SOME ASPECTS OF INDONESIAN POLITICS
UNDER THE
JAPANESE OCCUPATION: 1944-1945
BENEDICT R. O’G. ANDERSON
INTERIM REPORTS SERIES
MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
Price — $3.00
SEAP Publications
Do not remove from room 213
640 Stewart AvenueA Note Concerning the Interim Reports Series
One of the distressing aspects of contemporary scholarship is the substantial interval that often intervenes between
the completion of field research and the first appearance of writings descriptive of its findings. American scholarship
relating to Indonesia has been no exception, and here this delay has been particularly regrettable inasmuch as the
extent of research being undertaken is so limited. With respect to much of the research carried out in post-revolu-
tionary Indonesia there has been a lag of two to three or more years between the termination of research and the
first publication describing its results. From this situation stem a number of unfortunate consequences. Scholars and
others having a serious interest in the country, Indonesians as well as Americans, are sometimes required to wait so
long before seeing the results of such research that when finally available its importance to them has appreciably
diminished. Moreover, because they are kept for so long in the dark as to the course and character of this earlier but
as yet unreported work, they frequently are obliged to spend time in unnecessarily laying foundations their predeces-
sors have laid but not yet divulged and in undertaking analysis of data similar to that already collected and analyzed
or largely analyzed. Thus all too often contemporary students of Indonesia waste much precious time and effort in
duplicating or roughly duplicating what has already been done or is in the process of being completed, instead of
utilizing such materials, building on them, and possibly refining them. Parenthetically it might be observed that some
of those perfectionists who insist that their name appear in print only when attached to a body of material wherein
each word has been given its final polish are deprived of what might well have been healthy and useful criticism
by those who would have been interested in reading their work at some earlier stage of its processing. Also this
reluctance to publish findings sooner sometimes puzzles Indonesians, because frequently for several years they look in
vain for some published account of research for which they smoothed the way or in which they actually participated.
Consequently some of them tend to doubt the usefulness of American scholars undertaking research in their country.
The object of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project’s Interim Reports Series is to avoid insofar as possible the
situation described above. Wherever feasible those undertaking research in connection with our project will prepare
preliminary reports concerning salient aspects of their study well before publication of their relatively finished mono-
graphs or articles. Our object, then, is to make available in provisional form what we believe to be some of the more
important of our findings soon enough to be of maximum usefulness to others engaging in studies relating to Indo-
nesia or having a serious interest in the topics with which our work is concerned. It is our hope that by doing so we
will be of help both to interested Indonesians and to students of Indonesia in the United States and other countries.
In thus submitting Interim Reports for early publication the members of our group will generally be doing so prior
to command of all relevant data or before this data has been completely analyzed. Certainly they will be submitting
them without having had an opportunity to cast them in finished written form. It should therefore be emphasized
that these preliminary reports are to be considered as explicitly tentative and provisional in character. It is our
expectation that most of them will be followed by later publications bearing on the same subject of a less tentative
and more solid character. We hope that our Interim Reports will elicit candid and open criticism from interested
persons reading them. For we believe that thereby we will benefit, and that in many cases such criticisms will point
the way to better analysis of the data in hand and/or further research on facets of the subject so far not adequately
covered. Thus we cordially invite and welcome such criticism. We would appreciate it if those inclined to offer it
would write to the author in question, c/o Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell Uni-
versity, Ithaca, New York.
George McT. Kahin
Director»
3
SOME ASPECTS OF INDONESIAN POLITICS
UNDER THE
JAPANESE OCCUPATION: 1944-1945
Benedict R. O'G. Anderson
ί
!r
INTERIM REPORTS SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1961
f
L1961 by Cornell Modern Indonesia Project111
PREFACE
The Indonesian revolution, its origins, the course of its develop-
ment, and its relation to current conditions in Indonesian society has
always been a subject of major concern to the Cornell Modern Indonesia
Project. Among the principal gaps in the coverage of its history (where
both Indonesian and other Asian and Western scholars have given rela-
tively little attention) are the background provided by the final year of
Japanese occupation and an account of the first few months of indepen -
dence, a critical time in which the revolutionary forces acquired their
first institutional form.
It is a matter of great regret that most of those Indonesians best
qualified to write about this period have had little opportunity for doing
so because of their preoccupation with governmental administration and
other heavy duties. In the past decade, during which research on Indo-
nesia has taken root at Cornell University, there has been only one
substantial study relating to this period, Professor Harry J. Benda's
doctoral dissertation, later published under the title of The Crescent
and the Rising Sun, (The only other significant studies in English,
Dr. M. A. A ziz's Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia and Professor
W. H. Elsbree's Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements,
1940-1945 were written without access to the substantial body of docu-
ments available to Dr. Benda and Mr. Anderson in Cornell University
Library's collection on the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. ) Subse-
quently, a study of outstanding importance has appeared in Japan,
Indoneshia ni okeru Nippon gunsei no kenkyu (A Study of the Effects of
the Japanese Military Occupation on Indonesia) by Shigetada Nishijima,
Koichi Kishi, et al. ; but, unfortunately, this exists only in the Japanese
language and has not as yet been translated into English or Indonesian.
Mr. Benedict Anderson, a member of the Cornell Southeast
Asia Program's Modern Indonesia Project and for two years chief
teaching assistant in the University's Department of Government, is
currently on his way to Indonesia to undertake research concerning the
revolutionary period (1945-1949). It is my hope and expectation that
as a consequence he will be able to explore the history of the period in
a balanced and scholarly way. I believe that the quality of his work in
this present Interim Report, one based only on resources available at
Cornell, is a substantial earnest of his capacity for doing so.
Mr. Anderson's present study deals with the earliest period of
the broader study which he envisages. He wishes it emphasized that
the account offered here is an interim report, not a completed mono-
graph. It represents his preliminary research, based on the incom-
plete sources available to him at Cornell. Many of his data are regardedIV
by him as tentative and subject to confirmation or revision--depending upon
the information which he encounters during his research in Indonesia. So	«·
that this study may be improved, he and I hope that he may secure the co-
operation and the full, candid criticism of knowledgeable Indonesian scholars
and officials.
Ithaca, New York	George McT. Kahin
September 29, 1961	DirectorV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER	Page
FOREWORD.................................... vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.............................. ix
INTRODUCTION.................................. 1
I.	JAPANESE POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES.......... 2
II.	CONSEQUENCES OF THE KOISO DECLARATION ....	9
III.	CHANGING JAPANESE POLICIES, JUNE-JULY	1945 .	.	33
IV.	YOUTH GROUPS, ILLEGAL CrROUPS AND THE MASSES,
TO THE SURRENDER.......................... 43
V.	SAIGON........................................ 60
VI.	THE INDEPENDENCE PROCLAMATION................. 65
VII.	ALLIED STRATEGY AND THE PROBLEM OF
EXPECTATIONS.............................. 88
Realities................................  88
Illusions, Plans, Strategems
a)	The Japanese.................. .	94
b)	The Indonesians................ 98
.	VIII. THE FINAL CONFLICT WITH THE JAPANESE AND THE
BEGINNINGS OF A NEW REGIME........... 105Vll
FOREWORD
The central problem with which this study is concerned is the
birth of the new Indonesian State out of the debris of Japan’s collapsing
military Empire,, It is a subject of inexhaustible richness and com-
plexity; doubtless many years will pass before a truly all-embracing
and understanding account is written, The present study is intended
only as a modest, preliminary exploration The writer hopes that in
the course of his research in Indonesia, he will be able to come to a
deeper and larger comprehension of this important period in modern
Indonesian history.
The main purpose of the study has been to draw together the
written documentary materials available in America (particularly at
Cornell University), and so present the fullest possible record of the
period under consideration There is some information included which
is hardly to be distinguished from hearsay and conjecture; there are
serious gaps in the narrative of which the writer is deeply aware. Both
have probably distorted this study's picture of the realities of Indonesia's
history in the last year of the Occupation The writer's excuse is that
he was concerned to present and juxtapose the perspectives and recol-
lections of as many of the participants as possible--Indonesians, Jap-
anese and Westerners. Though many of their accounts are, for differ-
ent reasons, one-sided, they illuminate their authors' psychologies
and ideological outlooks, and one hopes that from their confrontation,
something nearer the truth will emerge. The reader is also asked to
bear in mind that many previous accounts of the period here discussed
have, perhaps unavoidably, omitted an extensive analysis of the motives
and policies of the Japanese Armed Forces, and that therefore, if the
Japanese seem to loom large in the framework of this study, it is be-
cause an effort has been made to compensate for this omission. A
further distortion arises from the fact that the bulk of the materials
available to the writer are concerned with conditions in Java and par-
ticularly in Djakarta. An undue emphasis has therefore indubitably
been laid on developments at the Centre. It is hoped that the reader
will make allowances for this bias.
Ithaca, New York
June 30, 1961
Benedict R. O'G. AndersonIX
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writer would like to take the opportunity to express his deep
gratitude for the advice, encouragement and criticism of Professor
Kahin, to whom he owes so much besides. He would also like to record
his good fortune in having had many talks with Herbert Feith, which have
done much to enlarge his own understanding of Indonesian life and politics
On the more strictly scholarly level, the writer acknowledges his great
debt to the writings of Professor Kahin and Professor Benda on the
Japanese Occupation and the Indonesian Revolution; without the guidance
of their work, this study would have been inconceivable. Finally, many
thanks are due to John Smail for his detailed criticism of the completed
manuscript, and many invaluable suggestions for correcting and im-
proving the text.
1
INTRODUCTION
There are many problems that confront anyone trying to assess
the meaning of the later stages of the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia,
as they have been recorded by those who participated in them. There
is the serious difficulty of distinguishing between rival claims to the
triumphs and glories of the Revolution: the Declaration of Independence,
the building of the new state, and the generation of the Revolutionary
Spirit. In the records that they have left us, the Japanese, the senior
Indonesian nationalist leadership, and the "youth groups" have each
claimed pre-eminetice for their own roles. Natural ambition and love
of glory would in any case impel those participating in the birth of a
revolution to emphasize their own share in its conception. But unluckily,
many of the accounts that we have were also written at a time when poli-
tical rivalries and discord had reached a point where the temptation was
strong not simply to embellish one’s own past, but to blacken that of
others. The Japanese, for obvious reasons, were unwilling, in the early
years after the war, to reveal very much of their activities under the
occupation. It is only in the last few years that they have advanced their
claims at all, though certain Dutchmen had long been willing to assign
them a major role in the germination of the revolution, sometimes even
beyond their due.
t2
CHAPTER I
JAPANESE POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES
On September 7, 1944, the Japanese Premier Kuniaki Koiso announced
before a special session of the 85th Imperial Diet that the ’East Indies' would
be given independence "in the near future." (1) Instructions issued simulta-
neously from Tokyo to local commanders in the area specified that the date
of Independence should be kept indefinite, and that though the use of nationalist
symbols might be encouraged, there was to be no official creation of any Com-
mittee for the Preparation of Independence. (2)
The reasons for this Declaration are not hard to find. In July 1944
the strategic island of Saipan had fallen to the Americans. This meant the
collapse of the defence line of the Marianas, and the likelihood that the Phil-
ippines would be the next target of the enemy. Once the Philippines fell, the
lines of sea communication between Tokyo and Indonesia would finally be bro-
ken. Not only would the Home Front be deprived of supplies of Indonesian oil,
but the defence of the islands would have to be carried on without appreciable
help from Tokyo or the mainland. There is good reason to believe that until
very late in 1945, the Japanese viewed Java and Sumatra as being the battle-
ground for one of the last great campaigns of the war. But for the defence of
the two islands to be truly effective, two conditions would have to be fulfilled.
The Southern Fleet would have to remain in Indonesian waters near its oil
supply bases (indeed they were forced to do just this by the Battle of Leyte
Gulf in October 1944) and the Army would have to assure itself of a basically
friendly and co-operative population. To fight a war on two fronts against
Allied invaders and hostile Indonesians would be very difficult. It is there-
fore reasonable to say that though many individual Japanese were personally
in favour of Indonesian independence, in the minds of the key decision-makers
in Tokyo, the reasons for encouraging Indonesian nationalism were primarily
strategic.
However a number of factors threatened the success of this policy
from the outset. Perhaps the most crucial was the basic cleavage between
the Japanese Army and Navy. This cleavage was an old one, and its conse-
quences were felt throughout the Japanese Empire. Essentially the conflicts
(1)	Kan Po, #51, pp. 15f. In Indonesian the phrase is *di kemudian hari.1 2
(2)	Shigetada Nishijima, Koichiro Kishi, et al. , Indoneshia ni okeru Nippon
gunsei no kenkyu (Study of the Effects of the Japanese Military Occupa-
tion of Indonesia), Okuma Foundation for Studies in the Social Sciences,
Waseda University, Tokyo, 1959, p. 409.3
between the two military bureaucracies had four major aspects:
jurisdictions strategy, personnel and ideology. It appears that in the
Imperial Staff’s original plans Indonesia had been put in its entirety
under the control of the Navy. The area was seen as the strategic
supply base for the whole Southern fronts and the Navy was to have
borne the main responsibility for organizing the commissariat for
that front. However the Naval representative on the General Staff
objected to this on the ground that they could not cope with such admi-
nistrative burdens with their limited personnel. In the end, they
were assigned only the oil-producing areas of Eastern Indonesia»
which at that early stage of the war were vital for the supply of the
armies operating in New Guinea, the Solomons, etc..	(3) As a re-
sult Indonesia was divided administratively between two rival bureau-
cracies. When the Army decided for strategic purposes to split its
territory into a Java and a Sumatra-Malaya command, the juris-
dictional problem became even more awkward. In addition, the
Naval Territory was a deficit area for many kinds of vital supplies,
including food, textiles, etc.. To secure the smooth flow of such
supplies from Java to the Naval Territory, and also to help reduce
friction between the two services, Rear-Admiral Maeda was appointed
at his own suggestion, to the liaison office of Naval Attach^ in
Djakarta. It was from this strategic position that the Admiral was
to play the decisive role in the transfer of power from Japanese to
Indonesian hands that we shall be examining later.
The strategic viewpoints of the two services were also in
sharp conflict. The Army had been traditionally oriented towards the
Continent. It had Korea, Manchuria and Northern China as its pri-
mary targets. It saw its chief enemies as being Russia, and to a
lesser degree China. Its interests in the territories it controlled
were primarily strategic and exploitative. Manchuria and Korea, for
example, were considered first as buffer states between Japan and
the two major continental powers, and secondly as important indus-
trial bases for the supply of the Army and the Japanese homeland.
The Army’s administrative policies were not unlike those of Euro-
pean colonialism, though the external forms were somewhat different.
A puppet regime, for example, was generally installed under the
scarcely veiled control of the Japanese Armed Forces. By contrast,
Naval strategy was oriented eastwards and southwards. The Navy’s
history and traditions had led it to have much closer dealings with
the (essentially Naval) Anglo-Saxon powers than the Army ever had.
A good many Japanese Naval officers had been trained in
(3) There is a report that Admiral Maeda, then on the Navy’s General
Staff in Tokyo, argued against this arrangement, significantly on
the ground that it would allow the Army to set up two little king-
doms of its own.4
Britain. (4) It was the relatively rare Japanese Army officer who did a tour
of foreign duty outside France or Germany. (5) The struggle in the early
thirties over the ratio between the naval strengths of America, Britain and
Japan had aroused considerable nationalist indignation in Japan, and nowhere
more so than in Army circles. (6) But this indignation was aroused pri-
marily by the symbolic humiliation of Japan implied in her naval inferiority
to the Western powers, much less by the concrete military implications of
the system. The Japanese Navy however derived from the struggle to alter
the ratio a fairly shrewd estimate of the probable risks involved in any con-
flict with the other two world naval powers. (7) From the time of Pearl
Harbor onwards, the Army and Navy found themselves increasingly at odds,
the Navy considering the Army’s tendency to overcommit its forces and
overextend its lines of communication sheer stupidity, and the Army con-
vinced of the Navy’s ’Anglo-Saxon-mindedness’ and timidity in support of
the Army’s plans. This hostility became especially marked after the fall
of Saipan. The Army was bitter at the Navy's supposed lack of support,
while the Navy claimed that it was being destroyed piecemeal by the Ameri-
cans because the Army insisted on trying to defend so many different areas
simultaneously. (8)
(4)	Cf. E. Brunsveld van Hulten, Military Auditor, Rapport over de Japansche
Invloede op de Merdekabeweging en de Gebeurtenissen in de Augustdagen,
after the preliminary interrogation of Japanese prisoners in Singapore,
July 17-24, 1946, p. 2. These and other Statements cited hereafter
are taken from a collection of documents made by Mr. Shigetada
Nishijima from the archives of the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumen-
tatie at Amsterdam. They form part of a mass of data on the Japanese
occupation accumulated through Dutch interrogations of Japanese pri-
soners-of-war in 1946-1947. Hitherto little systematic use has been
made of these materials in English, the exceptions being the studies by
Aziz and Elsbree cited below.
(5)	However General Nishimura, of whom more below, lived in the United
States from February 1936 to March 1938. He studied the English
language in Boston and American military tactics in Washington. See
his Statement of June 6, 1946, under interrogation at Changi prison in
Singapore, p. 1.
(6)	Cf. e. g. Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination, Alfred A. Knopf,
New York, 1942, pp. 44-46.
(7)	Cf. F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia 1937-1945, Oxford
University Press, London, 1954, pp. 104, 115-119, 191-192 and 222,
for the attitude of Admiral Yonai as Navy spokesman, first as Navy
Minister and then as Premier.
(8)	This feeling apparently percolated right down the military hierarchy.
Cf. Anonymous Japanese Officer, Beschouwingen ouer de algemene
en financiele voorbereiding van der Indonesische Onafhankelijkheids-
beweging door de Japaners, June 21-^3, 1947, p. 24.	“5
On the level of personnel, the Navy disposed of a far more sophis-
ticated and 'select' staff. It was the elite service into which young cadets
usually tried to enrol before reconciling themselves to the more 'popular*
Army. Asa consequence the Navy had considerably higher social pres-
tige. Moreover the course of naval life permitted a degree of international
and cosmopolitan experience that few Army officers could match. (9)
There was therefore a natural tendency towards a Navy superiority com-
plex, which in turn often generated Army suspicions and resentments.
Generally speaking, the two services were united only in the face of civi-
lian interference in what they regarded as 'military' affairs. (10)
Finally there seems to have been an ideological split in the
Armed Forces. This cleavage is far less definite and explicit than the
others, and to some extent the lines of division do not run directly be-
tween the services. The classic conflict within the Army, between the
Young Officers and the Old Guard, had begun as a conflict of classes
and generations which took the schematic ideological form of a radical
anti-capitalist nationalism opposed to a conservative, capitalistic im-
perialism. A great many of the younger officers in the Army came from
depressed rural areas, either from peasant or d4classd" samurai fami-
lies. A combination of circumstances, notably the World Depression,
the contraction of Japanese world markets, the policies of the older
colonial powers in the Far East, and certain well-established authori-
tarian Japanese traditions, molded them into a new elite without a gen-
uinely functional position in a modern industrial society such as early
twentieth century Japan. The centralization of power in Japanese society
(9)	Admiral Maeda, for example had been for some time in Indonesia
before the war. He had also served as Naval Attache^ in Berlin,
and later in Amsterdam when the Nazi Armies occupied the Nether-
lands. Cf. E. B. van Hulten, Rapport. . . , op. cit. , July 24, 1946, p. 1.
(10)	Civilian opposition to the military generally centred in the Foreign
Ministry and the Ministry for Greater East Asia. Both were sup-
posed to have a hand in policy-making for Indonesia, but in wartime
Japan their influence was limited. Generally they were more liber-
ally disposed towards Indonesia, essentially for diplomatic and poli-
tical reasons. It was on them that the pressure of Allied promises,
such as the Atlantic Charter, was most powerfully felt. However
it is interesting to note that one observer believes that the Koiso
Declaration itself represented a defection of the Army to the two
civilian ministries. The reason for this break in military solidarity
seems to have been the Army's anxiety (in Tokyo at least) for a
secure local base for their more isolated units, in view of the pre-
cariousness of communications between Japan and South East Asia.
Cf. R. Soerjono Wirjodiatmodjo, Die Besatzungzeit (vom 9 Maerz
'42 bis 17 August '45), unpublished mimeo, 1959, pp. 30, 34. See
also Jones, op. cit. , passim. , and Statement of Major Tadakazu
Ishizima, Intelligence Officer attached to Army HQ at Saigon and
Singapore, dated November 16, 1946, p. 2.6
and the extremes of oligarchy in the government created a ruling class with
a dangerously narrow base. Between the top civilian administrators, the
Zaibatsu and the ruling military cliques of the Satsuma and Choshu clans,
and the increasingly industrialized society they ruled, there was no gradual
dispersion of power and social influence. The young officers were conscious
of themselves as the elite of a numerically powerful and yet under-privileged
provincial rural class. In the circumstances of the twenties and thirties,
the enemies of that class were seen as the ’monopoly capitalists', their mili-
tary allies at the Imperial Court and the foreigners who were plotting to
limit the power and thwart the destiny of Japan. The political product of
these sociological and psychological forces does not fall neatly into 'left'
or 'right' categories. The vague political theories of this new elite called
for some form of state 'socialism' and an aggressive 'spirit of national
unity' under the quasi-religious leadership of the Emperor: a pattern which
clearly foreshadows an important strand in the political thinking of many
post-colonial nationalisms. The peculiarity of the Japanese case was that
while the 'younger generation's' skills were technical and bureaucratic, as
professional soldiers, their vocation was the more 'political' one of symbol-
manipulation. In the Army at least, limited educational opportunities, and
what has been called the culture-bound nature of Japanese society, tended
to give the radicalism of the younger officers a basically xenophobic tinge.
Even where they could find elements abroad with an essentially similar out-
look, they were rarely able to empathize with those elements. Psychologi-
cally, they were in blinkers. To spread their 'word', they could rarely
rise above the technique of direct Japanization. (11)
In the Navy however, where some of the same generational and class
cleavages existed, a different psychological type seems to have emerged,
a type in which the radical xenophobia of the younger Army officers' intro-
verted nationalism was transformed by a wider life experience and education.
Their transformed nationalism expressed itself in a genuine if limited
form of internationalism. Men like Admiral Shibata and Rear-Admiral
Maeda in Indonesia, for example, were able to perceive and empathize with
the psychological traits of other Asian nationalisms. The ideology of such
men has been described as national-communism, but the description is not
wholly apt. Nor perhaps is 'internationalism' alone, with its sense of an
all-embracing humanism. The internationalism of these men rarely meant
'love for all men, including Westerners.' It was essentially an ability to
find the satisfactions of Japanese nationalism in a feeling of 'common life-
experience' vis-a-vis the West, shared with the renascent nationalisms of
South East Asia. And in addition there were the more subtle satisfactions
(11) A good specimen of the type was General Itagaki, Commander of the
7th Army group at Singapore in 1945. He was a well-known member
of the Kodoha radical group, was involved in the Manchurian incident
of 1931, and became Minister for War under Konoye and Hiranuma.
He was violently anti-British. See Hillis Lory, Japan's Military
Masters, Viking Press, 1943, p. 174, and Richard Storry, The Double
Patriots, Chatto and Windus, 1957, pp. 77-79, 84-85, 92, iTT,
244,.254.7
enjoyed by any group of.'elite reformers' in guiding the destinies of their
less fortunate fellows?
Of course superimposed on these two 'younger generation’ groups
were the clannish and conservative military cliques left over from the
Meiji period, who held the ultimate power. Essentially they were not
unlike the typical capitalistic imperialists of the 19th Century, national-
istic, pragmatic, exploitative and fundamentally uninterested in their
colonies as such, even for the purposes of 'Japanization.' Their conduct
towards countries like Indonesia could be expected to be guided by
rational considerations of political and military strategy. They would
tend to despise both the 'crudity' of the younger Army, and the 'senti-
mentality' of the younger Naval officers. (12)
The inevitable conflicts within and between the two military bur-
eaucracies caused by the factors outlined above, bedevilled the whole
question of a coherent 'Indonesia policy. ' The problem was further
complicated by the enormous extent of Japanese conquests, the lack of
good communications in Indonesia (indeed in South East Asia as a whole),
and Japanese inexperience in dealing with the area. The Army line of
command in South East Asia extended down from the Supreme War
Council in Tokyo through Marshal Terauchi's Southern Territories Com-
mand at Saigon, General Itagaki's 7th Army Group Headquarters in
Singapore to the 25th Army's Headquarters at Bukittinggi in Sumatra,
and the 16th Army's Headquarters in Djakarta. The Navy had its own
separate line of command running down from the Navy Ministry through
the 10th Area Fleet Headquarters in Singapore to the 2nd Fleet's Head-
quarters in Surabaya and Makassar. (13) Thus the two hierarchies
were only co-ordinated at the highest level, though in the last two
months of the war, for practical purposes of closer communication,
the Navy in Indonesia was put under the orders of Marshal Terauchi.
Two other difficulties faced Tokyo and the occupying Armies in
attempting to formulate and execute a coherent Indonesian policy. One
was the great heterogeneity of the territories they governed. The level
(12)	Cf. Storry, op. cit, , especially pp. 126-203, for military faction-
alism. A typical Toseiha or conservative senior Army officer
was Count Hisaichi Terauchi, Commander of the Southern Terri-
tories from October 1941 to September 1945. He was Minister
for War in the Toseiha -dominated Hirota Cabinet formed immedi-
ately after the February 1936 Affair. Storry, op. cit. , p. 192.
Cf. the Anonymous Japanese Officer, Beschouwingen. . . , op. cit.
p. 16.
(13)	See Statement under Interrogation of Captain Masuzo Yanagihara,
Deputy Ghief of the Naval Administration Office in Makassar,
dated July 6th and 8th, 1946, p. 2. See also Statement of General
Otoshi Nishimura, Head of the General Affairs Office in Djakarta,
under interrogation, Changi prison, Singapore, May 31-June 6,
1946, p. 2.8
of political sophistication and awareness on Java, for example, was far above
that on Kalimantan. The possibilities for advancing political participation in
a ’war* area like Sulawesi or the Moluccas were far less than in a 'supply'
area like Java. Trained administrators were far more numerous and effec-
tive in Java than in any of the Outer Islands. On the other hand 'class differ-
ences' in Java were more marked than anywhere else, except possibly in
North and East Sumatra, and some parts of Sulawesi. This heterogeneity
was decidedly useful so long as the main purpose of military rule was physi-
cal control and the extraction of resources. The old colonial formula of
divide and rule was used with considerable skill by the Japanese. Islamic,
secular nationalist and bureaucratic elites were manipulated against one
another. Each group was forced to turn to the Japanese as arbiters to win
political decisions in their favour. (14) But once the policy became one of
extracting, not physical resources, but intellectual and psychological co-
operation, the divisions which the Japanese themselves had fostered worked
against them: dissension among the elites was hardly conducive to maxi-
mizing Indonesia's contribution to the war effort.
Secondly, there was the problem of administering policy. At the be-
ginning of the occupation, the Army had relied largely on Japanese civilians
resident in Indonesia to see that its policies were effectively administered,
employing them either as bureaucrats or as spies, or as both. However,
from the beginning, it had been found necessary to make use of Indonesian
talents. Indonesian administrators found themselves assigned positions
much higher than they had been permitted to attain in the Dutch colonial
period. The decline of Japanese personnel available for civilian administra-
tive purposes (and the aversion of most military men for civilian adminis-
trative work) combined with the new policy of encouraging Indonesian poli-
tical participation inaugurated after the Koiso Declaration, (which meant,
in the absence of a legislature or political parties, a greater share in the
bureaucratic decision-making process) created a difficult situation. In the
latter stages of the occupation there was a tiny crust of Japanese executives
who gave the orders, but who depended on the far greater body of Indonesian
administrators to carry them out, and to provide them with the information
on which their orders could be based. Here was a subtle block to Japanese
policy-making. On the way down the governmental apparatus orders were
often imperceptibly transmuted. Anti-imperialist slogans and propaganda
tended to drop specific reference to America, Britain and Holland. Pro-
Japanese propaganda could often be infused with directly nationalist appeals.
And in the flow of information up the bureaucratic structure from the vil-
lages to the Japanese military authorities, the scope and intensity of
Indonesian 'demands' for independence could be subtly enlarged and deepened.
(14) See H. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, W. van Hoeve Ltd. ,
The Hague and Bandung, 1950, for a superD analysis of Japanese
policy towards the Islamic elite (and incidentally the secular nation-
alists as well).9
CHAPTER XI
CONSEQUENCES OF THE KOISO DECLARATION
The Koiso Declaration was received with a certain amount of am-
bivalence in Indonesia. It was obviously designed to encourage the Indo-
nesian leadership to greater and more active co-operation, and to per-
suade the Indonesian masses that Independence was conditional on their
massive support during the coming final struggle for victory in the Pacific.
Many Indonesian leaders however were aware of the serious military
situation. By the middle of 1944, information coming from clandestine
radios and from Indonesians working in the Propaganda (Information)
Division of the Military Administration, had convinced many that a Jap-
anese defeat was inevitable. Moreover as time wore on, Japanese at-
tempts to explain their admitted retreats as part of a strategy of
'reculer pour mieux sauter* began to wear thin. But for the time being
there was little that the Indonesian leaders could do but work with the
Japanese while maintaining a steady pressure for increased autonomy.
Both Indonesians and Japanese were naturally out to win the maximum of
concessions from their antagonists, in exchange for a minimum of sac-
rifices on their own part.
The promise of independence contained in the Declaration was
vague enough for the silent battle of pressure and counter-pressure to
be continued on much the same terms as before. The Indonesian leaders
demanded some concrete steps towards fulfilling the promise of inde-
pendence, and claimed that only increased autonomy could really fire
the Indonesian people to make the sacrifices the Japanese demanded.
Any delay would simply mean a politically and militarily dangerous dis-
illusionment on the part of the masses. The Japanese authorities of the
16th Army however made it clear for their part that the Indonesians could
expect Independence only as a gift ('hadiah') in exchange for genuine and
wholehearted co-operation. In the struggle for advantage then, the In-
donesians had the psychological benefit of their knowledge of Japan's de-
clining military power, while the Japanese had only their monopoly of
the instruments of violence and the promises they held out.
Nevertheless in the six months that followed the Koiso Declara-
tion, the movement towards independence moved forward at a snail's
pace. Asa sop to the Indonesian elite, the Japanese did, late in Decem-
ber 1944, increase the number of Sanyos (Advisors) to the various de-10
partments of the Military Administration. (15) These Sanyos were assembled
into a Dewan Sanyo (Council of Advisors) (16) which was supposed to act as
a sort of ‘Privy Council* to the government. The membership of the Tyoo
Sangi In (Central Advisory Council) (17) was also increased. (18) A new provin-
(15)	Kan Po, # 56, (December 10, 1944), pp. 15f. These included: R.
Pandji Soeroso to replace M. Yamin in the General Affairs Department;
Mr. R. M. Sartono in the Home Affairs Department (he was replaced in
June 1945 by R. A. A. Wiranatakusuma); Ki Hadjar Dewantoro in Educa-
tion; Dr. Buntaran Martoatmodjo in the Health Department; Mr. R.
Pandji Singgih in the Labour Section; Dr. Samsi Sastrawidagda in the
Finance Department; Oto Iskandardinata in the Department of Public Se-
curity; Soekardjo Wirjopranoto in Propaganda; Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso
in the Public Works Section.
(16)	Kan Po, # 55, (November 23, 1944), p. 6. (Makloemat Gunseikan # 68).
(17)	Henceforth referred to as C. A. C.
(18)	For the announcement of this body's creation, see Kan Po, #24 (August
10, 1943), pp. lOf. In many respects the C. A. C. was not unlike the
pre-war Volksraad, except that it was not even allowed to criticize the
regime as the Volksraad had done. It had no legislative powers what-
ever. It was supposed to act as a purely advisory body, answering 'ques
tions' put to it by the military government. It seems to have been quite
ineffective for most of its life, though Japanese protests that it was
imagining itself to be a 'Parliamentary body' indicate that its ineffective
ness was not of its members' making. As of its Seventh Session, the
C. A. C. 's membership was as follows;
Members appointed by the Government:
K. H. Abdul Halim	E>r. R. Boentaran Martoatmodjo
Ki Hadjar Dewantoro
Drs. Mohammad Hatta
Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemfc
Liem Thwan Tik
Oei Tiang Tjoei
Dr. Abdul Rasjid
Dr. Samsi Sastrawidagda
Mr. R. M. Sartono
Ir. Soekarno
R. Pandji Soeroso
K. R. Μ. T. Ario Woerjaningrat
R. Gatot Mangkupradja
Mr. R. Soedjono
♦Abdurahman Baswedan
♦Mr. Mohammad Djamin
♦Mr. Johannes Latuharhary
♦Ir. R. Oekar Bratakoesoema
*R. Roedjito
♦Mr. Muhammad Yamin
♦Drs. Yap Tjwan Bing
Prof. Dr. P. Ario Hoesein
Djajadiningrat
Oto Iskandardinata
R. M. A. A. Koesoemo Oetojo
K. Η. M. Mansoer
Oey Tjong Hauw
R. Roeslan Wongsokoesoemo
Mr. R. Samsoedin
R. Soekardjo Wirjopranoto
Bendoro P. Ario Soerjodiningrat
K. H. Abdoel Wachid Hasjim
R. Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso
R. M. Margono Djojohadikoesoemo
Mr. R. M. Soemanang
♦P. F. Dahler
♦Mas Goenari
♦Mr. Alexander A. Maramis
*R. Prawoto Soemodilogo
*R. Wiwoho Poerbohadidjojo11
cial administrative post was also created, the Vice-Resident (Huku
Syuutyookan) which was usually filled by an Indonesian, generally an ex-
perienced prijaji civil servant. (19) The Residents however remained
Japanese in all but three residencies. There is some reason to believe
that these moves were designed to strengthen the hands of the prijaji,
who had simply their administrative skills and institutional power, vis-
a-vis the secular nationalist and Islamic elites who had more ’popular’
bases of influence. The Japanese probably hoped in this way to provide
channels whereby military directives would have a maximum effectiveness
(18) (cont'd)
Members elected from Advisory Councils in the Residencies and
Djakarta Raya:
R. Z. Soeriakartalegawa (Banten)
Ir. M. A. Sofwan (Djakarta Raya)
M. Soetisna Sendjaja (Priangan)
Dr. Maas	(Pekalongan)
R. Sardjono Danoedibroto(Banjuma
' Mr. R. Soejoedi (Semarang)
R. Mas Aris	(Pati)
K. R. T. R. Wediodiningrat (Madiun)
Mr. R. Soenarko	(Malang)
R. A.A. Soerjonegoro (Madura)
Poero Martodipoero (Kediri)
R. Ibrahim Singadilaga (Djakarta)
Dr. Marzoeki Mahdi (Bogor)
Dr. Mohamad Toha (Tjirebon)
Dr. Sardjito Kartomihardjo (Kedu)
s)
feandoro P. Ario Poeroebojo
(Jogjakarta)
Drs. K. R. Μ. T. Adipati
Sosrodiningrat (Solo)
R. H. Fatchoerrahman (Bodjonegoro)
*R. Soedirman (Surabaja)
*A smo A smodisastro (Besuki)
Those names marked with a star are the new members. Cf. Djawa
Baroe, I, #21, (November 1,1943), pp. 4f;II, #18, (September 15,
TWFF7 p. 29; III, #6, (March 15, 1945), p. 4. Also A sia Raya, November
13, 1944, February 12, 1945, and June 15 and 19, 1945. See also John O.
Sutter, Indonesianisasi, Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940-1955,
Data Paper No. 36, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern
Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. , 1959, Appendix B, pp. 1268f.,
for further details. N. B. On January 3, 1945, a similar body was
created in Sumatra, cf. Pandji Poestaka, 23, # 2, (February 1945), p. 58.
(19) These appointments included initially:
Hadji Ahmad Sanoesi (Bogor); R. M. A. A. Soeriatanoedibrata (Tjirebon)
R. T. A. Milono (Pati); Mr. R. P.Iskaq Tjokroadisoerjo (Banjumas)
Mr. K. R. Μ. T. Wongsonegoro (Semarang); R. Abdoerahim Pratalykrama
R. Poeradiredjo (Priangan);	(Kediri)
Mr. R. S. Budhyarto Martoatmodjo (Madiun).
See Kan Po, #56, (Dec. 10, 1944), p. 16. On April 23, 1945 three more
such appointments were made: R. Soedirman (Surabaja);
R. A. A. Tjakraningrat (Madura); Mr. M. Besar (Pekalongan).
See Ka.n Pa, #67, (May 25, 1945), p. 20. Four final appointments were
made on June 15, 1945:	R. Rangga Tirtasoejatna (Banten)
R. Μ. T. A. Koesnandar (Madiun); Mr. R. S. Budhyarto Martoatmodjo
Mr. R. Pandji Singgih (Malang).	(Besuki)
See Kan Po, #69, (June 25, 1945), p. 39. Thus by the end of the occupa-
tion there were Vice-Residents in every Residence but Djakarta, Kedu
and Bodjonegoro, ready to take over the top regional administrative posts,
and in these three areas the Residents themselves were now Indonesians.12
among the mass of Indonesians, and to consolidate a bureaucratic structure
to which power could be transferred as slowly or as rapidly as they wished,
without any break in governmental authority or any chance for chaos and
anarchy to break out. It should also be noted that all the new positions were
advisory, carrying no powers with them, except the informal ones created
by experience and tactful manoeuvre.
Whereas the Koiso Declaration was apparently received by the masses
with some enthusiasm in Sumatra and the Naval Territories, (20) and even
in Java, the bureaucratic promotions that followed it were not of any great
publicity value and probably pleased only a limited circle of top leaders.
These were however needed to mobilize the masses. The deeper significance
of the appointments lies however in the fact that they reveal the beginning
of a steady progress towards a 'dual apparatus' of government at the highest
levels of the administration. This was to be of crucial importance when the
Japanese finally 'transferred' power to the Indonesians late in 1945. One
might use the simile of the relay race, and say that during the last six
months of the occupation, the two bureaucratic directorates ran things side
by side until the baton of power was finally relinquished to the Indonesian
leadership.
In spite of these liberalizing measures, the Japanese found the
Javanese population restless and uneasy. The 16th Army had to bear the
brunt of the growing tension and dissatisfaction, as conditions on the Outer
Islands were much more placid. (21) Some indications of the changing atmo-
(20)	Cf. Statement of Captain Masuzo Yanagihara, July 6, 8, 1946, p. 4; the
rather sour comments of Lt. Gen. Toshio Miyake, Governor of Palembang
are also revealing. See his Statement (from Changi prison) Dec. 19, 1946, p. 1
(21)	Cf. Statement of Captain Yanagihara, p. 5, where he discusses the diffi-
culties oi trying to create a mass movement in the Naval Territory, based
on all strata of the population. He adds, somewhat in contradiction to
his description of the reception of the Koiso Declaration, that only the
wealthy local entrepreneurs were enthusiastic about independence, because
they were promised the local assets and 'good will'of Japanese firms
operating in the area as soon as independence would be announced.
The situation on Sumatra seems to have been fairly calm too. Yet Major-
General Fumie Shimura, head of the Civil Administration on Sumatra
from January 1944 to July 1945, personally rejected a proposed 'propa-
ganda' tour in his territory by Soekarno or Hatta, because he felt the re-
percussions might be undesirable. See his Statement, no date, pp. 1 and 5.
It is perhaps worth adding that when the Naval Administration decided
to relax its highly repressive anti-nationalist policies after the American
landings on Leyte in October 1944, it agreed to invite the two leaders to
tour its territories. Asa result Hatta visited Kalimantan and Soekarno
Sulawesi, Bali and the Lesser Sundas. However there is no indication
that these visits had any very significant consequences. Cf. Statement of
Captain Yanagihara, p. 6. Other aspects of the Navy's 'liberalizing* poli-
cies included the expansion of the numbers and the 'powers' of provincial
and municipal councils. See Report # 58, U. S. Office of Strategic Services,
Research and Analysis Branch, Honolulu, February 28, 1945, p. 9.13
sphere on Java can be gained from the Peta uprising at Blitar in Febru-
ary 1945 (see below, Chapter III), and the Seventh Session of the C.A.C.
