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Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mAthode. a*a BJure, 3 I2X 1 2 3 2 3 4 5 6 LETTER TO THB BIGHT EOIT. BENJAMIN DISRAELI, I.P. If:' ON THB PBESENT EELATIONS OF ENGLAND WTTfl THE COLONIES. ,• #^- BT THE RIGHT HON. C. B. JWEBIiET, M.P NEW EDmON. WI1H A FBEficE ON CANADUN Al^UBS; AHD AN APPENDIX or isnuoTS ibok KVXDaNdk taken bbfobb OM COUmUM UUTABY EXP: lOT OOUMITtBK • tOUDON: PARKER, SO|^||p BOURN. WEST STRAND. . I ("• \ 1 1 .u I » V( 1 ■i";.! ■ »<- ».. ■f-f ♦ ■ ; ' ♦ . »> %A W * .- ♦ ^*:=!^ <*. / ■ il'/f \\ ■4 ^ s doing so refuted 7. The Manner in which a complete Return to our original Oolonial Relations might be safely and satisfactorily e£fected APPENDIX. MOB T 1 4 8 20 36 i 42 64 1. Extracts from Evidence of J. R. Godley, Esq. . 2. „ „ Right Hon. W.*. Gladstone 8. „ „ Right Hon. R. Lowe 4. „ „ Lord Herbert . . . 6. „ # General Sir John Bnrgoyne 69 61 68 66 67 REFERENCES. Beport of Departmental Committee on Expense of Military Defences in Colonies. 4th May, 1860. Beport from, and Evidence before, Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, 1861, with Appendix, and Returns. Parliamentary Returns. Col. Sykes. April 1859. „ „ Mr. Adder ley. July 1860. Parliamentary Papers, Estimates, and Debates. Grahame's " History of the United States." Smith and Elder. 1836. Chalmers^ " Political Annals of United Colonies.'* 1780. "Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration.** By Earl Qrey. 1853. John Arthur Roebuck, M.P., " On the Colonies of England." 1849. Clark " On Colonial Law." " Charters of the Old English Colonies in America." Samuel Lucas. For Society for Reform of Colonial Government. Parker, 1850. John Stuart Mill, " On Representative Government." 1861. Arthur Mills, M.P., " Colonial Constitutions." 1866. Goldwin Smith's " Letters to the Daily News."" Jan., Feb., and Oct., 1862. Hermann Merivale's "Paper read before the British Association." October 1862. PREFACE TO NEW EDITION, 1862. I re-issue my Letter on Colonial Relations at a moment when Canada is strikingly illustrating the truth of my warning, and the necessity of our adopting a sounder policy, or at least of coming to some definite understanding with our colonial fellow-subjects about their military defences. Is Canada to be looked upon with satisfaction at this mo- ment — is she safe, in the state of semi-dependency described in the following Letter ; free as to her own go\emment, legislation, and policy, but dependent upon English arms and funds for her defence and security ? Is she likely to remain part of the British Empire long on an English gua- rantee of her liabilities ; or to retain, on the credit of others, a fellow-citizenship the vital essence of which consists of self-reliance ? The common Sovereign of England and Canada will, chiefly in reference to the latter, soon have to enter into relations with at least two new American Powers. These new Powers will come in place of the old United States, but by no means similarly presenting themselves to the family of nations. The largest dominion of one people speaking one language and possessing similar habits and institutions which the world has ever seen will have become permanently disintegrated. The Union, in which have been merged, for eighty years, the jealousies of numerous and multiplying communities, will ««■ VI have burst open, and released its discordant elements into separate life. The enormous aggregation of States which that Union at length embraced, has been found to exceed the utmost possibility of national extension. The limit of federation has been reached and tested. Congress could no longer speak the language of common interests for all its constituents. America can no longer stand by itself on the earth as one people, with an Atlantic Ocean between itself and its elders. It can no longer act only as a great magnet on the conduct of the Old World, — as we have felt it act, on important points of international policy, upon ourselves of late — in- fluencing, attracting, repelling, controlling from afar, but not participating. That broken federation must now acquire in detail those na- tional features which take their character from the neighbour- hood and contact of sovereign powers. No longer a dwelling sole, or with only subordinate belongings of other nations about it, it will become the arena of rivalry, and of mutual action between foreign powers. Standing armies, ready for external service, will supersede or embody a dormant home militia ; national fleets will succeed to mere squadrons of observation ; . treaties and international reciprocitieo will tr^sfer to diplomatic intercourse the discussions hitherto confined within an internal Congress ; the vague and judge- less law of nations will replace the appeal to a supreme federal jurisdiction ; and the jealousy of parties expanding into the rivalry of nations, will give new form as well as spirit to every American institution. • But the novelty will not only consist of a new division of the North American continent among independent sovereign- ties. The great aggregate of republics will probably split into separate republics, and we shall, for the first time, see how neighbouring democracies of the American type can fare to- ▼ii gcthcr, and whether the change of circumstances will not necessitate a change of political conditions. Democratic in- stitutions must pass through a new trial. Their intcnial as well as external aspect must become something wholly new. Whatever there may bo of truth at the bottom of the "manifest destiny'' theory, it pervades, in some shape, every American breast. Washington announced to his first Congress that " they had the fortunes of republican government in their hands." We shall now see the second stage of tliis experiment in its adaptation to a divided instead of a common territory, to alliances instead of federation, to a jealous neighbourhood of nations instead of a joint Congress of states. Patriarchal despotism was the indigenous institution of Asia, as it was the form of government most congenial with the first societies of mankind. It has undergone the changes incident to its scenes and fortunes, but has never suffered transplantation to another quarter of the globe, nor obliteration from its own. Feudal aristocracy, alike indigenous to Europe, has miti- gated, but never neutrahzed, its nature by repeated revolutions witliin thut quarter of the globe. The utmost possibility of a hybrid junction between the Asiatic and European forms of government seems to have been realized in Russia, which government, perhaps, contains a promise of prolonged vitality from such an imion of the past and future in its composition. Democracy, the last of the triple series of human go- vernments, is reserved for the accumulated multitude of mankind, and the last of the world's stages is reserved for this experiment. America offers scenes of giant proportions to give adequate scope for its wide requirements. There the features of nature are on a scale which it would have exceedec' the graap of early poetry to deify, but which modem intelligence demands for its ordinary service, and the crowded vm v; "World explores for practical use, and the energies of distributed power will fully occupy. The people who are the chief actors in this last drama of social institutions went out from England, and took with them all that was un-fcudal in her system as the basis of their own democracy. The democratic aristocracy of England seems to be another link between the second and third stages of this destined series ; participating in progress, while retaining hold of the past ; firm in tradition, yet in living sympathy with the future ; capable, therefore, of undiminished prominence among the coming nations of the world. ' The soil of America, intolerant of aristocracy, gives spon- taneous growth to all the elements of democracy. They may present themselves in many new combinations, but their essence will never leave that soil. Europe is as incapable of adopting them as America of eradicating them. European re- publics have all had aristocratic bases. Vain was De Toc- queville's warning to Europe, to look away from her failing aristocracy and prepare for the advent of democracy from the West. Pure democracy is not in Europe's destiny, any more than feudal aristocracy could spread back towards Asia. While democracy was sprouting on its American soil, Eu- rope seemed to be discharging all her freedom in the seed of this novel growth. Her own institutions seemed re- lapsing towards the despotism which preceded them. But her destiny retrieved its course. Our own Revolution rallied European freedom : yet even the violence of reaction could not precipitate democracy on this side the Atlantic. It is not for democratic ascendency that European freedom is now struggling. On the other hand, none need expect the present dissolution of America to disengage elements of monarchy. The Southern States mi^ht have been expected to show some such principle in separation : but the South has already published, as its proposed new constitution, only a wisely modified republic. Pure democracy is the natural and peren- nial growth of America. Wo may, therefore, suppose it will be with new republics that the Queen of England will shortly have to institute relations in America ; and these relations must refer primarily to her interests and obligations in Canada and the sister colonies, and on their account must be incapable of delay. Other nations may have time to deliberate, and will treat at leisure with their new allies on the general terms of the comity of nations ; but England must negotiate at once as a partner in the same territory. What will be the Canadian interest in this negotiation P The democratic atmosphere of the West must find strong native sympathies in the nostrils of British North Americans ; and we read in a recent address from one of their Assemblies, that " those provinces would speedily become repubUcs, but for their belief in the applicability of British constitutional guards and usages." But even there, as among all people, there must be many minds and tempers congenial with monarchical insti- tutions. It is thought by good judges that many of the wealthier citizens of the United States would have emigrated to Canada had the English monarchy delegated more of the charms of State to the colonial seat of government. Canada has, besides, all the attachment, moral and in- terested, which a perfectly free Colony must feel towards a liberal and powerful metropolitan country — a sympathy with the freedom of her mixed constitution — an interest in the greatness of her name — an implication also in her commerce, as in a common concern. England has, on the other hand, a direct interest in the continuance of her North American connexion. She woxild rather have the vigorous natives of those shores recruit her own than a foreign naval power : however indefinitely, we feel that there is power as well as weakness in extent of M '1 ! 1. «! empire, and we know also that our emigrating instinct" have more certain, if not larger, s^ope under the same allegiance.* Secession and abandonment should be inadmissible ques- tions on either side. Nemo potest exuere patrian should be the recognized maxim of both. To contemplate divorce id to imperil union. The Canadians would be rebels if they abjured their allegiance, and the Queon would repudiate inalienable responsibilities oy abdicating her functions of sovereignty. - Imperial disintegration cannot be legitimate matter for discussion within any empire. The reciprocal duties of sovereignty and allegiance have, at this time, their foundations laid a^? definitely in the English Colonies as at homo. The Crown acts under responsibility to the subjects' representatives throughout the Empire, and no one represents them but those whom they elect. It is false to say that the English Parliament implicates a Colony in its policy in anv way otherwise than a Colonial Parliament often implicates \^ at home. The people are freely represented in either Parliament, and practically the Executive is involved in the decisions of the legislature in whichever of its distributed localities they take effect. There is certainly a difficult problem resulting from this distribution of parliamentary debate over a widely scattered Empire. The Queen's representative in a Colony acts by the ar'vice of ministers about him, responsible to the popular voice on the spot, yet amenable also to the powers at home, which may not always be in concert. The central and provincial administrations are responsible to co-ordinate, but not identical organs of the popular will, in all matters not specifically imperial. ♦ Upon this point some very striking remarks have been recently made by Mr. Hermann Merivale, in reading a Paper before the British Association. . ....... XI Sir Cornewall Lewis pointed out, in the debate which I raised lately on the subject, the inconvenience of any attempt by actior of the Imperial Parliamen*^ to force the adoption by the Canr:dian Parliament of the local Militia Bill which they had rejected when proposed by their own Government. Ho might have shown more than inconvenience in such an attempt. The experience of Sir Francis Head, Lord Sydenham, Lord Metcalfe, and others, amply proved that the day was gone by for any appeal for a Canadian Governor, on local matters, from his own to the Imperial Parliament ; or for the maintenance of his own policy, or council, or of instructions from home, in the teeth of the representatives of the Colony. There is the inevitable defect of dualism in distant colonial parliamentary government: but there are also gaps in the system of constitutional government ai; home — gaps which are rather bridged over by compromise and management, or avoided by foresight and prudence, than constructively filled up. A judicious governor will biing provincial counsels into harmony with imperial policy, just as a judicious minister will avoid col- lision between the balanced powers of mixed government at home. There need therefore be nothing fatal to colonial connexion in this constitutional defect. The question is not of separation, but of sounder relations. There is a defect in colonial administration, to which my letter chiefly adverts, not inherent in the nature of things, but the accident of recent policy, and in its essence fatal to prolonged connexion ; I mean the communication of free- dom «rithout itS responsibilitiep — the attempt to give a Colony its full share of self-government in common w'th the home country, yet to relieve it of the duties and liabilities which are essential to self-government. ' -•, •: - '^' ■ " The naif Editor of the Amklander, May 19, 1862, criticizes some words of mine to this efiect, thus : " We object as much " as Mr. Adderley can do, to the Home Ministry interfering " in the mana^'^ment of our local affairs ; but we object also zu '' to England neglecting the functions which belong to sove- " reignty," by which he means supplying them gratuitously with troops and stores. The Colonies have thus inverted the terms of their early re- lationship, and assert a complete right to have their own will under the auspices of a representative legislature, while Eng- land's "function" is to furnish them with the means required for the execution of their will, and for the protection of their property. Take the recent affairs of Canada for an example. In June last year, there were sjonptoms of filibustering propen- sities in the United States, and we raised pur garrison in Canada by the addition of 3,000 men, or nearly fourfold, before Canada had moved a finger, or shown a sign of any sense of responsibility for her own defence. Then came the affair of the Trent — an insult to the English flag — ^in which, as the British navy is the chief and the gratuitous protector of Canada, and as Canada was the ultimate object of the insult, one would think she had some interest. England increased still further her auxiliaries, and sent in wirtei across the Atlantic, at a moment's notice, some of her best troops, until her forces in North America amounted to 12,000 men. The Canadians merely told us the more we sent the better ; but when their Government proposed to them to arm they rejected the proposal, said they were too rich to afford it (a rather Irish form of the truth),* and ousted * See Am the Canadian Mr. Gait's recent speech in Manchester, magnifying the rapid progress of Canada as a reason for England taking care of so valuable a Colony : and the great expenditure of Canada on her own public works, as