FM 21-77 
1NT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 
EVASION
AND
ESCAPE 

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
NOVEMBER 1965 

·.......... 

• 
*FM 	21-77 
HEADQUARTERS
FIELD MANUALl DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
No. 21-77 WASHINGTON, D.C., 12 November 1965 
EVASI'ON AND ESCAPE 
Paragraphs Page 
1. 	1--6 4
CHAPTER GENERAL ································ 
2. 	HISTORY ANDRATIONALE OF THE EVASION AND ESCAPE PROGRAM 
Section I. Historical background ············ 7,8 9 
II. Code of conduct .......... ··········· 9,10 11 

III. 	Need for E&E training 11-13 16 
CHAPTER, 3. CONCEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES 

Section ·r. General 	14-18 20 
II. Evasion techniques 19-21 22 
CHAPTER 4. SHORT-RANGE
EVASION 

Section I. General ................................... 22 33 

II. Isolated units 	23-28 33 
III. 	Lone evader 29,30 36 
*This manual supersedes FM 21-77, 19 December 1958. 
~
graphs Page Section IV. Evasion in counterinsurgency............................... 81-83 87 
CHAPTER 5~ LONG-RANGE
EVASION 

Section I. General ··············•·····'··•······ 34,35 40
II. 	The will to surviveand evade ......................... . 86,37 41
III. 	Plannin~ for long-rangeevasion ........................ 38-45 42 
CHAPTER 6. ASSISTED EVASION 
Section I. · General ...................................... 46 47

II. 	Assistance by dissidentpeople ......;............................ 47-53 47
III. 	Assisted'·evasion in ·guerrilla warfare operational areas ................................ 54-60 54 
CHAPTER 7. EVASION .AIDS 
61-65 56 
8. CAPTURE 
Section I. Introduction 
. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... .. ... . 66, 67 65
II. 	Escape prior tO confine~ment in PW camp ................ 68-71 66 
CHAPTER 9. PRISONER OF WARCAMP 
Section I. Organization and Administration .................................. 72-75 70
II. 	Typical Communist PWcamps (general war) 76-79 76
III. 	Communist internmentcamps (cold war) 80-83 79 
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Para~rraphs Page 
IV. 	Survival .while in PW status ...................................... 84 80 
CHAPTER 10. ENEMYINTERROGATION 
Section I. General ···································· 85,86 81 
II. Resisting interrogation .......... 87,88 82 

.CHAPTER 11• ENEMYINDOCTRINATION 
Section I. General .................................... 89,90 86 

II. 	Communist indoctrination program (Korean Con91-96 86
fiict) ······································
III. 	Indoctrination methods and techniques of the 97,98 93
Viet Cong ····························
IV. 	Defense against .indoctrination .............................. 99 93 
CHAPTER 12. ESCAPE FROM 
PW CAMP 

Section I. General . . .................................. 100, 101 94 

II. Escape techniques .................. ; 102-105 95 

III. Escape devices ...................... 106,107 98 

IV. Escape documentation .......... 108-115 99 

V. Cover-up at roll call ......... .. ... 116, 117 106 

REFERENCES ·································································· 111 
GLOSSARY ......................····· ...... ··: ... . ...... ......... ...... .. . . .. ... 113 

116
INDEX 
3 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL 
1. 	Purpose and Scope 
a. Purp'Ose. 
(1) 	This manual, together with its classified supplement, FM 21-77A, providesa basis for all evasion an escape (E&E)training conducted in the U. S. Army.It is intended for the information, guidance, and use of all U. S. Army personnel and should serve as a guide to commanders in the training and indoctrination of personnel in the principles andtechniques of E&E. 
(2) 	The material presented herein is applicable to both nuclear and nonnuclearwarfare. 
b. Sco-pe. 
(1) This manual contains doctrine and tech\·, niques for E&E training and operationsbased on experience gained during theWorld Wars, the Korean conflict, and·counterinsurgency operations· in bothLaos and the Republic of Vietnam. Fac':"tual information is presented in theform of principles, procedures, and techniques that have been used successfullyworldwide. Specific area intelligence andprocedures ar,e not included in this manual, but will be given to individuals 
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through special briefings prior to or after arrival overseas. 
2. 	Changes Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded directly to the Commanding officer U. S. Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency, Fort Bragg, N.C. 28307. 
3. 	Definitions For continuity of thought, selected definitions are included in the text of this manual. For a compilation of definitions pertaining to evasion and escape, see Glossary. 
4. Necessity for Training 
a. Numerous U. S. personnel involved in past hostilities have been captured and were detained in spite of opportunities for successful evasion and escape. 
b. Troops must be trained to recognize and act on the most feasible evasion alternative that presents itself. They must be convinced that as long as evasion is,possible, surrender is not to be accepted. They must be taught that as individuals they are not to choose to become a prisoner of war (PW) as long as someone capable :Of assum
,5 
ing leadership of the group is present or otheralternativ,es exist. The evasion area is merely anextension of the battlefield. A soldier must beproperly indoctrinated and motivated and mentally and spiritually prepared to follow the ordersof his leaders. If separated, he must be capableof taking appropriate action on his own. If cap.tured, he must continue to seek means to escape. 
5. 	Objectives of Evasion and Escape Training 
a. Train the soldier in the principles and techniques of evasion. 
b. Familiarize the soldier with techniques ofplanning and executing escape.
c. Familiarize the soldier with the leadershipand organization required within PW camps tofacilitate successful survival and escape.
d. Equip the soldier to resist enemy interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation.
e. Instill in the soldier an understanding ofhis security obligation upon return to friendlycontrol. 
f. Enhance the soldier's self-reliance and confidence in his ability to survive, evade, and escape. 
6. 	Responsibilities for the Evasion and Escape
Program 

a. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, is theexecutive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff fordeveloping taCtics, techniques, and equipmentconcerning the joint aspects of evasion andescape. 
b. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) pro
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duces and disseminates ·necessary intelligence to support military E&E operations as required. 
c. The commanders of unified and subordinate unified commands plan and prepare for the conduct of E&E operations in accordance with policies and directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and develop E&E requirements as necessary for their own area(s) of influence. 
d.' The Army responsibility for evasion and escape training is assigned to the, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. The Army is responsible for--:-·· · · · · 
( 1) , Training military personnel in E&E doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques. 
(2) 	Integrating Code of Conduct .and PW train~ng into appropriate E&E training programs and fiel~ training exercises. 
(3) 	Providing appropriate support and assistance as required. . (4)· Developing a capability to conduct E&E within assigned guerrilla warfare operational areas (GWOA). 
e. Individuals are r~ponsible for
(1) 	Members of the United States Army will meet the standards embodied in the Code of Conduct. 
(2) 	All individuals or group of individuals, who find themselves isolated from their unit in the course of combat operations, will continue to fight and, when necessary, to evade capture and to regain 
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contact with friendly forces.
(3) 	All individuals in the U. S. Army whoare taken as prisoners of war or interned by the enemy will
(a) Make every effort to escape at theearliest opportunity and to assist others to escape. 
(b) 	Give only their name, grade, servicenumber, and date of birth when questioned, except to communicate withthe enemy regarding health and welfare ·and, when appropriate; .on routine matters of camp administration.
(c) 	Refuse to accept parole or special favors from the enemy. 
(d) 	Refuse to make oral or written statements for propaganda purposes,broadcasts, or any other oral or written communications on behalf of theenemy. 
(e) 	Live, act, and speak during their captivity in a manner that leaves no doubtthat they adhere to the traditions ofthe U. S. Army and to their missionof fighting the enemy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
. I . .
HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF THE 
EVASION AND ESCAPE PROGRAM 
I am an American fighting man, I serve in the. forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense. (Article I -Code of Conduct) 
. Section I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
7. 	General 
a. Throughout military history, units and individuals cut off from parent organizations have employed evasion and escape techniques in returning to friendly lines. However, the necessity for evasion and escape training was not recognized until World War II. Prior to that time E&E was accomplished by individuals and units without pre-planning or organization. 
b. Follow~ng is a brief history of the development of the E&E program since the beginning of WW II. 
8. 	Development of E&E. Program 
a. World War II. 
(1) 	AU. S. evasion and escape organization became operational on 1 January 1943. It was placed in G2, War Department General Staff, where it worked in the interest of all services in matters of policy and coordination~ 
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(2) 	A special school for selected militarypersonnel from all branches of the Service provided a nucleus of instructorscapable of directing E&E training bothin the zone of interior and in overseatheaters. A training program was instituted for combat personnel; however,in the earlier days of the war this train·• ing was directed at Army Air Corpspersonnel whose missions usually tookthem behind enemy lines. Later, briefings for ground force personnel wereinitiated. 
b. 	Korean Conflict. 
(1) 	During the early phases of.the Korean. conflict, many u. s. personnel who hadnever been briefed or 'trained in evasionand escape . procedures found them.. selves cut · off behind erierny lines. Inadequately hriefed on evasion possibilfties and confused· as' to their responsibilities, very few of these me:ri attemptedto evade capture or to escape once theyhad been captured. Those whose naturalinstincts led them to evade or escapemade many mistakes which could havebeen avoided by a minimum of training.Furthermore, captured .Chinese documents attest to the fact that some of ourcaptured soldiers revealed military information without compulsion and thatmany of them apparently accepted communist indoctrination..· 
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(2) 	To remedy this situation, the Department of -the Army, in February 1951, established a training program in evasion and escape designed not only to reach personnel already committed to combat but also to cover the indoctrination of all U. S. Army personnel destined for oversea shipment. 
c. Post Korean Conflict. Interrogation of repatriated American prisoners of war from all services indicated the great need for evasion and escape training and instruction in methods of resisting interrogation and indoctrination. Training doctrine pertaining to survival, evasion, and escape were reviewed and directives were issued to prevent a recurrence in future wars. Most prominent among the directives was the promulgation of the Code of Conduct in the form of a Presidential Executive Order. 
Section II. CODE OF CONDUCT 
9. 	General 
The Code of Conduct is applicable to each member of the Armed Forces which is prescribed by Executive Order No. 10631, 17 August 1955, announced in DA Bulletin 13, 1955, restated in DOD Directive No. 1300.7, 8 July 1964, and AR 350-30, 12 November 1964. Military training in support of this Code has the primary objectives of increasing unit fighting strength and the individual's will to resist. In no way should this training assume the approach of merely training soldiers 
11 
how to behave as prisoners of war, but should,through training and indoctrination, instill inthem the will and the courage to avoid capture,or if captured, .to resist interrogation and indoctrination, and to escape. This training will assurethe soldier that
a. Even as a prisoner of war, he continues tobe of special concern to the United States; hewill not be forgotten. 
· b. Every available national means will be employed to establish contact with him, to supporthim, and to gain his release. 
c. The laws of the United States provide forthe support and care of his dependents duringperiods in which he serves in PW status or isdetained in a foreign country against his will. 
10. Meaning of the Code of Conduct 
Every member of the Armed Forces is provided instruction in the Code of Conduct and isexpected to measure up to the standards embodied therein while he is in combat with his unit orduring captivity. Complete and loyal observanceGf the spirit and letter of this Code is in the bestinterest of the Nation, Army, unit, and the individual. The six articles of the Code of Conductwith their interpretation are as follows: 
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THE CODE OF CONDUCT 
I 
I AM AN AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN, I SERVE IN THE FORCES WHICH GUARD MY COUNTRY AND OUR WAY OF LIFE. I AM PREPARED TO GIVE MY LIFE IN THEIR DEFENSE. 
A member of the Armed Forces is always a fighting man. As such, it is his duty to oppose the enemies of the United States, regardless of the circumstances -in which he may find himself, whether in active participation in combat, or as a prisoner of war. 
II 
I WILL NEVER SURRENDER OF MY OWN FREE WILL. IF IN COMMAND I WILL NEVER SURRENDER MY MEN WHILE THEY STILL HAVE THE MEANS TO RESIST. 
As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may never voluntarily surrender himself. When isolated and he can no longer' inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces. 
The responsibility and authority of a commander never ,extends to the surrender of his command to 'the enemy while it has power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off, or surrounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved, or able to rejoin, friendly forces, by breaking out or by evading the enemy. 
III 
IF I AM CAPTURED I WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE, I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT :TO ESCAPE AND AID OTHERS TO ESCAPE. I WILL ACCEPT NEITHER PAROLE NOR SPECIAL FAVORS FROM THE ENEMY. 
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The duty of a member of the Armed Forces tocontinue resistance by all means at his disposalis not lessened by the misfortune of capture.Article 82 of the Geneva Convention pertains andmust be explained. He will escape if able to doso, and will assist others to escape. Paroleagreements are promises given the captor by aprisoner of war upon his faith and honor, to fulfill stated conditions, such as not to bear armsor not to escape, in consideration of special privileges, usually .release from ,captivity or a lessened restraint. He will never sign or. enter intoa parole agreement. 
IV 
IF I BECOME A PRISONER OF WAR, I WILL KEEPFAITH WITH MY FELLOW PRISONERS. I WILLGIVE NO INFORMATION OR TAKE PART IN ANYACTION WHICH MIGHT BE HARMFUL TO MY
COMRADES. IF I AM SENIOR, I WILL TAKE COM
MAND. IF NOT I WILL .OBEY THE LAWFUL OR
DERS OF THOSE APPOINTED OVER ME AND WILL
BACK THEM UP IN EVERY WAY. 
Informing, or·any other action to the detrimentof a fellow prisoner, is despicable and is expressly forbidden. Prisoners of, war must avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who mayhave knowledge of particular value to the enemy,and may therefore be made to suffer coerciveinterrogation. 
Strong leadership is essential to discipline.Without discipline, camp organization, resistance,and even survival may be impossible. Personalhygiene, camp sanitation, and care of sick andwounded are imperative. Officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States will continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority subsequent to capture. Thesenior line officer or noncommissioned officer 
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within the prisoner of war camp or group of prisoners will assume command according to rank (or precedence) without regard to Service. This responsibility and accountability may · not be evaded. If the senior officer or noncommissioned officer is incapacitated or unable to act for any reason, command will assumed by the next senior. 
v 
WHEN QUESTIONED, SHOULD I BECOME. A PRISONER OF WAR, I .AM. BOUND TO GIVE ONLY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH. I WILL EVADE ANSWERING FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY•. I WILL MAKE NO ORAL OR WRITTEN STATEMENTS DISLOYAL TO MY COUNTRY AND ITS ALLIES OR HARMFUL TO THEIR CAUSE. When questioned,. a prisoner of war 'is• requiredby the Geneva Convention and permitted by. this Code to disclose his name, rank, .service number, and date of birth. A prisoner of war may also colhmunicate with the enemy regarding his individUal health or welfare as a pris~ner of war and, when appropriate, on routine· matters of camp adrriinist~ation. Oral.• or written confessions true or false, questionnaires, personal history state~ents, propaganda recordings and broadcasts, appeals to other prisoners of war, signatures to peace or surrende~ appeais, self criticisms or any other oral or written communications" on behalf of the enemy or critical oiharmful to the United States, its allies, the Armed Forces or other prisoners are forbidde~. 
It is a .viblation of the Geneva Convention to place a prisoner of war under. physical.or mental torture or any other form of coercion to . secure from him information of any kind. lf, however, a prisoner is subjected to such treatment, he will endeavor to avoid by every means the disclosure 
.15 
of any information, or the making, of any statement or the performance of any action harmful to the interests of the United States or ·itsallies or which will provide aid or comfort tothe enemy. Under Communist Bloc reservationsto the Geneva Convention, the signing of a confession or the making of a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used to convict him as awar criminal under the laws of his captors. Thisconviction has the effect of removing him fromthe prisoner of war status and according to thisCommunist Bloc device denying him any protection under terms of the Geneva Convention and
: repatriation until a prison sentence is served. 
VI 
I WILL NEVER FORGET THAT I AM AN AMERICANFIGHTING MAN, RESPONSIBLE FOR MY ACTION,AND DEDICATED TO THE PRINCIPLES WHICHMADE MY COUNTRY FREE. I WILL TRUST IN MYGOD AND IN THE UNITED. STATES OF AMERICA. The provisions of the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, whenever appropriate, continue to applyto members Of the Armed F~rces while prisonersof war. Upon repatriation, the conduct of prisoners will be examined as to the circumstancesof capture and through the period of detentionwith due regard for the rights of the individualand consideration for the conditions of captivity.A member of the Armed Forces who becomes aprisoner of war has a continuing obligation toremain loyal to his country, his s"ervice arid hisunit. 
The life of a prisoner of war is hard. He mustnever give up hope. He must resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners. of war who stand--firmand united against the enemy will aid one .another in surviving this ordeal. 
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Section Ill. NEED FOR E&E TRAINING 
11. 	Legal Status of E¥aders, Escapee's, and Prisoners of War 
Escapees and. evaders have legal rights under international law..These rights are clearly defined and set forth in the IV Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva PW Convention of 1929. They are restated in the Revised Geneva Convention of 1949. (See FM 27-10 and DA Pam 27-1.) 
12. 	Basic .Reasons for an Evasion and Escape 
Program 

