.# <"^. .^:^ ^%. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) P, // &"- Cp. y //A, 1.0 I.I 1.25 .■5 6 IlliU m m M 2.2 2.0 1-4 IIIIII.6 V] .;^;" y ' '•*,.( V '.»■• ■ v ' . f.tnrniil Pl'^..^.rn -ftUiiUim Vol XXXV, 1.1 >J^ i~>? PUT _ , — ' vtssweAH Scale of Miles i W 15 10 IS • \ 1 .„^^,^™^,j ^IMOUTX asBsaBsaan i . ( Vol XXXA/. HARRISON I S3NS LITH.S: M*RT|N )ate A- H«RRISONVSJNS LITH.S: MARTIN4 LANtW.C FOR COAST AND HARBOUR DEFENC3. Then comes a short lengti of coast which would be undefended except by a few ancient martellos. Following these are the intricate windings of the Ore, which make the coast practically inaccessible. Aldborough, Lowestoft, and Yarmouth are well defended. After them comes a length of 12 miles totally undefended, 120 miles from London, however; then Cromer and its vicinity, which are covered. And now the vagaries of the 5-fathom line, in the Wash, will permit us to leave it aside and cross to Theddlesthorpe, a possible landing, which can, however, be secured. Again the 5-fathom line runs out to sea, and the Humber is reached and closed. In the neigh- bourhood of Withernsea a possible landing exists, which is unsecured ; this might, however, be remedied at small cost by a short extension of the line. From Bridlington north to the Border, 150 miles, the whole coast line is admirably defended on paper, and the towns of Bridling- ton, Scarborough, Whitby, Saltburn, Middlesborough, Seaham, Hartlepool, Sunderland, Shields, Tynemouth, and Berwick could be protected. A considerable portion of this coast is, however, inaccessible, and would in practice be neglected. Crossing to the western coast, the accessible shores from the Solway to the Menai Strait are completely defended, including the ports of Barrow, Fleetwood, and Holyhead. The western coast of Wales is not completely defended, but is in itself a sufficient obstacle. In the Bristol Channel, Milford Haven, Llanelly, Swansea, Barry Docks, Cardiff, Avonmouth, and Bristol are covered. The northern coast of Cornwall is in most places inaccessible ; on its southern coast Penzance, Falmouth, and Fov/ey could be pro- tected. Plymouth and Portsmouth may be neglected ; between the two, however, Kingswear, Torquay, Exmouth, and Sidmouth would be covered. From Portsmouth to the Thames there is a coast line of 170 miles, and of this very important section 160 miles are defensible, and the unprotected towns of Worthing, Brighton, Eastbourne, Hastings, Folkestone, Margate, and Ramsgate, all at present quite open to in- sult, could probably defy an enemy. Summarizing, the unsatisfactory portions of the coast railway defence would be few and far between, and could, if thought neces- sary, be remedied at a trifling cost. In Table I the details of the coast line of the English counties are given. In a total length of 1,900 miles of coast, 1,270 could theo- retically be defended from the railways ; 425 are inaccessible, thus increasing the total defended to 1,695, or 89 per cent, of the whole. Of the coast of the counties close to London, and to the great manufacturing centres, namely, the counties of Lancashire, Cheshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Sussex, Kent, and Dorset, 92 per cent, is de- fensible. Every English coast town of the slightest importance is defended j every estuary and harbour the same. (a.) The Subdivision of the Defence. — From the configuration of the 6 THE USE OF RAILWAYS •t ! I i coast, the line to be taken in the subdivision of the defence is an obvious OTie. 1st. A South-eastern section. 2nd. A special defence for the Thames. 3rd. The Eastern counties. 4th. The Lincolnshire coast. 6th. The coast of Yorkshire. 6th. The defences of the Middlesborough-Newcastle district. 7th. A North-western section. 8th. A Bristol Channel section. 9th, The Portsmouth and Southern district, the major part of which is already defended. In addition, a few minor sections might have to be introduced. Each of these sections would, as I propose, be organized into series of— Ist. Firing lines, consisting of guns stationed at vulnerable points along the coast, or concentrated at junctions from which they could readily move up to threatened points. 2nd. Supports placed at some central point of the sections, from which the firing lines would receive their first reinforcements. 3rd. Behind these reinforcements at central points in the country would be stationed gr8,nd reserves. Thus, if an attack be imagined at any point on the coast line of a particular section, the firing line of the section would immediately come into action if on the spot, or move up to the threatened point. Within a few minutes the support could by telegraph be started on its way to replace the firing line, and the reserve be on its way to perform this same relief for the support. To ensure a good working system, the different sections would have to be served as far as possible by distinct lines of railway. In this country this could be effected without disturbing the divisions which the configuration of the coast line dictate. Thus, in the south-eastern section, the South Eastern Railway and London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway would cover the whole ground, and the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway (except for Sheerness) would be an alternative route. Ashford and Lewes would be the natural positions for the central points of the firing line, New Cross the best position for the support. For the special defence of the Thames, the South Eastern Railway on the south, and the London, Tilbury, and Southend Railway on the north. In the eastern section the Great Eastern Railway would practically cover the whole of the ground. In Lincolnshire, the Great Northern would do the same. In the North-east, the North Eastern Railway, with Pickerina^ Norton Junction, and Gateshead as central points for the firing line, Leeds as support. In the North-west, the London and North Western, with Preston as centre, Leeds again as support. In the Bristol Cbauuel, on both north and south, the Great Western ence is an rict. rt of which daced. into series able points they could tions, from nta. ;he country st line of a ^mediately ened point, arted on its to perform ions would lilway. In e divisions ail way and f the whole (except for 3we8 would r line, New n Railway way on the practically Pickeri firing U^e, Preston as it Western FOR COAST AND HARBOUR DEFENCE. ? Railway could be made the section line, Bridgend as a firing line ou the north, Swindon as support. In the South-west, the Great Western Railway again, with Plymouth as firing line centre. In the South, the London and South Western Railway, with yeovil as firing line centre. In both this section and the south-western one Swindon would again be the position for the support. Behind all these firing lines and supports would be kept a general reserve for the whole English system, which might be advantageously stationed at Rugby. (b.) Proposed Personnel and Oo-operation with Bailway Officials.