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Qq' ayant une arm^e, il fau' \'avoir au moins 6gale, et, s'il se peut «upe- rieiire & celles des autres puissances en discipline et ^n instmction. Ca^ ce qui ooute cber, tant au present que dans I'avenir, c'est une arm^e mediocre ; Guibert, Defense du iysteme de gU«rr« modorne. Chap. II. Vol, IV. page 276. t (( NEW-YORK: PUBLISHED BY KIRK AND MERCED. HO. 22, WALL-STBIKT. William A. Mercein, PWater 1819, s^ai CONTENTS. ■»^ni***» CHAPTER I. A brief Analysis of the causes which have changed England from a free nation, into a great military power, and of her military improvements. CHAPTER II. Refutation of the popular opinion of the American?, con- cerning the late war — military analysis of that war, and of the principles on which it was conducted. CHAPTER III. Development of the principles on which the next contest between England and America will probably be conducted, and of the chief objects which Britain will then seek to ac- complish. CHAPTER IV. Investigation of the chief objections which are made to the augmentation and improvement of our military esta- blishments. Insufficiency of the navy and militia alone for the purposes of national defence. CHAPTER V. Necessity of organizing both the materiel and personnel 6\ our defensive means on a permanent footing, in time of peace, and under the sole control of the national federal executive. IT OONfl'ENTS. CHAPTER VI. T A brief abstract of the simplest, safest, and most effectual mode by which the national forces might be raised, instruct- ed, organized, and employed in time of peace and in time of war. — Of their destination and numbers. ctual nict- time PREFACE. THE object of this Essay is to disseminate through this country some useful notions, on im- portant subjects, which appear to be generally mis- understood, and to investigate some popular errors, which may hereafter prove very mischievous. It has been the peculiar happiness of America, that, to this day, she has had little occasion for mi- litary knowledge and military institutions. Whilst the rest of the world was agitated by war and revolu- tion, she was allowed to ameliorate in peace her civil government, to augment her wealth and popu- lation, and to proceed in the career of improve- ment with a rapidity as yet unexampled. In conse- quence of this stateof security and tranqr'llity, her people, with a very few exceptions, are complete- ly destitute of mihtary knowledge. They are not aware of the weakness and insufficiency of their pre- sent means of defence, nor of the forces which may be turned against them. Their success in the last war, which was so highly creditable to their spirit and patriotism, has inspired them with a belief that they are strong enough to repel every attack. Prepossessed with this belief, the crudest notions have been advanced and maiutained by statesmen VI PRETACE. and orators of the highest political talent, largest views, most brilliant eloquence, and purest patrio- tism and integrity. The handful of troops, compo sing the regular army of the United States, has boeii viewed with jealousy, and arraigned with virulence ; the liberties of the country have been almost pro claimed in danger, from their spirit of insubordina- tion. The necessity of maintaining any standing force in time of peace, or of making any preparations for a time of war, has been loudly denied ; the navy and militia, even under the various establishments of the different states, have been declared sufficient for the purposes of national defence, and any at- tempts to put the organization and service of the latter under the more immediate inspection and control of the executive central government, has been denounced as unconstitutional, and leading to military tyranny and usurpation. But the situation of America is materially altered. Europe, after all her struggles for liberty, appears, at least for the present, to have settled in lassitude and submission, and the combined efforts of her coalised sovereigns are joined to keep her down. At the head of this great confederation, Britain stands pa- ramount. These powers, and Britain especially, view this country with jealous and hostile feelings, as still maintaining those principles which they have crushed every where else, as fostering them and keeping them alive, perhaps to their future ruin. Britain, besides, %ars for her naval ascendency and commercial monopoly, from our rising trade and improving navy. Under all these circumstances, we I PREFACE. ▼ii cannot doubt, that if it is not in her power to destroy America^ to overturn her government and constitu- tion, break her union, and reach to the sources of her prosperity, she will, at least, supported by the whole coalition, endeavour to put a stop to her fur- ther progress. Before the late wars and revolutions which have changed the whole face of Europe, the military in- stitutions of England were little superior to those of America ; a fact of which our people, who are too apt to take all their notions of that country from its own writers, are not sufficiently aware. This is well known to all military writers in Europe; it would lead us, however, too far to prove it by examples and illus- trations. But during the course of these wars, the whole character of her policy, government and con- stitution,has been gradually altered; she has aseumed another ground amongst nations, and has become a formidable military power. To develop and illustrate this change, to dispel the dangerous illusions which our success in the last war has spread through the people, to prove that inuch more powerful means may and probably will be directed against us on the next occasion, such is the object of the first part of this work. To prove that our present means of defence would be totally inadequate to resist such an attack ; that they im- periously require to be improved, organized and augmented, and that our liberties can run no dan- ger from such improvements on a moderate but suf- ficient scale, such is the object of the second. 1 am aware that many of the opinions which I have expressed, will not at first view be popular; some mm ▼m PREFACE. ti of our institutions I have considered as faulty, some measures as ill directed and ill organized; the conduct of some portions of the nation, of powerful parties and corporate bodies, 1 have blamed on several oc- casions, and even considered some of those national triumphs on which our people pride themselves, as useless and unprofitable. But how should a good citizen serve his country ? Is it by flattery and decla- matioh ? encouraging the people in a false and over- weening opinion of their own force ? undervaluing that of their enemies? disguising to them every wholesome truth, and inspiring them with a vain con- fidence, the sure forerunner of disaster and defeat ? Must he forever cry, we are the first, the most en- lightened, the most instructed, the bravest people in the world ; our laws, establishments and institu- tions are all faultless ; our militia, an army of citi- zens and freemen, is irresistible ; our navy superior to all navies, and able to crush every opposition.— We need no instruction, we need no improvement ? In a republic, where no operation can be under- taken by the government without the consent and approbation of the people, deceptions of such a nature are peculiarly mischievous and impolitic. It is the glorious, but sometimes inconvenient privi- lege of a repubhc, that its government cannot cover its operations with darkness and mystery. They must be explained; they must be open as the day, that the people may judge of them. This must be my justification to those who would accuse me of exposing our weak points to the enemy. The peo- ple must know what kind of danger renders such and such measures necessary ; what evils they tend ty, some conduct I parties eral oc- national [nselves, I a good d decla- nd over- rvaluing n every ^ain con- defeat ? most en- t people . institu- of citi- superior sition. — ement ? e under- sent and such a litic. It nt privi- ot cover . They the dav, must be ie me of 'he peo- ers such hey tend PREFACE. ix to correct : they must know what points are v/eak, either in their territory, their institutions, or theiv cstabhshraents, l?f'ore they will let them be strength- ened at their expense. r have little to add about myself and my mo- tives for writing this work. Brought to this coun- try in my infancy, by my father, an exile and a martyr in the cause of liberty, my earliest recol- lections were associated with the name of America. Returned to settle in it as a citizen, under the hos- pitable protection of its laws and constitution, 1 am studying those laws and that constitution since nearly three years, with increasing c^nelight and ad- miration. My hopes and views are confined to the honest independence which I may acquire by per- sonal exertions at the bar, as soon as the period comes round which has been fixed by the wisdom of our legislature, for every foreigner to become ac- quainted with our manners and institutions, and to depose the leaven of national feelings, animosities and prejudices, before he becomes entitled to the rights and privileges, and before he is called upon to practise the duties of an American citizen. I can therefore have no other motive in writing thig Essay, than the desire of exposing whatever Ithink conducive to the benefit of my adopted country. Reared in the military schools of France, where every thing relative to military instruction had been carried to perfection, I afterwards served three cam- paigns under Napoleon, as an officer of light cavalry and as a staff officer. I have been several times employed in the raising, organizing, and instructing of new corps. Acquainted therefore with the military PREFACE. institutions of that country, which have served as models to those of ail Europe, I claim f me right of understanding the subject of which I treat. Before I conclude, J must claim some indulgence for defects of style. The English language is ill adapted to write on military subjects ; it is remark- bly deficient in military technical expressions, cor- responding to those of the Frencli. I have perhaps insisted too much upon elementary notions and prin- ciples, but they appeared to me to be little known to the generality of the people. The same ideas, the same v.ords are repeated perhaps too frequent- ly ; someiimes for the sake of clearness, sometimes from the necessity of recurring to the same idea in the course of argument, and inculcnting it more strong- ly. But if my meaning is always plain, and easily u?iderstood, I shall be satisfied; and if tlie !nattcr of Ihe work be approved of, I hope that the form and matjncr will be excuf^ed. as CHAPTER J. .i brief Analysis of the Causes which have changed England from a free Nation into a great Military Power, and of her Military Improvements, A. French engineer of distinguished talent, Chevalier Dupin, has lately travelled through England to exaniine into the pre- sent state of her military establishments. The view which that able officer has given of her recent military improve- ments, and of the immense means of hostility collected in her arsenals, is calculated to inspire every reflecting mind with the most awful forebodings. — (1) vide note 1. However selfish her policy may have been, however offensive her pride, whatever evils she may have inlicted upon him- self, or upon his country, still every friend of reason, justice, and liberty, must confess that the world owes incalcu- lable benefits to England. Her constkution, however im- perfect and overpraised, afforded the first model of a liberal government, sanctifying the individual rights and the indi- vidua' independence of man. English principles, and Eng- lish laws, laid the foundation of American freedom. To see that country rapidly exchanging the character o( a free na- tion for that of a military power, must strike even her great- est enemies with melancholy reflections. The causes of this unfortunate change are easily traced. — When France, towards the conclusion of the last century, broke the shackles of a weak and vicious government, tho jealous selfishness of England took the alarm ; some states- men may have perceived and justly feared, that France, de- livered from its feudal trammels, would soon have eclipsed Chaf. I. 12 I England ; the short-sighted and bigoted hatred of the common people did not look so far, and they were more honest in their open aversion. But the cry that France must be put down, and government strengthened for that purpose, was nearly univer- sal. The generous voice of the few who sympathised with the cause of liberty in every part of the world, was drowned by the general clamour, and all opposition to government be- came unpopular. Europe was paid, was armed by England, and from the Caucasus to the pillars of Hercules, torn from her foundations and hurled upon France. Inexperienced in the formation and march of a free government, the French on their side were obliged to forego their attempts for establish- ing it on a tirm and regular foundation ; terror at such a uni- versal attack forced them alsotOb*^rengthen tlieirexecutive,and the crimes of Robespierre and ihe jacobins, and the mihtary reign of Napoleon, were thus brought, were even forced on by the efforts of England and continental Europe, to crush the rising liberties of France. (i But these efforts soon recoiled upon themselves. When France was forced to become a military nation, she found in her old establishments and institutions a strength which the world had not foreseen. She possessed the only corps of scientific engineers and the best artillery in Europe, her ar- senals were provided on the grandest scale, a triple line of fortresses, the eternal monuments of Vauhan's genius, cover- ed her frontiers, and all these establishments had been foster- ed and improved with constant care since the age of Louis XIV. The inexperience and indocility of her troops, was almost compensated by their enthusiastic valour; the science of war and of tactics had been a subject of study and medi- tation to her officers for two centuries, and after some defeats, they were able to face, to beat, to conquer all their enemies. Europe was subdued ; a splendid despotism, from Uus<*ia to Spain, erected on the ruins of those powers who well de- served thoir fate, and the face of affairs so reversed, ihat England, in her turn, had to stand alone, the combined hos- tilitv of the world. I n Chap. i. She was saved by lier naval force, anil insular situation, and her people certainly displayed a constancy which, had the origin of the contest been of a purer and more liberal nature, would have reflected immortal glory on her name. But the cry fo/ strengthening the government was stronger than ever, the most alarming encroachments upon the liberty of the subject and purity of the constitution, were viewed with indifference — the end sanctified the means. The go- vernment availed itself fully of the occasion, and laid the foundation of a military despotism, perhaps as formidable to the exterior, but certainly as well calculated to overpower all opposition of the people at home, as that of the great ruler of France. The faults of Napoleon, that cooled the French in his cause, and inspired the subject nations with the desire and hope of retrieving their liberty; his disasters in 1812 and 1813, the combined efforts of Europe, at length overturned his colossal power, and closed at least for the present the bloody and brilliant scene of the revolution. And what has been the result ? England, like France, has become a military power ; she has subverted her rival, and crowned her arms with military fame. But she has lost, perhaps irretrievably lost, that character and those institu- tions which made her greatness and her glory. Or rather under an improved form and better auspices, they have emi- grated acrofis the Atlantic. The world in general is scarcely yet aware of the total change which has taken place in the character of England, in her constitution, and in the relative rank which she holds amongst nations. Englatul was a rich, industrious, free and enlightened country; her manufactures, trade and agricul- ture were equally flourishing, and she was strong by her navy, her opulence, and the proud, firm and independent character of her people. Her army was insignificant both in its num- bers and (|uahty, (2) vide note 2; but the bravery and pa- triotism cf her citijsens 8ecure,° ^'^J' ™ ' ^ t"« are fast losing, and becauu ,ke n..n. '"f "^;{;"' ^T' is cn(«rmg « compMion with Ihn.s, and re,«.« to 6e «Wp(. Such is the present situation of England, such is the result o the old clamour of the infatuated people, France must be pu down covornment must he strengthened. Francehasbeenput down', and England ,s reduced, at leas., at home, very ncariy oZ' situation of France some tm,e h.fore the -voh, ,on O. the ruins of her independence and ol her 1'™"? <=> '» "^f ,„i;f.r.n nf thr rxccutivc power ana miiitaiy the enormous eclilice oi iiu, uaci^uh*^ i • r despo ism. But the world, we n.peat it, and the people <>t America in particular, are not aware on what a nuhtary power that despotism is founded-nor of the complete chanm£$limk 17 Ch AP. I. S The uniform has become fashionable and honourable, in a country where no drum was allowed to be beaten in the city of London, and every young man, if he does not enter the army or navy, aspires at least to belong to some mihtia, volunteer or yeomanry corps. 2d. That military services are become the surest road to titles, honours and dignities. A number of peerages have been distributed in the army, and the order of the Bath, or- ganized on the model of the legion of honour ; an innovation for which Walpole or North might have lost their heads. 3d. The composition of the army has been greatly ame- liorated. The venality which disgraced the administration of the Duke of York in the time of the famous Mrs. Clarke has been corrected. Although promotions by purchase or family interest still exist in the subaltern ranks, yet a number of able officers have riaen by service or seniority m the last war, and the government has an ample choice of subjects to fill all high and commanding posts, '"he artillery and engi- neers will hereafter be exclusively recruited with instructed officers from the military schools. The discipline, the arma- ment of the troops, their clothing and equipment, have been equally amehorated on the model of the French array. 4th. A good staff has been organized. That servfce was in its infancy in Britain at the beginning of the war, and was organized in its present form by some French emigrant offi- cers, Messrs. Tromelin, Phelippeaux, kc. That stalF is care- fully maintained. 5th. It may be seen from the work of Mr. Dupin, with what sedulous care and attention the British government maintain and improve all their military and naval establishments, how they have organized and keep in readiness for action the most complete, effective, and numerous materiel, that was 3 I J Chap. i. 18 11 In ever possessed by a military power, and what importance they attach to the diffusion and improvement of mihtary edu- cation, principally in the corps of their engmeers and artillery. This improvement can scarcely yet be perceived. Many years must elapse after the creation of military schools^ before their influence can be felt in the army. The old offi- cers, however uninstructed and inefficient, cannot be displaced to put young men in their room. The polytechnic school in France has scarcely yet exerted a sensible influence on the improvement of those branches of the military pro- fession, which it was destined to recruit, and which indeed were already carried to a high state of perfection before the revolution by the fostering care of the government since the days of Louis XIV. The British engineers, on the contrary, ranked very low in the estimation of the best judges, but their government is forming the elements of a new corps in their military schools. Their artillery is better. 6th. Although the British government have disbanded some corps of infantry and cavalry which they can easily recruit again ; although to satisfy the clamours of the reformers and economize their finances, they may disband some more, yet they carefully keep up their military institutions, and a mass of troops sufficient to awe any opposition at home, and in ca«^c of war, to embody in their ranks any number of recruit* and communicate to them their spirit and their discipline. 