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Las diegrammes suivsnts illustrent la mAthede. 1 2 3 4 5 6 MKIOCOPV MSOWTION TtST CHART (ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2) A ^IPPLIED IIVMSr I 1653 East Moin Stmt (716) «2 - 0300 - Phon. (716) 2Sa - 5989 - r APOLOGETICS VOLUME I. FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS OR THE RATIONAL VINDICATION OF CHRISTIANITY FRANCIS R. BEATTIE, B.D., Ph.a.., D.D., LL.D. Fhofessor or Apologktics and Systematic Theology in the Presbyterian Theo- logical Seminary of Kentucky; Author op " Radical Criticism," "The Presbvtbriam Standards," Etc., Etc. With an Introduction BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, D. D., LL. D. Professor of Systematic Theology in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, New Jersey I THREE VOLUMES VOLUME I. FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS RICHMOND, VA. The Pkesbvterian Committee of Publication "BTiiovSss Copyrighted by Thi Pusbytmian Committbx of Pubucation R. E. Maoill, Stcrttary 1903 Pkiktid by Whittbt ft SHirriHON RiCNMOMO, Va. 5 b TO Ay TPntfe WHOSB CHUMNO FKBSBNCB AND PATIENT lUVICB UOHTKNBD MANY HOURS OF LABOK THIS VOLUME IS AFFECTIONATBLY D!-'DICATBD 7o;^''io ■■ "And be ready always to give a reason for the hope that is in you with meekness and fear."— The Apostle Peter. "And in the defence and confirmation of the gospel, knowing that I am set for the defence of the gospel."— The Apostle Pauu "Hold that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy crown."— The Afostu: John. "A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways."— The Afostlk James. PREFACE. THIS treatise seeks to give a somewhat complete account of the rational grounds upon which the Christian system securely rests. Christianity proclaims a changeless gospel to an ever-changfing world. This implies that its message and its vindication must be wisely adapted to constantly changing conditions. And this being the case, the task of Apologetics is ceaseless, and its service is ever needed. While we place a very high value upon Apologetics in its own proper sphere, we are careful not to overrate the service it can render. Christianity in its essence does not stand or fall, is not made or unmade, by the effectiveness of any apologetic proposed for it. In the last analysis, the Christian system is its own best vindication, for the reason, mainly, that the foundations of Christianity lie deeper than any apologetic on its behalf can go. Apologetics neither plans nor lays thest foundations ; it can only exhibit their inherent stre igth and abiding security. Nor must it be supposed that Apologetics is able to construct the contents of the Christian religion; these are provided in the gracious revelation of the redeeming activity of God, as it is working out its divine purpose among men all along the ages. Still less must we expect that Apologetics can convert a single soul ; only the gospel of the grace of God can effect this. But when all this is said, it is still true that, from the very nature of the case, Apologetics must ever retain its most important place and task. It is bound to present to each succeeding age the 8 PREFACE. most effective vindication it can of the rational validity, of the divine redeeming reality, and of the unique supernatural character of Christianity. The fact just stated provides, in part at least, a reason for the publication of another treatise upon a subject whose literature is already extensive and valuable. At the same time, another word of justification for sending forth a treatise like this may be uttered. It can hardly be ciid that we have in our own English tongue a work which fully covers the whole wide field of Apologetics. We have v^■± treatises from German sources, but these, even when well translated, do not suitably meet the needs of the average English-speaking student. In addition, while we have from the pens of English writers very many most excellent trea- tises on natural theology, theism, the philosophy of religion, and the evidences of Christianity, there is not, so far as we are aware, a single comprehensive treatise from such a source, which binds the entire defence and vindication of Christianity into a well-orga.iized whole, so as thereby to present what may be properly called a scientific system of Apologetics. This treatise ventures to supply this need, but with what success the reader must be the final judge. The general plan and view-point of the treatise may be merely indicated. It proposes to organize, according to the inner nature of Christianity, as the only truly redemptive religion, the whole materials of its defence and vindication. It makes an attempt to exhibit, in a somewhat scientific way, a complete apologetic for the Christian system, drawn from its inner nature, as the only redeeming religion. As thus regarded, Christianity may be construed in three well-defined relations. First, its philosophical foundations PREFACE. 9 are to be carefully examined; secondly, its historicity and divine authority must be taken fully into account; and, thirdly, its practical restilts in the world, in relation to the pressing problems of thought and life among men, must be diligently considered. From these three view-points we derive the three main branches of Apologetics. They may be termed Fundamental, Christian, and Applied Apologetics, respectively. The first leads us to construe Christianity mainly in relation to its underlying philosophy; the second calls upon us to interpret Christianity in the light of its unique redemptive history; while the third bids us test the Christian system by means of its splendid fruitage in the world. These three branches of Apologetics are closely related to each other; yet they are so well defined, in a logical way at least, that each merits separate treatment. Hence emerges the plan for the three volumes of this treatise. The present volume is the first, and it deals entirely with Fundamental or Philosophical Apologetics. Therein the underlying philosc^phy involved in Christianity is to be vindicated. Not much need now be said concerning the general stand- point of this treatise, as this can be best gathered by the careful reader from the discussion itself. In philosophy it stands firmly on the ground of rational realism, as against both materialism and idealism. As to its epistemolog^, it holds, against empiricism and skepticism, to the rationality of human cognition. In its philosophy of religion, it maintains a definite vital theism, over 'nst deism and pantheism. In regard to Christianity, . asserts a well- defined supernaturalism, against all types of naturalism. As to the essence of Christianity, it finds this in the redeeming liniliiifc lO PREFACE. activity of God, mediated in the world by Jesus Christ, and administered by the Holy Spirit, as against all other systems of religion. As to its doctrinal standpoint, it rests confi- dently on the basis of the hi toric Reformed system. And in its temper, it seeks to cherish, over against a hopeless pessimism, a hopeful meliorism, which believes that things are getting better, and that the world is surely moving on towards that welcome day when the eternal sun of optimism shall brightly shine in a cloudless sky. Such is the stand- point of this treatise. Some care has been taken to make this work useful to the average English-speaking student, and at the same time to supply some aid to any who may wish to pursue their reading more widely in this inviting field. To this end, a partial bibliography is given in connection with each chapter. This bibliography in no case claims to be complete. It simply gives the titles of a few of the books easily accessible to the average English reader. It is hoped, however, that this bibliography may in each case serve a useful purpose. A well-digested table of contents is affixed to each chapter, to further aid the student in grasping the discussions con- tained therein. An index is added at the end of the volume. Professor Benjamin B. Warfield, D. D., LL. D., of the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J., has been kind enough o accede to the author's request to write an Intro- duction for the treatise, which greatly enhances its value. For this splendid service the reader will no doubt be deeply grateful, as the author is truly thankful. The other two volumes are in course of preparation, and will be issued without undue d»lay. The three volumes rpprescnt, in their own way, the results of twenty years of PREFACE. II reading and lection upon these themes, fifteen of which have been devoted to teaching these topics in the theologfical class-room. Tf there really be any need for such a treatise, it is humbly .v>ped that this may to some extent supply this need, and be useful as a sort of hand-book in Apologetics. Above all, if it shall do anything to make it plain that Christianity has philosophical validity, historic reality, and redemptive sufficiency, the author will be more than rewarded for all his labors. May the Head of the Church accept it, and grant it some measure of usefulness ! Francis R. Beattie. Louisville, Ky. 1903. rifl "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is our Lord."— Deut. vi. 4. "God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."— ^ oh n iv. 24. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handiwork." — Psa. xix. i. "Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things, that bringeth out their host by number: he calleth them all by names by the greatness of his migh'., for that he is strong in power; not one faileth."— Isaiah xl. 26. "Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" — ^Job xi. 7. "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" — Psa. cxxxix. 7. "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." — Shoktu Cati- CHtSM, QUES. 4. CONTENTS. VOLUME I. FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS. Pagb. TbxPrkfacs, 7 Thi Table of Contents, 13 An Intkoduction by the Rev. Pbofessor Benjamin B. Wak- riELD, D. D., LL. D 19 INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I. The Spheee, the Scope and the Spibit of Apologetics, . 3$ CHAPTER II. The Definition, the Aiu and the Natube of Afologetics, 48 CHAPTER III. The Place, the Method and the Divisions of Apologetics, 63 CHAPTER IV. Apologetics and the Theoby of Knowledge, .... 76 CHAPTER V. Apologehcs and the Philosophy of Belief, . . . . g6 W^^ 14 CONTENTS. THE FIRST PART. FUNDAMENTAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL APOLO- GETICS. CHAPTER I. p,,. The Meaning, the Definition and the Divisions of Funda- mental Apologetics, 113 THE FIRST DIVISION. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THEISM. THE FIRST SECTION. CHAPTER II. The Nature of Reugious and Theistic Belief, ... 135 THE SECOND SECTION. CHAPTER III. The Origin of Reugious and Theistic Belief: The Fetich- istic Theory, 139 CHAPTER IV. The Origin of Religious and Theistic Belief: Naturism and Animism, 156 CHAPTER V. The Origin of Religious and Theistic Belief : Spiritism and Ancestorism, 169 CHAPTER VI. The Origin of Religious and Theistic Belief : Henotheism, . 183 CONTENTS. 15 CHAPTER VII. p*„^ The Obigin of Religious and Theistic Belief : The Function OF Reasoning or Inference, i9S CHAPTER VIII. The Origin of Religious and Theistic Belief: Idealistic Evolution, 209 CHAPTER IX. The Origin of Reugious and Theistic Belief : The Function OF Revelation, 222 CHAPTER X. The Origin of Reugious and Theistic Belief : The Accepted Theory, 234 THE SECOND DIVISION. THE ONTOLOGY OF THEISM. THE FIRST SECTION. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. CHAPTER I. Introductory Topics, 249 CHAPTER II. The Psychical Argument: Proof fro . the Autopistic Nature of Theistic Belief, 262 CHAPTER III. The Psychical Argument : Proof from the Idea of a Neces- sary Being, 274 i6 CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. p^ Tai Psychical Pioors : Pioop FsOi^ the Idea of iNnNrrv, . ago CHAPTER V. The Psychical ?>oofs : Proof from the Principle ok Intel- L".ENCE, 304 CHAPTER VI. The Cosmical Proofs: Causation and the Proof from Cosmic Origin, 316 CHAPTER VII. The Cosmic \l Proofs: Proof from Cosmic Progress, . . 335 CHAPTER VIII. The Cosmical Proof.<: ; Pjumv from Cosmic C ^er, ... 347 CHAPTER IX. The Cosy <>. Proofs : Proof from Cosmic Design, . . . 3G0 CHAPTER X. The Moral Proofs : Moral Theory : Proof from the Icea of Right, 382 CHAPTER XI. The Mokal Proofs : Proof from the Fact of Obligation and THE Idea of the Good, 395 CHAPTER XII. The Moral Proofs : Proof from History, 409 CHAPTER XIII. The Kantian CRinasM, and a Summary of Theism, . . 418 CONTENTS. 17 THE ONTOLOGY OF THEISM. THE SECOND SECTION. THE ANTITHEISTIC THEORIES. CHAPTER I. rKc Atbeism : Statxmint and Cuncisii, 4.^1 CHAPTER II. Semi-Materiaush : Statement and OuTiasu , ... 445 CHAPTER III. Pure MATEioAusif: Statement, 459 CHAPTER IV. Pure Materialism : Criticism, 4^9 CHAPTER V. PSYCHOU'GICAL MaTEP'ALISM: STATEMENT AND CRITICISM, . 484 CHAPTER VI. Materialistic Evolution : Statement and Criticism, . 497 CHAPTER VII. Positivism : Statement and Criticism, S09 CHAPTER VIII. AcNosTiasM: Statement, . S^i ■ l8 CONTENTS. CHAPTER IX. p^o^ AcNosTiasM: Ctmasu, ........ 531 CHAPTER X. Deism and Rationausm : Statement and CuTiasM, . . 545 CHAPTER XI. Pantheism: Statement, 558 CHAPTER XII. Pantheism: CRrriasM, 569 CHAPTER XIII. Pessimism and the Pioblbm op Eva: Statement and Criti- asM, 581 The Index Sj^ INTRODUCTORY NOTE. By benjamin B. WARFIELD, D. D., LL. D. IT gives me great pleasure to respond to Dr. Beattie's request that I shall say a few words by way of intro- duction to his comprehensive work on Apologetics. I am purposely laying stress on the comprehensiveness of the work. It is always a satisfaction to have placed in our hands a treatise on one of the theological disciplines, which de- velops with serenity and sanity its entire content. In the case of Apologetics, however, such an achievement is par- ticularly to be welcomed. We have had many apologies; perhaps no branch of scientific theology has been more fruitful during the past two centuries. But we have had comparatively few surveys of the whole field of Apologetics. Perhaps Dr. Beattie's is the first to be produced by an American Presbyterian. The fact is, despite the richness of our apologetical literature. Apologetics has been treated very much like a step-child in the theological household. The encyclopaedists have seemed scarcely to know what to do with it. They have with difficulty been persuaded to allow it a place among the theological disciplines at all. And, when forced to recognize it, they have been very prone to thrust it away into some odd comer, where it could hide its diminished head behind the skirts of some of its more esteemed sisters. This widespread misprision of Apologetics has been greatly fostered by the influence of two opposite (if they be indeed opposite) tendencies of thought, which have very deeply affected the thinking even of theologians who are in principle antagonistic to them. I mean Rationalism and Mysticism. To Rationalistn, of course, Apologetics were ao INTRODUCTORY NOTE. ,' an inanity; to Mysticism, an impertinence. Wherever, therefore, RationaHstic presuppositions have intruded, there proportionately the validity of Apologetics has been ques- tioned. Wherever mystical sentiment has seeped in, there the utility of Apologetics has been more or less distrusted. At the present moment, the Rationalistic tendency is perhaps most active in the churches in the form given it by Albrecht Ritschl. In this form it strikes at the very roots of Apolo- getics by the distinction it erects between religious and theoretical knowledge. Where religion is supposed to seek and find expression only in value-judgments — the subjective product of the human soul in its struggle after personal freedom — and thus to stand out of all relation with theo- retical knowledge, there, obviously, there is no place for a vindication of Christian faith to reason and no possibility of Apologetics. In a somewhat odd parallelism to this(though, perhaps, it is not so odd, after all) the mystical tendency is showing itself in our day most markedly in a widespread inclination to decline Apologetics in favor of the so-called testimonium Spiritus Sancti. The convictions of the Christian man, we are told, are not the product of reasons addressed to his intellect, but are the immediate creation of the Holy Spirit in his heart. Therefore, it is intimated, we can not only do very well without these reasons, but it is something very like sacrilege to attend to them. Apolo- getics, accordingly, is not merely useless, but may even become noxious, because tending to substitute a barren intellectual ism for a vital faith. We need not much disturb ourselves over such utterances when they are the expression, as they often are in our modern church, of the intellectual distress of those whose own Apologetic has proved too weak to withstand the Ra- tionalistic as> ailt, and who are fain, therefore, to take refuge from the oppressive rationalism of their understandings in an empty irrationalism of the heart. In these cases the extremes have met, and the %vould-be mystic preser\'es INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 21 nothing but his dialect to distinguish him from the Ritschlite rationalist. What he needs for his cure is clearly not less Apologetics, but more Apologetics — lacking which he must ever remain of a "double mind," clingfing with the despera- tion of a drowning man to a faith on which his own intellect has passed the sentence of irrationality. The case is very diflferent, however, when we encounter very much the same forms of speech on the lips of heroes of the faith, who depreciate Apologetics because they feel no need of "rea- sons" to ground a faith which they are sure they have received immediately from God. Apologetics, they say, will iitfver make a Christian. Ch stians are made by the creative Spirit alone. And when God Almighty has implanted faith in the heart, we shall not require to seek for "reasons" to ground our conviction of the truth of the Christian religion. We have tasted and seen, and we know of ourselves that it is from God. Thus, the sturdiest belief joins hands with unbelief to disparage the defences of the Christian religion. Dr. Abraham Kuyper, one of the really great theologians of our time, is a very striking instance of thinkers of this tendency. It is not to be supposed that Dr. Kuyper would abolish Apologetics altogether. He has written an Encyclo- padia of Sacred Theology, and in it he gives a place to ApoiogeticR ii-^ong the other disciplines. But how subordi- nate a place ; And in what a curtailed form ! Hidden away as a subdivision of a subdivision of what Dr. Kuyper calls the "Dogmatological Group" of disciplines (which corres- ponds roughly to what most encyclopaedists call "Systematic Theology"), one has to search for it before he finds it, ar . when he finds it, he discovers that its function is confir d closely, we might almost say jealously, to the narrow task of defending developed Christianity against philosophy, falsely so called. After the contents of Christianity have been set forth thetically in Dogmatics and Ethics, it finds itself, it seems, in a three fold conflict. This is waged with 22 INTRODUCTORY NOTE. i a pseudo-Christianity, a pseudo-religion, and a pseudo- philosophy. Three antithetic dogmatological disciplines are therefore requisite — Polemics, Elenchtics and Apologetics, corresponding, respectively, to heterodoxy, paganism, phil- osophy. The least of these is Apologetics, which concerns itself only with the distinctively philosophical assault on Christianity. Meanwhile, as for Christianity itself, it has remained up to this t.">int — let us say it frankly — ^the great Assumption. The work of the exegete, the historian, the systematist, has all hung, so to speak, in the air; not until all their labor is accomplished do they pause to wipe their streaming brows and ask whether they have been dealing with realities, or perchance with fancies only. Naturally it is not thus that Dr. Kuyper represents it to himself. He supposes that all these workers have through- out wrought in faith. But >u seems not quite able to conceal from himself that they have not justified that faith, and that some may think their procedure itself, therefore, unjustified, if not unjustifiable. He distributes the departments of theological science into four groups, corresponding roughly with the Exegetical, Historical, Systematic and Practical disciplines which the majority of encyclopaedists erect, although for reasons of his own, very interestingly set forth, he prefers to call them, respectively, the Bibliological, Eccle- siological, Dogmatological and Diaconiological groups of disciplines. Now, when he comes to discuss the contents of these groups in detail, he betrays a feeling that something is lucking at the l)eginning. "Before dealing separately with the four groups of departments of study into which theology is divided," he says,* "we must give a brief resume from the second part of this Encyclopadia, of how the subject arrives at the first group. Logical order demands that the first group bring you to the point where the second begins, that the second open the way for the third, and that the third introduce you to the fourth. But no other precedes the first ^ Encychptedie dcr Hcilige Godgeteerdheid, Deel III., p. 4 sq. INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 23 group, and it is accordingly in place here to indicate how we arrive at the first group." Just so, surely! Dr. Kuyper proceeds to point out that the subject of theology is the human consciousness; that in this con- sciousness there is implanted a sensus divinitatis, a semen religionis, which impels it to seek after the knowledge of God ; that in the sinner this action is renewed and quickened by the palingenesis:, through which the subject is opened for the reception of the special revelation of God made first by deed, culminating in the Incarnation, and then by word, centering in the Scriptures. Thus, by the testimoniu,n Spiritus Sancti, the subject is put in possession of the revela- tion of God embodied in the Scriptures, and is able to proceed to explicate its contents through the several disci- plines of theological science. Now, what is it that Dr. Kuyper has done here except outline a very considerable— though certainly not a complete — Apologetics, which must precede and prepare the way for the "Bibliological Group" of theological departments? We must, it seems, vindicate the existence of a sensus divinitatis in man capable of producing a natural theology independently of special reve- lation ; and then the reality of a special revelation in deed and word ; and as well, the reality of a supernatural prepa- ration of the heart of man to receive it; before we can proceed to the study of theologfy at all, as Dr. Kuyper has outlined it. With these things at least we must, then, con- fessedly, reckon at the outset; and to reckon with these things is to enter deeply into Apologetics. As the case really stands, we must say even more. Despite the attractiveness of Dr. Kuyper's distribution of the departments of theological science, we cannot think it an improvement upon the ordinary schema. It appears to us a mistake to derive, as he does, the principium divisionis from the Holy Scriptures. The Scriptures, after all, are not the object of theolog}', but only its source ; and the principium divisionis in this science, too, must be taken, as Dr. Kuyper M INTRODUCTORY NOTE. I himself argues,* from the object. Now, the object of theology, as Dr. Kuyper has often justly insisted, is the cctypal knowledge of God. This knowledge of God is deposited for us in the Scriptures, and must needs be drawn out of them — ^hence "Exegetical Theology." It has been derived from the Scriptures by divers portions and in divers manners, for the life of the Church through the ages, and its gradual assimilation must needs be traced in i*^s effects on the life of the Christian world — hence "Historical The- ology." It is capable of statement in a systematized thetical form — hence "Systematic Theology." And, so drawn out from Scripture, so assimilated in the Church's growth, so organized into a system, it is to be made available for life — hence "Practical Theology." But certainly, before we draw it from the Scriptures, we must assure ourselves that there is a knowledge of God in the Scriptures. And, before we do that, we must assure ourselves that there is a knowledge of God in the world. And, before we do that, we must assure ourselves that a knowledge of God is possible for man. And, before we do that, we must assure ourselves that there is a God to know. Thus, we inevitably work back to first principles. And, in working thus back to first princi- ples, we exhibit the indispensability of an "Apologetical Theology," which of necessity holds the place of the first among the five essential theological disciplines. It is easy, of course, to say that a Christian man must take his standpoint not above the Scriptures, but in the Scrip- tures. He very certainly must. But surely he must first have Scriptures, authenticated to him as such, before he can take his standpoint in them. It is equally easy to o^j that Christianity is attained, not by demonstrations, but by a new birth. Nothing could be more true. But neither could any- thing be more unjustified than the inferences that are drawn from this truth for the discrediting of Apologetics. It certainly is not in the power of all the demonstrations in the ' Encyclopedia, E. T., p. 629. INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 25 world to make a Chris', ar. Paul may ola».t and Apollos water ; it is God alone who gives the increase. But it does not seem to follow that Paul would as well, therefore, not plant, and Apollos as well not water. Faith is the gift of God; but it does not in the least follow that the faith that God gives is an irrational faith, that is, a faith without grounds in right reason. It is beyond all question only the prepared heart that can fitly respond to the "reasons" ; but how can even a prepared heart respond, when there are no "reasons" to draw out its action? One might as well say that photography is independent of light, because no light can make an impression unless the plate is prepared to receive it. The Holy Spirit does not work a blind, an ungrounded faith in the heart. What is supplied by his creative energy in working faith is not a ready-made faith, rooted in nothing, and clinging without reason to its object ; nor yet new grounds of belief in the object presented ; but just a new ability of the heart to respond to the grounds of faith, sufficient in themselves, already present to the under- standing. We believe in Christ because it is rational to believe in him, not though it be irrational. Accordingly, our Reformed fathers always posited in the production of faith the presence of the "argttmentum propter quod credo," as well as the "principium seu causa efUciens a quo ad cre- dendum adducor." That is to say, for the birth of faith in the soul, it is just as essential that grounds of faith should be present to the mind as that the Giver of faith should act creatively upon the heart. We are not absurdly arguing that Apologetics has in itself the power to make a man a Christian or to conquer the world to Christ. Only the Spirit of Life can communicate life to a dead soul, or can convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment. But we are arguing that faith is, in all its exercises alike, a form of conviction, and is, therefore, necessarily grounded in evidence. And we are arguing that evidence accordingly has its part to play in the a6 INTRODUCTORY NOTE. conversion of the soul ; and that the S3rstematicaHy organized evidence which we call Apologetics similarly has its part to play in the Christianizing of the world. And we are arguing that this part is not a small part; nor is it a merely sub- sidiary part ; nor yet a merely defensive part — ^as if the one end of Apologetics were to protect an isolated body of Christians from annoyance from the surrounding world, or to aid the distracted Christian to bring his head into har- mony with his heart. The part that Apologetics has to play in the Christianizing of the world is rather a primary part, and it is a conquering part. It is the distinction of Chris- tianity that it has come into the world clothed with the mission to reason its way to its dominion. Other religions may appeal to the sword, or seek some other way to propa- gate themselves. Christianity makes its appeal 1 right reason, and stands out among all religions, therefore, as distinctively "the Apologetic religion." It is solely by rea- soning that it has come thus far on its way to its kingship. And it is solely by reasoning that it will put all its enemies under its feet. Face to face with the tremendous energy of thought and the incredible fertility in assault which characterizes the world in its anti-Christian manifestation, Christianity finds its task in thinking itself thoroughly through, and in organizing, not its defence only, but also its attack. It stands calmly over against the world with its credentials in its hands, and fears no contention of men. * It is a standing matter of surprise to us that the brilliant school of Christian thinkers, on whose attitude towards Apologetics we have been animadverting, should be tempted to make little of Apologetics. When we read, for instance, the beautiful exposition of the relation of sin and regene- ration to science which Dr. Kuyper has given us in his Encyclopedia, we cannot understand why he does not magnify, instead of minifying, the value of Apologetics. Perhaps? the explan.itinn is to be found in a tendency to make too absolute the contrast between the "two kinds of science" INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 37 — ^that which is the product of the thought of sinful man in his state of nature, and that which is the prod^ci of man under the influence of the regenerating grace of God. There certainly do exist these "two kinds of men" in the world — men under the unbroken sway of sin, and men who have been brought under the power of the palingenesis. And the product of the intellection of these "two kinds of men" will certainly g^ve us "two kinds of science." But the difference between the two is, after all, not accurately described as a diflFerence in kind — gradus non mutant speciem. Sin has not destroyed or altered in its essential nature any one of man's faculties, although — since it corrupts homo totus — it has affected the operation of them all. The depraved man neither thinks, nor feels, nor wills as he ought; and the products of his action as a scientific thinker cannot possibly escape the influence of this everywhere operative destructive power ; although, as Dr. Kuyper lucidly points out, they are affected in different degrees in the several "sciences," in accordance with the nature of their objects and the rank of the human faculties engaged in their structure. Neverthe- less, there is question here of perfection of performance, rather than of kind. It is "science" that is produced by the subject held under sin, even though imperfect science — fall- ing away from the ideal here, there and elsewhere, on account of all sorts of deflecting influences entering in at all points of the process. The science gf sinful man is thus a substantive part of the abstract science produced by the ideal subject, the general human consciousness, though a less valuable part than it would be without sin. It is well that it is so ; for otherwise there would be no "science" attainable by man at all. For regeneration is not, in the first instance, the removal of sin : the regenerated man remains a sinner. Only after his sanctification has become complete can the contrast between him and the unregenerate sinner become absolute : not until then, in any case, cnuld there be thought to exist an absolute contrast between his 28 INTRODUCTORY NOTE. intellection and that of the sinner. In the meantime, the regenerated man remains a sinner; no new faculties have been inserted into him by regeneration ; and the old faculties, common to man in all his states, have been only in some measure restored to their proper functioning. He is in no condition, therefore, to produce a "science" differing in kind from that produced by sinful man; the science of palin- genesis is only a part of the science of sinful humanity, though no doubt its best part ; and only along with it can it enter as a constituent part into that ideal science which the composite human subject is producing in its endless effort to embrace in mental grasp the ideal object, that is to say, all that is. Even if the palingenesis had completed its work, indeed, and those under its sway had become "perfect," it may be doubted whether the contrast between the science produced by the two classes of men could be treated as absolute. Sinful and sinless men are, after all, both men; and being both men, are fundamentally alike and know fun- damentally alike. Ideally there is but one "science," the subject of which is the human spirit, and the object all that is. J.I'??.nwhile, as things are, the human spirit attains to this science only in part and by slow accretions, won through many partial and erroneous constructions. Men of all sorts and of all grades work side by side at the common task, and the common edifice grows under their hands into ever fuller and truer outlines. As Dr. Kuyper finely says himself,* in the conflict of perceptions and opinions, those of the strongest energy and clearest thought finally prevail. Why is not the palingenesis to be conceived simply as preparing the stronger and clearer spirits whose thought always finally prevails? It is not a different kind of science that they are producing. It is not even the same kind of science, but as part of a different edifice of truth. Through them merely the better scientific outlook, and the better scientific product, are striving in conflict with the outlook and product of 'Encyclop., etc., E. T., p. 151. i INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 29 fellow-workers, to get built into the one great edifice of truth ascertained, which is rising slowly because of sin, but surely because of palingenesis. Only in the Divine mind, of course, does science lie per- fect — the perfect comprehension of all that is in its organic completeness. In the mind of perfected humanity, the perfected ectypal science shall at length lie. In the mind of sinful humanity, struggling here below, there can lie only a partial and broken reflection of the object, a reflection which is rather a deflection. The task of science is, therefore, not merely quantitative, but qualitative; the edifice must be built up to its completion, and the deflection induced by sin must be corrected. This cannot be accomplished by sinful man. But he makes the effort continuously, and is continu- ously attaining his measure of success — a success that varies inversely with the rank of the sciences. The entrance of regeneration prepares men to build better and ever more truly as the effects of regeneration increase intensively and extensively. The end will come only when the regenerated universe becomes the well-comprehended object of the science of the regenerated race. It would seem, then, a grave mistake to separate the men of the palingenesis from the race, a part of which they are, and which is itself the object of the palingenesis. And no mistake could be greater than to lead them to decline to bring their principles into conf ict with those of the unregenerate in the prosecution of the common task of man. It is the better science that ever in the end wins the victory; and palingenetic science is the better science, and to it belongs the victory. How shall it win its victory, however, if it declines the conflict? In the ordinance of God, it is only in and through this conflict that the edifice of truth is to rise steadily onwards to its per- fecting. In the fact thus brought out, the ultimate vindication of the supreme importance of Apologetics lies, and as well the vindication of its supreme utility. In the prosecution of the 30 INTRODUCTORY NOTE. I\ tasks of Apologetics, virc see the palingenesis at work on the science of man at its highest point. And here, too, the "man of stronger and purer thought" — even though that he has it is of God alone — "will prevail in the end." The task of the Christian is surely to urge "his stronger and purer thought" continuously, and in all its details, upon the attention of men. It is not true that he cannot soundly prove his posi- tion. It is not true that the Christian view of the world is subjective merely, and is incapable of validation in the forum of pure reason. It is not true that the arguments adduced for the support of the foundations of the Christian religion lack objective validity. It is not even true that the minds of sinful men are inaccessible to the "evidences," though, in the sense of the proverb, "convinced against their will," they may "remain of the same opinion still." All minds are of the same essential structure; and the less illuminated will not be able permanently to resist or gainsay the determina- tions of the more illuminated. The Christian, by virtue of the palingenesis working in him, stands undoubtedly on an indefinitely higher plane of thought than that occupied by sinful man as such. And he must not decline, but use and press the advantage which God has thus given him. He must insist, nnd insist again, that his determinations, and not those of the unilluminated, must be built into the slowly rising fabric of human science. Thus will he serve, if not obviously his own generation, yet truly all the generations of men. We may assure ourselves from the outset that the palingenesis shall ultimately conquer to itself the whole race and all its products; and we may equally assure ourselves that its gradually increasing power will show itself only as the result of conflict in the free intercourse of men. Thinking thus of Apologetics and of its task, it is natural that we should feel little sympathy with the representation sometimes heard, to the effect that Apologetics concerns itself only with "the minimum of Christianity." What is "the minimum of Christianity"? And what business ha& INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 31 Apologetics with "the minimum of Christianity"? What Apologetics has to do with is certainly not any "minimum," but just Christianity itself, whatever that may prove to be. Its function is not to vindicate for us the least that we can get along with, and yet manage to call ourselves Christians; but to validate the Christian "view of the world," with all that is contained in the Christian "view of the world," for the science of men. It must not be permitted to sink into an "apology" for the Christian religion, in the vulgar sense of that word, which makes it much the synonym of an "ex- cuse" ; and much less into an "apology" for what is at best an "apology for the Christian religion" — ^possibly nothing more than "a couple of starved and hunger-bitten dogmas," which for the purposes of the moment we may choose to identify with "the essence of Christianity." The function of Apologetics is not performed until it has placed in our hands God, Religion, Christianity and the Bible, and said to us, Now go on and explicate these fundamental facts in all their contents. When men speak of "the Apologetical mini- mum," we cannot help suspecting that they have for the moment lost sight of Apologetics itself altogether, and are thinking rather of some specific "Apology" which they judge might usefully be launched in the behalf of Christi- anity, in the conditions of thought for the moment obtaining. If such an "Apology" were identifiable with "Apologetics," we might well sympathize with those who consider Apolo- getics a department of "Practical Theology," and it is doubtless because they do not rise above such a conception of it that many encyclopzedists have so classified it. But the Apologetics with which we are concerned is a much more fundamental, a much more comprehensive and a much more objective thing. It does not concern itself with how this man or that may best be approached to induce him to make a beginning of Christian living, or how this age or that may most easily be brought to give a hearing to the Christian cor ception of the world. It concerns itself with the solid 32 INTRODUCTORY NOTE. M objective establishment, after a fashion valid for all normally working minds and for all ages of the world in its develop- ing thought, of those great basal facts which constitute the Christian religion; or, better, which embody in the concrete the entire knowledge of God accessible to men, and which, therefore, need only explication by means of the further theological disciplines in order to lay openly before the eye: of men the entirety of the knowledge of God within their reach. It is because Dr. Beattie's treatise conceives Apologetics after this fundamental, comprehensive and objective fashion, and develops its contents from that point of view, that we accord it our heartiest welcome. i [IM A TREATISE ON APOLOGETICS INTRODUCTION 'i "Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts? Or who hath given understanding to the heart?"— Job xxviii. 36. "Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you." — Acts xvii. 23. "That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us." — Acts xvii. 37. "For in him we live and move and have our being." — Acts xvii. 28. "For the invisible things of him [God] from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." — Romans i. 20. APOLOGETICS. INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I. THE SCOPE, THE SPHERE AND THE SPIRIT OF APOLO- GETICS. Contents. Apologetics the Previous Questioti of Christianity.— Raises Profound Problems.— Their Solution Vital.— An Age-long Conflict.— The Divine Redeeming Activity.— Its Vindication Required.— The Mode of Defence Varies.— Must be Adjusted to Modern Thought.— The Spirit of Apolo- getics.— Needs a Wide Outlook.— Must be Candid and Fair.— Without Bigotry or Prejudice.— With Earnestness and Reverence.— Its Aim to be Practical.- Its True Function. Literature. Ebrard's Apologetics, Vol. I. Introduction.— H. B. Smith's Apolo- getics, Chap. I.— Bruce's Apologetics, Chap. I.— Macgregor's Apology of the Christian Religion. Chap. I.— SchaflPs Theological Propedeutic— Articles on Apologetics in the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, in McClintock and Strong's Cyclopedia, in Johnston's Uni- versal Cyclopedia, and in the Britannica Encyclopedia. Some works on Apologetics less accessible to the ordinary reader may be merely mentioned: Planck.— P. E. Muller.— Frank.— Stein.— Sack.— Von Drey. — Schleiermacher.— Delitzsch.— Baumstark.— Dorner.— Hirzel.— Sieffert. —Stinn.—Luthardt.—Riggenbach.—Dusterdieck.—Ritschl.— Kaftan. At the beginning of their treatises these authors discuss the questions dealt with in this chapter. In Orr's Christian View of God and the World there are some useful hints. I. The Scope of Apologetics. § i. J • A POLOGETICS is concerned with the previous ques- £\. tions of Christianity. It is that important branch of theological inquiry which investigates the great questions which lie at the very foundations of the Christian system. It even ventures, at times, into the very heart of that system, and undertakes to unfold its inner reasonableness and suffi- ciency. 36 APOLOGETICS. i I E i I The questions which thus come before it are many and varied, and they urgently press for satisfactory answers. In seeking to supply these answers, Apologetics has to deal with the intelligible grounds of the Christian religion, and it has to consider the varied evidences which provide its rational vindication. In rendering this useful service, it finds itself face to face with philosophical, historical, ethical and religious problems of the deepest import. 2. It has to make earnest inquiry regarding the existence and nature of God, and concerning the constitution and destiny of man. It has to grapple with many perplexing problems which are involved in the relations of God to man and th» universe. The questions of what knowledge man can o* n concerning God, and of how far God can make himselt known to man, have also to be considered. The claim which the sacred Scriptures make to set forth a special message from God must be examined with care. In this connection Apologetics has to make good the complete his- toricity of these Scriptures, and at the same time to vindicate their divine authority. It has also to deal with Jesus Christ, and it is called upon to give some satisfactory account of his unique personality, and of his most remarkable historical career. His wonderful influence on human affairs, as seen in the history of the Christian church, in the personal experience of its members, and in its splendid fruitage in modem civilization, calls for careful study. Nor can Apologetics be indifferent to the dark facts of moral evil as it appears in its various degrading aspects in the world. Of this it must give some reasonable account, and it dare not overlook the far-reaching issues of immortality for man. The abiding moral relations between God and man, and man's proper place in the scale of existing things, must be seriously pondered. 3. And are not these momentous questions? They are not merely theoretical speculations far removed from the affairs of men, but thf.y arc pregnant with vital practical THE SCOPE OF APOLOGETICS. n meaning for this life, and with vast import for that which is to come. If knowledge has any relation to the activity of men, and if belief has any bearing upon their conduct, then the questions to be considered a- d settled by Apologetics are of profound interest and of vital meaning. They cannot be set aside in a hurried way, nor is a superficial treatment of them likely to oe satisfactory. Is Christianity true ? Has it claims upon my attention which I dare not disregard, save at my peril ? Is there a supreme and perfect Being who has made me, and still upholds me and all things else in the world? Am I endowed with a moral and religious nature, by means of which I find myself placed in definite relations of responsibility to a moral ruler who is over me? Am I so constantly and completely dependent upon this ruler that, by no possible effort of mine, can I shake myself free from his oversight and control? Is the Bible not only true and excellent as a matter of fact, but does it also unfold a divine revelation of the holiness and love, of the power and saving grace, of Gk)d in Christ, over against the sin and woe of men? Is the gospel messaj , with its divine and gracious remedy for this ?in and wue, really needed by men? Is there proper ground for confidently accepting what the Bible says regarding the salvation which is in Christ, and are there good reasons why men should act upon the warnings and invitation of the gospel ? Above all, is there a future state of reward and punishment, wherein the issues of this life will have their proper fruition, and is a personal interest in the Lord Jesus Christ necessary for the present and eternal welfare of men? 4. To ask tiiese questions is to reveal the tremendous import of the issues which are wrapped in Christianity, for each one of them is freighted with the deepest signifi- cance. Christianity is either everyth- -' for mankind, or ncthing. It is either the highest certainty or the greatest delusion. If it be a hoary superstition, from which advanc- ing modern thought is slowly but surely delivering us, we 38 APOLOGETICS. il ought to examine very carefully the grounds upon which such a conclusion rests, lest we be found acting hastily, and heedlessly casting away the pearl of greatest price. While this demand of modem thought cannot be ignored, yet it should not be too readily conceded, lest we be found guilty of treating with contempt those priceless realities of the Christian faith which have long had such an abiding place in the living experience and dying hopes of multitudes oi men and women. A persistent delusion should at least be treated with consideration and respect. But if Christianity be everything for mankind, it is im- portant for every man to be able to give a good reason for the hope that is in him in regard to the eternal verities of the Christian faith. To accept these verities in an unthinking way, or to receive them simply on authority, is not enough for an intelligent and stable faith in these restless times. If our Christian heritage be a treasure of unspeakable value for us, we should examine carefully whether its rational, his- torical, moral and religious titles are valid and complete. The task of Apologetics is not so much to draw up these titles, as to exhibit them in an orderly and intelligible way. A clear head, a brave heart and a strong hand are needed for this task. To make good the title which reason and conscience, as well as heart and life, unite in giving to the reality, validity and adequacy of the Christian verities, is an undertaking of widest scope and deepest moment. One cannot but ask, earnestly though not hopelessly, Who is sufficient for such a task? II. The Sphere of Apologetics. § 2. In a preliminary way, the precise point of departure for Apologetics may now be indicated. This leads to the deepest view of the sphere of Apologetics, and raises inquiry as to its fundamental source. In making this inquiry, the underlying conditions which render the service of Apologetics to Chris- i THE SCOPE OF APOLOGETICS. 39 tianity necessary will be unfolded. The setting forth of these fundamental conditions will make it plam that the service thus rendered is neither needless nor optional, but essential and necessary. It will be made evident that there are deep and abiding conditions that pertain to the very nature of Christianity, which constitute the fundamental sphere wherein the genesis of Apologetics is to be found. These conditions form its point of departure and constitute its real source. I. These underlying conditions are involved in that deep- seated and age-long connict between good and evil going on in the universe. They are conditions which really grow out of this conflict. In the universe there are operative two principles or agencies, which are sometimes conceived of as two kingdoms, or sets of organized forces. They are now, and long have been, in truceless antagonism against each other. These antagonistic principles, or sets of agencies, are denoted by various terms. Sometimes the symbols of light and darkness are used to denote them. Again, they are called good and evil, truth and error, right and wrong, sin and holiness. As the universe now subsists, as an object of reflection, there is observed in it a deeply seated dualism, wherein opposing forces are in irrepressible opposition. The Persian, the Hindoo, and the Norse forms of express- ing this dualism are undoubted witnesses to this incessant conflict. In certain philosophical systems, like Gnosticism, and in pagan forms of demon worship, there are evidences of the same inveterate contest. With this conflict Christi- anity is directly and vitally concerned. The very re- son for Christianity, to a large extent, lies in the fact of this conflict, for it is the very evils which give rise to it that Christianity proposes to remedy or conquer. These evils, however, are not inherent in the universe at its deepest roots; they arc rather abnormal and destructive agencies with which Chris- tianity proposes to deal. Apologetics undertakes to plead the cause of Christianity in this conflict. 40 APOLOGETICS. ! I Hi The profound question of the origfin and precise nature of those evil and destructive agencies with which Christianity finds itself in conflict is not now formally raised. The fact that thif deadly conflict exists s simply assumed, as the sphere in which Christianity finds her appointed mission. Light and darkness, truth and error, good and evil, right and wrong, sin and holiness, are in such inherent opposition that peace between them is not possible, sav> by the defeat of the one and the victory of the other. Light can have no fellowship with darkness, and good can have no agreement with evil. In the last analysis, the real function of Apolo- getics is to vindicate Christianity, and to exhibit her defensive and offensive resources for this conflict. 2. In this same sphere there are also evidences that a divine redeeming activity is silently, but surely, at work. For it is to be remembered that Christianity is not to be conceived of as merely a principle or set of agencies, which is well able to hold its own against the opposing forces of evil in the universe. It is rather to be thought of as a set of redeeming and restoring agencies, with ability not only to defeat and destroy evil, but also to conserve and construct the good. Ever since the introduction of moral evil into the current of human history, there are evidences, not only of persistent conflict, but also of a potent redeeming and restor- ing activity. As the conflict continues from age to age, ti.ere are indications in the onward march of Christianity that the victory is declaring itself more and more plainly in favor of truth and righteousness. There seems to be a far-off glorious goal, where the light shines undimmed by the darkness; near by that goal there stands a noble palace, where truth and goodness are enthroned ; beside that palace there is a splendid temple, whose walls and pillars are righteousness ; and in that temple there is a shrine of holi- ness, on whose altar the pure fires of devotion ever bum. Christianity has her face towards that goal ; and, with her heart full of faith and hope, amid the moral conflict of the THE SCOPE OF APOLOGETICS. 41 ages, she leads the universe, by the persistent power of he- redeeming agencies, towards that glorious goal. This divine redeeming activity resident in Christianity must be taken into account as we seek to get our deeper view of the real sphere of Apologetics. This activity has appeared in the world in various historic forms, culminating in Christianity, but the redeeming activity itself has always been essentially the same. This makes the conflict not merely a contest from without, but a restoration of the good and a subjugation of the evil from within. It is an overcoming evil with good. The Evangel which Christi- anity proclaims represents this redeeming activity, and Apologetics is commissioned and prepared to vindicate Christianity as adequate for her task. 3. From all this, it follows that the task of Apologetics is not self-imposed, but arises naturally from the nature of the case. The conflict already described is a persistent fact, and Christianity is committed to her long and arduous campaign. If the serpent is bruising the heel of the woman's seed, the seed of the woman will, in the end, surely bruise the serpent's head. In this moral warfare Apologetics vindicates the ability of Christianity to conquer in due time. Even though it be true that the redeeming activity operative through the gospel in the world is, in a sense, its own effective advocate and valiant defender, yet the exposition of the resources of Christianity for her divine mission made by Apologetics is of great value Evidences of this value have appeared in all the periods of this conflict. The redeeming activity of God in the world, as it appeared in Old Testament times, in the hands of the prophets, is sometimes consciously, and often unconsciously, a distinctively apologetical service. In like manner the apologies of apostolic and patristic ages were well fitted to serve the same purpose. These apologies were not the redeeming activities themselves, yet they served to vindicate and exhibit these redemptive acttivities. The same is true in modem times. The gospel, which is the heart of 42 APOLOGETICS. I: * i 1^ 'I Christianity, exerts its renovating and subduing agency in the world, and, in the very nature of the case. Apologetics finds its call to exhibit Christianity in a defensive and vindicatory way. 4. It is evident, also, that the mode in which Apologetics shall undertake and best discharge its task will vary from age to age. As already indicated, the redeeming activity is always essentially the same, but the circumstances in which it is exhibited are subject to change. This naturally requires that Apologetics should be prepared to show how fully Christianity is qualified for every emergency in the conflict. Hence Apologetics must be ever watchful and ready to discern the signs of the times. In this service, to be fore- warned is often to be forearmed. The assault may now be at one point, and again at another. Hence, Apologetics must be always alert, and ready for the foe at every turn; for the defences of one age may not suit another, and the vindication which served at one time may not be sufficient for another. In our own age, when the service of Apologetics is greatly enlarged, and its resources so fully drawn on, it is of the utmost importance to have the methods and materials of apologetical service carefully adapted to our own restless and inquiring age. We do no injustice to the Apologetics of a century ago, when we say that it scarcely serves the demands of the present day, though it nobly served the needs of the day in which its service was called for. But in our own age new phases of the conflict have emerged, and a fresh setting of the defences is needed, and additional forms of vindication may be required. The Apologetics which was effective against the deism, materialism and rationalism of a century ago, may not be altogether effective against the monistic philosophy, the evolutionary science, and the his- torical criticism of current times. Hence an extension of the lines, and a recasting of the materials of Apologetics, is a service which presses upon modern apologetical activity, in THE SCOPE OF APOLOGETICS. 43 order that it may render as useful a service in the newer conditions as it did in the older. 5. It is proper to add, even at this early stage of the discussion, that the sphere of Apologetics is not fully appre- hended until it undertakes to so present the vindication of Christianity as to supply a valid defence against every possible assault. As the real nature of the moral conflict going on in the universe is more fully understood, and as the true genius and inner resources of Christianity are more and more adequately exhibited, it will be shown, in ever increas- ing degree, what the sphere of Apologetics is. The result will surely be that just as Christianity represents an all- conquering and ever-renovating spiritual activity in the world, so will Apologetics undertake to exhibit its ability to present a rationally complete defence and vindication of Christianity. With no lower an ambition should modem Apologetics be content. III. The Spirit of Apologetics. § 3. It is important that Apologetics should possess the right temper for its work, so this opening chapter may properly conclude with some remarks upon the true apologetical spirit. It is well to catch the best spirit at the outset of our work, for the temper in which we commend Christianity to others often does more than anything else to win them. In general, no sentiment inconsistent with the mind of Christ, or the spirit of the gospel, should ever enter into Apologetics. I. Apologetics should be calm and elevated in spirit. There should be no bitterness in its tone, nor should it ever be unkind. It should be firm, yet gentle ; always alert, yet never hasty. If called to repel attacks that are bitter and unjust, it should never lose its temper, but ever maintain a serene spirit and exhibit a calm self-possession. Apologetics should ever keep in mind that to rule its own spirit is better than to take a city. Such a spirit will give strength to the I :ii I f 44 APOLOGETICS. I service it renders, and afford it satisfaction in that service; for it is humiliating to lose temper, even in the defence of a good cause. So, also, the spirit of Apologetics should be elevated, and maintain true dignity and nobility. Only by this elevated spirit can it obtain a wide outlook over its extensive field, and secure that comprehensive view of its work which is necessary. If Apologetics is to vindicate Christianity at every point, it must not be content to take narrow views, or spend its strength on unimportant details. It should rather, in the noblest manner possible, engage itself with the main defences. In a well-balanced way, and with nobility and elevation of mind. Apologetics should look at all the lines of assault and defence, and, with a brave spirit and hopeful temper, address itself to its work. A wide outlook, an elevated temper, and a strong, manly grasp of its task, is what Apologetics needs at this time. 2. In spirit. Apologetics should be candid and impartial. It ought not to play the part of a mere advocate or special pleader, nor should it enter upon its task in an apologetic way, as if it thought that Christianity rested on somewhat insecure foundations. It should rather seek to exhibit, in a fair and judicial way, the rational grounds, the historical facts, and the experimental realities upon which Christianity securely rests. Nothing will be gained by unfair advocacy of a good cause, nor by taking any undue advantage of an antagonist. The candor and directness of the Scripture narratives, and especially of our Lord himself, may well be heeded by Apologetics. No defence that is not founded on sound reason, even though it may silence an adversary for a time, is ever likely to do Christianity much permanent good. Christianity, as the cause of truth and righteousness, needs no doubtful defences, and care should be taken that her good cause does not suffer from unfair advocacy. Apologetics is not .^n attorney or special pleader serv^ing for a fee, but rather a judge, seeking to render a just and candid verdict. THE SCOPE OF APOLOGETICS. 45 3. In the spirit of Apologetics there should be no bigotry nor prejudice. The spirit of the bigot is bad, and the temper of prejudice may be hurtful. There may be the bigotry of the reason and the prejudice of the heart arrayed against Christianity, still the Apologetic for Christianity should not cherish narrow bigotry or perverting prejudice. If it does, it may not see things at quite the right angle, and by an intolerant spirit may wound Christianity in the house of its friends. If the opponents of Christianity have anything to say, and say it in a courteous way. Apologetics should patiently listen and faithfully seek to make reply. To abuse these opponents is not to answer their objections, and to call hard names does not serve to refute error. If the attack on Christianity be bold, impudent and blasphemous, silence may be the golden response which Apologetics ought to make. Only in rare and extreme cases should Apologetics be cutting and sarcastic, answering a fool according to his folly. Patience is usually power for Apologetics. It should be added that when we exhort Apologetics to be free from bigotry and prejudice, it does not mean that we are to cast away that splendid heritage of religious truth of which this age is the heir. In no case are we to cast this away at the bidding of the skeptical opponent of Christi- anity. Apologetics holds this heritage most dear, and will allow no rude hand to take it away. Still, we hold it, not only as a heritage, but as truth which can be defended without intolerance or bigotry. 4. Apologetics must cherish an earnest and reverent spirit. The subjects with which Apologetics deals are the noblest about which the human mind can be engaged, and the issues involved in Christianity are of immense import. No flippant temper, no irreverent spirit, no half-hearted manner, are in harmony with the discussions in which Apologetics must engage. These discussions are concerned with the great problems of God, of the world, of man, of the relations of the universe and man to God, of revelation and miracles, of i: mm 46 APOLOGETICS. I U\ sin and redemption, of Jesus Christ and his career, of a future state, and of rewards and penalties therein. Turely Apologetics shall feel that it is in the presence of majestic realities, and realize that the place where it stands is holy ground. The assault may often be made in a frivolous spirit, or with a sneering tone, and the temptation to make reply in the same spirit may often be strong. But it is usually best to treat all questions, that are worthy of treat- ment at all by Apologetics, in an earnest and reverent way. If the objections do not deserve such a treatment, it will usually be best to pass them over- in silence. In presenting the positive strength of the grounds for accepting Christi- anity, thorough work is needed at the present day, for the controversy often is concerning the very foundations of Christianity, rather than regarding the superstructure itself. Such being the case. Apologetics must gird on its whole armor, and take its best weapons. Strenuous effort, earnest purpose, and profound reverence must mark modem Apolo- getics, if it is to serve its day in a virile and heroic manner. - Apologetics must always be conducted in a very prac- tical spirit. It is not to enter upon its defence, and debate merely for the sake of the discussions which arise. The service which it renders is not simply a speculative one. The apologetical arena is not a mere intellectual amphitheatre, where the contestants meet for a exhibition of their skill in controversy; it is rather a battlefield, where the contest is serious, and the issues of the conflict are weighty. Apolo- getics thus seeks an end beyond itself in the defence and vindication of the Christian system. As the task of Apolo- getics in pleading the cause of Christianity grows out of the conflict with evil in which she is engaged, that task partakes of the nature of that conflict, and it calls for a practical performance of the duty thereby imposed. Apo ogetics does not exhibit Christianity on dress parade or P;,nting a sham battle; it ratlier presents her in campaign LTvice, or on the battlefield in actual conflict with real foes. ["P THE SCOPE OF APOLOGETICS. 47 This does not mean that men are made Christians by Apologetics, or that it is the real spiritual agent in gaining victories over evil. The gospel of the grace of God, and the energy of the Spirit of life, alone secure these results. But Apologetics renders useful service in removing stumbling blocks out of the way, in showing the inadequacy of the proposed substitutes for Christianity, and in exhibiting the reasonableness and sufficiency of the Christian religion. 6. Apologetics should be courageous, and never forget its true function. It has no excuse to make for Christianity, but a brave and heroic defence. It is to be animated by the spirit of the martyr and the hero. While the antagonist is always to be treated with courtesy, yet he is to be con- fronted boldly and bravely. Christianity, in one sense, needs no apology, for in the last analysis the Christian system is independent of Apologetics. The real foundations of the Christian system lie deeper than the results of Apolo- getics, but the service it renders is none the less valuable on this account. It exhibits the stability of these foundations, and enables us in various ways to test their security. With a brave heart, and with its eye ever steadily fixed on its true function, Apologetics seeks to do her noble duty. The Mount Zion of the Christian system rests securely upo.: the enduring foundation of the redeeming activity of God in Christ by the Spirit, seeking to remedy and conquer the evil that is in the world. But Apologetics takes us by the hand as we "walk about Zion, and go round about her," and as we "tell the towers thereof," and "mark well her bulwarks, and consider her palaces, that we may tell it to the generation following." "For this God is our God for ever and ever; he will be our guide even unto death."(Psalm xlviii. 12-14.) CHAPTER II. THE DEFINITION, THE AIM AND THE NATURE OF apologetics. Contents. The Meaning of the Term. — Ajxilogy and Apologetics.— The Usage of the Term.— Qassic. — New Testament. — Patristic— Scholastic- Modern.— Definition. — Defective Definitions. — The Accepted Definition. —The Aim of Apologetics.— Defence.— Vindication.— Refutation.— The Nature of Apologetical Service. — Controversy. — Exposition. — Criticism. —Must take into Account the Fact of Sin. LmsATtntE. The Encyclopaedia articles noted in Chap, i., especially that in the Schaff-Herzog.— Also the German treatises named in the same chapter, with the addition of Lechler. — Ebrnrd's Apologetics, Vol. I. In.roduc- tion.— H. B. Smith's Apologetics, Chap. II. — Crooks and Hurst's Theo- logical Encyclopedia and Methodology, pp. 435-437. — Cave's Introduc- tton to Theology, pp. 506-533.— Bruce's Apologetics, Chap. II. — Shedd's History of Doctrine, Vol. I., pp. 103-316. — Frank's System of Christian Certainty, pp. 18-35. — Hodge's Outlines of Theology, pp. 19, 30. — Van Oosterzee's Christian Dogmatics, pp. 75-238. — Foster's Systematic The- ology, pp. 3^31.— Th* Presbyterian Quarterly, Vol. IV., pp. 337-37a I. The Meaning of the Term. § 4. THE term Apologetics is closely related to apology. They are both derived from the Greek anoioria, which means a defence or a pleading. The Greek verb oTrokoftot, as used in the middle voice, means to defend ourself, or to plead one's own cause. To make a plea in self-defence, or to present a vindication against certain charges, is the precise meaning of the word. The word apology was used exclu- sively in early times, but it did not convey the idea of excuse, palliation or making amends for some injury done. It rather denoted a plea or vindication. The plea of an attor- ney in the court-room is, in this primary sense, an apology for the cause or client. The advocacy of any set of opinions, either by speech or pen, is really an apologetical service. i I I THE DEFINITION OF APOLOGETICS. 49 1. The term Apologetics, however, has come into vogue only in recent times, and is now used in a technical sense, to denote the science of apology, or of defence and vindication. In general, this applies to any sort of pleading or vindication, such as that of the court-room, or as that of the public vindication or advocacy of any cause. Apologetics is thus the science of pleading, or advocacy, or vindication in gen- eral. It covers the whole ground of the exposition of the principles of effective pleading, and of the art of applying these principles in any given case. 2. Apologetics in relation to religion is the advocacy of the cause of religion in general, whereby the religious view of man and the universe is unfolded. Then, Christian Apologetics is the science of pleading the cause of Christi- anity, or of vindicating the claims and contents of the Christian system. An apology is a specific defence against some definite asaault. Apologetics, however, is the science of all the defences, the vindication of Christianity from every possible assault. Apologetics for the Christian system is the science of the presentation of the whole plea for Christianity in such a way as to fortify it from all attacks, and to effectively commend it to the minds and hearts of men. Christian Apologetics is the organized defence and the systematic vindication of the whole area of the Christian system. It is not merely defence at one point; it is the science of all the defences. II. The Usage of the Term. § 5. To trace the usage of the term would require the writing of a history of Apologetics. This cannot be attempted here, but a few remarks may be of some interest and value, for the term apology is found in frequent and continuous usage, although the technical term. Apologetics, has come into use only in comparatively recent times. I. In classic Grefk, Xenophon uses the term apology, in 4 w^am so APOLOGETICS. ii ifF' his Memorabilia, Chapter IV., several times. He employs it when presenting his noble defence of his master, Socrates, against the several charges which were made in reference to his teaching. Here Xenophon not only defends Socrates against the charges of impiety, of corrupting the youth, and of introducing new deities, but he also vindicates, in various effective ways, his master as one of the noblest and best of men. This defence and vindication is Xenophon's apology for Socrates. 2. In the New Testament the Greek word for apology occurs several times. In Acts xxii. i, and in Phil. i. 7, it is translated "defence" ; but in Acts xxv. 8, and i Cor. ix. 3, it is rendered by the word "answer." The meaning is the same, however, in all of these passages, for the Greek word is identical in them. If a man makes answer Tor himself, his procedure is a defence, and when a man makes a defence his doing so may be regarded as a reply or answer to some charges made against him. Stephen's splendid defence of himself, of his Master, and of the gospel cause, recorded in Acts vii., is very properly called his apology. When Paul said, in Phil. i. 17, that he was set for the defence of the gospel, he distinctly announces that he held an apologetic attitude towards that gospel. It is thus evident that the function of Apologetics in relation to the Christian system has a well-defined scriptural basis. In the Scriptures there are various apologies; and, by inference, Apologetics, as the science of these apologies, has also a biblical foundation. 3. During patristic times, as is evident from the writings of the Apostolic and early Greek and Latin Fathers, much apologetical work was done. From Eusebius, the Church historian, we learn that Aristides, Quadratus, and others whose writings have perished, wrote defences of Christi- anity. Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athenagoras and Hermas, whose writings have survived in whole or in part, also did much of the same useful work. Justin Martyr's two Apolo- gies, written about the middle of the second century, are L»» «- THE DEFINITION OF APOLOGETICS. 51 important and valuable works. They are addressed to the Roman Emperor, and they first make an able defence of Christianity against assaults which, from pag^n and other sources, had been made against it; and then they exliibit the main beliefs and practices of the early Christians. Clement of Alexandria defended Christianity against the pretensions of Greek philosophy, and Origen answered the various attacks which Celsus made upon the Christian sys- tem. Tertullian vindicated Christianity against the Gentiles on the one hand, and the Jews on the other, while Athanasius wrote against Greek paganism, and Cyril replied at length to Julian. Augustine also wrote an Apology. 4. In scholastic times there was little apologetical activity. The energy of human reason during this period was devoted to the relations between philosoflhy and the doctrines of Christianity, and the activity of men's hands was engaged in warlike conflicts with the followers of the prophet of Mecca. Abelard and Aquinas did some apologetical work towards the close of the scholastic period. 5. After the Reformation began the discussions in the sphere of religion were largely polemic. It could scarcely be otherwise in the circumstances. But about a century after the Reformation, when human reason began to realize its freedom in various ways, serious assaults upon the Chris- tian system began to be made from several quarters. These were promptly met by suitable apologies. Lardner, Stack- house, Addison, Butler and Paley did good work in England, while Pascal and Turretin came to the rescue on the Conti- nent. It is to be observed, however, that these apologies were always definite defences against specific assaults. They served an excellent purpose, but they did not, in any single case, supply a complete Apologetic. Butler came nearest to this in his Analogy, whose principles art jy no means out of date for our own day. There were many noble treatises on natural theology, and excellent books on Christian evi- dences, produced in this age; but the scope of Aixjlogetics 52 APOLOGETICS. was not clearly conceived during the last century, with all its apologetical activity. 6. In Germany, about the same time, the need for the defence of Christianity also arose, largely on account of the advent of a widespread rationalism. The early German treatises were mainly apologies also, but about the beginning of this century more systematic treatises of an apologetical nature began to appear. The term Apologetics by degrees came into general use. Planck was the first to employ it, about 1794; but it was only by slow degrees that this tech- nical term came to be generally employed, so that it is only about a generation since Apologetics succeeded in obtaining its rightful place in the theological encyclopaedia. Even yet some hesitate to give it a separate place. III. The Definition of Apologetics. § 6. The way is now open to give a general definition of Apologetics. The precise form of definition to be adopted will be determined by the view taken of religion in general, and of the Christian religion in particular. And, in framing the definition, it may be best not to make any clear distinc- tion between what is called natural and revealed religion, for Christianity, broadly viewed in the interests of Apolo- getics, really includes both. All that is insisted on at this stage is that the Christian religion is truly divine in its nature, and that it is the only adequate religion for sinful men, for the reason, mainly, that it is the only one which properly and effectively represents God's redemptive activity in the world. Aid may be given in framing a definition of Apologetics by briefly noticing some of the defective definitions which have been proposed. In this way the accepted definition may the more clearly appear to be, in some measure, satisfactory. In doing so, H. B, Smith is followed in part. I. Schleiermacher says, in substance, that "Apologetics is THE DEFINITION OF APOLOGETICS. 53 a preparatory discipline, having to do with the fundamental principles of theology." It has thus to do with all the ideas, truths and facts which logically precede or historically ante- date the system of theology proper. There is not a little that is true in this conception, for Apologetics is a preparatory discipline in relation to theology. But this definition rather describes its place in relation to theology proper than defines what it really is. In addition, it gives too wide a sweep for Apologetics, and includes under it much material which belongs to Introduction. Moreover, it scarcely denotes the specific aim of Apologetics, which is the defence and vin- dication of Christianity. 2. Hannell takes Apologetics to be "the science of the common ground of the church and theology." On this rather curious view the question at once arises as to what is this common ground. Till this is clearly answered, one cannot tell what the materials of Apologetics really are. If the Scriptures be that common ground, or underlying principle, then Apologetics is the science of the Scriptures. Or, if Christ be made the common ground, then it is the science of Christ. Or, again, if the common ground be the creeds, then it is the science of the creeds. From this it would appear that this definition is rather too vague to be of much service. And, in addition, it is open to the same objection as the previous definition, in that it gives no proper place to the main function of Apologetics in the defence and vindi- cation of Christianity. 3. Von Drey defines Apologetics as "the philosophy of the Christian revelation and its history." From this view- point it becomes a branch of philosophy in general, and of the philosophy of religion in particular. This view is right, however, in giving prominence to the historical character of Christianity, and in finding the philosophy of history in it. But it reduces Apologetics to a branch of the philosophy of religion, whereas the philosophy of religion is, properly speaking, a branch of Apologetics. And it is perhaps better 54 APOLOGETICS. to avoid the use of the word philosophy in defining Apolo- getics, since it may more properly be regarded as a branch of theological science than as a department of philosophy. 4. Sack describes Apologetics as "that branch of theology which treats of the ground of the Christian religion as divine fact." According to this view, Christianity is held to be real and supernatural, in its principles or ground, and the function of Apologetics is to make this claim good. It further prepares the way for dogmatics or systematic the- ology. The ideal side of Christianity is treated by systematic theology, and the real side by Apologetics. This definition has some merits, for Apologetics has, as part of its task, to make good the divine reality of Christianity. Still, U is rather one-sided and incomplete, for it lays exclusive stress upon the historical evidences, and leaves little place for the moral and other lines of defence and vindication which have much apologetic value. 5. Lechler gives quite another turn to the definition when he says that "Apologetics is the scientific proof that the Christian religion is the absolute religion." The function of Apologetics is to exhibit the ordered and systematic proof which suffices to show that Christianity is the only adequate religion for men. This definition points in the right direc- tion, and yet it scarcely supplies what is now needed. The term absolute is a little vague, and Apologetics has not so much to show that Christianity is this sort of a religion as to make out its reality and sufficiency. Then, Apologetics is not best described as proof, even though that proof be scientific in its form. It is rather the science of the defence and vindication of Christianity as the divine redemptive religion. This definition, however, signalizes the fact that Apologetics is a science rather than a philosophy, and this is a good feature of it. 6. Baumstark leads us a further step in the right direction when he says that "Apologetics is the scientific defence of Christianity as the absolute religion." This definition is THE DEFINITION OF APOLOGETICS. 55 nearer the mark than any yet given, though it still retains the term, absolute religion. But it has the merit of substi- tuting the idea of defence for Lechler's notion of proof. It makes the main function of Apologetics to be the scientific defence of the Christian system in general, and in this it is so far correct. But it would have come still nearer the mark if it had said "the science of the defence," instead of "the scientific defence." A defence at a single point may be scientific, yet it may not be the science of all the defences, as Apologetics now claims to be. 7. Ebrard's briefest definition is to the eflFect that "Apolo- getics is the science of the defence of Christianity." This is brief, clear and pointed; and it indicates, better than any of the foregoing definitions, the main function of Apologetics. It may err by defect, though Ebrard, in his exposition of his definition, lays stress upon the vindication of Christianity, so that Apologetics really comes to be the science of the vindication of Christianity. Thus taken, it at least forms the point of departure for a correct definition. H. B. Smith agrees with this view, and lays stress on the vindication of Christianity. 8. Bruce, in theory, practically agrees with Ebrard, and speaks approvingly of his general positions. But he is inclined to take a much narrower view when he begins to unfold his defensive statements of Christianity. "Apolo- getics is a preparer of the way of faith, an aid to faith agamst doubts whencesoever arising, especially such as are engendered by philosophy and science. Its specific aim is to help men of ingenuous spirit who, while assailed by such doubts, are morally in sympathy with believers." » This view of the central function of Apologetics is scarcely adequate, and it leads almost necessarily to a constantly concessive treatment of the grounds and contents of the Christian system. And, further, Brace's view scarcely gives scope to the presentation of the defences as a whole in a scientific way, according to some principle inherent in the ^Apologetics, Introduction, page 37. 56 APOLOGETICS. ' I : h I very nature of Christianity. It makes Apologetics little more tb-^n a series of varying apologies. And, in addition, instead of properly defining Apologetics, it indicates, and that correctly enough, the homiletical use and value of Apologetics, rather than gives a proper definition of the science. 9. The following definition is the one which underlies this treatise: Apologetics is that branch of theological science which presents a systematic defence and vindication of the reality of that divine redemptive agency which is resident in, and operative through, Christianity upon the world. This states the function of Apologetics in harmony with the view already presented of its deeper point of departure.* In Christianity there is a divine redemptive activity operative in the world; for the Christian religion is not merely a system of truths, it is also a set of redemptive agencies or activities. Apologetics is here defined in such a way as to indicate that its fundamental aim is to make good the reality of these divine redeeming agencies resident in, and operative through, Christianity. This view, moreover, enables Apolo- getics to deduce its principle for a scientific presentation of all the defences from the inherent nature of Christianity, regarded at its root as a set of divine renewing activities operative in the world. this there may be some gain in clearness and in compk . .ess. As a further definil 1, somewhat expository of the one just given, and as presenting more fully its concrete details. Apologetics may be regarded as that branch of theological science which presents a reasoned defence and vindication of the essential truth, supernatural origin, divine authority, and inherent sufficiency of the Christian system of doctrine, of worship, of ethics, and of redemption, together with the systematic refutation of all opposing systems. These two forms of the definition serve to determine the idea of that branch of theological science which is the theme of this treatise. The former indicates its point of departure and ' Chapter I., page ao. .M ism THE DEFINITION OF APOLOGETICS. 57 inner function. The latter exhibits its task more in detail, and its practical function. Taken together, they serve the theoretical and practical ends of a definition of the Apolo- getics of the present day. IV. The Aim of Apologetics. § 7. Apologetics deals with Christianity from a certain point of view. This point of view is expressed in a general way by the definition of it just given. An exposition of this definition will serve to exhibit more fully the noble aim of this branch of theological science. When Apologetics understands clearly what its peculiar task is, it will be the better able to proceed with its performance. From the definition proposed, the aim of Apologetics is threefold in its nature. I. i Lundertak es to defend Christianity. From the very nature of the~raser"it-i»^he legitimate dtffender-of the Christian system. This system represents the divine redeem- ing activity operative in the world, and it is natural to expect that the agencies of evil, also ever active in the world, shall make assaults upon Christianity. It is the professed aim and proper function of Apologetics to ward off these assaults. It must not only meet these attacks in detail, but take a position where it can defend the citadel of Christianity from every attack. And it may sometimes happenthat the weapons with which the enemy assaults Christianity are actually captured and transformed into armor of defence for it. No attempt is made, at this stage, to sketch the varied attacks against which Apologetics must make valiant de- fence. The attacks may be made upon the truthfulness of the doctrines, and reality of the worship of the Christian system, or upon the trustworthiness of its ethical system, and the potency of its redemptive scheme. These attacks Apolo- getics must resist and ward off. The assaults may be ■sophy of the universe. But this view of apologetical method is in danger of overlooking the concrete historical reality of Christianity, and of reducing Apologetics to little more than a meta- physical scheme or a system of philosophy. Moreover, this method necessarily gives the whole treatment too much of the abstract to serve the best ends. 2. Others prefer what may be called the psychological or anthropological me*:hod. Delitzsch formally adopts this method, and the writings of President Edwards, so far as they are apologetical, have the same feature. If this view of the method be adopted, the point of departure for the disci ision, and the principle for the development of Apolo- getics, is found in the nature and needs of mankind. Man's nature is so constituted, anH his needs are of such a charac- ter, that some provision mi e discovered to fit this nature and meet these needs. Chn. mity is found to fully supply ' Oup. I., Sec. 2, dealing with the Scope of Apologetics. THE METHOD OF APOLOGETICS. 69 what is required for this purpose. Apologetics, pursuing this method, undertakes to show how Christianity fulfils this demand. This view, again, is in a measure true; and so far it is very important. Christianity is perfectly suited to man's nature, and it supplies all that sinful men need in the religion they feel they require. But this view is scarcely deep enough; for Christianity has its doctrine of God and of the universe, and it has its sacred records in holy Scripture. Apologetics must find and apply its central principle in such a way as to organize all these, as well as its anthropological factors, into a complete system. 3. Some others prefer to follow the historical or biWio- logical method. Writers like Paley and Rawlinson, though they do not announce any definite principle, are practically following this method. Recent writers who lay special stress on the historical evidences in general also belong to this class. Here the external evidences of Christianity are made prominent, and various lines of reasonings which serve to vindicate the historicity of the sacred Scriptures and of the Christian origins, constitute the burden of Apologetics The confirmation of the biblical history from profane history and from the monuments, is a large feature in the working out of this method. Little stress is laid upon the philosophical side of the case for Christianity. The main contention of Apologetics is to show that the Christian system is essen- tially true. This, too. is a very important part of apologetical service, for the historicity of the Christian documents is to be made good by Apologetics. But this view of its method hardly reaches to the root of the problem. The real question of Apologetics relates to the redemptive activity of which these records speak; for Christianity is not merely historic truth it IS also a divine dynamic in the worid. Therefore the principle which determines the apologetical method must go beneath the historical and bibliological aspects of Christi- 70 APOLOGETICS. 'I t iM! I 41 i- i 1 anity, though that same principle must also take into account the historicity of the Scripture records. 4. In more recent times many are inclined to adopt what may be described as the Christological and redemptive method. Bruce, so far as he has any definite method, repre- sents this view. H. B. Smith is perhaps a better type of it. Writers like Fairbaim incline more or less definitely to this conception of apologetical method. This view is often pre- sented in a rather vague and pretentious way. In general, it projects Apologetics from the person, mission and activity of Jesus Christ, and it finds its principle for the distribution of the apologetical material in the redeeming agencies which proceed from Christ into the world. In many ways this is the popular view in our day. There is much in this view to be commended. It gives a proper place to the redemptive aspect of Christianity. It also honors the person and activity of the divine Mediator and Redeemer, who is the head of that kingdom of light, and truth, and holiness, which is in inevitable conflict with the kingdom of darkness, error and sin. If this view be not confined merely to the historic career of Jesus Christ, but is taken to embrace this entire redeeming activity, it is almost on the correct gp-ound in regard to the proper apologetical method. Its only defect, in the hands of some who adopt it, is that nearly all the stress is laid on the earthly historic period of the redeeming activity and teaching of our Lord. 5. There remains, therefore, a somewhat deeper, though not entirely diflferent, view to take, in order to rightly seize the true apologetical method at its deepest root. This method may be denoted by the term theological and redemp- tive. This view of the method or principle of Apologetics is in harmony with the position already taken in regard to the true function of Apologetics in relation to Christianity. Christianity represents the redeeming activity of God in the world, which is rendered operative through Christ by the Holy Spirit, and Apologetics vindicates the Christian system jtL THE METHOD OF APOLOGETICS. 71 from this deeper point of view. Hence its point of departure is from the mission of Christianity in the world, and the principle, which is to determine its proper method, roots itself in God as he exercises his redeeming agency in the world and in conflict with evil. The relation of God to the world, and man's knowledge of God are fundamental. Not only does this provide us with the deeper view of a comprehensive apologetical method; it also gives proper place to what is sound in all the other proposed methods. These start from the world, man, the Bible and Christ, respectively. Now, the redeeming activity of God presup- poses a certain relation between him and the world; it discovers in Christianity what suits and supplies man's need; it has its authentic records given in the sacred Scriptures, which give a true knowledge of God, and it is mediated through Jesus Christ. This theological redemptive principle, consequently, supplies the best method, and the one, there- fore, which is adopted in this treatise. III. The Divisions of Apologetics. § 11. The divisions of Apologetics relate to the way in which its mnterials are distributed into the various branches of the science, in order to its logical development and systematic discussion. It was some time after this branch of theological science began to take definite form that any positive attempt was made to distribute its materials in a logical manner. So long as Natural Theology and the Evidences of Christianity were discussed separately by apologists, the somewhat mechanical division of the materials into two branches pre- vailed ; but this division was of little logical value. The distribution of the materials must be determined by the principle already announced in the method adopted. If the universe, or man, or the Bible, or Christ, or God and his redeeming activity, be the point of departure for Apolo- getics, then the principle of the division of its materials will 7a APOLOGETICS. i V correspond with the method adopted. In this treatise the last of these supplies the method followed, and this conse- quently gives the key to the division to be made. It may illumine the exposition of this topic to note swne of the proposed plans for the divisions of Apologetics. I. Bruce has three divisions: First, Theories of the Universe, Christian and Anti-Christian; secondly. The Historical Preparation for Christianity; and thirdly. The Christian Origins. This can scarcely be regarded as suffi- ciently comprehensive. It gives no adequate place for the theistic proofs, and it does not exhibit the relation of Chris- tianity to other forms of religion as fully as it should. And it scarcely seems proper to separate the historical preparation for Christianity from the Christian origins, as both con- stitute the historic aspect of God's redeeming activity in the world. Cave regards Apologetics as Fundamental Theology, and makes it one of the branches of Comparative Theology. He then makes four divisions of it: First, Natural Theology; secondly, Ethnic Theology ; thirdly, Biblical Theology ; and fourthly. Ecclesiastical Theology. These might be termed philosophical, ethnic, biblical, and ecclesiastical apologetics, respectively. This cannot be regarded as a really practical division. It is not made on any single principle which clearly appears. Ebrard, after a useful introduction, makes two main divisions, with various subdivisions, and works out the whole plan so as to include most of the apologetical material : First, The eternal contents of the truth of Christianity, according to the facts of nature and human consciousness. This is opened up in two main sections. One deals with the positive development, which is elaborated at great length. The other considers critically some of the leading anti- theistic schemes, but is not so fully wrought out as the other. Secondly, Christianity as a historic fact, in its organic con- nection with the history of religfion. This division is broken THE METHOD OF APOLOGETICS. 73 into two somewhat unequal sections. One contains a verj- complete historical survey of the non-Christian religions. The other gives a somewhat brief treatment of the revelation of God set forth in the Christian system. There are many strong features about Ebrard's work. Its treatment of the facts of nature and man's consciousness, and its exposition of the theistic proof founded thereon, are very thorough. And its comprehensive outline of compara- tive religion is one of its strong features. But it is not without defects. It lays stress upon the purely philosophical side of Apologetics, and scarcely does full justice to the historical materials of the science. And relatively too much space is devoted to the non-biblical systems, and far too little to the revelation of God which Christianity represents. In spite if these defects, however, Ebrard's treatise is a noble work. H. B. Smith adopts a simple threefold division, in which he is substantially followed by Foster in his Systematic Theology. First, Fundamental Apologetics, in which the underlying philosophical questions regarding God, man and the universe are treated. Secondly, Historical Apologetics, which deals with the supernatural in histov'cal iorm is it emerges in the Christian system, especially in ; :: .-rcred records. Thirdly, Philosophical Apologetics, i- ::vce -i n is shown that Christianity is the highest ti;'C!'. .ivm rif.' (iiui! solution of the problems of existence. This comes very nearly up to the require tn'r.ts .■ a good division. The only defect about it is that it is not easy to see clearly how the discussion of the first and third divisions can always be kept logically separate. In both cases philosophi- cal inquiries arise. These regard the same matters from only slightly different view-points, so that confusion or repetition is almost sure to arise. On this account, Ebrard's twofold division has some advantages. In the first, philo- sophical probffTiS are expounded; and in the second, historical questions are considered. Hence there is little if .J I \ ! i 74 APOLOGETICS. danger of confusion. By a combination of the plans of Ebrard and Smith, a workable division may be obtained. 2. The plan for the divi. vn and distribution of the apologetical material adopted in this treatise may now be outlined. This plan keeps in mind the true function of Apologetics in relation to Christianity. It is also determined by the method already adopted in this chapter, which provides the principle by which the division is to be effected. That principle is the redeeming and restoring activity of God in the world as it appears in Christianity. This implies a certain underlying relation of God to the world and man. It also exhibits a certain definite historical form in the world. And it is face to face witi: the various problems of a practical nature with which Christianity proposes to deal. This key to the division of the material opens up a threefold classifica- tion of it. First, there is fundamental or philosophical Apologetics. This is concerned mainly with three problems, God, man and the world. The underlying problem involved in these three refers to the relation between them. This opens up impor- tant aspects of the philosophy of religion, and the exposition to be entered on under this division covers the whole field of the thcistic discussion. The nature and origin of theistic belief, the rational grounds for man's knowledge of, and belief in, the existence of God, together with an adequate criticism of all the anti-theistic theories constitutes the burden of this division. In the conclusion reached, the organic and rational relation of God to man and the world is to be carefully educed. The second division may be termed Christian or historical Apologetics. This is engaged chiefly with the historical nature of the revela*"on of himself which God has given in the Christian system Here his redemptive activity resident in. and operative upon, the world through Christianity, appears in historic form; and its real historical nature, as well as its true divine authority, must be fully vindicated. THE METHOD OF APOLOGETICS. 75 And its sacred documents in the Sr-^otures must be carefully considered in this connection. At»J the relation between Christianity and the various other religious systems has to be fully understood. . . ce the inquiry here is largely historical in its nature, u mg first with the non-Christian systems, and afterwards weaving into a complete whole the evidences of Christianity as a truly redemptive religion. This division gives the Bible, Christ and redemption. The third division, for want of a better name, may be called applied or practical Apologetics. In this division Christianity is viewed in its relation to the various practical problems with which it has to deal in the life and thought of men. Its relation to modem science and recent social theories, its bearing on the various pressing evils which rest on men in the world, and its ability to adjust itself to these and provide the practical and effective remedy for these evils, are to be unfolded under this division. Here Christianity is reaoy to meet with the practical test of its ability to cope with all these evils, and ofits adequacy to effect the complete evangelization of the world. By its ability to do this Chris- tianity abundantly vindicates itself, and thereby reveals the undoubted reality of the divine redemptive agencies which it possesses. This practical test constitutes the verification of Christianity, as competent to fulfil its divine mission. Thus the task opened up is threefold. The philosophical validity, the historical reality, and the practical efficiency of Chris- tianity are to be shown. This gives Philosophical, Christian and Applied Apologetics respectively. CHAPTER IV. APOLOGETICS AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. I I Contents. The Spiritua] Principle in Man.— Body and Soul Distinct— Different. —Yet Gotely Related.— Mode Mysterious.— The Powers of the Spirit- ual Principle.— A Misconception.— The Mental Faculties.— Their Classi- fication.— Various Plans.— The Modem Scheme.— The Intellect— Sense- Perception.— Understanding and Reason. — The Sensibility.— The Appe- tites.— The /affections and Emotions.— The Will.— Its Nature.— Free- dom.— The Moral Nature.— The Religious Activity.— The Mode of Knowledge.- Epistemology. — Theories.— The Empirical and Rational Contrasted at Three Points.— The Objects of Knowledge.— Knowledge Defined.— Its Tests.— The Objects Sketched.— The Reality of the Sub- jective and Objective in Knowledge. — Truth. Lttbiatuu. The articles on Psychology and KnowUdge in the Encyclopedias already mentioned.— Sir W. Hamilton's Lectmres on Metaphysics, with J. S. Mill's Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. — Kant's Critique of Pure Reason with Spencer's First Principles.— Dibnefi Sensualistic Philosophy, with Bain's Mental and Moral Science.— yic- Cosh's Intuitions, with Watson's Kant and His English Cri/tcA- Trea- tises on Psychology, by Bald« '.n, Davis, James, Porter, McCosh, Ladd. Sully, Dewey, Murray, Hickok and Spencer— Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 13.— Harris* Philosophical Basis of Theism, p. 44.— Ebrard's Apologetics, Vol. I., p, 35.— H. B. Smith's Apologetics, p. 46.— Bowne's Metaphysics, p. 403, and his Studies in Theism, p. 9.— Diman's The The- istic Argument, p. 35.— Bowne's Theory of Thought and Knowledge.— Ladd's Philosophy of Knowledge.—Sa.h»titr'i Outlines of the Philos- ophy of Religion, p. 277. 1 I 4 1 AS a man's philosophy goes far to determine his type of theology, so the theory of knowledge he adopts will greatly affect his Apologetics. On this account. Apologetics has a vital interest in a soimd theory of knotvlcdge. It would be an initial mistake to accept an epistemology which leaves the Christian system without a rational foundation, and Ajwlogetics without any constructive materials. Inquiry as to the nature and powers of the human mind, and careful THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. yy scrutiny of the conditions and bounds of the knowledge it may acquire, are of pressing importance for Apologetics. Hence, even at this early stage in these discussions, some preliminary positions must be understood in regard to the mind of man and its powers of cognition. Though the thorough discussion of these questions must be deferred till Materialism and Agnosticism are reached, yet a few broad lines of safety should even thus early be marked out. I. The Spiritual Punciple in Man. § 12. The whole personality of man is the subject of religion. This personality is complex. It is composed of a material organism, which is called the body, and of a spiritual prin- ciple, which is known as the mind or soul. Though related, these t\vo factors are essentially distinct, and religion pertains to both. From this it follows that Apologetics cannot be indifferent to the views held touching either of these factors in man's complex constitution. It dare not allow materialism to exclude the spiritual factor, nor can it permit idealism to do injustice to the material element in the nature of man. Nor can Apologetics consent to accept any theory of knowledge which closes the door of cognition against the supersensible, and thus rules out the knowledge of God on the part of man. Above all, the reality of the spiritual factor in man must be guarded with the utmost care. I. The material and spiritual factors in man are essen- tially distinct. They differ in their nature, and are unlike m the conditions of their existence. The former is material substance; the latter is spiritual. Both, therefore, have substantial reality; the one, that of an organic structure; the other, that of an intelligent principle. Life is resident m the former, and thought belongs to the latter. The organic life of the body is not to be identified with mere physical force, nor is thought to be confounded with the 78 APOLOGETICS. 1 .1 I « • r I .1 i V i .'!» 1 ^ li\ purely vital activities of the body. Consciousness may involve brain movement, but brain movement is not identical with consciousness. Thought processes may imply an activity of the nerve system, but the nerve system alone does not account for these processes. If consciousness and thought processes generally have not their seat in the bodily organism, there must be another factor in the personality of man to which they belong. This is the spiritual factor in man ; and the reality of this factor is now insisted on in the interests of Apologetics. 2. Not only are these factors distinct in man; they are also different in their nature. This difference has already been denoted by the terms material and spiritual. The bodily organism belongs to one category of being, the spiritual principle to another. The body is directly con- cerned with organic, or vital, functions; the soul exhibits intellectual, moral, emotional and volitional activities. As spiritual, the soul is not subject to the conditions of material existence, nor can physical predicates be applied to it. Its nature is spiritual and personal, and its activities are psychical and rational. This position Apologetics earnestly maintains in the interests of religion. 3. Though the body and soul in man are distinct and different, yet they are most intimately related. In order to the completeness of the human personality both are required. Though the seat of personality may be located in the soul, yei the body is necessary to the fulness of that personality. So far as continued existence in this earthly state is con- cerned, the union between them must abide. If the bond binding them together is broken, ihe organic condition of the body dissolves, and the spiritual pi nciple no longer finds its proper abode on earth. The fact of the resurrection illustrates the intimate relation between body and sou!, and confirms the view that both are requisite to complete pfr- sonality. As to the precise nature of the union between them, and as to tlie exact mode of their interaction, not very THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 79 much may be said. It can scarcely be regarded as me- diamcal or external; it may rather be looked upon as dynamical and mternal. To say this, however, is to do little rnll.'".''''" '\' ^"^ °^ '^'" P«^^"^' ""i°". and of constant interaction between them. Few, Jf any, now would IZ "m "^^T'"^'' *he soul is lodged I the pineal gland. Most would. ,„ some sense, cccept Hamilton's sug- gest on that the soul IS in proximate relation with the entife physical orgamsm. And though modem physiological in- vestigations in relation to psychology have mad^ gr,^t advances since Hamilton's day. it is yet true that psycholo^^ and physiology together have not yet been able to lift Z veil from that mysterious holy of holies in the personali y of man, wherein nerve excitation is translated into actual ZT\ ,f r> ""'' *^^" *^* --<= moveml up to the threshold of this holy of holies, but it cannot lead Into >ts secret chamber. Yet this movement seems to 4 The necessary antecedent to the mental affection called sensation. All of which goes to show how intimately the two factors to both soul and body. Apologetics is bound to protect the for the defence of the spiritual principle in man. II. The Powers of the Spiritual Principle. § 13. the^oTituTl'^ '' T '° "^ "'"^'^ '■"^'■^•"^ *he powers of the spiritual prinaple m man. This raises the question of he faculties of the human mind, and introduces the discus nhrhiaV^'-^.^H ''''"''''''- ^'^ p^-" - ^-"''^s of the human mind denote those capacities which enable it In this connection >t at once appears that, although the ewllt:'"'''^'" """ '' ' ""'^' y^' its activitifs and ex,M;nences are quite numerous and varied. This opens ud -e sphere of that science which deals with the facult's oi 80 APOLOGETICS. t II 'IS .1' the human mind and their various operations. The facts of consciousness in general are the materials of psychology. 1. An initial, though a rather superficial, misconception has to be guarded against at the outset. It is sometimes supposed that, just as the brain has its various real divisions, so the mind has also its several actual sections. In this way the various powers of the human mind come to be regarded as separate divisions of it In one section is located the memory, in another the imagination, and in another the conscience. Certain types of phrenology of materialistic tendencies, and some recent investigations into the physio- logical antecedents of psychology, may have fostered this popular error. It need scarcely be said that this way of thinkii^ in regard to the spiritual principle in man, and of its various powers and capacities, is quite superficial, and entirely misleading. This principle, in its very nature, is a single, indivisible, spiritual unit, incapable of any kind of partition. From this it follows that the several faculties of the human mind are not to be regarded as sections of it, but rather as modes of its unitary activity. For it must not be concluded that because various nerve excitations can be localized in certain sections cf the brain, the sensations associated with these excitations must also be located in diverse departments of the mind. The entire spiritual principle which is the seat of personality in man is involved in each and all of these activities. Hence, intellect and conscience and will, per- ception and memory and imagination, do not denote several diverse sections of the mind, but express various activities and experiences of the one indivisible spiritual principle, which is the subject of these activities and experiences in man. 2. Various plans for the classification of the powers of the human mind have been proposed. The Gredcs. in their philosophy, inclined to classify the materials of human knowledge, rather than to make any formal division of the THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 8l ouSl "^^' 'T''.'^ '" •*' ^*^*»"'"^'°"- A« *e result of this, dialectics, physics, ethics and politics appear in the wntings of Plato and Aristotle. To some e^en th! scholastic philosophy followed the leadership of the Greeks m this matter. The earlier Scottish philosophy adopt^a twofold diviSion of the mental powers. Reid dLded them mto the mental, or intellectual, and the moral, or activ" powers. This .s good as far as it goes ; but it places the wm under the active or moral powers, instead of ly itself sl W. Hamilton centered his type of the Scottish philosophy in consciousness, and his division of the mental ,^wers naturally grew out of his analysis of consciousnesf To some extent. Kant follows the older Scottish school He he a5r;H°'f T''"?': '"^ "''''^' °^ P^^^^'^'' reason. But he adds the faculty of judgment, and gives prominence to it m a «>mewhat j^uliar way. Other older modes of class - hcation cannot be noted. st/nti.?' P'^*=''°^°«T °^ '^' Pr«^^"t day has come to sub- 2" ml agreement .n regard to the classification of the cTassel """"■ '' '" "°" ""^">^ ^•^•^'^^ '"^^ ^hree The first division includes the knowing powers and is usually called the intellect. These powers^arTcon^r^^ j" the various cognitive activities of the spiritual princip^ .•" man, and the result of the operation of these pOwer! I u's:::;rrade"^ ^'^ '---^ -- ^^^- -^-^^^ The first is sense-perception, by means of which the human S'e"r ttSt 1" ^° ''' ^"^"'^' ^^"^'^ ^•'-"^^ ^ -- th ru^tt """""''""' '"^''^ '' ^" ^^«=^'°" °^ the soul through the senses, and perception, which is rather an operation of the mind unifying the sensations into a pe cent proper, have to be considered. The result here fs pre sentative knowledge. P understanding. Th,s ,s the discursive faculty, the faculty ll 82 APOLOGETICS. of comparison, or the logical faculty. It is exercised in comparison, generalization and abstraction. It utilizes the materials given in sense-perception, and by means of its laws, or categories, it unifies, in various ways, these materials. Out of percepts it constructs concepts, and thus transmutes presentative knowledge into representa- tive. The third subdivision of the intellect is the reason. This is that capacity of the spiritual principle by which it relates itself to the supersensible realm of thought. This is the mental faculty which deals with principles and laws. These laws regulate the activity of the spiritual principle of human intelligence in the supersensible realm of pure thought. It deals not so much with percepts, or concepts, as with rational principles which lie at the basis of cognition. This is a very important activity. The second generaf class of the mental powers is the feelings. This is known as the sensibility, and it relates to certain experiences of the soul which are usually associated with the exercise of the knowing powers. On this account, various forms or aspects of knowledge produce correspond- ing affections in the sensibility. These affections will be weak or strong, agreeable or disagreeable, according to the character of the exercise of the knowing powers which condition them. Three subdivisions are usually made in this class also. The first is the appetites. These are the lowest, and are, in a measure, instinctive and spontaneous. The second is the afTections. These arc hig^her, and they denote those feelings of like and dislike which pertain to the sensibility. The third is the emotions. These are the highest, and they denote those aspirations of the soul which reach out beyond it. These three sulxlivisions cannot be very strictly separated, and there runs through them all the striving activity, or desire, oiierative in the spiritual principle in man, viewed as sensibility. Sonic writers, consequently, call these THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 83 tiic conatiye powers, meaning thereby to prepare the way for the distinction between desire and will .Ji^'t!!