AMERICAN REACTIONS TO INDONESIA’S ROLE
IN THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
FREDERICK P. BUNNELL
INTERIM REPORTS SERIES
MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Asian Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
Price — $2.00ί
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1AMERICAN REACTIONS TO INDONESIA’S ROLE
IN THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
Frederick P. Bunnell
*
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INTERIM REPORTS SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Asian Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
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(Έ) 1961). by Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
PREFACE
Those who have followed the history of Indonesia’s foreign rela-
tions will have been struck by the frequent lack of congruence between
the Indonesian conception of the country's posture in international
affairs and its perception abroad. The reasons for this are generally
complex, and it is undoubtedly as difficult for Indonesians to under-
stand them as it is for other people. There have been, however, during
the past decade and a half, a number of episodes in the course of
Indonesia's foreign relations which have been important in developing
this incongruity and which, if fairly analyzed, should help to explain
it. Such an episode was the September 1961 Belgrade Conference of non-
aligned countries. Mr. Bunnell's account and analysis of the American
reaction which it provoked is, I believe, a useful contribution to an
understanding of this development, helpful, I would hope, to Indonesians
as well as to Americans.
The fact that the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing on the
eve of the Belgrade Conference served to ensure that world—and
particularly American—interest in the Conference would be keen. As
one of the three co-sponsors of the Conference—and perhaps also be-
cause of the leading role she had played in the Asian-African Confer-
ence held at Bandung in 1955—Indonesia received particular attention.
Certainly the image of Indonesia in the United States was defined
more clearly by the Belgrade Conference; the fact that the Conference
provoked a hostile reaction on the part of some segments of opinion
in this country tended to ensure that at the same time that Indonesia's
image was becoming clearer it was also being viewed more critically.
It should be emphasized that this study is confined primarily to
American reactions to the Belgrade Conference and, especially, the
American assessment of Indonesia's part in it. No account is given of
the proceedings of the Conference as such; nor does Mr. Bunnell attempt
to present or explain Indonesia's aims at Belgrade. He devotes the
major part of his study to an account of the reaction of the American
press and Congress to the Conference, and Indonesia's role in it, and
to an assessment of the effect of this reaction on Administration
policy towards Indonesia. This is an Interim Report, based only on
sources available in the United States, and Mr. Bunnell wishes to make
clear that his study as here presented is provisional and tentative.
Mr. Bunnell is currently in Indonesia pursuing research relating to
Indonesia’s relations with the United States. It is my hope and ex-
pectation that his work there will lead to the publication of a fuller
iiiand broader monograph of considerable importance to those inter-
ested in Indonesia's foreign relations in general and Indonesian-
American relations in particular.
Ithaca, New York
December 20, 1963.
George McT.
Director
Kahin
ivTABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER	Page
PREFACE	iii
INTRODUCTION: THE "MODERATE1' AND "MILITANT" POSI-
TIONS	AT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE	vii
I	AMERICAN PRESS REACTIONS TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE	1
The Vehement Reaction	3
The Moderate Reaction	U
The Relatively Mild Reaction	7
Indonesia's Image in the Press Reaction
to Belgrade	11
II	THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION TO THE BELGRADE
CONFERENCE	l£
The Major Sources of	Irritation	lf>
The Administration’s Post-Belgrade
Aid Policy	18
a)	The Special Disappointment
with	Yugoslavia	22
b)	India	2i|
c)	UAR	2k
d)	Ghana	2k
e)	Indonesia	26
III	THE IMPACT OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE ON
CONGRESS, 1961	33
The House Aid Debate of September $	3U
Senate Debate of September l3	ii3
vCHAPTER
Page
IV THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION IN 1962j THE PASSMAN
COMMITTEE HEARINGS	55
Chairman Passman’s Views and Tactics
in the 1962 Hearings	55
The Relative Tactical Importance of
the Belgrade Conference	59
Elements in the Committee’s Perception
of	Indonesia	63
a)	Passman's Views	63
b)	Ford’s Views	65
c)	Rhodes’ Views	65
The Distribution of Power on the
Passman Committee	66
The Implications for Indonesia	68
V CONCLUSIONS	71
APPENDIX
I COMMENTS OF AMBASSADOR KENNAN ON PRESIDENT TITO'S
SPEECH TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE ON
SEPTEMBER 3, 196l	7U
II VOTING RECORDS OF THE PASSMAN COMMITTEE MEMBERS	76
viINTRODUCTION
THE "MODERATE" AND "MILITANT" POSITIONS AT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
In late April of 1961 President Tito of Yugoslavia and President
Nasser of the United Arab Republic jointly announced their intention to
organize a summit conference of non-aligned nations. Three weeks later
Indonesia officially indicated that she too would be a co-sponsor of
the projected meeting. After securing the reluctant support of Prime
Minister Nehru of India, the three sponsors convened a Preparatory Con-
ference of twenty-one non-aligned nations in Cairo on June ζ. This
meeting was marked by considerable disagreement on several issues. The
most important of these concerned the scbpe of the agenda and the
length of the invitation list. In both of these matters the three
sponsors again found themselves at odds with. India. Still refusing to
commit herself to participation in the planned summit gathering, India
insisted on the exclusion from the agenda of major colonial disputes—
disputes such as Angola, Algeria, the Congo, and West Irian. All of
these touched on the special interests of one or more of the sponsors
and their African supporters. Moreover, a militant anti-colonialism
had become for many of these nations the central focus of their foreign
policies. For India, on the other hand, a militant anti-colonialism
seemed unwarranted. Nehru's position was that not only had Western
colonialism virtually disappeared from Asia and Africa, but in the
early summer of 1901 the issue of world peace demanded priority. With
the Berlin Crisis deepening, the responsibility of the non-aligned
nations was to concentrate on ways to decrease tension between the two
world powers.
It was this dispute over the relative priority of the issues of
peace and colonialism that lay also behind the Cairo Conference
controversy over the invitation list. Essentially, India sought to
expand the invitations to embrace both moderate Asian-African neutrals,
such as Nigeria, and the traditional European neutrals, such as
Sweden. With these nations present, India believed she would have a
better opportunity to restrain the militant anti-colonialism of the
sponsors and their supporters and provide a fuller opportunity to work
towards a US-Soviet detente. The sponsors, on the other hand, clearly
wished to preserve their dominance by restricting the summit meeting
to the nations present at Cairo. Bargaining on this issue extended at
least into early July, the ultimate result being that the sponsors
prevailed—though in part because some of India's proposed invitees
declined to attend. Thus it was that in Belgrade on Friday, September
1, 1961, 2k nations—later 25> with the arrival of Congo delegates—
viiopened "The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned
Countries.”
Generally speaking, the most conspicuous theme to emerge from the
Conference addresses, the reports of the secret Committee meetings,
and the final declarations was the continuing tension between the
priorities of easing cold war tensions and mounting an attack on
colonialism. As at Cairo, India was without question the chief pro-
tagonist of what, from a Western perspective, was a relatively
moderate position. Not only did Prime Minster Nehru publicly lecture
the Conference on the waning significance of the colonial problem, but
he warned them against making specific proposals for the settlement of
the Berlin and German questions. These were, he said, the most urgent
questions, but they could be settled only by the great powers. The
task of the non-aligned nations was to create the proper atmosphere for
negotiations between the Soviet Union and America. This could only be
done by articulating their demand for peace and exerting their collec-
tive pressure for negotiations. For nations of meagre military and
economic strength to attempt more than this was futile. More important,
any specific suggestions made by the Belgrade participants would be
likely to irritate one side or the other and thus exacerbate tensions.
Although there were significant differences between them, the
three Conference sponsors—Yugoslavia, the U.A.R., and Indonesia—
all dissented from the moderate course urged by Nehru. Of the three
sponsors, it was, however, Indonesia that clashed most directly with
India both in the public meetings and in the secret committee sessions.
This clash is amply illustrated by the sharp contrast offered by the
addresses of Nehru and Sukarno to the Conference. Activated by both
domestic political considerations and a deep ideological commitment,
Sukarno delivered a scathing denunciation of colonialism. Not only did
he disagree with Nehru's estimate of the threat to peace posed by the
remnants of traditional colonialism, but he also warned of the "real
danger” of "colonialism in a new cloak, the so-called neo-colonialism."
This new form of colonialism included, he said, the various strategems
employed by Western powers to preserve their economic interests—and
sometimes also their political and military concerns—in their former
colonies. In Sukarno's view this double-faceted colonialism constituted
the most urgent issue confronting the non-aligned nations. While not
denying the danger to world peace posed by cold war tensions, Sukarno
rejected Nehru's assumption that the prime cause of world tension lay
in ideological conflict between the Great Powers. To make such an
assumption was to misread world history, for the real cause of inter-
national tension was the confrontation between the "old forces of
domination" and the "new emergent forces for freedom and justice."
Unlike the cold war tensions, this confrontation could not be resolved
through coexistence. For, in Sukarno's words, "there can be no co-
existence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-
colonialism on the other side." The chief threats to world peace,
Sukarno argued, lay in Angola and West Irian rather than in Berlin.
viiiJust as the more militant sponsors’ position, illustrated by
Sukarno’s Conference address, dissented from Nehru's analysis of the
causes of world tension, so also it tended to propose a radically
different resolution of those tensions. The most important re-
sponsibility of a non-aligned nation truly devoted to world peace
was to intensify the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism.
As for the cold war confrontation, the task of the non-aligned was
greater than that suggested by Nehru. The role of the non-aligned
must be measured against the tide of history not merely in terms of a
calculation of military and economic strength. As the leaders of
the ’’new emergent forces,” the non-aligned nations deserved a promi-
nent role in the settlement of all world issues, not just those
directly affecting their own regions. Moreover, it was consistent
with such a role, that these nations not refrain from suggesting
specific solutions to world problems and, in short, assume a more
assertive role in international affairs than was agreeable to Nehru.
There were other important elements in the proceedings of the
Belgrade Conference that would refine this simplified portrayal of
the ideological contrasts between the moderate Indian position and
the more militant position represented by Indonesia. Moreover,
other aspects of the Conference—such as the impact of the Soviet
resumption of nuclear testing—bore on the character of the factional
differences within the Conference and at the same time constituted
important independent themes. Nevertheless, in this brief back-
ground to a study of American reactions to the Belgrade Conference,
it is especially important to illuminate the moderate-militant
divergence. For not only did this divergence occupy a prominent
place in most American comment on the Conference, but the nature of
those American comments also raises a crucial question about the
capacity of many American editors, Congressmen, and Administration
officials to understand the motivations behind non-alignment.
ixCHAPTER I
AMERICAN PRESS REACTIONS TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
On the eve of the Belgrade Conference the Soviet Union announced
that it was about to resume nuclear testing. That announcement had a
profound effect on the delegates gathering in Belgrade. It had an
even more profound effect on the American press. (1) Suddenly the
significance of the Belgrade meeting had multiplied. Moscow’s action
had imparted a new dramatic urgency to the attention first turned on
Belgrade by the Berlin Crisis. In American eyes the neutrals had been
placed on trial. Such was the theme of initial press comment typified
by the New York Times editorial captioned, "Moscow Challenges
Belgrade”:
The Belgrade meeting of ’’non-aligned" —or "positive
neutralist" —Governments opened yesterday in what was ob-
viously an atmosphere of crisis. The crisis arose from
the challenge which had been contemptuously thrown before
the Belgrade meeting by the Soviet Government earlier this
week when it unexpectedly announced its intention of resum-
ing nuclear testing, including testing of the most powerful
hydrogen bombs the world has ever known. Already it can be
seen that the success or failure of the Belgrade meeting
will be decided by how it reacts to that challenge. (2)
In underscoring the challenge Soviet policy had imposed on the non-
aligned conference, much of the press expressed considerable confidence
that Belgrade would respond to the challenge. Even papers consistently
hostile to neutrals felt that Moscow’s blatant brutality would jolt
the most complacent neutral. Such, for example, was the reaction of
the Chicago Tribune in its lead editorial of September 1 entitled
"Farewell to Illusion":
(1)	The papers used to illustrate American press reaction were
arbitrarily selected on the basis of those available in the Cornell
University Library. As such they do constitute a selection of
leading papers from major regions of the country. They do not,
however, constitute a rigorously selected sample of the American
press as a whole.
(2)	Editorial, New York Times, Sep. 2, 1961 (henceforth cited as Times
or NYT, without year unless other than 1961.)
12
"World opinion,’* for what it is worth, is outraged at
the Soviet stimulus to an arms race...The profession that
Russia is a champion of peace can be seen for what it is,
although why there should have been any bemusement on that
score is a mystery. (3)
Papers more sympathetic to neutrals adopted a similar stance.
They too hailed what seemed an inevitable propaganda victory for an
America accustomed to steady abuse from "world opinion." The Atlanta
Constitution heartily endorsed Secretary Rusk’s professed intention to
let the Soviet resumption announcement "soak in hard." Like Rusk, the
Constitution editor assumed he understood the psychology of the
non-alignedj
The Soviet announcement is, in a grotesque way, an
American victory...The side that unilaterally resumed test-
ing was bound to take a beating in world opinion. Russia,
not America, must now take that beating. (U)
In a similar vein the vast majority of the press indicated that the
uncommitted would this time side with the West in condemning patent
treachery by the Soviet Union. ($) The fact that the US itself had
appeared to be on the verge of resuming tests was, for the most part,
conveniently forgotten—though in some instances it was cited as
another reason for hailing the Soviet propaganda blunder. As the
Kansas City Star frankly put it, the US had been relieved of "an
extremely serious problem of world opinion." (6)
For the vast majority of American editors the non-aligned leaders
disappointed expectation. Most viewed the Belgrade reaction to the
Soviet tests as woefully mild. In addition, they resented the per-
sistence of what they termed the neutrals’ "double standard" on other
cold war issues—a "double standard" that allegedly discriminated
against the West. Some editors echoed their reporters in lauding
Nehru’s efforts to tone down the anti-Westernism of the militant
majority, but in the end the Belgrade Conference emerged as an un-
qualified symbol of the neutrals’ hypocriscy and pro-Soviet
proclivities.
(3) Editorial, Chicago Tribune, Sep. 1. Cf. New Orleans Times-
Picayune, Sep. 1 and Wall Street Journal, Sep. 5>.
(U) Editorial, Atlanta Constitution, Sep. 1.
(5)	See sampling of press reactions to Soviet test announcement in
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 3· Also see Max Frankel, NYT,
Sep. 1.
(6)	Cited in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 3· Concerning American
plans for the resumption of testing, see NYT, Sep. 1.3
The Vehement Reaction
The most emotional and simplistic cold war judgements of the
Conference came from the chauvinistic, conservative press. Probably
representing more than a majority of the editorial voices in the
country, this segment of the press tended to reflect and determine
the "mood response*1 of the ’’mass public.*’ (7) In the midwest the
Chicago Tribune reacted with predictable vehemence. And like many
conservatives in Congress the Tribune pointedly linked the conduct of
the Belgrade neutrals to American aid policy:
The US has about 6 billion in foreign aid invested in
this bunch of myopic opportunists, whose conception of
justice is anything that gives them advantage, and whose
dedication to peace can be translated as a dispostion to
accept with equanimity the destruction of Western civiliza-
tion as long as their hides come through unscathed.
There isn't a nickel’s worth of principle or morality
in the whole crummy crowd, and in the face of the apelike
Khrushchev’s studied insults and his determination to impose
the law of the jungle in the whole world, all that the lot
of them can do is to withdraw into their mental bomb shelters,
as impervious to reality as to reason or ethics. (8)
In siding with the Tribune, the New Orleans Times-Picayune
spoke for the Southern conservative bloc in Congress. Under the title
'•Uhdiscerning Conscience,” it declared:
(7)	It is generally agreed that the majority of the press editorials
in the United States tend to be both more conservative and more
chauvinistic than either of the last two Administrations. See
V. 0. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York,
1961), ChapTTTI
The terms "mood response” and ’’mass public” are taken from a
most stimulating study by Gabriel Almond, The American People and
Foreign Policy (New York, I960), especially Chapter VII.
For estimates of the impact of the mass media—including the
press—on the opinions of various elements of the American public,
see the cautions expressed by Almond, op. cit., p. lltO, and
elaborated in Key, op. cit., Chaps, IJ4. and ίί>.
The terms conservative and chauvinistic are obviously in-
adequate for characterizing the general foreign policy orienta-
tion of a newspaper. The former term is perhaps aspec-i ally
misleading because of the lack of correlation between '’conserva-
tiveness” and what is now falsely termed ”isolationism." See
Key, op. cit., Chapter 7, on “Interrelations of Opinion.”
(8)	Editorial, Chicago Tribune, Sep. 6.ii
To be sure, no one expected these neutral countries to
be too "harsh” with Khrushchev even though it might be
routine for many of them to belabor the whole world day in
and day out for a multiplicity of fancied wrongs.
But certainly as a distillation of the world’s conscience
the conference of the neutral nations failed dismally in not
indicating in some fashion its recognition of the fact that
Moscow's resumption of nuclear testing does anything but
help ward off danger of nuclear war "which threatens the
world and humanity". (9)
Other papers predisposed against the Kennedy Administration policy of
wooing the neutralists joined the chorus of emotional denunciation.
The Hew York Daily News, the Washington Evening Star, and the
Minneapolis Star expressed varying degrees of bitterness with
Belgrade. (10)
The conservative press evaluation of the Belgrade Conference
found its most telling representation in a cartoon. On the day the
Belgrade "peace mission" conferred with President Kennedy in Washington,
the Chicago Tribune adorned its front page with a graphic message.
Under the caption, "The Neutral Can't Choose Between Right and Wrong,"
a cartoon showed Nehru undecided between the United States—pictured
as "The Good Samaritan"—and the Soviet Union—represented as a
"Vicious Barbarian." Clearly the Tribune was not impressed with its
own stories on Nehru's efforts to moderate the tone of the Belgrade
declaration. (11)
The Moderate Reaction
The most significant aspect of the American press reaction to the
Belgrade Conference appears on the editorial pages of the highly in-
fluential New York Times and Washington Post. Generally relatively
sympathetic to neutralist sentiments and their economic needs, these
two papers constitute a good index of the pervasiveness of American
irritation with Belgrade. Although the Times and Post seldom affect
the sentiment of the "mass public," they do penetrate the more
strategic levels of public opinion—the levels of the "attentive public"
and the "foreign policy elites." (12) Their view would, in short, tend
(9)	Editorial, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sep. 10.
(10)	See editions of these papers for Sep. 6, Sep. 7> and Sep. $
respectively.
(11)	Cartoon appears in Chicago Tribune, Sep. 13. Stories on Nehru
appear on Sep. 3 and For back-handed editorial praise for
Nehru, see editorial, Sep. 6.
(12)	Again Almond's terms. See Almond, op. cit., especially pp. 138-5
to reflect and partially determine the degree of impact the Belgrade
Conference would have in the highest levels of the Kennedy Admin-
istration» (13)
Consistent with their relatively great emphasis on international
affairs, the Times and Post reacted editorially more quickly to
Belgrade than did the Chicago Tribune or the New Orleans Times-
Picayune. (lit) Complementing front page dispatches by their own
reporters in Belgrade, both papers ran considerable editorial comment.
These comments proved more discriminating and sophisticated than those
already cited. But as the Times editorial on the opening speeches
demonstrates, the liberal-internationalist press tended to share some
of the moral indignation of their more conservative-isolationist
colleagues. Alluding to "Moscow’s Challenge to Belgrade,” the Times
delivered this judgement of Tito, Nasser and Sukarno:
It must regretfully be said that the proceedings during
yesterday’s initial meeting in Belgrade were far from
encouraging. Of the three opening speakers, Tito, Sukarno,
and Nasser, only the latter spoke with anything remotely like
the required honesty in condemning the planned Soviet crime
against all humanity. The other two speakers dodged the
issue which they knew was in the mind of every person in
their audience. President Sukarno was particularly shock-
ing since that gentlemen found it possible in the same
speech to come out with what was virtually a demand that
the West bow in all respects to the Soviet "solution” for
Berlin and Germany. (15)
Despite the cryptic title "It Pays to Be Wicked?," the Post re-
acted somewhat less severely than the Times. It merely confessed
to "rueful resignation" at the neutrals’ initial "discreet disapproval"
of the Soviet tests. Furthermore it pointed out that there is a
"profound compliment in this double standard," just as it was willing
to concede that it is "doubtless true that many of the emergent
nations have had bitter first-hand experience with Western colonial-
ism." Essentially, however, the Post shared much of the Times’
(13) Evidence for this statement is necessarily circumstantial. For
one impressive instance of such, note Senate Majority Whip
Humphrey’s citation of Washington Post (henceforth cited as Post)
and Times editorials in his floor speech on Belgrade and American
testing; Congressional Record, Sep. 16, pp. 19896-98. See Key’s
discussion of the quality press; Key, op. cit., p. hO5. Also see
Douglas Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston, 1959).
