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Ml 
 
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 /•'( 
 
GUIDE TO THE COURSE 
 
 OF- 
 
 fi-&Jjd 
 
 Military Engineering 
 
 AT XWV. 
 
 Royal Military Collkgk of Canada 
 
 ' BY 
 
 MAJOR G. H. WALKER, R.E. 
 
 AND 
 
 CAPTAIN H. R. SANKEY, R.E., 
 i-o R T u /•: V s /•: o f t // h r, /•: .v '/■ /. /•: m /■: x c a n /•: r s . 
 
 KIXCSTON 
 
 rKlMKI) Al llIK DAII.V NEWS ni-l-UK 
 1X83. 
 
* 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The followiii}^ pii^'es <1() not profess to constitute a treatise on 
 Military Engineerinf,s bui simply, as the title implies, a f,aii(le to 
 assist the Gentlemen Cadets in their study of the Text Books and 
 to save the writing; of notes. The attempt made is to put before 
 the Cadets of the R.M.C. of Canada the course, taken from the* 
 several Text Books, as an harmonious whole, and further to supply 
 a body of notes upon which the lectures are based, and thus to 
 save much time ; for the distinguishing^ feature of the instruction 
 at the R. M. C, consisting as it does, in careful and systematic 
 lecturing, in explanation and amplification of the text books, it 
 was found that a considerable loss of time resulted in writing out 
 fair notes of these lectures, and this, it is hoped, will be to a 
 great extent avoided by this work. 
 
 The varying amount of detail given in the several sections 
 results from the fact that where no amplification was thought 
 necessary reference is merely given to the text book, while in 
 other cases, where the information in the text book was thought 
 too meagre the subject has been treated more in detail. 
 
 Table A (effect. Sec, of arms in use) has not been printed, as 
 it was found impossible to obtain sufficient data. 
 
 Cadets in using this guide are recommended first to see what are 
 the conditions which should influence the design of any work, and 
 then to trace carefully the effect of the conditions in the work as 
 designed. This will tend to an intelligent appreciation of the 
 subject, rather than to the mere mechanical knowledge of facts 
 and dimensions, which too often takes the place of the former. 
 
IV 
 
 I'ici; lAci:. 
 
 A list ()f;nitli(.is consulted in |)iv|.;mii- this work will he foiiii-l 
 on j)K. y. Special rcco^Miition is liow'cvc-r diu' to the assistance de- 
 rived from C:ai)t. Waf^ner's "Principles of l-ortiiication," which 
 sii{,'gesteti the nietiiod of the work. 
 
 . No one can be more fully aware of the shortcoming's of this 
 httle work than the authors, but it shouhl, in fairness, be stated in 
 extenuation, that it has been written })iecemeal, in i)rief intervals 
 of leisure, found witii dilliculty amidst the very arduous work, 
 botli instructional and executive, whid, luis fallen to the lot of the 
 Military Staff of the R. M. College of Canada. 
 
 G. K. W. 
 H. R. S. 
 
 r must here record my obli-aiioiis to Captain Raban, R.J-:., 
 for imirh information afforded to me since his arrival at the R. m! 
 
 College 
 
 G. R. W. 
 
 R. M. C(>Lij;(;i:, oi. Canada,) 
 Kingston, Out., Jan., nScSj.) 
 
 
1 
 
 LIST ()!• WOKKS COXSLLIJ:!). 
 
 M. 
 
 "Field FortiHcation"" by Lieut. -(<.!. I'liillips, K.JC. 
 ^^ 'jFidd Works froni a tactical point <;f view," Lieut. -Col. Scliaw, 
 
 MliSta^Ki"^^^-' ^''^>'^^' ^"'^^^ ^--^ ^-^'^"te," :.;,, 
 "Royal Engineer Pri;.e J-ssays," 1875-76, ^[ajor I'razer, K.J:. 
 
 Claj^rR^T'-' ^''''^ ^'"'"^ "^'^'^'^ Institute/- r«7,, Major 
 "Hasty Intrcnchments," Brialmont. 
 
 "OccasiomiirapersRoyalEngineer Institute.'- Papersbvvaric.us 
 authors, including Ma or Woodward, R.J- ., Capt.G Clarke R 
 
 L.cut.-Genl. Skobeleff (translated,, Lieu't.-c!.l. Lovett C S I." 
 
