\: I lOCK'NOOO MEMJRIAL UBRARI )) ' / I 0 E P A R T M E N T 0F T H 'E A R M Y F I E L D M A N AL l. ;· , ' '·I'{'' r~ THE i I i ' DIVISION -~~.· EADOUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TtiE AR Y • JUNE 1965 I 11 I *FM 61-100 CHAPTER Section CHAPTER Section CHAPTER Section CHAPTER Section CHAPTER Section HEADQUARTERS ) FIEID MANUAL\ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 61-100 WASHINGTON, D.C., 25 June 1965 • THE DIVISION 1. INTRODUCTION I. General______________________________________ _ II. Missions and roles of the division. ______________ _ III. Organization, capabilities, and limitations of the division. 2. COMMAND I. GeneraL_________ ----------------.-----------"- II. Division command____________________________ _ III. Division staff_________________________________ _ IV. Brigade command_________________ -_____ -_____ _ V. Brigade staff_________________________________ _ VI. Command posts ______________________________ _ VII. Signal communications ________________________ _ 3. ORGANIZATION I. The division base _____________________________ _ II. Combat battalions____________________________ _ III. Organization for combat _______________________ _ 4. COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT I. General______________________________________ _ II. Fire support__________________________________ _ Ill. Air defense artillery ___________________________ _ IV. Intelligence support_ __________________________ _ V. Engineer support _____________________________ _ VI. Signal support________________________________ _ VII. Army aviation support_ _______________________ _ VIII. Military police support ________________________ _ IX. Chemical support_____________________________ _ X. Ground transportation_________________________ _ XI. Psychological operations_______________________ _ XII. Medical support ______________________________ _ XIII. Personnel and administration___________________ _ XIV. Graves registration____________________________ _ XV. Civil affairs __________________________________ _ 5. OFFENSE I. General______________________________________ _ II. Basic considerations of offense ___________________ III. Planning the attack___________________________ _ IV. Movement to contact _________________________ _ V. The penetration______________________________ _ VI. The envelopment_ ____________________________ _ VII. Exploitation__________________________________ _ VIII. Pursuit______________________________________ _ IX. Night combat________________________________ _ X. Infiltration___________________________________ _ XI. Reconnaissance in force ________________________ _ XII. The division as a covering force _________________ _ *This manual supersedes FM 61-100,4 January 1962, inciuding C 1, 27 March 1963; FM 7-100, 15 November 1960; and FM 17-100, 12 May 1958, including C 1, 8 June 1959, and C 2, 25 May 1961. Paragraph 1-1, 1-2 1-3, 1-4 1-5-1-9 2-1 2-2-2-5 2-6-2-8 2-9-2-11 2-12-2-14 2-15-2-21 2-22-2-28 3-1-3-10 3-11-3-14 3-15, 3-16 4-1,4-2 4-3-4-7 4-8,4-9 4-1Q--4-18 4-19-4-21 4-22-4-25 4-26-4-29 4-30,4-31 4-32,4-33 4-34,4-35 4-36,4-37 4-38 4-39-4-46 4-47,4-48 4-49--4-52 5-1-5-5 5-6-5-20 5-21-5-30 5-31-5-40 5-41-5-44 5-45-5-49 5-5Q--5-52 5-53-5-55 5-56-5-58 5-59--5-61 5-62-5-65 5-66-5-69 Page 3 3 3 6 6 6 8 8 10 12 13 16 17 18 18 23 23 25 26 32 34 35 36 36 36 36 38 39 41 42 50 56 60 63 67 69 71 74 77 79 CHAPTER 6. DEFENSE Paragraph Page I. General______________________________________ _ Section 6-1-6-3 80 II. Forms of defense ______________________________ _ 6-4---6-6 81 III. Defensive areas ________________________ ------__ 6-7-6-10 82 IV. Planning the defense __________________________ _ 6-11-6-19 82 V. Conduct of the defense ________________________ _ 6-20-6-23 93 VI. The division in the corps defense ________________ _ 6-24---6-27 97 VII. Special defensive considerations _________________ _ 6-28-6-35 99 CHAPTER 7. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS I. General______________________________________ _ Section 7-1-7-3 103 II. Basic considerations ___________________________ _ 7-4--7-9 103 III. WithdrawaL _________________________________ _ 7-10-7-13 108 IV. Delaying action~-----~': _______________________ _ 7-14---7-20 116 V. Retirement___________________________________ _ 7-21-7-23 122 CHAPTER 8. RELIEF OPERATIONS I. General______________________________________ _ Section 8-1,8-2 123 II. Relief in place________________________________ _ 8-3-8-6 123 III. Passage of lines _______________________________ _ 8-7-8-10 126 IV. Considerations affecting the choice of reliefs prior 8-11-8-14 128 to attack. CHAPTER 9. OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS I. GeneraL_____________________________________ _ Section 9--1 130 II. Joint amphibious operations ____________________ _ 9-2,9-3 130 III. Shore to shore operations ______________________ _ 9-4 131 IV. Joint airborne operations ______________________ _ 9-5--9-7 131 V. Airmobile operations __________________________ _ 9-8-9-10 133 VI. Linkup operations____________________________ _ 9-11, 9-12 135 VII .. Raids, feints, demonstrations, and ruses _________ _ 9-13-9-16 138 VIII. Combat at river lines __________________________ _ 9-17-9-19 140 IX. Combat in fortified areas _______________ · _______ _ 9-20-9-22 140 X. Combat in built-up areas ______________________ _ 9-23-9-25 142 XI. Combat in extreme terrain and weather conditions__ 9-26-9-33 142 XII. Cold war situations ___________________________ _ 9-34---9-37 146 XIII. Special warfare operations _____________________ _ 9-38-9-41 149 CHAPTER 10. TROOP MOVEMENTS Section I. Basic considerations____________________________ 10-1-10-7 151 II. Tactical motor marches___________ ~ _____________ 10-8-10-28 152 III. Movements by rail____________________________ 10-29-10-32 157 IV. Movements by water__________________________ 10-33-10-34 157 V. Movements by air ____________________________ 10-35--10-38 157 VI. Bivouac and assembly areas____________________ 10-39-10-42 158 APPENDIX I. REFERENCES__ ----------------------------- 160 II. ORGANIZATION CHARTS __________________ _ 164 III. SAMPLE STANDING OPERATING PRO- CEDURE_________________________________ _ 192 INDEX------------------------------------------------------- 225 • 1-5. General Characteristics a. The division consists of a relatively fixed command, staff, combat, and support structure to which are assigned combat battalions (airborne infantry, infantry, mechanized infantry, tank) in types and numbers appropriate to the division's mission and its anticipated operational environment. Determination of the types and numbers of -~, combat battalions in a particular division is called CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Section I. GENERAL 1-1 . Purpose a. This manual sets forth military doctrine, tactics, and techniques for the employment of the division. It provides guidance for division and subordinate commanders and their staffs. b. The material presented in this manual agrees with applicable portions of STANAG 2007 (SOLOG-20)-Use of Abbreviations by the NATO Armed Forces. 1-2. Scope a. This manual provides information on the organization, capabilities, limitations, command, planning, tactical employment, and combat service support of airborne, armored, infantry, and mechanized infantry divisions. It presents doc 1-3. Mission The mission of the division is the destruction of enemy military forces and the seizure or domination of critical land areas, their populations, and resources. 1-4. Other Roles In addition to its basic mission, the division may be employed to accomplish counterinsurgency and trine common to all areas of operations and is applicable to nuclear and nonnuclear operations. SpeCial operations (such as airborne, amphibious and those in northern, jungle and desert areas) are covered in detail in other publications ( app. I). These subjects are therefore discussed only in general terms herein. b. Technological advancement and the continuing improvement in organizational and operational concepts will necessitate modification of this manual from time to time. Recommendations for changes should be forwarded directly to the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Combined Arms Agency, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.2 66027, on DA Form 1598 (Record of Comments on Publications) . Section II. MISSIONS AND ROLES OF THE DIVISION other tasks similar to the following : a. A show of force. b. Truce enforcement. c. International police action. d. Encouragement of a faltering government. e. Legal occupation. f. Restoration of order. g. Protection of personnel and property. h. Assistance to civil defense efforts. Section Ill. ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS OF THE DIVISION "tailoring." Making this determination prior to deploying a division to a particular area of operations is "strategic tailoring." The transfer of units by higher field commanders from one division to another, or the augmentation of a division from nondivisional sources to meet specific needs, or the streamlining of a division by detaching some of its elements or equipment is "tactical tailoring." Grouping appropriate elements of the division under its three brigades and other control head quarters in types and numbers appropriate to each brigade or other control unit's specific mission is organization of the division for combat. b. A division is designated by the Department of the Army as airborne, armored, infantry, or infantry (mechanized), depending upon the types and numbers of combat battalions assigned when it is strategically tailored. This tailoring gives the division and its subordinate units the capability to perform specific missions in an anticipated operational environment. c. Within the division, the three brigade headquarters are the major tactical command headquarters to which combat, combat support, and combat service support elements may be attached or placed in support to perform specific missions .. d. The division support command consists of a headquarters and headquarters company and appropriate functionalized combat service support units. Combat service support units can be fragmented to provide functional support elements which can be attached to or placed in support of the brigades or other combat units. e. Siqce the organization, strength, and equipment of the division are Nuclear, chemical, and biological fires (command channels), preplanned close air support, and armed helicopter support. NOTE: Naval gunfire is requested thrpugh ANGLICO teams. Figure 3. Fire support req~tests. ·1 LEGEND ---.-...;._______...,_ Fire Support Planning. -------Arty Fire Planning. -• -• ~Air Force Fire Planning. .___, -1 -Army Avn Fire Planning• ........... ............. .......... ....... ............ .................. ............ • FDC 1 l I XX ---------• FDC I I I I CTOC ----------t:Joc '\. • '• ., xxxx ' IFATOC I Ji,iuure 4. Fire Pla!l'minu Ohannel8. Section Ill. AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY 4-8. General a. Air defense of the field army area of responsibili.ty is provided by the field army air defense commander through the air defense artillery brigade. This defense by air defense artillery units is in conjunction with the air defense (missile and aircraft) provided by the theater. Air defense of the corps area is provided by air defense artillery units and is coordinated with the army air defense commander. Air defense artillery units may be attached to the division. b. Plans for the employment of attached air defense artillery units are coordinated with adjacent and higher headquarters. The air defense intelligence means of all air defense artillery units are integrated with the air defense intelligence system to provide for early warning information, transmission of flash messages, and dissemination of information and instructions pertaining to air defense. c. In the event of an attack of a defended area by aircraft or missiles, air defense units will engage the target in accordance with the rules of engagement in effect in the command. 4-9. Employment of AHached Air Defense Artillery Battalions a. The air defense artillery battalion is normally retained unde~di~ision control. b. Air defense artillery units are, employed to defend ~ital areas or units in acco~dance with priorities established by the division commander. Be cause of the range of air defense missiles, a single fire unit may defend several vital areas and units, but the terrain may require that a single vital area or unit be defended by more than one fire unit. c. Air defense should be provided for elements of the division while moving and for critical points along a route of march. Air defense fire unit sites should be selected to provide maximum defense for the march columns. d. Air defense artillery units should be in position to provide air defense before the first major units arrive in the assembly areas. e. See FM 44-1 for details of employment of air defense artillery. Section IV. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 4-10. General The intelligence capabilities of the division are supplemented by intelligence agencies of higher echelons. Detailed intelligence procedures are prescribed in FM 30-5 and in other appropriate field manuals. 4-11. Flow of Information and Intelligence a. As information is processed into intelligence, the G2 insures its timely dissemination to all staff sections concerned and to higher, lower, and adjacent units. The transmission of target acquisition information to the FSE normally takes precedence over the dissemination of the intelligence information. b. An op,~rations and intelligence net providing direct communication between division headquarters and major subordinate tactical units and selective monitoring of the radio transmission of subordinate units assists in rapid production of intelligence. 4-12. Reconnaissance ,a, General. Effective reconnaissance provides much of the information concerning the enemy, ,terrain, and weather essential to the conduct of operations. All division units must exploit their organic reconnaissance caprubilities, and the activities of these units must be integrated with the division's reconnaissance operations and tactical plans. b. G11ournd Reconnai.----00-3 army air ambulance unit. When nonmedical aircraft are used for medical evacuation functions, the division surgeon designates the patients to be transported and the pickup and delivery points. 4-28. Nondivision Army Aviation Support a. Army transport aviation units are assigned to the field army and normally are attached to corps for tactical operations. They may be further attached to, or placed in support of, subor dinate corps units for specific missions. Normally, they are not attached below division level, except for the conduct of airmobile operations which are under brigade control. b. Plans for employing units using Army airlift can encompass operations up to and including the tactical airlift of battalions. Requests for Army transport aviation support for tactical operations are made through command channels. 4-29. Employment of Army Aviation Army aviation can be employed to assist ground elements on the following missions: a. Exploiting the effects of nuclear weapons. b. Enveloping defended areas or traversing bar~ r1ers. c. Seizing key terrain features, particularly in pursuit, exploitation, and advance to contact. d. Reinforcing or evacuating isolated units. e. Movement of reserves. f. Supply of critically needed items. g. Concentrating dispersed forces for execution of a tactical operation. h. Dispersing forces. i. Combating guerrilla or other irregular forces. j. Movement of reconnaissance forces and patrols. k. Augmenting aeromedical evacuation of patients. l. Ship-to-shore movement in amphibious operations. m. Performing radiological monitoring and survey. n. Providing limited aerial fire support. o. Establishing aerial radio relays. p. Assisting in traffic control. q. Providing reconnaissance and surveillance. r. Locating targets and adjusting .artillery fire. Section VIII. MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT 4-30. General The military police company, under the operational control of the division provost marshal, provides military police support to the division. 4-31. Division Military Police Company a. General. The division military police company is normally employed under centralized control. It can be tailored to the assigned mission. Employment of the subordinate ·elements of the company is as follows. See also chapters 5 through 10. ( 1) The security platoon provides local and internal ground protection for the division main and tactical command posts. (2) A military police platoon is normally employed in support of each of the two committed brigades to provide military police support on an area basis. Platoons may be attached to, or placed in support of, committed brigades as dictated by the tactical situation. Attachment is the normal employment in the case of a brigade operating independently. ( 3) One military police platoon is employed to operate a PW collecting point, a strag .gler collecting point, a civilian internee collecting point, and a temporary confinement facility for military prisoners. This platoon also evacuates PW from brigade to division as required. ( 4) One military police platoon is normally employed to provide general military police support on an area basis in the division rear area, including the division support command area. When three brigades are committed and a military police platoon is required in support of each additional military police: units are ' 'd requested from corps or army to provi e military police support in the division rear area. b. Traffic Control. Traffic control operations are performed hy the military police platoons in accordance with the division traffic control plan. Traffic control is ~complished through the operation of traffic control posts, traffic patrols, and information posts. c. Circulation Control of Individuals. (1) The control of thecirculation of individ uals is a basic function performed by all military police patrols and posts. (2) Each subordinate commander is responsible for straggler control within his own area. Commanders of units located within the division rear area assist in the control of stragglers who appear in their areas of responsibility. (3) The area in which military police straggler control is estrublished extends from the rear of units in contact to the division rear boundary. All traffic control posts, information posts, and roving military police patrols perform the additional function of straggler control. Special straggler control posts, when requir~, are located: at critical points on the mam roads and other natural lines of drift within the division area. These posts perform the multiple functions of straggler control traffic control, refugee control, and co~trol of the circulation of individuals. ( 4) The military police company operates a division straggler collecting point at a · central location. As stragglers are collected at the collecting point, they are screened and sorted for return to their units, evacuation to a medical facility, or other disposition as appropriate. d. Confine'I'IWnt of Military Prisoners. Convicted military prisoners normally are not confined in the division area. The military police company operates a temp~rary con'finement facility for U.S. military personnel. The 'military police company also provides eScorts for the evacuation of military prisoners. . · e. Prevention and Investigation of Cri'I'IW. (1) Military police augment and extend the command crime prevention program. They conduct crime prevention surveys and other special operations in the area of crime prevention. (2) The division military police company has a limited capability to conduct criminal investigations. The division provost marsha·! supervises the criminal investigation program and arranges for the transfer of cases to nondivisional supporting units as necessary. • f. Escort and Security of Materiel, Installations, Personnel, and Movements. The military police company provides escorts and security 'personnel for sensitive materiel, key installations, designated personnel, and critical or sensitive movements. When the personnel requirements are beyond the capabilities of the company, additional military police may be requested from corps or army. g. Di."-...._ Rear Scty t C. Two brigades abrease. Covering Force / '\ D X X / Flank Flank Scty D Scty XX / D<;..> -~ X D Rear Scty t B. Column of ~rigodes. ~Covering Force / X D \ / Flank Flank Scty Scty / XX X"-...._ D<-> D Rear Scty t D. Eehelon. Figure "/. Oombat formati()'fl,8. Section IV. MOVEMENT TO CONTACT ( 5-31. General b. The advance is conducted on a broad front using the techniques of the tactical column and a. Movement to contact is a means of gaining approach march (fig. 8). The movement to concontact or of reestablishing lost contact with the tact is characterized by decentralized control and enemy. Its purpose is the early development of piecemeal commitment of forces. It terminates the situation to provide an advantage prior to when determined enemy resistance requires the decisive engagement. deployment and coordinated effort of the division. D L:JrF Covering Force D D Advance Guard D Flank Guard Figure B. LJrF ~ ~TF LJrF L:Jspt Main Body 11 D ~earGuar~ LJrF D DTF LJTF XX D(-) D it Dt Flank Guard An 'organization for movement to contact (multiple oolumn8). ~~ 5-32. Basic Considerations a. Primary emphasiS is placed on the best use of the road net and terrain. Provisions are made to overcome obstacles and for rapid passage of defiles. See paragraphs 9-26 through 9-33. b. Primary components are the covering force, advance guards, flank and rear security forces, and the main body. These groupings provide for (1) Rapid and uninterrupted advance of the division. (2) Adequate all-round security and the early development of the situation. ( 3) Retention of the bulk of the combat power uncommitted during movement for rapid employment upon contact with enemy forces. e. The basic formations are the column of brigades, three brigades abreast, two brigades abreast, and brigades in echelon. Normally the movement is conducted in multi pie columns. Subordinate combat units adopt formations or variations of these formations which facilitate the accomplishment of their assigned missions, i.e., battalions abreast or in echelon. d. Imminence of contact and the terrain largely determine the degree of control required. Control must permit rapid response by subordinate units to changes in mission, march procedures, organization, and control measures. e. Nuclear weapons increase the speed of movement because, in conjunction with relatively small forces, they can eliminate enemy resistance which might otherwise require the deployment of sizable elements. Nucl~r fires, to include use of fallout, can provide security by blocking enemy avenues of approach or by restricting the enemy access to terrain essential to the advance. Toxic chemicals in ·highly persistent concentrations can be used in a similar manner. The vagueness of the enemy situati~n normally requires that the bulk of nuclear fires be held on an oncall basis. f. Tactical Air Force aircraft in day and night, visual, photo, and electronic reconnaissance missions augment the efforts of Army aircraft to detect enemy units or movement into the area and to provide information on the nature of the terrain to be traversed. Tactical aircraft reinforce frontal and flank security efforts. The use of column cover or air alert aircraft is habitual when contact is imminent. g. Airmobile forces greatly increase security. They can seize key terrain essential to the uninterrupted advance of the command. Provision of airmobility increases the responsiveness of the reserve to varying situations. 5-33. Planning the Movement The commander follows the procedures in paragraphs 5-21 through 5-30 to determine the best organization and distribution of forces to be used initially. Primary consideration is directed toward the anticipated action during the movement and the subsequent employment of forces. During the advance, the commander continually analyzes the situation based upon the latest developments. He shifts forces and alters his plan of movement as required. Upon gaining contact, he again employs the proeedures in paragraphs 5-21 through 5-30. 5-34. Organization for the Movement a. General. Organization for the movement depends upon the mission, available intelligence, probable order of commitment of units, and relative mobility of units. (1) The position of infantry, tank, artillery, and engineer units throughout the formation is as dictated by the situation, particularly the anticipated employment of the units. ( 2) Combat service support units and installations are located to provide the required support but not to interfere with tactical movements. Normally, these units follow combat echelons. b. The Covering Foree. ( 1) Missions assigned the covering force are broad in nature. They may include development of the situation, destruction of enemy resistance, seizure of, key terrain, or containment of enemy forces. (2) The covering force is tailored to accomplish its mission. ·Itnormally operates at a considerable distance in front of the main body. A highly mobile force such as the armored cavalry squadron or a battalion task force provides the basic element of the covering force. It is appropriately reinforced with aviation, artil lery, and engineers. The covering force is supported by tactical Air Force aircraft for long-range reconnaissance and offensive strikes and by Army aircraft for short-range surveillance, limited fire support, and control. Nuclear and chemical fires support the covering force as required. Airmobile forces make excellent reserves for the covering force. (3) The covering force normally operates under division control. However, when the the division is advancing on multiple routes, terrain and distance may require subordinate commanders to command their own covering forces. ( 4) When the division is marching as part of a large force, the covering force may be furnished and controlled by the higher headquarters. The division advance guard is then the contact force between the division and the covering forces. ( 5) Operations of the division acting as a covering force are covered in paragraphs 5-66 through 5-68. c. The Advance Guard. The advance guard is organized for the mission andmay include armored cavalry, tank, mechanized infantry, airmobile infantry, or motorized infantry units in the proper proportion required to expedite the movement of the main body following it. Necessary combat support such as engineer and artillery is integrated into the advance guard. d. Flank and RearSecurity Forces. (1) Flank and rear security forces protect the main body from ground observation and surprise attack. These forces must be strong enough to defeat minor enemy forces or to delay strong enemy attack until the main body can deploy. (2) The flank guard travels on routes parallel to that of the main body or moves by bounds to occupy key positions. The rear guard follows the main body. (3) The strength and composition of the rear and flank guards are similar to the advance guard. Airmobile forces may be used as flank or rear guards. Elements of the armored cavalry squadron are well suited to flank and rear guard missions. Should the flanks or rear of the division be secured by the presence of adjacent or following units, security forces may be f appropriately reduced. \ (4) Flank and rear security for<;es operate either under control of the division or of elements of the main body marching in proximity to them. e. TheMainBody. (1) The main body comprises the bulk of the division's combat power. It is immediately available to attack major enemy forces or the division objective. (2) Unit of the main body are organized for combat and are positioned in the advancing columns to permit maximum versatility for employment during the movement or after contact with the main enemy force has been made. 5-35. Command a. A division command element marches well forward in the main body. b. The movement is carefully planned and the division commander's concept of the advance and anticipated subsequent action is known by all subordinate commanders. Minimum tactical control measures are used. These may consist of boundaries axes of advance, phase lines, checkpoints, march objectives, and fire coordination measures, as required. Execution of the movementis based upon aggressive action by subordinate commanders acting on their initiative in accordance with the commanderrs concept. As the situation progresses and the advance develops into an attack, the division commander resumes more centralized control of the division. c. Maximum, rapid dissemination of all information obtained is essential. When security is required, this is accomplished by transmission of information from the security forces to the division, with other station~ maintaining listening silence~ 5-36. Security Security is obtained by the use of the security and covering forces. Security is enhanced by rapid, aggressive movement. The use of dispersed formations provides protection against nuclear attack but may increase the difficulty of maintaining adequate mutual support between the various tactical groupings. This difficulty may be overcome ~~ in part by the use of nuclear and chemical fires and reconnaissance. J 5-37. Combat Service Support a. The movement to contact is characterized by the high rate of consumption of class III supplies, increased vehicular maintenance, low rates of ammunition expenditure, and relatively low casualty rates. It is complicated by the dispersed nature of the operation, the speed of forward movement, and variables injected by the enemy and terrain. The fast-moving nature of the operation and the high class III consumption require careful planning of combat service support. Adequate combat service support must be provided to enable the division to move without delay. Mobile distributing points and Army aircraft are useful to accom . plish this. Augmentation of organic combat service support means by higher headquarters may be required. b. Of particular significance is the need for maintenance and traffic control on routes forward. This may conflict with the requirements of combat units for engineers and military police and may require that additional support be furnished by higher headquarters. 5-38. Conduct of the Movement The movement to contact is marked by rapid, aggressive action. Local situations are rapidly developed .by the covering force. Within its capability, it destroys enemy forces which will interfere with the movement of the main body and contains those it cannot destroy. The main body commits elements to reduce pockets of resistance bypassed by the covering force or, when required by the mission, leaves them for engagement by follow and support units. The division commander is apprised of the progress of the various combat units and their anticipated actions. He · commits forces as they become available to maintain the momentum of the advance. Nuclear weapons are used against targets of opportunity to destroy enemy forces, to prevent their movement against the division, or to deny key terrain to the enemy. All efforts are directed toward keeping the enemy off balance and preventing small elements from establishing an effective defense or unified action against the division. S-39. Meeting Engagements a. A meeting engagement is the combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy force, static or in motion, concerning which it has inadequate intelligence. The action ceases to be a meeting engagement when the enemy's situation has been developed and subsequent planned and coordin.ated operations are undertaken. b. Meeting engagements may occur frequently at lower echelons of the division in both offensive and defensive situations. c. The principal characteristics of meeting engagements are a limited knowledge of the enemy, and minimum time available for the commander to develop the situation and formulate and execucute plans. 5-40. Conduct of Meeting Engagements a. The basic principle in the conduct of a meeting engagement is that of seizing and retaining the initiative. By retaining the initiative a commander can subsequently adopt that course of action which will contribute most effectively to the accomplishment of his mission. b. The following actions contribute to the commander's ability to retain the initiative: (1) Rapid estimate of the situation and issuance of fragmentary orders. (2) Commitment of units from march column. (3) Organization of the advance guard with mobile forces capable of reconnaissance by fire, rapid deployment, and speed in the attack. ( 4) Interspersing of artillery throughout the column to insure availability of supporting fires in the early stages of the action. c. The enemy situation is developed vigorously and aggressively. Flanking attacks will generally disclose the enemy's configuration more rapidly than will frontal attacks, and will give more opportunity for tactical surprise and decisive results. d. Commanders at· each echelon furnish adjacent and higher headquarters with rapid and continuous information concerning the situation and their general plan of action. Brigade and division commanders must be continuously aware of the disposition of their commands and be prepared to react rapidly to any situation. Section V. THE PENETRATION The divided enemy forces are then destroyed in 5-41 . General detail, and mobile forces exploit through his vital a. In the penetration, the attack passes through rear areas (fig. 9). the enemy's principal defensive position, ruptures b. The penetration consists of three stages: rupit completely, and neutralizes or destroys enemy ture of the enemy's defensive position, widening forces in order to break up the continuity of his of the gap, and overrunning or seizure of objectives defense and facilitate future offensive operations. which destroy the continuity of the enemy's de- X XX X Sup Main porting Attack Attack X (--.o ~ .. ~ ~ D X Reserve Brigade Figure 9. Division conducting a penetration. ~) fense. These stages may be followed by the exploitation. The stages of the penetration and the subsequent exploitation blend into a continuous operation, frequently overlapping one another. ~en overwhelming fire support is applied and the division is sufficiently mobile, the phases may be so condensed in time as not to be distinguishable during execution. c. The division may penetrate an enemy position and conduct the exploitation, or it may rupture a position and be passed through by an exploiting force. In conjunction with other forms of maneuver, the division may assign subordinate elements tasks requiring penetration, e.g., a supporting attack during an envelopment by the division. 