^ To ensure the perfect success of any mov"ble defence by sea, the directions for all general movements should t, ianal3 from one central authority. The same would apply to any movable land defence. Generally speaking, it would, seem necessary to provide a personnel somewhat on the following lines : — (I.) One responsible head, who would be in command of all the coast defences of the country, and be in close c )mmunication with the naval and railway authorities. (2.) Artillery Officers in charge of the subsections of the defence and of the reserves. (3.) A nucleus battery of artillery in each section to perfect the system in time of peace. (4.) Militia and. Volunteer artillery to work the sections. (c.) Types of Proposed Ordnance (Heavy, Medium, Light). — As pointed out previously, any gun can be fired from a railway in the direction of the line ; relative efficiency would determine the nature of heavy gun to use upon railways. For the purposes of this paper, the 22-ton gun has been assumed to be the heaviest ordnance which would be so employed. The use of these heavy guns would seem necessary if the fire of the defence is to reach like natures of guns mounted in ships. Too much stress can hardly be laid upon the desirability of using a great number of modem howitzers and mortars to fire out of cuttings, from behind hills, &c. In medium ordnance the 6-inch B.L. gun and the various natures of Q.F. guns would seem to be the best. For points where landings are possible, the lighter natures of Q.F.'s, machine, and field guns could be employed. (d.) Proposed Carriages. — The design of carriages to fire guns from in the direction of the line is already well established, by their use in European arsenals. Carriages for firing at angles to the line would be a' matter for experiment. •L(e.) .Emplacements for Heavy Guns and Positions for Lighter Natures. -5n places where heavy guns would have to exercise an all-round fire, special emplacements would have to be provided. These emplace- ments might take the form of turntables located upon short sidings specially constructed for the purpose. The turntables would be of considerable diameter, their bridges of wrought iron, with hydraalio r ill •i H 8 THE USE OP RAILWAYS or other suitable buffers to take up the recoil, the whole swinging in concrete lined pits. The lighter guns could be fired directly from the main lino from existing sidings, or from specially constructed lines, (/.) Method of Controlling and Bireding Fire: — Taking into full consideration the great advances which have been made in the last few years in the art of controlling and directing the fire from guns, even when mounted in concealed positions, there would seem to be no practical difficulty in adapting one of the systems to the requirements of the proposed system of rr Iway coast defence. {g.) Estimate of Cost. — Any estimate of the cost of the railway system of coast defence is naturally extremely difficult to reach and yet retain a semblance ov' probability ; undoubtedly a practical survey of the 1 would materially alter dispositions made upon theory. On <■' Tie basis that all of the water covered from the existinsr railwuj .n , t have to be defended, the theoretical disposition of guns of difierent natures previously exemplified was effected, and their cost, witli that of all other requisite materiel for the defence of England, would roughly be — £ 31 22-ton guns, with all spare parts and 3,100 rounds. . 221,960 1(6 medium guns, &c. „ „ 10,600 „ . . 241,680 151 Q.F. guns „ „ 15,100 „ .. 141,940 155 carriages for the above (guns mounted in pairs) .... 268,000 Machine-guns 100,000 Carriages for same 50,000 Emplacements and sidings 150,000 Magazine carriages, &c 25,000 In round numbers £1,200,000 Add 10 per cent 120,000 Total for materiel £1,320,000 This estimate as stated is not practical, but it affords to the mind a basis for comparison thoroughly with the probable cost of extending any actual system to perform the same work. Advantages of the Proposed System. The advantages of using for the defence of this country a system based upon the use of guns firing from existing lines of railway are numerous and apparent. 1st. The amount of resistance which could be offered at any point of our seaboard in a given time would be infinitely greater than by the use of any other practical system. 2nd. The resistance would also be the most economical that could be provided for a general defence of the country. 3rd. Once in working order, the cost of the system would depend upon the moral and physical life of its guns and their mountings. ^.'1 swinging in in lino from ng into full i in the last from guns, )em to be no equirements the railway reach and itical survey 3on theory, the existinsr eposition of ffected, and ! defence of £ 221,960 241,680 141,940 268,000 100,000 60,000 150,000 25,000 £1,200,000 120,000 £1,320,000 the mind a : extending PBCE 7 a system railway aro b any point ter than by that could aid depend tuouatings. FOR COAST AND HARBOUR DEFENCE. 9 All fixed defences and ships are dependent upon the march of the science of gunnery, as well as upon the life of the gr 'S they contain, therefore a standard of excellence is never reached. In maintenance expensew, the proposed system would cost less than fixed fortifications, and infinitely less than that of keeping ships in commission. The cost of personnel would bear the same ratio to other systems as that of maintenance. 4th. The system could promise the rescue of all unprotected towns from bombardment. 6th. At the few landings which exist, a heavy force of artillery to oppose any enemy could be concentrated in a short space of time. 6th. Tide, storm, and darkness would have no effect upon the efficiency of a concentration. Fog would delay, not deter. 7th. The supply of coal for motive power and of munitions for the guns would be practically unlimited. 8th. In accuracy of fire the guns should compare favourably with like ordnance mounted in fixed defences. 9th. In mobility all existing systems would be distanced. 10th. The guns could in most places be concealed by natural features. Naval artillerymen tell us that good practice from ships against forts depends upon one important point, viz., that a distinct object must be fired at. A fort is not deemed a distinct object, a particular gun must be selected as a mark. The result of naval fire against the guns of Alexandria did not, however, tend to show that firing at distinct objects was ever likely to be extremely damaging to that object. If the suips' guns were obliged to fire at a puff of smoke issuing from behind a hedge, or from out of a cutting, it is safe to assume that the effect of the fire would be still less damaging, though it might possibly have the effect of forcing the railway gun to shift its position from time to time. Smokeless powder would introduce the sole remaining factor requisite for total invisibility. Finally, the system could be practically tested in time of peace in conjunction with our fleet manoeuvres. Certain sections might be fully mobilized against the attacks of a squadron or cruizers which were to attempt secret aggression of some form along its shores, and umpires decide upon the efficiency of the system. In fact this might be done without actually providing the guns. Railway trucks could represent the armament, and thus the system be tried before any great expense for