^"^- ^T'f '^^' °* '^"^ ""'t*! Po^«'« « the m. This ,s the faculty of choice, or of volition, or of se f-determmation. If the sensibility be the b^sis of self-expression ,n man. then will is the source of self- determination. If the former produces desire, the latter r 'f""r; '^ '^' ^°""*'" '^ ^°'""tary, the latter is volitional. Many problems arise in connection with this aspect of the activity of the spiritual principle in man. The nature of volition, the relation between motives and voli- tions, and the great question of the freedom of man in his volitions all arise here, but cannot be discussed. It can only te remarked that, in the interests of Apologetics, the utmost care must be taken not to adopt a psychology which leads to a mechamcal theory of the faculty of volition, or which would, in any way. invade the essential freedom of the spiritual principle in man. 4j^Growing out of these three general classes of the powers of the human mind, there are two additional aspects of the activity of the spiritual principle in man which are to be mentioned m connection with Apologetics. These activities are sometimes ranked along with the intellect, sensibility and will ; but most writers are now inclined to regard them not as different classes of activities, but as the same poweTs* exercised in other spheres and upon different materials One of these ,s known as conscience, or the moral faculty lZVtf\ 'f '*"'• P""*='P'*^ '" '"^" ^'•^^'^^ '" relation to moral facts and experiences. Its activity, thus vie-' ed implies an exercise of the intellect, the sensibility. an II ?; I "i i i 1 86 APOLOGETICS. inherent in its very nature certain principles which it brings to experience. These principles really make experience possible, and condition it in a definite way. These opposing views are to be seen in all ages, and between them there has always been open warfare. This appears in the disputes between Socrates and the Sophists, in the reasonings of Plato against the Heraclitics, and in the controversy of Aristotle with the Epicureans, in ancient times. In modem speculation, the same warfare emerges in the reasonings of Leibnitz against Lorke, of Kant against Hume, and of Mill against Hamilton. And in our own day the antagonism is as great as ever, and perhaps more clearly defined, between sensationalism and intuitionalism, between empiricism and rationalism, as to the theory of knowledge. And this contest is in progress in the moral sphere, as well as in the intellectual. The question as to whether conscience is an original factor in man's nature, or the product of certain of his experiences, is earnestly debated. The inquiry into the nature of moral distinctions, so as to discover whether they are primitive and ultimate, or the result of some simpler factors, such as pleasure or utility, is answered in two widely different ways. The same debate arises also in regard to the nature and origin of theistic belief. Some contend that it is a derived, empirical product, and others that its germ, at least, is native with the spiritual principle in man. It is evident, therefore, that Apologetics has pro- found interests at stake in the sphere of epistemology. 3. The contrast between these two contending views may be pretty fully brought out by some critical comparison at three points. The result of this critique may elucidate and confirm the correct doctrine. The initial point of contrast is found in the diverse views taken of the human mind at first, and prior to any cognitive experiences. Touching this point, the empirical view is that the mind is negative, empty and passive in its original siate. It 13 at first like a sheet of blank paper, with nothing written THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 87 upon it, and not even any ruled lines on it, by which the wntmg IS to be directed. The rational doctrine maintains that the human mind, at .he very outset, has in its inner nature certam principles, conditions or rules, according to which the spontaneity of the spiritual principle in man is determined in all its cognitions. This principle is active according to certain rules which pertain to its very nature Prior to experience it may be like a sheet of blank paper, with nothing actually written on it; but the ruled lines are there already, and the writing of experience upon it must be conformed to these lines. That the rational is the better view upon this point, is evident from the fact that only on its ground can human knowledge have any order or system in it. Empiricism leaves the fabric of knowledge in confusion. The very fact that human experience exhibits certain great uniformities plainly implies that the mind is not at first entirely blank colorless and passive. Even if it be allowed, as Spencer contends, that the law of heredity accounts for those ele- ments in knowledge that are universal and necessary the question would still press as to how it comes to pass that the law of heredity operates so uniformly in a certain way if there be no subjective rule according to which its activity is determined. Empiricism, there )re. cannot account for the universal and necessary elements in knowledge, and even heredity requires a subjective rule in order to produce the uniform results claimed for it. The second point of contrast between the empirical and rational theories of knowledge is in regard to the genesis of knowledge. How does cognition arise, and what are its initial factors? The empiricist says that all knowledge comes from without, and enters the mind, so to speak, by the avenue of the senses. Sensuous experience is at once the occasion and the source, the condition and the origin of knowledge. The rational doctrine, on the other hand maintains that while experience may be the occasion o' I 88 APOLOGETICS. knowledge, yet the mind itself always makes a contribution to the origin of knowledge, and is, in a sense, its source. The mind itself brings certain laws or rules, which give form to cognition at the very first. Even in sensation this is true, for single, unrelated sensations are not knowledge. They are the unrelated materials of knowledge, and they become knowledge in sense-perception only when the mind itself, by a primitive spontaneous act, binds the separate sensations together according to a rule inherent in the mind. The result is the knowledge of some external object as a percept. The view here vindicated is not to be confounded with the traditional doctrine of innate ideas, which is commonly supposed to have been held by Descartes, and is criticised by Locke in the first book of his Essay. It seems more than likely that Locke exaggerated the Cartesian philosophy at this point, just as Cousin exaggerated Locke's system at several points in his celebrated critique of the Enqrlish philosopher. In both cases the man of straw was s. up, for it is doubtful if any reputable philosopher ever held the doctrine of innate ideas as Locke criticised it, and there is no reason to believe that Cousin rightly understood Locke at all the points of his criticism. All that is contended for, on behalf of the rational theory of knowledge, is that in the spiritual principle in man, and underlying all its activities, there are certain rules or con- ditions of cognition which are spontaneously brought by it to the beginnings of knowledge. This subjective rule is the a priori factor which springs from the mind itself and con- ditions knowledge. Leibnitz against Locke suggests the true doctrine when he says that the mind itself precedes experience. And Kant against Hume is right when he says that experience may be the occasion, but is not the sole source, Oi knowledge. In like manner, modern thinkers who insist that the spiritual principle in man possesses a spontaneous activity which operates, not at random, but THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 89 according to certain rules inherent in it. are clearly in pos- session of the key to a sound epistemology. The third point of contrast between empiricism and rationahsm remams. This relates to the manner in which the higher and more complex elements of knowledge are constructed. Touching this point, the empiricist holds that all the more complex forms of knowledge are elaborated out of the simpler lactors which come by the senses. This elaboration takes place by means of habit, association and trh /J'k u°"*.'"^ determining subjective factor con- tributed by the mind itself. The rational theory maintains that to every advance in the elaboration of knowledge, and as It increases in complexity, the mind always supplies the rules and princjles by which this progress takes place. These rules condition and unify every form of kno Jedge to which the mind attains. Just as the initial knowledge of the external world in sense-perception implies an activity of Z Z!: T"T^ T''^'"^ *° ^ '^^'' ^y '"^^"^ °f which the solated and unrelated elements in sensation are bound tS of T ' "T'' '" '"»^'''°"' ^°' •" '^^ higher opera- tions of the understanding, the activity of the spiritual principle in man, operating according to the categories or rules of this activity, elaborate and unify what may be termed discursive knowledge into a systematic v^.iole in the form of concepts. And so. also, in the exercise of reason this same activity proceeds to unify, according to certain niles or ideals, the supersensible elements of human know- ^f ^Tu '"u ' ""'^ ''■" ^''^^'' ""'*■■«' ^'here concepts become thoughts, are reached. At every stage the sponta- neous activity of the spiritual principle is the pedagoguTthat conducts the elaboranve process of human kn^^Iedge according to cert nherent rules. ^ Did space permu. .t might be shown that the same is true in regard to the moral nature and experiences of the spiritual >s rejected, for the reason that in man's moral nature certain I f r i l, Hi 90 APOLOGETICS. principles or rules must be presupposed, in order to explain the nature of moral distinctions and the fact of moral obligation. The significance of all this will appear more clearly when the nature anjd origin of theistic and religious belief is investigated. Meantime, the foundations of a sound epistemology are laid. IV. The Objects of Knozvledge. § 15. It now remains to make some remarks concerning the things actually known. This inquiry relates to the objects which the spiritual principle in man, in the exercise of its various powers, can apprehend, with full assurance that those things subsist just as they ire apprehended. To put it more definitely. Are the convictions of the human mind in the matter of knowledge in harmony with real facts, and what are the real facts or things to which these convictions stand directly related? I. At the very outset, an ambiguity in the meaning and usage of the term, knowledge, meets us. Sometimes the term denotes the act, or mode of mental activity involved in knowing. To have knowledge of anything thus means to exercise the mental activity involved in acquiring knowledge in any sphere. This was the meaning mainly under notice in the previous section of this chapter. Again, knowledge sometimes denotes the result of the activity called know- ledge. When used in ihis sense, it signifies the sum of things actually known. To have knowledge thus, means to have information about any subject. This is evidently the sense in which the term is used in discussing the question of the objects of knowledge. The discussions of this entire chapter thus bring before us three main topics. In the second section the inquiry lay in the realm of psychology, in the third the problems arose in the sphere of epistemology, and now the investigations open out upon the field of ontology. Are there real objects to be ^!l i* ■ Is THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 91 truly known? Can there be a true correspondence betwten real things and the activities of the spiritual and intelligent principle in the nature of man ? ^ 2. In order to answer this question with any degree of accuracy, it is necessary to define more clearly than has yet been done what knowledge really is. This is no easy task In making an attempt to do this, let the matter be put in several ways. In general, knowledge implies a relation; a Object. If this relation be founded in the very nature of things, then it is real knowledge. If there be a real, not an arbitrary, correspondence between the knowing subject and the object known, then there is true cognition. Hence knowledge may be defined as the direct apprehension of reality. In this apprehension the cognitive capacity of the spiritual principle in man comes into direct relation with the object known, and there arises in the mind the full assurance that the relation thus established is an accurate one, by which the subjective conviction has objective validity. To vary the statement a little, knowledge is the firm inward convic- tion that percepts, concepts, or thoughts, are in rational correspondence with the facts, truths or the realities of things which are related to the mind as objects of know- ledge A descriptive definition like this is valid for all the fouTd '" '^''''^ ^^^ °^^'^^' °^ knowledge are to be 3- A brief allusion to the tests or marks of true knowledge niay confirm and illumine this definition. There are three chief tests or criteria of true knowledge. The first is self- evidence. That which is apprehended clearly in its own direct light may be regarded as real knowledge. In other words that which is autopistic, and in its very nature carries conviction, is true knowledge. Truths like the axioms are matters of real knowledge, because in and of themselves they compel conviction. A second test of knowledge is necessity This means that what, in the nature of the case, must be III 93 APOLOGETICS. iK accepted, and whose acceptance is essential to the validity of other accepted convictions, is to be regarded as actual know- ledge. This is what may be termed the apodictic feature in certain aspects of knowledge, which are of such a nature that to suppose their opposite is to enter on the pathway to contradiction and absurdity. The third test, which is in a sense implied in the two already stated, is universality. Facts or truths which are held by all men in all ages to be true, and as really known, constitute genuine knowledge. To make denial of the reality of such knowledge is to enter the highway to nescience by the gateway of agnosticism. 4. In regard to the objects of knowledge, it may be said, generally, that whatever is directly apprehended by any of the powers of the spiritual principle in man is known. All those convictions of the human mind which are autopistic, apodictic and universal constitute real knowledge. The objects of knowledge thus understood are usually divided into three classes, though these classes are not to be too widely separated from each other. The first class includes the objects known in sense-perception. This class implies the reality of the external world of existing things, and the rational correlation and correspondence of the mental appre- hensions with its reality. The second consists in the facts of consciousness. This class implies the reality of the spiritual principle in man, and the possession by that principle of certain experiences of whose reality it is impossible to doubt. The third class of the objects of knowledge is found in connection with the rational principles or inherent rules of the ictivity of the human mind. These principles which are thus involved in the activity of the human mind are imme- diately apprehended as necessary to the very possibility of knowledge in any sphere. Another division might be adopted. There are the obj "cts of intellect, of sensibility, of will, of conscience, and of the religious nature in man. In all these cases there are elements of knowledge in the strict sense. But the threefold classification of the objects THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 93 of knowledge will serve present purposes, for it includes all. 5- A profound and far-reaching question yet remains. What IS tnith? What is the reality which is immediately apprehended in that knowledge of things which the mind acquires? Is there a fixed reality in the external world of thmgs which forms the basis, alike in the intellectual and moral spheres, of a real correspondence in cognition between the immediate apprehensions, or the fixed convictions of the mind, and the reality of the objects known thereby? Is there objective, rational and moral truth which is ultimate in Its nature ? This is one of the burning questions of the day and we must be careful not to make a treaty of peace with agnostic skepticism or positivist empiricism, by which we unwittingly cede to either the whole territory of cognition Is there a system of real things which constitutes the fixed objects of knowledge? And does the spiritual principle in man, in the exercise of iis intelligent activity, come into real and rational correspondence with this system of things? Does the intelligence of man obtain such an apprehension of this real system of existing things that its apprehension has objective validity as knowledge? Was Socrates or the Sophists, Plato or the Heraclitics, Aristotle or the Epicu- reans right in their -> r^ ^nd for our day, is Descartes or Condillac Leibnitz Kant or Hume. Reid or Berke- ley Hamilton or L- :, cist or intuitionalist, correct? The answer give question must turn largely upon the view taken of uie real nature of the external world where so many objects of knowledge lie. Shall we say, with the Idealist, that this world is a system of mere relations dependent, in whole or in part, upon the process of cognition or Its constitution? Or shall we assert, with the empiricist, that things in the external world are not a system, bu d sconnected units, which do not in any sense constitme a our theory of knowledge. According to the former view 94 APOLOGETICS. 'H there are relations, but i;r> real things; and, on the latter theory, there are real things, but no relations. The one hides the real in the rational, and the other loses the rational in the real. Both, therefjre, seem to be one-sided and incomplete, though there is a truth in each. It is better to maintain in some sense, the reality and rationality of both the knowing subject and the objects known in cognition. According to this view, the external world, as an object of knowledge, is neither a system of mere relations nor a collection of unrelated things. It is rather a system of related things, in whose very nature there is reality and rationality. According to this view, the external world, as the object of knowledge, presents a rational and a real unity as an object for the activity of the spiritual prin- ciple in man. This activity has rational rules by which it is determined, and in cognition this activity comes into real correspondence with the external world as a system of related things. To put it briefly, the laws of thought and the laws of things are correlated in cognition, and this correlation is real knowledge. The basis for this correlation is found in the fact that the world of related things, being rational at its roots, is intelligible as an object of knowledge for the principle of rational intelligence in man. There is, therefore, a distant kinship between the subject and object, according to the view just set forth. This kinship subsists between the spiritual principle in man, with its rules of activity, and the rational unity in the system of related things in the world. This supplies a fixed bond between the subject and object, whereby the reality of things and the certainty of knowledge can be maintained. Hence, there is an objective truth and reality, and a real knowledge of this truth and reality is attainable. This view of truth and knowledge is deemed of very great value to subsequent discussion of apologetical questions. It avoids the defects of idealism and agnosticism, for the spiritual and rational principle in man discovers rather than THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 95 constructs the rational system or unity of things in th. S;isr:Lrr;^°'" ''- --^^^^^^^ positivism, which afford no possiL.e bond of kinship between the subject and object save on the basis of mater ah^m It also fully meets the Ritschlian denial of metanTy 1 Th may be termed the theory of rational realisn., in smuch a' It finds in rationality the basis for objective trnth ^!f / for the scientific knowledge of nature. The qnestioTof the sri Uf CHAPTER V. APOLOGETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF. ' •■> U ! Contents. Nature of Belief.— Belief and Faith. — Their General and Special Senses. — Taken in Wide Sense. — Knowledge and Beiief Compared. — Knowledge and Belief not Contradictory. — But Reciprocal. — Grounds of Belief.— Evidence, its Ground and Measure.— Subjective and Objective Grounds of Belief. — Two Gasses of each.— Knowledge and Belief Oosely Related.— The Objects of Belief.— Many and Varied.— In Ordi- nary Life. — In Matters of History. — Information Based on Testimony. — In the Hypotheses of Science. — Fact and Theory. — in Matters of Re- ligion. — Apologetic Service. Literature. The articles on E '.'.ef. Faith, and Evidence in the Encyclopxdias already named. — Also ' ; treatises on Psychology noted in the last chapter. — Butler's Analogy, Chap. I. — Bowne's Studies in Theism, Chap. II. — Luthardt's Fundamental Truths of Christianity, Chap. VI. — ^Jevon's The Principles of Science, Chap. X. — Frank's System of Christian Cer- tainty, Part II., Sees, i and 2.— Kaftan' ^he Truth of the Christian Religion, Chap. IV. — Balfour's The Foundations of Belief, Parts I. and II. — Principal Caird's The Philosophy of Religion, Chaps. I. and II. — And his Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, Vol. I., Chap. II. — Eraser's Philosophy of Theism, Vol. I., Chap. V.— Lindsay's Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion, Chap. XI. — Edward Caird's The Evolution of Religion. — ^James' The Will to Believe. In the writings of the Common Sense School of Philosophy, and in the treatises of those who are in sympathy with the Faith Philosophy of Jacobi, there are some useful hints for the subject of this chapter. KNOWLEDGE and belief are closely related. In many of the convictions of the human mind they are blended, and they both imply some of the same conditions of mental activity. To some extent, therefore, the discussions of the last chapter laid the foundation for *br .-positions to be made in this one. In that chapter the rea.ity of the spiritual principle in man was asserted, and the nature of the powers of that principle was explained. In addition, the soundness of the rational, ?.i against the empirical theory of knowledge. THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF 57 tained, not onlv thaf ti,- • , * ^* ^^^ "lain- and rational I'^tall^^^^ P"-'P'« '" -n is real related to thii pl^e i^ tiorr.t ^^ ' d^' ^^ at its root. This view of th.rllT' I "^^ ^"'^ "*'°"a' subject and ob ect ' n rl V °" '"^^'^''"^ ^t^««" the which brings them ntoT; " ''°"'" ^ ^^^•°"^' ''^"d, ledge. Thfs samTCd f J^'-^P^^^-- in true know-' activity caned beUen:i:,Zr'''''''' " '""^ '"^"^' I. The Nature of Belief. § j^ Often us«, i«X^:,7 So"t;tT '5'"^' '"" '^' "yn-ological meaning is'J°,^Z hlv "'™"°" " identical. And in nrHi„,, ™™"'. ""ey are practically any wc,,.,.l"^: -tZ -^. -o. -yo dUcove^: shade of difference in th«.v * t'^^''^ '^ any effect that l^hefLote^theT'"'"'^ '"' ""^^' '' '^ *° ^''^ i'-plies trust in pet^ aLTX :r^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ?\^ in their friends. But this di.Hn.! ' ""^ ^^^^ ^^'^^ 'ar as the „sa^ ^Tyttt Sr"' "" *" ""'"'^ '« Both belief and /oil/, are osed in a irenml ,„J ■ ^K. In a ^„„r»; sense, they de^riran thl .' '?'^'"' tS'-actf r: ■; "- -^ -"" th- hCr..:' .-.nds! ™ssrsa"„s:^:;:"r "^- °" '-""'" assnmes „any ,„™s. To a la ge e4j,tT"' "t " emerges in the discnssion, of thi chapt"r ' ' " -*';" and trusted as Savion'r and J^r^ltiXS i 98 APOLOGETICS. ( , and rest upon Christ alone for salvation. Hence, we find in the Scriptures that to believe in Christ, and to have faith in him, signify the same activity of the soul. The truths of the gospel are believed to be true, and Jesus Christ is confided in for salvation. In the discussions of this chaptei the term is used m the wider sense, to include all forms of the faith activity of the human mind. It may be better to use the term belief rather than faith, for the latter word has, in popular religious usage, come specially to denote saving faith in Christ. The term belief will, therefore, be uniformly used in this chapter to cover that wide field of mental activity by means of which certain convictions or persuasions are reached in an indirect or mediate way. This raises the problem of the philosophy of belief in its widest sense. 2. Perhaps the nature of belief, as a mental activity, can be best understood by putting it in contrast with knowledge. If knowledge be the direct apprehension of the truth or reality of its object, belief is the indirect or mediate appre- hension of its object. If knowledge be conviction of the truth, as it shines in its own light, belief is persuasion of the truth as it is seen in the light of proper evidence. If know- ledge produces complete certainty, belief is content with probability of greater or less deg^ree. In the case of knowledge, its grounds are, so to speak, in itself, and compel acceptance by all minds so soon as apprehended ; in the case of belief, its grounds He, as it were, outside of itself, and do not necessarily produce conviction in every mind. The axioms of mathematics illustrate the former, and the molecular theory of matter the latter. The a.xioms are known to be true in thtir own nature; but the molecular theory may or may not be believed in, since it is not the theory itself, but the evidence for it. which induces belief in it. Hence, belief mav be defined as mental assent or con- viction, founded upon evidence. It is the persuasion, more or less assured, of the truth of anything, resting upon THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF. ^ belie:: :::^ :£: ;: ^^^^ -^ - p^fess . grounds for knowledge are InH ' i^. ^^'''''^- '^^' what may be called o^^^^^f^^^^^^^ ^T^' -^ have belief are not necessarily good for aLinH, '^^^°""^^ ^°'- have only more or less of ?"bjecHveva™dhv V "'' '"^'^ th s validitv mav h*. n.,.* ■'^"^^ validity. For one mind not be r strife 'Sf"'^'"''' ""' '°'' ^"°^''" «' may measure^f S and ha"; ^r^'' ^'^^ ^""^^"^^ '« '^- firmer will be theiS 5n J ''r^"" *'*^ ^^'^^"^^ ^"^^ is evidence it is no , TH"^ '^^' '^^ «^'"°""d o^ btaef ratioXrounVs It rZr *''* !:"°"'*^'^^ '^ ^-°'^ ^^ ledge the Znd of the' '"'"" V'^'* '" ^'^'^ '''' ^^ •^"°«^- appfehensrand t oC^^^^^^ ^^^ ^'^'^ '"^"*^' itself; while in thfcase'^f l^HeT^V" '^T^'^^"^'^" respondence does f^n^ul ^ ^ ^""""^ °^ this cor- -^thin/ihth hT : ;"xt ir^irt" '""' '" ^" >' lation to it It i, «r„ ^ . ' ^''"^'^ ^^^^ 3" internal, stiltdel'r^^Tt.Tl^''""* """^^ *° '"^•^e this point W 1' i fi ! ■' ';u lOO APOLOGETICS. 3. It thus becomes evident that knowledge and belief are in no sense to be regarded as contradictory of each other. To say that we may believe what is devoid of evidence, or irrational, is absurd. Both are valid rational activities of the spiritual principle in man; and both lead to legitimate convictions of the truth or reality of their respective objects. Hence, they are reciprocal, and mutually support each other. A fatal mistake is made if they are regarded as in any sort of inherent conflict. Belief rests on evidence, and evidence, in turn, is a matter of knowledge, and knowledge implies a primary belief in the reliability of the faculties involved in it. And this clearly shows that they are so closely related as to be reciprocal and complementary. It may also be admitted that what to one person is an object of knowledge, may to another be a matter of belief. The knowledge of an expert in chemistry, working in the laboratory, may be a matter of belief to the amateur who reads the writings of the expert, and accepts the information as true on the evidence given by the expert. In a certain sense, it can be truly said that we know when we believe, and that we believe when we know. In all spheres of mental activity this is true. II. The Grounds of Belief. § 17. 1. It has just been shown that crndcnce is the ground and measure of belief. A few things must now be said in regard to its nature and functions. As already indicated, beliet includes a very wide area of the activity of the spiritual principle in man; and from this it follows that evidence assumes a great variety of forms. And since so many phases of the activities of men in the ordinary affairs of life are at root of the nature of belief, the inquiry concerning evidence as the ground of belief has also an exceedingly practical bearing upon life. In matters of business and social life, as well as in every branch of scientific inquiry, belief has a large place, while the whole fabric of history, and the entire pro- THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF. joi S o 'huma ,T T '^"'"'"'^^ '^' ^'"'^ ^"' ^he main • need.Tr f . T' "° '^^' '^'^^""' «^ ^^e basis of benTf needs careful understanding at the outset rl.tfi ?•' ^"r^P'' "°' P°'''''''= t° '"^ke any clearly logical classification of the eroundt nf Iv.i,-f i • j . 'o&»cai Which Justify rationV'^t^r- ::er;^^^^^^^^^^^ grounds of belief would require an inventory of all our knowle^e for knowledge really supplies the evidence upon which belief erects its edifice of rational convictions For practical purposes, the grounds of belief are to be evidence. The one set consists in certain facts or feelines hat he within the soul; the other in certain facts or etnt m the outward world of nature and human life. The former obiLt" This"'^"'^'^ ^^""'^ °^ ^'^^^' -^ ^« '-- andtnother f T' T ""^ °^ '"'^^"" ^^'"^ '" ^^e mind, and another found without it. Each of these, in turn some what naturally divides itself into two closely relaSdas^ This gives four main divisions of the grounds of belief comem^' ' "' '''"' ■' '''^^''''"'' ^"d consists in the contents c ccsaousncss. This class is very comprehensive and includes all the varied facts of the conscious exSces l-rectly and they constitute a large part of our true know- X'ri: ceT '•''"';• '''"• ^" ''' ^^°""^ °^ ^'^-"-r; experiences, viewed as evidence, various beliefs are more or ess confidently entertained by the human mind. FrTn the it wth^rrT,'""^^"^ '" -se-pcrception. men external world. From the facts of consciousness implied in the activity of man's moral nature, belief in the real ty of h m I :- i • I i : ,m:; I I : Hi if ftl li 102 APOLOGETICS. moral principles, if not in a moral ruler, is induced. So, in other well-defined phases of consciousness, there is supplied internal and undoubted evidence, which forms the secure grounds of many valid beliefs. The veracity of conscious- ness is pledged to their rational validity. b. The second kind of evidence is also subjective, and is more subtle, and not so easily described. It consists in what may be termed the ground of the native spontaneous beliefs of the soul. It embraces those various subtle forms of instinctive feeling which are found in the human mind, as firmly rooted convictions therein. These grounds of belief seem to lie deeper even than the facts of consciousness, and from them spring those primitive beliefs which seem to be the spontaneous expression of man's nature. These are sometimes described as the intuitive factors in man's con- stitution. They are spontaneous, instinctive feelings, in which there is involved, in some way, a conviction of the rt ■ >f the objects to which these beliefs relate. The instni..iive conviction that our faculties do not systematically delude or deceive us, our own conviction that we have a real existence, our belief in the validity of space and time, and, in a sense, the belief in the existence of God, illustrate this class of the grounds of belief. These things must be believed in, else all knowledge and belief is groundless. So, also, in ordinary life, many things are believed in and acted on in an apparently instinctive way. There is firm belief exercised ; and though reason, and even consciousness, may not clearly reveal the grounds of the belief, yet it is instinc- tively felt that the belief is not devoid of rational grounds. Many such beliefs underlie the complex fabric of human life, and if an analysis of their ground be made, it will be found to be some instinctive feeling within the soul. At this point the question as to how much of this instinctive feeling is native to the mind, and how much of it is the product of habit and heredity is not now raised. The fact that these feelings form the grounds of not a few valid theoretical, and THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF. 103 second class o evidence grounding certain beliefs. n,n~ k"^ f °^ ^^^ «^'"°""^s of belief is objective and Zect t^tL e .^ r' ^''■'' '^ '"^^"^ ^"'"^ "-^^l thing, or of nhl ? ""' '"°'''^- These lie under our powers annr r!, T' '"^ '" ^^^* ^^"^« ^^^ ^nown.^ Tbey aTe apprehended as rc=I. and they constitute the materials of the some rational explanation of thom t^ *i.- hy^theses and theories Trelol^-J. and ^elLrS m proportion to the force and pertinency of the ev idenci bv which they are supported. Thus, in allLnches o fdenc/ the facts are known, and form the grounds upon whTch various hypotheses are founded These htJ^S believed in n«^ , u """"^u. inese hypotheses are evidence ^hev L '^'^ "'" '^^^^^^'^ "^^hlished on evidence they become assured truths of science The to a^i for th' ^r''''''°"' ^^ ' -ell-grounded theory to account for these facts, is believed in. So with th. J. The fourth branch of evidence is also objective, and is very comprehens ve. In eeneral it m.„ u 1 , valifl nr rrij.M u general, it may be designated as valid or reliable human testimony. This testimony assumes it c.'iIt:sS?„':Jrpt^V;:.1;t ■': -« "---^.y .he stne. no^on of the facts of nl.ure whi/h h! '^ ' ^*. " """^ *''*' observation of .ion of thelc Let, in^'nt i^r""" ""* "'^ '"•'*'"=''«^ ^ 'PP-"- fVli I : 104 .'APOLOGETICS. many forms, and it provides the evidential ground for a great multiplicity of beliefs. If this testimony be reliable, it constitutes knowledge, and it becomes the basis of belief in many things. The whole function of evidence in the courts of law illustrates this phase of belief. Evidence given in court by witnesses, to have value, must be matters of their own knowledge, while the guilt or innocence of the accused is of the nature of a belief founded upon this evidence. This belief is based on the evidence, and is expressed in the verdict. The same is true regarding all history which records past events, and of the reports of the happenings of our own day. The testimony of the eye-witnesses of these events is the ground on which thousands of things are believed. If that testimony is reliable, the belief is well founded. And what is true of secular history is also true of the sacred Scriptures, and in particular of the gospel narratives. We believe the things therein recorded because the testimony of the men who gave the record is that of trustworthy and capable witnesses. To refuse belief of the gospel records on this ground, is to take a position which makes all history im- possible. Here belief plays an important part in Christian Apologetics, and its validity is, at this early stage, so far vindicated. It should also be kept in mind that vast areas of what passes for scientific knowledge is neither more nor less than a collection of authentic beliefs. As the knowledge of the various sciences is obtained largely from text-books, th< testimony of the author is real'y the ground upon which that knowledge res,ts. In such cases much of the information which the student acquires in physics, .;hemistry, biology, geology and astronomy is of the nature of belief. From this sketch of the grounds of belief, it again appears that knowledge and belief are intimately related. The evidence which supplies the basis of belief must be, as far as possible, a matter of knowledge, in some of the general THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF. 105 forms just sketched. And vast masses of information which" often pass for knowledge are only reliable beliefs. wS the evidence ,s strong, the beliefs reach a high degree of probab,hty ; and. for the practical purposes of life, thfy^ay ^rve the ends of knowledge. All of which hows "he IfZ^:^ u'" '"' '^y '•'"' ^* "^""^ that a certain event happened a thousand years ago. or a thousand miles away :;:trSid^i;^-''--"--^---^He:::s Moreover, it is evident that in all the spheres of the ac.v.ty of the spiritual principle in man, knowledg^ and r^ oi^eHT : ^°'' '"" ^'^'^ "^'^^^' -hich m^ust b^ recognized ahke by science and philosophy; and in religion they have also claims which must not be ignored. Thev cannot be divorced in any sphere without serious injury to many vital human interests. Hence, science, philosophy and religion have equa interests in the vindication of the cLms tno .i" T "^^''' """t^'" '^"'Ss are matters of knc^vledge and certain other things are of the nature of beliefs, and bo h are legitimate activities of the powers of the human soul. Hence, science, philosophy and theolo^ have no reason to quarrel, or be jealous of each other. TrS carTful'tol; '';^"°'''^' ^"' ^''""^ ''^«''°-' -'^h being uJnl n "^^P ^r "" '^^ °^^" bounds, are not to be looked upon as in any mherent or necessary conflict with each other. III. The Objects of Belief. § 18. brold' '^T^ f ""1" "'' '^^''''' °^ ^^^'^ !•« •« exceedingly knowled J. 'T" '^''""'" *'^^^ °^j^«« ^"d those of may fade away m the vista of slender probability. As the of bllief tr ; '*■' """"ediately known, so the objects Of behef are greater m number than those of knowledge. 106 APOLOGETICS. **. And as the objects of knowledge give rise to well-defined certainty, so the objects of bel:;f have every degree of probability, from the highest moral certainty down to the very lowest probability. In general, the things believed are all the objects of those mental persuasions which are taken to be more or less probable, according to the convincing nature of the evidence upon which they are founded. I. In the ordinary affairs of life many of the objects of belief are to be found. These are things which are not, and perhaps cannot be, certainly known, yet they are matters of assured rational belief. In business, all plans and enterprises which look to the future are matters of belief. Confiding in the experience of the past, as ground of action for the future, men make their business plans, and in doing so belief plays a large part. Take belief away, and the whole fabric of commercial life would fall to pieces. In the home circle, and in the relations of social life, the same is try; The things which often lead men to action are nothing uijre than beliefs. If men were to wait till they had positive know- ledge, they would seldom act in these spheres, and the bonds which bind home and society together would become very slender. Men really know much less, and believe much more than they often think. They often act with confidence upon what is simply belief. Hence, the greater part of man's activity in the ordinary affairs of life flows from belief. The certainty of these matters is in proportion to the clearness and consistency of the evidence. And, in this connection, it should be kept in mind that if men act on such grounds in ordinary secular affairs, they ought to be ready to act consistently with this principle in the concerns of religion. If assured probability be the acknowledged guide of action in secular affairs, it should also be admitted as valid and sufficient in matters of religion. Many who reject religion on this ground are glaringly inconsistent. 2. L all forms of historical information there is another large ass of the objects of belief. By means of testimony. THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF. 107 ZZ °' !?' 7"'"*=' ^« '^^"^ «l«»t the events whi^h trans- entertained. All our information concemine the oa«;f u aclma„« J.h pis* ':'"' °' '■'"°'^' -^ »" "-• rests nn f.c*- passing events in our own time which rests on testimony, are of the nature of belief. This is also uZVr ''''''' "^'^'^ -'^*« *° the future Relyng upon the permanency, under God, of the existing order of «^.ngs men entertain certain beliefs, more or less securely object of knowledge, but it may be the object of belief S'LrirrVndr";"' ""^' ''-''-y ^"^^' -^^^ of to the ftr "'^°" '" '"'"^" ^^P--- ^-king oAl'J T^ °^ *''' °^J''*^ °^ "^"^f "« within the circle of the several saences. In what is usually called scientTfic theTlt/InS rT'' ^'"^ '^ "^"" *° distinguish^Jw^t the^ac/j and the theones involved in it; and there is also need to make sure that what are regarded as sc entTfi fSs whTfs irelv ! ' " "^r''^ '^ " '^^^' ^"d «t other times What ,s mere y a more or less reasonable theory to account or he facts is tacitly assumed to be as real or c^ain Tthe facts It proposes to explain. True scientific facts are real XThef V""".' "'"^ ^'^°"^^' °^ hypotheses con wTlw tha?' "V''^°^J■^^t^ o^ belief. A little reflection nltZntl uri '"'■'■'"' ^'^"tific information is evtenfe Th rn.^ f ' T' '' '"^ ^^'="-'>^ ^^""ded on M '"^' '"^^te to the various hypotheses the e \ ' r^"'^ '" ^"P'^'" «^tain facts. OnTy when b™* o£ «.e„ce. and scores of il,„s,ra.io„s c^uM £ Pi li' loS APOLOGETICS. adduced from physics, chemistry, biology, geology, astron- omy and anthropology at the present day. Even in psychology and ethics the facts and the theories must be very carefully distinguished; and in the sphere of religious experience the same exhortation is not to be ignored. The variable factor in these sciences is that of theory, to which belief relates. The facts rightly apprehended are the perma- nent factor, while the theories to account for the facts are constantly changing, and only a few theories, from time to time, become the established truths of science. It thus appears that the function of belief in the realm of science is very large, and its objects in this realm are very many. Nor is there any essential difference between science and religion in regard to the function of belief. Both rightly use it, as both possess a basis of fact which is known. 4. In matters of religion belief has a large place, and consequently many of its objects lie in this sphere. In religion certain things are known, and on these many assured beliefs rest. The belief in God, in the future state, and in the reality of spiritual things, alike illustrate this. In connection with these beliefs. Apologetics renders a useful service in unfolding their rational grounds. So, also, the contents of divine revelation, the earthly career of Jesus Christ, and the reality of the power of the gospel to save from sin, are objects of belief resting on evidence. Con- cerning these questions, Apologetics undertakes to vindicate the grounds of these beliefs. In like manner many valid objects of belief are found in the reality of religious experience, in the blessings it bestows upon the individuals, and in its excellent fruitage in the world. Here, again, Apologetics will find occasion to utilize belief, and to exhibit the reasonable grounds of Christianity. As a comprehensive theory to solve the manifold problems of man and the universe, of thought and things, of sin and its remedy, Christianity makes its claim to be adequate and sufficient, and thus, in the broadest possible way, Christianity becomes, THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELII F. ,09 in its totality, an object of rational belief On. , . how important an activir„f ,^ ^ '""' «"'' "> "">«' WW is and to" vTtk °I*' '"'"'■^ """"f" '<• ™n «rju« „ .0 Siij -r tr--^.' -- exhib,-, these greeds in a sc"S ^a^l ^TJTs" the vindication of the Christian system This completes introductory matters. Definition and description of Apologetics have been given. The 7eorv of knowledge and the philosophy of beliff have been sketched rolled" TH-r ""1 ^•""""^ ""'' '^ ""^^ our feet twe IZ \ nu '"' '^' ''^y- 0"^ t^^k now is to vindicate and verify Christianity as a divine redemptive reli^on 1 1 'I i .:i! "I will assuredly reach truth, if I only fix my attention sufficiently on all the things I conceive perfectly." — Descartes. "My certainty of .ality is simply my consciousness of knowing; which, whether I attend to it or not, is essential to every act of knowledge."— Habsis. "All knowledge rests ultimately on faith. I must at last believe in my own sou.', and in the perceptions of my own soul."— Luthabdt. "Knowledge and faith cannot be severed from one another, like the bulkheads in a ship, the first of which may be crushed in, while the other still keeps the vessel afloat."— Robinson. "We can rationally believe that a thing is, without knowing how or why it is. It is enough fc. the true dignity of man, as a rational creature, that he is not called upon by his Creator to believe without knowledge, to receive as true propositions which convey no meaning to his mind." — Hooge. "A man is but what he knoweth. The mind itself is but 4n accident of knowledge; for knowled-- is the double of that which is."— Bacon. "By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by God."— Epistle to the Hebrews. THE FIRST PART FT^NDAMENTAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 1M ifi II I i "O God, my soul is restless till it rests in thee !"— Augustine. "A little philosophy inclineth a man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion."— Bacon. "Intelligence stands first in the order of existence." — Hamilton. "If education be not already preceded by an innate consciousness of God, as an operative predisposition, there would be nothing for educa- tion and culture to act upon." — Nitzsch. "We see before we know that we have eyes, but when this is known, we perceive that we must have preexisted in order to enable us to see." — COLEBIDGE. "To think of God is to be certain of his existence."— Luthasdt. "God is the most certain fact of objective knowledge."— Bowne, "Tradition can perpetuate only what has already been originated."— Paiton. "Cogitable existence cannot be produced out of incogitable."— Mab- TINEAU. "Agnosticism in philosophy involves agnosticism in religion."— Strong. THE FIRST PART. FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS. CHAPTER I ft, ■ • Contents -Used in Two Senses.-Wide SensV m 7 1 ***=''"'"« of the Term. ;.ons of this Usage.-Spec^ Sen LlrS r^T^ *° **«»'^r-I"ustrT- Relauo., to the Cosmos -Th<^The7h1l-S !!'•'' 7»"°'^ °f ^od and His -Theism.-Deism.-Panthe^,:ilDet °^'''^' B«is for Christianity I^epart„re.-P.,ehoC SVh2L"^S=^^^---^ P"'- S Tii» A »• Literature, "9.-Flinfs Theisn,. ChVps I HP ""','"''""0" *o Theology, p. H. B Smith's ^^oto'"irt fch n t"""/'"""^ "" ^'^^^-•- o«rf Cr^c* Philosophy, Chan 11 n- P" i.— Coclcer's Christianity, Chap I Bowne/ ^/^S /J ^ rS^'^^k''*"'''' '^^*«'"-' Chnst^n Theism. Chap. I.lRedfordV r*' ^??"'' ^-Thomson's II., Chap. I._Tullocl^s r/,«;l chJ T ^r'^"'* ^'"'' P'rt ^K^ion, Vol. I., Chap'^ S;,S^,''- "r'^'' ^^'' ^'^'' ^^""'''on of Chap.I._Lindsay's^c««/wIar. • xf*'''**^ ''^ ^'•«''«. Vol. I Dabne/s n..,^, cTap^llS: ''* ?^"''^ '"'•''''^''My, 6hap. I _ § 19. I. Preliminary. 8 • ■ "'I""'=- Th. >|,l,cr, 01 th. optralion of >his ^M 114 APOLOGETICS. I J [ y "ii m ' I I activity is, first of all, in the souls of men, and then, through them, it has its influence on the world. This is the under- lying conception of the Christian system which is carried with us rough this discussion. Christianity is at once a system truths to be known, and a set of redeeming agencies to be experienced. It is revealed truth and divine energy, and these two factors are closely related. The truth reveals and expresses the energy, and the energy, in turn, is experienced through the reception of the truth. It thus appears that Christianity involves both a doctrine and a life. This life is realized through Christ by the Holy Spirit, and the doctrine implied in the life is found in Holy Scripture. This is the general view of Christianity here adopted. 2. The conception of the Christian religion just sketched not only presupposes the existence of God. but also assumes that certain organic relations must subsist between God and the world, which is the sphere of his redeeming activity. If God through the ages is conducting the movements of this activity in the world, he must of necessity sustain certain intimate relations with the world in general, and with man in particular. If God be not in vital contact with his creatures, the conditions for the exercise of his redeeming activity are wanting. This makes it plain that atheism and materialism are niadequate. because they deny the existence of the agent in this activity. It is equally clear that both deism and pantheism cannot supply the ground for the operation of the divine redemptive activity resident in Christianity, because they hnth misconstrue the relation of God to his works. We are thus led to the conclusion that Christian theism is more adequate, since it announces such relations between God. man and the universe as provide an ample basis for the unimpeded exercise f)f the redemiUive aspects of Christianity. This Iwing the case, there at once arises the ratiordl deinand for a proper exposition of the Christian pliil ' "' ""™ "■*"« -atura 7h» ol and the,sl,c cosmology in a carehtl ami complete >vay E^ 'y «sm" h!™r f ' '° •'""' '"^ '""'>'""« •■»y m s^n t"e anfnf "^^^ very properly ,lis.inp,ishes between fpecuiatne and Christian theism. I. A glance at some of the definitions proposed by certain leading writers upon the su.ject may pave the Z for 1 " nccepted definition. Tulloch ( r/./L' p. '^o^ ^ays t theism .the doctrine of one almighty, wLfnd li h^ w ^ e t"^^:-?:"^' ^^'" ^^"^'•^' -^1 --t essential ele- mav n /i'V "'""" " "^ ^'^'"^ ^^^'"«t pantheism, but it may not be best to define God as merelv will. He is a Pe-„a1 being. The whole idea presented'by this d^fini on '■l!|l 'in I20 APOLOGETICS. i v is rather too general, and it announces no relation of God to the cosmos. Luthardt (Fundamental Truths, p. 22) suggests the single idea that theism is the doctrine which regards God as "the principle of all things." As the starting point of a definition this has some real merit, but it does not clearly distinguish between theism and pantheism as any proper definition should. Miley (Systematic Theology, Vol. I., p. 57) says that "theism means the existence of a personal God, Creator, Preserver, and Ruler of all things." This is evidently rather vague, and can scarcely be regarded as a definition in the strict sense. Flint (Theism, p. 18) defines theism as "the doctrine that the universe owes its existence, and continuance in existence, to the reason and will of a self-existent Being, who is infinitely powerful, wise and good." By way of explanation, he adds that "it is the doctrine that nature has a creator and preserver, the nations a ruler, and men a Heavenly Father and Judge." This is a fairly good definition. It announces a doctrine of God and a theory of the universe, such as theism proposes to maintain. It may, perhaps, go more fully into details than is necessary, yet all it states is properly contained in theism. In his secondary definition Flint possibly goes beyond the proper contents of theism, when he introduces the idea of God as Father. It may be doubted whether theism, without borrowing from revelation, has this factor in it. That Christian theism comes to possess this idea there can be no doubt, but it may be going too far to make it an element in theism as the philosophical basis of Christianity. At the same time, we would be very careful not to conceive of theism in a purely abstract way, for there is evident propriety in the remark of Professor Orr (The Christian Viexv of God and the World, p. 49), to the effect that "a true theism should be a living and not a barren one." 2. The following definition is presented to set forth the idea of theism suitable for fundamental Apologetics : Theism is that doctrine concerning the origin and continued exist- FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS explanation of thn t>r^hi ., necessary and adequate solution. ^ ^''^^'"'' '^'''^y P'-'^^^ted for rational by man and the Lrirrenf / ^ ^ P'°'''''"' P^'^^"ted an ever-active Jd And T/"u '"'^''^ ''^^ P°^^"'«t« °f defined natural Tnd n,nr".1 /"'''' '""°'^^^ ^^^^^'^ ^e" world. Tt e rdado^s ! f ""' '^'^^"^" ^°^ ^"^ the so that God bo'h il ^' ? T '"*""^^ ^"^ '"^«--'' these three <:^^:Z{ .Z^ir^::^:^?', "^^ '' progress of this discussion ^ ""' '° '""^ '" ^^e profound questions Th.^J y'°fi^e"cs, but also raises many three ^actsUrrelatJ^^^T ^rthS^^^^ ^^""^ God, man and the world. Howis cZ\ k "'*' "" How far is he inten,V.n. Tl ^ *° ^ conceived? his abidin/relat on Ir ' . ^°'' ^^' "^^'^'^- ^hat is What is h^ ;Cn tord"';V"^^ '^'^^^ '^ -"? world? Has man thel ,' ^'^^' '' ^'' ^^'^*'°" to the with GodT Che ari "™' "'° '^^^'^'^^ ••^>^*-- through speciar reUaUon To^if tt""^',?^ ^^^ regarded, and how is it related to cL I ^u '^""^ *° ^^ -de of God's activity L Ihe ^orM ^ '""'^^ '^ ^"^^ '"'^''^ calLte^nStlwr ^'^ '""^^ ^''^^ '^^ ^ ^ -e the questio s Just ;lr In addition to •^ored. Theoreiillv Ihlu ^'""^^T u^ '^'^ """^^ "°^ ^e reference to thf u, ' "^ '"'^''* ''^ discussed without can oT,:Ln it'an?";-"^^ ''''''''''' '* '""'^^ '^ -hat" explam ,t and mdicate its place in the world. The ■m : .11 M 1 122 APOLOGETICS. main task for theism in connection with this problem is to be careful to vindicate such a relation between God and his creatures as does not involve God, in any causal way, with the production of moral evil, and that leaves the way open for the free play of those redemptive activities of God which constitute the essential principles of Christiainty. An organic relation between God and the cosmos is announced in theism, and fundamental Apologetics seeks to elucidate this relation in such a way as to provide its ample philosophy. N ) IV. The Divisions of Theism. § 22. I. The definition of theism just given suggests its main divisions. While there may be no serious difficulty in arranging the materials of theism in an orderly way, yet it is no easy task to decide where the exposition should begin. Some writers commence with an exposition of the various proofs for the existence of God, and make this the main part of the discussion. Others proceed at once to unfold the theistic significance of the cosmos, and in doing so have much to say about the order and design which it exhibits. This gives vwo types of theistic method. In neither case is much attention given to the initial question of the nature and origin of theistic belief on its subjective side. This, however, is perhaps the first question which should engage attention. Ever since Kant's day, inquiry into the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge is of primary im- portance in any field. In the field of theism this may be specially true. To reach some assured conclusions in regard to the nature and origin of theistic belief may be of interest in itself, and of value for the discussions which are to follow. It may supply an experimental basis for the first steps in the discussion, and aflford a good foothold against agnosticism at the outset. 2. It also deserves to be noted that write in theism do FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS. 123 not always distinguish between what may be called the subjecuve and obiective aspects of theism. Thi! „!' Z the contrast between the belief in God as it lies n the" nd and he existence of God as an actual fact is not always God is tot; T." T '''"^' ^"' ^'^^^ ^'^^ -'^t-- o' trod IS another. The former is mainly a question in psychology, and the latter a problem in ontologj Though closely related as a matter of fact, yet it ma> conduce to orderly treatment to consider them separately.' Ind in the o der of the. treatment, it may be natural and best to ^gt with the subjective side. ^ It may be well to bear in mind, also that the w.Vl.r the discussions of theism to some extent. If God be the betf thssur^'-^r^'" "^ ^"'^^^^'- -^ '^ - t^ '^ behef this subject ,s related to that object, then theism and that theism, m some sense, is involved in all religions, yet the fact remains that the question of the nature and o igfn of religion, and that of theistic belief, can scarcely be kC entirely apart in this discussion. ^ ^ .J'l^'T'"^"' """'"^'y '"'■''^^t^^' f'^t^^'^^n the subjective and objective aspects of theism provides the key ffr the ^r^:' '^ '"^^^"^'- ^'^^ «-t d-ision dUs . h theistic belief as a psychical fact. This division mav be c escribed as the psychology of theism. In this division two chstmct questions arise. One relates to the essent ^ natur^ of theistic belief and the other to its origin. The former eads to an analysis of that belief, and the 1 tter to a„ exposition of its genesis and growth the'VellitvTH' "'" ''""°" "' ^'^"^"' ^"™^ ^"^"tion to Zv 71 I '' ""^'^'"' o^J^'^t of theistic belief This ^^hich the human mind entertains? I„ a word, Has t^e III ■m i ' * i t * 124 APOLOGETICS. subjective belief in God objective reality as fact? This division of the subject, also, naturally falls into two sections. In the first, the various proofs or reasonings which show that the belief in the existence of God is a rational, well- grounded belief, are to be unfolded. This leads to the presentation in detail of the theistic arguments. The second section of this division undertakes to investigate all those schemes which either deny the validity of the theistic inference, or propose some substitute for it. This raises the exter ive controversy in regard to the anti-theistic theories. Some of these deny the main positions of theism altogether, others propose to modify these positions, and still others venture to propose certain substitutes for theism. This whole second main division of the subject may be termed the ontology of theism, inasmuch as it has to do with the real being of the object of theistic belief. The psychology and ontology of theism thus await dis- cussion. Under the former the nature and origin of theistic belief are to be considered, and under the latter the theistic proofs and the anti-theistic theories are to engage attention. To the survey of this wide field we at once proceed. THE FIRST DIVISION. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THEISM. THE FIRST SECTION. CHAPTER II. THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. p ,. . COXTENTS. SidJ-SSr DSL'^L^r-'n^-"'''*^- - *"* subjective Kant- Hegel.- Goethe 1 MiH - aTrke ^JT • ^•="*«^-Sp.noza.- Pfleiderer.-MuUer.-Kostlin-FosS. r~,^''''"'™^'=''^^ - C'i'd.- Cave. - Ritschl. _ KuyZl^J, ^■~^°''^"-~ Martineau.-Flint.- AdopteC-Coment, oT^iel^tf fiSr?' ^^ Saussaye.- Definition sonalityof Ma„.-Cognitiono Deftv R^"". ^'° '"' ^''"''^ P"' pendence-Sense of Ob gatio„ In^^^^^^ « ^°<^-F«linK of De- of the Self-Revelation of S-xt'Te/^ r^^^ P™'''- sc.ousness.-A Definite Connatural pi^ a^'"'' °^ '^^'"'^'^ Con- Element-The Rational PsXlo J ru'°o' °'"'"^' Empirical Terns Innate and Intuitive SoSeHrt "^' ^'''' ^°' '^is.-The Three Facts.-Theistic P Idic^fion Tr^^^ I"" ^"^'""^ Stated.- by Revelation. ^'='»"fons.-The.stic Hypothesis—Instruction Literature. ^A^ r/,.«/.V Argument, Chap XH ^ "' ^'''P- "-^'•"^•'•^ />««»wrt«. Part I., Chap I S"!?" 0°^'"««'* CAm/,a„ Chap. VI.-MiiIler's TheOnJ'ZS'ru'*''''''^''''''' ^'•"*'. ■"■a/ /?W,-^,o„, Chap. Il.-Pfllfderer', P T""' ^^'^^ ^-MflHer's JVa«- Chap. I., of Vol. liL-Stelrn • rl' p i''''"^*^ "^ ^"*^""'' Sec. II.. Chap. III.-Kello^..'s ThTr ^^'dence of Christian Experience God and the World, Chap m-cS J' J 7°" ' ^''"^"■'"' ^•-«' "^ IV.-Caird's F^^rfa'J-J ^7%^ T V/ ''^''^•'"•' ^hap' ^A.£ro/«„v,„,^ ;?,/,..,„ cC jll ^^"''T''' Chap. Ill.-Caird's Chap. II.-De La Saussrve'= J' "^/-^W" « Encyclopaedia. Div. II VII., VIIL-Mlrtin aT;;„Irr^^^^^ -"S"" "^ ^^"■^•-' Chai «m. Chap. VIIL-Lang's rt ;i ^^''':' ^^^P• "-I-erach's 7A.- Tigert's Theism. "^'"^ "^ ^'^^sion. Chap. XVII.- 1 ::! : \ m i I r m I I h 126 APOLOGETICS. I. The Nature of Theistic Belief. § 2^. ^- ''jT^HEISTIC belief is so intimately associated with A religion that some account of the latter is necessary to understand the former. It may be assumed that religion is a persistent fact in human life, and a constant element in the history of mankind. In a general way, religion may be said to consist in certain beliefs which have associated with them certain ritual and other acts. The present inquiry has to do, not so much with the objects of these beliefs, as with the experiences of the soul involved in them. Hence, it is a certain condition of the soul of man, rather than the outward ceremonies of religion, with which attention is now to be engaged. In a word, it is the subjective, rather than the objective, side of religion which is to be considered. What, then, is religion as an inward experience of the human soul? It is not easy to define what the essential nature of religion is. The derivation of the term, religion, either from rclcgerc, "to gather up," or from religare, "to bind back," does not go very far in giving a clear idea of the essence of religion. And the Greek term, Opr^axua, which really means the service of deity in general, does not give much additional light, as it is used in the New Testament by Paul and James. As a matter of fact, the interpretation of religion on the subjective side has ah the difficulty involved in any psycho- logical inquiry, and it is also invested with all the perplexities peculiar to religious lielief. .All introspection is difficult: but that which seeks to observe and interpret the religious experiences of the human soul is the most difficult of all. This interpretation is all the more difficult, for the reason that religious belief, as it now ajipears in any S(HiI, is more or less complex. Its simple, primitive, su'ijcctive elements have been affected by many influences of heredity, tradition and education, so that it now Iwcomcs very hard to deter- mine what in it is native to the soul, and what is the product of expcrieiice. And thii ta-^k is made sti!! nsorc pcq.lcxin- THE NATURE OF THEISTIC BELIEF. ,27 would give the same account o u. '" '™' '■''•^'°" 2. In addition, it is not ea ^- t . 1 1 religion si^ouldb; kept in vew ■ ' , ;^^"^'^ ^"^^^ ^^Pe of nature proceeds. VVe have tU '" '^".^'^^''t'^" '"^o Us Mohammedan and the Ch ris tan 'rT' ''^ •^""''' ^'^^ among men Which i! ,, "*'^" "^''^'""^^ consciousness shoulJwe see^r 1;; X^^^^^^^^ ^J ^rT' ^ should take the consciousness of t le Chril i „ t!! '"^ ''' Christians there is t he dtff \ """""^ "'''"'"^' religion. astC i. ;;:it ' "'■■'■; " '°"'"'™ ■" "" P'ay all the con,pIex powers of „,en ll^ts "T. ..4ir;::,:~,;-~;:;;\:;*;;i;;: « III I!. a ji s, 128 APOLOGETICS. ing what the real nature of it is. Those definitions which make religion consist in fear or selfish dep-Vg may be set aside as useless, and the familiar definition that religion is a mode of knowing and worshipping God need only be noted. Spinoza made religion consist in "the love of God, founded upon a knowledge of the divine perfections." Kant said that "religion is the recognition of all our duties as if they were divine coi.imands." Hegel's brief definition is that "religion is perfect freedom," which he expands into "the relation of the subjective consciousness to God, who is Spirit." Goethe makes religion "a feeling of reverence for what is above, around, and what is beneath us." Mill says that it is "a craving for an ide; object." Schleiermacher's well-known definition of religion is, "The absolute feeling of dependence." J. F. Clarke describes religion as "the worship and service by man of invisible powers, believed to be like himself, yet above himself." Principal Caird regards religion as "the elevation of the human spirit into union with the divine." Edward Caird looks upon it as an evolution, whose essence consists in "a conscious relation of God," who, as the highest unity, is the "ultimate pre- supposition of consciousness." Pfleideicr gives a careful definition to the eflfect that "the kernel of religion in all its forms, is that reference of man's life to the world-governing power, which seeks to grow into union with it." Martineau describes religion as "a belief in an everliving God ; that is, a divine mind and will ruling the universe, and holding moral relations with mankind." Muiler's definition of religion has been much discussed. He says that "religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral conduct of men." Kostlin, in a very good article on "Religion" in the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia, says that religion means "the conscious relation of man and God, and the expression of that relation in human conduct." R. V. Foster gives a different turn to the definition when he says THE NATURE OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 129 o^worshi^^T? '"' "''^'°" "^^ '^ ^^^"^^ - ^he spirit ot worship This view is somewhat in harmony with the scriptural idea of it. FHnt savs thaf "r^Ucr- . belief in o K^- . ^ ^^ rehgion is man's UMCcesaUe to his senses, but not indifferent to his senli- »»e.hin, h^e^^zr;e,^ll^/hS:rs^e?he^ c"; ™ '.'*r °J *^' P-P.ion 'upon tt'e Lt^e^T ={tt^\ShCs;-?-i3 rather han to God. is the fundamental fact in LlTon' ^mThinV H°. """""' '' ''' ^°°^' '^ "-™i"n S; tTen ulv^' , '''"?"'^ *'^ *^°^'"°^' ^'^^ ^o^'-os being taken subjectively and objectively." This means fhl? is "a l»li,f i! . "' ^,^="*^y'^ *"SS«ts that religion >» follows: "Rel^or^Us, '\'"^'"' ''."'"i'ion, h«.sion of his „l?,ion toTn n 'L'" ™" ' "^"- able ,0 influence his deSny o whichT"' " ''°"'"' object, together with the S^ d i ^s and '' "^T'"" .-.^ appt^hension calls forth," "^ThUira.rhkrFt't definition, and is quite contprehensive '"' ' ^:"Z re>:!r Z'the-Lt-irtJ T' '^ very variously conceived by diff " ^Z, t^, " w/».dTLh^U7o':;7:, ::;^r r ri^ir • -' ^<)i «30 APOLOGETICS. between him and some superior being called God. This definition presupposes an abiding relation between man and deity, and makes religion, on the subjective side, consist in a mode of man's complex activity. It pertains to the whole personality of man, and embraces the entire area of his activity. This agrees with what was said in the Introduction of this treatise, to the effect that religion did not belong to some single faculty of the soul, but rather consisted in the combined activity of all its powers in relation to the noblest objects with which this activity can possibly be exercised.* God is its object, man is its subject; and religion is a complex experience growing out of the realization of this relation. JI. The Contents of Theistic Belief. % 24. 1. The exposition of the previous section has opened the way for the analysis of theistic belief on the subjective side. It has been s .own that this belief is one of the various phases of religious belief. As it appears in Christian theism, it is more clearly defined than anywhere else. As theism was carefully defined in a former chapter, its contents are now to be exhibited as clearly as possible. What does theistic belief imply as an experience in the human soul? What is the nature of the idea of God as it exists in the human mind? What is the real import of the religious consciousness involved in theistic belief? By adapting the definition of religious belief given in the first section of this chapter to the topic now in hand, we may very properly say that theistic belief, on the subjective side, is a mcde of knowing, Wieving, feeling and acting on the part of man. which arises from a realization by him of the natural and moral relations which subsist between him and the infinite personal God, whose existence and constant activity theism asserts. 'Introduction, Chap. IV. THE NATURE OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 131 2. It is assumed that the experience now under considera tion invo ves the exerri'r." '" '^''""^^ °' '''''f '" ^'^'^ «P«"«"ce. ihis ,s the faith factor which some writers make verv crknowiT "";; s;t ^^^-^ ^^^ -iprLTrlti::^ tJetween knowledge and belief that both should have a place m theistic consciousness. Indeed, it may not be t^ much i I I ii' 132 APOLOGETICS. 'i! to say that knowledge and belief mingle with each other in it. This belief is not merely a vague impression or a simple probability. It is rather a rational conviction resting on ample evidence. This belief may be regarded in two aspects. It may be looked upon as an instinctive conviction rising up spontaneously in the human soul. Those who hold theistic belief to be intuitive in the sense in which Jacobi taught, illustrate this view of the faith factor in it. In the deepest sense this factor is a rational belief. Theistic belief, however, may be considered in another light. Belief is, as has been shown, rational conviction based on evidence.* In the case of theistic belief there are many undoubted facts which supply valid evidence to justify belief in God. The activity of the human mind 'n making the inference from this evidence is of the nature of belief. Both of these aspects of the belief are properly included in the second factor of theistic belief. Care, however, muit be taken not to regard this as a distinct God-consciousness. It is rather that experience of the soul which is implied in theistic belief in either of its aspects just described. c. Thirdly, theistic belief includes the sense of natural dependence on God. This consists in an affection of the sensibility, and supplies, to a large extent, the emotional element in religion. Schleiernjacher gives this factor great prominence in his system. Some regard it as mainly a sense of our finiteness over against the infinite one. Others look upon it as the natural sense -n' dependence which the creature properly feels towards the creator. This feeling of depend- ence, this sense of finiteness, this feeling after God, is undoubtedly an element in the theistic consciousness. Closer analysis might lead to the conclusion that this feeling is to be regarded as the natural concomitant of the intellectual and faith factors already described. Yet in the con- sciousness itself they are all so blended as to be inseparable, ' Introduction, Chap. V. THE NATURE OF THEISTIC BELIEF 133 makes it the dominant feature of theistic heliVf t/ • moral law. under which man finds h'm,f I'd the 2' sion of a moral nature by man OutZT' / ^ ''" factor .; . ^: T'^'' '' ''^^ '"°'-« distinctly religious ^Z'Jo^TT. '" ^'^V'^"*-^"*' - impulse. In theTou which prompts it to give homage to the object of religious a^ of I :L'"f"^/; "°"^'P -P--es itself in eS 'vt ch promrto'^h ""'°"'' "^^""^ ^he sentiments he eby'Tr7what 1 ' ""'"' ?"' *'' *="P"'^"" ^^"-^ inereoy, are what appear m this factor of theistic belief This instinctive impulse to worship some ob£t ^ s^ T::lrj "". ^'^^ '^ '"^^^ be'connden ;" g de" as an abiding factor in the religious consciousness It k he native tendency to reverence%ome supe^ 4tg nd ^niir Thi! t ^-^'T'°" '" "rtain'^rites aJ'cer". monies. This instinct rea y involves the ott,-.. t . ^heistic belief, and it may beUet^ ^t^^^^'li The cognition of deity, the belief in God. the sense TnaS dependence, and the feeling of moral responsiWHtranTerd out towards, and culminate in, sentiments of adorTdo^ and ^I hese Irt' '°""'^ *'^ ^'"^ -"^^ - the obTeit of all these othe.- features in theistic belief These, then, are the five factors which constitute the main »34 APOLOGETICS. it i f! contents of theism on the subjective side. They are all bound together in the unity of that experience of which they are the complex expression, and are separable only in the way of logical analysis such as has been made. It is also made more clearly evident than ever that in religious and theistic belief all the powers of the human soul are called into exercise. 3. A profound problem now comes partly into view. At this stage this problem is merely suggested, but it must be fully considered later on in these discussions. That problem consists in an inquiry as to how far the theistic consciousness in man involves an activity on the part of God, which is of the nature of self-revelation. This is a question of deepest import. At present it is merely suggested that the theistic experience of the human soul, of which an anlysis has just been made, may imply, as its abiding background, a move- ment of God towards man, in the way of self-expression or self-revelation. Some think that the experience of man, in his theistic consciousness, may be his response to the activity of God in self-revelation. If this view be valid, then a revelation of God in the soul may, in the last analysis, be the condition of the possibility of the complex experience involved in that consciousness. The relation between God and man which theism announces provides the ground for this natural revelation, and this natural revelation would then he the basis and the pledge of a supernatural re elation, such as iL recorded in the holy Scriptures. III. The Precise Nature of Theistic Belief. § 25. In the previous section the constituent factors in theistic belief were unfolded. It now remains to consider this belief in it otality, with a view of giving a careful description of its essential tv^nre as a whole. This now raises the question of the real psychological nature of the belief in God. Here a few simpic remarks must suffice. THE NATURE OF THEISTIC BELIEF 135 good deal of confusion of thought and no little^bT^i' of language. In regard to no idea, belief or priS7 perhaps, .s this more evident than in'the case of th^S a .^ a well defired""^ ".'"" ^^"^^^ ''^' ''^ ^'^^i ^ s a well-defined innate idea and at other times that there analysis of he previous section is that both of these are « reme positions. Against the view that the tdef ofUd 1 oner f ""'''•'' " '^'' ''''' ^^^^« '^ - theistic experience It is argued that there is in theistic belief, at its root an abiding connatural factor, which is not the proTct' of experience, but is rather necessary to this experien^ t is no asserted therefore, that the human soul aU at once L a clear cognition of one infinite personal G.d. nor isTfor a moment admitted that the belief in God s entire y the product of some process of experience. It is sim^y ma „ down, that the germinal principles of theistic belief must be presupposed to be in the human soul, in order to the validity of the experiences involved in theistic b^Hef > 2. The analysis made further sumes that theistic belief m Its essential nature, is not a merely empirS proSu t As a matter of fact, to begin with experience alone rn^es k wT t Utl: ^b^^'f ^° f ?f °" °^ ^^'' -'^^' ^^ -^-e theistic in ,r ^"^ '^ '^' ^"' ^ "^^"d^d as non- of Sh m "^*''"' "''"™' '^"^*'°" »" the knowledge of God would be impossible. As the empirical theory Ti knowledge ,n general has already been rejected TrZrt nence. In this experience there is a native factor which Z •Introduction, Chap. IV. ■4\i •f. 136 APOLOGETICS. I \> ) jiii ii ill .1 ,! soul itself brings to the occasion upon which this experience takes definite form in the theistic consciousness. There are, therefore, two factors in this consciousness. The one is original, e other acquired; the one intuitive, the other experimental; the one connatural, and the other em- pirical. 3. In these discussions it may be well to avoid the frequent use of the terms innate and intuitive, because they are somewhat ambiguous, and are at times misapplied. The term used by H. B. Smith to denote the truth here seems a good one, when he speaks of the connatural knowledge of God. This simply means that in the very constitution of the human soul there are the elements of theistic belief. This does not imply a complete knowledge of God, but only the existence in the soul of its principles. The term intuitive must not be taken to mean that man has a distinct God- consciousness as he has an immediate self-consciousness. Yet, again, it may be going too far to admit H. B. Smith's position, when he says tb-\t the denial of the existence of God does not involve an nl solute contradiction, for the reason that the logical outcome of the connatural theistic principles in the human soul is a definite theistic conscious- ness on the occasion of experience. This is simply saying, in a round-about way, that atheism is illogical; and, it might be added, is unnatural. 4. From this it follows that if man's native theistic endo\-ment is not at first a distinct consciousness of God, it will require certain suitable experiences to bring this endow- ment into distinct consciousness. The true doctrine thus emerges. Man is so constituted by his Maker that he comes, in the course of the natural development of the native principles of his soul, to attain to definite belief in and idea of God, and to realize the consciousness which theistic belief involves. As the powers of the human soul unfold their native resources, they rise to the apprehension of the notion of God in a perfectly natural way. In this process both the THE NATURE OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 137 connatural condition in tlie soul and the occasion in expe- rience are involved. The universality of religious belief, and an analysis of man's constitution, fully confirm this conclusion. 5. Three striking facts How from the contents of the theistic consciousness. The first is the power man has to use theistic predicates. How comes it to pass that untutored men can call any natural or artificial objects their gods? This seems possible only on the supposition of the reality of the connatural factor in the nature of man. This fact also greatly confirms the description given of the nature of theistic belief. The second of these facts consists in the ability men possess to frame the theistic hypothesis of the universe. This arises from reflection upon the universe. They see the starry heavens above, and the fruitful earth below, and observe law, order and design in the cosmos, and these things press for an explanation. Then the theistic hypothe- sis is brought forward as the best solution of the various problems thereby presented. The ability to make and use this hypothesis argues for the reality of the connatural theistic factor in man's constitution, and further vmdicates the exposition of the theistic consciousness already made. The third fact is the most significant of all. It consists in the capacity to receive and understand a special revelation from God. This fact is worthy of note here, and will come up for fuller discussion under Christian Apologetics. The fact that man can receive and understand the things set forth in the Scriptures, and so obtain instruction in divine things thereby, is possible only on the assumption that man's constitution is endowed with a theistic capacity. There is thus a certain kinship between God and man, so that man finds himself made for God; and, in turn, it appears that God may communicate a knowledge of himself to man in some special way. And this fact still further confirms the view presented of the nature of theistic belief. h-\ 1% fC.ti: ijS f i APOLOGETICS. These three facts, taken in connection with the analysis made of theistic belief, greatly illumine and confirm the definition of theism given some time ago. It was asserted that God was immanent, as well as transcendent, in relation to the universe. This means that he is always in contact with the cosmos in general, and with man in particular. This being the case, the door is open for both the natural and supernatural forms of revelation on the part of God to his creature, man. This position will be repeatedly insisted on. THE SECOND SECTION. CHAPTER III. THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. THE FETICHISTIC THEORY. Contents. Religk)us and Theistic Belief Related—Burning Questions in Apolo- getics -Problems Difficult-Diversity of Method—Descriptive, His- torical and Psychological Methods— All Methods Needed— The Real Quiestion— Qassificationof Theories.-Cocker— Patton— Plan Adopted -Nine Tueones— Superstition and the Craft of Cunning Men.-No Philosophical Value-The Fetichistic Theory-Positivism and Natural Evo ution.-Comte and Shultre— Term Fetich Defined— Its Usage and Application— Used in Two Distinct Senses-Its Strict Sense— Its f/'lf °'"^l""'P''''''*'*'"~^'" Symbolism of the Fetich— Wait* and MuIIer— The History of the Case— The Fetichistic Theory Explained. -Criticism of the Theory— Not Complete at this Point—The Theory « Superf5c.al.-It is Historically Defective.-Assumes the Rudest to be Difficui" ^^"^'^^ ^^°^^^ ^'*""' Evolution— A Psychological LlIOtATUlE. The Articles on Religion and FeHcUism in the Encyclopaedias- Cockers CArw/w».ec. 1., Chap. I.-Principal Caird's Philosophy of Religion, Chap. VIII -Edward Caird-s The Evolution of Religion, Vol. I., Chap. VI.-Fair- bairn s Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. Chap. I.-Van Oosterzee's Chrisl'm Dogmaties. Part I., Chap. I.-Hodge's Systematic Theology. Vol. I Part I., Chap. I.-Miley's Systematic Theology. Part I., Chap. I Sec. II.-Schurman's Belief in God. Ch^p. III.-Beattie's Methods of TAmm Part I., Chap. I.-Kellogg's The Genesis and Growth of Re- /.gwn Chap. II.-Fiske's Outlines of the Cosmic Philosophy. Vol. II , Part III Chap. V.-W. N. Qarke's Outlines of Christian Theology. Introd.-Tylors Anthropology. Chap. XIV— Tide's Outlines of the Htstory of Religion. Chap. I— Ellinwood's Oriental Religions and bZ^c^'' ^.'""t.Y!."-7^'*''"'' ^'"'"'"''^ °f ^*^''^ o^d Christian Belxef Chap. »— Kidd's Social EvoluHon.-Dt La Saussaye's Manual "Lrt S""'vv4.^''r'*' ,^'^- VI.-Quatrefage's The Human r£/n v5xf ■ T -^^Iri?""' Introduction to the History of Religion. Chap, XXV.— Iverach's Theism, Chap. VIII. 'J if- 3 I J4O APOLOGETICS. I. Preliminary. § 26. 1. 'T^HE question of the origin of religion in general, J. and the problem of the genesis of theistic belief in particular, are so involved in each other, that the discussion of the one necessarily requires some consideration of the other. It is evident that the inquiry into the origin of the belief in an infinite personal God roots itself in the much wider question of the beginnings of religion among men. The question now is, How did men come to be religious at first? How is it that all the tribes of mankind have some sort of religion ? Are the simple and crude forms of religion the earliest, or are the higher and purer types first in time? Are the lowest and degraded religions to be explained as degenerations from the noblest and best? If the former are first, how did they originate, and how do the latter arise from them ? If the latter are eariiest, what is their genesis, and how are the degraded forms related to them? In particular, how did theistic belief, with its noble view of God and of his relation to his works, first come into the possession of the human race? These are burning questions in Apologetics at the present day, and on this field the conflict is now fiercely waged. The influence of the evolutionary philosophy, and of the his- torical method of investigation, are both sensibly felt in the sphere of religion. This has led to a renewed discussion of the whole subject of the genesis of religious and theistic belief, and of the rites and ceremonies associated with that belief. The mode of the development of this belief has also had to be considered in the light of modem thought, so that the older views scarcely seem to fully meet the conditions of the problem in its new form. 2. These questions are confessedly difficult. The difficulty arises from various causes. The views taken of religion differ. The question as to whether the beliefs in the mind, or the outward rites and customs of religion, are to have THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 141 prominence in the problem, introduces some confusion. varies SomHIt 7"'^'"' f"""^^ '" '''' investigation vanes. Some take for granted that all religious systems are purely natural products, which have been ^dual^r evolved from their primitive form. This is one extreme. The other «treme is to assume that all religion originated exclusively whSr T^'f" ''°'" '^' ^"^ *h^^ ^h« degeneration ^^n worL '"'"''' ''' '''^'''^ 'y''"^' °f ^he «ihanced by the diversity of method followed in their study. There are at least three general methods adopted by different methoT T^" '°"°" ^'""^^ exclusively'the LcripTe rvstems" 7 r "' '°"'*"' '° '*"^^ ^"'^ ^°'"P*'-« the various systems as they exist at the present day, or as they are exhibited in their sacred books. Little attention is given the histoncal connections of the various religions, or to mr^'T.^T'' "''''°"'- '^^°"^h '^^' "^hod gives much useful information, yet it does not go very far toward, the solution of the problem of the origin of religion. Others adopt the historical method, which has given eood results in other departments of inquiry. This method Lks to trace back the various religions to their sources, or to follow them doH-n from their distant fountains in the remote past. This method has certain decided advantages, for it ^eks to a«:ertain the facts in their historic relatbns. Yet the practical difficulty with this method lies in the fact that history proper leads us back only so far, but does not enable us to reach the very first stages of religion among men. Sooner or later we come to a prehistoric period in almost every case. Even if the aid of philology and archeology ^ called m the difficulty is not entirely removed, for .nferencer-ih this field are always more or less unce^ain. The historic method, therefore, has its limitations. Still others rr- itclined to deal with the,^ problem, hy the psychological method. In this case the individual, rather !'i I .' 14a APOLOGETICS. than the race, is the direct subject of inspection. The inquiry, then, is. How does religious and theistic belief arise in the individual soul? This, however, makes a diiHcult problem. Even with the aid of the careful analysis of theistic belief made in the last chapter, the difficulty still presses, because the belief in the adult reflective mind is complex, and it is not easy for such a mind, by the aid of memory, to go back to its first distinct religious impressions, and to explain clearly how they were obtained. Nor is the case materially helped by careful observation of the first religious impressions of children, either in pagan or Chris- tian lands. No one has ever yet been able to give a very satisfactory account of the way in which the child-mind first comes to entertain the idea of God, and to have certain religious sentiments associated with that idea. 4. It would seem, therefore, that no single method can fully solve the whole problem, but that advantage should be taken of them all. The description of the manifold phases of religion is useful, the study of the historic develop- ment of different religions is of much value, and the observation of the rise of religious belief in the soul is of great importance. But it is only by letting the light shine from all quarters upon the perplexing problem of the genesis of religious and theistic belief that trustworthy conclusions may be reached. Thus we have the problem of the origin of theistic belief in the individual soul, the question of the genesis of that belief in the history of the human race, and the evidence of the extant religions of the day, to consider. What is the origin of religious belief in the human soul? How did various religious institutions, like sacrifice and worship, first arise? How has the race come to possess the idea of God? In particular, how did men first come to entertain the belief that there exists one infinite personal being called God, who is over all, and who sustains abiding natural and moral relations with all his creatures? Was there e%'ef a time when religion was not a factor in the life ! THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 143 of the race? If, historically, religion is as old as the race, then the problem of its genesis comes round again to be a question of its origin in the individual. How did the first man come to be religious and believe in God ? In what sense are the germinal principles of theistic belief in the very constitution of man? The exposition of this profound problem requires several chapters. II. The Classification of Theories. § 27. Various schemes for the classification of the theories to account for the origin of religion have been proposed. Some make two main classes. One includes all those theories which propose a purely naturalistic explanation, and the other embraces those which find the origin of religion in some form of supernatural revelation. This plan of division can hardly be regarded as satisfactory, for it scarcely does justice to the psychological aspects of the problem I. Cocker arranges the theories upon this subject in five Classes, and has a good discussion of the whole subject > some phase of superstition, which arises largely from a fear of invisible and superhuman powers, that are supposed to operate in nature. t-t^-w w Secondly theories which discover its genesis in a process of the evolution of the absolute, according to which the I'l^eTfTn ."^"""'."^ '" ^"'** '""'"^^ ^"^"^"y ""folds Thirdly, theories which regard the 1-ginnings of religion as a natura and moral feeling, which of the nature o^ an mstinctive faith or intuition of the s 1 Fourthly theories which, in var ..s ways, regard the ongin of religion as the outcome of the spontaneous app^r! that the necessary ideas of human reason, ,«ch as those of ' Christianity and Creek Philosophy, p. 55. j'lt; I e 1) I 144 APOLOGETICS. infinity and causation, coming into consciousness over against the changing world, constitute the source of theistic belief. Fifthly, theories which assert that religion is due at first to some form of external revelation from God, the reception of which by the human soul explains the origin of religious and theistic belief. It is evident that the problem mainly before Cocker's mind is the origin of theistic belief in the individual soul, and from this view-point his classification seems quite com- plete. He rejects the theories of the first three classes, and adopts the fourth as the true one. At the same time, he couples with it certain elements of the last class, and thus gives revelation a certain place in the solution of the problem. 2. Patton, in his Syllabus of Theism, gives a slightly different scheme. He treats of the theories to account for the genesis of theism under four classes. Fiirv, those theories which involve the principle of natural development. Under this class several subdivisions are made. Secondly, theories which find the genesis of theistic belief in outward revelation of some kind. Thirdly, theories which find the beginnings of theistic belief in some sort of inference or logical process of the mind. Fourthly, theories which regard this belief as the outcome of a certain form of intuition. The last view, rightly under- stood, is the one which Patton adopts; and he argues for it with much force. 3. The following classification slightly modifies and expands those just outlined, and is adopted for this dis- cussion. First, those reasonings which seek the origin of religious and theistic belief in superstition, the cunning or craft of men. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 145 Secondly, theories which deny the original theistic nature of man, and find the origin of religion in fetichism. Thirdly, those schemes which discover the beginnings of religion m naturism or animism. Fourthly, somewhat similar speculations which regard spiritism or ancestorism as the source of religion. Fifthly, those peculiar intermediate views which propose henotheism as the starting point of theistic belief in con- nection with the infinite. Sixthly, those views which give a foremost place to some mode of reasoning or reflection. Seve-thly, the speculative proposals of idealistic evolution to account for the origin of this belief. Eighthly, the theory which proposes outward revelation from God as the source of theistic belief. Ninthly, the accepted doctrine, which may be termed the rational, intuitional or inspirational theory. This theory is outlined in harmony with the view taken in the last chapter touching the nature of theistic belief. The first of these schemes has no philosophic value, and may be dismissed in a few sentences. The next four will be found to be inadequate solutions of the problem. In the next three theories, aspects of truth will be found, and these must be carefully educed. The last-named view will be vindicated as the true doctrine of the genesis of religious and theistic belief. It will also incorporate what is true in some of the other theories. 4- The first class of theories is associated wi*'-; a mate- rialistic philosophy, and a tliorough-going skepticism in regard to spiritual forms of being. It is as old as Epicurus and Lucretius, and as new as the latest superficial skepticism of our own day. It denies that man's nature is essentially religious, and then seeks to give some purely empirical explanation of the way in which religion, as a universal fact among men. at first arose. There are several shades of 10 ^l; inH i 146 APOLOGETICS. opinion among the advocates of this view as to the best «xplanation. Some say that fear or dread of some supposed super- human powers led to the belief in deity and produced religion. In particular, alarm at the rough moods of nature, and the experience of the evils which befall men in the world' caused them by degrees to believe in certain supposed agencies behind them, and to perform certain rites with a view to obtain or preserve the favor of these agencies or deities. This theory has no real value, for the reason, mainly, that fear is an emotion which is associated with some belief or conviction already entertained. Hence, before reverential regard or superstitious fear could have arisen, men must already have had some sort of belief in these superhuman powers or agents. But it is the origin of this very belief for which search is now instituted. This search reveals the fact that it is not fear which produces religious belief, but that this belief rather conditions this fear. The con- viction produces the emotion, not the emotion the con- viction. 5- The other main aspect of this skeptical theory is to the effect that religion arose from the cunning of priests and the craft of rulers. It argues that these classes of men planned belief in the deities and formulated systems of religion among men for purely selfish ends. They sought thereby to secure and retain influence and authority over men for their own personal advantage. To this end, there- fore, they invented religion. This view is also entirely superficial. Before priests or rulers could have had any such influence over men as this theory asserts, it must be presupposed that men already possess religious convictions and sentiments. Before these cunning priests and crafty rulers could possibly find any point of contact with the men they sought to influence, these men must alre.idy have become possessed of relii^ious senti- THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 147 ments. The question now under consideration relates to the origin of these very sentiments, which constitute the essence of rehgion. Thus, it turns out again that religion makes priests ^ssible, instead of priests having produced religion at the first. And civil rulers can only bring religious influences to bear upon men under the supposition that the men under them already possess the essential elements of religion in their lives. III. Statement of the Fetichistic Theory. § 28. I. In general, this theory finds the origin of religious and theistic belief in what is called fetichism. It maintains that man at first was non-theistic and non-religious, and it assumes that fetichism is the lowest form of religion From It, as the starting-point, and by a strictly natural evolutionary process, all phases of religious belief, culmi- nating in definite monotheism, have gradually arisen. The term fetichism is used in vario-ts senses, and not a little confusion has arisen from this nbiguity. And the precise relations of fetichism, animism and naturism are by no means very clearly defined. Nor is the precise place of magic and taboo in relation to fetichism yet uniformly understood among writers upon this theme. The fetichistic explanation of the genesis of religion is advocated by positivists generally. Comte for the earlier and Schultze for the later positivists, advocated this theory' though Schultze was prepared to admit an early belief in spirits along with fetichism. In general, this theory denies that man is theistic and religious in his very consutution, and It maintains that religion in general, and the belief in God m particular, grew out of fetichism. A generation or two ago many were content to hold this theory, and some were its earnest advocates. But at the present day the priority of fetichism has been seriously questioned, not only by Christian apologists, but also by many students of #*f^ 148 APOLOGETICS. ^ : religion who argue on merely naturalistic grounds that some other form of religious belief antedated fetichism. 2 The term fetich comes from the Portuguese feitico which, m turn, is connected with the Latin factitius It thus means something that is artificial, or made by the skill of man. Whether it should be connected with the word fatum may be considered doubtful. Le Brosse, who lived about the middle of the eighteenth century, was the first to use the temi. In a curious old book he describes how the term fetttco, from which fetich is derived, was applied by Portu- giiese explorers on the coast of West Africa to certain objects which the natives of that region regarded with religious veneration. By degrees the term fetich came to denote these and various other objects. 3. In the course of time the application of the term was extended, until at the present day its usage is varied and comprehensive. Indeed, in the popular mind fetichism is often taken to embrace all those lower forms of religious belief and worship wherein certain natural and artificial objects are regarded as having connected with them certain superhuman powers for good or evil. The term thus comes to have a very wide application. It includes not onI> various natural or artificial material objects which are regarded as m some sense superhuman or divine, and possessed of some sort of magical powers. It also embraces many other things such as bus of metal, pieces of cloth, and locks of hair as well as rehcs, amulets and carved images of all sorts. In addition, various animals, birds and reptiles, when they become objects of veneration, and even the heavenly bodies when they are worshipped, are called fetiches. This of course, is a rather indefinite use of the term. Strictly speaking, the fetich is any natural or artificial object which ts supposed to possess some magical virtue, in bringing good or warding off evil, and which consequently is held in reverential regard. 4. In its religious applications it is obvious that the term THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 149 is used in two distinct senses. In a wide and somewhat popular sense it is used to denote all those objects just mentioned which are regarded by certain men with religious veneration. It is this vague usage which has introduced confusion into the discussion. Properly speaking, the term should be confined to the worship of certain tangible inani- mate objects in nature, or to certain artificial objects made by the skill of man, and in which some peculiar magical virtues reside. Fetichism, as a religious scheme, is that phase of religious belief and worship which implies the veneration of these objects as divine, and as endowed with magical powers. In this strict sense it is distinct from animism, naturism and spiritism, and it excludes zoolatry and astrolatry as well, since its objects are simple and inanimate. It is merely a crude form of idolatry, coupled with the belief in magic. At times it scarcely deserves the name of a religion, yet positivists claim that it is the fountain of all religion. 5. A perplexing question now arises in regard to the proper interpretation of the religious significance of the fetich. How are these various objects called fetiches to be regarded? In what sense are they divine? Do they point to something beyond themselves? What is the import of the magical virtue which is supposed to reside in them and to be exercised by them ? The answer given to these queries will evidently aflfect the view taken of the fetichistic theory touching the origin of religion among men. The result is that there are really two quite distinct opinions upon this point. The one opinion is, that the fetich, as a tangible object of veneration, is the goal upon which the worship terminates. The object called the fetich is regarded as the deity, and no symbolism whatever is attached to it. This is the opinion held by the thorough-going positivists. alike of earlier and later types. They earnestly contend that there is nothing else than the fetich to be taken into account, and that the I it/iJ H' :,:i m >!> I !!■ % m: :■ if iti: ! ■I ISO APOLOGETICS. worship begins and ends with the object so denoted. In support of this view, facts are adduced mainly from the lowest types of paganism, where the impressic- of the divine has almost faded from the consciousness of men. The other opinion is to the effect that the object called the fetich is the sign or symbol of the divine. The fetich is not all there is, nor does it exist for itself alone. It is a tangible or visible sign of that which is intangible or invisible. In Its higher forms the fetich becomes the symbol of the divine. Waitz and MuUer, in arguing against the fetichisti" theory, insist strongly upon this interpretation of the fetich. They maintain that among pagan peoples generally there prevails a conviction, often very vague indeed, of the reality of the unseen and superhuman. According to this view, the fetich comes to r^jresent something beyond the object. The testimony of Waitz is of great value upon this point, for the reason that he has studied, as perhaps few others have, the religious beliefs and practices of the African peoples, upon which the positivists chiefly rely in support of their views. He, and others since his day, assert with confidence that even among the degraded tribes of Africa there exists a generally diffused, though often vague, impression of the reality of the supernatural, along with their fetichistic beliefs and practices. 6. There is good reason to believe that this was the state of the case when the objects called fetiches first came to be regarded with veneration. This is not inconsistent with the position that some of these rude peoples in Africa or the islands of the sea have in later times largely lost a vivid sense of the invisible and divine, and have confined their worship entirely to the object known as the fetich. It has simply to be assumed that a process of degradation, of which there are varied evidences, has taken place, and that as a result the original symbolism of the fetich has been almost entirely lost. It will be Sserved in this connection that if this be true, fctichism, in its strict sense, cannot have been THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 151 the first form of religion, and hence not the source of religious belief. 7. It only remains to explain a little more clearly how religious and theistic belief originated, according to the theory under notice. Since different authors give diverse details of explanation regarding this problem, only general outlines of exposition can now be given. The central principle of the theory is natural evolution. Its starting point is the lowest phase of religious belief and practice. This is assumed to be fetichism. This marks the condition of primitive men when they first began to feel the religious impulse moving within them. Certain natural objects round about them arrested their attention, as this impulse moved in their souls, and by degrees a vague sense of the super- natural began to be associated with these objects. Certain magical powers were also connected with them. By degrees men began to suspect that there was some peculiar hurtful or helpful influences in these objects, so that they gradually came to be regarded with superstitious fear. The conviction also came into the minds of these early men that the powers supposed to be exercised by these objects had some relation to human affairs and destiny. Then, as the evolution proceeded, men began to extend the scope of the term fetich, and to apply it to various other objects. Under this impulse these other objects were endowed with magical powers and regarded as fetiches. By this means fetichism virtually became a system of polythe- istic idolatry. It next came to pass that a belief in souls or spirits arose, to account for these magical powers in the fetiches, and by this means mythology in general, and ances- tor worship in particular, are accounted for. Thus, step by step, according to this theory, by reason of an impulse in primitive men, and by the influence of environment without them, religion was gradually elevated and purified, till at length monotheistic belief, witii its appropriate modes of worship, was evolved from its lowly origin in fetichism. ,• I ■ I 1 1 i i 152 APOLOGETICS. In this way simple rcverencf for certain natural or artificial objects, wtth which so.ne magical or superhuman powers were somehow associaiei, developed into the cruder forms of polytheism; and these, in turn, passed on into the great mythologies. These, agpi. oushed their way slowly up- wards, till at last Judu. rn ...., Christianity appeared. The process throughout is . :f,.M>..ic evolution, and the result IS the derivation of h. 'si. bel- f from fetichism. IV. Criticise of :!ecific aspects of nature in particular- that animism is that somewhat more definite view of nature whicl, regards it as animated by certain activities, or permeated by active f.^rces which are often idealized or personified; that stiritism lays stress upon the primitive behcf m souls or spirits, as having at first some sort of separate existence, and also as capable of entering into, and possessing, various natural objects; and that 'vucslomm is a development from spiritism, by means of which primitive '■>. ml i X58 APOLOGETICS. men are supposed to have been led in some way to regard their dead ancestors as still living, and as worthy of veneration. Thus we have to examine naturism, animism, spiritism and ancestorism, as proposed solutions of the problem of the origin of religion in general, pnd of theistic beliex in particular. ; ! ili II. Statement of Naturism. § 31. 2. The leading exponent of this view is Pfleiderer, and one class of mythologists agrees in the main with him. He argues that religion cannot have had its beginnings, either in external revelation or in fetichism. He claims that we must discover its origin in some middle view lying between these extremes. He further contends that this middle view can be neither henotheism nor ancestorism, because these are more mature forms of religious belief. Nor can it even be animism, as this term is generally understood. He rather finds the solution of this difficult problem in what he is pleased to call naturism which may be looked upon as the most primitive form of nature worship. In the main, Reville agrees with Pfleiderer. It is not easy to give a lucid and complete statement of this theory in the few paragraphs which can be devoted to it here. It is a form of religious consciousness higher than that implied in fetichism, and, at the same time, not so high as that involved in animism. In general, it is a theory which has regard to nature in a somewhat ideal or poetic way. It argues that primitive man, at the very outset of his career, was naturally inclined to look upon certain processes and activities of nature with sentiments of awe or reverence. Just as fetichism lays hold of tangible material objects near at hand with reverential regard, so naturism looks abroad upon the beautiful world all around, and lifts it. eyes to the heavens above, and views the varied objects therein presented with sentiments of veneration, which find THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 159 expression in acts of worship. Thus the conditions of the first dawnings of the sense of the divine in the soul are supposed to He in the simple half-poetic and half-mythical view which primitive man took of nature, and in the corresponding feelings which that view stirred within him The somewhat childlike fancy of men, when the race was in Its infancy, led them to look upon nature as interpene- trated by numberless activities, whose varied operations were conceived after the analogy of animal life, or after the manner of the conscious life of mankind. These activities as seen in the beautiful world about them, or in the majesty of the heavens above them, made a profound impression upon primitive man. By degrees these activities, by a sort of mythical process, came to be personified in an almost unconscious way. Thus it came to pass that the sun, moon and stars, the lightning, the thunder and the storm, and the river, the mountain and the sea, were clad with certain divine qualities; and, in turn, they stirred, in the receptive souls of primitive men, those sentiments which constituted the beginnings of religious feeling, and led to acts of homape. In this way, according to this theory, men first began to believe in deity, and to have devout experiences in their souls. It does not claim that man, in this initial stage of religion, had a well-defined belief in deities, existing apart from or independenMy of nature. At first, nature and the deity were blended or identified. Yet it was from this view of nature, or from what may be termed the mythical conception of nature deities, that the original gcds of all religions took their rise. And it is in the reverence borne towards these deities that the beginnings of all religious worship are to be discovered. In one respect this belief and worship constitute that widely prevalent phase of mythology in which a great variety of striking poetic views of nature appear in the form of the nature myths of all sorts. Did space permit, it would be of much interest to give mm s ' I i6o APOLOGETICS. concrete illustrations of some of these simple mythical views of nature. 3. This theory further contends that a sense of moral obligation among primitive men gradually grew out of the feelings of mingled awe and confidence, and from the desire to be in harmony with these nature deities. In this way the origin of morality, and its relation to religion, is explained. As primitive men found that their welfare was conditioned in various ways upon the everchanging moods of nature, so they became the subjects of an impulse to act in such ways towards the nature deities already de- scribed as would be for their best interests. Thus the primitive piety connected with simple mythical naturism is the root out of which the ethical life of primitive men grew. And it is from this early mythical naturism that all religious beliefs and practices have arisen. Here various writers give diflferent explanations of the mode in which this development has been effected. Pfleiderer says that the progress which has taken place in religion has moved along three main lines among different peoples. The result is the production in due time of polytheism, spiritism and heno- theism. Pfleiderer explains at length the mode of develop- ment in each of these cases. He also announces that two principles have been operative in the growth of religion from its primal roots in naturism. The one consists in an intellectual impulse which prompts man to seek a rational understanding of nature ; and the other is an impulse, partly ethical and partly religious, which leads to suitable senti- ments of homage, and urges to appropriate acts of worship. The result of the operation of these two impulses was the onward progress of religion in the experience of men. In due time, through various intermediate stages, definite monotheism, and modes of worship in harmony with the belief in one personal deity, originated among men. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. i6i III. Examination of Naturism. § ^2. Some of the points made against the fetichistic theory in the last chapter are also effective against naturism. They both assume, without good reason, that man was in a non-religious state at the outset of his career. On this account they are both inconsistent with the analysis of man's religious constitution made in a former chapter. Some additional points of criticism bearing directly on the natur- istic theory niay enable us to estimate its validity, I. It is open to nearly all the objections made against any purely naturalistic explanation of the origin of religion. Every such theory proposes to find the conditions of the genesis of religion from without man, and consequenUy it does injustice to certain fundamental factors in man's con- stitution. If that constitution be inherently non-religious, then the origin of belief in God, and the beginnings of religious emotions and actions can only be of the nature of a kind of spontaneous generation in the human soul, accord- ing to which something appears in the consciousness of man whose germs even were not to be found in his constitution. In like manner, every onward movement in the progress of religion must be accounted for on the supposition that the lower stage produced the higher without any contribu- tion from the nature of man. This does serious injustice to the law of causation, for it assumes something in the effect which is not in the cause. In addition, if the law of natural evolution rules in this sphere, fetichism has certain logical advantages. Fetichism is professedly the lowest stage of religion, so that naturism, which is a higher form could scarcely be the primitive phase of religion, if a thorougF-v naturalistic theory v hich admits of no degene- ration be maintained. 2. If naturism admits that fetichism is a degeneration from some higher form of religion, may not naturism itself .-1^1 I .'•il l62 APOLOGETICS. '*i I * i 'I ! also be the result of a decline from a purer stage of religious belief and practice? The frequency with which survivals of an older and purer form of religion appear in naturism, as well as in other lower types of religious belief, rather points to this conclusion. If this be admitted, naturism can scarcely make good its claim to be the primary form of religion, wherein men first came to the consciousness of the divine. The facts which bear this out are to be found in almost every form of religion extant among pagan peoples. The fact that there are such survivals is usually admitted by evolutionists. These survivals may be either relics of a lower form, or remnants of a higher phase of religion. In so far as they are the latter they testify to a prior and a purer type of religion than naturism expresses. 3. This theory assumes that, when it discovers the early men in various lands who began to look upon nature in a somewhat mythical way, it has before it the earliest type of the human race. The correctness of this assumption may be seriously questioned. History, tradition and archas- ology carry us back only so far. A long pre-historic period, ^ in all probability, preceded the stage at which it is said that * naturism appeared historically. During this period great changes may have taken place in matters of religion. There was time enough for men to have risen from fetichsm to naturism, or to have declined from a primitive monotheism to naturism. If a clear case cannot be made out for the former of these suppositions, the latter becomes the more reasonable hypothesis. And, as a matter of fact, the primitive man, of whom these naturistic theories all make so much, is largely s hypothetical personage, so that but little can be certainly known concem-ng him by purely scientific inquiry. In addition, much oi the reasonings in favor of naturism implicitly assume that the religious phenomena of modern pagan peoples represent what religion really was among primitive men. The illegitimacy of this procedure is self-evident. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 163 4. The psychological diMculty noted at the close of the last chapter reappears, and must be met by naturism. Even >f we admit that naturism was the first outward definite form m which religion appeared among men, this would scarcely touch the problem of the origin of religious belief as Its psychological side. This, after all. is the real question, for It may very properly be asked how it came to pass that men in eariy or later times were able to regard natural objects and activities as having certain divine qualities, and as worthy of religious homage? To conceive of nature as possessing certain vital energies, which are supposed to be in analogy with the activities of men, does not go to the roof of the problem. The real question is as to how it came to pass that primitive men were able, almost unconsciously it may be. to regard the objects and processes of nature as divine. Hoxv were they able to construe nature under the category of divinity? The only rational reply is that there IS in the very constitution of men an impulse which takes the mitiative in bringing the consciousness of deity into their experience. Experience may be the occasion upon which It springs into consciousness, but the concept of the divme conditions the possibility of conceiving of nature as divine. The concept of nature, as actuated by certain forces. IS one thing, and the idea of the divine is another. And the possibility of uniting these in human consciousness lies m the fact that the mind of man brings the idea of the divine to nature, and thus renders the mythical view of it which naturism expresses possible. This being the case, naturism does not fully account for the origin of religious and theistic IV. Statement of Animism. § 33. I. Tylor, in his Primitive Culture, is the great repre- sentative of animism. His views are, in a general way supported by Tiele and others. It is to be observed, how- ever, that Tylor uses the term animism in a very wide ■!i' t V -i m 'I ( ( ! ii i 164 APOLOGETICS. sense, and makes it include ^iritism and anccstorism, and to a certain extent naturism and fetichism. Tiele scarcely gives animism such a wide meaning, though he does derive fetichism fronr mimism, and argues that animism is at root a belief in spirits. It may be better for practical purposes to give to animism a more definite meaning than Tylor and Tiele do; for if belief in souls and spiritual beings of some kind be regarded as the source of religion, then spiritism would be a better term to describe it than animism. If this were done, animism would stand beside spiritism as a theory to account for the beginnings of religion. Tylor, indeed, makes two main divisions of animism, and this leads him to give a special meaning to the term, for he describes animism in such a way as to denote the same idea as spiritualism. The one of these divisions relates to belief in human souls, and in their continued existence after death ; the other includes the belief in spiritual beings, which are of higher rank than human souls, and may be regarded as deities tkit exercise some influence over the affairs of men. In our judgment, it is better to confine the term animism to the first of these forms of early belief, and to apply the term spiritism to the latter. This is the plan followed in this discus- sion. 2. Taking animism in the sense just defined, it finds the origin of religion in the belief in souls in general, or in the souls of men in particular. In various primitive experiences at the beginning of his career, man gradually came to have the belief that there was in his body some other form of being. He saw a dead human body, and concluded that something very real had gone away from it. The experience of dreams and certain abnormal affections confirmed this belief. In this way the belief in the living soul of man arose. As this belief became more firmly fixed in the mind of primitive man, he gradually came to have the persuasion that the soul continued to exist after death in a disembodied THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 165 state. And later on, as this conviction deepened, the idea of the immortality of the soul was reached. These souls, thus conceived, were supposed to have the power to enter into various objects, animate and inanimate. In this way various birds and animals, and different sorts of trees and plants, were supposed to become the habitations of these souls. In this way, too, a kind of animated philosophy of nature was reached by primitive man. These souls in the several objects of nature were supposed to explain its varied and complex activities. And having reached the conception of nature as animated by these souls, which were, at one time at least, human, the notion of the divine was gradually associated with nature in general, and with these souls in particular. How the transition from soul to deity was effected is not made very plain by the advocates of this theory. At this point one difference between naturism and animism appears. In naturism, the natural object or process is identified more or less fully with the agency associated with it, while in animism this agency is of the nature of soul, and capable of existing independently of any material object. In addition, it can be conceived as numerically distinct from the object it animates. It is from this animistic conception of nature, and from the belief in souls which it implies, that the origin of religion is to be found. From the belief in souls, men in early ages rose to that of spirits without bodies. Then they regarded these as deities, and m this way polytheism came into existence. Then out of polytheism, by a process of elimination, at last came monotheism. Thus animism accounts for religion. V. Examination of Animism. § 34. I. Some of the difficulties of fetichism, and not a few of the objections to naturism have force against animism as the philosophy of the origin of religion. Some additional p. \v i66 'I :!! I r. APOLOGETICS. aspects of insufficiency may be mentioned. The fact that Tylor gives such a zvide meaning to animism renders his reasonings more or less inconclusive when animism is taken in a strict sense. The admission of Tide, that in all probability there existed prior to animism an earlier form of religion which has left but faint traces behind it, is fatal to the claim that animism has priority. It leaves the ques- tion of the conditions of its genesis practically untouched. The earnest contention of both Muller and Spencer against animism, as the alone source of religion, has considerable value. Then, all the historical uncertainty regarding the information which gives animism its support tends to weaken the theory. The light that shines on the distant past is dim, and its rays have been refracted through tradition, so that its historical value is not of the highest order. And if it be admitted that the principle of degene- ration has been operative, it may be that animism can be best mterpreted as a later decadent aspect of an earlier and higher form of religious belief. Every indication of an original monotheism confirms this view. 2. As our exposition proceeds, it becomes more and more evident that the eflfort to solve the problem of the origin of religious and theistic belief in a merely naturalistic way, and by means of purely historical or linguistic investigations concerning what was probably the first form in which that belief took definite shape is futile. Such investigations do not go to the root of the problem, so that it may be im- possible, in this way, to discover certainly what was the primary form of religion. The analogy, upon which so much stress is sometimes laid, between the religions of modem savages and ancient men, does not justify any cer- tain conclusion, for the reason, mainly, that great changes may have taken place during the period between the present and the distant past in the matter of religion. This con- sideration has special pertinence against evolutionists, who presuppose change and progress in this as in other spheres. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 167 3. In order to make good the claims of animism, it must be shown that it was the earliest form in all lands. This is a difficult task, for historical and other investigations may reveal that in one land one form had historical priority, and in another land some other form was first. This being the case, it becomes practically impossible to explain the genesis and growth of religion as successive strata, lying historically one above the other in regular order, and with genetic relations to each other. That diflFerent forms of early religion may have been contemporaneous expressions of the religious aptitudes of men on the one hand, and of the self-revelation of God on the other hand, is at least a reasonable supposition, even at this stage of our inquiries. If this be true, the value of the psychological method of inquiry appears. The question of the way in which an en- lightened mind in a Christian land, in the exercise of his varied powers, arrives at a well-founded theistic belief, may be at least as fruitful an inquiry as the attempt to disco\er with uncertain historical materials what was probably the beginnings of religion among men. 4. If tiiis be the case, then the pressure of the psycho- logical difficulty against any empirical scheme is sorely felt. In the case of animism, with its belief in souls as the genesis of religion, the question as to how the notion of soul came to be construed by primitive men under the category of deity cannot be properly answered. The only supposition under whicii the transition from soul to deity can be made, is that the mind that makes it has the two notions already in possession. In the fact of the transition, therefore, the genesis of neither can be discovered, for the reason that both are already in the possession of the mind. This being the case, the psychological aspects of the problem are of much more importance than those who lay stress on historical iiiquiry alone are ready to admit. In the light of this con- sideration, the question of the psychological validity of theistic and religious belief is quite as important as the i: ^. v I ••I la APOLOGETICS. problem of its historical origin. We shall seek to give proper place to both afpects of the inquiry as we pursue our further investigations. 5. It may be proper to add here that the genesis of the notion of deity, and the origin of the idea of soul may each have its own explanaHon, and that neither is to be derived from the other. Many things are pointed out by Lang m his The Making of Religion which go to show that the notion of God does not grow out of the idea of soul, but that men come to believe in God and in soul along different lines and on independent evidence. Just in pro- portion as this is made out, does the claim that animism IS the source of religious belief cease to have validity Tf primitive men acquired the belief in the soul apart from the body in one way, and obtained the belief in God in another way, the transition from the former to the latter IS an unnecessary assumption. This assumption the ani- mistic theory of the origin of religious belief really makes. CHAPTER V. THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. SPIRITISM AND ANCESTORISM. Contents. Spiritism and Ancestorisra.— Spiritism Defined.— Its Origin De- scribed.— \'arious Grades of Spirits.— Two Great Qasses.- Polytheism and Polydaemonism.— Genesis of Religious Rites.— Naturistic Myth- ology.— Euhemerism.— Examination of Spiritism.— Spiritism Prior to Fetichism and Naturism.— It Fails to Explain Higher Spiritual Beings. —Fails to Show Qearly how Finite Spirits were Looked upon as Deities. —The Psychological Method Needed.— Ancestorism Defined.— Herbert Spencer.— Ancestorism is a Specific Phase of Animism or of Spiritism. —Starting Point is a Man's Double.— The Continued Existence of the Soul.— Homage to Ancestors and Rites at Graves.— Transition from Ancestorism to Religion.— Examination.— The Origin of Belief in Souls.— Spencer's Primitive Man.— Assumes Sa\-agism.— Ancestorism not always First.— The Theory Breaks Down. LlTEKATL-RE. Encyclopaedia Articles on Animism. Spiritism, and Ancesforism.^ Spencer's Sociology. Part I.. Chaps. XXI., XXII.-Spencers EccUti- astieal Institutions, Chaps. I.-VIII.— Fiske's Outlines of Cosmic PhU- osophy. Part III., Chaps. II.. III.-De Pressenses Origins. Book IV„ Chap. III.— Pfleiderer's Philosophy of Religion, Vol. III., Chap. I.— Pat- ton's Syllabus on Theism.— Fisher's Grounds of Theistic and Christum Belief. Chap. I.— Knight's Aspects of Theism, Chap. II.— Ktllogg'a Genesis and Growth of Religion. Chap. Ill — Miiller's Naturd Religiom. Chap. XVI.— Lindsay's ThcUtic Philosophy of Religion, Chap. III.- De La Saussaye's Science of Religion. Chap. VI.— Menzie's History of Religion, Chap. III.— Lang's The Making of Religion, Chaps. IX.-XI.— Fairbaim's Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Chap. I. I. Statement of Sfyiritism. § 35. TWO other relt . ' . leories to account for the origin of religion are to ne considered in this cliapter. In dealing with them, we have still before us the ground em- braced in Tylor's elaborate treatment of animism. The two a9|)ects of this general scheme now to Iw noticed are sfmtism and ancestorism. Spiritism in its more mature (• I h'.'4 i II 170 APOLOGETICS. t 'I forms, as the belief in spiritual beings, is really the highest of these types of view; for ancestorism relates itself mainly to some phase of animism, and finds its point of departure in the belief in human souls. Thus both spiritism and ancestorism have in a measure to be viewed in the light of previous discussions. I. Spiritism maintains that men in very eariy times came to entertain the conviction that there existed invisible spiritual beings of various kinds. By degrees this convic- tion came to be a firmly fixed belief in the minds of primitive men, and in the course of time it became quite elabr.rate. At the outset, it is supposed by some that this belief was m the reality of human souls; and in this aspect of it spiritism is very much like animism. But by degrees the conception of the existence of human souls apart from the bodies of men became more definite, and in this way it is supposed that primitive men attained to a belief in the exist- ence of separate spiritual beings without bodies. This is the stage in this belief which the term spiritism properly denotes. It marks that aspect of the belie, m spirits which regards them as having an independent spir- itual mode of existence and activity, in which all necessar> relations with a material body are severed. This view is not prepared to deny that these spiritual beings may not, at will, enter into and possess the bodies of men, or even take up their abode in certain objects in nature. In some cases this view suggests that the souls of certain men seem to have undergone a process of elevation above the human sphere, and to have had given to them a sort of superhuman If not divine, character. In any case, the conviction of the 8ei)arate existence of spiritual beings of some sort is sup- posed to have been the starting point of religious belief. These spirits, whether they entered into natural objects, or possessed human Imdies, or existed in a separate state, were gradiiaily regarded with awe and respect, which, in the course of time, became veneration. As the movement iil H THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 171 advanced, these spiritual beings were elevated more and more in the reverent esteem and regard of men, until, finally, they came to be conceived of as real deities. In this way a certain type of polytheism arose. 2. Not only are these supposed spirits very numerous and of various grades, but they were gradually divided into two very diverse classes. This divison is supposed to have been made on moral grounds by primitve men in a somewhat unconscious way. The one class is holy, and ever ready to do good to men ; while the other is wicked, and always seeking to do evil to them. The former are deities, properly so called, while the latter are rather demons. In this way it is supposed that polytheism and polydaemonism arose in very early times. Some writers are inclined to give the larger place to the former, while others lay great stress on the latter, in developing, if not in producing, religion at first. Schurman is inclined to regard polydaemonism as the first definite phase of religious belief; and there can be no doubt that primitive men seem very often to have been more anxious to appease the evil deities than to please the good. In such general ways as these the belief in deities grew out of the belief in spirits which men in early times enter- tained. It was further felt by primitive men that these deities sustained certain relations with men, and that they had some influence on their welfare and destiny. Out of this fact religious ordinances arose, such as sacrifice, offer- ings and worship, and were intended to please or appease the deities. And as many of these deities were supposed to be ready to take offence and do harm to men. much o{ the religious service consisted in efforts to deceive, or to pacify these supposed divine spiritual beings. In this way the rites and ceremonies associated with polytheistic or polydjemonistic beliefs originated. 3. Associated with this scheme, a certain phase of »i>'//i- ology appears. As distinguished from the naturistic myth- n \72 APOLCXJETICS. ology, described in the last chapter, the euhemeristic type of It now appears. It might be called animistic, spiritistic or anthropic mythology. According to this view of the origin of certain aspects of mythology, it began in the belief in the continued existence of certain heroic men after their death. Their spirits, at least, still existed after their earthly career ended, posterity regarded them with growing venera- tion, and at length they were clad with divine qualities and regarded as deities. Men became heroes, and these heroes became gods, and in this way one phase of mythology is accounted for. II. Examination of Spiritism. § 36. Only a few points of critical import need be noticed. So far as this theory connects itself with human spirits, viewed apart from their bodily habitation, the criticism of animism m the last chapter serves to refute this aspect of spiritism. So far as the belief in spiritual beings higher than human spirits, and having no relation with any kind of physical body, is concerned, a few points may be briefly noted. I. The claim of spiritism to have priority over fetichism and naturism seems to be well founded. The condition under which it was possible for primitive man to construe nature as animate, or as possessing magical powers, is the supposition that primitive man already possessed the con- ception of a living soul. The conception of spirit is one thmg, and that of the objects of nature is another, and these are essentially different. To be able to say that nature is m any sense inhabited by supposed spiritual beings, the nund must already have attained the idea of such beings. This consideration completely refutes the claims of fetichism and naturism to have priority. Hence, the reasonings for spiritism refute these theories to account for the beginnings of religion. And whatever is true in animism renders the same service. IM , THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 173 2. The adequacy of th- way in which, according to spiritism, the conception of higher spiritual beings is reached, may be seriously doubted. Even if it be admitted that the idea of the soul be reached in the way that animism describes, the question then arises as to how the transition was made from the conception of the human soul which consciousness announces, to the higher spiritual beings which are supposed to exist without bodies at all. This is the problem which needs some further elucidation than it has yet received at the hands of those who advocate the theory now under consideration. 3. Then, even if the belief in higher independent spiritual beings arose in the way spiritism claims, the theory would still have to show how these beings came to be regarded as divine. How came they to be construed under the cate- gory of divinity? The explanation often given by this theory consists in the application of the principles of euheme- ristic mythology to the facts involved. Heroic men came to be reverenced as gods. But how came this to pass ? How did primitive men come to attach the idea of deity to certain men, and then to do them homage as gods? Here we come again to the position that the notion of deity cannot be primarily drawn from nature; nor is it reached by elevating the human soul, as such, to the plane of deity; nor is it the result of endowing higher spiritual beings with the attributes of deity. It seems more reasonable to suppose that the varied powers of man's complex nature, as they came into exercise, by an impulse from within the soul, and were directed towards nature or to finite spirits in a reflective way, gave rise to the belief in the divine and to the idea of deity. On this supposition the mind of man is able to bring the idea of deity to the contemplation of natural objects, or spiritual beings, and to construe them in terms of the concept of divinity. This cleariy gives prominence to the psychological method of inquiry in dealing with the problem of the genesis of religious and theistic belief. The fl 1 J 'v 174 APOLOGETICS. real question goes deeper than history or ethnography can take us. It leads us to ask how men in early or later times came to possess the idea of deity, and were thereby able to apply theistic predicates to objects in nature, to the souls of men, or to higher spiritual beings. This sets the real problem in such a way that no merely empirical explanation of it is adequate. Hence, we conclude that while historical investigation into the origin of religion may shed helpful light upon the problem, it cannot alone give the fundamental solution. III. Statement of Ancestorism. § 37. This is an elaborate explanation of the origin of religion of which Herbert Spencer is the leading exponent. He is the author of what he calls the synthetic philosophy, in which scientific materialism, naturalistic evolution and philo- sophical agnosticism are combined in the construction of an elaborate system. In the various parts of his system, Spencer seeks to construe all phenomena on the basis of a materialistic philosophy, and by means of the principle of continuity, and the hypothesis of evolution. Hence, mate- rial, vital, mental, moral and religious facts are interpreted in accordance with these principles. It is with Spencer's explanation of the genesis of religious and theistic belief and practice that we have now to do. It is to be observed that Spencer does not seriously attempt 10 give a psychological explanation of the origin of religion, though in his First Principles he makes certain suggestions in this direction, which lead us to expect some- thing more than he gives us. He might have started from the idea of the unknowable, or from the principle of causa- tion in relation to nature, and have given a much more profound account of the origin of theistic belief than appears afterwards in his Sociology. Fiske, in his Cosmic Philoso- phy, has done better justice to this aspect of the problem THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 175 than Spencer, who really turned away from an open door of psychological explanation to a purely empirical theory of the origin of religion. This led him to elaborate that theory which is sometimes called the ghost theory, but which, for the present discussion, may more property be termed ancestorism. In general, this scheme seeks to dis- cover the origin of religion in that phase of belief in human souls which regards the souls of departed ancestors as still existing in some relation to their descendants, and as worthy of some sort of reverence and homage. It thus appears that Spencer's theory is little more than a specific phase of animism or spiritism, which does not take into account all souls or spirits, but regards only the souls of those who departed this life in those relations which enable subsequent generations to look upon them as ancestors. A brief statement of Spencer's theory, as it is set forth in his Sociology, may be the best way to get a compact view of ancestorism. It is to be noted that Spencer argues strongly against the sufficiency of the fetichistic theory of the origin of religion; and he undertakes to show that fetichism can be best explained from ancestorism, with its implied belief in the reality of human souls existing after death. Spencer's scheme may be stated in four particulars, which represent the successive steps in the movement of the explanation. 1. The starting point of the theory is the notion of his double, or second self, which primitive man in very eariy times acquired. Spencer does not very clearlv define what this second self really is, but he describes at length the way m which he supposes primitive man came to possess it. This man observed the shadow which his body cast on the ground, and concluded that this was another self. He beheld his form reflected in the clear water when he stooped down to drink, and the notion of a second self was deepened. The experiences of dreams led primitive man to think that he had a double which could go off on various excursions j inw.''?wg«j i y ii[i ii^j 176 APOLOGETICS. during the hours of slumber, and return again before he awoke. The abnormal experiences of catalepsy are taken to further Ulustrate and confirm the process by which primi- tive man attained the notion of his double or second self. In this crude, blundering way, man, in the beginning of his career, obtained a vague belief in something like a soul. 2. Primitive man next acquired the conviction of the continued existence of the dead. As in the dream the second self went away from the body for a short time, so at death this self went away permanently. Hence, men were sup- posed to have continued existence after death. Especially was this hel(J to be true of relatives or kinsmen. Their second self A\as believed to exist separately from the body which wa5 laid in the grave. In this way the idea of spirit became more definite, and a vague belief in immortality gradually arose in the minds of primitive men. The second self, which had left the body at death, was believed to have continued existence somewhere as a disembodied spirit. This results in a modified spiritism. 3. Primitive man soon began to perform acts of homage at the graves of departed ancestors, and to entertain the supposition that the spirits of these ancestors were capable of taking up their temporary abode in various objects. In this way that stage in this scheme which is properly denoted ancestorism is reached. At this stage, also, this theory parts company, to a large extent, with animism and spiritism. Primitive men, believing in the continued existence of departed ancestors, began to do certain acts of homage at the gt. ,es of these ancestors, and to express, in variou simple ways, their veneration for them. Burial places were kept with care, and visits were made to them from time to time. By degrees these acts of reverence became more definite, and some simple rites and ceremonies began to be observed at the graves of ancestors. Certain offerings were brought to these burial places; and in the course of time the graves of departed ancestors were regarded as sacred ¥m THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 177 shrines, and acts of filial devotion were gradually trans- formed into religious worship. In this way, it is supposed by this theory, that the belief in deities, the practice of worship, and the offering of sacrifice had their origin amone primitive men. 4. At this stage an explanation is given of the way in which ancestorism is actually transformed into religious belief and worship. Here lies the real difficulty of the theory, and at this stage Spencer seeks in various ways to carry his theory through this critical transmutation. First of all, he supposes that the spirits of departed ances- tors have the power of entering into various natural and artificial objects, and in this way fetichism is explained as an outgrowth of ancestorism. To some extent, naturisra IS accounted for in the same way. Then, in seeking to span the chasm between veneration for ancestors and the worship of deities, Spencer adopts severe expedients. These are mainly two : First, primitive man, having by means of the notion of his double attained to the Idea of soul or spirit existing separately, passed on to suppose that these spirits could take up their abode, not only in natural and artificial objects which came to be called fetiches but also in animals and in various forms of nature. Ihen, these spirits having veneration paid to them as an- cestors, ,t gradually came to pass that this veneration was transferred to the object in which this ancestral spirit was supposed to dwell. In this way, further, the ruder forms 01 polytheism are explained. Secondly, the euhemeristic theory of mythology is used to assist m making this transition. According to this theory, certain of the departed dead are looked upon as heroes and then, by the play of the mythical principle, these heroes are gradually clothed with the qualities of deity and come to be regarded as gods. So departed ancestors, m their disembodied state, were gradually invested with increasing veneration till they assumed heroic proportions, ii'!' ■M 178 APOLOGETICS. and as the process went on through successive generations these heroic ancestors were gradually elevated to the rank of deity, and worshipped accordingly. In this way certain higher forms of mythological polytheism are explained as the outcome of ancestorism. Many other things are suggested by Spencer as assisting in the transition from ancestorism to eligion among primi- tive men. The experience of catalepsy, the phenomena of intoxication, and certain phases o^ insanity are mentioned as having some part in this important transition. But space forbids further allusion to these things. Departed ancestors become deities, their graves are turned into places of wor- ship, and the offerings brought to their tombs are trans- formed into rites of divine worship. In this way ancestorism seeks to explain the genesis of religion among primitive men. And having accounted for the origin of religion, its growth onward, till monotheism is reached, is explained as a process of purification and elimination, which takes place according to the principles of natural evolution. Even Judaism and Christianity are made subject to this explanation of their origin and develop- ment. IV. Examination of Ancestorism. § 38. No criticism of the synthetic philosophy, as a whole, is necessary to expose the defects of its explanation of the origin of religion. Nor is it necessary to do more than mention the fact that Spencer, in his First Principles and in his Sociology, suggests two quite different explanations of the problem now under discussion. It is also sufHcient to indicate that a pu'-ely empirical explanation of the origin of religion is all that Spencer's philosophy allows him to give, and that this explanation has really no more value than the philosophy upon which it is founded. Some par- ticulars o\ criticism are now offered. I. Spencer's explanation of the origin of the belief in THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 179 souls on the part of primitive men is superficial. To begin with, the conception of man's doubl';, or second self, set forth by Spencer, is unnatural, and at the same time very indefinite. At first it seems to have been man's shadow, or an echo, or a dream. The difference between these things and the idea of a man's soul, or spirit, is very great, and Spencer gives no good reason for believing that primitive men blundered vaguely from the one to the other. Then, if any untutored man in the infancy of the race did chance to make this blunder, further experience of a very simple kind would enable him to correct his unreflecting mistake. "The result of this would be to make it impossible for primi- tive man to attain to a belief in his soul, for he would come to see that his shadow was simply the reflection of his body. So evident is this that it is not easy to take Spencer seriously on t'Ms initial point of his theory. In the absence of valid proof for Spencer's explanation of the origin of belief in souls or spirits, by means of the notion of a man's double, it seems far more reasonable to conclude that the idea of soul or spirit grew out of the experiences of self-conscious- ness, and that no merely empirical explanation goes to the root of the problem on its psychological side. On this ground, also, the primitive belief in immortality has its reasonable explanation. So, also, those eariy beliefs touch- ing the future life, as a continuation of the experiences and employments of this life can be accounted for on this sup- position. 2. The supposed primitive man of Spencer's theory is largely hypothetical. He is too ancient to be interviewed, or even directly observed in these later days. To assume, as Spencer at times tacitly does, that modem savages accu- rately represent primitive men is illegitimate. The identity in their religious condition can never be proved, while there is strong probability that the condition of men has greatly changed through the passing centuries. Modem savage peoples may be higher or lower in the religious scale than 1 1 MKMO C Oiy nSOWTION TKT OMn (ANSI and ISO TEST CHAKT No. 2) ^ i^PLEDM«<3E 1653 Eott Uoin Strt*( Rochtlttf. tfw York 14009 k«a ('18) 482 - 0300 - Phon, "^ ('16) 2M-19B9-F0. i8o APOLOGETICS. ; P primitive men. From the many instances of degeneration which we see among the races of men in matters of religion, it seems reasonable to suppose that modern savages are the result of religious decline. If this be so, to judge of the religious condition of the first generations of men from what is now seen among modem savage peoples, is quite illegitimate. In addition, it should be kept in mind that the supposed primitive men of Spencer's reasonings may not after all really be the first men. Even theirs may have been a decline from a prior and a purer form of religious belief. Most of Spencer's materials of proof are drawn from pagan and savage peoples of comparatively recent times. His inferences from these facts to the condition and experiences of the first generations of the humaa race is about as far-fetched as anything could well be. 3. Spencer's theory assumes that man at first was in a rude savage state, little better than the brute beasts about him. This is to assume what needs to be proved. There are not a few indications that the first men were not un- tutored savages. Leaving out of account what the Bible implies on this subject, there are not wanting indications in the conclusions of modem ethnology that many peoples in very early ages were in a much higher moral and religious conflition than modern savage races. And history reveals tht fact that in very early days whole communities, like Egypt and Babylon, were far above the rude savage state. It may also be pointed out that while Spencer's criticism of fetichism, as the philosophy of the genesis of religion, has much force, yet his own evolutionary principles are rather inconsistent with this criticism. If evolution marks onward progress from the lower to the higher in the sphere of religion, then, since fetichism is a lower form of religious belief than ancestorism, it must have been pr'or to it. Or, on the other hand, if the priority of ancestorism be admitted, it may be proper to go a step further, and say that some phase of theistic belief lies before ancestorism. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. i8i 4. To make good this theory, ancestorism must antedate and condition religion among all peoples. It must be shown that religion grew out of ancestorism in every country, or that ...1 forms of religion have come by migration, or in some other way, from lands where ancestorism was primi- tive. To do this is difficult, if not impossible, for the reason that in many lands, and especially among some of those peoples where high civilization existed in very early ages, there is really no trace of ancestorism in the sense in which Spencer uses the term. In Egypt, Babylon and Greece, in the very earliest times, this is the case. Thij is a difficulty with which Spencer does not deal in any satisfactory way. The euhemeristic theory of mythology can scarcely be of much service in this connect-on, for it is now very gen- erally discarded. And even if it were admitted, the very difficulties which press against ancestorism at this point would remain in full force. If it cannot be shown that ancestorism precedes and conditions religion everywhere, it can scarcely be maintained that ancestorism accounts for the beginnings of religion everywhere. 5. This theory breaks dowtt, at several important points, It overlooks the fact that veneration for departed ancestors is one thing, and worship of deities is another. It con- sequently fails to show how the transition is actually made from the one to the other. More thorough investigation might show that the transition is not possible in a natural way. At this point the theory must confess serious failure, fc>r to explain religion from ancestorism is either to take religion for granted, or to explain it away. It may be that in order to give a valid basis for ancestor worship we must presuppose religion as already existent. In addition to all this, the searching question may properly be asked this theory, How could primitive man call his ancestors deities, and render to them a certain kind of worship, unless he already possessed the idea of deity, and understood, in some measure, what the instinct of worship really was? If this m 1 4^ li. l\l ! ^i i1 1 i :• 182 APOLOGETICS. be so, ancestorism cannot be the source of religious belief and practice, for the inquiry we are now pursuing relates to the origin of that very belief which is presupposed in ancestor worship. To crown all, this theory is not com- petent to account for the development of theistic belief, and the religion of the Bible, in accordance with its own terms. CHAPTER VI. THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEIS7TC BELIEF. HENOTHEISM. Contents. Muller's General Position.— His Definition of Religion.— A Growth, the Result of Criticism.- His Polemic against Fetichism.— This Quite Successful.— Statement of His Theory.— His Philosophy of the Infinite Underlies It.— The Infinite and the Indefinite.— The Theistic Signifi- cance of the Idea of the Infinite.— Materials Drawn from Literature of India.— Tangible, Semi-Tangible and Intangible Objects of Sense.— The Last Suggest the Infinite.— Henotheism Defined.— Henotheism the Source of Religion.— Criticism of the Theory.— The Philosophy of the Infinite Defective. — It is Historically Insecure. — It is Logically Contra- dictory.— It Has a Psychological Difficulty.— It Breaks Down in Passing from the Infinite to the Divine. LiTEKATinUC Encycloptedia Articles on Henotheism and Kalhenotheism.—lAuntfB The Origin of Religion, and His Natural Religion.— Dt Pressensc's Origins, Book IV., Chap. III.— Edward Caird's The Evolution of Re- ligion, Vol. I., Chap. IV.— Kellogg's The Genesis and Growth of Religion, Chap. IV. — Lindsay's Theistic Philosophy of Religion, Chap. III.— De La Saussaye's Science of Religion, Chap. VI.— Menzie's His- tory of Religion, Chap. IV. — Fairbaim's Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Chap. I.— Lang's The Making of Religion, Chap. XV. I. Muller's General Position. § 39. 1. TV^AX MULLER'S unique theory to account for IV J. the origin of religious and theistic belief deserves some attention. He is an authority on philology in general, and on the literature of India in particular. He has also given great attention to the question of the nature and origin of religion, and he holds well-defined opinions upon the genesis of theistic belief. He has written extensively upon the subject, and his views have undergone certain changes from time to time. If we judged his opinions from his earlier writings, like his Chips from a German i,' I' If M- :« !, 1; i84 APOLOGETICS. tif: Workshop, we would find admissions in regard to the native religious instinct of men, which are not so prominent in his later works, like The Origin of Religion and Natural Religion. In the latter his empiricism is more clearly an- nounced, and the principle of natural evolution is given a larger place in the genesis of religion. The origin of the belief in deity, according to Miiller, is associated with the way in which men at first were led to a realization of the infinite, in its correlation with finite things in certain aspects. His theory has come to be known as hcnotheism, and some recent writers speak of this gen- eral theory as kathenotheism. He seeks to illustrate and confirm it from the contents of the literature of India which bear upon the question. 2. Muller is careful to define what he understands by religion. He follows Cicero in deriving it from relegere. to gather up, or carefully consider. He also states and criticises at length various proposed definitions of religion. In doing so he presents a valuable discussion of this subject. His own definition seems to have been a gradual growth in his hands. He first says, in his Introduction to the Science of Religion, that "religion is a mental faculty or disposition, which independently of, nay, in spite of, sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite under different names and under varying disguises. Without this faculty, no religion, not even the lowest worship of idols and fetiches, would be possible." As the result of criticisms made upon this definition, he modified it in his The Origin of Religion so as to make religion consist in 'the potential energy which enables man to apprehend the infinite." He thus substitutes potential energy for fac-ilty, but says little or nothing about the objective side of religion.' Under the influence of other criticisms, he still further modified his definition in his Natura Religion, so as to niake it consist in "that faculty or pot aal r»uergy in man by which the infinite is apprehended in such a way as to .■ 1i THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 185 affect his moral conduct." This may be regarded as Miiller's most manure conception of religion. It is to be observed that it still gives prominence to the subjective side of religion, and relates it to the conception of the infinite. It is the or-^in of religion thus defined which he investigates. 3. Before he unfolds his own theory he enters on a vigor- ous polemic against the fetichistic theory advocated by posi- tivists. His assault upon this theory is entirely successful, inasmuch as he shows very conclusively that religious belief and practices have not arisen as the result of homage paid to natural objects of any kin-'. This he does by adducing the testimony of travellers i^.-ci. \g what they observed in various pagan lands, concernmg the religious traditions, beliefs and practices of the people. He also draws at length upon the history of primitive religion, and makes out a strong cast against fetichism as the first form of religion among men. He also presents a learned and elaborate review of the sacred literature of India in particular, and reaches the well-assured conclusion that the fetichistic ex- planation of the origin of religion is not supported by this literature. He further brings forward a fatal psychological objection to the fetichistic theory, to the effect that primitive peoples must have had some notion of the divine before they could regard a fetich as deity or call it a god. This polemic part of Muller's work is excellent, and is really the best service he has rendered in this connection. '4: "I II II. Statement of Miiller's Theory. § 40. I. Since Muller's theory of the origin of religion is asso- ciated with the idea of the infinite, it is natural to expect that he will set forth a philosophy of the infinite. This philosophy constitutes the basis of Miiller's theory of primi- tive theistic belief. In unfolding it he proceeds in a some- what empirical way. Negatively, he argues that the idea of the infinite in the \\ i86 APOLOGETICb. . !•: i'\ human mind is not evolved by reason. It is not a rational intuition. Though he does not formally deny the a priori factor in human knowledge, yet he implicitly takes his stand on the ground of the empiricist in his theory of know- ledge. He says that the* infinite is a something which transcends both the senses and the reason, taking these terms in their ordinary meaning. In some places he seems to identify the infinite with the indefinite, the invisible, the supersensuous, and the supernatural, and is ready to admit that any of these terms might be used to denote what the term infinite means. He adds that the infinite is not merely a negative concept, nor is it abstracted from the finite. Yet the finite and infinite are correlatives. Still, so far as the apprehension of the infinite is con- cerned, it is supplied to us in its original form by the senses. It seems strange to say this, after asserting that the infinite transcends both the senses and reason. Miiller's words are : "Beyond, behind, beneath and within the finite, the infinite is always present to the senses. Its presence presses in on us in all our experiences of the finite. The finite by itself without the infinite is simply inconceivable; as also is the infinite without the finite." He thus makes the finite and the infinite relative terms, and finds the one implied in the other in cognition. Muller, however, makes the unwilling confession that the ' nite, thus apprehended, is after all only the indefinite. 'is words are, "The indefinite and the infinite are in reality .*'o names for the same thing; the former expressing its phenomenal, and the latter its real character." And he adds that the history of religion is a history of all human efiforts to render the infinite less and less indefinite, and that, in spite of all these efforts, the infinite must always remain to us the indefinite. This goes far to show that Muller's philosophy of the infinite is not adequate, and that it is justly exposed to the criticism made upon it by Edward Caird, in his The Evolution of Religion, to the effect that i.-l THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 187 the infinite should not be so much regarded as the correlative of the finite, as the principle of unity in the multiplicity of finite things. 2. After expounding the philosophy of the infinite, Muller proceeds to unfold its religious and theistic significance in an extended discussion. His main aim is to connect the idea of God with the notion of the infinite in the earliest stages of theistic belief. This leads him to seek to show how the vague sense of the invisible or infinite led out to the sense of the divine, and generated religious sentiments. He finds his materials for reasoning largely in the literature and religions of India. In working out his theory, he undertakes to show that from the sacred literature of India, especially the Vedas, men were led in early times to an apprehension of the infinite over against certain forms of the finite which were present to the senses. Then he has further to explain how it came to pass that the infinite thus apprehended was con- strued under the category of deity. The objects of sense are divided into three classes for the purposes of complete discussion. First, there are tangible objects, which can be touched and comprehended by the senses. Here certain objects, such as stones, bones, shells, flowers, berries, pieces of wood, water and animals, can be touched all round, as it were. By the senses these objects can be fully apprehended, so that the idea of the infinite is not realized in connection with these in the first instance. These objects, by the lower pagan religious systems, are regarded as fetiches; but this is not the primitive form of religious belief, since it is not in relation to them that men first began to suspect or realize the presence of the infinite in certain relations to them. This stage of religious belief is a degeneration, and is not the original stage of that belief. Secondly, there are semi-tangible ob; cts, which can be apprehended by the senses only in part, for to some extent Ir.. !!' i88 APOLOGETICS. these objects lie beyond the reach of the senses, especially of that of touch. As examples of this class of natural objects may be mentioned trees, whose deepest roots are out o. sight, and whose highest branches are out of reach Mountains are another example, for we may tread about their base, but may not be able to scale their snow-clad summits, hidden 1 ^yond the clouds. And rivers are of the same nature, for we may see the portion of the stream visible as we stand on its banks, but its source among the moun- tains, and its mouth at the ocean, we cannot see. Here there IS a dim hint of the infinite in the fact of the unseen and intangible features of these objects. The idea of a beyond the senses at least arises in the mind. To some degree the infinite is at hand, in connection with the partial apprehen- sion of these objects by the senses; but the sense of the infinite is not yet vivid. This dim sense of the infinite passes over to the idea of the divine, somehow, and the result is the semt-deities of polytheistic paganism. Still, this is not the primary source of religious belief, for it is derived by degeneration from another earlier stage. Thirdly, intangible objects form the third class, and they consist in those objects which cannot be touched at ail by man They may be apprehended by hearing or by sight but not by touch. The azure sky, the passing cloud, the raging s^orm, the shining sun, the changing moon, the sparkl- ars and the morning dawn, are examples of this class to which Miiller makes frequent allusion. Here it is, as Miiller understands the literature of India, that there were present to the senses of men certain objects in which the presence of the infinite was distinctly apprehend-d. He eloquently describes how the early Sanscrit Indians, on the tablelands of Hindustan, looking up into the Oriental skies, gradually reached the conception of the infinite, which they somehow or other transmuted into that of deity. Thus, the sky, and c cloud, and the dawn, were the vehicles which conveyed the impression of the infinite beyond, in THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 189 upon the minds of these primitive men. Thus, Dyaus and Varunna, Vishnu and Aditi, and many other deities, arose in connection with this apprehension of the infinite. Miiller does not very dearly show how the transition from the infinite to the notion of deity is actually made, nor does he seem ready to admit that the notion of the infinite is in any proper sense a priori. The vague sense of the vast beyond suggested by these intangible objects is the germ out of which religion springs. Thus the conception of deities arose, and, in connection ' '♦h this conception, cer- tain religious rites were instituted. III. Henotheism Explained. § 41. I. The term henotheism, used to denote Muller's theory, must now be more definitely explained in contrast with polytheism and monotheism. Polytheism is the belief in and service of many gods. These may be regarded as a multitude of separate deities, or as classes of deities. Pagan fetichism represents the former, and the classic mythologies the latter. Of this polytheistic belief there are many forms. Monotheism is the belief in and worship of one infinite personal God. There is only one such being, and, from the nature of the case, there cannot be more than one. There are different types of this, also, represented bj Mohamme- dani i, Judaism and C'lristianity. Certain types of specu- latr e theism, whicfc ^ f ffe towards pantheism, are also to be thought of in this nnection. 2. Now, henothrism is a curious intermediate doctrine, '*«d. It denotes the belief in, and " at a time, which are repre- ible objects wherein men first - of the infinite. These dei: . js i independent of each other, to a large extent, so that only --ne among the many gods whose reality is admitted, for tb ne being, engages the attention which is not easily worship o', single sented by those natt began to suspect the are regarded as single 190 APOLOGETICS. of the worshipper. These individual gods are not conceived as hmited by the power of others, superior or inferior in rank. Each god is, to the mind Oi the suppliant, as good as all the gods. The reality of more than one god is admitted; but one is, for the time being, regarded as a real divmity, with its claim to homage. Mtiller thinks that this view of the subject is properly drawn from the litera- ture and religion of India. But he also argues that there are traces of the same form of religious belief in Greece and Rome, and also in Germany. It marks in these lards that phase of religious belief which preceded that polytheism, where the gods were organized into a commonwealth, with one as supreme, like Zeus, Jupiter or Wodin. J. The contenti. - of Muller is that this henotheistic stage of religious belief is the earliest of all, and the source whence all others have come. A twofold development, he says, has taken place in the history of religion. The one is the evolu- tion of henotheism into theism and monotheism. This has taken place by a process of . elimination and elevation according to which attention was fixed more and more on the single deity, till at length all thought of others faded out of the minds of men. In due time monotheism, as it appears in Judaism and Christianity, originated. The other mo /ement is by the of oration of dei "ruHon whereby henotheism declines to pagan polytheisn od this' polytheism, in turn, sinks still lower and 1 ecomes letichism m Its various forms. Fetichism, instead f Deing the pri- mary source of religion, is :> seconda. . product from henotheism, resulting from o-'e aeration ir. religion In this way Miiller argues that all the phenomena of religion may be accounted for, from the assumption of henotheism as the fountain whence they all flow. Theism is the result of an advance on henotheism, and fetichism is the product of a decline from it. There is a good deal that is interesting and attractive about this whole scheme, so that it needs some careful scrutiny. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 191 IV. Criticism of Henotheisni. § 42. I. 7' philo- 'i)hy involved in Miiller's theory is de- fective. He a ..is ,he empirical theory of knowledge, and presents a peculiar philosophy of the infinite. As a matter of fact, it .s his empirical epistemology which leads to his philosophy of the infinite. It is with the latter that we have now chiefly to do, and some critical remarks may now be made upon it. In denying that the notion of the infinite is a deliverance of reason, and in asserting that it is present in a 'lenomenal way to the senses is to miss the mark in both cases. The notion of the infinite is not apprehended by the senses, jut is contributed by reason to certain aspects of cognition. He also confounds the infinite with the indefinite, and over looks the fact that these are entirely diverse conceptions. The indefinite, no matter how vast, is still the finite. To speak of the infinite and the indefinite as the real and phe- nomenal aspects of the same thing is to introduce hopeless confusion into the discussion. Further, if we begin with the senses as our only source of knowledge, we can never reach the -nfinite. Empiricism will never lead to the goal of the in.' aite, for the infinite pertains to the reason as the faculty of supersensible principles. Miiller's fundamental error regarding the infinite is that he confounds the mathematical with the metaphysical infinite. The former is a quantitative conception, while the latter is qualitative. In the former case the finite stands related to the infinite as a mode; in the latter case it per- tains to some form of beim as a quality. The infinite, therefore, is not a substanti . entity, supplying i' stuff out of which the finite is made; it is rather a quai-.y per- taining to the basal ground of the reality of all finite things. Nor, again, is the infinite the sum total of all finite things ; it is rather the condition of the possibility of finite things l| i t \ v. ' t* 1 . ' 192 APOLOGETICS. existing as a totality. Nor, again, is the infinite the highest or most general conception; it is rather an a priori prin- ciple of reason on its psychological side. This suffices to show how far short Mtiller's doctrine is of being an ade- quate philosophy of the infinite, either on its ontological or its psychological side. 2. Historically, Muller's theory is open to objections. Indeed, some of the reasonings which he uses against fetichism as the source of religious belief tell against his own theory. History shows that when religions are left to themselves they surely degenerate, and that the early forms of belief and the oldest traditions are the purest. Miiller admits the operation of the principle of degeneration m deriving polytheism and fetichism from henotheism. But he gives no good reason for beginning with what he calls henotheism, which, at best, is a somewhat hypothetical stage. If he had fully traced out his views, he might have been led to a primitive monotheism, instead of to heno- theism. For if henotheism be prior to fetichism, and the latter a degeneration from the former, may not monotheism be before either, and both be a degeneration from it? This consideration might be illustrated at length from the his- tory of religion in Egypt, Babylon and India, did space permit. 3. Muller's effective polemic against the positivist account of the origin of religion is inconsistent with his own con- structive exposition of the genesis of theistic belief. Against fetichism. he argues that it is a degeneration from heno- theism ; and against the view that religious belief originated m a primitive monotheism, he asserts the operation of an upward evolution from henotheism. And he does this without introducing any sufficient reason why the develop- ment should have taken one direction in the one case and another in the other. He refuses to allow the operation of any supernatural factor, and cannot consistently hold one principle to explain fetichism and another to account for THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 193 theism. Christianity, with its supernatural factor, can account for general decline in religion beyond the sphere of its influence, and for upward movement in religion where the supernatural factor is operative, as in Judaism and the Christian system. Miiller's inconsistency is evident. 4. The same psychological difficulty arises here as in former naturalistic explanations of religion. When Muller properly enough says that savage men could not have called their rude fetiches, deities, unless they already had some conception of deity in their minds, he provides a weapon to strike his own theory a sore blow; for the question at once arises as to how the Sanscrit Indians could have called those intangible objects, in which they began to suspect the presence of the infinite, deities, unless they already had in their minds the concept of deity. It is quite clear that at this point Muller is little better off than the positivist, and that henotheism is scarcely more successful than fetich- ism in accounting for the genesis of theistic belief. The only supposition upon which Muller's theory can be made to work is that the human mind possesses, in its very nature, the principles of theistic belief. But if this assumption be made, Miiller's theory is not needed to account for the origin of theistic belief. He cannot surmount this psychological difficulty. 5. In addition to .'1 this, it must be pointed out that Muller tacitly identifies the infinite and the divine, without showing how primitive men made the passage from the one notion to the other. The notion of the infinite is one thing, and the idea of deity is another. The former is a meta- physical concept, the latter is a theistic notion. How are the two to be related, and how is the passage made from the one to the other on the basis of Miiller's theory ? Before the predicate of infinity can be rationally made of God, the mind must already have both concepts. It may be that neither is to be derived from the other, but that each has its own independent psychological origin. What is now 13 ^ ■-I : » ■f'i Jij iiifa 194 APOLOGETICS. chiefly charged against MuUer's theory is, that it does not show how the transition was made, or can be effected from the infinite, which he assumes to be first, to the concept of deity, which, he argues, is derived from the apprehension of the infinite over against the finite under certain con- ditions. With the acknowledgment that Muller has rendered good service in this discussion, we are, nevertheless, compelled to pronounce his theory inadequate to account for the genesis and growth of religion. .1 CHAPTER VII. THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. THE FUNCTION OF REASONING OR INFERENCE. Contents. Preliminary.—Inference Theory.— General Statement— Relation of Inference to Theistic Belief.— Confusion among Different Advocates.— Various Reasons for the Confusion.— Particular Statement of the The- ory of Inference.— Two Types.— Theistic Belief Complex, Therefore not Intuitive.— Rather an Inference.— Confusion Again.— Theistic Belief an Unconscious Inference.— Not Intuitive, However.— Flint's View.— Cruder Forms.— Examination of the Theory.— Admissions Made.— The Usage of the Term Intuition Ambiguous.— Though now Complex, may Have an Intuitive Root.— Flint's Exposition Rather Ambiguous.— Con- fuses the Question of the Ougin of the Idea of God with Proofs for His Existence.— Hence an Important Distinction Between the Genesis and Vindication of a Belief.— The Threefold Function of Logical Inference. — This View Confirmed. LlTEItATtJU. Flint's Theism, Chaps. I., II.— McCosh's Intuitions.— Hstnii' Philo- sophical Basis of Theism, Chap. XVI.— Cocker's Christianity and Greek Philosophy, Chap. II.— De Pressense's Origins, Book IV., Chap. 'TL— Principal Caird's Philosophy of Religion, Chap. VI.— Lindsay's Theistic Philosophy of Religion, Chap. III.— Schurman's Belief in God, Chap. II. — De La Saussaye's Science of Religion. Chap. VI.— Sabatier's Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion, Chap. I. I. Preliminary. § 43. SEVERAL naturalistic theories to account for the origin of religious and theistic belief have been considered. It has been found that they all presuppose more or less definitely a non-religious and non-theistic stage in the early history of the human race, and that they also attempt to explain, in some empirical way, the genesis of the religious consciousness and of theistic belief in man. It has also been discovered that each of these theories is marked by certain radical defects, and that some other solution of the problem must be sought. . r ■IB 196 APOLOGETICS. -H I. We now proceed to the discussion of another theory which needs careful scrutiny, inasmuch as it is a defective, rather than an erroneous, solution of the problem. This theory discovers the origin of the belief in God, and hence of religion, in a reasoning process of some kind. Accord- ing to this view, theistic belief originates in some s,ort of a logical inference. Much diversity of opinion exists as to the precise nature of the inference in question. It can scarcely be maintained that belief in God results from a strict logical demonstration, inasmuch as such demonstra- tion only makes explicit what is already an implicit mental possession. To suppose, therefore, that men in very early times obtained the idea of God, and came to believe in his existence because they proved it, can hardly be a proper explanation of the origin of religious and theistic belief, for the reason, mainly, that men can only reason about that of which they already have some idea. 2. Most of the advocates of this theory are content to say that the origin of theistic belief is to be discovered, in a general v/ay, in an inference of some sort touching the existence of God. At the same time no clear statement is given as to the precise logical form of this inference. It is not made plain whether it is the product of a mediate, an immediate or an inductive inference, nor is any definite view announced as to the non-theistic grounds upon which the inference rests which generates theistic belief. It must not be supposed, however, that logical inference has no relation at all to theistic belief. It has, as we shall see, important bearings upon that belief, and it is of vital moment to ascertain its precise functions in relation to the belief in God. It must not be hastily concluded that logical mference has no bearing upon theistic belief, simply because that belief may not originate, in the first instance, in such an inference. It is precisely at this point that a good deal of confusion has arisen in the discussion of this topic. Very many things that those who hold this view say do not bear tv iiii THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 197 upon the genesis of the idea of God in the human soul, but relate, rather, to the proofs for the existence of God. It is with the problem of the origin of the idea of God that the psychology of theisiu has to do, and this is the topic now in hand. 3. Further confusion arises in the discussion of this theory from the fact that different writers seem to have before their minds diverse ideas of God. One thinks of God mainly as the first cause, or creator of all things; and another regards him chiefly as one infinite personal God, the object of homage and ser\'ice. One has before his mind the matured idea of God found in the Christian system, which is quite complex in its nature, while another turns his attention rather to the simpler forms of the idea of God found in cruder systems. It is easy to see that the function of reasoning in relation to these different ideas of God will necessarily be differently regarded by these several writers. In cases where the idea of God is complex, certain elements in it may be due to reflection and reasoning, although in no case can it be shown that the basal elements of the idea are generated by any reasoning process, because they must be presupposed in order to the possibility of the reasoning. 4. An additional element of confusion arises from the somewhat vague way in which tlie supporters of this theory regard the operation of the faculties of the human mind upon the manifold objects in nature. How far can the observation of, and reflection on, the glories of the heavens and the wonders of tlie earth, go to generate the idea of God in a mind presumably devoid of it? How much may this observation and reflection do to enlarge and enrich the idea of God in the minds of those who already possess it? These are two very different questions, and many of the advocates of the theory now under consideration do not make a proper distinction between them. They speak, in a general way, of reflection up^m the starry heavens and the beautiful earth, and grow quite eloquent about how all this m I. \ ■I ^ ifi ■i ( t ! I , I i i 198 APOLOGETICS. leads out to God, and produces the idea c K)d in the mind of the reverent beholder. With much thc> scy we heartily agree, if it be regarded as vindicating the objective validity of the belief in God, and as enlarging 1'. idea already in the mind of the observer. But all thi. leaves untouched the basal inquiry as to the origin of the primary con-natural idea of, or belief in, God, which must be presupposed before reflection on, and inference from, the objects of nature can possess theistic quality. We seek to keep clearly before our minds the single inquiry into the origin of theistic belief. II. Statement of the Inference Theory. § 44. A brief statement of the theory which finds the origin of religious and theistic belief in some reasoning or infer- ential process may now be given. It is not easy to make such a statement, because able writers vary not a little in their mode of setting it forth. There are two main forms of stating it. I. The first takes the somewhat mature notion of Goc' found in the human mind, and discovers that it is quite complex. It then asserts that the belief in God which this notion implies cannot be an intuition, in the proper sense of the term. Hence, it is argued that the idea of God i- the mind of man is not a simple and original idea or belief, but that it is comr'ox and derived. Consequently it is no' an ultimate idea, but capable of being reduced to lower terms, or of analysis into its component elements. Accord- ing to this view, the term intuition is taken to denote a mental product, rather than the mental activity involved in ongmating that product. When this view of what an intuition consists in is applied to the idea of God, it follows that since intuitions are simple and original ideas, the idea of God, which is not simple and original, cannot be an intuition. And, touching the origin of the idea of God, It IS further contended that it cannot arise in an intuitive m Jt^v4- THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 19^ way. And it also follows, from the position just stated, that the genesis of the idea of God in the human mind must be sought in some other quarter. If it be not intuitive, it must be empirical in its origin. If it be not original, it must be derived from some other source. The supporters of the theory now under consideration usually fall back on the ground that the origin of the idea of God is the product of reflection on, or an inference from, certain aspects of the world about us. Reflective observation of the starry heavens, the fruitful earth, the changing seasons, the inci- dents of our lives, the events of history, and similar things, generates the idea of God 'in the minds of men, and leads them to believe in his existence. There is evidently some confusion in this phase of the inference theory at this point. Those who argue in its favor do not distinguish clearly between the question of the origin of the idea of God and that of the reasons for believing In hi- existence. Much of what they say bears upon the latter ques' i rather than upon the former, and it has much • e ■ • s .egarded. But it does not follow that because » • iDJe to give good reasons for believing in the -; '•i>.nce of God, these reasons generate the idea of God ;.- the soul of man at first. More will be said upon this point later on in this chapter. 2. The other aspect of the inference theory prefers to say that the belief in God is the result of an immediate inference which men unconsciously make. Like the other phase of this tlieory, it denies that the belief in God is the product of immediate intuition, or that it originates in any kind of feeling. It is not always quite clear whether the adherents of this view are dealing with the genesis of the idea of God without reference to his existence, or whethtr they are really assuming the presence of that idea in the human mind, and then seeking to account for the validity of this belief in the existence of God. Flint, in the third chapter of his excellent treatise on Theism, in which he If M 1 200 APOLOGETICS. ( ' deals with the nature, conditions and limits of the theistic proof, seems to stand on this general ground, as a few quotations may show. H- says that "if not perfectly instan- taneous, the theistic inference is so rapid and spontaneous as to have seemed to many intuitive. And, in a loose sense, perhaps, it may be considered so. Not, however, strictly and properly, since the idea of deity is no simple idea, but the most complex of ideas." Again, he says that "the contemplation of nature, and mind, and history, is an indis- pensable . tage towards the knowledge of him. Physical and mental facts and laws are the materials or data of reason in its quest of reHgious truth." These passages, so far as they bear upon the origin of theistic belief, seem to indicate that this belief is not intuitive, but the result of the contem- plation of nature. Flint further says that "our knowledge of God is obtained as simply and naturally as our knowledge of our fellow- men. It is obtained, in fact, mainly in the same way. We have no direct or immediate knowledge, no intuitive or a priori knowledge, of our fellow-creatures any more than we have of the intelligence of our Creator. We grow up into knowledge of the mind of God, as we grow in acquaint- ance with the minds of men, through familiarity with their acts." In such passages as these it is not very clear what Flmt means by the knowledge of God. It seems not easy to decide whether he intends this phnib- to denote the idea of God m the human mind, or to describe the belief in the existence of God. One feels like asking whether he includes both of these aspects of theistic belief under the phrase, the knowledge of God ? And one hesitates to admit the cogency of the analogy between the way we know our fellow-men and obtain our knowledge of God. Our relations with our fellow-men and with God are by no means the same. Our relation to God is one of origin and dependence, such as our relations with our fellow-men do not imply. Flint adds that "the inferences which theistic belief in- THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 201 volves are, in fact, involuntary and unconscious." It is thus an immediate, iir oluntary, spontaneous and uncon- scious inference. "As a rule, the theistic process is as simple and easy an operation for the mind as digestion is for the body." Here, again, one is impelled to ask what kind of an inference a spontaneous, unconscious, involuntary inference really is. It looks almost as if there were an intuitive or con-natural factor in it. And the question still presses as to whether the result of this peculiar inference is the production of che idea or knowledge of God in the soul, where it did not already exist, or whether it relates to the apprehension of the reasons why we believe in the existence of God. 3. There are other and cruder form? in which the infer- ence theory is presented, but it is scarcely necessary to ex- plain them. They are generally quite unreflecting, and usually presuppose that the mind actually possesses the idea of God. What they say relates very largely to the elabora- tion of that idea, or to reasonings to vindicate the actual existence of God. But the real question now before us is as to the genesis of the idea of God in the human soul, and of the origin of what may be called the theistic and religious consciousness. The theory under notice claims that some reasoning process originates these experiences in the soul of man. The validity of this claim is now to be examined, and the function of reasoning in relation to theistic belief is to be indicated. III. Examination of the Inference Theory. § 45. As there are elements of truth in this theory, and at the same time not a little confusion in the statement of it, a somewhat careful examination is needed. I. Concerning the inference theory, certain admissions should be freely made. It is frankly admitted that observa- tion and reflection upon the manifold facts of nature, as 202 APOLOGETICS. well as Upon the evenis of human history, may serve to enlarge and elevate the idea of God. Various forms of inference or reasoning may do much to clarify theistic belief and give it definiteness and persistence. And it should be just as readily conceded that reflection and reasoning may do much to confirm the belief in the existence of a supreme being. Logical inferences of various kmds may go far to establish the objective validity of the idea of God. The arguments for the existence of God are reasonings of diflferent sorts which serve to provide a rational basis for this belief. This, indeed, is the main function of reasoning in relation to theistic belief. Further, the function of reasoning is of great value in its inductive forms, since it enables us to solve the most profound problems of the universe by means of the theistic postulate. These problems are many and varied, and they pertain to the origin and continued existence of the universe The human mind, having the idea of God in its possession, IS able to bring it to the solution of these great problems. In doing so, it pursues a legitimate inductive process of reasoning, and announces a sound theistic philosophy of the universe. The result is a theistic cosmology. But when all these admissions are made, the question as to the origin of the idea of God, or of theistic belief on its subjective side, still remains. The reflection which enlarges the idea of God, the reasoning which confirms belief in the existence of God, and the theistic inference which solves the world problems, rather presuppose than produce the idea of God m the first instance. The idea of God already in the mind logically conditions this reflection, reasoning or inference. 2. The usage of the term intuition in connection with the idea of God is not uniform, and consequently needs some elucidation. Indeed, in philosophy few terms are so ambiguous as intuition, and in the discussion of the psy- chology of theism it might be better to avoid it altogether. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 203 It has, however, been used so much that it car ot easily be set aside. Those who say that the idea of God is not int itive be- cause it is complex, scarcely go to the root of the juestion. They leave it uncertain whether they take the term aituition to denote a mental product, or the mental process therein involved. The advocates of the- inference theory, already alluded to, make it refer mainly to the mertal oroducL An intuition is a simple original belief, rather lan the act of believing. It is a definite mental product expressive of a fundamental conviction of the mind. T' '' ^w of intuition scarcely does justice to the activity nind whic is spontaneous, and which conditions the on as a ment. J product. Now, it may be that the ic God, as four! in the human mind, is complex in its t. are factors in it which are the produ« spontaneous activity of the soul. In a plex, there may be con-natural elenttnt and it may be found that those con-timtiona factors in theistic belief lie at the basis of the pos-^ibility r Miza- tion of this idea. Hence, to deny altogethe ■ - n uitive factor in the origin of the idea of (lod may h ^imt^ too far, even if we admit complexity ia ■ 4 s realized m experi- ence. Let it be carefully observed, howe'-sr ^m the -eal question now before us is not a hov thr * becaane complex, but as to how man ca to p :dea of God at the very first. The real riuestion is r» of the theistic consciousness, not in referen ment. And so we conclude that the ambij; -. intuition exhorts us to avoid its use as much the discussion of the psychology of theism, i ' *. > and • ^at ther*- the naive and i, thouig^ com- the rdca of God. lie origin levelop- be term •isible in ^av be better to use the term native, or con-natural, to di lote the r. of theistic belief as it springs up in the human soul. 3. The exposition of Flint, usually so clear, is a I'* tie confused at this point. He denies that theistic belief is intuitive, by saying that "the opinion that man has an % 111 204 APOLOGETICS. I' it m mtuitiv . or immediate perception of God, is untenable; and the opmion that he has an immediate feeling of God is absurd." The latter part of this statement has much force agamst the absolutists, like Schelling and Schleiermacher. The first part of the statement quoted shows that by an mtmtion Flint means an immediate perception of God by gazmg with the eye of the soul upon the very being of God. The force of Flint's remark may be admitted, if mtuition be taken only in the sense in which he uses it. But It does not follow that there is not in the soul of man a native the.stic capacity which is not produced by any infer- mtial process of the mind itself. The ambiguity of the term mtuition is again evident. 4- Flint's exposition seems ambiguous in another respect He evidently identifies the proofs for the existence of God with the grounds for the belief in God. He says that "the proofs for the existence of God coincide with the grounds for the belief in God; they are simply the real grounds of the belief established and expounded in a scientific manner. If there were no such proofs there could be no such grounds." If Flint is here speaking of the theistic proofs, his statement is almost a truism, for the proofs are simply the grounds for believing in the existence of God, explicated in a more or less thorough manner. But if this statement has reference also to the origin of the belief in C .d, it implies that the explication of the proofs for believing, m the exist- ence ot God generates the idea of God in the soul. If this is Flint's explanation of the genesis of che idea of God in the soul of man, we are constrained to take issue with it, for the reason, mainly, that the human soul must already possess some definite notion of God before it can lead out the proofs for his existence. This being the case, the proofs are not necessary to generate the belief which already exists The fact seems to be that Flint does not clearly conceive the question of the genesis of the idea of God. When he calls theistic belief an immediate unconscious belief, and p THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 205 when he makes the proofs coincide with the grounds of that belief, he can scarcely mean anything else concerning the origin of the idea of God than what Luthardt and H. B. Smith mean when they say that belief in God is a native con-natural belief of the human soul, which springs up spontaneously on suitable occasion, and as the faculties of the soul come into exercise. This does not mean that the belief is not rational, or that it cannot be vindicated by rea- sonings which show the reality of its object. This position simply maintains that in the first instance the idea of God springs up within the soul, and is not brought into it by any process of inference or reasoning. Perhaps this is what Flint really means, so far as the origin of the idea of God which theistic belief implies is concerned. If so, )♦• seems a pity that he should have denied the intuitional nature of this belief so decidedly as he has done. The truth may be, as we shall see later on, that there are both con-natural and empirical elements in theistic belief, as we find it fully matured in the human mind. 5. A very important distinction now emerges. This is the distinction between the vindication of a belief and the genesis of a belief. To account for the origin of a belief is one thing, and to establish its validity is another. To explain how an idea comes into the possession of the mind is one problem, to prove tlie reality of its object is quite another. Now, inference, reasoning or proof, has much force in justifying the rational nature of theistic belief, and in vindicating the real existence of the object to which that belief relates. It is in this sense that we prove the divine existence. But inquiry concerning the origin of the idea of God in the mind is a very different thing; and this must be settled before the proofs can be properly opened up. This is an inquiry in psychology, while the question of the theistic proofs is a matter of logic. Those who find the genesis of the idea of God in inference have the question of the proofs uppermost in their thought, while the problem now t F n I' '4 206 APOLOGETICS. before us is that of the origin of the idea. These two questions should be kept apart, and each ought to be con- sidered in its proper place. The question of its origin now engages attention. We may be well able to give very good reasons for holding that there is a God, but it does not follow that the idea of God springs from these reasons. Hence, we conclude that this theory does not rightly regard the distinction between these two questions, and that it fails to show that man at first acquired the idea of God by any process of ratiocination from non-theistic premises. 6. Inquiry into the resources of logical processes will further show that theistic belief does not arise from any sort of logical inference. This is a point of vital importance in this discussion, and n«^lect of it has led to much con- fusion. 'There are three modes of logical inference of which the logicians speak, and these three exhaust the list. There is immediate inference, first of all. By this mode of inference the conclusion is reached without the use of a third term for the purpose of comparison. By this kind of inference we merely elucidate in one form of expression what is contained in another. We really do not originate any new truth which is not implicitly in the first statement; we simply explicate the contents of the original assertion. Nor have we any right to put into the second statement any- thing which is not latent in the first. Hence, if the idea of God be not in some way implied in the original proposi- tion, it can never justify for itself a place in the second, as the result of immediate inference. Then, if the idea of God be in the original statement, its origin cannot be ac- counted for as the product of au immediate inference from that statement, which already has a theistic quality about it. All that inference can do in such a case is to elaborate the idea and vindicate the reality of the existence of its object. Then, there is mediate inference. Here a third term comes into service in reaching the conclusion. In this case, the form of reasoning is the syllogism, which consists of THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 207 two propositions, from which a conclusion is drawn. In this case, also, no new truth is obtained. We simply unfold, in the conclusion, what is implicitly in the premisses, and we can never have more, seldom as much, in the conclusion as in the premisses, without having a logical fallacy in our procedure. Hence, if the idea of God be not implicitly in the premisses, it can never get into the conclusion. We, therefore, have the idea of God before we make the infer- ence, and hence we do not need the inference to generate that idea. In a word, we do not rightly explain the origin of the idea of God by means of a logical process, which presupposes its existence in the mind. There remains a third mode of inference. This is known as the inductive, and it consists in the observation and classi- fication of facts, with a view to discover the laws which gove.n the facts, and thereby solve the problems which the facts present. In a word, in inductive reasoning we bring some sort of postulate, which the mind already has in its possession, and we seek to solve the problems by means of it. Thus, we observe the manifold facts of order and design in nature, and we bring the theistic hypothesis which involves the idea of God to bear upon these facts, and therein we find their adequate solution. But it is to be observed that the mind already possesses the idea of God, otherwise it could not formulate and apply the theistic hypothesis ; and hence, again, the idea of God cannot origi- nate from an inductive inference which presupposes its existence already in the mind making the inference. Thus, it seems clear that it does not lie within the province of reasoning or inference to generate the idea of God in the human mind at first. 7. The general conclusion thus reached is confirmed by the fact that men generally have the idea of God, and even believe in his existence before they begin to reason abiut these questions. Now, if theistic belief arose from infer- ence, only those who had gone through the reasoning IP i If ''i^ M •■*4 I e' 208 APOLOGETICS. process involved in that inference would have that belief, and the idea of God involved therein. But, as a matter of fact, men seem to have the idea, or belief, first of all. Long before a child can conduct any sort of reasoning process, it may come to possess a pretty clear notion of God. In early times there seems to be little doubt that men had the theistic notion long before they reasoned about it, or concerning the existence of its object. Flint, of course, would say that the child or the primitive man makes the inference so quickly as not to be aware of it. But surely it seems better to say that theistic belief is the natural deliverance of the human mind, which is endowed w h a con-natural theistic capacity. Before the mind can perf. m any act of conscious theistic inference, it must already possess the idea of God. An unconscious inference is prac- tically an intuitive operation of the mind, determined by the nature of the mind itseK. and springing up spontaneously therein. It is certainly a priori in its fundamental principles. wn ; CHAPTER VIII. THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. idealistic evolution. Contents. This Theory Important— Vital Interests Involved.— The Hegelian Type of Thought.— Kant.— Fichte.—Schelling.— Hegel.— Spencer and H^el.— Statement of the Theory.— Unconscious Reason the Basal Fact. —Hegel, Green, Caird.— In the Absolute an Inner Principle of Move- ment.— Produces Nature and Spirit.— The Origin of Religious Con- sciousness.— Man's Consciousness of God is God's Consciousness of Himself.— Examination of the Theory.— Certain Admissions.— Funda- mental Conception Inadequate.— No Reason for the Direction of the Evolution.— No Teleology.— Explains the Higher from the ^ower.— De- stroys Man's Individuality.— Tends to Pantheism.— A Psychological Difficulty. Literature. Encyclopaedia Article on Idealism.— HegeVs Logic— Cocker's Chris- tianity anrf Greek Philosophy, Chap. II.— Pflciderer's Philosophy of Religion. Vol. II., Chap. VI.— Principal Caird's Philosophy of Religion, Chap. VIII.— Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, Book I., Chap. I.— Ed- ward Caird's The Evolution of Religion, Chaps. VI., VII.— Watson's Christianity and Idealism, Chap. XI.— Lindsay's Theistic Philosophy of Religion, Chap. III.— Sabatier's Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, Chap. I.— Royce's The World and the Individual, Chaps. VIII., IX.— Bowne's Philosophy of Theism, Chaps. I.-III. I. Preliminary. § 46, I. \^7^ "°^^' "^*^'i ^ profound and subtle theory, which W in a measure deals with both the psychology and ontology of theism. It is based on certain aspects of the Hegelian nhilosophy, especially as modified by writers like Thomas .1. Green and Edward Caird. It may be termed the th& .y of idealistic evolution or dialectic process. It must be kept clearly in mind that the evolutionary process involved m this theory is not mechanical nor physical, but rather logical and idealistic. According to this theory, the inner resources of absolute reason, developing in accordance 14 ri ^lO APOLOGETICS. ! ■., m W \ •with their inherent conditions, produce the religious con- isciousness in the human soul which theistic belief implies. As this theory touches vital questions in psychology, ontology and theolog}% it merits careful consideration. And the fact that the general type of thought with which it is associated commands the sympathetic attention of m?.ny thoughtful minds at the present day exhorts us to give it a respectful hearing. If there be in it elements of value, and if it shows a deep insight into the psychology of theism, we cannot afford to ignore it. And if it be marked by some -crious and radical defects, these should be clearly indicated. 2. The Hegelian philosophy is the outcome of that re- markable movement of speculation in Germany which began with Kant, and continued through Fichte and Schelling, till it culminated in Hegel. So far as this type of specula- tion relates to the absolute reality of things, it deals with the problem of the dualism between mind and matter which Descartes set, and which Spinoza sought to solve by his thorough-going monistic system. Kant held that the abso- lute reality, as the thing in itself, is noumenal, and that cognition has to do with phenomena only. The absolute reality was merely assumed by Kant to provide, through sensuous intuition, the materials which the categories of the understanding are to organize into definite forms of cognition. Fichte discarded the absolute, as the thing in itself, lying beyond the conscious subject, and placed it within that subject as a kind of reaction against its own activity. Schelling conceived of the absolute, or thing in itself, as having two sides or poles. One of these is positive, ideal and spiritual, the other is negative, real and material. By tliis assumption it was supposed that tlie dualism between matter and spirit was solved in the inner unity of the absolute where tliey were really identical. The dualism, however, was solved by postulating a sort of dual identity in tlie absolute. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 211 Hegel, in turn, identified the absolute reality with uni- versal reason or thought, which is impersonal and uncon- scious. This absolute or universal reason, which is a rational unity, unfolds itself in the twoiold forms of ex- ternal nature and of human spirit. This supposition is taken to be an adequate solution of the problem of the dualism between matter and spirit, whv.. had perplexed philosophers ever since the time of Descartes. These systems are all more or less idealistic. The kinship of these theories is evident. Kant's idealism is critical, Fichte's is subjecti 'e, Schelling's is objective, and Hegel's is absolute. The absolute reality with Kan', is noumenal object, with Fichte it is universal subject, with Schelling universal reason, and with H'igel it is universal process. 3. The relations between the idealism of Hegel and the materialism of Spencer are worthy of passing notice. At first sight they seem entirely different, yet they have features of resemblance. Both are, in a sense, nion'':<: :, and both proceed to explain the world by an evolutionary principle. But Hegel starts irom an ideal, and Spencer from a mate- rial, principle. Hegel begins with the absolute reason, Spencer with the atomic homogeneous. Hegel endows the absolute with thought which is unconscious ; Spencer clothes it with power which is inscrutible. Hegel posits the idea, and by a logical process develops the universe; Spencer posits the atom, and by a mechanical process evolves the universe. These two modes of philosophizing are as ancient as the Greek philosophy. Plato is the forerunner of Hegel, and Democritus paves the way for Spencer. Perhaps the old Greeks have the best claim to originality. 1 II. Statement of the Idealistic Theory. § 47. In the statement now to be made of the idealistic evolu- tionary theory of the genesis of theistic belief, we shall keep in view tlie general type of modern thought now MSB 9i ill 1 1 Hn '9< ] Hh m I Mil aPj iM i UBf m 313 APOLOGETICS. known as Hegelianism, and neo-Heg«lianism. '^his type of thought has greatly modified both philoboi/hy and theology in Germany. It has also been imported into English-speaking circles in Britain and America, through the writings of Green and Caird, Royce and Watson. In its imported form it has undergone considerable modifica- tions, and it certainly strikes a profound note in philo- sophical speculation. I. The fundamental fact in the system is the view taken of the absolute reality. The ground of all reality is absolute reason or pure thought, which is held to be alike uncon- scious and impersonal. What this reason or thought is in its essential nature does not very clearly appear in the system. Whether it is pure spirit, or highly refined matter, or the widest possible abstraction, is not easily determined. According to Hegel himself, it seems to be the impersonal spiritual ground of the reality of nature in the material universe, and of spirit in the realm of thought. But whether it is to be regarded as an entity of some kind, or simply as an empty abstraction, is a question in regard to which the interpreters of Hegel widely differ. Green maintains that the spiritual principle, which is assumed to exist alike in nature and spirit, is the ground of the reality of both. This spiritual principle unifies and explains the world of nature and the realm of mind. Caird lays much stress on the view that being and thought are really at root identical. But he does not very clearly show how they are to be iden- tified, whether on the side of being or of thought. Hegel makes the absolute to lie unconscious reason or thought, and regards it as the ground of the reality of both nature and spirit. Green looks upon the absolute as a spiritual principle, and as the element of reality common to both nature and spirit. Caird regards the absolute as a prin- ciple of rational unity, and describes it as the bond which binds nature and spirit into one rational system. Thus, in a threefold way, the tj-pe of thought now under n THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 213 notice is described in its basal principle of reality in the absolute. 2. This theory presupposes an inner principle of move- ment in unconscious reason or pure thought. This internal principle of movement is a dialectic or thought process; its mode of operation is logical and rational. Its operation causes the absolute and unconscious reason to unfold itself in nature and finite spirit, by means of a progressive move- ment from the lower to the higher. This self-unfolding causes unconscious reason or absolute spirit to differentiate, and externalize itself first of all in nature, where it becomes other than itself. Then it returns to itself in finite spirit, and thus preserves its identity. In reaching this result there are at least three distinct stages. The first is in abstract thought, the second in outward nature, and the third in finite spirit. The first movement of absolute reason is from the most abstract of all conceptions, that of pure being, to the most concrete conception which still retains in it the unity of nature and finite spirit. This is the absolute idea. This absolute idea is that moment in the self-development of absolute reason which precedes the differentiation of it into nature and finite spirit. In the second stage, the abso- lute idea passes over into nature as other than itself, not by any creative process, but by a rational movement. In the third stage, the differentiation takes place into finite spirit, when consciousness arises, and wherein the absolute returns to itself, so that the cycle of logical movement is complete. Then, in the experience of finite spirit, the move- ment is through subjective spirit, on to objective spirit, and up to absolute spirit, which is God. This is a very brief outline of a great scheme, but it may pave the way for the statement cf the next section. 3. The origin of the religious consciousness in inan, according to this theory, must now be explained. This consciousness should be called God-consciousness, rather than theistic belief. This explanation is founded upon the I SI 214 APOLOGETICS. exposition made in the last section. The absolute reason, which is the basal fact in this theory, is at first regarded as unconscious and impersonal. It only attains conscious- ness m the process of development, as the absolute idea is differentiated into nature and spirit. As the absolute idea IS realized in human spirit, by means of its own inner self- development, God, on the one hand, becomes conscious of himself, and man, on the other, rises to the consciousness of God. The consciousness of God which the human spirit comes to possess is but a moment in the logical process by which unconscious reason rises to consciousness. Thus it comes to pass, as Patton says, that man's thought of God becomes God's thought of himself. Or, to put it in another way, man comes to have a consciousness of God as God becomes conscious of himself. In this way the religious ^consciousness of man, and his belief in God, originates It IS the product of the self-evolution of the absolute in the consciousness of the human spirit. The statement just made is essentially that of Hegel. Edward Caird, who maintains the identity at root of being and thought, states the theory in a different way. He says that it IS necessary for the human spirit to relate itself to God In explaining what he means by this, he seems to imply that belief in God, and the religious consciousness which goes with it, are to be regarded as the natural result of the relation of the absolute spirit to the finite spirit of man. God comes in some way into the activities of the human spirit, and thus the consciousness of God arises therein. Other adherents of the Hegelian mode of thinking gn-e different explanations of the way in which the belief in God originates; but they all substantially agree in finding the genesis of the religious consciousness as a moment in the process of the inner self-development of absolute uncon- scious reason. Absolute spirit and finite spirit relate them- selves to each other, and out of this relation the genesis of the religious and theistic consciousness naturally springs. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 215 III. Examination of this Theory. § 48. To examine this theory fully would require an investiga- tion of the entire Hegelian system. This cannot now be done; nor, indeed, is it necessary to do so. Some general considerations are presented which may give a just estimate of the import of the theory which finds the explanation of the idea of God and of the religious consciousness in man in the necessary evolution or logical self-revelation of the absolute. I. Certain important admissions are frankly made. It must be acknowledged that the view-point of the Hegelian system in regard to some of the deepest probl'-ms of exist- ence and thought is profound and comprehensive. It is a highly speculative type of thought, and to discover what is called the secret of Hegel has greatly puzzled many of his interpreters. It may be further confessed that the Hegelian point of view gives glimpses, though perhaps in a one-sided way, of a profound philosophical truth. That truth consists in the fact that between subjective rationality in the fundamental laws of thought, and objective ration- ality in the basal conditions of existence, there is corre- spondence. In other words, in the cognition of the external world, the necessary forms of thought, and the underlying laws of nature, come into rational correlation. Human thought has its order and uniformity, and nature is a system of rationally related things. Between the two systems there is rational correspondence, and in true cognition there is rational correlation. This reveals the profoundly important position that the categories or necessary laws of thought have a fundamental relation of correspondence with the essential conditions under which the external world exists for rational apprehension. The questions of how this cor- respondence has been established, and whether the higher rational ground of their unity may not be in God, need now only be suggested. -vill recur later on in these dis- ', 1 2l6 APOLOGETICS. cussions It is only just to acknowledge the good service which the Hegelian view-point has rendered in this con- nection. 2. The adequacy of the fundamental assumption of the Hegelian system may be seriously questioned. It assumes that the fundamental fact which is the ground of all reality IS absolute unconscious, impersonal reason, spirit or pure thought. It IS difficult to determine whether it is a real form of existence or an abstraction. Hegel himself seemed to look upon the absolute as the highest possible abstraction. At the same time, being in the first instance impersonal, it IS hard to see how it can be spiritual. Then, if it be an abstraction, the mode of its formation may be properly raised. If the absolute be not the supposition of a reality of some kind the question at once arises as to whence it !! h'T. , -f .!' ^ '" abstraction in the proper sense, it IS doubtful If the notion of the highest abstraction can be formed, save as it may be drawn from materials already given m the worid of nature and the realm of spirit, which exist as a closely-related dualism. Pure Hegelianism seems to be sporting with abstractions, rather than dealing with realities m its fundamental postulate. Neo-HegelianUm, if It admits the reality of a personal God, and the fact of creation, avoids some of these difficulties. The assumption of an unconscious reason, with an inner principle of develop- ment operating by necessity, is not vindicated by any good reasons. And even when this postulate is made, ft fails to explain all the problems of personality and freedom. And to make the process of evolution, by which all finite things have been produced, a merely logical, and not an ontological one. IS either to identify thought and being, or to move n the regions of abstraction only. The postulate of one infinite personal God is a far more adequate assumption. tltlT^ ^ssuniption has to be made, it is proper to make that assumption which best meets the conditions of the problem. If the choice be between the supposition of THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 217 absolute unconscious reason, and the postulate of an infinite personal God as the basal fact of reality, the latter surely seems the more rational of the two. Hence, we cannot but hesitate to accept the fundamental postulate of pure Hegelianism. 3. But even if this postulate were accepted as sufficient at the outset, and if it were admitted that absolute reason, in its logical yet unconscious evolution, did produce nature and finite spirit, no principle is provided which explains why the evolution should rationally move in one direction rather than in another. There is no free rational deter- mination on the part of the absolute. Hegelianism simply presupposes an immanent principle of movement in the absolute, and seeks to construe this under the category of the rational and logical, though it be unconscious and im- personal. This virtually compels the conclusion that this principle of supposed rational activity is really bound by the law of necessity, so that idealistic evolution is not radi- cally different from mechanical evolution in this respect. There is in it no basis for the formation of a plan which involves foresight and purpose. There is no free rational agency by which that plan is wrought out in the logical evolution of the absolute. In a word, the absolute, con- ceived of as impersonal spirit or unconscious reason, does not contain any principle which determines the nature and the direction of the evolution. There is no conscious realiza- tion of the plan, especially in its earlier stages there is no creation of anything by the free activity of the absolute. The evolution out of which all finite things spring is the necessary logical development of the absolute in accordance with its own inner nature. Above all, there can be no teleology in this process, save a kind of immanent teleology, which is no proper teleology at all. On this account, the Hegelian explanation of the origin of religious belief is not sufficient, for it makes the consciousness of God in the human soul merely a moment in a process, which, though 4 ■^1 • ■ f:'| A ii B ^ V ' |v 2l8 APOLOGETICS. The reason in it, there- termed rational, is necessitarian, fore, is non-free. 4. It is further to be observed that this theory has to explain the higher out of, and by means of, the lower. It begins with the lowest form of rationality in absolute unconscious reason. Indeed, it seems almost a misnomer to call the absolute, thus viewed, rational; and there is no transcendent rationality at all. It is merely immanent at best. It is claimed by this theory that somehow the inner self-movement of the absolute, which is yet unconscious, produces the consciousness which the human soul experi- ences. And this same movement rises even higher, and generates the God-consciousness which the soul of man is supposed to reach. This self-consciousness and this God- conscousness are the products, by a necessary movement in the absolute by which, in some mysterious way, the unconscious is transmuted into the conscious. In like manner the impersonal in some remarkable way becomes endowed with the dignity and glory of personality. The lower produces the higher without the aid of anything which lies outside of the lower. It gives an effect without a cause. One naturally asks, Is this rationally possible? Can the unconscious produce out of itself, the conscious? Can the impersonal beget the pcrsor/al? Can the non-moral, by Its own mner movement, generate the moral? Can the non-religious lift itself up to the religious? Can the non- free transmute itself into the free? To these questions the theory supplies no satisfactory answer. Indeed, the law of causation is transgressed at every upward movement of the theory, for there is a new factor in the higher moment whose causality does not lie in the lowei. This is the msuperable difficulty which faces any self-contained evolu- tionary theory which admits no reason and efficiency outside the process of onward progress. And it is just as effective against idealistic evolution as against mechanical, when it THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 219 proposes to explain the higher from the lower, by means of an immanent reason and efficiency which is not also transcendent. We maiijtain that God is the only absolute form of being, from whom all other grades of being come. But we conceive of him as possessing rationality, conscious personality, self-determination, creative power and moral perfection. These characteristics of God, as the absolute, manifest themselves in, and account for, nature and human spirit. This is the correct theistic view. 5. It also follows that this theory destroys the proper individual existence of the human spirit. It also leaves no legitimate basis for man's moral freedom. Hence, it may be charged with cutting the roots of morality and religion. According to this theory, man is but a stage in the process of the self-developmei.t of the absolute, but a moment in the evolution of unconscious reason. He has no proper sub- stantial, even though dependent, existence apart from his place in the evolution of which he is a moment. The con- ditions of the continuity of the existence of the individual human spirit are not made plain. The basis for moral responsibility is insecure, and the ground for a real immor- tality is wanting. If this be the case, there is no rational basis for either morality or religion. Any valid theory must preserve both the object and the subject in religion. God, as the infinite personal Spirit, is absolute. Man, as a rational, moral, though dependent, personality, has real existence. The theory under notice fails to do justice to either the object or the subject in religion. 6. It is evident, from what has been said, that the Hegelian type of thought tends to pantheism. Some of its later adherents have guarded against this charge, but it is true of Hegel himself. He may not inaptly be described as an idealistic pantheist; and he has some kinship with Spinoza. With Spinoza, the absolute is construed as sub- stance, which has two attributes, according to which t'.is substance unfold, itself for us. These are extension and aao APOLOGETICS. thought, and aU finite things are merely modifications of these two attributes. Hegel regards the absolute as uncon- scious reason, which evolves itself, through the absolute Idea, m the two forms of nature and human spirit Spmoza's absolute is substance; Hegel's is reason. Spi- noza's ::..te.v;ioi. and thought are not unlike Hegel's nature and f.nnt. And boti are essentially monistic systems tfioug. liagd's viev is of a more elevated type than Spmoir, 3. Th-n fne way in which Hegel, in a quite monistic manner, relates all finite forms of existence to absolute unconscious reason, gives a decidedly pantheistic color to his system. Ebrard, in his Apologetics (Vol. H., p. 204), says that in the controversy between Rosencrantz and Hoffmann, the latter proved conclusively against the former that Hegel was a pantheist, not a theist. If this be a just remark, then Hegelianism has no proper account to give for the origin of the religious consciousness, and of theistic belief, for the reason that it makes no real numerical difference between God and the human spirit. Man is but a moment in the evolution of the absolute; his consciousness of God is God's consciousness of himself, which comes very near to making the consciousness and personality of God depend on these features in man. 7- Finally, even if we admit the validity of the general Hegelian doctrine, and concede that the absolute, as uncon- scious, IS capable to doing all that is claimed for it, there IS still a very serious difficulty. How can the absolute be denominated God, unless the mind already possesses the Idea of God. The notion of the absolute is one thing, and the xdca of God is another. The question as to how they are to be related is not easily answered. Does the mind rise from the absolute, as an abstract conception, to God. as a concrete infinite being? Or does the mind, already possessing the idea of God. pass on to associate with it the notion of absolute existence? The latter is the more rea- sonable view. Hence, it follows that before we can apply THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 221 a theistic predicate to the absolute, we must already have the idea of God. And it is the origin of this idea for which we are now making search. All who are in sympathy with the Hegelian type of thinking on this subject are in real danger here; so that while we admit that the view-point it gives us is profound, yet great care needs to be exercised in regard to it. Various writers in prose and poetry have exhibited it in attractive colors and in fine literary form. Others, like Green and Caird, have sought to give this type of thought greater philosophical precision, and to present an interpretation which is profoundly theistic. If we assume the fundamental reality to be an infinite personal God, who is the ground, reason and cause of all else, then there are features in the Hegelian way of thinking with which theism may have sympathy. But it is hardly an adequate theory, especially as presented by Hegel himself, to account for the origin of theistic belief. At the same time, we do not hesitate to believe that the Hegelian type of thought has great value against the current empiricism and superficial positivism of our own time. , r 1 ' CHAPTER IX. THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF THE FUNCTION OF REVELATION. Contents. fe^IJl'n^T"'"'"'^'""' ^^'^'''"■■°"- Vague.-Three Senses.-Mani- E,^ rT"'",';°"-~^'^''"'°"-P'"™"'^« Unrecorded Reve- Utions now Mamly m V.ew.-The Process o' Revelation an 1 iu Record. fJ* P^oWeni.-Statement of the Theory.-No Intuitive Religious Factors.-.Watson.-Luthardt-Man's Converse with God in Srl^ Ages.-Admu .t so Far.-But Redemptive Relation the Same.-Outlines of Redemption Due to Primitive Revelation—Theory Explains General Rel.g,ou, Belief and Practice-Examination of the ThLry-Srufn SnSn^"''""';";^."'''''^ ^"' Q""''°" Remains-Hements of Confus on-Or,g,n of Rehg.on and the Knowledge of Redemption- The Or.gm of Religious Belief and its Perpetuation-Danger of Athe- istic Consciousness-General Summary and Conclusion. LlTESATURE. /«/f " VolT^P ^'r'''' °" /e«^Wa/,<,»-Watson's Theological Insti- X ' T tV ^f " ^•' ^*"P'- ^- "-Howe's Living Temple, Vol I ch:s^Ii"D~''p"'"'''^^'A^'^'"•'''""^''"" ^^•"*' "f ^'^-i^> Chap. VII.-De Pressense's Origins, Book IV., Chap. III-Hodge-s t1?u ,f^ "7^? * ^"f""*'""'-'-' Revelation, Chap. III-Beattie's The Me^ds of The,sm, Part I.. Chap. Il.-Cocker's Christianity and r Mosophy Chap II-Edward Caird's The Evolution of Re- Rel „„ '''*P*-/-V"-Sabaticr's Outlines of the Philosophy of ReU^n, aap. II.-Kuyper's Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology, Div III.. Chap II-Martmeau', A Study of Religion, Vol. I., Book II- Men.,es «„/.ry o/ ^W.^,<,„, Chap. Il-Iverach's Theism. Chap. VIII Of^r Z'^'n^'ctt t "''"'""'' ''-'■ "-^'"-'^•^ ^-- "^ I. Revelation Defined. § 49. 'T^O determine the function of revelation in relation to J -he genesis of thcistic belief is important, but by no means easy. Some go so far as to say that the origin of rel,,-.,us behef in general is due to some sort of outward reve .,on from God. Not a few theologians of a century 41 THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 223 ago, who had not freed themselves entirely from the philosophy of deism, adopted this explanation of religious and theistic belief. Watson is an able exponent of this view. In his writings he maintains, in an earnest way, what, in a sense, is true of sinful man, that human reason cannot give him genuine religious knowledge, and that a revela- tion from God alone can d^ this. As the term revelation is rather vague, and is used in different senses, it is necessary to define, as clearly as pos- sible, what it really means. There are at least thr.e distinct Usages of the term. I. The most general meaning of the term takes it to denote any manifestation which God makes of himself in any way whatever. These manifestations of God may appear in nature about us, in our own spirits, and in human history, as well as in his Word. In all of these ways, God is said to be revealing himself to men. The term revelation thus comes to mean the same thing as manifestation. This usage of the term really leaves no place for any distinction between the natural and supernatural forms of revelation, nor does it rightly distinguish between what may be called outward and inward revelation. This wide sense of the term may denote much that is true, yt it is of little value in this discussion. It is doubt- less true that men may learn much about God in all of these ways, but this fact throws littio light upon the question of the origin of religious belief at first. 