5-42. Basic Considerations a. A penetration is demanded when enemy flanks are unassailable or when time does not permit another form of maneuver. A penetration is favored when the enemy is overextended, when weak spots are detected in his position, when terrain and observation are favorable, or when strong fire support, especially nuclear fire support, is available. b. The penetration of a well-organized position requires a preponderance of combat power and continued momentum of the attack. The attack must move rapidly to destroy the continuity of the defense. If the attack is slowed or delayed, the enemy is given time to react. If the rupture is not made sharply and the seizure of the objectives is not aceomplished quickly, the penetration is likely to resemble a frontal attack. This may result in high casualties and affords the enemy an opportunity to fall back to secondary defensive positions or along his routes of communication, thereby avoiding destruction. c. Selection of the location of the penetration depends upon (1) Terrain. Terrain must support the mobility of the division. This requires evaluation of terrain trafficability, nature and extent of obstacles, and the road net. Fields of fire and observation for the control of fire are necessary. (2) Strength and depth of the enem;y po8ition. (3) Manewver room. The attacking force should not be unduly restricted by boundaries or lateral obstacles. ( 4) Disti1!1UJe to the objective. A short direct route to the division objective is desirable. ( 5) Surpise. Surprise obtained by penetrating in a particular area affords more rapid and decisive results. (6) Plans of the higher echelon. The location selected must be in conformance with the plan of the higher headquarters. d. The main attack is on a relatively narrow front and is directed toward the division objective. The supporting attack(s) widen the gap or prevent the enemy from disengaging. Reserves are held ready to reinforce success or to exploit. The distance to the division objective may require that the reserve pass through the main attack forces after rupture of the position to seize or destroy the objective. e. The width and depth of the penetration depend upon the depth of the enemy position and the combat power available to the division. The wider the penetration, the more ,difficult it is for the enemy to close it, hut the greater the resources required to accomplish it. The deeper it is, the more effective is the "rolling up" action against the hostile flanks and the more difficult it is for the enemy to reestablish his defense by withdrawing to a new location. However, it is easier for the enemy to close such a penetration. f. The division commander will not normally assign intermediate objectives to the main attack. He may assign objectives to supporting attacks to insure adequate width in the area of rupture to protect the flanks and prevent the enemy from disengaging. Subordinate commanders may designate close-in objectives to coordinate their attacks through the defensive position and to insure that their units generate maximum combat power in the desired areas. g. When the division is attacking against a weak enemy or attempting to isolate an extremely strong minor defensive position, it may execute a multiple penetration. This is an attack consisting of two or more penetrations against weak localities or against a relatively small, strong defensive position. Strong enemy defenses are contained by supporting attacks. When the penetrations reach a suitable depth, the bypassed forces are reduced and the attacks are combined into a single attack. h. The division may be given a mission of making the corps penetration (fig. 10). Other divisions may follow to roll back the enemy flanks and complete the rupture of enemy positions all along the corps front. i. When other attacking units of the corps make slow progress, the division may be committed to attack through them to hasten the penetration. It is essential that close liaison be maintained between the units in contact and the division being used to hasten the penetration. 5-43. Fire Support a. The penetration is normally preceded by a preparation delivered to demoralize and weaken the defender, limit his ability to react against the X X \X '"" attack, and cover the movement of attacking units. (_J Suitable targets include defensive positions, fire \ support means, command and control installations, and reserve. Smoke may be employed to reduce the effectiveness of enemy observation. b. Nuclear fires must be carefully planned and integrated with the scheme of maneuver since their effects may create obstacles to the penetration. It may be necessary to use these weapons on the flanks rather than in the area of the main attack. They can be used against reserves or to widen the gap, thereby reducing the requirement for troops in this role. X X X LJ Corps Reserve Figure 10. Division making the corps penetration. c. Toxic chemicals in nonpersistent concentra ~I tions are a rapid, effective method of expediting rupture of the position. They increase the friendly combat superiority in the area without producing obstacles. d. Fires are planned to neutralize enemy reserves, to prevent movement into or out of the area of operations, and to destroy any targets that seriously threaten the accomplishment of the mission. e. Enemy forces isolated during the rupture of the position may be neutralized by fire. Nuclear and chemical fires are suited to this task. 5-44. Conduct of the Penetration a. Following the preparation, assault units attack through the enemy's defensive positions. b. Supporting attacks by infiltration may neutralize enemy fire support means and command facilities. They may also seize terrain which blocks the movement of reserves against the main attack or which promotes continuous movement of the attack. c. As the attack progresses, units of the support-, ~ ing attack secure the flank~ of the main attack or \1 widen the gap. The reserve is used to exploit success or to assist the main attack in the accomplish- Section VI. THE 5-45. General a. In the envelopment, the main or enveloping attack passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to seize objectives which cut his escape routes and subject him to destruction in position from the flank or rear. Supporting attacks hold the enemy in position during the advance of the enveloping attack. The envelopment forces the enemy to fight in two or more directions simul-· · taneously to meet the converging attacks (fig. 11). b. The division may be the holding force or it may conduct the envelopment (fig. 12). The divi~ sion may use the envelopment for its main attack or it may assign missions to subordinate units which require them to envelop. 5-46. Basic Considerations a. The envelopment by ground attack requires that the enemy have an assailable flank. An as ment of the division miSSion. Enemy counter attacks are rapidly engaged using the reserve or supporting fires. Troop safety considerations re quire judicious application of nuclear fires in these cases. d. As the attack breaks out of the area of enemy . · defenses, it increases its speed and momentum to overrun, destroy, or seize the objective. Ifthe objective is at a depth beyond the capability of the main attack force or if its strength has been depleted, the main attack force is reinforced or passed through by the reserve which continues to or beyond the objective. A suitable reserve is reconstituted as soon as practicable from forces available such as the original main attack fo~ce. e. Upon seizing the objective of the penetration, the division exploits to destroy command installa tions, logistical support installations, fire support means, and enemy units attempting to escape. Se curity forces are promptly deployed to give warn ing of and delay enemy countermeasures; f. Enemy forces which have been divided by the penetration and contained by action of the support ing attacks are rapidly destroyed or are destroyed by follow and support units. g. Throughout the penetration, all efforts are devoted to maintaining the violence and momen tum of the attack. ENVELOPMENT sailable flank is one which can be circumvented without fighting a major engagement. b. An envelopment by air requires that adequate su.ppressive fires be availahle, or that the enemy's dispositions or capabilities not interfere materially with the flights of large numbers of aircraft. Ground patrols and innltrating forces may be used to reconnoiter and secure the flight routes to be used. Direct airmobile assault landings against occupied objectives normally are not deliberately attempted. Plans for the use of airmobile, air borne, or airlanded forces should include provi sions for linkup with ground attack forces. c. The success of. the envelopment depends largely upon surprise, mobility, and the ability of supporting attacks and deception to hold the ene my in place. Surprise is gained by secrecy, de ception, unexpected maneuver, and speed.·· Mobil ity is increased by the use of armored cavalry, air mdbile, tank, mechanized, and motorized units and the skillful use of terrain. X X XX 00 00 X ·D \/ D X Reserve Brigade Figure 11. Division conducting an envelopment. d. Rapid movement of the enveloping force to its objective is essential to prevent the enemy's movement of reserves to counter it or to occupy previously prepared positions. Vigorous support ing attacks prevent the enemy from reconstituting reserves from other portions of his front. e. The commander executing an envelopment must be alert that the weakly defended area through which he is attacking is not a trap. Analysis of the terrain and the enemy's capabilities contribute to the security of the command. Mobile forces and nuclear weapons in reserve, continual reconnaissance, and the careful selection of objectives for supporting attack forces increase the security of the main attack. f. Envelopments may be close or wide based upon the initial distances between attacking elements. In a close envelopment, fire support of the supporting attack force, as well as other fire support elements of the division, support the enveloping force to its objective. In a wide envelopment, the enveloping force moves at a greater distance from the supporting attack, making fire support CORPS X X OBJECTIVE X X X X ~\ ) Supporting Supporting Attock Attock .. LJ Corps ~· Reserve Figure 12. Di'Villf..on makmg an mwewpment. more difficult. In this situation, artillery may be attached to the enveloping force. g. Minimum control measures are assigned to the enveloping force. The use of a zone of action may simplify control and coordination with an adjacent supporting attack. In some situations, an axis of advance may be necessary to implement the commander's scheme of maneuver. h. In the envelopment, the division's organization for combat takes into consideration the mobility, firepower, and security needed by the enveloping force. Normally a brigade, heavy in tanks, will be the enveloping force. 5-47. Conduct of the Envelopment a. The enveloping force moves rapidly into the attack. Diversionary actions may be employed to mask the noise and direction of its movement. b. The attack may be launched simultaneously across the front or the times of the supporting and enveloping attack may be staggered; the supporting attacks normally will be launched earlier to increase deception. a. Because of the requirement for secrecy, limited targets, and inability of local forces to impede the attack in the area of the enveloping force, a preparation might not be fired in support of the enveloping force. Iffired, it is violent but of short duration. The supporting attack(s) may be preceded by a preparation. d. The enveloping force moves rapidly and directly to its objective, bypassing enemy forces which might delay it. These forces are reduced by fires or by follow and support units. Security forces protect its exposed flanks. e. Supporting attacks and fires hold the enemy in position and prevent his use of reserves against the enveloping force. Infiltrated forces may block the movement of enemy reserves, attack his fire support and command control means, or seize terrain which assists the enveloping force. f. If the enemy attempts to cut off the enveloping force or extend his flank beyond it, the division commander may elect to penetrate the enemy's overextended front. This takes advantage of the weakness offered by the enemy in reacting against the envelopment. An attempt to outflank the enemy's extension may lead to overextension of the division or a dangerous separation of the enveloping force from the supporting attack. g. The division commander is alert to detect opportunities to exploit success with his reserve. These opportunities may be either in the area of the enveloping or supporting attacks. When the reserve is committed, another is constituted as soon as practicable. 5-48. Double Envelopment a. A double envelopment is executed by two enveloping forces and a supporting attack force. It requires a great preponderance of combat power and may be difficult to control. Nuclear weapons contribute greatly to the combat power required. The force executing a double enveloping must be capable of deploying on a broad front against an enemy who is on a narrower front or who has limited maneuver capability. b. The amount of combat power required to provide for two enveloping forces, a supporting attack force, and the reserve may prevent the. division from executing this type of maneuver unless it has strong nuclear support or is opposed by a substantially inferior enemy. Frequently the supporting attack will necessarily be frontal in nature. Nuclear fires may be used with a support ing attack to reduce the requirement for troops. e. Dependent upon mutual support considerations, simultaneous envelopments by ground attack and airborne forces offset the undesirable aspects of a double surface envelopment and may not require so great a preponderance of force. d. An initial envelopment of one flank may cre ate favorable conditions for passing to the double envelopment by commiting the division reserve around the other flank. e. In order to control the double envelopment and still maintain a reserve, one of the combat battalions may be used as a control headquarters in addition to the three brigades. 5-49. The Turning Movement a. In the turning movement-a variation of the envelopment-the attacking force passes around or over the enemy's main force to seize objec tives deep in his rear, forcing him to abandon . his position or to divert major forces to meet the turning threat.: The enemy is then destroyed on ground of the 'attacker's choosing. The turning force normally is out of supporting distance of any other ground attacking force (fig. 13). · b. The turning movement differs from the envelopment in that it is not directed at the destruction of the enemy position. It avoids attacking the flanks and rear of the enemy's main defensive position. It seizes vital areas deep in the hostile rear which prevent the escape, support, or rein-• forcement of the enemy's main force. It is used • when an opportunity exists to seize vital areas in the enemy's rear before his main force can escape or be reinforced. When -the enemy occupies a strong defensive position, the turning movement offers a means of causing him to abandon the position and to fight on ground more favorable to the attacker. e. The division may be the turning force for a higher echelon. Under certain conditions, the division may execute a turning movement within its own resources. d. Under most conditions, infantry battalions will require ground or air mobility when acting as part of a turning force. The cross attachment of tanks is desirable. e. Sufficient combat power must be applied by a holding force against the enemy force to prevent its interference with the turning force. The application of this combat power may be in the form of a supporting attack. Because the turning force and the holding force frequently operate beyond mutually supporting distance, each force must have sufficient combat power and mobility to avoid defeat in detail. The turning movement requires secrecy, mobility, and deception. • @ 0 0 0 0 0 0 • • • Demonstrations ·o '1·2•'• Figure 18. Division conducting a turning movement. Section VII. EXPLOITATION 5-50. General withdraw in good order in the face of threatened disaster. a. Exploitation is the following up of gains to take full advantage of success in battle. ·n is a b. Exploitation ranges from that of pursuing phase of the offensive that destroys the enemy's small local forces to the pursuit of large enemy ability to reconstitute an organized defense or to forces. While individual local exploitations may appear insignificant, their cumulative effects may be decisive. c. The division may exploit its own success; it may be the exploiting force for a higher echelon; or it may follow and support another exploiting force. 5-51 . Basic Considerations a. Exploiting forces may be given the mission of seizing objectives deep in the enemy rear, cutting lines of communication, surrounding and destroying enemy forces, denying escape routes to an encircled :force, and destroying enemy reserves. b. Speed and combat power are required in exploiting forces. Tanks, mechanized or motorized infantry, and armored cavalry normally make up the forward elements. Army air9ra:ft can be used to provide mobility to foot elements. Provisions are made for engineer support to overcomEj/ obstacles. Adequate signal communications must be furnished. ' c. Preparation :for the exploitation entails planning, warning orders, grouping of exploiting :forces, provision of combat services support, and establishment of communications. d. The commander mustoe ready at all times to exploit opportunities afforded by the enemy. Opportunities :for major exploitations are indicated by an increase in prisoners captured, an increase in abandoned materiel, and the overrunning of artillery, command :facilities, signal installations, and supply dumps. The transition from the attack to the exploitation may be so gradual as to be hardly distinguishable, or it may be abrupt. The latter occurs most frequently when nuclear weapons are used. e. When nuclear fires are not available or are limited, the exploitation normally occurs after the seizure of the division objective. With adequate nuclear support, however, the exploitation may be launched in conjunction with the initial assault or at any time thereafter depending upon the effects of the fires and the desires of the commander. f. Once the exploitation is begun, it is carried out without letup to the final dbjective. The enemy is given no relief from offensive pressure. g. Decentralized execution is characteristic of the exploitation. However, the commander maintains sufficient control to prevent overextension of the command. Minimum control measures are used. Combat service support ·and combat support plans are flexible. Combat service support operations are normally decentralized. h. In the exploitation, nuclear, conventional, • and ~hemical weapons are used principally on targets of opportunity. These weapons .are used to eliminate pockets of resistance, destroy hostile reserves, seal enemy escape routes, and destroy enemy nuclear delivery means. i. Tactical reconnaissance aviation and Army aircraft maintain contact with the ehemy, locate enemy movements, and keep the command advised of enemy activities. j. Tactical aircraft inflict maximum damage by attacking enemy reserves and withdrawing columns. k. Class III consumption rates are high, and provision for rapid supply is essential. Security of ground supply columns must be considered since forward elements may be operating behind bypassed enemy forces. Aerial ,..supply may be necessary. 5-52. Conduct of the Exploitation a. Employment of forces in the exploitation is similar in many respects to the movement to contact. Attack from march column is normal. b. Expoiting :forces advance rapidly and arrive at their objectives with maximum strength. The exploiting :force clears only as much of its zone as is necessary to permit its advance to continue. Commanders avoid dissipation of :forces to achieve minor tactical success. Enemy :forces that interfere, or can interfere, with accomplishment of the mission are contained or destroyed. Exploiting forces 'bypass or. contain, with minimum forces, enemy resistance of insufficient strength to jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Bypassed enemy forces are reported to the high headquarters or the the :follow and support unit. c. When the leading elements of a march column make contact with enemy forces, they deploy and attempt to bypass or to continue to advance. If the resistance is too heavy for the leading elements, yet cannot be bypassed, the leading elements develop the enemy position, reporting to the main body. Succeeding elements in the column ,are employed to strengthen the leading elements .?rexecute a coordinated attack or both in accordance with the principles of the penetration or the envelopmel\~· ~ d. Commanders use all means and weapons to i overrun enemy forces that cannot be bypassed or __ / contained. Exploitation continues day and night without regard ·to· weather. Reconnaissance element&-both ground and air-keep commanders informed of enemy action. Rapid advance of exploiting forces reduces their vulnerability to enemy counteraction. e. As enemy demoralization begins and enemy forces disintegrate under pressure, exploitation may develop into pursuit. f. Follow and support units initially prevent the enemy from closing the gap in a penetration, and they secure key terrain gainedduring the penetration or envelopment. As the exploiting force advances, the follow and support units secure lines of communication, mop'up, destroy bypassed pockets of resistance, expand the area of exploita~ Section VIII. 5-53. General • a. The pursuit may follow the exploitation. It differs from the exploitation in that its primary function is to complete the destruction of the enemy force which is jn the process of disengagement. While a terrain objective may be designated, the enemy force itself is the primary objective. b. The pursuit usually consists of direct pressure and encircling forces. (1) The mission of a direct pressure force is to prevent enemy disengagement and subsequent reconstitution of the defense and to inflict maximum casualties. It does this by attacking constantly, day and night. The enemy is not allowed to break contact. He is denied the opportunity to reorganize and reestablish his defense. Leading elements of the direct pressure forces move rapidly along all available roads, containing or bypassing small enemy pockets of resistance which are reduced by follow and support units. At every opportunity, the direct pressure force envelops to cut off and destroy enemy elements, provided such actions do not interfere with its primary mission. (2) The mission of the encircling force is to get in rear of the enemy and block his tion from the axis of advance of the exploiting force, and block the movement of enemy reinforcements into the area. Follow. and support units relieve elements of the exploiting force, which have been left to block or contain enemy forces or to protect ·areas or installations. Within their capability, follow and support units assist the exploiting force by furnishing combat service support. They may assist the exploiting force in handling CA activities and PW's. g. Follow and support units must be capable of keeping up with exploiting forces. They may employ nuclear and chemical fires in the accomplishment of their missions. Close liaison is established between commanders of the follow and support unit and the exploiting force. Elements of the follow and support unit may be attached to the exploiting force. · PURSUIT escape so that he will be destroyed between the direct pressure and encircling forces. It advances along or flies over routes paralleling the enemy's line of retreat to reach defiles, communications centers, bridges, and other key terrain ahead of the enemy main force. Airborne, armored, and merchanized infantry units are particularly effective as encircling forces. I£ the encircling force cannot outdistance the enemy, it attacks the enemy main body on its flank. (3) The division may conduct local pursuits or may be used as the direct pressure or encircling forces of a higher echelon in pursuit. 5-54. Basic Considerations a. A force in the exploitation is alert to indications of enemy collapse which enable pursuit. It makes prior preparations for pursuit including issuance of warning orders, regrouping of forces, and provision of logistical support. b. The attacker uses all possible means to maintain the continuity of the attack. When the enemy can no longer maintain his positions and seeks to escape, the pursuit is launched. Destruction ofthe enemy force is the primary objective of the attacking forces. Prompt exploitation of nuclear fires may permit pursuit to be launched during the initial assault. • t y II X D X D [](-) Encircling Force Direct Pressure Force -.s-~IJJJD Figure 14. Division conducting a pursuit. . ·..:·· . 1}. o. Successful pursuit requires unrelenting pres~\ sure against the enemy to prevent reorganization ) and preparation of defenses. This requires that troops and equipment be pushed to the limit of their endurance. Commanders are located well forward to insure the impetus of advance. Greater risks may be taken to achieve decisive results. d. When the division conducts local pursuit operations, organization for combat provides a direct pressure force of sufficient size and composition to maintain continuous pressure. The encircling force must have mobility equal to or superior to the enemy and must be organized for a semi-independent operation. The enemy's inability to react effectively reduces the need for mutual support. Engineer units are required in both forces to clear obstacles and enable advancing columns to move rapidly. Adequate signal communication support must be provided. e. Infantry and airborne units normally require additional mobility for pursuit operations. f. Adequate preparation is made for logistical support. Class III consumption is particularly high. Air transportation may be used for prompt delivery of supplies to forward units. Maximum use is made of captured enemy materiel-particularly transportation-and stocks of supplies. g. Security is increased by the speed of advance, the enemy's inability to react effectively, and the dispersion of forces. 5-55. Conduct of the Pursuit a. The pursuit is conducted on as broad a front as possible. Forces engaged in direct pressure and encircling maneuvers are given deep objectives, mission type orders, and minimum controls. Maximum latitude is given subordinate commanders for exercise of their initiative. Decentralization of fire support and combat service support means is usually necessary. b. Direct pressure forces advance relentlessly while the encircling force cuts the enemy's lines of retreat. Double envelopment of the retreating main force or its elements is accomplished when conditions permit. Hostile rear guards or forces on flank positions are not permitted to divert the main force from its mission. Airniobile units are used· to envelop enemy rear guards expediting their destruction and speeding the .movement of the force. If the enemy's main force establishes itself on a position from which it cannot be quickly dislodged, the commander immediately attacks. o. If the attempt to cut the enemy's escape routes fails, a new encircling force is immediately dispatched. d. Air support is desirable in the pursuit. Reconnaissance aircraft keep commanders informed of locations and activities of enemy forces. Tactical aircraft inflict maximum damage on the retreating enemy, concentrating on his lines of withdrawal, on his columns, and on his reserves. e. Figure 14 depicts the division. conducting a pursuit. Section IX. NIGHT COMBAT 5-56. General a. Night combat is an integral part of all operations, because the division operates under all environmental conditions to accomplish its mission. The principles of night operations are the same as those for daylight operations. However, certain techniqu~ require special emphasis to exploit the opportunities and overcome difficulties ofnight operations. The effects of night on the division's relative combat power are considered when making a night attack to insure exploitation of opportunities and planning for special difficulties. b. Night operations are characterized by reduced visibility. This affords increased concealment to both friendly and enemy forces. It also complicates the problem of control and coordination in the maneuver of combat forces. o. Operations in smoke, fog, haze, thick jungle, and other conditions of reducted visibility use the special techniques of night operations. d. Night airmobile operations are feasible and are considered a normal part of night attack operations. 5-57. Basic Considerations a. Night combat ,is characterized by a decrease in the effectiveness of aimed fire and a corresponding increase in the importance of close combat and supporting fires. b. Morale of troop&-both friendly and enemyis highly sensitive to physical· and psychological factors. Reverses and failures at night generally affect troops more than the same reverses would in daylight. Well-trained troops, confident of their ability to fight at night, can use these psychological factors in their favor. c. Darkness increases difficulty of movement, maintenance of direction, and control. The time required to execute movements and emplace weapons is greater at night than in daylight. Simple schemes of maneuver with well-defined objectives and routes simplify control. Leaders must be well forward in attacking echelons. Full use is made of navigational aids to assist in maintenance of direction. d. Subordinate commanders should have adequate time for reconnaissance. They should be able to observe, during daylight, terrain· over which their units will move in order to fix terrain features which will aid maintenance of direction. e. Coordination of nuclear fires with maneuver at night is difficult. Darkness increases troop safety considerations because of loss of night vision (adaptation). Obstacles created by nuclear fires are difficult to traverse at night. Nuclear fires may destroy landmarks which were to be used as control measures. f. Enemy use of nuclear weapons may affect the vision of attacking or defending troops, rendering them temporarily less effective. Fires creatoo by nuclear weapons may assist in identification of objectives and maintaining direction but may also silhouette :forces o:f either side. g. All combat and combat support units can be used at night. The effectiveness of armor is increased by the use of illumination, including tankmounted infrared devices and searchlights. Illumination also facilitates the adjustment of artillery fire. h. Illumination by diffused lighting in rear areas assists in troop movements, logistical operations, and the operation of supporting weapons. 5-58. The Night Attack a. General. (1) The same considerations of planning, preparation, and conduct that apply to night attacks apply also to daylight attacks. The same forms of maneuver may be used. Night attack plans, however, are usually less flexible than those of daylight attacks. (2) The division attacks at night to continue • an attack started in daylight; to achieve surprise and psychological superiority; to gain important terrain for further operations; and to use concealment afforded by darkness to avoid heavy losses, to exploit, or to compensate for friendly air and armor inferiority. b. Planning. (1) The procedures involved in planning attacks at night are the same as for daylight attacks. (2) The decision to make a night attack is made far enough in advance to provide time for reconnaissance, detailed planning, and coordination. The use of warning and fragmentary orders and concurrent planning is habitual. Successful attacks can be made at night on an impromptu basis, but the risk of failure is greater. Attacks in progress are not discontinued merely 'because of nightfall. Subordinate units in the attack plan to continue the attack through the night unless ordered otherwise. (3) The concept for the night attack must be simple and planned in detail. The scheme of maneuver, fire support plan, and. control measures are carefully specified. ( 4) H the attack is to seize :favorable terrain :for a succeeding daylight attack, it is usually launched during the final hours of darkness to give the enemy minimum time in which to interfere with the subsequent attack. Attacks launched during early darkness, however, permit the attacker to take ma,x:imum advantage of a long period of darkness and exploit the enemy's confusion and loss of control. Attacks may be initiated during darkness and continued without pause during daylight. Infiltration may be employed at night followed up by an attack at daylight or during the remaining darkness. ( 5) Secrecy is stressed during preparations for the attack. Reconnaissance, noise, ·and light are carefully controlled. Deception measures include sounds to cover the movement of vehicles. • (6) Although it is desira;ble that night attacks be made with fresh troops, the paramount consideration is that the attacking troops he as familiar as possible with the terrain over which they will attack. (7) If conditions permit, a rehearsal of the attack is conducted over similar terrain and under similar conditions of light. c. OofYl'din-ation an-d Oon-trol. (1) Highly restrictive control measures are used to prevent collision between attacking units. These may include objectives, a line of departure, boundaries, phase lines, and directions of attack. (2) Deep division objectives require that a series of intermediate objectives be assigned to assaulting units to facilitate control. Battlefield illumination assists in movement and control. It enables a command to seize deeper objectives than would otherwise be possible. ( 3) Provisions are made for indicating direction by firing tracers, by use of incendiaries, or by other improvisations. (4) Provisions are made for mutual identification of troops. d. Battlefield lllwmination-. ( 1) The use of battlefield illumination assists in coordination and control and increases the effectiveness of aimed and observed fires. It may, however, be of some assistance to the enemy and cause reduced surprise. Its use must be carefully coordinated to avoid detrimental effects in adjacent areas. (2) Searchlights, illuminating shells, and aerial flares are the principal means of illuminating the battlefield. The decision to employ illumination depends upon (a) Natwrallight con-dition-s. (b) Availability of mean-s. (c) Swrprise. Surprise is attained by withholding illumination until the critical moment of attack. The illumination then serves to blind the enemy while assisting friendly troops. Prior employment patterns of friendly illumination may have a decided influence on surprise. (d) En-emy's use of ill;u;mination. (e) Coordin-ation an-d control. The use of illumination may overcome disadvantages resulting from lack of time for reconnaissance, deep objectives, and difficult terrain. It may permit accelerated cross-country movement and thus further the rapid exploitation of nuclear fires. ( 3) Searchlights in a direct role can be used to dazzle enemy observers and gunners. ( 4) If the attack is not to be illuminated initially, plans for on -call illumination are prepared. Such action facilitates its subsequent employment in the execution of the attack. ( 5) Terrain, vegetation, structures, weather and atmospheric conditions, and the vulnerability of illuminating means to enemy countermeasures are technical considerations in the selection of means to be used and the method of their employment. See FM 20-60 for details of illumination. e. Fire Support. (1) In determining whether a preparation will be fired, its probable effects on maneuver must be weighed against the effect of greater surprise stemming from an attack by stealth. If a preparation is not fired, on-call fires are planned to be used in the event surprise is lost. (2) Ih addition to normal fires, fires are planned to cover the withdrawal of the attacking force and, if possible, to isolate the area of the attack. (3) Careful consideration is given to the use of on-call nuclear fires because of the difficulty of providing effective warning. When on-call nuclear fires are used, normal troop safety warnings are augmented to insure protection against loss of night VISIOn. (4) Smoke may reduce the effectiveness of enemy illumination; however, searchlights beamed on low lying cloudbanks or smoke provide effective illumination. f. Oon-duct of the Attack. (1) Simple formations ,are used at all echelons. Column formations are held as long as possible and deployment occurs at the last possible moment. Eaeh attack ing unit is given a direction and objective. Contact is maintained between columns, and every precaution is taken to prevent their collision. (2) Enemy sentinels and listening posts ·are quietly and rapidly silenced. At a time coordinated with the main effort, infiltrators may attack command installations and communications to increase enemy reaction time. Attacks on enemy reserves and fire support means further confuse his efforts. Section X. 5-59. General a. Infiltration is a technique of movement used in conjunction with offensive operations. The division can attack by infiltration. or use infiltration as a means of obtaining intelligence and of harassing the enemy. Though it is not necessarily restricted to small unit or dismounted actions, the division normally employs infiltration techniques with a portion of the division in conjunction with offensive maneuver by the remainder of the division. b. Because of the interspersed deployment of friendly and enemy units during infiltration, the nuclear vulnerability of both is high, and use of any but the smallest nuclear weapons is normally precluded. e. An attack preceded by infiltration may permit the destruction of enemy units and installations without recourse to nuclear fires and may curtail the enemy's use of nuclear fires because of the absence of remunerative targets. 