Being desirous of concluding a convention for this purpose, have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, to wit: [Names of plenipotentiaries.] Who, after depositing their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions: ARTICLE I. The contracting Powers agree that hostilities between them should not begin without a previous unequivocal notice, which shall either be in the form of a declaration of war with reasons therefor, or of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war. AgTicLe II. A state of war shall be made known without delay to the neutral Powers, and shall not be effective with regard to them until they re- ceive «a notice, which may even be given by telegraph. However, the neutral Powers cannot use the lack of a notice as a pretext if it should be proven beyond doubt that they really knew of the state of war. 6 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. Articte III. Article I. of the present convention shall be applicable in case of war between two or more of the contracting Powers. Article II. shall be binding in the relations between a contracting belligerent and neutral Powers which are also contracting parties. Prof. J. Westlake remarks: 3 “This regulation coincides with the doctrine which we have laid down above. Only two remarks are needed in order to put the matter in u clear light. One is that the declaration of war is now expressly required to be motivée which the declarants have always made it for their own justification. The other is that the commencement of hos- tilities without «a preceding declaration, in such peculiar cases as are contemplated above, is left possible by the fact that the parties are not made to contract that they will not commence hostilities against one another otherwise than as described, but recognise that hostilities ought not (ne doivent pas) to be otherwise commenced. “Nothing can more clearly show the impossibility of insisting on an interval of notice between a declaration of war and a commence- ment of hostilities under it, than the fact that the very moderate proposal of a 24-hours’ interval, made by the delegation of the Neth- erlands, was not accepted. The Conference has therefore rather con- firmed than weakened the necessity that, in order not to be taken un- prepared, every nation must rely on its own vigilance and on no formal rule.” As mentioned in the diary in Appendix III., just after the Japanese. torpedo boats made an attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, the following declarations were issued by both the governments: JAPANESE DECLARATION OF WAR. (Official Translation.) 10th Feb., 1904. We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make Proclamation to all Our loyal and brave subjects as follows: We hereby declare war against Russia and We command Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and We also command all Our competent authorities to make every effort, in pursuance of their duties and in accordance with their 1 Westlake’s International Law, Part II., War, 1807, p. 267. CHAP. I., SECT. I.] GENERAL STATEMENTS, 7 powers, to attain the national aim with all the means within the limits of the law of nations. ‘We have always deemed it essential to international relations and made it Our constant aim to promote the pacific progress of Our Empire in civilisation, to strengthen Our friendly ties with other States, and to establish a state of things which would maintain enduring peace in the Extreme East and assure the future security of Our Dominion without injury to the rights and interests of other Powers. Our Competent Authorities have also performed their duties in obedience to Our will, so that Our relations with the Powers have been steadily growing in cordiality. It was thus entirely against Our expectation that We have unhappily come to open hostilities against Russia. The integrity of Korea is a matter of constant concern to this Empire, not only because of Our traditional relations with that country, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of Our Realm. Nevertheless Russia, in disregard of her solemn treaty pledges to China and her repeated assurances to other Powers, is still in occupation of Manchuria and has consolidated and strengthened her hold upon those provinces and is bent upon their final annexation. And since the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the integrity of Korea and would in addition compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in the Extreme East, We determined in those circumstances to settle the question by negotiation and to secure thereby permanent peace. With that object in view, Our Competent Authorities, by Our order, made proposals to Russia, and frequent con- ferences were held during the course of six months. Russia, however, never met such proposals in a spirit of conciliation, but by her wanton delays put off the settlement of the question, and by ostensibly advo- cating peace on the one hand while she was on the other extending. her naval and military preparations, sought to accomplish her own selfish designs. We cannot in the least admit that Russia had from the first any serious or genuine desire for peace. She has rejected the proposals of Our Government; the safety of Korea is in danger; the vital interests of Our Empire are menaced. The guarantees for the future which We have failed to secure by peaceful negotiations, We can now only seek by an appeal to arms. It is Our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valour of Our faith- ful subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored and the glory of Our Empire preserved. RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF WAR. 10th Feb., 1904. By the grace of God We, Nicholas II., Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, etc., make known to all our loyal subjects: In Our solicitude for the maintenance of peace, which is dear to Our heart, we made every exertion to consolidate tranquillity in the 8 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. Far East. In these peaceful aims we signified assent to the proposals of the Japanese Government to revise agreements regarding Korean affairs existing between the two Governments. However, the negotia- tions begun upon this subject were not brought to a conclusion, and Japan, without awaiting the receipt of the last responsive proposals of Our Government, declared the negotiations broken off and diplomatic relations with Russia dissolved. Without advising us of the fact that the breach of such relations would in itself mean an opening of warlike operations, the Japanese Government gave orders to its torpedo boats to suddenly attack Our squadron standing in the outer harbour of the fortress of Port Arthur. Upon receiving reports from the Viceroy in the Far East about this, We immediately commanded him to answer the Japanese challenge with armed force. Making known this Our decision, We, with unshaken faith in the Almighty and with a firm expectation of and reliance upon the unani- mous willingness of all Our loyal subjects to stand with us in defence of the Fatherland, ask God’s blessing upon our stalwart land and naval forces. Given at St. Petersburg, January 27, 1904, a.p. (new calendar, February 9, 1904), and in the tenth year of our reign, written in full by the hand of His Imperial Majesty, Nicholas. On the 18th Feb., 1904, the Russian Government published the following manifesto: “ight days have passed since Russia has been burning with indig- nation against an enemy which has suddenly broken off negotiations and whose aim it was to obtain a slight success in the long desired war by a treacherous attack. The Russian nation with natural impatierice is wishing for a speedy revenge and expects news from the Far East with feverish anxiety. The unity and power of the Russian nation remove doubts that Japan will receive chastisement for her treachery and for having challenged Russia to war. While our Sovereign desired to maintain peace, the circumstances of the outbreak of hostilities com- pel us to wait with patience for news concerning the success of our troops, which cannot be received before decisive action is taken by the Russian army. The wide distances of the territory attacked and the . desire of the Emperor to maintain peace, were the reasons for the im- ~ possibility of making far-reaching preparations for war beforehand. It will not take much time to give Japan signal defeats worthy of the power of Russia, while Russia will be careful not to shed unnecessarily the blood of her children in inflicting chatisement on a nation which well deserves it and which has challenged Russia in an arrogant man- ner. She must, however, wait for events with patience in the certainty that our army will revenge the attack a hundredfold. The operations on land still lie in the distant future. We cannot receive news from CHAP. I., SECT. 11.] PROTESTS AND ANSWERS. 9 the seat of war very quickly. Unnecessary shedding of blood is not worthy of the power and greatness of the Empire of Russia. Our Fatherland shows so much unity and willingness to make sacrifices in ‘the national cause that all correct news arriving from the seat of war shall be immediately published to the whole nation.” Sect. II. Russian Protests and Japanese Answers. Russia’s strong protest to the Powers is as follows: A FULL TEXT. Russia presented to the Powers, through her Representatives, on February 22, a protest against certain actions of Japan in Korea, which she alleged to be against the recognised rules of International Law. The Russian document reads: “Since the rupture of negotiations between Russia and Japan, the attitude of the Tokyo cabinet has constituted open violation of all customary laws governing the mutual declarations of civilised nations. Without specifying each particular violation of the laws on the part of Japan, the Imperial Government considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Powers to the acts of violence committed by the Japanese Government with respect to Korea. The independence and integrity of Korea as a fully independent empire have been fully recognised by all the Powers, and the inviolability of this fundamental principle was confirmed by Art. I. of the Shimonoseki treaty, and by the agreement for this purpose between Japan and Germany on Janu- ary 30, 1902, as well as by the Franco-Russian declaration of March 16, 1902. “The Emperor of Korea, foreseeing the danger of a possible conflict between Russia and Japan, addressed, early in January, 1904, a note to all the Powers declaring his intention to preserve the strictest neu- trality. This declaration was received with satisfaction by the powers and it was ratified by Russia. “ According to the Russian Minister to Korea, the British Govern- ment charged the British diplomatic representative at Sdéul to present an official note to the Emperor of Korea thanking him for his declara- tion of neutrality. “In disregard of all these facts, in spite of all treaties, in spite of its obligations, and in violation of the fundamental rules of inter- national law, it has been proved by exact and fully confirmed facts that the Japanese Government, “First, before the opening of hostilities against Russia, landed its troops in the independent empire of Korea, which had declared its neutrality. “Second, with a division of its fleet made a sudden attack on Feb- ruary 8th—that is, three days prior to the declaration of war—on two -Russian warships in the neutral port of Chemulpo. The commanders of 10 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. these ships had not been notified of the severance of diplomatic rela- tions, as the Japanese maliciously stopped the delivery of Russian tele- grams by the Danish cable and destroyed the telegraphic communication of the Korean Government. The details of this dastardly attack are contained and published in an official telegram from the Russian Min- ister at Sdul. “Third, in spite of the international laws above mentioned, and shortly before opening of hostilities, the Japanese captured as prizes of war certain Russian merchant ships in neutral ports of Korea. “Fourth, Japan declared to the Emperor of Korea, through the Japanese Minister at Séul, that Korea would henceforth be under Japa- nese administration, and she warned the Emperor that in case of his non-compliance Japanese troop would occupy the palace. “Fifth, through the French Minister at Séul she summoned the Russian representative at the Korean court to leave the country, with the staffs of the Russian Legation and Consulate. “ Recognising that all the above facts constitute a flagrant breach of international law, the Imperial Government considers it to be its duty to lodge a protest with all the Powers against this procedure of the Japanese Government, and it is firmly convinced that all the pow- ers, valuing the principles which guarantee their relations, will agree with the Russian attitude. At the same time the Imperial Government considers it necessary to issue a timely warning that, owing to Japan’s illegal assumption of power in Korea, the Government declares all orders and declarations which may be issued on the part of the Korean Government to be invalid. “T beg you to communicate this document to the Governments to which you are accredited. 7 “ LAMSDORFF.” First Reply of the Japanese Government to the Russian Circulars. 22nd Feb., 1904. The Russian Government have, in their communiqués of the 18th and 20th instants, charged Japan with having treacherously obtained a slight victory by a sudden attack upon Russia, who was bent upon maintaining peace, and asserted that since the rupture of diplomatic relations can never be looked upon as the opening of hostilities, and since Japan did not issue her declaration of war until the 11th, she was guilty of a flagrant breach of the principles of International Law in making, as early as the 8th Feb., most unwarrantable attacks on Russian men-of-war and merchant ships. That Russia had never entertained any sincere desire for peace may be clearly seen from the facts that she persistently refused throughout the whole course of the negotiations to meet the proposals made by Japan in a conciliatory spirit, and that by wanton delays put off the settlement of the question, while at the same time she was busily: CHAP. I., SECT. II.] PROTESTS AND ANSWERS. 11 extending her naval and military preparations. In confirmation of these facts may be given her warlike preparations in the Far East since April last, when she failed to carry out her promised second evacuation of Manchuria. INCREASE IN NAVAL STRENGTH. No. Tonnage. Battleships............ 000.000 e eee ee eee ee eee 3 38,488 Armoured cruiser.............000 cece cece eeeee 1 7,726 IG FUISE NS ss acc8 Codcartr acarneuahareeet dvabsidnare Sucebhave Avengedeer stiles 5 26,417 Torpedo destroyers.................5..02. petiole 7 2,450 (Gi DOA tries. sveros seicectost tomar svete ae ea vein aoe ed Antec 1 1,334 Mine-shipa'ss.cisc3< ee sarar masons oeeccmasams ea 2 6,000 AL Ob Ali Sue pecteventastica ton mete ave a i greenest 19 82,415 In addition to these, Russia sent destroyers in section by rail to Port Arthur. The work of putting those vessels together was hurried up, and seven of them have been already completed. Furthermore, two vessels of the Volunteer fleet were armed at Vladivostock and hoisted the Russian naval ensign. She further ordered out one battleship, three cruisers, seven desizoy: ers, and four torpedo boats (total tonnage amounting to about 30,740), which might have joined the Russian squadron already in the Far East had not certain ulterior circumstances compelled Russia to recall them, and , these, if added to the others, would make the aggregate increase 113,000 tons. INCREASE IN LAND FORCES. Since the 29th of June last, when, on the pretext of a trial trans- portation on the Siberian railway, Russia sent to Chita two infantry brigades, two artillery battalions, a body of cavalry, and a military train, Russia has continued to despatch troops to the Far East, and at the beginning of the present month their total augmented strength was over 40,000, and plans were being made for sending out, if necessary, over 200,000 more. She has at the same time..been engaged day and night in strength- ening the fortifications at the naval ports of Port Arthur and Vladivos- tock, building forts at Hunchun, Liaoyang, and other strategical points, and forwarding arms and ammunition to the Far East by the Siberian railway and the Volunteer fleet; and in the middle of October last, a train of 14 cars hurriedly left Russia laden with the equipment of a field hospital. It is therefore quite evident that Russia had not the least inclination for friendly settlement, but solely sought by military preponderance to force Japan into submission. The military activity of Russia became, from the latter part of January to the beginning of February, still turther intensified. On the 12 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. 2st of January about two battalions of infantry and a detachment of. cavalry were despatched from Port Arthur and Dalny to the northern frontier of Korea; and on the 28th of the same month, an order to prepare for war was given by Admiral Alexieff to the forces which were stationed in the vicinity of the Yalu; and on the Ist of February, the Commander at Vladivostock, under orders from his Government, re- quested the Japanese Commercial Agent at that port that, as a state of siege might at any moment be proclaimed there, he would make his nationals prepare to withdraw to Khabarovsk. At Port Arthur all the powerful warships, except a battleship then under repair, steamed into ‘the open ‘sea, while troops advanced ‘in large forces from Liaoyang toward the Yalu. Who can then say that Russia had no warlike intentions or that she was unprepared for war? Japan, seeing that the situation had become so critical that it admitted of no further delay, was compelled to break off the abortive negotiations and decided to take necessary steps for self-protection. The responsibility for the challenge to war rests, then, not with Japan, but solely with Russia. Finally, on the 6th of February, Japan announced to Russia her decision to terminate pending negotiations, and that she would take such independent action as she might deem best to defend her position’ menaced by Russia and to protect her established rights and legitimate interests, and that she would sever her diplomatic relations and with- draw her Legation. The term independent action naturally includes the opening of hostilities. Even supposing that Russia was unable to under- stand it in’ that sense, that'is, of course, no reason why Japan should, in Russia’s place, be held responsible for the misinterpretation. Again, it is the unanimous opinion of international jurists that « declaration of war is not an indispensable prerequisite to the opening of hostilities. Indeed, it has been the common practice in recent wars to declare war subsequently to the opening of hostilities. Japan’s action is not there- fore open to the least criticism from the standpoint of international law. It must certainly be confessed that the charge sounds rather odd, coming as it does from the lips of Russia; for there are not only very many historical instances of that country herself instantly taking a hostile action without declaring war, but in 1808 she invaded Finland even before the rupture of their diplomatic relations. Second Reply of the Japanese Government. March 2nd, 1904. The Imperial Japanese Government is given to understand that the Russian Government has recently addressed a note to the Powers in which the Government of Japan is charged with having committed certain acts in Korea which is considered by Russia to be in violation of International Law, and all future orders and declarations of the Korean Government are declared in that note to be invalid. CHAP. I., SECT. I1.] PROTESTS AND ANSWERS. 13 The Imperial Government does not find it necessary in the present instance to concern themselves in any way with the opinions or declara- tions of the Russian Government, but it believes it to be their right and duty to correct misstatements of fact which, if permitted to remain uncontradicted, might give rise in the minds of neutral Powers to incor- rect inferences and conclusions, Accordingly the Imperial Government makes the following state- ment respecting the five acts, which in the note referred to are declared to be fully proved and confirmed: facts; 1. The Imperial® Government admits that “Japanese troops landed in Korea before the declaration of war was issued, but not before a state of war actually existed between Japan and Russia. The main- tenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Korea is one of the objects of the war, and the despatch of troops to the menaced. territory was a matter of right and necessity which had the distinct consent of the Korean Government. The Imperial Government draws a sharp distinction between the landing of Japanese troops in Korea in the actual circumstances of the case, and the sending of large bodies of Russian troops to Manchuria without the consent of China, while peaceful negotiations were still in progress. 2. The Imperial Government declares that the allegations under this number are untrue. The. Imperial, Government did not stop the delivery of Russian telegrams by the Danish ‘cable, ‘neither did they ‘destidy™ ‘the Korean Government’s telegraphic communication. Regarding the alleged sudden attack, Feb. 8th, on two Russian men-of-war in the port of Che- mulpo, it is only necessary to say that a state of war existed ‘and that, Korea having given her consent to the landing of Japanese troops at Chemulpo, the harbour of Chemulpo had ceased to be a neutral port, at least as between the belligerents. 3. The Imperial Government has established Prize Courts with full authority to pronounce finally upon the question of the legality of seizures of merchant vessels. Accordingly it would manifestly be out of place for the Imperial Government to make any statement regarding the assertion under this number. 4, The Imperial Government also declares the charge under this number to be absolutely and wholly without foundation in fact. 5. The Imperial Government denies the accuracy of the statement under this number. No demand, either direct or indirect, was addressed by the Japanese Government to the Russian Minister to retire from Korea. On the 10th of February the French Chargé d’affaires called on the Japanese Minister and informed him, as he did afterward in writing, that it was the desire of the Russian Minister to leave Korea, and asked the opinion of the Japanese Minister on the subject. The Japanese Minister replied that if the Russian Minister would withdraw in a peaceful manner, taking with him his staff and Legation guard, he would be fully protected by Japanese troops. He did so withdraw of his own free will on the 12th of February, and an escort of Japanese soldiers was furnished him as far as Chemulpo. 14 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. In this connection it may be remarked that the Russian Consul at Fusan remained at his post as late as the 28th of February. It is reported that he was compelled to stay so long in absence of instruc- tions which the Russian Minister apparently did not care to give his Consul before his departure. When it was made known that necessary instructions had at last reached the Russian Consul, and that he desired’ to leave Fusan.as soon as possible, the Japanese Consul in the same port offered him every facility for his departure, and his passage to Shanghai through Japan was arranged by the latter. Just after the war had commenced and before the govern- mental replies to the Russian protest had been issued, the fol- lowing essay was published by the author. The reason for add- ing it here is that it may take the place of a minute observation of the outbreak of the hostilities, though in many respects it may appear to be a duplication of the government's replies. Sect. III. A Personal Observation on the Russian Declara- tion.1 . 1. Data Concerning the Outbreak of the War. The Russian Government seems to have endeavoured to throw upon Japan the responsibility of having trampled the peace of the Orient by upbraiding our conduct in the vilest of terms from the point of view of the so-called International Law. Leaving the vileness of the reproaches to take care of themselves, we have here, in a few words, to justify those points, so much exaggerated and ill-construed by the Rus- sians. Should a formal notice necessarily precede the com- mencement of war or should it be condemned by the authority of International Law? None will deny that the answer must be in the negative, for belligerent relations may be commenced at any time, as the law expressly authorises. Before we clear up this point, let us summarise very briefly those facts that tend to put our fair dealing in its proper light. To sum up the Russo-Japanese negotiations prior to the commencement of war: In the latter part of July, 1903, the. Japanese Government declared to Russia our primary wishes, 1 This essay appeared in the Koku-min, Tokyo. CHAP. I., SECT. III.] ON THE RUSSIAN DECLARATION. 15 and under.date of August 12th formally sent to them a writ containing our requisites, to which the Russian Government ‘gave reply as late as the 30th of October, accompanied by the refusal to permit any negotiations being held at the Russian capital. After repeated conferences, at Tokyo, of the deputies on both sides, our Government sent to Russia a settled revision of requisites dated the 30th of October, to which, after much delay, answers came to us, dated the 11th of December. To our admonitory notice, dated the 21st, urging Russia to re- consider, the answer arrived in Tokyo on the 6th of January, 1904; and as to our repeated notices requiring their reconsider- ation, they declined to give an answer, even when pressed by our officials several times; but they zealously continued prepa- rations for war. At this crisis the Japanese Government found it inevitable to put a stop to her friendly relations with Russia, and sent a notice to this purport to the Russian Government. Now, since the international relationship was broken off under such circumstances, neither of these hostile nations should have had any objection to an hostile measure; which, however, in this case was resorted to, on Japan’s part, after a long notice, thereby affording Russia sufficient time for preparation. The severing of international friendship was announced to Minister Rosen by Baron Komura in Tokyo at 2 o’clock p.m., on the 6th of February, and an official notice of the same purport was handed to Count Lamsdorff by our Minister Kurino, at St. Petersburg at 4 o’clock the same day. Thus there was an interim of more than two days between the breaking off of international friendship, resorted to on the part of Japan after so many moderate measures, and our de- stroyers’ attack at the harbour of Port Arthur on the 8th. Availing themselves of such an exceptional display of indul- gence, if they had wished they might have given all the neces- sary cautions to Port Arthur and other quarters of consequence. These facts considered, our attitude on this occasion can be said to have been rather inclined toward generosity than to have been treacherous, as they allege. 16 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. Dr. Lawrence says: “The fact that, when the attack was at last delivered, the officers were engaged in festivity, proves them negligent, but does not prove their foes treacherous.” Nothing could be more clever and keen than this criticism. 2. Hostilities Need No Precursive Notice. To cite a few of the important instances in which there was no warning given: In 1715, during a time of peace, the Duchies of Brehmen and Verden were seized by England. ‘These provinces were Swedish. In 1718, Spain, by a powerful expedition, secretly prepared, seized Messina and the greater part of Sicily. On the 11th of August, 1718 (six months before any decla- ration of war), Byng destroyed the Spanish fleet. In 1727, Spain, still at nominal peace with England, laid siege to Gibraltar from February 11th to June 23rd. In August, 1756, Frederick the Great suddenly invaded Saxony with 75,000 men. He had previously asked for expla- nations as to certain movements of Austrian troops, and hav- ing received an evasive answer, despatched a second Minister to ask for a definite statement whether or not Austria would pledge herself not to invade Prussia that year or the next. As Carlyle puts it, his troops were meantime everywhere on the march “to the frontier in an industrious, cunningly devised, evident, and yet impenetrably mysterious manner.” On the receipt of an answer from Maria Theresa that his idea that she and the Empress of Russia were contemplating attack on him was baseless he instantly crossed the Saxon frontier and published a declaration—* protesting in the most solemn man- ner that he had no hostile views against his Polish Majesty or his dominions; that his troops did not enter Saxony as an enemy; that he only seized it as a sacred ‘depositum,’ and a means of protecting his own territory, threatened, as he had reason to believe, by the union of the King of France, the King CHAP. I., SECT. III.] ON THE RUSSIAN DECLARATION, 17 Elector, the Czarina, and the Empress Queen; that he would take care that his troops should maintain the best order and the most exact discipline; and that he desired nothing so much as the happy minute when he could have the satisfaction of restoring his hereditary dominions to his Polish Majesty.” So sudden and unexpected was his stroke that the Polish Court, which was at the time at Dresden, had not had time to remove its secret archives, which Frederick seized and pub- lished to the world, showing that Maria Theresa’s answer to him—as personal a pledge of her own word as a lady as it was possible for a sovereign to have given—was in express terms false; that the Empress and the Polish Court had, within six months after the Peace of Dresden, commenced a plot to dis- member Prussia, in which the Empress of Russia had joined by the Treaty of St. Petersburg (22nd of May, 1746) ; that on the 14th and 15th of May, 1753, the Russian Senate had secretly agreed to dismember and crush Prussia; and that France, hav- ing been gained over, Russia and Austria were actually mov- ing troops to put the project into execution, when Frederick anticipated them by more rapid movements. In this case his declaration was not designed to give any warning of his com- ing hostile acts, but (at the moment when his movements could no longer be concealed) to reduce the resistance of the Saxons to a minimum. In 1796, the French Republican army, without declaring war, seized forts and territory of the States of the Church, Naples, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, etc. In 1798, Republican France suddenly invaded Republican Switzerland. In 1798, France suddenly attacked Piedmont. Novarra, Suez, and Coni were seized without declaration. In 180%, negotiations were still on at Constantinople while an expedition was being prepared under the orders of the Eng- lish Government at Messina for the seizure of Egypt. Before any news of the final rupture at Constantinople had reached either Egypt or the English Government, “on the 6th of 18 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. March the Tigre, 74, Captain Benjamin Hallowell, accompa- nied by the Apollo, 38, Captain Fellows, and the Wizard, 16, Captain Polmer, with 33 sail of transports, having 5000 troops on board, under Major-General Fraser, set sail from Messina, and on the 15th the Tigre, keeping the rest of the expedition out of sight, reached the offing of Alexandria, and summoned the governor. This summons having been disre- garded, Captain Hallowell waited till the 20th, when the whole of the armament anchored in Aboukir Bay; the troops, to the number of 1000 men, were, amidst many difficulties, got on shore, with five field pieces, and a detachment of blue- jackets, under Lieutenant Boxer, who moved forward the fol- lowing day, and took possession of the castle. The governor, as soon as he perceived the accession of strength, accepted terms of capitulation, and on the 21st, “the anniversary of the Battle of Alexandria,” the city was taken possession of.” In 1816, Portugal seized Spanish Montevideo during peace. In 1832, France seized Ancona during absolute peace with Rome. In 1848, with the ‘Danish Minister still at Berlin, Prussian troops crossed the Danish frontier without declaration. The war of 1863, between Austria and Prussia on the one part, and Denmark on the other, virtually commenced by the occupation of Holstein and Lauenburg by the troops of the two great Powers. We thus see that, as the present International Law stands, hostilities do begin with actual battle, and that again no pre- cursory notice is needed to make it lawful. If the Russian protestation against Japan’s attack without any prior warning is serious, a glance at their own similar doings, indelibly put down in history, would show Russia her- self to be by far the more advanced delinquent in this direction, assuming the unlawfulness of the conduct. Before the battle of Narva, in 1700, Russia took military action without giving any special notice. (Cf. J. F. Maurice, “ Hostilities without Declaration of War,” p. 12.) CHAP. I., SECT. III.] ON THE RUSSIAN DECLARATION. 19 In 1733, the Russian army suddenly entered Poland for the purpose of electing Stanislaus, anticipating the movement with no declaration of war. (Ibid., p. 16.) In 1753, Russia, allied with Austria and Prussia, invaded Poland without warning. (Ibid., p. 22.) In 1801, the Russian Emperor Paul, without notice, seized 200 British ships in Russian ports, thus opening her military movement. (Ibid., p. 34.) In 1806, in the course of a negotiation, the Russian army suddenly attacked Moldavia, taking possession of a fort. (Ibid., p. 38.) In 182%, the allied fleets of Russia, England, and France destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarius, without any prior warning. (Ibid., p. 49.) In 1828, in the Russo-Turkish war, hostilities on both sides preceded a declaration of war. (Ibid., p. 49.) In 1831, the Russians fired upon, sunk, and captured Greek ships. (Ibid., p. 50.) In 1836, Russia, together with Prussia and Austria, seized Cracow without any warning. (Ibid., p. 55.) In 1853, the Crimean war was commenced without any declaration of war. (Ibid., p. 64.) In this way hostilities without a declaration of war have been a common recourse, frequently availed of by Russia since 1700, and she sometimes went so far as to take mili- tary action in the midst of diplomatic negotiations. A protest from such a quarter is illogical and unexpected, to say the least. 3. On the Russian Manifesto Concerning Korea. According to an official telegram received by the Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Government seems to have sent to the Powers a manifesto, dated the 22nd of Feb- ruary, 1904, reproaching the Japanese for the attitude assumed in Korea. Finding as yet no access to the original, reliance must be placed on a translation in the following brief criticism : 20 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. A. “Prior to the opening of hostilities the Japanese troops landed in Korea, the Government of which had proclaimed neu- trality.” Suppose the above be an exact rendering. Then the Rus- sian Government in this point committed a serious mistake, both logically and legally. When we consider that rights and obligations as a neutral Power, as far as International Law is concerned, are first conceivable after hostilities have com- menced, “to land in neutral Korea prior to the commencement of hostilities” must be logically and legally unintelligible, for how is it possible that in time of peace Korea should declare neutrality? Or, to construe it with much greater sympathy, it may mean, “It is against the provisions of the Russo-Jap- anese Treaty to have put our army into Korea”’; then it makes sense, but what a legal inconsistency to blame Japan for what they had already perpetrated themselves. B. “On the 8th inst., three days prior to the declaration of war, a Japanese squadron which was staying at Chemulpo, a neutral port of Korea, unexpectedly attacked two of our warships which were placed in such a position that they were unable to know of the rupture of negotiations, owing to the fact that the Japanese had intentionally stopped the delivery of our telegrams sent through the Danish cable, and had de- stroyed the telegraph lines owned by the Korean Government.” As repeatedly explained, Japan’s attitude stands justified by the provisions of International Law that, when once an international relationship is broken off there is a freedom to resort to war de facto. As for the difficulties Russia met. with in her telegraphic communications, it is of Do concern. History contains several cases in which war de facto’ took place while diplomatic negotiations were going on, for instance: On the 23rd of November, 1806, the Russians suddenly in- vaded Moldavia, and there took possession of a fort during a diplomatic conference. In 180%, under similar circumstances, the English army descended upon Egypt. On the 4th of April, 1848, the Prussian army invaded CHAP. I., SECT. I11.] ON THE RUSSIAN DECLARATION. 