The C. A. C. met on February 21st, and inducted its 14 new members.
It seems that its discussions were rather more lively than usual. In
any case it made a number of instructive ’suggestions' to the Military
Government. (22) Of these the most important were:
1.	Expansion of military training among the masses.
2.	An improvement in the working conditions, the food and the
clothing of the Romushas. (23)
3.	A relaxation of restrictions on the passage of non-strategic
goods from Residency to Residency.
4.	The creation of a New Life Movement to prepare the masses
for independence "both physically and psychologically."
5.	The integration of the Masjumi and the Djawa Hookookai by
the Military Government, for the sake of national unity.
The Council complained that the two had separate organiza-
tions "though there is no conflict between them." (24)
(22)	In fact, the suggestions were formally made to the Saikosikikan, or
Commander-in-Chief of the 16th Army on Java, at that time Lt. Gen.
Kumashiki Harada. He held a position somewhat analogous to that
of the former Dutch Governor-General, though in practice, on
account of his military responsibilities, he had little to do with
running the civilian administrative system.
(23)	The Romushas were forced labourers made use of by the Japanese
in mining and construction projects, mainly in Indonesia, Thailand
and Burma. They were partly conscripted, partly seduced by pro-
mises of high pay and good living conditions, and patriotic propa-
ganda. They were given, ironically, the title of Heroes of Labour.
Thousands died or disappeared under the inhuman conditions in which
they were compelled to work. For an estimate of the losses, de-
rived from Japanese sources, see Muhammad Abdul Aziz, Japan's
Colonialism and Indonesia, Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1955, p.
242. His figure is about 200, 000 dead or missing.
(24)	Djawa Baroe, HI, # 6, (March 15, 1945), pp. 4f. The Djawa Hook-
ookai was an extensive mass-based organization, set up in January
1944 to replace the former Putera, which, partly because it was con-
fined to ethnic Indonesians, the Japanese felt was not sufficiently
under their control. The new organization had Japanese officials at
its command posts, had an extensive village network at its base, and
was multi-racial--all in contrast to the Putera. Soekarno served as
its Secretary-General. Its Indonesian leadership was predominantly
'secular Nationalist. ' The Masjumi, founded in October 1943, was an
organization designed to merge all pre-existing Islamic groups and
organizations. It had an entirely Indonesian executive, enjoyed ex-
tensive grass-roots backing, and flourished under the special protec-
tion of the Japanese authorities. For a detailed analysis of the role
and organization of the Masjumi, see H. Benda, op. cit. , Chapter 7.
For the Djawa Hookookai, cf. Aziz, op. cit. , pp.~z22-224.14
The first of these suggestions promised to benefit both Japanese and
Indonesians alike, or at least gave the appearance of doing so. The Japanese
steadily refused to train more than a very few Indonesians with real weapons,
generally equipping them only with sharpened bamboo spears or imitation
wooden rifles. Not unnaturally they were afraid of revolt against their own
often oppressive rule. Yet military training was likely to be a good prelimi-
nary method of channelling the energies of the masses into the war effort.
On the other hand the Indonesian leaders wanted better training for their
own people to prepare them for an anticipated fight for independence, whether
against the Dutch or the Japanese. The second and third suggestions may have
originated from the Indonesians themselves, unprompted by Japanese in-
sistence. The third suggestion is particularly important as it threatened
to break down the elaborate plans of the Japanese for regional autarchy.
These plans were designed partly to minimize the damage done by the de-
terioration or destruction of lines of communication and transportation
under an enemy attack (and thus to allow local guerilla activities to be car-
ried on as freely as possible), and partly to ensure a more efficient ration-
ing and distribution of available supplies. The scheme also had the advan-
tage of lightening the burden on the very meagre transportation facilities
on Java. (25)
The New Life Movement was part of the overall Army policy of doing
everything possible to stimulate nationalist sentiment without allowing it to
take concrete political expression. The Movement, when established, was
ostensibly non-political. Its 'program' consisted of sending important Indo-
nesian leaders into the villages to set examples of thrift, hard work and dis-
cipline, and to encourage the more intensive cultivation (for war purposes)
of ordinary farm land and the peasants' family plots. It is notable that an
unusually non-Japanese set of slogans was provided for these emissaries.
In any event, both the major political organizations on Java at the
time, the Masjumi and the Djawa Hookookai, actively participated in the
movement, even competing for its leadership. It is hard to estimate how
successful the new movement was, mainly because its goals were almost
purely psychological. Some observers claimed that it was a highly efficient
way of bringing the secular Nationalist leaders and their Moslem counter-
parts into closer contact with the villagers. Other reports allege that on
the contrary, the 'agricultural' activities of these leaders only lowered
their prestige and opened them to ridicule; and that no remarkable rise in
village productivity followed the New Life Movement's energetic campaign.
(25) See Aziz, op. cit. , pp. 185-188. Almost inevitably this artificial
autarchic policy tended to break down. For a variety of reasons, in-
cluding the sheer struggle for survival, wide-spread smuggling opera-
tions grew up. In many cases the police and other administrative of-
ficers involved in executing the policy found themselves involved in
this smuggling, which often acquired a 'patriotic' aspect. The con-
cept of 'patriotic smuggling' for one's people proved popular even after
Independence, with of course unfortunate consequences in the changed
political circumstances.15
The 16th Army was also careful to ignore the suggestion made by
the secular nationalist leaders in the C. A. C., for a merger of the Mas-
jumi and the Djawa Hookookai. It can hardly be doubted that this ’sugges-
tion’ was a thinly veiled invitation to the Japanese authorities to stop their
earlier policy of playing off the Islamic elite against the secular national-
ists. If the demand had been accepted it would have meant the absorption
of the Masjumi into the secular nationalist-dominated Hookookai. (26)
The demand therefore faced the Japanese with an awkward dilemma. Their
control, as we have seen, rested to an important degree on the formula
of divide and rule, which entailed keeping the Moslem elite unabsorbed.
Yet a strengthening of the war effort could hardly be expected while the
two elites were permitted to devote their energies to their mutual rivalries.
On this occasion, by ignoring the secular nationalists' suggestion, the
Japanese sided with the Moslem elements. But as one shrewd observer
has pointed out, the hesitations of the Japanese did not last long. For
the very boldness of the secular nationalists’ claim was a clear indica-
tion that as the Japanese relinquished gradually their tight grip on Indo-
nesian political life, the "real': strengths of the rival elites they had
fostered became increasingly apparent. The rapid sinking of the Mas-
jumi into the background as the year wore on, revealed the comparative
poverty of its leadership's political and administrative experience, and
the greater ’inclusiveness· of the political philosophy of the secular
nationalists. (27) Even if one does not accept this analysis irf its entirety,
it is fair to say that within the very heterogejseoie Masjumi organization,
the Japanese encouraged the predominance of ’symbol-manipulating' mass
leaders, whom they found they could influence more easily, at the expense
(26) The division between secular nationalists and Moslems was paralleled
among the youth as well. The Barisan Pelopor, set up in September
1944 (see Pandji Poestaka, 23, # 17, (September 1, 1944), p. 540),
was a youth organization designed to extend the reach and deepen the
dynamism of the Djawa Hookookai. It was under direct Indonesian
leadership, being neaded by Soekarno, with Oto Iskandardinata and
Dr. Boentaran Martoatmodjo as his executive assistants. Many
prominent nationalists were attached to it from all over Java. It
was the most heavily indoctrinated of the various Indonesian youth
corps, and maintained its anti-Western, authoritarian and fervently
nationalist character, when, after the Declaration of Independence,
it became the Barisan Banteng. It later came under the influence
of Tan Malakka. It probably cumbered somewhere near 80, 000. See
Aziz, op. cit. , p. 230, n. 3; Benda, op. cit., p. 178; George McT.
Kahin,"~Na tionali s m and Revolution in "Indonesia, Cornell University
Press, Ithaca, 1952, p. 163.
To counterbalance the Barisan Pelopor, the Masjumi had its own
youth organization, the Hxzboejllah (Army of God), probably num-
bering about 50, 000, It was given much the same kind of ideologi-
cal training as its counterpart, though of course with a heavy
Islamic colouring as well. Cf. Aziz, loc. cit. and Benda, op. cit.
p. 179.	~
(27) Benda, op. cit. , pp. 177-179.16
of former members of such bodies as the Jong Islamieten Bond, (28) who
had the administrative skills to compete with the top secular nationalist and
prijaji leaders.
The increasingly strong nationalist sentiment revealed by the Seventh
Session of the C. A. C. , in addition to the Blitar revolt (see below), and of
course the promises made in the Koiso Declaration, led the 16th Army in
February of 1945 to attempt to channel and perhaps divert nationalist aspira-
tions by an apparently significant concession. It decided to create a Com-
mittee for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence (Baden Penjelidik
Kemerdekaan Indonesia). (29) The idea was reportedly poorly received in
Singapore and Saigon, but Tokyo approved. (30) A conference of top Japan-
ese administrative officials was convened late in February to work out just
when the Committee would be inaugurated and what its precise function
would be. However the conference did not prove to be very productive,
and we shall see that this was to create considerable difficulties for the
Japanese when the Committee eventually met. The essential idea behind
the Committee was to side-track nationalist energy into harmless activi-
ties. The strategy was still to give play to divisions within the top Indo-
nesian elite by confining the Committee to a purely advisory role, and at
the same time giving it the widest possible agenda. With no compulsion to
arrive at detailed or specific decisions, and with an unprecedented oppor-
tunity to discuss all kinds of political problems, it was hoped that the secu-
lar nationalists and the Moslem leaders would become embroiled in endless
debate and recrimination. (31) It says much for the leadership exercised
(28)	A pre-war association of ’modernist' and highly educated Islamic
leaders, including Hadji A goes Salim, Mr. Roem, Dr. Sukiman,
Mohammed Natsir, Sardian, etc.. They were often at sharp odds with
the more traditional and less 'western-educated' Islamic leadership.
Interestingly enough however, many of them assumed key positions in
the executive of the Hizboe 'llah. Cf. Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III,
#2, (January 15, 1945), p.l3. Among those on the Poe sat JPimpinan
(Central Directorate) were Roem, Jusuf Wibisono, Anwar I*jokroa-
minoto, Prawoto Mangkoesasmita.
(29)	Henceforth referred to as B. P. K. I.
(30)	Nishijima, Kishi, et al. , op. cit. , p. 417; Wirjodiatmodjo, op. cit., p. 37.
(31)	Nishijima, Kishi, et al. , loc. cit. , and p. 412. There was inevitably
an air of contradiction about Japanese policy towards the political
elite during this period. Co-operation was desired, but solely for
war purposes. But elite cohesion was never anything but an apparently
inevitable means to the mobilization of the population, not an end in
itself. The obvious risks involved in promoting elite cohesion meant
that the Japanese probably always had mixed feelings about following
this policy. The basic opportunism of the policy accounts for much
of the apparent confusion in Japanese activities during this period.17
by Soekarno and Hatta that when the B. P. K. I. eventually convened, these
dangers were largely avoided, and the Indonesians skirted the trap laid
for them by the military authorities.
On March 1, 1945, a Proclamation from the Gunseikan announced
the formation of the B. P. K. I. to the Indonesian public. (32) The newly
announced Committee was to study all matters that concerned the poli-
tical and administrative framework of an independent Indonesian state.
It was then to turn over its final report, its records and other documents
to the Gunseikan, who would then send them for inspection and approval
to the proper authorities in Tokyo. Eventually the approved materials
would be sent back to a future Committee for the Preparation of Indo-
nesian Independence, which would add the last touches and make the final
formal decisions.
However once this announcement had been made, very little pro-
gress towards the actual inauguration of the B. P. K. I. seemed to take
place in the following two months. Aside from the general considerations
which led to the Japanese conception of the B. P. K. I. in the first place,
two further considerations were probably important in accounting for the
delay. On the one hand, the membership of the Committee was to be the
product of joint discussions between leading Nationalists, the members
of the Dewan Sanyo and the Japanese administration. Undoubtedly behind
the scenes a good deal of hard and protracted bargaining and manoeuvring
took place. As we shall see, the eventual composition of the B. P. K. I.
was scarcely representative of the three main Indonesian elites. Secondly,
the Koiso Cabinet fell on April 5th as a result of the American landings
on Okinawa on April 1st. Until the new Suzuki Cabinet settled itself into
the saddle, it was inevitable that plans for Indonesia’s future would be
held in abeyance as far as possible.
At any rate, when a general meeting of the administrative heads of
the various Southern Territories was held in Singapore late in March,
the spokesmen for the 16th Army made it clear to their more cautious
(and less harrassed) colleagues that they would go ahead with plans for
the Committee regardless of what those colleagues might have in mind
for their own territories--the discussions of the Committee would officially,
and for the time being, be confined to the immediate future of Java alone.(33)
(32)	Pandji Poes taka, 23, # 5, (March 1, 1945), p. 131. Soeara Asia,
March 1, 1945, p. 1. Kan Po, (March 10, 1945), ppl· 26fi.
(33)	Present at this Conference were: General Dohihara, C-in-C, 7th
Army Group (a prominent former member of the Kwangtung Kodoha
clique); Lt, Gen. Ayabe, Chief of Staff, 7th Army Group; Major Oen-
eral Isomura, head of the General Affairs Department, 7th Army
Group; the heads of various other departments of the 7th Army Group's
Headquarters; Major-Generals Umezu, Shimura, and Nishimura, re-
presenting the General Affairs Departments of the military adminis-
trations in Malaya, Sumatra and Java respectively. See Statement
of Nishimura, April 25, 1947, p. 10.18
On April 29th, the Emperor's Birthday, was considered an auspicious
occasion for two important developments. The cornerstone of a new State
Training Institute (Kenkoku Gakuin) designed to produce an elite corps of
highly trained young administrators was laid. More notable still, the mem-
bership of the B. P. K. I. was announced. (34) It was to consist of a Chair -
(34) Apart from Dr. Radjiman and R.
Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso
Prof. Dr R. Asikin
B. P. H. Bintoro
A.M. Dasaad
Ki Bagus H. Hadikusumo
R. A. A. Sumitro Kolopaking
Mr. Alexander A. Maramis
K. Η. M. Mansoer
Moenandar
R. Roeslan Wongsokusumo
Hadji A goes Salim
Mr. R. Sastromoeljono
Ir. Soekarno
Dr. Soekiman
R. Μ. T. A, Soerio
K. H, A. Wachid Hasjim
K. H. Abdoel Halim
Dr. R. Boentaran Martotmodjo
Mr. R. Hendromartono
R. M. Margono Djojohadikusumo
P. B. H. Poeroebojo
Mr. R. M. Sartono
R. Soekardjo Wirjopranoto
Ir. Soerachman Tjokroadisoerjo
M. Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo
K. R. Μ. T. H. Woerjaningrat
Nj. Soenarjo Mangoenpoespito
*A. R. Baswedan
*Liem Koen Hian
*Oei Tjong Hauw
Pandji Soeroso, the membership was:
Hadji A. Sanoesi
R. Aris
Ki Hadjar Dewantoro
Drs. Mohammad Hatta
Mr. Muhammad Yamin
Dr. R. Koesoemaatmadja
K. H. Masjkoer
A. Kahar Moezakkir
Parada Harahap
Prof. Ir. R. Roosseno
Dr. Samsi Sastrawidagda
Mr. R. Pandji Singgih
R. Soedirman
Mr. A. Soebardjo
Mr. Soesanto
Mr. Soewandi
Abdoel Kadir
Prof. Dr. Hoesein Djajadiningrat
Mr. Johannes Latuharhary
R. Oto Iskandardinata
R. Abdoelrahim Pratalykrama
Mr. R. Samsoedin
Prof. Mr. Dr. Soepomo
Drs. K. R. M. A, Soerodiningrat
R. A.A. Wiranatakoesoema
Nj. M. Ulfah Santoso
K. R. Μ. T. Wongsonagoro
*P. F. Dahler
*Tan Eng Hoa
*Oeij Tiang Tjoei
Those names marked with a star are non-ethnic Indonesians. See
Makloemat Gunseikan, in Kan Po, # 66, (May 10, 1945), pp. 9f. Also
Soeara Moeslimin, ill, # 10, (May 15, 1945), pp. 8f. Cf. also A. G.
Pringgodigdo, Berdirinja Negara Republik Indonesia, N. V. Pus taka
Indonesia, Surabaja, 1958, pT 25.
On June 26th, 8 further appointments were made to the B. P, K. L
These were:
Mr. Mas Besar Martokoesoemo Ir. P. Mohammad Noor
R. Asikin Natanegara	H. A. Fatah Hassan
Chaeroel Saleh	Soekarni
Abdoel Kahar	Bendoro K. P. Ario Soerjohamidjojo
Asia Raya, June 26, 1945. Cf. also Sutter op. cit., Appendix D, p. 1271f,
However Chaeroel Saleh and Soekarni, designated as representatives of19
man, 2 Vice-Chairmen and 60 ordinary members, including 4 Chinese, 1
Arab and 1 Eurasian. There were also to be 7 Special Japanese members
who would attend the Committee’s sessions but would have no vote. (35)
It was at first considered probable that Soekarno, as the pre-eminent
nationalist leader, would take the chair, but apparently he was eager to
take an active part in the debates, and after consultation with Hatta, he
urged the appointment of the elderly, well-known nationalist Dr. Radjiman
Wediodiningrat. The First Vice-Chairman was the Japanese Resident of
Tjirebon, Yoshio Ichibangase, the second R. Pandji Soeroso, then Resi-
dent of Kedu. (36)
The composition of the B. P. K. I. is instructive in a number of
ways. Broken down by age, one gets the following distribution: (37)
(34)	(cont’d)
the youth, refused their appointments. Asa result they were dis-
missed from their jobs in the Sendenbu (Propaganda Department).
This story is partially corroborated by the testimony of Yoshio Ichi-
bangase, as reported in Prof. Dr. I. J. Brugmans et al. , eds.
Nederlandsch-Indie onder Japanse Begetting, Gegevens en documentan
over de jaren 1942-1945, Uitgave T. Wever, Franeker, I960, p. 588.
He agrees that the youth representatives refused their appointments,
but says there were three of them and that the new appointments
numbered 6.
(35)	Pringgodigdo, op. cit. , p.25, says there were 8 such members. So
does Yoshio Icmbangase himself, in Brugmans et al. , op. cit. p. 588.
Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, #10, (May 15, 1945), p78f., gives 7.
It may be that Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia excluded Yoshio Ichibangase
from its count since he was First Vice-Chairman. The Japanese mem-
bers were:
Yoshio Ichibangase
Teichiro Ide
Toyohiko Masuda
Masamitu Itagaki
Tokuzi Tokonami
Mitukiyo Matsuura
Minoru Tanaka
Shozo Miyano
A sia Raya, April 29,1945. Nishimura, in his Statement of May 31-
June 6, 1946,p. 2, gives the same list, omitting only the name of
Toyohiko Masuda. For an account of the role of the Japanese mem-
bers, see Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit. , p. 413.
(36)	Soeroso was also designated head of the B. P, K, I.'s secretariat, assisted
by Toyohiko Masuda and Abdul Gafar Pringgodigdo. See Asia Raya,
June 5, 1945; Kan Po, #67, (May 25, 1945), p. 21. Pringgodigdo had
earlier been secretary to the Visman Commission for Constitutional
’ Reform which had convened to discuss the status of the East Indies in
1941. In fact, owing to the other duties for which Soeroso was respon-
sible as Resident of Kedu, and to the negligence of Masuda, the bulk
of the B. P. K. I.’s administrative work was carried on by Mr. Pringgo-
digdo and his two young lawyer-assistants, Mr. Assaat and Mr. Iskandar
Gondowardojo, both later to become prominant in the nationalist movement.
(37)	See Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, loc. cit., and Sutter,op. cit. , p. 1271f.
Where these two sources differ, I have-followed the former.20
25-29	1	1. 6%
30-34	1	1. 6%
35-39	9	14. 5%
40-44	11	17. 7%
45-49	14	22. 6%
50-54	11	17. 7%
55-59	10	16. 1%
60-64	4	6. 5%
65-69	1	1. 6%
	”6?	99. 9%
The average age of the Committee is just over 48 years. In view both of
the comparatively low life expectancy in Indonesia, and of the enormously
important role the 'youth' were to play in the achievement of independence,
it seems fair to conclude that the Committee is disproportionately weighted
on the side of age. This is made even clearer when we remember that Hatta
and Soekarno were at this time 44 and 45 years old respectively. Secondly,
of the 11 members of the first three above groups, 2 were women and 3 non-
ethnic Indonesians. Thirdly, the only member of the group that could be
called 'youthful' (25-29 years old) was a young aristocrat from Jogjakarta,
sent to represent the Sultanate.
In 1944 the Gunseikan's office had produced a roster of prominent
Indonesians living on Java, covering about 2000 names. The roster was
drawn up under the direction of Dr. Hatta, and included brief career bio-
graphies of each member listed. According to the general classifications
into which these 'prominent Indonesians' were divided the B. P. K. I. , as it
was composed in April 1945, can be broken down as follows:
General State Administration	4	6. 5%
Pamong pradja (civil service)	10	16. 1%
State Finance	0	
Security	0	--
Justice	3	4. 8%
Business	7	11. 3%
Information (Propaganda)	3	4. 8%
Law	3	4. 8%
Health	4	6. 5%
Education	1	1. 6%
Culture	0	
Religion	7	11. 3%
Politics	10	16. 1%
Youth	0	
Not mentioned	10	16. 1%
62	100. 0% (38)
(38) See Orang Indonesia Jang Terkemuka di Djawa, Gunseikanbu, 1944,
passim. Those members of the B, P. K. 1. not mentioned in this roster
were: the 4 Chinese, the Arab and the Eurasian, and, among the ethnic
Indonesians, K. H. Masjkoer, P. B. H. Bintoro, Nj. Mr. Maria Ulfah
Santoso and R. Abdoelrahman Pratalykrama.21
In some ways this classification is rather misleading, in that, for
example, the four 'health' officials were also active politicians, as were
some of the members listed under 'law' and 'information'. Nevertheless
the main groupings are made fairly clear. If we combine 'general state
administration', 'pamong pradja' and 'justice', we shall have 17 members
of the Committee (2?. 4%) as civil servants dating from the pre-war period.
This group approximately represents the prijaji elite. Combining 'health',
'law', 'education', 'information' and 'politics', we shall have the core of
the secular nationalist elite represented on the Committee. This group
numbers 21 (or nearly 34%). The Islamic elite is represented primarily
by the 7 'religious' members (11. 3%). It is therefore readily apparent
that Islam was heavily outweighed on the Committee, with the secular
nationalists and the administrator prijajis each commanding nearly twice
its strength. Educationally too, the Islamic elements were at a great dis-
advantage. Whereas almost all the members of the two other elites had
had a fairly extensive Western-style education, and the administrators of
course had accumulated a good deal of 'executive' experience, generally
speaking the Islamic representatives had neither. (39) These factors, in
addition to their numerical inferiority, were to have serious consequences
for the Moslem group, not only in the manoeuvring within the B. P. K. I, ,
but in the struggle for pre-eminence within the nationalist movement as a
whole.
(39) AbdjdlHalim: No school education. Member of various Ulama groups
before the war. First executive experience was being
a member of the C. A. C.
Hadikusumo: Schooling in Koranic law in Mecca, Worked as a teacher
and as a director of the pre-war modernist Moehammad-
ijah 'welfare and education' organization. Member of
the C. A. C.
Moezakkir:	Religious education in Mecca and Cairo. A teacher all
his life.
Sanoesi:	Religious education in Java, and later Mecca. Writer
of religious tracts. Sole political experience was being
a member of the Bogor Provincial Council.
W. Hasjim:	Local religious schooling. Associated with the pre-war
traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama. Political experience con-
fined to membership of the C.A. C. and the directorate
of Masjumi's predecessor, the Μ. I, A, I.
K. M. Mansoer: Extended education in modernist Islamic schools in
Mecca and Cairo. First executive experience: member-
ship in the directorate of the Putera.
Dr.Sbekiman: Western-style education, culminating in medical school
in Amsterdam. Worked as a doctor and as an active poli-
tician in pre-war Islamic political organizations.
Three other members with Islamic connections were Hadji AgoeeSalim,
Abikoesno and Prof. Dr. Djajadiningrat, all of high educational standing
widely experienced, and, especially in the case of the first two, with
strong affiliations with the secular nationalists. This group was to be
important as a mediator between the secular nationalists and the Islamic
leaders in the forthcoming debates of the B. P. K. I. , though generally
throwing their weight to the side of the former.22
Two notable omissions in the B. P. K. X.'s memberships were the
absence of any representation of the youth or of the pre-war 'leftist' politi-
cal organizations. It was probably to correct the first omission or at least
to acknowledge the growing influence of the youth, that, as previously men-
tioned, Chaerul Saleh andSoekarni were offered seats on the Committee in
June. Nevertheless, even with two representatives, the youth would have
been under-represented, both in proportion to the population and to their
actual political influence. And as for the pre-war 'leftists', though Soekarno
and Hatta are reported to have urged the Japanese to give a fair representa-
tion to the pre-war political parties, there was little that could be done in
this case. Almost all such 'leftist' elements were underground or in
jail. (40)
Between the announcement of the membership of the B. P. K. I. on
April 29th and the opening of its first session on May 28th, one very signi-
ficant development took place. On May 13th, Nishimura, head of the Gen-
eral Affairs Department, called the members of the B. P. K. I. together to
brief them on developments at home and abroad, in the light of which they
were to direct their deliberations. He revealed for the first time in pub-
lic the news that Germany had capitulated, but declared that Japan had de-
cided to carry on the war on her own. Even more significant was his state-
ment that the military authorities would assume complete neutrality on
"the religious question." As the General put it: (41)
"Although we clearly recognize the ties between the
Indonesian people and Islam, the Dai Nippon Govern-
ment has absolutely no blue-print or plan on the
status of the Islamic religion in the New State, or
on its relationship to other religions, since, as I
have already explained, it is for the Indonesian
people to give substance to their own ideals in the
formation of the New State; and Nippon will merely
offer its help. "
Taken in conjunction with the fact that Islam was represented by only 7, or
at the outside by 10, members of the B. P. K. I. , this statement was a ser-
ious blow to the general political position of the Masjumi, and more parti-
cularly to those elements in it who might have been expecting powerful Jap-
anese support when the Committee came into session. The statement
makes it probable that the small representation of Islam in the B. P. K. I.
was the result of a deliberate decision of the Japanese. One can hardly
doubt, in the light of the events of the First Session of the B. P. K. I. , that
the ease with which Soekarno dominated the proceedings and managed to
impose his will on the Committee, was partially due to this shift in Japan-
ese political strategy. Now that the Japanese had given a clear indication
(40)	The Par tai Komunis Indonesia was 'illegal' or underground. Sjahrir
and his group were underground. Amir Sjarifuddin was in prison.
(41)	Djawa Baroe, III, # 10, (May 15, 1945), pp. 4f. gives the full text.23
that they were no longer prepared to use the usually more 'co-operative'
Islamic elite to balance off the secular nationalists, the prestige and self-
confidence of the latter rose markedly.
The first session of the B. P. K. I. opened with a good deal of pomp
and publicity on May 28th. The Committee was gathered together in the
old C.A. C. building. General Itagaki, Commander of the 7th Army Group,
and General Nagano, now Commander of the 16th Army attended personally.
The Japanese and Indonesian flags were hoisted side by side above the
Committee’s conference rooms. (42) After General Nagano's formal in-
augural speech, General Yamamoto, the Gunseikan (head of civilian ad-
ministration) issued a series of instructions to the Committee. This in
turn was followed by a formal speech of welcome on the Committee's
behalf by the Chairman, Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat. The public was
told little about the agenda or the debates of the Committee. (43) It was
officially stated that this would allow the members of the Committee to
discuss the important problems they faced in a more open manner. (44)
The press could add little more than that the Committee "had stayed up
till 1 a. m. on the 30th discussing important problems." (45)
A final statement was eventually issued, declaring inter alia
that the Committee deeply resented the landing of the Dutch on Morotai,
Tarakan and Papua, and their attempts to invade Halmahera; rejected
the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Administration and the idea of
colonialism; was ready, along with 70 million other Indonesians to fight
with all sincerity for Dai Nippon Teikoku; looked forward to the rapid
realization of Indonesian Independence in order to carry out the final ex-
(42)	For an account of the occasion, see Soeara Asia, May 28th, and G.
Pakpahan, 1261 Hari Dibawah Sinar Matahari Terbit, publisher un-
known, no date (l948?), p. 122. Also by Makloemat Saikosikikan
# 2, April 29th, the flying of the Indonesian flag, the Sang Me rah
Putih, was permitted on buildings designated by the Gunseikan. See
Kan Po, # 66, (May 10, 1945), p. 9. The Japanese were also from
now on forbidden to use the word Gen-zyuumin ('natives' or 'in-
landers'), 'but rather the word Indonesia Zin; and Indonesia-go
(the Indonesian language) was substituted for Marai-go (Malay).
(43)	See Brugmans et al. , eds, op. cit. , p. 588, for a statement by Ichi-
bangase that the occasions on which the Committee would meet were
kept a secret so as to prevent 'outside' influence on the Committee
members. He adds that "several groups of students and other youths,
with the support of certain committee members, asked to attend the
meetings as interested bystanders. The chairman forbade this,
which under the circumstances was very understandable."
(44)	Kan Po, #66, (May 10, 1945), Makloemat Gunseikan # 23, p. 10.
(45)	Soeara Asia, June 2, 1945; Asia Raya, June 2, 1945.24
pulsion of the Dutch; and rejected the idea of a "mandate status", planned
for Indonesia at the San Francisco Conference, as unfit for a free Indo-
nesia. (46) In answer to these resolutions, the Japanese thanked the mem-
bers of the B. P. K. I, for the sense of responsibility they had shown, and
urged them to spend the time until the next session of the Committee in
writing out their ideas and conceptions for an Indonesian Constitution to be
instituted after Independence.
Generally speaking the three days of the first session of the B. P. K. I.
were taken up with formal speech-making, and elaborate analyses of certain
prominent members’ ’state-philosophies.' By far the most notable of these
was the future President Soekarno’s outline of what was later, under the
name of the Pantjasila, to become the official philosophy of the Indonesian
state. The principles that make up the Pantjasila are well-known: national-
ism, international humanism, popular sovereignty, social justice and the
belief in God. These themes can almost all be found elsewhere in early
post-war Asian socialism, and represent an attempt to synthesize modern
European socialist ideas with more traditional indigenous conceptions. Yet
the sources of Soekarno’s thinking, and his very personal style of expres-
sion are so well brought out in this speech, that it may be appropriate to
examine it in some detail.
In the course of his speech, the future President of Indonesia
declared: (47)
"In 1918, thanks be to God, there was another man
who recalled me (to my task), and that was Dr. Sun
Yat-sen. In his work "San Min Chu I" or "Three
People’s Principles" I found a lesson which exposed
cosmopolitanism ... In my heart since then there
has flourished a sense of nationalism through the in-
fluence of the Three People’s Principles."
And indeed Soekarno’s Nationalism, Popular Sovereignty and Social Justice
clearly run parallel to Sun Yat-sen's Min Tsu, Min Chuan and Min Sheng,
though certainly Soekarno’s rhapsodic and eloquent expression of his Prin-
(46)	Soeara Asia, June 1, 1945; Kan Po, # 68, (June 10, 1945), pp. 12f.
(47)	Prof. Mr. Hadji Muhammad Yamin, ed. , Naskah Persiapan Undang-
Undang Dasar 1945, Jajasan Prapantja, Djakarta, 1959, p. 73.
There is no indication in Professor Yamin’s edition as to the sources
he has made use of, but it is probable that he has relied mainly on
the official minutes taken down by Mr. A. G. Pringgodigdo, who was
secretary to both the B. P. K. I. and the P. P. K. I. , though of course
as an active member on both bodies himself, Professor Yamin has
presumably also drawn on his own personal recollections.25
ciples contrasts sharply with his mentor’s dry and academic style. (48)
In speaking of Internationalism Soekarno mentioned Gandhi’s phrase,
"I am a nationalist, but my nationalism is humanity.” Yet perhaps
Soekarno’s internationalism is better seen as growing out of his exper-
ience with Marxist and socialist ideas than as a reflection of Ghandhian
influence. His glowing references to Lenin in this same speech seem
to support this suggestion. There is reason to believe that Soekarno’s
emphasis on the belief in God (ketuhanan), which of course finds no paral-
lel in the writings of Sun Yat-sen and Lenin, stemmed both from his keen
awareness of the place of religion in Indonesian life and from his exper-
ience as an exile in Flores between 1933 and 1938. There he had been in
close contact with Roman Catholic priests and missionaries, and had re-
portedly become increasingly convinced of the ’equivalence’ of different
religious inspirations. (49) Certainly such a concept would also evoke
deep resonances in traditional Javanese religious attitudes. In his
speech Soekarno said: (50)
"every Christian should believe in his own parti-
cular God. The Christian should worship God
according to the teachings of Jesus Christ, Mos-
lems according to the teachings of the prophet
Mohammed, Buddhists should discharge their
religious rites according to their own books.
But let us all have belief in God. The Indonesian
state shall be a state where every person can
worship God in freedom . . . without religious
egoism. And the state of Indonesia should be a
state incorporating the belief in God! Let us
observe, let us practise religion whether Islam
or Christianity in a civilized way. What is the
civilized way? It is the way of mutual respect.”
(clapping in the audience)
Yet at the same time Soekarno also repeatedly appealed directly to his Is-
lamic colleagues on the Committee, doubtless through them addressing the
whole powerful organization of Islam. Most significantly, in discussing
the principle of popular sovereignty, he declared: (51)
(48)	Cf. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I, trans. Frank W. Price, China
Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, Shanghai, China, 1927,
passim.
(49)	Soekarno himself however remained a Moslem, and even carried on
a public debate through magazine articles on the subject of the prob-
lems of Islam. His opponent was the then youthful Mohammad Natsir.
(50)	Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , pp. 77f.
(51)	Ibid., pp. 74f.26
"For Islam this is the best condition for the promotion
of religion . .. the House of Representatives, this is
the place for us to bring forward the demands of Is-
lam ... If we are really an Islamic people, let us
work hard so that most of the seats in the People's
representative body that we will create, are occupied
by Islamic delegates . . . then the laws made by this
representative body will naturally be Islamic laws
too .. . We say that 90% of us follow the Islamic reli-
gion, but look around you in this gathering and see
what percentage give their votes to Islam! To me
it is a proof that Islam does not yet flourish among
the masses. "
The challenge could hardly be clearer. Considering the methods by which
the Committee's membership had been chosen it was scarcely surprising
that the percentage of ardent Moslems was not 90. The Committee however
accepted the Pantjasila, and thus dealt another major blow to the Islamic
cause and the Islamic State. The acceptance of Pantjasila by the Com-
mittee further emphasized the ascendancy of the secular nationalist leaders
over their rivals. If the Moslem groups had won the first round by avoid-
ing incorporation into a monolithic nationalist movement, they had lost the
second in the B. P, K, I.
Before breaking up on June 1st, the B. P, K. I. decided to set up a
sub-committee under Soekarno to be responsible for analyzing and classi-
fying suggestions for the future Constitution. All Indonesians were urged
to send in any proposals or suggestions they might have to this committee.
In the days that followed all the members of the B. P. K. I. , particularly the
Special Members, (52) were very active, going round from Residency to
Residency conferring with administrative officials, holding meetings with
youth groups and other organizations, and generally stirring up as much
interest as possible in the fact of the Committee's deliberations. (53) On
June 22nd, Soekarno organized a joint meeting of the B. P. K. I. Subcom-
mittee, those members of the B. P. K. I. who also sat on the C. A. C. , as
well as any others that happened to be in Djakarta at the time. The meeting
was held in the head offices of the Djawa Hookookai, and was attended by 38
people. This group then appointed its own subcommittee of 9 members to
act as an executive and drafting committee. Asa matter of fact, with the
exception of Yamin, this new subcommittee was made up of the same men
as those appointed to the B. P. K. I.'s subcommittee. They were:
(52)	For the ostensible tasks of these members, see Kan Po, # 66 (May 10,
1945), p. 10. They were supposed to keep the Indonesians informed
of Japanese law and customs as they might relate to the new Constitu-
tion and state structure. In effect they were appointed to keep a sharp
eye on the Committee's discussions.
(53)	See Asia Raya for May and June 1945 for reports from various
Residencies.27
Soekarno	Hatta	Maramis	Muzakkir	Abikusno (54)
Soebardjo	Yamin	Wachid Hasjim	Hadji Agoes Salim
The main product of this Committee's work was a preamble for the new
Constitution later to become famous, and controversial, as the Djakarta
Charter. The main body of this Preamble was a catalogue of the crimes
committed against the Indonesian people by the Dutch, and an eloquent
tribute to the glories of Indonesian power and civilization before the arri-
val of the Dutch East India Company. Suitable tributes to the inspiring
example of Japan, as the leader of Asia's struggle against the imperial-
ist West were also included. Lastly, a description of the history of
Indonesia's struggle for independence was appended. The climax of the
Preamble read as follows: (55)
"And now the struggle of the Indonesian movement
has reached a stage of happy and prosperous wel-
fare, in which the Indonesian people have been led
to the gateway of the Indonesian state, which is
free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous, and
which lives as a sincere member of the Greater
East Asian Family. . .
Thanks to the blessings of Almighty Allah, and
basing itself on all the principles heretofore enu-
merated, and inspired by the glorious ideal of
being master of its own fate and of a life for its
people that will be free, honourable, respected,
the Indonesian people hereby
Declare their Independence!
In the name of Allah, All-Loving and All-Merciful,
in order to establish a Government for the Indo-
nesian State; to protect the whole Indonesian people
and territories; to promote the public welfare; to
raise the standard of living; to develop our liveli-
hood within the Greater East Asian family; and to
participate in establishing a world order which is
founded on freedom, eternal peace and social
justice, National Independence is set forth in a
Constitution of the Indonesian State, which forms
a Republic based on people's sovereignty, founded
on: the belief in God, the obligation to carry out
the commandments of Islam for all its adherents,
on the basis of a righteous and civilized humanity,
the unity of Indonesia, and a democracy led by the
(54) Prof. Mr. Drs. Notonagoro, Pemboekaan Oendang-Oendang Dasar
1945, Penerbitan mengenai Pantjasila, Nomor Kedua, Universitas
Gadjah Mada, Jogjakarta, 1957, p. 13,
(55) Notonagoro, op. cit. , pp. 35-38.28
wise guidance of the Representatives' Congress en-
suring social justice for the whole Indonesian people." (56)
It should here be noted parenthetically that, as we have already men-
tioned, the Japanese had made almost no serious preparations for the ses-
sions of the B. P. K, I. , aside from their share in selecting its membership.
No blueprints for the achievement of Independence had been drawn up. No
final word had come from Tokyo. Most Japanese officers regarded the Com
mittee essentially as a sop to Nationalist sentiment. (57) Although many of
them, especially those in the 16th Army, were well aware of a rising popu-
lar restiveness, they were psychologically unprepared to do much more
than play for time. Outside Java, many military men subscribed to the so-
called "three-year plan" - -which envisioned one year of preparation of the
'basis' of independence, one of preparation of independence itself, and one
of the 'completion' of independence. (58) Without any firm ideas about
what the Committee was or was not supposed to do, there was some diffi-
culty in knowing just what to 'stop' at the Committee's discussions. It
appears that the Japanese were caught unprepared by the boldness and in-
sistence of the Indonesian leaders. The Indonesians on the other hand, re-
garding the Committee in a somewhat jaundiced light, were determined not
to let themselves be played with by the Japanese. They intended to make
the Committee a platform from which further demands could be made, far
more concrete than hitherto. (59)
(56)	The italics are the author's. The phrase underlined was to be the sub-
ject of great controversy both at the second session of the B. P. K. I.
and at the first meeting of its successor, the Committee for the Pre-
paration of Indonesian Independence (which later became the Komite
Nasional Indonesia Pusat or K. N. I. P. ). The reader is therefore
urged to bear it in mind.
