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 October 24th, 1795* 
 
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 IT Is the pUfpofe bf the foUdwing j>ages 
 to give a general tiew of the cirdum- 
 ftances and interefts of the French Revolu * 
 tion, and the French war, as they appear to 
 jne in the month of Odober 1795. 
 
 The attempt prefents many difcourage- 
 ments at the outfeti the objedts are ex* 
 tenfive, numerous, and complicated ; they 
 are, as yet, too near to us to be juftly efti- 
 mated, and in a courfe of varying move- 
 tnent, which baffles every attempt to place 
 them in any piecife and fettled point of 
 ¥icw. 
 
 A 2 Th» 
 
 .iii^*'^-K..^*v..'i(,; ■ 
 
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 The mind of every man has been fatigued 
 
 by long agitations amidft thefe bewildered 
 
 and unnatural fcenes, and is brought with 
 
 reluftance, pain, i.nd loathing, to a new 
 
 f conlideration of thtm. 
 
 I fhall, neverthelefs, try to ftate my ideas 
 with candour and with plainnefs, in the 
 order in which they oflFer themfelves. 
 The fame ideas have been feparately dif- 
 CLifled by many: the tafk, which I prefcribe 
 to myfelf, is to bring them together, and to 
 lead them to certain conclufions. 
 
 If in the refult, I can contribute either 
 to a juft appreciation of the great interefts 
 in queftion, or in any degree affift others 
 more able to form fuch an appreciation, 
 I fhall think that my time and attention 
 have been employed to good efFedt, both 
 politioilly and morally. 
 
 I 
 
 § 2. The people of France have been in 
 a ftate of infurredion from the month of 
 July, 1789, and in a flate of war with fo- 
 reign powers from the time of their de- 
 9 > t'^rces 
 
 Aa'5--;'3:5i*f^?i:.'iti=-ia^S&*'j*-. 
 
ITOTIK^^I 
 
 •^•^ww^pmpiK^ 
 
 an^.?T; 
 
 [ 5 1 
 
 crees* of war againft the Empcrof, and 
 their invafion of the Auftrian Netherlands* 
 in April, 1792. This combined preffure of 
 interior and exterior troubles has been ag- 
 gravated by a fufpenfion of commerce, a 
 failure of manufa(5tures, an interruption of 
 agriculture, a great emigration, dilburfe- 
 ments from the public treafure beyond any 
 example among nations, large exportations 
 of fpecie, and a dearth of the neceflaries of 
 life. To thefe evils we may add the ex- 
 cefles of individuals and of fad:ions ftrug- 
 gling for the afcendency, and a train of 
 miferies refulting from anarchy, commo- 
 tions, civil war, pillage, and malfacres, with 
 and without the colour of law. 
 
 
 I 4 
 
 * Premier Decret. *' Le rot de Hongrie is* de So-' 
 ** heme a attenti a la fouverainete nationale, en declarant 
 ** voultirjoutenir la caufe des princes pojfcjjionnes en Alface^ 
 ** qui ont conjiamment rifuje les indemnitis qui lettr ont iti 
 ** offertes^' &c. 
 
 Second Decret. " L*J//emblee Nationale fidele an 
 *' ferment qu'clle a fait de n^entreprendre aucune guerre 
 ** dans fejprl* de conquitef ne prend let armes que pourJi 
 ** maintien defa liberie" ^c. 
 
 The 
 
ir 
 
 t 6 1 
 
 ^ht military and naval eXertlorts, fkf 
 Irom being broken by fuch a paroxyfm, 
 have been aided and maintained by it* 
 The French armies* employed in the lattef 
 part of 1793 and in 1794* are faid to have 
 amounted to 800,000 mens in fome re- 
 ports of the Convention they were flated at 
 1,000,000; at this hour they cannot be 
 cftimated at lefs than 600,000. 
 
 It would be here unmanly not to fpeak 
 of their military fucccfs in the terms whicfh 
 are due to it. Much of that fucceis may in 
 truth be attributed to the overbearing force 
 of numbers; but much was the fefult alfo 
 of their own talents, adivity, and perfe-* 
 verance. They have fliewn to the world, 
 that an undifciplincd multitude, brought 
 into the field partly through an enthuiiafm 
 of the popular mind, but more by the in- 
 fluence and urgency of famine, force, and 
 terror, may learn, under felf-taught generals, 
 to defeat the befl difciplined armies, headed 
 by their fovercigns in perfon, and condudted 
 
 by 
 
 'H^ 
 
 T<*»ws««(il«P!S?9!iV 
 
r 7 ] 
 
 Uy officers of the firft abilities and cxpc- 
 l^ence. I enter not into other caufes of theip 
 fucccfs .; they would lead ma < into detftiU ta 
 which hifl'ory will render juftice. The con^* 
 fbquenccs are, that Europe has been overrun. 
 The torrent of conqueft and defolation is 
 ftill rufliing forwards; and thofe who diredt 
 Ithe war profefs notito fufpend their efforts,- 
 till they fhall have didated a pacification, 
 which (according' to their decree pafled a 
 few days ago) is to unite to their empire, 
 either in poffeiTibn or ii;- dependence, a^ 
 great, extenfion off territory, new barriers, 
 many frontier places of fttength^ a large 
 ij?a-coaft, and feveral fea^ortsv 
 
 §! 3, As far as military prowefs can avail, 
 
 France certainly has acquired good ground 
 
 of folf-oonfidence } and in this refped:, her 
 
 prctenfiQns, gigantic as they are, do not 
 
 atfiril fight appear extravagant,. 
 
 But a nearer approach to thofe pretenfions • 
 will place them in a diifereiit point of view ; 
 
 ^nd 
 
 ; f 
 
 (I 
 
 ,^lv 
 
 MIWMiMI 
 
f 
 
 [ 8 I 
 
 and it may even be doubted, whether the 
 preponderance which France held through 
 centuries in the fcale of European powers 
 win not eventually be deftroycd by the ef- 
 fedl of her prefent fuccelTes -, or, at leaft, 
 whether, fo far as the political interefts of 
 Great Britain are concerned, fhe will re- 
 main an objedt of as much jealoufy and 
 alarm as fhe was under the late monarchy. 
 
 In faying this I am not feeking to con- 
 ceal our embarraflments, or to palliate our 
 difappointments ; nor am I infenfible to the 
 unmerited fate and defolation of individuals 
 and countries connected v^rith us in the war : 
 I am not difpofed to under- rate a calamity 
 fubverfive, for the prefent at leaft, of the ba- 
 lance of Europe, and which has threatened 
 to demolifh a fyftem of civilization, under 
 which my country enjoys a profperity unpa- 
 ralleled in the hiftory of man. But after avow- 
 ing the evil, J may be permitted, in the hour 
 of retirement and reflection, to examine the 
 chances and means of emerging from it. If 
 
 my 
 
"•P«P^H 
 
 •'^ 
 
 i 
 
 r 9 i 
 
 my fpeculations tend to inlpire hopes beyond 
 what the better opinion of others or future 
 events may juftify, it will not be from a 
 defire to midead, but from an error of judg- 
 ment, arifmg from a difpofition not to be 
 dilheartened by difficulties. 
 
 § 4* Quitting therefore the veJcatious 
 fpe^acle pf the conquefls of France upon 
 the continent^ I now turn with fome com- 
 placency to naval operations. In this 
 branch of the war we relied almoft entirely 
 on ourfelves -, whilft the ftruggle on the 
 continent was maintained on the one hand 
 by numerous and united armies of the fame 
 country, and on the other by allies, whofe 
 fuppofed ftrength became their weaknefs, 
 becaufe it led them to mifcalculate their 
 means, and to make falfe combinations of 
 meafures and plans. In the condud of the 
 allied armies there was occafionally a want 
 both of concert and confidence ; their at- 
 tention was fometimes diflradbed by projeds 
 of advantage, foreign or adverfe to the gene- 
 
 B ral 
 
V -V 
 
 -ij- -'^vri^r,- 
 
 
 
 f. 
 
 [ '° 1 
 
 fal caafe; and in the moft preffing moments 
 of the "ar, fome of them Hiewed more foli- 
 citude to embarrafs each other, than to 
 cruHi the common enemy. 
 
 It is notorious that the naval exertions 
 of France were made on the fame prin- 
 ciples, which formed her armies. She 
 fent to fea a force great beyond expec- 
 tation. She facrificed her own commerce 
 to find the means o" interrupting ours. She 
 has fince added to her advantages the neu- 
 trality of Spain, and the ports of Flanders 
 and Holland, and the difpofal of the Dutch 
 navy. And yet I do not fpeak vauntingly 
 whtn I afTertythat, though (he has occafion- 
 ally found means ta annoy our commerce, 
 the extent and profperity of which oblige us 
 to have vefTels pafling and repaffing in every 
 part of the ocean, fhe has ceafed to alarm us 
 as a competitor for naval dominion. Her 
 naval failure Is decided. Time and hiflory 
 will heft fliew, what proportion of that fail- 
 ure is to be attributed to the wantof fubor- 
 
 dination; to the events at Toulon in 1793 ; 
 
 to 
 
 %. 
 
