IMAGE EVALUATION 
 TEST TARGET (MT-3) 
 
 1.0 
 
 I.I 
 
 11.25 
 
 
 c 
 
 Sciences 
 CorporatiQii 
 
 iP 
 
 O 
 
 ^.5v« 
 
 '^>i 
 
 
 i j WBT MAIN STRHT 
 
 WIBSTII,N.Y. 14SM 
 
 (716)«73<4S03 
 
 
CIHM/ICMH 
 
 Microfiche 
 
 Series. 
 
 CIHIVI/ICIVIH 
 Collection de 
 microfiches. 
 
 Canadian Institute for Historical IMicroraproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiquaa 
 
 ;V 
 
Tachnical and Bibliographic Notas/Notas tachniquaa at bibliographiquaa 
 
 Tha inatitute haa attamptad to obtain tlia baat 
 original copy avaiiabia for filming. Faaturaa of tliia 
 copy wtiich may ba bibiiograpliically uniqua, 
 which may altar any of tha imagaa in tha 
 raproduction, or which may significantly changa 
 tha usual mathod.of filming, ara chackad baiow. 
 
 D 
 
 D 
 D 
 
 D 
 
 H 
 
 Colourad covars/ 
 Couvartura da coulaur 
 
 I I Covars damagad/ 
 
 Couvartura andommagte 
 
 Covars rastorad and/or laminatad/ 
 Couvartura rastaurte et/ou paiiicuite 
 
 Covar titia missing/ 
 
 La titra da couvartura manque 
 
 Colourad maps/ 
 
 Cartea gAographiquas en couieur 
 
 Coloured inic (i.e. other than blue or blacic)/ 
 Encre de couieur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) 
 
 I I Coloured plates and/or iiluatrations/ 
 
 Planchaa et/ou iliuatrationa en couieur 
 
 Bound with other material/ 
 ReilA avec d'autrea documents 
 
 Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion 
 along interior margin/ 
 
 La re iiure serrie peut cauaar da i'ombre ou de la 
 distortion la long de la marge int^rieure 
 
 Bianic leavaa added during restoration may 
 appear within the text. Whenever possible, these 
 have been omitted from filming/ 
 II se peut que certalnes pages blanches ajoutAes 
 iors d'une restauration apparaiasant dans la texte, 
 mala, lorsque ceia Atait possible, ces pages n'ont 
 pas AtA film(§es. 
 
 L'Institut a mlcroflimA la maillaur exemplaira 
 qu'il lui a At* poasibia da se procurer. Les ditaiia 
 de cet exemplaire qui sent paut-Atre uniques du 
 point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier 
 une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une 
 modification dans la mAthode normaia da f ilmage 
 sent indlquAs cl-dessous. 
 
 n 
 n 
 n 
 
 D 
 D 
 D 
 
 Coloured pagea/ 
 Pagea de couieur 
 
 Pages damaged/ 
 Pagea endommagAes 
 
 Pages restored and/or laminated/ 
 Pages reataurAea et/ou peliicuiAea 
 
 Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ 
 Pagea dAcoiorAea, tachetAes ou piquAes 
 
 Pagea detached/ 
 Pagea dAtachAes 
 
 Showthrough/ 
 Transpurance 
 
 Quality of print variea/ 
 Quality InAyala de I'impression 
 
 Includes supplementary material/ 
 Comprend du matAriai supplAmentaire 
 
 Only edition available/ 
 Seule Mition diaponible 
 
 Pagea wholly or partially obacurad by errata 
 slips, tissues, etc., have been ref limed to 
 ensure the best possible image/ 
 Les pagea totalement ou partieilement 
 obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, 
 etc., ont M filmAea A nouveau de fapon A 
 obtenir la meilleure image possible. 
 
 Th 
 to 
 
 Th 
 pa 
 of 
 fill 
 
 Oi 
 b« 
 th 
 sic 
 ot 
 fir 
 
 Si( 
 
 or 
 
 Additional comments:/ 
 Commentaires supplAmentaires: 
 
 Preliminary leaf is a photoreproduction. 
 
 This item is filmed at tha reduction ratio checked below/ 
 
 Ce document eat film* au taux de reduction indiquA cl-deaaous. 
 
 10X 
 
 
 
 
 14X 
 
 
 
 
 18X 
 
 
 
 
 22X 
 
 
 
 
 26X 
 
 
 
 
 30X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 12X 
 
 
 
 
 lex 
 
 
 
 • 
 
 20X 
 
 
 
 
 24X 
 
 
 
 
 28X 
 
 
 
 
 32X 
 
 
 Th 
 sh 
 Til 
 
 wl 
 
 Ml 
 dil 
 en 
 be 
 rifl 
 ret 
 m( 
 
ails 
 
 du 
 
 tdifiar 
 
 una 
 
 naga 
 
 Tha copy fUmad hara has baan raproducad thanks 
 to tha ganaroslty of: 
 
 Library of tha Pubiic 
 Archivas of Canada 
 
 Tha imagas appaaring hara ara tha bast qusilHty 
 possibia considaring tha condition and laglblllty 
 of tha original copy and In kaaping with tha 
 filming contract spaciflcatlons. 
 
 L'axamplaira filmA f ut raproduit grAca A la 
 ginArositi da: 
 
 La bibiiothique das Archivas 
 publiquas du Canada 
 
 Las imagas sulvantas ont titS raprodultes avac la 
 plus grand soln, compta tanu da la condition et 
 da la nattatA da Taxamplaira film*, et en 
 conformity avec les conditions du contrat de 
 filmaga. 
 
 Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed 
 beginning with the front cover and ending on 
 the last page with a printed or illustrated impres- 
 sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All 
 other original copies ara filmed beginning on the 
 first page with a printed or illustrated Impres- 
 sion, and ending on the last page with a printed 
 or illustrated Impression. 
 
 Les exempiaires orlginaux dont la couverture en 
 papier est ImprimHe sent fllmte en commengant 
 par la premier plat et en terminant soit par la 
 darnlAre page qui comporte une empreinte 
 d'impresslon ou d'lllustration, soit par ie second 
 plat, salon ie cas. Tous les autras exempiaires 
 orlginaux sont filmAs en commen9ant par la 
 pramiire page qui comporte une empreinte 
 d'impresslon ou d'lllustratlon at en terminant par 
 la dernlAre page qui comporte une telle 
 empreinte. 
 