guns, &c., was gone into. Examples of Ground adaptable to the Railway System of Defence. A few examples in detail of well-known sections in their adapta- bility to the purposes of the railway system will I think emphasize the enormous command which our railways give us over the waters which are immediately contiguous to our shores. As examples I have chosen an estuary, a landing, and an unpro- tected coast town. 10 THE USE OF RAILWAYS To follow the phases of possible attacks anfainst these chosen places woald be mere theory, and I shall therefore limit myself to descri'bing them in as short a mp.nner as possible, and allow the accompanying maps to speak for themselves as to the chances an enemy would have in engaging the guns the railways cjuld provide. ( I ' f Estuary — The Thames. As an example of an estuary, I have chosen the mouth of the Thames. In spare moments I have been able to make a close study in the field of the railways, and the ground from Shcerness to Gravesend on the south, and from Southend to Thames Haven on the north. The accompanying map represents the result of this study. The portion coloured blue indicates the water covered up to 4,500 yards, that coloured red the same up to 5,500. The dotted line indicates the limits of the 20-foot channel at low tide. At Sheerness a line of railway runs in from the south, and close to the tov, n divides into two branches, one running into the town itself, the other to Queenborough Pier. The line into Sheerness would not be of much practical use unless a short extension of it was made towards the east, in which case a strong reinforcement to the guns of Sheerness might be brought up. The Queenborough line would afford a position for firing down the River Medway, thereby flanking the dockyard and the forts. On the opposite bank of the river, at Port Victoria, a good position well concealed behind the sea wall could be taken up. From this portion of the line, guns could fire directly down the channel of the Medway towards the Nore light. Moving in a westerly direction good positions exist for taking an enemy in reverse, should he force the defences of Sheerness. After this point, which is about two miles from Port Victoria, the line runs behind and up a low range of hills to emerge and sight the Thames close to High Halstow. At this point a good position exists. The railway concealed by small trees and hedges is at an elevation of 100 feet above the Thames, on which 5,000 yards away every boat could be plainly seen. Behind High Halstow a high-angle fire battery might be stationed, controlled by a range-finder station in the church tower (210 feet above the river). Between Halstow and Gravesend several very good sites for bat- teries could be found, the fire of which might assist in the defence of mine-fields in the river. On the north side the railway (London, Tilbury, and Southend Railway) is mostly situated in low-lying land, and is for many miles within a few hundred yards of the river bank. Excepting for the short stretch from Southend to Shoeburyness, ideal positions for range or position finders are to be found on the hills directly behind the line. FOR COAST AND HARBOUR DEFENCE. 11 osen places descrrbing ompanying pould have ath of the close study icerness to Haven on udy. The •500 yards, nel at low id close to own itself, use unless ich case a ought up. down the position 'rom this lel of the aking an fcoria, the sight the ealed by Thames, Behind ontrolled bove the for bat- 3fence of iouthend ny miles uryness, on the From the railway itself every funnel and mast in the channel can be distinctly seen, and direction thus obtained without difficulty. The guns coiild not be seen from the decks of vessels, and even if looked for fnmi the mast-head would be exceedingly hard to distinguish, as hedges exist on both sides of the line. A-t Thames Haven a bianch lino would afford an opportunity for establishing guns to fire directly down the chnnnel. The piece of country which T have just described has unfortunately been the only one which time would permit of ray studying in detail on the ground. I can only hope that other important points will after a practical study lend themselves as readily to the purposes of the railway idea. The ranges would not be excessive, many opportunities for crossfire exist, no costly extensions of the existing lines would be necessary, and the control of the fire should be thorough and effective. Unprotected Coast Town. Let us now consider the case of an unprotected coast town. A well known Admiral of a foreign Power made the statement not long since, that in the event of war with this country, he would have no hesitation in bombarding our defenceless coast towns; what would be the probable influence of the railway-gun upon his idea ? If he approached by day, our lookouts should give the necessary time for bringing up a heavy force of guns. If, however, he eluded the lookouts and took the town unawares, his punishment of it could not be of any duration ; it would not, for the satisfaction of bombard- ing a defenceless town, pay him to risk the loss of a ship nor waste ammunition, the use of which might at any moment become of vital necessity to him. His best chance of success would, therefore, lie in an approach by night, when he might hope to pass the lookouts, and open Are on the town (if he happened to have struck it off in the night) immediately after daybreak. As an example of a place which might be so visited, let us consider the case of Hastings and St. Leonards, which form a single town open to the sea for a length of 2^ miles. Double lines of railway approach the town from three directions : — (a.) From the north-east the South Eastern, entering the town at the east end. (b.) From the north-west the South Eastern line from Tunbridge, entering the town near the west end in combination with (c.) The London, Brighton, and South Coast line from Lewes. From the map it will be observed that all these lines run within a short distance of the shore, and that the hills, &c., favour concealment. Several good positions for guns are to be found on the railways. Thus at the east end of the town we find, close by Hastings station, three existing sidings well located for fire along the line ; on one of these a turntable might withou 3 difficulty be laid down for a 22-ton gun ; in addition to these three sidings there is a set of four more which could be utilized for any nature of fire. IS THE USE OF RAILWAYS 1 1 ■III Mi At Hastirps Castle a good observing station for a position finder might bo established. From Hastings Station to the Warrior Square Station the line is in a tnnnel, which might servo as a shelter if the fire of an enemy became too heavy. At Warrior Square there is an open length of about 200 yards ; here a battery of howitzers and mortars might be stationed, and their fire observed and directed from a church close by. After passing through a second tunnel, Bo-peep Junction is rcBiched ; here the South Eastern Railway and the London, Brighton, and South Coast lines separate, the former running into a deep cutting and bearing away towards the north-west. Excellent positions could be taken up close by this junction for flanking the