There are · numerous reasons why training in principles and techniques to be followed behind enemy lines in evading capture, resisting interrogation, and escaping from enemy control will pay dividends. Some of them are
a. Humanitarian Reasons; Anyone with knowledge of the treatment of prisoners of war by the communists has no illusions concerning the horrors of imprisonment by them. ·In· general, it is a life of slave labor devoid of all creature comforts, barely enough food to sustain life, and insufficient clothing and shelter to protect against disease. 
b. Beneficial Influence on Morale of Our Own Forces. The beneficial impact on the morale of a unit when one of its men returns to his unit after being listed as missing in action is readily apparent. The knowledge that a man reported missing has returned cannot fail to raise the spirits of the entire unit and impress all personnel with the proof that evasion or escape can be accomplished. 
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c. Preservation of Manpower. Today's wars arefought by highly trained experts. Much time, effort, and money go into the development of asoldier. His capture means that his country haslost the services of a well-trained and valuableman. Most important however is the recovery ofthe individual soldier as a human being. 
d. Safeguarding of Military lnforrruttion. Twoprincipal benefits the eneniy receives from thecapture of our soldiers are the reduction in thenumber of combatants opposing them and thepossibility of obtaining military information.Proper training in evasion and escape techniquesreduces. the riumber of our soldiers who may be
< •• I 
' ·,, >
captured and subsequently subjected to enemyinterrogation. Prope;r indoctrination in means andmethods of resisting enemy interrogation furtherreduces the chances that the enemy will benefitfrom the capture of our personnel. 
e. Impediments to Enemy's War Efforts. An indirect benefit from the efforts of our personnelbehind. enemy lines to evade capture or to escapefrom enemy control is the expenditure· of manpower by the enemy to prevent the success ofsuch efforts by our soldiers. The evader or escapeeshall not disclose his methods of evasion or escape, routes l taken, . identities of individuals, orgroups who assisted him or any other aspects ofhis evasion pr~ escape to anyone other. than tofriendly intelligence personnel or to the authorized debriefing officer. No statement shall be madeto·the press. or other· news media except throughthe appointed Public Information Officer (PIO). 
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f. Collection of Information. Evaders and escapees upon their return to friendly control can provide a valuable source of information and intelligence. · · 
13. Recent Developments 
a. With the advent of modern warfare and its technical advances in machines of war and improved mobility, the problems associated with E&E have changed. 
b. The increased use of aircraft and the dispersion of units has made the probability of being isolated-perhaps deep in enemy or enemy-controlled.territory-a likely occurrence to airborne and airmobile troops, long-range patrols, and special operational elements. Additionally, the dispersal of conventional troops necessitated by the use of modern weapons exposes heretofore relatively secure elements to being overrun by enemy forces or isolation as a result of their weapons . effects and ground maneuver. Conversely, aircraft developments since WW II, such as the helicopter, vertical takeoff landing <VTOL), and short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft make rescue and exfiltration of personnel more possible. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES 
I will never surrender of my own free will. If incommand I will never surrender my men whilethey still have the means to resist. (Article IICode of Conduct) 
Section I. GENERAL 
J4, Purpose 
This chapter discusses in general terms theclassification concept, principles, and general tac
tics to be utilized in evasion. The succeedingchapters will discuss the two ·types of evasion,assistance that might be expected, and the evasion techniques required in special situations toinclude counterinsurgency operations. 
15. Classification 
a. Evasion is classified as either short-rangeor long-range. The difference lies in the condi
tions which confront the evader. Principles remain generally the same while techniques vary tomeet the requirements of different situations.
b. Generally, short-range evasion occurs in theforward combat zone or areas of hostilitieswhen return to friendly control can be accomplished within a matter of hours or perhaps daysfollowing isolation. The individual soldier or smallunit normally has adequate food and clothing, andgenerally is oriented as to direction, distance, andterrain. In contrast, the long-range evader, usu
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ally a downed pilot or an escaped PW, must operate over terrain completely foreign to him with little or no food or equipment. 
16. 	Concept The Army places emphasis on short-range evasion to parallel the emphasis placed in training upon early escape in forward areas if captured or isolated. While long-range evasion and escape from PW camps is essential to the program, the importance of stressing short-range evasion and early escape cannot be overemphasized. 
17. Basic Problems During Evasion 
a. 	Evading the enemy. 
b. 	Living in the open with limited supplies. 
c. 	Returning to friendly teritory. 
18. Basic Principles 
a. Successful evasion depends primarily upon the following basic principles and techniques: 
(1) 	Preparing a detailed plan. 
(2) 	Observing the elementary rules of movement, camouflage, and concealment. 
(3) 	Refraining from getting in a hurry, es. pecially while traveling. Hurrying only · __increases weariness and decreases alertness. Patience and perseverance are key words in evasion. · 
( 4) 	Conserving food is extremely important as it may be days or even weeks before more food can be obtained. 
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(5) 	Reserve strength will be required duringcritical periods; therefore, strengthshould be conserved as much as possible. 
b. Evasion will require living in the open forextended periods and traveling on foot over difficult terrain, often during inclement weather. Aknowledge of survival techniques is essential (see
FM 21-76). 
Section II. EVASION TECHNIQUES 
19. Initial Action 
a. The individual soldier becomes an evaderwhen he finds himself isolated in enemy dominated or controlled territory and is unable tocontinue his assigned mission and is preventedfrom rejoining his unit by enemy action. The evasion status is the result of enemy action, such asambush, artillery barrage, or over-running offriendly positions. To avoid being killed or captured by enemy mopup forces, the evader mustleave the immediate area as soon as possible andselect a hiding place at a safe distance. The evadermust take stock of the situation and devise a planof action during his stay in this initial hidingplace. 
b. The period during which an evader shouldremain in this initial location should be governedby the enemy's activities, the evader's physicalcondition, and patience. This "hole-up time"should be used to regain strength and to evaluatethe evasion problem ahead. When the time comesto travel, he should be prepared with a plan and 
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alternatives to cope with as many eventualities as can be perceived. 
20. Travel 
Periods of travel probably are the most vulnerable phases of evasion. Many evaders have been captured merely because they followed the easiest and shortest route or failed to employ simple techniques such as concealment, camouflage, etc. · a. General. As a rule, the safest route will be that which avoids major roads and. populated areas even if this involves expending additional time and energy. 
b. Concealment and Camouflage. Full use should be made of concealment and ·camouflage. The use of the natural concealment afforded by darkness, wooded areas, trees, bushes, an:d other terrain features ate recommended; however, any method devised for deceit, 'for hiding from view, or for disguising oneself will increase the chances of success. Camouflage and concealment are discussed in detail in FM 5-20. 
c. DisguiSe. Potential and actual evaders normally will consider the possibility of disguise. Putting on civilian attire in the eXpectation of passing as a native of the area is extremely dangerous and should be ruled out in any case where the evader's race is different from that of the people in the evasion area. Even in an area where racial dissimilarities would not betray the evader, the mannerisms of walking, eating, smoking, plus unfamiliarity with the language, . could quickly 
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bring on suspicion leading to investigation andpossible capture. 
(1) 	Under established international law, anevader is considered a belligerent untilcaptured. So long as he wears the uniform of his nation, he is considered tobe an instrument of that government under orders to evade capture and neversurrender of his own free will. This entitles the evader to commit acts of violence against legitimate military targetswithout the risk of prosecution aftercapture for violation of the local criminal law. Such entitlement does not extend to an escapee. For example, it wouldbe permissible for an evader to kill, inthe line of duty, any of the enemy whomay impeqe him in his effort to carryout his orders to evade capture. On theother hand, such a killing by an escapeewould be considered murder and wouldrender the escapee liable for trial andpunishment. 
(2) 	Article 29 of the IV Hague Conventionstates that a person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely,he endeavors to obtain information inthe zone of operations of a belligerent,with intention of communicating it to ahostile party. Thus, uniformed soldiers,performing reconnaissance missions, arenot considered spies. 
(3) 	The treaties are silent on the status of 
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evaders who conceal their identity. However, "members of armed forces lose their right to be treated as PW when they deliberately conceal· their status in enemy country to gather military information or to wage war...." (see FM 27-10). 
( 4) 	The evader should fully understand the prejudicial situation which could ensue from capture while disgnised or wearing the uniform of the enemy; in either case, if captured, the almost insurmountable burden would be on him to show that he did not conceal his status for the· purpose of gathering military informa... tion or for waging war. 
(5) 	Disguise must not be rejected entirely as the time may arise when he is ordered by his assisters (see ch 6) to chang.e clothing. The evader may comply; however, he should retain some tYpe of military identification such as identification tags or identification card (DD Form 2A). 
d. Daylight vs Night. 
(1) 	When feasible, travel should be accomplished under cove1· of darkness. However, if the evader suspects that his location is known to the enemy or ·local civilians, he should move immediately. 
(2) 	Whenever possible; the evader should observe during daylight hours the terrain he plans to traverse during the 
night. He should be particularly attentive to the concealment it will provideand the obstacles over or around whichhe will have'to travel.
e. Maps. If the evader is fortunate enough tohave a map of the area, it should not be marked.
A marked map in enemy hands can lead to thecompromise of persons and locations where assistance was provided to the evader. Soiled fingers will mark the chart as plainly as a pencil.The evader should 'be careful· not to point to hisdestination or put his f,inger on a particular point.
· f. Shelter. Existing shelters such as abandonedhouses, barns, caves, haystacks, and similar structures should be avoided. These type areas are almost certain to come to the enemy's attentionwhen a search· 'is being conducted for 'an evader.-Although shelters of this type are condemned inprinciple the terrain or climate may be such thatlittle choice· is left to the evader. 
g. Progress. Pr~gress on the ground is meas:ured in stopover points reached. Speed and distance are of secondary importance..The evadermust not let his failure to meet a precise schedule
endanger his plan. 
.21. . Obstacles 
· · The evader will be confronted with many obstacles which will impede the evasion effort and influence selection of travel routes. These obstaclescan be divided into natural obstacles, such as rivers, streams, and mountains ; and human obstacles, such as border guards and enemy troops. 
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Some of these obstacles may be considered as assets by the evader while others will prove to be a hindrance. 
a. Natural Obstacles. 
(1) 	Rivers and streams. The evader may have to cross streams and rivers. An evader seldom should expect to cross over a bridge or ferry since the enemy normally will establish checkpoints at these installations. This leaves the evader a choice . of accomplishing the crossing by fording, swimming, traversing by boat, or some improvised field expedient. Water crossings are discussed in FM 21-76. 
(2) 	Mountains. 
(a) 	In mountainous areas, the evader may find hiniself concerned primarily with survival. Under these conditions, it may be necessary to remain in one location for an entire winter and wait for the coming of spring before attempting to travel. In many cases, mountains may be considered as havens. Mountainous areas afford the evader cover, water, food, and areas of low population densities. Assistance from individuals is facilitated in areas where homes and farms are siparated by great distances. 
(b) 	For detailed information concerning techniques for traveling and surviving in mountains, see FM 21-76. 
27 
b. Artijicia:l Obstacles. 
(1) 	Electrified fences.
(a) 	To assess the likelihood of electrifiedfences, watch for
1. 	Dead animals. 
2. 	Insulators on the wire.
3. 	Flashes from the wire which occurduring storms and .from short circuits. 
(b) 	If doubt remains whether a wire iselectrified, a quick simple test can beapplied. Carefully approach the wire,making no quick movements which· might cause accidental touching of thewire. Double the fist extending oneknuckle while doing so. Swing thehand so that the protruding knucklewill graze the wire. If the wire ischarged, a mild shock will be receivedbut it will not be injurious.
(2) 	Contaminated areas. The evader may beconfronted with the problem of crossingareas which have been contaminated asa result of enemy or friendly CBR operations. Since the .evader may or may nothave in his possession protective cloth. ing, mask and accessories, contaminatedareas, if recognized, should be bypassedif possible. The evader .should be alertto the possibility· that food and watersources may be contaminated.
c. Border Crossing. 
(1) 	The crossing of borders presents a rna
28 
jor problem to the evader. H~ may be required to cross· several borders on his journey to freedom. Border areas may be--open areas, mountains, hills; rivers, etc. 
(2) 	In areas where there is no well-defined terrain feature to indicate the border, the evader can expect to encounter manmade obstacles such as electrified or barbed wire fences and these may be augmented with trip wires, antipersonnel mines, or flares. Open areas may be patrolled by men or dogs, or both, particularly during the hours of darkness. 
(3) 	In open terrain the enemy may employ floodlights and plowed strips as aids to detecting evaders. 
(4) The :plan to cross the border must be deliberate and designed to take advantage of unusually bad weather or a major distraction to the enemy force. It should be borne in mind that borders · should be crossed in areas where security forces are overextended. These areas usually are found where there are natural obstacles. 
(5) In effecting the crossing, the evader should move at night when possible. During daylight hours he should select a crossing pdint that offers the best pro. tection and' cover. If it is necessary to cross during daylight hours, he should keep. the area under close surveillance 
29 
· · for several -days to ascertain'
(a) The number of guards utilized.
(b) The manner of their posting.
(c) The limits of the areas they patrol.
(d) Aerial patrols and their frequency. 
d. Frontline Crossings. 
(1) .General. A difficult task for an evader orescapee is when he attempts to cross theforward edge of the battle area. If unable to determine the general directionto friendly lines, he should remain inposition until able to do so. Generaldirection may be determined by observing the movement of enemy militaryforces or supplies, the noise and flashesof the battle area, or the orientation ofenemy artillery. After arriving in thecombat zone, he should select a concealed observation point which allowsthe maximum visual coverage of thebattle zone. He attempts to reorganizecritical terrain features to facilitate infiltration to friendly positions. under thecover of darkness~ Several alternative· routes should be selected with care toavoid "easy" approaches· to friendlylines which are more apt to be coveredby friendly fires and enemy patrols. Ifhe is in uniform, .he should select hisexposure time during daylight hours,and be close enough to be easily recognized by friendly troops.
(2) Friendly patrols. The evader should be 
30 
constantly on the ·alert for friendly pa.; trois. Once a patrol is spotted, it is best to remain in position and allow it to approach~ When the patrol is close enough to recognize the evader, he should dis.:. play a white cloth and· call out a gree~ ing that is clearly and unmistakenly of American origin. It is imperative that at the time of contact there be sufficient light for the patrol to identify him. In the .event the evader elects not to establish contact he can, if possible, observe their route and approach friendly lines at approximately the same location. This will enable him to avoid minefields and boobytraps. 
(3) 	Friendly Outposts. If unable to contact a friendly patrol, the evader's only alternative may be to make a direct approach of front line positions. This will require him to crawl through the enemy's forward positions to a position near forward friendly elements. This action should be accomplished during the hours of darkness. However, once near friendly lines he should not attempt to make c~;mtact until there is sufficient light to be recognized. As in establishing contact with a friendly patrol, call out something typically American and wave a white cloth. 
e. Rescue by Aircraft. Rescue may be accomplished either by helicopters or :fixed wing air
:n 
craft. The standard SOS distress code and methods of improvising signals are discussed in FM21-76. Ground-to-air signal displays should bearranged so that they can be removed at a moment's notice since enemy aircraft may also flyover his immediate area. 
32 
. CHAPTER 4 
SHORT-RANGE EVASION· 
Section I. GENERAL 
22. S.pecial Aspects of Short-Range Evasion 
a. As men~ioned in the previous chapter, shortrange evasion generally occurs in the forward combat zone or the area of hostilities. These areas normally are not too distant from friendly elements and therefore allow the evader the advantages of direction and distance. Short-range evasion situations result from: (1) isolation of units; and (2) individuals becoming separated or lost from their parent unit. 
b. The principles and techniques discussed in · the preceding chapter ·are applicable to shortrange evasion. 
Section II. ISOLATED UNITS 
23. Hazards of Isolated Units 
a. Wartime experiences reflect that the greatest losses in prisoners of war occurred in units that had been isolated by enemy action. Approximately three-fourth of the men captured in Korea and World War II reported that their unit had been isolated by enemy action. 
b. In future hostilities, isolation on the battlefield may be a common occurrence since units may be widely dispersed. Under modern concepts of land warfare, the threat of isolation confronts 
33 
all units. Frontline tactical units may be bypassed during a major enemy offensive. Reararea or service units may be cut off by enemyairborne or amphibious operations. · 
c. For the purposes of ·this discussion, tacticalunits that are '~physically out of contact withhigher or adjacent units as a result of a tacticalscheme of maneuver, e.g., airheads, blockingforces limiting an allowed penetration for coun~terattack supported by nuclear fires, etc., arenot considered to 'be isolated and. facing an E&Esituation. 
24. Courses of Action .· 
'When a unit'. is · isolated; many courses of action may be considered that will .enable the unitor its individual members to avoid capt,ure andreturn to friendly lines. Some alternatives are-
a. Defense of present position.
b. Breakout to areas under friendly control.
c. Evasion by infiltr~tion. .
d. Combination of any of the above. 
25. Defense of Present Position 
This course of action might be adopted whena unit occupies good defensive terrain and early~elief by friendly forces is probable. :l'he decisionto hold or to attempt evasion rests with the seniorheadquarters of the isolated unit. ·However, ifcommunication with this headquarters are nonexistent, the decision'must be made. by the com•mander of the isolated u·nit. (For ·spec1fic de~ 
34 
fensive action, see FM 61~100 and appropriate unit level field manuals.) 
26 Breakout tc> Areas Under Friendly Control 
a. This. action may be feasible when the enemy forces opposing the isolated unit are relatively weak. If this is the action decided upon, the breakout should be accomplished ,as soon as practical. The longer aggressive action is delayed the greater the advantage that accrues to the enemy. 
b. A hastily conceived but.. aggressively executed plan in most instances is ·more desirable than a more deliberate plan that is not timely. The actual breakout may be enhanced when utilizing the cover of darkness; however, this will depend upon the situation. '~. For the specific tactics arid techniques concerning a breakout, see FM. 31-16, FM 31-21, FM 61-100, and appropriate unit level FM. 
27. Evasion by Infiltration · 
The alte~nativ~·.to' the. b~eakout is evading by infiltration. This may provide the best solution if a breako.utis impracticable1_'· .~ . ' ' '
a. The unit ~hould be separated into groups of not more than four men with one of each group in command. This size group reduces the ·chance of detection, .e~hances move:rpent and control, and fosters .confidence through the use of the buddy system. . · . · . . . 
b. The tactics and tel!hniques used by reconnaissance pa:trols generally will apply (see FM 21-,-75).. ' 
35 
28. Other Alternatives 
a. The courses of action listed above should notbe considered as covering all actions that can betaken to avoid capture. Any action is justifiedso long as it does not violate the IV Hague Convention. Misusing the distinctive Red Cross emblem to protect personnel or materials not entitled .to such protection is an example of such aviolation. 
··b. A combination of any of the above alternatives might be the solution for a given situation. 
Section Ill. LONE EVADER 
29. Gene~~al 
The individual who becomes separated or lostfrom his unit has no choice but to evade by himself. However, any individual who is or has beenoperating in a situation or area which makesevasion a possibility should have prepared himself both psychologically and materially for suchan eventuality. Adequate preparation coupledwith the fact that one person is much more difficult to track and locate than a group gives theindividual an excellent chance for success. 
30. Evasion Techniques 
a. Techniques discussed in paragraphs 19through 21 are applicable; however, it is mostimportant in this type .situation to avoid panic.Overcome fear and shock ! It is only natural tobecome anxious in a situation of this type but th~individual must not take action without thinking. 
36 
He must recall any previous briefings, SOP, or training and choose a course of action to return to friendly territory. .b. The person who has been forced to parachute into enemy or enemy-controlled territory must decide what equipment to keep and how and where to dispose of the remainder. He must presume that the enemy has observed his descent. The important thing is to get away from the scene of landing as soon as possible, even at the expense of leaving valuable salvage behind. However, he must be sure to destroy all classified material. · 
c. Contact no one QXcept in the special case of trying to get in touch with assistance personnel in an E&E net (See ch 6 for a discussion on this subj.ect.) 
d. The principles and techniques discussed in chapter 3 should be followed from this point. 
Section IV. EVASION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 
31. General 
The general Dature of counterinsurgency operations dictates a need of varying evasion techniques since there is little distinction between friendly and enemy territory. Areas that are under friendly control one day may be under the control of insurgent forces the next day. There are no definite battlelines for the evader to guide on. 
32. Advantages 
Evasion during counterinsurgency operations 
37 
may be less difficult than in general and limitedwar situations.
a. In this type environment, friendly forces mayprovide a measure of security throughout thecountry. Therefore, distances to be traveled byevaders may be much shorter than in limited orgeneral war situations. 
b. It can be assumed that the majority of thepopulation is friendly; however, contacting thelocai population remains a calculated risk. Whenevading with friendly indigenous personnel~ contact with the natives of the country is facilitated,i.e., the counterpart's knowledge of the environment, language, customs, ethnic groups, and peculiarities pertinent to the various locales maketraveling and contact easier and more secure.
c. The evader is normally well-oriented in relation to his present position, location of friendlyunits, and the current tactical situation. Normally, an evader can assume aircraft are friendly. 
33. Disadvantages 
a. It is difficult if not impossible to distinguishthe insurgent · from the friendly populace. Also,since the government forces may employ a nonuniformed paramilitary force against the insurgent force, it is possible to mistake friendly personnel for insurgents and vice versa.
b. The evader can expect little or no assistancefrom local "neutrals" since most of the populationlive in fear of the insurgent forces and their actsof terrorism, coercion, and atrocities.
c. Occasionally, it is worthwhile for the guer
38 
rilla force to take selected prisoners for propaganda purposes; but normally a guerrilla unit connot afford to allow prisoners to impede its movement. Even when they do retain· prisoners, which is the exception, it must be understood that often the guerrilla force has . never heard of, nor will it adhere to, Article 3 of the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners. 
· d. Since most insurgencies occur in less developed areas of the world, the majority of which are located in tropical or semi-tropical region.s, survival 'presents problems peculiar 'to these · conditions. In counterinsurgency operations, however, survival kits normally are readily available and in the possession of personnel who are apt to require them. 
CHAPTER 5 
LONG-RANGE EVASION 
Section I. GENERAL 
34. Special Aspects of Long Range Evasion 
a. Long-rang:e evasion differs from short-rangeevasion in several aspects.. 
(1) 	Distance from friendly forces is greater,ranging from hundreds to even thousands of miles.
(2) 	The will to survive and the knowledgeof survival techniques becomes morevital.
(3) 	Conditions such as travel restrictions,security checks, and border crossingsare prevalent. 
b. Many, if not most of the principles and techniques discussed previously concerning evasion ingeneral and short-range evasion in particular,are applicable to long-range evasion. However,whereas short-range evasion techniques capitalizeupon the fluidity of a frontline or combat zonesituation and advocates haste in planning andexecution, the long-range evasion situation demands a careful, deliberate analysis by the evaderof every possible course of action before he abandons the relative security of one position foranother. The long-range evader must continually bear in mind the fact that the enemy maybe aware of his existence and has initiated actions to capture him. 
40 
35. Long-Range Evaders 
a. 
Army personnel evading far behind enemy lines usually are escaped prisoners of war or personnel from downed aircraft. However, all combat personnel should be prepared for this eventuality. 