(lH) The date of the first editorials were as follows: NYT, Sep. 2;
Post, Sep. 2; Chicago Tribune, Sep. 6; and New Orleans Times-
Picayune, Sep. 10.
(l5) Editorial, NYT, Sep. 2. For a more moderate assessment of Sukarno's
position on the Berlin and German question see the report of the
Times’ own correspondent, M. S. Handler, in the same issue.6
irritation» It admitted its aggravation «that the pious preachments
of the neutrals are sometimes directed with even-handed nicety to both
West and East.” (16)
Later, at the conclusion of the Conference, the editors of the
Times and Post underscored their disapprobation of neutral conduct
under the themes of "Disappointment at Belgrade" and "Belgrade’s
Eloquent Silences." Mingled with their annoyance at the neutrals’
failure to side with the moral principles of the Western cold war
position was a broader concern. The neutrals had, in their view,
forfeited the opportunity to play their professed role as "the con-
science of mankind." And by abdicating that role they had undermined
those in the West—including the Times and Post—who had persistently
counseled delay in US resumption of tests. ΤΪ77
The stress of the Times and the Post on the neutrals’ failure to
grasp their opportunity for moral leadership finds its sharpest ex-
pression in a Herblock cartoon. (18) Displaying awareness of the
factional line-up at Belgrade, Herblock did not follow the Chicago
Tribune in selecting Nehru as the prototype of the Belgrade leader.
Rather he selected a leader of the militant faction that opposed Nehru.
Significantly that choice was President Sukarno. There was no question
as to the identity of the prototype. Dressed in a military uniform,
the figure wore Sukarno’s characteristic accoutrements—dark glasses
and a black pitji. With devastating mockery Herblock pictured Sukarno
atop a child’s sandpile labeled "Belgrade Resolutions." Clutched in his
hand is the standard of non-alignment. Its banner bears the slogan
"We are firmly opposed to the evils of the 19th century." With his
other hand Sukarno shields his eyes in order to survey better the
terrain ahead. But directly behind this ludicrous caricature of a
visionary statesman towers a tremendous mountain peak symbolizing the
"Neutrals’ Opportunity for Moral Leadership." As a final touch Herblock
had added the caption "The Sandpile Summit."
As already indicated, both the Times and the Post displayed a much
greater degree of discrimination in their attacks on the Belgrade
Conference than did most papers. The appropriateness of Herblock*s
choice of Sukarno as the militant neutralist prototype is paralleled in
the Post1s editorial praise for Nehru. "The Conference of non-aligned
nations, thanks to Prime Minister Nehru’s exertions, faced up to the
unpalatable fact that tomorrow’s thermonuclear wars may be more
than yesterday’s colonial wars. That was a gain for realism." (19)
(16)	Post, Sep. 2.
(17)	NTT, Sep. 6, and Post, Sep. 7.
(18)	Post, Sep. 7· The same cartoon was reprinted the following Sunday
in the NYT, Section IV, Sep. 10.
(19)	Post, Sep. 7-7
Amid its general '’disappointment'’ the Times also saw some positive
features in the Belgrade meeting:
Yet with all its shortcomings, the meeting also
demonstrated that reality —as distinct from dogma —is
touching the conscience of the "neutralists." Thus,
despite all their discretion, they were far less
enthusiastic about communism than at Bandung six years
ago} and President Tito's best efforts failed to
persuade them to downgrade the United Nations Secretary
General. Their next meeting should show them even
farther advanced along the road of genuinely objective
judgement that would lend meaning and stature to their
neutralist position. (20)
The Relatively Mild Reaction
A few papers seemed to deviate from the consensus of "disappoint-
ment" and "aggravation" registered in the Times and Post as well as in
the conservative press. The most puzzling of these is the San
Francisco Chronicle. The day after the Times and Post had expressed
their initial indignation with the opening speeches at Belgrade, the
Chronicle characterized those same speeches in the following fashion:
"national leaders who have consistently echoed Soviet aspiration
against Western imperialism and colonialism, have expressed shock
and bitter regret over Soviet action." (21) Clearly, the Chronicle
attached different meaning to the words "shock" and "regret" than
did the Times or Post editors—not to mention the Chicago Tribune.
What seems to explain this satisfaction with the neutrals' response
to the Soviet tests is the Chronicle's steadfast opposition to the
resumption of American testing. By keeping alive the notion that
the Soviets had suffered a propaganda defeat on the testing question,
the editors of the Chronicle could hang on to an important supporting
argument against American tests. Significantly, they did not follow
the Times and Post in approving the President's decision on September 6
to resume US tests. (22)
The Denver Post also displayed some hesitancy in condemning the
Belgrade leaders. As late as September U the Post described the
neutral leaders' reaction to the Soviet tests as "irate." Confidently
it asserted that the Soviets had suffered "at least a short-term
propaganda defeat." But an accompanying cartoon showed that the
Post had limited respect for the neutrals' moral fiber. It depicted
(20)	NYT, Sep. 6.
(21)	Editorial was entitled "World Reacts to Soviet Blunder."
San Francisco Chronicle, Sep. 3.
(22)	Editorial was entitled "Bleak Return of Atomic Tests."
San Francisco Chronicle, Sep. 7.8
the Belgrade nations running for cover in the face of the Soviet
tests. (23)
A more significant instance of a comparatively mild reaction to
the Belgrade Conference appears in the Christian Science Monitor. On
September $ the Monitor editor Erwin Canham argued that the anticipated
propaganda defeat for the Soviet Union had, in fact, taken place. The
editorial’s wording suggests, however, some tension between the
Monitor1s perception of Belgrade reactions and its predisposition to
be sympathetic to the neutrals.
Thus, although some of the more communistically in-
clined of the delegates gathered at Belgrade have made
proposals regarding Berlin which would play right into
Mr. Khrushchev’s hands, most of them—like Prime Minister
Nehru of India—have in the end condemned the action in
Berlin. There has been virtually no defense of his resump-
tion of nuclear testing except in the satellite bloc
itself. (2h)
Finally among the relatively mild reactions to Belgrade, mention
must be made of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Its reaction is noteworthy
primarily because, like the Times and Post, it can claim considerable
influence among the ’’foreign policy elites.” In addition, the Post-
Dispatch commands special interest because of its close identification
with a sympathetic policy toward neutral countries. Even more
emphatically than the Times and Post, the St. Louis paper vigorously
supported the Stevenson-Bowles stress on America’s need to identify
with the aspirations of the newly independent, uncommitted nations.
Implicit in this approach were assumptions about the importance of
'•world public opinion,” the role of the United Nations and the motiva-
tions of non-aligned nations that had won acceptance in official policy
during the first nine months of the Kennedy Administration. (25) Hie
Belgrade Conference offered a dramatic test of those assumptions. Not
only the neutrals themselves, but American policy was on trial at
Belgrade. For this reason the impact of Belgrade on one of the most
outspoken press supporters of Administration policy gives some clue to
whether Belgrade would induce a policy review In the Administration.
(23) Denver Post, Sep. h.
(2l|) Christian Science Monitor, Sep. 5.
(25) References to the Stevenson-Bowles group or a like-minded group
within the Administration appear in the following articles,
among others: NYT, Aug. 27; Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 29;
Hanson Baldwin, NYT, Sep. 7; James Reston, NYT, Sep. 25; Warren
Unna, Post, Aug. 20; Joseph Alsop, Post, Sep. 9; Newsweek,
Sep. U, pp. 28-29.9
On September 3, in their initial editorial on the Belgrade Con-
ference, the Post-Dispatch revealed none of the "rueful resignation"
and "shock" that marked the September 2 editorials in the Post and
Times, As with the San Francisco Chronicle, the Post-Dispatch opposi-
tion to the resumption of US tests may at least partly account for its
view of the Belgrade reaction to the Soviet tests. Asserting that
Russia was "reaping the whirlwind of world contumely," it went on to
warn that the US would face a similar denunciation if she followed the
view of "powerful elements" urging test resumption. Departing sharply
from the,Times evaluation of the initial speeches at Belgrade the Post
Dispatch pointed to Nasser's expression of "deep regret" with the
Russian test decision. Of more significance, however, was the succeed
ing sentences "This probably expressed the feelings of most of the
delegates, for while all the countries are by no means monolithic
all have a deep interest in disarmament," Like the Monitor's
appraisal, this statement carefully skirts the critical question of
whether the public statements at Belgrade—other than Nasser’s—lived
up to neutral pretensions of morality. In not raising this question
and instead conveying the impression that the neutrals were condemn-
ing the Soviets, the Post-Dispatch like the Monitor—and perhaps the
Chronicle—exhibited a degree of patience and sympathy with non-
aligned nations lacking in the reaction of both the conservative and
moderate press. (26)
Significantly, the Post-Dispatch devoted only a small portion of
its initial editorial to the question primary in most other editorial
declarations—-how well the neutrals rated on cold war issues. Most
of the September 3 editorial constituted an affirmation of support for
the Administration policy toward neutralism. They explicitly praised
the President for having adopted views "a long way from the attitude
once expressed by Secretary of State Dulles, that neutralism is
immoral." Specifically with regard to Belgrade, the Administration
had taken "the proper position"—"identifying without trying to in-
fluence on specific issues." In offering justifications for the
Administration's deference to neutralism, the Post-Dispatch first
noted that the countries represented at Belgrade totaled about one-
fourth of the UN membership. Then they concluded with what could be
construed as a cautious reply to those who questioned the importance
of neutralist opinion in power politics:
The importance of a neutral force in the world is
growing rather than decreasing. With intensification of
the arms race the neutralist middle could become the only
mediator between East and West. Its value would lie in its
genuine neutrality, a neutrality it should jealously
maintain. (27)
(26)	Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 3.
(27)	Ibid.10
Four days later, after the close of the Conference, the Post-
Dispatch rendered a less favorable evaluation of the Belgrade Confer-
ence. Although with less bitterness and fewer pejoratives than the
Times and Post, it manifested considerable disappointment with the
neutrals’ performance. The editors complained that the final declara-
tion represented not a consensus but a series of compromises to
accommodate many individual selfish interests. In particular, Kashmir
had been conveniently omitted while Israel had been included. While
not actually employing the opprobrious term ’’double standard’’, the
Post-Dispatch did object to the neutrals’ ’’frowns” on Western colonial-
ism without any mention of Soviet colonialism. Significantly, however,
the editorial balanced its mild condemnation with some important
praise. In conclusion it conveyed the impression that the neutrals
had, indeed, fallen short of their opportunity for moral leadership,
but that they had taken some constructive steps for peace. Certainly
Belgrade had not fallen ’’dismally short” of its opportunities, as the
Times had adjudged. Accordingly, after alluding to the selfish
character of the resolutions, the Post-Dispatch declared!
It is difficult to see what is to be gained by resolu-
tions such as these, since the familiar process of log-
rolling is so obviously involved. The Conference was on
sounder ground when it appealed to the US and the Soviet
Union to start immediate negotiations to head off nuclear
destruction, and was acting constructively when it supported
Yugoslavia President Tito’s proposal for a world conference
on disarmament convened by the United Nations.
Ihe neutral nations can accomplish an important mission
by advocating and helping implement agreement between East
and West. Their voice will be louder if they act in concert
to bring about peace rather than to advance the selfish
interests of individual nations. (28)
Mauldin’s accompanying cartoon seemed to parallel the relative absence
of moral condemnation in the editorial. In place of the harsh indict-
ment conveyed in the cartoons of both the Chicago Tribune and the
Washington Post Mauldin showed the neutrals hopelessly caught in the
meshes of the conflicting cold war antagonists. An image of moral
cowards thus gave way to one of helpless victims. (29)
A brief survey of American press reaction to the Belgrade Confer-
ence reveals widespread irritation with the neutrals' conduct. While
most vehement in the conservative press, expressions of irritation also
figured prominently in the editorials of the influential pro-Administra
tion papers, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post.
Despite the sometimes bitter tone of these two journals, their pique
(28)	Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 7.
(29)	Ibid.11
never moved them to advocate even a review of American policy. The
mildest reactions among the major papers examined appeared in the
Christian Science Monitor and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Rapanially
the latter demonstrated two important points. Even the most vigorous
supporters of the Stevenson-Bowles approach to neutrals confessed to
some disappointment with the Belgrade participants. But one dramatic
episode surely was not enough to jolt the assumptions of those whose
ingrained attitudes dictated a sympathetic regard for both the opinions
and the economic needs of the uncommitted nations.
In short, the basic attitudes of the major papers were not shifted
by Belgrade—just as those of Congress do not appear to have altered.
But despite this, the strength of those distrustful of the Administra-
tion approach to neutrals grew as a result of Belgrade. The
chauvinistic and conservative elements that controlled a probable
majority of the press had been aroused. They had what they regarded
as a new symbol of neutral perfidy to add to their arsenal. Even if
Belgrade did not assist them in winning converts to their cause, it
would help in placing the advocates of Administration policy on
the defensive.
Indonesia's Image in the Press Reaction to Belgrade
As one of the three co-sponsors of the twenty-five-nation
neutralist gathering, Indonesia could not escape the disapprobation
leveled by the American press at the Belgrade Conference. The rela-
tive frequency with which President Sukarno's picture appeared in the
press indicates that in the American newspaper reading public he
ranked only behind Nehru and Tito·—-and perhaps Nasser—as a prototype
of the neutralist leader. (30) This fact is, as we have noted, per-
haps best demonstrated by Herblock's selection of Sukarno to represent
the Belgrade neutrals in his cartoon indictment of the Conference. (31)
The reputation of President Sukarno and Indonesia did not suffer
merely from the general attitude of irritation with Belgrade neutrals.
Specific comments about Sukarno individually, and comparison of him
with the other major leaders, tended to assure that Indonesia would
become a target of special annoyance when Belgrade was discussed.
Most references to Sukarno or Indonesia were prompted by his speech,
his role in the factional struggle at Belgrade, or by his peace
mission to Washington.
Only the New fork Times made specific editorial comment on
Sukarno's speech As noted above, of the three sponsors the Times
found Sukarno "particularly shocking" because of his silence on the
Soviet tests and his pro-Soviet stance on the Berlin and German
(30)	For example, see ΝΐΤ Sunday Magazine, Oct. 1, p. 29; or News-
week, Sep. U; or Time, Sep. 8.
(31)	See above, p. 6.12
questions. (32) Dispatches in the Times, the Post, the Herald Tribune
as well as in the AP and UPI stories used by other papers also con-
veyed an unfavorable impression of Sukarno’s speech. Virtually all of
these headlined their gratitude to Nasser for denouncing the Soviet
tests. (33) Readers learned that, in contrast to Nasser, "the other
two sponsors, Tito and Sukarno, made no mention of the tests.” (3h)
In their summaries of Sukarno’s speech, most reporters accurately
emphasized his preoccupation with ’’denouncing impari al ϊ sm, colonial-
ism, and neo-colonialism.” (35) The Chicago Tribune chose to embellish
its AP-based story by adding the tag ’’pro-Communist" in its initial
mention of President Sukarno. (36)
The unfavorable reaction to Sukarno’s opening-day speech was re-
inforced by subsequent press accounts of the factional struggle at
Belgrade. (37) The hero of these battles was Nehru. Consistent with
his ’’statesmanlike” speech, the Indian Prime Minister was pictured
as waging a stubborn campaign against the ”militant” anti-Western
majority. Cast as the chief villain in leading the militants was
Tito, but Nkrumah and Sukarno were several times identified as his
leading allies. On Soviet tests, on Germany and Berlin, on colonial-
ism and lesser issues the newspaper reader was told that Indonesia
fought for the pro-Soviet position. It is this fact that made
Herblock's use of Sukarno as the target of contempt consistent with
the predominant American press reaction. George Sokolsky was stirred
by a similar perception of the factional differences at Belgrade when
he remarked that ”at Belgrade only Nehru has the courage to take a
noble moral attitude. Both Tito and Sukarno displayed unbelievable
cowardice.” (38) In its summary judgement of Sukarno at Belgrade, the
Chicago Tribune underlined another aspect of his press image:
”Mr. Sukarno was not deterred from performing his usual service to
Moscow with a comprehensive plan for Western appeasement.” (39)
(32)	See above p.. 5.
(33)	See the Sep. 2 editions of NYT, Post, New York Herald Tribune. AP-
based accounts sqppear in Sep. 2 editions of Denver Post, Atlanta
Constitution, and New Orleans Times-Picayune. Also see Christian
Science Monitor, Sep. 3.
(3l|) See, for example, the AP story in Denver Post, Sep. 1.
(35)	See the AP story in San Francisco Chronicle, Sep. 2.
(36)	Chicago Tribune, Sep. 2.
(37)	Reports of the factional struggle are numerous. Among the most
comprehensive, see M. S. Handler, NYT, Sep. 7, and Flora lewis, Post,
Sep. 5 and 6. Also see Sharokh Sabavala, Christian Science Moni-
tor, Sep. 6. For AP dispatch see Washington Evening Star, Sep. 5.
For Reuter account see National Herald (India), Sep~ 5.
(38)	post, Sep. 20.
(39)	Chicago Tribune, Sep. 6.13
A week after the close of the Belgrade Conference President
Sukarno and President Keita of Mali came to Washington as the official
emmissaries of the Conference. Their assignment was to present
President Kennedy with an appeal for the resumption of negotiations
between the President and Premier Khrushchev. Although the mission
visit received much less attention in the press than did the Confer-
ence itself, the eastern press gave both front page coverage and
editorial judgements. (1+0) Given the above described press reaction
to both the Conference generally and Indonesia's role in particular,
it is not surprising that editorials stressed the demonstrated moral
incompetence of the neutrals to play the role of mediators. The Times,
the Post, and the Christian Science Monitor all struck this lecturing
note. (1+1) Only the Herald Tribune, however, made specific aspersions
about both the neutralism and the personality of the emmissaries
themselves. The Tribune opened its editorial with a gratuitous
description of Sukarno as "the carefree President of Indonesia."
More significantly, the title of the editorial—"Mr. Sukarno Should
Be Asked to Explain"—illustrated how the mission had cast Sukarno
in a most difficult role. In effect he served as the lightening rod
for inflamed irritation with the Belgrade neutrals as a group, as
well as for the special annoyance with Indonesia and the President
himself. (1+2)
Perhaps even more critical to the shaping of Indonesia's image
were the Tribune's disparagements of Sukarno in their stories of the
mission. Under the front page single column headline "Sukarno In With
1+5 To See Kennedy," Tribune reporter Marguerite Higgins effectively
satirized the President's practice of traveling with a great entourage.
Unrelentingly Miss Higgins went on to refer to it "as one of the most
astonishing entourages in recent diplomatic annals." (1+3) The
Tribune's weekly news review picked up where Miss Higgins left off.
Noting that the two peace envoys from Belgrade were quite different
personalities, the Tribune gave this picture of President Sukarnos
President Sukarno of Indonesia is regarded as something
of a playboy who enjoys night clubs featuring belly
dancers. He startled Washington by flying here with an
entourage of forty-five; the extravagant size made it look
(1+0) Antara reported that "leading American papers gave wide
publicity to the mission, but took a reserved attitude toward
its results." Among the papers not giving the mission front
page coverage were, however, the Atlanta Constitution, Denver
Post, and New Orleans Times-Picayune.
(1+1) See the editions of Sep. 13, Sep. 13, and Sep. 7 respectively.
(1+2) New York Herald Tribune, Sep. 13.
(1+3) Ibid., Sep. 12.Hl
more like a junket than a business trip. After seeing Kennedy,
he popped promptly to New York to see the sights by day and by
night. (Wi)
These specific references to Indonesia and her President were thus
further indication that any ire generated over Belgrade would very likely
fix on Indonesia as a primary target.
(UU) Ibid., Section II, Sep. 17.CHAPTER II
THE ADMINISTRATION’S REACTION TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
The Major Sources of Irritation
The Kennedy Administration’s reaction to the Belgrade Conference
closely paralleled the editorial reaction of the Times and Post. The
Administration, like the press, was incensed by the neutrals’ stand
on the pressing cold war issues of nuclear testing and Berlin. On
the former issue, the Conference's failure to denounce the Soviet
violation of the test ban greatly provoked Washington. (1) In
addition, the neutrals annoyed the Administration by refusing to
commend the President's persistent and conciliatory endeavor to
reach a test ban agreement at Geneva. (2) Consistent with a major
Kennedy campaign promise this endeavor had had a high priority in
the personal views of both the President and his advisers. Die
Conference’s Declaration did endorse the Western insistence on an
international system of control for disarmament agreements. But
this proved small consolation for the "eloquent silence" on both
Soviet perfidy and American good intentions. (3)
(1)	See Ambassador Kennan's telegram to the Department of State of
September U, given in Appendix I, pp. 7U-75.
