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IMaps, plates, charts, etc.. may be filmed at differant reduction retioa. Thoaa too lerge to be entirehf Included In one expoaura ara filmed beginning in the upper left liand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames ee requlrad. The following diagrama illustrate the method: Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent Atre fllmte A das taux de reduction dlff«rents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour Atre raproduit en un seul cilchA. 11 est film* A psrtir de I'engie supArieur geuche, de gsk.hs A droits, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'Imeges niceeeaire. Les diagrammes sulvsnts lllustrent la mAthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 «■■ I K^s i wmm i A FULL and CANDID A N S W E R To a PAMPHLET, entitled. CONSIDERATIONS N T H 5 Prefent German War, {Price One Shilling and Six-pence;] :k:. ERRATUM. Page 19, L. 20. dele the word votts. mmk i il m 1 'I A FULL and CANDID ANSWER To a PAMPHLET, entitled. CONSIDERATIONS ON THE Prefent German War. Sapientes, Pacis Causa, bellum gerunt, et Laboris, fpe K otii, fuflentant. Sallust. ■ LONDON: Printed for J. P r i d D E N, at the Feathers, near Fleet-Bridge j J. B u R d, near Temple-Bar, Fleet- Street i and J. G R E T T o N, in Old Bond-Street. M DCCLX. A FULL and CANDID A N S W E R, &c. 3 IT is not to be expeded that mi Ar.fwcr to a profefTed invedlive againfl the khvr^ of Piufiu will fet out with any fevere rcflcdions ^gairifi: that monarch. TJie author of the Conlidcr- ations has introduced his pamphlet with a quo- tation from a refcript, faid to be delivered and printed at the fame time by the Prufuan mi- nifter at London ; the fum of which is, ^' that his Pruffian majefty hopes the Engliili nation will not meddle with the domeftic aiTairs of the empire ,'* and the author archly applies this to the prefent condud: of the court of Lon- don. I fhall not take advantage of an obfer- vation which every man, who knows the turns of ftates, may make upon the inconfiflencies which the moft fteady governments, fometimes, run into, when their interefts vary : I fhall only fay, that the quotation of the refcript is by no manner of means applicable to the B purpofe l! t 4 ] purpofc of the confidcrer. The empire of Germany is, properly fpeaking, a republic of fovereigns, and each fovereign that forms it, has a right, independent of the emperor, to make what alliances he pleafes with other fove- reigns j nor can fqch alliances be (ponfidered as domeftic affairs of the empire. At the time his Pruflian majefty publiihed the re- fcript in queflion, the affair he hints at, might in fome mcafure be looked upon as domeftic to the empire, becaufe a difpute lay between the princes of the empire and the eledors. Great- Britain had no right to interfere in fuch a difpute j Great-Britain did not interfere in it j at the fame time, if his Prullian majefty was author of that re- fcript, he might perhaps, with greater pro- priety, have made ufe of the word cecono^ piical, than domeftic. The author of the Confiderations fpends the firft fix pages of his pamphlet in proving, what no body will difpute, that France is fuperior to Great- Britain in extent of territory, and number of inhabitants ; and he brings Vol- taire, a good writer, but a moil miferablp author, to vouch for the vaft armies that Lewis XIV. kept on foot. But the author of th^ [ 5 ] the Confideratlons is miflaken in his fird prin^ ciples. The battles of Crefly, Poidliers, and Agincourt, were gained by Engliflimen, and Englifhmen alone : the battle of Minden, which, every thing confidered, was more glo- rious than all the three, was gained by Britons, with a more confeflcd fuperiority againft them, than there was againft the fon of Edward the Third, or the father of Henry the Sixth. There is undoubtedly a principle of politi- cal, as well as of commercial, arithmetic -, but the data of the former are extremely hard to be fettled. The confiderer goes to work in the Cheapfide way; he pofts his books, he ftrikeshis balance, but he does not give weight for inches, though he brings forth a moft plaufible account. I will venture to fay that hiftory cannot pro- duce a period of glory that is not liable to ex- ception, if thofe mechanical calculations are to take place. " From the time, fays the confi- derer, when the whole of France was united to the crown, and the liberties of the ftates and nobility abfolutely fubjeifted to its power, the kingdom of France has been, in the extent of hs country, the number of its inhabitants, and the greatnefs of its revenue, fuperior to Bri- tain." I admit that France, in the extent of its B 2 country, [ 6 ] country, nnd the number of its inhabitants, h fuperior to Great- Britain j but that its revenue is equal, I totally deny. Great-Britain, pro- perly fpeaking, has no revenue that is fixed or fettled. And let the confidercr authenticate the revenues of France for thcfe two years pafl, and reduce the revenue, or rather the expenccs of our government, during that time, to French money : let the meaneft and mod ignorant reader he has, pronounce which is the richeft people. I am aware of a prodigious and popular ad- vantage the confiderer has taken in point of calculation j and, at the fame time, I will be candid enough to fay, that if his data are to be admitted, he might have carried his argu- ment much iarther .han he has done He ferves his purpofe perhaps better in not doing it. But I totally deny and difclaim his data, or firft prin- ciples. *' I never, fays he, read the hiflory of the two grand alliances, which were formed by king William againft the growing power of France, without feeling the warmefl fentiments of gratitude to the great deliverer of Europe. Never did king of England appear with greater dignity, than he did in that great con- grefs held at the Hague in the year 1691, when the >mperor and empire, the kings of Spain, i [ 7 ] Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, by their fcvc- ral ambafTadors, the cledors of Germany by their particular minifters, and feveral of them in their own perfons, with at leaft fifty of the greateft princes of Germany, all attended to hear him plead the caufe of Europe ; and all joined in one common league and declaration againft France." It is undoubtedly a talk equally bold as it is difagreeable, to combat rooted prejudices ; but now that the ridiculous diftindions of Whig and Tory are fo juftly exploded, a pub- lic writer may have fome chance for a fair hearing. I do not pretend to deny that king William was at the head of the glorious con- federacy J but I will, with both my hands, deny, that that confederacy fulfilled its engagements : they brought troops upon paper ; they produc- ed them not in the field -, they hired armies, but England paid them. Unwilling as I am to revive party difiindions, I am forry to fay, I never yet faw, though I have taken a great deal of pains in the inquiry, a full and a fair anfwei to the charge b -ought by the Tory miniftry againft the Whigs, at the time of the peace of Utrecht, that the whole ftrefs of the war lay on the flioulders of Great-Britain, and that her allies had failed in, almoft, every point of II... n [ 8 ] of their engagements, as to men, money, antf operations of every kind : this, I fay, is a charge that the boldcft Whig writer never