(57)	Nishijima, Kishi, et al., op. cit. , p. 411. On May 20th, a second
Military Conference was lieid at Singapore, with almost the same
people present as at the first. The only notable changes were that
General Itagaki had replaced General Dohihara, and that for the first
time the Navy (10th Area Fleet HQ in Singapore) sent representatives.
The Java command reported on its preparations for the forthcoming
meeting of the B. P. K. I. The Navy seems to have been rather unco-
operative, insisting that its territory was 'special' with unique prob-
lems demanding 'unique' (i. e. Navy) treatment. Though the Confer-
ence was called primarily to co-ordinate the activities of the four
commands on the nationalist and other questions, it does not seem to
have accomplished much beyond an exchange of views and information.
Cf. also the Statement of Nishimura of April 25, 1947, p. 12. Also
Statement of Klajor-General Fumie Shimura, June 13, 1946, pp. 3f.
(58)	Nishijima, Kishi, et al. , op. cit. , p. 417.
(59)	Ibid. , p. 412.29
With this more positive objective in mind, the Indonesians certainly-
held the upper hand through the remainder of the B. P. K„ I. *s life. (60)
When the second session opened on July 10th, and the Committee as a
whole for the first time engaged itself in drawing up specific programs
and a Constitution, Japanese ideas, such as they were, were firmly set
aside. (61) The Army had expected Indonesia to emerge as a sort of
semi-feudal monarchy, perhaps with the Sultan of Jogjakarta at its head.
But here the Army underestimated the cultural differences between the
Japanese and Indonesian traditions. They failed to realize that many of
the Indonesian leaders had had far more extensive Western education
than they themselves, and, apart from a small minority, were set upon
creating a Republic, in its most non-monarchical sense. (62) From his
own perspective, the Japanese Vice-Chairman of the B. P. K, I, summed
up the reasons for the collapse of the Army’s expectations. He listed
four: i) the Islamic members supported a Republic because, according
to Islam, political affairs should be decided by "common deliberation."
ii) Many members believed that whatever state structure was instituted
by the Committee would last only for the duration of the war. There-
after, at a gathering of a National Congress, a permanent structure
would be erected, iii) Though Indonesian nationalism inclined to mon-
archy, it was hard to decide which of the Javanese princes should fill
the office, iv) If the Sultan of Jogjakarta should be selected, no one
could be sure that the people from the Outer Islands or from the Sundan-
ese areas on Java would accept him. (63)
With really remarkable speed, the B. P. K. I. at its second session
drew up a Constitution and laid down the draft outlines of the future Indo-
nesian state, covering such problems as: the extent of Indonesians terri-
tory, citizenship, religion and political organizations. The problem of
territory was essentially whether the new Indonesia would include British
North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, Timor, Malaya and New Guinea. The
Committee finally voted on the question as follows: 39 for all of the above,
19 for the former territory of the Dutch East Indies, 6 for the former East
Indies combined with Malaya, and omitting New Guinea, and 2 for other
proposals. The Greater Indonesians thus won their point. (64) The
question of citizenship was rooted in the difficult Chinese problem. The
debate on their status divided not only the ethnic Indonesians but the Chinese
representatives themselves, who were split between an ’assimilationist’
and a ’non-assimilationist' group. The formula finally arrived at was that
(60)	Cf. the testimony of Ichibangase in Brugmans, et al. , eds.» op. cit. ,
p. 588.
(61)	For example, the Japanese request that the Indonesians vote only on
disconnected proposals. See Brugmans et al. , eda, locj.cit.
(62)	Nishijima, Kishi, et al. , op. cit. , p. 414.
(63)	Brugmans, et al. , eda, op. cit, , p. 589.
(64)	Yamin, ed. , op. cit, , pp. 187-210, 214.30
"citizens shall be native Indonesians and those of other races who are con-
firmed as citizens by law." (65) But this clearly meant that the assimilation -
ist forces, as represented by Liem Koen Hian for the Chinese and P. F.
Dahler for the Eurasians, had lost their battle for the automatic inclusion
of their minority groups as Indonesian citizens. The formula effectively put
off any final decision on this question till after independence.
The religious problem was perhaps the most delicate that the B. P.
K. I. had to face. The Islamic members pressed for a full and strong recog-
nition of their religion in the Constitution. This would have involved not
only the power interests of the Islamic elite, but also assured the superior
legal status of Islamic law (hukum) in the new state. However the demands
of this group were strongly resisted by most of the other members of the
Committee. Debate became particularly sharp over the important phrase
of the draft Preamble, already quoted: "the obligation to carry out the com-
mandments of Islam for all its adherents?" The Islamic group was very
dissatisfied with the vagueness and ambiguity of this commitment. It was
not clear whether the obligation was legally binding or merely 'moral,' a
serious political principle or rhetorical phrase-mongering. It was equally
unclear just who were "adherents,"whether the phrase covered all nominal
Moslems (perhaps 90% of the population) or only those who proclaimed
their personal commitment to Islam. The dialogue between the Moslem
group and their antagonists became highly acrimonious. It was only by dint
of Soekarno's personal persuasion and diplomacy that the Islamic leaders
were induced to accept the phrase. (66) Asa sop to Islamic sentiment,
it was agreed that by Constitutional provision, any future President of
(65)	Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , p. 267; also ibid. , pp. 242-250, 344-356.
(66)	Ki Bagus Hadikusumo commented that the phrase implied special duties
for Moslems. There would be thus one law for the nationalists and one
for the followers of Islam. This would only lead to resentment and
anger in the country at large once it was known. Furthermore, there
would certainly be Moslems in the national government; yet how were
these Moslems to carry out the commandments of Islam if, as the
nationalists proposed, the Government was to avoid all religious com-
mitments. Soekarno replied that if the phrase were left out, it would
look as if no recognition was being given to Islam in the Constitution.
Clearly this would have embarrassed the secular nationalists. Hadi-
kusumo was attempting to use this card to force the nationalists to
concede Islam a greater role. Abikusno finally stepped forward to
convince the opposition. He said that he of course as a Moslem "natur-
ally . . . would ask for what Mr. Hadikusumo hopes for. But we have
made a compromise . . . and, as the Chairman has said, we must give
and take. For the sake of unity, let it never appear to the outside
world that we have conflicted in our interpretation in this case."
Cf. Yamin, ed. , op. cit., pp. 282-284, 371-376.
MM&M>	«ΗΜΜΜΜΜΜ F	Λ A	*31
Indonesia would have to be a Moslem. This however was a purely nomi-
nal concession since the political facts of life in Indonesia would ensure
that any future President would be some sort of Moslem, the nub of the
question being what sort--"committed,: or indifferent. And the ’constitu-
tional provision’ was silent on this point. (67) There is no doubt that
the Islamic group on the B. P. K. I. were upset over the Committee’s deci-
sion, and a Japanese source comments that the formula, when made public,
aroused considerable hostility both among the nationalist youth and Indo-
nesians from the outer islands, (68) as a vague and unsatisfactory com-
promise.
The political structure of the future Indonesian republic, as pro-
posed to the B. P. K, I. , was apparently largely the work of Soekarno,
Yamin, Soepomo andSoebardjo, three of whom were later to become promi-
nent figures in the first post-independence Cabinet. The draft Constitution
was designed to create a highly centralized and powerful state. Proposals
for a federal structure of government were voted down overwhelmingly.
The main feature of the government itself was to be an extremely author-
itative and independent executive, not responsible to any legislature but
rather to a huge People’s Deliberative Assembly (Μ. P. R. or Madjelis
Permusjawaratan Rakjat), meeting once every five years, (69) The
President would be elected by this Assembly by majority vote, and was
not restricted to one term of office. (70) There would also be a tradi-
tional type of legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat or People’s Repre-
sentative Council). But it would play a quite subordinate role, though
sitting in a body within the Μ. P. R. when that Assembly convened. The
legislature would have few claims on the President, while he would have
an absolute veto on any action it might take. (71) Moreover the President
was to have wide emergency powers, whose assumption and duration he
alone had the right to determine. Although any regulation issued by the
President during an emergency could be revoked by the Dewan Perwakilan
Rakjat (D. P. R. ) at its next session, the President alone decided when
such a session could be held. Suggestions that democracy might be served
by making the Cabinet Ministers responsible to the D. P. R. were decisively
rejected. The Cabinet would be selected by and answerable to the Presi-
dent alone. (72) A High Court was to supervise an independent judiciary
without, however, having any powers of judicial review.
After a good deal of discussion it was also agreed not to include
a bill of rights in the Constitution. It was felt that articles of this kind
(67)	Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , pp. 391-393. See also pp. 386f. for Hadiku-
sumo's strongly worded final statement.
(68)	Brugmans et al. , eds, op. cit. , pp. 589f.
(69)	See Chapter II of the Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, as quoted in
Yamin, ed, op. cit. , p. 287
(70)	See Chapter III, Articles 6 and 7, as quoted ibid.
(71)	See Chapter I7II, as quoted in Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , pp. 30f.
(72)	See Chapter V, as quoted ibid.32
smacked of 'liberalism* and 'capitalistic individualism', and as such were
contrary to the principles of gotong-rojong (mutual co-operation) and the
organic unified state. Yet largely on the insistence of Hatta, certain parti-
cular rights, such as the freedoms of assembly, association and speech,
would be "provided for by law." They would thus not be matters of indivi-
dual right, but moral obligations assumed voluntarily by the state. (73)
Finally on the subject of political parties, there seems to have been
some warm debate. Reportedly Soekarno took a position strongly opposed
to any organizations which at that stage at least threatened the unified and
organized power of the new nation. (74) Accordingly, no mention of parties
was included in the final draft of the Constitution accepted by the Committee.
(73)	See Article 28, as quoted in Yamin, ed., op. cit., p. 32, and, for
the debate on these matters, pp. 287 - 3 00,—314-^15.
(74)	Cf. Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit. , p. 414. No mention of this
problem is made in Yamin, e"d?, op. cit. See also Beknopt overzicht
van de onaflaankelykheidsbewegingin Post-Indie, a memo submitted
to Rear-Admiral Patterson on September 26, Γ945 by Rear-Admiral
Maeda, p. 2, where Maeda says that the lessons derived from the
frustrations of nationalism through factionalism in the colonial period,
now provided a powerful incentive to the centralized co-ordination of
all revolutionary forces.33
CHAPTER III
CHANGING JAPANESE POLICIES, JUNE-JULY 1945
Throughout the summer of 1945 the Japanese military position
deteriorated rapidly. Already in April, the new Suzuki Government had
resigned itself to ultimate defeat probably late in the year, and was
casting about desperately for means to alleviate the coming catastrophe.
By July the Government had been forced by the progress of the Allied
armies to make a final decision with regard to the eventual fate of Indo-
nesia. On July 16th, the commanders of the various Southern Territories
had already been warned informally that a final Supreme War Council
meeting on the problem was imminent. They were also given a resume
of the decisions the Council would probably take. The Vice-Minister for
War and the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the local
commanders that the greatest care would have to be taken to ensure that
independence "would be handled in a way that would enable the Supreme
War Council's political objectives to be realized." The provisional date
for independence would probably be some time in September, but the
actual date in any one area would depend largely on the initiative of the
commander in that area, and the timing of the expected Allied attacks.
There were also assurances that the remaining differences between the
Army and the Navy would finally be resolved. (75) The Supreme War
Council convened on July 17th, and their decisions followed the course
outlined in the unofficial instructions of the 16th. The central concern of
the Conference was how to secure a solid base for the 16th and 25th
Armies’ defence of Malaya and Indonesia against an anticipated Allied
assault. Accordingly, the local commanders in the area were now re-
quested to notify Tokyo of their own views as to the timing for independence
in each of their areas, though, as previously mentioned, the Council had
provisionally settled on September, at least for Java. (76)
In response to these instructions, which were approved by the
Japanese Cabinet on July 21st, a third regional military conference was
held in Singapore on July 27th, under the chairmanship of General Itagaki.
The meeting was attended by representatives from the military administra-
tions in Java, Sumatra, Malaya and the Naval Territories, as well as a
(75)	Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit. , p. 419.
(76)	Cf. Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op; cit., p. 419. Also Aziz, op. cit. ,
pp. 246ff. , for further details.34
group of staff officers sent down from Saigon. (77) At this brief meeting
it was finally decided not to include Malaya along with the former Dutch
colonial territory in the new Indonesian nation, and to schedule independence
definitely for early September. Draft plans for the actual transfer of auth-
ority were worked out, ready to be used when Tokyo gave the final signal. (78)
However the local commanders and their representatives, though expressing
themselves as confident about handling the details of carrying out an ’inde-
pendence program’, said that they would prefer if possible for the formal
legal beginnings to be made in Tokyo. (This request was shortly after-
wards rejected by Tokyo, which ordered those on the spot to do everything
in their power to make independence look like a spontaneous Indonesian
creation not a product ’made in Japan’. ) (79) The regional conference also
decided that the time had come to create a Committee for the Preparation of
Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia-P. P. K. I. )
to make final arrangements for the transfer of power from the Japanese to
the Indonesian leadership. The announcement of this Committee’s estab-
lishment would be made all over the Indies on August 7th. Its membership
would be drawn from the entire Indonesian territory, proportionately to
population. The Committee would then proceed to work under general in-
structions from Terauchi in Saigon and under the immediate supervision of
Itagaki in Singapore. It would hold its first meeting on August 18th, and
would use the recommendations of the B. P. K. I. as the basis of its discus-
sions. (80) But though independence was ostensibly to be applied to the
whole of Indonesia as a unit, supplementary instructions made it clear
that it was in fact to be granted provisionally only to ’’major areas.” "Those
areas not yet ready for assimilation” would be incorporated into the new
nation at a later date. (81) By leaving the nature of "major areas" unde-
fined, the Japanese of course retained the initiative and left themselves an
’out’ in the case of unexpected eventualities. On August 2nd, a further set
of instructions was issued from Marshal Terauchi’s headquarters, con-
firming the plans laid down at the July 27th Conference, and assigning now
a definite date, September 7th, for Independence. Certain subsidiary stip-
ulations governing the relations between the Imperial Government and the
new nation were also appended. The most important of these were:
a) the Imperial Government would "recognize" the Indonesian
Government at once.
(77)	For a list of those attending, see the Statement of Nishimura of May
31-June 6, 1946, p. 3.
(78)	Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit., p. 420. Also Statement of Nishi-
mura of May 31-June 6, 1946, p. 3, and his Statement of April 10,
1947, p. 10.
(79)	Nishijima, Kishi et al. , loc. cit.
(80)	Statement of Nishimura, April 10, 1947, p. 10.
(81)	Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit. , p. 429.35
b)	Indonesia would be required to declare war immediately
on Britain, Holland and the United States.
c)	For the time being, the commander of the 16th Army on
Java would act as Japanese Ambassador, though there
would also be a special Minister attached who would be
a military officer on active duty. (82)
d)	The Indonesian Government would temporarily have to
maintain a number of Japanese military officers on its
staff either with official appointments or in an advisory
capacity.
e)	There would be no ’extraterritoriality’, but Japanese
property rights would be treated on the basis of the
status quo.
f)	For the immediate future, ’’the Imperial Government
will exercise guidance over Indonesia’s relations with
third nations.” (83)
Agreement was reached among the Commanders of the various areas of
Indonesia that the four guiding Advisors to the new government would be
the Chiefs of Military Administration of Sumatra, Java and the Naval
Territory, and Admiral Mae da. (84)
On the eve of the destruction of Hiroshima, the overall lines of
Japanese policy towards Indonesia were thus reasonably clear. The
Japanese authorities were well aware from reports they had been getting
from Java and elsewhere that nationalist sentiment was rising fast. They
generally believed that Japanese influence had been strong enough to make
sure that this nationalism was deeply anti-Western. Asa consequence
two rough stages of development seem to have been envisioned. In the
short run, in the event of an Allied invasion of the islands, this national
feeling could be counted upon to bolster an effective Japanese defence of
the area. And with luck, providing that the war continued at least until
December, a fully-fledged Indonesian state would have been created be-
fore the war came to an end. The Allies would find an unpleasant sur-
prise awaiting them on their arrival. A regime would have been created
owing a deep material and psychological debt to the Japanese, and with
no reason to expect anything but merciless hostility from the Allies, es-
(82)	Ibid. , p.420. On August 9th, an Ambassadorship was created. The
Ambassador was to be responsible for diplomatic negotiations, and the
protection of Japanese citizens and their commercial rights. The Mil-
itary Commander was merely then to complement in the Ambassador’s
work in matters of internal and external security. They were sup-
posed to work in the closest harmony.
(83)	Nishijima, Kishi et al., loc. cit. Clearly ’’independence” was going to
be quite limited 2
(84)	Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit. , p. 429.36
pecially the Dutch. The essence of this strategy was timing. The Japanese
had to have two or three months to consolidate the Indonesian administrative
structure and political authority, so that the Allies could be effectively re-
sisted when they landed. However these calculations were abruptly annulled
by the annihilation of Hiroshima. From August 6th onwards, events began to
move beyond Japanese control. (85)
Meanwhile in Indonesia too the situation was developing rapidly. On
the official level a Committee similar to the B. P. K, I. was set up on Sum-
atra as of July 25th. It was headed by Mshammad Sjafe’i, previously chair-
man of the Sumatran Central Advisory Council. (86) But though it did succeed
(85) Cf. Anonymous Japanese Officer, Beschouwingen over de algemene en
financiele voorbereiding van der Indonesische Onafhankelijkheidsbewe-
ging door de Japaners, June 21-23, 1947, p. 4. Also E. Brunsveld
van Hulten, Rapport over de Japansche Invloede op de Merdekabeweging
en de Gebeurtenissen in ge Augustdagen, July 24, 1946, pp. 2f. It is
possible also that some Japanese had an eye to the postwar world,
where Japan would benefit by having a major Southeast Asian country
favorably disposed towards it.
p. 121. Its membership included:
isan
(86) Cf. Kahin, op. cit.,
Appointed members:
..feb^rTjbet''fia.
Tengkoe Hasbi
Radja Kalimsah Sinaga
Hadji Abdoel Azis
A. R. Soetan Mansjoer
Dr. Moehammad Djamil
Sjamsoeddin
Moehammad Jasin
Tjikmat
Ir. Ibrahim
Soetan Rahim Pasaman
Makalan
Oen Lam Sing
Elected:
Moehammad Sjafe’i (W. Sumatra)
Tengkoe Damrah (E. Sumatra)
Toekoe NjakArif (Atjeh)
Aminoedin (Riau)
Abdoel Manan (Djambi)
Dr. A. K. Gani (Palembang)
Radja Pa gar Alam (Lampung)
Abdoel Radjak (Palembang)
There was one other unnamed member. The Vice-Chairmen were
Abdoel Abas and Teukoe Njak Arif. See Djawa Ba roe, HI, #15,
(July 15, 1945), p. 6. See also Statement of Klajor-General Fumie
Shimura, June 13, 1946, p. 3.
Teukoe Moehammad Ali
Tengkoe Othman
Dr. R. Pirngadi
H. Abdoel Malik Karim Amroellah
Radja Saoel Loembantobing
Datoek Perpatih Baringek
Rangkaja Moehammad Djamil
Ir. Indera Tjahaja
K. Η. T jik Wan
Mr. Abdoel Abas
Abdoel Katab
Tji Hoa Tjiong
Chatib Soeleiman (E. Sumatra)
Teukoe Moehammad Daoed
Broeeh /Beureuh?7 (Atjeh)
Dr. Ferdinand Loembantobing
(Tapanuli)
Soetan Sori Pada Moelia (Tapanuli)
Masarlif (Bangka-Billiton)
Abdoellah (Bengkoelen)37
in holding one meeting from June 21st to July 2nd, it was insignificant for
all practical purposes. From June 18th to June 21st, the eighth and final
meeting of the Central Advisory Council on Java was held. On this occa-
sion the Council exhibited an increasingly independent attitude on its 'sug-
gestions. ’ It urged that all existing organizations on Java be abolished
and absorbed into a new unitary movement, in which--and this was a sig-
nificant change--important posts would be assigned to youth leaders and
officers of the Peta corps, (87) on the ground that "they are so well-
known among the people. " (88) The Council also asked for: a speedy
expansion of the Peta and other para-military organizations in prepara-
tion for Allied landings; the rapid transfer of administrative posts to In-
donesian hands; and the further recruitment of young Indonesians into de-
partments of government, state enterprises, and provincial administrations,
(87)	The Peta (Pembala Tanah Air--Defenders of the Fatherland) was a Jap-
anese-trained volunteer corps of young Indonesians. Though the officers
were Indonesians, Japanese N. C„ O.s were usually attached to each unit
as trainers, advisors, and spies. The higher ranks of the Peta were of-
ten filled with non-military politicians who also held political posts in the
Djawa Hookookai. Below the battalion and company level however, the
Indonesian recruits were given a thorough professional training. For an
interesting account of the conflicts between the Japanese and Indonesians
within the Peta, see S. M. Gandsubrata, An Account of the Japanese Oc-
cupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to August Ϊ9^5ζ
Data Paper #10, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern
Studies, Cornell University, 1953, p. 19. For an account of the Peta
from the Japanese side see Brugmans, et al. , eds. , op. cit. s p. 536.
(Statement of Lieut.-General Yoshiro Nagano). Cf. also the interesting
Statement of Captain Kiso Tsuchiya of the Beppan (Nanseitai), Military
Intelligence, l6thArmy, April 3-8, 1947, pp. 2-4. He gives 33,000
men in the Peta (cf. Brugmans, et al. , eds. , be. cit., for a figure of
35, 853, and Aziz, op. cit. , p. 230, for one of 37, 000). He reports
that on Java there were usually two Japanese officers and five or six
N„ C. O.s attached to every battalion of 500 men. There were 66 bat-
talions on Java, requiring from 330 to 400 Japanese officers to look
after them. The general headquarters for the organization was in
Bandung. There were also four subordinate district headquarters,
each staffed with Indonesian and Japanese officers under a Japanese .
colonel. The Bandung Headquarters made use of about 40 men including
a few Javanese.
The Beppan (or Nanseitai after April 1945) seems to have been a mil-
itary intelligence organization at first, but got involved later, perhaps
in December 1944, in active defence preparations. It operated under
Colonel Obana who was attached to the staff of the 16th Army. The
Beppan seems to have had the main responsibility for training the Peta.
However, according to Tsuchiya, the line of command to the Peta did
not always run directly from the 16th Army headquarters through
Bandung to the district headquarters. The policy-controlling bureau
for the Peta in Djakarta, the Giyugun Shidobu, was often in direct com-
munication with the district headquarters.
(88)	Statement of Mr. Sartono, Djawa Baroe.III, # 13, (July 1, 1945), p. 7.38
to train them for positions of leadership in the young Republic. (89)
Without going into the reasons, which will be discussed later, it is still
important to note the great stress laid at this meeting on the role of the
youth and its "military” organizations in a Council dominated by elderly
bureaucrats and nationalist revolutionaries of twenty years standing or
more. It was a sign of a change in the focus of conflict in Indonesian poli-
tics that set in at about this time. The main struggle was increasingly to
take place between youth groups (and other semi-legal organizations), and
the Japanese, with the older leaders temporarily assuming a less promi-
nent role.
The Japanese ignored most of these requests, except those con-
cerned with the expansion of military and para-military bodies. They had
made their plans and these did not for the time being envisage a free hand
being given to undisciplined 'young rowdies' who might well turn popular
hostility against the Japanese themselves, rather than the Allies, if they
were not kept under firm control.
The Japanese military strategy for the defence of Java was, how-
ever, one in which an expanded indigenous 'army' was essential. They
had discovered from earlier island campaigns the terrible cost of fighting
the Allies with their superior fire-power and air support, on the beach-
heads. Their revised strategy was therefore to have a three-tiered coastal
defence. The outer ring, nearest the coast, and including the major cities,
was to consist largely of Indonesian auxiliary forces. These would bear
the brunt of the Allies' opening onslaught. Behind them would stand a
secondary line of Japanese troops, strategically placed to control the units
in front of them, and prevent any attempts to collaborate with the Allies.
This secondary line would be concentrated on the perimeter of Java's
massif central, with local headquarters at Bandung, Solo, Malang, Madiun,
etb.· to maintain this line, a steady movement of supplies, arms and cur-
rency was set under way in the summer of 1945 into these upland depots,
out of the main areas where the Allies might attack. Finally, high up in
the hills, there would be a group of Japanese and Indonesians specially
trained in the techniques of sabotage and prolonged guerilla warfare. The
general expectation was that fighting between the enemy and the Peta on
the shoreline would fire the whole population behind the anti-Allied cause.
The hard core of Japanese regular troops would defend the almost impreg-
nable mountainous heart of Java. If and when the Allies finally crushed
them, the guerillas would remain a running sore on the body of the victor-
ious Dutch or Allied administration. This should ensure "no peace in Java"
(89) Djawa Baroe, III, # 13, (July 1, 1945), p. 9.39
for some time to come. (90)
To complement this military strategy» the Japanese Army decided
to try to set up a new all-inclusive national movement. According to a
Government Announcement of July 2nd» this movement would be called the
New People’s Movement (Gerakan Rakjat jang Ba roe - G R. B. ), and would
be based on the principles of the Pantja Dharma and the (now moribund)
New Life Movement. (91) Its membership was to be determined by four
men: Soekarno, Hatta (secular nationalists)» Wachid Hasjim (Moslem)
and R. A. A. Wiranatakusuma (Prijaji administrator). The Gunseikan
added that the youth would be expected to take part in the work of the
movement» but» it was implied» would confine itself to village propaganda
activities and para-military training. (92)
The four leaders then proceeded to select an 80-man Preparatory
and Organizational Committee» which included 4 Chinese» 1 Eurasian,
1 Arab» and 8 Japanese» including» significantly enough» a member of
the all-powerful General Affairs Department. The P eta was for the
first time given official representation in a national body» in the persons
of Kasman Singodimedjo and Abdul Kadir, then the top Peta officers in
Djakarta. (93) A number of youth representatives were also included
(90)	See Anonymous Japanese Officer» Beschouwingen... » op. cit. pp. 4-6
Cf. also Oemar Bachsan, Peta dan JPeristiwa Rengasdengklok, N„ V»
’’Melati Bandung·’» Bandung» no date» passim. Figures for the Jap-
anese Army on Java are uncertain» but cf. Beschouwingen..., p. 31»
for an estimate of 70» 000» and 40» 000 on Sumatra. In Djakarta,
according to the Statement of Captain Tsuchiya» April 3-8» 1947, p. 6,
there were two P eta battalions» or in other words» approximately
1» 000 men.
(91)	See Kan Po» #70» (July 10» 1945), p. 19, for the inauguration of this
movement. The Pantja Dharma was a set of Five Duties to the Jap-
anese Empire accepted by the sixth session of the G. A. C. See Kan
Po, # 55s, ( November 25» 1944)» p. 17. Essentially" the duties were
to fight fervently for Dai Nippon Teikoku and to devote all energies
to the upbuilding of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
They were» incidentally, an adaptation for Indonesian use of a tradi-
tional set of Japanese political commandments.
(92)	Kan Po, #70, (July 10» 1945), p. 19. Also Pakpahan, op. cit.»pp. 129f.
(93) The members of this Committee were:
£*Ir. Soekarno
*R. A. A. Wiranatakoesoema
$*Mr. J. Latuharhary
$*Mr. R. M. Sartono
£*R. Abikusno Tjokrosujoso
$B. P. A. Soerjodiningrat
£*R. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto
*R. Μ. T.A. Soerjo
£*Drs. Mohammad Hatta
£*K. H. Mas Mansoer
(*Mr. Alexander Ma rami s
£*R. Oto Iskandardinata
*Moenandar
$*Ki Bagus Hadikusumo
£*K. H. Abdoel Halim
*R. Pandji Singgih40
probably because the Japanese wanted to keep them out in the open where
they could be watched. It is significant that many of them were to become
very prominent in the early days of the Revolution, and almost all were
strongly anti-Japanese in outlook. (94)
However, apparently to avoid future misunderstanding and trouble,
the head of the General Affairs Department, General Nishimura, handed
the four top leaders a nine-point statement elucidating the scope and role
(93) (cont’d)
*M. Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo
*R. Abdulrahim Pratalykrama
R. Kasman Singodimedjo
cMr. R. M. Soemanang
£*Wachid Hasjim
i*Mr. Muhammad Yamin
£*K. R. Μ. T. Woer janingrat
£*R. Pandji Soeroso
*Hadji A. Sanoesi
Soeprapto
£*Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat
Soeradiredja
*Mr R. Hindromartono
@B. M. Diah
@Asmara Hadi
@R. M. Harsono Tjokroaminoto
Dr. Mas Moewardi
@Adam Malik
@Nj. Trimurty
*Nj. Mr. Maria Ulfah Santoso
£#Oey Tiang Tjoei
£*P. F. Dahler
Mr. R. Ali Sastroamidjojo
Jozef Hasan
@Wikana
R. Soewirjo
Nj. Emma Poeradiredja
£*Oei Tjong Hauw
*Abdoel Kadir
*K. H. Masjkoer
Soetardji
Aboe
*Dr, Bnntaran Martoatmodjo
£* *Ki Hadjar Dewantoro
£*R. Roeslan Wongsokusumo
*Mr. A. Soebardjo
*Hadji Agoes Salim
A roetoho
Dr. Mas Moerdjani
*Ir. P. Mohammad Noor
Zainoel A rifin
@Chaeroel Saleh
@Soediro
@Soepeno
Chalid Rasjidi
@Soetomo
*Nj. Soenarjo
*Dr. Soekiman
*Liem Koen Hian
£*A. Baswedan
J. Jahja
@Soekarni
Soediro
@Pandoe Kartawigoena
*K. R. Μ. T. Wongsonegoro
Opposite the names above, $ means 'member of the C. A. C. ', * means
'member of the B. P, K. I. ' and @ means 'youth representative'. See
A sia Raya, July 4, 1945, p. 1. Also Indonesia Merdeka, I, # 6,(July
Iff, 1945), p. 7, for the names of the Japanese members, and that of
Wongsonegoro, omitted from the list in Asia Raya.
(94) For more information on the youth representatives, see Chapter IV,
below, especially in their relation to the G. R. B.41
of the new organization. He warned the leaders against "continuing dis-
cord", and at the same time specifically reserved command over youth
organizations for the official governmental apparatus. Though the youth
leaders might be given representation on the Preparatory Committee,
their organizations would continue to be controlled by older appointees of
the Gunseikan, assisted by Japanese "experts." (95) On July 27th, the
names of the 15 members of the G. R. B. 's executive council were announced.
They included 5 secular nationalists of various types (Soekarno, Hatta, R.
Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, R. Oto Iskandardinata, Dr, Moewardi), 3 Islamic
representatives (Wachid Hasjim, Nj. Soenarjo Mangoenpoespito and Mr.
Moehammad Roem, the latter acting for the Hizboe’llah), 1 delegate
apiece for the Seinendan and Keibodan, (96) 1 for the Peta (Abdoel Kadir),
1 prijaji administrator (R. A. A. Wiranatakoesoema), as well as Dr.
Abdoel Rachman Saleh and Soepeno (youth groups?) and Mr. Subardjo.
Soekarno was elected Chairman, with Dr. Doeharto as his secretary. (97)
Pakpahan claims that many meetings of the new Executive Council
were held without the knowledge or participation of the Japanese. (98)
Aziz however adds that lack of harmony among the leadership, their at-
tempts to insert "republican" phraseology into governmental regulations,
and their open discussion of "forms of government" so annoyed the Japan-
ese that the movement "had to disappear." (99) Whether this was in fact
the case or not, the G. R. B. was unlikely to amount to much as long as
the Djawa Hookookai and the Masjumi, its largest components were not
effectively integrated. And to the end of the occupation the Moslem or-
ganization managed to retain its own separate identity.
(95)	Indonesia Merdeka, I, # 6, (July 10, 1945), pp. 6ff. See also
Benda, op. cit. , pp. 192f.
(96)	The Seinendan was a youth corps for ethnic Indonesians between the
ages of 14 and 25, who were trained in elementary military training,
fire prevention, and air-raid defence. They were also given ex-
tensive physical education and instruction in the Japanese language.
The corps’ most promising members were given heavy Japanese
militarist indoctrination, and were often promoted into the Peta
officers’ class. The Keibodan was a similar ’boy scout’ youth
association, perhaps numbering as many as 1, 280, 000 young men.
Cf. Aziz, op. cit. , pp. 224-230; Benda, op. cit., p. 252, n. 34;
and Japanese Report about Indo-auxiliary troops, R. V. O., 006501-
006f>Db,.'<50"6527 as"' cited in Aziz, ibid. , p. 250.
(97)	Cf. Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, # 15, (August 1, 1945), p. 2.
(98)	Pakpahan, op. cit. , p. 136.
(99)	Aziz, op. cit. , p. 244; cf. also Benda, op. cit. , p. 193. See be-
low, Chapter IV.42
One other indication of the general tendency of the Japanese in this
period to lean to the side of the "older' leaders, was the continuing trend
towards the transfer of high governmental posts to Indonesians in this
group. R. A. A. Wiranatakoesoema was appointed head of the Local Admin
istration Division, Dr. Boentaran Martoatmodjo of the Health Division,
Ki Hadjar Dewantoro of the Educational Division (all within the Interior
Affairs Department) and Ir. Soerachman Tjokroadisoerjo of the Economic
Affairs Department. (100) As we have already noted, Dr. Samsi was now
Sanyo to the Finance Department, and Dr. Soepomo held the same position
within the Justice Department. These appointments were symptomatic of
the steady rise of Indonesians within the bureaucracy, and were part of
an emerging pattern of dual authority, created in preparation for the
transfer of power.
(100) For these appointments, see Kan Po, # 71, (July 25, 1945) pp. 19f.43
CHAPTER IV
YOUTH GROUPS, ILLEGAL GROUPS AND THE MASSES,
TO THE SURRENDER
There can be little doubt that the Japanese Occupation was a
•traumatic' experience to a great many Indonesians. The initial reaction
to the Japanese invasion had been in many quarters enthusiastic. The
Japanese had been welcomed as delivering Indonesia from Dutch colonial-
ism. But the sudden and complete collapse of Dutch power had more sig-
nificant long-term results, leaving aside the special characteristics of
Japanese military rule. The seclusion of the top echelons of the Dutch
administrative apparatus in internment camps meant that a large number
of Javanese who had previously held subordinate administrative posts had
suddenly to be promoted. But at the same time, the actual prestige of
such administrative positions was sharply reduced, both as a result of a
deliberate early Japanese policy of humiliating the pamong pradja class,
(101) and as an inevitable consequence of their identification in the popu-
lar mind with the previous regime. The new positions may therefore
have been regarded by those who held them in a somewhat ambiguous
light. Forced to assume unprecedented responsibilities, yet without real
authority or great prestige, the pamong pradja as a group suffered a
severe decline in morale, though doubtless their practical experience
and competence was widened by the new duties they had to undertake. (102)
Their standing within the Indonesian community can scarcely have been
raised by their direct responsibility for two of the most hated aspects of
the Japanese economic system: the forced deliveries of rice, and the re-
cruitment of Romusha labour. The occupation thus seems to have been
marked by a steady breaking up of traditional social relationships and
hierarchies, at least partly as the result of deliberate Japanese policy.
New elites, also encouraged by the Japanese, assumed an importance un-
paralleled in Dutch times. And there was every indication that the greater
the autonomy Indonesia gained, the stronger the position of the more speci
fically political elements (particularly the Moslem and secular nationalist
leaders) would become. There is good reason then to suspect that the
(101)	See Gandasubrata, op. cit. , passim. , for the perspective of a mem
ber of this class on Japanese administrative policy, and on the
changing position of (in his case) the Regent in wartime Indonesia.
(102)	Cf. some comments by three Indonesians on this question, as cited
in Brugmans, etal, op. cit. , pp. 159-161.44
more conservative members of the pamong pradja were at least ambivalent
about the whole concept of Independence and the future it promised, (103)
The Islamic and secular nationalist elites of course experienced the
effects of the occupation rather differently. The arrival of the Japanese en-
hanced their social and political prestige, and mass organizations like the
Djawa Hookookai and the Masjumi enabled them to build a kind of popular
underpinning for themselves which they had never been able to do during
the later Dutch period. For the first time many of them were given oppor-
tunities to exercise ’responsible' administrative functions, although
'oppositional' residues, acquired through years of Dutch repression, in
some cases persisted. Those who had had a more extensive Western-style
education tended, with some notable exceptions, to be psychologically un-
attracted by if not contemptuous of the methods and personnel of the Mili-
tary administration. Others rapidly turned strongly anti-Japanese, but
were more lastingly affected by Japanese attitudes and working-styles.
But perhaps it was at the lowest level of Javanese society (104)
that the occupation had its most revolutionary effects. A vast disruption
of village life, already unsettled during the later Dutch period, was set
in motion. The autarchic policies of the Japanese Army, and the growing
disruption of trans-Java communications, had disastrous consequences.
Smuggling became widespread, both within Java, and beyond to Sumatra
and Singapore, often as an indispensable condition of staying alive. (105)
The ineffectiveness of Japanese countermeasures, and in some areas their
open connivance, did nothing to diminish popular dislike for the 'barbarian'
invaders. The drafting of the Romushas imposed a serious drain on the
village economy. (106) The decline or diversion of textile production led
to severe clothing shortages. Forced deliveries of rice had the same
effect on food supplies in many areas. Inflation, fostered by irresponsible
Japanese financial policies, pressed hard on the urban communities. A
greatly accelerated rate of movement into the larger cities from the country
(103)	Cf. the obviously bitter comments of"Javanicus"in Brugmans, ed. ,
op. cit. , pp. 159f. , who speaks of "upstart" young men from the
Keibodan and other youth organizations intimidating local officials.
He also notes the breakdown of the old distinctions between "dorpers"
and "prijaji" (roughly "villagers" and "aristocrats") caused by Japan-
ese centralization and militarization of the bureaucracy, as well as
promotion policies by which inexperienced Japanese "favorites"
secured positions traditionally reserved for the prijaji.
(104)	Javanese, of course, in the geographical not the ethnic sense.
(105)	Cf. above, footnote 25.
(106)	For the Romushas, see above, footnote 23. The removal of the
Romushas often involved a transformation of the family division of
labour, with the women assuming new roles.45
side was stimulated by Japanese educational training programs, youth or-
ganizations, propaganda and the declining prospects and attractions of vil-
lage life. Nor were the cities in any condition to absorb this great migra-
tion. Traditional social structures and attitudes of deference were shaken
by the Japanese treatment of established local notables, and the unprece-
dented attention paid to the youth. (107)
There is reason to believe that rural unrest in many areas had its
origins in the last two decades of Dutch rule which helped to create a
sizeable dispossessed and marginal 'rural proletariat. ’ The ferocity of
the Japanese and the speed of the changes they introduced unleased long-
suppressed dissatisfaction, hatred and other anomic and revolutionary
impulses. On the positive side, the elaborate systems built up by the
Japanese to mobilize popular energies and enthusiasm for the war effort
through nationalist symbols did much to canalize the general unrest and
give it a definite objective. Admiral Maeda himself compared the situ-
ation in Java in 1944-45 with that in Banten just prior to the Communist
revolt in 1926-27, adding that the revolutionary forces were now a
thousand times greater and a thousand times more conscious of themselve:
and their aims. (108) The opportunities afforded to such leaders as
Soekarno and Hatta, on the orders of the Gunseikan, to arouse nationalist
sentiment by radio addresses and personal tours through Java and in the
outer islands, were effectively seized to give ’specific’ ideological
channels to these revolutionary forces. Moreover, the Djawa Hookookai,
which Soekarno headed, was able to reach down to the village level,
where it was organizationally linked to the Tonarigumi (or Neighbourhood
Associations). (109) It was thus able to create an organized framework
for the expression of strongly aroused nationalist (and anti-Japanese)
(107)	For example, these notables were often made to do gymnastics,
dig in the fields, wear unaccustomed and often undignified
clothing, etc. Cf. also Brugmans,etal, op. cit. , pp. 527f,
for the observations of a Javanese Regent, on the recruitment of
young schoolteachers and police officers into the higher ranks of
Peta. Apparently a battalion commander in the Peta was ac-
corded equal rank to a Regent (in the Dutch period, the highest
rank in the Indonesian side of the civil service).