5-60. Basic Considerations a. An infiltration prior to an attack is a difficult operation. Planning must be detailed and troops must be carefully briefed. The movement by stealth through enemy positions and the assembly of infiltrating groups prior to decisive action. are slow. The use of airmobile units can increase the rate of movement consid~ra!bly. b. Infiltration is aided by use of terrain which limits the enemy's observation and surveillance of ('3) Leaders are well forward to insure rapid aggressive movement of their units, main-• terrance of direction, avoidance of collision, and coordination with other units and fire support. (4) The division reserve is located where it is available to exploit success, replace a unit in the attack, or cover a withdrawal. At night, the reserve is committed only in an area where the possibility of collision with friendly troops is remote or when illumination is used. INFILTRATION the routes to be used. Woods, swamps, and broken ground are examples of the areas suited to infiltration. Within an area of infiltration, suitable routes for the movement of small groups are selected by the infiltrating unit. In contrast to other offensive action, avenues of ·approach iri the traditional sense are not used. Frequently, the avoidance of the best avenues of approach increases the probaibilitiy of success. Conditions of reduced visibility, such as darkness, fog, and falling snow, assist the undetected movement of infiltrating groups. Such conditions, however, cause an alert enemy to increase his surveillance. c. A widely dispersed enemy force with gaps existing between his defensive positions invites infiltration. Infiltration against an alert enemy equipped with means of detecting movement, requires the careful use of deception and diversionary measures, electronic countermeasures, and passive security measures. Widespread enemy use of illumination deters infiltration unless the illumination can be neutralized. d. Suitable objectives for attack subsequent to infiltration are key terrain features, especially those which restrict the movement of enemy reserves or isolate his defensive positions, reserves, fire support means, command and communication instalhitions, and critical logistical instaHations. The objectives must contribute directly to the accomplishment of the division's mission and should not result in dissipation of strength. e. Small infiltrating groups can be assigned missions of target acquisition and of obtaining other • intelligence, of harassing enemy units and installations, or of interdicting enemy routes. The effect of such missions on coordination of friendly fire support must be considered. f. Infiltration is difficult to coordinate and control. Deviation from plans is difficult to coordinate after elements have begun to move. Coordination of the movement of the infiltrating groups with the division's fires is essential. Arrangements for the linkup with other attacking forces or for exfiltration, evacuation, rescue, or for overt continuation of the attack are necessary. g. An infiltrating unit may be controlled by the division, or control can be decentralized to a unit which is operating in the area of infiltration. If the infiltrating unit is under division control, linkup plans are made at division level to facilitate this phase. Unity of command normally dictates that at the time of juncture, control of the infiltrating units pass to the unit linking up. h. Within the area of infiltration, a series of infiltration lanes wide enough to permit the infiltrating groups to move by stealth is designated. Infiltration lanes, in conjunction with the coded designation of infiltrating groups and their probable sequence of movement, checkpoints, and phase lines, provide a means of reporting the progress of the operation and of coordinating fires with movement of the groups. Other control measures used are attack positions, objectives, and rallying points or areas. i. Adequate communications are provided for use within the infiltrating unit and for use between that unit and the controlling headquarters. j. Infiltrating groups moving on foot generally are limited to hand-carried weapons. Consequently, they are provided additional fire support from division means. This requires good observation, reliable communications, and a responsive system of obtaining the fires. Although groups traveling by air can carry more and larger weapons, they frequently will also require additional fire support. k. Because of the nature of the operation and the hazards encountered during movement, it is essential that maximum dissemination of the plan be made including the action to be taken in the area of decisive action. l. Suitable recognition signals, both visual and sound, are provided all units operating in the area of likely linkup to prevent fire fights between friendly elements. m. Figure 15 depicts the division attacking subsequent to infiltration. 5-61. Conduct of the Infiltration a. The infiltrating elements subdivided into small groups pass through, over, or around the enemy forward defensive positions avoiding detection where possible, and, if detected, avoiding decisive engagement. They normally move through multiple lanes to attack positions in the area of decisive action. The passage of the groups through the enemy position and their movement to their attack positions may be accompanied by demonstrations, including preparatory fires and feints, in areas not included in the infiltration. Preparatory fires may be placed on the enemy positions in the area of infiltration to reduce the enemy's surveillance capability. b. Upon arrival in their attack positions, the infiltrating groups move into their attack formations and prepare for action. At a specified time, the infiltrating force executes its mission and prepares for subsequent planned actions. c. Groups which lose direction or are unable to reach the attack position proceed to rallying points or areas. Contingency plans cover their subsequent actions including their evacuation. d. Ifairborne or airmobile forces are being used for infiltration, the aircraft flying individually or in small groups pass through the enemy forward defense area. This passage, where possible, is over unoccupied areas and may follow routes which ground patrols have found to be clear of enemy units. During and after movement to the attack position, aircraft simulate landing at other loca tions as a deception measure. Infiltrating groups may land at various points in the enemy's rear and proceed on foot to the designated attack position. Other aspects of the operation are similar to those of surface infiltration. e. A widely dispersed enemy, suitable trafficability of terrain, and concealment may enable infiltrating units to use vehicles during the operation. Similarly, infiltrating groups may use small watercraft. f. Infiltrating forces proceeding to great depths or remaining in the enemy's rear for extended periods require supply which sometimes can only be accomplished by air. Maximum use should be X X Q.) ~ -' c: 0 ~ r a .. .. .. Q 'I Figure 15. ~ 0 c:=tk!F 9bF ,. ... XX 0<-> Division attacking subsequent to infiltration. • X X made of captured enemy stocks, but the success of g. Friendly units bypassed during defensive the operation must not be jeopardized by sole reoperations can be used in a manner similar to those liance upon the seizure of such stocks. which have infiltrated enemy positions. Section XI. RECONNAISSANCE IN .FORCE 5-62. General The reconnaissance in force is an· attack to dis" cover and test the enemy's position and strength or to develop other intelligence. Although ·.its primary aim is reconnaissance, it may discover weaknesses in the enemy dispositions which, if . promptly exploited, may permit tactical suc6ess. .5-63. Basic Considerations a. The reconnaissance in force normally develops information more rapidly and in more detail than other reconnaissance methods. In arriving at a decision to reconnoiter in force, the commander considers the-- (1) Extent of his present knowledge of the enemy situation and the urgency and importance of the additional information sought. (2) Efficiency and speed of other intelligence collection agencies. (3) Extent to which his plan of action may be divulged by the reconnaissance in force. ( 4) Possibility that the reconnaissance may lead to a general engagement under unfavorable conditions. b. When information is sought regarding a particular area, the reconnaissance in force is planned and executed as an attack with a limited objective. The objective should be of such importance that, when threatened, it will force the enemy to react. If the enemy situation along a front is to be developed, the reconnaissance in force is an advance employing strong aggressive probes to determine the enemy situation at critical points. e. The reconnoitering force must be of size and composition to cause the enemy to react strongly and definitely to the attack, thus disclosing his locations, dispositions, strength, planned fires, and planned use of reserves. The size of the force depends upon the mission of the division and the situation. The division commander may use a battalion task force or he may use the bulk of the division, retaining sufficient reserves to exploit enemy weakness. If the situation permits, the task force should include tanks. d. The division may employ several task forces on reconnaissances in force staggered in time and at widely"· separated points. Such action keeps the enemy off balance, discloses his dispositions over a· broad area, and may develop the location and planned use of his reserve. Ifthe reconnoitering force makes a penetration, it disrupts and destroys all possible enemy rear installations. Multiple reconnaissances in force are favored by operations on a wide front, friendly superiority in armor and mobility, and an inexperienced enemy or an enemy who is weak in control and communication means. 5-64. Organization for Combat Units designated to make the reconnaissance in force should have sufficient combat power to uncover main enemy positions. ranks offer a means of furnishing added combat power and, when appropriate, should be provided. 5-65. Conduct of the Reconnaissance in Force a. Although reconnaissance in force is a form of attack, restrictions may be placed upon the commander of the ·force to avoid actions which might precipitate a general engagement. b. The division commander is alert to exploit success gained by the reconnaissance in force. Such actions include continuation of the attack or control of terrain seized by the force. Suitable targets discovered by the forces are attacked by nuclear weapons, and their destruction is completed by local exploitation by the reconnoitering force. e. The division commander prepares to assist in the extrication of the force if it 'becomes closely engaged. d. Upon completion of its reconnaissance, the force may remain in contact with the enemy or it may withdraw. If the reconnaissance is to be followed by further attack, other units pass through the reconnoitering force in the attack, or it may itself continue the attack. e. Figure 16 depicts a division conducting a reconnaissance in force. FEBA Unoccupied X 0 X 0 00 0 • X D X LJrF Mission of reconnaissance in force: 1. Seize objective. 2. Withdraw on division order. Purpose of reconnaissance in force: 1. Determine nature of enemy positions in objective area. 2. Determine enemy plans for employment of reserves and reaction times. 3. Determine enemy defensive fires. Figure 16. Division conducting a reconnaissance in force. Section XII. THE DIVISION AS A COVERING FORCE 5-66. Gelleral a. The division may be assigned a mission as a covering force for a large force, normally a corps. Since mobility is essential, an armored or mechanized division is normally employed. b. The purpose of the covering force is the early development of the situation, the provision of security for the main body, and the prevention of unnecessary delay of the main body. Covering :force missions may be broad and may include attacks to destroy enemy resistance, seize and control key terrain, or contain large enemy units. 5-67. Control • Since the division will operate on a broad front, usually covering the entire zone of action o:f the corps, a well-prepared, coordinated operation plan is required. Measures by which the rate and direction of movement of the covering force are correlated with the remainder of the force are required. These measures may include successive march objectives; checkpoints and/or phase lines; boundanes between brigades; and coordinated use of radio, aircraft, and ground messenger communications. 5-68. Conduct of Covering Force Action The division acting as a covering :force operates at a considerable distance from the main :force. Normally, the division advances with the bulk of its combat battalions :forward. Where terrain permits, tank heavy :forces usually lead the advance. Engineers and artillery, to include nuclear fire support, are usually attached to brigades. Nuclear and chemical weapons are employed against targets of opportunity to block enemy avenues of approach and to restrict the enemy use of key terrain. Covering force actions are characterized by speed and aggressiveness, by developing situations rapidly with strength, by unhesitating commitment of reserves to elminate enemy resistance, and by keeping the enemy off· balance. The division concentrates its attention against enemy :forces which are of sufficient size to threaten the movement of the main body while bypassing and reporting minor resistance. Every action is directed toward insuring the uninterrupted movement of the main :force. 5-69. Applicable STANAG The material presented in this chapter agrees with applicable portions of STANAG-2029 (SOLOG-34R)-Methods of Describing Ground Location~, Areas, and Boundaries. CHAPTER 6 DEFENSE Section I. 6-1. Introduction 'Defensive operations are actions to prevent; resist, repulse, or destroy en~my attack. The defense is undertaken to develop more favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations, economize forces in one area in order to apply decisive force elsewhere, destroy or trap a hostile force, deny an enemy entrance to an area, or reduce enemy capability with minimum losses to friendly forces. 6-2. Concept of Defense In the defense, the defender takes every opportunity to seize the initiative and destroy the enemy. The defender seizes the initiative by a. Selecting the battle area. b. Forcing the enemy to react in conformity with the defensive plan. c. Exploiting enemy weaknesses and errors by offensive operations. d. Counterattacking enemy successes. 6-3. Fundamental Considerations The planning, organization, and conduct of the defense are based on certain fundamental considerations which include: a. Proper Use of Terrain. Terrain is a major factor in the selection of the defensive area and the location and distribution of defending forces. The defender retains control of those terrain features essential to observation, communications, and maneuver of reserves; he denies the enemy the use of terrain which might jeopardize the success of the defense. The natural strength of the area is increased by the use of field fortifications and barriers. Advantage is also taken of these obstacles to divert the enemy into areas suitable for counterattack or nuclear attack. Obstacles in the area have a strong bearing on the general defensive scheme, including the distribution of forces and the positioning of reserves. All probable enemy avenues of approach into the area should be visualized. An evaluation of the avenues of approach GENERAL in conjunction with key terrain features serves as the basis for positioning forces as well as the use of surveillance means, fire planning, and security forces. Normally, at division level these are avenues which will accommodate at a minimum an enemy regiment. The selected area should afford good observation and fields of fire and adequate cover and concealment to the defending forces. b. Security. Necessary steps must be taken to avoid tactical surprise. Means are provided to insure early warning and reliable information of approaching enemy forces. Security measures include placing security elements to the front in the direction of anticipated enemy approach and providing necessary security for the protection of division flanks and rear. All-round security is essential. c. All-round Defense. Although the defense is designed primarily to combat an enemy attack along the most probable avenues of approach, the possibility exists that the enemy may attack from a direction other than that expected or considered likely., Also, the enemy may attack the division rear by ground envelopment, airmobile or airborne attack, or large-scale guerrilla action. The enemy should not be permitted to gain a decisive advantage by surprise as to direction or location of the attack. The division prepares for all-round defense by the careful initial disposition of forces, by the planned redisposition of troops and shifting of fires to meet contingencies, and by insuring that all subordinate units are prepared for all-round defense. d. Defense in Depth. Adequate depth to the defense is essential. A strong attack supported by nuclear weapons may permit the enemy to penetrate into the forward defense area. Therefore, there must be sufficient depth to the defenseto contain or canalize the enemy and permit execution of counterattacks. Shallow defenses are inherently vulnerable since the enemy may breach such defenses before he can be contained or effective counteraction can be taken. Depth to the defense is achieved by proper deployment and maneuver of forces, use of blocking positions, use of field fortic fications and barriers, and use of fires and reserves. e. Responsiveness. The defense is organized to permit the shifting of forces and fires to counter the attack as it develops. Mobile reserves and nuclear weapons provide the division commander greater freedom to conduct the defensive battle. f. Dispersion. The defender disperses units in consonance with the requirements of the mission to reduce vulnerability to nuclear attack. For example, the retention of specific terrain may oppose ma.ximum dispersion. In such cases, the mission is paramount, and the degree of risk in accepting less dispersion is secondary. Dispersion in depth is preferable to purely lateral dispersions since it avoids frontages that overextend the defender, provides a larger percentage of a given force as a reserve, avoids lateral movements in the face of an enemy attack, facilitates detection and destruction of infiltrators, and provides a better posture from which to launch the counterattack. g. Maximum Use of Offensive Action. In the defense, every opportunity is taken to regain the initiative from the enemy and destroy enemy forces. The division must be prepared to take offensive action whenever the opportunity presents itself. The counterattack, or a spoiling attack, is often the key to success in the defense. By such action, the enemy may be kept off balance and prevented from massing forces; decisive results can thereby be achieved. h. Integration and Coordination of Defensive Mewsure.s. The overall defense plan involves the careful integration and coordination of all defens1ve measures. (1) Fire plans, including use of nuclear and nonnuclear fires, are prepared to directly support forward defense elements, to control unoccupied areas or to cover barriers, and to support offensive action such as counterattacks. Planned fires are integrated into the overall defensive sche~e, and fires of all units are closely coordinated. (2) Natural terrain features are supplemented by the use of planned barriers to include minefields and other artificial obstacles and, w'hen authorized, chemical agents and residual nuclear effects. Such barriers are designed to restrict the move-. ment of the enemy without restricting the planned maneuver· of our own forces. The division barrier plan is integrated with the requirements of the next higher echelon and is designed to support the scheme of defense. It is carefully coordinated to insure that it will accommodate planned maneuver, particularly the movement of reserves. (3) In the disposition, maneuver, and fire planning of combat elements, consideration is given to mutual support. Section II. FORMS OF DEFENSE 6-4. General The fundamental forms of defense are the mobile defense and the area defense. Most defensive postures for a given situation will be some variation of either the mobile or area defense, and will incorporate characteristics of each. The defense established is that which best meets the requirements of the particular situation. 6-5. Mobile Defense a. The mobile defense is that form of defense in which minimum forces are deployed forward and priority is given to use of mobile combat elements and fires concentrated in the reserve. Pri mary reliance is .placed upon the use of offensive action by the reserve to destroy enemy forces. b. In the mobile defense, the defender plans to accept decisive engagement and to accomplish his mission primarily by executing offensive action against the attacking enemy forces. Control of the forward defense area and the retention of terrain are not primary objectives of the counterattack. The fixingforces-those minimum necessary forces committed initially in the forward defense areaconduct defensive, delaying, screening, or limited offensive operations in 'any combination required to make the attacker vulnerable to the counterattac!r. Mobility equal or superior to that of the enemy is essential for all elements of the defensive force. c. Normally, -the division is the smallest element has a higher priority for combat power than does (c!llpable of conducting amobile defense because of the reserves. the need for a strong reserve capable of executing b. In the area defense, the defender plans to a decisive counterattack (fig. 20). accept decisive engagement and to accomplish his mission primarily by engaging the attacker along 6-6. Area Defense the forward edge of the battle area with a large a. The area defense is that form of defense in volume and variety of fires. Counterattacks are which emphasis is placed upon retention of or conducted primarily to eject or destroy enemy control over specific terrain. Reliance is placed forces that penetrate the position and so to regain upon the ability of fires and forces deployed on control of the forward defense area and terrain pm.ition in the forward defense area to stop and which the defense has been designed to retain repulse the attacker. The forward defense area (fig. 21). Section Ill. DEFENSIVE AREAS 6-7. General rity forces, division aerial surveillance elements, and patrols. For a discussion of rea.r area se Defensive areas include the security area, the curity, see paragraph 6-33. forward defense area, and the reserve area. Each of these areas is allocated forces and fires as part 6-9. Forward Defense Area of the overall defense plan. The forward defense area (FDA) extends rear 6-8. Security Area ward from the forward edge of the battle area ('FEBA) to include that area organized by theThe division security area begins at the forward forward committed units. The composition of theedge of the battle area (FEBA) and extends as far forward defense echelon depends upon the formto the front and the flanks as security elements are of defense employed. employed. Forces in the security area furnish information of the enemy; delay, deceive, and dis 6-1 0. Reserve Area rupt him as much as possible; and provide a counThe reserve ·area extends rearward from the forterreconnaissance screen. The security echelon ward defense area to the division rear boundary. also may have the mission of loc!llting and developThe reserve echelon mans the reserve area, consists ing nuclear targets. Forces operating in the secuof those uncommitted forces held under division rity area may include elements from higher eche control, and is the principal means by which the lons, such as covering forces and units to provide commander influences the defensive battle andreaerial surveillance and flank security. Division gains the initiative. The combat power of the forces in the security area will consist of the genreserve may consist of nuclear weapons, maneuver eral outpost (GOP), combat outposts, flank seen-elements, or both. Section IV. PLANNING THE DEFENSE 6-11 . General sions of subordinate units, fire support plans, logistical support plans, and counterattack plans. a. The plan for the defense is developed as a The plan is developed from a detailed recon result of a careful estimate of the situation. The c. defender has an advantage since he can normally naissance of the area and an estimate of the situa reconnoiter and select the area within which the tion to determine the most effective way to use the defense is to be organized. terrain and available resources. It provides for b. After the basic form of defense has been security for~, forward defensive forces, and a redetermined, the plan is developed in detail to inserve. Itindicates the location of the forward deelude organization of the ground, designation of fense area, provides fire support to all defensive control measures, organization for combat, mis-echelons, and provides for additional, artificial ) / obstacles and barriers to improve the natural defensive strength of the terrain. d. The operation plan (order) will include. the following: (1) Location of division security forces. (2) Location of FEBA and FDA. (3) Location of reserve. ( 4) Boundaries and coordinating points. ( 5) Organization for combat. (6) Missions to major subordinate units. (7) Fire support plan (normally issued as an annex to the operation plan). (8) Barrier plan (normally issued as an annex to the operation plan) . (9) Counterattack plans (normally issued as separate plans but refer~nced to the basic operation plan). (10) Additional annexes as necessary, such as a communications plan or an administrative annex. 6-12. Selection of the Form of Defense a. In the initial stages of planning, determination is made as to the basic form of defense to be used. The form of defense may be specified by higher headquarters, or the decision may be left to the division commander. b. Considerations which affect the commander's choice of the form of defense include the mission, the enemy, the terrain, and troops available (METT). Further, additional considerations which have been derived from METT are analyzed by the division G3 when he recommends the form of defense to be adopted. These considerations are mission, terrain, mobility, nuclear weapons, air situation, time, and enemy. (1) Mission. The mission may prescribe the form of defense, or an analysis of the mission may identify conditions that require the adoption of a particular form. The mission may impose restrictions that prevent maneuver to the depth required for a mobile defense. Such restrictions may dictate the adoption of an area defense. I£ the mission assigns a frontage that exceeds the defender's capability to establish an effective defense along the FEBA together with an effective reserve, the adoption of a mobile defense may be indicated. · ' 1i (2) Terrain. The collective-effect of obsertatibh and fire,' cover and concealment, ob stacles, key terrain features, and avenues of approach is assessed. Weather may have an influence on these considerations, and its effects should be included in the assessment. (a) Good defensive terrain situated well forward in the sector favors the area defense. Such terrain can generally be described as dominant ground that provides good observation and fields of fire over enemy avenues of approach and offers the defender cover and concealment. (b) On the other hand, terrain which has good trafficability and which lacks significant obstacles and good defensive features well forward favors a mobile defense. (c) A rna j or obstacle such as an unfordable river extending across the front of the sector offers the defender an advantage in organizing the ground for either form of defense. (3) Mobility. The relative ability of opposing forces for ground movement throughout the defended area is considered. I£ the defender has a significant mobility advantage, this favors a mobile defense. If the attacker has a significant advantage, it favors an area defense. The collective effect of transportation, terrain, weather, and the air situation is assessed. (a) The transportation aspect of mobility considers the quantities and capabilities of combat vehicles and other tactical transportation available to the opposing forces. (b) Terrain obstacles and relief are evaluated individually and then collectively to determine their effect on mobility. (c) The influence of weather on trafficability and movement is also assessed. (d) The air situation is assessed as it relates to the ability of a force to move without effective interference from the air. ( 4) Nuclear weapons. The dispersion desired under nuclear conditions or under the threat of the use of nuclear weapons favors the adoption of a mobile defense. (5) Air situation. The air situation as it relates to movement on the ground is considered under mobility. ·!Except in that regard, the air situation usually has no influence on the choice of the form of ··defense. (6) Time. An assessment is made as to how the time availa:ble affects planning the defense, deployment of forces, and organization of the ground. A more thorough organization-of the ground in the FDA is usually required in an area defense. For this reason, when time is short (less than one day), a mobile defense is generally favored. If more time is availa:ble, this factor alone usually has no influence on the choice of the form of defense. (7) Enemy. Enemy capabilities relating to nuclear weapons, air power, and mobility have previously been considered. Thus, in appraising the enemy, the ·effects of other capabilities are considered. This appraisal is made chiefly in terms of the enemy's attack capability. To assess this capability, an evaluation is made of enemy strength, dispositions, tactical doctrine, and avenues of approach. (a) A significant airmobile capability favors the mobile defense. (b) Should the lack of intelligence preclude an assessment as to where and in what strength the enemy will attack, this favors a mdbile defense. (c) An assessment of enemy capabilities is usually less significant as an aid in .determining the form of defense to be adopted than are such considerations as mission, mobility, or terrain. (8) SumJmary. When the mission permits the choice of either form of defense, the collective effect of all considerations must be evaluated. In some situations, one or more may clearly govern the choice; in others, a careful analysis of each consideration must be made. 6-13. Organization of the Ground a. As a prerequisite to detailed planning for the organization of the defense, it is necessary to know the specific mission of the defense force including the time the operation is to start and any special requirements that are imposed, the area to be defended, the enemy situation, and the form or variation of defense to be used. b. Detailed reconnaissance of the area is necessary to determine the major avenues of approach • into the area, key terrain features which control these avenues of approach, natural obstacles, and routes for the movement of forces within the area. Selection is made of areas to be occupied and organized by the forward defense forces. Also, the location of security forces and the location of the reserve are designated. c. Once determination is made of the specific location of the forward defense area, the division area is divided into sectors designating responsibility for major subordinate units. Boundaries between these major subordinate units are located so as not to split responsibility for major avenues of approach or key terrain features which control them. d. Organization of the ground involves use of the natural defensive qualities of the terrain and improvement of the natural terrain to the fullest extent possible with the men, materiel, and time available. In addition to the preparation of the initial defensive and blocking positions, this includes the laying of mines, erection of artificial obstacles, camouflage, protective construction, and improvement of observation and fields of fire. Barriers are integrated into the defensive scheme to hold the enemy under fire or to divert him into areas where he can be destroyed by fires a.nd offensive maneuver. The barrier plan is designed to take maximum advantage of natural obstacles. When their use is authorized, chemical agents and nuclear fires may be used effectively to contaminate barriers, obstacles, and defiles to further impede enemy movement and canalize his advance. e. Detailed coordination is necessary to insure that plans for the organization of the ground are carefully integrated with detailed fire plans and plans for the maneuver of forces, particularly the reserve. For maximum effectiveness, obstacles and barriers are covered by fire. Also, the construction of obstacles and minefields must not interfere with the freedom of maneuver of defensive forces. 