 K.L.Major-Cenl. Maunsell, C.B.R.E., Capt. Sale, R F I ieut 
 
 Lol. Jan.es, R.E. Capt. A. O. Creen, R.lL, Capt! L;^;.;; I^e!, 
 
 " Minor Tactics," Lieut. -Col. Clery. 
 
 " Official Account I-Tanco-Ciernian War 1.S70--1," 
 
 " Precis of Modern Tactics," Lieut. -C..1. II,, me, R.].;. 
 
 "Tactical Retrospect," by Capt. Ma\ . 
 
 "Principles of FortiHcation." Capt. Wagner. 
 
 "Fortification Polygonale," IJrialuiont. 
 
VI WOKKS ( ONSn.ll.l). 
 
 "Notes mi Tactics," Majoi I). !■. foius, K.A. 
 
 " Instruction in Military ICn/^Miu-crin;^'," S. M. \i. ("hathani. 
 
 "Tlu- defences of \\'asliinf,'t()ii," (ieiil. jjainard, U.S.IC. 
 
 " Dt'tcnce (U'S ICtats," llrialtuont. 
 " l''()rtiess Warfare," ("apt. l-Jnniner. 
 
 "Corps Papers Koyal ICnj^'ini'ers." Papers by various authors, in- 
 cluding,' Col. Owen. K.JC, Capt. Wilson, K.IC, Col. Inj^dis, K.IC., 
 Lieut. -Col. Webber, K.i:., Ca|)t. Moncrieff, I".M., Sir J. l\ I'.ur- 
 {^oyne, K.I',., Col. b'islier., K. J-^., .Major l'"eatlierstonliauf,di, R. E., 
 Major. -Cienl, (iallwey, K.K.. Sir W. Jervois, K.IC, Col. Lennox, 
 V.C.,C.l-)., K.L., Major iMa/er, K.IL., Prince (jfllohenlohe-Inj^de- 
 iinj^en (translation.) 
 
 "Kei)ort on the Art of War in ICurope," by Lieut. -Col. Delatiekl, 
 U.S.L. 
 
 "Coast Defence," \ On Schelilia. 
 
 ■Proceedinj^s Kcjyal Artillery Institute," Paper by Lieut. Nolan, 
 
 R.A. 
 
 " Lectures on Iron b'ortihcations," Col. Inj^dis, R.IC. 
 
 "Importance Actuelle de Paris au point de vue Strate;,M(iue,(S:c.*' 
 
 " Les Nonvelles defences de la, I'rance," E. Tenot. 
 
 "iCxplosives," by (^ipt. Sankey, R.IC. 
 
 "Austrian Guide to Railways" translated by Lieut. Jessep, K.E. 
 
 " Royal ICiij^iui'cr Prize ICssaxs," 1S7S. C-apt. O'Brien, R.J-^ 
 
 " Proposed Prussian Orj^^ani/ation for the Duties of Troops at 
 Sicf^es" translateil, by Lieut. Rawson, R.l£. 
 
 " Siege Operations, Canipaij^n iHyo-ji," Von Tiedemann. 
 
 ABUKEVIATIONS USED. 
 
 \ 
 
 K.U.S.I., Royal United Service Institution. 
 K.E.L, Royal Engineer Institute. 
 LM.E., Instruction in Military ICngineering. 
 l'\. Text Book of P'ortitication. 
 
I'KRATA. 
 
 ' '5 
 
 ' ^-1 
 
 ' .Vy 
 
 • 4'^ 
 
 ' 7" 
 ' 71 
 
 ' 7-' 
 
 ' 1^ 
 
 ' 79 
 
 ' Sj 
 
 ' 99 
 loo 
 
 lOO 
 
 I or 
 1 04 
 104 
 
 104 
 loS 
 III 
 
 131 
 
 I4(S 
 170 
 
 J 79 
 
 i-j 
 
 •• 4". 
 " 35. 
 
 '• 17. 
 
 i5» 
 
 I, 
 40, 
 ^i, 
 
 7. 
 34. 
 34- 
 
 5- 
 10, 
 
 35. 
 