attempted to anfwer. It is a charge which the German and Dutch miniders, and they had at that time the ablefl in Europe, in all their warm memorials and reprefentations, never offered to refute. It is a charge which brought the great prince Eugene over to England ; but far from anfwering, he endeavoured to palliate, it. The rival miniflers, in thofe times, were compofed of, perhaps, the greatefl men that England ever faw under any government ', but the Whigs indifputably had refolution, talents, and penetration fuperior to their antagonifts. They never pretended to difpute the fad, that Great- Britain was left in the lurch for the blood and treafure that was expended in the war. Let not therefore declamation or bold alTcr- tions drive us out of the fort of common fenfe. Let us not imagine, becaufe we are now in a war with France, carried on in Germany, we fight in the fmalleft degree on greater dilad- vantage than we did in the times of king Wil- liam and queen Anne. I fhall, in the courfe of this paper, prove, that the terms on which we now carry on the war, are, nationally fpcaking, infinitely preferable to thofe on which C 9 ] which we fought before ; I will not except even the laft war againft France. Had the confiderer been a candid oppofer of the prefent meafures of our government, he would not have gone fo far back as the reign of king William for an alliance of ftrength and dignity againft France. The late king George was united with the houfe of Auftria, and at laft brought the Dutch to take part with him, when the emprefs-queen might have been faid to fight fro aris & foch. In what a dreadful fituationisan Englil'h miniftcr ! There was not, . when we entered into that war with France, fo popular a topic in the world, as the expe- diency of maintaining the pragmatic fandion. Its popularity, both within and without doors, arofe next to madnefs \ and had not the mini- ftry given way to the torrent, it would have borne down the barriers of civil government. But, in the event, were we, as a people, bet- tered by that illuftrious alliance ? Did the Dutch and Auftrians fight for us in the field ? Did they negociate with us in the cabinet ? Were not our foldiers butchered by their cow- ardice? Were not our councils betrayed b^ their perfidy ? *^ Every meafure, fays the confiderer, which (ends to fet the ftatcs of Germany, Holland, and 1' 1 ■, n r * III <\ i [ 10 ] and England, cither at war with each other, or amongft themfelves, muft be a meafure cal- culated for the good of France, and the pre- judice of other powers of Europe. F6r the fame reafon, every meafure tending to the con- tinuance or increafe of fuch a war, muft be for the benefit of France, and the prejudice of Europe : becaufe it is a weakening of the rivals of France, and keeping thofe powers at variance, from whom France can have no- thing to fear but in the union/* I have given this paflage at large, becaufe I apprehend that it is the corner-ftone of the confiderer's reafoning ; but a very fmall dif- cuffion of fadts will difcover its futility. Will the confiderer fay, that Great-Britain is never to make war with France, till fuch time as all the powers in Europe are united againft her ? That time, it is believed, never will come, and that time never was. The confederacy of which king William was the head, was the ftroBgefl' union ever formed againft France : but what did it avail England ? (he was left to bear the brunt of the day j fhe was obliged to pay the troops, and fight the battles of her nominal allies. After all, the confederacy formed by king William proved, as all confederacies muft be • againft Mi '1 le % [ " ] ♦ againft one capital power, to be a mere rope of fand. Its continuity was preferved until a certain twift came, which diflblved it. Hol- land and Germany would undoubtedly have been pleafed, had we continued to this day to pay the troops, and fight their battles ; they would in a very cheap manner have muiler- cd their armies, and regulated their contin- gencies upon paper : but the moment that Great-Britain came to talk of her own inte- rcft, then came in the democratic nonfenfe of public faith, the liberties of Europe, prior engagements, national honour, and a thou- fand fuch terms, which meant nothing but money; nothing but Britifh blood, or Bri- tifh money. It may to fome, perhaps, feem too bold an aflertion, (but nothing can be too bold that is founded on truth and experience) that had Great-Britain, in all the wars flie ever had with France, been fingle and alone, her expence would have been lefs, her fuccefs would have been greater. The fum of the confiderer's reafoning is, that France is more populous, and therefore more powerful, than Great- Britain. This puts me in mind of the reafoning of the ho- C nourablc tl [ »2 ] nourabie admiral who was Co delervcdly (hot for his cowardice, and who, after weighing a French cannon-ball, hung it up in a cab- bage-net at the fhrouds of his ihip, and demon- ftrated, as clearly as that three and two makes five, that had he come within reach of that cannon-ball, he and his fliip muft have been torn to pieces. I will defy the confiderer, from all the experience of reading, he, or anv man, ever had, to produce a finglc inflance of two nations going to war with one ano- ther upon fuch principles : and this brings me to come to clofer quarters with the con- fiderer. Ik In private life it is but too commort, when two parties go to Weftminfter-haH, for a by-ftander, from the weight of their purfes, to form a fhrewd guefs which will have the better in the end. The confiderer looks upon the extent of territory, and numbers of men, when two nations goes to war, the fame as a long purfe is when two parties goes to law. I can by no means be of that opinion 5 and 1 can icarcely dip into a page of hiftory, which does not convince me tliat it is ill founded. Parties who go to law are fub- jeded to its forms, which drain their purfes* Nations . f [ 13 ] Nations who go to war, have no diredory but the fword. But allowing Great>Britain to be as mean and contemptible a power as Corfica itfelf J (fuppoling Corfica to be a fo- vereign ftate) is (lie to bear an infult from a a neighbouring power, becaufe that neigh- bour is a garagantua ? Sovereign dates have no appeal that they can make to their fupe- riors ; but a wife ftate, ever fo feeble, will make a ftruggle in defence of its indepen* dency, be its enemy ever fo powerful. The confideration, therefore, of inequality of power between Great- Britain and France muft drop to the ground, unlefs it can be proved that the caufe in which we fight is unjuft : a taik which I apprehend the confiderer himfelf will be far from attempting. The confiderer, as if confcious that his ge^ neral reafoning upon the inequality of force between the two ftates cannot bear the teft of reafon, proceeds to fhew that Great-Bri*. tain is in the wrong to carry on a war in Germany againft France. In order to intro-p duce this reafoning, he lays down certain maxims, every one of which in fadt, as well ^ in fpeculation, are falfe and trite. Every fghool-boy knows that France, formerly, agaia C Z and t ' r H 1 and again defended the liberties of Germany. The confiderer has flourifhed upon that, but has he informed the pubhc againft whom {he defended thofe Uberties ? Has he told his countrymen, that it was againfl: the encroach- ments and ufurpations