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Les diagrammes suivants lllustrent la mdthode. / errata id to It ie pelure, pon d n 1 2 3 32X 1 2 3 4 5 6 k -— ..i'. i A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS WHICH PRECEDED THE /Mf CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON, BY THE BRITISH, ON THE TWENTY-FOURTH OF AUGUST, 1814. v^ " If we desire to avoid hisuli, we must be prepared to repel it."— G. Washinoton, 1793. PHILADELPHIA: CAREY AND HART, 126, CHARLES MARSHALL, 148 CHESTNUT STREET. 1849. tg'^ Advance, ot^the Army TUtuj-n of „ „ ddvouice o/VwJrjrgr Retivn cT fy f>? 2 scAix Of ari£.i:s 2: If 10 m ^v ofthe OT THI . UKDIR GEJfi IIOSS. fjomibe 1^"^ to iht21*!^AvLgust. 1814. Ftrma il Sketch by I) Kvans ^lT Pial'oint of the hJnjgagariaxl on th* f ^ tJipha/ri '*%;-«--«[(M c. :^s IK ]v: '\r r, m \ ({/ J ^ i , \ ( i . [ / ' y' '' Ji ' ',» i I ,..:k ■» 'J *•. '..VM ' ■, />:;- ^•.:dif//;/^^^-' i_^ tf^Fositu C.C.Vneniys BBEnanysCa EEBridsTiC F/'Skirmisl 62^Brigdd SK Rocket 1 I Fortified Emmy. RBridshA MTht^Arro\ ^^ the^Movti Mibtary Depot QnmnirJfasTOenFCmceMrseOuxircb Cct.W^^m /S^^ T^^ TAnoLixrt HtK Jfulu . F 501 !) .5 X 5* 125967 Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1849, by EDWARD D. INGRAHAM, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. PHILADELPHIA : T. K. AND F. a. COLLINS, FEINTERS. J PREFACE. An accidental circumstance, in the summer of 1848, induced me to view the ground on which the battle of Bladensburg was fought, and a desire to become better acquainted with the state of things which preceded that disastrous event, led me to search for information from various sources. Many of the cotemporaneous publi- cations have disappeared entirely; others are scarce, and not readily procured ; and it was found to be no easy matter to arrange the various materials which, with considerable industry, I had collected together. An increasing interest in the subject, derived from my researches, led me to seek for unpublished papers and documents, of which some have been furnished by the families of the actors in the scenes described, and others by some of the few surviving actors themselves. Having satisfied my own curiosity, and formed my own opinion, the thought struck me that, perhaps, that which had so much interested me, might not be without interest for those who were inclined to examine into the history of the events of their own country ; and I 5 r,t iv V*. »'^"^> PREpAfi. '^ was induced to^extdnd^the notes I had made in the course of my inquiries, into the sketch which is now given to the public. I am indebted for the map, ex- hibiting the ground, and the positions of the American troops and the enemy's forces, to the kindness of Peter Force, Esq., of Washington, from whose excellent His- torical Library I have also derived much and valuable assistance. E. D. I. Philadelphia^ March 1, 1849. of J] A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, &c. " Were nations to review in peace their motives for having made war, with the means they employed, and the method by which they conducted it, they would, in general, find much to blame in a moral as well as a military view; the conviction of the wrongs they did, and the blunders they committed, might, on another and similar occasion, improve both their ethics and tactics, and make them, at once, better men and abler soldiers; but as nations cannot be brought together, it rests with govern- ments to perform this duty of self examination, when, if they omit it, the task devolves on the historian. "(*) It is proposed to review the method by which a portion of the war of 1812 was conducted, which led to the deep disgrace of the nation abroad, and its deeper mortification at home. The capture of Washington by a handful of men, after more than twelve months' notice to the proper authority of coming danger, and more than six months of actual, impending peril, ought never to be forgotten, for the lesson it holds out to confident security and ill-judged procrastination. At the distance of thirty-four years from the period of the transaction, at the close of an uniformly suc- cessful campaign, in which victory seems to have be- longed to the arms of the United States, it is difficult to (') Mabit. Gen. Armstrong lias adopted the quotation as the " Preface" to his "Notices of the War of 1812," (New York, Geo. Dearborn, 1836, 1840,) where it is credited (by the mistake of the printer) to Mabbt. , . A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS. ETC. ,-. J J realize that forty-five hundred infantry, without artillery, and under the effects of a climate deadly to European constitutions, should have marched fifty miles into a country peculiarly adapted for defence, whose inhabit- ants had heretofore been celebrated for bravery, and their skill in irregular warfare, destroyed with every degree of wanton barbarism the capitol of the country, and been permitted to retire unmolested to their ship- ping, to prosecute a new enterprise undertaken upon the impunity which attended such extraordinary success. War was declared against Great Britain on the 1 8th of June, 1812; and so early as December of that year notice was received in the United States from Bermuda, that a British squadron had arrived at that place, hav- ing on board a considerable body of troops, with the requisite munitions, including Congreve rockets, des- tined for the attack of the southern cities of the United States. (*) On the 4th of February following two ships of the line, three frigates, and some smaller vessels of this squadron entered the mouth of the Chesapeake, and came to anchor in Hampton Roads. The destruc- tion of private property, the capture of negroes,(^) and the burning of Frederick, Georgetown, Havre de Grace, and Frenchtown, and the exercise of almost incredi- ble barbarities on the defenceless inhabitants, followed the arrival of this force,(^) which was afterwards in- creased to seven ships of the line and thirteen frigates, having on board four thousand infantry. An attempt vi^as made by this armament to take Norfolk, on the 22d of June, 1813; but the timely organization of a small (') Palmer, Hist. Reg., vol. ii. 83. (») 700 were at Bermuda in Jan., 1814. Nat. Int., March 17, 1814 ; Niles' Reg., vol. vi. 45. (*) Armstrong, Not. of War, vol. ii. p. 46. Macon, Report on the Barbarities of the Enemy, 1813. A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. rtillery, iropean into a inhabit- ry, and 1 every ountry, ir ship- pon the jcess. tie 1 8th at year irmuda, ;e, hav- ith the ts, des- TJnited o ships ■ssels of apeake, lestruc- ,n and Grace, ncredi- Dilowed irds in- rigates, attempt the 22d a small ^files' Reg., rbarities of militia force, and their efficient resistance, with the aid of a liandful of seamen and marines, proved sufficient to def(jat the attack and repulse the enemy with signal lovSs,(') and they proceeded to North Carolina, to repeat at Ocrucoke and Portsmouth the revolting acts which the^ had pretviously perpetrated in Maryland. The attitude of the defenders of those two places induced Admiral Cockburn to return to the Chesapeake, to resume his system of plunder, the particulars of which need not be enumerated.(^) So early as March the 1st, 1814, Admiral Cockburn, with one seventy-four, two frigates, a brig and a schooner, arrived in Lynnhaven Bay, and began the usual system of capture and plunder.(^) Their presence was con- tinually taken notice of, and published in the city of Washington, (^) where the probable result of the cam- paign in Europe, which soon left at the disposal of the British government a large body of troops then serving in France, was publicly known, and seems to have excited neither attention, remark, (*) nor preparation. Soon after, the fact was announced that 4000 troops, said to be destined for the United States,(^) had, on the 20th of January, arrived at Bermuda, where the preparations for their successful action were going on with the knowledge of every member of the cabinet. (^) (') Palmer, Hist. Reg., vol. ii. p. 86. (^) One of his exploits was the plundering and burning, on the 27Ui Nov., 1813, at St. George's Island, the cottage of a poor man, whose daughter was twice fired at by one of the party. — Niles' Reg., vol. v. p. 219. (3) Nat. Int., March 7, 1814. (<) Ibid., March 11, 1814. (5) Ibid.; and see Nat. Int., March 23, 1814, postscript, April 18, 1814; 9th May postscript. («) Nat. Int., March 17, 1814. C) TheArmida and Lacedemonian frigates, two scluioners, a brig, and the Albion and Dragon, seventy-fours, were in the Bay on the 16th March, and placed three buoys.— Nat. Int., March 22, 1814. A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. m The " shadows of coining events" grew stronger as the events themselves drew nearer; and the intelligence from France, little heeded, it would seem, soon became distinct and positive(') — confirmation arrived from time to time, as later intelligence was received of designs, the news of which served to fill a column in the government newspaper, but seems to have brought no warning to those who were so soon to sufFer.(^) One individual, indeed, like Cassandra, prophesied in vain. The views pointed out by him were fully justified by the events, (') and are in strong contrast with the inchnation, apparent in the neighborhood of danger, to treat as unworthy of belief that which should have operated as warning. (") Islands in the Chesapeake were forcibly occupied, hos- pitals and fortifications erected ; but to the nation, under the editorial head of the government journal, it was said,(*) " We have no idea of his" (the enemy then at Blackstone's Island) "attempting to reach the vicinity of the Capitol; and if he does, we have no doubt he will meet such a reception as he had a sample of at Craney Island. The enemy knows better than to trust himself abreast of, or on this side of Fort Washing- ton."(^) At the time of this luckless boast the enemy J (') Nat. Int., March 28, 1814, postscript. See Ibid., March 30, 1814, "Late Fo- reign News;" 6000 troops were daily looked for. (') Ibid., April 5, 1814. 6000 n.tn destined for the southern states. On the 6th April the enemy in the Chesapeake were reinforced (Ibid., April 12, 1814) by two sail of the line. The same statement from a deserter. — Ibid., April 30, 1814. (3) "Americanus to the Military of the District of Columbia," Ibid., 6th and 11th of April, 1814. (<) Ibid., April 23, 1814. "Idle Rumor," — that Admiral Cochrane had arrived with 5000 troops, Norfolk, April 16. See the "Ode on the National Apathy," Ibid., Sept. 20, 1814. (5) Ibid., May 7, 1814. (6) Which afterwards, (Aug. 27, 1814,) without any attempt at defence, was abandoned and destroyed on the approach of the enemy. " Report of the Comm. appointed to Imnire into the Causes, &c., of the Invasion of Washington," p. 328 ; A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. • as the iligence became nn time ^ns, the rnment ning to ividiial, e views r'ents,('^) pparent )rthy of ning.(^) ed, hos- L, under it was then at i^icinity lubt he e of at to trust ashing- enemy "Late Fo- !. On the !, 1814) by 30, 1814. h and 11th lad arrived ithy," Ibid., ;fence, was the Comm. " p. 328 J had been in the Potomac for a week, and by their movements harassed the militia of St. Mary's County, called out under a law which the chief magistrate of Maryland pronounced to be "a dead letter,"(») and two days afterwards intelligence was received that the allies were in Paris. (^) Of the actual condition of the country on the Chesa- peake the enemy were fully aware. They received the newspapers, (^) they were continually receiving ne- groes(^) well acquainted with every locality, (*) and spies, it was well understood, " passed daily in and out of Washington, and through the country."