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1 2 3

«9#«M»4NMNMMMMMH»««9»»4»»»

t tt I

CJ O N D U C T

OF TP H E

I N X S T R Y

Impftrdall^ exammedi Vc^

rw^WPw

♦>.

%^ ^

» •• v,»^

THE

CONDUCT

OF THE

MINISTRY

Impartially Examined.

And the Pamphlet entitled

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR,

K^fiitcd from its own Principles,

Qtie Nation^ toujours echauffee pouroit plus atfement etre
con4uite par fes pajpons que par la raifon^ et il feroit
facile a ceux qui la gowuerneroient 4e lui faire faire des
enterprifes contrefes veritables interets,

L* Esprit des Loix.

LONDON:

Printed for R. Griffiths, in the Strand.

M.DCCLX.

THE

CONDUCT

OF THE

MINISTRY

Impartially examined, ^c.

TH E author of the following (heets, Is
fenfible of the difadvantages he lies
under, in attempting, thus late, to oppofe the
popular prejudice, which has been induftri-
oufly railed in favour of the fpirited and fpe-
cious Conjtderations on the prefent German
War. But, if his remarks on that pamph-
let are juft and impartial, truth, however
ilowly, will force its way in oppofition to
fallacy : if, on the contrary, they arc frivo-
lous and ill grounded, their earlier appear-
ance might perhaps have better anfvvered the
interefl of the bookfcller, but would not have
been of any fervice to the public.

B Upon

[ 2 ]

upon a candid Review of thefe Confidera"
tions, it mud be owned that there is merit in
the compofition ; and there are fome ani-
madvcrfions in it, to which every man, who
is not a bigot to party, mud readily afTent.
The writer's ridicule, for inftance, on the na-
tional idolatry of the K — g ofP ■ a, is, in
fome refpeds, not ill placed. And it mud be
confefTed, that the regard we have paid to
that monarch, by our public illuminations,
extravagant elogiums, and other teflimonies
of indifcreet attachment, have been carried
to an excefs, which has done no credit to the
wifdom or fpirit of Great-Britain.

But our Confiderer's Antipruflian farcafms
are too indifcriminate ; and it is the intent of
thefe (heets to ihew that his refledtions
throughout are either falfe, or exaggerated
and fallacious : that, in fhort, he has either
been deceived himfelf, or, what is more to
his difhonour, has endeavoured to deceive
others.

He writes, it is true, with great appear^
ance of difintereftedners and moderation. He
has too much judgment, to be abufive or
fcurrilous in terrm : but an acute obferver
may be led to conclude, from his matter^ that
he has no iincere difpoiition to candor and;
impartiality.

Was the writer of thefe (heets inclined to
imitate the Confiderer, by indulging himfelf
in perfonai reflexions, it would not be diffi-
cult

[ 3 ]
cult, perhaps, to conjedlure the motives of the
Conliderations, from the well known con-
nexions of the author.

The malice of party is dormant, but not
extind:. The veterans in ftate intrigue know
when, and by what arts, to work upon po-
pular inftabiHty. When they find a pro-
per time to fet fire to the brand of fa<ftion,
their adherents (land prepared in every cor-
ner to hurl it about, till they have enkindled
a general flame.

To fpeak without a metaphor. When
the leaders of a difcontcnted party, being
ftrengthenei by new confederates^ find a fea*
fonable opportunity of pradiling upon the
public, their obfequious emiflaries are at hand
to difFufe their fentiments, and inftill preju*
dices into the minds of people. Some per-*
haps, of greatcft weight among their depen-
dents, may be inftruded to echo thofe fen-
timents in a certain affembly, where no one
ought to fpeak by direction : and there are
fo few who judge from their own percep-
tions, that the mukitude are readily difpofed
to believe, that arguments, fo powerfully
urged, and fo folemnly adopted, are unan'»^
fwerabk'y without confidering that all thefe
echoes of applaufe, are nothing more than
the cry of fadtion reverberated.

But if the deluded public are fofar blinded
by prejudice, that they cannot attend impar*
tially to any reafoning againft the Confidera-

, B 2 tionSf

[ 4 ]

' tionSi at leaft, it is to be hoped that they will
believe the ConfiJerer againft himfclf. It is
from his own principles that I propofc to re-
fute him, and to expofe the fallacy of his
conclufijns.

For this purpofc it will be proper, firft to
take a view of his general propofitions, and
then to confidcr his particular applications of
them, with rcfped to the German and French
war.

Page 9. He afTures us, that " From the
" time when the whole of France was united
to the crown, and the liberties of the
ftates and nobility abfolutely fubjedled to
its power, the kingdom of France has
been, in the extent of its country, the
number of its inhabitants, and the great-
nefsof its revenue, fuperior to Britain."
The firfl- and fecond of thefe propofitions
we may readily grant, without allowing the
inferences which he afterwards draws from
theni; and as to the third, it will be animad-
verted upon in its proper place.

He proceeds in the next place to eftablifh
the following principles: *' France is ftronger
at land, not only than England, but than
any power in Europe. The empire of
Germany in the extent of its country, and
the number of its inhabitants, may be
equaly if not fuperior to France ; but the
d'vifion of it into a great number of fepa-
rate independent flares, while France ha?

((

Its

[ 5 ]

<* its whole force united under one abfolute
«* monarch, renders Germany greatly infe-
** rior to France. Hence it is that France
*« for a century paft has been formidable to
" the reft of Europe; and has twice been
*« able to fupport a long war againji the uni-
" ted alliance of the whole''

" Whenever any power in Europe (hall
" have grown up to a degree of ftrength,
** much greater than that of any other
** power, it from thence forward becomes
" the intereft of the other dates to be watch-
ful over it, to guard againfl the growth of
it, and mutually to ajjijl each other^ when
they are attacked hy it. This is the univer-
** fal maxim of politicks, which has been held
good in all ages, from the lirfl: eftablilhing
of governments. T>um JinguU piignant^
univerfi 'vincuntiir^ (that is) while the fe^ue-
ral powers Jight Jinglyy the whole arefubdiiedy
is related by the hiftorian as a caufe of
extending the Roman monarchy, and muft
be a principal, or at leall a concomitant
caufe in the growth of every other."
Here we may without fcruple join ifTue
with the Confiderer. Thefe propofitions are
uncoLtravertible : and the reader is defired
to keep them in view tiiroughout, for by re-
ferring to them, and fome which follow, we
fhall be able to refute the Confiderations.

Having eftablifhed thefe juft principles,
he proceeds to obferve, that " The three

((

powers

if 1

€C

[ 6 ]

<* powers of Eurqpe which are moft endan-
gered by France, and which by their
union alone can carry on an effe(flual land
war againrt France, are Germany, Hol-
land, and England. Spain and Savoy,
Ruflia, Denmark, and Sweden, may any
*' of them accede to fuch an alliance ;
but Germany, Holland, and England,
muft be the bafis of every confederacy,
which can be of any avail againft the land
power of France.*'
Let us admit that thefe three powers ought
to be the bafis of every confederacy againft
France. But what if the firft, to gratify
prefent malice and revenge, fhould ally with
it's natural enemy j and the fccond, from
fear, or fordid motives of immediate gain,
(hould violate its engagements, and fecretly
abet the common foe, — what is England to
do in fuch an inverted fyftem of affairs ? Is
ihe to (it ftill, and fee their ravages on the
continent ? Is (he paflively to behold the
flrong towns in Flanders ceded to the French,
and fuffer them to extend their conquefts
over the reft, one after another, till, to adopt
the Confiderer's quotation, Dumjinguli pug*
nant^ univerfi vincuntur f Is ftie to adt this
impolitic part, or, abandoned by confede-
rates who prefer a temporary advantage to
their true and lafting intereft, (hall (he not
endeavour to repair their lofs by engage-
ments with Pruffia^ Hanover. 6^. &c. &;c. ?

The

ought
againfl
gratify
y with
, from
gain,
"ecrctly
land to
irs? Is
on the
lid the
^'rcnch,
iqucfts
adopt
di pug-'
idt this
>nfcdc-
tage to
{he not
ngage-
:. &c. ?
The

[ 7 1 .

The Confiderer's fyftem is fpeculatively
right. But the fallacy of his reafoning lies
in this : that he condemns connexions en-
tered into under particular exigencies, be-
caufe they are inconfiftent with that confe-
deracy, which ought to take place, if every
party purfued its real intereft.

States too often adt from paflion, as well as
individuals. Private pique, ambition, or ava-
rice, frequently make them abandon their
friends, to embrace their enemies. But (hail
not the party thus bafely deferted, endeavour
to form new attachments? It is certainly
againft the general principles of true policy
for England and Auftria to meafure (words,
but if the latter will confederate with the
common enemy, our oppofition is a neceflary
confequence of that unnatural alliance*

The Confiderer however, for a prefent an-
fwer, may argue ♦•hat we were the occafion gf
her taking that unnatural ftep. This, as will
appear hereafter, from his ovtrn confeflion,
is not the cafe 5 but, for the prefent, admit-
ting it to be fo : — ^yet, if by a wrong ftrokc
of policy, we force4 Aufliia into the arms of
France, {hall we back one blunder with an-
other, and fufFcr them to adl in concert, to
the ruin of the liberties of Europe r Shajl
we, as the Confiderer would advife us, aban-
don Hanover, &c. and give up all concern
for' the continent ? Shall we be crcduloys
enough to take his word, and truifl that the

French

^" I

! !