1 do not exactly know the present force of the British army. But without including their colonial service in the East Indies, in Africa and America, 1 believe the whole mass of their European troops of all kinds, will not be found under 200 battalions of foot and 200 squadrons of horse, a force more than sufficient for these purposes. And if the exclusive devo- tion of these troops to the government that pays them, and from which thny expect recompenses and promotion, if their total inditterence to public spirit and patriotism be doubted, let it be remembered hozo cusilif thci/ have been turmd ovf against the people an rccmt occasion^' J^M^& BBsSEa&k"a 19 Chap. 1. portance tary edu- iers and erceived. f schools^ e old offi- displaced ic school uence on tary pro- ;h indeed lefore the since the contrary, but their )S in their ided some ly recruit rmers and more, yet nd a mass le, and in )f recruit-s discipline, tish army, i^ast Indies, is of their under 200 brce more isivedevo- them, and n, if their e doubled, turned ovf '■I 1 ■i 1 However strongly the power of the British government may be built '^n such an army, and on such a navy, they do not exclusively rely upon them. In the first place the very abuses of their administration, its prodigality, and the num- ber of people who live en the interest of the national debt, have intimately connected with their cause a great mass of the population, who must stand or fall with them. The ramifications of political corruption reach to the lowest ranks of society. In the next place, the splendour and brillian- cy of their successes have attached to ^hem a numerous class, who forget the loss of their liberty, dazzled by the external glory to which the British name has been raised. With a parliament composed, organized and drilled as the British parliament is at this day ; with such a mass of ready instru- ments in such a needy and unprincipled popuiation ; with «uch an army and such a navy at the disposition of govern- ment, what is become of English liberty ? It is time for other nations to look to theirs. For what will that government do with the military force and spirit which they have created. France was obliged, in the same circumstances, to keep her army employed in foreign war and conquest. Let it not be imagined that the financial embarrassments of Britain will prevent her from following that course. Whatever be the distress of the people, whatever ruin war may bring upon them, the government are taking another ground, and render- ing themselves independent of its support. If they create so numerous a class, exclusively devoted to their interests ; if they can only secure enough to pay and maintain a force that will keep down the people, what need the ministry care for their murmurs, their distress, and their ruin. When their army ac- quires the same superiority over the other armies of Europe •which the French possessed in the time of Napoleon ; when their navy surpasses the collected naval force of the rest of the world, they need no longer subsidize foreign nations ; they can even abridge their means and liberty, their industry and trade, draw contributions from them, and support their oivn forces at ^heir ospcns?.— (3) vide note 3. Chap. i. 20 p.; i i This forced, artificial and unnatural situation <^-"n'>t bow- .ZJ DesDotism and corruption universally pro- "r dlv ''in Sg liberty and her principles, England SoDorted by force, and must fall some day or other by the supported oy , ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ,^^ r„„. wben it was always HnUed wHH <^J^;^-J< ^^:,^, r s;,:: i/:Xeof';'';rts;oU .topped ^.th go.d l,.med with brass and iron, but reposes on a fo;'"'J»"°" "J Td a^d of clay. When founded only on a m-Ma^ "- however excellent, numerous and well appomted, ever. However eic , f fortune. An awful eJiam- situation of England in such a ease •, her r.ches, her mdn=try^ --rranrcr;fe:Tosn-^^^^^^^^^ „ce Ld industry in England , but, - '» F-"";^ ; ^ „f „„.,lltic8 will have been exclusively applied to the service oi r government, or all who join talent to honesty will have emigrated long before. How much more respectable was the name of England, how much more solid her power, when with a small army, a ta«™carcelv equal to that of the Dutch, but a government trnrby he support of a free, enet^etic, and enlightened ^op^cshe stood Ihebulwark of European liberty, against the ambit!;, of Louis XIV. Under .11 her apparent greatne^. ■he is really weaker in the love of her people for the.rcountry, t their moral courage and principle, than she was thirty year. f 21 Chap. t how- y pro- ngland langed lie and and re- )nly be by the le con- irname justice nezzar, h gold, ition of Y force, , every il exam- such an II be the industry, r people jple, and There is alent, of all these 9rvice of will have England, 11 army, a ivernment ilightened igainst the greatness, lircountry, hirty yearff ago. Thus, when the powei* of Napoleon stretched from Cadiz to Moscow, when a million of armed veterans stood at his command, and the treasures of Europe were at his disposal, France was really weaker, as was proved by the event, than when confined between Belgium and the Pyrenees, divided at home, without an army, without a navy, without finances, al* most without a government ; but animatf by the young en- thusiasm of hope, and the love of liberty. But it must be remembered, that before the catastrophe of Moscow, the power of Napoleon had repeatedly crushed all opposition from the frontiers of Spain to those of Russia. It had risen co it?? acmfe, just before its fall, and no human foresight could have fixed the moment of its decline. In the same way England can do incalculable mischief in the world before she falls. It behoves America, for her own sake, for the sake of that world, where she stands the last and only asylum of liberty and of its friends and martyrs in every country; the sanctuary, where the flame of freedom is yet cherished and kept alive, to watch the progress and march of this great power, a power infinitely greater than that of Napoleon. The jealousy of England is chiefly directed against her. The English know right well, that their naval supremacy, on which their greatness depends, has ultimately more to fear from America, than from the r.jst of the world. They cannot reach to the sources of her prosperity, nor finally prevent her progress ; it depends on causes which it is not in the power of England, nor even of man, to change ; on her geographical position, her immense territory, her free government, and the enlightened character of her people. But they can stop it for a time ; they can give it severe checks, and it behoves' America to stand upon her guard. To prove these positions, to show the necessity of organizing an efficient defensive force in America, and to point out some Chap. i. 22 11 of the principles on which such a force should he founded, such are the objects of the present Essay. I am aware ihat the very examples which I have just quoted, of France and of England, whc both lost their liberties by over-augmenting that military force, which they had been obliged to raise for purposes of self-defence; I am aware that these example* may be turned against me, and that they have excited a very just and proper alarm in this free country. But that the situa- tion of America is radically diflferent from that of France or England, and that her mihtary force, founded on differer* principles, and diflferently composed and organized, can nev. * endanger her liberties, even when improved and strengthened so as to protect her effectually, I shall also endeavour to prove. in I i?fj*sy^rflr^i^? CHAPTER 11. Hefutaticn of the popular opinion of the Americans concerning the late war — Military Analysis of that mar, and of the prin- ciples on which it was conducted. Before we enter into a review of the defensive preparations which are become requisite in this country, to guard against the overgrown power of Britain, it will be necessary to correct some erroneous estimations of our actual strength, grounded on our success in the last war. ** Whatever be the resources of England, we need not fear her;'' such is the popular and common cry, " We fairly tried, and repelled them." But, if success, and even glorious success, in a noble cause, inspires us with too much presumption, and too great a confidence in our own means; if it makes us undervalue those of our ene- mies, it is sometimes more mischievous than a defeat. Far be it from me to detract from the just fame of those brave soldiers, who so proudly supported the honour of the American flag. Their success was as glorious as it was unex- pected by the rest of the world ; it gave a great check to the presumption of Britain, and taught her to estimate at a higher rate, the means and character of America. But the military forces of Britain are improved, and are still improving since that time, and during that war she did not really exert them, as we shall prove by a short analysis. In hazarding, however, an opinion upon the mihtary operations of the British and American an. s, I necessarily speak with diffidence. Em- ployed in activ service in the distant wars of Europe, which engaged all my feelings and attention at the time, I cannot pretend to judge of the local and political interests which 54 111. Chap. ii. 24 may have swayed the governments and chiefs on either .jde. To' hole who'were atl distance and not i" the secret the.r movements ppeared strange and unsystematical ; hut 1 can onlypretend to ground my opinions upon pubhc documents, and geographical positions. When the American war broke out, the vast edifice of the French empire, that menaced the very existence of Br^am, was beginning to give way. and the nat.ons of Europe to e in arms and assist in ovedurning it: they all required Bnti.h ubsidies, andall the energy at.d inspiration that Britain codd give to them (4) mdenoleA-, her armies, gradually formed dunng the Spanish war, were poured in the peninsula or m Belgium to join in the contest; her navy, roling from the Baltic to he Mediterranean, not only enforced a strict blockade round the French dominions, but formed a line of communication, to connect every attack, and convey troops, stores, and ammu. nition to e- ery point at once, from Venice and Sicily, to Kiga, Hamburgh, and Holland. When, under these circumstances, Z resolution of the Americans was known, the British cabi- net could scarcely be persuaded, that their long patience under insults and injuries of al! kiads, was at length subdued, or that they would declare war upon Britain at the very moment in which the .cale was turning in her favour. Her colonies in America were quite unprovided ; a few battalions of regulars with the Canadiau militia, whose tidelity wavered, were the only defence of her northern possessions, a few frigates blockaded the coast, from the station of Halifax, and pressed by closer and more important cares in Europe, she could spare but a very small proportion of her means to occupy the Americans at home. The inferiority of these forces obliged the English to stand on the defensive in Canada, whilst then frigates might operate some diversions on the coast of the United States. In this they were singularly assisted by the geographical character of that country, and the unwillingness with which the New England states appear to have entered la. (he contest. ^■' I 25 CiTAP. 11. jr side. it, their t I can iiments, ; of the Britain, e to rise I British in could d during Belgium, ic to the jund the ation, to d ammu* , to Riga, nstances, tish cabi- patience subdued, the very ur. Her battalions wavered, IS, a few ilifax, and irope, she , to occupy ;es obliged /hilst their aast of the ted by the willingness entered ia- I The thinly scattered population of Canada is disseminaled on a long and single line from Lake Huron along the shores of Erie, Ontario and the St. Lawrence, to a little distance be- low Quebec. That country has but one open communica- tion with 13ritain, by the mouth of the last mentioned river, for though hereafter a communication may be opened with Hudson's Bay, the intervening country is at present desert, and no aiiiitary operation could be directed on that line. That communication is covered by the colonies of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Isle Royale, Cape Breton, which serve as advanced barriers and depots to the more im- portant province of Canada, and secured by its capital, Quebec, a regularly fortified city which stands at its only entry. All military means in men, arms, money, ammunition, stores of all kinds, must be conveyed through that city, and up the St. Lawrence to Montreal, before they can be distri- buted through the province. From Montreal PvfonHs a double communication, the one along the St. Lawrence to the Ontario,. the other up the Uta- was ; but I am ignorant how far the second, which is the great channel of the lur trade, may be used as a military commu- nication with Lake Huron. It would certainly be a very fa- tiguing route for an army to ascend its numerous rapids, draw- /ng or poling their boats all the way, against the current. From this simple view, it is evident that the object of every mvaderof Canada should be to sci/e upon Quebec or .Mon- treal, after which the rest of the province must fall of course. Quebec may be attacked by flailing up the St. Lawrence (tins was the route pursued by Wolfe in 17.09), or by descend- ing that river from Montreal, or by a difticult march .,p the Kennebeck, and through the desert which separates the district of Maine from Lower Canada. This was (ho route which the brave and then honest Arnold traced with such dorv and difficulty in 1776. ° ^ Montreal is still more immediatcl y exposed (oaltack, cither Chap. ii. 20 i;i lii by descending the St. Lawrence through the rapids, ffOM Brownsville and Sacket's Harbour (this was the route of Gen. Wilkinson in 1813), or by descending from Lake Cham- plain directly on the island in which it is situated (this was the route of Lord Amherst in 1760, and of Montgomery in 1775). Montreal is not fortified, and Quebec is not calculated to make a long and serious defence against a regular attack, scientifically conducted. From the same view, it is apparent, that the object of the possessors of Canada, unless they have a great superiority of forces, will always be to turn the direction of war out of that channel and transfer it to the lakes and back settlements of the Americans. Thus did the marquis of Montcalm, the ablest general that ever fought in America, operate in 1756 and 1757. The British forces in Canada were very insigni- ficant in the last war. They would have been overwhelmed by a direct attack, on that plain and simple line of operations which is indicated by the nature of the country, the example of preceding generals, and the expedition planned by Wash- ington at the very beginning of the revolutionary war; hosti- lities would have been closed on (lie northern frontier in a few weeks, and it would be worth comparing the probable ex- pense both of blood and of treasure, which such an expedi- tion mi'^lit have cost, with what was expended in tho thre^ campaigns of lOli, 1013, and 1814. IVhj this was not done, must have been from local and po- litical reasons, of which a military writer cannot pretond to judge. Perhaps from the fear of hurting the prospects and in- terests of some slates who apprehended that the St. Lawrence miyht afford a new channel for the products of the west ; perhaps, from the fear of drawing on America the whole force of r.ritain,a part of the nation may have been averse to the con- quest of Canada. It appears, besides, that America was as unprepared for the content as liritain. After thirty years of peace, there existed no military establishments nor iuBlitutions 27 Chap. ii. iU that country ; an army was hastily formed and organized at great expense, but generals, officers, men, and administra•^ tors were equally inexperienced. Before they could be armed, equipped, disciplined and put in motion, the govern- ment was obliged to rely upon the voluntary exertions of the people. Unfortunately the eastern states, whose local situation, numerous, hardy and active population, and well appointed militia, would have enabled them to have made the most effectual exertions on the most essential point, re- fused to co-operate in the cause of their countrymen, and the people of the western states, Pennsylvania, and New- York, were the only portion of the nation on whom the government could rely for prompt and voluntary aid. In consequence, the Americans were obliged to follow the lead of the enemy, and pursue the very march which he designated to them ; attack his line at its very extremity, and proceed down step by step. It is evident that they must thereby have found him stronger and stronger at every post, and during so long and tedious a march through so wretched a country, afford him full time to receive all his reinforcements. That to make them follow this course was the plan of the British commanders in Canada during the two first campaign^ of 1812 and 1813, a short analysis of these campaigns will demonstrate. Although they were not men of distinguished reputation, their conduct of the war does credit to their military iews and capacity. Whilcthcy amused the Ameri- can government with negotiations, their first step was to des- patch Colonel Proctor, \vithasmall corps of regulars, to raise the militia of IJpprr Canada an^ nvade the territory of Michi- gan, whilst aiioliicr corps was sent by Lake Huron to carry Michilimakinac. Fleets wore equipped on (he lakes, and all the N. W. Indians roused to arms; an operation premedita- ted and preconcerted long before, by intrigues with their chiefs and prophets, especially wilh the celebrated Tccumseh. The Americans, on their side, with an army raised in Ohio, inva- ded Upper Canada, but after displacing a great deal of use- Chap. ii. 2« iH^^ I less and misdirected valour, were attacked at Detroit by an inferior force, and from the inconceivable weakness or cow- ardice of their chief, General Hull, laid down their arms and surrendered the whole territory of Michigan. The western states were laid open to the merciless ravages of a savage enemy. These misfortunes were at length redeemed by the bravery and good conduct of Generals Harrison, Cass, John- son, Governor Shelby of Kentucky (whose patriotic devo- tion deserves to be eternally recorded by a grateful country), by the valour of the young and heroic Croghan, the naval vic- tory of the immortal Perry, and the spirit of the people of the western states, who rose en masse to repel the invaders. The Americans recovered Michigan, obtained complete pos- session of Lake Erie, destroyed their Indian foes, conquered a portion of Upper Canada, and repelled the British to Lake Ontario and the Niagara frontier. These exploits were glo- rious, no doubt, but what did they cost, and what was their result. To protect against 2000 or 3000 British and Indians, a vast country, containing several hundred thousand souls, two armies were raised at the most extravagant expense (for in valuing the cost of a militia army, we should include the loss of time, of professional duties, the private costs of each man) ; one was annihilated, and all its stores, artillery, and ammtuiition, were lost ; a fleet was built on the lakes. Two whole campaigns, from July, inV2, to November, 1813, were spent in accomp/ishing thfse objects imperfectly, for at the conclusion of the second campaign, Upper Canada was evacuated and Michilimakinac was not even recovered. The British, on their side, by that able diversion, at the sli-rhtest possible trouble and expense, not only threw the whole western territory into a most dreadful state of alarm and confusion, and put the whole nation to a very great ex- pense, but drew all the forces and attention of the Americans from the real and proper object of their attack to the most distant point. Their system was, what we call in the military hn^uau'e of Kurope, an offensive defence. Unable to make 2d Chap. ii. any powerful impression on the territory of an enemy much superior to them in strength and resources, their object was to make him waste that strength and exhaust those resources on points of no importance, and prevent him from closing with them in those where the contest would have been deci- ded at once. at the The state of New- York had also entered with activity in the war. From 1812, the American forces, collected on Niagara river, made, during the rest of the season, several very ill-directed attempts to land on the other side. The conduct of the militia gave an additional proof, if any were wanted, of the inefficiency of such troops to stand a whole campaign in the field. (1) In 1813 mutual surprises and small affairs of no importance occupied both parties till the month of November. But in those affairs the Americans were acquiring experience and steadiness, and displayed a great deal of firmness and valour in the combats of York, Sacket's Harbour, Stony-Creek, &;c. All this valour was however uselessly displayed, and the expenditure in men and money, the efforts made by land and water to obtain pos- session of the lakes and rivers of Upper Canada, were thrown away in a wrong direction. For what purpose the Americans showed themselves so eager to obtain possession of that Niagara frontier during the whole war, is difficult to guess. It secured no military advantages whatsoever, and without the possession of the lake, did not even cover New- York ai;ainst invasion. The Biitish very willingly and pro- perly endeavoured to fix their attention upon U, and disputed itovfirand over with the greatest animosity and perseve- rance. It is to be remarked, that both in 181 ;J and 1814 the Americans evacuated the British lines voluntaril}, after ob- taining possession of them at a great cost of blood and treasure. In November, 1813, General Wilkinson invaded Lower (l)Vi(le on (liHl .subject, WasLingtoii's It>Uerii, in every page ottiiein, ..... J, .,, ?nri« -. •" Chap. ii. 30 i^'i Canada. I cannot pretend to judge of the causes from whence his two expeditions failed in 1813 and 1814; his ad- ministrative service must have been very imperfectly orga- nized, and have delayed and tmbarrassedall his movements. But these expeditions were certainly the only offensive ope- rations undertaken during the whole war with a proper mih- tary object in view. The possession of Lower Canada se- cures the possession of Upper Canada ; but after the much more difficult conquest of Upper Canada, Lower Canada remains to be subdued. The forces which had fought on the Petroit and Niagara frontiers were collected for that expedi- tion, and afterwards divided between Plattsburg and Niagara. To conclude the abstract of these two campaigns, we shall observe, that in the south the Indians were roused to arms, through the connivance of the Spanish government ol Florida and the intrigues of the British, with the view ol alarming the western states, keeping them occupied at home, and putting them to as muchtrouble andexpenseontheirsouth- ern frontier, as they had been put to on their northern frontier in the beginning of the war. This diversion proved useful to America in the end, as during the arduous struggle which it occasioned, that army and that