(*^) The ad- miTiistration knew these things, which were published at the seat of government, in the official journal, to which reference is made as the evidence of their occur- rence. The encouragement given to an enemy, by such a state of affairs, to proceed from one enterprise to an- other more hardy, may be readily imagined, as well as the suffering and loss to individuals, and the national honor, from acts, which either no means existed to pre- a hastily prepared and not very intelligible production, chiefly valuable for the Docu- ments in the Appendix. — See Nat. Int., Nov. 30, 1814. The attention of Virginia to the defence of her seaboard seems to have been early awakened. See the account of the "Mountaineers'' wl'.o marched to Norfolk between the 31st of March and 2d of May, 1814. Ibid., May 9, 1814; June 27, 1814. (') Nat. Int., May 16, 1814. As it turned out to be subsequently. — See "District Orders," Aug. 13, 1814. Ibid., Aug. 16, 1814. O Ibid., May 18, 1814. (3) Ibid., June 0, 1814. (4) Scotts (capt. R. N.) Rec. of a Naval Life, vol. iii. p. 118. See the effect it had upon the negroes at Fredericktovvn, Md. Nat. Int., Aug. 24, 1814, under the head of " The Little Plot." (5) Scott, vol. iii. p. 76. Lond., 1834. («) Nat. Int., July 23, 1814. "The enemy was conducted through the city (after the battle of Bladensburg) by a former resident of the city, who, with other de- tected traitors, is now in confinement." — Niles' Reg., vol. vi. p. 446. See the Let- ter of R. Rush, Esq., Nat. Int., Oct. 3, 1814. An agent for British prisoners, Col. Barclay, was allowed to reside at Bladensburg. Gen. Ross's Despatch, Palmer's Hist, vol. iv. p. 149. '1 i 1 6 A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. vent,(^) or which were attempted to be resisted with inadequate forces, hastily drawn together, to J* commit many blunders" upon the spur of the occasion. f) Very soon, however, the same official gazette, which contained the President's proclamation in answer to Admiral Cochrane's declaration that the whole Atlantic coast of the United States was in a state of blockade, contained also a paragraph, taken from a London paper of the 20th of April, announcing that "a num- ber of the largest class of transports were fitting out, with all possible speed, at Portsmouth, as well as all the troop ships at that port, for the purpose, it was supposed, of going to Bordeaux, to take the most effective regiments in Lord Wellington's army to Ame- rica;(^) and the next day's paper stated the arrival of a cartel from Bermuda at New York, on the 28th of June, bringing intelligence that she had "left at Ber- muda a fleet of transports, with a large force on board, to sail in one or two days for some port in the United States — probably for the Potomac. "('') Such intelligence was not entirely without its effect upon the long-continued apathy of the administration. (') "For five miles round we have no arms." — Dorsey's Letter, (Nat. Int., June 20, 1814,) giving an account of the attack on Benedict. Six days after (June 20) official notice was received of the pacification of Europe. Armstrong, Not. of War of 1812, p. 127. (2) See Col. Wadswoith's Letter from the camp at St. Leonard's, June 26, Nat. Int., June 29, 1814. Letter from an Eye-witness, Ibid., July 7, 1814. Statement from T. P. Andrews' Journal, Ibid., July 9, 1814. (3) Nat. Int., June 30, 1814. The expedition sailed June 2d. Gleig's Camp. British Army at Washington, p. 41. (■•) Nat. Int., July 1, 1814. The same paper stated diat the War Department, in consequence of the retreat of the enemy from the waters of the Patuxent, had di- reeled the militia of the District to return home, and that the cavalry had arrived and been dismissed. The governor of Virginia had issued orders for twenty regi- ments to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice, to repel invasion. Four more were subsequently called upon. Ibid,, July 4, 1814. I' ■ f l1 ed with commit ') I, which swer to A-tlantic lockade, London a num- ng out, [1 as all it was e most to Ame- rival of 28th of at Ber- 1 board, United ;s effect stration. t. Int., June (June 20) Jot. of War me 26, Nat. Statement ?ig's Camp. A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 7 The following notice to those deeply concerned in effective measures made its official appearance. ^ WASHINGTON CITY, FKIDAY, JULY 8. " DEFENSIVE MEASURES, We understand, are already arranged by tlie War Department, to guard against and repel the depredations of the enemy on the shores of the waters adjacent to this district. It is said that a camp of two thou- sand regular troops, of whom two hundred are to be dragoons, is to be established at some point between the Patuxent and Potomac, so as to be able to send out, at the shortest notice, detachments to any point invaded or menaced on either river. Requisitions of militia, it is also said, are to be held in readiness to aid this force in repelling any attack on this city of a more formidable character, if attempted. These measures cannot but aflPord much satisfaction to the people of this district, and of the adjoin- ing country, as it will relieve them from the liability to perform military service, except on really urgent occasions." (^) Properly carried out, such a plan would have ensured safety ; (2) and it can hardly be said to have been too soon (') Nat. Int., July 8, 1814. The "General Orders" issued from the adjutant gene- ral's office at Richmond, (Va.,) appeared the next day, calling on the regiments designated to be ready, "as the enemy, inflated with the splendid successes in Europe, would omit no exertion or preparation to make the state feel his strength." Ibid., July 9, 1814. The sailing from Bermuda of four ships of the line, with troops on board, previously to the 16th of June, and that Admiral Cochrane, with four more sail of the line, and several frigates, &c., with troops, were to depart from the same place, for the American coast, on the 20th of June, is stated in the Nat. Int. of July 12, 1814. A capital plan of defence, by " Americanus," appears in the Nat. Int. of July 14, 1814. O This is substantially the plan proposed by the President to the cabinet on the kMtj£jari.iJija^ 1 1 A ] g A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. - * determined upon, for on the 14th of July, thirteen sail of the enemy's vessels were ascending the Bay, in time to reach the Patuxent that night, (') and nine sail had come into Lynnhaven Bay on the 12th of July, sup- posed to be a reinforcement, with Admiral Lord Coch- rane on board. (^) It is not to be concealed that, what- ever alarm the inhabitants of the District may have felt, the War Department treated the matter very lightly. (^) In the order of events the inquiry presents itself — what measures were taken to form " the camp" of regu- lars, and to call for the auxiliary aid of militia ? On the 2d of July, 1814, the 10th Military District w^as created. It was composed of the State of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and that part of Virginia lying between the Rappahannock and Potomac Rivers ; the command of it was assigned to Brig. Gen. Winder of the United States Army,('') and a requisition for 93,500 men, was made upon the several States,(*) "to be organized and held in readiness for immediate service under the laws of the 28th of February, 1795, and 18th of April, 1814." Upon paper all this has a formidable appearance ; but the appointment of a general, unless a proper military staff is furnished him, and efficient troops given to him, is a very unnecessary ceremony. There were few re- Ist of July, Rep. of Comm., p. 6, and stated by Col. Monroe, and confirmed by Gen. Armstrong, Rep. of Comm., 2S9, 290. See the account of the state of the militia of the District, Nat. Int., July 18, 1S14, "Local Defence." (') Nat. Int., July 16, 1814. (2) Ibid., July 18, 1814. Letter from Norfolk, dated July 12 ; at that place they were "prepared to receive them." (3) Ibid., July 15, 1814. See the statement, Scott's Rec. of a Naval Life, vol. iii. p. 239. (■») Gen. Orders, Adj. and Insp. General's office, 2d July. Nat. Int., July 6, 1814. (5) Appendix, No. 1. Nat. Int., July 11, 1814. It states expressly, that it was " not known with certainty that any particular point or points would be the objects of attack." S IVi A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 9 gular troops within the power of the government — the most numerous body which had recently been within or near the District, 500 men of the 10th infantry, under Lt. Col. Clinch, "a body of stout, active young men, enlisted in North Carolina, which had been encamped near Washington for several weeks," were marched away to the northern frontier on the 13th of June, in the midst of the alarm of an expected attack. (') In strictness, two detachments of the 36th and 38th in- fantry, and a small detachment of artillery, amounting, in the whole, to 330 men,(^) were all that could be said to be at their disposal at the time that the 10th Military District was created, nor was this great deficiency re- medied in any degree before the troops were called into action. ...*...— — No orders were issued by the War Department ap- pointing an assistant adjutant geneial, assistant inspector general, or assigning to duty in the District any topo- graphical engineers; and it is well known, that General Winder's greatest complaint was, that he had not the aid of this staff, without which the proper organization, equipment, and efficiency of troops is impossible, and that his time was occupied by an oppressive mass of detail, when he should have been at liberty to devote it to duties of a very different character. (^) With regard to the militia force which " it was con- (') Nat. Int., June 18, 1814. The notice of their departure is immediately under the account of the alarm occasioned by*the report of the burning of Benedict and Lower Marlborough. (') Report of Committee, p. 144. The garrisons of Forts MHenry, Severn, and Washington, are, of course, not included ; they amounted to 282 men, who could not be withdrawn from those forts. (3) He urged it on the Department, (Letter 9th July, 1814, Appendix, No. 2,) but though promised on the 12th of July, (Appendix, No 3,) it was the 10th of August following before Mr. Hite, who received his orders on the 9th from the War De- partment, reported himself. Letter 10th Aug. 1814, Appendix, No. 4. I m A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. templated to hold in readiness" in the neighboring states, "to march without delay in case of necessity," it is obvious, that its usefulness would depend on the nature of the force called for, and its state of prepara- tion and fitness for service when brought to the field. The requisition of the War Department of the 4th July, 1814, upon the several states was for artillery and infantry only, cavalry — an absolutely necessary species of force, in the event to be provided against — was en- tirely omitted. (^) Nor does the detail furnished to the Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, or Virginia, in- dicate that riflemen, the most effective troops against an invading army, were to form any portion of the force called for.(^) The requisition on theXrovernor of Penn- sylvania was ten days in reaching 'S/utm&ii^'X^) and under date of July 25, 1814, the Secretary of the Com- monwealth points out, to the Secretary at War, the rea- sons which existed in the way of complying with the requisition, showing clearly that no aid was to be ex- pected from that state, and his letter of the 27th August following confirms his first statement. C) In Virginia the object of the requisition seems to have been under- stood as a call to repel sudden invasion which might fall upon the State, and the Deputy Adjutant General informs the Secretary at War, on the 14th July, 1814,(*) that such previous preparation had been made for that purpose, that it was " believed that the object of the re- quisition had been anticipated." The Secretary at War, (') Gen. Winder, in his letter to the Governor of Pennsylvania of the 17th July, wishes as many of the militia as possible to be riflemen. The Governor of Pennsyl- vania, in the detail accompanying his "General Orders'" of the 22d July, 1814, specifies that " deficiencies of artillery must be supplied hy ii^jal numbers of in- fantry" and that " rifle corps will be received in lieu of infantry.^* Aurora, July 29, 1814. (') Appendix, No. 1. (3) Sec. Boileau to Gen. Armstrong, July 14, 1814, Appendix, No. 5. (■») Appendix, No. 6. (s) Appendix, No. 7. or A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 11 in reply, under date of July 18, 1814, states to the Governor of Virginia, that the arrangements and prepa- rations made, could " not be considered as fulfilHng the vievi^s of the President;" and "that 2000 of the quota of Virginia will be put at the disposition of Gen. Winder, as commanding this District."(') The Go- vernor of Maryland, under date of the 29th July, 1814, in answer to the requisition, shows how little reliance was to be placed on aid from that state, either as to time or numbers.(^) It cannot have escaped the reader, that the requisi- tion on the Governors of the States was for militia " to be held in readiness for immediate service. With that object this force was to be placed at the disposition of the government, in accordance with the plan suggested by the President to the Cabinet on the 1st of July, 1814,(') and that when the quotas were organized and completed, and the places of rendezvous reported by the state authorities, who were to designate the species of forces, and their places of rendezvous,^*) the forces so organized became subject to the orders of the Govern- ment, but not before. Previously to any intelHgence from the several states, and acting as if the requisition had been complied with, the Secretary at War, on the 12th of July, informed the General commanding the District, that, " in case of actual or menaced invasion, he might call for a part, or the whole of the quota as- signed to the State of Maryland, which shall have been organized and equipped under the aforesaid requisition," (') Appendix, No. 8. The construction put by Gen. Gooch on this requisition is obviously the correct one. _, • ^o (3) Rep. Coram, of July, p. 6. "The convenient depots of arms and military equipments to be established," do not seem to have been thought of afterwards. (4) Appendix, No. 1. 