BISON • DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL FM 21-40 u.s 0101.~0·. l.l-4 o/9~VI tD U) CTl - CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SEPTEMBER 1966 AGO 6647A • I *FM 21-40 FlELD MANUAL } HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 21-40 WASHINGTON, D. C., 28 September 1966 CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE Paragraph Page CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1, 2 3 2. UNIT CBR DEFENSE -----------------------------3-6 4 3. CHEMICAL AGENTS ------------------------------7-14 7 4. PROTECTION AND DECONTAMINATION AGAINST CHEMICAL AGENTS Section I. Individual protection --------------------------------15-20 12 II. Collective protection (Protective Shelters) -------------21-24 17 III. Protection in the field --------------------------------25-37 18 IV. Decontamination ------------------------------------38-40 27 CHAPTER 5. DEFENSE AGAINST FLAME AND INCENDIARIES ---------------------------------41, 42 31 6. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS ----------------------------43-46 34 7. EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS --------------------47-49 38 8. NUCLEAR DEFENSE Section I. Defense before, during, and after nuclear detonations ___ 50-74 41 II. Organization for tactical dosimetry --------------------75, 76 50, 51 APPENDIX I. REFERENCES ------------------------------------53 II. STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY -----------------54 III. DECONTAMINATION MATERIALS AND HOW THEY ARE USED -------------------------------56 IV. SOP FOR DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS (OUTLINE) -------------------------------------59 V. REPORTING OF ENEMY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR ATTACKS ------------------------64 VI. CONTAMINATION AND MINEFIELD MARKERS ___ 71 VII. ALARMS ------------------------------------------75 VIII. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL ELEMENT (CBRE) ------------------------------77 IX. APPLICABLE STANAGS -------------------------- 83 INDEX 85 *This manual supersedes FM 21-40, 30 October 1963, including C 1, 24 July 1964. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Purpose and Scope This manual provides doctrinal guidance in biological, and nuclear defense. It contains principles, policies, and concepts relative to the protective measures against the effects of chemical or biological agents, radioactive materials, and nuclear weapons. The material in this manual is applicable as appropriate to nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. 2. Changes and Revisions Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the manual i which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, U. S. Army Combat Developments Command CBR Agency, Fort McClellan, Alabama 36201. AGO &647A CHAPTER 2 UNIT CBR DEFENSE headquarters that are not assigned a chemical 3. General NCO will appoint, on additional duty basis, a Unit CER defensive measures are designed school-trained CER NCO and a school-trainedto allow friendly forces to operate successfully enlisted CER specialist (does not refer to rank in a CER environment. The objective of these of enlisted man, but to his training) . Considmeasures is to enable the unit to continue its eration should be given to appointing at commission. Some of these measures are: use of pany level a school-trained CER officer on addi alarm systems, wearing of protective masks, tional duty basis. use of protective clothing and other protective equipment, use of protective shelters, disperd. Chemical officers are assigned to staffs of sion of personnel and equipment, decontaminamajor units, support commands, brigades, divition, and first aid. sion artillery, divisions, corps, army, and logistical commands. They may also be assigned to military assistance commands, military advi 4. Responsibilities sory groups, military missions, and communiAttaining and maintaining individual and cations zone and zone of interior installationsunit proficiency in CER protective measures such as major terminals, posts, and equivalentwithin the established standards is a command commands. At division level the chemical offiresponsibility. General , duties of personnel in cer is assigned as a special staff officer, while CER defensive operations are shown in figure 1. at other levels of command and in other type units, chemical officers are assigned to the G2, 5. Organization and Training G3, and G4 staff sections and to the S2, S3, and a. The normal command and staff structure S4 sections. For example, at field army level, will be used for the conduct of training in CER chemical officers are assigned to the G2 section, defense. Each staff section is responsible for to the G3 section, and to the G4 section. Thus chemical officers advise the commander andthose phases of CER training within its purstaff on CER matters either directly or throughview. their respective staff sections. Chemical offi b. Company/ battery or comparable-size units cers at all levels of command may supervise will appoint and train a CER team. The unit CER training of subordinate units and conduct SOP will normally designate the specific duties, schools for this training. For details on duties assignments, and equipment for the CER team and responsibilities of chemical officers, see FM (app IV). 101-5, FM 7-30, and FM 3-12. e. The chemical, biological, and radiologicalc. To assist in the conduct of training for element (CERE) is one of the elements ofCER operations, commanders of companies and operations centers such as tactical operations comparable-size units will appoint a school trained CER NCO on additional duty basis. centers at division, corps, and army or indepen dent corps levels, rear area security control orCommanders of battalions and higher level area damage control centers, and operations headquarters that are not assigned a chemical officer will appoint a school-trained CER officer centers at logistical command level. The CERE performs the primary functions of coordinatingon additional duty basis in the S2 or S3 staff. chemical and biological operations with otherCommanders of battalions and higher level AGO 5647A 4 • The individual soldier must have a knowledge ofunit and individual CBR protection proceduresso that he can carry out his mission with theleast risk of injury. Unit officers and noncommissioned officersmust be able to teach individual protectionprocedures to all unit personnel, to establishunit collective and tactical CBR defensivemeasures and procedures, and to use organizational first-aid and detection equipment. The chemical officer advises the staff on planning and coordinating of CBR operations. Inunits not authorized a chemical officer, CBRtrained personnel wi II perform these duties. The Army Medical Service provides medical treatment, identifies biological agents, and advisesthe commander on immunization procedures,field sanitation, first aid, capabilities of medical foci Ii ties, fitness of food, and the effects of CBR agents on personnel. Figure 1. General duties of personnel in CBR operations. .mpport operations, predicting fallout resulting cies for the nuclear, biological and chemicalfrom the employment of nuclear weapons by (NBC) reporting and warning organizationfriendly and enemy forces, and evaluating for the Army in the field. See appendix VIIIchemical, biological, and radiological contamifor detailed functions of the CERE and dutiesnation. The CERE performs the functions of a of CERE personnel.center for the receipt, consolidation, and evaluation of reports of enemy nuclear detonations 6. Proficiency Standards for Units inand biological and chemical attacks and reCBR Operationssultant contamination, and for the production a. General. Units must develop and mainand dissemination of appropriate reports and tain a capability for successful accomplishment warnings to friendly forces. Collectively, the of their mission while under chemical, biologi CERE's provide the collection and control agen-cal, or nuclear attack. AGO 6647A 5 b. Specific Objectives. See appendix II for a list of specific objectives to be used as standards of proficiency. c. Attainment of Standa1·ds. The commander is responsible for the readiness of his unit to operate with maximum individual and unit effectiveness under conditions produced by friendly or enemy employment of CBR weapons. Each officer and noncommissioned officer must possess a full knowledge of, and be capable of applying, those principles, tactics, and techn~ques of CBR defense that are commensurate with his level of command. AliU 5647A • • CHAPTER 3 CHEMICAL AGENTS 7. General the eyes and by membranes of the nose andthroat. T he liquid agent readily penetrates the Chemical agents may be classified according eyes and t he membranes of the nose and throat. to their physical state, their use, or their effectson man. For example, mustard (H) may be a. Most of the nerve agents are quick actingclassified as a liquid, casualty-producing blister when inhaled, with some symptoms developingagent. The characteristics and properties of in 1 to 2 minutes after inhalation. They actsome typical chemical agents are shown in figmore slowly when penetration is through theure 2. The persistency (duration of effectiveskin. Pinpointing of the pupils of the eyes mayness) of a chemical agent (TM 3-215) is denot occur for 5 to 10 minutes (or even longer)pendent on the physical properties of the agent, after exposure of the eyes to a very low vaporthe weather conditions, the method of agent concentration of the agent.dissemination, and the condition of the terrain b. Nerve agents are generally odorless, color in the target area. The terms "persistent less, and t asteless. • agent" and "nonpersistent agent" are used to express the relative duration of the effective 10. Blister Agents ness of agents without reference to a particularagent and do not refer to the duration of the These agents usually appear as colorless toeffects of the agent (s) on personnel. dark brown, oily liquids but normally are invisible in vapor form. Some blister agents 8. Characteristics and Properties of Chemical have an odor like fish or garlic; the odor oflewisite (L) is fruity but biting, whereas the Agents odors of other agents may be disagreeable andThe data on the more common chemical biting. Blister agents have the following effectsagents, discussed in the following paragraphs, on the body:are limited to those characteristics and proper a. In either liquid form or vapor form, theseties that are important in field identification. agents may burn and blister any body area theyFor further details on chemical agents, see contact. The degree of damage is dependentTM 3-215. upon t he exposure time and the concentrationof. the agent. 9. Nerve Agents b. They are very effective even in smallThese agents are highly toxic in both the quantit ies. A drop the size of a pinhead mayliquid and vapor forms. The general nature of produce a blister the size of a quarter. Anthe physiological effects of the nerve agents unprotected man exposed to a low vapor conis essentially the same whether due to absorpcentration for an hour may become a casualty. tion through the skin or to inhalation of theagent. These agents cause runny nose, tightc. They have a marked effect on the eyes, ness of chest, dimness of vision (due to pinproducing redness, infiamation, and frequently pointing of pupils of the eyes), difficult breathtemporary blindness. ing, excessive sweating, drooling, nausea, d. They are quickly absorbed by the skin.vomiting, convulsions, and coma followed by Reddening of the skin may appear any time updeath. Nerve agent vapor is readily absorbed by to 12 hours, depending upon the degree of AGO 5647A 7 • • 10 [£C(WWUHA.Tl0ff MF.AJm or IE'l'ICTIO!f IY.C'I'IC.U.S~'J'IA.T rm IJfD s!Wf Ern:t'lS (If MM Pfi)D'.CTIOff REQUIRED (Are. and *teriel) II ntl FIELD .... CHEMICAL AOE!tr; 68" r. OOOR !IA't1l OF ACTION SDIBOL (20" c.) 'roXICITY ..__ ba,y; o...&•• and t'looda l.una•· Protect.IYe ••k Hone Deeded in I.BC-Kl.BA2 lilt.; odor C.sualey apat. CDlorle.. field; aeratlcm 1D ~ate to Jboun 01ok1tJC A&aat&reen com -·~ ... - eloaed ·~"' STB, llu.rry, dilute AII-Kl5o\2A and Cuualt.)' -.pn1. S.V.n!l incapeeiteUon to Protect1ft ••kl Co\ bnMI llquid ln the t1e1d inhalation. ate.. and .-mla ln CDlorle11 to lfot detect.eble Vecy high Very np1d by AliC-MlBA2 kitl ,...."' deeth •• doaap lncreaaea. al&.dl, or IS2; Herve A«-ct confined uoea .u. - ,. -- CIII'Ualty ap.nt Very n.pld by &ro-ere 1ru:apec1tat1on to Protect.lft .u1 In confined area AI-Ml5A2A and ABC-M18A2 1t1 t1 liquid ia ttw rteld hot aa.py vater ..,.,. Oolorl.e•• Aot. detec:tabt. Vu-y hi&h ateaaand~ta; inhal.at1on. deat.h •• ~1ncreaua. Slov t.hnlugh akin llerve Agent Very n.pid b:r SeTere 1ncapec1tat1on to Protective •e.k1 S'nl, llurry, dilute AN-Ml5A2A and Ouual.ty qeat 0Dlorle11 Jklt. detectabl.a Very hi&h dosqe lncreaMI, alk.alJ; 1n confined ABC-M18A2 k.ltl CD liquid in the ttel.d area bot IOIIP7 1111ter 1nhal.lt1on. death u Slnvth~akin He,.,. Alent sn, llllrl'}', we, Alf·Ml5A2A and C.l\l<:y acent vx ())lorlass OiorlAn Very hl&h lnhsled or absorbed. and pro:.ect.in or I62 aoluttor.; Allpld b:y 1nhalaUoa. Produces casu.alUea when Protect:•e ••k A.BC· Ml.8A2Uta (Del.tl:y.4 except Del.ayed··houn to a when tllha.l.ltd.) liquid hot soapy vster day throut:;h skin Herve Asent enaelllblM A.BC·Ml.8A2Ut C.-t.t¥-aent Peach kernel.tl Very npld Interferes vitb use or Protective •.U Jllone needed tn ~encyanide ())l.orle•• ""o b]M than skin destructive to upper resptr-e111nbll .... liquid etoey tnet.; esn cauae ~ OIIIILlt.:y agent De~daeuon--12 ponl')' bllndnesG. PTot.ecttve ••II. 51'111 DM'C, ttre,~ Alf-Ml5o\2A an4 ll'ttl"Qien ..., lard Darltltqu.id Pith)' or ~~~aty ~~.Ore IUICeptl• and protective ABC-Ml.8A2 Uta ble than skin hours or lonaer Blltter A&entlHl-1, HH-2, Hlf-3 tlnt..tllA OI.IUI.l.ty qent x-dtate effects on ViolentlY lrrltate• aaeous PTotecUve -•• None ent.trel.:y Al'f·Ml5A2A and fboasene on-Colorless Sharp; pene-Povertul. trrtt&.Dt to and prouctl•e effective; Vllsh ABC·MlW kltt ex aolld or eyes, noae, and akin foru vbesl rapldl,y. ,,.._, -.brane or eye• lllld DOH; tretln& liquid Blister A&ent ··- BTB, we, tire, 002 A.BC-Ml8A2 kit OI.Wilty qeot Allptd st..uu to HD snd .a)' CIU~ Prot.eetJve -Ilk Levillte o.n oily VartablA; •:r E;rl!• .are IUteeptt-systeaic polSQ:Ilfll. and pfOU'C:Uve L liquid rese.ble gera-ble than sUn BUster Agent ense.bla Pr-o.pt ltln&illl; Sillllar t.o NO and ..,.caUEe Prot.eetJve •"It S111, we, rm, m<:. ABC·KlBA.: IIJt CIINilt,. 118fllt ~st.ard-lewistte ran otly C.rllellke Very high de~ (about 13 cyt~r poicon1na. and protective liquid enr.-bla .....~ houn) bll~~rtn& BllG~r AGent '1'n1n1D& and rtot BL Like cold c.yapt.o. ~d Protec·tJve •::k None needed 1n Yellow to lrri~ttng; relative Vel')'raptd field; STB or control ae:ent .......... .... .. headache, ..-o.J.tlll61 nauan. ~n-alld -toxic Vc.itl~~& A&'ent confined. ·~•• "' 'l're1D.1Q& an4 riot J.entton tn open; lnst.ant.aneou.s t.ert..t.ory; trrit.stet Pn:ltecttve uak lio.. QU.oroe.cet.ophenone 6olid Apple bl.os-s Te•porary aevere eye retplntorytreet. IOda llh IOlutiOD control q:ent 1n1t&t1on; alld eltin or alcoholic caustic 1rrt~t1nn 'l'urAgent soda in closed "' speces 'l'n.Ja1.. aDd rtotProte<:tlve -•a Aeration 1.11 opei!IJ 'l'lltlqlorary ....,..e,.. t.cri-t.ory; 1rT1t.lt.es aoda ash -elution eoatl'Ol apnt ......... Clll.oz'o.eetopM- resrtntory tract. 1rr1t.at.ton; lllld tUn 1D ehl.orotor.. Tear AGent or alcoholic eaustte trrtt.ation apeees 01C Aentton tn open; 'I'ntnln& ltld riot ~eetopbenone Liquid tod.t uh 110lut1on control agent f'Overi'II.Uy laert•atory. PJ'otee:Uve•sk Te.pora..ey Mvere .,.. Inst.antaneous -r.ar Agent - tn benune and caJ'tlon 1n1t&t1oa; .J.ld Ut11 or alC1)hollc eeu.st.lc irritatlon soda ln ci.o.ed t.atrechlortck am Tn1nin6 l!ld riot PJ'ot.ective maek Water, 5S .adi1111 Pepper Hiahl)' 1rr1t.at1116; lnlt.ant.lneOUII Hiahly trrttauna; but 110t btaul.tlte, and control ae:ent o-chlo:robeDZJ"l- COlorleu and protective ..,..,.,.,...,. not t.o:rlc ""'' vat.er rtnae ~lid enae.bA cs Ino:apeett.aUnc H:ypoehlorite: "" ~·· ..... vtth -P and Vllt.er lio.. Sei"Hning sw;:okeL1(1.11ld corro1tve to skin; !tone tor ordlnel')' Aliellne solid or '!'1 t.a.D.11a t.atnchloride liei"I)'1 Col.or-A _,. produce syapt.oas of eonc::eno;.retlon•; pro- HC acrid dne poi1011ina; t.ec:ttve•sktor Jot toxic eaeept 1o Inhalation or denae ..aile hi&h concentnttOM denp;e llliDke !tone for ordtnaey Water or copper Wh1 t.a phoaphoru1 61..Uer to ll.ov-beal1116 burna; vaport coneentrattona; sultat.e 1olutton WP or fVP )"ell.ow, ...lQ' Mtebes (DOt '**•) polaooou•--flalleproof clothi.llfi 1t.ope burntna Sereentr.g bOlla sollci; NP--cause bone deel.)' tor 'bun:linl; putt· Noel,)' dtTid· ed vP to ael '"' ot rubber and ,.__,.,. s.oJte DOt t.oll.tc lllzn1116 \IP Or PJP CaUIII ,..,_ .... None l'fl''~ 1"'1 l"h"'"~ 5creenins •-*• rioM ~a-retortuel Oily liquid ~""eo.e 1ttuatton1 the p.rotecUft enstlllbl.e vUl be required tor protection sp.inlt liquid COIItu.inetlon or the tUn. ~igure 2. Characteristics and properties of chemical agents. 8 ........ . contamination and the weather conditions. Blisters may appear in a day or less following reddening. Healing time varies from about 6 days to as much as 8 weeks in severe cases, particularly in those cases involving moist areas such as the crotch or armpits. e. Inhalation of blister agents causes serious damage to the membranes of the nose, throat, and lungs. f. They often have a more serious effect than is immediately apparent. Exposure to some blister agents may go unnoticed because blister agents often have only faint odors and cause no immediate pain. Signs of injury may not appear for hours. The vapor of some blister agents irritates the eyes and respiratory tract immediately, and the liquid stings the skin within a few seconds. 11. Incapacitating Agents These agents are capable of producing physical or mental effects, or both, that prevent military personnel from performing their duties for a significant period of time. These effects are temporary, with complete recovery of exposed personnel. Some of the more common symptoms of incapacitating agents are: confusion, headache, drowsiness, and a slowing of mental and physical activity. For characteristics of incapacitating agents, see FM 3-10 and FM 3-lOB. 12. Blood and Choking Agents a. In general, the blood agents cause quickened breathing, headache, convulsions, coma, and sometimes death. Death within a few minutes may result from inhalation of a few breaths of a field concentration of a blood agent. The agent vapors are colorless but may possess a faint odor. b. Choking agents produce the following immediate effects: coughing, choking, feeling of tightness in the chest, nausea, headache, and watering of the eyes. Delayed effects, occurring 2 to 24 hours after exposure, usually follow a period during which no initial effects are present. These delayed effects include rapid and shallow breathing, painful cough, discomfort, and fatigue, shock, and frequently AGO 6647A death. These agents are colorless as gases and may have an odor similar to that of new mown hay, green silage, green corn, or flypaper. 13. Other Agents a. Vomiting agents produce the following effects: coughing, sneezing, irritation of the nose and throat, pain in the throat and windpipe, aching gums and teeth, nausea and vomiting, salivation, and headache. These agents are yellow or white at the point of release and are color less when mixed with air. In low concentrations they smell somewhat like burning fireworks. b. Tear agents produce immediate irritation of the eyes, tears, stinging of warm moist skin, and irritation of the nose. During hot weather concentrations may produce mild burns of the skin. Agent CS produces instant and extreme burning of the eyes, copious tears, coughing, difficult breathing, and runny nose. High concentrations of this agent may produce nausea, vomiting, and dizziness. Agent CN may have a faint, agreeable odor, whereas agent CS has a pungent, pepperlike odor. Tear agents may be crystalline solids or solutions before dissemination. They may be disseminated as vapors or aerosols. c. Screening smokes are gray or white and may have biting or irritating odors. They are nontoxic during short periods of exposure in field concentrations; however, high concentrations may cause irritation of the nose and throat . Signaling smokes may be red, green, yellow, or violet; may possess biting or irritating odors ; and are not toxic in field concentrations. However, inhalation of high concentrations of a signaling smoke can cause nose and throat irritation. d. Incendiaries such as thermite (TH) and magnesium, though usually used to destroy material, can cause casualties. Like WP, burning particles of these incendiaries cause severe burns. Casualties may be caused by burns from burning particles of flame fuel used in flamethrowers and flame bombs and mines. They may also be caused by consumption of oxygen or by poisoning due to formation of harmful gases in enclosed spaces. MUNITIONS a: CHEMICAL 0 a: > a: ... a: -0 a: c z ... c z a: -0 ~ 3: c a: -a:AGENT ... 0 a: .,. ... 0 % c.!) ... ~ ... ... .,. ii ... .... --c Q ... a: ... -... -.... ... ~ o:D c :..: ... a: Q ~ >-;;; :..: v z Q ~ z c •~ v a: ~ ... z 0 .,. a: 0 ~ c ... -0 a: c .,. v ... c a: c o:D c.!) ... Q IIIII ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ NERVE AGENTS IIIII ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ BLISTER AGENTS IIIII ~ ~ ~ ~ v' BLOOD AGENTS CHOKING AGENTS I ~ -i ~ i ~ I RIOT CONTROl AGENTS I VOMITING AGENTS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ SCREENING SMOKES I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ INCENDIARIES I -i ~ ~ -i ~ ~ Figure 9. Possible enemy munitions for chemical agent dissemination. some of the means for disseminating chemical e. Defoliants are used to remove leaves from plants prematurely. However, defoliants are agents. harmless to personnel and do not require any a. The enemy might employ chemical agentsdefensive measures. to produce casualties, harass troops, contaminate areas and equipment, contaminate sup 14. Enemy Use of Chemical Agents plies, obscure visual observation; or to produce Comrpanders will have a better understandincendiary effects for burning of supplies, ing of protection requirements if they are equipment, or structures; or to disable, kill, or aware of conditions under which the enemy demoralize personnel. might employ chemical agents, effects of b. Weather conditions have important effectsweather and terrain on chemical agents, and • on the behavior of chemical agents when they are released. Although chemical agents may be used under most weather conditions and at any time of day or night, there are certain conditions and times when they .can be most effectively employed. The most favorable conditions usually occur on a clear night, during early morning or dusk, or during periods of heavily overcast skies when the winds are steady and light. Smooth terrain usually is more favorable for employment of chemical agents than rough terrain, and low places are generally more favorable than elevated areas. Chemical agents have a tendency to linger and settle in low places. c. Figure 3 lists some of the possible means the enemy might use to disseminate chemical agents. In addition to any standard munition, improvised devices may be used to disseminate some chemical agents. Chemical agents may be disseminated by ground munitions, dropped from aircraft in bombs or bomblets, or released as spray. CHAPTER 4 PROTECTION AND DECONTAMINATION AGAINST CHEMICAL AGENTS Section 1. INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION 15. General In the field the soldier must be protected against chemical agents. This protection is accomplished by providing individual protection and collective protection (para 21-24). Individual protection is provided through the use of the protective mask, protective clothing, and other protective items. Components for a protective system for the individual soldier have been type classified. This ensemble consists of the following items: a. Mask, protective field, ABC-M17. b. Hood, field protective mask, M6A2. (Compatible only with the ABC-M17 mask.) c. Boots, combat, leather (treated with leather dressing) ; or boots, combat, rubber, insulated. d. Clothing outfit, chemical protective, consisting of: (1) One liner, trousers, chemical protective. (2) One liner, shirt, chemical protective. (3) Three pair 1'!ocks, cushion sole, chemical protective. ( 4) One pair gloves, cotton, chemical protective. e. Decontaminating and reimpregnating kit, individual, M13. 16. Use of the Individual Protective Ensemble in the Field The working capacity of troops wearing the individual protective ensemble is greatly decreased under conditions of high humidity and high temperature. Under such conditions, rest periods should be frequent and inadequate drinking water and salt tablets should be available to prevent heat exhaustion, heat stroke, and undue fatigue. When the situation will permit, troops may wear the protective hood (M6A2) "open" to relieve the heat load imposed on the wearer. Commanders can expect heat casualties among troops wearing the protective ensemble, even though the workload of the individual soldier is reduced to a minimum. When the situation and mission will permit, commanders should move or march troops during the coolest part of the day. Troops should be given practice in wearing the protective ensemble in order to accustom them to wearing it. 17. Field Protective Mask a. General. The protective mask when properly fitted gives protection against inhalation of all known chemical agents in gaseous or aerosol form in field concentrations. However, it does not afford protection against ammonia vapors or carbon monoxide. Specialpurpose masks or breathing apparatuses are required for protection against certain fumes and gases encountered in the manufacture or handling of chemicals and in firefighting. Several different types of masks have been developed for field use and special uses. Specially designed protective masks are available for wear by crewmen of aircraft and armored vehicles. The ABC-M17 mask is the standard-A field protective mask. It has filter element assemblies that fit in the cheeks of the facepiece. The field protective mask filters the contaminated air but does not manufacture or produce oxygen. When the air is low in oxygen • • • content, or when individuals are in tunnels or (2) Impermeable protective clothing iscaves with heavy concentrations of CS, the made of butyl-rubber-coated materials protective mask cannot supply air suitable for that resist the penetration of chemicalbreathing. agents. The impermeable suit is worn b. Inspection, Fitting, and Adjustment of as an outergarment with impregnatedMask. Instruction in inspection, proper fitting, underwear worn underneath. Approand adjustment of the mask is a command priate hood, mask, gloves, socks, andresponsibility. TM 3-4240-202-15 and GTA boots are worn with this ensemble.3-4-1 contain instructions on the inspection, This special-purpose clothing is issuedfitting, and cold-weather use of the mask and only to personnel engaged in operafor sighting a rifle while wearing the mask. tions requiring such specialized proWhile the individual soldier is fitting and adjusttection. Because of the heat load iming his protective mask (during gas chamber posed, it is not suitable for generaltraining exercise), he should determine the use. limitations of head movements without breakb. Uses.ing the seal to the mask. To accomplish this (1) The standard-A issue permeable prodetermination, each individual should slowly tective clothing is normally treatedturn or snap his head far to the left and right before being issued and is reimpreg while wearing the mask in a heavy concentration nated as necessary by the supply eleof agent in the gas chamber. This determinament of the command. It affords ation of the movements that can be made while high degree of protection against thewearing the mask should be done at least once vapors and fine spray of blister and a year to refresh the individual's memory. V-agents. It does not afford protec c. Care of the Mask. The individual soldier tion against large drops or splashesis responsible for the proper care of his proof any liquid agent. It protects againsttective mask, and should inspect it frequently liquid G-agents since it slows the to insure that it is clean, free from damage or rate of penetration of the liquid agent.defect, and in a usable condition. This general-issue permeable protec The filter elements are designed to provide long-life protive clothing is worn underneath aptection for the user and should be replaced only propriate outergarments. The M13after prolonged usage, accidental immersion kit provides the individual soldierin water, or otherwise damaged or deteriorated. with material for decontaminating oremergency reimpregnation of thisstandard issue protective clothing. 18. Protective Clothing (2) The protective cotton-sateen trousers a. Types. and shirt to be worn as outergarments (1) Permeable protective clothing is clothare not general-issue clothing items.ing that has been treated (impregnaPersonnel engaged in certain deconted) with material that affords protamination operations and/ or subtection against chemical agents. The jected to a vapor or fine spray hazardstandard-A issue permeable protecfrom chemical agents may use thistive clothing (para 15) consists of protective clothing instead of theprotective liners for the trousers and standard permeable protective clothshirt to be worn underneath seasonal ing.outergarments. The standard-B issue (3) Impermeable protective clothing ispermeable clothing consists of imused by military personnel engaged inpregnated cotton-sateen trousers and extremely hazardous decontamination shirt to be worn as outergarments. operations or special operations inAppropriate hood, mask, gloves, socks, volving danger from spillage or and boots are worn with the permesplashes in handling liquid chemicalable protective clothing outfit. agents. AGO 6647A 13 19. M 13 Decontamination and Reimpregnating Kit a. Desc1·iption. The container is an aluminum or plastic can and is equipped with a plastic pull-handle slip-on lid. It contains the following items : ( 1) Two cloth bags filled with a decontaminating and reimpregnating compound. Each bag contains a capsule of chemical agent detector dye. (2) A single-edge cutter. (3) A small skin pad filled with a powder (fuller's earth), for the decontamination of the skin. The kit is carried in the large external pocket of the carrier for the M17 mask and in the appropriate pocket of other mask carriers. General instructions for use of the kit are attached to the container. See figure 4. b. PuTpose and Use. This kit replaces the M5-series Chemical Agent!'i Protection and Treatment Set. It provides the individual soldier a means for decontaminating his skin, equipment, and clothing or for reimpregnating his protective clothing. Details on use of the kit are contained in TB 3-4230-207-10 and FM 21-41. The use of this kit for decontamination eliminates the requirement for flushing the skin and clothing with water. Water, however, is still required for removal of chemical agents from the eyes. The skin pad containing the fuller's earth is used to decontaminate the skin. The two bags containing the chemical compound are used to decontaminate clothing and equipment or to reimpregnate the protective clothing (liners, gloves, and socks). The single-edge cutter is used to cut out spots of heavy contamination on clothing. By using the "buddy" system, two individuals can help each other to dust, locate, and cut out contaminated spots on clothing and to decontaminate the skin. The most effective procedure to follow in using the skin pad to decontaminate the skin is to BLOT, SLAP (dust), TURN, RUB. The pad fits over the fingers in such a way that one side can be used to blot and dust the contaminated skin and the other side used to rub over the contaminated area. c. Expedient Use. If impregnated clothing is not available and sufficient M13 kits are available, a degree of protection may be obtained by dusting the inside of available clothing (such as utility jackets and trousers) with the two decontaminating and reimpregnating bags of the kit. After treatment, the trouser legs should be tucked in the boots, the wrists of the jacket tied, and the clothing buttoned completely to insure retention of the dusting powder. 