 27-2(S 
 
 3^ 
 
 17- 
 
 10, 
 
 39- 
 
 foi' "ari"" read "is." 
 
 omit "in" at end of line. 
 
 for "Skoholow" read ".SkoIxIcCf/' 
 
 for "pajj^e" read "pa^^es 5 and 4;." 
 
 for "and" read "to." 
 
 footnote for 45-45, read 45 4(). 
 
 for "and (2) for" read "and" for (j.)" 
 
 footnote J, line f). for "head" read "overlieai 
 
 for "eoiinterscarps" read "counters arp." 
 
 for *'\'illeurbaune" read "X'illi'urhanne." 
 
 for "X'illenrbaiine" read "\'illeurbanne." 
 
 for "llislion" read "Place." 
 
 for "dWreon" read "d'Arcon." 
 
 tor "indej^ent" read "independent." 
 
 for "\'uban read "V'auban." 
 
 for "suek" read ".seek." 
 
 for *'siini)ly" read "amply." 
 
 for inverted commas at end 
 
 asteiisk. 
 for "examples" read "example," 
 for "K.K. cori)s" read "R.b:.I. Occasional 
 footnote for "R.K. corps" read "R.J<:, 
 
 Occasional." 
 after "make" insert a comma, 
 for "the latter" read "them." 
 for "distinction" read "destruction." 
 after torpedoes place a semi-colon, 
 for "head" read "overhead." 
 for "or lar-^e" read "of lar^^a," 
 for "cross-trees" read "cross-ties." 
 
 of line i)ut an 
 
 I. 
 
® 
 
 TABLE (JK CONTENT 
 
 ® 
 
 Definition of Militarv V.U'^mr.cdw^, (^ll)^^ Sankeycj^j-issjii^ 
 
 Ddinitic.n of I-ortiHcation <S)(iiS$s>..clo..<5(^ ^^^ ® 
 
 Field Fortification, <i)<s)^^..@....do....@ <j)....@ 4 
 
 Permanent Fortification, ., Major Walker.. <t) ^^ 0^ 
 
 Semi- Permanent I'^ort ificat ion, do . ^ 
 
 Coast Defence, (]o^^ 
 
 Attack of Fortn.'sses, do 
 
 Defence of Fortresses, do 
 
 ^lin'uv^, ;tl„ 
 
 Pioneer Duties Capt. Sankcy i(,r 
 
 Tamp Duties, ,jp ^3^3 
 
 •€>• 
 
 106 
 
 TT9 
 
 144 
 
 153 
 
 158 
 
® 
 
 D ® 
 
 i) 4 
 
 ^ O5 
 
 luO 
 
 IT9 
 
 144 
 153 
 
 186 
 
MILITARY EiNGLNEERING. 
 
 The term "Military Engineering" is not clearly detined, and is 
 used in different senses by various authors; but for the purposes 
 of the present course it will be taken to include the threi; follow- 
 ing subjects: 
 
 Fortification— T\\G design and execution of works of defence, 
 whether they be of a temporary or permanent nature, and also of 
 the works needed for the attack of fortresses, and fortified posi- 
 tions. 
 
 Pioneer Duties — The design, execution and maintenance of tlu' 
 communications of an army in the field (railways, roads, tele- 
 graphs, etc.) together with the demolition and restoration of thest- 
 communications. 
 
 Camp Duties — The design and execution of the works required 
 for the sanitary arrangements, water supply, etc., of a camp. 
 
 It will be observed that these three sub-divisions arc perfectl\ 
 distinct. They will therefore be separately. considered, and in 
 the above order. 
 
 Military Engineering, as thus defined, does not, however, in- 
 clude all the duties of a Military Engineer, for he must, further, 
 be acquainted with Building Construction, Surveying, etc. : and, 
 as will be seen in the se(]uel, a knowledge of several other sub- 
 jects (Electricit}' and Chemistry, for instance,) is necessary to 
 enable him fully to carry out the duties included above under the 
 head of Military Engineering. 
 
FOIITIFIOATION. 
 