 
 ■"m,,^"Y- 
 
 ,.<Ui'- «W., 
 
 -; ii> r "(1 iiiu'lr^"' 
 
iLMI|,^<iRP*i III 
 
 [ " 1 
 
 to the mod important and eflential vidory 
 gained by the Britifti fleet on the ift of June, 
 1794; to other glorious adions in the dif» 
 ferent feas ; to the unremitted exertions of 
 our boards of admiralty ; to the condudt of 
 our officers ; and the valour of our feamen. 
 The lofTes on our part by capture amount 
 to two fliips of the line, one of which has 
 been retaken, and two frigates and a few in- 
 ferior veflels; and by different accidents four 
 Britifh fhips of the Hne have been burnt or 
 funk. On the part of the enemy, the lofles 
 by capture and burning, and by the accidents 
 of fea, amount to thirty-three fhips of the 
 line, and near an hundred frigates and infe- 
 rior veffels of war. It appears that we 
 have commiflioned fix (liips of the line, 
 which belonged to the enemy, and that 
 three more are in readinefs, and to be 
 immediately commiflioned. Every (hip thus 
 brought into fervice operates in a dou- 
 bled proportion upon the comparative force 
 of the cwo navies ; and, accordingly, tSe to- 
 tal relative difference in favour of England, 
 by captures, burning, and finking, fince the 
 commencement of the war, may be efti* 
 
 B 2 mated 
 
 
 4 
 
 Hi 
 
 m 
 

 [ 12 ] 
 
 mated to be about thirty-fix fhips of tba 
 line, to which may be added, on fimilai? 
 principles of calculation, a farther diffe- 
 rence of near eighty frigates. France now 
 hardly poifelTes a fleet that flie can venture 
 to fen^ to fea; her fcanty fupply of necefla- 
 ries from other countries depends on the 
 cafual arrivals pf neutral vefTels; fhe has 
 abandoned her fiflieries, the old and impor- 
 tant objed: of our competition j her princi- 
 pal ports have been blockaded during feve- 
 ral months; and our naval fuperiority is 
 augmenting from day to day. I quit with 
 reluctance this part of my fubjed, on which 
 an Englifh mind repofes with pleafure. 
 
 § c. In the predominancy of our navy 
 
 we Ml poflels the efficient and permanent 
 
 caufe of our profpcrity. It is this confide- 
 
 ration, which, nbtwithftanding the nullity 
 
 of the prefent campaign in fome parts of 
 
 the continent, and its difaftrous iffue and 
 circumftances in other parts, places us on 
 
 higher ground for treating, than thofe on 
 
 which we flood in any period of the lall two 
 
 X years. 
 
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 years. It is our naval flrength, which done 
 can give to us the means of reftoring tran^ 
 quiUity to Europe. But in faying this, I do 
 not mean to convey any diffent from thq 
 occafional expediency of continental opera- 
 tions in war: I even doubt, whether the 
 danger of invafion could have been averted, 
 and whether the naval fuperiority, on which 
 I am now relying, could, have been eftab- 
 lifhed, if the attention xif: the enemy had 
 not been powerfully diverted, during the 
 firft two years of the war, by our treaties 
 and continental alliances, and by the brave, 
 though unfuccefsful, exertions of our ar- 
 mies on the continent. 
 
 § 6. There is another point, in which our 
 comparative fituation is much improved, 
 and by which the fuccelTes of France may 
 fuddenly lofe all their importance aud efFeft. 
 I never perfuaded myfelf that France would 
 foon arrive at the end of her refources, or 
 that the expences, which Great Britain was 
 incurring, would be of no ferious confequcncc 
 
 to 
 
 -/' 
 
*♦ 
 
 m ' 
 
 I 14 1 
 
 to her. I have thought, however, that this 
 war, like feveral modern wars, would be- 
 come at laft a ftruggle and queftion of fi- 
 nance. Here alio I can look with compla- 
 cency to the fituation of our enemies. With 
 them the fupplies of the year are not equal 
 to the expence cf a month ; and the expence 
 of a year is more than the whole amount of 
 our national debt. Their fpecie, which in 
 1785 waseftimated at eighty millions fterling, 
 is nearly gone from the country, or is con- 
 cealed. Their taxes are levied, and the ex- 
 changes of their interior trade are ma- 
 naged by a fcanty fupply of fpecie, by the 
 transfer and barter of the necelTaries of 
 life ; a mode of exiftence ruinous to agri- 
 culture, and leading to every defcription of 
 extortion and diftrefs. The amount of the 
 aflignats, which have taken the place of 
 the fpecie, is now faid to be eighteen mil- 
 liards, or feven hundred and twenty millions 
 fterlingi the confequent depreciation is in 
 the proportion of feventy-five to one; and 
 there remain no vifible refources, but in ex- 
 tremes of violence no longer applicable to 
 
 the 
 
r '5 ] 
 
 the fpirit and temper of the people. It is 
 utterly inexplicable how a government fo 
 circumftanced, and with fourteen armies to 
 be paid, cloathed, fed, and fupplied, can 
 find means to exift twenty-four hours. 
 
 From the firft introduction of the fyftem 
 of affignats (founded in defperation and 
 iniquity) it v/as eafy to forefee the irre- 
 trievable ruin of the French finances, and 
 the bankruptcy of their public debt, which 
 was then folemnly placed under the gua^ 
 ranty of French honour and French good* 
 faith ; and it was a natural inference, that 
 a failure of the affignats would produce a 
 diffolution of the armies. They are now 
 maintained by putting the phyfical refources 
 and produce of the country into requifition : 
 it is utterly impoffible that this mode can 
 be durable; and we have not heard that 
 there is any other, to which it is poffible to 
 recur. 
 
 § 7. It is not within my prefent plan to 
 purfue the comparifon to a ftatement of our 
 
 own 
 
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 bwh pecuniary means. I admit thai, oh 
 our part, the drain upon the country for 
 the expences of the war has been great j 
 and, though the charge of continental 
 armies, and of new levies on the continent 
 is now much leflened, and will, I truft, 
 undergo a total redud:ion, I do not fuppofe, 
 if we continue to avoid the accumulation of 
 unfunded debt, that the loan and taxes for 
 the cnfuing year will be much lefs than 
 they were in the year 1795. But de-* 
 ploring, as I do, a courfe of events, which, 
 before the next two months fhall have 
 clapfed, will have rendered indifpenfable fo 
 large an additioii to the permanent taxes> 
 I neverthelefs fee good ground of confo-* 
 lation in the refources which have thus far 
 enabled us to bear the prefTure. And here 
 it is well worthy of remark, that the wife 
 and vigorous fyftem for the reduction of the 
 debt eftabliflied in 1786, has had, during 
 the war, an uninterrupted and increafing 
 effed ; and even that additions have been 
 made for leilening the debt, and for accele- 
 rating 
 
"»'^8^?f»•" 
 
 "™"^^' "^ PUWiJ' P'lHtJ' 
 
 [ >7 1 . 
 
 rating the operation of compound Intereft: 
 
 It is farther to be recollected, that the taxes 
 impofed to pay the intereft of the fums 
 borrowed during the war include a pro- 
 vilion of one per cent, for the gradual liqui- 
 dation of the capital. It may be attributed 
 chiefly to thefe falutary meafures, that the 
 price of the three per cents, which was £.$$ 
 in January^ 1784, a period of peace, is £.6^ 
 at this day (Od. 24th) notwithftanding 
 the war, and the great additions made and 
 making, to the capital of the debt. ^ , 
 
 . § -8. In looking forwards to the end of this 
 conflid, it is fome confolation to obferve, 
 that all the evils, which we have hitherto 
 fjffered by the war, are trivial in comparifon 
 •of thofe with which we were mcinaced by 
 tJie French, in the vifitation of their revo- 
 Imionary doftrines. The leaders of the 
 French infurredlion had, long before the 
 war, conceived the projedt of rendering the 
 danger general, in order to extricate them- 
 
 C felves 
 
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 I '8 ] 
 felvcs amidft the general confuiion. In 
 their language, ** it was expedient to fet 
 " fire to every corner of Europe, and to 
 deftroy all eftabliflied governments, by an 
 eruption of the volcanic ^ rinciple of equa- 
 lity." To this policy we may attribute 
 their declarations, that all other countries 
 were unhappy, ignorant, fuperftitious, and 
 cnflaved; that *' a great battle was to be 
 " fought between errors and principles;" and 
 that it was " the morning of reafon dawn- 
 " ing upon the earth." Their declama- 
 tory dcdtrines made fome progrefs ; and 
 they proceeded to ifTue to all nations their 
 folemn grant of univerfal fraternity, which 
 was promulgated in all languages with 
 great activity and expence. 
 
 § 9. At the epoch of the declaration of 
 war againft thefe kingdoms and Holland, 
 the people of the feveral goveiiiments of 
 Europe, without exception, were in a dan- 
 gerous ilate of ferment. This had not 
 
 arifen 
 
'■■wr*' 
 
 [ 19 ] 
 
 arifen entirely from the attradion of the 
 new principles. The firfl fucceffes of the 
 French infurredtion, a natural leaning to 
 what was then thought to he the caufe of 
 liberty, the revolutions in the Belgic pro- 
 vinces and in Poland, and the total failnre 
 of the Auftriart and Pruflian campaign of 
 1792, fallowed by the fuccefsful invafion of 
 Brabant, had, all together, excited the ad- 
 miration of furrounding nations. 
 