20. Other Protective Items a. When properly applied to leather footwear, vesicant gas resistant leather dressing (protective dubbing) not orily makes the leather resistant to penetration by chemical agents but also softens, waterproofs, and preserves the leather (fig. 5). The most effective method for applying the leather dressing to leather combat boots is the hot-dip (immersion) method. This process involves total immersion of the boots in the melted leather dressing, where both the exterior and interior surfaces of the boots are completely treated by the melted dressing. After immersion the boots are drained into the dipping can, and the excess dressing is wiped from the boots. The procedure for application of vesicant gas resistant leather dressing is essentially as follows : ( 1) Place the leather dressing in a clean can or drum (8-to 30-gallon size). Sixteen ounces of leather dressing are required to treat one pair of boots. (2) Heat the container until the dressing melts. (Exercise caution while heating because the dressing is flammable.) ( 3) Immerse the boots in the melted dressing for at least 2 minutes. Remove them from the container and let them drip. ( 4) Remove the excess dressing from the boots and allow them to air for at least 24 hours before they are worn. Before dipping boots in the melted dressing, insure that they are clean, free of cracks, and without laces. Sufficient dressing must be added to the dipping container during this process to insure that the level of the melted dressing • AGO 56"A . 11 c;"l "' "'... ""' II l1,_:~~:->t.-: ,t~· '::~:~ '·t::~ :• ... -~ • -4'. I CLOTH BAG WITH CHEMICAL COMPOUND TWO CLOTH BAGS FILLED WITH CHEMICAL COMPOUND KIT CONTAINER WITH PLASTIC LID J ! . J ... . - "' SINGLE EDGE CUTTER SKIN PAD SKIN PAD ON GLOVED HAND Figure 4. M13 decontaminating and reimp'l'egnating kit. • • AMYL NITRITE AMPUL AUTOMATIC ATROPINE INJECTOR VESICANT GAS RESISTANT LEATHER DRESSING PROTECTIVE HOOD WATERPROOFING BAG J@lt!fi\ WINTERIZING KIT Figure 5. Protective items. is high enough to completely cover the boots. Once the boots have been impregnated by use of the hot-dip method, it is not necessary to repeat the process. However, after boots have been washed or worn for extended periods of time, it is necessary to replenish the dubbing on the outside of the boot. This replenishment may be accomplished by the hot-dip method or hand-rubbing warm leather dressing into the outside surface of the clean boots. When the hot-dip method cannot be used and prestocked boots (treated with vesicant gas resistant dressing) are not available, as an emergency measure warm leather dressing can be applied by hand-rubbing to the inside and outside surfaces of clean boots. This method is not as effective • as the hot-dip method and should be used only as an interim measure until properly treated boots are available. b. Three spring-operated, automatic atro pine injectors (fig. 5) normally are stored in the pocket of the field protective mask carrier. Directions for use are printed on the injector and in FM 21-41. The freezing point of atropine solution is approximately 30° F., a temperature well above that at which nerve agents will produce casualties. Injection into the body of a fluid at low temperatures will induce unnecessary trauma. Therefore, in cold weather (40 ° F. and below), the atropine injectors will be removed from the carrier and placed in the inside of the upper right-hand pocket of the field uniform, where body temperature will prevent freezing. c. Other protective items include the amyl nitrite ampul (fig. 5) and vesicant agent protective ointment and an absorbent blotting cloth. d. Accessories for use with the protective mask include mask spectacles (eyelens inserts), a waterproofing bag, and a winterizing kit. See figure 5 and FM 21-41 for detailed information on these accessories. Section II. COLLECTIVE PROTECTION (PROTECTIVE SHELTERS) 21. General Since it is possible for an enemy to subject an area to a hazardous concentration of a chemical agent for a prolonged period of time, some means of collective protection (protective shelters) will be necessary to provide for the various field activities. Masks and protective clothing give protection to personnel, but they cannot be worn indefinitely. Protective shelters that exclude chemical agents are needed for rest and relief of troops and where communications, command, and other important functions are conducted. Details concerning protective shelters and filter units used with the shelters are contained in FM 5-15 and TM 5-311. 22. Types of Shelters Protective shelters are basically permanent or field types as described below: a. Permanent shelters are constructed by · Engineer personnel according to prescribed standards, usually in areas where conditions are comparatively static. b. Field shelters may be equipped with filter units and allied airlock equipment. (1) Ventilated field shelters. This type shelter is equipped with particulate filter units and airlock entrances and exits. A filter unit pumps filtered air into the shelter, providing agent- AGO 6847A free air and building up a positive pressue within the shelter. This type shelter can be provided by utilizing bunkers, pillboxes, armored personnel carriers, or various types of vans. (2) Other shelters. There are structures on the battlefield that offer overhead cover against spray and affords a little more time for donning protective equipment. Examples are caves, tunnels, covered emplacements, and hasty shelters. This type shelter provides overhead cover but occupation of such shelters may subject the occupants to a vapor hazard when surrounding areas may be hazard free, since chemical agent vapors tend to settle and linger in such areas after a chemical attack. These shelters are not equipped with filter units or allied airlock equipment and thus personnel occupying this type shelter will be required to wear the protective mask for protection against any vapor hazard that exists in the shelter. 23. Location and Design a. Location. Fundamental considerations for the location of protective shelters are as follows: (1) Shelters must be readily accessible to personnel who intend to use them. (This accessibility will minimize the energy and time personnel expend in (4) The structure should offer maximum reaching the shelter, particularly resistance to HE blast and missile those wearing protective clothing and penetration. equipment.) (5) An emergency exit and an airlock en (2) Shelters must be located so that t hey trance should be provided. • • • provide protection from contamination and high explosives. (3) Shelters should not be located where high concentrations of chemical agents may accumulate. ( 4) Shelters should be located on welldrained, firm soil. ( 5) Shelters should be located underground, if possible, and should be well camouflaged. b. Design. Considerations for the design of protective shelters are as follows: ( 1) Elimination of drafts and prevention of chemical agent seepage. (2) If underground, the shelter should be covered with at least 1 meter of earth or sandbags. If the shelter is above ground, all joints and cracks must be sealed and floors must be made airtight. (3) Any openings around piping, conduits, ventilators, or chimneys should be stopped up or altered so that they can be closed. Section Ill. PROTECTION IN THE FIELD 25. General Principles The tactical situation and the unit mission govern the protective measures to be taken by a unit. Maneuver of troops and movement of supplies should be planned so that contaminated areas may be avoided to the maximum extent consistent with the security of the movement. Contaminated areas should be crossed as quickly as possible, preferably by vehicle. Positions should be organized so that alternate uncontaminated positions may be occupied if possible. Troops must be trained in proper precautions and procedures when eating, drinking, sleeping, defecating, and urinating in contaminated areas. 26. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP's) All units will prepare a defense SOP to con ( 6) When practical, space should be provided for lights, water, first-aid kit, shaving facilities, and latrines. (7) Provision should be made for communication (radio or telephone) between personnel inside the shelter and those outside. ( 8) Shelters must be made virtually airtight to maintain a positive pressure in the shelter. (9) Means must be provided to prevent entering personnel from carrying contamination into the shelter. 24. Operation Details of operation of a shelter, including the duties of occupants, should be set forth in the SOP for the shelter. The capacity of each shelter should be posted on the wall of the shelter. A qualified sentinel is stationed outside and equipped with detection equipment to advise occupants of the status of contamination outside the shelter, control entry to the shelter, and ascertain when it can be vacated safely. form with the SOP of the next higher headquarters. Each member of a unit must be thoroughly familiar with the provisions of the unit SOP. FM 101-5 contains basic guidance for preparation of an SOP. Appendix IV presents a sample outline of an SOP for combat units. 27. Tactical Protection Plans a. Geneml. Tactical protection plans are integrated into the general scheme of attack or defense. b. Estimate of the Situation. In addition to other matters, in estimating the situation and formulating plans commanders consider (!) The weather, terrain, and tactical situation. AGO 5647A (3) The capabilities of enemy weapons and chemical agents. ( 4) The effects that wearing protective clothing and equipment will have on friendly troops and the mission. c. Surprise. Commanders must be constantly alert for signs of a chemical attack by the enemy. A chemical agent attack may be used by an enemy under unfavorable conditions in an effort to obtain surprise or to reduce his troop safety hazard. All attacks should be considered potential chemical attacks until proven otherwise. 28. Reconnaissance a. Long-range Reconnaissance. There may be a requirement to locate those areas where the enemy might contaminate the terrain with chemical agents. Reconnaissance of areas that lie outside the area of influence of a force is conducted by aerial observers and by longrange patrols. Special attention is given to areas that normally would be covered in the next several days' operations. Aerial photographs and distant ground observation show location of terrain which, if contaminated, might hamper advancing troops. Enemy chemical activity, such as insta~llltion of chemical land mines, may be revealed. Also, information may be obtained through raids or by questioning of prisoners and inhabitants. b. Unit Reconnaissance. Each unit is responsible for reconnoitering its own front, flanks, routes, and alternate routes of approach. Units may be required to include explosive ordnance reconnaissance while reconnoitering an area. Unexploded bombs, shells, rockets, or missiles will be marked with an appropriate sign (FM 31-45 and STANAG 2002) to assure that trained explosive ordnance personnel will find the explosive without delay. Consideration should be given to appointing members of an explosive ordnance reconnaissance team to also serve as members of the CBR team. An immediate and quick reconnaissance to determine the best means of passage is necessary whenever a contaminated area is encountered unexpectedly, day or night. Daytime reconnaissance of contaminated areas is preferable, if possible, since night reconnais- AGO 5647A sance of these areas is difficult. Areas suspected of being contaminated should be checked with a chemical agent detector kit, with special attention given to low-lying patches of woods, defiles, ravines, stream beds, areas covered with high grass or underbrush, and other spots favorable to contamination by a persistent chemical agent or residual contamination. Units discovering chemical contamination in an area will mark the area with the chemical contamination sign (app VI), in those cases where this action is deemed necessary to pro tect units crossing or occupying the area. The following information should be· gathered by the reconnaissance party: (1) For areas known to be contaminated. (a) Kind of contamination present. (b) Location and extent of contamination. (c) Possible routes for troops and ve hicles upwind or downwind of the contaminated area, and requirement for masking. (d) Feasibility of preparing a road or of using any established paths or roads through the contaminated area. (e) Requirements for marking of contaminated area or establishing warning of contamination. (2) For areas recently contaminated with chemical agents. (a) Limitation of contaminated areas. ( b) Location of uncontaminated areas. (c) Other information on which to base recommendations as to whether or not the area can be safely occupied or traversed. 29. Intelligence The timely collection of information and the dissemination of intelligence are essential to the planning of chemical defensive measures. On the basis of available intelligence, the commander makes his estimate of the imminence of the threat of enemy employment of chemical agents. FM 101-40 contains guidance to assist the commander in determining the items and quantities of protective equipment to be included in the planning of an operation. a. Sowrces. All army units are responsible for collection of information relative to the enemy. Individuals are an important source of information; they should obtain and report information to their commander or intelligence staff, as appropriate, pertaining to enemy equipment and activities. Annex A of appendix IV contains a sample CBR EEL This EEl is not intended to be all-inclusive, but is intended to serve as a guide. All units should prepare a basic EEl and add specific items as required, based on the tactical situation. Specialized units of the Army normally have the mission of collecting specific information relative to the enemy. The information collected is evaluated and becomes intelligence. The most common sources of information for CBR intelligence purposes are: enemy activity; prisoners of war; local civilians; recovered military personnel; captured enemy documents; captured enemy CBR materiel; informers; and other means available to intelligence channels. (1) Enemy activity is the source of most information of combat intelligence value. The volume and type of information available from enemy activities are limited by the capabilities of the means to detect and observe them and by measures taken by the enemy to mask his activities. For example, the sudden issue of CBR protective equipment to enemy troops is information that should be reported. Evidence that the enemy has not engaged in certain activities mq be of greater value than reports of what he has done or is doing. For example, the lack of CBR protective measures might imply that the enemy is not contemplating CBR operations. (2) Prisoners of war (PW's) are valuable sources of information, particularly pertaining to the immediate battle area. Maximum information is obtained through skillful handling of PW's from the time of capture until interrogation is completed. PW's are processed as indicated in the unit SOP. The PW can be a source of such information as: What CBR protective equipment has been issued to enemy troops? Does the enemy have CBR protective shelters and decontaminating stations? Do enemy troops • have chemical and biological munitions on hand? ( 3) Local civilians, civilian agencies, and informers who have been with enemycontrolled areas may be valuable sources of information. Civilian sources can provide information on enemy installations and activities. ( 4) Recovered military personnel are sources of information on the area of operations, enemy protective devices, and enemy activities. (5) Captured enemy documents such as immunization records provide valuable CBR intelligence information. ( 6) Captured enemy materiel may provide chemical technical intelligence information of immediate value to target intelligence or in the determination of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. b. Reports. The unit commander is required to make intelligence reports. Reports of chemical activity are explained and illustrated in appendix V. 30. Maneu ver Maneuver as applied to chemical defense includes movements to place troops and materiel in more favorable positions with respect to defense against enemy chemical agent attack. Emphasis is on avoidance of casualties from chemical agents. 3 1. Selectio n of Routes a nd Positions Routes and positions selected should be favorable both for accomplishment of the mission and for protection against chemical attack. In choosing routes and areas, the following considerations are important: a. Elevation. Chemical agents in the form of vapor and aerosols tend to flow to low ground; high ground, therefore, is preferable unless contaminated. Air currents in corridors, however, may tend to carry agents up slope and • AGO 5647A up valley during the day and down slope and down valley during the night. b. Concealment and Cover. Woods in leaf offer concealment and some cover against spray. Woods with good overhead cover and clear of undergrowth are preferable. Commanders should bear in mind that chemical agents are likely to be more persistent in wooded areas of this type. Before entering wooded areas, a chemical agent detection team should determine if contamination is present. The possible hazard from chemical attack under these conditions should be weighed against the security of concealment offered by the wooded area. c. Freedom from Underbrush. If heavily contaminated, low scrub and long grass may contaminate troops. Furthermore, chemical agent vapors and aerosols linger in heavy undergrowth, particularly if the ground is low. d. Dispersion. Dispersion is an important protective measure. A dispersed installation or formation presents a less lucrative target to attack than a concentrated one, especially to a chemical agent attack for immediate casualty effect. 32. Defensive Measures a. General. Casualties from chemical con tamination may be minimized by the following measures: (1) Establishment of an effective detection and warning system. (2) Proper training in protective measures. ( 3) Enforcement of CBR discipline. ( 4) Exposing a minimum number of personnel. ( 5) Exposing personnel for the shortest possible time. ( 6) Exposing personnel to the lowest possible concentration of the hazard. b. Factors Involved in Chemical Casu,alties. The effects of chemical agents on unprotected personnel depend on (1) Dosage. Dosage depends upon the amount, or concentration, of agent in the air and the length of time the indi- AGO 5647A vidual is exposed or upon the amount of liquid agent absorbed through the skin. Either prolonged exposure to low vapor concentrations or brief exposure to high vapor concentrations will cause casualties. Casualties may also result from failure to recognize and avoid liquid contamination or from failure to remove or neutralize liquid agent contamination on personnel and equipment. (2) Sensitivity. Individuals show varying sensitivity to chemical agents. (3) DegTee of activity. The degree of an individual's activity will affect the rate of breathing which, in turn, affects the amount of agent inhaled and the ability to hold the breath while masking. The blistering effects of a blister agent are more rapid for active, perspiring individuals than for inactive individuals. ( 4) Prior exposure. Many agents have a cumulative effect, and repeated exposure to a normally noncasualtyproducing dosage can eventually cause a casualty. ( 5) Temperatu1·e and humidity. Blister agents are more effective under conditions of high temperature and high humidity. c. Immediate Action MeasU?·es. Immediate action measu1·es fo1· individuals when unde1· chemical agent attack are as follows: (1) Stop breathing. (2) Mask. (3) Give alarm. ( 4) Continue mission. ( 5) Remain masked until ordered to unmask. (6) If (a) Tactical situation permits-TAKE COVER. (b) You have symptoms of nerve agent poisoning-TAKE ATROPINE. (c) Skin is contaminated-DECONTAMINATE. (d) Clothing and equipment are con taminated-DEC ONTAMINATE WHEN MISSION PERMITS. d. Protection Against Aircmft Spray. When under a surprise enemy spray attack and the situation permits, a protective cover such as a poncho or shelter half may be used to protect the body from falling liquid. As much of the body as possible (particularly the head and neck) should be covered. Gloves giving hand and wrist cover should be worn. After the spray has stopped falling, the protective cover should be thrown off, with care being taken to prevent liquid contamination of skin and clothing. When the situation permits, decontamination should be accomplished as necessary. The protective mask is not removed until the order to do so is given. e. Protection Under Static or Defensive Situations. Once chemical operations have been initiated or the threat of enemy chemical operations exists, commanders must consider keeping the maximum number of personnel masked at all times (on a selective basis) . Whether to keep all personnel masked or only a certain number masked is the commander's decision and is based on the threat, mission of the unit, and the activity performed. This decision should be made at the lowest command echelon based on policy or guidance furnished by the major command. f. Protection Against Large-a1·ea Liquid and Vapor Attacks. The protective measures against spray attack will also provide protection against large-area liquid and vapor attacks. Troops should be protected by overhead cover if the situation permits. If overhead cover is not available, a poncho, raincoat, or similar cover should be used to protect the body and the mask should be used to protect the face. When the threat of such attacks are imminent or apparent, troops should sleep masked and under cover. Overhead cover, such as foliage, covered foxholes, and protective shelters, is to be utilized for protection under these conditions. g. Friendly Use of Chemical Agents. When chemical agents are employed against the enemy, friendly units in the area and down wind must be advised of the contemplated employment so that they will be aware that pro tective measures may be necessary. The headquarters directing the mission will provide the necessary information to the units in the area. If friendly troops are endangered by the effects of chemical agent employment because of a shift in winds or miscalculation of the exte:1t of the area to be contaminated, the protective measures used are the same as those against an enemy chemical attack. h. SOP. The unit SOP should set forth procedures to be followed in the event of a chemical attack (app IV). 33. Conditions for Masking and Unmasking a. Masking. Commanders should insure that every soldier knows the conditions for automatic masking. Soliders mask without waiting for an alarm once chemical operations are in progress or are imminent when (1) Attacked by a concentration of artillery, mortar, or rocket fire; or by an aircraft bomb. (2) Attacked by aircraft spray. (3) Smoke or mist of an unknown source is present. ( 4) A suspicious odor or liquid is present. (5) A chemical agent attack is suspected. ( 6) Entering an area known to be or suspected of being contaminated with a lethal or incapacitating chemical agent. (7) For no obvious reason the following effects occur : (a) An unexplained runny nose. (b) A feeling of choking and tightness in the chest or throat. (c) Dimming of vision and difficulty in focusing the eyes on close objects. (d) Irritation of the eyes (could be caused by presence of any of several chemical agents) . ( e) Difficulty in breathing or increased rate of breathing. b. Unmasking. Unmasking entails a command decision. Personnel will not unmask until directed to do so. After a chemical attack, the commander should follow the instructions given below to determine when to unmask: AGO 5647A (1) Have a test made with the chemical agent detector kit and determine the absence of nerve agent or other lethal or incapacitating agents. Tests with the kit should be made throughout the unit area, especially downwind from the suspected release point of the agent. After determining the absence of agent with the detector kit, have 2 or 3 men unmask for 5 minutes. Examine the men in a shaded area for any chemical agent symptoms. If no symptoms occur, have personnel unmask. However, personnel should remain alert for the appearance of any chemical agent symptoms. (2) In the absence of a chemical agent detector kit, remain masked until a kit can be obtained. As an emergency field expedient or if no kit is obtainable, have 2 or 3 men each take a deep breath, hold it, and break the seal of the mask, keeping the eyes wide open for about 15 seconds. Have the men reestablish the mask seal and wait 10 minutes. Observe the men for any signs of chemical agent symptoms. If no symptoms develop in 10 minutes after this procedure, have these same 2 or 3 men break the mask seal and take 3 or 4 breaths. After the men have taken these breaths, have them reseal the masks and again allow 10 minutes to elapse. If no symptoms develop, have these same men unmask for 5 minutes and then remask. After 10 minutes examine these men as in (1) above. If no symptoms occur, have the entire group remove their masks. However, personnel should remain alert for the appearance of chemical agent symptoms. c. Limited Exposure. It should be noted that limited exposure to a low concentration of nerve agents not detectable by the detector kit will cause no ill effects other than a runny nose, tightness of the chest, and/ or pinpointing of the pupils. These effects are usually relieved by one injection of atropine. Care should be taken to avoid enclosed spaces, close grouping AGO 5647A of personnel, and long-time occupancy of lowlying areas having little air movement. Advantage should be taken of air currents. 34. Detection of Chemical Agents Unit CBR personnel must be trained to detect chemical agent contamination by use of authorized unit equipment. Personnel should not depend upon odors or colors alone to detect the presence of chemical agents. All personnel must be trained to recognize a chemical agent attack or hazard. a. Chemical Agent Detector Kits. (1) Chemical agent detector kit, VGH, AN-M15A2A. (TM 3-6665-211-12.) The AN-M15A2A detector kit (fig. 6) is standard-A TOE equipment for issue to all platoons, companies, battalions, brigades, or similar-size units or headquarters. The purpose of this kit is to provide a lightweight and simplified detector kit that can be used without the assistance of specialized technical personnel to detect the presence of dangerous vapor concentrations of G-and V-agents and mustard (H) by observation of color changes in detector tubes or enzyme tickets. CK and CX can also be detected by the kit. Detailed operating instructions are contained in the kit. (2) Chemical agent detector kit, ABCM18A2. This kit is designed to detect and identify dangerous vapor concentrations of blister agents, V-and Gagents, blood agents, and choking agents. It may also be used to collect vapor samples of agents that cannot be identified by the kit. Six white dot or white band tubes containing samples of the unknown agent will be forwarded as directed by the division chemical officer. The tubes should be sealed with aluminum foil or other similar wrapping material to prevent deterioration of the sample. This kit is issued to certain units having personnel trained to operate it. Detailed operating instructions are contained in the kit. b. Chemical Agent Detector Paper. Detector scrapings dusted on a surface suspected of paper (fig. 6) is issued in booklets of 25 sheet . being contaminated. Liquid or high vapor con It is paper impregnated with a chemical comcentrations of blister agents (except the nitropound that turns dark blue, yellow, or red when gen mustards) turn detector crayon from pink • to blue. The crayon cannot be used as a reliable in contact with V-agent, G-agent, or H, respectest for nerve agents, because the reactions be tively, in liquid form. This paper must touch the liquid agent to insure a positive test. It is tween the crayon and nerve agents are variable best suited for use on nonporous material ; o and the color developed is dependent upon imporous material the test is not always reliable. purities and other uncontrollable conditions It does not detect vapor. DANC solution and High concentrations of phosgene or chlorine and a strong acid, such as hydrochloric or sul certain solvents also cause a change in the color of the paper. The paper is unreliable for deterfuric acid, also turn detector crayon blue. Demining the completeness of decontamination by tector crayon also detects high concentrations use of DANC solution or certain solvents, but of CX. DANC solution or protective ointment may be used for determining the completeness must be thoroughly removed before detector crayon can be used to test for completeness of of decontamination by washing or weathering. A color chart is included in the booklet to aid decontamination because these decontaminants in interpreting the tests. Normally, a booklet interfere with the test. of the paper is issued to each individual. 