Ill

Mi '■

[ 8 ]

French will only raife contributions, and not
attempt to keep what they acquire ? But
more of this as we proceed.

In the enfuing pages, he fpeaks in high
terms of the two grand alliances formed by
king William the third. Upon this head, I
am by no means inclined to difputc with
him, being perfuaded that the fyftem of our
great deliverer claims our mod grateful ac-
knowledgments ^ and we might wifli that
the condudt of our allies at that time like-
wife deferved our thanks. After having
magnified the power which France exerted
in oppofition to that confederacy, the Con-
fiderer makes the following refledions.
'* We Jiave fince heard fo much of the
attempts of France towards univerfal mo-
narchy, and the balance of power neceflary
to be prefer ved in oppofition to it j and
have feen it made a pretence for fo many
meaner purpofes, that we now naufeate
the fubjedt, and do not like to hear any
*' more of it. Yet a meafure which was
once right, mufl: continue to be right to
eternity. And though France may not
have a prince, equally able and enterpri-
zing with Lewis the Fourteenth, yet the
kingdom is the fame, and its land forces
are dill formidable to Europe : at leafi, it
is the only fl:ate which either Europe in
general, or England in particular, can be

** en-

nd not
:? But

in high

med by

head, I

te with

1 of our

ful ac-

ifli that

Hie like-

having

exerted

he Con-

3ns.

h of the

erfal mo-

neceffary

3 it ; and

fo many

naufeate

hear any

hich was

e right to

may not

enterpri-

J, yet the

nd forces

at lead, it

Europe in

ir, can be

** en-

[ 9 ]

" endangered by, and the pnly flate which
** England is now at war with."
* Jn this paragraph, there appears to be a
twofold fallacy. Firft, we may deny " that
" a meafurc once right, mufl continue to be
*' right to eternity." It was once right for all
Europe to join with France in oppofing
Charles the Vth, when Germany, Spain, and
the Netherlands, with the Indies were united
under one head. But that meafure did not
long continue to be right ; for after the de-
cay of the Spanifli monarchy, it became right
to oppofe the growing power of France.

Again, admitting a meafure once right, to
be right to eternity, yet it does not follow,
that a meafure onc^pr amicable ^ will be prnc-^
ticable to all eternity. Though King William
had the good fortune to effed: an union
among the powers of Europe, yet they may
fince have been fo much corrupted or infa-
tuated, that it might not have been in the
power of his fucceffors, to bind them to their
true intereft.

That the kingdom of France, that is, that
the terra firma, is the fame now as in the
days of Lewis the XlVth, is certain : but it is
as certain, that neither the fpirit of the peo-
ple, or the power of the nation, is the fame
now that it was then. Then they were able
to contend againft the troops of all Europe :
now, though combined with Auftria, Rulfia,
, C . Sv^cden,

111

[ 10 ]

Sweden, &c. they are not able to fubduc the
kingofPruffia and his allies.

But as I am not difpofed to dwell upon
objeftions not effential to the main argument,
I will readily grant, that neverthelefs, the
land forces of France are ftill formidable to
Europe, and that ** every meafure which has
a tendency to the uniting the powers of Eu-
rope among themfelves, and againi France,
muft therefore be for the general good of
Europe, and the particular intereft of Eng-
land. And every meafure which tends to
fet the ftates of Germany, Holland, and
England, either at war with each other, or
amongfl themfelves, mufl be a meafure cal-
cula^^d for the good of France, and the
prejudice of the other powers of Europe."
All this is true, but before the Confiderer
can draw any inferences to the prejudice of
our condudl in the prefent war, he muft fhew
that our meafures have difunited the powers
of Europe, and that we fet Pruffia at vari-
ance with Auftria, which was the beginning
of the prefent war. This we apprehend,
however, he will appear as little able to do,
as to fupport the following conclufion :
«* If every war, which arifes between any
two particular ftates of the empire, be it-
felfa misfortune, and contrary to the inte-
reft of Europe, the evil will be ftill the
greater, and the mifchief fo much the
more extenfive, if France (hall make it-

« felf

• <c

it
it

(€

[ii]

felf a party in the war, and fliall join it-
felf to either of the two (ides, to keep the
difpute aUve fo much the longer."
It is to be wifhed that the Confiderer had
given a folution of this paradox ; for to plain
common fenie, it feems evident, that if two
powers are engaged, and France fits ftill
while they weaken each other, the evil will
be greater, than if France byjoiiying one fide,
cxhaufts herfelf in proportion. Her engag-
ing indeed will extend the mifchief of war
wider, but cannot make the evil greater with
refpedt to any apprehenfions from her power,
fince her interfering will necefTarily draw fomc
other great potentate to efpoufe the other
fide, in order to counterbalance her weight.
Page 20. The Confiderer proceeds to ex-
amine into the rife and progrefs of the pre-
fent German war. " Germany, fays he, has
** been fo unhappy as to have a difpute arife
" between two of it's leading princes, about
the right to four great dutchies in one of
it's remoteft provinces. . . However, as the
revenues of neither of the parties are inex-
hauftiblc, the probable iffue of fuch a war,
if .hey were left to themfelves, would be,
that one or the other of them would find
their revenues brought to an end, and
would be obliged to fubmit. Whether
Pruflia or Auftria carried it's point, cannol
be a matter of the leafl conlequence to
England -, for befides that, the country it-

C 2 '« felf

«c

t ill

[ .2 1

felf is at too great a diftance for us to be
** affcc'ilecl by it, England has actually taken
" both fides of the contraverfy, and cannot
** be really interefted in either."

Had the Confiderer received his education
at St. Omers, he could not have argued more
fophiftically : but we (hall fee how eafy it is
to entangle a fophifter in his own fine fpun
web. Firft, We may freely grant, that if
Auftria and Pruffia could have been left to
thcmfelves, it would not have been a matter
of the leaft confequence to England, which
of them carried it's point: but there was
not the leaft profpedt that they could be left
to themfelves, and we were well affured that
France would intermeddle in the difpute. I
"am the more confident on this head, becaufe
I have the Confiderer on my fide.

Page 15 and 16 he fays, ** We find that
it has been the conftant policy of France
to mix itfelf in all quarrels in the empire,
and keep up the difputes of the contend-
ing parties, as long as it can, &c" Again,
page 103, " We knew that the king c^Pruf-
fia could at anytime join with his fiire
** friends the French."

This, upon his own authority, being the
true pofture of affairs. How was England to
adl atfuch a crifis ?,On one hand we had ex-
perienced the expence of Auftrian alliances,
the flownefs of Auftrian councils, and the
caution of Auftrian troops. On the other

2 hand.

.<(

us to be
lly taken
id cannot

education

:ued more

eafy it is

fine fpun

[It, that if

sen left to

1 a matter

id, which

here was

Id be ieft

bred that

ifpute. I

id, becaufe

e find that
of France
he empire,
e contend-
\'* Again,
ig c^Pruf-
th his7«r^

, being the
England to
we had ex-
n alliances,
s, and the
1 th€ other
hand,

^1^

In)

hand, we had feen proofs of the capacity,
the vigour, and refolution of the Pruffian
monarch, whofe arms were at that time fo
vidlorious, that they out dripped all oppofi-
tion. Now, not to mention that we had
adlually guaranteed Silefia, was it not the
mod advifeable meafure which could be
adopted, to detach fo able a flatefman, and
fo ad:ive a warrior, from the alliance with the
common enemy ? Will not any man who
docs not judge from events, admit that this
was the moft probable means to unite the
contending powers, and bring the houfe of
Auftria to terms of accommodation ? Tho'
we knew that the French were intriguing
at the court of Vienna, yet would any one
have gained credit, who had furmized that
Auftria would throw herfelf into the arms
of France, furrcnder her fortified towns to
her implacable enemy, and form an unnatu-
ral alliance, which nothing but the prefent
gratification of the moft rancorous revenge
could didtate ?

But admitting that we had been certain of
the event, yet as affairs were circumftanced
at the time of concluding the Pruffian alli-
ance, it was the moft eligible meafure. That
monarch had then n^ade himfelf mafter of
Saxony, bid fair for th\conqueft of Bohemia,
and was in the full zenKh of glory and repu-
tation. Ruffia had not commenced hoftili-
ties againft him, and Sweden ftood aloof. In

what

I^V^

' 1,^

lilt

[ H]
what condition wc flood at that time, I will
not give my readers the pain to recolledt. It
is well known, that public dejcdtion cafl her
eyes on Pruflia as her protedtor and deliverer.
Thank Heaven wc have fince wiped off the
difgrace of oqr pufillanimity, and are now in
a capacity to give that protedion, which we
had then need of urfclves. If the Conii-
derer meant to examine public meafures im-
partially, he would not argue from confe-
quences, but confider how circumdances
ilood at the time thofe meafures were adopted.

But he fays, " England has adlually taken
*' both fides of the contraverfy, and there-
" fore cannot be really interefted in either.'*
This again is fallacious : it is fo far from be-
ing true, that we may be alternately interefted
on both fides ; that is, though it may be of
no confcquence to us, whether the provinces
in Silefia remain with Pruffia or Auftria^ yet
we are interefled, upon the Confiderer*s own
principles, to oppofe that fide, which ever it be,
that leagues with France the common enemy.

