THE MARCH TO THE SEA CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.—X. THE MAECH TO THE SEA FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE BY JACOB \). COX, LL.D., LATE MAJOB-OKNERAL COMMANDINO TWENTY-THIRD AKMY COBFS AUTUOB OF "ATLANTA," ETC. 40154 NEW YORK CHAKLES SCRIBN.Ell'S SONS 1882 PROPfRTY Ot bhiversity of Waterloo THE LIBRAKY .A:i;,- COPYBIOHT BY CHARLES SPRIBNER'S SONS 1882 Trow's PiUNTlNG AND BOOKBINDINU CoMl'ANY 80i-ai3 East fztk Street NEW YORK PHEFACE. The class of reaclers which has been most in the author's mind in preparing the two vohimes assigned him in the series, is that which includes the surviving officers and men who served in the late war. His aim has been to supple- ment their personal knowledge by the facts which are within the reach of recent research, and to give unity and sym- metry to the hiatoiy of the campaigns here told, by examin- ing each in the light of the plans and purposes of the leaders on both sides. The limits assigned io the volumes have made it neces- sary to choose between the narration of incidents which would enliven the story, and that fulness of strictly military detail which seemed necessary to make the several cam- paigns clearly intelligible, and to enable the reader to judge, with some degree of satisfaction, the character of the opera- tions. The former course would perhaps have made the work more popular, but the latter has seemed likely to make it more useful and to meet the wishes of those for whom it has been chiefly written. It is still hoped, however, that the general reader will not find it difficult to follow the movements described, and that the eflfort to do so will give to such a broader understanding of what the great game of war really is. The maps in both volumes are, with two exceptions, re- Vi PREFACE. duced copies of the official siuTeya made by the engineers of the army. For the originals the author is indebted to the courtesy of Cdneral Poe, U. S. Engineers. In reducing them it has not been possible to preserve all the details of the originals ; but the eflfort has been to give accurately what is most essential. The reader is presumed to make reference to an ordinary hand-atlas for the relations of the special theatre of operations to that of the whole war. To have illustrated the text by larger and more elaborate maps would have thwarted the pui-pose of the publishers to put the series within the r jach of all. To General Drum, Adjutant-General, and to Colonel Scott, of the War Records Office, the author is greatly indebted for access to unpublished archives, and for official informa- tion without which it would have been impossible to reach the degree of accuracy which he hopes will be found to mark the more important parts of the narrative : it would be vain to expect to escape all error with our present means of investigation. A still greater debt of obligation, if possible, is due to Major E. C. Dawes, late of the Fifty-third Ohio, who has not only given the use of his valuable collection of books and documents relating to the war, but has thought no personal trouble too great in assisting to verify facts and trace events, and whose zeal in investigation has been a con- stant aid and stimulus. Cincinnati, September, 1883. . ; •» ■ -f CONTENTS. » - • > PASB List op Maps, ** CHAPTER I. . . Planning tub Campaign, ....... 1 CHAPTER II. , . . ., The March Through Georgia, 21 CHAPTER III. Savannah, 43 CHAPTER IV. Middle Tennessee — Pulaski to Spring Hill, . . 63 CHAPTER V. Battle op Franklin, 81 CHAPTER VI. Battle op Nashville, 99 viii CONTENTS. CnAPTEll VII. PAOB The Puksuit after tiik Battle —Rksults ok the Campaign 124 t CIIAPTEU \IU. FoUT FiBiiEll, 137 CHAPTEU IX. Captuue of Wilmington— Battle op Kinston, . . 147 CHAPTER X. Savannah to Columbia, lO'J CHAPTER XI. AvEUAsnono and Benton villb — Reunion of the Gband Abmy, 177 CHAPTER XII. Stoneman's and Wilson's Cavaluy E-vpeditions, . 199 CHAPTER XIII. GoLDsnoRo TO Raleigh— Surrender of Johnston's Aimv, 211 APPENDIX A. Forces op the Opposing Armies in Tennessek, . . 219 APPENDIX B. Organization of Opposing Armies in Tennessee, . 223 CONTENTS. ix APPENDIX C. Confederate Stragglers, 230 APPENDIX D. Battle op Franklin, a33 APPENDIX E. Strength of the Opposing Armies in the Carolinas, . 239 APPENDIX F. Organization of Opposing Armies in the Carolinas, . 244 Index, 251 LIST OF MAPS. Atlanta to Savannah, Savannah and Vicinity, . Middle Tennessee, .... Vicinity op Columbia, Tenn., Battle-Field op Fkanklin, Map OB Battle-Field of Nashville, Fort Fisher and Wilmington, N. C, Map of North Carolina, Map of Battle op Kinston, . Battle op Bentonvillk, . PAGE , 20 , 45 . 62 , 68 . 83 . 109 189 146 157 190 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. CHAPTER I. PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN. When Sherman stood upon the border of Alabama, at the close of October, 1864, looking toward Gadsden, and follow- ing in his mind's ejo the retreating forces of Hood w^.o was marching westward, he had an undoubting conviction that the true counter-movemenb was to turn his back upon his adversaiy and march away for Savannah and the sea. He had formed the opinion at the beginning of the month, but the campaign of October made him sure of it. The mobil- ity of Hood's army was such that there was little hope of coming up with it till accident, or the exhaustion of the countiy, should force him to come to bay. The delays to a pursuing column may be indefinitely increased by an active and well-handled rear guard, and the moral effect of allow- ing the war to be transferred again to Tennessee would be eveiy way bad. Still, if Hood had crossed the Tennessee anywhere between Stevenson and Guntersville, in the bond of the river, Sherman would have i)ursuod hiiu ; biit when he marched to Decatur, and, upon General li. S. Granger Vol. X— 1 2 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. showing a bold front there, moved still further west to Tus- cumbia, nearly at the Mississippi line, it was clear as day to the National Commander that the only way to preserve the moral superiority and the initiative, was to put in operation his previous plan. He thought it probable that Hood ■would be forced to follow him, especially since the latter had been made, by a recent order of the Confederate Gov- ernment, subordinate to General Beauregard, who had been invested with the military command of all the territory be- tween Middle Georgia and the Mississippi River. He was no^ mistaken in his forecast of Beauregard's judgment in this respect, as will soon be seen ; but Beauregard did not feel authorized to take actual control of Hood's movements under the somewhat peculiar orders giv^n by President Davis. To trv whether an indication of liis counter-move- ment would call Hood back from the west, Sherman marched again into Georgia in the first days of November, and con- centrated his army at Rome and Kingston. There, upon the second of the month, he got from Grant the final assent to his plan, and put all the capacity of the railroad, now re- paired, to the utmost strain to remove surplus stores and material of war from Atlanta and other posts in Georgia to Nashville. No militaiy operation of the war has been so commonly misunderstood as the campaign on which Sherman was now entering. The brilliancy of its design and the immense re- sults which followed, have captivated the popular imagina- tion and deeply impressed students of military history eveiy- where ; but there has been a singular tendency to treat the conception of a march from Atlanta to the gulf or to the ocean as if that were an invention or a discoveiy. People have disi^uted the priority of idea, as if it were a patent right ; and, besides the military claimants of the honor of PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN. 8 the invention, non-combatants of both sexes have entered the lists and claimed to have given expression to the thought of such a movement bt .ore Sherman had captured Atlanta. General Badeau, the historian of Grant's cam- paigns, must be held responsible for a good deal of this misapprehension, which he seems to have shared himself; for he treats Grant's earlier indications of Mobile as an ob- jective point, as if these contained the essential parts of the campaign as actually conducted. For the matter of that, we have seen, in a former volume, that Sherman gave a suffi- ciently clear outline of the movement in his letter to the General-in-Chief before the campaign of Atlanta had opened in the spring. In that, not only the march to the coast was foreshadowed, but the subsequent campaign through the Carolinas, which was to make, as he said, " short work " of what was left of the Confederate Government and cause. "Whoever will reflect a little, will see, however, that not even in this fuller anticipation of the outward form of the movement are found the essential features which gave to Sherman's decision and plan in October their peculiar mili- tary character. Unless the campaign just closed had been an aimless thing, we must suppose that both Grant and Sherman had reflected upon what should be done when Atlanta fell. Every intelligent person in the country, iu or out of the army, must have seen that the successful march of a gi'eat army from Chattanooga southward, meant not only the capture of Atlanta, but more. The problems of war are not matters of occult science, and while it was hoped that in some decisive engagement Johnston's army might be routed before it reached the Chattahoochee, it took no genius to see that if its retreat to Atlanta should leave it with a still formidable organization, further opera- 4 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. tions would be necessary. These would naturally be such as would turn to good use the auxiliary efforts which Cauby and the Navy were making to reduce Mobile, and, by reach- ing a hand to Sherman from the South, put the whole of Alabama and Mississippi behind a wall of national bayonets moving Eastward, and driving the Confederate Army before them. This was the course of events which would be the natuinl sequence of what had gone before, if no disaster befell us ; aud had things worked in this way, we should never have had the almost absurd debate upon the question of intellectual authorship. It was Hood's audacious movement upon Sherman's com- munications that changed all that. His design was to carry back the war from Central Georgia to Tennessee, as, once and again, Lee had carried it back from Central Virginia to the Potomac. A weak general would have made haste to puL tl e National Army on the north side of the Tennessee to cover and protect his communications ; and Hood's pur- pose would have been successfully accomplished. It would have been much better than this to have followed Hood across Alabama, striving to get between him and his own djputs of supply, though this might have had no really deci- sive results. To provide for v sulficient force to keep him from reaching the Northfci'u States before the rapidly col- lecting }'ecruits should swell Thomas's army to a size fully able to deal with him, and with sixty thousand veterans strike for the very heart of the Confederacy, was completely to turn the tables upon the enteriuising Southern general, and make his very audacity prove at once his own ruin and the ruin of the cause for which he fought. This was what Sherman did, and the determination to do it, in the actual situation, before any base upon the distant seacoast had been secured, called for the very highest qualities in a commander. PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN. 5 The moral courage which decides upon a daring course, when faihire must involve terrible and far-reaching consequences, is far greater in kind and in degree than that which the sub- ordinate or the soldier in the rani s is called upon to show. 'Ihe cool-headed, practical skill which canies out such a plan, through the vicissitudes of a campaign where the c'rcum- stances are always the unexpected, is only possible to one who unites physical hardihood to mental gi*asp and unbending will. In thus fixing his purpose, Sherman had no assistance. He had hoard nothing from Grant in reply to his proposal of the movement, though the latter had sent, on Octo- ber 11th, a conditional approval, which the interruption of communications had prevented Sherman from receiving. Thomas advised against his i^lan,^ and on November 1st Grant suggested to him to resume that of following Hood.* But Sherman was immovable in his judgment, un- less Hood should try to cross the Tennessee somewhere near him, and on the second of the month Grant gave formal and final consent. Grant's sympathies were never lacking for a bold and decided course, but in this instance he had less faith than Sherman that all would go well in Tennessee in the intei'val. Lincoln, as he himself said a little later, " was anxious, if not fearful," but did not interfere. So long as it seemed probable that he would force hi:? adversary to follow him, Sherman's purpose had been to 1 Despatch of October 17th. " Despatch of that date : '• Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone 80 far North, to entirely ruin him before Rtarting on your proposed cam- paign." Badeau says, vol. iii., p. 02 : " Sherman declared Hood would follow him; Grant was certain that the rebel aimy would go North." Neither statement ia quite accurate. He wrote this, forgetting that in the despatch of November Ist (which he himself quotes on page 157) Grant said : " I believed, and still believe, that if you had stai-ted South while Hood was in the nuighborhond of you, ho would have been forced to go after you." There was no real di£Ecreuce of opinion on this point. (f THE MARCH TO THE SEA. leave only the Fourth Corps (Stanley's) in addition to the troops already stationed in Tennessee, and these, with the recruits which were rapidly enrolling, would have given Thomas very soon an anny quite large enough for all prob- able needs. When Hood had passed Decatur, however, Sherman determined to send back Schofield with the Twenty-third Corps also, reckoning that the two corps, to- gether with that of Major General A. J. Smith, which was ordered to join Thomas as speedily as possible, and the garrisons and posts in Tennessee, would make an army equal to Hood's at the opening of the new campaign. The recruits which would be added to this would soon give it a decided sui)eriority, the real risk being limited to the time within which Thomas should be concentrating his forces. Three divisions of the Sixteenth Corps were at this time under General A. J. Smith in Missouri, near the Kansas bor- der, but on October 29th, General Rosecrans, who com- manded that department, was directed from Washington to send Smith's troops to Nashville, and promptly put them in motion for the Mississippi River. Sherman had hoped that steamboats might meet them at Booneville on the Missouri and transport them directly to Paducah on the Ohio ; but the Missouri was so low that navigation could not be de- pended upon, and Smith's troops were obliged to move by land to St. Louis from Warrensburg, where they were on November 2d. SLorman had the most implicit confidence in General Thomas's ability to bear the great responsibilities to be im- posed upon him, writing to Halleck that he was better suited to the emergency than any man he had. The very differ- ences in temperament between the two men seemed to adapt them to the work each was to do. The task before Thomas PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN. 7 was to conduct a cautious and purposely dilatory campaign till his reinforcements should bo well in hand, and then, re- suming the aggressive, to drive Hood southward and follow him wherever he should go. His whole career had borno witness to the unflinching courage with which he would meet the impetuosity of his opponent, and the tenacity with which he would stick to the contest even if the odds should be against him. Yet he would have been glad to avoid the task, and had said to Sherman, when the plan was first opened to him, that the one thing he did not wish was to assume the part allotted to him, unless Sherman and the authorities at Washington deemed it; absolutely necessary. With the addition to his forces of Schofield's Twenty -third Corps he believed he would be strong enough to drive Hood back, but this increase he urged as indispensable, and as soon as Grant's definitive consent to the new plan of cam- paign was received, Schofield was ordered to march to Eesaca and Dalton, where his troops were to meet the trains and be transported by rail to Nashville. The burden of taking to the rear the surplus material at Atlanta and of carrj'ing to that place the stores Sherman intended to take with him, was overtaxing the railway, and it was not till November 7th that the last of Schofield's com- mand procured transportation, though he had gone on to Nashville upon the 4th, for the pui-pose of arranging with Thomas the details of the operations committed to them. This assignment of the Twenty-third Corps to duty under General Thomas had been at Schofield's own suggestion, and was agreeable, therefore, to both officers. Schofield's depart- mental command covered East Tennessee and part of Ken- tucky, and his presence saved the necessity of any change in the organization there. But still stronger motives were 8 THK MAR(>^H TO THE SEA. found in tho fact that the strength of tho Twenty-third Cori).s had been reduced below ten thousand men present for diity, by tho casualties of tho campaign, and the op- portunity would thus be given it to recruit the two divi- sions already belonging to it, while a third division of new troops was ordered to join it when the new levies should reach the front. Schofield also believed that the cam- jiaign in Tennessee was to be an important one, full of varied military problems and contingencies, and that he could be quite as useful there as in any other field of operations. For a full understanding of the situation in the Confeder- ate arniy, and of the motives which controlled Hood's subse- quent plan of campaign, we must go back to the beginning of September. The fall of Atlanta had been followed by differences between Confederate leaders as to the policy which should now be pursued. Governor Brown of Georgia had assumed the responsibility of giving a general furlough to the Georgia militia, ostensibly for the purpose of gather- ing the autumnal crops. Against this tho President of the Confederacy protested, as well as against the claim of Gov- ernor Brown that the militia of the State were in the field under State authority for the defence of the State, and that as Governor he had the right to appoint and assign the officers to these State forces, and to keep them within the State boundaries. This assertion by the State executive of a very mild form of the doctrine of State rights, was looked upon as hardly less than treason by the Confederate Govern- ment. A war begun to assert the doctrine that eveiy State was itself the judge of its rights under the Constitution and of the measure of redress when it considered those rights violated, had resulted in a centralizatiou of which no Northern statesman had ever di-eamed. PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN. 9 On September 8th, Hood telegvftpheJ to General Bragg, at liiehmond, suggesting that all the reserves of Georgia, under Gen(?ral Cobb, be ordered to his army, and that Gen- eral Taylor be ordered to relieve Hardee in the command of his coqis, bringing with him all the troops which could be spared from the department Taylor was then commanding, and which included Alabama and Mississippi. No imme- diate notice seems to have been taken of this at Bichmond, and, on the 13th, Hood repeated the request to Davis him- self, charging Hardee with being the cause of all the de- feats his army had suft'ered, except that of July 28th at Ezra Church. A week later, still apparently without a reply, ho sketched his proposed movement upon Sherman's communi- cations, and he now learned that the Confederate President would immediately visit his camp. Accordingly, on Sep- tember 25th, Davis reached Hood's headquarters at Pal- metto, and a couple of days were spent in conference not only with Hood, but with his principal siibordinates. The general plan of Hood's new campaign was approved, with the understanding that if he should succeed in drawing Sherman away from Atlanta, the new invasion of Tennessee should bo made by crossing the river near Guntersville, not far from the Georgia line. The decision upon Hood's demand fur Hardee's removal from his coi*i)s was a more troublesome question than the ai)proval of the plan of operations. The great injustice of Hood's charges has been shown in tho stoiy of the Atlanta campaign ; but the dissatisfaction of a commanding general with a subordinate is so strong a rea- son for a change that it will rarely do to ignore it. Liou- tenant-General Richard Taylor, whom Hood suggested as Hardee's successor, was the brother-in-law of Mr. Davis, and the latter very well knew that this relationship would com- plicate tlie difficulty and bo seized upcm by many as proof 1* 10 THE MARCH TO THE HEA. of personal motives on his part if ho sliould give Hood his wish. Ho seems, besidc^s, to have had a real respect for Hardee, and to have heen driven to very serious doiil)ts of his own wisdom in giving Hood the command from whioh he had hoped so mnch. The sohition ho reached was jjcrhaps the best the situation allowed. Ho determined to transfer Hardee to a departmental command, including Eastern Georgia and the adjacent territory in South Carolina and Florida, a promotion in form, while ho combined Hood's and Taylor's department in one military division and as- signed General Beauregai'd to the command, with the under- standing that Hood's aniiy organization should not be dis- turbed, though Beauregard was expected to assume the personal control whenever he might deem it necessary to be with the troops. Hood learned of the intended changes by a communica- tion from Davis on September 28th or 29th, and the formal orders followed in a day or two. Davis met Beauregard at Augusta, in the first week of October, explained to him Hood's plan of operations, which he had already begun to execute, and no doubt impressed upon him the policy of making no unnecessary interference with Hood's pur^Doses. Certain it is that it must have been in deference to some such instructions that Beauregard carefully avoided estab- lishing his headquarters with the army in the field, though he kept near enough to Hood to have frequent conferences with him, until the latter crossed the Tennessee, some six weeks later. Hood was already across the Chattahoochee on his northward march when the formal order placing Beaure- gard over him was issued, and as it had no influence upon the campaign till the Confederate army reached Gadsden at the close of October, no mention was made of these changes in the naiTative of operations in the last volume. PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN. %% Beauregard had indeed overtaken Hood on October 0th, at Cave Spring, near Borne, before the crossing of the Coosa, but the conference does not appear to have had any signifi- cance. At Gadsden, however, on the 20th and 21st, the two generals fully discussed the situation, and Hood's proposal to march on Guntersvillo and cross the Tennessee there, was approved by Beauregard. It was arranged that Wheeler's cavalry cori)s, consisting of twelve brigades (to be increased by another sent from Jackson's division) should closely watch Sherman's movement, opposing and harassing his ad- vance, whatever way he turned ; and if he should mai-ch for the sea, Governor Brown and General Cobb held out expec- tations that, in the emergency, seventeen thousand G jorgia troops could join Wheeler, and throw themselves across Sherman's i)ath. Beauregard also expected in this event to draw some five thousand men from the Carolinas, making, as he reckoned, an army of tw«mty-nine thousand to oppose the eastward march of the National forces.' In the invasion of Tennessee, Hood would be accompanied by part of Jackson's division of cavalry, and FoiTest, who was between Tuscumbia and Corinth, was ordered to join him with all his mounted force. At Florence, on November 6th, and before beginning his movement against Schofield, Hood had present with him 41,185 infantry and artilleiy, and 3,544 cavalry, making an aggregate of 44,729. About No- « Beaurcfrard's Official Report. Tn this, however, he has nndprestimatcd Wheeler's cavalry. That corps reported at I.ovejoy Station, August Ist, an "ef- fective " total of enlisted men of 6,28.3, and it does not appear to have suffered notably between that time and the opening of the new campaign. It was joined by a brigade from Jackson's divitiion, and a Kentucky infantry brigade, which was mounted. These made about two thousand seven hundred enlisted men, and adding the usual proportion of officers to the whole list of "effectives," it gives Wheeler an actual force, in round numbers, of 10,000, instead of 7,000, as esti mated by Beauregard. Hood puts the number at 10,000 (Advance and Retreat, p. 310). 12 THP] MARCH TO THE SEA. vember 15111 lio was joined by Forrest with his cavahy corps, numbering 9,'JUU present, and increasing the aggi'egate to 53,938 officers and men present.' After his conference with Beauregard, Hood had gone but one day's march from Gadsden toward Guutersville when he suddenly turned his columns to the west, making first for Decatur. He learned that Forrest had started upon a raid northward into West Tennessee, and that it was uncertain how long it might be before that cavalry could join him. On October 7th, and before seeing Beauregard, he had asked General Taylor to send Forrest a second time into Tennessee to break the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway, if he could, or at least to occupy Thomas's forces so as to create a diversion in his favor. Forrest was at Cherokee Station, where ho had been refitting and resting his com- mand, and both Taylor and he misapprehended Hood's wish to have a strong cavaliy force with his moving column as ' These flsrnros nre taken from the offlciiil returns in the Ailjutant-Geucral's ofUce at Washington, and are distributed as follows : Infantry. Cavalry. S. D. Lee's corps 11,784 i Lee's A. P. Stewart's corps. . 11,524 Stewart's. B. V. Chea' ham's corps. 14,:W.5 Cheatham's. Engineers 484 Jackson'a. !KM) I JacV :oii's division . . !«8 Bnford's 8.s() Chidmers's " 321 I Ilo.Uley's Escorts Totals :i8,117 r. i . 3,1 5'2 . 3,857 . 2,841 . 2,.-)ll 12,75-^ This is exclusive of Forrest's artJllery, and of .about one thousand men nuule up of the Fifth Missi8>ippi Cavalry iind several battalions of State reserves which joined Forrest. Ilo. ,>.t, b'M. 14 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. it would be quite too costly to force a crossing there, if it could be done at all. The post was commanded by Colonel Doolittle, of the Eighteenth Michigan, whose bold and judicious use of the garrison promptly repulsed the first efforts to carry the place. General R. S. Granger arrived with reinforcements at the close of the first day. A brisk sortie from the garrison captured over a hundred prisoners from Cheatham's corps, siDiking a couple of guns, and inflicting considerable loss in killed and wounded. Hood now marched to Tuscumbia, and by the last day of October secured an unobstnicted crossing, occupying the town of Florence on the northern bank of the river. At this point the naviga- tion of the Tennessee is interrapted by Muscle Shoals above and Colbert Shoals below, so that it was only in the highest water that even light gunboats could pass. Croxton's bri- gade of cavalry was in observation near Florence, but was unable to make any serious opposition, and pontoon bridges were soon laid. Could Hood then have marched at once upon Pulaski he would have found but little opposition south of Duck River. It was necessary, however, to rear- range his lines of communication and accumulate at Flor- ence supplies for the campaign. He had left Gadsden with twenty days' rations, but when soldiers' haversacks are over- loaded there is always a great waste of food, and his wagons had been unable to keep up with the troops. The prisoners taken by Granger at Decatur reported that the men were half mutinous at the scanty issue of supplies, and when Tuscumbia was reached the sustenance of the army had be- come the problem demanding first attention. Hood pro- fesses to believe he had reason to expect supplies to meet him at Tuscumbia ; but the superintendent of the railway reported the road in no condition to furnish the requisite transportation, and in spite of the most earnest efforts of PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN. 15 Beauregard and Taylor to put it speedily in repair, the greater jmrt of the three weeks' delay at Florence must prob- ably be attributed to its half ruined and decayed condi- tion. Stores were collected at j^oints on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad in Mississippi, carried to Corinth and thence east to Cherokee Station upon a piece of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad which Forrest had been able to protect. But from Cherokee Station to Tuscumbia was a gap of fif- teen or sixteen miles where the road had never been rebuilt, and here the army stores must be hauled in wagon trains over a wretched country road, which became a quagmire as soon as the rains began. Beauregard does not seem to have ventured upon any peremptory interference with Hood at their meeting at Decatur, but acquiesced in what was done, sharing, no doubt, the hopes of the latter that the news of their cross- ing at Florence would be quickly followed by that of the re- turn of Sherman to Midtlle Tennessee. But it had become evident that there would be delays ; and Forrest, who had been waiting at Jackson, resumed his expedition with a pur- pose of attracting Thomas's attention to the west and rear of Nashville, so as to draw troops in that direction and prevent the concentration in front of Hood, where alone was any se- rious danger. He struck the river on the 29th, a few miles above Fort Henry, and his batteries disabk^d and brought to three transports and a "tin-clad" gunboat, the Undine, The latter, after a stout defence, was injured in her machin- erv and was run ashore and abandoned. Two of the trans- l)orts were burned, but the gunboat and the other transport were in the possession of Forrest's "horse-marines" for a couple of days, when the transport with her lading of stores was recaptured and the Undine was run ashore and burned. Forrest's first appearance on the river was at the most north- 16 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. ern point ho reached, and he returned, making demonstra- tions to assist his purpose at various j'l^^^'^ ak)ng the west- ern bank. On November 4th he appeared opposite John- sonville, eighty miles directly west of Nashville, and by a noisy cannonade caused a jianic in the garrison. Three gunboats, eight transports, and some barges were moored to the river bank, and great quantities of stores were in ware- houses at the landing. All these were abandoned and burned by tlie crews and garrison, and the troops fled toward Nashville, tho commandant telegraphing Thomas that Forrest was across the river and marching in pursuit. ' But Forrest had not crossed, and continiied his march up the river. At Perryville he put over part of Eucker's bri- gade, but kept the body of his troops on the western side, reaching Cherokee Station on the 15th and joining Hood at Florence next day. The dates which have been given and the character of Forrest's movement, ^ ^lich came in contact with no National forces west of tho river, plainly prove the l)urposes of the Confederate generals. Time was needed to repair the railway and collect supplies at Tuscumbia, and this was the easiest way to get it. Sherman's attitude, however, was not without its influ- ence upon his adversaries. They knew that the Twentieth Corps was still at Atlanta and that Sherman with three others was observing them at Rome or Kingston. It was quite among the possibilities that he might march westward across Alabama, destroying all railway lines and close in upon the rear of Hood's army, while Thomas delayed him in the " barrens " of Tennessee, where the country could do but little to sustain such an army. The desire to see Sher- 1 The {TarrlRon consisted of about 1,000 men, of the Twelfth United States col- ored troops, Forty-third Wisconsin Infantry, and Eleventh Tennessee Cavalry, all under couimund uC Culuael C. U. Tliumpiiuii, vi the firtit-iiumed regiment. PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN. 17 man begin some definite movement nndonbtetlly worked upon Hood, and after the expected jjrepai'ation for his ad- vance was made he still delayed till Beauregard spiivred him anew to his work by urgent despatches of a kind to which ho was not used. It is not unreasonable to suppose that ho was bitterly disappointed in finding that Sherman did not hasten back to Tennessee, and was oppressed with the fore- boding that if this part of his jilan failed and Sherman turned eastward, he would be in no small measiire respon- sible for the impending ruin of the Confederate cause. Returning to the preparations Sherman was making to give Thomas forces enough to cope Avith Hood in Tennes- see, we find that on October 30th Wood's division of Stan- ley's (Fourth) corps was moving by rail from Chattanooga, and by November 3d the whole coii^s was concentrated at Pulaski, eighty miles south of Nashville and forty-four north of Decatur, upon the railway connecting those places. De- catur and Athens were held by General Granger, who com- manded the District of Northern Alabama, whicli also includ- ed Huntsvillo and Stevenson ; but the bridges and trestles on the railway between Pulaski and Athens at the crossing of Elk River had been destroyed by Forrest in the latter i)art of September and had not been rebiiilt, and Pulaski was there- fore the terminus of the direct railway line south from Nash- ville. When it was definitely known that the Confederate army was at Tuscumbia and Florence, Thomas had ordered Stanley to get together his corps at Pulaski, but ho did not put Gran- ger under his command, and the latter continued through the whole campaign to receive his orders direct from Nashville. On November 3d, Schofield started Cooper's divisicm of the Twenty-third Coii)s ui)on the railway trains for Nash- ville, leaving Cox's division for several days at Dalton till transportation could bo got for it. Schofield himself went 18 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. forward with the advance, and when he reached Nashville next day, Thomas had just received the first alarming news from Johnsonville, and hnrried Schofield in person with Gal- lup's brigade (the first of the Twenty-third Corps to arrive) to Gillem's Station, on the railway from Nashville to the abandoned post. Finding no enemy near Gillem's, Scho- field marched to Johnsonville on the 6th, and was able to give Thomas the truth as to the disgraceful affair. General Cooper, with Gallup's and Moore's brigades of his division, were placed at Johnsonville for a time, with orders to fortify it in accordance with a general plan prepared by the engi- neers. Schofield returned to Nashville, whence he was sent on the 11th by Thomas to Pulaski, to assume command of the forces assembling there. The remainder of the Twenty- third Coi-ps reached Nashville on the 9th, and went forward by easy stages. On the 15th, Schofield had at Pulaski the Fourth Corps and Cox's division of the Twenty-third, Strick- land's brigade of the latter corps was at Columbia, and the cavalry under General Hatch was covering the front and right, toward Florence and Waynesboro. AVhen the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps reported to Thomas, and even before the arrival of A. J. Smith with the divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, his official returns showed a force present for duty just about equal to that of Hood, though differently divided, being stronger in infantry and weaker in cavalry. The latter numbered 5,591, being less than half Hood's strength in that arm, but the infantiy and artillery were 48,975.' "When this force should be increased ' These figures give the " present for duty" on October Slst, and were distrib- uted ns follows : Tourth Corps, 12,.S31 ; Twenty-third Corps, 10,(124 ; cavalry, 5,591 ; District of Tennessee, 18,661 ; unassigned detachments, 7,369 — total, 54,5tM). This does not include the District of Etowah under Steeduian, which first appears In Thomas's report for Noveniljer 20th, and which numbered 6,421. The official returns for subsequent dates will be found in Appendix A. PLANNIN(} THE CAMPAIGN. 19 by Steeclman's garrisons in Northern Georgia and at Chatta- nooga, by A. J. Smith's corps, and by detachments which Thomas was o-uthorized to draw from Schofield's depart- ment, Sherman estimated the army in Tennessee easily able to cope with Hood. "When he should leave his base of sup- plies in Georgia, the necessity for guarding a long line of railway would cease, and Chattanooga would be the only I>laco in Thomas's department east of Nashville which it would be necessary to gai'rison. The supplies in store at Chattanooga were all that would be needed for the posts maintained in East Tennessee. Thomas could therefore concentrate nearly everj'thing to meet Hood, and when the latter should be defeated and driven southward, the lines of operation would necessarily be rearranged. As soon as it seemed probable that Hood intended to make Florence and Tuscumbia his base, Sherman wrote Thomas, "You must unite all your men into one army, and abandon all minor l)oints if you expect to defeat Hood." The long delay of the Confederate general in making his advance from the Tennes- see gave the needed time for j^reliminary arrangements ; and when, on November 12th, parting messages were ex- changed between them, Thomas was able to say to Sherman that he believed he should have " men enough to rain Hood unless he gets out of the way very rapidly." Thomas was empowered, in the absence of his superior, to exert all the authority of Sherman himself in the Military Division of the Mississippi, and the new campaign was begun. THE MARCH TO THE SEA. < CHAPTEK n. THE MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA. At Rome, when parting with one of the officers he was sending back to Tennessee, Sherman said, " If there's to be any hard fighting, you will have it to do." He perfectly understood that there was no sufficient force in Georgia to thwart his plan or even to delay his march. Before leaving Atlanta he pointed out to one of his pi-incipal subordinates that a National army at Columbia, S. C, would end the war un- less it should be routed and destroyed. Deprived of the mate- rial support of all the States but North Carolina, it would be impossible for the Confederate Government to feed its army at Richmond, or to fill its exchequer. The experience it had With the country west of the Mississippi proved that a region isolated from the rest of the Confederacy would not furnish men or money, and could not furnish supplies ; while anxiety for their families, who were within the Na- tional lines, tempted the soldiers from those States to desert, and weakened the confidence of the whole army. In such a situation credit would be destroyed, the Confederate i.ai)er money would become worthless, its foreign assistance would be cut off, and the rebellion must end. The one chance left would be for Lee to break away from Grant, overwhelm Sherman, and re-establish the Confederate power in a cen- tral position by the abandonment of Virginia. But this implied that Lee could break away from Grant, who, on the 22 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. south side of Petersburg, was as near Columbia as his oppo- nent, and would be close upon his heels from the moment the lines about Itichmond were abandoned. If Sherman, therefore, should reach Columbia with an army that could resist the first onslaught of Lee, the last hope of the Confederacy would be cmshed between the national forces meeting from the east and west. Of *?our8e, this implied that Thomas should, at least, be able to resist Hood till the Eastern campaign should be ended, when, in the general collapse of the Richmond Government, Hood must as certainly abandon the liopeless cause, as Johnston was in fact forced to do after Lee's sunender in the fol- lowing spring. To establish a new base upon the sea was a necessaiy part of such a plan, for the old base at Chattanooga must be abandoned from the start, and the practical separation of the Carolinas from the Gulf States could only be accom- plished by a great and thorough destruction of railway lines in Georgia. The army could live upon the country while marching, but it must have the ordinaiy means of supply within a very few days from the time of halting, or it would starve. The country through which it moved was hostile, no local government could be made to respond to formal requi- sitions for subsistence, and the wasteful method of foraging itself made a necessity for moving on into new fields. A rapid march to the sea, the occupation of some harbor capa- ble of becoming a fortified base, and the opening of lines of ocean communication with the great depots of the North must therefore constitute the first part of the vast project. Be- yond this Sherman did not venture to plan in detail, and recognizing the possibility that unlooked-for opposition might force a modification even of this, he kept in mind the alternative that he might have to go west rather than THE MARCH THROUGH (.KORGIA. 28 east of Macon. Ho reqneHfed that the fleets on the coast might watch for his appearance at Morris Island near Charleston, at Ossabaw Sound just south of Savannah, and at Pensacola and Mobilo. If he should reach Morris Island, it would naturally bo by the way of Augusta and the left bank of the Savannah Eiver. Ossal)aw Soiiud would, in like manner, indicate the route by way of Milledgevillo, Mil- ieu, and the valley of the Ogeecheo. The Gulf ports would only be chosen if his course to the cast should bo made im- practicable. On November 12th comniunicatiou with the rear was broken. The railway bridge at Alatoona was taken to jjieces and can-ied to the rear to be stored ; but from the crossing of the Etowah, southward to Atlanta, the whole line of the road was thoroughly destroyed. The foundries, machine- shops, and factories at Rome were burned, lest they should be again turned to use by the enemy, and on the 14th the army was concentrated at Atlanta. Sherman's force nov/ consisted of two corj^s of the Army of the Tennessee under General Howard, and two of the Army of the Cumberland under General Slocum, which were respectively designated as right and left wing. Logan was absent, and his coi*ps (the Fifteenth) was in command of Major-General P. J. Oster- haus. The division of General J. E. Smith, which had been distributed along the railroad in Northern Georgia, had joined that coi*ps, which now consisted of four divisions, commanded by Generals Woods, Hazen, Smith, and Corse. Blair's coi-ps (Seventeenth; had three divisions, viz.. Mow- er's, Leggett's, and Giles A. Smith's. The assignment of Slocum to the command of the wing left the Twentieth CoiTps under Brigadier-General A. S. Williams, with Geary, Ward, and Jackson as division commanders. Davis's (Fourteenth) corps retained the organization it had at the 24 THE3 MARCH TO THE REA. close of tlio Atlanta campaip;n, and consisted of Carlin's, Morgan's, and Baird's divisions. The cavalry was under Kilpatrick, and was but a single division, composed of the two brigades of Munay and Atkins. T\w numerical force of the whole, according to the returns of November loth, only two days before communication with the North was broken, was a little over fifty nine thousand, but fur- loughed men and recruits hurried so fast to the front in those last davs that the muster at Atlanta hIiowchI a total of over sixty-two thousand.' No pains had been spared to make this a thoroughly efficient force, for an army in an enemy's country and without a base cannot afford to be encumbered with sick, or to have its trains or its artilleiy delayed by weak or insufficient teams. The artilleiy was reduced to about one gnn to a thousand men, and the batteries usually to four guns each, with eight good horses to each gun or caisson. Twenty days' rations were in hand, and two Inmdred roTinds of ammunition of all kinds were in the wagons. Droves of beef cattle to furnish the meat ration were ready to accompany the march, and these grew larger rather than smaller as the army moved through tlie country. The determination to abandon Atlanta involved also the undoing of much work that had been done there in tlie early aiitumn. As the town could not be used by the Na- tional forces, the defences must be destroyed, the work- shops, mills, and dCpots mined and biirned. This task had been given to Colonel Poe, Chief Engineer, and was com- pleted by the time the army was assembled and ready to march southward. > FifteoTith Corps, infantry, 15,894; SevcnU-enth Corps, 11,733; Fourteenth Corps, 13,902; Twentieth Corps, 13,741 ; artillery, 1,812 ; cavalry, 6,(HW-total, 62,204. THK MAIK^H THllOUUH (;KOK(!IA. li On the morning of Novemhor 15th tho movomont began. The two corjjH of ouch wing woro ordore '^orsyth, creating the impression of aii advance in force in jhat direction ; then it turned eastward and crossed the Ocmulgee with the iufantiy. A section of pontoon train was with each coqis, and How- ard put down two bridges ; ' but though his head of column reached Planters' Factoiy on the 18th, and the bridges wera kept full day and night, it was not till the morning of the ' The pontoons nseil by Sherman, both in the Atlanta campaign and the pres- ent one, were those of canvas, of which tlie frames cenxld lio disjointed. Tliolr lightness and serviceability U'ft little *<) be desired, and they proved thoroughly satisfactory in hanl and constiut eainiuiigii use. THE MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA. 27 20tli that the rear guard was able to cross. The bank on the eastern side of the river was steep and slippeiy from rain, making it tedious work getting the trains up the hill. His heads of columns were jmshing fonvard meanwhile, and reached Clinton, a few miles north of Macon, by the time the rear was over the river. Kilpatrick now made a feint upon Macon, striking the railway a littlo oast of the town, capturing and destroying a train of cars, and tearing up the track for a mile. Under cover of this demonstration and while the cavalry were holding all roads north and east of Macon, Howard's infantiy on the 22d closed up toward Gor- don, a station on the Savannah railroad, twenty miles east- ward. Woods's division of tho Fifteenth Corj)3 brought up the rear and was approaching Griswoldville. Eeturning to the left wing, which Sherman accompanied, we find that it had applied itself in earnest to the destruc- tion of the railway from Atlanta to Augusta, making thor- ough work of it to Madison, seventy miles from Atlanta, and destroying the bridge over the Oconee River, ten or twelve miles further on. Here, the divergence between the winga was greatest, the distance from Slocum's left to Kilpatrick, on the right, being fifty miles in a direct line. Sherman, however, did not cross the Oconee, but directed Slocum to turn southward along the right bank of the river with Wil- liams's (Twentieth) cori)s, while Davis's (Fourteenth) took the interior line by a more direct route to Mil ledge vi lie, where the left whig assembled on the 23d, the advance of the Twentieth Coii>s having entered the city the day before, driving out a small force of the enemy, which retreated rap- idly across the river, leaving the bridge uninjured. Slocura immediately threw out Jackson's division to the east, cover- ing and securing the bridge for further operations. Sherman's advance from Atlanta drew from Beaureguid f), 28 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. rattling volley of telegraphic despatches to all the Confed- erate officials, civil and militai-y. In these he made much of the fact that he had ordered General Taylor in Alabama to move with his available forces into Georgia ; but Taylor had no available forces, and could only go in person to Macon, where he arrived on the 22d, just in time to meet Governor Brown with his Adjutant, Toombs, escaping from the State Capitol on the ajiproach of Slocum's columns. The only organized troops were Wheeler's cavalry. Smith's division of Georgia militia, and a couple of battalions of local volun- teers. General Howell Cobb was nominally Confederate commander of "reserves," but there seems to have been no reserves to command. Hardee had been there the day be- fore, coming up from Savannah, and judging rightly that the spread of Sherman's wings from Oconee Bridge to Planters' Factory argued a course toward Augusta or Savan- nah, he declared that Macon was in no danger and directed Smith to move his division rapidly eastward, to interpose, if possible, between Sherman and Augusta, delaying his march and obstmcting the roads. Wheeler, under orders already given, would continue to harass the flank and rear of the National forces. Orders from Eichmond had ex- tended Hardee's authority over the theatre of operations in Georgia, and having given the best directions the circum- stances allowed, he hastened back to Savannah to strengthen its means of defence and to be in direct communication with Augusta, Charleston, and Richmond. Beauregard issued from Corinth, Miss., a proclamation to the people of Georgia, calling upon them to arise for the defence of the State, and to " obstruct and destroy all roads in Sherman's front, flank, and rear," assuring them that the enemy would then starve in their midst. He strove to raise vague hopes also by announcing that he was hastening to THE MARCH THROUGH GEORUfyV. 