a ground for her not incurring the further expense of protecting them. So likewise says Mr. Qoldwin Smith, in the last of a series of Letters to the Daily News, the force and great ability of which none can dispute, though I deplore his con- clusions : " No doubt of our unlimited liability for their protection " seems to cross the Colonists' minds. In answer to the appeal of " the Home Government, t)ioy satisfactorily prove their local re- " venues are already devoted to local objects." " It does not occur xm their Ministry; and to prevent all supposition that ousting them was their object, they repeated the refusal to arm when asked by the succeeding Ministry. In the debate I raised, on these events, in Parliament, I was told I encouraged thoughts of separation, by urging upon Canada the daty of taking her proper share in providing the requisites for her defence. But I maintain that no less demand upon Canada than this, can avert a very rapid process of separation from Eng- land. Canada and England cannot long remain together on terms of disadvantage to either. If you wish for perma- nent friendship with anybody, its terms must be fair and equal on both sides. Romantic patronage on one side, and interested attachment on the other, is not friendship, but mutual deception. When we find out that we are paying too much for our pride, or they that they are receiving too little for their dependence, the rottenness of our pres'>nt connexion will be detected. As I value Canada, I seek for the earliest possible exposure of her false friends who would cherish her present relations. Let not a free country like England dream of maintaining Colonies in equally free government with herself, by the bribe of undertaking their protection. Their freedom is corrupted, and its spirit dies, in the very act of receiving the boon; while its form mischievously re- mains, for we cannot recall their constitutions. England undertakes a task of protection which she cannot always sustain, and saps the strength of freedom which would or- dinarily sustain itself. " to them," Bays the Duke of Newcastle, " that their revenue might " be increased by fresh taxation, and that the part of it which is " devoted to public works, might, in times of disaster, be diverted to " the paramount object of averting ruin." But Mr. Goldwin Smith need not waste his powers in discussing federal union as one alter- native for such a sleeping partnership ; and we only need a bold Minister, who will deal in action instead of threats, to avert sepa- ration — his other alternative. XIV ,^M One, than wliom there can be no better judge on the spot, writes thus : " In the event of foreign attack, the inhabitants " of Canada have as much right to invoke for their defence " the entire power of the Empire, as those of Middlesex ; *' but assuming this to be the case, it is plain, that in order " to entitle themselves to the assertion of this right, they " must place themselves in some manner upon the same foot- " ing as the inhabitants of Middlesex, in reference to their " preparations for, and powers of participating in, the defence " of the Empire." Some are now saying, in excuse for the Canadians, that they are declining to arm because they do not see any danger. If this be the case, it remains for Her Majesty either to induce them to see their danger ; or, if she acquiesces in their view, to withdraw her troops. But Sir Cornewall Lewis stigmatises the latter proposition as a penal treatment of Canada. Surely a Colony has become the most fastidious of tyrants. We may not ask it to arm for fear of its taking offence and separating from us. We may not agree with its own decision that there is no need of arming, because it would be penal treatment to withdraw troops whose presence they say they don't need, while they like to retain it. ' Such terms of intercourse compose no friendship, nor alli- ance, nor community, nor solid inter-connexion of any sort : but a fool's paradise of mutual promise and expectation equally visionary and evanescent. It will require no American invasion to dissipate these false relations. Let America only decompose and reconstruct herself in the neighbourhood of Canada. There is no cohesion in the con- stitution of Canadian connexion with England sufficient to resist the mere impact of any fragment from the ruins of the Union. IT Let the disbanded forces of the North? which the cessation of civil strife must some day leave unoccupied, but seasoned, diilled, and reckless, only find the materials for adventure ready to hand in a raid upon defenceless Canada, spiced with affront to a small English garrison — what must be the consequence ? A bitter parting with a Colony which it is the cant of the day to cherish by such protection. I believe it is yet in the power of the Governor- General to make Canada see that England cannot do more than aid her own militia in time of need : and that no country can, without loss of freedom, be exonerated from the primary obligation of self-defence. If the Canadians will undertake the duties as well as privileges of British citizens, we may go on together as members of one great Empire : each part habitually maintaining itself, and the whole ready to rally round any threatened point. They are in large majority strongly attached to Britisl con- nexion, and the British reciprocate the feeling. Yet we have not the courage to draw the veil from between us of mutual deception,* which scarcely hides, from any watchful man, the rapid and certain process of separation, and of separation in disappointment and anger. The broad English shield of protection is so held over Canada, as to suppress, and conceal the suppression of, any basis of defence. It lulls to sleep within her all sense of * The Canadians have so completely shut their eyes in reliance upon England that they fancy they may compare the cost i^er head of what they call their " sedentary militia," and their estimate of the possible expense of its active organization on emergency, with the cost habitually borne by English tax-payers (partly on their account) in an Army, Navy, and Militia, besides the expenditure on Volun- teers, and other national defences undertaken by private individuals : and they feel perfectly satisfied that the comparison is so much in their favour, that the last thing that can be expected of them is to do anything more. W^f-f, 'U\ ■'' i m XVI responsibility for her own welfare, and smothers her national instincts of self-preservation ; while its own inadequacy to supply the defence which it has crushed, oflfers to an aggressive and insolent neighbourhood one incentive stronger than fhe acquisition of her territory, — an opportunity for humiliating England. "•*■ ■ LETTER, &c. Dear Disraeli, * I address myself to you, in writing on the subject of our present colonial relations, not only because you are the Leader of the political party to which I belong in the House of Commons, but still more because you are the last leading Statesman there, who has openly shown a due appreciation of the naked and disastrous truth — to which I am anxious to draw attention, — that England has lost the right estimation of her special art, and vital interest in colonization ; and has sub- stituted for her former national offspring, a semi-dependency, looking to her for protection, instead of sharing with her in universal empire. We became aware, late last session, that Her Majesty had engaged the service of the largest steamer in the world, to convey additional forces from home to Canada, which we were told was agitated by the first sound of civil strife across its borders. Lord Palmerston vented his most heroic indignation against Sir James Fergusson, who remonstrated against this forestallment of assistance. Nothing but ignorance of the history of our Colonies could have enabled the Premier to adopt the civis Bomanus tone in his defence of a proceeding which, if he knew anything of the spirit of our Colonies in former times, must have indicated a conviction in his mind of the degeneracy of his countrymen. You replied by the coun- ter question, " Are there no inhabitants in Canada — are there " not a numerous and gallant people there ? If not adequate, " on this occasion to depend wholly on their own enei^es, do " they require our men to set them the first example ? Taking " so early an opportunity of letting the Canadians know that " we are prepared to assume the monopoly of their defence ia B 1 1 " calculated to damp their ardour, and make them feel that it " is not their business to protect their hearths and homes and *' national honour. The transmission of 3,000 troops cannot he *' meant as an adequate means for baffling an invasion of Canada. " If there is suspicion in the minds of the Government of a ** misunderstanding with the United States, it cannot be politic ** to intimate that opinion by taking inadequate means of vin- " dicating the honour of this country." The present conjunc- ture of affairs only adds force to your reply. If the time is near when the strength of the empire must be brought to their support, doubly requisite is it that the Colonists should have put forth their own strength. Even though it should prove to have been a happy accident that a detachment of English troops anticipated a quarrel of our own in America arising in a season impracticable for transport, nevertheless, the mischief of our undertaking the primary responsibility for the defence of Canada appears clearly, above any such advantage, by the fact that Canada has but 30,000 ill-trained militia ready, which, moreover, we have to arm, for her own defence. She would have had 200,000 but for our garrisons. I spent my first ten years of Parliamentary life in co- operation with the men who succeeded, against an opposition which rendered the legislation imperfect, in restoring self- government to the Colonies, but without its correlative respon- sibilities. The result has been, in many cases, the production of an unprecedented anomaly — the freest possible government, responsible to legislatures based on universal suffrage; yet equipped with the sinews of war, in some cases the means of internal police, and part of the cost of civil establishments from another community, in the distant centre of the empire. Complete democracy impels these Colonial Ministries in their course of local policy, while supplies from another quarter enable them to deal with wars, and tumults, and even with governmental opposition without reference to the people ; having their defence provided, and the needM costs defrayed by an all-sufficient proxy. The Colonies asked for the control of 8 their own taxation : we gave them the use of a good deal of OUT own besides. On the other hand, while we gave them self-government enough to enable them freely to direct their own affairs, we retained enough of the theory of protecting them to render them in'esponsible for the consequences of their own actions, or the security of th(?ir own interests. • We cannot trust to the mere economists of the House of Commons to disembarrass us of this confusion. If they would take the subject in hand even in its least important aspect — the heavy burden inflicted on our tax-payers without r shniiov, of compensatory benefit to any one — we might wait in expecta- tion of some help from them. But though Mr. Bright tells the people of Birmingham eeery year that the House of Com- mons, as now constituted, is lavish and wasteful, especially in military expenditure, yet he balances the weight of his theoretic grievance by an abstinence from action, which gives a practical sanction to it. His uniform absence from the House of Commons on supply nights is a fair composition with ministers for his tirades in town-halls against their extravagance. His silence in their presence gives consent to all their yearly squanderings on useless colonial fortifications, and on the perpetual transport of our troops wasting their strength in scattered detachments, preventing all the rest of the empire from drawing out its own resources, and need- lessly burdening ours. ..,..;. If I look to the present occupants of the treasury bench, I see there a Minister of first-rate ability, in charge of the Exchequer, thoroughly conversant with colonial questions, in all respects most eminently qualified to deal with this subject. His masterly treatment of it in his evidence before Mr. Arthur Mills's late Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, furnishes me with my best materials in writing to you. But I derive no hope from all his knowledge, and all his ability, while he continues to lament over our growing national expenditure, and only points his moral with this repeated illustration. b2 i > K I r Allow mo, then, to profess publicly my own expectations as resting solely on yourself. I feci assured of your grappling with the subject, and acknowledging its immense importance. I am confident, this being the case, that you will neither treat it rashly, nor neglect it. The interests of the Crown in a great colonial empire will not be trifled with by you. The hazard to these interests resulting from unsound colonial relations, enervating the colonies, and diminishing the aggregate power of the empire, you will keenly discern. You have a parlia- mentary following which will enable you to give effect to awakening public opinion, and restrain it from the rash haste to which a sudden vision of such public mischief might be likely to impel it. 1. — Only tvjto possible Colonial Eelations. There are only two essentially distinct principles of re- lationship between a mother country and colonies: the one, that of subserviency and dependence, the other of community and partnership. On the first principle the mother country treats a colony as a dependency, to be made conducive to her own interests, and entitled to her protection : on the other, an equality of rights and duties is mutually recognized as between the citizens of a common empire. It is useless to ransack the records of antiquity, or those of contemporary nations, for illustrations of colonial relations. Maimers, and the structure of society differ so essentially, that we arrive at this fundamental distinction before any feature presents itself for useful comparison, or example. The Greek Colonies most nearly resembled our own in the principle of their first foundation, and the relation of alliance which they maintained with the mother country: and like ours, their rapidity of growth to wealth and greatness, from the first moment of their release from home, exceeded all other instances of national increase. But whatever the difference of type may be between n Tynan, Roman, Grecian, Venetian, Spanish, English, or Dutch Colony, whether in its origin, struc- ture, growth, or idea, the colonies of all times and nations range themselves under one or other of the alternative principles of relationship with their mother country, as long as they main- tain any connexion at all, namely, that of subserviency and dependence, or that of community and partnership. 