The legality of the claim, politically con-
fidered, is no part of our concern. A claim
may be legally juft, and yet it may be poli-
tically expedient to oppofe it j and fo e con^
verjb. If a kingdom fhould either by legacy,
defcent, or conquefl, veft in a potentate al-
ready too powerful, though his title may be
good, yet it is the common intereft to prevent
it's taking place. In fhort, as the Confiderer

very

I wilt

,a. It

aft her
livcrcr.
off the
now in
iich we
Confi-
ires im-
confe-
iftances
idopted.
ly taken
I there-
cither.'*
torn be-
iterefted
ay be of
irovinces
^ria, yet
er*s own
ver it be»
1 enemy,
ally con-
A claim
be poli-
fo e con^
\y legacy,
:ntate al-
may be
o prevent
:onfiderer
very

[ is] ,
very juftly obferves, and we want no better
authority, it is our intereft to adl in oppofition
to our rival France, ** who is ftill formidable
" to Europe." Confequently her natural ene-
mies, are our friends : but if they will not be
true to their own intereft, but, to indulge
I fome prefcnt gratification, adl to the preju-
7 dice of the common caufe, we muft change
^^ our (yftem, and treat them as temporary
1 enemies.

^1 Page 2 2d, we meet with (bme very extra-
* ordinarv refledtions. ** If, fays the Conlidercr,
*' as Oiten as France declares on the one fide,
England adopts the other j How is Ger-
many relieved ? France will always take
care to fend troops enough to keep the
balance even, and all that England can do
by it's officioufnefs, will be drawing fo
many more parts of Germany into the
quarrel, and enabling the Germans to cut
each other's throats fo much the longer.
That is, leave the French to f hemfelves,
doubilefs they will do as much mifchief
as they can ; but in time they may make
themfelves generally hated, and the Ger-
mans wife enough to agree." Again, page
23d, " If any country in Europe is to be
over-run by the French, Whither can
their armies, (efpecially when we are at
war with them) be better turned, than
into Germany ? A country, which they can
never conquer^ which can beft bear their

" in-

■\

I !

[ i6 1

invafions, and the powers of which are by
themfelves able, when united, to repell
" them."

. It is certainly as great an affront as ever
wjis offered to the public judgment, to at-
tempt to reafon upon fuch abfurd maxims
of policy. Shall wc leave the French to do
what mifchief they can, in hopes that Ger-
mans will at length unite? What if they
fliould not unite till it is too late ? Hiftory
will tell us tha( this has frequently been the
cafe, and that dates have beheld, with uncon-
cern, the downfal of rival neighbours, till at
length they have fallen vidtims to their own
jealous and miflaken policy. What did the
Macedonian, what did the Roman, what
have all the antient and modern great flate^,
owed their grandeur to, but to this principle
of difunion among other powers? And fliall
we fufFer the French to purfue conqueil in
Germany, in vain expedation of an uncertain
union, till, " by attacking them fingly, the
" common enemy has fubdued the whole."
If we were to aO: fo imprudent a part,
how might the Confiderer upbraid us for
departing from thofe principles, which he
has fo ju ftly cflablifhed, and by which a-
lone I deiire to try the force of his Argu-
ments. ** France," he has told us, and
we believe him, ** is the only ftate by which
** Europe in general can be indangered. . . .
** It therefore becomes the intereft of the

other

ue by
repell

; ever
to at-
axims
to do
tGer-
f they
liftory
:en the
uncon-
;, till at
;ir own
did the
, what
,t date?,
►rinciple
nd (liall
ijueft in
ncertain
gly, the
whole.'*
: a part,
I us for
hich he
rhicb a-
is ^rgu-
us, and
>y which
sred. . . .
\ of the
other

[ 17]

*» other Jlates, to be watchful over it, to guard
* againft the growth of it, and mutually to
each other ^ when they arc attacked by

" it." Thus, from his own reafoning, it is evi-
dently our intereft to oppofe the progrcfs of
the French arms in Germany, and not to
wait till, dumfinguli pugnantiUniverfi vincun-
tur.

But fuppofe that the Germans could be
perfuaded to unite before it was too late.
What then ? Why then, the Conlidcrer tells
us, the French can never conquer Germany.
Indeed ! This is a bold affirmation, and per-
haps, in point of argument, it might be fuf-
ficient to anfwer it with a pofitive negative.
By good luck, however, we are provided
with a fuller anfwer, and one which the Con-
fiderer himfelf has furni(hed us with.

Jf France can never conquer Germany
when united. What (hall we fay to the ac-«
count of it's ftrength before given, page 9 P
where the Confidcrer fays, ** The empire of
Germany, may be equals if not fupcrior to
France, but the divifion of it into feparate
ftates, renders it inferior." Now, if it is
a doubt, whether Germany, when united, be
equal to France ; nay, if we even fuppofe it
to be fomcwhat fuperior, with what confi-
denr*' can he affure us, that France can never
conquer it ? I will not refer him to conqucfts
made by the Greeks and Romans, over ftates
vaftly fuperior to themfelves, bccaufe fuch

((

refe

I t

•5 1

!.l

[ i8 ]

references are unfa(hionable, but if he will
only recoDedt what has pafled under his own
eyes, he will be convinced, that even fmall
potentates, may prove an over-match for an
overgrown confederacy among the greateft
powers. But the Confiderc. compares the
ilrength of kingdoms, as a New Market
jockey, would calculate weight and inches.
From page 24 to page 29, The Confiderer
takes a great deal ot pains to prove, what no
man of fenfe ever doubted, that this is not a
religious war ; and then he proceeds to affirm
that ** No one who is the leaft acquainted
with the Aate of Europe, and the confti-
tiition of the empire, can fuppofe the crown
of France fhould entertain a thought of
making a real and permanent conquefl of
Hanover. France enters Germany as a
friend and ally of the empire, and as gua*
rantee of the treaty of Weftphalia ; and
** as fuch, cannot pretend to make a real con-
queft there : that would be quarelling with
their allies in the very adt of afliding them.
. . . For a king of France to make himfelf
ele^QT of Hanover, and ejedt a whole fa-
mily out of its rights, would be fo great
an a6k of violence, that every member in
the empire would rife againft it . • . 'Tis
" the very thin^ which England (hould wifli
the French to attempt, in order to units
all Gerowny ayainft them."

•c

((

«l

«i

he will
^is own
;n fmall

for an
greateft
ares the
Market
inches,
infiderer
ivhat no
is not a
;o affirm
)uainted
e confti->
le crown
3ught of
iqueft of
my as a
) as gua-
lia ; and
real con-
ing with
ng them.
i himfelf
vhole fa-
; fo great
imhet in
t...Tis
>uld wifli

to unite

[19]

It mud be confcfTedythat it is the very quin*
teflence of refinement, to fuffer an eiietny to
take, in confidence that he will not hold.
I grant that the French have no ju/i pretence
for making a conquefl of Hanover, and I be«
lieve that it will be difHcult for the Confi-
derer to fhew, that they had any jufl pretence
for invading it. Nay, page 38. he owns that
they had not. Many, however, who have
entered as allies and guarantees, have after-
wards kept pofTefHon as conquerors. The
French have done it, and we have no fecu-
rlty, but the Confiderer's word, that they
will not do it again. .

Perhaps it might provoke the members of
the empire* to fee a family ejedted out of it's
rights : yet we have known a proteflant elec-
tor turned out of his dominions, and fent a
hegging with his family from country to
country, and yet all Germany did not unite,
^iid move Heaven and earth to redore him .
We have lived to fee a king of England re-
proached, and the national councils (ligma*
tized in hiflory, for not yielding timely and
powerful afliflarce to that difhefled cledor.

But, what if after the French have con*,
quered Hanover, and fhewn a difpofition to
retain it, all Germany ftfoulj unite againd
fuch injuftice, to what purpofe would their
union lerve, when, according to the Confi-
derer, it is only a may be^ Whether they are
equal, when united, to France? Therrfore,

D 2 at

4-.

[20]

at laft, wc muft be obliged to throw our
weight in the fcale ; and every quack will tell
him, that it is prudent *u^«;V»// occurrere morbo^
Political as well as natural evils, are belt and
eafieft refifled at their firfl beginning.

Page 3 1 • The Confiderer pleafantly tells
us, that " a fmall itate, which is invaded by
the ar.nies of one infinitely greater than
itfelf, is doubtlefs under a great misfortune;
all refiflance is ufelefs, and it has nothing
to do but to fubmit. But there is a way
of doubling this misfortune, and that is,
by h?ving another great ilate, almoA e-
qual to the invader, undertake the defence
of it. If the country fubmit, it has bit
one army to maintain, and may in the be-^
ginning yield upon terms that are tolerable :
but if it be defended, it has then two ar-
mies in it, and is fure to be opprefTcd by
them both."
The Confiderer's reafoning is fo whimfical,
that it does not deferve a ferious anfwer. He
certainly means to fport with his readers : for
if a fmall flate when invaded, has nothing
to do but to fubmit, to what purpofe does
he eftablifh this principle, '* that the Icfler
" ftatcs fhould mutually affift each other,
** when attacked by the greater power ?"
How is one flate to aiiifl another againft an
invading army, but by marching an army to
it's defence ? But, fays the Confiderer, '< the
J* defending army ought to have a'i many

<* mouths

'«C

f>t

DW our
vill tell
» morbo^
»eil and

:ly tells
ided by
cr than
fortune;
nothing
5 a way

that is>
moO: e-

defence
has bit

the be-^
>lcrablc:

two ar*
effcd by

limfical,
er. He
lers : for
nothing
>ofe does
the lefler
h other,
power ?**
gainft an
i army to
er, '< the
af> many
' mouths

[ 21 ]

<* mouths as the attacking/' What then ?
Surely that muft be a ftate of fingular oeco-
nomy, and muft rate it's religious and civil
liberties at a very low cftimation, which
(hould think much of giving it's defenders
a morfel of bread.