(108)	See Beknopt overzicht van de onafhankelijkheidsbeweging in
Post-Indie, memorandum of Admiral Maeda to Rear-Admiral
Patterson, September 26, 1945, p. 3.
(109)	The Tonarigumi was a system of village organization imitated
from traditional Tokugawa practice. It was designed to work
as a two-way communications system between the government
and the villages, passing orders and propaganda down, and in-
telligence information up the administrative system. Cf.
Aziz, op. cit. , pp. 222-224. For an amusing Indonesian com-
ment, see the observations of a 17-year old girl cited in
Brugmans, et.aJ, op. cit. , p. 162.46
aspirations. (110) By 1945, for the first time in Indonesian history, there
were political organizations continuously and fairly effectively connecting
the rural family to the centres of political power and decision-making in
the capital.
However popular unrest only began to take on a definitely political
coloration on a broad scale in 1945. A number of outbursts and uprisings
had previously taken place against the Japanese, but they had been mostly
simple protests against the local exactions of particular military admini-
strators, or other Army officers. But by early 1945 a much wider poli-
ticization of the masses began to make itself felt, especially in the 'twi-
light zone' between the cities and the remote rural hinterland. The extent
and depth of this revolutionary transformation seems to have been seriously
underestimated by the major groups contending for power in Djakarta,
Japanese, 'older* leaders, youth leaders and 'resistance' groups alike.
Yet in the last analysis, it was the politicized masses that created the
Revolution, and brought about its final triumph against the calculations of
the returning Dutch, and of the outside world. Therefore, although much
space will be devoted from here on to a discussion of youth and 'resistance'
activities, the groundswell of revolutionary excitation among the masses
in 1945 should always be kept in mind. (Ill)
It is convenient to mark the opening of the new revolutionary period
of the Occupation by the revolt of the Peta garrison in Blitar (Kediri) in
February 1945. On the night of February 14-15th, Peta groups in Blitar
carried out a surprise attack on the munitions depot, and seized key points
within the city such as the headquarters of the Military Police and the tele-
phone exchange. (112) A sizeable number of Japanese military men and
local Chinese were massacred. According to the official report, not pub-
lished until two months later, the mutiny was led by a young officer named
Suprijadi, who had "mystical beliefs" and was resentful at not having been
promoted with his fellow-officers. (113) An Indonesian source claims that
though in fact Suprijadi was an ascetic and an "occultist," it was not this,
or any question of promotion, but the procuring of local girls for Japanese
(110)	Cf. Aziz, loc. cit.
(111)	The two most important uprisings prior to Blitar had occurred in
Tasikmalaja (March 1944) and Indramaju (September 1944). Cf.
also an interesting report contained in Brugmans,ebail., op. cit.,
p. 599; the author, an Indonesian, reporting to the Japanese author-
ities, notes the sudden rise early in 1945, of omens and signs of
impending calamity, observed by kampung seers and clairvoyants.
"Generally the people are awaiting critical developments. "
(112)	Aziz, op. cit., p. 228.
(113)	Cf. Kan Po, # 67, (May 25, 1945), pp. 10-14; Asia Raya, May 19,
1945, p. I; Pakpahan, op. cit., pp. 108f.47
officers by Chinese white-slavers» that had impelled him to revolt. But
the source adds significantly that "the spirit implanted by the Japanese
began to flare up in his heart and created resistance against his teachers."
(114)	The revolt itself was speedily crushed. Suprijadi himself disappeared,
and was probably secretly executed by the Japanese. All the other leaders
of the revolt were court-martialled. A number of high Indonesian civilian
officials and Peta officers were summoned to witness the trials. Among
these were Oto Iskandardinata, Kasman Singodimedjo, Mas Sudiro,
Abikusno, A. K. Muzakkir and Dr. Supomo. The presence of Abikusno
and Muzakkir» two prominent Islamic leaders seems to indicate that the
Japanese wished to involve all the three major elites in a general condem-
nation of such anti-Japanese actions» and to show that the punishment meted
out was not an act of Japanese vindictiveness, but was approved by Indo-
nesia’s most trusted leaders. When the future President Soekarno was
directed to speak on the affair, he skilfully avoided either condemning or
condoning the mutineers directly. He simply said that "possibly it will
have a damaging effect on the interests of Indonesia. " But he hoped the
generosity of the Japanese would induce the Government to mitigate the
sentences of those convicted. (115) The local prijaji officials were dis-
graced and forced to resign, and after an investigation carried on for some
weeks of the 68 accused, 8 were sentenced to death, (116) 12 were re-
leased and the rest received intermediary punishments. (117)
The Blitar revolt was certainly the most serious single attack on
Japanese authority during the Occupation. It must have been deeply dis-
turbing to the authorities, especially in view of the favoured treatment
that they had accorded to the Peta. It is therefore rather remarkable how
leniently (by Japanese standards) the offenders were dealt with. It is
reasonable to assume (and the lack of publicity given the affair seems to
confirm this) that the Japanese sensed that in the changing psychological
atmosphere oh Java, seyere repressions might only generate further re-
sistance. Certainly it is unlikely that the authorities would have acted
with such mildness a year before. Furthermore, as one Peta officer re-
cords it, Hs organization, which militarily speaking was an elite corps,
gradually came to see itself as the vanguard of revolutionary nationalism.
After early difficulties between commissioned and non-commissioned
officers (caused partly by the Japanese policy of filling the former group
with political appointees), began to subside, the local units of the Peta
developed an increasingly intense esprit de corps. (118) The various
(114)	Pakpahan, op. cit. , p. 109.
(115)	Ibid. » p. 110.
(116)	Two of these later had their sentences commuted.
(117)	Pakpahan, loc. cit.
(118)	Cf. Oemar Bachsan, op. cit., passim, but especially sections 3 and 7.48
para-military youth organizations» such as the Seinendan, Keibodan and
Heiho, although less highly trained, were infected with the same ppirit of
messianic revolutionary ardour. (119) Special corps such as the Barisan
Pelopor, (120) the Hizboe 'llah, and the Kamikaze-like Barisan Berani
Mati, were given special treatment and training on the best Japanese Patri-
ot Army model. As has been suggested before, the main body of these or-
ganizations was made up of young men and adolscents of little formal educa-
tion, who were enormously stimulated (often against the Japanese) by Jap-
anese propaganda, and in whom the patterns to be expected of the Japanese
military personality found an inevitable reflection. Xenophobia, radicalism,
strong comradely loyalty, authoritarianism, superb, if almost suicidal
courage, and a belief in salvation through direct action characterized all
these units to a greater or lesser extent. (121) The revolutionary elan
was not however confined to military and para-military formations. Under
the influence of the general popular unrest, and the sedulous proselytizing
of the "older" leaders as well as the para-military elements, the same
elan was rapidly communicated to the student populations of the larger
cities such as Djakarta, Surabaja, Bandung, Semarang and Jogjakarta.
There were also, particularly in Djakarta a number of "resistance'
or "underground" organizations operating clandestinely against the Japan-
ese. These organizations can be divided loosely into four main groups,
though there were people in each "underground" who acted as ’overlap* or
liaison members with the others. First there were the remnants of Amir
Sjarifuddin’s organization, which had largely disintegrated when the Jap-
anese arrested Amir early in 1943. (122) These were people mainly from
the more radical wing of the pre-war Gerindo, and from the "illegal P. K.
I. " (123) The second group, probably the most extensive by the summer
of 1945, was headed by Sutan Sjahrir. His organization, with the most
highly educated membership of the four, had branches in Tjirebon, Garut,
Semarang and Surabaja; in Tjirebon Dr. Sudarsono succeeded in setting up
an elaborate organization under the cover of a Japanese-sanctioned peasant
co-operative system. The organization's activities seem to have been con-
centrated on intelligence-gathering and surreptitious anti-Japanese propa-
gandizing. In close association with the Sjahrir group, and perhaps in
(119)	In these latter units, the Japanese "style" seems to have been more
influential. See Brugmans, etdj., op. cit., pp. 482f. , for an inter-
esting comparison between the Japanese military ethics of Bushido
and some aspects of Javanese tradition.
(120)	See footnote 26, above. Cf. also Brugmans,efedL» op. cit. , pp. 544ff.,
for some observations on the Hizboe ’llah, which may have had as
many as 50, 000 members by the end of the occupation; and Aziz, op.
cit., p. 230. It is hard to believe the Statement of Captain Kiso
Tsuchiya, p. 3, that the numbers went as high as 500, 000.
(121)	Maeda, Beknopt Overzicht ,,. , pp. 2f.
(122)	For the story of Amir’s arrest, see Pakpahan, op. cit. , pp. 97-99.
Cf. also Kahin, op. cit., pp. 11 If.
(123)	For this sectionlam almost wholly indebted to Kahin,op. cit., pp. 111-12049
some sense its ’junior partner’ was the Persatuan Mahasiswa (Student
Union) in Djakarta, consisting chiefly of students at the medical faculty
there. Its members were generally younger, less ’underground* and,
towards the end, more openly anti-Japanese in their attitudes and be-
haviour. Both the Sjarifuddin and the Sjahrir groups were opposed to the
Japanese regime on ideological (anti-fascist) as well as on nationalist
grounds. The other two ’underground’ organizations were perhaps less
ideological in their attitudes. One of these was the so-called Menteng 31
group, led by Chaerul Saleh, Sukarni, Adam Malik, Panduwiguna and
Maruto Nitimihardjo. A number of these leaders had been employed
in the Sendenbu (Department of Propaganda) and though they "resigned"
their posts in June 1945, (124) they remained somewhat apart from the
Sjahrir-Persatuan Mahasiswa group. Many of them had been given
ideological training at the Sendenbu-sponsored Asrama A ngkatan Baru
Indonesia, located at Menteng 31. (125) Asa result perhaps they were
more attuned to the psychology of the Peta officers and other para-
military groups, than to that of the Sjahrir group, though many of them
supposedly remained under Sjahrir's influence. (126) Their main or-
ganization was in Djakarta though reportedly they had close associations
with certain radical kiais in Banten. (127) The Japanese Military had
certainly seen that their greatest chance of stirring up strongly Japan-
ized anti-Western sentiment lay in capturing the allegiance of the younger
student groups who had been least under Western (Dutch) influence, and
could be expected to give an ideological lead to their non-university con-
temporaries. (128)
(124)	In fact they were removed by the Japanese. See Statement of Lieuten-
ant-Colonel Hisayoshi Adachi et al. , no date, p. 6. We shall see why
below.
(125)	Cf. Kahin, op. cit. , p. 113, Bachsan, op. cit. , section 7. (He men-
tions that Soekarno, Hatta, Yamin and Iwa Kusumasumantri were in-
vited to lecture there). See also for more details, Fakta dan Doku-
men2 untuk menjusun buku "Indonesia Memasuki Gelanggang Inter-
nasional", Subperiode: Kabinet Presiden Soekarno dari tenggal 17. 8.45
sampai "T4. 11,45 (from Periode ΙΪΙ-Dari Proklamasi Kemerdekaan ke
Pengakuan Kedaulatan, dari 17 Agustus 1$45 sampai achir Desember"
1950) Kementerian Penerangan, Direktorat V, Seksi Penjelidikan dan
Dokumentasi/Perpustakaan, Djakarta, June 1958, pp. 150-153. This
source notes that one of the most effective ways of spreading anti-
Japanese propaganda was by means of a travelling theatre company,
giving inflammatory performances in the kampungs.
(126)	Reportedly Sukarni, Maruto, Adam Malik and Panduwiguna were
former pupils of his.
(127)	Cf. Fakta dan Dokumen2,.,, , p. 152.
(128)	Ibid., p. 150, describes the assortment of betjak drivers, laborers,
schoolboys, drifters and students associated with this group.50
That this general classification of ’resistance’ groups is reasonably
accurate is partly borne out by the subsequent careers of the three ’groups’.
The faithful in Sjahrir’s group formed the nucleus of the post-independence
Partai Sosialis Indonesia, with its strongly Western orientation and disinclin
ation for organized state violence. Parts of the Sjarifuddin group eventually
formed an important component of the resurrected Communist Party. And
many members of the Menteng organization becamfe associated with the radi-
cal nationalism of the Partai Murba and its first leader Tan Malakka.
The fourth group centred around the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka (Inde
pendent Indonesia Training-school) set up by Admiral Kfaeda, but effectively
administered by his aides Shigetada Nishijima and Tomegoro Yoshizumi,
with Mr. Subardjo and Wikana as their chief Indonesian colleagues. Other
associates included Dr. Samsi, Dr. Buntaran Martoatmodjo, Mr. Latuhar-
hary, Dr, Katulangie, Iwa Kusumasumantri and Tadjoeddin Noer. (129)
The activities of this ’school’ have been fully discussed elsewhere. (130)
It is perhaps enough to say here that from October 1944 to July 1945 a small
group of young men aged from eighteen to twenty, specially selected by
Nishijima on the advice of his Indonesian intimates, were given extensive
instruction in a wide variety of subjects, but with particular emphasis on
so-called ’communism.’ In fact this ’communism’ seems to have been very
closely related to the ideology of an important group within the Japanese
Navy as a whole. (131) The dominant themes of the training given in the
Navy’s A srama were anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism (Western) and a
strong elitism. (132)
Kahin has discussed the various interpretations that have been put
upon this "Kaigun" (Naval) school. These fall into two main categories:
1) The school was used by the Japanese to train ’infiltrators’ who could
penetrate the Communist and near Communist undergrounds and either con-
trol them (and eventually perhaps direct them against the Allies) or split
them along pre-war lines (perhaps between the ’orthodox’ group and the
unorthodox ’nationalist-communist’ Tan Malakka group). The main objec-
tion to this interpretation is that it leaves unexplained the strong Army hos-
tility to this organization, supposing the group to be a genuinely anti-
(129)	Kahin, op. cit. , pp. 115-120. However Dr. Ratulangie spent most
of his time in Makassar.
(130)	Ibid., loc. cit. Probably not more than 25 or 30 people attended the
school. Among them were Djojopranoto, Sudiro, and Chairuddin.
(131)	See above, Chapter I.
(132)	Among those invited to lecture at the school, on the initiative of
Mr. Subardjo, were such figures as Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Iwa
Kusumasumantri, Sanusi Pane, Dr. Buntaran, Mr. Maramis,
Mr. Latuharhary and Sudiro (not the student Sudiro).51
Communist infiltrating group, and the popularity of the organization’s
sponsors in Indonesia in the post-revolutionary years. Moreover Wikana,
•who was a key man in the organization, seems to have been a bona fide
Communist at this time, (133) and was keeping the various undergrounds
closely informed of what was going on at the Kaigun office. 2) The school
represented a genuine effort to create an echelon of Indonesian nationalist
leaders who would serve two quite distinct purposes: a) in the case of an
Allied landing and the death or capture of the older leaders Soekarno and
Hatta, they would form a reserve group ready to take over and carry on
the struggle, b) there seems to have been an anticipation among the ’Naval
group’ that in the event of an Allied victory, Japan would "go Communist’
or at any rate sharply leftist; that the Allies would soon fall out, with the
Anglo-Saxon powers arrayed against the Soviet Union; and that in such
circumstances Japan might find herself in alliance with Russia. If this
should prove the case, an Indonesian elite with radical anti-Western sym-
pathies might prove useful in countering the influence of the Anglo-Saxon
powers in Southeast Asia, and extending that of their adversaries. If this
interpretation is correct (and it should again be emphasized that in this
context "Communism" should not be taken to mean subservience to Russian
interests), it accounts for the employment of Wikana as organizer for the
Asrama Indonesia Merdeka, the hostility of the Army, and the exemption
of Maeda and his group from Indonesian bitterness towards the Japanese.
To this writer at any rate, it seems difficult to deny that there was a
strong element of sincere and intelligent interest in Indonesian indepen-
dence on the part of the Kaigun organizers. (134)
With this rough outline of the main organized groups involved, and
the general "climate of opinion" on Java, we may be in a better position
to follow the course of events of the summer of 1945.
From May 16th to 18th a meeting of the Angkatan Muda was held
in the Villa Isola near Bandung. The Angkatan Muda (Young Generation)
was a Japanese device, established in mid-1944, for controlling undesir-
able elements among the youth. Those young men who were known or sus-
pected of having "illegal" connections or who were persistently and openly
hostile to the Japanese and at the same time influential among their com-
rades, were forced to assume leadership in the organization. The Japan-
ese were thus able both to keep an eye on them, and implicate them in
(133)	Before the war he had been a member of the radical oppositionist
Gerindo party. It is uncertain when or to what extent he became a
Communist.
(134)	Cf. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 115-120, and Beschouwinger ..,, p. 27f.
(with caution^ This theory incidentally helps to account for the
attraction of many of the Asrama's pupils to Tan Malakka's organi-
zation. There are strong similarities between Tan Malakka’s
nationalism, anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism (Western) and
"pan-Asian" internationalism, and what I have suggested was the
ideological outlook of the Kaigun group.52
’pro-Japanese' activities. In the middle and lower echelons of this organ-
ization of course they had their own agents and spies, (135) The Congress
of the Angkatan Muda was attended by college and high-school students from
all over Java. (13b) One Indonesian commentator reports that the Congress
had been preceded by a demand in the Djakarta press (137) that the A ngkatan
Muda be ’’brought out of the wings” and allowed to push itself forward into all
fields» both political and social ’’since it was the youth who would be the
future builders and defenders of free Indonesia.” (138) After the Congress,
reports issued by the Japanese-controlled Domei radio network from Djakarta
declared that the Congress had decided that only two alternatives could pos-
sibly be accepted by the youth of Indonesia--Freedom or Death, In this spirit
the Congress had passed two resolutions: 1) That all Indonesian groups be
united and centralized under a single national leadership, 2) Indonesian In-
dependence should be realized as soon as possible--the A ngkatan Muda was
constantly prepared and ready to devote its physical and spiritual energies
towards the co-ordination of all efforts in that direction. (139)
The two resolutions are significant. The first clearly attacks the
divisions between the top secular nationalist and Masjumi leaders as weakening
the unity of the drive for independence. Although "a single united leadership”
was a phrase open to varying interpretations, it certainly postulated prima
facie an all-inclusive leadership which the Masjumi elements could scarcely
provide. In combination with Nishimura's statement of May 15th» mentioned
earlier, by which the Army tacitly abandoned its efforts to balance the con-
flicting Indonesian elites, the youth resolution must have struck an ominous
note in Islamic ears. If the A ngkatan Muda was at all representative of the
youth, the Islamic leaders faced still another contending group besides the
older leaders, the prijaji administrative class, and the Army itself.
The second resolution revealed a barely concealed impatience with
the slow pace of preparations for independence (probably the youth had the
(135)	Kahin» op. cit. , p. 114. Among the more notable of the A ngkatan
Muda's leaders were Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh and Ruslan Abdulgani.
(136)	According to monitored Japanese broadcasts, there were 300 dele-
gates from all parts of Java, and the purpose of the Congress was to
prepare for the creation of a single all-Java youth organization, see
Federal Broadcasting Intelligence Service Daily Reports, May 26,
194$,Section Q 2.	----- ----------'--------
(137)	Since the press was tightly controlled by the Japanese, this "demand”
must have had official approval or at least permission.
(138)	Pakpahan, op. cit., pp. 118ff. For further details, see Soeara
Moeslimin Indonesia, III, # 12, (June 15» 1945), pp. 17f.
(139)	Pakpahan, loc. cit.53
B. P. K. I. particularly in mind), and the older leadership for not pressing
the authorities firmly and vigorously enough.
The Villa Isola Congress was followed by a series of youth confer-
ences and meetings all over Java, particularly in the larger cities. There
is perhaps therefore some reason to believe that the Congress was a
turning point in youth activities in the pre-revolutionary period, some-
what similar to the inauguration of the B. P. K. I. for the older leaders.
Like the B. P, K. I,, the Congress allowed representatives from all parts
of the island, speaking for all kinds of groups, to co-ordinate plans and
proposals, compare ideas, increase their solidarity, and return to their
own localities with a renewed self-confidence and a determination to
spread their influence still further and deeper.
From June 18th to 21st, the eighth session of the Central Advisory
Council was held. As suggested previously, (140) the most notable aspect
of its discussions was the great emphasis placed for the first time on the
role of the youth, and the pleas made to the Japanese government to bring
more young people into the administration, expand their military training,
and include them in the leadership of the projected G. R. B. (Gerakan Rakjat
jang Baru). The motivation of the older leaders at this C. A. C. meeting
remains open to conflicting interpretation. One observer comments that
"the mounting revolutionary fervor of the recently formed youth organiza-
tion, Angkatan Muda, had exerted strong pressures on the not entirely un-
w ill in g, if not even (sic) intimidated, councillors. The call for the in-
clusion of youth and military leaders in the national leadership, may,
therefore, in part at least have been the genuine expression of a widely
shared, growing Indonesian impatience, primarily caused by Japanese
dilatoriness in transferring authority. The resolution may, in such an
interpretation, have had the backing of the established, older leadership,
constituting a direct challenge to the Japanese authorities. On the other
hand ... the Angkatan Muda's claim to a prominent place in the nation's
councils may not only have been intended as a challenge to continued Jap-
anese authority but, at the same time, as an equally emphatic challenge
to the divided ranks of the older leaders.... The Council's advice would
then, in that case, have been brought about by moves of which the estab-
lished Indonesian leadership, in particular Soekarno and Hatta, had no
knowledge, and which they had, therefore, not approved." (141)
The second interpretation seems the more difficult to maintain,
in its entirety at least. At the beginning of the session, the Vice-
Chairman, Kusumo Utojo, had been replaced by Hatta on the grounds of
age. Soekarno was already Chairman. (142) The demands for the inclu-
sion of youth representatives were forwarded most notably by Mr. Sartono,
(140)	See above, pp. 37-38.
(141)	Benda, op. cit., pp. 191f.
(142)	Pakpahan, op. cit., p. 126.54
one of Soekarno's most loyal followers. Moreover,, a curious episode re-
corded by an Indonesian writer throws an illuminating sidelight on the events
of C. A. C. *s meeting. According to this account, a mass meeting was held
in the Taman Raden Saleh in Djakarta by students of the Medical College,
the Law Faculty, the Japanese-sponsored State Training Institute and the
secondary schools of Djakarta, On the urging of a student at the State
Training Institute, three resolutions were adopted: 1) The youth should
prepare themselves to carry on the struggle however bloody. (143)
2) The youth of Indonesia should stand firmly on the principle of the total
unity of all sectors of society. 3) In order to be able to defend their coun-
try the youth must be prepared to undergo intensive military training. A
representative from the Medical College declared that:
"Everywhere throughout the world, it is the youth
who are always revolting to combat inappropriate
modes of acting and thinking. The youth must
now agree to undergo training in military barracks."
Armed with a further unspecified resolution, the crowd marched off to
Soekarno's house. The future President tried to calm them:
"I will work as hard as I know how to have your
resolution put into effect.... I see that my younger
friends out there are carrying a banner reading
'Freedom for the People!' That is completely in
harmony with our Pantja Dharma." (144)
When the youth groups reached Hatta's house, the same demands were
pressed. The future Vice-President answered briefly:
"I am delighted to see all you young people here.
Unity among the youth like this is something 1
have long dreamed of. Be sure that you will all
of you soon replace the present leaders, who are
‘getting old. (145) I myself will work hard to see
that all your aspirations are fulfilled."
The commentator adds "it was as though they were still uneasy about the
urgings of the youth; so that they only answered 'they would work hard so
(143)	Note that there is no mention of whom the struggle is to be against.
(144)	This comment is a little curious since barely two weeks before
Soekarno had specifically rejected the Pantja Dharma in favour of
the PantJa Sila (at tke first meeting of the B. P. K. I. ). For a note
on the i?antja tlharma, see footnote 91, above.
(145)	The writer's italics.55
as to get things done. (146) If this report is accurate, the almost
apologetic note struck by the two leaders leads one to surmise that they
had a very shrewd idea of what the attitudes of the youth were, but were
faced with an awkward dilemma. It was all very well to make use of the
youth groups' impatience as a means of pressuring the Japanese into ac-
celerating the attainment of Independence. But it was clearly a very diffi-
cult thing to try to turn these youth demonstrations "on and off,' as the
occasion warranted. Such open and premature agitation must have had its
alarming as well as its encouraging aspect. There was always the danger
that the youth would bypass their leadership and come into open conflict
with the Japanese authorities. The resolution of the C. A. C. can there-
fore perhaps be best interpreted as an adroit attempt to kill two birds with
one stone: stimulate the Japanese to hasten independence, and satisfy the
clamour of the militant youth groups, - -and possibly tap the energies of
some of the youth leaders in semi-administrative jobs, or military exercises
If we accept the idea that the older leadership was already somewhat
anxious about youth activities, their anxiety can only have been increased
by another extraordinary incident that occurred in Surabaja at about the
same time. At a Japanese-sponsored meeting of about 4, 000 students,
the official opening speech stressing that Indonesian independence could
be obtained only by Indonesians fighting alongside the Japanese against
the Allies, was roughly interrupted by a member of the Angkatan Mud a,
who said he agreed with the necessity of fighting for independence, but
denied that it would be against the Allies. The meeting’s speeches were
being broadcast all over Java, and the thunderous applause which greeted
this challenge must have been heard in many parts of the island. The
Japanese had no recourse but to break up the meeting by turning on the
air-raid sirens. (147)
The main concentration of the Angkatan Muda apparently centred
around Bandung. However, according to Tan Malakka, a second youth
organization, "with its own conceptions," called the Angkatan Baru Indo-
nesia, was set up in Djakarta on June 15th, 1945. (l4S) 'though there was
a good deal of overlapping between its leadership and that of the Angkatan
Muda, it seems to have been more radically minded, possibly because its
leaders were drawn largely from the Menteng 31 group. (149) It was
nearer the centres of power in Djakarta, and, though like the Angkatan
Muda it was sponsored by the Japanese, it seems to have been smaller
(146)	Pakpahan, op. cit. , p. 125.
(147)	Recounted in Kahin, op. cit., p. 122.
(148)	Tan Malakka, Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara, "Widjaja, " Djakarta,
1948 (7), Volume ΠΪ, p. *5 £----------
(149)	For comments on the two youth organizations from the Japanese
side, see the Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Hisayoshi Adachi,
et al., p. 8.56
and less thoroughly infiltrated by the regime. Its leading figures were,
according to Tan Malakka, Chaerul Saleh, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, Sukarni,
B. M. Diah, Supeno and Wikana. (150) It was within this group that the
plans for a coup d*etat against the Japanese which were to become, if only
psychologically, an important factor in the events of the Proclamation of
Independence were laid. (151)
It is worthwhile in this connection to follow Tan Malakka "s move-
ments in these last months, and his relationship to these youth organiza-
tions, though doubtless his account should be accepted only with caution.
According to his own story, he was working at this time as assistant to the
head of the Rangkas (Banten) branch of the Badan Pembantu Keluarga Peta,
(152)	and that his chief was one of the delegates to the May 16th congress
of the Angkatan Mud a. On returning from the Congress, he told Tan
Malakka of incipient plans discussed by the delegates for merging all youth
organizations on Java. After the establishment of the Angkatan Baru Indo-
nesia in Djakarta, the sentiment for this merger became even stronger,
and a conference was supposed to assemble in Djakarta late in June to dis-
cuss the details. Tan Malakka was thereupon asked by his chief to go to
represent the Rangkas district at this conference. But he xarrived In i
Djakarta only to find that the conference had been cancelledon the orders
of the Japanese Army. Though he tried to make contact with Wikana and
Panduwiguna "whose names I had heard previously", he succeeded in
reaching only Harsono Tjokroaminoto, Anwar Tjokroaminoto and Chaerul
Saleh, without however revealing who he was. Disappointed by the cancel-
lation of the conference, he was compelled to return to Banten. (153)
Tan Malakka also claims (and to some degree his interpretation is
corroborated by Nishijima) that the Gerakan Rakjat jang Baru, (154) or at
(150)	Tan Malakka, loc. cit. Cf. also Darmosugondo, "Mengenang per-
istiwa sekitar 1*7 Agustus 1945", in Darius Marpaung, ed., Bingkisan
Nasional, P. T. "Usaha Pegawai Nasional Indonesia," (P. T. "Vpeni"),
Djakarta, 1956 (?), pp. 42f., for further details on the Angkatan
Baru Indonesia. He gives the executive committee as being composed
of; J5, M. Diah (A sia Raya), Sudiro (HQ Barisan Pelopor), Sjarif
Thajeb, Harsono Tjokroaminoto (Madjalah Masjumi), Wikana (Kaigun),
Chaerul Saleh (Sendenbu-Barisan Pelopor}? F. Goeltom (Seinendan),
Supono, and Asmara Hadi (Liaison between Barisan Pelopor and tEe
Djawa Hookookai).
(151)	See below, Chapter VI.
(152)	An organization to provide financial and other aid to the families of
Peta men on active duty away from home.
(153)	Tan Malakka, op. cit., p. 53.
(154)	For other aspects of this organization and its establishment, see
above, Chapter III, pp. 39-41.57
any rate, the important role assigned to the youth in that movement, was
a deliberate tactic on the part of the Japanese to mollify youth sentiment
for the cancellation of the proposed Djakarta conference. (155) If this is
correct» it suggests how alarmed the Japanese were becoming at the acti-
vities of the younger generation. The situation was particularly delicate
for them» since their plans for a general mobilization of the population for
the Allied invasion did not allow them to give these prominent youth leaders
the short shrift which would have been easy a year earlier. Moreover as
Kahin points out, many of the youth leaders were sons of important nation-
alist politicians and other widely respected figures. (156)
Further insight into the difficulties the Japanese were confronted with
is provided by the story of the session of the G. R. Β» ’s Working Committee
and particularly its debate on the creation of a united youth organization
for all of Java. At the opening meeting on July 6, controversy apparently
arose immediately on the use of the word “Republic" in the charter the
G. R. B. was drawing up for itself. The Subcommittee headed by Soekarno,
Hatta, Subardjo, Yamin and Abikusno prudently advised simply putting
the word in brackets, as indicating a future state of affairs. According
to Tan Malakka, the "main body" of the conference was extremely dis-
satisfied with this advice. (157) A climax was reached when the senior
Japanese officer present handed Chairman Soekarno a note and asked him
to read it aloud to the audience. The contents of the note simply said that
the "Republic" question was one which the Emperor alone had the right
to decide. A great hubbub ensued, in which one source states that
"Soekarno lost control of the meeting. " (158) Chaerul Saleh spoke harshly
against the cautious tactics of the older leaders and told them that if they
persisted, their efforts would be sabotaged by the youth. He warned the
Japanese that the Indonesian people was no longer willing to await orders
from Tokyo. (159) Finally, possibly by pre-arrangement, (160) Adam
Malik stood up and shouted that he and his friends had come to the confer-
ence "to speak for the people" and that if the people’s will was going to be
frustrated, he saw no reason to stay. With that he stalked out, followed
(155)	Tan Malakka, loc. cit. Cf. Nishijima, Kishi, et al., op. cit., p. 485.
(156)	Kahin, op. cit., p. 114, n. 20.
(157)	This sounds rather unlikely, considering the make-up of the body,
which except for the youth leaders, seems to have been ’older
generation’ and rather cautious in its approach.
(158)	Tan Malakka, op. cit. , p. 54.
(159)	Fakta dan Dokumen2, p. 153.
(160)	According to Fakta dan Dokumen2, loc. cit., the youth had held a
strategy meeting just before the big G. R. B. session.58
by Chaerul Saleh, Sukarni, Chalid Rasjidi, Wikana, Trimurty, B. M„ Diah,
Supeno, Sudiro (mBah), Sutomo, Panduwiguna, Harsono Tjokroaminoto,
Asmara Hadi and Muwardi. (161)
Whether in fact this incident is true in all its details (it is obviously
directed against Soekarno and Hatta), it is certainly 'in character’ for the
period. A 'dare-devil1 psychology (162) was being generated among the
youth by their growing sense that the defeat of the Japanese was impending.
Though the Japanese Military Police (Kempeitai) remained active and vigi-
lant, its psychological ascendancy was diminishing rapidly. (163)
On August 4, a statement was issued in the name of Soekarno and
Hatta, the two top leaders of the G. R. B., summoning an A11-Java Youth
Congress to meet some time in the middle of the month. But this state-
ment had to be withdrawn suddenly, on the grounds that the two leaders
"had to devote their energies to more important matters." (164) It is pos-
sible that this was the case, but it is perhaps more likely that the Japanese
had once again cancelled such plans. (165) Various important youth leaders
prominent in the Angkatan Muda were ordered to go out and pacify their fol-
lowers by stressing the genuineness of these "more important matters" and
(161)	Inferred from Fakta dan Dokumen2, loc, cit.. Tan Malakka, loc.
cit., says only Chaerul Saleh, Sukarni, Panduwiguna, Diah, Trimurty,
Wikana, Sudiro (mBah), Chalid Rasjidi and Supeno walked out. The
others remained. Incidentally Fakta dan Dokumen2, loc. cit., makes
Chaerul Saleh the leader of the walk-out. Ci. also Brugmans, eta.1,
op. cit., pp. 566f. , statement of Hideo Ohashi of the Sendenbu, who
says that Soekarno ordered a temporary adjournment, which was
later made permanent.
(162)	Stimulated no doubt by competition and rivalry among the youth
groups as to who could 'outdare' the others.
(163)	Lieutenant-Colonel Adachi et al. , in their Statement say that the
Military Police effectively broke up the Angkatan Baru Indonesia
late in July. See p. 8. Considering the looseness of these organi-
zations, and their semi-official character, it is hard to know what
this meant in real terms. The psychological position of the
Kempeitai as the Revolution approached has an interesting histori-
cal parallel in the situation of the AVOs on the eve of the Hungarian
uprising in October 1956,
(164)	Pakpahan, op. cit. , pp. 136, 138.
(165)	They can hardly have been reassured by Soekarno and Hatta's
wording of the initial announcement, which, as Pakpahan notes,
contained none of the usual effusive expressions of gratitude and
loyalty to Dai Nippon. For this whole incident, see Pakpahan,
op. cit., pp. 136-139.59
the fact that the Congress was really only being postponed, not cancelled.
Clearly there was a strong suspicion among the rank and file that neither
was true.
With the beginning of August, the schools were breaking up for
the holidays. Partly, one suspects, to get the students out of the big cities
where they might cause real trouble, loose all day, the Japanese author-
ities began by ordering all those enrolled in the State Training Institute
to scatter over the countryside to the remotest village "in order to get
experience and enlarge their outlook," (166) As Nishimura, head of the
General Affairs Department, gently put it, "throughout that summer
we had growing difficulties in keeping them in line." (167)
(166)	Pakpahan, op. cit. , p, 137.
(167)	Statement of Nishimura, April 10, 1947, p. 3.60
CHAPTER V
SAIGON
Early in August a reluctant Marshal Terauchi received final in-
structions from Tokyo as to the course independence should take. (168)
The order was signed by both the Japanese Government and the Supreme
War Council. Accordingly on August 7th, he proclaimed throughout the
areas under his command that permission had finally been granted for a
'•Committee to Prepare Independence for Indonesia" (Panitia Persiapan
Kemerdekaan Indonesia - P. P„ K„ I.). The Committee was to be set up
immediately: (169)
"In acknowledgement of the efforts and sincerity of the
inhabitants of Indonesia, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Southern Territories expresses his approval for
the institution, towards the middle of August 1945, of
a Committee for the Preparation of Independence. This
Committee is to speed up the final measures to be taken
to establish a government for an independent Indonesia. "
A supplementary announcement however by the Gunseikan, General Yama
moto, added that: (170)
"The first condition for attaining independence must be
winning the war.... Indonesia will also have to develop
her resources so that in co-operation with Dai Nippon
a final victory in the war may be achieved for Greater
East Asia.,.. This Preparatory Committee is to be
formed in Java, and its purpose is to complete the last
preparations for independence for the whole of Indo-
nesia, so that when all the preparations in Java are
completed, this will mean that all the areas of Indo-
nesia will become free in a new state."
(168)	W. H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Move-
ments, 1940-1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass-
achusetts, 1963, p. 94. Cf. also Aziz, op. cit., p. 251, quoting state-
ment of Numata Takazo, Chief of Staff to Marshal Terauchi, that
these orders had come to his superior from General Anami himself
the Minister of War.
(169)	Asia Raya, August 7, 1945.
(170)	Kan Po, # 72, (August 10, 1945), p. 12.61
At the same time the old B. P. K. I. was quietly and informally disbanded.
Yamamoto thanked it for its services, and reminded its members that the
members of the new Committee would be selected this time not just by the
16th Army, but by Marshal Terauchi himself on the advice of the regional
commanders. (171) The representatives for Java were then chosen by
Yamamoto and Nagano, the Commander of the 16th Army, and their names
were passed on first to Itagaki in Singapore, and then to Terauchi. (172)
On the same day that the Terauchi proclamation was made, a group
of top military officers met at Itagaki's orders in Djakarta to do the "real
work" that the P. P. K. I. was ostensibly supposed to do before indepen-
dence could be obtained. Those present at this meeting were General
Nagano, Commander of the 16th Army, General Shimura of the 7th Army
Group, Admiral Maeda, General Hamada of the Sumatran command,
General Nishimura, Captain Yanagihara of the Kaigun, and Major Mori,
liaison officer between Singapore and Djakarta, in addition to a large
staff. (173) On Tokyo’s insistence, and in spite of their apparent convic-
tion that the task was impossible, the Committee worked "ni&ht and day"
to solve the difficult problems of transferring power, financing the new
regime, (174) and deciding on the concrete role to be played withiiiitftat re-
gime by Japanese civilian and military personnel. As reported by Colonel
Jano, political advisor to Marshal Terauchi, he had received on July 29th
a secret wire from Tokyo saying that "in principle the Emperor grants
independence to the Indonesians, nevertheless this should only be pro-
claimed if Russia’s participation in the war becomes inevitable." On
August 5th word again came from Tokyo, this time warning the Marshal
that "within a few hours Russia will declare war on Japan, and therefore
the Marshal should summon Soekarno and Hatta to tell them of the
Japanese Government's decision to grant independence." (175)
(171)	A sia Raya, loe. cit.
(172)	Statement of Nishimura, May 31-June 6, 1946, p. 3.
(173)	Statement of Nishimura, May 31-June 6, 1946, p. 4. Cf. also Y. Ita-
gaki, "Outline of Japanese Policy in Indonesia and Malaya during
the war with special reference to (the) Nationalism of (the) respec-
tive countries," Annals of the Hitotsubashi Academy, Vol. II, # 2,
April 1952, p. l££
(174)	It was decided that the Indonesians should use Japanese Army cur-
rency till they could produce a currency of their own, and the early
financing of the regime would be carried out by the Southern Areas
Development Bank. See Statement of Nishimura, May 31-June 6, 1946,
p. 4.
(175)	Transportation had become so precarious between Tokyo and South
East Asia that already in late July it had been decided that the official
Indonesian ’visit’ to receive the symbols of Independence would be
made not to Tokyo, as had for example been the case with the Burmese,
but to Marshal Terauchi, as the highest accessible representative of
the Imperial Government. Cf. Statement of Nishimura, May 31-June
6, 1946, p. 5. Jano’s remarks were made in an interview with62
Accordingly on August 8th, Soekarno, Hatta and Dr. Radjiman
Wediodiningrat left Djakarta by plane for Singapore and Saigon. Accom-
panying them were Dr. Soeharto, Dr. Radjiman's physician, General Shi-
mura, Lieutenant-Colonel Nomura, head of the Planning Section in the Gen-
eral Affairs Department of the 16th Army, and Miyoshi, a civilian aide and
interpreter on General Nishimura's staff. (176) What exactly happened at
the meeting of the Indonesian leaders with the Marshal is a little obscure.