front of the town or for direct fire out to sea. The high ground close by would afford sites for range or position finders. For the above notes of the lines about these towns I am indebted to n brother Officer, who has a knowledge of the vicinity and kindly volunteered to give me a few hints. Landings. As I have not actually been on the ground at Dungeness, I shall content myself with drawing your attention to the accompanying map of that section of the country which seems to demonstrate the possibility of bringing a heavy fire of all natures of guns on the water which an enemy's boats would occupy in any attempted land- ing. I have lately had the opportunity of visiting another of the dangerous landings of the country, that of Clacton. Here, close beside the row of ancient martollos built for the purpose of deny- ing the landing, a line of railway could be built at a very small cost. The guns mounted upon it would be hidden behind the sea wall and could cover the water which an enemy would occupy, both in landing and in covering his landing. In conclusion, I may be allowed to recapitulate the leading points of my argument. The strong point of our defensive position in England is, as I submit, our enormous railway power. Whether we regard it from the point of railway mileage open, as compared with square mileage of area to be defended in Great Britain and Ireland generally, or whether we look to the length of our extended coast line as compared with the railway mileage at or near that coast line, and therefore locally available for its defence, the conclusion is one and the same, namely, that our defensive railway power is far greater than that of any other country. What the nature of our defensive position should be is not within the province of this paper, and I trust that I have not made state- ments which are construable into opinions on this vexed subject. What 1 have wished to point out is that the railway system of coast defence is equally applicable to all shades of opinion. jition finder n tlie lino is i' an enemy n length of r.s might be liurch close Junction is I, Brighton, nto a deep Excellent )r flanking or position m indebted and kindly FOR COAST AND HARBOUR DEFENCE. 13 less, I shall ompanying Bmonstrate uns on the ipted land- her of the lere, close 3 of deny- i^ery small ebind the d occupy, ing points IS, as I it from mileage erally, or compared therefore the same, n that of ot within de state- subject, of coast The weak point of England's defensive position is, as I have sub- mitted to your judgment, our existing deficiency in gun power. Our coast defence is admitted to be very partial and incomplete. It leaves great lengths of our seaboard and important commercial centres on the coast, nearly if not quite undefended. And when we look inland, we find a similar deficiency of gun power for that field force which successive generations of responsible Ministers have thought to be a necessary provision for our defence in the event of invasion. My argument therefore is, and has been throughout this paper. Why not use our strength to correct our weakness ? Why should we not Table. — Details of English Coast Line by Counties. Coast county. Length of coast. Coast defended from railways. Inacces- siblo. Total defended. Remarks. Kent miles 97 8-t 101 67 69 53 171 58 5 104 28 94 44 28 95 78 9 26 18 102 69 62 64 116 68 80 53 64 miles 90 71 99 40 32 13 65 42 5 70 20 16 15 28 65 56 9 26 18 93 51 60 60 84 30 64 40 38 miles 5 3 1 25 24 36 96 10 6 67 4 40 17 9 P 2 14 15 30 10 7 4 miles 95 74 100 65 56 49 161 42 5 80 26 83 19 28 95 73 9 26 18 102 51 62 64 99 60 64 47 42 FromCanvey Island. Sussex Hampshire Dorset ■r, [South . . . ^«^«"iNorth... Cornwall Somerset Gloucester Glamorgan Carmarthen Pembroke Cardigan Merioneth Carnarvon Anglesea Denbigh Flint Cheshire Lancashire Isle of Man Cumberland .... Northumberland . Yorkshire Lincoln Norfolk Suffolk To mouth of Mersey. Morecambe Bay and Rive: Ribble as- sumed inaccessible. To Bowuess. To Grimsby. The Wash assumed to be inaccessible. Essex .•••••.... To Canvey Island. Totals 1,896 1,270 425 1,695 14 THE USE OF RAILWAYS turn to account the oiiormous ndvantap^e wln'ch onr proat railway power gives UR to concentrate every available pun at a tlircatciHHl point in the rijfht and the Hliortest time, wliich the propoi- utilization of our railways can and will do; thereby, as I submit, practically doubling or quadrupling our available gnn power? I!. i Tlie CnATKMAN : Wo have boon listcTiing to a very ingtnictivo lecture upon a «ub)ofly, it is sufllcient to look at the map, and let us admit for example that it is possible to fire guns of heavy calibre from our railway metals as proposed, subject, of course, to certain modifications whieh could doubtless be easily ctirried out. If you look at the const liiu' of England and consider our present system of defence, the distances our ships would liavo to travel round that coast, you will see what a number of vessels wo should require to be constantly on the move and how our existing Fleet, which would bo required in all its strength to strike a blow, and protect our com- merce, would 1)0 Hup])liod. Now, looking at tlie map, suppose we had a large reserve of heavy guns mounted and equip])od at Rugby, or some more suitable central position, how easy it would be to move direct to any given point of the older circle, which our railway system provided for. You could move your guns in one quarter, or even one-tenth, of the time that it would take to get a ship round from point to point of our extended seaboard. I have listened to the lecture with con- Bidemblo interest, I may say, almost with a kind of parental feeling, not because as an old man I rise to compliment the young lecturer, but he has taken up my child, and naturally the parent always likes the man that fondles his offspring. I am getting on in years myself, and I am therefore glad to see that a very young man has risen up and taken an interest in this subject. Twenty years ago I sug- gested the very same thing. I wrote to the War Otlice proposing it. I will read you a portion of my letter. My infant met with the usual War Office attention, and I suppose it was put asleep in the pigeon-bole, and if this young man had not raised the question it might have lain there long after I had boon laid in the grave. " January 4, 1871. Sir, as the defences of our country are now occup;, ing much national concern, I hope I may not be considered presumptuous in briefly and very superficially offering a suggestion relative to this im|)ortnnt subject. In view that all our heavy ordnance is at present mounted in fixed positions and incapable of concentration at any threatened point of our coast, or even at any particular face of a fortification without considerable labour, I would propose to utilize generally our railway system for defensive purposes, and would mount all our guns on wheel carriages, so that thoy could be moved along any of our lines from point to point : the advantages of such a system must be obvious, as not only would it enable us to concentrate our artillery with overwhelm- ing force at any given point, but guns on such movable carriages could be fought with infinitely less exposure to the men." This was the reply I received from the War 0G5ce :— " War Office, 13th January, 1871. Sir, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your communication, dated 4th instant, containing suggestions for the adaptation of the railway system for defensive purposes by mounting guns on carriages which could run on the lines ; and for the defence of the metropolis on a similar plan." I am not aware that any gun was ever previously mounted for firing purposes upon a railway wheel-carriage platform before this, but not being either a gunner or a sapper, or in any way mixed up with gunnery experiments, I am unable to speak from personal knowledge. Shortly after this, at the proof butts at Woolwich, an 81-ton gun was thus mounted and fired on the very principle I proposed. In 1877 I wrote to the " Timea " as follows : it was printed in the " Times " of the 25th May, 1877, headed — Jii FOR COAST AND HARnOUR DEFENCE. 