2. COMMTNITY OP ClTIZENSHIP IS THE TrUE PRINCIPLE OP British Colonization. Clark, our chief authority en Colonial Law, lays down a triple classification of English Colonies according to their mode of acquisition, (Summary of Colonial Law, p. 4,) whether by conquest, by cession, or by occupancy. The first and second classes he considers to be dominions of the Crown, until the right of self-government be conceded to them, which concession can never be revoked. The third class are English cocnmu- nities, with all the rights and liabilities of English citizens from the outset, as much as if they were detached pieces of this island floated oif on the distant ocean. It matters little now what was the origin of any of our Colonies, whether conquered by force of our arms, as Jamaica ; or of our colonists* arms, aa Nova Scotia ; or of both united, as Canada ; or ceded to us by any treaty ; or first occupied by us for commerce. As every Colony, properly so called, has had self-government conceded to it, we need not search now for charters, or records, to ascertain the original character of any. England may assume superiority, and volunteer her patronage, but the legitimate rights and responsibilities of all her colonists are to be studied in the constitution of her citizens at home. Our true colonial relations are, as I hold, the relations naturally existing between one part of England and another, modified only by a greater distance from the metropolis ; the distance being so great as to necessitate separate establishments. ' ii . I English Colonies, gifted with self-governmont, arc offset communities of the English type, just aa Tyrinn Colonies were Tyriun ; and Greek Greek ; as grown-up sons resemble parents ; and their households resemble the parental home ; unless by unnatural treatment, denial of rights, selfish usurpation, or oppression by force or fraud, they have lost their natural cha- racter, become alienated from their natural affinities, or in- curred the stamp of slaves ; or else, by the equal injury of over-patronage, become crippled or emasculated. Offspring nations naturally tend to stronger development of the parental characteristics. In the fresh and open field of America, the free genius of our race expanded in still freer institutions, while a more despotic government prevailed in the neighbouring dominions of France, than her ministers could ever establish at home. The English more eagerly fastened on the sea-coasts, and devoted themselves to enter- prise; the French more fastidiously sought the interior and the rivers, and were intent on military occupation. That is the best government, which gives scope to the best quali- ties of the governed. English Colonies inherit the noblest faculties for freedom; and if Mr. Mill rightly describes re- presentative institutions as the true tendency and the natural composition of free citizenship ; and the self-reliant, vigorous character of our race as specially fitted for them ; what violence it must be to our colonial instincts, to choke the natural channels of self-action, or to encumber them with extraneous help ! What poison to English vitality must be the first acquired sense- of dependence, especially to our countrymen whose emigration has only indicated an exuber- ance of national spirit refusing to be pent up at home I What hope of any permanent success can attend such repressive colonial policy? Reduce a British Colony to habits of the most abject dependence — fiimish it with every local requirement from its governor to its police — ^let money, drawn from English taxation, flow through every channel of its internal admimstration, until every feature of self-govem- mcnt bocomos fictitious, and ovory s]mng of action cormpt— still, through tho lowest process of dccomiHKsition, the tin natnrw will sprout forth agiiin. Freemen cannot live long on crumbs from a master's table. The natural spirit of Englishmen is too high to let go their birthright for tho wages of protection : their self-reliance too innate to become obliterated by any culture. If anything more than the supremacy of tho Crown is to be set over colonial communities, if E^^igland desires to act as a superior nation over them, they should not be allowed tho forms of freedom — representative institutions — for through thoao forms tho intended inferior must rise to real equality with tho ideal superior. Despotism, congenial with Asiatic people, serves also to retain their incapacity for freedom, and obstructs tho possible approaches of freedom. But our American, African, and Australian Colonies, natu- rally free, have also representative institutions, and the re- presentative of tho Crown on the spot. They are complete transmarine Englands. They have all the equipment of English self-government ; only in separate establishments, because their distance renders their representation in Westminster impo «>sible. It is but creating confusion to give them entire nationality, and supply them with an external government besides. We at once see that community, not subservienry, is the principle of their relation to us. They have the control of supplies for their own executive; and such power includes, of course, responsibility for the conduct of their own affairs. The rights of self-control they must necessarily forego, in proportion as their own establishments are not supported by themselves. The idea of self-government involves that of self-sufficiency. The Colonies may, indeed, expect the forces of the empire to rally round them at need, and they must be expected to rally round the imperial standard themselves when needed. But the one is no more to be expected than the other. Community cannot be one-sided. The Colonies h - M li 8 cannot take the privileges, and leave to England the duties of freedom. The rights of freedom, to use Mr. Gladstone's words {Uvid. 3,781), entail its duties also, and the one can- not long be possessed >vithout the other ; and, in Mr. Mill's words, it is exactly in proporti'ii as a man has more or less to do for his country, that he becomes attached more or loss as a free citizen to it. (J. S. Jilill, On Representative Govern- ment.) A free country imdertaken for by another, is not really free. It is for the interest of England's Colonies, more than for her own, that they should lose none of the exercises of citizenship in their separation from the home country, of its labours any more than of its enjoyments. wm ■:»ii 1 fi'' 3. — Common Citizenship was the Relation between England and heh first Colonies ; and they sepa- rated IN CONSEQUENrJE OF ITS VIOLATION. It would be impossible to assert, and absurd to suppose it likely, that this healthy colonial relationship and condition had ever been ftdly realized for any length of time. Nothing in this world's history takes its natural course unimpeded by crossing currents or obstructions. But the early American Settlements of the 16th and 17th centuries had at least docu- mentary recognition, from their first going out, of " a right to " the same conditions of citizenship as if they had remained ** at home," and they always asserted it. Queen Elizabeth's first patent, granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, guaranteed to her subjects who went out with him to Virginia, " all the rights of free denizens of England." But as much as any Queen she loved management, and those to whom she delegated her power, loved it no less. James I. indulged his legislative fancy in drawing charters for colonial government, and nodes of laws for the Companies to whom he dealt out the American Continent. Grahame remarks the inconsistency of this kingly legisla- tion, with his invariable " reservation to the colonists and their 9 "children, of the same liberties and privileges as they would have "in England," {Hist, of United States^ Book I., chap, i., p. 35.) The ascription of legislative power f o the sovereign, might have agreed very well with such a reservation in a Colony of Spain, whose royal councils, and audiencias administered at Madrid as much, or as little liberty and justice to distant colonists as to Spaniards at home. But the Anglo-American Colonies speedily vindicated their national rights as Englishmen, nor did that con- stitutional spirit of independence, or of self-dependence, termi- nate in separation from England — nor the almost invincible attachment which it created finally give way — until the revival of interference under a more obstinate king than James I. tested the greater strength of their confirmed liberty. Mr. Roebuck (in his Colonies of England) shows how th* -' all prospered in exact proportion to their acquisition of civil rights and interests ; nor did any of those Colonies, so various in origin, so constant to freedom, fail, even in the first enter- prise, except Virginia, which at first languished, and nearly expired, when treated as the subject of a London Company — the gift of a king — the plaything of adventurers. The London Company then assumed towards the Colonies very much the position of the Colonial Office a few years ago. The Colonies under it were constantly in trouble, the blame and care of which they always laid at its door, with the same helpless bitterness with which a Frenchman curses the Minister at Paris for all his misfortunes. Chalmers, whose prejudices were in favour of the Home Government, is obliged to confess {Polit. Ann., l&ook I., chap, iii., p. 63,) that " the length of Virginia's infancy, the miseries of " its youth, the disasters of its riper years, might all be at- " tributed to this monstrous government. The Assembly of " Virginia, after it had tasted the sweets of a simple govem- " ment, opposed with firm spirit all attempts to revive the " patents. They then exerted their own talents to discover " remedies. Nothing was wanting to establish their prosperity 10 " but unqualified permission to manage their own affairs. " They displayed a vigour in design and action, which men, " when left to themselves amid dangers, never fail to exert." Released from protection, they fortified themselves against the Indians, and even undertook enterprises against the French •port Iloyal, and the Dutch Settlement of New York. James, wishing to flatter their Assembly on the dissolution of the Company, offered them military aid; but they declined it, unless placed under the control of their Governor, and paid by the votes of the^'r own Assembly. Unlike our recent Colonists they undertook the survey of their own country, aiid so well, that their original plans have only been expanded as the Colony has grown. With their own legislature and administration, free as their fellow-countrjonen at home, they became so loyal to the British Crown, that in that part of the empire alone Royalty suffered no ecHpse, but reflected thence its outskirt rays, until, the home rebellion having cleared away, it shone forth on all again. The Navigation Act at the Restoration was a trial of their loyalty. They murmured that it was a violation of their rights, inflicted by a Parliament in which they were not > presented. They rebelled ; and for the first time, regular troops from England were quartered on them, at their expense, to suppress, not to protect their rights. The first permanent settlement of New England was ef- fected by Independents flying from the ecclesiastical tyranny of James I., who nevertheless connived at their establishing themselves in America as a body politic, with a free constitution. Charles I., eager to rid himself of Puritans, gave a charter to a second body of emigrants {Charters of American Colonies) y who founded Massachusetts, having a legislature to themselves as freemen, " entitled to all the rights of home-born subjects of Englani." Instantly on this assurance of autonomy, num- bers flocked there, and founded Boston ; and evinced still greater vigour by throwing out offset colonies, such as Connec- ticut, each providing in every respect for its own requirements. Ilia- 11 This first colonial grandson of England, within a year of its birth, defeated, by its o^tq unaided power, the Pequod and Naraganset tribes combined against it under the famous Chief Sassacus, — burnt their fortifications — in short, did every- thing that New Zcahind, after forty years' settlement, has lately proved itself incompetent to do against Maori tribes with the aid of British troops. It was amid struggles such as these, that Massachusetts found time and means to found Harvard College — such is the living spring of home resources, compared vdth the languor of a distant supply. These were real colonies — not dependencies — consisting of real Englishmen, only settled in America. Charles I. had been alarmed at the vigour of English liberty ; planted out, as he had intended, for riddance. He tried to stop the emigration, and so kept neur himself, Hamp- den, Pjnm, and Cromwell, who no doubt would have contributed to the same liberty abroad, which they afterwards promoted so much at home. When the Indians, in terror of English progress, formed a general confederacy against the Colonists, a corresponding union of colonial self-defence was formed against them. In every war after 1643, each Colony furnished its stipulated quota of men, money, and provisions, at a rate proportioned to its population. After the Restoration, Charles II. attempted to control this colonial union ; but they met his attempt by a " Declaration of Rights," (Grahame, Book II., chap, iii., p. 309,) in which they asserted that the provincial governments were " entitled " by every means, even by force of arms, to defend themselves " both by land and sea, against all who should attempt injury "to the provinces or their inhabitants," an assertion which has since changed into that of a right to be protected by England. In the treaty of Breda, Charles II. restored CromweD's conquest of Acadio to the French, whom the Indians there- fore concluded to be in the ascendant. The Indians instantly 'H 1 id i I! I h;i' li > 12 renewed their combination against the New England States. A fierce native war lasted a whole year. At length, the steady efforts and invincible courage of the Colonists prevailed. No praise, however, did they get from Charles for this repulse of hostilities, wholly occasioned by imperial policy; but only reproach for their "seditious obstinacy in refusing to solicit " assistance from their king, and for sordid parsimony in the " equipment of their own levies ; " (Grahame, Book II., chap, iv., p. 344, and Evelyn's Diary;) by which, he said, they had protracted the war, and proved themselves unfit to be trusted with the government of the country. Charles was proceeding to revoke the charters of New England when he died, 1685. Halifax had, indeed, remonstrated ; urging that, as English Colonists, the New Englanders were entitled to the same laws and institutions as were established in England : and upon James II. putting them under the government of a Commission, the Crown lawyers, and in particular Sir William Jones, gave an official opinion that, notwithstanding the forfeiture of their Charter, the inhabitants continued English subjects invested with English liberties, and, consequently, that the king could no more levy money on them without their consent in an Assembly, than they could discharge themselves from their allegiance. The Royal institutions were, however, says Grahame, (I., 367,) good in themselves : and amongst them we find the direction " to " discipline and arm themselves for the defence of their own " country." The Stuart king asked his Colonies to undertake the duties, and leave to liim all the rights of their government. We now give Colonies all the rights, and charge ourselves with the duties of their government. Our Revolution brought us into war with the French, who immediately set the Indians again in combination against our Colonies. Massachusetts instantly armed, reconquered Acadie for the British Crown, 1689, and proceeded to apply to William III. for aid to invade Canada ; which he refused to do, on the ground of having work enough for his troops in Europe. The New Englanders advanced to the attempt alone, and this enter- 18 prise waa undertaken by them heroically, though unsuccessfully, only sixty years after their first settlement in America. William III. sought to retain the advantage taken by James against the Charters ; but the people of Massachusetts repeated the declaration of their right to representative government, always acknowledging the supremacy of the King. In his name they built and garrisoned forts along their frontier. When in 1635 they lost Acadie again, and their own Fort Pemmaquid was stormed and taken by a joint French and Indian attack, by land and sea, under Count Frontignac, their defence was a gallant one, and only the Peace of Ryswick stopped their renewed advance. But I have heard some men allow that all this is true enough of the New England Colonies, but that no such spirit was shown by their Southern contemporaries; so completely has one of the proudest pages of our national history been for- gotten. Let us then look into the annals of a Southern terri- tory, which was given by a Stuart King to a Roman Catholic Peer, as Proprietor, with the intention of its being an asylum for Papists, and for martyrs to Royal supremacy. Surely if freedom and self-dependence found no impediment to their establishment in such a settlement as Maryland, there can be no excuse for their absence anywhere. Yet, here, Charles I. only granted to Lord Baltimore power to make laws with the assent of the freemen, or their representatives in Assembly ; all the settlers were recognized as freemen, entitled to the same liberties as native-bom Englishmen ; and to the Proprietor, as Prince Palatine, was delegated the Royal authority to command them to act under his local orders in their own defence, " to repel invasion, and to suppress rebellions." (Bozman's Hist, of Maryland.) Not many years after its foundation we read of Maryland imposing a tax on its own exports to maintain a magazine of arms. Among the troubled days of civil and religious warfare, these early Colonies were perpetually involved in both the internal and external struggles of the parent state ; yet not 14 less in those