v-^

o^. '^^.t:

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)

t/i

1.0

I.I

1.25

fM IIIIM

^ I4£ IIIII2.0

U i 1.6

'■c^^ .>:^

Photoraphic

Sciences
Corporation

23 WEST MAIN STREET

WEBSTER, NY. 14580

(716) 872-4503

■1>^

.^\^

^9)

-^-U'J" ^^-^-'

i/x

CIHM
Microfiche
Series
(Monographs)

ICI\/IH

Collection de
microfiches
(monographles)

Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques

Technical and Bibliographic Notes / Notes techniques et bibliographiq

ues

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original
copy available for filming. Features of this copy which
may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any
of the images in the reproduction, or which may
significantly change the usual method of filming, are
checked below.

D
D
D
D
□

Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur

Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagee

Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restauree et/ou pelliculee

Cover title missing/

Le titre de couverture manque

Coloured maps/

Caites geographiques en couleur

Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)

Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou illustration* en couleur

Bound with other material/
Relie avec d'autres documents

Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion
along interior margin/
La reliure serree peut causer de I'ombre ou de la
distorsion le long de la marge interieure

Blank leaves added during restoration may appear
within the text. Whenever possible, these have
been omitted from filming/
II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutees
lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte,
mais, lorsque cela etait possible, ces pages n'ont
pas etefilmees.

Additional comments:/
Commentaires supplementaires;

L'Institut a microfilme le meilleur exemplaire qu'il
lui a ete possible de se procurer. Les details de cet
exemplaire qui sont peut 6tre uniques du point de vue
bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image
reproduite. ou qui peuvent exiger une modification
dans la methode normale de filmage sont indiques
ci-dessous.

□ Coloured pages/
Pages de couleur

□ Pages damaged/
Pages endommagees

□ Pages restored and/or laminated/
Pages restaurees et/ou pellicul^es

Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages decolorees, tachetees ou piquees

□ Pages detached/
Pages detachees

I y] Showthrough/

Transparence

□ Quality of print varies/
Qualite inegale de I'impression

□ Continuous pagination/
Pagination continue

□ Includes index
Comprend un

5x(es)/
Comprend un (des) index

Title on header taken from:/
Le titre de l'en-t§te provient:

□ Title page of issue/
Page de titre de la li

□ Caption of issue/
Titre de depart de

vraison

la livraison

□ Masthead/
Generique (periodiques) de la livraison

This Item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/

Ce document est filme au taux de reduction indique ci-dessous

10X 14X 18X

1 — r

12X

22X

26 X

30X

24 X

28X

32 X

^,p^^'flfr.

i^u'il
cet

de vue
je

ition
jes

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks
to the generosity of:

Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Library
Dalhousie University

The images appearing here are the best quality
possible considering the condition and legibility
of the original copy and in keeping with the
filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed
beginning with the front cover and ending on
the last page with a printed or illustrated impres-
sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All
other original copies are filmed beginning on the
first page with a printed or illustrated impres-
sion, and ending on the last page with a printed
or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche
shall contain the symbol —^(meaning "CON-
TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"),
whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at
different reduction ratios. Those too large to be
entirely included in one exposure are filmed
beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to
right and top to bottom, as many frames as
required. The following diagrams illustrate the
method:

L'exemplaire film6 fut reproduit grice d la
g6n6rosit6 de:

Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Library
Dalhousie University

Les images suivantes ont 6X6 reproduites avec le
plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et
de la nettet6 de l'exemplaire film6, et en
conformity avec les conditions du contrat de
filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en
papier est imprim6e sont film6s en commenpant
par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la
dernidre page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second
plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires
origiriaux sont film6s en commengant par la
premidre page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par
la dernidre page qui comporte une telle
empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la
dernidre image de cheque microfiche, selon le
cas: le symbole — »- signifie "A SUIVRE", le
symbole V signifie "FIN ".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent Stre
film6s d des taux de reduction diff^rents.
Lorsqua le document est trop grand pour Stre
reproduit en un seul clich6, il est film6 d partir
de Tangle supdrieur gauche, de gauche d droite,
et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre
d'images nScessaire. Les diagrammes suivants
illustrent la mSthode.

32 X

j 1

♦

pioiHi is Ti "scii OF mm"

INAUGURAL ADDRESS

Delivered at the Convocation of Dalliousie University,
Halifax, N. S., Oct. 18, 1887.

J-5v.3^Es sets:, im:. .^l..

Professor of Metaphysics and Ethics.

HALIFAX :

PRINTBD AT TUF OFFICE OF TAB NOVA SCOTIA PRINTING COMPANT,

1887.

Philosopliy as tlie "Science of Sciences."