3 5. Alarms c. Vesicant Detector Crayon. To detect contamination, detector crayon (fig. 6) may be used a. General Alarms. These are sent out by higher headquarters when it is expected that like blackboard crayon and rubbed on the bac of a piece of paper or on equipment. It may chemical a t tacks will involve large areas. Gen eral alarms are spread as rapidly as possiblebe scraped to a powder with a knife and the DETECTOR PAPER AN-M1SA2A DETECTOR KIT DETECTOR CRAYON Figure 6. Items for chemical agent detection. AGO 5647A 24 • in conformity with the SOP to all areas likely to be affected. Signal operating instructions (SOl) should include brevity codes for alarms. Once an attack has occurred and the local alarm has been given, a general alarm is immediately given to alert all units near the area of attack to prevent additional casualties from new attacks or from the downwind travel of the .chemical agent cloud or fallout. The procedure is specified in the unit SOP. b. Local Alarms. The local alarm (warning) is given by any person recognizing or suspecting the presence of a CBR hazard. Unit SOP's must provide for the rapid transmission of the warning to all elements of the unit and to adjacent units. Brevity codes should be used where feasible. Suspicion of the presence of a chemical hazard is reported to the unit commander for confirmation. It is important to avoid giving false alarms and to prevent unnecessary transmission of alarms to unaffected areas. Consistent with the mission and circumstances of the unit, the alarm will be given by use of any device that produces an audible sound that cannot be easily confused with other sounds encountered in combat. Examples of suitable devices for local alarms are empty shell cases, bells, metal triangles, vehicle horns, and iron pipes or rails. The unit SOP should specify the devices to be used, locations of the devices in the unit area, and procedures to be followed. As a supplement to the audible (sound) alarms or to replace them when the tactical situation does not permit their use, certain visual signals are used to give emergency warning of a CBR hazard or attack. These visual signals consist of donning the protective mask and protective equipment, followed by an agitated action to call attention to this fact. In the event of a chemical agent attack, there is a danger of breathing in the agent if the vocal warning is given before masking. The individual suspecting or recognizing this attack will mask first and then give the alarm. The vocal alarm for chemical agent attack will be "SPRAY" for a spray attack, and "GAS" for an attack delivered by other means. The vocal warning is intended for those individuals in the immediate vicinity of the person recognizing the attack. The vocal alarm does not take the place of the sound alarm or the visual AGO 6647A signal to alert a unit of a chemical attack. The signals for emergency warnings and "all clear" are contained in appendix VII. 36. Sentinels All sentinels have duties in connection with CBR def ense. These duties should be detailed in the unit SOP. Each sentinel must be thoroughly familiar with the specific actions to be taken i connection with sounding the alarm or other means of alerting unit personnel to the presence of a CBR hazard. 37. Protection of Supplies and Equipment Supplies and equipment contaminated with chemical agents present a casualty threat to unprotected personnel. Appropriate covers should be used to protect supplies and equipment stored outdoors. The following measures are recommended for protection of supplies and equipment against contamination: a. Packaged Subsistence Items. Chemical agents may contaminate subsistence items by means of vapor, aerosol, or liquid. The vulnerability of subsistence items to chemical agents is affected by the type of subsistence, the type and amount of chemical agent, and the effectiveness of protective measures. These protective measures including packaging of subsistence, proper storage procedures, dispersal of supplies, and maximum use of both natural and artificial protective shelters or other forms of overhead cover. Foods not specially packed in protective packages generally constitute the major difficulty. The present methods employed in packing for overseas shipment substantially reduce the possibility of contamination. Current packaging materials offer some protection against all contaminating agents and may be summarized briefly as follows : ( 1) Airtight glass bottles, sealed metal cans, and sealed metal drums give complete protection against vapor and liquid. (2) Wooden barrels, well sealed for the exclusion of air, give complete protection against vapor; protection against liquid is also complete except for heavy, prolonged heavy concentrations. (3) Wooden boxes, if sealed for the exclu sion of air, give good protection against vapor but poor protection against liquid. (4) Waxed paper boxes, well sealed for the exclusion of air, give good protection against vapor and fair protection against liquid. (5) Untreated wrapping papers give poor protection against vapor and liquid. (6) Cellophane wrappings, if sealed for the exclusion of air, give good protection against vapor and liquid if all joints are tight. (7) Metal foils and plastic-foil laminated bags give complete protection against both vapor and liquid if joints are tight and there are no scuffed areas or severe creases. (8) Ordinary textiles (such as canvas) in single-layer packaging give practically no protection against vapor and liquid. (9) Generally, double layers greatly increase the protective efficiency of packaging materials. (10) Packaged operational subsistence (such as the meal, combat, individual and ration, small detachment, 5 persons) is so packaged as to protect the enclosed foods for many hours even when the outside of the package is heavily contaminated with liquid agent. b. Unpackaged Subsistence Items. Chemical agents will contaminate unpackaged subsistence items. Oily and fatty foods in particular are vulnerable. Foods are protected from agent contamination when stored in containers such as field ice boxes and refrigerators. As a general rule, contaminated unpackaged food will not be consumed unless released for consumption by Medical Service personnel. c. Water. The Corps of Engineers is responsible for appropriate water sources and for the purification and distribution of water from these sources. The Army Medical Service is responsible for recommendations on the potability of water. Water that is not in sealed containers may become contaminated. Water suspected of contamination will not be consumed. d. Equipment. Critical items of equipment should be covered. Plastic sheets serve as an excellent cover as they are nonporous. If plastic material is not available, paulins or other suitable material may be used. If no other cover is available, dense foliage will provide some protection. The following are sample means of protection for listed items: (1) Ammunition. Amunition is covered or kept in its containers as long as possible. (2) Weapons. Weapons are covered or dispersed under foliage when possible. (3) Instruments. Instruments, such as those used for fire control, are kept in their containers when not being used. Both ammunition and instruments are subject to corrosion by certain chemical agents. ( 4) Missile vans. Emphasis should be on selecting locations for missile vans that take advantage of any natural shielding which may be available. If possible the vans should be located so that the air conditioner is opposite the prevailing wind direction. Troops responsible for the operation of the van should make every effort possible to reduce leakage in vans and components such as the air conditioner. (5) Air craft. Aircraft are provided with covers (at least for cockpits, plastic windows, guns, and gun compartments) when not in hangars. (6) V ehicles. Vehicles are stored in woods free of underbrush or are dispersed and covered, if possible. Lower portions of ravines and canyons should be avoided because of vapor hazard. (7) Communications equipment. Communications equipment not housed in shelters is covered. Special care should be taken to protect the headsets on radios and the mouthpieces on telephones from contamination. (8) Field latrines. Overhead cover should be provided for field latrines. AGO 6647A • Section IV. Decontamination 38. General Contamination of personnel, equipment, or terrain may necessitate that decontamination be accomplished when the mission permits. Decontamination of personnel and equipment is discussed below : a. Principles. Decontamination is accomplished by removal, absorption, neutralization, destruction, or burial of chemical agents. In all decontamination operations, the soldier must use care to avoid contaminating himself. Material which has been used for decontamination may require disposal. Decontaminating materials and methods for their use may be found in appendix III. TM 3-220 contains additional details of decontamination. b. Echelons of Decontamination. (1) Individual decontamination is performed by the individual, with material at hand, on himself or on equipment he uses. The procedures are usually sufficient to allow the individual to carry on his assigned mission. In emergencies the soldier may have to perform any o~ all of the decontamination measures mentioned in this manual. (2) Unit decontamination is performed by personnel of the unit, under supervision of trained individuals, with equipment available to the unit. All officers, NCO's, and qualified specialists should be prepared to act as supervisors of decontamination teams. (3) Field decontamination is performed by specialized units and is confined to vital installations, equipment, and areas, the decontamination of which is beyond the capabilities of the using unit. In some cases the specialized units may provide technical assistance and supervision to the unit responsible for the area. c. Personnel Decontamination Stations. Fixed-type decontamination stations are described in TM 3-220. (1) Operation. Personnel field decontami nation stations are established and operated by the commander having direct jurisdiction over the area, normally at battalion, brigade, or higher level. A clothing exchange and a bathing facility normally are operated in conjunction with the personnel decontamination station. Procedures for operation of a station are contained in TM 3-220. (2) Location. Personnel decontamination stations should be located as far forward as the tactical situation permits and near a medical aid station if feasible. The area should provide cover from air and ground observation. Stations should be located so that disposal of contaminated water can be accomplished. d. Equipment Decontamination Stations. These stations should be located as far forward as possible. A typical layout for an equipment decontamination station is described in TM 3-220. Collapsible water tanks may be used to store water. Standard decontaminating equipment and materials should be used if available. Brooms, mops, and pails may be used if standard decontaminating equipment is not available. Contaminated wash water must be disposed of in such a way that it is not a hazard (a sump disposal pit is one means of disposal of contaminated wash water). e. Field E xpe dient Decontamination Stations. It may be necessary to improvise facilities for decontamination stations when standard bath units or decontaminating apparatus are not available. Water storage tanks, water heaters, and rubber hose (with holes for sprinkling) can be utilized for this purpose. Means for disposing of contaminated clothing, equipment, and water must be provided. 39. Personnel Decontamination and First Aid a. Geneml. Prompt removal or decontamination of certain agents in contact with the eyes or the skin is imperative if casualties are to be prevented. Personnel must be trained in proper decontamination and first-aid measures. Contaiminated personnel must first mask, even though their faces are contaminated, before attempting to decontaminate their person. After the individual has masked and resumed breathing, if he then suspects contamination in eyes or on face, he must immediately obtain overhead shelter. This shelter is necessary to project to protect the individual during the following decontamination process: ( 1) Remove and open canteen. ( 2) Prepare the skin pad. ( 3) Take a deep breath and hold it. (4) Remove the mask. (5) Flush the eyes with water. (6) Use skin pad to decontaminate both the face and the portion of the mask which came into contact with the contamination on the face. (7) Replace mask and resume breathing. The decontamination process should be repeated as necessary until the individual is sure that the decontamination of his eyes or face is complete. If protective ointment (M5) or components of the M13 kit are used as a decontaminant, they should not be used in or around the eyes. Soliders should use the "buddy" system when decontamination is being accomplished. b. Blister Agents. Removal or decontamination of blister agents in contact with the eyes must be prompt; only water will be used for removing blister agents from the eyes. Removal or decontamination of these agents in contact with the skin must also be accomplished promptly if casualties are to be prevented. The M13 kit and protective ointment are effective decontaminants for removal of these agents from the skin. If neither of these items is available, soap and water can also be used to remove the agents from the skin and to decontaminate small areas of clothing. c. N e'rve Agents. It is imperative that nerve agents in contact with the skin or eyes be neutralized or removed immediately if casualties are to be prevented. These agents are lethal and are readily absorbed by the eyes; absorption through the skin is somewhat slower. Nerve agents can be removed from the skin by the use of the M13 kit. If this kit is not available, nerve agents can be removed from the skin with soap and water. Protective ointment is an effective decontaminant for re • moval of the V-agents, but is not effective for • decontamination of the G-agents. Water is effective in removing nerve agents from the eyes. Injection of atropine and application of artificial respiration or resuscitation may be necessary first-aid measures for personnel showing symptoms of nerve agent poisoning (FM 21-13). The individual soldier is authorized to carry three automatic atropine injection devices. Clothing contaminated with the nerve agents should not be allowed to contact the skin. Small spots of liquid contamination on clothing may be decontaminated or cut out; clothing grossly contaminated with liquid agent should be removed. Skin underneath contaminated clothing should be decontaminated. d. Smokes. Enemy smokes should be considered dangerous until proven otherwise, since they may contain lethal or incapacitating chemical agents. Smoke munitions may be dangerous when released in confined places. First-aid measures for white phosphorus are contained in FM 21-11. e. Other Agents. (1) Choking agents. Troops exposed to a choking agent need not be withdrawn from combat unless breathing becomes difficult. Symptoms may persist and grow worse, but often first symptoms disappear and are followed by a latent period in which the victim feels fairly well. Serious symptoms of lung injury may not appear for several hours ; the critical period for choking agent victims is during the first 48 hours after exposure. When symptoms become severe, the casualty should avoid movement and be kept warm until evacuated by medical personnel. See TM 8-285 for details on first aid and treatment of personnel exposed to choking agents. (2) Blood agents. Blood agents may cause unconsciousness in less than 2 minutes . First aid for these agents consists of inhalation of amyl nitrite and AGO 5647A • application of artificial respiration or resuscitation (if required). See FM 21-41 for details. (3) Vomiting agents. As vomiting agents may be used to conceal the presence of a lethal agent, personnel must be warned that the distress following exposure to vomiting agents may in crease after the mask is put on but that the mask must be left in place. However, the mask should be pulled away from the chin (not removed) during actual vomiting. The face piece must be cleared of agent each time the airtight seal is broken. Per sonnel should continue the mission; vigorous activity lessens the duration of effects of the agent. ( 4) Tear agents. Soldiers must be informed not to rub their eyes and must be informed that effects of tear agents are only temporary. When the situation permits, soldiers should face the wind keeping eyes open ; they should flush eyes, face, and skin with water if necessary. Individuals affected by CS vapors should be removed to fresh air for 5 to 10 minutes, faced into the wind, and cautioned not to rub eyes; individuals should be kept well spaced. (See FM 21-48 for additional information on CS.) (5) Incapacitating agents. These agents normally can be removed from the skin with soap and water and from the eyes with clear water. Personnel exposed to a low concentration of the agent should be removed to fresh air and observed for symptoms of poisoning. (6) Unidentified chemical agents. Decontamination and first-aid procedures for unidentified chemical agents are contained in FM 21-41. 40. Decontamination of Equipment, Buildings, Food and Water, and Terrain a. General. The individual soldier is responsible for decontamination of his equipment and his person. A unit must decontaminate its equipment with available decontaminating rnaterials and equipment. Decontamination beyond the capability of the unit is accomplished by specialized units using special equipment. Some of the more common materials and means of decontamination of chemical contamination are (1) Decontaminating materials. (a) Supertropical bleach (STB) powder mixed with water (slurry) or earth (dry mix). (b) DANC, which requires mixing a powder with a solvent just prior to use. (c) DS2, a solution that requires no mixing and that can be applied with the Mll apparatus or with brushes and swabs. (d) Hot, soapy water used in conjunction with other decontaminating materials or used alone for removal of contamination. (2) Sun and air. Weathering will decontaminate if sufficient time is allowed. (3) Earth. A cover of earth (if undisturbed) seals over a contaminated area. A 4-inch thickness is adequate for most chemical agents. (4) Bu1·ning. Vegetation that is contaminated with chemical agents may be burned, but liquid agents that have soaked into the ground remain dangerous. It may be necessary to post, abandon, and later (when time permits) burn contaminated supplies, equipment, buildings, and other items not worth salvaging. Burning is highly effective against chemical agents; however, unprotected personnel downwind must be alerted to the possible vapor hazard. It may be necessary to delay burning until weather conditions are favorable. Personnel engaged in decontamination operations will usually be required to wear the protective mask and appropriate protective clothing and gloves. TM 3-220 contains detailed inf ormation on decontaminating equipment, materials, and procedures. b. Personal Equipment. (1) Ordinary clothing. Ordinary clothing AGO 5647A that has been exposed to vapo1·s of chemical agents may be decontaminated under temperate conditions by aeration in sunlight for 4 to 8 hours or overnight. However, clothing exposed to liquid agent will require decontamination as outlined in TM 3 220. If the M13 kit is not available, small areas contaminated with blister agent or VX may be decontaminated with protective ointment as an expedient until clothing can be changed. The ointment should be applied to both sides of the cloth and thoroughly rubbed in, with special attention given contaminated seam areas. (2) Permeable protective clothing. Permeable protective clothing exposed to vapors of blister agents does not require decontamination. Impregnated clothing exposed to nerve agent vapor may retain enough agent to preclude the removal of the mask until the clothing is removed or decontaminated. When clothing has been decontaminated, the prescribed tests for impregnite in clothing are made and reimpregnation is accomplished if necessary. Usually contaminated protective clothing is placed in suitable containers and returned to laundry units for disposition or decontamination; after decontamination the clothing is reimpregnated to restore its protective qualities. Heavily contaminated clothing will be placed in separate containers from other contaminated clothing for disposition. (3) Impermeable protective clothing. Impermeable protective clothing that has become contaminated with liquid agent must be decontaminated prior to storage and reuse. Details of decontamination procedures are contained in TM 3-220. (4) Leathe1· boots. After decontamination of leather boots ( TM 3-220), they should be treated with vesicant gas resistant leather dressing. The detailed procedure for treating leather footwear is contained in FM 21-41. (5} Protective masks. Liquid agents are absorbed by rubber; therefore, it is important to decontaminate protective mask facepieces as soon as practicable. See TM 3-220 for details. (6) Othe1· equipment. For decontamination procedures for weapons, metallic and glass equipment, leather, and canvas webbing, see TM 3-220. Lightly contaminated web equipment does not offer a serious hazard when worn over protective clothing and handled with gloves. Heavily contaminated web equipment should be destroyed and replaced. Personal equipment (web and load-carrying equipment) may be decontaminated by soaking in gasoline for one hour. Gasoline must be used with care to avoid fire or explosion, and equipment decontaminated by this means must be thoroughly dried before use. c. Buildin gs. Contaminated buildings, particularly wooden ones, are difficult to decontaminate. Buildings may be decontaminated by (1) Scrubbing or swabbing with slurry (STB). (2) Applying STB slurry by use of the power-driven decontaminating apparatus. (3) Washing with hot, soapy water. ( 4) Washing or spraying with a 5-percent washing soda solution (for nerve agents or phosgene oxime). (5) Burning contamination from surface. (6) Aeration. d. Food and Wate?'. For a detailed discussion of food, forage, and water decontamination, see TM 3-220, TM 5-700, and TM 8-285. e. T e?T ain. As a matter of practical necessity, decontamination of terrain by other than weathering will be confined to small areas criti cally needed for immediate operations. In such critical instances, units should utilize any practical means available for removal or covering of the contaminants. AGO 6647A CHAPTER 5 DEFENSE AGAINST FLAME AND INCENDIARIES 41. Defense Against Flame a. The primary objective of individual defense is to keep particles of burning fuel off the person. As soon as the flash and flame in the high heat zone have dissipated, the covering should be discarded. b. Individuals should be instructed to (1) Use any available cover when a flame attack appears imminent. Foxholes and prepared positions are the most satisfactory, but shell holes and small depressions assist in reducing the hazards of burning fuel and offer some protection. If time permits, a shelter half or blanket should be used as a cover. A field jacket pulled up over the head and covering any exposed skin (such as face, neck, or hands) offers some protection to eliminate direct burns. (2) Remain covered with no skin exposed until after the bomb has burst in the vicinity and then throw off the cover and remove any burning particles from their clothing. (a) Several items of individual equipment offer protection against burning fuel. Two thicknesses of the shelter half will hold burning fuel for more than 10 seconds. The field jacket and the issue blanket offer almost the same protection when used as foxhole covers. Tent canvas and truck tarpaulins, which have been treated with fire-resistant material, will withstand direct hits with burning fuel and will hold the burning particles for a sufficient time (more than 30 seconds) to permit personnel to escape from the foxhole. (b) Foxhole covers improvised of brush and with as little as 2 inches of earth on top will successfully withstand burning fuel. (c) The plastic poncho is not a satisfactory cover. It melts rapidly and burns when hit with flaming fuel. This would increase the severity of burns received by an individual. c. Foxholes and weapon positions can be modified to afford adequate protection for anything except a direct hit with a fire bomb. The addition of a crouch hole, which permits the use of a flap consisting of a shelter half, blanket, or similar material, will give increased protectio . d. Despite the value of individual cover, camouflage and dispersion are still important elements in the defense against flame. Selecting positions which avoid obvious natural or isolated features; dispersing the unit within the selected position; and enforcing proper camouflage discipline, to preclude developing aiming points, strengthen the defense against flame attacks. For further details on defense against flame, see FM 20-33. 42. Defense Against Incendiary Attack a. Geneml. The incendiary bomb (as distinguished from the fire bomb filled with thickened fuel) has been considered a strategic rather than a tactical weapon and has been used mainly against rear area installations; nevertheless, possible tactical targets include ammunition dumps, advance depots, railheads, airbases, and ·supply columns. Incendiary shells, fire bombs, incendiary grenades, and flamethrowers are primarily tactical weapons. This paragraph is concerned with the action of individuals and units in fighting fires started by incendiaries. It does not cover the employment AGO 6647A of engineer firefighting teams, which normally are located to protect the most important installations and are equipped to fight large fires. b. Types of Attack. (1) Large incendiary bombs are customarily used on important installations (point targets) such as airbases, railheads, docks, depots, and factories. (2) Small incendiary bombs are usually dropped in clusters against area targets. These bombs disperse in falling, the object being to start a number of separate fires that will merge into a major conflagration. (3) Incendiary bomb clusters may contain a percentage of high explosive incendiary bombs. Unless known to the contrary, all incendiary bombs must be considered to be of explosive type, and suitable precautions must be taken. Ordinary room walls, tables, chairs, and similar objects do not provide a safe shield for an individual against these bombs. A brick wall offers adequate protection against small explosive incendiary bombs. Only one firefighter should risk exposure in an. attempt to extinguish a bomb. When cover is available, the firefighter's body should be shielded so that only the hands are exposed. Helmets should be worn. When cover is not available, firefighters operate from a prone position and from a distance as great as equipment permits. c. Equipment. (1) Sho vels. Shovels can be used to scoop up incendiary bombs and throw them in a place where no damage will be done. (2) Sand mats. Sand mats can be used to smother bombs. Fighters should then take cover or run at least 20 meters away and lie fiat. Sandbags or sand mats reduce fragmentation of explosive bombs to some degree; some fragments are confined, and those that escape are dispersed over a substan (3) Loos e sand. Loose sand may be thrown around the bomb, helping to smother fires started by it. Sometimes it may be necessary to cover the bomb with sand a nd scoop it or the molten particles into a shovel. The bomb or particles are then placed in a pail partially filled with sand. More sand is placed on top, and the bomb is carried to a safe place. (4) Wat er or fire extinguishers. Water or fire extinguishers are employed immediately against bombs and the combustible area around the bombs, regardless of whether sandbags or sand mats are used. Carbon tetrachloride extinguishers should not be used in confined places because they generate phosgene at high temperatures. Soda acid and water extinguishers should not be used directly on oil because t hey tend to spread the fire, or on electrical lines because of short-circuit hazards. The fog nozzle extinguisher and the carbon dioxide type, however, can be used safely. Water can be used against other types of incendiaries such as phosphorus and burning metal. It may be projected from a hose, pump tank, or knapsack-type pump. Water serves two purposes: it confines the spread of the fire by wetting down the surrounding area, and it controls the magnesium types of incendiaries by increasing their rate of burning (or extinguishing them if enough water is used). Warning: Do not use water to combat magnesium types of incendiaries in confined spaces. ( 5) Power-driv en decontaminating apparatus. The power-driven decontaminating apparatus, 'if available, can be used in the same manner as regular firefighting equipment. d. Insp ection After Incendiary Attacks. (1) General. After an incendiary attack, a watch must be maintained for several hours to make certa-in that fire tially reduced area. does not break out again. AGO 6647A I 32 (2) Phosphorus or oil. Phosphorus ignites when exposed to oxygen in the air. When phosphorus bombs or phosphorus and oil bombs have been used and the filling is spattered on walls and floors of building, the area must be kept wet and scraped clean with a hoe, scraper, or knife. Then, as the surfaces dry, they must be watched for reignition of remaining phosphorus. Phosphorus must be removed to prevent reignition. (3) Unexploded bombs. After each incendiary attack, a careful inspection must be made for bombs that have not detonated and for separated explosive portions that have not detonated. When these have been located, the spot should be marked with a sign, "Unexploded Bomb," the area roped off, personnel excluded, and the explosive disposal team notified. Under no circumstances will untrained personnel handle unexploded bombs. Combustible materials should be removed from the immediate vicinity to prevent ignition in case the bomb explodes. Bomb disposal is a function of explosive disposal teams. These teams should be notified through channels. (4) Equipment. Immediately after a fire has been extinguished, all firefighting equipment should be inspected, cleaned, and returned to its usual place. Empty extinguishers should be refilled. AGO 6647A • CHAPTER 6 BIOLOGICAL AGENTS 43. Characteristics and Effects of Biological Agents Biological agents are microorganisms that cause disease in man, animals, or plants or cause deterioration of materiel. These agents may be classified by their effects as antipersonnel, antianimal, anticrop, or antimateriel. Man may be susceptible to some antianimal agents, and animals may be susceptible to some antipersonnel agents. Man and animals are not suspectible to anticrop agents. a. Characteristics. Since biological agents are living microorganisms, the individual agents are affected differently by their environment. Some microorganisms are readily destroyed by sunlight or other adverse environmental conditions, while other microorganisms remain alive for long periods of time in an unfavorable environment. In such an environment, for example, sporeforming microorganisms tend to remain alive longer than nonsporeforming microorganisms. Biological agents may be transmitted to man or domestic animals (vectors) such as mites, ticks, fleas, mosquitoes, and flies. Some biological agents can be disseminated in aerosol form and are thus readily spread by the winds. b. Effects. Biological agents may produce incapacitating or lethal effects. Man