general, whose untutored but vigorous genius decided the last great victory of the Americans, acquired those habits of patience and discipline which secured it. The naval contests of the two nations do not properl> enter into my subject. I shall only observe, tiint the British government had greatly undervalued the naval means ol America, and the courage and talents of her officers and seamen. Their force was in consequence insufficient for blockading the coast, and Hull, Rogers, Porter, Decatur, Jones, &c. were crowned with glory at the very outset of the war. Animated by their example, the American privateers swarmed over the ocean, their flag was victorious on every sea, and they did real and great mischief to Ihe trade of Eusland= even on her own proud coasts. The fame of the 31 Chap. ii. ises from ; his ad- tly orga- vements. sive ope- )per mili- ainada se- he much r Canada ;ht on the t expedi- Niagara. , we shall [ to arms, iment of ; view ol I at home. icirsoiUh- n frontier ed useful ;gle which untutored ry of the disciplinf' properl> he British means of ficers and Jicient for Decatur, tsel of the privateers on every le trade of me of the American navy was ably supported during the whole war, by the brave and unfortunate Lawrence, and a crowd of other heroes. In 1813 the British began to be aware of the importance of the contest; they blockaded the American harbours, but could not prevent our privateers from fre- quently slipping out and severelv annoying their trade. A small armament sailed up the Chesapeak, audits piratical de- predations will long be remembered in this country. They put the Americans to great trouble and expense, in guardmg the long and indented coast of tnat bay, where every point is equally exposed to the attack of a central enemy. But the brutality and ferocity of their conduct at Hampton, Elk- town, and Havre de Grace, forms a strong contrast with the generous and humane spirit which was uniformly displayed by the 'Americans. At the close of 1 8 14, the war took another character. The fall of Napoleon enabled England to dispose of her naval and military forces, and turn her attention to America. But it must be observed, that to restore her finances, her trade and manufactures, to put some order in heradministration, to guard against popular discontents and satisfy the popular clamour, now as loud against war as it was formerly in its favour, a uni- versal peace, at least for some time, was become necessary. In fact, negotiations had already begun with America for that purpose, and the congress of Ghent was opened m August to settle its conditions. As both parties had agreed to waive the discui^sion of some delicate points, no material difficulty could arise in the course of these debates. But the trade of England had sulTered severely, her arms h.id received some checks, her naval charactcrwasdiminished, and she wished, before the conclusion of peace, to stnke some severe blows, retrieve the credit of the war, terrify Uie Ameri- cans by a display of the mischief which she might do, chastise what she termed thoir prosumpliou, and, perhaps, (orce upon Chap. ii. 3-2 m 1 1; m I them scmo harder conditions of peace. The British vveii; not aware that, during the war, several brave and able generals had been formed on the American side, that the troops of the republic had acquired a great deal of steadiness and discipline : they undervalued the strength of their enemy, an erroi- which will probably not be repeated. At the same time, by a very impolitic measure, they extended their hostilities to the New England states, which they had cautiously sparer', till that mo- ment. By these ill-timed measures, they began to offend even their partisans, and more signal insults soon roused against them every American spirit, and destroyed, it is hoped for ever, their influence on a-.y part of the American population. From thirty to forty thousand men, between May and Octo- ber, were successively despatched and collected in Halifax, Canada, Bermuda, Jamaica, kc. to invade the most distant pomts of the American territory. There was no concert between these expeditions, they had no views of settlement or conquest; their only object was to plunder, ravage, and destroy. In July, hostilities recommenced with fresh vigour on the Niagara frontier; the forces on both sides varied be- tween 2000 and 5000 men, but if the contest appears unim- portant, both from the smallness of these forces, and the little possible result of any operations in that quartpr. it was highly creditable to the spirit of the American troops, and of their brave commanders, Brown, Scott. M'Ree, Ripley,Porter, Miller, Jessup, &ic. who displayed equal energy and forlitude' • n the battles of Chippeway, Niagara, and (he brilliant sortie of Fort Krie, which concluded the campaign. At the close of the season, both parties resumed their former stations, and Uie Americans again evacuated the .hitish territory. In .September, the mass of the British forces in Canada amounlmg to 14000 men, descended on Plattsburg: probably with the MOW of destroying the military stores of the Ame- ricans, and ravaging the country as for as Albany; for asnosi- •miKaaeous attack was directed against New- York, it does not 33 Ohap. u. appear that they intended to pursue the course in which Bur- goyne lost his army, in 1777. Whatever were these views, they were defeated by the glorious victory of Commodore Macdonough, and the brave resistance of General Macomb. The total destruction of their fleet rendered their farther progress impracticable, and they retreated in confusion and disorder before a handful of miHtia. In August, the small armament that had committed with impunity such ravages in the Chesapeak, was reinforced by Admiral Cochrane, and General Ross; the defeat of the Ame- ricans, at Bladensburgh, afforded a new example of the in- sufficiency of militia to stand in the field against the manoeu- vres of regular troops ; the destruction of Washington was a wanton i^isult, which rendered more service to the American cause than a victory. The attack on Baltimore could have no object but plunder and devastation, and its failure closed the war in that quarter. The troops employed in that dis- graceful service, were then directed to co-operate in the grand and final attack on New-Orleans. That the British, by these expeditions, only intended to chastise the Americans before the conclusion of peace, by the destruction of their chief cities, and the devastation of their private property, is proved by the fact, that peace was actually signed at Ghent, on the 24th December, 1814. only one day after che first attack of General Jackson on the British van- guard, and without any reference to the New-Orleans expe- dition. This expedition was fortunately as ill conducted in its execution, as cruel and infamous in its purpose. Tiie point of attack was ill selected ; an overwhelming force moved for- wards with such slow, cautious, and timid steps, that time was given for the Americans to make their preparations. The decided, intrepid character of the American general, his good selection of the point of defence, the judgment he showed in throwing up intrenchments before his inexperienced troops, theskillof the cannoneers, the paiient, cool, and firm valour of 6 I IT .'HAP. II. 34 \^ 1 ! !) ,'i ill the Tennessee volunteers, formed in a laborious and severe warfare with the Indians, the patriotic bravery and enthusiasm of the less experienced militia, the sure aim of the rifles, and the presumption of the enemy, whose last attack was as rash as his former movements had been tedious and dilatory, did the rest. Above all, that ruling providence, which, on this occasion, protected the cause of freedom and justice, against ra- pine and violence, decided the victory, and closed the eventful history of the wat, by this signal triumph. From the review of this whole war, it cannot be too strong- ly insisted upon — 1st. That during the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and the be- ginning of 1814, the English, who had very few forces in America, and could not spare more, endeavoured only to ha- rass the Americans on as many points as possible, and make them expend their blood and treasure on objects of no im- portance. 2d. That when they seriously took the ofleusive in 1814, thry had already decided on a peace, which was necessary to them, and only aimed at deterring the Americans from another contest, by first making them feel the evils of war. But they took no measures for making a deep or permanent im- pression on the country. #^ 3d. That they were not aware of llie excellent quality of the American navy, of the improvements which had taken place in their army during the war, nor of the spirit and rr sources of the country in general, and had formed an erro- neous and exaggerated idea of its party divisions. Their last expeditions were generally ill planned and ill conducted. i:i 4th. That their cflbrtt. in the last war are therefore not to be taken as the measure of their strength. They know at present, they feel the importance of America ; they are awarf 35 Chap. if. that she is rapidly growing their rival on the seas, and sup- planting them with still greater advantages in commerce. They are aware that in a few years it will be out of their power to put her down. We may depend, there- fore, that with a better knowledge of the country and of its resources, with an improved army and a much greater dis- play of forces, as soon as they are freed from embarrassments at home, and at liberty to exert all their means, they will seize the first occasion, and leave nothing untried to put a stop to the progress of America, wound her in the jnost vital parts, and crush her rising prosperity. That such an object, however painful it may be to the proud feel- ings of a patriot to acknovledsje its practicability, however painful to a philosopher and philantbropist to think that it could even be conceived, that such an object has been tried, is still pursued, and is not absolutely unattainable, we shall endeavour to prove in the next chapter. And whether, in such a case, it will be prudent in America to remain in the same unguarded state in which she was at the beginning of the last war, when England had no means to assail her, we will leave to the judgment of erery reflecting American. CHAPTER in •r ' h\:ll Development of the principles on which the next contest ht- tween England and America will probably be conducted, and of the chief objects which Britain will then seek to accom- plish. The result of tap. lasf war apppars to have lulled the Ameri- cans into a state of the most complete security and confi- dence. The general cry of Britain was, strengthen the go vernment and the army ; we have seen what it has led to m that country. The popular cry in America seems to be, weaken the government and disband the army. Whether the reverse of wrong is right, whether the military establish- ment of the United States can endanger the public liberty, or whether the principle of economy, and the jealousy which the individual states entertain of the patronage and ^-ower ol the central government, may not be carried so far as to en- danger that public liberty and the general safety, we shall ex- amine in another chapter. We shall content ourselves here with observing, that the army which had been raised and formed in the last wa has been disbanded, and that a constant outcry has been kept up ever since for reducing and even disbandmg entirely the small regular force which had been retained. England on her side has been silently and gradually im- proving her military knowledge and her military establish- ments. Her unexpected reverses in the last war have turned her most serious attention towards America. The other powers of Europe may fear her aggrandizement, but they fear still more the principles of republicanism, that have still m ".'* 37 Chap. m. an asylum in this country. As long as Britain maintains her present artificial and unnatural power, she must view Ameri- ca as her most dangerous enemy. She is aware that she un- dervalued its forces in the last war, and that her own expe» ditions were ill planned and ill conducted. Since the peace, a number of British military and naval officers and engineers have visited our frontiers in every direction, and under va- rious pretexts. The fact is notorious ; some of them I have met, and some of their statistical and military notes I have accidentally seen. Whether sent by their government or im- pelled by their own private zeal, to reconnoitre a country where they soon expert to be employed, the consequence^ are the same, and I am persuaded that there exists at this day in the British war office, as complete a series of military me- moirs on America as at Washington ; perhaps more complete, if we do not preserve with care such documents and mate- rials as we possess. That all that information and all those means will be directed against us on the first occasion, we cannot doubt. The last war was defensive on the part of England ; she had no object in view ; the next will be offen- sive, and with a view to break down the resources of Ameri- ca, so as to preclude the possibility of her entering again in competition with the power of Britain — her blows will be struck home and deep. Her first object will be to bring about, if possible, a sepa- ration of the states, and to break that union which constitutes their strength and their greatness— that union on which the character and the standing of America depend. There is scarc^'ly an individual, there is certainly no party amongst us where the mass of individuals would not shudder at the bare possibility of that separation, and of the consequent and in- fallible loss of our republican institutions and national inde- pendence. But all are not equally aware how the crafty and ambitious government of Britain, by heating their passions, fomenting their party feuds and divisions, encouraging their local feelings and interests, and entertaining their jealousy of I f n i Chap. in. 38 the federal administration, might gradually accustom their minds to the idea. Many there are, who think it hard that the local interests of" their states should be sacrificed for ge- neral measures, which perhaps they disapprove, and which may be very hurtful to those very interests ; many who think the separate means of such great portions of the empire as the eastern or western states, amply sufficient for their wants, wishes and defen-^e ; many, who young, ambitious and aspi- ring, despair of playing & part on the grand scene of the ge- neral union, and expect a freer sphere of action in these smaller republics. These people do not aim at a separation, they only wish to augment the indiridual independence and influence of their states. They are not aware, that in declaim- ing against the danger of usurpation at home, in weakening the central governmemt, in gradually dissolving the connect- ing links of feeling and interest between the different parts of the union, they are unconsciously aiding by that narrow and selfish policy, the ambitious designs of England. Divide et impera^ was ever the motto of all usurpers on the rights of a free people, and more especially of Englan 1. If we could doubt it in rhis country, let us remember her polKy in Europe, in France, in India ; let us remember the talc of Henry's ne- gotiations, in time of peace, in our own country, 2nd if any American could forget it, it should be repeated to him daily, taught to every infant with his earliest lessons, and insisted apon in every assembly of the people, in v\'ery discussion of every party. The fatal moment which divides the feelings and the inte- rests of the people of America, is the last of their liberty here, of their cot:sequenc«i abroad, of their republican institutions and of all their glorious results, plenty, freedom, and happiness at home, and an envied and respectable name in the rest of the world. Whatever dangers our liberties may run from on« good army, organized and directed by a firm general govern- ment, and knowing no enemies but the foreign invaders of the Mates, there is no doubt that as soon as two rival armies shall 9 39 Chap, hi. exist in America, with all the bitter raitcour of neighbouring enmity, the executive and the military will be strengthened on both sides, until, by conquest or usui^pation, one or two military monarchies be erected. This is confirmed by the universal experience of history : in that case, England will be freed from any danger of competition from America, for that country will have lost the principle of its strength. With such an object before them, we need not doubt that the British government will neglect nothing to bring it about ; they will foment our divisions, manage the interests of some states, and bear all their forces upon others, to crush them. The second object of England will be to destroy those naval and military establishments, which although yet in their infancy, bid fair hereafter to rival those of Britain ; to inflict deep and deadly wounds on those points where the wealth and industry of the nation are concentring ; to ruin its trade, destroy its shipping* and put the people to such trouble and expense, as besides loading them with taxes and making Ihem suffer all the ills of war, may deter them from ever renewing a contest with CJreat Britain, and disgust them perhap? with their government and institutions. The English have the example of the most free and celebrated nations of antiqui- ty, for believing that in a democracy the executive govern- ment is usually held responsible for all the sufferings and mis- fortunes of the people. It is not likely that, in order to accomplish this, they will venture any serious invasion into the interior of the con- tinent. In the first place, however exccllout and disciplined the troops employed on such a service might Ix-, they would infallibly be destroyed in detail, and the population is so dis- seminated in small towns, villages, farms and !i;imlets, that no particular point would be worth the loss and expense of such an expedition. The militia, in that case, in every wood, marsh ana passage, behind every hedge and every wall, with their known dexterity in Bharp-shooling, would be irresistibly Chap. iii. 10 H 1 destructive. In Canada, from the same reasons, they wouli probably adopt the same course of offensive defence, which they did in the last war ; transfer the scene of hostili- ties to the back countries ; rouse the Indians to an active diversion against the western states, and send a few auxiliaries by water, to support and lead them ; harass with savage war- fare the back parts of New- York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, and thus prevent the inhabitants of the interior from supporting those of the coast; renew a naval contest on the lakes, to divide the attention and the forces of the Americans, and put them to a useless and extravagant expense. They will consider themselves as gainers thereby, whatever be the result of that unimportant contest, in which victory will not even secure the conquest of Canada. Such may be their course in those quarters, but it is not there that they can expect to strike any deep or decisive blow. It is ou the coast, where the population, the naval and mili- tary establishments, the wealth, the trade and industry of the people are concentred, that such blows will be struck. What was the course pursued in the Peninsula by the Duke of Wellington ? Occupying the impregnable position of Alju- barota, he concentred behind it all his means, formed his army and organized its service ; in front his intrenchments defied all the efforts of the enemy ; behind, lay the city. uid harbour of Lisbon, open to all the supplies and reinforcemei/s he required. The British navy ruled t\w sea, and gave him the nutans of attackmg whatever point he pleased; the PVench were obliged to guard themselves on every side, and he wait- ed, in secure patience,for any fault which they might commit, or any favourable occasion which might present itself. Thus on the most central and important points of our coast, on those points which cover and connect ourgreat land or water communications, our large cities, &c. if they should find some spots, so favourably disposed by nature, that in a short time, and at a small expense, they may be fortified and isolated from 41 Chap. in. tlie continent, an overwhelming combination of naval and military forces will be directed to occupy them, and when organized on a footing of permanent defence, they will be held a* regular stations and places of refreshment for the troops and navy, grand deposites of all means of hostility, arms, stores,, ammunition, &c. and of all the plunder which will be collected in the>country, centres of intrigue, bribery and conspiracy, &:c. Three or four posts of this kind on the coast of the United States, connected with the stations of Halifax, Uermuda, Jamaica, kc. would form a strong and powerful blockading line round America. If such a blockade required 40 sail of the line and as many frigates, England could spare them, and could not possibly employ them on a more important service. Nor is this all. From these centres of destruction, as from the focus of so many volcanoes, their predatory par- ties will successively assail our arsenals and naval and milita- ry establishments, our trading and manufacturing cities, com- bine their attacks, shoot out in every direction, carry their ravages on every unguarded spot, ascend every river and every creek, and force the whole population to remain in a constant state of anxiety and alarm, always armed and always marching from one point to another. They will be free to select their points of attack, and to retire to their boats, -vhercver they meet with resistance, or wherever they have accomplished their object. Such situations exist in every country, if the'jnvading gene- rals and engineers