I believe it is customary for the professor to
whom it falls to deliver the Introductory Address,
to take advantage of this opportunity to explain,'
m general and somewhat popular terms, the
nature and claims of his own special subject, as
well as its relation to other departments' of
academic study. And while I should naturally
on the ground of precedent alone, be led to adopt
a similar course, I do so the more willino-ly
because of the peculiar position and fortune'' of
Mental_ Philosophy. Here, if anywhere, there is
need of explanation, and possibly even of defence.
It is, indeed, significant of the irresistible claims of
Philosophy that its right to a place in the academic
curriculum is seldom, if ever, openly questionrd.
while the scientific and practical mind of .U
century has no hesitation in questioning thj
value of a classical education, it seldom ventures
upon an open and avowed attack on the equally
old-world and unpractical study of Philosophy.
Still there is a widespread scepticism, none the
less real because it is ashamed to express itself,
as to the intrinsic value and present interest of
philosophical study. It is allowed to retain its
place by sufferance, as it were, as an interesting
survival of the ancient and media3val world, and
a useful intellectual gymnastic, None, perhaps,
who pretend to culture,, and none v/itbout such a
pretension dare intermeddle with questions of

the liiirhor education, would accept this frank and
ddiiiite oxpiv.ssion of tlioir attitude to Philosopliy.
But it is the secret thouglit of many. Now, I
beliove that sucli an attitude is tlie result, solely
and entirely, of niisundei-standin^ as to the
fundamental aim and spirit of Philosophy. It is
only when the nature and purpose of philosophi-
cal study are not understood, or mz'sunderstood,
that the study itself is reprobated and requires
defence. Once understood, it needs none. What
I am anxious to do, then, in this address, is to
explain, so far as the narrow limits permit, what
Philosophy is, in the confidence that this explana-
tion, in so far as it is successful, will be, at the
same time, its best and sufficient defence.

Philosophy, then, is a kind, or rather a stage,
of Knowle<ro. I say stage rather than kind,
because all knowledge is essentially or in kind
the same. In the lower you have always the
germ of the higher; in the higher only the
development of the lower. We may distinguish
three great stages of Knowledge— (1) the "ordi-
nary or popular, (2) the scientific, and (3) the
phdosophical. Each of these, however, is only a
stage in the development of the same knowledge.
Ordinary knowledge naturally and inevitably
becomes scientific ; scientific knowledge, as natur-
ally and inevitably, becomes philosophic. The
higher is not different from the lower ; it is only
the lower followed out and made conscious of its
own meaning. The lower finds in the higher its
explanation ; sees its own content reasoned out
and developed. And Philosophy is just the
final and perfect form which Knowledge, in its
development from lower to higher, inevitably
assumes.

Ordinary knovvliMli^'c is knowloflge of fact.
Tlio universo is, to tlio ordinary man, a mass of
facts, and his attitude to it that of passive
ohservation. He is content to observe thj facts
as they present themselves to liim — en masse.
It is true he cannot help introducin<r into the
facts a certain unity and relation ; otherwise he
coidd not knoiv tliem all. He is compelled,
therefore, to employ certai- 1 principles of unity,
of relation. But he employs them unconsciously
and unquestionin<rly, as mere assumptions. The
great principle of the uniformity of nature, for
instance, is implied in our niost elementary
knowledge of the physical workl ; but while con-
stantly employed, it is never consciously realized,
far less questioned or criticised. In short, the
ordinary man does not think of explaining or
justifying his knowledge, either to others" or
lo himself. Knowledge is to him a practical
thing ; it serves all the purposes of life, and life
is his concern. He lives by faith ; his very
knowledge is a kind of faith— faith not so much
in fact as in a great body of principles wdiich
underlie and make possible his knowledge of
fact. For the explanation, at once of his know-
le(lge and of the axis he knows, he looks to
Science.

This tas"k Science confidently undertakes.
Not content with mere passive observation of the
facts as they lie massed before it. Science seeks
to reduce the facts to unity ; to recognize in each
fact a " case " of some law or general principle,
and in each law a " case" of some law yet higher
or more general. Thus the unconscious unity
which inspires the knowledge of the ordinary
man is in Science consciously realized. Science

i8 just this rococrnition, in the onrlless variety of
plicnoiiiona, of an undorlyin^r unity ; and it is
in this siinso, as exactin<r from it an explicit
recognition of the unity implied in it from the
first, that Science explains our ordinary
knowledjife. "^

The explanation of Science, however, is ahvays
partial and incomplete, and it remains tor Phil-
oso[)hy to .rive the complete and final explanation,
l^or scientific, equally with ordinary knowled<re
use f requires to be explained, and in two sen."es
i;iulosophy may be said to contain the explana-
tion ot Science.

