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Cooper in Pater- noller- Row MDCCLVIL ■I h REMARKS UPON A L E T T E R Publiihcd in the London Chronicle, &c. I S I R, N compliance with your requeft, I fend you my thoughts upon the letter from Briftol publiflied in the London Chronicle^ or Univerfal Evening . oft. No. 1 15 i contain- ing an account of the failure of our Expedition this year againit Cape Breton. It is certain, that no better fcheme could have been projedkd tor retrieving our late misfortunes in North America, than that enterprize. The importance of Cape Breton to the Erench may be eflim.ated from th:; effe(ft, which the reduaion of it had in the lafi war ; it paved the way for the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and the rcflitution of it appears to have been regarded by P ranee, as the moft eifenti^l article of the peace on her parr, b '/ [ 6] hy her ilipulating rhat Ilojlages fliould be given for the jjerformanct of it. The Expedition againfl. tjiis ifland was indeed Jiying the ax to the rooi of the tree •, and the re- duction of it would have given Canada its death wound •, our failure therefore in this important attempt may v\ell occafion i\ public concern. The aim of the writer of the Briflol letter is, to throw tlie blame of it upon the Miniflcrs, and to juliify the coiuiufl of the General and Admi- ral in abandoning the Lxpedition, as he lays they did, on the 4th of Auguft. >. % » He begins with faying, " Our Minijlers were certainly informed, long before Mr. Ilolbourn failed from S pithead, that Beaufremont's Iqua- dron v/as ordered to join the French fleet at Louifhourg, but flighted the information, he- caufe they knc-jj oetter •, That one would think their fatal m.ilfake concerning the IN aval P'orce, that was to be fent againlt Minorca, would have cured them of their Self-fujfi- cieucy •," that " H^'c dc every thing by halves, and lb do >zo//S///^'- efl^edually ;" th.at *' indeed our Naval flrength is fo injudicioufly divided and parrtlled out, that it is as eafily broken as a large flu-af of arrows taken out one by onei" nttti proceeds to obferve, " That the Naval " force lent to take Louilbourg was not only ^* too fraall, but difnatched loo laie in the year.'* As to his afll'rtion, *' thai we do every thing by ** I ^ Ives, and lo do n- rh.' .^ effectually," 1 think it mv be remarked, with regard to our Land. Forces t,i iC v( I given indeed the re- s death portant n. cttcr IS, rJ, and Adnii- lys they ers were olbourn :'s Iqua- k fleet at tion, be- W\ think Naval /luiorca, bahes, indeed divided oken as onei" Naval ot only e year.'* tl'ing by I think 11 r Land. I-orccs [7] Forces in North America, that his Majeily had there, before the arrival of the new -railed High- landers, and 6000 troops lall lent from Ireland, about 13,000, and has now upon that Continent upwards of 21,000 Regular troops •, and we have undoubted accounts lately come trom Quebec, that the French themfelves do not com|>utG their Regular troops in all Canada at more than 300G, nor tiiofe at Louifbourg to exceed 2500 i i<:i that we have a fupcriority ot regular forces there on the fide of the Englifn, which, with the Ir- regulars, that the Colonies coukl and woiikl rea- dily ruilc upon luch an occafio!!, leems mincient. if rightly diredled, to drive flic French out ot North America. As to his free Reflections u[)on the Minijlcrs for flighting the information whch, he fays, they had certainly received long before Mr. Uolbourii failed from Spithead^ '^ that Btaufrcmont was or- " dered to LouiJI^ourg,'' and his conclufion from thence, *' that the naval force lent to take Lou- " ifbourg was too/wW/," one would be naturally led by them to think, that the French fleet war., upon Beaufremoni^ s jun^'ion of Mr. Reveji, lu^ - rior to Mr. Holbourn-, whereas it appears by tin.. Letter-writer's own lift ot die Knglifli ar.d French Ihips, that Mr. Holbourft was much luperior to them, fo that there was no rcalbn for augmenting his fquadron : as to Mr. la Motthe^ it is evident from the lift', that he did not join Mr. RcvcJl and Mr. Beaufremont at Louiibourg till 25 days alter their