In the enfuing pages, the Confiderer talks
a great deal of ** the humanized laws of war,
** which do not admit of burning towns, and
" deftroyingof countries :"he adds, that "no-
" thing of this kind was pradifed in Hano-
" ver, while the French were vidlorious,
** and in quiet poiTeffion of it : they would
" not, fays he, deftroy that country then,
" for their own advantage. We have now,'*'
^he continues, " made the experiment and
P' known the worft of it. The French have
^" already been in pofleffion of this country.
*' Did the fun refufe to (hine, or the rivers
" ceafe to flow upon that account ? They
certainly did not here in England. Britain
ftill continued an iiland, and it's govern-
ment ftill fubfifted, though the French
*• had feized on the government of Hanover."
Is this arguing like a man of candor and a
lover of truth ? Do thefe flouri(hcs of decla-
mation, and little fallies of wit, fpeak the lan-»
guage of a difinterefted and difpaflionate
Conliderer? We all remember that the fun
did ihine in England, while Hanover was in
the hands of France, and we are perfuaded,
that if this kingdom was a province to France,

tho

[ 22 ]

the fun would not refufe to fliine tipon it:
but we may likewifb be afTured, that the in-
habitants of this ifland, would not behold it's
fifing with that pleafure and fatisfadtioHi with
which every free Briton now falutes it's weU
come rays.

To what purpofe is it for the Confiderer
to talk of humanized laws of war, and to tell
us, page 36, that ** the French are a fair
M enemy ?" Docs he e^^pcd that we will be
fo credulous as to take his word againft
fadts» againfl Richelieu's condud^ and againft
Belleifle's letter to Contade's P It is true we
felt no immediate inconvenience while the
French were in poflcflion of Hanover, but it
does not then follow that we know the worft
of it, bccaufe they were not in poffcfiion
long enough for us, or their nearer neigh-
bours, to feel the ill confequences bf their
acquifition.

Page 3«, He confcires,that **the eledtorate
is invaded merely on an Englifh account.
Is it poflible," fayfe he, " for that country
** to give our enemies lefs ground of offence,
in any future quarrel than it did in this ?
Who does not lee then that the fihgle rea-
fon why it is attacked, is, beeftufe the
French know that we (hall defend it? That
the French therefore only march their
troops thither, becaufe, as we, by our fu*
periority at fea, have the advantage in at-
tacking' the Frerich fettlements in America,

2 " and

«C

€t

upon it:
It the ift-
lehold it's
tion> with
5 it's wcl-

IlOftfidercr
ind to tell
are a fair
ve will be
rd againA
ind agaitiil
is true we
while the
)Vcr, but it
r the word
poiTeilion
rer neigh-
ss bf their

cleftorate
atcount.
lat country
of offence*
lid in this ?
: (ingle rea-
>eeaufe the
nd it? That
larch their

by cur fu-
itage In at-

n amcrica,
and

[ «3 ]

<< and eaft and weft Indies, fo the French

">' by their fuperiority at land, and their

f < greater nearnefs to Hanover, are Aire to

f < have the advantage, by noeeting the Engt

lifli troops there. They would not go

thither, unlefs they were fare of finding

us there."

Perhaps not; neither ihould we go there,
lefs we were fare to meet them there ; and
herever they attempt to extend their con-^
efts, and repair their defeats, it is our ba<»
efs to oppofe them. The Coofiderer, hpw^
er, in this paragraph, makes the faireft^
nceilfioQs we could wi(h, and we defire that
e reader wil) not forget them. , Here ha
nowledges, that the French had no pre*
ce for attacking Hanover, and that '' the
electorate had not taken any part in the
f difpute between the twro nations, about our
^ pQ^effions in America," This being the
||fe upon his own ftating, and it is certainly
ly ftated, wc woald aik him, whether
ance has not as good a pretence for attack^
any other power on the continent, to in*
mnify hcrfelf for the loflbs ftc fuflaios
our fuperiority at fca ? We agree wiiJi
, pige 39, that " no partieuUr diftriQ ia
north Germany, is rich en<>ugh to make it
worth the while of a great kingdom, like
that of France, to march it's troops fp far
out of it's own dominiona^ merely for the
fake of maintaining thenvat free quarter."

There-

Therefore we may conclude, from his own
pofitions, that was France fufFered to remain
in quiet pofTcfHon of Hanover, (he would
not only keep it, but find or make pretences
for enlirging her conqucfts. Who would
anfwer, that in fuch cafe they would not in-
vade the Dutch, whom they have already
awed, or otherwife influenced, to be falfe to
their engagements, or at lead compel them
to furni(h (hipping, that they might make a
defcent on this ifland ? As our fuperiority at
fea, is conferred by the Confiderer, as it is no-
torious, that the French trade is ruined, their
mod valuable colonies in our poiTcffion by
conqued, is it to be fuppofed, that unable as
they are to refift us at fea, or attempt an in-
vafion of this kingdom, that they will fit flill
and mourn over their defeats, without attempt-
ing to repair their lofles by invafions on the
continent ? And will any friend to Great Bri-
tain endeavour to perfuade the public, that
it is for the intereft of this kingdom to re-
main calm fpedtators, and fee them extend
their dominions on the continent, which
may more than counter-balance our acquifi-
tions, and render the hopes of peace more
diftant than ever ? No ! no matter for fpot,
whether it be Hanover or Heflia, Hamburg ;
or Holland, wherever the French carry inva-
fion, the invaded become, at lead, our tempo-
rary allies, {^r. and it is ourintereft to oppofe
... the

n his own
to remain
(he would
; pretences
ho would
lid not in-
ve already
be falfe to
npel them
ht make a
periority at
as it is no-
lined, their
)ffcflion by
t unable as
tnpt an in-
will fit dill
ut attempt-
3ns on the
Great Bri-
ublic, that
dom to re-
em extend
int, which
)ur acquifi-
)eace more
:r for fpot,
Hamburg
carry inva-
our tempo-
l to oppofe
the

e invader, in order to ftop the progrefs of
e common enemy.

Page 44. He ventures to affirm, that the
uflian treaty was made in order to find
e king of Pruffia employment at home,
d prevent his invading the eledtorate.
We afterwards (fays he) perceived that
this Ruffian diverfion, which was to
march through Poiand, would be ineffec-
tual ; what then was to be done ? That
was the only refource which Britain had
for defending itj and that failed. We
were then forced to fee our inability;
and in renouncing our treaty with Ruffia,
and giving up our old allies, were made
to buy off an evil, which we could not
irepel/* Here it is neceifary to advertife
reader, that the Coniiderer himfelf con-
didts this pafTage, of which we (hall take
tice in its proper place.
" Being thus (he adds) brought into a
ftate of dependence upon a lingle ally,
he knew how to improve it from one
ftep to another, till we are at length re-
duced to an appearance of being tributa-
ries to the k — g of P a. Here (he

continues) a generous Englifh breaft may
revolt againft the expreffion, and difdain
to own that the money we pay to Pruffia,
is a tribute. He is our ally, and we pay
him a fubfidy, but not a tribute. Let us
confider the nature of 'eacht and what it

((

is,

[ 26 1

** is, which conftitutes the difference be-
*^ tween them."

Here the Conlidercr has forgotten himfelf.
For he only confidcrs the nature of a fub-
lidy, without faying a fyllable of the na-
ture of a tribute. As he has thought pro-
per, however, to decline it, I will do it for
him. A tribute, in the original, or derivative
fenfe of the word, was a fum afTeffed upon,
and exadted from the Roman tribes, a tri-
tubus y according to the proportion of their
eftates. The money therefore that we pay

to the k — g of P a, cannot be of this

tributary nature.

In the appropriated fenfe of the word,
9 tribute is a fum of money, or other ac-
knovvledgment, which an inferior ftate is
forced to pay to a fuperior, in token of fub-
jedlion ; without any condition, either ex-
prefs or implied, on the part of the receiver.
Now let us examine the treaty,' and fee
whether the money we pay the k — g of
P— a, is of this kind : and if we find
• conditions, both exprefs and implied, then
we are not tributaries, or under fubjedion.

In the fecond claufe of the treaty, we
find thefe words: — " His majefty the king
of Pruflia, engages on his part, to employ
the faid fum in keeping up and augment-
ing his forces, who (liall adt in the mod
advantageous manner for the common
caufe, and for the end propofed by their

" aforefaid

((

[ 27 ]

" aforeLid majefties, of reciprocal defence
** and mutual ifecurity."

Here then we find a general engagement
to adl for ihe common caufe, and for the
end of reciprocal defence, and mutual fecu-
rity. Are here any of the qualities of a
tribute? Did a tributary ever bind a receiver
by any covenant ?

But the Confiderer aflcs, " What is the
common caufe betv^een two parties, who
have no common enemy ? We are not
" at war with Auftria, and he will tell us
" fhe is not at war with France."