21 Holstein, while at Berlin the Danish minister was negotiating with Prussia. In 1850, the English army attacked Greece, without break- ing off their international relationship. Compared with these precedents, our first military move- ment off Sedul should be deemed anything but precipitate and entirely free from blame. Here we cannot help being reminded of the Chinese declara- tion of war, in the Chino-J apanese war, in which we find this brilliant clause: “Judge of our surprise then when, half way to Korea, a number of the Wojen ships suddenly appeared, and taking advantage of our unpreparedness opened fire ...”; and further of the fact that Russia then was one of those civ- ilised Powers who made great fun of the same queer words! C. “The Japanese Government, in defiance of the rules of International Law, captured several of our merchantmen within the neutral ports of Korea at the moment when hostili- ties were about to be opened.” As for the explanation on this point, recourse is had to some of the ablest spokesmen of our naval authorities and the Coun- cillors of Prize Courts. D. “The Japanese Government, through the Japanese Minister at Seéul, declared to the Korean Emperor that Korea should hereafter be placed under Japanese administration, and gave a warning that should the Emperor disregard this decla- ration, Japanese troops would occupy the Palace.” This point has been touched several times since June, 1903, consistently insisting on Japan’s lawful seizure of Korea when the Japanese-Russian War. took place, and referring to the capture of the Danish fleet. (Cf. Westlake, Chap. 5; Hall, Section 85; the author’s Essays on the Outbreak of the Russo- Japanese War; The Manchurian Problem.) When the law sanctions the seizure of Korea as a whole, who can possibly say anything against the occupation of a part of that whole? E. “The Japanese Government, through the French Min- ister at Sedul, sent a note to the Russian Minister there, order- 22 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. ing the latter, together with the members of the Russian Lega- tion, to withdraw from Korea.” : Before we consider the legitimacy of this protest, its re- liability should be settled. According to the official paper of the 15th of February, the Russian Minister’s retreat from Korea seems to have been of his own accord. If any compulsory meas- ures had been recognised as taken by Japan, it was quite in his power to have absolutely disregarded them. Once more, if to the Russian Minister an alternative was left to remain or not, the retreat must have been of his own free will, not forced by any outside compulsion. Why did he retreat from his post, where he should have remained, in order to protest against Japan? In this way the Russian manifesto, supposed to be based upon International Law, absolutely lacks legal support, and there is no doubt but that all the civilised Powers give to it no more than a mere glance of ridicule. Sect. IV. When Did the Russo-Japanese War Commence? As to the question of the time the war broke out there, are different views. ‘To understand the question, it is best to briefly describe the facts relative thereto, and for that purpose a diary of the beginning of the war is quoted here. The 6th of Feb., 1904. The Japanese Minister, Mr. Kurino, at St. Petersburg handed the ultimatuin to Count Lamsdorff. The Japanese fleet started from Sasebo port. The Sat-yen captured the Ekaterinoslav, the vessel of the Russian volunteer fleet. The Hei-yen captured the Mukden, the vessel of the East China Railway Company, Russia. The 8th, at 11 p.m. The Japanese torpedo boats attacked Port Arthur and gave serious injury to the Russian warships. At noon the Koreetz and Variag were ordered to leave Chemulpo. Fight ensued in which both the Russian warships were sunk.:- . CHAP. I., SECT. IV.] THE DATE OF THE OUTBREAK. 23 The opinions concerning the above-mentioned question are as follows: (1) War is not necessarily opened by the war de facto. The Russo-Japanese war, therefore, was opened by the sending of the ultimatum by the Japanese authority to the Russian Government. In the decision of the Higher Prize Court on the Argun case we find the following words: “War is not always commenced by the war de facto. It can be opened by a declaration of war or ultimatum, through which a party expresses the determination of fighting.” (2) The war began when the Japanese fleet left Japan with the object of attacking the Russian fleet. In the decision of the Sasebo Prize Court on the Argun case we find the fol- lowing sentence: “The war commenced when the Japanese fleet left Sasebo with an intention of attacking the Russian fleet.” (3) The war must be opened by the declaration of war. This is actually the view of the Russian Government. But it is quite without meaning to say that the late war began with the declaration made by belligerent Powers, which was in real- ity issued after the war de facto at Port Arthur. (4) War may be opened by the war de facto. But what constituted war de facto in the late war? There were several views among those who were of a common opinion that war may, be opened by the war de facto: A. Some said that the attacking of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur was the first action of the war de facto, and by. this action the war commenced. B. Some said that the capture of the Russian merchant- men was the very fact of the war de facto. In this view the capture of the Ekaterinoslav is deemed as such; that is, the taking of the ship as a Russian private vessel. The author thinks this view is not correctly sabebantiiian from two points of view: 1st. The Ekaterinoslav cannot be deemed a private vessel, 24 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. because she is a vessel of the Russian Volunteer Fleet Com- pany. Mr. Hall says: “The incorporation of a part of the merchant marine of a country in its regular navy is of course to be distinguished from such a measure as that above discussed. A marked in- stance of incorporation is supplied by the Russian volunteer fleet. The vessels are built at private cost, and in time of peace they carry the mercantile flag of their country; but their captain and at least one other officer hold commissions from their sovereign, they are under naval discipline, and: they appear to be employed solely in public services, such as the conveyance of convicts to the Russian possessions on the Pacific. Taking the circumstances as a whole, it is difficult to regard the use of a mercantile flag as serious; they are not merely vessels which in the event of war can be instantaneously converted into public vessels of the state, they are properly to be consid- ered as already belonging to the Imperial Navy.” So she is not a private vessel. 2nd. Modern International Law agrees in the opinion that war exists between states, but not between individuals of the belligerent states, and that a belligerent state, however, may treat an individual of the other belligerent as one who has an enemy character contaminated by the National enemy character. So, the enemy character of an individual of one belligerent state is the effect of a national enemy character. The enemy character of States comes first, then the individual character follows. Now, on the 6th of February, 1904, there was no war. At that time the Japanese fleet detained the Rus- sian vessel belonging to an individual, who must not be deemed as an enemy, because there was no war. How can this deten- tion of a private vessel in time of peace cause a war between states? Effect is not the cause, as logic shows. C. Some said that the capture of the Russian public vessel in the first act was the beginning of war de facto. The cap- ture of the Ekaterinoslav, deeming her to be a public vessel CHAP, I., SECT. IV.] THE DATE OF THE OUTBREAK. 25 of Russia, is mentioned as such an act. This view was insisted upon by the author from the very beginning of the late war. Afterwards this view was also actually expressed on the occa- sion of the Higher Prize Court on the Mukden case. It runs thus: “Qn the way to the zone of battle the Japanese fleet cap- tured the Fkaterinoslav of the Russian volunteer fleet, which was a vessel liable to naval service in time of war. This was nothing more than the carrying out of the hostile intentions, and any capture made after that time is lawful.” On the whole, the author’s view is that the Russo-Japanese war was commenced by the capture of the Hkaterinoslav, as she was liable to be appropriated for Naval service during the war. CHAPTER II. THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY OF ONE BELLIGERENT WITHIN THE TERRI- TORY OF THE OTHER ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. Sect. I. The Days of Grace for the Enemy’s Subjects and Their Properties. As to the treatment by one of the belligerent nations of the enemy’s subjects staying in its territory at the outbreak of war, Powers have not been of the same opinion. In 1803, when France entered into hostile relations with England, Na- poleon I. issued an imperial decree well known in history as the Arrété de Napoleon, detaining until 1814 all the Englishmen between 18 and 60 years of age, while, on the other hand, dur- ing the Franco-Prussian war, quite an opposite proceeding oc- curred when the French Government expelled all the Prussians then staying in Paris and in the department of the Seine.? The theory, however, remains unequivocal amidst such an incongruity of facts that those who wish to be engaged in peaceful occupations may be suffered to remain in the hostile nation and those having a mind to leave suffered to do so, along with their effects, within a certain number of days of grace. Below is a brief historical outline on the subject. In England, as early as the fourteenth century, it was pro- vided by the Statute of Staples (27 Ed. III. St. 2) that on the outbreak of war foreign merchants should have forty days within which to depart the realm together with their goods, 1 Browning, England and Napoleon in 1808, pp. 272-295. 2 Washburn, Recollections, I., p. 83; Rolin Jacquemyns, La Guerre Actuelle, pp. 33-36. 26 CHAP, II., SECT. 1.] PROTECTION OF ENEMY’S SUBJECTS. 27 with an extension of time in case of necessity. A similar prac- tice seems to have been adopted in other countries. In later times the privilege of safe withdrawal within a certain period, ranging from six months to a year, became very commonly a matter of express treaty provision. Finally, it became a gen- erally recognised principle that subjects of either belligerent, whether merchant or not, found within the territory of the other should be at liberty to depart freely within a period rea- sonably sufficient for the arrangement of their affairs, subject to a possible exception in the case of persons whose detention might be a matter of great political or military importance. Modern practices appear to be even more liberal, inasmuch as the custom has been inaugurated of allowing the enemy’s sub- jects to continue their residence during their good behaviour. By act of the United States Congress, 1798, the President is authorised in case of war to direct in what cases and upon what security the subjects of any hostile nation shall be permitted to remain in the United States. By the same act, withdraw- ing subjects are to be allowed such reasonable time as may he consistent with public safety for the recovery, disposal, and re- moval of their goods and for their departure. This is also occasionally a matter of express stipulation by treaty. Thus, by the Treaty of 1795, between Great Britain and the United States, it was provided that in the event of war the subjects of either country should have the privilege of remaining and continuing their trade, so long as they con- ducted themselves peaceably and committed no offence against the laws." Where such permission is expressly or implicitly given, it would seem to follow that such persons are entitled to the same privileges as other resident aliens. But in Great Britain it has been held in Alcinous v. Nigren, that an alien enemy, even though allowed to remain in British territory, cannot, without express license from the Crown, maintain an action in the Eng- lish Courts during the continuance of the war. 1 Hall, A Treatise on International Law, p. 392. 28 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. Apart from a treaty, moreover, the right to expel an enemy still remains, and may rightly be exercised under circumstances of political or military necessity. On the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, permission was at first given by the French Government to subjects of the enemy to remain in France, or in any French Colony, so long as their conduct furnished no reason for complaint; but any new admission into French territory was made a subject for special permission, which was only to be exceptionally granted; thirty days were allowed to the enemy’s ships by which they were to quit France with the privilege of safe conduct; vessels bound to French ports, with goods on French accounts, laden before the decla- ration of war, were to be at liberty to enter and discharge their cargoes, with the privilege of safe conduct on their return voyage. On the 17th of September, 1870, however, a decree was issued ordering the enemy’s subjects to quit French terri- tory within three days, unless specially authorised to remain, as already referred to.1 ’ With regard to the enemy’s property, we have clearly seen from’ a leading case that the Supreme Court of the United States has agreed that the outbreak of war gives the Sovereign a right to confiscate such property, although it goes on to hold that the mere declaration or existence of war does not of itself render such property subject to confiscation. This may be said to fairly represent the existing law on the subject. When the citizens of a hostile state are allowed to remain, the question of confiscation of property is not likely to arise. The express or implied permission to stay would involve, as an almost necessary consequence, the according of the same gen- eral protection to their property as that afforded to other domiciled aliens. If ordered’ to quit the belligerent country, then by modern usage and sometimes also by express treaty provision, alien enemies would be entitled to a reasonable time for withdrawal, and within such time they would doubtless be privileged to collect and take with them such part of their 1 See page 24. CHAP. II., SECT. I.] PROTECTION OF ENEMY’S SUBJECTS. 29 effects as they could, or failing that, to dispose of them to other persons. I. The Japanese Attitude Towards the Enemy’s Subjects in Her Own Territory at the Outbreak of War. (1) The Chino-Japanese War. To take an example from the Chino-Japanese war, the Imperial decree attached below was issued on August the 4th, 1894, (The quotation is here as rendered into French by Mr. Ariga, a learned friend of the author, who prepared the original draft of the same.)? Décret impérial du 4 aoilt 1894 relatif & la protection des Chinois résident au Japon, Peu aprés la promulgation de la déclaration de guerre, le 4 aoat 1894, le gouvernement japonais rendit un décret relatif 4 la protection des Chinois établis au Japon. En méme temps, il invita les préfets de l’Empire 4 exercer une surveillance sur leurs administrés pour qu’aucun acte de violence ne soit commis sur les Chinois. L’Empire du Japon, se conformant aux usages des peuples civilisés, considérait ainsi la guerre comme un fait entre Etats; il entendait que les relations entre individus ne fussent point entravées, tant qu’ells ne porteraient pas atteinte aux intéréts militaires. Voici le texte du décret impérial: ArT. I.—Les sujets chinois pourront, 4 condition de se conformer aux prescriptions du présent décret, continuer 4 demeurer dans toutes les localités de Empire od il leur a été permis de résider jusqu’d présent, en jouissant de la protection de leur personne et de leurs biens, et ils pourront s’y livrer 4 toute profession pacifique et licite. Toutefois, ils devront se soumettre 4 la juridiction des cours et des tribunaux de YEmpire. ArT. II.—Les sujets chinois qui doivent résider dans l’Empire en vertu de l’article précédent feront, dans le délai de vingt jours, 4 partir de la promulgation du présent décret, une déclaration au préfet du lieu de leur résidence, pour demander |’énregistrement de leur résidence, de leur profession, ainsi que de leurs noms et prénoms. ArT. III.—Le préfet remettra un certificat d’enregistrement aux Chi- nois qui auront obtenu l’enregistrement prévu a l'article IT. Art. IV.—Les sujets chinois ayant obtenu l’enregistrement indiqué 2 Varticle II. pourront transférer ailleurs leur résidence. Mais ils devront obtenir du préfet de leur résidence un endossement sur le certificat d’enregistrement, et, dans les trois jours aprés leur arrivée au lieu de 1 Pitt-Cobett, pp. 155-157. 2 Ariga, La Guerre Sino-Japonaise, pp. 23-25. 30 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. leur résidence nouvelle, ils devront faire une déclaration au préfet de ce lieu, afin d’obtenir de nouveau l’enregistrement indiqué a l’article II. Art. V.—Les préfets pourront faire sortir des territoires de l’Empire les sujets chinois qui n’auront pas demandé l’enregistrement établi par le présent décret. ArT. VI.—Les sujets chinois qui portent atteinte aux intéréts de Empire, commettent des infractions, troublent l’ordre et la paix ou sont suspects de ces divers faits, outre les condamnations qu’ils encour- ront en vertu des lois et réglements, pourront encore étre expulsés des territoires de |’Empire par un ordre du préfet. ArT. VII.—Le présent décret est applicable aux Chinois employés par les autorités ou par les particuliers de l’Empire. ART. VITI.—Le présent avis ne préjudicie pas 4 tout ordre émis ou a toute mesure prise par une autorité militaire de l’Empire, a l’égard des Chinois y résidant, dans un but qu’elle se propose d’atteindre dans la guerre. , Art. TX.—Aucun sujet chinois ne sera admis, aprés la promulgation du présent décret, 4 entrer dans les territoires de Empire qu’en vertu dune autorisation spéciale du ministre de lintérieur demandée par Ventremise du préfet. ArT. X.—Le présent décret entrera en vigueur dés le jour méme de sa promulgation. : Le 4 aotit de la 27 année de Meiji (1894). (Nom et cachets impériaux.) (Contre-signés) ComTer ITo, Président du Conseil ; ComTE Inovuyré&, Ministre de VIntérieur ; MutTsv, Ministre des Affaires étrangéres; YOSHIKAWA, Ministre de la Justice. (2) The Russo-Japanese War. At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War the Department of Foreign Affairs asked its Legal Committee for an opinion as to whether a similar ordinance as that given during the Chino-Japanese war was to be issued or not; to which question a negative answer was given after a deliberate consultation. Hence short instructions addressed to the local and municipal Governors were substituted for a formal Imperial Ordinance. 1 For English version, see the author’s Case on International Law during the Chino- Japanese War, pp. 169-170. CHAP. II., SECT. I.] PROTECTION OF ENEMY’S SUBJECTS. 31 Instruction No. 1, issued by the Department of Home Affairs to the governmental officers, prefectural and municipal, and governors of Hokkaido and Formosa: Feb. 9th, Meiji 37. Now that the Russian legation and consulate are about to be with- drawn, special care should be taken for the protection of Russian sub- jects staying within our territory. Count Taro Katsura Minister of Home Affairs. Further, other instructions were given to inform the gov- ernors, prefectural and municipal, as to the scope of protection to be exercised over the Russian subjects. Feb. 10th, year of Meiji 37. It being a matter of universal acknowledgment that the war declared by our Imperial Government against Russia has nothing to do with the Russian populace, toward whom we have never cherished anything like enmity, the Russian subjects now staying in our country shall meet with no interference to their remaining in Japan; newcomers shall be welcomed, and even their living here shall be entirely free from all restrictions. Their bodies, lives, honour, and effects, therefore, shall be carefully respected according to our registration, so that they may be able, without any fear, to engage in their lawful occupations with every claim upon all the protection our courts afford. In spite of our good will toward them, however, they will be held to a strict account for their behaviour, and if they are found in any way interfering with the military or naval arrangements, or doing anything that is contrary to the best interests of Japan, or if they are assisting in any way the military movements of their country, or if they disturb our peace, order, or good customs, or do anything contrary to our wel- fare, they shall be put under the proper restriction imposed by our laws, and may be immediately expelled from Japan. Besides, those who lack the means of maintaining themselves without relying on pub- lie assistance are likely to be subject to a similar measure. In a word, every possible advantage shall be extended to them, in so far as it does not conflict with our own national interests. You are thus cautioned against exposing them to any inconvenience, when possible, and to any misunderstanding on the part of our populace at large. Count Taro Katsura, Minister of Home Affairs. Following are some of the main reasons we deviated on this occasion from the precedent established during the Chino- Japanese war. 32 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. I. Foreigners’ rights and interests in matters concerning life and property being implicitly respected in the Japanese laws (cf. Civil Code, Section II) they need no special Imperial Ordinance to reassure them, and any such step would merely be duplicating what had been already conferred. An Imperial Ordinance was thus deterred, and a similar step resorted to during the Chino-Japanese war (the Imperial Ordinance, No. I) found entirely tautological. II. A register, corresponding to the Imperial decree, Arts. II.-V., issued in the time of the Chino-Japanese war, was also found unnecessary, the names and nationalities of foreigners having been already fully registered in time of peace. ItI. The text in the Imperial decree of 1894, on enforcing the withdrawal of foreigners if found necessary with a view to administrative or military requirements, was considered un- necessary. The reason is as follows: There is no law in Japan containing any article correspond- ing to those regulations for the expulsion and admission of foreigners. But, by an administrative measure Japan can en- force the withdrawal of any foreigner whenever circumstances require it, and thus in such a case can expel even those of any other nationality as well as of Russia by administrative meas- ures. Hence the addition of the clause, “the Russians can be expelled whenever military or administrative measures require it,” may be made, when logically construed, to mean the ex- emption of all foreigners besides Russians from expulsion, even when such expulsion is urged by military or administrative necessity. By thus enacting a new law implicitly limited to Rus- sians, Japan would be powerless to expel other foreigners, even when desirable. This may serve, although indirectly, as an illustration of Jap- anese alertness in arriving at the required end without minute provisions by duplicate and elaborate ordinance. Again we may ascribe it to the growing perfection of the Japanese legislation, and congratulate ourselves in the thought that the enemy’s sub- jects enjoyed the Japanese generous protective method. CHAP. II., SECT. I.] PROTECTION OF ENEMY’S SUBJECTS. 33 Il. The Russian Attitude. The Russian treatment as regards Japanese subjects staying in Siberia was not, to say the least, generous or even fair, since no previous notice of expulsion had been given. On this point Dr. Lawrence thus declared his opinion: “The first article of the Russian ‘Rules,’ issued on February 28, soon after the commencement of the present war, laid down that ‘ Japa- nese subjects are authorised to continue, under the protection of Rus- sian law, to reside and to follow peaceful callings in the Russian Empire, except in the territories forming part of the Imperial Lieutenancy in the Far East. The treatment thus meted out to the subjects of Russia’s enemy was a compound of the new liberality and the old severity. They were free to remain in all parts of the Empire save the provinces ruled over by Admiral Alexeieff. From these they were to be expelled at once. No time to wind up their affairs, no days of grace were given them. They were obliged to leave their homes and avoca- tions immediately, and make for their country as best they could, in the midst of the turmoil and bitterness caused by Japan’s sudden attack. What this meant in the way of robbery and cruelty we have already described. Though things righted themselves after a time, the prompt expulsion, and the hardships inflicted on the first refugees, do not re- dound to the credit of the Czar’s Government, or its troops and sub- ordinate officials. No such scenes were enacted in Japan. The enemy’s officials, when they left the country, were surrounded in every circum- stance with courtesy and honour; while, with regard to those Russians who remained, the policy of protection on condition of registration, which was enunciated by an Imperial Ordinance during the war with China, was again followed on the present occasion.” On the other hand, the Japanese in Asiatic Russia and Man- churia under the Russian command underwent unutterable dif- ficulties while withdrawing. It is not without regret that jus- tice forces the publication of the following unhappy, though actual facts, as instances of the disaster Japanese subjects met with, for the sake of humanity and the amelioration of Inter- national Law: A STORY OF RUSSIAN INHUMANITY. “The Jiji publishes the statement made by one of the refugees who have just arrived in this country by the German steamer Willehad. We translate it in substance as follows: 1 The Japan Times, 4th Dec., 1904. 34 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. “When diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia threatened to be broken off, a notification from Mr. Kawakami, our Commercial Agent at Vladivostock, was transmitted to all Japanese residents in Siberia and North Manchuria, inviting them to proceed to Vladivostock and to embark on.a steamer, which, owing to the situation, would be the last one to leave for Japan. Prepared as we were for such a contingency, this notification came to us as a surprise. Though many of our com- patriots at once availed themselves of this opportunity to return home, there were many who, owing either to their limited means or the distance separating the places of their residence from Vladivostock, were prevented from withdrawing. Only seven of our residents of Blagovestchensk succeeded in reaching Vladivostock in time to embark on the steamer, while a number of their fellow refugees, who left Bla- govestchensk uw few hours later, missed the opportunity, the vessel having left Vladivostock by the time they reached Nicholaevsk. As for our residents at Khabarovsk, some 100 succeeded in catching the above steamer, but the rest, 63 in number, were left behind. The fort- night or so which succeeded the outbreak of the war was passed in indescribable anxiety, when a notification was issued concerning the treatment of the Japanese in the Viceregal districts. As the result of this notification, 236 Japanese who remained at Blagovestchensk were detained in five unfurnished buildings which were guarded by sentinels, no communication being allowed between the refugees. Others of our countrymen who were in other places received similar treatment. On March 20 an order for our withdrawal was issued, and on the 22nd we started for an unknown destination. To cite an instance of Russian inhumanity, 63 of our compatriots from Khabarovsk were escorted to Nicholaevsk by ten troops with fixed bayonets, who treated them as if they were convicts, and during the 24 hours’ journey between the two towns the refugees were only provided with tea. They found at Nicholaevsk 25 of their fellow-refugees, with whom they were detained for three days, the strictest vigilance being kept over them. It is true that each of the refugees received a daily allowance of nine sen, but it was not more than the allowance for convicts. How this mere pittance was inadequate to support us may be understood by the fact that two pieces of bread cost us seven sen. Next we were ordered to proceed to Kharbin, the Russian authorities having taken the trouble to hire carts with which to transport our effects from our detention rooms to the railway station. We were deeply impressed with this kind conduct of the Russians, but we were soon to be disillusioned. On arrival at the station we were ordered to pay for the carts, and as our remon- strances proved of no avail with the relentless Russians, we were obliged to pay. “ After journeying three days we reached Kharbin. Being forbidden to leave the train, we lived in the carriages, which, by the way, were not ordinary passenger carriages, but those used for the transportation of convicts. At Kharbin there were 11 Japanese who had been brought from various quarters. Of these, 10 were women, some of whom had CHAP. II., SECT. I.] PROTECTION OF ENEMY’S SUBJECTS. 35 been detained for more than a month. A woman from the Korean frontier had been outraged by the Russian guards in the presence of her husband. Several other women had also been subjected to similar treatment. Five of these women were, on arrival at the prison at Kharbin, forced to deposit their money, which individually amounted from 200 to 500 yen, with the jailers. On departure the women received only 10 to 15 yen, and were told that the remainder would be returned on arrival at their destination. The promise, however, was not ful- filled. We were transported from Kharbin to Chita, and were impris- oned there for one day and night, during which time we were given a piece of brown bread and a quantity of soup. The following day we arrived at the eastern bank of Lake Baikal and started at 3 p.m. on a journey of 45 versts across the lake by horse sleighs, each of which seated five persons. During the night the cold was so intense that a four-months-old child was frozen to death. At midnight the western bank was reached, and we were at once conveyed into railway car- riages. All the men and women suffered terribly from the cold and hunger, and it was with the deepest gratitude that we received a gift of bread and tea from a Colonel of Gendarmerie there. We were then taken to Tomsk by a branch line of the Siberian Railway. This caused much anxiety among us. We at first believed that we were being taken to St. Petersburg by the trunk line of the Siberian Railway, and now we were at the terminus of a branch line, and imprisoned there. We asked our guards for information, but could not obtain any. Our party, which consisted of 140 persons, was then taken to a place called Kar- pashova, on the Obi, and 200 versts from Tomsk. There we were de- tained for a1 month and a half, and during this time were well treated by the local authorities. We were afterwards joined by 230 refugees from Blagovestchensk, and the whole party was then taken to Perm, near the Ural mountains. “ A party of 330 persons was then distributed among Perm, Solikamsk, and Kungur, where we were permitted to work. Some were employed in gathering the wheat crops, others as coolies for the transportation of timber, and some were engaged in carrying salt. Owing to the fact that the above places are agricultural districts, we experienced great hardship in procuring sufficient food and clothing. It was insufferable to be regarded by the Russians as prisoners, and if we had all remained together we should have been starved to death. Governed by our desire to return home, we had appointed a committee for this purpose, whose quarters were then at Perm. Through the medium of certain Russian Jews, whose favour we had managed to acquire, we were able to com- municate with the United States Ambassador at St. Peterburg and our Minister at Berlin, pleading for our immediate release. After the lapse of a month and a half—that is to say, at the beginning of September— a telegram was received from the United States Ambassador announcing that arrangements had been made for our return to Japan, and that a messenger would be despatched to Perm to escort us home. Needless to say, the telegram was received with mixed feelings of surprise and 36 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. joy, and banzais were shouted by all the party. Towards the end of September the messenger arrived at Perm, which place the party left on Sept. 25. During the journey homeward the party was joined by a body of women, who had been detained in a temple at Tomsk. On entering Germany the party was received by our residents there, as well as by Germans, who rendered every possible assistance. The impression made on our mind on the occasion will never be forgotten.” On the 29th of Feb., 1904, the following correspondence came from Tientsin: Concerning the Withdrawing Japanese Who Arrived at Newchwang After the Withdrawal of the Japanese Consul at Newchwang. On the 11th instant, on the withdrawal of the Japanese Consul from Newchwang, a special application was made to the American Consul for the protection of the Japanese subjects, acquainting him at the same time with the praiseworthy proposal made by Kaichi Okada and Kai- chiro Tanaka, two Japanese proprietors of hotels at Newchwang, to accommodate all the Japanese who might come thither. Later on, however, on the 19th instant, these two Japanese also were compelled to leave Newchwang for Tientsin. From them, as well as from the report from the American Consul, complete information as regards the actual conditions at Newchwang, after the withdrawal of the Japanese Consul, was cbtained. On Feb. 12, after the withdrawal of the Japanese Con- sul, the city was somewhat upset, since, about 8 o’clock in the morning, soldiers were seen hurrying about, and there was even a rumour abroad that the Japanese Squadron was preparing for an attack, which caused not a little sensation among Russian women, headed by the wife of the chief civil magistrate. During the night some Russian warships kept vigil by means of a searchlight. On the 12th more than 140 Japanese women, who came thither as refugees from Kharbin and other districts, were detained at the Yingkow station. Three of these, however, by name Hisa Yamada, Kawasumi, and Haru Takagi, successfully contrived to escape, and resorted to the Japanese Consulate, which they found already vacant. While roam- ing in that vicinity they were noticed by the American Consul, who delivered them to Okada. Except one who was left behind, Okada sent them, together with a Chinese employee, to meet midway the women coming from Niu-chia-tun. They were seized upon by the Russian authorities, and shared the same confinement as many other women, after having undergone various sorts of hard treatment, which was apparently provoked by their appeal to the American authorities. As soon as informed of this, Okada appealed to the American Consul, who in turn sought explanation from Mr. Grosse, the Russian chief civil magistrate, and received the telephone answer that they, the women CHAP. II., SECT. 1.] PROTECTION OF ENEMY’S SUBJECTS. 