arrival there i fo that it leems mofl: proba ble, that the deilination of his fquadron for Fou- ifbourg was not determined upon by the Fren \\ minifters themlelves, till fonie. time ajier ; and t'y-rr •I •< f 8 ] there is no appearance, that our Minifters had any reafon to a;-)prchencl before Mr. Holbourn Tailed from Spithead, that Mr. la Mottbe would be " ordered to J.oiiifbourg :" but, as foon as they h;ul, they Iciu Mr. Holbourn a reinforcement, which nuulc him (lill fuperior to the whole French lltct. And will) regard to the obfervatlon, " That " the naval force fent to take Louifbourg was *' diipatchcd too late in the year j" it is well known that Mr. lidboiirn lay wind-bound at Spithcad, St. Helen':-', and Cork, fix weeks in the whole at leaft, and was afterwards nine weeks on his palliige to Halifax : if his fliips had not been thus retarded, hu mull have arrived there by the beginning of May ; in which cafe he would have had it in his power (according to the Letter- writer's own account ot the times of the arrival of the French fliips at l.ouilbourg) firft to have intercepted Mr. Reirft^s and Mr. Beaufremont^s iquadrons fcparately, (but if not fcparately, his fquadron was fuperior to their joint force) or at lead to have prevented their entering the har- bour •, and Mr. la Motthe^ who did not get to Louilbourg till the 29th uf June, would, in all probability, have Ihared the fame fate ; which mud have fecurcd the reduttion of Louifbourg. That Mr. Holbourn did not happen to arri\^e at Hahfax bv that time, accordmcp to the intention of the Alinijlers^ and what might have rcafonably been expe6fed, can't be juftly charged to their account, but was wholly owing to contrary winds i ar^ adverfe Event, which all fea Enter- pTizes are liable to, and no Miftijters can either torefee or controul. The I i d any Tailed lid be IS they ;ment, whok ■' That irg was is well )iind at ^ceks in e weeks had not there by e would ; Lxtter- » arrival to have fremont*s tely, his or at the har- get to d, in all which jifbourg. arrive at intention afonably to their contrary « ;a Enter- an either [ ? 1 The writer of the Brillo! letter iiulccJ 6b- ferves, *' That our o|icr:itioris againd Caj^e Brc- ** ton fliould begin wiih the Spring ;" but allow- ing that to be the inolb aclvar.tan;.(uv, time \ yic if Mr. llolbourn had arrivctl at 1 lalil.ix by llie beginning of May, or even three weeks l.itr'r, the conqued ot LouillMuirg might have been very cafily ma.ie this ycnr. The two mod" (.nii-.tir.l points in this cafe aro» id. That the IVoops eiiiployed u[)on this fer- vice dioiiltl be drong enough to keep t!ie lield againd Succours, that may be thrown into Lou- ilbourg iluring the fiege, and to re[>ulfe any Par- ties ot the enemy in their falli-s liom the town. 2(lly. That they fliould be landed u:\n\ the IQand in time to go through the necelfary Opera- tions for the reduction ot Louilbourg betore the winter fets in \ which it does not generally, till about the beginning of November. Now both thefe points would have been fe* cured, if Mr. Uolbouvn\ Squadron had arrived at Halifax by the time, it might have reafonably been expected to have done, and the i-emral had got there in due feafon. As to the fird •, the forces inten:!ed to havs been landed upon the iQand were i i,f\:o Regular Troops-, which would doubtlt fs have been drong enough to have carri^ d (m their works ngalnlt \\\z lieficgei Field. 1, and iliemf-lves Mi:Krs or the I B And The wmm^ ^ ^' f [ 10 ] And as to the fecond j thclb Troops might have been landed by the middle or Utter end of May at furthcH: ; which would have given them five months at lead to have cffedcd the redu(5lion of L.ouifbourg •, a time much more than fufticient for 1 1 ,000 Regular Troops to have done it in againft the oppofition of 3500 Irregulars^ which the writer of the Briftol letter fays the Garrifon of" Louilbourg confided of: the New Kngland men, in their Expedition againll it in 1 745, did it in torty-rcven days with 40C0 Irregulars againft a Garrifon of 650 Regular Troops, and about 1600 inhabitants and fifliermen capable ot bear- ing arms. It might pofllbly have taken up