 The last recorded frame on each microfiche 
 shall contain the symbol <— ► (meaning "CON- 
 TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), 
 whichever applies. 
 
 Un des symboles sulvants apparaltra sur la 
 darnlAre image de shaqua microfiche, seion Ie 
 cas: la symbols — ► signifle "A SUIVRE". ie 
 symbols V signifle "FIN". 
 
 Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at 
 different reduction ratios. Those too large to be 
 entirely included in one exposure ara filmed 
 beginning In the upper left hand corner, left to 
 right and top to bottom, as many frames as 
 required. The following diagrams illustrate the 
 method: 
 
 Les cartas, planches, tableaux, etc.. peuvent Atre 
 fiimAs A des taux da reduction diffArents. 
 Lorsque Ie document est trop grand pour Atre 
 reproduit en un seul clichA, II est f limA A partir 
 de I'angle supArleur gauche, de gauche A droite. 
 et de haut en bas, an prenant Ie nombre 
 d'Imagas nAcessaira. Las diagrammes sulvants 
 illustrant la mAthoda. 
 
 rata 
 
 9 
 
 talure, 
 A 
 
 3 
 
 32X 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
^ 
 
 k/l 
 

 V 
 
 / 
 
 uCfZV-/ Qon. 
 
 040 
 
 ^S$^lk,<*>jSf-%^'%<i>J$^*%,}^f^*jSi"'% 
 
 A N 
 
 EKOUIRY 
 
 INTO THR 
 
 vfe^ U S E S 
 
 Of pur III Success ia the 
 Prefent War* 
 
 
 
 •i ;.:.',H -.>?-*■. .'rf if---.' ••;■.• ■*■■.- ... 
 
 • '•.■ '^■'r-Hm^tf- ."i.i --■■!; i «* ■• ■. • « • ••• ■•■ - ;•• ■ 
 
 ••.- ■ '•^.-''* ■■'.^>K>rH.*»*.V'..\« -».> ..-•^ .. , .. . . .. . -, .... .,.■ '.-..■- 
 
 ■■. ..•.,^ >• . ^»-.. V'-\"*^'"»; ,.-,>'-,V .V .-•.-■,;■ . .,•, 
 
 'I * ■," 1 
 
 ry.'4 
 
 
 
 
 .■;.' ■■^;i>*T'-.rr ■ 
 
 >■■ . ■ -• **c>-V ■..'..,.•_.-■;,• ■. ■ . 
 • '--• •■"^r'* -. ; •*,--•■*■■ -/■ ' 
 
 ...1. •»-->• •»,i.E'-.*l»i;<-' ,. • - . . ' .-•-•..> I . r 
 
 
 
 
 -* ■>. 
 
 ^^^l 
 
 ■•'.■•■V 
 
 ^<i'A 
 
 L» 
 
 '••■-. • ' .^•■'^ 
 
 
 
 >.-^' 
 
 =,'- f» 
 
^ •.: 
 
 1 
 
 A 
 r 
 
■a-- 
 
 * ii 
 
 I 
 
 A I 
 
 >>-»j»Wiir*-*' 
 
 A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 '!^' 
 
 INTO THE 
 
 C A U S E S 
 
 OF OUR 
 
 ILL SUCCESS 
 
 I N T H E 
 
 PRESENT WAR. 
 
 'Attrxpo^ 7 ftp ToJc y te^i \ieit saffoyi.£mft icv^Sffhcui 
 
 " * "' —\'_---;y--- 
 
 L O N D O N : 
 printed for R. Griffiths, in Pater -nofler-Row^ 
 
 MDCCLVII. ■■^ 
 
 • ■'^v W" 
 
 [Price One Shilling.] 
 
 y,aU r^h^'^- ^-^ 
 
' r 
 
 •5 
 
 r 
 
IWBBPWPWMW 
 
 ( ' 
 
 
 A N 
 
 ENQUIRY, 8f^. 
 
 \: '• 
 
 5fi(38Gfi(38C)eCOWEVER inconfiftent it 
 5j^ H )^ may be with the Vanity of 
 50(^ )K an Author to forbid, rather 
 Kt)m.^ than invite his Reader, th^ 
 Writer of this Enquiry is willing to 
 ^c^uaint thofe whofe Curiofity may 
 
 expeft 
 
I' Ij 
 
 ( 6 ) 
 e.ncaaDeteaion of n^inmerial Scheme. 
 
 Jwhofc Malignity may cal for G a 
 
 : fication. by the A^P-^!"";/ ^ ' " 
 rhataflcrs. that they w.U be but lU en 
 Character , ^^ ^^.^ ^.^^^^^^ 
 
 tertained by a itiu* _ ^^ _ 
 
 let. 
 
 H. well kno-.-s the Genius of his 
 
 he would more willingly 
 Countrymens he wouio 
 /- f Mankind, that it has a lecret, or 
 fay of Mankin , difcovering 
 
 rother an avowed I'leauiic, i» 
 u r Uf of Individuals. But Truth s 
 1 1 be wrel<i - gratify the black 
 
 p:ffinsofDep,avity.andtheLnqu.r^ 
 
 I - . -.nt.neftcd or not, ought to be 
 "•^'^" /t heEyeofJuftice. After 
 ;„,partial as the J^y J ^^ 
 
 r Iwed by conjeaural Reproach, fo 
 
 .either ii-lV^.«'P-'-^''y.P°''''Uf. 
 
.17) 
 
 tranfgrefled by an unpleafing Defence of 
 any obnoxious name. 
 
 The People of Great -Britain arc aflo- 
 nilh'd to fee their Arms unfuccefsful, 
 their Efforts baffled, their Settlements 
 plundered, and their Enemies triumph: 
 and to a People dreaded for their Cou- 
 rage, fam*d for their Vidtories, and re- 
 fpeded by all the Powers in Eurrpe, 
 thefe, it muft be confefs'd, arc morti- 
 fying Circum (lances ; how thefe Cir- 
 cumftances came to be ours, is the Sub- 
 ject of the prefent Enquiry. 
 