37 detained, were coming. Upon this Okada again despatched the before- mentioned Chinese employee to the station. He, however, found there only 13 women and three children, the others having been already sent back to Ta-shi-chao. These 16 Japanese thus were restored once more to Okada, to start on the following day for Shan-hai-kuan. According to a letter from the American Consul, Alexeieff, the Governor-General in the Far East, was said to have issued instructions that all Japanese found in Manchuria should be sent to Port Arthur, under the Russian protection, and this seems to have frustrated the efforts of the American Consul, who demanded of Mr. Grosse the serious consideration of the attitude Russian soldiers assumed towards our subjects withdrawing from the field, and arranged for the immediate delivery of the Japanese sent to Da-si-cho up to that time, in number about 100. On the 12th two women succeeded in their escape from Ta-shih-chiao, and, disguising themselves in the Chinese costume, went back without molestation to Okada at Newchwang, when the American Consul was paying a visit, and from these refugees facts were learned contrary to what the Russian chief civil magistrate had pretended, and of what persecutions their fellow-countrymen were suffering. On the 15th, being informed that two Japanese women were lurking in Yunraiyenkui, the American Consul asked Okada to accompany him thither to take them back. The two women, by name Chika Motomura and Sada Urazono, were found there as reported and were persuaded by the American Consul to speedily withdraw themselves; but failed at last to keep their promise. The same night, while Danburg, a Norwegian, whose tenant Okada was, while paying a visit to Okada, two Russian officers, followed by about 30 soldiers, each armed with drawn sword or bayonet, rushed in, breaking through the front door, plundered the property and furni- ture, bound Okada, Kaichiro Tanaka, and Tokujiro Shigematsu, giving to the last-mentioned a stab on the head, and also pulled out one Chitose Takeshita, who was lurking in the adjoining room. Okada was pre- vented by the Russian intruders from letting Danburg go to inform the American Consul of the matter. Then, addressing in English Mrs. Hunt, who was looking out from a neighbouring window, he asked her to send an immediate despatch to the American Consul. Thus he presently got the American Consul to come to him, along with another American. The interview between the Consul and the Russian officers lost much of its purport because they did not understand each other’s language. The Russians seem to have insisted on the absence of the Japanese Consul, and the American Consul repritianded ‘their unlawful conduct, explain- ing that he was invested with the same right as the Japanese Consul. Finally the police authorities were brought in, and set the bound men at liberty. Subsequently the American Consul spoke with the Russian chief civil magistrate regarding the lawless intrusion. The latter, after examining the officers concerned, expressed his deep regret over the affair, and suggesting as its motive a rumour that a number of Japanese residents were preparing for an attack. This apology, however, must 38 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. be of little weight when the fact is considered that at that time, accord- ing to the report of the American Consul, nearly 3000 Russian troops were stationed in and about Newchwang, while our subjects there were entirely unprovided with arms and explosives. The purpose, therefore, which the marauding Russians had before them must have been ex- pressly the plunder of property. Next day Okada wrote out an invoice or statement of damages suffered. In the afternoon of the same day ‘ the American Consul declared that the Japanese would no longer be safe in the city; so that, about 4 o’clock, all the Japanese, escorted by the American Consul and a Russian soldier, withdrew themselves as far as the Ho-pe Station. The facts thus far enumerated were obtained from a statement of Kaichi Okada and the report of the American Consul. The following further information concerning the Japanese sent to Che-foo via Port Arthur is from the Imperial Consul at Che-foo. By the way, Mr. Miller, the American Consul at Newchwang, has always remained a great friend of ours, and his efforts in protecting the right of our subjects were incalculable, particularly since the with- drawal of the Japanese Consulate. We cannot but regard his activities with unmitigated satisfaction. Although parallel cases in which the rights of life and prop- erty were trampled upon are by no means far to seek, we shall forbear the multiplying of instances; for nothing is more alien to the purpose of the present work than to record a mass of complaints. Sect. II. The Protection of Catholics and Catholic Mis- sionary Institutions in the Far East by the Japanese Gov- ernment. During the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese Government made great effort in protecting the subjects and citizens of neutral Powers in Manchuria, Korea, and other places which were under the Japanese military authorities. It is of interest to foreigners to have the facts of this protection described in detail, and here is given one case concerning the Catholics and Catholic Missionary Institutions in the Far East. On the 13th of Feb., 1904, the Politische Correspondenz, published in Germany, contained an article, in which it stated that “it was well known that the Pope had applied, through the Nuncio in Paris, to the Japanese Government, for the pro- CHAP. II., SECT. II.] PROTECTION OF CATHOLICS. 39 tection of Roman Catholic Missionaries. The Catholic Mission- aries in Japan, Korea, and Manchuria are nearly all of French nationality, and while there are about 90,000 Catholics in Japan, those living in Korea and Manchuria number 84,000.” It is true that the Nuncio in Paris made the above request to Mr. Motono, the Japanese Minister there, on the 8th of Feb., and that Mr. Motono transmitted the request to the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government replied without hesitation that proper protection would be extended to the lives and properties of the Catholics and Catholic Mis- sionary Institutions as far as lay within the power of the government." On the 12th of Feb., 1904, Minister Motono handed the following note to the Nuncio: AIDE MEMOIRE. Le Government Japonais, déférent au désir exprimé par S. Exe. Monseigneur le Nonce Apostolique au nom du Saint Siége au Ministre du Japon 4 Paris, ne manquere pas de prendre toutes les mesures necessaires pour protéger la vie et les biens des Catholiques ainsi que les institutions Catholiques en tant qu’il se trouverait dans les limites de l’autorité du Gouvernement Impérial du Japon. On the 17th the following answer was sent by the Nuncio: Paris, le 17 Fevrier, 1904. Nonciature du Saint Siége Apostolique en France. MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE: M’étant empressé de transmettre au Gouvernement du Saint Siége VAide-Mémoire que Votre Excellence «4 bien voulu m/’adresser le 11 courant, concernant le protection des Catholiques dans toute l’étendu de l’Autorité du Gouvernement Impérial du Japon, j’ai l’honneur, 4 présent, de vous faire savoir que Sa Sainteté le Pape, Pie X., mon Auguste. Souverain, en a €prouvé une véritable satisfaction. C’est pourquoi il me charge de vous prier Monsieur le Ministre, de faire parvenir ses plus vifs remerciements 4 Sa Majesté VEmpereur du Japon et a son gouvernement. Le Souverain Pontife aimerait, en méme temps, 4 faire exprimer a Sa Majesté Impériale toute sa gratitude pour la belle résponse 1 Ariga’s La guerre Russo-Japonaise au point de vue continental et le droit interna- tional, 1907, pp. 469-473. 40 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. qu’elle a bien voulu donner 4 la lettre de faire part de son avénement au Trone Pontifical. De mon coté, je tiens, Monsieur le Ministre et cher collégue, 4 vous offrir expression de ma reconnaissance trés sincére pour le bienveillant accueil, que vous avez fait et que vous avez obtenu de la part de votre gouvernement 4 ma priére du 8 courant; et je suis heureux de renouveler & Votre Excellence les assurances de tout ma haute et déferant consideration. (Signé) B. LorENnzE.1, Nonce Apostolique. A Son Excellence Monsieur Motono, Env. Extr. et Ministre Plenip. du Japon, Paris. The Japanese Government put forth its best efforts in car- tying out the wishes of the Nuncio. The following are the names of the Catholic missionaries who remained in Manchuria under the Japanese protection: List of the Catholic Missionaries in the Province of Mukden.? Urbain M. Remise, resident & Tchi-a-keon sous prefecture Sion Yen. Vincent Sage Yangkouan Kaiping ete. ete. ete. Chinese Missionaries. Barthelemy Hia Kaoukiatsai Liao-yang Laurent Hia Chen Yang Fung-cheng ete. ete. ete. These missionaries and the adherents of the Catholic Church, 9000 in number, were protected by the Japanese au- thorities. Something must be added about the missionaries who left Manchuria and other places, which were under the military occupations of both belligerents. The following is the corre- spondence received from Newchwang, China, under the date of Sept. 19, 1904: ' “There were in Manchuria many English, French, Danish, and other missionaries who took refuge in Newchwang and Tientsin at the outbreak of the war and who were wishing to return to their posts.” 1 There was a long list, but it is omitted here. CHAP. II., SECT. 11.] PROTECTION OF CATHOLICS. 41 Their desires being known to the Japanese Government, we made inquiries as to what Russia was doing in the matter. The Russian authorities in the field protected those mission- aries who remained at their original posts, but those mis- sionaries who had quitted their posts were not allowed to return. The Japanese Government, however, having the intention of doing all in their power for the missionaries, after some consultation between the Foreign and Military Departments, decided that the Christian missionaries should be allowed to return to the places where they were before the war, provided those places were under the Japanese military authorities, who would fully realise their responsibility, and who were perfectly able to protect them. On the 6th of Oct., 1904, the military authorities issued the following notice: The Christian missionaries who left the interior of Manchuria may return to their original places if said places are within the precincts of Liao-yang and Haitcheng; but permission is not given to live outside the fortifications on account of possible danger. These are the facts concerning the protection of the Catho- lies and Catholic Missionary Institutions, but it must not be understood that Japan favoured only the Catholics. In fact, Japan endeavoured to protect all nationalities within their power, even the Russians, whatever their religion. It seems rather strange to foreigners that there is so little animosity in Japan between religious sects, the people not being overzealous in these matters. The Japanese Government treats the different sects alike, provided they do nothing inconsistent with the safety of the State. So, during the war, the Russian Bishop Nicholai remained in Japan, and safely carried on his religious work. In conclusion, it is a rather regrettable fact that the Nuncio made of Japan the above request, because had he under- stood the condition of Japanese civilisation he would not have 42 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. found it necessary. The making of such a request by these eminent men clearly shows that there are still many people who are not well acquainted with the religious, social, and legal conditions of Japan. In 1871 the Edict against Christianity was removed, free preaching was allowed, and religious liberty firmly guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution, promulgated 1889.* Thus all people in Japan, either native or foreign, have full liberty of religious belief in times of both peace and war. On the whole, speaking from the social point of view and from that of International Law, Japan acted on the principles of true ethics and law. Japan as a nation is very law-abiding, and is also very sincere, and it is very desirous that the real condition should be fully known and appreciated by the people of the Great West—both in America and Europe. Sect. III. The American Protection of Japanese Interests in Russian Territories at the Outbreak of the War. Russia and Japan are now, after the great struggle, very friendly with each other, and France who, during the late war so sympathetically conveyed her feelings of friendship to Rus- sia, has now concluded an entent with Japan. All disagree- able things are now passed, and the great Powers of the world are all at present on good terms, forgetting what they felt dur- ing the war. At this time it is fitting to bring to light what the United States did for Japanese subjects in protecting them during the said war. This may be done without irritating any country of the world. On the contrary, it may prove how benevolent the United States is, and how righteous she is from the point of view of International Law, in protecting the Japa- nese non-combatants who were in Russian territories and in the districts occupied by the latter. On the 7th of Feb., 1904, Baron Komura, the Japanese minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a telegram to Mr. Takahira, the Japanese minister at Washington, instructing him to see the 1 Sidney L. Gubick’s Evolution of the Japanese, p. 327. CHAP. II., SECT. IIl.] AMERICAN PROTECTION OF JAPANESE. 43 Secretary of State as soon as possible and to ask him if the United States Government would permit their embassy at St. Petersburg and their consulates in various places in Russia to assume charge and protection of Japanese subjects and interests in Russia; he instructed him to add that the Japanese Govern- ment retains a lively appreciation of the friendly offices extended to them by the United States during the Chino-Japanese war, and that they venture to hope that nothing will prevent the United States from acting for them in a similar capacity in the present instance.* Mr. Takahira carried out the instructions, to which Mr. John Hay, the Secretary of State, replied that the United States Government was willing to do everything in its power to take charge of the Japanese interests in Russia as requested, and was sending instructions to the United States Ambassador to Russia to ascertain if that arrangement was agreeable to the Russian Government. Below is the answer of the United States Government.* Mr. John Hay to Mr. Takahira. Feb. 9, 1904. DEAR Mr. TAKAHIRA: I learn from our Ambassador at St. Petersburg that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has informed him that the Emperor of Russia sees no objection to our representatives looking after Japanese interests upon the withdrawal from Russia of all diplomatic and consular representa- Hyes of Japan, Very sincerely yours, (Signed) JoHN Hay. Now to establish by facts the friendly attitude the United States of America assumed for the Japanese interests in vari- ous parts of the Russian territory. I. The Withdrawal of the Japanese from the Viadivostock Districts. According to an imperative instruction of the Russian Gov- ernment, not a single Japanese was allowed to remain in Siberia and Manchuria, so that those Japanese found there at that time 1 Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 430. 44 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. were forced to promptly fly for their lives, without having time to dispose of their properties, not only immovable, but also movable. It must be remembered that in the course of this rather hazardous withdrawal, they owed much to the never- failing kindness of the American authorities. Most of the Japanese found in Siberia and Manchuria took their departure through Vladivostock, while some came back through Newchwang,’ some through the European continent, and some were detained in Port Arthur. The number and whereabouts of the Japanese found in 1904 within the command of the Commercial Agent in Vladi- vostock are as follows, according to the report dated January 17th, 1904, by Mr. Kawakami, the Commercial Agent: Paces, moved Ni ume Wiladivostockiisrdavsie cuales ven santer ure emanate ceases 3,000 Nicholae Usurieski .................-.00-0005 PCLOEE ERTS 600 Khabarovsk... seuwsenont ee Woes earns nok mea che asics a4 A 250 Nicholaevsk....... ee WORE RE ORS Ee SEE RET BE Ba eae 300 Blagovestchensk............. 0.00: cece eee cece eet e ees 230 Chitais ss seid 2 on signa. dew Ses a Gotg oS Scuaes PEG We Rae due ds 40 DPR CSIR sae ¢.hess ates g Seattapg ai gociord aheans- © Wi Sesende ae auaits a cduaaaeaee wboadel See aa 30 MSUPYVeLCISK oes icai shar diveaceanccaiecs saa a ee Hlth a Sauare ase atacand cies 30 CTO S's eyaiin acs iiav es oe ake eusperiahd. dala iyel a dead cantante Da AUN, NaS ode don 500 Along the Line of the East............ 00.00... cece eee ee] cee China Railway in North........... 00.00... cece eee eee ee] bene Man GHUPI AT 6 iss g 05 5 ase SAE edd Geel Soe oie lap RRR Seat 1,500 OAL 3 oka Gata 2c anes Kee eis wae has, BAAS 6,480 Two thousand three hundred and twelve of the above came back on board the Afridge, an English ship which had sailed at 1 p.m., February 6th, 1904, and landed at the Port of Tsuruga, Japan. Again on the twelfth of the same month, Mr. Kawa- kami, the commercial agent, sent back 1511 Japanese, which was the maximum number to which he could afford any relief on board the Batavia, a German ship, to land at the Port of Moji. Those on board the above English ship were mostly from Vladivostock and its vicinity, and those on board the German vessel, from Siberia and Manchuria. CHAP. II., SECT. 111.] AMERICAN PROTECTION OF JAPANESE. 45 Owing, however, to the shortness of notice given, many were still left, of whom the following were ascertained : Puaces. | Still Remaining. In Siberia. f th . 21 of them being pris- Vladivostock...........00000..00 200 50 { oners. Nicholae Usurieski.............0. 005. 4 i ee Novikievski......... a aaa ihe th 43 Bung-chung).o.s nieig se peace cance a i : Withdrawal forbidden Blagovestchensk.................... 285 heeaise the: absenée : of communicative Nicholaevsk e224 92. evaceeeyceseeeesrs 258 system. Stryeténsksscccuemsaee2 sen oieeesents 17 Nerchinskt ..3.222 4 sites. nex ee eee needs 17 CU aii 2.2 adectctecris hans ape ince GROG MSR ES 2 Tr ttle si: asassiesgos ce ausgs oa accyhanteer anh agit 85 TACHI GAs Siacisiyra hn dncat ed epesd ual tusines Anes 1 MEOMAS Ke yea laced, waved oR Ancona Sanaa oa bree 5 In Manchuria. Boglanichinaya.................0005- 10 IMIR TITIAE vciciccatas dee ave tee teed orang aaeeea led 6 1 Hantaheiza,, ....0.0000ccecees acer ee es 4 Hanan pos jacssce0e oan chases denon he 10 : Nearly 1s of ag : un- eing said to be on Kharbitives: «es 4 swaisiva adenine nen ccests eure their way towards Newchwang. Jaranlenincnnds 39 4 okay coat eae ee ve 15 Chilthtal : 4 saeus4 egaveeneaeies wae ees a 30 Buchata...cc.0.0 seeaveeunees eeenet s 20 Ala an. 2... ones cea enetas reSeueenes 52 CAIMAVOE tarcc saath eee eeeue 3 Other Districts..................0.- 100 PO GAL s ses iasavdtaod.totendidueracd dada. desta 986 The solicitude of the Japanese Government, felt for those still remaining in the enemy’s land, who must surely have been gteater in number than the known list showed,.was, however, largely relieved by the careful protection the American authori- ties afforded them. The document below throws light on this point: Mr. John Hay to Mr. Takahira. Washington, March 8th, 1904. Sir: The United States Ambassador at St. Petersburg has sent to the Department copies of telegrams received by him from Mr. Greener, 46 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. the United States Commercial Agent in Vladivostock, dated February 24th. In a telegram of February 15th Mr. Greener says that no private or cipher telegrams are being transmitted; that the Japanese commer- cial agent left Vladivostock on the 13th ultimo; that the British repre- sentative was leaving on the 15th; and the Japanese agent asked the American agent to occupy the Japanese agency. ; In another telegram of the 15th Mr. Greener says that 2500 Japanese left Vladivostock on the 6th and that 1500 would leave with the. Japa- nese agent. Under date of the 19th Mr. Greener says that 117 Japanese arrived at Vladivostock on that day, and that he had undertaken to send them away on the following day. Their destination is not stated. Under date of the 24th Mr. Greener says that the Folmina left on the 23rd with 194 Japanese collected since the 18th from Manchuria; that 20 women wished to stay, but that the commandant, at Mr. Greener’s request, sent all away, as agreeable to our request. (Signed) J. Hay. On March 9th, 1904, Mr. Takahira, the Japanese Minister at Washington, sent a response, expressing on behalf of his government, cordial thanks for the steps taken by the United States. In fact, throughout the war the American representatives spared no effort in protecting the interests of Japanese sub- jects. Il. The Withdrawal of the Japanese from Port. Arthur. Just as the diplomatic negotiations between Russia and Japan were found to be utterly hopeless, Mr. Kokichi Midzuno, the Japanese Consul at Chefoo, whose ability was well known, chartered an English ship of 2000 tons, and set out on ‘the ?th of February to’ make a circuit through Port Arthur and Dalny in forty-eight hours. In this way 730 persons were put outside the dangers of the war. This step of Mr. Kokichi Midzuno must have been really wonderful, when it is considered that it was just before the Japanese squadron of torpedo boats made its daring attack there. The Rasbar, the English ship which had arranged to take Japanese refugees to Japan, arrived at Chefoo with no passen- CHAP, II., SECT. 111.] AMERICAN PROTECTION OF JAPANESE. 47 gers on board. The captain told that on the 8th of February, when the ship was waiting for Japanese passengers, Russian authorities took all of them away who were on board the ship, and that no others were allowed to embark. She was detained there without reason until February 11th at 2 p.m. The Japanese Government upon this, under date of Feb- ruary 13th, asked the United States Government to request the Russian Government, through her ambassador at St. Peters- ‘burg, to allow Japanese subjects to leave for Japan by the earliest steamer of a neutral country. The British steamer Wen-chow arrived on February 15th from Port Arthur with 342 Japanese subjects of every descrip- tion, among whom were 100 from Kharbin and vicinity. It is related that more than 100 women were separated from men at Tashichao, and were said to have been sent to Newchwang. The following facts we should not omit, as the instances of the protection of Japanese subjects by the United States: On February 13th, Consul Segawa received telegraphic in- formation from Captain Kawasaki at Chin-chow ‘that he had heard from a group of Japanese fugitives, women and children only, who were withdrawing from Newchwang for Shan- hai-kan, and who had with difficulty escaped from the Russians at Tashichao; that about 250 Japanese on their way from Chita, Kharbin, Kundalin, and Perm to Newchwang were stopped for some time at Mukden, and again at Tashichao, where they received most cruel treatment, and were conveyed to Port Arthur. Consul Segawa sent a telegram to the United States Consul at Newchwang in confirmation. On February 14th United States Consul at Newchwang had asked the Russian authorities there to hand the Japanese over to him, but the Russian authorities answered that the pro- tection of Japanese remaining in Manchuria rested with Rus- sia, and all Japanese in Manchuria had been ordered to go to Port Arthur. On the 14th of Feb., 1904, another report was sent in, say- ing that: 48 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. About 300 refugees from the environs of Kharbin, nearly half of whom were women, arrived at Mukden February 10th, where they were ordered to alight and received strict inspection and cruel treatment. On Feb- ruary 1lth they were conveyed to Tashichao, where they met the same fate as at Mukden. On the same day the men only were sent to Port Arthur, and the women were allowed to proceed to Newchwang. They were once conveyed to Niu-chia-tun, and, excepting 13 who were missed by chance, again sent to Tashichao, whence they were sent to Port Ar- thur. The 13 women left at Niu-chia-tun were brought to Newchwang under protection of the United States Consul, February 12th, and they were sent to Shan-hai-kan, borrowing travelling expenses from the said Consul. In course of the above hardship, some of the 300 refugees were beaten and wounded, and were robbed of almost all of their money and personal effects by the Russian soldiers. Some of them escaped the same fate by bribing, and they were in a most destitute condition. Without delay, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs sent instructions to the Minister at Washington to communicate to the Secretary of State the text of the above reports, and to say to him that as the Imperial Government: entertained grave apprehension as to the welfare of Japanese subjects remaining in Manchuria, they deem it necessary to request at once that the United States Government will issue necessary instructions to the United States Ambassador to Russia with a view to se- curing for those Japanese subjects such protection and treat- ment as are ordinarily accorded to the subjects of a belligerent state, who continue to be orderly and peaceful. On Feb. 16 the Secretary of State agreed to instruct the United States Ambassador to Russia at once. Soon afterwards we received the following report from Chefoo: About 170 Japanese, mostly women, just arrived safely from Dalny on board « German steamer. Although some of them were maltreated on the way to Port Arthur yet the Russian authorities in that city and in Dalny seem to have duly protected them. Besides these, two criminals and 100 other ’ Japanese arrived at Chefoo from Port Arthur, and 322 arrived at Naga- saki from Dalny. Thus nearly all of the Japanese subjects in Manchuria re- turned to Japan under the protection of the United States. CHAP. II., SECT. II.] AMERICAN PROTECTION OF JAPANESE. 49 Ill. The Withdrawal of the Japanese from Odessa. Soon after the commencement of hostilities, the Japanese Consul at Odessa received instructions from the Home Govern- ment to close the consulate, and to immediately leave the post, his staff accompanying him. According to this order, Mr. lijima left the post, leaving a servant named Togasi as the keeper of the unoccupied con- sulate. On the 21st of August, 1904, the following information was received from Washington: The United States Ambassador to Russia reports that the servant left in charge of our consulate at Odessa has been arrested and is to be expelled from the Russian Empire. Our Minister at Washington asked the United States Government to kindly instruct their consul in Odessa to take charge at once, and further to engage, if mecessary, a special watchman at the expense of the Japanese Government. Soon afterwards we received the following report from Vienna: Togasi, the guard of our consulate at Odessa, was arrested on the 13th of August by the Russian police and detained until the 18th. After undergoing an examination, he was forcibly escorted by two gendarmes, on the latter day, as far as the Austrian frontier, whence he proceeded to Vienna. The United States Consul in Odessa rendered him every -assistance and has taken charge of the consulate quarters. On this occasion the American Government favoured us with her best offices, as the document below indicates : American Consulate, Odessa, Russia, August 27th, 1904. HoNoURABLE ALVEY A. ADEE, Acting Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Sir: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the following telegram: Washington, D. C., August 22nd. American Consul, Odessa: Take custody of Japanese Consulate. Engage watchman if necessary. ADEE. 50 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. This message was received on the 23rd instant, and I engaged a watchman the same day at thirty rubles per month. I have also taken custody of the consulate. I may add that the Ambassador had previously instructed me to take charge of the Japa- nese Consulate, and I have done so to the extent of causing the place to be sealed up by the Russian authorities, pending more definite in- structions. The arrival of your telegram authorising me to engage a watchman enabled me to assume charge of the place. I notified the Governor of Odessa on August 13th that the person in charge of the Japanese Consulate had, on that date, been arrested by the gendarmes, and consequently the consulate was without protec- tion. I asked that special police protection be given the place. My request was promptly granted, the doors of the Consulate were sealed and the police placed on guard. These have now been withdrawn. The servant or person who was Jeft in charge by the late Japanese Consul, and who was expelled from Russia, was Kiichi Togasi. I have sent the Ambassador a full report of the case. I an, Sir, Your obedient Servant, (Signed) THos, E. HEENEN, Consul. P.S.—I have received a letter from the Japanese Minister at Vienna, in which he thanks me for the services rendered Togasi, and requests me to take charge of the consulate. Iv. The Protection of the Japanese Subjects Returning Through Europe. The Japanese found in European Russia and the interior of Siberia, having no access to the Pacific Ocean, came back through Germany, setting out from Bremen. Their obliga- tions while withdrawing to the zealous efforts of the American Ambassador in Russia and the sympathy of German officers and people ought not to be ignored.? No particular mention is needed about the six Japanese who came back via Berlin on February 29th and March 22nd, 1904. On March 26th 12 Japanese were enabled to withdraw from Russia safely, owing to the efforts of American Ambassador in Russia. The following indicates the America-Japanese understand- 1 Foreign Relations, 1904, pp, 431-432, CHAP. II., SECT. m.] AMERICAN PROTECTION OF JAPANESE. 51 ing agreed upon prior to the withdrawal, concerning the protec- tion of Japanese returning via Europe: Mr. Takahira to Mr. Hay. Washington, March 19th, 1904. Sir: With reference to my conversation with you on Thursday last, the l/th instant, I beg here to hand to you a copy of the telegram which was received by Baron Komura, his Imperial Majesty’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, from Mr. Inouye, the Japanese Minister at Berlin, in regard to a number of Japanese residents in Siberia now suffering from the untoward treatment of the Russian police authorities, and consequently requesting for protection and assistance to enable them to return to Japan, I am now instructed to request that the United States Government will have the goodness to instruct His Excellency Ambassador McCor- mick to take necessary steps to the end that those Japanese subjects now in Russia, who are destitute and desire to return to Japan, may be sent to Berlin, as the Japanese Legation in that city will be pre- pared to take charge of them. As to the expenses required for the jour- ney of those Japanese subjects from Tsuta to Berlin, I am in the hope that the United States Ambassador at St. Petersburg may find means to obtain the necessary information, as I shall be ready to furnish the amount necessary upon receipt of such information. ; Accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances of my highest con- sideration. (Signed) K. Taxkaunira. The answer is as follows: Mr. Hay to Mr. Takahira. Washington, March 19th, 1904. Sir: I have the honour.to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 19th instant, requesting that the United States Ambassador to Russia be instructed to take the necessary steps to the end that certain Japanese subjects now in Russia, who are destitute and desire to return to Japan, may be sent to Berlin, to be cared for by the Japanese Legation in that city. : In reply I have the honour to inform you that the Department has just received a telegram from Ambassador McCormick saying that twelve Japanese, six men and six women, in a destitute condition, arrived at St. Petersburg to-day from Irkutsk, not being allowed to proceed east, and who wish to proceed to Germany. Mr. McCormick adds that he is arranging to send them to Berlin, where they are to find employment through the Japanese Legation or to be sent home. 1 Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 431. 52 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. The Department has approved Mr. McCormick’s action. Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. (Signed) Francis B. Loomis, Acting Secretary. In order to show how far the American Ambassador took pains in the protection of the twelve Japanese, together with one female then staying at St. Petersburg, the complete file of documents concerned is here published, notwithstanding its voluminous character and duplication, believing that same in- tricacy of correspondence to be a powerful witness to the ex- traordinary difficulties the American Ambassador underwent. Mr. McCormick to Mr. Inouye. American Embassy, St. Petersburg, March 26th, 1904. My pear Sir: As has already been communicated to you through the United States Ambassador in Berlin, and in accordance with instructions which I re- ceived from Washington, I took charge of the twelve Japanese refugees who arrived here from Siberia on March 19th and made arrangements for them to continue their journey to Berlin. Not being able to secure promptly the presence of a resident Japa- nese who speaks Russian, I found some difficulty in communicating through the only member of the party speaking Russian. No complaint was made by the party speaking Russian of the treatment received by the refugees, although it seemed a hardship that they were compelled to leave the country in which they were established. I learned that one of the party had advanced 2640 rubles to an Italian in the town where he lived, for which he held a receipt, and further details of which he can, of course, give you himself. I will do anything in my power to assist in collecting or securing this sum. The best method, in my judgment, would be to put the claim in the hands of a lawyer in St. Petersburg. I am, sir, Your obedient servant, (Signed) RosBertT McCormick, American Ambassador. To His Excellency Mr. Inouye, The Minister of Japan at Berlin. On the 30th of March Mr. Inouye answered Mr. McCor- mick, saying that the safe arrival of the Japanese refugees to Berlin is entirely due to his kind efforts and care. CHAP. II., SECT. III.] AMERICAN PROTECTION OF JAPANESE. 