 Fortification is the art by the lielp of which a body of troops 
 can meet on e(iual or even advantaj^'eous terms a strons/er bo(i\- 
 
 of tl 
 
 le enemy 
 
 By its means important iocahties on the field of battle-, l)rid 
 heads, cU,'fiIes, Positi 
 
 L'C- 
 
 ons covi.rint; the comnumications or from 
 which the enemy's communications may l)e assailed, lU'pots of 
 war material or supplies, can be held by com[)arativelv small 
 
 forces, thus frcciiii^ the bulk of the troops for active oj)erations. 
 
 This view presents Fortihcation as an accessor\', and this view 
 must never be lost si;j^ht of. Fortification should not jjaralyse 
 the action of the troops, but on the contrary j^ive them full free- 
 dom of movement. 
 
 The nature of the works erected depends in a ,i,Teat measure on 
 the time and means at disposal, and on whether they are for a 
 temporary or a permanent purpose. Hence Fortihcation is 
 divided into three classes : 
 
 Field Fortification. 
 
 Semi-Permanent or Provisional Fortification. 
 
 Permanent Fortification. 
 
 lUit it also includes — 
 The Defence of Fortresses and b'orts and. 
 
 The Attack of P\)rtr 
 
 esses and fortified positioib 
 
 Tl 
 
 as foil 
 
 le application of the above sub-divisions of I'ortihcati 
 
 on is 
 
 ows 
 
 Field Fortification. 
 
 1. Intrcnchinj,M)n the held of battle la) IJy the defenders 
 (b) Hy the attackers. 
 
 2. Securiii;^ dofiles, bridj^^'-heads, formation of intrenched 
 camps, defendin^^ posts, depots, maj,^a;;ines— ^^euerally when the 
 time available is short, and the Positions are of temnorarv 
 
 iinportanci! only, 
 
 emporaiy 
 
FORTH' ICATIOX. 
 
 ]. Supplcnicnliii;^^ the defences of a laif^e I'^oitrcss as may 
 become necessary duiinj^'^ the proj^ness of a siej^^e. 
 
 Time available- l'"rom half an hour to j days. In special 
 cases the time may be })ractically unlimited. 
 
 Soni-pcnnancni Fortifuation. 
 
 1. Completinj^ and addinj^' to existinj; Fortresses durinf:^ time 
 of war. 
 
 2. Securing,' defiles, brid^'c-heads, formation of intrenched 
 camps, defendin;^' posts, di-pots, maj^a/jines, or open towns politi- 
 cally im[)ortant, — when sulficient time is available and the Posi- 
 tions are of nuicli importance and will in all probability continue 
 to be so. 
 
 Time — minimum. 2 weeks. 
 
 Pcnnancnt Uortijicatioii. — I'ortifyinj,', during' time of })eace, 
 places inifx^rtant for the defence of a country. 
 Time — Practical!}- unlimited. 
 
 Defence (if Fortresses. - -'V\\v works of a temi)orary nature thrown 
 u]) and of the measures taken to resist the actual attack or sie^^e 
 of a fortress. 
 
 Attack (f Fortresses Tiie works thrown up for this purpose are 
 called siej^^e-works. 
 
 Attack of a fortified Position. — This is the application of b'ield- 
 P^jrtilication by the attackers already noted. 
 
 -^ 
 
 USli OF I-OKTIFICATION \',\ WW. DEFENCli AND 15V THH ATTACK. 
 
 Fortification has Ixnii and always will be principally used by 
 the lUifence, but as already mentioned it is also employed by the 
 attack. In the former case the desi},ni and the sites of the works 
 must \)v such as to conform to the 
 
 (ieneral Principles if Defence, vi/ : — 
 
 I. The stratcf^ical and tactical requirements of the case must 
 be fulfilled. 
 
 J.. ICxposure of the (.'iiemy to defender's tire. 
 
 ]. Difficulty of niovenu-nt for the enemy. 
 
 4. C'over ff)r the defeiidi-rs from the enenn's Hre. 
 
 5. Freedom of movement for the (U>fenders. 
 
 '{"he fulfilment of thesi' i)rinciples must l)i,' chiefly sou;,dit for in 
 a proper selc'Ction of the ^^iduiid and in a proper distribution of 
 the troops on it, and althouj^di the art of I'ortification judiciously 
 
 ■it 
 
GENliKAL PKINCII'IJCS. 
 