 Many, unable or unwilling to penetrate 
 into more abftraded Caufes, have heard 
 of their Country's Misfortunes with a 
 Kind of philofophic Eafe, concerned 
 only as at the Events of common Chancer 
 and have readily acquiefced in the moft 
 obvious Excufes ; fuch as, the fuperiority 
 of Numbers, or the Accidents of War. 
 
 Thefe 
 
 s 
 
 
I 
 
 t 8 ) 
 
 Thefe may be good Men and peaceful 
 Subjedls, but it admits of a Difpute, whe- 
 ther this ought on all Occafions to be 
 the Behaviour of a free People. . 
 
 If we have not known our Loflcs (6 
 many, our Expeditions fo vain, and our 
 Expences fo great, it is but natural 
 ilridlly to enquire why the firft have not 
 been prevented ? why the fccond were 
 unfuccefsfui ? and to complain that the 
 laft have been ruinoufly mifapplied. 
 
 France, whofe Punic Faith is branded 
 to a Proverb, has, many many Years 
 ago, done enough to inform a difcerning 
 People, that (lie is jealous, ambitious, 
 faithlefs, and defigning. 
 
 r 
 
 Great' 
 
 ■¥, 
 
 d;'i"j 
 
( 9 ) 
 
 ijrcat -Britain fccnis to be with- 
 
 out Miftrurt;, very unambitious, con- 
 fcientioufly faithful' in hcr^ Engage- 
 ments, and conl^qucntly without 
 any Dcfign on the PoiTcflions of 
 others. ■* 
 
 
 /, 
 
 When fuch are ^be Difpofitions 
 of two Kingdoms, Rivals in Intereft 
 and In Power, between which there 
 exifls a Kind of hereditary Enmity, 
 it will not be v/ondered that no pa- 
 cific Treaty, however folemnly rati- 
 fied, can- long continue : th#)fe whom 
 no Engagements of Honour can bind, 
 would only wait a favourable Oppor- 
 tunity to gratify their Ambition : the 
 French^ from the Commencement of 
 the late glorious I eace, have only flu- 
 died how they might renew the War 
 
 fi to 
 
 1^^ 
 
.^1 
 
 i! 
 
 ( lO ) 
 
 to an Advantage, and I wifh we could 
 now fay that their Defigns have beea 
 unfuccef-ruL 
 
 
 Our Ajnerican Pofle/Tions, the GIot 
 ry of the Britijio Crown, and the Ba- 
 fis of our Commerce, they have long 
 envied us : And for that, among o- 
 ther lleafons, rticfe became the fii;ft 
 Objedl of their Depredations. /^ 
 
 In the Year I753> 1500 regular 
 Forces fent from France built three 
 Forts on the Obio^ on Lands which, 
 by a Grant from his Majefty, were the 
 property of feveral Gentlemen in 
 Lend J n and Virginia. In OSfober of the 
 fame Year, the Governor of that Pro-? 
 vince thought proper to fend Mr, 
 Wajhimton to demand of the French 
 ^' " ^ Com- 
 
 y* 
 
 I 
 
 t^ 
 
 % , 
 
i 
 
 ( it ) 
 
 Commandant, the Reafons of tl:ieir fet- 
 tling on the Properties of the Britip 
 Subjeds ? and to require them in a 
 folemn Manner to withdraw. Mr. 
 JfaJl:r7igto7i\ painful Journey only pro- 
 cured this Anfwer, that the Marquis 
 Duguifne (hould be confulted, and his 
 Determinations followed ; and that, 
 in the mean time, the French were 
 refolved to keep their Station. This 
 Conclufioni however, might have 
 been made from fome Hints which the 
 French Officers, when Wine* had 
 taken ofF Refcrve, inadvertently threw 
 out; and their unwarrantable Pre- 
 
 • When Mr Wajhingion was with fome of the 
 General Officers, in the Freedom of the Bottle, 
 they told him, That their Defign was, to pre- 
 vent the Englijh from buUding Forts on the 
 
 Ohi9, 
 
 B 
 
 2 
 
 tcnces 
 
■i 
 
 ,11 
 
 Ifl! 
 
 . ( 12 ) 
 
 tences -f* to a Right on the Ohio, that 
 they were determined not to quit 
 their Forts, till baniflied by Supe- 
 riority of Numbers ^ which, tho' the 
 Engli/h, they owned, could eafily 
 raife, yet, fo well they knew the 
 Tardinefs of their Operations, they 
 had no Thoughts of being foon 
 obliged to abandon the Settlements 
 they had ufurped. ; ,. 
 
 
 . • 'i 
 
 «-.'*». . i 
 
 When an Enemy is fo kind as to 
 point out to us our] weak Parts, v/e 
 ought furely to be alarmed, and prin- 
 cipally to defend the Objedl of 
 his Sword. 
 
 Fas eft et ah hofle doceri. 
 
 •!,v s;lj iC i-r ^ 1 ■ ""I 
 
 .-r>j.i.i • ?s;'<f?.n-?n 
 
 f They pretended a Right to the Ohio^ Dy 
 the Difcovery of one La Solle, m^ide about 6o 
 Years aiio. 
 
 In 
 
( '3 ) 
 
 ^ In the Spring, 1754, Orders were 
 fent from Englandj to repel Force by 
 Force, and to drive the Enemy from 
 the Forts they had built, and the Set- 
 tlements they had eftablifhed contrary 
 to Treaty. Accordingly a Number of 
 Forces, to the Amount of 2,000, 
 draughted from the fever al Provinces, 
 were ordered to form a Camp on the 
 Ohio. While thefe military Prepara- 
 tions were making, the French caft 
 . off all Pretexts, puflicd their En- 
 ; croachments. and committed open 
 Hoflilities. But hear the Succefs of 
 this Campaign. Were the Ufurpers 
 baniihed from their Forts r Was their 
 Plunder recovered ? Were their fet- 
 tling Schemes defeated ? No Un- 
 