fume time for the Troops to carry the Redoubts, which may be fuppolcd to have been erec^ted by the French fince the lalt Expedition ; but if the Ifland was covered v/ith them, they could have held out but a fhort time againft the force of the Befiegers, and the City after that would have been a very eafy Conqucll ; for its wcaknefs, I muft obferve to you, confifts in the fmall extent of it, and the works Vv'ithin it j which expofes the inhabitants and loldiers in every quarter to the cannon and bombs of the Belicorrs \ fo that the foimcrnull be obliged to quit their houfcs and betake them- felve;y(as muft alio the loldiers when off duty) to their cafmates, which are extremely damp and unwholfonie ; and that muft foon reduce them to fuch cxtrcminc'j, iis vould oblige them to fur- render But CI (I ai (I <( (C ■ii Jl But [ " ] But this happened unfortunately not to b* the cafe ; the General dul not «^et to llahtdx til about the 3d ol July, whiihwas 27 days after Mr. Revejl and Mr. Beaufrcmont liad got to Louifbourg, and four days after Mr. la Motthc \ nor did the /^^w/r^;/ arrive at Haliiax till the 9tii of July. I Ihall therefor-j proceed to examine the realons afTi^ned by the writer of the Briltol lctt( r, for the General's and AimiriiF*, not proceeding; (ben to Louilbourg. In the firft placc\ he fays, tliat one 64 gun fhi[) lying in the harbour oi Louifbourg would render th.' landing of'l'roops upon the liland im- practicable •, whereas there were eii_,htcen capital Ships there, when the //J;;.7>vr/ arrived at llalilax •, his words are, " Shi^js of war lying in the har- bour lof L.ouilbourg] commaiid hi fuch man- ner the place, where our Troops mud ne.X'f- farily debark, that rarly as we | New I'.ngland menj were, had the Vigilant, a fliipofO^ guns, got in, inlL'ad o[b..ing taken by Sir Peie?- IVarrcn^ flie v/ould have rendered our landing imprat^li cable •" and he fays, ** That the Leneral ought to have landed on Cafe tn ■ ' ton before any r}ii]"^s of war from France or (( (C = 1 *' hour of L-ouiroc)iirg •, upon which, tho' llich . *' a force was capable otL;alling hiti Troops moli tcrrioly in their landing, ycc he embarked rheni, in order co difpiirr the point •, but Capt. rdvvardh ''n the Newloundhiiid Ration taking an advice boat, about the fame time, lent him a true account of the French llrength, which you v;ill Icl; in the annexed lilt •, whereupon, a Louncd uf war being called,conrifling of land aiid ka Oifjcers, it was agreed unanimoufly, excepti'ig only one dil]mti}ig vote^ that ihe at- tcm^^t was impracticable at that time •," and then proceeds to obkrvc, " That it would have " been againft common prudence, and tool- ** hardy to have made the attempt." I intirely airrcc with tlie writer of the letter, *' That if fliips lying in the harbour of Louif- " bouig command in fuch manner the place, " where our trcops mu(t nccciTarily debark, as *' that c;;i 64 gun .Ship wcnikl render their land- " ing impra(i;ticable," (as he aHerts) it would have bcca tiie licighth (.)i foci-bar dinejs to have attcmpLi'd landing them againil eighteen capital Ships lying there \ and in that cafe it will be dif- ficult to reconcile with comr.ion 'priuknce the at- tempt, which he fays the Gcmral\\\'\ determined upon making to land his troops againft the lire oiy^r^f// capital hhips-, as alio to account icr his altering that cktermination ; for it is well known, that there is not roomi in rh.it part of the harbour, trom whence it is in the povscr of Ships to annoy an Fnerny on ihoar, for more than live to fpread, and be pro^^erly placed ior tiiat purpofc ; lb that the Gt/'/m;/ m'f;iu as we:l l;avc landed his troops ap;ainif I I ,1 [ '3 ] againft eighteen Ships as again ft Jeven ; eiglitcer^ could not have obihu6led his landirifi more than fcven : and it he thought it advifcuble to attempt landing his rroops againll 'itzvtw Oiips, the intel- ligence he received from Captain Edv/ards, " that there were eighteen in the iiarbour," could be no rcaion with him tor altering his tirit deter- mination, as th^ wirter of the Brilfol letter fays it was : but it is clear, that his cijfcrtion is not well founded. "What