than in their own local disturbances they bore the part which fell to them without fear or question. The convul- sions of England spread their agitations to the extremities of the empire ; and foreign enemies, so stirred up, often made a colony their first battle-field. Yet this was not considered any reason for their means of defence, in men or money, being sent to them from England. England broke up the Peace of Ryswick, 1702, to prevent France from seizing the Spanish succession. French hostility instantly operated in America, stirring up the Indians to re- newed conspiracies. The Colonies combined for their defence against this English war, without any help from England. They asked, indeed, for co-operation in a second invasion of Canada. Again assistance was promised, but failed to arrive, being detained by disasters in Spain ; and the colonial militia alone attacked Port Royal, garrisoned by French regulars ; but their power was unequal to their high spirit, and they were again unsuccessful. Upon this disaster. Queen Anne assured them of reinforcements, and fixed the contribution of each Colony for a renewed enterprise. The Colonies sent addresses of thanks, and largely exceeded their stipulated quota of men. The combined army assembled; but again the English withdrew to meet European pressure at home ; again the Colonists advanced alone, and finally themselves added Port Royal and Acadie to the dominions of the British Crown. At the same time, a combined force of Indians attacked North Carolina, whose first warning was a night massacre of 137 inhabitants. The settlers rallied, and kept the Indians in check till succours came of men and money from South Carolina, with which intercolonial assistance, they repelled the invasion. The Indians then attacked South Carolina, which, in its exhi< ition, asked aid from England. The request was dis- regi "d, and the militia proved sufficient alone. Tho militia of New England in 1730 numbered 50,000 men, regularly drilled and organized. It is remarkable that even the body of insolvent debtors '1 I 15 who were sent out from English prisons in 1732 to found Georgia, — the last of this group of Colonics, — were previously to their going out regularly trained as soldiers, and, on their arrival, formed into an organized militia. They were not only expected ordinarily to defend themselves, but were expressly meant to act as a barrier between the other Colonies and the Spanish in Florida ; and the English Parliament voted for this, their own undertaking, only a few thousand pounds in part payment for some of the first forts to be erected. On this settlement being made, France lost no time in joining her forces with those of Spain to invade both Georgia and Carolina ; and the militia of those two provinces, aided by some friendly Indians, repulsed them. Some Moravians, who came with the first settlers to Georgia, had stipulated vntla. the English Government on religious grounds for exemption from military service ; but so indignant were the rest of the community at any such ex- emption existing when war came on, that the Moravians were compelled to leave the Colony. Even Quaker Pennsylvania came at last to a formal vote that defensive war was lawful, and formed themselves into an organized militia. Georgia greatly contributed to the resolution of the English Parliament for the war with Spain, which was fatal to Walpole's Ministry. One English regiment was then sent out to them, and placed under Georgian command ; and with the hearty co- operation, in men and money, of Virginia and Carolina, an united invasion of Florida was made. When the Austrian succession war drew France as well as Spain into hostilities with England, 1744, the English Colonists successfully defended Annapolis against the first at- tack; and, in return, carrying the war into the enemy's country, they took Louisburg, which was called the Gibraltar of America, and subjected Cape Breton altogether to the British Crown. For this great expedition the Colonists furnished the naval as well as military equipment — arming twelve of their own I ! 16 ; i w ■1.1 Ml I*, , II If ' war sloops, and hiring two privateers. Their land force was commanded by Pepperel, a Colonel of the Massachusetts mili- tia, and consisted of men of all classes, including many free- holders, thriving farmers, and substantial tradesmen — a sort of colonist now thought too valuable to defend themselves, though unable to pay for their own defence. Their task was the reduction of a regular fortress, garri- soned by disciplined troops of France, and their only assist- ance was the accidental co-oporation, late in the action, of Commodore Warren's squadron. England was then much occupied at home by the Scotch Rebellion, and European war ; but on Louis XV. threatening great revenge for the loss of Louisburg, she promised her Colonies some assistance for the defence of the new posses- sions which they had gained for her: and remitted some money towards the costs they had already incurred. She, however, required a large colonial force to be got ready. It was fortunate she did, for her promised assistance never came ; but the habitual self-reliance of New England was equal to the emergency. 6,400 militia from Massachusetts, and 6,000 from Connecticut, joined the troops already mus- tered, and new forts and batteries were erected along the coast. D'Anville, disheartened, forbore to attack. All this while Nova Scotia, the basis of English operations, had been, from its French origin and sympathy, hourly ex- pected to revolt. The Colonists, also, had a great disadvantage from confusion of counsels. The Provincial Governors, each controlled by independent Assemblies, often had to confer military command on popular adherents. Their enemy had a regular army, and their country was under the undivided sway of military government. In this imperial war about their frontiers, the Colonists in- curred a heavy loss of men and money, yet the only question raised about it, related to the apportionment of their several contributions ; and they refused not to pay their quota to the expenses of Anson's fleet. They resisted, indeed, an attempt dl*Jli ir to impress thoir men for the British navy ; but, in doing so, they did no more than England herself, soon after, did at home ; the press-gang being a relic of feudal service which the circumstances of colonies, and the modern notions at homo alike repudiated. We can scarcely imagine, in these days, the indigna- tion of New England at the news of its recent conquests, Louisburg and Cape Breton, being restored to France, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in exchange for some equiva- lent given up by France to Austria ! This it was that occasioned the first colonial demand for reimbursement ; and the Statute of 21 Geo. II., c. 33, granted, on a gradu- ated scale, repayments to each of the Colonies of part of their expenses in the late war. Such a payment was the converse of the remittances now sometimes made by colonies of a trifling contribution, or extra allowance, to the habitual expenses of England in defending them. It should also be observed that the same statute provided for a like indemni- fication to Sardinia, and other foreign allies. But it was the novelty of taxing the English at home, in aid of the English abroad, that suggested afterwards ihe idea of taxing colonists, in the English Parliament, for home service ; a constitutional vio- lence, which finally severed colonial allegiance, and which would also have struck at the root of English liberty at home, by providing the Government with extraneous supplies. On this same occasion another novelty in colonization was introduced, by settling troops, disbanded at the Peace, amongst the disafiected French inhabitants of Nova Scotia : and for this purpose Parliament voted £40,000 a year for ten years. The scheme wholly failed, the settlement lingering only for a time, subsisting, much as Western Australia now does, on the expenditure of the military and naval forces maintained by the parent state, and not by its own resources. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was soon ended by the re- newed jealousies of France and England in America. Were the Colonists alone to sustain the ensuing war ? England had c P"| 7IP»"^!' 18 'I ! fc.'S M :i fi . II i 1 : '•ii ?t mugivings about their growing vigour, but she decided that they should undertake the opposition to the French in the first instance, reserving the question of partial reimbursement of their expenses. For so great an undertaking, the Colonists formed their first federation, and placed Washington at the head of their federal army. In his first operations, at the head of his Virginian militia alone, ho was unsuccessful, and the British Government dispatched General Braddock to sup- port him, and to raise levies on the spot ; Parliament extend- ing then, for the first time, the Mutiny Act to North America, 1758 (Grahame, III., 380). It was the Seven Years' War, however, which first impli- cated English and Colonial forces avowedly in joint warfare. The Colonists gladly accepted the co-operation, but showed unwillingness to bo taken out of their own provinces to fight, or to bo engaged in wars, in voting supplies for which they had had no voice. Franklin's writings vouch for these having been their sentiments, though so unlike the calculations of colonists now- a-days of economy through English protection. They furnished whatever forces were required of them ; and though they disputed the assertion that the Billeting Act extended to them, they removed all difficulty by passing an Act putting themselves under the same obligation, and ren- dering themselves liable to be recruited into the English regiments sent out to them. The authority, generally, of British statutes expressly applying to them, was rather sub- mitted to than acknowledged by them, and was never allowed to extend to taxation. Lord Chatham threw the whole vigour of his mind into this war, and put under General Abercrombie's command the largest army America had ever seen, of which 22,000 were EngUsh troops, and 28,000 Colonial. It is well known that the first Pitt and Franklin had each his own different doubts as to the wisdom of American con- 19 quest. It was, however, undertaken, and ultimately accom- plished by Wolfe, 1759. Now began the question, whether the Colonies were to sus- tain equally with P^ngland the enormous levies of men, and the profuse expenditure of money involved in such foreign enterprise. The Colonists were getting deeper in debt, and the English promises of reimbursement wore slow and measured in per- forma^^ce. This is the turning point of our colonial history. Quebec received a garrison of 5,000 English troops. Canada would certainly have been lost again, but for large reinforcements from England. The war grew to a scale on which the two Principals were necessarily more engaged than their respective Colonies ; and the conquest was completed by England over France. At the completion of the war, many English officers and disbanded soldiers were settled in the Colonies. England had become the sole power in America. Canada, which, at the Peace of Paris, 1762, she resolved, to the im- mense satisfaction of the Colonists, to retain, was placed under a government, the offices of which were chiefly conferred on the British military, or traders, to the great discontent of the French inhabitants. Pitt called upon the Colonists to fortify Canada, which they did, and they garrisoned the forts. Unfortimately England also projected the permanent maintenance of a regular army in America, to be supported at the expense of the Colonists; and, for defraying the cost of their protection, the imposition of a tax on them by the enactment of the British Par- liament. Mr. Grenville proposed a stamp-duty, but invited them to name any other they might prefer. Massachusetts answered, "It were better for them to endure injustice in " silence, than to purchase its instigation by recognizing its " principle. The English Parliament had no right to tax the c 2 % '!'• I i '■ n I" r!! .'I i ! ).! i hi ,i ! ! f^t' i; 30 " Colonics. The King might inform them of the cxigenoiea of " the public service, und they were ready to provide for them, " if required, in a constituticjnal manner. If they were taxed " in a Parliament in which they were not represented, they " were slaves to the Britons from whom they were descended." (Grahame, IV., 178-9.) Franklin conceived a plan for their representation in the House of Commons. It was, no doubt, impracticable, yet had England only respected their rights of common citizenship, though the Americans might have grown out of all possible retention under a common allegiance, they would always have retained for us, from common origin, common interests, and commerce, a strong attachment as allies. Instead of this, our high-spirited first Colonies exhibit now, as foreign nations, a stronger friendship for uncongenial France, which helped them in their struggle, than for kindred England, from whom they preferred to separate rather than lose the constitutional independence which they derived from her. 4. — Contrast between present and former Colonial Relations. Before I show how the spirit and condition of our Colonies, and the nature of their relations with this country, gradually deteriorated after the American disruption, I proceed at once to put in contrast with our first ideas of colonization, those which we have now arrived at. I will afterwards trace the process of deterioration. Our Colonies at this time do not exhibit the lowest stage of the descending process, for they passed at one period entirely out of the relation of common citizenship with Englishmen into the inferior relation of dependence and subserviency. They had not even the self-action of an English munici- pality. (See Mr. Gladstone's magnificent Speech on the New Zealand 0-ovemment Bill, Hansard, cxxi., 1862, p. 957.) They ,.L 21 halt now in a grotesque stage of half rccovory. They hare recovered so much of the rights which used to he recognized as insepanible from all English communities, as to \\a\c re- presentative govoniment. New Zealand had so much of the British constitution granted to it in 1852. I count none of the caricatures of British Constitutions which amused the leisure of Colonial Ministers hefore. Little had the Now Zealand Provinces, before that date, thriven as the old American Settlements throve with all their early struggles, excepting Canterbury, which founded itself in somewhat similar spirit to theirs. Auckland, for in- stance, languished, fed only on English supplies : and its population of 20,000 now little exceeds that of the recent settlement of Canterbury, 15,000; and one-fifth of all its population, 4,000, consists of troops sent from England, and paid by Englishmen. Lord Grey, in his Qblonial Policy of Lord John RusselVs Admdnistration, condoles with his noble colleague on the interruption of peace in this Colony during his administration. The phrase is remarkable ; showing the present theory to be, that the administration of this country includes the administration of the Colonies, though they have their own legislatures, and a viceroy, and ministry, on the spot, leaving properly but a scanty catalogue of Crown relations to be administered in Downing-street, and the more scanty the catalogue the better. He gives an account of the native re- bellion there in 1845, and of the mission of Sir George Grey then, as now again, to put rebellion down ; " whose energy," he says, "supported as it was both by troops and naval force '* from England, "brought the insurrection to a close. The firmness and decision of Captain Laye, saved the country." (Colon. Policy, II. 115.) Charmed with this rescue of a help- less Colony from its own disturbance, he dwells on the con- sideration of the formidable character of the Natives, and paucity of the Colonists, as having enhanced the feat. But the I i i i.