6-14. Control Measures a. Control measures used in defensive operations include boundaries, coordinating points, fire control measures, and designated assembly areas. Control measures in the counterattack are discussed in paragraph 6.18. b. The FEBA is designated by coordinating poinu; established by corps. When the FEBA is ) not defined by a terrain feature, it may be shown on the map or overlay as a dashed line connecting coordinating points and representing.the general trace of the FEBA. The FEBA should be located to take advantage of natural obstacles in the area and frequently is located along a suitable barrier such as a river line. c. The division commander designates boundaries to define terrain responsibility for major subordinate units. Lateral boundaries are extended forward to the range of direct support fires or limits of ground observation, whichever is greater, and indicate the foremost limit of territorial responsibility. Lateral boundaries also serve as a fire control measure. When the division commander desires to indicate an area responsibility :for the forces in the FDA, rear boundaries will be designated. Rear boundaries, when designated, must provide sufficient area to permit adequate maneuver and dispersion of the forward defense forces. Boundaries between major subordinate units are located so as not to split responsibility for major avenues of approach. d. Coordinating points are designated on boundaries as specific points for coordination of fires and maneuver between adjacent units. Coordinating points are indicated whenever a boundary crosses the FEBA and the· trace of the security force. e. The division controls the general location of the reserve by designating assembly areas or blocking positions. 6-15. Organization for Combat a. The division plan for the defense includes a detailed organization for combat to implement the schem:eqf defense. The allocation of forces to the major tactical goupings may be shown in the task organjzation portion of the operation . plan (order). b. The commander attaches combat elements to the major subordinate commands in the proportion best suited for accomplishment of the mis8ion. Combat support and combat service support elements are then placed in support or attached as necessary. Elements are provided to the security forces, to units in the forward defense area, and to the reserve. Forces not so allocated are placed under the control of the division support command or are retain~d direptly under division control, as appropriate. ( 1) In the mobile defense, minimum essential forces are allocated to units in the :forward defense area. These forces may be primarily infantry heavy. The reserve as the principal element of the defense, is normally given priority in allocation of armor. (2) In the area defense, priority is given to forces for the forward defense area. The reserve is provided sufficient strength to insure continuity of the defense. c. The division may be involved in another operation when given the mission to defend and will, consequently, have to reorganize. Time to establish the ·defense is usually limited. To avoid unnecessary changes and shifting of units, only essential changes should be made to the existing organization of major subordinate units. Shifts of tank and infantry elements between brigades should normally be by battalion task force. d. Security forces used in the defense may include the GOP, combat outpost, observation posts, listening posts, patrols, flank guard, and rear area security forces. (1) General Outpost. The GOP is organized and controlled by the division to intercept, engage, delay, disorganize, and deceive the enemy before he can attack. It provides security for the division by observation, reconnaissance, attack or defense, or by any combination of these methods. The GOP force may be provided from the division reserve. The GOP may be a brigade or elements thereof, the armored cavalry squadron, or a battalion task force as required. Within the division, the armored cavalry squadron is particularly well suited to this type mission but may require additional aviation S\lpport as well as artillery and engineer support. The corps commander prescribes the general location of the division GOP to coordinate security measures across the corps front. (2) Oombat Outpost. The combat outpost is a security element provided and controlled by the brigade or major subordinate unit assigned a sector in the :forward defense area. It is located to provide timely warning of the enemy's approach and to deny the enemy close .ground ob servation and direct fires into the forward defense area. Its location permits support by fire from within the brigade. It will normally consist of reinforced platoon-sized elements from each front-line battalion. The division commander prescribes the general location of combat outposts to the extent necessary to insure the provision of security across the division front. e. The forward defense area forces are organized to carry out their basic mission of defense or delay. Division designates the trace of the FEBA and responsibility for major subordinate units the along the FEBA hy specifying the location of brigade boundaries. and coordinating points. ( 1) The division usually uses two brigade headquarters to control these forces. However, more than two control headquarters in the FDA may be required when the division sector is unusually wide or when the existence of widely separated avenues of approach or extensive lateral obstacles would overtax the capabilities of two headquarters to effectively control the FDA. ( 2) In the mobile defense, the fixing force commanders organize their areas by establishing defensive positions augmented by observation and listening posts and patrols. The · positions are areas organized for all-round defense by elements varying in size from a company to a battalion task force. They are located to control terrain that dominates avenues of approach and to repel, delay, or canalize attacking forces. Alternate or successive positions are designated in depth. Because of the limited forces in the forward area, these positions cannot be initially occupied in depth. The forward defense force is allocated in the minimum essential forces to carry out its mission. It is normally infantry heavy. ( 3) In the area defense, the forward de fen~ area is organized into defensive positions which provide good fields of fire, observation, and natural defensive strength. Positions are prepared to block avenues of approach at the FEBA and in depth to control the area. The natural defen sive strength of the terrain is increased as time permits by the use of artificial obstacles, fortifications, and barriers. f. The reserve is organized to destroy or repulse • the enemy l:>y offensive action and must be prepared for timely commitment on division order. Should it be infeasible for the division to counterattack, the reserve may be employed in a blocking role to assist in containing the enemy penetration prior to the launching of the corps counterattack. One brigade headquarters is normally designated to control the reserve. However, in some situations, the reserve may be controlled by a provisional task force headquarters or placed urider division control. g. The armored cavalry squadron may be used in the security echelon, along the FEBA as part of the forward defense forces, to provide security for the division flanks or within the division area; or it may be used as part of the reserve. When the squadron is committed along the FEBA, it may be attached to one of the brigades in the forward defense area; however, it is capable of occuping a sector independently as an economy of force measure. h. Engineers may 'be attached to or placed in direct support of the brigades. Normal support is one engineer company for each brigade, although this is varied to meet specific requirements. Engineers with the security force are normally attached. The engineer battalion, less elements attached to major subordinate units, is kept under division control. i. Artillery is normally retained under division control with direct support artillery provided to major subordinate units in the FDA. Artillery units are attached to combat elements when distances and communications are so extended that attachment is preferable to centralized control. It is desirable to support the division GOP with artillery fires that are representative of all calibers available to the division to provide the necessary fire support and to aid in deceiving the enemy. Direct support artillery is normally attached to the GOP. Medium and heavy a:rtilllery support is provided the division GOP by the assignment of an appropriate tactical mission or by attachment. Nuclear delivery means furnish general support to the division as a whole, although elements may be attached to the division GOP. Provision is made for artillery support to the reserve when committed. ' j. For organization of combat service s'upport units, see FM 54,.:--2. 6-16. Combat Support a. Fire Support. (1) The division prepares fire plans to support the scheme of defense to include provision for long-range fires to engage the enemy as early as possible and fires in direct support of -the defending forces. Specific provision is made to furnish close fire support to the security forces, the forward defense forces, and the reserve in the execution of counterattacks. Field artil~ lery units are located within the defense area so that fires may be massed on likely avenues of approach and areas to be denied the enemy. (2) In planning for use of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to determine early in the planning stage the number of weapons to be employed on targets of opportunity or preplanned targets forward of the FEBA and the number of weapons to be retained to support counterattacks. Delivery means must be available and properly located to deliver these fires as needed. In tJhe mobile defense, the bulk of the weapons are normally held for the support of counterattacks. b. Air Defense. (1) The division may be provided with air defense units by army or corps or may derive protection by air defense weapons in or near the division area. (2) When attacked, air defense artillery is normally retained under division control and used to provide defense of the division area.· Priorities for the protection of installations or areas such as nuclear delivery means, division reserve, support command~ and critical areas are established. c. Engineer Support. (1) The primary combat support missions of the division engineers in the defense are to increase the defensive capabilities of combat troops by assisting in the organiZilltion of the ground and the preparation of defensive positions, and to assist the movement of reserves in the counterat tack. Engineers may prepare demolitions, lay minefields, and prepare and maintain routes. The division engineer assists in the formulation of the overall barrier plan and its implementation. (2) When authorized, ADM may be used to deny specific areas and strengthen the position. Engineer responsibilities for ADM are indicated in paragraphs 4,.:--19 through 4-21. (3) When the requirements for engineer support within the division exceed the capability of the organic engineer battalion, additional engineer support must be requested from the next higher headquarters. In the defense, such nondivisional engineers are normally placed in support of the division rather than attached and are under the supervision of the division engmeer. ( 4) For more detailed information, see FM 5-26, FM 5-1~5, and FM 5-136. d. Signal Sup p o r t . See paragraphs 4-22 through 4-25. e. OhemicalSupport. (1) Detailed plants are prepared to insure that the use of chemical agents is closely integrated with other fire plans, barrier plans, and the scheme of defense. (2) Toxic chemicals may be used in support of forces along the FEBA, on enemy forces concentrating for an attack, and to support the reserve in the execution of counterattacks. Chemical concentrations can be used effectively to assist in destroying, canalizing, or containing the enemy along major avenues of approach or to contaminate key terrain or likely enemy assembly areas. When toxic chemicals are authorized, it is normal to integrate chemical mines into high explosive minefields to increase their obstacle value and to make clearance more difficult. ( 3) Smoke can be used to obscure operations from the enemy by blinding enemy observation posts and by hindering enemy aerial observation and tactical air operations within the defense area. Smoke must be used with caution, however, so as not to block essential observation by the defending forces. · ( 4) Since the division has no organic chemical units, large-scale use of toxic chemical agents by the enemy may require additional decontamination support from higher headquarters. ( 5) For more detailed discussion on chemical support, see paragraphs 4-32 and 4-33; FM 3-5; FM 3-10; and FM 101-40. f. Army Aviation. (1) Use of organic aviation in the defense is similar to its use in other types of operations. (See para. 4-26 through 4-29.) The division aviation battalion provides general support to the division for aerial observation, reconnaissance, and surveillance; aerial photograph; radiological monitoring and survey; limited transportation and air movement of patients; limited aerial suppressive fires; and command liaison. (2) The division aviation battalion normally remains under division control. Flight elements may be placed in support of subordinate units. Flight elements with th~ security forces may he attached. ( 3) The reconnaissance-' and surveillance function is particularly important in the defense. Constant surveillance of the battle area is essential to obtain early and continuous information of the enemy, target acquisition, and verification and evaluation of potential targets. 6-17. Combat Service Support a. Particular consideration is given to the location and security of the division support area, supply and evacuation of combat elements, apd traffic control within the division area. b. Military Police. In the defense, the division military police company normally operates under· division control. The greater part of the military police effort must ·be devoted to planning and enforcing traffic control measures. PW normally are not as great a problem as they are in offensive operations, and one central PW collecting point is usually sufficient. . c. In the defense, combat service support facilities are usually located farther to the rear than in offensive operations. This avoids possible interference with tactical operations and undue congestion in the forward 'areas. It also offers less chance of damage or destruction of the combat service support facilities in event of an enemy penetration. Nevertheless, the support command units must be located close enough to the combat elements to provide proper support. The location must provide sufficient space for operation!> and dispersion and permit a · reasonable degree of security. d. Defensive operations ,are usually characterized by relatively heavy expenditures of ammunition (class V) and relatively light expenditures of fuel and lubricants (class III). In the mobile defense, however, the expenditure of class III supply may become heavy because of the maneuvering of both the forward defense forces and the reserve. e. Plans are made for supply 'and evacuation routes il)cluding alternate supply routes. Measures are taken to regulate and control traffic within the division area, particularly traffic entering the forward defense area. f. Normally, 'a forward support company from the maintenance battalion, a medical company, and elements of the supply and transport battalion are placed in support of each brigade. These units are normally located in the 'brigade trains area but provide combat service support on an area basis. The support .command units normally perform ' their functions under control of their parent orga\ nization rather than by attachment to brigades. Division support command units, with the exception of those elements located in the brigade trains areas, are located in the division support area. g. For further discussion of combat service sup" port, see chapter 4 and FM 54-2. 6-18. Counterattack Plans ' a. The counterattack is a basic and essential part of the defense. Counterattack pl,anning is started early and dev~loped concurrently with other phases of defense planning. The conduct of the counterattack varies somewhat with the form of defense being conducted, but planning techniques in both the mobile and area defense are essentially the same. b. Counterattack plans are prepared, as a minimum, to counter an assumed major penetration on each principal enemy avenue of approach. Major factors involved in visualizing an assumed enemy penetration are the force the enemy may employ on the avenue of :3:pproach; the use of terrain in the area of the penetration ; the capability of the forward defense force to control the limits of the penetration; and the responsiveness, strength, and composition of the reserve. The priority for the preparation of these plans is based upon the effect each penetration will have on the division mission. c. Basic counterattack plans are prepared by division and disseminated to all lower echelons in sufficient time to permit detailed planning by subordinate commanders. Detailed cotmterattack planning is the responsibility of the reserve commander to include reconnaissance, selection of routes, determination of time and space factors, and coordination with elements of the forward defense forces. d. The division counterattack plan will normally include: ( 1) Mission. A brief statement of the mission assigned by the next higher headquarters. (2) Asswmptions. The following should be considered : (a) The size and shape of the •assumed penetration. (b) The strength and composition of the enemy forces in the penetrated area. (c) The status of the forces in the FDA including their capability to contain the penetration. (d) The strength and responsiveness of the division reserve at the time the counterattack is to be executed. (e) The availability nnd capabilities of nuclear weapons and delivery. means. (f) Other assumptions pertinent to the existing situation. (3) Concept of the operation. The overall objective of the counterattack is the destruction of the enemy in the penetration or the restoration of the forward defense area. After making assumptions on which the counterattack plan is based, a scheme of maneuver to accomplish the overall objective of the counterattack is determined. Consideration of the mission, the division organization, the terrain, and the enemy capabilities will assist in determining whether the scheme of maneuver will essentially be a penetration or an envelopment. The scheme of maneuver and provisions for fire support are included in the concept of operation. (4) Control measures (fig.l?' and 18). (a) Ob.fective. Normally, the division assigns a single terrain objective to the counterattacking force. The objective should be within the capabilities of the counterattacking force to seize, and should contribute to the overall objective of the counterattack. (b) Direction of attack. A direction of attack is used to orient the main effort of the counterattack force. The direction of attack arrow is drawn from the line of departure into the objective. (c) Line of departure (LD) . A line of departure is prescribed for planning and rehearsal purposes. It is selected on the basis of assumed locations of the forces in the FDA and the location of easily identifiable terrain features. Upon execution, the LD may be designated as the line of contact (LC). (d) Boundaries. Boundaries may be used in the counterattack when additional control is needed. It is desirable to make as few changes as possible in existing boundaries. Boundaries are adjusted, as necessary, to control the passage and maneuver of the counterattacking force and to assist in the control of fires during the counterattack. Figure 17 illustrates a situation in which the counterattacking brigade has no territorial responsibility outside the penetration, nor any command .control over the FDA force. The trace of the assumed penetration serves as a boundary between the 1st and 3d Bde. Figure 18 illustrates a situation that dictates a realignment of boundaries and the assignment of territorial responsibility to the counterattacking brigade. The FDA forces are placed under the counterattacking force commander when it is necessary to assign territorial responsibility outside the limits of the penetration to the counterattacking force. (5) Orders to m,a.for subordinate units. Orders to the major unit commanders should be in sufficient detail to insure that the division commander's concept of the operation is carried out. Command relations between the FDA force and counteratta.ck force should be clearly defined. FEBA FEBA 1 X 2 I Assumed Penetration X X X X 30 X ~~-4~.~~0-----------------xx,----------------------~ Figure 17. Divi8ion Counterattack Plan. (6) Fire support. Detailed fire sup~ort counterattack is normally specified in the plans, including the use of nuclear weap plan. ons, are prepared for each counterattack e. The success of a counterattack depends upon plan. The number of nuclear weapons the ability of the commander and staff to visualize tentatively allocated to support each situations that might exist and, when the en.emy FEBA • X X X X NOTE: (/fj])> These forces of the 1st Bde are placed under reserve commander to provide unity of effort in the counter~ attack. a...-----------xx----------... 0 ,~ Figure 18. Division Counterattack Plan. Objective isenemy force . - I ___ deploying for attack FEBA y ~ FEBA "" X X X X X fQl ~------------------xx--------------------~ Figure 19. Diviswn spoiling attack, armored division. 92 attack occurs, to select a suitable course of action to defeat it. Basic counterattack plans must be highly flexible so that they can be modified to meet the actual situation. The actual counterattack will probably be a variation of one of the counterattack plans. 6-19. Spoiling AHack a. Plans for defense may include spoiling attacks to prevent or delay enemy attacks. The spoiling attack is normally launched against enemy forces which are forming or assembling for an attack (fig.19). b. Plans for the spoiling attack are made and coordinated with the same degree of care and coordination as for the normal attack discussed in chapter 5. c. The following considerations affect the use of the spoiling attack: (1) The spoiling attack is used to delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy capability to launch an offensive. (2) The objective of the spoiling attack is destruction of enemy personnel and equipment, not the seizure of terrain or other physical objectives. (3) The objective selected must facilitate the accomplishment of the defensive mission of the unit. ( 4) The next higher commander may limit the size of the force that may be used for a spoiling attack. ( 5) The spoiling attack should not be used if the loss or destruction of the force will jeopardize the ability of the command to accomplish its defensive mission. Section V. CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE 6-20. General a. A successful defense depends largely upon timely and accurate information of the enemy and the ability of forces within the defensive area to react rapidly. A continuous and aggressive intelligence collection effort is essential in determining the probable strength, composition, direction, and time of an enemy attack. Effective communications must exist throughout the division so that information and instructions can be transmitted without delay. All units must be constantly prepared to move rapidly to support the scheme of defense. b. Other than aerial reconnaissance, the security force is normally the first element of the division to gain contact with advancing enemy forces. The security force reconnoiters to establish and main, tain contact, and once contact is gained, a continuous flow of information is provided the division commander. As enemy strength is developed, the GOP conducts a delaying action to inflict casualties, delay, deceive, and disorganize the enemy. The GOP avoids decisive engagement with the enemy but maintains contact until it is withdrawn through the COP (if established) or the FEBA. The elements of the GOP then accomplish other assigned missions, as appropriate. c. Once the security force has been withdrawn through the FEBA, the attacker is engaged by the forward defense forces. As the enemy comes within range, maximum supporting fires are delivered to slow and disrupt his attack. As contact is gained, the commanders of the forward defense force initiate action to stop, repel, contain, or disorg~nize the enemy. Ifthe attack cannot be effectively stopped or contained, then action is taken to control the enemy in a manner which permits effective counterattack by the reserve. The forward defense force must prevent an enemy breakthrough and must prevent his consolidation of the penetrated area. This sets the stage for the counterattack. d. Successful accomplishment of the forward defense force mission requires a combination of holding ground, delaying, and containing. The forward defense force commander must retain flexibility and must carefully control the operation in the forward area..In general, units in danger of being overrun are ordered to move to alter~ nate or successive positions. As the enemy pressure increases, the forward defense units may be forced into a delaying action using alternate or successive positions selected in depth. However, some units may be ordered to hold on specific terrain, being bypassed if necessary, to cause canalization of the attacking forces. 6-21. Mobile Defense With the relatively light fixing forces in the mobile defense, it is anticipated that a strong and de termined enemy can penetrate the FDA. At the enemy presents his flanks or rear, when appropriate time, the division launches a strong he has become overextended, or when his counterattack using the reserve supported by numomentum is dissipated. The comclear weapons and all other available fires to demander must have a continuous flow of stroy the penetration (fig. 20). 6-22. Area Defense In the area defense, emphasis is placed upon blocking avenues of approach at the FEBA and defending in depth to hold the terrain. Penetrations that cannot be eliminated by the forces assigned to the FDA are contained to permit restoration of the FEBA by division counterattack. See figure 21. 6-23. Counterattack a. When the division commander commits the reserve, it is with the knowledge that the division is decisively engag~d and, for a period of time, he will not possess a major troop reserve. Therefore, the decision to execute a division counterattack must be based on a reasonable chance for success. Once the reserve is completely committed, the division commander will reconstitute the reserve. b. Although penetrations are expected and planned for in the overall defense planning, it is unlikely that the development of the action will correspond to the prepared counterattack plans. However, as the situation·develops, the basic questions the division commander must answer are these: (1) Is a counterattack feasible or should the reserve be employed to contain? ( 2) When and where to counterattack~ (3) In the event of more than one penetration, which should be attacked and which should be blocked or contained? o. If a counterattack is considered feasible, it is launched with the full power of all available resources necessary to insure success. Piecemeal commitment of the reserve is avoided. Among other things, success depends upon surprise, speed, and boldness.· The entire resources of the commander may 'be committed to include all availa:ble nuclear weapons. d. The most difficult decision to make is when to execute the counterattack. (1) It is not launched as an automatic reaction to an enemy penetration, nor is the reserve committed solely by virtue of the enemy reaching a certain phaSe line or area. It may be launched when the accurate information on the current situation and enemy forces. He must know the condition of the FDA forces, whether or not they can contain enemy forces in the penetration, and for how long. He must know how long it will take the reserve to attack. He must know the power and rate of the enemy advance, and the enemy reinforcing capability. To this, he must add his knowledge of enemy tactical doctrine and procedures. (2) Ideally~ the counterattack is made when the enemy attack has been slowed, stopped, or disorganized. However, these conditions are not essential prerequisites for the the counterattack. A counterattack should 'be launched prior to the time that the attacking enemy can consolidate his gains and reorganize or regroup his forces. e. Ifmultiple penetrations have occurred, it may be necessary to deal with these penetrations simultaneously. On such a case, determination is made as to which penetration poses the greatest threat \ to the division. The reserve is committed to destroy the major threat, while sufficient force is applied to contain the other threats. Itmay be necessary to detach a portion of the reserve and attach it to the FDA force, or to allocate nuclear weapons, or a combination of hoth to assist in containing secondary threats. f. The penetration is preferably attacked on the shoulder or flank. This will usually strike the enemy at his most vulnerable point and offers the best chance of cutting off the enemy, disrupting his attack, and destroying him in place. However, considerations of time and space, terrain, maneuver room, and the enemy capability of striking the division counterattack force on the flank with second echelon assualt forces may make it more desirable to attack the penetration on the nose. Employment of nuclear weapons assists in overcoming enemy resistance and increases the feasibility of a head-on direction of attack. The counterattack normally will be based on one of the existing counterattack plans modified as necessary to fit the actual situation. GOP 0(+) GOP FEBA ......,c-----------------.--FEBA 1 X X X X S-o3JIO ~-------------xx------------- Figure 2. ~0 r--.... ••~~. IDP ••• ......•••....) '"•..J lOP X """'" ,/ OS bn remain to support • detachments leftJ 8 \ (OS) (OS) ~Additional support for etachments L...:..J left in contact ~ j (GS) I LJ LJ ~ X X ~ ILJ .--u-, OS Bn L LJ ~displaces to rear pos • Covering Force • • Posi • GS, reinf bn displaces to support covering force. I 6~ tion [:] 8(-) (GS, Reinf) (OS or Atch NOTE: Brigade assembly areas are normally not assigned. Battalions move individually to next position. If move is over extended distance, control points are established for traffic control and to allow brigade commanders to regain • control. .. ..' • ~ Figure 24. VoZuntarv withdrawalr-division second phase. Reconnaissance elements from ~ ~ • covering force ·maintain con tinuous contact with enemy • lOP lOP • • • • Detachments left in contact and OS artillery withdraw ~l~ 8 ( (OS) • (OS) X ~ X (GS) X X Joins parent unit. .. Covering • Force Pos Covering Force Pos 8 (G~. Reinf) t:J (OS or Atch) .. 0 ., "" ' .;, Figure 25. Voluntary withdrawalr-division third phase. • trol and security are provided by thoroughly detailed preparation of plans, deception, and the simulation of normal radio traffic, fires, and other activities. 7-13. Conduct of Involuntary Withdrawal a. An involuntary withdrawal is based upon elements fighting their way to the rear, using delaying tactics on successive positions. The greater the mobility and long-range firepower of the division, the better will be its capability to conduct a successful involuntary withdrawal. Since involuntary withdrawals normally are subject to enemy observation, success depends upon mobility, control, effective employment of covering forces, and looal control of the air. b. The procedure followed in an involuntary withdrawal provides for security forces at all echelons to cover forward element..<; which withdraw intact without leaving detachments in contact. Each unit of the forward defense force normally provides and controls its own security force. These forces should be organized with a rel·atively high proportion of tanks to obtain the greatest delay, to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy, and to minimize friendly losses. Close coordination and control between unit security forces are required. c. A covering force normally is provided by the division reserve. It should consist of tanks and mechanized or motorized infantry, and be augmented by Army aviation, field artillery, engineers, and, if available, air defense artillery. It accomplishes its mission either from the security area of the new position or from prescribed areas forward thereof. In addition to covering the withdrawal of the forward defense forces, it is prepared to assist those forces to break contact and to conduct delay between successive positions. d. The least heavily engaged elements of the forward defense force withdraw first. Those heavily engaged generally withdraw through cover provided by the division covering force and the massed fires of all delivery means available (fig. 26). Nuclear fires may be used to assist the forward defense force in breaking contact with the enemy and in supporting the security forces. Smoke may be used to screen movement and to reduce the accuracy of enemy fire. e. Movement is expedited. Assembly areas normally are not used. Instead, units move to successive covering positions which are used alternately by the covering force and the disengaged forward defense forces until the entire unit breaks contact with the enemy or reaches the new delay position (fig. 27). 