53 At that time, one of the party, a woman named Noshi Nishimoto, brought forward the complaint that her husband, a certain Natsuzo Nishimoto, had been forcibly detained on the way by the Russian Police Authorities at the Omsk station, on some false ground of suspicion. So Mr. Inouye asked Mr. McCormick to make inquiries into the matter. The answer is as follows: Mr. McCormick to Mr. Inouye. American Embassy, St. Petersburg, April 15th, 1904. Your EXcELLENCY: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency’s communication of March 30th, and to say in reply that I lost no time in making inquiries through proper channels as to Natsuzo Nishimoto, the husband of the unfortunate woman who was among the refugees to whom it was my privilege to render assistance as they passed through St. Petersburg. I also took occasion to speak personally to His Excel- leney Count Lamsdorff with reference to the case of Nishimoto, and he promised to telegraph that full information be furnished as to Nishi- moto’s offence, and that, unless this offence was of a character to make release impossible, steps be taken to bring about the discharge through whatever channel found necessary to enable Nishimoto to reach St. Petersburg, where I will take him in charge and provide him with what- ever is necessary for his comfort and transportation to Berlin. ... I am, with high regard, Your obedient servant, (Signed) RosBert 8. McCoRMIck. His Excellency Mr. Inouye, Japanese Minister at Berlin, ete. Mr. McCormick to Mr. Inouye. American Embassy, St. Petersburg, April 18th, 1904. Your EXcELLENCY: I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that there is in St. Petersburg at present a Japanese subject, « woman who was employed in the family of M. Stein, Secretary of the Russian Legation to Korea, who accompanied the family to this city before the beginning of the war. She is still in the employ of M. Stein, but wishes to leave Russia, where she is constantly apprehensive of possible trouble, and desires to go by direct boat to London upon the opening of navigation at St. Petersburg, which will occur in some ten days or two weeks, She is 54 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. afraid to go by rail to Berlin as she speaks only a little Russian and no German, while she speaks English fairly well, and would consequently be more comfortable on an English steamer. As I do not consider it within my instruction from Washington, and as I have no authorisation from Your Excellency to forward any Japanese refugees except to Berlin, I shall await your assurance that the woman in question may safely proceed to London and be met on her arrival there by a representative of the Japanese Legation before sending her on her way. She is kindly treated by the family with whom she lives and is in no sort of danger, but is naturally very anxious to return to Japan and to be among her own people once more. I am, with high regard, Your obedient servant, His Excellency Mr. Inouye, (Signed). Rosert 8. McCormick. Imperial Japanese Minister to the German Empire, ete. Mr. Inouye sent a note, with date of April 21st, 1904, ex- pressing his cordial thanks. As to the woman in question, who desired to be sent direct to London, he answered that there was no objection. As for the number of Japanese subjects, besides the men- tioned 12 persons, of whom no information whatever could be obtainable, the Japanese Minister Inouye made investigation with the following result: In April, when the American Ambassador in Russia in- quired of Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning the welfare of Japanese subjects residing in Siberia, the answer was that some of the Japanese still lived voluntarily in Siberia, by virtue of the Imperial Ordinance, Art. I., issued November 14th, concerning the war, and that their not attempting to withdraw was, the Russian Minister believed, a clear indication that they were not destitute, as apparently seemed. On the other side, however, the instructions of the Lieuten- ant of the Far East compelled all Japanese found in districts under his administration to withdraw. These circumstances put together, the words of the Russian Minister of Foreign affairs cannot be readily accepted, for the lack of unified administration between the Central Foreign De- CHAP. II., SECT. III.] AMERICAN PROTECTION OF JAPANESE. 55 partment and the Lieutenant in the Far East is a common occurrence in the Russian Empire. On June 26th a report was made by the American Ambas- sador concerning a number of Japanese subjects assembled at Perm, who, according to the Russian edict, dated January 29th, 1904 (Russian calendar), had been put under American pro- tection, and enters there from out various localities as Bra- govestchensk, Chita, Irkutsk, Mukden, and others. These Japanese, under special protection of the American Ambassador, were sent back to their home from Bremen via Berlin.t The following was the correspondence, dated Octo- ber 4th, from Berlin, regarding this transaction : Eight hundred and twenty-six Japanese refugees, all of them more or less destitute, have just passed through Berlin en route to Bremen by special trains from the Russian frontier. We expect the further arrival of about 115 refugees in a few days. The Japanese might have made arrangements with the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company to send them home by special steamer, The Willehad, leaving Bremen. Our thanks are especially due to the United States Ambassador to Russia for all his friendly efforts and care, without which none of the refugees would have been able to reach Germany in safety. The Willehad, which departed from Bremen on October 24th, arrived at Nagasaki on December 9th. Soon after the departure of that group, the following report was sent in: More than 30 Japanese are still left in Siberia in a destitute condition. The following was the report made by the American Ambas- sador concerning the matter: Mr. McCormick to Mr. Inouye. American Embassy, St. Petersburg, 11 February, 1905. Your EXCELLENCY: With reference to the Japanese remaining in Siberia at Veliky Usting, I had an opportunity yesterday to consult with Prince Hil- koff, the Minister of Ways and Communication, in the hope that some 1See ‘‘ The Russian Inhumanity, pp. 35-38.” 56 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. plan might be devised to have them repatriated immediately via Berlin, as in the case of those who went forward some three months ago. I found, however, that while this was not absolutely impossible, it was not practicable at this season of the year, in view of the fact that those of your countrymen who, unfortunately, still remain in Siberia would have to go by a very circuitous route, involving a thousand or more miles of unnecessary travel, and over a line more or less over- burdened by the demand made upon it at this time. By travelling about 175 miles by sleigh they could reach the railroad at a point not far east of Perm, but to cover this distance at this season of the year would involve great hardship and suffering during the sleigh journey, and possibly serious consequences thereafter. For this reason it seems best to me that they remain where they are until the opening of the spring, in the mean time being provided with what is necessary for their sustenance and comfort. Prince Hilkoff manifested every willingness to meet the situation and would have provided transportation had I only asked for it. I now learn that the delay in sending in an account for the transpor- tation, concerning which I have already written you, is due to an error made by the agent at the point where the Japanese took train, involv- ing an overcharge of something like 900 rubles. The accounts, there- fore, had to be sent back, and Prince Hilkoff has undertaken to have them presented to me with as little delay as possible so that we may render account to you for the sum expended and remit any balance remaining in my hand. I avail myself of this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration. (Signed) Rospert S. McCormick. His Excellency Mr. Inouye, Imperial Japanese Minister at Berlin, ete. Mr. McCormick to Mr. Inouye. American Embassy, St. Petersburg, 13 February, 1905. Your EXcELLENCY: I am this day in receipt of a telegram from one of the Japanese at Veliky Usting, Isaworg by name, stating that, owing to the high price of provisions, it will cost about 40 copecks per day per man to support himself until such time as they can be repatriated. Of course I have no means of verifying his figures, but in view of the sum allowed for taking care of those whom we patriated in October these figures seem excessive. Granting, however, that the above figures are correct, and that it will be two months before river navigation opens, it will cost about 720 rubles to provide food alone, and some- thing additional may be necessary for those who are in need of warm clothing, although I have not received any information to this effect. CHAP. II., SECT. 1.] AMERICAN PROTECTION OF JAPANESE. 57 I assume that it is your pleasure that I remit the sum above indi- cated, and have already sent some 300 rubles to provide for necessities up to to-day. I have the honour to be Your Excellency’s obedient servant, (Signed) Robert S. McCormick. His Excellency Mr. Inouye, Imperial Japanese Minister at Berlin, ete. On the 31st of May, 1905, Mr. Inouye forwarded the in- formation that through the kind endeavours of the United States Ambassador, and with the friendly assistance of German authorities, twenty-nine refugees from Siberia (twenty-four men and five women) had safely arrived in Berlin May 29th, that they would leave Bremen by the German steamer Prinz Heinrich June 7th, and that the first port of call would be Nagasaki. The winter. season having passed, and the refugees not yet having been sent back, Minister Inouye asked Mr. Meyer, the new American Ambassador, to urge the Russian Government to discharge her duty. On May 21 those refugees leaving Russia came back from Bremen via Germany. The following document is attached, as in other instances to bring to light the efforts of the American Ambassador: Mr. Meyer, the new American Ambassador, to Mr. Inouye. St. Petersburg, May 15, 1905. Your EXcELLencyr: I have the honour to inform you, in reply to your notes of the 27th of April and 10th of May, that I have made all the arrangements neces- sary for the repatriation of the 28 Japanese subjects who have been detained at Velikiousting. As they will be ten days on the road, they may be expected to arrive at the German frontier about the 30th of May. I will let you know the exact date of their arrival at Wirballen as soon as I am informed of their departure from Yoroslaw. The journey between this latter place and the frontier is from 5 to 6 days and will give you time to arrange for some one from your legation to meet them at Wirballen. I avail myself of this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration. (Signed) GEORGE VON LENGERKE MEYER. His Excellency Mr. Inouye, Imperial Minister of Japan, Berlin. 58 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. Mr. Meyer to Mr. Inouye. Embassy of United States, Your EXceLLEency: St. Petersburg, May 21st, 1905. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of May 20th, in answer to which I telegraphed you on the 22nd instant as follows: Your compatriots, 28 in number, left Onsting yesterday, Sunday, the 21st, en route for Wirballen. Will wire later approximate arrival at frontier. Yesterday I telegraphed you: “ Twenty-nine refugees will probably reach frontier by end of month.” In explanation of the additional member of the party of refugees, I have to inform Your Excellency that Mr. Wassilieff, late Russian Vice- Consul at Kobe, Japan, brought with him to St. Petersburg a Japa- nese maid, Katsu Fukuyama, 40 years old, resident of Hiogo, who now desires to return to Japan and in whose behalf Mr. Wassilieff has requested me to permit her to join the Japanese now en route. All arrangements have been made for her to leave Russia without molestation. I am unable to inform Your Excellency at this moment when this woman will join the party, but it will be, if not at the frontier, at some station before, so that when your countrymen are turned over to your representative this woman will be of the number. I avail myself of this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration. (Signed) GEORGE VON LENGERKE MEYER. His Excellency Mr. K. Inouye, Japanese Minister, Berlin. On the 3rd of May the United States Ambassador to Rus- sia gave information to the effect that he had received intima- tion from the Russian Foreign Office that there were in the province of Amur 63 Japanese who would be sent to Stryetensk ; and that besides these, there were some prisoners of war in the Trans-Baikal province, consisting of a major, his wife, five soldiers, and an interpreter. The United States Ambassador took steps to see that they were provided with facilities to reach Berlin. Above are given only a very few of the many instances that might be cited to set forth the great and unceasing efforts ex- erted by the United States for the protection of Japanese in- terests during the war. To attempt to enumerate them all, so CHAP. II., SECT. III.] AMERICAN PROTECTION OF JAPANESE. 59 as to show Japan’s indebtedness to the United States, would require volumes; the single instance above given serves well as an. illustration. No judicious reader could possibly glance over these pages without being made aware of the book’s intention, deeper than it may apparently seem, to bring to light the friendly atti- tude which the United States Government never failed to pre- serve during the withdrawal of the Japanese subjects who were found in Russian territories and in the land occupied by Rus- sia. It has been an earnest endeavour to make both the Amer- ican and Japanese public well acquainted with facts hitherto comparatively little known. Peace among civilised nations must be the pedestal upon which international intercourse is to be placed; and if any two friendly nations breed estrange- ment, however slight, because of a sensational and groundless misunderstanding, fermented among the uneducated classes, then the more refined and the highly educated should be largely held responsible for the consequences. What perhaps seems a too minute exposure of details illustrative of the Americo- Japanese friendship, surely will not be regarded as casual, when viewed in such a light. CHAPTER III. DAYS OF GRACE FOR THE ENEMY’S VESSELS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. The most important commercially of the cases in which days of grace were granted occurred when, at the commencement of hostilities, belligerents gave permission to private vessels of the enemy to depart from their ports within a certain time unmolested. Sometimes a right to enter as well as leave is granted. Sometimes the set period is long, sometimes short. Everything depends upon the liberality of the com- batant powers. Strictly speaking, the outbreak of war gives a State a right to capture all vessels of the enemy it finds, as long as the seizure does not take place in neutral waters. Indeed, until about a century ago the custom obtained of levy- ing, in anticipation of hostilities, what was called an embargo on vessels of a prospective enemy. That is to say, an enemy’s merchantmen lying in the ports of a State that contemplated a war were detained in order that there might be a rich harvest of prizes as soon as the expected war broke out. But since then the interests of commerce have prevailed over the desire for spoil. Imperial maritime powers, on becoming belligerents, have issued proclamations, giving merchant vessels of the enemy found in their ports at the commencement of hostilities a cer- tain fixed time during which they are free to depart unmo- lested.* It was until lately the practice of Great Britain to seize as prizes all vessels and cargoes belonging to an enemy found within her borders or bound for her territorial waters or har- bours on the outbreak of war; but even this appears to have 1 Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 49. 60 CHAP. III.] DAYS ‘OF GRACE. 61 been given up. On the outbreak of the Crimean war both Great Britain and France allowed Russian merchant vessels then in British or French ports six weeks to complete their cargoes and depart unmolested. The same exemption was ex- tended to all Russian merchant vessels which, prior to the date of the Order in Council, had sailed from any foreign port for any British port, such vessels being allowed to enter and dis- charge their cargoes and return unmolested to any port of their own country not under blockade. The same policy was pur- sued by France at the outbreak of the Franco-German War in 1870, the privilege of free departure with safe conduct being granted to the enemy’s ships then in French ports, the privilege of entry and departure being also granted to the enemy’s ves- sels that had begun to load goods on French account at any time before war was declared. Germany went still farther and issued a declaration altogether exempting private vessels and cargoes belonging to the enemy from capture. This declaration was, however, subsequently rescinded, and was probably only intended to force the French Government into a similar course. Subject to this exceptional practice, however, the right of seizure would still be exercisable in respect of the enemy’s ves- sels or property found within or bound for the territory of the other belligerent after the outbreak of war. In the case of the Jahanna Emilie (Spinks, 14), 1854, Dr. Lushington laid down that it was legitimate for any person to take possession of and to assist the Crown to proceed against the enemy’s property found in any part of the United Kingdom, unless it were pro- tected by license or declaration from the Crown." The most liberal indulgences ever granted in this respect to an enemy’s trade are to be found in the Proclamation of Presi- dent McKinley.” The details are as follows: 1. The neutral flag covers the enemy’s goods, with the exception of contraband of war. 1 Pitt-Cobett, Leading Cases, pp. 157-158. 2 International Law Situation with Solution and Notes, 1901, pp. 150-159. 62 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. 2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to confisca- tion under the enemy’s flag. 3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective. 4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places within the United States, shall be allowed until May 21, 1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes and departing from such ports or places; and such Spanish merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes were taken on board before the expira- tion of the above term: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish vessels having on board any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal (except such as may be necessary for their voyage), or any other article prohibited or contra- band of war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish Government. 5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21, 1898, shall have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or place in the United States, shall be permitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without moles- tation; and any such vessel, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard for the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers are not to be inter- fered with, except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of wa violation of law in respect of contraband or blockade, issued on April 26, 1898, at the commencement of the late war between the United States and Spain. Spanish merchant vessels in American ports were allowed till May 21 for loading cargoes and departing, and were not to be captured on their return voyage unless their cargoes included contraband of war, or Spanish military or naval officers, or despatches to or from the Spanish Government. Further, the enemy’s merchantmen which had sailed before April 21, the day on which the war broke out, from any foreign port to any port of the United States, were allowed to enter such port, discharge cargo and depart without molestation, and if met at sea on the return voyage to any port not under blockade were to be exempt from capture by American cruisers. Moreover, these liberal rules received extension from the judiciary. In the case of the Buena Ventura, it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that Spanish vessels came within the “intention” of the President’s Procla- mation if they had sailed from any American port on or before May 21, even though the departure took place before the war began. Acting on his interpretation, the Court released an enemy vessel which had sailed from Ship Island, Mississippi, on April 19, two days before the com- mencement of hostilities, and was captured at sea on April 22, a day after the outbreak of the war. In the second Hague Conference the following convention was passed : CHAP. III.] DAYS OF GRACE. 63 Convention Relative to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities. ARTICLE I. When a merchant ship belonging to one of the belligerent Powers is at the commencement of hostilities in an enemy port, it is desirable that it should be allowed to depart freely, either immediately, or after a reasonable number of days of grace, and to proceed, after being furnished with w pass, direct to its port of destination or any other port indicated. The same rule should apply in the case of a ship which has left its last port of departure before the commencement of the war and entered a port belonging to the enemy while still ignorant that hostilities had broken out. ARTICLE II. A merchant ship unable, owing to circumstances of vis major, to leave the enemy port within the period contemplated in the above article, or which was not allowed to leave, cannot be confiscated. The belligerent may detain it, without payment of compensation, subject to the obligation of restoring it after the war, or requisition it on payment of compensation. ARTICLE III. Enemy merchant ships which left their last port of departure before the commencement of the war, and are encountered on the high seas while still ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities, cannot be confiscated. They are only liable to detention on the understanding that they shall be restored after the war without compensation, or to be requisitioned, or even destroyed, on payment of compensation, but in such case pro- vision must be made for the safety of the persons on board as well as the security of the ship’s papers. After touching at a port in their own country or at a neutral port, these ships are subject to the laws and customs of maritime war. ARTICLE IV. Enemy cargo on board the vessels referred to in Arts. I. and II. is likewise liable to be detained and restored after the termination of the war without payment of compensation, or to be requisitioned on pay- ment of compensation, with or without the ship. The same rule applies in the case of cargo on board the vessels referred to in Art. III. ARTICLE V. The present convention does not affect merchant ships whose build shows that they are intended for conversion into warships. 64 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. The brief observation on this Convention by Dr. J. B. Scott is worthy of quotation here: * “The sixth is the convention concerning enemy merchant ships found in enemy ports or upon the high seas at the outbreak of hostilities. Custom forbids the capture of enemy vessels within the port of the enemy on the outbreak of hostilities and allows them a limited time to discharge or load their cargo and depart for their port of destination. The attempt was made to establish this custom or privilege as a right. The proposition, however, met with serious opposition, and, instead of the right, the convention states that it is desirable that enemy ships be permitted freely to leave the port. The convention, therefore, was restrictive rather than declaratory of existing international practice. The same might be said of another provision of the convention concern- ing the treatment of enemy merchant ships upon the high seas. It may be said that the expression of a desire is tantamount to a positive declaration, but, strictly construed, the convention is not progressive. It lessens rights acquired by custom and usage, although it does, indeed, render the privilege granted universal. The American delegation, there- fore, refrained from signing the convention.” The author quite agrees with his opinion. At the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan published the following Imperial Ordinance under date of the 9th of February, 1904: We hereby sanction the rules concerning the exemption from cap- ture of Imperial Russian merchant vessels and order the same to be promulgated. No. 20, Imperial Ordinances. Art. I. Those Imperial Russian merchant vessels that shall hap- pen to be in the ports of Japan at the time when this Ordinance comes into operation shall be allowed till February 16, 1904, to discharge or load their cargoes and to depart from such ports. ArT. II. Any such Russian merchant vessel that shall take her departure from Japan in accordance with the foregoing rule shall be exempted from capture, if it shall be plain by the ship’s papers certified by the authorities of Japan, that she departed from a port of Japan on discharging or loading her cargo before the expiration of the period prescribed in the above article and that she is on her way from such a port to the nearest port of her own country or leased territory or of her destination, excepting the case when she shall have touched at a port of her own country or leased territory on her way. 1 The American Journal of International Law, January, 1908, pp.18-19. CHAP, III.] DAYS OF GRACE. 65 ArT. III. Those Imperial Russian merchant vessels that shall have sailed prior to February 9, 1904, from any foreign port for any port of Japan, shall be allowed to enter such a port of Japan, and forthwith to discharge her cargo and to depart therefrom. (Agr. II. is to be applied to those Imperial Russian merchant ves- sels that shall have departed from Japan in accordance with the above Clause of this Article. y Art. IV. The clauses of this Ordinance are not to be applied to those Imperial Russian merchant vessels having on board export pro- hibited goods, or contraband men, or contraband goods, or contraband despatches. This Ordinance shall come into operation on the day of its prom- ulgation. A few observations on this Ordinance will be made, start- ing with some remarks on the opinion of Dr. Lawrence. He says: We look in vain for such liberality in the present conflict. The Japanese Imperial Decree of February 9, 1904, exempted from cap- ture Russian merchantmen that were leaving Japanese ports up to February 16, and also those that were sailing direct for Japan up to that date from non-Japanese ports, and, after discharging cargo, should keep on the return voyage to a route marked out for them. In every ease the indulgence is made conditional upon the absence from the cargo of contraband of war. The second article of the Czar’s Rules, issued on February 28, granted permission to Japanese ships of com- merce found in Russian ports “at the time of the Declaration of War,” which was made on February 10, to remain without molestation, “ for such a period as may be necessary, in proportion to their loading Tequirements, but which should in no case exceed forty-eight hours, counting from the moment that the present declaration was published by the local authorities.” The Russian indulgence, like the Japanese, was made to depend upon the absence of contraband of war from the cargoes. Thus the days of grace granted by Japan amounted to but seven. Russia gave a variable time, it being certain that the local authori- ties in all parts of her vast empire would not publish the Czar’s declaration on the same day. But the period of forty-eight hours, which was the utmost that could elapse between its publication and the departure of the enemy’s vessel, is very short, and contrasts strongly with the thirty days which might have been enjoyed under the Proclamation of President McKinley. It may be assumed that 66 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. Japanese vessels departing in accordance with the Czar’s Order are to be free from capture on the return voyage, though this is not ex- pressly stated. But even so, their privileges are small compared with those accorded to Spanish vessels by the United States in 1898; and the case of those that are on their way to Russian ports when the war broke out is not mentioned at all. It is too early yet to pass judgment upon the whole matter. The full facts are not at hand; and there is no opportunity of weighing the decisions of Prize Courts. But we can hardly escape the conclusion that commercial interests will not prove so potent as to mitigate the strict rights of belligerents in this war as in other recent struggles. The sea-borne trade of Rus- sia in the Northern Pacific is not large in extent or enormous in value. She can afford to see it suffer with equanimity. Japan, on the other hand, has much to lose. Of late the increase of her mercantile marine has been as remarkable as the growth of her fighting navy. She has taken over a large number of its best vessels to act as transports. It is impossible to exaggerate the value of such service to a State which must attack its foe with armies sent across the seas. Per- haps it was the consciousness of this fact which caused Russia to cut down her days of grace to a minimum. The incident should be a warning to nations of what they may expect if they should be engaged in war with a maritime power. In this matter, when bel- ligerents are bound by no definite rules of universal acceptance, they will naturally consult their own interests, though it is to be hoped that cases will sometimes occur in which other considerations will be present to their minds. A power which sees a chance of striking a severe blow at its enemy’s trade by cutting the days of grace down to.a minimum, is almost certain to do so, especially if its own sea- borne commerce is so small that little is to be feared from retaliatory measures. The essential points of this opinion are two; blaming, firstly, the inadequacy of the days of grace, and, secondly, the lack of a clause providing for the exemption from capture of the enemy’s merchant vessels that had departed from Japan prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Of the first point, it may be stated with confidence that the days of grace of one week were sufficient for Russian ships to enjoy the full benefits of exemption, considering the nature. of marine traffic, commercial interest between Japan and Rus- sia, as well as the position of the commercial ports in the Far CHAP. I11.] DAYS OF GRACE. 67 East; consequently the one week’s grace was adopted by the experienced experts of the Japanese Navy. With regard to the second point, such a clause was inten- tionally omitted at the time of publishing the Ordinance as a result of careful consideration, and those Russian vessels that had departed from Japan prior to the outbreak of war were not allowed to enjoy the privilege of exemption from capture. As a reason for this intentional omission of such a clause, reference is made to the fact that at the time when the diplo- matic relations with Russia were in a critical condition and war was most likely to break out at any moment, there were several Russian steamers that had left Nagasaki and other ports of Japan for Port Arthur and other ports, some of which were suspected of having on board various documents detrimental to the interests of Japan. In times of peace, there are no existing contraband despatches; which circumstance compelled Japan to abstain from taking any steps towards such Russian steam- ers as gave reasonable cause to invite suspicion. There were also several Russian steamers that were suspected of -carrying coal, arms, and other warlike articles on board; but they were not restrained from departing for the same reason. If the Russian ships that left Japan before the outbreak of war had been exempted from capture, those suspected vessels would naturally have been also exempted from capture as a matter of course. It should not be forgotten that a search at sea is in most cases rather incapable of discovering contraband de- spatches concealed in a ship. Even contraband goods often es- cape discovery, when hidden among other cargo. It was dur- ing the Chino-Japanese war that the Yik-sang carried on board 224 cases of ammunition, each case containing 10,000 packets, under the disguise of Chinese books. At the time of the first search, the ammunition was overlooked by the Japanese officers who inspected the steamer; but some arms having been found later in another steamer, which had been transhipped from the Yik-sang, a second search was made of the suspected steamer ; the result of which was the discovery of the disguised ammu- 68 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. nition. The case of the Yik-sang is an example showing how difficult it is to discover contraband despatches or con- traband goods by a search at sea. This it was that induced Japan to omit a clause providing for the exemption from seiz- ure of those Russian merchant vessels that had left Japan prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it being certain in most cases to result in practical disadvantage for Japan to exempt those. Russian vessels under suspicion; but to reserve the right to detain and bring them to a port of adjudication in case of closer investigation being found necessary, irrespective of the result of a search made on the open sea. What merchant vessels are to be exempted from capture is another question raised on this Ordinance. According to the opinion of the Japanese Prize Court, a big whaling boat (over 100 tons) did not come within the rating of a merchant vessel, and this opinion was insisted upon when the whaling boat Kotic was captured during the period fixed for exemption from appropriation. The reason offered by the Court for this cap- ture was that the object of the Ordinance was to protect com- mercial interests, and that the privilege of exemption was therefore limited to merchant vessels exclusively, while whaling vessels were outside of that meaning. There was another reason in refusing the extension of the privilege of exemption to the Kotic. The reason is that she had done some acts in the interests of the Russian Government and had not confined herself to the proper business of whaling. For this reason no objection can be made to making her a prize; but a protest rightfully goes out against the reasoning on the ground that fishing boats are not merchant vessels. The word “merchantman” is a word in contrast with the word “ man- of-war,” showing one of the two categories of the generic term “ship,” and comprises every ship which belongs to either a company or individual, no matter whether it may be a cargo boat, passenger boat, work boat, or whaling boat. According to the Prize Court Regulations of Japan, the vessels to be 1 Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War, pp. 71-112. CHAP. III.] DAYS OF GRACE. 69 exempted from capture are clearly stated to be lighthouse boats, cartels, coast fishing boats, and ships engaged exclusively on a voyage of scientific discovery. It is meant by this clause that all the enemy vessels shall be captured, except those enumer- ated; consequently it must be the meaning of the Ordinance that, although all the enemy vessels other than those enumer- ated in the Regulations are to be captured, yet they shall be exempted from capture specially during the days of grace. It therefore follows that the opinion of the Prize Court, though it is quite good enough in confiscating the Kotic, cannot be said to be correct in considering it to be the intention of the present Ordinance that those for exemption from capture were the enemy’s merchant vessels in the narrow sense only. CHAPTER IV. EFFECTS OF THE OUTBREAK OF WAR ON FOR- EIGNERS IN ONE OF THE BELLIGERENT STATES. If construed in accordance with the English school, all persons domiciled in the territory of one belligerent, not only belligerent subjects, but foreigners also, are contaminated by the hostile character of that territory, and consequently are deemed hostile by the opposing party, for “domicile, not citi- zenship, is the primary test of subject character under the Laws of War and Neutrality,” and “all persons, whether na- tives or foreigners, who are domiciled in belligerent territory, or in places under belligerent military occupation, may be treated as hostile by the opposing belligerent.” The aim of this chapter, however, is not to deal with the legal effects of the outbreak of war, but to consider, as one of the effects of the outbreak of war, the question of a war tax upon foreigners who lodged a protest with the Japanese Gov- ernment. To lay a firm basis for the argument, extracts are arranged below, from treaties between the Powers and Japan, which bear on the topic under consideration. Japan and Great Britain. August 25, 1894. Art. II. The subjects of either of the contracting parties residing in the dominions and possessions of the other shall be exempted from all compulsory military service whatsoever, whether in the army, navy, national guard, or militia; from all contributions imposed in lieu of personal service, and from all forced loans or military exactions or contributions. 70 _CHAP. Iv.] WAR TAXES. 71 This term is also prescribed in many other treaties between Japan and other Powers, namely: Japan and the United States, . . . . Art. I, par. 5. Japan and Italy, ........ . Art. IL Japan and Russia, . . . .... =. =. Art. L, par. 5. Japan and Denmark, . . . . .. . . Art. I, par. 5. Japan and Germany, . ..... . . Art. IL Japan and Belgium, .... . . . Art. TL, par. 5. Japan and the Republic of Peru, . . . Art. L, par. 5. Japan and Sweden-Norway, . .. . . Art. -L., par. 5. Japan and Netherlands, . . .. . . . Art. L, par. 6. Japan and Switzerland, . . ... . . Art. IL, par. 6. Japan and Spain, . .. . 