place it is, Vvhere he fays our Troops muft necejjhrily debark, he has not indeed point- ed out. i fuppole he can't mean the harbour. As to Chapcau Rouge Bay, from whence the New England men landed in their Expedition againft Cape Breton in 1745, it is about twelve miles deep, and affords many good places for hmding troops upon the back of Louilbourg ; and it is weil known, that the dillance ot th^ Bay is in Ibme parts upwards of five miles from LouiPoourg harbour, in none lefs than three •, and r'lat no iiglit; can be had, Irom (hips in the har- bour, of I'roops landing from the Bay ; io that it is impolTiblefor Ships lying there to give Troops tiie leaft annoyance in their debarka:ion from the Bay. Another reafon afflgncd by the lcttcr-wri<"er is, "■ T. iuit t!ij i r^'iich were much luperior in *' the number of their capitjil Ihips, carrying a '" much greater numl^er of guns, all of much " heavier metal, and inuch larger calibres than " ours i and il' tlic Goural and Adr,iiral had been *' never thelefs io r:.ih as to make the intended " ddccnt." ) ■wAm [ '4 ] dcfccnt," li(» nn^ that if the only queftion before theCouicil of war was,whe- ther it was advileable to rifque a battle with the French, confi.:ering the bad conlequences, which might have attended a defeat on our part, I think the determination of the Council againft doing it, was right. But there is anotJK r very ;,v^/frA?/circumftance to be conii' itred in the caie -, Vv^hicli is •, the Ge- neral ^nd .-.'chnrral had leceived intelligence, that the French crews ^(txcvery f!iki)\ and their fqua- dron thereby much weakened •, and this intelli- gence v/as corrob^;rated by another circumftance, viz. rh.at v. lien the //u/7//;r7 ] it was the Opinion of the belt Judges there, thar the l^nghfh iquadron, though lb much infeii(;r to the French in refpecl of the luim'oer and iizc of it's (hips, yet on account ol the 'icalth and vi- gour ot it's men, was of lufficicnt iorce, even to have attacked the French in their iiarbour. If the French fleet in Louifbouro: harbour t> this year was in the fame y;(i/)' (late, that Mr. d'Anville's was in at Chebuito in 1 746, it is clear thac Mr. llolbourn's pvenWen Ihips of the line, which it does not appear were in tlic lead diiiiblecl by (ickriel's, were a fuj^erior Vovoz to the ^/^■■^'/(f^w French capital fliips : the fiflierman's in- telligence therefore was a matter ot fuch moment, that it ouuht not to have b.en Oiohred cuJy be- caufe other hfliermen had happened betore to give a wrong account ot the number of the Ihips in Louifbourg harbour -, efpecially when the in- formation he gave, had been llreng;hened by 'io confiderable a circunillance, as Mr. Hclboirrr^s appearing off Louifbourg with only five or (ix fhips, and cruizing there without being niolelled by the French : i: was undoubtedly of rlie utmoit importance to have all polTible enquiry made into the truth of it i ior if ic was true, r.s no brdy ivjvj dcubts it zvjs i the Gcner il ap.d y^dhur::! need nof have been under any apprehenfion tliat th.e French Iquadron would have come out to attack Mr. liolbourn^ \j:holc ilict: and in U:ch cafe, ii the troops had been landed, it would have put it in- to their pov.er to have made themillves mafters of the b'rench lleet, as well as ot Louiiborrg : for then the fhips in the harbour would have been cxpofed to the cannon or" batfrics railed on fl:oar» 'mmmm »l 1 f < ' . \ - 1 is [ ^s ] fliore, which the z-.r/lcr of the later oblcrvcSi '* wouid command the entrance into the har- " bour i'o, that no Jhip can come in or go out, " and ilth.y rhouhi ilip in, in thp night, can in- *' falHMy dcllioy them." ilc luppoles indeed thc'.c Batteries to be raifed before fliips enter the harbour ; but according to accounts given of the fituation of the grouud, where llich ijatteries ought to be railed, it appears practicable to ere6l them, e\en after Ihips have ciUcrcd, in fuch manner, as that they will not be much expofed to the tire from the Ihips. It feems extremely unfortunate, that the Ex- pedition was abandoned, ar^d the General hap- pened to return with 6000 troops to ;\ew York (as it is laid he did) b^-'tbre the lour fliips lad lent to Mr. Holbourn ](J\\-\t^\ him : this reinlorcement, which mull have arrived at Halifax loon after, would have made his fquadron lliperior to the French fleet, even in the numl.