15 way power <1 ]K)infc in li/ation of [H'uctically ture upon a ny who will rivitcd. part of tlie 18 exercised, rking out in briefly, it is isible'to fire ^e, to certain look at the istaiices our r of vessels ^leet, which t our com- uid a large )ro suitable )f the outer guns in one mund from with con- because as ;en up my Pspring. I ^ery young ago I sug- will read attention, n had not the grave. ing much and very view that Japable of ^articular to utilize lount all ■ of our obvious, erwhelm- could be received cted by nication, y system he lines ; that any carriage ly mixed owledge. uounted 0168 " as " PORTABLE BATTERIES. " To the Editor of the ' Times.' " Sir, — Any sugeestion w})ich has for its object the rendering of our seagirt island so impregnable in itself against the possibility of invusion or injury from hostile forces that our powerful Navy may be left free and unlettered by honu» fears or necessities to })rotect our extended Colonies and connneree, or to strike a blow with all its power at any given point, cannot fail to be of interest at the present tinu>, and will, I trust, plead a sufficient excuse for soliciting spuce in your columns to draw attention to my proposal. *' Our present conscious security is based mainly on the command wo possess on the high seas, and should any combination of circumstances render our fleets powerless to cope with the enemies' navies, the invasion of this country Mould admittedly be feasible. In such adverce eircunistiinets we should depend for the defence of our coast on the existing fortifications, 8upi)Ienu'nted by sutOi earth- works as time permitted, together with the aid of all the gunboats and torpedo craft we could conuuand ; our telegraph system would enable us to direct our floating batteries and ail available troops to proceed by most expeditious means to the }X)intB threatened. The objections that occur to me in trusting exclusively to this means of defence are — " 1. All our scattered or detached forts, with their fixed complement of guns, men, and nuiterial, weal"?n our powers of concentration, for these forts cannot be denuded of troops, as nui only must the material and stores be protected, but the transfer of gunners to any other point would be of very little service without their guns. Again, an enemy once effecting a landing and getting possession of one or moreoftliese fortifications would secure a solid armed basis of commuuicalion, which, supported by their navy, would render tiieir position impregnable. " 2. Our gunucats and torpedo craft, besides being largely dependent on the weather, and having very long distances to travel round the outer circle of the coasts, would not be enabled to concentrate at any given point in sufTicient time ; in fact, the enemy, having command of the Channel for the time being, could bar the approach of any vessels of this kind on both flanks of their disembarking troops. " The collecting of a large force of Militia and Volunteers at any particular spot would occupy considerable time. " Again, the enemy would, in all probability, make a feint to attack on two o/ more points, and having thus drawn our forces in those directions would, under cover of night, run with the main body of his troops for another part of our shores. " Our island home, being providentially surrounded by water, possesses the strongest natural barrier against invasion that can possibly exist, and it appears to me that if we provide the means of concentrating with unerring certainty a crush- ing force of artillery, with guns of heavier calibre than even the war-ships of the invader could command, on any given points of the coast, before the enemy coidd possibly set foot on the shore, it would be impossible for the vessels of an invading force to approach near enough either to disembark or cover the landing of their men. " My proposal is simply to take the full advantage which our railway system, in connection with our insular position, affords, and provide powerful movable batteries, which can be sent fully equipped in fighi ing order direct by railway to any required point, and the recent experimental trials of the 81-ton gun have proved that thti heaviest ordnance can be moved and fought on rail way metals with con- siderable advantage, the incline of the rail at the firing point forming almost an automatic platform, the recoil taking the gun up the incline, where it is held in position by the brakes, and when libemted returns to the firing point by its own momentum. " In connection with our present main lines of railway, which probably would require strengthening at certain points, I would construct branch lines or sidings leading to every strategical point of ova coast and into every fort, as far as possible, 16 THE USE OF RAILWAYS a \ Si i •with requisite platforms, either on the incline principle, turntable, or other mechani- cal arrangement. These branch lines during peace would, doubtless, be of some small commercial value. I would mount as many of our heaviest guns as practic- able on railway gun-carriages, so that they could be moved by rail from one face of a fort to another, and from one place to another. The locomotives required for this service could be so mechanically constructed as to facilitate the loading of the guns by steam power, and thus save manual work. I would suggest three large central dep6ts, where u number of guns tlius mounted, fully equipped, and ready for use, sliould be kept. These central dep6ts might be so constructed as to form an inner circle of fortifications to defend the metropolis. At each of these stations the regular Militia and Volunteer Artillery might be instructed in everything that pertains to the working of these guns — the construction, repair, and destruction of railway lines, besides the formation of a locomotive corps specially trained to conduct the traffic. " Besides the drill and instruction imparted at these stations, a number of these heavy guns, fully equipped, with proper complement of men, ammunition, and material, might be occasionally moved to difPerent points of the coast for drill and gun practice. Practical instruction of this kind would be highly calculated to interest our Volunteer soldiers, who should be given every encouragement and opportunity to