2. The term revelation is used in a narrower sense, to denote any direct communications which God may make to man. This excludes nature and history, and, in a sense, the witness of our own constitution, from tha sphere of revelation. But it includes within its scope, not only the revelations recorded in the holy Scriptures, but also any other special or supernatural communications which God, in any age, may have made to men. Such communications may have been made in patriarchial times, in the Mosaic 224 APOLOGETICS. Ini !! ' i ,"^1 era, and in the apostolic period. And if God has, since the • canon of Scripture closed, given, by his Spirit, any special messages to men, these would also come under this meaning of the term. This sense of the Word includes all the special messages that God may have made known to men ji a supernatural way, whether they have been recorded or not From the Scripture itself there is good r-ason to believe that such messages were given, but not recorded in the canonical Scriptures. It is in this sense that we may very properly speak of primeval revelation. Of such a nature would be the unrecorded messages given to Adam, to Enoch or to Noah, to Abraham, to Moses or to Ezra, to John to Peter or to Paul. And Jesus, no doubt, uttered many thmgs not recorded in the Gospel narratives. This sense of the term is much more definite, and has a very proper place in the discussion now in hand. The question of the influence of primitive external revelation in generatmg religious and theistic belief is the very inquiry which IS now pursued. And the special problem now before us relates to the effect of any kind of outward supernatural revelation, whether primitive or biblical, in generatin belief in God and originating religion. 3- But the term revelation is used in a still more definite sense. In this sense it relates only to that series of special divme communications which are on record in the canonical Scriptures. Tills is much narrower in its scope than the preceding view, for it includes only those divine messages which God, in his wisdom and goodness, deemed necessary to have put on permanent record for all ages. In this sense revelation is really equivalent to the holy Scripiures Strictly speaking, this is the meaning of the term revela- tion with which the apologete has chiefly to do in vindicat- mg supernatural revelation. Now, in dealing with the question of the origin of re- ligious belief, the question is as to which of these senses of the term revelation is to be taken. Some are inclined THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 225 to take the most general view, and argue that religion origi- nates in some, or all, of the external manifestations which God makes of himself. This scarcely meets the case, for the reason that unless there be some capacity on the part of man to apprehend these manifestations, they would have no effect on him. But the very question in debate is the origin of this capacity. Few, if any, at the present day, take the third meaning of the term, and argue that the genesis of religious belief is to be found arising from the influence of the Bible. The Bible, rather, presupposes religion as already existent, and its great purpose is to perpetuate, purify and elevate religion by means of the redemption which is in Christ. It is, therefore, the second meaning of the term which those who find the origin of religion in outward revelation usually adopt. In some form of primitive revelation, made in the earliest times, is the beginnings of religion to be dis- covered. Watson evidently takes this view when he says that the traditions of early revelations had much to do with producing lelij^ion, and in accounting for its general prevalence in the world. T .* question now to be considered is, How far is this view true? Has religious and theistic belief originated in any form of outward revelation in early times } 4. To detern the idea of revelation still more clearly, another distinction must be made. This relates to the con- trast between the process of revelation and the record of it. The process pertains to the activity of God in making the messages known to men, while the record is the permanent form into which the messages have been reduced. The former had its main effect only on the few men who were chosen to be its subjects, while the latter remains in per- manent form for men in all ages. So far as the divine activity is concerned, the effect of it would be practically the same upon all who were its subjects, no matter whether the revelation were recorded or not; but the result of each »5 J26 APOLOGETICS. T)n men in after ages would be very different. The unre- corded revelations would have but little influence, while the recorded would have very much. This simple distinction has important bearing upon the question now before us. If by revelation we mean the mfluence of the divine activity in giving the message, then the question of this influence in generating religious belief would have to be considered. But if we mean rather the tradition, or the recorded account of this activity, the ques- tion will be quite different in its form. The latter form of the inquiry can scarcely bear upon the problem of the genesis of the belief in God, for the reason, mainly, that before the tradition, or the record of things revealed ages ago, would have any effect on men of later times, these men must already possess some religious sentiment or theistic capacity. It is the genesis of this which is our present problem. The real mquiry, therefore, must be concerning the effect of the divine activity on those men in early times who were the subjects of special outward revelations from God in origi- nating religious and theistic belief and experience. In its lowest terms, the question is as to the effect of this activity on Adam and Eve, and as to whether they came to be possessed of their religious constitution and capacity by creation or by revelation, in the first instance. The related question of the influence of tradition and the record of the revelation in the development of theistic belief is one which ts also of much importance, and must, at the same time be carefully considered. To educe clearly the function' of revelation in its relation to the con-natural constitution of man. and to elucidate its relation first to the origin, and then to the grozvth of theistic belief, is important. II. Statement of the Revelation Theory. § 50. The way in which outward revelation is taken to account for theistic behef may now be explained. THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 227 I, Those who hold this view assert that there is no intuitive knowledge of God in the human mind. They also maintain that the human reason by itself is not sufficient to lead men to true religious knowledge. Watson dwells on this point at great length. He seeks to show that the general religious condition of the peoples that are destitute of the light of revelation fully proves the necessity of that light to meet the religious need of mankind. It is evident that Watson is here speaking not so much of the primitive natural religious experiences of men, as of the true know- ledge of God and of his will, which sinful men need in order to life and salvation. When so regarded, much that he says may be freely admitted. He also traces whatever is pure in morals and true in religious knowledge among pagan peoples indirectly to revelation. He likewise finds the origin of the belief in immortality and future rewards and punishments, in the same outward divine source. The ordinance of sacrifice, and a knowledge of its meaning, are accounted for in the same way. In regard to the knowledge of God, he dis- tinctly says that "the first man received the knowledge of God by sensible converse with him, and that the doctrines were transmitted, with the confirmation of successive mani- festations, to the early ancestors of all nations." It is clear that Watson is here speaking chiefly of the purification and perpetuation of religious knowledge by revelation, and that a capacity at least to receive religious instruction by divine revelation must be presupposed in the first man. In a somewhat similar way, Luthardt, who does not entirely deny the intuitive element in religion, sets forth the same general view. He says that "all religion rests ultimately upon a primitive revelation." It is to be observed that Luthardt does not make it clear what he means by primitive revelation. Since he admits the intuitive factor, it may mean either inward or outward revelation. The intuitive factor may be the inward revelation which needs 228 APOLOGETICS. the outward revelation to bring it into distinct conscious- ness. 2. This general theory assumes that men in early times had more intimate fellowship with God than in later days. Those passages of Scripture which tell of God walking and talking with men in primitive days are so interpreted, Wat- son says that "the belief in God among the Jews was pre- served by continual manifestations of the presence of Jehovah." He also goes on to say that as the knowledge of God and of religion became more generally fixed and deN eloped, the converse God held with men became less mtimate and personal, and men were led to depend more on the contents of the record of the revelation, and to expect less of the personal manifestations. It may be admitted that in very early times God did hold mtercourse in a more personal way with men, as the modes of revelation were then adapted to the conditions of the race. But it does not follow that the essential relations between man and God, on the basis of which revelations are made, have changed. The only radical change of rela- tion was produced by the income of sin. Ever after man smned and had hope of deliverance and restoration given him, the relation between God and man is a redemptive one. This relation remains unchanged, though the modes of communicating the knowledge of it, and of administering Its benefits may be modified. It is to be observed all through that Watson has in view early unrecorded revelations, as well a^ hose on record in the canonical Scriptures. Indeed he lays special stress on these early revelations, made when man held intimate converse with God. 3- This view also maintains that these early unrecorded revelations contained the outlines of redemption. Hence the origin of sacrifice, and of religious rites and duties, is explained in relation to these primitive revelations. There : • much force in many things set forth in this connection by the advocates of this view. The germ of the hope and k THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 229 k-.owledge of redemption was planted in the mind of the human race as our first parents left paradise, and this know- ledge was made clearer and this hope brighter by advancing revelation as the ages moved on. But Adam and Eve had a knowledge of God, and religious experiences, prior to the invasion of sin. The question may still be raised as to the origin of this in them first of all. Thus, unless it is held that the fall reduced man to an entirely non-religious condition, revelation may not be needed to constitute him a religious being. In addition, it may be pointed out that redemption stands related to sin, and that sin is an abnormal fact, which presupposes some knowledge of God and his law. Hence, religion, at its root in the human race, can scarcely originate in those conditions of sin and redemption which presuppose iii presence already in the race. 4. This theory seeks to find further support in the claim that it best accounts for the general prevalence of the belief in God among men, and the universal observance of religious rites everywhere. It argues that the history of the race shows that when men are left to themselves they gradually lose the knowledge of God, and that divine revelation has ever been their only safeguard. The survivals of the true religion now to be found in non-biblical religions have their explanation and source in original primitive revelation. They are dim reflections from the bright light of primaeval revelations. Watson and others lay much stress upon this point in the interests of revealed religion. Cocker, on the other hand, thinks that if there be no native theistic endowment in man's constitution, a primitive revelation alone would not be suffi- cient to explain the universality of religious belief and practice. Consequently, he suggests that the fundamental explanation of the prevalence of religion lies in the fact that men have a native theistic capacity, which they carry with them wherever they go. There is no doubt some force in both of these views. Man has a con-created theistic APOLOGETICS. capacity; otherwise he would not be a religious being at all. At the same time, there can be no doubt that not a few things found in the non-biblical religions are to be explained as survivals of primitive or biblical revelation. III. The Theory of Revelation Examined. § 51. In the examination of this theory much care is needed, for there are certain aspects of truth in it. There is, how- ever, a good deal of confusion in the views of its advocates. The aim of this examination is to sift the truth from the error, and to eliminate, as far as possible, the confusion. The function of revelation in generating and developing religious belief will then appear. I. Certain important admissions are to be made at the outset. It is admitted that the clear and complete knowledge of God and his will which prevail in Christian lands is due largely to the revelations found in the holy Scriptures. The knowledge of the nature and attributes of God, and of his tri-personality, comes largely from the Bible. Our lofty view of his transcendent majesty and moral perfection is chiefly drawn from the same source. The clear view we have of our relation to God, of his constant care over all his creatures, of his moral government over moral beings, and of our duties to him and to our fellow-men, is obtained from divine revelation. Above all, our knowledge of the world to come, our information regarding the nature and desert of sin, and our instruction in reference to the redemp- tion which is in Jesus Christ, are drawn entirely from the sacred record of special revelation found in the Bible. In all these things it is ours to rejoice and give praise to God. But, after all these admissions are made, the vital ques- tion still remains, How, in the very first instance in the earliest times, did any kind of religious belief and practice ongmate? Outward revelation has, no doubt, done much to purify and c;evate religious belief, but it may be an open THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 231 question whether such revelation generated it at first. Deal- ing with the question of the genesis of religious and th ;istic belief, as we now are, we are persuaded that the con-natural theistir capacity must be presupposed in man in order to render him capable of receiving and understanding any objective revelation from God. This primitive theistic factor must antedate the reception of any outward revela- tion, and, in part at least, must logically condition it. This being granted, the revelation may come in to conserve and develop this con-natural factor of the religious conscious- ness. It may also be conceded that this revelation is really needed to preserve a well-defined monotheism, and thus prevent it from declining to pantheism, and then breaking up into polytheism. 2. In the advocacy of this theory there are certain ele- ments of confusion which need to be removed. Watson, and those who agree with him, are discussing what is necessary to give men who are in the darkness and deadness of sin a saving knowledge of God, and of the redemption which is in Christ. Much they say on this point is true and valuable. But this is not the question now in hand. The real problem relates to the origin of religious and theistic belief at the first. The inquiry relates to the genesis of religious experiences in the human race. To overlook this is to miss the mark and introduce con- fusion. The advocates of this theory confuse two other ques- tions. These are the origin and the growth of religion. The inquiry into the development of religious and theistic belief is a very important and interesting one, and much that the advocates of the theory now under consideration adduce bears directly upon this question. Outward revela- tion, in oral or in written form, may do much to preserve, perpetuate and purify theistic belief. Yet it may be helpless to originate this belief. The real question with which the psychology of theism i % 232 APOLOGETICS. deals relates to the initial appearance of theistic belief in the human race. It is not merely an investigation of the way in which men now come to believe in God and have religious experience, but of the manner in which any belief in God originated among men. Did man at first appear without any theistic factors in his nature, and had he to wait till these were produced by outward revelation? Or was he first possessed, in his very nature, of these factors? The debate lies between these contending views. The latter view has the better claim to our acceptance, mainly because it must be presupposed in order to give revelation access to the soul of man. The first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans confirms this view. 3- This theory is in danger of taking a defective view of man s origmal constitution and consciousness. It im- plicitly, at least, assumes that there is no theistic factor in human nature at first. At the present day, when naturalistic evolution so strongly asserts that man slowly rose up from a non-moral and non-religious state, it is perilous to deny of man, even in the interests of supernatural revelation the native theistic factor. The position of Descartes, that the knovvledge of God is necessary to give guarantee for the validity of our other knowledge, is important here. Even Luthardt, who favors, in a general way, the revelation theory, still says that "an intuitive conviction of the exist- ence of God dwells within the human mind. We can by no means shake ourselves free from the notion of God Consciousness of God is as essential an element of our own mind as consciousness of the world, or of self-conscious- ness. Schelling says that "the revelation theory implies an original atheism of consciousness." There is much force in these statements. If man's consciousness be at first atheistic, It is difficult to see how he would ever come to be a religious being, or be capable of receiving religious instruction, even by divine revelation. Nit^sch says that If education be not already preceded by an innate con- THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 233 sciousness of God as an operative predisposition, there would be nothing for education and culture to act upon." Cocker puts the same view in another form when he says that "a merely verbal revelation cannot communicate the knowledge of God if man has not already the idea of God in his mind." With these views we, in the main, concur. 4. The conclusion in which wo rest, therefore, is that primitive theistic beliei in the humai race has not originated in the first instance as he result of any outward revelation producing it where its constitutional factors did not exist. These factors tp t be presupposed, in order to give validity to outward revelation and render it intelligible. At the same time, revelation renders good service in preserving, perpetuating and purifying theistic belief. Without it, and by reason of sin, this belief would almost surely decline. Above all, revelation is indispensable to give important new elements of knowledge, regarding God and his will, man and his destiny, and the way of life and salvation through the Gospel, which was a mystery, hidden till revealed. CHAPTER X. THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF THE ACCEPTED THEORY. Contents. The True Doctrine.-A Philosophical Conflict.-The Theist an In- S,«iH„H A ""?'''""-"»"'"'°" »"" Kant-Calderwood.- Dwcartes and An.elrn.-Statement c£ the Doctrine-Intuitional Ra- wL°% M'""r^T^°' Empirical-Exposition of the Do^fr net £nse Not f ^ ^r '^'*'"" *"' ^°"'-Y«' "«' I""«« '" Strict .S^ rl Ge"««i5onception.-Experience its Occasion of Coming Confirmafon of the D^trine.-Hodge.-Flint.-H. B. Smith.-Luth- ardt.-Owen.-Ca^v,n.-Ebrard.-Agrees with Theory of Knowledge - Gives Basis for Ontological Proofs.-Gives Key to CausarPr^ffs -iT Harmony w.th the Way the Holy Spirit Works in the Humanloul. LlTESATUSE. Temu'vT'l tC'""x°",f'''^''"' »"*» Theism.-Hoyr.'» Living Ch^Ll rl" ^T^- "-L-'hardfs Fundamental Truths of U^TtI' P'P- VI-P'««°"''' Syllabus on rAmm-Hodge's Sy- vTl San^fm^J- ^^'"'- ^-Thornwell's Collected WriHnl. Chap i-H B Smi h^iri^"'""^'" '^''"''""' D'X^'-o'ics. Part L ^Z V^'f' !""*' ;^f'"''«^''«. Div. I.. Chap. II.-Ebrard-s Apolo- gettcs. Vol I Sec. i. Chap. II.-FIint's Theism. Chap. I.-Strone's Systematic Theology, Part II Chan T —<;»-=.,„.• r w ^ i; . * * Exherienro ri„„ irr ir u . JL' '-S'Mrns Evidence of Christian Belie? cL.)\^A~^f"' ^""'"''' "f ^"'""' "'"' Christian ael,ef Chap. I._Meads Supernatural Revelation, Chap. I.-Cocker's ?:;• 'rchao"''ii''K?/"'r"^'- ""'''■ "-Kni«h?s j.,,";",: //.c.^./, Chap. II.-Kelloggs Genesis and Grouih of Religion Chap V-K„yper s Encyclopaedia of Sacred Theology. Du. I . Chap, U- Creen$ Proltgomena to Ethics. Book I.. Chan I -Orr', rlyr, .'■ yie. of Cod and the World. Chap, Il.-Sc'hu'ma? '/J ."^^T; Chap IlI.-Deat„e-s The Methods of Theism. Part I.. Chap IV-Fair LS;i//Z '" ""/'"i-"^/:^ "f '?-"•*••<"'. Chap. L^Mailers rL L,m,ls of ReUgwus Thought.-CaUin's Institutes. Book I.. Chap. III. I. Preliminary. § 52. ft l.q^HREE defective and four erroneoits explanation* i of the genesis of religious and theistic belief have been passed under review. Their discussion leads up to the THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 235 true doctrine I > be unfolded in this chapter. This doctrine seeks to give a careful account of the origin of the religious consciousness in the human race. Its exposition raises pro- found questions, and brings us upon a great controversial battle-field, where many a hard-fought fight has taken place, and where the din of the conflict has not yet ceased. The lines of battle are drawn between the Intuitionalist and Empiricist in reference to the theory of knowledge. The form of battle and the weapons used may have changed from age to agfe, but the inner nature of the conflict has always remained the same. In ancient times Sophist and Socratist, Democritean and Eleatic, Epicurean and Platonist crossed swords on this field. In later times, Nominalist contended with Realist, Lockian with Cartesian, Sensation- alist with Intuitionalist, in many an historic conflict. And on the same field, at the present day, Materialist and Idealist, Empiricist and Rationalist, Relativist and Realist, are fight- ing the same battles over again. The combatants may change, the plan of attack and defence may vary, but it is ever the same old controversy in regard to the problems of being and cognition. 2. The Christian theist cannot be an uninterested spec- tator of this age-long conflict. If empiricism wins the day on the field of pliilosophy. theism may have to capitulate in the sphere of religion, and leave agnosticism or skepticism in possession of the spoils. If we have no knowledge save that which comes by the senses, then the knowledge of God, as an infinite spiritual Iwing. is ruled out. In the fourth chapter of tlie Introduction, the intuitional or rational theory of knowledge, in its general outlines, was accepted as correct. It is accepted, however, not in the sense of the historic ini.atc ideas, hut rather in the sense justified by the K.intian criticism. It is thereby admitted that experi- ence may be the occasion when knowletlge rises into con- sciousness; but it is also held that experience is not the sole source of knowledge. According to this view, the mind 236 APOLOGETICS. Itself, by the very laws of its own spontaneity, contributes certain rational elements to the fabric of knowledge These a pnon elements do not spring from experience, either mdmdual or hereditary, but are the necessary rational conditions of the possibility of the experience itself This theoiy of knowledge is carried with us as we enter the realm of religious and theistic experience. We shall seek to thread our way with some care over very difficult and delicate ground. We may first seek to understand the significance of certain partial views, and then try to unfold the better doctrine. im^^ II. Some Partially Correct Views. % 53. Several phases of this theory, which, in a rather one-sided way, seek to account for the origin of theistic belief, are to be briefly noticed These all agree m denying that primitive theistic belief is the product of any empirical process, or of any kind of logical inference, or even of an outward revela- tion. Though these operations may do much to develop the behef m various ways, yet they do not originate it at hrst. There are several types of this view; and it will be obsenxd that the problem they deal with is the way in which a knowledge of God is obtained, rather than the question of the genesis of the belief in God in the human mind. I. Fichte and Schelling, with the transcendentalists gen- erally, represent one type. This is the a&.o/«/,>/ type. God IS Identified with the absolute, and is immediately appre- hended by an act of pure intellection. God is known face to face by; immediate intuition. There is a vision of the absolute V the human soul. In this vision subject and objec arc ^ought to a sort of rational identity. This vision »s not of Che nature of an ordinary consciousness; it is rather an intellectual intuition, which looks directly upon the ftaiitj- of the absolute, which is God. By some it is dl mm THE ORIGIN OF 1 ' .STIC BELIEF. 237 regarded as a transcendental gaze upon the very essence of deity by pure reason, as the faculty of the supersensible. It need only be remarked that the transcendental philoso- phy upon which this view of intuition rests is not accepted. It, however, announces a great truth in an exaggerated way. That truth consists in the fact that the human spirit may sustain definite spiritual relations with God; but he is thereby apprehended as a living, loving, personal God, not merely gazed on intellectually as the absolute. 2. Cousin, the eclectic French philoso^lrer, gives a slightly different turn to this general view. He argues that the absolute is of the nature of reason, and hence capable of being immediately cognized by human reason. He differs with the transcendentalists as to the mode in which the absolute is known. He holds that the absolute or infinite is immediately known in consciousness, rather than by pure intellection. He asserts that the absolute is both conceivable and cognizable, and that the conditions of consciousness, which are relation, plurality and difference, are applicable to the absolute. In particular, Cousin maintains that, over against the finite, the infinite is also present in conscious- ness. Hence, he contends that the infinite or absolute is known in consciousness, and thus the knowledge of God is realized. The process by which Cousin explains the consciousness of the infinite is merely logical. We have the rational con- viction of the reality of an infinite somethine over against finite things; but this can scarcely be called consciousness, unless we use that term in a very wide sense. Then the notion of the infinite, as Cousin conceives of it, is scarcely the same as tlie idea of an infinite personal God. 3. Jacobi and Schlciermacher, though differing in various respects, may be grouped together as another type of this general view. The conviction or apprehension of God is of the nature of faith or feeling. Jacobi lays stress on faith, and Schleiermacher on feeling. We hav belief in, and 238 APOLOGETICS. sense of dependence on, some higher power. God is believed in rather than known ; he is felt rather than cognized. This faith and feeling are simple, spontaneous and immediate activities of the soul, and they relate the soul to God in what may be called a God-consciousness. Schleiermacher made this feeling of dependence the essence of religion. God was immediately felt. There is an element of truth in this view. God is believed in, from one point of view, and the sense of dependence is a factor in religious experience. But these views scarcely do justice to the intellectual factor in the religious con- sciousness, and hence they tend to some form of mysticism. The theistic intuition, rightly understood, is more than feeling, and it involves more even than a spontaneous act of faith. 4- Hamilton and Kant, though representing different types of philosophy, are in substantial agreement touching the question now under discussion. Hamilton holds that the unconditioned, which includes both the infinite and the absolute, is both incognoscible and inconceivable. It is the negative of the conditioned, and it is the conditioned alone that can be known and conceived. The unconditioned cannot be cognized, and hence God, as the unconditioned, lies beyond rational cognition. It does not follow, however, that Hamilton was an agnostic; for though he holds that God is not the object of intellectual cognition, his real exist- ence is a fixed comnction of man's moral nature. Kant held that God cannot be the object of cognition by the human understanding, which deals only with phenomena m the sphere of experience. According to Kant, the idea of God is merely a regulative principle of pure reason itself. by which it is to be guided in unifying its cognitions. Hence. Kant held that the proofs for the existence of God are invalid, since they do not deal with realities, but wi . phenomena. As the door for the intellectual cognition of God is thus closed by Kant, it looks as if he must be an THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 239 agnostic. But he is not ; for he holds that what pure reason or intellect cannot do, practical reason or conscience can. Pure reason has God as merely a regulative idea, while practical reason makes God its fundamental postulate. Thus, both Hamilton and Kant find the knowledge of God to be a product of man's moral experiences; and hence it is a matter of faith, rather than of cognition. There is, no doubt, much force in what both of these writerj say in regard to the theistic import of man's moral nature, and they both render good service in giving faith a large place in theistic belief. Still, both of them have done harm, alike to speculative and theistic philosophy, in denying the validity of the intellect in relation ic the know- ledge of God. Herbert Spencer has ingenious" . used both of these names in support of agnosticism, in a way never intended by them. But the door was opened for him to do so, and the efforts of Mansel were not entirely successful to close it. The sound doctrine here is that both intellectual cognition and moral conviction relate us to God. If he be the postulate of practical reason, he is the same also for pure reason. God, as truth, is the object of the intellect; and God, as right, is the object of the conscience. If the cognition of God be banished from pure rea^son, it is hard to see how it can be retained in the spliere of practical reason. But all this, it will be observed, pertains as much to the existence of God as to the origin of the Idea of God in the mind. 5. Calderwood may be taken as an example of another type of view. He makes the knowledge of God 10 be intuitive, but this intuition is not so much an immediate perception of God. as a necessary judgment affirming the existence of an infinite personal God. Some who take this general view describe the intuition of God as a necessary belief which the mind possesses. This judgment is not at first in itself theistic, for it arises from what is really a non-theJstic aspect of the soul. The religious conscious- ' 1 240 ll 1 APOLOGETICS. ness arises from the exercise of the belief in the exist- ence of God, rather than conditions it, according to this view. Calderwood, and those who think with him, have per- haps, been too much influenced by Kant's criticism of the theistic proofs, and hence have been led to rest mainly on mtuition to justify belief in the existence of God. Hence they mmimize the value of the proofs for the existence of God, as they magnify the import of the theistic intuition, as a necessary judgment or belief asserting the divine exist- «ice. If Kant goes to one extreme in making little of the theistic proofs, we have to be careful not to put too much stress on the intuition. It is precisely this mistake that Calderwood and others are in danger of making. It may be going too far to say that the intuition of God is a neces- Mry judgment affirming the existence of one infinite God For even if we admit, as we do, that there are con-natural factors m the idea of, or belief in, God, it may still be true that revelation and reflection have done much to enlarge the Idea and enrich the belief. It may also be true that the rea.' lings which vindicate the rational nature of the belief in Cue existence of God are of much value. And it must ever be kept in mind that the question of the origin of theistic belief is one thing, and that the problem of the proofs for the existence of God is another. 6. The last partial type of view now to be noted is that represented by Descartes and Anselm. This view emerges in connection with the elaboration of the ontological proofs for the existence of God. Anselm seems to have simply assumed that the human mind is ,„ possession of the idea ot a being than whom a greater cannot be thought": and from this Idea he proceeds to vindicate the existence of the being to whom it relates. Descartes, in one of his argu- ments for the existence of God, drawn from the idea of an all-perfect being." which the mind nei-essarily possesses, gives no account of how the mind arrives at this idea tumu THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 241 When, however, Descartes opens up another of his theistic proofs, he says that the only adequate explanation of the idea of God in the mind is the fact of the existence of God. Were Anselm or Descartes asked, whence the idea of God came, he would likely say that the human mind, in its very nature as created by God, possessed it. Most of those who give value to the ontological proofs agree in holding that the idea of God is innate, or con-natural, in some sense. The idea is in the mind, not so much as an intuition, which the mind itself arrives at, as a product of which God, in the last analysis, is the author. In this position there is something profoundly true, but that truth does not bear directly upon the question of the psychological origin of theistic belief. It is not really intended to be a philosophy of the genesis of that belief. It assumes man's theistic constitution, and proceeds to justify belief in the existence of God from the contents of that constitution. The discussion will recur to this position again in the ontology of theism. These six tvpes of view are all on the true ground, m the ma.n; but they do not distinguish between the psy- chology and the ontology of theism, and in some instances they bear chiefly upon its ontology. But the origin of the- istic belief in the human mind is the question now under careful consideration. III. Statement of the Correct Doctrine. § 54- I. It now remains to give a statement of the doctrine which we are led to adopt in regard to the genesis of theistic belief and the religious consciousness. This is one of the deepest problems in psycholor;y which can engage our attention. It relates, not so much to the way in which we now comf. to obtain a knowledge of God, as to how the religious consciousness in the human race at first had its 16 242 APOLOGETICS. ■'it ongin How has it come to pass that man possesses the con-natural theistic capacity which expresses itself in re- hgious behef and practice everywhere among men? fJ: I .*"*'' ^""'""^ '"^^ ^ '^"'^^ ^^"^ intuitional, if we ake the term mtu,t.on in the sense of con-naturci, con- stitutional or a pnori. It may be termed the rational tieo,^ which imp^^es that human reason, or spirit, in its very"?: stitution, has a theistic factor. Some would callTt the inspirational theory, indicating thereby that God himself ir^olier tJ' '''' J'" '" *'^ ™"^ -h'«=h theistic S he r^e V'^'^^^^-'}^-^ t«n««. Perhaps, best describes InalvsTnfj r ? ''^"^'^^ to keep in mind the chate oTl' /' ' '1^°"' consciousness in the second chapter of this division of the discussion. It is the origin of this that we are now dealing with. 3. In general, this view holds that the basal factors in religious consciousness and theistic belief are not empirical ZtZr^T. ''''^ ^° "°' ^"^^ '^^^ "^*"^^' -volition. ^Tn "" °" ^°^"^^ '"^^'■^"«- Nor are they the result of the necessary evolution of absolute unconscious r^son. On the other hand, while it is admitted that in mature theistic belief there are empirical elements which spnng from these various sources just named, yet it is firmly maintained that the human spirit itself, in its very constitu- tion possesses certain primitive con-natural factors, which antedate all distinct conscious religious and theistic experi- ence and which, indeed, condition that experience and render it possible. These primitive factors constitute the intumonal or rational basis of theistic belief, and the genesis of this belief must have relation to these native factors In this sense, theistic belief is intuitive or a priori. This belief IS not a translation from something in the soul which is not theistic, for the original itself is already theistic. This belief is what it is in religious consciousness, because it is on the occasion of experience, the spontaneous outcome of the native theistic factors in the constitution of man On yk mam THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 243 this basis education and revelation may have much influ- ence in developing the belief. Such is a general outline of the doctrine held. The belief in God is not intuitive, in the sense that we have, at first, the immediate perception of God, or that we make a neces- sary judgment asserting the existence of one infinite God. This belief at first implies that man, having the theistic con- stitution, naturally attains, by an impulse from within, rather than by influences from without, to that belief in God which religious experience implies. The influences acting from without may be the occasion of the rise of this belief into distinct consciousness, but the impulse of the con-natural theistic endowment of man, working from within, conditions and shapes that consciousness. This, in the last analysis, is the source of theistic belief. IV. Exposition of this Doctrine. § 55. That the doctrine thus stated may \ie more thoroughly understood, some further exposition of k may be of value. 1. The genesis of theistic belief must, in the end, be dis- covered within the human spirit, rather than in any circumstances operating on it outwardly. This is a simple statement, but full of significance. It means that the human mind rises to the belief in God, not merely as the result of certain external experiences, such as may be exerted by nature, or outward revelation, or education and reflection. It means that the soul at first is not like a blank, unruled sheet of paper, but that, in its very nature, it is endowed with a native, theistic appetency, or aptitude. In this nature the germ of theistic belief lies, here it is quickened into life, and here it plants its roots as it grows up into a mature religious experience. Deep down in the very nature of the soul the sources of theistic belief lie. 2. This doctrine does not imply that the idea of God which theistic belief involves is innate, in the sense in which 244 APOLOGETJCS. lit the term "innate ideas" has often been used. This phrase, coming to us from Plato through the scholastic philosophy' has caused much confusion, and introduced some error inro both philosophy and theology. The doctrine of the origin of theistic belief just stated does not imply that the idea of God is stored away in the mind, as a fully formed idea of one infinite God, ready to be brought forth into experi- ence at any time. By intuitive or a priori we do not mean the same thing as the scholastic term innate usually denotes. The idea of God, in its maturity, does not lie in the human soul; but Its germ, which is already theistic in its nature is there. ' 3. Nor does this doctrine imply that the idea of God is of the nature of a general conception framed by the mind A general concept, which is expressed in a general term is a mental product, and is the result of abstraction and generalization. When it is said, therefore, that belief in God has Its genesis in the soul, it is not to be supposed that the soul has formed it there, in the same way that a general conception is framed. Were this the case, no legitimate mference could be made from the idea of God to his actual existence, for the reason that general conceptions have no real objects actually existing, other than the qualities con- stituting these conceptions, as they are found in individual objects. Much of the criticism of some of the proofs for the existence of God has proceeded on the ground that the idea of God is a general conception framed by the mind instead of an idea formed in it. All such criticisms are dis- armed when it is seen that the idea of God is con-natural, and that it conditions theistic experience. 4. This doctrine further implies that theistic belief comes into distinct consciousness as the powers of the soul de- veloping from within, find themselves in relation with those conditions which constitute the occasion of this conscious- ness taking definite form. AH growth is the result of the hfe-germ in the seed, and of the suitable conditions to render THE ORIGIN OF THEISTIC BELIEF. 245 it vitally active. This is true in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. The source and cause of the growth and development are within the germ, but the occasion of the activity coming into play are certain external conditions. So in regard to the genesis and growth of theistic belief. Its germinal elements are con-natural, as a constitutional endowment of our nature; and, as the intellectual, emo- tional and moral life of the soul opens up, theistic belief comes into ever clearer consciousness. The initial move- ment is from within the soul, and not from without. 5. The true doctrine, finally, maintains that the con- natural factor in theistic belief needs expansion before it reaches its maturity. Here it is that reasoning, reflection and revelation render valuable service in leading the theistic belief out to its maturity. By this means a purified, elevated, rational theism, such as Christianity presupposes, is realized. Some intuitionalists put too much into the intuition of God, and do not allow enough for the influence of reasoning, revelation and religious education. The basal factors of theistic belief are a priori or con-natural; but reasoned, mature theism has in it many empirical elements. Here, as in other aspects of the theory of knowledge, the a priori and the a posteriori, are both necessary to the matured product of cognition. V. Some Coniirmation of the Doctrine. § 56. I. The views of eminent scholars greatly confirm this doctrine. Charles Hodge (Sys. Th., Vol. I., Ch. I.) holds that the idea of God is intuitive, and at the same time he properly recognizes the use and force of the theistic proofs. Flint {Theism, Lect. III., § 2), when he speaks of theistic belief being an immediate unconscious inference, can scarcely mean anything different from this doctrine. H. B. Smith (Introd. to Christian Theology, p. 90) says that "such is the human constitution that under appropriate 246 APOLOGETICS. 5(^ i arcumstances it always recognizes the existence of God as a fact." He calls this aspect of the knowledge of God "con- natural." Owen (quoted in Haliburton's Rational Inquiry, Ch. III.) says that "men are bom with a capacity of know- ing him (God), and they do not so naturally know as they feel this implanted capacity of knowing God." Calvin {Institutes. Book I.. Ch. III.) says that "all men have by nature an mnate persuasion of the divine existence, a per- suasion inseparable from their very constitution." Luthardt {Fundamental Truths, Lect. II., pp. 43. 44) says that "an intuitive conviction of the existence of God dwells within the human mind. We can by no means free ourselves from the notion of God. It is a question of the whole man, of his whole mental and moral life. And if it be a question of the whole man, its answer must come from the whole man. Ebrard (Apologetics, Vol. I., § 100) says, with deep insight, that "both the premises which lead to the cognition of God, ,". c, the knowledge of the external world, and the knowledge of self, are in every human consciousness immediately given, even in that of the simplest child, ind operate directly as an urgent feeling which presses on to the knowledge." Again. Luthardt {Fundamental Truths, Ch VIL) adds that "we have within us a consciousness Of his (God's) existence, a natural knowledge of God which is further developed by his 'estimony of iiiniself in creation and providence." The consensus of opinion thus adduced could be greatly expanded by reference tr ther writers like Augustine, Howe, Christlieb, Th rnu^ Diman and Patton. 2. Some ^f theism are assumed, and carried forward to the discubion of its ontology. This affords the starting-point of the /ea- sonings which justify belief in the existence of Gud , and it at the same time supplies, in part at least, some of the materials for the proofs to- the reality 01 the object of , 252 APOLOGETICS. theistic belief. It is held that this belief has its roots deeply fixed in the very nature of man. and that it is an essential element m his constitution. From this secure subjective fact the reasonings for the existence of God proceed- and never, m the exposition of the theistic proofs, should the con-natural or intuitive nature of the belief in God be lost sight of. 2. It Should also be kept in mind that we do not under- take to prove the existence of God after the manner of a stnct demonsiration. The method of mathematics is not the one now to be followed. The method must rather be that of rational vindication, and the result will be moral probability. This is perhaps the only method possible in dealing with this problem, for it is doubtful if real exist- ence in any sphere can be proved by strict deductive or demonstrative reasonings. Hence, we undertake to show that theistic belief, which involves the actual existence of w u',f T'T^ ^^^^' ^^^^"^ °^ ^»'""d«"t vindication. We shall also be prepared to make it plain that the denial of the divine existence is irrational and unnatural, and that theistic belief, in predicating the actual existence of its object IS reasonable and natural. In a word, we undertake to make good the claim that theistic belief is reasonable and that atheism is irrational. ' 3- This position further implies that theistic belief is not a mental fancy or a subjective dream, but an a priori belief, ^v•h.ch asserts the existence of its object. The exposition of the theistic proofs will mainiy consist in the rational vin- dicat.on of the objective validity of this native belief. Thi>= belief will be regarded as a valid witness, and the significant of Its testimony will be interpreted. Hence, we do not begin to prove the existence of a God of whom we are entirely ignorant, or concerning whom we have no idea. To take this position would be to make reasonings m regard to the existence of God impossible. But we begin with the primitive theistic belief, whose sub- INTRODUCTORY TOPICS. 353 jective and con-natural reality has been established in the psychology of theism, and then proceed to vindicate the ontological reality of this belief in the existence of God. This initial position for the ontology of theism is well brought out by Luthardt (Fundamental Truths, p. 48), when he says that "the theistic arguments are not intended to prove to us that which we are not already acquainted with, but to justify our intuitive conviction to our reasoning faculties, by directing us to the traces, scattered on all sides, of that God, whom we already perceive and know in our hearts." Thus we undertake to vindicate the native spori- taneous conviction of the heart before the bar of reason, and so to set sail for the long voyage across the wide sea of the theistic discussion. 4. The import of the difference between proving and solving should also be kept in mind as it here emerges. This may seem but a verbal distinction; yet it is necessary to make it in order to understand the function of the argu- ments for the existence of God. To prove is one thing, and to solve is another. The former is of the nature of demonstration, the latter of explanation. Proving, as demonstr. don, relates to a theorem; solving, as explana- tion, pertains to a problem. We prove a theorem, and solve a problem. The method in the former case is mainly de- ductive, and in the latter chiefly inductive. In unfolding the theistic proofs this distinction must be constantly kept in view. To undertake to demonstrate the existence of God is one thing, and to offer the theistic hypothesis as the solution of the problems of the universe is another. In the former case we undertake to prove the existence of God, without direct reference to the native belief in him, and in the latter we proceed to vindicate this native belief, as a valid witness to the existence of God. In the ontological proofs we may seem to be often following the method of proving or demonstration. Still, in this case, even after we have reached the idea of an infinite, an all- 254 APOLOGETICS. I : perfect, or a necessary being, we must presuppose the theistic concept as already in mental possession before theistic predi- cates can be applied to this object. Thus it appears that even m this case we do not really demonstrate the existence of a God of whom we have no antecedent notion or belief But m presenting the theistic proofs we shall be mainly en- gaged m showing that belief in the existence and activity of God IS a reasonable and rationally necessary belief, inas- much as It supplies the most adequate solution of the varied problems presented by man and the universe. If theistic be lef, which postulates the existence of God, thereby fully solves all these problems, we are justified in concluding tha the divine existence is a fact which is rational and well grounded. This gives the task we now undertake a somewhat dif- ferent form from that which it had in the hands of the older natural theology. That theology proceeded to unfold the arguments for the divine existence, and thereby sought to put the human mind into possession of the idea of or belief in God. The method now suggested assumes 'the reality of the subjective and con-natural nature of the belief in God, and from this it proceeds to vindicate the reality of the existence of God. In the former case, the reality of the existence of God was vindicated as the ground of the subjective belief; in the latter, the reality of the sub- jective belief is vindicated as the rational ground for believ- ing in the existence of God. The results of the psychology of theism justify this conclusion. III. The Relations of the Theistic Proofs. § 59. I. In entering upon the exposition of the theistic proofs. It IS necessary to come to some understanding in regard to the relaton of the various proofs to each other. There are many lines of reasoning by which the belief in the existence of God u vindicated, and these differ in their method and INTRODUCTORY TOPICS. 255 materials. The relation of these to each otL-,i is an im- portant question. What is the relation of the so called a priori and a posteriori proofs? How do the deductive and inductive modes of reasoning stand related in the theistic argument? How should the ontological, cosmo- logical, teleological and moral proofs be construed in their mutual bearing upon each other ? To understand these ques- tions is necessary to clearness of exposition, and may pave the way for such a presentation of the theistic proofs as shall go far to meet certain objections to them. 2. First of all, these proofs are to be regarded as cumu- lative in their nature. This means that the many lines of reasoning are to be taken, not singly, but in their combined logical force. The theistic proofs are like the strands of a cable, rather than the links of a chain. If they be regarded merely as links in a chain, the strength of the whole is measured by the strength of the weakest link; but if they be considered to be strands of a cable, their argvmientative force is equal to the strength of all the strands when com- pacted into the cable. One strand may be strong and another weak, yet each adds its quota of logical value to the force of the whole. One strand may even be quite defective, yet the theistic argument, as a whole, may stand quite secure, because other strands ..re sound and strong. This is what is meant by the cumulative nature of the argument for the existence of God. Hence, after we have expounded each separate proof, and shown its peculiar value, we shall be careful to bind them all together in a legitimate logical synthesis, and thus exhibit their combined and convincing force. Thus we are justified in speaking o* tlie theistic proofs collectively, and in calling them the t etstic rgument. The proofs are many, but the argument is one. 3. Each proof should be carefully estimated in accord- ance with its peculiar logical form. In doing this, it is important to understand clearly what the logical form of 25<5 APOLOGETICS. ii any particular argument is, and not to expect any conclu- sion from it which it is not fitted to supply. We should carefully observe whether any argument is deductive or inductive, a priori or a posteriori. We should understand clearly the principle of each form of reasoning, whether it be ontological, cosmological or teleological. We should observe whether we start from the idea of a necessary being, from the notion of the infinite, or from the principle of causation. We should consider whether we are seeking for a first cause, or trying to account for order and design in the universe. Above all, care should be taken to compre- hend the method of immediate inference which the moral argument exhibits. Much confusion will be avoided, and the relation of the several theistic proofs will be better under- stood if this point be kept constantly in view. 4. In like manner, the subject-matter of each proof should be diligently considered. The subject-matter of the various proofs is as diflferent as their logical methods are diverse. In this respect the ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral proofs widely differ. Diligent observation is needed to discover whether the materials of any given proof are drawn from the contents of human reason and its modes of cognition, from the varied facts of nature about us, or from man's moral nature and the conditions of moral order under which he finds himself placed. It will be a serious mistake to derive from the materials of one line of proof what can only be deduced from another. To expect the teleological argument to give what only the ontological can would be a serious mistake. And in this connection it is necessary to distinguish between the native, con-natural factors, and the empirical elements in theistic belief, in order to clearly comprehend the significance of the materials of the several proofs. The material of some of the proofs is more directly related to the con-natural aspects of theistic belief, and in others to its empirical factors. To keep this in mind is necessary ililiiilH INTRODUCTORY TOPICS. 257 in order to make a legitimate use of the subject-matter of the varied lints of reasoning for the divine existence. 5. It must be further borne in mind that some of the proofs bear directly upon the being of God, and others upon his attributes mainly. The being of God denotes his real essential nature as God; the attributes of God are those qualities which belong to his essence, or are exhibited by his manifold activities. Certain proofs, such as the argu- ment for a necessary being, or that for a first cause, relate mainly to the essential nature, the very being of God. Others, like the arguments from order and design, relate directly to the attributes of knowledge, wisdom and power. And still others, such as the varied phases of the moral argument, bear upon the moral attributes of righteousness and justice. Then, having reached these attributes by varied lines of inference, we postulate the reality of the being to whom these attributes necessarily belong. It will thus appear that certain proofs establish the reality of the divine existence in its essential nature, and that others clothe that being with certain natural and moral attributes. In the former case the divine existence is vindicated, in the latter we enlarge our idea of God. In the one case we are assured that God is, and in the other we learn something of what God is. Thus, by reasoning, the primitive knowledge of God is gfreatly enlarged and enriched. The relation of the several proofs in this respect should be faithfully regarded. IV. '^iie Order of the Theistic Proofs. § 60. I. Opinions differ widely as to the best order in which to exhibit the different theistic proofs. Some think one order, and some another, the more effective. Shall we begin with the ontolofical, the cosmological or the teleo- logical proof? Shall we begin with the a priori, and pass on to the a posteriori modes of reasoning, or shall we invert this order? Shall we begin with the contents of the human 17 . as8 APOLOGETICS. ^ ! i 1 1 ! ) 1 1 ; 1 1 •mind, or shall we take our point of departure from external nature? And how shall we relate the moral proofs to the other lines of reasoning? Some eminent writers pursue one order, and some another. Flint begins with certain phases of the cosmological argument, passes on to the design and moral proofs, and finally reaches the ontological. This was the natural order for Flint to pursue, inasmuch as he allows no proper place for the con-natural factor in theistic belief. This required his ijoint of departure to be empirical in his presentation of the theistic proofs. Writers of the Cartesian and intuitive schools usually pursue the opposite course, and begin with some aspects of the psy- chical or ontological proofs, and then pass on to the cosmological, teleological and mora' modes of reasoning. When high authorities thus differ, it is not easy to decide which order is the better one to adopt. Yet it is of some importance to come to an understanding as to the order of presenting the proofs, so that their exposition may be made in a simple and natural way. 2. The positions taken, and the conclusions reached in the psychology of theism, naturally suggest that the exposi- tion of the proofs should connect itself closely with these conclusions. In dealing with the nature and origin of theistic belief, the reality of the con-natural or a priori factor in that belief was vindicated. In taking up the ontology of theism, and in seeking to make good the existence of «God, It IS natural to seek, first of all, to interpret the objective validity of the subjective belief in God. Con- sequently, we are led to begin v ith the psychical proofs, whose material is found in the mind itself, and then to proceed to deal with those proofs whose material is found m various aspects of the universe. For a natural method of exposition, therefore, we begin where the discussion of the psychology of theism left us, and proceed to establish the objective validity of the native 'wlief in God. We begin, consequently, with the a priori aspects of the proof, and INTRODUCTORY TOPICS. 259 pe-ss on to the a posteriori. The ontological proofs will thus be considered before t'le teleological. This order may be the best for another reason. In all the proofs there is, as we shall see, an a priori as well as an a posteriori factor. This being the case, it may be an advantage to have the import of this factor clearly brought out first of all. Those who fail to do justice to the native or con-natural factor in theistic belief cannot so consistently follow this course. We shall begin by seeking to interpret the meaning of the native theistic belief. We shall regard this con-natural appetency to believe in God as a witness to his actual exist- ence. We shall inspect its credentials and weigh its testi- mony. V. The Classification of the Proofs. § 61. I. This is also a question concerning which the authorities differ. What divisions of the proofs shall be made? How shall the various branches of the theistic argument be classified? Having settled the order of their treatment in the previous section, we are now to see how the proofs can be best marshalled according to this order. What principle of classification should be adopted, and what titles shall be applied to the various strands in the cable of proof? The literature of tlie theistic discussion does not afford much help on this point. One author adopts one classification, a second follows another, and a third may give the question of classification but little consideration. The old division into a priori and a posteriori does not aid us much, because most of the proofs have both of these factors in their make-up. The division into deductive and inductive is much the same in principle, and is open to the same objection. The scholastic classification into ontological, cosmological and teleological is defective, inasmuch as they imply each other, and the two latter are really founded alike upon the principle of causation or sufficient reason. This fact gives BsamtrnttlM 26o APOLOGETICS. some plausibility for the merciless assault on the rational proofs which Kant made. A classification and an exposition of these proofs which turns, in some degree, the edge of this criticism, is desirable. Moreover, this threefold division gives no proper place for the moral proof, upon which Kant and many others have laid such stress, and which in itself has such cogency and power. A classification which over- looks the moral arguments is surely defective, and a criticism which fails to do the rational proofs justice is equally at fault. Both classes of proofs are valid. If God be the postulate of conscience, he is also the postulate of reason. Any adequate classification must recognize this fact. 2. It may also be well to avoid the use of the terms onto- logical, cosmological and teleological, as far as possible. Recent critical theistic discussions justify a more careful use of titles than these historic terms supply. The various aspects of the ontilogical proof merit recognition; the cos- mological has l)een slu.wn tu be ambiguous, since it some- times means the argument for a first cause, and sometimes the proof from order. Then, too, the arguments from order and design have in our own day been clearly discriminated from each other. And the several aspects of the moral or anthropological proof have also been elucidated in recent years. All of these considerations should have pre .-.• recognition in an adequate classification of the l! ;:;•,; proofs. 3. The following classification is suggested: The "a >• -!? proofs are divided into three main classes. The first n\y be termed the psychical or psychological. Here the materiah of exposition and proof are found in the contents of the human mind, and in the conditions of its cognition. The second we designate the cosmical or cosmological. The principle involved in these proofs is that of causation, and the materials are found in various aspects of the universe of nature all about us. The third class is denoted the moral or anthropological. Here the starting point and the mate- INTRODUCTORY 'PICS. 261 rials of the reasonings are found iri min's moral nature, and the conditions of moral gove^iment under which he finds himself situated. In brief, the three main divisions of the theistic proofs are the psy hical, the cosmical and the moral. The materials of the first he mainly in the human mind, of the second in tht external world, and of the third in the sphere of man's moral expe. iences. As the exposition proceeds, various subdivisions of these three mam classes of proofs will be opened up. Then, when this is d^ne, they will all be bound together logically, to supply one irrefutable argum it, which abundantly vindicates the objective validity of i .eistic belief in the fact if the exist- ence of God. CHAPTER II. THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM THE AUTOPISTIC NATURE OF THEI ": BELIEF. CONTBNV. Theiitic Proofs. — Starting Point. - Psychical Proof.. — SewrU Forms.— Theistic Belief Autopistic.— Two Presuppositions.— Transition from Psychology to Ontology of Theism.— Sutement of This Proof.— The Connatural Nature of the Belief in God.— Gives Presumption of His Existence.— Lutbardt and Others Confirm.— Exposition of This Proof.— Does not Strictly Prove nor Really Form iu Object— Theistic Belief is a Messenger and a Witness to the Existence of God.— It is God's Testimony in th-; Human Soul to His own Real Existence.— It is Self-evidencing.— Vindication of This Proof.— Important to Make it Good.— The Universality of Religion Supports it— Pagan Peoples In- stinctively Believe in the Reality of Their Gods.— Philosophical Specu- Ution Confirms it.— So does the Tendency of the Soul of Man Towards a Unity.— The Method and Conditions of Special Revelation also Vin- dicate this Proof. LrriBATURt. Lutiiardt's Fundamtnlal Truths, Chap. III.— Dabney's Theology, Chap. II.— Hodge . SyslemaHc Theology, Vol. L, Part I.. Chap. I.— Shedd's Dogmatic Theology. Vol. I., Div. III., Chap. II.— Strong's Systematic Theology, Part II., Chaps. I.. Il.-Orr's Christian View of Cod and the World, Chap. III., Appendix.— Lindsay's Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion, Chap. V.— Mead's Supernatural Revelation, Chap. II.— Ebrard's Apologetics, Vil. I.. Part I.. Book I., Sec. I., Chap. III.— Fisher's Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief. Chap. II.— Fiske's Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II., Part I., Chap. II.— Knight's Aspects of Theism. Chap. V^III.— Thomson's Christian Theism Book II.. Chap. VIII— Dale's Christian Doctrine, Chaps. I., II.-! Clarke's Outline of Christian Theology, Part I.. Chap. II.. a.— H. B. Smiths Introduction to Theology. Part II., Chap. III., 3.— Fraser's Philosophy of Theism. Vol. I.. Chap. II -Karris' Philosophical Basis of Theism, Chap. V— Calvin's Institutes. Book I., Chaps. I.-III.— Illing- worth's Divine Immanence. Chap. IV.— Descartes' Method and Medita- rto»i*.-Augu.stines The Trinity. Chap. VII.-Frank's System of Chris- tian Certainty. Sec. II., Chap. I. I. General Statement. § 62. I. TN this chapter the formal exposition of the theistic A proofs is begun. .According to the classification of those proofs suggested in the last chapter, the psychical or .aM THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. ^ psychological proofs are to be first unfolded. These proofs take their point of departure froin certain rational contents of the human mind, and find their materials in the fundamental conditions of cognition. Banning with the psydiical proofs, we are ^^' . to bring the ontology of theism; into close relation with its psychology. If we were to raise the metaphysical question of the ground of the con-natural theistic aptitude or instinct of the human soul, we might find the best answer to be that it was due to God making his presence known in the human soul. Theistic belief, in^ the last analysis, would then be grounded on the testimony of God in the soul of man, to his own existence This view is not pressed just now, but it is merely suggested to show^ how the subjective and objective aspects of theistic belief are related. Th'j psychical proofs assume several quite distinct forms. First, the autopistic or self -evidencing nature of theistic belief; secondly, the proof from the idea of a necessary being; thirdly, the proof growing out of the idea of the infinite; and fourthly, the inference from the rational prin- ciple of intelligence itself, have to be unfolded. In this chap >• attention will be devoted to the first of these. This leads to a careful interpretation of the autopistic nature of the belief in God. 2. This initial theistic proof presupposes two important iwsitions already made good in these discussions. '3ne is the rational theory of knowledge. This theory insists on the reality of the a priori laws of thought, and asserts that in cognition these laws come into rational correspondence with the real conditions of objective existence. The other is the con-natural or instinctive nature of theistic belief. This implies that this belief in its deepest roots is a priori or native to the human constitution. With the rational theory of knowledge as our guide, and the instinctive nature of theistic belief as our starting-point, we now pro- ceed to investigate the ontological character of this belief. 264 APOLOGETICS. I 3. By this means we may hope to be able to make the passage from the psychology to the ontology of theism in an entirely rational way. If this passage can thus be made, the objective validity of theistic belief will be securely estab- lished. It is evident that this is a matter of the utmost importance. How is the passage to be effected in an entirely rational way from the subjective belief in God, which is an undoubted psychical fact, to the objective existence of God as an undoubted reality? To show that this can be done in various ways is to go far to vindicate theistic belief as a warrant for belief in the exisu.ice of its object. In some respects the autopistic nature of this belief is the key to the situation. This may be termed the esotheistic proof, and we now enter on its exposition. II. Statement of this Proof. § 63. 1. The starting point of this proof is the nature of theistic belief as inherently con-natural or intuitive. By intuitive, we do not now mean a direct gaze upon the very being of God. It is rather taken to denote that native theistic endowment, or inborn tendency to believe in God, which the human soul possesses. It is now assumed that the soul of man has this constitutional capacity in its very make-up. This intuitive factor must indeed be presupposed in order to the possibility of any definite theistic experience. Other- wise this experience would have to be explained on purely empirical grounds, and from materials at first non-theistic in tlieir nature. But it has already been shown that this intuitive factor antedates and conditions the empirical ele- ments which enter into this belief. Now, if it can be shown that this intuitive or con-natural factor in theistic belief is in rational correspondence, and cognitive relation with its object in the existence of God. a very important step will be taken towards laying the foundations for belief in the divine existence. THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. a6s 2. In proceeding to show this, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the intuitive factor in theistic belief is like the same factor in other aspects of human cognition. They all, as by an instinctive conviction, posttdate their external counterparts, as actually existing in the objective realm. On this general and somewhat abstract ground, we reach the presumption that the theistic intuition has objective validity. In this connection, it must be remembered that theistic belief is not of the nature of a general conception, but rather a native endowment of the human soul, which ^■\s an a priori quality about it. Such being the case, it is not framed by the mind in the experiences of abstraction and generalization ; it is rather possessed by the mind and given to that experience which is theistic. This wards oflf the objection that the idea of God has not any necessary objective validity, since the human mind can construct various general notions which have no real existence at all, as, for example, a mermaid or a centaur. But if the true intuitive or a priori factor be rightly regarded, it conditions, rather than springs from, experience ; and it thereby pledges the reality of the object to which it rationally stands related. This, then, is an initial presumption in favor of the objective validity of theistic belief. 3. This presumption enables us to assume, tentatively at least, that the theistic intuition, with i.i a priori quality, may be justly regarded as an abiding witness in the human soul to the reality of the existence of God. The con-natural theistic factor in the constitution of man thus becomes God's testimony therein to his own actual existence; and it also lays the foundation for the autopistic nature of theistic belief. As rational intuition, in its very nature, relates the human mind to objective reality of some kind, so the theistic intuition of the human soul may relate it to God as an actually existing object. In such a case the object is not formed by the mind, but rather given to it. This being so, the very existence and character of this subjective factor I f '' i att APOLOGETICS. postulates its object as really existent From another point of view, the theistic intuition may be regarded as a revela- tion of God in the soul. The con-natural theistic factor is the ear of the soul to hear the voice of God; it is his con- scious presence in the audience chamber of the soul. Such revelation certainly presupposes the existence of the being who makes it. Hence, man's instinctive belief in God is a valid testimony to the existence of God. Luthardt expresses almost the same view when he says tiiat "to think of God is to be certain of his existence." This simply means that in the thought of God his existence IS implied; or that the existence of God is necessary to account for man's native belief in him. Certain aspects of the Cartesian view suggest the same conclusion. When Descartes argues that the only proper way to account for the presence in the human soul of the idea of an infinite self-existent being, is to presuppose the existence of such a being, he makes this suggestion. Thus, the existence of God becomes the guarantee for the validity of human knowledge. Malebranche is not far from the same position when he says that we perceive all things in God when we perceive them accurately. Green, Caird, Royce and Watson certainly suggest the same view when they assume that God IS the highest goal to which human intelligence can attain. And we may not be going too far when we suggest that the witness of the Holy Spirit in Christian experience implies the underlying natural relation of the infinite Spirit with the soul of man. If God. by his Spirit, sustains this mward relation to »he believer's experience, may we not suppose tha: the foundation of this gracious relation is the natural re!ati..n, on the ground of wliich the theistic in- tuition IS regarded as the testimony of God in the human soul, giving assurance tliat he is, ami that we are under his authority? Even thoHgl, sin may have marretl this relation, and pervertcil tliis testimony, still it is not utterly destroyed; for if It were, man would no longer be a religious being THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. ntff at all. At root this may be called the religious proof for the existence of God, wherein man's religious nature as self-evidencing testifies to the existence of God. In other words, the theistic intuition is native and autopistic. III. Exposition of this Proof . §64. Some further exposition may more fully elucidate this proof, and indicate more clearly the precise results which it attains. 1. The theistic intuition as autopistic does not prove the existence of God in the sense of a strict logical demonstra- tion. This con-natural theistic factor does not do the work of formal logic. It does not proceed deductively to reach by logical processes the conclusion that God exists. It operates instinctively, and spontaneously suggests the rea- sonableness of the existence of God. What was said in the preceding chapter, in regard to the function of proof in relation to the divine existence need only be now recalled, in support of what has just been stated. We do not seek to prove the existence of a God of whom we have no knowledge, but we rather undertake to interpret our instinctive conviction in regard to the existence of such a being. 2. Nor is it admitted that the theistic intuition forms the object to which it relates. If it did, God would have only a conceptual existence. But it has already been insisted that primitive theistic lielief is not of the nature of a general notion framed in the mind by abstraction. If it were, the mind would be the virtual creator of God, and his existence would be purely ideal. The theistic intuition rather finds its object already existing. It is not, therefore, a mechanic, but rather a discoverer; it finds, rather than makes, its object. In the light ot this view, the contention of Kant, that the idea of God is merely a regulative principle of human reason, according to which it proceeds in dealing Vi 368 APOLOGETICS. with the totality of phenomena in the cosmos, is entirely untenable. The position of Kant upon this point has been hurtful to both philosophy and theology. But if it be firmly held that theistic belief, which involves the idea of God, should be regarded as a rational intuition, much will be gained. The idea of God will then be regarded, not merely as a regiilative principle, having only subjective validity, but it will be looked on as an instinctive and constitutive belief, carrying in its very nature the promise and pledge of its objective validity. 3- The theistic intuition rather reveals its object as exist- ing. That object thus revealed is God. Hence, man's in- stinctive belief in God becomes a messenger in the human soul, revealing the existence of God. As in nature we say that God reveals himself, and thus the heavens declare his glory, so in the human soul God may, in like manner, be said to reveal himself, and therein declare his presence. In both cases the revelation is possible only on the supposition that God actually exists. The con-natural or intuitive belief in God is the fundamental fact, for unless we have the conviction concerning God which this belief implies, we could never see the glory of God in the starry heavens,' nor find all nature vocal with his praise. Thus the intuitive factor rather reveals than forms or proves its object. It is needful to add that the revelation here implied is not ex- ternal, but internal. It is not an outward special revelaUon, but an inward manifestation of God to the soul. 4- The theistic intuition further attests the reality of its object. It is an abiding attestation in the soul itself, testify- ing to the real existence of God. The native theistic endowment of the human soul is a zvitness, not a mechanic. It testifies to the reality of its object, which consequently It does not construct. Thus, as it is a messenger to the soul, revealing God therein; it is also a witness, testifying from within the soul to the reality of the existence of God. In this way the self-evidencing nature of theistic belief is f ft monk THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 369 vindicated, and its objective validity securely established. This belief is not at first fully matured. It is at root con- natural, but needs revelation and education to lead it out to maturity. Thus the native theistic belief of the soul neither proves nor forms its object. It rather reveals and attests the exist- ence of that object. It is neither a logician nor a mechanic. It is simply a messenger and a witness. It is autopistic IV. Vindication of this Proof. § 65. As the conclusion just stated is of much significance in itself, and in relation to the further exposition of the theistic proofs, it may be well to give some further reasons in its support. I. The autopistic nature of theistic belief is supported by the facts of religion among men generally. If the con- natural nature of that belief be denied, it is not easy to see how a satisfactory explanation of the universal preva- lence of religious ideas and practices can be given. If the phenomena of religion depend on primitive revelation, and subsequent education, there is reason to believe that religion would die out altogether in certain cases. If any people should entirely lose the memory of the revelation, or be deprived of the necessary religious education, the proba- bility is that the knowledge of God would fade away from them entirely. But the fact is that there are no tribes of men, no matter how ntde, but retain some acquaintance with deity. It may often be sadly perverted, but its essential principle is present. The best explanation of the persistency of religion among men is found in the con-natural nature of theistic belief. This implies that this belief is an essential element in the very nature of man, just as truly as con- science is, so that wherever man goes he carries it with him. This fact, coupled with the influence of revelation, fully accounts for the universality of religion. That it does so .270 APOLOGETICS. in turn confirms the self-evidencing nature of the belief in God. 2. In this connection, it is worth while noting the fact that the religious belief of the different pagan systems is a belief in the actual existence of their deities. Their gods are not to them imaginary, but real beings. This persuasion prevails so widely among pagan peoples that it cannot be called in question. If these peoples thus assume the real existence of their deities, there is reason to conclude that their belief in them is self-evidencing in its nature. The native belief in the gods, though defective and perverted, is acted on in a somewhat unconscious way by untutored peoples, as if it were a testimony to the actual existence of their deities. Even though it be admitted that they are in error as to the precise form and number of their gods, yet their belief in them is a testimony to the objective validity of the native theistic endowmenl of mankind. 3. The conditions of philosophical speculation further confirm the doctrine announced in this chapter. It is inter- esting to observe how intimately theistic and philosophical speculation have always been related. The best types of ancient Greek philosophy give prominence to the theistic element. This is true of Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. In patristic and scholastic ages philosophy and theology were closely allied. In modem times almost every notable philosopher gives prominence to the theistic view of the universe. Descartes, and after him Spinoza in a quite different way, combined aspects of theism with their philosophy. Leibnitz and Kant wrestled with the problem of the divine existence and government. Hamilton and Hegel speculated profoundly upon the nature of the infinite and absolute. Ethical monism and definite theism have a large place in the philosophy of our own day. Even those whose philosophy is anti-theistic have to face the ver) problems of which theisnj provides the best solution. THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 271 Whence arises this persistent impulse in philosophical speculation to move on and up to the theistic goal ? If the native and autopistic nature of theistic belief be admitted, this impulse can be understood. If the theistic intuition be regarded as an abiding attestation in the human soul to the existence of God, then it is easy to see how the belief in God comes to be used as the solution of the problems of the universe in the hands of philosophy. Thus the con- natural and self-evidencing nature of theistic belief explains the prevalence of the theistic element in philosophy. In turn, the prevalence of this element in human thought goes far to confirm the autopistic nature of the be! in God when it affirms the existence of the object of this belief. 4. The fact that all the powers of the human soul find unity for their activities in God, further confirms the doc- trine of this chapter. Thus it comes to pass that cognition, faith, feeling, moral experiences and religious instinct, all fin. I the goal of their noblest exercise in the postulate of God. The highest thinking, the most exalted faith, the most elevated emotion, the deepest moral experiences, and the loftiest religious aspirations of the human soul, reach to, and rest in, God. These all lead out and up to God, and when they rest in him they find unity and satisfaction. As Augustine has said, "the soul is restless till it rests in God." Thus. God, is the true home of the soul, and aU its activities find their highest forms of exeicise in relation to him. This, again, is in harmony with the doctrine that theistic belief is autopistic in its nature. The dire effects of sin have, of course, to be taken into account in these reasonings. The intellect !ias been dark- ened, the eye of faith has been blinded, the feelings have been per\'erted, conscience has been aulled, and the religious sentiments have been turned into wrong channels. But this does not destroy the force of the contention here made, because the Gospel comes, with its remedy frr the evil.i of sin in all t'lese elements of man's nature, so that they may :^^ ^ 37a APOLOGETICS. be brought into harmonious action again. The return to God ,s associated with the restoration of this harmony, and, indeed. «)ndit.ons it. In redeemed men the self-evidencing nature of theistic belief is clearly seen, for in them the native of the Spirit that he is. and that they are his children. S. The doctrine of this chapter is further confirmed by the way m which the Scriptures, as a divine revelation, come to men, and are received by them. There must be a channel of communication between God and man, and there must be a door of access in the soul of man for outward revelation, in order to the possibility of revelation address- ing Itself to him at all. Unless man has a spirtual nature, and a con-natural theistic endowment, he cannot sustain spiritual relation with the infinite Spirit, nor receive any special communications from him. In other words, the condition of the possibility of any kind of outward special revelation from God to men, lies in the fact that God is still m contact with men in the inner chambers of their souls. This implies, not only that men are made in the image of God but also that men "are not far from him," and that He hath not left himself without witness." Even "that which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God nath showed it unto them." That God has made outward revelations, such as are recorded in the Scriptures, is assured historical fact; and that men may understand and receive this revelation is also undoubted experimental fact. This plainly implies that in the very constitution of man there is a native theistic factor by which man is related to God. It also justifies the con- elusion that this factor may rightly be regarded as a divine messenger m the human soul, and as a testimony, in the audience chamber of the spirit of man, to the objective existence of God. This further confirms the doctrine of this chapter, and vindicates the self-evidencing nature of theistic belief. THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. a73 In this way the transition is securely made from the psychology to the ontology of theism. Given the idea of God as a fact in the human soul, the presumption is that he actually exists. Given the con-natural quality of theistic belief, the reality of the object of this belief is at least sug- gested. This is what is meant by the autopistic nature of theistic belief. With this presumption, and this suggestion, we seek further confirmation of it in the proofs that are to follow. By some it may be thought that if primitive theistic belief is autopistic, the presentation of further proofs is not neces- sary, so that the discussion might be ended at this stage. But if we keep in mind the true nature and relation of the theistic proofs, it will be evident that this would be a mistake. These proofs are cumulative, and each gfives its share of logical result. The autopistic nature of theistic belief is the first contribution to that result, and we proceed to confirm and expand the suggestion of this proof by un- folding others. tS MKXOCOPr RBOWTION TBST CHART (ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2) A )e53 Cost Uom Stmt RochMttf. Nmi York 1**09 USA (716) *«2 - 0300 - PhofY. (716) ?B0 - S9S9 - F« li 1 p i r in CHAPTER III. THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM THE IDEA OF A NECESSARY BEING. Contents. TT J'"" .°* "''' Proof.-Kanfs Relation to it-Reaction B^t„ Understand n« of it.— Various Tvn.. „« ■. <- Reaction.— Better Scholasticism extremes.-f ruth brtween S I ^°'^-^''"' ''"'' Human Thought.-It. underlying S^e tu„d '^^"""™^'^ Literature. Augustine's City of God, Chao XII — Aii.«i«,'. d i ■ S'r'a"'„rr'' ^"'^"" ''^ss .frrT« Vol. I Part I rh,n IT c^ '-Hodges Sistcnmtic Theology, ChL II J" . '^; "—Strong's 5jr,*<.ma/,c rA«-ofo«y Part II Chap. II.. 4.-Foster's Systematic Theology. Part II Chan I Mi •' Systematic Theology. Vol. I Part I rL? iin'^. "*''*'' ' ^ll.ip. IV.— Mirlings P/ll/0J0/>/lir owrf rAfo/opv Chan V TI, Christian Theism Book f rh,„ r j ^u */, "^^ '^—Thomson s I- Preliminary, § 66. I. 'T^HIS chapter deals with the second as,«;ct of the nsy- J. chical proofs. In general, it may .,e described as THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 27s the proof from the idea of a necessary being as it is found in the human mind. It is often called the a priori proof for the existence of God, and it is sometimes known as the deductive argument for the divine existence. These two terms are now seen to be rather too general to denote quite clearly this aspect of the psychical argument. Strictly speaking, it is the ontological proof in its historic and classic form that we are now to consider. And even this term has to be taken in the sense which recent criticism has eluci- dated and made definite. The literature of this proof would fill many a library shelf, so that no outline of it can be given here. At times Aristotle and Plato are almost on this ground, though they often mingle cosmological elements with their ontological reasonings. Some of the early Christian Fathers, like Tertullian and Augustine, lay the foundations for this argu- ment; and many of the Scholastics, like Anselm and Aquinas, elaborate it with much acuteness. Indeed, it took its definite form in their hands. Boethius was the forerunner of Anselm, and Anselm is the typical exponent of this proof among the Scholastics. Descartes, in his philosophy, gave great prominence to the a priori proofs for the divine exist- ence, and in one of his proofs he follows very closely the lines marked out by Anselm. Clarke presents the dedi'ctive proof for the exists e of God in a very elaborate way. In its preliminary steps, his argument is chiefly a priori, but in its later stages a posteriori factors are introduced into it. This illustrates the fact that the a priori and a posteriori proofs cannot be entirely separated from each other; and it suggests the additional fact that in the cosmological proof there is an ontological element. Gillespie, and many other writers up to our own day, have expounded and criticised this proof in various ways. 2. In recent times Kant's trenchant criticism of the rational proofs for the existence of God was directed very specially against the logical validity d«^ •"^"<=h a way that it cannot be rationally denied This illustration has been criticised on the ground that It does not prove anything in regard to the actual existence of Cn'^T^ \ ' '"'"'"' '^^ ^'^™«"t for the existence of God from the very idea of him proves nothing as to his existence. It is doubtful if Descartes intended by his illus- ra ion to prove the existence of a triangle, or to make the fact of existence the feature common to the two cases It LT./''T^'V° '"PP°'' '^''' ^' ^•'"P'y '"tended to say. that just as the quality of having its angles equal to t«o nght angles is involved in the very notion of a triangle ideaof God "^-^.^ """T'^ '"'^^^"^^ P^*-*^'"^ ^° the vfr; Idea of God. i hus understood, the illustration has a degree of pertinency not to be ignored. A^Ztlu^-l ^°'"'"- °^ '^' "''^'"^"* '^^' Kant assailed. Aga nst the illustrat.cn especially he made his assault. As fn'tn n "T""" ^'' ^""""^^^^ ^^^" ^^^^^^^ as fatal to all ontological reasomng, it may be well to discover its precise THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. -ji force. The criticism runs as follows: If a triangle exists, its angles, of course, are equal to two right angles; but the existence of the triangle must be first assumed. So he says that if God exists he is an all-perfect being; but his existence must be assumed, and cannot be proved. 5. In the light of the real meaning of the illustration used, this criticism may not be entirely fatal to this argu- ment. The real point in the illustration is that any quality which is necessary to the completeness of the idea must be supposed to have reality. Having the two angles equal to two right angles, and necessary existence, are features neces- sary to the completeness of their respective ideas. The fact of existence or non-existence is not the feature in which the illustration and the thing illustrated agree. In addition, to say that there may be no existing triangle, that is, to annul the predicate in the proposition, "a triangle exists," still leaves the idea of a triangle in the possession of the mind. So, to annul the predicate in the proposition, "God exists," still leaves unaffected the fact that the mind pos- sesses the idea of an all-perfect being, in which idea exist- ence is taken to be a component part. Hence, whether we assert or deny the existence of God, the idea remains in the mind. So long as this is left intact, the Cartesian proof is protected from the Kantian criticism, unless it can be shown I . '^tence is an incident, and not an essential elemen lea of God. The real force of this argu- ment 1 ; *act that the con-natural nature of the idea of Gou .6 it ineradicable in the nature of man; and being so, it finds its objective validity in the existence of God. 1 i i a M M III. The Anselmian Form of the Proof. § 68. I. Anselm of Canterbury presents the ontological argu- ment in its typical form. Many since his day have stated and restated it, yet its essential principle has never been 282 APOLOGETICS. j I ' more clearly exhibited than by Anselm. In his Proslogium especially, he btites the proof, and in his Apology he defends It. In his Mouologium he also alludes to this proof but there dwells chefly on others aspects of the theistic argu- ment. * It is not easy to give a concise statement of Anselm's reasoning, thou^^h the argument itself is very compact He professedly undertakes to prove the existence of God from the t'^ry idea we have of him. He sets out with the idea of God as of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought This IS really the idea of a being who possesses all possible perfections. This idea must be supposed to be in the mind alike of the theist, who asserts the existence of God, and of the atheist, who denies that existence. Then Anselm argues that the being, whose idea is of a being than whom a greater cannot be thou-ht, must exist in reality as well as in thought. Hence, a being than - hom a greater cannot be thought, must exist in re, that is, objectively as well as in intellectu. that is, subjectively. This simp'y rneans that the existence of God must be postulated, as the object to which the idea of him necessarily relatt^s Itself. ' 2. Anselm seeks to confirm this inference by indirect proof. He says that if we suppose that the being than whom a greater cannot be thought, does not exist in re, that IS, actually, we could still think of him as so existing. This would then be the thought of a greater being than the one from which we set out, and yet we set out from the ,dea of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought. This would give the idea of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought, and also the idea of a still greater being, which IS absurd. Hence, it must be concluded that the being than whom a greater cannot be thought does actually exist; and that h,s existence is necessary, not merely contingent. In this way Anselm deduces the existence of God from the very Idea the human mind has of him. As that idea requires THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 283 the quality of the existence of its object to make it com- plete, so it at the same time postulates the actual existence of God as its object. 3. This proof has beeti interpreted in so many ways, and criticised from so many points of view, that some further exposition of it is necessary to unfold its true significance. First of all, the terms used by Anw m should be carefully noted. He uses the word cogitare, not concipere. Hence, we translate think, rather than conceive. This indicates that Anselm is not thnking of a general conception which the mind forms, when he describes the idea of God, as that of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought. The view he evidently has is that the idea of God is a product of rational thought, not a mere concept of the under- standing. With this verbal explanation to guide us, we now seek to ascertain the real significance of the proof. And in doing so we are greatly aided by the acute hints given by Patton, in his Syllabus of Theism. The starting point of the proof is, that the actual existence of God is somehow implied in the native idea of him in the human mind. The force of the inference involved in the proof lies in the statement, that what exists in re is greater than what exists tH intellectu, which means that the idea of a being which is necessarily thought to exist, is a ri'-'^er or more complete idea than is the idea of a being wb" . not thought to so exist. Then, since we have the idea of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought, such a being is the most complete of all beings; and, as necessary existence is essential to that completeness, the being to whom the idea in question relates cannot but exist. This being is God, whose existence, there- fore, is necessary. The core of the inference is that necessity in thouglit and necessity in existence are somehow bound up with each other. The ground of the proof is that whatever is necessarily thou it to exist objectively does so exist. But even on this point different expounders u I. 1 1 h ' 284 I f 1 11 111; !* ^1 i I APOLOGETICS. and^critics of Anselm give various interpretations of his 4. First, some explain it in a superficial way. What exists m thought also exists in fact. But a being than whom JrT- '^""°' ^ '^''''^^' ^""'''^ '" thought. Therefore such a bemg exists m fact Only superficial critics state the IZi V u'\ '''^ *''"' '"^^ *h«y have refuted the proof when they show that many things may exist in the l^c^iZrTW .'°"?'°"^' ^hich have no existence in crk dL n. J'^'^'^«^>d«"tly the view Gaunilo took i„ his crmasm of Anselm's reasoning. Gaunilo says that he can .magine an island, and so the island exists in thought. But AnZ I'f u " T r°°* '''' ^" '^'^"d «-t^ •" f-t. Anselm naturally replied that the idea of God is not like other mental concepts. It is unique, as the idea of a being than .horn a greater cannot be thought. So he added that whent Gaunilo presented an island than which a greater cannot be thought, his objection would have weight If Anselm had indicated more clearly that the idea of God is not a generalization, hered from reflection upon a num- made f?l'' .? 1'°""^' °^ "" '^'""^ »^ ^ generalization, made from the observation of a number of islands, his answer would have been still more complete to this ob- 5- Secondly, others give another turn to the proof. That which necessarily exists in thought exists in fact. A being than whom a greater cannot be thought necessarily exists m thought. Therefore such a being does exist I TcJ bome critics assail the proof as thus stated. This inter- the mLd n "^- ^''' '''" '^ ^^^^'•^^d '' °- -hich the mind necessarily possesses and from the idea thus regarded the existence of tl Ject is inferred. This inter- pretation shows a truer appreciation of the proof than the foregoing one, and the inference from. an iSea which he mind, by virtue of its inherent nature, necessarily possesses THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 285 to the actual existence of its object may be legitimate. Still the chasm between necessity in thought and actuality in existence is not very easily bridged over by this inierpreta- tion of Anselm's argument, so we hesitate to accept it. 6. Thirdly, this may be a truer construction of the proof Anselm propounds. That which is necessarily thought to exist in fact does so exist. A being than whom a greater cannot be thought is necessarily thought to exist in fact. Therefore, such a being does so exist. This, as Patton shows, may be accepted as the correct interpretation of the Anselmian proof. Anselm himself may not always have held closely to this meaning of his proof, yet we are per- suaded that this is what underlies the type of reasoning which he initiatea. The gist of I'e inference is that what is necessarily thought to exist in fact, does actually exist. This means that in any idea wherein necessity of existence is an essential faclor, the object to which that idea relates does exist in fact. Such an object is not only a necessity of thought, but is also thought to have necessary existence. When thus stated, this proof has rational force. It would be interesting to follow this profound type of theistic speculation as it appears in subsequent writers. The fact that it has always attracted the earnest attention of minds of a high order, argues that t cannot be entirely without logical and rational value. One can scarcely suppose chat a mode of reasoning that was entirely illogical and irratiin^l would be treated with so much respect by human rcas('" as this has been. 7. Many and varied are the objections i.i.kJ* against -:. Some say that the fallacy of four terms, or of reasoning in a circle, lurks somewhere in this proof. Others say that it is useless to try to prove the existence of God syllo- gistically; and still others allege that this proof simply assumes the existence of God, and then seeks to justify it to human reason. But it has never been shown what the four terms are, or how the reasoning in a circle takes place. % {■; 286 APOLOGETICS. [ I Then, strictly speaking, it does not profess to prove the existence of God syllogistically, nor can it be truly said that it assumes the existence of God. It simply argues that since the idea of God in the mind implies the existence of Its object, the existence of God may be legitimately inferred from the very idea we have of him. The main objection which can be made against this gen- eral proof lies in the statement that to exist in fact is greater than to exist in thought only. The real questions here raised are: Whether existence is a quality or attribute of any object, and whether the fact of existence adds any- thing to the idea of the thing. While we might hesitate to say that existence is a quality in the strict sense, yet most minds instinctively feel that the idea of an existing object is a richer notion than the idea of a non-existing object. There is a factor in the one that is not in the other. This factor is the predicate of existence. No doubt this is what Anselm had chiefly in view when he said that the idea of God is unique, in that the fact of the existence of God is involved in the very idea of him which the mind possesses. It is of the very nature of God to have real existence, and the idea of him in the human mind so regards him. 8. Taking it all in all, Anselm's exposition of the onto- logical proof is the purest and most effective form in which It has ever been presented. As we have seen, the Cartesian form is not so effective. And other forms of this proof such as that presented by Clarke and Gillespie, though a prton, are not strictly ontological, and must be treated in another place later on in our discussion. While we may hesitate to a 'mit the complete logical validity of the onto- theistic proof, we may equally hesitate to concede that it has. when clearly stated, ever been successfully refuted. Its real value consists in the fact that it shows that in the o priori factors of the human mind we have the premises of what may be called a transcendental logic which ration- A THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 287 ally justifies the inference that the objects to which these factors relate exist; in a word, that the a priori factors have objective validity. IV. General Estimate of this Proof. § 69. I. It is not easy, in a few concluding sentences, to give an estimate of the real cogency and value of this proof. It naturally has more weight with some minds than others. Minds of a speculative turn may recognize its full force, while those of a more practical temper may think it of little value. The scholastics of the middle ages no doubt laid too much stress upon it, while the criticism of Kant, a century ago, certainly led to an undue depreciation of it. At the present day. theistic speculation is slowly restoring this mode of reasoning to its proper place, and presenting a more just and balanced view concerning it. The precise nature and scope of its inference is more clearly understood, and modes of reasoning not strictly ontotheistic are set in another place. Hence, we are enabled to rest in a middle view between Kant and the scholasticism he criticised. While this historic proof may not be regarded as a strict demonstration by means of the processes of formal logic, it may still be held to be a rational inference in accordance with transcendental logic which presupposes a ground of unity for thought and reality. This simply means that, from certain fundamental factors in the human mind and its modes of cognition, we may justly conclude that their counterparts have objective reality. 2. The pc'inancnt place which the ontotheistic mode of reasoning for the existence of God lias ever had in the activity of human reason, certainly suggests that it must have some true rationality about it. It appears in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle among the Greeks. It is discovered in the theology of TertuUian and .\ugustine among the patristic writers. Among the scholastics, where I'; HI l^ 288 APOLOGETICS. i • 1 1^ philosophy and theology are blended, it reaches its high- water mark. The great theologians of the Reformation, though they parted with the scholastics in many things, often rely on the ontotheistic form of reasoning in regard to the existence of God. And at the present day it is slowly recovering from the effects of the Kantian criticism, and both philosophy and theology are aiding in this recovery. This reaction may be very properly regarded as an evidence of the rational right of this proof to have a permanent place in human thought. The duty of the philosopher and theologian alike is to try to interpret the real significance of this mode of reasoning. With the advent, in our own day, of a sounder epistemology than either empiricism or idealism can supply, the psychical basis for this proof is made more evident. It is now more and more clearly seen that a sound interpretation of the principles of human reason goes in the direction of sustaining the validity of the onto- logical proof for the divine existence. 3. Hence, without pronouncing upon the logical sound- ness of all the forms in which this proof has been stated, we are inclined to think that there is a valid principle of inference underlying them. This principle is that there is a rational unity lying at the very root of both human thought and objective existence. This does not mean that thought and being are in any sense to be identified, nor does it suggest the view that matter and spirit do not belong to different categories of existence. It rather suggests that human reason, in its fundamental principles or a priori elements, relates itself rationally in a real cognitive manner to forms of existence which are objective to it. On this basis the knowledge of the external world is real and rational, and on the same basis the existence of God is guaranteed as real and our knowledge of him rational. And, as we shall see in another form of the psychical proofs. It shall appear that the postulate of God is the ground of rational unity for human reason and the external world. it THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 289 Descartes stated this in another way when he made the important assertion that the existence of God as an all- perfect being is the pledge of the validity of human cognition. And, in more modern phrase, this implies that the a priori or necessary elements in the human mind rationally postulate the real existence of their objects ; and, further, that in both the mind and the world there is an element of rationality which forms the basis of their union in cognition. This is the very important doctrine which the Common Sense philosophy grasped, but did not fully interpret. The belief in God, containing the a priori element of necessary existence which cannot be cast out of it, justifies the inference that he actually exists. This we take to be the profound truth in the ontological argument. t9 I J I' : V U CHAPTER IV. THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM THE IDEA OF INFINITY. Contents. The Infinite and the All-perfect Compared.— The Infinite and Abso- lute in Philosophy.— The Human Mind has these Ideas.— They are Native or a priori.— The Unconditioned, the Infinite and the Absolute.— The Idea of the Infinite defined.— Not the Sum Total of Finite Things.— Not the most Abstract Conception.— Not the Concept of Pure Being.— Other Views defective also.— True Doctrine.— The Terms Adjectives, not Substantives.— They are not Empiiical.- The Mathematical In- finite.— The Metaphysical.— And the Dynamical.— Must include all.— Includes the Absolute.— Theistic Import of the Idea.— The Idea of the Infinite, being a priori, has Objective Validity.— It is Congruous with the Idea of God.— Illustrated by Clarke's Reasoning.— Confirmed by that of Descartes.— The Qualitative and Quantitative Aspects enlarge the Idea.— The Personality of the Infinite as related to God. Literature. Encyclopaedia article on The Infinite.— Howe's Living Temple, Chap. IV.— Charnocke's Attributes of God, Chaps. I., II.— Hamilton's Meta- physics, Chaps. XXXIX., XL.— Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought— Calderwood's Philosophy of the /n/Ini;ed as really existing, with the characteristics of infinity and absoluteness. 2. Reflection concerning the infinite and absolute has had a large place in speculation in all ages. The foiupov of Anaximander, 600 B. C, seems to have been a hint, at least, of the infinite. In the Eleatic philosophy, the one and the all had the quality of infinity. In the atomic Mate- rialism of Democritus and Epicurus, the atoms were infinite in number, and the vacuum was infinite in extent. And Plato and Aristotle were not strangers to these notions. In modem times these ideas run all through the philosophy of Descartes, and they are one of the essential features of the pantheism of Spinoza. Kant and later Germans, on to Hegel, gave much prominence to tlic notion of the absolute. Hamilton's philosophy of the imconditioned deals almost entirely with these notions, and Mansel and Calderwood gave much attention to the same speculations. J. S. MilU mmm 292 APOLOGETICS. i f I Ml -f! 1 and, later on, Spencer, criticised, from different view-points, the philosophy of Hamilton; while Mtiller, Caird and Green have all wrestled earnestly with the problems of the infinite and the absolute in our own day. 3. That the mind of man possesses these ideas or con- victions is generally admitted. There is, however, much difference of opinion as to how the mind obtains them, and as to what their essential nature really is. The sound rational psychology usually maintains the a priori character of these notions or persuasions of the human mind. And the usage of terms to denote these notions is not always consistent. English writers generally use the term, infinite, while the Germans seem to prefer the title, absolute. Hamil- ton hai sought to use these words in a well-defined sense. The unconditioned is his general term; and under it he includes both the infinite and absolute. The infinite is that which has no limits, and the absolute is the independent. The former is mainly a quantitative, and the latter a quali- tative, notion. The infinite, then, is that which is conceived as incapable of ever being completed by any finite additions ; and the absolute is that which is regarded as unrelated to anything else and complete in itself. The former is unconditionally unlimited, and the latter is unconditionally limited. This is perhaps making a rather rigid distinction between these two ideas. They can scarcely be regarded as two things, for they are not really entities at all. They seem rather to denote two ways of regarding certain things. The infinite regards its object as over agains finite things, and as without iimits of any sort; while the absolute Icoks upon its object as independent and self-sufficient. The term ideal, now coming into use in certain quarters, seems a better term than the unconditioned to embrace both of these ideas. It is with the idea of the infinite that we are to be mainly occupied in this chapter. THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 293 II. The Idea of the Infinite Defined. § 71. In seeking to discover the theistic import of the idea of the infinite, it is very necessary to define, as clearly a: possible, what that idea really is. Several inadequate views must be understood and set aside, and the distinction between the mathematical or quantitative, and the meta- physical or qualitative infinite, must be made definite and lain. Nor must the dynamical aspect of it be overlooked. I. Some have made the infinite consist in the sum total of all finite things. According to this view, the notion of the infinite is reached by adding together the totality of all existing finite things. The vast variety of existing things in the heavens and on the earth, of every grade and order, viewed as a great whole, constitutes the infinite. These finite things are simply parts or parcels of the infinite. The same sort of substantial reality pertains to both, and they do not belong to different categories of being. This is in principle a monistic view, and makes the infinite purely quantitative. It is the fundamental error in Spinoza's pantheism. In a somewhat diflferent way, it is the mistake of those who identify the infinite with the ens realissimum. And even the idea of an all-perfect being, as criticised by Kant, was conceived of as mathematical and quantitative, rather than dynamical and qualitat" ;. The infinite is not the sum total of all existing finite things, for by no possible addition of finite things can the infinite ever be reached. At best, we can only reach the indefinite, or a very great finite, by this pathway of reflec- tion. Some phase of monism, with materialistic tendencies, must be the logical result of this view of the infinite ; and it surely leads to pantheism rather than to theism. 2. Others take the infinite to be the most general con- ception. A general conception is the product of the discursive powers of the human mind. By means of these < ; f It 294 APOLOGETICS. i I" > 1« 3* I- !.. I 1 : ! ) - 1 J 1 : ii i', ■ i 'J f < If powers in the operations of abstraction and generalization, general notions are formed, and these are expressed by general terms. This process begins with individual things wherein there are resemblances; these resemblances are abstracted, and then all the individuals having these resem- blances are formed into a class, and a class name is given to it. Then, from these general notions, by the same process of abstraction and generalization, the mental activity is carried on, till the very highest possible notion is reached. This leads to the most general conception, and this is taken to be the infinite. This is an entirely inadequate conception, alike of the nature of the infinite and of the way in which the idea of it is realized. The infinite is not the most general concep- tion to which the understanding may attain in a purely empirical way. It is an a priori idea of the reason, and its object is the condition of the possibility of finite things existing as a totality. This idea i: ^ ven to the mind, not framed by it. Moreover, if the notion of the infinite were a general concept of the understanding, it would have a purely conceptual existence, and its objective validity could not be vindicated at all. 3. Still others have sought to identify the infinite with the notion of pure being. Concrete existing things are manifold, and qualitatively distinct from each other. In this way, iron, stone, wood, water and other material things are distinct from each other. There are also various grades of existing things, such as the material and spiritual, the inorganic and organic, the vegetable and animal. Now, by thinking away all qualitative distinctions that diflfer- entiate things from each other, there remains only the bare and empty fact of existence. This is said to be pure being, which can scarcely be regarded as an entity of any kind. It is at most the empty abstract conception of mere exist- ence. Nor is this a proper exposition of the infinite. At best, THE PSYCHICAL P^^OOFS. 295 this view makes the infinite consist in the mere fact of existence, which is common to all forms of being that have reality. So far as its entity is concerned, i. is pure nothing. It is as empty of real content as the most general notion of the preceding view is, if, indeed, it is not really the same thing regarded in a somewhat different way. The highest possible abstraction of being in general, which can be nothing more than the simple fact of existence, is a totally inadequate view of the infinite. The infinite is a positive idea, and not entirely devoid of content. In certain respects it is a richer idea than that of the finite. 