 3 
 
 .'ipplicd will iiiatcrially increase i\\v rapahilitics of dcfcnrc of" a 
 Position, it ( aiiiiot traiisfonii a had Tositioii into a ;^^oo(l one. Tlu' 
 entire fnliilnicnt of tliesc piincipU's nuist not however be i'\[)ectcd. 
 and tills for many reasons, snch for instance as the naturi' of 
 the {ijround, the time and means at disposal. A compromise 
 nuist therefore hi- made in most cases, ancl it is particularl\- h«M"e 
 that an linj^nneer recjuires to apj)ly his skill and jnd;.,Mnent. 
 
 The employment of Fortification by the attack is limited in 
 kind, and from the ver\' essence of the attack is confined to works 
 of a temporary nature. It is a use of I'^)rtiHcation which is j^row- 
 iu},' in importance, a result l)rouf;;ht about by the development of 
 infantry hre. The (lesij,^n of the necessary works and the selec- 
 tion of the sites must be jirimarily based on the 
 
 General Principles of Aitack, vi/ : — 
 
 1. The tactical refjuirements of the case must be fulfilled. 
 
 2. ICxposure of the enemy to tlu; attackin's tire. 
 
 3. Cover for the attackers from the defender's fire. 
 
 4. I'reedom of movement for the attackers. 
 
 5. Tiie defender's position must be j^radiially approached. 
 
 The fuUilment of these principles are subject to the same con- 
 ditions as those of the defence. 
 
 :Id- 
 
 m 
 
 of 
 
 sly 
 
 IXILI'HNCE Ol-- ARMAMF.NT. 
 
 The application of the above j)rinciples, those of the defence 
 as well as those of the attack, depends evidently on the nature 
 and effect of the arms in use. Tiiese principles are unchan^'eable 
 and were followed instinctively from the very first, and the }^aeat 
 difference there is in the present and i)ast methods of I'ortification 
 is principally due to the chan^^^e in the arms in use. To clearlv 
 understand how this has been brou^dit about the History of bOr- 
 tification should be studied. 
 
 Table .1 ;^nves the effect of the present arms in use. See also 
 
 DIFFHRKNT KINDS OI" IIRF.. 
 
 Different names have Ixhmi ,t,Mven to lire accordinj,'' to the direc- 
 tion from which it proceeds relatively to the troops or works 
 exposed to it. '^ iSj /•'. 
 
 •Si-e p. .S:V.t :u:{ und IMT :i.V2, V(.l. win, .Inmii.-.l n.r.S.I., an,l tw.. pap. IS l.y 
 Captain .liiiiu'H, It.H,, in Vols. XXII ami \.\l\', cit tlif same Journal. 
 
 " , , - II ^i. ^ ih^ »,-Wi'. Ji>^: /6/i»«*^^ 
 
 ^i '*^<- 
 
 
 n<'**- 
 
 /UIH^' 9/t^U^^f IhUU^ - Cf"^'^* 
 
I'llCLl) I'OKTII'KATION. 
 
 Field Fortification is also called the Art of Intrcncllill},^ and is 
 in all probability one of the oldest of lunnan arts. The Romans 
 practised it with j^reat skill, and some of their fortified camps are 
 still to be seen. An historian says of them, " It was by movinj; 
 earth that they conquered the world." b'ield Fortification has 
 been used with advantaj,^e in almost all wars, but it is chiefly in 
 the latter end of this century that the art has Jiiost rapidly ad- 
 vanced, a result due to the introduction of rifles and especially of 
 breechloaders.* So important has it now become to obtain cover 
 that the execution of the slif,diter forms, called "Shelter Trenches," 
 is a matter of drill. t 
 
 The time available for Intrenching,^ is t^a.'nerally short, and the 
 labour of the troops themselves is all that can be counted on in 
 ordinary circumstances. And further the tools and materials will 
 probably be limited. The probK;m therefore is : /;/ a i^ivcii lime 
 to 'a'ork up to the best adruitlii^s^c the DUilen'als at liaiid by uieans of the 
 labour and tools at disposal. The solution of this problem frequently 
 re<|uires considerable technical knowledf^e and inj^^enuity. 
 