 Every arrangement had been taken in 
 the French ports and armies to commence 
 hoflilities at fea and op the continent, be- 
 fore it could be known in London or at the 
 Hague that war was declared. The crifis 
 was a,wfvil J and my imagination cannot fix 
 bounds to the evils then impending, if the 
 invafion of Holland * had met with the fame 
 
 fuccefs 
 
 m 
 
 * Dumouriez, in his Memoirs, and in his Letters to 
 Pache and Miranda, afFedits to fay, and others have re- 
 |)eated, that his fuccefs agatnfl Holland was prevented 
 by the Auftrian victories of the ift and 3d of Klarch. 
 Tdotc vi(5lorics were glorious and important, and cer> 
 
 C 2 taiHly 
 
 I 1 
 
 
 i^mtmnOiBBm 
 
rfV 
 
 [ '20 1 
 
 fuccers which, through the hoftility of the 
 elements, and through other caufes, it ob- 
 tained two years afterwards. The great 
 fuccefies of the Auftrian, Englifli, and 
 Dutch forces, during the firft fix months of 
 the war, and the wife and fpirited meafures 
 adopted and purfued for the fecurity-and 
 defence of the interior of thefe kingdoms, 
 gave a fahitary check to the contagion of 
 anarchy. * 
 
 'S: 
 
 
 §10. After the capture of Valenciennes 
 the tide of war turned againft us. But 
 men's minds had already revolted againft 
 the crimes and fanguinary charad:er of the 
 French revolution. Every individual, who 
 poflefled any integrity, any benevolence, or 
 any fenfe of religion, (huddered when the 
 
 tainly confirmed the fecurity of Holland at that time ; but 
 the fact is, that before Dumouriezr was leady to attempt 
 the paflage of the Moerdyck, the Eiiglifli guards were 
 arrived, and the gun-boats were ftationed ; and from tliat 
 hour (every poflibility of froft bfeing over) his expeditioji 
 was at aU events baffled. 
 
 ** ■ ' excefles 
 
 ''«&« 
 
-^^r-'-"?^^^ 
 
 ^<m 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 t 21 ] 
 
 cxcefles of a populous and enlightened na- 
 tion became fuch as would be hardly cre- 
 dible, if faid to be committed by armed 
 favages in a ftate of intoxication and mad- 
 nefs. 
 
 I turn from the recolledlion of thofe ex- 
 ceffes to dwell for a few moments on the 
 impreffion which they have left. The tri- 
 umphs of a criminal people had not fo far 
 dazzled the world, as to fubdue that ab- 
 horrence of crimes, which a benevolent 
 Creator hath implanted in the human mind. 
 The eyes of men were now opened j and 
 the notion of liberty, raifed in the cradle 
 of terror, amidft crowded camps and over- 
 flowing gaols, was confidered as a phan- 
 tom, a deception, a monftrous dream in a 
 delirium* 
 
 §11. France will long fcrve as a beacon 
 to other nations. The cruelties, which fol- 
 lowed the feizure of eccleliailical property, 
 the avowal of infidelity and atheifm, which 
 
 feemed 
 
mmmmm 
 
 mmm 
 
 m^t^mmmi 
 
 r 22 ] 
 
 fcemed to ferve as a pretext for robbing 
 the churches, the profligacy of manners, 
 cncoHiaged by the new code of divorces, 
 the requifitions againfl the farmers and 
 /liopkeepers, the law of the maxim um» the- 
 forced loans, the compulfory enrohnents, 
 the domiciliary vifits, the judicial maf- 
 facres from prepared lifts, were all admoni- 
 tions to other countries to look with revived 
 attachment to their own governments, in the 
 worfi: of which fome protection was given 
 to life, property, and the exercife of reli^ 
 gion. To Englilhmen the comparifon pre-, 
 fented new grounds of fair national pride ; 
 it led them to contemplate and to cherifli 
 the wliole fyftem of their own civil and ec- 
 cle/iailical eftablifhment. 
 
 To all mankind one awful lefTon will re- 
 main in the hiflory of the leaders of the 
 French infurreclions, which, in the language 
 of one of its principal leaders, is, " a recital 
 of crimes puiiiflied :'* One fet of mifcreants 
 rapidly fucceeded another by a fort of he- 
 reditary 
 
mmw 
 
 mma 
 
 wmimmmti 
 
 '^♦^^"^1^ 
 
 fcditary fucccffion, and every new admini* 
 ftration murdered its predeceiTors. Thus it 
 was that men, inveterate enemies of each 
 other, were frequently brought together to 
 the fame (caflfold, and at the fame moment 
 with the innocent victims of their cruelty. 
 Many have efcaped public execution by the 
 refourceof fuicidej and others (whofe moral 
 punifliment is perhaps the mofl fevere) ilill 
 furvive. 
 
 ^12. To thofe who meditate on the 
 workings of the human mind, a doubt may 
 perhaps arife, whether the effedls, which I 
 have defcribed, though at prefent a falutary 
 check to the dangerous fpirit of innovation, 
 may not hereafter prove favourable to a-, 
 bufes of power, by creating a timidity in the 
 jufl caufe of liberty. 
 
 I will hope, however, that if the feafon of 
 peace fliould return, the misfortunes, which 
 have been fuffered by many, and the peril 
 incurred by all, may produce a general 
 foftening of charader, and a revifion in 
 7 men's 
 
 
 •.T>i mirrrma': 
 
•y^mm^ 
 
 ■,';--7i-., : vs, 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 r 24 ] :i5^ 
 
 lncn*s minds of their fecial fituationS and du— '^^ 
 ties. — Governments will have learnt not tc*; M 
 precipitate themfelves 'nto embarrafTments 
 by fpeculative wars ; Sovereigns and Princes 
 will not forget, that fleadinefs, moderation,^ 
 and public oeconomy, are the beft fupports 
 of the eminence on which they ftand; No- 
 bles and men of property will reflect, that 
 their large allotment of worldly advantages 
 is for the aid and beneiit of the whole; and 
 the labouring claiTes (for fuch there muft be 
 whilfl men are men) will feel, that fober in- 
 duftry, proteded by eftabliflied government, 
 is feldom without the benefits of competence 
 arid fecurit^^ 
 
 ¥ 
 
 U 
 
 p. 
 
 If''' '. 
 
 § 13. Thefe truths feeni to be finding 
 their way into the bofoms of the French na- 
 tion alfo ; ** their fraternity" (as was latt- 
 ly ftated to them in a folemn report) " has 
 ** been the brotherhood of Cain and Abel ;" 
 and " they have organized nothing but 
 ^* bankruptcy and famine." 
 
 Amidft the difpcdion and deftru(^ion of 
 
 their 
 
i^mm 
 
 ■msip*^ ■ ' ' ' ' I ' 
 
 ^iS"'- 
 
 t *5 ) 
 
 their feminaries, libraries, and men of fci- 
 ence, the humanizing efFedts of education 
 have been fufpended near fix years ; and a 
 large clafs of the people, in the mofl inte- 
 refting time of life, has been reared in the 
 diflblutenefs of campk, and in the habits of 
 violence and rapine. Still, however, that 
 they are wearied with their agitations'^ we 
 may infer from the ready acceptance of 
 their new conftitution. So far as can be 
 forefeen, that conftitution is the experiment 
 of men difpofed to try any thing to obtain 
 repofej and yet it affords fmall hope of 
 a permanent refting place to the country. 
 I admit that it contains many of the ele- 
 ments, which, when properly arranged, are 
 known to form the beft practical govern- 
 ments; but the parts are ftrangely and ano- 
 maloufly combined: with one power to ori- 
 ginate the laws ; \ 'ith another to accept or 
 rejedt, but not to propofe laws ; and with a 
 third power, which (though it feems in fome 
 refpedts to hold the kingly office in com- 
 
 D miilion) 
 
"wmmmm 
 
 ■» I 
 
 ^r- 
 
 [ 26 ] 
 
 miflion) is neither to propole, nor to accept, 
 nor to reject laws, but to be refponlible for a 
 fourth power, which is to be employed to ex- 
 ecute. To this jealous fovereignty, of which 
 the annual expence and mere civil lift will be 
 at leaft a million fterlir g, * are to be added 
 the paraphernalia of royalty v/ithout the 
 dignity, and alfo the diftindtions of arifto- 
 cracy, both in the parade of drefs and in 
 privileges, beyond any that exifted under the 
 profcribed monarchy : We may reafonably 
 infer, that tlie tafte for democracy is much 
 changed ; and yet, to crown the whole, the 
 occafional interference of the populace, un- 
 der the name of primary alfemblies, is added 
 to this incoherent fyftem. 
 
 § 14. It was referved for the eighteenth 
 century to fee sl great and enlightened na- 
 tion, in which All, who were not (bedding 
 
 • This would be the amount in fpccicj if paid in 
 ^fiignats, it would be fcventy-live million ftcrling. 
 
 tcarSi 
 
 u 
 
^■PK*""**"*""" 
 
 [ 27 ] 
 
 tears, were rejoicing in the fufFerings of 
 others. " But what" (exclaimed Barrere, in 
 adverting to one of the maflacres) *' what 
 ** is the prefent generation in comparifon of 
 ** the generations which are to come ?" It 
 would be a wafte of words to argue with 
 men, who, by fuch phrafes 
 
 <* Stop up th* accefs and pafTage to remorfe, 
 '* That no compuncSlious vifltings of nature 
 ** Shake their fell purpofe." 
 
 Still, however, to this application of the 
 deteftable dodlrine of expedient crimes it 
 may be anfwered, that in the eye of eter- 
 nity the prefent generation is fmall in- 
 deed ; but to the faculties and duties of 
 man it is every thing : if, by the beft exer- 
 cife of his powers, he can contribute to the 
 improvement and happinefs of the genera- 
 tion in which he lives, he may reft affured 
 that he has no better means of promoting 
 the improvement and happinefs of the genc- 
 irations which are to come. 
 
 
 D2 
 
 §15^ 
 
 fi- 
 
[ 28 ] 
 
 §15. Every difcuflion refpeding this 
 eventful period derives, from the multipli- 
 city and ipagnitude of its objedls, a tone of 
 declamation, which it is defirable to avoid. 
 An interruption has certainly been given to 
 the progrefs of. arts, of fcience, and of Ictr- 
 ters ; in return, fcenes have been exhibited, 
 which will for ages employ the pointer, the 
 moralift, the poet, and the hiftorian. 
 