(1.) Philosophy completes, or seeks to com-
plete, tlie partial explanation of Science. Each
science deals with one part or aspect only of the
universe of being. The mass of detail to be '
reduced to unity is so vast that it is impossil)le
tor any single science to overtake the whole
liere is no such thing as a universal science,
llie man of science is necessarily a specialist; if
he would contribute his part to the grand result
he must limit himself to some one department
ot existence. Science thus incurs the unavoi^V-ble
consequences of Specialism. It necessarily roo-ards
the universe from its own point of view vvhich
IS not that of the whole but of the part not
central but one-sided. Each science deals with
Its own part or aspect of the universe, and con-
siders this apart from the whole, as a res com-
pleta—a separate and independent share ;, The
incompleteness of scientific explanation is thus
the result of the incompleteness or " abstract-
ness ' of the scientific point of view— a point of
view which, while legitimate and necessary in
View of the peculiar work of the individuaf sci-

ence,liocomo,s inovitnbly no loniriT a(l(M|uato when
the snr\'oy is widciuMi an<I tlie nttciiipt inadu to
comprehend from it tlie whoh; of iliin<rs. Its very
exceUence for Science constitutes its ""lefect as a
coniph'te explanation. Eini)hasizin;r, and there-
fore exan:-:,a'ratini;, tlio sionilicance of the part at
the expense of the wlioh', it misses tlie full nican-
ir.«C of both. For the part can he fully undcistood
only in the li^ht of the whole ; the whole only as
the concrete unity of the parts. Trke, \>y way
ot iliusfration, the science of Physiolorry or of
Political Econon)y. The standpoint of th'e'formpr
rs pnysical life ; that of the latter, material
wealtji. _ It IS ohvious that neither of these
standpomts is adequate to a complete explanation
of the universe, limited as each is to one pa)t
orphaseof existence, to the exclusion of all the
rest. _ Physiolo^fry, for instance, camiot explain
conscious or spiritual life, except in so far as the
conscious or spiritual is at the same tim.,
pliysical. Nor can pclitical economy take into
account moral and artistic considerations except
in so far as these have also an economic side.

What is wantsd, therefore, heyond tlie partial
explanations of the special sciences, is an explana-
tion of the whoie, such as Science is unable to
pve. Iho various scientific standpoints must
be co-related, and the results of the special
sciences regarded f-om the hi,i.her standpoint of
the whole, in the light of which the parts find
their true meaning. This ultimate, because com-
plete, explanation Philosophy undertakes to <nve
Her interest is not in the parts, but in the wliolJ
and in its unity. God, the world .an<l man— the
three great factors of universal existence— Phil-
osophy seeks to view them in their unity and

in tlioir miitnal relation. She seeks to view the
whole, and from its centre; to view the parts,
not in isolation and independence, but sub specie
cefernitatis—sis each informed with the idea of
the whole.

(2.) Philosophy undertakes the final, as
opposed to the provisional, explanation of
Science. In this view her task may be said to be
the final revision or criticism of knowledge. We
have seen tliat Science compels ordinary know-
ledge to a consciousness of its own assumptions
or uncriticised principles. Science, however,
leaves this work of awakening or criticism incom-
plete. Science has its own assumptions. The
scientific, equally with the ordinary man, employs
principles unconsciously and unquestioningly ;
and it remains for Philosophy to complete the
work of criticism begun by Science. Take, for
example, the law of causal connection. The
man of science does not ask whether, or how far,
this is a valid principle of knowledge. He
employs it in all his reasoning ; but his only
concern is to find the laws according to which i't
is exemplified in particular phenomena. He is so
interested in " cases" of the law that it does not
occur to him to inquire into the nature and
ground of the law itself. This is only an instance
of the general truth that the principles which
underlie the procedure of scientific as well as of
ordinary thought are, for the latter as for the
former, of the nature of assumptions. Philoso-
phy, on the contrary, can have no assumptions.
No part or phase of khowledge can claim innnu-
nity from her criticism. It is her high calling
to yivestigate, and, as the result of investigation,
to justify or condemn the assumptions alike of
ordinary and of scientific knowledge.