b. 
Long-range patrols, armored reconnaissance units, airmobile organizations, and special operations elements which habitually penetrate deep into enemy territory are a few of the potential long-:range evaders.. 


Section II. THE WILL TO SURVIVE AND EVADE 
36. Importance of Will to Survive 
a. 
Knowledge that the evader may have to travel hundreds of miles over a period of many months may be discouraging to the evader. Therefore, a strong will to survive coupled with an ability to withstand hardships and overcome obstacles is necessary to successful long-range evasion. 

b. 
The determination to survive must be maintained at times by sheer willpower, and it should be recognized that many of the obstacles to be overcome are mental rather than physical. 


37. Maintaining the Will to Survive 
Among the factors and conditions that may help to maintain the will to survive are-
a. Sense of Responsibility. Loyalty to country and military duty (see Code of Conduct). 
b. Family and Home Ties. Desire to return to 
home and family. 
c. 
Control of Panic. Maintain self-control and think the problem through. 

d. 
Planning. Formulate a plan making use of all available resources. · · · 

e. 
Patience. Be patient and willing to wait it out. 

f. 
Endurance. Pain, discomfort, and other unpleasant conditions must be accepted as normal and endured. 

g. 
Stronger Helps the Weaker. In a group, support those who have a tendency to give up. Help to bring them through by encouraging them, calming their fears, and persuading them to do their best. 


h. Knowledge of Survival and E&E Techniques. 
It seldom is possible to evade and survive long periods unless the evader is psychologically prepared to over'come all obstacles. The evader must be trained and convinced that he can and will survive, whatever the odds, and return to friendly control. The individual must remember that the evasion area is an extension ·of the battlefield and therefore he must not give up so long as he has the means to continue. · 
Section Ill. PLANNING FOR LONG•RANGE EVASION 
38. General 
Planning for long-range evasion must be as detailed as knowledge of the enemy situation will permit. Planning must be continuous and plans flexible enough to meet unforeseen circumstances. 

39. Considerations 
.Every alternative should be considered prior to determining a course of action. Factors which might have been unimportant to the short-range evader may be major problem areas in long-range 
evasion. 
a. Travel restrictions such as curfews, check
points, and roadblocks will have to be anticipated and cover stories devised. 
b. 
Customs of local people will require study for possible imitation to avoid bei:rig conspicuous. 

c. 
Information on _specific border areas should be obtained and studi.ed. 

d. 
Supply economy will have to be planned and practiced-items such as shoes, clothing, and. supplies will require care to assure the evader maximum usage. 


e. Contact with local natives will require con
sideration of the advantages versus disadvantages. 
40. Planning 
a. If captured, planning for the early phases of evasion should be concurrent with escape planning. The scope and extent of the evasion plan as conceived while in custody varies with the amount and type of information available concerning the population and the evasion area. Information available to escape committees (see ch 9) or the individual· PW may range from limited to complete information giving details on enemy security measures, checkpoints, travel restrictions, 
customs of the people, and information concerning areas where U. S.-sponsored guerrillas maybe operating (see ch 6). In some instances, mapsof the area have been obtained, and in oth.ers PWs have constructed reasonably accuratemaps of their own from the Gollective knowledgeof other PWs and information received fromsympathetic or careless guards. 
b. In most cases, recapture of escaped prisoners of war largely can be attributed to the escapees~ lack of information concerning securitymeasures employed by the enemy immediatelyoutside of the confinement area. Therefore, it isessential that careful planning ·of the initial
phases of long-range evasion be accomplishedwhile in PW status. A well.:.organized escape committee usually can, by distracting guard personnel, insure that escapees have at least a few hoursbefore their escape is detected. 
41. Available Courses of Action 
Courses of action available to the long-rangeevader in his return to friendly controls are
a. Evasion by infiltration. 
b. .Evasion by deception.
c. Combination of the above. 
42. Evasion by Infiltration 
Studies indicate that infiltration is the mostsuccessful course of action for the individual orsmall group evading far behind enemy lines. Ifpossible, the entire journey to friendly lines orneutral areas should be· completed without con
44 
tacting natives for assistance. This will require living_ off the. land and completing the entire trip by foot. Under some circumstances, especially in areas such as the arctic or desert, it may become necessary to seek assistance from natives in order to survive. Methods of contacting natives ar.e discussed in the following chapter; however, this action should be taken only as a last .resort. If the evader has been previously briefed that a particular area is a guerrilla warfare operational area (GWOA), contact should be attempted with a U.S.-sponsored guerrilla force. A GWOA is a geographical area within enemy or enemy-controlled territory designated by the unified command commander for the orgaNization and conduct of guerrilla warfare and related unconventional warfare activities. 
43. · Evasion by Deception 
This alternative may be the only practical course of action available. In many parts of the world it is impossible to travel without coming into contact with civilians. Evasion by deception under these circumstances is necessary. Deception contemplates the use of disguise and cover stories .explaining the evader's presence in the area. As an evasion technique deception perhaps is the most difficult. In European countries it obviously can be more successfully employed than in Asiatic countries because of marked differences in facial features, language, and customs. See chapter 3 for a discussion of this technique. 
45 
44. Combination of Courses 
Circumstances may dictate the selection of various tactics combining several courses of action.The first phase of evasion may be accomplishedwithout assistance of any kind by employing infiltratfbn tactics and living off the land, whilelater phases may necessitate the use of deception when passing through populated areas.Weigh all factors before reaching a decision asto a 'specific course of action. 
45. Collecting Enemy Information 
By virtue of the evader's military backgroundand· training, intelligence officers rate him as avery reliable source of information. However, donot under any Circumstances jeopardize personalsafety or compromise cover for the express purpose of collecting infor~ation. Do, however, observe and memorize in as much detail as possibleenemy strength, 'equipment, location,. disposition,organization and ·rn.ovement-:-or the common factors of ,Qrder of Battle intelligence. Do not underany circumstances ·,record anything in writing.Such information found on the person of theevader mar be sufficient to convict him of .espionage. 
'·, ., 
46 
CHAPTER 6 
ASSISTED EVASION 
Section I. GENERAL 
46. General 
a. In future hostilities it can be expected that 
there will be. dissident peoples in enemy-held or enemy-controlled territories who resent the occupation or domination by the regime in. power. Active resistance movements emerge from this dissident element One of the functions of such movements may be the operation of evasion and escape lines for the purpose of returning Allied evaders to friendly territory. 
b. 
U.S. Army Special Forces may also organize and operate evasion and escape mechanisms in assigned guerrilla warfare operational areas (GWOA). 

c. 
This chapter discusses assistance rendered by both of the above. 