 V 
 
 Ifli 
 
 hi- 
 ll 
 
 § 1 6. The French infurreftion, confider- 
 ed diftirtdt and feparate from its crimes^ ex- 
 hibits a ' mixture of impiety, kvitics, and 
 pedantry. A pantheon for the remains of 
 Voltaire, RoulTeau, Mirabeau, and Matat! 
 All religion fuperfeded by the goddtfs 
 Reafon, and this new divinity exhibited to 
 the aflembly i>f the nation in the perfon of a 
 proftitute upon a pedeftal ! The chauriting 
 of civic hymns by the legiflators in chbrtis 
 with fifliwomen ! The fraternity decreed 
 to the public executioner ! The afFeded ufe 
 
 ■ ■ - -^of 
 
[ 29 I 
 
 pf the word citizen *, and the adoption 6f 
 the claffical forms of addrefs ! The red caps^ 
 the civic feafts, the objects affigned to the 
 feftivals, and to the five complementary day^ 
 of the calendar ! All th* j " fantaftic tricks 
 =** before high Heaven'-^ efcape our indigha- 
 tion amidft the ridicule which they excite. 
 We might forgive a nation foi fufFering itfelf 
 to beperfuaded that liberty confifts in fingu- 
 iarrties; but the Angularities are fo blended 
 V^ith att-ocities, that it becomes painful oii 
 fefle(!lion to have fmiled at them. Thefe ex* 
 travagaricies, however, have had their ufe ; 
 
 r ♦ ■ 
 
 •; •* In rccapitalating the pedantries, I ought not to for- 
 get the new phrafeology (Je Neologifme de la Revolution.) 
 A catalogue of the new coined words would be curious : 
 they were often charadteriftic of the fpeakers and a^tors^ 
 and of the progrefs through confufion to crimes. For 
 example—-" Nationalifer, fayettifer, federaJifer, demo- 
 '* cratifer, demoralifer, nwnicipalifer, lanternet, volca- 
 *' nifer, feptembrifer, guillotiner, decathoiifer, fraterniferj 
 *' defocialifer, deforganifer, ferocifer, fansculottifer, pan- 
 ** thconifer : — et les fubftantifs ; Centralite, Civifme, 
 *' Sansculottifme, Terrorifme, Republicanifme, Leze^ 
 " nation, Eurocratie, Demonetifation, Baigaade, No- 
 ** yade, Fufillade, Rolandifte, Democratc, Deforganifa- 
 *' teur, Robefpierrifte, Ultra-revolutionaire, Tcrrorifte^ 
 « Septenabrifeur, SansculottiHe, &c, &c. &c." • 
 
 the^ 
 
 
 % 
 
 W 
 
'misii!x.'Ji}j.i _ 
 
 [ 3° ] 
 
 they have helped to eradicate from the 
 minds of furrounding nations the admiration, 
 which they were difpofed to feel for the 
 French infurredion. 
 
 I 
 
 ^ 
 
 § 17. Still, however, we muft recur to the 
 imprcflion made by the continental fuc- 
 ceffes, to the avowed pretenfions of aggran- 
 dizement, and to the apparent power of 
 the French armies (o enforce thofe preten- 
 fions J a due regard muft be given to thofe 
 objects, in confidering what is next to be 
 done, even if we fhould perfuade ourfelves 
 that the dodtrines and details of the French 
 revolution are beginning to be feen by 
 mankind, both with abhorrence and with 
 contempt. 
 
 It cannot be denied, that the climate of a 
 country, its extent, its populoufnefs, and the 
 nature of its government and ufages, may 
 gradually form a peculiarity of morals and 
 manners in peace, and of refource and ener- 
 gy in war ; but in reviewing the military 
 atchievements of the French, I cannot trace 
 ffe*5l, which did not naturally refult 
 
 anj' 
 
 hi% 
 
 from 
 
'- *s':'>.A'iS.'' ■ iw>j-^--^^rv 
 
 t 3' 3 
 
 ftoin. the mifmanagement of others, co-ope- 
 rating with motives which no longer fubiifl, 
 and fupported by means which are ceafing 
 to be prafticable. At the fame time it 
 would be unjuft to attribute to the national 
 character of France a diftin^ive alacrity in 
 crimes. It would be but a painful difcuf- 
 fion, whether any other country poflefling 
 numerous inhabitants, vitiated by thecorrup- 
 tions of great and opulent cities, raifed into 
 fermentation by artful and defperate men, 
 dnd thrown abruptly from the rcilraints of 
 abfolute lijonarchy to all the licentioufnefsof 
 anarchy, might not have fallen into iimilar 
 exceffes and (imilar calamities. I willingly 
 believe that France is not in her naturaj 
 Hate, but in a temporary delirium. I have 
 infifled on this point, becaufe che poflibi- 
 lity, that a fhort time may produce great 
 changes will merit attention, efpecially if it 
 fliould be thought that I lay too much ftrefs 
 on the neceflity of maintaining the war till 
 wc obtain the pacification which I (hall 
 defcribe, 
 
 §ia. 
 
 4 
 
 . ^-.,;»-.-4,^— " -«-*..#Uii*} — 
 
 ■■:f;&C :■ 
 
 .« .!.«»;» %** • 
 
 mtmn 
 
■ ' T^'T7»'™ ^ fTfiTfn^ . 
 
 ! 1 
 
 ■M 
 
 I 32 ] 
 
 ' : § 18^. What turn the French ittfufrcdioii 
 may next be cxpedted to take, what per- 
 manent form of government will at lafl be 
 cftablifhed, what relation it will hold with 
 othet nations, and to what extent the 
 iriifchief may be carried, both on the con- 
 tinent and elfe where, before general tran- 
 quillity and independen'^e can b6 reftored, 
 are queftions to which the mind looks with 
 anxiety ; but they are far beyond the reach 
 of human forefight. .^ r ; : i 
 
 It frequently happens, that the refultof 
 political meafures may be predicated by thofe 
 who arc not engaged in them. When 
 France took part in our American war, as; 
 the ally of a people in a ftate of infurredionj 
 it was evident, notwithftanding Mr. Necker's 
 affertions to the contrary, that (he was in- 
 curring not only a great debt, but an increafed 
 deficiency of revenue, from which he after- 
 wards f.ruggled fo helplefsly to recover hen 
 When the army and navy of the monarchy 
 were employed to fight the battles of a 
 revolt founded in republican principles;' 
 
 when 
 
 * 
 
 * *<»»^«,ifl*-». 
 
 ♦ * 
 
 ^ 4 n <WWK. ^jK j 
 
■ "^^T mr^'^ ' 
 
 In] 
 
 Xvlien the minifters were permitted to in- 
 dulge their vanity in tampering with inno- 
 vations i when the fpirit of reform among 
 the people was excited by writers not 
 difcountenanced by the court; when the 
 princes and nobles, under the idea of re- 
 fembling Engliflimen, wore the drelTes of 
 groomis, und confounded all appearances 
 (which are always important to the reality) 
 of rank and of inequality of condition ; and 
 when, at the fame time, by their profligacy, 
 futile manners, and irreligion, they were 
 forfeiting all claim to refpedt, it was a 
 fevere lot which was falling upon the good 
 and moral part of the nation; but it was im- 
 poflible not to " diftinguifli the figns of the 
 ** times." 
 
 In like manner, through the whole of 
 the difputes with the parliaments, the re- 
 ference to the two aflemblies of notables, 
 the invitation iflfued from Verfaiiles to every 
 individual in France to become a political 
 advifer, and the entire formation and hiftory 
 of the conftituent aflfembly, there was a 
 
 E 
 
 regular 
 
 ■•»*«w«wM*Si;.- 
 
[ 34 ] 
 
 regular and evident progrefiion (announced 
 and lamented by many) towards the con- 
 fufions which took place, and which, in 
 defpitc of the new conftitution, ftill prevail; 
 but the fituation to which that country is 
 now brought fets at defiance all fpeculation ; 
 the vellel, now rolling without mafl or 
 rudder upon the ocean of events, is too 
 large for the ftrength, and Ikill, and guid- 
 ance of men. Whether fome forturate 
 tide may bring her unbroken into port, or 
 whether Ibme new ftorm may throw her 
 piece-meal upon the fliore, time can alone 
 afcertain, 
 
 § 1 9. Certain it is, that there will be 
 farther and great changes, and, probably, 
 with the fame quicknefs of tranfition with 
 which the fame individuals, who ftill main- 
 tain the afcendency, formed the feveral 
 contradidory conftitutions of iy<)i> 1793> 
 and 1795. France, having pafl'ed from an 
 abfolute monarchy, through the indefina- 
 ble conftitution of 179 1, to a military 
 4 democracy. 
 
 1 
 I 
 
mm^mtm 
 
 k . 
 
 f [ 35 ] 
 
 democracy, has now adopted a form of 
 
 mixed oUgarcliy, which at bed can only be 
 Aated and confidered as an atteiiip: or llep 
 towards abetter fyftem; and having 5 ^ne 
 round the circle, may at laft fctile eithtr in 
 a hmited monarchy, or in the defpotil'm 
 from which flie ftarted. But it is hardly 
 poffible that fome fettlcment can much 
 longer be deferred. It was faid a few 
 weeks ago by one of the leaders, that the 
 people are almoft as much in want of a go- 
 vernment as of bread. 
 
 i * 
 
 § ?,o. It is not cafy to afcertain, whether 
 the general fpirit of the latter ad'^ of the 
 Convention is to be attributed to popular 
 influence; but certainly its moderation has 
 been confonant to the corre(5ted difpolition 
 of the people. Crowds of prifoners ifliied 
 from dungeons i the prifons became lefs 
 numerous and lefs full; public executions 
 were dilcontiiiued : the nation fecmed to 
 view thefe afts with pleafure, and in con- 
 fideration of them, to confent tacitly that 
 their reprefentatives ihould throw the 
 
 E 2 blame 
 
 -'»r^^.r. 
 
 ilirtit'ii'it-" ■ I 
 
[ 36 ] 
 
 blame of the whole upon the name and 
 
 memory of one individual. 
 