have knowledge and talent to find 1 hem out. That in the revolutionary war, the English did not succeed in such attempts, is only a proof of the state of in- fancy in which the military art was y(!t in England, at that period. Cornwalhs, Lord Howe, and several of their most cele- brated chiefs, committed the grossest blunders on such occa- sions. But if the enemy pursue that course in the next war, I shall leave to the judgment *of every candid and W( II informed American, whelhr r our navy is yet strong enough (o oppose Ihem, and what effect would sach a harassing system 6 ill Chap. hi. 42 ^Vi II of warfare have on the patience and spirit of the mUitia. Those who ^tnow how badly it is organized and equipped, those who are acquainted with the confusion and disorder of its temporary administration, and how unfit it must be, from its very nature and composition, for any long or permanent ser- vice, will be able to conceive, but not to calculate, the enor- mous trouble and expense which would thus be occasioned, and how soon the people would grow weary of the war and of government. Was not this the case in the last war. We undertook it to secure some points which we left undecided at its close, because a great portion of our people refused to co-opcrnte in it any longer, and because a division of our union was already apprehended in consequence. The same reasons still exist on our side, and stronger reasons on the side of Britain, for renewing another contest. If we endeavour to find out the chief points of attack, and examine for that purpose the military qualities of the vast extent of our coasts, we shall observe that, by its geographi- cal and military nature, as well as by the political connexions, interests and habits of its population, it is divided, from Maine to Florida, in three great districts, Iho northern, the southern and the midille or central. A fourth division is formed by the roast of the gulf of Mexico, and the mouths of the Alabama, Mobile and vast Mississippi, which belongs to our western territory. By (heir military properties the southern shores of New-Kngland, from Cape ('od to New-Y'oik, should however be attached to the middle district, whilst, by their poli- tical character and connexions, they belong to the northern slates. If we examine fhe coast of New-Eiigland from Nova fccotia to Cape Cod, it will appear, at the first view, that from the nalnrr of the dark, foggy and stormy sea, which bathes it. from its indented figure, covered with small islands, and intersoctod by ports, creeks, harbours and mouths of rivers, rr I Ch\i'. hi. U * / IP quired to blockade the coast of New-England, notwithstand- ing which the American j^rivateers will always lind means to escape, and retahate severely for &ny injury whirh they may receive. Boston is the only place worth being attacked by a large expedition. fid. In the southern states, from the Chesapeak to the extremest point of Florida, other motives vi') orobably deter the British from any considerable or per:'.i"ient invasion; the deadliness of the climate to foreign troops, on that low, sandy and marshy coast; the want of good naval stations, the want of grand marking points of attack, and the dispersed state of the agricultural population. Some islands on the coast may be occupied as deposites of plunder ; some light frigates and flying parties keep the militia in movement and alarm ; plantations be destroyed; the negroes excited to rise, and perhaps Charleston or Savannah menaced for the sake of plunder, but no serious attempt will be made there. 3d. The middle coast between Cape Cod and Cape Fear, will be the scene of such attempts. That coast, which is so admirably adapted by nature to become the seat of a great maritime power, forms a long sweeping curve in the very centre of the American empire, where four deep bays, plun- ging in the heart of the country, convey to its inland territories the productions of the exterior. On these are concentrated the mass of the wealth, of the population and industry of America ; on these are situated her chief national establish- ments. Those points, which will certainly attract all the etlbrts and forces of the enemy, are the bay of Rhode Island, of New-York, the Delaware, and the Chesapeak. For a mere destructive and plundering expedition, New- Vork is the most important object in America ; and if an enemy once occupies the heights of Brooklyn, that jjjilacc is untenable ; for a great commercial city, when bombs, bullets and rockets can reach its ships and stores, cannot be expected tu sacrilice them ; but N«w-York requires an army ib Chap. hi. to keep it, which might be better employed. This was the chief error of the British in the revolutionary war. New- York may therefore be plundered or destroyed, but will not be kept as a military station, unless the eastern states should again adopt the same unwise and uupatriotic course which they did in the last war; and separate their interests from those of America. In that case, it is not impossible that the plans of Burgoyne may be revived, anJ expeditions directed in concert from Canada and Long Island, to conquer the regions border- ing on the Hudson, and thus permanently divide the republic in two parts. At the close of the revolutionary war, England proposed to acknowledge the independence of the other states, on condition that she might keep New-York. Philadelphia, though a great object of plunder, is even more unfit for a military and naval station; its inland situatiou and little defensibility preclude the idea. Besides, the Hud- son and Delaware bays, situated in the centre and bottom of the great curve which I have described, present no proper |)oints of occupation, and would not serve as blockading stations. It is on the two extremities of this line, on the very points which the American government has selected as the seat of her naval establishments, on the mouth of the Chesapeak bay, and on Rhode Island, that the efforts of the British will be directed. It is there, if they can find proper points, that they will fix permanent military and naval stations, such as I have described above, and follow the course of hostilities which I have mentioned, combine from thence their movements all along the coast, and connect them with those of the stations of Halifax and Bermuda. \i 4th. The western states, forming a world in them" ^es, have little immediately to fear or to hope from Britain; and she has no influence amongst them. The feeble hostilities of the Indians, those which she may direct against them by the Chap. in. 46 I r *i:- the extremity of Canada, any one of the states is strong enough to repel; but from their singular lopography, the whole im- mensity of regions, watered by the Mississippi, Ohio, Missouri, Arkansaw, and all their tributaries, have but one natural emporium, New-Oneans. The importance of that post, the key of the western world, has been already perceived by Britain. I have already hinted ihat the point of attack was ill selected by the British chiefs in the last war : without any particular knowledge of the local topography of the neigh- bourhood, I had judged so from a simple view of the map. 1 have since had the satisfaction of hearing my opinion con- firmed by indisputable authority. But if there should be any truth iri the report that the Spanish government has proposed to cede Cuba to England, or if she should seize that colony, under any pretext, she need not attack New-Orleans a second time. The possession of Havana wouH secure to her the dominion of the gulf of Mexico, and .ose it so effectually, that no ship could possibly pass the channel of Bahama, without her permission. And by intercepting from CanaHn, the northern communications of the western slates, she might lay them under a complete blockade. She will endeavour to prevent them, by small diversions and Indian wars, from aidmg their Atlantic brethren. But we hope that this narrow and selfish policy will never be that of our brave backwoodsmen. Although behind their forests, they might be secure for the present; although the ruin of the maritime states might strengthen and enrich them by a vast flood of emigration, yet they would eventually fall in the dependence of that power, which would hold the coasts, and blockade them at will. The consequences of a separation we have already shown. By holding several posts of tho.t nature, England will prevent the different parts of the union from assisting each other; by occupying Rhode Island, she will menace an extent of coun- try, that will oblige m to maintain 100,000 men of militia under arms to guard it ; a similar station on the Chesapeak would have a similar effect; Havana would immediately xi — r\-\ «.wi <^/%n^r>lofA)v LIqcI':*'''^ oiir southern 47 Chap. ni. shores; and, combined with the other stations to Halifax, etrcctuallj close up the whole of our coasts to all foreign trade. If the British find all these important and essential points guarded by the Americans, and put in a state of defence ; if they find them prepared against an invasion, they will proba- bly confine their views to harassing them and putting them to trouble and expence. By displaying on our coast a naval force calculated to overwhelm all opposition, sending detach- ments to hover round it, affecting now and then to disembark and form an establishment, till they have roused the country and forced the militia to assemble and march in haste, then re- embarking and appearing in another point with the same pur- pose, they may fatigue our people with perpetual service, and force us for every million wh . they advance, to expend ten times as much and more. This, however, is but a small con- sideration if we remain true to ourselves, constant and united. The Americans should never forget that the object of Britain, in every contest with them, will be to divide and destroy. By repeated destruction, but especially by dividing this noble republic and setting its component parts at variance with each other, and by these arts alone, can she expect to stop its growth, and prevent her own impending ruin. If Ameri- ca was once put down, her tyranny and monopoly on the seas would meet with no rival, and by that monopoly she would extend her haughty and heavy empire over the rest of the world. Her pride was deeply hurt by the success of the American navy; it was touching her in her vital parts. We may therefore count that on the next occasion she will endeavour utterly to destroy it, to ruin all its establishments, and all our chief seaports, to harass the whole of our sea roast, unless some parts be designedly favoured, to create a division of interests between our northern, southern, and western states, to occupy some military posts on those cen- tral points, which would be of a great deal more value to her than the whole barren and expensive province of Canada, md that to accomplish this she will spare neither ships. if ■ 1 1 hi- ll w m CilAP. Hi. 18 monev, troops, aims and intrigues, bribes, promises and con- ^piracies, nor any means whatsoever ; that her exped.t.ons vvill be more formidable by their numbers and quahty, better combined and directed than in the last war; that her troops and especially her artillery and engineers, will be found greatly improved, and that she is better acquainted with the resources and localities of America, and no longer ei. ertains such an overweening opinion of her own superiority, nor such a contempt for the means of her enemy. Whether, with the prospect of such an attack before us, our present confidence and security be well founded ; whether our present means of defence be sufficient to withstand it, or whether prudence does not imperiously call upon us to organize them on a more effective footing, shall be the subject of another chapter. CHAPTER IV. investigation of the chief objections which are made to the augmentation and improvement of our Military Establish- ments. Insufficiency of the Navy and Militia alone for the purposes of national defence. From this brief analysis of the changes which tlie govern- ment of Great Britain, and the character of her civil and military institutions, have undergone, in the course of her late contests with France ; from the improvement of her forces, and the nature of her grasping and envious policy, of that policy which can only support her present overgro' n and artificial power, by the depression and debasement of every rising nation ; from the review of her conduct in the last war, which shows that what she has done must not be taken as a sample of all that she can and will do ; from the abstract of the possible and probable measures which she may take to humble and even destroy the strength of Ameri- ca on the next occasion, we might trust that our people would be awake to the necessity of preparing and consolidating their means of defence in the present period of peace, and whilst England is yet involved in financial difficulties. As nevertheless there seems to prevail amongst a portion of the nation and some of our statesmen, apprehensions concerning the waHike spirit growing in America, fears that our military force might be employed on some future day to subvert those liberties which they have so bravely defended, and conse- quently a desire of reducing ft to the smallest and most in- significant scale, and a dislike to apply any considerable por- tion of the public revenue to military works and prepara- tions ; as those feelings natural in a free country are plausi- bly grounded on the experience of past ages, find established 7 Chap, ly . 50 political axioms, it will be proper to examine and discuss theni before we proceed any farther. The chief arguments used on the occasion, and I do not desire to weaken them in the exposition, are these: Where- ever a free people, either with a view to aggrandizement and conquest, or even for the purpose of self-defence, have given too much strength to their executive and their military force, their liberties have been uniformly subverted. Such was the fate of the Greek republics in antiquity, and of the Italian commonwealths in the middle ages, such was formerly the fate of Rome, and such of France and of England in modern days. Standing armies are heterogeneous elements in the constitution of a free government, exclusively confined to the profession of arms, isolated from the people, and subject to a discipline, of which absolute authority in the chiefs and passive obedience in the subalterns are the fundamental prin- ciples. The natural independence of soldiers must be blunt- ed by these habits, and they must necessarily contract a cer- tain disregard for civil virtues and those civil laws and au- thorities with which they have so little connexion. To these cogent reasons others are added, equally forcible, and drawn from the peculiar constitution of America. Formed by a confederation of independent republics, the central govern- ment is to each of them an object of jealousy, and they vigi- lantly watch its measures and resist any enlargement of its powers. This is (he great palladium of our liberties, and that vigilance should never be intermitted. Our constitu- tion, our representation, are so essentially democratic, that vo course of measures can be pursued for any time, or to 'uiy extent by the government, without the consent »nd ap- probation of a majority of the people. They are daily in- ve^ti^atcd, and by the frequency of our elections are m fact direcled, as they should be, by the public will. Economy should therefore be the first principle of a government where the people really lax themselves, and are not taxed by a de- lusive representation's in England; nor will they impose on 51 Chap. iv. themselves any burden, unless it be demonstrated to them that it is indispensable for their safety or benefit. Despotic governments alone can form great and magnificent establish- ments, and these in their turn support and strengthen despo- tism. A standing army may be necessary to such govern- ments fbr the purposes of invasion and foreign cor .pest, but these have always been ruinous to a republic, and our con- stitution only allows of a defensive system, for which a naval force, which is never dangerous to liberty, and our militia, the people themselves, defending their own homes and properties, and their own rights, are amply sufficient. We should ind ourselves the bulwark of our country, we should fig ur own battles, and never surrender our arms into the han :. of any subsidized force whatsoever ; wherever the people did so they were enslaved, and they deserved to be enslaved. In reply to these objections, I shall begin by observing that the example of other nations is not applicable to us ; our constitution, the nature of our territory and of our people, have no parallel in history. That people are universallv en- lightened, universally republican, and universally armed; twenty state governments, each possessed of independent forces, watch the general government, and the members of the legislature are more anxious for popularity in their respec- tive states, than for credit with an administration which has few incentives to offer to private ambition. Neither do we require a large force; we can never be assailed by overwhelm- ing numbers, from our distant and isolated situation, and from the immense expense of transmarine expeditions ; it is the quality, and not the quantity of our enemies' troops which can render them dangerous. The immense- qxtent of our coasts precludes the possibility of their being defended en- tirely by the regular army ; and all those nations wlio were subdued by their own soldiers, had first given up tlie use of arms. But from the very nature of things, owr defence must ultimately depend upon our militia. Far be it from us, to propose disarming the nation; still farther, to render America Chap. iv. 52 a military power ; we deprecate the spirit of conquest, we deprecate the creation of a great military eslabhshment, possessing a separate interest and influence n. the country, isolated from its political principles, solely subservient to any executive whatsoever, and strong enough to be turned against the people. A defensive system is the only one which our constitution allows ; but it should be sufficient, effective, and well organized. The only point, therefore, which we have to examine is, whether the navy and mihtia are sufficient for that purpose, and no argument can be drawn from the dangers which our liberties may run from a standing army, if onr defence i-ruires one ; for supposing even that it could nev4^r be formed on republican principles, nor animated by patriotic feelings, which we hope and believe is far from being the case, it would be but a poor compliment to the spirit of America, to assert that the liberties of a million of armed citizens would run any danger from a few thousand regulars. It would be superfluous to go over those arguments, which were ad-anced by Hamilton, by Madison, by all the sages of the revolution, at the glorious period when the American con- stitution was discussed, and finally adopted, by the most con- summate wisdom that ever ruled the affairs of men ; those arguments, confirmed by so many years of unparalleled pros- perity, demonstrate that, under our institutions, the liberty of America can run no risk from the power of its elective central government. But if the object of that government be to give strength and dignity to the nation abroad, and union at home, it must be liberally provided with all the necessary means. Let these be inspected as jealously, as closely, as the nature of our democratic constitution requires; but they should exist, it is the interest of every state and individual that they hhoiild. Our liberties, I fear, run more danger from the weak- ness than from the strength of the federal government ; if it cannot afford prompt and efficient protection to every part of the union in time of war, if one will, one administration, one 53 Chap, iV. uniform organization does not pervade the whole of our de- fensive Bystem ; if the several great divisions of our cwintry separate their interests, and rely only on their individual means for their protection, not only those means will prove insufficient, and their defence unconnected and unsystemati* cal, against an enemy attacking them with all the contrary advantages ; but they will afford to that enemy an occasion of bringing about, by his intrigues, his grand object, the division of America. The connecting link, the central government, cannot be too much strengthened ; if once it is broken, all the evils deprecated by our jealousy will be felt with tenfold intensity. Our independent governments, suspicious of each ttther, will vie in eveiy military establishment, and in strength- ening their executives, until they will all b« turned into military despotisms. The hopes of mankind, that a new era of liberal and enlightened freedotis was going to commence, these hopes would be crushed, the rising splendour of the genius of American liberty, which dawned on a hailing and admiring world, with such pure and bright glory, accompanied ^^he prayers and wishes of all good men, would set in i.^^iiessand in disappointment ; the ^ime disgusting, bloody, «• uniform track in which the old world has marched, from .iiutual jealousies, wars, and usurpations, to despotism and revolution, would again be traced by the new, and the same dark and ensanguined hue would st.