Section ·n. ASSISTANCE BY DISSIDENT PEOPLES 
47. Type Assistance 
Assistance of this type may range from the spontaneous type ·rendered by the sympathetic individual to elaborate E&E nets organized by local .inhabitants. E&E nets may be limited in nature, such as assisting an evader to reach a national frontier, or they may be linked to larger organizations equipped to assist the evader or escapee in returning to friendly control. Although 


most escape lines are modeled after a similar pattern, local variations preclude any specific description which would always hold true. 
48. Evasion and Escape Lines 
An evasion and escape line is a system of oneor more clandestine nets, organized to contact,secure and, when possible, evacuate friendly personnel. Well organized and supported lines normally can be expected to provide the following
assistance :
a. Temporary shelter, food and necessities forthe next phase of the journey.
b. Clothing and credentials acceptable in thearea to be traveled.
c. Information concerning enemy security measures along the evasion route. 
d. Local· currency and transportation tickets.
e. Medical treatment.
f. A native guide if available. 
49. Conduct of Evasion and Escape Lines 
The success of an organization to aid in evasionor escape depends almost entirely on its security.The organization of a line erita:ils a considerableamount of planning and work carried out underperilous conditions. It is essential that the evaderor escapee who uses such a line have at least someadvance knowledge of how it functions, how itmay be contacted, and what rules of personal conduct he will be expected to follow. The followingarticles summarize the major aspects of the operation of an E&E line. 
48 
50. Contacting the Line 
As stated in AR 350-225 : "During combat operations, the theater commander may provide combat forces with' information as to general areas in enemy spheres of influence where evasion and escape mechanisms have been established. He may provide, in addition, certain recognition signals which will aid evaders in being recognized by members of an evasion and escape mechanism. After an evader has been picked up by an evasion and escape mechanism, he will be infiltrated under the control of this mechanism to territory: under friendly control, or he will be infiltrated to a removal area and arrangements will be made for air or sea rescue." The organizer of a line in friendly but enemy-occupied territory normally will have arranged a network of spotters to contact and assist evaders. These spotters will be especially active when there is reason to suppose that evaders or escapees are in the immediate area, but so will the enemy police and counterintelligence organizations. For this reason the evader must observe certain precautions when making his contact. 
a. Approach. When approaching anyone, it is vitally important not to do so in the presence of witnesses, and equally important not to approach a house when there are people nearby. In enemyoccupied countries people seldom trust one another unless they are close friends or colleagues in the resistance effort. An evader may be refused help by a person simply because the person thinks somone else has seen the evader's approach 
to seek assistance. Should an evader be captured with a local helper, it must be remembered that the evader will become a PW but the helper and perhaps his entire family may be severely punished. 
b. 
Making Contact. Contacts with the natives are discouraged unless observation indicates that they are dissatisfied with the local governing authority, or previous intelligence indicates the populace·is friendly. The evader should proceed to and remain in the nearest safe area where arrangements for contact can be developed. If the E&E system is operating successfully, the spotter will know that an evader is present and will search the immediate area, making frequent visits to designated contact points. Identification signs and countersigns, if utilized, will be included in the preoperational briefing. It seldom is advisable for an evader to seek his first contaCt in a village or town. Strangers are conspicuous by day and there may be curfews or other security measures iluring the hours of darkness. 

c. 
Procedure After Contact. If a contact is successful, the evader may be told to remain in the vicinity where spotted, or more likely taken to a house or other structure used by the E&E net as a holding area. The evader must now make up his mind whether or not to trust his contact. If there is any doubt the evader should attempt to leave at once. It is also possible that the house may not be one belonging to the escape organization but rather to someone who will look after the evader until arrangements can be made for 


the line to identify and accept him in the E&E net. In any case, the evader will have two alternatives: one is to leave and continue to evade by himself or to stay and do as he is told. Once having made his decision, the evader should stick to it, remembering that his helper, of necessity, may be playing a role demanding that he do things which appear to cast doubt on his loyalty to the escape organization, such as being on good terms with the local authorities. 
51. Establishing Identity 
'rhe evader must realize that he will not be ac:. ceptecl as a bona fide evader until his identity is verified. The constant danger facing the operators of an escape line is the penetration of the E&E system by enemy agents pretending to be evaders or ·escapees. The evader must-be prepared to furnish proof of identity or nationality. Since it may· lead to later difficulties of identification,. he should never give a false name--just his name, grade, service number, and date of birth. Beyond that it is best to avoid talk as much as possible. 
52. Awaiting Movement on the Line 
a. An evader may expect a.delay before proceeding further along the escape line. If the period of waiting is unduly prolonged, frustration and impatience may . become unbearable, and the evader may become obsessed with an urge to leave the holding area. This he must not do, because if he does yield to the temptation of leaving and is seen by other people, he will not only be endangering the_lives of the assisting .person
51 
nel but also the existence of the line itself. 
b. An evader must foUow the orders of thoseassisting him. lf he is kept indoors for anyleng'th, he should keep fit by moderate physicalexercise. He should try to wall<:' a mile or twoevery day even if this means pacing back andforth in a room or passag.e.
' '
· c. The host should have a plan for a rapid evacuation of the area if enemy personnel raid theholding area. If not, the evader should alwayshave a plan for himself, including measures forremoving all traces of h~s occupation of the area. 
53. Traveling the Line 
It would be grave breach of faith and security for an evader to discuss the earlier stagesof his journey to any point in the line. His helpers may want to know about them, but for security reasons and to protect the compartmentationof the .line, no information should be revealed.It is also useless for the evader to ask where aline leads or how he will eventually reach friendlyterritory. He should know as little as possibleabout the line. H.e should neither learn nor memorize names and addresses, and above all neverput these facts or any other information in writing. If captured, give only name, grade, servic.enumber and date of birth and no other information. Convey the impression of having receivedno assistance from local inhabitants. 
a. Fellow Evaders. Caution is required in thecase of felloW evaders oil an escape line unlessthey aore personally known. An evader ·may be 
52 
able to satisfy himself after a few minutes of casual conversation that another man·is a genuine evader but no information should be divulged. 
b. Travel with Guides. If the evader is being escorted it should ·not be apparl:mt to outsiders. In a public vehicle, for example, he should never talk to his guide or appear to be associated with him. This will lessen the possibility of both individuals being apprehended if one should arouse suspicion. It should always be possible for the guide to disown the evader if he gets into difficulties. When an evader is being escorted through the streets of a town, he should follow his guide at a safe distance rather than walk 'beside him, unless instructed to do otherwise. 
c. Speaking to Strangers. The evader must never speak to strang.ers if it can be avoided. As a last resort, he can pretend to be deaf and dumb, or even half-witted. '!'his device has often been successful. To discourage conversation in a public conveyance, he should either pretend to read the local paper or sleep. 
d. Personal Articles and Habits. An evader should be car.eful not to produce in public arti:cles which might show their national origin. This pertains to items such as pipes, cigarettes, tobacco, matches, fountain pens, pencils, and wrist watches. He should not hum or whistle popular tunes or utter involuntary oaths. In restaurants he can watch how people use their knives and forks and other table manners. 
e. Payment to Helpers. On an escape line, an evader should not offer to pay for his board, lodg
53 
ing or other services rendered. These matters willbe settled afterwards by those who are directingand financing the line. If in possession of an escape kit or survival pack, the evader should keepit -as a reserve for emergency. If he has no reserve of food, he must. try to build up a smallstock in case he is forced to abandon the line. 
Section Ill. ASSISTED EVASION IN
GUERRILLA WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREAS 

54. General 
Special Forces Operational Detachments which· infiltrate behind. enemy lines in time of war forthe purpose of conducting unconventional warfare operations are trained to organize and operate evasion and escape mechanisms and to organize and utilize the indigenous population forthese ·purposes. -The training .of special forcesoperational teams to establish and operate evasionand escape mechanisms within unconventionalwarfare' areas in enemy spheres of influence andbeyond the combat zone requires training in specialized and classified methods and techniquesand is an integral part of unconventional warfare. 
55. E&E Activities in the GWOA 
See FM 21-77A. 
56. The E&E Net. 
See FM 21-77A. 
57. Segments of the E&E Net 
See FM 21-77A; 
54 
58. 	Security of Net See FM 21-77A. 
59. 	Initial Contact of Evader or Escapee with· E&E Mechanism 
See FM 21-77A. 
60. 	Techniques Specific techniques concerning the holding, movement, and exfiltration phases used in operation of the E&E net are discussed in FM 31-20. 
55 
CHAPTER 7 
EVASION AIDS 
61. General 
a. Evasion aids are items of equipment designed for the specific purpose of providing assistance to personnel in evading the enemy, Asdetermined by the Army component, these itemsare issued as required to selected personnel. 
b. Three of the more common aids that potential evaders may be issued and should know howto use are the blood chit, pointee talkee, and special maps. These devices are discussed below. 
62. Blood Chit 
a. The blood chit is a small rayon Americanflag bearing an inscription in several languagesthat identifies the bearer as an American citizenand promises a reward for his return to U. S.control (fig. 1). 
Figure 1. Blood chit. 
(Located in back of manual) 
b. Each blood chit is assigned a number (theonly one of its kind) which is to be given to theperson or persons who provide assistance to theevader. This number is to be written down orcommitted to memory by the person furnishingthe assistance. The evader is to maintain physical possession of the chit if humanly possible.The number on the bottom of the blood chit is 
56 
registered in the headquarters of the organization to which the evader is assigned. The loss of blood chits, in administrative and tactical situations, should be reported at the first opportunity. 
63. Payment of Blood Chit Reward 
See FM 21-77A. 
64. Pointee Talkee 
a. The pointee talkee is a language aid which contains selected phrases in English and related foreign languages. These aids are specifically prepared to overcome the language barrier that most likely will confront the evader in a foreign country. The term "Pointee Talkee" was derived from the mechanics of its use, i.e., the evadee points out to the for.eigner the text of the instructions or questions in the foreigner's language. After determining the question or statement to be used in the English text, the evader then points to its foreign language counterpart. In reply, the native will point to the applicable phrase in his own language. All questions and requests for assistance are printed on the left hand side of the page and the answers on the right hand side (fig. 2). 
57 
::: LANGUAGE INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL 
FIRST SHOW NATIVE TEXT ON A
UNUA .ELMONTRI INDIGUEA TEK-
THE OPPOSITE PAGE TO THE STO SUR KONTRAUA PAGEO AL
"" .A..
PERSON WITH WHOM YOU ARE LA PERSONO KUN AKIU]i VI PE
TRYING TO COMMUNICATE. THIS NANTA KOMUNIKIGI. CI KLARIWILL EXPLAIN TO HIM THE PUR
GAS AL LI CELO KAJ UZO DEPOSE AND USE OF TRE HANDMANLIBRO.
BOOK. TIAM TROVAS LA DEMANDO
THEN FIND THE QUESTION KIO VI DESlRAS SCI!, KAJ FIN<j:WHICH YOU WISH TO ASK, AND ROMONTRI GIJ LINGVO KONTRAUPOINT TO ITS LANGUAGE COUNPARTO. JE, RESPONDO LA INDI~TERPART. IN REPLY THE NATIVE 
GEUA FINGROMONTRI AL LAWILL POINT TO THE PHRASE HE FRAZO LI DEZIRAS UZI KIEL REWISHES TO USE AS AN ANSWER. SPONDO. TUTA DEMANDOJ ESTAS
ALL QUESTIONS. ARE ON THE SU~ LA MALDEKSTRAMANOLEFT-HAND PAGES;· ANSWERS ON PAGEOJ; RESPONDOl. ESTAS SUR
THE RIGHT-HAND PAGES. . LA DEKSTRAMA PAGEOJ. 
I. FINDING AN INTERPRETER 
...... .A. 
1. 	YES.
1. 	DOES ANYONE 1. CU IU CI TIE 1. JES SPEAK ENGLISH? PAROLAS NE NO.ANGLE? 
MI FARI NE I DON'T(OTHER)? (ALIA)? sen. KNOW. 
(IF YOU SPEAK A FOREIGN LAN
GUAGE CONSULT YOUR INTELLI
GENCE OFFICER FOR THE TRANS
LATION). 

2. 	PLEASE GET A 2. BONVOLU 2. MI PROVAS. 2. I'LL TRY. 
DOCTOR. 	OBTEUI
KURACISTON. 

Figure 2. Pointee talkee.
ClloO 
g; 
LANGUAGE 
INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL-Continued 
II. COURTESY PHRASES 
1. 	GLAD TO MEET 1. ESTAS PLEZURO
YOU. KONI VIN. 