776-087 0---65-------8 IDP IDP Division Covering Force DelayingPositionDelaying .,.---~ A Position ('---) \.__,__, A __,,_.., DelayingPosition B Delaying Position B New r; " < ., New Positionr----~------{...iyPosition Figure !6. In.vo,untary withdrawa~forward defense area forces disengage. 114 ::J ~ C,:J C "-1--:'1 I . I J 1 I I Division I 1---~ --- Covering -J.----1 I Force I \ II \ II l J Delaying Delaying 1 Position Position A 1~GJJ Cn:J1 1 A \ I I IX2 X\-) C,~ C~ X _,_, Delaying Delaying Position Position B B .)\ New New 1\r).._ Position Y-> -------s~.u:-4~\1 Position Figure 2'1. Involuntary withdrawat-security forces withdraw through division covering force. 115 Section IV. DELAYING ACTION 7-14. General a. A delaying action is an operation in which maximum delay and damage are inflicted on an advancing enemy without the delaying force becoming decisively engaged in combat..It is the type of action normally fought by cov~rmg forces and security detac~ents. In executmg a dela~ing action, minimum space is exchanged for maximum time. b. A unit is decisively engaged when it has lost its freedom of maneuver and no longer possesses the capability of initiating planned action by thb introduction of firepower or maneuver at its echelon. Although.elements or all of a battalion task force or the bulk of a brigade may be decisively engaged, the division must retain the ability to maneuver to successfully execute the delay. c. The division accomplishes a delaying mission by (1) Delay on successive positions. (2} Delay on alternate positions. . ( 3) Combination of the a:bove techniques. d. Continuous delay is inherent in each of the above techniques and requires constant contact with the enemy by at least a portion of the Jlelaying force, including the use of long-range firepower and maneuv:er, to cause him~ deploy, reconnoiter, maneuver, and take other trme consuming measures. . . e. The choice between delay on successive positions and alternate positions is usually based on the width of the front, the forces available, the enemy threat, and the period or degree of delay · required. . . (1} The delay on alternate positrons can only ·he used when the division can accomplish its mission and can occupy two positions simultaneously. This normally will prevail when the frontage assigned the division is relatively narrow. (2} Delay on successive positions may be used when a relatively wide front is assigned. f. The above techniques may be used in combination. Continuous delay is sought on and between positions. Situations beyond the control of the division may require rapid transition from one technique to another. Aggressi~~ offe~sive ~ction is taken whenever opportumtles anse to mflict serious casualties on the enemy. Similar action may be required as a means of deception, to control dominating terrain, or to disengage a decisively engaged force. g. Planning for and the control of the cond~ct of the overall operations is centralized, hut 1ts execution is decentralized. Within the overall plans announced by the division c~mmander.' sub· ordinate unit commanders are giVen maxrmum freedom of action. This freedom of action permits the exploitation of any advantages wh~ch may accrue at the small unit level and allows mcreased delay to he caused at that level. h. Nuclear fires, to include ADM, may be used by the division to inflict casualties; to create dhstacles to enemy movement; to entrap, confine, or canalize the. enemy; and to deny him use of major facilities. For additional information on the employment of ADM, see FM 5-26. i. For more information on the delaying action see FM 100-5. 7-15. Planning the Delaying Action When the division is given a mission to delay, the higher commander (corps or field army) normally will state the mission in general terms allowing the division commander maximu~ f:eedom for personal initiative. The followmg I~ considered to be the minimum command gmdance necessary: a. General Location of the Initial Delay Position. The higher commander's guidance may be specific to the point of designating. th~ ~tial delay position (IDP) but normally will mdiCate a general area, thereby allowing the division commander to reconnoiter the area and recommend or select the specific location. . If the division is in contact when the decision is made to initiate the delay, it is not necessary to ~esi~~te an IDP since the friendly forward dispositiOns become theiDP. b. Area for Delay. The higher commander will specify the area in which the divi~ion is respon~ible for the delay. Lateral boundanes are prescnbed and coordinating points are indicated for the IDP and subsequent corps designated delay positions. When the division is deployed to cover the withdrawal of othet.: corps elements, it is free to operate in the entire corps sector. c. Period of Delay. The corps commander will specify to the division commander the time he ~~ is to delay the enemy forward of a specified line. Normally, the division commander will he given the IDP and the new location of the corps security forces. He may add intermediate delay positions or phase lines. . d. Location of the New Oorps Set:nlll'ity Area. Location of the new corps security area and distribution of the elements occupying it are of primary concern to the delaying force commander since he must make plans for its .occupation or a possible rearward passage of lines. For details on withdrawal through a rearward position see paragraphs 8-7 through 8-10. If the location of the new security areas is not known during the initial planning, the information must be provided the delaying force commander early enough to permit him to make timely plans. In the case of a division covering the withdrawal of other corps elements, the division commander will, if possible, insure that his brigade boundaries coincide with the boundaries of the major forces occuping the corps security area. e. Limitations Imposed Upon the Operation. In his guidance, the corps commander must identify those areas in which he has reason to limit the operation. As an example, limitations on the use of nuclear weapons, chemical or biological agents, or a specific control measure may he necessary during a particular operational phase of the delaying action. f. In turn, the division order normally will specify the initial delaying position, the time schedule for the delay, intermediate delaying positions, boundaries, phase lines, and the line along which the delay will terminate. 7-16. Selection of Delaying Positions a. Delaying positions are selected which will provide the maximum delay while inflicting the .most damage upon the enemy. Positions are selected where minimum forces can cause the enemy to mass and thus present a profitable nuclear target. Successive delaying positions should be far enough apart to cause the enemy to regroup prior to continuing the attack from one position to the next. Delaying positions are sought which incorporate the following: ( 1) A series of parallel ridges across the lines of hostile advance. (2) Unfordable streams, swamps, lakes, and other obstacles on the front and flanks. ( 3) High ground with good observation and long-range fields of fire. ( 4) Concealed routes of withdrawal. ( 5) A road· net and/or areas providing good t c:r~oss-country trafficability. b. Delaying positions may be selected and designated by division or left to the discretion of brigade commanders. When a suitable natural obstacle extends across the entire division front, it normally will he designated as a delaying position by the division commander. In the absence of suitable natural obstacles, the diVision commander may designate phase lines rather than actual delaying positions. Concurrently, he announces how long the enemy is to be held forward of each phase line. Here the commander relates the overall time for delay to the depth of the area in which the delay will occur. From a study of the terrain he further relates this time in hours to distance on the ground, establishes phase lines, and determines the length of time the enemy must be held forward of each of these lines to gain the minimum overall time prescribed in the mission. · 7-17. Organization of Ground a. In planning for a delaying action, definite sectors of responsibility are assigned to each committed brigade. The limits of each sector are delineated by boundaries. These boundaries may he extended through the depth of the division sector, and as a minimum, must extend through the next rearward division delaying position or phase line. b. In assigning sectors to subordinate units, each enemy avenue of approach is included, in its entirety, in the sector of one unit. Boundaries are assigned so that terrain features which control fire and observation into a sector are assigned to the unit having responsibility for that sector. a. Natural obstacles are exploited in organizing delaying positions. Artificial obstacles also are used to improve the position to the extent possible with the materials, time, and manpower available. Although important, obstacles alone must not be relied upon to halt the enemy's progress. An aggressive enemy will attempt to gain surprise by attacking over ground considered . impassable. All obgtacles-natural and artificial-must be covered by fire to cause the maximum delay. In massing to overcome such defended obstacles, the enemy may present a profitable nuclear target. 7-18. Organization for Combat a. The division commander allocates troops to the delaying force and the division reserve. A division covering force may be employed if the division is not initially in contact. In such cases, the division commander allocates troops to the division covering force and provides a control headquarters for its employment. b. The size of the delaying force necessary across the division front will depend upon the relative enemy strength, the width of the sector, the nature of the terrain, the depth of the sector, and the period of delay required. Usually, this will result in the major portion of the division being required in the force deployed on the delay position. c. The division reserve will be small since the bulk of the force is needed on the delaying positions. There may be times when the division commander may retain the authority to employ, as a division reserve, a portion of the troops allocated to a brigade. d. Delaying positions are not organized in great depth. Firepower is forward with the bulk of the forces concentrated on likely avenues of approach. The delaying force should be capable of delivering long-range fires; the reserve should be highly mobile and responsive in the conduct of limited objective attacks and counterattacks. e. Engineer support is provided to each committed brigade, usually by the attachment of elements of the engineer battalion. f. The organization for com'bat of the division artillery and the division support command is discussed in paragraphs 7-4 through '1-9 and FM 54.-2, respectively. 7-19. Delay on Successive Positions a. Delay on successive positions is the type of delaying action most frequently conducted by the division. When employing this type of delaying action, the major portion of the division is continuously in the line. Figure 28 is a schematic of a brigade delaying on successive positions. b. Delay on successive positions envisages the improvement and occupation of each natural delaying position. Units delay continuously on and between these positions. Terrain is never given up unnecessarily. c. The IDP is ·organized and occupied by the major elements of each committed brigade. In some cases, the IDP is occupied prior to the establishment of contact with the advancing enemy. In such cases, a division covering force or security elements from each committed unit are sent forward to establish contact and to delay the enemy advance toward the initial position. Long-range artillery and.the units in the IDP take the enemy under fire at· maximum range. This fire inflicts casualties on the enemy, causes his early deployment, and requires him to take other time-consuming measures to close with the position. As the enemy maneuvers toward the position, all individual and automatic weapons are brought to bear, thus subjecting the enemy to an increasing heavy volume of fire. d. Each position occupied 'by a ·forward unit is defended by that unit until the enemy threatens decisive engagement or envelopment of the position. When the maximum delay has been achieved and it becomes apparent that further occupation of the position will result in the unit becoming decisively engaged, the withdrawal begins. The withdrawal may begin in accordance with prearranged plans, or order of the higher commander, or to prevent decisive engagement. Each withdrawal is coordinated with division and with adjacent units. e. When the order to withdraw is received, a portion of the unit concerned displaces directly to the rear and occupies the next designated delaying position. The remainder of the unit maintains contact with the enemy and continues Ito delay between the first position and the next rearward delaying position. Forces remaining in contact should contain as much tank strength as possible. These units, when threatened with decisive engagement, slowly withdraw toward the next position. When the enemy has advanced to within range of the rear delaying positions, he is subjected to fire by the elements occupying these positions. These units provide overwatching fire for the delaying elements that have remained in contact. When forced 'back by the enemy, the forces which have remained in contact rejoin that portion of the command which is occupying the second prepared position. The commander then employs all his available firepower to hold the position as long as possible. When he is no longer able to hold the position without becoming de STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 ENEMY ENEMY ~ ~ Initial Delay Position ~D(-) ~· l D<-) ENEMY ~ 2d D "'-o Oel~y Position Step 1. Elements of delaying force break contact andmove to rear to organize next position. Step 2. Elements remaining in contact fight to rearmaintaining continuous contact. Step 3. Elements rejoin parent organizations on nextdelay position and continue the delay. Figure 28. Delay on successive positions. cisively engaged, the withdrawal procedure is repeated. f. The mission assigned to the division or a brigade may require that the enemy be delayed for an extended period in an area which has little depth. Under these conditions, the division may be required to risk decisive engagement to ac~ complish its mission. Maximum use is made of nuclear and nonnuclear fires to destroy those enemy forces that threaten the delaying position. Counterattacks disrupt the enemy attack, inflict casualties, and cause additional delay. g. The division normally will retain a reserve when conducting a delay on successive positions. This reserve will be comparatively small and as mobile as possible. The reserve may be ordered to provide security forces forward of the delaying position, counterattack, protect a threatened flank, secure vital rear areas, prepare successive delaying positions, conduct spoiling attacks to assist in disengaging forces, or provide overwatching fire to a withdrawing unit. The reserve frequently will be employed to assist a decisively engaged unit to disengage by executing a counterattack. Such counterattacks may take the form of limited objective attacks. In this type of action, the counterattack force strikes the enemy flank immediately in rear of the area of contact. Enemy units moving forward in the march column are struck and destroyed prior to reaching the area of contaci. The counterattack force usually does not attempt to seize and hold terrain; after reaching its objective, it delays hack into friendly terrain. Counterattacks designed to strike the enemy flank and to place direct fire on the advancing enemy columns may also be used to cause the damage and delay required. h. In the delay, brigades hold the enemy as far forward as possible, for as long as possible, without becoming decisively engaged. Based upon the phase lines and time-phasing schedule announced by the division commander, brigades select delaying positions to be occupied by their major subordinate elements. These units delay on and between these positions. Delaying positions selected by brigades are coordinated with division and with adjacent units. i. Committed brigades may also retain a small reserve. This reserve may be employed on the same types ofmissions as the division reserve. The (J" division commander may require subordinate commanders to obtain his permission prior to the commitment of their reserves. Retention of control over the reserve of subordinate units enables the division commander to constitute a larger division reserve, should the situation require such action. 7-20. Delay on Alternate Positions a. When operating on a narrow front, the division may elect to delay on alternate positions. Employing this technique, the division is organized into two elements. The first element occupies the IDP and engages the enemy. The second element occupies and improves the second delaying position. b. Those units occupying the IDP delay the enemy by employing the continuous delay technique. They delay on the IDP and between it and the second delaying position. When the units arrive at the second delaying position they withdraw through or around the units that prepared and are occupying that position. After withdrawing through the second delaying position, the units proceed to the third delaying position and commence the preparation and occupation of that position. Responsibility for delay o~ the enemy is assumed by the units on tl.!e second delaying position when the first element has withdrawn through their position. Figure 29 is a schematic of a force delaying on alternate positions. The delay procedure is then repeated, with each element being alternately in contact and responsible for causing the required delay. When not in contact, each element is responsible for improving and occupying rearward positions and for providing overwatching fire for the ,withdrawal of the element that is in contact. c. Division-level reserves normally are not retained if this type of delaying action is being conducted. The uncommitted elements occupying alternate positions will be committed as reserves if the need arises. d. Delay on alternate positions has the advantage of providing more time for the improvement of delaying positions and the maintenance of materiel. It also provides troops with periods of relief from combat. However, this technique may leave the division vulnerable to nuclear fires because of the frequent rearward passage of lines required. STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 Enemy • ~ Enemy Initialdelayposition 0<-> • ~• • • Enemy 2d ~ delayposition 0 "m •••••••. 3d ........ delay 'C""' r---, -;:~& ',...,: A :- position L---J(-) 0<-> Step 1. Elements of the brigade organize the initial and second delay positions.Step 2. Elements on the initial delay position delay back through the secondposition to the third delay position.Step 3. Elements on the second position pick up the delay. The third delayposition is occupied. F·igure 29. Delay on alternate positions. Section V. RETIREMENT 7-21. General between itself and the enemy, the division com t. t · t d t• ··.-·,,~,,o.m.ander resumes centralized control. a. A re Iremen Is a re rogra e opera Ion m ,. ·" ._, .-· ,_j • which a force moves away from the enemy to avoid combat under the existing condition. b. A retirement may be made following a with drawal or when there is no actual contact with the ·thd 1 ____ .J th t• enemy. When a WI rawa pr1Xtrues e re Ire t th f t b · fte th . f men ' e re Iremen e~ns a r e mam orces have broken contact with the enemy and march columns have been formed. 7_22. Conduct of the Retiremen·t a. The division assigns definite routes and march objectives or rearward positions to each of the major commands moving with the main body. Movement by night is emphasized. During the initial stage of the retirement, control may be decentralized. to subordinate commanders. However, as the main body increases the distance b. Secunty for the mam body. Is. proVIded by adv.ance, flank, a~d rear guards similar to thesecunty employed m a movement to contact. When the retirement is preceded by a withdrawal action, a strong rear guard normally will be required. T . . . he rear guard employs delaymg action tactics to delay the advancing enemy and to prevent interference with the movement of the main body. The commander must be especially watchful for at tempts by the enemy to envelop the retiring force. Tactical air force reconnaissance aircraft and aircraft from the aviation battalion are employed to obtain early information of such enemy attempts. 7-23. Applicable SOLOG The material presented in this chapter a.groo; with applicable portions of SOLOG-82-Withdrawal in Nuclear Operations. '\] RELIEF OPERATIONS Section I. GENERAL 8-1 . Purpose and Types of Relief a. When tactical operations continue over a prolonged period, conservation of fighting power, maintenance of effectiveness, and the tactical plan may require the periodic relief of committed units. Such reliefs are accomplished,by a relief in place or a passage of lines. b. The division may participate in a relief when the entire division relieves other divisions, or it may direct and control reliefs of subordinate units. 8-2. Basic Considerations The following considerations are common to the planning and execution of all types of reliefs. a. Adequate time must be provided for planning and reconnaissance. Early issuance of warning orders is mandatory. b. Plans must be detailed, simple, and well-coordinated among all echelons of the relieving and relieved units. c. When possible, reliefs should be executed during periods of reduced visibility. d. The plans for tactical cover and deception must include all practicable measures to insure secrecy and surprise. e. The relief must be executed efficiently, in the shortest possible time, and with every precaution taken to reduce vulnerability to enemy attack during the time. the relief is being accomplished. Section II. RELIEF IN PLACE 8-3. Definition A relief in place is an operation in which all or part of a unit is replaced in a combat area by an incoming unit. The combat mission and area of operation responsibilities of the outgoing unit are assumed by the incoming unit. The relief in place · is executed when the outgoing unit is on the defense. The incoming unit may have the mission of continuing the defense or preparing for a subsequent attack. In either case, the outgoing unit or elements thereof are withdrawn. 8-4. Planning Procedures a. General. When the division relieves another unit in place, the warning order to the incoming division must specify, as a minimum, the time for commencing and completing the relief and the priorities for use of routes involved. The warning order normally will direct that the relief be carried out under cover of darkness or other conditions of reduced visibility. The order may direct the relief to be completed in one or more nights. Upon receipt of the warning order, the division commander and staff analyze the mission, issue internal warning orders, establish liaison, and visit the unit to be relieved. The division will esta)blish its tactical command post in the vicinity of the main command post of the unit being relieved. Joint conferences are held between the commanders and staffs of the two units concerned to work out the details of the relief. b. Details to be Coordinated. Procedures for the accomplishment of the following must be agreed upon: 0) Exchange of plans and liaison personnel. . The incoming unit commanders and staffs must be briefed and become thoroughly familiar with the existing defensive plans to include fire plans, barrier plans, and counterattack plans. To make the most efficient transfer of information concerning the plans, dispositions and area of operation, the outgoing unit leaves liaison personnel with the incoming unit. The number of these personnel and the duration of their stay with the incoming unit vary with the situation. Normally, they will remain with each combat and T23 combat support headquarters of the incoming unit from company level up. These personnel usually remain until the incoming units become familiar with the situation. (2) Sequence of relief (if not specified by the headquarters ordering the relief). To establish the strongest defense during relief, the relief in place is executed by stages, either rear to front or front to rear. In determining the sequence of the relief, both commanders should consider ( a) The £ubsequent mission of the division that is conducting the relief. (b) The strength and _combat efficiency of the unit presently in the forward defense area. (c) The capability of the enemy to detect and react against the relief. (d). The characteristics of the area of operations. (e) The need to vary the pattern of relief. (/) Size and type of elements involved in the relief. (3) When "command is to pass." The time or circumstances under which the incoming unit commander will assume responsibility for the area must be clearly established. Until command passes, the outgoing unit commander retains responsibility for the area and mission and exercises operational control over all subordinate elements of the in.coming unit which have completed their portion of the relief. During this period, the incoming units must fit into and accept the general defense plans of the outgoing unit. Normally, command passes to the incoming commander when the units in the forward defense area have been relieved by his subordinate pni;ts and when adequate communications means have been established. When command passes, the incoming commander assumes operational control of all units of the outgoing unit which have not been relieved. ( 4) Reconnaissance. Arrangements must be made for a thorough daylight reconnaissance by commanders and:staff officers of all echelons of the incoming unit. Reconnaissance should include an inspection of terrain to the front, defensive installa· tions, relief routes, assembly areas, weapon positions, and combat service support installations. (5) Security. Every effort must be made by all echelons of the incoming and the outgoing units to prevent the enemy from learning that a relief is taking place. In addition to conducting t.he relief during periods of reduced visibility, the following security measures should be taken: (a) Every form of normal activity in the area of operations must be maintained during the relief. The incoming unit should assume the normal pattern of harassing and interdicting· fires, patrols, communications traffic, and movement previously employed hy the outgoing unit. (b) Restrictions on the size of advance parties a n d reconnaissance parties must be enforced. These parties should move to the area of operations by infiltration. (c) Aerial reconnaissance by members of the incoming unit should be made in aircraft of the outgoing unit. (d) Radio nets of the incoming unit should not be used in the new area :until after the relief is complete. (e) Registration of fires of the incoming unit should be coordinated by the outgoing unit until command passes. (f) An integrated tactical cover and deception plan should be executed by both the incoming and outgoing units. ( 6) Movement control. Arrangements between the incoming and outgoing units must be made for the control of units moving into and out of the area. Coordination must include (a) Routes to be used and priorities for their use. (b) Responsibility for traffic control. (c) Location of assembly areas. (d) Provision of guides for incoming units. (e) Common use of transportation. (7) Intelligence. The outgoing unit transfers to the incoming unit all information and intelligence concerning the enemy and the area of operations. Additional intelligence information required by the ,.--- ( incoming unit should be obtained by the outgoing unit. (8) Fire support. (a) The method of relieving fire support units must be clearly established. Normally, the artillery of the outgoing unit will remain in position until the units in the forward defense area have been relieved. By using this procedure, artillery units which are familiar with the fire support plans and the area of operations are in position to fir~ during the critical period of the relief of forward units. (b) If sufficient firing positions are available, the incoming artillery may elect not to take over the outgoing artillery's firing position, but may select new positions from which the same fire missions can be accomplished. In this case, the incoming artillery moves into position by battery under battalion control. The incoming artillery is prepared to take over fire missions before the outgoing batteries are withdrawn. (c) When the lack of firing positions so dictates, artillery may be relieved in place. In this case, it may be necessary to relieve by platoon or section to avoid congestion. (d) When the relief is to be conducted over a period of more than one night, the· incoming artillery normally will move at least one gun per battery forward the the first night to secure registration data. In any case, liaison officers and forward observers of the incoming unit join the outgoing units as soon as possible to become familiar with the existing fire plans. (e) Until command passes, registration and all other fires of the incoming artillery units are controlled by the commander of the outgoing artillery. (/) The headquarters ordering the relief may direct that the artillery of the outgoing unit remain in position to support subsequent operations of the incoming unit. In this case, careful coordination of position areas must be made in order to reduce vulnerability. (9) Ewchange of equipment. The time avail able for and other circumstances influencing the relief may require that certain weapons and other equipment be exchanged between the incoming· and the outgoing units. The extent of 'such exchange should be authorized by £he headquarters ordering the relief. · (10) Combat service support. Pertinent combat service support matters such as the transfer of supplies, use of installations, transfer of PW, operation of civilian collecting points, displacement of combat service support units, use of transportation, and traffic control must be coordinated between the incoming and outgoing units. c. Concurrent Planning. The unit executing the relief and the unit being relieved will issue operation orders directing the conduct of the relief in accordance with procedures agreed upon at the planning conference. Prior to the issuance of the operation orders, fragmentary orders are disseminated to subordinate units to allow concurrent planning by these units. 8-5. Conduct of the Relief in Place a. Two primary factors determine the method by which a re1ief in place is conducted. These factors are the sequence of the relief and whether the relief is to be conducted in one or more than one night. Within the scheme dictated by these factors, the relief in place is a series of relief operations conducted by subordinate units and controlled by the division. After detailed divisional planning, execution is decentralized. b. Once the relief in place is begun, the division staffs are primarily concerned with (1) Supervising the timing and movement of subordinate units. (2) Coordinating joint use of transportation between incoming and outgoing units. (3) Supervising the execution of traffic control. ( 4) Preparing for exchange of overall control after "command passes." ( 5) Staying abreast of the situation so that they can react swiftly to any emergency or required change in the plan for relief. 8-6. Nuclear Considerations During the execution of the relief, the physical presence of two elements in an area where only one normally is positioned inherently increases the vulnerability to nuclear attack. Therefore, the plan~ ning and conduct of the relief must be made with an appreciation of the risks involved. Carefql scl).eduling of the reliefs executed by subordinate units must be accomplished to reduce to the minimum the troop density in the area of operations. Generally, if the relief is conducted over an extended period of time, vulnerability to nuclear at tack can be reduced. However, the possibility of enemy detection and reaction against the relief are increased. The threat of nuclear attack emphasizes the requirement for secrecy to avoid detection and the necessity for thorough planning to limit the number and duration of profitable nuclear targets. It also points out the need for early and preplanned tactical cover and deception measures. Section Ill. PASSAGE OF LINES 8-7. Definition A passage of lines is an operation in which an incoming unit attacks through a unit which is in contact with the enemy, or when a unit withdraws through another unit occupying a rearward position. Elements of the unit passed through remain in position and support a. The attacking unit until · their fires are masked, at which time they may remain in posi~ tion, be withdrawn, or committed to other action. b. The withdrawing unit and take up either the delaying mission of the withdrawing unit or the defense. 