Before a Congressional Committee on July 30, 1962; Phillips
Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs made this allusion to US reaction to the Belgrade
response to nuclear testing: "That Conference was a conference
in which much was said that was critical of the positions we
had taken on«a number of significant issues, including the
question of testing. I think we were extremely disappointed
that nations which had been vociferous about nuclear testing
when our turn came said so little about the Soviet tests which
had started just on the eve of that conference, you may recall."
See Mr. Talbot's reply to Rep. Ford, Hearings Before Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Part III, July 30? 1962,
p. 2ii0 (henceforth cited as 1962 Passman Committee Hearings).
(2)	Max Frankel, NYT, Sep. 6.
(3)	For Administration views on testing issue prior to Belgrade see NYT,
Aug. 27 and Aug. 31· For summaries of Administration reaction to
Belgrade on testing and other issues, see James Reston, NYT, Sep.
25; Murrey Marder, Post, Sep. 22; Max Frankel, NYT, Sep. 6.
1516
On the Berlin question the Administration's irritation was perhaps
even more marked than on the testing issue. To the President, as well
as to virtually the entire "attentive public" the moral principle of
self-determination infused the Berlin issue with a great symbolic
importance. This was not merely a clash of political interests over a
remote city. To Washington the essence of the Western ideological
position was at stake. As Senator Keating later said on the Senate
floor, this was an issue on which there could be no neutrality. (U)
What intensified the Administration's disappointment with the
Belgrade stance on the Berlin question was the Administration's ex-
pectation that the newly independent nations shared Washington’s moral
commitment to self-determination. It was this view that had informed
much of the Kennedy Administration strategy for identifying with the
new nations.
Given this background, it was natural that the Administration
should have invoked the principle of self-determination in its pro-
paganda on the Berlin question. With the Soviet erection of the
Berlin Wall in mid-August, emphasis on this point intensified further.
And, after first following a policy of official silence on the
approaching Belgrade Conference, the Administration decided to use the
self-determination principle in an appeal to the Belgrade participants
for moderation, if not open support, on the Berlin issue. This de-
cision reflected the relative ascendancy in the Administration of those
advisers with the greatest sympathetic understanding of the emergent
nations. (5) Implicit in their orientation was the hopeful assumption-
apparently shared by the President—that these nations would indeed
voice some support for self-determination in Berlin and Germany. (6)
Significantly, Secretary Rusk asserted on August 19 that the neutral
nations were responsive to the notion of self-determination. In a TV
interview he remarkedί
They do look upon the immediate problem of Berlin as a
question primarily for the great powers. But when the issue
becomes completely clarified, the so-called neutral nations
will make it clear that this principle of self-determination,
that is so important to them, is one to which they attach
importance right around the world.
I am not discouraged about their attitude on this
question. (7)
(h) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. l81|2O.
(5)	For references to divided counsels in the Administration see p. 15
n. 3.
(6)	NYT, Section IV, Aug. 27.
(7)	National Herald (India), Aug. 19·17
Although some doubts did develop about the potency of the self-
determination appeal, it appears that on the eve of the Conference
Washington still entertained some hope that it would have an impact.
(8)	A Times dispatch from Belgrade on the day before the Conference
reflects this hope: ’’The United States insistence upon upholding the
principle of self-determination for the people of Berlin and Germany
is believed to have made an impression upon the participants in the
Conference which opens Friday.” (9) A more reliable indication of
the Administration’s hopes and expectations on the eve of the Con-
ference is the President's message to the Conference. In what the
Times termed a "tacit appeal for the Conference to take a strong
stand on national self-determination and an effort to associate the
United States with that position in advance,” the President said:
We believe that the peoples represented at this Con-
ference are committed to a world society in which men
have the right and freedom to determine their own destiny,
a world in which one people is not enslaved by the other
and in which the powerful do not devour the weak.
The American people share that commitment. We have
pledged the influence of this nation to the abolition of
exploitation in all its forms. (10)
In view of these hopeful appeals on the basis of self-
determination, the Administration's "disappointment" over Belgrade
becomes more understandable. Pique over Belgrade speeches on Berlin
reflected more than awareness of a propaganda defeat. Washington's
ideological sensitivities had been deeply wounded. And, more im-
portantly, some wishful thinking about the convictions of the
non-aligned nations had been rudely shattered, (ll)
The Belgrade "double standard" on both the Soviet tests and the
Berlin problem did, then, produce genuine anger in the Administration.
The crucial question, however, was whether the Administration's anger
affected policy toward the Belgrade participants. Perhaps the most
reliable index of Belgrade's immediate impact on policy—as dis-
tinguished from impact on Administration tempers—is United States
aid policy. Although’'the major policy battle over foreign aid had
just ended with the compromise allowing long-term commitments, but
not appropriations, Congress had yet to act on the foreign aid
appropriations bill. The intensity of the President’s exertions
(8)	These doubts arose largely from Nehru's unfavorable interpretation
of the legality of the Western occupation rights in Berlin. See
NTT, Aug. 27.
(9)	NTT, Aug. 31.
(10)	Both commentary by reporter Tom Wicker and the President's news
conference transcript appear in NTT, Aug. 31.
(11)	Reston suggests the characterization "naive" for Kennedy's
expectations of the neutrals' conduct; NTT, Sep. 2%.18
on behalf of that bill would be one measure of the depth of his pique
with the Belgrade Conference. (12) And a still more specific test of
his feelings lay in the Administration’s handling of current aid nego-
tiations and deliveries. If the President sought to retaliate for a
particular nation’s offensive behavior at Belgrade, a delay or a
stoppage of aid was one readily available weapon.
The Administration's Post-Belgrade Aid Policy
The President's first public comment pertaining to the Belgrade
Conference appeared on Labor Day, September lj.—the day before the Con-
ference published its final declaration. Occasioned by his signing
of the 1961 foreign aid authorization bill, the President’s statement
proved to be of crucial relevance to the United States's post-Belgrade
aid policy. In what appeared to be an urgent plea to Congress to re-
store the aid appropriations cuts engineered by the Passman Committee,
the President cited the intensification of Communist efforts in under-
developed countries and the dangerous Berlin crisis as reasons for
firm backing for the aid program. The statement concluded with a final
sentence reportedly appended by the President himself. It is this
sentence that provoked a spate of speculations that the Belgrade Con-
ference had prompted a shift in American aid policy, The President's
comment read as follows:
It is my belief that in the administration of these
funds we should give great attention and consideration to
those nations who have our view of the world crisis. (13)
Most of the statement could be dismissed as the perennial Presi-
dential plea to Congress to resist the scuttling designs of Chairman
Passman. Even the final sentence seemed aimed at reassuring the
critics and wavering supporters of foreign aid whose ire had undoubtedly
been aroused by the Belgrade Conference. It may have been primarily
a calculated tactic to forestall any drastic attacks on the aid
appropriations bill—a bill scheduled for debate in the House the
Very next day. Later in the Senate debate—as noted below—it was
employed by Administration supporters for just such a purpose. But
apart from such political tactics, it seems highly probable that the
President's personal addendum to the perfunctory prepared statement
reflected a degree of personal ire with at least some of the speeches
at Belgrade. Although he probably had not yet received Ambassador
Kennan's cable evincing bitter disappointment with Tito's speech,
certainly the President had had ample opportunity to learn the tenor
(12) As the description below—especially pp. UOn,U6—shows, but does
not spell out, the President did lobby intensively for the
foreign aid money bill.
(13) NIT, Sep. 5.19
of the initial speeches and the press reaction to them. (li|)
Reporting from Washington on September 5, Times reporter Max
Frankel stressed this element of personal ire in the President’s
cryptic comment on future aid policy. Alluding to the "perceptible
feeling of annoyance and disappointment" in Washington due to the
Belgrade Conference, Frankel offered the following interpretation of
the President's remarks
That the White House was moving closer to the view
that foreign aid ought to go first and foremost to nations
in accord with the foreign policy objectives of the
United States was first revealed by the President
yesterday.
Informed sources said Mr. Kennedy himself added a
final sentence to a statement he issued at Hyannis Port,
Mass., when he signed a bill authorizing $i|., 253,500,000
for foreign aid this year.
That sentence reads "It is my belief that in the
administration of these funds we should give great
attention and consideration to those nations who have
our view of the world crisis."
The same sources said that the President "meant
exactly what he said."
(ill.) The State Department received Ambassador Kennan's summary of
Tito's Belgrade speech at 9s06 p.m. on Sep. 3· Kennan's tele-
gram with his comments on the speech did not arrive until
ΰϊ27 p.m. on Sep. U. Presumably, then, the President was
aware of Tito's remarks, but not of Kennan's comments, when
he appended the sentence on aid preference to ideological
allies. The President did have, however, the press reports
on the morning of Sep. 1 (Labor Day Monday). The New York
Herald Tribune (to which the President still subscribed
at this time)had an especially scathing denunciation of
Tito which it telegraphed to its readers with this front page
head: "Tito Backs Red Line, Hits German Arming." Reporter
Donald Cook pursued this theme in his opening paragraph:
"/Tito/ aligned himself with the Soviet Union on just about
every point yesterday in a major policy speech to the con-
ference." Paul Hoffman's story in the NYT had a less
provocative head, but like Cook he spelled out the close
parallels between Tito's line and that of the Soviet Union.
Both reporters also referred to the American Bmbassy as
"bitter and disappointed" because the Yugoslavs had indicated
that Tito would take a more moderate stand. See NYT,
Sep. U, and New York Herald Tribune, Sep. U. Also see Post,
Sep. h-.20
The statement, they remarked, was partly intended
to please Congressional leaders now weighing foreign
aid appropriations.
At the same time, they said, it was also directed
at those neutral leaders whose comments on Berlin and
on the renewal of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union
could be considered to have given aid and comfort to
Moscow.
Specifically, it was learned, the President had in
mind President Tito of Yugoslavia and, to a lesser
degree, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. (15)
Frankel's view that the President’s September h comment did re-
flect genuine Presidential anger with the neutrals finds corroboration
in the September 7 column of Post staff writer Carroll Kilpatrick.
But like Frankel, Kilpatrick is uncertain whether the “President was
expressing pique or policy." Rather bitterly Kilpatrick complained
that "officials who should know do not seem to know" and that "the
White House has declined to explain or to amplify the President's
statement." Not only was official Washington "baffled," but there
were "serious misgivings in many embassies." (16)
The failure of the Administration to clarify the President's
statement allowed the bafflement and misgivings to continue. An
initial partial clarification did occur as early as September 22.
At a news conference before the UN Foreign Press Association,
Secretary Rusk gave some reassurance to an Indian questioner. Re-
flecting the speculation in the Indian press over the alleged shift
in American aid policy, the Indian newsman sought an official state-
ment from Rusk. (17) What he got was an abbreviated remark which did
not directly answer the concern about future United States policy.
Rusk simply said the Administration "would not expect to withdraw
economic aid from neutral countries." (18) In any case, Rusk's reply
did not receive sufficient attention in the press to stifle specula-
tion now recently sustained by reports of a shelving of Yugoslav aid
requests. (19) Subsequently reports of a "review" of American aid
(15)	Max Frankel, NYT, Sep. 6.
(16)	Post, Sep. 8.
(17)	Ashwini Kumari comments on Indian press reaction to American press
speculation on a possible shift in American aid policy. See Post,
Sep. 16.
(18)	NYT, Sep. 23.
(19)	The Washington Post did not report the Rusk comment. But the trap
script of the entire news conference does appear in the NYT, Sep.
23. Reports of the shelving of Yugoslav aid requests appears in
NYT, Sep. lU.21
to the Ghana Volta River Project added further weight to the view that
Administration policy had shifted. (20) Both the Times and Post issued
editorial warnings against the indications of a new policy of attach-
ing political conditions to our aid—a futile policy of "buying
intellectual allies." (21)
Only after nearly six weeks of mounting speculation and concern
did the President finally clarify the policy implications of his
September h· expression of preference for aid to "those nations who
have our view of the world crisis." The pertinent question and the
President's extended reply came at a news conference on October 11:
Q: Mr. President, written into the foreign aid bill
is a clause which says that there should be more stress on
giving aid to friendly countries, countries that share our
view on major world problems.
In view of the decision to review aid to Ghana's River
Project, could you elaborate on how far you think the
countries should go towards agreeing with us on these major
issues?
The President: I don't think that there is—we are not
attempting to use our aid in order to secure agreement by
these countries with all of our policies. The phrase that
was used in signing the Mutual Security Bill was that we
should give particular attention to the needs of those
countries which share our view of the world crisis.
Our view of the world crisis is that countries are
entitled to national sovereignty and independence, and
that is all we ever suggested. That is the purpose of
our aid, to make it more possible.
Now, if a country has ceased to choose national
sovereignty or should cease to choose national inde-
pendence, then, of course, our aid becomes less useful.
But that is a different matter from suggesting that in
order to be entitled to our assistance, particularly as
a good percentage of our assistance today is in the form
of loans, that they must agree with us, because quite
obviously these people in the underdeveloped world are newly
independent and they want to run their own affairs and they
would rather not accept assistance if we have that kind of
string attached to it.
Therefore, I think that we ought to make an educated
guess, but it is not an easy matter. These countries are
passing through very difficult times, and they are going
to swing one way, and then another. In general, our
(20)	Post and NYT editions of Sep. 23.
(21)	NYT, Sep. 9 and Oct. U. Post, Sep. 22.22
object is that they maintain their independence. We hope it
is theirs. (22)
The President’s reply testifies to the general consistency of
Administration post-Belgrade policy with that preceding Belgrade. In
expressing the most liberal possible interpretation of his ambiguous
September b remark the President calmed the fears of liberal-
internationalists who discerned a new policy of political blackmail.
But despite this the President’s declaration of policy does not tell
the whole story of America's post-Belgrade aid policy. When policy
actions are set along side the October 11 policy statement at least
a small discrepancy seems apparent. As one Washington official stated
in late September, there had been "a tightening of attitude, but not a
reversal of policy.” In expanding on this remark for Post reporter
Kilpatrick, the same official said that in practice this would mean a
willingness to forgive many irritations from a country like India or
Burma whom the Administration felt was attempting to follow a neutral
course. But it would mean less tolerance of neutrals such as Ghana
and Guinea who frequently attacked the United States and excused the
Soviet Union. Essentially, however, the Administration still believed,
as both the President and Secretary Rusk had often said, that a
genuinely neutral and independent country is a valuable free world
asset in that it is an obstacle to Soviet expansion. (23)
A brief examination of the Administration's post-Belgrade aid
policy toward the major neutral countries confirms this impression
that there had been ”a tightening of attitude, but not a reversal
of policy. ”
a) The Special Disappointment
with Yugoslavia
Of the five major neutrals Yugoslavia reportedly aroused the
Administration's anger more than any other. Immediately after Tito's
speech to the Conference on September 2 both the Times and Post reporters
in Belgrade wrote of the bitterness expressed at the American Embassy.
(2b) Ambassador Kennan had earlier confidently predicted that Tito
would play, a moderating role at Belgrade. Although based on private
talks with Yugoslav officials, this firm expectation was not realized.
Kennan's anger at what he viewed as a broken promise permeates his
cable back to Washington. The text of this cable lends considerable
credence to reports that not only the American Embassy in Belgrade but
also the President of the United States himself was embittered by Tito's
conduct at Belgrade. (25)
(22)	NYT, Oct. 12.
(23)	Carroll Kilpatrick, Post, Sep. 21.
(2h) Post, Sep. 5, NYT, Sep. 5, and New York Herald Tribune, Sep. b.
(25) See the Kennan Telegram of Sep. b in Appendix I, pp. 7 b.—75.
Also see news reports cited above in n. lb on p. 19.23
Ambassador Kennan's cable bolsters the plausibility of reports of
subsequent policy rebuffs to Tito by the Administration. As early
as September 13 Times reporter E. W. Kenworthy reported from Washington
that Tito's aid requests and tentative plans for a state visit to the
United States in 1962 had been shelved. In accounting for these de-
cisions Kenworthy quoted an official who referred to the "great anger
at the White House" with President Tito because of his statements at
Belgrade. (26) Over a month later on October 18 an AP dispatch
attributed a similar interpretation to "State Department officials"
who had been asked to comment on the temporary shelving of a Yugoslav
request to buy 500,000 tons of surplus wheat. The same sources said
American policy was to continue all present commitments for economic
assistance, but to halt consideration of new programs. (27)
On the same day, however, Secretary Rusk sought to correct this
picture of the impact of the Belgrade Conference on Administration
aid policy toward Yugoslavia. After defending past aid to Yugoslavia
on the grounds that it had unquestionably strengthened Yugoslavia's
ability to maintain her independence of the Soviet bloc, Mr. Rusk went
on to reaffirm his confidence in Yugoslav independence. While con-
ceding some Administration disapproval of Tito's stance at Belgrade,
he emphatically repudiated critics of aid to Yugoslavia: (28)
I think some of the criticism which this policy is now
receiving stems to a certain degree from public disappoint-
ment that our aid to Yugoslavia has not led to full Yugoslav
agreement with the foreign policy of the United States.
But, as the President has stated, our aid programs
are not designed to purchase agreement with us. In our
view, countries are entitled to national sovereignty and
independence and the basic purpose of our aid is to
strengthen the efforts of recipient countries to main-
tain their national sovereignty and independence.
(26)	NYT, Sep. lb.
(27)	NYT, Oct. 19.
(28)	NYT, Oct. 19. Cf. later dispatch in which "Belgrade officials"
are pictured as being "immediately concerned with the question
of the alleged US economic pressure against them." The dispatch
goes on to say: "This charge stems from Washington's failure
to act on Yugoslav's requests for aid in the wake of a drought
that cut the wheat harvest below normal consumption figures.
"The Yugoslavs contend that this is part of a campaign
by Washington against the position of all the non-aligned
nations." See NYT, Nov. 16, 1961. Cf. Time, Jan. 12, 1962,
pp. 19-20.2ii
Some of the disappointment in this country has come
from the Belgrade meeting. We do not believe that that
Belgrade meeting indicated that Yugoslavia was in the
process of losing its independence, even though some
things were said there that we ourselves did not
particularly approve.
b.	India
As the Kennan cable suggests, American confidence in Nehru's
moderation had been confirmed by his speech. (29) Although he fell
far short of endorsing the principle of self-determination in Berlin,
his sincere and partially effective efforts to forestall the mili-
tants’ attempt to recommend recognition of the two Germanies in the
Conference resolution must have been appreciated in the State Depart-
ment. The United States press image of Nehru as the champion of a
moderate non-alignment was also reflected in Ambassador Galbraith’s
description of President Kennedy as having been ’’personally pleased"
with the role of Nehru at the Belgrade Conference. (30) The more
recent testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East
and South Asia, Phillips Talbot, suggests that such an estimate is
only mildly exaggerated. Although granting that Nehru fell short of
Makarios’s endorsement of self-determination for the German people,
Talbot defended Nehru's moderation at Belgrade. (31)
c.	UAR
President Nasser of the UAR also managed to escape the focus of
the Administration's disappointment over Belgrade. Not only did he
express some "shock" about the Soviet tests, but his own fear of a
partition solution in Palestine led him to oppose a similar resolu-
tion of the German question. (32) Moreover, it is noteworthy that
Ambassador Kennan cites Nasser along with Nehru as one of the few
moderating influences at Belgrade. (33)	*
d.	Ghana
The positions taken by Ghana and Indonesia at Belgrade elicited
a markedly different American reaction than that produced by India and
(29)	See the Kennan Telegram of Sep. U.
(30)	NYT, Sep. 16.
(31)	1962 Passman Committee Hearings, Part HI, p. 21ii. See p. l£,
n. 1.
(32)
(33)
M. S. Handler, NYT, Sep. 2 and Sep. 7.
Kennan Telegram of Sep. U.25
the UAR. At the Conference they apparently played the role ascribed
to them by the American press—leaders of the militant group which in
considerable degree prevailed in spite of Nehru's efforts to promote
a more moderate anti-Western stand. (3t) But though their militancy
associated them with strident anti-colonialism, and a resolution
urging recognition of the two Gertnanies, these positions and others
were largely anticipated in Washington. Indonesia and Ghana behaved
less out of character than did Tito. (35) Accordingly irritation
with them had more the quality of the Washington Post's "rueful
resignation" than the "anger" generated ty Tito's denial of expecta-
tion. Even so it was the group led by Indonesia and Ghana together
with Yugoslavia that employed the alleged "double standard" with the
greatest fervor. Certainly they would not escape the consequences
of a shift in aid policy to favoring politically correct neutrals.