29 jjiii tliom ill (lefenco of tlieir homos and firesides. A more practical step was his order to Hood to begin the Tennessee campaign, the only counter-stroke in his power. At Mil- ledgeville, the ai)proach of Sherman was met by an Act of the Legislature to levy en masse the population, with a hys- terical preamble, picturing the National general as an ogre, and exhorting the people " to die freemen rather than live slaves." The act, to have been of any use, should have been passed a month before, when Hood was starting west f loiu Gadsden. It was now only a confession of terror, for there was no time to organize. Any disposition of the in- habitants along his route to destroy roads was effectually checked by Sherman's making it known tha<" ■'he houses and property of those who did so would be destroyed. Such opposition to a large army can never be of real use ; its com- mon effect is only to increase by retaliation the miseries of the unfortunate people along the line of march, and in this case there was, besides, no lack of evidence that most of them were heartily tired of the war, and had lost all the en- thusiasm which leads to self-sacrifice. Even in such a panic the strife of political factious was not stilled, and the oppo- nents of Governor Brown's States-rights policy took advan- tage of the flight from the Capital to perpetrate a novel absurdity. The Lieutenant-Governor, Wright, w^as also a general in the Confederate army, and on the 21st, the day before our occupation of the Cajiital, issued a proclamation from Augusta, declaring himself ex-nfficio Governor of the part of tnc State east of the Oconee, and ordering' the peo- ple under tht levy en masse to report to him, by reason of what a Confederate historian calls the " territorial disabil- ity " of the Governor. • The proclamation had no result, but > Jones's Siege of Savannah, etc., p. 18. 30 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. the ridiculousness of it is shown by the faot that the Geor- gia militia under Smith were moved by Brown's orders to Savannah, reaching there on the 30th, and General Taylor returned from Savannah to Macon after that time, as will bo seen. In truth, communication by courier from Augusta to Macon was only intermpted while the army was passing. While Taylor, Brown, Toombs, and Cobb were conferring at Macon on the 22d, the division of Georgia militia under Brigadier General Phillips was marching toward Gordon in the effort to obey Hardee's order. At Griswoldville, about eight miles out, they ran into Walcutt's brigade of Woods's division, which was the rear guard of the right wing, and attacked it with more courage than discretion. Walcutt had been making a reconnoisance toward Macon, driving back Wheeler's cavalry, and was recalled by General Woods to a position on the Duncan Farm, a little east of the town. Here his flanks were protected by swampy ground, his line was on the crest of a hill, with open ground in front, on which the enemy must attack. This Phillips did with a great deal of vigor, putting in all four of his brigades, and striving hard also to turn the flanks of Walcutt's position. He was supe- rior in artillery, as Walcutt had only two guns with him, and was obliged to withdraw these early in the engagement. But the infantry attacks, which were renewed seveml times, were repulsed with severe loss, and Phillips retreated, after several hours' fighting, having lost over six hundred in killed and v/ounded. On the National side. General Woods, who was present, rejjorts a total of ninety-four casualties. Walcutt was severely wounded in the leg, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Colonel Catterson (Ninety- seventh Indiana) during the latter half of the combat. Both officers distinguished themselves by their conduct and cour- age. THE MARCPI TH HOUGH GEORGIA. 31 Nothing could be more nsolcss than this engagement, for Phillips had before him two corps if Walcutt had been driven off; but he had been ordered to move along the rail- road, and thought he was obliged to do so till he should be recalled. This was done as soon as Smith at Macon heard of the fight, and the division, at the instance of Taylor, was sent southward by rail to Albany, which was the end of the rail- way in that direction. Thence they marched sixty miles to Thomasville on the Savannah and Gulf Railroad, where Toombs hectored the railway officials into furnishing trans- portation with unwonted promptness, and they reported to Hardee in Savannah on the last day of the month. Hardee's orders to Wheeler now directed him to get in front of Sher- man's forces and cover all the roads by which he might move. Wheeler accordingly marched south of the Central Railroad, swam the Oconee River, and reached Sandersville on the 2Cth, just before the National columns. The change of position of the Confederate cavalry was followed by Kil- patrick, who moved, ])y Sherman's direction, to the front and left of the infantry, there being no enemy whatever on the right flank after crossing the Oconee. Sherman had not delayed at Milledgoville, but had marched again on the 24th. Davis's (Fourteenth) corps now became the flanking column on the left. The Twentieth Corps (Williams's), after passing Sandersville, reached the Central Railroad at Teunille and marched to Davisboro, de- stroying the track as they went. From Davisboro both coips of the left wing moved by the same road to Louisville, crossing the Ogeechee River before reaching that place, where they camped on the 29th. The work of destroying the railway was begun by the right wing at Griswoldville, and of the hundred miles between that station and Millen very little of the road was left. Howard found the crossing 32 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. of the Oconee near Ball's Ferry a iliffienlt operation, for tlio river was up and the current so swift that the forry could not be used. AVheeler's cavalry made some resistance from the other side. A detachment of Blair's corps, directed by the engineers, succeeded in constntcting a flying bridge some two miles above the ferry, and getting over to the left bank, moved down to the principal road, which had been cleared of the enemy by the artillery on the hither side. The pontoons were then laid and the march resumed. On leaving Milledgeville, Sherman ordered Kilpatrick to make a considerable detour to the north, feinting strongly on Augusta, but trying hard to reach and destroy the important railway bridge and trestles at Briar Creek, near Waynesboro, half way between Augusta and Millen. He was then to move rapidly on JVIillen in the hope of releasing the National prisoners of war who were in a prison camp near that jplace. Kilpatrick moved by one of the principal roads to Augusta, giving out that he was marching on that city. After he had passed the Ogeeehee Shoals, Wheeler heard of his move- ment, and rapidly concentrated his force on the Augusta road, where it debouches from the swamps of Briar Creek. Kilpatrick, however, in obedience to his orders, turned the head of his columns to the right, upon the road running from Warrenton to Waynesboro, and they were well on their way to the latter place before Wheeler Avas aware of it. MniTay's brigade was in the rear, and two of his regi- ments, the Eighth Indiana and Second Kentucky, consti- tuted the rear-guard. These became too far separated from the column when they camped at evening near a place called Sylvan Grove. Wheeler heard of their where- abouts, and attacked them in the middle of the night. Though surprised and driven from their camps, the regi- ments stoutly fought their way back, and were only gradu- THE MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA. 33 ally driven in on the rest of Murray's brigade. Wheeler followed up persistently with his superior forces, harassing the rear and flank of the column, and causing some confu- sion, but gaining no important advantage, except that Kilpatrick was obliged to abandon the eflbrt to burn the Briar Creek bridge and trestles, and to turn his line of march southwesterly from Waynesboro, after destroying a mile or two of the railroad. He reported that he herd learned that the Millen prisoners had been removed, and determined to rejoin the army at Louisville. On the 27th Murray's brigade passed through that of Atkins, which now became the rear-guard, and on the 28th this order was reversed, each brigade taking, alternately, the brunt of the continuing fight with Wheeler. Early in the morning of the 28th Kilpatrick himself narrowly escaped capture, hav- ing improperly made his quarters for the night at some distance from the body of his command, the Ninth Michi- gan being with him as a guard. The enemy got between him and the column, and it was with no little difficulty he succeeded in cutting his way out, and saving himself from the consequences of his own folly. The long causeway and bridge at Buckhead Creek was held while the division passed, by Colonel Heath and the Fifth Ohio, with two how- itzers, and Wheeler there received a severe check. The bridge was destroyed, and Kilpatrick took a strong i^osition at Reynolds's plantation. Wheeler here attacked in force, but was decisively repulsed, and Kilpatrick effected his junction with the infantry without further molestation. Wheeler's whole corps, consisting ot Dibrell's, Hume's, and Anderson's divisions, was engaged in this series of sharp skirmishes, and he boasted loudly that he had routed Kil- patrick, causing him to fly in confusion with a loss of nearly two hundred in killed, wounded, and captured. Chafing 2* 31 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. at this rebuff, Kilpatrick obtained permission to deliver a return blow, and after resting his horses a day or two, marched from Louisville on Waynesboro, supportetl by Baird's division of Davis's (Fourteenth) corps. He attacked Wheeler near the town, and drove him by very spirited charges from three successive lines of barricades, chasing him through Waynesboro, and over Briar Creek. Wheeler admits that it was with diihculty ho " succeeded in with- drawing " from his position at the town, but seeks to take off the edge of his chagrin by reporting that he was at- tacked by the Fourteenth Corps, as well as by Kilpatrick's cavalry. Baird's division was not actually engaged, but its presence and close support no doubt assisted Kilpatrick, by enabling him to make more decisive movements than he could otherwise have ventured on, as he could freely use his horsemen on the flanks of a solid body of advancing infantry. Millen was reached on December 3d, by Blair's corps, which Sherman accompanied, and the direct railway com- munication between Savannah and Augusta was cut. Three corps now moved down the narrowing space between the Savannah and Ogeechee Eivers, while Osterhaus, with the Fifteenth, marched on the right bank of the latter stream in two columns some miles apart. Howard was in person with this corps and met with no resistance. Indeed from Millen onward the march of the whole army was a methodic progress with no noticeable opposition, for even Wlieelei*'s horsemen generally kept a respectful distance, and soon crossed to the left bank of the Savannah. The country became more sandy, corn and grain grew scarcer, and all began to realize that they were approaching the low country bordering the sea, where but little breadstuffs or forage would be found. On the 9th and 10th the columns closed in upon the defences of Savannah, Davis's corps rest- THE MARCH THttOUtlH GEORGIA. 35 ing its left upon the Savanuali Eiver, Williams's, Blair's, and OsUnhaus's continuing the line toward the right, near the Ogeechee. Cavalry detachments, and skilful infantry scou!;^ were sent out to ojien communication with the fleet and to out the Gulf Railway, thus severing the last connection of the city with the south. But before tracing these oi)erations farther, some of the characteristic features of the march just made are worthy of a little more attention. The destruction of railway communication between the Confederate Army at Richmond, and the Gulf States, had been a very important part of Sherman's purpose, and ho spared no pains to do this thoroughly. A battalion of me- chanics was selected and furnished with tools for ripping the rails from the cross-ties and twisting them when heated, and these were kept constantly at work ; but the infantry on the march became expert in methods of their own, and the cavalry also joined in the work, though the almost constant fikirmishing on the flanks and rear of the army usually kept the mounted troops otherwise employed. A division of in- fantry would be extended along the railway line about the length of its proper front. The men, stacking arms, would cluster along one side of the track, and at the word of com- mand, lifting together, would raise the line of rail with the ties as high as their shoulders ; then at another command they would let the whole drop, stepping back out of the way as it fell. The heavy fall would shake loose many of the spikes and chairs, and seizing the loosened rails, tho men, using them as levers, would quickly pry off the rest. The cross-ties would now be piled up like cob-houses, and with these and other fuel a brisk fire would be made ; tho rails were piled upon the fire, and in half an hour would be red hot in the middle. Seizing the rail now by the two ends, the soldiers would twist it about a tree, or interlace and 36 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. twino tlie whole pile together in great iron knots, making them useless for anything but old iron, and most unmanageable and troublesome, even to convey away to a mill. In this way it was not difficult for a corps marching along the railway to destroy. in a day, ten or fifteen miles of track most completely ; and Sherman himself gave close watch to the work, to see that it was not slighted. Then all machine-shops, stations, bridges, and culverts were destroyed, and the masonry blown up. The extent of line destroyed was enormous. From the Etowah liiver through Atlanta southward to Lovejoy's, for a hundred miles nothing was left of the road. From Fairburn through Atlanta eastward to Madison and the Oconee Kiver, another hundred miles, the destruction was equally com- plete. From Gordon southeastwardly the ruin of the Cen- tral road was continued to the very f^uburbs of Savannah, a hundred and sixty miles. Then there were serious breaks in the branch road from Gordon northward through Mil- ledgeville, and in that connecting Augusta and Milieu. So great a destiniction would have been a long and serious in- terruption even at the North ; but the blockade of Southern ports and the small facilities for manufacture in the Confed- erate States made the damage practically irreparable. The lines which were wrecked were the only ones which then connected the Gulf States with the Carolinas, and even if Sherman had not marched northward from Savannah the ]'e- sources of the Confederacy woviid have been seriously crip- pled. The forage of the country was also destroyed through- out a belt fifty or sixty miles in width. Both armies co- operated in this ; the Confederate cavalry burning it that it might not fall into the hands of the National Army, and th6 latter leaving none that 'hey could not themselves use, so that wagon transportation of military supj)lies across the belt might be made more difficult. THE MAROH THROUGH GEORGIA. 87 As the campaif^n progresseil, great numbers of negroes at- tached themselves to the cohimna and accompanied the march. This was contrary to the wisli of Sherman, who felt the embarrassment of having thousands of moutlis added to the number of those who must be fed from the country as he moved. Those who had less responsibility for the cam- paign did not trouble themselves so much with this consider- ation, and the men in the ranks generally encouraged the slaves to leave the i)lantations. The negroes themselves found it hard to let slip the jn-esent opportunity of getting out of bondage, and their uneducated minds could not esti- mate the hope of freedom at the close of the war as having much weight against the instant liberty Avhich was to be had by simply tramping away aftw the blue-coated soldiers. The natural result was that the regular bivouacs of the troops were fringed by numberless gipsy camps, where the negi'o families, old and young, endured every privation, liv- ing upon the charity of the soldiers, helping themselves to what they could glean in the track of the army foragers. On the march, they tiaidged along, making no complaint, full of a simple faith that "Lincoln's men" were leading them to abodes of ease and plenty. When the lower and less fruitful lands were reached, the embarrassment and military annoyance increased. This was more particularly felt in the left wing, wliich was then the only one exposed to the attacks of the enemy. Losing pa- tience at the failure of all orders and exhortations to these poor people to stay at home, General Davis (commanding the Fourteenth Corps), ordered the pontoon bridge at Eben- ezer Creek to be taken up before the refugees who were following that corps had crossed, so as to leave them on the further bank of the unfordable stream and thus disembar- rass the marching troops. It would be unjust to that officer 88 THI2 MARCH TO THE SEA. to boliovo that the order would have been given, if the effect had boon foreseen. The poor refugees had their hearts so set on liberation, and the fear of falling into the hands of the Confederate cavalry was so great, that, with wild wailings and cries, the great crowd rushed, like a stampeded drove of cattle, into the water, those who could not swim as well as those who could, and many were drowned in spite of the earnest efforts of the soldiers to help them. As soon as the character of the unthinking rush and panic was seen, all was done that could be done to save them from the water ; but the loss of life was still great enough to prove that there were many ignorant, simple souls to whom it was literally preferable to die freemen rather than to live slaves. When Savannah was reached, the great number of colored refugees with all the columns were i^laced on the Sea Islands, under the care of government officers, and added largely to the colonies already established there. The Freedmen's Bureau was afterward, in great measure, the necessary out- growth of this organization. The subsistence of the army upon the countiy was a necessary part of Sherman's plan, and the bizarre character given it by the humor of the soldiers has made it a striking feature of the march. It is important, however, to distin- guish between what was plai\ned and ordered, and what was an accidental growth of the soldier's disposition to make sport of everything that could be turned to amusement. The orders issued were of a strictly proper military charac- ter. The supplies in the trains were to be treated as a re- serve to be drawn upon only in case of necessity, and a systematic foraging upon the country for daily food was the regular means of getting rations. Each regiment organized a foraging party of about one-twentieth of its numbers under command of an officer. These parties set out first THE MARCH THIIOUOH GEORCIA. 30 of all, in tlio moruiiig, those of tlio same hripuloH nnd «livi- sioiis working in (^onocn't, keeping n(»ar enough together to be a nnitual Htipport if attacked by the enemy, and aiming to rejoin the column at the halting place appointed for the end of the day's march. The foragers became the bedu ideal of iiartisan troops. Their self-confideuce and daring increased to a wonderful pitch, and no organized lino of skirmishers could so quickly clear the head of column of the opposing cavaliy of the enemy. Nothing short of an intrenched line of battle could stop them, and when they were far scattered on the flank, plying their vocation, if a body of hostile cavalry api)roached, a singular sight was to be seen. Here and there, from bara, from granary and smoke-house, and from the kitcl;en gardens of the planta- tions, isolated foragers would hasten by converging linos, driving before them the laden mule heaped high with vege- tables, smoked bacon, fresh meat, and poultry. As soon as two or three of these met, one would drive the animals, and the others, from fence corners or behind trees, would begin a bold skirmish, their Springfield rifles giving them the ad- vantage in range over the carbines of the horsemen. As they were pressed they would continue falling back and assembling, the regimental platoons falling in beside each other till their line of fire would become too hot for their opponents, and these would retire reporting that they had driven in the skirmishers upon the main column which was probably miles away. The work of foraging would then be resumed. It was of the rarest possible occurrence that Wheeler's men succeeded in breaking through these enter- prising flankers and approaching the troops of the line, and as the columns approached the place designated for tlieir evening camp, they would find this ludicrous but most bountiful supply train waiting for them at every fork of the 40 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. road, with as much regularity as a railway train ruiming on " schedule time." They brought in all animals that could be applied to army use, and as the mule teams or artillery horses broke down in pulling through the swamps which made a wide border for every stream, fresh animals were ready, so that on reach- ing Savannah the teams were fat and sleek and in far better condition than thev had been at Atlanta. The orders given these parties forbade their entering oc- cupied private houses, or meddling with private property of the kinds not included in supplies and munitions of war, and in the best <. 'plined divisions these orders were en- forced. Discipline in armies, however, is apt to be uneven, and among sixty thousand men there are men enough who are willing to become robbers, and officers enough who are willing to wink at irregularities or to share the loot, to make such a march a terrible scourge to any country. A bad emi- nence in this respect was generally accorded to Kilj)atrick, whose notorious immoralities and rapacity set so demoral- izing an example to his troops that the best disciplinarians among his subordinates could only mitigate its influence. His enterprise and daring had made his two brigades usually hold their own against the dozen which Wheeler com- manded, and the value of his services made his commander willing to be ignorant of escapades which he could hardly condone, and which on more than one occasion came near resulting in Kilpatrick's own capture and the rout of his command. But he was quite capable, in a night attack of this kind, of mounting,, bare-backed, the fii'st animal, horse or mule, that came to hand, ,ind charging in his shir^ at the head of his troopers with a dare-devil recklessness thf.t dismayed his opponents and imparted his own daring to his men. Then, the confirmed and habitual stragglers soon became THE MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA. 41 numerous enough to bo a nuisance ujion the line of march. Here again the dift'erence in i)ortions of the army was very marked. In some brigades every regiment was made to keep its own rear guard to j^revent struggling, and the bri- gade provost guard marched in rear of all, arresting any who sought to leave the ranks, and reporting the regimental commander who allowed his men to scatter. But little by little the stragglers became numerous enough to cause serious complaint, and they followed the command without joining it for days together, living on the country, and shirking the labors of their comrades. It was to these that the name "bummer" was properly applied. This class was numerous in the Confederate as in the National Army, in I)roportion to its strength, and the Southern jjcoijle cried out for the most summary execution of military justice against them. Responsible persons addressed s])ecitic com- jilaints to the Confederate War Secretary, charging robbery and pillage of the most scandalous kinds against their own troops. Their leading newspapers demanded the cashiering and shooting of colonels and other officers, and declared their conduct worse than the enemy's. It is perhaps vain to hope that a great war can ever bo conducted without abuses of this kind, and we may congratulate ourselves that the wrongs done were almost without exception to property, and that murders; rapes, and other heinous personal offences were nearly unknown.' The great mass of the officers and soldiers of the lino worked hard and continuously, day by day, in marching, in bridging streams, in making corduroy roads through the swamps, in lifting the wagons and cannon from mud-holes, and in tearing up the railways. They saw little or notliing ' For a few extracts from Southern newspapers corroborating what is here 8tat«pose the march north- ward which Sherman must be expected to make as soon as he had established a base on the ocean. No sounder mili- tary judgment could be made, and the subsequent errors of Beauregard and Bragg grew out of their departure from it Vol. X.— 3 60 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. when Sherman's skilfnl demonstrations throw them into doubt as to his jmri^ose. Writinj^ of it later, Taylor ex- pressed his own sense of the crisis by saying it was i)lain that "unless a force could be interposed between Sherman and Lee's rear, the game would l)e over when the former moved."* Hardee assigned troops and commanders to his lines of defence as follows. From the Savannah, at "Williamson's jilantation, to the Central Railroad crossing, the Georgia militia under General G. W. Smith hold the linos with twenty guns in position. The batteries at the Central Rail- road and on the Louisville road with the lines to the head of Shaw's Dam were held by the troops of General McLaws with twenty-nine pieces of artillery. General Wright com- manded the left, reaching from Shaw's Dam to the bridge of the Gulf Railway over the Little Ogeechee, and had thiity- two guns in position on his front. The artillery above re- fciTed to was the heavier armament, besides which the light artillery, consisting of eleven batteries of forty-eight guns in all, under Colonel Jones, was distributed as the necessity of the moment demanded. The forts and fixed batteries on the side toward the sea were under the command of Colonel E. C. Anderson. Of these, Fort McAllister was the only one within the scope of the National attack, and is, therefore, the only one which need be described. It was situated at Genesis Point on the right bank of the Great Ogeechee River, commanding the channel of approach from Ossabaw Sound and covering the important bridge of the Gulf Railway across the river. It was a heavy earthwork with its principal front toward the river it was intended to command ; but the gorge had also ' DcHtruction anil Reconstruction, p. 218. SAVANNAH. 51 been closed by a straight infantiy lino with works for the protection of artillery at intervals in it. The armament consisted of seven heavy guns in i)ermanent position, and eight light field giins, all mounted in barbette. The river was planted with torpedoes, and before the arrival of Sher- man, sub-terra shells had also been placed along the land face, where the ditch was further i)rotected hy palisades and a fraise. As it was possible this fort would become isolated, it had been sui^plied with about fifty days' rations. Its garri- son was about two hundred men under command of Major G. W. Anderson. Immediately above the fort the river makes a double loop, the straight lino across either neck being less than a quarter of a mile, while the course by the stream is nine miles. In nearly a direct line across the broader part of the loop above the fort is the Cheves plantation with its rice-mill, two miles away, upon the other bank of the river. The fort was at the edge of the higher ground, and south of it the li.>;id fell away to the broad salt marshes over which the Hound and the sea could be seen in the distance. Hardee's whole force consisted of about eighteen thou- sand men, from which must be deducted about one thousand sick in hospital. The garrisons for the forts ou the sea front were small, though these, of course, could not be evacuated, as the navy was likely to make some efforts at co-operation with Sherman.' The inhabitants would also be available, to some extent, under the lei^t/ en masse which • Jones's Siege of Savannah is the chief authority for the details of the situa- tion within the Confederate lines. He says (p. 91) that the rations issued by the Cummisfiary on December Kith were as follows : viz., to Confederate troops, 11,- 2111; to Militia, 3,249; to hospitals, 1,282; total. 15,822. Assuming that olllcers either commuted their rations, or bought from the Commissary, about 2,000 nuist be added to these. Colonel Jones says that only 10,000 men were available for active duty on the western line, but this would depend on the judgment of the general in command. 52 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. the Legialatiiro Imd ordered, and which was enforced by Hardeo under a i)roclamation of the Mayor issued on Nov- ember 28th. Such was the situation in Savannah when, on December 10th, the National army closed in on the works around the city. A day or two was spent in bringing the several cori)3 into position, but on the 12th the investment was complete from the Savannah River to the Ogeechee. Jackson's divi- sion of "Williams's (Twentieth) corps rested on the river at the extreme left, and the other divisions of that corps ex- tended the line to the Central Railroad. Here Davis's (Fourteenth) corps joined it and reached somewhat beyond the Ogeechee Canal, near the Lawton i)lantation, where it unitml with the left of Blair's (Seventeenth) corps. Oster- haus's (Fifteenth) cor]is completed the line to the Great Ogeechee River, near King's Bridge, a structure a thousand feet long, which ihe en -my had destroyed; but the posts were still standing, and under the direction of Howard's chief engineer. Captain Reese, the bridge was reT)uilt and lit for use by the 13tli. On the Central Railroad Slocum's pickets were close to the thvoe-mile post, the Confederate entrenched line being a quarter of a mile nearer to the city ; but the works were farther from the town in front of Howard. During the last few days brcadstuflfs had been very scarce in the country, and foraging was not bringing in the boun- tiful supply which had been usual. The bread ration was drawn from the train, and rice was nearly the only thing the counti-y now furnished the troops. Sherman's first task, therefore, was to open communication with the fleet and establish a base of supplies by means of transports plying between Ossabaw Sound and Port Royal. Howard had sent a skilful scouting officer. Captain Duncan, with two SAVANNAH. 53 men to pass Fort McAllister in the night in n canoe, and Duncan had succeeded in reaching Admiral Dahlgren, though it was not known till a day or two later. Kilpatrick also was pushing light parties of horse along the coast for the same puii)OHe. To make use of the Ogeechee liiver, however, would be impossible till Fort McAllister was taken, and no sooner was King's Bridge passable than Sher- man ordered Howard to send a sulHcient force to attack and carry the fort by storm, believing that the more i)ronii)tly this should be done the less the loss would be in doing it. Howard assigned Hazcn's division of the Fifteenth Corjjs to the duty, and this command crossed the bridge at daybreak of the 13th, and moving down the right bank of the river, reached the vicinity of the fort before noon. General Howard had established a signal station at Cheves's rice-mill on the left bank of the river, which liaa already been referred to, and there a section of DeGres's bat- teiy of twenty-pound Pan'otts had been intrenched, covering the rear of the investing line. Sherman and Howard were both at the signal station on the roof of the mill, communi- cating with Hazen, and watching for boats from the fleet. Hazen's men had captured a picket about a mile from the fort, and had learned of the position of a lino of toi-pedoes in the road; these had been removed, and the advanced brigade under Colonel W. S. Jones had approached within half a mile of the fort early in the afternoon. Jones was anxious to attack at once, but Hazen thought it wiser to make the assault with portions of each of his three brigades, and delayed the attack till they could be brought into i)osi- tion. The reserve was placed where the torpedoes had been found, and three regiments from each brigade were detailed to make the assault. Colonel Wells S. Jones's brigade was on the left, Colonel Oliver's in the centre, and Colonel 54 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. Theodore Jones's on the right. The latter of these found considerable difficulty in getting into position, and it was nearly five o'clock before the signal for the attack could bo given. The garrison of the fort had recently added an abattis to their defences on the land side, but had not had time to remove the largo trunks of the trees from which the branches for this use had been taken. These trunks gave good cover to the skirmish line, which was pressed so close to the fort as to pick off the gunners and prevent the effective use of the artillerv. Meanwhile Sherman and Howard, full of impatience, were watching the declining sun from the top of Cheves's mill, and signalling their orders to hasten. A tug-boat from the fleet had come in sight, and approached as close as it was safe ; and to its captain's question whether the fort had been taken, which reached Sherman jiist as Hazen's signal to his troops to advance had been given, he answered, " Not yet, but it will be in a minute." The gallant dash of the line fiilfilled the promise. A short, sharp struggle ensued, and the parapet was crowned on all sides by the detachments, at nearly the same moment. The attack had been in a thin line concentrating as they reached the fort, and the men passed the abatis, the palisades, and the ditch with scarce a perceptible halt. Their greatest loss was from the torpe- does which exploded under their feet just before the ditch was reached. Part of the troops on the extreme flanks got around the palisading, where the angle of the works at the river's edge was not so well protected, and were helped by the fact that the tide was out, the abatis not extending be- low high -water mark. It was all over in fifteen minutes, and the National flag floated on the staff from which the Confederate ensign was pulled down, while the victors fired afeu-de-Joie. Hazeu's loss was 24 killed and 110 wounded; SAVANNAH. 53 tliat of the garrison was 48. There was no formal surren- der, but officei-s and men ceased the struggle when they found that thoy were overpowercul. Colonel W. H. Jones fell severely wounded as the assault began, and the com- mand of that brigade devolved on Colonel Martin of the One Hundred and Eleventh Illinois. The capture of the fort had an importance to Sherman far out of proportion to its military strength. The Great Ogee- chee was now open and vessels could reach King's Bridge in rear of the right of his line. So the rpiestion of a base on the sea was already solved, and the ojiportune presence of the tug whicih Sherman had signalled from Cheves's mill enal)l(3d hinx to send despatches that same night to Admiral Dahlgren's flag-ship in Warsaw Sound, for General Foster at Port lioyal and General Grant at City Point. Before morning he heard of General Foster's arrival in the river, though unable to reach Fort McAllister because of tlio torpedoes planted below it. Thereupon Sherman again took a small boat and joined Foster upon his steamer, when he decided that the best economy of time would bo found in proceeding at once to find Admiral Dahlgren in Warsaw Sound. The admiral entered earnestly into the plans for co-operation, undertook to find light-draught vef.scls for the transporta- tion of supplies to King's Bridge, and to remove the ob- structions from the Ogeechee. Foster reported the efforts he had made to reach the Charleston railway, and that .'ilthough he had not succeeded in getting actual possession of any point of the road, he had, about a week before, intrenched a position near Coosaw- hatchee from which his guns commanded the railroad. Ho was unable to be in the saddle owing to the breaking out of an old wound, and this was a serious misfortune, for the juncture was one in which the presence of the responsible 5G THE MARCH TO THE SEA. commander is the only guaranty for thorough work at the front. The truth was, that although the position referred to was within a mile of the railway, the enemy continued to operate the road without serious interruption as far as Hardeeville, from which point the connection with Savannah was made by the Union Causeway. Within the range of the guns at Foster's position the railway was used chiefly at night, and the trains were kept mnniug till the evacuation of Savannah, a week later. Foster, however, was directed to establish himself upon the railway, if possible, and Sherman returned on the morn- ing of December 15th to Howard's headquarters. Strong reconnoissances had meanwhile been made by the corps commanders, the approaches to Hardee's works had been carefully studied, and the preliminary steps taken to di'ain off the overflow from portions of the rice-fields in front of the city. By mending some of the breaks in the causeways and canals, and especially in the Ogeechee Canal, and by rearranging the flood-gates within our lines so that they should shut out the w'ater from the rivers instead of shut- ting it in, the depth of the inundations began to be sensibly diminished. Till the water should bo a good deal reduced an assault could hardly be thought of, for narrow columns along the causeways and dykes woiild have little chance, and in the overflowed fields the certainty of ^U wounded men being drowned would make an unjustifiable waste of human life. On the night of the 11th, General Williams of the Twen- tieth Corps had put over part of the Third Wisconsin upon Argyle Island, and next morning the rest of the regiment. While these troops were crossing, three anned steamers of the Confederates attempted to descend the river, but were tired upon by AViuegar's rifled battery, two of them were SAVANNAH. 57 driven back, and one, the Ecsoluto, was driven ashore upon the island and captured with its crew by Colonel Hawley and the Wisconsin regiment. Hardee had other gunboats below, and the presence of these in the river made it seem unadvisable to lay pontoon bridges till some thorough means of protecting them could be arranged. By an unfortunate mistake the Resolute was burned by her captors, when she would have "been of inestimable value in ferrying troops and supplies. The Confederates had carefully removed all flat- boats and barges from the river, and the great exposure of detached troops on the South Cai'olina side, with no as- sured means of communication or of supply, made it seem better to trust to Foster's ability to complete the invest- ment on the east by seizing the railway to which his troops were so near. Large (i[uantitios of rice were found on the island, and for some days this was the only breadstuff the men could pro- cure, while the rice-straw was the only forage for animals. On the IGth, Colonel Carman with the remainder of his bri- gade joined Hawloy on the island, while at the same time Wheeler began a concentration of the Confederate cavulry oi)posite, to contest any landing on the Carolina shore. At the right, Howard was making corduroy roads to con- nect the camps with the new d''pot that was i)reparing at King's Bridge, and was hurrying the operations which were cxi)ected to drain the rice-fields. His divisions and Slo- cum's were also an-anging earthworks to receive some heavy rifled guns which Sherman had directed Foster to send from Port Royal, as the light artillery brought with the army could not cope with the armament of the Confederate forti- fications. In many places a fringe of pine woods protected the canqis of the National trt)ops, and it was noticed that when this was half a mile deep, the shot from even the 3* 58 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. heaviest of the enemy's guns failed to pass through it. Around the plantation houses were groves of giant live-oaks festooned with the tillandsia, the long moss of the South, and the hoadcpiarters tents were picturesquely dotted among these. A despatch boat had been waiting on the coast with the mail for the army, and Sherman received despatches from Grant, dated the 3d and Gth of December, in which he di- rected that an intrenched jjosition be established at any eligible point, and that the bulk of the army should then be shipi^ed by sea, to join the forces before Richmond. Sherman responded to these at some length on the 16th, accepting the role assigned him with hearty subordination, but saying that his own expectation had been to reduce Savannah and then march to Columbia. To the officers of Grant's staff, who were the bearers of the despatches, he explained more fully his plans, and very vigorously urged the advantages of the movements he had proposed, so that these might be properly laid before the General in-Chief.' It happened, however, that on the very day when Sherman was thus replying, Grant had himself reached the conclu- sion to leave his subordinate free to choose his own course, and Halleck was writing to Sherman, by his direction, the authority to act upon his own judgment. The true strategic l^irpose of the campaign was thus maintained, but as the despatches of the IGth and 18th did not reach Sherman till Savannah was in his possession, the effect was to make him less decisive than he would otherwise have been in jjutting the left wing of the army into positions on the Carolina side of the river, and in committing himself to siege operations and to a completed investment, from which it 1 M; authority for this is Colonel G. W. Nichols, of Sherinau's staff, who was present at the conversation. SAVANNAH. 50 would not have been easy to withdraw wlien the expected transports shouhl appear to take away the army. As a mid- dle course, therefore, ho determined to rely mainly upo:i Foster for operations in South Carolina, limitin^^ Slocum to such auxiliary efforts from Argyle Island as might at any time be withdrawn. That such a middle course was a comparatively weak one, no one was better aware than Sherman, but it was that which duty seemed to dictate. He directed his Chief Enginei v, Colonel Poe, to lay out an intrenched camp at Fort McAllister, which might be held in the manner indicated by General Grant's first despatches, and ordered the corps commanders to i)ress the siege with the means in hand. In the hope also that the boldness of the demand might have some moral effect, ho sent on tho 17th a formal sum- mons to Hardee to surrender, but this was refused. We have already seen that the Confederate commander was de- termined not to allow himself to l)e shut up in the city, and the only rpiestiou with him was how long he could stay without too seriously endangering his escape. J3eauregard had reached Augusta, and was in general command, and this officer had accejited and earnestly reiterated the views which Hardee and Taylor had laid before the Confederate Government on this subject. General S. Jones, now in command at Charleston, was ordered to Pocatligo to keep open the railroad at every hazard, and a bridge of boats was built across the two channels of the river, from Savan- nah to Hutchinson Island and thence to the Carolina shore. Meanwhile the waters on the inundated rice-fields were slowly subsiding, Howard and Slocum had their siege bat- teries in position, some of their divisions had prepared light bridges to be carried by the men and thrown across the ditches, and other preparations were made for an assault 60 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. which must havo been sanguinary, but which they boliovod could bo successfully made. On the 19th Carman's brigade was ferried across from Argyle Island to the Carolina shore, and obtained a strong defensive position at Izard's mill, but the fields were under water there also, and Jl bridges were burned, so that it was not an easy thing to advance. The movement, however, satisfied Hardee that ho could not delay longer, and he began the evacuation, first sending over a strong detachment to resist fiercely the advance of Carman along the dykes. Knowing the danger of Har- dee's escape, and believing that a vigorous effort by Foster's troops might still prevent it, Sherman started in person by steamer, on the 18th, to visit Foster, whose physical condi- tion was not siTch that he could come to the camp. He spent the 20th at Hilton Head, giving directions for a move- ment of Hatch's division against the Union Causeway, and started to return in the night ; but his boat was delayed by high winds and by grounding at low tide, so that he did not get back till toward evening on the 21st, when he founil the city already in possession of his troops. Hardee had completed the evacuation in the night of the 20th, and Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, being the nearest to the town, had marched in at daybreak next morning. Sher- man's despatch announcing the possession of the city reached President Lincoln on Christmas eve, and its publication was received by the country as a Christmas gift of priceless value. The moral prestige of the march was greatly height- ened by the so quick capture of one of the principal South- ern cities and seaports. The escape of Hardee was a disappointment, but as we now know that he had been care- fully watching the roads since the first approach of the National army, with the determination to abandon the city before the investment could have been made complete, SAVANNAH. (jj the only question was whether ho should make the evacua- tion a iow days sooner or later. Hardee had only been able to remove his light artillery w ith his troops, and the heavy guns, mounted and in store, which were captured, were found to number over two hun- dred and fifty. Thirty-one thousand bales of cotton also Ml into the hands of the National army and were turned over to the officers of the Treasury Department. The re- treating Confederate army moved first to Charleston, whence the Georgia militia were sent to Augusta, that they might relieve other Confedei-ato troops there and serve within their own State, in accordance with the terms of their enlist- ment. 02 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. CHATTER IV. MIDDLE TENNESSEE— PULASKI TO SPRING HILL. "While the events clescribed in the last chapters were occurring in Georgia, the struggle in Middle Tennessee had reached a crisis. We have seen that before November 15th Forrest's cavaliy had joined Hood, and that a portion of the Confederate infantry occupied Florence, covering the bridge that was laid there in preparation for the advance of the whole of Hood's army. General Thomas had committed to General Schofield tho command of the trooi)S immediat(ily ojiposed to Hood, but it was tho universal expectation that a rapid concentration of the National forces would be made in time to prevent the Confederate army from advancing far.' In East Tennessee the enemy, under Breckenridge, made an attack upon General Gillem, who commanded a body of our cavalry there ; but this was simply a diversion intended to delay the concentration of our forces, like that made just before by Forrest, and had no further significance. Sher- man's march from Atlanta made it necessary for Hood to do promptly whatever he meant to do, and his cavalry began to make demonstrations toward Lawrenceburg and W^aynes- boro as early as the 15th. The weather, however, had proven a formidable obstacle, delaying the rebuilding of the railroad between Tuscumbia and Cherokee Station, and > For organization of the armies of Thomas and Uood, set Appendix 6. 