of the houfe of Au- ftria ; that tyrannical power, which the go- vernment of Great-Britain and her allies are endeavouring, at this very time, to withftand ? Had the confiderer been candid enough to ex- plain this matter, it might have faved him- felf and me, and perhaps the public, no lit- tle labour. He has taken all advantages of reafoning from the former fyftems that pre- vailed in Europe, but he has not told usj that thofe fyftems exift no more. He has not been ingenuous enough to fay, that there is no period in hiftory, before the prefent, in which the hcufes of Bourbon and Auftria, like He- rod and Pontius Pilate, agreed in the crucifix- ion of public liberty : nor is there in all his pam- phlet, a fingle paragraph upon that fubjed, though it is the only fair, the only candid, the only conftitutional, topic, upon which a confiderer on the prefent German war ought to proceed. If he proceeds not upon that, he fays lefs than nothing. If he proceeds upon that, the condudl of Great- Britain, and her govern* >n s t IS ] government muft at prcfent appeu' irrc^ proachable and unblamable. The confidcrer. therefore, may figure away to eternity upon his comparative and political arithmetic j but if the fads upon which his data are founded have no longer exiflence, which is the cafe, to what does his reafoning tend, but to feduce weak minds, and to break that unanimity, which at prefent forms the pride, the glory, and ftrength of the Britifli empire ? Were the confiderer to bring a million of inftances of what France has done, or what Britain has fulFered in former times, cui bono ? What can it avail him, if thofe inftances are not applicable to the prefent jundure ? and applicable they cannot be, unlefs he can, from hiftory; pro- duce a (imilarity of circumftances. The con- fiderer, with a true polernic fpirit, fuppofes two powers of Germany at war ; ** if France, fays he, to keep up the conteft, fhbuld take the weaker fide, and add to the power whofe force is eight, fo as to be fuperior to ten, the evil is not leflened, but made greater. Should England be fo unfortunate as to join in the couffft, and fend its land forces of fifty into the war, and France thereupon fend a force of eighty, the party aflifted by Eng- gland ■ft! [ 16 ] land would be but little benefited by the aU liance ; the Englifli would ftill be the weaker fide, the force of Europe be diminifhed fo much the more, and France only be advan- taged. This is a kind of reafoning which muft hold invariably juft in all ages." I fay, that not a fingle particle c ^ fuch reafoning ever held good in any age, and there never was a more bare-faced infult, than fuch rea- foning is upon the public underftanding. According to the confiderer's apprehen- iion, France, by the difpofitions of the powers and differences in Europe, has every thing ihe can wifh or defire. She has had it for thefe four or five years, at leaft, ever fince we carried our troops into Germany. What has been the confequence ? Is France a greater, a richer, or more fuccefsful power, through the blunders of Britain ? Has fhe enlarged her territory ? Has fhe incieafed her reve- nue ? Has fhe repaired her marine ? Has fhe didlated, as formerly, to the Britifh councils ? No. I will give the confiderer an anfwer, that, in one fingle word, comprehends folios of logic, and reams of reafoning. France, with all the advantages which the miflaken policy of Great-Britain has given her, is now a de- clared ■#■ [ 17 ] dared bankrupt to all Europe, and (lie has declared herfelf fuch. Let the condderer get over the fadl, and then * To dinner with what appetite he may/ " I don't determine, fays the confiderer, whether the Germans are likely foon to agree together in anj' one point j and much in uniting with England and the States-Gene- ral in a war with France : but till they do thus agree, England has nothing to do with their Ltlle internal quarrels." You don't de- termine, Mr. or my lord, confiderer 5 but I do : and 1 fay and affirm from paft expe- rience, (I care not what prepofeflions may lie againft the dodlrine) that the fewer allies England has againft France, provided thofe allies, as his Pruffian majefty certainly is, are hearty in the caufe, Great-Britain is a gainer ; (he fees the end of her expence, Ihe knows the extent of her operations ; which is more than fhe did in any continental war fhe ever embraced. The confiderer affedls to call the prefent war a German civil war, and the whole of his pamphlet is levelled againft Great-Britain taking [ i8 1 taking part in it. I deny, in the mofl: dircd terms, that the war between the king of Pruflia and the houfe of Auftria, or rather Lorrain, can with the lead propriety, either of fpeech or reafoning, be termed a civil war. The quarrel between the king of Pruflia and the queen of Hungary has not in the fmalleft or moft remote degree, a relation to that fyftem of political confederacy which conftitutes the kings of Great-Britain or Pruflia members, or, if the fanguine confi- derer will have it, fubjedls, of the Germanic body. It is, in fhort, either the good or bad fortune of the conflderer, that the pofition he lays down, if admitted, mufl eflablifh his dodlrines, if difputed, the whole appears fu- tile and fallacious. The king of Pruflia, as a fovereign prince, is as indepedent, perhaps more fo, than the emprefs-queen is. Were the conflderer to be allowed his own fway, he undoubtedly would carry every thing be- fore him, by the plain felf-evident maxim, that Great-Britain is worfe than mad to pre- tend to fupport one little German prince, againft the Germanic body. But here I mufl: again have recourfe to principles, and again obferve that our confi- derer's [ «9 ] dcrer*s principles arc fundamentally wrong. The king of Pruffia's dominions undoubtedly arc in Germany, and our confidercr takes ad- vantage of that to treat him, through the whole of his pamphlet, as a German prince, fubje6t rather to the dictates of the emperor, than the laws of the empire. How different mud the reafoning refutting from fuch pofiti- ons appear, when we confider his Pruilian majedy equal, at leail in dignity, to the Van-* demout family^ and in himfelf an independent fovereign, at the head of the proteftant interefl upon the continent^ and the only natural ally left there for GreatrBritgin ? Were the confti- tutions of Germany to be examined, it would be found that both the elector of Hanover, and the elcdlor of Brandenburg, without changing their religion, have as good a title to be chofen emperor, as the hufbarid of the queen of Hun- gary, who votes, cor regentia jure, has. Will the confidercr be mean or wicked enough to fay, that Great-rBritain at this junc- ture, ought to abandon all the fyftcm and prin- ciples of policy upon which her power and in- dcpend<""cy is formed ? If fhe does not, let the boldeft advocate for anti- continental meafures ftep forth, and point out what courfe fhe D could i [ 20 ] could have ftcercd different from what Hic lia» done ? Let the laudatores icmporis aSli de- claim as they plcafc j let the confidcrer ring his changes upon former meafures j but whiHt the power of France exifts; is not Great-Britain to guard againft her ambition ? That the power of France exifts, is the bafis of our confide- rer's doftrinc. That we have not purfued the war upon the principles and meafures that di- rected us in former times, muft