To snm up what has just been said about the
three starves of Enowledo-c and their relation to
one another, we may take as an ilkistration
our knowledi^e of space. Some conception of
space IS implied in our ordinary knowledge of
the material world. We always 'place things at
a distance from ourselves and from one another,
that is, we relate them in a common space. But
it is not necessary, for the purposes of ordinary
knowledge, to inquire into the nature of this
space or its properties ; r does the ordinary
man do so. Such inquiries he leaves to Science
and Philosophy. The former, not satisfied with
the vagueness of ordinary knowledge, seeks to
giye the conception a new definiteness. The
science of Geometry investigates the properties of
space, and formulates the universal and necessary
spatial relations. But even Geometry does not
raise the question of the essential nature of
space. Given space — the space of ordinary
knowledge— Geometry deduces its necessary
properties ; but what space itself is, it does not
inquire. Nor does Geometry consider the relation
of the spatial to the other aspects of tlie universe ;
it concentrates on this one aspect with exclusive
interest. It tlius remains for Philosophy to com-
plete, if possible, our knowledge of space, by
investigating its essential nature, our right to
employ the conception alike in our ordinary and
scientific knowledge, as well as its relation to
other necessary conceptions or aspects of the
universe.

Thus it is that Philosophy is the last and
highest stage of Knowledge— the ultimate form
whieli, m ifH development from lower to higher,
it inevitably assumes. It is the endeavour— con-

scionsly and eoiiiplotolv— to th'nih or 7-<'-tln'nk tlio
uniyerso, only ])artially and lu'sit.-itinn-ly tl„)u..-l.t
by tiie ordinary .-md the seientilie man ; tlio final
nnd coniploto awakcnin.,^ from tlio sleep of
jnu'ojiscious or semi-conscious thouohfc; Kuow-
lodn-o comes to full self-consciousness.

Lot mo illusti-ato this uni(]no position of
1 hilosopl.y as the " scionco of sciences," by con-
sidenng a httlo farther its relation, on tile ono
iian.l, to Science, and on the other to Th(>olo<'-y
called by Aristotle " the ilrst philosophy." '

The one constant factor of existence— the
"common denominator" to whoso terms all
phenomena may be reduced, is Thoun-ht l^^rom
this " magic circle" escape is impossible. ThiiK-.s
arc tor us non-existent, because non-si<rniticairt
until known; and to hiow things is^to think
them, i he Science of Thought is, therefore, the
science ot universal existence, investi-ratino- as
It does the essential nature of that whose sj^ecial
maniiestations are studied by the various sciences
As luis been well said, " at bottom there is but
one subject of study— the forms and metamor-
phoses of mind. All other subjects may bo
reduced to that ; all other studies' brino- us l)ack
to this study." Occupying this central or
universal point of view. Philosophy is free from
the limitations which necessarily beset the
special sciences, aii.l is therefore in a position to
adjuuate between their conllicting claims.

Science, however, does not always recognize
her own limitations, but sometimes, and niore
particularly in our own time, sets up a claim
to that independence and ultimateness of view
which, we have just seen, belongs bv peeu-
liur right to Philosophy. \n setting up this

claim, Science abandons her own lc<ritiniate nnd
l)rop{'r f^nound, and beconics Pliilo.sT)i)liy. Jt is
.strange that men, otliorwise eminently iitted to
represent the science of tliis century, slionld
have laid tliemselves open to the condemnation
\vhich Bacon pronounciMl a<,^ainst the science of
tlie Middle Airv.s, of " false generalization," that
IS, gf.-neralization which is not a strict and faith-
fiil induction fro»n the facts observed. The wIkjIo
phenomenon of Agnosticism, it seems to me, is an
examj)l(! of this pseudo-science. It becomes neces-
Kary, thei-efore, in order to clearness of thought,
todistinguii*cnrefully between the proviuct'^ of
fScience and Philosophy. Until we thus distin-
guish, in the writings of S))(>ncer, between what
is the result of strictly scientific procedure, and
what is very questionable philosophical slipi-r-
structurc reared th(!reon, we are not in a position
to judg(i of the value of the net-i'csult. Thus
one yeiy evident service of riiilosc^phy is, by
showing the necessary limitations of its point of
view, to correct the over-conlident conclusions of
Science.

But Pln'losophy has not only this negative
relation to Science ; it has also positive relations
of a close and important nature. If what 1 h.avo
said above be true, it follows that Philosophy
and Science are oi-ganically connected with one
another. It is indeed the result, in large measure,
of the growth of the scientific spii-it in modern'
times that Philosophy has learned to modify her
conception of her task and province, and to
recognize her community of interest with Science
The old conception of "'Metaphysics," as dealing
with a sphere of existence IJ'//o!h/ or hchhul
the natural has been generally abandoned.