12 A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. and on the 17th (*) of the same month, with no addi- tional information, the General was "authorized to draw from the quota of Virginia 2000 men, and from the quota of Pennsylvania 5000." The letters are given.(') War Department, July 12, 1814. Sir : — You will receive herewith the copy of a circu- lar letter addressed to the governors of certain states, requiring a body of militia to be organized, equipped, and held in readiness for future service. In case of actual or menaced invasion of the District you command, you will call for a part, or for the whole of the quota assigned to the state of Maryland, which shall have been organized and equipped under the afore- said requisition. In performing this duty, you will be careful to avoid unnecessary calls, to proportion the call to the exigency, and to have inspected, without delay, all corps entering on service, to the end that men, who from any cause are unfit therefor, be promptly discharged, and that a due proportion, in all cases, be maintained between officers and privates. I am sir, very respectfully, Your obt. servant, J. ARMSTRONG. Brigadier General Winder. War Department, July 17, 1814. Sir : — In addition to my circular letter of the 12th inst. , which subjects to your call the quota of Mar3rland (') The letter, as printed in the Report of the Investigating Committee, is dated the 18th of July, (p. 125,) and so Gen. Armstrong states it: "Notices," &c., vol. ii. p. 128. Some of the pamphlets which arose out of the events"of fli8*HiSy state it to have been the 17th, which is the true date, as appears from the original now before the writer. (2) From the originals now before the writer. A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 13 militia, you are also authorized to draw from that of Virginia 2000 men, and from the quota of Pennsylvania 5000. The whole of the militia of the District of Co- lumbia, amounting to about 2000, is kept in a disposable state, and subject to your orders. I am, sir, very respectfully. Your most obt. servant, J. ARMSTRONG. Brigadier General Winder. It is obvious, therefore, that the plan of the War De- partment was, to have recourse to "the militia of the District kept in a disposable state," and that in the event of actual invasion, the quotas of the states " held in readiness iox future service," were to be called out on the spur of the occasion, but that no present disposition of them was to be made.(*) The condition of the District of Columbia, and of the 10th Military District, therefore, from the 2d of July, 1814, up to the moment of actual invasion of the enemy on the 18th August, was utterly defenceless, and their helpless condition was well known to those who took advantage(*) of it to strike ii blow that such a condition (■) It is very clear that the oommandii ig general of the 10th Military District had not any power at all over these quotas uwtil organized and equipped under the re- quisition, which it was the duty of the War Department to see carried into effect ; merely to make the requisition neither exhausted the power nor fulfilled the duty of that office. (*) Gleig, Camp, at Washington, p. 162, (Am. ed.,) says, that the "capture of Washington was not the original end of the expedition; to destroy the (Barney's) flotilla was the sole object of the disembarkation ; and but for the instigation of Admiral Cockburn, who accompanied the army, the capitol would probably have escaped. This statement is different from Scott's, (Rec. of Naval Life, vol. iii. 272,) who says that the capture of Washington was the object, and was to be masked by an attack on the flotilla. See his statement (pp. 271, 272) as to the information gained of the resources of the Americans, "and the character of the troops likely to be brought into contact with the forthcoming expedition." Coch- rane's despatches agree with Scott. — Palmer's Hist. Reg , vol. iv. 137. 1 V. 14 A SKETCH OP THE EVENTS, ETC. I 1 invited. The force, by which the hazardous expedition viras undertaken, amounted to but 4500 men,(*) includ- ing sailors and armed negroes, entirely destitute of cavalry, and dragging with them, by hand, one six- pounder, and two three-pounder grasshoppers. The distance to march was upwards of forty miles, through a country intersected with streams, and covered with woods, during excessively sultry weather, the effect of which, upon men who had been relaxed by being long cooped up in ships, and unused to carry their arms, was so extremely severe, (*) that the second day the army marched but six miles, during which, says one of the number, "a greater number of soldiers drop- ped out of the ranks, and fell behind from fatigue, than I recollect to have seen in any march in the Peninsula of thrice its duration."(^) It required very little mili- tary knowledge to dispose of an invading force of such a strength under such circumstances. To obstruct the roads by felling trees across them, and breaking down the bridges ; to hover round the flanks and rear guard of the advancing corps, continually harassing them by a fire of musketry and rifles ; a succession of attacks on the advance whenever a stream was to be crossed, or fallen trees to be removed or avoided; and occasionally a (') Gleig, Camp, at Washington, 96, 97, The infantry was the 4th, 21st, 44th, and 85th.— Scott, (Rec. of Naval Life,) p. 272. The " Brigade Orders" found near the exploded well at Greenleaf 's Point, where Capt. Blanchard, of the Royal En- gineers, was killed, are printed in a pamphlet entitled "An Inquiry respecting the Capture of Washington, by Spectator," Feb. 1816, attributed to Gen. Armstrong, (p. 22.) They confirm the account. Col. Monroe states that Col. Beall, an old revo- lutionary officer, who viewed the column, estimated the enemy's force at l^etween 4 and 5000 men. — Rep. Inv. Com., 65. (2) Scott (Rec. of Naval Life, vol. iii. p. from 84 to 90 degrees." (3) Gleig, Camp, at Washington, p. 102. without a wound. — Niles' Reg., vol. vi. 443. 261) says, "the thermometer ranged Twelve were buried at Bladensburg A SKETCH OF THE EV£Ni KTT 15 shell from a howitzer, would have ol igcd the j to sur- render at discretion. (») The time occupied in reaching Washington wa» Alp days, and during the march the troops halted Ih m hours at Nottingham, and eight hours at Marlbo- rough. (') The retreat occupied more than four days, during the first of which there was a halt from seven in the morning till noon, rendered imperative by the state of excessive fatigue of the men from the march of the night before, in which they would have fallen an easy conquest to a small body of resolute men acquainted with the country — but no one was at hand even to harass them.(^) We have, too, the express acknowledgment of one who was an actor in the battle of Bladensburg, and a competent judge,(^) that "had the Americans been better troops, and in a higher state of discipline," the conse- quence of hurrying the British into action, after a long and toilsome march, "as was done, must have been fatal." The plan of the President, therefore, it is abundantly clear, was well devised, and would have been attended with perfect success, if carried into proper operation ; — two thousand, or even one thousand regular troops, en- camped and instructed, and ten thousand organized militia and volunteers, properly equipped, and brought into the field in time to receive sufficient instruction to act in concert against the enemy, and held in readiness (') Gleig (Camp, at Washington, p. 157) admits that such must have been the result of such a mode of resistance. Q) Gleig, Camp, at Washington, p. 151. (3) Dr. Bean, of Marlborough, instigated the inhabitants of that place to arms, and they killed some stragglers, and made some prisoners, afterwards rescued by the troopers of the enemy, who returned for the purpose. Ibid., 149. (<) Gleig, who was wounded. — Palmer, Hist. Reg., vol. iv. 151. 16 A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. i' I I so to do, would have been amply sufficient for the pur- pose. It is now in order to review the course pursued by the commanding general, to whose charge the 10th Military District was confided, and the use of the means which were furnished to him a short time previous to the battle. On the 9th of July, 1814, he addressed, to the Secretary at War, a letter, which is given entire. The view of the events to come is as accurate as if written after the occurrences had taken place. Baltimore, July 9, 1814. Sir : — The objects of the command which has been conferred on me, have, consequently, since I received it, occupied my serious consideration. The utmost regular force which, it is probable, can, in the present state of affairs, be placed at my command, including the force necessary for garrisoning the several forts, will not exceed 1000 men, and some weeks will necessarily elapse before the detachments from Virginia and Carlisle will reach my District : the detachments of the 36th and 38th are, therefore, the only troops that I can expect to have in the field in the meantime; and when those other detachments join, the utmost force will be 7 to 800. In conversation with you at Washington, I understood the idea, at pre- sent entertained relative to the auxiliary militia force proposed for the District, to be, that it shall be drafted and designated, but that no part of it is to be called into the field until the hostile force, now in the Chesapeake, shall be reinforced to such an extent as to render it probable that a serious attack is contemplated. The enemy's fleet has now spent more than a twelvemonth in the waters of the Chesapeake j and during that time has visited almost every river falling into the bay ; and must be presumed to have such accurate information, that whatever expedition may be destined to these waters, will have a definite object, to the execution of which, on its arrival, it will proceed with the utmost promptitude and dispatch. Should Wash- ington, Baltimore, or Annapolis, be their object, what possible chance will taere be of collecting a force, after the arrival of the enemy, to interpose between them and either of those places? They can proceed, without dropping anchor, to within three hours' rowing and marching of A SKKTCH OF THE KVENTS, ETC. 17 Bultin.iiro; within Ichs of Annapolis; and upon arriving off South Kiver, can (h-bark, and bo in Washington in a (hiy and a half. This celerity of niovomont on their part is not probable, owing to adverse weather, and other causes; })ut if the enemy has been aetive, while in our waters, to ac'i|uirc a knowledge; of our country, (tf which ther« can be no doubt, and shouhl be favored with wi'atlier on the arrival of reinforcements, he can he in Washington, Baltimore, or Annapolis, in four days from enter- ing t lie Capes ]Jut allowing liberally for all causes of detention, he can be in either of those places in ten days from his arrival. What time will this allow UH to hear of his arrival, to disseminate through the intricate and winding channels the various orders to the militia, for them to assemble, have their officers designated, their arms, aceoutrement.s, and ammunition delivered, the necessary supplies provided, or for the com- manding officer to learn the different corps and detachments, so as to issue ordi'rs with the promiititude and certainty so necessary in active operations? If the enemy's force should bo strong, which, if it come at all, it will be, sulficient numbers of the militia could not be warned and run together, even as a disorderly crowd, without arms, ammunition, or organization, before the enemy woidd already have given his blow. Would it not, then, be expedient to increase the force of my connnand, by immediately calling out a portion of the militia; so that, by previ- ously selecting the best positions for defence, and increasing, as far as possible, the natural advantages of these positions, the advance of the enemy might be retarded, his force crippled, and time and opportunity thus gained for drawing together whatever other resources of defence might be competent to resist the enemy? The small force of regulars will be