64 FRANKLIN AND NASIIVihLE. (l(!layin}^ still moro tlio wagon trains which woro toiling through tho iinul in tho cfTort to accumnlato su[)i)lios Hutli- oi(*nt to warrant tho opening of an active campaign. Tho HtorniH, of which only tho edgo reached Sherman ntuvr Ma- con, were continuous antl severe in Tennessee, alternating between rains and severe frosts, covering the roads with a frozen (unist over deep mire, just strong enough to make tho utmost obstniction, without getting tho solidity necessary to bear up tho wagons and teams. Beauregard had left Hood on tho 17th, after issuing the order which directed tho latter to advance Avith the least possible delay, and on the 2()th had reached West Point, Miss., whence ho telegraphed to Hood to '-push an active offensivo immediately." On that day, Lee's corps marched ten miles out from Florence, on a road between those lead- ing to Waynesboro and to Lawrenceburg, and on tho 21st tho whole of tho army was in motion, Hood hoping by a, rapid march to get in rear of Schofield's f(jr(M>s before they could reach Duck Eivor. Schofield received wtn'd on tho 20tli from Hatch, who commanded his cavalry, that the ad- vance had begun, and as soon as it Mas evident that Hood was moving on tho Lawrenceburg road, he sent back hi.i surplus stoi-es from Pulaski, and prepared to retreat to Co- lumbia. Ho had ordered Colonel Strickland, who was at the last-named place, to prepare a defensive lino by which he could hold the town, or at least the crossings of Duck liiver at tho railway and pontoon bridges. On tho 21st the cavalry reports left no doubt that Hood was near Lawrence- burg, and the next morning Cox's division of tho Twenty-third Corps was sent to Lynnvillo, about half way between Pulaski and Columbia, where it was joined in the evening by Wag- ner's division of the Fourth Corps. At this point they cov- ered an important cross-road coming in from Lawrenceburg MIDDLE TENNESSEE. G5 to the railway. Thomas's dospatclics to Sohofu^ld ho«l all contained tho stronj^ wish that the troops niij^ht rotrcnvt as little and as slowly as i)OHsil)lo, for on Sunday, tho 2()th, hi* had abandoned the expectation of seeing A. J. Smith's trot)ps bo- fore the following Friday. H(* expressed a hope that Pulaski might be held till then, but coincided in Schotield's opinion that, if Hood attemi)tcd to get in his rear, it would be neces- sary to retire to Columbia, covering tho railway. The min- gled and continuous storms of snow, sleet, and rain were delaying Hood, and he was not yet so far North as to make it sure that he would not seek to reach the railway south of Columbia. On the 23d, Schofield's movement kept pace with Hood'.s, Cox's division being sent ten miles farther north to Hurricane, tho crossing of tho railway by tho Mount Pleasant and Shelbyvillo road, and Stanley, with tho whole of the Fourth Cori)s, was moved to Lynnvillo. But during the night Schofield received word that the cavalry on the Mount Pleasant and Columbia Pike were unable to resist the determined advance of Forrest, and before day- break of the 24th ho put his little army in rapid motion for Columbia. Cox's division, having tho shorter distance to travel, approached the town first, and hearing tho noise of the cavalry combat on the converging road at the west, marched by a cross-road some two miles out of town, and reached that on which tho fight was going on in time to in- terpose the infantry skirmishers, moving at double-qviick, between FoiTest's cavalry and the brigade of Colonel Capron, which was rapidly retreating into the place. The enemy was quickly checked and a line formed behind Bigby Creek. It was now a little after seven o'clock ; in less than three hours Stanley's head of column came up, and a strong posi- tion was taken by tho whole command, covering the town on the south. Hood did not succeed in getting the whole of 6G FRANKLIN AND NA8HVILLE. his forces up until tlio 20tli, his utmost exertions having failed to move his army faster than ton miles a day. Hcho- field was joined on the man^li by General Wilson, who took command of all the cavalry, which was slowly reinforced, and ho was mot at Columbia by General linger, with one of the brigades of the Twenty-third Corps, which had been left at Johnsouvillo. General Cooper, who had also been at Johnsonville, was ordered by General Thomas to march with his brigade from there to Centre vi Ho, a crossing of the Duck lliver, thirty miles west of Columbia, where it was thought Forrest's cavalry might tiy to pass that stream. Part of Ruger's command was scattered at several points on the river, within a few miles of Columbia, to protect cross- ings and fords on Schofield's right flank. Wilson, with tho cavalry, was directed to ojierate on the left, covering the country in tho direction of Lewisburg and Shelbyville as well as possible, besides watching tho fords and crossings of the river above Columbia. • Schotield's position was a strong one if the attack were made upon him in front, but it had the great disadvantage of a river at his back. No lino north of tho river coulJ. be occupied without abandoning tho railroad bridge to destruc- tion, and this would be needed again as soon as a forward movement should begin. The river at tho town makes a horse-shoo bend to the south, and the land on the north bank in the bend is low, and completely commanded by that on the south. Hood was too wary to make an assault of tho lines, and contented himself with a shaii> skirmis;hing engagement, while he prepared to turn Schofield's position by crossing the river some miles above. Thomas had given orders to Genei'al Granger, at Decatur, prior to the retrograde movement, under which that officer, on the same day that Bchofleld abandoned Pulaski, with- MIDDLE TENNESSER 07 drew las garrisons from Atlions, Decatur, and Huntsvillo, and concentrated his division at Stevenson, a hundred niil(>s cast. The relations of this singular divergent movement will be considered later ; its immediate etlect was to relievo Hood of any embarrassment as to his right Hank in operat- ing against Sehofield. The gamson at Johnson vi lie was ordered to remove the i)ublio property and retire to Clarks- ville, fifty miles northwest of Nashville. On the 24:th, a careful examination of the country satisfied Sehofield that he must expect Hood to try to turn his posi- tion, and he informed Thomas of liis purpose to prei)are an interior and shorter line, so that when it became necessary he could retire to this and send i)art of his force north of Duck River. Thomas still urged that the cftbrt be made to cover the railway and pontoon bridges with a bridge-head, so keeping command of a crossing till ho should be ready to advance ; and Sehofield prepared to delay and obstruct Hood to the last moment, urging that the infantry rein- forcements be sent to him as fast as possible. The strong efforts which had been made had increased Wilson's cavalry to about seven thousand efjuipped, five regiments being sent forward from Nashville between the 24th and 27tli of the mouth. These, however, did not reach him at the front till the 30th, and till that time his force remained inferior in strength to Forrest's, even if we deduct from the latter llod- dey's division, which seems to have been detached, guarding Northern Alabama. During the night of the 25th Sehofield ordered Cox to move two brigades of his division to the north side of the river, and take a position covering the pontoon bridge which was at the ford. On the 26th, this was strengthened by breastworks on indenttd lines, where the brigades and regi- ments were separately intrenched, taking advantage of every 68 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. iri-egularity of tlio ground antl of groves of tiinbor to pro- tect the force from the cross-fire of artillery which the en- emy would have from the higher ground on the south of the stream. Pits were also made for a line of skirmishers close Vicinity of Columbia, Tenn. to the rivL '• bank. The Fourth Corps troops were brought into the interior line which had been constructed on the other side, and the town and bridges were still held. Hood felt cautiously tho ncvV line in front of Columbia MIDDLE TENNESSEE. but still did not attack, and the whole of his infantry being uji, he began a movement to cross the river above. Forrest assembled most of the Confederate cavalry between Hood's right and the turniDike, and other roads leading from Lewis- burg to Franklin eastward of Columbia, trying the difterent fords. Wilson was actively at work to prevent the crossing, watching the coiintry as far as Shelbyville. The indications of Hood's purpose were now so plain tliat SchofieJd felt ho could no longer delay, and moved the whole of his command to the north side of the river, in the nigh!; of the 27th, partly destroying the railway bridge, so that the enemy could nob make use of it. He was also obliged to destroy the pontoon bridge, which was of heavy wooden boats, for which \u) had no means of transportation. He earnestly assured Thomas that he had held on as long as was at all safe, and he was plainly right, the only doubt being whether, in his zeal to give Thomas all the time possible for the intended concen- ' tration, he was not taking too great a risk. Wilson heard, on the afternoon of the 28tli, that Forrest had forced a crossizig at Haey's mill, eight miles above Columbia. ' He tried to unite his forces as rapidly as possi- ble in front of the enemy, but Hurt's c.oss-roads, between Spring Hill and the Lewisburg i)ike, was the first point at which he was able to make any continiied stand. At eight in the evening his information seemed to show that Forrest was movrag eastward toward the Lowisburg pike, and that none of the enemy had gone toward the Franklin i)ike, i:i ' The official rcjiorts anrl momoirs on both rkIos are full of differences as to the distance from Coluiablii to tlie place where Hood'.s infantry crossed. The Con- federate aecount.s say nothiiii; of Hiiey's mill, and do not dis, ' .ctly t\\ the place of their i)oiitooii bridfxe. By tlie courtesy of Capt. 11. D. Smith, of Columbia, who was in Hood's army at the time, I am able to nay definitely that tlie bridge was laid at Lavis's ford, between five and six miles from CoUimuia. Some of the cavalry 'jrossed at I I'y's mill. 70 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. roar of Sohofiold. At ono o'clock, however, he received in- formation that pontoons were laid at Huey's mill, and that Hood'.s infantry were crossing. This he immediately de- spatched to Schofield; but the messenger had to go by Spring Hill, and the way was long, so that the intelligence was only received at daylight in the morning. A brigftde of infantry (Post's of Wood's division) was immediately sent upon a reconnoissance up the river, accompanied by one of Schofield's staff, with orders to observe and report the move- ments of the enemy. Stanley was ordered to march at eight o'clock with two divisions of his corps to S2)ring Hill, eleven miles, 'saving "Wood in support of Post's reconnoissance, and about a mile in rear of Cox's di^'ision, which was ordered to hold stubbornly the crossing at Columbia and the tongue of land in the bend of the river. Ruger was ordered to hasten the blockade of the fords and roads below the town by fell- «tng ti'eos, and then to march also to Spring Hill. Stewart's brigade of cavalry, which had l^een watching the lower fords, had been ordered the jireceding evening to proceed rapidly to join Wilson by way of Spring Hill ; and Ham- mond's brigade, which was coming from Nashville freshly remounted, was ordered to stop at the same place and move as Wilson should direct. As another precaution Schotield had telegraphed Thomas, asking that a pontoon bridge be sent to Franklin, m here the wagon bridge had been carried away by a freshet. Soon after daylight the Confederate artillery around the whole bend of the river opened upon the division en- trenched in the lower lands along the north shore, but the l)recautions that had been taken by building traverses and angles in the lines prevented any serious loss. The fire was returned from our batteries, and the renewal of the artillery combat at different times through the day, by MIDDLE TENNESSEE. 71 allowing that Hood's cannon woro in position, proved also that his whole army could not have moved. The truth was that Hood had left two divisions of Lee's corps, and the whole of his artillery, in Columbia, witli orders to make strong demonstrations in the niorning, and to force the crossing of the river later in the day. The roads by which he was leading Cheatham's and Stewart's C0111S were not thought practicable for the cannon. Scho- field needed time for Rugcr to comi)lete his Avork at the fords below, and to ship by rail some artillery which had no horses and other material for which transportation was lacking. He judged also from the strong force of the ene- my in Columbia that Hood was not unlikely to move straight down the river ui;)on his flank, when the two parts of tlie Confederate army could co-operate. He therefore modi- fied his order to Stanley, so as to place Kimball's division near Rutherford Creek crossing, about two miles from Wood, and let Stanley proceed to Si)ring Hill with Wag- ner's division alone. Huger was ready to march early in the day, and leaving one regiment as an outpost on the right, he hastened with the rest of his two brigades over Kiitherford Creek, when he halted, by Schofield's orders, a short distance beyond the position of Kimball. The wagon trains of the army had been ordered to Spring Hill, and Stanley reached that i)lace about noon, and just in time to pi'event their capture by the enemy's cavalry. Forrest had, on the 2Sth, placed Buford's division upon the Lewisburg and Franklin turni)ike, Chalmers's division at Holland's Ford, about seven miles east of Columbia, and Jackson's at Hue>y's mill, between Chalmers and Buford, while he himself, with his escort, and Biffle's demi-brigade attempted Davis's Ford, two miles west of Chalmers.' The Jordan and Prior'H Campaigns of Forrost, p. (119. 72 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. two divisions of the National cavalry were broken into smaller detacliments, part of them well out toward Slielby- ville, the nearest to the infantry being part of Capron's brigade, at Rally Hill, on the Lewisbnrg pike, where a branch turnpike turns off to Spring Hill. The resistance made to Buford was so vigorous that he could not got over the river, but Jackson and Clialmers forced a crossing after a sharp skirmish, and Forrest himself does not seem to have found any resistance. He soon struck the Columbia and Murfreesboro road, and turning Chalmers and Jackson to the east, drove Wilson's detachment beyond Rally Hill. The enemy was now between the main body of our cavalry and the i)arties watching the fords near tht; Lewisburg crossing. These were collected by Major Young (Fifth Iowa Cavalry) and under his lead they daringly cut their way through. "Wilson now called in his deta diments to- ward Hurt's Corners as rapidly as possible, but his despatch to Schofield at eight o'clock, giving the information already referred to, shows that he was misled as to Forrest's jrar- poses. It is true that the latter was moving eastward with two-thirds of his command, but he was doing so only to clear the way for Buford, and at Rally Hill he was in pos- session of the only macadamized road leading dii'ectly to Schotield's rear at Spring Hill. Wilson had been able to rally his whole command at Hurt's Corners, and checked the further advance of the enemy in the evening, but Buford joined Forrest in the night, and early in the morning the whole of the Confederate cavalry again advanced. Wilson made a brave and determined resistance, jiutting Croxton's brigade of Johnson's division in the rear, to contest every foot of the way. Capron's brigade of the same division, which had been badly worsted the evening before, took the advance on the Franklin road, and Hatch's division was MIDDLE TENNESSEE. 73 the middle of the cohimn supporting Croxton. Forrest operated by flank movements, usin<^ his heavier foree to turn the i^ositious sehictod by "Wilson, and by the mid- dle of the forenoon hud gained Mount Carmel, where the Murfrr(^ek, two and a half miles from Spring Hill. Ordering Cheatham to remain and hurry the crossing of his other divisions, Cleburne was di- rected to press forward and attiiclv whatever force there might be at Spring Hill, where the noise of Stanley's artil- lery warned them that Forrest was meeting with opi^osition. But tlie distant firing at Columbia eoiild also be heard, and the tenacity with which Schotield hung on to the lino of Duck River apparently raised doubts in Hood's mind whether the National commander might not have received reinforcements enough to cut boldly between the now sepa- rated wings of his army. Post's reconnoissance had gone far enough to observe the movement, and it is probable that ib had in turn been seen by Hood's command, and he would thus know that infantry was api>roa<^hing his line of march. But whatever the reasons which induced it. Hood ordered Stewart to form his coi-jis in lino of battle south of Ruther- ford Creek, facing west, and this instruction necessai'ily im- plies the expectation of the apin-oach of an enemy fi'om that direction, or the purpose of himself making an attack upon the line which Scholield had i^repared to receive him by putting Wood's, Kimball's, and Ruger's divisions within sup- porting distance of each other upon the extension of Cox's left. He may have thought that the resistance at Spring Hill would be slight when Cheatham reached the field, and that this corps sweeping down the turnpike toward Colum- bia would meet the convergent advance of Stewart in a gen- eral attack upon Schofield's flank. The advantages of the MIDDLli TENNKSSEi:. 75 defence in a broken and wooded countiy, and tlio pradent disposal of bis force, hj wdiicli Soliofiold had now some miles of line facing the east, would possibly have made siich an attack as disastrous as the ouo at Franklin next dav ; but Hood did not attack there, and Stewart remained in line till Cheatham had l)een repulsed at Sprini,' Hill, and was then ordered up when darkness had fallen and it was thought too late for further action that night. ^Yllen Stanley had reached Spring Hiil he found a i^art of Forrest's command already in the outskirts of the place. Ho ordered "Wagner to put Oi:)dyckc's and Lane's brigades in position to cover the village, and advanced Bradley's brigade to a wooded hill about three-fourths of a mile east of the turnpike, which commanded the approaches from that direc- tion. One battery of artillery hud accompanied Wagner, but Captain Bridges, Chief of Artillery of the Fourth Corjis, had followed Stanley's march with six batteries, leaving one with Wood's division. This hiid been done only to get them well forward en route to Franklin ; but on reaching Spring Hill, Captain Bridges had with wise precaution put his guns in battery on a commanding bench just west of the road, and where a little later they proved of great use and most fortunate in position. The enemy's cavalry made active ef- forts to reach the trains, which were parked by the roadside, and also to destroy the railway station a short distance west of the turn2)ike, and the protection of all these kept Opdycke and Lane fully employed. Bradley was engaged at the same time, but the affair was not serious until the arrival of Cle- burne's division on the field. This officer formed his com- mand along the Rally Hill road, and, advancing at right angles to it, attempted to reach the Columbia turnpike. Ha does not seem to have been fully aware of Bradle5''s position, for his extreme right (Lowry's brigade) alone reached it, 70 FIIANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. and was received with so nido a shock that Cleburne was quickly forced to change front nearly at right angles in order to (nigago his opponent. Bate's division, which fol- lowed Cleburne, had formed in the same manner and tonic the same lino of direction. It had nearly reached the Col- unibia road when Bate discovered that CUeburne had changed direction, and his orders being to form on the left of that division, much time was consumed in rectifying tlio line. Brown's division had followed Bate and had been sent forward on Cleburne's right. Bradley's jiosition had been too isolated to be held by a single brigade against so extended a lino of battle, and after his first sharp encounter with Clobiirne ho retreated in some disorder, he himself being severely wounded. The brigade was (piickly re- formed on the right of Lane, at the southern edge of the village commanding the Colund)ia road, and a regiment was detached from Opdycke to strengthen it, Wagner's line was now a semicircle, reaching from the Columbia road around the eastern side of the place to the railway station on the northwest, Opdycke's brigade being stretched out till it was only a strong line of skirmishers. A regiment which was with tlie trains as a guard was also utilized, and advantage was taken of the ground to present the strongest front pos- sible. Cleburne and Brown followed u]) Bradley's retreat, but were met with so continuous a fire and on so long a de- fensive line, that they were made to believe they were in the presence of a superior force. The concentration of artillery fire upon them was so far beyond what they could expect from a single division, that it checked them as much, per- haps, by producing the conviction that they had most of Schofield's army before them, as by the severe losses caused by the terrible fire of shrapnel and canister. It was now gi'owing dark, and Hood having reached the conclusion that MIDDLE TENNESSEE. 77 he needed Stewart's cori)s also, ordered this up from Ruther- ford Creek, with Johnson's division of Lee's corps which accompanied it. Jackson's division of cavahy occuijicd Thompson's Station, three miles north of Spring Hill, and the rest of Forrest's horsemen were in that direction. AVhen Stewart arrived it was already night, and he was ordered to bivouac on the right and rear of Cheatham. Meanwhile Schofield had issued his orders that Cox's di- vision should continue to hold the bank of the river opposite Columbia till nightfall, if possible, and then, leaving a skir- mish line in position, should march to Spring Hill, followed in turn by Wood's and Kimball's divisions. The skirmishers were directed to remain till midnight unless driven off, and to join the rear guard of the army or follow it. The divi- sions were all to move by the left flank, so that whenever they should halt and face they would be in line of battle, and could use the road fences for barricades if attacked bv Hood. The whole line would thus be shortened from the right till Kimball only should remain on that flank, when ho also would march to Spring Hill. By this arrangement there was the least risk of confusion and the greatest readiness for any contingency which might arise. On hearing from Stanley that he was attacked l)y infantry, Schofield hastened to Euger's division, which, it wdll be re- membered, was nearest to Spring Hill, and led its two bri- gades in person by a rapid march to Stanley's support. As he approached the village he found i^ickets of the enemy on the road, but thtse were driven off and he joined Stanley at seven o'clock. Whittaker's brigade of Kimball's divi- sion had also been ordered up, and followed Ruger closely. When it arrived it was placed on the right of Wagner's line, to cover the march of the rest of the column as it should approach. Learning from Stanley that some force of the 78 rilANKLIN AND NASHVILLM cuomy was at Thoiupsoii'H Station, Schotield immediately marched with Kuger's division to that jioint to ojien the way to Franklin. At his ai)i)roaeh Jack.son withdrew his cavalry and linger was placed in jjosition there without a contest. Schotield now returned to 8i)ring Hill, reaching the village at midnight, and meeting there the head of Cox's division which had moved from Duck liiver in accordance with his orders. It is necessary, to a complete understanding of the situa- tion, that we should go back a little and notice the efforts which Lee made to carry out Hood's orders, and force the crossing of Duck Eiver in the afternoon. He had kept up, at intervals, an annoying plunging fire upon Cox's trocjps in the bend of the river, but our rifled cannon, by greater range and better practice, had prevented the enemy's artillery from maintaining its })ositions or doing much damage. A line of skirmishers' pits on the very end of the tongue of land hud been made untenable, but a fringe of wood, a little further back, alibrded a cover which gave complete command of the oi)en ground to the edge of the river bank. About four o'clock the efforts of Lee to effect a crossing became more energetic. Some pontoons were brought to the south bank of the river, and, under cover of a rapid artillery fire, a few boats were run down to the water. Some trooi)s were fer- ried over in these, and so long as they remained under i)ro- tectiou of the river bank, they could not be reached by our fire. As soon, however, as they ajipeared above its edge, and attempted to advance against the fringe of woods held by the Twelfth and Sixteenth Kentucky (part of Eeilly's brigade) they were met by the most determined resistance. The Sixty-third Indiana and One Hundred and Twelfth Illi- nois, of Henderson's brigade (temporarily commanded by Colonel Stiles), w^ero sent forward to support the right of MiniJLlO TENNK8.SKI':. 7J) Iloilly's men, iiuil the onemy was driven from tho ojum j^Tcmud to tho cover of tho river bank aj^uin, and made no further ett'ort to croHS tho river dnrinj,' tho (iveuing. Soon after nij^htfall the line of pickets near tho river was stronfjjthened, the two Kcnitncky regiments, nndcu- <'onnnand of Colonel White, were left as their sui)i)ort, tho Division Inspector-General, Major Dow, being with them, and having (H'ders to bring them otF at midnight. Tho division then marched to Spring Hill, where it was directed by General Schotield to take tho advance and proceed at once to Frank- lin, twelve miles fnrtluu-. The other divisions followed in the appointed manner and without serious interrnjjtion. The pickets at the river were withdrawn, as directed, and overtook the rear of Wood's division a littlo beyond Hjjring Hill, and, under orders from that oflicor, protected tho ilank of the trains from the cavalry of the enemy on tho remainder of the march to Franklin. Wagner's division was kept in position at Spring Hill till the tmins and all the other troops were in movement, and Opdycke's brigade, which was the rear guard of the whole, did not march until six o'clock in tho morning. About mid- night Hood was informed that trooj^s were passing on the Columbia road, and sent Johnson's division of Lee's corps to extend Bate's line and stoj) the movement; but the night was dark and the country unfamiliar, and nothing came of it but a slight occasional skirmish, while our columns marched by in full view of the enemy's camp-fires, which were burning less than half a mile away. Here, as at Atlanta, Hood sought to shift the responsibil- ity for his failure upon a subordinate, and Cheatham was now selected to bear the burden. Hood charged him with tardi- ness and weakness in the attack upon Stanley, and asked to have him relieved from his command. This request was 80 I RANKLIX AND NASHVILLIi withdrawn after the battlo of Franklin, though without re- tracting the chai'ge. But a commander who is personally with the head of column in such a n\ovement and upon tho field, has the means of enforcing lus orders by direct com- mands to tho divisions. Had his own confidence not wav- ered, and had he not begun to yield to the belief tluit much more than one division was before him, his own energy would have carried his subordinates with him, and would have made the assault as desi)erate, if need be, as it was next day. But he seems to have lacked the gi-asp of mind which enables a general to judge and to act with vigor in the pre^f^nce of circumstances which tlu'ow doubt upon his plan, ,4. he proved inferior to his opponent in a strategic contest, which has been generally regarded as one of the most ciitical and instructive conjunctures of the war. The circumstances, as narrated by the leading Confederate of- ficers who were present, show that Hood had an access of hesitation at the very moment when the success of his move- ment demanded that all doubts should bo thrown to the winds and everything risked upon a desperate stroke.' ' A popcr read in ■December, 1881, bi-fore a society of 8f)Uthern officers at L<»ai«- vjlle, Ky., by (ieneral Clieatliam, coutoius u very full array of the evidence which BOKtuius the above view. CHAPTEK V. BATTLE OP FRANKLIN. The march of the National army from Spring Hill to Franklin was not seriously internipted. Forrest's troopers made an occasional dash at the long wagon train, but only in one or two instances did they succeed in reaching it, and very few wagons were lost. After seeing his columns fairly started, Schofield rode forward and ovei-took General Cox with the advanced division just before the village of Frank- lin was reached. He had, about noon, urgently renewed his request to Thomas to send a pontoon bridge to the crossing of the Harpeth liive- , but having received no answer, he spurred forward with his staff to see if it had arrived. It was not yet daybreak, and the division was ordered to mass by the roadside to allow the trains to pass into the town. The division commander and his staff had halted at the house of a Mr. Carter, at the edge of the village (a house soon to become the key-point of a fierce battle) and were trying to catch a few minutes' sleep upon the floor, when General Schofield returned, much disturbed at finding that no pontoons had come.' He ordered General Cox to as- * In the correHpondcnce on file in the War Heoords office, no response to the second re-quest for pontoons if> fount', and General Schofield informs the author that he received none. The same files do not contain any explanation of the de- struction of the boats at Columbia, and it would therefore Rcein that General Thomas must have continued to assume that they were available, notwithstandini; the strong imi)licati((ti of Schofleld'a despatches. See Apiiendix D. 4* 82 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. sume command of l)oth divisions of the Twenty-third Coi-ps, and, as soon as day should dawn, intrench them upon the best line which could be made right and left of the knoll on which the Carter house stood, to cover the crossing of the trains and the rest of the army. He himself, with Major Twining, his Chief Engineer, began immediately to plan such improvements of the river crossings as should enable him to get the trains and the artillery upon the north side of the Harpeth at the earliest possible hour. The village of Franklin is upon the south side of the river, which partly encloses it in a deep curve to the northeast. The northern bank is hero considerably higher than the other, and, upon a hill commanding the railway and wagon- road bridges, an earthwork called Fort Granger had been built more than a year before. The railway approaches the town from the south, parallel to the Columbia turnpike, and about five hundred yards east of it. For a thousand yards it runs close to the bank of the river and on the eastern edge of the village, then crosses without change of direction, for the liver here makes a turn to the west, nearly at right angles to its former course. Through a part of the distance last traversed the railway is in a considerable cut, and this as well as the bridges and the reach of the river, is com- pletely under the tiro of the fort. The Carter's Creek turn- pike runs southwest from the centre of the town. The line selected for defence was a curve which would be very nearly that struck with a radius of a thousand yards from the junction of the two turnpikes in the village. Its centre was a few rods in front of the Carter house on the Columbia road, and was upon a gentle rise of ground. Its left was at the railway cut close to the river, where was an- other knoll. Upon this line the Carter's Creek turnpike is about the same distance from the Columbia turnpike as the IJATTLK OF FRANKLIN. 83 railway, and this constituted the proper front facing Coluni- Ina and Spring Hill, whence Hood was advancing. The third division of the Twenty-third Corps (Cieneral lieilly in -^ _ untw __™ " ^^ ^^^ ^a" ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ at'ft Battle-Field of Frunklin. Hi FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. temporary command) was i)laced on the left, Reilly's own brif^ado resting its flank on the i)iko, with Casement's and Henderson's brigades (Colonel Stiles in temporary com- mand of tlio latter) continuing the line to the railway and river. The front of Reilly's own brigade was shorter than the others, for the two regiments which were left behind as i)ickets at Duck River belonged to it, and these did not arrive till the line was occupied. They were then placed in second line, supporting the first and less than a hundred yards in rear of it. Ruger's division was between the Col- umbia and Carter's Creek turnpikes, Strickland's brigade on the left, and Moore's on the right. Along the whole front the ground sloped very gently from the line, and was only obstructed by a small grove of locust trees a short distance in front of Ruger, and by farm buildings, with orchards here and there in the distance. A range of high hills bounded this plain on the south, through a gap in which the Columbia road runs. The Twenty-third Corps immediately began the building of breastworks, and by noon a strong intrenchment had been completed, the lack of timber for revetment being the only thing which jirevented it from being equal to those usually made during the campaign. An old cotton gin in Reilly's line furnished timber for head logs, and upon the knoll near the railway, at the Carter house, and in one or two other places, where the slope was sufficient, strong epaulements for artillery Avero constructed inside of and somewhat higher than the infantry parrpet. At the Colum- bia turnjiike the full width of the road was left open, for it was all needed to enable the doubled lines of wagons and artillery to pass, and a retrenchment crossing the road a few rods in rear was built to command the opening and its ap- proach. At the river it had been found that by scarping the banks, BATTLE OP FRANKLIN. 85 the ford, though a very bad one, could be used to some ex- tent. Some wooden buildings were dismantled to furnish planking for the railway bridge, and a wagon approach to this was made. The lower part of the posts of the county bridge were found to be good, and these were sawn off nearly level with the water, crossbeams and planking were laid upon them, and by noon the army was j^rovided with two passable bridges. The artillery of the Twenty-third Corps passed over first of all at the ford, to gain time, and part of it was placed on the fort on the north bank. General Stanley being directed to send several batteries of the Fourth Corps to report to the commandant upon the lino when they should arrive. The trench on the left, in front of Stiles, was placed close behind a thick-set hedge of osago orange, which was thinned out so as to make an impassable thorny palisade, and the material was used to make a slight obstruction in front of Keilly's brigades. In front of Ruger the locust grove was cut down for the same use, though the trees were much too small for the purpose. At General Cox's request for troops to cover the right flank, since his force was not sufficient to reacli the river on that side, Kim- ball's division of the Fourth Corps was ordered to report to him as it came in, and was placed there,' Wood's division of the Fourth Corj^s arrived and crossed to the north bank, Kimball had taken his place in the line, Wilson's cavalry was ujion Wood's left, opjiosing the eflbrts of FoiTest to cross the river in that direction, the town was full of wagons waiting their turn at the bridges, and some of them struggling through the ford. The wearied troops, which had fought and marched since daybreak of the preceding day, dropped to sleep as soon as their breast- ' See Appendix D. 86 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. works were l)uilt, and caught such rest as tlioy could pre- paratory to a more temble struggle and another night of marching. On the Confederate side, Lee had sent forward the artil- lery from Columbia, as soon as it could be crossed over Duck liiver in the morning, and with it went ammunition for Forrest's men, who were getting short of it. The march in pursuit does not seem to have been hurried, and the sin- gle brigade, which was rear-guard, had no difliculty in hold- ing back the enemy. A more annoying task was to drive forward the stragglers. A number of new regiments had joined the army at Columbia, and in these were many inex- l)erienced recruits, who were not hardened to their work, and who had overloaded their knapsacks. It required the utmost exertion to prevent these men from falling into the enemy's hands, footsore and dispirited from fatigue as they were. To keep them up, Colonel Opdycke was obliged to order their knapsack straps to bo cut, and to detail a pro- vost guard to hurry them on. About noon the rear-guard reached the hills at the border of the Haii)eth Valley, from which the heavy columns of Hood's army could now be seen advancing rajjidly. Op- dycke checked them for a time by opening upon them with artillery, but was then withdrawn and brought within the lines, where he was placed in reserve upon the west of the Columbia road, two or three hundred yards from the Carter house. Wagner placed the rest of his division (Lane's and Conrad's brigades) astride the Columbia turnpike, about half a mile in front of the principal line. The commandant upon the line was notified by General Schofield that "Wag- ner's orders directed him to remain in observation only till Hood should show a disposition to advance in force, and then to retire within the lines to Opdycke's position and act BATTLE OP FRANKLIN. 87 as a general reserve. Wagner, on being shown the note conveying this notice, said that such were his orders. By three o'clock the trains were nearly all over the river, and Schofield had issued orders that the troops should also pass over at six o'clock if the enemy should not attack be- fore sunset. But the period of depression and recrimina- tion in Hood's army in the morning seems to have been fol- lowed by fierce excitement. Cleburne talked with Brown, as they rode along, complaining bitterly that Hood had cen- sured him, and telling of his dotoruiination to demand an investigation.' Evidently all were keyed to a high moral tension, and were determined that at the next opportunity, their commander should not have it to say that his plans had failed from any lack of energy or courage on their part. Hood, himself, had resolved upon a desperate effort to destroy Schofield's army before any further concentration of Thomas's forces could be made. About three o'clock word was sent from Wagner's brigades in front that the enemy was forming at the foot of the hills in heavy force, and reiterating to General Wagner the direc- tions already given him, the commandant upon the line went to the knoll in Stiles's brigade, which afforded a better view of the whole field. General Schofield had moved his headquarters to the north side of the river, and was personally at the fort on the hill, which not only com- manded a view of the field, but was nearest the bridges by which communication was kept up, and where alone he could see the cavalry demonstrations on the left where For- rest and Wilson were already engaged. The v-illage itself is on a plateau lower than the line intrenched, and from it • statement of General Brown in General Cheatham's paper before referrcfl to. Hood, however, in his Advance and Iletreat, p. 294, tpeaks of a cordial under- standing with Cleburne before he entered the battle. 83 KIIANKLIN AND NASIIVII LE. nothing whatever conhl be seen. General Stanley, who had been ill dnring the morning, had also his quartera on the north of the Harpeth, with Wood's division. A depression in front of Wagner's brigades and some scat- tered trees shut out Hood's lines from view at the Carter house, but from Btiles's position they wore plainly seen, formed ap- parently in double and triple lines of brigades, with artillery in the intervals between the columns. Hood had i)laced Cheatham's corps ujjon the Columbia turnpike with Cle- burne's division on the east of the road, Brown's on the west of it, and Bate's in C;chelon on Brown's flank. Stewart's corps was on the right (east) of Cheatham, the order of his divisions from Cleburne's flank being French, Walthall, and Loring. Johnson's division was the only one of S. D. Lee's corps which had yet come up, and it was kept in reserve. Very few battlefields of the war were so free from obstruc- tion to the view. Here, along a mile and a half of front, the imposing array of the Confederate army could be seen ad- vancing at quick step with trailed arms, the artillery in the intervals galloping forward, unlimbering and firing as soon as they were within range.' A section of artilleiy with Wag- ner's brigades first opened on the advancing enemy, but as they approached it limbered up and deliberately trotted within the principal line, in accordance with orders sent it by the Chief of Artillery. It was now four o'clock, and to the amazement of the thousands who were watching them, Wagner's infantry opened fire. There was a rattling fusillade for a few moments, Cleburne and Brown were checked for an instant, but the Confederate forces passed the flanks of Lane and Conrad, to right and left, a rush and a yell fol- ' HockI pays he did not use artillery. That he is in error of recollection is alniiidaiitly shown by rept)rts and jirintcd statements on both sides. The writer speaks from his personal observation. BATTLE OF FUANKLIN. 89 lowed, and the two hapless bripvdes crtiiio stroaming to the rear iu a disorf^auizod crowd, ninuiuf? rapidly to reach the parajjets btdiiud them. Orders were (piickly sent down the line to withhold the fire at the centre till our own men should be iu, but to make the utmost use of the artillei-y and small arms on the flanks. Opdycke was warned to bo ready for a rush to the centre if the line sliould f?ive way there, and the second lino along the whole front was simi- larly prepared. A few moments later, the head of the flying mass was seen swarming over the works at the tiirnpike, and orders were sent for all reserves to charge. Tin? men in the trenches, confused by the crowd tram})ling over them, and hearing Wagner's oflicers calling upon their men to rally at the rear, were carried away by the surging mass, and for the length of a regiment on the left, and more than that on the right, they fell away from the works. Neither Colonel White, commanding Reilly's second line, nor Colonel Op- dycke waited for the word to charge, but were in motion before the order could reach them. White was nearest the parapet and reached it soonest, but his line did not reach quite to the turnpike. The Carter house and out-buildings on the right of the road obstnicted the movement to tho front, and Opdycke made part of his brigade oblique to tho left till clear of the obstacles, and they then charged head- long upon the enemy. Part also went forward on the west of the houses, and Strickland's brigade rallying with them, the Confederates were driven back here also ; but that the gap was open longer here than on the left, was proven by the enemy's dead who were found fifty yards within the lines. Stanley, forgetting his illness, had mounted his horse at the first sound of the cannonade, and the commandants of the two corps met on the turnpike just as Oi)dycke and his 90 KIIANKLIN ANI> NASHVILLR men \V(!ro rushinp to the front. Four guns, w Inch had boon l)lut'0(l u few yards to tlio left of tlio road, were in the enemy'H hands, and were loaded with canister. Those were turned upon the flank of licilly's line, but the frightened horses had run off with the ammunition chests which contained the primers, and while the captors were unsuceessfuLy trying to tire the piec(;s, the reserve was ujwn them. Four other gims on the right of the road were also in the enemy's hands. There was a few minutes' fierce mOlCe, but the guns were retaken and all of the men in gray who were inside the parapet were dead or prisoners. Yet the successive lines of assailants charging the works allowed no resi)ite. Colonel White received a severe wound in the face, but refused to leave the line till after nightfall, and Opdycke had joiiied personally in the thickest of the deadly tussle on the turn- pike. Our men, who had been driven back from the line, rallied by officers of all grades, returned to their posts, min- gling with those who were there, making a wall three or four deep, those in rear loading the muskets for those who were firing. While rallying those men Stanley was wounded, his horse was shot under him, and he was reluctantly per- suaded to return to his quarters for surgical help. Farther to tlie right, and in part of what had been Strick- land's brigade line, the Confederates of Brown's division held the outside of our jiarapet, so that when their com- rades were driven back they were able to prevent our men from reaching it again. These, seizing upon fences and such material as came to hand, made a new barricade within about twenty-five yards of the first, and across the narrow interval the battle raged with most persistent fierceness. It was hard to tell where either brigade line ended, for Op- dycke's men mingled with Reilly's on the one side, and with Strickland's on the other, and the three crowded the space BATTLE OF FUANKLIN. 91 where two had been. OfHeerH and nion had be<>n coiiHcious that with the centre broken, nut sui)erhiiman exer- tions couhl keep one winpf, at least, of the litthi army from being driven into the river. They were equal to the occa- sion and thev Haved the dav. But though the crisis of the engagement was at the centre, the tight was by no means all there. In other parts the veterans of the Atlanta campaign held their lines with- out flinching, though the assaults of Stewart's divisions rivalled those of Cheatham in their gallantry, and they made the most dai'ing efforts to reach the bridges which were on that flank. Loring's men came upon the hedge in front of Stiles, and attempted in vain to tear it away, or to pass it. Henderson, who had been for some days ill, re- joined his brigade, and both he and Stiles directed the fir- ing, which, sweeping along the gi'ound, mowed down all before it. The Confederate officers urged their men to the right, hoping to pass through the railway cut, but here they were met by the shrapnel and canister of the guns in the fort north of the river. The batteries in Stiles's line were also admirably handled, and the attack here had never a chance. On Casement's line, Walthall's and part of Loring's divi- sions made the assault, and as there was here no obstruc- tion in front of the trench worth naming, the possibility of carrying such a line when projjcrly held was fully tested. General John Adams led his brigade, riding straight at the ditch, leaping it, and mounting the parapet, where his horse was killed astride of it, and he himself pitched hef\dlong among Casement's men, mortally wounded. SccliHh, that they rcdaxod thnt volli(fs, as th(! (Jonfederate ^((MKirals strove to assist tho central attack })y stronj^ dtunonstrations ; but heni the roar was for a lon^ time incessant and dc^afenin^. Otliers suf^- ^esti^d to Htrahl to withdraw, or to surrenchsr, but h(!st<»adily repeat(;d tho connnatid, " k(!