is most readily infected by inhalation of the agent. Generally, the physiological effects will resemble symptoms of known diseases. Incapacitating agents may cause deaths in a low percentage of individuals infected but usually cause prolonged incapacitation and hospitalization. The lethal agents can cause a relatively high percentage of deaths in infected cases. The effects of biological agents are delayed; thus these agents would be used for producing de 44. Protection Against Biological Agents In general, the protective measures used against biological aerosol attacks are the same as those used against chemical attacks. See appendix IV for a sample outline of a CBR defense SOP. a. Personal Protection. The protection of personnel against biological agents in aerosol form can be accomplished by donning the protective mask. Ordinary clothing offers the skin some protection from contamination by biological agents and from vectors such as flies, mosquitoes, and ticks. Since some biological agents remain alive for extended periods after the initial attack, soil and vegetation may be contaminated. Marching men or moving vehicles may stir up contaminated dust into the atmosphere, thus creating a secondary aerosol of the biological agents. However, these aerosols do not normally present a hazard of military significance. In areas known to be or suspected of being contaminated, personnel should wear the protective mask and decontaminate (as permitted by the mission) clothing worn in these areas. b. Preventive Measures. Casualties from biological agents can be minimized by such precautions as immunization of troops, quarantine of contaminated buildings and areas, stringent rodent and pest control, proper care of cuts and wounds, and troop indoctrination in using only approved sources for food and drink. Protective measures against biological attacks can properly start with training and plans for prevention of disease. Vaccines and related items are available for some of the biological agents that could possibly be used in biological attacks. In any immunization program, administrative action must be taken to insure that all person layed casualties instead of immediate casualties. nel receive the prescribed inoculations and any 34 AGO 5647A I followup or booster "shots." The physical condition of personnel exposed to biological agents will influence the effects of the exposure. Soldiers should understand that high standards of personal hygiene and avoidance of practices that produce a rundown condition will pay dividends in the event of a biological agent attack. The importance of proper field sanitation measures and good protective mask discipline should be stressed. Personnel should decontaminate themselves as soon as practicable after exposure to a biological agent attack. c. Treatment of Casualties. Table I lists important protective measures. Personnel who become ill because of a biological agent attack will be treated by the same general measures used in other cases of illness. These measures will often be limited to getting the patient to a place of treatment as promptly as possible and in as good a condition as possible. Serious cases should not walk; fevers may be alleviated by means normally used by personnel charged with evacuating the sick and wounded. d. Troop Indoctrination. Training for defense against biological operations must stress the necessity for an alert but questioning attitude toward any indication that biological agents may have been employed. Full respect for the power of biological operations is important, but there must be freedom from any unreasonable fear of contracting disease as a result of biological operations. Troops should understand the nature and objectives of biological attacks and bear in mind that: (1) Such an attack is difficult to recognize or detect. (2) A biological attack may be used as a supplement or complement to other types of attack. (3) A biological operation may be used as either a strategic or a tactical means of attack. Table I. P1·otective Measures for Biological Operations Items Protective measures • Protective equipment _ The protective mask when worn will protect against respiratory infection. Normal clothing covering exposed skin offers some protection against vectors such as mosquitoes. AGO 6647A Table I. Protective Measres for Biological Operations Continued Items Protective measures Immunization Prescribed "shots" taken regularly as scheduled increase body resistance to the form of the disease against which individual is inoculated. Decontamination ____ _ The body should be scrubbed thoroughly and frequently with soap and water. Clothing should be washed thoroughly with soap and water, dry cleaned, or aerated in sunlight. Cotton items may be boiled. Food and drink ______ _ Only approved food and drink should be consumed and should be protected from possible contamination. Approved water treatment or cooking will destroy most biological agents. Restricted areas ______ Personnel must stay out of quarantined buildings and areas. Intelligence -----------Personnel should be alert to note and report suspicious activities and materiel. Sabotage may be used by the enemy. Rumors -------------Repeating or exaggerating rumors should be avoided; such practices alarm others and accomplish nothing. 45. Detection a. A biological attack is difficult to detect. However, there are certain prior indications of an enemy's interest in biological operations that intelligence personnel are trained to look for. All military personnel need to be alert to detect indications of actual use of biological agents. Biological attacks should be suspected if low flying aircraft which appear to be producing a mist or spray (aerosol) are observed or if any type of spray device is observed functioning. Another observation which might indicate a biological attack would be the finding of unusual types of bomblets. The functioning of any weapon which appears to have little, if any, immediate effect might be indicative of SHELL AIR CRAFT SPRAY VECTORS AERIAL BOMBS AEROSOL GENERATORS GUIDED MISSILES AND ROCKETS MISCELLANEOUS Figure 7. Possible means of disseminating biological agents. a biological attack and should be reported to commanding officers. These indications might occur behind the lines and in the zone of interior; civilian defense organizations also should be alert to note them. Some of the possible means of disseminating biological agents are shown in figure 7. b. Samples of the suspected biological agent must be collected by trained individuals and sent to medical laboratories for identification. Samples taken by untrained personnel will often give negative results because of poor sam • piing techniques or improper care of the sample in transit. It is preferable to have a few properly taken samples from diversified areas; therefore, requests will be made for technical intelligence teams to take the samples and forward them to the appropriate laboratory for analysis. The microorganisms in the samples have to be processed under controlled laboratory conditions and should not be exposed to extremes of temperature or sunlight. A positive means of identification of the agent is the diagnosis of the disease in man, animals, or • AGO 5647A plants. However, this identification may require several days to several weeks because of the incubation period (time from infection to appearance of symptoms). Devices are being developed for warning and sampling of biological agents in the field. 46. Decontamination The methods and materials available in the field for biological decontamination are listed in appendix III. a. Pe'rsonal Decontamination. This is accomplished by showering thoroughly with soap and hot water; germicidal soaps should be used if available. The nails and hairy portions of the body require special attention. Contaminated clothing should be washed in hot soapy water if decontamination is not performed by quartermaster laundries. Cotton items may be boiled. b. Outdoor Areas. Since sunlight destroys most microorganisms, it will usually decontaminate unshaded outdoor areas. However, shaded areas, especially at low temperatures, may remain hazardous for extended periods. Decontamination of large areas is not feasible, but critical areas known to be or suspected of being heavily contaminated should be decontaminated. The warning sign for marking biologically contaminated areas is shown in appendix VI. c. Indoor Areas. Personnel in a shelter, warehouse, or other building that is known to be or suspected of being contaminated with biological agents must wear protective masks until the building is evacuated or decontaminated. Medical personnel furnish the necessary advice, and engineer personnel provide the support required for interior decontamination. TM 3-220 includes detailed decontamination information. • AGO 6647A CHAPTER 7 • • EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 47. General All personnel must have knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons. Nuclear explosions produce three effects: blast, thermal radiation (heat), and nuclear radiation (fig. 8). The extent and relative importance of the three effects will depend on the yield of the weapon, height of the burst (HOB), and weapon types. Radioactive materials can be disseminated by means other than nuclear weapons; the protective measures taken against them are similar to those taken against fallout. 48. Types of Bursts Classified according to height of burst, there are three types of nuclear explosions: airbursts, surface bursts, and subsurface l?ursts. Field manuals of the 101-31-series contain details of the effects that height of burst, yield, and weapon type have on the following: casualty production, materiel damage, fallout and contingent effects. a. Ai?'bU?·sts. When the fireball does not touch the surface of the earth, the explosion is BLAST Figure 8. Effects from a nuclear explosion. AGO 5647A called an airburst. Blast, initial nuclear radiation, and heat effects are maximized in an airburst. Fallout is not of military significance. Neutrons from the detonation will induce radiation in the ground in the vicinity of ground zero ( GZ). Except in the case of very high airbursts, neutron-induced radiation in this area will be of concern to both mounted and dismounted troops who are required to pass through the area. Radiological monitoring will be required as troops pass through the area so that hazardous levels of nuclear radiation can be detected and avoided if possible. b. Surface Bursts. When the fireball touches the surface of the earth, the explosion is called a surface blast. Blast, heat, and initial nuclear radiation effects are not as widespread as in an airburst; induced radiation is also present but is masked by residual radiation from fallout. Fallout from a surface burst may cover areas as large as thousands of square kilometers, depending on the weapon yield, weapon design, and meteorological conditions. c. Subsu'rface Bursts. When the center of the fireball is beneath the surface of the ground (or water), the explosion is called a subsurface burst. If the burst is near enough to the surface that the fireball breaks through, fallout will occur. The thermal radiation will not be a significant hazard since it will be almost completely absorbed by the soil material. Airblast effects are greatly reduced, and shock waves passing through the ground or water will extend for a limited distance. The range of initial nuclear radiation is considerably less than that from an air or surface burst. Extremely hazardous residual radiation occurs in and around the crater, especially in the area covered by contaminated earth from the crater. If the burst is far enough below the surface that the fireball does not break through the surface (does not vent) , the only significant effect consists of shock waves passing through the ground or water. 49 . Effects • At the instant of a nuclear explosion, a fireball is produced that gives off a blinding flash of light, great quantities of heat, and nuclear radiation. A blast wave is also produced. In all bursts except very high airbursts and sub- AGO 5647A surface bursts, the fireball, as it rises, creates an updraft that pulls material from the ground up into the air, making both a radioactive stem and clo d. The radioactive cloud will consist of fission fragments, unfissioned weapon material, and earth containing induced radioactive material. The degree of hazard created by fallout from this cloud depends on the yield and type of weapon, height of burst, and weather. a. Blast. Blast can cause casualties and damage to materiel. Direct pressure from the blast can cause immediate death or injury to person el and damage to material. Indirect effects are caused by flying debris and by overturning and dragging of objects. Indirect blast effects are primarily responsible for casualties. b. Heat and Light. (1) The heat from a nuclear explosion may cause injuries to personnel from either flash burns or burns from fires caused directly or indirectly by the explosion. On a moderately clear day, slight skin burns can be produced by a 20-kiloton burst at a distance up to 4 kilometers, and heat may be felt as far as 16 kilometers away. Anything that casts a shadow will protect an individual from being burned by the direct heat rays. (2) The flash of light produced by a nuclear explosion causes dazzle (temporary loss of vision or a temporary reduction in visual acuity). Dazzle from a burst during daylight hours does not persist for more than 2 minutes and is not generally an important consideration. At night personnel not facing the burst can be expected to recover from dazzle in about 3 minutes and those facing the burst, in about 10 minutes. The flash of light produced by the nuclear explosion can also cause permanent retinal burns, but only in those personnel whose eyes are focused on the burst point at the instant of the explosion. Generally, retinal burns do not cause a significant reduction in vision and are not tactically significant as a casualty producer. Usually the individual is unaware that he has received a retinal burn. c. Nuclear Radiation. The tremendous outextent of this radioactivity depend put of initial nuclear radiation accompanying a upon soil type, height of burst, and nuclear explosion is in the form of gamma weapon type. For an airburst the unrays, neutrons, and alpha and beta particles. derlying soil is normally the only sig However, since the range of the alpha and beta nificant residual source of radiation. particles in air is limited, the gamma rays and The physiological effects of neutrons neutrons present the only significant initial resemble those of gamma radiation. radiation hazard. Gamma rays and/ or beta and (3) Beta particles. These are rapidly movalpha particles are also emitted by the fallout ing electrons; that is, minute particlesmaterials from a nuclear explosion. Radiowith a negative electrical charge. Beactive materials that might be disseminated by cause their range in air is limited to means other than a nuclear weapon are prionly a few feet, beta particles presentmarily gamma emitters but some may also emit in initial radiation from a nuclearalpha and beta particles. Nuclear radiation explosion are not a military hazard. from any source cannot be detected by the However, if radioactive material givphysical senses, and reliance must be placed ing off beta particles is held in contact on radiation detection devices to determine its with the skin, damage to certain orpresence. gans and sores and burns of the skin (1) Gamma rays. These are invisible rays may result. The severity of sores and of very short wave length, similar to burns depends upon the length of time X-rays. They pass through the human the source is in contact with the skin body and cause damage to the bloodand upon the penetrating power of forming cells and tissues. Probable the particles. Beta particles that enter effects from gamma radiation are the body may present a long-term listed in table II. hazard of little military significance. (2) Neutrons. During a nuclear explosion, (4) Alpha particles. These are positively small electrically neutral particles charged particles. Their range in air called neutrons are emitted. They conis only a few inches; therefore, emitstitute an important part of the initial ters of alpha particles outside the body nuclear radiation. Neutrons have the are not militarily dangerous. Howability to make other substances radioever, an alpha-emitting source that active, particularly some elements in enters the body through wounds, the soil and certain metals, in the vicinity mouth, or the nose can be a long-term of ground zero. The intensity and hazard of little military significance. Table II. Probable Effects of N u clear Radiation (Gamma) on E x posed P erson n el -------------------. E xp osure (rad) Effect Less than 150 ----------~light, but not incapacitating, illness in a few individuals. 150 to 250 _____________11' ausea and vomiting within 24 hours in one-third to two-thirds of the exposed individuals. Routine tasks possible, but sustained combat hampered for 6 to 12 hours; hospitalization required for approximately 50 percent of exposed individuals within 3 weeks postexposure. 250 to 500 ____________ Nausea, vomiting, and fatigue in most individuals; may perform routine tasks, with increasing hampering of sustained effort. Hospitalization required for all exposed personnel within 14 days postexposure; deaths may approach 50 percent. 500 to 1,000 ___________ Incapacitation within 6 hours in most exposed individuals ; hospitalization for all within 7 days postexposure; ultimate deaths approaching 100 percent. More than 1,000 ------Incapacitation within a few hours; hospitalization required for all; ultimate death for all exposed individuals within 2 weeks. Notes. 1. This table is applicable to expos u res to either initial or r esidual hard, penetrating radiations and t otal body exposures. 2. It is assumed that the indicated ex posures, if r ec eived within 1 day to 1 week, will have similar effects and will apply to individuals exposed for the first time or following an interval that would permit .,full" recovery from previous exposures. 3. The con t ents of this table are in consonance with STANAG 2083, Radiological Hazards. 40 AGO 5647A CHAPTER 8 NUCLEAR DEFENSE Section I. DEFENSE BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER NUCLEAR DETONATIONS 50. Preparing Unit Defenses a. General. Units should be dispersed to the extent permitted by the situation and mission. Dispersed units present a less lucrative target and hence provide greater tactical protection. Foxholes, bunkers, and other protective shelters should be utilized to the greatest extent possible consistent with the mission. Protection against the effects of nuclear radiation is primarily a problem of shielding against gamma radiation and neutrons, since alpha and beta radiation are essentially internal or contact hazards. Certain common materials and types of construction provide good shielding against gamma radiation and neutrons, and also provide protection against the blast and heat effects of a nuclear explosion. Some of these materials and types of construction are listed below. Further details may be found in FM 3-12. • (1) Earth. Earth is the most readily available and among the best shielding materials. A properly constructed foxhole provides excellent protection for troops, and its value cannot be overemphasized. Troops must habitually dig foxholes whenever occupying a position for any length of time and improve them by providing overhead cover as soon as time and tactical situation permit. Equipment and vehicles also must be dug in when feasible. Troops must be trained to occupy foxholes or other shelters at the first warning of a nuclear attack and to stay there until ordered to leave. A deep foxhole provides more shielding against initial gamma radiation and neutrons than a shallow foxhole, because there is more earth between the fireball and the occupant AGO IIM7A of the deep foxhole. Radiation can enter the foxhole through the earth and through the opening but the amount that enters through the earth is reduced considerably by the earth's shielding effect. Approximately 10 percent of the initial radiation can enter the foxhole through the opening; however, an earth cover will reduce the amount of radiation entering the foxhole and will also prevent the entrance of fallout. This cover should be as thick as possible and should shield as much of the opening as practical. Care must be exercised to make the foxhole and the cover strong enough to resist being collapsed by the blast wave. (See FM 5-15 for information on construction of foxholes, including overhead cover.) Tunnels, caves, and storm drains will provide effective shelters unless there is a nearby underground burst. Culverts, drains, and ditches could be used in an emergency, but they would offer only partial protection. Figure 9 shows types of simple earth shelters that are suitable for a military unit. (2) ConcTete . Concrete provides better shielding against gamma radiation than earth. ( 3) Steel. Steel is a good shielding material and should be used when available. A tank will provide excellent protection in the majority of situations. Other vehicles made of steel will provide some protection, depending on the thickness of armor and the degree of cover provided. ( 4) Buildings. In military installations there are few buildings strong enough 41 to provide effective shelter from a nuclear explosion. However, the lowest floor or basement of a r einforced CORRUGATED NOTE: For details see TM 5-311 . Figure 9. T y pes of simple earth shelters suitable for a military unit. concrete or steel-framed building will offer excellent protection from all effects except the higher overpressures of blast, provided personnel are not in front of a window facing ground zero. In this event, personnel will receive significant exposures to initial radiation and heat effects and will be subjected to indirect blast damage, especially from flying glass shards and other missiles carried in the shock wave. (5) Constructiom of shelt ers. In the construction of any protective shelter, special consideration should be given to two factors : access and air supply. Each shelter should have at least two exits in case one caves in or is blocked by debris. The entrance passages or ramps should be located at right angles to the shelter proper so as to avoid direct exposure to blast, thermal radiation and nuclear radiation. Two exits also help to prevent blockage of the air passages to the shelter. In special cases it may be possible to provide forced air systems in shelters, in which case filter units will remove contaminated dust particles. By using a filter unit and by sealing the shelter, inhalation of radioactive airborne dust can be prevented. b. Su pplies. Supplies, particularly explosives and flammables, should be dispersed. Debris should be kept to a minimum and should not be allowed to collect to the point where a fire hazard would be created. Objects such as helmets, ration cans, tools, and gas cans should always be secured to minimize the danger of casualties from flying debris when the shock wave hits. Supplies should remain packaged to provide protection against radioactive dust. Food and water supplies should be further protected by storage under cover. c. Clothing. Military uniforms provide some protection against thermal radiation emitted during a nuclear explosion and reduce the probability of beta burns on the body caused by radioact ive dust contamination. Even when a person is beyond the zone of serious danger from blast and nuclear radiation, he may still be vulnerable to thermal radiation. AGO 5647A • In these circumstances, parts of the body covered by clothing will be fairly well protected from flash burns. Sofar as radiological effects are concerned, the chief protective value of clothing is to keep radioactive contamination from coming into actual contact with the skin. Loose-fitting, light-colored clothing offers greater protection against flash burns than tight-fitting or dark clothing. Additional layers give better protection. d. Unit SOP. The unit SOP for defense against nuclear atack (app IV) must be issued and given maximum distribution within the units. Dry runs and test alerts must be conducted frequently. The SOP must include protective measures to be taken during friendly employment of nuclear weapons. 51. The Nuclear Battlefield The nuclear battlefield will be characterized by a higher degree of dispersion between units than will a nonnuclear battlefield, and mobility and target acquisitions will assume greater significance. Major adjustments must be made to minimize the effects of nuclear detonations while maintaining the ability to wage war. While it is recognized that the complexity of modern warfare and its associated equipment requires some massing of troops, it is imperative that the frequency of troop and equipment concentrations be minimized. Despite this dispersion, the fact that entire units rather than individuals will become casuktties in nuclear war should be recognized. The introduction of subkiloton-yield weapons has made it practical to engage small units such as platoons, communication relay points, and individual missile sites. 52. Target Acquisition a. The importance of target acquisition is emphasized in nuclear warfare. A target must be acquired before it can be destroyed; therefore, the first defense against nuclear warfare is to prevent the enemy from locating friendly units. The enemy will employ any or all of the following techniques to locate targets: visual observation; radar, infrared, direction-finding, sound-ranging, and flashspotting equipment; long-range patrols; and enemy agents and collaborators. Unit signatures which lead to acquisition by the enemy should be recognized and eliminated or disguised, if practical. The techniques used to detect a unit will depend on the unit location relative to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and the type of unit. In all cases, communications traffic should be held to a minimum to make communications direction-finding as difficult as possible. Units should avoid roads and should travel cross-country, taking advantage of the natural concealment of the terrain. b. The battle area under friendly control can be divided into two zones: Zone A, zero to 2 kilometers from the FEBA; 11nd Zone B, more than 2 kilometers from the FEBA. (1) Zon e A. Units in this zone are most vulnerable to acquisition by visual, infrared, radar, and direction-finding means. The enemy will locate most of his target acquisition equipment as close to the FEBA as possible, in order to ·make maximum use of its range. In addition, units near the FEBA will be constantly searching for enemy activity. Any movement in Zone A invites detection; therefore, units and individuals should move as little as possible. Communications traffic should be held to a minimum, and wherever possible the communications equipment should be located as far from the troop position as practical. (2) Zone B. Units in this zone are most likely to be detected by aerial reconnaissance ; patrols ; enemy sympathizers; and direction-finding, soundranging, and flash-spotting equipment. Zone B units must use communications equipment to operate effectively and to perform their missions. Locating units by detection of signatures from communications equipment is more time consuming than other target acquisition methods. This delay and the communications delay in forwarding the intelligence to the enemy firing unit will enable units to escape destruction by moving. Generally, units in Zone B will be required to move at least once every 12 hours. In this zone civilian movement should AGO 6647A 43 be restricted and unit security emphasized to prevent enemy collaborators and agents from locating friendly units. 53. Problems Related to Specific Units a. Artillery Units. The greatest potential threat on the nuclear battlefield is the nuclear delivery means of the opposing force. Because of their nuclear capability, the location of artillery units will have a high priority in nuclear warfare. These units can be located by the volume and type of communications and flash and sound ranging. There is some delay when these means are used because of the time required to compile communications data and to process and transmit the intelligence to the firing units. This delay will allow artillery units to deploy to another location before the enemy fires a nuclear round at them. Artillery units should move as soon as their fire mission is completed. b. Cornm;unicati ons Units and Command Posts. These units can be detected by the volume and type of their communications traffic. If possible, the communications equipment should be located 5 to 10 kilometers from the command post area. Moving the communications equipment frequently will hinder acquisition and decrease considerably the possibility of a nuclear attack. Dummy traffic by similar communications equipment will further delay enemy target acquisition. 54. Cover and Concealment In addition to the added protection afforded by cover, the increased emphasis on target acquisition in nuclear warfare increases the importance of cover and concealment. Complete information on cover and concealment is found in TM 5-311, FM 5-15, FM 5-20, and FM 5 22. Units should take full advantage of the natural cover in an area and improve protection and camouflage as described in above references. 55. Defense During Nuclear Detonations a. Unit. During an attack the unit will take cover. To avoid or reduce the effects of dazzle, troops must close and shield their eyes. Under no condition should they look at the fireball for at least 3 seconds after the detonation. Designated persons will make observations to determine nuclear cloud parameters in accordance with the unit SOP (app IV). When the immediate danger has passed, the unit com mander will make an estimate of the situation and issue orders accordingly. See FM 3-12 for further information. b. Individual. Individual procedures during a nuclear attack are covered in FM 21-41. All personnel must be trained in and be familiar with individual procedures. 56. Detection and Measurement of Contamination Following the use of a nuclear weapon, the presence and degree of radioactive contamination must be determined. This can be done by fallout predictions, radiological monitoring, and radiological survey. Fallout information can be used in conjunction with the commander's tactical plans and recommendations to higher headquarters. 