4. Other opinions concerning the infinite can only be men- tioned. Kant and his school were inclined to regard it as "the thing in itself," and to conceive of it as the absolute. The Hegelian absolute was the culmination of this general view. Miiller and Cousin regard it as merely the correla- tive of the finite, but do not define very dearly what it really is. Spencer identifies it with the inscrutable or unknowable which underlies phenomena. Those who take an empirical view of the way in which the mind acquires the idea of the infinite can only regard it as the indefinite. Miiller is a good example of this statement. 5. In seeking to unfold the true idea of the infinite we have a difficult task, and the utmost care must be taken to guard against serious error. a. First of all, a verbal remark must be made. The terms infinite and absolute are to be regarded as adjectives rather than substantives. This may seem to be a superficial remark, yet it is of much importance. If we regard these terms as substantives, we are in danger of being compelled to regard them as real existent forms of being. If we take them to be adjectives, we can then look upon them as attributes, or as the conditions, of the existence of certain things. The infinite is not an existing entity, having a real being of its own apart from all other things. Nor is the absolute to be thought of as an actually existing thing ^ * 296 APOLOGETICS. i i ', ii • in itself. If, therefore, we regard these terms as adjectives, then they properly qualify some forms of being or activity! Thus we may rightly speak of infinite space and time, of infinite wisdom and power, and of a being which is both infinite and absolute. This remark, if kept in mind, will ward off many errors. b. As to the nature of the idea itself, and the mode by which it is acquired, it need only be stated that empiricism cannot supply the explanation. The idea has an a prion quality about it, so that neither individual experience, nor association, nor even the accumulated hereditary experience of the human race can account for it. Hence, no experience of finite things, no process of abstraction, or negation, or analysis, can in any empirical way lead us into the heart of the idea of the infinite. This idea is native to the mind, and it conditions all our thought of the finite in a rational way. It is intuitive, and cannot be reached by any empirical process, nor is its complete significance exhausted in the experience of finite things. Instead of being the idea of the totality of finite things, it is rather the rational con- dition of the possibility of thinking of finite things as a totality. Instead, therefore, of being an empty or negative idea, it is positive and rich in its contents. c. The whole significance of the idea of the infinite is not exhausted in the mathematical infinite. This aspect of the idea is quantitative, and consists in the process of adding finite parts indefinitely, with the possibility of find- ing something ever beyond our greatest endeavors. The fact that the mind can entertain the convictions of a some- thing beyond the greatest possible addition of finite parts, is a hint, at least, that the idea of the infinite has something about it which is not empirical. This is the meaning of the term infinite which is most frequently associated with Its usage. In mathematics this meaning prevails, and this is the main thing implied when space i» said to be infinite m extent and time infinite in continuance. The scientific THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 297 conception of all infinite regression oi causes and effects illustrates the same usage. d. The other and deeper aspect of the infinite is the meta- physical and qualitative. This, in many respects, is a different idea than the mathematical. It is qualitative instead of quantitative. Instead of asking, How much? it asks. What kind? is the object of the idea denoted by the term infinite. This is, perhaps, the truest conception of the infinite. It raises the question of the real nature of any object to which the term infinite is properly applicable. And if this aspect of the infinite be given its proper place, it really embraces what is denoted by the term absolute as well. Thus, any form of being or mode of activity which is described by the term infinite, in this metaphysical and qualitative sense, is also properly regarded as absolute or independent in its mode of existence. As to its nature, such a form of being, and such an activity, are without limits, and are independent. Thus the infinite, as qualita- tive, denotes certain characteristics which pertain to that which is called infinite. e. Perhaps it would not be amiss to connect the dynamical idea with the metaphysical aspect of the infinite, in order to make the explanation of it complete. This expresses the idea of agency and activity, wherein power and resource- fulness are implied. That which is infinite and absolute is not to be thought of as boundless extension merely, or as only abstract endlessness. It is more, even, than the rational unity which lies at the root of all finite things. It is also the dynamical agency which is involved in all the finite changes and onward progress which are seen in the universe of thought and of things. This aspect of the inrinite, which suggests causality as well as rationality, is exceedingly important, for a causality that is rational and' not merely mechanical implies self-determination. And this brings us within sight of will and personality in con- nection with the infinite. i I 298 APOLOGETICS. Hence, to get a complete view of the infinite, we need to take the mathematical, the metaphysical, and the dynamical aspects of it. Quantity, quality and causality are all implied in it, and any object which is termed infinite and absolute exhibits these three related qualities. This is true, whether that object be a form of being or a mode of activity. If the infinite be the ground of unity, it is also the ground of change in the world. If it be inde- pendent in itself, it must be the basis for all that is dependent. If it he self-sufficient, it must be the source of the sufficiency of all else save itself. This view we carry with us. III. The Theistic Import of the Infinite. § 72. ^ I. The careful exposition of the idea of the Infinite given m the last section, paves the way for an interpretation of Its theistic significance in this. The metaphysical and the dynamical, as well as the mathematical, aspects of the infinite are still to be kept clearly in mind. At the very outset, care must be exercised not to identify, in an immediate way he infinite and absolute with God. The infinite relates to a quality or condition of certain existing things, while God is a well-defined existent being. To vindicate the true doc- trine of the 'inite is not to prove the existence of God Nor should we forget that the tenn infinite, in the mathe- matical sense, applies to other things than God. But havin^r arrived at the existence of God on other grounds, we have in that fact a form of being and modes of activity with which the ideas of infinity and absoluteness do properly claim kinship. Our main task now is to so connect infinity with God as thereby to give the theistic interpretation of the infinite, and at the same time confirm our belief in the existence of God. In doing so, it will clearly appear that the metaphysical and dynamical aspects of the infinite though they supply the ground and provide the interpreta- THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 299 tion of finite forms of ex .tence, yet do not find their full significance in relation to those forms of being «hich,m their very nature, are limited and dependent. This leads naturally to the supposition that the full significance of these aspects of the infinite is to be discovered in the necessarily existent and independent being, whose reality was established in the last chapter. The result of the reasonings now entered on will be, not so much to prove the existence of God, as to invest him with the attributes of infinity and absolute- ness, which are congruous with no being except God. We shall not prove t* e existence of God from the idea of the infinite; nor shall we vindicate the reality of the infinite from the existence of God. But having both the idea of God and of the infinite in mental possession, we shall show their rational kinship, and in this way confirm the reality of both. In view of this position, it seems clear that some of the older theologians undertook to do too much in seek- ing to prove the existence of God from the idea of the infinite. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to apyly theistic predicates to the infinite, unless the idea of God be already in the mind. All that can be done, therefore, in the present reasonings, is to show how the two ideas are to be rationally correlated. 2. The first step in the theistic interpretation of the idea of the infinite is to understand its real psychological nature. It is not the product of experience in relation to finite things, though experience may be the occasion when it is realized as a native mental law. Nor is it the result of mental abstraction in any way. so that it has more than a con- ceptual reality. It is a priori in its nature, and hence given by the mind itself to certain of its experiences. In a word, it conditions the activity of the mind in relation to finite things. . The idea of the infinite, being a prion, leads to the inter- ence that it has objective validity, and that it postulates a reality of some kind, other than the mind which is its J T dift 300 APOLOGETICS. I 1 V U i iHj 11 W n i I I source, and other than finite things which are the occasion of Its realization. The idea of the infinite, being neither empirical nor conceptual, is rather rational, and, as such It has objective validity. It, therefore, postulates an obj«:t to which it properly belongs. That object cannot be finite things, either in part or in their totality. It may be the ground of the possibility of finite things existing as a totality, and of their being so apprehended by reason. This is illustrated by one stage in Clarke's Demonstration. He finds space and time to be facts for the human mind Reflection upon them shows that they are neither substances nor agents; so he concludes that they must be attributes of some substance or subject which possesses the qualitv of infinity that space and time exhibit. He concludes that such a being is God. While we may hesitate to agree with Clarke that space and time are attributes of some substance, and while we do not now argue whether they are merely subjective conditions of certain forms of human cognition, yet It may be doubted if the quality of infinity, which Clarke here presents, is wholly exhausted, when viewed only sub- jectively. In other words, the purely empirical explanation of It is not sufficient. This is further confirmed by reflecting, after the manner of Descartes, upon the causal origin of the idea of the mfin.te in the human mind. That cause, or, more properly, ground, cannot be myself, nor things about mc; for I am finite, and .so are they. Hence, its ground must be beyond me, and other t an finite things. It must, therefore, be connected with .some proper objective reality wliicli con- stitutes at r>nce its ground in relation to reason, and the ground for finite things existing as a totality for cognition In this way the objective reality of the idea of the infinite as a prwrt may be vindicated. 3. Then, when the qualitative aspects of the infinite are considered, we get a still deeper view, and are able to THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 30I rationally relate the idea of the infinite with God. These aspects of it lead us to lay aside all quantitative notions of the infinite. In doing so, we get rid of some of the diffi- culties of the subject which grow out of the idea of the infinite, as extensive boundlessness. We think of it now in terms of quality, and have regard to its intensive aspects. The inner reality and resources of the infinite, rather than its boundlessness, are now considered. The intensive unity, the self-sufficiency, and the complete rationality of the infinite are what we now consider. These, without any limitation pertaining to them, give the infinite under our present vision of it. This idea, as infinite, having objective validity, very naturally connects itself with God, as a neces- sarily existent being. This enables us also to regard God as the ground of unity and system in finite things, and to clothe God with the qualities of independency and self- sufficiency. In this way the theistic significance of the intensive infinite appears. 4. This interpretation becomes richer still when we take into account the dynamical aspects of the infinite. This view of the infinite associates the quality of activity and efficiency with it. In addition to the intensive, we have now the causal aspect of the infinite before us. We observe constant change taking place within and without us. We instinctively postulate a causality for these changes. We at the same time instinctively conclude that the resources of causality operative in the universe are not exhausted in all the finite changes wliich take place in it. We think of the wealth of this causality as without limit. This is the idea of infinite power or efficiency, and it presents an aspect of the infinite which is dynamical. Here, again, the a priori nature of the idea of the infinite enables us to postulate a proper object for this idea. The natural association of this idea with the necessarily existent lieing. God. is readily effected. Here, in its deejiest aspects, the idea of the infinite fg5.eives its theistic interpretation, and the necessarily ex- 302 APOLOGETICS. istent God is thereby shown to be the source of infinite causality in the cosmos. S. The personality of the infinite remains for brief dis- cussion. This is confessedly a difficult question. Its diffi- culty arises largely from the fact that the infinite has been regarded chiefly in its quantitative aspects. To connect personality with the merely boundless is by no means easy. And the difficulty has not been lessened by regarding as merely an abstract quality, for it is virtually impossible to associate personality with an abstraction of any sort. But, if we regard the infinite as a quality or condition of the existence of some form of being, it may be comparatively easy to assert personality of these forms of being to which the quality of infinite is properly applicable. Let this be made plain. If we give the metaphysical and dynamical aspects of the idea of the infinite their proper place, we shall find little difficulty in binding infinity and personality together in a rational way. We have already found the being called God to be the proper object of the a priori aspects of the idea of the infinite. If we regard this infinite being as the rational ground of the totality of finite things, infinity and rationality are associated in this being. And if we regard this infinite being as the ground of the causality that is implied in the changing of finite things, we further associate mfinity and causality together in this infinite being. Then, if this infinite causality be also rational, we have the main factors of personality provided. These are causality or efficiency, and rationality or intelligence. These provide what may be regarded as the rational self-determination which personality demands. The qualitative aspect of the infinite supplies the factor of rationality, the dynamical aspect of it provides the element of agency or power. R.>th of these, associated with the form of being that the urm God denotes, gives an infinite being who is also personal. In this way it is made plain that the infinite and personality THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 303 do not exclude each other. And the conclusion may be confidently rested in, that the infinite, as qualitative and dynamical, in connection with God, provides the richest form of personality, with limitless rational self-determina- tion, as its inherent endowment and crowning glory. This is a conclusion of much importance in itself, and m the controversy with pantheism. Pantheism always denies personality to the ground of all things. It insists that the absolute form of being must be undifferentiated and imper- sonal. The main error here is in construing the infinite and absolute under the concept of quantity almost entirely. But if the qualitative and causal aspects of the infinite and absolute ground of all finite things be kept in view, the difficulty vanishes. Hence infinite power and absolute rea- son are lOt only consistent with personality, but really supply its highest form. I '• i t CHAPTER V. THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF INTELLIGENCE. Contents. Interpretatio„.-The real Vr.U.rn^ZJ:ZX^ZS:ZZ Theory of Knowledge accepted.-The Laws of ThoS-R^es o Mental SpontaneUy.-The Spiritual Principle in Man.-TL Unity o Silr"Trr"~'';'r. ^ ^'^'^'^ °^ R*'»'^'» Things for cog n.t.on.-The Laws and Unities of Nature-Modern Scientific View- The Laws of Nature Rational at Root.-Hence Intelligibl -How arc the Laws of Thought and Laws of Nature related fn CogSt°o„?I LlTEHATUBE. 5- Jm** ChCIrtv ' ^''v"", '"^ ^'•^''W'c.-Cudworth's Intellectual SotT S'^P/V-Hegel's Z.o^,r.-Green's Prolegomena to Ethics XII RovS'- r^'*"' ^'""'^ ^"''""''"' "f ^^"•^""•. Vol. I.. Chap' piJ;"7 p u r :'""'r "^ ^'"'' ^''^P- I-Ebrard's Apologetics Part I.. Book I Sec. L. Chap. Il.-Schurman's Belief in Cod Chap JnTtrl )■ ^iTr' ?'"''• '^- ^"'^ ^.-Lindsays Lee„tAdrS^^!s •« the Theisttc Philosophy of Religion Chan XI P,..»»,> f"""-"""^ TheoioBv Part II Ch,,. t e. ■ ' o '^^ ■^'•-'^°«'«r s Systematic Chap. S: ?-Red'foS^''-75i7?SL^^^^^^^ Fa,f/^ Chap VII.-Thomson's Christian Theism. Book II.. Chap III- Jian Befi'Jru' T ''^"•' "-Fisher's Crounrf, ^^ rA.,-,/,c and Chris- twn Belef. Chap. I.-G.rardeau's Discussions, Chip. XI -Leibnitz's vor'?i..Ss.i.'a;d^ir"'' '"^ """" "^ '"^ ^'•^••^"- ^^"■-•-'' I. Preliminary. § 73. 'T^HE fourth phase of the psychical proofs remains A for exposition. The first sought to interpret the autopisfc nature of t.,eistic belief, and found thereby a THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 305 presumption for the existence of God. The second made an inference concerning the existence of God from the very idea of him which the human mind possesses. The third tried to discover the theistic import of the idea of the infinite and absolute. 1. In this chapter an attempt will be made to ascertain whether the principle of human intelligence itself has any theistic significance. This leads to an inquiry in regard to the essential nature and fundamental activities of human reason. The main question thus raised is as to whether any theistic inference may be i»roperly made from the principle of human intelligence and its rational activities. We are now to interrogate that principle in order to find out whether it supplies a valid ground for asserting the existence of God. If it shall turn out that the deepest interpretation of human intelligence implies the reality of a supreme intel- ligence, much will be done to vindicate the existence of God. 2. The point of departure for the reasoning now to be entered on is the rational epistemology, or theory of know- ledge, expounded in the fourth chapter of the Introduction. This theory holds' that while experience may be the occasion, the human mind itself is the source of rational knowledge, inasmuch as it supplies the rules according to which the manifold units of experience arc bound together. This means that there are a priori or pre-empirical factors in all true knowledge. These factors, viewed generally, are those necessary laxi'S of thought which condition the possi- bility, and determine the form of our cognition. These factors the mind always contributes to experience. They presuppose certain mental rules, according to which the rational activity of the principle of intelligence takes place. This theory of knowledge also maintains ihat in cognition the laws of thought find themselves rationally correlated with certain abiding laws in the things which become the objects of cognition. These laws are regarded as the rational conditions under which the universe exists for il ,306 APOLOGETICS. "human cognition. This implies that the world is a system of related things, and that in cognition the laws of intelli- gence and the laws of nature are correlated in a truly rational way. We are now to inquire what theistic implica- tions, if any, are involved in this view of human intelligence and of its activity in rational cognition. Is human reason, as its root, theistic or atheistic? [I !( I' ''' i I h t< II. This Inquiry in the History of Speculation. § 74. I. This type of speculation has had a prominent and permanent place in the history of the activity of human reason. It appears in ancient Greek philosophy. Its key- note was sounded by Socrates, who, against the Sophists of his day, asserted the eternal and immutable reality of the principles of truth and right. This truth and right are not individual and subjective, but universal and objective. As such, they determine true knowledge and right action. Plato, in his lofty idealism, put the Socratic doctrine into more definite form, and thereby gave permanency to a type of thought which has produced much that is best in philosophy. The universal principles of Socrates were transmuted into the ideas of Plato. These ideas are the eternal rational unities, according to which things are made, and by means of which the mind arrives at a knowledge of things. Viewed subjectively, these ideas become the a priori principles of knowledge which determine cognition, •'iewed objectively, they are the fundamental conditions of tlie reality of things. The world of things is framed accord- ing to these ideas, and this world becomes an object of knowledge by means of the same ideas. These ideas are of different grades, and they appear as determining various forms of being. The h-ghest idea is that of the good, which is the complete, or the perfect. This is usually iden- tified with God, and it virtually includes all the other idcaj. Hence, the ideas all pertain to God, and in a sense they ijg^M THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 307 are all in him. With him they are the archetypes accord- ing to which things are framed as unities out of matter, which is also held to be eternal. These ideas thus become the unchanging realities in things, and the fixed elements in human knowledge. They, in turn, are all unified in God, whose existence, therefore, is the goal of all Platonic speculation. Though there is much in Platonic idealism that must now be discar ' ' yet its central principle, that the rational is the abiding and real both in thought and in things, must be regarded as of great value in all sound philosophy. And it may be pointed out that, though Aristotle differed widely from Plato in his philosophy, yet his doctrine of the eternal forms, according to which the world-former framed the world out of eternal matter, is a testimony to the persist- ence of that type of thought, which asserts the reality of the permanent amid the changing, and of the one and the abiding among the many and the fleeting. Aristotle con- ceived of these unchanging unities as mechanical rather than rational, while Plato regarded them as mainly rational. As against the materialists and empiricists, the sophists and sceptics of ancient and modem times, this general type of philosophy is of the utmost value. 2. In the noblest aspects of philosophy during the Chris- tian era this type of thought frequently appears. Augus- tine reasons from the fact of truth to the existence of God. Cudworth, the great English Platonist, reproduced the idealism of the Greek philosophy in his elaborate system. Descartes, in all of his speculation, gives a foremost place to the rational, and announces the important position that the postulate of tne existence of God is the necessary guar- antee for the validity of human knowledge. Malebranche's supposition that we see all things in God, is neither so superficial nor so mystical as it is sometimes supposed to be, if viewed in the light of the general type of thought we are now considering. It simply means that both thought II t if 308 APOLOGETICS. l! and things have their source and their solution in relation to God. The monadology of Leibnitz, according to which all things are looked on as active and possessing ideas, has its real meaning given to it in the light of Plato's idealism. The monads are of varying grades, but each has an element of rationality at its core; and God is the highest monad, having perfect rationality, and giving rational reality to all the other monads. 3. In more recent times the wonderful movement of idealistic speculation which appears in the transition from Kant, through Fichte and Schelling, to Hegel, exhibits the same type of thought on a large scale. Plato and Hegel have many points in common, and in some respects the idealism of the former is less abstract than that of the latter. In spite of all its defects, it may be safely admitted that the idealism of Hegel has been fruitful in giving a vantage ground for philosophy which makes materialism rationally impossible. In other systems of philosophy distinct traces of the Platonic unities appear. As against Locke's moderate em- piricism, Berkeley in one way, and the Scottish school in another, sought to preserve the rational element in human knowledge, the former by a one-sided idealism, and the latter by a rather rigid dualism between mind and matter. Then, writers like Green and Caird, Watson and Royce, have done not a little to avoid the errors of Hegel, and to present an idealism which professes to do justice to the reality of both thought and things. And many others, like Cocker and Harris, Bowne and Strong, Ferrier and Seth, Flint and Fischer, Baader and Krause, have done good service on this ground, some critically and others con- structively. It is evident that many of the leading workers in the field of philosophy at the present day are in sympathy with some phase of modified idealism. It may be yet too soon to pronounce a final judgment on its claims to be the true philosophy. Still one of the cheering and attractive THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 309 features of this type of speculation is that it seeks to con- strue the universe, finally, in terms of spirit and thought, rather than of atoms and force. In this way the rational, rather than the mechanical, is made fundamental in the universe, and a spiritual principle is assumed to lie at the very heart of things. As against pure empiricism, and absolute dualism between mind and matter, many of the foremost thinkers of our day are inclined to hold that a modified idealism, which places a rational and spiritual prin- ciple at the core of things, and which, at the same time, gives to finite things in the universe their proper dependent reality, is on the path which leads to a sound philosophy. There is great difficulty in framing any theory which binds thought and things together in the unity of a single system. It seems clear that many earnest minds are ready to con- clude that the diftn-ulties of a modified idealism are less formidable than those which lie against any other system. They think that it opens the way to construe the universe with reference to a spiritual principle, and then to interpret that principle, in turn, by the theistic postulate. f •i' III. The Theistic Significance of the Principle of Intelli- gence. §75. I. If there be a spiritual principle at the heart of things, and if human intelligence be rational in its nature, the inquiry naturally arises whether any theistic inference can be properly made from this principle of intelligence? Does this principle, rightly interpreted, justify the theistic postu- late? If so, the fourth aspect of the psychical proof for the existence of God is vindicated. In the last section the tendency in human thought towards a rational and spiritual, rather than an empirical and me- chanical, explanation of the universe was pointed out. The inadequacy of the materialistic philosophy, with its em- pirical psychology, has been repeatedly revealed by these 3IO APOLOGETICS. W ! : t 1 more spiritual types of speculation. The soundness of that philosophy which, in varying modes, asserts that a spiritual principle lies at the basis of all things, and that our know- ledge is not only sensuous, but also rational, has been made very plain. To make inquiry whether this better philosophy gives good reason to postulate God, as the final ground of the spiritual principle in the universe, and as the basis of the rational factor in human intelligence, is our present task. 2. In opening up this inquiry, the implications of the human mind and its cognitive activity must first be ascer- tained. In the light of previous discussions, we feel justified in setting aside the empirical theory of cognition, alike in its cruder sensational forms and in its more refined asso- ciationalist types. In like manner, we feel justified in accepting the rational epistemology in its general outlines. For our present purposes, an exposition of the rational, intuitional or a priori factor in human knowledge is our point of departure. Speaking generally, this factor is what the mind itself contributes to the fabric of cognition. Such cognition is itself possible only because the a priori factor, as a rational rule or law of the mind's activity, is given to experience by human reason. Mere isolated facts of experience are not knowledge, for they become knowledge only when the mind binds them together according to certain rules which it itself supplies. No collection of sense impressions, after the manner of Hume, nor any grouping of mental facts, in the way Mill suggests, can ever become a rational unity in cognition, unless there be first presup- posed a principle of unity in human reason, and definite laws of intelligence according to which the unity itself is effected. This spiritual principle, and these a priori rules are necessary to the possibility of true knowledge. Kant and his school, with their doctrines of the unity of self- consciousness in the ego, Pnd of the a priori factor in human cognition, are, in principle, r ":t, as against Hume and the Sceptics; and the Comm. '. ^tme philosophy, with its THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 3" fundamental laws of thought, is on safe ground, as against empiricism generally. Hence, the real source of cognition is the inherent power of the mind by which it spontaneously unifies the scattered items of experience according to a rule which the mind itself supplies. No analysis of conscious- ness which does not reach this result goes to the root of the problem. These a priori rules must be presupposed in order to the possibility of knowledge. The laws of thought thus come into view. These are rational subjective rules which inhere in the very constitu- tion of the human mind. They underlie and give direction . to all the activities of the spiritual principle in man. They are involved alike in the acuvities of sense-perception, in the operations of the understanding, and in the exercises of the reason. In the activity of the spiritual principle in man in all these spheres, there are certain rules or unities, according to which that activity is determined. We may call these rules the lazvs of thought, or the first principles of knowledge, or the a priori conditions of cog- nition, or the rational unities for experience, as we please. Their main feature is that they belong to the spontaneity of the mind itself, and are necessary to cognition. They really lie deeper than consciousness, and give form to experi- ence, making it this or that, as the case may be. Without them human knowledge would be isolated, chaotic and unstable. By means of them that knowledge becomes real, stable and rational. They cannot arise out ol experience, since they antedate and condition it. The supposition of Herbert Spencer, and the evolutionists generally, that heredity has contributed that stable element which we call the a priori factor in human knowledge, does not meet the case, for the reason, mainly, that unless we assume the validity of certain rules which determine the experience there could not arise any permanent factor to be transmitted by heredity. In addition, the supposition of a basis of unity other than 1 i ( 312 APOLOGETICS. the manifold of experience must also be made. The ele- ments of experience are many, and yet they are found to be bound together in a rational way. We have already seen how the a priori rules of the spiritual principle in man explain the order and unity of experience. We now further find that all these experiences, together with the rules that condition them, are to be unified in relation to a principle which lies at the basis of all cognition. This is to be re- garded as the spiritual principle in man, which is the seat of the inner unity of self-consciousness. The seat of this unity cannot be any one of the priori rules, nor even the sum total of them. Still less can it be one of the elemental factors in experience, nor all of them combined. In a word, from the very nature of the case, the seat of the unity of self-consciousness must be a unitary spiritual principle. Hence, our knowledge becomes a rational unity on the basis of a spiritual principle, and according to certain a priori rules which are involved in the spontaneous activity of that principle. This is the initial stage in the theistic inter- pretation of the principle of intelligence in man. 3. The second stage turns our attention to the world of external realities in nature, as an object of cognition. What is this external world with which the mind come? l-^to cognitive relation? What is the nature of the non-ego which stands related to the ego in cognition? As it is cognized, is it a collocation of unrelated things without any order or connection? Or is it a system of related things having a rational unity? Or must we go further, and say that nature is constituted a system by the mind itself through the act of cognition ? Does the understanding make nature, as Kant suggests, or does the mind discover that nature is already a definite system for cognition? All we need now say is that in cognition we find nature a system of related things. For thought it is a cosmos, not a chaos. Therein we discover certain laws or unities. These constitute the laws or uniformities of nature. It is THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 313 only on this supposition that a scientific knowledge of nature is possible. If there be no order or unity in nature, it would not be intelligible. But if it be regarded as a system of related things, it becomes an intelligible object for intelli- gence, and a science of nature is possible. It would be interesting, did space permit, to show that scientific inquiry consists largely in a search for these laws or unities in nature. The facts lie open before us for observation. At first they seem to be isolated, but search is instituted for the unities or laws, by means of which nature may be construed in a rational way. Hence, the laws of motion, the principle of gravitation, the modes of chemical combination, and the laws of organic being, are discovered. By this means modern scientific reflection has opened up a splendid vision of the rational unity of nature. Nature becomes a real system of related things for cognition. This gives a deeper meaning an-' a more rational interpreta- tion to the laws of nature than empiricism can possibly supply- , . . The question at once arises as to the significance of this view of nature as a system of related things. Are these laws to be regarded as merely physical and mechanical in their nature, or do they really imply a rational factor? Is there a spiritual principle associateJ with nature, whose rational activity is the true philosophy of the laws of nature? It can scarcely be supposed that the laws which bind nature into an intelligible system are in, and of, the things themselves. Then, if this bond be other than the things themselves, the question at once arises as to whether it is mechanical or rational in its nature. The intelligibility of nature suggests that it has at least a rational factor about it. Then, if it be rational in some sense, we may justly presuppose a spiritual principle to be associated with nature as a system of related things. There is evidently force in the reasoning of Green in his Prolegomena to Ethics, as he proceeds to show that a spiritual principle must be associated i 4 » '''1 I m f m \ II I {i ■ W' i-'U il'l l^tm^ mamim 3H APOLOGETICS. I ? with nature as the basis of the unity and intelligibility which human intelligence discovers therein. 4. This le-ci to the third stage in this exposition. What interpretation must now be given of the relation between the laws of thought and the laws of things, as they are bound together in cognition? Are they connected in a merely external way? Or is one set of laws to be subordi- nated to the other? If so, then are we to conclude that the laws of thought produce the laws of nature, and commit ourselves fully to idealism? Or are we to hold that the laws of nature produce the laws of thought, and capitulate to empiricism? Or shall we say that there is no rational relation at all between them, and rest in an irreconcilable dualism? Or shall we assume that the two sets of laws are to be unified on the supposition of an impersonal ground that really contains both, and thus make a treaty with pan- theism? What shall we say? If the laws of thought do not produce the laws of nature, and if the laws of nature do not produce the laws of thought, how shall wc regard these two sets of laws in their relation in cognition? If we say that the laws of thought and the laws of nature are rationally correlated in cognition, we may be not far from the truth. According to this view, neither set of laws produces the other, but in cognition the two sets of laws come into rational relation with each other. Hence, we find two sets of laws which are ontologicaily independent of each other, yet they are related by a rational bond in cognition. This, then, is their relation. 5. The final stage of exposition remains. This is the definite theistic inquiry as to whether these two sets of laws may not he taken to postulate a higher spiritual and rational unity which is their common source. If neither set of laws is to be subordinated to the other, they may both 'e subordinated to a higher rationality, from which they both spring. If the laws of thought have been set by a higher intelligence, and if the laws of nature have been organized THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS. 315 by the same intelligence, then that intelligence may be re- garded as the basis of unity for both sets of laws. This would be the postulate of intelligence and a spiritual prin- ciple in its highest form. This would be the highest aspect of rationality of which we can think. By this means we are abi- lu rno : w the infinite and neces- sarily existent being wit . the qualities c f spirituality and rationality. This, then, =s tre theisdc .nference we make from the spiritual princi > .^ ip mm. jiven this principle as the seat of intelligence, with its a p: on rules in cognitive relation with nature as a system of related things, we may justly infer a higher intelligence which constitutes the ground of unity for both. 6. The fact of personality is also suggested by the infer- ence just made. The reality of self-consciousness which is involved in the spiritual principle in man implies personality. And the principle of intelligence is not to be regarded as merely passive and unconscious. It is rather found to be endowed with spontaneity and consciousness, and this furtHf implies personality. An impersonal spirit is a con- tradiction, and an unconscious intelligence is impossible. The rational unities in the human mind and in nature postu- late a higher unity, which is properly identified with the divine being, the reality of whose existence has been estab- lished by former proofs. 1 i CHAPTER VI. THE COSMICAL PROOFS: CAUSATION, AND THE PROOF FROM COSMIC ORIGIN. Contents. The Principle of Causation.— The Basis of Theistic Proofs.— De- fective Theoriej.— Not merely Invariable Succession.— Nor all Concomi- tant Antecedent Circumstances.— Nor merely the Mental Law of the Conditioned.-Nor only a Category of the Understanding.— Nor simply Inscrutable Force.— Nor Volitional Agency alone.— True Doctrine.— An a priori Rule of the Mind.— Connection between Cause and Effect necessary.— Includes Efficiency.— Also sufficient Reason.— Rests on an Uncaused Cause.— Four Phases of Causal Proof.— That for a First Cause—Aitiological Proo' -The Problem—The entire Universe in its Totality.— Solved by the Principle of Causality.— The Universe not necessarily Infinite and Eternal.— Hence may be Finite and Contin- gent-Infinite Regress untenable.— Reasons.— The Theistic Postulate needed.— God the Uncaused Cause.— And the Abiding Ground. LiTERATins. Flint's Theism, Chap. IV.— Watts' Reign of Causality.— Kzttt'$ Critique of Pure Reason: Transcendental Dialectic, Book II., Chap. II.— Diman's The Theistic Argumtnt, Chap. III.— Dabney's Theology, Chap. II.— Hodge's Systematic Theology, Vol. I., Part I., Chap II.— Thornwell's. Collected Writings. Vol. I., Chap. II.— Shedd's Dogmatic Theology, Vol. I.. Div. III., Chap. Li-Foster's Systematic Theology. Part II., Chap. I., 2.— Miley's Systematic Theology, Part I., Chap. II., a.— Fisher's Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief. Chap II — Martineau's A Study of Religion. Vol. I., Book II., Chap. I.-Pressense's Ortgtns, Book II., Chap. I.— Lindsay's Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion. Chap. Vl.-Orr's Christian yiew of God and the World. Chap. III., a.— Fraser's Philosophy of Theism. Vol. II., Chap. III.— Stirling's Philosophy and Theology. C'.^ps. VII., VIII.— Conder's Basis of Faith. Chap. Il.-Schurman's L ief in God Chap. IV.— Fiskc's Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II., Part III., Chap III.— Knight's Aspects of Theism. Chap. VII.— Ebrard's Apologetics. Vol. I., Chap. II,, Sec. ge.-Hamilton's Metaphysics, Chap. XXX.— Mill's Sys- tem of Logic. Book III., Chaps. V., Vl.-Spencer's First Principles— Kaftan s The Truth of the Christian Religion. Vol. II., Chap. I. FOUR chapters have been devoted to as many branches of the psychical proofs for the existence of God. In all aspects of these proofs the materials of reasoning lie in THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 317 the constitution of the human mind. The self-evidencing nature of the bel' f in God, the inference irom the idea of a necessarily exigent being, the import of the notion of the infinite, and the significance of the principle of human intelligence itielf, have yielded certain important theistic results which we now carry forward with us, as we take up the second main class of proofs for the reality of the divine existence. The proofs now to be considered are all based on the principle of causation broadly viewed and rightly interpreted in relation to the cosmos, and it is in this class that some of the most cogent theistic proofs are to be found. I. Defective Views of the Principle of Causation. § 76. I. As the principle of causation underlies, in some way, all forms of the proofs now to be expounded, a clear under- standing of this important principle is necessary at the outset. How far the theistic inference depends upon any particular doctrine of causation, or whether that inference is really independent of any definite view of the causal relation, are questions of some importance in theistic dis- cussion. While we r^-''- not go so far as to say that the validity of the theis "nee is conditioned upon a sound metaphysic of causal. may be sure that a correct doc- trine of causation maKCS the basis of the inference more secure. Hence, some exposition of causation must first be made, and certain defective views of the causal relation must be set aside by a brief critical statement. Few questions in philosophy have given rise to more debate than that of causality. It has been discussed at great length alike in its psvchological and ontological aspects. The question as to -iher we arrive at the idea by an a priori method, or by an a posteriori process, has Ijcen earn- estly debated, and the -oblem of the real connection between things which stand i' ihe causal relation has been much \\\ 318 APOLOGETICS. discussed. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of causation held will largely give color to the type of philosophy adopted. 2. The cruder types of empiricism make causation consist merely in the uniform succession of physical phenomena. The invariable antecedent is the cause, and the invariable consequent is the effect, in the order of changes which take place. The a priori factor is denied to the idea, and the feature of necessary connection is not admitted to have a place in the causal relation. The sphere of causation is the mere sequence of physical phenomena, and the idea of causality is obtained in a purely empirical way. This theory has had its advocates in all ages. The Greek sensationalists and sceptics first sounded its note. Mate- rialists cannot consistently hold any other view, nor can they admit any other efficiency than that of m 'unical energy. Hume regards the idea of cause as the .csult of custom, or association of things together in frequent suc- cession. Brown, in nearly the same way, looks upon causa- tion PS the product of habit, or of an induction from experi- ence on the basis of association. And empiricists generally must discover the origin of the idea of causation in experience, and they cannot consistently assert that there is any necessary relation between cause and effect. This explanation of the causal relation is far from ade- quate. The idea of causation involves a great deal more than mere observed succession, for we Oi'ten observe invariable succession when we never think of predicating causation. We do not think of saying that day is the cause of night, or that night is the cause of day, though they succeed each other with incessant regularity. But we almost instinctively say that a spark applied to gunpowder produces an explosion, or that a blow on the head causes death, when we observe only single cases of this nature. Observed suc- cession does not account for the idea of causation, nor is it a proper explanation of the real connection between cause and effect. THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 319 Not only is the fact of the necessary connection between cause and effect not accounted for by this theory, but the quaHty of efficiency associated with the fact of causation is not properly explained. This quality is of the very essence of causation, and the mere sequence of events, no matter how invariable, cannot alone supply it. Yet consciousness instinctively discovers the quality of power or efficiency in the very conception of causation. In a word, the dynamical aspects of causality must be taken into account, and this involves more than sequence, no matter how invariable that may be. That this is the case is really confessed by Locke, who is usually regarded as an empiricist. He says, in effect, that the senses do not make known to us the features of necessity and efficiency, yet we must suppose that these features do pertain to events that stand in the causal relation to each other. Now, this supposition, which Locke says the mind must make, is not the result of habit or association, but the offspring of the mind itself. And Spencer, in his attempt to account for the factor of necessity by the law of heredity, and the fact of efficiency by the hypothesis of an inscrutable force, also makes an incidental confession of the insufficiency of this theory. It may, therefore, be rejected. 3. A second theory of causation is conn^aed with the name of John Stuart Mill. Mill's doctrine is an enlarged edition of the empirical theory. He denies the a priori factor in causation, and falls back on experience for the origin of the idea of cause and effect. But Mill does not regard any single immediate antecedent of an event as its cause. His conception of cause includes all the antecedent concomitant circumstances that are related to the event. All that goes before, and has anything to do with the production of any event, is the cause of that event. Mill holds that this is true alike of physical and mental sequences; and his theory thus becomes mechanism in the former, and determinism in the latter, sphere. The whole problem of -: it ' B'1 f 320 APOLOGETICS. cause and effect is solved only when we consider the complex antecedent circumstances of any event, so that any attempt to reason to a first cause is needless, if not invalid. Then the features of necessity and efficiency, according to Mill, are explained on the usual ground of repetition, habit and association. Wundt practically agrees with Mill in this explanation. Interesting as this explanation is, it can hardly be held to be adequate. On the psychological side it does not do justice to the a priori nature of the idea of causation. Then, it makes it practically impossible to obtain a clear and com- plete view of the cause of anything, for it would require virtual omniscience to ascertain all the concomitant circum- stances which make up the cause of any event. In addition, its explanation of necessity and efficiency as associated with causation is entirely defective, since it is made on an em- pirical basis. We insist that any doctrine of causation which is adequate must do full justice to these two essential features of causality. 4. A third explanation of the causal relation, which views it mainly on its psychological side, is that of Hamilton. In some respects, Hamilton's doctrine is like that of Mill, and yet there are features in which they widely differ. In many ways Hamilton's doctrine is unique, and merits separate consideration. His somewhat peculiar theory of the idea of cause and eflfect is the outcome of his philosophy of the conditioned and unconditioned. The unconditioned is that whicli is entire'^ independent of anything else for its exist- ence and continuance. As such, when viewed in relation to human cognition, it is alike inconceivable and incog- noscible. The infinite and absolute are two aspects of the unconditioned. The infinite is the unconditionally un- limited, and the absolute is the unconditionally limited. Both are in contrast with the conditioned, and both are to be regarded as the negative of the limited or conditioned, which is both conceivable and knowabie. THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 321 The doctrine of causation arises in this connection. Hamilton says that we cannot conceive of an absolute com- mencement or of an absolute non-commencement, such as change, succession and causality imply. Some explanation of the causal relation in harmony with this philosophy of the unconditioned must be given. This explanation is to be found only in the sphere of the conditioned, and in the mean between extremes which are mutually exclusive. This implies that neither ::n absolute commencement nor an absolute non-commencement is conceivable; yet one of them, on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, must be admitted to be necessary. Applying this general teaching to the doctrine of causation, it implies that we cannot conceive of an absolute beginning, or an absolute non-beginning of anything in the sphere of the uncon- ditioned. Thus the idea of cause, which is entirely nega- tive, arises. Its application is confined to the realm of the conditioned which is conceivable and cognizable. Causation thus, in a somewhat negative way, becomes the mental lazv of the conditioned wherever change takes place. This doctrine is not unlike that of Kant. Hamilton him- self acknowledges this in a measure. On the subjective side, Kant makes causation one of the categories of the under- standing. As such it is a regulutivc principle, according to which the manifold phenomena of sense perception are unified in cognition. The kinship of Kant and Hamilton thus appears. Hamilton's unconditioned is like Kant's thing in itself, and Hamilton's conditioned resembles Kant's phenomena. The sphere of the conditioned, according to Hamilton, and the realm of phenomena, according to Kant, is the area of experience. And to this region causation belongs. Hamilton makes it the mental laxv of the con- ditioned, Kant makes it a category of the understanding in relation to phenomena. In both cases its a priori nature is maintained, but in neither case has the law of causation at P* >^\ fi£,^fi| A 1 T ■ ^r t t B! I ' ■i J^ M It! I tif- ' I 322 APOLOGETICS. Tiny /alid application beyond the conditioned and the phenomenal. Both phases of this doctrine are much better than those empirical theories which deny the a priori factor in causa- tion. Yet they are both defective. Hamilton's distinction between the conditioned and the unconditioned, and Kant's separation between noumena and phenomena are both too rigid. Both are in error in placing the world of realities beyond the scope of the principle of causation. Both vir- tually close the door against the postulate of a cause which lies outside the line of phenomenal or conditioned sequences, and this comes perilously near casting us adrift on the shore- less ocean of the infinite regress of cause and effect. Hamil- ton errs in supposng that the causal judgment arises from the impotency of the mind in relation to apparent contra- dictories. Kant also errs in confining the principle of causa- tion so rigidly to the realm of phenomena. 5. A fourth type of causation brings Spencer into view. Speaking generally, Spencer is an empiricist in his psy- chology, yet in his ontology he makes a great deal of force and its persistence. On this ground he has a place for an efficiency, which, however, is mechanical; but out of the fact of force, Spencer's doctrine of causation arises. Ac- cording t( I iiis view, all phenomenal changes are the product of a power wliich is infinite and inscrutable, and by means of this postulate he proposes to harmonize science and religion. As to this inscrutable and infi ite energy which Mes behind phenomena, we only know that it is, but not what it is. This, again, is almost like Hamilton's uncon- ditioned, and Kant's thing in itself. This inscrutable energy is the ground for all change in the universe, and it supplies the root of the notion of cause. But when Spencer expounds th« principle of causation, he moves almost exclusively in the i>!»^*hway of empiricism. This .-' not a sufficient account of causation. Spencer confesses tlwt tiiere is an infinite energj' which is the ground THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 333 m of all phenomenal change in the universe. But this non- phenomenal ground is not in the sequence of the phenomenal, and this is really inconsistent with Spencer's empiricism. Then, at most, the energy in Spencer's doctrine is physical and mechanical, and it gives no proper place for dependent second causes with finite efficiency. There is only one cause, and that is mechanical, and the observed sequences of phenomena are devoid of any dependent efficiency. Spencer's system, therefore, is mechanical monism, which makes a true doctrine of causation really impossible. Then, Spencer's attempts to explain the feature of necessity in the causal relation are unsatisfactory. He makes it arise from the results of habit and association, working through long ages, and handed down by heredity from one genera- tion to another. As heredity can originate nothing, the diff.culty of producing the factor of necessity by habit or custom is very great. Spencer's theory is insufficient, and has in it a strong tendency towards materialism, mechanism and monism. 6. A fifth theory of causation is quite different from those already noted. It has an able advocate in Maine De Biran. This theory deals almost exclusively with the psy- chological aspects of the problem. According to this view, the genesis of the idea of causation is found in man's con- scious volitional agency. Will is the only efficient cause. In our conscious free agency we realize the fact of efficiency in certain changes in ^ur experience. Then, we instinc- tively postulate efficiency when we observe change in the world about us. Will thus becomes the type of causa- tion. So far as the psychical explanation of the idea of efficiency is concerned, there is much that is true in this theory. Still, even here we must be careful not to give the law of causality an entirely experimental origin, for we must not forget that the mind itself, even in such cases, provides the a priori rule, according to which events that sustain the causal m 324 APOLOGETICS. relation in our experience are held together. But this theory deals only with the subjective aspects of causation. The question still remains as to how things in the objective sphere which are construed under the causal relation are really connected with each other. While it may be per- fectly true that we get our first impression of efficiency from our own volitional agency, we may yet have to inquire concerning the way in which things in the outward world, which we call cause and effect, are related. This inquiry is necessary to unfold clearly to us what the principle of causality really is, and to make it plain that we are justified in applying the causal judgment to anything beyond the sequences of psychical phenomena. It is doubtful if any merely subjective explanation of causation, or even of the element of efficiency in it, is sufficient to justify an inference from the order of sequences in the cosmos to a cause of these sequences which lies outside the cosmos of experience. And while Biran's theory shows that the physical sequences may be effected by a spiritual cause, in the influence of will on members ^he body, it may be questioned whether a deeper phiior uhy of causality is not needed to provide a valid objective ground for Flint's forceful reasoning that the universe is an effect whose cause is God. In a word, the principle of causality requires an objective as well as a subjective exposition, for it has its ontology as well as its psychology. II. The True Doctrine of Causation. § yy. The exposition of defective views in the foregoing section makes it now possible to state the true doctrine of causation quite briefly in this section. In making this statement, care must be taken to give it its proper scope, and to include all its constituent elements. Five important particulars com- plete the analysis. I. As in the mind, the principle of causation is a priori THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 325 in its nature. On its subjective side, causality is a funda- mental law of thought. This means that it does not arise in the mind from experience, but is given by the mind itself to experience. On the psychological side, therefore, empiricism does not go to the root of the problem of causa- tion ; for while experience may be the occasion upon which this fundamental law of thought is elicited into conscious- ness, yet it is not the source whence it springs. Hence, neither in its psychological nature or origin is the principle of causation empirical. Its true rational and a priori nature must not be forgotten. It is at root one of those a priori rules of the spontaneity of the human mind, according to which the experience in question is regfulated. 2. As between things, the causal bond is necessary, not contingent. On its objective side, causality finds the events which are construed under the causal relation bound together by an inward bond. This means that mere suc- cession, no matter how invariable, is not the deepest reality in causation; but that wherever we construe events in the causal relation, we presuppose an inner objective tie between them. This feature of necessity belongs inherently to the principle of causation, for we instinctively associate it with the causal judgment, whenever that judgment is made. Certain events may be observed in frequent succession, and yet the fact of necessity may not be connected with their sequence ; but whenever they are construed under the prin- ciple of causality, the feature of necessity is implied in that very construction. The causal relation, therefore, has objective reality. 3. As in the mind, and as between things, the principle of causality implies power or efUciency. Both objectively and subjectively, efficiency is an essential factor in causation. Biran, in his idea of the efficiency of the will, gives the hint of this on the subjective side; and on the objective side, we instinctively assume that there is some power in that which is a cause, such as is .lOt asserted of what may iiHl 326 APOLOGETICS. i'l be merely antecedent. Even Locke, who is so much of an empiricist, associates the ideas of power and of cause very intimately. And both technical and applied science proceed upon the assumption of real efficiency in the causal relation. It is thus evident that succession is not all there is in that relation. Power, agency or efficiency is the very essence of causality. If that be removed, causality is destroyed. 4- As in the mind and as between things, causation implies the fact of sufficient reason or adequate ground. This is a very important aspect of causation in itself, and especially in the theistic discussion. Leibnitz was the first to give this principle definite form, though the germs of it are in the Greek philosophy. By some it is separated from causation almost entirely, and treated as a separate principle. We incline to the opinion that it is best to discuss the fact of sufficient reason in close connection with the principle of causation. This would make sufficient reason a quality of the principle of causality, just as necessity and efficiency are. This feature of the causal relation implies that there is something in every cause which makes the effect which follows it what it is and not otherwise. There is some kinship, therefore, between cause and effect. The cause always contains a factor which determines what the effect will be. This means, not merely that there is power or efficiency in the cause to produce the effect, but that there is also an impulse which gives form and direction to the effect. In other words, there is in the cause the reason which adequatelv accounts for the effect being just what it is. Thus, there is something in the spark which produces the explosion of the gunpowder rather than its fusion. This is an aspect of the principle of causation of great value in the exposition of some of the theistic proofs. 5. In addition to all this, the principle of causation leads us to posit a cause which is not also an effect. In the last analysis, causality postulates an uncaused cause. This is THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 3*7. a f^ature of causation sometimes overlooked. Some ex- positors of the philosophy of causation are content to think only of sequence or regress. But causation is more than sequence, or regress of cause and effect. Even an infinite regress does not satisfy the principle of causation. That principle forbids such a regress and demands a resting- place. Causation thus requires a cause which is not also an effect of an antecedent cause. Only by this supposition is the logical demand of causation finally satisfied. 6. In addition, causation, rightly understood, requires us to postulate a ground outside the series of events which stand in the causal relation, in order to its complete inter- pretation. Any one event in the series does not in itself contain all that tlie principle of causation implies. That which effects the passage from one event in the series to another must be taken into account. A ground to effect the change from one stage to another in the series must be provided. Change implies a great deal more than sequence. It implies an efficiency, and a sufficient reason to effect it, and to give it its particular form. This ground for change, this agency which effects the passage from one event to another in the series, must lie outside the series itself. Aristotle's hypothesis of a first mover, who himself is unmoved, illustrates this position, which we take to be of vital importance in the doctrine of causation. Therefore, we conclude that, in the last analysis, the basis of the prin- ciple of causality is an uncaused cause, which has its ground outside the causal series. III. Proof from a First Cause: The Problem. § 78. I. The principle of causation just expounded forms the basis of four phases of theistic proof. The first is the proof based on the logical demand for a first cause of the universe ; the second consists in the reasonings which grew o:it of certain specific facts in the cosmos; the third is derived MOBi 3^-8 APOLOGETICS. from the marks of order to be seen everywhere in the uni- verse; and the fourth is the inference which is justified by the evidences of design which abound in the world. In the older natural theology, three of these were included under the cosmological proof for the existence of God. But now more careful distinctions are made among these four phases of the causal proofs. The first may be called the aitiologicd proof, the second the cosmological, the third the eutaxiologicd, and the fourth the teleological. They all involve certain applications of the principle of causality to various problems which the universe presents for rational solution. In this chapter the proof for the reality of the divine existence founded on the reasonings for a first cause of the universe of existing things is discussed. 2. The problem presented is a vast one, yet it can be stated in a few sentences. That problem is the existing universe regarded in its totality. This includes the sum total of all finite things in the cosmos. This totality of finite things is viewed as existing not necessarily, but con- tingently. The materials of reasoning from which this proof proceeds consists in the sum of '^''pendent existing things regarded as contingent. This includes the whole vast frame of the material universe, in all its complexity and immensity. It embraces suns and planets, moons and stars, in all their magnitude and grandeur, and viewed in their totality as a mighty system. In addition, the system of natural laws involved in the universe, viewed in all their complex totality, has also to be taken into account in making up the problem. And, further, all the complex forces and agencies operative throughout the vast universe constitute an additional element in the problem. And we must not omit to take into actount all the various grades of being in the universe, from the material and inorganic up to the sentient and spiritual. Even men and angels, regarded as part of finite existing things, are a part of the problem presented by the universe in its totality. This vast complex THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 3*9 of existing things, in its aggregate, is the problem which presents itself for solution. With this vast problem before us, we have now to make an application of the principle of causation to it in its totality. That something has always existed must be as- sumed. If the universe exists contingently, we may think of it as not always existing. And if the universe be finite, no matter how vast, it is not necessarily self-existent. We do not need to settle the question of the original condition of the universe just when it began to be. It is simply the fact of its beginning that has to be considered. If it had a beginning, how came it to be? It could not have origi- nated itself. What was its first cause? What was its uncaused cause? Then, what is the ground of all the changes which take place in it? Is this ground within or without the series of changes? 3. This proof is sometimes called the cosmological argu- ment, but it is better to term it the aitiological. Many writers have presented it in varying forms. Aristotle and Cicero both have it. The former argues from the fact of motion in the universe. Motion is a fact, and it presup- poses, in the last analysis, a first mover, who himself is unmoved, though the cause of all motion. One of the Cartesian proofs reasons from the universe as contingently existing, to God as necessarily existent as its first cause. In Clarke's celebrated argument certain aspects of this proof appear. Some writers confuse this proof with that from order, and expound it under the title of the cosmological proof. It is better to confine it strictly to the one fact of an uncaused cause of the universe as a whole. This is the aitiological proof in its simplest terms. Based on the logical demand of causation for a cause which is not also an effect, it postulates God, for the solution of the origin of the uni- verse as contingently existing. Flint gives fine scope to this proof when he speaks of the universe being an effect of which God is the cause. The universe of contingently it 330 APOLOGETICS. existing finite things, taken in their complete totality, is the problem to be solved. How is its origin to be accounted for? IV. The Proof from a First Cause: The Solution. § 79. There are really only two possible solutions of the problem. One is to suppose that the universe is eternal and self-contained; the other is that it had a beginning and is dependent. In the former case, the present condition of the universe is due to an infinite regression of causes and eflfects moving ceaselessly on. In the latter, the uni- verse has its origin in a first cause, and its present state is grounded upon this cause as its abiding basis. These two alternatives must be briefly considered in their contrasts. I. The theory of the eternity of the universe, and of the infinite regress of causes and effects in it, must be first examined. This theory, in assuming the eternity of the tmiverse in some form, takes for granted the very question in debate. Is the universe eternal? Does it exist neces- sarily? As to the ceaseless changes which are constantly taking place in the universe, it is evident that they are not eternal, but originated by some cause. Then, the various orderly combinations of things in the universe are also temporal, and require a cause to account for their origin. This leaves the material basis of the universe as the only apparently eternal factor in it. But is matter eternal ? The first thing to do, in answering this question, is to decide what matter is. What is the atom of matter? Is matter only the per- manent possibility of sensations, as Mill says? Is the atom simply a point or centre of energy, as Faraday suggested? Is matter non-corporeal, as the idealists assert ? Is the atom, after all, a manufactured article, as Herschel intimated? Does the atom bear the marks of supernatural agency, as Clerk Maxwell thinks? THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 331 In general, it may safely be said that the tendency of many physicists is towards the conclusion that matter, in its constitution, does not possess those elements of per- manency which the hypothesis of its eternity implies. Lord Kelvin's vortex-atom theory of matter requires a cause to account for the rotatory motion which it implies ; and his hypothesis of the gradual dissipation of heat in the universe, implies that it is not in a condition of permanency such as its eternity would require. Hence, just in proportion as the permanency of the universe, or of the material basis of it, may be doubted, so its eternity may be called in question. The same conclusion may be deduced from the nature of the case. Unless the universe be infinite in extent, it is not necessarily eternal as to time; for if it be finite in one respect, it is likely finite in the other. We are inclined to think that its infinity as to space can never be proved. Then, if it be neither infinite in regard to space, no; Infinite in relation to time, it is not likely necessarily existent. And unless it can be shown that the universe has in it the ele- ments of permanency and self-sufiiciency, it can hardly be said to have self-existence and eternity. Its finitude and consequent contingency seem the more reasonable conten- tions. This leaves the universe open for the application of the principle of causality to it, in the form of an inquiry for its first cause and abiding ground. 2. The hypothesis of all infinite regress of events in the universe cai'sally related, is the more popular form in which the theory of the universe which rejects a first cause is usually presented. The universe, as it exists in its totality now, is the effect of the i iverse as it was the preceding moment; and the univfer? in that moment is the eflfect of it as it existed in a still er ;er moment, and so on infinitely. In the regression of the causal series there is no halting place, and the universe at any given time is adequately explained when its successive changes are construed in :4 •II _ 1} ( ir ' 332 APOLOGETICS. accordance with the principle of this infinite causal regress. Usually this regression is applied mainly to physical sequences; but to be complete, it must include all forms of sequence, physical, vital, mental and moral, in the cosmos. A few critical remarks may show the insufficiency of this endless-chain scheme. First, it does not satisfy the logical demand of the prin- ciple of causation for a ground of the causal series. That demand calls for an uncaused cause, and it is not satisfied with the oflFer of an infinite regress, no matter how long continued that may be. Causation means more than that every change must have a proper cause. It also requires that a ground which is unchanging must be provided for the fact of change. After the regression has been pursued a million stages backward, the demand of causation for an uncaused cause, and an unchanging ground, is still unsat- isfied and as loud as ever. Secondly, the hypothesis of infinite regress gives no ac- count of the beginning of the series of changes. It rather assumes that it had no beginning. It gives no ground for believing that this series exists contingently. It rather assumes that it exists necessarily. The hypothesis in ques- tion gives no place for a beginning of the causal series. But if the universe exists contingently because finite, and if it be not necessarily eternal, as we have already seen, the causal series is not necessarily eternal. This means that it, in all probability, had a beginning. This is the very thing which the hypothesis of infinite regress persistently denies. Thirdly, even if we admit that che theory of infinite regress has some plausibility in regard to purely physical sequences, it would still have great difficulty to account for the sequences which appear in the vital, mental and moral spheres. Can an infinite regress explain these sequences? Do we not come to a time when the sequences end ? Was there not a time when life and mind did not exist on this THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 333 earth? If we say that the regress passes over into the physical, then we are on the ground of the materialist, and must prove that the vital came from the non-vital. In this way the theory of an infinite regress breaks down entirely, if an attempt is made to apply it in a definite way to every phase of the series of causes and effects. Fourthly, this theory at best could only place a cause at the beginning of the causal series. The first cause would then be merely the first in the series whose sequences con- tinue afterwards. It would not lay any ground for the changes involved in the series, nor provide any reason for the movement of the series in any gfiven direction. In a word, the hypothesis of an infinite regress, even if a certain sort of beginning in the series were allowed, does not pro- vide an uncaused cause, which is also the abiding gfround of the vv 'lole series. From this it is evident that we would be compelled to give the universe a deistic construction on this hypothesis. 3. The true doctrine can now be stated in very brief and simple terms. The only adequate explanation of the uni- verse existing contingently in its totality is the theistic postulate. This means that the infinite and necessarily existent being, of whose reality we have already been assured by previous reasonings, is the adequate first cause and abiding ground of the universe, with all its complex changes and sequences. This provides an uncaused cause of the universe, and thus fully accounts for its beginning. It also provides an unchanging ground for all its changes, and thus accounts for its continuance. This is the theistic postulate as the solution of the problem of the commence- ment of the universe. It also constitutes the principle of the aitiological proof for tht existence of God. 4. This postulate fully satisfies the logical demands of the principle of causation. The logical faculty rests content with an uncaused cause. And the hypothesis of an absolute cause outside the series of sequences in the universe supplies 334 APOLOGETICS. 1 I 1 hf: the element of permanency which further satisfies reason. That it is not one of the series of causal sequences is implied in the supposition of an uncaused cause, for every event in this series may be, in turn, both ca jse and effect. If, therefore, a cause which is not also an effect is assumed, we have a cause which is outside the series, and independent of it, though related to it. On this cause the series is de- pendent for its origin and continuance. It is, consequently, fully adequate to account for all the sequences of physical, vital, mental and moral events which come to pass in the universe viewed in its totality. 5. It is important to observe that it also provides for the profound doctrine that this uncaused cause is related not only to the origin of the series, but also to each factor in the series. God, therefore, is not only the eternal first cause of the universe in its totality, but he is also its change- less ground, so that he is in intimate relation with the universe in its totality from moment to moment. As such changeless ground, he is in contact with each factor in every causal series in all the complex activity of the universe, and he is as near to it now as when he first brought it into existence, as its uncaused cause. This is the true theistic doctrine. It lays the ground for the divine transcendence, as against pantheism, for God is outside the causal series. It also provides the basis for the divine immanence, as against deism, for God is in relation with each stage in the causal series of changes through which the universe passes. This is the result to which the aitiologicai proof surely brings us. God is the uncaused cause, and ever-present ground of the universe, alike as to its origin and continued existence. CHAPTER VII. « THE COSMICAL PROOFS: THE PROOF FROM COSMIC PROGRESS. Contents. Relation to the Previous Proof.— The Cosmological Proof.— Its Re- lation to other Causal Proofs.— The Principle of the Proof.— Sufficient Reason.— Relations of Cause and Effect. — Kinship, but not necessarily Identity. — This Problem in Philosophy.— Descartes. — Guelinx.— Leib- nitz. — Spinoza.— Coleridge quoted. — The Problem of the Proof. — The Universe in its Cosmic History and Progress.— Stages in its History. — The Inorganic Stage primal.— The Organic— The Sentient. — The Intel- ligent. — Self-consciousness. — Moral and Religious. — At each stage certain Specific Facts.— The Problem consists in these. — The Solution of the Problem.— Two Proposed Solutions.— First by the Principle of Con- tinuity and Evolution. — But this transgresses the Principle of Causation. —The true Solution is by Efficiency and Sufficient Reason.— This results in the Theistic Postulate.— Adequate Solution. Literature. The Bridgewater Treatises by Kidd, Roget, Buckland, Chalmers, Proat and Kirby.— Flint's Theism, Notes VII., XL, XXII.— Lindsay's Recent Advances in Theism, laps. VII. and X.— Knight's Aspects of Theism, Chap. XIII.— Bowne s Studies in Theism, Chaps. V.-X.— Locke's Human Understanding, Book IV., Chap. X.— Strong's Syste- matic Theology, Part II., Chap. II., 3.— Thomwell's Collected Writings. Vol. I., Chap. II.— Eraser's Philosophyof Theism, Vol. II., Chap. VIII.— Fisher's Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, Chap. II.— Iverach's Theism, Chap. III.— Conder's Basis of Faith, Chap. V.— Boyce's Ab- stract of Systematic Theology, Chap. II.— Barry's Some Lights of Science on the Faith, Chap. III.— Shaler's The Interpretation of Nature, Chap. II.— D.iwson's The Origin of the World, Chaps. V.-X.— Tulloch's Theism, Sec. II., Chaps. I.-IIL— Cooke's Religion and Chemiitry, Chaps. I.-VII. — Chapman's Preorganic Evolution and the Idea of God, Chaps. II., III. I. The Principle of this Proof. § 80. i.'T^HE line of reasoning now to be followed out is X closely related to that of 'he foregoing chapter. There the universe was viewed in its totality, now certain specific features in it are to be interpreted. There it was 336 APOLOGETICS. V the origin, now it is the progress of the universe whicf- has to be considered. The specific facts now to be inter- preted are found in the universe, viewed as a cosmos of organically related things marked by progress. The theistic proof which thus emerges may be properly termed the cos- mological, since it deals with certain inherent features of the cosmos. This gfives a much more definite meaning to the scope of this term than it usually has. But in the more thorough theistic discussions of the present day this limita- tion is just and necessary. It gives the four causal proofs their well-defined spheres, and greatly increases the logical value of these proofs. The aitiological proof vindicates an uncaused cause and abiding ground for the universe as a whole. The cosmological seeks a cause and sufficient reason for certain facts in the cosmos as progressive. The cutaxiological proof reasons towards God from the phe- nomena of law and order in the universe; and the teleological proof argues towards the same conclusion from the features of design which the world exhibits. This classification of the causal proofs gives harmony and com- pleteness of view. Each branch of proof has its aspect of causation and its proper subject-matter. The cosmo- logical aspect of the causal proofs seeks to interpret, by the principle of sufficient reason, certain aspects of the universe as an organized cosmos. 2. At the very outset a clear grasp of the principle of this proof is needed. This principle, in general, is that of causa- tion, but the aspect of this principle which is prominent is that of suMcient reason or adequate ground. This feature of causation was briefly explained in the previous chapter, but this explanation needs a little more illumination in con- nection with the proof now under consideration. According to Leibnitz, as quoted by Thomson in his Outlines of the Laws of Thought, the principle of sufficient reason means that "whatever exists, or is true, must have a sufficient reason why the thing or proposition should be as it is and ..Jl ■■■M THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 337 not otherwise." In its logical meaning, this signifies that any inference or conclusion in reasoning must rest on ade- quate grounds. There must be good evidence for any infer- ence which is made. The premises of any conclusion must be reliable and assured. Then, in its ontological significance, the principle of sufficient reason implies that there must be in the cause of anything something by reason of which it is what it is, and not otherwise. This is the feature of causality now mainly in view. It means that there is some- thing pertaining to every cause by virtue of which the effect assumes its well-defined character. It is thus a definite aspect of the principle of causation, and it may be called sufficient reason or adequate ground. It is this which constitutes the nerve of the cosmological proof. 3. An important and very difficult problem meets us on the threshold of this exposition. As this problem emerges again later on in these discussions, it may be well to give attention to it at this stage. As has been pointed out, the principle of causality involves the two features of efficiency and sufficient reason. In every cause there is that which effects the change implied in the causal relation; and there is also that which makes the effect just what it is and not something else. The question which arises in this con- nection relates to the identity in nature between cause and effect. How far must cause and effect be like each other? May they be quite diverse in their essential nature? Can things affect each other causally only when they are alike? Is the feature of sufficient reason especially conditioned upon some sort of identity between the cause and effect? These seem simple inquiries, yet in some of their applications they are of the deepest import. Mind and matter, for example, are different substances, yet the soul and body seem to interact on each other. The volitions of the soul, at least, affect the movements of the body. How is this effected? Must we say that, at root, body and soul are the same, and hence must be reduced to unity on the basis I 33 J38 APOLOGETICS. ': ' ti ! ) leither of materialism or idealism? This must not be done, so that some other construction must be given to their rela- tion. That the soul and body do act on each other is an undoubted fact. It seems clear, "lerefore, that in some way mind can act on matter so as to produce changes which are of the nature of effects in the material sphere. So in regard to the relation of God to the universe the same problem arises. Must God and the universe be of the same essential nature, in order to the exercise of divine activity in the cosmos? If so, then some type of monism is the only philosophy. In order to think of God as the first cause of the universe, must we postulate identity of essence be- tween the universe, as an effect, and God its cause? If so, that one essence must be either material or ideal, and the abyss of monism opens wide before us. Such examples s'.ow how serious a problem this is, and exhorts us to dis- cover a secure basis whereon the kinship of cause and effect may be held, and the possibility of spiritual forms of being producing changes in material modes of existence may be vindicated. 4- Still another turn must be given to this problem. Does It follow, from what has just been suggested, that there must always be as much of reality, if not more, in the cause as there is in the effect ? It has just been suggested that the effect may not be essentially the same in nature as the use, which leaves the way open for the view that a p ica'l sequence may be produced by a spiritual cause. Nr • does it follow that there must be as much of real conten. in the •cause as appears in the effect? Does it come to pass that if we find certain qualities in the effect, that these, in at least corresponding degree, must be found in the cause? Thus, if life or thought be present in the effect, must these qualities be asserted of the cause producing them? In a word, can the non-vital produce the vital; can the non- intelligent c se the intelligent to arise: can water rise higher than ..o level? Must there be, in short, a suMcient THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 339 reason in the cause of anything, which determines what the character and corents of the effect shall be? Are we justified, when we find that certain features are in an effect, in concluding that these features must find their counter- part in its cause? It seems reasonable to maintain, in the light of the efficiency and sufficient reason implied in the principle of causality, that there must be at least as much richness of content in the cause as appears in the effect, even though their strict identity may not be asserted. If there be not efficiency enough in the cause, the effect would never arise; and if there be no sufficient reason, everything would be entirely contingent, and we could never know that any particular cause would produce any given effect. Hence, we may safely conclude that there must be at least as much in the cause as in the effect, and that there must be a degree of kinship, though not necessarily identity, between them. In no case is it to be supposed that the cause is exhausted in the effect, or that in essential nature they are to be identified. There is likeness without identity, efficiency without exhaustion, and sufficient reason without contingency in the causal relation, as now viewed. This is the principle of the cosmological proof. 5. This problem of unlikeness between cause and effect has given color to many things in philosophy. It was im- plied in the crude Greek materialism and sensationalism, in which the conclusion was drawn that the soul must be material in order to be the subject of sensations produced by impressions from material objects. In the Cartesian philosophy, the view held of the essential difference between mind and matter had much influence upon that philosophy itself, and upon subsequent speculation. Out of this sprang the occasionalism of Guelinx, the preestablished harmony of Leibnitz, and the pantheism of Spinoza. They all wrestled with the causal relation between soul and body in man. Guelinx supposed that on the occasion of an affec- tion in the body, a corresponding affection arose in the '1' I I ! I 340 APOLOGETICS. mind. Leibnitz assumed that there was a harmony estab- lished from all ettinity between the sequences in the body and those in the mind. And Spinoza held that the two series of sequencer had a common ground, in a unitary basis which he den- * ' eternal substance and identified with God. And th - :mi;ii . ism and idealism of our own day have both fel^ t: > .^iTtct ^ of this speculation, which entirely separates sou' yC fjd} . and is in danger of divorcing God from the uni\(i <' In both cases the relations are apt to be construed in a v ..- r' and mechanical way, which leads to the theories ji . tr-^r/,: •nor' • •■':^'ng the relation between the soul and b • i U 354 APOLOGETICS. in the grand oratorio, have all to be included in the problem of cosmic order. Nor is this all. The regular recurrence of the seasons, with the complex uniformities therein in- volved ; the ceaseless succession of day and night, with the changing moment of sunrise and sunset, as it is set down beforehand in the almanac; the orderly succession of vegetable and animal life, with the laws of nutrition, growth and reproduction which they exhibit; and the great unities of species and type in the realm of organic things as shown in the science of biology, are a further part of our present problem. Nor must we exclude from view the uniformities which appear in the operations of the human mind, as ex- pressed in the principles of reasoning and the laws of thought with which logic and psychology are concerned. And we may even take into account the great uniformities which appear in the moral world, and in all the relations which men sustain as expounded in ethics and sociology, as part of this immense problem. These are but a few general illustrations of the problem of the eutaxiological proof for the existence of God. They may serve to illustrate the nature of the problem, and to show its boundless magnitude. The aggregate of these and similar instances provide the problem of the proof from order. These remarkable facts, which have been the theme of the poet and the philosopher, of the naturalist snd the theologian, in all ages, form the basis of the theistic infer- ence, which we are now unfolding. Never before has the vision of philosophical observation been able to reach as far as now, nor has the inspection of science ever been able to look so deeply into this great problem as at the present day. Order, harmony, law and uniformity stretch far and wide on every hand. Theism and Christianity have nothing to fear, but much to gain, from the enlarged vision. We may welcome and ever use the telescope and the microscope, the observatory and the laboratory, in getting a clear vision of this wonderful problem. THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 355 III. The Solution of the Problem of this Proof. § 85. This solution leads us to inquire concerning the best ex- planation of the facts of order in the cosmos. There are at least three possible solutions, each of which has its advo- cates. The first is the theory of chance, with which the theory of fate may be connected. The second is the sup- position of germinal order inherent in the universe itself. And the third is supplied by the tbeistic postulate. The first and second will be criticised witii a view to the con- firmation of the third. I. The theory of chance and that C)f fate may be taken together, for though they are apparently very different, they are not really so in principle. Both deny the need of intelli- gence to explain order. Both are purely niecliai.Icil ; the one mechanical contingency, and tv other mechanical necessity. What happens by chance cannot be otherwise than it is, which means that it is necessary. And what happens by fate just happens so, without any reason for it. This theory, whose principle is mechanical contingency, undertakes to explain all the facts of order in the universe by supposing that a succession of fortunate chances brought it all into existence. Through infinite time this process of contingency had gone on by slow degrees, and, without any guiding wisdom, things began to fall into unity, order and harmony, till in the course of time the orderly universe now existing came to be what it is. This scheme seems scarcely worthy of serious con- sideration, and yet it has a considerable place in human speculation. It was the fortuitous concourse of atoms with Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius among the ancients. In modern times it is represented by the cruder current materialism of our own day. According to the ancients and moderns alike, all the wonderful facts of law, system, order and harmony observable in the cosmos are the result • I *S'i il ,^t»m 356 APOLOGETICS. of an endless number of happy hits which have been taking place during countless ages. By this method, cosmos o- tie out of chaos by chance or fate. 2. A little reflection surely shows that chance cannot really account causally for anything. In its very idea it is inadequate. Chance is simply a process, and requires a causality. Hence, in and of itself it can really explain nothing. A process cannot account for itself, unless we hold to empiricism and phenomenalism, where description takes the place of philosophy. Chance is only the mode in which certain events come to pass, oftentimes with a con- fession of ignorance as to the causality which bnngs them to pass. To say that events happen by chance, or according to fate, is simply to say nothing at all in the way of explana- tion. To assert that order was produced by chance, or that law arose from fate, is to darken counsel by words without any real meaning. A single example may expose the absurdity of this theory. Suppose a man had all the letters of the great poem. Paradise Lost, printed singly on little bits of paper. Then suppose that he put them all into a bag, and then went with them to the brow of a high hill overlooking a level valley. And then, suppose that he scattered them out on the wings of the wind, to bo swept over the valley, that they might all i-est on the green grass somewhere. How often would he have to repeat the process before he would find them fall by chance into the very order they have in Milton's great poem? Humanly speaking, it could never be done. Now, this is a simple problem compared with that which the system and order of the universe presents. Without further discussion, therefore, this theory may be set aside as irra- tional and absurd. 3. The second theory is much more subtile, and of greater danger to the theistic inference from the facts of order. It is Dased on certain dynamical and ontological evolutionary views of the cosmos. It admits that the principle of order I • i THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 357 is inherent in the cosmos, and that chance alone does not solve the problem. But it holds that this principle is simply within tht universe, and that it neither needs nor justifies the inference to any extra-mundane causality or inte* -nee. According to the dynamical view of matter wh this theory holds, there is supposed to be latent in matter certain potencies which provide the agency by which the facts of order are wrought out. It also holds that there is an evolu- tionary endowment in matter, according to which these potencies operate in producing the facts of order every- where. This general theory assumes many special forms, and appears alike in ancient and modern times. The old Stoic doctrine of the world as a great living thing, animated by a soul or life, and the later Platonic conception ot a plastic principle in the cosmos, moulding it into order, repre- sent this theory. All modern hylozooistic views of the nature of matter, and the refined materialism of our own day, that professes to discover "the promis. ^ and potency" of all things in matter, are also exponents of this theory. Systems which, like that of Spencer, hold to the eternity of matter, the persistence of force, the continuity of motion, and the reality of the evolutionary principle, are necessarily on this ground, especially if agnosticism, as is usually the case, be coupled with them. All the phenomena of order which the universe reveals are explained from within rather than from without it. The principle of order is immanent in the cosmos, and as it emerges in the universe it is self -produced. Hence, there is no rational ground to infer an extra-cosmic intelli- gence, nor is there any need for the theistic postulate. A more refined type of this theory admits that divine wisdom ano ^r were involved in the origin of those potencies am. forniities which are inherent in nature, and that exhibit themselves in the manifold facts of order in the universe. But it oenies that tliese facts as they now are need any explanation, save their deistic origin just indi- cated. But this practically concedes the point, and puts 358 APOLOGETICS. asi the fact of intelligence only a step further back. It thus confesses that something extra-mundane must be admitted somewhere to account for the genesis of order, if not for its present reality. The argument for the first cause, at least, is legitimate, even if we admit the force of this theory. 4. But, concerning all these aspects of this general theory, it need only be pointed out that they either assume the reality of intelligence to account for order, or they con- travene the principle of causation, which is implied in the proof now under discussion. If they admit that intelligence originated germs of order in the cosmos, the inference to intelligence from order holds good. It is practically assumed. If this inference be denied, both the efficiency and sufficient reason of causality are ignored. As the facts of order arise, a causal agency of some sort must be assumed to account for them. And a sufficient reason must also be adduced to e.xpla'n the precise nature of the law and order which arise. Unless, therefore, the inference from order to intelligence is invalid and needless, theauty, unf Ids the same proof in the Timicus, and Aristotle, who lays so much stress on the proof for a first cause, is not without allusions to the proof from design also. In the middle ages, Selwnde reasrmed in a teleolngical way at a time when the schoolmen were chiefly occupied with ontological V 36a APOLOGETICS. speculations. In modem times, Niewentyt in Holland appears as the forerunner of Paley in England. And Paley, in turn, is usually regarded as the founder of that teleological method of natural theology which appears in the Bridge- water Treatises, and in many other writings, wherein this proof is elaborated in various forms, and illuminated by numerous instances of design in nature. For a time after Paley, and especially among English apologists, this proof had a very wide scope given to it, and it was relied on very generally to vindicate the reality of the divine exist- ence. In our own day, it is very much more clearly defined, and has its proper place given to it beside the other lines of proof. 3. Hosts of critics, especially in recent times, have risen up in arms against the argument from design. It is very evident that the opponents of theism recognize this proof for the exstence of God to be one of the strongholds of theism. The result is that the principle of final cause, and the theistic inference based upon it, have been subjected to the severest scrutiny. But at the present day, those who support the validity of the theistic argument have every reason to be satisfied with the results of this criticism, for much good has come out of it. The admission is freely made that many writers on natural theology half a century ago were more eloquent than logical, and sometimes mistook illustration for proof. Yet it does not follow that the prin- ciple which underlies their reasonings is not sound. Even if we grant that the early writers on natural theology put more theistic content into the conclusion than the premises warranted, when they inferred an infinite creator from the facts of design, still it can be successfully maintained that they did splendid service against atheism and deism. The criticism to which this proof has been subjected has ex- hibited its central principle more clearly, and has confined its inference more strictly to the facts of the problem it solves. On this account the argument from design has been m J Vk THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 363 made more effective than ever. Janet, in his great treatise on Final Causes, amply justifies this statement. The pres- ence of teleology, as inherent in the universe, is now more fully assured than ever, and the necessity for a proper explanation of it is even more urgent than a generation ago. It is also worth while noting the fact that modem evolutionary doctrines, which profess to supersede teleology altogether, can scarcely express themselves without using the language of design, adaptation, or adjustment. Tele- ology, therefore, cannot be discarded, but must be properly explained. II. The Principle of this Proof. § 87. I. By some writers this principle is called that of special order. McCosh applies the term special ends to it. as dis- tinguished from typical forms. As the latter is the proof from order, so the former is the argument from design. But this is only a general statement, and we must endeavor to show more clearly the principle involved in design, or adaptation of means to ends, as it appears in nature. That principle may be called teleology or finality, for these terms mean the same thing. Perhaps the best term to denote the principle of this proof is that of final cause. This title has the advantage of signalizing the idea of ends in nature, and of associating this argtiment with the principle of causation. 2. To bring out cleariy the aspect of causation involved in the principle of this proof, Aristotle's fourfold view of causation may be noted. According to the Greek polymath, the cause of anything may be viewed as formal, material, efficient or final cause. Its formal cause is the scheme or plan according to which it is framed; its material cause is the material out of which it is constructed ; its efficient cause is the agency involved in its production ; and its final cause is the purpose for which it is brought into existence. In I 3^ APOLOGETICS. 1^ the case of a house, for example, the plan of the architect is its formal cause, the materials of which it is built make its material cause, the workmen who build it are its efficient cause, and the purpose for which it is intended is its final cause. It is evident that the last aspect of causality has some relation to all the others; for the purpose we have in view determines the plan of the house, and the plan affects the materials, and the materials modify the agency of the builders. So, in nature, the principle of finality, if its presence be admitted, has a wide sweep. Without .admitting the value of all that is implied in Aris- totle's doctrine, it is evident that it serves to bring out the real diFrinction between the efficient and the Anal aspects of causality. The former denotes the agency which effects any change; the latter suggests the purpose for which the change is brought about. In the one case, the power pro- ducing an event, and in the other the reason for it, is expressed. The first is mainly a dynamical and the latter chiefly a rational conception. In this way agency and end are distinguished. It is further evident that the aspect of causation which is prominent in the principle of this proof is that of sufficient reason. On this account final cause and sufficient reason are closely related. If there be design, or adaptation, or final cause in nature, a sufficient reason for it must be provided. If there be teleology in the world, it must be rationally accounted for. If there be finality in things, an adequate explanation of this fact must be given. a;- )f which shows that final cause and sufficient reason imply each other. 3. But the principle of this proof, thus suggested in a general way, has had various interpretations given to it. Some say that it bids us argue to design, and others contend that it leads to an inference from design. In the former case, we have mainly to vindicate the fact that desi^jn or finality pertains to nature, and in the latter we undertake to infer an extra-cosmic intelligence from design or finality. THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 365 It may be nearer the truth to maintain that the principle of the proof now under discussion embraces both of these views. We may be said to reason to design when we show that finality or teleology is a fact inherent in nature, and we argue from design when we proceed to infer intelligence from this finality. Some writers, like Hicks, contend that we cannot state the teleological proof without taking for granted the very intelligence we are seeking to prove. But this is a mistake from which we may be saved if we keep the distinction just noted in mind. So far as finality is concerned, it simply means that in nature things seem to be fitted for each other, and that certain ends are related to certain means. At this stage we need not decide whether the means determine the ends, or the ends bring the means into play. The simple fact that they are linked together in nature is what design, or finality, expresses. At this stage, it cannot be said that intelligence is simply assumed in finality. But when the fact of finality in nature has been established, a sufficient reason for this feature of the cosmos must be discovered. The postulate of an extra-cosmic intelligence supplies it for this proof, just as it affords the sufficient reason for the facts of order in nature according to the eutaxiological proof. In a word, we find finality in nature, and infer intelligence from finality. 4. But what is this design or adaptation? What par- ticular feature of the cosmos does teleology or finality denote? The proper answer tc these queries gives the principle of this proof. In general, it may be said that design or teleology implies an end, a plan or an ideal which is forecast and realized in nature. This general statement implies two related things. First, we observe in nature what looks like ends towards which its activities are directed. An ideal future result seems to be forecast, and in nature there appears a tendency towards its realization. It might almost be called nature's prediction and fulfilment. This is what Ebrard fittingly calls design-setting in nature. This ' * 1 IHita 366 APOLOGETICS. I i.l simply means that somehow nature seems to have what looks like purpose and forethought. Secondly, we also ob- serve in nature that certain means come into play, and are made effective towards securing the forecast ends. By virtue of these means the plan is matured, and the ideal realized. In some remarkable way the means and the end, the tendency and the ideal, the resources and the plan, seem to be linked together in such a manner that the end is attained, the ideal is realized, and the plan is completed. This is what nature exhibits to obs. vation. These, then, are the two main features of design or finality. A design seems to be set for nature, and conditions arise which bring it into effect. Certain ends seem to be projected, and agencies operate to effect those ends. The analogy between chis aspect of nature and human activity is often used to illustrate this principle and its application. While analogy is useful for purposes of illustration, tare must be taken not to look upon the proof from design as merely an analogical mode of reasoning. 5. The precise relation of design or finality to amsality has been much discussed and variously understood. Sonic writers look upon them as entirely distinct principles; others construe one in relation to the other. Some hold that both finality and causality are a priori in their nature; while others deny the a priori nature of one or both of these facts. Reid, Porter, and intuitioi.alists generally, regard the prin- ciple of design as a priori, or intuitive, while Mill and Janet, in quite different senses, look upon finality as inductive or analogical. What, then, is the relation of finality to causa- tion? In our classification of the theistic proofs, we construed the proof from design under the principle of causality. This implies a close relation between these two facts. Th« fact that we classify the proof from design under causation implies a certain a priori character about it, for causation has this character. The elements of causa- tion which enter into final cause are efficiency and sufficient THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 367 reason. The fact of efficiency is involved in the efficacy of means to attain the projected ends, for thereby the ideal or design-setting is realized. To effect the changes involved in this process certain agencies are needed. These are pro- vided by the fact of efficiency implied in causation. But this is not the main aspect of causality involved in finality. This efficiency takes a given direction as the means realize the end. This implies that there is something in the means which makes the end just what it is and not otherwise. This is the principle of sufficient reason, and it implies some sort of kinship between the means and the end. Hence, finality is causation looking towards and realizing an end, and the principle of the teleological proof consists in an application of the principle of causality to the facts in nature which the term finality denotes. This we take to be a impler and clearer view than to make finality and causality entirely distinct principles. 6. The relation of the principle of this proof to analogy needs to be clearly understood. What is the relation of Unality to analogy? Is the theistic inference from design merely an arg^ument from analogy? Analogy, it may be first explained, consists in the resemblance of relations between things that have something in common. Thus the foot of a chair is analogous to the foot of a horse, because the object denoted by the term foot sustains a like relation to the chair that it does to the horse. Though the objects themselves are very different, their relations are similar. Those who make the theistic proof from design turn on analogy argue from certain features in works of man's agency and skill to the adaptations of means to ends in nature. The inference is thereby made that since it is very evident that intelligence is involved in works of human skill, so also may similar intelligence be implied in the marks of design observed in nature. This use of analogy is promi- nent in Paley; and Janet, in the first part of his treatise, with acute discrimination, gives analogy a place in con- I • ! ' , ill 1 HKXOCOn RBOUITION TBT CHART (ANSI and ISO TEST CHAUT No. 2) ^PPLJED KVMGE I 1653 c„i y„,„ ^'^, ~ 368 APOLOGETICS. ! nection with finality. Kant's criticism of the teleological proof assumes that analogy has much to do with the theistic inference it makes. Careful discrimination is needed here. It is freely ad- mitted that analogy may be of service in illustrating this argument, and in answering objections to it. At the same time, we incline to the opinion that mere analogy is not the real principle of the teleological proof. In that proof there are two tages. The first is the vindication of finality as inherent in nature, and the other is the theistic inference from that finality. In making good the former, analogy has much value. Here the analogy between what Janet calls "the industry of men" and "the industry of nature" is valid and of force. If in the former case we see that means are used to effect certain projected ends, so in the latter we may rightly conclude that a similar adaptation exists. But in both cases we simply establish finality in the two spheres in question, and the facts in the human sphere illustrate, by analogy, the facts in the sphere of nature. But the question still arises as to the cause or sufficient reason of finality in both cases. Here we pass, in both cases, from analogy to causation, when we make the inference from finality to intelligence. Causal efficiency is involved in the agency which renders the mea* ^ effective for the ends in view, alike in the case of man's agency and skill, and in that of nature. And the feature of sufficient reason must also be assumed to account for the precise nature of the ends in view, and to exhibit the relation between the means and the ends where finality is present. Instead, tlierefore, of reasoning by analogy from human to divine intelligence, we rather infer, by virtue of causation, that the postulate of intelligence is needed to provide a sufficient reason for marks of design in both spheres. Hence, the form of logical inference from a watch, and from the eye, with their respective marks of finality, to an adequate intelligence, is precisely the same in both cases. r THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 369 The fact that the agency and intelligence are more evident in the one case than in the other does not affect t'le prin- ciple of this proof. This principle, therefore, is not mere analogy. Analogy may vindicate and illustrate finality in nature, but causation is necessar>' to make the theistic infer- ence from finality in nature. That this is true is evident from the fact that even after finality is shown to be inherent in nature, the quertion still remains as to whether this finality implies mechanism or intelligence to account for it. And if intelligence is necessary to explain finality in a rational way, the further question at once arises as to whether this intelligence is intra-cosmic or extra-cosmic. To answer these quesMons, the principle of causation is required, as will !)e more fully shown in the last section of this chapter. It is very important to keep this distinction in mind. It protects the teleological arj^aunent from certain objections which are based on the assumption that it is merely analogical. It also shows that the theistic inference of this proof rests on the principle of causation, and that it is a legitimate application of that principle. Hence, we conclude that the theistc inference of the teleo-theistic proof is neither inductive nor analogical, but causal. Induction and analogj' may establish and illustrate finality as a feature of nature, but the theistic inference here made consists in an application of the principle of causality to the facts of design, that is, finality, in nature. ' f i M 4 ■ 1i' III. The Problem of this Proof. § 88. I. This problem is of vast extent and great variety. It includes all the marks of design, all the instances of the adaptation of means to crds, observed in nature. It em- braces all those combinations in nature where finality, as distinguished from mere order, appears. These features of the cosmos constitute the materials or the proof, and present 34 f.;< ¥i1 i 'I ! 