(!p thin^" till lio was hiniscdf struck down. He; calhid for Coh)n('l Stallbrd, to turn over the conunand, and they tiicnl to carry him to the nsar, but on tho way a seuiond and a third ball Htnurk him, killinf>; him instantly.' Colonel Stallbrd continucid tlu; contest with the same dettM'niination. Mcjssen^^ers were seait to (ien(!ral IJrown to tcdl him of Strahl's deatli and ask for orders, but th(!y found that he was already disabhid l)y a wound, and the stair sujjpostid Strahl to bi; in command of tlu; division. Ch(uitham had stMit in all of lirown's l>rit^ades, but Gt^idon had l)e(;n cai)turi!d in thci first melf-e, (Jist, as well as Stnihl, was dead, and Cart(U' was wounded. Hood was called ui)on for assistance, and he scuit forward Johnson's division (jf Lee's corps, but this, too, was driv(>n back l)y tliat terrible lire, h^avinf,' (ireneral INIanif^ault woundetl on th;! licdd. On the National side the One llundrcid and Twelfth Illi- nois was brought over from SLiki.s's l)ri<,'a(l(', and i)ut in to assist Strickland. An elFort was made to get this regiment forward over the little interval between the two bn^ast- works, but it was not successful. The obliiiuo fire from cur > The dotiillH of tho Rituatinn on tho Oonfeilorat*? Kiilr- nt this point un^ chiefly (Iriiwii from a iwiniphUit l)y S. A. Ouiiiiiiitfliuiii, Scri^nunt Major, uiiliUtMl Ituinl- iiiHCfiiwH of thr I'ortylirnt IViiuchhoc lU'giuiciit, 94 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. troops, on right and left, whon thoy were not hotly engaged in front, was turned upon Cheatham's men, but it was nine o'clock before they gave up the contest, and those that were left were reformed on the line occupied by Stewart and Lee, though for more than an hour occasional volleys were exchanged. At eleven o'clock, the whole front being quiet, F ^hofleld ordered the withdrawal of our troops to the north side of the river, but an accidental fire broke out in the vil- lage, making a bright background on which our lines could be too plainly seen by the enemy, and it was neces- sary to wait an liour till the fire was extinguished. Kim- ball's division then marc^hcd by the rear to the wagon bridge, liuger's passed behind the lines to the railroad })ridge, Opdycke's brigade was sent to follow Kimball, and Reilly's division crossed behind Euger, a lino of sku-mishers, under command of Major Dow, Inspector General, remain- ing in the trenches till all the rest were over and the plank taken from the wagon bridge, when these also crossed at the railwav. The dead could not be removed, but the well disciplined ambulance corps, under Surgeon Frink, had taken off all the wounded who could endure transportation, except some who had crawled away into buildings and sheds and were not found in the darkness. Reilly'tj division car- ried off as trophies twenty-two battle flags of the enemy, and Opdycke's brigade ten.' The battle had been j^eculiar, partly by reason of the late hour in the day at which it began, which prolonged the hard fighting far into the night, and partly from the char- acter of the weather. A day or two of sunshine had fol- lowed the continuous storms of the j^receding fortnight, I Hood says that thii-tccn was the number of Hags he lost, tout the number stati'M.l above was ofllcially reported by our division and brigade cotumauderti aitd \ ei'ifiud at the time. BATTLE OF FRANKLIN. 96 and the air had been still and hazy. The smoke of the battle did not rise or drift awav, but settled on the field in a thick cloud, obscuring the vision far more than common. It was said that this had led to the mistake, on Hood's l)art, of supposing that his lirst advantage at the centre was much greater than in fact it was, and resulted in greater de- stJTiction to the Confederate trooi:)s, by repeated assaults after all real chance of success was gone. The Confederate accounts of the condition of the field next morning are full of tragic interest. Before daybreak it was learned that the National lines were empty, and the plain was covered with torchbearers seeking their comrades and friends. Colonel Stafford was found in the ditch General Strahl and he had so stubbornly held. The dead lay literally in a pile about him. They had fallen about his logs and behind him, till when he at last received a fatal shot, he did not wholly fall, but was found stiifencd in death and partly tipright, seeming still to command the ghustly line of his comrades lying beneath the parapet. The color-bearer of the Forty- first Tennessee had fallen between the two lines of breast- works, but neither friend nor foe had been able to reach the flag till it was hidden by the night, and in the morning it was found where it dropped.' But even civil war rarely furnishes so sad a stoiy as that which the Carter family have to tell. The house was occu- pied by an elderly man and his two daughters. Their presence during the day had been respected and had kept their property from unnecessary disturbance, and the day vvas so far gone that they thought there was no need to leave their home. The battle, when it came, broke upon them so suddenly that they did not dare to leave, and they took ' Seiyeunt-AIajor Cuniungham'H pamphlet. 9G FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. refuge in the collar. The house was in the focus of the storm which raged about it for hours. They said that while the horrid din lasted, it seemed that they muat die of tenor if it did not. cease; hut when there was a lull, the suspense of fearful expectation seemed worse than the din, and ib was almost a rc^lief when the combat was renewed. The long night ended at last, and with the first light the young women found relief in ministering to the wounded who had crept into the house and outbuildings, and in carrying water to those on the field. But, as they climbed the para- pet at the rear of the house, among the first they found was a young staff officer, their own brother, mortally wounded, lying, as ho had fallen at sunset, almost at the door of his home. The withdrawal of Schofield's forces in the night left no op- jiortunity to reckon the Confederate losses. Hood says that his casualties, comj)uted ten days after the battle by means of the returns cf " eifective strength," were found to be 7,547 since the opening of this campaign, and including the losses about Columbia and Spring Hill. This, however, excludes all the slightly wounded who had returned to duty, and all officers, and makes no account of the accessions he had by the return of absentees and the joining of recruits. It still acknowledges a loss of 6,300 in this battle, of which 700 were prisoners in our hands. It is very certain that the whole Confederacy was deeply impressed with the fright- ful carnage of their troops, and their writers, with common accord, spoke of the desperate fighting as remarkable even in this war of desperate combats. The jmrtial returns acces- sible seem to show clearly that no one of the divisions en- gaged (except Bate's), lost less than eight hundred, and that Brown's and Cleburne's, at the centre, and Loring's, on our left, lost much more heavily. The long list of general BATTLE OP FRANKLIN. 97 officers killed and wounded gives terrible significance to the recriminations which the affair at Spring Hill had excited. W(; have seen that Brown and all fonr of his brigadiers were disabled or killed. In Cleburne's division, Granberry })e- sides himself fell. In Loring's division they lost Gcmeials John Adams and Scott. In French's, Cockrell ; in Walt- hall's, Qnarles ; and in Johnson's, Manigault ; twelve gen- erals in all, besides Stafford, and a long list of colonels and field officers who succeeded to brigade commands. On the National side the losses were 2,826, of which more than one thousand were in the two brigades of Wagner, which wore so unnecessarily compromised at the front. Near the centre, wIkh'o the line was temporarily broken, the losses were naturally much heavier than on the flanks, where our men stoutly held the breastworks and fought under good cover. The result well illustrates the fearful odds at which the bravest troops assault a line of earthworks over open ground, even when a grave fault of a subordinate has given them an exceptional and unlooked-for advantages Ocnieral Wagner's ])lace of duty was with the two brigades of his division which were exposed in front, and the order to bring them in without fighting had been sent through the Fourth Corps' head-quarters, and had been received by hini. He was at the Carter house when the message canu; from the front that Hood was forming in lino of battle, and, in a moment of excitement, forgetting himself and his orders, he sent back a command to fight.' The overwhelming of the two brigades and the })oril to the whole line were the neciessary (ionsc;- quence. He rallied the disorganized brigades at the river, but thev were not again carried into action. During the battle and in preparation for aiiy contingency 1 This is stated to tlie writer by two olTlccrs who wore present nnil heard it. Vol. X.— 5 98 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. which might arise, General Schofield directed General Wood to put the three brigades of his division in position to cover the flanks of the troops in front of the town, and to protect the bridges in case of need. Wood accordingly placed Post's brigade opposite Kimball's flank, below tho town, Strcight's near the bridges, and Beatty's above Fort Granger, all on the liigh ground of the north bank of tho Haii^eth ; and these brigades maintained their position in the night till the rest of the infantry had passed through their lines and marched to Brentwood. General Wilson, with tho cavalry, had, during tho afternoon, a warm skirmish with Forrest, who tried in vain to cross the Harpeth beyond the left of Schofield's forces. Thomas sent a warm con- gratulatory despatch when the result of the engagement was announced to him ; bat, as he thought three days would still bo needed to prei)ari:i his concentrated army for aggressive operations, and as this tvas a longer time than Schotield could engage to hold t]» line of the Hai'peth without rein- forcements, he directed the lattvv to retire uj^on Brentwood, and thence to Nashville.' Despatches had been sent to General Cooper, who, it will b^^ remembered, had been stationed at Centreville, on Duck River, with n brigade of the Twenty-third Corps, directing him to fnii bock on Franklin. But unavoidable delays occurred, and when he approached Franklin, the enemy was in possession. He was similarly anticipated at Brentwood, but by coolness and good conduct brought in his command safely to Nashville. • For corrc8i»ondence between these oiBccrs on November 149th and 30th, rca Ai)pLndix D, CHAPTER \1. BATTLE OP NASHVILLE. Schofield's little army reached Nashville in the morning of December 1st, and was merged in the forces which Gen- eral Thomas was assembling there. General A. J. Smith, after many unforeseen delays, had arrived with his d«>tachmenta from the Army of the Tennessee, consisting of three divi- sions, aggregating nearly twelve thousand men. Of these, something over nine thousand men reached Nashville early in the morning of November 30tli, and the rest on the next day. The first intention of General Thomas had been to meet Schofield at Brentwood, ten miles in front of Nash- ville, with these troops, while Schofield marched the ten miles from Franklin to the same point ; but he concluded later to make the union at Nashville. When he i-cceived from Schofield and from Wilson the reports of Hood's move- ment of the 28th and 29th, by which the cavalry had been sejjarated from Schofield, and Forrest was reported pushing eastward, he ordered Steedman to leave a garrison in Chatta- nooga and take his other available forces to Cowan, a station near Elk River, on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway. Steedman reached there on the morning of the 80th and put his troops in position ; but in the evening, Thomas, having learned of Hood's attack in force upon Schofield at Franklin, ordered Steedman to hasten to Nash- ville. The troops were accordingly put upon the railway 100 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. trains again, and most of them reaclicl their destination safely on the evening of December 1st. One train, l)eing delayed bv an accident, did not arrive till the 2d, and was attacked by Forrest five miles south of Nashville, but the troops made their way through without serious loss, though the train was captured and destroyed. Of the 8,000 men who had l)een at Chattanooga on the 30th, Steedman brought with him 5,200, consisting of two brigades of colored troops, and a provisional division made up of soldiers be- longing to the army with Sherman, but who had arrived at the front too late to rejoin their own regiments. Most of the troops under General R. S. Granger, in North Alabama, and of those under General Milroy, at Tullahoma, were ordered to Murfreesboro, where the whole, amounting to about eight thousand men, were placed under command of General Rousseau, and remained until after Hood's defeat on December 15tli and IGth. The block-house garrison, at the important railroad bridge on the Elk River, was the only considerable detachment left along the line of the Chattanooga Road, between Murfreesboro and Stevenson. In Nashville, on November 30th, besides Smith's forces, Thomas had about six thousand infantry and artillery, and three thousand cavalry, mostly dismounted.' The Chief Quartermaster, General Donaldson, had also armed and organized into a division the employes of his and the com- missary department, and these were prepared to serve as an addition to the garrison when needed. The new regiments which arrived were gradually assigned to the old divisions, ' By the table in Appendix A, it will be seen that the cavalry " present for duty' were 10,884, of which 2,272 were not "c the difference between 14,000 and the number at Murfreesboro. See Appendix A. BATTLI3 OF NASHVILLE. IM and the additions to the list of Sherman's convalescents and returning men were united to those who had come with Steedman, making, by December 14tli, a division of over tlvo thousand men, under command of General Cruft. Accepting Hood's statements of his losses thus far in the camiiaign, the army which he led against Nashville con- sisted of about forty-four thousand men of all arms.' His means of information were such that he had pretty full knowledge of the concentration Thomas was now effecting, and the motives which induced a march to Nashville aro matters of interesting inquiry. Beauregard, in his prelimin- ary report to the Confederate War Department, said : *' It ia clear to my mind that after the great loss of life at Franklin, the army was no longer in a condition to make a successful attack on Nashville." Hood's own statement, which would be entitled to the greatest weight if his subsequent writing j were not so full of evidence that they are labored apologies for his misfortunes, is that he expected reinforcements from Texas, and that he hoped by intrenching near Nashville ho could maintain himself in a defensive attitude till these should arrive ; or that he might even take advantage of a reverse to Thomas, if the latter should be beaten in an attack upon his fortified line. The hope of aid from Texas was a forlorn one, for no organized body of Confederates had for a long time succeeded in j)assing the Mississippi Kiver. From other sources, however, we learn that the show of confidence and of success was relied upon to induce recruit- ing in Tennessee, and that the pretended Governor, Harris, was with Hood, endeavoring to enforce the conscription in that State. This, and the collection of supplies, give an in- telligible reason for occupying as much territory as possible, • Seo Appendix A. 102 FUANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. and for an appearauco of bmvado which could hardly be justilied on military grounds. Doubtless, too, Hood be- lieved that while his veterans might be forced to retreat, they could not be routed ; and he underestimated the dis- couragement that began to pervade them when they were taught, by the terrible lesson of Franklin, how hopeless was that dream of conipiest with which their loaders had tried to inspire them when they crossed the Tennessee. Hood also says he learned that Schofield retreated in alarm ; but never -was a greater mistake. Schotield's officers on the line had rejjorted their perfect confidence in their ability to hold it, and the withdrawal from the Harpeth had been based solely on the probability of the position being turned before reinforcements could be sure to arrive. In truth. Hood's situation was a very difficult one, and to go forward or to go back was almost equally unpromising. He followed his natural bent, therefore, which always favored the appearance, at least, of aggression, and he marched after Schofield to Nashville. Ou approaching the town, he put Lee's corps in the centre, aci'oss the Franklin turnpike, for it had suffered least in the campaign, and was now his strongest corps. Cheatham took the right, and Stewart the left of the line, while Forrest, with the cavalry, occupied the country between Stewart and the river below Nashville. Attempts were made to repair the railway from Corinth to Decatur, and thence by Pulaski to Hood's rear. Hood tells us that he gained possession of two locomotives and several cars (perhaps at Spring Hill), and that these were used to help transport supplies. Thomas put his troops in position upon the heights sur- rounding Nashville, General Smith's divisions on the right, the Fourth Corps (General Wood temporarily commanding) in the centre, and Schofield's Twenty-third Corps ou the DATTLK OP NASHVILLE. 10.3 left. Steedman, who amved latr the river to Edgefield, on the north bank. On December 2d, Hood sent Bate's division of Cheatham's cordis to destroy tho railroad between Nashville and Mur- freesboro. Bate reached Overall's Creek, ten miles from Murfreesboro, and attackcid the block-house protecting the railway bridge there ; but the little garrison h«dd out against a severe cannonade till General Milroy arrived with reinforcements from Murfreesboro, and drove tho enemy off. Bate now tof>k tho road toward Nashville, and at Stewart's Crook and two other places in that neighborliood, found the block-houses evacuated, and burned them with tho bridges they were built to protect. Ho also reported that he had torn ui> several miles of track. Forrest, mean- while, who had been directed to co-operate with Bate, had sent Buford's division against tho I'iock-houses nearest Nashville, and succeeded in reducing three of them near Mill Creek, beginning with one five miles from the city. On tho 5th he united Jackson's division with Buford's, and moving toward Lavergne took two more block-houses. He now met Bate, who was moNang in the opposite direc- tion, and turned tho united forces upon Murfreesboro. Here, on the evening of tho 6th, ho was further rtiinforced by Sears's brigade of French's division, and Palmer's brigade of Stevenson's, and on next morning apy)roached the town, reconnoitring the fovtificaMons in person. Rousseau now sent Milroy against the enemy, with seven regiments, and these attacked vigorously tho left flank of Forrest's infantry, while they were moving by his orders in the same direc- tion for the puri^oso of taking ground farther to the left. 104 I'llANKLl.V AND NASIIVILIiK. Milroy's attack foil obliciiidy upon tlio oxtrcMiiity of liaic'.H lino, which was quickly ntlUfd up ami put to rout, lf)siu^ two pioc(!s of artillery. TJato admits 2i:i casualtioH in th(( in- fantry, hut those of tho cavalry aro not pfivcui. Milroy took 207 prisonc^rs, and hin own losses in tho atTair woro 'M) killed, and 175 wounded. Meanwhile, Buford's division attenipttfd to ontor tho town hy another road, but was also defeated and di'ivcMi otf. Bato'H division was now recalled to Nashville, and re- placed by a brifjfade undquest, liieutenant-Commander Fitch pa- trolled tho Cumberland with gunboats al)ove and below Nashville, to prevent the crossing of that stream by the enemy, and Wilson sent Hammond's brigade of cavalry to Gallatin to watch the north bank of the river as far as Carthage. From tho time of Hood's arrival in front of Nashville, the President and Secretary of War became very urgent in their desire that Thomas should at once assume the aggressive. ' CampaiRns of Porrcft, p. fi-'J-l. Thomas's report puts the affair at Murfrpps- boro on the 8tb, but both Bate's report and Forrest's biographers say it was tho 7th. BATTLE OF NASHVILLE 105 At their suRRostion, Oon<»ral Gmnt tologmplied on Decom- bor 2, lulvisiii^ Thomas to k'uvo tlio dcfouct'S of NashviUo to Gcnoial Doiuildson'H or^jfaiiizoil i'lnployes, and attack Hood at oiico. Grant's lan^ua^o was si-arcoly k>ss ini])erative than an order, but Thomas was so desirous of increasing his force of nu)unted nwn that he ;riLe luppoRime tHiwr ivttt.HC 1* Tm. „i Mup of baillo-Field of Nabhviiltd. 110 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. similar angles, all radiating from tlio centre of the town. The ground is hilly, ri.siug into knobs and eminences two or three hundred feet above the Cumberland, but mostly ojjen, with groves of timber here and there. Hood's line was over Brown's Creek, on the high ground from the Nolensville turnpike and the Chattanooga railway to the Franklin turnpike, then crossing the creek and mounting a high hill west of it, it extended to the Hillsboro road, where it turned back along a stone wall on the side of the turnpike. The detached works, of which mention has been made, were still to the southwest of this, and across Kichland Creek. The relative places of his several corps were the same as when he first came before the town. His main line at his left, where it reached the Hillsboro pike, was about a milo in front of "Wood, but he also occupied an ad- vanced line with skirmishers, only half that distanc»j away, and terminating in a strong outpost on Montgomery Hill, at the Hillsboro road. Before six o'clock in the morning Steedman was moving forward under cover of the fog by the Murfreesboro road, on the extreme left, and about eight ho attacked Hood's right between the turnpike and the railway. The vigor of the as- sault made it something more than a demonstration, and tlu; rapid lire of both artillery and small arms attracted the at- tention of the enemy in that direction. The distance Smith's right wing had to move was found to be greater than had been reckoned on, and it was ten o'clock before McArthur's division had moved sufViciently to the left to open the way for Wilson's cavaliy to advance upon the Hardin road. Johnson's division moved focward on the Charlotte turn- pike, looking also after the enemy's battery at Bell's Land- ing, on the Cumberland ; Croxton's i)rigade took the interval to the Hardin turnpike, Hatch's division contiiuied the lino BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. Ill to the flank of Smith's infantry, and Knipe's division was in reserve. Smith formed the Sixteenth Corps with Garrard's division on his left, connecting with the Fourth Corps, and Me Arthur's division on the right. The division of Moore was in reserve. On the other side Chahners did v\l'at h;i couhl to oppose them, supported by Coleman's (formerly Ector's) brigade of infantry,' but the odds was too great, and they were driven steadily bat'k. Half a mile southeast of the Hardin road the first of Hood's detached works, con- taining four guns, was foiind. The batteries of McArthur and Hatch were brought to bear upon it from all sides, and, after a severe cannonade, McMillan's and Hubbard's bri- gades of infantry and Coon's of cavalry (dismounted) at- tacked and carried the redoubt.- Stewart now recalled Coleman and directed him to report to Walthall, whoso division occupied the s'one wall bordering the Hillsboro turni)ike. AValthall placed him on the extension of his line southward, upon some high points covering the Granny White road. This left the other redoubts to their fate, as Chalmers was far too much over-matched to make much re- sistance with his cavalry. He had been driven back so fast that his train, with his hcadcpiarters baggage and i)apors, had been cui>tured. The next redoubt, about four hundred yards to the right, was carried by the same troops, and two guns in it were taken. Another four-gun battery, intrenched on a detached hill, was stormed and captured by the cavalry, and a two-gun battery by Hill's brigade of McArthur's divi- sion, though with the loss of Colonel Hill, who fell in the • This was of French's division, but French seems to have been absent, and his brigades were separately used as oceasiou reciiiired. Sears's had been recalled from Forrest, and was temporarily rejiorting to Walthall. 2 Smith and Wilson each claim for their men the honors in the attack of all thiwe works, but in such acomi)incd movement it is vniii to discriminate minutely as to the exact credit due each brigade. 112 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. moment of success. Smith's corps now bore somewhat to the left, strikinj? the extreme flank of the stone wall held by Wulthali'i, division, driving Reynolds's brigade fronx it in con- fusion. At the same time, Schoiield, who had followed the movement closely with the Twenty-third Corps, in accord- ance with Thomas's order, pushed Couch's division (formerly Cooper's) past Smith's flank, and beyond the last redoul)t which had been captured. Now advancing on the line from the Hillsboro road, eastward, across an open valley half a mile wide, Couch assaulted and carried the left of a series of hills parallel to the Granny White turnpike. The as- sault was made by Cooper's brigade, and the rest of the division was quickly brought up in snjjport, while Cox's division marched still farther to the riglit and occupied the continuation of the line of hills nlong Pdchland Creek with two brigades, keeping the third (Stiles's) on the heights west of the creek to cover the flank. These last movements had occurred just as darkness was falling, and completed the day's work on the extreme right. It is now necesaary to go back and traco the jjrogress of the Fourth Corps. General Wood had formed the corps with Elliott's division (formerly Wagner's) on the right, connect- ing with Smith's corps, while Kimball's and Beatty's extend- ed the line to the left. The time occupied in the deployed movement of the right of the army made it one o'clock be- fore it was time for the extreme left to move. Wood then ordered forward Post's l)rigade of Beatty's division to attack Montgomery Hill, the high point half a mile in front of the salient of our line, on which was Hood's advanced guard. The assault v-as preceded by ra]nd artillery fire and was gallantly executed. The general advance of the line was now progressing, and Schotield's corps was ordered away by General Thomas to support the movement of the right liauk. BATTLE OP NASHVILLE. 113 Wood met with a strong skirmishing resistance, but the lines went forward steadily, keeping pace with tlie troops on the right, till Smith's attack upon the south end of the stone wall along the Hillsboro road, which was held by Walthall. Kimball's division was opposite the angle in Hood's line where Walthall joined ui)ou Loring, having Hears's brigade of French's division between them. Kimball pushed straight at the angle, ami the right of the stone wall having already been carried, Walthall's brigades, under Johnston (formerly Quarles's) and Shelley, successively gave way. Elliott's division of Wood's corjxs lapped upon Gar- rard's of the Sixteenth, and the whole went forward with enthusiasm, capturing several guns and many prisoners. Hood's left was now hopelessly broken, and he made haste to draw back his shattered divisions iipon a new line. Scho- fi(dd's advan(!e had separated Coleman's brigade from Walt- hall, but it occui)icd a commanding hill (afterward known as Shy's Hill),' and held on with tenacity till Walthall, helped by the gathering darkness, could form along its right across the Granny Wliite road. At the tirst news of the loss of the redoubts. Hood ordered Cheatham's corps (except Smith's, formerly Cleburne's division) from the right to the left, and his divisions, hurrying by the Franklin pike toward Overton's Hill, passed great numbers of stragglers streaming to the rear. Bate was ordered to relieve part of Walthall's division, so as to make a stronger lino between Shy's Hill and the Granny White road, and Walthall closed to the right ui)on Loriug. South of Shy's Hill, Lowry's (formerly Brown's) division extended the Confederate left in front of Schofield, and the whole worked diligently to intrench themselves. Lee's corps was drawn back till his right eu- ' This namo Ih given the hill by General Bate, whose troops held it, in hono." of Colonel Sliy who fell there. It seems to have had no special name before. 114 FRANKLIN AND I^ASHVILLB. circled Ovorton'.s Hill, on which Clayton's division was placed, supported by Brantley's brigade, while Stevenson's and Johnson's divisions extended the line to the west till it united with Loring's division of Stewart's corps. On our left Steedman had kept his men active. He had attacked and earned an earthwork near the Haines house early in the day, and had followed up the progressive move- ment of the army, harassing the enemy's right as it drew back. About nightfall there was a strong appearance of a pre- cipitate retreat of the enemy, and Thomas ordered Wood to move his corps farther to the left, reaching the Franklin turnpike, if possible, and to push southward upon it. This direction was a wise one if the enemy continued his retreat, for it prevented the crowding of the army upon a single road ; but had Thomas been sure that Hood would reform upon the new line, he would, no doubt, have continued the general movement of the day by extending his forces to the right. The darkness stopped Wood before he had reached the Franklin road, and he bivouacked whore night overtook him, ready to continue the march in the morning. His right was near Smith's left, and his own left was diagonally toward the rear, in the works which Lee's corps had aban- doned on the hither side of Brown's Creek. For the results obtained, the losses had been astonishingly light. Wood reports only three hundred and fifty casualties in his corps, Smith's were about the same, and Schofield's not over one hundred and fifty. Those of Steedman and of Wilson were proportionately small, though the exact figures cannot be given, as the losses of the first and second days are not discriminated in any report but Wood's. Sixteen pieces of artillery and twelve hundred prisoners had been taken, and Hood's whole line had been di'iveu back fully BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. 115 two miles. The work was not completed, b'lt should the enemy maintain his position, the promise for the morrow was good. Hood now realized the mistake his over-confidence had led him into, by inducing him not only to extend his lines beyond what was prudent, but, worst of all, to allow Forrest to become so far detached that he could not bo recalled in time for the battle. Sears's brigade had been brought back to the lines before the 15th, but two others were still with Forrest, and Cockrell's was at Duck Rivor. The Confede- rate commander set to work in earnest, however, to repair his mistake. The cavalry was too far away to join him in twenty-four hours, but orders were despatched recalling Forrest, and preparations were made to hold the new line another day. As his left still seemed his weak point, Hood ordered the whole of Cheatham's corps to that flank. Shy's Hill, which was held by Coleman's brigade, made the angle in the line, from which the sharply refused flank continued southward, Lowry's division and Smith's (formerly Cle- burne's) extending it to the Brentwood Hills. Bate's divi- sion was placed, as we have already seen, between Shy's Hill and the flank of Stewart's corps, facing north. Chal- mers's division of cavalry was close upon the left of the in- fantry, bending the line back, somewhat, toward the Granny White road. The Confederate line now rested upon high hills, Over- ton's and Shy's, between which the ground was lower, though rolling, and was broken by the upi)er branches of Brown's Creek, which ran in nearly straight courses north- ward, crossing Hood's position at right angles. Overton's hill was a broad, rounded elevation, and the works, in curv- ing southward around its summit, did not present any sharp angle to weaken their strength. Shy's Hill, however, though 110 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. lii^li, was of leas extent, and the lines of Bate and Lowiy nuul(! a rif^ht anf^lo there. Bate complained of the position, but Hood's engineers had established it, and Cheatham did not feel at liberty to change it. Indeed, it could not have been changed much, unless the whole Conffuleratc! army were to retreat. Coleman had been driven to Shy's Hill by Schofield's advance at dusk, and had all he could do to hold on to it at all. The extension of the Twenty-third Corps along the east side of Richland Creek left oidv the hills directly south of Shy's unoccupied, and it was thoYo. alone tiiat the advance of Thomas's right wing could be checked. The National skirmish lines were so close that the digging had to be done on the inside of the parapet chiefly, getting cover for the men as soon as possible. The hill on our side, held by C!ouch's division, was only three hundred yards from Shy's, and the work on the latter, built under fire, was weak. Farther south, the confronting hills, held by the rest of Cheatham's corps on the one side, and Schofield's on the other, were farther apart, and that in the Confederate line was considerably higher and well wooded on the toji. A strong work was made upon it, revetted with timber, with embrasures for cannon, and a parapet high enough to defi- lade the interior ; but the fire of our sharpshooters prevented any abatis being made. General Thomas held a council with his corps commanders in the evening, but no new orders seem to have been issued, except some directions as to movements in the event of a retreat of Hood during the night. If he remained in posi- tion, the movements progressing at the close of the day Avould be continued. During the night the lines on the National side also were adjusted. In Schofield's corps, Couch's division, in making connection with Smith, opened a gap between it and Cox's division, which, after extending BATTLE OP NASHVILLE. 117 the two biigadfis, which were over Kichland Creek, in single line, without reserves, was still unable to join Crouch's left by as miTch as three hundred yards. The disadvantage of drawing in and contracting the extension of the right flank was so manifest, that, upon the rejwrt of the fact, Schofltdd applied to Smith for some of his reserves to complete the line, and at six o'clock in the morning, Colonel Moore re- ported with five regiments and a battery, and was placed there.' Three of the regiments were put in the trenches already there, and two in supjiort of the artillery in rear. At the same hour, Wood resumed the movement of the Fourth Corps, which had been interrupted in the evening, and Steedman advanced upon the Nolensville pike to the abandoned line of the Confederate works, where he half wheeled to the right and came up on Wood's left. The lat- ter first formed his corps with Beatty's division on the left of the Franklin road, and Kimball's on the right, with Elliott m reserve ; but finding a large space vacant between himself and the centre of the armv, he moved Elliott's division for- ward into line continuous with Smith's corps. The left of the Fourth Corps, where it now connected with Steedman, remained across the Franklin road, and opposite Overton's Hill, where Hood's line bent back to the south. The Na- tional line, therefore, instead of being oblique to the enemy, and far outreaching it on the right, as on the previous day, was parallel and exterior to it from flank to flank, nowhere reaching beyond it, except where Wilson's cavalry was oper- ating beyond Schofield on the Hillsboro road. About noon, Steedman's troops formed a connection with Wood's, and the latter, by order of General Thomas, took direction of both. Along the whole line the skirmishers ' In Smith's report this is spoken of by mistalio as Moore's division, but it was, ill fact, only part of his division. 118 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. woi'o advanced closo to tlio enemy's works, and various points were niconnoitred to determine the fea.sihility of an assault. Thomas did not order an attack upon the intreneh- ments, but loft the corps commanders to their own discre- tion in this n^spect. Wood concientrated his artillery tire ui)on Overton's Hill, Smith and Schotield maintained a se- vere cross-firo upon the angle at Shy's Hill, and at other points on the line the opposing batteries were warmly en- gaged. Finding that the enemy was strongly intrenched in Wood's front, (leneial Thomas rode to Smith, and learned the results of the reeonnoissanco there, and, after examining for himself tlie position, continued on to Schofield's lines on the right. Schofiold had ordered Stiles's brigade of Cox's division to leave its position in rear of the extreme right and march farther south, then, turning to the east, to push forward upon a wooded hill on the extension of the line of the division. Thence he was to keep pace with the advance of Wilson's dismoiinted cavalry, and attack with the rest of the lino when it shoiild go forward. The termi- nation of the Confederate continuous works in Cheatham's line, was the embrasured earthwork already referred to, with a recurved flank facing the south. A four-gun battery, of smooth twelve-pound guns, was in this fort, with four more in the curtain connecting it with Shy's Hill. The rifled gnus of Cockerell's battery, on the west side of Rich- land Creek, were able to reach the embrasures of the work in front, while the shells of the smooth guns fell short in the efforts at reply, and the superiority of the National artillery was such that the Confederate gunners were forced to re- load their pieces, by drawing them aside with the prolonye^ to the protection of the parapet. On learning the nature of the works in front of Schofield, BATTLE OP NASHVILLE. 119 and tho oxfont of tho onomy'a lino, Tliomaa ordorod Smith to Hond ono of his divisions to oxtoud that Hank, l)ut on repiosentations as to tho condition of allairs in Smith's front, tho onU;r was withdrawn. Wilson, howovor, was maltinj? good pro{?voss with his c.ivalry, which must now ho traced. Johnson's division had not felt strong enough to attack tho position of C!halmcrs, near Boll's Landing, on tho loth, and Wilson's movements had heen made with tho rest of tho c()ri)S. The conctMitra- tion of Chalmers's division in tho night, enabled W^ilson to bring Johnson up in tho morning, and ho now had all threo of his divisions in hand. Hammond's had pickets toward the Granny White turni)iko, in rear of Hood's left, Hatch's division was ordered to move from his bivouac on tho Hills- boro road, on tho loft of Hammond, and upon tho enemy's rear. Johnson was moving across tho country from near Bell's Landing. By noon, or shortly after, W^ilson'a skir- mishers formed a continuous curved line from Schofield's right around the enemy's flank across tho Granny White road. It was at this timo that Schofield ordered the move- ment of Stiles's brigade, which has been mentioned, and had suggested the desirability of sending a full division of in- fantiy beyond Hold's flank, if one could bo spared from tho lino. He did not think it wise to assault tho lieaN-y work in front of Cox's division, excei)t in connection with a general advance. The situation at the angle on Shy's Hill, however, was opening tho prospect of a successful attack there. Tho ad- vance of Wilson's dismounted cavalry from one wooded hill to another on the south, was making Hood uneasy, and his vehement exhortation to Chalmers, to hold his own, not being enough to overcome the odds against that ofhcer, ho was forced to withdraw Govau's brigade from Cheatham's 120 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. line, and send it to Chalmers's support. Bate was ordered to extend his left, and occupy Shy's Hill, while Coleman, who had been there, was sent to fill Govan's place. Bate's line was now a good deal stretched, and he found also that the earthworks built in the night were too far back from the brow of the hill, so that they did not command its slope. The fire upon it was too hot to change it, he could get no reinforcements, and he could onlv hold on to the last. Bate's own words best describe his situaticm in the afhu'noon : " The enemy, he says, opened a most teirific fii'e of artillery, and kept it up during the day. In the afternoon, he planted a battery in the woods, in the rear of Mrs. Bradford's house (this was in McArthur's line), fired directly across both lines composing the angle, and threw shells directly in the back of my left brigade ; also placed a battery on a hill diag- onally to my left, which took my first brigade in reverse. (This was in Cox's line.) The batteries on the hill, in its front, not more than three hundred yards distant (in Couch's line) had borne the concentrated fire of my Whitworth rifles all day, and must have sufferei^I iieavilv, but were not silenced. These rifled guns of the ( vtimy being so close, razed the works on the left of the angle for fifty or sixty yards," ' General McArthur, from his position, was able to see something of the mischief done to Bate's line, and reported that an assault upon the angle was practicable. He pro- posed to move McMillan's brigade to the right, in front of the hill held by Couch, and to charge under the cover of Couch's guns, where the hillside gave most i)rotection to an advance. Thonias ai)proved the plan, and Smith sent to Schofield for directions to Couch to co-operate. Schofield • General Bate's official report. BATTLE OP NASHVILLE. 121 acceded to this, and directed Cox also to attack the hill in his front simultanoouslv, while Stik^s shonld advance be- vond the flank with the cavalrv. It was now near four o'clock, and Thomas was in person at Schofield's j)osition, from which Shy's Hill, and the whole range south, to the Brentwood Hills, were iu full view. The whole connection of events will be best understood if we now return to the left flank, where Wood had been making anxious examination of the enemy's position ou Overton's Hill, and upon the report of a reconnoissan(;^e by Colonel Post, had determined to try the chances of an at- tack there. The assault from the Fourth Corps' position was assigned to Post's Ijrigade of Beatty's division, sup- ported by Streight's. Thompson s colored brigade, of Steed- man's command, supported by Grosveuor's brigade, were to attack at the same time from the east. A concentrated artillery fire upon the hill preceded the assault, and at three o'clock the order to advance was given. A cloud of skirmishers ran forward to draw the enemy's fire and to annoy the artillerists in the works, and the brigades in lino followed them. Nearing the intrenchmcnts, they rushed forward, some of the men gaining the parapet, but they were received with so hot a fire, that they could not endure it, and after a sh(U-t, sharp struggle they recoiled. Their re- treat was covered by the rest of Beatty's division and Steed- man's reserves, and by the artillery. These were so handled that the enemy did not venture from his works, and our wounded were brought safely off; but the casualties were probably half of all that occurred in the l)attle, adding an- other to the many proofs of the terrible disadvantage at which a direct assault of a well intrenched line is usually made. Colonel Post was killed, and the loss in officers was heavy, for they exposed themselves fearlessly in loading their men. Vol. X.— G tkife 122 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLR At the angle in the Confederate works hold by Bate, at Shy's Hill, the circumstances were ditierent. His lines, as we have seen, were enfiladed and taken in reverse ; his para- pet was levelled for yome distance ; the closeness of Ck)uch's batteries, the near approac:h of onr skirmishers, the attenua- tion of Bate's troops, the cover for the approach of the as- sailing force under the hill-slope, all combined to neutralize the advantage of modern weapons, and to give the assault the preponderance of chances which justify it. While the fire upon the angle was kejit up with increasing severity, McAi'tlmr ordered Colonel McMillan to form his brigade in the hollow before Couch's works, and when they should be half-way up the hill, the brigades to the left were to ad- vance in echelon^ attacldng the lower line before them. Wilson's dismounted cavalry had been advancing from the south, gaining position after position, and increasing their ardor as thev advanced. Their immbers enabled them to outflank Govan's brigade, which Hood had sent to assist Chalmers in holding them back, and as they approached Schofield's position Stiles's brigade of infantry came in close support." The balls from this attacking force were now falling in rear of Bate and Lowry, and the men of Cle- burne's old division were vainly trying to form a line long or strong enough to match that which was coming from the south. Wilson had gone in j^erson to Thomas, at Schofield's position, to reix>rt what his men were doing, and reached him just as McMillan's brig-ade was seen to rush forward upon the slope of Shy's Hill. At a sign from Schofiold, Cox's division started also on the run, Doolittle's brigade in • In his report General Schofleld expressed some disappointment that th's bri- gade hatl not been able to get forward faster ; but Colonel Stiles's account of the mutter and of the nature of tlio ground sliow that ho accomplished all that could be expected of so Knmll a force moving over rough, detached hilla. BATTLE OF ;NASHV1LLE. 123 advanco. Wilson turned to gallop back to his command, but before he could get half-way there, the whole Confede- rate left was crushed in like an egg-shell. McMillan swept unchecked over Bates's mined line at Shy's Hill. The gallant Colonel of the Thirty-seventh Georgia did all that man could do to hold it, and dying at his post, gave to the height the name it bears. The arch was broken ; there were no resei-ves to restore it, and from right and left the Confederate troops peeled away from the works in wild confusion. From the heavy earthwork in front of Dooli+'' one volley of cannon and small arms was fired, but in the excitement it was aimed so high as to do no mischief, and Cox's whole division was over the works before they could reload. At the same time Hatch and Knipe, with their divi- sions of dismounted men, rushed in from the right, and, abandoning their artillery, the Confederates west of the Granny White road crowded eastward, running for life. Some were killed, many were captured, and Smith's and Schofield's men met uj)on the turnpike at right angles, and were halted to prevent their organizations from being con- fused together. Hubbard's brigade, of McArthnr's division, which followed McMillan's movement, met with more resistance, and suf- fered more severely ; but though some of the Confederate regiments held tenaciously to their works, and surrendered in form, most of the troops broke their organizations entirely when the advance was taken up from centre to wings, and Wood's divisions now charged, with hardly a show of opposi- tion, over Overton's Hill, from which they had been driven back an hour before. CHAPTER Vn. THE PURSUIT AFTER THE BATTLE— RESULTS OP THE CAMPAIGN. Nmirr was falling when the victory was complete, and a drenching rain had set in to add to the darkness and confu- sion. Thomas ordered "Wood to pursue by the Franklin road, and the cavalry by the Granny White road, to the in- tersection with that to Franklin, when Wilson was to take the advance. Smith and Schofield were ordered to follow Wilson on the next day. But few, if any, of the Confederates fled by the Granny White turnpike, for it was commanded by Wilson's cavaliy, and the masses streamed through the Brentwood Hills, making the best of their way to the Frank- lin road. There was hardly the semblance of organization among them till they passed the Harpeth River. Forrest was ordered to retreat on Shelbyville and Pulaski, but he hurried Armstrong's brigade of cavalry across country to get in rear of Hood's routed forces and cover their retreat. Reynolds's and Coleman's brigades had been taken from the line, at the last moment, to cover the passes through the Brentwood Hills from the Granny White road, and had pre- served their organization. By delaying the advance of Wil- son's horsemen toward the Franklin turnpike, these brigades had saved the larger part of Hood's army from capture. The hospitals at Franklin were abandoned, containing over two thouaaud wounded. Wilson, with his cavalry, had como TLE. 125 up with the rear guard four uiiles north of Franklin, at Hol- low Tree Gajj, and Knipe'.s division, chargiuf? it in front and flank, carried the position, capturing over four Imndi'ed prisoners and their colors. At the Harpeth, Johnson's divi- sion crossed some distance below, and compelled Hood to abandon the defence of the river at Franklin. At Ruther- ford Creek, on the 18 th, the water was up, the stream was a torrent, and some delay in getting a jiontoon train forward gave the enemy a little respite. At Columbia, Forrest re- joined Hood, and his cavalry, with an infantry rear guard under command of "Walthall, covered the retreat to the Ten- nessee. General Walthall's force was made up of the two brigades which had been detached with Forrest, and of three others besides his own division.' This force was able to present so strong a front that, aided by the condition of the roads and streams, which retarded pursuit, our advance guard was not able to break through again, and Hood reached the Tennessee, at Baixibridge, by way of Pulaski, on the 2Gtli. Here he was favored by a gleam of good fortune in the arrival of pontoons, which had been floated down from Decatur, where, by some blunder, they had been left by our forces when General Granger had evacuated that post in Novembei*.