\u the white and unsullied pureness of her robe of freedom. Economy should niidoubt' dly be one of the first principles of every republican udmiiiiKtration, but economy does not con- sist in avoiding every expense till necessity imperiously calls for it ; in such casos. parsimony at one time is always followed by extravagant profusion at another. If we do not prepare our defensive means with leisure, order and deliberation in time of peace, we must create them with sudden haste and confusion, and at immense expense, at the moment ofwur, when they should already be in active motion. Moreover, they wiU aeceiiaarily be insufioient and bidly brganiized. Tbt 1 Chap. yv. 54 experience of the last war should at least have taught us 3© much. If economy was the paramount, the only object ol government, that same experience should have taught us, that from various reasons, which shall be further developed, no service is more expensive as well as inefficient than that of the militia. However startling the expense of great mili- tary establishments, such as those of France or England, Rus- Bia or Austria, a little insight into the details of their adminis- tration will prove, that the force of a great nation cannot possibly be organized or exerted in a cheaper manner. Economy ia with great miUtary powers the first principle, for every economy enables them to augment their force. But we ^ould be swayed by higher considerations. (5) vide note 5, Those who are most unwilling to apply any portion of the public revenue to the army, are generally liberal to the navy. And it is a very popular opinion, that by strengthening it suffi- ciently, we might dispense with other forces. It would be the height of presumption in an officer, who has seen no sea service, to venture a positive opinion on this subject, and we all know that America contains all the elements of a naval es- tablishment, and those of the most perfect kind ; her coasts are admirably adapted for creating a naval power; her im- mense commerce is an inexhaustible nursery of sailorj, and her seamen are perhaps the hardiest, the most skilful and in- trepid in the world. But popular as our navy universally and justly is, covered with glory as it was in the last war, it is yet in its infancy. (6) vide 7iole 6. I would refer its greatesi admirers to Rogers, to Porter and Decatur, to be informed whether it can cope with all the forces which Britain can send against us ; whether it can repel every attack directed on our extensive coasts ; how long it must be, and what im- mense expense must be incurred, before its establishments can rival those of Britain, Woolwich, Deptford, Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth, die. 1 believe that our few ships will always brat an equal British force. But who can doubt,, that if England- was at peace with the rest of the world, ihe 55 Chap. iv. might pour from these great estahlishments, such an over- whelming power as would effectually destroy, or at least block- ade our navy ; and on the first occasion, she will certainly strain every nerve to ruin and eradicate every trace of our arsenals, navy yards, and all marine establishments. Instead of protecting the nation, they will for a long time require to be protected ; besides, it should be observed, that by the pos- session of Canada, and still more, if she takes possession of Cuba, England should not only be considered n% a distant naval power, but as a neighbouring enemy; her ..^ans of ag- gression are organized, not only in England, but in the neigh- bourhood of America. From all these reasons, the objections to the military esta- blishment of the United States are reducible to this single ques tion : is the militia sufficient for their defence ? That defence, for the reasons which we have mentioned above, must ulti- mately and chiefly devolve upon it, but can it stand alone the fatigues of a long and protracted campaign ; can it stand the attack of an experienced and disciplined enemy, directed by chiefs who have made the art of war their sole and particular study, without being supported by a force of similar nature, and led by chiefs of the same character. How often, during the revolutionary war and during the last war, has experience taught us that they cannot. I might content myself with quo- ting the repeated testirnony of Washington to that purpose; but the subject deserves to be fully investigated. I would render full justice to the American militia. In the defence of their country, of their homes and of their liberty, they have done wonders, and displayed the greatest patriotism, self devotion and intrepidity. Sober, vigilant, active and brave, nature has admirably qualified them to beconegood soldiers; they bear, withoui, repining, hunger and thirst, heat, cold and fatigues of all kinds ; they are generally good marksmen, and as light troops incomparable ; when covered h> walls or lines^ whrn fighting in woods or marshes, they will stand against ve- Ch AP. IV. 6(j lli.: teran troops, and when supported by regulars, have sometimes eminently contributed to success in the field. But, although they will hold a line as long as they only have to tire before them, they cannot stand if they are turned, nor rally if they are broken on any point, nor be led to successive assaults, nor return to the charge if they lose their position. It cannot be expected that they should stand alone a re- gular and scientific attack, nor a prolonged campaign ; and besides the consciousness of inexperience, both in the chiefs and men, the little confidence which they can have in each ^ other, the novelty and terror of the scenes of danger into which they are brought, their anxieties about those homes, those families, those professions from which they have sudden- ly been torn, defects common to all militias, the Americans, from the very nature of their government, have some defects in their militia system peculiar to themselves. 1st. In the first place, their organization in brigades, bat- talions, and their armament and equipment, (whatever the con- stitution may require) their service, discipline and instruction, such as they are, vary in every state, and are more or less strict or uniform, according to the care which the several state govcrnncents, who jealously reserve to themselves the direction and superintendence of their militia, choose to give to these objects. When brought together, this produces all the inconvenience which is found in a confederated army of difl'erent independent nations ; armies which are always bad and insufficient, even when the troops which compose them are separately well organized and instructed, which is far from being our case. 2d. In the ncxi place, the mode of appointing the militia officers varies also in different states, but is no where calcu- lated to put in these important and confidential stations the most proper persons. In some the council of appointment, hi most the men themselves select them. In some the staff officers are named by the state governments ; in some by the ^ Mm f K ' O m i i. 37 Ch AP. IV. choice of the subaltern officers. Supposing that party spirit and private influence had no share in these appointments, hovr are the quahties, instruction and fitness of the officers to be appreciated by such methods. It is evident that generally their epaulets alone must distinguish them from the men whom they command. A few brilliant exceptions, such as Brown and Jackson, Harrison, Ripley, Johnson, kc. do not militate against this general rule. 3d. Thirdly, The manner in which their services are com- bined with those of the regular army and of each other, pro- duces serious inconveniences. The law merely proviaes, that amongst the militia of several states, officers of equal rank take command according to their seniority, and that the officers of the line only take precedence of those of the same rank in the militia. The governor of the state where the army serves has the right of assuming its chief command, whatever be his military capacity and instruction. In consequence, a miUtia officer, perhaps chosen for his electioneering infuence, and exclusively applied in the previous course of his life to other cares and to other studies, may happen to command and direct the operations of an experienced soldier, who has made the art of war the study of his life. In every other profes- sion, some previous information is deemed necessary. No one would confide his health to a physician, his fortune to a merchant, his affiiirs to a lawyer, without full confidence in his learning or experience. But we confide the defence of our country and liberties indiscriminately to every popular fa- vourite. The jealousies and dislikes, which must break out between the militias of several states ; the difficulty of subject- ing them to the command of a chief who may ba of a weaker state, must strike, at the first view, any person acquainted with the nature of these troops io all ages and countries. 4th. Fourthly. From the nature of our federal constitu- tion. It IS impossible to count on their services, when their ♦tatc governments do not choose to co-operate Uartily and i m : i i Stf 1 I Chap. "'• ^" .ctivelv in the general cause. At any rate, those governments ::;: (he nghfof raising and org-.-g as hey P ease the f„.ees.hiohthe federa^ ,|:™™^-,;Te:y;.and '^states tTte the article of *e constitution which spec.hes the cases vented greater evils, perhaps a separation ^^ ^f^^'^^f ^^^j^ those recent facts imperiously prove how httle the miht.a alone can be relied on. «k Fifthlv From the little instruction, authority and creft'of t?Jf;offi!ers,from the very spirit of ind^P™^-- of tie people, who deem an exact disciplme mcompatible trpeCluiherty,it,simpos.h,e.^^^^^^^^^ proper subordination. And J;' *«, ^lo^:^ '„^^ ,„,„;,,;,« proudest of nat.ons at '"""<=•""»„ "J ^j Lt militar,- and obedient .n the camp. Jh«J "''''"^ . ^^,■ ^ is noble. .„„„vdination is --;;';S™t ' onr-anVof compelling r"^:: : 't tnUira''- eveu'thcse excite every day ^--irs^andalons and expensive lawsui. and pubhc d^ cussions, as shameful (o the na mnaUharacter, thoy intolerable iu the daily course of service. Gth. Sixthly. The service of the mihUa '-;' ^'^ '", ;,::mitw>thd.aws .romthclr ordinary avocat.ons, and whose .mmr-^-^m 59 Chap. IV. ments le the put at states sachu- itriotic in that e cases tnilitia. misfor- state of Ameri- jovern- discus- )ly pre- s. But mihtia rity and endence mpatible ivn under reest and ibmissive military is noble. )mpelling jvery day ublic dis- i they are ; only in- only, as I ndividuals ind whose \ losses should be included in the estimation of its expense, but its temporary administration, organized in the sudden moment of necessity by men of no experience, is always dis- orderly and profuse. From the variability of its force, from the rotation of its service, it is impossible to ascertain exactly its numbers and consequently clear its accounts, even where there is no malversation. It is very difficult to settle which charges belong to the states and which to the centra! govern- ment, and between them, all the wants of the militia, their armament, clothing, equipment and approvisionment of all kinds, the hospital expenses and those of the medical depart- ment and artillery, &:c. are always miserably provided, con- fusedly administered, never accounted for, and yei paid by the nation at the most extravagant ratr*. Are these accounts all settled since the last war ? Are they ever likely to be settled? From all these reasons, the militia is not calculated to re- sist alone a strong invasion, nor stand a long campaign. They are brave; they may be exalted by enthusiasm in a day of battle ; and, as light troops, we have already observed, that they are incomparable. But we cannot count upon them for the sole defence of the country. If such was our pur- pose, it would be necessary, by a uniform and general law, to divide it in classes ; to withdraw entirely, from the super- intendence of its respective states, a given portion of the youngest and most active classes, and to commit tht, power of requiring and compelling their service, by rotation, t'uring a portion of every year, the power of appointing their offi- cers, and the whole of their organization, administration, discipline and instruction, to the uniform, steady and simple direction of the central government. A military system founded on this principle, might be rendered niost perfect and proper for a republic. But it would be needless to dwell on measures which will not be adopted. The state governments will never commit their militias to the federal executive. For that very reason, if they do not wish the ll Chap. ly. tJO Mi country to remam in a defenceless state, they must maintain a regular army at its disposal, calculated to support the mi- Ixtia, and encounter the efforts of a disciplined enemy. Even then, some of the abuses and defects existing in the mihtia system would require to be redressed; and the state governments can do much for that purpose. It were highly desirable, that the organization, instruction and discipline, armament and equipment of the militia, were uniform; that the.r service and administration, when acting conjointly with the regular army, were better fixed, and that more care were taken m the selection of their officers; some previous instruction required by the state governments in the candi- dates for these offices, and a preference given in their ap- pomtment to such citizens as had served in the army, in some former war, or in the military schools. A last and a serious objection has been lately raised against luaintaining a regular army in America. It is a delicate and a painful subject, and one which I do not willingly enter in. borne disagreeable differences have arisen between one of our most justly celebrated chiefs and some of our represen- tatives and evil authorities. On these it would not become me to give an opinion. But it has been pretended, in conse- quence, that the spirit of our army is already mutinous and arrogant, and thftt it behoves us to get rid of it in time, and •betore it grows dangerous. I trust that the sensitiveness of private feelings, and per- hap- the exaggerations of that party spirit, and of that jea- lousy of the government, which sometimes thwarts amongst us the most useful measures, and throws a cast of disinge- nuous . liberality on our public discussions, unworthy of a free and great people ; I trust that such are the only foundu^ l.ons of this accusation. But supposing, for the sake of argu- ment, that It were founded; we should first ascertain whether we can dispense with the services of the army, and if we find 61 Chap . IV. ^hat we cannot, we should correct whatever abuses may exist in its laws, establishments and military spirit. Patience, discipline, obedience, and a proper subordination to the go- vernment, and to his chiefs, in all that concerns his military service, to the civil authorities on every other occasion ; such should be the first and most indispensable qualities of every soldier. The functions of the army, in the great po- litical machine, should operate as silently, as smoothly and regularly, as those of its other wheels. If that part of the machine jars and creaks, and impedes the march of the rest, repair it, replace it in its right order ; but if you take it out, and cast it away, beware how the machine will go on with- out it. If the navy and militia are not alone sufficient to protect «s, it becomes of the utmost importance to examine the principles on which our defensive force should be formed, and the elements of which it should consist. These objects we shall endeavour to investigate and discuss in the next chapter. CHAPTER V. ll |1 II iT Necessity of organizing both /Ae materiel one? personnel of our defensive means on a permanent footing, in time of peace, and under the sole control of the national federal executive. The permanent force which is necessary to protect every nation in time of war, and even to secure its respectabihty and independence in time of peace, divides itself under two heads, which the French writers term the personnel and the materiel; and which a lawyer amongst us would call the force of persons and the force of things. The first consists of the troops, the second of the arms, ordnance, and ammunition, subsistence, clothing, lodging and necessaries of all kinds, of the administration of all these means, of the fortifications, roads, bridges, canals, instruments, &c. which are required to render the service of these troops effective. However opi- nions may differ about the necessity of organizing the personnel in time of peace, it is evident that the materiel must be orga- nized with leisure and tranquillity. The hasty works which are thrown up in the moment of danger, are generally badly planned, insufficient for their purpose, and erected in the most slovenly and expensive manner. The same may be said of all sudder preparations of war, the armament, the subsistence, med* dl means in such cases, &ic. are almost always incom- plete, extravagantly expensive, and administered with confu- sion. The first care of the government should therefore be to erect those permanent fortifications which are necessary for the defence of the country. It may appear a gigantic enterprise, and beyond our means, CO fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of America. 63 Chap. t. * m "t Bat it is not the number of fortified posU which constitutes the strcnglh of a frontier ; it is their proper deposition. It .» well Zl that the Roman empire was never so weak as when every village was converted into a citadel, [he expenses Thich government applies to such purposes, should be ca lula- Ted upon the relative importance of the points whid. -t to ,0 defend, and that can only be ascertained by «^^' »"* '^ entific surveys. Such as cover a vast and ""•extent of open territory • such as secure the great commumcations of a conn try byTaid or water; such as contain an immense proportion of Drivate pmperty, or such as are destined by their position r:ata7alan^;ges to become the seat of .-» ;- ;j military establishments, require to be '^'^"^f^'^'^^Zt. such alone, will great expeditious and great ^^^J^^^'^- ^A An invader would soon fruitlessly rum nimselt by a con rary co« Less important points will th-efore se Worn be IttaLed but by small P-aa^oj Parties ^^^ -^^''^ ^t't^e their own local means of defence. It the enemy great expense and powerful means .n ^^ -^-g them ^M^^^^^^^ not be guarded, and som. must be sacnficed to ^ov^r othe^ of more importance. The destruction of New- York for ex ample, would be a greater disaster, even to the people of the Niagara frontier, than that of B iffalo. In tracmg the probable views of the enemy in the next war, we hatZignatL the chief points ^^^^-:;;--^^;^, lifted. Our naval establishments, on wh.ch the futu e great ne s of America chierty depends, are the most -mportant ; no penL can beconsidLed too lavish for the Purpose o orga nizing and strengthening them on a scale wor by of th... fu tnre destinies, and enabling them to defy every aUack. It h e stftionTare not occupied by us, they w.l. e occupied by the British, and become more mischievous m the.r hands, aLentres of annoyance, than useful in ou-, as centres of d- fence. The same observation applies to New-Orleans but hrtbours pursued at this moment by the Arr.en-ne - neers, will soon give us more exact notions on this subject. Ch A p. y. <)4 r> i i The reconnaissance which they are making is one of the wisest measures of the American government. No permanent de* fensive works, requiring so much time and expense before they can be finished, should be undertaken till such a recon- naissance of the whole frontier, under all its military proper- ties, has ascertained their use and necessity, and combined their relations with each other on a grand and uniform systen*, (7) vide note 7; otherwise chance alone and a very unlikely and uncommon chance, must guide us in selecting proper positions. Such works should not be erected for small and local interests, but all with a view to the part which they must act, in the general system of the national defence. When all the chief points in the country shall be sufficiently secured by permanent defensive works, the enemy will use- lessly exhaust his resources in attacking them by grand expe- ditions, such as we have mentioned mthe preceding chapter. He will be reduced to predatory excursions along our coasts. But the erection of such works alone is not sufficient ; they must be armed, manned, and communicate together. The second care of the government should therefore be to open easy, ready, and cheap communications, by land and wa- ter, between all these defensive posts, and to extend their ramifications through the whole country, to connect the gene- ral defensive system, and thus be enabled to carry their forces yapidly on every menaced point. A scientific and military topographical survey of the whole country, of its levels and soils, even of its geology, and of all its military qualities, is therefore indispensable, before the grand system of the national communications, canals, roads and bridges, &c. can be or- ganized on a proper plan; such only as are necessary open, and no useless expense .avished on points of no importance. I need not expatiate on the utility of such works for a thou- sand purposes, almost as important as our military defence. Bat to utilize these surveys, it is necessary that the an- m 65 Chap. v. nual result of the labours of our engineers, ihe col'ection of all their views, projects, memoirs and calculations, their topo- graphical, military and statistical works of all kinds, plans, views, charts and maps, descriptive of the whole of our coun- try, unde- all its properties, and of all possible improvements to be made in it, should be deposited in the war office, classed and registered, and religiously preserved for the government to consult on every occasion. This collection should form the archives of the forces and means of the nation, the memoir of its defence : no part of it should be published nor allowed to circulate but by the express desire of the legislature or exe- cutive, and if copies be sent by order of the government to uirect public works, commanding officers, &c. the originals should always remain at the disposal of the secretary of war. ^uch an establishment is productive of incalculable economy and benefit ; it is considered indispensable in every well