Kahin reports that on August 11th, Terauchi promised the three leaders that
Indonesia would be made independent on the 24th, after a Constitutional Assem
bly had been convened on the 19th to add finishing touches to the constitutional
draft already drawn up by the B. P. K. I. (177) General Shimura gives early
September as the date assigned for the transfer of power. (178) Nishijima
asserts that Terauchi told the three Indonesians that no fixed date would be
set, though the P. P. K. I. would be inaugurated on the 18th. Furthermore,
the final territory to be included in the new nation would cover only the for-
mer Netherlands Indies. Independence would start in Java, and thence would
be extended stage by stage through the outer islands. Japan would also re-
serve certain rights and privileges for the duration of the war, and wodLd ex-
pect the P. P. K. I. to maintain close contact with, and accept the guidance of,
a Guidance and Communications Bureau (Dokuritsu Jumbi Shido Renraku) of
Japanese officers, which would be established separately in Djakarta. 79)
Hatta relates that at an official meeting on the 12th, Terauchi told him that
"we leave it up to you to decide when Indonesia is to become independent."
(180) Soekarno later declared at the opening session of the P. P. K. I. that
he had told the Marshal that in spite of the B. P. K. I. 's claim to Malaya,
New Guinea, British North Borneo, Portuguese Timor, etc., he would be
content with the territory of the former Netherlands Indies. (181) In view
(175)	(cont’d)
Nathan Brock of the Christian Science Monitor on August 30, 1946.
(Cited in Wirjodiatmodjo, op. cit., pp. 38f.)
(176)	Statement of Nishimura, April 25, 1947, p. 7. Statement of Shimura,
June 13, 1946, p. 4. Brugmans, et al, op. cit., p. 594, gives
Miyoshi’s report.
(177)	Kahin, op. cit., p. 127. Interestingly enough, this implies that the
Japanese must have accepted the B. P. K. I. *s constitutional draft
with very little change.
(178)	Statement of General Shimura, June 13, 1946, p. 5.
(179)	Nishijima, Kishi, et al. , op. cit., p. 430.
(180)	Mohammad Hatta, "Legende dan Realiteit sekitar Proklamasi 17
Agustus" in Osman Raliby, ed. , Documenta Historica, Lampiran,
LXIV, p. 655.
(181)	As quoted in A. G. Pringgodigdo, op. cit. , p. 36.63
of the decision taken at the Itagaki Committee's previous sessions, (182)
it seems that Nishijima's is probably the fullest and most exact of these
accounts. In any case, it can be safely said that after the atom-bombing
of Hiroshima on the 6th and Nagasaki on the 9th, Tokyo was no longer con-
cerned to obstruct the formation of an independent Indonesia--she no longer
had anything to gain by keeping Indonesia in bondage, and time in which to
"set the Indonesian free" was rapidly running out.
While these talks were going on at Terauchi's headquarters in
Dalath near Saigon, the membership of the P, P, K.I, was announced. (183)
It was to have 21 members, divided geographically and ethnically as
follows: Java 12, Sumatra 3, Sulawesi 2, Bali 1, Moluccas 1, Kaliman-
tan 1, Chinese 1. (184) Mr, Subardjo was designated Advisor to the
(182) See above, Chapter III,
pp.33-34 for an account of these sessions.
(183)
The membership of the
P. P. K. I.
was as follows:
Dr, Soepomo
Poeroebojo
Wachid Hasjim
Dr. Mohammad Amir
Tengkoe Mohd. Hasan
Mr. Latuharharv
Ir. Soekarno	Oto Iskandardinata
Drs. Mohammad Hatta	Abdul Kadir
Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat R. Pandji Soeroso
M. Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo
Soerjohamidjojo
Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo
Abdul Abbas
Dr. Ratulangie
Andi Pangeran
I Goesti Ketoet Poetjo /PoedjaJ'
A. A. Hamidhan	Drs. Yap Tjwan Bing.
Cf. A.G. Pringgodigdo, op. cit., p. 30, and Soerara Moeslimin
Indonesia, IH, #16, (August l£>, 1945), p. 1. The first 8 names
represent secular nationalist and prijaji elements. Poeroebojo
and Soerjohamidjojo were delegates for the principalities of Jog-
jakarta and Surakarta respectively. Wachid Hasjim and Hadikoe-
soemo represented the Islamic leadership. Abbas, Amir and Hasan,
the three Sumatran delegates, were to speak for the Batak, Minang-
kabau and Atjehnese areas. Ratulangie, Latuharhary, Andi
Pangeran, Poedja and Hamidhan represented respectively SulaweSi-
Christians, Moluccas-Christians, Sulawesi-non-Christians, Bali
and Kalimantan. Drs. Yap Tjwan Bing was the delegate from the
Chinese community.
(184) Aziz, op. cit., p. 249, says 20 seats were reserved for Java,
4 for Sumatra and 4 for the Naval Territory. This is clearly
wrong, but has its origin in the Statement of Nishimura,
May 31-June 6, 1946, p. 4.64
Committee. (185) By the time Soekarno, Hatta and Dr. Radjiman flew back
to Djakarta on the 14th, Japan had effectively been brought to her knees by
the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Russia's entry into the war.
After stopping off at Singapore to pick up the three Sumatran members of
the P. P. K. I., the three leaders landed in Djakarta to be given an unprece-
dented welcome by the Commander of the 16th Army, General Nagano
himself.
Soekarno, exultant over the success of the Saigon discussions and
his sense of Indonesia's impending freedom, made a none too cryptic refer-
ence to the old Javanese legend of Djojobojo: (186)
"If I used to say that Indonesia would only be free
when the maize bore fruit, now I can declare that
Indonesia will be free before it flowers!"
Later at a press interview, in answer to a question as to whether he had
discussed the Constitution drawn up by the B. P. K. I. with Marshal Terauchi,
he said: (187)
"We certainly did not discuss it, since the prob-
lems of realizing our independence were unani-
mously handed over to us to solve, "
though he admitted that Indonesia would continue to accept Japan's leader-
ship in the war, and would remain within the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere.
(185)	Mr. Soebardjo's appointment is listed in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia,
loc. cit., and A sia Raya, August 14, 1945, but not in Pringgodigdo,
op. cit.. The P. P. K. i. 's administrative secretariat was headed by
Hatta, with A. G. Pringgodigdo as his deputy, and Mr. Gondowardojo
and Mr. Ismail Tajib as his assistants.
(186)	Asia Raya, August 14, 1945. For the legend of Djojobojo, cf.
Tjantrik Mataram, Peranan Ramalan Djojobojo dalam Revolusi Kita,
N. V. "Masa Baru", Bandung, 1950. Also Pringgodigdo, op. cit.,
pp. 7f., and A. G. Pringgodigdo, Tataneg^ara Djawa pada waktu pen-
dudukan Djepang dari bulan Maret sampai bulan Pesember 1942,
Jajasan Fonds Universitit Negeri Gadjah Mada, Jogjakarta, 1952,
p. 11. The essence of the legend was that when the fortunes of Java
were at their lowest, a yellow-skinned people from the North would
occupy Java for a time equal to that taken by an ear of maize to
ripen for harvest. Then they would leave, and Java would be free.
(187)	Asia Raya, August 16, 1945.65
CHAPTER VI
THE INDEPENDENCE PROCLAMATION
It is probable that Hatta and Soekarno knew of Russia’s entry into
the war by the time they returned to Djakarta, and were reasonably sure
that the fighting was unlikely to continue for more than a few weeks.
Probably also they foresaw no insurmountable difficulties from the Jap-
anese side. If anything the problem would be one of maintaining Indone-
sian discipline and unity. Hatta had spoken to Sjahrir, leader of the
largest existing ’underground* organization, just prior to leaving for
Saigon and Dalath. According to Sjahrir, he agreed that the time had
come for a massive national effort, and that at Dalath, a very sharp line
would have to be drawn between the Indonesian and Japanese positions,
so that feven the Indonesians who had "sincerely” collaborated would find
themselves forced to join the Indonesian camp. Hatta also consented to
Sjahrir’s proposal to alert all branches of the various 'resistance* groups
for action on his return. (188) Whether this report is wholly reliable or
not, (189) Hatta himself reports that at 5:00 p. m. on the 14th he was
visited by Sjahrir who told him that he was absolutely opposed to any in-
dependence that came as the gift of the Japanese. (190) He told Hatta
that from its clandestine radios, his organization had heard that the
Japanese Government had been putting out peace feelers since August
10th. The end of the war was clearly in sight; the arrival of the Allies
was imminent. If Soekarno and Hatta declared independence at once,
the "collaborationist" elements would think that the declaration was the
result of the Saigon talks, and would go along with it. Mass action could
then be used against the Japanese Army. When the Allies arrived they
would find a regime in power which had established itself by throwing
off the Japanese yoke all on its own.
(188)	Sutan Sjahrir, Out of Exile, translated by Charles Wolf, Jr., John
Day, N. Y., 1949, p. 253.
(189)	In view of his later strongly-expressed hostility towards "collabor-
ationists "it is difficult to fathom his solicitude for such elements
at this point. He must surely by this time have calculated that the
only regime that stood a chance of Allied recognition would be one
formed by unimpeachably anti-Japanese leaders.
(190)	Hatta, op. cit., p. 656.66
Sjahrir claims that Hatta was convinced by this reasoning, and merely
stipulated that no declaration without Soekarno's endorsement would have any
effect, and that therefore he would have to try to persuade Soekarno as soon
as possible. Sjahrir adds that Hatta agreed to abandoning the idea of using
the P. P. K. I. to declare independence, as being too Japanized a body. (-i^l)
Hatta's account of this meeting places the emphasis rather differently. He
apparently told Sjahrir that in his view the means of declaring independence
were of no importance. If Soekarno was to be the man to declare it, it would
make no difference as far as the Allies were concerned whether he did it
on his own or through the P. P. K. I.. He would still be viewed as a collabor-
ator. Hatta then went to see Soekarno and found him quite unwilling to fore-
go the P. P. K. I.. He was not convinced that the Japanese were really on the
verge of surrender, and wanted confirmation first from the Gunseikan, Gen-
eral Yamamoto. (^P92)There may however have been another reason for
Soekarno's reluctance to abandon the P, P. K. I.. The all-Indonesian repre-
sentation on the Committee would in one sense make a declaration of inde-
pendence more legitimate than any single man's proclamation could possibly
be. Making use of the P. P, K. I. would also deprive the Japanese of a pre-
text for violent intervention. Both Soekarno and Hatta were worried that the
underground and semi-underground youth groups would be unsuccessful in
trying to overthrow the Japanese, and that there would be a useless blood-
bath if an uprising were attempted.
In the meantime, Sjahrir, apparently convinced that Soekarno would
delcare independence, ordered all preparations set for the evening of the
15th. However, when Hatta returned to Sjahrir's house at noon that day,
with the news of Soekarno's objections, Sjahrir persuaded him to go back
with him to see Soekarno again. A long discussion ensued, the upshot being
that Soekarno reportedly agreed to declare independence that evening at
5:00 p. m. as Sjahrir had planned. Word was thereupon sent out to various
key points on Java to prepare for the uprising. Thousands of Pemudas
(youth activists) were to be assembled on the outskirts of Djakarta ready to
be brought in by Peta trucks as soon as underground elements at the
Djakarta radio station broadcast Soekarno's declaration. The immediate
objectives of the Pemudas were to be the Military Police headquarters and
the radio station. However matters did not develop as planned. At 6:00
p. m. word came from Soekarno that he would not go through with the plan
and wanted to put off any move until the next day. (193) It is probable that
the afternoon of the 15th was spent by the top official leadership in search
of the key military officers who might be able to tell them how the situation
in Japan was developing. But none was available. Only junior staff offi-
cers remained on the official premises. Accompanied by Soekarno, Hatta
then proceeded to Maeda's. The Admiral told them he could give them no
official word; but that in his opinion, the rumours circulating to the effect
(191)	Sjahrir, op. cit. , p. 253.
(192)	Hatta, op. cit. , p. 656.
(193)	Sjahrir, op. cit., p. 255.67
that Japan had surrendered were probably correct. In any case he would
let them know if official word did come through. (194)
The two leaders then went home, prepared, according to Hatta, to
issue invitations for a special meeting of the P. P. K, I. at 10:00 a. m. of
the 16th, two days before that body's official inauguration was due. A
short emergency meeting was envisaged at which the Declaration of Inde-
pendence would be read out, and the Constitution briefly debated and
adopted. A provisional government for Djakarta and the provinces would
then be set up in the next few days. The members of the P. P. K. I. from
outside Java would proceed to their home bases and set up provisional
administrations, before the Japanese could surrender power to the Allies.
For although Tokyo had agreed to independence, the Allies might be
tempted to try to get the Japanese Army to maintain the status quo ante
in Indonesia till they arrived. (195) If this account is correct, it does
much to explain why Soekarno changed his mind about Sjahrir's plans on
the 15th. Thanks to Maeda's promise, a much less dangerous and
equally rapid path to independence now seemed open. In the circum-
stances, if was unnecessary to risk a bloodbath.
In one sense however the change in policy came too late. Two
youth leaders, Subadio and Subianto had arrived at Hatta's house at 5:00
p. m. that same day (the 15th) urging a coup d'etat in Djakarta. Hatta re-
fused to agree. (196) Communications between the various groups con-
cerned seem at this point to have been very poor. The Sjahrir group
appears to have been able to get news about Soekarno's intentions and acti-
vities only from Hatta, and even the usual emissaries between these two
leaders were absent at this critical period. Whether through the reports
of Subadio and Subianto, or by some other means, Sjahrir learnt of the
change of plans, but too late to revoke his earlier orders everywhere.
Dr. Sudarsono, leader of the Sjahrir organization in Tjirebon, had al-
ready begun an uprising there, which was promptly crushed. Sudarsono
and some other leaders were arrested and jailed by the Kempeitai. At
the same time Japanese suspicions in Djakarta were aroused by signs of
unusual activity in the city and its environs. Several known underground
leaders were arrested. And as the Kempeitai's armored cars patrolled
the streets, tension steadily mounted.
(194)	See Statement of Admiral Maeda, translated by S. Nishijima, April
16, 1947, p. 4. Maeda gives the interview as taking place at 3:00
p. m. on the 16th, but the date is a mistake. The two leaders were
already at Rengasdengklok by the 16th. The Admiral must mean the 15th.
(195)	Hatta, op. cit., p. 656. However, cf. also Sukarni Kartodiwirjo,
"The 'Djakarta Charter' has no connection with the Proclamation of
17th August 1945," Antara, newsbulletin# 140/B, May 21, 1959, who
avers that Hatta wanted the P. P. K. I. to meet only on August 23rd, as
the Japanese had planned it.
(196)	Hatta, op. cit., p. 657.68
A series of harried and improvised meetings were held among the
various underground organizations to adjust to the changing situation. Plans
for surprising the Japanese were now clearly obsolete. The coup d'etat was
for the moment checkmated. Most of the younger people looked to Sjahrir
to take the lead in declaring independence, but he rejected the idea, partly
because Hatta's arguments on Soekarno's indispensability had convinced him,
partly, it appears, because he was ’’still sure” that he could persuade Soekarno
to act the following day. (197) It is not certain whether he knew of Hatta’s
plans for convening the P. P. K. I. the next morning, and if he did know, to
what degree he approved or disapproved.
In any case, during the lull that followed the set-back to the scheduled
uprising, word came from certain underground contacts in the Japanese
administration that Japan had definitely surrendered. (198) The news pro-
vided the stimulus to some adventurous elements within the Menteng 31 and
Kaigun youth groups, most notably Sukarni Kartodiwirjo, Chaerul Saleh,
Djonar Nher, Subadio and Wikana, who were very dissatisfied with the way
things were developing. In their eyes, it looked as if Sjahrir was being in-
fected with the same hesitancy and dilatoriness that afflicted Soekarno and
Hatta. Accordingly these elements, along with some members of the
Persatuan Mahasiswa, assembled in the Bacteriological Laboratories behind
the hledical school on Pegangsaan Timur to discuss the situation and make
plans (199) According to Adam Malik, the meeting decided on an immedi-
ate declaration of independence ’’without any foreign participation." However
some of those attending seem to have had misgivings, and on their urging,
it was agreed to try to secure Soekarno’s co-operation once more. Wikana
and Darwis (one of Chaerul Saleh’s associates) were chosen to carry a thinly-
disguised ultimatum to him. The whole group would reassemble later that
night to hear the results of the mission. (200)
(197)	Sjahrir, op. cit., p. 256; cf. also Kahin, op. cit. , pp. 134f.
(198)	Probably the news came from Panduwiguna and Adam Malik who
worked for the Domei radia network. The news of the surrender was
not made generally public until August 21st, cf. Asia Raya of that date.
(199)	Adam Malik, Riwajat dan Perdjuangan sekitar Proklamasi Kemerde-
kaan Indonesia 17 Agustus Ϊ9?ΐ>, "Widjaja”, Djakarta, 1950, p. 33.
He adds the names of Kusnandar, Subianto, Aidit Sunjoto, Margono,
Abubakar, Erie Sudewo and Armansjah. For a Communist version,
see D. N. Aidit, Pilihan Tulisan, 1951-1955, Jajasan "Pembaruan",
Djakarta, 1959, Vol. I. , p. 508. He adds the names of Pardjono
and Suroto Kunto.
(200)	Malik, op. cit., p. 33. Aidit, op. cit., loc. cit., says Wikana,
Aidit, Suroto Kunto and Subadio went to Soekarno's, with Wikana
as their spokesman.69
At 10:00 p. m. of the 15th, Wikana and Darwis reached Soekarno’s
house and found him alone. Confronted with their demands for immediate
action,, Soekarno seems to have been in something of a quandary,, though
he firmly rejected the idea of acting till he received official word of the
surrender from Yamamoto or Nishimura. He urged the youth groups to
wait; independence was only a short step away. In any case, he told them
that he could and would do nothing until he had consulted finally with Hatta
and other senior nationalist leaders. The dispute became heated; the two
youth leaders grew more and more upset that Soekarno continued to refuse
to take the responsibility for declaring independence that night. Finally
Wikana threatened that "If Bung Karno will not pronounce this proclama-
tion tonight, tomorrow there will be murder and bloodshed." At this
Soekarno apparently became very angry, went over to Wikana and said:
"Here is my throat! Drag me into the corner, and finish me off tonight!
Don't wait till tomorrow." Wikana appears to have been somewhat
abashed by this outburst, and merely repeated his warnings of a probable
flare-up of popular violence. (201) Somehow Soekarno must have got
word out as to what was going on, for Subardjo soon appeared at Hatta’s
house, urging him to go immediately to Pegangsaan Timur 56 where his
colleague lived. Subardjo told Hatta that Soekarno was now surrounded
by a gang of pemudas under the leadership of Wikana and Chaerul Saleh.
Dropping the text of the Proclamation of Independence on which he had
been working in preparation for the opening meeting of the P. P„ K. I.,
Hatta hurried to the rescue with Subardjo. (202) On arrival at Soekarno’s
house, Hatta found argument still continuing, though by this time Dr.
Buntaran Martoatmodjo and some other older nationalists had also
arrived. Asked his opinion by Soekarno as to what course should now
be taken, Hatta admitted that Sjahrir had already sent him word of the
Japanese surrender, but that it was still "unofficial.81 He refused to act
until he found out for certain what the attitude of the military authorities
would be to any unauthorized declaration of independence. (203) He also
gave the youth leaders a timely warning that neither he nor Soekarno
would be pressured or coerced into doing anything rash, and sardonically
challenged them to declare independence themselves if they thought they
could carry it off. Wikana and Darwis were temporarily checked. They
could only reply that "they would not answer for the consequences if the
proclamation was not made the next morning at noon." (204)
(201)	Hatta, as quoted in Fakta dan Dokumen2, op. cit., p. 139.
(202)	Malik, op. cit. , p. 34.
(2Θ3) Ibid. It is worth noting that Malik's book was written by a man gen-
erally regarded as politically opposed to both Sjahrir and Hatta in
the post-revolutionary period.
(204) Ibid. Cf. also Ali Moechtar Hoeta Soehoet, "Sedikit sekitar saat
Lahirnja R. I. Proklamasi," M. D. Marpaung, ed. , op. cit., pp„ 28f.
Aidit, op. cit., p. 508, gives roughly the same story, only adding
Iwa Kusumasumantri, Djojopranoto and Sudiro (mBah) to the list of
those present.70
What is clear from the accounts given by Malik and Hatta is that the
most crucial question was one of timing. Hatta's story affirms his analysis
of the whole Proclamation affair, the essence of which is that the younger
and older leaders differed on method, not on timing. Both sides wanted in-
dependence by the morning of the 16th. But the youth wanted a putsch, while
the older leaders felt this to be unnecessary. (205) Malik however main-
tains that timing, as well as method was at stake. The older leaders had no
intention of declaring independence until such time as the Japanese gave
them permission. (206) If one accepts that Soekarno and Hatta had arranged
for the P. P. K. I. to meet on the morning of the 16th (and it seems reasonable
to do so), it is rather improbable that they would have failed to tell Wikana
and Darwis of their plans. If one grants that the P. P. K. I» session had really
been arranged, Malik's omission of any mention of it is to be explained either
as deliberate suppression designed to discredit the older leaders, or due to
Wikana and Darwis'having failed to pass the message on.
In any case, what emerges from both Hatta's and Malik's narratives,
is that the older leaders had the stronger bargaining position. As Hatta
said of the youth, "they had no leader of stature." Although in Malik's ver-
sion the Wikana mission is depicted as the bold and triumphant issuing of an
ultimatum, it is perhaps better seen as an astute bluff, designed to coerce
the older nationalist leaders into immediate action. And the bluff was called.
When challenged to declare independence themselves, the pemuda leaders
could only retreat with vague threats and warnings. They still needed the
older leaders. Though they had perhaps succeeded in stirring up a good
deal of uncoordinated unrest in the city, they must have suspected, or
sensed half-consciously, that without a national figure at their head (or a
national figurehead) their uprising would be unsuccessful. An attempt to
overthrow the Japanese regime in Djakarta would probably be crushed by
forces moved in from the interior, unless the uprising could penetrate the
other cities of Java and the rural hinterland. It must have been doubtful if
this could be done rapidly by anyone but Soekarno and Hatta.
At about 11:30 p. m.: of the 151th, Wikana and Darwis left for Tjikini
71 where the pemuda leaders had shifted their 'headquarters' to keep out
of the clutches of the Kempeitai. At midnight, the second conference of the
evening opened, under the chairmanship of Chaerul Saleh. As Malik de-
scribes it, it was decided that Soekarno and Hatta would have to be "evacu-
ated" to a safe place outside Djakarta, where the "masses" and the Peta
were ready "to face all possible consequences that might arise once inde-
pendence was declared." Otherwise, "if Bung Karno-Hatta were to remain
in the city, they could be made use of by the Japanese to crush or obstruct
the Independence Proclamation." (207)
(205)	Cf. Hatta, op. cit. , p. 657. "Saja suka revolusi, akan tetapi menolak
putsch." ("I want a revolution, not a putsch1!'").
(206)	Malik, op. cit. , p. 35.
(207)	Ibid., loc. cit.71
It is difficult to be sure how to interpret this claim. It is possible
that the pemudas were really convinced that the older leaders were too
timid to declare independence without Japanese approval, and were really
afraid that after the surrender this approval would never be given. On the
other hand there was as yet no indication that the Japanese had changed
their minds about going through with their own brand of independence. And
they would probably think twice before arresting Soekamo and Hatta, an
act which might set off a dangerous reaction among the Indonesian masses.
It is perhaps most likely that the attitude of the pemuda leaders repre-
sented an attempt to maintain the momentum of their earlier activities,
and to make good the bluff that Soekarno and Hatta had just called. As the
events of the next day were to prove, “evacuating" Soekarno and Hatta out
of Djakarta was simply a renewal of the first ultimatum, more imposing
but hardies less hollow. The pemudas perhaps gambled that once outside
Djakarta, the psychological atmosphere would be such that Soekarno and
Hatta would yield to their demands. But the net result of their reactions
was a delay in the attainment of their ostensible goals. And the fact that
none of the ’pemuda1 accounts claims that an uprising in Djakarta was
attempted while the older leaders were outside the city, tends to support
this interpr etatiott. The youth needed Soekarno and Hatta to lead the rev-
olution, not to stop the Japanese from using them to crush it.
Malik’s story that the decision to "evacuate" Soekarno and Hatta
was taken by a unanimous vote of the whole youth conference at Tjikini 71,
is to some degree contradicted by the testimony of Sjahrir. Sjahrir re-
ports that he was only told about the conference at 1:00 a. m. that morning,
and that at 2:00 a. m. (of the 16th) some delegates from the meeting came
to him suggesting that only by kidnapping Soekarno and Hatta could the
objectives of the underground groups be attained. Sjahrir however re-
plied that it would be unnecessary since he was sure he could control the
situation by contacting Soekarno the next day. The young men left, only
to return an hour later with the news that "a clique in the assemblage"
had, contrary to the consensus, kidnapped the two leaders. (208) Neither
account ΐέ entirely satisfactory. Perhaps a more plausible hypothesis is
that two meetings really took place: First, a large and heterogeneous
gathering of all groups, including members of Sjahrir’s organization,
heard Wikana's account of his mission and its failure. Then the idea of
kidnapping Soekarno and Hatta was perhaps mooted. Sjahrir’s support
was then solicited, but his rejection of the idea settled the matter for the
majority of the members, who thereupon dispersed. Then, after the main
conference broke up, a second conference was held by such like-minded
spirits as Sukarni, Wikana and Chaerul Saleh. This smaller group de-
cided to go ahead with the kidnapping plans, and so re-assume the initia-
tive. Responsibility was divided, with Sukarni in charge of the actual
(208) Sjahrir, op. cit. , pp. 256f. On p. 257 however Sjahrir says that
the kidnapping took place on the morning of the 15th--which is cer-
tainly wrong--and that the final declaration of independence was
made in Admiral Maeda's house on the morning of the 16th, which
is also incorrect. There are other vagaries in his account.72
operation, Singgih, from the Peta, detailed to handle liaison with friendly
Peta groups, and Chaerul Saleh and Wikana left behind in Djakarta to watch
the course of events, spy on the Japanese and, in time, to warn other
pemudas of their fait accompli. (209)
Whatever the case, the conspirators, Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh, Singgih,
J. Kunto and Dr. Muwardi (of the Barisan Pelopor), proceeded to the house
of D. Asmoro, another member of their group, to pick up a second car. With
their two cars, they managed to evade Kempeitai patrols and appear at the
houses of Soekarno and Hatta sometime between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. (210)
The two nationalist leaders were roused from their beds, and forced, along
with Soekarno's wife and infant son, to accompany the pemudas. In spite of
Soekarno's protests and arguments, the two cars were driven past the Japan-
ese watchposts to the Peta barracks at Rengasdengklok, some 30 miles out-
side Djakarta in the direction of Tjirebon. (211) The area had previously
been one of unrest and anti-Japanese activity. It was within easy reach of
the capital, and advantageously situated to dominate Krawang and Tjikampek,
and guard the road and railway into Djakarta from Tjirebon and Purwakarta.
The Peta Battalion commander at Purwakarta was warned by two of
the conspirators, Singgih and Dr. Sutjipto, acting as liaison men, that the
two leaders were on their way. On the orders of the local company comman-
der at Rengasdengklok, Subeno, who had previously had extensive contacts
with the Menteng 31 group through Sutjipto, the whole area surrounding the
Peta barracks was sealed off. The village of Rengasdengklok was put under
'Republican'' martial law and guards were set up on all roads leading to the
village and barracks to warn against any Japanese counter-measures. At
noon of the 16th, the Resident of Djakarta, (212) Sutardjo, was arrested
just as he was returning from the capital, where he had gone to attend the
scheduled inauguration of the P. P. K. I. (213) The local wedana (district
(209)	Malik, op. cit. , pp. 36-38. Also Ali Moechtar Hoeta Soehoet, op.
cit, , in D. Marpaung, ed. , op. cit. , p. 31.
(210)	As a historical curiosity, it is interesting that Sukarni and Muwardi
were involved in the kidnapping of Prime Minister Sjahrir on June
27, 1946.
(211)	Aidit, op. cit., p. 508 names Sukarni, Kunto, Muwardi, Singgih and
Sutjipto as kidnappers. For further details of the actual kidnapping,
see Malik, op. cit. , pp. 36-38.
(212)	The Residency of Djakarta did not include the city of Djakarta itself.
(213)	Bachsan, op. cit. , p. 49. Malik, op. cit. , p. 39, says Sutardjo was
leaving for the capital, and says nothing about the P. P. K. I. meeting,
but Bachsan’s report looks more likely, partly because he has no ob-
vious axe to grind. Cf. also Aidit, op. cit., p. 508. Ali Moechtar
Soehoet, op. cit. , in D„ Marpaung, ed. , op. cit., pp. 3If. , says
that arrangements had been made long before. Between them Singgih,
Bachsan, the local section commander, and Sujono Hadipranoto, the73
officer), Abdurrachman, and several other local officials suspected of
being Japanese agents were also arrested. The tjamat (sub-district offi-
cer), Hadipranoto, a known Republican, was put in temporary charge of
civilian affairs. To all appearances, the operation was carried out with
speed and efficiency, and without the Japanese suspecting what was in the
wind.
On their arrival, Soekarno and Hatta were taken to the house of a
local Chinese trader, I Song, and there kept under guard. There seems
to have been a lot of arguing and vehement discussion, but neither side
was willing to budge. (214) As the day wore on however, the psychologi-
cal advantage began to shift to the older leaders. Resident Sutardjo told
Sukarni that he had gone to the previously arranged meeting of the P. P.
K. I. , and had been amazed when Soekarno and Hatta had not appeared.
(215)	It was obvious therefore that the Japanese would now be hunting for
them add their kidnappers. There was no way that Sukarni could force
Soekarno and Hatta to yield, or, in fact, to publicize a declaration of in-
dependence if they had yielded. It was becoming apparent that the plan
had been rashly conceived, and was likely to prove fruitless. Kahin re-
lates that Sukarni did manage to persuade Soekarno and Hatta that Japan
had surrendered, but that his claim that there were 15, 000 armed
pemudas ready outside Djakarta waiting to seize power, was received
sceptically. Both were convinced that some arrangement could be made
with the Japanese. (216) In any event, about noon of the 16th, Sukarni
decided to send Kunto back to Djakarta to find out how the land lay, and
to contact the conspirators there, probably Chaerul Saleh and Wikana. (217)
Meanwhile in Djakarta, the Japanese were busy. At noon on the
15th, the Army Information Department had heard the Surrender messages
(213)	(cont’d)
local tjamat, had long planned for a declaration of independence on
the 16th. Although to some extent corroborated by Bachsan, op. cit.,
pp. 38-48, the story seems unlikely. The whole kidnapping aHair
gives a strong impression of last-minute improvisation.
(214)	Bachsan, op. cit., p. 50. Malik, op. cit. , p. 40.
(215)	Bachsan, op. cit., p. 49.
(216)	Kahin, op. cit., p. 135. However it should be noted that Hatta
claims that he had already been convinced of the truth of the surren-
der reports, and, as we have seen, his statement that the P. P. K. I.
was due to meet on the 16th is supported independently by the episode
of Resident Sutardjo. Ci, Hatta, op. cit., p. 656, and Bachsan, ibid.
(217)	Malik, op. cit., p. 43.74
delivered in Tokyo by Prime Minister Suzuki and the Emperor. (218) The
official telegram however did not arrive until midnight, just about the time
the youth conference was being held at Tjikini 71. On the morning of the
16th, Admiral Maeda took steps to warn Soekarno and Hatta, as he had
promised. But the two leaders were nowhere to be found. Maeda immed-
iately suspected that the Kempeitai had arrested them, in order to nip an
uprising in the bud. But when he went to Army Headquarters, he found
them as mystified as he was. (219) Nishimura later testified that though
he had been warned by Soekarno of the danger that the youth represented,
he had not thought to do more than have the radio-station carefully guarded.
On the morning of the 16th, however, a Mr, Terada, Hatta8s 'secretary,'
called in to say that Hatta's family had reported that he had been out all
night and was not yet back. Nishimura then heard from Yamamoto, who
had been conferring with Maeda, about the disappearance of the two
leaders, (220) It was now becoming clear that the only people who could
have kidnapped Soekarno and Hatta were the pemuda elements. It was not
however so clear that the act had been done without the connivance of the
'victims.1 * Maeda was now receiving reports that there were at least
6, 000 pemudas in Djakarta prepared for a coup d'etat. (221) The situation
was very delicate. The Japanese, conscious of their position as a defeated
army, were loath to do anything that might unnecessarily cause unrest. In
view of the tense psychological atmosphere and the mood of the pemudas,
an attempt to get Soekarno and Hatta back by force could be the spark that
would set the dry stubble of Indonesian nationalism alight.
Apparently Yamamoto, Nishimura and Maeda decided that more
diplomatic methods were called for. (222) Maeda instructed his aide
Nishijima to try and find out what he could through the Kaigun organization.
Nishijima thereupon hurried off to track down Wikana at his home. After
some hours of discussion and pleading Nishijima got Wikana to reveal that
(218)	Cf. Statement of Captain Kiso Tsuchiya of the Beppan, April 3-8,
1947, p. 7.
(219)	Statement of Admiral Maeda, April 16, 1947, p. 4.
(220)	Statement of Nishimura, April 25, 1947, pp. If. Apparently the
Army was very angry and upset at not being able to trace the two
leaders. Cf. also Nishijima, Kishi, et al., op. cit., p. 495.
(221)	Statement of Admiral Maeda, April 16, 1947, p. 4. Maeda said:
"I felt that the coup was much more serious than the disappearnce
of Soekarno-Hatta. If they (the youth) tried a coup, it would mean
fighting with the Japanese Army .,, civil war and bloodshed. .., The
first job was to get Soekarno-Hatta back ... on the condition that
their return would be temporary and under Indonesian auspices."
(222)	Statement of Maeda, April 16, 1947, p. 4, Maeda comments: "All
the time Ϊ kept the Gunseikan (Yamamoto) informed of progress.
Precautions had meantime been taken by the Army."75
plans had been made for seizing the radio station that night, and using it
to declare independence all over Java immediately. In the meantime,
Soekarno and Hatta were in the charge of some "comrades,” Nishijima
then told Wikana that he and Maeda had no objection to an independence
proclamation that night (the 16th), but that the P. P. K. I. was the appro-
priate instrument. A coup d"etat without the presence and leadership of
Soekarno and Hatta would be foolhardy in the extreme. Wikana9s sus-
picions seem partly to have been overcome, and he agreed to consult his
comrades. The result of the consultations appears to have been that the
pemudas in Djakarta were willing to allow Soekarno and Hatta to return
to Djakarta, on the condition that the personal safety of all parties was
guaranteed by Admiral Maeda. Wikana however insisted in the mean-
time on keeping the location of the two leaders secret, to protect his
group from possible Japanese double-dealing. Nishijima thereupon called
on the services of Mr, Subardjo, acting head of the Asrama Indonesia
Merdeka, for a delicate diptdrnatic mission. He was to go with two of
Wikana’s people to the place where Soekarno, Hatta and their kidnappers
were hiding, and try to bring them back to Djakarta. Subardjo agreed to
go provided that Maeda guaranteed that Independence would be declared
that night, and that none of the youth leaders would be punished. These
conditions Maeda accepted, and promised that, if necessary, the Indo-
nesians could use his house (which had quasi-’extraterritorial® status
vis-a-vis the Japanese Army) as a meeting place, (223)
The problem was basically how to bridge the gap between the kid-
nappers and the Japanese Army, and find some solution which could satis-
fy all parties and cause none of them to lose too much face or seriously
endanger their positions. An elaborate and extended chain of communica-
tion was thus constructed running through Yamamoto, Maeda, Nishijima,
Subardjo, Wikana and Sukarni, with each link a little more 'trusted' by
the Rengasdengklok group. It was a situation where brokers were badly
needed. Subardjo was excellently equipped to play this role, though it
should be realized that under the tense circumstances his mission might
well have failed, andHmselLbeebi killed, or at least hopelessly compro-
mised politically, had the Japanese failed to live up to their promises.
Accordingly in the late afternoon of the 16th, about 5:00 p„ m.,
Subardjo set out for Rengasdengklok, accompanied by Sudiro and Kunto,
(223) Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit., pp. 495ff. Cf. Nishijima’s
deposed before Military Auditor A. ϊ3. M. Audretsch, March 10-13,
1947, pp. 3ff., for a more detailed (and self-effacing) account of
the role of the Kaxgun office at this time. Both accounts empha-
size the importance and patriotism of Mr. Subardjo in this affair.
Cf. also H. J. de Graaf, "The Indonesian Declaration of Indepen-
dence," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Deel 115,
1959, pp. 3l7£f.76
who had been Sukarni’s messenger to Wikana. (224) On arrival at
Rengasdengklok, Subardjo was apparently received with a good deal of sus-
picion, until he convinced Sukarni that he had really come at Wikana’s re-
quest, that the surrender was now official, and that all preparations for
a declaration of independence in Djakarta had now been made. (225)
Subardjo’s arrival showed Soekarno and Hatta that the Japanese either al-
ready knew or shortly would know all about the youths’ plans, and they
were thus even more convinced that a coup would fail, now that the ele-
ment of surprise had been removed. For some hours Subardjo’s offer
was debated, and three-way negotiations between Soekarno-Hatta, Sukarni,
and Subardjo were thrashed out. Finally the offer was accepted by all
parties. Soekarno, Hatta and Sukarni agreed to go back with Subardjo
to Djakarta. The proclamation would be made that night, probably in
Maeda’s house. The personal security of all parties was guaranteed by
Subardjo. (226) Soekarno and Hatta were sure that Subardjo, being a
close associate of Maeda’s, was telling the truth about the surrender,
and knew enough of Maeda’s views and personality (and influence) to be-
lieve in his sincerity. It is less easy to assess Sukarni’s attitude. He
had previously been well-acquainted with Subardjo, and so must have
realized that the Kaigun office was behind Subardjo’s mission, and pos-
sibly even that the Japanese Army was involved. One cannot help thinking
(224)	In his answers to Supplementary Questions, of April 16, 1947, p. 1,
Maeda claimed that nis aide Yoshizumi went along too. This is not
corroborated by any Indonesian source except perhaps Sjahrir, who
writes (op. cit., p. 257) that he made a surprise visit to a highly-
placed Indonesian collaborator who told him that there had been no
mass arrests, owing to the intervention of "his Japanese Naval
friends... A leading Indonesian collaborator and a Japanese" had
been sent out to Rengasdengklok to negotiate for the prisoners’ re-
lease. The story seems unlikely in view of Subardjo’s already deli-
cate and ambiguous situation.
(225)	Cf. Statement of Maeda, April 16, 1947, p. 4. For further details
see S. Nishijima’s Verklaring... , pp. 4ff. , and Malik, op. cit.,
pp. 44f. However Hatta’s comment that Subardjo came as "utusan
Gunseikanbu" (emissary of the Gunseikan’s office) may mean that
Malik’s version on which this analysis is based is wrong, and that
Subardjo’s role was quite explicit at the time. See Hatta, op. cit„
p. 657.
(226)	Doubtless the main arguments took place between Sukarni and Subard-
jo. This may account for the fact that Hatta’s account mentions no
discussions, in fact denies that any took place. See Hatta, loc. cit.
For a splendid, if highly stylized and theatrical account of the debate
at Rengasdengklok, see Tan Malakka, op. cit., pp. 56ff. He claims
that a deal was made whereby in exchange for a promise to declare
independence between 6:00 a. m. and 12:00 noon on the 17th, Soekarno
was able to get the youth to agree to take no action till his time was
up. Unfortunately he also says (p. 57), that Subardjo persuaded
Soekarno to declare independence that night at 10:00 p. m. i77
that he was glad to have someone else take the initiative and allow him to
emerge from the impasse into which he had been driven.