8-8. Planning Procedures a. General. The planning procedures involved when a division passes through another unit are very similar to those fo~ a relief in place. Upon receipt of a warning order which directs an operation requiring a passage of lines, the division commander and his staff will make early contact with the unit being passed through. Arrangements will be made to establish a division tactical command post in the vicinity of the command post of the unit to 'be passed through and for the initiation of planning conferences to work but the details of the passage. Liaison officers will be exchanged at all levels. b. Details To Be Coordinated. During the planning conferences, the following details must be coordinated by the co~andersofthe units involved: ( 1) Exchange of intelligence. (2) Exchange of tactical plans to include communication plans. ('3) Exchange of radio frequencies. ( 4) Arrangements for reconnaissance by elements of the units passing through. ( 5) Measures to be taken to provide security during the passage. (6) Selection of areas of passage and provisions for guides. (7) Priorities for use of routes and provisions for movement control. ( 8) The time or circumstances when responsibility for the control of the area of operations will be transferred to the unit making contact with the enemy. (9) Extent of fire support and other combat support to be provided by the unit being passed through. (10) Extent of combat service support to be provided by the unit ·being passed through. ( 11) Exchange of liaison officers. c. Selection of Areas of Passage. When possible, the areas selected for the passage of lines should be the unoccupied areas between elements of the unit in position or on its flanks. This procedure reduces the vulnerability that results when one unit passes directly through the occupied positions of another unit. Vulnerability also is reduced when the subordinate units of the division making the passage move directly to the areas of passage. d. Priorities for the Use of Routes. The unit passing through must have priority for use of routes to and within the area of the unit being passed through. Route priority should be established by the headquarters directing the passage of lines. Traffic control in the area of the unit being passed through ;is the responsibility of that unit until the responsibility for the area passes to the unit making contact with the enemy. The passing unit may augment the traffic control capability of the unit in position during the time of passage. e. Passage of Command. The time or circumstance when the responsibility for control of the zone of action or sector of defense is transferred to the commander of the unit executing the pass age of lines must 'be mutually agreed upon by the two commanders concerned. Normally, the commander of the unit making a forward passage of lines assumes responsibility for the zone of action at or prior to the time of -attack. This responsibility may shift at the time ·Of tlw firing of the preparatory fires or earlier at the direction of the headquarters ordering the passage. The commander of the unit in position l)1ay assume responsibility for the control of the sector at a specific time or during an operational phase, such as the rearward passage by the withdrawing force across a designated phase line. This transfer of responsibility requires that the commander making the passage assume operational control of those elements of the unit being passed through that remain in contact at the time of the transfer. f. Tactical Support. ( 1) The unit in position provides all possible aid to the unitpassing through, e. g., the gapping of minefields, provision of guides, fire support, and other combat support within its capabilities. (2) Normally, because of problems of control, only the indirect fire means of the-unit in position will be used to support the passing unit. After responsibility for the zone of action or sector of defense is transferred to the passing unit, the artillery commander of the passing unit coordi · nates the fires of the artillery of the unit which has been passed through. ( 3) It is desirable to employ the artillery of the unit making the forward passage to support the attack. However, if the attack is receiving nuclear support, it may not be necessary to increase troop density by deploring the artillery of the attacking unit in the forward area. In this case, the artillery of the unit in position supports the attack initially, and the artillery of the attacking unit is placed in rear positions ready to move to forward firing positions to support the continuation of the attack. ( 4) In the case of a unit making a rearward passage of lines, the withdrawing force will coordinate with the forces in position for artillery and other fires to support the withdrawing unit as it approaches the forward defense area. These fires are esp·e cially needed to assist the withdrawal of elements of the delaying force left in con tact with the enemy. g. Oombat Service Support. The unit in position provides assistance to the passing unit in combat service support matters as follows: (1) Evacuation of casualties and PW. (2) Civilian and straggler control. (3) Use of areas and facilities, e.g., water points, medical facilities. ( 4) Route priority and traffic control. ( 5) Evacuation of disabled vehicles, consistent with the capabilities of the unit in position. 8-9. Conduct of the Passage of Lines a. Forward PMsage of Lines. (1) Elements of the attacking division move preferably during periods of reduced visibility from rearward positions to attack at the scheduled time. Careful march calculations are made to insure that the units attack at the correct time without the requirements for use of a forwa.rd assembly area. This procedure reduces to the minimum the time in which elements of two units are concentrated in the forward area. (2) Ifthe attack subsequent to the passage of lines is preceded by a nuclear preparation, it will be necessary, because of different degrees of protection inherent in the at-· tacking division and the unit being passed through, to prescribe troop safety meas ures. (3) In some situations, it may be desirable to displace the reserves of the unit in position to rear assembly areas just prior to the beginning of the passage of lines. This procedure reduces troop density during the passage. Ifthis procedure is used, normally it will be prescribed by the headquarters ordering the passage of lines. b. Rearward PMsage of Lines. (1) When contact is made with the corps covering force, uncommitted units of the withdrawing division will begin a withdrawal straight to the rear within their sectors. Corps security forces then take up the defense or delay. Units in the withdrawing force will avoid using assembly areas, as this would result in an unacceptable density of troops in the forward area of the unit in position. Multiple routes designated and controlled by the commander of the unit in position are used to provide necessary dispersion and speed to the withdrawing force in movement through the forward defense area of the defense force. (2) While the division is withdrawing through the corps defensive positions, the withdrawing division is responsible for traffic control forward of the corps security area; the forces organizing the defense are responsible from the covering , force to their rear boundary, and corps from there to the withdrawing division assembly area or new position. 8-10. Passage of the Armored Division Through the Mechanized or Infantry Division a. In the passage of an armored division through a mechanized or infantry division, coordination is facilitated when the passage of each armored element takes place wholly within the lateral boundaries of one major subordinate element of the mechanized or infantry division. Transfer of responsibility for the area normally :will be unnecessary, due to the difference in unit mission. b. Special emphasis must be placed on the following coordination measures: (1) Refueling areas and routes into and out of these areas are reconnoitered by personnel from the passing unit assisted by guides furnished by the unit being passed • through. It may be necessary for the unit being passed to adjust its positions to permit a satisfactory passage, but such adjustments should be held to a minimum. ( 2) Clearing and marking the lanes through friendly minefields to permit the rapid passage of the passing unit are accomplished by the unit being passed through. Passing units should provide their own liaison officers at difficult gaps or defiles to check each subunit through. (3) Details of fire support to be furnished by the division being passed through must be coordinated. ( 4) Priority on roads normally is given to the passing unit consistent with the traffic essential to the support of other units. ( 5) Within its capabilities, the unit being passed through furnishes combat service support to the passing unit during and immediately after the passing. This support may include using medical facilities, handling PW, clearing roads of refugees, providing traffic control, and assisting in handling the dead, but normally will not include supply of petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL), or ammunition. Section IV. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE CHOICE OF RELIEFS PRIOR TO ATTACK 8-11 . General Frequently situations will arise within the division which require that a unit in contact be relieved prior to the initiation of an attack. This can be accomplished by a relief in place prior to the attack or a passage of lines. The foilowing paragraphs discuss the considerations affecting the choice of methods of relief. 8-12. Relief in Place When sufficient time is available, the reiief in place prior to an attack should be employed in those situations where- a. The unit being relieved is required in another area. b. The capa;bility of the enemy is such that the troop density involved in a passage of lines constitutes an excessive risk. c. The attacker requires more detailed familiarity with the terrain and the enemy situation. 8-13. Passage of Lines The passage of lines is preferred prior to the attack when a. There is insufficient time to conduct a relief in place. b. More flexibility is desired in the selection of the formation for the attack. c. The fire support of two units is desired in a particular area. d. A major change in the direction of attack is planned. e. It is desired to maintain continuous offensive pressure against the enemy. f. Speed can be achieved. g. It is desired to exploit the full capabilities of the attacking unit. 8-14. Applicable STANAG The material presented in this chapter agrees with STANAG-2082 (S 0 L 0 G-49R) (SEASTAG-2082)-Relief of Combat Troops. ( CHAPTER 9 OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS Section 9-1. General a. The division operates under any and all conditions. However, it may have to be augmented with additional equipment and/or specialized troops as required by the characteristics of the area of operations, the nature of the operations, I. GENERAL b. The principles stated elsewhere in this manual are applicruble to the tactical operations described in this chapter. However, techniques in the application of these principles may vary in conducting the operations under consideration. conditions under which the operations may be conc. Appendix I lists other references pertinent to ducted, or a combination of these factors. tactical operations discussed in this chapter. Section II. JOINT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 9-2. General a. Army divisions participate in joint amphibious operations as part of the Army component of an amphibious task force FM 31-11 sets forth basic joint doctrine governing the planning for and conduct of amphibious operations. FM 3112 sets forth the fundamental principles, doctrine, and procedures relative to the Army component of the amphibious task force, to include preparatory training. b. The composition and size of the Army component force (Army landing force) varies with the type amphibious operation, landing force mission, and the operational environment. The Army landing. force is a task force formed on a basic tactical organization varying in size from the lowest echelon capable of semi-independent operations to a field army. It may include ele ments of a division, a complete division, or several divisions of like or different types: c. Divisions of the landing force which execute assault landings are termed assault divisions. They are, in effect, a division task force, because the division is reinforced to provide required combat and interim combat service support pending establishment of normal support systems in the objective area. d. Infantry, mechanized, or armored divisions may be employed as assault divisions. However, infantry divisions are more readily adapted to lift in transport type ships and to ship-to-shore movement in assault craft and assault aircraft. The greater numbers of heavy vehicles in the mechanized and armored divisions necessitate a high proportion of landing ships, tank (LST), for their movement and landing. Mechanized infantry and armored divisions are well suited for landings over beaches already secured and for rapid advance inland in an exploitation role. e. In training for amphibious operations, emphasis is placed upon preparation of the division for participation in an amphibious attack which is the principal type of amphibious operation. The amphibious raid, demonstration, reconnaissance, and withdrawal-as secondary types of amphibious operations-will normally involve a force of less than division size. f. In amphibious operations, communications control is vital. This requires detailed planning among all of the amphibious forces. 9-3. Organization for an Amphibious Operation For an amphibious operation, divisions form temporary combat and combat service support organizations which are designated according to a standard pattern for the landing force. a. Organization for Landing. This is a temporary combat grouping of units under one commander for control and coordination during the assault. Assault divisions organize assault landing ~teams as the basic subordinate task forces of the ) division. A division in landing force reserve which must be prepared to execute assault landings also organizes assault landing teams. Assault landing team designations include prefixal words reflecting the echelon of the combat unit around which the task force is formed. For reference purposes, an assault landing team may be further identified according to the type of ship-to-shore movement means to be used. Type designations are as follows : Designations Surface movement Air movement Battalion landing team, BLT (S) BLT (A) (BLT). Brigade landing team, Bde Bde LT (S) Bde LT (A) (LT). The brigade landing team consists of two or more battalion landing teams. b. Organization for Embarkation. This is an administrative grouping of forces for the embarkation in ships and the overseas movement. Divisions form embarkation teams which consist of the troops, supplies, and equipment embarked in a single ship. Embarkation elements consisting of two or more embarkation teams grouped together to conform to the organization for landing are formed as required. A reinforced division normally constitutes an embarkation group with the division commander as embarkation group' commander: c. Organization of Shore Parties. A shore party is a task organization of the landing force formed to facilitate the landing and movement of troops, equipment, and supplies over the beaches; to evacuate casualties and P'V from the beaches; and to facilitate the beaching, retracting, and salvaging of landing ships and craft. It is comprised of elements of both the naval and landing forces. Specialized engineer shore assault units provide the command and control elements for the shore party. These units also furnish engineer personnel specifically trained for shore party operations and provide equipment suitable for beach development and expansion tasks. (See FM 5-144.) Other nondivisional units are attached to shore parties as dictated by operational requirements. Shore parties are usually attached to each assault echelon of the division when these echelons have the responsibility for establishing or operating a beach support area. This attachment terminates when the next higher echelon lands and assumes control of shore party operations. d. Organization of Airmobile Support Parties. An airmobile support party is a task organization formed for employment in a landing zone to facilitate landing and interim logistical support of elements in the zone. An assault division commander provides for organization of airmobile support parties by those landing teams which will execute initial assault landings in assault aircraft. Section. Ill. SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS 9-4. General a. Shore-to-shore operations involve short overb. Detailed guidance on shore-to-shore operawater movement by small forces using Army water tions is contained in FM31-12. craft or aircraft. These operations includer:. Army shore-to-shore operations normally will ( 1) Shore-to-shore attack. involve a reinforced division or smaller size force (2) Shore-to-shore withdrawal. employing primarily Army means for movement. ( 3) Shore-to-shore raid. A uniservice command structure normally is used. ( 4) Shore-to-shore deceptive operation. Navy and/or Air Force elements may be attached ( 5) Shore-to-shore reconnaissance. toor placed in support of the Army Force. Section IV. JOINT AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 9-5. General strategic mission. Normally, the ground forces are provided. by the Army and the airlift forces a. An airborne operation is an operation which are provided by the Air Force. The means eminvolves movement and delivery by air, into ployed may be any combination of airborne units, an objective area, of combat forces and their logistiair transportable units, and types of transport cal support for the execution of a tactical or a aircraft, depending upon the mission and the over all situation. Ground forces participating in an airborne operation are eith'er parachuted into the objective area or air landed therein or both. A simple administrative air movement personnel, supplies, and/or equipment is not termed an airborne operation, although some of the techniques employed in airborne operations may be applicable (e.g., techniques for preparing, loading and lashing supplies, or for preparing flight manifests). b. General considerations of joint airborne operations.are contained in FM 100-5. Detailed information on the planning and conduct of joint airborne operations is contained in FM 57-10. Technical information required for planning the air movement of troops and equipment is contained in TM 57-210. c. Movements by air are discussed in paragra:phs 10-35 through 10-38. 9-6. Air Transportability of the Division a. The airborne division has been designed primarily to perform joint airborne assault landings. Therefore, with the exception of a ·few bulky items, all of its equipment is air transportable in Air Force medium transport aircraft and can be delivered by parachute. b. The majority of the infantry division's equipment is air transportable in Air Force medium and heavy transport aircraft. Exceptions are tanks, tank recovery vehicles, the armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) and certain other items o£ engineer heavy equipment, and fixed wing aircraft. If within range, organic aircraft may be flown into the airhead. The infantry division, when appropriately tailored, is well suited to participate in joint airborne operations in the air landed role. c. Because their equipment-particularly main battle tanks and self-propelled artillery-is not air transportable, the armored and mechanized divisions normally do not participate in joint airborne operations. These divisions, minus heavy equipment, may be deployed by strategic airlift to an area where substitute equipment has been previously stockpiled. 9-7. Participation in Joint Airborne Operations a. GeneraL This discussion is applicable to infantry and airborne divisions when participating in joint airborne operations. b. Oorrvmand Relationships. The division may •. participate in joint airborne operations as follows: (1) Unified. cowmand. The division, by itself, or as a part of a larger Army echelon, may be part of a unified command established by an existing unified commander. Such a command is established when extensive airborne operations are anticipated, when a broad continuing mission for airborne forces is assigned, and when significant elements of two or more services are committed to such operations for an extended period of time. ( 2) J oifnt task force. The division, by itself, or as part of a larger Army echelon, may be part of a joint task force for a specific operation involving significant elements of two or more services. c. Role of the Airborne Division. The airborne is the basic, large, tactical airborne unit. It is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct frequent airborne assaults and therefore normally is the principal participating ground force unit during the assault phase of a joint airborne operation. Doctrine and guidance for employment of the airborne division in joint airborne operations are contained in FM 57-10. d. Role of the1nfantry Division. The infantry division may participate in joint airborne operations in the air landed role. Such participation may be alone or in conjunction with airborne assault operations of the airborne division. ( 1) The division may be air landed within an established airhead to assist in expanding the airhead, to assume responsibility for a portion of the airhead, to be an exploiting force or part of such a force, or to be a reserve force. (2) When conditions permit, normally as a result of nuclear fires or lack of enemy strength in the landing area, the division can conduct an air landed operation not preceded by an airborne assault by the airborne division. (3) Doctrine and guidance for the employment of. air landed units in joint airborne operations are contained in FM 57-10. e. Tactical Operations in the Objective Area. (1) Planning and execution of the airborne assault phase of joint airborne operations are discussed in FM 57-10. Doctrine for • employment of the division, as expressed elsewhere in this manual, is valid for the conduct of tactical operations following the assault. However, the following con siderations are included to emphasize certain limitations in the capabilities of the division when conducting operations in the objective area. (2) Because of the limited availability of tracked and wheeled vehicles, the mobility of the division is somewhat restricted. This must be considered in the determination and assignment of missions during execution. Judicious use of available Army aircraft will partially compensate for this limited ground mobility. (3) Because ·of the absence of tanks and other armor protected vehicles in the airhead and the phaseback of equipment, action must be taken to reduce the vulnerability of the division to attack by enemy armor. Maximum use of terrain obstacles, together with the rapid installation of minefields and other obstacles, helps protect the division under such circumstances. Mobile antitank weapons, Army aircraft armed with rockets and ATGM, and tactical air support further reduce this vulnerability. If available, additional antitank weapons are used to partially compensate for the lack of tanks. Section V. AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS 9-8. General a. An airmobile operation is one in which combat forces and their equipment move about the battlefield in aerial vehicles, under the control of a ground force commander, to engage in ground combat. The size of an airmobile operation is contingent upon availability of aircraft. Such an operation may vary from one involving the use of a squad to one involving one or more battalions. The type and weight of organic equipment in the airborne and infantry divisions make the combat and combat support elements of these divisions more suitable for battalion and larger airmobile operations than equivalent elements of the mechanized and armored divisions. b. The capability of the division commander to conduct airmobile operations enables him to ( 1) Increase the speed and flexibility of operations. (2) Pose a constant threat which may cause the enemy to dissipate his forces to protect vital installations and hold key terrain in rear areas. (3) Extend the area over which he can exert his influence. ( 4) Improve his rear area security. ( 5) Concentrate his forces quickly and effectively at critical points and redisperse them after accomplishing the mission. c. Appropriate missions for an airmobile force include- (1) Raids. ( 2) Antiairborne operations and operations against irregular forces. ( 3) Overobstacle assault operation. ( 4) Exploitation of nuclear fires. ( 5) Control of key terrain. (6) Blocking or screening enemy avenues of approach. (7) Feints and demonstrations. (8) Reconnai~ance and security missions. ( 9) Counterattack of enemy penetrations. (10) Reinforcement of threatened areas. ( 11) Economy of furce missions. 9-9. Basic Considerations a. Using its organic airlift capability, the division is capable of conducting company size airmobile operations. Larger operations require transport aircraft from corps or Army. b. Aviation support for 'airm6bile operations is provided by attachment, operational control for a specified period, direct support, or various combinations of these methods. The lowest echelon capable of oontrolling and coordinating the operation exercises control of supporting aerial vehicles in accordance with the overall plan. Normally, 'an aviation unit is placed in support of a ground combat unit with operational control of both units retained by the commander who directs and supports the operation. c. Limited airm6bile ope11ations can be conducted without full air superiority during periods of limited visibility or by using low level flight techniques. d. Terminal guidance, when required, may be performed by specially trained personnel in the unit being lifted (unit pathfinders) or by TOE pathfinder detachments assigned to field army. These units may be further allocated to corps or divisions as required. Consistent with security, pathfinders may be used in all airmobile operations, especially during periods of reduced visibility. Pathfinder detachments are trained and equipped to provide terminal guidance to aircraft, to assist in the assembly of troops, to reconnoiter and recommend drop or landing zones, and to reconnoiter and make radiological surveys of areas subjected to nuclear attack. Detachments can be delivered to the landing zone by parachute, aircraft, surface vehicles and craft, or they may infiltrate on foot. e. When possible, routes flown by aircraft avoid areas occupied by enemy forces. Ground or small airmobile patrols are useful in determining the safety of the routes and in securing them. f. Airmobile operations do not envision direct assault of heavily defended objectives. Forces land at nearby landing zones and control or destroy the assigned objectives in dismounted attacks. Nuclear or chemical fires may be used to eliminate enemy defenses. Armed Army aircraft provide escort and limited suppressive fires during debarkation and assembly of landing troops. g. A daylight airmobile operation permits more effective air 'and artillery support than one conducted at night and facilitates assembly o£ troops and equipment. However, darkness aids in achieving surprise and reduces the ~ffectiveness of enemy fire. 9-1 0. Planning Planning procedures for airmobile operations are discussed in detail in FM 57-35. a. To act quickly and efficiently, the commander must plan rapidly and issue 'brief, simple orders. Formal operation plans complete with annexes are prepared only for large-scale operations. For small-scale operations, a simple operation plan that includes a graphic presentation of the following may be used: (1) Scheme of ground maneuver, including linkup or withdra~al. (2) Flight route diagram (including, as appropriate, loading areas, air control points, initial points, release points, land ing/drop zones, times between control points, and primary and alternate routes) . • Whim an air movement plan annex is not prepared, the flight route diagvam may also show altitude and speed. (3) Air movement table (including, as appropriate, time and place of loading, aircraft allocated to units and aircraft loads, 'and times aircraft clear various ·control points). b. Use of unit standing operating procedures (SOP) covering the activities involved in airmobile operations will save time in launching an operation. SOP aircraft loads are developed in detail at squad, platoon, and company level. Generalloading plans are developed for company and battalion to indicate how many spaces are required to lift each unit (planning work sheet) . Loading plans are developed for each type aircraft and for several environmental conditions which would vary the lift capacity of the aircraft. c. Plans include the provision of electronic countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of enemy surveillance and fire control equipment. Detailed aerial reconnaissance and surveillance requirements in support of airmobile operations must be· prepared and included in the division aerial surveillance plan. d. Fire support planning includes the . use of artillery, chemical, and biological fires, close air support, and armed helicopters to destroy or neutralize the enemy's capability to deliver fires against the force en route to or in the objective area. e. Linkup planning is discussed in paragraphs 9-11 and 9-12. f. Alternate plans are prepared in the event that (1) Part of the force fails in its particular miSSIOn. (2) Signal communications are disrupted. (3) Weather conditions or enemy action prevent the use of designated routes or landing zones or interfere with landings. (4) Withdrawal from the objective area becomes necessary or desirable. ( 5) Reinforcement of units in the objective area becomes desirable. g. When airmobile operations involve retention of terrain in the objective area, the plan includes defensive measures to be taken. If necessary, a ~.. separate plan for defense of the area is prepared. \ h. Selection of the hour of landing is influenced / by-( 1) Enemy situation and capabilities (air and ground). (2) Predicted weather. (3) Visibility. (4) Availability of artillery, air, and nuclear fires. (5) Availability of ground and aerial vehicles. i. Timing of the operation with respect to ground operation is influenced by the ( 1) Depth of the operation. · (2) Capabilities and limitations of fire support agencies. (3) Expected timeoflinkup. ( 4) Availability of logistical support. Section VI. LINKUP OPERATIONS 9-11. General a. A linkup operation entails the juncture of two ground units. Such a juncture may occur in jo~t airborne, joint ~~:mphibious, shore-to-shore, or airmobile operations, during the relief of an isolated unit the breakout of an encircled force, the conver~ence of separate forces, on the linkup w~th U.S.-sponsored guerrilla forces, or other allied forces. b. The initial phase of a linkup operation is conducted as a normal offensive operation. As linkup becomes imminent, coordination and control are intensified, placing definite restrictions on the at -~'.• tacking forces. ' c. Because forces within an airhead or those cut / off by enemy action frequently lack staying power, time is often a critical factor. 9-12. Planning a. General. Planning for the linkup must be timely. Plans of the forces involved in the linkup are coordinated in advance. Provisions are made for' the prompt exchange of information between the two forces. The following factors should be considered in planning linkup operations: (1) Command relationships and responsibilities. ( 2) Command and staff liaison. (3) Coordination of schemes of maneuver. ( 4) Fire coordination measures. ( 5) Coordination of communications plans. (6) Actions following linkup. b. Corn;m;and Relatiunships and Responsibilities. The headquarters directing the linkup establishes the command relationships and responsibilities of the two forces. The linked-up force (hereafter called the stationary force) can be attached to the force making the linkup (hereafter called the linkup force), or the linkup force can be attached to the stationary force, or both forces can come under or remain under control of a higher commander. c. Com;mand and Staff Liai8on. Command and staff liaison between the two forces is essential. This liaison is initially established during the planning phase and is continued throughout t~e operation. As linkup becomes imminent, additional liaison personnel are exchanged to represent leading units and their supporting artillery. In the event that the operation entails linkup with allied forces, provisions must be made for interpreters or liaison officers with linguistic ability. d. Coordination of Schemes of Maneuver. Control measures are carefully delineated. Linkup points are selected at which physical contact between the two forces will occur. These points are mutually agreed upon ·and should be readily recognizable to both forces. They are located where the routes of advance of the linkup force intersect the security elements of the stationary force.· Alternate linkup points are established. Enemy action may force linkup to occur at places other than those planned. The number of linkup points established depends upon the capability of the stationary force, the number of routes being used by the linkup force, nature of terrain, and enemy threats to the operation. Troops manning the points, as well as the units contacting t~em, ~n.ust be familiar with procedures for mutual Identification and plans for the rapid passage of the advancing units. Assistance by the stationary force includes removing obstacles est1l.!blished to hinder enemy movement, providing guides, and reserving assembly areas for the reorganization of linkup forces. e. Fire Coordination, Measures. Fire coordination measures are established by the headquarters directing the operation. Neither force will deliver fires across the lines established without prior clearance of the other. As linkup becomes imminent, the fire coordination line (FCL) is moved as close to the stationary force as possible to allow maximum freedom of action to the linkup force. Both forces establish fire support coordination lines (FSCL). The FSCL of the linkup force may be separate from the stationary force in the early stages. As linkup becomes imminent, a single FSCL becomes applicable to both forces. Airstrikes not controlled by an air control team in the area between the two forces must then be cleared by both the linkup force and the stationary force. Normally, the initial FCL will become effective at the time a common FSCL is established (fig. 30). Upon linkup, a responsibility for fire support coordination for the force as a whole must be clearly established; responsibility for such coordination is that of the senior headquarters in the area or of the force having primary interest in the operations following linkup. See paragraphs 4-3 through 4-7 for discussion of fire coordination measures. f. OoordiMtion of SSee FM 55-30 for details of time, duration, frequency. b. A series of assembly areas is selected along all routes for _dispersal of units during planned halts. Units move into these areas for refueling and relief halts and to clear blocked or contaminated roads when ordered to do so. Movement into and out of assembly areas is rigidly controlled by unit commanders. These areas should be easily accessible to the routes of movement and should be large enough to permit dispersion of battalion size units. Camouflage discipline in such areas is very important. 10-21. Refueling on the March ·Commanders make plans for refueling en route. Halts for refueling take place in selected assembly areas if possible. Sufficient class III supplies are carried in unit trains, obtained from army supply points en route, or are· dispatched ahead of the movement to be on hand as required. 