\ f l\ r i I 1 (if '■'r ' ■ , i 22 population of New Zealand at that time was twice as great as that of some of the Anglo- American Settlements when they were engaged, unaided, with far more formidable Natives, armed, disciplined, and assisted by the French The Governor, Sir George Grey, iu a despatch dated July 9, 1849, {Colon. Policy, II. 117,) commenting on the recent New Zealand re- bellion, deprecates (one would have thought needlessly) any comparison between New Zealand and the early American Colonies. He refers to the authority of experienced officers to prove the superiority of Maori tribes to the North American Indians; and oven to our own troops, in point of equipment for warfare in that sort of country. He extols the rapidity and socrecy of movement of the Maori natives ; their coilrage, and their cunning in presenilug no point for attack while always attacking ; and their daring following of any leader. I wonder if he ever read of the Six Nations; of Cherokees sustain- ing long and doubtful campai^^s ; of Delawaros invading three British provinces at once by combined movements, capturing several forts garrisoned by English, and with great difficulty and loss diverted from the siege of Pittsburg ; of Braddock's army perishii\g by an unseen attack ; of the great leader Sassacus in earlier times, against whom the new formed colony of Connecticut warred in siege and field ; or of the terrible Pontiac in later times, whose terror roused the Pennsylvanian Quakers to arms, put to the proof the Virginian militia, and called into existence the celebrated border-riflemen. The secrecy with which these Indians planned their wars, and the vigilance and art with which they conducted them, are chronicled in the names of many distinguished victims. The real ditterence between those times and these is not, as Sir G. Grey supposed, in the greater danger, or less means to meet danger, of our present Colonies, but in the mode in which danger was met, and the means of self-defence made use of. When, early in the progress of the North American Colonies, the imited Indians threatened their existence, England 28 simply called on the Colonists to unite against their common danger. (Chalmers' PoUt. Ann., Book I.) On the conclusion of the Maori wf\r of 1845, the Governor, Sir G. Grey, asked for a still Larger British force, iis a peace establishment ; and Lord Grey says (p. 140), "It was with much diificvdty wo " spared the 2,500 men asked for." The American Colonies only on one occasion had any British troops to assist them against Indians, and thet was at the commencement, not at the close of a wai* with them. They, moreover, paid for and supplied the troops which were sent them, and got rid of them as scon as they could. Lord Grey gives his opinion (p. 141) that a standing force kept in a colony should, instead of being constantly under arms, and in receipt of pay, be established as settlers in the colony. Opposite extremes of colonial policy here meet. Lord Grey proposes that soldiers should be settled in colonics; the old Colonists settled themselves as soldiers. Lord Grey defends his proposition (p. 146), as combining the two objects of military defence and increased population, and he would have this country undertake such a combination of protection and emigration all over the world; even in tropical climates he would have the higher spots so occupied wherever an Enghsh soldier could breathe. In the present New Zealand war, however, we have heard nothing of his military pen- sioners settled there. In the early colonial native wars no other defenders were heard of but the settlers themselves. A farther contrast with former policy presents itself in Lord Grey's account of the civil expenditure of New Zealand. The Governor infers (p. 148-9), from the fact of there being a native population besides the Europeans in the Colony, " that it was, therefore, absolutely necessary that a con- " siderable annual expenditure, in excess of the colonial " revenue, should be sanctioned, by the British Parliament, " to provide for roads, public buildings, and other establish- " ments requisite for the assertion of British supremacy." — .1 ' j . 1 l'' 1; I I' 24 {Despatch of Sir G. Grey, in Papers presented January, 1847, p. 15.) Lord Grey says that he and his colleagues fully con- curred in these views, and that the Duke of Wellington was consulted, who, naturally as a soldier, advised the construction of roads. As they were to he lines of communication hetween English troops and English magistrates, they were of course to ho constructed with English money. What, according to such notions, is left for colonists to do ? Our first Colonies, while still imder the conduct of the London Company, are described as having been without interest or occupation, from the want of women, property, and politics; but such ennui would be a blessing compared with the possession of every- thing to interest, and the freest organs of the public' will about them, but the task of maintenance left in other hands. It took but nine years, 1600 — 1609, for Virginia to emancipate herself from the London Company, and assert her English righis of self-control. Lord Grey, in 1846, was still debating whether New Zealand was ripe for an EngHsh Constitution, and when the concession was at length granted, Sir George Grey took upon himself to suspend its announce- ment, alleging fears of the susceptibilities which he had himself nurtured among the Natives. We stiU retain, though to the credit of Sir John Pakington the Constitution was given in 1852, the Native administration in our supposed care, annually exhibiting our ignorance of all concerning it in Parliament, and voting large sums from our taxes to pay for the disastrous conseq[uences of that ignorance. I have a recent letter from Mr. Fitzgerald, late Super- intendent of Canterbury and Prime Minister at Auckland, in which he designates this present war as a complication of folly and wickedness. He calls our Native administration a simple confusion. The Native movements, which we should have fostered, we have repelled ; and their crimes, which any govern- ment should have punished, we have wholly disregarded. We have eflfected nothing in their interest, and whenever our own in- 2S V tercsts arc the question, we have overridden all dispute by force. Above all change of policy, he insists first on the necessity of doing away the abomination of our management of Native affairs. He asks, " Can you believe for a moment that if the Assembly ' had had uncontrolled power in Native affairs, and had to pay ' the whole of the expenses, this wicked war would ever have * happened ? If you do really direct the Native policy, why ' don't you compel the Governor to write home for instructions * before taking the step which induces war ? But you let * him do that which is actually a commencement of war at his ' own discretion. He gets the British flag insulted, and then ' you are compelled to avenge the insult. The whole Cohmy * is of course for war. It is a cheap way of being gallant * wlisn others, overburdened as they are with taxes at home, ha , c io pay for it. I should be cuiious to see the faces of the * House of Representatives if a new Governor announced to * them that they might do as they liked about Native affairs, * but that no further funds would be forthcoming from home. * Indeed, to take liigher grounds, I mourn over the youth of * this nation, which can by no means lead to greatness. "War * — that ordeal of Providence for cvdling out the weeds among ' nations — is close to our doors, but with it none of its disci- * pline or its benefits. Somebody else is fighting, not we. It is ' our cause, but we fight by proxy, and pay by deputy. If we * ever beco "J great we shall have been rocked and dandled * into po^c ' Sir Robei; eel described New Zealand as an island in form, latitude, and climate, so resembling England, as to bear promise, with our race and institutions, of a repetition of our happy destiny in another hemisphere. Si qua retinacula rumpaSj tu Marcellm eris. Could you but cast off the fatal gift of England's patronage, you would be as herself. But Englan -as not herself nursed and dandled into her present vigour, -'le has won it for herself, through many stmggles, fighting her own way, not clinging to the support of others. !i PI' I'l; 26 I find another striking contrast with our first colonial system in our present treatment of Canada. Canada was won by conquesi, and became the origin of our baser kind of Colonial government, but she has since had the same concessions of self-government, as other Colo- nies ; and she now has complete popular representation, both in her metropolitan and municipal institutions. She may, therefore, fairly be compared with our earlier free Colonies. None of the Anglo-American Colonies exceeded her in free- dom, or reached her present growth in wealth or popula- tion. Yet she is never without troops sent and paid by England. Mr. Elliott states {M 'I J 21—132) that the whole pay of the regular forces always . ^mada, including that of the Canadian Eifles, comes from i^e Imperial Treasury ; and the entire cost of barracks and stores, and the whole expense of transport to and fro. It was once proposed to call upon the Province at least to keep in repair a selected number of barracks ; but for various reasons the selection has never yet been made. When Sir Fenwick "Williams com- manded our forces in North America he discovered more military positions, where forts might be made. We imme- diately offered to make them, if the Colonists would only bear a portion of the expense. But they answered they were much obliged for the suggestion, but that they were not disposed to build new forts, and had not money to spare for troops. Canada has, indeed, a militia, or at least a militia-roll; about a third in numbers, proportionately to population, of what a New England Colony would have had in constant training ; but Mr. Elliott tells us {Evid. 109) that this militia- roll is so nominal an affair, that it would be a delusion to place dependence on any return based upon it. Late illustra- tions of the results of this colonial exemption from service, set off in strong contiast present with former times. When in old times Canada was the focus of French aggression, the adjoining L 27 English Colonists armed themselves — repelled, retorted every threat. When civil war lately broke out in the United States, there was no threat to English Canada ; but she was imme- diately supposed in danger, and helpless to meet the danger supposed. Three thousand English troops in addition, and perhaps in necessary sequence, to the promissory garrison al- ready there, were instantly despatched to Canada, and placed in quarters at our expense. Some say our troops are as well there, as in home quarters; there is but the transport to consider. Is the cost of transport, however, all the difference between making every part of the Empire maintain troops, or making one part supply all? I doubt if it can be the same thing to us whether every part bear its share of service, and the aggregate strength be ready to collect at any point; or all British territory beyond the four seas be treated as outposts to be held by English garrisons against all comers, — a perplexity to us in war, a mere extravagance in peace. No such view as the latter alternative was taken by England when she bred great nations in her offspring colonies. The Army and Navy Gf-azette thiew out the conjecture that Lord Palmerston was not sending troops to Canada as a demonstration ; nor with the view of scattering them in single files along the Canadian frontier ; but because " he " was aware to what a height politics ran among that mixed " population ; and, with a rabid war, with which much sym- " pathy was felt on one side or the other, close at hand, he " was anxious to strengthen the local authorities against " possible combinations." Sending detachments of English forces to maintain the influence of the Crown among a distant English community having three million inhabitants, as free and self-governed as those at home, is a scheme as chimerical as unconstitutional, and likely to be productive only of discord and jealousy, or of the corruption which alone can smother those passions under sordid calculations of pecuniary gain. The Queen might have said to her North American li i 28 M » I u i I I I: subjects, had thoy boon like her Grandfather's, Your neigh- bourhood is disturbed ; you must therefore be prepared against any possible contingency. Call out your militia. If you want a more disciplined force on the emergency I will send as many troops as your Assembly may agree to pay for, and I can spare from England, to be put on your service. Should war occur I will furnish an auxiliary force. But no delay must take place in your own enlistments, and training for your own establishment ; because home or other service may at any moment require the recall of my English troops. Such would have been the terms advised by Chatham. Another contrast with our old colonial practice — and per- haps the most startling of all — is afforded by the entii'e occu- pation, in peace and war, of the South African Settlements by English troops, suppUed and paid by drafts interminable, and often unaccounted for, on the Home Treasury. Cape Town, Graham's Town, and Natal Representatives sport with the policy which leads us through recurrent costly wars on their account. Dutch farmers spread their herds along a frontier rich in pasture, and only exposed to plunder which we ward off, or else restore ; which to them, therefore, so far from being depreciatory of their propeiiy, is only a fresh source of profit. The market of an EngUsh commissariat is so brought to their doors. Army contractors purchase the very cattle which have been just recaptured, to feed the soldiers who serve as their gratuitous herdsmen. The Select Committee were informed (Uvid. 481), that £400,000 a year is so made over to the farmers of South Africa by the farmers and other tax-payers of this country. The liberal farmers of England are represented in Parliament as being enthusiastic for the continuance of this employment of our men and money in the farm service of the wealthy Cape proprietors. We are so pressing with our services, that the settlers have only one small police force to raise on their own account. "We furnish and pay all the rest entirely ; and we do :Uu 29 so not only on the ground of the inability of our Colonists to help themselves, but also because we suppose them to be as sanguin- ary as they are helpless : and if once let loose to defend their own farms, in their own way, it is supposed from past experience, they would outrage the feelings of humanity which belong to Englishmen at home. England now undertakes to nurse not only the strength, but the morality of her Colonies ; and, in this case, the latter undertaking has ended in substituting, for the lex talionis, a chronic and bloody warfare between our regular army and the Kafirs trained by them to fight nearly as well as themselves : the perpetuity of which warfare is secured by the separation of the corrective agency from the source of strife, the conjunction of which made short work of the former prac- tice of self-defence. The whole evidence given before Mr. Mills's Committee is replete with instances of the novelty of our present colonial policy. We scatter little garrisons in the "West Indian Islands, which do police duty among the black population ; or, being mostly black themselves, furnish police duty for the rest of the garrison. The Planters take no share in the task of defending their own property, and these little garrisons can never by any possibility be of the slightest use against a foreign enemy. So much of them as consists of English troops is sent from where they are in health and readiness for any emergency, only to be decimated in West Indian police service by yellow fever. This is an innovation as well as a vicious practice. The Island of Jamaica, even when it was Cromwell's recent conquest, was allowed an elected Coimcil, by which to act for itself independently. The Planters asked for representation at home, if they could not have self-government fully on the spot — saying (see Memorial from Jamaica, 1651, State Paper Office), " if laws be imposed on us without our consent, we be no better than slaves." In 1670, their total white population was 16,198 : and their 80 I )) militia-roll then showed a strength of 2,720. Soon after the introduction of slaves, formidable insurrections occurred, but were always suppressed by the vigilance of the militia. That our West Indian Colonists are no less able to help themselves now is clear from the evidence of Sir C. Elliott before Mr. Mills's Committee; by which it appears that Antigua, and every island from which our troops have been withdrawn, have raised a militia for themselves ; and that they look to the British fleet for external safety, and to the name of Englishman, which suggests reflection to every foreign invader. What Minister would have dreamt in the last century of sending Royal Engineers under the pretence of making the surveys and roads of a new colony, as we have just done in the case of British Columbia ? Under some excuse or other a little garrison is now deposited, as a Palladium, in all English Colonies. Their native energies are taken xmder the guardian- ship of the higher power, whose ensign is hoisted, not by themselves as their own, but by the tutelary sovereignty, in chivalrous assumption of their protection, and in menace against the whole world. Our better Statesmen knew that the true defence of a small English Colony lay rather in the know- ledge of other nations that in attacking it they attacked a part of England, and came in conflict not with a mere garrison, but with a portion of the British nation, alike circumstanced, and in common cause with the rest. I take my leave of this part of my subject, by giving the following statistical index of the total inversion which has taken place in our colonial military relations. In the last century Wolfe conquered Canada with an army chiefly con- sisting of colonial militia. England now, in time of peace, keeps twice as many troops in all her Colonies, exclusive of military posts, as the colonists enrol among themselves. ' I proceed to the consideration of the still greater anomaly , and novelty, of our contributions to the civil and ecclesiastical 81 expenses of our colonial fellow-subjects, of which I have only incidentally given one instance as yet. In the beginning of the eighteenth century the annual im- ports into all the New England provinces from England were estimated, by Neal, at £100,000. The exports by the Eng- lish merchants consisted of dried cod-fish sold in Europe for £80,000, and of 3,000 tons of naval stores. In the Colonial Blxie Book just presented, I find the im- ports of Canada stated at 24,766,981 dols. ; the exports at 33,555,161 dols. ; the duty collected 4,437,846 dols. ; land sales produced 459,803 dols., of which one-half came from sales of clergy-lands : and the population amounts to about three millions ; while, in Mr. Lowe's words {Evid. 3,335), " by " the guarantee of this country in time of war, they are enabled " to apply their revenues entirely to their own local purposes." "With this comparative statement before me of the small beginnings on which New England maintained herself, in ordinary circumstances, independently ; and the wealth of which Canada now asks us to guarantee her safe possession, under the pledge of a constant garrison ; I proceed to look into No. 5 of our last Civil Service Estimates ; and I find that, not content with relieving the strength of such a Colony of the task of defending its wealth, we further contribute to its wealth, by paying Canadian Bishops, Rectors, and Archdeacons, al- though the Crown has given up the sales of clergy-lands, which were expressly reserved for that purpose. "We give a small* salary to the President of a College ; and pensions, and blankets for aged Indians, and other charitable donations. Writing of New England, Grahame says (Book II. chap, i.) " To a community of men thus assembled the formation of " their Church appeared the most interesting of all their con- " cems, and it occupied, accordingly, their earliest and earnest " deliberations." I have related how, in the midst of their first struggles for existence, they founded their own Colleges : 82 and as to missiouaiy labours among the Indians, so far from having English taxes voted to tbera for the purpose, their early history is filled with such names as Elliott, and Mayhew, and hundreds of American Missionaries whose work was amply supported by liberal colonial subscriptions and endowments ; and, kindling missionary sympathies at home, gave birth to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which is now apart from its purpose, in partnership with our Treasury, subsidizing *ho colonial church. Australia is just beginning to legislate for the endo^vment of its own Churches. The fourth item in our last colonial estimates is £17,800 for British Columb'i, the detail of which would be wholly un- intelligible to countrymen of our old colonies. What would the members of Congress say to a demand from a newly formed State for £1,800 a year from the central Treasury for its governor's salary — £1,200 more for surveying its lands — £11,000 more for the pay of a standing federal force to act as its police, and that of the costliest kind, as any equivalent to the Royal Engineers sent out to Columbia would be — ^£1,800 more for an Assay Office — and, as a last freak of impudence, £2,000 more for unexplained contingencies ? What would the English Parliament in the seventeenth century have said to any one of these demands from a new colony ? We vote, in the firth item of our estimates, £25,000 for governors, and £15,000 more for magistrates of the West Indian Islands, whose police expenses occupied a previous estimate. The vagaries of English legislation with regard to those islands have certainly violated all ordinary rules of policy : entitling their inhabitants to make, and exposing us to meet, any sort of anom- alous claim. The bygone spirit of territorial acquisitiveness, and the magnanimity of universal philanthropy have left us an inheritance of liabilities in that part of the world which we might be glad to compound for by the sacrifice of every possible imperial interest we have there, even including the right to cut 33 logwood in Honduras, and the special privilege of protectorship over the mosquitoes. Our colonial connexion with all that part of the world, including the Isthmus, produces literally no other result to this country but frequent embroilment with foreign American powers, and a frightful mortality among all the men we send there. Should that mortality, however, seem Insignificant to any one, let him look at the next item in our estimates, and he will find £15,000 a year more devoted to no other object than the maintenance of those pest holes in the name of Colonies on the deadly western coast of Africa, of which, when in 1785 it was proposed to send convicts there, Burke said ** that the conse- "quences of transportation were not meant to be deprivation of " life : and of Gambia it might truly be said, that there all life " dies, and all death lives." Whether ihese, and the valuable possession of St. Helena, which stands next on our list, are kept at all as Colonies, or in what light they present their strange contrast with our former foreign possessions, it is diffi- cult to say. We occupied Sierra Leone for the purpose of im- porting free blacks, and Gambia for exporting slave blacks under the Assiento Treaty, and we continue to sacrifice Englishmen there in hopes of discouraging Slave Trade. In the possession of St. Helena we have no apparent object. The ninth item of these estimates exhibits another novelty — the cost of abandoning territory ; in spite of which the last accounts from South Africa intimate an intention of fresh annexation, in the modern manner of colonization, in the same quarter. The last item I will notice iu the Colonial Estimates for this year, and not the least remarkable, is the 10th, which devotes £27,000, a reduced vote from £40,000 in previous years, for " improving Kafirs." The imagination of a similar charge upon the English Treasury, for enabling the Governors % 1: lli> fiTy of State, 1768, marks the period of home interference which we have noted as the origin of change in the principle of our colonial re- lations. Now began the government of Colonies in Downing- street. The Secretaryship ceased on the loss of the American Colonies — " Othello's occupation " was " gone.** In 1794, the business of the Colonies was carried on at the Home Office, New South "Wales having then given a police character to our colonial administration. In 1801, it was transferred to the War Department, a change suggested by our military occupation of conquests during the war. In 1816, Mr. Tiemey moved for the restoration of the old colonial office ; but the Colonies had not, by that time, recovered even the first step back towards former relations ; Lord Castlereagh replied, that "the policy of this country ** was founded on the conviction that it would not be wise to " permit the erection of a local authority, in the shape of a " Parliament in the Colonies of which Great Britain had ob- " tained possession. Consequently the superintending control " of the Colonial Secretary of State had been augmented.'* Now that every colony, properly so called, has that " local authority," one hardly knows what there is for the re- established colonial office to do, beyond the management of 42 a few Crown Colonies. Its chief work of late haa been to present annually to Parliament a Blue Book of colonial sta- tistics — the population, number of sheep, newly erected tele- graphs, &c., of each colony — and to watch the operation of the Passengers Act, for which it has also a separate office. The War Office practically transacts all the remaining colonial government business of this country. In such manner, we have arrived at colonial relations midway between those of former times, and the reverse into which they had fallen ; i. e. between the freest self-government and dependence. Our colonial result is a protected autonomy. I M 6.— Reasons considered for making a complete Return to former colonial relations, and arguments against doing so refuted. Lord Grey, in the introduction to his Colonial Policy^ p. 10, well says, that " the abandonment of the old com- " mercial system of this country towards the Colonies has not " diminished the inetrest of the Colonies in their connexion " with England, nor of England in the retention of the " Colonies. The possession of a number of steady allies in " various quarters of the globe adds strength to a nation, both " physically and morally, and the advantage to the Colonies is "far greater." - . :. ; . In this sentiment I fully agree with Lord Grey ; but when he further proceeds to explain what he means by this desirable connexion, I find that, in his view (p. 17), the " steady allies " are " to be assisted to govern themselves." He fears that some haye had representative institutions allowed to them prematurely ; but he would, nevertheless, make them undertake their own defence. This, be says, would be but to return to what was formerly the practice of this country, which he calls (p. 44) a sounder system, I cannot see why Canada and Australia i^Qold mot be pow V 4S i as ripe as Virginia and Massachusetts were a few years after their settlement for representative institutions. At all events they have them. To me, therefore, the conclusion comes, a fortiori, that colonial self-defence is the sounder system. It is the natural state of things that they who freely govern themselves should maintain their own government. It is specially the natural spirit of Englishmen to rely on them- selves, and not to lean on others. It is the nature of our race to propagate itself by seedlings, not by suckers. It is even in the nature of things an impracticable system of government to let distant communities devise their own policy, follow their own interests, make their own neighbour wars, and ft-om the centre of empire to undertake to maintain for them their various policy, protect their interests, and fight their wars. "We have not even the acquaintance with their affairs to keep our Executive concurrent with them. How laughable, the other day, was the exhibition of ignorance upon the strength of which Parliament resolved to furnish men and miouey for the New Zealand Native war, the local authors of which were almost immediately afterwards discredited ! Besides, the utmost amount of protection which in the way of garrisons we could possibly afford to all the Colonies, must be wbolly ineffectual for their security. If England ever lost the command of the seas in a war, no one would expect those garrisons to supply the means of local defence with which a spirited and devoted people accustomed to the use of arms could supply themselves. Those very garrisons have displaced and superseded the first and best defence. In Mr. Lowe's words {JBvid. 3,405), " every English soldier in a colony prevents a hundred colonists from taking up arms and driUing." If we would make our colonial protection in any degree re- place the strength it has displaced, we must first, according to Sir J. Burgoyne's Evidence (App. No. 7), spend £1,000,000 in completing colonial fortifications. To garrison those fortifica- 44 I ^i it 1! If' I ■ ■ I) Pi ■I'- ! ' I ! i fl tions would occupy an increasingly large proportion of our army in the most precarious kind of service. For our home-defence we must then have much more recourse to mercenaries, and if we are to he ready to take our proper part in such wars as we have been recently involved in, foreign legions with all their hazardous enlistment, and German regiments with their expensive terms of disbanding, must be our substitute for the English troops, which we have scattered over the world. It seems enough to condemn the present system that during the late war we should have sent our troops to Kafraria, hired a German Legion in their place for home-service, and finally disbanded the Legionaries by settling them as colonists in Kafraria ; or that, as the Duke of Newcastle tells us he be- lieves {Evid, 2,962), five supplementary regiments were sent by us to Canada in 1856, in anticipation of differences with the United States about our recruiting among them, — that is, that having first scattered our own troops about the Colonies, we made a fresh enemy in an attempt to hire foreigners to fill their place, and then had to increase the colonial detachments to confront that enemy. The conclu- sion to which the Select Committee came was, "that the " tendency of modem warfare being to strike blows at the " heart of a hostile power, it is therefore desirable to con- ** centrate the troops required for the defence of the United " Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval " supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant " dependencies of the Empire." {Report, s. 19.) In fact, every part of the Empire should raise its own means of defence at home, and at the sound of danger all should be ready to rally round the threatened point, the ocean being our proper medium of national intercommunication, and every enemy being made aware that on his temporary success in any quarter, the vengeance of the whole Empire waits. I recollect the late Prussian Minister, De Bunsen, who was well acquainted with our affairs, remarking that it was 46 fortunate for other nations that England suppressed as she did the development of her strength throughout the world. It may be fortunate for others, but I am not content myself to see England presenting herself among other nations, when any emergency arises, as the weakest instead of the strongest of the world's powers — contributing subsidies of money instead of men to her allies — as a tributary rather than co-ordinate in war. I cannot rejoice like a Prussian, in seeing England employ a portion of her forces in preventing the service of four-fold more, while she reduces herself to be an applicant for mercenaries from other countries to enable her to fulfil her obligations. If, like Athens under Themistocles, we received quotas of men or money from a confederacy, to furnish in return a common defence — or if, like Spain, England reserved a feudal tribute from all the products of dependent colonies in lieu of personal service — or if, like the Dutch, our Government em- barked itself in the colonial commerce, and made a revenue from it which it would be their business to protect — in any such case we might fairly be expected to bear the burthen of our own undertaking. But why should all the autonomous communities which now make up the British Empire — from vigorous Canada to the golden Englands of the south — quarter themselves on the deeply-mortgaged patrimony of the mother-country, to which they bring no other profit than any foreigner brings, with whom she may have commercial dealings ? Can youth or poverty be their plea? or is it the pride of old England on which they impose, which makes her reckless of an extra million of annual expense, to treat her family as she thinks becomes her dignity? Mr. Lowe told the Committee (Uvid. 3,411) that the Victorians are wise enough to see that even paying English soldiers is their cheapest mode of providing themselves with a police. But it is not so easy for the English tax-payer to see why he should reduce the police expenses of Victoria. 