The fact that they did not suffer such consequences is further evidence
that its general policy did not shift-although attitudes hardened.
In Ghana's case, Nkrumah's role at Belgrade seems to have had
some influence on the Administration's decision of September 22 to
review its commitment of |133,OOO,OOO million in aid to the Volta
River Project. In a nicely balanced analysis, Times reporter
Kenworthy noted that the expectation was that the aid agreement
would be delayed, but that it would be signed. He also pointed
out that although the Belgrade Conference was a major factor in the
Administration's decision, other political and economic factors
were also important. (36) A subsequent Times report described the
Administration's decision to review the Volta River Project "as an
opportunity to show that, while the United States is willing to give
aid to genuine positive neutralists, it expects to see a little more
accent on the positive." (37) That this review in fact constituted
only mild political pressure was reflected in another dispatch
which again noted that "It is unlikely that the Administration will
pull out of the project at this late date. Such a step would be
reminiscent of the United States' decision in 1956 to back down on
aid to Egypt's Aswan Dam Project on the Nile." (38)
(3U) See above p. 12.	.
(35) NYT editorial of Sep. 2 suggests that Sukarno's stand on Germany
and Berlin perhaps came as something of a surprise. Also see
West German press reaction. See PIA, Sep. 5, 6, and 7 and
Antara, Sep. 8 and 15.
(36)
(37)
(38)
NYT, Sep. 23.
NYT, Sep. 30.
Ibid. In this regard it is interesting to note that the Cairo
press pictured the "reconsideration" as "due to the attitude
adopted by Ghana at the conference of non-aligned nations held26
These reports, however, disturbed the Times editor enough to
elicit the warning that "it would be self-defeating for decisions in
Washington regarding Ghana to be based upon pique over Nkrumah’s
foreign policy pronouncements in Belgrade or over his plans to speed
up socialization of Ghana’s economy.” The Times went on to show even
more emphatically that its own pique.over the neutrals’ Belgrade
pronouncements had not lessened its antagonism to using foreign aid
as «bribery”. (39) Essentially this warning to the Administration was
unnecessary, for it was just a week later at his October 11 News Con-
ference that President Kennedy reaffirmed his allegiance to the
policy defended by the Times. (hO) The fact that on December 10 the
Kennedy Administration announced its decision to participate in the
Volta Project is another indication that Belgrade alone had not
caused a basic shift in policy. (hl)
e. Indonesia
The attention given above to the Administration’s post-Belgrade
aid policy toward the leading Belgrade Conference neutrals contri-
butes to an understanding of policy toward Indonesia. Ghana’s
experience with the Kennedy Administration seems especially relevant.
The press had labeled both Ghana and Indonesia ”pro-Soviet" both
before and during the Belgrade Conference. Since the advent of
President Sukarno's concept of Guided Democracy in 1957 and the
attendant rise in influence both of the Communist Party and of the
in Belgrade in September last, which was received with dis-
approval in Washington and contributed to the elimination of
cooperation with neutralists such as Dr. Nkrumah." This
particular report appeared in a magazine article the title of
which appeared on the cover with an added reference to the
parallel with Secretary Dulles' withdrawal of aid for the
Egyptian Aswan Dam project: "As with the High Dam
WASHINGTON WITHDRAWS ITS OFFER OF HELP FOR THE VOLTA DAM."
See the Cairo-published The Scribe (Oct.-Nov. 1961),
pp. 62-65. In that this magazine is distributed upon re-
quest by the United Arab Republic Embassy in Washington, it
seems reasonable to consider its view close to the govern-
ment’s. (This in no way diminishes the author's gratitude
to the Embassy for this and other copies of UAR publications.)
(39) NYT, Oct. U.
(hO) See above pp. 21-22.
(hl) NYT, Dec. l6 and 17, 1961. The author is grateful to the In-
formation Division of the Ghana Embassy in Washington for the
loan of its clipping file on the Volta River Project.27
Soviet Union, Indonesia had, in the Western view, turned ’’left.”
Her recently completed arms deal with Russia gave added force to this
label. In addition, Indonesia, like Ghana, gave official Washington
pause because of Sukarno’s alleged "dictatorship" and because of
chaotic economic conditions. Finally, Indonesia shared Ghana’s
concern with a possible shift in American aid policy. For like
Ghana, Indonesia anticipated a major increase in economic assistance
from the new Kennedy Administration.
Despite these parallels with Ghana, Indonesia did not apparently
suffer even the mild intimidation implied in the Administration's
review of the Volta River Project. In part this may have been due
to the Administration’s greater uncertainty in gauging the impact of
its policy in Indonesia. In any case, it appears that the United
States continued without interruption to implement its existing aid
arrangements with Indonesia. On September 12 in a press release
possibly timed to coincide with Sukarno's arrival in Washington on
his Belgrade "peace mission," the Agriculture Department announced
that a shipment of $3.U million in PL U80 wheat would arrive shortly
in Indonesia. (i|2) Ten days later another USIA release told of the
departure for the United States of the 3OOOth IGA student grantee
from Indonesia. (1|3)
Another indication of the amicable tone prevailing in Indonesian-
American aid relations in September and October is the relative
absence in the Indonesian press of uneasy speculation over a possible
shift in American aid policy. Unlike the Indian press or the govern-
ment-controlled Egyptian press neither of Indonesia's government news
agencies even reported the Washington dispatches on retaliatory delays
in aid to Yugoslavia and Ghana. (hU) The only PIA dispatch alluding
(U2) PIA, Sep. 13.
(U3) Antara, Sep. 22.
(hU) This is based on a thorough perusal of both PIA and Antara for
September 1901, as well as the USIS Press Summaries which
include a fairly wide sampling of editorial opinion. Together
these three sources constitute substantial, but admittedly
inconclusive, evidence of Indonesian indifference to specula-
tion about a shift in American aid policy toward offensive
Belgrade neutrals. Cf. the Yugoslavs reaction cited in NYT,
Nov. 16, and the Indian reaction in Post, Sep. 16. For the
Egyptian view of American policy see citation in n. 38,
p. 2.3 above.
PIA does cite one editorial from Bintang Timur condemning
West Germany for its alleged threat to "discontinue economic
aid to countries which agree to the decisions of the Belgrade
Conference of non-bloc countries"; PIA, Sep. 9. For report of
German aid policy see sources cited in n. 33, p. 23.28
to the speculated shift in American policy is, however, of some
significance.
Based on a UPI Washington release this story was prompted by the
arrival in Washington of Indonesian Minister for Development, Chaerul
Saleh, Noting that Saleh’s visit concerned the prospects for American
support for Indonesia’s new 8-Year Plan, the dispatch declared that
Saleh’s talks at the State Department would "test the meaning of
President Kennedy's newly declared foreign aid policy” of giving
priority to nations sharing the US view of the world crisis. While
admitting that no official indication had yet been given of the
policy's effect on Indonesia, the article hinted thgt the policy had
been applied "in slowing down action on aid to oth^r countries which
have supported the Soviet stand in the Berlin crises.” (2j5) The
significance of Saleh's visit is further heightened by recalling that
a team of American experts (known as the Humphrey Mission) had just
returned from a four-week study mission to Indonesia. As provided in
an earlier Kennedy-Sukarno understanding, the team was to evaluate
the Indonesian 8-Year-Plan and to make recommendations for possible
United States assistance. (I46) A major purpose of Saleh’s visit was
to inquire about the preliminary findings of the Humphrey Mission, (if?)
Both Indonesian and American officials have indicated that Saleh's
visit did not provoke allusion on either side to any possible shift in
American policy because of Indonesia's stance at Belgrade. (U8) One
Indonesian Eknbassy official asserted that Saleh was pleased with the
talks he held with both State Department and ATP officials. This
testimony coincides with the report of PIA's Washington correspondent
that "Indonesia’s overall development plan has received favorable
attention from American circles.” (h-9) Given the generally sympathetic
character of the final report of the Humphrey Mission, it does seem
(U5) PIA, Sep, 27.
(i|6) The understanding was reached during President Sukarno's April
2h visit with President Kennedy. See forward to Indonesia
Perspectives and Proposals for United States Economic Aids
Report to the President by the United States Economic Survey
Team to Indonesia (Reproduced by the Agency for Internation
Development of the US Government in the summer of 1962; hence-
forth cited as Humphrey Mission Report).
(1+7) PIA, Sep. 26, Also interviews of author with American AID
officials,
(U8) Interviews with author in August 1962,
(h9) PIA, Sep. 27.29
likely that Saleh was generally content with the summary presented to
him of the mission’s initial conclusions. (50)
On the other hand, it must be noted that Saleh apparently dis-
played some impatience with the slow progress of the Humphrey Mission
in drafting its comprehensive report. But American officials have
insisted that delays then and subsequently resulted primarily from
difficulties in securing adequate data~and not as a result of calcu-
lated policy. The full explanation of later delays is beyond the
scope of this inquiry, but it seems likely that the West Irian dispute
rather than Belgrade would have provided the motivation for any delay
dictated on policy grounds.
Finally, with regard to Saleh's visit, mention must be made of
the considerable furor that erupted in the Indonesian press over
Saleh's irritation with Eugene Black, President of the World Bank.
The relevant point here is that neither Saleh nor the Indonesian
press seem to have related the World Bank incident to the alleged
shift in American aid policy. Saleh denounced Black for having in-
sulted Indonesia by remarking that Indonesia could not qualify for a
World Bank loan because of her failure to compensate the Dutch for
the 1957 confiscations. (5l) As with a more minor incident involving
Senator Sparkman, Saleh did not link this insult to any hardening of
American aid policy. (52)
The course of American aid relations with Indonesia following
Saleh's visit bears out the impression that Belgrade had no detri-
mental affect. A perusal of USIA's selected translations of Indo-
nesian editorials in the fall of 1901 reveals only one comment on
alleged American policy shift. On October 2 the Surabaya Post
briefly and critically noted the United States' intention to favor
nations sharing her view of the world situation. (53) Despite this
continued indifference of the Indonesian press to United States aid
policy, a USIA release of October 28 plainly indicated that there was
some puzzlement among Indonesian leaders about the import of the
September U Kennedy statement. A high USIA official stationed in
Djakarta at the time has confirmed both the presence of this un-
easiness and the USIA efforts to clarify Washington's stand. (5U)
(50)	An Indonesian Embassy Official used the adjective "sympathetic"
to describe his initial reaction to the Humphrey Mission Re-
port . Interview with author in August 1962 i
(51)	PIA, Sep. 29.
(52)	PIA, Sep. 27.
(53)	USIS Press Summary, Surabaya, Oct. 2, 1961.
(5U) Interview with author August 1962.30
Although State Department officials contend that Indonesian uncer-
tainty about our aid policy was neither marked nor significant, the
October 28 release is unmistakable evidence that the State Department
had—perhaps belatedly—recognized that an elaborate and emphatic
clarification was necessary.
Djakarta, Oct. 28 '6ls—A number of questions have
arisen following signing of the new U.S. Foreign Assistance
Bill. In this connection the following has been received
by the U.S. Embassy from Washington.
"The United States fully recognizes that a revolu-
tionary process of modernization is under way in many
parts of the world. Many nations, including those
emerging from colonialism, seek the political, economic
and social means of expressing their national personality
and securing their national independence.
"The United States welcomes and encourages this move-
ment, which has aparallel in America’s own revolutionary
origins.
"In expending assistance to nations in the process of
modernization, the United States seeks two results:
(1)	that truly independent nations shall emerge on the
world scene; and
(2)	that each nation shall be permitted to fashion,
out of its own culture and aspirations, the kind of modern
society it wants. (55)
The release concluded by citing the aforementioned clarifications of US
aid policy made by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk at their news
conferences on October 11 and October 18 respectively. (56)
Though the failure of the Administration to forestall the need for
such a clarification of policy is in itself of some significance, it
does appear that there was in fact no basis for Indonesian concern.
The picture in September of an uninterrupted aid program prevailed also
in October. On October 2? a USIA release announced that United States
military assistance deliveries were proceeding. Of a programmed
delivery of fifty T-3UA primary flight trainers for AURI. twenty-five
had been delivered on September 30» fourteen on October lit, and the
remaining thirteen would arrive on November 18. (57)
Apart from deliveries of surplus food and military equipment
stipulated in existing agreements, Washington exhibited willingness
to make new agreements—a willingness which was somewhat tempered in
the Yugoslav and Ghana cases. Congressional hearings on American
aid to Indonesia in the fiscal year 1962 revealed that in October 1961
(55)	USIS Release, Djakarta, Oct. 28, 1961.
(56)	See above pp. 20-22.
(57)	USIS Release, Djakarta, Oct. 27, 1961.31
the decision was made to program contingency funds for Indonesia for
assistance in constructing a bypass in Djakarta. (£8) In addition,
on October 26 the US signed an agreement to provide fifty-five
thousand tons of rice under the "Food for Peace" program. (59) In
that negotiations for such an agreement must have been carried on for
at least a few weeks prior, the agreement must be interpreted as
indication of US application of the policy enunciated by Kennedy and
Rusk in their mid-October news conferences. A similar significance
can be given to the amendment made on November 17 to the October 26
agreement. This provided for an additional fifty thousand tons of
rice. (60)
In 1962 two prominent facts demonstrated that American aid
policy eventually did change with regard to Indonesia—but the
change was in the direction of a much more generous program of
economic assistance supplemented by continuing PL U80 sales. On
February 19 Foreign Minister Subandrio and Ambassador Jones signed
a new surplus food agreement, providing for a total of $92.7 million
in rice, wheat flour, cotton, and tobacco in the initial phase of a
three-year program. (61) Far more significant is the content of the
Humphrey Mission Report presented to Sukarno on August 1. (62) Al-
though AID officials have asserted that the recommended tripling of
the level of economic assistance over the next five years did not
perfectly coincide with the figures presented to Congress, a reading
of the House hearings on appropriations shows that the Humphrey
Mission recommendations have been relied on to justify large increases
in aid to Indonesia. (63) Certainly the Belgrade Conference itself
did not arouse sufficient Administration ire toward Indonesia to
alter the pre-Belgrade course of our aid policy. (6I4)
(58)	1962	Passman	Committee	Hearings,	Part H, p. 70U.
(59)	USIS	Release,	Djakarta,	Nov.	17,	1961.
(60)	USIS	Release,	Djakarta,	Nov.	17,	1961.
(61)	USIS	Release,	Djakarta,	Feb.	20,	1962.
(62)	Antara, Aug. 1 , 1962.
(63)	See particularly the discussion of new AID projects planned
for Indonesia in the fiscal year 1963.	1962 Passman
Committee Hearings, Part III, pp. 600-613.
(6U) Given the American willingness in 1962 to abandon its
neutrality in the West Irian dispute for a role of active
mediation producing a solution favorable to Indonesia, it
appears that Belgrade also had no significant bearing on US
political policy toward Indonesia.CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE ON CONGRESS, 1961
The Belgrade Conference had a perceptible impact on the US
Congress' regard for aid to neutral countries. Like the President,
Congress felt immediate shock and irritation at the exhibition of the
"double standard" at Belgrade. But unlike the President's irritation,
Congress’ ire tended to be both more lasting and more potent in its
effect on American aid policy. This was the case in part because
the Congress does not feel the acute inhibitions of executive re-
sponsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. Congressional
irritation was more severe also because resentment over the foreign
aid program generally and over aid to neutrals particularly had been
mounting for several sessions. In this context the Belgrade Con-
ference functioned as a catalyst. It reinforced and crystallized a
latent attitude of frustration—a feeling that insults were the only
return we could expect from our billions of aid to the "so-called"
neutrals. Although the conservative opponents of aid displayed the
loudest annoyance with Belgrade, it is significant that some of the
more moderate-internationalist figures also expressed dismay. In any
case, the net result visible by the fall of 1962 had been the strength
ening of a major argument in the brief against foreign aid. (l)
(1) Several legislative assistants to Representatives, Senators, and
Committees confirmed this general impression in interviews with
the author during August 1962.
Among the press references to Congressional reaction to
Belgrade the most impressive analysis appears in veteran Times1
reporter Felix Belair's account. Summarizing Congressional
attitudes in the 1st session of the 87th Congress, Belair puts
the impact of Belgrade in its proper context—a context of per-
ennial hostility to foreign aid because of its alleged effect
on the American economy: "Their [Congressmen's^ conclusions
have less to do with neutrals remaining neutral in the 'cold
war' between the East and West than with domestic unemployment,
budget deficits, inflation and foreign competition."
Belair went on to appraise the impact of Belgrade in these
terms: "The resentment of the employer and worker alike had
already been registered in the Congressional mail when the
Belgrade Conference...got underway. Its condemnation of the
333h
The House Aid Debate of September 5
The first occasion for Congressional reaction to appear was the
September 5 House debate on the foreign aid appropriations bill—a debate
that occurred as the Belgrade Conference participants were themselves
debating the working of their final declaration. Although the stage was
thus set for a rash of oratory denouncing the treacherous neutrals,
the oratory was in considerable degree absent. Indeed, the floor debate
generally disappointed the press expectation of a fierce battle by the
Administration to restore some of the $896 million that Representative
Passman’s Committee had cut from the amounts in the Congressional
authorization bill for foreign aid.
Before reviewing the allusions that were made to Belgrade in the
floor debate, it is important to assess why the debate did not fulfill
expectations of a dramatic battle to restore cuts—cuts which would have
been defended with aroused passion by those infuriated with Belgrade.
The primary reason for a relatively placid debate was the nature of
the Administration’s strategy. Assessing the mood of the House, the
Administration decided against risking a floor debate challenge to the
influential recommendations of the Passman Committee—recommendations
already endorsed by the parent House Appropriations Committee and
destined to pass the House with little protest. This decision must
have been at least partially based on an awareness that the current
reports of the Belgrade Conference would invoke an emotional response
in the House. Such a response would certainly sustain the cuts made
in the development loans and grants, and possibly even deepen them.
Opponents of the strategy argued that the cold war crises over Berlin
and nuclear testing would have permitted sizeable restoration on the
floor. In any case, the Administration strategy of not bucking Passman
on the House floor meant that the resulting floor debate did not
produce the expected battle. Indeed, on some amendments offered in
defiance of the Administration strategy, Administration adherents in-
cluding Acting Speaker McCormack voted with the Passman supporters
against restoring Committee cuts. (2)
American naval base in Cuba and failure to mention the resumption
of Soviet nuclear testing was all that was needed to set the
catalyst to work."
Within the week the resentment of the Senate was written into
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in the form of a clear directive
to the Administration to focus its aid on those nations "who
share our view of the world crisis." See, Section IV, Oct. 1, 1961.
(2) The Administration strategy is most fully discussed in the Post,
Sep. 6 and 7. Also see Felix Belair, NYT, Sep. 6; Don Irwin in
New York Herald Tribune, Sep. 6; and the AP account in St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Sep. 6. As some of these accounts reveal,
McCormack voted against the Ford Amendment to restore $300 million35
Other less weighty reasons contribute to the argument that this
debate was not an adequate index of House reaction to the Belgrade
Conference. Because the debate came on the morning after the long
Labor Day weekend, it seems likely that many Congressmen were at least
somewhat unprepared—if not actually absent. (3) Humours of the
Administration strategy to avoid a floor fight had been circulating
over the weekend to add impetus to the human impulse to let holiday
take precedence over duty. Also the Belgrade Conference had only be-
gun on Friday September 1—and although press coverage was extensive
because of the resumption of Soviet tests, the holiday weekend tended
both to limit the number of immediate Congressional reactions to the
neutrals' "eloquent silence" or to obscure the few that were made. (1|)
The President's statement of September h. on aid preference to "those
who share our view of the world crisis" did eventually trigger a
Senate amendment to the foreign aid bill, but on the House floor on
the September 5 no one even alluded to it. (5) Finally, most of the
Congress felt that the real battle over foreign aid had already been
settled. Strong fears of encroachment on Congressional control had
checked the President's energetic efforts to win long-term aid
appropriations. (6) The resulting compromise providing for long-term
authorizations subject to annual appropriations was interpreted, how-
ever, by the Administration and many in Congress as imposing a moral
obligation on Congress to appropriate approximately the amount
in military aid. He did so, however, only on the voice vote.
When a roll-call was demanded, McCormack switched his vote. Also
see Belair, NYT, Aug. 2k, 1962.
Also see references in Passman's floor presentation to his
deal with "high echelons" concerning his recommendation of a
$175 million restoration of military aid funds. See Congressional
Record, Sep. 5, pp. 16995-99.