Pliilo.sophy, it is now reco,^nize(l, has to do,
not witli a world of abstract Being or Tliings-in-
thenisclves apart from the world "of plienomena,
but witli that world of Gxporionco which is the
common domain of Philosophy and Science. Its
true function is not to separate that whicli has
been joined together, to conjure up a world of
absolute Reality apart from the world of
experience ; but rather, as we have seen, to join
once more what Science has separated, the various
parts or aspects of the universe in one great
whole. So misleading, indeed, in this refeiHjnco,
because so full of archaic misunderstanding, is
the term " Metaphysics," that I believe it' is
largely to blame for the distrust of Philosophy
so prevalent in the popular and scientific mind.
As suggesting the old historic conception of her
task, the term is full of interest ; but in view of
the revolution— for it it is no less— since Kant
in the attitude of Philosopy to Science, it is
questionable whether it sliould be retained.
Kant has shown, once for all, that Philosophy, in
the sense of the old " :Metaphysics," that is,' as
the science of absolute Being or Things-in-them-
selves, is an impossible dream, and that tlie only
legitimate and fruitful Philosophy is the Pliil-
osophy of Experience. Not that either Philosophy
or Science is empirical. Whde both alike are
limited to experience, both, in a sense, go beyond
experience, and seek its explanation. But
though Philosophy goes farther than Science,
anil ^ seeks to supplement its partial and
provisional explanation by one that is exhaustive
anrl final, it is always the same Experience that
it is seeking to explain.

But Philosophy not only completes the work
of Science ; it also leads up to that of Theology,

,f.

and throws lipfht on leji^itimate procedure here
also. ^ Tins is the task of tlie Philosophy of
Religion. For here we are still dealing with
experience — experience in its highest form —
that of the religious consciousness. This, like
all experience, implies certain factors which
make it possible ; and it is in the justice done
to these by the full and adequate view^ of
Philosophy that we see its most positive service.
Li its appreciation of the moral^the basis the
religious experience ; of the great fact of self-
hood in human life ; of the eternal import of
moral distinctions ; of the destiny of the moral
agent ; of the counterpart in God of man's moral
nature ; of the subordination of the physical to
the ethical, and at the same time the working
down of the ethical into the physical ; in the final
interpretation of the universe in the light of
this, its highest characteristic — in all this Phil-
osophy is preparing the way for Theology,
finding, in the facts of the universe and especially
of human life, the groundwork of religious
experience. Above all, in the strange, inex-
plical'le, yet constant fact of evil, of confiict, or
failure in moral life, Philosophy finds the great
religious need. The full significance of these
facth is appreciated only when they are
interpreted religiously. The only possible
solution of the problem they present is a religious
solution. The religious man conceives moral evil
as Sin against God, and finds escape from the
the contradictions of moral life in the thought
of a Divine Redemption. It is the task of
Theology, and not of Philosophy, to think out
this religious experience, to theorize it, if possible.
In so far, too, as the element of Revelation enters

mto Theology, its sphere is distinct from that of
Philosopliy no less than of Science. Still, dealin.r
as it necessarily does with ultimate philosophical
notions, as these are implied in religious experience
Theology must receive the teaching of Philosophy
as to how far these notions come within the
compass of our knowledge, as to how far it is
possible to theorize this highest form of
experience. This connection of Philosophy and
Theology is indeed matter of history. Even in
the Scholastic age Philosophy was acknowled<rcd
to be " the handmaid of TJjeology ;" and in modern
tunes a rationalistic or nega'tive Theology has
been the invariable complement of a rationalistic
or negative Philosophy. Wliile already we can
see the beginnings of the influence of the new
philosophical standpoint of this century upon
tlie Theology of the time. Here, once more,
1 hilosophy IS seen to be the " science of sciences."
The task of Philosophy is thus a very ambitious
one. Too ambitious, we are apt to say, when
we contrast the grandeur of its ideal With the
poverty of its actual achievement. If its ideal
far surpasses that of Science, does not its attain-
ment fall infinitely short ? Instead of the sure
march of ever wider conquest of truth, we have
a prolonged war of systems, system after system,
mutually destructive; the same old questions
debated again and again, with no advance, no
definite gain of truth. Such is the disheartenin<T
conclusion which we are apt to draw from a
survey of the History of Philosophy.

^ But is there no progress to be traced in the
history ? Does not the law of evolution find
verification here as elsewhere, though with less
of constancy, more of freedom ; less of uniform-