* Their own pontoon train was delayed by the condition of the roads, and part of the defeated army passed the Tennessee before it arrived; but when it came it was laid, and Hood had his shattered forces on the southern bank by the evening of the 27th. A Confederate account ' Feathcrston's brigade of Loring'fi division, Ileiskcll's and Field's of Lowry'a division, were the three others. Coleman's was now part of Walthall's own divi- Bion. See Appendix B, II. " The author learns from olflcers who were at Decatur that the pontoon bridgo had been cut loose, with the expectation that it would be taken in tow by gun- boats ; but he is unable to trace the responsibility for the failure either to take it up or to destroy it. 12G FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. states that soon after tlio first bridge was down, two Na- tional gunboats appeared in the direction of Florence and steamed toward it ; but General Stewart opened upon them with a battery of smooth field guns, which was all he then had, and the boats desisted from the attempt to break through the pontoons.' From Franklin, on the 17th, Thomas had ordered Steetl- man to march to Murfreesboro, and thence to proceed by rail to Decatur, occiipying the jjosts in Northern Alabama which had been abandoned earlier in the cam- paign. At the close of the month Steedman was at Decatur, Wood was near Lexington, in North Alabama, thirty miles southwest of Pulaski, Smith was at Pulaski, and Schofield at Columbia. Thomas issued his orders announcing the close of the campaign, assigning winter quarters to the various corps ; but directions were received from Washing- ton to continue operations. The expected march of Sher- man northward, from Savannah, made it important that no rest or time for concentration should be given the enemy in the Gulf States, and Thomas prepared for a new campaign.. Among the results of the two days' battle at Nashville had been the capture of about four thousand five hundred piisoners, and fifty-three pieces of artillery, besides small arms in great number. Among the prisoners were Generals Johnson, Smith, Jackson, and Kucker, and a number of regimental ofiicers commanding brigades. The losses in killed and wounded on both sides were small, compared with the material results, though the demoralization of Hood's army, followed so soon by the close of the war, leaves us without the full returns which are necessary to ' SergeantTtfajor Cunningham's pamphlet. The author has found the Btate- nient8 of Mr, Cunningham so accurate when he has the means of verifying them, that he does not feel at liberty to ignore tliem in this case. THE PURSUIT AFTER THE BATTLE, 127 determine the casualties on the Confederate side. Hood assembled the remnant of his army at Tupelo, Mississipjii, and then gave furloughs to part of his men (particularly the Teunesseeans), and asked to bo relieved from the com- mand of the army. He does not admit a loss from all causes, from December 15th to 30tli, as groat as the num- ber of prisoners taken by Thomas's army on the 15th and 16th, and claims that he reassembled at Tupelo on army of 18,500 effective muskets. These; figures are nearly worth- less for any historical purpose. General Thomas's return of lu'isoners captured, and deserters received during No- vember and December, show the number to be over thir- teen thousand ; besides these he reports the capture of 72 cannon and 3,000 muskets. "We shall meet with some of the veterans of Hood's army again in the Carolina^, main- taining their old corps organization ; but, for the time, they were scattered and demoralized, and seemed almost to lose the character of a disciplined amiy. Thomas's losses in the battle of Nashville were 3,057, of which less than four hundred were killed. The analysis of these figures shows that the Fourth Corjis suffered a little less than a thousand casualties, of which two-thirds were in the unsuccessful attack upon Overton's Hill. Steedman's losses were over eight hundred, and nearly all of them seem to have occun'ed in the same assault, those of his second colored brigade (Colonel Thomi)son's) being fifty per cent, heavier than in any other on the field. The Sixteenth Corps lost 750, which appear to have been pretty evenly divided between the two days. It is noteworthy that the attack upon the angle at Shy's Hill was not a costly one, for the preceding preparation by the enfilading artillery fire, and the shape of the ground, which enabled McMillan to approach closely before exposing his men, show that 128 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. Ruccoss in stieh cases (when success is possible), follows tho use of projier means. Tho total nnmber of casualties in McMillan's brigade was 118, of which not more than two- thirds occuiTed in tho final assault, and they were less than half of those which occurred in IIubl)ard's brigade, which went forward on its left against the works in the lower gi'ound, and where Bate's centre and right, holding on with better cover, were able to inflict considerable loss beforo the crushing of the whole of Hood's left made their posi- tion untenable. The Twenty -third Coiiis was in reserve nearly all of tho first day, and its only losses worth men- tioning were in Couch's division, when carrying the hill close to Shy's in the evening. The position was of inestima- ble importance for one so cheaply gained, for the casualties were only 150. Those of the other division in the final assault were less than twenty.' As nearly always happens in a panic, the break of the enemy's lino was so sudden and comidete that the loss was almost wholly on one side. Tho loss in the cavalry corps was 329, and when distributed among the three divisions, it must also be regarded as trifling, and the larger part, even of this, undoubtedly oc- curred in carrying the redoubts on the 15th. These considerations show that the success was due chiefly to the tactical combination of a superior force, and that moral causes, growing out of the preceding part of tho campaign, must have had a great etiect in producing dis- couragement among Hood's men, and j^redisposing them to panic when the break in the line occurred. Hood was evi- dently in fault, as a tactician, on the 15th, when he allowed Thomas to array his whole force diagonally beyond his left flank, and awaited an attack in such a position. His only hope was to have drawn back to tho Brent svood Hills at once, without allowing his troops to become engaged. Ho THE PUllSUIT AFTER THE BATTLE. 129 would thus have saved them from the domoralizing effect of being driven from position after position on the first day, and from the conviction (which was partly the cause of its own fnltilnient), that they were wholly unable to cojjc with the National army. On the morning of the 10th he issued orders to his subordinates to ])repare for a reti'cat in the (evening ; but he could not withdraw laider fire, and the de- cision was reached too late to be of successful accomi)lish- jnent. The evening found his routed army a disorganized crowd flying from the lost battle-field. Hood's retreat from Nashville to the Tennessee and Thomas's pursuit were almost equally laborious for thcnr armies, though very diflferent in their effect upon the spirits of the troops. The roads were in horiible condition, even those which had been macadamized being almost impass- able. The ordinary countr;f roads were much worse, and, after passing Pulaski, till the Tennessee was reached, the wrecks of wagons and the carcasses of animals filled the way. Hood had been forced to destroy ammunition to get teams to take forward his pontoons, and Wilson and Wood in pursuit had been obliged to leave most of their cannon, and double the teams of the rest. On getting orders from Washington to resume the campaign, Thomas ordered Wood to assemble the Fourth Corps at Huntsville, Ala,, Hchofield, Smith, and Wilson to concentrate at Eastport, Mississippi. Schofield marched the Twenty-third Corps to Clifton on the Tennessee, preparatory to taking boats up the river, but other orders met him there, transferring him to a distant field upon the sea-coast. The completeness of the victory at Nashville caused a joy- ful revulsion of feeling throughout the Northern States. The impatience of the President and of General Grant had only been the expression of a feeling which all the country G* 130 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. had shared. The conviction was general that Hood ought to have been mot much nearer the Tennessee River, and the fear that ho woukl be allowed to march to the Ohio was all but universal. Now, however, all vied in giving honor to the successful general, and not a few were ready to blame the authorities at Washington for having doubted, even for a day, the wisdom of Thomas's management of the early campaign. The President, the Secretary of War, and Gen- eral Grant were not slow or stinting in their congratulations, and between the chief actors in the scene a coidial good understanding was at once established. On the one hand, it was ungrudgingly conceded that the final battle had been skilfully delivered and crowned with the most satisfactory results; on the other, it was felt that the anxiety of the early December days was reasonable, and that the demand for prompt action was such a stimulus to great exertion as the resioonsible authorities of a government may apply to its most trusted officers in such a crisis, without giving cause for lasting chagrin. In such a time, the reward for success and the responsibility for ill-fortune may neither of them be quite justly proportioned to real desert, and both are apt to be ex- aggerated. In war, more than in anything else, the proverb *' all's well that ends well " is the jjopular one, and the popular sympathy was evidently with the hero of the great victory. Few men have the qualities which deserve public confi- dence in greater measure than General Thomas. He was a patriot whose love of his country was greater than his at- tachment to a province ; a Virginian who refused to follow the example of Lee in taking a^ s against the National Government which Washington had founded. He was a man of large mould in body and mind, of a quiet, modest dignity, who hated pretence, and avoided notoriety. He was transparently true to his superiors, and kindly consid- THE PURSUIT AFTEH THE BATTLE. 131 crate to liis suborcliuates. He had the personal courage which wouhl bo ashamed of its own display as innoh as of a cowardice, but which seemed simply oblivious of danger when duty recjuired a risk to bo taken. Those qualities made him always a trusted lieutenant to his chief, and wore the basis of an affectionate and respectful attachment in his own army which was })eculiar. His real and unaffected aversion to taking tlio chief responsibility of command had kei)t him in secondary positions when his rank in both the regular and volunteer* armies would have made him the head of a separate army in the field. In this respect he was not unlike Hardee, in the Confederate Army, who also steadily refused a supremo command. The duties of the soldier, and the exhibition of courage and skill in making the details of a cami)aign successful, were easy to him ; but to become the theme of discussion in Congress and in the newsiiapers, to be the butt of ten thousand public critics, and to carry the burden of plans w'hose failure might be ruin to the country — this he hated so heartily and shrunk from so naturally, that, after all his long experience, we have seen him protesting that the position assigned him in this last campaign was "the one thing he did not want." That these qualities in some degi'ee unfitted him for an in- dependent command cannoi be questioned. The veiy anx- iety to be right, if it is excessive, j^roduces hesitation in action and timidity in plan. Under such conditions the stimulus from without, coming in the form of urgency from the Government and command from the General-in-Chief, may not have been wholly unwelcome, and unquestionably added vigor to the final movements. It is, however, in the earlier part of the campaign that the steps taken were most open to question, though very few of the oflOicers and men who served there had any exact kuowl- 132 FJIANKUN AND NA.SIIVILLK. 0(1^0 of tlio moans wliicli wore at Oonoral Thomas's disposal, or of tho mamior in which thoy woro vised. Tho ma^'iiitiido of tho final success was so sjilcMidid, that it seemod to i)rovt! each step toward it tho l)ost jjossiblo ; and it is only when we ex- amine the oflicial ovidenco of tho nnmber and i)osition of tho troops in Ti^nnessee that we are ahlo to aj^ply to the events which followed tho tests afforded by the rules of military art.' General Thomas tells us in his olllcial rejjort that, had Hood d(!layed his advance from Florence Um days longer, ho would have met him at Columbia, or some other point south of tho Duck River. An early concentration in front of tho enemy is thus indicated as tho controlling purpose, and Hood's march on Nashville is recognized as the result oidy of the unforeseen delays in tho anival of General Smith with his divisions. Tho military student of the cam- paign is therefore led to inquire whether a concentration of the means at hand wcmld not have opposed to Hood a force "which would have kept him at least south of Duck lUver till Smith could have arrived. Communication with Sherman was broken on November 12th, and Hood began liis advance from Florence on the 20th, thoiTgh it was not till the 2Gtli that his infantry was all assembled in front of Columbia, Schofield having aban- doned Pulaski on tho 22d. A fortnight Avas thus unexpect- edly given for concentration, and the resources of the rail- ways were at Thomas's disposal. His tri-monthly return of November 2()th shows a force in Tennessee of 59,534 olll- cers and men "present for duty equiiiped." To determine the deductions necessary for smaller garrisons and bridge ' The author has been led by this examination to conclusions quite different from his own predilections. lie had ussuniod, in common with moKt of hit? com- rades in that campaign, that tho Fourth and Twenty-third Corps were the only forces available to oppose Hood until tho arrival of Major-General A. J. Smith with the SLvtecnth Corps. THI<: I'UUSUIT AFTER TIIK HATrLIO. 13J pnards, no better niotliod can ho used than to make tlioni the samo as was artnivUy done wlion the battle of NashviUo was imminent. AcUl to tl»(\se a ^yarrison of '2,500 for Nash- ville and Chattanooga each, and we shall tind still remain- ing a force of 47,000 infantry and artilleiy, and abont six thousand eavaliy, which there could have been no ditliculty in assend)ling at Columl)ia before Hood reached there. After Sherman started from Home, it was known that Wheeler's cavalry had hastened after him. The raid of Breckenridge into East Tennessee was a feeble diversion which the troops in that part of Schofield's department were quite able to meet. Iloddey's division of cavaliy was the only Confederate force in North Alabama, and gave no trou- ble during the campaign. Eveiything combined, therefore, to point to an immediate concentration in front of Hood, as the true policy on our side. General R. S. Granger was at Decatur on November 1st with over five thousand men. Steedman could have Joined him there with the live thou- sand which he subsequently took to Nashville. The bridge and trestle between Pulaski and Athens could have been re- built, and if demonstrations on the south of the Tennessee did not keep Hood from committing himself to a campaign north of the river, the divisions of Steedman and Granger could have, joined Schofield at Pulaski. If Thomas had joined them there or at Columbia with the remainder of his available force, he would liave been superior to Hood in everything but cavalry from the beginning, and would have been able himself to dictate whether a battle should bo fought before the arrival of Smith's corps.' From the knowledge of the facts we now have, it would seem that Thomas gave undue importance to the necessity of having 1 See tables in Appendix A. 1,34 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. . tho Sixteenth Corps present before decisive operations against Hood. When the battle of Nashville was fought, liousseau's eight thousand or more at Murfreesboro were as wholly out of the account as if they had been north of the Ohio, and nearly five thousand of Craft's division, besides the post garrison, were kept in the works at the city with General Donaldson's employes, and were not brought into the action. The battle was fought, therefore, with a force numerically less than it would have been if Smith's corps had been entirely absent, and Eoussi and Cruft had been in line instead. It is trae that a good many new regiments had taken the place of old ones ; but these were not what is commonly meant by raw recniits. They were always of- fleered by men of experience, and many veterans were in the ranks. Four thousand of them swelled the old divisions of the Fourth Corps, and there was no complaint that they did not fight well. As to the provisional organization of convalescents and furloughed men of the diflerent corps with Sherman, their conduct in Grosvenor's brigade in this action, and subsecpientlj '^n the North Carolina coast, proved they were scarcely distinguishable from veteran troops under their accustomed flags. But if the troops had not been rf the best quality, there would be no less need of handling them according to the principles which military experience has established, and a rapid concentration would still be proper. When Hood began the campaign in earnest, the first movements of our forces w> i'e the reverse of concentric. Gmnger, instead of joining Schofield, was sent a hundred miles to the east, and the garrison at Johnsonville was taken to the rear of Nashville. This would seem to have been with the idea that it was necessary to protect the rail- ways against expected raids. If so, it was an error, for had THE PURSUIT AFTER THE BATTLE. 135 Hood been unwise enough to have detached Forrest for such a purpose, ho would have been at the same disadvantage he subsequently was at Nashville, where the absence of the hos- tile cavalry made the opportunity which resulted so glori- ously for ouv arms. No raid of Forrest's could have done more damage to the Chattanooga Railroad than the forced retreat from Pulaski did to an equally important line, to say nothing of the damage actually done to the former while Hood lay in front of Nashville. The delay in concentration was also fraught with the very gravest perils to the portion of the army under Scho- field. It was Hood's jjolicy to foi'ce the lighting with this, in the hope of destroying or capturing it before it could be aided, yet nothing was farther from Thomas's wish than that it should make a precipitate retreat. Had it reached Nash- ville a single day sooner, Thomas would have been wholly unprepared to meet his adversary, and Steodman's rein- forcements would have been cut oflf. To save time, Scho- field took the gravest risks ; bxit as he well said, the slight- est mistake on his part, or the failure of a subordinate, might have proved disastrous. The misconduct of Wagner at Franklin woiild certainly have proved so, but for the hero- ism of Opdycke and "White and the brave men of their commands. A consideration of all the facts therefore, seems to show that Thomas should have concentrated everv available man in front of Hood before the latter moved ; and that the great success of the closing part of the campaign was in spite of this error in its Ijeginning, and by no means because of it. The difficulties had certainly been very great, and to an ordinary man they would have been overwhelming. There was a gi'oat scarcity of animals for the cavalry, for the artillery, for the ]iontoons, and for the wagon trains, while 136 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. the season was such as to use up the animals with double rapidity. The army was new to its organization, and though it did all that an army could do, Thomas could hardly have full faith in it till it had been jiroven. But through all these difficulties a triumph was achieved which has been rarely ecpialled, and without which even Sherman's position in the heart of the Confederacy and on the communications of its only remaining great army must have lost half its signilieauco. CHAPTER Vin. FORT PISHEll. The subsidiary operations wliicli were intended to co-o})- erate with Bherman's mareli northward from Savannah wero two. First, the capture of Fort Fisher at the mouth of Cape Fear River in North Carolina, and second, the transfer of Bcliofiekl from Middle Tennessee to the Carolina coast, where, with the Tenth Corps under Major-Gencral A. H. Terry and the Twenty-third under Major-General Cox, he was to reduce Wilmington and advance upon two lines from that city and from Newborn to Goldsboro, at which place it was expected a junction with Sherman would be made. The attack ui)on Fort Fisher was practically simultaneous with Sherman's departure from Savannah and with Schofield's from Clifton on the Tennessee Eiver; and the result of all, accomplished two months later, was the reunion at Goldsboro of the army which Sherman had led at Atlanta, except that the Tenth Corps was substituted for the Fourth, which still remained at the West. The city of Wilmington, which had been one of the prin- cipal ports of the Confederacy, is on the left bank of Capo Fear River, about thirty miles from the ocean. The river, near its mouth, runs parallel to the sea-coast, the sandy tongue between, called Federal Point, being hardly more than a mile wide for the last live or six miles of its length. 138 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. Fort Fisher was upon the southern point of this, ami con- sisted of sand parai)ets sodded with marsh grass on the slope, and revetted with the same. The land face extended across the tongue, from the sea beach to the river, something over a mile from the point, and the parapet was about five hun- dred yards in length. The sea-face was thirteen hundred yards long from the bastion where it joined the land front to a work known as the mound battery at its southern end. On the extreme point was a smaller detached work known as Fort Buchanan, mounting four heavy guns. Smith Island lies opposite the mouth of the river, giving two channels from the sea into the harbor. Fort Fisher with Fort Bu- chanan commanded the northern entrance, called New Inlet, and on the main land south of the entrance, two other forts, Caswell and Johnson, protected the principal channel. A village of pilots and fishermen, called Smithville, lay under the guns of Fort Johnson, a quaint little place embowered in live-oaks, where the daring men lived who chose the stormiest nights and the foggiest days for piloting in the blockade runners upon which the South was dependent for its commerce. Fort Fisher not only commanded New Inlet where the turns of the channel brought every entering vessel under its guns, but the narrowness of Federal Point gave it con- trol of the river also ; and when it should once be in our possession the port would be closed. It had been con- structed in accordance with its situation and use, with the two long faces described, but open at the back upon the river and having only a light rifle trench extending from the mound battery to the river, facing Fort Buchanan. As any military force intending to attack the place would neces- sarily land otit of cannon range to the northward, the land face of the fort was the most elaborately built. Starting FORT FISHER. 139 JFort Fisher and Wilmiiigtou, N. C. 140 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. from fi half bastion on tho river, a cnrtain ran to tlio bastion at the angle on tlio sea. The parapet was abont twenty feet high, with a shallow ditch, most of tho sand for the work l^eing taken from the interior. Midway the cnrtain was a small outwork covering an entrance to the fort. Two field-pieces in this gave a flanking fire upon the ditch and assisted the guns in the bastions in sweeping the front. A heavy loopholed palisade was before the ditch and about fifty feet from the foot of the slope. This front was armed with twenty-one heavy guns and three mortars. A formida- ble system of torpedoes had been planted beyond the pali- sade, to be discharged by electricity from within the fort. To protect the guns from an enfilading naval fire, very heavy traverses had been built, about a dozen in number, at right angles to the parapet, from twenty-five to forty feet long, and rising ten feet above the gunners' heads. These were strongly built, as hollow bomb-proofs, and served both as magazines and as shelter for the garrison when driven from the guns by a cannonade from the ficet. A large interior magazine and some stores and quarters were similarly con- structed. The sea-front was built in the same way, but was not so continuously heavy as the other, the guns being groui)ed in batteries connected by a lighter parai'jet for in- fantry. Twenty-four guns were on this face, and among them an Armstrong rifled gun of 150 lbs. calibre, mounted upon a solid mahogany candage, a gift from English friends of the Confederate cause. The armament was mostly of eight- and ten-inch columbiads, interspersed with heavy rifled cannon. The garrison numbered about twenty-five hundred men under Colonel Lamb, though Major-General Whiting was present in the fort when it surrendered.* General Terry rciiorta his prisoners at 2,083, but does not state the casualties among the Confederates. FOllT FISHER. Ml An attempt to take the fort in December had been f niit- loss, but the strong opinion of Reai'-Admiral Porter and of some of the army officers that it could be taken, led to the speedy renewal of the eflort. General Terry was put in com- mand of Ames's division and Abbott's brigade of the Twenty-fourth Corps, and Paine's division of the Twenty-fifth Corps, with two light batteries. A fleet of transports con- veyed them and a siege-train to the rendezvous on the North Carolina coast, where they met Admiral Porter's fleet. Storms delayed the landing, which was effected January 13th, upon the beach about five miles north of the fort and under cover of the fire of the fleet. The shore there is a mere key of sand a few hundred yards wide, and sepa- rated from the mainland by Myrtle Sound, a long and shallow bay of which the outlet is at Masonboro Inlet, a few miles further north. Nearly two hianclred small boats from the na%'j', besides steam-tugs were employed in taking the trooi)s from the transports to the shore, and the whole was done be- tween eight in the morning and four o'clock in the afternoon, though a heavy surf beat continuously upon the open coast. After several reconnoissances, it was determined to estab- lish a line of contravallation across the point about two miles from the fort, which should jnotect Terry's camp from any attack in rear during his operations. This line was es- tablished and occupied by Paine's division and Abbott's bri- gade. The interior of Federal Point and the part of the peninsula along the river is a shallow fresh-water swamp, overgrown with pines, and with a thicket of smaller trees and shrubs. The first efforts were aimed at establishing the line farther away from the fort, with its flanks resting upon the swamps ; but these were found to be so shallow as to make no protection, and the trench was therefore put where it could reach from river to the sea. Under co\'er of 142 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. the firo of the fleet, Curtis'a brigade of Ames's division was moved down along the river toward the fort, and reached a small unfinished outwork in front of the west end of the land face, while Terry, with General Curtis and Colonel Comstock of General Grant's staff (who accompanied the exp(Hlition as chief engineer), made a reconnoissance within six hundred yards of the works. Curtis had approached the fort at this place on the former expedition, and the re- sult of the reconnoissance confirmed his opinion that it was the proper point for an assault, which it was determined to make the next day. Admiral Porter was requested to main- tain a steady fire of the fleet Tipon the works, and to destroy the i)alisade in front of the ditch, so as to prevent delay when the attacking force should move forward. After con- sultation, the hour of 3 p.m. of the 15th was fixed for the as- sault, which General Ames was ordered to make with his division, and the Admiral ordered a party of sailors and marines, under Commander Breese, to land and attack the bastion at the sea-angle at the same time with Ames's as- sault ujion the other end of the land front. Admiral Porter had maintained an occasional fire on the fort during the night, and at an early hour in the morning of the 15th, sixty men-of-war and gunboats, arranged in a great curve off the shore, opened a steady and systematic cannonade upon it. The method adopted was to fire slowly and with great care to get the range accurately, taking the traverses in regular order, and endeavoring to dismount the guns between them. A designated section of the fleet di- rected their fire upon the palisade. A steady rain of great projectiles was thus kept up upon the fort, many of them eleven and thirteen inch shells, driving the infantry of the garrison to their bomb-proofs. The Confederate artillerists vainly tried to match the persistent cannonade of the ships. PORT FISHKR. 143 One by one their {?uns were silenced, many were dismounted and broken, till, by the time fixed for the assault, hardly any of the larger caimon were in condition to be used. Ames had kept Curtis's brigade in the advanced work it had occupied the evening befoi'o, with Ponnypacker's and Bell's in supporting distance. At two o'clo(!k a lino of sharpshooters, provided with shovels, ran forward and established themselves in pits a hundred and seventy-five yards from the fort. The infantry of the garrison now be- gan to man the parapet, and opened with their muskets upon Curtis's line, which advanced to a point about four hundred yards in rear of the sharpshooters, when they also quickly covered themselves with a shallow trench in the sand. Again Curtis was moved forward to the cover of a little ridge in the sands much nearer the enemy, while Pennypackor's brigade occupied the trench he had left, and Bell's brigade came to the advanced work, which had been Curtis's first position. The signal was now given to the fleet to change the direction of its fire, and Curtis's brigade rushed at the end of the half bastion next the river. The ground along the river bank was marshy, and the i)alisades wore standing in some places ; but a party of axemen with the head of the column quickly cleared the way of obstruc- tions, and there was no halt till the men swarmed over the parapet, and took it in reverse as far as the first traverse. At the same time Commander Breese's storming party from the ships charged upon the bastion at the sea-angle, but the enemy ran forward a light gun or two in the bastion, tind another in the outwork at the middle of the curtain opened on them, while they were met with a steady musketry fire from the parapet. Their position had none of the advantages of Ames's, and they were soon driven back with considerable loss. At the river side Pennypacker's brigade went forward to lU FUANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. Curtis's support, and carviotl tho pali.sado reaching from tho end of the eartlnvork to tho water, taking a nnnihor of ims- onors. A hand-to-hand conflict began, in which tho garri- Ron were shiwly drivcui back from ono traverse to anothm-. In carrying tho third traverse, Colonel rennyi)acker fell badly wounded ; Bell's brigade was ordered up and formed along tho river within tho fort, but the interior was full of trenches from which sand for the parapet had been dug, and the magazines and tho ruins of barracks and storehouses made tenable defences for tho garrison, so that the progress was slow. By six o'clock nine traverses had been carried, and Terry now ordered to Ames's assistance Abbott's bri- gade and the Twenty-seventh colored regiment from Paine's division. Abbott was able to complete the occupation of the land front, and Ames directed a general advance upon the reverse of the sea front, which cleared the works and took full possession of the fort. In the final effort Curtis had been wounded in the head by a canister-ball, and Colonel Bell received a fatal shot while leading forward his brigade. The garrison retreated precipitately to the shelter of Fort Buchanan, Avhere, upon the advance <1 Al)bott's brigade against them, they wovo surrendered Lite in the evening by General Whiting and Colonel Lamb, their commanders. AMiile the attack upon the fort was going on. General Hoke had made some demonstrations of attack upon the line of General Paine, and Commander Brocse's sailors and marines were sent, after their repulse, to strengthen that line ; but 'a slight skirmish was all that followed, and Hoke retired, leaving tho garrison to its fate. The fight- ing along the parapet had been obstinate, and the losses were severe in proportion to the numbers engaged, espe- cially in officers, of whom fifty were killed and wounded. The casualties in the rank and file were about six hundred. FOllT FISHKR. 146 From the time the assault bogau tho aliijis could pivo no fui'thor assistaueo, and the advantages for defen<*(i wliirh tho traverses and the obstructions within tlu! fort gave, were such as to make the work of Ames and his brigade com- manders hardly less difKcult than the assault of a well- manned field fortification. The assault of tho detachment from tho ships, though unsuccessful, was of assistance as a diversion, and enabled the infantry to get forward fast(;r than they could otherwise have done. Tho cannonade from the ships appc^ars to have destroyed tho connection between the torixsdoos which had been jjlaced in the ground along the front which was astrailcnl and the electric battery within tho lort, for no explosions took place end the attacking i)artie3 did not suffer from this cause. The victory was in itself an important one, and it was all the more grateful to the country because of the chagrin at the so recent failure of Butler's expedition against the same fortress. The other forts near Smithville were immediately abandoned by the enemy, and their armament also was cap- tured, making in all one hundred and sixty-nine cannon, be- sides small arms and stores, and over two thousand prisoners. The harbor was now in our possession and blockade run- ning was nearly ended. General Hoke, tho Confederate commander of tlio District, intrenched himself with his own and the remainder of Whiting's divisions, on a lino reaching from Myrtle Sound to Capo Fear Piiver, a mile or two above the southern end of the Sound. Nearly oj^posite this line, upon a projecting i)oint of tho right bank of the river, was Fort Anderson, a heavy earthwork, either built or enlarged and strengthened at this time. From this point also, the channel was planted with torpedoes, and full uso was made of all the means for obstructing the i)assage of tho fleet which the ingenuity of the Confederates had devised. Vol. X.-7 i^%l T\m^:^ CHAPTER IX. CAPTURE OF WILMINGTON-BATTLE OF KINSTON. The orders which had beon sent General Hchofleld to move the Twenty-third Corps eastward reached him on January 14th. liivor transports took the troops down the Tennessee and up the Oiiio to points where railway trans- portation could be got, and the transfer to Washington and Alexandria was then completed by rail. The distance trav- elled was fourteen hundred miles, and the corps was ready to take ship before February 1st ; but the unusual severity of the winter weather had frozen the Potomac liiver, and it was not till the 4th that the first detachments of the troops sailed. Meanwhile Schofield had joined General Grant at Fortress Monroe and had accompanied him to the mouth of Cape Fear River to hold a consultation with General Terry and Admiral Porter with regard to future operations 'u the Department of North Carolina, as the new command was designated. The result was the decision to make Wilming- ton the first objective point of the campaign, so that a new base might be secured for Sherman if circumstances should oblige him to concentrate his army south of Goldsboro. The first step accomplished, Schofield's task would be to open the route from Newberne to Goldsboro, rebuilding the railway, and uniting both his corjDS there in time to meet Sherman for the final operations of the general campaign when the concentration of the gi*and army should be complete. Returning to Washington, Schofiold, embarked with Cox's division on February 4th, leaving the rest of the corps to fol- 148 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. low as fast as ships coiild be procured. A gale off Cape Hattoras delayed the transports for a day or two, but the di- vision landed safely at Fort Fisher on the 9th. The fort still bore evidence of the extraordinary bombardment it had undergone, and its broad sandy interior was thickly strewn with great shells rasted red in the weather, and re- sembling nothing so much as a farmer's field strewn with pumpkins. On the 11th Terry's line Mas advanced close enough to that of the enemy to compel him to hold it in force. The next night the attempt was made to convoy pontoons up the coast by the navy, while Cox's and Ames's divisions marched along the beach to receive the boats, haul them over the sands and lav a bridge across Mvrtle Sound in a narrow place in rear of Hoke. The Aveatlif^r became so stormy, however, that the boats could not bo brought to the rendezvous and the infantry marched back to their camps before morning. The night was dark but intensely cold, and the gale from the ocean seemed to find every button-hole in the men's clothing, and to chill them to the marrow. A severe northeaster swept the coast for several days, but on the night of the 14th a new attempt was made to move the jiontoons to the selected place. This time the boats were put on their wagons and all the scanty supply of horses and mules was used to haul them forward along the beach. The high tide and surf proved too great a hindrance ; the sand, Mhere not washed by the water, was too deej) and soft for the teams, and where thu «'aves broke, the sea was too much for them ; so this also had to be given up. Before they reached the appointed po.^ition the moon rose, revealing the naval squadron in the ofHug, and reveal- ing also the marching troops to the enemy, who were put upon the aleii to defeat the tsffort to cross the Sound. Scholield uow determined to try the right bank of the CAPTUllK OF WILMINGTON. 149 river, whore there was at least room for manoeuvre, although the country was very swampy and filled with ponds and lakes. Cox's and Ames's divisions were ferried to Smith- ville, where they were joined by Moore's brigade of Couch's^ division, just landed, and the whole, under command of Gen- eral Cox, was directed to advance upon Fort Anderson and attempt to turn it. The vessels of the fleet had from time to time engaged the fort at long range, and Admiral Porter ordered a section of them to renew the fire when the land forces should advance. General Schofield made his head- quarters temporarily upon a steamer, jjassing from one bank to the other as circumstances required. The IGth was used in getting the troops over the bay with a few field pieces and a small ti'aiu of wagons. Cox's divi- sion marched on the morning of the 17th, meeting the enemy's cavalry within two or three miles of the village, and pressing them back by a continuous skirmish till within two miles of the fort, established a lino with the right flank resting on the river, and opened communication with the fleet, having marched ten miles during the day. Next morning the advance was resumed and the enemy driven within the fortifications. A reconnoissance s1iow(h1 that be- sides the principal fort upon the river, a lino of infantry trench ran at right angles from the bank to the foot of Orton Pond, a lake several miles long, giving it a front which could not be turned except by a long detour. The line was pro- tected by abatis, and epaulements for field artillery were seen in jilaces along it, from which a rapid fire with shrap- nel was opened as the National forces came within range. In accordance with his orders. Cox intrenched two brigades to invest the fort on this side, and with two others marched for the head of Orton Pond, sending directions to Ames's division to join him there. The detour recjuired a march of 150 FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. about fifteen miles, and it was almost niglit when the cause- way through the marsh at the head of the pond was reached. The enemy made a sharp resistance with cavalry, but by sending detachments on the flanks to pass the swamps by wading, the crossing was forced and high ground beyond was occiipied. During the day the fleet had continued a cannonade of the fort, and demonstrations had been kept up by the two brigades in position. In the night the enemy abandoned the place, and the troops hastening forward by the west side of Orton Pond to complete their work, were met by the news that the fort was in our possession, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance which made its armament. On the right bank of the river the enemy retreated to Town Creek, destroying bridges and obstructing the road. On the other side of the river he fell back to a strong i^osi- tion opposite the mouth of Town Creek, covered by swamps on the east. General Terry followed Hoke's retreat up the left bank, and it appearing that the greater part of Hoke's force was in his front, Ames's division was taken back to that side on the 19th, while Cox continued his advance to Town Creek, eight miles above the fort, driving a rear guard be- fore him. Town Creek is a deep, unfordable stream, with marshy banks, which, near the river, had been dyked and cultivated as rice-fields. A strong line of earthworks h^d been built on the north bank of the stream before tiit. evacuation of Fort Anderson, and in them were a Whitworth rifled cannon and two smooth twelve-pounder field pieces. Hagood's brigade, of Hoke's division, strengthened by an- other Confederate regiment, held the works, and had re- moved the planking from the bridge. The artillery swept the long causeway through the marsh by which the bridge must be approached. Henderson's brigade was advanced to the edge of the low CAPTURE OF WILMINGTON. 151 ground, and a strong line of skirmishers worked tlieir way through the marsh to the edge of the stream. Careful reoonnoissance was made above and below, and during the night a small flat-boat, of the kind used for collecting the rice crop, was found a mile or two down the creek, and was secured and guarded. The north bank, n<, Beauregard asked to be relieved of the care of Sotilh Carolina and Southern Georgia, so that he might give his exclusive attention to the Armv of Tennessee and the Gulf States. He suggested that Augusta naturally belonged to Hardee's command, and, in a letter of final instnictions to the latter, written on December 31st, he indicated the prob- SAVANNAH TO (M)LUMBIA. 107 able neceasity, at an early day, of evacuating Charleston, and uniting all the available troops in Hardee's department to oppose Sherman's advance. Ho dii'ected all the cotton to be removed, and if any remained in the city at the time of evacuation, it should be burned. This was in accordance with the general policy of the Confederates in regard to the great Southern staple ; that of the National armies, in like manner, was to save for the public treasury all that was caj)- tured in seaports or in territory likely to remain under our control, but to destroy that which, by the passage of our armies, could fall again into the enemy's hands. It often happened, therefore, that both armies were co-oi)erating in the destruction of cotton when both were in doubt whether their opponents might not gain something by its preserva- tion. In this way Wheeler had offered to spare the cotton in the Georgia march if Sherman would give assurances as to other property; but Sherman had answered: "If you don't burn it, I will." The evacuation of Charleston was so grave a question of public policy for the Confederate Government that it could not be determined as a purely military problem. Beaure- gard had said, in the letter just referred to, "The fall of Charleston would necessarily be a terrible blow to the Con- federacy, but its fall, with the loss of its brave garrison, would be still more fatal to our cause." ' Knowing the oi)in- ions of all the Confederate generals, as we now do, we must conclude that the Richmond authorities delayed the aban- donment of the city until it was too late to concentrate in SJierman's front. It is true, however, that the National commander surprised all of his opponents by the speed at which he forced his way northward, and that Hardee had ' Joiu'N'ri Cliulhaiii Aftilleiy, p. SIO. 1G8 THE MAIK.'H TO THE SEA. rei)orted the Salkohatcliie swamps to bo entirely impassable at the time Sherman's army was marching through them at the regular i)aee t)f ten or twelve miles daily, making oor- (luroy road for his trains nearly every nnle of the way.' Bhorman had hoi)ed that he might rely upon fair weather after the middle of January, and had i)lainied his march to begin at that time. The season disappointed him, for it proved to be a winter of almost continuous rains. Tho Savannah rose so that, at Sister's Ferry, forty miles up the river, where Slocum laid his bridge, the stream was three miles wide, and long trestle bridges had to be made to con- nect the ends of the pontoon bridge with the shores. It was also almost impossible to jiroteet the structure against the force of the current and of the drift-wood brought down by the freshet. The Union Causeway, on which one or two divisions attemi)ted to march from Savannah to join General Howard at Pocotaligo, was under water, and tin- whole re- gion was more like a great lake than a habitable land. On the last day of January, Howard had concentrated at Poco- taligo the right wing, except Corse's division of Logan's cori)s, which had been forced by the high water to join Slo- cum and cross the Savannah at his bridge, awaiting an op- portunity to rejoin the corps some days later. This concen- tration had been effected with but little fighting, for Hardee had evidently determined to take up the line of the Comba- hee and Salkehatchie, and to make no serious defence west of it. Force's division, of Blair's cori)s, was sent to make a demonstration as if to cross the Combahee ten miles below the railroad bridge, and so t j create the impression that 1 At the time of paroling the Confederate Army at Greensboro, N. C, speaking of this part of Sherman's mareh. and of the combination of physical labor with military hardihood, General Johii-^ton said, in the hearing of the author, that, when he heard of it, '' ho made up his mind tlmt there had been no such urmy since the days uf Julius Ca3sar.'' ^ SAVANNAH TO COLUMBIA. lOi) Charleston was aimed at. This done, tho ordor was given to march northward on tho ronto ah'eady described, in the expectation tliat Sh)cum and Kilpatrick's cavah-y wonhl Ix* over Sister's Ferry, and ready to join the movement by tli«' time Howard shonld be opposite that crossing. It happened that simnltaneonsly with tho beginning of tho new campaign by ShtM'iuan, a conference of Confederate oflicers was hehl near Angnsta to arrange the details of their own plans. Beauregard, Hardee, D. H. Hill, and G. W. Smith were all there, anti a careful estimate was made of the eftectivo force they hoped to combine against Sherman. Of 18,000 men under Hardee's command in South Carolina, they reckoned 14,500 as available for concentration, while the heavy artillery and some other troops would garrison Charleston and other points along the coast. Beauregard promised 11,000 infantry and artillery from Hood's army, though only half of these were then present. Wheeler's cavalry was G,700 strong, besides Butler's division which has been counted among Hardee's men. Tho Georgia mili- tia and reserves were 1,450. A total of 33,450 was the force they agreed they could concentrate by February 4th or 5th, though about three thousand from tho Army of Ten- nessee were not expected to reach Augusta till the 10th or 11th.' It was not expected that tho State Militia would serve far outside their own States, nor does there seem to have been any hoiJO that new reciiiits could be added to their army. The conscription had exhausted itself, and the population not already in tho ranks was paralyzed rather than stimulated to exertion by the presence of the National army. As Hardee afterward expressed it, they knew that it was now only a question of the time it would take to use up • S»'i' Appemlix V), TI. Vol. X- 8 170 THK MARCH TO THE SEA. the military force already organized, for the politicians could not face the thought of Hurronder.' Th(! outlook was surc^ly far from encouraging, but Beau- regard, as the superior ofllcer present, though sick in l)ody and in mind, was forced to assume command, and make fuch dispositions as he could to obstruct Sherman's march. But while their somewhat tardy consultation was going on, the opportunity for an eflectual concentration, even of the little force at their disjiosal, had jiassed, for Sherman was in motion. On February 7th, General Howard was upon the line of the Charleston and Augusta Kuilway at Midway, and on the 12th he had crossed both forks of the Edisto and had broken the Columbia branch of the road at Orangeburg. Butler's division of cavalry, a light batteiy or two, and some small detachments of infantry were all of Hardee's that succeeded in getting in front of Sherman. These joined Wheeler, and did what they could to burn bridges and hold the long causeways through the swamps ; but the leading division of a column was usually strong enough to outtlank them and drive them olf with little losp., so that the laying of the corduroy road never ceased, and Sherman's twenty-live hundred wagons rolled on unchecked. Leaving the Georgia militia to garrison Augusta, where they were useless, Beauregard could only lead the remnants of the Army of Tennessee by the country roads and by a long detour through New'beriy and Chester to Charlotte in North Carolina, while Hardee at Charleston was awaiting the in- evitable day when he must abandon Sumter and the cradle of the rebellion, to make haste by his only remaining rail- way through Florence to Cheraw, that the concentration talked of at Augusta might be finally made near the capital • This wafi said by Ilivrdee to tho author after tho close of hostilities. SAVANNAH TO COLUMRIA. 