By 11:00 p. m. of the 16th, all the protagonists of Rengasdengklok
had arrived back in Djakarta. On leaving the barr&cks, Sukarni had re-
portedly whispered to Bachsan, the section commander in charge, to "go
ahead with the revolution" if he did not return, but this was now merely
a gesture. For the moment everything lay in Maeda’s hands. And to his
house on the old Oranje-Nassau Boulevard they all proceeded. (227)
On (heir arrival Maeda immediately telephoned General Yamamoto
and asked him to attend the meeting. The Gunseikan however refused and
told Maeda to see Nishimura--and in any case to take no action until the
morning. (228) Soekarno, Hatta and Maeda then agreed, over the pro-
tests of the pemuda representatives, that they should try to find Nishi-
mura, and at least secure his neutrality. Shortly after midnight, they
hurried to his residence, where he was sitting up waiting for them,
having been warned earlier of a possible visit by both Maeda and Yama-
moto. Nishimura afterwards described the meeting in these terms: (229)
"Soekarno and Hatta together visited me with Rear-
Admiral Maeda.... Soekarno and Hatta demanded
immediate independence. Whereupon Rear-
Admiral Maeda asked them from his heart of hearts
to behave prudently, while, endeavouring to drive
their attention to the Japanese standpoint, 1 also
persuaded them for long hours not to take any unlaw-
ful steps, ignoring the Japanese ground (sic). Upon
this occasion they requested furthermore to open the
'Preparatory Committee for Independence' immedi-
ately on the 17th, but I stubbornly refused to accept
this proposal saying to the effect that I had no right
to acknowledge that sort of proposal whatever. This
strong rejection won them to consent, as they had
known that the meeting of the conference was expected
to be held on the 18th. On the other hand, however,
both Messrs. Soekarno and Hatta were so much ex-
cited, and, therefore, Rear-Admiral Maeda left my
house with them, while soothing them down."
The meeting was obviously hardly a success. However Maeda re-
mained calm, and seems to have had the situation well in hand. Nishimura
claims that when the three men left, he had no suspicion that Maeda was
(227)	Nishijima, Kishi et al., op. cit., p. 497.
(228)	Ibid., p. 498.
(229)	Statement of Nishimura, April 15, 1947, pp. If. Cf. Aziz, op. cit.,
p. 256, for an exceedingly free version of the same passage.78
going to help them declare independence, but thought he was just going to
calm them down. ’’When they left my house ... I only believed that they
were going to the Maeda's (sic) for being appeased by Admiral Maeda . ..
(But) when leaving my house they were excited, so I had some suspicion
on their action to come.... X ordered Mr. Miyoshi to get further informa-
tion about them, and asked Mr. Miyano, the Chief of Police ... to get
prepared for the emergency cases which might happen." (230) Miyano
saw to it that a strong guard was stationed at the radio-station and the
printing presses. (231)
Maeda avers that there was a representative of the Gunseikan pre-
sent in his house on the night of the l6'th. (232) A Dutch source states
that: (233)
"Nishimura and his people did not dare to send along an
official person, because they knew Soekarno’s mentality.
He could make political capital by saying this meant the
assemblage was approved of by the Gunseikan’s office,
which was represented there, and ratified its decisions.
Yet they still felt obliged to find out what did go on and so
sent an interpreter, who got drunk and fell asleep at
MaedA’s. "
No Indonesian source except Tan Malakka confirms the presence of Japan-
ese officials at Maeda's on the night of the 16th. It seems reasonable to
suppose that at this point the Japanese were prepared to turn a blind eye
(230)	Statement of Nishimura, April 25, 1947, p. 2. Cf. also ibid., p. 4.
(231)	Cf. de Graaf, op. cit., pp. 321f. for a rather different account,
which emphasizes Nishimura's refusal to take any initiative till he
received orders from above, and his refusal to allow a P. P. K. I.
meeting, though a private "tea-party" at Soekarno’s would not be
prevented. This charge however is firmly rejected by Nishimura
himself, see his Statement of April 25, 1947, p. 1.
(232)	Statement of Maeda, April 16, 1947, p. 5. In his answers to Sup-
?lementary Questions, April 16, 1947, p. 1, Maeda added that
oshizumi was also present, as well as Saito, Nakatani and Miyoshi,
all from the Political Section of the Department of General Affairs.
Nishijima, in his Verklaring .. „,p. 8, says that Miyoshi was asked
along at Maeda's request as a representative of the Gunseikan’s
office to give the meeting an "official" aura. He also avers, con-
trary to Nishimura, that Nishimura had agreed to move up the in-
auguration of the P. P. K. I. one day to the 18th, on Soekarno’s and
Hatta's urgings.
(233)	E. Brunsveld van Hulten, Rapport over de Japansche Invloed op de
Merdekabeweging en de Gebeurtenissen in de Augustdagen, July
247 1946, p. ?. --------- -------------------------79
on Maeda’s activities, and while unwilling to aSsume the responsibility for
independence, were not at this stage unhappy to see it take place, symboli-
cally at least. For so long as they controlled the means of communication
on Java, the practical consequences of a quiet Declaration in Maeda’s house
were not likely to prove dangerous. Moreover the fact that the declaration
had been made might temper the impatience and restlessness of the pemudas
in Djakarta. Moreover if the Army wished to sit on the fence and blur its
responsibilities, it was good sense to send along a civilian employee of the
Gunseikan’s office in an unofficial capacity. (234)
Meanwhile Sukarni, who had been left behind at Maeda’s with Nishi-
jima and the others "suddenly remembered" that certain plans had been
laid for a violent military uprising in Djakarta that very night. What this
"uprising" amounted to is rather obscure. According to Malik, Chaerul
Saleh, the brains behind the scheme, had already on August 15th set about
organizing a conference of favorably-inclined Peta officers and leaders
in the Seinendan and Barisan Pelopor. Among these were Dr. Muwardi
of the Barisan~Pelopor and Company Commander Abdul La tie f, temporar-
ily in charge of the Djakarta Peta garrison, in the absence of Battalion
Commander Kasman Singodimedjo. (235) The meeting was actually held
on the morning of the 16th, soon after Sukarni, Soekarno and Hatta had
left for Rengasdengklok, in the billiard-room of the Zoological Gardens.
At the meeting it was decided that: (236)
1.	The Peta and Heiho units were to lead the attack on the
Japanese in Djakarta.
2.	Pemudas and students who had had military training and
knew how to handle weapons would be issued arms from
the Peta arsenals, and taken by truck to the city limits to
wait there as reserves till they were needed.
(234)	Cf. for a different interpretation of Maeda’s and Nishimura's
actions at this point, De Graaf, op. cit., p. 322.
(235)	See an article by Nawawi Dusky in Harian Abadi, August 22, 1955,
for a favorable account of Kasman’s role in the Proclamation
Affair. Nawawi claims that Kasman knew about the surrender on
the 15th, and when invited to Bandung that day by the Japanese
authorities, he expected that they would hand over military power
to him. He was then unpleasantly surprised to find that this was
not the case. His zealous patriotism however was demonstrated
by the fact that "it was in Kasman’s truck that Soekarno and Hatta
were taken to Rengasdengklok!" No mention is made of the pro-
posed pemuda uprising, or of Chaerul Saleh’s organization. For
a pemuda view of his role, see Malik, op. cit., pp. 41-43. It
should be remembered however that as a Battalion Commander,
Kasman’s job in the Peta was more political than military, in-
volving mostly liaison work with the Djawa Hookookai.
(236)	Malik, op. cit., pp. 4If.80
3.	A detailed study of Japanese barracks and guardposts,
already being carried on by the students, would be con-
tinued, and the results passed on to the Peta commanders.
4.	All action would be directed by the Peta and Heiho head-
quarters.
5.	The uprising would start at 1:00 a. m. on August 17th.
6.	Village units would be directed by local leaders towards
assisting the military action.
7.	Communications, codes and passwords would be agreed on.
Malik claims that the students actually carried out their assigned re
connoitring operations, and reported to the "coup" headquarters then
stationed at Prapatan 10. But at 8515 p. m. that evening (the 16th) word
came from Kasman Singodimedjo that the Peta and Heiho would not move
without orders from Soekarno. (237) This upset the pemudas* plans com-
pletely. Chaerul Saleh and his group appear to have believed that as
Kasman knew that Soekarno was still at Rengasdengklok in Peta hands,
his message could only mean that he had lost his nerve and was retreating
from his commitments. A student mission was sent out to find him, but
to no avail. (238)
However another aspect of Malik's account appears to conflict with
this story. He records that early in the evening of the 16th, Wikana had
succeeded in extracting from the Menteng group a promise that they would
not move until he had heard the results of Subardjo's mission to Rengas-
dengklok that afternoon. When they had heard Wikana's explanation of the
situation, the group broke up (at 8:40 p. m. ), agreeing to reconvene at
10:00 p. m. when the news from Subardjo should have come through. (239)
The second story seems the more convincing. The time interval between
the report of Kasman's defection, 8:15 p. m. , and the break-up of the youth
conference after Wikana's report at 8:45 is too short to be convincing, es-
pecially as part of the conference agreement was to postpone action till
word came from Subardjo. If the Kasman story is correct, 'action' must
have been out of the question by 8:15 or shortly thereafter anyway. In any
case, morale among the pemudas must have been temporarily low.
Djohar Noer had told the conference that attempts to penetrate Japanese
guards at Radio Djakarta had failed. The atmosphere was gloomy and
(237)	Malik, op. cit., p. 42.
(238)	Dr. Sutjipto, who, as a Peta Company Commander, acted as liaison
between Chaerul Saleh's group and the Peta garrisons in Djakarta
and its environs, seems to have been overwhelmed by Kasman's
message. He said to an angry Chaerul Saleh: "I don't understand
Kasman and Latief. God knows where they've got to now. For
you civilians it's not so bad, but for us, who've been glorified with
the name of Defenders of the Fatherland, to fail in our duty, hiii,
hiii!" Malik, ibid., loc. cit.
(239)	Malik, op. cit. , pp. 43f.81
tense. The Kempeitai seemed everywhere in control. (240)
Nevertheless, certain pemuda elements had agreed that in case
Sukarni, Soekarno and Hatta did not re-appear in Djakarta by 12:00 mid-
night, they would attempt an uprising. (241) In any case such an attempt
would have been rash But with Soekarno's and Hatta's return to the cap-
ital, it might well have been disastrous. The delicate compromise en-
gineered by Maeda, Nishijima and Subardjo would have collapsed in ruins
if fighting broke out in the streets. The Army's hitherto hesitant and equi
vocal attitude would have hardened into murderous hostility. Sukarni's
belated recollection of the scheduled uprising meant that action had to be
taken immediately. Nishijima and Sukarni thereupon set off to warn the
pemudas to hold their hand. The car stopped at key points on Djalan
Tjikini and behind the Pasar Senen, as well as Chaerul Saleh's temporary
headquarters at Prapatan 10. To the clusters of pemudas gathered on
street-corners and in alleyways Sukarni called his warning: "Ini hari tidak
djadi, bung, " (Not today, brother!) Some of the youths must have been
hard to persuade, or suspicious of Sukarni's Japanese riding companion.
Nishijima reports Sukarni climbing back wearily into the car muttering:
"Mereka ini semuanja kepala batu, susah!" (What a pig-headed lot they
all are!) (242) The last and most crucial spot was the radio station on the
Koningsplein, which was supposed to be the main target of the pemudas 1
onslaught. They found it heavily guarded by the Kempeitai, and were im-
mediately arrested. Only when a telephone call was put through to Maeda
were they both released. Finally with their mission successfully
(240)	Malik, op cit. , p. 43. Cf. also Aidit, op. cit. , p. 508. He agree
with Malik that the pemudas, and certain Peta and Heiho elements
planned a coup. Those assigned to the key task of mobilizing "the
people of Djakarta" were Aidit, Lukman, Sidik Kertapati, Suko,
Gundiwan Muljono, Njono, Samsuddin, A. M. Hanafi, etc. Plans
were simultaneously made for spreading the word of the Proclama-
tion and seizing independence in the "regions" (daerah2). The cru-
cial meeting for this purpose was held at 4:00 p. m of the 16th
(i. e. as Kunto arrived in Djakarta from Rengasdengklok), at
Armunanto's house on Gang Sentiong. Present were: Sidik Djojo-
sukarto, Widarta, Kartopandojo, Sujono, Sudiro (mBah), Inu
Kertapati, Sundoro, Ukon Effendi and Armunanto himself. Aidit
attributes the collapse of the coup to insufficient preparation, the
lack of a firm revolutionary core in the Peta leadership (i. e.
Kasman and Latief), and poor coordination between revolutionary
groups within Djakarta and those outside.
(241)	Nishijima, Verklaring . . . , March 10-13, 1947, p. 6.
(242)	Ibid. , pp. 6f.82
accomplished, they returned to Maeda's house. (243)
While Nishijima and Sukarni had been busy forestalling an uprising,
and Maeda, Soekarno and Hatta had been conferring with Nishimura, Mr.
Subardjo had been active, on instructions from Hatta, in routing as many
members of the P. P. K. I. as possible out of their beds, and bringing them
to Maeda's house. By the time the Admiral and his two companions returned,
many of these had already arrived. It was at this point, according to Kahin,
that Sjahrir visited Soekarno and "elicited from him a promise to declare in-
dependence; however, he was unable to secure from him a commitment that
it would be done in the strongly anti-Japanese terms that he and his group
advocated." (244) Sjahrir himself merely says that a delegation arrived
asking him to attend the signing of the Proclamation, and that he refused be-
cause he was sure that the proclamation finally issued would not run along
the same lines as the one he had prepared himself. In any case a revolu-
tionary document could hardly be signed at the house of a Japanese admiral.
(245) There can be little doubt, even discounting Malik's polemical analysis,
that he is right in saying that the initiative had passed out of Sjahrir's hands,
and that in these three historic days, he remained largely a spectator. In-
deed he admits as much himself. With the Menteng and Kaigun groups now
at least partially co-operating with the older leaders and the Japanese, the
"anti-Fascist" revolt he had dreamed of seemed rather remote.
There is a good deal of controversy as to who actually attended the
final meeting at Maeda's when the Proclamation of Independence was drafted
and signed Although all Indonesian sources except Tan Malakka deny that
any Japanese were present, we have it on the generally reliable authority of
Nishijima that he , Maeda, Yoshizumi and Miyoshi were on hand, at
least for some of the time. (246) It is certainly unlikely that having played
so important a part in setting the stage for independence, they would be con-
tent to vanish entirely from the scene. It is perhaps worth noting that in the
immediate post-Independence period, an admission of even minor Japanese
participation would have been damaging in Allied eyes, and this consideration
perhaps allows one to regard Indonesian treatments of this point with some
reservations.
(243)	Nishijima, Verklaring, . . . , March 10-13, 1947, p. 7. Cf. also the
interesting account of Hasjim Mahdan in Indonesia Ra.ya, August 16,
1955. As one of the Pemudas attached to Prapatan 10, he was as-
signed to the job of taking over this radio station, for the all-impor-
tant task of publicizing independence. See also Maeda's answers to
Supplementary Questions, April 16, 1947, p 1.
(244)	Kahin, op. cit. , p. 136.
(245)	Sjahrir, op. cit. , p. 258.
(246)	Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit. , p. 499f.83
Hatta says simply that all the members of the P. P„ K. I. and the
leaders of some ’’youth’’and other organizations met together and accepted
a suggestion by the youth leaders that the proclamation should be signed
by Soekarno and Hatta alone. (247) Sjahrir agrees that all the P. P. K. I.
members attended, and adds that they called themselves a National Com-
mittee for the occasion. (248) Kahin lists all the members of the P. P. K.
I. as well as Subardjo, Sukarni and Wikana. (249) Pringgodigdo believes
that not all the P. P. K. I. representatives attended, as it was late at night;
on the other hand such youth leaders as Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh, and B.
M. Siah, and some older nationalists like Dr. Buntaran and Semaun Bakri
were present. (250) A. M. Hoeta Soehoet and Malik list B. M. Diah,
Semaun Bakri, Sajuti Melik (just out of jail), Xwa Kusumasumantri,
Sukarni, Subardjo, and Chaerul Saleh, as well as Soekarno and Hatta.
(251) Dimyati, who claims to follow the main lines of Malik’s account of
the Proclamation affair, gives as present: (252)
♦Soekarno
♦Latuha rha r y
♦Iskandardinata
♦Moh. Hasan
Dr. Buntaran
♦Hatta *Subardjo
♦Dr. Amir *Dr. Radjiman
♦Poedja *Hamidhan
♦Ratulangie
Dr.Samsi A. A. Rivai
♦Soetardjo
♦Dr. Soepomo
♦A. Abbas
♦Andi Pangeran
Iwa Kusumasumantri
Andi Sultan Daeng Radja,
"and various other youth and revolutionary leaders." Tan Malakka concurs
(247)	Hatta, op. cit. , p. 657.
(248)	Sjahrir, op. cit. , p. 258.
(249)	Kahin, op. cit. , p. 136.
(250)	A.G. Pringgodigdo, Perubahan Kabinet Presidensil Mendjadi Kabinet
Parlementer, Jajasan Fonds Universitit Negeri Gadjah Mada, Jog-
jakarta, no date, p. 17.
(251)	A. M. Hoeta Soehoet, in D. Marpaung, ed. , op. cit. , p. 33. Malik,
op. cit. , p. 51. Malik says that Sukarni, Iwa, Subardjo, and Kunto
left together for Djalan Bogor Lama, the new pemuda headquarters,
and after discussions there, accepted Sukarni and Chaerul Saleh as
pemuda spokesmen. He adds that Sjahrir was there, and concurred.
Tan Malakka, op. cit. , p. 59 agrees, and adds that Sukarni and
Chaerul Saleh were chosen by a group including Sjahrir, Maruto,
Panduwiguna, Adam Malik, Kusnaeni and Djawoto. It is curious that
in Malik's list the P. P. K. I. is not mentioned at all, and that those
honourably cited there were all eventually to join Malik as members
of Tan Malakka's Persatuan Perdjuangan.
(252)	M. Dimyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia, Widjaja, Djakarta,
1951, p 90. The names with asterisks are those of members of the
P. P. K. I.84
and adds Supeno, Gunadi, Semaun Bakri, Sajuti Melik, B. M. Diah, Kunto,
Chaerul Saleh, Sukarni, as well as Maeda, Nishijima, Miyoshi and Saito. (253)
If we combine Dimyati’s and Tan Malakka's accounts, we find a good
sprinkling of youth leaders, older nationalists, and 15 of the 22 members of
the P. P. K. I. , which seems very reasonable for that hour of the night. It
also squares with Nishijima *s figure of about 30 people being present, "mainly
members of the P. P. K. I. and older nationalists living in Djakarta " (254)
The substance of the long and heated discussion that followed was
the content of the Independence Proclamation. Sjahrir’s proposed draft was
rejected, probably because its proponent was not present, as well as be-
cause of its presumably strongly anti-Japanese tone. The text proposed by
Sukarni and supported by the other pemudas present ran as follows: (255)
"The Indonesian people hereby declares its independence.
All existing governmental organs shall be seized By the
people from the foreigners who still control them."
Hatta however objected: "As the youth say, only power can make
the revolution successful. But power is not enough The enemy, the true
enemy is not Japan, who has been defeated in Indonesia, and has lost all
power from now on. It is Holland that is trying to dominate Indonesia again."
He saw no sense in a showdown with the Japanese at this stage. (256) After
further heated discussion a final draft was produced, according to Malik and
others by Sajuti Melik, according to Nishijima by the joint efforts of Soekarno,
Hatta, Subardjo, Maeda, Nishijima, xYashizumi and Miyoshi (257) This
final draft was rather better adapted to the delicate position of the Japanese,
and was generally less infammatory in tone. It read: (258)
(253)	Tan Malakka, op cit , pp. 58f.
(254)	Nishijima, Kishi et al , op. cit. , p. 500.
(255)	Cf. Sjahrir, op. cit. , p. 258, and Malik, op. cit. , p. 52.
(256)	Nishijima, Kishi et al. , loc. cit.
(257)	Compare Malik, loc. cit. , with Nishijima, Kishi et al. , loc. cit.
(258)	Malik, loc. cit. Cf. also Hatta, "Isi Proklamasi" in Fakta dan Doku-
men2 untuk menjusun buku 'Indonesia memasuki Gelanggang Inter-
nasional1, Supplemen I, Vol. XI, KemluR.I. Direktorat V~ Seksi
Pemjelidikan, Dokumentasi dan Perpustakaan (ed. Emzita), 1958,
p. 1. He says that the second sentence of the Proclamation was
geared to the question of how the instruments of power would pass
from Japanese to Indonesian hands. "Matters concerning the trans-
fer of power ... in an orderly manner" meant that the Indonesians
would attempt not to destroy their own forces in attempting to seize
power. ". . . will be carried out ... in the shortest possible time, "
meant "before the Allies arrive."85
"We, the people of Indonesia hereby declare Indonesia's
Independence. Matters concerning the transfer of power,
and other matters, will be executed in an orderly manner
and in the shortest possible time."
As Sjahrir commented bitterly, every word "that reflected our struggle
against Japanese oppression and extortion disappeared from the draft
of the Proclamation of the constitutional convention." (259)
A final dispute arose over who should have the honour of signing
the Proclamation. Malik reports that the six (?) representatives of the
pemudas wanted their names included without those of the older national-
ists. But Soekarno adamantly rejected this idea. Finally, as a compro-
mise, the Proclamation was signed by Soekarno and Hatta alone. The
document was read solemnly aloud to the assembled representatives,
who then mostly went home to bed. It was already 7:00 a. m. , August
17th. (260)
It seems that the original plan agreed on for the public reading of
the proclamation, was that it should take place on the Koningsplein (Ikada)
in the presence of a hastily summoned but large crowd. Aidit reports
that Suwirjo, the mayor of Djakarta, ordered his subordinate to make the
necessary preparations. He adds however that the plans had to be changed
because the Kempeitai1 tapped the telephone lines, and so got wind of the
scheme. (261) This may be the case. Another source however affirms
that Maeda, who had gone to bed before the actual signing of the Proclama-
tion, and who up to this point had no idea of the 'Koningsplein proposal',
found out about it when he woke up. Knowing that the Koningsplein would
be stiff with Japanese tanks and guns protecting the radio-station and the
Kempeitai headquarters situated on' the square, he became very alarmed.
It would take very little in such circumstances for the violence he had con-
sistently tried to avoid, to break out. A nervous Japanese officer, or an
overzealous Indonesian nationalist might spark a tragedy. He therefore
contacted Subardjo, and impressed upon him the necessity of changing the
plan. (262) Nishijima reports that on waking up that morning he too was
(259)	Sjahrir, op. cit. , p. 258.
(260)	Malik, op. cit. , p. 52. Tan Malakka, op. cit. , p. 59, says the
compromise suggestion was made by Chaerul Saleh, because the
pemudas would not sign on the same paper with "Kempei nominees."
(261)	Probably the two readings were designed to satisfy two constituencies.
The older leaders provided the Proclamation with P. P. K. I. endorse-
ment at Maeda's house. The pemudas had the satisfaction of an
"open" proclamation among the "masses." Cf. Aidit, op. cit. ,
p. 509.
(262)	De Graaf, op. cit. , pp. 324f. , quoting directly from Maeda.86
startled to see out of the window "thousands of people of all ages and walks
of life, marching in rows of four, like regular troops, towards the Konings-
plein. They were carrying sharpened bamboo spears and red-and-white
flags, and singing Indonesian songs. " On telephoning to one of the Indo-
nesian clerks at his office, he was told of a mass meeting to be held on the
Koningsplein, where Soekarno would proclaim Indonesian Independence.
Later however he heard that the site of the Declaration had been shifted to
Soekarno's house on Pegangsaan near the Manggarai station. (263) This
makes it look as if plans were changed only at the very last minute. The
difficulty of Aidit's account is that it does not really explain how the fact
of the Kempeitaj's knowing of the proposed meeting got back to the Indone-
sians (could it really have been through Maeda and Nishijima?), or how the
change in plans was put into effect.
In any case it was not until 11:30 a. m. of the 17th that Soekarno, ac-
companied by Hatta, Abdul Latief, Dr. Muwardi and other dignitaries, read
out the Proclamation in the courtyard of his own home at Pegangsaan 56.
(264)	The Sang Me rah Putih was hoisted up a bamboo pole by Abdul Latief
dressed in his Peta uniform, and Indonesia Raya was sung by all those
present.
Though the Japanese military authorities kept a tight control over all
the public presses in Djakarta, handbills announcing Independence were
printed in the Naval Attache's office print-shop under Nishijima's super-
vision. (265) But it was not until 7:00 p. m. that evening that the Proclama-
tion, together with Hatta's personal message to his old Nationalist comrades,
was broadcast clandestinely from the Domei transmission-room. (266)
The central radio station was still in the hands of the Kempeitai. General
Nishimura's comment on this historic event was very much in character: (267)
"About noon of this day, when I was in the office with the
chief of the Planning Section and other personnel, my
eyes caught a shabby sheet of paper brought in by a
frightened and confused official, and all present there
(263)	Nishijima, Verklaring , . . , March 10-13, 1947, p. 8.
(264)	Kahin, op. cit. , p. 136. For a description of the scene by one of
Soekarno's Kodyguards, see R. O. Permadipura's article in Peman-
dangan, August 16, 1955. (By local Java time, the ceremony took
place at 10:00 a. m. ).
(265)	Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit. , p. 501.
(266)	Kahin, loc. cit. , and Hasjim Mahdan, op. cit. The name of the man
who succeeded in getting the broadcast was, according to Hasjim
Mahdan, Sjachruddin.
(267)	Statement of Nishimura, April 10, 1947, p. 5. He adds that he then
tried to collect the leaflets, find out where they were coming from,
and suppress them, but was unsuccessful!87
were suddenly taken aback, knowing that it was a
propaganda sheet of Indonesian independence, and
a part of the Indonesians had proclaimed indepen-
dence breaking out of Japanese control. "
But in Java, the reaction was great and growing enthusiasm. The Revo-
lution had begun.88
CHAPTER VII
ALLIED STRATEGY AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPECTATIONS
Realities.
On June 19, 1945 General MacArthur announed the transfer of the
Netherlands East Indies from his own South-West Pacific Area Command
to Lord Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command. (268) The trans-
fer however only became of real significance after the Potsdam Conference.
For it was only then that Mountbatten became aware of the existence of the
Atom Bomb and the prospect of a speedy Japanese capitulation. (269) The
political and military question of how Indonesia was to be approached and
administered had however been the subject of dispute between American,
Dutch and British officials for some time. (270) And it was only on August
24th that agreement was finally attained. (271) Under the terms of this
agreement, the parties recognized that the re-occupation of the Netherlands
East Indies would be a two-staged operation. In the first, or military,
stage, the South East Asia Command would have plenary powers to take any
(268)	Cf. , e. g. Brugmans, etal, op. cit. , p. 83. For the political manoeuvres
between Dutch, American and British authorities at this time, see the
excellent detailed analysis contained in Idrus Djajadiningrat, The Be-
ginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe Talks,
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell
University, Ithaca, N, Y„ , 1958, pp. 4-27.
(269)	F. S. V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East
1943-1946, History of the Second World War Series, Η. M. Stationary
Office, London, 1956, p. 417.
(270)	Donnison, op. cit. , pp 415f. For a text of the original van Mook-
MacArthur~uhderstanding of December 10, 1944, and of the agree-
ment of August 1945, cf. Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-
1945, Militair Beleid, Terugkeer Naar· Nederlandsch-Indie, (8A en
B), Staatsdrukkerijen Uitgeverijbedrijf, 's-Gravenhage, ΓΨ56, pp
632-634, 650-651.
(271)	The actual transfer of authority in the Netherlands-Indies from Ameri-
can to British hands was not made legally effective till August 15th, the
day of the surrender Cf. Rajendra Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces:
Japan and South-East Asia, in the series Official History of the Indian
Armed Forces in the Second World War 1^39-1945 (ed. .Bisheshwar
Prasad), Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and
Pakistan, 1968, p. 220.89
measures it might think fit to end the fighting in the islands. The Nether-
lands Indies Civil Affairs Administration (NICA) was in this early period
to give unconditional obedience to the orders of the Supreme Commander.
In return, the South East Asia Command would make no formal or public
assumption of authority, and would see to it that the NICA was given as im-
portant a role as circumstances permitted. (272) Later, full powers
would be handed over to the Dutch. Till then, however, the Allied Supreme
Command would have complete jurisdiction over all personnel.
The changes in the South East Asia Command's jurisdiction should
be understood for any just appreciation of the Allies' activities in the
period under consideration. Half a million square miles were added to
the million already under its jurisdiction. It acquired charge of an addi-
tional 80, 000, 000 people in addition to the 45, 000, 000 already assigned to
it. And 2, 000 more miles were now included in an already grossly over-
extended system of communications. It was therefore logical for the
British to use the Japanese Army to keep control of the occupied areas,
until they could arrive themselves. This meant that it was of the utmost
importance to seize the nerve-centers of Japanese control in Southeast
Asia, Saigon and Singapore, as soon as possible. Once these centers
had been seized, the Allies could gradually take; over power in the con-
quered areas from the Japanese troops occupying them. In view of the im-
portance of avoiding massive resistance on the part of the Japanese it was
deemed advisable by MacArthur and Moutatbatten to make no attempt to land
forces in Malaya or Indonesia till after a formal surrender had been signed
in Tokyo. The Dutch protested bitterly, since it was essential for their
purposes that the Indonesians should not have the time to prepare a regime
of their own, and they recognized that if the MacArthur-Mountbatten plan
were followed, Allied troops were unlikely to land on Java till late in
September. (273)
(272)	Cf. Aneta (Manila) August 25, 1945 (as cited in U. S. Office of
Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Report #3250,
pp. 2f. , September 1945) for the statement of General L. H. Van
Oyen that "Once Batavia (Djakarta) is re-entered, the machinery
for civil administration will be quickly re-introduced, and the
Netherlands Indies Government, at present in Australia, will be
likely to accompany the invasion forces or follow them shortly.
For a time there will be a military administration in the Indies,
but military control will be relinquished on the establishment of
civil machinery."
(273)	See for details, Donnison, op. cit. , pp. 420ff. , and Rajendra
Singh, op. cit. , pp. I69f. Djakarta and Surabaja were fifth and
sixth on the British list of Southeast Asian centres to be captured.
Altogether 1 infantry division and 3 Air Force squadrons were
initially assigned to accept the Japanese surrender on Java.90
Two other problems bedevilled the Allied strategists. The transfer
of the Netherlands Indies to the South East Asia Command at such a late
date meant Mountbatten had virtually no adequate basic intelligence on Indo-
nesia, let alone any up-to-date information. The core of the Dutch intelli-
gence service and civil administration had been concentrated at MacArthur.*S
headquarters in Australia, which had been planned as the jumping-off point
for an invasion of the Indies. There was no possibility, due to transport
shortages, of shipping them en masse to Kandy, Rangoon or even Singapore.
There was of course always the alternative, after August 17th, of recognizing
and relying on the embryo Indonesian regime to maintain law and order on
Java. But as we have seen, the British scarcely seem to have considered
this at first. The demands of the Dutch and the logic of the re-conquest of
Southeast Asia as a whole, inevitably cast the Japanese Army in the role of
maintainer of the status quo in Indonesia On Java, the full responsibility for
carrying out this task was assigned to the Commander of the 16th Army.
The second difficulty was that of Allied ignorance of the political situ-
ation in Indonesia, especially on Java. Generally speaking there was little
suspicion that the new Indonesian "regime” was anything but a Japanese pup-
pet administration. Soekarno was certainly regarded as a quisling from his
wartime broadcasts. Few believed he had any popular support whatever.
(274) This impression seems to have been sedulously fostered by "old
Netherlands Indies hands. " American intelligence apparently had a shrewder
inkling of the real situation. An O. S. S. report dated August 13, 1945, com-
mented: (275)
". . . (The Nationalist politicians) might conceivably consider
the crucial period between actual Japanese surrender to the
Allies, and the firm re-establishment of the Netherlands
East Indies administration as their only precious chance to
gain a strong bargaining position in relation to the govern-
ment. ... A possibility therefore would be the formation . . .
of an independent Indonesian government, which would dis-
associate itself from the Japanese and denounce them, or,
if at all possible, revolt against them. This move would of-
fer a chance of clearing the leadership group from the stigma
of Japanese collaboration and create a purely Indonesian-
Netherlands issue."
(274)	Cf. e.g, Donnison, op. cit. , pp. 422-425, and E. B. Van Hulten,
Rapport . . . , July 247" 1946, p. 6. See also Kahin, op. cit. , p. 142,
	g
(275)	U. S. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch,
Report # 3229, "Problems arising from a sudden liberation of the
Netherlands East Indies," August 13, 1945, pp. If. These originally
classified reports have recently been made available to scholars.91
The Report went on to suggest that the Dutch select a group of trustworthy
Indonesians, including some collaborators, and give them interim charge
of administration in Indonesia. Otherwise there would be trouble--and the
United States would inevitably be identified as pro-colonial by the local
population!
This seems to have been an exception to the rule however. The
British seem to have been misled by their experience in Burma to expect
little resistance from "native" administrators, and indeed felt that there
would be no need for a tough policy. As one British officer later com-
mented, "In Burma and Malaya, everywhere we had been hailed as liber-
ators- Why do the people here (in Indonesia) alone look upon us with
animosity?" (276) There is reason to believe that at the topmost levels,
the British Labour Government's ideological position discouraged any
very whole-hearted co-operation with the NICA, which was staffed by
men who were not usually politically associated with the new leftist Dutch
government, but were old pre-war colonial administrators. Lord Mount-
batten, whose political savoir-faire in handling the Burmese problem has
been generally acclaimed, and who had a generally liberal and progressive
outlook, expressed at once the new British attitude towards colonialism
and a more traditional British tendency to inane language, when he said,
"Our one idea is to get the Dutch and Indonesians to kiss and make friends
and then pull out." (277)
From all this it is important to understand that while speed was
essential for the Dutch, on whose mental horizon Indonesia loomed very
large, to MacArthur and Mountbatten, Indonesia was very much a secon-
dary affair, not at all at the centre of their attention. While the Dutch,
Japanese and Indonesians might very well imagine that the Allies kept a
hard, beady eye on Indonesia at every moment, the reality was very dif-
ferent. Power lay in the hands of the British and Americans, and naturally
British and American interests were going to be seen to before the Dutch
were allowed effectively to stake their claims.
Such was the rather confusing reality of the Allied approach to
Indonesia. However two factors tended to distort the conception of this
reality held by Indonesians and Japanese on Java. One was the nature of
Allied communications to the islands. The other was the hopes and fears
of their audiences.
Allied propaganda to Indonesia during the war seems to have cen-
tred around two main themes: 1) retribution for collaboration with the
Japanese. 2) the promise of a new political relationship between Holland
and her colony after the war was over. Most sources agree that Allied
(276) Quoted by Anonymous Japanese Office, Beschouwingen. . . , June
21-23, 1947, p. 36.
(277) Cited in Geoffrey Sawer, "Allied Policy in Indonesia," Austral-
Asiatic Bulletin, April, 1946, p. 14.92
threats to punish severely those who gave aid and comfort to the enemy were
important in creating an atmosphere of anxiety and uncertainty among the In-
donesians. It was very easy, especially for those who feared that they might
be affected, to see retribution as being the main Allied objective, whereas in
reality of course it was very far down on their list of priorities. (278) Part
of the weakness of the first post-Proclamation cabinet, was, as we shall see,
this cloud which hung over the greater part of its membership.
Secondly, in spite of the ringing declaration of the Atlantic Charter and
Allied propaganda about the San Francisco Conference, Dutch policy state-
ments about Indonesia's future were made ambiguous by their great diversity.
On December 12th, 1942, Queen Wilhelmina had made a speech in London,
in which she announced the post-war creation of a Commonwealth "in which
the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao will participate with com-
plete self-reliance and freedom of conduct in internal matters, but with
readiness to render mutual assistance." Though she made no explicit pro-
mise that Indonesia would be allowed a free choice of government, she as-
serted that there would be "no room for discrimination according to race or
nationality." The new relationship would be "a combination of independence
and collaboration." (279) The then Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, van
Kleffens, argued against immediate and full independence, preferring "pro-
gressive emancipation." (280) In June 1945, Professor Schermerhorn's
new Government talked vaguely of "the liberation" of the "East Indies" from
"Japanese oppression" as having "the utmost priority in all our endeavours."
(281) In Australia, the acting Governor-General Hubertus van Mook, spoke
of "the formation of a new state" based on "co-operation between Dutch and
Indonesians." (282) The Dutch had also attempted to be tactful by changing
their Ministry of Colonies into a Ministry for Overseas Territories; some
radio-announcers even went so far as to speak of "Indonesians" instead of
"natives." In July, 1945, the Minister for Overseas Territories, Logemann,
(278)	The Anonymous Japanese Officer, in his Beschouwingen. . . , p. 18, re-
ports on the chilling effect of the broadcasts of Col. Abdul Kadir
(later advisor to Van Mook) from Papua and Australia. The Colonel's
repeated threat was that "When we go back to Java, we shall never
forgive those who cried 'Amerika strika, Inggeris linggis!' (Flatten
America, use a crowbar on Britain!). " For some Indonesian re-
actions to these threats, see ibid , pp. 17-18.
(279)	For a text of the Queen's speech, see e. g. Fakta dan Dokumen2,
pp. 218-220.
(280)	Cf. U. S. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch,
Report # 28769, "Dutch Attitudes towards the Future of the Nether-
lands East Indies," February 2, 1945, p. 1.
(281)	Quoted in F. B. I. S. Reports, June 29, 1945, section H, pp. 8f.
(282)	Quoted in ibid. , June 26, 1945, section Q, pp. 3f.93
made an unusually specific and liberal statement of Dutch intentions: (283)
"The Netherlands is not going to reconquer a colony.
It is going out for the liberation of the people of Indo-
nesia . „. which it wishes to receive as a partner in the
Kingdom of Queen Wilhelmina.. » . After the war of
steel, a spiritual struggle awaits us. The new respon-
sibility which we assume in regard to the independence
of Indonesia is not a mere formal action, let us say a
democratic constitution on paper.. .. Our Sovereign,
as well as our Government and our people are ready
to have the Netherlands fight only for an independent
Indonesia and not for the restoration of the colonial ad-
ministration. . .. We have the expressed demand of our
democratic people that it does not want to fight for
Capitalistic and imperialistic objectives.”
The liberality of Logemann was balanced by Major-General van Klemens,
who can hardly have relieved many Indonesian minds by declaring that
100, 000 Dutch troops were ready to invade the Netherlands East Indies,
and that he was sure the "natives . . . would be loyal, and co-operate fully
with the Allies." (284) And General van Oyen announced that in his view
all but a few dissidents would welcome the return of the Dutch. Trials
would be held, but they would probably be few in number. He had the im-
pression that the Japanese Occupation had left only one-tenth of one per-
cent of the population influenced by Japanese propaganda (285)
It is probable, however, that such varied and confusing statements
were often taken by the Indonesians less as indication of doubt and con-
flict among Dutch policy-makers than as further examples of Dutch dupli-
city The decision taken by the Allies to use the Japanese enemy rather
than the "oppressed" Indonesians to maintain law and order, must surely
at the start have undermined any possible Indonesian trust in Dutch in-
tentions, and focussed Indonesian attention on the inescapable fact that
the Dutch, not the Japanese, were their real antagonists.
(283)	Speech of July 17, 1945, as quoted in U. S. Office of Strategic Ser-
vices, Research and Analysis Branch, Report # 3215, July 23,
1945, p. 1. The Report is entitled, "New Netherlands Minister
of Overseas Territories states Netherlands' Objectives in the
Liberation of Indonesia."
(284)	Quoted in F. B. I. S. Reports, June 24, 1945, section Q, p. 3.
(285)	See U. S. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis
Branch, Report # 3250, "Pre-Liberation Developments in the
Netherlands East Indies," September 1945, citing an Aneta
(Manila) bulletin of August 25, 1945.94
Illusions, Plans, Stratagems:
a) The Japanese
Most accounts of the reactions and the "plans" of the Japanese in
Indonesia at this time, tend to portray the Japanese as "Indonesia-centred"
in their outlook. Yet a real understanding of Japanese behaviour, even at
the higher levels, will be vitiated by such a perspective. The ordinary
Japanese soldiers and middle-rank officers, who were unlikely to be af-
fected by Allied war-crimes tribunals were far from being preoccupied
with Indonesia's fate. From various Japanese reports one gets an impres-
sion of bewilderment, confusion and despair when the Imperial Rescript
announcing the Emperor's surrender to the Allies was known. (286) Wild
rumours of Allied revenge and the destruction of the homeland swept
through the Army on Java Even so cool and rational an observer as
Nishijima notes parenthetically his own depression and feeling of despera-
tion. (287) The majority of Japanese were concerned with just three
things: getting safely out of Indonesia as rapidly as possible, seeing their
homes and families, and doing what little they could to salvage something
from the wreckage in Japan Among the officer-corps this meant a hope
that the position of the Emperor would somehow be maintained, and that
Japan herself would not be razed by the invading barbarians. Psychologi-
cal reactions to the collapse of the myth-system on which an entire genera-
tion had been reared varied from suicide, through complete apathy to
'last flings' , orgies, etc. (288) Trained elite groups like the Kempeitai
might carry on their work efficiently, but the majority of Japanese were
morally shattered, and full of doubt and anxieties. Insofar as the Indo-
nesians were involved in ordinary Japanese thinking, it was probably only
tangentially. What attitude towards the Indonesians would allow them to
get home as quickly and peacefully as possible?