equally be ad- mitted. But for that reafon objects are changed ; the fame fyftcm no longer exifts ; and the ballancc of power, in the point where it formerly vibrated, is now a non-entity* Upon the fuppofition of this ballance being an entity, the confidercr has raifed his whole fabrick. The fmalleft fpark of candour would have taught him, that when king Wil- liam formed the grand confederacy, the fupport of the houfe of Auftria, upon the continent, was his great object. Why was that his ob- ject ? Becaufe he reafonably thought that the houfe of Auflria was the grand counterprize, upon the continent, to the ambition of the houfe of Bourbon j and the houfe of Bourbon was the power which England and Holland had then the greatell reafon to dread. Had they dreaded the houfe of Auftria, king William, , > like [ 21 ] like queen Elizabeth, would have diredlcd his attention, and formed his alliance accord- ingly. Auftria and Bourbon are only founds, the danger refulting from cither is the matter. , . If the danger refulting from the houfe of Auftrla to the liberties of Europe, was an objedt of attention in queen Elizabeth, that has done immortal honour to her memory ; if the forming an alliance againft the houfe of Bourbon, has done the fame to the me- mory of king William, and to the Whig adminiftration under queen Anne : if the boldeft advocates for anti-continental mea- fures, never yet pretended that the balance of power in Europe was a chimera ; how is Great- Britain, in the prefent juncture, to behave, when the houfes of Auftria and Bourbon C'ac embarked in one common caufe, the ruin of the proteftant intereft? " But, fays the confiderer, we happen to have one nominal protellant prince on our fide; and therefore the proteftant intereft has been fpecioufly held out to our view. But in the laft war we were fighting for the queen of Hungary, and the proteftant prince D 2 had . 'I , - ''! 'i M i:ii ■■i [ 22 ] had only a pbpifli king of France for his de- fender. Did we think then the proteftant intereil at all concerned in that war ? And why fhould we in this ? This great cham- pion of proteftantifm was then uniyerfally decried by us, as a man void of faith, reli- gion, and every good principle." Drained as the nation has been of htt td the very dregs of political writing, I know no man fo great a dunce, or QuiiHrote, as to imagine thUt every prince, and eVery pc^en^^ tate, does not purfuie his own intereft, if he can fee it, or if he thinks he fees it. A gtieat and a fenfible prince can have no principle but intereft, becaufe it never can be his true intcreft to adopt a fyftem of fraud, perfidy, and injuftice. If, with Lewis the XlVth of France, he fhall adopt fuch a fyftem, he is no great prince. His greatnefs is temporary, and, like that of Lewis, it muft have an end in his own life time, ' , But let us not be deceived by bold founds and aifertions. I deny that our illuftricus ally is more a nominal proteftant, than the heads of the houfcs of Auftria and Bourbon are nominal paplfts. The king of Pruffia can- not [ 23 ] not be more properly ftiled a nominal pro- teftant, than king George the Ift, lid, or Illd caft be. If the cpnfidercr can prove, what I think has been never yet attempted to be proved, that the interefts he had in view were fbndamentally falfe, unjuft, and inju* rious to any Other power, he would then fay fomewhat to the purpofe. But if both his connexions, and thofe of Great-Britain, were only, as they certainly were, accidental, and not fyflematical, the coniiderer is as much tvrong in his reafoning, as he is in his fads. The connexions of Great-Britain with the houfe of Auflria, in the times which he hints ^t, were occaiioned by accidents, viz. the death of Charles the Vlth of Germany, and the violence which France offered to her own guaranty of the pragmatic fandlion. Inde- pendent of thofe confiderations, his Pruffian majefty h^d, as we muft fuppofe he thought, a claim of right upon certain dominions, which lie not, as the confiderer fays, in an obfcure corner of Germany, but are well known to every one who knows the fmalleft tittle of geography or hiftory. I am old enough to remember when this claim was ftarted, and when it was made good. His fruffian majefty fupported it by what I muft " " ' call [ 24 ] call uncontroverted, and therefore Imuftfup- pofe uncontrovertible, reafons j for I never faw a fcrap from the houfe of Auflria that difputed the fads of the family compadts, upon which the claim was founded. It is, therefore, infamous to infinuate, thatbecaufe the intercfl: of Pruffia happened at that time to lead her to fide with France, that there- fore this proteflant prince had only a popifh king of France for his defender : the fadl is falfe and unfupported ; and all the confiderer poffibly can gain by his infinuations and af- fertions, is what I believe no mortal is weak enough to difpute, that, amongft princes, pro- teftantifm and popery, and in fadt, religion, are words that fometimes fignify nothing. But though I fincerely think, that in the cabir nets of fovereigns the popifh or proteflant re- ligion are words that neither have, nor ought to have, any meaning, yet I think the popifh or proteflant interefls are terms that not only have meaning, but are of the mofl decifive impor- tance to us, as men and Englifhmen. Acci- dents, as I have already hinted, may fome- times interfere, and give a fhock to the vehi- cle, but it mufl flill in time return to its true and its natural polition. Is thtre a man in England [ 25 ] England weak enough to doubt, that while Great-Britain was fighting in conjundtion with the houfe of Auftria, the heads of that houfe were not the moft miferable bigots that ever polluted an altar by fuperflition ? And yet thofe bigots, though not of the protef- tant religion, fought for the proteflant inte- reft, that is, for the independency of Ger- many and Britain. . That the king of Pruffia was ever decry*d by.this nation, as a man void of faith, religion, and every good principle, is a mofl execrable falfhood. It is equally fo, that we, as the coniiderer affirms, fet out in this.war with con- iidering him as an enemy to our proteflant eledlorate. It is equally falfe, that we hired an army of Ruffians to invade him. Ferreus ut teneat fe F, ^is tarn " What is it, fays the confiderer, then, that has at once changed him in our opinion, from a defpifer of all religion, to the defender of the proteftant ? But not to infift on this.** Can a man of common fenfe and honefty fit, with any degree of patience, and hear fuch infamous ! .. '» v > I-::. ' 'I ■■4\ 3:1 |. 