57. Fallout Prediction a. Fallout prediction is a method to determine probable areas of contamination that may result from the use of nuclear weapons prior to the actual arrival and detection of fallout. Fallout prediction can be used by the commander to ( 1) Warn or alert personnel to expect contamination. (2) Aid in tactical planning. (3) Form a basis for radiological survey. b. Fallout predictions normally are prepared at division level. However, when a unit subordinate to division has been given the authority to employ nuclear weapons, the prestrike and poststrike predictions of radioactive contamination will be prepared by that unit, based on the division fallout prediction. For example, a brigade delegated the authority to employ nuclear weapons will prepare the estimate of radioactive contamination. Units below division level will make fallout predictions, as required, using the division fallout prediction message if available or the division effective wind message and the M5 fallout predictor. AGO 5647A 58. Radiological Monitoring a. Since nuclear radiation cannot be detected by the senses, special devices are needed for detection. Radiological monitoring is the act of detecting the presence of radiation and the measuring of it with radiac instruments. These instruments include dose-rate meters and dosimeters, described in paragraph 59. Radiological monitoring alerts the commander to a hazard that could otherwise go undetected or unmeasured. A single radiation measurement usually has limited operational significance (except to the unit in the immediate area), since it gives information at the point of reading only. However, a number of individual measurements considered together can give a picture of the radiation pattern over the area involved. A number of readings made at the same point over a period of time are required for determining fallout decay rate. Several different points for taking readings may be required in variable terrain. Monitoring is included in normal reconnaissance and intelligence activities of all units. Radiological monitoring at all levels is a command responsibility and is initiated upon order of the unit commander, upon orders of higher headquarters, or pursuant to unit SOP or other standing instructions. Reports of radiation dose rates must be reported to higher headquarters (see para 71d). b. Under conditions of nuclear warfare, company-size units (or smaller units operating independently) will monitor for radiation. (As a general rule, company-size units maintain a minimum of two trained monitors per assigned dose-rate meter.) Monitoring may be periodi c or contimwus, under the circumstances described below. (1) Perio dic m onitoring is routinely conducted during nuclear warfare. All units must routinely monitor a designated point in their unit area a minimum of once during each 1-hour period. The unit SOP must give detailed guidance on monitoring procedures. Units authorized several instruments need utilize only one instrument for this purpose. However, instruments should be. alternated to conserve batteries. Dosimeters will also be read when a periodic check of t he unit area is made. (2) Continuou s monitoring is initiated by all units when a fallout warning is received; when on an administrative or tactical move; when a nuclear burst is reported, seen, or heard; when radiation above 1 rad/ hr is detected by periodic monitoring; and on order of the commanding officer. Continuous monitoring will stop on instructions from higher headquarters or when the dose rate falls below 1 rad/ hr (except for units on the move) . c. Responsibilities of brigades, battalions, and comparable-size units include alerting subordinate units to expect radioactive contamination, maintaining the current contamination chart on which the data obtained by monitoring and radiological survey are plotted, interpreti g the contamination situation, and disseminating contamination intelligence. The S2 performs these functions for his organization. Headquarters companies will monitor command post areas, The reconnaissance platoon of brigade headquarters supplements the brigade capability with four monitors per scout section. 59. Radiac Instruments a. Dose-Rate Meters. Dose-rate meters are electronic devices designed to indicate the level of radioactivity in a contaminated area. The ion-chamber type dose-rate meters are used for radiological monitoring and surveys. The standard ion-chamber meter is the radiacmeter IM-174A/ PD. The radiac set AN / PDR-27J (TM 11-6665-209-15) contains the radiacmeter IM-141/ PDR-27J, a Geiger-Mueller ( G-M) type meter, and is issued to certain specialized units for monitoring personnel, food, and equipment. b. Dosimet ers. Dosimeters are devices used to measure the total nuclear radiation (gamma) dose received by an individual. The IM93 ( ) / UD tactical dosimeter, the standard type, is self indicating (direct reading). It normally is issued on the basis of two per platoon. If a platoon or similar-size organization operates as separate squads or as individuals AGO 6647A 45 functioning under sufficiently dissimilar conditions to warrant it, a more widespre;:td issue of dosimeters may be made. TM 11-6665214-10 contains information on the IM-93 dosimeter. TB SIG 226-8 describes the radiac det ector chargers PP-1578/ PD and PP-1578 A ! PD , which are used to charge the IM-93 dosimeter. 60. Radiological Surveys a. Radiological survey is a diTected effort to determine the degree and extent of radioactive contamination in an area. Surveys are performed by a group consisting of one or more radiological survey parties and a control party. A ground survey party includes a monitor , who operates a dose-rate meter and records all survey data, and an assistant, who may be a driver or radio operator, or both. Additional personnel may be included in a survey party for security or for other reasons. (An aerial survey party consists of a monitor, whose duties are similar to those of the ground monitor, and a pilot.) The control party directs t he survey, collects the data reported, and assembles the data into a form usable by the command. The control party organization varies depending upon the level of command which it serves . The control party and survey party must be organized within established TOE's. b. Unit and installation commanders become aware of the presence and degree of radioactive contamination in their own areas through monitoring activities. However, at higher echelons monitoring reports from lower units may not provide sufficient information for the determination of the contamination pattern. A radiological survey may be directed to evaluate the degree and extent of radioactive contamination when normal monitoring reports are insufficient to provide the commander with information required before plans, maneuvers, or operations can proceed. c. There are two methods of controlling a r adiological survey: centralized and decentralized. Centralized control is the primary method of operation in which the authority ordering t he survey provides the control party and the r adiological data are reported directly to the cont r ol party. Decentralized control is the alt ernate method in wh ich the operation is di rected through command channels and controlled by a control party of the subordinate command. The radiological data are furnished to the authority ordering the survey. Radiological surveys can be performed from the air or on the ground. An aerial survey normally is conducted under centralized control; the control of a ground survey may be centralized or decentralized, depending upon operational requirements, span of control, and communication capabilities. d. The CERE, as part of TOC (tactical operations center), plans radiological surveys and processe and evaluates radiological survey data. Commanders at all echelons are responsible for training radiological survey personnel and performing radiological surveys (and resurveys if necessary) when directed. e. As a general rule, company-size units will organize, equip, and train at least two survey parties for each dose-rate area survey meter authorized. (Only one party will be equipped.) Survey parties should be organized so as to use organic vehicles affording maximum protection against nuclear radiation when available; for example, armored vehicles for armored units and aircraft for aviation units. f . The commanders of brigades, battalions, and comparable-size units are responsible for training, equipping, and organizing a control party capable of planninz and directing decentralized survey operations as assigned. 61 . Estimate of the Situation When the danger from heat, blast, and initial nuclear radiation has passed, the commander must determine a. The number and severity of casualties. b. The extent of material damage. c. The ability of the unit to continue its mission. d. When personnel may leave shelter. e. The degree and extent of the radiological hazard. Following an airburst, determination of neutron-induced radioactivity must be made as soon as possible and normally is part of the mission of the elements first nearing ground zero. In the case of a surface or subsurface burst, determination of fallout pattern ' and AGO 5647A levels of residual nuclear radioactivity must be made. The ability of the unit to continue its mission wiJJ depend upon the number of casualties, extent of damage to equipment and supplies, unit radiation exposure history, and the contamination hazard. The unit SOP should specify procedures for reporting casualties and material damage to the commander. The severity of casualties and damage is extremely important in determining the overall effect of a nuclear attack. When the estimate of the situation has been made, the next higher headquarters will be informed by the most expe ditious means. 62. First Aid The principal casualty-producing effects of a nuclear explosion are thermal radiation, blast, and nuclear radiation. In nuclear radiation sickness early symptoms (nausea and vomiting) are followed by a latent period when symptoms disappear and the individual feels normal. If incapacitating symptoms follow the latent period, treatment will be provided by appropriate medical personnel. See FM 21-11 for first-aid treatment of burns and injuries due to blast effects. 63. Evacuation of Casualties The evacuation of casualties from blast, heat, and/ or nuclear radiation will be carried out according to current medical doctrine. It is the responsibility of the Army Medical Service to determine the evacuation procedure. 64. Time of Entry-Time of Stay It may be necessary for personnel to carry out assigned tasks in a radiological contaminated area. Since the commander must take into consideration the nuclear radiation exposure guide and the unit radiation exposure history in determining the present and probable future effectiveness of his men, he must determine which operations, if any, should be conducted in the contaminated area and must establish an operation exposure guide (see para 75) for personnel working in the contaminated area. Use of the operation exposure guide concept wilJ assist the commander in making effective use of his men in a radiologically contaminated area. The immediate AGO 5647A fighting effectiveness of previously unexposed individuals who receive 50 rad or less will not be reduced, but some casualties may result if larger doses are received. See FM 3-12 for a method of determining time of entry, time of stay, and use of the operation exposure guide. 65. Monitoring of Food, Water, Equipment, and Personnel Following a nuclear attack, food, water, equipment and personnel may be radiologically contaminated and should be monitored. The G-M type dose-rate meter (IM 141 / PDR-27J) normally would be used for this monitoring as it measures radiation at lower range than the ion-chamber type dose-rate meters (IM-174A/ PD). 66. Radiological Decontamination a. Radiological decontamination will usually be confined to personnel, equipment, and food. Large-area decontamination usually is not feasible without earthmoving equipment. However, the ground and vegetation within a radius of 10 meters (minimum) around individual positions should be swept with a broom (improvised from shrubbery) to reduce the radiation. About half of the residual dose received by an individual originates from a circular area of 10 meters radius around the individual's position. Radioactive material cannot be neutralized or destroyed. It can, however, be removed. The subsequent efforts in decontamination of vehicles, arms, and ammunition can be reduced if, prior to arrival of fallout, they are covered with available materials such as tarpaulins, shelter halves, or ponchos. Equipment requiring decontamination may be washed as may the outside of sealed food containers. Decontamination operations should be conducted at a site with good drainage. Waste water should flow into a sump, if possible. If waste water flows into a river or stream, units downstream must be so informed. For details of radiological decontamination, see TM 3-220. b. Personnel whose duties require them to enter radiologically contaminated areas or to come in contact with contaminated objects should wear the following clothing: (1) Standard military clothing or combat fatigues tightly buttoned at the neck and tied at the wrists and ankles with string (trouser legs may be bloused into the top of combat boots instead of being tied). (2) Any form of gloves available. (3) Headgear, preferably tight. (A hood may be worn if available.) c. For certain decontamination operations such as hosing down contaminated buildings, it may be advisable for personnel to wear impermeable protective clothing if available to prevent radioactive material from coming in contact with the body. 67. Decontamination of Personnel a. The skin and clothing of personnel who have been exposed to fallout or who have traversed a radiologically contaminated area may be contaminated to a hazardous level. Personnel so exposed must be monitored and perform necessary decontamination. b. Monitoring for radioactive contamination must be accomplished in an uncontaminated area or shelter. If contamination is noted on the person, decontamin~.tion should be performed as soon as possible. c. If the combat situation temporarily prohibits decontamination of personnel by a change of clothing and bathing, field expedient methods should be employed. These methods consist of removal and vigorous shaking of clothing or brushing the clothing with brushes improvised from shrubbery. Dust must be removed from the hair and from under the fingernails. Exposed skin should be wiped with a damp cloth. Care must be taken to prevent secondary contamination of food and water supplies during and after the decontamination process. Personnel should bathe and change clothing as soon as the tactical situation permits. 68. Decontamination of Food and Water a. Food. An appreciable amount of radioactivity may be detected in food after a nuclear attack. Food that has been contaminated may still be acceptable for consumption, especially under emergency conditions. This is because a large proportion of the ingested radioactive particles pass out of the body, leaving only a fractional amount to act as an internal hazard. Food that is packaged or sealed will require decontamination of the container by washing and scrubbing before it is opened, but the contents will be suitable for consumption. The decision to consume food exposed to contamination is a command decision (aided by the recommendation of a medical officer). b. Wate-r. The Corps of Engineers is responsible for reconnaissance for appropriate water sources and the purification and distribution of water from these sources. The Army Medical Service is responsible for recommendations on the potability of water. 69. Cause of Fallout Fallout is produced by material from the earth being drawn tip into the fireball, vaporized, combined with radioactive material, and then condensed to particles which gradually fall to earth. The particles are carried by the upper air winds until they settle d_own on the earth's surface. Rain following detonation of small-yield weapons may be radioactive. The start of fallout can sometimes be determined by observing particles settling; it may always be determined by noting the readings of a radiac instrument. 70. Extent of Contamination from Fallout a. The dose rate and the area covered depend on the following factors: (1) Yield and type of weapon. ( 2) Height of burst. (3) Velocity and direction of wind at all altitudes up to the top of the cloud. ( 4) Composition of the surface upon which the nuclear weapon is detonated. The contaminated area may be very small or may extend over many thousand square kilometers, and the dose rate may vary from a militarily insignificant level to an extremely dangerous one for all personnel not taking necessary protective measures. b. A timelag of several hours to a day or more may occur between the time of burst and the availability of the hazard evaluation. This timelag occurs because measured data cannot 48 AGO 6647A be obtained until fallout in an area of interest is complete. Also, several additional hours may be required to report and process measured data into usable form. The contamination overlay will be disseminated by the CBRE in accordance with the SOP. Before the final contamination overlay is received from the CBRE, unit commanders should prepare a contamination overlay using monitoring and survey data received from their monitors and control parties. 71. Protective Measures Against Fallout a. FactQfrs. The casual-producing potential of fallout is based on the following factors: (1) Dose rate during occupation. (2) Degree of shielding of personnel in area. (3) Time spent in the area after arrival of fallout. ( 4) Previous exposure of personnel. b. Instruments. In general, all units of platoon size and larger will be equipped with the tactical dosillleter to indicate the total nuclear radiation dose received and with survey meters for radiological monitoring and survey to determine the dose rate and extent of radioactive contamination. c. Protection of Personnel. (1) The greatest potential danger from fallout can be avoided by proper protection of personnel during the early hours following the arrival of fallout. For example, if fa.llout arrives at H + 2, half of a total 4-day dose will be received in about 8 hours after fallout occurs. (2) The best form of protection usually available for dismounted personnel in the field is a foxhole with cover, or any other underground fortification. It will be necessary for personnel in some areas to stay in shelters for extended periods of time. For armored units, the tank provides excellent protection and has the added advantage of mobility. The unit SOP should make provisions to minimize casualties from operations in a fallout area and to disseminate fallout AGO li647A information to other units. In all cases the prescribed actions should interfere as little as possible with the immediate mission of each unit. (3) The actions that will minimize unit casualties are influenced primarily by the time of arrival of fallout, the rate at which fallout is deposited, and the availability of shelter. In a situation where the radiation dose rate does not reach a peak until 6 to 8 hours after the fallout begins, it is possible to construct shelters that can reduce the fallout hazard by a factor of 10 to 100. Whereas, if the peak is reached rapidly, a unit can only utilize existing cover. In the absence of time to construct shelters, the alternatives are to stay in place, cover with any available material, and accept the exposure dose, or to move to a less contaminated area. (4) Movement to a less contaminated area may be authorized by higher headquarters after consideration of the tactical situation. A unit will not move solely on the basis of a fallout prediction. ( 5) Whenever effective shelter from fallout exists, it normally should be utilized in preference to movement to escape fallout. ( 6) The dissemination of fallout information to other units is determined by the unit capability to obtain the information and transmit it. The fallout information will probably be limited to the arrival of fallout and to the dose rate of the fallout being deposited. (7) Rear-area shelters should be designed to take advantage of the maximum use of earthmoving equipment to shorten construction time required. Large diameter pipe (culvert) sections lowered into trenches and covered with earth offer good protection if the ends are barricaded. d. Actions To Be Taken. When consistent with the mission (1 ) Report t he beginning and dose rate of fallout to the next higher headquarters, as outlined in the unit SOP. (2) Keep unit under cover until fallout stops. ( 3) If it is necessary to cross a radioactive ar ea, cross fast-in vehicles if possible. If it is necessary to enter and remain in a radioactive area, go in fast, dig in quickly, sweep area around foxhole, camouflage and remain covered. Tank crews stay in their tanks as much as possible or dig foxholes if staying in tanks is impractical. (4) Frequently monitor personnel to insure that t hey are not excessively contaminated. Perform partial decontamination as necessary. 72. Evacuation from a Fallout-Contam inated Area The efficient utilization of field fortifications will usually provide troops in the field the best form of shielding against nuclear radiation. Improvement of t he shelter will increase the safe stay time. In order to arrive at a decision as to t he optimum time to begin evacuation, certain information is required, such as: time of detonation of the nuclear weapon, location of an uncontaminated area, transmission factor of available shelters, transmission factor during period of movement out of t he contaminated area, the time required to move, t he routes to use, and location of new areas. Improving the shelter will decrease the radiation dose received by occupants of the shelter. Then, a longer stay in the shelter is practicable before troops move out. See FM 3-12 for optimum time for exit from fallout areas. Section II. ORGANIZATION 75. General a. The radiation status charts of platoonsize units will be kept at battalion or similar echelon. Since the S3 is responsible for evaluating unit combat effectiveness, staff responsibility for maintaining data on the unit radiation status rests with the operations officer. 73. Neutron-Induced Radiation When compared with other effects of nuclear weapons, induced radiation does not pose a e1 threat of major military significance. Induced radiation normally is found in a circular pattern around ground zero. There is usually no requirement for troops to enter and stay in this area because of the great destruction. In the event that occupancy is necessary, radiation is monitored to insure that the allowable total doses are not exceeded. Foot troops may usually pass within 300 meters of ground zero without undue radiation risk. The area of induced contamination is relatively small and can generally be avoided or crossed rapidly. 74. Command and Staff Problems a. Casualties can be reduced by protection, by movement of units out of heavily contaminated area , and by replacement of exposed units before a critical total dose is received. Reports to the next higher headquarters on the results of exposure and dose received are necessary in order that the overall situation and appropdate action can be determined. Specially trained staff officers will recommend to their commanders the appropriate action in each case. (See TM 23-200, FM 100-1, and FM 101-31-1 for necessary information.) b. The requirements in nuclear warfare to maintain communications security and to remain undetected will place on commanders at all levels a greater demand for leadership. Guidance from higher headquarters will not always be available to the commander because of the requirement to maintain communications silence. Furthermore, in the initial phases of nuclear war, the commander will have to display forceful leadership to dispel panic and redirect the men in the performance of t he unit's assigned mission. FOR TACTICAL DOSIMETRY b. Data from radiation status charts are factors in establishing the operation exposure guide. On the basis of this information, the medical officer advises the commander on the operation exposure guide for a particular mission. (It is emphasized that a decision to admit personnel suspected of nuclear radiation AGO 5647A injury to medical channels is made by the unit ( 1) The tactical dosimeters will be read surgeon on the basis of symptoms and physical daily or more often if the situation findings-not on actual or calculated physical dictates. measure of exposure.) (2) The net readings of the two platoon c. The battalion percentage of companies in each radiation status category will be forwarded to division th?'ough brigade headquarters as specified by the commander or the unit SOP. This procedure insures that the brigade S3 is informed of the radiation status of battalions and attached units so that he, in turn, can advise the brigade commander. The S3 can also designate that the chemical officer at brigade monitor this information since the chemical officer usually advises on radiation matters. The brigade headquarters is not required to retain any records of radiation exposure. d. Unit dosimeter information is needed for operational purposes, and this information will be kept in the division TOC. The percentage summaries of the battalions, giving the overall radiation status, are retained in the CERE located in the TOC and hence are readily available for G2 and G3 operations. The CERE will keep the radiation status information since other information, concerning radiological activities such as fallout plots and fallout predictions, is kept in the CERE. The division commander will usually rely on the chemical officer (who has the overall responsibility for the CERE operation) for information on the radiation situation. The radiation status records are also readily available to the division surgeon, and the information from these records is a factor he considers in advising the commanding general concerning the operation exposure guide. 76. Processing Radiological Exposure Data from Tactical Dosimeters n. The IM-93 ( ) / UD tactical dosimeter is issued on the general basis of two per platoon or the smallest operational unit of interest. Present concepts indicate that the platoonsize unit is the optimum size on which to maintain the radiation status. b. The following is a step-by-step procedure for handling tactical dosimeter readings in an infantry platoon. A similar procedure would also be applicable to other organizations. dosimeters will be averaged, rounded off to the nearest 10 rad, and reported to the company. If there is reason to believe that the reading from one dosimeter is not representative of the platoon (for example, if the person carrying the dosimeter was shielded or operating away from the platoon), then only the reading from the one representative dosimeter should be reported. An alternate unit dosimeter wearer is assigned for each instrument so that a dosimeter remains within the unit when the primary wearer leaves the platoon area. The platoon reports to the company only the "net" reading, or the amount accumulated since the last reading. This means that the instrument reader records each reading of the dosimeter; following the next reading, only the difference between the two readings is reported. The reading can be be jotted down in a pocket notebook and kept until the next reading; no permanent record is necessary. Dosimeters are read and readings reported before recharging the instruments. The next reported reading after recharging is the total reading. If a unit dosimeter wearer is evacuated, the dosimeter remains with the platoon. (3) The platoon readings are reported by radio or telephone daily (or when the situation permits) by company to the S3 at battalion or similar-size unit as a part of an established operational type report, required by unit SOP, except when units are exposed to relatively high doses (that is, established operational exposure guide has been exceeded). In the latter case, reports should be processed without delay. The unit SOP will specify the routine times and methods for reading and transmitting this AGO 6647A information to the next higher headquarters. ( 4) At battalion (or similar echelon), a chart is kept depicting the radiation status of each platoon and company organic or attached to the battalion. The chart should be constructed of waterproof and lightweight (for example, transparent plastic) material and be small in size. (For details, see FM 3-12.) (5) The battalion (and separate units attached to the brigade) forwards information daily (or after each operation) over command channels through brigade to division as a part of the periodic operations report. Information concerning the effectiveness of the battalion or attached unit will be forwarded; that is, the battallion percentage of companies in each radiation status category (FM 3-12). The information is sent to the CERE in the division TOC. Normally, only this overall percentage information is of interest to the brigade or division commander. If these commanders desire more specific information, it is obtained from the battalion at the commander's request. These commanders will establish an SOP requirement outlining the radiation exposure information that they desire from the battalion. (6) In some cases elements of one unit are attached to another unit. For example, elements of a tank battalion are attached to another battalion or to another brigade. The radiation status of these units is kept by the unit to which they are attached. When units return to their parent unit, the parent unit is informed of their unit radiation exposure history and current status. If the parent organization desires to know the radiation status of its detached units, it contacts the headquarters of the unit to which they are attached. (7) The dosimetry information concerning divisional units is not forwarded higher than the division headquarters unless specifically requested. Instead, the general radiation status is made a part of overall reports of the division's combat effectiveness. c. The IM-93 ( ) / UD dosimeters are recharged when it is convenient to do so or when the total dosage reads more than 500 rad. In order to prevent excessive leakage of charge, with the resultant introduction of a false reading of the dose received, the dosimeters are charged after not more than 2 or 3 days (preferably each day) if possible. A minimum of two charges will be kept at company level. AGO 5647A AR 220-58 AR 320-5 AR 320-50 AR 385-32 AR 700-62 FM 3-10 (S) FM 3-10A (C) FM 3-10B FM 3-12 FM 5-15 FM 21-41 FM 21-48 FM 30-5 FM 101-40 TM 3-210 TM 3-215 TM 3-216 TM 3-220 TM 3-240 TM 3-4240-202-15 TM 3-6665-211-12 TM 3-6665-212-12 TM 5-311 TM 8-285 TM 11-6665-209-15 TM 11-6665-213-12 TM 11-6665-214-10 TB SIG 226-8 TB 3-4230-207-10 TC 3-15 APPENDIX I REFERENCES Organization and Training for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Operations. Dictionary of United States Army Terms. Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes. Protective Clothing and Equipment. Chemical Protective Clothing Policy and Utilization of Certain Chemical Corps Units and Equipment in Combat Areas. Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents. Employment of Biological Agents (U). Employment of Chemical Agents (U). Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense. Field Fortifications. Soldier's Handbook for Chemical and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological ( CBR), and Nuclear Defense Training Exercises. Combat Intelligence. Arrp.ed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense. Fallout Prediction. Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents. Military Biology and Biological Agents. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Decontamination. Field Behavior of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents. Organizational, DS, GS, and Depot Maintenance Manual: Mask, Protec tive, Field, ABC-M17. Operator and Organizational Maintenance Manual: Detector Kit, Chemical Agent, VGH, AN-M15A1 and AN-M15A1A. Operator and Organizational Maintenance Manual: Detector Kit, Chemical Agent, ABC-M18Al. Military Protective Construction (Nuclear Warfare and Chemical and Biological Operations). Treatment of Chemical Warfare Casualties. Operator, Organizational, Field, and Depot Maintenance Manual: Radiac Set AN/ PDR-27J. Operator and Organizational Maintenance Manual: Radiacmeter IM174/ PD. Operator's Mar.ual: Radiacmeters IM-93/ UD, IM-93A/ UD, and IM147/ PD. Chargers, Radiac Detector PP-1578/ PD and PP-1578A/ PD. Decontamin:1ting and Reimpregnating Kit, Individual, M13. Prediction of Fallout From Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM). AGO 6647A 53 APPENDIX II STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY Section I. INDIVIDUAL STANDARDS 1. General Objective attacks, methods of delivery, and alarms; andtake appropriate protective action. To achieve proficiency in those protectivemeasures employed by the individual in order d. Perform simple decontamination of histo survive nuclear, biological, and chemicai person, clothing, personal equipment, individualattack with minimum reduction in combat weapon and position, and crew-served weapon.effectiveness and to participate effectively in e. Perform first aid for injuries caused byoperations in which chemical and biological chemical agents or nuclear weapons. munitions and nuclear weapons are employedin support of friendly forces. f. Recognize all standard marking signs t h atindicate chemically, biologically, and radiologically contaminated areas. 2. Specific Objectives g. Cross or bypass contaminated areas withEach individual must be able tominimum danger to himself. a. Properly don, seat, clear, and check his h. Maintain individual protective equipment. protective mask within 9 seconds following analarm or recognition of a chemical or biological i. Perform his mission during friendly or attack. enemy employment of chemical or biological munitions or nuclear weapons. b. Recognize, by appearance or effects, the j. Take protective measures against theexistence of a chemical hazard ; and take prothermal radiation (heat), blast, and nucleartective action. radiation effetts nf nuclear explosions, consistc. Recognize chemical, biological, and nuclear ent with mission . Section II. UNIT STANDARDS 3. General Objective (3) Take proper action against aircraftspray. To develop and maintain a capability for suc ( 4) Take proper action on signal by localcessful accomplishment of their mission while alarm systems, as prescribed in unitunder chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks, SOP. or in support of such attacks when made by ( 5) Determine the presence of toxic agent friendly forces. hazards and take proper action. ( 6) Operate its protective and detection 4. Specific Objectives equipment. a. The unit must be able to- (7) Exploit friendly nuclear and chemical (1) Decontaminate unit equipment. fire support. (2) Cross, bypass, or function in contami(8) Sustain an enemy toxic agent attacknated areas, decontaminating where with minimum interference of its asnecessary. signed mission. 54 AGO 5647A (9) Perform assigned mission while mask(2) Report chemical, biological, and nued and wearing protective clothing. clear attacks promptly and properly. (3) Maintain its protective and detection b. The unit mustequipment. (1) Follow sound procedures for protec tion prior to, during, and following a nuclear attack. AGO 5647A APPENDIX Ill DECONTAMINATING MATERIALS AND HOW THEY ARE USED STB DECONTAMINATING AGENT (BLEACH) HOW USED: Can be applied in pure form but is generally used either as dry mix or as wet mix. Leave on surface 24 hours when possible. ACTION: Is effective against liquid blister agent, liquid nerve agent, and biological agents. Pure form in direct contact with pools of liquid mustard reacts violently to cause flame and heavy vapor. Is chemically active, causing vigorous corrosion of metals. Wet mix is effective against biological agents. STORAGE: Keep in tightly closed container, away from moisture. DANC UNIT HOW USED: Mix powder and solvent; apply with brushes or swabs. Apply one coat, wait 15 minutes and rinse off. ACTION: Neutralizes blister and V-agents. Is highly effective against biological agents. Is not effective against G-agents. Corrodes metal and damages most paints, rubber, and plastics unless removed promptly. CAUTION: Solvent (acetylene tetrachloride) is extremely toxic in both vapor form and liquid form and requires care in handling. Effects are cumulative. Outdoor use is safest: masks must be used. DS2 DECONTAMINATING AGENT HOW USED: DS2 is available in 11fs-quart cans and 5-gallon drums in ready-to-use solutions. DS2 can be applied easily with the 11f.2-quart apparatus, a broom, or a swab. The solution is effective at temperatures from -15° to 125° F . Make one application of DS2 to the contaminated surface and after 30 minutes flush with water. ACTION: Reacts with GB and HD to effectively reduce their hazards within 5 minutes of application. It is effective for most chemical and biological agents. CAUTION: As DS2 is flammable, make sure that the 1% -quart decontaminating apparatus is not confused with a fire extinguisher. Avoid inhalation of vapors or solutions on the skin, or eyes. AGO o647A WASHING SODA (SODIUM CARBONATE) HOW USED: Add 2 pounds soda to each 21;2 gallons water; stir and apply to contaminated surfaces. ACTION: Is used as a washing agent against blister agents; neutralizes G-agents. WATER OR STEAM HOW USED: Apply under high pressure; speed action of hot water by using soap or other detergent. ACTION: Removes dirt or grease containing toxic agent. Hot soapy water destroys G-agent and physically removes other CBR contamination. CAUSTIC SODA (LYE) HOW USED: As 5 percent solution (1 pound lye to 2% gallons water). ACTION: Is especially effective against G-agents. Decontamination faster with concentrated solutions. Is also effective against biological agents and toxins. CAUTION: Both solid and solution damage skin, eyes, and clothing. Do not use f or personal decontamination. Caustic soda corrodes metal surfaces, especially aluminum. FUELS AND SOLVENTS HOW USED: Apply fuel on contaminated surface and ignite; apply solvent (like gasoline, kerosene, or carbon tetrachloride) with swabs, taking care not to spread contamination. ACTION: Ignited fuel destroys agents; solvents merely remove them, but sufficient dilution can remove most danger. CAUTION: Dangerous vapor concentrations may be set up during burning. Lewisite oxide residues remain dangerous. PROTECTIVE OINTMENT HOW USED: By individual soldier for limited individual equipment and personal decontamination. ACTION: Neutralizes blister agen and VX by chemical action. HOT AIR HOW USED: In special situations, such as decontamination of delicate instruments contaminated with liquid agents or decontamination of aircraft cabins by engine heaters. ACTION: Evaporates liquid contaminants. CAUTION: Temperature and air velocities used must be safe for particular equipment involved. Effluent air will be contaminated. AGO 5647A 57 INDIVIDUAL DECONTAMINATING AND REIMPREGNATING KIT HOW USED: ACTION: CAUTION: By individual soldier for limited individual equipment and personal decontamination. Skin pad removes liquid contamination from skin and neutralizes blister agents and VX by chemical action. Protective mask and gloves must be worn when using the kit. AGO 5647A APPENDIX IV SOP FOR DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, A N D N UCLEAR ATTACKS (OUTLINE) Note. As explained ~n F~ 101-5, standing operating procedures are published in the form most effective for :h.e comman.d. T~e d1scusswn presented here is meant to be a guide only and to apply, in general, to field cond1tJons. ModificatiOn should be made where necessary, particularly for fixed installations or specialized units For example of SOP at division level, see FM 61-100. . 1. General a. Pu1·pose. The SOP should standardize normal procedures for defense against chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks. it is published to assure that the unit accomplishes its mission during a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack with minimum losses in personnel, time, and equipment consistent with the mission. b. Unit SOP's. Subordinate units will issue SOP's to conform. 2 . References To be listed a. FM 21-40, AR 220-58, and other pertinent doctrinal sources. b. FM 21-41 and other pertinent procedural sources. c. Appropriate training directives. d. Orders, SOP's, and annexes that apply. 3 . Organization a. The normal unit organization is expected to exist under conditions of chemical and biological operations and nuclear warfare, since the unit will probably be required to continue its normal mission under all conditions if possible. However, there are minor exceptions to this principle. A CBR team will be needed to perform certain functions of the unit, such as special tasks that are beyond the capability of the individual soldier. This paragraph should contain a description of the team organization to include personnel duties and equipment needed. As a general rule, two chemical detection and radiological monitoring and survey parties, one primary and one alternate, should be trained for each chemical agent detector kit and area radiological survey meter authorized the unit. A decontamination squad of 6 to 9 men, security and support personnel may be required. The CBR team composition in figure 10 is recommended for company-size units. b. Because of turnover of personnel in the unit, the roster of CBR team personnel should be attached as an appendix to the SOP in order to prec.ude continuous revision. All team members should be cross-trained, and alternates should be appointed. 4 . Duties and Responsibilities This paragraph should contain a description of the duties of various personnel in the unit with regard to training for operations during a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack. These duties include a. Individual duties (app II). b. D ties of leader personnel. The unit commander 's functions with regard to training and operations may be given in this paragraph. This subparagraph, if used, should be headed by the unit commander's responsibilities and should contain a statement to the effect that the commander alone is responsible for all that his unit does or does not do; however, his specific functions as they pertain to defense against chemical, biological, and nuclear attack should be listed. c. Duties of teams or parties listed in paragraph 3. AGO 5647A 59 s ································ DECO NT AMINATION s QUAD ·································· > 10) "" ... "'..., > CBR TEAM CBR TEAM CHIEF-UNIT CBR OFFICER ASST CBR TEAM CHIEF -UNIT CBR NCO CHEMICAL DETECTION AND - RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY PARTY MONITOR DRIVER/RADIO OPERATOR l Figure 10. Organization of a CBR team. ......................····••\ ······························· .. SUPPORT AN D SECURITY PER SO NNEL ............................... .............................: .•••••••• ••••••• AS REQUIRED • 5. Warning System This paragraph should give a clear and concise description of the local alarm system as it applies to chemical and biological operations and nuclear warfare. The warning system should be broken down into three phases a. Before the attack-imminent attack alert. b. During the attack-actual attack ale-rt. c. After the attack-all clear. ( 1) Explain the meaning of each alert and phase and how the alert for each phase will be given. For tactical situations the local alarm system should consist of a percussion-type alarm plus the normal communications net. The percussion device and location in unit area should be specified; personnel to give the alarm and procedures for giving the alarm should be included. Indicate that the vocal alarm (after masking) will be given when no other means is available. The vocal alarm for a spray attack is "SPRAY" and for an attack by any other means is "GAS." (The warning system for friendly employment of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons should also be explained.) (2) Include personnel designated to make observations to determine nuclear cloud parameters. 6. Procedures In this paragraph should be included procedures for a. Actions to be followed in each phase of the warning system (for example, imminent attack alert, actual attack alert, and all clear). b. Chemical agent detection and radiological monitoring. c. Action to be taken on entering or leaving contaminated areas, to include disposition of any contaminated items. d. Reporting casualties and materiel damage. e. Reporting enemy or unidentified nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) attack information. f. Minimizing casualties from operations in a fallout area. .,., 5647A g. Use of effective wind messages, to include their frequency of receipt if known. h. Dissemination of fallout information and reporting the beginning and dose rate of fallout to higher headquarters. i. Handling readings from the tactical dosimeters. 7. Protection The protective measures to be used by the unit will be included in this paragraph. These measures should be broken down to those applicable to the individual and the unit and to those pertaining to tactical purposes. This paragraph should include the immediate protective measures to be taken when a CBR attack is suspected or detected or when a friendly CBR attack is contemplated. Conditions under which personnel should mask and unmask should be included. First aid and artificial respiration should be covered. It may be necessary to repeat measures covered elsewhere in the SOP. 8. Decontamination This paragraph should specify who will perform the various echelons of decontamination and when and how decontamination will be performed. It should further state that the company will be prepared to decontaminate on a unit basis on orders of higher headquarters. Procedures for decontaminating personnel and equipment should be listed. 9. Intelligence Attached as Annex A is a sample EEL 10. Supply This paragraph should specify procedures to be f ollowed for insuring proper maintenance and storage of authorized supplies and equipment, namely by periodic inspections. This paragraph should also explain the channels of resupply under conditions of chemical and biological operations and nuclear warfare, what protective equipment should be stored at the unit supply section, and what equipment should be issued to individuals of the unit. 11. Training This paragraph should contain instructions concerning training for CBR operations, such as references to directives from higher headCommand line . quarters to be used as guides in training; also Annex A-CBR Essential Elements of Inforinstructions concerning methods of carrying mation (EEl)out and checking results of training, to include • DISTRIBUTION: (To subordinate units, nextadequacy of the SOP. higher headquarters, staff sections, bulletin boards, 12. Reports and/ or platoons, sections, This paragraph should contain instructions and other organic parts of on the preparation of CBR (NBC) reports (see the organization) app V). OFFICIAL: (Signed by S3) Annex A (CBR EEl) to SOP 1. What items of CBR protective equipment have been issued to enemy troops? Is there any differentiation in issue of items for particular areas? If so, what items for what areas? 2. Are there any new or recent immunizations indicated by prisoners during interrogations? 3. What immunizations have enemy troop units received as indicated in captured immunization records? 4. Are enemy troops equipped with protective masks? Is the individual required to carry the mask on his person? Are there any sectors where the mask is not required equipment for the individual? What accessory equipment is issued with the mask? 5. Is protective clothing issued to enemy troops? If so, what type of clothing or articles? If special clothing is issued, is it for any particular area? 6. Have enemy troop units constructed CBR protective shelters? If so, what type? 7. Are enemy fortifications, individual and collective, provided with overhead cover? 8. Are enemy troops issued any protective footwear or other means to provide protection against penetration by liquid agents? 9. Are enemy tanks or armored vehicles provided with special installed protective equipment to protect crew in case of chemical attack? 10. Are enemy troops issued protective items such as atropine or other antidotes, protective ointment, and so forth, for self aid? 11. Are there any areas for which additional or unusual CBR safety precautions have been established? 12. What is the size and composition of enemy CBR specialist troop units? What is their disposition? 13. Have enemy troops been issued any special precautionary instructions relative to consumption of food and water or handling of livestock in areas that may be overrun by enemy forces? 14. What training, if any, have enemy troops received in the use of incapacitating type agents and their dissemination? AGO 5647A • 15. What items of chemical detection equipment have been issued to enemy troops? Are the items operated constantly, irregularly, or not at all? Is there any differentiation made regarding their use in certain areas? 16. What type of radiac instruments are issued to enemy troop units and what is their range or limit? How are they distributed? 17. How many hours training with radiac instruments have enemy monitoring and survey personnel received? 18. How many hours of CBR training have enemy troops received? How many hours training are devoted individually to chemical, biological, and radiological operations? Have enemy troops received any special or accelerated training as opposed to what is considered routine? 19. Do enemy units have decontamination materials on hand? If so, what type and in what quantity? 20. Have prisoners observed decontamination stations or installations established in enemy area? If so, what is their location and composition? 21. Are enemy troop units issued biological sampling kits or devices? Ifso, what is their type and/ or composition? 22. Have prisoners had occasion to observe any cylinders or containers which might contain bulk chemical agents? 23. Have prisoners observed any tactical aircraft equipped with accessory tanks which indicate a spray capability? 24. Are prisoners aware of location of dumps of chemical-filled ammunition, bombs, clusters, and/ or bulk chemical agents? 25. Do enemy artillery, mortar, or rocket units have chemical ammunition on hand? AGO 6647k APPENDIX V REPORTING OF ENEMY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR ATTACKS Section I. GENERAL 1. NBC Reports The reports of enemy or unidentified nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) attacks and the resulting contamination are made in accordance with the provisions of STANAG 2103. These reports are a. NBC 1. Observers' initial report, giving basic data. b. NBC 2. Report used for passing evaluated information. c. NBC 3. Immediate warning of expected contamination. d. NBC 4. Reports of radiation dose-rate measurements. e. N B C 5. Report of areas of contamination. 2 . Transmission and Distribution NBC 1 reports are transmitted by the observing unit to the CBRE through command, intelligence, or artillery channels as appropriate by the most expeditious means with a FLASH precedence. Reports of subsequent attacks will probably be transmitted with an IMMEDIATE precedence. Observing units advise adjacent and subordinate units of the attack. Observing units also transmit other NBC reports as required (NBC 4, for example). NBC 2, 3, 4, and 5 reports normally are disseminated by the CERE to higher, subordinate, and adjacent units. The CERE also transmits NBC 1 reports to the next higher headquarters. Section II . FORMAT OF REPORTS (STANAG 2103, including Amendment No. 2, Abstract) 3 . Letter Items The letter items as shown below are used in NBC reports: Meaning of L ette1· Items Us ed in All R eports Nuclear Forms Toxic Chem ical or Biological Forms A. Strike Serial Number(s) Strike Serial Number (s). B. Position of Observer (UTM or place) Position of Observer (UTM or place). C. Grid or magnetic (state which) bearing or azimuth of Grid or magnetic (state which) bearing or azimuth attack from Observer (in degrees or mils, say which). of attack from Observer (in degrees or mils, say which) . D. Date/ Time attack started (Zulu time) Date/ Time attack started (Zulu time). E . Illumination time (seconds) Time attack ended. F. Location of attack (UTM or place) (actual or estiArea attacked (actual or estimated, say which) . mated, say which). G. Means of delivery if known Means of delivery. H. Type of burst, Air, Surface or Unknown (say which) Type of Toxic agent if known. Type of attack (BW including height if known . or CW). I. Number of shells, etc. Number of shells, etc. J . Flash to bang time (seconds) K . Crater present or absent and dia)lleter if known (meters) AGO 6647A N uclear Forms To xic Chem ical or Biological Forms • L. Fireball width, immediately after passage of shock wave sound of detonation (degrees or mils, say which). M. Cloud height top or bottom, 10 minutes after burst (in degrees, mils, meters or feet, say which). N. Estimated yield (KT) 0. Reference Date/ Time for estimated contours when not H + 1 hour. P. For radar purposes only: Area of expected contamination. P.A. UTM coordinates of points to outline external contours of radio cloud. P.B. Effective wind direction, from, in degrees mag netic or mils (say which). Q. Location of reading R. Dose rate (r per hour). The words "Initial", "In creasing", "Peak", or "Decreasing" may be added. When decay rate is reported, the words "Decay Nor mal", "Decay Fast", or "Decay Slow", or the actual value of decay constant may be inserted. S. Date/ Time of reading T. H + 1 Date/ Time. (Zulu) Date/time toxic contamination detected. U. 1000 r per hour contour line coordinates (UTM) (red). V. 300 r per hour contour line coordinates (UTM) (green). W. 100 r per hour contour line coordinates (UTM) (blue). X. 30 r per hour contour line coordinates (UTM) Area of measured contamination (UTM) (yellow) (black). (state toxic). Y. Bearing or azimuth of left then right radial lines (degrees or mils, say which , four (4) digits each) Z. Effective wind speed (KPH), 3 digits; Downwind distance of Zone 1 (km), 3 digits; Cloud radius (km), 2 digits. 4. Sample Reports Sample NBC reports are shown below: AGO 5647A NBC 1 Purpose: Observers' Initial Report, giving basic data. Notes: a. NBC 1 follows the same format as the SHELLREPS, MORTREPS and BOMREPS which are included in STANAG 2008 dealing with conventional enemy attacks. b. The Items "Type of Report", D, H, and either Items B and C or Item F must always be reported; other items are optional. c. Users of NBC 1 are not confined solely to the use of letter items shown in the examples; other letter items may be added at the users' discretion. EXAMPLE EXAMPLE EXAMPLE LETTER MEANING NUCLEAR TOXIC BIOLOGICAL Precedence Date/ Time (ZULU) Security From To Type of Report !NBC 1 NBC 1 NBC 1 (NUCLEAR) (TOXIC) (BIOLOGICAL) A. Strike Serial Number B. (if known) Position of Observer IB· LB 196400 MARVILLE (UTM or place) C. Grid or magnetic (say which) C. Grid C. Magnetic bearing or azimuth of at 60 degrees 60 degrees tack from observer (in de grees or mils, say which) D. Date/ Time attack started D. 201405 Z D. 201405 Z D. 201405 Z (ZULU) E. Illumination time (sees) or E. 4 E. 201412 Z time attack ended F. Location of attack F. LB 2030 (UTM or place) actual (actual or estimated, say which) G. Means of delivery, if known G. Aerial spray H. Type of burst, Air, Surface H. Surface H. Nerve H. Biological or unknown, or type of toxic agent, if known, or type of attack (BW, CW, registra tion, harassing, etc.) I. Number of shells, etc. J. Flash to bang time (sees) K. Crater present or absent and diameter, if known (meters) L. Fireball width, immediately after passage of shock wave (sound of detonations) (degrees or mils, say which) 66 AGO 5647A EXAMPLE LETTER MEANING NUCLEAR M. Cloud height top or bottom, M. 40,000 10 mins after burst (defeet TOP grees, mils, meters or feet, say which) NBC 2 Purpose: Report used for passing evaluated data. Notes: a. This report is normally based on two or more NBC Forms 1. It includes an estimated GZ and in the case of nuclear detonations an evaluated yield. b. When adjacent agencies e.g. Navy and National NBC Defense use a different fallout prediction system, this form may be sent to provide basic data for their fallout computations. c. Items A, D, F , H and N may be r epeated as often as necessary to produce a summary report. d. Users of NBC 2 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items may be added at the user's discretion. EXAMPLE EXAMPLE LETTER MEANING NUCLEAR TOXIC Precedence Date/ Time (Z) Security From • To Type of Report NBC 2 NBC 2 (NUCLEAR) (TOXIC) A. Strike serial number ~. 24 A. 1 D. Date/ Time attack started ~. 201405 z D. 200945 Z (ZULU) F. Location of attack (UTM LB 187486 F. LB 126456 ~· or place) (actual or esti-actual actual mated, say which) G. Means of delivery, if known H. Type of burst, Air, Sur-IH. Surface H. Nerve face or Unknown (say which), or type of toxic agent. N. Estimated Yield (KT) iN· 5o NBC 3 Purpose: To issue immediate warning of expected contamination. Notes: a. When adjacent agencies e.g., Navy and National NBC defense organizations use a different fallout predic ion system, NBC 2 may be sent to provide basic data for their fallout computation. b. Users of NBC 3 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other Jetter items may be added at the users' discretion. AGO 5647A 67 EXAMPLE EXAMPLE LETTER MEANING NUCLEAR TOXIC Precedence Date/ Time (Z) (A telephone or radio message) Security From To Type of Report NHC 3 NBC 3 (NUCLEAR) (TOXIC) D. Date/ Time Attack started D. 201405 Z D. 201415 Z (ZULU) F. Location of Attack (UTM F. LB 187486 F. LB 206300 or place) (actual or esti-actual actual mated, say which) P. Area of Expected contami P. LB 208320 nation (UTM) LB 210320 LB 206310 Y. Bearing or azimuths of Y. 0272-0312 left then right radial degrees lines (degrees or mils, say which, four (4) digits each) z. Effective wind speed z. 019-025-05 (KPH), 3 digits; Down wind distance of Zone 1 (km), 3 digits; Cloud radius (km), 2 digits NBC 4 Purpose: To report radiation dose-rate measurements. Notes: a. Letter items Q, R, and S may be repeated as often as necessary. b. Radiation dose rates are measured in the open, one meter above ground. Other conditions will be specified in the message. c. Users of NBC 4 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items may be added at the users' discretion. LETTER MEANING EXAMPLE Precedence Date/ Time (Z) Security From To Type of Report NBC 4 Q. Location of reading Q. LB 123987 R. Dose rate (r per hour). The words "Initial", R. 35 "Increasing", "Peak", or "Decreasing" may be added. When decay rate is reported, the words "Decay Normal", "Decay Fast", or "Decay Slow", or the actual value of decay constant may be inserted. 68 AGO 5647A • LETTER MEANING EXAMPLE s. Date/ Time of Reading (ZULU) (this is s. 201735 z NOT normalized to H + 1 hour) Q. LB 129965 R. 60 s. 201650 z Q. LB 146808 R. 27 Increasing s. 201710 z NBC 5 Purpose: To report areas of contaminat ion. Notes : a. The form is best sent by means of a trace or overlay if time and distance permit. b. When the contamination arises from a single enemy or unidentified burst, the dose rate will always r efer to H + 1 hour, and the letter Item T will be used. But when th re have been several detonations at different times or on different days and no single H + 1 hour is possible, then the dose rates will be reported as at a specified time using letter Item 0. Letter Items 0 and T are therefore alternative and cannot both be used in the same report. c. It is not necessary or even desirable to r eport all four of the contours of different dose rates. Four are given to pro'{ide flexibility. (In the example only two are reported .) d. Letter Item X is used for chemical areas of tactical significance. e. When a contour closes to form a complete ring, the first coordinate is repeated at the end (see example for 300 r / hr). f . Colors when used in plotting, and when sending the report by means of a trace, are as follows: Red for 1000 r per hour Green for 300 r per hour Blue for 100 r per hour Black for 30 r per hour and Yellow for Chemical and Biological contamination. g. Contour lines will be annotated with the dose rates. h. Decay rates will be transmitted when requested. i. Users of NBC 5 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items may be added at the users' discretion. LETTER MEANING EXAMPLE EXAMPLE Precedence Date/ Time (Z) Security From To Type of Report NBC 5 NBC 5 (NUCLEAR) (TOXIC) A. Strike Serial number(s) A. 24 A. 1 causing contamination (if known) 0. Reference Date/ Time for estimated contours (see note b, above) when not H + 1 hour S. Date/ Time toxic contami s. 201045 z nation detected AGO 6647A LETTER MEANING EXAMPLE EXAMPLE T. H + 1 Date/ Time T. 201505 Z u. 1000 r / hr contour line coordinates v. 300 r / hr contour line co-V. ND 651455 • ordinates ND 810510 ND 821459 ND 651455 w. 100 r / hr contour line W. ND 604718 coordinates ND 991686 ND 114420 ND 595007 X. 30 r / hr contour line co-X. TOXIC ordinates, or area of ND 206991 tactical significance of ND 201575 TOX contamination ND 200787 (STATE IF TOXIC) ND 206991 70 AGO 5647A • APPENDIX VI CONTAMINATION AND MINEFIELD MARKERS Section I. DESCRIPTIONS O F MARKERS 1. Genera l This appendix discusses markers that are to be used in areas containing chemical, biological, and radiological contamination and chemical mines (fig. 11). All the markers are in the shape of a right-angled isosceles triangle with a base of approximately 11% inches (28 em) and sides of approximately 8 inches (20 em). The triangle may be made of plastic, metal, wood, or other rigid material. The markers are placed above the ground, right-angled apex downward, on wires, trees, or rocks. The coloring and markings of the signs are in accordance with the provisions of STANAG 2002 (Edition No.3). 2. Chemica l Contam ination M arker The triangle is painted yellow on both sides. The word GAS in red is placed on the side of the marker facing away from the contamination (front). The name of the agent, if known, and the date and time of detection are placed on the side of the marker facing the contamination (back). 3 . Biologica l Contamination Marker The t r iangle is painted blue on both sides. The letters BIO in red are placed on the side of the marker facing away from the contamination (front). The name of the agent, if known, and the date and time of detection are placed on the side facing the contamination (back) . 