incompetent to accomplish any material works at favorable posi- tions for strengthening the defences, and to supply the various vidette parties, which it will be necessary to station on the prominent points of the bay, to watch the cneni}', and communicate his movements with the greatest possible despatch. Allow me, sir, respectfully to propose that 4000 militia be called out without delay : I propose to station these in equal proportions in the most eligible positions between South River and Washington, and in the vicinity of Baltimore. Baltimore could not be aided by a force stationed between South River and Washington, unless a force were on the spot to retard the advance of the enemy until it could arrive, and so with respect to the force at Baltimore in co-operating with that intended to defend Washington. Each could assist the other if of this magnitude, and it appears to me, that, with materially less means actually in the field, and ready for instant action, II \ '11 ^ 18 A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. no hope can be entertained of opposing the enemy in assailing either of those places. I shall proceed to Annapolis to-morrow, and have hut little doubt that the Executive of Maryland will cordially co-operate in affording such means as it may be deemed advisable to call for, and I beg you will permit me to procure this, or such other militia force as the President may think proper immediately to be called out. I sent an order from Washington for the detachments of the 3Gth and 38th to move up to the head of South River, where I propose to meet them, and fix upon the most eligible spot for the camp intended to defend Washington. You will please, therefore, to direct any communications to me to Annapolis, which will enable me to make the requisite arrangements with the Executive of Maryland at once. I have the honor to be. With great respect, Sir, your obedient servant, W. H. WINDER, Brigadier General commanding lOtli Military Dislritt. Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War. He proceeded to examine personally the condition of the Military District. On the 12th of Jaly he was at Baltimore, the 16th at Marlborough, the 17th at Not- tingham, the 22d at Marlborough, the 23d at the Wood- yard, the 25th at Fort Washington, the 26th at Port Tobacco, the 27th at Piscataway, on the 1st of August at Washington, on the 4th at Tobacco, on the 6th at Washington, and on the 8th at Baltimore. (^) To his letter of the 9th of July no answer was re- turned by the Secretary at War.(') The plan of form- (') Rep. Inv. Comm., 138, 139. (2) This letter is not referred to by Gen. Armstrong in his statement to the com- mittee, (Rep., p. 74,) nor in the "Spectator" pamphlet, nor in his '-Notices of the War." It has been printed by the Committee of Investifjation. — Report, p. 98. The assistant Inspector General acknowledged its receipt, and its submission to the Secretary at War, but not a word is said about the object of it. — Appendix, No. 9. h A SKETCH OP THE EVENTS, ETC. n ing " a considerable camp, or rather camps, immediately to be formed in such positions as would best enable them to succor Washington, Baltimore, and the inter- mediate coasts, from whence those places would, if at ail, be assailed, and more particularly that magazines and depots of every necessary article be commenced without delay,''^ had previously been urged upon his attention by Gen. Winder in a letter to him of the 30th June, 1814, upon receiving information from him of the intention of the President to assign to that officer the command of the Mihtary District about to be created. (^) What the reasons were which influenced the Secre- tary at War to disregard these views of a mode of defence, it is impossible, upon his own authority, to say, as he returned no answer in which they were dis- cussed, modified, or controverted, nor has he, at any subsequent period, revealed them. It would seem, from the evidence which is attainable, that his own views were not in accordance with them at all, if his for- bearance to act in conformity with them, or carry them out, which can be explained only by his having a de- cided opinion, be regarded as evidence. As staled to himself by Gen. Winder, in the letter of the 9th of July, the Secretary's idea "relative to the auxiliary militia force proposed for the District" was, " that it be drafted and designated, but that no part of it be called into the field until the hostile force now in the Chesa- peake shall be reinforced to such an extent as to render (I) "Remarks, &c., on a Pamphlet, &c., by Spectator," p. 8. Bait., 181G. — Ac- cording to the letter of Gen. Armstrong to the Committee of Investigation, (Rep., p. 77,) "an order was taken to assemble a corps, and form a camp at such point between Washington and Baltimore as might be selected by the commanding general,'' — of which the requisition of the 4th of July, 1814, was the full exeaUion, See "Spectator," Pamp., p. 8. Tliis order, he says, (letter of Oct. 17, 1814,) was "conformably to the opinions (therein detailed) given in Cabinet Council, July 1, 1814." The same view of the "execution, so far as it depended on the War De- partment," is taken in the Notices of the War of 1812, vol. ii p. 128. 111 ,> A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. it probable that a serious attack is contemplated;" and his letter to the general of the 12th July, 1S14, inclosing a copy of the requisition of the 4th, speaks of the force as that " of a body of militia to be organized and equip- ped, and held in readiness for future service. C) In exact accordance with such views was the opinion of the Secretary, stated to Gen. Winder previously to the 9th of July, as an objection to caUing out any of the militia, and forming a camp, " that the most advantage- ous mode of using militia, was upon the spur of the occasion, and to bring them to fight as soon as called out."(^) An additional reason is to be found in the want of faith on the part of Gen. Armstrong that any attack would be made upon the Capital. (^) The General, in answer to tl e Secretary, on the 16th of July, after giving a detail of the defenceless condition of a portion of his District, and making a variety of suggestions, adds that he fears "it will be in vain to look for any efficient aid upon a sudden call upon the militia.''^) He addressed him again on the 23d of July, and after asking to be informed whether "only the quota of the District [of Columbia] militia is to be (') The whole of the letter is given, (ante, p. 12,) as it will be again referred to. It is omitted in the "Communication of the War Department" to the Investigating Committee, though those of the 2d July and ISth [l"th] July, 1814, are both given. — (Report, p. 98, 124.) (^) Report of Investigating Committee, p. 136, (*) Gen. Van Ness says, he treated the idea, repeatedly presented to him, "with indifference, at least, if not with levity." — Ibid., 289, 292. The statement of T. L. M'Kenney, (Reply to K. Armstrong's Assault, &c., p. ."3,) and the admission o'' K. Armstrong, (Review of T. L. M'Kenney "s Narrative, p. G.) confirms Gen. Van Ntss' statement. The same fact is stated by Gen. Wilkinson, Mem., vol. i. p. 751. — See the Letter of S. Pleasanton, Esq., Appendix, No. 10. That General Arni.'Strong had long known the defenceless state of the Capital, see his reply to a Committee of the Senate, (June 10, 1813,) Am. State Papers, Class V., Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 383. (*) Appendix, No. 10, (2). ■ » i ^ A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 21 drafted and placed at his disposal, or whether, on occa- sion, they are all liable to requisition," proceeds to ob- serve to him, that " as that part of the Pennsylvania militia, rssigned for his district, are remote, and could, not be called out upon emergency, might it not be ex- pedient to draw from remotest points, leaving that por- tion of the militia nearest the probable scene, to be called out on the spur of the occasion. "(') On the 25th July he made known the wretched state of Fort Wash- ington,(2) and on the 27th, that about 1500 militia, called out under the authority of the state laws, and not under his command, w^ere distributed from Cedar Point to Nottingham, and that the regulars (330 men) under his command were at Marlborough, between the enemy and amj posdhle approach to Washington. {^) To few of these suggestions and calls did the War Depart- ment return any answer or orders, and those of the shortest and most unsatisfactory kind.(^) It seemed as if the paper requisition — about as effectual as a paper blockade — was all that that branch of the Government deemed it essential to furnish for the defence of the Capital. TI e additional mortification of knowing that there were means of defence within reach, not furnished to him, was also endured by the commanding general. On the 4th of August he was informed by the War Department, that Captain Nicholas, a very efficient officer, was relieved from the command of Fort Wash- {') Appendix, No. 11. (2) Ajipendix, No. 12. One of the complaints was, " that for the water battery, five excellent 18 pounders, there was not a pound of ammunition." The Secre- tary at War stated to a Committee of the Senate, on the 12th July, 1813, that this fort and its covering work "had recently been put into a state of complete repair, are well furnished with heavy cannon, furnaces, &c., and are now occupied by a competent garrison." — See his Letter, Appendix, No. 19. (3) Appendix, No. 13. (*) To those of 25th and 27th July, Rep. Inv. Comm., p. 125. ^ A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. ington, and the command given to another, (0 afterwards cashiered for misbehavior before the expected enemy in that very post, vf hich he shamefully abandoned ;(^) and that the object in so relieving him was, that he might go to Philadelphia for the purpose of organizing a com- pany of recruits immediately, intended for the fron- tier.(^) On the same day a letter was written to him from New York, by Captain M'Keon,(^) who desired to serve under him with a company of artillery from the forces in New York harbor, where 400 artillerists were assembled, a part of whom could safely have been drafted for other services, as the militia of the State, ordered to be drafted for service, would supply their place; and the same remark applies to Captain Nicholas's company. Certainly the measure of taking 200 regulars from New York, and 100 from Philadelphia, would have added essentially to the means of safety, if ordered at once to Washington. As it had become evident that no force could be expected from distant points, the Secretary at War found it necessary to consider the militia of Balti- more, called out under a State requisition of the 24th of April, 1814, as part of the quota of 6000 men to be fur- nished under the requisition of July 4th, 1814, made by the United States. He gave no notice of this arrange- ment to General Winder, whose letter to him of the 13th of August, shows the actual state of destitution in which the arrangements of the War Department had left him;(*) and authority to take these forces, was re- ceived by letter from the Secretary, dated at Washing- ton, August 16, 1814, and delivered the next day. On Friday, the 18th of August, it was known at Washing- '(') Appendix, No. 14. (3) Appendix, No. 15. (') Appendix, No. 17. (2) Rep. Inv. Comm., 328. (*) Appendix, No. IG. A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 23 ton, that the enemy was coming up the Bay in force ; and the next day there was information of the deter- mination on the part of the Admiral, "to dine in Wash- ington on Sunday, after destroying the flotilla.(')" At this juncture the regular force stated, and relied upon, by the Secretary at War, at the Cabinet Council, amounting to about 1000 men, was found to consist of 330 men of the 36th and 38th regiments of infantry, and two troops of cavalry — 125 men — under Lieut. Col. Laval. (^) One company of the 12th infantry, consisting of 80 men, shortly after arrived at Washington. (^) The call of the War Department for the militia from General Samuel Smith's division of the militia of Mary- land, put in motion the quota from the brigade of General Stansbury, who marched on the 20th of August from Baltimore, with 1353 men.