24 . Art. ID Japan and Portugal, . . . . . . . Art. TL, par. 5. . \ Japan and ‘France. Traite entre le Japon et la France. ArT, IIL, par. 2. Ils ne seront astreints 4 aucun service obligatoire, soit dans les armées de terre ou de mer, soit dans les guardes ou milices nationales. Ils seront exempts de toutes contributions imposées eu lieu et place du service personnel, de tous empeunts forcés et de toute autre contribution extraordinaire, de quelque nature que ce soit. Japan and Austria-Hungary. Art. I, par. 4. Ils ne seront contraints, sous aucun prétexte, 4 subir des charges ou 4 payer des taxes, autres ou plus élevées que celles qui sont ou seront percues sur les nationaux ou les sujets de la nation la plus favorisée. ArT. II. Les sujets de chacune des Parties contractantes qui rési- dent dans les territoires de l’autre, ne seront astreints 4 aucun service militaire obligatoire, soit dans l’armée ou la marine, soit dans la garde nationale ou la milice; ils seront exempts de toutes contributions im- posées en lieu et place du service personnel et de tous emprunts forcés, de toutes exactions ou de contributions militaires. : Sont toutefois exceptées les charges qui sont attachées A la posses- sion d’un bien-fonds, ainci que les prestations et réquisitions militaires auxquelles tous les nationaux peuvent étre appelés 4 se soumettre comme propriétaires, fermiers ou locataires d’immeubles en tant que la possession d’un bien-founds ou d’immeubles sera permise. The Imperial Diet of Japan, which closed its extraordinary session on the 23rd of March, 1904, gave unanimous consent to the War Budget as well as to a bill authorising the Govern- ment to raise a loan for the prosecution of the war and also passed the War Taxation Bill. 72 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. On March 31, 1904, the extraordinary special taxation act was issued, as the result of which imposition on Imperial sub- jects was made much heavier than before. Concerning the protest, which the said act occasioned among foreigners living in Japanese territory, the followmg was the view held by that government: “Some foreigners resident in Japan are objecting to the imposition of special taxes provided for by Law No. III., pro- mulgated on the 31st of March last, on the ground that the taxation under the said law constitutes extraordinary contribu- tion from which foreign residents are exempted by virtue of Art. II. of the treaty between Japan and Austria-Hungary, Art. III. of the treaty between Japan and France, and simi- lar articles in other treaties. Some of the foreign representa- tives to Japan are said to have asked their governments for in- structions on the subject. “A careful perusal of the above-mentioned articles of the treaties between Japan and the Powers will at once show that Art. I, last Paragraph, of the British treaty; Art. II., first Paragraph, of the French Treaty, and similar paragraphs of other treaties deal with all ordinary charges, taxes, etc., and stipulate that in these matters foreign residents in Japan are entitled to equal treatment with Japanese, but certainly not to more favourable treatment than the latter. It is only in Art. II. of the British Treaty, Art. III, second paragraph of the French Treaty, etc., that cases are provided for exempting for- eigners from certain obligations. These cases are exclusively for the time of emergency where normal proceedings are dis- pensed with and military authority is called upon to exercise the necessary power in an exceptional manner dictated by the circumstances. It follows therefore that the taxes in question, being established by a law which was presented by the gov- ernment, voted by the Diet, and sanctioned and promulgated by His Imperial Majesty, all perfectly in accordance. with due ordinary processes, can by no means be taken as military exac- tion or extraordinary contributions, such as would exclude CHAP. IVv.] WAR TAXES. 73 foreign residents in this country. On the contrary, it is be- yond all doubt that they are nothing but ordinary imposts of which foreigners must be expected to bear a fair share equally with the people of the community where they reside.” Below is inserted an extract from the Kobe Chronicle, as most typical of foreigners’ views: The Kobe Chronicle. Wednesday, April 13th, 1904. Foreigners and the New Tacration. At the recent meeting of the Yokohama Board of Trade a sort of informal protest was made regarding the consumption taxes which the government has imposed with wu view to assisting to find means for the prosecution of the war. From the brief reports in our Yokohama contemporaries it is somewhat difficult to understand exactly the nature of the objections that were raised. According to the report in the Japan Herald, Mr. Griffin remarked that the sugar consumption-tax was a violation of the treaty, while, according to the Gazette, the same speaker seems to have applied his remarks to the consumption taxes in general. If the reference was to the consumption taxes on sugar, it would at first sight appear difficult for foreign merchants to raise objection on the ground that it forms a violation of the treaties. The Protocol to the British Treaty with Japan of 1894 has the following provision: “It is understood between the two high contracting parties that, if Japan thinks it necessary at any time to levy an additional duty on the production or manufacture of refined sugar in Japan, an increased Customs duty equivalent in amount may be levied on British refined sugar when imported into Japan, so long as such additional excise duty, tax, or inland duty continues to be raised. Provided always that British refined sugar shall in this respect be entitled to the treat- ment accorded to refined sugar being the produce or manufacture of the most favoured nation.” Under this clause the Japanese Government would seem to have full right to impose a consumption tax on sugar unless some other conven: tion specifically limits that right. But the objection taken to the con- sumption tax would seem to be that, so far as the import of articles specified under it are considered, it is exactly as if the additional import duty were imposed immediately, instead of the stipulated six months’ notice being given. That this is so appears very clearly from the state- ment in the appendix to the law providing for special taxation. It is there provided that with regard to the consumption tax on sugar of No. 1 description, molasses, and kerosene oil, the tax will be imposed after the lapse of six months from the date that the law goes into operation. Now the abolition of the tax on these articles is coincident with the coming into operation of the increased import duties upon 74 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. them, which, as we have said, the government is under a conventional obligation not to impose until after six months’ notice has been given. The result is that while the letter of the treaties is observed by the six months’ notice, it is evaded in spirit by the imposition of a con- sumption tax which is to all intents and purposes equivalent to an increased duty on the imported article. The case may be stated briefly thus: Under the treaties, Japan binds herself to give six months’ notice before an alteration of the statutory import tariff goes into effect. An occasion arises when it is necessary to impose additional taxation at the earliest possible moment. Debarred by the provision in the treaties from increasing duties immediately, a consumption tax is imposed under which the goods have to pay an equivalent of that duty as an inland tax before they can be taken for consumption out of the godowns in which they are stored. From this point of view it would certainly seem that the spirit of the treaties in this matter is violated, and that the foreign merchant who has made his contracts for months in advance has a legitimate grievance, for he will find it difficult in many cases to induce customers to take delivery unless he himself agrees to bear the increased taxation. It is to be hoped that when this injustice is pointed out, the consumption taxes, in so far as they affect the duties upon imported articles, will be suspended in operation for the six months necessary for which notice must be given of changes in the tariff. With regard to the increased levies on the business and income taxes, it may be expected that instructions will be given to the various taxation bureaus by the Finance Department, pointing out that accord- ing to the treaties the increased levy must not be made upon foreigners. The officials are now busily engaged making up the assessments for the business tax, and the work upon the income-tax assessments follows. It would undoubtedly save much trouble in the way of protest and facilitate collection if the officers of the Taxation Bureau had the mat- ter brought formally to their notice by the department responsible. We have already called attention to Art. II. of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty dealing with the matter, which reads: “The subjects of either of the contracting parties residing in the dominions and possessions of the other shall be exempted from all com- pulsory military service whatsoever, whether in the army, navy, national guard, or militia; from all contributions imposed in lieu of personal ser- vice, and from all forced loans or military exactions, or contributions.” From this it is evident that it would be against the provisions of the treaties to impose on foreign residents in Japan the additional war levies on the business and income taxes by which those taxes are almost doubled. The indirect taxation foreigners can hardly escape, but the direct taxes, in the shape of military exactions or contributions, evidently cannot be imposed upon them. Foreigners can with some show of justice claim the exemption, seeing it is notorious that they already pay far more in proportion than their Japanese fellow-residents, for, as we pointed out when considering the question some time ago, CHAP. IVv.] WAR TAXES. 75 it is quite evident from the returns that foreigners are far more accu- rate in the statement of their income and business than the Japanese, otherwise the proportion of the tax which they pay in such a place as Kobe would not be so large as it is. An argument, opposed to the above, was made public by Mr. Vickers, Professor of Political Economy of the Keiogijiku University, Japan. To the Editor of the Kobe Chronicle. Six: In your leader of April 13th, you state—or rather take for granted—that foreigners are exempt from payment of the additional levies recently authorised on the business and income taxes. If this view rests solely on Art. II. of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, as quoted by you, it does not seem to me likely that foreigners will escape the necessity of paying the additional levies. The war taxes authorised by the Diet do not appear to fall within any clause of the Article quoted by you. They are neither “military service” nor “ contributions im- posed in lieu of personal service,” nor “ forced loans” nor “ military exactions or contributions.” Presumably you thought of the “ war taxes ” as “military exactions or contributions.” If so, it seems to me that the phrase ‘“ military exactions or contributions” is sure to be interpreted as exactions or contributions which are levied under mili- tary authority, taken by representatives of the military arm of the government, or at least levied in territory over which martial law has been proclaimed. In other words, taxes which have been regularly authorised by the Diet and which are collected in the usual way by the civil arm of the Government are not in the legal sense “ Military exactions or contributions ”—even though used for the support of the military establishment or for defraying the actual costs of war. Other- wise, why are not foreigners wholly exempt from payment of business and income taxes, a part of which are at all times applied to military purposes? It seems worth while to call attention to this matter, because the impression that foreigners need not pay the increased levies might in some cases cause disappointment or inconvenience. Very truly yours, (Signed) E. H. Vickers, Prof. of Pol. Econ., Keiogijiku Univ. Kobe, April 17th, 1904, In short, the controversy was whether the taxes in question might be construed or not as included in “forced loans or military exactions and contributions” provided for in the treaties. 76 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. The positive argument is upheld by most foreigners, and the negative by Professor Vickers, who as a natural conclu- sion stated that foreigners have no right to be exempt from the new taxes. A foreigner taking the side of the Kobe Chronicle tried to refute Professor Vickers’ argument with a quotation from the latter part of the Austrian Treaty, Art. II., which, however, does not seem sufficient to overthrow the sound logic of Mr. Vickers. By way of argument, readers are presented with an article opposed to that of Professor Vickers. The Japan Daily Herald. April 21st, 1904. The War Tares. ‘The question has been raised whether, under the treaties, foreigners can be called upon the pay the extra taxes levied according to the Ex- traordinary Special Tax Law, a translation of which we include in to-day’s issue. With regard to the indirect taxes there appears but little chance of foreigners being exempted, though the arguments for the exemption of foreigners from the direct war taxes apply with no less force to these. It will be best first, however, to consider what these arguments are. Those who claim that foreigners are exempt from the payment of these taxes base their argument on the clause in the treaties which refers to the exemption of foreigners from military service and from contributions imposed in lieu of such service. In the Anglo- Japanese Treaty this clause reads: “The subjects of either of the contracting parties residing in the dominions and possessions of the other shall be exempted from all com- pulsory military service whatsoever, whether in the army, navy, national guard, or militia; from all contributions imposed in lieu of personal service, and from all forced loans or military exactions or contributions.” The concluding sentence of this clause is taken as showing that the negotiators intended that it should cover all special taxes raised for the purpose of carrying on war. This view is upheld by the wording of the corresponding clause in the French Treaty with Japan, which reads: Ils ne seront astreints 4 aucun service obligatoir, soit dans les armées de terre ou de mer, soit dans les gardes ou milices nationales. Ils seront exempts de toutes contributions imposées eu lieu et place du service personnel, de tous emprunts forcés et de toute autre contri- bution extraordinaire, de quelque nature que ce soit. Here, it will be seen, the place of the words “ military exactions or CHAP. Iv.] WAR TAXES. 77 contributions” is taken by “toute autre contribution extraordinaire, de quelque nature que ce soit.” Now, whatever may be the case in regard to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, it is claimed that the words in the French Treaty must apply to the increased taxes levied under the Ex- traordinary Special Tax Law. Although Art. I. of the law states but vaguely that the increased taxes are to defray the expenditure for a certain special purpose, in the article referring to the period during which the law is to remain in force, it is clearly stated that this term closes the year after peace is concluded. Thus there can be no doubt that the taxes are for military purposes and that they are “ extraor- dinary taxes,” or, in the words of the French Treaty, “contributions extraordinaires.” Now if the clause quoted from the English Treaty does not refer to taxes of this nature, to what kind of taxes does it refer? Professor Vickers, of the Keiogijiku University, in a letter to the Kobe Chronicle, contends that the clause refers to exactions “ levied under military authority, taken by representatives of the military arm of the government, or at least levied in territory over which martial law has been proclaimed.” This view is not upheld by a perusal of the same clause in the French Treaty, which sums up in the words, “all other extraordinary contributions whatsoever.” This also disposes of Professor Vickers’ query as to why, otherwise, foreigners should ‘not be wholly exempt from payment of business and income taxes, a part of which are at all times applied to military purposes. The answer is that such taxes are not extraordinary nor depend in duration on war- like movements. Thus, whatever construction may be placed upon the wording of the English Treaty, the French Treaty does not appear to admit of such a reading, since there is no equivalent phrase in the latter for the “ Military exactions” of the former. These, briefly, are the arguments of those who claim that foreigners should be exempted from the increased taxes. As stated above, any exemption from the increase in the indirect tax, such as the consumption tax, the increased tax on articles of food, and the increased import duties, is impossible. There remain, however, the increases in the Land, Business, Income, Registration, Exchange, Shooting License, and Mining Tax, about which there should be no difficulty. The inclusion of both direct and indirect tax in the law, however, seems to point to the authorities either hav- ing considered the matter and decided that the treaties do not apply, or else having neglected to give any thought to the question. This latter is very improbable, and it may therefore be concluded that the authorities intend to collect the taxes from foreigners and Japanese alike. Those who claim exemption have certainly a very strong case, and un- willing as Japan should be to see any cause of friction arise between the authorities and the sympathetic foreigners who reside in Japan, the fact is natural that failure to abide by treaty obligations is a much more serious matter and likely to give rise to much more serious con- sequences, Cases have been brought under our notice—not by way of complaint, however—of soldiers being billeted on foreigners residing in Tokyo, an action quite contrary to the treaties. This is a small matter, 78 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. and the foreigners in all cases referred to it laughingly; but if the treaties are infringed in one instance, there is a probability that in- fringements may be made in another. Among English newspapers published in Japan, the Japan Times, the Japan Mail, and the Japan Daily Advertiser, were of the same opinion as the J apanese Government about the matter. Below are annexed a few extracts illustrative of their tone. Japan Daily Advertiser. Yokohama, Monday, April 25, 1904. War Tazes. The question which has arisen in regard to the liability of foreigners for the payment of taxes raised for war purposes is 4 somewhat un- gracious one, especially in view of the disposition which the alien com- munities here have shown to contribute their uttermost in aid of the various benevolent movements for the relief of the sufferers from the struggle. The mooting of the question may be taken simply as an illustration of the essential difference between a contribution and an exaction, the former being assented to with the utmost cheerfulness and good-will, while the least mention of a tax is sure to awaken a protest and a desire to find some way of escaping it. Much stress is laid upon the wording of the provisions upon the sub- ject in the Revised Treaties, the clause as expressed in the French version being much more explicit and seemingly wider in scope than that found in the English rendering, and it is therefore very natural that the issue should be raised. In all questions of interpretation, however, an en- deavour should be made to get at the original meaning and general purpose of the insertion of the clause in such a document as a treaty. In this case, if we mistake not, the provision is based upon a general understanding between nations that in time of war foreigners dwelling in the land of a belligerent should not be liable to military duty in its behalf, nor be subject to the extraordinary exactions or inconveniences often incident to a state of war, such, for example, as having troops quartered upon them or being made to pay commutation for exemption therefrom. We doubt whether it was the original intent of the article upon the subject in the Revised Treaties with Japan to cover anything more in this regard, but that, of course, is a question for the inter- national lawyers to decide. We apprehend that in this case it will be very difficult for them to draw the line in regard to the liability of foreigners to share the national burden. It is quite true that the taxes laid are extraordinary ones, but the question will come up as to when they began to be extraordinary. The whole period of preparation for the war, necessitating a large increase of the nation’s armaments, has been marked by extraordinary taxation for this very purpose, a fact: CHAP. IV.] WAR TAXES. 79 which would seem to make it somewhat late now for foreigners to begin their protest. Furthermore, though we cannot speak with absolute assurance upon the matter, we are under the impression that such a question would not be likely to be raised in a western land. If we mistake not, during the Civil War in America there was no distinction whatever made be- tween native and alien residents in the matter of paying taxes incident to the great increase in the burden of the nation. It will be far better, we opine, as it will certainly conduce to the maintenance of good feeling, to have the matter settled upon such gen- eral grounds, rather than to have it descend to the low plane of quib- bling about the exact meaning or the interpretation which may possibly be put upon the words of the clause in a treaty. A key to this somewhat complicated controversy, so zeal- ously fought on both sides, is to be had by the following text in the Anglo-French Treaty: Convention conclué a Paris, le 28 fevrier, 1882, entre la France et la Grand-Bretagne pour regler les relations commerciales des deux pays. ArT. XI. Les ressortissants de chacun des deux Etats seront ex- empts dans l’autre, de tout service militaire, de toutes requisitions et contributions de guerre, des prets et emprunts et autres contributions extraordinaires qui seraient etablis par suite de circonstances excep- tionelles, en tant que les contributions ne seraient pas imposées sur la propriete fonciere. A treaty not yet abolished is still available. Notwithstand- ing the existence of such a treaty between England and France, England during the North China Affair and South-African Dis+ turbance imposed war taxes on foreigners without meeting with any apparent objection on the part of France and other coun- tries. In view of the data above mentioned, it is really illogical to find such a strong protest against a similar measure resorted to by Japan bound by similar treaties. The enlightened English public was convinced by the above logic of the legitimacy of the Japanese conduct, and began to advocate that Englishmen in Japan should pay war taxes. On the 26th of June, 1904, the British Minister to Japan communicated to Baron Komura the fact that the British Gov- ernment had just telegraphed to him that Art. II. of the 80 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. treaty between Japan and Great Britain was in their opinion not applicable in the present instance, and that the British residents in Japan could not invoke that article for exemption from the Extraordinary Taxes. Great Britain and Portugal. July 3, 1842. They shall be exempt from forced loans, or any other extraordinary contributions not. general, or not by law established, and from all military service by sea, or by land. Great Britain and Russia. January 12, 1859. Art. XIV. The subjects of either of the two high contracting Parties in the dominions and possessions of the. other, shall be exempted from all compulsory military service whatever, whether in the army, navy, national guard or militia. They shall be equally exempted from all judicial and municipal charges and functions whatever, as well as from all contributions, whether pecuniary or in kind, imposed as a compen- sation for personal service; and, finally, from forced loans and military exactions or re- quisitions. Great Britain and Italy. August 6, 1863. Art. XV. The subjects of each of the contracting Parties in the dominions and possessions of the other shall be exempted from all compulsory military service whatever, whether in the army, navy, national guard or militia. They shall be equally exempted from all judicial and municipal functions whatever, as well as from all contributions, whether pecuniary or in kind, imposed as a compensation for personal service; and, finally, from forced loans and military exactions or requisitions. The United States and Nicaragua. June 20, 1868. Art. IX., 2. The citizens of the United States resident in the Republic of Nicar-: agua, and the citizens of Nicaragua resident in the United States, shall be exempted from all forced or compulsory military service whatever, by land or sea; from all con- tributions of war, military exactions, or forced loans in time of war; but they shall be obliged, in the same manner as the citizens of each nation, to pay lawful taxes, municipal and other modes of imposts and ordinary charges, loans, and contributions in time of peace (as the citizens of the country are liable), in just proportion to the property owned. The United States and Italy. February 26, 1871. URE: AAs: eng 89 vid LS eeRd A aD SAM Wena GO Pea OE Pere en 3 sek oe They shall, however, be exempt in their respective territories from compulsory military service, either on land or sea, in the regular forces, in the national guard, or in the militia. They shall likewise be exempt from any judicial or municipal office, and from any contri- bution whatever in kind or in money, to be levied in compensation for personal services. Grecce and Spain. August 9-21, 1875. Arr. I., Parg. 3. Ils seront exempts de toute charge ou emploi municipal et de tout service personel, soit les armées de terre ou de mer, soit dans la garde ou milice nationale, ainsi que de toutes requisitions ou services speciaux de la milice et de toute contribution extraordinaire de guerre ou emprunt force, en taount que ces contributions et emprunts ne seront pas imposés sur la proprieté fonciere. CHAP. Iv.] WAR TAXES, 81 The United States and Peru. August 31, 1887. veg SS Suter S ; they shall not be called upon for any forced loan or extraordinary contribu- tion for any military expedition, or for any public purpose whatever, nor shall they be liable to any embargo, or be detained with their vessels, cargoes, merchandise, goods or effects, without being allowed therefor a full and sufficient indemnification, which shall be paid in advance. The United States and Servia. For Facilitating and Developing Commercial Relations. (Signed at Belgrade, October 2-14, 1881.) Art. IV. Citizens of the United States in Servia and Servian subjects in the United States shall be reciprocally exempted from all personal service, whether in the army by land or by sea; whether in the national guard or militia; from billeting; from all contributions, whether pecuniary or in kind, destined as a compensation for personal service; from all forced loans, and from all military exactions or requisitions. The liabilities, however, arising out of the possession of real property, and for military loans and requisitions to which all the natives might be called upon to contribute as proprietors. of real property or as farmers, shall be excepted. CHAPTER V. ‘TRADING WITH THE ENEMY AND PROHIBITION OF THE EXPORT OF GOODS FOR WARLIKE PURPOSES. Is it lawful or not for an individual of one belligerent na- ‘tion to trade with an individual of the other, when all their diplomatic agents and consuls have withdrawn from both coun- tries, as a natural consequence of hostilities? There are two sorts of arguments upon this point: Those of the first school argue against trading with enemies under such circumstances, ‘on the ground that when hostilities once begin, the trade and communication between the belligerent subjects, unless specially permitted, is implicitly prohibited without any special notice; and, according to them, those who act contrary to this, are to be duly punished as trading with the enemy. But, those of the other school, confine hostilities to affairs between two states, without extending the same relation to individuals, so that it naturally follows that trading between subjects of the belliger- ent nations may be independent of national hostilities. Some ‘of this school try to reinforce their argument by the theory that “ trading liberty, being a natural right of mankind, cannot be interfered with by any warfare.” Believing that the readers of these pages are already well acquainted with the ordinary arguments on the point in ques- tion, a series of facts illustrative of the Japanese practice re- specting trading liberty will be set forth, instead of going any further into these theoretical discussions. Cases during the Chino-Japanese War. Though ultimately fruitless, in the earlier days of the Chino-Japanese War, the Japanese Government negotiated 82 CHAP. V.] TRADING WITH THE ENEMY. 83 with the Chinese Government, through the American Minister, about the exemption of private property from capture at sea." A certain case induced a strict discussion in the Japanese Cabinet at that time upon the lawlessness of a Japanese subject trading with the Chinese. A certain Japanese contrived to supply China with coal through the medium of a neutral then residing in Japan. In the end, the Japanese Government took no measures against it. Here is the opinion on the case of Professor Ariga.? La deuxiéme question 4 laquelle donna lieu V’élaboration du décret* se rapportait au commerce des pays en lutte. II existe sur ce point; en droit international, deux systémes différents. L’un consiste 4 pro- hiber, en principe, le commerce entre les sujets du pays et ceux de Vadversaire, sauf la réserve d’une autorisation particuliére (licence) qui est accordée en faveur de certains objets, de certaines localités, de certaines personnes ou colectivités. Tel est le systéme suivi, notam- ment, par la France, l’Angleterre, les Etats-Unis de l’Amérique du Nord, Ja Hollande et Espagne. Cette doctrine a regu une applica- tion rigoureuse principalement dans les trois premiers de ces Etats. Le second systéme reconnait comme régle la liberté du commerce: celle-ci ne peut étre limitée que par des lois faits expressément dans ce but, et les restrictions qu’elles édictent ne doivent pas étre étendues. C’est la théorie qui domine en Allemagne, et, bien qu’ell ne soit pas encore adoptée par l’unanimité des jurisconsultes de ce pays, elle s’accorde bien avec Ja tendance actuelle du droit international en temps de guerre: Ja guerre est une affaire d’Etat a Etat, non d’indiv- idus 4 individus. Dans la guerre de 1860 contre la Chine, la France et l’Angleterre elle-méme autorisérent leurs nationaux 4 commercer avec le pays ennemi. De ces deux systémes si opposés, le gouvernement japonais, par des raisons théoriques et pratiques, n’hésita pas 4 pré- férer le second. La liberté du commerce est un des droits naturels de l’homme, il n’y a aucun motif pour qu’elle soit supprimée de plein droit par la. guerre. Si des considérations militaires l’exigent, il est d’ailleurs toujours facile d’émettre un order prohibitif interdisant le commerce de certains objets. Les considérations pratiques qui déterminérent le 1 The author’s Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War, pp. 9-10. 2 Ariga, La Guerre Sino-Japonaise au Point de Vue du Droit International, pp. 27-28. 3 Décret Impérial du 4 aot 1894, relatif Ala protection des Chinois au Japon. ( 84 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. gouvernement impérial n’étaient pas sans valeur. La prohibition du commerce avec Chine devait nuire au développement économique du Japon. Au début de la guerre, des journaux japonais avaient con- staté que des négociants étrangers achetaient du charbon de terre au Japon pour le revendre & la Chine, et ils avaient fait entendre a ce sujet de vives protestations. Le gouvernement ne crut pas devoir tenir compte de ces reproches. II pensa, non sans raison, que la Chine ne serait point dans l’embarras, quand méme elle ne recevrait pas du Japon le charbon dont elle avait besoin; elle s’adresserait alors, pour se le procurer, 4 ]’Angleterre ou 4 tout autre pays étran- ger. De la sorte, Podre prohibitif du Japon n’aurait servi qu’a lui faire perdre un débouché pour ses charbons; de ce fait, sans aucune compensation, le pays aurait subi un préjudice considérable. C’est pour cela que l’article ler a stipulé que les Chinois résidant au Ja- pon pourraient continuer 4 vaquer & leurs occupations légales et pacifiques. Thus, while engaged in hostilities with China, the export of coal to the enemy’s land was winked at by the Japanese Government; and if winking at may be considered synonymous with implied recognition, the principle of the Japanese Gov- ernment adhered to at that time must have been the opposite of the prohibition of trading with the enemy. However, the absence of any settled principle whatever most probably induced the Japanese Government to take such an indulgent step. Later on, even during the Russo-Japanese War, no definite declaration was made on this subject, so that the author will propose his own argument towards the end of the present chapter. In the course of the Russo-Japanese War, a case happened which involved the Japanese prohibition of exporting a certain sort of goods, not only destined for the enemy, but also for a neutral port. It should be remarked in passing that horses were prohib- ited from exportation during the Chino-Japanese War and the North China Affair. And the reader should remember that the prohibition of exporting goods implies the prohibition of trading with the enemy, as a part of its provisions; at any rate CHAP. V.] TRADING WITH THE ENEMY. 85 this is the case when the goods are destined ot the enemy or a neutral state or their subjects. Below are arranged various cases bearing on this point which took place during the Russo-Japanese War. In May, 1905, the Japanese Minister of the Army and Navy addressed the following letter to the Minister of Home Affairs : We request you to interdict for the time being the exportation of any coal, on the suspicion of its being used by the enemy’s forces. P.S.—The supervision we are attempting with the above purpose needs to be supplemented by yours. Cases of interdiction were as follows: The British 8S. S. Hatasu. Consignor: Midushima Branch at Mojji. The steamer above mentioned was prohibited, on the 16th of May, from exporting 4500 tons of coal, consigned to the branch of M. M. & Company at Saigon. The name of the steamer, uncertain. Consignor: Midushima Branch at Moji. The steamer above mentioned was prohibited, on the 22nd May, from exporting 15,000 tons of coal consigned to the branch of M. M. & Company at Singapore. The British S. S. Hatasu. Consignor: Takashima Co. at Moji. The steamer above mentioned was prohibited, on the 22nd “May, from exporting 7500 tons of coal consigned to Messrs. Shewan, Tomes ‘& Co. at Hongkong. The British S. S. Langdale. Consignor: Midushima Branch at Moji. The steamer above mentioned was prohibitd, on the 23rd May, from exporting 5000 tons of coal consigned to Messrs. Shewan, Tomes & Co. at Hongkong. The British 8. 8S. ......--.. Consignor: Uryu & Co. Loaded with 6200 tons of coal, destined for Tokunaga & Co. at Hongkong, and with 2300 tons of coal destined for Hongkong. The American 8. 8. .......... Consignor: Yasukawa & Co. Loaded with 4700 tons of coal destined for Hongkong. On May 26, 1905, the steamers hereinafter mentioned were also stopped. 1 Jt must be also noticed that Contraband of war is not the same as goods prohibited to export; because the contraband is destined for the Enemy’s territory or sometimes to the army or navy in the Enemy’s territory, or Enemy’s warships on the high seas. 86 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.' [PART I. The British S. S. Hermiston, loaded with 5600 tons of coal destined for Singapore. The Norwegian S. 8. Oscar II., loaded with 4000 tons of coal des- tined for Hongkong. A complaint was made, referring to the cases of the Hatasu. and Langdale, on May 25, 1905, as follows: The British 8. 