render themselves efficient artillerists. The cost of such a system would not be great, for when once we have established a means whereby our heavy guns, as well as men, can be moved expeditiously from place to place, we can afford to diminish the number of our scattered forces and present immovable batteries. " 1 have merely stated my views superficially ; the details are easily worked out. " I remain, Sir, yours faithfully, "E. R. Wetheebd. " Woolwich, May 24:th, 1877." Immediately after this letter appeared, I had a number of copies printed for cir- culation, to ^ hich I appended the folio wing footnote : — " If, in addition to connecting some of our light-ships by telegraph cable with the shore, some provision were made for running out, in the event of war, from these ships a further length of cable, some 10 or 20 miles out to sea, and there establish- ing a temporary telegraph post, our cruizers would, by these means, be enabled to communicate any movements of the enemy or other information, without loss of ,time or having to quit their cruizing ground." I am an old-fashioned man myself. I prefer one practical test to ever so many theoretical ideas, and firing at a direct angle on a railway is a point that requires very careful practical experiment, because we are taking the line at the very weakest point. The rails, the sleepers, bolts, and everything are taken at the weakest point. The wheels, metals, chairs, sleepers are constructed mainly to bear the vertical strain, and the sudden shock of discharge would throw a very considerable pressure on the outer rail. The sleepers also run across, and the bolts which hold the sleepers run with the grain in the direction of the side pressure. These are all very weak points. Therefore it would be impossible, I think, for any mathematical cal- culation to arrive at any conclusion as to whether the carriage and the railway metals would bear right-angle fire. Then if the gun was fired from any part of a curve, if the recoil is towards the upper side, the raised outer rail would strengthen the power of resistance, but, if the recoil was in the reverse direction, the carriage would stand partly tilted up in the direction the recoil would force it. These are matters of detail. Only admit the principle, and everything else can be worked out without much difficulty. Colonel Kensington, R.A. : I have been referred to in the lecture concerning the calculation of the overturning eflfect of fire at right angles to the line of rails. This problem is not easy, because it is difficult to calculate the energy of recoil exactly. It is not sufficient to take it as due only to the momentum of the pro- jectile, because there are other causes which must not be neglected, as has been ably shown by Dr. Anderson, F.R.S., Director- General of Ordnanoe Factories. There is the force expended on driving the air out from the bore of the gun, which alone I I FOR COAST AND HARBOUR DEFENCE. 17 r mecbani- be of some as practic- one face of squired for 3ing of the ■hree large and ready- as to form !se stations thing that truction of to conduct sr of these lition, and r drill and culated to iment and 1 a system our heavy can afford Lteries. rked out. HEEBD. ed for cir- 3 with the •om tliese establish- nabled to it loss of so many requires weakest 9st point, vertical pressure lold the all very tical cal- railway )art of a lengthen carriage hese are ked out ning the This >f recoil he pro- jen ably There ih alone is too much to be neglected. There is also the great amount of the reaction due to the expansion of the powder gas on leaving the bore, besides the actua' velocity acquired by the very considerable weight of powder. By Dr. Anderson's calcula- tions it would appear that the energy of the recoil of the 6-inch B.L. gun is prob- ably about half again as much as the energy of recoil which would be due to the momentum of the projectile alone. This would bring the amount to 25 foot-tons at most, taking the muzzle velocity at a rather larger figure than the lecturer has given, namely, close upon 2,000 feet per second, which I believe is nearly correct. Making then these assumptions concerning the energy of recoil, and taking into eonsideration tne average amounts for the weights of the truck and mounting that might be employed and the position of the centre of gravity, as well as the width of the track, I find tliat, even if the whole of the energy of recoil were available for upsetting the truck, there would be sufficient stability to prevent a complete upset. In fact, however, a large amount of energy of recoil would be absorbed by the hydraulic buffers, also by the action of the springs of the truck ; so that I think that it may be fairly be assumed on mathematicaJ calculations alone that the 6-inch gun might be fired at right angles to the truck. Further, I have considered the ques- tion in connection with experiments with the 40-pr. R.B.L. whichhave been alluded to, the energy of recoil in that instance not being more than 4 or 5 foot-tons, or about one-fifth of the amount for the 6-inch B.L. It appears that the gun- carriage might have in that case been able to recoil about 6 inches at roost, whereas for the Vavasseur carriage used for tlie 6-inch B.L. there is a recoil of 3 feet allowed. *rhis would compensate for the greater energy of the 6 inch B.L. The new Vavasseur carriage for garrison service is only constructed for a recoil of 1^ feet, which according to my calculations would, I think, be insufficient, because the question is not merely to consider what will prevent the carriage from over- turning, but rather that the front trucks should not leave the rails at all. I am satisfied that with a recoil allowed of 3 feet the truck would remain safely on the rails. I should like to say a few words on some further points connected with the lecture. I think that the system which has been brought before us is admirably adapted for the high-angle fire, which has been proved so effectual, and that the apparently long ranges the lecturer has taken, up to 7,000 yards, ai'e not by any means excessive when considered in connection with ranges at which high-angle fire has been experimentally em])loyed with very great success. Experiments have been made at the Isle of Wight, extending up to 10,000 yards, when a moving raft, the size of the deck of a vessel, has been successfully hit. Further, I have just been informed that at Shoeburyness the practice has been adopted of firing guns from curved rails, thus easily obtaining any required direction. It has recently been suggested that all our lightliouaes ought to be connected by telegraphic cominuni- cation with the land, chiefly for the purpose of giving inforiaation concerning shipwrecKs that may occur near them. This would be invaluable in connection with the question of coast defenci^, so that the earliest information might be obtained. I think the lecture is very instructive, as showing the short period of time within which armaments of very considerable power can be brought together, and must altogether be considered a valuable contribution to the vexed question as to which of the sister Services, Army or Navy, shoxdd be responsible for coast defence. Captain