 In accordance with the precedinj,^ sub-division Field Fortifica- 
 tion will be considered under two heads, namely, the use of b'ield 
 I'"ortification b}' the Defence and its use by the Attack. 
 
 USE OF FIELD FOliTIFWATloX II Y THE DEFENCE. 
 
 
 As will be explained in the setjuel the action fouj,dit for the 
 defence of a Position may be either Offensive- Defensive or 
 Pmely Defensive. In the former the intention is to crush the 
 eneni}' by the difficulties of the attack and then to assume the 
 offensive so as to complete the victory ; evidently in this case tiic 
 arranj^^nnent and natun; of the works must be such as to present 
 no hindrance to the assum[)tion of the offensive by the defenders. 
 In a purel}' defensivi; action the priuuuy intention is to iiold the 
 Position, but to do this effectually ever}' opportunity of dealinj^^ 
 blows to the eneni}' by niakin;^^ local countiM'-attacks should be 
 seized. In this case, therefore, the localities occupied by the 
 troops should be made as unapproachable as time and materials 
 will admit, so lonj; as passaj^^es are left for the issue of the counter- 
 attack. 
 
 The j^^eneral arranf,'ement of the works, which is the outcome of 
 the hrst j^^eneral principle of defence is to stronj^dy occupy |)oints 
 
 *A Hlioit liiHtdiii'iil skiteh of Kield Koitilicatiou is given in "Hasty iutreiicliuicuts" 
 by (Ji'iuTal hriaiiiniiit. 
 tSee Fiehl Exeruises. 
 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 

 
 ■•>'jS 
 
 i 
 
 CKNKKAL I'KINCIPI.HS. 5 
 
 at iiitcrvals aloii;^^ the lint; to be (lef(.;ii(l(jcl. These are called the 
 "stfow^ points' or the '' tactical pivots"' of the Position. Tiie inti'r- 
 vals between the stroiij.; })oints \ary from 500 to 6000- yards, and 
 can either l)e left undefended, closed by means of obstacles or 
 defended l)y sh(K)tinf,'- trendies accordin^^ to circninstances. 
 To further increase the difficulties of the attack posts in front 
 of the main or first line of defence and also in rear of it can he 
 fortified ; the former are called "Advanced posts" and tiie latter 
 form a sec id and occasionally even a third line of defence. 
 
 The nature of the works recpiired can be deduced from the last 
 four ;^encral principles of defence : To expose the enemy to fire 
 the j,qf)und in front of the Position lias to be cleared. To impede 
 the movements of the enemy obstacles should be placed in his 
 way and his communications should be destroyed. To cover tiie 
 defenders from fire parapets of various kinds are required, and 
 lastly to facilitate the movement of the defenders communciations 
 may have to be prepared. The work to be done in preparin;^- a 
 Position for defence may tiierefore be divided into five classes, as 
 as follows : 
 
 1. Clearing' the ^Tound. 
 
 2. Preparation of obstacles. 
 " " cover. 
 " " communications. 
 
 Demolition of communications. 
 
 3. 
 
 4- 
 5- 
 
 A f,^eneral knowledf^e of what occurs when a Position is 
 attacked will assist in forminj; an adequate idea of the works 
 suitable for streii;^^tlieiiin,i,^ a Position. 
 
 I-Jefore conmiencin^f the attack the enemy will endeavour to 
 obtain information about the position, strength, etc., of the defen- 
 sive works, to enable him to arranj^'-e liis scheme of uttack. 
 
 The attack will be be<,nin by the Artillery i)reparation, that is. 
 the Artillery of the attack will fire with common shell and shrapnel' 
 a},^ainst the works and troops until it is thou<,dit that the former 
 are suffici-'utly shattered and the latter sufficiently deinorali;;ed to 
 enable the Infantry to advance. The defenders will now be ex- 
 posed to th(> direct fire of tli-' advancin;^^ Infantry, to Artillery fire 
 and also U) lon;,Man;^^e musketry fire (mass firinj,0. Durinj^- the 
 advai). 0| nortunities win probably i)reseiit themselves, which 
 sliouiv iiimediately seized, for counter-attacks. Towards the 
 
 latter i)art of the ailvance the attackers will find themseves much 
 hampered and delayed by obstacles, and it is at this moment 
 that the defender's fire will have its j^reatest eflect. It is at this 
 moment also that the fire would be opened with tiie "-re: 
 
 St 
 
 *n. E. Prize Essay tor 1875, p. 13, Capt. Fraser, R.E. 
 