necessity, more of the free play of individuality ?
Is there no development to he traced— from lower
to higher, from less to more adequate views of
truth ? System follows system, it is true ; but
not arbitrarily and aimlessly, rather by a certain
inward necessity, the necessity of thouo-lit Nor
IS there any going hack in Philosopiry. Each
apparent " return" is in reality an advance, made
possible by the intervening conllict and criticism.
Compare, for example, any great modern with a
corresponding ancient system, as the philosophy
ot Hegel with that of Aristotle. Aristotle's
formujje may be capable of expressino- He<-vlian
conceptions ; but the formulie. when'thus mter-
preted, are infinitely richer to us than they could
have been to Aristotle. So again the "return to
Kant," of which we hear so much at present is
not a return to the philosophy of Kant precisely
as conceived by Kant himself, to the sacrifice oi
all that has been done since; it is a return to
Kantian conceptions illumined and developed by
later thought. Such is truth, that each seed
contains the whole in germ, each facet reflects,
or may in the proper light reflect the colours of
the whole. But the light which reveals these
colours comes only after long and patient seekin<T
although, once found, it sheds "back its lustre
upon the discoveries of the past. It is thus that
every part of the history of Philosophy is full of
interest to the speculative mind ; for each part
is touched with the glory of the whole. Each
thinker in turn has had his own o-lance of
deepest insight into truth, though it may be that
we, m the retrospect, can see clearly and fully
what he, prophet-like, saw but dimly and afar

And as for the sttifo and tumult which mark
the history of thought, as well as of action, is it
not so, that tlirongh negation an<l contradiction,
and only thus, tlie full content of the truth may
be developed. The truth of Realism, for example,
must be opposed to the truth of Idealism, that
the full truth, of which each is only a partial
expression, may be reached. Truth is so rich
and many-sided, that it cannot be exhausted in
any single view, however apparently compre-
hensive. Its various sides must in turn be
emphasized, that at least the wliole may, in all
the fulness of its meaning, be seen and
appreciated. It may, indeed, be that this full
vision of the truth belongs to God alone, and
that man can only behold and celebrate its
various aspects as, one by one, they are presented
to him. It may be that, as Socrates said, we
can only be " philosophers " — seekers after
wisdom — and that God alone is ivise. A final
and complete Philosophy may be unattainable.
That full-toned harmony, which is the last result
of all the discords that together make the
grand anthem of the truth, we perhaps can
never hear ; it may be for the ears of Him alone
whose praise it tells. But that the discords do
contribute to such a final harmony we know and
feel, and it is this hope and confidence that has
inspired the singers through all the centuries as
each took up his several part.

Thus, even though complete success in the
execution of its task may be impossible, yet the
ideal, unattainable though it be, is the spur and
spring of philosophical endeavour. Our intellect-
ual, like our moral life, implies an ideal. But
it may be that, here as there, the ideal is

unattainable, and our experience is one of
constant striio-gle and failure, l)orne up })y tlio
hope of ultimate success. But though the
characteristic of both alike is failure and defeat,
that does not express tlie whole of either. There
is tragedy in both ; but neither is altogether
tragic. We do not know absolute good — our
good is always mixed with evil ; nor absolute
truth — our truth is always mixed with error.
But good is ever stronger than evil, and truth
than error; and in failure, whether moral
or intellect, which knows itself to be failure,
there is the seed of ultimate success ; in defeat,
which knoivs itself to be defeat, there is the
prophecy of future triumph. And perhaps it
needs the lesson of failure and defeat in the
struggle towards its attainment to teach us the
rich significance of the ideal, alike of our moral
and of our intellectual life. Perhaps if it were
not for the discords of our life, and the know-
ledge that they are discords, we could not
appreciate the harmony when we hear it. At
any rate faith in an Ideal which, while it reveals,
can also harmonize the discords, is the postulate
of the highest life, whether of action or of
thought.

" Tlie high that proved too high, the heroic for earth too
hard,
The passion that left the ground to lose itself in the sky,
Are music sent up to (jod by tlie lover and the bard ;

Enougli that He heard it once : we shall hear it by-and-
bye. _
And what is our failure here but a triumph's evidence

For the fulness of the days? Have we withered or
agonized ?
Why else was the pause prolonged but that singing might
issue thence '!
Why ruslied the discords in, but that harmony should be
prized ?"

T foar T W alromly .l.tainocl you too Ion-

;-n n 'iJ^'^VP 'y t" you on tl.o yroun.l of the

intonso and varied interest wliich attaclies to it

inf.."/ ^'r/^'^'Tr '' ^'^^ ^^"'"^^ interest-the
mtere.st of Jito. Man, in virtue of his peculiar
j;ature IS necessarily a philosopher. As a ^Z
1 n <.. he IS not content till he has recognized in
ftl things a reason answering to his own. Born
into a world of mystery, he ?annot rest witho i
pislung the mystery farther an.l farther hack
ilo craves for knowledge— ever hh-her and

an Id';;;:;' "'? 7'^'' °*" 'f^'' «*' '^^^ -- -^'-0

and duty an.l dostniy. An.l in knowledge there
huu\T V'l?'? ''' -^tisfaction ; it is a Constant
J>"ng<>r and thirst, an insatiahle cravin-.- The

un2;iv?'l''''"Tl''' "^' »'r^tery-of probleins >-et
s ^f ^^'"^ consciousness of the need^f