11 / t a6 j b&mQua inv6flives fpewcd fbrtbj waiS hb Pruifian majefty no more than a pivatc gen- tleman i The con(]derer pretends that at the time of the breaking but of the prefent war, the proteftaat religion in Gei^many (for I will Gontnidt hia argument as much as poflible; without weakening it) iiras iix hq danger/ The confiderer amufes u& with founds. Can he produce a refcript, can he product? a icrap of Writing from his Pruffian majefly, or any pro- teftant power in the world; tiiat etrer pre- tended it was in danger ? But I will venture to ikjf and will d^fy all niankind to pibve the contrary^ that the proteflant intereft was in danger. It mayy however^ be neceiiary to clear up the diftin&ion I make between the proteflant religion, and the proteftant intereft. This I cannot do better than by fuppofing that a power now exifts in Europe that profefTes protedantifm, and yet fides with France and Auftria in this prefent war. Such powers, tho' they may pray with proteftants, undoubtedly a6: for papifts ^ though they are of the proteilarit religion, they are not in the^ proteftant intereft. In fhort, popery and proteftantifm, unlefs appliorials and manifeftos, publiftied on that occafion. Let the public, thert^fore, ^pon the Vvhole, judge of an an- chor who offers fuch an infult to the fpemo^y of that venerable head that is now laid in the duft. t 37 1 duft. In my own life-time I have known judicial fcntcnces paft againft the revilers of the memory of king William, 40 years after his death J but here is the memory of the gfeateft and the befl monarch that ever Bri- tain had, infulted before his aflies are cold in the grave that receives them. The fubjedl difpenfes with ceremony, and even with forms of writing ; the fad: is falfe; his late triajefty did not break the convention of Clofter-Seven. His late majefty avowed his refuming arms; he juftified that refumtion,and the confiderer cannot, without incurring the cenfure of the blacked calumny, maintain his aflertion, that his late majefty was guilty of a moft fcandalous breach of faith. The confiderer thinks himfelf exceflively ftrong in his impeachment of the king of Pruilia's condudt, when he mentions the great hardfhips which the eledorate of Saxony underwent, when it was in pofTelTion of the Pruflians. Who doubts it? but who was to blame ? Has the confiderer offered a fingle argument, to prove, that the king of Pruffia was not well founded, in juflice as well as prudence, in his proceedings againfl thai elec- torate ? Has he offered a colour of reafon to F 2 prove, .'I fi! t 38 ] prove, that, had not the king of Pruffia a(fted as he did, he and the proteflant interefl in Germany, muft have been totally ruined? Is any power, cfpecially an independent p jwer, to anfwer for the confequences of another's injuftice ? If the eledor of Saxony, by his iniquitous combination againfl the eledor of Brandenburgh, obliged the latter to put the citizens of Leipfic under a fcvere contribu- tion, the eledor of Saxony, and not the eledor of Brandenburgh, was to blame. Delirant reges, fkSiuntur Acbivi* Talking as men, what heart does not feel for the miferies, lolTes, and misfortunes of fubjeds, through the injuftice of the princes. I never fee a Fren':h prifoner, without con- fidering him as the innocent vidim of his fo- vereign*s perfidy All arguments therefore, drawn from conliden tions of humanity, when inhunianity is pradifcd, are unneceflp.ry, idle, or futile. If rhe injuftice of one prince, makes it neccflary for another to proceed with feverity againft the innocent fubjeds of another power j he who gives the provo- cation alone is to blame, and alone is anfwer- able for all confequences. Princes do not make [ 39 1 make war upon one another's perfons or pa- laces. The moft generous and humane, and moft virtuous princes that ever lived, have been oblig'd, in juftice to their own fubjedls, to proceed again ft thofe of another, in a manner againft which their nature has re- volted. The moft under ftanding reader in Europe, perhaps, therefore, will be puzzled to find out the meaning of the confiderer's reafoning, between the 31ft and 38th pages of his coniiderations ; if he has any mean- ing, it is, that Great-Britain, did not Hanover U in Germany, would have no army in Germany. Again, the fa(Jt is falfe, for before the eledtors of Hanover were kings of Great- Britain, Great- Britain had armies in Germany; nay what was ft ill more expenfive, they had armies in Spain, and in Portugal ? for what reafon ? undoubtedly to maintain the balance of th . ^ wer in Europe, and, in whatever quartc; tiin • balance is indan^ered, the Britifh arms ought lo find bufinefs. This is reafoning that never yet has been difputed, it is what has been adapted by every wife minifter, and by e\( sry patriot that ^ever England had, nor do IIS P V-bj [ 40 ] do i remember a proftitute of the p6n (b abaudoh'dy as to contradict it. The confiderer enjoys an imaginaTy triumph, when he pretends to (how that Great-Britain fights at a vad dif^ldvantage with France in Germany, and that the prc- fcrvation of Hanover oaght not to be an objedt of our concern, nor would the French attack it, did we not defend it. He feems to have laid the fort tf H$ rcafoning upon thofe principles, and he h; aid them down in a multiplicity of words j but as ufualj every fadt is falfe. The French, before the prefent war, have again and again, through the mere luft of power, and wantonnefs of ambition, laid wade German eledorates. The liberties of Europe were then endan»- gered, but lefs than they are now, and Great- Britain interpos'd at a greater expisnce, and with lefs efficacy than (he does now. If, in- ftead of the electorate of Hanover, a dung- hill was the fpot, where the fate of public liberty was to be difputed and decided, we muft forfeit the name of Britons-, fhotrld we abandon it ; pofterity would curfe us, fhould we give it up, r How, [ 41 ] " How, fays the confiderer, did the war begin ? The fcene in Germany, opened with our being in alliance with the emprefs queen. And the king of P a, under the incourage- inent of France, was threatening to invade the e te : we looked over ajl the other parts of Europe i^ I I [ 43 ] fchemes of the French were thus difcon- certed, and his Pruffian majefty, with equal wifdom and magnanimity, declared that he was ready to draw his fword againft foreign troops, be they Ruffian or be they French, who fliould enter Germany* This was the point precifely, which his late maje^ly aimed at, and was the true b^fis of that fo much wiflied for, fo much ap- plauded, reconciliation, which happened be- tween him and his Pruffian majefty. If the confiderer had the fmalleft grain of candor^ or the leaft fpark of information, he would have informed the public^ that the violence of the court of Vienna had difgufted his late majefl:y, long before the differences between France and England broke out. Like a wife and great prince as he was, he concealed the nakednefs of the antientally of his people and family, as long as he could, confiftently with Jhis public faith and common juftice. But the demands of the court of Vienna out-run all moderation. I fhall not diflemble, that the court of London perhaps did give the emprefs-queen fome hopes of feeing her fon made king of the Romans, and undoubtedly as the intcreft of Europe appeared to be at G that [ 44 1 that time circumftanced, it Was cxtreamly natural for hi" late majefty to attempt fuch a meafurc. ; ir./^i^j he did attempt it, and perhaps couid it Viave been carried into execu- tion, without tearing the fundamental con* flitution of Germany to pieces, he might have efFedled it. But the court of Vienna never had the fmalieft regard for that confi- deration ; her ambition mufl be gratified at the expence of Germanic liberty. His late majeily's penetration and tendernefs for that coniideration, and the impatience of the emprefs- queen, made him fee what he fcarcely could have believed, that the houfc of Auftria now aded upon principles in- confident with all their former engagements, and that the emprefs-queen, like another Juno, faid. h i "FkSiere Ji nequeo fuperoi^ acheronia movebo. If I cannot