O I'SIC Ol' lli;i.l) I OKTllICATION P.V Till'. DHFENCi:. 
 
 a<lvaiit;if,''(.- froiii wDiks liitlicrto hidden and nnknnun to the 
 the attark(,'rs and that the most effective counter-stroke would be 
 (leUveiiMl. If, however, the attackers succeed in overconiin},^ this 
 resistance the defench'rs will in all [nobability have to retire, 
 unless till! works are diflicult to assault. 
 
 It should be obserNcd that the attackers will, in preference to 
 makini,^ a frontal attack on a fortified Position, endeavour if pos- 
 sible to take the Position in ilank. This points to two thinj^'s : 
 the first is that a Position should not show its strenj^'th so that 
 that the enemy may be enticed to attack in front, and the second 
 is the advantaj^a; of beiu},^ able to rapidl}- intrench so as to meet 
 the enemy in his flank attack. 
 
 Hefore describin;,^ the works required to fortify a Position the 
 tools and materials available and the manner of doinj^ the work 
 must be considered. 
 
 TOOLS. 
 
 The followin^f is a list of the principal tools employed. 
 
 For hiyiii}:; out work.—^ ft. rods — Mcasuriu}^' tapes, 50 yds. — 
 Traciu}^^ Tapes — Field Level. ^ 399 F. 
 
 For luirthu'ork, also called Intrenching 7'oo/,s'.— Shovels — Spades 
 —Picks. 
 
 For Stnnc or Brickwork. — Mason's hammers and points — Crow- 
 bars — Explosives. 
 
 For W'dodic'ork. — Axes, fellinp^ — Hand- Axes — Ad;^es — P>illhooks 
 — -Pit Saws — Cross-cut Saws — Hand Saws — Circular Saws 
 worked l)y steam — Gabion Knives — Hammers — Morticing 
 Chisels (rare.) 
 
 A list of the tools carried by R.E. companies and by Battalions 
 of Infantry will be found at p. 114 F, Part I. 
 
 Owinjj^ to the very short time now f,''c.nerally available for In- 
 trenchinj,^ and the absolute necessity of obtaininj^ cover, this most 
 important question is now presentinj^^ itself for solution: "How 
 are the intrenching tools refpiired by the Infantry to be carried so 
 that the\- may be forthcoming whenever wanted ?" The follow- 
 ing are four alternatives that have been proposed : '■ 
 
 1. To carry them in battalion wagons. 
 
 2. " " on pack animals. 
 
 3. To have them carried by the troops themselves. 
 
 4. To be carried by the troops only when there is a proba- 
 bilit}- of their being required. 
 
 There are reasons for and against each of these proposals, but 
 the probability is that the time will come when every Infantry 
 
 \See p. ;{■)'.• :{()4, Vol. XXIIl, Journal P. U. S. I. 
 ami p. 38'2, 383, \'ol. XXI\' • 
 
 i 
 
MATKRIAr.S. « 
 
 soldier will he rcciuircd to carry a sliovil of special pattern so 
 arran^'ed that it will he as much a part of his accoutrements as 
 iiis hayonet is. 
 
 MATi; RIALS. 
 
 Tile materials employed can he divided into two classes : 
 
 1. Kaiv M ale rid Is. —Eluih, wood, hrushwood, stone, Inick, 
 iron, etc. ' 
 
 2. Maiuifactnycd Malcn'als.—C.ixhions, fascines, pickets, hurdles 
 sandha/^'s, sods, etc. ' 
 
 Methods of ubtainiu!^ the rariuus raiv materials. 
 
 KAUTH. 
 
 See sN 85 F. 
 
 KartIncorK.—\vAvi\\, for purposes of l-ieid-I-ortilication, is^u,„e,-- 
 ally ol)taine(l from trenches which are du^^ as near to where the 
 earth is wanted as possihle. The process can be divided into 
 three operations. 
 