^olut.on Man must tkink. It is the very law
o MS being And to philosophize is onh^ to
think more deeply and more unweariedly.

it) all literature— in the novel and the drama

c p.c,ally-we find this reaching after a com-

•U'to view ot human life, of the workinrr of

each r'"- ,^''il«-P^^y i^ J^^'^t the attempt to
icach a complete and reasoned view, w-here
literature is content with " Hashes" of insight as

nuch ot (Muotmn as of thought. It is tru? tl\at

e thif" •T'''^'? "'"'" ^^'''^' Pl'il<'«ophy, and it may
be hat literature, in spite of the fragmentarinesi

fr. .n ,'';"'•' ""' .P^^'^P' -J"''^ ^^^''^"^c of this
tiagn entarmess, is truer to life than philosophy

^or "m literature," as my colljixgue. ^J)r

Alexan<ler, finely remarked in addre,5;.in<r you

on a SIMM!,,,, occassion, " is to be found a trea'sure-

iiouso ot aid-suggestions the more stimulatino-

1(1 tJio

that they are hut suggestions, partial solutions
the n.ore endurinj. that they ari but nartia an.l
east " W'^^^' philosophy in.p^icit wl'J e
least oxpecte.l." Literature, liko P].ysiolo..v
views the hvinc. reality ; while Philosoph' F^J

rn y '"■'^^P^'y i'^, hke that of Science of a
cliifcrent kind tVoni the interestof literature It
IS concerned with the conditions of that life
w iKch in Its full breathing actuality is to
subject ot literature. But thSr interest!' tho, !
drterent are both equally le^^ntimat; The
phd^ophical endeavour to theorize life, to under!
stand Its conditions, is no less necessary than the

ei2l?^f'f" r'^^T^^'^ appr^iate tl:
lite Itself, which IS the result of these conditions.

Manifold indeed are the possible solutions of

^r 1 r f,'^^"'" "'ay be a practical one
-the solution ot life. This is, in a sense the
universal solution. Many have no interest n
h^-aiiire, far less ^

^^^e, and bfe implies an ideal, however low or
Ill-considered. Or the solution may be fouml L
religion-in an escape fron. the contradictions

cult es^Tv '"" f "«'^'' ^'^' ^" ^^'^"^'^ the diffi-
culties of knowledge are swallowed up in a

victorious faith. Or in poetry-imao-ination and
feeling shedding their glory o^n the de^d p^n of
a inerely intellectual life. Yet, in certain nfoods^

of us at'n '"'"'f thought-which come to all
ot us at times, when the eager questioninrrs of
reason demand an answer, and escape bec"omes
impossible, the human mind is content wUl
nuthmg less than a Pkllosopky of life~a clear
and reasoned account of its nature and conditions'

And all the intonso intorest of that life whoso ,

nature and conditions it investi -rates is reflected

on the study of Pliihwophy. |

^ Closely connected with this human interest

IS the historical interest of philosophical study

Pliilosophy is no new thin^^ It is a inovcn.L-rit

ot the human mind from the earliest times to the ^'•

present day. Men have always pondered its ''

questions. Wond<'i fully diH'erent as have been

the solutions of dilf'erent ai,a's and countries, of

different individual minds, the problems are

eternally the same. And thus the student of

Philosophy is supported by a sense of sympathy

in a common search with the thoughtful of every

age and country.

_ Again there is the literary interest. Nor is
this merely incidental, in that Philosophy, as we
have seen, deals fully and deliberately with the
problem raised in all literature ; there is, farther,
a whole literary domain peculiar to Philosophy.'
The great thinkers of the world have also been
amongst its greatest writers. The literature of
Philosophy is no less important— in some periods
it is much more so— than the literature of the
Imagination. Would not Greek literature be
poorer without the Dialogues of Plato and the
Treatises of Aristotle ? And in modcii cim(is
are not names like Jjescartes, Spinoza. J.o-l-e,
Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegul, gieai in
literature as well as in philosophy ? Some
training in Philosophy, then, is necessary — is it
not ?— for the appreciation of a whole depart-
ment of literature, devoted as it is to philosophical
!.. ;;stiv.,^tions. We must distinguish, of course,
j -jtw-eu the value of philo.sophical works a.s
1 '.ev-ature aru their value as philosophy; but