bring the king of England to join with me in the deftrudion of public li- berty, I will call in the French, who, I am fure, will be glad to fecond me. Let Germany be ravaged, let her conftitution be ruined, but let the houfc of Auftria be great, and iet her ride in the whirl- wind of public calamity. Too [ 4S ] Too many clrcumftances at that time con- curredy to flatter this prefumption : circum- ftances that are without parallel in hiftory. The French, by the weakeft, but, at the fame time, the mod frantic, condu<5t ever known, took fteps to drive the fubjedls of Great-Britain out of the empire of North- America. Such was the ruling paflion of France. That of the emprefs-queen wr to have her fon eleded king of the Romans, and to be revenged upon the king of Pruffia. The ruling paflions in both parties coincided in one point. The friendfhip of PrufHa was of lefs conlidcration to France, than tlie empire of North-America was. The regaining Silefia was thought of more importance by the court of Vienna, than all her former engagements, than every tye of gratitude and honour, and, when rightly confidered, of interefl:. Thus an unnatural combination was formed againft the liberties of Europe. The objeds which Great-Britain and Pruflia had in their eyes, were the preferva- tion of the former's empire in North- America, and of the latter 's pofTefllon of Silefia. The Germanic conftitution, and the balance of G 2 power, Il ;'' [ 46 ] power, were objcdls in common to both. Ought fuch facfls, or fuch rcafoning, to be fup- prefTcd by one who calls himfelf a confidcrer on the prcfent German war ? Could any, but the moft proftitute of all writers, have aiked the following qucttion ? ** Was his Pruflian majedy'S having fallen upon a proteflant eledorate, and deftroying Saxony, a fervicc done to Britain ?" Who ever faid it was, or what bufinefs have Britons in the affair ? A deep- laid fcheme, and a treacherous combination was formed againft the king of Pruflia, in which the eledor of Saxony had a principal concern. His Pruflian majefty prevented the execution of fo infamous a confederacy ; nor does it matter a fingle ftraw, whether the con- federates againft him were proteftants or pa- pifts 5 the eledor of Saxony moft undoubt- edly is a papift ; and it is equally undoubted that, when he gives the nod, the fubjedls of his eledtorate muft fight in a popifh quarrel. Here I am aware of a poor, though plau- fible, objcdlion ; the head, it may be faid, of the landgraviate of Hefle-Caflel, is not a proteftant. True, but thanks to the care of his late majefty, and the patriotifm of his ftates, he is a proteftant power, and the pro- r 47 ] proteftant intcreft in his eledlortc, is fecurcd fo as not to be affedlcd by any temporaiy or private fyftcm of religion, that he has em- braced. Is that the cafe with Saxony ? No, the immaterial forms of worship, are not the barriers, or indeed charadleriftics, ofproteftant- ifm. In ihort, nothing is more certain, than that the Saxons did, and may fight in a popilh caufe, and upon popifh principles j and I look upon the barons of England, though they undoubtedly believed in the pope, to have been the bed proteflants that ever breathed, when they obliged a tyrant to give them their magna charta. Page 38, &c. The confiderer takes pains to prove, that the money we pay to his Pruffian majefty, is, properly^ fpeaking, a tribute. It is falfe j it is the cheapefl: bargain Great-Britain ever made, and the moft honourable, as well as wife. The principles of the Britifh conftitution have ever been for her maintaining, for her defending, for her adopting the caufe of the public li- berty, againfl the oppreflbrs of mankind ; the fame caufe; fubfifts, the fame condudt is obferved, and the like confequences mufl: follow. -I [ 48 ] follow, if Britons are not traitors to them* fclvcs. I fhould be glad to know of the moft fan- f uine patron or abettor the confidcrer has, what the confequences mud have been, and what face Europe, at this time, muft have pre- fented, had not England adted as (he has done. Muft not the proteftant interefl:, by which I mean public liberty, have been aboliftied on the continent r Muft not every port in Europe have been (hut up againft Britifli (hips, and muft not every cabinet have excluded Britifti councils, and have declared againft Britifti interefts ? The rcafoning brought by the confidcrer, to prove that the king of Pruflia, during the whole courfe of this war, is adling only for himfelf, is mere declamation, and if pofTible, lefs than nothing. There never was an alliance formed between two powers, who know what they are about, in which one of them did not make its own intcreft his firfl confidcration, and adted ac- cordingly. I will even go farther, and fay, that in the prefent war, the more felfifti, and the more felf-interefted his Pruflian majcfty is, he is of the more fervice to Britain, be- caufe n t 49 ] jcaufc he thereby the more weakens her de- clared enemies. But, fays the confidcrer, and his advocates, (for I will place their arguments in the ilrongeft point of light) while Great-Bri- tain has fo home-felt, fo acknowledged a fu- periority by fea, why (he jld fhe embark in a German war? But can the confiderer, with the fmalleft (hew of propriety or reafon, prove that Great-Britain would have had that fu- periority, har^ France been at liberty to have employed againft Britain thofe troops, that to the number of two hundred and fif y- thoufand men, have, fince the commencement of this war, found their graves in Germany ? In faft, where does our boafted fuperiority lie ; by fen ? No 5 there never was the Icaft doubt ofthe fuperiority of Great-Britain by fea, fince this war commenced j the unexpedled and boafted advantages we have gained over France, have been by land. We have dif- poffefled them of North- America, and a more certain fa of queen Elizabeth to the prefenr. As to the lofs, which the French power fuflained by the battles of Blenheim and Ramillies, exaggerated as they are by the confiderer, they are in no degree comparable, fctting afide the havock of the fword, to the number they have lofl in Ger- many by difeafes, fatigue, famine^ and every kind of indigence. j-.i '. If m In page 60 and 6 1 of the Confiderations,^ our author employs fome very fiimfy rca- foning, to prove, that v^e made a very bad bargain with Pruflia. ** In fa6l, though we are an ally to him, he is none to us. Our treaty with him, fays the confiderer, will not oblige him t 65 1 him to furnifli us either with money or troops, ihould we want them ever fo much. " No- body was ever wrong-headed enough to ima gine the treaty was made for any (ijch pur- pofc; it was made to prevent the ai^iolutc deflrudliou of the proteftant intereft, upon the continent, and it has hitherto anfwered that purpofe, notwithftanding the formidable and unexpedtca traverfes it has met with, " What then (fays the confiderer in the next page) have we gained by this ally ? Two things : the one is, the being obliged to pay him money to enable him to fight his own batdes againft enemies which Britain has no quarrel with 5 the other is, the driving the reft of the German princes into a clofer union with France, and making ourfelves obnoxious to Europe for fupporting this ally. Can it be fuppofed, that Britain is the ftronger for either of thefe ? " In anfwer to thofe round queftions, I fay, that