 I;"iy 
 
 I 
 
 1 
 
 § 21. It is at leaft within poflibility, that 
 France may be thrown into feparate States 
 and Republics. Her extent, and the difcor- 
 dant opinions, manners, and ufages of her dif- 
 ferent provinces, afford grounds for this fpe- 
 culation. In fuch an event, I fhould fee with 
 concern the fate of thofe, who, in the career 
 of laudable lives, have been driven from 
 their property; but I have long thought, 
 that in other refpedts the change might be 
 compatible with general tranquillity, and 
 with the eftablifhment of a peaceful and 
 profperous commerce among nations. 
 
 The only prediction, which may be made 
 with confidence, is, that new ftruggles mufl 
 ll:ill take place before the agitated country 
 under our view can attain ar^y pradicable 
 and fettled government. She has dearly pur- 
 chafecf her new conftitution, and, perhaps, 
 has not purchafed witji it any thing fnore 
 than the certainty of farther troubles. 
 
 § 22, I 
 
 
 ' '<:■ 
 

 'W0f' 
 
 
 [ 37 ] 
 
 § 22. I have not purfued this topic a& 
 fuppofing that any form whatever of govern- 
 ment eventually to be adopted by France for 
 her own interior can now furnilh a motive 
 for prolonging the war againft her, or even 
 for declining to negociate for peace, when- 
 ever the circumftances fhall afford that rea- 
 fonable hope of folidity and duration, which 
 alone makes peace defirable. I can watch 
 her revolutions without feeking to inter- 
 fere in them, farther than as they appear to 
 affedlthe fafety of that feparate portion of fo- 
 ciety in which I have duties to perform and 
 interefts to preferve : Still lefs am I lay- 
 ing the flattering undion to my mind, that 
 there can exift in France any pofiible form 
 of government, in which the jealoufies and 
 pretenfions of two large and neighbouring 
 maritime countries will not continue to 
 fupply frequent occafions of difagreement 
 and hoftility. 
 
 I 
 
 f 
 
 § 23, It would be pardonable to iiavc 
 dwelt fo long on the principles, temper, 
 
 ef^eds* 
 
 i>^ 
 
 ■•;;tm 
 
nm 
 
 ■ '- '1 '%"■• 
 
 [ 38 j 
 
 effe(5ts, and probable confequcnces of the 
 French infurredlion, if I had been merely 
 carried forwards by a fpirit of invefligation, 
 and a defire to purfue an eventful period of 
 hiflory, in which a few years have given 
 the experience of whole centuries ; it is 
 impoffible not to f^e' a peculiar intereft in 
 the miferies of a people, of whom our ideas 
 were fo different in the gay and fplendid 
 days of their attachment to their late 
 monarchy; and furely, although there 
 were imperfedions and abufes in that 
 monarchy, it was ccnliflent with every ini- , 
 provement that can enliven and embellifli 
 fociety, with much individual happinefs, 
 and great national profperity. 
 
 § 24. But I have a greater and graver 
 objedl in view. I muH, however, make 
 one previous remari\: refpefting the acftual 
 difpofition of furrounding nations to hold 
 in difguft and abhorrence the principles of 
 the French revolution. The continuance 
 ot fo falutary an impreflion, or the proL^o- 
 
 tion 
 
t 39 ] 
 tlon of it (if its exiftence (hould be quef- 
 tioned) muft depend entirely on the man- 
 ner in which the war may be clofed. If 
 France cannot be prevented from clofing 
 it on conditions which rnay hold her up ai 
 having accompli <hed the fubjugation of other 
 countries, and a pern:,anent aggrandizement 
 to her own comuarative v/eight in the ge- 
 neral fcale of power, it will be in the nature 
 of man to eflimate her principles by their 
 final refult, and the popular effer\^efcence 
 may recur with a rapidity beyond the 
 power of language todefcr.be. This whole 
 confidcration is deeply connedted with the 
 farther propofitions which I iliall new pro- 
 ceed to ftiite. 
 
 The inferences to be deduced from the ex- 
 haufted finances of France, irom the decided 
 inferiority of her naval llrength, from the as 
 yet unfettled pofition of her government, 
 and from the moderated temper of her 
 people, are all preparatory to the following 
 queilion : — How fiir may it be confident 
 with wifdom for thefe kingdoms to feek or 
 
 to 
 
 .1; 
 f 
 
 ■'I 
 

 , r 40 ] 
 
 to accept any clofe of the war, unlefs it cart 
 be accomplifhed on terms,which, on balanc- 
 ing the relative flate of power, fliall reftore 
 and fecure the fafety and independence of 
 Europe, and, above all, provide for the 
 naval and commercial interefts of thefe 
 kingdoms ? 
 
 In difcufTmg that queftion, .which occu- 
 pies the thoughts of many, I fiiall fay no- 
 thing of the campaign of the prefent year, 
 ncr of the farther operations which may be 
 cxpefted from our allies, or from the forces 
 which are now going to the Weft Indies : 
 I put fuch difcuffions out of my view at 
 prefent, and will merely remark on the ob- 
 jed laft adverted to, that it may contri- 
 bute eflentially to the means of doling the 
 war with advantage. 
 
 I am content to argue, even on the hypo- 
 thecs that our allies in the war are either 
 conquered, or worn out, or withdrawn, or 
 fo circumftanced, that they afford no rea- 
 fonable hope of farther aid or concurrence ; 
 
 that 
 
[ 41 ] 
 that all profped of fuccefs on the eaflcrn 
 or northern frontiers of France is loft ; that 
 our continental exertions (and expences) are 
 or ought to be fufpended ; and^ that the fe- 
 veral European Powers will either make a 
 forced peace, maintain an interefted neu- 
 trality, or purfue inefficient hoftilities, ac- 
 cording to their neceffities, fpeculations, and 
 faculties. On the other hand I affume, that 
 England polTefles a great naval fuperiority. 
 I will farther fuppofe (without admitting it 
 till we fee the ifllie of the meeting of the 
 new legillature) that France has now a Go- 
 vernment capable of maintaining the ac- 
 cuftomed relations of peace and amity; and 
 (which is more probable) that the French 
 leaders are difpofed to treat for peace. In 
 tills predicament, feeling the preflure of the 
 J, j!»lic expence -, feeling that the country is 
 ii fiCus of peace ; and conlidering the high 
 price of the necelTaries of life, to the gene- 
 ral fcarcity of which the war certainly con- 
 tributes, though in a much lefs degree than 
 is commonly fuppofed j knowing alfo that 
 
 F there 
 
[ 42 ] 
 
 there are certain bounds, beyond which 
 our refources cannot be forced without 
 danger i I afk myfelf whether it is expe- 
 dient to treat for peace, and on what ge- 
 neral outline and ftipulations it might be 
 expedient to conclude a peace. 
 
 V 
 
 § ::5. Tr the firft of thofe queftions I 
 anfwer, that i the duty of thofe who 
 conduct the war to treat for peace when- 
 ever negociation can tend to any probable . 
 good. The fyflem of the French govern- 
 ment (whatever may become its particular 
 form) is no longer likely to be an ob- 
 flacle to negociation ; befides, the modes 
 are infinite by which two nations at war 
 may found each other's difpofition without 
 humiliation to either. The concluding is 
 a very different confideration, to be decided 
 only by a due eftimate of the conditions at- 
 tainable, and of the confequences if thofe 
 conditions fhould be rejeded by us. 
 
 The extent of the French claims as the 
 
 price of pacification is npw known. If we 
 
 8 are 
 
.. 
 
 t 4,1 ] 
 
 are to fuppofe that their leaders will adhere 
 to what they haVe profefled in their late 
 decrees, I cannot hefitate to fay, that the 
 preponderance, which our acceflion to thofe 
 claims, or to any confiderable part of them, 
 muft give tc France, unlefs an adequate 
 compenfation in fome other fhape can be 
 fecured to us, would be di(honourable, and 
 exhibit us to the prefent age and to pofte- 
 rity as fubmitting to have the law prefcribed 
 to us by our enemy .-*-And what law ? The 
 facrifice of Powers that have been the moll: 
 nearly connefted with us j the dire<ft or in-. 
 diredt annexation to France of all the ports 
 of ^the continent from Dunkirk to Ham- 
 burgh J an immenfe celfion of territory ; 
 and, in one word, the abandonment of the 
 independence of Europe. 
 
 And yet we fee and know that the peo- 
 ple thus prefcribing to us are without any 
 eftablifhed conftitution ; diflraded by po- 
 pular convulfions j in a jftate of irretrievable 
 bankruptcy ; without commerce, except in 
 the exportation of coin in return for pro- 
 
 F 2 vifions. 
 
 ■*»-■•*'*»>'*■■ 
 
 '^VO'A-'I 
 
f^WPHHA. I III I [..Jl^KU 
 
 «HW!*W!|IWfJ.i!V^ 
 
 [ 44 } 
 
 vifions, ammunition, and naval ftores; wkfv 
 their principal ports blockaded; and with- 
 out a fleet that can venture to face one of 
 our detached fquadrons. Our profpedts are 
 elTentially better ; if we have refources and 
 lirmneis^ are better than they were twelve 
 montlis ago ; and the difadvaatages, if we 
 oive way, will be certain, immediate, and 
 boundlefs. 
 