Tliis, the reader will perceive, is a quib-
ble which turns upon their being no formal
declaration of war between her and France,
&c. But a reference to the treaty will de-
flroy this quibble, and (hew us what the
common caufe is, and who is the common
enemy. The preamble recites the treaty of
January, 1756, " The ftipulations whereof
" tended to the prefervation of the general
peace of Europe, and of Gemany in par-
** licular." And it recites farther, that
Whereas fince that period, France has
not only invaded the empire with nu-
merous armies, and attacked their afore-
faid majefties and their allies^ but has al fo
excited other powers to adl in hke man-
ner, &c.** It then fets forth the pre-
judice the king of Pruflia has fuffered by
his extraordinary efforts againft his ene-

E 2 mies.

((

I'll'

111

!■ '

i '^

', ti

((

«t

«(

[ 28 ]

mies, and concludes that " Their majefties
having mutually determined to continue
their efforts for their reciprocal defence
and fecurity, for the recovery of their
poiTcffions, for the protedion of their al-
lies, and of the liberties of the Germanic
body, &c. His Britannic majefty has rc-
folved to grant a fuccour in money to his
PrufTian majefty, as the fpeedieft and moft
effedual means to obtain thefe purpofes.
Then follow the articles.

Here then we find an exprefs declaration,
denoting who is the common enemy, what
is the common caufe, and what are the ends
to be obtained by the treaty. But if no
common enemy had been named, yet com-
mon fenfe would tell us, that when two
powers enter into alliance, the flate which
invades or commences hoftilities againft one,
becomes the common enemy of both. But
the third article of the treaty fets this point
in the clearefl light, and more particularly
demonftrates that the money we pay his
PrufTian majefty, cannot, by the moil forced
and invidious conftrudtion, be deemed a tri-
bute.

By that article, *' The high contradling
parties engage, not to conclude any treaty
of peace, truce, or neutrality, or any
other convention or agreement whatfoever,
with the powers who have taken part in the
prejent war, but in concert, and by mu-

8 " tual

[ 29 ]

" tual confent, and exprefly comprehending
" each other therein."

Here we fee there is a particular exprefs
covenant on the part of his Pruffian majefty,
befides the general engagement in the pre-
ceding article. By this laft article, he en-
gages not to conclude any treaty of peace,
&c. without the powers who have taken part
in the prejent war. This is fo fully worded,
as to take away all fubterfuge. Should his
majefty tell us, he is not at war with France,
we anfwer, France has taken part in the
prefent war. Should he tell us, he is not at
war with Ruflia, Sweden, &c. we give him
the fame anfwer. This article therefore not
only points out who is the common epemy,
but who are the common enemies. And a
fum of money given under fuch reftridlions,
differs as much from a tribute, as a free
cift does from an extortion. We fhould not
have infifted on this point, had not the Con-
fiderer attempted to inflame the paffions of
his readers, by invidioufly reprefenting the
nature of the Pruflian fubfidy.

" But (fays he) the treaty does not c-
" bilge him to yield us any fpecific afliftance.
" He is not obliged to fend a man to us."
Thefe, it muft be confeffed, are fpccious
objedtions, and will, no doubt, ftrike the
inconfiderate. This the writer is fo fenfible
of, that he expatiates greatly on this head,
and throws out all the power of his rhetoric,

t I . %■:

[30]

to render the Pruflian caufe unpopulai', not
without cafting fome very indecent reflec-
tions on his majefty's perlon.

Declamation however is not argument :
and when wc come to weigh thefe objec-
tions in the equal fcale of rcafon, we (hall
find that they amount to nothing. Firft, it is
neceffary to premife, that, in forming al-
liances, the contradiing parties cannot always
fecure a fpccific quid pro quo. Ail the rela-
tive circumftances between the parties (hould
be confidered ; their different degree of
power, and the particular circumftances in
which each of them ftand at the time of
making the treaty, fliould be attended to. If
a greater power enters into an alliance with
an inferior one, who is attacked by unequal
force, the only reafonable objedl which the
former can propofe, is, not to obtain a fpc-
cific afiiftance of men, &c. but, to enable the
latter to ftrengthen and defend himfelf againft
the common enemy ; left, by the deftrudtion
of the leJJ'er ftate, the common enemy ftiould
grow too powerful againft its rival, thcgreater*
This is the cafe between us and Pruflia.
Whatever confequence that kingdom may de-
fire from the abilities of its prefcnt fovereign,
it is but an inconfiderable ftate in comparilbn
with that of Great-Britain : and we could
not expedl that his majefty fo powerfully
preffed, could yield us any fpecific afliftance.
Neverthelefs, it is our intereft to fupport

him,

[3' ]

him, agalnfl: the common enemy, left the
latter ftiould gain ftrength by his fail.

But the Confiderer rants away in the
common ftile, and a(ks, — Whether we arc
to be the knights errant of Europe ? I an-
fwer, Yes. From his own principles, it is
evident that we muft in fome degree. It is
a tax we pay for the power and grandeur of
our kingdom. We are the great rivals of
France, " who is formidable to all Europe."
And when (he attempts to aggrandize hcrfelf
by attacking any of the leffer ftates, it is our
intc;eft, let them be who they will, to take
them under our protedtion. But in fuch
alliances we are not always to expedl a fpe-
<:ific affiftancc 5 for it may not be in the
power of our ally to ftipulate any thing
fpecifit ally. This was the cafe with his
PrufTian majefty ; though perhaps it had
been more prudent, for form fake, to have
mentioned the number of troops he was to
keep up. But we all know that this is mere
form, and we well remember in what man-
ner our allies, in the grand confederacy,
furnifhed their ftipulated quotas. Had the
Confiderer argued with the candor he pro-
feffes, he would have diftinguifhed between
9 general alliance of reciprocal defence and
fecurity, and a particular treaty, like that
with Ruffia, for the hiring a fpecific number
®f men, at a ftipulated fum.

From

II)

[32]

From page 52 to 60, the Confiderer la-
bours, with great learning and ingenuity, t j
prove that the engagement of parliament does
not bind us to defend the electorate. Here
he diOinguidies very accurately between a
perfedt and imperfect obligation; and his
whole argument, on this point, does him
credit as a writer. We could only wifli that
fuch abilities had been better employed. On
this head, however, I willingly agree with
the Confiderer J and I am moreover per-
fuaded that had it been a perfeSi obligation,
yet no engagement whatever can bind future
parliaments to adhere to meafures againd the
interefl of the nation.

In the courfe, however, of this argument,
he takes occafion to cad fome reiledlions
which muft not pafs unnoticed. " PoiTibly,
fays he, there may be thofe, who, after
having made their court, by running the
nation into a greater expence for the Ger-
man war, than it had then the lead idea of,
may hope to make their excufe to the peo-
ple, by pretending that they have done it
only in confequence of a former vote. — If
it has been wrong, and no one will avoyv
the pad, let no one adopt the future.
— Now they may put a dop to the ruin-
ous part of the war, and fave their coun-
try i and fave themfelves from the charge
of having gained the good opinion of the

public.

«,

«c

t 33 ]
public, by cxprefly declaring again ft thcfc
meafurcs, and then making ufe of that
" popularity, to carry them to an infinitely
greater heighth, than any other men could
have thought of." Again, page 57, ** If
the nation ftood bound by the obligation
of fuch a promife, why did any gentleman
mi dead the public, by afTurances to the
contrary ? If the addrcfs did not contain
any fuch promife, whence this failure in
his own ?"

Here we may difcover the anguis in herba.
A man muft be extremely fhort-fighted,
who does not, in thefe pages, perceivo the
features of party : and yet the Confidcrer
aflures us, in the beginning, that " He in-
tends to write without any view to parti CU'
lar menJ* It is a pity h'^ fo foon de\»iated
from his intentions: but how well his prac-
tice correfponds with his profeffions, the
above paflages will declare, without any
comment of mine. I will only obferve, that
when a writer indulges himfelf in perfonal
reflcdlions, that circumftance alone is fuffi-
cient to weaken his credit with the judicious
and impartial.

I am not concerned to vindicate any par-
ticular man or minifter ; but with refped to
public mcafures, I think them not only de-
fenfible, but highly deferving our applaufe :
and the Confiderer himfelf fliall be their

F champion.

€C

[ 34 I
champion. He is fo able and fo unan/wer-
able a reafoner, that I chule tg draw my
vindication of thofe meafures from his own
words.

Page 133. He combats the opinion that
the German war has been a diverfion of the
French forces or treafure, or prevented their
attention to their marine, and the fecurity of
their colonies. " The only profpeft (fays
*' he) which the Trench had of invading us
** with fuccefs, was, by furprizing us in
the beginning of the war, before wc were

prepared for them. All their attempts

fincc have been the cffeds of defperation,
rather than of council. But during all
the year 1756, wMle the French had
any hopes left of invading us, they never
thought of entering Germany 5 and fo far
was the elcdlorate from being in any
danger of an attack, that we brought
troops from thence over hither, England
was then too great an obje(5t in the French
councils, for them to trifle away their
money and troops in Germany. But the
next year, when they found themfelves
totally falling from that great hope of
ruining us at once, then they took the af-
ter game of trying to do it more gra-
dually j and therefore thought of Ger-
many. And whatever may be now pre-
tended of our having chofen the German

war

«(

«c

cc
((
<c

<€

CC
€t
CC
€C

CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
Cf
CC
.CC
CC

CC
CC
(C

<c
if

[ 35 ]
war as a diverfion, every one mufl: re-
member, that the army of obfervation
was an army of defence, and not of diver-
fion. *Twas the child of our fears, and
our fond concern to keep the French out
of the eledtorate, and not of any councils
of diverfion to draw them into it. Then
only it was when our enemies found that
we had raifed a fufficient land force to
guard our coaft from furprize, and to re-
pel any invafion, that they began to think
of fending troops into Germany : and
when, by the vigilance of our fquadrons,
at the mouth of their harbours, and the
lofs of fo many of their tranfports in their
paiTage to their colonies, they found it
impradicable to go any where elfe, then
it was that they pafTed the Rhine ; ftill
making every effort, and running every
hazard, to fuccour their colonies. At
length they found to their coft that they
could not go thither ; but they knew that
the Englifh forces could, and that they
could not be refilled there : that was the
part where only they were vulnerable ;
their beft trading intereft lay in. their
iflands, which were now naked and ex-
pofed ; and theref )re it was a diverfion of
the French clioofing, and not of the Eng-
lifli, to draw the Britifh force into Ger-
many, where they knew themfelves to be

F 2

in-

if.