8. Hatasw was chartered in the middle of the pres- ent month to take coal from Moji to Saigon, but the work of loading was stopped by the local authorities on the 16th instant, as the ex- port of coal from Japan to Saigon had been prohibited. The agents of the vessel accordingly cancelled their previous con- tract, and made a fresh contract with the Japanese firm of Messrs. Takashina to convey a cargo of their coal to Hongkong on account of the firm of Messrs. Shewan & Tomes. The representative of this latter firm declared that the coal was destined for Hongkong and would be consumed there. However, the local authorities still refused to allow the coal to be loaded, on the ground that orders to that effect had been received from the Imperial Government. It would appear that another steamer named the Langdale was similarly prevented from being consigned to the same firm, although other British vessels were being allowed to load coal for conveyance to Hongkong. The affair was settled by a notification from the Japanese Government containing the essential principles by which im- partial treatment was dealt; and the fact that the Hatasu and the other steamer could not be considered as treated with particular disfavour was fully explained. The following is the Regulation at that time concerning the coal export: Disciplinary Regulations of Coal Export. 1. The consignor or the consignee shall send in as caution-money twice the estimated cost of the coal to be exported to the Custom- house of the locality whence the shipment is to be sent out. In- stead of the caution-money above mentioned, there may be substituted, if sanction is given by the Custom-house, a letter of security, signed by a bail, if found necessary. 2. The consignor or the consignee shall recover the caution-money or the letter of security, by sending in a certificate from the Japanese consul (or authorities nominated by the Custom-house of the port CHAP. V.] TRADING WITH THE ENEMY. 87 of export) certifying that the said coal was unloaded at the proper port named. If the certificate be not sent in within 60 days from the date of export, the caution-money, or the face value of the letter of security, shall be exacted. 3. An export by a vessel, destined for, or calling at, a port where a man-of-war belonging to the enemy is, or so expected in the future,. may be subjected to prohibition. The decision will be given by naval authorities. The Author's Opinion on Trading with the Enemy. As for the provision for the future, I am not without opin-- ion on what course we should take with regard to trading with the enemy. Here I quote one theory and one precedent out of many English articles on trading with the enemy, upon which I be-. lieve our future course may be safely based: Property of Allies’ subjects trading with enemy confiscable. (Pitt-. Cobbett, p. 175.) The Neptunus, 1807. 6e, Rob. 403. This case is cited as illustrating the application of the rule of trading with the enemy as between allies. (Case)—During war between Great Britain and Holland, a ship. belonging to a subject of Sweden, one of the allies of Great Britain, was captured by a British cruiser while on « voyage from Amster- dam with a cargo of pitch and tar. She was brought in for adjudi- cation, and at the trial the case turned on the effect of a modified permission to trade with the common enemy in innocent articles on. the part of an ally in the war. (Judgment)—Sir W. Scott, in his judgment, stated that as be- tween allies it must be taken as an implied, if not an expressed con-. tract, that one state should not do anything to defeat the common object and interest. If one state permitted its subjects to carry on an: uninterrupted trade with the enemy, the consequence might be to sup- ply aid and comfort to the enemy, which might prove very injurious to the prosecution of the common cause and the interests of its ally. It was not enough to show that no state allowed this practice to its own subjects; but it must be shown, either that the practice was of such a nature as could in no manner interfere with the com- 1 An article prepared at the request of the Japanese Navy during the War. 88 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [PART I. mon operations or that such trade had the permission of the allied ‘state. There being no such circumstances in the present case, the goods were therefore pronounced liable to condemnation. According to Sir W. Scott, an alliance treaty, unless other- wise clearly contracted, presupposes that neither of the allies shall act in such a manner as to interfere in any way with the ‘common interest and cause. Hence if either of the allies in- sists on trading freedom, whereas the other perseveres in prohi- bition, the natural consequence must be the supplying of the common enemy with assistance and convenience; that is to say, injuring the common interest and cause of the alliance. In this way our free theory, as long as England, our ally, condemns allied subjects trading with the common enemy, must lead to no other result than to defeat the purport of our alli- ance implied as Sir W. Scott states; and to make our ships, although acting according to our law, liable to English capture, in case England and Japan come some day to fight against a common enemy. Thus it must be practically imprudent for Japan to insist on trading freedom in view of the English prohibition policy. Hence as for the problem how far our ships may maintain trading relations with the enemy, the same regulations and lim- its as those held by our ally may be recommended as adequate; for otherwise our merchant ships will be exposed to capture by English warships. In other words, our maritime trade should be regulated by the same prohibition policy as the Eng- lish; limiting our subjects’ trading with the enemy to certain places, articles, and persons. Some will perhaps deem such a measure injurious to our economic welfare, but their anxiety may be easily refuted if they bear in mind that the English policy is far from being an absolute check on trade, but means simply trading under special permission. PART II. THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF LAND WARFARE. CHAPTER I. COMBATANTS. The qualifications of a combatant have remained a question for many centuries; as, for instance, it occasioned fervent differ- ences of opinion in the course of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, until a definite decision was reached as the result of The Hague Conference. Art. I. The laws, rights, and obligations of war apply, not only to the army, but also to militia forces and to bodies of volunteers, which combine the following conditions: (1) Having at their head a person responsible for his subordinates. (2) Having « fixed, distinctive badge, recognisable at a distance; (3) Carrying arms openly; and (4) Conforming in their operations to the laws and usages of war. In countries in which the militia or volunteers compose the army, or form a part of it, they are included under the designation of “army.” ArT. II. The population of a non-occupied territory who, at the: approach of the enemy, take up arms spontaneously in order to re- sist the troops of invasion, without having had time to organise in conformity to Art. I., shall be considered as belligerents if they observe: the laws and usages of war. The principle Japan kept in view was to abstain from adopt-. ing the system of volunteers or levees en masse, as is well exem- plified by the Imperial Ordinance of 8th August, 1894, which expressly disapproved the Organisation of a volunteer com- pany. The following is from Dr. Ariga’s work on the Chino- Japanese War: * 1 Ariga’s La guerre Sino-Japonaise, pp. 35-38. 89 ‘90 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. Décision impériale sur la formation’ de bataillons de volontaires et -décret y relatif du 8 aoit 1894. Au Japon, le “ volontariat” n’est pas un moyen de recrutement de Varmée réguliére. Mais, lorsque les événements de Corée éclatérent, des Japonais, dans les diverses provinces, adressérent 4 leur gouverne- ment des pétitions pour obtenir l’autorisation d’organiser des batail- lons de volontaires contre la Chine. Dés que la guerre fut déclarée. ces pétitions devinrent de plus en plus nombreuses on vit les délégués des provinces assiéger en foule le ministére de la guerre. Si Von jette aujourd’hui un regard rétrospectif sur les derniers -événements, il est facile de juger des forces respectives des deux em- pires. On peut se convainere que les Japonais n’avaient, en définitive, nullement besoin d’auxiliaires. Mais, au début de la guerre, personne ne pouvait apprécier A leur juste valeur les forces militaires de la ‘Chine; beaucoup devaient considérer comme un adversaire redoutable les troupes de Li-Hong-Chang et les cavaliers mandchouriens. II était. -done tout naturel que les patriotes japonais eussent quelque inquié- tude sur l’issue de la lutte et voulussent venir en aide & leur pays en organisant des bataillons de volontaires. Si ces vétérans japonais, qui étaient fort nombreux dans l’Empire et qui étaient parfaitement ex- -ercés au maniement des armes, avaient en la permission de passer en Chine et d’y agir en toute liberté, armés de leurs sabres rendus sacrés par tant de faits brillants de leurs ancétres, il en fut résulté pour le gouvernement de Pékin, une situation oraiment grave. IIs eussent été pour lui des ennemis fort sérieux; car la longue tranquilité dans laquelle le Japon avait vécu jusqu’ici pesait 4 leur ardeur guerriére. Une semblable organisation eut été cependant parfaitement légale he ‘droit de faire usage de combattants irréguliers appartient a l’Etat ‘qui prend Voffensive aussi bien qu’A celui qui est sur la défensive. Le Japon n’aurait done pas fait un acte indigne en permettant 2 ses volontaires de traverser la mer aprés les avoir embrigadés et re- vétus d’un uniforme ou de quelque autre signe distinctif. On eut pu d’autant moins lui faire de reproches a cet égard que le gouvernement ‘de Pékin, obstiné dans ses vieilles habitudes, fermé aux idées des na- tions civilisées, se refusait 4 faire aucune distinction entre les com- battants et les non-combattants: ce gouvernement, pour exciter son peuple a résister 4 l’armée japonaise, avait en V’idée barbare d’apposer dans les villes et les villages affiches of il promettait un certain nombre de taéls 4 ceux qui rapporteraient la téte d’un général, d’un officier, d’un fonctionnaire ou d’un soldat .japonais; la récompense variait selont le grade et la qualité de la victime.* 1 Ce fait est confirmé par la Revue générale de droit international public, t. II. 1895, p. 123. é CHAP. I.] COMBATANTS. 91 Notre Empereur pensa toutefois que des volontaires, qui n’avaient pas recu linstruction militaire d’une maniére habituelle et constanté, ne devaient pas valoir les combattants réguliers au point de vue de la discipline; il craignit que, par leur fait, la dignité de l’armée de l’Em- pire ne vint a se trouver compromise. Aussi n’hésita-t-il point a refuser leurs services. I] fit connaitre ses intentions par un décret progulgué le 8 aofit, qui était ainsi concu: Nous, par la protection de nos aieux et le concours de notre peu- ple, espérons maintenir et rauvegarder Vhonneur et la gloire de la nation avec l’appui de nos forces de terre et de mer. Nous sommes convaincu que Vorganisation du volontariat par nos - sujets des diverses parties de ]’Empire est une manifestation de leurs sentiments les plus intimes de dévouement et de petriotisme. L’Etat a ses organes nécessaires et le peuple a ses occupations con- stantes. Nous souhaitons que, hors le cas de réquisitions extraor- dinaires, nos sujets ne néglisent pas leurs occupations ordinaires, au prejudice du développement de plus en plus grand de la puissance productive du pays et de l’entretien des éléments de notre force et de notre richesse. Nous ne saurions done reconnaitre dans la circonstance actuelle Putilité du volontariat. Nous prescrivons 4 nos autorités locales de donner les instructions nécessaires, en conformité de cette intention. Les armées d’expédition japonaises furent done organisées avec des combattants réguliers, seuls dignes de figurer dans les troupes de terre d’une nation civilisée. Ces armées comprenaient deux groupes dis- tincts. Le premier, que commanda le maréchal Yamagata, s’avanca en Chine par la voie de Corée 4 destination de Moukden; le second, qui eut a sa téte le maréchal Oyama, débarqua directement a la presqu’ile de Lia-Tong, et se proposa de s’emparer de Port-Arthur ainsi que de Wei-Hai-Wei, les deux clefs du golfe de Petchili.* The same principle was preserved also during the Russo-' Japanese War; although the sole exception happened when Japanese residents at Hwang-ju, Korea, organised a volunteer company under pressing circumstances. The fact was substan- tially as follows: ? Prior to the arrival of the First Army at Hwang-ju, Japa- nese residents there found themselves already exposed any mo- ment to assaults of Russian troops, who might descend from the north, and that the Korean forces stationed there were 1 Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War, p. 171. 2A. Ninagawa, Kuroki’s Army and International Law, pp. 51-52. 92 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. entirely ineffective to provide for such an emergency; so that a volunteer company was formed by forty-eight men who were not the heads of families. The Japanese Volunteers at Hwang-ju, as well becomes civ- ilised people, acted in perfect conformity with the stipulations. of The Hague Conference. 1. The Japanese Volunteers at Hwang-ju were led by a certain member of the Japanese consulate there who was to be _ responsible for what his men might do. 2. They were in western dress with a red blossom-shaped badge pinned on their breasts, and had a helmet cap covered with white. 3. Each of them was armed with a Schneider musket. 4, Their conduct was regulated by martial laws and usages. They were, however, dissolved, without any actual en- gagement, on the arrival of the van of Japan’s First Army. Thus even this exception should be considered as a device resorted to under special circumstances by Japanese residents at Hwang-ju, and not as anything like a levee en masse pro- jected by the Japanese Government. In the course of the war, Russia organised a volunteer company in accordance with the Russian Mobilisation order issued at the outbreak of the war, which was to be directed for the defence of Saghalien and the East China Railway, ac- cording to information furnished on July 29, 1904, by a Berlin correspondent. The United States Chargé d’Affaires in St. Petersburg trans- “mitted to the Japanese Minister at Berlin a communication of the Russian Government, dated July 26th, in which the latter requested communication to be made to the Japanese Government of the formation of free companies of militia composed of Russian people in the Maritime Province, in the island of Sakhalin, and along the East China Railway line. Free companies of militia were to serve as guards, and in case of necessity as combatants, for which purpose the militia was furnished by the State with rifles and arms, without wearing CHAP. I.] COMBATANTS. 93 special uniform. They had, as a distinctive mark of their belonging to the army, a cross on the head cover for East China Railways. “M.D.” (Manchouria Drujina) is fixed on the cross for Saghalien. Besides the distinctive cross, the militia wear on the sleeve a red stripe a half werschok wide, red button-holes on the collar, and on the top of their cap a narrow red band. Concerning the organisation of the volunteer company above mentioned, an American paper of August 6th, 1904, con- tained the following criticism: “The strange rumour that the Russian Government was going to organise a volunteer company of Saghalien exiles seems to have been confirmed by recent declaration. “The Russian exiles, mostly engaged in collieries, are un- paralleled in their ferocity, and may be regarded as beasts rather than men. Of these exiles the promised volunteer com- pany was to be organised not by voluntary enlistment, but by compulsory conscription, offering by way of reward the shorten- ing of the term of punishment, by reckoning every two months in the army as one year of punishment. “Such a contrivance could not be accepted as alleviating in any way the grimness of war.” Though somewhat harsh, the above well suggests what truth and law dictate. CHAPTER II. PRISONERS OF WAR. Sect. I. Treatment of Prisoners.! During the Russo-Japanese War there were 85,544 Rus- sians, including men in medical service and their families, who were captured by the Japanese army and navy. Examining these, the Japanese Government selected 79,367 from them and treated them as legitimate prisoners. Of course there were many prisoners who were released or died at the front. Only 72,408 Russians were sent across to Japan and interned in prison barracks in various provinces. On September 5, 1905, peace was restored between Japan and Russia by the conclu- sion of the Portsmouth Convention, Art. XIII., which pro- vided that “both governments shall deliver all their prisoners, and that as soon as possible in case the Convention came into force a special committee would be appointed by each govern- ment for that purpose, so that each government can easily deliver its prisoners to them or to some representative commis- sioned by them.” There were 1777 Japanese prisoners who were received by the Japanese Imperial special committee in the western frontier of Russia, besides 223 who were delivered at Manchuria and Nagasaki. Russian prisoners to the number of 71,802, excluding those escaped, released, and deceased, were delivered, by the order of the Japanese Minister of War from Bureau of Information to the Russian special committee or their representatives at Yokohama, Yokkaichi, Kobe, and Naga- saki, beginning from November 12, 1905, and ending on Feb- ruary 19, 1906. 1 The most part of the material in this chapter has been taken from Dr. Akiyama’s report on the Russian prisoners during the Russo-Japanese war. 94 CHAP. Il., SECT. I.] | TREATMENT OF PRISONERS. 95: Russian prisoners of war in Japan were numerous, while Japanese prisoners in Russia were only 2000 in all; and it is. with heartfelt pride that Japan can produce several proofs to show that she gave this great number of Russian prisoners the very best treatment in her power, a treatment far better than that given by Russia to the Japanese prisoners in her country. In the summer of 1905 a visit by the author of this. work to the barracks of Russian prisoners in Japan, a talk with. Admiral Wiren and other high officers as well as the lowest. common soldiers, revealed their unreserved opinion relative to the treatment given them, which was a universal satisfaction. on this point. It, however, will be convenient to readers to give them a few official reports concerning the treatment of prisoners both in Russia and in Japan so as to enable them to compare the results of the two countries, rather than to give them the results of merely a personal observation. I. Personal Investigation by Mr. Smith, U. 8. Vice-Consul at Moskow. In December, 1904, 65 Japanese prisoners of war, who: were detained and accorded the treatment of officers at Med- ved, sent in a petition to the United States Embassy, in Russia, asking to send a representative from that embassy. -According to what one of the American Embassy learned. at the General Staff at Russia, the despatch of a messenger was under the control of the General Staff, and that to get a formal permit, it was necessary to refer the matter through the Gen- eral Staff to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who then should get a sanction from his Majesty the Emperor, a visit to pris- oners during the war being a thing prohibited by an Imperial ordinance. The United States Embassy then made a formal communi- cation to the Russian Authorities. As its consequence Mr. Smith, the Vice-Consul at Moskow, was sent out as a messenger for the visit, whose careful and circumspect investigation is embodied in his report. When Mr. Smith arrived at Medved, ‘96 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. the Japanese prisoners handed him the following memo- randum : MEMORANDUM. (1) We cannot understand why the passengers and crew of the steamer Haginoura-Maru and the schooner Hakutsa-Maru are kept as prisoners of war, since they took no part whatever in the war. We also think surgeons should be released, according to the Treaty of Geneva. It is stated that the Japanese Government have released all who took no part in the war, except naval and military men. (2) As to our hospital, we have frequently complained to the Rus- sian authorities, and at present things have been considerably improved, but our request for Japanese attendants or nurses and for free medicine have not yet been fulfilled. (3) A. Regarding correspondence, we all requested that this be de- livered to us as quickly as possible, but sometimes it takes two or ‘three months in delivery. We do not think that this is necessary, for other letters are received in due time. B. We have forwarded letters written in Japanese and Katakana characters, but they could not pass the Bureau, and so we asked that they be returned to us, and also that the letters which came from Japan be delivered to us. C. It has often happened that we have not received parcels, although they were mentioned as having been sent in letters we received. After His Excellency the General visited us, a few days after Christmas, we expected these improvements, but the result seems to have been quite the contrary, especially as regards books, magazines, etc. D. During the last year we were allowed to read both Japanese and English -papers, but these have since been prohibited, as well as even Russian papers. E. There are many mistakes in handling letters and parcels, they being opened and then replaced sometimes under a different address. (4) Regarding interpreters, we have none here, in spite of our fre- quent requests. In a great country like Russia we believe there are many who speak English, if not Japanese, and we cannot understand why the Russian Government should be so economical and hesitating; there is at least one interpreter for every forty Russian prisoners in Japan. (5) The limits of our promenade have been more and more reduced, gradually, ever since we came here, and at present we only have two hours a day under strict control, and it frequently happens that we miss even this chance by some accident or other, the time being so limited. (6) A. At first we were quite free to do our purchasing in any way we saw fit, but now we are allowed only one hour for that purpose and two persons. This makes it quite inconvenient and almost impossible to do all the purchasing in that short time of about fifty different sorts CHAP, II., SECT. I.] | TREATMENT OF PRISONERS. 97 of daily provisions—and on Saturdays, Sundays, and the many other holidays we are entirely prohibited from shopping. B. We have been prohibited from purchasing at some shops, and not even permitted to enter them; hence we suffer great inconvenience and also have to pay higher prices for our goods. And we are not allowed the proper drinks for table use. (7) There is no chance or means of communicating with Japanese officers, soldiers, or sailors in prison in other garrisons. The report of Mr. Smith is as follows: REPORT OF MR. THOMAS SMITH’S VISIT TO THE JAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR AT MEDVED, NOVGOROD GOVERN- MENT, RUSSIA. February 11, 1905. On 30th January I visited the village of Medved in the Government of Novgorod, where the Japanese prisoners of war are concentrated. There are 69 officers and 414 privates, amongst the latter 21 Koreans and 5 Chinese. To assist me in the inspection and interrogation, the following officers had been despatched to Medved by order of the Minister of War: Lieut.-Col. of the General Staff, Prince Volkonsky; The late Russian Vice-Consul at Kobe, F. I. Vasilieff, at present attached to the General Staff; Col. A. U. Stankevich, Commander of the 199th Siberian Infantry Regt., who has charge of the prisoners. I commenced my inspection with the lower ranks of the prisoners, composed of 4 squads, who are domiciled in platoons in beautiful brick barracks, well lighted, dry and high (about 65 feet), and well venti- lated. Every soldier has been furnished by the government with an iron bedstead, straw mattress, pillow, blanket, two towels, pillow cases, sheets, and undergarments. By orders of the General Staff to the Dis- trict Commissariat, the prisoners of war will be furnished with a new equipment of clothing in the near future. All the prisoners look healthy and strong and they are in the best of spirits. I tried the food given them and found it very good and tasty. The dinner consisted, on that day, of rice soup, with vegetables, and beef and buckwheat gruel. According to the weekly distribution of food, which I herewith enclose, the menus are made up as follows: (a) Dinner: Barley soup with vegetables and beef, buckwheat gruel. Supper: Manna gruel. (b) Dinner: Vermicelli soup with vegetables and beef, buckwheat gruel. Supper: Millet gruel. (c) Dinner: Rice soup with vegetables and beef, buckwheat gruel. Supper: Manna gruel. 98 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. Generally black bread is furnished, but by order of the Minister of War this has been changed to coarse white bread. Each man gets 3 lbs. of bread per day, but as the Japanese do not eat so much bread, they asked to be given only 23 lbs. per day, and the cost of the remain- ing 34 lb. to be contributed towards improvement of the cooking. Tea and sugar are furnished twice a day, the Russian soldiers receiving pressed tea in the form of cakes, while the Japanese, who do not like this kind of tea, are getting the ordinary kind. As hot water is fur- nished all day tea can be prepared at any time of day, as each man wishes. Upon close inquiry I found that all the common soldiers among the prisoners are satisfied, but would like to have rice soup and macaroni instead of the manna. The Commander told me that under the circum- stances he cannot comply with this request, on account of the high price of rice and macaroni. However, the Commander has communicated with the General Staff about this, and in the near future the prisoners will receive macaroni instead of manna. The prisoners do not have to do any burdensome work, except that, they clean the barracks and courtyards surrounding the same, carry water, wood, and fire the stoves, etc. The prisoners have selected cer- tain of their number to do the cooking, and these are assisted by Rus- sian soldiers. If they did not wish this, the Russian soldiers would be recalled. The prisoners get plenty of exercise in their daily walks, coasting on icy hills, and gymnastic exercises in an excellent riding school, 500 ft. long and 180 ft. wide. They are engaged in manufacturing various toys, such as ships, ani- mals, birds, ete. Their work is very neat and skilful. The commander wishes them to turn out as much as possible of this work, as 50% of the proceeds goes to the workman and 50% to the fund for improving the food. The privates go twice a month to the regiment bath-house, but they are not satisfied with this, and wish to bathe four times a month. As each time involves a cost of copecks 30, the commander has applied to the authorities for permission. It must be noted that the Russian soldiers bathe only twice a month. I also called on Major Togo, who occupies a nice large room, part of which is partitioned off for a bedroom, with an adjoining kitchen. He has a Japanese soldier at his disposal. He is allowed to walk sepa- rately from the rest and is not so restricted in the space allotted. He is accompanied by his wife, who, at her own wish, went with Major Togo and is treated like a prisoner of war. Mrs. Togo has asked for permission to have a Russian maidservant. She had a Japanese maid, but the latter left not long ago, and the commander has placed her in charge of the Ministry of Interior. It would be desirable to assist this woman and send her back to Japan. Major Togo told me that he was satisfied with the treatment he received, but would like to have some books, for instance Schiller’s “William Tell,” a Russian-Japanese dictionary, Russian newspapers, CHAP. II., SECT. I.] | TREATMENT OF PRISONERS. 99 and the Japanese Times. He receives rbls. 75 per month from the Russian Government. I then visited the 68 officers. They are living in a large two-story brick house. The rooms are all large, well lighted, dry, and well ven- tilated. It was left to them to select their roommates. Each officer has an iron bedstead, with a good mattress, one chair, and one small table for two officers. They are not satisfied with this, and wish to have one large table in each room. Large tables may be forwarded later on. There is a closet in each room. To these 68 officers are attached 20 Japanese soldiers. They procure their own provisions, the same being purchased by four people selected for the purpose. Formerly they procured their dinners from the officers’ club, but as they did not like the Russian dishes, they were allowed to procure their own pro- visions. They paid 21 rbls. per month at the officers’ club, and the ex- pense is the same under the new arrangement. They are not satisfied, however, to be forced to purchase at certain stores. The officers receive rbls. 50 per month from the Russian Govern- ment, the same as the Russian officers, only that the Russian officers have to pay for their lodging and heating. Officers of the staff receive rbls. 75 per month, the same as the Russian staff officers do. The officers are permitted to go out daily for two hours in a district out- lined by the commander, and accompanied by one Russian officer. Lately this district has been reduced on account of some of the officers ‘having gone outside of the limits, principally the Englishmen, and also because the Japanese Government curtailed the liberty of the Russian prisoners of war in Japan. The dissatisfaction expressed by some of the officers consists in the following: (1) During the last month they have not been allowed to receive any newspapers and journals: The commander explains that the Japanese Government has acted likewise towards the Russian prisoners of war. (2) They would like to have certain medicines, but cannot get them at the drug store of the regiment. The commander states that at the drug store only such medicines as are prescribed by law are kept, and that the officers could procure the medicines desired at private drug stores and at their own expense, just as the Russian officers do. (3) They would like to receive their letters earlier, as now it takes three months to receive a letter. The commander promised to see to this. (4) They want an interpreter knowing English, Japanese, and Rus- sian attached to them. This request has been sanctioned, but there are difficulties in finding such an interpreter. For the soldiers they wish an interpreter speaking Japanese and Russian. (5) Formerly the officers (99 in number) were allowed to procure 70 bottles of beer and several bottles of whisky, but now they are only allowed to buy 30 bottles per day. The commander explains that the officers abused the order and incurred debts. Upon my request he 100 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. permitted them to procure 40 bottles of beer per day and each officer to have one glass of whisky per day. (6) They are allowed to go to the bath-house twice a month, but would like to go four times a month. As a matter of fact the officers should not be allowed in the Government bath-house, but the commander was kind enough to sanction it. He permits them to go to the bath oftener, but to a private bath, where they have to pay 20 copecks. All the officers are satisfied with this proposal. (7) The officers Miyazawa and Tatibana, who were made prisoners on board of the Sado Maru and Haginoura Maru, declare that they should not have been made prisoners, as they are physicians. All the officers confirm their statement. The Japanese Government does not make Russian doctors prisoners of war, but sets them free immediately. The Russian officers told me that there should be no difficulty in lib- erating these officers (doctors). Upon my question as to whether they were not in want of clothing, underwear, and bed linen, they told me that they were not. The Eng- lishmen, however, wished to have some American tobacco, say 4 lbs., and to get books and newspapers regularly. The Commander of the Regiment, Adam Zurjevich Stankevich, im- pressed me as a very congenial and good-hearted man, who takes an interest in the prisoners of war. There are a number of large brick barracks at the village of Medved. They all contain large and light rooms and spacious halls, and are all being renovated at present for other Japanese prisoners of war. In the building that Major Togo lives in, there are several large, good rooms with a kitchen, which are destined for officers, and if it were possible to place some of the officers in these rooms this would not mean less comfort but an improvement, as at present the soldiers and sailors are occupying better lighted and ventilated rooms than the offi- cers. The commander thinks that Your Excellency could easily arrange this, in your own name, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Englishmen have a room by themselves, four men in a room, and they are comfortably cared for as far as light and air is concerned, as well as food. (Annex. Memorandum of Mr. Thomas Smith.) I beg to call your attention to the following request that was made of me by the prisoners. It seems that before December they had great freedom of movement and were permitted to go all over the village of Medved, but at present the space that is allotted to the officers for walking is very small, and they have also been deprived of a skating pond. This latter I found to be one of the most important complaints, and if they could have the privilege of skating on the small pond it would be very important for their health. Respecting newspapers and books, they have been deprived of these for the last three or four weeks. It is very important for them to get CHAP. II., SECT. 1.] TREATMENT OF PRISONERS. 