^er and lorce oF fhips, and poilibly have eaCd all difnculties about landing the troops, and venturing to lay before Louifbourg. As to the other rcafon aOlgned by the v.'riter of the Bridol ktter for the Generdi's iiot landino; his CI? rroops, viz. " I'hat he had received information " that there were ne.ir 3500 Irreguhin inLouif- '^ bourg i" this furely could have liO weight with the General v/hen he had 1 1,000 Regular Troops ready ior the attack. There feems indeed one further difficulty with regard to landing the Iroops, v/hich the writer of the ! hap- York ft fcnt [ '9 ] the Brlftol letter has not mcPitioned : that is, the great Boclyof Sc.imcn which mult be liippofed to be on board tighceen Capital iTiips, detachments from which nnght, upon occalion, have been employed on flioar againll tl.e Befiegers, in leve- ral parts ol'land Icrvicc; and I think this of it- ielf wouki be an inlupcrable objeilion to landing them, unlefs they too could have drawn like fup- port and afTiftance from Mr. Holhourn^ fquadron in cafe ot need : bur as they might certainly have done that, it Mr. Ilolhc'Urn was ilrono- enough to have lay'd before L.ouifliourg •, x\\r. difficulty appears to be Iblved, el'pecially as die French crews were lb lickly. I now proceed to examine what the writer of the Brilfol letter obferves concerning the time, when he fiys theTroops ought to have been land- ed on Cape Breton, in order to have made die Expedition fucceed : upon this he lays great rtrefs •, he lays in o!ie part of his letter, tha: our Operations againil Cape Breton fhould commence with the Spring, not latrr than the end of March or bemnninc!; oF^'^r^ril — that the moment the thick io"s, which cover the fea, and ice, which choaks up the harbours of Cap;i Breton., be':iin to ciear away, is tiie proper time for making the dcicent •, and th.:*: it v.'as wholly owing to the New England men's ob fervinff and leiziii'T it, t'lat thev fucceeded in iC ■;( ,1! «,( their '^alJant atreinot v/hoever hopei for V\: tlie farm me:-!la\;s."- m f74:)J ■; and tlia: 'ri'11 iu;i.L f ;»!■■ " hcfws, <- \V; take ■ /ina in anotner pari [.'■ui'Nj'Urjz itnU'ls we '■'• bejdo X [ 20 ] " begin our Operations againfl it in April •," And i:jiv tl.en v. as it not clone ? The; only rcafon wliich the k'Ucr-vvriter al]ig:;s lor that, is con- tained in the iollowing wcjrds ; he iays, ** He [Lord Loudoun j ought to have been enabled to be]-oeecd then for want ot the afiiilance of Ad- miral liolbourn's Iquadron •, but ic/^y not ? The 6000 Troops which the 6V;/^r<7/had then ready,»ind alterwards carried with him to Halifax upon that jcrvice, mull (according to the letter-writer's own obfervation) have been, without the afh fi- ance of the iix Regimmts from Ireland, a fuffi- eicnt Land tbrce for the reduction ot Louifbourg againd the French Troops, which could be ex- pected to have been tound in (jarrifon there, at that le:if()n of the year ; at which time likewife there was no danger of the Troops being moleited by the French mips of war, either upon their paill'ge to Cape B'reton or debarkation there : for, he fays, '' I1iat both Sea and Land forces are *' fo/ccci to quit Louifbourg as foon as the win- " ter begins to fet in •, and that by attacking it *' early in the Spring (viz. in :\Y)v\\) before they " could J fuffi. at cc [ 21 J '^ tould receive any reinforcements or fupplies " from Europe, we fliall take the French at a *' total diladvantage." iVnd afur landing of our I'roops diey need not, acconiing to his afler- cion,have {eared any Succours being thrown into Louifbourg ; lor he lays, " If our troops get *' on fhoar time enough to ci e.l a Battery or two before any Ihips trom Europe arrive, they can command the entry into the harbour of Louilbourg lo, that no fhip can come m or go out-, and, it rhey (hould Hip in, in the night, can inialHbly cieilroy them •," and in anotiier part of his letter, h lays, " our Troops [when landed I " ' uuld fo comm.md the entrance [into the harbour] " as to render all acceis im- ** pradicable."