(3) UU were recorded as "not voting" on the motion for final passage
of the aid appropriation bill; Congressional Record, Sep.
p. 17OU3.
(U) No major Congressional statements appeared in NYT or Post in the
period prior to the House debate. The first notable Congressional
statement touching on the neutrals' conduct at Belgrade was
Senator Keating's proposal that the neutrals be invited to Berlin
to see "the wall"; New York Herald Tribune, Sep. 5.
(5)	Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 16995-170^3.
(6)	E. W. Kenworthy, NYT, Section IV, Aug. 27.36
approved in the authorization bill. (7) All these reasons but especially
the first concerning the Administration’s strategy help to explain why
the House debate did not generate many references to the Belgrade
Conference.
Despite these reasons for discounting the House debate as an ade-
quate index of House reaction to the Belgrade Conference, the debate
does record the views of several members toward aid to unfriendly
neutral countries. Some of these contain allusions to the Belgrade
Conference. Although only one comment specifically mentions Indonesia,
it seems reasonable to assume that most Congressmen upset about the
Belgrade Conference’s ’’double standard” would also be upset specifically
with Indonesia. For, as indicated above, the American press portrayed
Indonesia’s role at Belgrade as decidedly ’’militant" in its denunciation
of Western colonialism, in insistence on recognition of two German
states, and in maintaining silence on Soviet test resumptions. (8)
As Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee, Rep. Otto Passman (D., Louisiana) was
floor manager for the Committee bill during the House debate. This
bill included the $896,000,000 in cuts engineered by Passman's
Committee. Given the Administration strategy based on agreement with
Passman, the Louisiana Representative had little to fear in the way
of a concerted floor effort to restore any of the cut funds—with the
exception of military aid funds which to Congress had far greater cold
war justification than funds for development loans and grants. (9) It
is these latter categories that are of primary concern in a study of
the impact of the Belgrade Conference because the neutral countries by
in large received very little military aid from the US. (10) The
(7)	See the President’s statement of Sep. k', text cited in NYT, Sep,.
5. In the floor debate in the House on Sep. ζ note the remarks
of Congressman Rooney, the ranking pro-Administration Democrat
on the Passman Committee; see Congressional Record, Sep. 5,
p. 170lU. Also see views of the most ardent advocate of foreign
aid on the Passman Committee, Congressman Conte (R., Mass.),
Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17007-08.
(8)	See above p. 12.
(9)	In I960, for example, Congressman Taber, who has been a consistent
enemy of foreign aid, sponsored a successful amendment to restore
$200 million in military aid funds. Congressional Quarterly
Almanac I960, pp. U56-U57.
(10)	Funds programmed during the fiscal year 1962 for the Belgrade Con-
ference participants totaled $821.7 million in economic assistance
(loans and grants by AID) and only $63.9 million in military
assistance. Unexpended balances in these two categories of
American aid for neutrals stood, as of June 30, 1962, at $1,360.2
million and $83-9 million respectively. The ratio of economic to
military aid is thus approximately 12 to 1. See 1962 Passman
Committee Hearings, Part m, p. 583.37
Passman Committee cut in development loans was $175 million from the
authorized $1.2 billion and in development grants $121 million from
the authorized $380 million. (11)
The first explicit reference to Belgrade was made by Rep.
Cederburg (R., Michigan). Announcing his opposition to the entire
bill because of the action of the ’’so-called neutrals” at the Con-
ference, Cederburg, responding to anti-Western statements made by
neutral leaders, summarized his feelings as follows:
We are dedicated to doing something good for people. I
am tired of having my country kicked around by so-called
neutrals. If we as a nation are considered to have ulterior
motives in mind then I say they are not worthy of our
assistance. (12)
Cederburg concluded his brief comments by reading to his colleagues the
views of Washington Evening Star columnist Crosby S. Noyes. In an
article devoted to denigrating the neutralists' ’’monstrously distorted
double standard of international morality,” Noyes furnished abundant
ammunition for inveterate opponents of foreign aid like Cederburg.
(13) Significantly, the following passage at the outset of the
article identifies Indonesia with the objectional neutralist views
detailed in the body of the article.
In tone, they £the speeches of the leaders^) have
ranged all the way from the rantings of Indonesia’s
Sukarno and Ghana's Nkruma through temperate statements
of India's Nehru and Burma's U Nu. (lii)
(11)	E. W. Kenworthy, ΝΪΤ, Sep. 2, 1961. Also see House Report
No. 1107, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on Foreign Assistance and
Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1962, pp. 1-8.
(12)	Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. 1700U.
(13)	If a Congressman has voted frequently against the foreign aid
authorization and appropriation bills during the three year
period 1960-1962, he is generally characterized here as an
"inveterate opponent of foreign aid." Except for a partial
deviation in I960, Rep. Cederburg of Michigan has consistently
Voted against both these bills. For the six roll call votes in
question the author has referred to the Congressional Quarterly
Almanac for I960 and 1961. For 1962 votes the appropriate
weekly editions of the Quarterly have been used.
(lU) Congressional Record, Sep. p. 1700U.38
Cederburg was not alone in his condemnation of the Belgrade
participants. Rep. Durno (R., Oregon) began by objecting to the dire
effects of the aid program on the American economy, the bungling and
waste in the administration of the program abroad, and the support
given "to state monopolies to compete against private enterprise.”
Supplementing these familiar arguments of the fiscal conservative
was this recommendation to stop aiding unfriendly nations!
Cuba, Brazil, Prance and Tunisia and the Belgrade Con-
ference Should teach us something.
Military aid to those who can help us and development
loans to our friends, yes, to the world, no. (li>)
Near the close of the debate Rep. Hollifield, (D., California)
interrupted to report that President Kennedy had just announced that
the US would resume nuclear testing. Hollifield then volunteered a
rebuke to the neutrals1 «double standard" on testing. At the same
time he tacitly questioned the importance the US had been putting on
world public opinions
I believe the sober consideration given by the President
and his advisees to the resumption question—both before and
after the recent Soviet decision—has done much to improve the
US posture in world opinion. However I must say that the
comments of most of the neutral leaders were somewhat re-
strained to say the least. Does anyone believe they would
have been as restrained with the US, if we had unilaterally
resumed testing? (16)
The comment of Rep. Ashmore (D., South Carolina) also deserves
mention because it reflects on the House image of Indonesia. Hostile
to the entire aid bill, Ashmore offered these dire judgements of the
success of our aid policy:
It has gained us little if any prestige and probably no
real staunch allies in our never-ending struggle with
Communism... The so-called neutral nations receive millions of
our dollars. Both India and Indonesia are accepting our
money and then invariably vote with Russia in the United
Nations. But American aid to Poland and Yugoslavia is simply
unbelievable. (17)
(li>) Ibid, p. 17010. Durno voted against the authorization, but for
the final appropriation.
(16)	Ibid, p. 17023. Hollifield generally supports foreign aid.
(17)	Ibid, P- I70I+I. Ashmore is consistently opposed to foreign aid
authorizations and appropriations.39
In addition to these comments during the floor debate three
Representatives reacted violently enough to Belgrade to have articles
condemning the neutrals placed in the appendix of the Congressional
Record. Rep. Flood (R., Pennsylvania) cited David Lawrence’s
September 6 column in the Washington Evening Star. Lawrence’s slant
appears in an opening sentence appraising the neutral’s ”soft and
almost inaudible protest” of the Soviet tests as ’’proof that they
were aligned with the Soviets.” (18) Rep. Derounian (R., New York)
manifested his attitude toward the non-aligned by citing an editorial
in the New York Daily News which concluded with this recommendation
to the President as to how to treat the Belgrade emissaries, Sukarno
and Keitas
President Kennedy can hardly tell these uninvited guests
not to come here. But he can make it plain to them that
they are not wanted or welcome.
Why not give them the coldest reception possible?
What more do we owe to bums who take our money but reserve
the right to stab us in the back? (19)
Mr. Derounian’s Republican colleague from New York, Katherine
St. George chose a more sophisticated, but no less disparaging
commentary to illustrate her reaction to Belgrade. She cited Marguerite
Higgin’s column entitled ’’Power and Popularity” which bewailed Ameri-
can naivete in seeking applause rather than respect from world public
opinion. (20) Like Joseph Alsop, Miss Higgins had a virulent dislike
for those in the State Department who underestimated the role of
power in international relations.
Such were the scattered comments in the immediate wake of Belgrade
in the House of Representatives. Paralleling the views of the press,
most of these comments are those of arch enemies of foreign aid. (21)
Belgrade did not alter their existing views. Rather it functioned to
confirm and reinforce deep-seated attitudes. And as such it furnished
the opponents of aid another supporting argument for their annual
attack on expenditures.
(18)	Ibid, Sep. 7, p. A 70l|3-
(19)	Congressional Record, Sep. 7> p. A 7067. Derounian has a mixed
record on foreign aid roll calls.
(20)	Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. A 693· St. George voted for
aid in I960 under fellow Republican Eisenhower, but against it
in 1961 & 1962.
(21)	References have been made in preceding notes to voting
patterns of most of the cited Congressmen. Also see p. 37,
n. 13.ho
Despite Administration strategy not to challenge Rep. Passman and
the inveterate opponents of aid, an effort was made on the floor to
restore cuts made by the Passman Committee. Rep. Ford (R. Michigan),
a member of the Passman Committee, successfully pressed an amendment to
restore $300 million in military aid. Given the immediacy of the cold
war crises, Mr. Ford had important levers on his side. (22) Even
Passman himself had conceded to the traditional House preference for
military aid by offering to restore $175 million. (23)
The more noteworthy challenge to Mr. Passman came from another
member of the Passman Committee, Rep. Conte (R., Massachusetts). Hie
only member of the Committee to denounce the Committee's cuts publicly,
Conte offered an amendment to restore the development loan fund to its
authorized figure of $1.2 billion. (21;) In presenting his case for
such an amendment, Conte revealed himself as an articulate advocate
of the Administration policy toward aid to uncommitted countries.
In a prepared speech—the longest of the day in support of increased
economic assistance—Conte went so far as to suggest he felt no dis-
appointment over Belgrade. Although this may have been because his
speech was prepared before the Belgrade Conference speeches, (25)
Conte's remarks leave no doubt as to his policy toward aid to un-
committed nations:
Over the years, our foreign policy has been aimed at
keeping the uncommitted nations free and uncommitted, and to
(22)	Among the aid proponents invoking the urgency of the cold war
situation as justification for aid funds were President Kennedy
and ex-President Eisenhower; see NYT, Sep. 5. Rep. Boland
(D., Mass.) cited letters from Secretaries Rusk and MacNamara
who also used the cold war lever on behalf of aid; see Con-
gressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17002-03. Rooney and Conte also
used this argument; see Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17011;
and 17001 respectively.
(23)	See Passman presentation of the Committee bill on the House
floor in Congressional Record, Sep. 5> pp. 16995-99. Also see
NYT, Sep.S'.
(2b) Press release from the office of Congressman Silvio Conte, dated
Sep. 1, 1961. This release opened with an unequivocal slap at the
Passman Committee, on which Conte served. "I am most disappoint-
ed—in fact, shocked by the way in which the Subcommittee has
acted.” (Copy secured from Rep. Conte's office.) Conte's amend-
ment is found in Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. 17019.
(25) Conte's legislative assistant has agreed with the author that
Conte did use poor strategy in referring to Belgrade in a speech
defending the aid program.Ul
assist these nations in developing a particular philosophy,
not necessarily producing the same conclusions to specific
international problems as ourselves, but nevertheless, a
philosophy acceptable to their peoples and not alien to
our way of life. The final curtain has descended today on
the Belgrade Conference of the uncommitted nations - these
nations geographically arranged in various parts of the
world are key countries politically. As a result of their
increasing role in world affairs and the prestige they
command, they are bound to exert a powerful influence on
other countries who are economically underdeveloped and
politically uncommitted. Yet, by the axe we are
attempting to use, these nations will no longer look to
the west for help and guidance in the process of develop-
ing their democracies and their economies - their sights
may be turned to the Soviet Union if we are inconsistent
in our desire to continue assisting them. As I pointed
out earlier, these are the nations we must not allow to
lag behind because they might well conclude that the
democratic process is too expensive a system for them
to adopt. (26)
Following this forceful plea for more development loan funds,
Rep. Gross (R., Iowa) rose to challenge Conte's assumptions as to the
American national interest in aiding the uncommitted nations. The
heated exchange which ensued provides a further insight into the
poles of House sentiment toward the "so-called neutrals":
Gross: Since the gentleman has raised the issue of
Communism, how many nations are involved in the so-called
uncommitted nations meeting in Belgrade at the present
time?
Conte: Just about all, 30, I believe.
Gross: Thirty or thirty-six nations that are un-
committed?
Conte: About that.
Gross: Why should there be any uncommitted nations,
at the rate we have been shoveling out money all over the
world?
Conte: I do not think this foreign aid should be
a question of bribery. I do not think we should buy
anyone.
Gross: What is the purpose of this so-called foreign
aid?
Conte: The purpose of it is to help the under-
developed and -underprivileged people of the world. It
is a twofold program. It is like a two edged sword. It
is for the security of the free world and also a
(26) Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17007-08.U2
humanitarian program to help those less fortunate throughout
the world.
Gross: Such as Ghana, and Nkrumah, the head of that
government? Is that an independent nation?
Conte: I think it is very important to keep these nations
friendly to us.
Gross: Does the gentleman know that Nkrumah is one of
the worst dictators in the world today?
Conte: There are a lot of dictators throughout the
world, such as in the Dominican Republic and other nations.
Gross: It is very fitting that these uncommitted
nations that have been the beneficiaries of billions of
dollars of our money, including Nehru of India, should now
be over in a Communist country, throwing brickbats at us.
Conte: It is better to have them independent than
under the Communists.
Gross: How could we get any help from the uncommitted
nations?
Conte: I hope that they will be on the side of the free
world if the chips are ever down..........
Gross: The gentleman knows where they are going to be
if the chips are ever down. They are going to be neutral.
The gentleman knows these uncommitted nations did nothing for
us over in Korea, when Americans were fighting and dying,
and we were financing all the war in Korea. Where were the
uncommitted nations then? All India ever produced for
Korea was a hospital unit, and the gentleman knows it. (27)
Conte won floor support from a perennial defender of foreign aid
in the House, Rep. Judd (R., Minnesota) and Rep. Lindsay (R., New
York), who asserted that the development loan fund was the most im-
portant part of the bill. The fervent appeals of Reps. Bolton and
O'Hara, members of the Foreign Affairs Africa Sub-Committee, for
restoration of development grants which would go to Belgrade partici-
pants including Ghana and Guinea indicate that Conte's views were
shared by some influential House figures even at a time when aid to
the uncommitted would appear to be an unpopular subject. In any case,
given the Administration strategy and the dominant mood of the House,
the Conte Amendment for restoration of development loans and the
like-motivated Yates Amendment for restoration of development grants
both met defeat by votes of 132 to 110 and lHU to 131 respectively.
(28)
(27)	Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. 17013. Gross votes on foreign
aid as would be suspected from his remarks.
(28)	Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17O2ii and 17027.b3
The impact of the Belgrade Conference on the House did not die
with passage of the foreign aid appropriations bill. On the contrary,
the Belgrade Conference was to emerge in the second session of the
87th Congress as an important theme in the Passman Committee hearings
on aid. As such, it would also again have a role in kindling the
latent feelings of the House against foreign aid expenditures. Before
looking at the 1962 hearings, note must be taken of reaction to
Belgrade manifest in the Senate debate on foreign aid appropriations
on September lf>.
«
Senate Debate of September 1$
Hie Administration strategy for restoring a sizeable portion of
the Passman Committee cuts assumed that both the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee and the whole Senate would appropriate virtually the
entire authorized amount for foreign aid. The fact that these
assumptions proved correct shows that the irritation over the Belgrade
Conference was not by itself deep enough to cause the Senate to take
immediate reprisals against the offending nations. (29) The major
factor restraining such impulsive action was the continuing cold war
crises over Berlin and nuclear testing. (30) In addition, as with
some members of the House, the Senate was sensitive to the moral
obligation imposed by the passage of the authorization bill com-
promise instituting long term authorizations subject to annual
(29) Hew York Herald Tribune reporter Donald Cook laid the greatest
stress on this point. In his story on the work of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, he said on September lb: "The
Appropriations Committee mark up of the foreign aid money bill
was the first real chance Congress had to take counter-
action £against President Tito] and instead voted a massive
increase of $537.1 million, all but $62.9 million of $600
million slashed from the bill in the House”; See Tribune,
Sep. lb. Despite some exaggeration in Cook's account, it is
noteworthy that on Sep. 15 the whole Senate endorsed its
Appropriation Committee by a margin of 62-17. But as the
New York Herald Tribune's Rowland Evans pointed out, "the
debate Qin the Senate] , however, brought to the surface for
the first time a strong political reaction against President
lito of Yugoslavia for his blatant criticism of US policy...
during the Belgrade Conference.” Evans went on to discuss the
Keating Amendment? "President Tito and other 'neutral' leaders
who failed to stand up against Soviet decision to resume nuclear
testing were in the mind of Senator Keating"; See New York
Herald Tribune, Sep. 16. Cf. Felix Belair, NYT, Sep. lb and 16
and Oct. 1; Post, Sep. 16; Carroll Kilpatrick, Post, Sep. 21;
Washington Evening Star, Sep. lb, 15, and 17.
(30) See, for example, Washington Evening Star, Sep. lb.
appropriations. Also as the body constitutionally responsible for ad-
vising the President on foreign affairs the Senate usually proves more
sensitive to the President's need for flexibility in dealing with his
complex international responsibilities.
Irritation over Belgrade was, however, severe enough to manifest
itself in the Senate debate on the foreign aid appropriaion bill on
September lf>. (31) As in the House fiscal conservatives and chauvinists
issued their expected denunciations of the neutrals' "double standard."
In addition Senators of a more liberal-internationalist bent added their
voices to the outcry against Belgrade, ted by Sen. Keating (R., New
York) this latter group supported an amendment that would incorporate
President Kennedy's statement of September U into the appropriations
bill. This Keating amendment, cosponsored by Sens. Bush, Fong, and
Scott (all Republican) stated:
It is the sense of Congress that in the administration
of these funds great attention and consideration should be
given to those nations which share the view of the United
States on the world crisis. (32)
Outrage at the "double standard" of the Belgrade neutrals was the
direct cause for the Keating amendment. The Senator himself asserts that
without the stimulus of the Belgrade Conference he would not have been
moved to offer the amendment. (33) This influence is amply reflected
in Keating's floor speech in support of the amendment. Like the
American press and the President himself, Sen. Keating seemed most
perturbed at the neutrals’ seeming blatant hypocrisy in supporting the
principle of self-determination in Asia and Africa while ignoring its
application to the people under or threatened by Communist domination—
and particularly the people of West Berlin. This shocking behavior
could not be overlooked, for "the basic issue, the long-term issue and
the issue upon which the nations of NATO are taking their stand, is not
just West Berlin, but the right of a people to self-determination."
While conceding that it is "perhaps understandable for newly independent
nations to try to avoid cold war struggles in which their own interests
(31)	For the major press accounts of this debate see sources cited
above in n. 29, p. U3.
(32)	Congressional Record, Sep. l£, p. l8i|19. Co-sponsors Bush, Fong,
and Scott are cited the previous day, Congressional Record, Sep.
Ill, p. 18210.
(33)	Interview with the author on Aug. 13, 1962. Keating specifically
cited Egypt, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and India as the nations
which had particuarly irritated him at the time of Belgrade.
Whether the Senator's recollection is colored by his more recent
efforts against Egypt and India is moot. See Keating's floor speech
on April 30, 1962,on Foreign Aid Guidelines. (Copy secured from
Sen. Keating's office.)U5
do not appear to be immediately involved,” the Senator obviously could
not stomach their blindness to the moral issue in the current Berlin
crisiss
the time has come for the United States to take a
second look at the neutrality of some of these so-called
neutral nations. When the free world is facing a crisis
over Berlin, a crisis in which the freedom and inde-
pendence of millions of people is at stake there can be
no genuine neutrality for any nation which pays even the
slightest lipservice to the ideals of freedom. (3b)
Keating went on to castigate the Belgrade participants for their
reaction to another issue on which ’’there is also no room for
neutrality”—the question of nuclear testing?
their reaction to the blatant Soviet resumption of
nuclear testing in the atmosphere, make us really wonder
how neutral these neutral nations are. It is beginning
to look as if some of them were neutral against the West,
and neutral in favor of the Communist bloc. (35)
While venting his outrage with the Belgrade performance of
”some of these so-called neutrals”, Keating emphasized that his
appeal for ”a second look” at their neutrality did not imply backing
for an immediate slash of aid funds to such countries. Indeed he
expressed full support for the bill restoring all $63 million of the
House cuts. Nor did the Senator wish to impose a binding directive
on the President. He simply wanted to write into the record a
principle—what he would later call both a warning and a guide-
line— (36) embodying the language used by the President on
September Us
I think it is about time that the Congress is
placed on the record as specifically preferring the ex-
tension of U.S. aid to those countries which have a
genuine appreciation of freedom and a genuine concern
for the welfare of mankind. We are literally throwing
our money down the drain if we give it or lend it to
nations, the leaders of which are unable to appreciate
what is at stake in the Berlin crisis or unwilling to
(3U) All the above quotations appear in Congressional Record, Sep.