46 We have recently heard that the Attorney-General at Mel- bourne made his fortune on his first arrival, as counsel for the Ballarat rioters, being then an English Barrister of one year's standing. Cannot a Government afford to pay for a police in a country where the rioters can pay 1 ,000-guinea-fee8 for their Counsel ? But against all these reasons for colonies contributing their own strength to the common stock, it is urged that we should lose all remaining connexion with the colonies if we withdrew our constant protection from them. Mr. Roebuck asks {Uvid. 3,787), would not a colony, allowed to do what it likes, and to protect itself, bo independent ? The answer is, that the con- nexion with a colony on the same terms of citizenship with ourselves must be stronger, because healthier and more natural, than on terms of dependence. National affinities, and com- mercial interests, and partnership in a great name, are strong ties with us, which would not be weakened, but strengthened, by a Colony taking its full share with the rest of the Empire in the distribution of responsibilities, the habit of fulfilling which especially constitutes the national character. I agree with Mr. Lowe {Uvid. 3,407), that the constant presence of imperial troops in colonies tends to shorten, instead of prolonging, their connexion with the parent state. In time of peace there should be no imperial troops in any colony (3,370). If it has the least disposition to separate, a few troops will not restrain it, but, on the contrary, may very likely commit it in hostilities. The handful of troops which England sends is not the inducement to a colony to adhere to her, but her vast power which is unseen behind them (3,402). Mr. Fortescue, however, representing the Colonial Office on Mr. Mills's Committee, suggests {Hvid. 1,368 — 72) that we should take warning from the example of our first American Colonies, now become foreign powers, and possible enemies. 47 \ / But, if ho must allow that giving every part of the Em- pire free exercise of self-action, i. c, the habit of acting for itself, and looking to itself for the safety of its own a£fairs, is the only way to secure health, and vigour, and civic virtue throughout its length and breadth ; surely even if the ultimate separation of distant governments from the central sovereignty were a possible result from this process of de- velopment of vigour, he would not thence infer an argument for checking that development, and crippling that vigour. He would hardly propose clipping the young eagles' wings because former broods had found escape from torment by flight. I have already given proof enough, that it was not their independent conduct of their own affairs which led to the separation of the American Colonies. When they raised their own forces like the rest of the Empire, and fought like other Englishmen, and other Englishmen fought with them at need, their attachment to England grew so strong that the best judges denied to the last the possibility of our change of treatment ending, as it did, in separation. If Canada now raised an adequate militia for her own requirements, and garrisoned her own forts, and ceased to look for men or pay from England, until the occasion of war might call the forces of the Empire together, would she feel less inclined to remain in her allegiance by an increased sense of equal treatment and common action with her fellow-subjects at home ? Should we feel afraid of her consequently becoming a foreign power, and possibly an enemy ? Is this why we are afraid to trust her with arms, and continue to treat her as a dependency ? Lord Russell, in a recent speech at Newcastle, took pride to himself, in reflection on his past career, that he had not been as other Ministers in less happy countries who " consider " it a part of the duty of government to fetter and bind the " talents and abilities of men." Is he sure that this has not been his " colonial policy " all his life ? Is he content M ,1 • . I' I 'I I n\ ■'"> i ti (. 1 i- ■; "1 j;j 8; 1 48 with such abstinence from meddling only at home, and does distance lend enchantment to what seems to him so oifensivo in a nearer view Y But there are others who, granting that every part of the Empire ought to act alike, and, controlling its own affairs, should vote and furnish its own equipment, urge on us the unfairness of throwing particular charges which properly belong to the whole Empire on any one locality. Let it pass that that is the very unfairness of which I am complaining on the part of England ; let us see how it may be urged on the part of a colony. The Duke of Newcastle says {^vid. 2,961), that Nova Scotia, for instance, should no more be taxed in men or money for the garrison of Halifax than the coimty of Hailipshire for the garrison of Portsmouth. But that is exactly the parallel I wish to establish. Let the two cases be treated alike in demand of men and money, and my principle is conceded. True it is that New England, with a smaller population, wholly defended Boston, a place of great imperial importance — ^but I will not ask the utmost application of such precedents. The taxes and men voted for our military estimates are furnished by Hampshire in common with the rest of the kingdom, but no part of the men or money which maintain the garrison of Halifax are voted and furnished by the Nova- Scotian legislature ; and even though Halifax be an imperial fortress, yet Nova Scotia is part of the Empire. The small- ness of its interest is the worst of all arguments for its being overlooked. (Duke of Newcastle, Mid. 3,021.) So also it is replied against arguments for community of responsibilities, that a West Indian Island, though self-governed, could not wholly protect itself. The answer is, that though no small territory can find sufficient men or money to defend itself in all cases ; yet its being detached and self-governed does not properly relieve it, in its degree, of the duties of citizenship which it would have to bear as an integral part of England ; but its self-government demands that its share of men and *. '■ 49 [ monoy should bo raised on the spot : and that would be always sufficient for internal order ; and its general protection would be the same — whether so detached or not — namely, the com- mon power of the Empire. In fact, its self-government makes it the only judge as well as controller of its own requirements for peace and security, and throws upon it the solo responsi- bility for its own disturbance. It is a good illustration of the arbitrariness of the colonial protective principle that Ceylon, treated apart from India, has her defence undertaken by England ; treated as part of India, she would have her full share of military and other burthens to bear in common with all India; not, as Sir George Grey intimates (Question 2,564, Uvid.), separately by herself, but as subjects of a Government which, coterminously with its revenue, raises over its whole area the moans required for its defence. But then, it is said, even if England should not undertake to protect her Colonies, still she must place a few of her own troops in each as a nucleus around which they may rally, and which would assist them in their military organization (Lord Herbert's ^vid. 3,641). Others say, we must send a few troops as "a guard to the governors" (Uvid. 329), or as " emblems of the connexion with the mother country " (Uvid. 335), which Lord Herbert called the sentimental view of the subject (Mid. 3,630). All these are new colonial notions bred from the habits of the new regime. I will consider first the necessity of a permanent nucleus of English troops, round which the ordinary colonial forces, whatever they may be, may organize themselves. There is no Colony which it is so important for us to keep in sound relations with ourselves as Canada. I will, therefore, consider this point in connexion with that, as the strongest case for my opponents. The number of troops which the highest authorities, in- ^_ Tj;~2sss;r:^5»sEaE3ai I ■ l^'J tif ! ill ■;^ i I J ii '■ J IM 50 oluding Lord Grey, Lord Elgin, and the Duke of Newcastle, agree in thinking to be necessary as such a nucleus in Canada, is one regiment of the line, which, with the Canadian Rifles, should hold Quebec and Kingston (JEvid. 2,948). The question, then, is, whether these regiments should be raised, and paid, ptid sent by England, or consist ot Canadians, or, at least, be put on the votes of the Canadian Parliament. It is certain that our old Colonies worJd have inpisted on this last condition as essential to their rights. I have already (p. 10) related the answer of Virginia to James I. even in an hour of peril, refusing to receive English troops on any other terms. Let Canada, however, by all means, look to England in the hour of peril, and England look to her in her hour of jJer.il also; but if the sight of English red-coats, at all times, has become a needful support of Canadian confidence, and English pay has ceased to be resented as a symptom of dependence, we must bow humbly under the conviction thai Canada is no longer inhabited by men like those who conquered her. Even in 1812 she needed no nucleus round which to organize a power- ful militia ; though then the ancient colonial spirit was so far changed that she permitted England to furnish her militia „dth arms and pay. But the incidence of cost is only im- portant as indicating the seat of responsibility (Mr. Gladstone's Mid. 3,795). Mr. Merivale, who for many years was a very able Under- Secretary of State in the Colonial Office, told the Committee {Uvid. 2,439), that the English ti'oops in Now Brunswick are meant for little else than as a guard of honour to the Governor. But he allows that being so sent they are taken as a sort of pledge that England undertakes their entire defence, and that; they a;'e thereby deterred from taking -^^ny steps or care for their own security No wonder a Prize-Essay, which I have lately seen, emanating from the literary Institutions of that Colony, describes New Brunswick as " a noble example of the greatness which " may be achieved by tw industrious people protected by a ,- 51 '* powerful and liberal parent state." A Provincial Governor'* " guaid of honour " would bo more creditably and safely fur- nished by those about him : and as for an " emblem of the " Queen of England's sovereignty," a handful of troops from England serves much rather lO mark a limitation of a sove- reignty, which cin only levy men at home for whatever part of an extensive Empire they may be needed, even for the mere purpose of parade. The prestige of empire would be better illustrated by all possible varieties of race and costume parading all over the world under England's flag, and muster- irg everywhere to the sound of our national anthem. The poor idea of a reiterated display of home troops wherever our flag appears, reminds me rather of a scene in the Unequal Match, in which two or three soldiers are seen perpetually rushing from post to post to increase the apparent strength of the little army of some wretched German Grand-Duke. There are other men who, laughing at the fancy policy of emblematic and parade detachments of the army, think a few English soldiers very necessary in every Colony to keep it from commercial antagonism to the mother country. " We should " sooL ha\e Morrill tariffs in Canada, if we withdrew our " gamsons," I heard one spy — a singular example of that supercilious ignorance of everything beyond our immediate vision in which this imperial nation much resembles ancient Rome ; and which of itself is condemnatory of our preten- sions to govern distant colonies. That independent colonial action which, it is supposed, might result from the withdrawal of English troops is now in full exercise, in the presence of our troops, indeed under the sole projection of our troops. Mr. Gladstone repliea to Mr. Ellice's question {JSvid. 3,785) ** whether the old Colonies were not more independent thun the present," that " on the contrary, it would undoubtedly not " have been permitted to those Colonies to exorcise any power " to legislate adversely to the mother countiy, whereas we " have recent experience in Canada that even that power %2 m m l:f 1^ V j ' J i 'i ! i ! il " ■ ; ; : : ill 52 " may be exercised by our present Colonies with a view of " raising up a protected interest against the commerce of the " mother country." The truth is, in Mr. Godley's words, (see Report, Appendix 321) — " political conditions have little to do " with such matters ; they are mainly governed by economical " considerations, i.e., by the varying productions and wants of " the people." Our present colonial relations are no prevention against commercial antagonism. Some are ready to recognize an equitable claim on the part of colonies, to protection from the metropolis, in whose councils they are not r^resented, or have no actual voice ; inasmuch as they are, or may be, involved in wars over which their Assemblies have not as much control as th^ Home Parliament. If this be a fair principle, our historical application of it has been certainly capricious. Mr. Gladstone observes (JSvid, 3,784), *' that the primary responsibility for self-defence, (which " is all that is contended for,) was borne by our old Colonies under ''* circumstances when they were almost certain to be drawn " into entirely English quarrels, and to be made, directly, the " subject of contest among European powers — a state of things " to which, with our present ideas, we can hardly have a " parallel." Does England now draw her Colonies, or her Colonies draw her, into most war? If England were a foreign power to them, instead of being their shield against the interference of all foreign powers, they would soon learn how they might be more involved in war. They have, on the other hand, themselves the chief influence in Imperial implication in war. It is their being spread over all the world which brings us in contact, at so many points, with the sensibilities, jealousies, and cupidities of other nations, and which makes a war so wide a concern to us. Though the Irish temperament enters into but one-third of our national composition, we cannot help our skirts of em- pire being spread about the earth, on which any one may 58 tread his challenge. What brought us to the verge of hos- tilities on the Maine boundaryj or, more lately, on the Mus- quito shore, or at St. Juan's, or about the Newfoundland fisheries ; or why are we now sending troops to Canada ? As the Times says, in reflection on present events, " If Canada had " not been a British possession, there would have been no " reviling of England, no warlike demonstrations against Eng- " land, and no outrages committed on the English flag." I say nothing of millions of our taxes consumed in Kafir and Maori campaigns. Little interest or control has the British Parliament had in the incurring of any of these costly liabilities on behalf of Colonies. Far be it fi-om me to deny that the practical exclusion of colonial legislatures from immediate control on the supreme Executive demands some fair consideration ; but is there not a compensation in the partnership with a nation which few dare threaten, and which will never fail to rally round its own when danger comes ? The fear that colonists may expect to hav« the command of troops which they raise or pay for, is more specious than real. If they pay for the troops they command, they may safely be allowed to command the troops they pay. Their forces will chiefly consist of militia. Even the United States, at the breaking out of the present war, had about 3,000,000 militia to 12,000 regulars. That colonies should assume a diflerent foreign policy from that of the mother country, would be less likely in proportion as they took a real part themselves in maintaining the same policy. If the supposition be not altogether chimerical, at all events the mere withdrawal of an English regiment will not give it probability. Lastly, there may perhaps exist a lurking misgiving in the Ministerial class of minds lest the Crown should lose some patronage, when every Colony assumes its individual action as a component part of the Empire ; and that it is as well for the Crown to hold fast remaining shreds of patronage, in demo- 54 cratic days, rather than speculate on the increase of imperial power which a developed policy might give. But the concession of self-government, which is already past retracting, was the real hazard of colonial patronage ; and if Victoria, for example, still continues ungrudging — nay, lavish — of her salaries to the Crown's representatives, she is not likely to dispute that, or any other appointment, merely because, as a corollary of her free Constitution, her military expenditure, as well as her civil list, should be voted among the Estimates of her own Legislature. On the whole consideration of the question between com- pleting the return to our original colonial relations, or halting half-way, where we are now — retaining the duties,' having conceded the rights, of colonial government — I think every man's deliberate judgment must incline towards the completion of the policy, on the course of which we have, by the force of national tendencies, been led to go so far already. W J ' 1 \^ ill ' V ■. il !