10-22. March Liaison a. Each march unit and serial establishes liaison with the preceding element in the column before crossing the •SP~ The liaison agent keeps his commander informed of the state of readiness of the preceding unit, delays that occur, and the time of departure of the preceding unit. Unless radio or listening silence is imposed,. liaison normally is accomplished by radio. When radio silence is imposed, wire and messengers (motor or Army aircraft) are employed. This type of liaison minimizes last-minute changes in march prders and enables each unit to start at the proper time. Italso eliminates the premature removal of camouflage materials, unnecessary consumption of fuel, and fatigue to personnel. b. Division headquarters e~tablishes liaison with higher headquarters to keep abreast of priorities on roads and critical points on the route of march. If there is a ·possibility of other units using or crossing the routes designated for movement of the division, liaison is established with these units at the earliest time possible. 10-23. Combat· Service Support a. Through timely coordination and planning, combat service support units provide for emergency repair, evacuation, and resupply on the move and after arrival at the destination. b. The division combat service support units move independently, when practicable, and generally OJ?. one or more interior routes. They may march to the location in a single move or may displace by echelon. c. For details of maintenance and procedures in the event of accident, see FM 55-30. 10-24. Night Marches Enemy air and nuclear capabilities and therequirement for secrecy frequently dictate movement at night or under conditions of poor visibility. In general, night marches are organized and conducted in the same manner as day marches; however, reduced visibility places greater emphasis upon control, security, liaison, and maintenance of direction. These aspects require careful prior reconnaissance, preparation, and suitable control measures. 10-25. Security a. The division-commander prescribes the security measures for the division. b. The armored cavalry squadron and the aviation battalion assist in providing security for the division. During a move involving the major portion of the division, these units are used actively under division control. For details of security during movement, see paragraphs 5-31 through 5-40. c. When a column halts for a short period, its advance, flank and rear guards establish march outposts. If the command is required to halt for a long period, it secures itself by means of an interior guard for internal security and an outpost system disposed to cover its front, flanks, and rear. Each column organizes its own outpost system. When important points outside the outpost system are to be secured, detached posts are established: The main body is disposed to ~unter enemy threats and facilitate the adoption of a predetermined defense. 10-26. Orders a. The operation order contains the instructions issued for the movement of units from one location to another within a stated period of time. This order normally is prepared after the completion of the necessary reconnaissance and an estimate of the situation. On occasion, the time available and the existing tactical conditions will not permit detailed planning or reconnaissance. Consequently, it is advisable for a division to have several march plans prepared in the form of an SOP: These plans can then be modified by fragmentary orders to fit the given situation. b. Conditions and time ·permitting, information in the operation order includes destination, routes, rate of march, maximum speeds, order of march, SP's, time of crossing the SP's, details of air and ground alert guards scheduled halts, vehicle distances, RP's, communications, location of the commander during the march, and strip maps. Additional details, such as route or unit markers to be used, control or checkpoints, and location of road guides, may be included if necessary. Certain items listed above often ar~ standardized and included in the unit SOP. Items so included are not repeated in the operation order. 10-27. Strip Maps A strip map is a schematic sketch containing useful information a•bout the route of march. A strip map should lbe included as an annex to the operation order. It is particularly useful to commanders of small units for organizational control. Strip maps should ·be reprpduced in quantity by the using units and supplied to key personnel. 10-28. Control a. The division commander establishes initial control of the march by designating in the order (1) The start and other critical points. ( 2) The time at which the heads or the tails of columns pass these points. ( 3) The rate of march. (4) Column gap between units. ( 5) The order of march. ( 6) The routes of march. (7) The assembly areas. (8) Phase lines and march objective if appropriate. (9) The locations of his command post. (10 Communications to be used for control of the march. ( 11) Military police traffic control posts. b. The ra·pid movement of forces requires effective control. Emphasis must be placed upon the movement control of divisional units and of corps ·and army units operating in the division zone. A movement plan or an SOP should provide for (1) Establishment of unit priorities and control of the movement to and on routes. Routes must be clearly marked and vehicle operators thoroughly briefed. (2) The granting of a clearance by the appropriate traffic headquarters prior to move.ment. ( 3) A surveillance system to check unit locations and march dispersion and to assist in controlling the march. o. March discipline and adherence to march techniques are necessary for the maintenance of uninterrupted movement and reduction of the vulnerability of the division. Army aircraft provide an efficient means of detecting and correcting violations. Consistent with tactical security, this system is used to the maximum. Units identifying themselves to aerial observers by displaying panels. Ground surveillance should be used for all marches. Staff officers at all echelons should be used to check and control columns. d. Efficient use of military police must be planned. Movement on multiple routes during . periods of poor visibility and the existence of major intersections, defiles, and detours along routes increase traffic control problems. Minimum essential traffic control posts should be used. In conjunction with control posts and consistent with tactical security requirements, aerial and mobile ground control teams can be used with each column. The aerial control team can land and control situations until relieved by a ground control team. Additionai military police support from higher headquarters should be requested when organic military police cannot handle the operation alone. Section Ill. MOVEMENTS BY RAIL ~\ ! 10-29. General the unit will entrain and will indicate the desired closing time at the unit's destination. Rail is an economical form of land transportab. The commander of the.tr.oops is responsible tion for moving large bodies_ of troops long disfor the preparation of plans and tables regulatingtances and should be used to the maximum extent loading. Details of the move are worked out withpossible. When rail facilities are limited, trucked, the transportation officer of the area in which theheavy, and oversized vehicles should receive primove originates. A central transportation moveority for rail movement. ments agency determines the routing. Contacts 10-30. Responsibilities by the moving unit with civilian or foreign government railroads are usually made through the Troop movements by rail are the joint responarea transportation officer. sibility of the transportation agency and the unit being moved. 10-32. Organization for Movement a. The transportation agency is responsible a. The sequence in which elements are moved isfor providing suitable transport equipmentdetermined by the availability of transportation,CONEX if required-loading and unloading the mission, and the situation which will confrontfacilities, and necessary technical guidance and the moving unit at its destination. The assignsupervision. ment of units to entraining points is determined b. The moving unit is responsible for its own by availability of suitable loading facilities, mainternal administration and control. It prepares terial to be loaded, and proximity of elements toand implements loading plans in accordance with entraining points. directives and in cooperation with the transportab. A transportation grouping consists of thetion agency. The· moving unit also provides troops, equipment, and supplies transported on onehousekeeping and local security troops for the train. Transportation groupings are organizedtransportation agency. to obtain the most economical loading unless tactical considerations dictate the maintenance of 10-31. Plans and Orders tactical unity. When tactical considerations a. When directing the movement of a unit by govern, each combat element should be accomrail, the order will designate the points at which panied by its own equipment and supplies. Section IV. MOVEMENTS BY WATER 10-33. General under naval command and provided with a naval a. Water transportation is the primary means escort to include air cover. by which oversea operations are established and 10-34. Responsibilities maintained. It is characterized by a large capac ity for personnel and tonnage, great range, coma. The responsibilities of the moving agency paratively slow speed, but a high rate of movethe Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) or ment. the U.S. Navy-are se.t forth in JCS Pub 3. For b. Waterborne movements are especially vulnerdetails relative to water transportation, see FM able to attackby hostile air, surface, and undersea 101-10. forces. When there is a possibility of enemy atb. The responsibilities of the unit being moved tack, vessels usually will be assembled in a convoy are the same as set forth in pa-ragraph 1Q-:30. Section V. MOVEMENTS BY AIR 10-35. General into an area inaccessible to other means of trans Air movement is a means of transporting units port. Movements by air may be either tactical or rapidly into battle or of delivering troops, supadministrative, or a combination thereof, dependplies, or equipment to a secured objective area or ing upon the contemplated employment of the force being moved. Movement by air capitalizes to and including the tactical airlift of one or more on the capability ,of the aircraft to overcome disbattalions. · ( tances and overfly geographical barriers, and is 10-37. Control of Army Aviation characterized by speed. Itis limited in its employArmy aviation units from higher headquarters ment by a low tonnage and cubage capacity, admay be attached, placed under the operational verse weather, inadequate air-landing facilities, control, or placed in support of the division. and enemy counterair activities. a. Strategic. Normally, the division will retain operational con Speed is maximized by air movetrol of such units; however, circumstances may ment. The division, less tanks, tank recovery verequire that control be passed to a lower level. hicles, armored vehicle launched bridges, and Delegation of operational control may be favored self-propelled artillery, can be moved to locations when throughout the world in a short time, thereby a. A subordinate unit is better able to plan, cocapitalizing on strategic surprise. The dhrision ordinate, and control the overall operation. can be moved by air independently or as part of an b. The planned operations do not transcend the airborne force. See TM 57-210 and FM 57-10 for area of responsibility of the unit conducting the information regarding air movement. operation. b. Tactical. Tactical movement by air is covc. The uni.t conducting the operation has boon ered in FM 57-10 and FM 57-35. assigned the responsibility for designating the mission to be accomplished by the airmobile force. 10-36. Army Aviation d. The unit conducting the operation has ade ·within the division, aircraft suitable for cargo quate communication facilities for control of and troop lift are assigned to the aviation batArmy transport aviation. · talion. Mobility of the division is improved by 10-38. Air Force Troop Carrier Support the batta.lion's support of the reconnaissance effort The division plans for operations employing and its use to move troops and supplies and to troop carrier a.ircraft to include maintaining upevacuate casualties. Since the division's airlift to-date requirements to move the division or its capability is limited, careful coordination and subordinate elements by various types of aircraft. planning are essential for its efficient use. Con When aircraft are not available in the quantities sideration is given to. the additional Army transrequired, elements which are not needed immediport aviation support available within the field . ately in the objective area are phased back to army. Plans for employing units using Army subsequent echelons. See TM 57-210 for technical transport aviation may encompass operations up information regarding air movement. Section VI. BIVOUAC AND ASSEMBLY AREAS 10-39. General ability and imminence of contact with the enemy. Security measures are taken in assembly areas as a. The division normally occupies a bivouac area required by the tactical situation. only when the possibility of contact with enemy c. The following may be performed while m1its ground elements is remot~. "Disposition of the are in an assembly area:units within the bivouac area is influenced by the (1) Issue orders. need for adequate dispersion to minimize the (2) Reorganize for combat. effects of an air or nuclear attack and for protec(3) Refuel and resupply. tion against guerrilla attack. Adequate security (4) Maintenance and decontaminati9n. measures are required for protection of any biv(5) Rest and relaxation of personnel. ouac area. b. An assembly area for a division is an area in 10-40. Selection of Bivouac and Assembly which its organic units assemble to organize and Areas prepare for further action. Unit dispositions are a. Bivouac Area8. The selection of bivouac influenced by the tactical situation, and the prob-areas depends more upon the availability of suit able space than upon any other consideration. The area must be large enough to permit adequate dispersion of subordinate units. The bivouac area ~hould be located to favor combat service support of the division. The transportation net within the area must ·be considered and should be adequate to support division traffic. Dispersion of unit areas .should be consistent with the factors of control and the minimizing effects of nuclear, air, and ground attack. Required dispersion normally is obtained ·between battalion assembly areas rather than by the dispersion of smaller units over the entire division area. b. Assembly areas. (1) The assembly area of a division under conditions of nuclear war normally is located either in the army service area or in the corps rear area. This area is •a general area within which are located the assembly. areas of the major elements of the division. The subordinate command assembly areas are specified by the division commander. Unit integrity is maintained in the assignment of the subordinate unit assembly areas. (2) In selecting an assembly area, the following factors are considered : (a) Whether the area is located to permit the contemplated employment of the unit to occupy it. (b) Whether the area is defensible against known enemy capabilities. ( o) Whether the area is large enough and of proper shape and ground conforma tion to allow the occupying unit sufficient protection and dispersion to preclude the loss of more than one battalion to a single nuclear weapon. (d) Whether the occupying unit will be 'able to establish the necessary communications. (e) Whether the nature of the terrain provides adequate trafficability, concealment, and physical facilities to accommodate the unit. 10-41. Occupation of Bivouac and· Assembly Areas An advance ·or quartering party normally pre . cedes the main body of the division into the bivouac or 'assembly area. Air defense, if required, is requested and furnished the advance party. The advance party improves entrances into and routes within the area and prepares the area for occupancy prior to the arrival of the division. Subareas ,are allocated and signs and guides are posted so that the march units can move into the area without halting. Both logistical and tactical considerations apply in the occupation of an assembly area. 10-42. Applicable STANAGS The materi,al presented in this chapter agrees with applica!ble portions of STANAG 2041 (SOLOG 51)-0perational Road Movement Orders, Tables, and Graphs and STANAG 21MDefinitions and Regulations for Military Motor Movements by Road. FM 1-60 FM 1-100 FM 3-5 FM 3-8 FM 3-10 (S) FM 3-10A FM 3-12 FM 5-1 (S) FM 5-26 FM 5-135 FM 5-136 FM 5-142 FM 5-144 FM 6-20-1 FM 6-20-2 FM 6-54 FM 7-11 FM 7-15 FM 7-20 FM 7-30 FM 8-10 FM 8-15 FM 8-35 FM 8-55 FM 9-1 FM 9-5 FM 9-30 FM 10-8 FM 10-50 FM 10-63 FM 11-21 FM 11-50 FM 11-57 FM 12-11 FM 14-8 FM 1-5 FM 1-15 ( \ APPENDIX I REFERENCES Army Aviation Organizations and Employment. Aviation Battalion, Infantry, Airborne, Mechanized and Armored Divisions. Army Aviation Air Traffic Operations-Tactical. Army Aviation. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Operations. Chemical Corps Reference Handbook. Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment. Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment (U). Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense. Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations. Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitons-ADM (U). Engineer Battalion, Armored, Mechanized, and Infantry Divisions. Engineer Battalion, Airborne Division. N ondivisional Engineer Combat Units. Engineer Shore Assault Units. Field Artillery Tactics. Field Artillery Techniques. 115mm Area Toxic Rocket Sys'tem. Rifle Company, Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized. Rifle Platoons and Squads Infantry, Airborne and Mech anized. Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry. Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades. Medical Service, Theater of Operations. Division Medical Service, Infantry, Airborne, Mechanized and Armored Divisions. Transportation of the Sick and Wounded. Army Medical Service Planning Guide. Ordnance Service in the Field. Ordnance Ammunition Service. Maintenance Battalion: Division Support Command. Air Delivery of Supplies and Equipment in the. Field Army. Supply and Transport Battalion: Division Support Com mand. Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theaters of Operations. Tactical Signal Communications Systems, Army, Corps, and Division. Signal Battalion, Armored, Mechanized, and Infantry Divisions. Signal Battalion Airborne Division. Administration Company, Airborne, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Divisions. Class A Agent Officers. FM 16-5 FM 17-1 ~I ___ FM 17-15 / FM 17-30 FM 17-36 FM 19-10 FM 19-15 FM 19-20 FM 19-25 FM 19-40 FM 19-60 FM 19-90 FM 20-60 FM 21-5 FM 21-6 FM 21-18 FM 21-26 FM 21-30 FM 21-40 FM 21-41 FM 21-48 FM 22-100 FM 24-16 --~ \ FM 24-17 FM 24-18 FM 26-5 FM 27-10 FM 30-5 FM 30-7 FM 30-9 FM 30-10 (C) FM 30-15 FM 30-16 FM 30-20 FM 30-101 FM 30-102 FM 30-103 FM 31-10 FM 31-12 FM 31-15 FM 31-21 (S) FM 31-21A FM 31-22 (S) FM 31-22A FM 31-25 FM 31-30 (C) FM 31-40 FM 31-50 (776--<~87 0--65-11 The Chaplain. Armor Operations. Tank Units, Platoon, Company, and Battalion. The Armored Division Brigade. Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units. Military Police Operations. Civil Disturbances and Disasters. Military Police Investigations. Military' Police Traffic Control. Enemy Prisoners of'War and Civilian Internees. Confinement of Military Prisoners. The Provost Marshal. Battlefield Illumination. Military Training Management. Techniques of Military Instruction. Foot Marches. Map Reading. Military Symbols. Small Unit Procedures in Chemical, Biological, and Radio logical (CBR) Operations. Soldier's Handbook for Chemical and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) and Nuclear Defense Training Exercises. Military Leadership. Signal Orders, Records, and Reports. Tactical Communications Center Operations. Field Radio Techniques. Interior Guard. The Law of Land Warfare Combat Intelligence Combat Intelligence, Battle Group, Combat Command, and Smaller Units. Military Intelligence,Battalion; Field Army. Terrain Intelligence. Intelligence Interrogation (U). Technical Intelligence. Aerial Surveillance-Reconnaissance, Field Army. Aggressor, The Maneuver Enemy. Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces. Aggressor Order of Battle. Barriers and. Denial Operations. Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Force). Operations Against Irregular Forces. Special Forces Operations. Guerrilla Warfare and Special Weapons Operations (U). U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (U). Desert Operations. Jungle Operations. Tactical Cover and Deception (U). Combat in Fortified and Build-up Areas. FM 31-60 River Crossing Operations. FM 31-70 Basic Cold Weather Manual. FM 31-71 Northern Operations. FM 31-72 Mountain Operations. (CM) FM 32-5 Communications Security (U). FM 33-5 Psychological Operations. FM 41-5 Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government. FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations. , FM 44-1 U.S. Army Air Defense Employment. (S) FM 44-1A U.S. Army Air Defense Employment (U). FM 44-96 Air Defense Artillery Missile Unit, Hawk (Battalion and Battery). FM 54-2 Division Logistics and the Support Command. FM 55-6 Transportation Services in Theaters of Operations. FM 55-30 Motor Transportation Operations. FM 57-10 Army Forces in Joint Airborne Operations. FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations. (S) FM 100-1 Doctrinal Guidance (U). FM 10Q-5 Field Service Regulations-Operations. FM 100-10 Field Service Regulations-Administration. (C) FM 100-20 Field SerVice Regulations-Counterinsurgency (U). FM 101-5 Staff Officer's Field Manual..:._,Staff · Organization and Procedure. FM 101-10 Staff Officer's Field Manual-Organization, Technical, and (Part I) Logistical Data, Part I-Unclasssified FM 101-31-1 Staff Officer's Field Manual-Nuclear Weapons Employment FM 101-40 Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense. (S) TC 3-7 Capabilities and Employment of Biological Agents (U). TC 5-2 Employment of Mobile Assault Bridging. (C) TC 17-7 Aerial Surveillance Platoon, Divisions and Armored Calvary Regiment (U). TC 31-35 Control of Gaps. TC 101-2 Tactical Operations Centers. TM 3-200 Capabilities and Employment of Toxic Chemicals. TM 3-210 · Fallout Prediction. TM 3-220 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Decontamina tion. ·· " TM 57-210 Air Movement of Troops and Equipment. (C) AR 1Q-122 U.S. Army SecUrity Agency (U). AR 105-31 Message Preparation. AR 22Q-10 Preparation for Oversea Movement of Units (POM). AR 22Q-58 Organization and Training for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Operations. AR 320-5 Dictionary of Uni~ed States Army Terms. AR 32Q-50 Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity .Codes. AR 638-30 Graves Registration Organization and.Functions in Support of Major Military Operations. · DA Pam 310-Military Publications Indexes. senes JCS Pub 1 Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage. JCS Pub 2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). • (C) JCS Pub 3 Joint Logistics an,d Personnel Policy Guidance (U). TOE 7E Infantry Division (July 1963). TOE 17E Armored Division (July 1693). TOE 37E Infantry Division (Mechanized) (July 1963). TOE 57E Airborne Division (August 1963). c¢) J - : APPENDIX II ORGANIZATION CHARTS Spt :&~~ 0~ ~~b] .Ll H&Q~ H&Q~~~ Sup & Trans HQ~ ~~ Band~~ n=J ~ (HJ) ~SH)(Towed) (105H) (Towed) ~--------~~----------~ * Number and type of combat HQ~ [Qj battalions may vary. H~~ ~ Figure 3~. Infantry di'Vision. !\ ) 1\,,_} ~~~ Spt :~~ G ~~~~ ~~~ Sup & ~Q~.~ rt-l Trans ~~~~ Band~ ~ct=J 8 r-o,,o (HJ) (155/SH) (SP) a (155H) (SP) • * Number and type of combat H&Q~ [9 battalions may vary. HQ~ ~ Figure 33. M echCllnized infantry division. o- "' - o-, o <:::) XX vs and guided missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons personnel. 2. Captured documents. Cryptographic material and documents containing information on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons delivered immediately to G2. Other documents through S2 except as below. All documents marked with date, time and place found or captured, including name and rank of PW. Docu (Classification) 195 (Classification) ments found on PW carried by prisoner's escort to division col lecting point. Technical documents found with captured equip ment kept with equipment. 3. Technical intelligence. a. Reports: Report_ of new. or unusual enemy equipment, armament, nuclear material, or CB agents forwarded immediately to G2 with brief description. Enemy material related to nuclear warfare evacuated only. to avoid recapture. Captured or crashed enemy aircraft reported immediately to G2 and guarded by discovering unit. b. Captured materiel evacuation: Captured enemy materiel will be evacuated to nearest maintenance collecting point. Maintenance -collecting point report receipt of materiel to division G2 and request. disposition instructions. c. Captured enemy material of new type or which may indicate new tactics or procedures or items suspected of being dangerous, promptly reported by capturing unit, inspected by technical intelligence team, and evacuated as directed by technical intelligence team. 4. Maps and terrain models. Requisitions in excess of prescribed allowance to support command (supply and transport battalion) through G2. 5. Weather. G2 obtains and disseminates weather reports to division staff and to major subordinate commands. a.· Normal weather reports will be furnished twice daily or as deemed necessary for operations. b. Special reports: ( 1) Aviation weather forecasts for division area and flight routes every six hours. (2) Reports every 2 hours to include winds and other data required for nuclear weapons employment fallout prediction. (3) Severe weather warnings accompany 2 hours reports or are broadcast as spot transmissions during intervals between reports. 6. Reconnaissance. a. General. (1) Flash message: Use flash message report for approach of enemy armor, aircraft, naval or amphibious landing craft, airborne troops, or enemy nuclear or CB attack. Include number, type, location, direction of movement, speed, altitude (if applicable), time observed, and identification of observer. For nuclear flash message report, see Annex C, (Actions to Minimize Effects of Enemy Nuclear Attack). (2) Report immediately: (a) Known or suspected enemy troop concentrations ''"hich may be suitable for nuclear attack, or indication of their existence or development. 196 (Classification) ·-----\ (Classification) (b) Enemy countermeasures including, but not limited to, issue of special protective clothing to troops in forward area, construction of unusually deep or covered foxholes, or special shelters defiladed in . rear of forward positions. (c) Indication of enemy use of nuclear weapons, such as presence of special troop units in area, registration of heavy artillery, limited withdrawal of forward units without any apparent tactical reason, use of smoke cover on own forward troops, use of missiles with HE warheads. (d) Effect of our nuclear and chemical weapons. Estimated enemy casualties, equipment, and vehicles destroyed or rendered unusable, extent of area affected, and any obstacles to our movement created. Air or surface burst and estimated ground. zero. (e) First contact with enemy; initial enemy artillery fire and marked change in volume of artillery fire; changes in enemy dispositions includes changes of company or larger .units, counter-attack indications, ·and change in enemy combat attitude; loss of contact; initiation of hostile attack, identification of new enemy units; location of barriers, enemy minefields, demolitions, obstacles, and other defensive works, information on CB activities; known or suspected espionage, sabotage, or subversion. b. Ground. ( 1) Ground patrol plans to G2 as soon as developed. (2) Constant surveillance of enemy activities and movement maintained by ground electronic units. Report loca tion of observation posbs and radar and primary sectors of ground radar sets to G2. (3) SHELREP, MORTREP, TOXREP and BOMREP to nearest. artillery headquarters immediately. c. Air. (1) Requests. Air requests for preplanned visual and pho tographic reconnaissance submitted to tactical air support element, TASE, by 1900 hours daily. Im mediate aer1al reconnaissance requests may be sub mitted at any time. (2) Reports. (a) Major subordinate commands forward organic aviation visual aerial reconnaissance reports to G2 air. (b) Pilot and observer personnel, regardless of the type mission flown, report to the TASE any intelligence observed while in flight. (Classification) 197 \. (Classification) (3) Briefings and debriefings. (a) Pilots, observers, or aerial photographers will be· briefed and debriefed by a representative of G2 air division airfield. (b) Requesting units be prepared to assist G2 air repre sentative in the briefing and debriefing of pilots, observers, or aerial photographers. 7. Counterreconnaissance and counterinfiltration. a. Civilians. Civilians infiltrating through division zone or sec tor to or from enemy occupied territory apprehended and turned over to intelligence personnel. b. Unoccupied areas. Unoccupied areas reconnoitered periodically, employing ground or air patrols as appropriate. Maximum use made of ground surveillance equipment. c. Night illumination. See Annex A, (Fire Support Coordination). 8. Counterintelligence. a. Units check evacuated installations, bivouac, and assembly areas to insure no classified or identifying material left in area. b. Pass system established in conformity with division security plan. Control measures and guard system inspected and tested frequently. c. CP and directional signs use assigned code titles. d. Known or suspected loss or compromise of codes or other classified material will be reported immediately to G2. e. Communication security: compliance with current SOI, SSI, and operation order. f. Daily aerial and ground visual or photo checks by all units to determine effectiveness of camouflage measures. g. Security instructions for nuclear weapons and delivery will be coordinated in the operation and counterintelligence plans. h. Recovery of any friendly personnel specially trained in nuclear warfare will be reported to G2 without delay. 1. Suspected enemy agents will be reported immediately to G2. J· E.ecovered U.S. or Allied military personnel claiming to have escaped from the enemy or evaded capture behind enemy lines will be evacuated immediately to division medical facilities and reported to division G2 for interrogation on a priority basis. k. Surrender of sizable number of enemy personnel or marked decrease in the combat effectiveness of enemy troops or units as a result of friendly use or threatened use of nuclear weapons will be reported to G2 without delay. 9. Elements isolated behind enemy lines. a. Elements isolated behind enemy lines take all measures to de fend against enemy or friendly conventional, chemical and nuclear fires. b. Using methods prescribed in Annex B, (Methods of Reporting Location of Units), and current SOI, report locations, 198 (Classification) (Classification) strengths, available communications equipment, maps available, and status of supply to parent headquarters. C. Procedures. 1. Fire support coordination. See Annex A, (Fire Support coordination). 2. Security. Division G3 coordinates defense against enemy ground, air, and airborne attack. Each unit responsible for own local security. G3 supervises rear area security. G4 supervises area damage control. Support command commander coordinates and executes rear area security and area damage control plans of that portion of the rear area essential to the efficient functioning of combat service support units. Additional security for protection of division nuclear delivery units to be provided as required; requests to G3. 3. Development of the situation. Units reconnoiter and clear resistance within capabilities. Reconnaissance security elements habitually locate. obstacle bypass for heavy vehicles. 4. Tactical operations. a. Contact maintained left to right, from supporting to supported units. b. Tactical air support. Requests for preplanned missions submitted to TASE not later than 1900 on the day prior to the desired activity. Immediate requests submitted any time. c. Unit progress. After contact with enemy, units report location of elements every two hours~ upon reaching assigned objective~ or crossing designated phase line or checkpoi:nt. d. Employment of nuclear weapons. ( 1) Nuclear allocation announced in the operations order. Allocation to commander is authority to fire. ·weapons larger than Davy Crockett may be allocated to brigade. Davy Crockett may be allocated down to battalion/ squadron or small task force. (2) Authority to fire miclear weapons retained by commander or designated representative. (3) Individual protective or other restrictive measures included in coordination instructions in operations order. ( 4) Risk criteria, unless otherwise directed by Division Commanding General: negligible risk for unwarned, exposed troops. · ( 5) Tactical damage assessment by ground and air OP reported following strike giving: (a) Approximate location actual GZ. (b) Whether fallout "·as produced. (c) Location of significant. obstacles. {d) If known, estimated enemy casualties, equipment and vehicles destroyed or rendered unusable, and extent of area affected. (6) Appendix 1 (Nuclear Strike Warning) to Annex A (Fire Support Coordination). (Classification) 199 (Classification) e. Engineer. Report immediately to the engineer element of the TOC the location of own and enemy minefields and other barriers and obstacles to include prepositioned nuclear weapons on standard Department of Army report forms by most expeditious means available. f. Chemical and Biological. (1) See Annex D (Actions to Minimize the Effects of Enemy Chemical and Biological Attack), for defensive measures. Offensive use only on order of division commander. (2) Chemical troop safety will be negligible risk for un.Protected troops. g. Smoke. See Annex A (Fire Support Coordination). h. Defense against air attack. (1) Aircraft fired on only when hostile markings are plainly visible or when aircraft commits hostile act. (2) Maintain dispersion of vehicles and ground installations at all times. 1. Bomb and shell disposal. Units mark location of dud shells and bombs and report location to division support command in six digit coordinates. Use flash rhessage report for suspected dud nuclear weapon. Establish safety precautions. j. Actions to minimize effects of enemy nuClear, chemical, and biological attack, see Annexes C and D. D. Techniques. 