15, p. 18U19.
(35)	Ibid.
(36)	Interviews with Sen. Keating, his legislative assistant, and
the legislative assistant of Sen. Aiken. Also see speech by
Keating cited in n. 32, p. UU.U6
condemn the belligerent nuclear testing undertaken by the
Soviet Union. I realize that an amendment in this form is
not absolutely binding, but I think it is important none-
theless to reaffirm this principle as stated by the
President so that we can in fact concentrate our assistance
on those countries which share in our own concern for the
survival of freedom throughout the globe and our hope for
economic and social betterment. (37)
The first and probably the most influential endorsement came from
Sen. Saltonstall (Massachusetts), the ranking Republican on the Senate
Appropriations Committee—the committee responsible for restoring the
House cuts. As perhaps the most respected member of both that committee
and the Senate delegation to the crucial Conference Committee,
Saltonstall’s brief but unqualified sanction assured wide support for
the amendments
I have read the suggested amendment of the Senator from
New York. I have talked to him about it also. It is an
excellent amendment. I hope that the chairman of the com-
mittee will accept it and take it to conference. (38)
In taking this position Saltonstall did not, however, fully share
the intensity of Keating's discontent. While certainly not pleased
with Belgrade, the Massachusetts Senator was motivated more by legis-
lative tactics than emotional feeling about Belgrade. As may have
been known to the influential members of the Senate, the President him-
self had appealed to Sen. Saltonstall to take practical responsibility
for directing the aid appropriation through the Senate and into the
inevitable combat with Rep. Passman in the Conference Committee. There
was no Democrat of sufficient energy and prestige to take on this
task—although Sen. Pastore of Rhode Island would be nominally respon-
sible together with octogenarian Sen. Hayden, the Chairman of the
Appropriations Committee. Experienced from many similar battles in the
past and firm in his support of the legislation, Saltonstall was,
indeed, an excellent choice. Whatever criticism might be made of the
Administration’s Congressional laison in other phases of the foreign
aid legislation process, the President had in this case traded
(37) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18U19. Keating's voting on
foreign aid roll calls in the past three years reveals con-
sistent support for the program, but sympathy for moderate cuts
in economic development loans.
(38) Congressional Record, Sep. li>, p. 18U2O. Saltonstall has been
fiiroer than Keating in supporting the Administration on all but
one amendment during the years 1960-1962.kl
effectively on his surprisingly amicable relationship with the Republican
Senator from his own state. (39)
In keeping with his assigned task, Sen. Saltonstall’s motive in
supporting the Keating Amendment was to forestall an even more stringent
amendment both in the Senate and possibly in the Conference Committee.
It seems likely that Senator Hayden's backing had a like motive. (Uo)
That there was danger of an amendment with more binding language than
Keating's is suggested by the chorus of bipartisan support the latter
elicited from conservatives and liberal-internationalists as wen.
Both groups voiced what the Times reporter Felix Bel r termed "sharp
criticism" of the Belgrade Conference. (Ul)
Among the more conservative group, Sen. Lausche (D., Ohio) com-
plained that the language in the amendment was too "mi 1 d"—al though
he recognized that "we cannot have rigid, inflexible language on the
subject." (h.2) Sen* Miller (R., Iowa) allowed Crosby Noyes of the
Washington Evening Star to speak for him in a column entitled "Will
the United States Reappraise the Neutrals?" Cautioning against the
danger of a reappraisal going too far, Noyes stressed the importance
of discrimination between "moderate" and "radical" neutrals. In the
(39) A source close to Sen. Saltonstall is responsible for most of the
above interpretation. Another such source has pointed to the
relatively amicable relations between Saltonstall and Kennedy
during the I960 campaign.
(2j.O) It seems likely that the Administration and its supporters on
the Appropriations Committee, like Hayden and Pastore, endorsed
the strategy. No objection was raised by anyone really super-
fluous given the President's stand. But Pastore endorsed the
amendment and also placed his discontent with Belgrade into the
record. See Congressional Record, Sep. l£, p. 18I|2O.
(Ul) See sources cited in n. 29, p. h3, above.
(h.2) Congressional Record, Sep. 1ϊ>, p. l8ii20. Lausche emerged in the
Ϊ9δ2 session as a major critic of aid, policy. He sponsored the
controversial amendment banning aid and PL U80 loans to "nations
dominated by Communism and Marxism." See Congressional Quarterly,
June 8, 1962, p. 1000. As a member of the staff of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee explained to the author, Lausche's
"Horatio Alger rise" from a poor immigrant background has made
him highly sensitive to ideologies hostile to America. He also
has been upset by several encounters with neutralist spokesmen
who somewhat tactlessly indicated their belief that America
owed them assistance. Interview in August 1962.U8
former camp he specifically placed Nehru and U Nu. The identity and
qualities of the ’'radicals”—including Sukarno—emerged in this remarks
Many who sat through the recent conference came away
with the feeling that the sublime arrogance of the Titos,
the Nkrumahs and the Sukarnos of the world could stand a
bit of healthy deflation. Those who proclaim the moral ob-
ligation of the rest of the world to support them and then
use this very aid as a club to beat their benefactors can
hardly hope to escape forever the consequences of their own
lack of realism. There are limits, after all, to the
patience of the most dedicated advocate of American aid
programs. And the reaction of some diplomats to the
goings-on in Belgrade suggested that this limit was
periously close to being reached. (ίι3)
In urging reappraisal of policy toward these "radicals,” Noyes
offered this justification;
It is not a question as some nonaligned leaders loudly
claim of attaching political strings to aid or inter-
ferring in the affairs of other nations. It is a question
merely of whether the results of these policies, as re-
flected in the political attitudes of the countries in-
volved, justify continued sacrifice on the part of the
American taxpayer. (UU)
Sen. Proxmire (D., Wisconsin) followed Sen. Miller's citation of
Noyes with another citation stridently urging the same course.
Again in this US News and World Report article entitled ”To Neutrals;
US Billions; From Them; 0,” Indonesia is firmly associated with the
offending militants at Belgrade. This is apparent in the US News'
account of the policy implications allegedly drawn by American ob-
servers at Belgrade;
U. S. policy in recent years has been greatly influenced
by concern of what neutrals might think of U. S. policy.
There was no evidence at Belgrade that this policy has paid
off.
(U3) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18U21. Miller voted for final
passage of the aid money bill, but supported Sen. Ellender and
others in cutting both military and economic aid. He also
backed restrictive amendments such as Lausche’s in 1962.
(Ml) Congressional Record, Sep. lf>, p. 18U21.U9
Nikita Khrushchev in the same period has acted on the
theory that neutrals respect power, threats, more than
cash and kind words. This policy, it seems, has paid off for
the Soviet Union.
Indonesia's Sukarno, recipient of half a billion dollars
of US aid and an ardent backer of Soviet policy at the
Belgrade Conference, with President Keita of Mali, is taking
the neutral peace appeal to President Kennedy in the United
States.
Question now asked; After Belgrade, will the United
States keep supplying neutrals with cash, kind words, and
a voice in U. S. policymaking toward Russia? (Ui>)
One of the co-sponsors of the Keating Amendment, Sen. Scott
(R., Pennsylvania) appeared to take a position close to Keating's.
Evincing his continuing support for foreign aid, he went on to com-
plain that "it is becoming more and more difficult to support foreign
aid because of the flagrant and arrogant attitude of those who take our
money and then serve the other side." "I am tired of paying for
people to be Communist stooges with the aid of American cash." Sen.
Scott went on to cite a William Randolph Hearst Jr. editorial entitled
"Neutrals' Stand Perils Peace." Like Noyes, Hearst distinguishes be-
tween relatively moderate leaders like Nehru and Nasser and the mili-
tants "who did their Commie best to steer the just-closed Belgrade
Conference into anti-US positions." (1|6)
Another co-sponsor of the Amendment had already manifested an even
more severe view of Belgrade. Sen. Fong (R., Hawaii) said during the
floor debate;
We can only conclude from their own words that the
nonaligned nations are not "neutral" but are decidedly
biased against the West. The so-called neutral nations
chose to ignore the indisputable legal rights of the
West, and they rendered only lip service to moral
rectitude.
(Ui>) Congressional Record, Sep. 1ί>, pp. I8ii21-l81i22. In 1961 and
more conspicuously in 1962 Proxmire has emerged as a prime
advocate of reductions in funds and of restrictions on aid to
Yugoslavia and Poland. He did, however, back the President
in voting for long-term aid appropriations in August 1961.
(U6) Congressional Record, Sep. 1$, p. 18U57· In 1962 Scott showed
greater enthusiasm for the Administration aid program than
Keating. More recently they parted company on what the NYT
called the "key vote" in the Senate’s Oct. 2, 1962, debate
on the aid money bill. See NYT, Oct. 15, 1962.ίο
At the same time the 2ί nonaligned nations severely-
criticized the West, they called upon us for help—for food
to feed their hungry, for funds to develop their resources
and industries, for technicians to instruct them...
The American people are asking why should we continue to
help nations which, by their words and deeds, reveal a
strong prejudice against the West? (U7)
Senators regarded as more staunch supporters of foreign aid than
any of those above joined in the general denunciation of Belgrade.
(U8) The Republican whip, Sen. Kuchel (R., California) declared that
’’The time is overdue for the nations of the world to stand up and be
counted." Kuchel, however, shied away from a strict construction of
the Amendment's intent. He did not explicitly advocate or even sug-
gest cutting aid to unfriendly neutrals. Rather he used his brief
statement to urge cooperation with like-minded people, (It9) Sen.
(h7) Congressional Record, Sep. 12, pp. 19086-87. Fong's voting on aid
has been identical with Lausche's in the author's limited sample
of 1960-1962 roll calls. That his views in 1962 paralleled those
in the immediate wake of Belgrade appeared in his speech of July
5, 1962. Voicing a strict construction of the strengthened 1962
version of the Keating Amendment, he said; "Nations seeking our
aid in developing their economies should be put on notice that
we will not extend aid if they use their own economic resources
to buy Communist military equipment or take actions contrary
to America's foreign policy objectives. It is time to attach
some sensible strings to our foreign aid to insure that it will
be used in accord with, not against, America's best interests."
See script for radio tape for Station KGU, Honolulu, on July 5,
1962. (Copy secured from Sen. Fong's office.)
The third co-sponsor of the 1961 Keating Amendment, Sen.
Bush (Connecticut), did not participate in the debate on the aid
money bill. He did reveal a relatively mild discontent with the
Belgrade reaction to Soviet testing. This was in a radio broad-
cast on Sep. 8. See press release from office of Sen. Bush on
Sep. 8, 1961. (Copy secured from Sen. Bush's office.) His
voting on aid seems closer to Keating's than to Scott's.
(ii8) As above, general indications of the Senators' voting on aid
measures will be entered in the footnotes.
(U9) Congressional Record, Sep. ΐί, p. 18U2O. While voting against
the Administration in 1961 on two key aid amendments, Kuchel
in the aforementioned key vote in the Oct. 2, 1962, debate
sided with the Administration; See NYT, Oct. ΐί, 1962. See
n. U5, p. U9.5i
Aiken (R., Vermont) also eschewed the polemical tone of some of his
colleagues. In his reference to Belgrade he mingled some sympathetic
understanding with his general discontent. Noting that Cyprus was the
only nation ’’who dared to stand up and express its opinion of Russia’s
resumption of nuclear testing,” Aiken felt ’’certain that other so-
called neutral nations...perhaps shared our views about the Russian
testing but did not express them very forcefully. Had they done so,
they probably would have been out-numbered by many of the 2l+ nations
represented there.” (50)
There is also some evidence that even the most ardent backers of
foreign aid—Sens. Humphrey and Cooper—were not unaffected by
Belgrade. Sen. Cooper did not allude specifically to Belgrade during
his speech on the floor, but he did include the following in his list
of six suggested improvements in the foreign aid program: ’’the US
must not submit to pressure from any country, that it will seek aid
from the Soviet Union unless we meet their requests.” Whether Belgrade
helped to prompt this requirement is not known, but it fits the general
mood of irritation with the ”pro-Soviet” neutrals which was provoked
by the Conference. (51)
There is no question about Sen. Humphrey’s feeling. The Senate
majority whip did not contribute to the September 15 debate, but the
following day he alluded to the Belgrade Conference:
speaking of those neutrals, I want it quite under-
stood that as one who had frequently stood on this floor
during the last twelve and a half or thirteen years that
I have been a Member of the Senate and have defended the
right of neutral countries to be neutral, I do not defend
the right of any country to be neutral as regards morality.
It is one thing for a nation and its leaders to be neutral
in the power struggle—neutral in the sense that they do
not want to be caught up in the contesting forces of the
major powers. But one cannot be neutral as between right
and wrong or as between decency and indecency...
(50)	Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 181+20. While supporting some
amendments providing cuts in funds, Aiken was one of a tiny Re-
publican minority that voted against the restrictive Lausche
Amendment of 1962 banning aid to countries dominated by Communism
or Marxism. As his legislative assistant pointed out to the
author, Sen. Aiken definitely held to a loose construction of the
Keating Amendment. ’’Opponents of aid say don’t aid them unless
they conform to the guidelines. While Aiken and others say con-
tinue aid, but establish administrative and policy guidelines.”
Interview with author in August 1962.
(51)	Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 181+59. Cooper, of course,
together with Case and Javits, has the most consistent record of
any Republican in backing Administration aid policies.52
Mr. President, what happened at Belgrade was in ray-
opinion, one of the most disconcerting, and one of the most
depressing acts of nation-states in modern times..... There
may be an explanation for that, and I wish to be charitable,
and to afford them an opportunity to make such an explana-
tion if there is one. But certainly the only way in which
the so-called nonaligned powers can be powerful is by hold-
ing to a moral position and by using good judgement on the
basis of a sense of justice, not on the basis of a sense of
expediency. (52)
Clearly Humphrey showed the moral indignation voiced earlier by
Keating and others, though he refrained from alluding to the Keating
Amendment or any other course of action as a justified US response to
the neutrals' conduct. (53) This falls short of the tone and emphasis
of the Keating position, but it demonstrates again what the Post, Times
and Evening Star reporters agreed was a virulent Senate reaction to
Belgrade. (5U)
Although this reaction resulted in only a minor amendment with no
binding effect on Administration policy, it was a reaction of some
significance. It passed on an unanimous voice vote. As in the House
it obviously provided conservatives with additional data for their
thesis against aid. Moreover, middle-of-the-road internationalists
testified to their increasing irritation with the "so-called
neutrals." Even allowing for the inevitable deference paid in floor
speeches to home constituents and oratorical effect, several Sena-
torial legislative assistants testify to the catalytic effect of
Belgrade on Congress. A building resentment of the ingratitude of
neutrals found a new and evocative symbol. It was one which was to
be used again in the second session of the 87th Congress as a sub-
ordinate, but nonetheless important weapon in the anti-foreign aid
arsenal. The President's statement of September U and the Keating
Amendment as incorporated into the final foreign aid appropriations
act would provide convenient supporting references. (55)
(52)	Congressional Record, Sep. 16, pp. 19886-19888.
(53)	This restraint undoubtedly reflects the Administration position-
given the recognized identity of Humphrey and Administration
views on policy generally. Likewise, indication of Humphrey's
personal irritation seems to coincide with reports of the
President's personal feelings about Belgrade.
(5U) See sources cited in n. 29, p. h-3, above.
(55) The Conference Committee approved the inclusion of the Senate-
sponsored Keating amendment. See House Report No. 1270, 87th
Congress, 1st Session and Public Law 87-329, 87th Congress,
H.R. 9033 j September 30> 1981, p. 3.53
A hint that this strategy would, indeed, be employed in 1962
appears in the brief House debate on the Conference Committee report
on the aid money bill. Two members of the powerful Passman Committee
revealed their intention to use the symbol of Belgrade to win cuts
in what they regarded as a vastly over-extended program. Congressman
Gary (D., Virginia) rose first to hail the virtue of the Keating
Amendment and offer this strict construction of its meaning:
May I say we also hope that the converse will be true
and that no consideration will be given to the so-called
neutrals that try to kick our teeth down our throats every
time they get a chance.
I am hopeful that this is going to be a great source
of savings during the coming year, and that, therefore,
there will be a substantial balance at the end of the
year. (56)
This commentary prompted a familiar reply from Chairman Passman.
It reflected his ardent desire to attempt to enforce Gary’s inter-
pretation on the Administration:
I thank the distinguished gentleman from Virginia,
but knowing how the bureaucrats operate, I would say
that the chances are that they are, at least on paper,
allocating money this afternoon to some of those so-
called neutrals who are kicking us in the pants. (57)
(56) Congressional Record, Sep. 26, p. 20117.
(57) Ibid.CHAPTER IV
THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION IN 1962: THE PASSMAN COMMITTEE HEARINGS
The Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee has established itself as the prime obstacle in the way of
Congressional approval of the President’s annual request for foreign
aid funds. Under the strong hand of Rep. Otto Passman of Louisiana,
the Committee invariably culminates months of detailed hearings by
insisting upon major cuts in the Administration’s foreign aid program.
These cuts in turn almost automatically receive the prompt endorsement
of Rep. Cannon's Appropriations Committee. Then with relatively minor
amendments the Passman bill passes the full House. Subsequently, the
Senate Appropriations Committee usually restores a large portion of
the House cuts and then wins approval of the whole Senate. There then
ensues the final and most crucial skirmish over foreign aid. In the
Senate-House Conference Committee a tenacious Passman normally holds
out for a compromise weighted in favor of the House bill. (1)
Chairman Passman's Views and Tactics in the 1962 Hearings
The widely acknowledged power of Rep. Passman in determining the
amount of foreign aid cuts each year makes his attitude of prime
relevance in a study of Congressional attitudes toward aid to Indonesia.
In assessing Passman's view of aid to Indonesia, it is first necessary
to note that the Congress does not have the power to specify how much
or how little of appropriated funds a given country or even a given
region will receive. Although this is the case, administrators con-
cerned with securing maximum funds must often defer to the preferences
of Rep. Passman and his associates. (2)
(1)	For a review of this pattern in 1961 and a discussion of its first
stage in 1962, see Felix Belair, NTT, Aug. 2l|., 1962.
(2)	Numerous references to Congress' inability to specify countries or
projects in making fund reductions can be found in the 1962 hear-
ings of the Passman Committee. See Hearings Before Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Parts I-HI, July 30, 1962
(henceforth cited as 1962 Hearings).
&56
An evaluation of Passman's views of a particular country requires
an additional caution. Both because of the assigned jurisdiction of his
committee and because of his own predilections, Passman is preoccupied
with reducing the cost of foreign aid. Foreign policy considerations
as such seem to be of less importance to him. He does, however, have
policy views, including judgements about the governments of particular
aid recipients, such as Indonesia. Accordingly, although policy is a
subordinate issue to Passman, his policy views do inevitably affect his
judgement about the degree to which a given category of aid should be
cut. Likewise, his attitude toward a particular country may affect his
decision as to which of the almost one hundred aid recipients should
receive the committee's close scrutiny. Since limited time and resources
force the committee to focus its investigations on only a small portion
of the vast aid program, this is often a decisive factor in the hearings.
(3)
During the 1962 hearings of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee,
Chairman Passman again focused his attention on the impact of foreign
aid on the United States economy. In building his case for another
sizeable slash in foreign aid appropriations, Passman seemed moved by
a genuine concern with the continuing problem of American balance of
payments. Hie concomitant problem of America's declining gold reserves
led him, for example, to document instances where aid recipients have
purchased United States gold. Likewise, with each country studied, he
marshalled figures showing the United States trade balance with aid
recipients. He also sought to undermine the Administration contention
that eighty per cent of foreign aid funds would be spent within the
United States under the "Buy American" policy. (U)
Complementing these arguments was Passman's prominently publicized
tactic of inflating the actual amount of foreign aid expenditures. He
(3) These impressions emerge from a perusal of the 1962 Passman
Committee Hearings, the transcript of Mr. Passman's remarks on
Meet the Press of Aug. 7, 1961, and various press comments.