171 of North Carolina. General "NVado Hampton had been sent from A'^irginia to command tlu^ cavalry in South (Carolina, in the hope that hi.s groat jjcrsonal inliucnco would rouse the people from their desi)air, and do what jn'oclamations and levies-iu-mass had so signally failed to do in Georgia; but the only result was to lay the foundation of a somewhat bit- ter dispute whether he or the National soldiery caused the burning of Columbia, the Ijeautiful city of his home. An itinerary of the march through South Carolina would furnish interesting daily illustrations of the expedients by which an army of expert woodsmen can overcome difficul- ties in logistics commonly thought insurmountable. In a country where many of the rivers are known by the name of swamps, continuous rains so raised the waters that scarce a stream was passed without deploying the advanced guard through water waist deep, and sometimes it reached even to their armpits, forcing thc^m to carry the cartridge-box at the neck and the musket on the head. The fitness of the name swamp for even the rivers will be felt when it is re- membered that at the crossing of the Salkehatchie at Beau- fort's Bridge the stream had fifteen separate channels, (^acli of which had to be bridged before Logan's corps could get over. "Whoever will consider the eflfect of dragging the artillery and hundreds of loadc^d army Avagons over mud roads iu such a country, and of the infinite labor reqiiired to pave these roads with logs, levelling the surface with finaller poles in the hollows between, adding to the stnic- ture as the mass sinks in the ooze, and continuing this till the miles of train have pulled through, will get a constantly growing idea of the work, and a steadily increasing won- der that it was done at all. Certainly he will not wonder that the Confederate generals believed they could count upon Sherman's remaining at liis base till the rains ceased 172 TIIK MAIICII TO Till'] SKA. and tho waters snl)si(l«Hl. If tho inarch tlironp;h Ooorf(ia ro- mainod nicturod in tlio soldit^rs' memoricKS as a bri^lit, frol- icsome raid, that throu<,'h South Can^lina was even more indi^libly printed as a stubborn wrestle with the elements, in which the murky and dripping skies were so mingled with the earth and wat(>r below as to make the whole a lit tyi)e of " chaos come again ; " but where, also, the indomitable will of sixty thousimd men, concentrated to do tlu; inflexil)lo l)uri)ose of one, bi'idged this chaos for hundreds of miles, and, out-laboring Hercules, won a jdiysical triumph that must always remain a man-el. And mile by mile as tln^y advanced, tho General and his men Avere equally clear in the conviction he had expressed to Grant before starting, that every stej) they took was "as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as though I were operating within the sound of his artilleiT." Sixteen days' marching, working, and skirmishing brought tho army to the Saluda Riven-, just above Columbia. Tho Augusta Railway had been destroyed from the Edisto nearly to Aiken, some fifty miles, Tho Columbia branch had been ruined from a point five or six miles south of Orangeburg to the Congaree River, about thirty miles. These great gaps in the interior lines of communication effectually sepa- rat(Hl the Confederate forces, and were by far too great to bo rei)aired during tho campaign. A few hours were enough to secure the crossings of the Saluda and Broad Rivers, which iinite just above Columbia to form the Congaree. This was easier than to cross tlu^ latter stream, for it is bor- dered by the wide Caw-caw swamp, and the ajjproaches were very difficult. On the api)roach of the National troops, the Confederate cavalry burned the bridges, sprinkling them first with resin and tar, so as to make a quick tire : indeed, it was so quick SAVANNAH TO COLUMBIA. 173 that somo of tho roar giiard could not pass, and had to gallo)) oil" ])y a h)n}^ circuit to cscai)o capture. In C/()lunil)ia thi^y Iturnod tho two railway stations and di'i)ot buildings, one at the south and tho other at tho north of tho ])la'^'e. Long, narrow i)ilos of cotton bales wero made along tho middles of tho streets, and these wero cut opciu and fired. Some of Wheeler's cavalry, acting upon the rule they had oft(Mi avowed, that it was not worth while to leave what tht>v wanted for an enemy to take, broke open th(5 shops and pillaged them. ' Before entering tho city, Sherman issued orders that \m- vato dwellings and in'oi)erty, colleges, librari(\s, eharitablo institutions, and tlui like, should l)o respected, but that tlui arsenals, foundries, machine-shops, and public workshoi)S should bo destroved. The order was in substance tho sanu^ as ho had issutul at Savannah, and was approin'iate both because Columbia was tho first city of any considerable size the army occui)ied after leaving tho coast, and because tlu' long continuance of a march in which the troops wero livinj,' on the country had gradually increased the number of strag- glers, and relaxed the bands of discipline in portions of the. command. General C. li. Wood's division of Logan's coi-jis entered tho city, Stone's brigade being tho advanced guard. The other troops passed on and encamped beyond. A strong wind from the northwest was blowing, scattering tho loose cotton about, and Colonel Stone directed his men to assist the citizens, who, with a wretched hand-engine and buckets, were trying to quench the fire in the cotton, whicli the wind was making dangerous. Sherman himself entereosed to the weather and forced to bun-ow in the ground for their only shelter. These seized upon the idea that the destruction of the capi- tal of South Carolina was a fit retribution upon the State for its leadership in the great rebellion, and carried the fire to windward of its starting-place to make the destruction more complete. Drunken soldiers, camp followers, and escajied convicts from the penitentiary, made a dangerous mob, and the fire which began by accident was becoming the occasion of mischiefs of other kinds. Noticing this, Howard ordered a brigade from Hazen's division to bo deployed as skirmish- > Now Justice of tlie U. S. Supreuio Court. SAVANNAH TO COLUMBIA. 175 era, to sweep through the town, arresting all disorderly j)er- Kons, citizens and soldiers, white and black, and to hold them under guard. After midnight the gale subsided and the progress of the fire was stopped, but the greater part of the city was in ashes. Shenrau was sincerely grieved at the misfortune of Co- lumbia, and did what he could to lighten the trouble of the citizens. He gave them a L-^rge herd of cattle and other provisions to supply their immediate wants, and directed the issue of these to be made by the city authorities to the destitute. No one was more unbending than he in the destruction of whatever could be of military assistance to the enemy ; but no one drew more clearly the line between the destruction which was useful to a cause and tliat which would merely make private suffei'ing and irritation. The Confederate authorities made haste to proclaim the burning of Columbia as a deliberately planned and ordered piece of incendiarism ; but no event was ever more fully investigated, and no conclusion can well be more solidly established by testimony than that wliich is given in the foregoing narra- tive of the occurrence. Orangeburg had been partly burned by fire, set by an exasperated resident trader in revenge for the destruction of his cotton by the Confederate cavalry, and this too v/as loudly charged to the National army. An even- handed justice will, however, admit that the stragglers from the army wore increasing in number and in familiarity with pillage, through the natural education of such a war, and that there were some officers among the infantry who were not unwilling to compete with Kilpatrick in his eflfort to leave the route marked by " chimney-stacks without houses, and the country desolate." ' Some careless expressions of 1 In the •' Ninety second Illinois," commonly nttribnted to Greneral Atkinn who was one of Kilimtriuk'ij brigade oomimiudurB (p. 211), it ia said that on the cvetiiuK 17G THE MARCH TO THE SEA. Slierman, in a letter to General Halleck, have Ijoen seized upon as evidence of his approval of lawless pillaging ; but the consistent character of his commands to his subordinates from the beginning of the campaign, and the treatment of all the cities on the line of his march from Atlanta to Savan- nah, and from Savannah to Raleigh, show that his i)olicy was one of mildness to the individual citizen and of destruc- tion only to the public resources of the country. The city of Atlanta is to-day proof, to him who cares to see, that the far-echoed assertions that it was destroyed are consistent with the continued existence of its original buildings, except the depots, machine-shops, and military factories, with a very few houses that were immediately contiguous to them. War cannot bo other than a fearful scourge, but the asser- tion that the late civil war suq^assed others of modern times in wanton destruction or cmclty is the reverse of tnie. In Columbia there were factories of powder and fixed ammunition, an arsenal, armory and machine-shops, and an establishment for the engraving and manufacture of Con- federate paper money. All these wore destroyed on the 18th and 19th of Febi-uaiy, for their detached positions about the town had saved them from the general conflagration. On the 20th the army resumed its march, leaving behind it a community overwhelmed with its losses, almost stupefied by the terrible change a fcv/ days had wrought, and only saved from starvation by the store of food which the National com- mander took from his army supplies to give them. of Jnnnnry 27th, near Savannah, " General Kilpatrick pave a party to the offlcerH of his command, and in his Hjxjcch said, ' In after years, when travellers passint; through South Carolina shall see chimney- stack s without houses, and the country dcm)lat«, and shall ask. Who did this? some Yankee will answer, Kilpatrick's cavalry.'" The name narrative, pp. 212, 21fj, iseenm to cliii:>> for the cavalry tho burning; of the villii(;os of Oarnweil, Luxiugtuu, and Muutiotillo, beside the do- Blruutiuu of pluututiou housca. CHAPTER XI. AVERASBORO AND BBNTONVILLE.— REUNION OP THE GRAND ARMY. The military operations in tlio first part of the camjiaign had not cost many lives, though the skirmishing had been incessant. Occasionally a determined stand would be made, as at Rivers' Bridge on the Salkehatchio, where, in a can- nonade upon our advanced guard. Colonel Wager Swayne, an esteemed and valuable officer, lost a leg. More commonly, the trees and thickets made safe cover for the troops, and detachments sent a mile or two above or below would gain the farther bank of the stream by ferrying men over in pon- toons, and the enemy would retreat as soon as this was done. After passing Columbia the face of the country changed. It became more rolling, the streams were naiTower and less difficult, the plantations were more numerous and richer, and the foragers collected more abundant supplies. The Fifteenth Corps (Logan's) returned upon the line of the Charleston Railway to Cedar Creek, destroying about twenty miles of the road on the left l)ank of the Congaree, in addi- tion to the injury already done it on the other side of the river. Howard then turned this column northward to over- take Blair's (Seventeenth) Corps, which had marched along the railroad toward Charlotte, and had torn it up almost to Winnsboro, forty miles from Columbia. The only other railway running out of Columbia was a branch road going 178 THE MARCH TO THK SKA. westward to Abbeville, and this was committed to General Sloeum with the left winp: and the cavalry, who mined it for a distance about equal to that destroyed by Blair on the Charlotte road. This part of the army then turned toward Winnsboro, where they supplemented Blair's work by tear- ing up ten or iifteen miles more of the Northern line. While Sherman's chief purpose in making this strong demonstra- tion northward was to make thorough work of the iuternip- tion of the railway communications between Beauregard's and Hardee's forces, it also had the effect of creating the im- pression that he would continue his march on Cliarlotte, and delayed any concentration of the enemy toward Ealeigh. The National colujnns were now turned sharply to the east, crossing the Catawba River and making for the Great Pedee at Cheraw, while the cavalry kept well out on the left Hank. The extreme right visited Camden, and while moving be- tween the two rivers, the flanks of the army were often forty miles apart. There was scarcely any cessation of rain, and the marching was hardly less laborious than before, though the swamps were not so continuous. As soon as Hardee knew of Sherman's occupation of Co- lumbia, he evacuated Charleston, moving his troops by rail to Cheraw, where great quantities of stores, both public and private, had been sent. The cotton, which was stored in the city in large quantities, ho burned in the warehouses, and the tire, spreading, did a good deal of mischief to the city. A great store of powder and ammunition blew up, killing two hundred of the citizens who were crowding about the conflagration.' Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster had kejit up active demonstrations along the coast, and occupied the city on February 18th, tho day after its evacuation. 1 FoUaid'8 Southern Hist, of the War, Vol. IV., i>p. 160, 151. AVEUASBOIIO AND BENTONVILLE. 171) Hardee had constructed strong works at the Pedeo, hehijid Cheraw, but tliey met the usual fate of fortitications made by a very inferior force. The advance of Slociim with the left wing turned the position, ami the riglit wing, under Howard, entered Cheraw on March 3d, capturing 28 i^ieces of artillery, 3,000 stands of small arms, antl an immenso quantity of am- munition and stores.' Hampton, with the Confedeiuto cav- alry, at first moved off toward Charlotte, but making a wide circuit, he joined Hardee again before the latter crossed the Cape Fear River at Fayetteville, on the 11th, retreating before Slocum, who entered that place with the Fourteenth (Davis's) Corps on theft day. Hampton appears to have been deceived regarding Sherman's intended line of march, and to have thought he was aiming at Charlotte, where Hood's Army of Tennessee was assembling; and iu the effort to return to his place in front of the National army, he unexpectedly ran into Kilpatrick's cavalry, iu the night of the 9th, not far from a hamlet called Solemn Grove. Kili)iitrick had assigned to his three brigades halting places at the corners of a tri- angle, where tlu^y would hold different cross-roads and mu- tually protect each other, but Atkins and his brigade were anticipated by the Confederates at his intended position, and notwithstanding the most industrious efforts to reach Spen- cer's brigade by a circuit in the night, he was unable to do so iu time to warn it of an attack by Hampton from the side sup- posed to be covered. Kilpatrick was with Spencer, and Hampton having, as he thought, made dispositions of his force to assure success, charged, with Butler's division, upon the camp a little before daybreak. It was a complete sur- prise. A house iu which Kilpatrick and Spencer were sleep- ing was surrounded ; a battery near headijuarters was in the ' Howard's oftlciiU report. 180 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. oiiomy's hands, and the brigade was routed, and fled into the swamp. Kilpatrick himself managed to escape from tho house in the darkness, half -dressed and unarmed ; btit tho liardy troopers were used to rough-and-tumble lighting, and began to rally as soon as they reached the protection of tho cypress trees. Kilpatrick was soon among them, and, after a little organizing under cover of the train guard and of volun- teer skirmishers, they charged back upon Hampton, whoso men were too eager for plunder, retook the cannon, with which they fired upon their adversaries, and turned the rout into a victoiy. Spencer and the staff officers had taken refuge in the upper part of tho house, where they had barri • caded themselves, and were released by the unexpected stic- cess of their friends. Atkins, guided by the sound of the combat, came up as the affair ended, and Jordan's brigade arrived soon after, as did also a brigade of infantry mnit from Hlocum\s column at the noise of the tight. With all their cool courage, tho routed camp would hardly have been able to reform but for tho fact that four hundred dismounted men had been armed with rifled muskets and bayonets at Savannah, and these, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stough, of the Ninth Ohio Cavahy, were with the train, a little way from the general camp. At the noise of tho attack they formed, making a lino to which the rest rallied, and ad- vanced. When the gleaming bayonets were seen in tho gray light, the cry was raised that the infantry were upon them, and the disconcerted Confederates were thrown into confusion. Then came the general rally of Kilpatrick's men, and the tables were completely turned. The affair had no special importance, but is a fair type of the cavahy combats which enlivened the laborious march. Hampton released a number of prisoiiors, and claimed to have captured five hundred, though Kilpatrick only reported two bundled AVERASBORO AND RENTONVILLE. 181 missing. The Confederates suffered severely, " especially iu ollicers," .Johnston says, but the exact uunil)er of casual- ties is not given. Over a hune and Hampton, giv- ing orders for tho concentration of other troops near Smith- field. It was at this time that he anthori/ed Bragg to tako tho troops of Stewart's and Lee's corps to unite witli Hokij's and make tho movement against Schotield near Kiiiston, calcnlating that there wonld still be time to nuissemblo in front of Sherman before he eoiild reach the Nens(i River. It wonld bo difHcult to better his i)lan, but his nnmbeis were not enough to make either part of it successful, thcjugli he did everything that courage and activity could do. Sherman had waited at Favetteville a dav or two, in tho hope of receiving from Wilmington some shoes and clothing of which his men were almost destitute, but no supply of these could yet bo got, and he pushed forward. Slociim'ii columns with the cavalry crowded Hardee closely on tho 15th of March, capturing Colonel Rhett, the commander of the brigade acting as rear guard. They approach(>d Averasboro on the 16th, where Hardee had intrenched on a narrow ridgo between the river and swamp, and Slocum ordered Jackson's and Ward's divisions of the Twentieth (Williams') Corps to be deployed, Kilpatrick's cavalry being on the right flank. Sherman, being present, directed a V)rigade of infantry to bo sent well to the left to attack the line in flank. This was vigorously done by Case's brigade, 184 THK MAUCII TO THE SEA. and Tiiliivforvd'M division was routed, fulliiif? hack in liusto upon a lino about a third of a niilo in roar, whoro Hardi'n had intnrnclicd McLaw.s' division. Tlio chief weight of the Htroko fell upon llhett's brigade, which had lost its com- mander the day b('f(n'e, and it Hod with a loss of over a hun- drtsd left d(^ad upon the field, and more than two hundred cap- tured. A batteiy o, three field f?uns was also amonj^ the trophi(>s of this brilliant affair. Williams's divisions pressed on, found Hard(!(!'s liiu's ajjfain intrenched, and a warm en- paf^ement began; but darkness jmt an end to the day's oi)erations. Hardiui retreated during the night, and Sh(!r- man's movomonts were resumed in tho morning.' The Na- tional loss in the affair at Averasboro had been sovonty-scven killed and nearlv live hundred wounded. Hardeo admitted a loss of about tho same number. Seriously cncundjcred with his own injured men, Sherman directed the Cfmfederate wounded, who numbered about seventy, to bo left in a field hos]>ital in charge of an oflficer and some of their own men, after proper surgical attention had been given them. Tho two or three days that followed aro remembered by the ofHcers and men of that army as among tho most weari- some of tho campaign. Incessant rain, deep mud, roads always wretched but now nearly impassable, seemed to caj) the climax of tedioiis, laborious marching. Sherman had changed his order of movement at Fayettoville, directing four divisions of each wing to march light, and tho remain- der to accompany tho trains and assist them foi*ward. By this arrangement he reckoned upon having a force ready for battle on either flank, largo enough to hold at bay tho whole of Johnston's aniiy if the Confederate commander 1 IMietfs bii;j;i\(lc, whioh mifTerod kd Hovcrcly, wiw an ortrnniziitioii of licavy ar- tiliory at Cliniliftnii, and hiul beoii the Kurritiou of BiuiiU-r. It took the HciJ Uo iufiiuti'y whuii Churkbtou woi^ cviicuHl«d. AVEUASRORO AND IJENTONVILLB. 186 should suddenly assail one wing. In spite of cvory exer- tion, liowt^ver, the columns were a good dt'aj drawn out, and long intervals separated the divisions. On the morning of the lt)th, two divisions of Davis's corps (Fourteenth) weio about eight miles from Bentonvillo, a hamlet on the south- east side of Mill Creek, a small tributary of Neuso Kiver, where the north and south road from Smithtield to Clinton crosses one loading from Averasboro to Goldsboro. Two divisions of Williams's (Twentieth) cori)s were eight miles farther at the rear. Kilpatrick with his cavalry had fol- lowed the retreat t)f Hardee to the north, and was at the left and rear of Williams, making his way back to the jjriucipal column. Howard with the four light divisions of the right wing was upon parallel roads to the southward, if they can bo called parallel when they were sometimes six miles ajjart and sometimes ten or twelve. The trains with their guards were toiling along, somewhat farther back, taking inter- mediate roads when they could. Sherman reasoned that Hardee's affair at Averasboro had been made to delay his approach to lialeigh till Johnston could unite his forces in front of the State cai)ital, and the fact that battle was given with only Hardee's command seemed to i)rove that his adversary Avould be in no condi- tion to venture south of the Neuse liiver before his own concentration at Goldsboro could l)e made. He did not know, however, that Johnston had just strack fiercely at the column advancing from Newbern, and that Hardee's stand at Averasboro had been made to give time to get Bragg's forces back and deliver him a blow before his junction with Schofield could bo made. The Confederate commander, from his central position, was in telegi'aphio communication with his subordinates, and knew beffer than Sherman on the morning of the 19th what progress 186 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. Schofield'a two columns wero making. Ho could therefore make his combinations knowin{?ly, while the National com- mander was still left to conjecture. If Johnston meant to do anything more than make a purely defensive retreat, it was essential to him to gather his forces and strike (luick ; twenty-four hours later would have been too late, for Slo- cum and Howard would have been together at Cox's bridge, and Terry would have joined with the two fresh divisions. Johnston was now giving good proof that if he could not be made to fight unless he chose, he could assume the moiit active offensive when it was necessary. He knew on the 17th that Sherman had turned off from Averasboro toward Goldsboro, and that Hardee was resting at Eleva- tion about two-thirds of the way on the road from his late battle-ground to Smithfield. Bragg had reached the last- named place, and the infox*matiou from Hampton was that Slocum's two corps wero nearly a day's march apart, and as far from Howard's. They must pass by the flank three miles in front of 33entonville, the little village whose posi- tion has already been described. He saw that this was the only opportunity likely to occur for fighting Sherman's several corps in detail, and gave orders to concentrate ever}4hing at Bentonvillo on the 18th. Sherman had been loth to widen the lines of his march, but to do so was the condition of feeding his men on tho country as ho still had to do, and for the same reason he nuist keep moving till he should got upon a railway line of communication with the base Schofield was establishing. But ho frankly tells us, also, that the evidence before him induced a confident belief that Johnston would hold to the nm-th lino of the Neuse and dispute its passage. This belief induced him to leave Slocum's line early in the morning of the lUth, and make his way across to Howaid's. AVERASBORO AND RENTONVILLE. 1H7 In accordanco with his habit, ho had remained with the (^xj^osod flank till he thought the point of danger passed, and now went to tho right wing because he would thus get quickest into conimunieation with Hchotiold, and bo nearer to the point where ho meant to cross the Neuse and reach Goldsboro. His reasoning was strictly in accord ^vith sound principles, but as constantly happens in war, the facts which he did not know were essential to a right conclusion. It would, however, have been more prudent to have delayed Slocum's advance with the two divisions of Davis's coi-jjs till Williams with tho Twentieth should have come nearer, and a little carelessness in this respect must be attributed to over-contidence in the belief that Johnston would not now take the aggressive. But Johnston also found his calculations fail in some re- sjiects. He intended to have his troops ready to attack the head of Slocum's column early in the morning, Imt the maps were wrong, as they uniformly were, and Hardee's road to Bentonville proved to be too long to be marched by day- light after his orders were received Consecpiently Hamp- ton was directed to obstruct Slocum's advance, and prevent his reaching the cross-roads before Hardee. Tho Confed- erate cavalry under Wheeler was therefore close in front of Davis's cori)s when his march began on tho 10th, and had made breastworks at some points, behind whi(rh they oft'ered an luiusuallv stubborn resistance.' Carlin's division had tho lead, and as his men went forward tho foragers were found on right and left of the road, having been unable to drive oft' • The first priKoiiors cn))ttir(Hl were from Dibroll'a division. Johnston snys (Narriitivo, p. 392^ timt Butler's i^'vision was in front of Ifownnl. yt-t \w ivlwj Sixys tliat Wlieeler'B coinniumi wiis not cnKiinctl on tlic ISHh. There must be error in tills, unless the organization of WhiJeler'H corjis had recently bei.-n ehanvced. Slucum was certainly fighting some mounted force, whicti ruHisteil siubbornly all day. "I 188 THE MAllCII TO THE SEA. the onomy or get ont beyoud his flanks. This was an omin- ous «igii, for where those enterprising skirmishers coukl not go, the opposition must be stronger than a cavahy rear guard usually was. As Carlin pushed on, however, Hampton gave way slowly, and it was seen that the opposition came from horsemen only. On this report, Sherman started on his ride to the right wing. About noon, ho was overtaken by a mes- senger from Slocum, who still announced that they were resisted by nothing but cavalry ; but the firing of artilleiy now began to be more rapid, and to indicate more serious work. As one goes southward from Bentonville, a country road forks to the right from the Clinton road, about half a mile be- fore the crossing of the Goldsboro road is reached. This turns toward Averasboro, and a triangle of roads is thus made hav- ing sides of half a mile. Hoke's division of the Confederate forces was first on the ground, and was ordered to take this route, cross the Averasboro road and continue seven or eight hundred yards farther. Here he halted and intrenched, his line slightly recurved, but still at an acute angle to the road on which Davis was advancing. Stewart with the troops of his own and Lee's corps of Hood's army, came next and in- trenched the line of the road they had travelled, showing a front of four or five hundred yards. From this point the right was swung forward along the margin of woods looking into the open farm -lands of Cole's farm. Hardee, when he came up, found General Bate with two divisions of Cheatham's corps (his own and Smith's, formerly Cleburne's) placed on the extnune right, and put Talliafeno's division in reserve in support of Bate : his other division (McLaws') was ordered by Johnston to the left wing. The centre of John- ston's position, therefore, was not on the Averasboro road, but at the corner of Colo's fields, a quarter of a mile north. AVERASnORO AND BENTONVILLE, 189 The two wings went forward from this point, the left cross- ing diagonally the road on which Davis's corps was advan- cing, and the right, hidden in the thicket, reached fonvard ready to envelop any force that might attempt to pass to the west of the Cole farm. The country, except at the farm mentioned, was covered with a dense thicket and wood,, with marshes from which small streams ran in all directions. It was nearlv noon when General Davis, with Carlin's di- vision slowly driving Hampton's cavaliy back, came upon the breastworks crossing the road. Hobart's brigade had been deployed some time before, and was in line across the road, on which was moving a four-gnn battery. To the right of the road but little could be seen ; biit on the left tho enemy's line could be traced, apparently bending back along the farther side of Cole's field. Still thinking he had before him only the cavalry which he had slowly followed for five miles, Davis ordered Buell's brigade to make a detour to the left around the open farm lots and take the enemy in flank. But Hobart's skirmishers were developing a lino of lire farther to tho light, reaching toward our flank, and Ham- bright's brigade (Colonel Miles in command) was deployed on Hobart's right. Carlin now advanced with his two bri- gades to charge the works before him, but soon recoiled before a fire which had another sound than that of tho cav- alry carbines. A few prisoners had been taken, among them one who had been a national soldier and had been induced to enlist to escape from a Confederate prison. From him the fact that Johnston was present in person with his whole army was learned. Slocum had come up, and after consulta- tion with Davis, Morgan's division was ordered to deploy forward on the right of Carlin, with Mitchell's and Vando- ver's brigades in front and Fearing's in second line,, Heavy lines of skirmishers engaged tho enemy, while the troops of 190 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. the deployed lines hastened to cover tliemselves with a hreastwork. It was now about two o'clock, and Sloeum wrotea dispatch to Sherman telling of the situation, and sent Colonel Mc- Dattlj of Beutonville. Clurg, of his staff, to hasten up the divisions of Williams's corps. Buell's brigade was making its way slowly through the marsh and thicket on the left, when the crash of mus- ketry there gave warning of an assault. Hardee had sent Talliaferro's division still beyond Bate's riglu. upon the flank AVERASBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 191 of Buell's hrif?ade, and Bate, now attaokinf? in both front and flank, tliat sinpjlo brigade was overwhelmed, and driven to the rear in confusion. The attack was taken np in turn by Stewart's divisions, sweeping across the Cole farm diag- onally upon Davis's loft, taking Carlin's brigades successively in flank and rear, and pushing them back. But this took time, for there was no panic, and our men were not used to be beaten. The enemy sufl'ered terribly as he crossed the fields, played Tipon by the batteiy in the road near Cole's house, and cut down by Hobart's infantiy fire. Step by step they advanced, each regiment of Hobart's, as it found itself attacked in rear, retreating and fighting, forming a new line of its own, and again making a stand, till all of this brigade also had thus been pushed off in detachments, and the left was curved a full mile to the rear. Now a rush ui)on the road captured the battery. Miles's brigade was also driven from its line, and all connection between Carlin and Morgan was broken. Davis, whose soldierly qualities camo out brilliantly in the trial, now rode rapidly to Morgan and ordered Fearing to move his brigade toward the left, dt^ploy- ing parallel to the road as he went, and to charge headlong upon the flank of the enemy, who was following Carlin. The work could not have been put into better hands than those of the unfearing descendant of Israel Putnam. He changed front upon the run, swept everything before him at 'he point of the bayonet till tho road was reached, and form- ing there, his destructive volleys drove the Confederate cen- tre in confusion upon its right and into the swamf . At the sound of fighting, Williams had hunied forward the troops of his corps. Eobinson's brigade, of his own division, was the first to arrive, and it formed across the road in front of the MoiTis farmhouse, about a mile from Cole's liouse. The ground here was a little higher, and the Twon- 192 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. tictli Corjis artilloiy was put in position as it oamn up. Robinson connected with Fearing's left, and Cailin's brigades were rallied upon this line, still farther to tho left. A country road ran along this i)oint, and Bate attacked the lino again and again, now advancing, now driven back, until Hardee withdrew him some distance in consequence of the rout of tho troops in the centre. The rest of Morgan's division had not been idle while Fearing's brigade had been so shaii^ly engaged. Their first assault upon Hoke's division had been a vigorous one, and Bragg, who commanded that wing, had called for reinforce- ments, Hardee was just coming on tho field, and Johnston ordered McLaws' division to tho supjiort of Hoke, while Talliaferro took the position in rear of Bate already indi- cated.' Morgan had not been able to break through tho enemy's left, and had resumed his own lino and strength- ened it during the lull which followed tho severe check given to Stewart's advance in tho centre. Coggswell's brigade, of "Williams's corjis, came up about four o'clock, and formed on Fearing's right, though the line was stiU too short to reach to Mitchell, whose left was a lit- tle refused, so as not to present an uncovered flank. Soon after five a g(?kenridge was forced to escape by a rapid retreat into North Carolina, and at the end of December Stoneman returned to East Tennessee. In accordance with the policy of activity already stated, Cbiint directed Thomas on Febnuiry (»th to send Stone- man with his cavaliy through the Great Smoky Mountains STONEMAN'S AND WILSON'S EXPEDITIONS. 201 into South Carolina, to intomipt railway oonimunicn- tion between Columbia and Charlotte, N. C, and by oc- cupying tho attention of part of the Confederate forces in that region, usHint tho movement of Sherman. Delays occurred in pn^jaration, and it was not till March 22d, when Sherman had already reached his new communica- tions with the North Carolina coast, that this column was ready to start. The great progress of the Eastern cam- l^aign changed its ol)ject somewhat, and Stoneman was di- rected toward Lync^hburg, Va.,with the purpose of increas- ing the damage done by him to the Virginia and Tennessee Kailway in Decembei", and making it useless as a line of retreat for Lee's army, if llichmond should bo evacuated. Thomas was ordered to send also the infantry of th<; Fourth Corps into East Tennessee to ojipose and delay Lee if ho should escape from Virginia by that route. Tho troojjs now at Stone luan's disposal were Gillem's division of cavalry, which consisted of the three brigades of Brown, PalnKn-, and Miller. The upper valley of fho Holston had been reoccupicul by a small C'onfederate force under General Jackson, and tho local militia and reserves were out. Ilailway bridges had been rebuilt in anticipation of Lee's pro])al)lo necessiticjs. On the 2Gth, Stoneman was with the division at Jonesboro, in the extreme northeast corner of Tennessc^e. Here ho took tho valley of tho Watauga Kiver, following the moun- tain gorges through which it Hows, to Boone, in North (Caro- lina. He now crossed the Blue Kidge to the ui)i)er waters of the Vadkin, and turning northward reacthed New Iliver and Wytheville by a long dcitour, in which ho had turned all tlio hostile positions of Jackson's forces. At AVytlmville a dfijiot of supplies for the Confedei'atci army was destroyed, and detached i)arties burned tho railway bridges along 202 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. ninety miles of road, and within fifty milea of Lynchburg. This work was continued on April 6th and 7th, when Lee, who had retreated from Petersburg in the night of tho 2d, had already been anticipated by Grant's forces on the Danville road at Burke's Station, had thus been cut off from the supplies accumulated in depots on that line, and was shut up to the Lynchburg route as his last resource. The speed with which Grant's columns surrounded him at Appo- mattox gave the coup-de-grace to his valiant army, but the knowledge he had for a day or two before, that Stoneman was destroying his railway and stores beyond Lynchburg, must have added to his despair. On the 9th, Stoneraan re- assembled his brigades in the edge of North Carolina, and struck southward for the Danville and Charlotte road, which was the line by which Lee would have united his forces with Johnston had he succeeded in evading Grant at the Burkesville Junction. He passed southward through Ger- manton toward Salisbury, sending detachments right and left to destroy factories of clothing and the like. One of those columns nai'rowly missed capturing Davis and his Cabinet at Greenesboro. On the 12th he captured Salisbury, after a brisk skirmishing engagement, in which the local troops made but a feeble resistance, being manifestly dis- heartened by the surrender of Lee, which had occurred on the 9tli. The captures at Salisbury were enormous, and had Stoneman been fully aware of the situation in Virginia at Goldsboro, it is possible they might have been preseiTed ; but he acted wisely according to the infonnation he liad, and destroyed them. The Confederate forces under Gardi- ner and Pemberton were routed, and 1,300 prisoners were captured. Eighteen pieces of artillery, 10,000 stands of small arms, and vast stores of ammunition, provisions, cloth- ing and blankets which had been accumulated as a reserve STONEMAN'S AND WILSON'S EXPEDITIONS. 203 stock for Lee's army fell into Stonemau's hands. From Salisbury, after destroying the railway bridges for many miles he retired toward East Tennessee, learning, on the way, of the armistice which resulted in Johnston's surren- der. The expedition into Alabama was led by General Wilson, and was of nmch larger proportions. It also was much later in starting than General Grant had intended, his directions being that it should march as soon after F bruary 20th as possible. Wilson had four divisions of cavalry in canton- ments at Gravelly Sju-ings, nine miles below Florence on the Tennessee Eiver, where they had been refitting and drilling since the retreat of Hood in the beginning of January. One of these. Hatch's, had been dismounted to furnish horses to Knijie's division, which had been sent to Vicksburg to move inland from that point, in co-o})eratiou with Canby and with the movement Wilson hims(^lf was preparing. The other throe divisions were commanded by Generals Long, Upton, and McCook. All these subordinate campaigns were too late to hold any part of Hood's infantiy in Ala])ama, for the rem- nants of the Confederate Army of Tennessee had already ftmght with Schofield at Kinston, and with Sherman at Ben- tonville, before Wilson's columns moved southward on March 23d. But General Eichard Taylor was assembling the re- serves and the militia under the conscription laws of the Confederacy, and Forrest, who had also been busy in recmit- ing and refitting his cavalry corjjs, had four divisions under his command, and was confident of his ability to defeat any mounted force Wilson could lead into Alabama or Mississii)pi. Taylor had to detach some brigades from these to watch Canby's movements and to assist General Maury at Mobile, but this did not detract from Forrest's faith that in the cam- paign with Wilson he could " get there first with the most 204 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. men," to use a pithy saying of his own in which he embodied the essence of the art of war.' But " to get there first " it is necessary that detachments should be nearest the threatened point, and this was not now the case with Forrest. Selma was the one remaining great manufacturing arsenal of the Confederacy. It is ui)on the north bank of the Alabama River, about a hundred and fifty miles above Mobile, in the heart of the richest part of the State, the " cane-brake region." The river is navigable, and it had, besides, railway connection with the coast through Demopolis (on the Tombigbee River), and with Talladega to the northeast. On the latter railway, about fifty miles north, is Montevallo, which was then, as now, a centre for the manu- lacture of iron of a sr^erior quality. Forrest's men were a good deal scattered through the central and eastern region of Mississippi, collecting remounts, bringing in deserters and enforcing the conscription. Jackson's division had headquarters at West Point, on the Mobile and Ohio Rail- way, and Chalmers's near Columbus, Miss. Two of Roddey's brigades wore near Mobile, but Roddey himself, with the re- maining one, was jncketing North Alabama. Buford's division had not been fully re-organized since the campaign of Nash- ville, and Crossland's brigade was the only part of it which seems to have taken part in this campaign. One of Chalmers's brigades (Wirt Adams's) was on the march from Jackson, ]Miss., to Columbus, but it \^ as ordered to remain upon the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railway os a guard. Seven or eight thousand men would therefore be all the cavalrv Fon-est could hope to have in hand to meet Wilson's twelve thousand. The winter had been well spent by Wilson in organizing, and his train of two hundred and fifty wag(ms was carefully ' Tiv^loi'V DcslriicLiuii iiiul UuouiiHtriictioii. (•. ;illU. STONEMAN'S AND WILSON'S EXPEDITIONS. 205 selected and packed with a view to rapid movement. The 'small rations' and ammunition had the preference, as the country would be foraged for meat and l)read. A pontoon train of thirty canvas boats accompanied the column, and the wheel vehicles were guarded by fifteen hundred dis- mounted men. The three divisions started southward on separate roads, but united at Jasper, about eighty miles southeast of Tuscumbia. From information he here received, Wilson felt the need of haste, so tilling his men's haversacks he left the train behind and pushed hard for Montevallo. Koddey's brigade began to make some oiii)osition at Elyton, but it hardly amounted to delay. McCook was ordered to detach Croxton's brigade and send it to Tuscaloosa to de- stroy stores and public projierty there, incl'iding a militaiy school. A railway bridge at Hillsboro was oeized before it could be destroyed, and the column crossed upon it, flooring it with plank from the covering of the sides of the structure. Montevallo was reached on the 31st, Roddey's brigade and a militia force under General Daniel Adams retreating before the advance of Upton's division. In the vicinity five iron furnaces and as manv collieries were dostrbved ; but Wilson felt that hours were precioi;s and hurried southward. Cross- land's brigade had joined Roddey, and Forrest was hastening in person to them, but the heavy National colunnis gave them no rest, charging them without hesitation when they formed and hurrying them back toward Randolph, fourteen miles, during the first of April. Next day Randolph was reached, and a lucky capture of a courier gave Wilson knowl- edge of his adversaiy's positions and moves. He learned from the captured despatches that Forrest had now joined in person the force in front of him, but that Jackson's division was harassed by Croxton's brigade at Trion, thirty miles northwest, between the Cahavvba and Black Warrior Rivers. 206 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. He also learnofl that Chalmers's division was at Marion, about as far to the southwest, and was marching toward Selma, in- tending to cross the Cahawba near his present position. Croxton also sent word that ho should follow Jackson and bring him to an engagement. Wilson had evidently " got there first," and with the most men. He at once sent Mc- Cook with the rest of his division to co-operate with Crox- ton by attacking Jackson in front, crossing the Cahawba at Centreville, fifteen miles west of Randolph, for this puipose. McCook drove off a militia guard from the Centreville bridge and advanced toward Trion, but finding that Croxton was no longer fighting Jackson, and that the latter greatly outnum- bered him, he retired to the bridge and burned it, after cross- ing to the east bank. The river was unfordable, and as Jackson must go nearly to Marion to get over, Wilson was relieved of any fear of his joining Forrest north of Selma. He accordingly advanced with increased vigor against For- rest, who had selected an excellent defensive position six miles north of Plantersville. Fortune here favored Wilson again, as she usually does the bold, for by a mistake in tele- graphing Forrest had supposed that Chalmers was on the Selma road behind him, and had ordered him to move on Randolph. This dispatch being forwarded to Chalmers from Selma, that officer, who was upon the west side of the Ca- hawba, took the direct road up the river, separating himself from his commander instead of going to his assistance. This accident kept Forrest's force down to the two brigades of cavalry and the militia under General Adams, besides the battalion of his escort ; but he was a host in himself.' Wil- ' Wilson's report says that Armstrong's brigade from Chalmers had joined Forrest ; but the authors of Forrchfs Campaigns (pp. 6()6 and WTl) are so explicit in Htating the contrary that, witiiout access U> Chalmers's official report, I feel obliged to yield to their authority. STONEMAN'S AND WILSON'S KXPEDITIONS. 207 son had, for ease of marching, put Upton's and Long's divi- sions upon sejiarate roads at Randolph, and these converged near the enemy's position. Long was up first and allowed no delay. His advanced guard pushed forward on foot and broke the first line of Roddey's brigade, and he then sent a battalion of the Seventeenth Indiana moimted, with drawn sabres, to charge the retreating foe. Roddey's men were thrown into confusion, but Forrest advanced in person with his escort, their repeating carbines proved too much for the sabres, and Roddey and Adams succeeded in reforming their linesJ Colonel "White had ridden with his Indianians over the guns, crushing the wheel of one of them by a blow w^hich crushed the breast of a horse as well, but turning to the left he cut his way out. A gallant man, however. Captain Taylor, did not hear the order in the melCe, and, followed by his company, rode straight at Forrest, his men falling at every step. Forrest used only his pistols, w'arding and firing, but he received several sabre cuts, and finallv ,'>roke loose bv a great boiind of his horse in answer to the spi r, and killed Taylor by a fatal shot before he could reach him again. Upton's men had come up on Long's right and all dashed forward together, when Forrest's lines gave way and crowded in a confused rout toward Selma. Three guns and some two hundred prisoners fell into Wil on's hands. About midnight Forrest found Armstrong's brigade and hurrying it to Selma sent urgent orders to Chalmers to march the rest of his di- vision instantly in the same direction.