1. Orders. a. Fragmentary orders normal during operations. Maximum use of overlays, tables, and. charts. Written orders when time permits and for record. b. Nuclear fires will be planned and target analysis will be prepared in division Fire Support Element (FSE) of TOC, based on applicable portions of corps plans, weapons allocated to division, and coordination between the division G3 and the FSCOORD. Necessary information will be included in appropriate annexes to plans and orders (fire support, air support, barrier, etc). c. Warning order to own troops for friendly nuclear and chemical attack: ( 1) Time of attack for scheduled fires will be disseminated in the OPORD and appropriate fire plan. Procedures for warning of on-call fires and fires on targets of opportunity see Appendix 1 to Annex A (Fire Support Coordination) . (2) Postponement of nuclear and chemical attacks. Transmit in clear by fastest communications means available the message "Tarry, target number in structions later" followed by transmission of appropriate instructions. 200 (Classification) (Classification) 2. Reports. The following reports will be submitted by major commands, separate task force, and separate units: a. Intelligence (para liB) . Report How submitted and precedence Time Flash message report all By expeditious means----,,. At once. types. flash. BOMREP, SHELREP,.~. Radio, radioteletypewriter, At once. and MORTREP. or telephone-immediate. INTSUM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ·Radio, radio teletypewriter, As of 0600, 1200, or messenger-routine. 1800, and 2400 daily. Radioactive and toxic By expeditious meansAt once. contamination. immediate. b. Operations Unit progress report____ By expeditious meansSee para IIC4c. immediate. Loss of contact with By expeditious meansAt once. friendly units. immediate. SITREP_____________ _ Message form-routine___ _ As of 1800 daily; reach division headquarters by 2200 daily. Command report (to in-Formal written report-As of 2400 end of elude intelligence, op-routine. each month by erations, logistics, civil 5th of following affairs, and personnel). month. E. Special considerations. 1. Actions to minimize effects of nuclear attack. See Annex C, (Actions to Minimize Effects of Enemy Nuclear Attack), 'vith Appendices 1, 2, and 3. 2. Fallout, radiological monitoring, and survey. See Annex E, (Prediction of Fallout, Radiological Monitoring, and Survey). 3. Army aviation. See Annex G (Army Aviation). 4. Chemical and biological operations. See Annex D (Actions to Minimize the Effects of Enemy Chemical and Biological Attack). 5. Mobility. a. March organization. Division moves in march column (multiple routes when available) preceded by reconnaissance element, normally in six major march serials: three brigades, division artillery (-), division troops, and support command. Maximum use of darkness. b. Control. March serials provide own security. Prior reconnaissance (routes and assembly areas) ; organizational traffic control; guides; and posting and removing route markers are responsibility of serial commander, supplemented (for main routes) ·and coordinated by division. Report hourly location (Classification) (Classification) of heads of march serials. Annex B; (Methods of Reporting Location of Units). c. Priority. Nuclear delivery units, tactical troop movements, ambulance, ammunition vehicles, construction crews, staff cars, and messenger v~hieles. d. Density and rate. (1) Night. Close column 20 meters between vehicles, (density 75 vehicles per mile) at average speed 10 MPH. Maximum speed H) MPH. (21 Daylight. Open column 75 meters between vehicles (density 20 vehicles per mile) at average speed 15 MPH. Maximum speed: wheel, 25 MPH, track, 20 MPH. (3) Infiltration. Irregular dispatch, 3 vehicles per mile at 12to20MPH. ( 4) Time interval. Company is the basic march unit. Time interval between company march units: 2.5 minutes; between battalion march serials: 5 minutes; between major march serials:15 minutes. e. Halts. Halt time stated in march order based on 15 minutes after each 1% hours of march. Keep road clear. Commander determine cause of all unscheduled halts and take appro .priate action. Refueling halts are prescribed. Crews make maintenance check. DisaJbled vehicles displ'ay yellow flags. f. Lights. Blackout forward of army light line~ Use of infrared authorized. · · g. Passing. Only when column is halted, except control, recon . haissance, general officer, messenger,·. medical vehicles, and vehicles displaying red emergency flags. Convoys pass only on permissionof halted column cqmmander. h. Vehicle ,marking. Lead vehicles· of serial carry blue flag. Rear vehicles in serial carry green flag . .I. Accidents. Officers at tail of each .march unit investigate and take necessary action. . · J. Guards... Air .guards in all vehicles. Traffic guards will be posted at'head ·and tail of each halted march uni"t. 6. Barriers and division blocking positions. Respefense---------------------------------------------------------------------------------6-16a 87 I>elaying action ____________________________________________________________________ 7-18f, 7-19c 118 Element, tactical operation center ______ -_______________________________ -_-_________________ 4-3c 18 Night combat____________________________________________________________________________ 5-58e 73 Offense-------------------------------------------------------------------------------5-9, 5-28 44,51 Passage of lines __________ -~-_______ ---------___ -_---_-_-----_---__ -------__ -_-________ 8-8b, f 126, 127 Penetration______________________________________________________________________________ 5-43 62 Plan____________________________________________________________________________________ 4-4 18 Relief in place __________________________________________________________________________ 8-4b(8) 125 Requests_________________________________________________________________________________ 4-5 19 Retrograde __________ -_______________________________________________________ ._____________ 7-7a 105 WithdrawaL ______________________________________________________________ 7-11a(8), 7-lle, 7-13d 108, 109, 113 Fixing force ___________________________________________________________ 6-9, 6-15e, 6-18b, 6-20, 6-23f, i 82, 86, 88, 93, 94,97 Flank guard_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 5-34d, 7-22b 58, 122 Follow and support units__________ c ___________________________________________________ 5-52!, g, 5-53b • 69 Forms of maneuver____________________________________________________________________________ 5-4 42 Fortified areas, combat in _________________________ .. ______________________________________ 9-2G-9-22 141 Forward defense area___________________________________________ 6-9,6-14, 6-15e, 6-17d, 6-20d, 6-21,6-22 82, 84, 86, 88, 93,94 Forward edge of the battle area _______________________________ 6-9, 6-lld(2), 6-14, 6-15e, g, 6-22, 6-26 82, 83, 84, 86, 94,99 Frontages I>efense________________________________________________________________________________ _ 6-3 80Offense_________________________________________________________________________________ _ 5-11 45 General outpost I>efense-----------------------------------------------------------------------------6-8,6-15d 82, 85 Graves registration _____________________________ -_-_____ -___ -_-_-___ -_-_-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4-47-4-48 38 Guerrilla warfare ____________________________________________________________________ c ___ 9-38-9-40 149 I>efense against guerrillas _____________________ ---_-----___ ---___________________ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 6-32 100 Operations against guerrillas_________________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9-40 149 Headquarters and headquarters company, division_______________________________________________ 3-2 13 Helicopters, armed ______________________ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4-5e 20Holdingforce________________________________________________________________________________ 5-45b 63 Illumination_________________________________________________________________________________ 5-58d 73 Initial delaying position _____________________________________________________________ 7-15, 7-19-7-20 lip, 118 Infantry battalion____________________________________________________________________________ 3-11 16 Infiltration I>efense against--------------------------------------------------------------------------6-31 100 Offensive______________________________________________________________________ 5-4a, 5-59-5-61 42, 74 Involuntary withdrawaL______________________________________________________________________ 7-13 113 Joint airborne operations ___________________________________________________________________ 9-5-9-7 131 Joint amphibious operations________________________________________________________________ 9-2-9-3 130 Jungle, combat in____________________________________________________________________________ 9-:n 144 259 .Paragraphs Pages Key terrain _____ -----------------------------------_--------__ ------__ ---___ -----____________ 5-7e 43 Lake areas, combat in________________________________________________________________________ 9-27 143 Landingforce-----------------------------------------------------------------------------9-2--9~3 130 • Landing, organization for ______ -_____ -______ ~_________________________________________________ 9-3 130 Leaflets-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4-36 36 Leaves and passes----------------------------------------------------------------------------4-43c 38 Legal services________________________________________________________________________________ 4-44 38 Liaison Brigade_________________________________________________________________________________ 2-14 8I>ivision_________________________________________________________________________________ 2-8d 8 ~arch column___________________________________________________________________________ 10-22 155 Passage of lines _____________ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 8-8 126 Limitations, division ________ ---_---_--------_______________________________________________ 1-5--1-9 3Line of departure____________________________________________________________________ 5-29d,6-18d(2) 52,89 Link up operations----------------------------------------------------------------------9-11--9-12 135 Logistical operations__________________________________________________________________________ 2-8c 8 Loudspeakers________________________________________________________________________________ 4-36 36 ]Jain attack---------------------------------------------------------------------------5-12b,5-42 46, 61 ]Jain bodY-----------------------------------------------------------------------------5-34e, 7-22 58, 122 ]Janeuver, forms and choice __ ~------------------____________________________________ ~ ______ 5-4--5-5 42 ]Jap, strip______________ -------------------------------------------__________________________ . 10-27 156 ]Jarch Column·organization---------------------------------------------------------------------10-18 154 IIalts-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------10-20 155 ~ight ___________________________________________________________________________________ 10-24 155Rate____________________________________________________________________________________ 10-19 154Refueling _______________________________________________________________________________ 10-21 155 SecuritY---------------------------------------------------------------------------------10-25 155 Serials ___ -----·------------------------------------------------------__ ~_-_______________ 10-18 154 Units-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------10-18 154 ]Jechanized infantry battalion _____ -----_______________________________________________________ 3-12 16 ]Jedical battalion____________________________________________________________________________ 4-38 36 ]Jedical support __________________________________________________________________________ 3-8,4-38 15,36 ]Jeetingengagen1ents--------------------------------------------------------------------5-39--5-40 59 ]Jilitary intelligence detachment _______________________________________________________________ 4-13b 24 ]JiJitary police Cold war situation ___ --------___ --------_______________________________________________ 9-37a(9) 148 CompanY----------------------------------------------------------------------3-3,4-30--4-31 13, 34 I>efense_________________________________________________________________________________ 6-17b 88]Jotor march ____________________________________________________________________________ 10-28 156Support____________________________________________________________________________ 4-30--4-31 34 ]Jission_______________________________ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1-3, 5-6, 5-21, 9-8c 3, 42, 50, 133 ]Jobile defense (see also I>efense) ________________________________ 6-5,6-11--6-14, 6-15b(1), 6-15e(2), 6-21 81, 82, 85, 86, 93 ]JobilitY--------------------------------------------------------~---------------------------5-10 45 ]Jorale____________________________ ------------_____________________________________ 4-43, 5-57b, 7-9 38, 71, 108 ]Jotor marches------------------------------------------------------------------------10-8--10-28 152 ]Jountains, combat in________________________________________________________________________ 9-29 143 ]Jovement to contact ____________________________________________________________________ 5-31--5-38 56 ]Jovements (see Troop movements) ]dud, combat in-----------------------------------------------------------------------------9-33d 145 ~aval gunfire--------------------------------------------------------------------------------4-5d 19 ~ight combat___________________________________________________________________________ 5-56--5-58 71 ~ight n1arches-------------------------------------------------------------------------------10-24 155 ~o-fire line----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4-7b 20 ~orthernoperations--------------------------------------------------------------------------9-33· 145 / Nuclear considerations Paragraphs Pages Counterattack---------------------------------------~---------------------------6-18d(4),6-23k 89,97 Defense_____ -----______ -----______________________________________________ 6-12b(6), 6-15i, 6-16a 84, 86, 87 Relief in place___________________________________________________________________________ 8-6 125 Nuclear fires (see also Fire support) Counterattack-------------------------------------------------------------------6-18d(4),6-23k 89,97 Defense_______________________________ -----________________________ ---____ 6-12b(6), 6-15i, 6-16a 84, 86, 87 Delaying action ______ ~ _______________________________________________________ 7-14h, 7-19/, 7-20d 116, 118, 120 Exploitation___________________________________________________________________________ 5-51e, h 68 Night combat ____________________________________________________________________ 5-57e, f, 5-58e 72, 73 Offense_______________________________________________________ 5-2a, 5-7b,5-9b,5-12c,3,5-18,5-23 41, 43, 45 62,63 Penetration--------------------------------------------------------------------~-------5-43b,e Pursuit _________________________________________________________________________________ 5-54b 69 Reconnaissance in force ____________________________________________ -_-_-_____·_____________ 5-62b 77 Requests--------------------------------------------------------------------------------4-5a 19 Retrograde-----------------------------------------------------------------------------7-7a,b 105 WithdrawaL ____________________ -----_·_----_____ --_---_----------------___________ 7-11e, 7-13d 109, 113 3 Nuclearwarlare_c------------C---------------------------------------------------------------1-2a Objective Counterattack _____________________ -----------_____ -_____ ---__ ------------____ -----_ 6-18d(2) (b) 89 Envelopment______________________________ -_______________________ -----_____ -~_ 5-46b, d, e, 5-47d 63, 64, 66 Exploitation _________________________ -------______________ ---_-_-_~--_-____________ 5-51a, 5-52b 68 Infiltration ______________________________________________________________________________ ~60d 74 Night combat____________________________________________________________________________ 5-58c 73 52 Offense----------------------------------------------------------------------------------5-29c Penetration______________________________________________________________________________ 5-42 61 69 Pursuit----------------------------------------------------------------------------5-53--5-55 41 Offense----------------------------------------------------------------------------------5-1--5-65 Basic considerations__________________________________________________________________ 5-6--5-20 42 Choice of maneuver______________________________________________________________________ 5-5 42 Concept ____________________________________________________________________ ·_____________ 5-2 41 Coordination and control oL _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 5-29 52 41 Fundamentals---------------------------------------------------------------------------5-3 Orders__________________________________________________________________________________ 5-29b 52 Planning_______________________ .____ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 5-21~5-30 50 Order of march ______________________________________________________________________________ 10-18 154 Organization, division_____ -________________________________________________________ 1-5--1-9, App II 3, 164 Organization for amphibious assault_ __ _ _ _ ____ _ _ ____ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ ___ _ _ ___ ___ __ ___ _ 9-3 130 Organization of the march column ______________________________________________________________ 10-18 154 Organization for combat 82 Area defense-----------------------------------------------------------------------------6-6 Brigade__________________________________________________________________________ -.--____ 3-16 17 Counterattack ______________________________________________________________________ 6-18b,6-23 88,94Defense_______________________________________________________________________________ 6-11d(5) 83 Delaying action _____________________________________________________________________ ~____ 7-18 118 Envelopment____________________________________________________________________________ 5-46 63 Mobile defense___________________________________________________________________________ 81 ~5 ~34 Movement to contact_____________________________________________________________________ 57 17,47 Offense------------------------------------------------------------------------------3-16, ~13 Reconnaissance in force______________________________________________________________ 5-63c, ~64 77 Organization of ground 82,84 Defense------------------------------------------------------------------------6-7--6-10,6-13 Delaying action________________________________________________________________ 7-17, 7-19--7-20 117, 118 261 Organization of staff Paragraphs Pages Brigade____________________ -------------------.------------------------------------------2-13 8 I>ivision________________________________________________________________________________ • 2-7 7 Passage, armored division through mechanized or infantry division_____ ~___________________________ 8--10 128 Passage of command ____________________ ----------------------------------------__________ 8--4b, 8-8e 123, 126 Passage of lines _______________ -----------------------------------------------------------8--7-8--10 126 Penetration_____________________ ---------------------------------------------------5--4b, 5--41-5--44 42, 60 Personnel and administration ____________ -----------------------------------------________ 4--39-4-46 36 Personnel services___________________ -__ --------------------------------------_-_-_____ -_~ 4--40, 4--43 37, 38 Phase lines ______________________________ ---------_---------------------5--29i, 7-15, 7-19, 7-5a, 10--28a 53, 104, 116, 118, 156 51 Phasing-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5--27 Postalservices-------------------------------------------------------------------------------4--43b 38 Preparation fires (see Fire support) Preparation time, motor march________ -----------------------------------------------------__ 10-13a 153 Prisoners of war_______________ ---------------------------------------------------------4--31h, 6--17b 35,88 Provost marshaL________________ -------------------------------------------------------------4--30 34 Provost marshal, troop movements responsibility ___ ------_---------------------------_--_________ 10-ld 151 Psychological warfare___________ ---------------------------------------------------------4--36---4--37 36 Pursuit--------------------------------------------------------------------------------5--53-5--55 69 Radio frequency assignment______ -------------------------------------------------------------4--24a 29 Radiological monitoring and survey ______ ------------------------------------------------------_ 4--18 25 29 Radio nets----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4--24e Radio relay__________ -______ -----------------------------------------------------------------4--24c 29 Radio/wire integration___________________ ---·-------____ -------------------------______________ 4--24! 29 138 Raids---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9-13 Rail movement ____________________ -------------------------------------------------_-10--29-10-32 157 Rate of march _______________________ -----------------------------------------__ 10--9h, 10--19, 10--28a 152, 154, 156 Rear area security _______________ -----------------------------------------------------------_-6--33 101 Rear echelon_________________________________________________________________________________ 2-19 11 Rear guard ____________________________________________________________________________ 5--34d, 7-22b 58, 122 23 Reconnaissance------------------------------------------------------------------------------4--12 Armored cavalry squadron_________________ ----____________ -_-_-_-----_---__________ "_____ 3-5 14 I>efense___________________________________________________________________________ 6--1lc, 6--13b 82, 84 77 Inforce----------------------------------------------------------------------------5--62--5--65 Night combat_____________________________ ----___________ ----_-_---------__________ 5--57d, 5--58b 72 Relief in place ________________________ --_-----_____ -_-_-_-----------------______________ 8-4b(4) 124 Retrograde------------------------------------------------------------------------------7-6 104 Route___________________________________ ------____________ ---___ ---------__________ 10-9, 10-11 152 Release point, motor march _______________________ -_____________________ -__________ 10--9, 10-15, 10-28a 152, 154, 156 Relief in place _______________________________ --_---_________________ ---------________ 8-3-8--6, 8--12 123, 128 Relief operations ________________________ -__ -------____________ --____ ---------____________ 8-1-8--13 123 37 Replacements--------------------------------------------------------------------------------4--41 122 Retirement-----------------------------------------------------------------------------7-21-7-22 Retrograde operations_ _ _ _ ________________________________________________________________ 7-1--7-22 103 103 Types-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------7-2 Reserve 82 Areadefense-------------------------------------------------------------------------6--6,6--10b 82 Assembly areas--------------------------------------------------------------------------6--10 I>efense___________________________________________________________________ 6--10, 6--15!, 6--18, 6--23 82, 86, 88,94 I>elaying action_____________________________________________________________________ 7-18-7-20 118 Envelopment---------------------------------------------------------------5--46d, 5-47d,h, 5-48 64, 65, 66 Mobile defense_______________________________ ----______________________ --_____________ 6--5, 6--10 81,82 t Reserve-Continued Paragraphs Pages ~ Offense---------------------------------------------------------------------------------5-12 46 61,63 Penetration-------------------------------------------------------------------------5-42d,5-44 109 VVithdrawal-----------------------------------------------------------------------------7-11d Reserve area, defense_-----__________________ -----_____________ -----___ ---_----_______________ 6-10 82 River line, combat at ______________________________ ---___________________________________ 9-17-9-19 140 Road movement graph ________________ ---------------------_---------_-------__________ 1Q-13c, 1Q-16 153, 154 Road movement table ___________________________ --____________________ ----_______ 10-13c, 10-16, 1Q-17 153, 154 Roles, division _____________________________ ------____________ -___________ -_-____________ 1-4, 9-7c, d 3, 132 38 Rotation------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4-43c Route reconnaissance _______________________ --"---__________________________ -----________ 1Q-9, 1Q-11 152 Route selection, motor marches ___________________________________________________________ 1Q-9, 1Q-12 152, 153 140 Ruses---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9-16 Security 82 Area------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6-8 80 I>efense---------------------------------------------------------------------------------6-3b Forces, defense---------------------------------------------------------------------------6-15d 85 155 ~arch----------------------------------------------------------------------------------1Q-25 ~ovelllentto contact---------------------------------------------------------------------5-36 58 47 Offense---------------------------------------------------------------------------------5-14 124 Relief in place--------------------------------------------------------------------------8-4b(5) 122 Retrrement------------------------------------------------------------------------------7-22b Retrograde------------------------------------------------------------------------------7-6 104 12 Signal----------------------------------------------------------------------------------2-28 Security area, defense _______________ -------------------------------------------------~--------6-8 82 Security forces I>efense _________________________________ ----________ -----_-_---_-------______ 6-8, 6-15d, g, 6-20 82, 85, 86,93 Sequence of relief ___________________ -------------_---__ ----------------------_-__ ----___ --8-4-8-5 123 Serial, march ____________________________ --___ ---________________ -___ -_-___ -__________ 1Q-18b, 1Q-22 154, 155 Shore to shore operations _____________ -----------------------------------------_______________ -9-4 131 131 Shore partY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------9-3c Signal battalion_______________________________ -_________________________ -________ 3-7, 4-23, 9-37 a(6) 14, 27, 148 Signal communication (see Communication) 43, 87 Smoke---------------------------------------------------------------------------------5-7c,6-16e Snow, combat in _____________._______ --_----------__ --_-_--------------------_________________ 9-33d 145 Special warfare operations _______________ -_--------________ -___ -___ ---_-------____________ 9-38-9-40 149 Spoilingattack_______________________________________________________________________________ 6-19 93 Staff Brigade----------------------------------------------------------------------------2-12--2-14 8 I>ivision______________________________________________________________________________ 2-6--2-8 6 Staff Judge Advocate-------------------------------------------------------------------------4-44 38 Standing operating procedure _____________________ -________________________________________ App III 192 Start point, motor march ____________________________________________________ 1Q-9, 1Q-13, 10-14, IQ-28a 152, 153, 156 Steppes, combat in___________________________________________________________________________ 9-28 143 Straggler controL____________________________________________________________________________ 4-31c 34 Strip map_____________________________________________________________________________ 1Q-9j, lQ-27 152, 156 46 Supportingattack----------------------------------------------------------------------------5-12c Envelopment _______________________________________________________________________ 5-45--5-48 63 Penetration_________________________________________________________________________ 5-41-5-44 60 Support command-------------------------------------------------------------------------1-5d,3-8 4, 15 Area damage control _________________________________________________________________ 2-19d,6-34 11,101 Commander's responsibility for troop movements____________________________________________ 1Q-1b 151 Rear area security--~-_______________________________________________________________ 2-19d, 6-33 11, 101 Paragraphs Pages 25, 88, 100 Surveillance-----------------------------------------------------------------------4-15,6-16h6-31 Swamps, combat in__________________________________________________________________________ _ 9-27 143 • Tactical air force (see also Air support) Reconnaffisance _________________________________________________________________________ _ 4-12c 24 Tactical cover and deception: Intelligence support _________________ -_-_-___ -___________________________________________ _ 4-17 25 5-15 48 Offense--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Relief operations ________________________________________________________________________ _ 8-4b 125 7-6h 105 Retrograde----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1Q-2a 151 Tacticalmove---------------------~--------------------------------------------------------- Tactical operations center : Division _______________________ -------------_____________ ---__ ----_-_--_________________ 2-8b 7 Fire support element__" __________ ------------_____________________________________ _ _ 4-3c, 4-lla 18,23 G2element-----------~------------------------------------------------------------------4-12c 24 Tactical air support element____ -----------------_______________ ---_---___________________ _ 4-12c 24 Tailoring (see also Organization for combat)-_______ -____________ ------__________ -----__________ _ 1-5 3 Tank battalion------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3-13 16 Target acquffiuion----------------------------------------------------------------------------4-14 24 Technical service intelligence detachments__ -----------_________________ --_______________________ 4-13b 24 Terrain Defense-------------------------------------------------------------------6-12b(3), 6-13, 6-14c 83, 84, 85 142 Extreme---------------------------------------------------------------------------9-26--9-33 43 Offense---------------------------------------------------------------------------------5-7 Retrograde------------------------------------------------------------------------------7-4 103 Time distance, motor march______ -__ ------------------_---___ ----------------_________________ lG-13 153 Time length, motor march----.-_____ ---------------------___ ------------------_________________ lQ-13 153 Time of attack____________________ -_-------------_-_-_-_-----__ --_-__ ----_--_________________ 5-29e 52 Time to plan the defense ______________ --_-_-------___________________ -________________________ 6-12 83 Traffic control--------------------------------------------------------------------------4-31b,4-34 34, 36 Motor marches _________________ --____ --_---------__________ ---_---__________________ lG-9, lQ-28 152, 156 Passage of lines--------------------------------------------------------------------------8-8 126 Trafficregulation-----------------------------------------------------------------------------4-34 36 Training, cold war situations ____________________ -_-____________________________________________ 9-36c 147 Transportation, ground__________________________________________________________________ 4-34--4-35 36 Troop movements----------------------------------------------------------------------10-1--10-41 151 }Ur ______________________________________________________________________________ 1G-35--1G-38 158 Classification____________________________________________________________________________ lQ-2 151 !tail_____________________________________________________________________________ lG-29--lQ-32 157 157 VVater---------------------------------------------------------------------------lG-33--lG-34 Turningmovement------------------------------------------------------------------------5-4,5-49 42,66 Unconventional warfare_______________________________________________________________________ 9-40 158 U.S. Army Security Agency division support company __________________________________________ 4-13b(2) 24 Voluntary withdrawaL ___________________________________________________________ -.-__________ 7-12 109 157 VVater movement----------------------------------------------------------------------lG-33--lQ-34 VVeather Extreme, combat in _______________________________________________________ 9-26, 9-30--9-31, 9-33 142, 144 Intelligence---------------------------------------------------------------------------4-13b(3) 24 Offense---------------------------------------------------------------------------------5-7g 44 Retrograde------------------------------------------------------------------------------7-4 103 VVuhdrawal_____________________________________________________________________________ 7-1--7-13 103 InvoluntarY-----------------------------------------------------------------------------7-13 113 VoluntarY-------------------------------------------------------------------------------7-12 109 VVire communication--------------------------------------------------------------------------4-24 51 VVoods, combat in----------------~-----------------------------------------------------------9-27 143 Zone of action_______________________________________________________________________________ 5-29/ • -~ By Order of the Secretary of the Army : Official: J. C. LAMBERT, Major General, United States Army, The Adjutant General. Distribution: Active Army: DCSPER (5) ACSI (5) DCSLOG (5) DCSOPS (10) ACSFOR (10) CORO (5) CRD (5) COA (3) CINFO (3) TIG (3) TJAG (3) TPMG (5) TSG (5) OPO (5) CofEngrs (3) CofCh (3) USA CDC Agcy ( 5) except USACDCCAA (3) USACDCSWA (3) USCONARC (10) USACDC (10) USAMC (10) ARADCOM (5) OS Maj Com_~_(5) LOGCOMD (3) Armies (25) Corps (15) Div (10) Div Arty (5) Bde (5) HAROLD K. JOHNSON, General, United States Army, Ohief of Staff. Regt/Gp (5) cc (5) Bn (5) Co/Btry (2) USACDCEC (10) USACDCIAS (1) USACDCCAG (5) USACDCCSSG (3) USACDCSWCAG (3) USACDCNG (1) USACDCCCISG (1) Br Svc Sch (25) except USASWS (10) USAOGMS (5) USMA (10) NG: State AG (3) ; units-Same as Active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit. USAR: Units-Same as Active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit. For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 o-176-587