•:*; 7. — ^The Manner in which a complete Return to our ORIGINAL Colonial Relations might be safely and satisfactorily effected. Though the step to be taken is but the complement of a reform half effected already, yet no change whatever in re- lations so important, as those between our Colonies and our- selves, should be made abruptly. It is not from any want of appreciation of the value of colonial connexion that I advocate the completion of colonial self-government, but because I consider no interest this country has is more important. Besides the pride and natural sym- pathy which makes us hold in high respect our relationship with countries peopled with our kindred, of the same qualities and habits which we value in ourselves, and brought into a community of policy by the same allegiance ; there are ma- terial advantages also on both sides, which prompt a due 55 regard and consideration for tlie maintenance of mutual friend- ship. It is because I conceive that while the Colonies depend on England for the means of their ordinary administration, thoy can never, even though they have free Constitutions, be on equal terms of fellow-citizenship with ourselves, that I wish our relations with them to bo made sound, in order that they may be cordial and lasting. Even if Canada, or Australia, may become ultimately so great and flourishing, by means of self-reliance, that their partnership in government with us may be no longer possible, I would prepare for a transition from fellowship to alliance no less friendly, by removing every cause of jealousy or incapacity by which the process of transition might take the form of rupture, or the subsequent intercourse be tainted with any bitter recollections. My fear is, that the imperfection of our existing colonial relations has greatly perverted the feeling of the colonial populations. I find a proof of this in the answer I have already cited from the Canadians to our proposition for build- ing more forts on their frontier, which answer amoimted to " what have we to do with that ? " (See p. 26.) On the other hand, the necessity for correcting this evil has not yet taken hold of the public mind of England in any degree commensurate with its grave importance. Therefore, I say, borrowing Mr. Gladstone's words (Hvid. 3,829), " we " have now so long maintained the system of providing for the " ordinary purposes of colonial defence, and even of police, by " means of a British force, and at the cost of the British ex- " chequer, that, when we take into consideration the fact that " all political modes of thought are very much connected with " habit and tradition, I am not sanguine enough to believe " that a sound state of opinion could bo established in a day." There is this advantage in the gross inequality of our present treatment of various Colonies relatively — our taking payment for military assistance from those who are willing to pay, and asking for no payment where we anticipate refusal — \ i I ^fL lit .1" ' f.'i i 1.U ■■I.: V- m ^i . '1 :i |;1 ing our great mass of force at home, and sup- plying them as they may require. 8834. But the question is not so much of the amount of England's contribution, as of the transier of responsibility to the colonies. I should like to see the state of feeling restored to the colonies which induced the first American colonists to make it one of their grievances that British troops were kept in their borders without their consent. 8841. The old system of American self-defence was much more favourable to that high tone of spirit and feeling than the system we have pursued sinoe the separation of those colonies, and that not by the fault of the oolonies thomselves, but by the fault of what we have done for them. Although labour is scarce and dear in the colonies, yet I doubt very much whether there has ever existed any country where labour was too dear for self-defence, if only the com- munity had right ideas on the subject, and had not somebody else ready to undertake it for them. 3807. The colonists of former times were not allowed an inde- pendent existence as regards the full exercise of their own industry, but we now grant absolute commercial freedom, and that, of course, is a consideration which greatly increases the strength of the argu- ment for their assuming, with the benefits of freedom, the burdens of freedom also. 3828, 8873. The principles of our old colonial system do not tend to separation, but are powerfully conducive to keeping up connexion. It required a course of great harshness and obstinacy in us to effect American separation. 3. — Extracts taken from the Evidence given by The Eight. Hon. Egbert Lowe, M.P., wAo was a Member of the Legislative Council of New South Wales from 1843 to 1849. 3380-1. I do not think it desirable to retain any troops at all in New South Wales. A Qovernment of that kind is not fit to be trusted with the disposition of Her Majesty's troops for any purpose whatever. 3831. It seems to me that the people of this country ought not to be taxed for maintaining the external defence or internal police of the Australian Colonies in time of peace. 8332. Situate in a temperate latitude, inhabited by Englishmen and Irishmen, and under institutions in which they can govern them- selves, they can defend themselves from internal riot, and from suoh \l n lis! :il m ! 64 insultH fjom foreign nations as no country can be wholly secure from. As regards rcooiving payment from them for military assistance, it appears to me to bo unworthy of the dignity of this country to toke money from some colonies because they are villing to pay it, and not from others because thoy are unwilh'ng to pay it. I object to payment altogether ; it is putting our troops in the position of mercenaries. 3333. For every purpose, for prestige as well as defence, imperial troops are better out of the way. 3334. A colony which is ill-disposed to this country is not woi'th retaining. If it succeed in the struggle, it would have been better not to havo attempted to coerce it ; if it fail, a colony re-conquered, wasted, and embittered, would be a worthless possession. 3335. The question is the reverse of that of last century, — whether the people of tli.5 United Kingdom should be taxed for the bei>efit of the people of its dependencies ? When I lived at Sydney, there was no incomo-tax, nor assessed taxes, nor excise, except on spirits, which probably was a benefit rather than a burden. Profits were large, wages very high. The mildness of the climate renders fuel almost unnecessary except for cooking, and enables people to do with little clothing. To tax the labc-urers of licicpstershire and Dorsetshire to relieve such a community from a taxntion required for its own defence, i? a crying injustice. By their connexion with the mother country the colonists lose the power of making war and peace, but the advantages they gain by being pari of the British empire are enormous ; they are relieved from the necessity of keeping up o, large force at any time on land, or any at sea, and no people enjoy more security in time of Mar, and by tho guarantee of this country against war they are enabled to apply their revenues entirely t<^ their own local purposes. 3? 36. It is ridiculous to suppose that the troops we can spare in tir ) of peace would be a defence to Australia, and it is more ridi- culoi's to suppose that t'.o troops we can spare in time of war would be sufficient. The present conditions of war are such that wo must recall our troops to defend ourselves at home. The changes intro- du(!ed into warfare i ender this island more liable to invasion than before. Our troops can do little to defend Australian Colonies, but tbpy rely upon their presence almost a« much as if they were a sufficient guard; and it has prevented them, till within two jears, from drilling their own mjn, and from enrolling auffi* lent ^^'ilitia or volunteers. Strange we should send people from England to defend the Antipodes, while we leave tne young men of Australia to grow up without the knowledge of arms. 33.37. The motives which induce our colonints to remain united to the mother country, are sufficiently overwhelming, v/ithout our fur- ( <) nishing a force for their defence and police, which they are perfectly well able to pay for themselves. 3340. Their being subjoiit to our foreign policy givea the colouios fair ground to ask for assistance in times of war. 3343. Of course a large military expenditure is a popular thing in a colony. Even a war in a remote part of the colony will be popular in parts where it is not carried on, on account of the money which is made out of it. The country may suflFer, but the towns often get a great advantage. It is great imprudence on the part of the Imperial Government to place the power of commencing wars, in which it will be obliged to take part, in the hands of persons over whom it has no control, but who are often directly interested in getting up a war. So long as the wars they commence must be li^aght out at the expense of the mother country, there will always be war when there is a pretext. 3366. To this pecuniary advantage there are many countervailing evils to the colonies, who, as young nations, are educated in a one- sided manner, and may be reduced to the condition in which the Bomans left the Britons at the mercy of the Picts and Scots. 3350. The Australians, were they trained, would make as fine soldiers as any in the world. Their volunteers originated from the parent movement in England. There will be plenty to volunteer; no people better mounted ; they make excellent sailors, and are full of spirit. Their particular industry is favourable for volunteering. 8385. I have no doubt there is a spirit of self defencei'in , the people of Australia, and that when they understand that they must rely upon themselves, they will defend themselves. 3405. The small forces wo send aflFord no protection, deaden the spirit of the coloniets, and every soldier sent T)robably prevents a hundred colonists from taking arms and drilling. 3368, 3371. The more extensive and exposed tixe frontier, the more danger in deluding the colony, by the proseniie of a few imperial troopb. 3376. Better keep even the nucleuH of British aid in England. 334.6. I have seen what expenditure on fortifications in in New South Wales, whore, after an f'nnrnious waste of Engliah money, Sydney was left utterly defenceless. 3388. The entire withdrawal of Englii^ Umiy» from Austri^a, would not tend to separation. 8390. The troops involve the Imperial Govemmont in the unpopu- larity of the I/(Cal Government; and (.3402) offer to demagogucH a ready meanp of committing tiic colony by an insult on that sign and Bymbol of imperial pre-eminence and protection. I I 66 4. — Extract taken from the Evidence given by Lord Herbert, Secretary of State for War. I! i I IL I,' \i s 3501. Whenever there is an imperial necessity tr oncentrate troops on any point, the rest of the colonies are starved, without re- ference to their wants ut the time. In the Russian war, we denuded the colonies of troops. 3512 Canada has within itself a considerable element of personnel for its own defence ; and I think you may look forward to the time, wlien the necessity for sending troops there may cease, or, at all events, be greatly diminished. 3511. They have now a considerable force of volunteers. 3558. The great fortresses, such as Malta and Gibraltar, I should garrison to the utmost. I think the diflference between peace and war, in many of the colonies, would be that, instead of maintaining a force in them in time of war, we should withdraw it. I see no use in maintaining isolated battalions : either we have the supremacy of the sea, in which case they are useless, or, we lose the supremacy of the sea, in which case they are caught in a trap. 3563-5. To make colonies contribute to their own. defences, we must say, " you shall have very small garrisons." We should get the worst of bargains with them. 3677. If all our colonies could have been founded upon the Indian (i.e. solf-paj'ing) principle, it would have been of great advantage. 3579. The control it would give the colouiaJ authorities of the troops, would be no serious disadvantage, such as linjiting the opera- tions of a ship to a colony would be. So long as the troops remain, the colony pays ; when they ar<' withdrawn, the colon;^ ceases to pay for them. 3599. I should spend iis little as possible upon fortifications abroad, and strengthen our fortifications at home. 3630. The principle of keeping a small body of troops in a colony, by way of representing imperial power, is a sentimental view, to wliich I attach no importance. 3639. If you maintain a large garrison, you give colonists an ex- cellent excuse for not raising any miliMa of their own. 2529. The total cobt of transport to and from the colonies amounted in 1 859 to 200,000/. It would be a great advantage if that could be saved by the formation of local corps. 8546-7. SI: William Denison, in' his despatclies, August 1866, has recommended that a colony sliould be left to bear the primary re- Bponaibility of its own defence, and that the mother country should i^^i 67 only assist. The principle therein enanciated is certainly a principle to be aimed at. 3552. The necessity for the distribution of our force in the last few years is much altered. I should accumulate all the forces that it is possible to accumulate at home, and keep as few men as pc»fiBible in the colonies. 6. — Extracts taken from the Evidence (jiven by General Sin j^hs BuRGOYNE, Inspector General of Fortifications, shou'tnij ineffi- ciency of our present System. 1 264. We ought to maintain in strength, besides Mediterranean garrisons, principally Mauritius, Bermuda (1,339), Kingston, Quebec, and Halifax ; and secondarily, the Cape, Ceylon, Hong-Kong, and St. Helena; and for coaling stations (1,264), Aden, Seychelles, and the Falkland Islands. 1255. There are works at all these stations now, but most of them are quite incomplete and inefficient. 1266. The estimated cost of works at Mauritius is 202,00OZ., but the advance of military science will require great additions. The whole islands should be surrounded with forts (1,267, 1,264), of which necessarily the erection and defence must be at the cost of the Im- perial Exchequer. 1275. About 0,000 troops would be necessary to defend the island. 1313. 26,000/. has been voted for a citadel at Halifax. This vote was on a calculation made twenty years ago, and is not sufficient. 1319 and 1379. Those places which have large British population should organize a volunteer defence. 1326. They should j^rotect themselves. 1336. The presence of British troops discourages local efforts for defence. 1330, 1351. If the colonists are indifferent, our garrison could not defend Halifax or Canada. 1409-10. The coal mines of Cape Breton require defence against a possible enemy's cruiser,wliit'h defence should devolve on the colonists. 1410, 1412. The miners have formed a volunteer corps of 200 or 300 among themselves. 1459. 20,00uZ, is estimated to be necessary for improving the de- fences of St. Helena. 1472. We ought to have 6,000 or 6,000 men to defend Cape Town. There are only 81 at present defending that whole district. 1471, The troops are up the countiy. 68 a Appendix No. 7, p. 281. Bough estimate of the cost of completing works in progress, and of new works necessary to place named foreign possessions in a reasonable state of defence, in addition to sums in estimates 1861-2, and exclusive of armaments and barracks and of such occasional improvements as art and science may from time to time render necessary — 1,000,000/. ; of which only 100,000/. is for Gibraltar and Malta. I' I' I M t:' ffi k IB ■ mm m ': STANDARD EDITIONS PRINTED FOR PARKER, SON, AND BOURN, 445, WEST STRAND, LONDON. History of Nonnandy and of Fii?- Imul. 'iJy SirFRKNciH I'algkavk, Doput y Keeper of the itcoords. Octttvo. Vols. I. and II. 2l8. cBch. History of Endand from the Fall of WolRey to tlie Death of Elizunelh. By jAMhs Antiio.vt Frovdk. The Second Edition. Octavo. Volumes I to IV. 54a. 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