orga- nized government. (8) vide note 8. The next care of the government should be to secure the ar- mament of the nation. Those who are not aware of the mag- nitude and importance of England's military establishments, may see, in the memoir of Chevalier Dupin, the immense means of hostility and destruction which she has collected, the care with which she improves them, the perfect order in which they are classed, preserved, and organized, and the readiness with which they can be put in activity. That similar, if not equal establishments, should be organized in this country, ad- ministered with order and economy, but without parsimony, and directed by men of consummate skill and knowledge, is most necessary. Our foundries, arsenals, military establish ments of all kinds, destined to provide the navy and army with the means of the national defence, should be formed on a scale of magnitude, corresponding to the power of the enemy and to Ihe importance of the objects which they are destined to de- fend. A great part of our armament is provided amongst us by Cha p. V. 66 ^1' the state governments and by the people themselves, for the first interest of a free people is to be universally armed. But every man conversant with military service, must con- ceive how necessary it is that the armament should be uni- form, and to what trouble, confusion, and serious inconve- nience we must be exposed by the multitude and diversity of calibers, when the difTerent stales and individuals are left to provide themselves with arms, according to their own fancy. If all military fabrics were put under the inspection and di- rection of the national government, this evil would be reme- died, and we do not conceive what possible alarm such a rtieasurc could inspire, or what additional power it would give to the gov(ce of fixed positions on the coast. But if he wishes to understand his profession theoretically, he must acquire much previous mathematical learning, and receive a scientific education. Nor is there any part of the sublimer theory of tactics to which he should be a stranger; the principles of fortification he should understand, either to attack or defend them with success, and the tactics of the field, to co-operate in them with effect. As the ordnance department is a branch of the artillery, the fabrication and inspection of all kinds of arms, makes a part of his attributions, and he must be veised in all the process of thei f manufacture. ( 1 0) vide note 1 0. It is absurd to think of creating such a corps at the moment of war ; it has recjuired centuries to carry it to perfection in Europe. • The profession of the engineer requires still more learning and study, as much indeed as those which are called the learn- ed professions, the lawyer's, physician's, or divine's. There is scarcely a branch of natural philosophy which should be totally foreign to his studies; the laws of mechanics, the force of chemical compounds, the specific weight and gravity o t( ti c r c c 71 CriAP. V. of every substance which he may employ, should be famihar to him. He should be acquainted with the whole theory of tactics, to judge, at one glance, of the military properties of a country ; he should be fertile in resources and mventions, ready at drawing a survey, and levying a map, prompt in calculatine, and accurate in balancing the means and object, expense, time, and materials requisite even for a sudden work. His profession, in short, is one of the most profound and piv.ticaliy useful of the branches of human learning; his lalenfs may be pre-eminently serviceable in time of peace, applied lo those internal improvements by which commerce, agriculture and manufactures are equally benefited, and in time of war his services arc indispensable. Exact surveys, by pointing out the proper places, and proper means of de- fence, save at such moments an incalculable expense to the. nation, which would have been thrown away on useless and ,11-designed works. England, with laudable spirit, is endea- vouring at preser.: to form a good corps of engineers ; but in America, the fruits of such an establishment would be incom- parably greater; for in no country can works be erected of such magnitude, of such benefit to posterity, and to the wor d; works to immortalize the name, and excite the disinterested ambition of any engineer. The genius of that ^^^^l^or^s .hould not be cramped by an illiberal and short-sighted par- simony, their feelings disgusted from the service, and the, r conceptions rendered useless. Our engineers shoi^d be numerous and instn.cted, organized on the most efficient footing, and maintained on the most liberal system; for every good engineer who retires, is a real loss to the country. (11) vidtnote 11. The stair and administration equally require to be directed by experienced officers. An intimate acquamtance w.Ul the various and infinite details of military service, and habits of ^rder, economy, exactness, and despatch of business, are es- sentail in these departments. The most serious ev.l« result- 1-1 Chap. V. 72 ^11' i edmlhe last war lioin the want of a good commissariat. General officers, it may be said, luive sometimes distinguished themselves without any previous mihtary information. It is true, that some subHmer geniuses, soaring a* once to the higher excellences of the art, have formed rare and brilliant exceptions to the general rule. But that genius, that intui- tive instmct of tactics, that eagle glance on the field of bat- tle, which makes a great general, which Moreau and Jackson displayed on leaving the bar, and Cromwell and Conde in their first battles, that genius would not suffice to make a good staff officer, nor even a tolerable adjutant. These should be acquainted with the various service of all kinds of troops in every situation, and with their general discipline and admini- stration ; they should have the habit of analyzing, classifying and abridging the multitude of reports which they receive, and drawing clear abstracts of them, &c. It would be absurd to imagine that the generals who command, direct and super- intend the whole of the service, the staflf officers who assist in them those duties, and draw the regular and pertinent re- ports of that service, require less study and information than those who are to execute their orders. Let us not then be reminded of a Curius, a Regulus, a Cincnnatus, and of all those worthy Romans who repeatedly left the plough to assume the command of the legions. In the first place the art of war was then in its infancy. How long would the legions of Rome have stood the attack of a modern army with its artillery? The science of the engi- necr was out of the question, and the operations of those small corps of heavy infantry, with very little cvalry and very few m.ssne weapons, were ronlined to the neighbourhood of their city, and not calculated upon the surveyed topography of the country. In the next place, the Romans, those illustrious robbers, wore a nation of thieves and soldiers; they subsist- cd by v>:u and plunder, and those very chiefs, far from being rnw rernnts. had served from their earliest youth, and had ■•^'fff^^WliUftp*'- 73 Chap. v. successively passed through every rank of the militia, before they attained to the command of armies. This chapter has been devoted to provins; the necessity of organizing the two great branches of our defence, both the personnel and materiel, on a permanent and sufficient footmg. In the next, we shall endeavour to point out the best manner of forming and organizing those means, employmg them in lime of war against such an attack as I have described, and even utilizing the services of the army in time of peace. 10 !' I CHAPTER Vr A brief /Ibstract of the simplest, safest, and most effectual mode by which the national forces might be raised, instructed, or- ganized and employed in time of pea"e and in time of roar ; of their destination a^id numbers. If we have succeeded in proving the necessity of main- taining a standing army, the next point to consider is the best mode of forming and organizing it. Besides the general, ad- ministrative, medical staff, and engineers, an army is compo- sed of corps of cavalry, infantry and artillery. Cavalry we have little need for; the enemy cannot send against us any considerable force of that description by sea, and our northern frontiers are unfavourable to its movements. Mounted rifle- men will sufllce for every purpose, and have been employed against the Indians, and even against the British troops, at the Moravian towns, with great effect. But where cavalry is necessary, it becomes most important to maintain it on a re- «.pectal)lc footing in time of peace, from the long fraifiUig and instruction which men and horses recpiira, and the difHcuIty of organizing it at the moment of war. Kv^n in infantry and artillc". from the nature of our nortliern frontier, which is only assailable on some points, (rom the immensity of our western deserts, impervious to any ( ivilized enemy, from the small numbers which can be di- rected from the distant regions of Europe against our eastern or southern shores,* wc need fewer troops than any nation possessing a military force. And our chief and ultimate de- * This argtitnfint I'ses mucU of its fori p il the British acquire Cnba. 73 Chap. vi. fence, as we have observed, rests and should rest upon our militia. But vvc have seen that the militia alone is not sufficient for that purpose. The army, therefore, if properly organized ^IL a'system concordant with our republican mst.tut.ons should not be considered as the sole defensive force of the nation ; but as the firm basis on which that force .s built, th steady centre round which it forms, the model on which t should be organized. The free and armed c.tizeiis of Ame- L should In rise to defend their country in the hour of danger: but those who have made an exclusive and particu- iar study of the art of war, those who are paid and appomted by the people for that purpose, should stand m the ront aLnst the first attack, cover their fellow-citizens by then- steadiness, guide them by their experience, and give them the example of obedience and of disciphne. The soldiers in our army avc raked by voluntary enlistnrient at high premiums. Beside, being very expensive this method is not calculated to procure . chosen quality of men. \Ne certainly think that the annual service of the active class ol the militia, in whatever small numbers would be a more na- tional, a more repubhcan mode of hhng the ranks o Ik army, and give it a higher and prouder character. But as such : measure would be unpopular, even on the sma lies sal and as we need but few troops, we may expect that rom whatever class our soldiers are drawn, a severe d.sc.phne but tending to exalt the pride of the soldiers, and not to break their spirit with harshness, flogging, and ill treatment, a pa- ternal and constant attention to their interests, a certain res- pectability given to the military character, a security against d stress and beggary in their old age, and, above all, forming a good corps ol otfircrs, attached to their profession and pnnid of it, will suifice to make a good anny, even out o bad elements. It is to be hoped that such a Bpt.m w I prevent those murmurs, discontents, and frequent deseit.oni. Ch AP. VI. 76 which a stranger finds with surprise in the troops of so great and noble a repubhc, in those very troops who have so glo- riously distingi.j i:od th.jmselves and their country. On the otiicers must ultimately depend the character of all troops, and if we can secure a sufficient number of good offi- cers, soldiers will soon be formed. There are two modes ot providing an army with experienced and instructed officers, either by drawing them Irom the sub-officers and cadets attach- ed to each company, or by rearing them in military school?. There is a third mode, indeed, which 1 had nearly forgotten, and which is much practised here as well as in England ; that is, appointing to every rank, either by favour or interest, without regarding the previous qualities or information of the candi- date, and trusting to his disinterested zeal for acquiring the means of promotion, after he has obtained the end. As to the first of these modes, it can only be applicable to the service of the line, and even there, only in a country where the army is raised by the conscription, as in France, and com- prises in the ranks men of all descriptions and degrees of in- formation. A few promotions amongst the most able and clever sub-officers would tend however infinitely to exalt the pride and character of the soldier, and raise his profession in his own eyes. In France, most of our general and superior officers rose from that rank. But engineers and officers of artillery, who require a long and scientific education, can only be formed in mihtary schools. And for several reasons, it were best that the mass of our offi- cers should also be drawn from those establishments, >vheie they might be brought acquainted, more or less, with every branch of learning belonging to their profession, and with . o( v. ar, we shall need a d.v.s.on !f the army at NewO. .ans. supported by the m.hfa of Ll*lana"'Mi.sissipp., > »a«a. Kentucky and Tennessee The militia, well org..ni.e,< .,ay perhaps -«« " defence of Florida, Gergia . ,d Carohna, but the Chesapeak will re,,uire a strong div' o . < the army lo cover our nafonal Islabh hments, the seat of government, and the nch shores of th bay. (Maryland should be attached to Ih.s d.v.s.onO n our northern department, Ohio, '"'«»- ^'^f^'^^'SX^.'" which the Illinois and Missouri territor.es should be attached ) 7 nire a division of the army to garrison our '"d'a-'f™"*'" olhe Yellow Stone river, and in time "(^^M^^J^^ militia of these states, pour upon Upper Canada. Another "le required on the Hudson, on the Df--' '»"'=- E -I .nd covering Boston and Rhode Island, and another on fh ' olern fronfier of New-York and Vermont. It .s ev.- den that 40 battalions and 1000 officers w.U scarcely be slcent for this service, even if the militia be - .mproved a, to give some reliance on its service and co-operal on. It is not necessary that we should therefore mamtain that 1 ber Lll as\t is, in time of peace, but we shodd always have the means of completing .t immediately in the approach of war. For that purpose we might maintain twenty battalions, re- duced to haff the number of privates, a force Uttle supenor o 'Xt we maintam at present, but fully officered,and even att h to each of them a certain number of supernumerary ofhcers As soon as we determine on raising the army to the war Establishment, these battahons should be completed, organ .edin brigades and divisions, and encamped, whilst the super- rumerary officers and sub-officers, detached w.thsome chosen XCeceiveand incorporate tl-^.-crmts and organ, twenty other battalions. If the military depots be amply \6r — Chap. vi. 80 prvvidcti with arms, clothing, equipment, lield equipages, kc, h IS iiiconceivable in how short a time this may be done. I have seen corps thus formed with good elements, ready to appear in the ticld in the course of a few weeks. The num- ber of officers required in such an organization of the army will occasion a trifling augmentation in its expense, but of no moment, when compared with the advantage of having all its cadrt ready formed at the moment of war. The economy of time and expense, thus procured, will be understood by all who know the value of foresight and order, and the superior quality of such troops, by all mMitary men. In fact, new corps will otherwise be no bett'^r at first than the militia, and caanot support it. I need scarcely add that depots of ordnance, arms and ammunition, approvisionment and forage, clothing and equip- ment, shoul.1 be formed at the same time, and placed at a secure distance behind the armies, with some safe and easy communication between them. All roads and canals, ne- cessary for the a.^mies to communicate, should be opened, and the time requisite for such movements be calculated with precision. We may then securely brave any invasion of our territo- ry; for before the enemy can have made an imprc5-IoM on those important points, which deserve to attract his (ilforls, and which will, l>y that time, bo fortilied, a corps of expe- rienced soldiers, 'ed by military chiefs, and supported by the militia of the neighbouring states, will move against him ; and we trust that, in the contest, the spirit of patriotism and the i:onsciousncs<« n' t' noble cause which they defend, will 'Misurc ; icrory U: our troops and to the American flag. \V(j cannot however entirely prevent England from haras- ^lingour coasts h) siuall predatory expeditions, putting us there- l»v lo great trouble and expense, and fatiguing our militia by »1 Chap. vi. *-i frequent duty, marches and countermarches. But we can re- taliate severely upon her. Our numerous privateers and our na.y can pursue and ahaost destroy her trade on every sea, alarm her on her own coasts, and oblige her to divide her naval forces in every quarter. We can menace her coloniesj we can conque- Canada. Invasion and conquest may seem a measure contrary to our republican institutions. But in fact this movement would be a defensive measure ; for by the natural situation of Canada, the British keep our whole northern frontier from Maine to Illinois in a constant state of alarm, and carry their hostilities in every part of it, oblige us to maintain on that immense frontier a great naval and military force, divide our moans and attention, and surround our country ; whilst by occupying Quebec, or Montreal, or any single point on the eastern extremity of that line, we secure the whole of our northern and western frontier for ever, and are enabled to turn all our means and attention to the protection of our sea-coast. The rest of Canada must fall under the well managed efforts of any o.ie of our western states. We trust that, by a system of defence thus organized and conducted, Britain would soon be v,eary of a fruitless and hopeless contest, where the only injury she could do us, in- terrupting our trade, would be returned upon her tenfold, and where she would find herself unable to stop the progress of our country, or hurt its vital interestB. Such, in the moment of war, will be the result of forming a good military rntfiblishment. But is it necessary, even in time of peace, that the army should remain a dead load upon the nation ? Undoubtedly not. The life of a soldier slu.uld be a life of constant labour and txercise. Turn these to the public account. The Romans, occupied with incessant la- hours, never suffered from diseases in their armies, whilst in Europe they are more destructive than war. And the listless indolc!)ce of a garrison life, in the wilderness of our frontiers, would be iniupvorlablc, without oomr employment, to keep up the health and spirits of the soldier. 1 1 II ' ii! Chap. vi. 82 In summer they should be employed under the direction of engineers in opening roads and canals, and constructing bridges and fortifications. The axe and shovel should be as famiK >r to their hands as the musket and bayonet. And as the oftoers shiuld all be acquainted with the elements of field fortification, these habits would be of incalculable value in time of war. In the intervals of labour, military exer- cises, swimming, shooting at a mark, &c. should fill every mo- ment, and the scrubbing, polishing, and all the coxcombry of dress with which they are kept occupied in Europe, be given up. It is a fact, however ridiculous, that elegant white un- dresses were given to several British regiments of cavalry, to employ the soldiers in cleaning them. Nothing should be plainer than a soldier's dress. Convenience and uniformity should be its sole beauty. It will be highly useful to accustom them to remain under tents during a part of that season. Tents were latterly quite unknown in the French army. During five years service I never saw one. Curtailing all the necessaries of life in that manner, certainly facilitated ihe rapidity of our movements, but at an immense waste of health and life. I The leisure of winter should be consecrated to forming the moral character and habits of the soldier, and instructing him theoretically in his service. The sub-oflicers especially should be examined on all the branches of their duty. Regi- mental schools on the Lancasterian plan, where all the sol- diers should be taught at least to read, write, and account, rcf^imental libraries for the use of the officers, where books of history, geography, mathematics, and all kinds of military works should be at their disposal, would be of incalculable benefit, and serve to substitute the habits of decency, order, discipline and morality, to that drunkenness, to that gambling and dissipation in which ignorance and indolence so frequently plunge the military. Libraries might even be established for the men ; it in done in England. That idea might be carried r E'^.'.Si^saiiU— ■^■-■>- ...*-;^_...^-. 83 Chap. vi. I much farther. These schools might he of use to the neigh- bouring population, in those remote districts where our troops are usually quartered, and the regiments become centres of morality and instruction, instead of being, as they usually are, centres of vice and corruption. And would an order of men so constituted and so employ- ed be dangerous to the liberties of their country ? Would t he mon^y expended in qualifying them to lead and direct the cffbits of their inexperienced fellow-citizens, in the mo- ment of danger, be wasted ? No. Far from forming a hete- rogeneous clement in the constitution of the republic, such an army would be the most powerful instrument of her defence in time of war, and in time of peace a most useful, respecta- ble and honourable class of citizens. If attacked by regular disciplined forces, we must have forces of the same nature to repel them, and if it is better to have a good than a bad army, better to beat than to be beaten, we must train and discip- line them in time of peace to render their service effective in time of war. Let us, therefore, in viewing the ambitious and disorga- nizing designs of Britain, her immense means, her prepara- tions for warfare, and the rapid improvements of her milita- ry system, neither abandon ourselves to supine indolence, re- main unarmed and unpreparf^d until the blow be struck, nor yield to terror and despondency q*\ measuring the present disparity of our forces. Let us bo'\ are of any insidious at- tack against our union; let tjs never separate our interests, bu* organize ourselves, and forlify our frontiers, diffuse military knowledge by met: s of our military schools, and remedy the radical d^ifects of oui mtiitia system, foster years ago. equal to the labour of Ind r;ch^nd- ' T ' • ^'l" "^'^ ^'''' ""^'^h ; and the actual riches but aS H, f "" il"'-?