At the higher levels of the Japanese Command of course, there were
more complex issues at stake. General Yamamoto (289) and General
(286)	Cf. e. g. General Yamamoto, General Report for Allied Headquarters
from the l6thArmy, September 15, 1945, pp. if. ; Statement of
Major Tadakazu Ishizima, November 16, 1946, p 4; Nishijima,
Verklaring verbonden aan de politieke Afdeeling van het Marine-Kantoor
te Batavia van Schoutbij Nacht Maeda, March 25-29, 1947, p. T.
(Henceforth referred to as Nishijima, Verklaring (Marine-Kantoor)).
(287)	Nishijima, Verklaring (Marine-Kantoor), March 10-13, p 8.
(288)	See e. g. Goro Taniguchi, "Indonesia to tomo ni ikite," (Having Lived
with Indonesia), Volume 6 in Hiroku Dai-Toa Sen Shi (Secret History
of the War for Greater East Asia), Fuji Shoen, Tokyo, 1954, pp.
534-539, translated by Y. Sasaki (mimeo. )
(289)	He was acting for the Saikosikikan, General Nagano, who was then in
Singapore.95
Nishimura had been specifically instructed by the Allies to maintain order
on Java Their instructions ran: (290)
a.	Japanese commanders will be held responsible for ensuring
that orders issued to them 1) are transmitted forthwith as
requisite to all troops under their command. 2) are im-
plicitly obeyed.
b.	Japanese commanders at all levels will be informed that
pending further orders, they will be responsible for the
maintenance of discipline among their own troops.
c.	Japanese commanders will ... be held responsible for the
maintenance of public order . . . and the care and feeding
of the civilian population.
d.	Japanese commanders will be held responsible for the
maintenance of all essential services.
Both generals could well expect to be held personally accountable at a Mili
tary Tribunal if they failed to carry out their task. This "responsibility"
coincided with the natural inclinations of the two men, who seem to have
been intelligent, strongly nationalist, and politically moderate officers.
The Allies were expected to land at any moment. Any real aid they might
give the Indonesians would only endanger their own lives, and perhaps
even their country. Neither of the men can have doubted that the Allies,
who had crushed Japan, would have any trouble or hesitation in stamping
out a Republican Government. (291) Though neither of them seems to
have been at all opposed on principle to Indonesian independence, Army
ideology hardly encouraged them to stake their all on the aspirations of
an alien people. Their first duty was to their homeland and Emperor It
was more than likely that "trouble" in Java would only harden Allied atti-
tudes towards Japan and the Imperial family. A graphic, if not word for
word report of a conversation between Nishimura and Maeda at this time,
brings out these considerations clearly. Maeda had come to protest the
Army’s "reactionary" policy towards Indonesian Independence. Nishi-
mura reportedly replied: (292)
"We could help the Indonesians during war-time. But not
now. Politically and strategically, Indonesian Indepen-
dence is just another form of fighting It makes no sense
to stop fighting the Allies, but to urge on the Nationalists
at the same time. The Emperor's will is not always the
same. He ordered us to fight and we fought. Now he
orders us to stop. We do not know the reason. But we
(290)	From "Orders for Japanese Surrender," issued by HQ Allied
Land Forces, South East Asia Command, August 18, 1945.
(291)	Cf. the Anonymous Japanese Officer, Beschouwingen. . . , June
21-23, 1947, p. 17.
(292)	Ibid. , p. 21.96
should obey. . . . Have you thought of the possible punishment
the international world will inflict for such a breach of the
capitulation agreement? It is easy to die. That is what we
came here to do. But who is really going to suffer? Tokyo,
the Government and the Emperor. Ibtsdam allowed the
Emperor to stay on the throne ... but will this promise be
maintained if we break faith here?"
Major Ishizima, who was at Saigon during this period, reports a constant
flow of telegraph messages from Java demanding instructions as to the
proper course to be taken vis-k-vis Indonesian nationalist pressure: the
answer was always that the 16th Army should try to maintain the status
quo. (293)
The 16th Army generally gambled on a rapid landing of the Allies
in considerable force. On this assumption, two basic tasks confronted
them. One was maintaining discipline among their own men, the second
was maintaining it among the Indonesians. As one observer put it,
"Whether soldier or civilian, the Japanese were becoming desperate,
nihilistic and idle, and military administration went into disorder." (294)
Desertions were likely to break out, the authority of the officer-corps
would be weakened, energy to carry out Allied commands would be hard
to muster, and morale would be very low. As far as the Indonesians
were concerned, three steps had to be taken immediately. All armed
units would have to be disarmed and demobilized. Authority over Indo-
nesian bureaucrats who how manned all but the very highest administra-
tive posts had to be preserved. And a tight rein would have to be kept
on pemuda activities. We shall see later how successful the Army was
in carrying out these tasks.
Admiral Maeda and his group however seem to have been gambling
on different assumptions and with different ends in mind. Nishijima, his
right hand man at this period, notes that Maeda felt genuine sympathy with
the Nationalist cause, and was not hampered by any official responsibility
towards the Allies (295) And though, according to Major Ishizima, he
had received explicit instructions from the Naval General Staff to keep out
of the Indonesian Independence Movement, he does not seem ever to have
taken these instructions very seriously. (296) He had no troops under his
command; most of his aides were civilians. He had a far freer hand than
his opposite number in the Army. He also seems to have had a keener
appreciation of the 'emotional climate' on Java, and of the psychological
(293)	Statement of Major Tadakazu Ishizima, November 16, 1946, p. 4.
(294)	Taniguchi, op cit. , p. 534.
(295)	Nishijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit. , pp. 473f. Also Nishijima,
Verklaring, March 10-13, 1947, p. 9.
(296)	Statement of Major Tadakazu Ishizima, November 16, 1946, p. 4.97
consequences of the Proclamation he had done so much to put into
effect. (297)
Maeda was basically concerned to do everything he could to unite
the Nationalist leaders of all ages and groups, and to help prepare the
Indonesians for a successful resistance to the re-imposition of Dutch
colonial control. It is not certain quite what kind of "success" he en-
visaged. As has been suggested before, he seems to have tried to create
a "candidate" echelon of leaders, primarily ex-graduates of the Asrama
Indonesia Merdeka, to be led probably by the most notable of the "uncom-
promised" (in Allied eyes) nationalists--Tan Malakka or perhaps
Sjahrir. (298) If, as seemed likely, Soekarno, Hatta and Subardjo were
arrested, the struggle could be carried on by this reserve leadership.
To strengthen Indonesia's hand, four steps had to be taken: 1) Armaments
and ammunition had to be provided to the nationalists. 2) The Indonesians
would need a group of trained personnel to help them in the operation (if
necessary) of a guerilla resistance. 3) Any available Japanese funds
would be most useful to a young Indonesian regime, at least until the
Allies succeeded in cancelling the Japanese Military currency. 4) Avenues
of communication between different parts of Java, between the various
islands and on to the mainland would be extremely important.
There is reason to believe that Maeda and his colleague in
Surabaja, Admiral Shibata, planned and succeeded in having large quan-
tities of arms, including even aeroplanes, moved out of Naval munitions
dumps and arsenals. They were then turned over to certain Indonesians,
particularly those of the younger generation, where they would be in
'safer' hands (i. e. less likely to be turned over willingly to the Allies.
Claims have been made that a sizeable number of Japanese deserted before
the Allies arrived and later went to work for the Revolution, bringing with
them considerable quantities of packaged Japanese currency notes. It
has also been alleged that Maeda was active in creating an inter-island
network of small boats and fishing-smacks that could be used to carry
information, guns, food and other necessities in an unobtrustive way,
(297)	It is worth noting that Maeda had long connections with Indonesia
going back to the pre-war period. He had also been a member
of the Navy Ministry's Indonesian Policy Research Team. By
contrast Nishimura came to Indonesia from China late in the
occupation, and had developed no close ties with the Indonesian
elite.
(298)	See Chapters I and III of this paper.98
wherever they were needed. (299) There also were hints that in co-opera-
tion with certain Chinese businessmen, the groundwork was laid for exten-
sive smuggling operations to mainland Southeast Asia. (300) It is difficult
to estimate how true these allegations are. Many of them were made by
Dutchmen in the years 1946-1947 when Holland had every interest in black-
ening the Republican cause by depicting it as Japanese-sponsored. But
what one knows of the psychology and objectives of the Admiral and his
friends does not lead one to suppose that the six weeks before the Allies
arrived in Tandjung Priok harbour were spent in idle meditation. It is al-
most certain that a good part of the stories have a solid foundation in fact.
The one remaining question about Maeda’s attitude is whether, as some
claim, he really anticipated Indonesian Independence alone, or looked for-
ward to a period of turmoil in which the Allies would be unable to consoli-
date their power, after which the Japanese would be able to re-establish
their supremacy in the area, having already established a bridgehead
there during the occupation. Unfortunately, the question will probably
remain unanswered for a long time to come.
b J' T he IndOne s iia. ns
The expectations of the various groups of Indonesians in this period
are difficult to unravel At the risk of indulging in excessive speculation,
the writer feels that roughly four separable ’ opinion - gr oup s' can be dis-
tinguished.
1.' All observers testify to the fact that the Proclamation of Inde-
pendence had an electrifying effect on the mass of Indonesians. The degree
of excitation seems to have taken all parties by surprise, even those who
claimed to be closest to the grass-roots. For example Adam Malik writes
sadly, "The most regrettable thing was that the popular forces had had no
real guidance before the Proclamation was made. The lack of any organiza-
tion and leadership meant that the Revolutionary Army was like a flood,
(299)	Cf. Anonymous Japanese Officer, Beschouwingen. . . , June 21-23,
1947, pp, 7-9, 20-21, 25, 31-32, 38. He claims that the Republic thus
started off with assets of 800, 000, 000 guilders of Japanese money,
which even divided by 10 to allow for inflationary depreciation, was a
considerable sum. He also puts the number of pro-Indonesian deser-
tions at 7, 000. The same source lists Djakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Jogja
(Naval aerodrome), Semarang, Madiun (Largest Naval aerodrome),
Malang and especially the Surabaja naval base as the centres for Naval
distribution of arms and ammunition to the Indonesians. In the last
case, the transfer of armaments may have created the basis for the
Battle of Surabaja in November, Cf. E. B. Van Hulten, Rapport . . .,
July 24, 1946, pp. 4-6.
(300)	Statement of Captain Mizuta, March 14, 1946, p. 5. Cf. also E. B.
Van Hulten, Rapport.., , July 24, 1946, p. 5, for a statement that
Maeda, with the help of Yoshizumi and Mr. Maramis, created the
organizational basis of the K. R. I. S. , the famous Republican armed99
almost completely uncontrollable " (301) Suppressed hatred of the Jap-
anese, exhilaration at the sight of their conquerors in defeat, and the
elation of re-assuming control of their own destiny, produced reactions
similar to those that had occurred after the Dutch collapse in 1941-1942,
but many times more powerful. The reaction was of course not always
purely political. Murder and looting were common in many areas. The
Chinese, and those Dutchmen who had been released or escaped from
Japanese concentration camps were in a particularly bad position. The
Chinese, never very popular with ethnic Indonesians, had no military
power to protect them from their enemies. Almost inevitably many
tended to anticipate an Indonesian interregnum with alarm and hostility.
Without necessarily being pro-Allied or pro-Dutch, they had good reason
to be anti-Republican at this time, and to look forward to the imposition
of firm Allied control in Indonesia as soon as possible. The Dutchmen
who 'got loose,' seem in many cases to have found it hard to adjust to
the new social and political situation, and tried to talk and act as they
had done before 1942--with results unpleasant but wholly predictable. (302)
These observations are not intended to discount the vast popular
enthusiasm for independence, but rather to suggest that this enthusiasm
was amorphous, without organized channels along which it could flow.
As Dr. Hatta expressed it: (303)
"Every revolution invariably gives rise to an atmosphere
influenced by a mass psychology, which is itself strongly
(300)	(cont'd)
unit formed mainly from Christian Minahassans. Nishijima, in
his Verklaring (Marine-Kantoor), March 25-29, 1947, p. 2, ob-
serves that the Japanese faced the task of guarding 61 ammunition
and oil dumps, 41 food storage warehouses, 44 internment camps,
as well as power installations, water reservoirs, banks, business
offices, etc. , etc. , scattered through 20 Residencies. The impli-
cation is that Japanese forces were spread too thin to be able to
prevent large-scale looting and sabotage by groups of Indonesians.
This may well be the case too; many Indonesian supplies were un-
doubtedly taken from the Japanese by violence, as well as through
co-operation and diplomacy.
(301)	Malik, op. cit. , p. 59. Cf. also Maeda, Beknopt Overzicht. . . ,
September 26, 1945, pp. 2f.
(302)	Cf. Statement of Captain Kiso Tsuchiya, April 3-8, 1947, p. 4.
See also D. Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, George Allen & Unwin,
Ltd. , London, 1948, generally for some sharp comments on the
internment camps, guards and prisoners alike--though the author's
point of view is definitely pro-Dutch.
(303)	Hatta, "Isi Proklamasi," in Fakta dan Dokumen2 (Supplemen I), p. 1.100
affected by romanticism and heroism. The primary problem
in a revolution is how to channel the burning but anarchic
energies of the masses, and to mould them into a body, strong
at heart, capable of enduring suffering and undergoing trials
in facing reactions that may arise, until the final victory is
achieved.... For revolutions that break out suddenly and are
sustained by burning enthusiasms are faced by reactions who
possess co-ordinated control over the instruments of power. "
In an impending revolutionary situation, the range of actions seen as
"liberating" extend far beyond those usually considered 'political.* Inde-
pendence, for the masses, was something unconnected with institutions,
words, agreements, signatures, but rather a matter of "semangat"
(spirit), symbols, voices, violent direct action, conquest, comradeship,
destruction and spiritual solidarity. In the revolutionary universe, the
distinction between Rampok (roughly 'looting') and confiscation, murder
and revolutionary struggle, inevitably tended to be blurred. Fears and
hopes assumed titanic proportions. It was a situation where only charis-
matic authority could have any controlling and guiding effect. We shall
see the difficulties this was to give the established leadership. (304)
2) This leadership, which centred in these early days around
Soekarno, Hatta and perhaps Subardjo, was faced with a major political
dilemma. It correctly entertained grave fears about Allied, and parti-
cularly Dutch, intentions. There was reason to believe that the Allies
would regard them in a doubly unfavorable light--both as collaborators
with the Japanese and as rebels against Dutch authority. The Japanese
Army, increasingly concerned to maintain law and order (the status quo)
for political and 'survival' reasons, and realizing that Soekarno and Hatta
were dangerously powerful symbols to the mass of the population, would
certainly be hostile to any obvious encouragement of a revolutionary up-
heaval. If the Allies wanted the two leaders tried for "collaboration,"
the Army was unlikely to worsen its position by permitting them to dis-
appear. (305) Furthermore, though it was obvious that the Japanese had
only physical force, and the threat of massive retaliation to maintain their
position, and that therefore there was a good deal of leeway within which the
Indonesians could operate politically without forcing a show-down, the fear
of provoking the Japanese to violent repression was an important consider-
ation in the established Indonesian leadership's thinking. However, on the
other side, the pressure from the youth, the undergrounds and the masses
(304)	Cf. Prof. Dr. P. M. van Wulfften-Palthe, Psychological A spects of
the Indonesian Problem, E. J Brill, Leiden, 1949, pp. 27-32,45-
50, for some interesting comments on the mood of the early revolu-
tion as seen through hostile Dutch eyes. The rest of the book is too
partisan to be of much use.
(305)	Cf. Statement of Captain Kiso Tsuchiya, April 3-8, 1947, pp. 8f.
Nishijima, Verklaring (Marine-Kantoor), March 25-29, 1947, pp. 2f.
E. B. Van Hulten, Rapport .... July 24, 1946, p. 6.101
to give positive signs of Independence, was steadily rising. If it was not
given orderly means of satisfaction, the prestige of the top leadership
and its political effectiveness threatened to be seriously undermined.
Luckily however, the immediate demands of the period were less for
'practical' power than for the bold wielding of the symbols of authority.
This perhaps explains why so much of the early struggle between Japan-
ese and Indonesians centred around 'symbolic' actions such as raising
the Indonesian flag on public buildings, holding mass rallies, and broad-
casting revolutionary speeches. (306)
This meant that for a short time the established leadership did
not have to try to withdraw power from the Japanese Army where it
would have been most vitally felt--in the administration. They could--
and had to--depend on a gradual osmotic process whereby the Indonesians
in the bureaucracy could imperceptibly assume the psychological upper
hand, and effectively take over practical control. But very soon effective
control of the bureaucracy would be of overwhelming importance, not
simply as a solid way of backing the international claims of the new re-
gime, but also as a means of co-ordinating, centralizing and controlling
pemuda anarchism, and preventing alternative groups from outflanking
the top leadership by demands for concerted radical action against the
Japanese. (307)
The established leadership was thus the focal point for con-
flicting pressures exerted by Indonesians, Japanese and--from a dis-
tance --the Allies. The one way of trying to resolve these conflicts was
to establish an unobtrusive but effective and co-operative administration
(306)	See the letter of General Yamamoto to Admiral Patterson, dated
September 23, 1945, where he warns the British particularly
against interfering with such revolutionary and nationalist symbols.
See also Kahin, op. cit. , p. 137.
(307)	Hatta, in "Isi Proklamasi" (in Fakta dan Dokumen2, Supplement),
p. 4 observes: "There was another way /To power?--the seizure
of power from the Japanese by building up a national governmental
administrative arm alongside /the one controlled by the Japanese7.
This way might seem to be revolutionary--but not rational. And
what is not rational in a revolution is not revolutionary. This
second method would only have created difficulties and slowed
down the transfer of power into our hands. It is very probable
that it would have caused a violent struggle, and the victory would
not certainly have been ours. It would have created two different
government administrations side by side. Asa result the new
national administration, just set up, would not have been able to
work effectively, while the administrative structure capable of
working effectively would have been allowed to fall into the hands
of the Japanese, to be then handed over to the Allies. . . " The under
lining is the writer's. One can imagine pemuda reaction to the
underlined phrase.102
as soon as possible. Needless to say, this was easier planned than done.
But such a policy promised to allow the pemudas to expend their energies
usefully at the grass-roots level in administrative rather than agitational
politics. If it should happen that the British (or the Americans) were the
first Allied contingent to land, their partial support might be won by a show
of competence and full co-operation. And if the Dutch arrived first, the bar-
gaining position of the new regime would be strengthened proportionately to
the effectiveness of its governmental authority. For the Dutch would cer-
tainly use any signs of lack of control as an excuse for hostile moves
against the Republic. Finally, an orderly transition from 'symbol manipu-
lation' to practical routine administration would do much to allay the per-
sonal fears of the Japanese, and avoid any violent intervention. In effect,
the political objectives of the established leaders was to create a working
administration, and to build up a position where the Allies might be willing
to compromise with them to avoid trouble. But in the face of the enormous
forces that had destroyed the Japanese Empire, and the highly delicate and
precarious balance of power on Java which threatened to break down at any
moment into violence and anarchy, the established leaders cannot have been
too optimistic. The relative inconspicuousness of the first Cabinet may
perhaps be attributed partly to its unwillingness to do anything to antagonize
the powerful political forces that surrounded it.
The two remaining groups have much nv common.·. In essence they
were the circles around Sjahrir and Tan Malakka. 3) There 4a every reason
to believe that Sjahrir, who spent much of the summer of 1945 listening to
Allied radio broadcasts, developed a shrewd estimate of the probable sit-
uation in the immediate post-war period. In the face of dominant Anglo-
Saxon power in the Southeast Asian area, Indonesia would probably need a
leadership untainted by any suspicion of collaboration, unimpeachably
Nationalist, and yet recognized as comparatively moderate and pro-Western.
It can hardly have failed to occur to him, that with the possible exception of
Amir Sjarifuddin, he himself was the one man who could fulfill these re-
quirements. (308) In a less explicit way, much of the younger generation
was to come to similar conclusions. Sjahrir was a member of the 'older
generation,' but he provided a clear and 'respectable' focus for anti-
leadership feelings which were strong at the time among the youth. For
the younger generation was to become increasingly disturbed by the cautious
tactics of their elders, and the obvious distaste and alarm their revolution-
ary activity caused among sections of the traditional prijaji and Moslem
elites, Who tended to look to the established nationalist leadership for pro-
tection against pemuda 'attentions.' The youth certainly felt borne up on
a tide of popular revolutionary enthusiasm, and were in strong opposition
to anything that smacked too much of "order," "discipline" and bureaucratic
(308) In the event, his calculations were partially upset by the slow Allied
advance, which allowed the flood of undisciplined revolutionary fer-
vour to rise to a point where he alone could no longer control it. It
must have been clear that Soekarno was an essential component of any
Republican leadership from the moment that it became clear that he
was the one man who to some degree could control it.103
timidity. Much of their psychology was, as Maeda put it, frankly
"anarchic,” utterly opposed to the "diplomacy" of the older generation. (309)
4) Tan Malakka appears to have relied on the same kind of groups
as Sjahrir, though he had different long-term objectives in mind. Whereas
Sjahrir was in the long run hurt by the delayed Allied arrival in Indonesia,
Tan Malakka was able to use the time to good effect. Some mystery sur-
rounds his activities before the Proclamation. According to his own ac-
count he spent most of the Occupation working at a coal-mine at Bayeh
in Banten, hiding from the Japanese authorities under an assumed name.
However there is some reason to believe that the Japanese knew that he
was on Java, and possibly evfen where he was. The Japanese Army seems
to have believed him to be an important figure in Communist circles, and
a number of fake Tan Malakkas were "produced" by them on several
occasions in various parts of Java. For what purpose, is not quite clear.
The most probable reason is that they hoped to lure members of the Com-
munist Party into betraying themselves by trying to contact him. An
alternative theory is that they were trying to test Tan Malakka's popularity
in case he was needed to head the anti-Allied movement. But this seems
a little far-fetched in view of the Army's general political outlook and level
of sophistication. Another source indicates that he was seen talking to
certain high Naval officers at the Banten coal-mine just before the sur-
render (310) If this story is true, the "Naval officers" were presumably
associates or assistants of Admiral Maeda's. Tan Malakka himself says,
rather confusingly, that he was in contact with certain youth leaders from
May 1945 onwards (311) and that he arrived in Djakarta on August 15th,
and stayed at Sukarni's house, though concealing his identity from all, in-
cluding even Sukarni! (312) It is not impossible that he was covertly in-
volved in the Rengasdengklok affair. One source at least avers that he
(309)	Maeda, Beknopt Overzicht... , September 26, 1945, pp. 2-3.
Incidentally, this short memorandum of Maeda to Admiral Patter-
son is an excellent political and psychological analysis of the
period.
(310)	See Kahin, op. cit. , pp. 118ff. Tan Malakka, op. cit. , p. 67, con-
firms, with some satisfaction, the stories about the false Tan
Malakka's, which, he says, were used by the Japanese and Dutch(!)
to confuse patriots. He adds that when he got to Bogor early in
October, and met Sukarni and Adam Malik again, they gave him
a very hard look-over. Apparently they had on several occasions
nearly been trapped by the fake Tan Malakkas.
(311)	Tan Malakka, op. cit. , pp. 55f. For another aspect of his acti-
vities, see Chapter IV of this paper.
(312)	Tan Malakka, op. cit. , p. 55.104
spent his time at Sukarni’s urging a coup d’etat. (313) After the Proclama-
tion he is reported to have gone to live with Nishijima, and from there con-
tacted Admiral Maeda, in order to ask his advice as to what political strategy
he should adopt. The Admiral seems to have counselled him to drop all
"Communistic propaganda" in favour of Nationalisms and reminded him that
the pre-war "Popular Front" line supporting bourgeois nationalism was still
orthodox.
His activities for the rest of August and September are somewhat ob-
scures though he was in contact with Mr. Subardjo from August 25th on0
according to his own account» (314) and probably much earlier. One story
has it that the two men were preparing to dispense with Soekarno and Hatta,
and possibly in temporary alliance with Sjahrir9 assume national leadership
(315) It is probable that Tan Malakka was concerned in this period to build
up an organization and a reputation independent of the Soekarno-Hatta leader-
ship, so that he would be free to act on his own if and when a crisis arose.
This strategy would mean staying temporarily in the background. (316)
Whatever his ultimate purposes were, it is enough for our purposes to under-
stand that the essential difference between Tan Malakka and Sjahrir lay in
their attitude to the revolutionary surge that was beginning to sweep Java.
Tan Malakka welcomed the growing anarchy and disorder, hoping that out
of the confusion and excitement a more radical and tough-minded temper
would emerge. This in turn would help to precipitate a struggle with either
the Japanese or the Allies. And in such a struggle, his own peculiar talents
for underground revolutionary organization and agitation would be shown to
their best advantage. In contrast, Sjahrir feared and distrusted the anarchi-
cal, destructive side of the revolutionary movement as inevitably leading to
a massive and violent Allied intervention and probably to deep internal con-
flict and bitterness in Indonesian society as well. It was probably his hope that
a more regularized form of politics would emerge in which his intellectual and
diplomatic talents would be most usefully employed. Indonesia's immediate
interests would be best served, he may have felt, not on the barricades but at
the conference table.
(313)	Cf. Fakta dan Dokumen2, p. 154. Sukarni was then living on Djalan Fort de
Kocfc
(314)	Tan Malakka, op cit. , p. 61. They had also probably been in contact in
Japan during the thirties. (See footnote 134 for a brief comparison of
Maeda *s and Tan Malakka*s political outlook.) Tan Malakka recalls that
he had not seen Subardjo since 1922 in Hollands and Subardjo thought he
was dead. It was through Subardjo that he then met Iwa Kusumasumantri
and Sajuti Melik, and later Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Mr. Gatot, and Dr.
Buntaran.
(315)	For an extended and subtle account of Tan Malakka*s and Subardjo's acti-
vities at this time, see Kahin. op. cit. , pp. 147-170.
(316)	There is however a story that Tan Malakka was offered any new position
in the first Republican Cabinet that he cared to have. This would have
allowed him to take the portfolios of either Foreign Affairs or Informa-
tion, But not too surprisinglys he rejected the offer.105
CHAPTER VIII
THE FINAL CONFLICT WITH THE JAPANESE AND THE BEGINNINGS
OF A NEW REGIME'
(From the Proclamation of Independence to the First British Landing
on Java. )
As soon as Nishimura got word of the Proclamation he took steps
to minimize any effects it might have. Orders from the Allies had already
forbidden the Japanese to permit broadcasts of any kind anywhere. Nishi-
mura used this as a pretext for continuing to bar the Indonesians from all
radio-stations. (317) The distribution of nationalist posters and leaflets
was forbidden. (318) Soekarno and Hatta were summoned to Nishimura's
office to "explain themselves." According to one account, they told him
that they had been forced to issue the declaration (presumably the 'public'
declaration at Pegangsaap. 56) by pemuda elements, but that anyway Japan
had after all promised them independence. Nishimura replied that he
could not permit the Indonesians to jeopardize Japan's position vis-a-vis
the Allies, and therefore he would not yield to Indonesian persuasion, even
though Soekarno guaranteed that no violent seizure of power would be
attempted in Djakarta, At a meeting on the 19th with General Yamamoto,
the two leaders received the same answer. (319)
The first move on the Republican side therefore was to call an
'unauthorized' session of the P. P. K. I. on the morning of August 18th.
(317)	Statement of Nishimura, April 25, 1947, p. 8. Not only were the
radio-stations heavily guarded (one attack by Medical College
students was fended off) but as an added precaution the vacuum
tubes in the transmitters were removed.
(318)	Nishimura says that the Kempeitai was not called into the case
"because we still felt that the leaflets were a gesture." See
Statement of Nishimura, April 25, 1947, p. 8, and Statement of
Nishimura, April 10, 1947, p. 5.
(319)	Cf. Statement of Nishimura, April 10, 1947, p. 6; Statement of
Nishimura, April 25, 1947, pp. 8f. Nishijima, Kishi, et at. ,
op. cit. , pp. 509f. Cf. A. M. Hoeta Soehoet, op. cit. , in D.
Marpaung, ed. , op. cit. , p. 34.106
Soekarno nominated 6 new members to the Committee. (320) The meeting
was also attended by three Japanese, Nishijima, Miyoshi and Saito, all of
whom had been at Maeda’s house the night the Proclamation had been drafted
and signed. (321) Nishimura testifies to the equivocal policy of the Japan-
ese Army, which presumably felt that a sedate meeting of the P. P. K. I. was
better than revolutionary agitation among the Indonesian masses. He notes
that Yamamoto sent word via certain Japanese members (of the P. P. K. I. )
denouncing the meeting (but doing nothing to break it up). Moreover, the
denunciatory note was not delivered until the 19th. On August 18th, Yama-
moto did nevertheless summon the members of the P. P. K. I. to outline the
official position of his administration on the question of independence. He
told them that: (322)
"Japan has accepted the Potsdam Declaration, and accordingly
assistance towards Independence is impossible; the military
administration on Java will be continued under the command
of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army,
in conformity with the principles of maintaining the status quo,
while firmly securing peace and good order, until the day when
the transfer of everything to the Allies is completed."
When the newly enlarged P. P. K. I. met on the morning of the 18th,
its first task was the consideration of the draft Constitution bequeathed to
it by the B. P. K. I. The bulk of the draft was in fact approved, though a
number of significant modifications were accepted. Of these the most im-
portant were:
1.	The elimination of large parts of the Preamble, particularly
the more fulsome references to Japan.
2.	The removal, on Hatta's initiative, of the stipulation that the
President would have to be a Moslem. Hatta observed that the provision
was needlessly offensive to religious minorities, and that since in fact
the President was bound to be a Moslem, deletion of the provision would
(320)	These six members cause some difficulties. Pringgodigdo, in
Perubahan Kabinet Presidensil Mendjadi Kabinet Parlementer, p. 16,
and Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , pp. 399 473, name Subardjo, Kasman
Singodimedjo, R.A.A. Wiranatakusuma, Sajuti Melik, Iwa Kusuma-
sumantri and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. Malik, op. cit. , p. 61, and
Nishijima, Kishi, et al. , op. cit. , p. 512, however, name Sukarni,
Wikana and Chaerul Saleh "rather than Sajuti Melik, Iwa Kusumasum-
antri and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. The solution may be that Pringgo-
digdo and Yamin's three members were installed when the three
youth leaders walked out of the meeting (for which see below).
(321)	See e. g. Tan Malakka, op. cit. , p. 60.
(322)	Statement of Nishimura, April 10, 1947, p. 5.107
unite all groups in full support of the Constitution. (323)
3.	The deletion, again at Hatta's urging, of the controversial
phrase binding Moslems to the performance ot their religious duties as
a matter of constitutional law.
4.	A declaration of qua si-constitutional status by Dr. Supomo,
guaranteeing the institution of provincial autonomy, though no such guar-
antee was included in the Constitution itself. (324)
5.	Two supplementary regulations, added as a sort of appendix
to the Constitution, giving the President near-dictatorial emergency
powers for an initial six-month period. (325)
6.	A group of transitional regulations for the election of the Pres-
ident and Vice-President by the P. P. K. I. , confirming the interim powers
of the P. P. K. I. and declaring that all previous laws not specifically re-
pealed would continue in effect. One of these regulations stipulated that
until the D. P. R and the Μ. P. R. were formed, their functions would be
fulfilled by the President with the assistance of a National Committee.
Some difficulty arose here because a group of members wanted the P. P.
K. I. as a whole to choose the membership of the National Committee,
whereas others felt that the President should have full discretion. Even-
tually the group favoring Presidential initiative won, upon Hatta’s assur-
ance that full representation of all Indonesian groups would not be impaired
under this arrangement. (326)
(323)	Thus at one blow Soekarno's concession to Moslem sentiment at the
last meeting of the B. P. K. I. was gone. It was an indication of the
now completely subordinate role the religious leaders were playing
that not a voice was raised in real protest.
(324)	Dc Ratulangie strongly criticized the draft Constitution, saying
that "the administrative areas in the various larger islands should
be given the broadest possible right to see to their own needs as
they see fit themselves ... of course with the understanding and
agreement that these areas are areas of Indonesia, of one state
. .. but the needs of the areas must be heeded, i. e. by establishing
some regulation which will hand over to the provincial government
full powers to order their own regional affairs." Yamin, ed. , op.
cit. , p. 412.
(325)	The key provision read: "During the space of six months after the
end of the Greater East Asian War, the President of Indonesia shall
order and regulate all matters laid down in this Constitution." See
e.. g. Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , p. 34.
(326)	Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , pp. 428-431.108
Although the bulk of the Committee's work that morning was con-
ducted in a sedate and business-like fashion, as described above, one rather
unpleasant scene did take place, at least according to Malik and Tan Malakka
As the meeting was about to begin, Chaerul Saleh launched into a fierce
attack on the legitimacy of the P. P. K. I. itself, a body which he said "stank"
of the Japanese, Now that independence had been proclaimed, he said, all
chains that bound them to such creations of the Japanese were broken. He
demanded that the meeting be moved to a public place, iwhere the masses
could take part, and insisted that the committee be called the Komite
Nasional Indonesia and no longer the P. P. K. 1. Malik, supported by Tan
Malakka, goes on to say that in repl^”Hatta explained that for himself and
Soekarno it was difficult to separate their responsibility to the Japanese
from their duty to the people. For this reason, said Hatta .... we tell the
Japanese that this is a meeting of the P. P. K. I. , while we guarantee to the
people that this is a meeting of the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pertama. "
When asked by Hatta, Soekarno nodded his head in assent. Angered by what
Malik venomously calls Hatta's "hermaphroditic" statement, Chaerul Saleh,
Sukarni and Wikana then supposedly stalked out of the meeting. (327)
Whether the story is true or not is essentially unimportant. Its con-
tours reveal clearly enough what Hatta called the "legalism" of the youth,
but which is perhaps more precisely described as a deep need for strong
"symbolic action." Both sides recognized the undesirable features of the
P. P. K. I. , but Hatta, a man involved in real consideration of practical
power, attached much less significance than the youth to the Committee's
symbolic status. By their actions, the youth were able to wash their hands
of the cautious compromises that the Committee was trying to hammer out.
Probably the departure of the youth representatives contented both groups
in different ways.
Left to themselves, the 'older' leadership continued their discus-
sions until 3:15 p. m. , when Soekarno announced that the press outside was
eagerly awaiting the news of the election of Indonesia's first President.
The nomination of Soekarno as President and Hatta as Vice-President by
Oto Iskandardinata was greeted with acclamation, and amid cheers and
the singing of Indonesia Raya, the two leaders were formally elected. The
Executive, with its temporary "absolute powers" and the Constitution were
(327) Malik, op. cit. , p. 61. (Italics are Malik's) Cf. Tan Malakka, op.
cit. , p.-50. Tan Malakka says that Chaerul Saleh, Wikana, Sukarni
and Adam Malik were invited to attend the meeting by Soekarno.
After consultations with pemuda groups centred at Kramat (near the
Medical School) they agreed to go. When they arrived however and
found three Japanese there, they boycotted the meeting at once. In
the meantime they had also envisaged a "planning committee" to lay
down national goals, to be called the Indonesian National Committee.
Soekarno and Hatta would be obliged to carry out this Committee's
plans. A popular military arm was to be set up under a Kommissie
.i van Aksie (Action Committee). See also Nishijima, Kishi, et al. ,
op. cit. , pp. 413f.109
now officially established. (328)
On August 19th, the P. P. K„ I. met again. After much technical
discussion of jurisdictions, names, titles and offices for regional admin-
istration, general agreement was reached on the division of Indonesia
into 8 provinces, each with three levels of local government. These
would be: at the Provincial level a Governor and a National Regional Com-
mittee, at the Residency level a Resident with a National Residency Com-
mittee, and at the village level a kepala desa with a village council.
Special provisions were laid down for municipalities, but along the lines
of former Dutch practice. The status of the Princely States was left
deliberately vague. Teukoe Hasan, Pangeran Mohammad Noor, Dr.
Ratulangie, Mr. Latuharhary and Pudja were designated the first Gover-
nors of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and the Lesser Sundas
respectively. A series of important basic regulations for centralizing
the police force, controlling the distribution of medical supplies, re-
grouping assorted military units into a national army, liberalizing re-
gional autarchy, collecting reserves of food and clothing and controlling
their prices, establishing a legal currency, setting up a Central Govern-
ment Office, with its own Information Bureau, co-ordinating all communi-
cations, purging the bureaucracy and the police of undesirable elements--
all were approved. There was particular enthusiasm for a general poli-
tical amnesty. (329)
A Committee consisting of Subardjo, Sutardjo and Kasman Singo-
dimedjo outlined a plan for the future ministries of the new government.
Much of the discussion was technical, and concerned the most efficient
distribution of functions and jurisdictions. However two interesting poli-
tical proposals were also made. A projected Ministry of Religious
Affairs was subjected to violent attack by Mr. Latuharhary (a Christian),
as bound to cause discontent whether it was run by Moslems or Christians.
Partly as a result of his vehemence the proposed Ministry was voted down
6 to 19.	(330) Secondly Dr. Amir suggested the creation of a Department
for Youth Affairs "to enable us as soon as possible to start militarizing
and training the ideology of our youth." This idea was given partial sup-
port by Iwa Kusumasumantri who in his turn urged the creation of a
Staatspartij (State Party) under the Ministry of Information. He said it
(328)	Yamin, ed. , op. cit. pp. 425-427. Cf. , however, Tan Malakka,
op. cit. , p.	He comments sourly that Soekarno and Hatta were
elected quite undemocratically, without any opposition, and on the
express instructions of Marshal Terauchi (!)
(329)	Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , pp. 438-452. The amnesty read: "We hereby
proclaim that we, the President of Indonesia, will immediately take
advantage of our privilege to free those who are held punishable on
political grounds. For this purpose a careful investigation will be
set up."
(330)	Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , pp. 457, 462.110
would be "a party to support the government ... to build up our new
country. " (331) These suggestions were voted down for the time being.
But as we shall see, the idea of a national party, at least, remained very
much alive.
Twelve ministries having been decided upon, the problems of local
administration were next considered. Debate centred on how to get in-
structions flowing out to the local National Committees, how to build up a
strong political organization to harness the energies of the masses and how
to compel the Japanese to surrender their offices to Indonesians at a more
rapid rate Eventually however the Committee decided that in view of the
delicate political situation these were problems best left to the President's
discretion. He would be more likely to persuade the Japanese not to be
obstructive. More could perhaps be accomplished in private conversations
and private understandings than by resolutions and slogans. President
Soekarno wound up the meeting by agreeing that these were matters that
might well be left discreetly vague till power was handed over. He pro-
mised to try to persuade the military authorities to be as co-operative as
possible. (332) Although there had been a general wish among the Commit-
tee members to name specific people to the Ministries newly established
by the P. P. K. I. , no such step was taken at that time. The Japanese were
extremely hostile to any such idea. It seemed to them that the Allies would
never tolerate such open complaisance towards the new regime. (333)
Meeting again on August 22nd, the P. P. K. I. made two further im-
portant decisions. The first was to make further arrangements for the
establishment of the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (K. N. I. P.--Central
Indonesian National Committee) the formation of which had apparently
been somewhat delayed by the differences of opinion revealed in the
meeting on August 18th concerning the role which the Ρ» P. K. I. itself
would have in setting up the body which was destined to replace it. (334)
(331)	Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , pp. 457, 458, 460.