Buxbury, R.A. : 1 should like to say a few words from the point of view of the man at the gun. Colonel Kensington says 7,000 yards are not extreme for high-angle fire, but I think wiih the medium guns, the 6-inch guns to which the lecturer alludes, that we should find considerable difficulty in hitting a ship at 7,000 yards by direct fire ; in the first place, even if that range was taken from the gun itself. In many cases, as you see by the map, the town to bo bombarded would be some little distance nearer to i:he ship than the gun would be. The ship also would be firing at a very large object ; there would be no necessity for her to anchor as long as she throws her shells anywhere into the town. We should have, therefore, the difficulty of firing at a moving object. I am difl[ident about saying anything about position-finding in the presence of Major Watkin, who, I have no doubt, will be able to overcome any difficulties that will be raised, but, at present, it would be very difficult for us to use high-angle fire directed by position-finders, which are a necessity to accurate high-angle firing, with guns firing from trucks and moving on 18 THE USE OF RAILWAYS 1 i i« il^i railway lines. We are dependent for accuracy on direction, and without accurately laid training arcs I do not see how you are to get good results. Then, again, there is the electric communication of ranges and training, and I do not see how that is to be managed with guns running freely on railway lines. I think that points to the necessity of having short sidings running into emplacements for guns and howitzers. I also think the supply of ammunition in open trucks without magazines would be rather a hazardous exjjeriment. I do not think it would tend to ccmfidence in serving the guns. It would be difficult also to supply ammunition to individual guns if you had five or six guns in a row, unless you had a siding or branch line which would carry the ammunition round. I think the question of interruption of traffic has hardly been given sufficient attention. I fancy the War Office arrange- ments for moving troops and stores wou'd be very much interrupted if a consider- able portion of the line was to be taken up for the use of the guns. I fancy it would lead to friction, to say the least of it. Then, again, the ordnance would require to be practised from in peace-time, and there is local traffic to be considered. I do not know whether the railway companies would be ready to give up a portion of their lines and iuLeiTupt traffic without considerable compensation. There is one point the lecturer has not alluded to, in which I think the system would be of very great value. We depend, in time of war, very much for our coast defence upon the services of the Auxiliary Artillery, Militia and Volunteers. At present the great majority of them have little or no training with modern B.L. weapons. As to the Militia, I may say, without exaggeration, most of them have to train with the old 64-pr8., though they are sent occasionally at long intervals to be trained at the forts. Under some system such as that proposed, instead of the whole regiment going to the guns, we can have the guns sent up for the use of the Militia and Volunteer regiments at their own headquarters. That, I think, would do away with great part of the difficulties we have at present in training our Auxiliary Artillery in the use of new type guns. Lieutenant-Geueral Latjkie : It is, I think, rather en interesting fact that the first Canadian Military College Cadet who has delivered an address in this theatre should have spoken on the subject of the protection of the shores of England. It does strike me as rather a peculiar thing that his attention should first have been directed to the defence of the mother country. As regards this subject, it strikes me that perhaps he is suggesting too much, and so may overdo his proposal. He tells us in the same address that we are short of guns. He then proposes to lock up a very large number of our guns by mounting them on these carriages. It seems to me, speaking not of course as a gunner, that it would be more desirable to fit the carriages so that the guns could be readily placed upon them whenever required, so that they could be utilized for that purpose, rather than to lock up permanently a large portion of our armament, which mayor may not require to be used elsewhere. Besides, it seems to me you sliould not make your guns fixtures on the I'ailway trucks, but have them detachable and available to move into commanding positions where the railway track does not and cannot run ; hence it would surely be better that the trucks should be fitted to receive the guns, so that they could be utilized for this purpose, but should not be permanently connected. Again, I think, when he suggests putting these heavy guns on the railway carriages he is again going rather far. For light guns to meet raiders it seems to me to be a very servir^eable and feasible plan ; but to deal with heavy guns and to expect that they are to take the place of forts against ships does seem to me to be going a little beyond wliat we are at all prepared for at present, and may destroy the chance of carrying out 5i very reasonable, a very fair, and admirable suggestion. I throw out these ideas, speaking more as an infantryman, a man aocustomed to other work, than as a gunner ; but we are much indebted to the lecturer for the care and thought he has bestowed on this novel and important subject. The Chaibman : Perhaps Major Watkin can give us some information on this subject ? Major Watkin : I have not studied the question enough to answer any of the questions raised, because I understood the lecturer only to put the matter forward as a scheme, and not in detail. I think, when we come to matters of detail, we could possibly meet the objections raised. If you oould mount the guns on the 11, ' mi ll I ii unMj i . i | ii i]n I I ■■ FOR COAST AND HARBOUR DEFENCE. 19 this carriage, I think then jou come to the question of laying the guns, but I should be very sorry to lay it down exactly how it is to be done. The Chairman : I think that the lecturer has done good service in bringing this question forward and suggesting that a movable armament, such as is recognized as part of the defence of a position occupied by a chain of forts, might be utilized for the defence of the country at large, for, if not applicable to the extent he suggests, it might still be adopted for special sites. His proposals are not altogether new. We have been told by Colonel Wethered that somewliat similar proposals were submitted by him to the War Office in 1871, and the Index of Lectures that have been delivered in this Institution shows that the subject was also brought for- ward by an Officer of the 79th Highlanders in 1865, so that we may suppose that what has occurred to several niinds has doubtless a good deal in it. The lecturer's proposals wovdd enable one gun to do the work of two or more, for, by having the guns concenti'ated and moved to different places on the coast where they might be wanted, they could do a great deal better service than if they wer>' kept locked up in one or two places. Besides