2. 	IT IS TIME FOR 2. ESTES TEMPO
ME TO LEAVE POR MI NUN
NOW. THANK FORIRI.
YOU! DANKON! 

u
3. 	GOODBYE. 3. ADIAU. 
III. MISCELLANEOUS 
1. 	WHEN DOES 1. KIAM FORIROS 1. AT SEVEN 1. SEP HORO. THE PLANE LA AEROPLANO? O'CLOCK. LEAVE? 
2. 	I HAVE 2. MI DOLORIS 2. ARE YOU 2. ACU VI HURT MY MIAN PIEDON. ALL RIGHT? FARTASBONE?
FOOT. 
Figure 2-Continued 
!: 
b. Text contained in pointee talkees are ~esented under eight subheadings as follows :
(1) Finding an interpreter. 
(2) Courtesy phrases.. 
(3) Food and drink. 
(4) Comfort and lodging. 
(5) Communications. 
(6) Injury. 
(7) In enemy-occupied territory~· 
(8) Other military personnel. 
65. Maps 
a. A map designed specifically for evasion purposes may be issued to potential evaders. Thesemaps ·normally are water resistant and areprinted on a scale of 1 :2,000,000 or smaller. Itis recognized that these maps are not detailedenough to provide accurate navigation; however,they should provide for general orientation anddirection. 
b. Misjudgment is the chief difficulty facing thepossible user of the small-scale map because attimes it is difficult to identify a city, mountain,river or other terrain feature from one shownon the map. To obviate this difficulty the evadershould seek as many cross references as possiblewhen orienting himself. 
62 
CHAPTER 8-CAPTURE . 
.If l am captured I will continue to resist by aU means available. I will make every ·effort to escape and aid othe'rs to escape. I will accept neither parole nor specia~ favors from the enemy. (ArticleJII-Code of Conduct). 
' ' ' 
Section I. iNTRODUCTION 
66. Prevention of Capture 
Capture usually is neither dishonorable nor heroic. At times it is unavoidable, and often it is the result of injury. However, experience tables show that a majority of those persons taken into custody ·could have avoided capture merely by applying basic evasion tactics. Case histories reveal that many soldiers made no attempt to avoid capture, or in many instances, withdrew from tactical positions and subsequently were captured . .They. ran in. the face of the enemy in violation of the principles upon which the United States Army was founded. This is a violation of Article 99, Uniform Code, of Military Justice, and contrary to the standard of conduct prescribed by Article I of the Code of Conduct (para 9 and 'iO). 
67_.. 'communist Handling of .Prisoners of War 
During World War II, the movement of prisoners_. to the ·rear .by the communists in Europe '\V~S Conducted ' in , open terrain · where poSsible. Halts in villages where escapees would have cover 
were avoided. When there were only small numbers of PWs, the regimental PW assembly pointwas near the regimental CP. If there were largenumbers of PWs, the assembly point was at regimental staff rear echelon headquarters. Communist regulations prohibited the locati~ns of PWcollection points in dense woods or underbrush.In the evacuation of large numbers of PWs, twoguards led the column and the escort commanderwith a majority of the guards brought up ther~ar. PWs were not permitted to delay the marchor to talk to guards, civilians, or other prisoners.These procedures for handling PWs are typicaland are likely to be followed by any future enemyin limited or general war situations. 
Section II. ESCAPE PRIOR TO CONFINEMENT
IN PW CAMP 

68. General 
It is the duty of every soldier to attempt toescape as soon after capture as possible. The soldier is never relieved of this responsibility. Thebest time to escape is immediately after capture.This principle is clearly stated in Article III ofthe Code of Conduct (para 9 and 10). 
69. Advantages 
The concept of attempting escape as soon aspossible after capture is all-important. Chancesof a successful escape are immeasurably greaterwhen attempted shortly after capture. Many factors work to the advantage of the PW at thistime. 
64 
a. At the time of capture, the PW will be closer to friendly lines than he ever will be again while in custody; he will be oriented as to direction and he will know where friendly forces are located. 
If not injured, he is in better physical condition at this point than he ever will be while in custody. 
b. Enemy personnel in the forward combat zone generally are not as well trained as regular PW guards, consequently, many escape opportunities will exist. A word of caution here is necessary. Danger of being killed by a guard after capture is greater in the forward combat zone because combat troops are keyed to battle pitch. The slightest provocation may cause them to shoot. 
70. Opportunities for Early Escape 
Opportunities for escape during transit occur frequently whether travel is by foot, vehicle, or raiL Once the opportunity to escape occurs, success will depend on a quick estimate and prompt action to exploit any unexpected occurrence. Stay · alert to take advantage of the following sih.lations: 
a. 
Friendly mortar and artillery barrage£ create mass confusion. Guards often will take cover, providing a chance for escape. 

b. 
Prisoners usually are marched to the rear in a column of two's with approximately one guard for every five prisoners. These guards may be "walking wounded" and not trained in guarding PWs. Word should be. passed along for each prisoner to stretch out, the column. At the first bend in the road, the men in one part of the col


umn may be out of sight of the guards.
c. Friendly aircraft crews sometimes are instructed to strafe alongside friendly PW columns in order to create confusion .and cause enemy guard to take cover.
d. If the evacuation to the rear is made by truckor train, prisoners should watch for the f9llowingescape opportunities: 
(I) 	if ,being evacuated by ·truck, friendlyairstrikes may cau~e the truck to stop..You may have a chance to jump. Also,you may be able to get out when thetruck slows down while. ciimbing a .hillif guards are not alert. Motor movements in the combat zone usually aremade at night under blackout conditions.Take advantage of all conditions of pooror limited visibility such as darkness,rain, fog, or clouds of dust. They areall aids to escape. ·{2) · On trains, prisoners usually are transported in freight cars. During WorldWar II, some PWs managed to escape. through windows or by making holes inthe floor. PWs ttaveling in passengercoaches have escaped by breaking a window and jumping when the train sloweddown. ·Before jumping from a trainwhere they are ·double tracks, note onwhich side of the right-of-way the train., is traveling. In some countries rail traffic moves on the left. side and in others
.. , ,on the right side~ Exits ·must be made 
66 
from the .:appropriate side; otherwise, PW may jump into the path of an oncoming .train. if fea81ble, .·exits should be made from the right side·of the train, forcing • guards to .fire from the left . , shoulder which would norma,lJy. result in. less. accuracy. Such escapes have suc·''• ceeded in cases where one group of PWs created a diversion· by distracting,guards while other PWs escaped~:A plan tooverpower the guards on a. car-to-.car basis or to take over the whoie train is con. ·-,. ceivable if tlle ,guards :are lax or: few in number. Disconnecting railcar couplings and setting handbrakes would make. 'it . '· ... , possible to separate single cars or mul. · tipie groupil}gs of c~~s from,t'rains for escape purposes. 
i't' ·ainpdrtance of Alertness ' ·. 
Always remain alert to all escape opportunit~es, 
because '·each .one m~y be the last. It is 'the re~ponsibility of each PW. to assist .others in escaping, even. it means punishment for. himsell Sliccessful escapes ··have varied from the' very simp'le to th~-complex. Some of the 'better eseape schemes have been' 'qUite simple. ·The earlier the 11 escape attempt, the more simple it can be; and 1 it cannot be emphasiz~d enough that an early attempt has the greatest chance of resulting in a successful escape. 
67 
CHAPTER 9 
PRISONER OF WAR CAMP 
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faithwith my fellow piisoners. I will give no information or take· part in any action which might beharmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I willtake command. If not I will obey the lawful ordersof those appointed over me and will back themup in every way. (Article IV-Code of Conduct) 
Section I. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
72..General 
· a. Unless prisoners within a PW camp properlyorganize themselves, there cari be little hope ofmaintaining discipline, health, and morale at alevel conducive to survival; of resisting enemyindoctrination, or of escaping. · 
b. Experience indicates that in all probabilityorganization of the PW camp will require anovert organization which is known to the enemyand a covert organization which must remainunknown to the PW camp authorities. Both of
r. 
these type organizations will b~ discussed i~ thissection. 
. .. '
c. TypiCal PW camps and hints on survivingas a PW are discussed below. · · · , , 
73. Overt Organization 
a. The Senior in Command. Officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States will 
68 
continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority subsequent to capture. The senior officer within the prisoner of war camp or group of prisoners will assume command according to rank without regard to Service. If the senior officer is incapacitated, command will be assumed by the next senior. 
b. 
Prisoners' Representatives. The Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions makes provisions for the organization and election of appointment of prisoners' representatives. The prisoner representative is in command of no one but is responsible for those welfare-type duties that are described in the GPW Convention. These conventions recognize only one person as being in command; that is the camp commander. See FM 27-10 for a detailed discussion of the election and duties of prisoner representatives. 

c. 
Duties of Senior Prisoner. The aim of the senior PW and his assistants should be to set up a workable and efficient organization capable not only of insuring the best possible living conditions for the prisoners but also of keeping the men mentally and physically fit. The need for organization is paramount-the prisoner must have some solid structure in his life to lift him above the level of mere existence. He must be made responsible to someone for something. Therefore, various committees should be set up to deal with · the general problems of camp administration, and all possible facilities should be organized for the pursuit of studies, sports, and other recreational activity. No definite rules can be made in 


Cl I l
CAMP COMMANDER 
{SENIOR ,PWl 
r 
I 
r AD.JUTANT I 
r CAMP GIUARTE~MABTER
I l
CAMP DUTIES, ~ HOUSING, FOCC, CLC.THIND,
INTERPR,7TERS 
RED CROSS PARCELS 
T 
r I 

f CENTRAL l r BLOCK ~ 
COMMITTEE C~MMANDERS 
r 
r 1 l I 
ENTERTAINMENT EDUCATION
I SPORTS WELFARE 
SUBCOMMITTEE
SUBCDMMI~TEE SUBCOMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE 
~
1 
.• 
SHOWS, LIBRARY, COUNSELING LECTURES, COURSES, 
EXHIBITIONS CAMP NEWS, '· 
HANDICRAFTS ANC HOBBIES 
' 
Figure 9. Type overt orga:itizaticm. 
relation to the delegation of duties, but the organization table (fig. 3) will provide a useful basis for study and planning. 
d; Welfare Activities. Welfare plays an essential part in keeping PWs· reasonably happy. Attention to the following details will help in maintaining morale : 
(1) 	
Messing. Every opportunity should be taken to improv.e the standard of rations and the methods of cooking. Red Cross parcels must be equally distributed. 

(2) 	
Letters and false rumors. The importance of mail in keeping up men's spirits cannot be overemphasized. At times, however, it can have the opposite effect and prisoners need to be cautioned against believing gossip or rumor about their wives or fiancees and against reading wrong meanings into letters. When mail is infrequent or delayed, it does not necessarily mean that relatives are not writing regularly; the more likely reason is that enemy authorities are holding back letters for purposes of their own. Outgoing mail often is a source of intelligence for the enemy. Prisoners should be instructed to keep out of the mail information which the enemy can use for interrogation and propaganda purposes. Prisoners should make an effort. to limit Jetters to .a theme of "l am alive and :well." 


. (3) Counseling. Prisoners should be encour
aged to talk over family and other problems with their fellow prisoners andcommanders. Such sessions should beinformal, and the problem viewed withsympathetic interest. The services ofthe camp chaplain, if there is one, shouldprove invaluable in matters of this kind. 
(4) Grievances. Some men become imbuedwith a sense of grievance either aboutthe war effort or about the lack of helpfrom home. Attempts should be made tocounter these grievances by stressingan appreciation of the problems in thewar situation and the possible reasonsfor the absence of help. The prisonersmay smile at the explanations. and lookcynical, but the words usually will notbe wasted. Cynicism is often largely asurface reaction, and in their hearts menwill feel that there is a lot more in whathas been said than they care to admit.Although they most likely will continueto air their grievances, much of the stingwill have been removed. 
e. Continuity and Flexibility of Overt Operations. The administrative organization of a PWcamp, or of its subdivisions, is subject to severedisruptions at any time. Disruptions can becaused by relocation of large or small groups ofprisoners, by the disestablishment or death of acommander or staff officer, or by the prison authorities arbitrarily disbanding the overt organization and appointing PW leaders of their choos
72 
ing. The commanders and staffs at all levels of the overt organization should be prepared for the disruptions by designating a firm chain of command and appointing alternate or assistant staff personnel. The latter may receive periodic or onthe-job training to insure their readiness to assume responsibility without prior notice. In the event that the prison authorities attempt to appoint prison leaders of their choosing, the commanders at all levels must protest this action to the prison authorities. It is the duty of all prisoners to demonstrate their loyalty to the deposed leaders and to demand, at every opportunity, their 
reinstatement. 
/.Summary. This brief outline of the PW camp overt organization can best be summed up by presenting the essence of a statement made by one of the most notable prison camp organizers during World War II: "Keep up the fight. You are not out of the war. You are still a potentially effective combatant. Have faith in yourself, your country, and the Service you represent. Keep mentally and physically fit. Be tolerant. You may be hungry, dirty, ill-treated and living under conditions of the utmost discomfort, but so are the other prisoners. Do not fight others about it, reserve your energy for the enemy. Be cooperative in all measures to help your comrades and do all in your power to work for the common good. Above all, do not pity yourself. You will be surprised how hard it is to remember the black days when you arrive home. Only the amusing inci
dents will come to mind. You still belong to a 
great nation and you are still fighting. The reputation of your Service and your country dependon you." 
74. Covert Organization 
·See FM 21-77A. 
75. Protecting Powers 
a. To determine the degree of implementationof the provisions of the Geneva Convention andto safeguard the interests of the countries participating in the conflict, protecting powers (neutral nations) are designated by the detainingpowers to examine the application of the provisions to PWs. In addition, subject to the consentof the parties to the conflict, the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross may assume the humanitarian functions performed by the protectingpowers if the latter are unable ·or unwilling 'tooperate.
b. PWs undergoing confinement as disciplinary punishment will continue to enjoy the benefits of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions,exclusive of those rendered inapplicable by .theconfinement. This includes unrestricted right toapply to the representatives of the protectingpowers ~oncerning any complaints regarding theirconditions of captivity. 
Section II. TYPICAL COMMUNIST PW CAMPS(GENERAL WAR) 
76. General 
Communist PW camps are generally charac
74 
terized by remoteness, ill treatment, hard work, insufficient food; and .-inadequate clothing and housing. PWs are exploited severely, both physically and mentally, according to the needs of communist designs and their state ·of welfare is directly proportional to their usefulness for communist purposes. If anything·can be identified as typical in a communist PW camp, it is· the uniformity of the brutal treatment and living ·conditions accorded the prisoner. · The· ··communists make evecy effort to keep the :PW so exhausted that he. can ·neither maintain his strength to re.;. sist nor his will to escape. · 
71. 	Physical Descri.ption .. . A communist PW camp is ·usually· pictured as a cluster of barren, cheerless, and colorless shacks set )n,a desolate area devoid .of -vegetation.· This is substantially correct and any va.riation. is caused chiefly by differences in .terrain and climate. The pattern of armed guards, .wire fences, crowded and heatless quarters, and uncomfortable sleeping accommodatiOns . is standard whether the camp is in a temperate or arctic: zone. Buildings, unless improvised from existing structures, generally are long, low, one-story wooden structures situated in rows. Beds usually take the form of tiered bunks. Straw mattresses ritay or may .not be supplied. In many instances no beds are provided. Even floor pads in many cases, are not .available. Provisions for heating and cooking are substandard or nonexistent and the water supply and toilet facilities are inadequate for the number of prisoners. Such "refinements" as elec
75 
tric lights, hot baths, laundry tubs, recreationrooms, libraries, and dispensaries are exceptional. 
78. Internal· Security 
a.. Communist PW camp security measures aredirectly related to the distance of the camp fromthe frontlines or friendly territory, the difficultyof the climate or terrain, and the physical difference of the PW from the native element. Greatdistances from front lines, extreme difficulty ofclimate and terrain, and marked physical differences between PWs and native Koreans assistedthe Communists greatly in. restraining ·United
Nations PWs in the Korean War.
b. Communist PW camp security systems frequently utilize informers to assist in control ofprisoners. The informers may be used to gainintelligence information, to penetrate and neutralize clandestine PW organizations and activitfes, and to stimulate political thought along thecommunist lines. 
79. Chain of Command 
a. ,Large PW camps usually are divided intoseveral compounds in order to simplify prisonercontrol. Within the compounds the PWs are further organized for roll.call, work, and rations bybarracks leaders who report to compound or campcommanders. They may be organized into a structure .resembling our squad, platoon, and companysystem,. with both a prisoner leader and a communist leader fot each platoon and company. Inthe communist PW camp, political ·indoctrinationis considered as important as work production, 
76 
and usually communist political 'instructors will be used to achieve this end:: These political instructors may be assigned to each camp, com pany, barracks, or platoon. Usually, they exercise jurisdiction over the PW at •least on an equal basis with the regular communist military camp personnel. Such political members also may be associated with PW recreation, food, and ·sanitation committees in order to wield their influence over all phases of activity. 
b. PWs also may be segregated according to nationality, rank, race, and their susceptibility or resistance to political indoctrination.·'Within the PW: groupings there may. be assignment of PW rank without regard to actual rank, inasmuch as communists subordinate the concept of rank in order to provide a basis for their indoctrination propaganda which claims that the PWs are merely innocent civilians who were drafted to fight a capitalistic or imperialistic war. 
Section Ill. COMMUNIST INTERNMENT CAMPS
.· . .
.(COLD WAR) 
80. Genei'Cll 
Prisoners returned from communist , internment have repeatedly emphasized that the· most important training .that could. be given a..potential cold war pri.soner, other than how to avoid capture, is to inform personnel what to expect if taken prisoner. The references in paragraphs 81 through 83 are intended to inform the reader of treatment that has been meted out to United States prisoners in recent incidents. 
77 
81 ..· Viet Cong Treatment of Prisoners. in the .
; Republic of South Vietnam · 