(332)	Cf. Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , pp. 453-473, and especially pp, 472-473.
(333)	Pringgodigdo, Perubahan Kabinet Presidensil Mendjadi Kabinet
Parlementer, ppl 20-2l.
(334)	For indications of further complications surrounding the question
of the formation of the K. N, I. P. see Hatta's oblique references
in the discussions of August 18th to a "Komite Nasional" already
in existence, of which the P. P. K. I. was "only a part" (Yamin, ed. ,
op. cit. , pp. 428-430), and Tan Malakka's mention of pemuda plans
to"set up their own National Committee (note 327 aboveX The terms
"Komite Nasional" (used in the Constitution), "Komite Nasional In-
donesia," "Komite Nasional Pusat" and "Komite Nasional Indonesia
Pusat" were used almost interchangeably in these early days. For
the text of the P. P. K. I. 's August 18th announcement on the forma-
tion of the K. N. I. P. see Asia Raya, August 25, 1945, and Koesnodi-
p rod jo, ed. , Himpunan Undang2, ]Peraturan2, Penetapan2, Pemer-
intah Republik Indonesia, 1945~ new/revised/edition, Djakarta, 1951,Ill
Shortly afterwards Soekarno and Hatta appointed 135 members from a
large number of different ethnic, political and other groupings, including
all the members of the P„ P. K. I. except themselves, to the new body.
(335)	On.August 29th, President Soekarno dissolved the P. P. K. I. and
inaugurated the K. N. I. P, which, according to Section 4 of the Constitu-
tion's Transitional Regulations, was to act as an advisory body to the
President and his Cabinet. (336) In the next few months the new body
steadily gained in power. In addition to this civilian 'directorate', a
skeleton military organization was adumbrated (for which see below), to
be known as the Badan Keamanan Rakjat or B. K. R. (337) Secondly the
P. P. K. I. reversed its previous attitude towards Iwa Kusumasumantri's
proposal for a State Party. It agreed that a single national party, the
Par tai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party), should be formed,
to include all groups. Soekarno said of this party that it would become
"the 'motor' of the people's struggle in every sphere and in every field."
He added that "the National Committee is a committee, the Indonesian
National Party is a party. The Committee is set up for a temporary
period, the party we need also to continue into the future." Its tasks
would be:	"to strengthen the unity of the Nation and State, to increase
the feelings of love, loyalty and service to the native land; to make
efforts to work out the economic and social program as mentioned in
the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia; to assist in the achieve-
ment of social justice and of the principle of humanity by means of inter-
national peace. " (338) On August 27th, the top leadership of the new
(335)	On these appointments see Kahin, op. cit. , pp. 139f.
(336)	The provision reads: "Prior to the formation of the People's
Deliberative Assembly, the People's Representative Council
/Parliament/, and the Supreme Advisory Council according to
this Constitution, all their powers shall be exercised by the
President with the assistance of a National Committee."
Yamin, ed. , op. cit. , p. 34.
(337)	Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan . . . 1945, pp. 118-120. The B. K. R. was
formally a section of the Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang
(B. P. K. K. P.--Organization for Aid to the Families of Victims of
War), which was established at the same time. The B. P. K. K. P.
was a continuation of the Japanese-sponsored B. P. P. (Badan
Pembantu Pradjurit, later Badan Pembantu Pembelaan) which gave
assistance to Peta members and their families. Oto Iskandardinata,
the head of the former B. P. P. , continued as head of the B. P. K. K. P.
(338)	Radio speech by President Soekarno, August 23, 1945, entitled,
"The Change of the Times and Our Duty," cited in Fakta dan
Dokumen2, pp. 4-10. For the announcement of the P. P. K. I.
decision establishing the P. N. I. see Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan
. . . 1945, p. 118.112
party was announced as including Sajuti Melik, Iwa Kusumasumantri,
Sudjono, Wikana, Maramis, and various other associates of President
Soekarno and Mr. Subardjo. (339) The basis for the party was to be the
structure of the old Djawa Hookookai, though the names, for example, of
the local units would be changed. Initially at any rate, the new party was
to inherit the membership of its predecessor. (340) It was hoped that in
this way the party would be able to mobilize mass support for the regime
at the grass-roots level without too much difficulty. It would also provide
the leadership with an institutional support more flexible and dynamic
than the administrative bureaucracy. However the P. N. I. stayed in ex-
istence for scarcely a week. On August 31st, it was suddenly dissolved,
(341) The reasons for its early demise may include the fact that its top
leadership largely coincided with the membership of the P. P. K. I. -
K. N. I. P. It may also be true that its leaders bowed to a general feeling
that a "State Party" was unlikely to be very popular with the Allies and it
is probable also that there was opposition from leaders of pre-war poli-
tical parties. But there are good grounds for suspecting that rivalries
for control of it were more important. Still another answer may be that the
K. N. I. P. , inaugurated on August 29th, feared the P. N. I. as a rival and
forced its suppression. The comment made by the President in his August
23rd speech (quoted above), to the effect that while the K. N. I. P. would
be a temporary organization, the P. N. I. would be a permanent state in-
stitution, may support this interpretation.
On August 31st a national ministry was created under President
Soekarno's leadership. Its membership was: (342)
Foreign Affairs
Interior
Justice
Health
Education
Information
Mr. Subardjo
R. A, A. Wiranatakusuma
Prof. Mr. Dr. Supomo
Dr. Buntaran Martoatmodjo
Ki Hadjar Dewantoro
Amir Sjarifuddin
(339)	Asia Raya, August 28, 1945.
(340)	Generally speaking, the old Djawa Hookookai leadership seems grad-
ually to have been ousted by younger, more revolutionary elements.
At the same time, the units of the organization,failing to become
parts of the P. N. I., ended up as the essential core of the local and
regional National Committees.
(341)	Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan . . . 1945, p. 46.
(342)	Kabinet-Kabinet Republik Indonesia, Kementerian Penerangan,
Djakarta, 1955, p. Γ7ζ There was a theoretical Ministry of Defence,
but as yet no Minister. On October 6th, the missing (dead) Supri-
jadi who had led the tragic Blitar revolt was appointed to the post.
On October 20th, Suljoadikusumo became Minister ad interim.113
Finance
Social Affairs
Economic Affairs
Communications
Public Works
Dr. Samsi Sastrawidagda
Mr. Iwa Kusumasumantri
Ir. Surachman Tjokroadisurjo
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso
Dr. Amir, Wachid Hasjim, Mr. Sartono, Mr. Maramis and Oto Iskandar-
dinata served as Ministers without Portfolio. Mr. Harmani served tempor-
arily in the place of Wiranatakusuma, and Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo in that
of Amir Sjarifuddin, who had only just been released from a Kempeitai
jail. (343) With the exception of Amir Sjarifuddin all these men had
worked with the Japanese to some degree, and all were 'older generation. '
Many of them had in fact held almost identical posts under the Japanese
Military Administration.
There is no reason to believe that the new Cabinet Ministers were
not chosen with precisely this consideration in mind. One observer noted
that: (344)
"there is no reason to conceal the fact that although
Ministers had been appointed by this time, there were
still many of them who acted as Japanese officials,
and so to speak had a dual role. On the one hand they
were officials for the Japanese, who still exercised
real power; on the other hand they were also appointed
Ministers of the Indonesian Republic that had just been
proclaimed. "
Vice-President Hatta commented in a similar vein: (345)
"The method we decided on was to seize power from
within. Orders were issued to every government offi-
cial to acknowledge himself as an official of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia, and ready to accept only orders given
him by superiors of Indonesian nationality. ... Indonesian
deputy-heads of departments were confirmed as official
heads, taking their orders directly from the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia. . .. To hasten this seizure of
power from within, the greater part of the Ministers of
the first Presidential Cabinet were selected from those
(343)	He had originally been sentenced to death for underground activities,
but through the intercession of Soekarno and Hatta, this sentence
was commuted to life imprisonment. See Pakpahan, op. cit. , pp. 97-99.
(344)	Nawawi Dusky, in Harian Abadi, August 22, 1955.
(345)	Hatta, "Isi Proklamasi" in Fakta dan Dokumen2, Supplemen I, p. 2.114
men who were already placed at the top of the departmental
hierarchies as Butjos (Heads) or Sanyos (Advisors). In this
way, the downward channels of command could be controlled,
and the Japanese could easily be set aside. "
Nishimura’s perspective is illustrated by his description of Wiranataku-
suma's activities in the Home Affairs Department: (346)
"He was of course responsible to the Gunseikan. True, the
Indonesians may have liked to call him Minister of the Re-
public when he held this position. But after the Rangoon
Agreement (347) we suspended all appointments of Indonesian
officials. "
This ambiguous dualistic role played by the Cabinet was useful for
all parties, and provided a way for Japanese and Indonesians to avoid direct
and open conflict. But it certainly did little to raise the credit of the Cabi-
net itself which was anyway in no position to take the initiative. Its survival
depended largely on the broking function it performed, and it was bound to
last only so long as all the parties to its formation continued to be satisfied
with a slow and gradual change in the status quo. With the Allies about to
land, and the pemudas1 growing discontent with their marginal position
under the new government, the Cabinet's prospects were not very good.
In the meantime, outside the conference rooms of Djakarta, the
situation was developing rapidly. On August 18th, there was for the first
time under the Occupation a daylight attack on a Police Headquarters. The
incident took place in Serang. (348) The Japanese were seriously alarmed,
the affair confirming all their forebodings. Nishimura and his staff de-
cided that the Peta and Heiho and other para-military organizations had to
be disarmed and demobilized immediately, not simply to satisfy the Allies,
(346)	Statement of Nishimura, April 25, 1947, p. 9. Apparently the Min-
isters holding "new" portfolios (such as Foreign Affairs, Social Af-
fairs, etc. ) in the Cabinet, were also given appointments in the
Japanese bureaucratic structure, the appointment being backdated
to before the Japanese surrender, when the Japanese could still
legally make appointments.
(347)	The so-called Rangoon Agreement was the preliminary arrangement
prior to the formal instrument of surrender of the Southern Terri-
tories. It was signed by representatives of Marshal Terauchi in
the presence of the South East Asia Command at Rangoon on August
27, 1945. The formal instrument was not signed until September
12, in Singapore. Rajendra Singh, op. cit. , pp. 172f.
(348)	Statement of Nishimura, April 15, 1947, p. 2. Nishimura claimed
there were 1, 100 Japanese casualties, including 700 killed.115
but to protect themselves. Considering the low state of Japanese morale
at the time, this plan was carried out with astonishing coolness and con-
siderable success. With a few exceptions, the Peta units were taken com
pletely by surprise, (349) and seemed to be even more confused by the
pace of events than the Japanese. (350) One story is that the military
authorities summoned all Battalion and Company Commanders to Bogor.
On arrival they were disarmed and interned. Secret orders were cer-
tainly issued to the Japanese NCOs attached to Peta units, to demobilize
the troops in their charge, and collect their arms in central dumps where
they could be more easily guarded, preferably in the Residency capitals.
The execution of the operation, of course, varied from place to place.
It should be remembered that the official announcement of the Japanese
surrender was not made until August 21st, so that outside the larger
cities there must have been many areas where Japanese military auth-
ority was still unquestioned. The Japanese Army astutely softened the
blow of demobilization, and may have diverted natural, but awkward
questions, by paying men 6 months' salary in advance, as well as a spec-
ial advance "Lebaran" clothing bonus. (351) And, as Nishimura put it,
"Luckily the rice-harvest that summer was the best in years. " (352)
When the news of the demobilization of the Peta and Heiho reached
the Indonesian leaders, they were apparently at first non-plussed. But
a series of so-called Badan2 Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Corps)
were set up on August 22nd, ostensibly only to stop looting and carry out
certain other police functions. Soekarno was able to use his authority
over the Diawa Hookookai apparatus to publicize the B. K. R. s and to pro-
vide them with organizational nuclei. According to one story, the initi-
ative in this affair was1 taken by the acting head of the Internal Affairs
Department, R. A. A. Wiranatakusuma. Another account has it that Urip
Sumohardjo (who had held a unique position within the Dutch colonial
army) and several ex-Peta officers came to Hatta and Soekarno shortly
after the Proclamation urging the formation of a national army. The two
political leaders felt that such a move would be premature, and so,
after some days of hesitation, Soekarno told Urip that he had "been
thinking the whole thing over very carefully--Indonesia's situation in the
international world. We must immediately have some means of
(349)	There are reports that Hatta managed to get word out to Kasman
Singodimedjo and Abdul Kadir, and as a result some arms were
cached in Djakarta at least before the Japanese arrived,
(350)	Cf. Bachsan, op. cit. , pp. 63-65.
(351)	Statement of Nishimura, April 15, 1947, p. 3.
(352)	Ibid. It may be recalled that there were about 70, 000 Japanese
troops on Java at the time, as opposed to perhaps 50, 000 Peta-
Heiho.116
maintaining public security aside from the police, but not an army, .,. "(353)
Although in theory the B. K. R. s were to be co-ordinated and directed
from Djakarta, they were from the beginning highly autonomous groups,
locally oriented, with plans and ambitions of their own. (354) In some
areas they were simply bands of villagers armed with bamboo spears and
knives. In other areas, they tended to crystallize round ex-Peta and Heiho
officers. On August 22nd, the Japanese began to release the Battalion and
Company commanders they had interned during the demobilization opera-
tion, and these commanders immediately hurried back to their home
training-grounds. In many cases they tried to re-assemble groups of de-
mobilized members of the Peta, and active pemuda from the Keibodan and
Seinendan. (355) However they faced strong competition from junior offi-
cers who were as well educated and as capable as their superiors, and
who were often closer to their men. The result was a rapid disintegration
of the hierarchy of the Peta, as many Section Commanders, Platoon Com-
manders and even 'privates'' broke away to form their own "gerombolan, "
These bands were held together less by formal discipline or military sub-
ordination than by the charismatic qualities of the individual leader, who
often heightened his authority by clothing it with political and magico-
religious symbols, (356)
Meanwhile on Sumatra revolutionary activity was also beginning.
The Japanese governor of Palembang, Miyake, testified that young
"agitators" were sent over from Java immediately after the Proclamation
(353)	For an early public statement by Soekarno on the B. K. R. s, see
his speech of August 23rd, "The Change of the Times and Our Duty,"
in Fakta dan Dokumen2, pp. 4-10, where he urged all ex-Peta and
Heiho elements to unite their strength in the B. K. R. s. "Be sure,"
he added, "the time will come when you will be called to become
soldiers in the Indonesian National Army." Cf. also Nishijima,
Verklaring (Marine-Kantoor), March 25-29, 1947, pp. If. For
Drip and Soekarno, see FaKta dan Dokumen2, pp. 87f.
(354)	Serious attempts to co-ordinate these local units into a national
army probably date from the Government's establishment of the
Tentara Keamanan Rakjat on October 5th. See Koesnodiprodjo,
Himpunan ... 1945, p. S>4 for the proclamation of the T. K. R.
and ibid. , p. 92 for further official amplification.
(355)	Cf. however Kahin, op. cit, , p. 137. See also Tjantrik Mataram,
op. cit. , pp. 9f.
(356)	Cf. Taniguchi, op. cit. , pp. 537f.117
to rouse the local population. (357) By August 19th, the situation was
serious enough for a special Governors' Conference to be held at
Bukittinggi. The conference agreed on an informal basis to put themselves
completely under the military authority of the local division commanders,
in order to ensure cohesive action and prevent disturbances. (358)
By the last days of August, the initial daily expectation of the Allies
arrival had begun to wear off. The psychological advantage, which had
up to now lain largely with Soekarno and Hatta, and to some extent with
the Japanese, began to pass to other groups. President Soekarno appealed
to "the people of Indonesia to be united as one whole at this present time,
to stand behind the Leaders," avoiding "mutual accusations" and recrim-
inations. He urged the formation of local National Committees (K. N. I. ),
who would devote all their energy and devotion to: 1) Announcing the will
of the Indonesian people to live as a free Nation. 2) Uniting of all strata
and occupations so that everywhere throughout Indonesia, the solidarity
of complete and close national unity will be achieved. 3) Assisting in
calming the people and participating in protecting public security.
4) Assisting the Leaders in putting the ideals of the Indonesian Nation
into effect, and in the regions, helping the Local Governments to promote
the well-being of the public He concluded on this sober note:
"To proclaim Independence is easy. To make a Constitu-
tion is not difficult. To elect a President and a Vice-
President is easier still. But to form the bodies and
the posts of authority and administration of the State, as
well as to seek international recognition, especially
under conditions such as the present, where the Japanese
Government is still obliged by the international status
quo to remain in this country to run the administration
and maintain public order--these tasks are not easy! "(359)
The President's speech reflected a state of increasing tension and dis-
order in Java. Outside Djakarta, the B. K. R. 's and many other less
official groupings were springing up overnight, and taking the initiative
into their own hands. They attacked isolated Japanese encampments,
(357)	Statement of Lt. Gen. Toshio Miyake, December 19, 1946, pp. If.
Apparently the Sumatra high command enraged the 16th Army head-
quarters on Java by wiring them: "Situation in Java having grave
and unfavorable influence on Sumatra's peace and order. Please
control disturbing activities in your area. Take necessary steps
to check infiltration of agitators from Java into Sumatra." Anon-
ymous Japanese Officer, Beschouwingen . . . , June 21-23, 1947, p. 33.
(358)	Statement of Miyake, December 19, 1946, loc. cit.
(359)	Speech of President Soekarno, "The Change of the Times and Our
Duty," given on August 23, 1945, as cited in Fakta dan Dokumen2,
pp. 4-10.118
broke into the concentration camps, raided ammunition dumps and arsenals,
attacked local Chinese, and even struggled among themselves. All over
Java there was fighting as Japanese and Indonesians tried to disarm one
another. In areas where the Japanese had behaved with cruelty, the ten-
sion was especially great. The Japanese were fearful of retribution, and
the Indonesians determined to exact revenge. In some areas agreements
made between the responsible local Indonesian authorities and the Japanese
were broken by independent action on the part of pemuda elements or angry
mobs, thus heightening mutual suspicion and hostility. Generally speaking
the Japanese were loth to surrender their arms because to do so was to ex-
pose themselves completely to the mercy of the population, which for
emotional and political reasons could not but be rather uncertain. On the
one hand in Banjumas, where relations between the Japanese Resident
Iwashige and his Indonesian deputy, Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo were excel-
lent, an arrangement was made for the peaceable transfer of large quan-
tities of military equipment to the local Peta Battalion Commander Sudirman,
later to become Commander-in-Chief of the Republican Armies. (360) But
the situation in Banjumas was the exception rather than the rule. The rev-
olutionary tide was rising rapidly and almost uncontrollably. As Soekarno
put it, "Indeed it is not easy to keep quiet and calm in a time like this, in
a time when changes come as suddenly as the sky falling to the earth."(361)
The already grave difficulties faced by the Japanese were com-
pounded by the instructions remitted to them by the Allies. The South
East Asia Command had issued orders that all armaments were to be col -
lected together at certain specified places, and guarded till the Allied de-
tachments arrived to assume control. All Japanese troops were to be dis-
armed except for five rifle cartridges, and grouped at relocation camps,
which would eventually become evacuation centres. At the same time, the
requirement that essential services be maintained, the administrative ap-
paratus be kept in operation, and law and order preserved, presented an
overwhelming task for the deeply demoralized Japanese Army. (362) Their
problems were made no easier by an incautious broadcast from Singapore
to the effect that "the Allies have no intention of disarming the Indonesian
(360)	Gandasubrata, op. cit. , pp. 9, 19. Sudirman was actually the Battalion
Commander in Kroja. He had been a teacher in the Muhammadijah
movement before the war. As customary with Peta Battalion Comman-
ders, he held a political post in the civilian administration, as head of
the local Sendenka (branch of the Department of Propaganda).
(361)	Soekarno, "The Change of the Times and Our Duty," in Fakta dan
Dokumen2, p. 4.
(362)	Cf. "Orders for Japanese Surrender", August 18, 1945, as cited above
at footnote 280. See also Statement of Nishimura, April 10, 1947, pp. 4, 6;
Statement of Nishimura, April 25, 1947, p. 4; Anonymous Japanese Offi-
cer, Beschouw ingen. . . , June 21-23, 1947, pp 8f. .comments on the in-
creasing difficulty of the 16th Army's high command getting its orders
obeyed by local units; Nishijima, Verklaring (Marine-Kantoor), March
25-29, 1947, pp. 1-3.119
police or Soekarno's bodyguards. " (363) This allowed the pemudas to
claim Allied approval when they demanded and/or seized Japanese arms.
The gradual transfer of military supplies and personnel into the interior
where the Allied-designated relocation camps were situated made the
coastal region particularly dangerous for isolated and straggling Japan-
ese units. Maeda recalled later that some 80 Japanese soldiers were
cut down in the Bekasi area. (364) And this was only one in a series of
such confrontations and massacres.
In spite of Yamamoto's efforts to discipline his forces by re-
peatedly assuring them that the surrender had been on the Emperor's
personal order, (365) and warning them of their duty not to hurt Japan's
cause before the victorious Allies, desertions increased, communications
in Java became increasingly disrupted and haphazard, (366) and the im-
posing structure of the Japanese administration began to disintegrate.
One Japanese observer noted that: (367)
"Japanese Army Headquarters was busy receiving de-
tailed reports of the complete surrender of Japan
coming in successively each day. The Military Gov-
ernment offices lost their function. Japanese admin-
istrators, with no instructions to receive, transferred
the administration to Indonesian officials each ac-
cording to their judgment, and started to prepare them-
selves for reaching the internment camps in the inland
areas. "
It can safely be said that by the beginning of September with the
mounting difficulties of the Japanese, the unobtrusive but steady erosion
of their bureaucratic authority, (368) the growing confidence of the older
(363)	As reported by Anonymous Japanese Officer, Beschouwingen... ,
June 21-23, 1947, p. 35.
(364)	As cited in Aziz, op. cit. p. 253.
(365)	Nishijima, Verklaring (Marine-Kantoor), March 25-29, 1947, p. 2.
(366)	As noted above, the Allies forbade the use of radio to the Japanese
Army.
(367)	Taniguchi, op. cit. , p. 537.
(368)	Statement of Nishimura, April 10, 1947, p. 6. Nishimura notes
that Indonesian officials simply began withholding information, and
thus isolating their Japanese 'superiors. ' See also Statement of
Nishimura, April 25, 1947, p. 9. Here Nishimura comments that
though the Japanese officials tried to stick together, they were el-
bowed aside and even threatened by the increasingly truculent
Indonesians.
4120
leaders and the surge of revolutionary fervour among the younger genera-
tion, a new atmosphere had developed on Java. The tide now ran heavily
in favour of the Indonesians, who were becoming increasingly well-organized
and united. Hatta claimed that by this time "the Japanese were no longer
permitted to enter government offices. In areas outside Djakarta, they
were arrested or confined to their homes." (369) In many rural districts
where there were few Japanese, local K. N. I. s had already assumed wide
authority.
It was also early in September that the first signs of Allied activity
became directly visible. The R. A. P. W. I. (Recovery of Allied Prisoners
of War and other Internees) organization landed some agents to bring emer-
gency medical aid to Allied P. O. W. s and others in immediate need. (370)
The Indonesians did their best to co-operate with this group. Then on
September 15th, Rear-Admiral Patterson of the 5th Royal Cruiser Squad-
ron, accompanied by Dr. Charles van der Plas, the 1 NICA . representa-
tive, sailed into Tandjung Priok on Η. M. S. Cumberland. (371) Patterson
immediately began to try to reconnoitre the local situation, and consulted
the Japanese high command first of all. The. unanimous testimony from
the Japanese side warned the Allies of the tremendous degree of political
excitement that prevailed on Java. Yamamoto urged the Allied Commander
to allow all Indonesian officials to retain the posts they now held, and to
make a clear policy statement about the extent of political participation
that the Allies were prepared to permit. He said that though rivalries did
exist between Nationalists, Islamic elements and professional administra-
tors, they were all solidly behind independence. Particular tact should
be exercised on the matter of the Indonesian flag and national anthem,
because in the present context, any real or imagined insults would result
in massive sabotage, strikes and possibly even the murder of prisoners
massed in the hinterland. (372) When Dr. van der Plas criticized the
Japanese for allowing "terrorists" to intimidate the population into obeying
their orders, the former Gunseikan told Patterson that if the Indonesians
thought that the Allies would help them towards Independence, they would
be only too glad to co-operate. He warned the British not to treat Soekarno
(369)	Hatta, "Isi Proklamasi," in Fakta dan Dokumen2, Supplemen I, p. 2.
(370)	Cf. e. g. Rajendra Singh, op. cit. , p. 179.
(371)	Donnison, op. cit. , p. 423f. An advance group of British intelligence
officers haapreviously been parachuted into Java on September 8th.
In Rajendra Singh’s account (see Rajendra Singh, op. cit. , p. 222),
Patterson did not arrive till the 16th, and the Cumberland was accom-
panied by the Dutch cruiser Tromp.
(372)	Letter of General Yamamoto to Rear-Admiral Patterson of September
23, 1945, entitled "An Individual Opinion which may interest the Allied
Powers with regard to the future management of Indonesia," pp. 1-3.121
and Hatta as war-criminals. They had co-operated with the Japanese
simply to protect their countrymen, and advance the cause of Indonesian
freedom. (373)
Van der Plas, however, as the representative of NICA, . > was
in no position to accept the situation, (374) Pointing to the recently
signed Anglo-Dutch agreement of August 24th, he rejected the idea of
accepting the mediation and help of the Indonesians in repatriating prison-
ers of war and maintaining law and order. But for the moment he had no
alternative. No Allied troops had as yet arrived. (375) Patterson re-
ported to headquarters that there was no possibility of re-occupying Java
as a whole. The best the Allies could do, he said, would be to occupy
key enclaves on the coast, and accept the co-operation offered by the
Indonesian regime in evacuating Japanese soldiers and Allied internees.
If the Dutch wanted to extend their authority outside these areas, they
would have to try to do it themselves. The Allies (i. e. the British)
simply did not have the troops available to carry out the original plans
agreed on before the Japanese surrender, which had been made without
any real understanding of the political situation in Java. On September
28th, Lord Mountbatten accepted the Admiral's recommendations, and
reversed his earlier instructions that the Indonesian Republic should be
given no sort of recognition. (376) General Christison, newly appointed
Allied Commander in the area, announced, before leaving for Djakarta,
that "the Indonesian Government will not be expelled and will be expected
to continue civil administration in the areas outside those occupied by
(373)	Summary of a meeting between General Yamamoto, Admiral
Patterson and Dr. van der Plas on board Η. M. S. Cumberland,
September 21, 1945, p. 1.
(374)	Dr. van der Plas, in the view of American intelligence the most
favourably inclined of the Dutch policy-makers towards the views
of the Indonesian political elite, summarized his views on Indo-
nesia's future with the phrase: "We Dutch and Indonesians must
develop a nation oriental in its culture and art and Western in its
democratic ideals. " See U. S. Office of Strategic Services, Re-
search and Analysis Branch, Report # 28769, "Dutch Attitudes
towards the Future of the Netherlands East Indies," February 2,
1945. According to Donnison, op. cit. , p. 425, the Dutch were con-
vinced that once a few "extremists" had been removed from the
scene, they would have no difficulty in winning over the "moder-
ates" and the peasants.
(375)	According to Donnison, ibid. , 7 companies of the Royal Dutch Col-
onial Army were poised to leave for Indonesia, and 6 brigades of
top-flight Dutch troops were ready to embark in Holland at this time.
(376)	Cf. Donnison, ibid. ; also Rajendra Singh, op. cit. , p. 223. The
Dutch were naturally very angry.122
British forces" (377) There was no question of an All-Java Allied Mili-
tary Administration.
Meanwhile the pemudas had set up their own grass-roots centre of
operations at Menteng 31, and began to issue their own propaganda and
'program.· The key figures in the organization appear to have been Soekarni,
Maruto Nitimihardjo, Adam Malik, Wikana, Chaerul Saleh, Panduwiguna,
Kusnaeni, Darwis, Djohar Noer, Armunanto and Hanafi. (378) Its five-
point manifesto was as follows: (379)
1.	The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia came into
being on August 17, 1945, and the People are now inde-
pendent, free of Foreign rule.
2.	All power must be placed in the hands of the State and
People of Indonesia.
3.	Japan is now defeated, and has no more right to exer-
cise authority over Indonesian territory.
4.	The People of Indonesia must seize arms from the hands
of the Japanese.
5.	All enterprises (offices, factories, mines, plantations,
etc. ) must be seized from the Japanese, and controlled
by the Indonesian People (especially by the Workers).
Under a Central Action Committee several subordinate units were set up:
the Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (A. P. I.--Indonesian Youth Corps), as an
armed para-military brigade, Barisan Rakjat Indonesia (Indonesian People's
Front), as a peasant organization, and Barisan Burub Indonesia (Indonesian
Labour Front), as a labour action group.
Partly out of impatience at the cautious Fabian tactics of the Cabi-
net which they regarded as still trying to accomodate the Japanese as far
as possible, partly perhaps to undercut the Dutch, who were broadcasting
that those who had collaborated with the Japanese would be treated as war-
criminals, the Central Action Committee called for a drastic "grass-
roots" assumption of power. Under its leadership a series of local actions
such as the seizure of the Djakarta railroad system by the railroad workers,
and similar expropriations of plantations, were rapidly carried out. (380)
The intention of the Action Committee seems to have been to use these
faits accomplis by anonymous groups with anonymous leaders, to in-
crease the radical temper of the masses, ensure a 'leftist' and popular
(377)	Cf. Rajendra Singh, op. cit. , p. 224, citing P. Gerbrandy,
Indonesia, p. 99.
(378)	Malik, op. cit. , p. 69. Sjahrir was probably also involved indirectly.
(379)	Malik, ibid. , pp. 69f.
(380)	For details, see Malik, ibid. , pp. 69-73; also Nishijima, Kishi,
et al. , op. cit., p. 515.123
counterpoise to the Cabinet and the older politicians, and to parry Allied
charges that Indonesia was being run by a 'Japanese-made' government.
As word spread of the Committee's activities, the example of the
Djakarta pemudas was rapidly imitated by youth groups in other cities on
Java, somewhat to the embarrassment of the older leaders, who were
trying to establish coherent lines of authority from the top downward. (381)
The psychological climax to the struggle between the Indonesians
and Japanese was the "incident" of September 19th. According to Tan
Malakka, this occurred as a result of his own idea that the Indonesians in
Djakarta should put on a massive popular demonstration of Indonesian
unity and determination not to submit to Japanese control any longer. (382)
Malik asserts that the plan for a mass demonstration originated with the
Action Committee. (383) Tan Malakka further avers that a majority of
the Cabinet, and especially Iwa Kusumasumantri and Subardjo, accepted
the idea and agreed to carry it out. Careful plans were then laid for a
gigantic rally on the Koningsplein (Ikada). When word reached the
Japanese of the plans, they forbade the Cabinet to proceed, and told
Soekarno and Hatta that they would be held personally responsible for any
trouble that might arise. In the face of the Japanese threat Soekarno,
Hatta and Supomo came out against holding the rally, while Iwa, Subardjo,
Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Mr. Gatot and Abikusno favored it.
Tan Malakka reports that finding themselves in a minority,
Soekarno and Hatta sent in their resignations to the Japanese(l). However
when the Japanese requested them to continue in office they agreed to
withdraw their resignations. At the same time President Soekarno, in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief still banned any demonstrations.
(381)	It was perhaps in answer to pemuda agitation, that Vice-President
Hatta, in a radio speech on August 29th, said: "But aside from
being ready to die, the youth must also be ready to live to struggle
together with the common people for the accomplishment of the
ideals of the Indonesian Republic, based on the sovereignty of the
people. . . . The youth that come from the common people already
bear within them the people's spirit. Only their political conscious-
ness must be deepened. But for the educated youth ... it is neces-
sary to have training and instruction in how to bring themselves
close to the people's heart. There is no better training and instruc-
tion than disciplining themselves to follow the popular will.... The
youth must not act alone, failing to bind themselves to the people,
and outside the main movement of the people. . . " Fakta dan
Dokumen2, p. 69. The italics are the writer's. It is clear that
there were grave differences between Hatta's and the pemudas1
ideas of the content of the people's will.
(382)	Tan Malakka, op. cit. , p. 61.
(383)	Malik, op. cit. , p. 74.
4124
However, led by Adam Malik, then a Vice-Chairman of the K. N. I. P. , and
Abikusno, the pemudas refused to obey, and a crowd of 200, 000 was as-
sembled under their leadership in the Koningsplein. (384)	»
There are at least two fairly good reasons for not accepting this
story entirely at its face value. It is hard to imagine what 'Japanese'
offices Soekarno and Hatta could resign from, or if Tan Malakka is talking
about the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, why Soekarno and Hatta should
have offered to resign from offices of which the Japanese took no legal
cognizance anyway. Secondly, as yet no national army had been created,
so there are difficulties in understanding how Soekarno, in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief, could have banned anything (especially with the
Japanese still in military control). The truth of the matter probably is
that Soekarno and Hatta, realizing that they were indispensable to the
Japanese, as instruments for controlling pemuda activism, were able to
put very strong pressure on them to agree to the meeting taking place,
while assuming responsibility for the consequences. The threat of with-
drawing from their mediating role must have commanded the respect of
the Japanese at this stage. Though the initiative for the meeting may have
come from pemuda groups, the two leaders were able to turn it to their
own advantage.
Adam Malik's story is not only more convincing than Tan Malakka's,
but corroborates this interpretation and fills in another side of the picture.
He writes that the threat of resignation was sent to Menteng 31 and was de-
signed to pressure the pemudas into cancelling their preparations for the	‘
meeting. The Menteng 31 group then sent Adam Malik, third Vice-Chair-
man of the K. N. I. P. , to try to persuade the Cabinet to change its stand.
He was able to convince Soekarno and Hatta that popular expectations had
reached a point where serious outbreaks might be expected if the rally
was cancelled. A message was then sent to the Japanese authorities saying
that the meeting would be held and that "the Republic" would be respon-
sible for the consequences, (385)
Tension in Djakarta mounted as the Japanese sent tanks and
machine-gun squads to cover all entrances to the Koningsplein. The
pemudas who were leading the huge crowds of workers, peasants from
outside Djakarta, and other mass elements, were reportedly armed only
with sharpened bamboo spears. But their numbers and their determina-
tion were such that the Japanese did not dare to start firing. The crisis
was finally resolved only when Soekarno appeared, and with great skill
(384)	Tan Malakka, op. cit. , pp. 62f.
(385)	Malik, op. cit. , p. 75. "The Republic" in this context refers in
general to the Cabinet and in particular, presumably, to Soekarno
and Hatta.	*125
calmed the crowd down and sent them quietly back to their homes. (386)
The Kempeitai immediately retaliated against the Action Committee.
*	That night the pemuda headquarters at Menteng 31 were ransacked.
Darwis, Sidik, Hanafi, Aidit, A. Manafroni, Wahidin and Lukman were
arrested and taken first to the Kempeitai headquarters and later to the
Special Prison at Bukitduri. Malik was arrested two days later. But
the Japanese riposte was basically ineffective. The flow of radical
nationalist propaganda was barely checked. Popular feeling was aroused
by the arrests. (387) More important still, Soekarno's demonstration
of his enormous spiritual authority on this occasion was a crucial psycho-
logical turning-point. From September 19th onwards, the Indonesians
assumed a full spiritual ascendancy over their adversaries.
The other important political development of this period was the
obscure political manoeuvring between the rival organizations of Sjahrir
and Tan Malakka. However inasmuch as this struggle has been fully
analyzed elsewhere, (388) and in fact came to a head only in the period
after that covered by this study, a brief sketch will perhaps suffice.
Sjahrir had been very unwilling to endorse the Republican Government
in the first three weeks after independence. His general attitude was
that the Government represented, in too many cases, people who had
actively collaborated with the Japanese, and had become affected with
Japanese or Fascist ideology. (389) However a journey that he made
through Java in late August and early September convinced him that
Soekarno was essential to the revolutionary struggle, and more impor-
’	tant still, that there was enough popular support for a successful resis-
tance to the Dutch. Though he refused a possibly pro forma offer of
a Cabinet post by President Soekarno, he agreed to support the re-
*	gime. (390) And during a crucial period in which it appears that Tan
Malakka was aiming to supplant Soekarno as the head of the revolution-
ary movement, Sjahrir threw his support to Soekarno, and succeeded
(386)	For a paraphrased excerpt from Soekarno's speech, see Malik,
ibid. , p. 76. Otherwise, see Tan Malakka, op. cit. , p. 63,
and, for a less lurid account, Kahin, op. cit. , p„ Γ37, though
the date given there, August 19th, is a month too early. For
a highly atmospheric photograph of the occasion, see Lukisan
Revolusi, 1945-1949, Kementerian Penerangan, Jogjakarta, 1949,
p. 59.
(387)	Malik, op. cit. , pp. 77f.
(388)	See Kahin, op. cit. , pp. 147-192.
(389)	Cf. e. g. his controversial book, Perdjoeangan Kita (Our
Struggle), Pertjetakan Repoeblik Indonesia, Djakarta, 1945, passim.
(390)	Kahin, op. cit. , p. 147. For a version more hostile to Sjahrir,
see NisKijima, Kishi et al. , op. cit. , p. 516.
4126
!
in heading off his rival's bid for supreme power. (391)	;
At the same time the remnants of the Kaigun organization (392)
continued·with their plans for assisting the Revolution through the trans-
fer of weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment into National-
ist hands. (393) It is reported that both Nishijima and Yoshizumi joined
the Nationalist movement personally and that Yoshizumi was killed
fighting for the Revolution. (394) Maeda was arrested by the British in
October 1945 on the grounds that some 3, 000 Japanese had deserted into
the interior while under his charge. (395) In Surabaja, Admiral
Shibata adroitly delivered almost the entire contents of the Naval Head-
quarters' arsenal in that city to the pemudas. (396) And according to one
story at least, it was Nishijima who, with Jusuf Hasan, Sutomo, Djojo-
pranoto and the K. R. I. S. leader Evart Lankay, organized the tremendous
Indonesian resistance to the British forces at the Battle of Surabaja in
November 1945. (397)
On September 29th, the first British troops arrived in Djakarta,
and once again the political kaleidoscope in Indonesia was given a
shake. But the new patterns that emerged are beyond the scope of this
study. For with the arrival of the Allied Forces, the Japanese Occupa-
tion had come to an end.
(391)	Kahin, op. cit. , pp. 149-151.	t
(392)	Kahin, op. cit. , p. 136, says that Maeda was jailed by the Army im-
mediately after independence, but not for how long.	*
(393)	For some light on this, see Anonymous Japanese Officer, Beschouwingen
. . . , June 21 -23, 1947, p 20, and E. B. VanHulten, Rapport. . . July 24, 1946,
pp. 8f.
(394)	Apparently in East Java in 1948, after helping to build an Army division.
Cf. also E. B. VanHulten, Rapport. . . , July 24, 1946, p. 8; Anonymous Jap-
anese Officer, Beschouwingen. . . , June 21-23, 1947, p. 20.
(395)	E. B. VanHulten, ibid. ,p. 9. Cf. Nishijima, Verklaring.. . , March 10-13,
1947, pp. 10-12, for a very contrasting version. Also see Anonymoup
Japanese Officer, ibid. , p. 9.
(396)	See E. B. VanHulten, ibid. , p 8; Anonymous Japanese Officer, ibid. , p. 25,
Cf. also the suavely bland report given by Admiral Shibata to the Allies.
He describes how in spite of all his "pleas that our arms should be
given straight to the Allies," the Indonesians seized the Naval Arsenal
at Surabaja. The Japanese fought for one and a half hours, but then
Shibata acceded to Indonesian demands "in order to save lives." Report
of the Commander-in-Chief, 2nd South Seas Fleet to HQ Allied Adminis-
tration, Batavia, October 3, 1945, pp. If. Reportedly the pemudas used
the Naval equipment to help break into and seize the Army Headquar-	*
ters' ammunition depot in Surabaja.
(397)	E. B. VanHulten, ibid. , p. 5. Together they formed the Persatuan Rak-	·
jat Djelata, which helped direct the resistance in the city.