- And another very confiderable circumftance, which he leems ignorant of, might have been mentioned \ viz. that, befides raifing Batteries, it would have been ablblutely in the power of our i I oops to hive made themlclves mailers (as the Nev/ England men did three days alter their landing) of the grand Battery, which confifls of twenty -eight cannon of 42 pound ball, and two of 18 pound, much the greatell- part of which point directly down the harbour, and command every vcUll at it's entrance inro it. ' 1 nar The letter-writer's afiertion tlierefore, *' the Genercil was not enabled to begin his opera- " tions againll Louilbourg early in the Sprin-;. " for want ot tlie ;tirillai;ce ol Pvir. liclbonrjfi ^ " lquadroi\" is contuted bv his o-i; obicrva- tions. »l H'. '■ I i\ I ll :; I [ 22 ] This afTertion appears likevvife to be contrary to tlic GencraN own T^ntiments in this point ; for it he was of" Oi)inion, that it would not have been fafe for him to have proceeded in the T-xpc- dition, when the coall was clear of French Ihips of war Uis in fact it was till the 4th day of June), without the allillancc ot Mr. iiolhourii\ Iqua- dron, it leems impollible to account for his con- duct in fraying at New York, till the latter end of (hat month •, and then proceeding to Halifax, after he had certain advice that Mr. Revejl and Mr. Bcinifrernnut Wf-rc arrived at Louilloourg, and that Mr. IloU>r.itr!! was not got to Haliiax j in which cale he certainly run an extreme rifquc ofbeiiig intercepted in his palfage thither; he would doubtlels have either proceeded to Halifax before the arrival of the French fhips at Fouif- bourg, or hive flayed till Mr. Ho! bourn was got to Halifax ; unlets he was prevented by pofitive Orders not to fail from New York, till the arri- val of Mr. Iklhown at thiliiiix, or was not rea- dy to proceed trom thvncc till the latter end of June-, neither of which ought to be prefumed ; for in the f(M"mer ol thole cafes, he mult be guilty of a breach of Orders \ ar:d in the latter, of a mod: incxcufabic tielay in his prep;irations; which was not the cr'Je, it we may depend upon our ad- viceii from New York, viz. iliat his 'I'roops were aClually embarked on board the 'I'rarilports by the 6th of May. With regard to the Gencrr.rs not proceeding from New York to hour jl> our g in April ; if any doubt was made whether 6oooTroops would have then been a fufficient force tor the redudion of it, \\ f> 1 23 ] it, (for vviiiih I think there is no room) might thfy not have brcn Ilren[i,thftrvjd with looc New Kngliind IrreguU\rs, many ot whom, with their Officers, would have been ot (ingular Icrvice, from the experience they had gained in tiie lull Expedition againlt Cape Breton ; and ifoccafion had required, might they nor have been Hill fur- ther ftrengthcned with lome Troops, which might have htenthen fpared irom Nova Scotia ? For my own -art •, when tlie acrounts firft ap- peared in the prints, that a fecret Expedition was to be made irom iNcw York with 6000 lYoops, (which it v;as conjetlured were drftined againlt Cape Breton) the notion I entertained, that they would iuive proceeded to Louifbourg very early in the Spring, and landed before the arrival of the French I'quadron there, (as the New lingland men did in 1745) was lb (triking a circumllance in favour of the Enterprize, that I had no doubt of the fuccefs ot it. by mg my ive of it. i( (C The letter - writer concludes with faying, 'I'hat they [meaning the General and Aimiral\ are both by this time much better acquaintcfd with every thing neccffary to the fuccefs of the Expedition, than any other Commander^ who can be fent out : nor is it to be hoped, that Lord Lotidounh fucceflbr, whoever he be, will have near lb much influence over the North Americans i which is a very material point : 1 wifh to God, our miniilers law this matter in the lame light, in which it appears evi- dently to, Dear Sir, &c.