('') This force halted at the Stag Tavern on the evening of the 21st, and on the 22d advanced towards Bladensburg, near which place they encamped, and on the 23d commenced moving towards Marlborough, the orders of Gen. Winder being, to take a position on the road not far from that place. On the evening of the 23d, Lieut. Col. Sterret's command, con- sisting of the 5th Baltimore regiment of volunteers. Major Pinkney's(^) rifle battalion, and two companies (') Com. Barney's Letter, Appendix, No. 18. (2) Rep. Inv. Comm., I'M. The "two troops of dragoons" arrived on the 20th of August, raw recruits, just mounted, and utterly inefficient, (Laval's Statement, Rep. Inv. Comm., p. 230, 238.) and the " two companies'" of the lOtli regiment did not arrive at all. A "company of the 12th" reached Washington on the 22d of August, and joined General Winder in the evening — raw recruits, who received arms, &c., on their arrival. The garrison of Fort MHenry was composed, in part, of the "two companies — 1G7 elfectives — of Sea Fencibles," who could not be spared from it. (Rep. Inv. Comm., p. 58, Div. Orders, 15th Sept., 1814.) Com- pare the account with the statement made by the Secretary at War, July 12, 1813, of the force "in readiness for the defence of Washington." — Appendix, No. 19. (3) Rep. Inv. Comm., p. 14C. ('') Rep. Inv. Comm., 175. (6) Minister to London. i»l {i.f'l 24 A SKETCH OP THE EVENTS, ETC. (Myers' and Magruder's) of artillery, in all about 800 men, joined General Stansbury.(') The fatigued state of Sterret's command induced General Stansbury to halt and remain during the night on the hill near Bla- densburg. A false alarm, by which the command was roused, and kept under arms until after two o'clock in the morning of the 24th, together with other circum- stances, added to the exhaustion and distress of the troops. (^) After making a movement towards Wash- ington, General Stansbury's force was ordered by Gene- ral Winder to return to Bladensburg, where they took post in the orchard near the mill; the artillery, consist- ing of six guns, being behind a small breastwork of earth, commanding the pass into the town, and the bridge southwest of it, which was also commanded by Pinkney's riflemen. In the meantime it was ascertained by General Win- der, that the enemy was proceeding towards Washing- ton by the Bladensburg Road,(^) instead of moving on Annapolis, or Fort Washington, as his course for a time threatened, and he passed into the City of Wash- ington that night over the bridge at the Eastern Branch. He had with him Commodore Barney, w^ho joined him at the Old Fields, with the flotilla men and marines, amounting to about 500 men, Laval's dragoons, 125 in number, some volunteer cavalry, 260 strong, the 36th and 38th regiments of TJ. S. infantry, 330 men, the militia under Col. Hood, (6 or 700,) and the brigade of militia of the District, 1070 men,^) commanded by (') Sterret's Report, Rep. In v. Comm., p. 227. (^) The provisions issued to them consisted of salt beef of an inferior quality, and old and musty flour, — (Stansbury's Report, Rep. Inv. Comm., p. 179.) (3) The object of the enemy in turning towards Annapolis, was to keep the Americans in the dark as to his plan of operations. — Gleig, Camp, at Wash., p. 112. (*) General Smith complained of great deficiency of camp equipage, the public . f A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 26 t 800 state ry to Bla- d was >ck in Win- General W. Smith. These various bodies amounted in numbers to about 5100, "a mass suddenly assembled, without organization or discipline,"(^) and, with the ex- ception of Commodore Barney and Major Peters, with- out any "officers with the least knowledge of service," and wearied and exhausted by sudden exertion, and toil- some marches, in very hot weather. Col. Minor's force of 600 is not included in this estimate, as they were not on the battle-ground, having been detained from taking part in the action, by the neghgent, frivolous, and dila- tory course pursued by the Secretary at War, and the persons of his department whose duty it was to furnish them with arms and ammunition. (^) With 5000 men, assembled in time to organize them, and allow their officers to become acquainted with each other, and with his plan of operations, a general, ac- quainted as General Winder was, with the country through which his enemy had to penetrate, would un- doubtedly have given a good account of him; but to oppose in pitched battle the undisciplined valor and ex- ertions of the same men to that of an equal number of regular, veteran troops, could only be justified by abso- lute necessity — a necessity which existed on the 24th of August, 1814, the result of an improvident disregard on the part of the Secretary at War, of continual warning against coming evil, which he had the means of resist- stores being exhausted, and many of his troops compelled thereby to sleep in the open field; of flints, 200 only could be obtained upon a requisition for 1000; the deficiency was supplied from private sources.' — Rep. Inv. Comm., 202. (I) The flotilla men and marines should be excepted. (f) One very young man, who had charge of the armory, counted over again the flints after they had been counted by Col. Minor's ofl^icers, and so cautiously dealt out the stores, that the regiment was unable to get to the field in time. — See Col. Minor's Statement, Rep. Inv. Comm., 232. 26 A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. I inor and subduing, with honor to his country and credit to himself, but did not call them forth in time. The best British account of the engagement, which took place(') about noon, by an eyewitness, to whose relation of many particulars connected with the present inquiry, we have often had recourse, will render the position of the respective forces, and the action, very intelligible. (^) " The hour of noon was approaching, when a heavy cloud of dust, ap- parently not more than two or three miles distant, attracted our attention. From whence it originated there was little difficulty in guessing, nor did many minutes expire before surmise was changed into certainty; for on turning a sudden angle in the road, and passing a small plantation, which obstructed the vision towards the left, the British and American armies became visible to one another. The position occupied by the latter was one of great strength, and commanding attitude. They were drawn up in three lines upon the brow of a hill, having their front and left flank covered by a branch of the Potomac, and their right resting upon a thick wood and a deep ravine. This river, which may be about the breadth of the Isis at Oxford, flowed between the heights occupied by the American forces, and the little town of Bladensburg. Across it was throwu a nar- row bridge, extending from the chief street in that town to the continuation of the road, which passed through the very centre of their position ; and its right bank (the bank above which they were drawn up) was covered with a narrow stripe of willows and larch trees, whilst the left was alto- gether bare, low, and exposed. Such was the general aspect of their position as at the first glance it presented itself; of which I must endeavor to give a more detailed account, that my description of the battle may be in some degree intelligible. " I have said that the right bank of the Potomac was covered with a narrow stripe of willow and larch trees. Here the Americans had stationed strong bodies of riflemen, who, in skirmishing order, covered the whole front of their army. Behind this narrow plantation, again, the fields (') Gleig, Camp, at Wash., 119. He was a lieutenant in the 85th regiment. (^) The abuse, vituperation, and ridicule (in prose and verse) with which the adminisiration was attacked by its opponents, and by persons devoted to the enemy and opposed to the war, have never been equalled in the history of the countrv. A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 87 were open and clear, intersected, at certain distances, by rows of high and strong palings. About the middle of the ascent, and in the rear of one of these rows, stood the first line, composed entirely of infantry ; at a pro- per interval from this, and in a similar situation, stood the second line; while the third, or reserve, was posted within the skirts of a wood, which crowned the heights. The artillery, again, of which they had twenty pieces in the field, was thus arranged : on the high road, and commanding the bridge, stood two heavy guns; and four more, two on each side of the road, swept partly in the same direction, and partly down the whole of the slope into the streets of Bladensburg. The rest were scattered, with no great judgment, along the second line of infantry, occupying different spaces between the right of one regiment, and the left of another; while the cavalry showed itself in one mass, within a stubble field, near the extreme left of the position. Such was the nature of the ground which they occupied, and the formidable posture in which they waited our ap- proach; amounting, hy their oivn account, Q^ to nine thousand men, a number exactly doubling that of the force which was to attack them. "In the mean time, our column continued to advance in the same order which it had hitherto preserved. The road conducted us for about two miles in a direction parallel with the river, and of consequence with the enemy's line; when it suddenly turned, and led directly towards the town of Bladensburg. Being of course ignorant whether this town might not be filled with American troops, the main body paused here, till the ad- vanced guard should reconnoitre. The result proved that no opposition was intended in that quarter, and that the whole of the enemy's army had been withdrawn to the opposite side of the stream, whereupon the array was again put in motion, and in a short time arrived in the streets of Blad^jnsburg, and within range of the American artillery. Immediately on our reaching this point, several of their guns opened upon us, and kept up a quick and well directed cannonade, from which, as we were again commanded to halt, the men were directed to shelter themselves as much as possible behind the houses. The object of this halt, it was con- jectured, was to give the General an opportunity of examining the Ameri- can line, and of trying the depth of the river; because at present there appeared to be but one practicable mode of attack, by crossing the bridge, and taking the enemy directly in front. To do so, however, exposed as the bridge was, must be attended with bloody consequences, nor could the delay of a few minutes produce any mischief which the discovery of a ford would not amply compensate. "But in this conjecture we were altogether mistaken; for without al- (') Information derived from negroes. If M I A <»KETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. lowing time to the column to close its ranks or to be formed by some of the many stragglers, who were now hurrying, as fast as weariness would permit, to regain their places, the order to halt was countermanded, and the word given to attack ; and we immediately pushed on at double quick time, towards the head of the bridge. While we were moving along the street, a continued fire was kept up, with some execution, from those guns which stood to the left of the road ; but it was not till the bridge was covered with our people that the two-gun battery upon the road itself began to play. Then, indeed, it also opened, and with tremendous effect; for at the first discharge almost an entire company was swept down; but whether it was that the guns had been previously laid with measured exactness, or that the nerves of the gunners became afterwards unsteady, the succeeding discharges were much less fatal. The riflemen likewise now galled us from the wooded bank, with a running fire of musketry ; and it was not without trampling upon many of their dead and dying comrades, that the light brigade established itself on the opposite side of the stream. "When once there, however, everything else appeared easy. Wheel- ing off to the right and left of the road, they dashed into the thicket, and quickly cleared it of the American skirmishers; who falling back with precipitation upon the first line, threw it into disorder before it had fired a shot. The consequence was, that our troops had scarcely shoAvii them- selves when the whole of that line gave way, and fled in the greatest con- fusion, leaving the two guns upon the road in possession of the victors. " ]3ut here it must be confessed that the light brigade was guilty of imprudence. Instead of pausing till the rest of the army came up, they lightened themselves by throwing away their knapsacks and haversacks; and extending their ranks so as to show an equal front with the enemy, pushed on to the attack of the second line. The Americans, however, saw their weakness, and stood firm, and having the whole of their artillery, with the exception of those captured on the road, and the greater part of their infantry in this line, they first checked the ardor of the assailants by a heavy fire, and then in their turn, advanced to recover the ground which was lost.