Britain always has had, and that (he always ought to have, a quarrel with thofe powers, who attempt to deftroy the liberties of Europe. Suppofing the con- federacy between the courts of Vienna, France, Saxony, and Ruflia, who is neither papift nor proteftant, and is to be confidered rather as an Afiatic, than an European power, had I i [ 66 ] had been carried into execution, what muil have been the confequcnce ? By what I have fuggefted, how can the prevention of it drive the German princes into a clpfer union with France, while the latter is (o intimately con- ned:ed with the houfe of Auftria, which has always been their opprefibrs, when they fled to France for refuge ? The extindlion of the pro^eftant intereft in Germany, it is to be feared, would have extinguiflied the Ger- manic conftitution itfelfj while that ambition and bigottry, which has always diftinguifhed the houfe of Auftria, was fupported and abetted by the guaranties of the treaty of Weftphalia, What fupported the liberties of Germany, and confequently of Europe, before the pre- fent war broke out, but the enmity between the houfes of Bourbon and Auftria ? That en- mity being diftblved, the former ballance of power vaniftied ; and the honour, dignity, and intereft of Great-Britain called upon her to form another. She has done it, and ilie could have done it by no other means, than file has purfued. •' • The greateft art, which the confiderer has employed through the whole of his pam- phlet, and which he carries on to an amazing degree [ 67 ] degree from the 62d to the 68th page, is to reprefent the king of Prullia as a felf-interefl- ed prince. Were I to fpeak my own pri- vate thoughts, I muft fay, the greater his felf-intereft is, he will be the more ufeful and the more faithful ally to Great-Britain ; from whofe friendfhip, after what has happened, he never can find it his intereft to depart. I (hall fpeak nothing of gratitude or honour ; but while the prefent war lafts, can it be his interefl: to abandon his alliance with Great- Britain ? I believe, even, the confiderer will not be hardy enough to affirm it. Suppofing a peace was to take place, would he, after what has happened, throw himfelf into the arms of France ? No; he muft be fenfible, that while there is a poffibility of a mifunder- ftanding arifing between Groat-Britain and France, his danger recurs, and then he Would be in a worfe condition than ever, through the renewed connexions between Auftria and Bourbon. This muft hereafter always be the cafe. No peace can make Auftria lofe iight of her claims upon Silefia; or France of hers, for the damage we hiive done her in this war, and the territories we have taken from her. Thefe are confiderations which, however plain and fliort, I think ab- K folutely IM-: iiJ [ 68 ] folutely dellroys all the declamation employed by our author again ft our connexion with Pruflia. The perfonal invcdlivcs the conliderer has thrown out again ft him, are as void of truth, as they are of decency, and defer ve no anfwer. The confiderer next returns to his old to- pic of the inequality between France and Eng- land in a land-war between them, on the continent j and he reprcfents all the powers in Europe as being averfe to the caufe we are fighting in. The meancft coft'ee-houfe poli- tician knows the reafon. Ruffia has claims, Sweden has claims, upon Ruffia, which have been long quieted by treaties, •'.nd are there- fore unjuft. The fituation of the king of Denmark, between Ruffia and Sweden, with regard to Holftein, has been very tickliffi, and becoming more fo every day, does not admit him to part with a fingle fubjed: from the defence of his own dominions. The death of the prince and princefs of Orange have given the Dutch government back to the Loveftein fa but the talk of fuch never can be conflrued mto the fcnfe of the people of Britain. I fhall not differ much from our confiderer, with regard to a certain ribband and title be ft owed j but I cannot think it was beflowed, on account of vulgar prepoffeffions, and on the report of idle, ig- norant, news-mongers ; they were beflowed at a time when it was thought proper and prudent to give exemplary rewards, even to the fl^ew of refolution and refiflance. * The [ 71 1 The railing of our confidcrcr at the Ruffian treaty, is frivolous and thread-bare, and yet he is ingenuous enough to own (page 94,) that it was made folcly to keep all foreign troops out of the empire. Undoubtedly, as we have obferved before, it was. But it ij as certain, that, before tiie treaty was made, the court of France, unknown either to his Britannic, or PruHlan majefty, was far advanced in the treaty of Vienna ; nay, it was then as good as concluded, and we very foon found, from the chevalier Duglafs's negociations, on the part of France, at the court of Peteribourg, too much reafon to apprehend, that if the Ruffian troops had got footing in the empire, even upon our requifition, they would have infifted^ upon their own terms, before they had eva- cuated it. That the RuiTians were hiied to defend the eledlorate of Hanover, again ft all invaders, is admitted. That they were hired to ravage the Pruffian dominions, or that the king of Pruffia intended to invade Hanover at that time, is denied, Having faid thus much, I niuft be canJItt enough to own, before the treaty of London \v'a$ made, his late majefty (though he wifely L 2 kff^ I' ' t 78 ] kept it to himfclf ) had great reafons to fuf- ped the intentions of the court of Vienna, and her motives, or rather encouragement, for making certain demands upon him, which In honour, r.nd confciencCj he could not com- ply with. What muil: becomv" of our author's reaf./ning, if it fl^^ould appear that fome of thofe demanf'o regarded even the king of Pruflia ? Did not the natural feafon, the opta?uhi dies, then prcfcnt itfelf, and what treatment ri^afl: his majcliy's miniflers have met with from the public, had they not joined the national voice, and concluded the treaty of London. *' We had been ufed to think, fays the confiderer, (page 95,) the king of Pruffia, (I dont fay righdy) had fhown in his adions, a negled of all moral obligation, and in his writings, a contempt of every religious principle." Who are lue ? Does the confiderer clafs himfelf with the officious (liatter-brains of ccffee-houfes ? The people of England never thought fo of the conqueror of Silefia ; they never fpoke thus of ihe author of the Anti-Machiavel. Every man of fenfe and candour fpoke and thought the reverfe. They faw the king of Pruffia i-uier the dikigrceable nectffiiy of maintain- ing his L!lliance with France, through the in- i" iudic c > [ 79 ] juftice and obRInacy of the court of Vienna, who force*, him to maintain that alliance, though he offered, again and again, to re- nounce it. and to join in keeping the French out of the empire, provided (he would do him juflice in his claims upon Silefia. Thofe claims were, to the people of England, pro- blematical at lead, and they neither could, nor did, give them difguil:, far Icfs, deteflatiou. In all political writings, when fads are an- fwered, (and 1 think I have anfwered every fad advanced by the confiderer) the rell muft go for declamation. That is what I cannot anfwer. The charges again ft his Pruffian majefty, and our own miniflry, are repeated over and over again, and fpun through a hundred and thirty-feven pages, with an acrimony