' See FM 21-77A. 
82. •Physical Restraint 
See F.M·21.:...77A~ 
83. Medical Treatment . 
See FM 21-77A. 
. Section IV. SURVIVAL WHILE IN PW STATUS 
84., .The Will to Survive 
There is nothing :more important to survivalthan the will to live and resist. Regardless of thelocation, the poor living· conditions~ and the brutalities the enemy authorities might impose, if
the individual makes up his mind to endure thesehardships., most 'likely h'e will ·succeed.· Survivalas a PW ·or as ·an evader will be 'immeasurablyenhanced by accomplishing the following:
~-Ex~rcise leadership ~*e~ponsibilities.
b. Maintain military and self-discipline.
c. Keep up individual and group morale.
d. Recognize and control fear. ·
e. Eat evecything that is edible.
f. Nourish the sense of humor. 
g. Practice. survival, firs~ aid, .and preventive
medicine. ·· · 
h. Maintain the will to survive. · 
78 
CHAPTER 10 
EN'EMY INTERROGATION 
When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number a11,d date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I ivill make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause. (Article V-Codeof Conduct) 
Section I. .GENERAL 
85. Directive 
Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.7, dated July 1964, directs that each serviceman be instructed concerning the methods and techniques that the enemy can be expected to use during interrogation. The directive states .that this instruction should
a. Include description of the physical pairi, the adverse mental conditions, and the degree of coercion which may be utilized by an enemy in order to weaken the. serviceman's ability to adhere to the provisiOns of c below.· 
b. Explain how resistance can be accomplished when undergoing the varying interrogation techniques. 
c. Explain that. ·dogmatic refusal to answer a quest1on of an ~nterrogator with: "I will not answer your questions"; 'I. will , not :say. any more'; 'My orders are to give my .name, rank, 
79 
service number, and date of birth; I will not give
you anything else"; or to claim inability to comprehend, think or talk, constitute adherence toname, rank, service number and date of birth.
This instruction will be so explicit that eachserviceman understands
(1) 	The consequence of revealing more thanhis name rank, service number and dateof birth. 
(2) 	That Article V of the Code of Conductwhich states that the individual willevade answering questions beyond name,rank, service number, and date ofbirth "to the utmost of my ability'' isbinding on all military personnel.
d. That the Uniform Code of Military Justice
applies at all times. 
86. Purpose 
This chapter discusses previous experiencesencountered with enemy interrogation and suggests techniques for coping with interrogation
situations. 
Section II. RESISTING INTERROGATION 
87. Conduct of PW During Interrogation
The· PW first line of defense against communist interrogation and subsequent indoctrination is his· military bearing, silence, and trust inhimself, Army, ·country, and his religion. Thefollowing factors will help in resisting enemyinterrogation : 
80 
a. 
Give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. 

b. 
Be respectful during interrogation but do not convey the impression of willingness to cooperate through servile "politeness." Such an idea, once planted in the mind of the enemy, may prolong the inquisition. 

c. 
Act stupid. This may induce an interrogator to dismiss the individual as a waste of time. 

d. 
Beware of "stool pigeons" and PW camp medical personnel who may be used extensively to collect information. 

e. 
If knowledgeable of the enemy's language, do not disclose this ability nor admit it during an interrogation. Knowledge of the enemy's language, especially if the enemy is unaware of it, will increase chances of a successful escape. 

f. 
Never believe statements by the enemy that other PWs have talked. This is merely an interrogation procedure to catch the individual off guard and to motivate cooperation. 

g. 
Avoid fooking the interrogator directly in the eye. He may be able to infer a correct answer even though you say nothing. Pick out a spot between the eyes or on the forehead and concentrate on it. 

h. 
While being interrogated, be courteous but firm in refusal to give information. Salute all officer interrogators senior to you . 


. i. Never give information about other PWs. If the name of a fellow PW is mentioned during interrogation, report the name and circumstances about the enemy's interest as he may be under 
surveillance and will be, in turn, interrogated about your conversation. 
j. 
Beware of the temptation to impress interrogators by boasting of exploits either true or fabricated. 

k. 
Do· not be tricked into filling out innocentlooking questionnaires or writing statements which . require more than name, rank, service number, and date of birth. 

l. 
Don't attempt to deceive the enemy by volunteering false information. A skilled interrogator will be able to extract the information he needs, once he gets you started talking on the 


subject. 
88. Communist Interrogations 
a. 
Throughout all interrogations, communist preoccupation with political aspects is prevalent. They seek to root out bitter enemies arid to discover those who might be friends. The process of communist. indoctrination begins as early as possible. At division level, special interrogators begin exhaustive interrogations, and in some instances a panel. of. interrogators seeks to confuse the PW by questioning him simultaneously on unrelated matters. Prisoners whom the communist believe possess important information are processed to a higher command level as soon as possible. 

b. 
The .communists foster rivalry and distrust between individuals who are assigned to overlapping , responsibilities. The several agencies participating in the interrogations do not always 


exchange information.. -Lower echelons specifically are forbidden to' gather strategic information, evidently: because· the com:rriunlsts do not want the· truth· about-·conditions in· other coun~ tries. to become general knowled~e. , 
~ : 
, •.. ,/,1 , .
. .__ .--~ ... r .~ r, • ~ • 
:' 
; . 
83 
CHAPTER 11 
ENEMY INDOCTRINATION 
I will never forget .that I am an American fight
ing man, r-esponsible for my actions, and dedi
cated to the principles which made my country
free. I will trust in my God and in the UnitedStates of America. (Article VI-Code of Con-duct) 
Section I. GENERAL 
89. Definition 
Webster defined indoctrination : "to instructin doctrines, principles, theories, or beliefs." 
90. Purpose 
The purpose of this chapter is to acquaintUnited States Military personnel with the communist indoctrination program pursued duringthe Korean hostilities, some of the techniquesused, and general results accomplished. A typeindoctrination utilized by the Viet Cong in the
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) is discussed in
paragraphs 97 and 98, and paragraph 99 summarizes defense against indoctrination. 
Section II. COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION(KOREAN CONFLICT) 
91. General 
During hostilities in Korea, the enemy had amission in addition to achieving military objec
84 
tives. The communists wanted to convert United Nations prisoners--especially Americans-to a philosophy of government that embraced totalitarianism. In· attempting to acc@niplish his mission, the enemy hoped to ·disturb the mentality of the prisoners and so shake their faith in their governments that they would question the intentions of their governments, and . ultimately believe that the communist form of government is superior to the democratic form as exemplified by the United States. His mission of conversion among United Nations prisoners was supported by a well-organized and . disciplined program of teaching and instruction. It was well planned and efficient and adrp.inistered: by trained personnel, some of whom were educated in the United States. 
92. Objectives 
a. 
Basically, the indoctrination program had two main objectives. One was to completely indoctrinate a small, select group of prisoners in the theory arid actual practice of· communism as an ideal form of government. The second objective was to undermine the faith and trust of the other prisoners in their home country, its government, and its political leaders-not to make communists out of all the prisoner~.. 

b. 
In attempting to achieve the first ohiective, the communists selected the prisoners ort'whom they felt they could 'depend; gave them special training, tutoring, and counseling; and· extended them special treatment. This was !n keeping ~th' the communist concept, as ·advanced by Leni:n, 


that a small, select, disciplined group .shouldlead the masses. -As an incentive for the "chosenfew" to apply th~mselves to the task of betrayingtheir .country and their fellow prisoners, thecommuni_sts·told them that they were the "liberators~· of the masses, and promised them positionsof -leadership in the {Jnited States-after a communist-directed l,"evolution had replaced the democrati~ system with a cpmmunist form of government.. 
c. In pursuing their second objective, the communists consistently smeared the United States.by distorting minor 'imperfections in its politicaland economic institutions. At no time was mention of the true-: democratie principles. of theUnited States· Government permitted in discus-sions. In addition to attacking American conceptsof democracy, the communists launched repeatedattacks against American statesman by name,claiming that they were the chief perpetratorsof war and evil. . . 
.d•. .The communists felt .that if they _couldsucc~ed. in the second objective-subverting. theprisoners' loyalty-these Americans would beless opposed to communism after their repatriation to the United States. The communists alsoreasoned that these. ex-prisoners would bemore likely. to be sympathetic to any communistconspiracy . against _tll_e United. States. ·Part oftheir.plan called for the indoctrinated prisoners,upon their return to the United.States, to assumeleadership of the subverted ex-prisoners andurge them to support communist conspiracy 
86 
through the instrumentality of , the communist 
par~y. 
93. Other Objectives 
a. In support of these two main but general objectives, there were specific objectives that had a more direct effect on the lives of the prisoners. To facilitate internal control of the prisoner population, the Chinese Communists attempted to ,organize a net of informers to relay to the camp authorities information concerning the activities .of other prisoners. Through informers, the. Chinese Communists were able to thwart many escape attempts. Informers also furnished the Chinese Communists information concerning prisoners who were actively resisting indoctrination. 
b. Another objective was to recruit collaborators· to assist the Chinese Communists in implementing the indoctrination program. These collaborators would give propaganda lectures, write articles, and attempt to talk other prisoners into signing "peace petitions," surrender leaflets, and other types of propaganda; 
c. Still another objective, which fortunately had no success, was to recruit potential agents to perform espionage or subversion activities for the communists after repatriation. The few who agreed to work for the communists realized soon after their repatriation that they had been duped and notified the U. S. authorities of this communist plot. 
87 
94. Phases of Indoctrination 
The communists administered their indoctrination program in two general phases. The first canbe called the preparatory phase, the second theimplementation phase. 
a. Preparatory Phase. This phase, a "softening-up" or "conditioning" process, was conductedthrough the medium of a series of lectures onthe imperfections of the governments underwhich the prisoners lived before capture. The
U. S. Government and its economic and politicalsystems constituted the main target for alllectures. During this phase, the United Stateswas accused of instigating the war in Korea. 
b. Implementation Phase. This phase of indoctrinati<m was devoted to selling communismas a way of life to be preferred over the democratic system. The communists used an old technique during this phase-comparing one withthe other, pointing up the favorable aspectsof communism and emphasizing the so-called"defects" of democracy. The enemy pictured thecommunist state as a state in which every man,woman, and child lives a life of happiness, freeof poverty and class discrimination. 
95. Techniques Used 
a. Repetition. This technique was used againstall prisoners at ohe time or another during theircaptivity. Some prisoners, yielding to pressure,memorized certain material and were questionedand examined on it for days, weeks, and months.They were asked to answer the same question 
88 
over and over again. They were required to read and reread communist propaganda repeatedly. By repetition the enemy caused some prisoners with a relatively poor formal education to memorize lengthy works on communism and economics. As a result of this technique, some prisoners who had not advanced beyond the sixth grade could recite long essays on communism and its economic and political theories, yet not comprehend the content of the material. 
b. Harassment. This technique, like repetition, 
was used against a large number of prisoners. Harassment was employed on a precise schedule that did not vary from day to day, week to week, or month to month. Its purpose was to create a state of anxiety in the prisoners-to keep them tense and in a state of constant uncertainty. It was also contrived to make the prisoners believe that harassment would end eventually, and that they could then live as normally as possible in prison. Harassment usually was based on false charges against prisoners. These charges could be anything from a very minor infraction of the rules to a major offense such as striking an enemy officer. However, it worked best on, and was designed for, prisoners who committed minor offenses in connection with the indoctrina
tion program. 
c. Humiliation. Humiliation was used against prisoners who demonstrated a great deal of personal pride. Its objective was to break down the prisoner's personal pride by making him look ridiculous in the eyes of the other prisoners -to provoke shame and embarrassment in him. 
at 
To assure its effectiveness it almost always was
used by the enemy in the presence of other
prisoners. 
96. General Results 
a. The results of communist indoctrination inNorth Korea by the Chinese must be appraisedin the light of the enemy's objectives. As mentioned earlier, the communists in North Koreadid not attempt to convert every United Nationsprisoner. They wanted to indoCtrinate a selectedfew.whom they could trust to accept communismas away of life. These subsequently could developinto communist revolutionists. Primarily, thecommunists in ·North Korea desired to destroy,or at least red~ce, the hostility felt by the prisoners toward the communist ca.use. They attempted to plant ~eeds of doubt that would growand produce an attitude less opposed to communism. 
b. In light of these objectives, it is reasonableto assume that the communist· program of indoctrination in North Korea was successful to adegree. Official findings revealed that a small,select group of United Nations prisoners of warin North Korea were indoctrinated by the enemyin the theory and practice of communism. Theyalso revealed that an undetermined number ofother United Nations prisoners of war did notaccept communism as such, but adopted an attitude of "seeing both . sides" of communism,
observing .some "good" points· here and ·there.TJ:mse sources further showed ·that indoctrina
90 
tion weakened the old beliefs .of some prisoners, confused other prisoners, and frustrated still others. Witli' the exception of 'the allegedly in-. doctrinate'd' .Prisoners, the ones who saw merit in some aspects of communism failed to visualize communism as a .threat to their democratic governments or the political institutions in their countries. 
'Section ' ill. INDOCTRINATION METHODS AND 'TECHN·IQUES OF THE VIET CONG 
97., Gene11GI 
,. ..
See F:M: 21:.1.77A. 
9.8. Techniques 
. See FM 21-77A; · 