101 these regularly, as it keeps their minds engaged. They wish to have Russian newspapers as well. I visited the Bureau in St. Petersburg, No. 5 Panteleimonovskaya, where all letters, newspapers, books, and packages are censored, and obtained the promise of the Bureau to for- ward at once all packages of printed matter and letters that they had on hand. Amongst these was a very large quantity of English news- papers and some magazines. Mr. Vasilieff, late Russian Vice-Consul at Kobe, now attached to the General Staff at the War Department, is the censor at the Bureau, and everything destined for the Japanese prisoners of war, without exception, passes through his hands. In this connection I hope that the commander will carry out his promise of letting the soldiers and officers have four baths instead of two a month. I asked the commander whether, if he had a small fund in hand, he would agree to use it, when it was necessary, to improve the con- dition of the soldiers’ food and pay for medicines that the officers should require which are not in the hospital list,'and which I found would be a very small amount per month. Of course, with the officers neither of these things were absolutely necessary, because they buy their own food. With them it would only be the high-class medicine. The soldiers did not ask me for this, and it is merely my suggestion, so that these trifling matters might not give rise to any complaints. The hospital is in a very good condition and the prisoners of war are treated exactly as the Russians are. The hospital in Medved is of the ambulatory type, and when there is any serious indisposition of the officers they are sent to Novgorod. If it is desired to send the prisoners of war any tobacco, tea, coffee, or anything whatever, I have spoken about the matter at the Bureau to-day, and it was suggested that you send everything to the Bureau here, addressed to the parties the articles are intended for. The Bureau have promised to forward them the same day free of charge. They say this will simplify matters, and that if you send articles direct to the commander in charge of the prisoners he might get into trouble, while by sending through the Bureau the things are perfectly safe and reach their destination quicker. ’ Respecting the money that you would like to deposit with the com- mander in charge of the prisoners of war, this can be done by address- ing the commander. At the Bureau we discussed the sale of the articles made by the prisoners, and the opinion was that it would be difficult to dispose of them here in the city, because nobody cares to undertake it, although orders are being received from society people for different articles. I mention this because it would greatly improve the condition of the prisoners and give them a chance to make money if their articles could be disposed of. This, of course, refers only to the privates. I was told, when at Medved, that the Minister of War had arranged with the commissary to send all the prisoners of war special linen clothing and sheep-skin coats and boots, but up to the present time 102 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. these things have not arrived at Medved, although Prince Volkonsky, the Adjutant who was sent from the General Staff at St. Petersburg, said that the Commissioner had already made all the arrangements and that they will arrive in a few days at Medved. I mention this in case you should have an opportunity of speaking about it. The clothing and linen they have now are in very good condition—it is the clothing they arrived in. More rooms are being prepared in the barracks at Medved for pris- oners of war that are to arrive, and new apartments are being prepared for officers also. Medved seems to be the principal place in Russia for this purpose, as there are so many barracks there suitable for keeping prisoners. The Japanese prisoners want to know why they were not kept in a warmer climate, such as the south of Russia, for they say the Russian prisoners of war are kept in a warm climate in Japan. These are details of the report made by Mr. Smith who had twice visited the prison barracks at Medved during the war. After the war the author met several Japanese who had been prisoners at Medved; they still insisted that the treatment of the Russian authorities was not all in accordance with what they promised Mr. Smith. Mr. George Anderson, the Cap- tain of the Sado Maru, and Mr. William Kerr, the Chief Engineer of the same vessel, said that the treatment of pris- oners by the Russian authorities was not very bad, still it is true that the proper authorities were not prompt in carrying out their promises. Compare in the following the difference in treatment of Russian prisoners by the Japanese authorities: II. Treatment of the Russian Prisoners in Japan. I. According to verbal information of a member of the United States Embassy at St. Petersburg obtained at the Military Staff Office of Rus- sia, in December last, all visits to prisoners of war are prohibited in Russia by an Imperial Edict, and therefore, for giving permission to visit Japanese prisoners of war, the Military Staff Office has to apply to the Emperor himself, through the Minister of War. Such being the case, a French priest recently applied for permission to see those pris- oners, but met with a flat refusal. Whereas, in Japan, there being pro- visions in Art. IX. of the Regulations for the Treatment of Prisoners to the effect that no person shall visit prisoners’ quarters unless per- CHAP. Il., SECT. 1.] TREATMENT OF PRISONERS. 103 mitted by the Commander of the Garrison, and that to a foreigner who desires to visit prisoners’ quarters the Minister of War will grant the necessary permission, it is made a rule to permit all persons who may desire to see the Russian prisoners, be they Japanese or foreigners, to gain access to them. Not only the members of the foreign legations and consulates in Japan, but other foreigners who have applied for permission to pay a visit to prisoners’ quarters have never been refused. It may be observed in this connection that M. de Fossarieu, the French Consul, has been making such visits, once or twice every month, attended by his servants and others. The commander of the garrison in the places where prisoners’ quarters are established, has also accorded free access to the prisoners to the representatives of the various local bodies, as well as to individuals. As to religious services, the Japanese authorities pay the greatest possible attention, many priests, who are pupils of Bishop Nicolai, being granted free access to the prisoners; and for the benefit of the Roman Catholic prisoners, ’Abbe Perrin, a French priest, is accorded the liberty of freely performing the various rites and services. II. In Russia, Japanese officers and others in captivity are not allowed to purchase medicines, while the medicines kept in store at the medical laboratory of the garrisons having custody of the prisoners are very limited in kind and quantity. But in Japan, to give an in- stance, the sick and wounded among the Russian prisoners at Matsu- yama, irrespective of their being officers or not, are taken into the Military Hospital there, towards the equipment of which the authorities concerned are doing their best, and in which Military Surgeon-General Dr. Kikuchi, skilled in the medical art, and many other military sur- geons, as well as surgeons and nurses of the Red Cross are busily engaged in the treatment of the prisoners. In that hospital, and in the medical establishments attached to prisoners’ quarters in other places, as well as the reserve military hospitals where Russian prisoners are received for treatment, all necessary medicines are given them in suffi- cient quantities, so that they do not stand in any need of purchasing medicines from private dispensaries. In the case of captive officers, who are allowed to live in private houses on parole, they are received, when they become ill, into medical establishments attached to pris- oners’ quarters or reserve military hospitals, and are supplied with all medicines and other things necessary for their cure. III. The Japanese prisoners in Russia are, it is said, allowed to bathe only twice in a month. In Japan, on the contrary, the greatest care is taken of the health of the Russian prisoners, and a paper, giving full particulars relative to the preservation of health, is given to each of them. In each place where they are quartered they are allowed to bathe at least once a week, at no cost to themselves. IV. The Japanese prisoners in Russia are quartered in a cold place like Medved, and recently the space allowed them for free walk has been considerably diminished. Even the officers are allowed only two hours’ walking per day, and that in a very limited place, under strict \ 104 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. surveillance. Moreover, the prisoners are prohibited from enjoying the pastime of skating on the ice, which sport would be very healthful for them. In Japan the number of Russian prisoners has been constantly on the increase since the first batch of them, taken in the battle of Kiulien- cheng on the lst May last, was brought home. But they were all, including those taken at the fall of Port Arthur, quartered in Matsu- yama, Marugame, Himeji, Fukuchiyama, Nagoya, Shizuoka, etce., all of which places boast of the best climatic conditions in Japan; and it was only when the numerous prisoners taken in the battle near Mukden arrived that the authorities were compelled to establish a number of prisoners’ quarters in the neighbourhood of Tokyo and in places farther north. The prisoners lodged in Matsuyama, Marugame, etc., are allowed to take turns in the streets and to visit the hot springs in the neigh- bourhood. The time allowed them for promenading has never been limited to a small number of hours. In July last a Cossack lieutenant and six others quartered at Matsuyama attempted to escape as many as four times. In August and September, too, six prisoners at Matsuyama and Marugame made three such attempts. Again, on the 5th of January last, six prisoners, including officers, conspired to effect their flight at Matsuyama. Such attempts on the part of the prisoners have prevented the authorities for « long time from according the captive officers in general greater freedom in walking. But because such offences have since become less and less frequent, the Imperial Government established, on the 18th of March last, the Regulations for the Prisoners’ Free Walking, and Residence in Private Houses. By these regulations such officers and officials of corresponding rank as may desire under special circumstances to live with their wives and children were given permission to take private houses and to lead a free life as regards walking and in other respects. At the same time, the officers and officials of corresponding rank quartered in the establishments prepared by the Government for them were granted, on their taking oath, the liberty of taking walks abroad during the daytime. / V. The Japanese prisoners at Medved, 69 officers and 414 non- combatants, are allowed to purchase only 40 bottles of beer for all and a glassful of whisky for each officer per day. The officers have to pay high prices for their daily necessaries, as they are permitted to make purchases only at certain stores. Moreover, no more than two persons are allowed to -make daily purchases, and that within the short space of an hour. Hence, a serious inconvenience is felt by the prisoners in making their purchases. In Japan a canteen is attached to all the prisoners’ quarters, where the prisoners can buy anything they want, for reasonable prices, at any hour during daytime. Those canteens are not allowed to charge more than the ordinary market prices and are under strict inspection CHAP. II., SECT. 1.] TREATMENT OF PRISONERS. 105 of the military authorities. At Shizuoka, Nagoya, Matsuyama, and other places where officers are quartered, various kinds of alcoholic . beverages are for sale, so that the officers in those places can freely buy their table drinks. They are also allowed, while walking in the streets, to enter into any shop and buy almost anything through the assistance of their interpreters. Thus, not only the officers, but the non-commissioned officers and men are free to purchase their daily neces- saries, and in doing so they have to pay only reasonable prices. As the matter stands, not a few officers have bought such curios as Yoroi (armour) and Katana (swords), which they intrusted to the custody of the authorities, stating that they would take them home upon their release. : VI. The Russian authorities sometimes take two or three months in delivering to Japanese prisoners the letters addressed to them. Parcels, as regards the forwarding of which intimation is made in the letters, not infrequently fail to reach their destinations, especially in the case of books and magazines. Moreover, parcels and letters are often deliv- ered to the wrong persons through errors made on the part of the Russian authorities in opening and resealing them. Nor are the pris- oners at Medved allowed to have any communication with their brother- prisoners in other places in Russia. In Japan the Russian prisoners in the different places are permitted to communicate with one another, no restriction being put on their exchange of either telegrams or letters. Their letters, which they are left free to write either in Russian or in English, French, German, Polish, or other languages, are examined by a large staff of censors, and speedily forwarded. The letters addressed to the prisoners are examined in the same way, only such letters as are quite illegible being sent to the Prisoners’ Intelligence Bureau for examination. Even in the latter case not many days have ever been wasted in their transmission. It was after June that the number of Russian prisoners in Japan in- creased suddenly, and yet the letters and parcels they forwarded during ten months, ending the 3lst March last, amounted to 51,437 letters and 416 parcels, while those received during the same period amounted to 20,949 letters and 991 parcels. All such letters and parcels are examined by the Japanese authorities with a great deal of care, so that they have never failed, as in Russia, to reach the persons to whom they are ad- dressed. In strict accordance with The Hague Convention, this postal matter is exempted from postal charges, and all articles sent for the relief of the prisoners are made free from customs and all other dues, as well as from freight on all the government railways. Moreover, the general public entertains such warm sympathy towards these prisoners that the private railway companies, such as the Sanyo, Iyo, Sanuki, Hankaku, Kyushiu, and Nippon, whose lines extend to localities where the various prisoners’ quarters are established, are also carrying free all articles addressed to prisoners. VII. The Japanese prisoners in Russia, it is said, are denied all books and newspapers. But in Japan the Russian prisoners have never 106 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. once since the outbreak of war been prohibited from reading books, newspapers, or magazines. They are at liberty to purchase Japanese and Russian books, or any kind of foreign books. Books and magazines that are given to them as presents are at once delivered to them. Moreover, they are allowed to take not only Japanese newspapers and magazines, but those of Europe and America. A limit, however, has been made as to what newspapers can be purchased by the prisoners, because, and only because, the authorities find it impossible to examine all these worldwide publications, their time being so much taken up with the inspection of letters to and from the Russians. But this limitation does not apply to the newspapers printed in the Japanese vernacular. The following are the English and other papers on,the unprohibited list: English papers published in Japan— 1. The Japan Mail. 2. The Japan Times. 3. The Daily Advertiser. 4. The Japan Gazette. English papers— 1. The London Times. 2. The Standard. 3. The Daily Telegraph. French papers— 1. Le Temps. 2. Le Radical. 3. La Lanterne. American papers— 1. The Sun. 2. The Tribune. 3. The Washington Post. German and Austrian papers— 1. Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 2. Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger. 3. Neue Freie Presse. In addition to this, all foreign newspapers, even Russian, which are sent to the prisoners from abroad are delivered to their addressees. What is said above respecting hewspapers holds good in the case of Japanese and foreign magazines. Between July and March, 1905, the prisoners forwarded printed matter 416 times, and in the same period received it 2171. times. VIII. The Japanese prisoners at Medved are said to have asked in vain to have interpreters supplied them. On the contrary, the Japa- , nese authorities did their best to have interpreters connected with CHAP. II., SECT. 11.] FREE OUTDOOR EXERCISE. 107 Russian prisoners, even at the front. At home, Russian interpreters. are posted at the various prisoners’ quarters, their total number amounting , at present to no less than 181. At Nagoya the authorities have ap- * pointed a French interpreter, since among the Russian officers in that city there are some who speak French. Besides, the official staff of the prisoners’ quarters are selected from among military officers who can speak either English, French, or German, so that neither Russian officers nor men in these establishments can possibly feel any inconvenience in this respect. ‘ Sect. II. Parole for Free Outdoor Exercise, In order to enable the captured Russian officers to enjoy the pleasure of free outdoor exercise, the Japanese Government drew up a rule in the Russian language and gave it to” them. But there was much complaint among them about the word “ Presharg,” meaning ‘oath, that was used in the rule. The reason of their complaint was that the word “ Presharg ” meant taking an oath before God; and there were only three occasions in their life time when they were allowed to take an oath, namely, before a judge in a law court, at the time of being enlisted as a soldier, and at the time of the present Emperor’s coronation. They were not authorised to take an oath before God on ordinary occasions; and they would not do it, as, other- wise, they should be religiously punished with excommunica- tion. They further suggested that “Presharg” was not the only word meaning oath, but that there were other words with a similar meaning, which would be used in ordinary cases. The director of the prison barracks at Matsuyama, who found some reason in the complaint, sent an application to the War Department to get the wording corrected; and the department, aecepting his application, altered the wording to “ Obyazkosina-chehstne-slowo,” which has a similar mean- ing of an oath. But there was another trouble. Although the wording of the oath was corrected to their satisfac- tion, yet they offered another complaint against the sentence, “Prisoners shall not contemplate escape,” used in the wording of the parole. They insisted that it was natural for prisoners to wish to escape. To stop it by a rule was to restrict their 108 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. will. If the establishment of such a rule was for the purpose of facilitating their superintendence, a simple limitation of time for their going out would answer the same purpose, and there would not'be any necessity whatever to resort to the restriction of their free will; hence their unwillingness to accept the rule of parole. Japan decided not to give ear to any further pro- test, but to carry out the rule in the present form, it having been the belief that the objection was nothing but an example of the habit common among the Russians of catching at any little advantage by offering strained reasons on every important or trivial occasion, and that it had already been an act of deep grace towards them to alter the wording of parole. On the 20th of April, 1905, over 300 officer prisoners were assembled in the lecture hall of the Matsuyama Middle School, and the director of the prison barracks delivered a speech to them, explaining the rule of free outdoor exercise as well as the liberality of the Japanese Government, and told them to take an oath according to the rule if they wanted to enjoy this privilege. At this time about one-third of the whole number of Russian officers signed the oath, and gradually others followed their example until about two-thirds of the whole number had signed. Many, however, refused to take the oath to the very last, among them being Captain Salnavski. TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF RUSSIAN PRISONERS LIVING IN PRIVATE HOUSES. ARMY, Navy. Total Pace oF Rank. Rank. both Prison Barrack.|~ ™~ a“ Army 4 War- | Total. Total. | and Gen- | Col- | Liew- | rant Lieu- Navy. erals. | onels. |tenants.|Officers. tenants. Shizuoka..... 1 1 1 Nagoya...... 1 1 2 2 Fushimi...... 1 Se 10 2 13 13 Hirosaki..... 3 1 1 5 5 Matsuyama... 1 3 12 1 17 1 1 18 Total...... 2 8 24 4 38 1 1 39 CHAP. II., SECT. 1.] FREE OUTDOOR EXERCISE. 109 As soon as officer prisoners were permitted to take free outdoor exercise, in April of 1905, the Commander of the Gar- rison at Matsuyama decided to permit those who had brought their families with them, or who had special reasons for want- ing the privilege, to live in private houses within the limits of the city of Matsuyama. From the beginning, it was by Japan’s arrangements that those officer prisoners who, on account of their special circum- stances, wanted to live in private houses could apply for the per- mit to the Minister of War; but at the start, when the number of officer prisoners was very small, there were none in circum- stances to enable them to apply for this privilege, and no such applications were sent in. But when their number increased, especially after the arrival of a large number from Port Arthur, there came to be so many applicants for this privilege by virtue of their respective circumstances of various kinds that it was impossible to grant all their applications without hazarding the maintenance of order. Consequently it was decided to grant a few applications, selecting those who had the most important reasons for asking the privilege. Of those who enjoyed this privilege of living in private houses, Captain Gemmerman and Lieutenant Grinski, both married men, were prisoners. Then came in succession war- correspondent Tageff; Major General Ganenfeld, captured in the battle of Mukden; Colonel Prince Gedroitz; Lieutenant Colonel Gringerberg, once very famous as an honorary regi- mental commander; Captain Tarnovski, who had once be- haved like a madman through an intense love of his wife, and several others; the number of such homes at one time reaching sixteen. The manner of life of those who had this privilege was quite different from that of their fellow-officers in the prison bar- racks. They each formed a comfortable home, some with their wives, and some with their relatives or old friends, and all seemed to be forgetting the misery of their unfortunate situa- ‘tion. As it will be interesting to know the way they lived, a 110 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART IL. description of a few examples of their life in private houses may be given. 1. Captain Ivanoff. The surrender of Port Arthur brought to Matsuyama trans- port after transport full of Russian prisoners. Among these there were over 470 officers; and of these officer prisoners, there were not a few whose condition called forth Japan’s deep sym- pathy. in connection with their brothers or children who were with them as fellow-prisoners. But the case which received most sympathy was that of Second Captain Ivanoff. It was on the 18th of January, when a drizzling rain was falling and a chilly wind blowing, that a transport from Ujina dropped anchor alongside the pier of Takahama, having aboard prisoners from Port Arthur. Although the majority of the officers had a well-cared-for appearance, the common soldiers seemed mostly much neglected. It was on this occasion that Second Captain Ivanoff, came to the place of his detention with a sad and mel- ancholy countenance, leading by the hand a little girl of seven or eight years of age. She was a lovely girl, but her pale and timid face seemed to tell a story of long trial and adversity deeply impressed in her little heart during the siege of Port Ar- thur. When the Captain was taken into the barrack of Ichiban Street, his charge was intrusted to Mr. Bryan, an American missionary, whose family was apt to give comfort to the lonely and miserable girl, he having five or six children in his home. Here she stayed a few months. Gradually recovering from the fatigue of the siege, she grew cheerful and happy as soon as the privilege of living in a private house was granted; shortly the Captain took charge of his daughter, and lived jointly in a house with Tageff for a short time until he hired another house for himself at Samban Street. It was stated that his wife had died six years before in Siberia, but that he had not taken a second wife through the love of his daughter. Genya, which was the girl’s name, lived with her father in Port Arthur, and more than once during the siege she suffered slight. wounds by exploded shells which fell into her house. It was CHAP, II., SECT. I1.] FREE OUTDOOR EXERCISE. 111 therefore natural that the dreadful scenes of Port Arthur were so deeply impressed on her that for a long time after her arrival at Matsuyama she was frequently found in her sleep with a look of horror on her face, probably seeing in her dreams the fearful scenes of her old abode; and often, even in the day, she would seem to forget herself and would start as if with sud- den fright. The poor father received the more sympathy when we learned that he had lost two sisters of the little Genya while in Manchuria. The house in which the unfortunate father and his daugh- ter lived was a small building with ‘three or four rooms and a little garden. The front windows faced the street, which was, however, very quiet, and did not disturb the quiet of the house. Here the Captain peacefully and comfortably lived with his beloved daughter, employing a Japanese maid-servant as cook, who had a slight knowledge of the Russian language. It was in August, when the heat of summer was intense, that a Japanese officer of the prison barracks called on the Captain. The Captain instantly came out and showed the officer into a room, and only a few words had been exchanged when the lovely little girl came into the room with a sweet smile and offered a fan to the visitor. Then the Captain rose to bring tea, but the officer declined it, and was about to leave, when the girl again came in with a dish of pineapple and a fork, and asked the visitor to help himself to a piece. This was not done by order of the father, but she herself wanted to entertain the visitor, and had sliced the fruit neatly and brought it in. She ‘was still very young, and was of an age when children often do nothing but tease their mothers for sweets. But she had lost her mother, and was brought up by her father, whom she was able to help in his household affairs with the tender hand of a little child. The Captain was in the unfortunate position of a pris- oner, but he was able to live peacefully with his dearly beloved daughter under the cordial protection of the Japanese authori- ties, which must have been a happy feature in his sad circum- stances. 112 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II, 2. Home of Grinski and Gemmerman. Lieutenant Grinski also came from Port Arthur. His wife, who had at first stayed at Nagasaki with her little child, came to Matsuyama in company with the wives of some other officers. When the privilege of living in private houses was granted, the Lieutenant hired a comparatively spacious house at Niban Street, at first jointly with Captain Gemmerman, but later oc- cupied the house himself with his family and a Japanese maid- servant, the Captain haying got another place for himself. The house appeared to be very comfortable. It consisted of two buildings. with a garden between them; and the rooms with Japanese mats and fittings were used in the original form with an addition of tables, chairs, paintings, and photographs in the alcove. When he went out for a walk or on business he used to take his wife with him, but generally left his child with the servant in the house. Captain Gemmerman lived at Kaya Street with his wife and youthful daughter. ‘The gate faced the street, but the house was situated far towards the rear of the garden. It wasa new building and had six or seve rooms. The garden was not large, but had an artificial hillock and a pond in it, and beyond the garden there was an outhouse on each side, one being used for the Captain’s private room and the other for his official servant. In summer this private outhouse was lined with white gauze on all sides to prevent mosquitoes from coming in, and was used as a general living room. In the drawing room there was besides the usual tables and chairs, a red banner hung on the lintel with Chinese characters embroidered on it in gold, set- ting forth that it was a present given him by the Chinese people under his administration in appreciation of his virtue. In short, Captain Gemmerman appeared to be the happiest of all the officer prisoners who lived with their families. Indeed, they were all treated by Japan more like welcome guests invited from a distant country than like prisoners, cap- tured in war. CHAP. II., SECT. III.] PRISON BARRACKS. 113 Sect. III. Prison Barracks. In selecting places of detention for prisoners of war, Japan paid special attention to the following points: 1. The healthfulness of the place and its adaptability to the comfort of the prisoners. 2. The feeling of the people of the place towards the pris- oners. ' 3. The facility which the place afforded for superintend- ing the prisoners. Matsuyama, for instance, was situated within one hour’s travel from the seacoast of Takahama and only half an hour’s distance from the hot spring of Dogo. The climate was mild and the scenery was of the finest in Japan, so that it was noted as a pleasure resort, attracting health seekers at all times of the year. The town also had a history of having received Korean prisoners of war five hundred years ago. The inhab- itants were sprightly in nature and had no hostile feelings toward foreigners. Besides, there was an army division in the town, so that it would be comparatively easy to superintend the prisoners. These were the reasons that Matsuyama was first selected as a suitable place for the purpose. Kyoto, Himeji, and Hamadera in the neighbourhood of Osaka, which were also adapted for keeping Russian prisoners, were all ex- cellent places, noted in Japan and well known to Europeans, so that it is not necessary to describe them here. Turning to the side of Russia, things were quite different, and the Russian Government cannot escape reproach for their carelessness when the Japanese prisoners were detained at Medved, which was situated in the same latitude as that of Chishima (Kurile Islands), and which was a place opened by reclaiming swamps and marshes still full of dampness and a noxious atmosphere. In receiving Russian prisoners into barracks care was taken to make a distinction according to race and religion. Thus, those belonging to the Roman Catholic sect were separated from those of the Greek sect or of the Jewish sect, and the latter \ 114 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. two from each other. The pure Russians were also separated from the people of Polish origin. The following table, made on the 31st Oct., 1905, shows the particulars of the separa- tion, and also shows the places where prisoner barracks were established as well as the number of prisoners kept in those places, namely : Euro- geen oe Poland Jews. | 1 ee Tartars, | Others. | Total. sSlans, Narashino....| 13,271 | 1,232 | 214 0 236 0 14,953 Takasaki..... 314 138 48 0 5 26 531 Sendai....... 1,852 186 55 0 0 72 2,165 Shizuoka..... 300 14 1 0 0 4 319 Toyohashi... . 871 4 1 0 0 0 876 Nagoya....... . 8,349 195 43 12 147 47 3,793 Osaka........ 222 1 0 0 0 4 227 Hamadera. 19,364 | 1,587 | 589 0 0 833 22,373 Otsties. csn aon 597 85 49 0 67 2 750 Fushimi...... 1,070 102 56 0 56 428 1,712 Yamaguchi... 279 58 4 3 12 3 359 Kumamato...| 5,395 231 80 1 66 230 6,003 IKurume...... 2,363 262 74 0 0 0 2,699 Hirosaki...... 52 4 0 1 0 4 61 Akita........ 74 10 0 0 2 1 87 Yamagata.... 39 2 0 0 0 1 42 Kanazawa....| 2,527 499 87 0 145 60 3,318 Tsuruga...... 390 68 11 10 10 8 487 Sabaye....... 35 2 1 0 1 1 40 Himeji....... 1,804 152 93 1 62 73 2,185 Fukuchiyama. 181 123 41 2 1 43 391 Matsuyama...| 1,890 155 74 3 15 35 2,172 Marugame.... 334 0 0 0 8 8 350 Zentsuji...... 687 162 | 103 0 19 ‘26 997 Kokura....... 953 35 6 0 10 23 1,027 Fukuoka..... 3,262 465 | 109 1 67 143 4,047 Total...... 61,475 | 5,722 | 1,739 24 929 | 2,075 71,964 Sect. IV. Bureau of Information for Prisoners. Art. XIV. of The Hague Convention says: ! There shall be established at the outbreak of hostilities, in each of the belligerent states, and, if there be occasion, in neutral states which shall have received belligerents within their territories, a Bureau of In- formation in respect to prisoners of war. This Bureau, which is charged with replying to all applications concerning prisoners, shall receive from 1See also Art. XVI. of the Convention of The Second Hague Conference. CHAP, II., SECT. IV.] BUREAU OF INFORMATION. 115 the several branches of the service having jurisdiction of the same all the data necessary to establish the individual record of each prisoner of war. It is to be kept informed as to internments and changes, as well as to deaths and admissions to hospitals. The Bureau of Information is also to receive, centralise, and trans- mit to the properly interested parties all articles of personal property, valuables, letters, etc., which shall have been found on the field of battle or left by deceased prisoners in ambulances and hospitals. In explaining the Article, M. Rolin remarks: M. Beernaert a rappelé que J’initiative de ces propositions déga anciennes est surtout due & M. Romberg-Nisard, qui, aprés s’étre dévoué aux victimes de la guerre en 1870, n’a cessé de se préoccuper d’améliorer pour l’avenir le sort des combattants blessés ou prisoniers. Ils’agit en premier lieu, dans dispositions additionnelles, de rendre générale Vorganisation de bureaux de renseignements sur les prison- iers, analogues 4 celui qui fut institutué en Prusse dés l’année 1866 et qui rendit de si grands services durant la guerre de 1870-71. C’est Vobjet du premier de ces articles (Art. XIV). As may be seen in this remark, a Bureau of Information existed prior to the time of The Hague Convention, such as the body of volunteer nurses formed in Prussia during the Austro- Prussian War of 1866, the purpose of which was to report the conditions of the sick and wounded to their respective families at home; or the Bureau of Information established at Berlin during the war of 1870, where an individual record was first devised, by means of which various reports about the sick and wounded were collected and sent out. But it was not until the late Russo-Japanese War that a Bureau of Information in its complete form was established as a state institution according to The Hague Convention. The Bureau of Information estab- lished at Berlin in 1870 was a mere private body of Prussian vol- unteer nurses, and its functions went no farther than to simply report to their families the condition of the sick and wounded. In 1893 France issued regulations for the treatment of pris- oners of war, in which it was prescribed as the duty of a bellig- erent to establish a Bureau of Information as a state institution for giving reports on prisoners in general without distinction of 116 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. their being sick or wounded or not. But France has not en- tered into war with any other civilised country since that year, and has had no opportunity of putting the regulations into prac- tice. Of the latest wars, the one of 1898 between the United States and Spain was prior to The Hague Convention, and in the South African war of 1901 England would not hold her- self responsible to establish a Bureau of Information, the South African Republic not having been a signatory Power of the Conference at The Hague. It may be stated in this connection that Japan deserves high praise from the world for her strenu- ous exertions not only in enacting elaborate laws concerning a Bureau of Information, but in putting them into operation in regard to more than 70,000 Russian prisoners, as well as the sending back of private articles left on the field by the Russians killed in battle. The following explains how a Bureau of Information came into existence in Japan. As soon as the war broke out between Japan and Russia in February of 1904, the Japanese War Department started to make preparation for establishing a Bureau .of Information, and appointed Dr. Akiyama, one of the well-known specialists in International Law, a Councillor of the Department, to make a special investigation in regard to the institution. On the 12th of the same month General Terauchi, Minister of War, sent the following note to Baron Komura, Minister of For- eign Affairs, namely: “Enclosed please find a draft of Regulations for a Bureau of In- formation, which I have had drawn up, concerning the rules and usages of war on land. If you find no objection in it, I want to present it to the Cabinet under joint signatures with you.” Thus, the Regulations concerning a Bureau of Information were produced before the Cabinet Council under the initiative taken by both the Foreign Minister and the Minister of War. A few days later the French Minister sent a note request- ing the establishment of a Bureau of Information to make CHAP. II., SECT. Iv.] BUREAU OF INFORMATION. 117 clear the names and official rank of the Russian prisoners and of those who were dead. To this the Japanese Minister of War answered that Japan was quite willing to establish a Bureau of Information, and that when it should be opened, the request of the Russians would be complied with according to the following conditions: Conditions for Reporting. 