 . lefs it could have been effeded by a 
 
 trifling 
 
i 
 
 til 
 
 in 
 
 ( H) 
 
 trifling Sklrmifh ; for that, it mufl: be 
 owned, happened between a few Pro- 
 vincials, under Col. WcfJI^ijigton^ and a 
 Party of the Enemy : And in that 
 ended the Operations of the Seafon. 
 Can any one obferve the Progrefs 
 of thefe Affairs, and not be aftoni(h- 
 cd at our Negledt ? While we ftupid- 
 ly fufFcred our Enemies for whole 
 Seafons to ftrengthen their Powers, to 
 Ipread their Infinuations, and to extend 
 their Encroachments ! •— However 
 blameable our Colonics were, in that 
 they did not unite with the neceffary 
 Vigour and Difpatch to deftroy the 
 Enemy, the Britijh P — -'^-«— t muft 
 have been in a great Degree more fo# 
 If, inftead of the loofe Orders that were 
 difpatched to the Governors of our Co- 
 lonies, a Number of Tranfports had 
 beien fent over with Ammunition, Mo- 
 ney, 
 
( 15 ) 
 
 ney, proper Officers, and proper In* 
 flructions, we {hould not now expedl 
 Accounts of frelh Depredations, and 
 new Encroachments. But the Pomp 
 and Contefts of Eledioneering feem to 
 have made our Reprefentatives forget 
 the Caufe of their Eledion, 
 
 The Frenchy however, not fo in- 
 aQive in affaulting as we in defending 
 our Properties, did not fail to take the 
 Advantage of that Tardinefs they fore- 
 faw, and that Negligence which they 
 furely found to exceed their Expeda- 
 tions. They were continually rein- 
 forcing their Army in America with 
 whatever its NecefTities required ; nor 
 ' did it make that Ufe a modern Bri^ 
 
 if/h Army might have made of thp 
 
 Supplies which it received. 
 
■■ 
 
 It 
 
 ( 16 ) 
 
 « 
 
 4 
 
 i. 
 
 II 
 
 In the Beginning of the Year 
 J755, It was concluded,''that the Ene- 
 my was no longer to be trifled with, 
 and that fuch a Number of Forces 
 fliou'd be fcnt from England, as, 
 with thofc that might be raifed from 
 the feveral Colonies, would effectu- 
 ally put a Stop to the Proceedings of 
 the French^ if not totally drive them 
 from the Continent. Accordingly 
 General Brdddock with Dnnhat's, and 
 Halkct's Regiments, under Commo- 
 dore Kcppel^ arrived in America. — 
 A general Council was held at 
 Aniiapolts in Maryland, and upwards 
 of thirteen thoufand Men were 
 found ready for Adion. Thefe, in 
 feveral Parties, had feveral Deftina- 
 tions^ the Troops in Nens) England 
 * " and 
 
 ml 
 
( "7 ) 
 
 and Nova Scotia united to repel the 
 
 Enemy in the lad mentioned Pro- 
 
 • vinces, v hich they effeded. Colo- 
 
 . nel Jchnfoji was difpatched with a 
 good Force againft Crown - Point ; 
 Governor Shirley marched to attack, 
 another Fort at Niagara ; General 
 Braddock was deflined to the Ohio ; 
 
 .. and General Monkton to drive the 
 French from two Forts in the Bay 
 of Fundy, ..,..',. ., 
 
 '',^j:/\i. 
 
 i We foon received an Account of 
 Monkton'^ Succefs : which, indeed, 
 , we (hould have expeded from that 
 ' brave Officer, had he been engaged 
 in a more difficult Enterprizej — and 
 this Event Q^ouraged the Hopes we 
 had before entertained of eiFedually 
 banifhing our Enemies from the 
 
 C * Lands 
 
( i8 ) 
 
 Lands thev had feized, and'theFortS 
 they had built. ' • • 
 
 ■ 
 
 fi 'SI 
 
 The unhappy BraddocW Expedi- 
 tion had a different Event. Nothing 
 fhould be faid to nurt the Memory 
 of that brave Leader, who fell a 
 Sacrifice to his Courage 3 but it isuni- 
 verfally acknowledged, that he was 
 unfit for any Operation in America, 
 where fo much was to be done by cool 
 Circumfpedion and affable Behaviour, 
 and where Stratagem and Ambufcade 
 were more to be expedted than any re- 
 gular Battle. A calm Temper, and a 
 difcerning Head, were not fo much the 
 Charaderiflics of Braddock^ as rafli 
 Courage, and an impolitic Attach- 
 'ment to the Laws of War. 
 
 Bu*^ 
 
 
( '9 ) 
 
 But thofe who appointed that Ge- 
 neral to a Command in America^ 
 wanted either Skill or Honefty, as ap- 
 peared from feveral unfucccfsful Events 
 during their Adminiflration. An In- 
 {lance or two will prove the Truth of 
 this Affertion. 
 
 Bofcawen went out with elevea 
 Ships of the Line and one Frigate, to 
 intercept the French Fleet, which, 
 when it came out, was found to con- 
 fift of twenty- five Ships of the Line. 
 Had they then the neceffary Intelli- 
 gence, or was Bof,awen defigned to 
 beat ih^ French? 
 
 «*> 
 
 c^ 
 
 But 
 
( 20 ; 
 
 i; 
 
 But grofs as this Management was, 
 it was made flill worfe by Holbornc's 
 Difpatch to reinforce Bofcawcn, This 
 Affair might have been of the mod 
 ruinous Confequcnce, as it might pof- 
 fibly have deprived us of two Fleets, 
 which being attacked feparatcly by the 
 Enemy, would both have been taken 
 or deftroyed. 
 
 I 
 
 
 ;■( 
 
 Thus by a Negled of the neceflary 
 Intelligence, to fay no worfe, was the 
 French Power fuffered fo infinitely to 
 increafe in America -, and by the 
 Choice of an improper Commander to 
 go againft them, were thole Forts fuf- 
 fered to continue in the Enemy's 
 Hands, which we had been two Years 
 
 ' ^ 
 
 i.\^ 
 
( 21 ) 
 
 f 
 
 inefre<flually aiming to deftroy;, and 
 which it was the more fliameful to 
 leave undemoliflied or untaken, as 
 mofl Part of the Time they were de- 
 fended but by a Handful of Men. 
 