[ 36 1

** invulnerable^ and were always fure to be
" fuperior to us."

Here I moft willingly Aibfcr.be to the
Confiderer's general principles, and I will
Venture to fay, that there cannot be an
higher encomium on the condud: of the ad-
miniflration, than is contained in the above ex-
tract. In the beginning of the war, he owns,
we paid no regard to Gerniany, we fixed
all our ftrength to the principal objedls of our
concern. We difabled their marine, we
block'd up their harbours, we gained poffef-
fion of the colonies in difpute, we added
others to them by right of conqueft, we made
acquifitions in every quarter of the globe.
Till thefe eflential points were obtained,
ar'' the enemy thereby made defperate, the
miniftry (for I do not, like the Confiderer,
diftinguiHi between a noble Lord and an
honourable commoner, neither do I care
which of them it was) I fay the miniftry,
very wifely opposed our detaching any of
,our force to the continent. They faid,
and they faid truly, that the nation ftood
bound by no obligation to purfue fuch mca-
fures.

But, when thefe purpofes were fulfilled,
when our fuccefles " drove our enemies to
defperation," when they found it *• im-
pradicable to fuccour their colonies," when
they found the Englifh arms " irrefiftible,'*
where it was moft their intercft to oppofe

them.

I 37]
them, — then, as the Confiderer confeffes,
\vithout any juft pretence of hoftility, and in
a fit of " defperation," they " fent their
" troops into Germany,"

In this cafe what was to be done ?
We had already fecured the territories wc
claimed, we had acquired others to indem-
nify us for our expences. Thus circum-

^anced, Qiould we fend our fleets in parade
to plow the ocean without a cock-boat to
oppofe them ; fliould we go on adding co-
lony to cplony, and ifland to ifland, till we
r ;ted the jealoufy of other powers, and
threw them into the arms of opr enemy ?
While we were thus extending our con-
quefts, and provoj^ing rivalfhip by triumph,
fliould we fuffer pur enemies to ravage Ger-
many unmolefted -, fhould we permit theni
to pofTefs themfelves of defencelefs domi-
nions, by which they might fecure a ba-
lance in ibeir favour againft our ill-judged
cpnqufi^s, arid thus rerider the peace of
Europ ^ ' ipelefs ? No i the miniftry judged
better. ^ hile our enemy bent their force
againft us dtreBlyi they, as the Confiderer
acknowledges, took care of our immediate
intereft, and would not fufFer any collateral
views to take place. When they had not
only provided for ourfafety, but procured us
an iri<iemnification, and the enemy " in
" defpaii," attacked u% indireSily through
the fides of our allies, then they found them-
felves

hi'

[38]

fclves at leifurc to attend to collateral con-
cerns; and then, and not till then, they
applied their attention to the defence of our
German allies. Thus therefore they fulfilled
their promifes, and adicd a confiftent part :
for the diverfion, as the Confiderer rightly
obfervcs, was not of their, but of the French
choofing. As to the French "invulnerability
** and (uperiority,** let the plains of Mindcn,
and almoft every engagement we have had
with them, teftii 1

Page 63, He a* fcs us to go on, and
** by one more eafy corK|ueft, difable the
«* navy of France from ever rifing again;
*' and the peace of this ifland (he afiures us)
•* is then fixed on its firm and proper bafis :
** and we may thenceforward look on all
" the quarrels of the continent with indif-
** feience/'

This, I believe, is the firft principle^ in
which I have been fo unlucky to differ
from him ; and this I muft contravert with
all my might : for I am perfuaded, that were
we in poffcflion of all the French fettle-
ments, and our enemies without a fingle (hip,
^"*t the continent would not be a matter of
lii^ icr nee to us. On the contrary, it feems
evident that th« greater and more commercial
we grow, the more clofely we (hall be in-
terefted in, and conneded with the conti-
nent. It is abfurd to fuppofe that a nation
which depends upon commerce, can be de-
tached

[39l

lachcd froni the continent by which it fub-
fifts, and have no occafion to give or receive
fuccour from their continental friends, when
their very being depends upon their reci-
procal fupport and defence. As a trading
nation, we have more reafon to be attached
to the continent, than the continent has to
be allied with us ; and we may add, that, in
times of danger, we may, as we have done,
ftand in need of fuccour from our continen-
tal allies, as well as they occadonally require
afTiftance from u5.

Page 66. The Confiderer aflcs, — *' When
Britain is already engaged in a war with
France, can it be ftronger, for adopting
another prince's quarrels with the houfe
of Auftria ?" No : but it is the ftronger
for detaching that prince from the common
enemy, whom the Confiderer himfclf calls,
" the fure friends" of that prince.

That it was abfolutely necefTary for us to
ftrengthen ourfelves by detaching him from
that intereft, we again appeal to the Con fi-
derer's own authority. Page 4 5, where he
fays, ** The Emprefs-Queen refufed to de-
** fend the eledtorate." — She alledged her
** own danger. Here it is manifeft, from
his own confeffion, that we did not drive her
into the arms of France, but that fhe refufed
to embrace our caufe. She aliedged her
danger, as a reafon why (he could not a<ft

f«

againil the common enemy.

Could there
be

t 40 ]

te a better reafon on earth for clofihff with
the king pf Pruffia, and detaching him at
Icaft from the interefl: of our great rival ?
If the emprefs's danger was then fo great,
that (he could not affifl us, her danger, and
the danger of all Europe, would have been
greater, had Pruflia combined with France,
and by their confederacy have drawn, as
they certainly would have done, Sweden,
&:c. into their fcale.

Page 76. The Cgnfiderer enters into a
minute calculation and comparifon of thr
revenues of France and England. He cite,
the authority of fome namelefs fpeaker in
the laft feflions, whom he leaves us to guefs
by his ofEce, for the following account.

" The ftanding revenue of France, we
** were then told, is twelve millions, five of
•' them were anticipated, and the remaining
** feven, fubjedt to any deficiencies in the
" other ^VQ, make the prefent revenue of
" France. Befides this, they have bor-
.*' rowed two millions, and thefe nine mil-
" lions make the whole fund of France for

carrying on the war.

" The ftanding revenue of England (he

adds) is the land and malt tax, which
** amount to two millions feven hundred
** and fixty thoufand pounds : to which
" may be added, fo much as q^n be taken
" out of the finking fund. Allowing, how-
ever.

f4tJ
'? cVer, a million and a half to be taken
*< thence, we have then four milh'ons to
** oppofe to the French revenue of fevcn
<* millions. But, befides this, we have bor-
" rowed for this year twelve millions. Go
<* on therefore for two years longer on this
** plan : ^rance, at the three years end, will
'* be fix millions in debt, and Englan^l, if
** we reckon the twelve millions, will be
** thirty-fix. If we allow but the eight
•< millions, England will be twehty-four
*' millions in debt. Can we, he concludes,
" neied a more convincing proof, that this is
** a ruinous war."

What avails this calculation ? We need no
proof that our expenccs arc greater than
jtheirs. But if every ftroke we ftrike, we re-
cur to our numeration table, our arms will
make but a flow progrefs. It is more than
probable, hpwever, that the Confiderer, who
took this account from word of mouth, mif-
underftood the fpcaker, for it is agreed by the
mod authentic accounts, that the (landing
revenue of France, even in the year 1742,
when they themfelves allow it was at the
higheA, did not exceed eleven millions,
and even in time of peace, they frequently
run behind hand. In the year 17^2, for
indance.

The receipts amounted to - livres 202,535,994
The expenccs to - - - 2o8,io8,505

The expence exceeds the receipt by 5*572,51 1

G ""^ VV^e

[42]

Wc might bring the account as low as
the 17^2, but it would be more matter of
curiof , *h,n ufe, For to what purpofe is
't to uc that their {landing revenue i^
greater than ours ? Who does not know that
the (landing revenue of an arbitrary fove-
reignty, where the fubftance of the people
is applied to gild the trappings of monarchy,
and furniHi out a gaudy nobility, will be
greater than that of a free kingdom ? But is
the nation the richer ? Can thev raife fuch
fums to anfwcr prefling exigencies ! No, he
admits they cannot : if they could, they
would not be in the condition they are. Wc
believe the Confidcrer is the firf^ politician
who ever brought the poverty of a nation, as
a proof of their power.

But he would frighten the readers by dint
cf arithmetick, and (hew how much greater
our expences are than theirs. True : and
are not our operations more extenfive, our
advantages infinitely fuperior ? Have we not
numerous fleets to fupport, and have they
not well delerved their pay ? By their means
have we not gained every thing we contended
for, and made acquifitions to reimburfe ou|:
(;harges ? Haye we not deftroyed the French
marine, and ruined their trade? Have we
not likewile a powerful army in Germany,
V'hich has withllood their progrefs, and de-
feated their views ?