(*) Against this charge, the extended order of the British troops would not permit them to offer an effectual resistance, and they were accordingly borne back to the very thicket upon the river's brink; where they maintained themselves with determined obstinacy, repelling all attempts to drive them through it; and frequently following, to within a short distance of the cannon's mouth, such parts of the enemy's line as gave way. (') General Winder at the head of the fjth regiment. A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 29 "In this state the action continixcd till the second brigade had likewise crossed, and formed upon the right bank of the river j whon the 44th regiment moving to the right, and driving in the skirmi.shers, debouched upon the left flank of the Americans, and completely turned it. In that quarter, therefore, the battle was won; because the raw militia-men, who were stationed there as being the least assailable point, when once broken could not be rallied. Uut on their right, the enemy still kept their ground with much resolution; nor was it till tiie arrival of the 4th regiment, and the advance of the British forces in firm array, to the charge, that they began to waver. Then, indeed, seeing their left in full flight, and the 44th getting in their rear, they lost all order, and dispersed, leaving clouds of riflemen to cover their retreat; and hastened to conceal them- selves in the woods, where it would have been vain to follow them. The rout was now general throughout the whole line. The reserve, which ought to have supported the main body, fled as soon as those in its front began to give way; and the cavalry, instead of charging the British troops, now scattered in pursuit, turned their horses' heads and galloped off", leav- ing them in undisputed possession of the field, and of ten out of the twenty pieces of artillery. "This battle, by which the fate of the American capital was decided, began about one o'clock in the afternoon, and lasted till four. The loss on the part of the English was severe, since, out of two-thirds of the army, which were engaged, upwards of five hundred men were killed and wounded ; and what rendered it doubly severe was, that among these were numbered several officers of rank and distinction. Colonel Thornton who commanded the light brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel "Wood commanding the 85th regiment, and Major Brown who had led the advanced guard, were all severely wounded ; and General Boss himself had a horse shot under hira. On the side of the Americans the slaughter was not so great. Being in possession of a strong position, they were of course less exposed in de- fending, than the others in storming it ; and had they conducted them- selves with coolness, and resolution, it is not conceivable how the day could have been won. But the fact is, that, with the exception of a party of sailors from the gun boats, under the command of Commodore Barney, no troops could behave worse than they did. The skirmishers were driven in as soon as attacked, the first line gave way without offering the slight- est resistance, and the left of the main body was broken within half an hour after it was seriously engaged. Of the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, and not only did they serve their guns with a mil 80 A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. (|uickncss and precision which astonished their assaihintn, but thoy stood till sonic of them were actually bayoneted, with fuses in their hands; nor was it till their leader was wounded and taken, ami they saw theinselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field. With respect to the British army, again, no lino of distinction can be drawn. All did their duty, and none more gallantly than the rest; and though the brunt of the affair fell upon the light brigade, this was owing chiefly to the circumstance of its being at the head of the column, and perhaps, also, in some degree, to its own rash impetuosity. The artillery, indeed, could do little; being unable to show itself in presence of a force so superior; but the six-pounder was nevertheless brought into action, and a corps of rockets proved of striking utility. " Our troops being worn down from fatigue, and of course as ignorant of the country, as the Americans were the reverse, the pursuit could not be continued to any distance. Neither was it attended with much slaugh- ter. Diving into the recesses of the forests, and covering themselves with riflemen, the enemy were quickly beyond our reach; and having no cavalry to scour even the high road, ten of the lightest of their guns were carried off in the flight. The defeat, however, was absolute, and the army, which had been collected for the defence of Washington, was scattered beyond the possibility of, at least, an immediate reunion; and as the distance from Bladensburg to that city does not exceed four miles, there appeared to be no further obstacle in the way, to prevent its immediate capture." It should be remembered, that the formation of the American lines was scarcely completed when the enemy appeared. Colonel Beale, who was on the right, had just arrived with his regiment of Maryland mihtia,(') and taken post on a high ground, near the battery of Commodore Barney, which had been posted so as to com- mand the bridge and the road by which the eilemy ap- proached. (^) To Barney's right extended the flotilla men and marines under Captain Miller, and on his left was Colonel Magruder's regiment (the 1st) of District militia; Lieut.-Col. Scott with the United States infantry, com- (') Tlipy bad marched IG miles that morning, and were taken into battle fatigued and exhausted. (2) Rep. Iiiv. Com., 2\X A SKKTCn OF THK EVENTS, ETC. 91 posed of portions of the 3Gth, 38th, and 12th rcfrimcnts, was in front of Magruder about one hundred yards, but his position was afterwards chan<^ed, because in the way of the ^uns of Major Peters's battery, and the men fell back and formed in line with Ma^ruder's regiment. Peters's battery, (six six-pounders,) Davidson's light infantry and Stull's rifle corps(') were thus in advance, and Colonel Cramer was posted still further in advance, in the woods on the right of the road, with his battalion of Maryland militia. The troops under Stansbury(2) were to the west of Bladensburg, in an orchard, and on the left of the road to Washington, and formed, together with Beal's command, the first line; their artillery was behind a small breastwork in front, and the infantry in the rear and to the left, to protect the position; the other corps which we have mentioned formed the second line.(^) The enemy first approached Stansbury's line, about half-past 12 o'clock, and their light troops were dispersed by the fire of the Baltimore artillery, and taking shelter behind the houses of the villajre and trees, began to concentrate towards the bridge, and press across it and the river. Pinkney's riflemen now opened a very brisk fire upon them, which, added to the artillery, occasioned them a severe loss of men. They passed the bridge, however, and having deployed into line, advanced on the artillery and riflemen, and com- pelled them to retreat, and join the troops of the first (') jlrmed vnih muskets. The conduct of Captain StuU and his company on a subsequent occasion is highly commended by Commodore Perry. Letter of Sept. 9th, 1814.— Palmer's Hist. Reg., vol. iv. p. 172 of Hist. Doc. (2) They consisted of the 1st Baltimore regiment of militia, Lieut.-Col. Ragtm, the 2d Baltimore regiment, Licut.-Col. Schutz, the 5tli Baltimore regiment, (volun. teers,) Lieut.-Col. Sterrett, Pinkney's rifle battalion, and Myers's and Magruder'» Companies of Artillery. (3) The enemy deemed the arrangement and position described to be a "formi- dable posture."' — Gleig, Camp, at Wash., 120. It A. 32 A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. n i >. line. Their advance was annoyed by Captain B arch's company of volunteer artillery, belonging to the city, and a small detachment near it, who opened a sharp cross-fire upon them. General Winder, who was on the left of the 5th regiment, ordered it to advance and sustain the artillery, which it did with great prompt- ness, and opened a steady well-directed fire on the enemy, in which it was followed by Ragan's and Schutz's regiments forming the right and centre of the line. Some rockets thrown by the enemy, which passed very close over the heads of Ragan's and Schutz's regiments, created a panic in these raw troops, in action for the first time, and they broke. Their officers ex- erted themselves to rally them, in which they were aided by General Winder, who displayed great zeal, activity, and personal bravery; but their efforts were ineffectual, and both regiments were broken and dis- persed, leaving the 5th regiment with its flanks ex- posed. This regiment, however, kept its place in line firmly, covered the retreat of Ragan's and Schutz's by a smart fire, and did not retreat till ordered by General Winder to do so, after the enemy had gained both its flanks. The first line having been dispersed, the left of the enemy's force advanced on the second line. Pass- ing along the road in heavy column, they were encoun- tered by the corps of militia under Colonel Cramer, whom they drove back after a short and sharp conflict, and who formed upon Beal's command, and their column displayed in the field on the right of the road, and became exposed to the fire of Peters's battery, which galled, but did not check their progress. The onward movement of the enemy brought them in front of Barney's posi- tion, where, for a moment, they made a halt ; and then A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 33 pushed forward upon him, but received such a destruc- tive discharge from an eighteen pounder, that the road was completely cleared of them ; and a second and third attempt to advance was repulsed in the same effectual manner. To avoid the battery, the enemy turned to the left into a field, with the view to turn the right flank of the position, but the movement was promptly met by the marines under Captains Miller and Sevier, and the flotilla men acting as infantry, who charged them with such vigor that they broke the 85th and the 4th, or "King's Own," and pursued them until they got into a ravine, leaving their officers, Major Brown, Lieut.-Col. Wood, and Colonel Thornton, all severely wounded, in possession of the Americans. General Ross had ahorse shot under him.(^) The dispersion of Stansbury's troops left the ground on the left of the flotilla force unde- fended; and the enemy, having pushed a body of two or three hundred men against the militia under Beale, who were posted in a strong position on the right of Barney, dispersed them, and the British light troops gained both his flanks, and the Commodore himself was wounded severely, and also some of his best officers. The drivers, too, of his ammunition wagons, had gone oflf with them, in the confusion of the retreat of the militia ; and, de- prived of their ammunition, the power to resist any longer ceased, and the flotilla men and marines effected their retreat in good order ; but the Commodore's wound rendered him unable to move, and he was made pri- soner. The behaviour of the flotilla men and marines excited the highest admiration on the part of the enemy. The writer to whose account we have often referred, and who was an eye-witness of the scene, says: — "Of the 6 (I) Gleig, Camp, at Wash., 125. •t 34 A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 'V. ,1 ' sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in the highest terms which their conduct merits; they were employed as gunners; and not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision which aston- ished their assailants, but they stood till some of them were actually bayoneted, with fuses in their hands, nor was it until their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field." (') The British account of the battle mentions " a body of cavalry which showed itself in one mass, within a stubble field, near the extreme left of the position." They consisted of 260 volunteer dragoons, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Tilghman, and 125 United States dragoons, under Lieut.-Col. Laval, all raw re- cruits. They did not " charge the British troops when scattered in pursuit" of the Americans, but "turned their horses' heads, and galloped oflf."