370 APOLOGETICS. the problem now to be solved. Two things have to be done in exhibiting the problem in a definite way. The facts have to be sketched in outline, and the reality of the design or finality therein implied has to be vindicated. In the older natural theology the first of these things was the mam factor in this problem; but in our own day, owing largely to the influence of the hypothesis of evolution, the second has come to be a matter of vital importance m connection with this proof. In regard to the first, only the hem of nature s garment can be touched in setting forth the facts which constitute the problem. Limitations of space compel great condensation, and cause us to direct the reader's attention to current f^atises on natural theology, and in respect to the second phase of the problem not much need be said here, inasmuch as the bearing of evolution on finality will be considered more fully in the third main division of this treatise It is the less necessary to set forth a vast array of ihe facts, since the force of the inference made from them does not depend so much on *he number of the facts as upon their nature and meaning. A trw well assured instances of design, or cases of finality, really constitute the problem, and justify the theistic inference. Nor is there urgent need to follow out at any length the mechanistic explanation whicli modern evolution gives of these facts, since that very evolution can neither state its case nor make its assault upon the teleology of nature without using terms such as end, adaptation, and adjustment, which carry with them a teleological meaning, in spite of all the protestations J3f naturally Lie evolution to the contrary. ' 2. In setting forth certain of the facts which constitute the problem of this proof some of the larger instances of finality in nature may first be n- ned. Here we come within sight of the facts of order in me cosmos ; for in many cases the law and harmony therein seems to have an end or purpose in view. In such cases order and design are both present, and it is the latter with which we are now THE COSMICAL PROOFS. J7I concerned. All that is involved in the fact ot gravitation, in the way of effecting the end of a stable universe, is part of the problem. The position and power of the sun in relation to the planets of our soiar system to the end that it is the centre of regular motion, the fountain of light, and the source of heat, so that the solar system may be preserved, and the life upon this earth be perpetuated, supply many instances of finality. The procession of the equinoxes, and the revolution of our earth upon its axis, to the end that there may be successive seasons, and recurring day and night, are pertinent cases of adaptation of means to ends. The qualities of the ether in relation to light, and the atmosphere with reference to sound, supply many striking instances of design The phenomena of evaporation, con- densation and precipitation, to the end that the waters of the sea may oe carried to the fields and forests of the dry land, so as to keep it fertile and render it fruitful, are striking instances of the facts of this problem. The relation of the anim?.l and vegetable kingdoms, in the matter of the interchange of oxygen and carbon, and the various recupera- tive resources of nature, reveal instances of finality. 3. The observation of organisms in the animal kingdom shows that in particular organs there are many striking instances of finality, wherein the adaptation of the various parts of the organ realizes an end wiiose purpose can hardly be mistaken. The eye, with its varied, complex and delicate organization, and the remarkable combination of its entire structure to the end that vision may be realized, is the classic instance of finality in single organs. Then the human hand, with its palm, and fingers, and thumb, and joints, and the evident combirntion of all of these to certain well-defined ends; the wings of the bird, combining strength, rapid motion and little weight in a very high degree, to the end that flight may be realized ; the webbed feet in water-fowl, the fins of fishes, the ear in various animals, and ten thousand instances of which full descriptions may be found f< I' I ! 372 APOLOGETICS. in books on natural theology, present another group of the facts composing this problem. A The organic kingdom exhibits many mstances of the correlation of organs with each other for certain evident purposes. Here the adjustments are often very niarked. The relation of the heart to the lungs for the purification of the blood is a pertinent case of finality. As the blood is forced into the lungs it comes into contact with the fresh air which respiration brings into their cells, and there, by a curious chemical process, the excess of carbon is given off, and certain elements of oxygen taken in, so that the blood is sent on its way through the body purified. The teeth and the digestive organs of various animals are fitted -or each other in a most undoubted way. In carnivorous, herbivorous and omnivorous animals, respectively, the teeih and digestive apparatus are so adjusted to each other that the one could scarcely subsist on the food of the other. Even the appropriation of food would be difficult, save m harmony with this adjustment. The short neck and long trunk of the elephant, the long legs and long neck of the crane, the thumb in relation to the fingers of the hand, and the eye- brows with reference to the eyes, are familiar instances of this group of facts exhibiting finality. c Then the adaptation of organs to certain functions ^i equally evident, and introduces some new factors into the problem. Here organs are not sc much coordinated with each other, as associated with some function which they are suited to serve, for the welfare of the organism. The feet of man, or beast, or bird, seem to have been constructed for the purpose of walking, and this, in each case, according to its own definite type. The case of the wmgs of birds is very remarkable, as may be seen in the humming-bird or the eagle. Here the industry of nature far surpasses the industry of man, for man has never yet made a really successful flying-machine. The same is true of the fins of fishe« for swimming, the eyes 01 animals for seeing, the THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 373 ears for hearing, the heart for the circulation of the blood, the hands for grasping, the nose for smelling, and number- less other cases, are all instances of adaptation which belong to this problem. The objection which organic evolution makes to these facts, to the effect that the function produced the organ, need only be mentioned here, and dismissed with the single remark that function, at first, according to the evolutionist, could only mean sense of need ; and that sense of need has never yet been clearly proved competent to produce an entirely new organ. It may be admitted that organ and function are closely related, and that function may modify organ to some extent, yet it must be held, in the light of all the facts, that, from the nature of the case, organ logically conditions function and makes it possible. 6. The adaptation of organs to environment gives another group of instances of finality. Here we find organs ad- justed in various ways to the medium w'nerein their destiny is to be worked out. The lungs to the air, the eye to light, the ear to the atmosphere, fins to the water, oil for the feathers of water-fowl, warm fur for animals in cold coun- tries, the summer and winter plumage of birds in certain climates, the feature of mimicry in certain insects and animals, whereby the color of their bodies comes to resemble their immediate environment, the formation of organs in young mammals for a prospective environment very dif- ferent from that of their embryonic state, and scores of similar cases, illustrate this group of the facts where finality is to be observed. The objection here made by organic evolution, that environment may have produced the organ and the function, noed only be noted here, and set aside with the remark that, while environment may modify exist- ing organs, it has never been known to produce entirely new org.' 1 . Much less can it account for organs originating in c , environment, with the end in view of discharging functions in an entirely different environment, as, for ex- 1- U, pfSi 374 APOLOGETICS. ample, the eyes and ears of a young mammal. This must suffice as a brief survey of the facts where the problem of finality lies. What looks like means and ends is in nature. 7. Before we pass to the solution of the problem, the reality of design, as inherent in the facts of this problem as briefly recited, must be assured, for if there be no finality there might be no real problem, and consequently no basis for the theistic inference. Three remarks may serve, first of all, to limit our view of the problem to its proper materials. First, we do not feel cal'ed upon to show that everything in nature must have some final cause in order to make good the reality of the problem of finality. Some of the older writers on natural theology perhaps erred in this respect, in seeking to find finality in everything. It may not be possible to do this, and it certainly is not necessary to the reality of the problem. Secondly, we shall be careful not to postulate finality where it does not really exist in the combinations of nature. To say that noses were made to wear spectacles, that trees were made for squirrels to climb, or that the tide rises for sea-bathing purposes, illustrates this limitation. These and many similar cases are no part of the problem of finality. And, thirdly, instances w'.iere nature's com- binations produce pain are not necessa'-' parts of finality, unless it can be shown that the pro ' * pain is the end nature has in view by the ci .in question. The ner\'e of the tooth is not for th ■ . of producing toothache, arsenic does not exist in -.. . .. to cause death, nor does the appendix form part of the human system with a view to the production of disease. If due consideration be given to Uiis point, the objection to teleology in nature, based on the fact of pain, will be greatly minimized. These three observations lead us to confine the materials of the problem strictly to cases wherein finality is an assured fact. The combinations in nature must clearly have in view the securing of some definite end before design or finality can ' i THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 375. be asserted of any combinations. This limits the problem to its legitimate sphere. 8. But even in this sphere, is design a fact, is finality really present, is teleology inherent in cases in nature where means and ends seem to be rationally related ? Those who give a purely mechanical interpretation of nature, and those who hold a definite monistic theory of real existence, are ready to deny that there is any finality which requires an extra-cosmic explanation. As this point comes up still more definitely in the next section of this chapter, all we need now say is that the cofnm(.)n instinctive judgments of men are in favor of the postulate of fitiality in nature. Many of the mythological interpretations of nature imply this ; and much of the scientific and economic uses to which the resources of nature are put in our own day involve finality. And the evolutionary hypothesis, neither in its Darwinian, Spencerian nor Weissmanian form, has been able to exorcise teleology from nature. We are pretty safe in assuming that in nature there is design as well as order, finality as well as law, and teleology as well as agency. IV. The Solution of the Problem. § 89. That design or finality is inherent in nature is now taken for granted. That certain things in the cosmos are con- nected in a teleological way may be assumed. This being the case, we have a problem to solve. The various theories presented for its solution must be passed under review. In particular, we must see whether the theistic inference is needed for its adequate solution. I. From the nature of the case materialists must hold that there is no finality in nature, and that what appears to be design is simply mechanism. This, of course, leaves no basis for intelligence or the theistic inference. Ac- cording to this general view, the facts of design must be explained as matters of chance or necessity. Things just f t in natur is admitted. There is finality in nature, theix is teleology in the cosmos. Nature does seem to set ends or make plans for herself, anvl then she appears to proceed to work them out. But the wiiole process is confined to nature, and does not justify any inference to an extra-cosmic ground. If the process postulates intelligence, this intelligence is still within the cosmos, and consequently there is no ground upon which to make the theistic inference. This is based on certain aspects of the Hegelian philosophy, according 1 *■ 378 APOLOGETICS. to which, in a monistic way, an inner principle of logical development in the cosmo? produces the features of finality which it exhibits. This principle, in some sense, is rational, yet it is little more than a blind and unconscious tendency that brings forth results which look like purpose and design. But it is all within the cosmos, which is taken to be self- contained and self-explanatory. The anima mundi of the old Stoics, the Plastic nature of the later Platonists, and the unconscious rationality of recent Hegelians illustrate the views of nature with which this theory to explain finality is associated. The finality is immanent in nature, and re- quires no extra-cosmic explanation. The theistic inference, therefore, is not needed. This theory is not adequate, mainly because the philoso- phy which underlies it is one-sided and incompetent. The idea of unconscious finality is almost a contradiction in terms. We must at last construe the facts of design under either mechanism or intelligence. If we do the former, we are on the ground of the theory of chance ; if the latter, we open up the way for an extra-cosmic intelligence, and the theistic inference. Hence, if the fact of finality in nature be admitted, as it is by this theory, then the law of causality, which, as sufficient reason, is the principle of this proof, demands the postulate of an intelligent ground, which, as an uncaused cause, transcends the cosmos wherein the facts lie. 4. A fourth theory arises from an application of the hypothesis of evolution to the facts of design in nature. It usually presupposes the deistic view of the relation of God to the world, and holds that the world now, under the operation of natural laws, is working out its own destiny. The method of this working is evolution. We do not now require to discuss the scientific validity of the evolutionary hypothesis, but rather to consider its bearing upon the tele- ological proof. Does evolution eliminate finality from nature, and so destroy the basis of the theistic inference THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 379 founded thereon? Various types of evolution, of course, er.erge here. We have that of Lamarck, Wallace and Darwin, which confines the hypothesis of transformism to the organic sphere, and that of Comte, Spencer and V .:ke;, which gives it universal application. The Darwinian type of this theory deals with the facts of biology, where many instances of design are supposed to lie. Darwinism supersedes finality by natural selection, and puts the survival of the fittest in the place of teleology. In this way nature's adaptations -■■ all to be explained, and no theistic interpr»tation of ' ■■ .^s is required. The Spencerian type of evolution is n- more pretentious. It claims to be a philosophy of all existence. At root it is materialistic monism, wherein the principle of mechanical evolution becomes at once the architect and the builder of the cosmos. It takes the atomic homogeneous, and differ- entiates it int^ heterogeneous forms of being, having even life and consciousness. It professes, by the method of natural history, to give an explanation of all the features of design in the universe, without any intelligent extra- cosmic key. Matter, force and motion account for every- thing under the magic operation of ontological evolution. In a word, cosmic evolution dispenses with finality ''Ito- gethei . Not much d now be said to show that this theory is insufficient. Darwinism, while professing to supersede desigr by natural selection, and teleology b^ survival, con- stanti; i lis back on design and adaptation as a feature of nature. It constantly uses the terms "designed," "adapta- tion," "adjustment." "fitness," terms which very clearly imply finality in nature. Then, if unlimited variation hap- pening by chance be the starting point of the theory, it is virtually on the ground of the theory of chance, and exposed to the objections already stated. If purpose or design be admitted anywhere in the working of the hypothesis of evolution, then finality, in nature at least, is conceded. Then in 'm 380 APOLOGETICS. the process involved in its working needs an efficient cause, and the direction of the process towards a certain goal requires a sufficient reason. This again leads to the postu- late of an uncaused cause. And Spencer's scheme is open to the same objections. A ground, a cause and a reason for the evolutionary process is needed, even if we admit the validity of the process itself. A purely mechanical inter- pretation of the cosmic finality, which makes our present problem, is inherently inadequate. At best, evolution is but a process and a method; the process needs a cause, and the method a reason. The theistic postulate supplies both. 5. The conclusion to which we are thus surely led is that neither mechanical chance, nor subjective finality, nor im- manent teleology, nor cosmic evolution, solves our problem. We are, thereiore, shut up to the only remaining postulate, and that is the supposition of a purposive intelligence, which holds an immanent and transcendent relation to the cosmic finality to be explained. This gives a sufficient reason for the facts of design. Then, in accordance with the principle of causation, this intelligence must be extra-cosmic. And this intelligence demands a spiritual reality in which it rests and of which it is an expression. Hence, the explanation of cosmic teleology is an extra-cosmic intelligence, and this extra-cosmic intelligence requires a spiritual being as its ground. This being is found in the infinite, necessary and rational being of whose real existence other theistic proofs have assured us. This is the theistic inference to solve the problem of finality in the universe. Like the argument from order, this proof has its logical limitations, it does not prove a creator, nor does it lead to an infinite intelligence. Strictly speaking, it does not prove the existence of God. It rather takes the theistic postulate which the human mind can frame, and finds in this the solution of a well-defined cosmic problem. This in turn greatly confirms belief in the existence of God. This proof further enables us to clothe God with certain attributes. THE COSMICAL PROOFS. 381 Knowledge, foresight, wisdom, skill, power and goodness can now be rationally associated with the infinite and neces- sary being, whose existence, as a real being, was established in the psychical proofs. This concludes the exposition of the cosmical proofs, and brings us well on our way. The principle of causation is the key of inference in each case. The universe in its cosmic origin, its cosmic progress, its cosmic order, and its cosmic design, has been studied. In each case an extra-cosmic agent and a supra-cosmic intelligence was required. This was discovered in the theistic postulate, whose rational validity is thereby greatly confirmed. : ' I CHAPTER X. THE MORAL PROOFS: MORAL THEORY: THE IDEA OF RIGHT. PROOF FROM Contents. The Moral Argument.— Cogent and Efifective.— Yet not alone to be relied on.— Rests on facts of Man's Moral Nature and Moral Govern- ment.— Moral Theory and Theistic Inference related.— Yet Theistic Inference not dependent on Moral Theory.— Types of Ethical Theory.— Four Classes.— Morality founded on Legal Restraint.— Morality based on Pleasure or Utility.— Morality the outcome of Evolution.— These defective— Co- rect Doctrine.— Conscience original.— Right and Obliga- tion ultimate.— Morality has universal Validity.— The problem of this Proof.— The Moral Faculty.— The idea of Right.— The fact of Moral Ijvir.- These facts are not self-explanatory.— They need a ground.— This is found in God as Moral Ruler.— Moral Law in Man.— Moral Order over him.— Neither Produces the Other.— Both unified in God. Literature. Flint's Theism, Chap. VII.— Diman's The Theistic Argument, Chap. VIII.— i i^her's Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, Chap. VI.— Pressense's Origins, Book IV., Chap. I.— Lindsay's Recent Advances, Chap. IX.— Orr's Christian View of God and the World, Chap. III., 3.— Dabney's Theology, Chap. I.— Foster's Systematic Theology, Part II., Chap. I., 2.— Shedd's Dogmatic Theology, Vol. I., Div. III., Chap. III.— Redford's The Christians Plea, Part II., Chaps. II., III.— Bowne's Philosofhy of Theism, Chap. VI.— Caldcrwood's Hand-book of Moral Philosophy, Part V., Chap. V.— Harris' Philosophical Basis of Theism, Chap. IX.— Kant's Metaphysics of £flii«.— Johnston's Outline of Sys- tematic Theology, Part II., Se, XI., Chap. V.— Dale's Christian Doc- trine, Chap. II.— Seth's Ethical Principles, Part II., Chaps. I.-III.— Fraser's Philosophy of Theism, Chap. I.— Davis' Elements of Ethics, Prolegomena, Chap. II.— Bowne's Studies in Theism, Chap. XI.— Luthardt'.s Fundamental Truths, Chap. III.— Butler's Sermom, T.-III.— Mackenzie's Manual of Ethics, Book II., Chap. III.— Bradley's Ethical Studies, Chap. IV.— Muirhcad's Elements of Ethics, Book III., Chap. II. I. Preliminary. § 90. i.rr^HE third class of theistic proofs is now reached. J. This consists in the different phases of the moral proof for the existence of God. This is one of the most cogent and efifective of all the theistic proofs, and it is THE MORAL PROOFS. 383 perhaps less open to assault than any of them. Some writers are inclined to rely on it almost exclusiv' y to establish the fact of the divine existence. Such writers sometimes go so far as to say that the moral faculty in man is the religious organ of the soul, and that the dictates of conscience are the voice of God in the human spirit. By means of this faculty, some contend that man has an immediate intuition of deity. The Kantian criticism is no doubt chiefly responsible for this emphasis on the moral side of the theistic proof, for after ths great critical idealist had shown, as he thought, that all the intellectual proofs were inconclusive or contradictory, he fell back with a great deal of confidence on the moral proof for the exist- ence of God. He discovers in the moral law, with its categorical imperative uttered in man's nature, a sure ground for believing in God, freedom and immortality. Hamilton takes nearly the same view when he says that for the belief in immortality and in the existence of God we must rest on the ground of man's moral nature. It may be now safely said that Kant and Hamilton separated the intellectual and the moral basis of the theistic inference too widely. That inference is valid in both spheres. God is the po«tulaie equally of the intellect and the conscience, for he is absolute truth as well as absolute right. Flint is much nearer the sound position than Hamilton, and Luthardt than Kant. 2. In unfolding the moral proofs, wf must keep in mind the fact that the theistic argument is complex and cumula- tive. The moral proof, in its several forms, is not the only valid reasoning for the e*-istence of God. It is one of the many converging lines of proof, and has great logical force. But it is a mistake to rely on it alone to establish the reality of the divine existence. Other valu- able theistic allies should also be called into service. In this way the psychical, the cosmical and the moral proofs are all to have their proper place, and they are all to be I'mI T. , I ;l 11 384 APOLOGETICS. bound together in a cumulative way, in what may be termed the theistic argument. The moral proofs have a very im- portant place in this argument, but we are not compelled to rest upon them alone. This is now generally recog- nized. 3. The moral proofs rest, in general, upon the facts of man's moral nature, and upon the conditions of moral government under which he is placed. This being the case, it is evident that moral theory and t'.:''istic proof are very closely related. Writers differ as to ti.» nature of this relation. Some think that the validity of the theistic inference does not depend upon any particular theory as to the nature of moral distinctions, and of the origin of the moral faculty. Others incline to the view that the force of this inference is dependent upon a sound moral theory. We are inclined to agree with Flint, who takes a middle view. His position, in substance, is that if we take the facts of man's moral nature as we find them, and seek to interpret the ideas of rightness and oughtness as they are in moral experience, we are justified in making the theistic inference therefrom, irrespective of any particular theory as to their real nature and origin. At the same time, we are persuaded that while this position is substantially sound, it may also be true that, if we hold an empirical thei:)ry of morals, and make morality derivative, the theistic basis of inference is not so secure as if we adopt some form of the rational or intuitive theory, and regard moral distinctions as ultimate, and the moral faculty as original in man's nature. If, therefore, the cogency and force of the theistic proof is affected by the type of moral theory adopted, theism cannot afford to be entirely indifferent to the theory of morals on which its inference rests. This being the case, a brief sketch of moral theories, and a careful statement of the sound doctrine, should be made at the outset. rf >, THE MORAL PROOFS. 38s II. Types of Ethical Theory. § 91. In a somewhat general way, all tjrpes of ethical theory may be classified under four main heads, each of which has a distinct principle underlying it. Three of these deny that the moral faculty in man is an original factor in his constitution, or that the ideas of rightness and oughtness are ultimate and irreducible in their nature, while the fourth asserts that they are so. I. To the first class of theories belong all those that dis- cover the origin of moral distinctions and of obligation in some form of outward lazv or external authority. Hobbes and Bain, in different ways, represent this type of moral theory. Hobbes held a bald empirical theory. He asserted that the original of all the thoughts of man is to be found in the senses, and that there is no conception in man's mind which has not first, in whole or in all its parts, come from the organs of sense. In morals personal happiness plays a large part, and no common rule of good and evil is to be found in the nature of things. Where there is no civil authority, every man must be his own arbiter of what is good, and thus might makes rigiit. Where civil autliority is set up among men, that authority is the absolute judge of what is good and evil, and his sentence is the rule of right and wrong. In this way th; law of the land becomes the ground of morality. According to Bain, conscience has an empirical origin, and moral distinctions are the product of external restraints, in which parental authority plays a large part. The first lesson the child learns is obedi- ence, and with ihis is often associated pain or penalty for disobedience. Out of this experic ^he distinction between good and evil grows, and in lat .fe social and civil re- straints mature the moral experience. According to this theory, law conditions right, and moral distinctions arc originated out of the relation to external H 386 APOLOGETICS. H i 1 ! l^^B f f!;i restraint, and the pain which conflict with this restraint may produce. The sense of obligation, in the first instance at least, is nothing more than fear of pain, which springs from a violation of external restraint of some sort. It is <:lear that all such theories either presuppose the idea of right in the fact of law and restraint, or they place moral distinctions on an entirely arbitrary basis. In such case there can be no fixed standard of right, and no absolute basis for obligation. If law be not founded on right, it is only arbitrary commanu, and the unethical position is reached that will and might make right and duty. In a word, it professes to perform the impossible task of bringing an ethical experience out of a non-ethical state. 2. In a second class may be placed all those ethical sys- tems which find the source of morality and the basis of obligation in some form of self-love, pleasure or utility. This general theory assumes various forms, and has had many advocates in ancient and modern times. Here we have hedonism, and egoism, and altruism, and many types of each; but they all agree in denying that conscience is an original faculty, or that moral distinctions are simple and ultimate. The moral good is identified with pleasure, and moral evil with pain. The right is that which is useful to me or to men generally; the wrong is that which is devoid of egoistic or altruistic utility. The basis of obliga- tion lies in the fact that I should follow the dictates of the pleasant and the useful. My own welfare, or the general ^good, marks out the path of duty for me. It is evident that hedonists and utilitarians do not show how facts in human experience which are first expressed in terms of pleasure, happiness or utility, come to be stated in terms of right, duty and obligation. They do not clearly show how the notions of rightness and oughtness, which may be called ethical atoms, are to be reduced to lower terms. Above all, we are convinced that none of these hedonistic or utilitarian schemes can fully explain the fact THE MORAL PROOFS. 387 of obi.^ation. They may postulate it and lay stress upon it, but thfy can give no proper philosophy of it. They can f "-'ei show how the pleasurable or the useful, which is n- wly optional, can ever, on their principles, be trans- formed into the dutiful, which is obligatory. Nor can they make it plain how the self-interestedness, from which they set out, can ever be transmuted into the disinterestedness which appears in human conduct, without violating the principles of their own theory. We may very freely admit that in the long run the useful and the right, utility and obligation, will agree; but we must refuse to concede that the basis of morality is utility. In a word, the right con- ditions the useful, not the useful the right. 3. A third class of moral theories includes those modern schemes which connect morality with the modem hypothesis of evolution. These theories are of quite recent origin. They all agree in denying the ulti; .. . -ature of moral distinctions, and they refuse tc '.^nscience any a riori quality. According to 'lesf :heories, al' '^ -m* .>t- -)f the moral experiences of the inui >'!"' -e ».. c to be accounted for by the principles of t ioccune of evolution. Spencer gives this scheme defi"VA. *orm in his Data of Ethics, and many writers have followtd in his steps. In general, this theory contends that man, whether he came from the brute or no, was ?" first in a non-moral state. By slow degrcv , as men mingled together in the exercise of simple social instincts, the idea of right and a sense of duty gradually dawned within them. The laws of natural selection, of competition, and of environment, had their influence in bringing this about, and the principle of heredity handed down the gain of one generation as an ethical inheritance to another. In this way, by slow degrees through countless ages, the notion of right became clearly defined, and the basis of obligation was securely laid. It may be observed that some of the features of the utilitarian theory pertain to this scheme, because the operation of the 388 APOLOGETICS. laws of the evolutionary process are supposed to be working for the highest good of the whole. The only remark we make upon this general theory is, that thorough-going evolutionists have never yet presented an adequate philosophy of moral facts. An absolute standard of right, and an obligatory basis of duty, are not yet provided by this scheme, and it is doubtful if it ever can be. Some advocates of evolutionary ethics come very near to the denial of an immutable right and an absolute basis of obligation. Spencer's attempt to show how the conduce of the dog at his master's feet has been transmuted, during long ages, into the ethical conduct of the man, cannot be regarded as satisfactory. And while we may admit that the advocates of this theory have done good service in certain respects, in giving a natural history of moral experience, yet it must be confessed that they give no adequate philosophy of the facts of that experience. The natural history they give has value only on the supposition that right, duty and obligation are simple, ultimate and irreducible factors in human nature and experience. 4. In a fourth class there may be placed those theories which hold, in one way or another, that conscience is an original faculty of human nature, that moral distinctions are immutable and ultimate, and that obligation is absolute in moral experience. This gives the true philosophy of moral facts. Right and ought are ethical atoms, and cannot be transmuted or reduced to lower terms. They are ethical ultimates. Socrates against the Sophists, and intuition- alists against the empiricists, are on the ground of a sound moral philosophy. Three simple statements make this philosophy plain. First, it is held that conscience or practical reason is an original factor in the constitution of man. It is not the product of any sort of moral experience or education, but it is necessary to that experience and education. It matters not whether we call it the moral sense, or the ethical faculty, i THE MORAL PROOFS. 389 or conscience, or the power of making moral judgments, this sense, faculty or power is a connatural factor in the nature of man. Here the old distinction between the rational and empirical theories of human knowledge appears in the sphere of morals. Secondly, the distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, is an eternal and immutable distinction. The idea of rightness and the fact of oughtness are simple and ultimate. They cannot be reduced to lower terms, because they are not derived from any other facts or ideas. It matters not how men may differ in the application of moral distinctions, the fact remains that they make the distinc- tion, and this fact lies at the foundation of a moral experience. The right gives an ultimate standard, and the ought supplies an absolute authority for a moral life. Thirdly, moral distinctions have universal validity. By this is meant that right and wrong are not individual or relative notions. They have universal application and authority. The right is not merely for me, or for a few, but for all moral agents. If there be an eternal and im- mutable right, then man is not the measure of all things in the region of morals. What is right here is right everywhere; what is right on earth is right in heaven. These eternal principles of rectitude are revealed in and through the moral nature, and they supply the norm for the moral lif- It is evident, therefore, that I do not con- struct them, but that they instruct me, and bind me in matters of my moral experience. ■I I III. The Proof from the Right: Its Problem. § 92. I. Having set forth in three particulars the elements of a correct ethical theory, the foundation is laid to unfold the theistic proofs which rest securely upon it. That con- science is an original faculty, that moral distinctions are 39° APOLOGETICS. ultimate, and that moral law has universal validity, is now assumed as the basis of certain theistic inferences. Several lines of reasoning open up. The idea of moral law, the fact of moral obligation, the notion of a moral good, and the phenomena of a moral history, suggest these lines. The first of these now engages attention, and in this section a statement of its problem is to be made. 2. Conscience, or the moral faculty, perceives the dis- tinction between things right and things wrong. This distinction implies a standard or rule which we call moral law. The idea of a morally right implies moral law, and if that right is an ultimate idea the fact of moral law is a fixed fact. This further implies a moral order, in which the factors in a moral life constitute a system of related things just as surely as nature is a system of related things under natural law. Moral law is not merely a subjective rule, but it is also an objective fact having universal validity. Moral law is objective, therefore, and hence emerges what may be called a moral government, under which man finds himself placed. This constitutes the problem of this proof. 3. It must be borne in mind that while the sound theory of morality gives this problem its most definite form, and provides the most secure basis for the theistic inference, yet the problem remains on any ethical theory that admits the reality of the fact of a moral experience. If men are found making the distinction between right and wrong with refer- ence to some standard, and if they are conscious of a moral experience as a matter of fact, the problem still exists. There is here, in a certain sense, a moral order under which I find myself, and of this some proper explana- tion must be given. Here is the basis of an inference, and the materials of a line of reasoning which seeks a solution of the problem presented by the notion of right and moral law. Conscience must be accounted for, the moral dis- tinctions of which it makes us aware are to be properly i' ! i in THE MORAL PROOFS. 39» explained, and the moral order which it shows that we are under has to be interpreted. This is the problem which here awaits solution. IV. The Proof from the Right: Its Solution. § 93. 1. The inquiry now to be made is as to the theistic sig- nificance of the idea of right and wrong, and of the fact of moral law and government. This is simply a phase of the old question as to the foundation of virtue. Is con- science an entirely self-contained fact ? Is the idea of right self-explanatory? Is the fact of moral law and order self- interpreting? Are the conditions of a moral experience the product of man himself, or does he find himself in that experience related to a moral order and government? Does this moral order require a ground beyond itself as its ade- quate explanation ? 2. The reply which we make to these inquiries is that the theistic postuMe is needed to explain the facts. Con- science is not self-explanatory. The distinction between right and wrong does not account for itself. And the fact of moral law and moral order is not self-interpreting, but the postulate of the existence of God and of his rela- tion to man by means of moral government is needed. The metaphysics of ethics leads to theism. Man's moral nature finds its secure ground in God. Moral law and order would have no rer'ity apart from God. Moral gov- ernment would be witiiout foundation if there were no moral governor. Conscience needs an author, moral law a lawgiver, and moral government a moral governor. 3. The theistic postulate fully solves the problem, and that postulate is needed to solve it. Having the fact of the existence of God fully confirmed by the proofs already unfolded, we are in a position to present this fact for the solution of the problem now under consideration. That necessary infinite being who is the uncaused cause and t EM ■ 392 APOLOGETICS. abiding ground of the cosmic order and process nay be presented as the solution of the moral order and process. In this way God is the postulate of moral law and order as he is of natural law and order. He is the ground of the right as well as of the true, the presupposition of the practical as well as of the pure reason. Empiricists of both agnostic and positivist types deny the validity of this inference. They tell us that in moral science we are to deal only with the psychology and natural history of moral facts. In this way we construct what is a moral science rather than a moral phi' sophy. Then they insist that we should go no further, and that we have no right to "make any philosophical deduction or theistic inference from the facts of our moral life. It is easy to see that empiricism is logically driven to this untenable position by the necessities of its own theory. If we are to deal only with facts in their coexistences and sequences, and never raise inquiry as to causes or grounds, we are shut up to a self-contained explanation of the facts of our moral life, and are debarred from making any philosophical or »d have been elucidated. The inference which history justifies remains for exposition. This opens up a vast and varied field. It leads to the consideration of man, not as an individual, nor merely as the personal subject of moral government, but as a social and religious It i 1' f 4 f if I 4IO APOLOGETICS. ii i| organism, and as a current of successive hiF^oric activities. This leads to a study of the social fabric ii. its totality at any given time in part, but mainly to a careful interpre- tation of its historic moral and religious progress. Hence, social statics and dynamics are both involved in this com- prehensive proof. 2. There are two related aspects of this proof. The one consists in an inference from the fact that the belief in some sort of deity is practically universal among men. This, by some, is called the anthropological argument, and by others it is termed the religious proof for the existence of God. Either of these titles fairly well denotes this general proof. In any case, it may not be improper to regard it as a certain phase of the historical argument, for the reason, mainly, that history is largely the source of our informa- tion for the materials of this inference. Strictly speaking, it is the historico-religioHS proof, and as such it will be treated in this connection. The other and main branch of this proof grows out of the moral order and purpose which are to be observed in the history of the human race. Here is a multitude of facts which call for an explanation. The mora' ••lev and movement exhibited by the progress of the i "^wed as a social organism, in its broad and comprei. out- lines, are to be investigated, in order to discover whether they justify the theistic inference. Each of these somewhat diverse branches of the historical argument will be briefly outlined. II. The Historico-Rcligious Proof. § 99. ii I. The problem now presented is the widesprs. and per- manent belief in some form of deity which the history of the human race presents. Connected with this h ''ef is the universal prevalence of some sort of religious ri .s among men. This general religious cuUhs also forms part of the THE MORAL PROOFS. 411 present problem. The solution of this problem provides what is sometimes called the argument for the existence of God from the consensus gentium. The world-wide and age-long belief in deity thus argues his existence. A brief exposition of it must suffice. The universality of the belief in some sort of a god or gods is now seldom questioned. The alleged tribes of atheists spoken of by Lubbock and others, turn out to be quite mythical in the light of the mass of testimony which is now available from every age and every land. Flint, in his Antitheistic Theories, shows conclusively against Lub- bock, Feuerbach, and others, that there are no tribes of people on the earth devoid of the belief in some kind of supreme being or supernatural powers. Plato says that the belief in the gods is a natural and universal instinct. Aristotle bears similar testimony and expresses the same opinion. Calvin and Grotius adduce abundant evidence to justify the same conclusion. In our own clay we have materials coming from two important sources, which do much to establish the consensus gentium in regard to belief in deity. First, we have a vast mass of facts gathered from many a fieltl by those who are seeking to explain the phenomena of religion according to naturalistic methods and in accordance with the prin- ciples of natural evolution. These investigators have done much to show that religious belief and worship are found everywhere among men. They have searched far and wide among all races and tribes of men, and have broug.it to light much that is of interest and value for the argument now in hand. This material we willingly utilize in laying the foundations of the theistic inference which is now under discussion. Secondly, the study of Comparative Religion, by those who pursue it for legitimate apologetical purposes, renders a similar service. The beliefs and practices of all peoples in matters of religion, as set forth in their traditions, in liJi 412 APOLOGLiTICS. their literatures, or in their religfious rituals, are carefully studied, and a vast mass of materials is thereby placed at our disposal. We gladly use all that is suitable and ser- viceable of this material in the present discussion, for it is much easier to make bricks when both the clay and the straw are gathered. 2. In seeking to discover the solution of the problem thus formulated, we have simply to inquire what inference we can properly make from the facts of the universal and permanent belief in deity, and from the practice of various religious rites and ceremonies among men. The purely naturalistic explanations scarcely suffice to account for the facts, for while these explanations may give a complete natural history of the facts, they do not provide any complete philosophy of them. Indeed, these facts are not self-explanatory. The fact of a universal belief in deity argues for the reality of the object of that deity in some proper form. Even though the idea of the object be sadly perverted in many cases, yet the fact of the belief suggests the reality of its object, unless this universal instinct of the human race be false at its very root. But we must assume the veracity of that religious instinct, and hence find the solution of the problem of uni- versal belief in deity in the theistic hypothesis. Even if we admit that in many pagan systems there is much of superstition, this conclusion is valid, for superstition, as a counterfeit of religion, is a witness to the genuine. Hence, we find that the solution of the problem now in hand is found in the conclusion that God really exists. To deny this would be to do injustice to the very deepest convictions and the most permanent practices among men everywhere. III. The Historico-Theistic Proof. § 100. I. This is the main branch of the fourth line of the moral proofs. We have now to consider the facts of history in THE MORAL PROOFS. 413 their inner relations and search for their true philosophy. This is a cogent proof. The material of this proof is vast and varied. It em- braces all the events th- 1 have ti anspired in the great drama of man's historic activity in all the ages of the world. Many of these events have never been recorded on the pages of history ; but on the historic page we find sufficient to justify the inference of this proof. Everything that relates to men as individuals, as nations, and as a race of moral beings, rises up for review. To sketch all the facts here would be to write a com- prehen?ive universal history. It would require us to find out ail we could about the men who lived before the deluge ; it would call for a detailed account of all the movements of ancient nations ; it would further insist on a connected account of the rise and fall of the nations of the Christian era. It would also ask that we should ascertain, as far as possible, the underlying motives which prompted men to act their parts on the stage of history; and it would raise the question of the loral bearing of these facts upon each other, an'\ upon the progress of the race as a whole. But for the details of the materials thus hinted at we must refer the reader to the best current works on general history. 2. In seeking now to solve this tremendous problem, we have to ask the question, What is the true key to interpret the manifold facts of the history of the human race? What is the philosophy of human history? Can it be explained on merely natural social ground, or must moral factors be given a place? Various principles of explanation have been proposed. Comte, and positivists generall- ••eek to explain history in accordance with the principles of naturalistic evolution. All such attempts must be coi-'^dered failures, inasmuch as they merely state the problem by giving a natural history of the facts, but provide no philosophy of the facts, no solution of the problem presented. Herder, Vico, Buckle, 414 APOLOGETICS. ir: and others of similar views, propose to explain history in a purely social and statistical way. All such attempts leave largely out of account the fact of human freedom, and they ignore entirely the permanent moral factors in the historic activity of mankind. Edwards and Bossuet, and a host of others since their day, give the true theistic and religious explanation of the facts, with the agency of God and the fact of redemption underlying them. This is no doubt the correct principle of interpretation for the phenomena of history. We ob- serve a moral purpose running all through history. There seems to be a rational plan working out in it all. Events do not transpire on the stage of history by chance nor as the result of fate. They are marked by freedom, intelli- gence and morality. Plan, purpose and design seem to run all through history as the centuries roll on, and as empires rise and fall. There seems to be a moral teleology in this age-long stream of historic events. As the indi- vidual is consciously under moral government, so the race, as a whole, as an organism, is under the same government. Hence, a moral purpose runs all through the course of history. This is its moral teleology. There is also seen to be a power which makes for righteousness w^hich impels and overrules the destinies of the race. This is the moral dynamic of history. Hence, whether we view the human race in its social statical state, or in its dynamic historical movement, we observe a moral order. As in nature there is a natural order with natural law, so in social statics we see a moral order with moral law. And as we see in the universe cosmic progress in harmony with certain great cosmic prin- ciples, so in the movements of human history we see progress in accordance with recognized moral forces. This, then, is the problem to be solved. 3. The solution of this problem, in the light of previous proofs for the existence of God, is almost self-evident. It THE MORAL PROOFS. 415 consists in a simple theistic inference from the facts of human history to be seen on every hand, and running on through all the ages. That inference is secured by an application of the theistic hypothesis to the facts in ques- tion. No other explanation of the facts is adequate. We can give unity and rationality to the facts of history only on the supposition that there is an intelligent, powerful and moral ruler over men in their moral relations and history. The life and activity of the human race does not consist in a series of detached and arbitrary details, entirely devoid of any moral quality. The sum total of human history is not a vast mass of unrelated and unmeaning facts; but it is an orderly whole, which finds the philosophy of its order in the hypothesis of a power over it, and working through it, which is intelligent and moral. To give extended illustrations of this inference is en- tirely out of the question here. We can only give a hint or two in regard to the key for the interpretation of history which the theistic hypothesis supplies. Many able and popular treatises supply abundant illustration of the way history should be regarded in the light of its theistic inter- pretation. To such treatises, some of which are named at the beginning of this chapter, we must refer the reader. History, from this view-point, becomes a description of God's dealings with men. Even unconsciously on their part, it may come to pass that men and nations fulfil the great ends of the moral government of God. By this means the presence and power of God as moral n^'er is made mani- fest, and the fact of his existence assured. It is in this way, rather than by detailed illustration, that we emphasize the conclusion that we find in the theistic postulate, when applied to the facts of the human race and its history, a rational explanation of the history and destiny of humanity. No other view of history gives such an adequate explanation. The theist alone holds in his hands the key of human history. The atheist or agnostic may f MUMbl^Mk^ 1 1 la r i!'? J 416 APOLOGETICS. describe the facts with the utmost care, but both are alike helpless to explain them. Hence, both the moral teleology of the social fabric among men, and the moral dynamic seen in the historic lovements of the race, fully justify the conclusion that there is a moral divine ruler. 4. It would be easy, and perfectly legitimate, to rise a step higher than the philosophical theism just stated, and to find in human history the confi'mation of the reality and divinity of Christianity. It would then appear that the history and destiny of the human race can be best under- stood in its deepest significance only in the light of Jesus Christ and the redeeming activity of God in the world by him. From Bethlehem and Nazareth, from Jerusalem, Cal- vary and Olivet, rather than from palaces and fortresses and battle-fields, is the true divine keynote of history to be heard. God's spiritual kingdom in the world is the scene of his empire on this earth. The laws of that kingdom are moral and spiritual, and are for the government of men. Sin has come in to mar the order of that government as at first instituted. Redemption comes in to restore the harmony which sin had broken. Jesus Christ is the central figure of history, because he is the head of this spiritual kingdom. By him, through the Spirit, the redeeming activity of God is exercised among men in the world. The history of the race at large can only be understood in its relation to Christ and his kingdom. Indeed, all history, directly or indirectly, is but an expression of the n\i, I'ining operation of God among men according to his purpose. If we stand at Calvary, and look back, we see all history con- verging to its fulness of time in Jesus Christ; and if we look back from the same vantage ground, we see all history pressing forward towards its consummation in the culmi- nation of his spiritual kingdom. This being the case, the theistic inferente which the facts of history justify is of the very highest order. By means of it we stand at the threshold of Christianity, ready THE MORAL PROOFS. 417 to pass in by the gateway of revelation to lean the secrets of the spiritual kingdom itself. With the hand upon the lifted latch, reason leaves us standing on that threshold. Only when by faith we enter in, do we behold its beauty and its glory. 5. This completes the outline of the theistic proofs. The psychical and cosmical have been already summarized. In a sentence or two the force of the moral proof, in its four lines, may be gathered up. The ortho-theistic proof argued from the idea of moral right and law to God as its proper ground. The deonto-theistic proof reasoned from the fact of the binding nature of moral obligation to the will and authority of God as its basis. The agatho-theistic proof found that the striving of man for his true highest good reached its proper goal in God. And the historico-theistic proof discovered in the fact of the existence of God as the moral ruler of the nations the true key to interpret human history. These four true strands, bound together, form the moral proof for the existence of God. Binding the psychical, the cosmical and the moral proofs together, we form the strong cable of the theistic argument. ^ I I t mmn ]:! ih '! ill ii ill 4k 11 If , .1 CHAPTER XIII. THE KANTIAN CRITICISM, AND A SUMMARY OF THEISM. Contents. Kant's Influence on Philosophy and Theology.— His Criticism of the Theistic Proofs.— Not so Destructive as at one Time Supposed.— His Classiikation of the Proofs.— The Arguments in Order.— Charged with Logical Contradiction.— The Ontologicat Proof not Invalid.— Cosmo- logical Proof Criticised under a False \iew of Causation.— Noumena and Phenomena too Widely Separated.— Teleological Proof Commended •and Limited.— Yet Criticised as Defective.— Kant's Criticism Reduces kll Proofs to the Principle of the Ontological.— Overlooks a posteriori Factors.— Stress laid on Moral Proofs.— Yet if Valid, so is the Theo- retic—Summary of Psychology and Ontology of Theism.— Conclusions. —Man a Religious Being.— Idea of God not Produced by Theistic Proofs. —Proofs not Strict Deduction.— Revelation Needed.— Divine Attributes. — Theistic Cosmology. Literature. Kant's Critique of Pure 7??(M0«.— Transcendental Dialectic. Book II., Chap. III.— Pfleiderer's Philosophy of Religion, Vol. I., Chip. VI.— Stirling's Philosophy and Theology, Chaps. XV., XVI.— Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, Vol. II.. Div. III.— Shedd's Dogmatic Theology, Vol. I., Chap. III.— Fisher's Grounds of Theistic Belief, Chap. II.— Mar- tineau's Studies in Religion. Vol. I., Book II., Chap. I.— Caird's Phil- osophy of Religion, Chap. V.— Fairbairn's Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Chap. II.— Balfour's Foundations of Belief, Part II., Chap. II. — Pressense's Study of Origins, Chap. III.— Orr's The Ritschlian The- ology, Chap. II.— Fraser's Philosophy of Theism, Vol. II., Chap. II.— Schurman's Belief in God, Chaps. IV.. V.— Cocker's Christianity and Greek Philosophy, Chap. V.— Tigert's Theism, Chap. III.— Patton's Syllabus on Theism. I. The Kantian Criticism of the Theistic Proofs. § loi. 1, npMiE influence of Emmanuel Kant on both philoso- X phy and theology has been very great. Even if it be not fully admitted that the change he effected in philosophy was quite as radical as that brought about by Copernicus and Galileo in the science of astronomy, yet the deep and abiding influence of this great thinker on 111 ■■ THE KANTIAN CRITICISM. 419 subsequent philosophy cannot be denied. Perhaps no part of Kant's critical work demands more careful attention than his destructive criticism of the general rational proofs for the existence of God. So trenchant was that criticism that many writers since Kant's day have regarded all theistic inferences in the sphere of pure reason as neces- sarily inconclusive, and have fallen back entirely upon the moral argument as the only ground upon which belief in the existence of God can be vindicated. Others, influenced equally by this criticism, have taken refuge either in the contents of divine revelation or in the intuition of an infinite personal God as the only safety from atheism or agnos- ticism. It is, therefore, a very important matter to ascertain how far we should in our day be influenced by this bold criticism, and to imderstand what the proper limits of the- istic proof really are. It is mainly to this inquiry that this chapter is devoted. In general, it may be stated at the outset that our conviction is that many writers have given too much weight to Kant's criticism, and conse- quently have allowed themselves to be too easily driven off the field of rational theistic proof. It may be freely conceded that Kant h-s rendered good service 'in pointing out the proper limits of the rational proofs, and that he deserves all praise for the forceful way in which he has presented the argument based on the categorical imperative of our moral nature. At the same time, we should hesitate before we admit that Kant has shown that all the rational proofs are fallacious. Indeed, one of the wholesome signs m recent theistic speculation is the fact that the rational proofs for the divine existence are coming to be regarded with increasing favor. The modes in which they are now presented may be somewhat changed, but their rational force IS at the same time confidently admitted. We rejoice m this tendency of our own time, and a few remarks may serve to show that it is well-founded. it ^i I i \ 420 APOLOGETICS. In the examination of Kant's criticism now to be made, a general knowledge of the Kantian philosophy on the part of the reader must be assumed, for space quite forbids even a general sketch of it. The examination itself may be divided into two distinct branches. In the first branch, inquiry will be made as to whether Kant's criticism justifies the rejection of the ordinary theistic proofs. In the second, an attempt will be made to discover whether Kant is con- sistent in relying on the moral proofs while he rejects the rational. 2. Kant divided the ordinary rational proofs current in his day into three classes. The ontological proof reasoned from the idea of a necessary being; the cosmological argued from the universe existing contingently to its first cause, existing necessarily; and the teleological makes the theistic inference from various marks of design exhibited by the universe. The imperfection of this classification might be pointed out. At the outset, he treats these arguments as if they were entirely distinct, whereas we have already pointed out the fact, in unfolding the causal proofs, that the cosmo- logical and teleological both rest on the principle of causality. Then, in the course of his criticism, he attempts to reduce them all to the terms of the ontological. This does serious injustice to the a posteriori factors in the cos- mological and teleological proofs, and overlooks the fact that all the proofs are strands in a cable, not links in a chain. While, in a sense, the proofs are to be logically distinguished from each other for purposes of exposition, yet in their argumentative force they are cumulative and mutually confirmatory of each other. It cannot be admitted that the fundamental p'-inciple of these three proofs is the same, or that they can ail be reduced to any one of them. 3. Kant next takes up the three arguments in order, and seeks to show that they all lead to logical fallacies or land in rational contradictions. In the discussion of the psychical THE KANTIAN CRITICISM. 421 proofs, we have alluded to this part of Kant's criticism, but, now additional details may be given. Concerning the oniological proof, Kant argues that the judgment which affirms the existence of a necessary being is analytical, not synthetical. To understand the force of the criticism here made, the contrast between analytic and synthetic judgments must be perceived. The analytic judgment merely unfolds the contents of the propositions in the argument, and adds nothing to their material. The synthetic enables us to go beyond the scope of the propositions in the proof, and em- brace really new material with which the judgment may be concerned. Kant asserts that the judgment affirming the existence of God as a necessary being is simply an analytical judgment. Hence, it either assumes the exist- ence of God in its statement or identifies the idea of God with the object of that idea. In the former case the existence of God must be assumed, not proved, otherwise it could never be asserted. In the latter case, the mere conception of God is made the same as his existence, and no proof of his real existence can ever be given. The force of Kant's critique at this point may be ad- mitted against those views which regard the idea of God as merely a general notion, which the mind itself forms by generalization, for simple conceivableness is no test of actual existence. But if the idea of God be a rational intuition, with a definite a priori quality belonging to it, then Kant's criticism is not effective at this point. It is evident that Gaunilo's "island" and Kant's "dollars" are not analogous mental possessions with the idea of God as that of a necessary being. This being the case, their criticism of the ontological proof here fails. Rightly understood, the type of ontological reasoning for the exist- ence of God represented by Anselm, and in part by Descartes, holds good. It rests on the fact that the a priori factors of the human mind postulate the existence of their objects. Such factors have objective validity. Hence, the j(23 APOLOGETICS. ^m m it ft i: ■ theistic judgment is synthetic rather than analytic, and consequently connotes the actual existence of the object to which it points. In addition, the position suggested by Descartes, that the postulate of the divine existence is the condition of the reliability of human knowledge, is not in any way affected by the Kantian criticism. This is the very stronghold of certain aspects of the ontological proof, and theism need only surrender this ground when absolute skepticism ascends the throne of human reason. 4. In his criticism of the cosmological argument, Kant is very severe. He condemns it as full of logical fallacies. His attempt to resolve it into the ontological proof may riow be passed over, inasmuch as we have already shown that that proof is not destroyed by Kant's criticism. His criticism of the cosmological argument turns mainly upon the philosophy of causation which he holds. He rightly holds that the argument in question rests upon the principle of causation, but his interpretation of that principle may be seriously questioned. Kant constantly asserts that the law of causation belongs to the realm of the phenomenal, and is valid only within the sphere of experience. Hence, there can be no inference beyond this realm based on causa- tion, which is simply one of the categories that have meaning only in relation to the phenomenal. God, how- ever, is noumenal, and not an object of experience in the sphere of pure reason. Hence, lie says that when the category of causation is used to prove the existence of God. a transcendental use of it is made, inasmuch as it is taken from the realm of phenomena and applied to God as a noumenal object. This, Kant says, is illegitimate. Concerning this criticism we make two remarks. In the first place, the absolute separation between phenomena ami noumena in the fact of cognition is not justified, and it has done immense harm to the interests both of philosophy and theology. It logically led to subjective idealism in philosophy, and it has done much to produce mysticism in • i ■ il THE KANTIAN CRITICISM. 4a- theology. By means of this rigid sq)aration between the phenomenal and the real, the problem of the relativity of. human knowledge has been burdened with unnecessary difficulties, and the rational pathway to the cognition of realities has been beset with needless dangers. The result is that we are in danger of falling into the abyss of idealism so far as the contents of cognition are concerned, or of landing in the gloom of agnosticism so far as the know- ledge of the reality of either mind or matter is concerned. Fichte and Spencer are the logical descendants of Kant's position in regard to the distinction in question. In a true theory of knowledge, the phenomenal and the noumenal elements must always be taken into account. The real, and empirical so unite in true cognition that they ought not to be divorced in any sound epistemology. In the second place, it is not conceded that the law of causation is confined to phenomenal sequences only. Such a view leads to a purely empirical doctrine of causation, and makes it nothing more than mere succession. If we take into account the feature of efficiency which is an essential factor in causation, we might be nearer the truth if we said that it enables us to transcei i the line of mere phenomenal succession. Or if we confine causation to empirical sequences, we must deny the factor of efficiency in causation. This is to empty the principle of causality of one uf its essential features, for we maintain that the quality of efficiency, potency or agency is the very essence of causality. This element of efficiency is given to experi- ence as a rational a priori contribution which the mind itself makes to the experience of certain cases of sequence. It underlies the changes which causation implies, and it abides through every stage of any phenomenal scries. Hence, it does not stand merely at the Iwginning of the scries as the first step, but it grounds every succeeding step as well. Hence, Kant can only make good his criticism at this point by ignoring the fact of efficiency, as an essential factor in 1 11 till I! t' I! 424 APOLOGETICS. causation. This we cannot allow him to do, and thus his criticism may be met at this point. 5. In criticising the teleological argument, Kant treats it with a measure of respect, and admits that it has some right to be held in esteem. He is careful to confine it to its legfitimate sphere, and with some things Kant here says we can cordially agree. At the outset, his criticism of the desicTi argument is limitative rather than destructive. He shows that this argument has often been taken to prove too much. He points out, quite correctly, that the inference from marks of design in the universe only justifies the conclusion that the universe has had an intelligent arranger or framer, but not a creator or originator. God can, at best, be but the architect of the universe, according to this argument. Kant further argues that the quality of infinity is not justified by this argument from the marks of design observed in a finite universe. It may require a very vast intelligence, but not necessarily one that is infinite, to accoimt for the facts. Most careful writers on theism now frankly admit the propriety of this criticism. The design argument does not of itself justify the predicate of infinity. But it does not at all follow that the teleological argument has no value. The idea of a first cause and creator, and the attribute of infinity as pertaining to it, can be vindi- cated along other lines of proof. Then, we can very properly connect the intelligence which is necessary to account for the marks of design seen in the universe with this first cause, and clothe it with the attribute of infinity. With the limitations just noted, the teleological argum^ t is valid in its own sphere, and yields very valuable the! .c results. 6. One of the most important aspects of the Ka .lan criticism remains to be considered. This relates to the ingenious way in which Kant presents his criticism. He seeks to reduce the cosmologica! and teleological argument? to terms of the ontolugical, and then destroy them all at THE KANTIAN CRITICISM. 42s one blow, by showing that the ontological is invalid. He maintains that before the theistic inference can be made, the ontological realm must be entered. If it cannot be entered by the gateway of pure reason, rational proof is not possible. This procedure is ingenious, but cannot be admitted. Kant reduces the stronger proof to the terms of the weaker, and allows no theistic value to the cosmo- logical and teleological elements which he strips from these cogent proofs. He overlooks entirely the cumulative nature of the theistic proofs, and that each branch of the argument must be allowed to yield its own proper result. Kant really makes an undue analysis of the arguments, instead of giving a careful exposition of each, and then making a synthesis of the whole in the completed theistic argument. Each line of reasoning should be taken for what it is worth, nd we should not reject all because any one of the proofs does not establish the whole theistic position. It is also to be carefully observed that Kant allows the a posteriori to drop out of sight as he reduces the cosmo- logical and teleological proofs to the terms of the ontological, and he entirely fails to give them any proper logical import. Even if we admit that these two proofs do rest upon the third, it does not follow that they have no independent logical value. More than this, it might be shown that in the cosmological and teleological proofs there is an a priori basis in the principle of causation, which has also to be reckoned with in reducing these proofs to the third. The proofs mutually sustain each other, and hence we conclude that Kant's criticism of the rational proofs for the exist- ence of God is not nearly so destructive as it is generally supposed to be. We are very far from admitting that Kant has shown that all argumentation in the sphere of pure reason is contradictory, r.nd leads to inevitable logical antinomies. 7. It now remains to be seen whether Kant can main- tain his logical consistency as he proceeds to establish the 111 426 APOLOGETICS. theistic position by what is usually known as the moral argument. According to Kant, the idea of God is merely regulative in the domain of pure reason. It is a rule which guides our thinking in regard to certain aspects of the universe, but it affords no rational ground to conclude that there is any real being corresponding to this regulative idea. In the moral sphere, however, Kant argues, it is otherwise. The categorical imperative of practical reason is a witness within the soul, testifying directly to moral law and order without. This law implies a la>v-giver, who is God, regarded as moral ruler. We cannot enter fully into the merits and defects of the Kantian ethics. While Kant gave great prominence to moral law, and the authority of its categorical imperative in the human soul, yet there is reason to approve of the opinion expressed by Patton and Schurman, that Kant should scarcely be classed with the intuitionalists in morals, for the reason that the categorical imperative is an empty rule, void of ethical material, and that it can only have that material provided by entering the sphere of practical conduct. In doing so, however, Kant must virtually sur- render to the utilitarian. Passing this point with its simple statement, we make three critical remarks. In the first place, Kant draws the line too sharply between the pure and practical reason. The intellectual and moral faculties of the soul are different in many of their functions, yet such a rigid distinction between them as Kant makes cannot be justified. The intellectual and moral faculties not only toucli each other at various points, but are often interwoven. There is an intellectual factor in conscience, and the intellect cannot be regarded as devoid of ethical capacity. Tlie absolute unity of personality leads to this conclusion. Then, if truth be the object of the intellect, and right the object of conscience, it assuredly follows that the theistic inference may sustain the same relation to both. If God, as absolute right, be the postulate of conscience, ii J THE KANTIAN CRITICISM. 437 then God, as absolute truth, may be the postulate of the intellect. To be consistent, Kant must allow more than a merely regfulative value to the idea of God in pure reason, or else he cannot justify his position in regard to the validity of the argument from practical reason. He cannot barter God away to the skeptic on the ground of pure reason, and expect to have him restored on the same terms in the sphere of practical reason. If the personality of man cannot reach God by the avenue of the intellect, it is not Hkely to do so by the pathway of conscience. It is surely more reasonable to maintain that both the intellectual and moral faculties open up logical highways for the theistic inference. God is surely the postulate of both intellect and conscience. In the second place, practical reason, like pure reason, must enter the sphere of experience before it has its pure form filled with any empirical content. The moral law, with its categorical imperative, is as empty as the categories are prior to experience. To assume that the practical reason enables us to reach the noumenal sphere more readily than pure reason, is erroneous. In order to have content in cognition, both pure and practical reason must alike enter the realm of experience, where, according to Kant himself, all is phenomenal. Such being the case, conscience, with its law, brings us no nearer G<-)d than reason, with its regulative idea. does. On Kant's premises, neither gives us more than the phenomenal. In one case it relates to knowledge, in the other to conduct, but in neither case can the noumenal in the form of God ever be reached. But if it can be reached in one case, it can also be in the other. Kant is clearly inconsistent with himself at this point. The tnith is that both forms of i)roof, rightly understood, are valid, and justify the thccic inference. In the third place, the precise basis of the moral proofs is not clearly set forth by Kant. In criticising the cosmo- logical proof, Kant confines the conception of cause in- IL f i ■ ? llij 428 APOLOGETICS. volved in it to phenomena, and constantly refuses it any transcendental validity. Nor does he allow any proper place in the concept of causation for efficiency or sufficient reason. Such being the case, it is difficult to see how Kant can justify the inference of the moral argument, unless he removes it entirely from any relation to the principle of causality. And even if he does this, the difficulty still remains as to how, by the moral pathway, the transcendental region, where God abides, is reached in an ethical experi- ence. Our conviction is that the aspect of causation, known as sufficient reason, is involved in the moral proof; and if the law of causation in the intellectual sphere cannot be legitimately applied beyond experience, it is not easy to understand how it can be applied beyond experience in the moral sphere. Kant must fall back either on moral in- tuition or on faith; but if he does this he is on precisely the same ground as some of those whose views he so severely criticises. We maintain that if moral intuition and faith are valid, so also are intellectual. The t'^eistic proofs do not generate a knowledge or belief in a ^\)d of whom we know nothing, but they rather serve to justify to reason the validity of the primitive intuition, or native belief, with which the soul, both in its intellectual and moral aspects, finds itself endowed. The moral argument, there- fore, does not so much prove the existence of God, as enable us to attach moral attributes to the necessarily exist- ing being who is the uncaused cause of the universe. Rather than stake, as Kant does, the rational vindication of the belief in God upon the moral argfument alone, potent as it is, we prefer to place it beside the other lines of proof, giving all of them their proper rational and logical value. Then, having exhibited and tested the validity of each strand of proof, we also bind them together in a strong cable, and term it the theistic argument. To this goal we have now been brought. SUMMARY OF THEISM. 439 ' II. Summary of Theism. § 102. I. Thus far the discussion of theism has had three main topics under consideration. These were the nature of the belief in God, the origin of this belief, and the proofs for the existence of God. As to the first of these topics, it was found that in theistic belief there was a cognition of deity, a belief in the existence of God, a sense of natural depend- ence on him, a feeling of moral responsibility, and an instinct of worship. This being the case, man is able to frame the theistic hypothesis of the universe, to apply theistic predicates to natural objects, and is capable of re- ceiving religious instruction by means of revelation. The- istic belief, with its idea of God, is not innate in the sense of a fully matured notion of God. At the same time, it is not the product of education merely, although it is capable of being educated. It is rather a native, connaiural and constitutional aptitude which he naturally possesses, and into the maturity of which he grows as his various powers develop. 2. The second topic, which dealt with the genesis of theistic belief, was treated at much greater length. Three erroneous and three defective theories were considered. Fetichism, henotheism and ancestorism, as erroneous the- ories, were set aside. The function of revelation, reasoning and idealistic evolution, resi^ectively, was unfolded. The true doctrine was explained with some care. It discovers the genesis of theistic belief in the human soul, and finds that it arises therein spontaneously on the presentation of its appropriate object. Then revelation and reflection may direct, purify and exalt this primitive spontaneous belief. There is thus an a priori and an a posteriori factor in thf,- istic belief. 3. The third set of topics was discussed at still greater lenp;th. This consisted in a careful exposition of the III 430 APOLCX5ETICS. theistic argument. Here the correct logical attitude was clearly indicated. Three main lines of reasoning were followed out. These were the psychical, the cosmical, and the moral. The first found the materials of inference in the human mind and its conditions of cognition, the second rested on the principle of causation, and the third argued from man's moral nature and experiences. In each case the theistic inference was carefully vindicated in a variety of important particulars. Then the whole was bound together into a strong cable, which may very properly be termed the theistic argument, by means of which the belief in the reality of the existence of God is clearly shown to be rational and logical. III. Some General Conclusions. § 103. I. It has clearly appeared that man, by his verj' nature and constitution, is a religious being. By this it is not meant that man can, without the aid of special revelation, rise to a correct and adequate knowledge of God, and of the way of salvation from sin. It rather means that man is held to be distinct from the brute creation, in that he has a nature in which the primitive elements of religion form a constituent part. This implies that there never was a time when the human race was not religious in some sense. By reason of the disorder which sin has introduced, the race has lost the true knowledge of God, and of the way he should be worshipped and served. But the con- stitutional religiousness of his nature remains; otherwise the gospel would have no point of contact therein. Hence, revelation is needed to supply such a knowledge of God as may deliver man from the hopeless condition into which sin has brought him. All theistic discussion must recognize the native religiousness of the nature of man, and the necessity of revelation to supply a true knowledge of God, and of the way of escape from sin. It is a mistake to ignore SUMMARY OF THEISM. 431 •these facts, as is so often done by those who give purely naturahstic explanations of the origin and development of religion. 2. It is also evident that the theistic proofs do not pro- dttce the idea of God in the human soul, nor do they generate the religious consciousness. The theistic capacity must be presupposed in order to the possibility of reasoning or reflection concerning God. Even the skeptic has the Idea of God m his mind when he is reasoning against the reality of the divine existence, which still further shows that reasonmg does not produce the idea of God in the soul at first. 3- Nor do the proofs demonstrate the existence of God m a strictly deductive way. The various arguments are vindications of the rational reality and objective validity of primitive, spontaneous theistic belief. The method is expository rather than demonstrative, inductive rather than deductive. The result is moral rather than mathematical certainty. The denial of the theistic conclusion is illogical and irrational. 4. At the same time, the con-natural nature of theistic behef does not render supernatural revelation unnecessary. It IS again insisted that such revelation is urgently needed to give man important religious instruction. This position IS firmly held against all naturalistic theories which insist that the light of reason and the dictates of conscience are all that men need in order to the exercise of true religion However true it may be that reason and conscience would have been sufficient had mar not come under the blight of sin. It IS unquestionably not true of him when his sinful state is taken into account. The only way to escape this conclusion is to deny the reality of sin, and to do this is to fly in the face of facts. 5- It has. further, been made plain that one of the im- portant purposes served by the theistic proofs is to enable us to attach to the necessarily existent being called God 432 APOLOGETICS. !! I various attributes. This is specially true of the causal and moral proofs. The attributes of intelligence, power, wis- dom, justice and righteousness are reached and connected with the necessary being who is the uncaused cause of the universe. 6. In addition, the true philosophy of the universe is exhibited. This philosophy supplies a theistic cosmology, so that theism is at once a natural theology and a theistic cosmology. Neither atheism nor materialism, neither deism nor pantheism, can supply such a philosophy. Theism holds that the universe exists contingently, and that God is its first cause and abiding ground. It also teaches that God IS both immanent and transcendent in relation to the uni- verse. The theistic philosophy enables us to say that God is both within and without the universe, both before and beside the worlds he has made. He originated the universe and sustains it at every moment of its existence. In this conclusion we firmly rest, and are sure that it affords an adequate foundation for revelation to be made, and for redemption to be effected. This foundation is at once a natural theology and a theistic cosmology. THE ONTOLOGY OF THEISM. THE SECOND SECTION. THE ANTITHEISTIC THEORIES. CHAPTER I ATHEISM. Contents. Practical-CuTed by SS^Tef 7'" i °' ^'''''^"»-Two Types.- tempts to Reason out hs Se I^^^eSatf "'T??" '"''' Atheism.-At- State of Miml and Heart -P.^^hn/n f ^'heism.-An Unnatural Literature. rAMriM, Chap. I-Rishell's r/,1 c I' ■ "^— P''"' « Antitheistic CAr»*/«an Doctrine Chan? r it c. . '"t^'unon, i,nap. III.— Dale's ^«.. Chap. ii%tt^s'i> -i-^i^rcfr^v' Htr^" f ^- ««*.<: Theology, Part I Chan IIT <:.. i ^' /^^V— Hodges S-yj**. ii-Miie/s S. J- "S.; ,'c ; m°t7? '^r'T',^!'''- 7"*«^fe, Part I.-Cudworth'.s Intclleetual SvUe^ r~ w ' ^"^"^ /-n ./ Atheism.-WooU.y'. UnreoTlbfelZZJ^^^^ ^"«^•"- ^«/.di 444 APOLOGETICS. the dogmatic or theoretical atheist ever done to help tli2 needy, to comfort the sorrowing, and to raise up the fallen? When it has done as much as Christianity, with its belief in one living and true God, then it may make its claim. So with literature, science and art. History plainly shows that these have flourished and reached their best only under the benign influences of the Christian religion. Atheism blights everything that tends towards the elevation of the race, and it removes all those agencies that heal the sores and remove the ills of this mortal life. How strange it is that the atheist opposes and denies the very things which make life comfortable for him and his. For this blessing he is indebted to the very belief in God which he earnestly repudiates. Here in this sphere theism, as the basis for Christianity, is entirely adequate. 8. From the religious point uf view, atheism stands utterly condemned. That man has in his nature the senti- ment of religion and the instinct of worship, can scarcely be denied, yet atheism provides nothing to meet these deep demands of man's spiritual nature. It has no message for the heart of man. It gives no hint of immortality, and it affords no consolation in the days of darkness and sorrow. It has no hand to bind up the broken-hearted, nor to wipe away the tears of sorrow. It simply ignores these evident facts in the experience of men, and compels men to live without hope, and be little better than the beasts. But the belief in God which Christianity announces supplies every need that man's head or heart can know. Nay, more, the atheist stifles every aspiration of the human heart, and blunts all the tender instincts of the soul of man. Atheism first puts to death man's religious nature, and then proclaims that there is no God, and that man does not need a deity. Such !> system merits little serious consideration, and may be re , ?d at once. I HI CHAPTER II. SEMI-MATERIALISM. Contents. Materialism not New.-Its History.-China.-Gre«:e.-Democritus, I '"^r:. '"™"'*~^'***' ""^ AristotIe.-Rome.-Lucretius.-Med«. vL- Modern.- Hobbes.- France.- Spencer.- Germany.- Reaction. -Ihree Types of Materiahsm.-Semi-n.aterialism.-Three Phases- Soul of the World—Formative Principle— Immanent Rationality— Sem.-mater.al.sm and Semi-pantheism-Criticism of Semi-materialism. -Idea of God Inadequate-All Types of it are Monistic-No Proper Place for Individual Personal Beings.-All Present a Mechanical Th^ cry of the Universe-Freedom is Destroyed Both as to God and Man- TTie Teleology of the Un.verse Unexplained— The Immanent Principles of the Cosmos Themselves Need Explanation. LrreRATURB. Eiicyclopadia Articles on Materialism.-FishtT'a Grounds of Theistic ^ C-*"* »"' 'yP« "f though' I- n H, he itat Unge, in his History of MaZialism ives ^._;or he sough, to .hoj"'': ::■*:- ■:;^:f mentioned, for he adopted tl- '"-.,.•' f ,, ^" *''°^^ J""* Jedge in its baldest form ari ;;"' ''''?'' °^ '"°- materialism. so far as 'hTnatu > ' '" '" '^" ^'"""^ °^ Descartes did not entirl . V '"'"* " '''""'■"'^- =^^^" cations in re Jrd to , ! , "^'"" """"''"'^^''^^ '•"?'*- of the soul ^Z the LT'''n ' """" ^"^ ^^^ -*"- essentially sp^^s^lT^' , ,""T' ^''"°"P^>^ ^^^ •-•'•-"'""'"'"•'"• t' 450 APOLOGETICS. . Ihe eternity of matter in some form and with li £ M : '■■ 45J APOLOGETICS. certain endowments is assumed, and the existence of spirit as distinct from matter is denied. The reality of God is denied, and all mental facts are crnstrued under the cate- gory of matter. But these theories assume that along with matter, and not divorced from it, some other principle must be presupposed in order to explain the phenomena of matter. Whether these principles are really material in their nature is not made very clear. But all these views agree in regarding tnatter as the only real existence, and at the same time it is supposed to possess certain qualities or potencies, which are necessary to account for the facts which appear in the universe. 2. There are at least three phases of semi-materialism. Some of these are decidedly materialistic, while others are more pantheistic in their scope. Indeed, some of them might almost be termed semi-pantheistic. Still, as the monistic basis in each case is conceived under the category of matter, it seems better to regard them as semi-mate- rialistic theories. 3. The first phase of semi-materialism is found in the Stoic conception of the anima mundi, or soul of the world, and also, in nearly the same way, in modem hylozoic theories. According to the Stoics, matter is the basal reality of all things in the universe. But matter is not entirely alone, for it is animated, and has a life constantly throbbing in it. This life or soul of the world is sometimes called God, so that God, in this sense, is the immanent workinji power in the universe. In a quite monistic way, God is the soul of the world, and the world is the Ixnly of Goil. This aspect of Stoicism, which is by no means promineiil in it, has lem of Gcxl as numerically distinct from the universe seeiis scarcely probable, an: conclu- sion. But theism gives the consistent conception here. It meets the demands of monism perfectly in its hypothesis of one infinite personal God, who is eternal, self-existent and inde- pendent of the universe. It satisfies all the conditions of a legitimate dualism in its postulate of the real, though dependent, existence of the universe. God is, hence, tran- scendent in relation to the universe ; yet he is also immanent, and hence accounts for all the features of order, life and rationality which the universe exhibits. 3. Semi-materialism in every phase fails to leave a proper place for individual, personal human beings. The soul, with its personality, cannot find a consistent place in any of the schemes now under review. Man, at best, is but a part of the cosmos, and he can be nothing more. The universe, according to the first of these schemes, is a great living organism, and man is but a part of the great vital whole. On the ground of the second, the formative principle in the cosmos being at best physical, makes man nothing more than highly refined matter, so that he is cor- poreal, with no spiritual principle in him at all. Under the supposition of unconscious rationality as the endow- ment of the universe, man can only be quasi-spiritual at most, and never distinctly personal. According to any dug of the three suppositions, the soul is robbed of its persm- ality and reduced to the category of matter. Such \x'mg idtei SEMI-MATERIALISM. 457 the case, they all alike stand condenmed, for they destroy the possibility of religion by obliterating its subject. 4. These schemes all agree in presenting a purely me- chanical theory of the universe. Everything in the cosmos is reduced to mechanism, and free rationality is obliterated. The soul of the world moves without freedom or choice, the plastic principle operates blindly by chance or fate, and unconscious rationality lacks the conditions of free activity. The whole conception of the cosmos in any case is me- chanical. Such being the case, the universe is not under the govern- ment of a free, powerful and wise ruler. If any one of these principles which are supposed to be immanent in the cosmos be regarded as God, then he is bound by the iron law of necessity, or he is at the mercy of blind chance. The idea of the cosmos being under the control of God as transcendent and free, has no place. A world-soul non- free, a plastic principle working blindly, or an unconscious rationality incapable of self-direction, cannot supplv such a world-view as theism presents and Christianity demands. In like manner, man is robbed of freedom and reduced to a mere machine. The world-soul throbs in him, the formative principle moulds him, and the principle of ration- ality actuates him; but ail is purely mechanical, and free self-determination, such as morality and religion demand, can obtain no foothold in any of these schemes. Hence, definite personality for man has no place, and freedom, with consequent responsibility, is excluded. The effect of this is disastrous, not only for the individual man, but for society. Any scheme which destroys the basis of respon- sibility signs the death-warrant of social and rational well- being. This the.se schemes surely do. S- None of these phases of semi-materialism can give a sufficient explanation of the teleology or finality evident in the cosmos. That there is law, order, sequence in the universe must be conceded. That there are marks of plan. * 458 APOLOGETICS. purpose or design in the cosmos cannot be denied. At best, inunanent finality is the only explanation of the marics of design which are observed in the universe. The soul of the world, the formative principle and the latent rationality are all within the universe, and, in the very nature of the case, they provide no ground for an extra-mundane ex- planation of the order and design which the cosmos exhibits. What was said in presenting the design argument for the existence of God fully justifies this conclusion here, and it is not necessary to repeat what was then said. A merely hylozoic view of the universe cannot account for those features of it which involve rationality. Life and mind are different things, and the former cannot fully account for the latter. So, also, a formative principle working spontaneously within the universe, and moulding matter mechanically, cannot explain marks of intelligence. Nor can an unconscious reason which is supposed to permeate the cosmos, and is shut up within it, account for marks of purpose and intention manifest therein. 6. It may be added that the world-soul, the plastic prin- ciple, and the immanent rationality all need to be explained. How came the cosmos to be thus endowed? What is the ground or reason for each of these principles? Is matter eternally permeated by them? If not, whence did they come? Then, too, we may ask which of these three con- ceptions is really correct? These are questions which may be reasonably raised, and to which semi-materialism gives no proper answer. Theism, with its postulate of an infinite personal Ciod, whose efficiency and rationality is sufficient to account for all those features of tlie cosmos, is amply adequate. It provides a ground for the marks of design in the universe which is at once immanent and transcendent. This being so, theism is further confirmed. warn =J i-i I ■ CHAPTER III. PURE MATERIALISM: STATEMENT. Contents. Scope of the Exposition —Method of Statement.— Historical.— An- cient Greek Materialism.— Democritus and Epicurus.- Matter and Mat- ter only the Real Existence.— Matter Eternal.— No Creation.— Matter Indestructible.-Atomic-The Plenum—Atoms Qualiutiveiy Alike.— QuantiUtively Different—Extended, yet Indivisible.— The Vacuum.— Bounds Atoms.— Gives Motion.— Motion Downward.— Atoms OverUke Each Other.- Impact- Conuct.— Commotioa-Combination.— Aristo- tle 8 Acute Criticism.-Epicurus' Reply.-Necessity the Law of Atomic Combinations.-Chance and Fate.— Human Soul Atomic-Modem Ad- dttions.— These Slight.-MolecuUr Conception.— Prominence Given to Energy.— Conservation, TransmuUtion and Correlation.— Tendency to Endow Matter with the Getms of Life, Order, Design and Purpose — Its Verdict is: No Soul; No God. LiTBRATUtB. Encyclopaedia Articles on A/o/mo/wm.— Flint's Antitktutic Tkeo^ nw.- Unge's History of Mac.sms.-Cannot Prove that Matter is Eternal.-Spirit may be Sice M^ "" "°' ""'rrf' ^"<^^P^"dent.-If not Infinite aY to m/u!;^ P ""'' TJ'' ^"'^""" ''' '° Time.-It cannot Prove that «nr v'.^ Tvr '" ^^™' °^ Mi"d.-Cannot Prove Absolute Ind" struct.b>hty of Matter.-Cannot be True to its Theory of Knowledge.! 2'd"Mind. " °' ^"""'-N"' Order and Design.-Nor Life Literature. rJ^%1°^Z^\^'''i''\T Ma/^K,;/,m.-Flinfs Antitheistic Theories, 5o? 1 bIwTi rr ^{^'•"^"^'^-'-M^rtineau-s Study of Religion. ri TIT F- 1 '. ^*''- ^-P"^"'' PMosophy of Theism. Vol. I. Chap. ni.-F.sher s Grounds of Theistic Belief. Chap. III.-Ebrard's ApologeUcs Vol. II., Sec. IV., Chap. II.-Rishell's The FoundaHo^ of he Christian Faith Div. L, Sec. I., Chaps. IV.-V.-Bruce" C^ ^./.« Chap IV-B.rks' Modern Physical Fatalism. Chaps. VI.-X.- Chnstliebs Modern Doubt and Christian Belief. Chap. Ill Sec II — Vatsons Christianity and Idealism, Chap. Vlll.-Strong's Syst'ematic ./o^X Part ., Chap. II., Sec. I.-Hodge's Systematic The^y. - I Chap. IIL. Sec^IV.-Harris- Philosophical Basis of Theism. . IT rl rrf.'r^';^"'/'^ "^ Ma*.rm/«m.-Bowne's Metaphysics. -t II.. Chaps. III.-V.-Dabney's Theology, Chap. VI. ''•*''' I. General Considerations. §112. N the last chapter a statement of materialism as it appears in ancient and modern times was made. This cliapter undertakes to present in outline some criticisms of tins theory of existing things. At the close of the last chapter it was pointed out that in our own day there is a tendency to discard the older and cruder forms of mate- rialism, which hold the atomic or corpuscular view of I iri f 470 APOLOGETICS. (i t* ^ H -1 :' i: •natter, and to advocate a refined or cosmic materialism, which is rather dynamical and hylozoic in its estimate of Ihe materialistic basis of all things. This should be kept in mind in all criticism of modem materialism, as this is the type of this antithe-lfitic speculation against which Chris- janity must protect itself. In this chapter an attempt will be made to present as careful an examination of materialism as its limits will allow. Some general considerations will first be presented, and then several particular points of criticism will be outlined. I. Materialism signally fails to satisfy the logical demand of human reason for a unitary principle, on the basis of which the universe may receive its best philosophical ex- planation. The philosophical instinct of human reason demands 'inity in the principle from which a rationale of the cosmos is to be given. Now, in spite of the claim of materialism that it does this when it denies matter and spirit, and asserts only matter, the charge can be fully sustained that materialism, whilst monistic in its claims, does not supply a definite principle which is adequate as a principle of philosophical unity. First of all, matter itself is not unitary, but multiple. In general, as we look upon the universe we find matter ex- isting in every conceivable form. In the heavens above there are the sun, moon, and stars in almost endles.^ ul- tiplicity. On the earth about us, there is immense variety in the forms of existing material things. To the senses, in this superficial way, there is boundless multiplicity, instead of proper unity, in the material universe. From the view-point of philosophy, the unity here claimed is spurious, not legitimate. And if we take a deeper and more scientific view of matter, we discover in the atomic or molecular conception of its constitution still greater multiplicity. The atoms and molecules defy enumeration, and thus the notion of unity sinks almost out of sight. They differ in size, weight PURE MATERIALISM. 471 and shape. Some are round and some square, some rough and some smooth. What kind of unity is possible here? If we .ake the atomic homogeneous of Spencer, or the sup- posed star-dust of the nebular hypothesis, how can any sort of unity be connected with it? Reason asks for a philo- sophical principle ( raHonal unity, and materialism cnswers with its fundamental postjilate of atomic multiplicity. But, further, matter is not all of the same sort. Some of the Greek materialists asserted that the atoms were quali- tatively, as well as quantitatively, distinct. The atoms were of different kinds. Empedocles asserted that there were four distinct elements: earth, air, fire and water. Anaxagoras asserted that the elements of various material bodies were in primitive matter, and that these were moulded mto shape and order by intelligence. In modem times the conception of matter, as consisting in different kinds, is clearly defined. The simple substances, according to recent views in physics, are over sixty in number, and as chemical analysis is seeking to do its work, the number of simple substances is increasing. In their very nature these simple substances cannot be changed the one into another, nor can they a,l be reduced to some single material element. This being the case, the conception of unity really vanishes. It thus appears that, on a purely materialistic theory of existing ngs, there is no sort of absolute unity. The counte. ..erence that such unity can be found only in the postulate of an infinite personal spirit, such as theism pro- poses, where unity and indivisibility may both find a rational resting-place, is confirmed. In addition, if the fact of energy, and the various forms of force which appear in the universe are taken into account, the presence of a unitary principle in a merely materialistic scheme is still less likely. Materialism of all shades, and m every age, ) -s always been perplexed with the concep- tion of the physical forces, and how to construe them in relation to matter. V both are real and eternal, then -■ «■ ; f f! i ■i f i 1 P 473 APOLOGETICS. dualism, which excludes a unitary principle, rules in the system. Then the aspects of energy known as attraction and repulsion, and all the various sorts of physical for:es, have to be reckoned with. Here, again, multiplicity per- vades the whole cosmos. Then, in addition to the purely mechanical and chemical forces, there are the vital and volitional agencies which appear in the organic kingdom, and increase the notion of multiplicity very much. Now, unless all the physical forces can be reduced to one basal force, and unless the physical, vital and mental forces in the universe can all be correlated and reduced to one generic form of force, the foundation for a unitary principle does not exist in pure materialism, no matter how refined. Here, again, the theistic postulate is adequate; for an infinite personal spirit, with volitional agency in its personality, provides the basis for a rational unity, and for the dynamical activity which are latent in the cosmos. Absolute unity, both in its ontological and dynamical aspects, is found in the cci :nts of theism. It cannot be discovered, in either aspect, m materialism. 2. Materialism may be charged with being unscientific. This charge, if it can be made good, is severe on mate- rialism, because that system generally claims to be strictly scientific in its spirit and methods. And if theism is justly open to the charge that it is in some way inimical to modern science of a legitimate sort, it would seriously suffer from such a charge. The charge which we make against mate- rialism is that, in spite of its claims to the contrary, it is unscientific. This charge is now to be made good. First, materialism usually follows the dogmatic instead of the inductive method, and in so far as it does so it is out of har- v with the spirit of modern science. Its usual dogmatic assertion is that matter is the only real form of existence, and on this basis its theory is constructed. The true scientific, or inductive, method bids us investigate the phenomena of the universe, and if it can be shown that PURE MATERIALISM. 473 these can all be rationally accounted for on the basis of the materialistic theory, then this cc;. elusion might stand. On the other hand, if it should turn out that the facts cannot all be explained in a materialistic way, then it is clear that materialism is inadequate. In addition, if it is found that the postulate of spirit is needed, and is sufficient to account in a rational way for all the phenomena of the universe, we shall be justified in holding that the theistic hypothesis is thereby confirmed. But the point now made against materialism is that, in assuming its fundamental position, it is unscientific, inasmuch as it assumes dog-matically, prior to investigation, what should have been reached inductively as the result of .1 careful survey of all the facts. To assert dogmatically tlm^ matter is the only reality, exposes mate- rialism to the charge of unscientific procedure. Secondly, materialism is compelled to explain the higher by means of the lower, and is unscientific in its attempt to do so. Materialism asserts that matter is the primordial form of existence. Matter is reality in its lowest terms and in the simplest modes of existence. Out of the re- sources of matter all higher and more complex forms of existing things are to be derived and their reality ex- plained. Ma';ter is devoid of life at first: b- . somehow, life supervenes. This is a higher and more c ■ plex form of existence. Again, the sensitive aris s upon ...e basis of the vital, and reveals still further comokxity. This, again, is followed by the rational, w.iere v-';irely new factors^ which greatly increase the -.onnlexity, c .-.le'into view. To crown all, the facts of morainy and religion supervene, and here the complexity reaches its maximum. At every step there are factors in the higher and subsequent stage which are not in the lower and prior stage of development in the universe. The question for the materialist is .0 account for that new factor by means of the resources of matter alone. It may be justly charged that all attempts to explain 474 APOLOGETICS. "1.! ?».* the higher and more complex forms of existence from the lower and simpler, in a purely materialistic way, are quite unscientific, inasmuch as the essential demand of the law of cattsation must be disregarded at every onward and upward step. That law require that there shall be at least as much reality in the cause as appears in the effect, and that no new factor shall be admitted into the effect which has not its counterpart in the cause. The materialist admits no extra-mundane causality to account for that which is new in every more complex stage of the universe. Hence, he must explain the vital from the non-vital, the conscious from the non-conscious, the rational from the non-rational, the moral from the non-moral, and the religious from the n. n-religious. It is evident that at every stage the law of causation is transgressed, and the whole procedure of the materialist is, on this account, unscientiHc. The attempt made by some refined types of materialism to avoid this charge, by assuming that the germs of life, and mind and morality, are all latent in matter, is equally unwarranted, inasmuch as this is merely putting into matter by hypothesis something which is not essentially material, but which is found to be necessary to account for the facts which emerge in the universe. This is practically a con- fession of failure on the part of materialism to explain what we now see in the universe. It is also a suggestion that the theistic postulate is needed to provide an adequate causality which can account for all the facts in a thoroughly scientific way. Thirdly, little weight need be attached to the claim that materialism holds a more respectful atfitide to7 mrds xcicmc than theism. It is sometimes alleged that theistic belief and Christian faith are real obstacles in the pathway of progress in scientific research, and the boast is often openly made that mntcrialism has done very much to foster the interests of science. In reply to this it is sufficient to say that neither the nature of the case, nor facts which lie i PURE MATERIALISM. 475 open for observation, bear out this allegation. Much less do they justify the materialist's boast. It cannot be shown that there is anything in the nature of theistic belief or even of Christian faith which limits the human faculties, or hampers their exercise in any realm of rational inquiry! Nor do the facts sustain the charge in question. In those lands and ages where the belief in God is well defined and religious knowledge widely diffused, the activity of the human mind has been most marked, and its achievements in science and invention been most remarkable. Where religious ignorance has prevailed the opposite is undoubt- edly true. And if the materialist ventures, with a degree of assurance, to give a long list of men who have been noted in scientific research, and who at the same time were professed adherents of materialism, we can match such a list with one containing an equal number of the names of men who have done quite as much for the advancement of science, and who were all the while humble believers in God and the verities of the Christian system. Arguing from the nature of the case, we might go further, and make good the claim that theism puts the human mind in a better condition and attitude than materialism can. to study nature in all her wide and varied aspects. Fourthly, the charge that materialism is unscientific in its theory of knozvlcdge may also be made gtiod against it. That theory of knowledge must be the empirical in its cruder sensational forms. The only knowledge we can have must come through the avenue of the senses. That this theory is inadequate has been already shown. The criti- cism which goes to show that the sensational epistemology IS unsound also goes to show that it is an unscientific psychology. If the human mind has knowledge or beliefs which are not derived from the senses, the materialist can give no explanation of these things. To assume the atti- tude of the agnostic towards these elements of cognition and belief, as the materialist often does, is equally unscien- li V, '!' i / if I 476 APOLOGETICS. tific. As this point will emerge again in another connection, nothing more need now be done than to point out the unscientific and incomplete nature of the materialistic theory of knowledge. II. Particular Considerations. § 113. In the previous paragraph it was shown that materialism was neither philosophical nor scientific. It failed to give a unitary principle to explain all things from, and it also disregarded the method of inductive inquiry in various ways. A few particular points of criticism are now adduced. I. Materialism cannot justify its assumption that matter is eternal. It is bound to do this in order to make good its case, for it is just as easy, and perhaps quite as rational, to assume that spirit is eternal. That some form of being has always existed must be assumed; and the question in debate between the materialist and the theist is as to whether this eternal reality is matter or spirit. When the materialist asserts that it is matter, he is bound, in the circumstances, to give some sort of rational justification of his initial assumption. The attempt to prove the eternity of matter must be futile, and yet the demand of the theist that this be done is legitimate, unless it can be shown that in its very nature matter has the elements of independency and permanency. This can scarcely be done. If the materialist attempts, in an empirical way, to prove the eternity of matter, he can make little headway. His only instruments of observation are his senses. These en- able him to go back only a few short years. And even the observation of the race as a whole goes back only a few thousand years at most. And when he goes beyond the period covered by the direct observation of the human race, and considers the strata of the earth as revealed by geology, lie may infer great antiquity, but he cannot prove eternity for atom or molecule. And should he lift his eyes to PURE MATERIALISM. 477 heaven, and with the astronomer study the planets and the stars, he cannot rise to the definite conclusion that the material elements of which they are composed are eternal. Empirically, therefore, the eternity of matter is an unproved hypothesis. Again, that which is eternal must be independent in its conditions of existence. If there were a time when it was not, then it must depend on something else to bring it into existence. Now, unless it can be shown that matter is absolutely independent in its essential nature, there may have been a time when it was not. Hence, there may have been something upon which it is dependent, and in relation to which it may have had a beginning. As to the initial assumption which must be made, the theist has the advan- tage here. His assumption is that there is an eternal personal spirit called God. This possesses the element of mdependency and self-sufficiency much more clearly than the assumption of a multiplicity of blind crass atoms. If matter in any form has in it the features of change and decay, it is not easy to maintain its independency and con- sequent eternity. In addition, it may be argued that if matter be not infinite in relation to space it may not be so n -elation to time. That It IS infinite in relation to space cannot be proved; and if It could it would be only a quantitative infinite that would be reached. This being the case, the infinitude of matter in relation to time cannot be reasonably maintained, for if matter be finite in one respect it is likely finite in all respects. In any case the burden of proof rests with the materialist to pruve the eternity of the material basis of his system. 2. If materialism cannot justify its claim that matter is eternal, it cannot make good the contention that matter precedes every form of mind. From the very nature of the case it may be that mind has in it elements which sug- gest its eternity in some form. If this be the case, it may u .f ! I 478 APOLOGETICS. be much easier to explain matter from mind than to derive mind from matter. It must be assumed that something has always existed, which is the same as to say that it is eternal. The only question is as to the nature of that some- thing which is eternal. That the form of existence which has always existed is mind or spirit is an hypothesis which has many things in its support. The assertion that historically, so far as our earth is con- cerned, there seems to have been a time when there was no forms of spiritual being in it does not go to the root of the problem, unless it can be shown that spiritual per- sonal beings like men are derived from matter. But even then the question would still arise as to whether an infinite form of spiritual being did not antedate and condition all forms of finite being, both material and spiritual, in the universe. And it might be argued that even if the mate- rialistic view of the human constitution were admitted, the question of an infinite or divine mind, which implies a spiritual form of being, would still arise. In a word, even if psychological materialism should be proved, ontological evolution would not necessarily follow, for there might stil! be a God, even though man had no soul. 3. The materialist cannot prove the indestructibility of matter, and the absolute persistence of force. Superficial thinking here is apt to be misled by the fact that, so far as scientific observation and experiment go, human agency can neither originate nor destroy an atom of matter, nor an element of force. All that the materialist has any riglit to say is that, so far as man is concerned, matter is inde- structible and force persistent. With equal propriety can it be said that spirit and mental energy are persistent and indestructible, so far as man's observation is concerned. To assume that there is no other agency than that of man is to assume what is m debate. To deny that there is any divine agency that may do with matter and force what man cannot is to venture a bold denial. It may be that PURE MATERIALISM. 479 the divine agency which brought matter and force into being can cause them to cease to be. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to make it plain that, in its essential nature, matter is inherently indestructible, and it has already been shown that this is highly improbable. All that can be allowed in regard to the atom is its relative indestructi- bility, which means that, so far as human resources are concerned, this seems to be true of matter and force. It must also be kept in mind that the atomic conception of matter and the dynamic idea of force are more or less ^deal or a priori. Both are hypothetic constructions of cer- tain sets of facts which appear in nature. The atom does not really fall under the ken of the senses directly, and motion rather than force is what the senses realize in the dynamical realm. Both the atom and tiie forces are meta- physical principles. To assert the indestructibility of matter and the persistence of force is really to make an assertion about these principles. This is scarcely consistent with the materialistic theory, which usually denies the reality of metaphysical principles. Yet it would seem that material- ism must assume the reality of such principles. But theism is under no such difficulty. By its fundamental postulate of an infinite personal spirit it provides an absolutely inde- structible foundation for all finite forms of being, whether material or spiritual. This postulate also guarantees what- ever of permanency and persistence there may be in these finite aspects of l,eing. If the annihilation of matter and the cessation of force be not inconceivable, then tlie origin of both, under a theistic view of the universe, is possible Here materialism lias special difficulties. It must hold to the eternity of matter, for there is no infinite personal spirit to bring It into being. This means that matter always was and always must be. Tliis is a conclusion whose metaphysical validity may, as we have seen, l)e seriously questioned, while its scientific correctness is more than doubtful. Theism consistently holds ail that science provei ii y it'i_ 48o APOLOGETICS. 1l 4': in regard to the relative indestructibility of matter, and it provides the metaphysical basis of an absolutely indestructi- ble personal spirit in God. 4. Materialism cannot be consistent with its own theory of knowledge. Flint and others use this with telliiig effect against materialism. This theory is the sensational or purely empirical. According to this theory, the senses are the only avenues of knowledge, and the senses bring us into cog- nitive relation only with what is concrete and palpable. Now, it has already been seen that the fundamental con- ception of materialism is the atoms, and that these atoms are metaphysical conceptions which do not come under the ken of the senses. Even in the laboratory, where the closest inspection of various forms of matter is made, the atoms are never seen nor handled. Hence, materialism can only speak of knowing its fundamental conception by being incon- sistent with its own epistemology. In like manner, force in itself is not cognized by the senses. What is observed thereby is only the facts of motion, which are the results of force. By the senses only the fact of change is observed. They do not bring us into cognitive touch with the force which effects the change. Hence, materialism has no right to assert the reality of force ; and when it does so it must be entirely inconsistent. Both the atom and force are a priori conceptions, which can have value and validity only on the basis of the rational theory of knowledge whose main outlines have already been expounded in this treatise. For materialism to assert the reality of either is to proclaim its own inconsistency, or to go ijeyond the limits of its own principles. 5. Materialism has great difficulty in giving a good ex- planation of force or energy, and in indicating its relation to matter. The conceptions of force and matter are distinct even in the mind of the materialist. Both are abstractions or inferences from what the senses observe. Now, mate- rialism is, at best, vague in its conception of force. And ;' ^ i TC-giij W' -a-^ PURE MATERIAL M. 481 in regard to the relations between force ond matter the opinions of materialists differ widely. Soine regard force as corporeal, others incorporeal; so- hold that it may subsist independently of matte r, others chat it is to be found only in connection with matter. Some make matter funda- mental, conditioning force; others make force fundamental, conditioning matter. According to the former, the atom IS the great reality, and force is a quality or invariable concomitant of the atom; according to the latter, force is the real entity, and the atom is the resultant of force in some way. So long as this difference and confusion of ideas exists among materialists, we may well hesitate to accept their philosophy of existence. Here the theist has decided advantage. His conception of one infinite, personal Spmt IS definite. He is the one eternal reality, and from him both matter and force can be adequately explained in such a way as to render it unnecessary to deduce the one from the other as materialism must. Theism has the merit of clear thinking on this point. 6. What is perhaps a still more serious objection to the materialistic construction of things lies in its inadequacy to explain the order and design seen in the cosmos. That the universe exhibits order and harmony, and has marks of adaptation and design, must be admitted even by material- ism. Of these ^ cts some explanation is needed H( > materialism is practically helpless. All that was adduced m a positive way in the exposition of the eutaxio- and teleo- theistic proofs for the reality of the existence of God tells negatively against materialism. Materialism must explain order without intelligence, and design without purpose It must account for harmony and adaptation in the cosmos only by chance or fate. Such explanations are scarcely alT sunnl"' " '.""' '°"" "^"^''"^ "^^ ^ead atoms cannot supply an adequate explanation of the undoubted fact of order and design. Neither the eutaxiologv nor the teleologj- of the cosmos has any rationale on the' basis 0* p ip i 482 APOLOGETICS. of materialism. Neither the fortuitous concourse of atoms in , .ncient materialism, nor the reaction of the atomic homo- .^eneous of modem materialistic theory provides what the iacts need for rational explanation. Every phase of pure materialism which begins with crass material atoms and blind mechanical force is open to this fatal criticism. In addition, it may be further said that, to sustain the laws of nature which appear to express the order in the cosmos, something else than the order itself, and something other than atom and force, is necessary. To say that matter was originally endowed with the potcr y of order, and a tendency towards design, is to lodge in matter qualities which are not necessarily materialistic and d}mamical. This supposition is really a confession that pure materialism cannot account for order and adaptation, law and purpose, in the cosmos. Theism, on the other hand, has no such difficulty with these y^- oblems. In its postulate of an •.ifinite personal Spirit, wi*' intelligence and volitional agency, theism provides the key to solve all these problems in the cosmos. All in this sphere that goes to support theism refutes materialism. 7. Finally, materialism finds its fatal test in its attempt to explain life and mind. The origin of life, and the devel- opment of living things, are inexplicable on the basis of materialism. Even chemistry cannot account for life, for living things can use the resources of chemical activity. Yet materialism is bound to bridge the breach between the 'vital and non-vital forms of being, or it must reduce the former to terms of the latter. Materialism has never yet shown how atom became cell, or how physical energy be- came vital force. All the force of the modern doctrine of biogenesis, which teaches that life always comes from preexistent life, tells against materialism at this point. To speak of the physical basis of life as bioplasm or protoplasm is not to explain life itself in terms of matter, for protoplasm is never vit;;l, save in connectiun with an organism already PURE MATERIALISM. 483 vital. Can materialism explain this vitality? Even if we admitted that mere mechanical agency could account for the order in the cosmos, or explain the definite forms of the crystal, can this agency account for the life in a bee, a bird, or a bea-^t? Even if we conceded that the me- chanical forces could produce the complex lenses in the eye of a beetle, this would not explain the function of vision which this wonderful eye performs. In like manner, if mechanism can explain the organic structure of an animal, yet the fact of sensation must be accounted for, and mate- rialism has never succeeded in doing so; and the vital processes of nutrition, growth and reproduction, instead of arising out of the chemical action involved in them are rather produced by some agency which is capable of using this chemical action. Such considerations as these show how futile is the materialistic account of the facts of organic life. ° The phenomena of mind or thought aflford the materialist still greater difficulty. As many things which bear upon this point, so far as man is concerned, are to be discussed in the next chapter, what is now to be said will be of a general nature. The main point now to be discussed is not whether man can be accounted for without assuming that there is a spiritual factor in his constitution, but rather whether the whole frame of the ccsmos can be accounted for without mind. The former belongs to the sphere of psychological materialism, the latter to pure or ontological materialism. Man may have no soul, yet there may be a Ood. There are knowing forms of being in the universe. Can these be explained by materialism? There are moral forms of being in the world. Can the materialist account tor these? There are volitional forms of existence What can materialism do with free responsible agents? Mind morahty and freedom are rocks upon which pure material- ism goes to pieces. i 1 ' k 1 -i ' r' i CHAPTER V. PSYCHOLOGICAI, MATERIALISM. Contents. A Particular Aspect of Materialism. — Its Import. — The Materialistic Theory of Man. — No Spiritual Principle in Man. — All Mental Facts Explained from the Basis of the Physical Organism. — No Personal Immortality for Man. — Criticism. — Common Traditions against the Theory. — Many Things not Observed by the Senses have Reality. — The Brain as an Organic Structure not the Seat of Consciousness. — Self- Consciousness Demands a Unitary Basis. — This Found only in a Spirit- ual Principle. — The Facts of Memory and Personal Identity Tell against the Theory. — Matter, as Atomic, as much an Hypothesis as Soul. — Perhaps Soul near the Seat of Knowledge. — Consciousness of Freedom the Fatal Rock. — The Immortality of the Soul. — Its Simplicity and Immateriality Suggest it. — Man's Instinctive Desire Argues in Favor of it. — General Belief Implies it. — The Demand for a Moral Equality Requires it. LiTEKATURE. Encyclopxdia Articles on Materialism- and Immortality. — Flint's Antitheistic Theories, Chap. IV. — Martineau's Study of Religion, Vol. II., Book IV., Chaps. I.-III.— Bruce's Apologetics, Chap. IV.— Farrar's History of Free Thought, Chap. V. — Adeney's Evolution and Immor- tality, Chap. VI. — Draper's ConHict Between Religion and Science, Chap. V. — Van Dyke's Theism and Evolution, Chap. XIX. — Lange's History of Materialism. — Bowne's Metaphysics, Part III., Chap. I.— Tait's Mind and Matter, Part III.— Harris' Philosophical Basis of The- ism, Chap. XVII. — Rishell's The Grounds of the Christian Faith, Div. I., Sec. I., Chaps. II.-IV., and Div. VI., Sees. I., II. — Lindsay's Recent Advances, Chap. XII. — Bowne's Studies in Theism, Chap. X. — Dabney's Sensualistic Philosophy, Chaps. VII., VIIT. — Dabney's Theology, Chap. VII. — Girardeau's Discussions, Chap. XIII. — Vogt's Lectures on Man. — Lotze's Microcosmus. — Ulrici's God and Man. — Salmond's Christian Doctrine of Immortality, Book I. I. Stathnent of Psychological Materialism. % 114. i.^TT^WO chapters have been devoted to the statement X and criticism of the materialistic theory of the universe. It was shown that this theory was open to some general criticisms, and that it was marked by various par- ticular defects. At the same time, care was taken to indicate PSYCI OLOGICAL MATERIALISM. 485 at every turn that theism met the demands of the facts where materialism failed to do so. A particular aspect of materialism remains for this chapter. It may be termed psychological or anthropo- logical materialism, and it consists in an application of the the principles of the materialistic theory to the nature and constitution of man. In the interests of religion, it is very necessary for Apologetics to discuss this aspect of material- ism with some care, for it is at this point that the assault IS made upon the very foundations of Christianity. An opponent of Christianity may not hold the materialistic theory of the universe as a whole, yet maintain the mate- nahstic view as to the nature of man. And even if we establish the divine existence as against pure materialism, proof may still be demanded for the reality of the spiritual nature of man. We must vindicate the reality of the human soul, as well as the fact of the existence of God, for the Christian religion not only requires God as its object, but also the human spirit as its subject. This being the case the apologete must establish the reality of the human soul and Its immortality, just as carefully as he does the exist- ence ' f God. This is the attitude of the Bible towards these two problems. The reality of both is simply assumed as the basis of religion which pertains to the relations be- tween them. Hence, psychological as well as ontological materialism must receive serious attention. And hot only is this important in the interests of religion in general, but also of theism in particular. We have already seen that several of the arguments for the divine existence are based on the reality of the spiritual principle in man. The psy- chology of theism is the starting point for the ontology of theism. Hence, in the interests alike of the theistic philoso- phy and the Christian religion, psychological materialism has vital importance. 2. A few paragraphs will suffice to state the aspect of materialism now under discussion. In general, it consists 4 j h i1 486 APOLOGETICS. '•( in an interpretation of the facts of man's constitution in terms of materialism. Of course, there are various ways in which this interpretation is made, from crude Epicu- reanism to refined modem theories. As they all agree in their fundamental tenets, it is not necessary to expound them in detail. Three main particulars will give an outline of the way in which psycholog-'^al materialism regards man. First, man has no soul or spiritual principle, distinct from his body, in his make-up. There is only one essence in the being of man, and that belongs to the category of matter. Psychological materialism asserts that what is called mind, soul or spirit in man is not a distinct entity from his body. The only reality in man is his bodily organism, with its material organic structure and complex functions. Man's personality does not include the two natures, one material and the other spiritual. Any personality possessed by man is such individuality as is competent to highly refined matter. In some types of the materialistic theory of man, an attempt is made to give a place to the evident duality in man's nature and experience, by assuming that both body ana soul must be construed in terms of matter, bt- hat the soul is a much finer sort of matter than the body. I'his view appeared in ancient Greek materialism, and it has emerged in various quarters in later times. This, however, affords no relief. It confesses some sort of dualism in man's constitution, yet offers, as the key for its interpretation, nothing but a dual materialistic principle. Secondly, all mental facts are explained in some way as the product of the physical organism of man. All so- called psychical phenomena are construed in terms of their physical foundation. Hence, psychological materialism un- dertakes to explain all forms of mental activity on the basis of the brain and the nervous system. In this way thought, memory and imagination are to be accounted for, and the moral sentiments and the religious instincts are all to be explained in liie same way. As each physical organ has ' i PSYCHOLOGICAL MATERIALISM. 487 its special function, so the particular function of the brain is to produce all phases of thinking. Intellect, sensibility and will, in all their varied forms of activity, are all ex- plained in this way. Even consciousness itself, as the invariable concomitant of all psychical facts, must be con- strued on a materialistic basis. In explaining all these facts, modem psychical materialism makes much of phy- siological psychology, and thinks it discovers the secret of consciousness amid the mysteries of the nervous system. Sensation, perception, memory, feeling, reasoning, volition and morality are all explained as products of brain and nerve. They do not need a spiritual entity to account for them at all, for they can all be explained without it. We have no fault to find with physiology in relation to psy- chology; but we are careful ever to keep in mind that an affection of nerve or brain is one thing, and consists in motion, while an affection of the mind is another, and con- sists m some form of consciousnes ,. The problem arises as to how physical motion becomes psychical conscious- ness. Thirdly, psychological materialism admits no personal tmmortality for man. This necessarily follows from the two positions already stated. If, in the present life and experience of man, there is in his nature r- spiritual entity numerically distinct from the body, thei when the body suffers death and falls into its original elements, that is the end of the individual man. There cannot be any immor- tality tor him, since death ends all that made up the individual man. If all forms of nsychical activity are inhe- rently dependent on tne physiology of nerve and brain, when nerve and brain cease their physical activity, psychical activity also ceases; though, of course, this theory of man has no good reason to speak of physical and psychical activities on the part of man. If there be no brain there can be no thought; then when the brain ceases to do its work, thought is suspended. But if thinking implies a I » 488 APOLOGETICS. thinker, and if that thinker is other than matter, it is evident that a correct view of thinking makes it difficult to hold the materialistic view of the ending of man, and the denial of immortality. Turn the matter as we may, psychological materialism has no place for personal immortality. Most of its advocates plainly teach this, while others are ready to explain immortality as the permanency of our influence, as we live in the lives of those whom we have touched, and who survive us. In a few cases, as, for example, the French atheists and materialists, the materialistic view of man was stated in a crude and vulgar form, but we have no space to enter into particulars on this point. Hence, the materialistic construction of man's niture teaches that there is no spiritual entity in it; that all its activities can be explained in terms of matter, and that there is no personal immortality for man. The rest of the chapter proceeds to careful criticism of this doctrine. II. Criticism of Psychological Materialism. §115. As careful an examination of the materialistic view of man's nature as the limits of this chapter permit is now to be made. If man's nature be merely highly organized matter, and if immortality be but a dream, then religion is superstition, and our hope for the future is a mere delusion. But let us see. I. Certain common beliefs and traditions among men sug- gest that in man there is something more than his bodily organism. These beliefs and traditions are found in ancient and modern times, and among savage and semi-civilized peoples. Some general suggestions that man has a soul, and some faint gleams of its immortality, are found widely diffused among pagan races generally. .\n those facts which form the basis for animism and spiritism, as theories for the beginnings of religion, arise here. These involve tl e native tendency in mankind to believe that man has a PSYCHOLOGICAL MATERIALISM. 489 double, or second self, and that the man in some form con- tinues to be after death. This traditional belief in man's spiritual nature runs side by side with his belief in deity in some form. It is vain to recite the manifold forms in which this belief appears. The general belief in ghosts, or the disembodied spirits of men who once lived, illustrates one general set of these facts. The varied and widely prevalent belief in transmigration of souls, or metamorphosis of individuals of the human race, presupposes belief in the reality of a spiritual and enduring principle in man. Transmigration does not relate to the body, but to the soul, so that wherever It appears it presupposes a well-defined belief in the spiritual element in the human constitution. Egypt, India and China give abundant evidence of this belief. In like manner, ancestonsm, wherever it appears, implies a belief in spirit, as an essential element in man's nature. This belief so widely prevalent in Asia, rests upon the fact that man is supposed to possess a spiritual factor in his constitution which survives the article of death, and comes to be re- garded with reverence. This is the essence of ancestor worship in all its forms. All these primitive beliefs and traditions suggest the reality of the human soul, and tell against psychological materialism. 2. Crude forms of the materialistic theory of man argue m a very loose way when they assert that since the soul is not perceived by the senses, therefore it does not exist. Those who thus argue are out and out sensationalists in their theory of knowledge. They allege that what does not come under the observation of the senses does not exist. The soul IS not seen, nor felt, nor tasted, nor heard, hence Jt does not exist. Others, who profess to be a little more scientific, assert that the anatomy of the human organism never reveals the presence of the soul, nor does the micro- Kope reveal any sign of the spiritual principle in man. Scientific research, it is said, reveals only matter in more V 'i: I 490 APOLOGETICS. It or less highly organized forms, and to assert the existence of anything else is to go quite beyond the facts. All this reasoning is entirely superficial. It assumes that only what comes under the ken of the senses, or can be made the subject of physical experiment, has reality. Not only is the sensational theory of knowledge, upon which this reasoning is based, false, but the very materialists who use it are often quite inconsistent with it. They often talk about things which are entirely supersensible, as if they knew ever so much about them. Thus they discourse about atoms and the ether, neither of which the senses ever cog- nize, and yet refuse to admit the reality of the soul, which is no more supersensible than is atom or ether. All we claim heie is consistency at the hands of materialism. But the fact that anatomy does not reveal any signs of the soul in man proves nothing, for it is entirely beside the point at issue. The anatomist deals only with a dead body, from which the spiritual principle, by the very fact of death, has departed. Anatomy, to make good its claim, must make and complete its observation in a living human organism. Those who hold that there is a spiritual prin- ciple in man maintain that the union subsists during life between the soul and body. At death that principle departs, and it is vain to search for it in the dead body. The ab- surdity of this procedure is evident. It is as if I should seek for a friend, who had gone to Europe, in his house in America, and then declare that because I found that house empty my friend was dead. 3. The fact that the brain, as an organic structure, is not conscious, nor itself the scat of consciousness, is a serious objection to the materialistic doctrine of man. Recent physiological researclies in regard to the function of the brain in relation to thought have 1 .actically established the position that the brain, as a complex material organism, is not, and cannot be, the sphere of conscious experiences. Experiments in vivisection in various animals show that 11^ •i^ PSYCHOLOGICAL MATERIALISM. 491 large areas of the brain are not involved in sensation. Then, if a section of the brain be separated from the living organism, that section has no sensation whatever. Theo- retically, large sections of the brain might be removed, and yet the seat of sensation might remain unimpaired. And even if the removal of brain matter were continued till death ensued, it would not prove that the seat of conscious- ness were in the brain, but simply that the bond between the brain and the real seat of consciousness was broken. In a word, the real sphere in which consciousness arises always eludes the search of the physiologist. A that physiology discovers is motion, or change in the white and grey matter of the brain, but such motion is not itself sensa- tion, but must be transferred to the psychical sphere before consciousness arises. The materialist here must either show that consciousness arise out of brain, or that brain move- ment and psychical consciousness are identical. If the materialist says to us that it is very difficult to locate the soul anywhere in the body, we may replv that he finds it equally difficult to locate consciousness anywhere in the brain. At best, the brain may, on the purely physical side, be the organ of the soul and of certain of its experi- ences, yet that organ needs the player, which is the spiritual principle in man, to bring forth the harmonious activities which arise in consciousness. If. a^ jme say, the soul needs the brain in order to its activities as revealed in con- sciousness, it can be replied that the brain needs the soul in order to the possibility of consciousness in any form But we might go further, and say that a brain from which the soul had departed is so much dead matter, doomed to decay, while the soul, set free by death from its union with the body, may continue, in a freer form, its spiritual being and activity. In support of this hypothesis, it may be pointed out that certain forms of consciousness are scarcely dependent on the body organisms at all for their exercise ■inc lofuer emotions and abstract reasoning are cases in rJi; i ii. ' i; '^1 11 492 APOLOGETICS. point. Hence, the brain is not necessarily the seat of con- sciousness in all its forms, and this shows another serious defect in psychological materialism. 4. Against the materialistic view of man is may be further argued that consciousness demands a unitary basis, and that this cannot be supplied by psychological materialism. Con- sciousness is here taken, in its strict sense, to denote a certain psychical condition, which is an invariable con- comitant or condition of all mental and moral experiences. It is not so much a single faculty as the common basis of the activity of them all. As such it involves unity of the highest and most definite kind. It is the unity of apperception or self-consciousness, and consists in that spontaneous power in the human personality by which it unifies all its experiences, and says that they belong to that personality. This is the ego, and its absolutely ■; ii visible essence. All sound psychology now holds, in substance, to this view. It teaches that the ego, as the seat of self-con- sciousness, must be unitary in its nature. We charge that psychological materialism in every form fails to provide such a unitary basis. Matter, as we have already seen, is multiple, not unitary, in its fundamental conception. The unity of self-consciousness cannot be found amid the physical multiplicity of the atomic or cellular con- ception of matter, inorganic or organic. The materialist cannot locate consciousness in that which is material, nor can he attach self-consciousness to that which has atomic or cellular multiplicity. In which of the atoms or cells is the throne of the ego, and the seat of self -consciousness tu be found? To this question psychlogical materialism has no answer whatever. 5. The facts of memory and personal identity form an- other serious obstacle in the way of the materialistic theory of man. Memory is a fact in man's experience, and per- sonal identity is implied in his intellectual and moral life. It is not necessary, therefore, to discuss the psycholog)- of PSYCHOLOGICAL MATERIALISM. 493 memory, or the metaphysics of personal identity, in order to see the force of this argument against the materialistic view of man's constitution. Taking the two facts together, we recollect that we were the subjects of certain experi- ences in the past, and we are sure that we are now the same persons that we were then. If this be the ca,?e, it is not easy to see how the materialistic construction of the facts of man's mental and moral experience is sufficient. Physiologists tell us that our bodies, mcluding, of course, tht brain cells and fibres, are all changed by the vital pro- cesses which take place in the organism every seven ten or twelve years. If this be the case, it is net easy to see how memory, if its basis be purely material, can survive and persist throughout these changes. And if personal identity must have the same organic basis, without refer- ence to any spiritual principle, it is not easy to see how it can be preserved. If personal identity must have a purely org-anic, as distinergy. Literature. «.M7prn ChaS"l ?f,,^-'"«'--Spencer's SyntHetic Pkil- II and Vm Fi5*^r ^~^iy.~^'°''"' '^'""^'" Theology, Chaps. Vn-JS;;;? r' ^"f.'^'^ P'"'osophy, Vol. I., Part II.. Chap,. I.^ Part m Chin rf '?. " '" ''^ ''•'''"''"' '" ^-'■>'°« 7-^*' m Pr ^' "-Chapman's Pre-organic Evolution, Chaps II Ill-Pressense's A Study of Origins, Book II., Chap IV-Ri!hJl': Jurtis^T !•"" "f i'^^"''"' Div. II.. Sec. II.. Chapl" IV V- Curtis Creation or Evolution Chan« tv-tv n J . i, ' Chap^ III-Dabney's W.«:;,v?iily, S^^^^^^ ^- ^o»^e General Explanations. §1x7. n^HE formal discussion of materialism, in its three main X aspects, has been completed. As a theory concern- ing God. man and the universe, the glaring defects of matenalism have been made evident. It the sam t me ^e^rattonal sufficiency of theism has been more ful^ vTn-' I. There remains an important question which modern evoluUonJ..s started in connection with the materialSj *■• ': -J b i i^W'' h •498 APOLOGETICS. Ilicory of the universe. This question relates to the way in which the universe, construed in terms of materialism, came to be what it now is. This raises the problem of materialistic evolution. It might almost be called onto- logical evolution. It has come into view already at several stages of the discussion of materialism. Among the an- cients, the method by which the fortuitous concourse of atoms produced an orderly cosmos is a crude form of this type of evolution. In a more metaphysical form it appears in Greek pantheism, where the many were manifestations of the one. The universe shows progress from the simple to the com- plex all along its history. There has been development in its entire cosmical career. The question at once arises as to the mode and agency of this development. Materialism gives its answer in terms of cosmic evolution. It is by this principle that the progress of the universe from its primitive simple condition has come to be what we now find it. Some are content to speak of evolution as the method by which the agency operative in the cosmos works ; others, thinking less carefully, associate the idea of agency with the fact of evolution. According to the latter, evolu- tion becomes an agent, with power and rationality capable of producing the cosmos at any stage. This puts evolution in the place of God, and is atheistic. The former regards evolution as merely the mode of the operation of the causal -agency operative in the universe. If that agency be re- igarded as merely mechanical in its nature, then we have •a purely materialistic type of evolution ; but if that agency, be the operation directly or indirectly jf one infinite per- sonal God, then we have what may be termed theistic evolution. It is with materialistic evolution, strictly speak- ing, that the present discussion is concerned. Of this Herbert S' -ncer may be taken as the best modern repre- sentative -cording to Spencer, evolution represents tlie method according to which the infinite and inscrutable MATERIALISTIC EVOLUTION. 499 energy that lies at the heart of the universe operates in the production of the cosmos. John Fiske, in his Cosmic Fhxlosophy. is the best American expositor of this general evolutionary scheme. 2. The term evolution needs careful t.tplanation, for it ;s used m different senses, and is often quite ambiguous. The word itself means to unroll, but it is used in many Z^fc? Tl\^'"'"^ 'P^'"^'"^' '' ^™P^y d^"°tes the process by which the simple becomes the complex. It marks the progress of organization in the cosmos as a whole or in any section of it. Strictly speaking, neither causality nor rationality pertains to it. thus understood. If there t^ "^^^^ " f '°"?^ '"''^"^ •" *^^ P^*^^^^^' ^'^•^ belongs to something else, and is merely exhibited in the process evolution has its important place. First, there is its application to the entire cosmos. In this sense ,ts sphere is ail existing things. It professes to give a philosophy of the entire univefse, which tt: more han its natural history, from beginning to end The law of continuity rules, and the procL of ^evolution pre vails everywhere. It is cosmic transformism. and it is fi It a scientific hypothesis^which is next made a'philoso hy o the entire universe. Comte represents this on the basis of positivism. Spencer exhibits it in terms of materialism and piThlT' s"o' ""''^ '""'r- ' ^" ''' '-- ^^^ ZsZZ r"' ''f'^'P^ '''' ^'' representative of his type o evolution, which may be termed cosmic or onto- logical evolution on grounds of materialism tern^T?;- '^''^ '' ^ """"'^ "^'"^°^^'- application of the Ze M "' T*"'"^ *° "'^•^'^ '^ '^ ^-fined to the Solj ' y^'- '' '' '" *^'^ ^P'^-^ that modem bmlogical science has made so very much of it. This may be caned organic evolution. Its problem relates to th way m wh,ch one species or grade of living things has b^n produced m relation to other species in'the vjetab L ^d i: li'l i ■'4 iVhi thi' l> 500 APOLOGETICS. animal kingdoms. The origin of new species by means of genetic descent, in accordance with the laws of organic evolution, is the single question here considered. Lamarck, Darwin, Haeckel, Wallace and Huxley are well-known rep- resentatives of this type of evolution. It is not with this that we have now to do. Later on in our discussions it will be carefully reviewed. We have now to do with cosmic evolution as represented by Herbert Spencer on a materialistic basis. II. General Description of the Theory. § 118. The particular problem which now arises is the mode or method according to which the universe from its simple, primitive, materialistic condition comes to exist in its various stages of ever-increasing complexity. Several par- ticulars will exhibit the comprehensive scheme of cosmic evolution of which Spencer is the great modem exponent. 1. The starting-point of this scheme is that of pure modem materialism. According to this view, matter is etemal, and it exists in its early stages in the form of atomic homogeneity. From this primitive, atomic, homo- geneous matter everything is derived. Along with this primordial matter, an eternal and inscrutable energy i-, also assumed. This is the agency which, as the ground of change in the homogeneous, effects the movements which constantly take place in the universe. Then the fact of motion has a definite place at the initiation of the whole process of the cosmic evolution now under notice. Matter eternal, force persistent, and motion continuous, constitute the fundamental facts of Spencer's system. This is the trinity of cosmic evolution. That evolution expresses the mode in which that force works in producing motion in the atomic material homogeneity. 2. The process of cosmic evolution is relatively simple. The problem is, How does the primitive incoherent homo- '^-^'Hi MATERIALISTIC EVOLUTION. 501 geneous become the subsequent coherent heterogeneous? How do the ntoms. as they are all mixed together in an mdistmgu.shaLle mass, by degrees come to take definite form m this or that particular concrete object? How does the atomic homogeneous, under the operation of inscrutable " energy, acting according to the law of cosmic evolution produce gold and silver, hydrogen and oxygen, and all other inorganic concrete objects? The scheme of cosmic evolution indicates three stages in the process. First, the atomic homogeneous is supposed to be in an unstable condition. In its primitive state matter is not in a rigid or immobile condition. It is the seat of energy and this energy, constantly active, produces a ceaseless tendency m the homogeneous to change its state or mode of existence. This energy, either as an attribute of the atoms o~ as acting on them, gives rise to that condition of atomic or molecular activity which physicists tell us marks all materia forms of existence. The atomic homogeneous, consequently, is in a condition of unstable equUibrium whereby It IS ready at any time to enter into new combina- tions, and become more complex in its nature Secondly, this instability is accompanied with a reaction m the atomic homogeneous. As the inscrutable energy acts on the atoms and molecules, they in turn react against that energy. The result of this is that some degree of the motion which this energy has produced seems to be dissi- pated. This simply means that some of the motion which was manifested in the atomic homogeneous is transferred from a kmetic to a potential form in the atoms. The motion which was previously exhibited seems to be lost, and this >s what IS meant by the reaction of the atomic homo- geneous. Thirdb^, the integration or segregation of matter natu- rally follows. As the energy acting on, or among, the a cms IS resisted or reacted on by the atoms, and the form of the energy so modified as to cause the losing of some i * rti ■■\ ■ i 5smic evolution announces two further prin- ciples to explain increasing heterogeneity. First, coordination, which secures increasing and con- tinuous integregation, appears. According to the law of coordination, things which have become so far differen- tiated are so coordinated that tiie differentiation continues. This simply means that things are s turn, the which IS really the r^^oduct of what these terms denote, i the cause of these very things. But the question naturally arises as to what skillful hand effects the adjustments and b nation imply. ,f not a wisdom and power to effect what h.se terms e.xpress? Surely there are here marks of teleology. If tl,e adaptations and adjustments involved in cosmic evolution are of chance, how do they come to be ^constant and regtilar? Why do they produce results which look so much like the efTectr, of intelligence? Deny- mg teleology, cosmic evolution really implies it, and in its working cannot get on without it. an^ h' ? ''■" "'"••'^ P'-°f°""d question may also be asked, and that is, How does intelligence itself arise? Even if we were to hold that this intelligence is intra-mundane, the li 5o8 APOLOGETICS. question of its genesis would sorely press cosmic evolution. Spencer has no reply to such a query as this that meets the rational demands of the case. To take the conception of evolution presented by Le Conte in his Evolution and Religious Thought affords little relief to Spencer's perplexity. Le Conte defines evolution as "continuous progressive change according to certain laws and by means of resident forces." Only the first of the statements in this definition relates to what is now taken to be evolution in the strict sense as a method of cosmic progress, and not the cause of it. Both of the other state- ments in this definition lead to implications which transcend the cosmos wherein the progress lies. The question may at once be asked as to how the laws were planted in the cosmos, or whether they are inherent in it. Still more per- tinent r the question as to the nature, origin and ground of the resident forces of which this definition makes so much. They certainly imply an extra-cosmic ground, for otherwise they are entirely hypothetical. Hence, our conclusion is that cosmic evolution which ex- cludes God, and construes all the facts in the cosmos in terms of matter, force and motion, is not competent to meet the demands of the case. 'f i CHAPTER VII. positivism. Contents. SyS^Z"^J^'TK Statement-Term Vague.-Relation to Other iTr^ uT'"'' ,^«=«"««-Deni« Metaphysics.-Denies the rI' tonal Psychology._No Immutable Principles of Truth and Duty.-I?, or^TThrT^r^'^r'u *'* **»*-^-t- Evolution.-Thtliw Of the Three Stages of Human Progress.-The Theological -The Ph.losoph.cal.-The Scientific-Its Empirical Psycholog^!:^ Ou£e of Rel,g,on.-Exam.nation of Positivism.-Denial Tt MetaphysSs Fut.le.-Causes must be Sought.-Its Psychology Defective -Ito Ma! St-Vhe wl^'rp"^'^ ^T ^"-""''-T^« Three Stages D - fect.ve.-The Idea of Progress Inverted—The Three Stages Coexist - for r StLl M^'r^ '" ?T" P^°«^«— Positivism Gives no Sound iTav t ^.°"^''y-^'' R'^'iK-ous System a Confession of Failure - It Asks Questions which Philosophy and Theology alone Answer Literature. Encyclopaed^ Article on P..,V.V^.,„._Flinfs AntitheUHc Theories. p/v yi" wn. ' C-Am<,a«,/y and Posilivism.-Comte's Positive Plulosophy-MAl's Comte and Po«/.W5m.-Lewes' Hislorv of pZt woMy.-Huxley's The Scientific Aspects of Posit^Tm FisW ' Thought, Chap. Vll.-Pressense's A Study of Origins Book I Thll I-Bowne's Metaphysics. Part III.. Chap. IV-Sv's \t^L;:v. ta*^' ?r' ''r.'' s"^"- "^•' '^'=- "^-Harris- pSc,.Sr;ii*:; i-/..«m, Chap. y.-Rishell-s The Foundations of the Faith dTv Sec^ I.. Chaps. I.-IIL-Dabney's Sensualistic Philosophy ChT'v- Modern Skepticism, Chap. III.-Matheson's The GosZl' .,a Ir I S^stitutes. Chap. VI.-Bowne's Studies ilMcLS^ "-wt^t: I. I. GrM^ro/ Description and Statement. § 120. pOSITIVISM, which is to be the subject of this J. chapter, is a somewhat vague and indefinite scheme It often stands on the ground of materialism and speaks in the accents of agnosticism. Some of those who hold the cosmic evolution discussed in the last chapter might be termed positivists, while the distinction between the agnostic ,^/* Sio APOLOGETICS. Ilf M and the positivist is often quite obscure. Spencer, the pro- fessed agnostic, is sometimes described as the English exponent of Comte, but this description he persistently repudiates. Writers like Lewes and Harrisoi , Congreve and Morley, are avowed positivists, while the teachings of J. S. Mill are in many respects like those of positivism. Some deists, too, who deny the supernatural and exalt the natural and the sensible, are practically on the ground of the positivist. And in our own day, some who are devoted to scientific research, rather than to metaphysical study, exhibit the temper of positivism, and insist that human investigation is to be concerned only with observed facts as they coexist or succeed each other. It is evident, there- fore, that positivism is a general temper or type of thought, rather than a connected scheme of things. This being the case, it can scarcely be called a philosophy of all existence. It is rather a method of scientific investigation, with no general agreement among its adherents. This makes it difficult to give a connected description of the general scheme which it denotes. Comte, of course, is usually taken to be the great modern exponent of positivism, yet many who profess to be positivists do not agree with Comte in many particulars. Among the Greeks, especially with the Sophists, and the adherents of later decadent nescience, the temper of positivism is found. But we have now to do with modern po tivism, and, in a g:eneral way, the exposi- tion will follow Comte. 2. The relation of positivism to other systems may be a little more fully elucidated. In relation to atheism, posi- tivism is in Comte's hands practical atheism. By this is not meant that all positivists are atheists, but that the principles of positivism are entirely destructive of theism. When positivism confines our attention exclusively to sen- sible phenomena, and forbids any inquiry after causes and grounds, it blocks the way for any theistic theory of the universe, and renders religion virtually impossible. In rela- POSITIVISM. 511 tion to materialism, it may be said that in almost every case positivism builds on a materialistic basis. Materialism indeed, is the soil in which both positivism and agnosticism' usually grow. Comte and Spencer, in their ontology, have a great deal of materialistic resemblance, yet one is a positivist and the other an agnostic. This gives the mate- rialistic scheme of things greater importance. In relation to agnosticism, it may be remarked that it and positivism are twin brothers. In their psychology they agree in both holding the empirical theory of knowledge, but they differ in their application of that theory. The agnostic asserts that there may be an absolute or supersensible reality, but says that we cannot know anything of its real nature. The positivist, on the other hand, refuses to make any assertion whatever in regard to the absolute or real which is supposed to he behind the relative and phenomenal. In the sphere of religion, of course, there are other differences between the two systems. 3- In describing positivism, its negative features first arrest attention. These are simple denials. First in regard to metaphysics, as the science of first principles or necessary truths, both mental and moral, posi- tivists, with great unanimity, deny the validity of any such science. They do not admit the reality of the a priori conditions of human thought which render experience pos- sible. Hence, all metaphysical inquiry is futile, and can ever lead to any reliable results. Comte distinctly takes his negative position, and Lewes has written an elaborate History of philosophy to discredit metaphysics in the inter- ests of positivism. Positive science is exalted as the only reliable organ of truth, while metaphysics moves in the region of mere speculation, and never reaches certainty Secondly, ,n reference to psychology, as the science of the human soul and its conditions of cognition, positivism holds a negative position also. By not a few the mate- rialistic view ot man's nature is taken, and by such adherents i m 512 APOLOGETICS. I of the system the reahty of the spiritual principle in man is denied. By others, who do not hold the materialistic theory of man, the sensational theory of knowledge is held, and the validity of the rational theory is frankly denied. All the objects of human knowledge are found in the circle of phenomena, and the cognition of noumena is denied. All inquiry into grounds, causes or essences is excluded, and the activity of the human mind is to be confined strictly to the sphere of the sensible. Its epistemology is em- pirical. Thirdly, in the realm of morality and religion, similar denials are made. Positivism denies the reality of any eternal and immutable principles of morality. Man be- comes, as with the old Sophists, the measure of all things. There are no abiding rules of duty, but the path of duty is to be marked out by experience and expediency. There can be no metaphysics of ethics, since there are no neces- sarj moral truths; and so far as the knowledge of God is concerned, the negative position in some form is taken. At best, this knowledge can only be relative, for we cannot know God as he really is, but only as he is related to us. This virtually cuts up by the root any rational theism, and heads us towards agnosticism. 4. The positive features of this system can be briefly stated. These are associated with its peculiar theory of the progress of human civilization. First, positivism is usually associated with some form of naturalistic rc)olution. It can scarcely be said that any very thorough exposition of the evolutionary philosophy is given oy leading positivists, yet they generally assume its sound- ness, and construe the facts of human society according to the teachings of this philosophy. The idea of progress prevails in the positivist scheme, and this progress is a sort of natural development. Human society and institutions have developed through the centuries by slow degrees from the simple to the complex. POSITIVISM. 5,3 It is in this connection that the law of the three stages of human progress comes into view as one of the marked features of leading types of positivism. Comte gave much prommence to these stages in his scheme, but other posi- tmsts are content to interpret the progress of human civilization in terms of the evolutionary philosophy in a rather vag^e and comprehensive way. A very brief outline of these three successive stages will indicate the general drift of the scheme. The first is called the theological or religious stage, which IS associated with primitive man in his earliest con- dition of culture. In this stage, as men began to inquire concerning the world about them and the events which happened, they sought to explain the things that happened by referring them to certain supernatural powers or agents. These agents were personified, and then regarded as deities. In this stage men were theologians, and gave the religious explanation of the universe. Under the influence of this motive, the first stage of human culture was experienced. I'ositivists give elaborate descriptions of the way in which men m this stage of their culture sought to explain the various phenomena of nature. These events, sometimes, sub mie and terrible, sometimes gentle and beneficent were explained by means of some real divine agency which was he cause of them all. In this way positivism accounts for the ongin of religion in fetichism, and thus interprets the first temporary stage of the civilization of the human The second stage was the philosophical or metaphysical 1 his is an advance on the previous stage. With the events of nature still before them, men in this stage have made such progress that they begin to discard the theological explanation of these events, and proceed to give a meta- physical instead. In the place of personal ddties. occult causes or s.^i^ersensible essences are assumed to stipplv a rational explanation. Impersonal essences take the place su APOLOGETICS. of personal agents, and abstract causes are substituted for concrete beings. Men thus became philosophers in the .second stage of their progressive civilization. But the third stage follows, and constitutes the crown of it all. This is the scientific or positive stage. In this stage the supposition of causes and essences is discarded, and all search after them is declared to be futile. Hence, both theology and philosophy are rejected, and science is given the field. Phenomena in their coexistences and sequences are all that men have anything to do with in this stage. This is the very highest stage of intellectual development in the human race, and to its lofty and serene elevation only a few, who call themselves positivists, have yet attained. When all shall have reached this elevation, then the race will have attained its goal and perfection. 5. Positivism presents, as has been hinted, a psychology of its own. On this a word or two only is now necessary. Its psychology is sensational ; its epistemology is empirical. The priori factor is entirely excluded, and all knowledge is gained by sensible experience, and all the contents of the various sciences that have any reality depend entirely on observation. The results of this observation in various ■spheres of human knowledge, and the outcome of the -classification of these results, constitute the aim and end of science. The whole of human knowledge is embraced in the circle of the sciences thus understood, and Comte proposed an elaborate classification of the sciences on this '.basis. Indeed, the classification of the sciences is the only philosophy there is. How positivism can make any rational classification of the sciences, or suggest any kind of philoso- phy of them, is a real difficulty of the scheme, when it denies the reality of such first principles, as seem necessary to effect a true classification. 6. Finally, positivism outlines a religion and proposes a cultus. This may seem a strange statement after what has been said in regard to the repudiation of the religious view POSITIVISM. SIS of things made by positivism in its exposition of the law of the three stages of human progress. Yet. in spite of this, Comte undertakes to give an entirely new religious system. This system is entirely empirical, and has no place m It for a supersensible deity The deity erected is man himself. Humanity is made divinity, and hence this system »s sometimes called the religion of humanity. Positivists are usually content with the abstract conception of idealized humanity. Whatever this phrase may mean is the deity of the system, and man is bidden worship himself. Comte was much more concrete in his views, but they were so absurd as to be scarcely worthy of mention in this con- nection. A cultus. or ritual of worship, was drawn up by Comte though more sober adherents of positivism repudiate the prophet of the scheme at this point. Paris was to be the holy city, and a temple was to be built there. Other temples were to be built all over France, facing Paris. Priests were to be appointed and paid by the State. Prayers were to be offered and sacraments were to be observed The whole scheme at this point is puerile, and has been well termed, Romanism minus Christianity." The State was to control everything, and the priests of this system were to have charge of education. Both religion and education were to be paid for out of the public treasury The principles of positive science were to form the basis of all education, and for a time an attempt was made in France to put this scheme into practical effect As might be expected, the attempt was an utter failure m all of this there is a concession to the native religious mst.nct of men, which is entirely inconsistent with the principles of positivism. It is only fair to add that few It any, of the positivists of to-day embrace these vagaries ot Lomte. They content themselves with fine phrases con- cernmg the religion of humanity, and with hard words about metaphysics and theology. it i -lit s li mii 516 APOLOGETICS. II. The Examination of Positivism. § 121. This examination can only be made in general outline, although there are several points which merit careful con- sideration. 1. The denial of metaphysics which positivism makes is futile. Every line of investigation, sooner or later, leads to first principles, and demands a philosophy. To deny the a priori is to repudiate the fundamental conditions of the possibility of rational cognition. In practical experience it is impossible to hold to the denial of the search after causes. The inquiring little child insists on asking questions about causes, that upset all the arbitrary denials of the right of the human mind to make this interrogation ; and, in addi- tion, it can be charged against positivism that it greatly limits the scope of scientific inquiry, and in some respects renders it practically helpless. Much of the inspiration of modem science arises directly from the impulse of the human mind *o seek for causes, and to silence this quest is to deprive science of its romantic interest, and to make it prosaic in the extreme. In a word, all true science frames the materials of a metaphysic, and any scheme which puts up an impassable barrier between these two realms is arbi- trary and irrational. 2. In like manner, its empirical psychology is radically defective. After what has been said in the Introduction to this treatise, but little need now lie added in criticism of the empirical epistemology. Positivism is open to all the objections which lie against the empirical psycholofjy, and it entirely fails tc. meet the conditions of a rational epistemology. In addition to ail that was there adduccil, it need now only be pointed out that the ability to frame scientific hypotheses transcends a purely sensational theory of knowledge. Take the law of gravitation to illustrate. The senses never perceived this great law. When first POSITIVISM. 517 proposed, it was a purely supersensible or rational product The process of its mathematical confirmation was rational also, as It was worked out by Newton. Hence, the power to make and to prove any scientific hypothesis lies in a region of mental activity which transcends the senses. The senses simply observe the facts, which must ever remain smgle and unrelated if the human mind has no supersen- sible or rational power, such as is involved in making a scientific hypothesis. Hence, the positivist theory of know- ledge is either erroneous, or, if true, it destroys the possi- bihty of science itself, which relates facts to each other according to some general law or principle. 3- So, also, it need only be pointed out that, since posi- tivism builds on the basis of materialistic evolution it is open to all the criticisms of that scheme. We have seen already how defective that scheme is as a complete philoso- phy of all existence. In its attempt to provide such a philosophy, it must bid farewell to logic and reason. Just so far, therefore, as positivism rests on a materialistic basis, It is a house built on a foundation of sand, and cannot stand strict rational tests; and in the application of the philosophy of evolution to the progress of civilization in general, poc.tivism is open to the objection that it intro- duces something new into each successive stage of the development of humanity. This new factor pertains to a stage of the progress which is an .(Tect of the preceding stage as its cause. This construction of the facts of progress with increasing complexity, constantly contra- venes the law of causation, which refuses to allow anything in the effect which has not its adequate ground in the cause. i he higher cannot be explained from the lower alone, and an infinite regress, such as is involved in the positivist philosophy, in this view-point, is irrational. 4. Serious objection may be made to the law of the thret stages in human progress, as outlined in positivism. It is largely a speculative view of the way in which the human i •■i H I! 5x8 APOLOGETICS. race has advanced in civilization. The evident absurdity of the manner in which Comte has presented the theo- logical, philosophical and scientific stages of progressive human culture, has so impressed many more recent advo- cates of positivism that they reject it in its Comtean form, and are content with a purely empirical construction of the facts of the culture of the race, in accordance with pro- gressive evolution. A few separate points may now be noted. First, the very idea of progress is wrong. Comte regards . it as an advance to go from the theological to the meta- physical, and from the metaphysical to the scientific. It may be more correct to say that the progress lies in the opposite direction. The lowest activity of the human mind may be to observe phenomena and their order. To give a true philosophy of these phenomena, by referring them to their causes, is surely a higher form of rational activity; and to construe the phenomena of the universe in relation to the agency and purpose of deity, is certainly a still higher form of human activity This we take to be the true order, and this order is simply inverted by positivism. Secondly, as a matter of fact, these supposed stages are not really successive', but contemporaneous. History does not bear out Comte's exposition at all. In every age these three stages have existed side by side and been influential. Any age may be observing facts, seeking their philosophy, and searching for their religious significance. Even a single individual, like Newton, for example, may exhibit all these stages in himself. The positivist must show how the one stage leads on to the next, and at the same time make it plain that that stage is left entirely behind; and, in the same connection, it is proper to remark that the view of evolution which positivism exhibits leaves no place for degeneration, while the facts of the civilization of the race frequently show that there has been decline as well as advance. Recent advocates of the evolutionary philosophy POSITIVISM. 519 admit this, and are more ready to do justice to the facts than positivism is. Thirdly, as a matter of fact, science, philosophy and theology must always go together. In the activity of the human race, they cannot be divorced from each other. There are facts which pertain to each of these spheres, and of these facts in general the scientific, the philosophical, and the religious view may be taken. In this connection positivism does injustice, not only to history, but to the very nature of the case. These three departments of human inquiry inherently subsist side by side in all true rational investigation. We first explore the facts, and see what they are. We next search for their causes or reasons, and discover how they are. Then we finally raise the query concerning their purpose or end, and ascertain why they are as they are. At this point positivism is painfully one- sided and defective. 5. Positivism leaves no ground for stable morality or for national security. It rejects any fixed and immutable morality, and leaves no ground for the obligatory character of moral duties. This being the case, the very foundations of individual, domestic, social and national well-being are destroyed. It provides only an empirical type of ethics, and such a type must ever be intensely egoistic, clearly indi- vidualistic, and essentially utilitarian. 6. The attempts which certain types of positivism make to construct a religious system are not only in themselves absurd, but constitute a reluctant confession that man is, after all, a religious being, and must have some sort of reli! on. After denying that men need religion when they re? . the positivist stage, it seems very strange to find a r"' iion, with its deity and its cultus, proposed by posi- ti iSm. Then, to find more moderate positivists speaking, as they do, of the religion of humanity, with some vague Idealization of the race as its deity, is scarcely less absurd, and is equally a cgnfession of the insufficiency of positivism. SM APOLOGETICS. and a testimony to the native religiousness of the human race. In this respect positivism is self-condemned. 7. To conclude, it may be added that positivism really asks questions which it cannot answer, and, like the dog in the manger, forbids either philosophy or theology to give the answer. Questions concerning the origin of the imiverse, of its inner grounds and meaning, are left without any answer. Problems concerning the human mind and the profoimd principles of human knowledge are not solved ; and inquiries in regard to the moral sentiments and re- ligious instincts of the spirit of man are left untouched. Now, these are questions and problems and inquiries which will not down at the bidding of positivism. On this account we must pronounce this scheme superficial, incomplete, and arbitrary in its nature. Though Comtean positivism may have had its day, and be now no longer a potent power, yet the general temper which it has begotten abides as a baneful heritage in wide and influential scientific circles. This temper, we are sure, is not only most inimical to Christian faith, but hurtful to the best interests of science itself. The Christian philoso- phy, which is a sound theism, is needed to give the true explanation of the phenomena of the universe alike in their cosmic origin, cosmic progress, cosmic order, and cosmic design. At every one of these test places the positivist philosophy fails. It is, therefore, to be at once rejected. ■-i CHAPTER VIII. AGNOSTICISM: STATEMENT. Contents. Agnosticism a Type of Thought.-It is Ancient and Persistent- Greek.- Sadducees.- Modem— Hume.- Kant- Hamilton.- MiU.- Spencer.-Four Types.- Psychological.-Ontological.-Logical.-Reli- Trir ?"i^ "^"""'^ °^ Knowledge—Faculties of Cognition Some- what Unreliable.-Always Empiricism.-The Laws of Thoufrt Denied. -Rea ity not Subject of Cognition— Uses the Relativity of Human Know edge-Various Aspects of Relativity.-The Agnostic Theory of Know edge Leads to Antitheistic Results.-The Empirical Theory of Knowledge Rules Out a Knowledge of the Supersensible.-The Agnostic Use of the Doctrine of Relativity does the Same— Agnosticism does not Deny God—Asserts that He is not Cognizable— The Human Power. Inadequate.-God Absolutely Insc. utable.-Arguments Balanced-Rela- ttvjty Excludes God. Literature. Encyclopedia Articles on Agnosticum and Skepticism.— Sptncer't Synthcuc Philosophy, Part L. Chaps. I.-V.-Fiske's Cosmic Philosophy. vol I., Fart I.. Chap. I— Hamilton's Metaphysics. Chaps, on The Un- condit.oned.-Miirs ExaminaHon of Hamilton's Philosophy. Vol. I ^i"" VI.. VII.-Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought.— Boyme't Studies tn Theism. Chaps. II., III.-Bruce's Apologetics. Chap. VII- Physicus Candid Examination of Theism, Chaps. V.. VI— Fisher*! Cr«,««e of thought, ather , -^^ than a definite system of things. The term itself «s quite modem, but what it denotes is really of ancient Jate. In general, it relates to the cognitive capacity of the h $22 APOLOGETICS. human mind, and it expresses a sort of universal skepti- cism in regard to the power of the mind of man to know reality. It consequently raises in a very direct way the question of the capacity of the human mind to know God, and the supersensible verities of the Christian religion. In one form or another, it has had a place in the specu- lations of almost every age. Two centuries before Christ, in the decadent era of Greek philosophy, it appeared as a kind of universal skepticism or avowed nescience. The Sadducees of our Lord's day, among the Jews, represent, in the sphere of religion, many traits of agnosticism. They were, at least, skeptics in regard to the reality of the spiritual and tmseen world. In modem times, Hume, though usually regarded as a universal skeptic, is really a typical agnostic, alike in the field of philosophy and in the sphere of religion. This accounts for the revival of interest in the philosophy of Hume in our own day- Even in the philosophy of Kant, and of Hamilton, too, there are features which open the way for a form of agnosticism. When the former held that we have no cognition of noumena, and that the categories of the understanding and ideas of reason are regulative only of phenomena, and have no cogfnitive validity in relation to things in themselves, or notmiena, then idealism was the result on the side of psychology, and agnosticism or skepticism was the consequence in the sphere of ontology; and when the latter asserted that the uncon- ditioned, in both its infinite and absolute aspects, was both inconceivable and incognizable by the human understanding, he set the door open for the agnostic to come in as an unwelcome guest. Herbert Spencer has not been slow in turning thes^ aspects of the philosophy of Kant and of Hamilton to account in the interests of agnosticism. Spencer may have pushed his inferences too far, yet it must be confessed that these eminent thinkers left at least a loop- hole for Spencer. J. S. Mill, and those who hold similar aensatir . theories of cognition, and give prominence to I-: ii AGNOSTICISM. 5,3 the relativity of human knowledge, bring tribute to the feet of agnosticism. Spencer, of course, is the great modern exponent of scientific agnosticism, or of universal skepticism touching realities. Fiske, Huxley and Clifford are also familiar names in the same connection. This brief sketch will serve to show how extensive this antitheistic type of thought really is. It also makes it evident that agnosticism is merely a somewhat modest term to denote what is usually known m the history of human thought as philosophical skepticism, more or less complete. Agnosticism, skepticism and nescience mean neariy the same. In the discussion of agnosticism, it must be kept in mind hat It IS first a theory of knowledge, and then an anti- thetstc theory. Antitheistic implications are necessarily involved in its epistemology. This being the case, it be- comes necessary to discuss agnosticism as a theory of knowledge, and as a system opposed to theism. But before entering upon this twofold discussion, some explanation of ^.e various types of agnosticism may be of advantage 2. There are at least four distinct types of agnosticism, fhese are determined according to the different methods by which the agnostic conclusion is reached. First, there is what may be called psychological agnos- ticism According to this type of the theory, it is argued that the capacities of the human mind are not competent to come into cognitive relation with the supersensible objects of religion. God and the verities of the unseen world are beyond the grasp of the mental powers of man. He has no faculty by which God can be known. By reason of this mental incompetency agnosticism is the only con- clusion in which the mind of man can rest. Secondly, ; nother type may be termed ontological agnos- ticism. According to this phase of the system, the objects of religious knowledge, in their own nature, are inscrutable. They necessarily are such that they are not capable of be- 524 APOLOGETICS. I » \m coming objects of human cognition. God and supersensible realities are absolute entities that entirely elude the mental grasp of the finite mind of man. They are inscrutable and unknowable in their inherent nature; hence, the agnostic position in regard to them is the only tenable one. Thirdly, there is another type of agnosticism, which may be denoted the logical. According to this type of the theory, it is maintained that the arguments for and against the reality of God, and the things of the spiritual world, are so nearly balanced that no conclusion can be confidently rested in. There are reasons in favor of believing in their reality, and there are reasons which look in the other direction, so that the judicial mind, carefully weighing these reasons, must at least suspend judgment, and hold ihe agnostic attitude towards the whole matter. Fourthly, there remains the relativist phase of agnos- ticism. This is founded on an extreme application of the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge to the sub- ject-matter of religion. This doctrine, in general, holds that we do not know things as they really are, but only as they are related to us. This is a sort of phenomenalism. Things are not really known as they are, but only as they appear to us. Hence, in the case of God, he is not known as he really is, but only as he appears to us to be; and there is no reason to believe that our knowledge of him is adequate. In this way, again, the agfnostic goal is reached. The eternal verities of religion are only relatively known, and we can never be sure that our knowledge is adequate. These four types of agnosticism are often found subsist- ing side by side, but taken together, they quite cover the field of modern agnosticism. The conditions of the first are found in Kant, the germs of the second lie in Hamilton, the third is announced by Huxley, who claims the honor of inventing the term, and the elements of the fourth are involved in Mill. But they all agree in representing the type of thought now under consideration. AGNOSTICISM. 525 II. The Agnostic Theory of Knowledge. § 123. The statement of this theory can be made in compara- tively brief compass, after what has been said in the Introduction on the theory of knowledge. The several points involved in the agnostic theory of knowledge need only be stated without any expanded exposition. The main gist of the matter is involved in what the term empiricism denotes. With this the readers of this treatise are already famihar. The real point in debate is as to whether the human mind possesses the capacity to transcend the senses, and come into real cognitive relations with what is super- sensible. Hence, agnosticism raises a debate which goes to the very root of the doctrine of cognition. I. First of all, agnosticism shows a tendency to attach a degree of unreliabUity to the operation of the powers and faculties of the human mind. The hint is thrown out that these powers can never lead to certainty in any sphere, much less in regard to things supersensible. By those who hold with the Pyrrhonists, certainty can never be reached m any sphere, and the only attitude of the human mind is that of absolute skepticism. It is said that the first impressions of the senses may not be correct, for they have to be corrected by the subsequent exercise of the under- standing. This appears in the experience of the child as It acquires by degrees the conception of relative distance, from the first impressions made on the senses by objects. This, it is claimed, suggests that the senses are not accurate in their apprehension of realities. 2. The agnostic theory of knowledge is always more or less emfnrtcal in its nature. The empirical theory limits human knowledge to the resources of the senses. So far as the various senses extend their scope, so far we may have knowledge; but we cannot go beyond. Sensation is the source of all the materials of cognition, and the higher I ' -I llta -^-^ 5a6 APOLOGETICS. ri I ii i forms of knowledge, which we regard as rational in their nature, are nothing more than transformed sensations. Habit, ;-30ciation and heredity account for the whole fabric of human knowledge, no matter how abstract it may appear to be. Everything grows out of experience, and those elements of cognition which are not directly sensa- tional are only idealized experience. Just as Greek nescience and Hume's skepticism were associated with sensationalism, so modem agnosticism is connected with thorough-going empiricism. 3. The agnostic epistemology generally denies the a priori factor in human cognition. It steadily refuses to admit the real objective relation of the cognitive activity of the mind to the reality of the objects of cognition. The reality of the categories of the human understanding is not admitted by agnosticism. It does not concede that the spontaneity of the spiritual principle in man is determined by any rules inherent in its very nature. The laws of thought are not fundamental, and hence they are not necessary to condition the possibility of experience. Even these uniformities of cognition, like the causal relation, are the product of repe- tition and association, of habit and heredity. Modem agnosticism has no sympathy with any type of rational psychology. It repudiatet^ the a priori. 4. Agnosticism, consec itly, asserts that the faculties of the human mind are it. equate to cognize the reality of things at all. Human . jowledge pertains to the sphere of the phenomenal ; and man has no cognitive powers by the exercise of which he comes into rational relation with the non-phenomenal. Since man acquires all his knowledge, in the first instance, from the senses, he is severed, so far as cognition is concerned, from the supersensible or hyper- empirical. He knows appearances only, not realities, or things in themselves. The agnostic sometimes admits that there is or may be a supersensible world, but he uniformly insists that we cannot know aught about it. This is to AGNOSTICISM. 527 sever the whole rational activity of man from the realm of reality, and to commit him to the ever-changing region of appearances. This is what modem agnosticism uniformly does. It IS a scheme of phenomenalism. 5- Modem agnosticism is usually coupled with the doc- trine of the relativity of human knowledge. In many cases agnostics push this doctrine to an extreme in the interests of their views of cognition. It is not here asserted that there IS not something tme in the relativity of human Imowledge, much less is it implied in what is now said that all who hold in any way this doctrine are agnostics. It is simply stated that the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge is unduly pressed into service by modem agnos- ticism. * - It is scarcely necessary at this point to enter upon a careful dtscussion of the relativity of human knowledge The doctrine is held in different forms. In some cases it is substantially correct, but in others it is held in at least a one-sided way. By some this doctrine merely denotes that we know only those things, and that we know them only m the manner, and to the extent, which our faculties enable us to cognize them. When used in this way, it is ittle more than a truism, for it leaves entirely unsolved the problem of the extent of human knowledge, and of the nature of the objects actually known. Others, by the relativity of knowledge, mean that we do not know things as they really are, but only as they appear to be to us. The human mind is directly related only to the appearances of things, and we ran have no guarantee that things them- selves are wh^. chey appear to be. Still others lay stress upon the view that all the contents of cognition must pass through the forms of the senses and understanding before they actually become matters of knowledge. This being the case, it is impossible to tell what changes these mate- rials may have undergone in the process, so that wc can have no guarantee that there is any real and accurate know- 528 APOLOGETICS. ledge of things acquired. All is merely relative, and nothing assured. It is easy to see how the agnostic, pushing this doctrine to an extreme, uses it in favor of this theory. III. Agnosticism as Antitheistic. § 124. 1. The agnostic theory of knowledge has been explained; its antitheistic bearings are now to be indicated, for agnos- ticism is first a theory of knowledge, and then an antitheistic ^nhrrr-.^,. Taking the contents of the preceding section, we n^ ' p :^eed to show how the agnostic theory of knowledge ! .:essarily leads to entirely antitheistic results. As this is . .ne of the cultured aspects of philosophical unbelief in our o',vn day, it is of the utmost moment to have it clearly before us in this discussion. It prevails in many quarters in both Europe and America in our own time, and there are traces of it in much of the popular literature of our own day. It seeks to destroy the foundations of theistic belief b) pro- pounding a theory of knowledge which renders that belief impossible. It assumes the garb of humility and an air of modesty in regard to the capacities of finite human under- standing, and confesses, most willingly, that there is mucli that is mysterious in the universe. It is not so irreverent as atheism, nor so consistent as materialism; but it bows before the mystery which lies at the heart of all existence, and in regard to God, pleads the agnostic attitude. 2. Agnosticism essentially consists in an application of the theory of knoidedgc it holds to the subject-matter of religion. It argues that since that subject-matter, broadly viewed, belongs to the realm of the supersensible or nou- menal, it lies beyoi.d the scope of human knowledge. It cannot be known. Hence, it follows that God, who is confessedly supersensible, cannot be cognized. The whole round of spiritual facts which pertain to religion transcends the senses, and so they cannot be known. The most that can be said, is that God may be existent; but as to what i AGNOSTICISM. j^p he is in any cognitive way, agnosticism takes an entirely negative view. Even if there be a God. we could never know enough of h.m, and of our relations to him. to justify us m actmg upon this supposed knowledge. That God is. may be conceded by agnosticism; but as to what he is and A.«; we are related to him. we have no real knowledge.' This ,s the core of modem agnosticism. This geneS position may be elucidated in a few particulars 3. The sensational theory of knowledge held by agnos- ticism renders the knowledge of God as the objefT of religion impossible. Pure empiricism, with its deiial o the a pnon iactor in the activity of the spiritual principle m nun, makes it unreasonable to expect a knowfedge of the spinttal to be attained by mankind. If there L no m u- .'"r *'°"^'^^' ''^'^ "« - p-^p"- thJr Z "V'' '"•"^ ^" ^PP'-^hend reality. If there be nothing real and permanent in the whole realm of existence, then the knowledge of God as such a being ha no valid grounds. Hence, empiricism, which is the key note of agnosticism, confines cognition to the sensible and phe- AnTsfnce'? / " °"' ''^ supersensible and noumenal. tnln "^ '" *'' supersensible, he cannot be regard to human knowledge leads straight on to the Ll of agnosfcsm. If we know rhings, not r thev really are or as they are apprehended hy the .ubli. n oWhe en" ' hen we cannot know God real) v. ; ut on," as he is reS to , mr powers of cotrn ton .P«f .,, „ b^heve In this app,.ara,.-« ,s at all cong„„us with the reai.ty. It may merel:- >e : idealized and anthromornhic We are n^;"' ^" "" "^" ^""'^ ^"' '' ^''' ^ -other's, we are not anxi,,n<; to '!»"- 'hat tu^r • , of tnifh ;„ *u- I ' ^^^'^ '■ "^^ ^" *;lement taith^in this doctrine Ti.ere is a sense in which we ■^ .31 J H! mi n ' '}\ .1 : l'.i ! r I, i 53° APOLOGETICS. know things as they appear unto us, though it does not follow that we do not know them truly and as they really are. So there is a sense m which we know God only as he relates himself to us in his works about us, in our mental and moral constitution, in the revelation of the Holy Scriptures, and in the experience of the Christian life. But from this it does not follow that we are bound to take the gnostic conclusion, for our knowledge of God as a fact, no matter how it has been acquired, is correct and valid as far as it goes. 5. A few brief statements may make the antitheistic aspects of agnosticism perfectly evident. First of all, agnos- ticism does not deny the existence of God. It differs from atheism in saying that there may be a God, but that there are no faculties in man's constitution to cognize God. Its real ground is that of skepticism. If there be a God, he must to us ever be an unknown being, not cognitively related to us. If man has no faculty, "not even the rudiment of a faculty," by which God and religious realities can be cog- nized; if, in the very nature of the case, the object of religion, which is God, and the contents of religion, which are spiritual truths, are inscrutable; if the arguments for and against belief in God are almost evenly balanced, so that judgment must be suspended ; and if we know things, especially the things of religi' n, only as they are related to us, then in each case the agnostic wsition is the only one to hold. Hence, confessed ignorance, inherent defect, or simple indifference, are the marks of agnosticism in our own day. Usually the strict agnostic rests in sus(>cnsion of judgment, or rational indifference in regard to the reality of the existence of Gou. He argues that there is no good ground for bringing the thought of God into human life in any such way as may affect the conduct of that life. i-'\ CHAPTER IX. AGNOSTICISM: CRITICISM. Contents. «,H T^n, . » Rdated—Agnosticsm as Antitheistic.-Admit Mystery and Limitation—Agnostic Conception of God at Fault rL u . Merely the Absolute.-Or Unconditioned- "fves no p;;;*^^^^^^ Faith or Beliel-Kinship of Na'.re Between God andTan i^in.^ Agnostic.sn,.-a„not Explain Religious Sentiments -Nor R^Sou, R.te,.-Nor Contents of the Bible-Bad Effects of Atheism LiTERATURI. Encyclop«di. Article on //^«o./,Vwm.-Bowne's The Philosophy of SI /Jfr'';-^*r'"""''' ^ SMy of Religion, Vol I.. B^k l' Chaps. l.-IV.-Bowne'g Studu-t in Theism. Chaos II III n^.J. «^:'Xa'p x%L"h-'?r ''* ^--^'^^o^scii";^: In'. Ti X ^r^"rP'"' ' ^t"'«"<"« o-d Christianity, Chap. X.-Kaf- ^^» The Truth of the Christian Religion. Vol. II., Chap. T-^wVe'. Meta,hys*cs Part III.. Chap. II.-Miley's SysteJt^Theoiogv^U IV.-Knighfs Aspects of Theism. Chap. XIV.-GrouncI'sTt««^J Structural Principles. Part II.. Chaps. I.-V.-Smith's f".VA Hlpti osophy Chap. VIIL-Rishell's The FoundatioTof he Faith Diyf Sec. II.. Chaps. I.-VIII.. and Div. II., Sec. I., Chap, I II H '11' Systematic Theology. Part I.. Chap. IV.. Sec. T. H.-MaheTo": n ?2r chal ri/"'/'''"''".^' ^!;"'- "-^'^''•» ^^oderPh'yL^i /•a/a/wm Chaps. I.-IV.-Iverach's TheUm, Chap. IX.-Maitland's r*, «m or ^,„.,rtaj.^.Gir.rde.u-s Discussions. Lp. XIL-S L?;." I. The Theory of Knotvledge: Criticism. § 125. SINCE agnosticism is, first of all, a theory of knowledge that theory must ht carefully examined. It were folly to allow a doctri.ie of cognition to hold its place, if the 532 APOLOGETICS. logical result of that doctrine were universal skepticism. Such a doctrine would make shipwreck of philosophy, morals and religion, for its logic would surely be nescience, nihilism and atheism. Hence, the epistemology of agnos- ticism challenges careful criticism. I. The charge made by agnosticism, that our faculties of knowledge are more or less unreliable, cannot be admitted. We maintain that the powers of cognition with which the human soul is endowed, when taken together in their normal and healthy action, are trustv.'orthy. If the senses have to be corrected in experience by the rational judg- ment, the result is that the combined action leads to certainty, not uncertainty. The view that our faculties are constituted to be true and trustworthy is firmly held against agnosticism. To hold that these faculties are inherently constructed to deceive and perplex is absurd. It is not necessary, in maintaining the inherent reliability of our faculties, to hold that these powers are competent to embrace the whole field of possible knowledge, or that they are capable of fathoming its depths. Faculties of cognition may be reliable in certain spheres without being infallible in every realm, and knowledge may be quite trustworthy within its proper limits, and yet not be om- niscient. The agnostic seems to demand infallibility and omniscience in order to reliability and trustworthiness. This we do not admit, but protest against it with great earnestness. We argue that our powers were made to be reliable, and their results trustworthy, according to their finite constitution; and if one set of faculties willingly receives correction from another in actual experience, this plainly goes to show that when the complete cognitive results are reached, certitude has been attainwl. This posi- tion is earnestly held in the interests of science, philosophy and religion. Unreliable faculties of observation would destroy science, uncertain pnwff* nf reflection would obht- erate philosophy, and defective faculties to cognize deity AGNOSTICISM. 533 The agnostic commits treason would annihilate religion. against all three. 2. But agnosticism in this connection commits logical sutade. If the faculties of the human mind are unreliable one may very properly ask the agnostic how he, in the use of these same faculties, ever reaches so surely his agnostic conclusions? If he had faculties of a diflferent sort from those possessed by the theist, he might make good his con- tention; but he must rely on precisely the same sort of faculties of observation and powers of reflection as the theist. If, therefore, these faculties and powers are unre- liable and untrustworthy in the hands of the theist. they must also be m the hands of the agnostic. Thus, we may turn the tables on the agnostic in the realm of his psy- chology. This contention may be pushed against the agnostic with fatal effect. If the human pr -rs of cog- nition are inherently unreliable, not only is the .. ,ist frus- trated in his views, but the agnostic is blocked in the intentions he makes. Nay, more, the possibility of certain knowledge in any sphere, and in regard to any matter, is destroyed. We cannot be sure that we do not know, nor can we be sure that we are not sure that we do not know. This IS the absolute skepticism of decadent Greek philosophy, and It IS the logic of modern agnosticism at this point. In both cases it is absolute nescience, which, having destroyed theism, commits logical suicide. 3. But we, further, contend against agnosticism that the human mind does come into cognitive relation with reality as well as with appearances. The theory of knowledge steadily maintained in this treatise justifies this statement. That theory is the rational, as distinguished from the empirical. According to that theory, the human mind IK«sesses rational rules, according to which its cognitive activities come into exercise. In cognition, the mind of man comes into rational relation with the law« of thing* which constitiite their real being. Hence, while the senses I ,/' 534 APOLOGETICS. bring the human mind into relation with the appearances of things, the rational rules of the spiritual principle in man bring the mind at the same time into rational relation ■with the realities of things. Only thus can the many and varied units of sense perception be unified into a whole of rational cognition. According to this epistemology, the spiritual principle in man has rational relation to the realities of things. Hence, reality is not entirely beyond the grasp of human knowledge. If this doctrine of human cognition be carefully held, the agnostic theory of the incognoscibility of reality is no longer tenable. If human knowledge can in any measure penetrate the supersensible realm, the agnostic position is no longer defensible. It is not necessary to be able to per- ceive m an omniscient way all the inner secrets of real being in order to maintain the ground against agnosticism. It is enough if the human mind is able to look through the veil between the sensible and supersensible, and come into cognitive relations with the reality that is involved in phe- nomenal appearances. If the laws of thought and the laws of things are correlated in cognition, empiricism, on which agnosticism usually rests, is destroyed. The foundation being destroyed, agnosticism itself falls into ruins. Such being the case, the door is at least open for the human mind to come into real rational relation with God, even ihough he pertains to the supersensible realm. Unless the agnostic can show that God, as supreme personal reason, is superrational, he fails to establish his position in the sphere of religion. 4. Against agnosticism the ground may be safely taken that a knowledge of phenomena is possible only on the supposition of the reality of noumena, and that in the fact of the knowledge of appearances, the knowledge of realities is necessarily implied. We may not know both by the same sources of cognition, but each may be known by its own appropriate powers of rational apprehension. An AGNOSTICISM. ^^ appearance suggests a reality, for there must be something to appear. A phenomenon witnesses to a noumenon. The separation between the appearance and "the thing in Itself, which Kant made so rigid in his critical idealism, a^d which Spencer laid hold of in the interests of agnos- ticism, IS artificial, and has done much harm both to philosophy and theology. The idealism of Fichte and the nescience of Harrison are the logical results of this unreal divorce between phenomena and noumena. A true doctrine of cognition gives a place to both, and binds them together in the activity of true knowledge. By the senses the mind apprehends the appearances of things, and by the rules of he rational spontaneity of the spiritual principle in man. the mind apprehends the laws of the reality of things. The complete act of cognition involves both. By this means agan, it appears that the door is open for the cognition of the supersensible involved in the sensible, and the agnostic has no rational right to close this door. 5- A right understanding of the doctrine of relaHvity in relation to human knowledge does not favor the agnostic contention. This doctrine has puzzled philosophers in all ages. It has been both understated and overstated. From the days of the Greek sophists and skeptics, down to the positivists and agnostics of our own time, this doctrine has been pushed to an extreme in one direction, while by Idealists and certain intuitionalists it has been given undue stress in another. In both cases harm has been done to philosophy and theism. To secure a well-balance' position m regard to the doctrine of relativity is very portant. Three simple remarks may be helpful to this end. First, we may know a thing truly without knowing it tttlly. We may know very much about any object of knowledge, and yet be far from knowing all about it. Perhaps perfect knowledge of anything is possible only to omniscience. Since we are finite, absolute knowledge of anything may be impossible to us. But this does not justify ij«: 'v It 53* APOLOGETICS. the agnostic's position ; or, if it does, then the only deliver- ance from agnosticism is omniscience. The old distinction between apprehending a thing, and comprehending it, is of value here. The fact of space or extension may illus- trate this distinction. We apprehend limited portions of s >ace as extension ; yet we do not, perhaps cannot, com- prehend space in its infinite aspects. It does not follow, however, that because we do not fully comprehend infinite space, therefore we do not apprehend, in a real way, what extension is as a fact. Secondly, true knowledge does not require identity of nature between the subject and object in cognition. This error dates back to Descartes, who suggfested that essential distinction between mind and matter, which introduced a rigid dualism into philosophy. It also led to the one-sided solutions of it presented by idealism, pantheism and mate- rialism, respectively. This same error is the underlying assumption in many phases of the doctrine of relativity. It is assumed that before we can have a knowledge of any object, either the mind must be reduced to the terms of that object, or the object must be reduced to terms of the knowing mind. This means idealism or materialism. It is maintained by the relativists that the only way is to hold that we know things only as they are related to us through our powers of cognition. But this does not justify the conclusion that we do not truly know things as they really are. The sound theory of knowledge already established enables us to hold that true cognition does not require abso- lute identity between subject and object therein. In such cognition there is a synthesis of the two factors, so that both appearance and reality, both the sensuous and the rational, are bound together in cognition. Thirdly, a knowledge of relations implies some know- ledge of the things related. This bears very directly on the question nf the relativity of nur knowledge. Relations apart from things related are nothing. They are pure '■ AGNOSTICISM. 53^ abstractions, and have no rational value. To say that we taow thuigs only as they are related to us is to imply some knowledge of the things related. Then, if we hold the !!!;T *^,^''*'"8:^'«h«d from the empirical psychology, a iSint ?f '' t' °'^'"=*' '' "*=" - the subject is attamed. Thus, a knowledge of things is involved in a knowledge of the, r relations. A doctrine of pure relativity ..consequently quite untenable. A doctrine of modified relativity enables us to hold that while we know things only as they are related to us by our powers of knowing yet we know thmgs truly in this way The conclusion is reached that the agnostic theory of taow ledge breaks down at various points. The door of taowledge stands open towards the supersensible, and hence God IS not necessarily beyond the rational grasp of the human mind. s h "» me II. Agnosticism as Antitheistic: CriHcism. § 126. I. In dealing critically with the antitheistic aspects of agnosticism, an important admission is cheerfully made The spint of humility in regard to the very limited scope of human knowledge, so far as it is just and sincere, is worthy of praise in agnosticism. It is also conceded that there IS much of mystery in the things we know in part, and that in the case of the knowledge of God this is also the case. We cannot find out the Almighty unto perfection, and we can know only a little of his ways. Clouds and darkness are round about him. There is, therefore, a valid and a necessary agnosticism in our religious knowledge, which IS the source of certain aspects of true reverence and deep devotion. But while all this is admitted as the neces- ^O' results of the relation of the finite to the infinite, it is still maintained that we do know God. The spiritual prin- ciple m man comes into spiritual relations with God as the •upreme spirit, and hence in religion there is an element '538 APOLOGETICS. JiS of cognition. So far as the knowledge of God is concerned, both agnosticism and gnosticism have their place. There is mystery and knowledge, there is the known and the unknown, and the problem for the philosophy of religion is to define the limits of each, and to adjust their relations. 2. The agnostic conception of God is at fault. Passing by the point that one wonders how the agfnostic has any idea of God at all, we raise serious objection to the way in which the agnostic arrives at the incognoscibility of God. He first of all identifies God with the absolute. God is the absolute form of being, and is consequently out of relation with all other forms of being. This being the case, God is out of all cognitive relation with the human faculties, and hence he is inscrutable or unknowable. God is the absolute, the absolute is unknowable, therefore God is un- knowable. This is agnostic log^c. But this logical procedure is illegitimate. It takes the very point in debate for granted. The question relates to the knowableness of God. To say that the absolute is imknowable, and that God is the absolute, is an evident begging of the question. But, further, the agnostic idea of the absolute is at fault. It makes it an entity, whereas it is simply a quality of some form of being. God may be the absolute being, but it is not true that the absolute itself is a form of being. To speak of the absolute as inscrutable, therefore, is quite absurd. Then, the quality of absolute- ness, as it pertains to God, does not place him out of relation with all other forms of being. It rather denotes that he is not dependent on any other being for his origin and con- tinued existence. It means that he is self-existent and indeperjent. But the agnostic idea of God is mainly defective because it makes him a kind of abstraction when it describes him as the absolute. God is nc n abstraction, but a real spiritual personal being. Agi. icism is at fault, because it always obscures this fact. God is the infinite personal , i AGNOSTICISM. 53^ spirit who sustains definite relations to the universe, both as to Its ongm and continued existence. But he himself is ot none and dependent on none. Not unlike this agnostic reasoning is that which, foUow- mg Hamilton asserts that God is the unconditioned form of bemg and that to think is to condition the object thought, so that God cannot become an object of thought. To think of God IS to condition God; but God is the unconditioned, fel. p ?""°' ^. *'''"^^*' °'" *^°'"*= ^" object of know: ledge. Reflection for a moment will clearly show that to come mto cognitive or thought relations with any object does not m any way affect the conditions of the being of hat object, unless we be idealists, and hold that the cog- mtive act of the mind creates the object. Hence, when the human mmd comes into cognitive relations with "God as the unconditioned form of being, the ontological con- ditions of his being are in no way affected by the psychological activity of the human mind. Here agnosti- cism greatly blunders. 3- Agnosticism gives no proper place to faith in the sphere of theistic and religious truth, and it overlooks the fact that between faith or belief, and cognition or know- ledge, there are intimate relations. This has been pointed out in the Introduction of this treatise. Both have rational value and lead to certitude. In popular usage we some- times say that we know when we believe, and believe when we know. We almost as readily say that we know that there is a God as that we believe in God. This shows how close y belief and knowledge are bound together, and that t)ehef or faith is one avenue to truth and certainty. The agnostic ignores this fact, and argues that because Ood IS not, as he thinks, an object of knowledge, he lies beyond rational apprehension altogether. But this does not lollow. Even if we concede to the agnostic that the door of cognition is closed in regard to God, it may still be true that the avenue of belief is wide open to reach truth and i S40 APOLOGETICS. certainty concerning God. At this point, it is evident that Spencer does but scanty justice to Kant and Hamilton, in the use he makes of them in favor of agnosticism; for while Kant and Hamilton denied that the understanding related us cognitively to God, they both strongly held that by faith, and on moral grounds, the human mind reaches undoubted certainty regarding God. This fact modern agnosticism quite disregards. It may be added that this faith factor may be the fundamental fact m our rational apprehension of God, so that the agnostic, by ignoring this factor, does serious injustice to the aptitude of the human mind for God. 4. If there be any kinship in nature between God and man, then agnosticism may be untenable. God, according to the theistic conception of him, is the infinite personal spirit; and man, on theistic and religious grounds, is in his inner being spiritual. This being the case, there may be established a real rational relation between God as a spiritual being and the spiritual principle in man. If this be the case, the door is open for man to come into real cognitive relations with God. The agnostic, unless he be a materialist also in regard to man's constitution, cannot ward off the force of this fact. Of course, if he be a materialist, debate with him ends; but, if materialism be refuted, his foundation is destroyed. The reality of God having been established as an infinite spiritual and personal being, and the reality of the spiritual principle in man having been made good, the agnostic contention for the incognos- cibility of God is fully met. And with this the Scriptures agree when they teach that man was made in the image of God, and that there are the conditions of rational and moral relations between God and man that do not exist in regard to the relations between God and the brutes. If man be the crown and glory of God's creative activity, and if he be made in the image and likeness of God, then it is reasonable to conclude that AGNOSTICISM. 54, tnan (an have a knowledge of God. Of this high preroga- tive the agnostic robs man, and sends him on his dark pathway of ignorance to his unknown destiny. It blot- out the sun from his heavens, and hides from man's ej-e the pole-star which guides him safely on. No such gloomy doctnne meets the needs of a being made in the image of God, and made for God. S; Agnosticism is greatly perplexed with the religious fwhngs or sentiments. It is bound to admit the existence of these sentiments in the human breast. The experience of men everywhere testifies to the reality of these senti- ments. There is a consciousness of the divine in some form m the human race. There is a feeling of dependence, and a sense of responsibility, in the heart of men generally The agnostic is bound to construe these facts in some way. He must explain them in harmony with his denial of any cognition of God on the part of man. How he can account for a feeling of dependence on, and a sense of accounta- bility to, a being who lies beyond his cognitive apprehension IS almost absurd. The agnostic must admit this religious feeling and sentiment, and deny that it stands related in any rational way with the being of God. Religion can only be a purely subjective sentiment. It is really superstition, with no basis in objective reality. To this absurdity the agnostic is shut up. But, further, the feelings, psychologically considered, are associated with some form of knowledge. In psychological analysis we have first the cognitive powers of sense per- ception, understanding and reason, and then we have the sensibility or feeling capacities of the human soul, followed by the will. Now, the sensibility is always related to cog- nition. If there be no content of cognition, there can be no aflFection of the sensibility. This is true alike in the intellectual, the moral and the religious spheres. The nature of the cognition will determine the character of the feeling. This being the case, agnosticism is convicted of » f PiM^"^ m^'-H 54a APOLOGETICS. ff 'I I a false psychology in seeking to explain religious feelingfs or sentiments, without reference to the knowledge of God which these feelings imply. 6. Agnosticism has no proper explanation to give of the universal prevalence of religious rites and practices among men. Agnosticism is bound to admit that men in all ages and conditions have exhibited some form of external re- ligious activity. There is a belief in some form of deity, and religious rites connected with the worship instituted. This belief and these rites, so universal among men, con- stitute a real problem for the agnostic. They are an outward expression of the feelings and sentiments described in the preceding section, and the agnostic is bound to con- strue these universal fr.cts in harmony with his ultimate position in regard to the knowledge of Gud. Here the agnostic usually goes far a-field to account for the fact. He sometimes lays stress on the mythical instinct in the race, forgetful that even this instinct itself is a problem for him. He dwells on the effect of fetichism in producing religious belief and rites, overlooking the fact that fetichism has to be accounted for. He makes much of ancestorism, .n other cases, and derives religion from respect paid to departed ancestors, apparently insensible of the fact that even ancestor worship involves religion. All such attempts to solve the problem of the universal prevalence of religious opinions, rites and practices are futile. The agnostic has no explana- tion of them to give. When he says that God, the object of religion, is quite beyond the knowledge of man, the subject of religion, he simply leaves universal religious belief and practice hanging in mid-air, without any rational support. Theism fully meets this problem. It holds that man comes into rational relation with God; and that, by reason of sin, there has been decline in the knowledge and service of the true God. Hence, all forms of pagan religion can be explained. 7. The contents of the Bible greatly perplex the agnostic AGNOSTICISM. 543 Taking the Bible simply as a collection of remarkable religious literature, there are many things which the ag- nosfc ,s helpless to explain. Here we have a great many mtelhgent and devoutly religious men and women whose experience IS exhibited in the Bible. They had clear ideas t°L^ H J^7 ^f ""'^ '"™ '^^' '^^ l'"** God, and that God had spoken to them. The sense of God in the Old Testament is very vivid, and in the New the knowledge of God stands cut as clear as noonday. The prophets and apostles were mere certain of nothing than that there was an infinite personal God, and that they had, by some means or other, a knowledge of him. Now if agnosticism be true, how is all this possible? Or if this knowtedge was gained by men of the biblical era. how IS ajrnost,cism tena.lc' The agnostic seems to feel the force at t ms, an.l usually has but little to say concern- ing the comeut. . f Scripture. In this he reveals prudence. If he does expose the defects of his theory. Yet we feel justified in calling en the agnostic to account for the gnos- ticism of the Bible. ^ In addition, the agnostic must, further, explain the un- doubted fact that men may be taught clearer ideas of G-i by the contents of the Bible. This we see in th^ .- ,.^ children, and is evident in the results of preachme v >' - especially does it appear in heathen lands, wheiv •.■.». .^ /. of God prevail. These heathen, by the contents " ^ v^e Bible, come to have their ideas of God elevated and n : ■ eu Hovv this IS possible on agnostic ground is not easily mHer- stood And. above all. that saving knowledge of God which sinful men come to have by the preaching of the gospel, and through faith in Christ, stands as an insuperable barrier in the pathway of agnosticism. The fact of Jesus thnst and his knowledge of God. has also to be accounted or^ If he were but a man. how had he this knowledge? If he were more than a man. God was revealed in him in a way capable of apprehension by men; and all the experi. m ■I s rl U ■I rz 544 APOLOGETICS. cnces of the Chriswan life have to be taken into account knd explained by agnosticism. This cannot be done, so agnosticism is rejected. Theii.n meets all the conditions here. It provides a basis for the knowledge of God, it opens the v;ay for the message of the Scriptures, and it gives all the conditions for a true religious experience in all respects. Hence, eternal life, which consists in knowing the one Vrm God and Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent, is the very heart of true religion. 8. To conclude, agnosticism, if made universally opera- tive among men, would have all the evU moral effects of atheism and materialism- Even if there be a God, if I cannot know him, this is practically the same to me as if there were no God. The unknown God will not long hold authority over the human heart and life. If reduced to practice, it would be as dangerous anu harmful as atheism, and more subtile, for it wears a mask. Agnosticism seems very humble and modest, yet its influence is bound to be baneful. Let agnosticism rule the thought and life of any people, and its fruit would be exceedingly bad. This danger may threaten even now. Let a well-grounded theistic philosophy be held, let a firm faith in the Word of God be m!siintained, and let a pure gospel be faithfully preached, and all will be well. •: H DEISM ANL ATIONALISM. _. . _ Contents. In ^Z±^X\!:'TrTZTr ? ^'-"'>'--I" Greccc- alism.-Rationali,r-I„ J, ™1S '""^t"^^^ ence of God.-God One plr f T °^ Deism.-Holds Exist- Denie, God's I^r„a„e„Rera„°T r',/""^'"*'"'-^'^' Creator.- -No Supcrnatur^vl^f-ro ^V^tIc'^^^p7^° "^T'o"' '^'^ tion—Exaraination—GeneraJ n„, n . ?! « Prayer.-No Redemp. c«lty.-How has God's Relation cl ZT^J "^°-^" '"«'»' Diffi- -Deism Uy. too Much 8.^. *^''^?f«-'''?-S«'f-nainte„ance Difficult. Scope of Freedom—No Place for Tr^^Ti ^'^Pf'^"'*' -impairs the Literature. Ch-p. VII, Harris' Co,, Cr.^ZJu^JlrAUr^ i%"' ^^tT' -lllmgworth'. Difine ImmaHencc. Chan, m rv « ' ^'"P- ^^^- «'/!«, Book I., aap V-Far^nr. w , ;.■■ ^^— ^ruce's Apola. -Stearns' P,„,„, C^A^s Ch 7^x1 /'^ 'V' of Chrutuinily, Ch^p V ~ ITrCosh-! ri n^"'"'' * ^'"*''<"^'-hM Ideas -Fisher's D^u^Zs cZ^^niluth^^^^^^ ^"'P- "• C*m,i„, /.„,,,, Div. I. S«. IV Clfa; ^^ The foundations of tke ne^. Chap. Vin.-P.aser's P;»S;^ 'i, '^.-^rv:,. ^^^ I. Some Preliminary Explanations. § 127. EISM. like materialism, is a definite scheme and It ha, h. rr^ ?'''"' ^^"^'"•^'" «• ^" antitheisticT;eory cry : -^ '?^! '^'T,'" """'^^"'''^•^^' •^'-"••^"•<'" '•" aS «^verj age. The problem it ra uses does not relif f *u 1. D -r-!^---e--!-=ad[ 546 APOLOGETICS. ^eism and theism substantially agree, but in regard to the latter they differ at vital points. The old Greeks frequently raised the question of the rela- tion of the gods to the universe, and they often debated the extent of their control over the affairs of men. Anaxa- goras, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle incline to a definite theistic doctrine, while the Stoics and Epicureans in different ways represent the dcistic type of speculation. According to the latter, the gods may have played an active part in first framing and arran;^ng the universe, but they after- wards withdrew from its oversight, and do not now exercise any control over it. The affairs of men and the concerns of the entire universe are in the lap of chance or the grasp of fate. This was ancient deism. It represented the gods as now inactive, and the universe as running itself. In England and France, in the eighteenth century, there was a remarkable development of this type of thought. In England the chief exponents of deism in that century were Herbert, Hobbes, Bloj ist, Toland, Shaftesbury, Collins, Woolston, Tindal, Morgan, Chubb, Bolingbroke, Hume and Gibbon. In France and Germany, men like Rousseau and Voltaire, who did not go to such extremes of atheism and materialism as did Le Mettrie and D'Holbach, are the representatives of deistic views. In our own day there is a tendency towards a deistic view of the universe in certain scientific circles. By these circles the laws of nature are made very prominent, and the universe under their control is almost self-regulative, so that the agency of God is at least kept in the background, if not excluded entirely. This tendency threatens to dethrone God altogether, and leave the universe to its own resources. If God does appear upon the scene at all. it is only in some occasional, miracu- lous way. In the interests alike of science, philosophy and theology, it is cheering to know that a sounder theistic doctrine is taking hold of other influential scientific circles in our own day. DEISM AND RATIONALISM. 54;; n^rw'^V'Zi^'^ *" "^"^'''^ discussions, and meaning deum from the Utm. has the same meaning as theism whjch comes from the Greek. But in discusfion, onTi ^t^sophy of religion they are used in widely different senses. Theism .s the doctrine of one personal God. who sus tarns abidmg relations with the universe. Dei«n is the doctnne of one personal God. who does not now sustain such relations w.th the works of his hands. The former asserts providential control. t..c latter denies it. The term naturalism ,s often used in this connection. This te^ denotes the view that everything that transpires in the uni- verse is happening in a perfectly natural way under the laws of nature pertaining to the universe. Natural law and order account for everything, and there is nothing supernatural m nature cr in religion. The term rationalism is one very frequently used in the deistic controversy. This term indicates the place given to the reason and conscience of man in matters of religion and It expresses the high functions they discharge for man' LnT"*. ; ^.'''°"' T'* ""^ P'""^*''^'- '' the sufficient Z^T ^ u ^^°" ^°'' '"*"• N° supernatural aid is needed, and hence special revelation is quite superfluous. The light of nature, which is the light in man's intellectual and moral constitution, is all the tutor he needs for his guidance in religion. There is no need of the Bible as a sp«nal revelation from God. for the inner light of reason and ojnscience which God has kindled m the human «>ul IS sufficient. Another term is infidelity. This is often used in a wide sense to denote religious unbelief in general, but it should always be used in its proper definite signification. The term infidel first came into common use in the days of the Crusades, when the Turks or Saracens were called infidels. lh.s meant that they did not believe in the Bible, nor in jesus Lhrist, nor in the supernatural realities of the Chris- il-l 548 APOLOGETICS. tian system. Hence, in the strict sense, an infidel is one who does not believe in the supernatural factors in Chris- tianity. He thus corresponds to the deist, and infidelity is really the same as rationalism. It is this definite scheme, of which these terms denote different aspects, that is now under notice. II. Statement of the Deistic Position. § 128. Deism asserts certain things, and denies certain other things, in regard to the main topics of the theistic contro- versy. These are now to be set forth in order. 1. Deism asserts the reality of the existence of God. In this it differs with atheism and materialism, and agrees with theism. The spirituality and personality of God is held fast, and his separate existence from the universe is asserted. He is also set forth as the creator and framer of the universe. He at first brought it into being, and endowed it with all its powers and potencies. He also established the laws or fixed order of its activity, so that it works out its destiny apart from his hand. The fact of the existence, independence and wise creative power of God is strongly asserted by deism. 2. In regard to the nature of God. deism further holds that he is one, personal and intelligent. The monotheistic conception of God is clearly grasped, and the personality of the creator of the universe is distinctly asserted. The moral attributes of God are also given a place by the better types of deism, and in some cases the outlines of a moral government are announced. But in such cases the relation of God to the imiverse is extra-mundai .J and mechanical. God is external to the universe, in such a way that he dncs not exercise any direct control over its destiny. God is as an intelligent watchmaker who has made a watch, and having endowed it with the capacity of running so as to keep time, he leaves it to run itself. DEISM AND RATIONALISM. 