the

we cannot appreciate the one, witliout in some
niea.surc, at least, appreciatinr. tlio other also.
*or a6_ono of its most eminent livin- exponents
(i'rot. Duciien) has sai.l ; "The study of literature
IS not a stii.ly solely of what is graceful, attractive
and pleasure-givinj,r i„ books ; it attempts to
understand the great thoughts of the great
thinkers. To know Greek literature, we must
know Aristotle ; to know French literature, we
must know ])escartes. In English literature of
tJie eighteenth century, Berkeley and Butle-r and
Hume are greater names than Gravan-^ Collier"
One result of your study of Philosophy, then,
will be to introduce you to a large and important
department of literature, and to put you in
posses.^ion of some standard oi appreciation of
certain canons of criticism for application there
_ Once more : there is what I may call the
interest ot culture. Being free from the
necessary limitations of the scientific standpoint
Phi osophy gives a breadth of view which the
study of the special sciences cannot give It
gives the right, because the ability, to iud<Te
to criticise ; the tolerance which comes of know-
ledge ; the reverence which comes of knowledo-e
ot our Ignorance. It is the lack of this
philosophical culture in the scientific and theo-
logical, as well as in the popular mind, that is
the constant cause of controversy between
Science and _ Theology. Such controversy
invariably arises from the interference of the
one with the work of the other, or of either with
that ot Philosophy. So long as each restricts itself
to its own proper sphere, its results are not to
be questioned, and will not be found to contradict
one another. So soon, however, as either touches
on the ultimate questions of Philosophy n

becomas subject to philosophical criticism ; and
unless the man of science and the theolordan is
also a philosopher, he is found lackinrr iS that
perfect "culture" which is the condition of sound
judgment on these questions.

There is one other interest, sugcrested in what
I have already said, I mean the religious interest
We have seen that Philosophv. ?egardincr the
universe as it does from the luncal. ami no?
merely, hke Science, from the plu-sical and
intellectual side, calls attention V a moTa
situation, of which the only adequate interp^-e a-
tion and so ution is found in Religion. It^niav
indeed, be that a complete Pliilosophy of Religion
s impossible. Religion is always more "and
s ronger than Philosophy, as life is more and
stronger than theory ; ail the faith of the' liUlo

t^l 'rS r^^ 1^ '^^""^' *^^^^" ^^'^ ^^eepcst know-
ledge of Philosophy. Yet the attempt to think
out this highest of all forms of experience is no
ess necessary than the attempt to think out its
lower forms. So surely as we attain to intellectual
inanhood, we seek a reason of the faith that is
in us ; and the stronger our faith, the greater will

\LT%l—T' ^^ ««^^king for its rational
oas s. 1 his IS the supreme undertaking of Philo-
sophy, which investigates the ultimate notions
Lmn?F7-f "' ^^ Religion-God, Freedom and

oTZ :1^'\T^> ''^''^^''' wl^olly successful
01 not, at least draws attention to that side of
things which points to God and the religious life

woAl V T f-P ""J' ^''''' ^' *^^^ °^^>'^^'"« ^^^J
woi thy destiny of man.

, Such so far as I have been able hastily an
imperfectly to describe it.is the task of Philosoph
so great its interest and importance

and

sophy

Some of

fcism ; and
eologian is
ig in tliat
m of sound

id in what
IS interest,
irding the
and not
^sical and
a moral
titerpreta-
It may
f Religion
nore and
nore and
the "little
est know-
to think
nee is no
i out its
tellectual
I that is
jater will
rational
of Philo-
notions
dom and
iccessful
side of
;ious life
irue and

ily and
losophy
ome of

you are entermg upon this study to-day, and I
would urge you in my closing word, to earnest-
ness and faithfulness in it. Here, even more
than elsewhere, the student mast co-operate
with the teacher. It is but little that the latter
can do alone I cannot solve your problems for
you; the solutions must be your own, or the v
are of no value In Philosophy, at least, there is
no work done by proxy. The reward is strictly
proportioned to individual effort. But I have
sufhcient confi.lence in iny subject, and in your
earnestness of purpose as students of Dalhousio
to believe that you will not be slow to lend mo'
your active co-pperation in this great study.
Ihe time is propitious. I believe that the inter-
est in the problems of Philosophy is more wide-
spread just at present than at any former time.
Men s minds are full of them, and "the tremendous
intei-ests involved are appreciated as, perhaps
they never were before. You are to prepare to
take your part in the great debate ; to make
conquest of the truth for yourselves, that you may
be able help others to it. Use well the time of
preparation. You are just entering upon full and
independent intellectual life, upon " the novitiate
ot your intelligence." Possess yourselves of your
spiritual birthright; appropiiate your great
inheritance.^ But do so with reverence and
humility, with a sense of the solemnity of the
trust committed to you. In all that you do, be
mindful of that high trust, and faithful to it
Ihe use you make of these student years will
tell upon your whole future, and far beyond
5'our own. Be faithful, be earnest, be courageous.
And when the years of college life have come
and gone, they will leave bejiin.l them a rich
and abiding possession of spiritual gain.

~if