Section IV. DEFENSE AGAINST INDOCTRINATION 
99. General ··' Defenses against enemy interrogation ·apply equally well to indoctrination. If the interrogator cannot induce the PW to·give information other than name, rank, service number, and date of birth, then indoctrination obviously is 'inipossible. The uncooperative PW is considered poor material for indoctrination. Confidence in one's self, unit, country, and religions serves as a very effective bulwark against indoctrination. Above all, the will to survive must be retained· both physically and psychologi~ly. 
91 
CHAPTER ·12 
ESCAPE FROM PW CAMP 
Section I. GENERAL 
100. Article Ill, U.S. Fighting Man's Code 
"If I am captured, I will continue to resist byall means available. I will make every effort toescape and aid others to escape. I will acceptneither parole nor special favors from theenemy." Instead of accepting captivity passively,the PW is duty-bound to make and take opportunities to escape. Capture does not terminatethe individual's usefulness to his country. Byresisting the enemy and attempting to escape,the PW continues the battle as an active soldier.The following are some of the advantages of
escaping:
a. Reaching freedom and avoiding the miseriesof prison camp.
b. During escape and evasion travel, collectingmilitary information that may be of importanceto U. S. intelligence personnel.
c. Requiring the enemy to augment their guardpersonnel and to send out search parties.·d. Disrupting the enemy's PW camp .administration.e.· Creating a' nuisance effect to enemy militaryand civilian morale~ '}. Ad~ing to U. S. manpower resources. 
101. Planning an Escape 
See FM 21-77A. 
92 
Section II. ESCAPE TECHNIQUES 
102. General 
a. The PW covert organization plays a very important role in any escape. Seldom will the escapee be able to succeed by his own efforts, nor would such a course be. altogether desirable. For the' escape to succeed, diversions usually must be planned. Ladders may have to be provided, thEm whisked away and disposed o{ Numerous escape items .such as documents, money, ccimpasses, 'and food may be· required. Providing 'these items is one of the .mQst important functions .of the PW covert organization. 
b. The technique to be utilized in an escape will largely depend on the particular conditions. of captivity. The 1.PW may ·find himself confined by walls and barbed wire barricades or simplY by a vast area of unfriendly territory. 
103. 	Tunneling · a. Tunneling as a means of escape is difficult and requires many favorable factors. First of all, many prisoners of war, especially those who must work long and difficult hours, will be unable to meet the physical standards required in tunneV in:g. SecOndly, throughout the time of tunnel con:> struction the· risk of discovery is great. Thirdly; a tunnel is seldom, if ever, a ohe-man endeavor. Large .numbers of personnel must have knowledge of its· existence'; thus the possibility .of compromise· ·exists from the very beginning: ; The· most bitter blow of all is for the enemy, aware that a :tunnel exists, to allow the work to be: 
carried almost. to .completion before seizing thetunnelers and destroying their labor. . .
• ,. ~ '". • . ~ J •
b. It must be remembered that ·tunneling 'isvirtually' impossible 'iri' c'ertairi''types: of' earth;for example, riiarshy, #ozeri~ or extremely sandy
sOil. ··· · ' · ''' ·
. c: In addition· 'td"es&il:pe rout~~/ tuhnels '•ifiaysetv~,~-variety·of'otlier 'purpose's:;·They may He'us~d· to' link separate compourids''t6 ··est~biish·clahdestilie coi:rimunication '•(they .were :'used ex-'t~iisiv'eiy' for:· 'just this· purpdse by'·the _,;.North'Kbr~~n PW :in .the ·.uN ;PW camp on :ko]edo)'~Th~~ may ais~ be used--to pehetrate the' soilrt'es
of enemy supplies. . . _,., '; · ., '· .· .
;.1 ·.--~-·: ~ ~., • -~ :· : _:_, ... ·:J·. -r~ ;_c., ~·-.. _..· J _ -~
..Jj,. 'l''!mriel oper~tions .requirEf ,m;unmum .s~cllr.,..ity,'with the ~.eatest sec:unty-,n~e(f'atthe:open~il;lg~: This' is especially,true 'of. .turineHJ 'us~(("fo~communication 'purposes. • ·. . ,f. • ••• ' • ~-, •
; , • . p~ .: ~ : • .. j~
e. A major problem presented when digging atunnel is that of dirt disposal. In the 'majority ofcases the. dirt removed ,f.rom a tunnel .is differ:entin.c0lor fro:m,t~e surface earth. It must,.be-carefully blended·. with... surface earth; 0therwise jtcannot be disposed .of ~m .the ground in:the com~·pound. Camp .. ·guards· normally · are trained to.observe the. groun~ in ~nd, around PW.:camps for~ny. strangely colored earth, which· does" notappear to blend with the surface earth. · f; Dirt may .be secreted· in· the walls ·of abuilding, but care.must be taken that the seepageof. dust through the cracks does not lead to ·betrayal. If. at all possible, tunnel dirt should ·be·taken outside the camp for disposal. This may be 
94 
done by work parties who leave the compound daily. -In· a )ike manner, ·shoring: material and other essentials for construction should be brought in by these same people·. 
104. Over Wall or. Wire Bar~icad~~ ... a. The route which takes the .escaper over the barricade is extremely difficult. It has been accomplished on a number : of occasions by pole vaults, by collapsible ladders, and, as happened at the supposedly escape.,proof Colditz Castle in Germany by a gymnast tossing his _partner over a wall. Such an escape requires careful planning, 
near perfect conditions when the time comes, and the element of surpr'ise. · 
. . 
b. An over-the-barricade escape usually requires the cover of darkness and inclement weather, for these elements enhance the chance of success. As in all escape attempts, there must be coordination with the covert organization for both permission and support. . . 
105•. Through Walls or Wire Barricades 
a. Escape through walls or wire has been successfully accomplished in the past; however, the. enemy can make this method of escape all but impossible .by placing mines or concertina wire outside the wall or between doubled barbed wire . fences. ' 
. b. The . best possible .way through a wall or fence is through ·the ready-made· exi~the gate: There is practically no, ·limit to the ,ruses which haye permitte~ prisoners .of the 'past to ;leave a 
PW camp in this manner. All depended on oneprimary thing-an ability to· bluff. There is aword of caution that must be added here. Anybluff, when it is used by a person escaping orevading, must be a 100 percent bluff-99 percentis not good enough. The disguise may be perfect,the timing just right, but one furtive glance, ora hasty walk when an unhurried one is called for,and the result is failure. 
Section Ill. ,I:SCAPE DEVICES 
106. General 
a. Escapes require the use of a variety of tools.Providing a supply, of tools by stealing fromguards or working parties may lead to seriousreprisals. Also, the quantity and type which canbe procured in this fashion rarely are adequatefor the requirements. Improvisation thereforebecomes extremely important.
b. Among most groups of PW a certain number of craftsmen, artists, and handmen will beavailable. Such persons 'Can use their skills in thefabrication of escape devices. 
107. Tools 
a. One of the first essentials in the productionof tools is to obtain usable raw materials. Thevariety ·Of materials that can be found withinthe confines of a PW camp are numerous. Typicalarticles are ·nails, screws, brackets; hinges, angleiron, rods, timber, metal cans, clothing, wire,glass, paper, adhesive, etc.
b. After locating the various items which may 
96 
be used for the ,production of tools, the next important consideration is the conversion of this raw material into a usable collection of tools. Again, this is dependent upon the ingenuity and skill of the individuals working on the project. Some tools useful for escape purposes are-files, saws, drills, chisels, wire cutters, digging tools, knives, grates, fishhooks, hammers, hatchets, pliers, etc. With enough ingenuity and commonsense, all of these tools can be fabricated. 
Section IV. ESCAPE DOCUMENTATION 
108. General 
Escape from a PW camp is only the first phase in the bid for freedom. After escape, the individual is faced with the problem of moving through hostile territory to a point of safety which may be many miles distant. Two courses of action exist--to travel cross-country during darkness, avoiding contact with the enemy; or to travel in disguise, risking detection. If qualified to travel in disguise, such as having the ability to speak the indigenous language, requirements exist for certain documents to justify the individual's movements. For this reason, the escapee must be familiar with enemy documents and must be supplied with such documents or forgeries. 
109. Identity Documents 
a. In wartime identity cards will be required. It is difficult to obtain genuine documents of this nature because the loss of a pass, permit, or identity card by an enemy national is regarded as a serious offense. Therefore, trading in docu

ments is discouraged by the threat of harsh treatment. 
b. Theft of camp passes rarely will be possible.The theft of a pass from a prison guard may befoll()wed by vigorous reprisals or immediate recall and change of all camp passes, thus rendering the stolen pass useless. Occasionally, however,a guard may offer the pass of a dead relative orfriend for sale. Usually, it is possible to steal orborrow documents only long enough to copy the
wording and general layout, Some identity docu
ments are
(1) 	Gate passes. Gate passes may rangefrom colored sheets of paper carried bythe guard personnel to the elaborateidentity cards issued to security officials.The latter type usually contains a photograph of the individual.
(2) 	Identity cards. Normally, a soldier'sidentity card is represented in foreignarmies by his pay book. Since pay booksseldom are examined in detail and because they generally are worn and dirtythrough constant use, it rarely is necessary to forge more than the cover andfirst page. Civilian identity cards varyaccording to the sex, occupation, andnationality of the holder, and they mayrestrict travel to specific areas.
(3) 	Letters of recommendation. In manyforeign countries, persons moving fromone town to another carry letters ofrecommendation which may contain the 
98 
reasons for travel. These documents, usually with imposing letterheads and 
. impressive stamps, also are issued by business concerns for use of traveling personnel. Due to the variety of these documents, considerable _ latitude is offered to the forger, and he can use the name of a large business concern to lessen the chances of detection. 
(4) 	Miscellaneous passes. Temporary identification documents are issued to persons who lose permanent passes travel permits, and change of residence permits. These temporary papers normally are typewritten and vary from district to district. Any well-worded and imposingly-stamped document is likely to serve the purpose. 
11 0. Methods of Production 
a. 
The time required to forge documents depends on the size, number of pages, quantity and style of lettering, and the conditions under which they are produced. The available equipment will be inadequate, usually being limited to pencils, ink, and inferior nibs and brushes. But some paints and improvised drawing instruments may be available, and wood or coal ash can be mixed to obtain shades of color from dark brown to light tan. These have been used to stain paper to give it the appearance of age. 

b. 
Printed documents may be reproduced by the following systems: Place a sheet of window glass over the document to be copied; make a 



ti.·acing of the lettering in white paint and let it dry; then turn the glass over and retrace the white tracing with a slow-drying black ink or paint. Use this to print a copy of the document. 
Make additional copies by cleaning off the black paint and repeating the process: 
c. If a typewriter is available, make an im
provised stencil by typing on paper without using the ribbon, so that the type punctures the paper slightly. Then, by using an improvised inking roller on a pane of glass, it is possible to make numerous copies before the stencil tears. The printing seldom is perfect, but it can be retouched by hand. 
111. Maps 
The only maps normally available to PWs are small-scale maps that have been smuggled into the camp or copied from books or newspapers in the camp library. Maps are valuable aids in planning an escape, and every effort should be 
made to procure or prepare them. It is possible that good maps may be obtained from guards or visitors through bribery. It is desirable to have maps of the immediate camp area, of the roads and railways between the camp and the final destination, and the frontier zone and its approaches. Once obtained, maps should be reproduced for future use by escapees. Possible ways to produce copies are
a. One of the simplest methods of reproduction is tracing the map onto another sheet of paper by utilizing carbon paper or such substitutes as coating the back of the map with any 
high-carbon substance such as charcoal or graphite from a· pencil. A blank sheet of paper can also be· placed over the map and held to the light against a pane of glass and then traced. This method of tracing is slow and the,. original map may be damaged after a few reproductions have been made. Also, reproductions from copieS made in this manner tends to produce errors. 
' b. Another type of reproduction is possibie by using gelatin which may be available in the camp kitchen. Wash the gelatin in warm~water, then heat it until it becomes liquid, Pour it into a pan or tray of suitable size and allow it to cool. Using indelible ink, made by dissolving indelible lead from pencils in water, make a master copy of the map. Place this copy on the gelatin so that the gelatin surface absorbs the ink. Produce copies by placing thin sheets of paper on the gelatin, rolling the sheets with a smooth object to transfer the impression, and then carefully lifting the printed sheets. The number of copies that can be produced 'will vary with the materials used, but about 25 satisfactory copies can be made. The gelatin can be washed, melted, cooled, and used again. 
c. Wooden block printing may be employed if a PW skilled in this art is available. Rubber shoe heels will provide a good substitute for a wooden block. Trace or draw the map in reverse on the block. Carve the wood surrounding the image, leaving the traced lines. as the original surface of the block. Then cover the image lines on the block with any greasy ink, or ink in a flour paste (rice or wheat) base. Press a sheet of paper or cloth 
l01 
against the block and transfer the image. Thismethod has been used in the Orient for 3,000years. 
112. Photographs 
Most identity cards and passports carry photographs. It is difficult to obtain photographs in ~PW camp, but a good likeness seldom is necessaryon an identity card. In fact, during World WarII no case was reported of an escapee being recaptured as a result of having the wrong photograph on his identity card. Provided the photograph is of the right size, appears in the currentposition on the document, and carries an officiallooking stamp and signature, it should passordinary train or roadblock checks. To simplifythe problem of photography, however, try toobtain a camera and accessories. Visiting officials.may possess cameras or photographs which canbe pilfered. PWs who have experience in photography may be able to improvise cameras. Themain difficulty here is the developing and printing of films, but bribery may provide a solution. 
113. Official Stamps 
Most foreign documents bear official stamps.Use a rubber shoe heel to make a stamp bycutting out in reverse the outline of the seal orlettering with a razor blade. If a piece of linoleum, part of an inner tube, or a wooden blockis available, cut it to resemble an official stamp.Potatoes have been used as a substitute forrubber. If it is possible to obtain a genuine 
102 
document, an impression of its rubber stamp can sometimes be transferred to a forged document. This is done by pressing a damp piece of paper against the genuine "impression, thus getting a reversed impression. This impression is then transferred to the forged document and touched up as necessary. 
114. Casting 
Frequently the duplication of buttons, insignia, seals, medals, etc., is necessary to complete the evasion disguise. Casting these items in soft metal generally is the best method and the procedures involved require very simple materials. 
a. Lead, solder, and zinc are the easiest and most common materials to work with. Lead may be obtained from pipe or plumbing fittings, from around underground electrical wire, and from leaded window frames. Solder may be melted from the seams of tin cans. Zinc frequently is 
used on washbowls, metal fittings, metal containers, and in some window and roof construction. 
b. Make a mold by using clay, soap, or a large potato. The material to be used is cut in half, and half of the reversed design cut into each piece so that, when fitted together, the hollowed-out parts will have the form desired. Molds made of clay should be baked to harden them. After being poured and allowed to cool, finish the casting by trimming with a knife or file and painting or polishing as appropriate. 
115. Clothing 
Under normal circumstances, civilian clothingwill be most useful. If the attempt is made totrav:el as ari. enemy soldier, difficulties are increased due to military restrictions and controls;CiVilian disguises in most European countrieshave not proved difficult in the past. Due to thepresence of numerous foreign workers in variousstyles and conditions of clothing, it is possible touse. parts of the regular uniform. Servicetrousers, coats, and caps can be tailored anddyed to make satisfactory substitutes. Permanganate of potash, iodine, gentian violet(obtained from the dispensary), indelible lead,ink, coffee, tea, and colored book covers have beenused as dyes. Chloride of lime, often found incamp ·toilets, is a useful bleaching agent. Pistolholsters, pouches, and belts can be made frompaper and cardboard, glue, stain, and polish.Dummy pistols, rifles, and bayonets can be carvedout of wood. Paper can be used to make papiermache weapons, holsters, or other items. This isdone by boiling the paper to a thick pulp, thencooling and adding an adhesive material such asflour. When partially dry, it should be workedinto the desired shape. Use improvised coloringmaterial to give an appearance of genuinenessto the article. 
Section V. COVER-UP AT ROLL CALL 
116. General 
a. Once an escape has been made, chances of 
104 
successful evasion .are greatly increased if knowledge of the escape can be kept from the enemy guards. The best time to escape is at night just after the last roll call. Since the next roll call usually will not be held until morning, several hours normally will pass before guards detect the break. If the absence can be covered up at roll call for several days, the escapee gains even more time. In most escape attempts which failed .during World War II, the PWs were recaptured not far from the camps shortly after escaping. To a large extent this was due to the fact that the enemy security forces in the area had been alerted. On the other hand, other evaders, traveling prior to the alert or in areas where the enemy had not been alerted to watch for escaped prisoners, enjoyed astounding freedom of movement on occasion, even in daylight and in direct contact with enemy elements. 
b. The roll call cover-up should be part of the evasion plan. If it fails, the evasion may collapse. Such a collapse might occur when the PW plans to board a train in disguise at a specific time in a station near the camp. If his escape and absence from the camp remain undetected, the train station police will not have been alerted and the presence of a stranger in the station would not be cause for undue suspicion. However, if his escape has been discovered and the station security forces alerted, he probably would be the 
object of intensive search. Similarly, other situations may depend upon a time element, perhaps relating to the changing of the guard personnel, 
curfew restrictions, bridge crossings, ferry departures, etc. The nature of the escape determinesin part the amount of force and effort used by theauthorities to apprehend escapees. For example,if there has been a mass escape, it is probablethat a large police force will be alerted. Too, itmay be desirable to· cover up the escape in ·orderto employ the escape scheme again the followingday. This is necessary because the enemy, upondiscovering an escape, will make every effort todetermine the method of escape and to takeappropriate countermeasures. 
117. Methods of Covering Up 
The methods used to cover an escape necessarily will vary according to the conditions ineach instance. Substitution is the most commondevice employed, although delay of short duration may be achieved simply by causing confusionor miscounting during the roll call, particularlyin large camps, Some of the ruses that provedstJ.ccessful in the past may be effective. 
a. If a roll call is taken in ranks, outdoors, itmay be possible for a man who has already beencounted to slip into the empty spot. Alternatingshort and tall men and forming in slightly raggedbut close formations will aid in the deceptionattempt. 
b. If inclement weather forces the roll call tobe held indoors, and the count is taken room byroom, it may be possible for a counted PW toslip into the escapee's room. A trapdoor might beconstructed between rooms for this purpose. 
106 
c. Discovery of absences during bed checks sometimes may be avoided by placing a dummy in the bed. This should be done on a top bunk in a corner of the room and behind a table or other obstruction where a lazy guard is apt to make only a casual check. 
d. Substitutions may be feasible between com
pounds within a camp if roll calls are not held simultaneously and if passage between compounds is possible. Individuals such as mess or hospital personnel or hospital patients who normally are free of rigid control may take the escapee's place for several hours or longer. 
e. Mass escapes present a difficult problem for the cover-up operation. Since cover-up cannot be accomplished satisfactorily in all cases by substitution, it may be possible to temporarily deceive the enemy in the following manner: For several months prior to the scheduled mass escape attempt, a number of PWs can occasionally hide themselves at roll call, ostensibly only for nuisance purposes. They should hide in places that provide them cover for several hours or longer. In time, the enemy accepts these antics as nuisance tactics, and does not alert area security forces to be on the lookout for escapees. Thus, at the time of the actual mass escape, the escapees may have several hours of relative freedom before the hiding PWs are located and an accurate roll call is taken. Of course, this type of cover-up operation disrupts camp routine for all the PWs, and it is especially unrewarding to the PWs who volunteer to hide 
and subsequently are punished. But it may meansuccessful evasion for some of the escapeesand this is the primary consideration. 
108 
AR 350-30 
AR 350-225 