(^) The truth is, that these troops were so raw, and of course inefficient, that the horses and men could not be brought to the charge. (^) (') Gleig, Camp, at Wash., 127, 128. But for the delay. Col. Minor's regiment might have been in time upon the ground, and have prevented the turning of Bar- ney's flaniis. It was the Commodore's opinion, that he could have held out against the British army if this strong fresh regiment had been with him in time. — Col. Minor's Letter, Appendix, No. 20. The account of the battle has been drav.'n up from the reports of the officers engaged in it, and others — made to the Investigating Committee, Palmer's Hist. Register, Niles's Register, and the newspapers at Wash- ington and Baltimore, published about the time. The loss of the British, according to Gleig, was upwards of 500 men killed and wounded, but this account docs not include those blown up at the Navy Yard, nor the desertions, which, according to a cotemporary writer in the Baltimore Federal Gazette, must have swelled the actual loss to 1100 men. (2) Gleig, Camp, at Wash., 124. The British writers do not mention the well- known remarkable fact, that the President of the United States, (Mr. Madison,) and the heads of Department, were on the battle-field during a portion of the time of the action. (3) Nat. Int., Sept, 14, 1814. A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 36 The loss of the Americans did not exceed 10 or 12 killed, and 40 wounded. The great body of the American troops retreated after the battle towards Montgomery Court House; and there were, of course, no obstacles in the way of the enemy, who proceeded to march the portion of his army who had not taken an active part in the engagement, into the city of Washington. It is a matter of history, and of lasting reproach to the British nation, that in violation of all the rules of civilized warfare, General Ross proceeded to destroy and lay waste the public buildings, (i) monuments, and property, including a valuable library, and some of the archives, in the most wanton manner, involving in their destruction many private dwellings and a great amount of private property. (^) The feeling to which these acts -ave rise, not only in America, but in Europe,(^) in- ' J d British writers to offer excuses for the outrage. ii has been alleged, that a flag of truce was sent into the city with terms, and that the party bearing it was fired upon from one of the houses, and the horse of General Ross, who accompanied them, was killed, (") and that "so direct a breach of the law of nations" justified the subsequent atrocities. But these excuses are met by the fact, that on the 18th of August, 1814, Admiral Cochrane addressed a letter to Mr. Monroe, the Secre- tary of State, announcing his intention to " destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable." (') Admiral Cockburn, in his (I) The Patsnt Oflice alone escaped. ^ifi'/i^um^ («) Particular pains were taken by Admiral OulIiioBB to destroy the oflice of the "National Intelligencer." (3) Palmer, Hist. Reg., vol. iv. p. 56. (•«) Gleigr, Camp, at Wash., p. 129. (5) The letter is to be found in Palmer's Register, vol. iv. p. 181, Off. Doc. It was not delivered, however, till seven days after the destruction of the city. 'i^'A A: 36 A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. . I II official letter, describes being fired upon — " the General, myself, and some officers, advancing a short way past the first houses of the town, without being accompanied by the troops, the enemy opened a heavy fire of mus- ketry from the Capitol, and two other houses; these were, therefore, almost immediately stormed by our people, taken possession of, and set on fire, after which the town submitted without further resistance. "(') Not one word is said of there being "a flag of truce" with the party. The dispatch of General Ross to Earl Bathurst is entirely silent on the subject ;(^) he does not even mention being fired upon : — after describing the action at Bladensburg, and his arrival at Washington at 8 o'clock at night,(^) he says, "judging it of conse- quence to complete the destruction of the public build- ings with tlie least possible delay, so that the army might retire without loss of time, the following build- ings were consumed, the Capitol, &c. — The object of the expedition having been accomplished, &c." Posi- tive testimony, indeed, exists, that the General and Admiral had halted to confer about he destruction of the Capitol, when the gun was fired that killed the General's horse. The fact was stated to John S. Skinner, Esq., agent for the exchange of prisoners, by Admiral Cockburn himself, soon after the event ; he said not one word about the flag of truce, and did not attempt to justify the act, strongly condemned by Mr. Skinner, but on the contrary said, " he had, upon further reflection, (1) Palmer's Hist. Reg., vol. iv. p. 144, OfT. Doc. (2) Palmer's Hist. Reg., vol. iv. p. 146, Off. Doc. General Armstrong states, that tAT/f/S General Ross and iitn , after entering the city with a small escort, visited the public buildings, set a price on their ransom, and dispatched an agent to open a negotiation with some competent American authority on the subject; the return of the messenger with a rejection of the terms, became the signal for destruction. — (Not War of 1812, vol. ii. p. 1.31.) ,...,,.. --^■.,,^ (*) At which hour, in the latter port of the month of August, darkness prevails. K. A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 37 experienced much regret that it should have been done, and declared that if it were revocable it would not be repeated under similar circumstances, "(i) That such an event as we have described should have taken place without serious effects upon the public mind, cannot be supposed — inquiry and judgment upon the actors in it were necessary consequences. The Secretary at War, on his return to Washington, found the public mind greatly excited against him, and some of his friends went so far as to say that the Presi- dent was among those who intended to cast the respon- sibiUty of the disgrace at Bladensburg upon him. (2) He retired from office, after giving his reasons for the act to the public, in a letter dated September 3, 1814,(^) and never returned to public life. We are not aware that he ever sought any investigation, or asked for any inquiry on the part of Congress ; his appeal was to the pubUc and to history. C*) The course of General Winder — who never lost the confidence of the Executive(*) — was that of an officer who felt that he had been hardly dealt with, and was unfortunate, not through his own fault. He took an active part in the military operations against the enemy at Baltimore, and on the 22d of September, 1814, was (!) Gleig, Camp, at Wash., Appendix, p. 400. Am. ed., Philada. 1821. (2) Letter, John Hohnes, Esq., to General Armstrong, Oct. 15, 1814. K. Arm- strong's Ex. of MKenney's Reply, p. 18. The writer of that pamphlet insists that there was a plot to remove General A, from office. See also " extracts of a letter from Gov. Decha to General Armstrong, Sept. 26, 1814. K. Armstrong's Review of MKenney's Narr., (1846.) See the Boston Patriot, Sept. 21, 1814. "Letter from a gentleman in Washington, Sept. 13, 1814." (3) Bait. Patriot. Nat Int., Sept. 18, 1814. It is also given, bi^ without date, in K. Armstrong's Review of M'Kenney's Narr., (1846,) p. 13. Appendix, No. 21. (<) His "Notices of the War of 1812," published, (1836, vol, i., 1840, vol. ii.,) may also be viewed in this light. (>) Letter! of^fe^ftMMMpiA^MHi»Myv«k«»Adj.-Gen. Parker, Feb. 18, 1815, Appendix, No. 28 Letter of Mr. Madison, Sept. 15, 1834. Appendix, No. 23. i ^: A SKETCH OP THE EVENTS, ETC. ly H f ' in i * ordered to the army on the Niagara frontier, "where his services were deemed of importance."(^) He repaired there with the utmost celerity, though the investigation was going on vt'hich terminated in the Report to which we have so often referred, which did not decide upon the military question, inasmuch as the Committee were of opinion "that that belonged to a military tribunal."(^) The state of the affairs on the frontier gave him no op- portunity to vindicate his fame at the head of regular troops, and he returned to Washington to urge the in- quiry, by a competent military tribunal, of his conduct in the command of the 10th Military District. He had not ceased to demand this vindication from the moment that he found that attempts had been made, " and perse- vered in," to misrepresent his actions and injure his repu- tation. At his urgent instances a Court of Inquiry, of which Major-General Winfield Scott was president, was ordered(^) on the 21st of January, 1815, and their Report not only acquitted him with the highest honor, but estab- lished the propriety of the views he had given to the War Department when he took command of the 10th Military District, and of his subsequent conduct, by the sanction of the highest military authority. The Presi- dent approved the Report, and on the 12th of March. 1815, General Winder was again assigned to the com- mand of the 10th Military District,(') and enjoyed he continued confidence of the Government. (*) He de- clined, however, to continue in the army,^^) and n;- (') Orders of Sept. 22d, 1814. Appendix, No. 24. (2) R. M. Johnson's Letter, 21st Dee., 1814, to General Winder. (3) Orders of 25th Feb., 1815, Appendix, No. 25, which contain uie warrant and finding of the court (*) Gen. Orders, March 12, 1815, Appendix, No. 26. (S) Letter of Adj.-Gen. Parker, March 31, 1815, Appendix, No. 27. («) Letters of Gen. Winder ailll A. mmtm^'imf^mf'Wf'^Qlfl, Appendix, No. 28. iR A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS, ETC. 39 Re- turned to civil life, and the enjoyment of the respect and consideration of his fellow-citizens. His practice at the bar was extensive ; he was elected to the Senate of Maryland, and upon offering himself as a candidate for Congress ten days before the election, and after many of his friends had pledged themselves to his opponent, Mr. M'Kim, was within fourteen votes of being elected. The demonstrations of public respect upon his death, exhibited in the funeral honors paid to him, exceeded those which had ever been accorded to a private citi- zen.(') It is not foreign to our design to observe, that great as was the obloquy attempted to be thrown upon the efforts of the Americans at Bladensburg by some of the writers of their own country, who seemed to forget the difference between a force of hastily assembled citizens, and veteran troops, led by officers of experience, and using novel implements of war,(2) the estimation in which the exploit was held by the enemy should be taken into the account. It was certainly no trifling victory for which the thanks of Parliament were voted to those who achieved it, and which procured for the fallen General who led them, a monument in Westmin- ster Abbey, among the most honored of Britain — which augmented the armorial bearings of his family, and authorized his descendants forever to style themselves "Ross OF Bladensburg." (•) Ballimore Patriot, May 25, 1824. (2) The confusion created among some of the best troops of France at the battle cf Leipsic, by a rocket brigade, is well known tn military men. — Palmer, Hist. Reg., vol. iv. p. 40. I I t 1 ' ■ APPENDIX. No. 1. War Department, July 12, 1814. SiH— You will receive herewith the copy of a circular letter, addressed to the governors of certain States, requiring a body of militia to be organized and equipped, and held in readiness for future service. In case of actual or menaced invasion of the District you command, you will call for a part, or for the whole of the quota assigned to the State of Maryland, which shall have been organized and equipped under the aforesaid requisition. In performing this duty you will be careful to avoid all unnecessary calls, to pro- portion the call to the exigency, and to have inspected, without delay, all corps entering on service, to the end that men, who from any cause are unfit therefor, be promptly discharged, and that a duo proportion, in all cases, be maintained between officers and privates. I am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't servant, J. ARMSTRONG. Brigadier General Winder. War Department, July 4, 1814. Sin — The late pacification in Europe offers to the enemy a large disposable force, both naval and military, and with it the means of giving to the war here, a charac- ter of new and increased activity and extent. Without knowing with certainty that such will be its application, and still less, thaf any particular point or points will become objects of attack, the President has deemed it advisable, as a measure of precaution, to strengthen ourselves on the line of the Atlantic, and (as the principal means of doing this will be found in the militia) to invite the executives of certain States to organize and hold in readiness, for immediate service, a corps of ninety-three thousand five hundred men, under the laws of 28th February, 1795, and 18th of April, 1814. The enclosed detail will show your excellency what, under this requisition, will be the quota of As far as volunteer uniform companies can be found, they will be preferred. The expediency of regarding (as well in the designations of the militia as of their places of rendezvous) the points, the importance or exposure of which will be most likely to attract the views of the enemy, need but be suggested. A report of the organization of your quota, when completed, and of its place or places of rendezvous, will be acceptable. I have the honor to be, with very great respect. Your excellency's most ob't and very humble servant. His Excellency the Governor of 42 APPENDIX. I h *1 m ^ adjt. dep. « 00 • a. « • 0) • ? ISt. ral. • I- 1 s i s "O s •V s m so S V d. i i c« cd 'S w CO cd cd •^ g F* bo #« ff% S «o •\ •s » 9% tt «^ r k «; o V 60 B bo " B B S, cs e V 60 C4 a 60 a 0) bo a 4> bo cd .s 'oS to Id CO a s 09 B 4, B V 611 S *> c: u 60 B 4, 09 • Cd a BS> . cd 2"- to ^^ 09 Cd boa cd ti r 'b a - J g a 2 E B W.S «?" B-a e-o B o- S =r E-^i- IM « « CO ^^ CO 1-1 CO n ^^ 1-^ 1-4 ^^ 1-4 H tf "O "0 B 2 2 B B ^ 'a t3 "O Ed e a . 