549 3. In the sphere of religion, deism asserts that natural reason and conscience are amply sufficient. The conclusions of sound rational judgment, and the dictates of conscience, are adequate to guide men in all the paths of duty pleasing to God This IS that aspect of deism which is known as rationalism, and it denotes the fact that man needs no other mstruction in order to know the will of God than what reason and conscience teach. This is the light of nature, which shines in the human soul, and is enough to guide men m the right path, and home to God at last. Special revelation is not necessary, and the Scriptures do not so much contain such a revelation as set forth moral and religious teaching which confirms the light of nature in the soul. Revealed religion, as it is called, grounded in Scripture, does not so much give new and needed truth as confirm what reason has already propounded for human conduct. 4- Deism denies the constant prot'idence of God over all his creatures. If there be providence at all, it is of the most general nature, and consists in nothing more than simply holding the universe in being. A special provi- dence, with its constant, intelligent and tender care, is always denied by deists. It is sometimes argued by deism that the doctrine of theism, which holds that God has a direct and constant oversight of all his works, implies an mi],erfect condition of the universe, and is not entirely honoring to God. If God has made the universe complete at first. It does not need his sleepless vigil over it all along Its history. The universe moves on according to definite hxed laws which God has im,H.se.l upon it, and any inter- ference with the o,H;ration of these laws is unnecessary, if not impossible. Great stress is laid upon the uniformity "f nature, and the rigid character of her laws. Some even go so far as to say that the author of these laws is not able to interfere and modify their operation. Hence, there can be no sijecial providence in the universe. i», S50 APOLOGETICS. 5. In particular, deism denies the supernatural aspects of the activity of God in relation to his creatures. Since God is extra-mundane and transcendent merely, he cannot in any way introduce his activity into the cosmos or into the sphere of humanity. All that happens is purely natural; nothing whatever is supernatural. This is true in nature and in the realm of human history, and especially in the matter of religion. There is no such event as the miracle, since there can be no interruption of the laws of nature. Touching the miracle, deism sometimes contends that when our knowledge of nature is complete, the unusual nature of the miracle will disappear, and all will be seen to be natural. So there can be no such a thing as answer to prayer, if that answer implies any change in the supposed order of nature or of human history. All that prayer can possibly do is to bring our hearts into willing submission to the order of things as they were fixed under the hand of God. Above all, deism steadfastly refuses to admit the reality of any kind of supernatural revelations from God, such as are recorded in the Scriptures. The reality of those special messages from God which men in Old and New Testament times claimed to have received, is not admitted. It matters not how strong, reliable and abundant the evi- dence of such revelation may be, it is not competent to justify belief in its reality, for God is not now in such relations with his creatures as to make this possible; and so far as the experience of anything supernatural in per- sonal religious life is concerned, the same general denial is also made. Religion is all natural, and it is morality rather than piety. It consists in living according to the light of nature shining in the soul; not according to the light of external revelation shinine into the soul. The facts of theology are all construed as natural theology, and the facts of the inner life are all interpreted as natural religion. Such, in broad outline, is deism. It makes God tran- DEISM AND RATIONALISM. 551 scendent merely, and denies all aspects of his supernatural oversight and activity in relation to his works. III. An Examination of Deism. % 129. The examination of deism now to be made can only be in general terms. Detailed criticism of individual opinions m regard to the deistical mode of construing the relations subsistmg between God and the universe cannot be now undertaken. In a thorough review of deism in all its bear- mgs, It would be necessary to make an estimate of divergent opinions, from the one extreme of a bald deism, which does little more than recognize the one infinite being as the first cause and ground of the universe, to the other extreme of that elevated deism, which is really advocated by some who hold the Christian name. But for present purposes It IS not necessary to enter upon this large task, for all critical ends may be well served if the central position of deism be clearly seized and carefully examined. That cen- tral position lies in the question as to whether God's relation to the universe is merely transcendent, or not also immanent; and whether God's action upon the universe is merely external and mechanical, or not also internal and organic. All variant aspects of deism involve this question, and here lies the heart of its debate with theism. From this central position all controversy about general and special providence, about the natural and supernatural, about miracle and revelation, and about Christ and redemp- tion, takes its rise: and at this point theism enters into controversy with deism. The debate, then, is as to whether the deistical interpretation of the relations of God and the universe is correct, and affords the sound philosophical basis for the Christian system as found in the Scrio- tures. *^ I. The deistical view has an initial dimcultv. The deist admits that God, as the creator, organizer and endower of :J i rli > :| 552 APOLOGETICS. the universe, must have been at first in very close relations with the work of his hands. His skill planned it, his wisdom arranged it, and his creative power brought it into existence. As it came at first from his hand, he must have sustained intimate operative relations with the universe. This arises from the very nature of the case. But the deist then goes on to argue that God is now removed from operative relations with the universe which he originated. If he does come into such relations, it is only occasionally from without, and in an extraordinary way. God's normal relation to the order of nature and the process of human history is not to guide and order all things therein, but rather to watch the order and the process, and to be pre- pared to interfere at critical junctures when disaster seems to threaten. Now, the deist may very properly be asked to show how this change of relation to the universe on the part of God has taken place. He may be fairly asked to show why it is that God is now extra-mundane, though he at first was in close touch with the cosmos of nature and the order of history. Or we may ask the deist to make it plain how it comes to pass that, if God has now no providential hand upon the universe, he ever had a creative hand upon it. The unchangeableness and omnipotence of God, rightly under- stood, fully justifies these inquiries of the deist; and they go far to suggest that the relations of God to his works are always practically the same. Then, if God, as sound theism teaches, be the abiding jjround and reason for the continuance of the universe from moment to moment, as well as its creator and first cause, his fundamental relation to his works must remain the same from moment to mo- ment; and, in addition, if there be good reason to believe that God's creative activity was neither completed nor exhausted when the universe Iwgan to be, but that later on, from age to age, new forms of being were brought into existence by creative power, then the deist is bound to show DEISM AND RATIONALISM. 553 when and how Gods initial organic relation to the universe was changed into the mechanical, and how it came to pass that the divine immanence was withdrawn. 2. The deist has also to face the fact that the self-main- tenance of finite forms of being; is scarcely more rational than self-origination. The deist admits that the universe did not create itself at first. The self-production of any- thmg IS unthinkable, and the self-existence of any finite form of being is scarcely conceivable. Theism asserts that there is only one seif-e.xistent being, and that is God. The materialist is somewhat consistent in holding that the uni- verse maintains itself now, because he teaches that matter is eternal, that is, that it is infinite as to time. But when the deist asserts that the universe is finite, and no* self- produced, but created by God, he is bound to show that the self-mamtenance and self -regulation of the natural and moral universe is a rational belief. This he finds a difficult task. The fact that not a few philosophers and theologians have proposed continuous creation at the hand of God, as the best explanation of the continued existence and provi- dential care of the universe, indicates how hard it is to regard as reasonable any kind of self-maintenance of a universe that had a beginning in time and is finite in its nature. The deist must show, from the order of nature and the course of human history, that this order and course are self-sufticient. self-regulating and self-maintained. The assertion of the deistical doctrine requires this, and we are convinced of its error at this point. 3- From this it follows that deism lays too heavy a burden on natural lazv. It maintains that God. having framed the universe, and having endowed it with certain potencies, has placed it under certain definite laws, and has commis- sioned these laws to conduct nature and human affairs to their appointed destiny. There is no doubt much that is true in what deism has to say alwut the uniformity of ■ { i^^f (I iM^, 554 APOLOGETICS. nature, and the fixity of natural law, still when the whole burden of regulating the natural and moral order of the universe is laid upon these laws, the load may be more than they can bear. In addition, deism is in danger of giving a wrong construction of the nature and function of natural law in the uniformity of nature. These laws, whether in the order of nature or in the course of human affairs, have in themselves no rational or executive power at all. They are neither physical causes, nor rational agents, nor mora^ ulers. They are merely the expressions of the uniform mode in which these causes, agents or rulers exer- cise their i>ower or authority. In relation to God, they simply express, either directly or indirectly, his wisdom, his power, and his moral authority. Apart from divine agency, these laws would be empty abstractions, if not nonentities. If this be the case, it seems impossiMe to separate the agency from the lav, or to transfer the agency to the law as deism does. The deist goes to the opposite error of the pantheist at this point. 4. The deist often lays t. o much stress on the distinction between the physical and the nio^al. He does this when he suggests that, while God may have now no control over physical events in the order of nature, he may yet exercise authority over events in the realm of human affairs. Indeed, one of the strong contentions of certain types of deism is that God holds men under mora! responsibility, that con- science is the voice of God in the human soul, and that if its voice is faithfully heeded, the life will be pleasing to God, and reach its happy goal in the end. We have no dispute with the teaching of this type of deism upon God's relation to the moral order of which man forms a part. But we contend that the moral and physical are so inti- mately related that it is impossible to admit moral govern- ment and consistently deny physical control. If God governs in the one sphere, he also rules in the other. This is plainly evident in the case of man. He has a physical DEISM AND RATIONALISM. 555 organism, which relates him in various ways to the order of nature, and he has a moral constitution, by which he becomes a part of the moral order. If he is 'inder God in the one sphere, he must also be in the other. To teach otherwise is absurd. The only consistent deistical doctrine IS that God has no oversight in either sphere, and that as nature is self-contained under natural law, so human affairs are self-contained under moral law; but in neither case has God any interest in what takes place. This would be consistent; but the price of the consistency is the destruc- tion of moral government. There is no alternative. The physical and moral are so bound up together that the same philosophy of both must be given. The choice is between the baldest deism, which makes God a perpetual absentee from the universe, and a consistent theism, which regards him as an abiding resident in it, and as ruling over all forms of being embraced in it, ever in harmony with the nature of each of these orders of being. 5. Deism makes it difficult to hold a sound doctrine of human freedom. Man becomes a part of that universe from which God is usually absent. In that universe mechanism generally prevails. All events are under the reign of law, and there is small place for man's moral agency. Even if we hold that the creator has endowed man with inherent freedom, yet man is placed by the deist in a universe where mechanism prevails, and not in a universe where all events are to be traced, in the last analysis, to the free activity of God, the author of all. Under these circumstances man's autonomy must be seriously impaired. He is placed in a universe where rigid law rules; and his own nature is also under a moral law which is imposed upon him. This cannot but hamper his freedom. Thus it also appears that the best and widest field for human freedom is found where a free, rational, holy God exercises control in the spheres of both natural and moral government. This is what theism provides. I' .1 ll MKROCOPV nSOWTION TBT CHART (ANSI ond ISO TEST CHART No. 2) lit U£ 2 142 1 1^ |Z2 Urn A /APPLIED IM/1GE Inc leSJ tail Moir Slr.«t P^ochtittr. N«« rork 14809 USA ("e) 4(2 - Oy» - Phon. (7te) 2M - MM - Ton 556 APOLOGETICS. 6. Deism leaves no proper scope for the exercise of the divine love, pity and compassion towards men. God >s far removed from the universe, and does not concern himself with the affairs of men. He is too far away to touch us with his tender compassion, and we are too distant from him for the eye of his pity to see us. There is no bridge by which our burdened souls may go to him, and no channel down which his consolations may flow to us. His hand is too far removed tc wipe away the tears of sorrow, or to bind up broken-hearted grief. He cannot be t present help in time of trouble, nor a deliverer in seasons of dis- tress. Deism presents a God cold and distant; too cold to love and too distant to help his creatures. This condemns it on emotional grounds. t n a 7 Deism is open to this practical objection, that if Uod is not concerned in us, why should we concern ourselves with him? If God does not care for his creatures by his providence, why ought his creatures trouble themselves with obedience to him? If there be no other moral government than that which the law of my moral being expresses to me, why should I be troubled about obeying God, or be concerned about any rewards and punishments at his hand? Deism cuts the sinews of a moral life, and removes one of its strong sanctions. 8. In conclusion, deism leaves no place for the super- natural facts and experiences of a Christian life. The Bible as a supernatural revelation, Jesus Christ as the Son of God and divine Saviour of men, the atonement as a real sacrifice for our sins, regeneration as the work of the Holy Spirit in our souls, the contents of a truly religious life, prayer as a really efficacious exercise, the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting, have no real place on the basis of the deistical philosophy. This is its final and fatal defect; and, being marked by this defect, it can give no adequate interpretation of the facts of the history of the Christian religion. In this history we have a great t 5 DEISM AND RATIONALISM. 557 mass of facts pertaining to the affairs of men, which cannot be construed on the foundation of the deistic philosophy. Theism has no difficulty with these facts. God is the postu- late cf the moral order, as well as of the natural order. But deism, when weighed in the balances, is found wanting. It may be well to add that the Apologetics of a century ago proceeded largely upon the basis of a modified deism. The result was that the distinctive supernatural features of Christianity were regarded in a somewhat external and mechanical way. With the advent of a richer theistic philosophy of the relation of God to the universe, a more vital Apologetic has come into existence. Even Butler did not entirely free himself from certain features of deism. y M t s as i t* CHAPTER XI. PANTHEISM: STATEMENT. Contents. Pantheism, Deism and Theism in Contrast— Pantheism Subtile and Persistent.— Its History.— India.— Greece.— Mediaeval Times.— Modern Days.— Spinoza.— Hegel. — General Description. — Three Principles.— One Essence.— Finite Things Derived.— Principle of Derivation in the One Essence.— Personality of the Monistic Essence Denied.— The Re- ality and Creation of Finite Things Denied.— Four Historic Types of Pantheism.- Hindoo, with Brahm and Emanation.— Greek, with Pure Being and Manifestotion.— Spinozistic, with Substance and Modification. —Hegelian, with Absolute Reason and Idealistic Evolution. Summary of the Statement of Pantheism. LlTERATURB. Encyclopedia Articles on Pantheism and Afonwm.— Pinnock'i 5^»- wojo.— Saisset's Modern Pantheism.— Caird' a Spinota—Jandt'z History of Pantheism.— h\Mt'i Pantheism and Christianity.— Plamtret'a His- tory of PanfAmm.- Martineau's Study of Religion. Book III., Chaps. I., II.— Bruce's Apologetics, Cha, III.— Flint's Antitheistic Theories, Chap. IX.— Caird's Fundamental iu.« of Christianity, Ch ps. III., IV. — Oarke's Outline of Christian Theology, Part I., Chap. III.— Royce's The World and the Individual, Chap. IX.— Ebrard's Apologetics, Vol. II., Sec. v.. Chaps. I., II.— Miley's Systematic Theology, Vol. I., Chap. HI., Sec. II.— Rishell's The Foundations, Div. I., Sec. III., Chaps. I.- IX.— Strong's SystemaHc Theology, Part II., Chap. III., Sec. HI.— Modern Skepticism, Chap. II.— Bowne's Studies in Theism. Chap. HI.— Eraser's Philosophy of Theism. Vol. I., Chaps. V., VI.— Christlieb's Modem Doubt and Christian Belief. Chap. HI., Sec. III. I. Preliminary and Historical. § 130. i."WT|TE have now to consider pantheism. This great VV type of semi-reUgious philosophy has ^'ways had a large place in speculative thought. It has been alike per- sistent and widespread in both ancient and modern times. It seems to have a certain attractiveness to many minds that delight to meditate on high themes. As a type o£ thinking upon these themes, it is subtile and potent. In some cases Christian thinkers of speculative instincts have PANTHEISM. 559 shown pantheistic tendencies. The Christian apologete must, therefore, inspect pantheism with some care. The purer and nobler aspects of pantheism have certain points of affinity with theism. Like theism, it lays stress upon the fundamental unity of the absolute ground of all existence; but it differs with theism as to the precise nature of that ground. Lit- 3 theism, pantheism maintains the immanent relation of what it calls God to the finite uni- verse; but it is not in agreement with theism in regard to the real transcendence of God in relation to the cosmos. In certain respects, pantheism stands at the opposite pole of thought from deism. Deism insists on the positive transcendence of God, and almost ignores his immanence, while pantheism always emphasizes the divine immanence at the expense of his transcendence. But theism asserts both the transcendence and immanence of God in reference to his relations with the universe of finite things, and it seeks to construe both facts in a well-balanced way, and thereby to provide an adequate philosophical basis for the Christian system. Pantheism, however, lays insistent stress on t!ie essential and generic unity of all existence, and it refuses to admit that the finite cosmos and its infinite ground are to be numerically distinguished from each other. This means that God and the universe are in some way to be identified. God is eith - hidden in the universe, or ths universe is lost in God. 2. The history of pantheism is an interesting and instruc- tive chapter in the trend of human thought. The Hindoo theosophy involved in both Brahmanism and Buddhism is perhaps the oldest type of pantheistic speculation. In Greek philosophy it appears in several forms. Anaximander, with his mtttpov as the source of all things, came near to the notion of pantheistic unity. The Heraclitics, in quite an- other way, with their conception of all finite tbings ever becoming in ceaseless flow, sought for a monistic principle of existing things. Some of the Stoics, in their conception i ,1 iS < i' H^ h S6o APOLOGETICS. of the cosmos as a vast vital entity, were nearly on the same ground. In later Platonir speculations, especially in the Alexandrian school of Proclus and Plotinus, very dis- tinct pantheistic tendencies emerge. But the Eleatics, like Xenophones, Zeno and Parmenides, are the urqualified pantheists of Greek philosophy. In their conception of the one, or the all, or pure being, they assert the unity and reality of one unchanging essence, and at the same time they deny anything but a phenomenal reality to the many in finite forms of existence. This is pure monism in ancient times. In Gnosticism there are also distinct traces of pan- theistic influences. In medicpi'd times there was little pantheistic philoso- phizing, save as the neo-Platonic philosophy affected the thinking of certain scholastics. In the controversies between the scholastics who were Aristotelian in their philosophy, and those who were Platonic, the latter always inclined to what may be called idealistic pantheism. These scholastics, moreover, represent some of the very best aspects of mediaeval speculation. In modern days pantheism has widely prevailed. Bruno and Boehme, in Italy and Germany, respectively, in a vague way, were its modem precursors. But it was the philosophy of Descartes that se*- the problem which modem pantheism in Spinoza's hands sought to solve. Descartes asserted an inherent dualism between mind and matter, between spiritual and material forms of existence. To resolve this dualism, and to mediate between mind and matter, the occasionalism of Gueliux, the preestablished harmony of Leibnitz, and the vision of ali things in God of Malebranche, were proposed. But it was the Jew, Spinoza, who resolved this dualism by asserting the sole reality of a unitary substance, which underlay both mind and matter, and of which both spiritual and ma.erial forms of being were merely modes. There is only one essential reality which, as eternal, self-existent substance, has for PAxNTHEISM. 561 us two attributes, thought and extension, under which attributes all modes of spiritual and material existence in the finite universe may be construed. This is typical modern pantheism, and it has had many adherents. In more recent times, in that type of modem idealistic philosophy which sprang from Kant, and which, through Fichte and Schelling. culminated in Hegel, we have the latest type of pantiieism. By Hegel, the monistic ground of all existence in the finite universe is unconscious reason or impersonal tiiought or absolute idea. This reason, thought, idea, or ego, takes the place of Spinoza's sub^ stance; and while, perhaps, it is not so clearly defined as was Spinoza's monistic principle, it was perhaps a more fruitful conception. All finite things in the universe are construed m relation to absolute reason, and, by a logical process, are deduced from it. This may be called idealistic pantheism, and by its denial of personality to its monistic principle, is radically opposed to theism. In our own day, those who are in sympathy with this doctrine are anxious to attach moral attributes to absolute reason, or uncon- scious thought, and in this way to provide a philosophical basis for the moral world and a valid ground for the ethical life of moral beings, In this way that aspect of idealistic pantheism which is called ethical monism has arisen in our own day. The aim of this efifort is laudable; but so long as personality is denied to the absolute and self-existent ground of finite things, it is not easy to see how that ground can proi)erIy possess moral attributes, or establish and conduct a moral government over any forms of being. This very meagre historical sketch will suffice to show that pantheism has had a long history, and that it can claim the prestige of many noble names. II. General Description of Pantheism § 131. While pantheism has as.sumed many v ant historical and speculative forms, yet its essential principles are capable U \l i SI ii: •t a 562 \POLOGETICS. of comparatively easy exposition. This section, m a brief •way, undertakes to give that exposition, in the hope that a simple analysis of generic pantheism will suffice in its discussion as an antitheistic theory. I. Pantheism of all types always asserts that there is only one real and abiding existence in the realm of bemg. There is only one absolute and self-existent essence, only one fundamental and eternal substance, only one real and unchanging being. No matter under what category this essence, substance or being is construed, it is always unitary. It is infinite, eternal, self-existent and absolute, yet essen- tially and inherently one. This monistic basis has in it all the resources that are necessary to explain the finite and changing universe; but amid all these changes, the ground of all change is unchanging, and suffers no decay in its real being. It is often called God, but this adorable name is not applicable to this one essence in any proper theistic sense, for the reason, mainly, that personality, and all it involves, are denied to this essence. But pantheism is always monism, impersonal monism, and wherever we have this conception of absolute reality we have pantheism. 2 Pantheism of all shades always construes finite thmgs in relation to this one abiding essence. The precise mode of that construing may vary, but the fact is held fast by all pantheists. Finite things, which are many and changmg. have no real abiding being in themselves. The many have no reality, the one only has real being. Finite things are derived in some natural and necessary way from the infinite monistic ground of all being. Any reality which these finite things has is temporary and derivative, not permanent and inherent. Views differ widely among pan- theists as to the precise mode whereby finite things are de'ived from the monistic source of all being, but all are agreed that in some necessary way this derivation takes place. It is never creation, for no new essence or substance is brought into existence by this process of derivation. ' 'I r PANTHEISM. 563 These finite things are always phenomenal, and ever chang- ing. The only temporary reality they possess comes from the reality derived from the one only real essence. They are a stream ever flowing on, a fire ever blazing up, a panorama ever passing by, a procession ever moving on. They have no abiding reality; they are derived in some inherent way from the monistic ground of all real being; and they are always to be construed in relation to that ground. The unreal and derivative nature of all finite things in the universe is common to all aspects of pantheism. 3. The principle of the derivation of finite things from their infinite monistic ground is always within that ground. That monistic ground is self-contained, and has in it the resources of all finite forms of being. By some immanent process, finite things arise out of the secrets of the one and only real essence. This process cannot be called creation, and hence its ground need not be called a creator. This monistic ground, either from its own inherent nature or because of the conditions of its existence, is so constituted as to express or exhibit itself in forms of space and time, of motion and thought, of order and end. This expression or exhibition constitutes the universe as it is from moment to moment. There is no extra-mundane agent, nor a neces- sarily definite intelligence, involved in the process in ques- ^'on, for out of the native immanent resources of primal c ig all things finite come. If this inner principle of ^rivation be called God, he is confined within the universe, . lies back of it, without ever transcending it in any respect. The universe and God, so far as real essence, at l'»ast, is concerned, are to be regarded as numerically identical. The universe is not created by God. The universe, at best, can only be the existence form of God at any given time. The impersonal ground of all existence expresses itself in the finite universe, and the reason, cause and end of that expression are to be discovered in that ground. The prin- ciple of the derivation of the universe is intra, not extra- 1 ^a 1 fi^ (: I, ii i i: ■5 ' ' ^1 564 APOLOGETICS. I nundane, and the limits of the cosmos indicate the bounds of the activity of the absolute ground of all existence. These three principles mark all kinds of pantheism. Pan- tlieism is monism. Pantheism derives finite things by some ratural process from its monistic ground. The pnnctple ■A the process of derivation lies within that ground. Inci- dentally, it may be added that all forms of pantheism deny the personality of its monistic principle, refuse to admit that finite things have any save a phenomenal reality, and leave no place for a proper doctrine of free and intelligent creation. God and the cosmos are in some way to be regarded as identical. It may almost be said that the uni- verse produces itself, and this is about the same as to say that God reproduces himself in the universe. Wherever we find a system of thought which involves these main posi- tions, we are in touch with some one or other of the many types of pantheism. III. Four Historic Types of Panthism. § 132- In the further exposition of pantheism, it may best serve our purpose to give a brief description of some of its great historic forms. There are at least four of these which arrest attention and invite inspection. A brief sketcn of each of them will supply concrete illustration of the -''dactic statement made in the preceding section, and may, pt. -aps, serve to make our general view of pantheism more definite and clear. , • ..u» I Chronologically, the Oriental type of pantheism is the most ancient. It appears in its most definite forr^ among the Hindoos in India, though there are hints of it m Persia, Egypt and China. It took its rise somewhere between 1500 B C and 600 B. C, and it supplies the philosophical basis of Brahmanism, and, to some extent, of Buddhism also. This type of philosophy has colored the whole life of many millions of the human race. 1; 'ii „. PANTHEISM. S6S The primal essence, the one only reality, is thought of as a sort of spiritual entity. It is called Brahm, or primal essenoe, and it constitutes the basis of the Hindoo theosophy. It is usually conceived of under the category of spirit rather than matter, hence Hindoo philosophy has affinity with idealism rather than materialism. This Brahm is, however, impersonal and un.onscious, yet it is the source of all finite thmgs. These finite things have reality only as they par- take in the essence of Brahm. This vague, shadowy, half spiritual, yet impersonal, conception of real being, is re- garded as deity, and as the fountain of all finite being. The mode by which finite thirgs are derived from the resources of Brahm is cmamtion. Finite things, including the members of the human race, are eons which spring from Brahm by a process whose principle is inherent in Brahm. This process may be called emanation, although it is not quite the same as the emanation of the neo-Platonism which appears in Gnosticism. By this rather vague and specula- tu-e process finite tilings of all sorts and grades rise into phenomenal being; and. after they have served their day and generation, they fall back again into the bosom of Brahm, and their temporary existence thereby comes to an end. In an ever-recurring process this goes on through the ages. 2. Th- Greek pantheism is also of high antiquity and well d' .in its form. It appears in the Eieatic philoso- phy, about 400 B. C., and it was potent in the speculation of that period, and long afterwards. The fundamental essence which alone has reality is pure being. This is conceived of in different ways. It i: some- times called the one, as against the manifold of finite exist- ence, and again it is called the all, as embracing the total reality in all finite things. This, in any case, is taken to be the sole, unchanging and underived existence. In it, as one, all rea' >eing abides. It alone is unchanging, and is pure noumenal being. In it lies the secret, and is found < : :• . < % ■■ I : I' %\ m ill t " /§ 566 APOLOGETICS. ■■ i: ! i .: S) Hi the source, of the many as they appear in various passing forms of existence. As to the principle and process by which finite things are derived from the one, the Eleatics were never clear, and their statements upon this point are not very consistent. Some went as far as to deny that finite things had any reality at all, but this was against both sense and reason. Others were content to give finite things a sort of unreal, phenomenal existence, and to rest in a quite empirical inter- pretation of their relation to the one, as the unity of real being About all that can be said concerning the relation between finite things and real being is that in them real being is manifested. Manifestation, then, is the term we may take to denote the relation between the one and the many, between the noumenal and the phenomenal. r Spinoza, about 1600 A. D., represents modern con- sistent pantheism. It is stated by him in a wonderfu % clear and logical way, so that there is not mucn difficulty in under? iding his scheme. The fundamental and only real essence is substance. This substance is one, real, infinite, eternal and self-existent. It is in itself neither spiritual nor material, though it becomes the source of both kinds of finite existence. By Spinoza, and those who think with him, this substance is always identified with God, and the one basal reality and ground of all existence may be described equally well by one of these terms as by the other. Not only is this substance infinite in its extent and resources, but it also possesses an infinite number of attributes. But for us, and our appre- hension, there are only two attributes. These are extension for material thin-s and thought for spiritual tnings. Each material obje- x mode of substance exhibited under the attribute of extension, while each spiritual entity is a mode of this same substance under the attribute of thought Hence, a tree is infinite substance expressed as a mode of the attribute of extension; while a human soul is the ^i ♦ PANTHEISM. 567 same substance expressed as a mode of its attribute of thought. The principle which marks the process of the derivation of finite things from their basal reality is here more clearly defined. It may be termed modification. According to this conception, finite things are modes of infinite substance, determined according to one or other of these two attributes of extension and thought. Substance is capable of many modifications under these two attributes, and in this way the multiplicity of finite things is explained. This substance is always impersonal, and this affords real difficulty to an otherwise attractive scheme. How any modification of an impersonal entity could ever produce a personal form of finite being is hard *o conceive! The process, it must be added, by which il;.s activity of modification takes place is never free and distinctly rational. It is always necessary, and mechanical in its nature. By such a process, however, the whole cosmos of finite things, in its origin, progress and end, is derived from the one all in all. 4. The Hegelian type is the most recent phase of pan- theism. It seeks to avoid some of the rocks on which Spinoza's system suffers shipwreck, and in doing so comes into some affinity with neo-Platonism and Hindoo theoso- phy. Hegel's syi tern may be well cal'ed idt^^iistic p ' he' ?m, and in its better aspects it has some good features, ^ icially as against materialism. The primal essence, according to Hegel '"s pure thought, absolute reason or unconscious rnirit. Th' Ij.isal reality is construed under the conception .f pirit ratiir • than matter, of the idea rather than the atom. This pure thought is sometimes called pure being, and at first it is also regarded as impersonal. In this absolute unconscious reason there IS a principle, or inner logical movement, which is its main feature. This process is a thought or rational, not pnysical or mechanical, process. In this process the secret of finite things is to be found. I 1^ ' i I i n ii I 1568 APOLOGETICS. The process of the derivation of finite things from their original source has been practically suggested. The phrase, idealistic evolution, may express it. This process is not material or dynamical; it is rather logical and rational m its nature. There is a spiritual principle in all finite things, whether we call them spiritual or n.aterial, or whether they be found in nature or in human spirit. In that fact resides the unity of all things. The rational which comes into ■finite things, and constitutes their passing reality, flows by a logical process which is a thought activity, and which may be termed idealistic evolution. This process, as ex- pressed by Hegel, is quite complex, and in some respects it seems superficial. By means of it all finite things are construed in relation to absolute unconscious reason, which is the source of them all. These are the great historic types of pantheism. They are all monistic, presenting a unitary principle as the primal essence of all things. It may be Brahm, pure being, infinite substance, or unconscious reason, but it is always unitary; and finite things are always derived from the unitary basis by means of a principle resident in that basis, and they have naught save a phenomenal and temporary reality. Whether it be emanation, manifestation, modification or evolution, it matters not. The principle and the process are in. and from, the basal reality; and are in no sense outside of it, so that finite things thereby produced cannot be thought of as numerically distinct from the fountain whence they flow, and into which they return when their finite career ends. We may now be prepared for some criticism of this great antitheistic scheme in the next chapter. I k' < \ m. CHAPTER XII. PANTHEISM: CRITICISM. Contents. Criticism Necessary, for Pantheism Subtile and Attractive.— Defec- tive on Philosophical Grounds.— Its Advocates Differ Widely.— No Absolutely Unitary Basis.— Does not Explain Finite Things— Facts of Life and Consciousness Unaccounted for.— Personality Denied.— Defec- tive on Moral Grounds.— No Basis for a Moral Order.— Obliterates Moral Distinctions.— Robs God of Intelligent Freedom.— Denies Free- dom and Responsibility in Man.— Has all the Evil Results of Atheistn in Practice.— Defective on Religious Grounds.— Destroys Religion as Well as Morality.— Idea of God Inadequate.— Relation Between God and Man Excludes Religion.— Gives no Basis for the Facts of Objective Revelation.— Nor Proper Place for the Subjective Facts of Religious Experience.— But Theism Adequate at all These Points. LtTEHATURE. Encyclopedia Articles on Pantheism and A/oiiwrn.- Caird's Spinosa. — Saisset's Modern PoM//ifw»i— Flint's Antithcistic TItforics. Chap. X, — Bruce's Apologetics. Chap. Ill — Caird's Fundamental Ideas, Chaps. VI., VII.— Hunt's Pantheism.— lAWvyi^ Systematic Theology, Vol. I., Chap. III., Sec. II.— Rishell's Foundations of the Faith. Div. I.. Sec. III.. Chaps. I.-IX.. and Div. IV., Sec. I.. Chap. III.— Strong's Syste- matic Theology, Part II., Chap. III.. Sec. HI.— Hodge's Systematic Theology, Vol. I., Part I., Chap. III.. Sec. W— Modern Skepticism. Chap. II.— Bowne's Studies in Theism. Chap. VII.— Eraser's Philosophy of Theism, Vol. I.. Chaps. \'.. VI.— Girardeau's Discussions, Chap. VIII.— Christlieb's Modern fhmht and Christian Helief. Chap. III.. Sec III.— Cudworth's Intellectual System of the tMitrrii.— Fairbairn's Philosophy of the Christian Religion. Chap. I. THIS chapter undertakes to criticise pantheism in the interests of theism. Tliat which is good in it, such as the emphasis which it puts upon the immanence of God in his works, may be freely conceded. But its fatal defects, as a philosophy of the relation of God to the universe, and of the nature of God as well, must be plainly indicated. The popular idea of pantheism, as that system which regards God as merely the sum total of concrete existing thing?. "a h h ' H S70 APOLOGETICS. must be set aside as a defective conception of this great system. Pantheism is a much more profound theory of existing things than this popular idea suggests. That it is in itself a subtile system is undoubted, and that it is attractive to a certain type of minds is evident. Especially in its attractive modem dress of ethical monism is it inimical to a sound theism which gives a rational basis for Christianity. Due care in its criticism is, therefore, neces- sary. This critical survey is made under three heads. . f I. Criticism on Philosophical Grounds. § 133. I. Some weight is to be attached to the fact that the adherents of the pantheistic view of existing things are not in agreement in regard to the main elements of their system. This, of course, in itself, is not a refutation of pantheism, yet it is a consideration which exhorts us not to accept it hastily. Especially will it have weight if it can be shown that theism is a more definitely conceived system, and if it appears that its advocates are in g^reater agreement with each other. This, we believe, can be done. That pantheists are at variance with each other at many points is evident from the statement of the system made in the last chapter. It was incidentally brought out in that chapter that in regard to the nature of the one primal essence, in regard to the nature of finite things, and their relation to that monistic essence, and especially in regard to the way in which the fleeting things that make up the finite universe are derived from their monistic and imper- sonal source, there is not a little diversity of view among pantheists. Is Brahm, or pure being, or infinite substance, or unconscious reason, the unitary basis of all things? Then, is emanation or manifestation, modification or evolu- tion, the mode by which finite things are derived from their infinite source? Have concrete finite things any actual reality, or are they entirely unreal, and the whole universe iMiBi PANTHEISM. S7i merely a passing show? Is the Hindoo, or Parmenides, or Spinoza, or Hegel right ? Other deeper differences exist among pantheists. Some hold that the primal monistic essence has the attributes of both mind and matter, others that it has the attributes of matter only, and still others the attributes of mind alone. These differences are radical, and lead to entirely different constructions of the general scheme of things. Then, in regard to the place of personality in the system, in regard to the operation of secondary causes, and in regard to the relation of morality to the monistic essence, pantheists differ widely. So we see much diversity of opinion among them. On the other hand, tlieists are in closer agreement. They practically agree in holding that God, as infinite, spiritual and personal, is the primal reality; that the universe of finite things has a dependent, but genuine, reality, due to the causal creative agency of God; and that God is both immanent and transcendent in his relation to, and opera- tions in, the universe. Such being the case, theism has the rational advantage over pantheism. 2. It may be charged that pantlieism does not provide an absolutely unitary principle to account for the system of existing things. That it does provide such a principle is its high claim, and as against materialism t' ^s claim has some weight. Bit it is very evident that in its explana- tion of finite things it requires two principles. It has its primal essence, and its principle for the derivation of finite things from that essence. Without this principle the essence would be absolutely impassive and immobile, and hence incapihle of bringing the universe into temporal being. If ii be assumed that the principle is not eternal, as the primal essence is, tiien the question as to the source of the principle of derivation, and the beginning of its activity, at once arises. To this question pantheism can give no good answer. Its advocates cither ignore the question, or give the principle of derivation, whether it be I! 1% 11 1 572 APOLOGETICS. emanation, or manifestation, or modification, or evolution, a reality coeval with the primal essence. This necessarily lands in a rational dualism. In addition, if the primal essence be eternal, and if the principle for the derivation of finite things be coeval in its activity with that essence, then the finite universe, which is the result of the acti.ity of that principle, is also eternal. This gives three eternal forms of being, and shows how far from providing a uni- tary basis pantheism is. To make it workable, it must become dualism ; and when it does work, it becomes a sort of tritheism, which is, however, devoid of personality. Theism has the advantage at this point. In its funda- mental postulate of an infinite personal Spirit, possessing creative power in his very nature, theism provides in God an absolutely unitary principle to account for all existence; in its conception of creative power freely exercised, it pro- pounds the philosophy of finite things in their origin, reality and end; and in its doctrine of immanence it announces the gfr-ji;nd and explanation of the universe at every stage of it. 3. The explanation of finite things which pantheism sup- plies is defective. How are these things to be concei\ed? Are they in any proper sense real? If real, is their essence different from that of the primal essence? If different, what is it, and how does it become different? If the same, does the primal essence suffer any temporary loss of reality by the rise of finite things into existence? Further, if the primal essence is at first absolutely undifferentiated, and if finite things are derived from that essence in some natural way, how comes it to pass that finite things seem to be so greatly differentiated as they are in the various grades of these things? How does the distinction between the inor- ganic and organic, between the vegetable and the animal, between the sensitive and the rational, and between the rational and the moral, arise? At every turn pantheism cither does injustice to the facts in finite things, or fail-s PANTHEISM. 573 to provide a rational explanation of them. In addition, pantheism fails to give any reasonable account of the relation of finite things in the universe to each other. How are the different grades of finite things to be regarded in their relations? How do social and moral relations among cer- tam forms of finite being arise? In a word, pantheism provides no rational basis for either a natural or moral order and rule among finite things. 4. Pantheism cannot account for the facts of life and consciousness, and these facts themselves tell against it As LO the reality of these facts, there can be no doubt. Ever, pantheists cannot deny them. First of all, the ques- tion arises as to how vital and conscious forms of being first began to be. The primal essence of pantheism is always held to be at first non-vital and unconscious. Whether it be taken to be Brahm, or pure being, or infinite substance, or absolute reason, this is true. There was a time when, in the whole realm of being, there was not a smgle vital or conscious form in it. Creation in the proper sense being denied, no radically new forms of beings can arise. The gern.s of such forms of being must have been latent in the primal essence. Pantheists hesitate to say this plainly. And yet we are asked to believe that, in some mysterious way, a non-vital and non-conscious essence gave rise, out of its own resources, to certain forms of being that are vital and conscious. This means that the non- vital produced the vital, and that the unconscious produced the conscious. Such a supposition does utter injustice to the law of causation, and professes to derive the higher from the lower without any adequate cause for that derivation. Modern science fully confirms this criticiim of pantheism by its doctrine of biogenesis, and no school of psychology, even the very latest physiological psychology, has been able to deduce the conscious from tlie unconscious. Life and consciousness can have only a phenomenal exist- ence, .ind their reality is entirely obscured by pantheism. Ill 1 HMMMk 574 APOLOGETICS. This is a fatal criticism of all types of pantheism, for even the Hegelian refuses to admit that absolute reason is at first living and conscious. Theism again meets the conditions here. In its postulate of an infinite God, it provides a living, active, conscif is being, with power at least to create forms of beine having the same attributes as himself. He, being the highest form of being conceivable, provides a causal ground to originate and endow all lower forms of being with the qualities they possess. Hence, theism can account for the facts of life and consciousness. 5. The denial of personality to the primal essence is a fatal defect of pantheism. This denial blocks its way in seeking to give a rational explanation of finite personal forms of being. That there are such forms of being is certain. Here we have the question of the personality of the primal essence, and the problem of a multitude of finite personal beings to deal with. As to the denial of the per- sonality of the primal essence, it might be sufficient to say that this is a mere hypothesis, without anything to support it. But it can be added that the evidences of free, intelli- gent activity on the part of the primal essence imply that it possesses self-consciousness and self-direction, which are the essential elements of personality. Moreover, without the conception of personality, which pertains only to spir- itual forms of being, it is impossible to secure an absolutely unitary principle, in relation to which all forms of finite being may be rationally construed. The denial of person- ality to the primal essence whicl pantheism makes, robs us o srch a unitary principle as theism provides ; and for the rise of self-consciousness and the genesis of personal forms of finite being, pantheism gives no philosophy. This is one of the most glaring defects of pantheism, and yet it is one to which its adherents hold with great tenacity. Theism well meets the case here. In its postulate of God, it attaches self -consciousness and self-direction to the PANTHEISM. 575 basis of all being, and grounds its princip of absolute unity in the personality of God. This enables it to give a good account of all forms of finite dependent p»;rsonality, and to meet all the conditions of a soun< aeory. On philosophical grounds, pantheism fails us. II. Criticism on Moral Grounds. § 134. If pantheism is defective in its philosophy, it is still more so when tested in the moral realm. It does scant justice to moral facts, and explains the terms which express moral order by really explaining them away. A few points are noted. I. Pantheism provides no adequate basis for a moral order and government. Such order and government pre- suppose moral attributes in the ground of the order and m the nature of the moral governor. But the conception which pantheism gives of the primal essence of all things IS entirely devoid of moral attributes. Brahm, pure being, substance and unconscious reason, are all non-moral con- ceptions. Not one of them possesses such definite moral attnbutes as to lay the basis for a moral order and govern- ment among finite forms of being; and being non-moral, this monistic essence can never constitute any finite forms of being in such a way as to make them fit subjects of a moral order. All of l...s is evidently felt by those in our own time who are in sympathy with pantheism, and yet feel the need of attaching moral attributes to the primal essence, in what they call ethical monism. This is a con- fession of need, rather than a solution of the problem. It really seems impossible to provide a ground for a moral order, unless the primal essence and ground of all things is moral. The postulate of theism is ample to provide this. 2. A still more serious objection to pantheism is that it really obliterates moral distinctions, and leaves no proper 576 APOLOGETICS. difference between good and evil, right and wrong, holiness and sin. This appears in various respects. Everything that happens in the universe is the outcome of the activity of the primal essence, and its principle of activity, which is called God, and his mode of operation. All that comes into existence must be only either good or bad, for it is all the same in its essential nature. Then, all that these things do is really the activity of God; and if he is per- fectly holy, then these things must be like him. Among men, all that they do is in harmony with God, and it is not possible for them to be otherwise than as God is. They are from him as to their nature, and the activity of that nature can never be really moral. To identify God and the universe as pantheism does, is to break down all moral distinctions, and to obliterate the radical diflference which every moral consciousness experiences between right and wrong. There are no second causes under the pantheistic scheme. All that transpiris - due to God's causal agency. What a man does is an activity of God in and by that man. If he gives a cup of cold water to the thirsty, or if he loves his neighbor, it is God's deed; and if he grinds the face of the poor, or if he kills his fellow, it is God's doing also. All the ingenuity of ethical monism fails to scale this difficulty. 3. Pantheism robs God of freedom with the intelligent self-direction that freedom implies. The fundamental pos- tulate of pantheism always denies the quality of freedom to the primal essence of all things, and it also refuses to attach that quality, even to the principle of the derivation of finite things from the primal essence. This being the case, all the activities of this essence under this principle are necessitarian, and virtually mechanical in their nature. God is not able to set an end before him as the goal of the universe, he has no power to bring intelligence and wisdom to bear upon the development of the cosmos, and he is incapable of the exercise of free determination in regard PA. THEISM. 177, to what course the history of the universe shall take. Necessity of the sternest sort holds him in its grasp, and mechanism, in the strictest sense, marks out his course for him. This is sheer, blank, blind fatalism, under which morality never can come into being. 4. Nor is there any freed-^m in the creature. No member of the angelic host, nor any child of Adam's race, had, or ever can, possess freedom, which is the crowning glory of personality. Man is bound in the iron chains of necessity, and his supposed sense of freedom is a delusion into which he has fallen. His feeling of responsibility, which pre- supposes freedom, is entirely unreal. What he is, is as he must be; what he does, cannot be otherwise. He has no power of rational choice, or of freedom in action. He lives in a region of shadows, where twilight makes all sense of freedom unreal, and raises before him a mirage of responsibility which has no real existence at all. Pan- theism robs man of freedom, and binds him to the chariot wheels of a stern necessity, which is driven by a blind charioteer down the steeps of fatalism. 5- It may be added that pantheism, though more respect- able than atheism, has in its train all the bad moral results of atheism. An impersonal God is really no God Pure necessity, carried into the sphere of morals, binds men helpless under mechanical law; but it, at the same time, gives them license to live as they list, and co.nmit all sorts of excess. Pantheism gives no ground for moral order and hence fosters moral disorder. Pantheism, denying freedom alike to God and man, takes away responsibility, and sets every man with his hand against his neighbor It would, if reduced to practical eflfect, abolish the home, destroy stable government, and speedily obliterate modem civilization. At every one of these points theism suAccs. It gives a good basis for moral order and government; it announces in no uncertain tones, the eternal distinction between good « I 'If 578 APOLOGETICS. and evil, right and wrong; it asserts that God has absolute freedom, and that man has dependent freedom from God's hand; and it has noble fruitage among men as the adequate basis for Christianity. III. Criticism on Religious Grounds. § 135. It is on the ground of religion that pantheism reveals its greatest weakness. We now make this its final test. Any scheme of existing things that fails here is radically de- fective. Only a few points are needed to make plam this defect. 1 If pantheism lays no foundation for morality, it pro- vides no basis for religion. This is a general statement, yet it is profoundly true. Morality and religion, though not identical, are yet closely related. Morality is not the whole of religion, yet if man is not in moral relations with God, religion, on its ethical side, could never have risen. Now, pantheism, by destroying the basis of moral order, has left religion without a foundation. 2 The idea of God which pantheism announces is en- tirely defective. It makes God simply the primal essence of finite things, and then denies its personality. It asks us to love, worship and obey an abstract impersonal essence. It speaks of Brahm, pure being, substance and absolute reason, and then calls these God. This becomes little better than philosophical idolatry. It is a pure per- version of the sacred name to use it as pantheism does. Then, since all finite things, myself included, are aspects or modifications of God. I should worship nature and even myself, and still be guilty of no perversion of the senti- ment of worship. To ask me to worship the impersonal ground of all finite being, is to ask what is absurd. To use such an idea of God as this, is to address man m terms of atheism, or to set his face towards polytheism, in the form of nature worship, or hero worship. PANTHEISM. 579 3. Tlie relation between God and man which pantheism expresses renders religion impossible. For religion implies an object which is called God, and a subject, which may be man or angel. Now, to render religion possible, both Its subject and object must have real existence, and be capable of numerical distinction from each other. If God be an abstract, impersonal essence, he cannot be the object which religion requires, and if man be but a modification of infinite substance, or, at best, a moment in the logical evolution of absolute reason, religion will be evaporated. If religion be a mode of knowing, believing, feeling and acting on behalf of its subject, in relation to its object, then pantheism fails to provide the essential conditions of religion. No absolutely monistic system, no scheme of abstract identity, can suffice for the basis of religion. 4- So far as Christianity is concerned, pantheism does not provide any proper basis for its objective facts. These facts, as they are peculiar to Christianity, consist specially m the contents of supernatural revelation. Now, pantheism gives no place for such objective facts, nor can anything be supernatural at all. Everythmg is natural or super- natural, according as the terms are used. There can be no special revelation, no miracle, no providence and no prayer. As there is no objective fact of sin, so there is no incarnation, and no redemption by means of God mani- fest in the flesh. As God is hemmed in in his activity by the limits of the universe, he can act in no transcendent redemptive way in relation to that universe. Hence, pan- theism destroys every distinctive feature of Christianity. 5. Then, finally, pantheism provides no place for the subjective aspects of Christianity in religious experience. As man is but a mode or moment in the being of God, there can be in man no definite personal religious experience.' In particular, the supernatural experiences wrought by the Spirit of God, in regenerating and sanctifying the heart of man, and bringing him into a genuine Christian experience. f i; i f i "' ! if 1 - 1 S8o APOLOGETICS. have no rational place on the pantheistic scheme of things. Any attempt to construe the facts of such an experience as described in the Scriptures, or as realized in religious consciousness, must utterly fail. The fellowship of that experience must be between two persons. The conununi- cation and reception of truth, the exercise of repentance and faith, and emotions of joy and love, require what pan- theism does not provide. But theism is adequate as the religious basis of Chris- tianity. It binds morality and religion together in their proper relations, it provides an adequate conception of a personal God, it construes the relations between the object and subject of religion in a correct way, it provides a secure basis for the objective facts of a redemptive revelation, which is supernatural in its nature, and does ample justice to the conditions of religion on its subjective or experi- mental side. CHAPTER XIII. PESSIMISM: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. Contents. tivism.-i>ocialism.-Government Owne.ship of Property -Commtm. Anci^i^rn't- '' ^'^ P«P'-P-imisn^.-StateS [n G«"rT: nauer ?id Hartmann.-Existence Evil.-Life not Worth Living -Criti- c.sm.-.xaggerated.-One-sided.-Overlooks Facts.-fhe Proble^ o tZ7 A 'I ^°°' °^ Pessimism.-Dualism Defective.-The Real Prob- lem for Apologefcs-Physical Evil.-Metaphysical Evil.-RIoral EvU ReXn„'si"„?tr"'^ ^^-" °^ ^'" ^-'--^- s°'-'-„i Literature. Sf u- ^•TV"-C'*i'-d'' ^''^•''' /'A.Vo.oMj' <.»rf Religion ofcJmU- atkes TAe Tna/ of Theones.-Kidd's Social Evolution. Chap VIII- !smil TT^'-'Vl^r'' ^•"'""■■--Sch.penhaueVs S; >?iw Sro/lSrT"? ^""'"/'^ "^ ""^ C/««««<,«,._Augusti„e's r*. ^"y of God.-Fhnt's AnMheiitic Theories. Chaps. VI.-VIII -Fair- ba.rns The PhUosophy of the Christian Religion. Caps I IV- Martmeaus ^ Study of Religion. Vol. II., Chap. III.-Ebrard' "^*ofo- Tru r ^-'/T ^' ^"""^ '•• S-^-^- "-Rishdl's TA. Foundafonsof the Chrxstxan Fatth, Div. V., Sec. I., Chaps. III.. IV.-Lindsay" fJnt Advances. Chap. XVI.-Matheson's Th! Gospel and Modern slZu tutes. Chap. VIL-Fraser's Philosophy of TheL. Vol. I.. Chap VH - Calvms /«,*,/«/«, Book II.-Bruce's Moral Order. Chaps ^llXlk XI.-Pfl«derer's Philosophy of Religion. Vol. IV., Sec. IL, Chap. IV I. Some Hybrid Theories. § i j6. T> EFORE discussing, with some care, pessimism and the M^ probiem of evil, certain schemes which in practical effect are usually more or less antitheistic in their bearin? may be merely noted. These schemes are not so much separate or independent theories, as inferences from, and applications ol, some of the antitheistic systems already i I m I ii S82 APOLOGETICS. 1' " expounded and criticised. It is proper to remark that some of these schemes are advocated in our own day by men who are not professedly antitheistic. In some cases they even claim to be Christian. They are all practical schemes or methods of a social and economic nature, which propose to deal with human society and property rights in certain ways. This being the case, the most of them will come up naturally for consideration in the third division of this treatise. Some of these proposals may be merely mentioned here, as they are in all probability entirely sporadic aber- rations of a few erratic minds, and will soon pass away. How far these aberrations are to be viewed in relation to the problem of evil and Satanic agency, is a question of considerable importance. 1. Spiritualism, in its popular sense, is a perverted or exaggerated belief in the reality and activity of disembodied human spirits; and it has reference especially to the mode and extent of the communication of such spirits with those who are still in this earthly life. This communication is supposed to take place by means of those who possess cer- tain peculiar powers, and are called mediums, and it is claimed \o be effected by methods which quite transcend the natural conditions of our present earthly state. This whole scheme, and all the seances connected with it, may he taken as an indirect imtncss to the reality of the spirit world, and a testimony to the fact of man's immor- tality. It is marked by all sorts of extravagances, well fitte ' to impress those who are in a morbid mental state ; and sometimes it has been convicted of cunning imposture, which could delude only those who are willing to lie de- ceived. Many are inclined to think that this whole system of delusion or deception is to be associated with the problem of evil, and tliat it is the perversion of a legitimate belief in the reality of the world of spirits. 2. Mormonism is another remarkable excrescence in mod- ern thought and life. It claims, in a very irralioiiai way, PESSIMISM. 583 to be the true religion; but it is a self-evident travesty of all that ,s worthy the name of religion, alike in belief and practice. It is a crude mixture of pagan and Christian elements, with a great deal that is sensual and materialistic *r 11! '*• . "^^ ^" ^"^""P* ^0 masquerade in the garb of Christianity in order to delude the ignorant and the unwary; and, in doing so, it is often brazen, and some- times blasphemous. It is an eye-sore upon the fair face of this country, and a serious menace to our civilization and social well being. It demands the serious attention of our legislators, and it is a providential exhortation to the Christian churches to evangelise all our borders as speedily as possible. Rational refutation, national legisla- Hon, may be useful against this great evil; but the best weapon against it is the gospel, carried to every nook and comer of our broad and favored land. 3. Eddyism is another absurd and irrational development m this country. One hardly knows what to say about this system. Its very existence is an anachronism in this age and an absurdity in this land. The woman who poses as Its founder baffles psychological diagnosis, and the book of which she IS the author, and which forms the basis of the system that bears her name, does violence to reason and common sense. The working of this system gives rise to much that IS ridiculous. In practical effect, it is an Ameri- can reproduction of Buddhistic pessimism, with much less to commend it than its Oriental original. There are some things which can be best laughed into oblivion, and this IS surely one of them. 4. Dorvieism is perhaps tiie crowning absunlitv of these erratic schemes. It is. i„,lee.l. so absurd that i^t scarcely deserves mention in these pages. The man. the movement and his methods bear witness to his cunning and resource' and his apparent success is a sad commentary („, the readi- ness of many people to l,e deceived. Kis mothods also ieave the impression that some people like all the more to ^V 584 APOLOGETICS. be fooled when they have to pay handsomely for it. But his case is not an entirely new thing under the sun, for ever since the days of the Egyptian magicians, and the time of Simon Magus, the world has had such deceivers, and a credulous company ready to be deceived. It may be that the problem of evil and of Satanic agency has its illus- tration in such cases as these. Let alone, they will die of inanition. 5. Secularism is a scheme of human affairs which de- serves much more respectable mention. It consists in a general view of this life, which refuses to allow any refer- ence to the life which is to come to enter into its interpre- tation. It makes this life and its duties the main matter for the human race, and it gives a controlling place to the ordinary affairs of this world in the regard of men. It always ignores what we call religion and its sanctions, and it sometimes goes so far as to openly assail Christianity. At times it is willing to speak of the religion of humanity, but such religion is entirely secular. Christianity is only one form of superstition, is largely oth?r-worldly, and not necessary for the well-being of men in this life. Secularism is usually to be associated, as an inference, with atheism, materialism, agnosticism or positivism. Hence, it assumes different types. In most cases it seems to have a natural kinship with positivism, which practically denies or ignores the proper theistic basis of Christianity. As a practical scheme, it can be most naturally discussed in the third main division of this treatise. Its theoretic basis has already been examined, mainly under positivism. All we say now is that Christianity is not merely an other- world religion. It pertains to both worlds, teaching us how to live here, that we may fulfil our end in this life, and be meet for the world which is to come Secularism entirely misconceives Christianity in this respect. 6. Socialism is another modern scheme to be mentioned here. It has, however, its ancient counterpart in Plato's PESSIMISM. ^g- 'Republic, and its mediaeval aspect in More's Utopia But during the past few decades it has had its fresh and formal advocacy. It appears in various schemes to benefit the human race in their civic, social and economic relations In some respects it resembles secularism, although it does not formally Ignore or reject in every case the interests and cla,ms of rehgion. It relates mainly to the affairs of men m th.s hfe, and it pertains to the ownership and use of property of all kinds in particular. Its negative posi- tion .s the denial of all individual and personal rights to property. There should be no private property ownership houM h" "? ^T"'"'"'' '"^ ''^' '^^' government it .hould be used and managed for the advantage and wel- fare of the whole body of the people equally. L^emment faX^^Vnd '' "'r'^ ^"' telegraphies, of manu 80C ahsm. It does not necessarily imply the destruction of existmg governments. It simply argues against orivate ownership of all the productive activitS of thrioprand advocates government ownership of all these things scheme it M "'° ' ^T'""' ''''''' ^°^'^' ^"^ «'=°"°'»»«= scheme, ,t belongs properly to Applied Apologetics, and its d.scuss.on may be safely remitted to the third ci: ision o or m r :! ^" "^ "°" ""^^"^ '^' '^'^ --'-" -ay or may not be an ant-Christian scheme. Some of its advo- ZT ?'" ? '" '"'''"y ^'^'^ the Christian system, but others cla,m that their scheme is really a return to primitive and apostolic Christianity. 7. Communism is closely akin to socialism, and in the popu ar mmd ,s not always distinguished from it. Like ociahsm. It relates to the ownership and use of property. It sometimes goes further than socialism, and assails exist- ing forms of civil government. Negatively, it agr«.5 with Sialism m arguing against private ownership of property ft •, , i St I 586 APOLOGETICS. but, positively, it differs with socialism in holding that this ownership should be lodged, not in the national govern- ment, but in the body of the people. They should hold the property of the community in common, and as a trust for the whole people. Hence, the name communism, which means that the property is to be held in common. In its extreme form, communism arrays itself against all civil government, and in doing so comes perilously near to the ground of the anarchist, who is really the modern sociai and economic Ishmaelite. It is evident that this scheme has less regard for law and authority than socialism, and in its practical working is bound to be entirely impracticable. But a proper critical estimate of it m-.y be reserved till we reach the discussion of Applied Apologetics, towards the end of this treatise. We pass at once to pessimism and the problem of evil. II. Pessimism: Statement. § 137. I. The term pessimism means the worst, or the worst that can be. In the discussion of theistic problems, it denotes that dreary system which lays stress upon the misery and misfortune of finite existence, especially of those forms of it which are conscious, and hence capable of pain or suffering. It is that strange doctrine which argues that the very fact of existence is itself an evil, and that it is better for finite forms of being not to be. It raises the question whether life is worth living, and argues against the worth of life as a form ot finite conscious exist- ence, wherein pain far outweighs pleasure. With an accent of its own, it declares, concerning human life, that it is vanity of vanities. With its ear open to the cries of pain, and its eye closed to the better aspects of life, it pronounces life a failure, and is ready to declare that self-destruction is a virtue. This remarkable view has had its advocates in both ancient and modern times. PESSIMISM. 587 ■ 2. In ancient times there was a latent pessimism in the duahsm which widely prevailed. Dualism asserts the reality in the universe of two eternal principles, one good and the other evil; one conducive to happiness, the other leading to pain. As these two principles are eternal and in constant warfare, there is no hope of either triumphing over the other. Good can never get the victory over evil, and pain must ever mark the sphere of existing things. The effect of such a doctrine is to beget a hopelessness which gradually deepens mto despair, and leads on to pessimism. In most of the pagan mythologies there are tinges of this view But in Zoroastrianism without the Christian system, and m Gnosticism within it, we find typical dualism whose truitage is pessimism and asceticism. But it is in Buddhism that we find in ancient times a definite pessimistic doctrine; and this system continues to the present day, and is still dominant over the lives of millions of the human race. The germs of this system are found in the ascetici: n of Brahmanism. and its phtophical basis is Hindoo pantheism. According to Buddhism, there is pain and anguish everywhere in human lite This pam is an evil which is inseparably associated with the fact of finite existence. The Kharma, or law of consequences, implies this. The only way to end sorrow and suffering, pain and anguish, is to cau.^e the fact of conscious finite existence to cease to be. This endin- of existence is the highest virtue for m.n. and it is to be effected by the Dharma, or the moral pathway which leads to hmvna. The Nirvana state is not necessarily annihi- lation of essential being, but it is rather the destruction of conscious finite being, and with this the ending of pain and suffering in the individual life. Thi. form of nes- sumsm regards existence in this life as an evil, and it makes the ending of ,t the goal of the highest virtue. The sad and burdened condition of the Oriental million, provided a suitable soil fur this doctrine of despair, and its fearful f i\ ! V I 'I I III S88 APOLOGETICS. fruitage appears in the abject hopelessness of these millions. With them life is not worth living. 3. Li modern times there have been certain very strange developments of pessimism as a formal philosophy of finite existence, especially as it appears in human life. These have arisen in recent times in Germany, where there has been so much speculation since Kant's day. It is a striking thing to observe that this modem pessimism is associated with the idealistic pantheism of which Hegel is really the founder, ju^c as ancient pessimism arose in India in con- nection with the theosophic pantheism of the Hindoos. Is there any philosophical kinship between pantheism, with its denial of personality, and pessimism, which regards finite conscious existence as an evil to be gotten rid of? Schopenhauer and Hartmann are the names which repre- sent modern pessimism. The former makes the essence of real being consist in will; the latter discovers it in what he calls the unconscious. But the will of Schopenhauer is not merely volition; it is rather desire, striving or energy of any kind. It is the secret and cause of the development of the universe in all its stages, and when human will is reached the conditions of pain and evil are presented. On this basis, Schopenhauer declares that this world is the worst possible, and that life is not worth living. There are many points of likeness between this system and Buddhism, and all through it there is the note of the Cynic. Hartmann places the essence of all reality in the unconscious, which gradually rises through various grades of being till the stage of consciousness is attained ; and here, again, the conditions of hopeless pain and misery are provided, and existence is a misfortune from which men would gladly be free; and the only way to mend matters is to end them. No formal criticism of pessimism is now needed. The defects of its philosophic basis have been revealed 'n the criticism of pantheism. Any system which denies person^ PESSIMISM. 589 altty to the ground of all existence, and which fails to ^ justice to the dependent reality of finite things, is destined to lead to erroneous and absurd views of human life; and any system which binds all its parts under the iron law of necessity, and refuses any numerical distinction between finite things and their infinite ground or source, is bound to mterpret human life in terms of despair. Such is pan- theism; hence pessimism. .11,^"/! ^"^'^u^' ^'^^' P^^^''"'^'"' while it has some plau- sible features about it, certainly exaggerates the elements of pain and anguish in the world and in humanity. It wh Lral! ""T'"^ ""T '"^'*''''' *° '''' J°y ^"d happiness the conditions of sentient being in all its grades in the ZTr^L" aI' ^'^ n '" '""^ ^'°°'">^ P'^*"- ^-wn by pessimism. Above all, pessimism overlooks the fact that m^'lfZT't 'T^'"^ "^'""'^ ^' ^°^'^' ^"d that even pain Itself has beneficent results for the forms of being that are the subjects of it; and, in like manner, pessimism ent rely .g^ores the fact that in the sphere of hVman liS vlm'VT''''' '■'''■""^^ '^' ^^^"^y °^ the Christian system a redemptive and remedial force which surely cures As this r 'rf "" '"^' ^"' "^'^" "^« worth living. evlt • T ""^' "' '° '^' ^'^" °^ '^' P^°blem of ev 1 in Its deeper moral aspects, the discussion may now enter upon that subject. ^ : & : III. The Problem of Evil. § 138. I. The cardinal fact which is involved in all forms of pessimism is that of ez>il. With this fact every system of philosophy and every scheme of morals has to^eal and all forms of religion find it necessary to give a place to ^me aspect of this sad and abnormal fact. This fact'press s hard on the the.stic theory, which holds to the existence of an infinite personal God, who is the source, the ground i II 590 APOLOGETICS. and the end of the universe. There is special difficulty in construing the fact of evil in harmony with the goodness of God and the beneficence of his rule over the cosmos. All forms of dualism are founded upon a recognition of the fact of evil, and dualism professes to give its best philosophy. Gnosticism, with its accompanying asceticism, wrestled with the same persistent fact in a one-sided way. In the theodicies of every age there are attempts, more or less adequate, to solve the problem or harmonize it with the theistic conception of God and the universe. But it is only in the Christian system that we have its solution, and by means of the gospel its assured remedy. 2. No theistic construction of the relations between God and his creatures can be insensible to the fact of evil in its various bearings. Perhaps much current theistic philoso- phy and moral theory have failed to do justice to the facts of evil in the universe, and to take fully into account the effects of sin in the moral order of the world. In the early chapters of this treatise, when setting in clear relief the problem of Apologetics, stress was there laid upon the fact that evil in all its forms, and especially as moral evil, must be taken into account in any adequate apologetical scheme. The fact of moral evil is abnormal in the universe, yet it must be allowed for in any adequate theory of existing things. In these opening chapters it was also indicated that it was in relation to this abnormal fact that the essence and power of the Christian system appeared. Christianity was conceived to be the redeeming activity of God in the world. This activity is operative, first of all, in the members of the human race, and through them in the wider area of the cosmos. It is made effective through Christ by the agency of the Holy Spirit, and it has been operative in various ways along the ages. In this redeeming and re- newing activity is the true theodicy. 3. It is important to understand precisely what is meant PESSIMISM. 591 by the fact of evil in the world. There are widely different aspects of ,t, and some writers lay stress on one phase of It, and some on another. This has much to do with the tT^X'ies'"^"''""' ^'"^"^^ ^°'' *•"" P'°'''"" '" ^'^"'""* Some lay the main stress on the physical aspects of evil and hence make much of bodily pain and anguish in sen- tient bemgs m general, and on the sufferings of man in particular. The cruder conceptions of Buddhism, and some forms of asceticism, are to be noted in this connec- tion. Others incline to a rather metaphysical view of the nature of ev,l. and conceive it as defect, or privation, or as good in the making. This almost regards evil as inherent in finite forms of being, and renders it difficult to connect any moral q. j.ty with it. Perhaps Leibnitz best represents this general type of opinion ; and modem evolution has its points of contact here. Still others go nearer to the root of the matter, and regard that abnormal fact in the universe which is usually called evil as mainly moral in its nature. As such, it is somethmg which does violence to the moral order which s established in the universe; and since this moral order IS made up of personal moral beings, then evil must be a quality of the states and acts of such beings. The real nature o moral evil thus appears. It is essentially a quality of moral agents, not an entity of any kind. Viewed in relation to the other members of the moral order it may be injury, regarded in relation to the law of that order it IS Throng-doing, and described in relation to the person of the moral governor it is sin. It is only when this deeper mora view of the evil in the universe is taken that we rightly conceive of it. From the standpoint of moral evil, both physical and metaphysical evil can be construed; but moral evil cannot be deduced from either of the other aspects of it. 592 APOLOGETICS. 4. As to the mystery of the origin of evii, not much need be said. It is a mystery before which we must bow in silence and with uncovered head. To guard against error, we may say that evil is not due to the agency of God, either directly or indirectly exercised. God permits it and con- trols it, and upholds the universe within whose bounds evil is operative. He never can approve of it, he has not pre- vented it, and it never gets beyond his hand. It may be added that the origin of moral evil, which is the source of all other aspects of evil, is to be discovered in the mys- terious powers of the free, personal. Unite, mutable agency of moral beings. This merely indicates the sphere in which it arises, but does not account for its origin. Some are content to say that, in the very fact of the freedom of such agency, the possibility of self-will, which may rise to dis- obedience, resides. Why God did not keep his moral subjects all in loyal obedience and service we do not know; that he often brings good out of evil is evident, and that all things are working together for the largest good in the end we may be sure. 5. It is not necessary to say much concerning the various theoretical solutions of the problem of evil thar. have been suggested. We are concerned rather with giving the fact of evil in all its aspects its proper place in the view of the universe which we present ; and over against this we lay stress upon the fact that, in the redeeming activity of God which is operative in the universe according to his gracious purpose in Christ, is its remedy found. This, rather than any rational theodicy, is the best attitude to take towards the awful fact of evil, which otherwise would drape the cosmos forever in mourning, and drive moral beings to the abyss of despair. In view of the present conditions in the universe of physical and moral being, we discover much that is chaotic. In brighter hcv. vit may cherish a hopeful optimism, which can tun :- face towards a better day; mmk PESSIMISM, btit in gloomy mommts we are almost forced to have sn... « A :or,t He^trld 'Ja tT7 """ '"""-"^ h food t '" '' ■■'""'' """• •>' '" ^«l«n,ing^wer' Ha:\r ; -^"i: 'tSTsrxr" "k'lrr""^ proposes to exhibif tLl! ^''^ '*^<^°"^ volume nature and absoCiivLl as ToT /^ *"""^"'^"* religion for sinful men I'^hirV . "^ '"'^ redemptive the task of interpreTg ct atr;rrertfort '" '"" types of modern scientific thought to L ° ''^"°"' of human life anri tn\u ' ^ P'^'''"«^ problems mar, hfe. and to the evangelization of the whole ^94 APOLOGETICS. -world. In this way Christianity may receive its philo- sophical, historical and practical vindication, as the only adequate religion for sinful men. In connection with Christian Apologetics, which is to be the theme of the second volume of this treatise, other re- ligions than Christianity must be considered. The religious and theistic belief, whose autopistic and real nature has been vindicated in this volume, has, as a matter of fact, expressed itself historically in many diverse forms. Hence, the various religions of mankind have arisen. The problem of the relation of these to each other and to Christianity is one which modern Apologetics is bound to consider. The real unique character of the Christian system, the inner principle of the other religious systems, and the right key to interpret their mutual relations must all be ascertained. This will form the opening topic of the second volume, and a proper introduction to the vindication of Christianity as the only truly redemptive and restoring religion for sinful men. The End of Volume I. INDEX. Absolute, the idea of the, 291. an adjective, 295. Activity, divine redeeming. 40. redeeming in Old Testament, 41. redemptive, of God, 114 AoNosnciSM, statement of, 521. ^neral explanation of, 522. Its main advocates, 522. in relation to Kant and Hamilton, 522. several types of, 523. Its theory of knowledge, 523. asserts that human faculties are un- reliable, 525. and epistemology, 526. denies rational theory of knowledge, 520. and relativity of knowledge. 527, as an antitheistic theory, 528. in relation to the knowledge of God, . 528. IS antitheistic in various ways, S20 criticism of, 531. Its theory of knowledge examined, 532- its charge of unreliable human fac- ulties exaggerated, 532. inconsistent, 532. is empiricism in its theory of know- ledge, 533, rules out knowledge of phenomena as well as of noumena, 534. relativity of knowledge does not support, 534. as antitheistic, 537. p.dmissions made to, 537. its conception of God at fault. 538 gives small place to belief, 539. kinship between man and God re- futes, 539. cannot account for religious beliefs and rites, 542. fails to explain knowledge of God given in Bible, 543. its results similar to atheism, 544. Aim. of apologetics. 57. AiTioLOGicAL, proof for the existence of God, 327. Anaxacoras, reference to, 116 Ancestorism, reference to, is8. and Spencer 174. statement of, 174. Spencer's account of, 175 and religious belief, 175 examination of, 177. largely hypothetical, 177. breaks down as a theory, 180 ANIMISM, seeks to account for reli- gion, 157. statement of, 163. and origin of religion, 164. examination of, 166. psychological difliculty in, 167 ANSELM. and origin of theistic belief, and the ontotheistic proof, 275 and 2oI. "1?'"28"2 °^ **** ontological proof Antitheism, reference to, ns defined, 434. ^ Anthropological, method in apolo- getics, 67. *^ method of study of origin of reli- gion, 142. proof for the existence of God. 410 Apolooetics, Its scope, 38. its sphere, 08 and 42, momentous questions 37- its underlying conditions, 39. makes a place for Christianity, 40. vindicates the Christian system, 40. task given to, 41. ' > -* task varies from age to age 42 service now enlarged, 43. ' defends Christianity from all as- saults, 43. function of, 29. spirit of, 43. to be elevated, 44. to be impartial. 44. to be without bigotry, 45. to be reverent. 45. must be practical, 46. should be courageous, 47. meaning of the term, 48. usage of the term, 4.,. f ^1 1<" * I I 596 INDEX. AFotoGincs — Greek usage, SO- New T< * ment usage, 50. patristic use, SO. scholastic, 51. modern, 51. the definition of, 52, S3- defective definitions, 53. 54- correct definition of, 56. the aim of, 57, S8. defends Christianity, S7- vindicates it at all points, 58. refutes opposing systems, 59. nature of apologetical service, 59. enters into controversy, 59. makes exposition, 60. offers criticism, 62. fundamental described, 113. its questions, 3S- its place, 63. its methods, 67. distribution of the materials of, 74- the three main divisions of, 74- and the theory of knowledge, 76. Aquinas, 50. AwsTOTLE, and theism, 116 and the theory of knowledge, 306. and cosmological proof for exist- ence of a first cause, 330. and design, 361. Atheism, an antitheistic theory, 435- of two sorts, 436. j practical, 4.16. theoretical, 437- refutation of, 439- is unnatural, 439. is inconsistent, 440. explains nothing, 44'- . . when it tries to explain it is illogi- cal, 441- must prove a ne|ptive, 442- destroys the basis of morality and social fabric. 442. fails to satisfy the religious instincts of men, 444. , ,. • • AccusTiNE, and the origin of theistic belief, 246. and the theistic proofs, 275. and the theory of knowledge, 307. Bacon, 448. , ^ „, Bain, and the moral theory, y^. Baumstark, definition of apologetics *>>• 54- . ^ , . . -, Being, pure in Greek pantheism, 565. Belief, and knowledge related, 96, 104. nature of, 97- Belief — and faith, 97. used in wide sense, 97. in contrast with knowledge, 98. is mediate apprehension of truth or reality, 98. and knowledge not opposed, 100. grounds of, 100. evidence and, 100. objects of, 105. in matters of religion, 108. the nature of religious, 126. factors in theistic, 131. I natuie of theistic, I3S- origin of theistic, 139- Berkeley, on truth, 93. and the theory of knowledge, 307. BiRAN, and causation, 323. Bossuet, 414. Bradlaugh, 437. . Brahm, i.n Hindoo pantheism, 504- Brahmanism, and theism, 117- Bridgewater Treatises, and the ar- gument from design, 361. Bruce, definition of apologetics by, and the method of apologetics, 69. and the divisions of apologetics, 71. and the definition of theism, 1 19. Buckle, 414- Buddhism, and theism, 117. Butler, allusion to, 51. the argument for immortality by, 496. Cairo, reference to, 67. on evolution of religion, 186. and idealistic evolution, 209. and Hegel, 213. , , and the theistic proofs. 265 and 276. and the idea of the infinite, 291. Calderwood, and theistic belief, 238. and the theistic proofs, 276. Calvin, reference to. 651. and the origin of theistic belief. 246. and the proof of the existence of God from the history of mankind, 411. Cause, proof of a first, 327. an uncaused, 327. Causation, proofs from, 316. the principle of, 317 an exposition of. ,(i7. defective views of, 318. the true doctrine of, 324. is a priori, 324.. involves necessity, 324. implies efficiency, 326. INDEX. Causation — includes sufficient reason, 326 requires an uncaused cause, 327 the thcistic proofs from, 2,2'7. Cave, reference to, 129. on the divisions of apologetics, 71. CeLSUS, so. r o vo, , 1. Chinese, and materialT"-..! .u- Chalmers, and athei -. 44^ Christlieb, on the o ,gin of thcistic belief, 246. Christianity, everytl ns? or nofhir* for man, 37. * has its face towards a lofty goai, ^ a redeemmg activity, 40, 41. IS to be defended by apologetics, 57. IS vindicated by apologetics, 58, 100 aehned in its inner principle, 114. fundamental apologetics brings to threshold of historical, 593 Chhistolocical, as a method in apol- ogetics, 69. Clarke, and the ontotheistic proof, on the proofs for the existence of God, 300. Classification, of theories as to the origin of religion, 142. of the theistic proofs, 239. of the theories of causation, 318. "f ..loral theories, 385. jf antitheistic theories, 435. Clement, 50. Cocker, and the origin of theistic be- lief, 143, 229. and the criticism of revelation to account for the genesis of belief in God, 233. Coleridge, and the proof for the ex- istence of God based on -ausa- tion, 340. CoMPARA~ivE Religion, gives aid in shaping the anthropological proof for the existence of God 411 and universal belief in God, 411 Comparative Theolocy, a reference to, 71. Comte, and positivism, 510. and the cmUms of positivism, 516. Communism, statement of, 586 remarks on, 586. Conscience, nature of, 83. the psychical basis in man of mo- rality, 388. is ultimate and irreducible, 389 theistic arguments based on, i8j. and Kant's criticism of the theistic proofs, 428. 597 Controversy, in relation to apologet- ^ 'cs, 59. Cosmos, and God, 121. as a whole the basis of the proof from a first cause for the exist- ence of God, 328. God the ground and goal of the, 379 Cosmology, fundamental apologetics supplies a theistic, 438. C: mological, method in apologetics, proof of the existence of God, 260, 335- the principle of this theistic proof. 236. Cousin, and theistic belief, 236. Criticism, in apologetics, 61. of causation by many, 317. by Kant of the theistic proofs, 418. force of this, 419. examination of Kant's, 409. of semi-materialism, 455. of materialism proper, 469. of psychological materialism, 489. of agnosticism, 531. of pantheism, 461. Cudworth, and the theory of know- ledge, 307. Cyril, 50. Dabney, reference to, 65. Darwin, reference to. 37(5. Defence, of Christianity by apolonet- ics, 58. Definition, of apologetics, 55. of theism, 117. has three things in it, 121. Deism, some explanations of, 542. history of, 546. and rationalism, 546. statement of, 548. asserts the existence of a personal God as creator, 548. denies the immanence of God, 540. examination of, 557. has initial difficulty, 551. must explain the self-maintenance of the cosmos, 552. lays too much stress on natural law, separates the physical and moral too widely, 553. has difficulty in giving a place to human freedom, SS5. leaves no place for the pity of God. 550. excludes the supernatural, S56. Delitzsch, reference to, 65, 67. 598 INDEX. I}escartes, and innate ideas, 88. on the theory of knowledge, 88. on truth, 93. on origin of theistic belief, 211. on idealism, 211. and theistic belief, 231. and origin of belief in God, 239. statement of theistic proofs accord- ing to, 277. . illustration in theistic reasoning by, 280. and tb : idea of the infinite, 291. Design, ihe theistic proof from marks of, 360. Socrates and, 361. Anaxagoras and, 361. Niewentyt and, 361. Bridgewater Treatises and, 361. the true nature of, 365. DiMAN, and the origin of theistic be- lief, 368. and the theistic proofs. 349- Divisions, of apologetics, 71. D(«NER, reference to, 65. DowiEiSM, reference to, 583. DuAUSM, moral conflict in, 38. DUSTESOIECK, 64. Ebbard, definition of apologetics by, 55- reference to, 00. and divisions of apologetics, 72. and definition of theism, 119- and fetichism, 152. and Hegel as to pantheism, jO. and the origin of theistic belief, 246. Eddyism, allusion to, 583. Edwakds, and apologetical method, 67. Emanation, in the Hindoo panthe- ism, 565. , , , Empiricism, as a theory of know- ledge, 88, in relation to absolute truth, 93- and positivism, 514. and agnosticism, 525. Epicurus, 144, 460- £pisTEMOU>GY, the rational, 84. of positivism, 514. of agnosticism, 526. EuREMERisM, as a theory of mythol- ogy, 176- and Spencer s ancestonsm, 170. Eutaxiouxsy, theistic proof based on, 348. Hicks on, 349. Evidence, the ground and measure of belief, 100. subjective, 100. Evidence— objective, 102. the ground of persuasion or convic- tion, 103. the several branches of, 100. is the foundation of history, 104. Evil, is abnormal in the universe under God's hand, 38. a terrible fact in the world, 40. the background and condition of redemption, 40. . produces an age-long moral conflict, 41. makes the service of apologetics necessary, 41. the problem of, 121. the deeper problem of, 589. and dualism, 589. theism must reckon with, 589. moral at root, 590. Leibnitz and the problem of, 591. mystery of the origin of, 592. the power of the gospel redeems from the power of| 592. Christianity recovers from the mal- ady of, 593. . Evolution, some explain religion by natural, 153. and origin of theistic belief, 209. idealistic type of, 211. and the theory of knowledge, 311. materialistic phase of, 497- general explanation of, 498. explanation of the term, 500. some description of, 501. Spencer's ontological type of, 501. matter atomic homogeneous for, the process of integration of matter in, 502. environment and, 502. return process of, 504- examination of materialistic, 504. is "^pen to objections to pure m.-ite- . i:'lism, 505. as a term is ambiguous, 505. cannot begin its process, 506. cannot direct its course, 506. fails to explain order and design, life and mind, 507. Hegel's system of idealistic, 567. Exegetics, apologetics and, 64. Exposition, n apologetics, 60. of fetichism, 147. of naturism, 158. of animism, 163. of spiritism, 169. of ancestorism, 174. MHI 1^ INDEX. Exposition — of the true doctrine concerning the origin oi theistic belief, 242 of the psyciiical theistic proofs, 262. 01 the infinite and absolute, 243 of the theistic proof from the prin- ciple of intelligence in man, 310. Fairbairn, 70. Feeling powers of the human soul in, B2. Fetichism, as a theory of the origin of theistic belief. 146. the meaning of the term, 147 application of the term. 148. two in which to take. 148. origin of religion explained by, 149 many writers criticise. 152 assumes to be the first form of re- hgion, 153. has a serious psychological diffi- culty, 154. Finality, subjective and immanent, 377- and evolution, 378. and intelligence, 379. FisKE, and ancestorism, 175. Flint, on theism, 120. on definition of religion, 129 and the idea of God, 201. criticised as to his views concerning *"« of'K'n of theistic belief, 204. and the theistic proofs. 276 Force, added to matter bv modem science, 465. conservation of, 46^ transmutation o' correlation of, .' the dynamic cc of force really ideal, 479. Foster, references to, 65. 442. and the divisions of apologetics 72 Foundation, of Christianity 'lies deeper than apologetics, 47. 599 God — the existence of, 249. proofs for the existence of, 259. statement of the proofs for the ex- istence of, 264. psychical proofs of, 262. causal proofs of, 328. moral proofs of, 379. pantheism and the idea of. 578. Good theistic argument from the, 40a. and the suntmum bonum, 404. definition of the, 404. is ethical at its deepest root. 405. Green, and idealistic t solution, 209. and the theistic proofs, 265. and the notion of the infinite, 291. and the theory of knowledge, 307. Oueliux, and cosmic progress. 340. Gassendi, 449. Gillespie, and the proofs for the ex- istence of God, 286. God, theism asserts one, 121. how are we to conceive of, 121. relation between th- universe and. revelation from, 14, and the cosmos, 121. different ideas of. '07. complex is the noti' of. 198 Flint and the idea c 201. Hegel's conception of, 220. Hagenbach, on place of apologetics, Hamilton, on truth, 93. and theistic belief, 237. on relation of soul and bodv, 78. and the idea of the infinite and doc- trine of causation, 279. Hannell, definition of apologetics bv 53. «- B J. Hartmann, and pessimism, 588. Hegel, and origin of theistic belief. 211. • and idealistic evolution, 211. the philosophy of, 211. relation of Spencer and, 212. Caird and Hegel, 213. examination of the theory of 215 criticism of the fundamentarprirci- ple of, 216. and his pantheistic tendency, 219 Ebrard and, 220. and pantheism in general, 567. Henotheism, Muller's doctrine of. 185. the theor>' explained. 189 taken to explain the rise of religion, defective historically, 192. is inconsistent. 193. has serious psychological difficulty, „ 193. Heraclitus, allusion to, 93. Herder, 389. Hicks, and theistic proofs, 349. History, proof of the existence of God fiom, 409. statement of the theistic import of. 413. ' the problem made by, 415. 6oo INDEX. History — the solution of the problem, 415. hand of God in, 416. Historical, method in apologetics, 69. preparation for Christianity, 71- method of study concerning reli- gion, 213 and materialism, 448. HoBBES, and moral theory, 386. Hodge, reference to, 65. and origin of theistic belief, 245. Holy Spirit, the agent in redemption, 70. Homiletics, in relation to apologetics, 64. Hypothesis, ability to make the the- istic, 137. of a first cause, 330. of an infinite regress of causes, 332. of an uncaused or first cause suffi- cient, 333. Immortality, of the human soul, 493. Butler's argument for, 496. Inference, theory to account for the genesis of religion, 195. a logical process of some sort, 196. statement of the theory of, I97- t'leory examined, 201. i .imediate, ao6. Infidelity, same as deism, 508. applied to Saracens, 508. denies supernatural in religion, sr^. Infinite, Muller's doctrine of, 185. the philosophy of the, 186. the mathematical and metaphysical, 192. as unconscious reason, 213. the correct idea of the, 291. Plato and Aristotle and the, 291. as an adjective, 295. theistic import of the, 298. as mathematical, metaphysical and dynamical, 301. Innate ideas, 135. Intelligence, the principle of, 305. the theistic significance of human intelligence, 305. Intuitionalism, and the theory of knowledge, 88. and truth, 93. important for apologetics, 94. and the idea of God, 202. and the origin of theistic belief, 241. Jacobi, and theistic belief, 237. Janet, and the proof for the existence of God from design, 367. Jesus Christ, the peerless personage, 61. the redeeming activity of God is by, 70- mediates the redemption which is in Christianity, 114. and supernatural revelation, 224. the central figure and key of human history, 416. Jevons, and fetichism, 152. Justin Martyr, and his apologetical service, 50. Kant, on the theory of knowledge, 88. on truth, 93. on idealistic evolution. 211. and theistic belief, 237. criticism of theistic proofs by, 274. on the idea of the infinite, 291. and the philosophy of causation, 330- Knowledge, the theory of, 77. the powers of tl ^ humar mind in, 81. misconception a' -i, 80. the various modes of, 84. the two main theories of, 85. the genesis of, 88. objects of, 90. the deeper nature of, 91. the tests of true, 91. as self-evident, 91. as necessary, 91. as universal, 92. is direct apprehension of truth or reality, 92. belief in relation to, 96. theistic import of human know- ledge, 305- and agnosticism, 525. relativity oi, 526. Kostlin, 129. KuYPER, 21, 28, 65, 129. Lang, and fetichism, 152. Lance, and materialism, 446, 448- Lr. Bkosse, and fetichism, 152. Lechler, definition of apologetics by, 54- Leibnitz, on truth, 93. and the theory of knowledge, 307. and causation, 324, 336. and sufficient reason, 326. Locke, on the theory of knowledge, 88. and materialism, 450. Lubbock, and universal belief in God, 410. INDEX. €ox LuTHASin', on theism, 120. on th€ origin of theistic belief, 205. and the place of revelation in the- istic belief. 228. on the true doctrine of the origin of theistic belief, 246. and the ontology of theism, 252. and the theistic proofs, 265. Manifestation, in the Greek panthe- ism, 565. Mansel, and theistic belief, 238. and the idea of the infinite, 291. Maktineau, 128. Materiausm, of Democritus and Epi- curus, 291. and causation, 318. and teleology, 376. is opposed to theism, 435. semi, 445. history of, 445. in China and India, 446. among the Greeks, 446. Socrates and Plato against, 447. in mediaeval times, 4^^. in modem times, 448. main representatives of, 450. the pure type of, 459. history of pure, 460. statement of ancient, 461. additions by moderns to, 464. endows matter with germinal life and mind, 467. criticism of, 469. does not give a unitary principle for the universe, 470. is unscientific in several respects, 472. cannot prove that matter is eternal, 476. cannot show that matter is neces- sarily before mind, 477. cannot prove the indestructibility of matter, 479. cannot be consistent with its em- pirical theory of knowledge, 480. cannot explain force, 480. fails to account for order and de- sign, 481. helpless to account for life and mind, 482. psychological type of, 484. Matter, is not necessarily eternal, the atomic conception of, 479. is really ideal, 479. McCosH, 363. MiTHoo, of apologetics, 67. Method — as descriptive, historical and psy- chological, 69. of inquiry in regard to the origin o£ religion, 141. MiLEY, reference to, 65. Mill, on truth, 93. and the idea of the infinite, 291. and causation, 319. Milton, Paradise Lost used to illus- trate the theistic ar~ume.it from order, 357. Modification, in the pantheism of Spinoza, 666. Monotheism, and naturism, 162. and ancestorism, 175. and henotheism, 189. and the theistic proofs, 249. and Christianity, 592. Mormonism, statement of, 583. MoRALTTY, the theistic argument from. 382. several proofs based on, 383. theories of, 385. and evolution, 387. is ultimate and irreducible, 388. MuLLER, and fetichism, 149. and henotheism, 183. on the origin of religion, 183. definition of religion by, 184. has a peculiar theory of the origin of religion, 185. has a defective empirical philoso- phy, 191. and the philosophy of the infinite, 291. Naturism, seeks to explain religion. 158. statement of, 158. accounts for origin of religion, 159. gives a mythical view of nature, i6a examination of, 161. open to various objections, 162. has a serious psychological diffi- culty, 162. NiEWENTYT, 362. Note, introductor> , 19. Objects, of knowledge, 90. of belief, 105. belief rests on various. 105, 108. tangible, semi-tangible and intangi- ble, 187. Obligation, as a factor in moral the- . ory, 386. IS .absolutely binding, 389. the theistic proof from moral, 395. in m i ?■ 6o2 INDEX. OBUGAnON— explanation of the theistic proof based on, 396. solution of the problem presented by moral, 399. man finds himself under, 399. leads out and up to God as trans- cendent, 401. Ontology, of theism, 249. the task undertaken by theism in relation to, 251. theistic import of, 433. Ontological, proof for the existence of God, 260. general estimate of the proof known as the, 287. OitOBit, chance cannot explain cosmic, 356. immanent, 357. implies intelligence, 358. limits of the theistic proof from, 359- . , is moral as well as physical, 392. theistic postulate solves the problem of both kinds of, 393. Vaimy, allusion to his service to na- tural theology, 52. apologetical method of, 69. and theism, 116. and the theistic proof from design, 361. Pantheism, and oriental theosophy, 117- i? attractive to some minds, 119. a statement of, 558. the history of, 559. in Hindoo theosophy, 559. in Greek philosophy, 559. in modern times, 560. in the philosophy of Spinoza. 560. in the Hegelian philosophy, 560. a general descrijrt'on of, 561. is always monisT, 561. derives finite things from a monis- tic ground, 561. discovers the principle of the deri- vation of finite things in the monistic ground, 563. and the idea of God, 563. the four historic types of, 564. the Hindoo, S64. the Greek, 565. Spinoza's, 566. Hegel's, 566. criticism of, 569. defective on philosophical grounds, 570. Pantbeisu— does not after all give a unitary principle, 572. fails to explain finite things, 573. gives no proper place for the facts of consciousness, 573. gives no good basis for personality, 574- theism far better than, 574. defective on moral grounds, 575. destroys the basis for moral distinc- tions, 575. robs God as the monistic ground of freedom, 576. leaves no freedom in the creature, 576. would have bad moral results, 578. fails utterly on religious grounds, 578. gives a defective idea of God, 578. assumes a wrong relation between God and man, 579. affords no proper philosophical ground for the facts of Christi- anity, 580. Pascal, 51. ■"atton, and Hegel's theism, 214. on the origin of theistic belief, 246. on the ontotheistic reasoning of Anselm, 283. Pelt, reference to, 65. Pessimism, some discussion of, 581. statement of, 586. history of, .S87. and Hindooism, 587. modern types of, 588. and pantheism, 5^. Pfleiderer, reference to, 67. and fetichism, 152. and naturism, 159. and the theistic proofs, 276. Philosophy, of religion, 115. of the infinite, i8b. the common sense, 289. of the unconditioned, 290. of the infinite and absolute, 291. of knowledge, 306. of causation, 317. of cosmic order, 350. of history, 404. of positivism, 511. Place, of apologetics in the theologi- cal sciences, 63. Planck, allusion to his views on place of apologetics, 52. Plato, reference to, 93. and theism, 116. and the theory of knowledge, 306. mmm ISiBiiiiM INDEX. Polytheism, reference to, ii6. in relation to henotheism and mono- theism, 189. and fetichism, 149. Positivism, general description of, S09. of Comte and Lewes, 510. statement of the main points in, 511. and evolution, 512. has its own psychology, 514. and empiricism, 514. the three stages of human progress according to positivism, 514. an examination of, 517. has a defective psychology, 517. weak philosophical basis, 517. its philosophy of human progress false to history, 518. is little better than materialism, 519. leaves deep pressing questions un- answered, 520. Predicates, power to make theistic. _ 137. Principle, in man a spiritual, Tj. powers of the spiritual, 79. of intelligence as theistic, 304. of the cosmo-theistic proof, 333. of the teleotheistic proof, 375. Problem, of the aitio-theistic proof, 327- solution of the, 330. of the cosmo-theistic proof, 341. solution of the, 344, of the eutaxiotheistic proof, 352 illustrations of the, 353. solution of the, 355. of the teleo-theistic proof, 369. illustrations of the, 370. solution of the, 375. of the ortho-theistic proof, 389. the solution of the, 391. the theistic postulate solves 392. of thi agatho-theistic proof, 395. the solution of the, 395. the theistic hypothesis solves the problem, 407. Proof, of the existence of God, 264. psychical theistic proofs, 259. theistic belief gives autopistic, 260. the onto-theistic, 274. from cosmic origin, 316. from cosmic progress, 335. from cosmic order, 347. from comic design, 360. the moral theistic, 382. Psychology, an error in, 79. classification in. 81. 603 the^ Psychology— empirical in contrast with the ra- tional, 87. of theism, 125. of causation, 324. Psychological iviATERiAusM, a state- ment of, 485. asserts that man has no soul, 486. explains mental facts from matter highly organized, 486. denies immortality to man, 488. criticism of, 488. common traditions of men against. 489- brain and conditions of causation against, 491. personal identity refutes, 492. freedom of man entirely destroys, 493- QuADRATus, allusion to his apologeti- cal work, 50. Rationalism, and deism, 546. explanation of, 548. asserts that the light of nature suffi- cient for religion, 550. excludes the supernatural, 556. Rawlinson, reference to, 129. Reason, in Hegel's pantheism is un- conscious, 565. Reformation, and apologetics. 52. Religion, powers of man involved in, 83. conception of the Christian, 114. philosophy of, 115. the Jewish, 127. the Mohammedan, 127. various writers give different defi- nitions of, 127. accepted definitions of, 130. the origin of, 140. theories as to the origin of, 143. the skeptical theory, 146. fetichism and the crigin of, 146. Spencer and the genesis of, 174. Muller and the beginnings of, 184. reasoning and, 195. Hegelian doctrine as to the genesis of, 211. revelation and origin of, 222. the true doctrine of the origin of re- ligion, 241. Revelation, of man's capacity t , re- ceive, 137. m theistic belief the function of, 232. definition of, 222. 604 INDEX. Revelation — God and, 233. used in three different senses, 323. and the Holy Scriptures, 224. determination of the idea of, 225. the origin of belief in God by, 227. examination of the theory of, 230. theism the basis of supernatural, 114. Reville, an'^ natunsm, 159. RiTSCHL, I3(^ RoYCE, and the theistic proofs, 365. and the theory of knowledge, 307. Sacb, on the definition of apologetics, 54- Saussaye on definition of religion, 129. Schelukg, and the origin of theistic belief, 236. Schleiermacher, on the definition of apologetics, 53, 127. reference to, 66, 132. and the theistic belief, 237. ScHOPENHAUEB, and his pessimism, S88. SCBURMAN, 71. Scripture, and the belief in God, 272. SCBOUDE, 288. Secularism, statement of, 583. relation to positivism, 584. Semi-materialism, a statement of 451- Stoic type of, 452. Platonic type of, 453. Hegelian aspect of, 433. criticism of, 455. Shedd, reference to, 65. and the theistic proofs, 276. Smith, H. B., definition of apologet- ics by, 55. apologetic method of, 70. divisions of apologetics by, 72. ..nd theistic belief. 136. on the genesis of theistic belief, 205, 245- Socialism, description of, 584. remarks on, 584. Socrates, allusion to, 49, and theism, 116. and the theory of knowledge, 306. SoLinoN, of the problem of cosmic progress, 344. of the jff'AAfm of cosmic order, 355. of the pt'Mem of cosmic design, 363. Sophists, reference to, 93. and the theory of knowledge, 306. Soul, of man distinct from his body, 77- different from the body, 78. and body very closely related, 78. Spencer, Herbert, and fetichism, 153. and ancestorism, 174. and Hegel, 213. and the philosophy of the infinite, 291. and the theory of knowledge, 311. and the doctrine of causation, 322. Spinoza, on the idea of the infinite and absolute, 291. and pantheism, 533. Sphere, of apologetics, 38. Spirit, of apologetics, 43. Holy Spirit administers redemption in Christianity, 114. Spiritism, reference to, 158. statement of, 169. and the origin of theistic belief, 170. examination of the theory of, 173. Spiritualism, statement of, 582. remarks on, 582. Strong, reference to, 65. Substance, in the pantheism of Spi- noza, 566. Summary, of theism, 429. Teleology, has a large place in specu- lation, 289. the principle of, 363. what is? 365. relation of causation to teleology, 365. relation of analogy to, 366. and materialism, 376. and chance or fate, 376. subjective, 377. immanent, 378. and intelligence, 379. Teleological proof for the existence of God, -00. Theism, the phik>sophical basis ot Christianity, 114. is opposed to deism and pantheism, 114. the task of, ii5- The meaning and scope of, 116. derivation of the term, 116. two senses of, 116. in the technical sense, 117. definition of, 119. Tulloch on, 120. Luthardt, 120. Miley on, 120. Flint on, 120. Orr on, 120. kfiiUiii INDEX. Thbsu— the service of, 121. the divisions of, 132. as subjective and objective, 122. the psychology cf, 123. the ontology of, 123. the contents of, 130. precise nature of, 13s. the origin af, 139. and the explanation of, 151. some general conclusions on, 430. THEiSTic Belief, true doctrine of the origin of, 234. .-ivolves an epistemology, 235. some partial views of, 216. statement of the t. je doctrine of. 241. exposition of, 242. confirmation of the true doctrine of. ^ 245. ', THEISTIC Proofs, relations of the. ^254. the order of the, 257. Descartes and the, 257. a priori and a posteriori views of. 259. classification of the, 259. ontological, cosraological and teleo- logical, 260. psychical views of the, 262. autopistic or self-evidencing, 262. vindication of the autopistic nature of, 269. Cartesian views of the, 277. Anselmian views of the, 281. Theology, relation of apologetics to, OS- fundamental, 71 natural, 71. romparative, 71. 605 Theology— biblical, 71. theism supplies a natural, 431. THiOLOGiCAL, method in apologetics, Theosophy, the oriental type of. 117, Thoknwell on the origin of belief in God, 246. Teuth, what is? 93. the sophistical view as to, 93 Socratic doctrine of, 93. true doctrine of, 94. Tulloch, on theism, 120. TUBBEHN, 52. Tyloh, and fetichism, 152. and animism, 163. Utility, and the basis of absolute ob- ligation, 386. Vico, 414. Von Dsey, on the definition of apolo- getics, 53. Waitz, and fetichism, 140. Warfield, 66. Watson, and the origin of theistic be- lief, 228. and primitive revelation. 228. his theory of theistic origin exam- ined, 229. and the theistic proofs, 265. Weissman, 375. Will, as a capacity in man, 82. WUNDT, and causation, 319. Xenophon, allusion to, 49. Zoroastrianism, in relation to the- ism and dualism, 117.