 After this Event, Virginia was left 
 naked, expofed to every Incurfion of 
 the Enemy, that Cruelty, Revenge, 
 or the Hopes of Plunder might ex- 
 cite : an almoft univerfal Stop was put 
 to Trade, and the Inhabitants were 
 buficd only in hiding their Effeds, 
 and confulting for their Safety, 
 
 Such were the dreadful Apprehen- 
 fions after BraddocU^ Defeat ; and 
 happy it was that the expecfted Confe- 
 quences did not enfue: Fortho' many 
 Families on the Frontiers were either 
 
 .1 . ' mur^ 
 
 '•^ 
 
. . ( " ) 
 
 murdered, or ruined in their Circunit 
 fiances by the Enemy, yet that valu- 
 able Province is ftill ours. 
 
 nil 
 
 Soon after, however, a mde fuc- 
 cef&ful Event cleared the Gloom of 
 Defpondcncy, and made the unhappy 
 Provincials once more refume their 
 Courage, and hope for Superiority. 
 
 :( This was the fliarp Engagement 
 between Col. yohnfon and Baron 
 'DieJkaUy in which the latter was taken 
 Prifoner, and a great Number of his 
 Men periflied. 
 
 This Succefs might have had a 
 good EfFedl both on our own People, 
 and the Indians in our Favour, but 
 another difcouraging Circumftance at 
 - i * that 
 
■ ( 23 ) 
 
 that Time, unluckily retarded the 
 Wheel of Profperity in its Career. 
 
 The Supplies voted by the AfTem- 
 bly of Penjyhama, and fo much 
 wanted and expedted at this Time, 
 were flopped by the ill-timed Differ- 
 ences between that Body and the Go- 
 vernor. However juftifiable thofe 
 Difputes might have been at any other 
 Time, they were then of the worfi ^ 
 Confequence, and highly blameable. 
 
 Though Difputes concerning the 
 Method or Legality of raifi ng Sup- 
 plies, or the Means to be ufed for re- 
 pelling an invading Enemy, are fo un- 
 natural and deteftable when carried to* 
 fuch a Pitch as to fruftrate their End, 
 that one would expedl no prudent Peo- 
 ple 
 
u 
 
 ( H ) 
 
 pie would admit them ; yet, as thty 
 are found frequent in all Countries, 
 the Method of railing Supplies for Va- - 
 riety of Occafions ought to be fixed 
 and indifpenfable as every conftitu- 
 tional Law j ... , . , 
 
 ' til 
 
 This Misfortune of the Differences 
 
 •f 
 
 in Penfyhania was aggravatea by the ' 
 RemilTnefs of fome other Provinces 
 in confulting, at this important Crifis, 
 for the common Good. 
 
 f miM":^ 
 
 tUd 
 
 The northern Colonies, which had 
 been both more adlive and unanimous, 
 were alfo diffatisfied to find that their 
 Mother Country diflributed her Fa- 
 vours, and her Care, more liberally 
 among thofe that had been more inac- 
 tive, and confequently not fo deferv- 
 
 rVt 
 
 :«* 
 
 ing J 
 
 I 
 
 r 
 
 m^. 
 

 I 
 
 irigj ahcl if this were true, it wjls 
 certainly a great Neglcdt in us, and 
 might tsnfortunateb' cool the Ardour, 
 and unnerve the Activity of thofe who 
 found their moft vigorous Efforts 
 ilegledted, aiid the Supine ind Indo- 
 lent catry the Palni of Favour. 
 
 .:r '■ 
 
 
 Thcfe Differences, and thefe Diflk- 
 tisfadlions, we knew j but did we avail 
 6urfclves of the Intelligence? Were 
 we fufEciently adtivc in infpiriting 
 the Indolenti in reconciling Difputcs, 
 and exciting a right Emulation by re- 
 warding and encouraging thofe whofe 
 Merits entitled them to Encourage- 
 ment and Rewards. ^ ^ 
 
 Nothing could have fo effedtually 
 contributed to deter the Enemy, and 
 
 D to 
 
 V 
 
to afccrtain the Refourccs of Provifi- 
 ons, and other Neceffaries, as uniting 
 the feveral Golonics^ and by that 
 MeaiiS engaging them in a mutual Ex- 
 ertion of their Strength, and an 
 unanimous Defence of the commoa 
 Liberty. Had this been done, all 
 muft have contributed proportionably, * 
 and Murmuring and Partiality had not 
 been of any ill Confcquence. For 
 want of this Unaninsxity and general 
 Contribution, was Johnjoriy after his 
 Advantage over the Frenchy left with- 
 out common Neccffarie? of a Catn- 
 paign J and though he had a fufficient 
 Force to have taken Crown-Pointy had- 
 he not wanted Frovilions, that Fort 
 was left to be the Objedt of another 
 Spring's Operations. 
 
 1 ,u 
 
 ^ K 
 
 ■ r 
 -i 
 
 If 
 
{ 27 ) 
 
 ',*,,-■ 
 
 "V" i->^v '•■■ 
 
 i.<»/' 
 
 ^ > If it ihould be alked what General 
 Sbirky^ and the 3,000 Men under his 
 Conimand were doing during the Sum*- 
 mer, it can only be anfwered, that, 
 after having built two fmall Forts at 
 OfivegOy he retired inu Winter-Quar- 
 ters* - i'^rriS(^i0Mm-'i^nhmmutsf[ni. 
 
 ^ The Miferics that fucceeded this in- 
 effectual Campaign might have been 
 expedted, but they were indeed ter- 
 rible : the unhappy Backfettlers expe- 
 rienced all the Diftrefs that human Na- 
 ture can fuffer, whether in the Loft 
 of Circumftances, or the Lofs of 
 
 Life! f. ' '--:^--y>^^ ^r--:.: - y:,j, .. 
 