 It is true, that by giving way we might 
 liave fomc of the benefits of a temporary 
 peace. The exhaufted ftate of France might 
 not permit her to avail herfr'" immediately 
 of her new advantages ; ' at the evident 
 precarioufnefs of our poll tion would be fuch, 
 that we muft continue to maintain the pre- 
 parations and expences of war. Unhappily 
 it is the incorrigible policy of neighbouring, 
 rtates to lower and diftrefs each other ; and 
 it is impoffible to convince mankind that 
 their profperity is beft promoted and fecured 
 by the profperity of all around them. When, 
 however, a pacification takes place between 
 two fettled governments, an exhaufting 
 
 uonteil may be followed by an interval of 
 
 unequivocal 
 
 ■ *"♦ — .*-|«,V * • 
 
[ 45 1 
 unequivocal tranquillity ; and this has ofte'rt 
 been the cafe between England and Francey 
 though the intervals have been Ihort ; but 
 jn the inftance which I have hypothetically 
 defcribed, no fuch interval could be ex- 
 pelled. 
 
 § 26. On the whole view of our refpec- 
 tive fituations, and after making to France 
 a full allowance for all her continental ad- 
 vantages, and coniidering at the fame time 
 ouracquif)tions and profpedls, and the com- 
 parative ft ate of circumilances, we are en*- 
 titled to require, that the French armies 
 iliall be recalled within their old boundaries ; 
 that Europe, in the general effedt of arrange- 
 ments, rtiall be replaced as nearly as may be 
 on the fame balance as before the war; and 
 particularly with rcfpedt to the naval and 
 commercial interefls of thefe kingdoms, that 
 F'rance iliall not have obtained, in the rcfult, 
 any new means of preponderance. In order 
 to arrive at fuch an adjuftment, and par- 
 ticularly in the eventual difcuflions relative 
 to pofleiTions feparatcd from the continent 
 
 of 
 
 ' iil. 
 
"I'Ti WW""'"" '! ViilJHi(i['A^I"»l|i^"i»JHIU, 
 
 V 
 
 • r 
 
 t 46 1 
 
 f Eur ue, much muft depend on expkna* 
 tion, a .d on reafons of mutual and relative 
 convenience. 
 
 § 27. All the advantages of war are at 
 prefent with England, confidered as an 
 infular naval power, and feparatcd as fhe 
 now Hands from the reft of Europe i fepa^ 
 rated not by any fault of hcr's, but by the 
 fate of war, and by the fault of others. 
 
 As the war is at prefent circumftanced, 
 its expence to us may be greatly contradted : 
 England may gain much, and rifks little j 
 fhe has the profpedt of ruining flill farther 
 the reduced commerce and naval power of 
 her rival. 
 
 But if the other countries, which have 
 been overwhelmed by the torrent from which 
 we have efcaped, were to be left entirely to 
 their fate, and if all the confiderations of 
 honour and territory were out of the 
 queftion, it might ftill be doubted how far 
 Great Britain could hope to fland alone as 
 a rich and profperous nation. 
 
 § 28. It 
 
 k> »tm M i*«Knti<-i»»ta 
 
.' 
 
 [ 47 ] 
 
 § 28. It is not eafy to draw inferences 
 from the real or fuppofcd interefts of 
 France j all her adivity has long tended to 
 her own mifery, and to the mifery and 
 alarm of otlier ftates. At the fame time 
 I cannot fliut my eyes againft this glaring 
 truth, that the want of indifpenfable arti- 
 cles of fubfiftence and of money, and the 
 whole prelTure of her interior circum- 
 fiances, may foon make a return to peace 
 not only defirable, but neceflary to her. 
 
 If the French leaders are lincere in 
 trying to fettle a conftitution upon prin- 
 ciples of mixed democracy and ariftocracy, 
 they cannot be ignorant that a large land- 
 ing army is incompatible with fuch a con- 
 ftitution; and they well know, that the 
 propofed aggrandizement can only be main- 
 tained by a large Handing army. The ex- 
 perience of ages has fliewn, that large ar- 
 mies; which always form a fort of feparate 
 ftate, yield a precarious obedience to popu- 
 lar authorities. How far the new confti-* 
 tution is maintainable either with or with-' 
 
 out; 
 
 i^ A-iAu. 
 
 ■jiiiiihtiiirliiifltit 
 
"' .'■ 
 
 I 
 
 1 I 
 
 / 
 
 if 
 
 
 .l> 
 
 f 48 ] 
 
 out a large army, is another confideration 
 which at prefent I (hall put afide. It was 
 the eftablilhed army which deftroyed the 
 monarchy i it has fuice been employed to 
 overawe the democracy, and, perhaps, will 
 at lafl prove fatal to the whole vifionary 
 {peculation of an indivifible republic of 
 thirty millions of inhabitants, extending 
 from the Lower Meufe to the Pyrenees, 
 and from the Rhine 'o the Atlantic. 
 
 § 29. It cannot be unknown to France, 
 that any ceflion of the conquefts in 
 queftion muft be extorted by a fevere 
 compullion ; and that if any powers 
 have, during the war, given way to her 
 claims, it has been on the fpur of a real 
 or fuppofed neceffity, or from fome mo- 
 tive lefs calculated to infpire confidence. 
 It may be an immorality in politics, but 
 national ceflions of importance are never 
 made without a fecret hope that fome oc- 
 cafion may arrive for wre fling them back 
 again, 
 
 Wh^n 
 
 1. 
 
 
 „ / .1 ' 
 
, 
 
 t 49 1 
 
 'The French anfwer to thefe reafonlngs, 
 that nature has pointed out the Alps, and the 
 CQurfe of the Rhine and of the Lower Meufe, 
 as the eaOern and northern boundaries of the 
 French empire : if by nature is meant 
 Providence, (or, according to the laft invo- 
 cation adopted by the Convention, " The 
 •* Genius which prefides over France,") 
 there is neither religion, nor fenfe, nor 
 modefty, nor morality in fuch a pretenfion; 
 it might with equal propriety be faid, that 
 nature has pointed out the Baltic and the 
 borders of Siberia. 
 
 I will not make fo harfh an infinuation, 
 as that all the pacifications hitherto con- 
 cluded by the differci.' powers, which were 
 engaged in the war, are falfe and hollow; but 
 any man who knows even the fuperficial 
 interefts of ftates, and who looks at the 
 ceffions of Maeftricht, of Breda, of Hel- 
 voet, of Cleves, of the Spanifli moiety of 
 St. Domingo, of Rheinlberg, and of Man-, 
 heim, knows \yell that fuch ceflions arc 
 
 G either 
 
T 
 
 • )<fy.5;^'^ -■ 
 
 1 ' 
 
 I 
 
 t 5° ] 
 
 Cither to be compendited by the efTeA of 
 fecret articles, or that they will be relumed 
 whenever the refumption becomes prac- 
 ticable. 
 
 1 . 
 
 § 30. It is evident, that fome of the 
 conquefts of France, under the union v^^hich 
 (he propofes, wrAdd be fources to her, not 
 of wealth, but of expence. It is in moft 
 cafes improvident to appropriate what can- 
 not be retained without an incelTant exer- 
 tion. Countries fpeaking a different lan- 
 guage, attached to different cuftoms, and 
 influenced by jarring interefts, may be go- 
 verned by force ; but it will be an unfure 
 fubjedion : it might even be doubted, 
 whether the Polifli partitions will not ulti- 
 mately recoil on the great powers con- 
 cerned in them, and prove that they are as 
 irreconcilable to political wifdom as they 
 are to morality. 
 
 Will it be anfwered, that if thefe pofitions 
 arc true, they prove only that we ought not 
 
 to 
 
 I 
 
.f 
 d 
 
 f 51 ] 
 
 to objea: to France retaining her conquefts, 
 becaufe the conquered countries will cm- 
 barrafs her, and probably rife againft her ? 
 my reply is, that tho' it may be unwife on 
 the part of our enemy to contend defperately 
 for an equivocal advantage] on the other 
 hand we ought not, in the pofition in which 
 we are, to leave even doubtful a fpeculativc 
 aggrandifement of fuch extent ; and to wait 
 in an imperfe<5l and expenfive ftate of peace 
 for cafual advantages in the explofion of 
 new troubles. 
 
 § 31. In the conclufions to which I am 
 tending, I aiTume that France is not to re- 
 main in a ftate of anarchy j and if ihe can 
 obtain a practicable conftitution, evvn for a 
 limited period of time, fhewill be in a con- 
 dition to re-eftabli(h the accuftomed rela- 
 tions of peace and amity ; {he will at the 
 fame time acquire an intereft in thofe rela* 
 tions far beyond the importance of coftly 
 and offenlive conquefts. It is incumbent 
 on her to advert to the repair of her ii- 
 
 G 2 nances> 
 
I 
 
 [ 52 ] 
 
 nances, and to the preflure of thofe milliards 
 of aflignats, " which" (in the words of one of 
 her committees) " have left nothing in the 
 *^ country but mifery and paper." What 
 is to become of thofe milliards, a few months 
 more muft decide. Some other means muft 
 be adopted. We may wait with deciiive 
 advantage to learn what thofe iTicans may 
 be, if in the interval we cannot attain jufu 
 and honourable terms of pacification. It is 
 farther indifpenfible for France to advert to 
 the re-eftabli(hmentcf her agriculture, ma- 
 nufactures, and commerce ; I may add, to 
 repair her population; for i fliould noi 
 exaggerate if I were to aifert that flic has 
 loft at leaft three millions of inhabitants by 
 the eiFe(5ts of the infurreclion and the war. 
 