* Wilson's movements 1 It is an interesting fact that Forrest, whose experience was equal to that of any one, hud reached the conchisioii that reiK'nting flre-arins were the proper weapons for mounted troops, and that he rejected sabref>, using his force, by pre- ference, as a mounted infantry. 2 Forrest's biograpliers suggest (Campaigns, p. 67) that the hospitality of his reception at Marion had made Chalmers forget the need of haste in the previous movements. 208 THK MARCH TO THE SEA. are an admirable proof of the value of time in snch a cam- paign. After fighting and chasing till late in the night of April 1st, making twenty-four miles of progress during the day, he marched at dawn of the 2d, and closed iu upon Selma early in the af. ernoon, in time to prevent Chalmers and Jackson from entering the city. Forrest, covered with the hlood and dust of the battle, had a hurried conference with General Taylor, the department commander, and the latter quickly left for Demopolis on the W>''sLcrn Railway, to see what resources he could gather to assist his heroic but badly worsted lieutenant. The locomotive on which he went had hardly passed beyond the city when Wilson's lines ad- vanced, and these sent a volley after Taylor, who, however, sped on his way unhurt. Forrest now disposed his little garrison as best he could, though they made but a thin line in the long parapet, and the militia, corai^osed of old men and young boys, were so demoralized that he placed no reliance on them. The works were strong and carefully built, with good ditch and I)alisade, and many heavy guns were in position. Steamboats and trains had worked hard to carrv awav the ordnance and stores which were worth their weiglit in gold to the Confeder- acy now ; but these had all steamed away and the city was left to its fate. Wilson placed Long on the right and Ui)ton on the left, but despite their utmost exertions, it was near evening when their lines had been established and the works reconnoitred. The plan had been to pick the way through swamps on the left, where Upton thoiight he could reach a less guarded jiart of the fortifications, but Long heard that a force was threat- ening his rear and sending a regiment to jjrotect his pack train and led horses, he pushed headlong at the works. The noise of his attack was the signal for the rest, the audacity STONEMAN'S AND WILSON'S EXPEDITIONS. 209 of the thing eonfoiindod the already demoralized Confeder- ates, and after a short straggle, the lines were carried every- where, and Wilson's men entered the town on all sides amid a scene of indescribable confusion. Forrest had again ex- posed himself like a trooper in the line ; but it was of no use, and with a mere handful of the best of his men and some of his principal officers, he cut his way out by the Montgomery road to the east. During the night he made the circuit of the National Army by the north and reached Plantersville in the morning, the scene of his hasty retreat the day before. Resting here a few hours, he led his men toward Marion, but was soon confronted by McCook's divis- ion, marching to rejoin Wilson at Selma. Skirmishing to gain time, he again evaded by the left, and by anotlier night march crossed the Cahawba River and joined Chalmers and Jackson at Marion, on the morning of the 4th. Wilson's prize was an enormous one, and it had been most skilfully won. His rapid movements, his promi>t attacks, his untiring pursuit had made his preponderance of force of double value. He had always anticipated Lis adversary in time and overpowered him in strength, so that for once in his career the doughty FoiTest had his own tactics com- pletely turned upon him, and had been thoroughly beaten in detail. Forty guns, twenty-seven hundred prisoners, and great stores of material of war were captured ; but the sever- est loss to the Confederacy was the destruction of their great manufacturing arsenal. Wilson laid a pontoon bridge across the Alabama River with great difficulty, for the stream was deep and swift. After destroying the workshoi)S and public stores, he deter- mined to move on Montgomery and thence into Georgia, Nvith the ultimate purpose, he says, of using the discretion allowed him, to march through the Carolinas to the armies in 210 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. the east. The militia and reserves made but feeble resist- ance, the evacuation of Richmond and sun'ender of Lee were soon rumored through the country, and the march to Macon had none of the military significance of the brilliant and instructive campaign against Forrest. In a strategic point of view, it was a departure from the sound principles which had guided the preceding part of the campaign. Two- thirds of Forrest's corps was still intact between the Cuhawba and Tombigbee Rivers, and Mobile was not yet taken. His time objectives were west and south, not east and north. But the exhausted Confederacy was collapsing from all sides, its President was fleeing for his life, as he thought, and it was the fortune of a detachment of Wilson's command to arrest him in the far southern part of Georgia, near the Florida line. Mobile soon fell, and Forrest, sore with his wounds, but more sore with the chagrin of terminating his military career with so great a defeat, gave his parole, dis- banded his hardy troopers, and like most of the good soldiers of the South, taught the people by word and by example to submit without reserve to the triumphant National Govern- ment. CHAPTER Xin. aOLDSBOllO TO RALEIGH.— SURRENDER OF JOHNSTON'S ARMY. Upon assembling his avmy at Goldsboro, the first work demanding Sherman's attention was to supply with clothmg and shoes the four corps which had become nearly naked and barefoot in the march from Savannah. Colonel Wright had worked so industriously upon the Neuse River Railway that a train reached Goldsboro the dav of Shennan's arrival there ; but the line was so j^oorly stocked with locomotives and cars that it could not be depended upon to supply the army. Kinston was therefore made a secondary base for a time, steamboats carried stores there from Beaufort, More- head City, and Newbern, and the army trains were kept busy between Kinston and Goldsboro. The Wilmington Railway was not badly damaged, and a few days sufficed to put its track in order, but it was bare of equijjment. Loco- motives and cars could not be procured and shipped in a moment. Some interval must necessarily elapse before a new campaign could open, and after establishing his camps, Sherman left Schofield in command and made a swift jour- ney to City Point, where he had a personal consultation with General Grant, and plans for the final campaign were defi- nitely arranged. The position of the Army of the Potomac about Petersburg was such that Lee's army must necessarily follow the Dauville and Charlotte line in retreat, or make its 212 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. way by LynclibnrR into the valley of East Tonnoasoo. To meot the latter contingency, General Thomas hail been or- tlered, as has already been noted, to send the Fourth (^oi^m (Wood's) to Bull's Gap, fifty miles nortluMist of Knoxville, where it could hold the passes through which the 2>iincii)al routes ran, long enough to enable Grant to close upon tho rear of Lee's army. To meet the first contingency, Sheridan ■was already ordered into position on the left flank of the Army of tho Potomac, where ho was soon to fight the series of bi-illiant engagements near Five Forks, and to get where he could beat Lee in the race for Danville when the forced evacuation of Ilichmond and Petersburg should take place. In this final combination, Sherman's part was to move his whole army a little north of Raleigh and thence to Weldon on tho Roanoke River, unless changes in the situation should induce General Grant to modify tho orders. Sherman also had tho fortune to meet President Lincoln at City Point, and in an unreserved conversation upon the situation, ho learned that that great man's heart was set njion restoring peace without more bloodshed, if that were possible ; the only terms which he demanded being submis- sion to the National Constitution, disbanding of Confederate armies and governments, acknowledgment of the abolition of slavery, and tho speedy resumption of the relations of the States to the Federal Government, tho existing State govern- ments continuing to act de facto till necessaiy legislation by Congress could be had. A general amnesty would follow such submission, but he hoped to be relieved of embarrass- ment as to the i)olitical chiefs, by the voluntaiy expatriation of Mr. Davis and a few of the most prominent. Sherman returned to Goldsboro on March 30tli, with au- thority for some changes in his army organization which were essential to its easy administration. His left wing, OOLDSnORO TO RALKIGH. 213 under Hiocum, was formally constituted tho Army of Georgia ; thu centre nMnainod tho Army of tho Ohio, under Schotield, including tho diviisions under General Terry, whicli were per- manontly orguni/ed us the Tenth Corps; and the right wing retaining tho organization it had as Army of tho Tennessee. These wore not merely nominal distinctions, but wore neces- sary, under tho laws, to give tho commanders of these three grand divisions tho power to relievo Sherman of tho details of business administration of the whole. Tho only change in the commanders of corps was the assignment of Major- Goueral Mower to tho Twentieth Cor])s. Tho accumulation of supplies and refitting of tho troops had so far progressed that, on April 5th, confidential instructions were issued, or- dering tho* new campaign to open on the 10th. But next da} came tho news that llichmond was evacuated, Leo was struggling to reach Danville, and Sherman's lino was accord- ingly changed to lialeigh, with Greensboro and Charlotte as his objective jwints beyond. Tho march began on tho 10th, and on tho 11th, at Smith- field, tho army was electrified by the announcement that Lee had surrendered at Appomattox on tlio 0th. Tho day was a warm and bright Hi)ring day ; the columns had halted for the usual rest at tho end of each hour's march ; tho men were sitting or lying ujion the grass on either side the road, near Smithfield, when a staff officer was seen riding from the front, galloping and gesticulating in great excitement, the men cheering and cutting strange antics as he passed. When he came nearer ho was heard to shout, " Lee has sur- rendered ! " Tho soldiers screamed out their delight ; they flung their liats at him as lie rode; they shouted, "You're the man we've been looking for those three years ! " They turned somersaults like over-excited children. They knew the long Civil "War was virtually over. Another phase of 214 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. the universal rejoicing in the land was quite as well illus- trated by the roadside. A Southern woman had come to the gate with her children, to ask of a corps commander the usual protection for her family while the column was pass- ing, and as she caught the meaning of the wild shout, she looked down uiDon the wondering little ones, while tears streamed down her cheeks, saying to them only, " Now father will come home." From this time the march had military importance only as it led to the quickly approaching end. The skirmishing of advance and rear guards continued, but Johnston was only delaying Sherman's movements till he could communi- cate with the Confederate President, who, with some of his Cabinet and the more important archives of the dissolv- ing Government, was upon a railway train at Greensboro. Raleigh was occupied on the 13th, and on the next day a flag of tnice from General Johnston opened the final nego- tiations for surrender. It was on the evening of that day that President Lincoln was assassinated. The conjuncture of events was one of the strangest that the strange current of humar. history has ever presented, and we puzzle our brains in th V un effort to conjecture how the destiny of the coun- tiy might have been modified if that horrible murder had not been committed. Sherman met Johnston at Durham Station in the spirit of the lenient policy Lincoln had indicated to him a fo)'tnight before, and an outline of a convention was arranged before he knew of the President's death. Knowing the danger that the war would take a more revengeful and destructive foim if the campaign were continued, and deeply impressed by the dismay and sorrow with which General Johnston re- ceived the tenible news of the assassination, he felt that this was only a new reason for ending the strife before it de- GOLDSBORO TO RALEIGH. 215 generated into one of extermination on the one side, and despair on the other. Both f^enerals recognized the use- lessnesR of any further destruction of human life, and agi'eed in regarding it as criminal. Johnston and the prominent men with him were explicit in admitting the abolition of slavery as an accomplished fact, but the negotiating parties made the error of failing to see that the embodiment of such a statement in the terms of the convention would have increased greatly the chances of its approval by the National Administration. The history of the armistice and of its disapproval are part of the political history of the country rather than of the military campaign. It is enough to say here that the agreement reached Washington when the members of the Ad- ministration and the leaders in Congress were under the influence of a panic resulting from the belief that the Con- federate leaders, conscious of the desperation of their cause, had organized a plot for the murder not only of the Presi- dent, but of all his Cabinet and the principal generals of the army. We now know that the leading southern men felt Lincoln's murder to be the most grievous misfortune that could then have befallen them ; and Sherman was in- fluenced by the conviction of this, as he saw it involuntarily expressed in the countenances of General Johnston and the men about him. But panic is uni'easoning, and the Secre- tary of War, whose position at the moment was a dominant one in the Goverament, seems to have rashed to the conclu- sion that Sherman was ready to betray the cause he had so greatly served, and acted accordingly. No trait of Sherman's character was more marked than his loyal subordination to his superiors in army rank or in the State. Full of confidence in his own views, and vigorous in urging them, he never complained at being overruled, and 210 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. instantly adaptpcl liis militaiy conduct to the orders he re- ceived when once debate was closed by specific directions from those in authority. He had shown this in the Vicks- burg cami^aigu. and at Savannah ; and, hurt and humiliated as he now was, his conduct as an officer was the same, though he resented the personal wrong. He had not known that General Grant had been directed to have no negotia- tions with Lee except for ^ae military surrender of his army, and he overestimated the importance, as a guard against anarchy, of having a formal agreement of submission made in the name of all the Southern people. His armistice and convention with Johnston was subject to confirmation or re- jection. He had given to his Government tlic opportunity of doing either, or of taking the negotiation into the control of civil officers and modifying it. Had President Johnson simply said to him that the arrangement was inadmissible, and that he must resume the campaign unless the Confed- erate General made an unconditional surrender, he would have obeyed, not only without protest, but without any thought of complaint. Instead of this, the Secretaiy of War published the agree- ment as if he were proclaiming a discovered treason and were appealing to the countiy to sustain the Government against a formidable enemy in its own camp. General Grant was hurried to Raleigh to suptirv-se Sherman in the control of liis army and to take -'" ■■J ^vs responsibility, leaving only the nominal command. Even this would per- haps have been taken from him had not the same un- founded fears made the authorities do the army the injustice of supposing it, too, might rebel. Grant's practical, cool judgment made him turn his presence at Raleigh into an apparent visit of consultation with Sherman, who had promptly given the stipulated notice of the termination of GOLDSBORO TO RALEIGH. 217 the armistice before Grant's arrival, and soon after received the final suiTender of the Confederate army. When the . panic was over, the Secretaiy of War gave public evidence of his soiTow for the oftensive incidents in the course pni- sued, but Sherman could not at once forgive the imputatiou upon his personal loyalty to the Government. The duty of receiving the arms of the late Confedemtes and of issuing the paroles was committed to General Scho- field, and was performed at Greenesboro, in close neighbor- hood of the battlefield of Guilford Court House, where, in the War of the Revolution, General Greene had won laurels in an important eng*^ -ment with Lord Cornwallis. Gen- eral Hardee met Schotield and a small detachment of the Twenty-third Corps on the railway near Hillsboro, and con- ducted him to Johnston's headquarters in a grove in the edge of Greenesboro. The Confederate General had declined the use of a house for his head(iuarters, and a few war-worn tents sheltered him and his stafif. Hampton, still in-econ- cilable, had refused to bring in the cavalry for surrender, and these were scattering over the country, making their way home as they might. Some four thousand horsemen, and nearly or quite as many of the infantry, had deserted since the beginning of the armistice, fearing it might end in their being held as prisoners of war.' Those who remained found the advantage of having a respected and responsible head to represent them, for, after receiving their paroles, they were furnished with transportation on the railways, and with rations from the National stores. Johnston scrupu- lously distributed to each officer and man a coined dollar out of a small sum of money he had received from the Con- fedemte treasury, and, with this token of the unpaid ser- ' Johnston's Narrative. Vol. X.— 10 218 PRANKMN AND NASHVILLE. vices they had given to the lost cause, the men in gray, scattering on different routes, took up the journey home- ward — to many of them a long and weary one — to begin anew the struggle of life in an almost universal impoverish- ment. The National columns marched northward with flying colors and swell of martial music, full of hope and enthusiasm, to take part in the memorable review ut Wash- ington, where their sorrow that Lincoln could not have returned their salute from the front of the White House was a representative sorrow for all the comrades who could not answer to that morning's roll-call. APPENDIX A. FORCES OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES IN TENNESSEE. -Forces ^^ present for duty" under the immediate command of Ma jok-Genekai. Geouge H. Thomas, October 'ii\, November 2^ and 30, and December 10, 1804, as reported by the returns on file in the office of the Adjutatit- General, Washington, D. V. Oct. 31st. Nov. 20th. Nov. 30th. Dec. 10th. Commands. •p z "& IC n « ■/ TS y. . 0) * '3 u S8 is c a .2§ ■S6 |8 O o 710 Pi 11.012 775 13,940 760 10,200 630 P4 Fourth Corpp 14,415 Twenty-third Corps i 4fil 1(1,10:^ 4.55 9,903 494 10,033 490 9,781 Cavalry 257 r),S<54 2252 5 551 S431 10,45;^ 4566 14,133 District of Tennessee ^ . . 748 17,918 792 19,141 704 10,911 65;^ 15,850 Unassignei Detiichments District of Etowah 248 7,111 193 0,238 210 0,864 2:i7 '7,6i2 Reserve Brigade, Chatta nooga 29 891 26 880 2,'j 753 (Jnassigned Infantry .... 2S 1,047 30 1,122 30 1,060 Artillery.... 7 268 7 202 3 115 Signal Corps, Chattan'ga. 11 63 11 60 12 67 Veteran Keserve Corps, Nashville 3 027 15 4a3 15 522 Det. Armv ct Tennessee «. 483 8,843 681 11,345 lloserve Artillery, Chatta nooga 2,403 52,163 57,309 3,176 8 3,312 403 Total present for duty . . . 2,545 72,121 70,100 Present for duty equipped 2,293 61,122 2,509 57,025 3,1?,9 68,323 3,092 07,180 1 Second and Third Divisions. " Consisted of Hatch's Division, Croxton's and Capron's Brigadct*, and Fourth U. S. Cavalry. 3 Consisted of Hatch's and Johnson's Divisions, Croxton's Brigade and Fourth U. S. Cavalrj', and several independent cavalry commands not specifioally enu- merated. Of these 2,272 are reported '• present for duty," but not " present for duty equipped" (dismounted). * ComiJosed of McCook's, Hatch's, Johnson's, and Knipc's Divisions, and F')Hrth U. 8. Cavalry. Of these r),460 are reported " present for duty," and not " present for duty equipped " (dismounted). 6 See abstract in detjiil. « General A. J. Smitu'e divisions. 220 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. II. — Forces ''^ present for duty" as reported to the Adjutant-General of the Army^ Washington, D. C, hy the Vomniandant of the Dis- trict of 'Tennessee, November 30 and 30, and December 10, 18(54. - Stations. Nov. 20th. Nov. 30th. Dec. 10th. Commands. a' 172 Enlisted men. -a s| o O 474 60 8 3 3 4 63 ■ > ■ • "5 2 ■"to 3 4 1 4 704 Enlisted men. IS Enli.*ted men. Fourth Division Twen- tieth Corps Nashville, Tcnn Springfield, Tenn... Fort Donelson, Tenn. Clarksville. Tenn. . . . Galliitin, Tenn Johnsonville, Tenn.. Decatur, Ala Larkinsville, Ala Pulaski. Tenn Colnmbiii, Tciin Tullahoma. Tenn. . . . Stevenson, Ala Decherd, Tenn Murfreesboro% Tenn. Stevenson, Ala 3.016 10.390 2.0(10 376 106 109 144 1,964 • • • ■ "83 124 1,361 120 • • • • 134 16,911 424 9.210 Post Forces 178 4,698 6 380 2, 108 3' 60 39 907 1 fl<) 2,617 3 .... 10() 2,285 24, 4l« 61 1.969 kk 12 5;^9 t( 2 109 It 3! Ill Trooi)s on N. & N. W. It. II 4 145 District of N. Alabama. . FoBt Forces It .... Troops on T. & A. R. R. Post Forces 1 35 152 3 32 40 810 1,028 128 703 1,008 19,141 Defences N. &C. R. R.. Post Forces 4 80 2: 122 »k kt 65 1.348 District of N. Alabama. . 3 5 1 4 63 653 Battery F. First Ohio Artil'ery it tt Nashville, Tenn 792 117 Troops on T. & A. R. R. Twenty - first Indiana Volunteer Battery Troops on N, & N. W, R. R 136 1,964 Total "pre 5ent for duty" 15,850 1 Post of Tullahoma included. III. — Forces ^'■present for duty,'^ as reported to the Adjntant-Cleneral of the Army, Washington, D. C, by the Commandant of the Dis- trict of Etowah, December 10, 18G4. Commands. Stations. F rst Separate Div. Different Corps. Cha'timoopa, Tenn. Fourteenth U. S. Colored Troops. . . 'Na,shville, Tenn Sixteenth '* '• ... | " '• ... Eighteenth " " ' Uridgeport, Ala Forty-second " " 'Chattanooga, Tenn. Forty -fourth " " Nashville, Tenn Artillery IChattanooga, Tenn. Total " present for duty " Commiss'd Enlisted officers. men. 101 .3.9.39 16 594 26 655 11 353 20 399 14 198 49 1,474 2:^7 7,612 APPENDIX A. 221 IV. — Abstract ofofflrrrfi and men '■'■present,''^ taken from Generai, J. 13. Hood's returii oj December 10, 18(54. Present FOB DaTY. Sick. EXTBA Duty. In Abrest. H X M H |2 iS 8 6 o 13 19 2i9 2Hi 25s 838 9 252 88 IttO 509 12 274 267 191 744 11 44 197 241 42 52 39 13 146 i 1 i 8 a General and Staff 13 Zee's Corps : Staff 19 Johnson's Divi.sion. . . Stevenson's Division ' Clayton's Division . . . 2,530 2,664 2,053 9 7 3 19 87 177 127 56 31 44 181 ' ' "777 736 6^4 5 '"3 8 6 8 7 3,6&S 3,9(1!) 3,175 7,247 391 2,197 20 10,a51 Stewarfs Corps : Staff 9 Loring's Division French's Division '^., . Walthall's Division... 2,625 ()02 1,476 ' 52 1 21 74 12 15 36 "is 516 67 296 26 21 &3 80 ■41 61 46 138 4 2 43 46 3 1 2 2 8 72;^ 215 621 8 ""3 6 '"3 3 6 8 2 8 4,205 1.01 (i 2,621 4,703 '2^539 2,730 1,659 6,928 377 272 2,344 899 1,562 18 7,S51 Cheatham's Corps: Staff Cleburne's Division ^ . Cheatham's Division, (Brown) "'246 215 216 "*794 751 630 "■'17 10 6 13 3,925 4 04'2 Bate's Division 2,66;^ 677 2,078 33 10,640 Engineer Battalion 16 76 52 476 484 - Escorts 11 6-i 381 Jackson's Div, Cavalry. 4 4 1 8 3,15;J 2,616 18 73 528 8 3,533 Artillery : Lee' IS Corps 726 801 730 247 2,504 15 22 1 11 122 82 108 44 90!» Stewart's Corps 95S Cheatham's Corps 8S(I Jackson's Cav. Div, . . 1 4 321 .... 49 356 4 3,06;3 • Palmer's brigaile not included * Scars's and Cockrell's brigades not included, ' Mercer's brigade not included. 222 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. Humnviry : Gen. Hood and Staff. Lee'H CorpH Stewart's Corps Cheiithiim'8 Corps Cavalry Artillery Engineers Pkesent G E.XTRA [N FOB Duty. Ddty. Abbest. j CD • E E o d S a 8 a 1 a e .2 IH a Hi 2 P o o 13 838 a O a o ^ o ;^ 7.247 1» 391 131 2.197 8 20 50!» 4,703 74 8it() 80 1,502 18 7^4 6,!>28 30 6':7 138 2,078 3S 241 2.610 18 73 45 528 4 8 14fi 2.504 .... 4« 8 H50 1 4 11 2,502 1 377 147 10 4 406 76 26 24,875 2,105 6,797 83. 1 13 10,851 7,851 10,010 .3,533 > 3,008 484 ;6,440 a On the original return are the following remarks : " Palmer's brigade of Lee's corps, French'.'! (Mercer's) brigade of Cheatham's corps, and Scars'a and Cockrell's brigades of Stewart's corps, are on detached service and not herein included." " A return of the cavalry under Mnjor-Gencral Forrest has not been furnished, and consequently not included. The last field return of the division of cavalry commanded by Brig.-Genoral Jackson (of November 0, 1804), is included." The numbers of the cavalry corps of General Forrest, given in the text, page 12, are taken, as there stated, from his official return made just before entering upon this campaign, and are the only ones accessible. While, therefore, the foregoing table should be increased by the numbers of Scare's brigade to give the aggregate force of Hood in the battle of Nashville, Forrest's cavalry must also bo added, and the three other infantry brigades, to show the whole of his army in Tennessee. The abstract of Hood's forces at the oi>ening of the campaign (November 20th), as given in the text, is also made up from official returns in the War Ileoorda Office, and need not be repeated here. ' Error in original, which reads 3.532. 9 Original return erroneously footed 34, 439, APPENDIX B. ORGANIZATION OF OPPOSING ARMIES IN TENNESSEE. I. — Organization of U. S. forces commanded by Ma.jor-General. Georoe H. Thomas at the Battle of Nashville^ Te«n., December 15andlQ, 1864.' FOURTH ARMY CORPS. Brioadier-General THOMAS J. WOOD. First Brigade. Col. ISAAO M. KiRBT. 21 8t Illinois. 38th lllinoiP, 81st Indiana. 81 st Indiana. 90th Ohio. 101st Ohio. FIRST DIVISION. BRiaADiEB-OENERAL NATHAN KIMBALL, Second Brigade. Brig.-Gon. Walteb O, WUITAKER. 9(ith Illinois. 115th Illinois. S5th Indiana. 21st Kentucky. 23d Kentucky. 45th Ohio. 5l8t Ohio. TMrd Brigade. Brig.-Gcn. Wh. Grosr. 75th lUinoisL 80th Illinois. 84th Illinois. flth Indiana. 30th Indiana. 36th Indiana (detaoh't). 84th Indiana. 77th Pennsylvania. SECOND DIVISION. BRiaADIRH-GBNKBAl- WASHINGTON L. ELLIOTT. First Brigade. Col. Emerson Opoxckb. 30th Illinois. 44th lilinoie. 73d Illinois. 74th Illinois. 88th Illinois. 125th Ohio. 24th Wisconsin. Second Brigade. Col. John Q. Lanb. 100th Illinois. 40th Indiana. 57th Indiana. 2Hth Kentucky. 2t>th Ohio. 97th Ohio. Third Brigade. Col. Joseph Conrad. 42(1 Illinois. 51.st Illinois. 79th Illinois. 15th Mi.ssonrL 64th Ohio. C5th Ohio. > Compiled from the Records of the Adjutaut-Geucrars Offlce. 224 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. THIRD DIVISION. Bbiqadier-Gbnkrai, SAMUEL BEATTY. f^H liiHgade. Second Uriyade. Third Brigade. Col. AiiEi. I). Strkioht. (l)Col. P. Sidney Poht.' Col. Fred. Knevleb. 8!»th Illinois. (2) Lt-Col. Host. L. KlMHKBLY. 7i>tl) Inilinna. 5lHt IiKliana. 5*.>th Illinois. 86th Indiana. Kih Kansas. 4l8t Ohio. i:^th Ohio. 15th Ohio. llHtOhio. 19th Ohio. 4Uth Ohio. U;^d (Jhio. ia4th Ohio, ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Major WILBER P. OOODSPEED. Indiana LJRht Artillery. 25th Battery. Ohio Light Artillery, fith Battery. Kentucky Light .* rtillery, lat Battery. Ponnuylviinia Light Artillery, Buttery B. Ist Michigan Lignt Artillery, Bntt'y E. 4th U. 8. Artillery, Battery M. lat Ohio Light Artillery, Battery O. TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS. Majou-Genkkal JOHN M. SCHOFIELD. SECOND DIVISION. Majob-Gkneral DARIUS N. COUCH. Firtt Brigade. Secoiui Brigade. Third Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Jok. A.Coopkb. Col. Orimkdo H. Moobb. Col. John Mebrinuer. 180th Indiana. 107th Illinois. illst Indiana 2fith Kentncky. 80th Indiana. 123d Indiana. 25th Michigan. 12".>th Indiana. 5()th Ohio. 99th Ohio. a-'M Michigan. 183d Ohio. 3d Tennessee. 111th Ohio. Cth Tennessee. 118th Ohio. ARTILLERY. Indiana Light Artillery, 15th Battery. Ohio Light Artillery, 19th Battery. THIRD DIVISION. Bbioadibr General JACOB D. COX. First Brigade. /Second Brigade. Third Brigade. Col. Cha8. C. Doolivtle. CoL John S. Casement. Col. Ihrael N. Stiles. 18lh Kentncky. (i'nh Illinois. 112th Hhnoia. Kith Kentucky. (j5th Indiana. (iSd Indiana. 100th Ohio. 124th Indiana. 120th Indiana. 104th Ohio. 10:W Ohio. 128th Indiana. 8th Tennessee. 5th Tennessee. ARTILLERY. Indiana Light Artillery, 23d Battery. Ist Ohio Light Artillery, Battery D. 1 Wounded. APPENDIX H. 225 DETACHMENT OF ARMY OK THE TENNESSEE. Majok-Oeneual ANDIIEW J. SMITH. FIRST DIVISION. Brioadikr-Qeneral JOHN McARTHXJR. Fir»t Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade. Col. Wm. L. McMillek. Col. LnciDS F. Hubbard. (l)Col. s. o. HiLL(killed). Illinois Lt. Artillery, Cogs- Iowa Li^ht Artillery, 2d (2) CoI.Wm. R. Marhhall. weH'H Buttery. Battery. 12th Iowa. 114th Illinois. 6th Minnesota. 85th Iowa. U3i{ Indiana. Hth Minnesota. 7th Minnenota. lOth Minnesota. 11th Missouri. Slid Missouri. 72d Ohio. 8th Wisconsin. 2d Missouri Light Artillery, 95th Ohio. Battery I. SECOND DIVISION. BniaADlER-GENERAL KENNER GARRARD. First Brigade. Second Jiriumtc. Third Brigade. Col. David Mooae. Col. James I. Gilbkrt. Col. Edward H. Wolfe. llftth Illinois. 58th Illinoie. 4!>th Illinois. 1-22(1 Illinois. Indiana Lt. Art., 3d Bat. 117th Illinois. 8!)t,h Indiana. 27th Iowa. 2d Illinois Lt. Art., Bat. G. Indiana Lt. Art., Oth Bat. 82d lowii. fi2d Indiana. 2l8t Missouri. 10th Kansas. 178th New York. TillllD DIVISION. Colonel JONATHAN B. MOORE. First Brigade, Second Brigalc. Artillery. Col. Lyman M. Ward. Col. Leander Blanden. 72d Illinois. 81st Illinois. Indiana Lt. Art., 14th Bat. 40th Missouri. ft5th Illinois. 2d Miascjuri Lifht Artillery, 14th VVi.-consin. 44th Missouri. Battery A. 3ad Wisconsin. PROVISIONAL DETACHMENT (District of the Etowah). Major-Geneiial JAMES B. STEEDMAN. PROVISIONAL DIVISION.! Brioadikk Geserai- CHARLES CRUPT. First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade. Col. Benjamin Harrison. Col. John G. Mitchell. Lt.-Col. C. H. Grosvenor. Artillery. Second Brigade {Army Tenii.) 68th Indiana Infantry.^ 20th Indiana Battery. Col. Adam G. MALLor. 18th Ohio Infantry,* 18th Ohio Battery. ' Composed mainly of detachments belonging to the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Army Ccjrps. which had been unable to rejoin their proper commands serving with General Sherman's army, ou the march through Georgia. ^ Attached to Third Brigade. 10* 226 tiil: march to the sea. Flmt Colored flrtf/nde. Second Colored Uriyitde. Col. TllOMAM J. MdKUiN. f'ol. ClIARLKS U. TlIOMHHClN. Mth U. H. Colored Trooim. 12th U. H. Colored TriKtpH. 1«th U. H. (Colored 'J'rooi h.« i:^th U. H. Colored Trooim. 17th U. H. Colored Troofw. 100th U. B. Colurcd Troops. IHth U, 8. Colored Troopn (battalion). 4-lth U, 8. ColoroU Troojm. rOST OF NASHVILLE. Buigadieu-Genehal JOHN F. MILLER SECOND DlUaADE, FOURTH DIVISION. TWENTIETH ARMY CORPH. COLONKL EDWIN C. MASON. 1.12d Indiana. 17(U,h Ohio. ISad Ohio. 45th New York. 17i)th Ohio. Unattached. 3d Kentucky. 173d Ohio. Veteran Roservo Corps. 28th Michigan. 78th I'ennsylvania. 44th Wisconsin. 4r)th Wisconsin. , GARRISON ARTILLERY. Major JOHN J. ELY. Indiana Lipht Artillery, 2d Battery. 1st Michigan Light Artillery, Battery P. Indiana Li^ht Artillery, 4th Battery. Ist Ohio Li^{ht Artillery, Buttery E. Indiana Li^'ht infantry, 12th Battery. Ohio Light Artillery, 2()th BalU-ry. Indiana Light Artillery, 2lHt Battery. 1st Tennessee Light Artillery, Battery C Indiana Jiight Artilh^ry, 22d Battery. Ist Tennessee Light Artillery, Battery D. ludianii Light Artillery, 24tli Battery. 2d U. S. Colored Lt. Artillery, Battery A. QUARTERMASTER'S DIVISION, a CoiX)NEL JAMES L. DONALDSON. CAVALRY CORPS. BuEVET Majou-Genbual JAMES H. WILSON. ESOOHT. 4th United States. FIRST DIVI8ION.3 First Drloade. Brigadlor-General John T. Croxton. IllinoisLt. Art,, Board of Trade Bat. «th Iowa. 2d Michigan. 4lh Kentucky (mounted infantry). Ist Tennessee. FIFTH DIVISION. Brioabier General EDWARD HATCH. Firbt Brigade. Second Brigade. Artillery. Col. Robert R. Stewart. Col. Datus E. Coon. Ist Illinois, Battery I. 8d Illinois. »ith Illinois. 11th Indiana. 7th Illinois. 12th Missouri. 9th Illinois. 10th Tennessee. 2d Iowa. 12th Tennessee. 1 Detached with pontoon train. 2 Composed of <|uartermaster'8 employes. 3 The Second and Third Brigades of this division, under the division com- mander, Brigadier-Ueneial E. M. McCuuk, were ubseiit on au expedition intu Western Kentucky, AITENDIX U. 997 aixTir DIVISION. DRiaADIEB-OEMKIlAL IllCHAUI) W. First Urif/iule. Col. TlIOMAH ./. Kauiuson. Kith IllinuiH. Rth Iowa. 7tU Ohio. Second Jirigattf. Col. Jamks JSiodlk. 14th IlliiioiH. TMh Iiiitiitnn. Kth Miohi^in. ikl Teniicusco. JOHNSON. ArUltfry. 4th United Staton, Bat'y 1. SEVENTH DIVISION. Buioadiek-Oknehal JOSEPH P. KNIFE. Second liiiuade. Col. a. M. L. JOIINBON. I'ilh Iiiiliaim. l')t)i Iiidiiina. tith TuiincHaeo. ArtHlery. Ohio Lt, Art., 14th Battery. First Brigade. Col. J. H. Hammond. l(th Indiana. 10th Indiana. ll>th Pennsylvania. 8(1 TcnncHHCO. 4tli TenneoHce. The forccR under Major-Goncral L. H. Ronseeau at Murfroesboro aro not In- cluded in the forcgoint^. II. — Orgaiiization of the Army of Tetmesscc (Confederate), enui- uiundcd by Genkkal John M. Hood, for the 2><'*'io<^i ending December 10, 1804. LEE'S ARMY CORPS. Lieut. -Geneual S. D. LEE Commanding. DIVISION. Major Genkkal ED. JOHNSON. Dean's lirigade. ManigauWn Itrigade. P.riK. Gen. Z. (!. Deas GoinmandinB. Licut.-Gol. W. L. 15otli;k (loninmnding. lUth, !Wd, ;i6th, 3»th, and 50th Alabama. 10th and lltth South Carolina. 24th, 2Hth, and ;i4th Alabama. Sharp^s Brigade. Brantleipn Ihigade. 7th, nth, Kith, 4l8t, and 44th MisslsHippi. 24th. 34th, 27th, 2!)th, and 30th MiHBirt- miarpahootcrp, MissisMippi. sippi and dismounted Cavalry. DIVISION. Majoh-General C. L. STEVENSON. Cumming^H Brigade. PHtus's Brigade. Colonel E. V. Watkins Commanding. 20th, 23d, 30t.i, Slst, and 4(ith Alabama. 34th, 36th, 3'<)iiiiiiiiii(liti);. l«t, ;{(l, aad, ;n«f, .'{;jiHiir(l C'avnlry. Infantry. J5'.>th and :iOLh North (Jarolinu. Ist una 'M iliHniountod MisBouri Cttv'ry. Settrn'H liriyadK, 4th, tinth, 3<)th, ai>th, and 4r)th MIhb. 7th Battalion, MisslBHlppi. DIVISION. Major-Oknekal E. C. WALTHALL. (ji.wtrlnsi'it Jiiifi'Kli'. C'utUy'a ISrlffarte. Urijr.-Oon. (Jko. D. ./ownhon ConuVj^. Ilritr.-Ocn. (J. M. Siiklley (!oind'>?. 4iJd, 4(ith, 4Hl,h, 4!ttli, .VJd, Sntti TcnnoH- 17tli, anth, a»Lh Aluhamu, and Wth Mis- Hce, and iHt Alubamu. KiHHippi. liet/nohlH'H lirifidde. IhI, Sid, 4th, Uth, and ;^5th ArkanKiiH. CHEATHAM'S ARMY CORPS. MAJOK-GKNKnAL R F. (JHEATHAM Commandinq. CHEATHAM'S DIVISION. Bbio.-Oenkkai. M. p. LOWUY Commanding. OinCa llrii.ifKlo. Aftinty'H llrigade. Lieut. Col. H. L. Watp'.hs Coind'^?. Colonel H. U. Fiki.d Commanding. lOth and a4th South (hirolina. It^t. »)tti, Kth, !tth, 16th, 27th, 'Mth, and iid, fith, and Hth (JuorKia Ilattaliont*. ftOth TiMinoHsw-. 4tith Ueorgiu. 4th ConfcMlcrateH, fitrahtH Jh l Oovnfi'n lirianUf.. flrnnherrv^H nrUindP.. Brij?.-«on. I), v.. (Jovan VmxwV^. Capttiin M. T. Urodohton (Vimd'R. Ist, 5J(I, 6t,h, i:Jth 15th, and Aijih Ark. filh, 7lh, lOth, IBtli, 17th, 18th, a4th, and 6th, ?th, 8th, and 19th ArkauHaH. SSth Tex«H. 6th (.'orifedorate, .'Jfith 'IVnneBKec. and Niitt'H Cavalry cunipany. BATE'S DIVISION. MAJon-OENERAL WILLIAM B. BATE Commandino. Tyler^H /Irluwle. Finlnifx llrifidde. Brip.-Ocn. T. D. Hmitii OommandinK. Major J. A. Lush Commandln«. 2d, lOth. aoth. and ;j7th TeniuiUKeo. Ist, 3d, 4th, «th, and 7th Florida. 37th OeorKia and 4th Ga. Shai pshooterB. JackiKm'a lirigade. Ist Confederate. 25th, 2«th, 30th, an.l «lfith Georgia, and Ist Oa. SharpshooterH. ARTILLERY. LEE'S COnrS. -Commanded by Majo« J. W. JOHNSTON. DouKlaKH'H Battery. Pcdiier ^ Battery. Rowan'H Battory. Kent's " I'Uifaula «' Corput's (Jarrity's " Stanford's " MarHhall's " STKWAIIT'S nORPS.~Comiiiand<(l by Lieut. Colone.", S. C. WILLIAMS. SeldcMi'H Battery. Bonnncbord'H Battery. Hiiskin'H Buttery. Tarrunt'H " Cowairn Battery. Guibor'H " Limisden'H " Darden'H •' Kalk'a " CHEATHAM'S COUPS.— (;<)mniandcd by CoLONBi, M. SMITH. Turner's Battery. Bleosition, or to retire to Home point from whioh we can move offensively. Of courwe wo cannot secure the river here. I could eatsily have held the bridpro-head at the 11. B.., but it would have been useless, as we could not possibly advance from that point. Please give me your views and wishes. (Signed) J. M. SCHOPIELD, Major- General. (Telegi-am.)' Headquarters Army of the Ohio, Neah Columbia, Tenn., November 28, 1864 — 9.10 a.m. Major General Thomas, Nashville: General — I have all the fords above and below this place well watched, and guardetl as far as iwssible. Wils(m is operating with his main force on my left. The enemy does not appear to have moved in that direction yet to any consider- able distance. I will probably be able to give you pretty full information this evoning. Do you not think the infantry at the distant crossings below hero should now be withdrawn, and cavalry substituted ? I do not think we can pre- vent the crossing of even the enemy's cavalry, because the places are so numerous. I think the best we can do is to hold the crossings near us and watch the distant ones. (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELu, Major- General. (Telegram.) Nashvuxe, November 28, 1864—10 a.m. Major-Genebal Schofield, Columbia via Franklin : The following just received from Lieut. -General Grant: "City Point, Nov. 27, 9 P.M.— Savannah papers just received state that Forrest is expected in the rear of General Sherman, and that Breckeni'idge is already on his way to Georgia from East Tennessee." If this proves true. General Grant wishes me to t.ike the offen- sive against Hood, and destroy the railroad into Virginia with Stonemnn's force now beyond Knoxville. General Smith will certainly be here in three days, when I think we will be able to commence moving on Hood, whetner Forrest goes to Georgia or remains with Hood. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Major- General U. S. Vols., Co7mVa. (Telegram.) Headquarters Army of the Ohio Near Columbia, Tk.nn., November 28, 1864. Major-Genebal Thomas, Nashville : The enemy was crossing in force a short distance this side of the Lewisburg Pike at noon to-day, and had driven our cavalry back across the river and the Pike at the same time. The force is reputed to be infantry, but I do not regard it as very ijrobable. Wilson has gone with his main force to learn the fact, and drivo the tnemy back, if practicable. (Signed) J. M. SCHOPIELD, Mojor-Geiieral. 234: THE MARCH TO THE SEA. (Telegram.) Headquarters Army op the Ohio, Near Columbia, Tenn., November 28, 1864—4 p.m. Major-General Thomas: If Hood advances on the Lewisburg and Franklin Pike, where do you propose to flight him ? I have nil the force that is necessary here, and A. J. Smith's troops should be placed with reference to the iiroposcd point of concentration. (Signed) J. M. SGHOFIELD, Major- General, (Telegram.) Nashville, November 28, 1864. Major-General Sohofield, near Columbia : Your despatch of 3.30 is just received. If General Wilson cannot succeed in driving back the enemy, should it prove true that he has crossed the river, you will necessarily have to make preparations to take up a new position at Franklin, behind Harpeth, immediately, if it becomes necessary to fall back. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. S. Vols., ConuSg, (Telegram.) Headquarters Army of the Ohio, Fra -iki.in Pike, Tenn., November 28, 1864, Major-Genekal George H. Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. General — I am iuformcil the wagon bridge at Franklin has been carried away. Would it not be well to replace it by pontoon bridge during the rainy season ? (Signe«l) J. M. SGHOFIELD, Major-General, (Telegram.) Nashville, November 28, 1864. Majok-General Schofield : You can send some of the pontoons you used at Columbia to Franklin, to lay a bridge there. I will answer your other telegrams in a few monienta. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-Geiieral U. S. Volt., ComdCg. (Telegram.) Near Columbia, November 28, 1864—6 p.m. Major-General Thomas, Nashville : The enemy's cavalry in force has crossed the river on thoLewisburg Pike, and is now in possession of Rally Hill. Wilson is trying to get on the Franklin Pike ahead of them. He thinks the enemy may swing in I)etween him and me and strike Spring Hill, and wants Hammond's brigade to halt there. Please give it orders if you know where it is. Also, I think, it would be well to send A. J, Smith's force to that place. (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major- General. (Telegram.) Nashvillb, November 28, 1864—8 P.M. Major-General Schofield : If you are confident you can hold your present iwsition I wish you to do so un- til I can get General Smith here. After his arrival we can withdraw gradually, and invite Hood across Duck River and fall upon him with our whole force, or wait until Wilson can organize bis entire cavalry force, and then withdraw from APPENDIX D. 235 yonr present position. Should Hood then cross tho river wc surely can ruin him. You iiiny have the fords at Ccntrcville, Beard's Ferry, Gordon's Ferry, and Wil- liamsport thoroughly obstructed by filling up all the roads lending from them with trees, and then replace your infantry by cavalry. Send ah intelligent staff offlcer to see that the worlc is projwrly done. As soon as relieved concentrate your in- fantry. The cavalry will be able to retard if not prevent Hood from crossing after the roads are thoroughly obBtnictcd, if they do their duty. The road loading from Centre villo to Nashville should be thoroughly obstructed. I am not sure but it would be a good plan to invite Hood across Duck River if wo can get him to move toward Clarksville. Is there no convenience for unloading beyond Thompson's Station ? (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. H. Vols., Comd^g. (Telegram.) Nashviixk, November 29, 1864—3.30 a.m. Major-Genebal Schofield, near Columbia : Your despatches of B p.m. and 9 p.m. yesterday are received. I have directed General Hammond to halt his command at Spring Hill and report to you for orders, if ho cannot communicate with General Wilson, and also instructing him to kcHjp you well advised of the enemy's movements. I desire you to fall back from Columbia and to take up your position at Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at Spring Hill ^ contest the enemy's progress until you are securely posted at Franklin. The troops at the fords below Will iamsport, etc., will be withdrawn and take up a position behind Franklin. General A. J. Smith's command has not yet reached Nashville ; as soon as he arrives I will make immediate disposition of his troops and notify you of the same. Tlease send me a report as to how matters stand upon your receipt of this. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, • Major- General U. S. Vola., ComcCg. (Telegram.) Nashville, November IJO, 1864. JIajor-Geneual Schofield, near Columbia via Franklin: I have a report from the N. W. R. R. that four regiments of Forrest's cavalry have crossed Duck Iliver below ^Villiams^)o^t. Have yon any such information ? (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Ifajor- General U, S. Vols., Comd'a. (Telegram.) Headquarters Army of the Ohio, Fkankmn Pike, Tenn., November 29, 18(34—8.20 a.m. Major-General Thomas, Nashville : The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force on the Lcwisburg Pike, and General Wilson reports the infantry crossing alwve Huey's Mill, about five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry reconnoissancc to learn tho fact. It it proves true I will act according to your instructions received this morning. I'lease send (.rdcrs to Ceneral Coo|)er at Centreville. It may be doubtful whether any mes- senger from here will roach him. (Si/iCned) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major- General, 236 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. (TcleKTiiin.) Fkanklin Pike, Tenn., November 20, 1864—1 p.m. Majob-General Thomas, Nanhvillo: rieaHC have pontoons put down at Franklin at once. (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-Oenetal. (Telegram.) Nashville, November 20, 1864—2,30 p.m. Major-General Schofikld, Franklin: Your ilespiitch of 8 a.m. received. I huve sent orders to General Cooper aa ^ou reciuested, but think it would bo well for you to send a second mesKenger to him to make Bure that he rcceiveH hi.s orders. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. S. Vols., Corrutg, (Telegram.) Nashville, November 29, 1864—11 p.m. MajorGeneral Schofield, Franklin: Genend Wilson telegniphed me very fully the movempnts of the enemy yester- day and this morning. Ho believes Forrest is aiming to strike this plaiie, whilst the infantry will move ugain^t you and iiLtcmpt to get on your flank. If you dis- cover such to be his movement you had better cross Harpeth at Franklin, and then retire along the Franklin Pike to this place, covering yoxir wagon train i»nd the railroad. I directed General Cooper in accordance with your wishes yester- day, to withdraw from Centrevilie by the Niishvillo road, crossing Harpeth at Widow IJean's, and report to you from that place for further orders. You had better send orders to meet him. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Major- General U. S. Vols., ComcCg. (Telegram.) Franklin, November .30, 1884—5.30 a.m. Majou-General Thomas, Nashville: I hope to get my troops and material safely across the Harpeth this morning. We have suffered no material loss so far. I shall try to get Wilson on my flank this morning. Forrest was all around us yesterday, but we brushed him away during the evening, and came through, llood attacked in front and flank, but did not hurt us. (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major- General. (Telegram.) Franklin, November .30, 1864—9.50 a.m. Major-Geneual Thomas, Nashville : My trains are coming in all right. Half the troops are here, and the other half about Ave miles out, coming on in good order, witii light skirmishing. I will have all across the river this evening. Wilson is here, and his cavalry on my flank. I do not know where Forrest is. He may have gone east, but no doubt will strike our flank and rear again soon. Wilson is entirely unable to cope with him. Of course, I cannot prevent Hood from crossing the Har|)eth whenever he may attempt it. Do you desire me to hold on here until compelled to fall back ? (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-Oeneral. APPENDIX D. 287 (Teleprram.) NAsnviLLK, November 30, ISO I. MAJOK-dENERAf. RcHOFiELD. Franklin: Your (leKpatches of B.^W, 5.50, and Wilson's rte-'patch, forwarded to you, havo been rcoelveil. It will take Smith quite all da}' to disembark, but if 1 find there Is no immediate necessity to retain him here, will send him to Franklin or Brent wood, according to (;ircuinstancefi. If you can prevent Hood from turning yor.r positi(m at Franklin, it Khould be held ; but I do not wish you to risk too much. I send you a map of the environs of Franklin. (Signed) GEO. H, THOMAS, Major- General U. S. Vol»., CoirKTg. (Telcpram.) Franklin, November 30, 1861—12 m. Major-General Thomas, Nashville : Your despatch of 10.25 a.m. is received. I am satisfied that I have heretofore run too much riHk in trying to hold Hood in check, while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. The slightest mistake on my part, or failure of n subordinate, during the la'^t three days, might have proved disastrous. T don't want to get into so tight a place again. Yet I will cheerfully act in nceordanco with your views of expeciiency. if you think it impoitant to hold Hood back as long as possible. When you get all your troops together, and the cavalry in effec- tive condition, wo can whip Hood easily, and, I believe, make the eami)aign a decisive one. Before that, the most we can do la to husband our strength and increiise it as much as possible. I fear the troops which were stationed on the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out of the way as soon as possible, and watch Hood carefully. Possibly I may be able to hold him hero, but do not expect to be able to do so long. (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General, (Telegram.) Nashville, November 30, lS(i4. Major Gkneral Sohofield, Franklin: General Smith reported to me this morning that one division of his troops is still behind. We must therefore try to hold Hood where he now is until those troops can get np and the steamers return. After that we will concentrate here, reorganize our cavalry, and try Hood again. Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin for three days longer ? Answer, giving your views ; and I should like to know what Wilson thinks he can do to aid you in holding Hood. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U, S. Vols., ComdCg. (Telegram.) Franklin, November 30, 1864 — 3 p.m. Major-General Thomas, Nashville : I have just received your despatch asking whether I can hold Hofjd here three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold him one day, but will hazard something in doing that. He now has a large forc^-, nrobably two corps, in my front, and seems ))repared to cross the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing to-morrow in spite of all my efforts, and probably to-night, if he attempts it. A worse position than this for an inferior force could hardly be found. I will refer your question to General Wilson this evening. I think h« can do very little. I have no doubt Forrest ivill be in my rear to-morrow, or doing some greater mischief. It appears to me that I ought to take position aft 238 THE MARCH TO THE SEA.. Brontwood ftt onro. If A. J. Smith's division and thn Mnrfrocshoio' gnrrldon join mc Ihcro, I oiiKht to Ik) nblo to hold Hood in check for some tiriio. I iinvo juBt Icnrncd tlint the cnemy'n cavalry in already crowiing three niilcH below. I will hove lively times with my trnliiH again. (Signed) J. M. SCHOFEELn, JUaJor-Otneral. (Telpgram.) Nashville, November 30, 1864. MAJOK-fiKNEHAL BcnOFlKLl), Franklin: Your dcKpiitch of 3 p.m. is rccfived. Send back your trnins to this place at once, and hold your troopH in ruadincps to march to Brcntwcxxl, and thence to this place as soon a« your troiiiM are fairly on the way, 8o diKponing your forco as to cover the wagon train. Have all 11. U. truins sent back immediately. Notify General Wilson of my instructions. He wiil govern himself accordingly. Ilclievo all garrisons in blockhouses, and send back by railroatl trains last over the road. Acknowledge reccii)t. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, 3Ic0or- General U. S. >'o/»., ConiiVg, (Telegram.) HKADQUARTF.ns Army of the Ohio, Franklin, Tenn., November 30, 1864. Major-general Geo. IT. TnoMAS, Nasln "Me, Tenn. : General— ricaso send A. J. Smith's division to Bicntwood early to-morrow morning. Also jjleaso send to Brentwood to-morrow morning one million rounds of infantry ammunition, 2,000 rounds three-inch ond 1.000 rounds light twelve artillery, (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major- General. (Tologmm.) Franklin, November 30th— 7.10 p.m. MAjou-GENF.nAL Thomas, Nashville : The enemy made a heavy and persistent attack with about two corps, com- mencing at 4 P.M. and lasting until after dark. He was repulsed at all points, with very heavy lost;— probably 5,000 or 6,000 men. Our loss is not probably more than one-fourth that number. We have captured about 1,000 prisoners, in- cluding one brigadier-general. Your despatch of this p.m. is received. I had olready given tlie orders you direct, and am now executing them. (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Jfajor- General. (Telegram.) Nashville, November 30, 1864. Major-General SCHOFIELD, Franklin : Your telegram is just received. It is glorious news, and I congratulate you and the brave men of your command. But yon must look out that the enemy dot!s not still persist. The courier you sent to General Cooper at Widow Dean's could not reach there, and rcjwrts that he was chased by rebel cavalry on the whole route, and finally came into this place. Major-General Stcedman, with five thousand men, should be hero in the morning. When he arrives, I will .'^tart General A. J. Smith's command and General Steedman's troops to your assistance at Brentwood. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. S. Vols., ComiVo, APPENDIX E. STRENGTH OF OPPOSING ARMIES IN THE CAROLINAS. I. — National Army under General W. T. Sherman on entering the Campaign, February 1, 1805. Commands. Infantry. 15.358 11,060 Cavalry. Artillery. Total. Fifteenth Army Corps Seventeenth •' 10 47 381 2()4 15.765 11,'.K)7 lUght Wing 27,044 13,008 12,!»11 26,879 03 646 27,752 Fourteenth Army Corps Twentieth '' 452 623 14,420 13,434 Left Wing 075 27,854 Cavalry Division • •• 4,375 98 4,473 AcrirreErato 53,923 4,438 1,718 00,079 The Same, April 10, 18C5. Hioht Wing — AniiT op the Tennessee— MAJoii-GENEnAL O. O. IIowabd. Commands. Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. Total. Fifteenth Army Corps Seventeenth " 15.244 12,673 23 3U 403 2(il 15,070 13,104 Aggregate 28,117 53 004 . 28,&34 Left Wing — Army op Georgia— MAjoB-GENEBAii H. W. Slocum. Fourteenth Army Corps Twentieth " 14,053 12,471 445 4M ].5.0'.>8 12,Wa Aggregate. 27,12^1 939 28,003 240 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. Centre— AnMT of thk Ohio— MAJOB-GF.NBnAt J. M. ScRomcLD. COHMANDH. Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. Total. Tenth Army Oorpn Twenty-tliird Army Corps.. 11,727 14,(X)0 25,787 372 2u;i 12.0(19 M.2<.);j Asinretratc 666 26,393 CaVALBT— BnEVET MAJOn-OENEEAL J. KtLPATHICK. Cavalry Division 8(),»68 6,484 5,537 175 2,443 5,U6» CtrniKi aMtrreptntc Total nuiabcr of guns. . S8,tt48 yi II. — Confederate forces available to resist iShermaii's inarcfi through the Uarolinas. Although exact data are not easily to be got, we are not wholly without pvI- dcnce as to the means which General Beauregard had at his command when Sherutions against Sherman, ill which he estimated their ellectivo force of infantry and artillery then available at 20,0(0, as follows: *' Hardee's corps (mfnnlry and artillery) 10,000 Army of Tennessee 0,0(tO Bragg's forces 10,000 Infantry and Artillery 26,000 " The full plan is published in " The Land we Love." a monthly mngaisino, Charlotte, N. C, Vol. I., p. 188 (18(16). In it Beauregard distinctly RtatfH that the 0,000 are then at Char'otte. Detachments from the Army of the Tennessee continued to arrive nmch later, Cheatham himself reaching Johnston with part of his corps after the battle of Bentonville, March 10th and 20th (see Johnston's '• Narrative," p. 893). A reinforcement of about 2,000 joined on the 20th and 21st. Jefferson Davis, in his '" Rise and Fall of the ("onfederate (Jovenmient," Vol. II., p. R32, says, on this sv.bject: "Genera! Johnston's force, according to his estimate, when ho took command, amonntod to about 10,000 infantry anil artil- lery and 4.000 cavalry ; if to this be added the portion of the Army of Tennessee, about 2,500 men, under command of General Stephen D. Lee, which afterward joined the Army at Smithfield, N. C, and that of General Bragg's command at Goldsboro, which amounted to about 8,000, the aggregate would be about 30,500 men of all arms." As bearing upon this question, see also the tablo of paroles issued to Johnston's army upon its surrender, p. 243, infra. Vol. X.— 11 242 THE MARCH TO THE SKA, III. — Abstract from return of the Army, General J. E. Johnston, Vornintindimj, for period ending March ol, lb05, Headquarters, Smitt)Jield, Iv. C. Present FOB Duty. : Effective total : present. ! pres- present cnt. Prisoners OF War. Command. 1 i N 15 Aggregate and abs 2 1 General Sti\ff 15; 2! 592 1,556 4,217 8,365 15 14 JfarUee'H Army Corps : • Staff 11 274 93 409 2,533 1.5:34 4,091 8,158 3.589 2,273 883 6,745 14,903 697 96 793 318 16,014 11 MoLaw's division 3,(iH5 10.145 1,907 4.^57 5,267 1(),6';2 10,890 31.088 Tiiliaferro's '" Hoke's •■» " 179 179 3.353 Total 7S7 1 5 503 300 129, 937 1,739 1 36 3 1 3,353 5 Army of Tennessee : Staff 3,779 2,386 951 7,116 15,481 11 371 410 100 881 1,060 Lee's corps Cheatham's corps 5,201 24,711 3 266 24 1'iJ 6.6f!6 5 390 Stewart's corps Total Total Infantry 1,644 10,016 20,921 10,139 58,985 90,088 ].0?5 1,027 13,083 16,430 Artillery : » Hardee's corps 716 9S 814 847 1,060 Army of the Tennessee 112 152 i 959 1,187 1 1 398 621 22,278 91,896 4 Total Artillery 39 25j 1,803 ] 4 Pioneer Regiment (Tucker's Confederate) » Grand total, without cavalry. 6 326 16,621 16,440 1 The return of Hardee's troops, from which this is prepared, is dated March 27th, thitt of the Army of Tennessee April 1st. ^ The Sixty-eighth and Sixty-seventh llegiments. North CaroJinn (State) troops, and the .''irst North Carolina Battalion (State), operating on the enemy's com- nuinicati->ns with Newberne are not reported. " The artil.ery of the Army of Tennessee has not yet /rived from Mississippi. The larger portion of the artillery of the Departments of Nf)rth Carolina and South Carolina, Georgia and Ploridi, has been sent to the rear for reorganization, and no report has been received. * and *. Sec next page. APPENDIX E. 243 IV. — Army of Tennessee, and other forces under Geneual Johnston's command, paroled at Greensboro\ N. CI, May 1 arnl 2, 1865. Commands, etc. Geneiftls Johnston and Beauregard and staffs . . Stewart's corps , Lee's corps , Hardee's corps Reserve Artillery Cavalry corps Detachments Naval Mrisade Medical orticers, attendants, and patients in hospital General CoojKir and Brig. -Gen. Cohiuitt and stalf . . . Total . Paroled at Salisbury . " Charlotte. Total Grand Total , Offlcera. 275 Men. 533 73<> 8,145 i 550 4,126 <.)t)l iS.lOl t.l 1.1 '.)1 175 2..S31 212 i,o;w 106 iw i;35 867 7 3,221 26,824 2,708 279 .366 y,6-J9 665 6,337 3,8Ffi 33,161 Aggregate. 808 8,884 4. in 6 9,(162 1,2.^)2 2.506 1,246 3U3 1,002 7 30,045 2,ns7 4,015 General Johnston, in his "Narrative," p. 410, eays the apprehension of being made prisoners or war " caused a great number of desertions between the 19th and 24th of April — not less than four thousand in the infantry and artillery, and almost as many from the cavalry ; many of them rode off artillery horses and mules belonging to the baggage trains." If this estimate of eight thousand bo added to those paroled at Greensboro', the number of his troops will be raised to about 45,000. « Companies A ..nd D, Engineer Regiment, are on detached sei-vice and not in- cluded, as no report has been received from them. Effective total (about) 80. 6 A formal retum of the cavalry has not yet been furnished. Effective total, April 1, 5,105. Total present, 6,587. Aggregate present, 7,042. At the time of the above report nearly all Johnston's artillery was at Ilillsboro, N. C, refitting. Colonel Jones says ("Chatham Artillery," p. 216): "Of thirty light batteries there concentrated — the most of them being unfit for field service— ten were to be chosen and furnished at the expense of the othei-s, with the best battery animals and equipmentb." Thirty butteries would make, say 2,600 men.— J. D. C. APPENDIX F. ORGANIZATION OF OPPOSING ARMIES IN THE CAROLINAS. I. — Organization of the Armies under the Command of Major-Gen, W. T. SiiEKMAN, April, 1865. AKIVIY OF THE TENNESSEE. Major- General O. O HOWAKD, CoMsiANDiNa. FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS. Major-Geneual JOHN A. LOGAN Commanding. FIRST DIVISION. Breve-* Major-Genekal C. R. WOODS, /Vr«< Brigade. Second Brloade. Third Brigade. Brevpt l?rig Gen. W. B, Col. R. P. Cattekbon. Col. G. A. Stone, Woods. 4(lth Ilhnois. •1th Iowa. 27th Missouri. 46th Ohio. 9th " 12th Indiana. ](J3d Illinois. 25th " 7«th Ohio. 6th Iowa. 3(lth " 2(ith Iowa. 9~th Indiana. 3l8t " 31t*t Minfioiiri. S6rh Illinois. 32d Mii^souri. lOOth Indiana. SECOND DIVISION. Mawi\. 93d Illinois. Battalion 2f)th MisBonri. Battalion 10th '* 4th Minnesota. FOURTH DIVISION. BRiaADIER-CrENKRAL E. W. BICE. First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third DiHgade. Col. N. 15. HowABD. Col. R. N. Adams. Col. F. J. Hurlbut. 2(1 Iowa. 12th Illinois. 7th Illinois 7th " «)6th " ;i9th Iowa, fifith Indiana. 81st Ohio. 50th lllinoia 52d Illinois. 57th " 110th U. S. colored. DETACHMENTS. Artillery Brigade. Lieut.Col. William II. Ross. II, 1st Illinois. H, 1st Missouri. 29th Missouri Infantry. 12th Wisconsin Battery. B, 1st Michigan. Signal Detachment. SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS. Major-Geneual p. p. BLAIR, Commanding. FIRST DIVISION. Infantry. Brigadier-Genkral M. F. FORCE. First Brigade. Secmul Brigade. Third Brigade. Brig.-Gen. J. W. Fuller. Brig.-Gen. J. W. Sphague. Lt.-Co). J. S. Wbight. 18th Missouri. 25th Wisconsin. 10th Illinois. 27th Ohio. 35th New Jersey. 25th Indiana. 39th " 43d Ohio. 88d Wisconsin. 64th Illinois. 6;W " THIRD DIVISION. Brevet Major Genebal M. D. LEGGETT. First Brigade. Second Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Charles Ewing. Brig.-Gen. R. K. Scott. Kith Wisconsin. 20th Ohio. 45th Illinois. fiSfh " 31st " 78th " Sflth '• 19th Wisconsin. 30th " 12th Wisconsin. 246 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. FOURTH DIVISION. Brevet Ma.tor-General G. A. SMITH. First Brigade. Brig.-Gen. B. F. Potts. %iA Indiana. 32(1 Ohio. 53d Indiana. 14th Illinois. 53d 15th " T?iird Brigade. Brig.-Gen. W. W. Belknap. llth Iowa. 13th " 15th " Ifith " .32(1 Illinois DETACHMENTS. Artiilery Brigade. Major Frederick Welker. D, Ist Michigan Artillery. li!t Miiinesotii Battery. I'jth Ohio Battery. 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry. G Company, llth Illinois Cavalry. Signal Detachment. ARMY OF GEORGIA. Major-Geneeal H. W. SLOCUM, Commanding. FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS. BuEYET Majok-Geneual J. C. DAVIS Commanding. FIRST DIVISION. Infantry. Bhigadier-Generai. C. C. WALCUTT. First Brigade. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Hobart, 21st Wisconsin. 33d Ohio. 94th •' 42d Indiana. 88th " 104th Illinois. Second Brigade. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Buell. 21st Michij-an. 13th eyth Ohio. Third Brigade. Colonel Hambright. 21 St Ohio. 74th " 38th Pennsylvania. 79th SECOND DIVISION. Bbiqadieb-General J. D. MORGAN. Third Brigade. Lt.-Colonel Langlet. 86th Illinois. S«th " 110th " 125th •' 52d Ohio. S2il Indiana. 37th " (det.) First Brigade. Second Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Wm.Vandeveb. Brig.-Gen. J.G. Mitchell, 10th Michigan. 12l8t Ohio. 14th " 11.3th " Kith Illinois. 108th " 60th *' 98th " 17th New York. 78th Illinola. 84th " APPENDIX P. 247 THIRD DIVISION. Bbevet Major-Grneral a. BAIRD. First Brigade. Colonel M. C. Hunter. 17th Ohio. •AUt "■ 8!»th " 92(1 " ii'id Indiana. 23(1 Missouri (det). 11th Ohi(j. Secotid Brigade. Lt.-Colonel Doan. 2(1 Minnesota. 105th Ohio. 75th Indiana. 8Tth lOlst " DETACHMENTS. TMrd Brigade. Brig. -Gen. Geo. S. Greene. 14th Ohio. Jifcth '* 10th Kentucky. 18th 74th Indiana. Artillery Brigade. Major Charles Houohtaling. iaiterv ?, 2d Illinois. 5th Wisconsin Battery. " ■ C, 1st *' l!)th Indiana TWENTIETH ABMY CORPS. Major-Geneual J. A. MOWER Commanding. FIRST DIVISION. Infantry. Brevet Major-Gen ekai. A. S. Fimt Brigade Colonel J. L. Sklfridoe. 4th Pennsylvania. 5th Connecticut. 123d New jfork. 14lBt Second Brigade. Colonel \Vm. Hawley. 2d Massachusetts. 3d Wist^onsin. 1.3th New Jersey. lOTth New York. 150th SECOND DIVISION. WILLIAMS. Tliird Brigade. Brig.-Gcti. J. S. liOBiNSON, 31st Wisconsin. 61st Ohio. 82d '• 82d Illinois. 101st " l-m. New York. Brevet Major-Genebai, JOHN W. GEARY. First Brigade. Bvt. Bg.-Gen. N. Pardee, Jr. 5th Ohio. 2«th " 6Bth " 2JSth Pennsylvania. 147th Detachment K. P. B. Second Brigade. Col. P. H. Jones. .33d New Jersey. 73d Pennsylvania. 10(»th 1 l!)th New York. 134th " 154ih '* Third Brigade. Bvt. Brig.-Oen. Barndm. 29th Pennsylvania, nith 60th New York. l()2d 137th " 149th " THIRD DIVISION. Brevet Major-General W. T. WARD. First Brigade. Col. H. Case. 70th Indiana. 79th Ohio. 102tl Illinois. 105th " 129tli " Second Brigade. Col. Daniei. Dustin. 19th Michigan. 22(1 Wisconsin. 33d Indiana. 85th " Third Brigade, Bvt. Brig.-Uen. CouQsWEiiL. 20t.h Connecticut. 2'/£/arfes— Elliott's, Rhett's. Major-general R. F. HOKE'S DIVISION. ^r<£rad«s— Clinqman'b, Hagood's, Colquitt's, Kibkland's, Nethebcdtt's Junior Reserves. ARINIY OF THE TENNESSEE. STEWART'S, LEE'S, and CHEATHAM'S CORPS. (These corps are reported as having the same organiziition as when with Hood, both as to divisions and brigades, except that Anderson's Division of Lee's Corpa was under command of Major-General D, H. Hill, and the whole of Stewart's Corps was under the command of Major-General E. C. Walthall.) ARTILLERY ATTACHED TO HARDEE'S CORFS. Batteries — Abelle's, Anderson's, Brooks's, Maxwell's (section), Atkins's, Parvis's, Detachment 10th North Carolina Battalion, Lb Gabden's, Stuabt's. ARTILLERY ATTACHED TO ARMY OF TENNESSEE. ^<0, ISaetseq., 128, 188, l<.K)et seq. Batteries: CockereU's, IIH; De Gres's, 53; Wiiiegar's, 5(5 Beatty, Brigadier-CJeueral Samuel, division of, 98, 113, 117, 131 Beaufort, S. C, 46, 48, 103 etseq., 171, 311 Beauregard, General G. T., in mili- tary command between middle Georgia and the Mississippi, 3 ; put over Hood and Taylor, 10 et seq. ; hastens after Hood, 13; repairs railroad, 15; his earnest despatches to Hood, 17; despatches of , 37 et seq., 40, 59, 64; reports of, 101, IGl (note); suggestions of, 106 et seq. ; at a conference at Augusta, 169 etseq., 178, 183 Bell, Colonel L., brigade of, 143 et seq. Bell's Landing, Tcnn., 110, 119 Bentonville, N. C, 103, 185 et seq., 303 Biffle, Colonel J. B., demi-brigade of cavalry, 71 Blair, Major-General F. P., corps of, 33 ; constructs a flying bridge, 31 ; at Millen, 34 et .seq., 53, 168, 177 et seq., 194 Boone, N. C, 301 Boonevillo, Mo., 6 Boyd's Neck, S. C, 48 et seq. Bradley, Colonel Luther P., bri- gade of, 75 et seq. Bragg, General Braxton, 8 ; at Au- gusta, 49, 158 et seq. ; retreats to Kingston, 160 et seq., 181 etseq., 185, 193, 195 Brantley, Brigadier-General W. F., brigade of, 114 Breckenridge, Major-Geucral John C, i'ii, i:53, 300 Breese, Commander K. R, 142 ct seq. Brentwood, Tenn., 98 ct seq., 108, 115, 131, 134, 138 Briar Creek, Ga., 33, 34 Bridges, Captain Lyman, Chief of Artillery, Fourth Cori)8, 75 Brown, Brevet Brigadier-General S. B., cavalry brigade of, 301 Brown, Major-GeneralJolmC, di- vision of, 73, 76, 87 et seq. , 90, 93 et seq., 90 et seq., 113 Brown, Governor Joseph E., of Georgia, 8, 11, 38 et seq. ; army of, 47 Buchanan, Fort, N. C, 138, 144 Buell, Brevet Brigadier-General G. P., brigade of, 1^9 et seq. Buford, Brigadier -General A., cavalry division of, 12 (note), I 71 et seq., 103 et seq., 106, 304 Bull's Gap, Tenn., 212 Burbridge, Brigadier- General S. ; G., 300 Burke's Station, Va., 303 Butler, Major-General M. C, divi- sion of cavalry, 109, 170, 179, 187 Butler, General B. F., 145 Camden, S. C, 178 Canby, General E. R. S., 4, 199, 303 Capron, Colonel Horace, brigade of, 05, 73 et seq. Carlin, Brigadier-General W. P., division of (Fourteenth Corps), INDEX. 253 24, 187 ct ficq. ; recoiled, 180, lyictscq., 1«.)4, V.Y7 Carman, Colonel E. A., brigade of, 57, , lUl et seq. Feutheiston, Brigadier - General W. S., brigade of, 135 Field, Colonel H. 11., brigade of, 1^5 (note) Fisher, Fort, N. C, 137 et seq., 147, 165 Fitch, Lieutenant-Commander Le- roy, 104 Florence, Ala., 11, 14 et seq., 17 et seq., 63 et seq., 12(J, 132, 170, 20^), ^03 Force, Brigadier-General M. F., division of, 168 Forrest, Lieutenant-General N. B. , cavalry corps of, 11 ; starts on a raid, i;3 et seq., 15 et acq.; joins Hood, 63, 05 et seq., 71 et seq., 81, 85et8e(i.; his skirmish with Wilson, *,)8 et seq., 10^ et seq., 10(), 111 (note), 115 ; re- treat, 124 ; rejoins Hood, l;i5, . 135, a03 et seq. ; rout of, 207 et seq. Forsyth, Ga., 26 Fort Anderson (see Anderson, Fort) Fort Buchanan (see Buchanan, Fort) Fort Caswell (see Caswell, Fort) Fort Fisher (see Fisher, Fort) Fort Granger (see (iranger, Fort) Fort Henry (see Henry, Fort) Fort Jackson (see Jackson, Fort) Fort Johnson (see Johnson, Fort) Fort McAllister (see McAllister, Fort) I Fort Macon (flco Macon, Fort) I Fort Puiuski (hcc Pulaski, Fort) Fortress Monroe (see Monroe, Fort- ress) Foster, Major (Joneral J. (J., 40, 48, 55 ct seq., 51) et seq., 104, 178 Franklin, Tenn., 6'.> et bh[.; battle of, 81 et seq., 101 et soq., I ^'4 et secj., 135 French, Major-General S. ( J. , divi- sion of, 88, U7, 103, 111 (note), 113 Friuk, Surgeon C. S., 94 Gadsden, Ala., 1, lOetseq., 21) Gallatin, Tenn., 104 Gallup, Colonel G. W., brigade of, 18 Gardiner, Brigadier-General W. M., 202 Garrard, Brigadier-General Ken- ner, division of, HI, 113 Geary, Brigadier-General John W., division of, 23, 00 Genesis Point, Ga., 50 Georgia, regiment of : Thirty- seventh, 123 Germauton, N. C, 202 Gillcm, Brigadier-General A. C, cavalry division of, 63, SiOO et seq. Gillem's Station, Tenn., 18 Gist, Brigadier-General S. R., killed, 93 Goldsboro, N. C, 137, 147, 155, 159 et soq., 103, 104, 181, 185 et seq., 194, 190, 202, 211 et seq. Gordon, Brigadier-General G. W., 93 Gordon, Ga., 27, 3D, 36 Govan, Brigadier-General D. C, brigade of, 119 et seq., 123 INDEX. Graham ville, S. C, 48 Cranberry, IJrigadier-General H. B., death of, 97 Granger, Fort, Tenn., 83, 98 Granger, Brigadier-General R. S., 1 ; at Decatur, 14, 17, ^56. 100, 135, 133 Granny White Turnpike, 108, 111 et seq., 115, ] 19, 1.3 et seq. Grant, Lieutenant-General U. S., assents to Sherman's plan, 2 et Bcq , 31, 55, 58 et soq. ; chafes under Thomas's delay, 105 et seq., 139 etseq., 143, 140, 165, 173, 199 et seq., 303 et seq., 311 et seq., 310 et seq. Gravelly Springs, Ala., 303 Greene, General Nathaniel, 317 '. Greenesboro, N. C., 108 (note), 303, 313 etseq., 317 Griswold ville, Ga., 37, 30 et seq. Grosvenor, Brevet Brigadier-Gen- eral, brigade of, 107, 131, 134 Gun tcrs ville, Ala., 1, 9, 11 et seq. Hagood, Brigadier-General John- son, brig.ado of, 1 50 et seq. Halleck, Major-General H. W., 6, 58, 176 Hambright, Col '1 H. A., brigade of, 189 Hammond, Colonel J. H., brigade of, at Spring Hill, 70, 104 H?.r ipton, Licutenant-G e n e r a 1 , Wade, 171, 179 et seq.; meets Hardee and Johnston at Fay- ette viUc, 183, 180 et seq.; re- fuses to bring in the cavalry for surrender, 317 Hardee, Lieutenant-General W. J., Hood's unjust charges against, 9 etseq.; hastens back to Sa- vannah, 38, 30 ; his orders to Wheeler, 31,40et seq.; advised to abandon Savannah, 49 et seq.; refuses to surrender, 59; begins the evacuation, 00, 131 ; at Wilmington, 154, 164; re- port of, 100 et seq.; at a con- ference near Augusta, 109 et seq.; evacuates Charleston, 178 et seq., 181 et seq.; meets Johnston and Hampton at Fayetteville, 183 et seq.; at Benton ville, 180 et seq.; meets Schofield, 317 Hardeeville, S. C, 47,56 Harper's Ferry, Va., 181 Harri.s, Governor Isham G. , 101 Hatch, Brigadier-General Edward, cavalry under, 18, 04, 73, 110 et seq., 119, 133, 303 Hatch, Brigadier-General John P., affair at Honey Hill, 48 et seq,, 60 Hawley, Colonel William, 57 Hazen, Major-General W. B., di- vision of, 33 ; capture of Fort McAllister, 53 etseq., 174, 193 et seq. Heath, Cok nei Thomas T., 33 Heiskell, Co?.onel, brigade of, 135 (note) j Henderson, Brevet Brigadier-Gen- eral Thomas J., brigade of, 78, 84, 91, 150 etseq. Henry, Fort, 15 Hill, Colonel S. G., death of. 111 Hill, General D. H., 159 et seq.; at a conference at Augusta, 109 Hillsboro Turnpike, 107 et seq., 305, 317 Hilton Head, S. C, 60 INDEX. 257 Hobart, brigade of, 189, 191, 197 Hoke, Major -General R. F., 144 et seq. , 148 ; retreat of, 150, 15:i, 154, 15G, 158, 100, 18^, 188, 192 Honey Hill, S. C, 48 Hood, General John B. , 1 ; enbor- dinato to General Beauregard, 2 ; his design to carry the war back to Tennessee, 4 et seq.; demands Hardee's removal, 9 ; force of, 11 et seq.; views of his subordination to Beaure- gard, 13 ; marches to Tuscum- bia, Hetseq. ; delays, 17; force of, 18 et seq.; Beauregard's orders to, 29 ; joined by For- rest, 63 ; near Lawrenceburg, 64 et seq.; moves upon Spring Hill, 73 ; asks to have Cheat- hem relieved, 29 et seq.; ad- vances toward Franklin, 84 et seq.; losses of, ItGetseq. ; apolo- gies of, 101 et seq.; before Nashville, 106; position of, 110 et seq. ; forms a new line, 113 et seq.; rout of, 1.26; at Tupelo, 127 et seq., 1.33 et seq., 159, 106 109, 179, 183, 190, 199 et seq., 203 Howard, Major - General O. O. (commanding Army of the Tennessee), with Sherman, 23 ; march of, 26 et seq.; crosses the Oconee, 31 et seq.; pro- gress of, 34, 47 ; orders King's Bridge rebuilt, 52 ; at tak- ing of Fort McAllister, 53 et seq.; preparations before Savannah, 55 et seq. ; at Beau- fort, 163 et eeq., 108 et seq.; -fcers Columbia, 173 et seq., 177 ; enters Cheraw, 179, 185 et seq., 193, 195 Hubl)ard, Colonel Lucius F., bri- gade of, 111, 123, 128 Huey's Mill, Tenn., 09 et seq. Hume, Brigadier-General W. Y. C, cavalry division of, 33 Hunt's Corners, Tenn., 72 Hunts ville, Ala., 17, 67, 129 Hurricane, Tenn., 05 Hutchinson Island, Ga., 44, 47, 59 Illinois, regiments of : Ninety- second, 175, 181 ; One Hundred and Eleventh, 55 ; One Hun- dred and Twelfth, 78, 93 Indiana, regiments of : Eighth, 32 ; Seventeenth, 207 ; Sixty-third, 78 Indian Spring, Ga., 26 Iowa, regiment ut : Fifth, 72 Izard's Mill, Ga., GO Jackson, Brigadier-Goneral Win. H., cavalry division of, 11 et seq., 71 et seq., 77; with- draw.s, 78 et seq., 103 etseq., 205 et seq., 208 et seq. Jackson, Brigadier-General H. R. (commanding brigade in Bate's division), taken prisoner, 120 Jackson, Brigadier-General, com- manding forces in S. W. Vir- ginia, 201, 203 Jackson, Brigadier-General N. J., division of (Twentieth Corps), 23, 27, 52, 183 Jackson, Fort, 46 Jackson, Miss., 204 Jackson, Tenn., 13, 15 Jasper, Ala., 205 258 INDEX. Johnson, Major-Oenoral Ed., divi- sion of, 74, 17, '.)3, 97, 114; prisoner, I'Jfi Johnson, Brigadier-General Geo. D., brigade of, 113 Johnson, General R. W. , cavalry division of, 73, 110, 110; pur- sues Hood, ri5 Johnson, Fort. N. C, 138 Johnson, President Andrew, 21(5 Johnsonville, Tenn., 10, 18, GO et seq., 135 Johnston, General Joseph E., o, 23; at Newbern, 159 eb seq., 108 (note), 180 et seq. ; meets Hardee and Hampton at Fay- etteville, 183 et seq. ; concen- trates at Benton ville, 180 et seq. ; retreat of, 190 et seq., ^03, 303 ; opens negotiations for surrender, 314 et seq. Jonesboro, Ga., 30 Jonesboro, Tenn., 301 Jones, Jr., Colonel C. C, his " Siege of Savannah," 29, 4(5, 48 (note), 50, 51 (note), 107 (note) Jones, Colonel Theodore, Ijrigade of, 53 et seq. Jones, Colonel Wells S., brigade of, 58 ; severely wounded, 54 Jone.s, General S.,in command at Charleston, S. C, 59 Jordan and Prior's " Campaigns of P'orrest," 13 (note), 71 (note) Jordan, Brevet Brigadier-Cioneral Thomas J., cavalry brigade of, 180 Kentt^cky, regiments of : Sec- ond, 32; Twelfth, 78; Six- teenth, 78 Kilpatrick, Brigadier-General Jnd- son, commands cavalry, 24 ; charges the artillery at Lovejoy on foot, 30 ; makes a feint upon Macon, 27, 31 et seq.; rapa- city of, 40, 53, 169, 175 ; sur- prised, 179 et seq., 183, 185, 193 Kimball, Brigadier- General Na- than, division of, 71, 74, 77 ; at Franklin, 85, 92, 94, 98, 113 et seq., 117 King's Bridge, (ia., 52 et seq., 57 Kingston, (4a., 3, 10 Kinston, N. C, 155 et seq., 100 etseq., 181, 183, 194, 203, 211 Knipe, Brigadier-General Joseph F., cavalry division of. 111, 123, 135, 199, 203 Knoxville, Tenn., 200, 313 Lamb, Colonel William, 139, 144 Lane, Colonel John Q., brigade of, 75 et seq., 8(5, 88 Lavergne, Tenn., 103 Lawrenceburg, Tenn., 03 et seq. Lawton, plantation of, 44, 53 Lee, General Robert E., 4, 31 et seq., 60, 130, 105, 172, 182, 301 et seq.; surrender of, 210 etseq., 213, 216 Lee, Lieutenant-General S. D., 13 (note) ; corps of, 04, 71, 74; tries to force a cros.sing of Duck River, 78 et seq., 86, 88, 93 et seq., 103, 113 et seq., 158, 183, 188, 196 Leggett, Brevet Major-General M. D. , division of, 23 Lewisburg, Tenn., 66, 69, 71 et seq. Lexington, Ala., 186, 176 (note) INDEX. 25J) Lincoln, President Abraham, 5, 37, 6U, 104, 13U et seq., 103, aiJi ; assassination of, 214 et seq., 218 Logan, Major-Cleneral John A. ,2;5 ; ordered to Nashville, 106, 104, 170, 173, 177, 103 et seq. Long, Brigadier-General Eli, cav- alry division of, 203, .207 et seq. Loring, Major-General W. W., division of, 88, 01, 04, 103, 113 et seq., 125 (note) Louisville, Ga., 31, 33 et seq., 50 Lovejoy Station, 11 (note), 26, 3*» Lowry, Brigadier-General M. P., division of, 7.5, 113, 115 et seq., 122, 125 (note), 105 Lynchburg, Va., 301 et seq., 212 Lynnville, Tenn., 04 et seq. I McAllisteu, Fort, 46, 50, 53 ; fall of, 54 et seq., 50 j Mc Arthur, Brigadier-General John, division of, 110 et seq., 120, 132 et seq. McClurg, Colonel A. C, 190, 193 McCook, Brigadier-General Ed. M., cavalry division of, 303, 205 et seq., 200 McDonoiigh. Ga., 26 MeLavvs, Major-General L., 50, 184, 188, 102 McMillan Brevet Brigadier-General W. L., brigade of. 111, 120, 122 et seq., 127 et seq. McQuiston, Colonel J. C, brigade of, 160 Macon, Fort, N. C, 154 Macon, Ga., 23, 25 et setj., 63, 310 Madison, Ga. , 27, 3(5 Manigault, Brigadier-General A. M., 03, 97 Maps : Atlanta to Savannah, 20 ; Savannah and Vicinity, 45 ; Middle Tennessee, 62; Vicinity of Columbia, 08 ; Battle-lield of Franklin, 83; Battle-field of Nashville, 10",); Fort Fisher and Wilmington, 130; North Carolina, 14(); Kinston. 157; Battle of Bentonville, 180 Marion, Ala., 200, 206, 207 (note), 200 Martin, Colonel J. S., 55 Maury, Miijor-( Jeneral Dabnoy K., 303 Mercer, Brigadier General Hugh W., brigade of, 104 Michigan, regiments of : Ninth, 33 ; Fourteentli, l03 Midway, S. C, 170 Miles, Colonel David, 180, 101 Milledgeville, (ia., 33, 25, 27, 20, ol et seq., 36 Millen, CJa., 2:!, 31 et seq., 36 Miller, Colonel J. K. , cavalry bri- gade of, 201 Milroy, Major-General R. S., 100, 103 et seq. Mitchell, Brigadier-General J. G., brigade of, 180, 102 et seq. MobUe, Ala., 3, 33, 109, 303 et seq., 210 Monroe, Fortress, Va. , 1 46 Montevallo, Ala., 204 et seq. Montgomery, Ala., 209 Mcmticello, 176 (note) Moore, Colonel O. H., brigade of, 18, 84, 111, 117, 148, 151 et seq. More liead City, N. C.,211 Morgan, Brigadier-General J. D., divisionof (Fourteenth Corps), 24, 107, 189, 191 et seq., 194, 197 260 INDEX. Morris Island, S.C., 23 Mount Pleasant, Tenn., 05 Mower, Major-General J. A., di- vision of, 2;{, ll»5, 313 Murfreesboro, Term., 73 et seq., 100, 103 et seq., 109 et seq, r,'6, 134 Murray, Brevet Brigadier-General "Eli H., cavalry brigade of, 84, 3;3 et seq. Muscle Shoals, Ala., 14 Nashville, Tenn., 3, et seq., 12 et seq. , 1 7 et seq. , (57 et seq., 98; battle of, 90 et seq., 13U et seq., 133 et seq., 199 Newborn, N. C, 137, 147, 154 et seq., 1(54, 181, 185, 311 Newberry, S. C, 170 New Orleans, La., 199 New York, regiment of : Twelfth, 156 Nichols, Colonel G. VV., his " Story of the Great March," 43 (note), 58 (note) Nohmsville Turnpike, 103, 108, 110, 117 North Carolina, regiment of : For- tieth, 193 Onio, regiments of : Fifth, 33 ; Ninth, 180 ; Eighteenth, 107 Oliver, Colonel John M., 53 Olmstcad, Colonel C. H., 104 Onslow Island, Ga., 44 Opdycke, Brevet Brigadier-Gen- eral Emer.s(>n, brigade of, 75 et seq., 79, 86, 89 et seq., 94, 155 Orangeburg, S. C, 106, 170, 173, 175 Ossabaw Sound, Ga., 33 Ofiterhaus, Brevet Major-General P. J., commands Logan's cori)8, 33, 34etBeq., 53 Paducaii, Ky., 6 Paine, Brigadier-General Charles J., division of. 141, 144 Palmer, ColonelJ. B., brigade of, 103 Palmer, Colonel W. J., cavalry brigade of (Gillem's division), 301 Palmer, General I. N., 155 et seq., 158 et seq. Palmetto, Ga., 9 Pemberton, Lieutenant-General J. C, 3(3 Pennj'packer, Brevet Brigadier- General G. A., brigade of, 143 et seq. Pensacola, Fla., 23 Perry ville, Tenn., 16 Petersburg, Va., 32, 105, 203, 311 et seq. Phillips, Brigadier-General P. J., division of (Georgia Militia), 30 et seq. Planter's Factory, Ga., 3»>, 28 Plantersville, Ala., 30(5, 209 Pocotaligo, S. C, 59, 1(54, 108 Poe, Colonel O. M., Chief En- gineer, 24, 59, 164 Porter, Vice- Admiral D. D., 141 etseq., 146, 149 Port Royal, S. C, 46, 53, 55, 57 Post, Colonel P. Sidney, brigade of, 70, 74, 97, 112, 131 Pulaski, Fort, 45 Pulaski, Tenn., 14, 17 et seq., 64 et seq., 103, 134 et seq., 129, 133 et seq. Putnam, Israel, 191 INDEX. 2G1 QuART.ES, Brigadier-General Wm. A., brigade of, 91, 97, 113 Raines, house of, lU Raluigh, N.C., 170, 178, 181, 185, 313 ct seq.- Rally Hill, 'IVnn., 73 et seq. Randolph, Ala., 20.5 et .seq. Reese, Captain O. B., Chief En- gineer, 53 Reilly, Brigadier-General J. W., brigade of, 78 et seq., 83 et seq., 89 et seq., 94 Resaca, Ga., 7 Resolute, the, driven ashore, 57 Reynolds, plantation of, iiii Reynolds, Brigadier-General D. H., brigade of, 113, 134 Rliett, Colonel Albert, 183 et seq. Richmond, Va., 9, 31 et seq., 38, 35, 49, 58, 165, 167, 183, 201, 210, 313 et seq. Robertsville, S. C, 104 Robinson, Brigadier-General J, S., brigade of, 191 et seq. Roddey, Brigadier-General P. D., cavalry divi.sion of, 13 (note), 67, 133, 304 et seq., 307 Rome, Ga., 3, 11, 10, 31, 33, 133 Rosecrans, Major-General W. S., 6 Rousseau, Major-General L. H., 100, 103, 134 Rucker. Brigadier-General E. W., brigade of, 16, 130 Ruger, Brigadier-General T. H., 66, 71, 74, 77 et seq., 84, 93, 94, 155, 158 et seq. St. Loui3, Mo., 6 Salisbury, N. C, 303 et seq. Saltville, Va., 300 Sanders ville, Ga., 31 Savannah, Ga., 1, 2\ 33, 35, 37 et seq., 43 et seq. ; fall of, 00, 139, 102 et seq., 168, 173, 176, 180, 197, 199, 310 Schoiield, Major-General Johii M. (Army of the Ohio). et seq ; Hood's movement again.st, 11 ; at Nashville, 17 et seq. ; against Hood, 03 ct se(i. ; at Spring Hill, 69 et seq. ; battle of Franklin, 79 ct seq. ; losses of, 97; at Nashville, 99 et seq. ; advises further delay before Nashville, 105 ; prepa- rations for battle, 100 et seq. ; losses of, 114 ; second day at Nashville, 117 et seq. ; pursues Hood, 134 et seq. ; concentrates at Corinth, Miss., 139 et seq., 137; joins Grant at Fortress Monroe, 147; at Fort P'isher, 147 et seq. ; enters Wilming- ton, 1.54 et seq. ; at Newborn, 158 et seq. ; at Kinston, 100 et seq., 108 (note), 181, 183, 1^5 et seq. ; ordered to Goldsboro, 194 et seq., 300, 303; left in command, 311, 213; receives the arms of Confederates, 217 Scott, Brigadier-General Th. M., brigade of, 91, 97 Sea Island, S. C, 33 Sears, Brigadier-General C. W., brigade of, 103, 111 (note), 113, 115 Selma, Ala., 204, 20^ H seq. Shelby ville, Te- 65 et seq., 73, 134 Shelley, Brigadier-General C. M., brigade of, 113 Sheridan, Major-General P. H., 813 262 INDEX. Sherman, Major-Ge?neral W. T., plans of, 1 et seq.; moral courage of, 4 ct seq.; his confidence in Thoniaa, '6 ; en- emy's plans agamst, 9 et seq. ; letter to Thomas, 11>; views of his march througli Georgia, 131 et seq. ; force of, 2;5 et Boq. ; line of march, 20 ot seq. ; his orders to Kilpatrick, 3;- ; at Millen, ol ; his destruc- tion ot railways, 3.5 et seq.; his plan of foraging, .'IS ct seq. ; before Savannah, 4t) et seq. ; opens communication with fleet, .52 ; at siege of Fort Mc- Allister, .5:! et seq. ; prepara- tions before Savannah, 55 et seq. ; demands surrender of Hardee, 59, 100 et .seq., 1:.'6, lo2 et seq.; at Goldsboro, i;')7, 147, 154 et seq., 159 ; his plan of campaign, lG3etseq. ; route of, 105 et seq. ; enters Colum- bia, ITo ct seq., 178 et seq. ; destroys arsenal at Fayette- ville, ISl et seq. ; at Averas- boro, 183 et seq, ; at Benton- ville, 186 et seq. ; resumes his march, 190 et seq., 201, 203; at Goldsboro, 21 1 ; meets Grant and Lincoln at City Point, 212 ; meets Johnston, 214 et seq. Shy, Colonel T. M., 113 (note), 123 Shy's Hill, 113, 115 et seq., 118 et seq., 127 et seq. Silk Hope plantation, Ga., 44 Simonton, Colonel C. H., 152 Slocum, Major-General H. W. (commanding Army of Geor- gia), with Sherman, 23, 27 et se(j|. ; before Savannah, 52; arranging earthworks, 57, 59; commands left wing, 104, 108 ot seq., 178 et seq. ; at Averasboro, 183; at Benton- ville, 180 etseq. ; losses of, 190 et seq., 213 Smith, Captain 11. D., 09 (note) Smithfield, N. C, 159, 101, 183 et seq., ISO, 194, 190. 213 Smith, Major-General A. J., or- dered to join Thomas, 0. 18 et seq., 05 ; at Nashville, 99 ct seq., 107 etseq. ; losses of, 114, 110 et seq.; ordered to pursue Hood, 124 et seq.; concen- trates at Eastport, 129 et seq., l;« ot seq., 199 Smith, Brigadier-General Giles A., division of (in Blair's corps), 23 Smith, Major-General G. W., 20, 28, 30 et .seq., 48, .50; at a con- ference near Augusta, 109 Smith, (General J. E., division of, joins Sherman, 23 Smith, Brigadier-General J. H., divi-sion of, 113, 115; taken prisoner, 120, 188 Smith Island, N. C, 138 SmithviUe, N. C.,138, 145 Solemn (^rove, N. C, 179 Spencer, Colonel George E., cavalry l)rigade of, l'<9 et seq. Spring Hill, Tenn., 69 et seq., 90 et seq., 102 Stafford, Colonel F. E P., 93, 95, 97 Stanley. Major-General D. S. (B'ourlli Corps), 0, 17; at Lynnville, 05 ; at Spring Hill, 70 et seq., 77, 79; at Frank- lin, S.5, 88 et seq. INDKX. 268 Stanton, Edwin M., Secretary of War, Un, m\ UY.i, '215 et seq. Steedman, Major-General J. B., 18 (note) ; at Chattanootja, 90 ; at Nashville, 100 et se(i., 107 et seq., lU, 117, l;.'l ; in Ala- bama, ISfietseq., loiJ, 135 Sterl, Colonel O. W., brigade of, 151 et seq. Stevenson, Ala., 1, 17, 67, 100, 104 Stevenson, Major-General C. L., division of, 114 Stewart, Colonel R. R., cavalry brigade of, at Spring Hill, 70 Stewart, Lientenant - General A. P., 12 (note), 13, 71, 73 et seq., 77, 88, 01 etseq., 103, 111, 114 et seq., 120, 156, 183, 188, 101 et seq., 19(5 Stilea, Brevet Brigadier - General I. N., brigade of, 78. 84 et seq., 87 et seq., 91, 93, 112, 118 et seq. Stone, Colonel George A., brigade of, 173 et seq. Stoneman, Major-General George, cavalry expedition of, 199 et seq. Stone's River, battle of, 13 Stougli, Lieutenant-Colonel Wil- liam, 180 Strahl, Brigadier-General O. F., 92 et seq., 95 Streight, Colonel A. D., brigade of, 98, 121 Strickland, Colonel S. A. , brigade of, 18, 64, 84, 89 etseq., 93 Sumter, Fort, 170, 184 (note) Swayne, Colonel Wager, 177 TALlAFEUKO,Brigadier-G( tieralW. B.,di vision of, 1S4, l,s8,190, 102 Talladega. Ala.. 204 Taylor, Captain J. D. M., Seven- teenth Indiana, 207 Taylor, Lleutenant-General Rich- ard, 9 et seq. ; puts railroad in repair, 15 ; ordered to Macon, 28, 30 et seq.; at Savaimah, 47 et seq., 59 ; report ot, 166 ; 203, 208 Tennessee, regiments of : Elev- enth, 16 (note) ; Forty-tirst, '.t5 Tennille, Ga., 31 Terry, Major-General A. H. (Tenth Corps), 137, 140 (note), 141 et seq., 144, 147, 148, 150, 152, 154, 102, 186, 194, 106, 313 Thomas, Major-General George H., 4 et seq.; Sherman's confidence in, 6 et seq., 12 ; Forrest's ex- -pedition against, 15 et seq.; receives news of disaster at Johnsonville, 18 et seq. ; his despatches to Schofield, 65 et seq., 81 ; sends congratulations to Schofield, 08 ; at Nashville, 99 et seq. ; urged to assume the aggressive, 104 et seq. ; preparations for battle, 106 et seq. ; holds council of com- manders, 116; second day at Nashville, 1 17 et seq. ; pursues Hood, 134 et seq. ; prepares for a new campaign, 12ii et seq., 199 et seq., 312 Thomasville, Ga., 31 Thompson, Colonel C R.. of Twelfth U. S. Colored, 1(5 (note), 121, 127 Thompson's Station, Tenn., 77 et seq. Toombs, Hriga(lier-(«enerul Rob- 264 INDEX. ert, 28, 30, et scq., 42 (note), 47 et seq. Town Creek, N. C, 150 Trion, Ala., 21)5 et seq. Tiilliihoina, Tenn.,100 Tupelo, Miss., 137 Tuscaloosa, Ala., 205 Tuscnmbiu, Ala., 2, 11, 13 et seq., 17, 19, O:}, 200, 205 Twining, Major William J., Chief Engineer, 82 Undine, the, burned, 15 United States. Colored regiments of : Twelfth, 10 (note) ; Four- teenth. 107 Upham, Colonel S. C, 150, 158 et seq. Upton, Brevet Major-General E., 303, 205, 207 ct seq. Vandeveu, Brigadier-General William, brigade of, 189. 192 et seq. Vicksburg, Tenn., 203, 210 "Virginia, regiment of : Fifty- fourth, 193 Wagner, Brigadier-General G. D , division of (Fourth Corps), 04, 71, 75, 77, 79, 80 et seq., 92, 97, 112; at Franklin, 1:55 Walcutt, Brigadier-General C. C, brigade of, 30 et seq. Walthall, Major-General E. C, division of, 88, 91 et seq., 97, 107, 111 et seq.; retards our pursuit, 125 Ward, Brevet Major-General W. T., division of (in Twentieth Corps), 23, 183 Warreuaburg, Ala., U Warrenton, Ga., 33 Washington, D. C, et seq., 13, 10.5, 120, 129 et seq., 140 et seq., 1.55, 31.5, 218 Washington, General George, 130, 1.54 Waynesboro, Ga., 33 et seq. Waynesboro, Tenn. , 18, 03 et seq. Wcldon, N. C, 212 West Point, Miss., 04, 204 Wheeler, Major-General Joseph, cavalry corps of, 11, 26, 28, 30 et seq., 39 et seq.; concen- trates on Carolina shore, 57, 133, 167, 109 et suq., 173, 187, 195 Whitford, Colonel J. N., brigade of, 150 White, Colonel Samuel, Sixteenth Kentucky, 79, 89 et seq. , 135 White, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank, Seventeenth Indiana, 207 Whiting, Major-General W. H. C, 140, 144 et seq. Whittakcr, Brigadier-General W. C, brigade of, 77 Williams, Brevet Major-General A. S., under Slocura, 23, 27, 31, 35, 52, 50, 183 et seq., 187, l<)0ctseq.,197et seq. Williamson, plantation of, Ga., 44, 50 Wilmington, N. C, 137, 147, 153; evacuation of, 154 et seq., 181, 183, 194, 211 Wilson, Brevet Major-General James H. (cavalry corps), joins Schofield. 0(5 et seq. , 72 ct seq. ; at Franklin, 8.5, 87 ; skirmish with Forrest, 98 et seq., 103 et seq., 107, 110, 114, 117, 119, 133 et seq.; concentrates at INDEX. 265 Eastporfc, 129 efc seq., 190; cavalry exj)eUition into Ala- bama, 'Mi et seq. ; eaters Sei- nia, 2U9 et seq. Winegar, Captain Charles E. , bat- tery of, 50 Wiimsboro, S. C, 177 et seq., 181 Wisconsin, regiments of : Third, 5(5 ; Forty-third, 10 (note) Wright, Colonel W. W., Chief Engineer, 155, 102, 211 Wright, Major-Ueneral A. R. (Lieutoniint-(Movernor of Geor- gia), 29, 50 Wood, Brigadier-C.enoral Thomas J., division of, 70 et seq., 77, 79; at Franklin, 85, 88, 98; at Nashville, 102, 107 et seq., 112et8eq.; losses of, 114, 117 etscq.; pursnes Hood, 12'1 et seq.; ordered to assemble the Fourth Corps at Huntsville, 129, 212 Woods, Brevet Major-General C. R., division of, 17, 28, 27, '.'>0 Woods, Brigadier-General W. B., brigade of, 174 Wytheville, Va., 200 et seq. Young, Major J. M., Fifth Iowa Cavalry, 72 ERRATA. On page 121, next to last line, for 'killed' read 'danger- ously wounded.' On page 123, line 5, for 'Tliirty-sevenLh Georgia' read ' Twentieth Tennessee. ' MESSRS. CHARLES SCRIIJNER'S SONS are publishing, under the general title of the Campaigns oe the Civil War, a series of volumes, contributed at their solicitation by a numljer of leading actors in and students of the great conllict of 1861-65, with a view to bringing together, for the first time, a full and authoritative military history of the suppres- sion of the Rebellion. The final and exliaustive form of this great narrative, in which every doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a possil)ility only of the future. But it is a matter for surprise that twenty years after the beginning of the RebelHon, and wlien a whole generation has grown up needing such knowledge, there is no authority whicii is at the same time of tiie highest rank, intelligible and trustworthy, and to which a reader can turn for any general view of the field— for a strong, vivid, concise but truly proportioned story of the great salient events. The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other materi- als of value for special passages, require, for their intelligent reading, an ability to combine and proportion them which the ordinary reader does not possess. There have been no attempts at general histories which have supplied this satisfactorily to any large part of the public. Undoubtedly there has been no such narrative as would be especially welcome to men of the new generation, and would be valued by a very great class of readers;— and there has seemed to be great danger that the time would be allowed to pass when it would be possible to give to such a work the vividness and accuracy that come from personal recollection. These facts led to the conception of the present work. From every department of the Government, from the officers ot the army, and from a great number of custodians of records and specinl information everywhere, both authors and publishers have received every aid that could be asked in this undertaking ; and in announcing the issue of the work the publishers take this occasion to convey the thanks which the authors have had individual opportunities to express elsewhere. The volumes of the series will be duodecimos of about 250 pages each, illustrated by maps and plans prepared under the direction of the authors. They will appear, as far as possible, in the chronological order of the Campaigns of which they treat; and by their preliminary and concluding chapters will be so far connected that the completed work will practically cover the entire field of the war. The price of each volume will be $1.00. The following volumes are now ready : I.— THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. By John G. NiCOLAV, Esq., Private Secretary to President Lincoln; late Consul-General to France, etc. A prelimin.'iry volume, describing the opening of the war, and covering the period from the election oi Lincoln to the end of the first battle of Bull Run. XI.— FROM FORT HENRY TO CORINTH. By the Hon. M. F. Force, Justice of the Superior Court, Cincinnati ; lale Brigadier-General and Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V., commanding First Division, 17th Corps: in 1862, Lieut. Colonel of the 20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at Shiloh ; Treasurer of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee. The n.arrative of events in the West from the Summer of 1861 to May, 1869 '. covering tlie c.ipture of Fts. Henry and Donelson, the Buttle of Shiloh, etc., etc. Ill THE PENINSULA. By Alexander S. Wekb, LL D , President of the College of the City of New York ; Assistant Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, 1861-62 ; Inspector General Fifth Army Corps; General commanding 2d Div., 2d Corps; Major General Assigned, and Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac. The history of McC'cllan's Peninsula Campaign, from his appointment to the end of the Seven Days' Figlit. IV THE ARMY UNDER POPE. By John C. Ropes, Esq., of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Historical Society, etc. From the appointment of Pope to comm.ind the Army of Virginia, to the appoint- ment of McClellan to the general command in September, 1862. v.— THE ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG. By Francis Winthrop Palfrey, Bvt. Brigadier Gen'l, U.S.V., and formerly Colonel 20th Mass. Infantry; Lieut. Col. of the 20th Massachusetts at the battle of the Antietam ; Member of Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, of the Massachu- setts Historical Society, etc. From the appointment of McClellan to the general command, Sept. 1862, to the end of the battle of Fredericksburg. VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG. By Abner Doubleday, Bvt, Maj. Gen'l, U.S.A., and Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V. ; commanding the First Corps at Gettysburg, etc. From the appointment of Hooker, throtigh the campaigns of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee aftei the latter battk. VII.— THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. By Henry M. Cist, Brevet Brig. Gen'l U.S.V. ; A.A.G. on the staff of Major Gen'l Rosecrans, and afterwards oii that of Major Gen'l Thomas; Corresponding Secretary of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland. From the form.ition of the Army of the Cumberland to the end of the batdes at Chattanooga, November, 1863. IX.— THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. By the Hon. Jacob 1). Cox, Ex-Governor of Ohio ; late SetreUiry of the Interior of the United States; Major General U.S.V., com- manding Twenty- third Corps during the campaigns of Atlanta and the Carolinas, etc., etc. From Sherman's first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to the beginning of the March to the Sea. X— THE MARCH TO THE SEA— FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE, liy the Hon. Jacob U. Cox. From the beginning of the March to the Sea to the Surrender of Johnston — including also the operations of Thomas in Tennessee. The following volumes, now preparing for early publica- tion, will complete the series : VIII.— THE MISSISSIPPI. By Francis Vinton Greene, Lieut, of Engineers, U. S. Army ; late Military Attache to the U. iy. Legation in St. Petersburg ; Author of " the Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78," and of "Army Life in Russia." An account of the operations — esjiecially at Vicksburg and Port Hudson — by which tlic Mississippi River and its shores were restored to the control of the Union. XL— THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY in 1864. The Cam- paign of Sheridan. By George E. Pond, Esq., Associate Editor of the Army and Navy Journal. XII.— THE CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT IN VIRGINIA. , By Andrew A. Humphreys, Brigadier General and Bvt. Major General, U.S A. ; late Chief of Engineers; Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, i863-'64 ; commanding Second Corps, 1 864-' 65, etc., etc. Covering the Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and '65, to Lee's surrender. *** The nbo7'e books for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent, /lost-faidy upon receipt 0/ price by CHARLES SCRIRNER'S SONS, • 743 and 745 Broadway, New York.