*' h mmim I I [ H ] Jt if. not CO be doubted, that the General mufl by thii time hi' iiuich better acquainted with eve- ry part of liis Maidi y's fervice in North America from hir, Experience in it thele two lalt Cam- paigus •, but it is pjllilih', that wc may not have the lame tavounibit opportunity for making the conquefl oi Cape Breton another ye.ir, that we had this , tor I uon't think we can ablbluiely de- pend upon what the ktter-wnter lb pofitivciy af- ferts, ** That a French i\i my or Fk-ct cannot *' winter in that iiiholpitabk: part ol" the workl '* [Louifbourg or Caniuki). J hat he is miilaken in the former part ot his alfertiun, no [)erloii, who is in the lead verled in the hillory of this war, can be ignorant ; for it is well known that the i'roops, which have been fent trom France to Louilbourtr and Canada, lincc the commencement oi it, have at'iudly v/inter'd there •, and that it is not pofTiblc for a Fleet to tU) the fame, tho' there may Jiave been no inllancc ol that, fecms far from being certain. ii > H I have been Informed, that in 1745, two Ihips of Sir Peter Warren's Iquadron wintered in the north eafl part ui Louiibourp- k.aibour : hov/- ever, from the accounts 1 have heard, of the ex- pofure ol it to the fouth we^ winds, the fmall nfc of (he tides wlrhin tlie narbour, and the quantities of ice with whicii it is generally filled at that feafon, it v/^'iikl b.'; too hazaidous for a Fleet to attempt the fame -, but, that a very large fquadron may fahly v/inter in Chapeau Rouge Bay, I believe there is no douh: to be made •, a F'rench fquadron would indeed lie very much ex- pofed there to be attacked by our fliips •, and how far )Uge i a cx- r far [ 25 ] Tar that may be an ob ^edion with the French agaiiill venturing their (hips there, I will not take upon me to fay. 1 »m well ifTured, that the late Sir Peter IVarren^ who had the chief command at fea in the iiut ndt-dtxpcdirion againft Canada in 1746, was, from rhe inquiry he then made in America, concerning the pradicablcnefs oF wintering a Fleet in the river St. Lawrence, fo fully pcriuadcvl of it, that in cafe that Expe- dition had proceeded, and he had found it too late in the leafon to have effeded it that year, he determined to winter the flii[)S under his com- mand in one of the harbours there, the name of which I don*t immediately recoiled. As to the letter- writer's propofal, that an Englifh Fleet deftined for an Expedition againft Louilbourg or Canada, fhould winter in North America, it is, I think, not only practicable but very advifeable : but I mud differ from him in what he fays in his poftfcript, viz. ** No Captain *' of a man of war ought to be confuked about *' wintering in Halifax -, not one of them will ** give his vote for it, as there are no public di- ** verfions there." For to my knowledge, fcve- ral of thefe Officers have themfelves wintered in North America, and would be very proper to be confuked ♦, nor can I entertain fo bafe an opinion of them, as to fuppofe, that they would ever let their Pieafures come in C()ni})etition with the fer- vice of their King and Country. The influence, which he obfcrves, Lcrd Lou- doun has gained over the North Americans, mud certainly be of great advantage to his Lordjhip^ D and I'l i ' 'h '\ .1 ' [ 26 ] and is, as he rightly obfcrves, a moft material point tor a Commander in that part of the world 5 and it muft be acknowledged, coniidering what the events of the war in North America havd been thefe two lajl years, that it is no fmall con- queft to make gver New England men, who, till of /^/^, have not been accuftomed to fuch mif- lortunes, and from their general characfter feem as little formed to bear dif appointments of that kind, as any Subjeds whatever within his Ma- jelly's dominions. I have now. Sir, gone through the examina- tion of what the writer of the Brittol letter afligns for the caufes of our lailure in this year's Expe- pition againft Cape Breton, and his reafons tor it's being abandoned; but as the General and Admiral might, for ought we know, give other reafons for their condud in this Enterprize, than what h(j has difclofed in his letter, and which we are at prefent unacquainted with, it would be prejudging in the caic, to form a conclufive Opinion, without hearing thofe reafonsjjif any