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An hospital sur- geon would also be useful, perhaps necessary. I fear I shall find it extremely inconvenient, if not impossible, without great injury to the service, to call on the olTicers serving under me to constitute the neces- sary courts martial. If I could bo allowed to call upon some of the recruiting oflicers most convenient to the places where the courts are to be held, it would relieve the officers of my command very much, without injuring the recruiting service. Be pleased to lay these subjects before the Secretary of War for his commands. I am, very respectfully, your ob't servant, (Signed) WM. H. WINDER, Brig. Gen. commanding Wtli Military District. Capt. John R. Beli, jlsst. Inspr. Gen., Washington City. 2 o o ft o« ^^ 1-1 >>>» e a Nos. 3 & 9. Mjutant and Inspector General's Office, Washington, July 12, 1814. Sir — Your letter of the 9th instant has been received, and submitted to the Secretary of War. I am directed to inform you, that when courts martial cannot otherwise be constituted, and when sitting at places which are recruiting stations, officers belonging to these may be put on courts martial. Major Hito and Jemison, Assistant Adjutants General, will be attached to your staff; to one of them you will assign the duties of inspector. I am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't servant, JAS. R. BELL, ^sst. Ingpr. General. P. S. — ^Thero is, at this place, a hospital surgeon's mate, and garrison surgeon's mate. Brio. Gek. W. H. Winder, Commanding M. Dial. a. 10 Baltimore. (') Sent inclosed in the letter of the same date printed at page IG. 44 APPENDIX. No. 4. Crawford' » Hotel, Jlugutl 10, 1814. Sin — I called «it your qiinrters this morning to report myself to you hs Assistant Adjutant Gfuerul, pursuant to an order I yesterday received frr)m tlie War Depart* merit; understanding you had gone to Baltimore on onal respect, and my readiness to conform to liis wishes on all pro|)( r occasions. I remarked, that whatever zeal, diligence, and talent I possessed hail been employed freely, but firmly, ond according to my best views of the pul)lic good, and that, as long as they were left to be so exerte the fact, and to say that the Navy Yard could no longer bo covered. The con'modore was, of course, left to follow the suggestions of his own mind, or to obey the orders, if ordera had been given, of the Navy Department. f)th. And lastly, that means had not been taken to collect a force suflicient for the occasion. As the subject of this rliarge may very soon become one of Congressional in- quiry, I shall at present make but a few remarks. 1st. That no means within reach of the War Department had hern omitted or withheld; that a separate military district, embracing the seat of government, had been created ; that an officer of high rank and character hud been placed in cliurge of it; that to him was given full authority to call for supplies, and for a militia furco of fifteen thousand men; that to this force was ailded the 3t)th regiment of the line, a battalion of the 38th, detachments of the 12th, of the artillery, and of the dra- go'jns, the marine corps, and the crews of the flotilla, under the special command of Commodore Barney, making a total of 1G,300 men. General Winder's oflicial report of the engagement of the 24tli ult. shows how much of this force had been assembled, and the causes why a greater portion of it had not been got together. These will be found to have been altogether extraneous from the Government, and entirely beyond its control: and 2(1. That I'rom what is now known of the enemy's force, of the Idss ho snstai,..jd in the enterjjrise, of the marks of panic under which he retreated, &c. &c., it is obvious, that if all the troops assembled at Bladensburg had been faithful tu them- selves and to their country, the enemy would have been beaten, and the Capital saved. JOHN ARMSTRONG. Bdltimore. Septetnher 3, 1814. t APPENDIX. 61 No. 22. Adjutant and Insp. Guns. Ojfice, Feb. 18, 18 in. Sin — I have the honor to inclose to you a certilleil copy ol' tlie Ileport of the Court of Inquiry appointed to investigate your inihtary coiuhict, as couuvmiuling general of the lOtli Military Di:r were not those of die administration. am Wi Wa APPENDIX. 63 No. 2r). •Adjutant and Inspedor Generals Office, Feb. 2.1, 1815. Oenehai. OnnER. The Secretary of War ilirects tliat tlic following Warrnnt, wiili the Report of the Court of Inquiry in the case of Brigadier General Winder, be publi.shoil to the aiiny. WARRANT. Brigadier General W. H. Winder, of the United States Army, having applied for a Court of Inquiry, to examine and inquire into his conduct as commanding general of the lOih Military District, during his command thereof in the summer of 1814 : A Court of Inquiry, to consist of iMajor General W. Scott, President, Col. John R. Fcnwick and Col. Wm. Drayton, mombors, is hereby appointed to meet at Balti- more on the Qfith day of January, 1815, to examine into the conduct of Brigadier General Winder, as embraced in the Report of the House of Representatives of the Congress of tlie United States by their Connnittee appointed to inquire into the causes, and particulars of the invasion of the city of Washington by the British forces in the month of August, 1814, and such other evidence and documents as may be laid before the Court by Lieut. J. M. Glassell,(') who is hereby appointeil recorder of the same. The Court is hereby empowered and required to give its opinion as to the merits of the case, for tlic information of the President of the United Stutesj ancririico. The members of this Court, in common with their fellowciii/.ens, lament deeply the cai)ture of the Capital; and they regard with no ordinary indignatii)n the spolia- tion of its edifices, those public monuments of art and science, alwiiys deemed sacred by a brave and generous foe; but amidst these minghni and (Minllicting sen- sations, they nevertheless feel it to bo their duty to separate the individual from the calamities surrounding him, and to doclare that to the oirieer ujjon whose oondnct they are to determine, no censure is attributable. On the contniry, when fney take into consideiation the complicated difficulties and embarrassments under which he labored, they are of opinion, notwithstanding the result, that he is entitled to no little commendation ; before the action he exhibited industry, zeal, and talent, and during its continuance a coolness, a promptitude, and a personal valour highly honorable to himself, and worthy of a better fate. W. SCOTT, Major, Gen. and President. Attest G. L. NICHOLAS, Lieut, and Recorder. The President of the United States having been plearni to approve the foregoing opinion of the Court of Inquiry, Brigadier General Winder will honorably resinno his connnand, and report to the major general commanding districts Nos. 4 and 10. By order of the Secretary of War. D. PARKER, jldj. and Inspr, General. APPENDIX, 65 No. 26. Head Quarters. Alh and lOth Military Dists., Baltimore, March 12, ISlf). GsNEnAL ORDEnS. Tlje commaiid of the 10th MiHtnry District is assigned to Brigadier General Wrn. H. Winder, of the U. S. Army, wlio will make his report to, and correspond directly with, the War Department. W. SCOTT, Maj. Gen. commanding. No. 27. Jldjutant and Inspector lleneral's Office, March 31, 1815. Sin — I have the honor to n-qucst that you will report to tliis office the posts and places within your district, which it niny be necessary to garrison in time of peace, and the nimibcr and kind of troops which will be required for each. This information will be necessary to enable the Secretary of War rightly to dis- tribute the small force which Congress lias left to the disposal of the Executive. Your early attention to this subject will promote the interests of the army, and very much oblit,e Your ino-!t obedient servant, D. PARKER, Adjt. and Insp. Gen. The Commanding Gencnil Dist. No. U), Baltimore. No. 28. Baltimore, May 21, 1815. Sin — I have received your circular of the 2'id inst., enclosing the army list for the peace establishment, and the accompanying orders, to which I shall conform. T beg to avail myyelf of this opportunity to state, that I did not req; ^t, uui to tje considered as one of those from whom the selection to compose the peace estab- lishment was to be made, from any disinclination to continue in the service — on the contrary, I had wholly surrendered myself to the profession of a soldier — but be- cause I was aware that there were officers of my own grade, who, to say the least, hud been iiutre fortanate than myself, and others who had, at an early period, devoted themselves tu a mi'itary life, and woidd, therefore, feel much greater em- barrassment in returning to civil employment than myself; and I was not willing to place myself in competition with gentlemen who, from those causes, if none other, I 10 66 APPENDIX. thouglit had a claim to prelerence. I vvisli this motive to bo distinctly understood by the President, that my having declined to talce my chance of continuance in service at this moment may not prejudice my pretensions on any future occasion. I beg you will also allow nie to ask if any, and what representations were made to induce my brother's name to be stricken out of the army list as judge advocate, after the unanimous recommendation of the board, volunteered on their part, in liis behalf. 1 cannot but feel solicitous on this point, since I caiuiot suppose that the recommenilation of the board so honorably given in his behalf would have been overruled, unless some very strong objections, unknown to the board, had been made against him. The motive which produces this solicitude on my part will, I am sure, recommend itself very decisively to your feelings. I am, &c. &e , W. H. WINDER. Hon. a. .1. Dallas, Acling Seirelttry of War, Washington Ci/y. Department of War, May 29, 1815. Sir — I have received your letter of the 24th instant. The motives of your con- duct in declining to be considered as one of the officers from whom the selection to compose the military peace establishment was to be made, have been justly appre- ciated ; and they will be communicated to the President in compliance with your request. The very sincere personal respect and esteem which I feel for you, will induce me to depart from the rule that I had presented to myself in relation to the arrangement of the military peace establishment. The general ofTiceis were con- sulted confidentially, their opinions, though entitled to great attention, co'dd never be regarded as conclusive ; and you will readily perceive, that private indiviti'ials have no right to demand the reasons which inlliience this department in the pcn'ormance of its public duties. But as an exception to my general rule, and in a si)irit of per- fect good will, the inquiry in the case of your brother shall be answered. The Act of Congress of the lllli of January, 1812, authorizes the appointment of a judge advocate to each division of the army. Marylatul is at the extreme of divisions of the North; and it was deemed expedient, in particular, that one of the judge advocates should reside in the State of New York, where the great body of the army of that division will jjrobably be stationed. This view of the subject will naturally account for the change that has been made; and bo assured that no sen- timent of disrespect or unkindness mingled in the transaction. A. J i^ALLaS. Brio. (j!kn. W. H. Winiikh. THK. END. n «**• understood iiiunnce in o occasion. jvcro inndo 3 advocate, part, in his ;e that the have been had been part will, I INDER. !0, 1815. r your con- selection to stiy appre- with your vill induce tion to the were eon- d never be u'Kils have cribrinance )irit of per- ppointment extreme of one of the eat body of ;ubjcct will lat no sen- ALLhS.