 Above all, £he w'U find in peace the only 
 hope of emerging from that fcarcity of fuf- 
 tenance, which (from whatever caufe de- 
 rived) keeps all her populous towns under 
 the prefTure or menace of a famine. 
 
 If the war continues, the dearth will ex- 
 tend itfelf even to the productive countries 
 
 of 
 
 •^^r' 
 

 of the Palatinate, of the Auftrian Nether^ 
 lands, r.ad alfo of Holland. We know that 
 though Amfterdam was, by the effed of her 
 pofition, the greateft corn market in Eu-. 
 lope, the Dutch provinces did not produce 
 a fufficiency even for their own confump- 
 tion 5 their intercourfe with the Baltioi 
 during the whole of this year, has been in- 
 terrupted by the war, and will now be fuf- 
 pen^ed by the winter, 
 
 §32. The conlideration laft alluded to is 
 certainly become of ferious moment to this 
 kingdom alio. It h;: s been laid, and the opinion 
 goes forth, that the icarcity and high price 
 of all the neceflaries of life are in fom.e mea- 
 fure caufed by the war. Sibjcd to certain 
 explanations, this aflertion may bs true with 
 refped both to Great Britain and to all Eu- 
 rope. With refped: however to Great 
 Britain, it is to be remarked that large bo- 
 dies of our infantry and cavalry have, during 
 a fpace of more than two years, been main- 
 tained upon the contin mt, and in a ccnli- 
 cjerable degree by the i reduce of the con- 
 tinent j 
 
■aSHBI 
 
 H; 
 
 ]\ 
 
 li 
 
 i\ 
 
 V 
 
 t 54 ] 
 
 tifl^nt ; nor mull we forget the aid derived 
 from the numerous cargoes of provifions 
 which have been feized in their paffage to 
 the French ports. In a general view, the 
 dilapidations and wnAc of war are certainly 
 great. The confumption made by men af- 
 fembled in armies and in fleets is much more 
 than the confumption occafiorted by fimilar 
 numbers in peaceful occupations. The wafte 
 which happens in great ftores and maga- 
 zines, and in fhips of war and tranfports, the 
 interruptions given to agriculture, the ra- 
 vage and deftrudlion of crops by the march 
 and maintenance of large bodies of cavalry, 
 are all in fome degree operative caufes of 
 fcarcity ; but we are not to infer that thofe 
 caufes would be removed by a pacification, 
 Unlefs the conditions of that pacification 
 were fuch as to eftablifh a real tranquillity 
 and confidence among mankind, the evils 
 refulting from military preparations, and 
 naval equipments would be prolonged -, and 
 fo far as ** kingdom is feparately aflfed:ed 
 by thofe evils, they would be increafed by 
 
 the 
 
♦•• .; 
 
 / 
 
 [ 55 ] 
 the facility opened to the hoftile ports of 
 
 Europe to receive cargoes, the irwpoftatiofi 
 
 of which may be diredtcd to the aid of thefe 
 
 kiiTgdonis and their dependencies whilft the 
 
 war cortinues. . . 
 
 In truth, a principal caufe of the prefent 
 fiiarcity of bi cad-corn in Europe is to be 
 found in the extraordinary and frequent He-* 
 currence of bad feafons in the laft eight 
 years : and though the prefent feafon has 
 given an abundant produce of fome kinds 
 of grain, and of other articles of nouriih- 
 ment, and fuch as will remove all danger of 
 famine, I am apprehenltve, from the belt 
 enquiries and obfervation in my power, 
 that the crops of wheat, colleilive' taken, 
 will not amount to what is called by the 
 farmers a medium crop. 
 
 It is well known, and has been afcer- 
 tained, that, " with the exception of barley 
 ** only, this country, viiich in former times 
 " produced more grain than was neceflary 
 " for its inhabitants, has, during the laft 
 
 twenty-live years, been under the necef- 
 
 " fity 
 
 «< 
 
 i 
 
 '^ 
 
 If 
 
mm 
 
 ,-^ 
 
 ■•.■■«*••.,■ 
 . ( ■.■■ ■ 
 
 <c 
 
 t< 
 
 ** fity of depending on the produce of fo- 
 ** rfcign countries for a part of its fapply.** 
 There is reafon alfo to believe* " that, in or- 
 dinary years, the produce of corn in Eu- 
 rope is not more than equal to the con- 
 ** fumption of its inhabitants." When, 
 therefore, wars and commotions, and their 
 wafteful confequences prevail; when the 
 feafons are bad j and farther, when the Eu- 
 ropean competition for fupplies from the 
 harvefts of North America becomes fuch as 
 greatly to raife the prices, and even to create 
 a demand beyond what that country can fur- 
 nifh, we cannot be furprifed at the diffi- 
 culty which has taken place It is juft 
 matter of regret, and a perilous refponfi- 
 bility, whenever the executive government 
 of a country feels itfelf obliged to undertake 
 the details of procuring food for the people, 
 and to fuperfede the merchants, whofe 
 energy, and competition, and capitals, are, 
 in general cafes, the beft and fureft vehicles 
 of fupply ; but this interference of go- 
 vernment was, perhaps, unavoidable in the 
 6 prefcnt 
 
*'". 
 
 •'■'HM^'- 
 
 '■ ' '/.'^K-. '*• 
 
 ■< ■■m- 
 
 
 ■ • ■ • [ S7 ] 
 prefent inftance, when the nece/fities of 
 France had raifed the prices in the diilint 
 markets beyond what the agents of the 
 merchants could venture to give; and it 
 feems now to be indifpcn fable, as any fudden 
 reVulfion in the aftual channel of fupply 
 from foreign ports might operate as an en- 
 tire interruption for many months. 
 
 The prices might be lowered, and the 
 danger of meeting the next harvefl with 
 empty granaries might be averted, if the 
 people could be induced for a limited period 
 to ufe with the wheat a certain proportion 
 of the other kinds of grain* This, how- 
 ever, is very difncult. In the mean time, I 
 have not a doubt that the meafures which 
 have been taken have materially contributed 
 to lefTen the danger and prefliire of the 
 greateft calamity that can fall upon nations. 
 I fhall not enter farther into a fubjedl which 
 muft foon come under the confideration of 
 parliament ; it is fufficient for my purpofe 
 to repeat, that the fcarclty of fubliftence is 
 a motive which ought to operate forcibly 
 
 H with 
 
 r A- .> ' 
 
 ■**■' 
 
 . ..^jil-.'"ii,i.a:-r'.« 
 
IM 
 
 msmm^ 
 
 HP 
 
 v*^. 
 
 r. 
 
 • V 
 
 1 ■:' 
 
 . '■' 
 
 i- );;■' •'■ 
 
 '^'• 
 
 
 with France towards producing peace ; and 
 that certainly it does not afFed thefe king- 
 doms in the fame point of view, nor in the 
 fame extent. r - 
 
 
 
 It 
 
 El 
 
 § 33. In looking to the objeds of preli- 
 minary negociation, the attention is called to 
 the diftant fcenes in the Weft-Indies, and 
 to the manner in which thofe iflands fhould 
 hereafter be governed. 
 
 In the difaftrous and baneful character of 
 
 « 
 
 this war, it has been the policy of the French 
 leaders to " generalize" (as they termed it) 
 confufions among mankind, and to fet afloat 
 eveiy country which they could not other- 
 wife reduce or retain. This infernal prin- 
 ciple has governed the whole of their mea- 
 fures relative to the Iflands. They began 
 by extending their citizenfliip and fra- 
 ternity to the people of colour ; they next 
 proclaimed a total abolition of llavery, ab- 
 ruptly, and without providing againft the 
 convulfions and general deftrudion of life 
 and property, v/hich fo fudden a change was 
 certain to create ; they have fince proceeded 
 
 to. 
 
 " 
 

 
 , 
 
 ^ 
 
 [ 59 ] 
 to arm the negro infurgents in a mafs, and 
 this was called " the fimple operation of 
 ** purifying the colonial fyftem of the French 
 ** illands, for the purpofe of accomplifliing 
 " the deftruaion of all the Britifli co- 
 « lonies." 
 
 I do not mean to enter into certain quef- 
 tions which this recital fuggefts. In the 
 opinions of fome, the Weft India illands are 
 the regions of injuftice, cruelty, and mor- 
 tality j the grave of Europeans, and the hell 
 of Africans : in the opinion of others, there 
 exifts neither a general unwholefomeneis cf 
 the climate, nor cruelty in the condition and 
 treatment of the flaves: whatever maybe the 
 truth in thefe oppofite alTertions, it muft be 
 fubmitted to the imprefiion of time and of 
 events. 
 
 So long, however, as we retain the valuable 
 pofleirions alluded to, and in the fyftem un- 
 der which they are become an eflential part 
 of our profperity, every confideration of re- 
 gard to our commerce, of juftice to nume- 
 
 11 2 rous 
 
 :'--^J.Lti' 
 
 MdunM* 
 

 ! 
 
 [ 60 ] " 
 
 rous and refpedtable proprietors, of protec- 
 tion to the planters, and of humanity to the 
 inhabitants and to the flaves themfelves, 
 Hiould induce us to provide for their per- 
 manent tranquillity. With that view it is 
 eflential that the feveral powers of Europe 
 fhould have fome analogy in the interior 
 fyftems of the feveral iflands which they may 
 refpedivcly retain on clofing the war : unlefs 
 this can be accomplifhed, or unlefs we can 
 acquire,'_keep, and refettle the iflands, which 
 the French principles have fubverted and 
 thrown into confufion, the fermentations to 
 be communicated between the neighbouring 
 colonies will be great, the difagreements 
 will be incellant, and caufes even of na- 
 tional quarrels will arife from day to day. 
 