fuch there be. In the mean time I would obferve to you, that from feveral marks difcernable in the Briftol letter, the writer of it, whoever he is, appears to me, not only to have refided in Halifax at the time of holding the feveral Councils of war there, which he mentions, but likewife to have had a participation in them. His privity to many things relative to that Council, wherein he fays the refolutwn of abandoning the Enterprize was taken \ particularly the unanimous agreement of the I [ 27 ] the members in it, excepting only one diffenting vole ; which every perfon, who is acquainted with the nature of Councils of war, knows, are matters of fecrecy, to which none but the Members and Se- cretary are made privy, is a circumftance, which with others, feem to me plainly to indicate that he aflifted in thofe Councils, or at leaft, that thofe circumftances were communicated to him cither by the Secretary or fome of the Members of the Council. ^A Upon the whole. Sir, nothing can be more manifeft, than that the defign of the Briftoi letter is to apologize for the conducft chiefly of the General, though at the expence of the lUini- fters : and 1 cannot but obferve, the writer's be- flowing on him the high encomium, which the Romans did on Quintus Fabius Maximus, viz. ^i cuNCTANDo rcftituit rem \ alluding to the celebrated inftance of Generallhip, which Fabius Maximus fliewed in avoiding to come to an en- gagement with the Vidorious Hannibal. This is a matter of too delicate a nature for me to en- ter into a particular examination of. But I think I may venture to remark one circumftance, which feems parallel in the ftories of both Gene- rals, viz. That as the Roman General's Coun- trymen at firft faw his condudt in fo unfavour- able a light that they pafled a public (a) cenfure upon him •, notwithilanding which, as the Ro- man hiftorian fays, he (b) obftinately pcrfiiled in it : fo, many of the Britilh General's Country- 1 (a) Vid. Liv. lib. 23. cap. 25 (h) Vid. Liv. lib. 22. cap. 15. 1 D z 1 i 1 ■S % % 20. men wpi I f' < v [28] men have long fcen bis in the fame light, that the Romans did atfajt that of Fabius Maximus 5 notwithftanding which his Lordjhip has mofl ftea- dily perfevered in it : and as at laft, the Roman Generars name was immortalized in Europe by the effeft, which his delays then had for flopping the Carthaginians from over-running Italy, fo it is to be hoped by all well wifhers to their Coun- try, that the Britilh General's name may likewife be perpetuated to his honour in North Americay by the happy effedls, which his memorable delays to come to a6tion there may have in the end to- wards hindering the French from over-running the Britijh Colonies. I am, &c. .;■* 1 cc ;| C( -^'. cc «( i:. U 1 I P O S T- i [29] POSTSCRIPT. ^ I N C E finifhing my remarks, I find in O the public prints, an extract of a letter dated September 1 5th from on board his Ma- jelly's fhip Newark^ Admiral Hoibourn Com- mander, on a cruize off Cape Breton, in which, it is faid, " we have been cruizing *' off the harbour's mouth ever fince the 20th *' of Auguft with fixteen fail of the line, ** but they [the French] will not come out to «' us." As this account. Sir, of the behaviour of the French fleet appears to have been fent from on board the Admiral^ own fhip byfome Officer,who could not be miflaken in it, and it is agreeable to their former behaviour in fufFering the Admiral to cruize with five or fix fliips of the line off the harbour without moleftation, it Teems to put it our of all doubtjthat theTroops might have been land ed on Cape Breton without any rifque of the French Fleet* s coming out to attack Mr. Holbcurrr, cfpe- cially confidering the intelligence, which the General and Admiral had received, that the French crews were very fickly ; which intirely accounts for the behaviour of the French in boti> cafes. rrf ■i [30 ] It is agreed on all hands, that (ince Mr. Hol- fx)urn has been reinforced with the four Ihips laft fent him^ the French Admiral has not dif- covered the lead difpofition of coming out of the harbour. FINIS. m m l« hi i ice Mr. Hol- le four ihips has not dif- ng out of the