4 . . Radiological Contamination Marker a. The triangle is painted white on both sides. The word ATOM in black is placed on the side of the marker facing away from the contamination (front). The dose rate, date and time of reading, and date and time of burst, if known, are placed on the side of the marker facing the contamination (back). b. The signposting of radiologically contaminated areas merely indicates the presence of a hazard, the extent of which must be determined by newly arrived troops by means of instrument readings, surveys, or information from other units. STANAG 2094 provides detailed guidance for marking radiologically contaminated areas. 5 . Chemical Minefield Marker The triangle is painted red on both sides. On the side facing away from the minefield (front) appear the words GAS MINES (yellow lettering) with a horizontal yellow stripe directly underneath the lettering. The chemical agent in the mines and date _of emplacement are inscribed on the side of the marker facing the minefield (back) . Figure 11 illustrates the marking signs described in this section. AGO 6647A CBR MARKERS ~--28 CM--+- GAS CHEMICAL AGENT DATE TIME BIOLOGICAL AGENT DATE TIME ATOM RADIOLOGICAL DOSE RATE DATE TIME BURST TIME BURST DATE SURFACE OF MARKER FACING SURFACE OF MARKER FACING AWAY FROM CONTAMINATION CONTAMINATION (FRONT) (BACK) CHEMICAL MINEFIELD (UNEXPLODED MINES) GAS MINES CHEMICAL AGENT IN MINE DATE OF EMPLACEMENT SURFACE OF MARKER FACING SURFACE OF MARKER FACING AWAY FROM MINEFIELD MINEFIELD (FRONT) (BACK) F igure 11. Markers for contaminated or dang erous land areas. ~GO 5647A Section II. MARKING OF CONTAMINATED OR DANGEROUS LAND AREAS (STANAG 2002, Edition No. 3, Abstract) 6. General In this section will be discussed such dangers as radioactive contamination, biological contamination, and chemical contamination. These dangers will always be marked by triangular signs (right-angled isosceles triangle) unless the area is to be abandoned to the enemy. The front surface of each sign will face away from the contaminated or dangerous area. 7. Color of Signs The nature of the contamination or danger of PRIMARY DANGER COLOR Radioactive contamination WHITE Biological contamination BLUE Chemical contamination YELLOW Chemical minefields RED 8. Biological, Radioactive, and Chemical Contaminations In the case of danger due to biological, chemical, and radioactive contamination, the primary color and the pattern of the signs by themselves will be the principal means of recognizing the type of contaminaton. As a safeguard, the words GAS, BIO (for biological contamination), or ATOM, with the optional symbol of a trefoil (for radioactive contamination), will be painted or written with the secondary color on the front surface. The language to be used for these inscriptions will be selected by the forces erecting the sign. These inscriptions will be written parallel to the longer side of the sign. 9. Inscription on Signs In addition, when practical, details of biological, chemical, and radioactive contaminations will be written on the back surface of each sign. For biological contamination and for persistent or moderately persistent chemical agents, the name of the agent used, when the considered area is to be indicated by the colors of the signs. These include a. The primary color, used for the background of the front surface and for the entire back surface of the sign. b. A secondary color, used for additional markings and/ or inscriptions on the front surface. c. The primary and secondary colors as indicated below. SECONDARY COLORS MARKINGS INSCRIPTIONS NONE BLACK NONE RED ONE RED YELLOW YELLOW (STRIPE) known, and the date and time of detection are required. In cases of radioactive contamination, the following information will be inscribed on each sign: a. The dose rate. b. The date and time of reading. c. The date and time of the detonation that produced the contamination (if known). 10. Multiple Contaminations Area which contain more than one type of contamination will be marked with the relevant signs placed near each other. 11. M arking of Simulated Contaminated Areas The system of marking simulated contaminated ar eas will be exactly the same as for those which are real. 12. Size, Shape, and Composition of Signs a. Existing stocks of colored triangular signs AGO 5647A of slightly divergent shapes and sizes will be retained and used until stocks are exhausted. b. The triangle will be a right-angled isosceles triangle. c. The base of the triangle will be approximately 11% inches (28 em) and the opposite sides will be approximately 8 inches (20 em). These dimensions may be varied to suit local material. d. Triangles will be made of metal, wood, plastic, composition board, or any other similar rigid material available. 13. Placing of Signs Signs will be placed above the ground, rightangled apex downward, on wire boundary fences, trees, rocks, poles, or by putting the apex into the ground. This latter method should not be used if the other methods can be adopted since the signs might well be hard to spot because of being obscured by grass and other undergrowth. Further, they can be readily knocked down. 14. Night Signing No standardization for lighting of signs is specified. Each army will provide lighting or reflecting devices where deemed necessary. 74 AGO 5647A • APPENDIX VII ALARMS Section I. TOXIC ALARM SYSTEM (STANAG 2004, Edition No. 2, Abstract) 1. General The toxic alarm system is for use only in forward combat areas and in rear areas where no civilian system or alarm is in force. In areas where a civilian system is in force, the alarm will be the civilian one supplemented as necessary by any military system at the discretion of the military authorities. 2 . Types of Alarms In the event of a toxic attack, that is, radiological, biological, or chemical attack, including "spray," the following two types of alarms may be given: a. General alarm. b. Local alarm. 3 . General Alarm The general alarm is given when toxic attacks are expected to involve a large area. This alarm will be sent out by all normal means of communications to those areas which may be affected. 4 . Local Alarm The local alarm is given in all cases in which the presence of a toxic agent is detected. This alarm is given with any device which, when struck rapidly and continuously, produces a sound not easily confused with other sounds encountered in combat, by shouting "GAS," or in the case of spray attack by shouting "SPRAY." Examples of improvised devices are a. Bells. b. Metal triangles. c. Iron rails. d. Iron pipes. e. Empty shell cases. Section II . EMERGENCY WARNING OF HAZARD OR ATTACK (STANAG 2047 Abstract) 5 . General When operating on land, units will use the sounds and signals detailed in this STANAG to give emergency warning of biological, chemical, or radiological hazards. These hazards include the presence of biological or chemical agents or radiological particles in the vicinity of friendly troops, whether as a result of enemy or friendly action. a. Procedures for U~ng Emergency Warnings. The emergency warnings prescribed in this STANAG are- AGO 5647A ( 1) Designed for use in a unit of battalionsize or smaller. (2) Suitable for use in both forward and rear areas. (3) Based on the use of distinctive sounds which can be produced in the field without special equipment or devices. Sirens will not be used to pr oduce these emergency warnings. ( 4) Limited in range and should be repeated swiftly throughout t he unit area by all who hear or see the original warning. (5) Normally supplemented by the simultaneous use of radio and telephones, particularly in case of the "all clear" signal. b. Vis'ual Signals. Visual signals are included in this STANAG to supplement the sound warnings under conditions when sound warnings may be lost because of other battelfield noises or to replace them when the tactical situation does not permit the use of sound signals. 6. Signals a. The signals used to give emergency warning of the biological, chemical, or radiological (dust) hazard will be as follows: (1) Sound signal. By percussion-rapid and continuous beating on any metal or any other object which will produce a loud noise, such as bells, metal triangles, iron railings, iron pipes, empty shell cases, mess tins, steel helmets, and vehicle bodies. (For further details on Toxic Alarm System, see STANAG 2004.) (2) Visual signal. By donning the respirator and protective equipment, followed by any agitated action to draw attention to this fact. b. The "all clear" signal used to indicate that the danger for which a warning has previously been given no longer exists will be as follows: (1) Sound signal. A continuous sustained blast on a vehicle horn, whistle, bugle, or other available wind instrument. (2) Visual signal. None unless prescribed in local instructions. AGO 5647A APPENDIX VIII CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL ELEMENT (CBRE) Section I. INTRODUCTION 1. General The chemical, biological, and radiological element (CBRE) is an element of a t actical operations center (TOC) established at divison, corps, army, or independent corps level. It is also an element of a rear area operations center, such as an area damage control center or a rear area security control center with an area damage control mission, established at field army support command and logistical command levels. 2. Scope of Activities a. The activities of a CBRE in a tactical operations center encompass the friendly employment of chemical and biological agents and fallout from friendly nuclear bursts, and the defense against enemy employment of chemical and biological agents and fallout from enemy nuclear bursts. b. The activities of a CBRE in a rear area operations center encompass defense measures for avoiding or minimizing the effects of enemy chemical and biological attacks and of fallout from enemy nuclear bursts. c. In consonance with STANAG's 2103 and · 2079, a CBRE performs the functions of a center for the receipt, consolidation, and evaluation of reports of enemy nuclear detonations and biological and chemical attacks and resultant contamination, and for the production and dissemination of appropriate reports and warnings to fri-endly forces and installations. Collectively, the CBREs provide the collection and control agencies for the nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) reporting and warning organization for the Army in the field. Section II. CBRE OF A TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER 3. Mission The mission of a CBRE of a tactical operations center (TOC) is to coordinate chemical and biological operations with other support operations, to predict fallout resulting from the employment of nuclear weapons by friendly and enemy forces, and to evaluate and disseminate chemical, biological, and radiological ( CBR) contamination information. 4. Functions A CBRE of a tactical operations center of a major tactical command performs the following functions: a. Coordinates CBR operations with other combat support and combat service suppnrt operations. b. Performs chemical and biological target analysis and munition requirement computations. c. Receives, collates, evaluates, and disseminates -Be (nuclear, biological, and chemical) reports in consonance with STANAG 2103 (see Appendix V). d. Prepares and disseminates effective wind messages. e. Receives NBC strike reports and performs assessment of effects to include fallout prediction for all enemy and friendly strikes, as required. AGO 6647A f. Coordinates chemical detection and radiological surveys with higher, lower, and adjacent units, and controls radiological surveys as required. g. Plans and coordinates the collection of CBR contamination information. h. Collates, evaluates, and disseminates CBR contamination data. i. Provides advice on the impact of CBR contamination on tactical operations. j. Maintains CBR situation map. k. Maintains the radiation dose status chart of subordinate and attached units. l. Provides advice on CBR intelligence matters and coordinates with G2 element on all matters related to CBR intelligence. m. Provides advice and recommendations pertaining to the use of defoliants and herbicides in support of tactical operations. n. Provides advice on smoke operations. o. Provides data on the casualty-producing effectiveness of and degree of hazard from chemical and biological attacks. 5 . Organization a. The personnel requirements for a CBRE at the various TOC levels are based on the minimum requirements that will provide the commander with an acceptable CBR operational readiness posture. Personnel for operating a CBRE at division level are provided by the division chemical staff section, augmented as required by personnel from an attached TOE 3-500 team J A, CBR element. CBRE personnel at corps, army, and independent corps level are provided from designated staff section(s) and are augmented as required by attachment of TOE 3-500 JA teams. b. The minimum number of personnel required for the 24-hour operation of a CBRE at division level is 10. They include a CBRE director, CBRE assistant director, both of whom are Chemical Corps officers, and 8 enlisted men. The enlisted personnel consist of 2 CBR operations sergeants, 4 CBRE operations specialists, and 2 clerks or clerk-typists. The CBRE personnel are organized into two 12-hour duty shifts of 5 members each. The CBRE director is chief 7 8 of one duty shift, and the assistant director is chief of the other shift. At corps, army, and independent corps levels, the requirements for CBRE duty personnel are greater than at division level and are dependent on the size and • scope of the CBR operations. 6 . Duties of Personne l The duties of CBRE personnel vary with the level of command at which the CBRE operates, with the requirements for processing and disseminating NBC data received from the NBC reporting system, with the extent of automation, and with the scale of CBR operations. The command chemical officer, or other designated staff officer, has staff supervision over the CBRE and is responsible for its operations. a. CERE Dir·ector. The CBRE director is the chief of one 12-hour duty shift. He directs all CBRE functions under the staff supervision of the command chemical officer or other designated staff officer. The CBRE director ( 1) Analyzes chemical and biological targets in the area of operations. (2) Advises other elements of the TOC on the capabilities, employment, and effects of chemical and biological agents. (3) Coordinates chemical and biological operations with other tactical support operations. (4) Predicts the effects from friendly and enemy use of chemical and biological weapons. ( 5) Analyzes incoming radiological monitoring data to determine whether they adequately describe the radiological situation. ( 6) Analyzes incoming radiological survey data, revises survey plans, and initiates requests for additional surveys as required. (7) Directs and controls the activities and movements of those survey parties which report directly to the CBRE. (8) Supervises fallout prediction resulting from the employment of nuclear weapons by friendly and enemy forces. (9) Disseminates CBR information. AGO 5647A (10) Performs other radiological duties as set forth in FM 3-12. b. CERE Assistant Director. The assistant director is the chief of the other 12-hour duty shift. He directs all CBRE functions under the staff supervision of the command chemical officer or other designated staff officer. His duties as chief are the same as those of the CBRE director. c. CBR Operations Se'rgeant. The CBR operations sergeant (1) Assists the duty chief in the overall supervision of the enlisted personnel. (2) Trains and cross-trains the enlisted members of the CBRE. (3) Insures accuracy by periodically checking the work of the CBR operations specialists. ( 4) Calculates munitions requirements for chemical and biological targets. ( 5) Monitors all information disseminated by the CBRE. ( 6) Calculates predicted effects resulting from the employment of chemical and biological agents. (7) Predicts future contamination based on decay, weather, and stability of CBR contaminants. ( 8) Prepares predicted CBR contamination charts. (9) Posts and maintains CBR situation maps and CBR contamination charts. (10) Compiles CBR contamination plots for transmission by NBC 4 and 5 messages. (11) Performs addi tiona! radiological duties as set forth in FM 3-12. d. CBR Opemtions Specialist. The CBR operations specialist is cross-trained in the duties of CBR computer and plotter. The CBR operations specialist (1) Receives, processes, and plots chemical detection reports and radiological monitoring and survey reports. (2) Prepares CBR situation maps and overlays. (3) Prepares CBR contamination charts. ( 4) Prepares downwind travel predictions of chemical and biological toxic clouds. (5) Performs the task of making fallout predictions, using input data as supplied. ( 6) Decodes and encodes messages as required. · (7) Performs additional radiological computer and plotter duties as set forth in FM 3-12. e. Clerk or Clerk-typist. The clerk or clerktypist (1) Acts as radio-telephone operator. (2) Maintains the CBRE journal and message file. (3) Prepares and dispatches messages. ( 4) Assists in the preparation of CBR contamination overlays for transmission. (5 ) Receives and records data on appropriate forms. 7.- CBRE Operations The information in this paragraph pertaining to the activities relating to CBRE is presented as a guide only. Actual procedures are dependent on t he composition and organization of the specific TOC of which the CBRE is one of the element s and on the procedures prescribed in the SOP of the TOC. a. Coordination of Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents. Procedures and activities involved in this function are: (1) The CBRE maintains the current readiness status of the command's chemical and biological munitions in coordination with the G4 element representative and with the G3 air group of the tactical air support element (TASE). (2 ) The CBRE analyzes targets in the area of operations, particularly those that the G3 is considering for attack, to determine their vulnerability to chemical and/ or biological agents. Included in the analyses are predictions as to the effects of the agents and possible resultant contamination on the targets. The CBRE coordinates the AGO 66(7A 79 analyses with the fire support coordination element (FSCE) and with the T AS E. It recommends to the FSCE the type and amounts of chemical or biological munitions to be used, time of attack, and-after coordination with other TOC elements-the weapons delivery system to deliver the munitions. (3) The CERE prepares and submits to the FSCE recommendations for the chemical-biological (CE) portion of the fire support plan. (4) The CERE predicts the chemical contamination expected in the target area, based on actual conditions existing at the time of the attack; estimates the downwind hazard area expected from the chemical and/ or biological attacks, and determines friendly troop safety requirements; and estimates the casualty-producing effectiveness of the chemical and biological attacks on enemy forces. (5) Upon approval of the CE plan, the CERE ( a) Provides information and advice to the other TOC elements regarding the type, degree, location, and duration of the contamination to be expected in the target area and the protection required for friendly troops operating in the area. (b) Disseminates to other TOC elements, other elements of the headquarters, subordinate units, and other commands as required, changes in the predicted contamination and downwind hazard areas caused by meteorological changes. b. Prediction of Chemical and Biological Casualty-Producing Effectiveness. The CERE predicts the casualty-producing effectiveness of chemical and biological attacks on enemy forces by generally following the procedures listed below. (1) In predicting the chemical casualtyproducing effectiveness, the CERE (a) Obtains from the G2 element intelligence data on location of suspect targets suitable for attack by CE munition, characteristics of enemy troops in the target area, such as the CE defensive posture of the troops; troop morale and status of chemical defense training; previous exposures, if any, to chemical attack; quality of protective equipment, first-aid equipment, and medical service; state of troop training to include masking time; probable troop activity which will affect rate of breathing; and other related factors. · (b) Estimates the percentage and type of casualties to be expected from the chemical attack (surprise dosage attack, total dosage attack, or contaminating attack), and chemical agent employed. (c) Estimates the duration of incapacitation of casualties. (d) Makes an estimate of casualty effectiveness of the chemical attack and submits the estimate to the FSCE, G2 and G3 element. (2) In predicting the biological casualtyproducing effectiveness, the CERE follows a procedure similar to that in (1) above, modified for biological agents. (See FM 3-10A for detailed information.) c. Prediction and Dissemination of Fallout Information. The CERE predicts fallout resulting from both friendly and enemy nuclear bursts and disseminates the fallout predictions. Detailed information for making fallout predictions is given in TM 3-210 and TC 3-15. (1) For friendly nuclear bursts, the CERE fallout prediction procedures are (a) Prior to the friendly nuclear burst, the CERE receives from the FSCE information as to the planned yield, height of burst, and ground zero. The CERE makes the fallout prediction and disseminates the prediction to the FSCE for incorporation in the target analysis being prepared by the FSCE. (b) After the friendly nuclear burst, the CERE prepares fallout predictions, AGO 5647A as required, based on the actual or reported yield, height of burst, and (3) Detailed procedures pertaining to radiological monitoring and survey ground zero, and disseminates these are contained in FM 3-12. predictions to all TOC elements and to other headquarters, units, or agencies as prescribed in the SOP or as directed by the G3 element. (2) For enemy nuclear bursts, the CERE fallout prediction procedures are ( a) Using raw data resulting from intelligence or operational experience, the CERE prepares fallout predictions. These predictions are made at intervals and disseminated as prescribed in the SOP or as directed by the G2 element. (b) Using changes in meteorological data occurring after the initial prediction, the CERE prepares revised fallout predictions as required and disseminates them as prescribed in the SOP or as directed by the G2 element. (c) Detailed information about CERE procedures pertaining to the prediction of fallout from enemy nuclear bursts is given in FM 3-12. d. Coordination and Control of Radiological Surveys. Procedures pertaining to the coordination and control of radiological surveys are (1) The CERE receives, processes, and plots radiological monitoring reports received from subordinate and other units in the command area. When the monitoring information is inadequate concerning an area of operational interest to the command, the CERE in coordination with the appropriate TOC elements recommends that radiological surveys be conducted. (2) Radiological surveys, either aerial or ground, may be controlled directly by the command headquarters. When the command headquarters controls the survey, the CERE acts as the control party and coordinates the surveys by prescribing the areas to be surveyed and the type, amount, frequency, and manner of reporting the survey information. e. Evaluation and Dissemination of CBR Contamination Data. The CERE evaluates and disseminates CBR contamination data by generally following the procedures listed below. (1) Receives, processes, and plots CBR contamination data received from NBC reporting system and organization. (2) Maintains a radiation situation map or overlay which shows the actual contamination existing at a given time for area of interest. It may also show predicted fallout that is still airborne. Based on decay and on additional contamination, the degree of contamination is recomputed and adjusted several times daily as prescribed in the SOP. (3) Maintains a CB contamination map or overlay. The degree of chemical contamination is adjusted several times daily as prescribed in the SOP. The incidence of biological effects is shown as appropriate. ( 4) Prepares current contamination charts and disseminates them as prescribed in the SOP or as directed by the G2 element. (5) Prepares and disseminates an estimate of contamination expected at a designated time in the future, as directed by the G2 element. f. Evaluation of Impact of CBR Contamination on Tactical Operations. The CERE evaluates the impact of CBR contamination on tactical operations and provides the G3 element with the evaluation. The evaluation may include information as to the degree of contamination at selected points or areas; the effect the contamination may have on units; the protection required for troops operating in designated areas; the length of time troops can safely operate in these areas; the amount and type of decontamination of troops, equipment, and supplies required after operating in designated areas; and the amount and type of decontami- AGO 6647A nants and decontaminating equipment required activity during time periods of interest covered to accomplish the necessary decontamination. by operational reports (to include total strikes reported, predominant nuclear yields employed, g. Ev aluation and Dissemination of NBC Re a brief assessment of the significance of these ports of Enemy Nuclear Bursts an d Biological NBC strikes, and other deductions that can be and Chemical Attacks. The CBRE plots and made). The CBRE utilizes the five NBC reports displays on maps and charts the location, time, described in appendix V in disseminating andnumber, and extent of reported NBC incidents exchanging CBR information. Detailed infor within zone of interest for purposes of providmation and examples of these reports are con ing information as to enemy CBR and nuclear tained in appendix V. Section Ill. CBRE OF A REAR AREA OPERAliONS CENTER 8. General The activities of a rear area operations center, such as an area damage control center or a rear area security control center with an area damage control mission, encompass defense measures against enemy employment of chemical and biological agents and fallout from enemy nuclear bursts on an area basis and require an internal CBRE capability to perform the functions of a contact point within the NBC reporting system and organization. These centers must receive, evaluate, report, and disseminate information pertaining to enemy nuclear detonations and chemical and biological attacks, resultant contamination, and the preparation and dissemination of appropriate warnings to friendly forces and installations. 9. Personnel Minimum personnel required for 12-hour operation are a CBRE director or chief, a CBR operations sergeant, a CBR specialist, and a clerk. The personnel are provided by the command headquarters (field army support command, support brigade, or logistical command) responsible for establishing the operations center. The CBRE personnel are augmented, as required, by personnel from TOE 3-500 team JA, CBR element. The duties of the personnel are the same as those of the personnel of the CBRE of a tactical operations center, sofar as the duties pertain to defense measures. 1 0. Operations Procedures for operation of the CBRE are set forth in the SOP of the operations center of which the CBRE is an element. 82 AGO 5647A APPENDIX IX APPLICABLE STANAGS The material presented in this manual agrees with the following STANAGS: 2002 Marking of Contaminated or Dangerous Land Areas. 2004 Toxic Alarm System. 2047 Emergency Warnings of Hazards or Attacks. 2079 Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control. 2083 Radiological Hazards. 2094 Signposting of Radiologically Contaminated Areas. 2103 Reporting Nuclear Detonation, Radioactive Fallout, and Bio logical and Chemical Attacks. -tx U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966-250-503/ 5647A AGO 6647.A INDEX Agents. (See Biological agents and Chemical agents.) Aircraft, protection against spray attack ---------------------------------------Alarm: General ------------------------------------------------------------------ Local ------------------------------------------------------ -------------Alerts --------------------------------------------------- Alpha particles. (See ~uclear radiation.) Amyl nitrite --------------------------------------------------------------- -Atropine------------------------------------------------------·----------------- Beta particles. (See ~uclear radiation.) Biological agents: Aerosols ------------------------------------------------------------------Characteristics --------------------------------------------------------- - Classification -------------------------------------------------------------Decontamination -----------------------------------------------------------Definition ----------------------------------------------------------------- Detection ----------------------------------------------------------------Effects --------------------------------------------------------------- Identification -------------------------------------------------------------Indications of enemy use ---------------------------------------------------Protection against ----------------------------------- lJse ----------------------------------------------------------------------Vectors -----------------------------------------------------Biological operations: Decontamination -------------------------------------------------------- -Preventive measures ----------------------------·----------------------Protective measures -------------------------------------------------------- Sampling ------------------------------------·-----------------------------Treatment of casualties ---------------------------------------------------- Blast ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bleach. (See Decontamination.) Blister agents (see also Chemical agents) : Characteristics ---------------------------------------------------------- Decontamination -----------------------------------------------------------Detection -----------------------------------------------------------------First aid -----------------------------------------~------------------------ Physiological effects ------------------------------------------------------Blood agents (see also Chemical agents): Detection ---------------------------------------------------------- ----- First aid -----------------------------------------------------------------P.hysiological effects Casualties: ~uclear vveapons effects ----------------------------------------------Prevention of --------------------------------------------------------------Reporting -----------------------------------------------------------------Severity ------------------------------------------------------------------ Paragraph Page 32d 22 35a 24 35b,App. IV 25,59 App. IV 59 20c 17 20b 17 44 34 43a 34 43 34 46 37 43 34 45 35 43b 34 45b 36 45a 35 44 34 44d 35 43a 34 46 37 44b 34 44a 34 45b 36 44c 35 49a 39 10 7 39b 28 Fig. 2; 34a, b, c 8,23,24 39b 28 Fig. 2; 10 8,7 Fig. 2; 34a 8,23 39e (2) 28 Fig.2,12a 8,9 47,49 38,39 49 71c 50,51 75,76 50,51 75,76 4,50, 77 CBRE ------------------------------------------------------------------------5e, 75, App. VIII Chemical agent detector kit. (See Kits and sets or Detection devices, chemical.) AGO 6647A 85 Chemical agents: Blister agents. (See Blister agents.) Blood agents. (See Blood agents.) Choking agents. (See Choking agents.) Decontamination _________ -------------------------------------------------- Description ---------------------------------------------------------------. Detection Duration of effectiveness __________________________________________ _ Effects of terrain and weather on use ------------------------------- Effects. (See Physiological effects below.) Enemy use ---------------------------------------------------------------. Factors in chemical injury -------------------------------------------------- Identification of ----------------------------------------------------------- Incapacitating agents ------------------------------------------------------ Incendiaries. (See Incendiaries.) ~unitions ---------------------------------------------------------------- Nerve agents. (See Nerve agents. Odors --------------------------------------------------------------------- Physiological effects -------------------·------------------------------------ Protection against -------------------------------------------------------- Riot control agents -------------------------------------------------------- Screening smokes --------------------------------------------------------- Signaling smokes ----------------------------------------------------------- Symbols ------------------------------------------------------------------ Tactical use --------------------------------------------------------------- Tear agents. (See Tear agents.) Training agents ----------------------------------------------------------llnidentified chemical agents -----------------------------------------------Vomiting agents. (See Vomiting agents.) Chemical detection team -------------------------------------------------------Chemical officer ----------.