 § 34. There are certain other points ob- 
 vioufiy important to be adverted to in any 
 pacification -, but I abftain from them as 
 they are not of a nature to form infur- 
 mountable obftacles to peace, if the greater 
 
 ., . difficulties 
 
 "n^-nT'^y^ *>,.*» _,- -* ■*" 
 
.♦V.' 
 
 K 
 
 [ 6i ] 
 
 difficulties to which I have alluded can be 
 removed. ' / '^„ " • ': 
 
 § 35. There is nothing in thefe remar^i, 
 which can be juftly fubjed to the invidious 
 charge of recommending and promoting 
 war: I wifh the bleffings of peace to be as 
 univerfally fliared as the air which we 
 breath ; but I know that both their reality 
 and their permanence muft depend on clof- 
 ing the war by conditions very different 
 from thofe which are defcribed in the 
 French decrees of the 30ta September. 
 
 
 § 36. We have incurred the chief ex- 
 pences and inconvenience*" of war; we 
 have compleated arrangements of force, 
 which, by the nature of our commerce and 
 conftitution, can never be attained without 
 great delay and difficulty; our military 
 eftablifhment is high and refpedtable -, our 
 navy is carried to an improvement and pre- 
 eminence in ilrength and ikill, of which 
 there is no example in our hiftory j we 
 
 have 
 
 fl»- 
 
 J iL 
 
 "'-"■"Ag''.?!:^ >.' ' ■' "-_ ' » ..'a. 
 
 •ml^ntH 
 
 ^w^ 
 
fmmw^ 
 
 ■pp 
 
 
 .V' 
 
 [ 62 ] ■ 
 
 have prepared, and are fending to fea an 
 expedition, from which it is reafonable to 
 expedt important effects: thus circumftanced 
 it is furely wifer to profecute the war, than 
 to clofe it on conditions which would oblige 
 us, either to continue the expence of war, 
 or to expofe ourfelves to a fudden return of 
 dangers and calamities, with the difad van- 
 tage of being unprepared for them. Let 
 us have a peace, and not a temporary and 
 fliort fufpenfion of war ; let us have a 
 peace, fuch as may make it confident with 
 prudence to difiim, and fuch as may afford 
 a good ground of fecial fecuritVi let it 
 maintain the general balance of power 
 among independent flates ; let it exhibit 
 to us France herfelf with a government (be 
 it of what defcription it may) confiflent, if 
 poflible, with her own quiet and profperity, 
 but at any rate confiflent with the fafety of 
 other countries. 
 
 
 § 37. It may be faid, that the rigid prin- 
 ciples which France profefles will not per- 
 mit 
 
SI. 
 
 1 ? 
 
 [ 63 ] 
 
 mit her to recede from the extended h'ne of 
 boundaries fo recently decreed by her Con- 
 vention after a folemn difcuflion. I will 
 not attempt to conjefture the motives of fo 
 flrange a meafare; but I know that it 
 cannot have been more folemn than the 
 repeated oaths and decrees of the ccnftltu- 
 ent and legiflative alTemblies, never to 
 make conquefts. We have feen, in nume- 
 rous inftances, that the decrees of the Con- 
 vention are not irrevocable j it is unnecef- 
 fary to carry the recoUeclion farther back 
 than to the treaty with the Royalifls and 
 Vend ans, w^hich promifed to them a large 
 indemnity, and other conditions applicable 
 only to independent powers ; and all this 
 after repeated decrees never to treat with 
 them, but to exterminate them. 
 
 § 3S. In treating of the termination of 
 the war, humanity and juftice fuggeft a 
 wifli that, whatever may be the modifica- 
 tions of territory and dominion, the prin- 
 ciples 
 
 ^^n ;4,'i..!5 !.:■., 
 
 ^tarnatm* 1 1 iJttMWWM'i'g;: 
 
 i;'"A ^4ti -^m*^'-' 
 
mm 
 
 [ 64 ] 
 
 ciplcsof the ftatus quo ante bellum might, by 
 the returning jufticeandgcnerofity of France, 
 be extended to individuals and to families, 
 who, in the courfe of thefe troubles, have 
 quitted their country ; but in ftating this, I 
 do not perfuade myfelf, that fuch a meafure 
 ■would furnifh, for any long period, new 
 and efficient links of friendftiip on the part 
 of France towards England. 
 
 § 39. It is the nature and fate of mod 
 contefts, that, though the provocations are 
 multiplied by the events which take place, 
 the paffions and fenfe of refentment are 
 lowered by the lapfe- of time, and thus 
 every war has its period, at which both 
 parties begin to figh for peace ; that mo- 
 ment is perhaps approaching ; but the dif- 
 ficulty of adjufting a pacification is at pre- 
 fent very different from what it was in for- 
 mer wars. We mufl meet the difficulty ; 
 and in the mean time we mufl moderate the 
 inconfiderate eagernefs of thofe, who, hav- 
 S ing 
 
n 
 
 t «5 ] 
 
 Ing reprobated the war from the firft, with- 
 out regard to its neceflity, now call for an 
 immediate peace, without regard to the at- 
 tainable conditions or confequences ; on 
 the other hand, we muft not be hurried 
 forward by the dodtrines of thofe who think 
 it effential to reflore the French monarchy; 
 we muft promote that fort of fpirit, which 
 is equally diftant from an undue impatience 
 for peace, and from an obftinate perfeve- 
 rance in pretenfions not to be maintained. 
 
 § 40. It is a weak argument, but it will be 
 faid, that we ought to make peace, becaufe 
 feveral powers of the late coalition have made 
 it, and becaufe others may, perhaps, be ex- 
 peded to withdraw themfelves in like man- 
 ner from the war, and upon grounds and fti- 
 pulations, which abandon and renounce all 
 the objeds of our conteft. It often happens 
 that thefe great coalitions, even when formed 
 and fu[ ported by themoft honourable fenfe of 
 public expediency, fail to produce, in coun- 
 fel or in adlion, all the effect that was ex- 
 
 I peded 
 
 
^mum 
 
 i-vwqpOTwnavaw^^ 
 
 [ 66 ] 
 
 pe(^led from them; and with refped to 
 the powers dluded to, I muft repeat, that 
 their difpofition and views are not to be 
 inferred from the treaties which they have 
 figned: fome of thofe treaties contain the 
 feeds of future hofliHties j others of them 
 imply nothing more than a truce, or tempo- 
 rary repofe from w^ar.j a.; the utmoft, they arc 
 the partial pacifications of feparate princes, 
 and in no degree embrace thofe principles of 
 general policy, to which it is elTential for 
 us to advert, if we mean to reilore peace, 
 or even the fcmblance of peace, to Europe. 
 
 § 41. I fee with deep concern the ra-? 
 vages which Europe has fuffored, and the 
 dangers which ftill prevail ; there is, how- 
 ever, nothing radically difcouraging in our 
 pofition ; if there were, a want of firmnefs 
 ./ould tend to make that pofition worfe than 
 it is : the whole clofes in this fingle point; 
 the expediency of bearing and rilking 
 fomething more for the hope, profped, 
 " and effential purpofe of reftoring general 
 ♦* peace on fecure and permanent grounds.* ' 
 g I have 
 
 t< 
 
 (( 
 
 i 
 
™ >«a «M» t»- 
 
 ^■A 
 
 [ 67 I 
 
 I have attempted to argue, that fuch a 
 clofe of the war is for the advantage even of 
 France -, but if it were not, I contend that it 
 is better for her to make peace in the 
 manner defcribed, than to continue the war. 
 If, however, fhe fhould not accede to either 
 of thefe opinions, I infift that it is incumbent 
 on this country, and effeni: il to her fafety, 
 and perhaps to her exiftence, to maintain the 
 irruggle. I conceive that (lie may maintain 
 it with a diminiHied expence, with little 
 hazard or detriment, and with a profpeft, 
 at no diftant period, of refulting and com- 
 penfating advantages. In this perfualion, 
 and in the confidence that we have the for- 
 titude and the means to encounter the dif- 
 ficulties which furround us, I feel a pride 
 and fatisfadion in thinking that England, 
 by maintaining with firmnefs principles of 
 found policy, will ftand fuccefsfully the huU 
 wark of nations, of focial order, of rational 
 liberty, and of religion. 
 
 § 42. The ranidity of thefe remarks and 
 inferences may lave led me to ufe expref-* 
 
 iions. 
 
 // 
 

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 4<^;f<teli on revifion I may,wiiEli^(|tno- 
 
 ^Ify and corred:; I may alio have i^ii 
 
 into repetitions amidft the complicated awd 
 
 recurring objeds of fuch an enquiry? -I 
 
 truft, however, that the impreffion of what 
 
 J have urged will be taken from the w^iole, 
 
 iand not from detached paflagcs. r^:^!,^. 
 
 '\ It is poflible that fome unforefeen viciffir 
 
 ftude may overfet the entire fabric -of 
 
 ipiy fpeculations, or even that, in the- 
 
 eventful courfe of the French agitations, 
 
 the whole confideration may be vyarled 
 
 ^^Uvhilll I ^m writing thefe pages, i'he ri|^ 
 
 -^ ,or fall of an individual will alone fometim^ 
 
 *change all the views and principles <rfj)0- 
 
 litical negociations and of ftates. Still, hpw- 
 
 '«ver, fuch of my pofitions as are founded in 
 
 ;V, \ .truth will remain unfliaken, and will be 
 
 ', >nore or lefs applicable to the new objei^sqf 
 
 '"'*. * policy, expediency, or neceffity, which m.Jty 
 
 ^■^ ."prcfent themfelves. In the mean time it is •; '• 
 
 V • better to reafon from what exifts, thanfrom 
 
 * ^ ' "^ endlefs conjediures as to what may happenV 
 
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