AR 320-5 
FM 5-20 
FM 8-50 FM 21-5 FM 21-6 
FM 21-11 FM 21-13 FM 21-18 FM 21-20 FM 21-26 FM 21-30 . FM 21-41 
FM 21-60 
FM 21-75 
FM 21-76 FM 21-150 FM 27-10 FM 30-5 FM 31-16 
(C) FM 31-20 
APPENDIX 
/ 

REFERENCES 
Code of Conduct. Survival, Evasion, arid Escape Training. Dictionary of United :States Arm7 Terms. Camouflage, Basic Principals and 
Field Camouflage. Bandaging and Splinting. Military Training Management. Techniqties of Military Instruc
tion. 
'First Aid for Soldiers. 
The Soldier's Guide. 
Foot Marches. 
Physical Training. 
Map Reading. 
Military Symbols. 
Soldier's Handbook for Chemical 

and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare. Visual Signals. Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling. Survival. Combatives. The Law of Land Warfare. Combat Intelligence. Counterguerrilla Operations. Special Forces Operational Techniques (U). 

FM 31-21 Special .Forces Operations.
(S) FM 31-21A Special Forces Operations (U).
FM 31-22 U. S. Army CounterinsurgencyForces.
(S) FM 31-22A U. S. Army CounterinsurgencyForces (U).FM 31-25 Desert Operations.FM 31-30 Jungle Training and Operations.FM 31-60 River-Crossing Operations.FM 31-70 Basic Cold Weather Manual.
FM 31-71 Northern Operations.FM 31-72 Mountain Operations.FM 61-100 The Division.TM 21-200 Physical Conditioning.DA Pam 20-151 Lectures of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.DA Pam 21-81 Individual Training in Collectingand Reporting Military Information.DA Pam 30-101 Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation ofPrisoners of War.ASubjScd 21-12 Survival, Evasion and Escape.'ASubjScd 33-22 
Clandestine and Intelligence Operations (U). 
110 
'GLOSSARY 

This glossary is provided to enable the user to have readily available terms unique to Evasion and Escape (E&E) found in this manual. Although some terms are contained in JCS Pub 1* and AR 320-5** they are reproduced here for the benefit of personnel not having ready access to those publications. Where differences exist between U. S. Army terms and JCS definitions, the JCS definition has been adopted. 
Auxiliary-That element of the resistance force, normally located in rural areas,. established to provide an organized civilian support of the · resistance movement. 
Breakotit-A tactic employed by units or individual when surrounded by the enemy to disengage and return to friendly lines. 
*Cold War-A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives. 
Contact-Initial meeting between an escapee/ evader and a member of the indigenous population for the purpose of obtaining assistance. 
The indigenous person may be a member of an E&E net. 
*Counterinsurgency-Those military, paramili
111' 

tary political, economic, psychological, and civic acti~ns taken bY. a goveJ.:nment_ to defeat -.subversive insurgency. 
*Esc~pee ()r ~scaper..,..;.Any person who has been physically captured by the enemy and succeeds in freeing himself. 
**Evadee or evader-Any person who is cut off behind enemy lines but succeeds with or without organized. assistance, in eluding physical capture. Not to be confused with escapee or liberated personnel. 
Evasive action-Action taken by an individual to elude capture, attack, or surveillance. 
*Evasion and escape-The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. 
Exfiltration-The removal or recovery of personnel from enemy or enemy-controlled areas to areas under friendly control. 
*General war-Armed conflict between the major powers of the communist and free worlds in which the total resources of the belligerents 
are employed, and the national survival of a 
major belligerent is in jeopardy. · 
*Guerrilla-A combat participant in gilerrilla warfare. · 
Guerrilla, force:..:_A group-of irregular, predomi
nantly indigenous personnel, organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy or enemy-held territory. 
*Guerrilla warfare-Military and paramilitarY operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. 
Guerrilla warfare operational area (GWOA)A geographical area within enemy or enemyheld territory designated by the unified commander for the organization .and conduct of guerrilla warfare and related unconventional warfare activities in support of theater objectives. 
Infiltration-The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organization. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy it infers that contact is avoided. 
*Insurgency-A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited. 
*Limited war-Armed conflict short -of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations. 
Long range evasion-Tactics and techniques employed by evasion groups or individuals to survive and avoid capture when traveling farbehind enemy lines. 
Removal area-An area from which evaders andescapees are evacuated. 
*Resistance movement--The resistance movement is an organized effort by some portionof the civil population of a country to resistthe legally · established government or anoccupying power. Initially, such resistance mayconsist of subversive political activities andother actions designed to agitate and propagandize the population to distrust and loseconfidence in the legally established government or occupying power. If not suppressed,such resistance can result in insurgency by irregular forces. 
Safe area--A geographic area in hostile territorywhich offers to an evader a reasonable chanceof avoiding capture and of surviving until hisevacuation can be undertaken. 
Short range evasion-Tactics and techniques employed by units, groups, or individuals to avoidcapture in the enemy combat zone. Examplesare units or individuals bypassed during anenemy breakthrough. 
Special forces operational base (SFOB)-A provisional organization which is establishedwithin a friendly area by elements of ·a specialforces group to provide command, administra
114 
tion, training, logistical support, and intelligence for committed special forces detachments. 
*Unconventional warfare-Includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subvel'iSion. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly 
indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. 
Underground-That element of the resistance force established to conduct operations in areas which are normally denied to the auxiliary and guerrillas. 
*United States Army Special Forces-Military personnel with cross-training in basic and specialized military skills, organized into small, multiple-purpose detachments with the mission to train, organize, supply, direct, and control indigenous forces in guerrilla warfare and to conduct unconventional warfare operations. 
• Denotes definition appearing in JCS Pub 1, Dictionary 
of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, 1 December 1964. 
** Denotes definition appearing in AR 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 23 April 1965. 
INDEX 
Paragraphs Page 
Assisted Evasion ·E&E lines ............................................ 46-60 44General ................... :.: .........: ................. . 46 44Type assistance ................................... 47 47 
Battlefield isolation ...............................: ... . 22,24 33,34
Blood chit .....:..................................: .......... . 62,63 56,57
Breakout ......... ···················''·························· 26 35 

Capture:
How to prevent .. ..... ...... ....................... 66 63
Treatment following ..........................67, 81-83 63,78
Code of conduct .... .... .. ... . . . ......... ................. 9, 10 11,12
Collection of information ..............:......... 45 46
Covert organizations .................................. 74,102 74,93 

Defense of present position ...................... 25 34
Documentation:
Casting items .................................... 114 103
Clothing ................................................ llS 104
·Identity documents ............................ 109,110 97,99
Maps ...................................................... 111 100
Official stamps ...................................... 113 102
Photographs ......................................... 112 102 

Early escape: 
Advantage ............................................ 69 64
Importance of alertness .................... 71 67
Opportunities ........................................ 70 65
Escapee, definition ......................................
Escape from PW camp:
Cover-up at roll call ...................... .. 116, 117 104, 106
Documentation .................................... 108 97
Planning ................................................ 101 92
Tools ...................................................... 106,107 96
Tunneling .............................................. 103 93
Value ...................................................... 100 92 

116 
Para~rraphs P&~re 
Walls and barricades .......................... 104,105 95 

Escape planning ......................:................. 101 92 

Escape tools ............................................ 106,107 96 

Evader, definition ........................................ Evasion: Aids:· Blood chits ......... ..... .. ........... .... .. . 62, 63 56, 57 Maps ........................................ · 65 62 Pointee talkee .............................. 64 57 Assisted evasion ................................ 46,47 47 Basic principles .................................. 18 21 Basic problems .................................... 17 21 Classification .....................:................. 15 20 Concept ......................................... 16 21 Counterinsurgency .............................. 31-33 37 Initial ac·tion ....................................... 19 22 Lone evader . .............. ................... ...... 29 36 Long-range .......................................... 38-44 42 Short-rang-e .....................................·....15, 16, 2220, 21, 33 Techniques ........................................ 30 36 Evasion and escape: Definition:< .......................................... 112 History ........................................ 7,8 9 Reasons for E&E program .............. 12 17 Responsibilities .................................... 6 6 Evasion and escape lines: Conduct 49 48 Contacting line ................................... 50,59 49,55 Esta bliRhing identity .......................... 51 51 General 48,54 48,54 Movement 52,53 51,52 Security 58 55 
Glossary 111 
Indoctrination, enemy: Communh<t program .......................... 91 84 Defense against .................................. 99 91 Objectives .......................................... 92,93 85,87 
Paragraphs Page 
Phases ................................................... 94 88Techniques of communist ................. 95 88Viet Cong methods ........................... 97,98 91Information, collection .............................. 45 46Interrogation:Communist way of conducting ........ 88 82Conduct during .................................... 87 80Training against ................................. 85 79Isolated units:Breakout ............................................ 26 35Courses of action 24 34Defense of present position 25 34Evasion by infiltration 27 35Other alternatives ....... . 28 36 
Legal status of evaders, escapees, andPW .......................................................11, 20c(1) 17,24Long-range evasion:Courses of action:Combination of courses 
44 46Evasion by deception 43 45Evasion by infiltration ..... . 42 44Planning ................................................ 38-40 42Special aspects .................................... 34 40Travel ...................................................... 20,21 23,26 
Native assistance:Escape lines ........................................ 48 48Making contact .......................... 50 49Type assistance .................................... 46,47 47 
Obstacles, how to overcome ..................... 21 26
Overt organization ...................................... 73 68 

Planning for escape .................................... 101 92
Pointee talkee .............................................. 64 57
PW: 
Duties .................................................... 6e 7
Legal status ....................................."..... 11 17 

118 
Paragraphs Page 
PW 	camp, communist: 
Chain of command .............................. 79 76 
Cold war ................................................ 80-82 77 
Description ............................................ 76,77 74,75 
Security ............................................... 78 76 

PW camp survival: 
Covert organization ............................ 74 74 
Organization ........................................ 72 68 
Overt organization ................ .. 73 68 
Will to survive .................................... 84 78 

Prisoners' representative ......................... . 73 68 
Protecting powers .................................... .. 75 74 
Purpose and scope ..................................... . 1 4 

References ..................................................... 
Roll call, cover-up .. .. . 116, 117 104, 106 

Short-range evasion ...........15, 16, 2220, 21, 33 

Training ...................... 	4, 5 5, 6 

Travel: Daylight versus night .............. .. 20d 25 Concealment and camouflage 20b 23 Disguise ........................................... .. 20c 23 Maps .................. .. ....................... 20e 26 Obstacles 21 26 
Will to survive: Importance ................... 36,84 41,78 Maintaining .... .. 37 41 
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 
HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Official: Chief of Staff, 
J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States ·Army,
The Adjutant General. 

Distribution: 
Active Army: 
DCSPER (2) ARADCOM (10)DCSO.PS (2) ARADCOM Rgn (10)
ACS1 (2) 
OS Maj Comd (10)DCSLOG (2) LOGCOMD (5)CRD (1) Armies (25)CORC (2) Corps (15)ACSFOR (2) Div (10)COA (1) Div Arty (5)CINFO (1) Bde (5)TIG (1) Regt/Gp (5)TPMG (1) cc (5)CofEngrs (3) Bn (5)CofCh (1) Co/Btry (2)TJAG (1) USAJFKCENSPWAROPO (1) (10)TSG (1) Br Svc Sch (5) except
USACDC Agcy (2) USAES (50)except USAOGMS (10)USACDCARMA (5) USAQMS (25)USACDCAVNA (3) USATSCH (10)USACDCCEA (3) USASWS (30)USACDCTA (6) USMA (5)USCONARC (10) USACGSC (10)USACDC (10) MAAG (3)USAMC ((15) Mil Msn (3) 
120 
NG: State AG 8); Div (2); Div Arty (2); Corps Arty (2); Bde (2); Regt/Gp (2); Bn (2); CojBtry (1); TOE 83-500 (2). USAR: Units -Same as active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit. 
For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50. 
121 
-f:c U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 

ENGLISH 
AM AN AMERICAN. I DC NOT SPEAK YOUR LANGUAGE. MISFORTUNE FORCES ME TO SEEK YOUR ASSISTANCE IN OB
TAINING FOOD, SHELTER AND 
* 
PROTECTION. PLEASE TAKE ME 
TO SOMEONE WHO WILL PRO
VIDE FOR MY SAFETY AND SEE THAT I AM RETURNED TO MY PEOPLE. I WILL DO MY BESTTO SEE THAT NO HARM COMES TO 
YOU. MY GOVERNMENT WILL 
* 
REWARD YOU. 
* * 
* 
112345 A 
I~
*VARIOUS TRANSLATIONS OF 
THE ENGLISH TEXT IN LANGUAGES INDIGENOUS TO THE OPERATIONAL BLOOD CHIT )(
AREA. CONTROL NUMBER 
Fig'ure 1. Blood chit.