which, at a time of invasion or attack in this country, when every available horse would probably be taken up, we should have the advan- tage of rapidly getting the guns by rail somewhere near the places where they woidd be wanted, instead of having to rely exclusively upon horse power for the purpose. We have had an estimate put before us of 1,320,000/. for doing this; it is a pretty large sum. but I fancy it is not quite enough. It does not include a great many accessories that would be required, such as the cost of providing storehouses and of purchasing land and making sidings and gun emplacements, which would be neces- sary, not only to prevent the main lines being blocked by the armoured trains at a time when troops would have to be hurried up to points where the attack was likely to take place, but also for the efficient working of the guns. Considering the long range which is proposed for the guns to fire over, I understand that high-angle fire is intended, the guns to be worked by means of the position range-finder from places where they would not themselves be seen. I doubt whether Militia or Volunteer Artillery would- be able to do much accurate practice at boats moving about under ouch conditions. There are, however, others much better fitted to give an opinion upon tlijs point than I am. Machine and otlier guns for direct fir ng to oppose a landing could not well be used from the lines of railways ; they would '.lave to be brought nearer the points to be defended. The London, Brighton, and South Coast and other lines referred to by the lecturer are pretty close to the sea, but I think there are few places on those railways where we could actually put guns on the metals and look over the siglits of those guns to fire at any places where troops might probably be landed ; arrangements would therefore have to be made for getting such guns to the front, to points where they could be used. The Officers of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer StafP Corps might have a good deal to say in the matter dealt with in this lecture. They would probably have to make the traffic arrangements in great measure for the armoured trains, if any such scheme as is proposed here were to be adopted, and I am sorry none of them happen to be here to-day to help us in the discussion. Lieutenant Girottabd, in reply : My first thought of this idea was more in connection with siege atcack than coast dei'ence, and in its bearing on siege attack I can see no reason why the idea is not quite appreciable. I have examined the country round Paris and Belfort, and apparently the heaviest guns, if necessary, could be brought up and laid directly on the forts, quite out of range of the guns that are mounted in them. But as the question of coast defence was one which more directly afPected our own country, I abandoned the question of siege attack and went into coast defence. I tlien became aware, by going through back papers, that Colonel Wethered and Mr. Walker, of the 79*^' "ghlanders, had pro- posed the scheme many years ago. At that time, unfo ceiy, a great many of our present railways wore not constructed, and the schenu as not so feasible as it is to-day. Captain Bunbury has spoken of a few objections to the scheme. The lecture to-day was never intended to go into detail. It seems to me that if the general idea is sound there certainly could be no difficulty in the details which might not be got over in some reasonable way. He has raised a few objec- tions ; one is tlie supply of ammunition. I can see no difficulty in this matter. ■ 20 USE OP RAILWAYS FOR 00\ST AND HARBOUR DEFENC3E. Special cars are provided, which would come up with the trains and be left at a short distance from the place where the guns would take up their firing positions, and also as to the supply of the ammunition from those cars to the guns. The lines are double, and the simplest method would be to use the second line to run a small oar on, and thus take up the ammunition to the guns. In the matter of interrup- tion of traffic. Captain Bunbury, by admitting the fact that an enemy was bombard- ing a town, certainly admits the fact that the traffic would be interrupted, and in such a case I do not think any regular railwav trains could run upon them. Practice in peace-time, which Captain Bunbury spoke about, ia, I think, one of the things which makes the scheme peculiarly valuable. It could be practised in peace- time and thoroughly perfected. General Laurie spoke about the locking up of the guns. I cannot quite see myself how one could dismount the guns. They need not necessarily be guns of the latest pattern. We have any number of guns in the country which are not used because guns of later pattern are superseding them. If we separate the guns from the carriages, the scheme could hardly be ready in time of war. The scheme M'ould have to be studied very carefully in peace-time, and all the details worked out. Q-eneral Laurie also spoke about replacing fortifi- cations by the use of these heavy guns. That, I think, was the last idea I had in my mind in this paper. What I did mean was that we could not hope to extend the present fortifications, and that there were many points on the coast which were totally undefended, and here the scheme could be used to greater advantage. If we only bring up light guns we may have heavy ship's guns to deal with, and I cannot therefore see that the exclusive use of light guns would be advisable; there- fore, I proposed at the more important points to put one or two turntables, in order that these heavy guns might serve three or four places. If you put a coast battery for each place it would reach the cost of fifteen or twenty of these guns, or probably the cost of the lieavy guns for the whole of the country. General Dawson-Scott spoke about blocking the concentration of troops coming up in case of invasion. Undoubtedly there would be some objection to this, but, at the same time, it is laid dovT^n that it does not pay to entrain troops unless they have 20 miles to go. I tb\nk it is 30 or 35 miles in Europe, but in this country, on account of our numerous nil ways, we assume it to be 20 miles. At any of these points it will be noticed tliat the guns would be up long before the troops would begin to entrain. Ashford is only 17 miles from Lydd, and the guns would be in position before the line would be used, and therefore would not cause a block. This would also seem to be the case at Clacton, as the guns would only have to travel from Ipswich. These are the two most dangerous landings in the country. At other points, if the bombard- ment of a town is going on, I cannot see how the ordinary traffic could possibly go on. Therefore, I should think no interruption would take place. In conclusion, I must thank the Officers who have kindly helped me. This paper is not an un- divided effort, a great many people having very kindly assisted me in every way. The Chairman : It only remains for me to ask you to join me in thanking the lecturer for this very interesting paper, and also to thank those gentlemen who have taken part in this discussion. RJkBBISOK AND SONS, 7BINTEBS IN OBDINABT TO HBB HAJESTT, ST. HABTIN 8 LANB. 7^ '« l^