What have the French done ? They have
fpent leis money : right ; becaufc they could

not

[ 43 1

Hbt raife fo much ; and to their inabilitjt wd
may partly attribute our fucccffcs. . The Con-
fidcrcr obfervcs, that wc are inferior ;o
France in number of men. We are fo : our
fupcriority confifts in length of purfc. Our
debt, it is true, is large : thcir's however is
above treble the fum*, and they borrow mo-
hey at neat treble the rate of intcrcft: itftiould
be confidered, moreover, that allowing for the
different rate of Intr.eft noW and in king
William's time, the intereft of out prefent
debt, is not equal to the intereft paid when
it was but feventy millions, and there needs
no ftronger proof of our credit*

But he takes upon him to fay, page 89^
** This is a war, which France never can be
" hurt by, and never can be weary of. A
** land war with England alone is an advan-
" tagc, and which France has not enjoyed
" thefe hundred years:*' ind again, page
1 27, he argues, that " the war In Getmany
** is not a diverfion of the treafures of
'* France.

What, will not France be hurt ? Will (he
never be weary of maintaining immenfe ar-a
mies in Germany, without gaining any thing
but (hame and defeat ? Are the lofs of her
men nothing to her? Does it coft her no-
thing to fubfift her vanquiflied forces ? Is it
nothing to have buried 200,000 men in Ger-
many this war, not to fpeak of thofe who

* Their national debt in X745 was 140 mll^loiits
fUrling.

Q 2 hav«

ii'

[ 44 ]
have fallen bythefword? As to tlieir car-
rying on a land war with England alone,
the Confideier, I had almofl laid the pre-
varicator, recurs to his old quibble, and would
perfuade us, that we (land alone, becaufe our
allies have not formally declared war againfl
France. But would a candid reafoner, whofe
purfuit was truth, cavil about words ? It is
plain that if the Hanoverians, Heflians,
Pruffians, &c. are riot at war with France,
they nevcrthelefs^jg^/6/ with us againft France,
und France fights againd them, and they cut
one another's throats, with as little remorfe,
as if a party coloured herald had denounced
war by the found of trumpet.

But the German war, he would perfuade
us, is nodiverfion of their treafures. Indeed!
What then has diverted them ? He owns
himfelf, that for a long time paft, they have
had no other objed of attention, and yet it
is certain that they are reduced to the greateft
(Iraits. Will he not credit their own reprefenta-
tions? Will he not believe the remonftrances of
their parliament, particularly of Rouen, which
exhibits the moA deplorable pi<fture of the
poverty and mifery of the people, and their
inability to pay the taxes, &c, ? Will he not
believe marflial Belleifle*s letter to Contades,
which fpecities their incapacity to continue
the war ? Will he not believe thev melted
their plate ? But fays he, the next year they
brougnt two armies into the field. Be it fo :
but extraordinary efforts of this kind are like

con-

[45l

convuFfions before death: there are, as he
himfelf well obferves, ** a<5ts of defpcration."
And after amcafure denoting fuch uncommon
diflrefs, we might reafonably expeifl fome
extraordinary attempts.

Thefe are incontedible authorities : but let
us confult reafon, which is fuperior to all au-
thority. On one fide, let us place a king-
dom, which is forced to draw it's fnbfiftencc
from it's own vitals : which has lofl: all nou->
rifhmcnt from it's members, thgt is, it's co-
lonies ', whofe trade it utterly deftroyed •,
whole marine is ruined ; a kingdom, which
has' been defeated and difappointed in the
important objetSt of it's purfuit, which is
*< reduced to defperation," and obliged, as
the Confiderer confefiTes, to profecute the war
where (he would lead choofe to wage it.

On the other hand, let us view the nation
which has reduced it's enemy to the above def-
perate and deplorable condition ; who has fe-
cured her own rights, and obtained depofitsover
and above ; whofe trade is flourifhing in the
midfl of war, and daily increafing ; and who
is able to raife immenfe fums at a moderate
interefl. Le: us thus fairly flate the coinpa*
rifon, and thi:n let reafon determine which
of the two iingdoms is moft likely to be
tired of the war.

But indeed, the Confidercr's own contra*
didions, are fufficient to betray his caufe.
One while he tells us, page 89, that " it k
^* the triumj)h^ and not the trial of their arms

*< to

ii1!„;f

t 46 )

•' tCK fight ift in Germany :" then he calls it
an ** a5: of dcfpcraiion.'* Again, page 134^
that " it was a diveriion of the French choof*
<< ingi and noi of the Englilh ;'* and yet,
page 1 29, he affirms, that ** France docs not
*' fend it's army to invade the German do-
** minions from choice^ but necejftty** In a
paiTage above quoted, he fpeaks of triffling
away their money and troops in Germany. — '
Now he fays, *• they cannot be hurt by the
<' German war, anu that it is no diverfion
" oftheirtreafurc, &r/' Was ever any thing
fo contradidtory ?

The Confidcrcr however does* not fcruple
to fay and unfay ; tho' it mud be obferved^
that his contradidtlons are not obvious to %
curfory reading: as he abounds in repeti-
tions, and leads the reader into a maze, vti
hopes, I fuppofe, to elude detedion ; for to
do juftice to his abilities, he feems capable of
writing with more method and precifion.

I have taken notice of fo many of his In-'
confiftencies, that I am weary of*^ the office j
tieverthelefs, I mud not omit taking notice of
one, which I have already referred to, pac©
100. After playing off his wit upon the
Ruffian treaty, he fays, •* the dread of thefe
«« guefts diverted his Pruffiin majcfty from
*< his intended attack on the electoral domi-^
nions, and brought him three months afr
tcr, to fign the treat}' of Weftminftcr."
Here the reader will fccolle<Jt the paflagef
J deiired him-to not« before,, where the'

Con-t

•(

af-

^g<S.

[ 47 ]
ConfiJcrcr affirms, that " wc perceived that
^* this Ruffian divcrfion, which was to march
" through Poland, would be ineffcSiual, . , .
«< Wc were then forced to fee our inability,
" and by renouncing our treaty with Ruffia,
" and giving up our old allies, were made to ^
•* buy off an evil whicli we could not repell."

Now we may defy tlie moft fubtlc fophi-
fter to reconcile thefe paffages. If the RuC-
fian treaty was ineffeSlual^ how came his
Pruffian majefty to dread it ? If -he was
frightened at it, and not only diverted by it
from his intended attack, but brought to
Ogn the treaty of Weftminfter, how can it
be faid, that we bought off an evil, which
we could n^t refeli?

In truth, however all thefe afTertions and
furmizes are nothing to the purpofe, we
might afk the Confiderer, how he became
acquainted with the king of Pruffia's inten-
tions to invade Hanover ! That monarch i%
generally pretty clofe in his councils, and
feidom declares his intentions, till his motions
fpeak them : and we do not remember that
his troops ever made any advances that way.

But, in fadt, one of the chief ends of the
Confiderations, is to render the king of Pruf-
fia, and thofe who are known to have
efpoufed his caufe, unpopular. For this pur-
pofe he throws out fuch invidious farcafms,
as are calculated to influence the mob of
readers. He even goes fo far as obliquely
to call his magnanimity in qu^ilion, and he

fn:ers

l:i II

IM '■

€t

«{

«C

[48 J
fricers at the authority which ufcd that epi-
thet in fpeaking of the Pruffian monarch.
He has, fays the Confiderer, been called
magtmmmousy by too great an authority to
admit a doubt, of his having it in his
power to do great things for us. For the
fake of fuch j")crfons, it may be of ufe to
think of his will." Who ufed that epithet
we well remember, and the worhi can teftify
that it was not mifappliedi therefore, it would
have be^ decent in the Confiderer, to have
fpared the refleftion. But judgment never
harbours with malice.

As to the king of Pruffia*s good will to^
wards this nation, or the good v^'iA of any
one nation towards another, it is not, I appre--
hend, much to be relied on, bevond the
bounds of poiitical intereft. I am not fo
thoroughly Pruflian, as to imagine, that on
feme luture occafion, that prince may not
again be o\Xt enemy : and if the Confiderer
had not addrefTed himfelf to the paflionS;, in-
ftead of the underAanding of his reJiders, he
would not have infinuated fufpicibns, which
are totally immaterial to the argument.
Whatever the king of Pruffia's will may be,
at prcfent our interells are cofinedted. if frqni
the revolution of thin<is, they (hoi^ld hereafr
ter be divided, and he (hould prove an enemy,

' pov^r *
onvmce ' '

ingd(

majefty,

lie has as much to dread froiii bur oppofi-

tion.

ch.
led

to
his
the

to^

[49]

tton, as he h^s now to hope from o\xf pto-
teftion.

After ringing the changes on the fame
fentiments, running over the hackneyed de-
clamation againfl German fubfidies, quitting
the king of Pruflia in one page, and worry-
ing him again in another; in fhort, after faying
what has been faid a hundred times before,
and what he himfelf has repeated over and
over, he comes at lafl to confider the nature
of continental connedtions.

Here he afFcC:s to be witty, and fpofts
with the different meanings which may be
annexed to thefe terms. As I write only
with a view to plain trutn, I fhall not
attempt to irival his pretentions to wit and
humour; but (hall proceed to animadvert
upon the following reflexions, which arc fo
extremely fingular, that I cannot forbear
giving them in his own words.