Brief interviews with the chief clerks of both the Passman
Committee and the Hardy Committee (Government Operations Sub-
committee on Foreign Operations and Monetary Affairs) have also
helped to form the author’s general impressions of both the
Committee's functioning and the role of the Chairman.
(U) These and other points reoccur in the Hearings. They are summarized
in House Report No. 2l|10, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Sep. 18, 1962.
Chairman Passman presented a more elaborate summary of this Report
in his presentation to the House on Sep. 20, 1962. See Congressional
Record, Sep. 20, 1962, pp. 19031-19035. Note especially Passman's
"eleven statements" on p. 19032. Also see the dispatches by Felix
Belair in the NTT' cited in n. 5· below.S7
did this by lumping together in one bill ’’all 19 spigots” of foreign
aid rather than just the three categories with which ATT) is primarily
concerned—development loans, supporting assistance, and development
grants. Apart from military aid and PL Ιι8θ aid, Passman insisted on
the inclusion of American contributions to the World Bank, the IMF,
the EX-IMP Bank, and other international lending agencies. By so
inflating the overall total for foreign aid Chairman Passman hoped to
make his recommended cuts in development loans more palatable to
Congress. A similar illusion was achieved by Passman’s familiar
tactic of stressing the amount of unexpended balances in ATT) accounts.
These, he contended, were sufficient to warrant Congress passing only
a token appropriation for the next year. (5)
Passman's emphasis on these and other economic arguments against
the current rate of foreign aid expenditures reflected what seemed to
be a rigid fiscal conservatism. It was a position which had won him
the consistent support of a majority of his own Committee. (6) It
also appealed to the powerful conservative-coalition in the House as
a whole. But unlike some fiscal conservatives—most notably former
President Eisenhower—Passman's attitude toward foreign aid expendi-
tures was reinforced by an unwillingness to accept what inter-
nationalists term the burdens of America's role as a world power.
Passman in 1962 was not an isolationist, but his limited understand-
ing of the new nations blended with his fanatic concern with the
integrity of the American economy to produce an emotional fear that
our expanding commitments abroad were already beyond our control.
Rep. Passman and at least the most faithful of his supporters on the
committee—notably Reps. Andrews, Alexander, and Taber—were thus
openly hostile to the Administration's concept of a "Decade of
Development.”
It is not surprising then that Passman supplemented his battery
of economic arguments for cutting foreign aid with a number of
political arguments—arguments based on simple common sense bolstered
by an ingrained suspicion of foreign countries. Two such arguments
appear prominently in the 1962 hearings. Both of them bear signifi-
cantly on Passman's view of Indonesia.
The first concerns Soviet aid. In justifying American aid ex-
penditures Administration witnesses from both the State Department
and AID frequently cite the challenge presented by the growing
Sino-Soviet aid program. Given the rapid acceleration in Soviet
economic and military aid to Indonesia since Khrushchev's visit in
(5) Evident in the sources cited in n. U above, this strategy is
illuminated by Felix Belair in a series of dispatches from
Washington. Among them are NIT, Aug. 2ii and 30, Sep. 9, 16, 20
and 21.
(6) See below pp. 66-67.58
February I960, this argument has been especially conspicuous in defend-
ing the increased aid requests for Indonesia. (7) Throughout the
hearings Passman—often backed by his colleagues—has countered the
references to the Soviet aid challenge with the rejoinder that the Soviets
‘•never give anything outright'·—that they are ’’long on promises and short
on deliveries." One illustration of these conflicting views on Soviet
aid appears in the following exchange between Passman and Seymour Janow,
AID Administrator for the Far Easts
Mr. Janow: We have had in Indonesia a very small total
program, perhaps one-tenth of the size that the Communist
bloc has had.
Mr. Passman; We have been told Russia has never given
as much as one rupee, that their assistance is in the form
of hard-boiled loans, short-term loans bearing a high rate of
interest, or in profitable barter arrangements.
Mr. Peterson. Sir, I do not think that is correct.
Mr. Passman. I have been trying for at least the last
8 years to find where Russia has given anything outright.
Mr. Peterson. I would like to submit the recent Soviet
proposal for assistance to the Indonesian aviation industry.
Mr. Passman. We would like to have that, but I wish
you would also confirm or deny at this point that the
Russians are long on promises and short on deliveries. (8)
Following this exchange Mr. Passman’s faithful supporter, Rep.
Andrews of Alabama referred to a press story that Russia had informed
India that she "would not be able to go through with about a $365 million
offer of economic assistance." In his spontaneous comment on this
story Passman displayed an extraordinary degree of suspicion of both
the reality of Soviet aid claims and the motives of neutral countries.
Mr. Passman: It has been said in previous years it
has not been possible to prove that the Russians have ever
made an outright grant of one rupee. It has been under-
stood that this is a trick of the Russians, and a lot of
the neutrals are cooperating with them. They make these
fabulous commitments and it may well be it is understood
that deliveries would be only a small proportion of the
total. As long as you do not know, and I do not either,
this may shed some light on it. I am reading from an
article entitled "Russia Cannot Deliver Equipment for India,"
by Patrick J. Killen. It is dated at New Delhi, August 5,
UPIs
(7)	The President himself gave prominence to "the challenge of Soviet
aid" argument in his Aug. 30 news conference. He cited Indonesia
as a prime example of Soviet intensification of its aid drive. See
Transcript of President's News Conference, Question 8, in NYT, Aug.
31, 1962.
(8)	1962 Hearings, Part III, pp. 605-606.59
Russian officials have quietly informed the
Indian Government that they will have to welsh on
a promise of electrical equipment. Diplomats said
the reasons are economic, not political.
It could be that Mr. Nehru thinks we will rush in and
fill the vacuum?
Mr. Rhodes. You think we will not?
Mr. Janow. I would like to finish this point. I
think it is relevant to the committee's consideration.
(Off the record.)
Mr. Passman. And at this time we do not know if
there is as much as a Si grant?
Mr. Janow. We do not know the details.
Mr. Passman. But what information you do have in-
dicates there are some short-term, interest-bearing
loans?
Mr. Janow: Yes. (9)
In concluding the discussion on Soviet aid to Indonesia, Mr.
Passman exhibited his tactical skill in getting witnesses to con-
tribute to his brief against foreign aid. Through persistent
questioning he compelled Mr. Janow to admit again that the AID had
little data on the amount of Soviet aid actually delivered to
Indonesia and even less on the precise terms of Soviet loans.
Mr. Passman. I believe you said yesterday that you
did not know the terms of these loans?
Mr. Janow. That is correct.
Mr. Passman. It could be, like most other Russian
loans, short term, high rate of interest, and well tied
down?
Mr. Janow. Our information is very sketchy in this
case.
Mr. Passman. Thank you.
Mr. Janow. I think they are 20 years in some in-
stances but we do not have full information.
Mr. Passman. I believe we agreed that they are
strong on promises and short on deliveries, the Soviets?
Mr. Janow. That is true. (10)
The Relative Tactical Importance of the Belgrade Conference
In addition to countering the Administration’s tactic of using
increased Soviet aid as a justification for more American aid to
(9) Ibid, p. 607.
(10) Ibid, pp. 706-707.60
countries such as Indonesia, Chairman Passman also developed another
argument against aiding ’’so-called neutrals" like Indonesia. With a
sensitive ear to the grumblings of his colleagues in the House, Passman
cleverly utilized the symbol of the Belgrade Conference to rally
opponents of aid to neutral countries.
Mindful of the widespread irritation in Washington over the per-
formance of the neutrals at that Conference, Passman throughout the
hearings charged that the Administration contradicted the expressed
wishes of both the President and Congress in increasing instead of
reducing aid to the unfriendly Belgrade neutral nations. As evidence
for this charge Passman first cited the September U aid policy state-
ment of the President and the subsequent incorporation of that state-
ment into the 1901 foreign aid appropriation bill. In addition,
Passman required AID to produce a chart demonstrating the statistical
fact that current AID aid requests for the Belgrade participants
represented a twenty per cent increase over the level of aid to these
countries before the Belgrade Conference. In this way Passman effec-
tively dramatized his case for a sharp reduction in aid funds to the
Belgrade neutrals. This strategy was first unveiled in the early
stages of the hearings during the June 12 testimony of AID Administra-
tor Fowler Hamilton. Chairman Passman raised the subject of the
Belgrade Conference in the following studied fashion:
PROGRAMING OF FUNDS FOR BELGRADE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Passman. Section 112 of last year’s appropria-
tion act stated:
It is the sense of Congress that in the admin-
istration of these funds great attention and con-
sideration should be given to those nations which
share the view of the United States on the world
crises.
If I remember correctly, Section 112 is almost exactly
the same as the President's remarks when he signed the
authorization bill last year.
Of 22+ so-called neutral nations that attended the Bel-
grade Conference last year, how many have had fiscal year
1962 funds programed for them out of any category of funds
made available, and how many are programmed to receive funds
in fiscal 1963?
Mr. Hamilton. If you give me a list, I will be glad
to answer it. I do not recall them all offhand.
Mr. Passman. I cannot ask the question and answer it,
too. You should have the list.
Mr. Hamilton. I do not have it. The preponderant
part of our funds covered by the appropriation $oii gentle-
men are considering goes to people with whom we have a
military alliance.61
Mr. Passman. There should be a way to get that
information.
Mr. Hamilton. I will be glad to furnish it for
the record.
Mr. Passman. Please do, sir.
(The information follows:)
Of the 2h countries sending delegates to the
Belgrade Conference in September 1961, 23 are re-
ceiving U.S. economic assistance and 13 military
assistance in fiscal year 1962. In fiscal year
1963 economic assistance is programed for 22
countries and military assistance for 13.
U.S. AID TO COUNTRIES ATTENDING
BELGRADE CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 1961
Delegations:
Afghanistan
Algeria
Burma
Cambodia
Ceylon
Cuba
Cyprus
Ethiopia
Ghana
Delegations-Continued
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Lebanon
Mali
Morocco
Nepal
Saudi Arabia
Delegations-Continued
Somali Republic
Sudan
Tunisia
UAR
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Observers:
Bolivia
Ecuador
Total U.S. economic and military assistance,
fiscal year 1962, $671 million (does not include
observers).
Total U.S. economic and military assistance,
fiscal year 1963, $813,500,000 (also does not
include observers).
Note. - Additional funds have been programed
for 1963 since the above information was received
by the committee. (11)
On several subsequent occasions Passman either repeated his case
against aid to the Belgrade neutrals or solicited further data from
AID witnesses to bolster the case. In addition, other members of the
Committee sometimes expressed their support for the Passman indict-
ment of ungrateful neutral aid recipients. The most extended expres-
sion of discontent with the Belgrade ’’double standard" came, however,
from Rep. Ford, a member of the minority on the Committee regarded
sympathetic to the Administration aid program. Commenting on the
Belgrade speeches, Rep. Ford denounced those "sanctimonious leaders
(11)	1962 Hearings, Part II, pp. 205-206.62
who have been preaching to us for years about our policies, and then when
the Soviet Union does something their attitude is quite different.” (12)
In condemning the insulting response of Belgrade neutrals to gen-
erous American aid, Passman and Ibrd expressed an attitude shared by a
majority of the committee. This is an attitude of combined suspicion
and disapproval of unfriendly aid recipients. As in the 1962 hearings
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this attitude emerged most
prominently in discussion of projected aid increases for India. (13)
Most of the comments both in the Senate Committee and in the Passman
Committee focused on episodes subsequent to Belgrade—notably India's
"aggression in Goa," her planned purchase of MIGs from Russia, and
hostile remarks by Menon and Nehru, (lit) But these comments Btill seem
related to the same basic attitude that produced Congressional irrita-
tion with Belgrade. It was well illustrated in the expanded version
of the Keating Amendment that Congress incorporated into the 1962
foreign aid authorization bill. As with the original Keating Amend-
ment in September 1961, the 1962 version was aimed primarily at the
more "radical" neutrals at Belgrade — especially those like Indonesia
who showed their "pro-Soviet” leanings not only by word but by
acceptance of Soviet military aid.
It is the sense of Congress that in the administra-
tion of these funds great attention and consideration
should be given to those countries which share the view of
the United States on the world crisis and which do not, as
a result of United States assistance, divert their own
economic resources to military or propaganda efforts,
supported by the Soviet Union or Communist China, and
directed against the United States or against other
countries receiving aid under this Act. (15)
Within the Passman Committee—and very likely in the House as a
whole—a majority applied their general distrust of unfriendly neutrals
to Indonesia. It was a distrust deep enough to pose a real threat to
the Administration's proposed increase in aid to Indonesia for fiscal
year 1963 and thereafter. During the 1962 Passman Committee hearings
remarks about Indonesia by three of the more active Committee members
(12)	1962 Hearings, Part III, p. 2ltl.
(13)	1962 Hearings of Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
(lit) For Passman Committee irritations with India see 1962 Hearings,
Part HI, especially pp. 229-2U6.
(1S>) Public Law 87-563, 8?th Congress, S. 2996, Aug. 1, 1962, cited
as Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Section 101, par. (b).63
revealed several elements in Indonesia's image that activated the
Committee's latent feeling of distrust for the Belgrade neutrals.
Elements in the Committee's Perception of Indonesia
a) Passman's Views
With regard to the most powerful individual on the Committee,
Chairman Passman, it is first important to establish that he did
identify Indonesia with the Belgrade Conference—and that accordingly
his above-cited brief against increased aid to Belgrade Conference
participants did in fact apply to Indonesia. On the second day of
the hearings on the Far East (which in AID organizational structure
embraces Indonesia) Passman reacted in the following manner to testi-
raoney by AID officials concerning the amount of United States aid to
Indonesia.
TOTAL AID TO INDONESIA
Mr. Passman. What has been the total amount of aid
to Indonesia since the inception of the program?
Mr. Tennant. $598.9 million.
Mr. Passman. There is that much aid in Indonesia?
Mr. Tennant. That includes Public Law i|80, Sir.
Mr. Poats. A substantial part of that is Public Law
U80.
Mr. Passman. That does not matter.
(Off the record.)
Mr. Passman. You are dealing with two spigots
only, are you not?
Mr. Tennant. Two funds; yes, sir.
Mr. Passman. Let us have the total. So, it is
$598,900,000 to this Belgrade Conference so-called
neutral country since the inception of the program?
Mr. Tennant. That is correct. (16)
Here then in this spontaneous expression Mr. Passman included Indo-
nesia in two groups for which he had displayed consistent contempt—
the participants in the Belgrade Conference and the "so-called
neutrals." Another aside from Mr. Passman revealed that he also
identified Indonesia’s President Sukarno with Nehru, a leader for
whom Mr. Passman evinced considerable hostility earlier in the hear-
ing. This aside is especially noteworthy because it appeared not
in the discussion on Indonesia, but in a discussion on aid to Guinea.
Accordingly it shows again the association in Passman's mind of
Indonesia with "left-leaning" neutral countries, especially those
like Guinea who allegedly have learned from Sukarno and Nehru how
(l6)	1962 Hearings, Part III, p. 669.6U
to blackmail the United States for aid. (17) This reference to
Sukarno and Nehru as blackmailing the United States for aid finds its
most extreme statement in the above-mentioned Passman charge that
neutrals generally and Nehru particularly actually "cooperate with
the Communists" to secure more aid from the United States. (18)
Passman looked on Sukarno not only as a clever blackmailer, but as
a pro-Communist. This is indicated by three remarks made by Passman
during his lengthy questioning of Mr. Janow about new projects planned
for Indonesia. At the outset of the discussion Passman responded to
Janow’s expression of hope about the aid opportunity in Indonesia in
the wake of the probable settlement of the West Irian problem. "If
you keep Sukarno out of Moscow long enough you might be able to do
something." (19) Later, during Janow's description of proposed
American assistance to the Indonesian Council of Sciences, Passman
interrupted with this observation: "Sukarno spent that amount,
probably, in his last visit to Moscow." (20) Near the close of his
interrogation of Mr. Janow, Passman questioned the appropriateness
of Janow's drawing an analogy between projects in Taiwan and Indonesia.
Mr. Passman. You are referring to Taiwan, with a pro-
American government. There is no relationship between the
two. One is neutral, no doubt pro-Russian, and the other
is 100 percent pro-American. I do not think you can do too
much of a job testifying what you do in Indonesia by what we
did in the Republic of China. (21)
The Passman image of Sukarno was not of recent origin. Events
within the previous year, such as the Belgrade Conference, had served
to reinforce a stereotype already well-established in Passman's per-
ception. During the hearings on foreign aid in March I960, for
example, Passman complained to Secretary of State Herter that the
United States had allowed an admitted pro-Communist like Sukarno to
blackmail us into an increase in aid. (22) Despite Herter's vigorous
denial of this allegation, the Louisiana Congressman did not per-
ceptibly alter his view of Sukarno. For later in the same hearings
Passman again expressed suspicion of the Indonesian President's Soviet
(17)	^62 Hearings, Part II, pp. 771-775.
(18)	See above pp. 58-59.
(19)	1962 Hearings, Part III, p. 600.
(20)	Ibid, p. 605.
(21)	Ibid, p. 613.
(22)	I960 Passman Committee Hearings, Part I, pp. 121-122.65
sympathies. (23) Although a review of the 1961 aid hearings reveal
no further Passman references to Indonesian political views, his
previously cited comments in the 1962 hearings demonstrate that Pass-
man still considered Sukarno a clever pro-Communist neutralist who
regularly blackmailed the US for millions in foreign aid.
b)	Ford's Views
Aside from Chairman Passman, Rep. Ford (R., Michigan) evinced the
most detailed interest in current and future American aid operations
in Indonesia. While not supporting Passman's blanket indictment of the
administration's aid program, Ford's extensive questioning of ATT)
Administrator Janow about aid to Indonesia reflected his general con-
cern about the efficiency and justification of particular projects.
His questions about such matters as the discrepancy between the
estimates for fiscal year 1962 and the actual expenditures had the
clear purpose of documenting the Committee’s perennial charge that
AID requested far more funds than it actually needed to operate. (2b.)
At one juncture, however, Ford did reveal his interpretation of
Indonesia's political leanings. Noting that $5.5 million had been
obligated for supporting assistance to Indonesia in 1962 and that more
was anticipated in 1963, Ford pointedly asked Mr. Janow: "In light
of the present government of Indonesia, why do we give any supporting
assistance?" (25) The disapprobation implicit in this remark takes
on added meaning when related to Ford's earlier cited castigation of
the Belgrade neutrals for their "double standard." (26)
c)	Rhodes' Views
Irritation with the current Indonesian government also appeared
in the comments of Rep. Rhodes (R., Arizona). While more cautious
than Passman in ascribing Communist leanings to Sukarno, Rhodes also
disparaged Indonesia's President as a dictator. This double objec-
tion to Indonesia's government emerged sharply in Rhodes' exchange
with Assistant Secretary of State Harriman on the West New Guinea
question. After complaining of the seeming inconsistency in American
aid policy toward dictatorships in Korea and Laos, Rhodes shifted
his attention to Indonesia with this remark:
Mr. Rhodes. You talked about another dictator,
Mr. Sukarno. You mentioned, when you first came in the
(23) Ibid, Part II, p. 2li92.
(2b)	1962 Hearings, Part III, pp. 700-706.
(25)	Ibid, Part III, p. 702.
(26)	Ibid, Part IH, pp. 2kO-2hl.66
room, that you were somewhat elated because we are appar-
ently being successful in getting the Dutch to step out
of West New Guinea so Sukarno can take over.
Mr. Harriman. Could I change one word?
Mr. Rhodes. Yes.
Mr. Harriman. '’Elated.” I said I was encouraged.
Mr. Rhodes. Very well, "Elated" was my word. To me
this is a mistake. In the first place, as far as I know
there is no more reason for Indonesia to control West New
Guinea than there is for the United States to control it—
ethnically or any other way. In the second place, I wonder
if, by putting a dictator who was at least somewhat oriented
toward Communists in control in New Guinea, we do not create
a brandnew Cuba for Autralia right off the coast there. In
other words, I wonder if this situation might not rise to
haunt us.
Mr. Harriman. (Off the record.) (27)
The Distribution of Power on the Passman Committee
The present incomplete sampling of the attitudes of the Passman
Committee needs to be supplemented by a comprehensive survey of each
member's expressed views, voting record, constituency pressures, etc.