void of fpirit ; arguments, that arc deftitutc of reafon ; charges, unfup- ported by truth ; allegations, not founded on fads ; and tautologies, which prove the writer . to be no admirer of Tacitus. His declama- tions and definitions upon continental con- nexions, and upon the difficulty of under- ilanding them as they ought to be underftood, are metaphyficalj vague, and idle. Every cobler, I was going to fiy, knows what a '-. " con- H I 80 1 continental connexion is, afi well as any member of either houfe of parliament 5 and though our author reprefents his fplittings of the queftion to be new and uncommon, yet there has not been perhaps a more hackney 'd topic in politicks, lince the Revolution j nor has he fallen upon a (ingle dividon or fubdi- vifion, that has not been brufhed thread-bare by Tories and Jacobites in their writings againft the adt of Settlement, and for the treaty of Utrecht. Let the author prove (and then he will fay fomething) that ouy connexions with Pruflia, or, if he pleafes, Willi the continent, at this time, are not as well founded, and as juftifiable, and perhaps more necefTary, than thofe formed by king William, by that alliance which the conliderer has employed fuch a needlefs pomp of lanr guage to amplify. Our confiderer, again and again, mentions our being without thof? allies, which king William and queen Anne had : I have given the plain and true ieafon, why we are without them, and probably mud be without them, till the proteftant confede-. racy has broken the chains of Europe. I am far from detracting from the merits or abilities of our great deliverer. But what has his condud: or character to do with the prefent queftioDj^ 1 I [ «I ] queftion, unlefs he can fliew, that Great- Britain and Europe were in lefs danger, at Lhi time the treaty of London was figned, than it was at the time the grand alliance was formed by king William ? I am even afraid our conliderer has over-ftrained his complai- fance to the memory of that monarch. He has given us a moft pompous account of the congrefs, in which the grand alliance was formed ; and fuch a meeting, compofcd of fo many illuftiious parties, all of them ene- mies to France, never perhaps was known in Europe. I am unwilling to fay it, but it is a well known truth, that the fplendor and frequency of that meeting, was the greateft misfortune of king William's reign. It fug- gefted to his enemies, a natural and a puzzling queftion. If fo many mighty potentates, are to g6 to war againft France, why is Eng- land to pay a greater proportion;, in the ex- pences of that war, than all thofe mighty po- tentates put together r nay, in fad:, the whole of the expence -, for man's fiefh (unleis when it is hired, or let out) has always been very cheap on the continent, efpecially in Ger- many, While IWMi [ ^2 J Willie I am upon this head, which I have touched with the utmoft reludlance, I am fony that our confiderer's calculation of our expence during king William and queen Anne's ivars, obliges . ie to repeat an obfervation I have made before ; that it is a grofs impofi- tion upon the fenfe of the public, to array the fums of thofe times againft the prefent ; be- caufe the intrinfic value of money in Great- Britain is now diminifhed. The interell which money bears in a flate, a commercial one I mean, may be called the pulfe, which indicates the health or indifpolition of the body-politic. The government in thofe times gave for money, fix or fcven, nay fometimes more, per cent. At this time they give at mod three and a half. I (hall not, from this, con- clude, that Great-Britain has, at prefent, double the money in fpecie, that fhe had under king William, or queen Anne 5 but I will venture to fay, however paradoxical it may appear, {he is at this time doubly able to bear the expenccs. " To talk, fays the confiderer, (page 114) of forming a connexion with that, which is in itfelf unconneded, is a contradidion in terms." [ 83 ] terms.** This is profefTv dly a gingle of words. Was the continent connc'6lcd in itfeU, I mean, even againd Fra.ice, in queen Anne's time ? Did not king William, even b f:re his death, break rholc connexions, lor v, iiich our author fo pomponfly applauds him, fo that queen Anne in the beginning of her reign, found Europe as unconnedled as it is nov^ ? The empire in itfelf, torn in pieces by the defcdlion of one of its moll: powerful electors from the common caufe, while others of them were more covertly friends to Friince; Sweden fo near declaring againft us, that we were obliged to have recourfe to gratifying the pride of that monarchy by fending the duke of Marlborough to him, to work upon his private paflions, which he did in a manner not altogether becoming the dignity of his miflrefs and his country. Al] Spain, and the greateft ran o" Jily in arms agiinitus, and even the iu._:j of Savoy our fncnd, only be- caufe Britain wab the moA Cvipable to be his, against the more than infolcnce of the French monirch ; and waat was worfe than all, Great-Britain, b\ being then unconnected III heifeif, gave the enemy double advantages. '* Wliv, fays the confiderer, (page ii6# £hot*ld any '^art of the war, which, as the M prefenti [ 84 ] I prcfent war, began with a contcH: about foreign fettlcmcnts, have iis courle div»jrted into a land-war in Germany, tor we were always vis he, (p. 120) our German war is no divcrlion at all for the French forces, " though he owns in the fame breath, that it employs them. Yes, and I will add, it deflroys them likewife, even without the afliftance of the fwordj fo miferably are they fupplied. To make out this notable reafoning of his, the confiderer tells us, that the French leave not a man fewer upon their ccafls on account of their army in Germany. Who fays they have ? But the confiderer will find it no eafy taik to prove, that fince the beginning of the war they have not fuffered a lo^? of men in Ger- many, which the pnpuloufiiefs of France (great as it is) will not be able for many years to repair. He never can perfuade any man, who has his fenfes about him, that H-anCw is not become a national bar.krurr, by her war in Germany ; or :iat, had ihc not found diver- fion, or if the confiderer pkak' , c. ^ ' -yment for [ler troops in Germany, ihc miglit not ftill have found means to have tnamj bed over us in America. It Vv'ill be impoliiUe to pei- Si: I „ t 86 ] perfuade the world, that France can keep 9, hundred and twenty thoufand men in a coun- try, that always has been, and is now,, the grave of the French, with as litde expence of blood and treafure. as they are at, when they are in quarters or garrifons in their own country, in a time of peace, which admits of their employing themfelves in manufadtures and agriculture, and in repairing thofe cala- mities of their country, which are fo feelingly fet forth by the remonftrances of their par- liaments. f~- Our author, by his own confeffion, thinks, that the latter pages of his pamphlet contains a recapituUtion, or rather, a repetition of what he had faid before ; and as they un- doubtedly are fuch, I fhall not pretend to anfwer them, becaufe I have, ftep by ftep, an- fwered every argument, without employing that declamation, which he has fo in- duftriouily made ufe of, to decry the pre- fent government of England, to throw per- fonal abufe, even in defcendingto perfonalitics, againfl: our illuflrious ally. F I N I S, _.^.*k^» s