^ "'" *" ^•^^ ^''"^'^ "f -t'""»' bankruptcy ; but after.t,th.s real wealth will remain, increased in its value,and the repro- duang powers freed from the immense load with which th y ar ch g d may possibly begin to act with renovated energy. Every individualTn Bri Zlu T ,' '"sses repaired, before trade has decidedly run in another channel, provided the government does not turn those ve y means .n another d.rectioir, and afford, in war and plunder, a career toThTde ! perate enterprise of the people. If this great change should be accompanied by an amelioration of the go er„,„ent ,t should be desired by all good m. n, and especially by aS good Englishmen. But if that government survives the shock, it wilf fo a time, be stronger than ever. Freed from its load of debt, i wm have :iit"rtr:r f rr' ^^^ "'^•^"^' '^^^ '« ^pp— . ^^ "-- :: a mv wit ,1 r' "^ '^^^^ ''' ^^'^ '"' ""d •^'^'^t' »»« "«vy and a my, „,th all their immense materid, exist, and are devoted to them • !„ mL. .' "«"-'="'"'"'«**'"n«d officers and privates, 5852 officers and ll,m horses, of which l.o,.58, with 8516 foot guards, ^erve in Eng-' 89 laud, 18,»i3 in Ireland, 18,280 in India, Sic. Add to these the navy, colo* nial corps, the native troops of Hindostan, the HaDOverian army, inc. and this is the state of ^teace. They will be enabled to strengthen this army, by the very misery of the people ; and thousands after thousands of starving wretches, when England coases to be a mauuficturing and industrious country, will seek for employment in its ranks, and be maintained at foreign expense. That {government exerts at present its power, by the expensive system of cor- rupting the people; it may then throw off the mask, and rule by open force. In the mean time, it has interested almost every class, in keeping up the deception ; even the poor, empowered to vest in the public funcTs, as corporate bodies, the economies which they had laid up in the saving banks, are thereby interested in maintaining the present system. Those economies were stated, in the course of last year, to have amounted, in England alone, to £1,254,000 sterling. NOTE IV. Chap. 2. pagt 24. — List of articles shipped to the continent by Great Britain, from the year 1808 to 1813. Laid before parliament. Countries. i'annon. Muskets. Barrels of powder. Cannon I _ Dozen.s of cart. 1 musket cart. Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Germany, 148 105 545 14 22 117,270 1,417,270 1,417.270 7,512,000 1,380,000 1,390,000 8*0 12,000 4,000 45,000 2,817 13,200 242,112 34,750 471, erected with a view to rov«r certain points, but not with a view to the part wliich those points were to act, to their properties and j'^ ^tions with each other, as Rrand depots of military or naval means, points of aUa k or of descent, in first or second line, supporting <.r supported, covtnn^ conimuuK-ations, movements, or destined to concentrate forces, &ic. 1 he detail of these principles would be endless. NOTE VIII. Ckat> W pa'-e <'.r».-If the memoirs, charts, and plans contained in the topo^phicaUffice, bn not kept with care, a.id fall into t-aduM-ous and I'hfld, or even into imprudent hands, they may be P-d-t. of t ^ most serious evils, aad direct the enemy in ^-^ '"^"^^ ^^^^^ convenience whiob will .-suit from such carelessness, will »- ''•- "^ '^^^ and imm.-nse loss of time squandered in doing over and over the same "rloys when works are to b« erected. Indeed, the -^vantage of ha.ng all the basis and preliminaries of every enterprise, of cverj plan ol cam IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGFT (MT-3) 1.0 I.I 1^ ""^ m t^ m E& m m ^ as, 1^ ','■''- H III i-6 ^«i 6" — ► V] ^''^>% # / €/.^ ''W //A ^ M I%otographic Sciences Corporation 33 WEST MAIN STRUT WflSTIR.N.Y. I4SS0 (71ft) S7a-4303 ^ V '^ , if 4 . *'^ ?^; ^ ^^W 5'* 92 III \h paign, of every civil or military work, thus drawn out and laid down he forehand, is so clear that it requires no comment. NOTE IX. Chap. 0. pagt 66. — In pursuing a course of experiments and improve- ments, which is always a useful occupation, our artillery should however remember that our military instruction is yet in its infancy, nor wait t«> establish our system of artillery ou a uniform, simple and convenient footing, till they have run over the same round of errors and trials which have brought at length the European artillery to such a state of formida- ble perfection The first and essential point is to render our artillery uni- form, so that as many pieces and wheels as possible may be the same in all the calibers both of cannons and caissons, and thus replaced wirh ease when any one is put out of service, shattered, worn or broken. In fixing on a system of artillery, we had best begin by profiting of the experience of Europe. We can hardly expect to imagine any thing which has not been imagined and tried under every form in the course of three centu- ries of uninterrupted experiments, intense meditations, and constant im- provements in France. And after all the wars of the revolution, in every climate, in every nature of soil and country, mountains, plains, marshes and deserts, the French artillery, the most scitntific in Europe, have uni- formly come to the conclusion that its system, with very slight improve- ments, was brought to perfection about forty or fifty yenrs ago, under the direction of the celebrated Gribeauval. The improvementB which some officers of brilliant talent and imagination, Montalembert, Congreve, be. have since attempted, have generally been given up as futile and in- convenient. NOTE X. Chap 5. pa^e 70. — In the course of this work, I have always considered tlie ordnance department as distinjfuished from the artillery ; but why they are thus divided in two departments I could never understand. England is the only country of Europe where this dis,iOBition exists, either because it was so established at first, or because it was thouglit that the immense quantity of armament which 'iliat country fabricates, required a separate corps, occupied with no otht-r fimctions. Hut even in F'ngland this system is vicious. The advantage of uniting tijese funrtions in the artillery is obvious and clear. Thts bent judges of the fabrication of arms are those who mr them and try them constantly : the tlu.'ory of that fabri- cation whi«'h requires such accurate iwid experimental knowledge, is best improved by practice, and the practice by theory. The corps of the ar- 93 lillery loses much of its value by this dirision of its labours ; it becomes y mere corps of cannon fir^rs. In Fiance (and the artillery in all the rest of Europe was more or less modelled upon the French) the young officer destined to that service, after two or three years of preparatory studies, spent two years at first in the polytechnic schoil, to acquire general mathematical information, and as many aftei .vards in the school of application of mathematical science, to the particular servict of the artillery. He entered then as second lieu- tenant into an arsenal, to study and practise the fabrication of armament, powder, projectiles, firiworks, &tc. He passed into a regiment of artillery as first lieutenant : when promoted to the rank of captain in second, he returned to the arsenals, and when he rose to the first captaincy, took the command of a company. On his next promotion; he became a sous di- redeur of artillery, and superintended the fabrics ; he then passed to the command o^a battalion or squadron of heavy or light artillery, to the di- rection of an arsenal, the command of a regim-^nt, fctc. The construction of all batteries and military reconnaissances, conjointly with the engi- neers, the administration of the armament and warlike approvisionment of armies, the erection of temporary bridges on pontoons, made part of his attributions. Thus, in the course of his service, an officer of artillery became perfectly acquainted with the fabricaiion of armament in the ar- senals and all its theory, with its properties and use in the field, with the command and administration of trooj s, both of horse and foot, and was a finished officer by the time that he had reached the higher ranks of his profession. The artillery furnished excellent staff and general officers ; Napoleon, Pichegru and Marmont were formed in that service- In this point of view it would be of invaluable use in America. NOTE XI. Chap &. pageTl—k sliglit review of the composition and function of the corps of engineers in France, will show what importance was attached to it in that country. Till lately, France uiis thf only country which had such an cstablishmoHt ; the engineers of all the othir powers of Europe, with the exception of a few eminent and stlf-tau^ht individual^ w.'re very bad. Holland, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Hiid BKvaria, have however pro- duced some men of science and talent in that profession ; Coehorn, Lands- berg, Glasser, Virgin, Rosard, be. The corps of engineers in France was divided in several classes, applied separately to the civil, military or naval iervicM. So numerous and im- u jsBitant are the cares which each of these services require from an engi neer, so abstruse the calculations and meditations necessary to cany thtm to perfection, that the advantages of tliis division of labour are ev'dent at firet view. Brought up in the same preliminary schools, the general m- Ptruction of these classes was similar and uniform, their rank and rtipec- tability the same ; they often co-operated either with each other or with the officers of artillery in the same works. The topographical engineer might be said to lay the ground-work for the others to work upon ; they depended on the good and intelligent exe- cution of his surveys, and on their being af .ted to the purpose for which they were required, either for establish.xg systems of military or naval defence, or opening proper communications, roads, bridges and canals- The topographer was not, therefore, considered in France as a mere sur- veyor or landscape painter, but as a most useful and important officer, equal in rank ^nd respectability to the rest of the corps of engineers. In the staffs of armies, their sf-rvices were considered as indispensable. I need only mention the names of Bevthi/^r, the friend and companion of Napo- leon, Generals Bacler D'Albe,Vallogne, Colonels Henry, Puissant, fcc. to shor • the rank and character of these officers. Another class of engineers was exclusively cha.-ged with naval con- structions, ship building, &,c. Inferior as the French navy was latterly to the English, in this branch it was superior, by the public confession ol the best jurges in England. (Vide note G.) Another class, applied to the civil service, was ciiargcd wilii the con- struction, reparation, preservation and administration ol" all public works, buildings, roads, bridges, eanals, fcc. The beauty, the grandeur and convenience of these works, ar<' known f(. all who have travelled in France ; their solidity, and the adniiri.ble order and cheapness of their administration, are not equally so. Every project was maturely discussed before it was pui in execution, and then executed under (he direction, in- spection and administration of that excellent corps of officers, who had all received a profound, scienliflc and uniform education in the same schools, and worked on the same principles. nor The corps of military engineers comprised seven generals, 102 supc- _..ir officers, 484 subaltern officers, besides six companies of miners, 57(> men, and four battalions of snppers or pioneers, 70U2 men ; these Inst were chiefly charged with superintending the details of the work traced by (he engiueers, a most useful establishment. For it doss not suffice to trace works ; they must be cnndiicttd by workmen who understand them. Such a corpj un a small icale would be very desirable here. 95 Tlie corns oi military engineers was not merely charged with tracing the military works required of them, on plana adapted to the Purpose o which they were destined, and to the sites where they were situated; they were also charged with their construction reparation, P;«-;-^'«i;;/^X all the immense details of the administrat.on of these labours The ad „,irahU.. order and cheapness of that ad,mn.strat.on, I need "J* '^J^ J" Sfirvroad badges and canals, the military topography of the fron- ts the framing of miUtary memoirs, defensive or offensive, m.htary r:::ilances.^ tl best means of employing the.r serv.oes on erery occasion, entered also into their attributions. NOTE XII. rfc«« r ««^e 77 -We have subjoined in our Appendix (No. 2), the evcelLnt report of Mr. ^^ h";;j;j;XoUeestab Colonel M'Ree -"-«^- ^^^"^'iif^ttuTt e-ember that four years of X^i:;!^^:^^^-- at the,cho»l Of appHcation, are nacessary tp form a good cngic'v ^ APPENDIX No. I. Report uf the Marshal Duk» of Ragusa, on a work, entitled, " Travels in England and Essay on the Improvement$ of the Artillery and Engineer Departments in that Country," by Chevalier Dupin, Corresponding Member of the Insttiliite. (Royal Institute of France.) (Extracted from the Maritime and Colonial Annals.} The Perpetual Secretary of the Academy of Mathematical Sciences, certi- fies that the following extract is taken from ths minutes of thfe mteting of Mon- day, 23d March, 1818. ■ H The Academy has commissioned me, with Messrs De Prony and De Rosily, to report on a Manuscript, entitled, " Travels in England and Essay on the Improvements of the Artillery, &.c. by Mr. Dupin, Naval Engineer. This task we are going to fulfil. The author undertook his Toyage with all the means of rendering it useful in its results, the best recommendations, the talents necessary to see and examine with profit, and an ardent love for science, by which he had been already more than once distinguished. Mr. Dupin was uni- formly well received in England.* Ir. his manuscript he has chiefly attended to the stat»! ^. the materiel of war in that country ; but in our account of his interesting work, we shall not confine ourselves strictly to follow the order in which he has arranged his subject. Ist. Military Establishments.— Mr. Dupin has visited with atten- tion the chief military establishments of Great Britain, Woolwich, Ports- inoutli, Chatham, &ic. • Chiefly by the most distinguished military characters of all ranks, General Hut- chinwri, the fon-ier commander-in-chitf of the army of Egypt, Generals Ferguson, Long, Robert Wilson, the celebrated miUliiry writer, the Colonels of artillery end en- gineers, Mudgc, Chapman, Elphinstcne, Miller, Griffin, Captains Colby, Rutherford, 97 Every thing relative to ihe personnel and materiel oi the artillery, hoth ill the land and sea service, and all fortifications in England, depeiid on one branch of the war department* Woolwich is the most important arsenal of that country, and comprises workshops (atteliers) of all kinds for the fabrications of the artillery, a foundry, magazine, barracks, a mili- tary school, fere; in short, all that is necessary for instruction and for pre- paring, iweserving, and'putting in service the waterid both of the land and sea service. Every tiling at Woolwich is on a grand and even magnificent scale; Ihe neighbouring grounds have|been drained at great expense; the Thames, bordered with granite quays, and the sands deposited by the river, which seemed accumulated beyond the power of man to remove, dispersed by a steam-engine of prodigious power. Canals, with well-devised sluices, convey the transports to the .'ery door of the store-hous«s, which are equally remarkable for their vast size, their elegant and convenient con- struction, the care with which they are kept, the canals which divide them, to guard against the communication of fire, the iron brMlpeswhch connect them, and tiie immense and well classed matenel which they contain. Most of the fabrications for the use of government are carried on at Woolwich, the other establishments being mere depots. Powder and small arms are not fabricated, but purchased by government and proved before they are received. The artillery cast at Woolwich is all brass. The iron pieces are chiefly cast at the cannon foundry in Scotland, a most important establishment, where all the processes of the manufacture have been brought to a point of singular perfection. The parks of Portsmouth and Chatham are, next to Woolwich, the chief depots of the British artillery, especially for the sea service. I lie same grandeur is displayed in their works, the same care and order appears in their details, the same quantity of matemt is deposited m them. od FoRTiFiCATioNS.-Portsmouth and Chatham, those important positions, containing such a mass of military stores, are fortified and their works were strengthened at the time that an invasion was feared from the French army encamped at Boulogne. Those of Portsmouth arc re. markablefrom the judicious management of the waters to augment their defence. At Chatham the casemates constructed in the works, suflic^e to lodge the whole corps ..f sappers, miners, and pontoncers. Generally there h nothing remarkable in Uie fortifications of England. They are con- •f. A »iciou< (1i«pojition. (Vide xoMO, thap, 5.) 13 ^^ p<» 98 structed from French books. Vauhan is the chief oracle of the British engineers as of all others ; Carnot's works are esteemed ; some of Mon- talembert's they tried, but they prov*d too expensive, even for the finances of Great Britain. Some less important but ingenious details, pro- posed by French authors, have been executed, and towers (1) of a simpler construction than ours, built on the coast. A plan of Gibraltar in relief, represents the multiplied casemates by which the English have endeavour- ed to reduce to absolute absurdity attacks which were already considered impracticable. 3. Machinert.— The most remarkable circumstance in the Britisk artillery is the machinery employed in its fabrications The habitual use or machinery has made such progress in England, and even the smallest manufactures are supported in that country by such ingenious inventions, that her great military fabrics must necessarily have received proportional improvements. The English value man at a very high rate (2); their object is to reduce his labour as much as possible to that mere direction, wh/ch must be exercised by an intelligent being, and to draw from the powers of brute matter or animal nature all their moving forces. The steam-engine, the hydraulic |>res8, and various combinations of these tw© machines, are at this day the chief agents of British industry. The work of Mr. Dupin gives some very clear and useful details on such machines as he had occasion to visit. The steam-engine is carried to a high degree of perfection i.j Britain, It is really a wonderful sight to see it work with so little noise and so much regularity, so precise, so punctual, and yet so powerful, that it produces the effect of 200 or 300 horses, with a rapidity which can be augmented to any required degree of swiftness. The hydraulir. press of Pascal, improved by Bramah, furnishes also powers which can be diversely applied. By means of that press, the British squeeze to the smallest possible volume their military stores, equipments, provisions, especially their forage, and thus render their conveyance so easy, that in Portugal their armies always enjoyed plenty before a starving enemy. In their arsenals, one single man, to whom the lever of Bramah gives the lifting strength of fifty, presents to the instruments animated by the steam-engine, all kinds of materials that seem to be fashioned by their own voluntary motion. Wood, iron and brass are presented to the (1) Martello towers. (2) This is certainly a mistaken notion. No people valiw the life ef mi>B so cheftply, but machinery is cheaper. I 99 be 1 moving force of saws, planes, knives, wedges, files and augers; they assume in a thousand different ways every kind of curve in the.r surfaces, and every possible shape, without noise, without any apparent effort and v/}*h inconceivable rapidity. The emperor of Russia, in his visit to England, purchased two Bramah's presses and thirty steam-engines, not with the view of depositing them as a barren decoration in his museums, but of employing them m h.s arsenals. Shall we observe that the steam-engine, originally derived trom the discovery of a Frenchman, is at this day one of the most po^vertul meansof the prosperity of Britain? that the hydraulic press, a French invention, is one of England's most useful machines ? that the rnechanicaa Brunei, a Frenchman, DOW directs the chief mechanical labours of Great Britain ? What has not been invented by French genius ? and what is tn* inveiition of which British policy has not availed itself. 4. Military Instructiojt.