 -M J- 
 
 r^a^^'^' 
 
 >jft 
 
 D 2 
 
 How 
 
 ^ 
 
 V- 
 
( »8 ) 
 
 .K-|iaf c»;.»v/ Kti V 
 
 „ -w 
 
 How great ought the Talents of 
 thofo intruftcd wi^i, the public V^Irf- 
 fare to be ! How extenfive their Know- 
 ledge ! How indefatigable their. En- 
 deavours ! it may alfo be added, holv 
 fenfible their Hearts of the Diftrefle^ 
 of others, that they may be careful 
 left any Negle<^ or Mifconduft of 
 theirs (hould expofe the meaneft Sub- 
 jcdt to Ruin or to Pain, 
 
 ^iiJ -ixiX' 
 
 d lib- 
 
 Thefe Confiderations feem not at all 
 to have taken Place with our Miniftry 
 at a Time v^hen they fliould have had 
 the greateft EfFedl. After we had fo 
 fenfibly feen the unfortunate Cppfcr 
 qucnces of Delay, in both the pre- 
 r^eding Summers, the Operations of 
 
 • the 
 
:( 29 ) 
 
 the Year Fifty-fix were cxpedted to 
 be managed with the greateft Vigour 
 and Di(|)atch i^ ^ But whoc v^Jr* expeded 
 it, wis ftiA% deciilved i The ftme 
 dilatory^ SpiritiyU lulling our Coun- 
 cils^iandL retardmg our A<Slion. Nor 
 will- this* Comprint appear unjuft, 
 when it J8 eanfidered, that the Supr% 
 plies fent. to America were not em* . 
 barked till the latter End q£ Aprils 
 that the General appointed to com- 
 mand the Forces, and who» there-, 
 fore, fliould have been at their Head 
 as early as poffible, did not go for- 
 ward till $ Month after thefe; and 
 feveral of theOfficers and the Amiiiurii- 
 fion, not till a Month after him. Thp 
 difcreet Method of (hipping the Am- 
 munition is fo well known, that it 
 peed not be mentioned. 
 
 Thus 
 
( 30 ) 
 
 Ihus was the Seafon for Adbion loft 
 in the moft inexcufable unaccountable 
 belays ! Delays which, in their Con- 
 fcquencc, we could forefee to be dan- 
 gerous, and which were the more un- 
 pardonable, not only as the then Si- 
 tuation of Affairs demanded the great- 
 eft Expedition, but as we had very 
 fenfibly experienced their bad Ef- 
 
 fects before. 
 
 fV 
 
 1J}^3- ' V 
 
 The frequent Change of our Com- 
 xmanders in America was neceflarily 
 attended with great Inconveniencies ; 
 the laft appointed had the Plan of the 
 Country and the Genius of its Inha- 
 bitants to enquire into, and to form 
 his Operations accordingly. No other 
 Arguments need be ufed to prove the' 
 Truth of this Aflertion, as unfortu-' 
 
 nately 
 
v( 30 
 
 natcly nothing from Pradtice can be 
 proved againft it;*,f,j,;\tf;.^:rM Jt« t » ^a^^t 'n 
 
 )l 
 
 Crown-Point, whofe Capture wa» . 
 the Objcdt of general Hope, and for ^. 
 which this Seafon was particularly de- 
 figned, was unmolefted, unattempt- 
 cd. The Frenchy it is true, were now , 
 greatly increafed in Numbers j but 
 that could be no Obftacle, as we had 
 ftill a fujfficient Force to fend againft it. 
 
 »if 
 
 ■^«*^ 
 
 By what ftrange Fatality then! — r, 
 by what unaccountable Negligence, 
 or unreafonable Cowardice, did we 
 leave the Defign of reducing thatr 
 Fort unexecuted ? The ftridlefl En- 
 quiry, I believe, would produce no- 
 thing more than Aftoni(hment; for 
 
 wc 
 
*( 32 ) 
 
 .m 
 
 W<J only find, that what v.ai pi'a<Sbicjt- 
 ble was left unattempted. 
 
 .f.. 
 
 But let us fuppofe, that our 
 Commanders were diverted from their 
 Attention to Crown-Pointy upon hear- 
 ing that the Enemy had a Defign on 
 Ofwego, Of this they had timely No- 
 tice, as the French had formed a large 
 Camp within aboit thirty Miles of 
 that Fort, the Intent of which could 
 only be to attack it 5 and of this No- 
 tice they induftriouily availed them- 
 fclves. They had long before expe- 
 rienced the ruinous Confequences of 
 Delay, and were determined to give 
 one Inftance of Vigour and Difpatch : 
 Accordingly General fVM was fcnt 
 with a Reinforcement to Ofivego, at; 
 mod two Davs after it was taken I 
 
 How- 
 
 •< I 
 
i*>' Jllli;-^.!? ' 
 
 b^Jv-JiH^J) 
 
 i-.'-'^ .^bl 
 
 •f 
 
 liowcvcr, let it not be faid, that our 
 Forced, during this Summer, eat the 
 Bread of Idlenefa : Tho* they durft 
 not fight, they could dig with Safety; 
 and' the Seafon was fpent in making 
 
 Entrenchments at Lake George, and 
 fortifying Fort William Henry. 
 
 -ir -^ 77»Affr» T'» 
 
 A^: 
 
 ^ Let us now turn from the melan- 
 choly Profpe(5t of that wretched 
 Year, and fee if the prefent will 
 not afford us a more pleafing 
 
 one. W:i:/tfitii'^ii ':ni^rtv\}'''":tpki' ^ 
 
 »^> The Beginning of this Year was 
 eniployed in Preparations for an Ex- 
 pedition againd Louisbourgh ; a 
 Scheme which, if it had been rightly 
 concerted, might probably have fuc- 
 
 £ ceeded: 
 
 ; 
 
r34 ) 
 
 ceedcd : But its Succefs entirely de^- 
 pendcd on an early Motion in the 
 Spring, before the Enemy could be 
 reinforced by Supplies from Europe 
 or Rebeck, As this was the Cafe, 
 there was never any Probability of 
 executing that Defign this Year : Ad- 
 miral Holborne could not be expedled^ 
 to arrive fooner than "june*, and whe- 
 ther he would bring a Number of 
 Ships with him fuperior to the French 
 Fleet, was equally uncertain with the 
 Time of his Arrival, When he came 
 to Halifax^ he found that the Enemy's . 
 Fleet confifled of more capital Ships> 
 befides Frigates, than his own ; and 
 that they had a much greater Number 
 ^of - Guns. A Council of War was- 
 thereupon held, and it was agreed to 
 
 one Vote, that tije attempt \xm ivx- 
 ptacticable at tfjat Cinie. ^ ^ .^ , 
 
 ^ This. 
 
 
 t 
 
( 35 ) 
 
 This Council of War ought not, 
 however, to be look'd upon in the fanic 
 Light as fome of thofe Councils of 
 ]|$)0i;1CC which have been held upon our 
 European Expeditions. Had Holborne 
 inconfiderately rifqued a Battle with 
 the Enemy, he might, in all human 
 Probability, have been conquered, and 
 the Confequences of that Defeat would 
 have been terrible indeed : The Tranf- 
 ports, with upwards of ten Thoufand 
 Land-Forces on board, would have 
 been taken or deftroyed, and New Tork, 
 and perhaps North America, had been 
 'loft in Confequence of that Event. 
 The Courage of the Admiral was ne- 
 ver doubted. After the Land-Forces 
 ^ere difmiffed, he was determined 
 Jiimfelf to fee the Strength of the 
 
 E 2 Enemy J 
 
 ! . 
 