-----------------------------------------------------Chemical operations: Conditions for masking ----------------------------------------------------Decontamination -----------------------------------------------------------First aid -----------------------------------------------------------------Friendly use __ ------------------------------------------------------------General -------------------------------------------------------------------Immediate action ---------------------------------------------------------~asking -----------------------------------------------------------------Training -----------------------------------------------------------------llnidentified chemical agents -----------------------------------------------llnmasking ---------------------------------------------------------------- Choking agents (see also Chemical agents): Detection ------------------------------------------------------- --------First aid ------------------------------------------------------------------Physiological effects -------------------------------------------------------Protection against --------------------------------------------------------- Clothing (military): Contaminated -------------------------------------------------------------- Decontamination. (See Decontamination.) Dispo~tion of ------------------------------------------------------------ Protection offered by ------------------------------------------------------ Protective. (See Protective clothing.) Reimpregnating kit for ----------------------------------------------------- Contaminated areas: ~arkers for --------------------------------------------------------------Occupation ----------------------------------------------------------------Operations in. (See also Movement.) -----------------------------------------Reconnaissance of ----------------------------------------------------------Sentinels ------------------------------------------------------------------ Paragraph Page Fig. 2, 38-40, 8,27 APP. II 54 9-13 7 34 23 7 7 14b 10 14u 10 3£ 21 34 23 F 2; 11 8,9 14c, 1' ig-. 3 11,10 9-13 7 9-13 7 15-28 12 Fig.2 8 13c, Fig. 3 9,10 13c, Fig. 2 9,8 Fig.2 8 Fig. 2 8 Fig. 2 8 34 23 App. IV 59 Fig.1,5d 5, 4 33 22 38-40 27 39 27 32g 22 7 7 32c 21 33a 22 5 4 34a(2),39e(6) 23,29 33b 22 Fig.2 8 39e(1) 28 12b 9 15 12 19c, 40b, 40c, 14, 29, 30, 46a,67c 37,48 40b 29 15,16 12 19 14 App. VI 71 App. VI 71 30,31,32g 20,22 28 19 36 25 86 AGO 5647A Contaminated clothing. (Sec Clothing.) Contaminating attacks -------------------------------------------------------- Contamination: Equipment and supplies ---------------------------------------------------Food and water -----------------------------------------------------------~arkers ------------------------------------------------------------------ DANC. (See Decontamination.) Decontamination: Aeration ------------------------------------------------------------------Ammunition ----------------------------------------------------------------Apparatus ----------------------------------------------------------------Area and terrain -------------------------------------------------------------Biological ------------------------------------------------------------------ Paragraph Page 14,43,47-49 10,34,38 50b,c, 65 42,47 37,65 25,47 App. VI 71 29 40b 4766 32 42d 30, 37,47 40e, 46b,66a 37,5646, App. III 29,56 Bleach --------------------------------------------------------------------40a (1), App. III Blister agents_____________________________ _________________________________ Boiling ------------------------------------------------------------------- Buildings ------------------------------------------------------------------ Burning ------------------------------------------------------------------ Caustic soda --------------------------------------------------------------- Chemical ------------------------------------------------------------------ Clothing ------------------------------------------------------------------- DANC -------------------------------------------------------------------- Detergent (hot soapy water) ------------------------------------------------ Dry mix -------------------------------------------------------------------- Earth --------------------------------------------------------------------- Echelons ------------------------------------------------------------------ Equipment ---------------------------------------------------------------- Food and water ------------------------------------------------------------ Fuels ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Germicidal soap ----------------------------------------------------------- Hot air ------------------------------------------------------------------- Leather (boots) __ ------------------------------------------_______________ ~aterials for --------------------------------------------------------------Nerve agents -------------------------------------------------------------- Personal ------------------------------------------------------------------ Personal equipment ------------------------------------------------------- Personnel stations. (See Field decontamination stations.) Principles _________________________________________---------------------- Protective clothing --------------------------------------------------------- Protective mask ----------------------------------------------------------- Protective ointment -------------------------------------------------------- Radiological --------------------------------------------------------------- Responsibilities ____________________________________________________________ Rubber articles -----------------------------------------------------------Solvents -------------------------------------------------------------------- Specialists ___________________ ________________---------------------------- Steam --------------------------------------------------------------------Techniques ---------------------------------------------------------------- Washing soda -------------------------------------------------------------Water Weathering -------------------------------------------------------------- 39b, App. III 28,56 37 46a 30 40c 29 40a(4) 56 App.III 27 38-40 29,37,48 40b,46a, 67c 56 App. III 37,56 46a, App. III 56 App. III 29 40a(4) 27 38b 29,47 40b,66 29,48 40d,68 56 App. III 37 46a 56 App.III 40b (4) 30 29,37,56 40, 46a , App. III 28,56 39c,App.III 27,37,48 39, 46, 67, Table I 5 40,46,66 29,37,47 38a 27 40b 29 40b(5) 30 20c, App. III 17, 56 66-68 47 40a,46 29,37 40b(5) 30 App.III 56 40a 29 App. III 56 40, 46, 66-67, 29, 37,47 App. III 56 App. III 56 40d, 68b, 30, 48, App. III 56 40a (2), 46a 29,37 Wet mix (slurry) ---------------------------------------------------------40a (1) , App. III 29,56 Detection devices: 34 23 Chemical ----------------------------------------------------------------- 59 45 Radiation (radiac) --------------------------------------------------------Detector crayon. (See Detection devices, chemical.) Detector paper. (See Detection devices, chemical.) 61 46 Determination of damage ------------------------------------------------------- AGO 5647A 87 Dispersion --------------------------------------------------------------------Dosimeters --------------------------------------------------------------------Dosimetry: Dosimeter readings ------------------------------------------------------- Operation exposure guide --------------------------------------------------Processing data -----------------------------------------------------------Radiation status -----------------------------------------------------------Reporting -----------------------------------------------------------------Responsibility ------------------------------------------------------------- Downwind hazard: Biological ----------------------------------------------------------------Chemical ------------------------------------------------------------------Radiological -------------------------------------------------------------- Duration of effectiveness. (See Chemical agents.) Evacuation and displacement Fallout: Cause ---------------------------------------------------------------------Defense against -----------------------------------------------------------Detection -----------------------------------------------------------------. Dissemination of information ___________ ------------------------------------Extent and degree ----------------------------------------------------------Pattern ------------------------------------------------------------------Predictions ----------------------------------------------------------------Protective measures -------------------------------------------------------Time of arrival ----------------------------------------------------------- Field decontamination stations ------------------------------------------------ Filter element assemblies, mask: Damage --------------------------------------·----------------------------]daintenance ------------------------------------------------------------- Fireball ----------------------------------------------------------------------Fire bombs --------------------------------------------------------------------Fire hazards ------------------------------------------------------------------First aid ---------------------------------------------------------------------Flame throwers --------------------------------------------------------------- Flash burns. (See Thermal radiation.) Food: Decontamination ----------------------------------------------------------Dispo~tion ----------------------------------------------------------------Protection ---------------------------------------------------------------- Foxholes (see also Shelters, protective): Earth cover ---------------------------------------------------------------Radiation protection ------------------------------------------------------Shelter half or poncho as cover for ------------------------------------------Gamma radiation. (See Nuclear radiation, gamma rays.) Gas mask. (See Protective mask.) Heat. (See Thermal radiation.) Hoods, protective -------------------------------------------------------------- Identification of chemical agents ----------------------------------------------- Impregnated clothing. (See Protective clothing.) Incendiaries: Attacks -------------------------------------------------------------------Characteristics ------------------------------------------------------------ Defense against -----------------------------------------------------------Description ----------------------------------------------------------------Physiological effects ------------------------------------------------------ lJse ----------------------------------------------------------------------Individual standards of proficiency ---------------------------------------------Intelligence -------------------------------------------------------------------- Intelligence sources -----------------------------------------------------------Internal radioactive hazard ----------------------------------------------------- Paragraph Parre 31d,50 20,41 59b 45 76b 51 75b 50 76 51 75c,d,76b 51 76b(3) 51 75a 51 43a 34 32g,33b 22 57 44 63,72 47,50 69 48 71-73 49 56 44 71c ( 6) 49 57,70 44, 48 70 48 57 44 71 49 71 49 38 27 17c 13 17c 13 48,49 38,39 42 31 42, 50 31,41 39, 44,62 27,34,47 42 31 40, 68 29, 48 40,68 29,48 37 25 41c, 50a 31,41 71c(2), 50a(1) 49,41 32e 22 18a 13 34 23 42b 32 13d 9 42 31 42 31 13d 9 42 31 App. II 54 29, App. IV 19,59 29a 20 49c 40 AGO 5647A Paragraph Page Kits and sets (see also Detection devices ) : 34 23 Chemical a gent detector kit ----------------------------------------------- Chemical agent decontaminating and reimpregnating kit ------------------------19 14 Leather dressing, vesicant gas resistan t -----------------------------------------20 14 25,30 18,20 ~aneuver --------------------------------------------------------------------- App. VI 71 ~arkers, contamination and minefield -----------------------------------------~asking time ------------------------------------------------------------------App. II 54 ~asks. (See Protective mask. ) 68 48 ~edical aid station ------------------------------------------------------------~eters. (See Detection devices, radiation.) App. VI 71 ~ines, marking chemical -----------------------------------------------------~onitoring: 58b(2) 45 Continuous --------------------------------------------------------------- 58 45 General ------------------------------------------------------------------- Implementation of _____ __________________________________________________ __ 58b 45 59 45 Instruments for ---------------------------------------------------------- 58 45 Intelligence -------------------------------------------------------------- 58b(1) 45 Periodic ------------------------------------------------------------------ 65 47 Personnel ---------------------------------------------------------------- 58 45 Plans and training for ---------------------------------------------------- 58 45 Reconnaissance ----------------------------------------------------------- 58 45 Responsibility ------------------------------------------------------------ 58 45 Special ----------------------------------------------------------------- 58 45 Unit capability for -------------------------------------------------------- Use in determining radiation pattern ----------------------------------------58 45 58 45 ~onitors, radiological -------------------------------------------------------- ~ovement: Downwind of contaminated areas -------------------------------------------32g,33b 22 31 20 Selection of routes and positions ------------------------------------------- 44a 34 Through contaminated areas ------------------------------------------------App. V 64 NBC reports ------------------------------------------------------------------ Nerve agents (see also Chemical agents) : 9 7 Characteristics ----------------------------------------------------------- 39c 28 Decontamination ---------------------------------------------------------- Fig.2 8 Detection ----------------------------------------------------------------- 39 27 First aid ----------------------------------------------------------------- Physiological effects _________________________________ _____ _____ _____ __ ___ __ _ Fig.2,9 8, 7 Neutron-induced radioactivity. (See Neutrons.) Neutrons: Definition -----------------------------------------------------------------49c(2) 40 Radioactivity induced by ---------------------------------------------------49c 40 Nuclear radiation: Alpha particles -----------------------------------------------------------49c ( 4) 40 Beta particles -------------------------------------------------------------49c ( 3) 40 Detection devices ----------------------------------------------------------59 45 Dose. (See Radiation.) Dose rate. (See Radiation.) Gamma rays ---------------------------------------------------------------49c (1), Table II 40 Neutrons. (See Neutrons.) Operation exposure guide -------------------------------------------------75 50 Production of -------------------------------------------------------------49c 40 Protection against ----------------------------------------------------------71 49 Nuclear warfare: 50,55 40,44 Defense against ----------------------------------------------------------Detection devices. (See Detection devices.) 49 39 Effects of nuclear explosions ----------------------------------------------50 40 Preparing unit defenses --------------------------------------------------- 55,71 44, 49 Protection against -------------------------------------------------------- Protective shelters. (See Shelters, protective.) AGO 6647A 89 Nuclear Warfare-Continued Purification of water -------------------------------------------------------SOP ----------------------------------------------------------------------Target acquisition -------------------------------------------------------Training and operations ---------------------------------------------------lJnit procedures ------------------------------------------------------------ Nuclear weapons : Bursts (detonations ) ---------------------------------------------------·----Definition ----------------------------------------------------------------Effects of ------------------------------------------------------------------Operation exposure guide. (See Nuclear radiation, operation exposure guide.) Operations. (See Biological operations, Chemical operations, and Radiological operations.) Packaging -------------------------------------------------------------------- Percussion alarms ------------------------------------------------------------ Prevention of casualties. (See Casualties.) Proficiency standards : Individual ---------------------------------------------------------------- lJnit ----------------------------------------------------------------------Protection: Biologkal ----------------------------------------------------------------Chemical -----------------------------------------------------------------Fallout -----------·------------------------------------------------------- Nuclear -------------------------------------------------------------------Protection of: Food and water -----------------------------------------------------------Personnel -----------------------------------------------------------------Supplies and equipment ---------------------------------------------------- Protective clothing: Care ---------------------------------------------------------------------General -------------------------------------------------------------------Hood. (See Hoods, protective.) Impermeable -------------------------------------------------------------Permeable -------------------------------------------·-------------------·-- lJnderwear lJses ----------------------------------------------------------------------Protective dubbing. (See Leather dressing, vesicant gas resistant.) Protective equipment and supplies ----------------------------------------------- Protective mask : Canister -----------------------------------------------------------------Care of -------------------------------------------------------------------Conditions for masking -----------------------------------------------------Defects and damage of -----------------------------------------------------Description ---------------------------------------------------------------Filter elements assemblies --------------------------------------------------Fitting and adjustment -----------------------------------------------------Functioning --------------------------------------------------------------Inspection -----------------------------------------------------------------Proficiency in masking -----------------------------------------------------Protection offered ________-------------------------------------------------Removal of (unmasking) --------------------------------------------------Specia~purpose -----------------------------------------------------------Spectacle inserts ---------------------------------------------------------- Speed in masking ---------------------·-------------------------------------Types -------------------------------------------------------------------Wearing ------------------------------------------------------------------ Paragraph Page 68b 48 App. IV 59 52 43 5,50,51 4,41,43 50-71, App. IV 41,59 48 38 48 38 49 39 37 25 35 24 App. II 54 App. II 54 44a 34 15-28 12 71 49 50 41 37, 44, Table I 25, 35 15-29,44,71 12,34,49 37,44 25,34 18 13 18 13 18a(2) 13 18a (1) 13 18a (2) 13 18b 13 16, 18-20 12, 13 42c, 44, Table I, 32,34, 35 App. III, App. IV 56, 59 17c 13 17 13 33 22 17c 13 17 12 17 12 17b 13 17a 12 17b 13 App. II 54 17a 12 33b 22 17 12 20d 17 App. II 54 17 12 32, 33, 35, 21, 22, 24, 39, 40, 44, 27, 29, 34, 46,55 37,44 AGO 5G47A Paragraph Page Protective ointment -------------·· ·--__ -----· -----------------------------------Protective shelters. (See Shelters, protective. ) Radiac instruments. (See Detection devices, radiation.) Radiation: Dose _____ ---------------------------------------------------------------Dose rate _ Nuclear. (Scr Nuclear radiation.) Sickness ------------------------------------------------------------------Thermal. (Sec Thermal radiation.) R::~dioactive cloud -------------·-· ·-·-·----------------------------------------- Radioactive contamination. (Sre Radiological contamination.) Radioactive dust. (See Radiological contamination.) Radioactive material --------------------------------------------------------- Radiological center. (Sec CBRE.) Radiological contamination (s ee also Contamination) : Extent and degree. (see Fallout.) ~onitoring of ------------------------------------------------------------- Occupation of areas -------------------------------------------------------Operations in. (See Contaminated areas.) Protection against ___ ------·---·----------------------------------------------Purification of water -------------------------------------------------Survey of ------------·_____ -------------·----------------------------------Time of entry-time of stay -----------------· ------------------------------Radiological operations: Decontamination Evacuation ----------------------------------------------------------------First aid __ _ -----··------------------------------------------------------- ~onitoring. (See ~onitoring.) Occupying radiologically contaminated areas --------------------------------Protective measures _ ----------------------------------------------------- Survey. (See Radiological survey.) Radiological survey ( see al$ 0 Radiological contamination) --------------------------Rear areas -------------------------------------------------------------------- Reconnaissance: Chemical contamination ----------------------------------------------------Tactical ------------------------------------------------------------------ Records -------------------------------------------------------------- Removal of masks ------------------·--------------------------·----------------Re~orts ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Riot control agents. (See Chemical agents.) Rules for masking ------------------------------------------------------------- Sand mats -------------------------------------------------------------------- Schools ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Selection of routes and positions ------------------------------------------------ Sentinels ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Sets. (See Kits and sets.) Shelters, CBR protective ------------------------------------------------------ Shelters, protective: Buildings ----------------------------------------------------------------Concrete ------------------------------------------------------------------ Construction --------------------------------------------------------------Design -------------------------------------------------------------------Excavations ---------------------------------------------------Fortifications --------------------------------------------------------------Foxholes --------------------------------------------·---------------------Location -----------------------------------------------------------------Nuclear ------------------------------------------------------------------Operation ------------------------------------------------------------- --Types -------------------------------------------------------------------- AGO 6,647A 20 67 58 62 49 47 56, 58, 65, 67, 71,73 72 54,55,71,72 68b 60 64 66-68 72 62 64 54,55, 71 60 71c(7) 28 27,28 75,76 33b App. V 33a 42c 5 31 36 21-24 50a(4) 50a (2) 21-23,50a(5) 23b 50a(1) 50a 50a(1) 23a 50 24 22 14 48 45 47 39 38 44, 45, 47, 48,49,50 50 44,49,50 48 46 47 47 50 47 47 44,49 46 49 19 18,19 50,51 22 64 22 32 4 20 25 17 41 41 17.42 18 41 41 41 17 41 18 17 91 Paragraph Page Shielding ---------------------------------------------------------------------Smokes. (See Chemical agents.) Specialists ----------------------------------------------------------------Spray, aircraft, protection against ----------------------------------------------Standing operating procedures. (See Unit procedures.) Survey. (See Radiological survey.) Tables II. Probable effects of nuclear radiation (gamma) on exposed personnel -----------------------------------------------------------!. Protective measures for biological operations -----------------------------Tactical plans. (See Unit procedures.) Tear agents (see also Chemical agents): Detection -----------------------------------------------------------------First aid ------------------------------------------------------------------Physiological effects --------------------------- --------------------------- Terrain: Decontamination -----------------------------------------------------------Effects of ----------------------------------------------------------------- Thermal radiation ------------------------------------------------------------- Time of entry-time of stay. (See Radiological contamination.) Training agents. (See Chemical agents.) Training, special -------------------------------------------------------------- Unidentified chemical agents --------------------------------------------------- Unit procedures : Biological operations ------------------------------------------------------ Chemical operations ------------------------------------------------------- Decontamination ----------------------------------------------------------- Defense measures ---------------------------------------------------------- Evacuation of positions ---------------------------------------------------- Governed by --------------------------------------------------------------- Intelligence information --------------------------------------------------- Minimizing casualties ------------------------------------------------------ Mission ------------------------------------------------------------------- Movements (maneuver) --------------------------------------------------- ~uclear vvarfare ---------------------------------------------------------- Operations in contaminated areas -------------------------------------------- Organization --------------------------------------------------------------- Proficiency standards ------------------------------------------------------ Purification of vvater ------------------------------------------------------ Radiological operations ---------------------------------------------------- Reconnaissance. (See Reconnaissance. ) Responsibilities ------------------------------------------------------------ Security ------------------------------------------------------------------ SOP's -------------------------------------------------------------------- Tactical plans ------------------------------------------------------------Tactical protection ---------------------------------------------------------Training ------------------------------------------------------------------Unmasking after chemical agent attack ----------------------------------------- 1Tehicles ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1Tesicant agent protective ointment. (See Protective ointment.) 1Tesicant gas resistant leather dressing ----------------------------------------- 1Tomiting agents (s ee also Chemical agents): Detection -----------------------------------------------------------------First aid -----------------------------------------------------------------Physiological effects ------------------------------------------------------- 50 5,38 32c 49c 44d Fig.2 39e(4) 13b 40e,46b,66a 14b 49b 5 34a(2) 43-46, App. IV 7-14, App. IV 38-40,46,66-68 15-20,44,71c App. IV 72 25 29, App. IV 32a,44b 25 25,30, 71 50-73, App. IV 25-27' 44-46, 56-73 5 App. II 37c,68b 50-73 4, 6, 26, App. IV 25,27 26. 44, 50d, 75c, App. IV 27 27 5, App. IV 33 25 20 Fig.2 39e(3) 13a 41 4,27 21 40 35 8 29 9 30,37,47 10 39 4 23 34,59 7,59 27,37,47 12,34,49 59 50 18 19,59 21,34 18 18,20,49 41,59 18, 34, 44 4 54 26,48 41 4,5,18,59 18 18, 34,43 51,59 18 18 4,59 22 18 14 8 29 9 92 AGO 5647A Paragraph Page Water: Accessibility ------------------------------------------------------------Decontamination -------------------------------------------------------- 68b 40d,68b 48 30,48 Protection of ------------------------------------------------------------- 44b, Table I 34,35 Purification of ------------------------------------------------------------ 37c,68b 26,48 Storage -------------------------------------------------------------------Weather, effect -------------------------------------------------------------- 37c 14,32b(5) 26 10,21 By Order of the Secretary of the Army : HAROLD K. JOHNSON, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff. Official: KENNETH G. WICKHAM, Major General, United States krmy, The Adjutant General. Distribution: Active Army, NG and USAR: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 requirements for Chemical, Biological & Radiological Operations. -tr U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966-250·503/5647A AGO 5647A 93