-A good instruction being the first founda- tion of all success, the English, for some years past, have «PP '^d wi^^ redoubled care to military education. They chiefly endeavour to fo m a corps of artillery and engineers, able to rival those ot any «ther nation^ In 1806 they established a school for that purpose at Woolwich, on a large scale, constructed vast buildings, with all their use ul dependencies, halls, dwelling-rooms, laboratories, cabinets of models, a library, Uc. Pro fessors were invited, installed and lodged,concourse3 opened for the elec^ tion of scholars, in which the candidates were examined ftej" one year o, preparatory studies, and those who were admitted entertained fou. yea« in L school at the expense of government. Their studies were chiefly directed to mathematics, physics, chemistry, mechanics, fortifications, topography and geodesy, ballistics, the nplieation of the theory of all these sciences to military practice, French, drawing, fencing, dancing, »c. The annual examinati.ms are conducted at Woolwich wiUi great im- Dartiality. The value of each science is represented by a given number, Cordoned to its importanc. ; the value of the scholar's examination by aportion of it, proportioned to his progress in that science, and the 8U n toL of each chilar's numb.- in all his classes gives the estimated vaLof lus instruction, according to which he is afterwards ranked ai.l Promoted This method, which necessarily excites great emulation, was Ked, as we believo. i.; imitation of the institutions of our Polytechnic school (!)• Schools, well kept, and well organised, have been established for th« (1) These amelioration, arc due lo Col. Mudgc, the present Gov. MR?, of I.e«(!bn aad Corresp Itnt. France. 100 f'vith isolated and private dwellings, those cannoneers who have families. At the school of Chatham our author saw the troops exercising on a vast ground, ]>repared for the purpose. They raised intrenchments, at- tacked them, (the sappers and miners by their peculiar modes of attack) whilst the pontoneers, in silent order, manoeuvred with their pontoons at the word of command, rapidly deploying and replaying them (forming and breaking up the bridge). The English were far behind us in military instruction twenty years ago; since that time they have studied our institutions, our wars, successes, and faults, our books and experience. They copy us, it is true, but the English are apt scholars, and have often surpassed their masters. Materiel OF the Artillery. — In the depot of Woolwich alone are above 10,000 cannon, and au iinmense number of mortars, howitzers, carronades, and swivels. The emperor of Russia was astonished at find- ing such a mass of armament, &ic. in a nation that has so profusely supplied all kinds of arms, since twenty-five years, to all who would use them. He was told that before the war, this depot contained 25,000 cannon, and other materiel in proportion ; besides which, enormous quan- tities were furnished by the continual labour of the private foundries. The parks of Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth, although smaller, con- tain also a great quantity of artillery. Every object is ranged in these magazines with the most perfect order and exquisite neatness, classed by calibers, taken to pieces, packed, embaled and corded, ready for em» barkation, so that, in lime of the profoundest peace, England, in twenty- four hours after the order is given, can despatch to any part of the globe, an immtnse mass of military stores, and means nf destructiov. From (1> Aa excellent inslitution, and deserving imit»tioti. 101 time to time, they are visited, unbaled, cleaned, and then packed up again in their cases and barrels. Enormous quantities of highly finished projectiles lie in the arsenals, some in piles of 20,000 or 30,000, others loaded, adapted to their car- tridges, [ensabot^s) and packed in boxes and caissons. They contain a number of mortars to fire granadoes, for the defence of towns, complete equipages of mountain artillery, a quantity of cast and forged iron car- riages for the defence of the coasts and colonies, plac ^ carriages, and coast carriages, which are merely naval carriages on frames, turning in the Fren;:h manner, incendiary balls and carcasses of pll kinds, &i.c — It did not enter into our traveller's plan to enumerate the particulars of the general system of field artillery, recently adopted in the British ar my. We know that it is constructed at great expense, with great care and intelligence, and possesses some remarkable advantages as to the facility of being easily embarked and disembarked, a condition indispensable in England. Improvements and Innovations in the British Artillert. — The British officers of artillery have been lately very busy about improve- ments, but although their discoveries have been announced with some ostentation, it does not appear that they have invented any thing very formidable or destructive. In 1811, incsndiary balls, of a kind known a long time since in France, were tried before the admiralty as a new invention; they have howitzers loaded with shot(l), to which they attach a great importance. The best judges of such inventions are those against whom they are directed, and their effect upon our troops proves that we should adopt them [i). Amongst the different experiments which have been undertaken in England for the sake of improvement, those begun by Dr. Hutton (3) at Woolwich, on the tir(on the swiftness and direction of the prqiectile)of the artillery, are most remarkable. These experiments are continued by the chiefs and professors of the arsenal and military school. Much talent, care and perseverance, and a great deal of expense, have been applied to them. They will teach to the artillery of other nations, those elementary prin- ciples of ballistics which are yet too little known. A most exact pendu- lum, of very large dimensions, is employed in these experiments, and the wheeling disks, invented by a French officer, (4) are sometimes used. (1) Shrapnell shelli. (2) lu wriung this pasiftge, the duke of Ragusa probably thought of the fcattlo of Salaraanca, where he had been wounded by one of these shells, it is the opinion of the best judges, that but for his wound, he would have gained tlie battle. (3) See a full account of these experiments, In Gay de Vernon, toI. i. chap. vii. HO. 48, p. 102-116. Paris edition of 1805 (4) Col. Grobert. 102 Mr. Bupin was •greeahlj surprised to find the British officers ti'ying some experiments which he had proposed in France, to ascortain the es- sential properties of the large timber employed in constructions. In gene- ral, the spirit of military improvement has talcen a grand and decisive character in Britain. In some affai. s, they suffered from our lancers ; they immediately organized corps ©f lancers ; ii others, they were charge'! by our cuirassiers, and whilst the London '^japers inveighed against them, the British general^ like an able and eniightened chief, went in person to visit those manufactories and wor^-shops, at Paris, where our cuirasses arc fabricated. Several experiments have latterly been made for lightening the heavy artillery, especially for the sea service, for however secure the British navy may appear in the possession of its present supremacy, their government still apply themselves with ardour to improve it Generals Congreve and Blnomfield have also turned their thoughts to wards lightening the weight of the heavier calibers of the artillery. Gene- ral Congreve's cannons were cited at first as possessing some wonderful and particular advantages over those of General Bloomfield. Though th«be may be exaggerated, it appears, from repeated and exact experiments, that they are actually superior, and both have some considerable advan- tages over the ordinary artilleiy for the particular services to wluch they are destined. It, u General Congreve is the most active promoter of every innovation in the British artillery. He has occupied himself very much about the con- struction of all kinds of ordnance carriages, and published a work on the subject, but in which wc found nothing but what ws had frequently read in French authors, especially in Montalembert. He has, however, taken for that work a patent, which if it cannot confer upon him the glory of an inventor, secures to him the valuable monopoly of the sale of these carria- ges to the armateurs, although, were it not for his patent, they might easily have constructed them from French books. These inventions have, never- theless, been appreciated, at least by the public, with that partiality which so easily attaches itself in England to every thing that touches the national glory. The chief title of General Congreve to fame, is the invention of those rockets that bear his name. Before they were introduced in England, they were used by the Indians, who employed them in the defence of Seringapatani Their use was proposed in France, wher« they luse ^th^^^^^^^^^^ of but few individuals ^o^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ telhct which is requisite to embrace four branches of f^^^^^Se, "» ^''^^^^^^^ Sive as are tho.. in question, and to pracUs. them all, ^'^^ th'it^orrec ness and promptitude, which is the F-'-^^dvantage o ^^^^ - J^ ° J themselves principally to but one of these branches In ord«^ to a « both of these inconveniences, the theoretical and Pr;'*^*' ^""^l.^'d into cessary in the conduct and operations of an army, h«« b««"^';'^^^^^ two distinct classes -, the one embracing whatever .s common to all the arms; the other confined to whnt p^rtUnUrly appertains o "<=«' «'^™- arms, ""^ ""' . ., .y.^^^^on has followed in the instruction; the grit brancn to '""="" . ^ j uractlce of each •rm m pst- previously been »«''1"''^'^V . and dutieHr-.^ «hich constitute a cation t.. the particular obiects and due ^' - J^ * ^ „j,b. school of application. In hose '^^^^^^''X ' ach arm But those na- '-"-T ""'^^ VX t:^^J^ -arH- on root, find nons who, H. tin •• ot peact, ktep u ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ 108 last case, the students at the school of application receive liliewise two kinds of instruction : 1st. That which is common to the several arms tt» which they are destined ; and £d, that which is exclusively necessary to the arm in which they are respectively to serve. Among all nations possessing military academies, the schools of appli- cation for such as are destined for the infantry and cavalry, arc the regi- ments of the army in which they are to serve. It is oi joining and doing duty with their respective regiments, that they learn to apply the instruc- tion received at the elementary school, and acquire whatsoever relates to the discipline, the conduct, administration, and legislation of troops. * This canuot be the case, however, with those destined for the artillery and engineers, or the topographical corps. They are all, more or less, lia- ble to be employed separately, and immediately after leaving the school » and are deprived of the advantages peculiar to the officer of infantry or cavalry, of making their first essays in their professional duties, under the eyes of their chiefs, or of those who hav3 preceded them ; and being un- assisted by the advice or opinions of their superiors in rank, knowledge, and experience, they are not only left without the means of obtaining the instruction of whieu they are yet deficient, but are also frequently exposed in the execution of the duties confided to them, to rompromit the public service by the commission of errors, which too often lead to irreparable misfortunes, and which are productive, at least, of a wasteful expenditure of public property, always beyond, sometimes exceeding an hundred fold, the expense of giving a proper education to the individual who has not been qualified to exercise his profession, with satisfaction to himself, or utility to his country. T' se considerations alone appear to us sufficient to show the advan- tage, if not necessity, of dividing the course of military instruction between two schools ; the one elementary, and the other u school of application. The elementary school at Wfst Point has hitherto been very inferior as such ; and altogether inadequate to the objects for which it was esta- blished. A project has been presented, however, calculated to place this school upon the footing of the most perfect of the kind which exist. As to a school of application, there is none. The degree of instruction, given to the cadets at the school of West Point, has heretofore been for * In tiie military srhools of infantry nnd cavalry in France, theoretical ietioni in th^w hranch«» ofinliiUiry instrutfimi were given to the scholars; and for thi sake of unifor- mity in that in«tniction, th<'»e courtes were very meftil. The service of tlio dhpols KiYcd afterwardt as a icbool ut application 109 the mostpart limited to a general acquaintance with those branches of knowledge, which are common to all the arms of an army ; and which ought to nave been extended, and applied to artillery, fortification and topography. The consequence has been, that the officers of infantry, art.Ilery,eng.neer8 and of the topographical corps, have had the same degree and kind of mstruction ; and ihe only real difference which exist- ed between them on leaving the school, consisted in the uniform of their respective corps or regiments. If any have been so fortunate as to ren- der hemselves serviceable, either in the artillery or engineers, the cause must be sought for, in then- own industry, and not in the education re- «eived by them at West Point, which was barely sufficient to excite a desire for military inquiries and of military pursuit?. inluT"'"' *° «""f"«te the branches of knowledge which are common to all the arms; and those which are necessary, and appertain, more or less exclusively, to each or several of these arms. The subjoined table exhibits the two principal divisions of the instruction. The first part includes the branches of knowledge that are necessary to all who are destined forany arm of the military establishment; either as officers in the exercise of their immediate professional duties, or as men of infor- mation, liable, in the course of their military career, to be intrusted with other interestB. It is, therefore, that the mathematics for instance are ex- tended farther than 18 strictly necessary to the officer of infantry; ulTr\ f P'^T!'"^^' philosophy, and chemistry, are inserted Oder the elementary division, rather as forming part of a liberal educa- .on than of mere military utility ; and finally, the several kinds of draw- o'drioT o rh"^"" ^''« ^'^•"'^""t-y 'I'vision, as an advantageous in- uhuTlv I "^'Z^' -^quisition and exercise of the art of topogra- ^ II e,t- nr" r^"" ''?''" "^ '^'^"'•^'"^'^ ^-^ "f ^he instn^ 'on. will re,|uire fie professors, rtiree teachers, n„d two instructors The Tor ""'"'^' "^^ depend upon the number of individua Jt a The same table presents the second part of the instruction which .s m addition to the first, and is necessary' to those destiner r'the ^ carried to a higher degree, which is rciulered necessary by their an- rv ^; M ^ ? '" *""«''^ '" *^« «**«"» '^''i^h is exclusively necessi- 7ul ed r "^f""*' •^"^'"'''" ' ""^ """'^--y *« "•« ^'^t^"' that i J only e. quired fo the officers at that arm. Geometry and trigonometry rcLve 1 .»^.r app .oation to topographical operations, and -pherical trigonome y ^.d descrip ivo geometry, to the projection, Lc. of charts. TW^pTrt of "" ■■' ^••' ""= "Uf,'ui at one scnouJ, or two separ:lt^ H t! lie .chool.. In the «rst case, the ^^'^f ^:^:S^ir::^: r^^'^"'^°:^T'S.twhethr the entire course (or both of these d>v.- schools, it win not be the ^f « '"^'«P;"«''?' /^'^h/rron is herefore to that here established, shou d exist m fact J^e que^.o ^^ reduced to this; shall the f^'^'^^^^J^^l'll^Zut a separate instruction, be tau.ht at West ?«»",»' J'^^.^^^J^/^^ part constitute school, to be established elsewhere ? Or h U the ^^'^"^ P ^^^^^, ^f an additional class ^[^'^^^y'^lttt^^^ and topo- rr:;i-r^a:^^^^^^^^^^^^ --^ ^^^ "^ mentary classes? The second dW.io'n of the --°V°Sr""a "hS'or eU» ,„„„ed .able, „,d «Weh n,u,. -"' '"'^ ;7X ^^jLiion of the „t a,,plication,«prad..«l a. "ell »'*t~;„^i°, „f mathematics, to elettlentar, branches of mstmc |0n, and *» '™;'^^^^^ ,h. ,H,„dkal the theory of artillery, fornncal.on and <»W«7^'°„,,i„„, „H,e the or academic part of th«dm«n »' *« °;^„°; "„f ,he pound, to application of these *«»'»' V.^X„"s>ra course of actoal cxperi- reqoires, and most be taugh to *« »'"''«"«•"» , .„ „^„„„y ,„ make U.ndl.rac«e«mp— ^^^ tS'niu'ret th" d^cisi«r of the present ,ucstio„. The advantages which may be ■'^^^^f.^rtr.CX'cl^" e,tabb.ln„ents, >-'°'-^^t' ^ .""sth aretbe dnties of the super- 'rr;hcpnrch,se„fa„-tiona,,ite,»hi^--avo«.^^^ ^Hsir ""•-..—,» library, instrum...... .„ t e'r:'oT.hose no"™ on hand at West Pom. A A III taence their course at the school of application, if these institutions were separate; and. 6tli In avoiding a loss of time on the part of the graduates, which would take place on their transfer to tlie school of application in the case just supposed. The following are the considerations which oppose a union, and which consequently urge a separation of these two schools. 1st. The classes of application will consist of those i.^dividuals destin- ea lor the artillery, engineers, and topographical corps, who shall have graduated at the termination of the ei.mentary course of instruction, and Who w.ll cor^sequently be then promoted by brevet or otherwise, in the same manner as those destined for the infantry. There must probably be two classes .f application, and tho number of students of which they ought to consist, m order to supply the annual vacancies in their respec- 11T?7. T ''^ '=«« than seventy. The school will tnerefore be augmented by this amount, and will be composed of commissioned offi- cers and cadets, whose rights, interests and occupations will be more or less dissimilar; and who must consequently be governed by regulation., fcc. essentially different, which will at once destroy that unity of system necessary to all military institutions. ^ 2d. The difference in point of rank, in the students of the elementary Uasses and those composing the classes of application, will originate c aim, to precedence and superiority on the one part, and resistance to proper nmUs.""' """ '" '''^''' ^^'''^ "° regulations can restrain within who I n r i "'? '"" P'""^*''''*'" "^ *"^ ^^-"^ department of science discord^ Individual interest and feelings must of necessity, and frequent- l^armonv.n.''''. ^'^^l '^'^ '"''^'" ^"'^ cadets, destructive of that harmony and order which should prevail, and are bel'.ved essentia! to the successful operations of the school. tion?ofTlt' V'"' '^ 'i' *? '''' "^ P'"'*''"^*"-^' '^'^ studies and occupa- lui n/to h. " '". ".t''' '"'"^ '''^•"•^"^ '" their character, and re- Tlrfn^^^rtVoX- . r"'^'/^*'^ ^''"^ '^"'^ ""ler circumstances, wil render two distinct systems of organization and police indispensable r«n ienc?'''" ^ '""'"^'u "''^'''' ''''''^^ without incurring some ion- JZl Z '"';r' r "•"'""* *'••' """'"•^^ «f """« «^vantage on the part •f one or the other division of the school, and perhaps of bjth. The s. 112 it: nerintendent will, in fact, havMwo schools to govern and conduct hi. time and attention will therefore bo divided, altenmtely occupied with the peculiar concerns of each, and frequently employed in reconolmg conflict- ine interests. The whole system of administration for the two schools, J\\ be more or less controlled or influenced, by the inonvenient and un- necessary relations in which they are placed to each other. The advantages and disadvantages here enumerated, as attending the union of the two divisions of the course of military instruction at the same school, arc obviously too different in their kind to admit of being com- pared ; nor is it necessary that they should be. The expense attendms the separate establishment of a school of application, might be offered as a reason for rejecting it altogether ; but by no means for uniting it to th.. TmenLy school, when the operations of both would be obstructed m consequence of so doing, and their ultimate success rendered more than doubtful. Amone the advantages that will be derived from the establishrnent of a school of apt>lication, are the means it will afford of providing for other departments of national service, besides those which have been men- tioned ; and by locating it immediately under the eyes of the government, the measures necessary to enlarge, or to adapt it to the particular objects in view, will be more readily ascertained, and applied with greater cer- tainty of effect. The necessity of this institution will become urgent, in the event of one or more additional elementary schools being created It %vill then be expedient, for those very reasons of economy which now form the only objections that can be opposed to it ; and it will he necessary, because it will enable the respective candidates for th. -f";-"-'^'-^'"'^;^^' and topographical corps, to be assembled at the same school, and to re- ceive in co.nmon their last degree of instruction ; and because, that, by no other means, can that uniformity in the instruction and duties of each ol these arms he attained, which is essential to their perfection. We are, therefore, of opinion, that a school of application is decidedly necessary to the military service of the cou .try ; that, to be rendered effi- cieut it ought to be separate from a'l immediate connexion with any other institution ; and that it should have a central location, and as little re- moved as possible from uiidei- the observation of government. Which is respectfully submitted to the honourable J. C. Calhoun, Secretary of VVar-^^ BERNARD, Brigadier General. ^ WM. M'REE, Major of Engiueers. ( uct ; his with the conflict- schoolsi and un- ■^* #■■ iding the the same ling corn- attending 3ffered as ; it to tht, ructed in lore than iment of a ; for other )een men- ivernment, liar objects reater cpr- urgent, in reated. It 1 now form necessary, LT, artillery, and to re- that,byno I of each of I decidedly tndered effi- th any other as little re- D. Calhoun, leneral, ^ngiueers. 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