*• Till fuch great occafions (alluding to
the grand alliance) {hall return again for
Britain to adt in conjundion with Holland
and Germany, and the other parts o£
Europe, united in a real alliance againft
** France, the true intereft of Britain, or of
** any part of Germany, can never call for
• ** our troops upon the continent.' We have
*< been indeed too long making ourfelves
parties in the internal quarrels of the em-
pire, to hope foon to fee that and the
** other fiate q£ the continent united in fuch

«c

«<

«c

lit:,-;

I so]

^« an alliance : but till that wc tan have tiCfa
•* connection with it. Previous to Britain's:
** having any continental connection, f\i9t .
** continent muft be conneded in itfelf^
** To talk of forming a connexion with
" that, which itfelf is unconnected, is a Con>
" tradiCtion in terms."

Let no one then attempt to form a cor<f
neCtion with the Confiderer, who is himself
unconnected : fo unconnected, that it is im-
poffible to collect the heterogeneous part^ of
his argument, and combine them into any
conliftcnt propofition.

Firft, he tells us, we can have no call for
our troops on the continent, till vy^e can a<3:
in conjunction with Holland and Germany,
and the otter parts of Europe, united in ^
real alliance againft France. By the other
parts of Europe, I fuppofe, he mei^is the
parts engaged in the grand alliance : for he
cannot think it neceflary that we (hpuld
wait till we get all the powers of Scandiijavia,
and the Grand Turk, &c. on our fide. 'But
though we agree with him, that Franc^e »
itill formidable, yet we are warranted, by
>his own corifeffion, page 13, to conclude
:that it is not fo formidable as in the days of
Lewis XIV. Confequeotly, from; his own#
propofidc the fame ftrength of Qonfpdo-
racy is nc. neceflary now as y^^% jthen. And
thus be deftroys his own argyqijeiit. , ., -» "

-■ij..

• 1

•16

[51]
But admitting that it v^s neceflary, yet
is it fo eafy a matter io convince fo many
different powers of fuch neceffity ? It is
next to a miracle^ that they united under
king William; and nothing but a fenfe of
immediate danger from an ambitious and en-
terprising prince, who had manifefted to all
Europe, that, according to his principles,
might was right, could have joined their jn-
terefts then. Such an union never may,
probably never will, and, what is more, ne-
ver need be efFeded again. Europe is not
now what it was at that time. Some great
j:>owers, fuch as Pruilia for inftance, bear
their heads aloft, who were then inconiider-
ablc potentates. A writer therefore who
contends for the neceflity of adapting pre-
fent meafures, to the ftandard of antient
fyftems, without allowing for change c^ cir-
cumftarces, what time produces, eitiier
wants judgment or integrity. And we may
add, that a writer of candor would not have
forgotreni that at the time of the grand al-
liance, little or no attention was paid to our
colonies and marine, which have been the
•principal 'ohje^s in the pr<;lent war.
. He argues farther, " that, previous to Bri-
** tain*s having any continental connedlions,
** that continent muil: be connected in it-
»' felf." Muft it fo ? Then we are afraid
it will be difficult to (hew that there ever
was a' (Continental connexion : and we may

H 2, add.

[52]

add, that probably there never will be one.
Even the grand alliance was not a continental
connection, fincc France, which makes fo
great a part of the continent, ftood uncon-
neded with, and in oppofition to, the far
greater part of the other powers.

But not to wafte time in difcntangling
thefe knots of fpphiftry, let us appeal to any
inai> of plain fenfe and impartial judgmenti
— -If, as the Confiderer allows they did, the
Audrians pleaded their danger and inability
to ad againd the coii^mon pnemy, and our
natural allies the E)utch tendered the fame
plea, -r- whether thus deferted, not only po-
licy, but neceffity, did not diredl us to form
alliances elfewhere. We find that jealoufy,
or fordid views of prefent gain, has made
the Dutch as much our ene;nies as they
dare to be. It is they, and other partisans
of France, who have magnified the power
and revenues of France : vvho have fome of
them gone fo far as even to over-rate it at
eighteen millions a year j whereas we find
it but eleven : and an able French writer
has afiTured us, that, in time of war, an ad-
ditional fum of five millions, iix hundred
eighty-feven tboufand, five hundred pounds,
is neceflary to profccute it with effeft. — It
is they, in (hort, who would perfuade us to
^bandon our allies.

As to the remainder of the Confiderations,
i( tends to prpvc that the German war is npt

[ 53 1

a war of diverdon. This I am not inclined
todifpute: I will readilv agree with him
that it was of the French choofing, not of
our own» and that they went there as an ad
of defperation, becaufe they could go no
where elfe.

In ihort, the fingle point, which the Con*
fiderer labours to eflablifli is this,^-that we
ought to profecute the war in the Baft and
Weft Indies, detach ourfelves from the con-
tinent, and leave our allies there to fhift for
themfelves.' — All the reft of the pamphlet is
nothing elfe but flourish, declamation, and
invcdkive.

With refpedt to this point, I have (hewn
that as a commercial nation, it is impoilible
for us to be detached from the continent,
from whence, in a great meafure, we draw
our fubfiftence. From the earlieft times to
the prefent period, it has been deemed good
policy to attend to the concerns of the con-
tinent, when we have had no German or
other territories, under the dominion of this
crown. — If therefore we cannot engage our
natural allies, we muft form fuch connedtions
as bid faireft to make amends for their defer-
tion. And I will add that Pruflia and Hano*
ver, 6cc. are for this purpofe the moft eligible
confederates.

With regard to the purfuit of our con-
quefts in the Baft and Weft Indies, it may
be obferyed in gcr«pEal> that extended cqn-

qucfts

[ 54 ]
(ffS^k are not for the mtereil of this nation ;
tkiiiWie have alceady» beOdes fecuring our
I^hfti)i0cattiredas>n>ucb, of perhaps more,than
ytffi. HM be Mq: to retain ;-^that an atten^pt
tofaritber. ^cquifitions can only ferve to move
the jealoufy of other nations, and incline them
to fide with our enemies. — To this may
tee addedy that if we go on and get poi&flioa
of the French fettlen>ent9, and at the fame
, time (ufTer them unmolefted to ravage the
QOOttneiit^ their acquilitions may more than
co\}Qterbalance ours, efpecially if they make
iSicanfelves nsiailers of the maritime provin-
ces ; whereas by oppofing their progrefs, and
^ifappointinfg their vi<s<¥s> we leave them
nothing (except Minorca) to fet off againft
^\ our conquefts*-*— ^Not to mention that
were we in pofTeilion of th^ French fettle-
mental the ^cquifition could be of little ufe ta
^», if we fuffer them to extend their arms
over the greater part of the continent. Fof
in that cafe«.' we (hould be flocked with
tpotpmodkies, without any cuflomers to take
ihem Q& QUf hands, but on their own terms.
r ,lt; will be faidi however, that the French
fan have no juil pretence for making fuch
conquefts^ ai^d (jbme have imagined, that we
IhOuld have, had no war on the comment,
but.for our alliance with Pruffia : but I refer
them, for an atifwer^ to the Confiderations.
it appears fron> th^ Copfiderer^s own prin-
ciples, and they ai$ fo far juft, that whenever
I . ) .. » the

[ S5 1
the French cannot defetid tbeir colonies, oer
intade xn, they will cafirynhoir acms ktcy
Gcrcnaoy: no matter wihcdiorrtheirrpcefeeoct
is. jttft or not. He admits that (they bad jnd
juft preytence for invading Hanover, and by
the fame rule they might turn their arms on
any other part. In (hort, it is evident from
the Coniiderer's own (hewing, that when-
ever we are at war with France, if we are
fuccefsful againft them, they will reek their
vengeance on the continent ; and furely it is*^
better for us to oppofe them abroad, than*
for them to attack us at home. That being,
now our main object, we may narrow our
expences, and to defeat them there, is the
only means now in our power to reduce them*
to ihe neceffity of begging peace.

Upon the whole, when we confider that-^
there is nothing in thefe Confiderations, but
what has been repeated oyer and over, with-
out meeting with any attention, we cannot >
but be perfuaded that fome extraordinary en- *
deavoufs have been ufed to influence the
public. When the fheets of difcpnteht iiS^c
firopa/the.prefs, w^ know by .what induftri-
ous arts they are circulated, and;how bud--
tongued party bawls in every c^nvpany,. in •
defence of the principles they contain. I can- .
not but lament, that my countrymen fliould .
be the dupes of fuch artifice, and that with
all their experience, they are ftill the fame •
fickle creatures, which the celebrated Mon-

tefq[uieu

[ 56 J
(efquieu has charadlerizcd them : *' A na-
** tion always violent, governed more by
•* paffion than reaftMi, and eafily influenced
«* topurfucmcafurcsagainftit's real intercft.'^

m J

* ^.

I" l^ ^ ^'

■1 J"

"' ■ *-4

*r '^t

R R

Page 3, 1. 18, inftead 6i mndhfpeopleyreid minds tf
the peopfe.'^Vsigc 22, 1. 16, iJ^ t^, read /^wr^.^PagC
25, 1. 27, no matter for jpot^ reaa «fl maturfot the/pot.
Page 29, 1. 8, for without^ read UK//?. — *«fc 2^ fof f»-
prefiniingi'^ read mifreprefenting, "^

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