But in lieu of such a survey, a cursory review of the membership's
voting on 1960-1962 roll calls on foreign aid will tend to bolster
the impressionistic picture that has emerged from the citation of
comments in the 1962 hearings. This is a picture of the balance of
power resting rather firmly in the hands of Chairman Passman and a
core of inveterate critics of foreign aid. (28)
In terms of both attitude and voting Passman's most consistent
allies in defending the domestic economy against the ravages of
(27)	Ibid, Part III, pp. 563-561). It is significant to note that
Rhodes' concern over Indonesia's acquiring West New Guinea was
shared by at least one other member of the Committee. Sur-
prisingly this was Rep. Conte—who as has been noted earlier
has the most sympathetic view of neutralism of anyone on the
Committee. (See above pp. l)O-l)l.) Conte's concern, however,
seems to have had a different basis: "to me this is the worst
form of colonialism by the Indonesians trying to take over New
Guinea." (1962 Hearings, Part I, p. 1)97).
(28)	The following discussion of the Passman Committee power balance
is at best a preliminary impression. Chief sources have been:
the articles of Felix Belair cited in n. 5, p. 57, above; Con-
gressional Quarterly article of Sep. 8, 1961, pp. 1553-1); and an
imperfect sampling of roll call votes on foreign aid in the years
I960, 1961, and 1962. The voting data is presented in a simple
table in Appendix II, pp. 7U-75.67
foreign aid expenditures have been Andrews (D., Alabama) and
Alexander (D., North Carolina). These two conservatives have, in-
deed, been as extreme in their hostility to the aid program as Passman
himself. Unlike the Chairman they even vote against the final aid
appropriation measure although it is a product of their own sub-
committee. Taber (R., New York) has proved equally adamant in his
protest against aid legislation—except that in i960 under a Republican
President he deviated from his rigid stand not only to vote for the
appropriation bill, but to offer an amendment restoring $200 million
of the Passman Committee cut in military aid. Another Republican con-
servative, Rhodes (R., Arizona), moved in 1962 into the camp of the
hard core opposition to aid. For the first time in three years he
voted against both the authorization and appropriation bill. Even
more significantly he moved to recommit the Passman Committee bill
with the instruction that an additional $100 million be cut from
"economic assistance” categories. From the Committee he won support
for his motion from only Andrews, Alexander, and Taber.
To this group of four perennial adversaries of the aid program,
Passman can usually add the vote of the Chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee, Rep. Gannon (D., Missouri) who exercises
his privilege to participate in the sub-committee’s voting on the
mark-up of the bill. Together with his own vote Passman can thus
muster 6 of the 12 votes on the Committee to support most of the
reductions he recommends in his capacity as Chairman.
To secure a clear majority Passman must, however, draw the
backing of at least one of what appears to be a somewhat incon-
sistent middle group of three—Gary (D., Virginia), Natcher (D.,
Kentucky), and Montoya (D., New Mexico). Although the Congressional
Quarterly suggests that Natcher is the most friendly to the aid
program, it is significant that he did not join the pro-Administration
Committee minority (Conte, Ford, and Rooney) in voting for the Ford
military aid restoration amendment to the 1961 appropriation bill.
But both Natcher and Gary did vote with the Administration on a more
telling test of sentiment toward the aid program. This was a bill in
i960 authorizing the US to participate in the International Develop-
ment Association and subscribe $320,290,000 to it. On this test of
sympathy for the concept of economic development loans the only
member of the middle three to join the Passman six in opposition was
Montoya. On this shred of evidence it would appear that Montoya more
frequently provides Passman with the decisive 7th vote than do either
Gary or Natcher. This tentative interpretation finds some confirma-
tion in the Congressional Quarterly’s characterization of Montoya as
voting with the Administration "only when specifically requested to
do so." On the other hand, Congressman Gary—despite his professed
support for the concept of foreign aid—clearly does not favor the
level of expenditure recommended by the White House.
Variations in intensity of support are also discernible in the
pro-Administration minority of Conte, Ford, and Rooney. Conte68
unquestionably is the Administration's most determined advocate on the
Committee. As noted already, he alone denounced the Passman Committee
bill in 1961 both on the floor and to the press. And in both the 1961
and 1962 floor debates on the appropriations bill he strongly urged
restoration of cuts in the economic development loans, as well as in
the generally more popular military aid category. His Republican
colleague Ford has also backed the Administration, but his ardent sup-
port seems limited to military aid—as evidenced in his offering an
amendment restoring military aid funds in the 1961 debate. As for
Rooney (D., New York), his budget-slicing on State Department allow-
ances raises a question about the fervor in his backing of Administra-
tion aid requests. He has not offered a restoration amendment—although
in 1961 and 1962 he would have been considerably inhibited by the
Administration strategy of conceding to Passman in the floor debate.
The Implications for Indonesia
Whatever the precise balance of power within the Passman Committee
during the crucial secret mark-up of the bill in August 1962, the
Committee’s bill was itself incontrovertible evidence that the Passman-
led fiscal conservatives prevailed. The numerous variations in voting
patterns and attitudes among the twelve-man Committee should not obscure
its predominantly conservative cast—a conservatism which combined with
a distrust of neutrals to imperil prospects for a major increase in
economic assistance to Belgrade participants. The Passman Committee
Report of September 12, 1962, called for reductions in development loans
of $i±?5 million out of the requested total of $1,250 million and reduc-
tions in development grants of $110 million out of the requested total
of $335 million (29), and the intent of the Committee was for the
Belgrade neutrals to absorb the bulk of the cuts. This was evident
from the inclusion in the Committee Report of the indictment against
the Belgrade Conference which Chairman Passman had carefully developed
in the hearings. Ironically, the President's remark of September h,
1961, expressing aid preference "to those nations which share the view
of the United States on the world crises" again served as a convenient
crutch for the Passman case against the President's aid requests.
Noting the incorporation of the President's remark into the 1962
Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act, the Report stated:
During the hearings this year the subcommittee inquired
into the administration of the above-quoted section of law
which appeared to be the policy of the United States in
September 1961, to see what effect it had on programs pro-
posed for fiscal 1963 for nations who participated in the
Belgrade Conference. The Conference was a meeting of the
so-called neutral nations, all of whom, except Cuba, re-
ceived grant aid from the United States in fiscal 1962.
(29) House Report No. 22|1O, p. 36.(>9
Final documents of the Conference were critical of the
United States and its allies; while Russia received no
criticism. To the subcommittee’s surprise, the proposed
1963 program — military and economic aid—is $813,500,000,
an increase of $1^2,500,000 above the 1962 program. The
Committee cannot reconcile the substantial increase of
the 1963 program over the 1962 program with last year's
statement of the Executive Branch. (30)
In presenting the Committee Report to the House, Passman re-
peated the substance of this paragraph. He also added a shorter
paragraph which gave some indication of the specific countries who
because of Belgrade and other events had become the prime targets
of Passman’s irritation with neutrals:
I am concerned also with the large sums programmed
for so-called neutralist or nonaligned, nations. I think
of the immense sums already committed and set aside for
India, Indonesia and Ghana. Should we not expect that
these countries would at least support us on major issues
before the United Nations? Yet, preponderantly their votes
have been against our proposals. (31)
As a postscript, it is noteworthy that the Administration again
felt constrained to bargain with Passman rather than fight him on the
House floor. In that the House only narrowly defeated a motion to
cut economic aid an additional $100 million, this seemed to have
been a shrewd strategy. Then, despite the usual Senate restoration,
the Conference Committee had to concede the Passman forces about
seventy per cent of their proposed reductions. The final aid appro-
priations bill for 1962 thus restored only $300 million of the
$l,12U,U00 deleted by the Passman Committee. Although the President
is given the authority to determine the allocation of this restored
$300 million, a severe cut in the economic loan and grant categories
is mathematically unavoidable. It thus seemed likely that neutrals
like India and Indonesia would feel the impact of the Passman Com-
mittee's ardent onslaught on the foreign aid program. (32)
(30)	Ibid, p. 6.
(31)	Congressional Record, Sep. 20, 1962, pp. 19O3h-19O35.
(32)	NYT, Oct. 2,	and 8, 1962. Also see other articles cited
in n. 5, p. 573 above.CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, it is important to underscore several points
made throughout the course of the previous discussion. The first
concerns the approach employed to highlight the place of Indonesia
in the various American reactions to the Belgrade Conference. Due
largely to the limited data reflecting specific reactions to Indone-
sia's Belgrade role, it has been necessary to rely extensively on
general reactions to the Conference as a whole. Where possible, such
as in the cases of Sen. Keating and Rep. Passman, it has been shown
that the general antipathy towards neutrals generated by Belgrade
applied very pointedly to Indonesia. But even where evidence of such
applicability has been lacking, it has been argued that such an
identification is implicit or latent. This would not be a safe
assumption in the cases of all the neutrals participating in the
Belgrade Conference, but it does seem justified with regard to
Indonesia. This is so in part both because of Indonesia's role as
one of the three sponsors of the Conference and because of President
Sukarno's role as Conference emissary to President Kennedy. More
critical, however, was the frequent American identification of Indone-
sia as a leader of the militant and allegedly "pro-Soviet" faction at
the Conference. As such Indonesia became associated with those actions
of the Conference that most offended American Congressional opinion.
These included in particular the unwillingness to denounce the Soviet
resumption of nuclear testing, advocacy of recognition of two German
states, and strong condemnation of the West for what many Congressmen
regarded as the almost anachronistic issue of colonialism. In short,
as illustrated by the Herblock cartoon, Indonesia often could and did
serve as a lightening rod for America's sense of moral outrage at the
proceedings at the Belgrade Conference.
Second, an attempt has been made throughout to stress the limited
impact of the Belgrade Conference on American policy toward Indonesia
and other aid recipients among the neutrals. Despite the widespread
editorial denunciation of the neutrals' apparent deference to the
Soviet Union, Congress did not appear to be sufficiently aroused to
take any immediate retaliatory action against them. The September $
debate in the House—although an inadequate index of House attitudes
toward Belgrade—did demonstrate that Belgrade alone was not sufficient
to precipitate any impulsive action in the branch of Congress most
sensitive to the public's response to foreign events. In the Senate
debate of September 15 on the foreign aid appropriation bill, irrita-
tion with Belgrade seemed more pronounced and pervasive—reaching into
7172
the ranks of internationalists such as Sens. Humphrey and Kuchel. At
the same time the lack of protest over the mild non-restrictive language
of the Keating Amendment showed again that Congressional ire with the
neutrals' "double-standard” produced no tangible results in terms of
any change of policy. The Administration, like Congress and the press,
exhibited initial displeasure toward the Conference. While Yugoslavia
was the prime target of this annoyance, the Administration seemed to
share the prevalent exasperation with the militant tone of the Confer-
ence with which Indonesia was identified. Accordingly, there appears
strong circumstantial evidence that personal anger was at least parti ally
responsible for the President's public statement that in foreign aid
allocations greater attention should be given to "nations sharing our
view of the world crisis." But even though the initial Presidential
reaction may have been one of severe annoyance, it did not, in fact,
lead to a revision of the Administration policy of extending aid not
only to the "moderate" neutrals like India, but also to the allegedly
"militant" and "pro-Soviet" neutrals like Ghana and Indonesia—as well,
indeed, as to Communist Yugoslavia.
Thirdly, while stressing the limited impact of the Belgrade Con-
ference on American aid policy, it has been insisted here that Belgrade
did produce a "toughening of attitude" toward neutrals such as Indonesia.
In the case of the Administration, James Reston contended that this
meant a subtle sobering of the previously enthusiastic and perhaps
naive policy of wooing neutrals—a policy linked with the "Stevenson-
Bowles" group. For the press and presumably much of the newspaper-
reading public, as well as for Congress, the "toughening of attitude"
had a different meaning. For those previously hostile to foreign aid
to neutrals, such as the Chicago Tribune and Rep. Passman, Belgrade had
a reinforcing effect. Moreover, it provided them with another symbol
of neutral perfidy. The discussion of Passman's tactics in the 1902
legislative struggle over aid appropriations has shown how that symbol
could be extensively exploited to damage the aid prospects of Belgrade
participants. Meanwhile, it appears that those inclined to support
the Administration's aid policy experienced a stiffening of attitude
akin to that of the President. In Congress, this shift in mood seems
to be illustrated by the wide support for the Keating Amendment. It
proved an ideal vehicle for those internationalists who felt keen dis-
appointment over the alleged hypocrisy of the neutrals, but who still
balked at altering the substance of Administration policy either by
cutting appropriations or by attaching binding restrictions. This
shift in mood of those previously sympathetic to neutrals, together
with the reinforcement of previously hostile attitudes towards neutrals,
testifies to what several Congressional staff assistants termed the
catalytic effect of Belgrade on Congressional feeling with regard to
aid for neutrals. In short, while not precipitating any immediate shift
in policy, Belgrade did prepare the ground for a future shift. It
would seem that if later events fail to dispel the impression made by
the Belgrade Conference the public and Congress will increasingly demand
both a reduction of the amount and an increase in the conditions of aid
to neutrals generally and militant neutrals in particular. Certainly73
the rebellion in the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1963 against
American aid policy in Indonesia lends support to this speculation.
Finally, apart from these conclusions about the impact of the
Belgrade Conference on American policy and attitudes on aid to
neutrals, there are two other facets of the American reaction to
Belgrade that are important for an understanding of Indonesian-
American relations. First, from a historical point of view, the
American impression of Indonesia at Belgrade marks another stage in
the deterioration of Indonesia's image in the United States. Dating
at least from President Sukarno's enunciation of the concept of
Guided Democracy in early 19^7, this deterioration had been abetted
by such events as the 195>8 rebellion, the growth in influence of the
Indonesian Communist Party, the Indonesian dependence on the Soviet
Union for military assistance, and Indonesia's militant posture in
the West Irian dispute. Indonesian's role at Belgrade clearly served
to reinforce the impressions made by these earlier events. In addi-
tion, Belgrade marked the emergence of a more prominent and more
sharply defined image of Indonesia in the United States. Not only
was Indonesia increasingly identified as a leader of the "pro-Soviet"
or "militant" neutral group, but she had achieved a greater place
in the American perceptions of international relations. In short,
at the same time that Indonesia's image was deteriorating it was
receiving more attention.
The second point about the emerging character of this Indonesian
image concerns the American assumptions that lay behind it. Although
the limited and often impressionistic illustrations given in the
foregoing account offer little basis for firm generalization, it
seems apparent that most American reactions to the Belgrade Conference
generally—as well as to Indonesia's role in particular—are colored
by ideological obsessions with the cold war. This is especially
evident in the moral indignation registered by many editors, Con-
gressmen, and Administration officials. Ironically, it is just such
an ideological orientation to foreign affairs that may impair
America's ability to strengthen its position in the cold war. For
it is often the preoccupation with the Communist challenge that tends
to blind Americans to the nature and origins of the emergent nations'
non-alignment policies. This in turn has had and will continue to
have a deep bearing on the relations of Americans with the Belgrade
Conference participants generally—and in particular with the
"militant neutrals" such as Indonesia.APPENDIX I
COMMENTS OF AMBASSADOR KENNAN ON PRESIDENT TITO'S SPEECH
TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE ON SEPTEMBER 3, l?6l
Incoming Telegram Department of State
Belgrade (Kennan)
Rcvd. U Sep 6l
ύ:27 pm
"Tito's statements on Berlin and Soviet resumption of tests
came as deep disappointment to Western observers here including myself.
Passage on Berlin contains no word that could not have been written
by Khrushchev; and that on testing, leading off with reproach to French
and accepting in full Soviet explanations for resumption, is weaker
and more pro-Soviet than even those of Nasser and Nkrumah. Private in-
formation indicates Tito has been endeavoring behind scenes to play
down issue of tests ever since beginning of conference probably fearing
it would adversely affect success of meeting.
"I have repeatedly called attention to strong Yugoslav feel-
ings over rearmament of West Germany and their negative reaction to
impression we have given of unwillingness to negotiate or at least to
make ary positive proposals for settlement of Berlin problem, as con-
firmed by Kohler to Nikezic on August 29. But neither I nor any of
my Western colleagues were prepared for so one-sided an attitude on
Tito’s part as this; and I think we must reflect carefully on its im-
plications for our treatment of conference and, in more long-term,
our attitude towards role of Yugoslavs at this juncture.
"I am stuck with Tito's expressed understanding that we are
preparing to go to war over specific issue of signing of peace treaty
itself and his evident failure to understand that our military inter-
ests could be actively engaged only if substantial effect of treaty
were to create intolerable limitations on allied rights in Berlin or
on freedom of city's communications. I recently urged, in conversa-
tion with the Secretary, that we take steps to make plain that
crucial issue in our eyes would not be signature of treaty itself but
situation which would arise if attempt were made to give to treaty an
interpretation and implementation which would affect these factors
just mentioned. Would like now to repeat this recommendation. So
7U75
long as we let stand present ambiguity on this score we will lead with
our chin for line of reproach which Tito took in this respect.
"At conclusion of Tito’s speech I had occasion to talk
alone with Nehru during intermission. I expressed to him my shock
over image conveyed by Tito of juxtaposition in Germany of stable East
German state peacefully developing under happy socialist system, as
against West Germany seething with "Fascist and Revanchist conceptions
and tendencies." Pointed out this was fantastic distortion of facts,
and that no attempt by us to play positive role in reaction to Berlin
crisis could conceivably be successful if it ignored fact that heart
of difficulty was incredible political failure of Ulbricht regime,
which could not even stand comparison with other Communist regimes of
East Europe. This, I said, was problem not only for us but for
Russians themselves, and no action of this conference based on fiction
this problem did not exist could come anywhere near root of difficulty
or have any particularly helpful effect. Nehru listened attentively
but was non-committal. Private knowledge that same thesis was force-
fully put to him this morning by personal envoy of Willi Brandt leads
me to hope all this may have some effect on his thinking.
"Archbishop Makarios speech, which followed Tito's, was
very constructive on Germany and nuclear testing, calling for re-
unification of Germany on basis of a plebiscite and characterizing
Soviet test resumption as "shocking," while expressing concern over
French nuclear tests in Africa.
"It is unfortunately plain that if moderation and balance is
to be brought into final resolutions of Conference on Berlin question,
the impulse will have to come from Nehru, Nasser, U Nu and others, not
from Tito."APPENDIX II
VOTING RECORDS OF THE PASSMAN COMMITTEE MEMBERS
ADMINISTRATION POSITION
Representative Party
Andrews	Dem.
Alexander	Dem.
Passman	Dem.
Taber	Rep.
Rhodes	Rep.
Cannon	Dem.
Montoya	Dem.
Gary	Dem.
Nateher	Dem.
Ford	Rep.
Rooney	Dem.
Conte	Rep.
1962
1 2 3* U 5 6
Y Y N Y
State
Ala.	N	N	Y	N
N.C.	N	N	Y	N
Louis.	N	N	N	Y
N.Y.	N	N	Y	N
Ariz.	N	N	Y	N
Mo.	Y	N	N	Y
N.M.	Y	Y	N	Y
Va.	Y	Y	N	Y
Ky.	Y	Y	N	Y
Mich.	Y	Y	N	Y
N.Y.	Y	Y	N	Y
Mass.	Y	Y	N	Y
1961	I960
7 8* 9 10 11* 12
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y Y
N N	N	N	NN
N N	N	N	NN
N N	Y	Y	NY
N N	N	N	NY
Y	N	Y	Y	NY
Y	N	Y	Y	NN
Y	Y	Y	Y	NY
Y	N	Y	Y	Y Y
Y	N	Y	Y	Y Y
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y Y
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y Y
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y Y
13
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Representatives
port for foreign aid.
are arranged roughly in terms of their degree
The strongest supporter being at the bottom.
of sup
* Indicates an especially controversial vote that helped to define
factions.
(All roll-calls taken from Congressional Quarterly.)
7677
ISSUE ΚΕΐ
1962i 1 FA Authorization Bill. Passed 2£0-l61| on July 12, 1902.
2	FA Authorization Bill Conference Report. Passed 221-102 on
July 2k, 1962.
3	Amendment to delete $100 million from FA Appropriation for
"economic assistance" categories. Defeated 203-190 on
September 20, 1962.
U FA Appropriation Bill. Passed 2li9-lWj. on September 20, 1962
196li	7 FA Authorization Bill. Passed 287-lUO on August 18, 1901.
8	Amendment to add $300 million for military aid to FA Appro-
priations Bill. Passed 2h3-l^l on September 9, 1961.
9	FA Appropriations Bill. Passed 270-123 on September 1961
10	FA Appropriations Bill Conference Report. Passed 192-81 on
September 26, 1961.
I960:	11 Authorize US participation in International Development
Association and authorize US subscription of $320 million.
Passed 2b9-li?8 on June 29, i960.
12	FA Appropriations Bill. Passed 2^9-12k on June 17, I960.
13	Amendment to restore $200 million in military aid funds.
Passed on June 17, I960.t

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