1. The name, age, nationality, social as well as official rank, and corps name of every prisoner, alive or dead, shall be reported in a batch every ten days. 2. As the Japanese Government will give the above report, the Rus- sian Government should give the United States Embassy or Consulate in Russia a similar report about our prisoners. Letters despatched or received by prisoners of war, shall enjoy the privilege of being exempted from postal charges and that articles intended as gifts or relief for prisoners of war shall be free from all duties and from any charges on Government railways. ESTABLISHMENT AND OPENING FOR BUSINESS OF THE BUREAU OF INFORMATION. The Bureau was organised by Imperial Ordinance No. 44, dated February 27, 1904, and on the 26th of the same month Major-general S. Ishimoto was appointed President, with a staff of officials. The Bureau began its duties at the war Office on the 29th of that month. RECEIPT OF INFORMATION. Immediately upon the establishment of the Bureau the President placed himself in communication with the commanding officers of the several armies in the field, the Commander-in-chief of the fleet, the Commanders-in-chief of all naval stations, and the President of the Red Cross Society, asking for information relative to any prisoners of war who might be taken, as well as to any of the enemy who might be killed. With regard to officers it is specially arranged that the Bureau shall receive details by telegraph direct from the field as far as circum- stances may permit. The Bureau is maintaining close touch with the prison barracks. Thus the Bureau is in a position to procure promptly, by every available means, authentic and precise information about prisoners. 118 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION SO OBTAINED. Hitherto there have been inquiries, in a few cases, relative to pris- oners of war, or concerning those whom it was thought might have fallen in battle; these inquiries have been received from persons of various nationalities, and in every instance the Bureau has rendered all the assistance in its power, often causing special investigation to be made before giving a reply. On August 15, 1904, the Bureau of Information in St. Petersburg sent a telegram to the Bureau of Information in Tokyo, asking to have direct communication between them for the sake of expediting the business relative to prisoners. “De this the Japanese authorities consented. Thus the means of reporting the condition of prisoners be- came much more convenient, and reports such as the example mentioned below were regularly interchanged to the mutual satisfaction of both nations. The readers are, however, re- quested to take note that the number of Japanese prisoners in Russia, having been comparatively small, it was rather an easy task for Russia to.give the reports; while Japan, which had more than 70,000 Russian prisoners on her hands, experi- enced no small amount of difficulty in making out reports even so simple as the example here given, namely: Bureau Central de Renseignements des Prisonniers de Guerre. 28 Janvier, 1905. No. 145. St. Petersburg, Pantileimonskaya. Le Bureau Central Russe de renseignements des prisonniers de guerre a4 Vhonneur de vous informer, que deux soldats Japonais du 48 regi- ment d’infanterie de reserve: Saruwatari Genko et Matoshima ont été faits prisonniers Je 31 decembre, 1904. MARTENS. Sect. V. Restoration of Personal Property Left by Russian Soldiers. In accordance with Art. XIX. of The Hague Convention, the Japanese Bureau of Information did its best to return to the properly interested parties all articles of personal property, CHAP. II., SECT. V.] PRISONER’S PERSONAL PROPERTY. 119 valuables, etc., which were found on the field of battle or left by deceased prisoners. There were innumerable examples of this, but one only will be shown here. On the 20th of May, 1904, the Japanese Foreign Minister sent a note concerning Lieutenant Demidowitch who was killed on the battle-field, and the articles left by him, as the follow- ing list shows: List of Articles Left by Lieutenant Demidowitch, Killed on the Field of Battle. 1 Officer’s Purse, containing: 6 5-ruble Russian paper money, 3 3-ruble - ee - 11 1-ruble ne & * 3 Photographs, 1 Photograph Album, 1 Officer’s Note-book. To this letter the French Minister replied as follows: Légation de la République Frangaise au Japon. Tokyo, le 20 Mai, 1904. MONSIEUR LE BaRoN: J’ai Vhonneur d’accuser réception 4 Votre Excellence de sa lettre du 20 courant transmissive, de la part du Bureau des Prisonniers d’un airs de décés du Lieutenant d’infanterie Russe Vladimir Adamowitch Demidowitch tué le 12 avril, 1904, and environs de Wiju, ainsi que des objets trouvés sur cet officier. Je remercie Votre Excellence de cette communication et la prie de vouloir bien agréer les assurances de ma trés haute considération. J, HABMAND. Son Excellence le Baron Komura, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. It, however, involved too much trouble to transmit these articles through the French Ministry, the occurrence not being limited to a few cases, but happening thousands of times. The French Minister therefore made the following proposal. On May 30, 1904, the French Minister suggested to the Japanese Government that some change in the management should be introduced. 120 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II, To this proposal General Terauchi, Minister of War, con- sented, and adopted the following rules: 1. The clothes, caps, sacred images, cross, and other things of low value that belonged to deceased prisoners of war, shall be buried together with the dead bodies, 2. The cloaks and other articles supplied by the Russian Govern- ment shall be taken charge of by the Prisoner Barracks and be used for other prisoners, except those extremely soiled, which shall be thrown away. 3. The private property, such as clothes, shall be sold to the fel- low-prisoners of the deceased; and the proceeds, attached with the list of the articles sold, together with gold and silver wares, coins, documents, medals, keepsakes, charitable gifts, etc., shall be sent to the French Legation through the Bureau of Information. The table on next page shows the number and kind of articles left by deceased prisoners. ~ 121 CHAP. II., SECT. V.] PRISONER’S PERSONAL PROPERTY. ‘wIojsno asouvder oy} 0} Surps09o8 [eLINq IOJ SWIOY Juss Paseadap 91} Jo SauOg dT} Jo SaddId 10 ITVY JO SYOOT ‘a *2 ‘SOrTOXY 1 1 lt — Peeeesssee 1 suy 6 eae wld eee as pea gy I 8 ede ire) week nanny | ahaa eee Ser [te Ra ++ ++ ssuo1yer00aqT OTL 61z 61% sees Gap 02% 90% Td ar 6g ““SoPIAY snoaueypeostyj 8% 2 Zz See aed |i P Zz eed RveeGal se eich: wrsteeta @ | aiteflerah Sw Catistfaus auctor mt Peres 'sg0qg Il ew le ee ee ee le ee ee Il Il ae sports ssrstesese ces yes cesses somo 7‘sorpey £2 Se eww eel ee ee eee we 2 aL I we Ce + pet pes ser eres TBE ySOTey Lz 9 geet oe "| 02 IT 6 Di peers I “erusisuy 8 Zz Zz rereererl @ I p I #3 Gus aie I Freese esses sgareg ¢9 z Z "*| ¢¢ ge ST Or 6 | ere **“squeuM00q] ST nee eee ee ee eee a} 6 6 sae 6 8 T “*'+syoog ysodeq yur 0Z I I teneeee eel T I Piaa mess] or 8I trrerees ess sgnreg moRogIuep] LL II II ENE AAY BG LZ z Le ee t rrr ts ***"syoog-3j0N 69 FI PI threes) Gg 1Z 8% Ba Eades Spann bei saved cidaveatcah [hosel a gs? tbr aks SIP CGZ CGZ identi SII 6Z 68 CP trrseseel og Pires e seen ses sgamTo1g FL aig far aie Cae yaies) Scena oe rahe: | alia “TOT e L Fo eee lp Pere ee esse ees eg Bney LI g ge ster | atin ca Srahieh 6 8 ¢ ¢ 9 Zz p obese ++ +saT098 AA ZZ T T an eS 8 9 Z I 9 Prt t renee ees eees ssmONT 180°% fF aodiaar wy hand [Yerisrel ashe oat easiepre T88‘0 TLL°0 It‘0 ‘Lol reseeree len gry tress ssutog esau) “203 "Je ‘201 “01 seeseeeesboge ag 00Z Ig "OGG “ogg vets |eseees ees egurog youedy ‘I “I 1 ‘l ea ‘I I I saqna 68°67z'S | 60'60E | GO'60E |'****"***| 20°998 | 20°T6A | 00'SL | E2°FL0'T] 89°29 [SO'STO'T |" °° °° *suION UeISsNyT eZ" CS" cz" oreerar tral (anurans iran erarh Rice fea erica acercearte aca ara anim i rte t[ere estes [reser reese sees estog UROLOUIy ‘SOI 20F ~—|S0T SOT so) 00 PF OO FF ft] OO STF] 00 STF pf sutog ysysag uaé wad m8A aad -w3aA uad or GI I I or a IL eine ear g g Ww nee Geers? [Wide oats alas etree SrtA ‘aTOILAY dO GNIS F6E Lg Lg es. 6FS LES oI 88 €L ST } RTOUOSTT , POS BPO8CL.IO"ON. [B10], “sIaIpjog "S100 O “[B,0], “SIDIPJOG “s199IJO “B10 J, ‘sINIpfog | ‘s1990IyO pases eo eee aera “THIOL, “‘syovlieg UOslIg Wl} “WOT}BUIIOJUT Jo nwaing “WOT}eUMIOJUT Jo Nvaing 94} puBin uedep ul smnsuog Yyouel 0} yueg ayy Aq JazsIUlPY YOUaT oy} 0} YUEG Aq J9,s Ul YOUET,T 9q} 07 Juag sreseseesessess g9mgISMOl ‘NvdvVf NI SUANOSIUG NVIssay GAASvaIOId OL ONIONOTAG SLoqday ‘SaTaIY NO L4a’] ASOH], Vee eeeeeeeeeeesgowng 122 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. Sect. VI. Postal Regulations. Art. XVI. of The Hague Convention runs thus: Bureaus of Information shall be entitled to freedom of transport. Letters, or drafts, and sums of money, as well as postal packages ad- dressed to prisoners of war, or sent by them, shall be exempt from all postal dues, not only in the countries of origin and destination, but also in intermediate countries. Charitable gifts and relief in kind des- tined for prisoners of war shall be admitted free of import duty, and shall be transported free of cost on railways operated by the state. During the late war, in virtue of a proclamation by the Department of Communications, all gifts and relief in kind for the prisoners shall be exempt from charges for carriage by the State Railways. The Department of Finance further announced that such gifts and relief in kind shall be in all cases admitted free of duty when coming from abroad. On application, moreover, they shall be exempt from internal taxation. The following is the official translation of the Postal Reg- ulations : Réglement postal concernant Jes prisonniers de guerre. 1. Les envois postaux concernant les prisonniers de guerre, désignés comme tels dans ce réglement, sont les correspondances internes ou internationales, expédiées ou recues soit par les bureaux de renseigne- ments sur le service de ces prisonniers, soit par ces personnes elles- mémes. 2. Les envois postaux concernant les prisonniers de guerre sont régis d’aprés les dispositions générales relatives au service postal interne ou international dans tout ce qui n’est pas prévu par ce réglement. 3. L’expéditeur doit inscrire la mention ou “service des prisonniers de guerre” sur la face de ces envois. 4. Ces correspondances sont exemptées de toutes taxes postales, en vertu des traités. 5. Les récépissés pour des envois recommandés ou avec valeurs déclarées et des colis postaux, expédiés ou recus par les prisonniers de guerre doivent étre soit remis aux chefs des dépdts de ces personnes, soit donnés par eux. Réglement pour les mandats de poste concernant les prisonniers de guerre. 1. Les mandats de poste concernant les prisonniers de guerre, dé- signés comme tels dans ce réglement, sont les mandats ordinaires in- CHAP. II., SECT. VI.] SUPPORT AND PAY. 123 ternes et initernationaux, expédiés ou recus soit par les prisonniers de guerre, soit dans l’intérét de ces personnes. 2. Les mandats de poste concernant les prisonniers de guerre sont régis d’aprés les dispositions générales relatives aux mandats internes ou internationaux, dans tout ce qui n’est pas prévu par ce réglement. 3. Ces mandats sont exemptés de toutes taxes, en vertu des traités. 4, L’expéditeur de ces mandats doit déposer, au bureau de poste, Vapplication avec la mention “Service des prisonniers de guerre.” 5. Les fonds, les titres et les autres documents a livrer aux prison- miers de guerre 4 l’égard de ces mandats sont remis aux chefs des dépdts de ces personnes sans la formalité d’autorisation. 6. Les chefs des dépdts des prisonniers de guerre peuvent, au nom ‘de ces personnes et sans la formalité d’autorisation, faire au bureau de poste des demandes de toute nature a l’égard de ces mandats. Sect. VII. Support and Pay of Prisoners of War. Art. VII. of The First and Second Hague Convention de- clares : The government in whose power prisoners of war happen to be is charged with their support. In the absence of a special understand- ing between the belligerents, prisoners of war shall be treated, in re- spect to food, lodging, and clothing, in the same way as the troops of the government which has captured them. In the Russo-Japanese War Japan went a step farther than the principle of this rule, and gave to Russian prisoners of war better treatment than that given to her own troops. As to the Pay of Prisoners we had great questions. Art. XVII. of The Hague Convention says: Les officiers prisonniers pourront recevoir le complément, s'il y a. lieu, de la solde qui leur est attribuée dans cette situation par les réglements de leur pays, & charge de remboursement par leur governe- “ment. Note the English translation: Art. XVII. Officers who are prisoners of war shall receive the portion, if any there be, of the pay allowed them, as prison- ers of war, by the regulations of their own country, on condition that it be reimbursed by their own Government. (By Davis.) 124 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II, Art. XVII. Officers taken prisoners may receive, if neces- sary, the full pay allowed them in this position by their coun- try’s regulations, the amount to be repaid by their Government. (By Toll.) Professor Holland translated this article in his work, The Laws and Customs of War on Lanid, as follows: Officers taken prisoners may receive, in proper cases, the full pay allowed them while in this position by the regulations of their own country, the amount to be repaid by their Gov- ernment. The French original is quite ambiguous, and it is difficult to say which of the translations is correct. At a meeting of a committee of our Foreign Department Japan discussed it, but could not come to a decision. The rule ought to be made more clear. During the Russo-Japanese War, however, there was no occasion to put the rule into practical application; for Russia made a regular remittance of money to the French Con- sul, and it was distributed to Russian prisoners every month, The following table shows the amounts distributed, namely: From Non- | Chief of From Captain A Second Generals. | Colonel | to Second wer ane Coparaee Sere OnEy, er- | Soldiers. to Major. Lieu- *| (Officer: Sergeant. geant. tenant. 150 yen | 75 yen | 50 yen | 41 yen}25 yen} 3yen |.1 yen | 50 cents In The Second Hague Convention the real meaning of the article is made quite clear. It runs thus: Officers who become prisoners shall receive the pay to which officers of their grade are entitled in the country where they are being detained, the amount to be repaid by their government. Sect. VIII. Labour of Prisoners of War. Art. VI. of The First Hague Convention says: The state may employ prisoners of war as labourers, according to their rank and aptitude. These labours shall not be excessive, and shall have no connection with the operations of the war. CHAP. II., SECT. VIII.] LABOUR OF PRISONERS. 125 Prisoners may be authorised to be employed in the public adminis- tration, or by private individuals, or on their own account. Work done for the state shall be paid for in accordance with the rates of pay allowed to military persons of the national army when engaged upon the same work. When work is done for other departments of the government, or for private individuals, the conditions of labour shall be regulated by agreement with the military authorities. The pay of prisoners shall be employed to ameliorate their condition, and the surplus, after the expenses of their maintenance have been deducted, shall be paid over to them at the instant of their liberation. Based on the principle of this rule, Japan issued the follow- ing regulations: REGULATIONS OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PRISONERS WHO ARE EMPLOYED IN ROAD-BUILDING. ArT. I. The labour of prisoners must be less than eight hours per day, beginning at 8 o’clock a.m. and ending at 4 o’clock p.m. Art. II. Prisoners in service have holidays on every Sunday, every great festival day, and every great Russian festival day. ArT. III. For the present, 30 prisoners are employed in this service, and a petty officer and a soldier are appointed as their superintendents, and also a constable from the local police office. The number of superintendents, as well as the number of prisoners in service, may be increased if it is necessary. Art. IV. Prisoners in service must return to their prison barrack every day, and are not allowed to stay outside. Art. V. Prisoners’ and their superintendents’ railroad fare between the prison barrack and their working place must be paid by the Lyo Railroad Company. ArT. VI. For the present, interpreters should be despatched from the prison barrack at Matsuyama. Art. VII. Monthly payment is allowed regarding the payment of wages of prisoners to the government, and the company must pay it to the paymaster of the prison barrack at Matsuyama. The regulations were issued, but Japan as a state did not impose labour on the Russian prisoners. As to employing the labour of pris- oners by private individuals, there was but one case, which was at Himeji, where a private individual caused certain Russian prisoners to make leather. From olden times Himeji had been noted for producing leather; and it was from a desire to learn the Russian method of making leather that the prisoners were employed there. The reason that the Japanese Government did not make use of the labour of Rus- sian prisoners, notwithstanding their having issued regulations about it, was that even a simple superintendent of so many Russians required a rather large number of our officers, and it would have required several 126 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART IL, other arrangements to make the prisoners work as labourers. Japanese individuals also did not employ the labour of the Russians, because they did not find any special need of Russian labour in addition to the native labour, which satisfied nearly every demand. No, these were not all. There was another cause, a cause much more important, namely: Russian prisoners themselves refused to work. Some stated that they did not want to work so long as the Japanese Government supported them, and that even if they did they would not work for Japanese wages; while others declared that they would work for their own country, but not for their enemy. Thus they refused to take labour, not accord- ing to the principle of International Law, such as The Hague Conven- tion, but from their feelings as individuals. Here it is necessary to ‘study the following point: Relation Between the Labour and Support of Prisoners of War. Art. VII. of The First and Second Hague Conventions says that the government in whose power prisoners of war happen to be is charged with their support. Prisoners are fed and clothed at the expense of the state which holds them in cap- tivity, and they sometimes also receive a cash allowance. During the war of 1870 France paid to officers from £4 to £13 10s. per month, according to their rank, and to private soldiers 7.50c. per day. Germany was not so liberal; privates received nothing, and officers from £1 16s. to £3 15s. per month. (D’angeberg, No. 694.) It, however, was formerly the custom for each state to pay the cost of the maintenance of its prisoners in the enemy’s country, and when advances were made by the enemy for the subsistence of the prisoners accounts were sometimes balanced from time to time during the war, and sometimes at its ter- mination. Several treaties—e. g., those of Paris in 1763 (De Martens, Rec. i. 64), of Versailles in 1783, between England and the United Provinces in 1783, between the United States and Prussia in 1785, of America in 1802, of Paris in 1814 (Nouv. Ree. ii. 16), and of Ghent in 1814—contain stipulations for re- payment of the amount expended on either side: 1 Hall, p. 424. CHAP. II., SECT. VIII.] SWORDS AND PRISONERS, 127 According to this new principle, a State which keeps pris- oners of war in captivity undertakes on one part to pay the expenses of supporting them, and on the other can impose labour on them; and taking Arts. VI. and VII. of The Hague Convention as supplementing each other, the State has the right of deducting the expenses of their maintenance out of the wages earned by their labour. But it is a question whether the new principle is feasible in practice or not. According to the actual state of things during the Russo-Japanese War, Russian prisoners declined to take labour, and Japan did not force it, the result being that the Japanese Government had to pay the expenses of support- ing Russian prisoners without being able to deduct anything out of the wages that they should have earned. Consequently it is not a practicable rule to make it the obligation of a State to support prisoners as prescribed in Art. VII. on the reason or reciprocation of its having the right of imposing labour on them. At the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan and Russia agreed by the Portsmouth Treaty to refund to each other the expenses paid out on account of the prisoners of war. This was clearly the restoration of the old principle, and appar- ently it is a principle feasible in practice. Therefore it is be- lieved that Article VII. of The Hague Convention ought to be corrected accordingly. Sect. IX. Wearing Swords by Prisoners. Prisoners from Port Arthur, having an idea of honourable capitulation and having had money distributed to them by General Stoessel at capitulation, were very haughty towards other prisoners. Among them there were many who resisted the orders to take away the swords they wore. The Russian officers who were made prisoners of war by the capitulation of Port Arthur were sent to Japan with their swords by them. One of the terms of the capitulation allowed them to wear their swords, so that they thought it would be right to wear them 128 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II, even after arriving in Japan. They were advised to take off their swords by the superintendent regulations at Matsuyama, but they did not comply. On the 19th of January, 1905, an order was issued to the effect that the swords the pris- oners were wearing would be taken away at 10 o’clock am. on the 20th at prison barracks. The captured officers peti- tioned for delay, and it was granted by Japan’s authority. Then the higher officers stated that while they were too con- scientious to deliver their swords themselves they would have no objection to have them taken away by the Japanese com- mittee. Thereupon Captain Yoshimatsu visited the cham- bers of the captured officers of higher rank and gently took away their swords. Then the Japanese officers, calling the pris- oners of lower rank to the office, took away their swords, fin- ishing the ceremony at half-past one in the afternoon. At half-past two in the afternoon the committee, accom- panied by an interpreter visited the branch prison barrack at Mioseiji, and called several prisoners of high rank to the office and ordered them to remove the swords they were wearing. Some of them complied, but others raised objections. There- upon the committee entered the prisoners’ chamber with the interpreter and commanded them to take off their swords. There were a few officers who gave up their swords themselves, but when two officers angrily broke their swords, all the others imitated them and confusion arose. Two of them were placed under arrest, and others were advised to deliver their swords. But at last the swords were taken away at the Ichibancho Bar- racks at 4.40 in the afternoon of the same day. The Russian officers complained, and sent several notes through the hands of the French Minister. But Regulations on this point are clear. The Imperial Government of Japan sent a reply to the French Minister on the 16th of March, 1905, stating that the protest of the Rus- sian Government had no grounds, because those Russian offi- cers who declined to be released by parole in Port Arthur and who chose to be prisoners at Matsuyama must be treated just CHAP. II., SECT. X.] PRISONERS’ OFFENCES. 129 3 as other prisoners are, according to Art. VIII. of annex of the Hague Convention. In fact, they were allowed to wear their swords at the time of capitulation, but they must surrender them when they became prisoners of war, according to Art. X. of Regulations for Prisoners’ Treatment. The swords of Russian prisoners were returned to them at the time of their release by Art. XXIX. of the same Regulations. Sect. X. Prisoners’ Offences. The offence to which prisoners are most tempted is that of attempting to escape. Theoretically we cannot say that prisoners ought not to es- cape. Nay, it is considered proper, because, though unfor- tunately having fallen into enemy’s hands, yet it may be the loyal combatants’ earnest desire to serve their own country if chance allows it. If they should be successful in escaping, they would not be punished for doing so, on their recapture. But from the view point of the authorities who interned them, the escape of prisoners must be prevented by all means, so as to decrease the enemy’s fighting force. Among prisoners in- terned at Matsuyama, there were 6 officers and 13 petty officers and soldiers who made unsuccessful attempts to escape and were punished by Court-martial. A peculiar offence is theft of electric force. When a mem- ber of the Electric Light Company was despatched to repair glass lamp chimneys of electric lights in Tairinji Prison Barracks at Matsuyama, one day in September, 1905, he found that a bulb of 16 candle power had been replaced by one of 82 candle power. On inquiry, it was found that Greeve, Second Lieutenant of the Russian Navy, had bought a higher power bulb in the city and was using it in place of the 16 candle-power bulb which was being paid for. These men said that in Russian warships it is permitted to use a higher electric power in this way, and if necessary they will pay the cost. This means that theft is not an offence if the offenders pay the price, and that they offended because they are accustomed 130 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II, to offend. Of course there are some lawyers who persist that the theft of electricity does not amount to an offence. But the Electric Light Company had been receiving an ap- preciable pecuniary damage, and such an offence must be pun- ished. Accordingly they were punished by Japanese authori- ties. The following is the table, showing the offences and pun- ishment of the Russian prisoners of war: 131 CHAP. II., SECT. X.] PRISONERS’ OFFENCES. 8gL 9¢ c0L oF €I LY Té ge 8L4¢ *JEJOJ, puvsry bs T | 1 él j9F | T [8 |Zh [ZTE | 2 08 | @ el || 82 ost} jot po SaduaYo Jo Joqunu [BO], be : aie ‘Ie ‘Ie |eetleg |+--ler es stile [oes|g [+++ +e0uego ue yo uonnedexy testes rpqog, v |S T | T [et |p | T je [2h e60 | 2 49 | @ [eT |] 8h |Tely"|4 |)" eeueBO Ist dt = ae dace {tT ee Sal eae +++] +++ g9uego ue jo uonedey } * **pueuidexy ¥\¢ 4 "e 9 @ |OT T |g T [°° 99Ueyo Ysa vole “lg --le |-++--aoueyo ue jo uonnedey } -‘ysoiry uedO wl sca (anee,| exe] tas I I 9 ¢ Ite le z |: teoueyo ysiq Z se]e feccjeeefeeefeesfeesfee feof s-]e++sgouago ue ) oo... yo wontedoy { 109m I "19% “lp |:steouego 4asaty ! I : “le ez ‘ig |--c[-+-]-++-aoueygo ue ) «+ * syouueg jo uoneday 04 T “GL |PE LP |18% GOT |p ak [TTT py eauego sary) yueusuguo/y *“BNGNHSINO J 2zjielalela2lela2jyelaz el) aye la) > | aye aye lay e | ]2ye | ale 2 2 e/g |e e|a]e » & s s 2 = eles le eee /ElS (e/a 2/2) 2/8/28 /3 2/2 |e le ie l2\e eee. “81200 er ‘s1a0190 cee “S120 Tee “S120 ae “S120 ee sieowo t see e ence eee wee pee eeee + sapein gneaeae eee. aae Geanore 40 ee “aL esa Te } SRE REUENG BSA hat er ‘t+ SaONaagO ‘VM dO SHANOSIUd NVISSOUY AHL JO SLNAWHSINNd AGNV SHONAIIO AHL ONIMOHS ATAVL V 132 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II. Sect. XI. The Sick and Wounded. The Japanese Government was so careful of its obligation to receive and care for the sick and wounded among the Rus- sian prisoners, in strict conformity to Art. VI. of the Red Cross Convention, that those who were slightly wounded were sent back to the interior of Japan by military hospital ships or the hospital ships belonging to the Red Cross Society, and those severely wounded were treated until it was possible to send them to Japan in safety. In all of these cases Japan never made any distinction between her own soldiers and those of Russia. At the surrender of Port Arthur the Japanese Army re- ceived many sick and wounded Russian prisoners. For their accommodation many new temporary hospitals were opened, and besides the already established hospitals belonging to the Russian Army, Navy, and the Red Cross Society, the Japa- nese Government received and treated them in nineteen hospi- tals. After the advancement of the Third Army northward, 145 physicians and pharmacists belonging to the Liangtung Garrison Army and the Japanese Red Cross Society and 1088 nurses laboured earnestly for their medical treatment and care, assisted by 1386 Russian physicians and pharmacists who be- longed to the Russian Army and Navy, and the Red Cross Society, and 2790 sick nurses, female sick nurses, and chap- lains, At the time of the surrender of Port Arthur 17,000 Rus- sian sick and wounded came into the hands of the Japanese for treatment. Although their language and customs were different from those of Japan, they were abundantly satisfied with the treatment of the Japanese, who did their best in nurs- ing them. Mr. Barashoff, the President of the Committee of Russian Red Cross Society at Port Arthur, pronounced the treatment of the Russian sick and wounded by the Japanese Imperial Medical Staff to be perfect, and said that their management CHAP. II., SECT. XI.] SICK AND WOUNDED. 133 of business was as careful and clever as their medical practice was skilful. The 1700 Russian sick and wounded were well enough in a few months to be sent to Japan, so that when Mr. Barashoff left Port Arthur he sent a letter of thanks to General Tjichi, the commander of the fortress. The Imperial Navy received several wounded prisoners in the Naval Hospitals, and treated them medically without mak- ing any distinction between them and her own men. In 1904 there were only 18 prisoners who were under the care of Sasebo Naval Hospital. On May 27 and 28, 1905, the famous Japan Sea fight took place. After this battle the Russian sick and wounded who were received by the Sasebo Naval Hospital, the Maizuru Naval Hospital, the Tsushima Defence Detachment Hospital, and the Hamada Military Hospital, were over 338 in number. On the other hand, there were 726 wounded in 1904 and 6790 in 1905 among the prisoners who were interned in the prison barracks, and many sick as well. Thereupon, the Art. XII. of Minutie of Rules of the Prisoners’ Treatment provided that the prison barrack can, if necessary, have a hos- pital chamber, providing sanitary materials, clothes, beds, and furniture equal to the military hospitals, and accordingly hos- pitals were opened in prison barracks at Matsuyama, Hamadera, and Narashino, so that prisoners who were sick and wounded could be sent immediately from the battle-field to the barracks, where they could be taken to the hospital. In one case there was an epidemic, and the patients were taken to the Military Preparatory Hospitals to receive the same kind of medical treatment as the patients of the Japanese army, according to Art. XIIT. of the same Minutiz. Prisoners had especially good care because the prison bar- rack, following Art. XIV. of the Minutie, not only employed the regular military surgeons attached to the garrison, but also caused the sick and wounded among the prisoners to be treated by the surgeons and doctors of the Red Cross Society who were under the superintendence of the regular military sur- geon. Thus prisoners enjoyed the most improved medical and 134 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART 11, surgical treatment, and were given the care of faithful male and female nurses. There were 79,817 Russian sick who were treated medically in the military and naval hospitals and the hospitals connected with the prison barrack, and there were 77,494 patients who were restored to health. (See the Table No. III.) Deceased numbered 373. Sick and wounded prisoners who on recovering were deemed incapable of further military service were not interned with the others, but the Japanese Government, con- forming to Paragraph 2 of Art. VI. of the Red Cross Con- vention released and sent back all of those who were considered incapable of further military service, with the exception of some who could serve their country with their mental powers, requiring of those sent that they do not take the arms again during the war, as in the Art. XXIII. The Russian sick and wounded who became prisoners at the surrender of Port Arthur were 4319 in number, 3438 being military officers and soldiers and 601 being naval officers and sailors. Seventeen voyages were made from Port Arthur to Chefoo from March 5 to May 22, 1905, to deliver the men and Rus- sian medical attendants into the charge of the Russian Consul at Chefoo. The returning of permanently disabled Russian prisoners from the interior of Japan began October 23, 1904. There was an old paymaster, 12 petty officers and soldiers, and 34 medical members. They were delivered to the French Con- sul at Kobe, and the total number of prisoners sent back at the eight different times is shown in the annexed Table No. I. It is noteworthy that all Russian prisoners who lost eyes or limbs in the field of battle were given artificial members through the charity of Her Majesty the Japanese Bayes: as shown in annexed Table No. II. Among many Russian prisoners there was one military officer and 123 petty military officers and soldiers and 9 petty naval officers and marines who received artificial limbs, and one military and one naval officer, 17 petty military officers CHAP. II., SECT. XI.] SICK AND WOUNDED. 135 and soldiers and two petty naval officers who received artificial eyes. ; Fourteen hundred and fifty-three Russians who died in Field Hospitals, Hospitals at Port Arthur, or prison barracks or during the journey to the interior, were buried, following the Arts. XXVI. and XXVIII. of Minutie. In the field the Japanese authorities paid due regard to their rank and grade in burying the dead, and made Buddhist priests attached to the army perform their religious ceremonies. In the interior they had the pastors of Russian Catholic Churches perform their religious rites, and buried the dead in the Military Burial-place, and where it was found to be narrow, they selected some other suitable place. The wills of prisoners were received and drawn up on the same conditions as for soldiers of the national army, as the Art. XIX. of The Hague Convention dictates, yet the Japanese allowed them to make the wills according to the effectual forms in their own country, if it was their desire. Conforming to the Art. XXXI. of the Minutiz, these wills, with bequests, were sent to the Information Bureau. If the Articles bequeathed were very hard to preserve, then the Japa- nese changed them to money by selling them, and sent the money to the Information Bureau. The Information Bureau sent these wills, bequests, or money to the French authorities, who sent them to the families or relatives of the deceased per- sons. I. Table on next page shows prisoners who were delivered to French Consul at Kobe for the reason that they were in- capable of serving though recovered, or who were discovered to be members in the medical service after being received. 136 LAWS OF LAND WARFARE. [PART II, Released | Released | Released GRADE, Oct. 23, | Feb. 24, | April 22, Total. 1904. 1905. 1905. PAY TAS COT eee oe rdcacerteose dness diaroreie he) Wheeeennsyarcallets enor ences 1 Military or Naval Physician....... 3 4 3 10 One who takes charge of Physician. AP |“ fawenerayeites 4 5 Pharmacist.........-....-.--0+-- Ae aaa cde] ont oeeekeer 1 Chief of Sick Nurses.............- 20 12 68 100 Sick Nurses... ..........00.0000- Qs | I Lanes atasiesedsiel| eactapaenst teas 9 Members in Medical Service.......]......--].-.-.--- 68 68 Civil Of C68: 5 penne aie v eerexa'| ge vaenadloesea nes 1 1 Benevolent Sick Nurses..........-|...-.---)e.se 200s 1 1 SOLAIETS§s .gcosiyiadeiin Herd oun Riad ansaaaaaee 12 Si | eewine ee 17 Soldiers under one’s personal com- RV ETN poche ve Sncbien Basis So anzoreaeoncacateec se Cial daeaebsabaad bogie 5 1 6 Missionaries............. BM ascanteewdl ghttee oor TL rete onda fhe 1 SGrvatits