 '.V A4|> 
 
 •: \ 
 
( 36 ) 
 
 Enemy ; and it is well known, he 
 would have hazarded a Battle, though 
 upon a moderate Difadvantage. 
 
 LIj 
 
 • That his Fleet has been difperfed 
 and damaged by a Storm, is an unfor- 
 tunate Accident -, but it is to be hoped, 
 that the Commiflioners of the Navy 
 will, without Lofs of Time, fend him 
 a Reinforcement that fliall make him 
 equal, if not fuperior, to the French 
 Fleet. . * 
 
 I ' : ' » 
 
 5 -J/t) '-('■ :i:vfr'. 
 
 _./k^ Before I have done with American 
 Affairs, one Particular more is to be 
 confidered, which, however, can giyc 
 the Reader no great Satisfadlion at 
 his Difmiffion. I know not whether 
 it will be expeded thai I am going to 
 
 mention the Lofs of Fort William 
 
 Uenry^ 
 
 ' 
 
 f^ 
 
• ■ t 
 
 ; 
 
 ( 37 ) 
 
 Henry, as that Event, I cannot tell for 
 what Rcafon, did not much alarm us. 
 If we fhould refume the Dcfign of redu- 
 cing Crown- Pointy it would be very ne- 
 ceffary for the Attempt, as it commands 
 the Lakes ; but whatever was its Ufe, 
 the Circumftances of its Capture were 
 fo (hameful, that they cannot fure be 
 heard without Indignation. ;- ' 
 
 ' \ 
 
 General Webb^ the fame who was 
 fent to the Relief of OJwego^ was in- 
 formed by the unhappy Affair of Co- 
 lonel Parker, which happened about 
 the 2 ift of July^ that a large Body of 
 French and Indians was coming againfl: 
 them, but he could not believe the 
 
 ^ti 
 
 Report', and fo negle^ljd to call in by 
 Exprcfles the Militia of the Pro- 
 vinces, and to provide every neceflary 
 Supply. Oil the fecond of Augitjl 
 ' ' "' their 
 
 V 
 
 "s 
 
'r 
 
 Iv 
 
 ( 38 ) 
 
 their Scouts difcovered them upon the 
 Lake : that very Night was the pru- 
 dent General for marching off to Fort 
 
 Edward: in the Morning he went, 
 
 efcorted by a ftrong Guard j and after 
 his fafe Arrival he ventured to write 
 by his Aid de Camp to the command- 
 ing OfEcir at Fort Henry. The Con- 
 tents of his gallant Letter may be thus 
 epitomized. 
 
 %; 
 
 .-('•^j--- ,.. /> 
 
 9 I 
 
 \ 
 
 *.J 
 
 Sir, 
 
 
 <e 
 
 (( 
 <c 
 
 w 
 
 «c 
 
 4C 
 
 " The Roads are fo inverted that 
 a Letter can fcarce get PafTage. As 
 you know my flrength, you know 
 how dangerous it would be for me 
 to join you. 1 have fent Exprefles 
 upon Exprefles for the Militia. If 
 neither I nor they fhould come to 
 your Afliftance, you muft make the 
 
 « beft 
 

 ( 39 ) 
 
 *' beft Terms you can, and I pray God 
 *!; give you Succefs." t ', 
 
 .■ t 
 
 % 
 
 * If/ as it is urged, the Fort was ill- 
 built, and it was impoffible to defend 
 it, why, in the name of common 
 Senfe, did not the Garrifon quit it 
 before it was in veiled by the Enemy. 
 They might by that Means have faved 
 the Provifions and every thing elfe, 
 wMch, upon a Surrender, were loft. 
 They had not then been expofed to 
 the Plundering and Butchering of the 
 favage Indiam, nor had they been in- 
 capacitated, by the Terms of Capitula- 
 tion, to take up Arms againft the French* 
 Befides, had the Garrifons of Fort WiU 
 ' Ham Henry and Fort Edward been 
 joined by the Militia, they might, by 
 the Difcrction of a prudent Commcn- 
 
 dcr^ 
 
f1 • 
 
 Kl! :' ' 
 
 ( 40 ) 
 
 dcr, have cut off the Enemy's Retreat, 
 and inftead of our lofing a Fort, the 
 French might have loft an Army. It 
 was expeded indeed, that Lord Lou^ 
 don would fall upon them in their 
 Return, but thofe Expedtati^ns were 
 founded on bad Intelligence, for 
 they returned vidorious, and unmo- 
 lefted. -'■■,M,;,M-. ;..'.v ■■-- r ; V 
 
 ^ih "t/'^^W; Y-'^ti "^ ■■■'■■ '* --:-:: :*'■ 
 
 /v • " ' ■■ '■ ' . . 
 
 ' Thus much of America — from 2l 
 Reflection on the whole it appears, that 
 the Forts on the Ohio were fuffered to 
 
 "remain in the Enemy's Hand, becauf© 
 of the Indifcretion of the Commander 
 that was fent againft them : that Ge- 
 neral Johifon was unable to profe- 
 cute his Victory over the French in 
 1755 by Want of Provifions and 
 other Neceffaries: that Crown-Point 
 
 
 was 
 
1- 
 
 ■^ 
 
 V ( 41 ) 
 
 was unattempted in 1756, to all Appear- 
 ance through mere Cowardice j and 
 that 0/wego was loft through Cowar- 
 dice or through Negligence. The 
 Defign again ft Louijbourgh was inef- 
 fedtual, becaufc it could not be exe- 
 cuted at a proper Seafon j and the 
 Lofs of Fort William-Henry was the Ef- 
 kdi of Ignorance and Delay. 
 
 Thus unfuccefsful have wc been 
 , m America ; and yet what we have 
 
 V done in Europe only adds to the Weight 
 
 of our Misfortunes, and, if poffible, 
 
 heightens our Difgrace. 
 
 Who can confider the Lofs of A//- 
 
 norca without an Indignation, which 
 
 Time can no more foften than the 
 
 F Deatli 
 
 ^' 
 
I 
 
 t: 
 
 ( 42 y 
 
 Death of an executed Admiral could 
 appeafe ? When we adl thus inef- 
 fectually for ourfelves, it is no wonder 
 that our Allies fhould be deceived in 
 las. It is in States as in private Life j 
 He that cannot do well for himfelf, as 
 certainly proves a hclplefs Friend 5 and 
 a King ' -^■, unfuccefsful in its own 
 Wars, muiw be a hopelefs Ally. The 
 brave King of BruJJia is indeed to be 
 pitied, as he has not only his own Ene- 
 mies but ours to repel. Great-Britain^ 
 once the Scourge oi France j was thought 
 fufficient, not only to defeat that King- 
 dom in any Attempt, but to aflift her 
 Allies, (hould their Neceffities, even 
 then, call for her Relief Not one of 
 us, I dare fay, but is perfuaded that 
 the brave Monarch, whom we have 
 fo inglorioufly deferted, would not havq 
 relinquiriisd us in the like Circum. 
 • ■ fiances* 
 
( 43 ) 
 
 fiances. But it is much to be wiihed 
 that the War be not clofed by a Peace 
 as fhamefui as the Treaty for H .,' 
 
 As a National Enquiry has been 
 made into the Caufes of our Lofs of 
 Minorca, it would be Arrogance un- 
 pardonable in a private Man to affign 
 any other than thofe which have been 
 pcjinted out by the wife Qouncil of 
 the Nation. This however, by the 
 Courtefy of Englajjd, may be faid j 
 If^ Byng was capitally guilty for neg- 
 le6ling to do all in his Power to fave 
 the liland, thofe who were then at the 
 Head of Affairs, and negledcd, though 
 they had timely Intelligence, to fend a 
 Fleet that might prevent the Enemy's 
 Landing — who, when the Fleet was 
 difpatched, fent no more than a Hand- 
 
 F a * ful 
 
 I 
 
1.1 
 
 (44) 
 
 ful of Land-Forces in Comparifon 
 of the Enemy along with it, whofe 
 Service, could they have been thrown .; 
 in, would have been inefFedual, while 
 the French Fleet was able to cruife off 
 the Ifland :— -Thofe, certainly, in fome 
 Degree, partook of his Crime, who * 
 did not do all he might have done to 
 five the Ifland. «^t i^ '^^-^A 0rW i 
 
 !" In the Corfican Expedition, indeed, 
 we have not been difappointed j — — 
 becaufe we had no Expedations . 
 from it. No Perfon of common Saga- \ 
 city could ever fuppofe that the Mal- 
 contents of that Ifland, who were la- 
 bouring to throw ofl?" one Yoke, would, 
 like the Horfe in the Fable, fubmit to 
 another. If we only meant to have the 
 Privilege of a Watering- Place in Re- 
 
 
 ■■:n 
 
 "% 
 
(45) 
 
 turn for aflifting the Rebels, could 
 we be fo ftupid as to think that a Peo- 
 ple who live on Plunder, would be 
 bound by any Laws of Gratitude ? 
 Or, in Times of Scarcity, be perfuaded 
 by any moral Confiderations, to ipare 
 their Benefadors ? . jr i ' \, 
 
 rm 
 
 3f»l:a?!:ii*3^:*ic'^ 
 
 ■V* 4' It ■-'♦,'«- 
 
 With Refped to the Secret Expedi- 
 tion, this may be faid in Favour of the 
 
 Defign, and to the Honour of thofe 
 that formed It : Had we been fuccefs- 
 ful, and deftroyed the Shipping at Ro^ 
 chelle or Rochforty the French would 
 not have been able to fend a new Fleet 
 into America in the Spring, becaufe 
 their Artificers muft have been enl- 
 ployed in repairing the Lofs. But 
 why, then, was not this ufeful Defign 
 put in Execution ? Was it impofllble 
 to land the Men, or to make an Im- 
 
 preffipa 
 
 i 
 
 ill 
 
f 
 
 1. 1 
 
 
 ( 46 ) 
 
 prcflion on the Works ? This will not 
 be avered, even by thofe who neg- 
 Icdled to make the Attempt. Why 
 then the Neglcd: ? The Attempt was 
 dangerous. But why thofe Delays 
 within Sight of the dcftined Coaft, till 
 it was covered by the Militia of the 
 Country? Was it not a Secret Expe- 
 dition, and its End to furprize ? — 
 
 ,^/.f,-i- 
 
 . y, Tims have we by Negligence, Delays, 
 
 .Mifcondud: and Cowardice, failed in 
 
 every Attempt we have made, and bee« 
 
 van^iuifli'd by every AfTault of the Ene- 
 
 my. ^ . How the War will end, it 
 
 ^T r^i'^ »» 
 
 cannot now be determined ; but if we 
 make not Reprifals by a vigorous Cam- 
 paign, in the approaching Summer, ^ye 
 may tremble for the Confcquence. 
 Should the deferted King of Frujjia be 
 fwallowed up by his numerous Ene- 
 mies^ 
 
 "A 
 
 I 1 
 
 \ 
 
 !i ' 
 
( 47 ) 
 
 mies, what will be the next Object of 
 the French Ambition ? 
 
 lys, 
 
 i in 
 
 However ufelefs fome may think it, 
 to enquire into the Caufes of unfuc- 
 cefsful Events, or to (hew how the 
 Misfortunes we have fuffered might 
 once have been avoided ; there is cer- 
 tai»>iy no Way fo efFedual to make us 
 attentive to our future Condudt, as to 
 confider the LoiTes we have fuflained, 
 and the Sources from whence they 
 fprung: And it is undoubtedly the 
 
 Wifh of every good Subjedl, That the 
 Senfe of our paft Sufferings and Dif- 
 grace may animate our Commanders 
 with that noble Indignation, and ex- 
 cite in them thofe Sentiments of Glory, 
 which muft be for ever followed by 
 Vidoryand Succefs. 
 
 FINIS.