 1. Di^^f^nn/j; or /^^ettint,'. _ 
 
 2. Movin;,^ tile earth to where it is required, 
 j. Rammin^^ 
 
 , lllTf 1 ; \ "»t «'" t'i« y..uu.l an,! l,c is mUmm-A <.f its shape an,l ,l,.„th an. 
 in NNhat .l.mtion he m tc thn.w the earth. He e..m,ne,uvs on the llfl „f his task ' 
 
 t'^k'irthe^i^t-'"'''^'''*'', T'"r;^' T^ *h'" ^^^^^y •''«« "'•* the ni of 
 task If the inek IS re.iuired ahout 'J eul.io feet shoul.l be loosene..! at a time If tl e 
 
 <h Hrl .■"""" '''■^'*" be at given slopes a treneh with vertieal si.les " houl I in 
 shown in F ,^' ' , *f f V ''^«'"i;fs are seaq.e.l olf. Thns in the sections of trenches 
 
 Fi'j. (I. 
 
 I 
 
 Fi,j. h. 
 
f! 
 
 8 
 
 USE oi" Mi:i.i) I'OKTiricATioN HV Till': i)i;i"i;N(:i': 
 
 DiHtriliiition of dij^pirn. If tiim; iH an object tlic dig^'ors hIioiiUI In; placed , is 
 close tii;<ctlu'i' as they can conveniently work namely, alxmt .") feet; in any case t 
 feet is a niininiuni. Two rmrs of dij^gers and no more can he enijiloyed to;4etlier in 
 the same trench, and they iniist work hack to hack throwinj^ tli(! earth outwardw. 
 
 Mitriinj till' Eiirtli. This can he done in the Field in three ditl'erent ways : 
 I. liy ahovellinf^. 
 *2. II means of wheelbarrows. 
 H. M M baskets. 
 
 Shovelling; is the general method, but the other two may in some cases he em 
 j)loyed with advantage. 
 
 Shovelling.- l'Ve(iuently the digger can throw tlie e;irtli to where it is rci|uircd, 
 hut if the place is beyond his reach a workman must be added to shovel on the earth. 
 These men are called sliovellers, and they are each provided with a shovel. The 
 niuuher of rows of slKjvellers will of course depend on the distance the earth has to 
 he moved. 
 
 Wheelbarrows. The harrows are tilled by the tligger and wheeled to the recjuired 
 place by other workmen. I'lanks should be laid down for the wheel of tin; harrow 
 to run on. These planks are called harrow runs. A few men are generally reijuired 
 to spread the earth. 
 
 Maskets.- The baskets are tilled by the tligger and carried by other men. 
 
 The last two methods can be used witli advantage when the distance the earth 
 has to be moved is great, hut this is tlie exception in Field h'ortitication, in fact it is 
 not often that even shovellers are re(|uired. 
 
 h'l nil mill;/. The object of ramming is to consolidate the earth, thus making it 
 less liable to be degraded by weather. It is very seldom re(|uired in Field Fortitica- 
 tion. Workmen provided with ranuuers are told oil" for this duty. 
 
 Extension of icoi-kin^ parties. — ^Tlie tnen detailed for work form a 
 " Workiii}^^ part}-." To save tiiiu and to carry out the work in 
 an orderly manner a drill has been drawn up for the e.xtcnsion of 
 working.,' parties, which is very similar to the extension of skir- 
 mishers."* 
 
 Profiliuj^. — It is sometimes required to shape the mass of earth 
 and form it to rej^ular slo})es. For this purpose " profiles" are 
 put up which f^ive a skeleton of the work reciuirecl. They are 
 generally made with wooden battens nailed toj^^ether. 
 
 Benii. — If possible the excavated earth should not be piled 
 close up to the etlj^^e of the excavation, or- in other words a berni 
 should be left. Sometimes a berm is a disadvantaj,''e, namely, 
 when it is on the attacker's side of a work, as it affords him a 
 step, but when inside a work a berm can often be utilized by the 
 defenders as a step. 
 
 Revettinij;. — When the slope to which the earth is to be formed 
 is .steep it must generally be faced to retain the shape. This fac- 
 ing is called a Revetment. The manner of revetting is described 
 at page lo. 
 
 WODJJ. 
 
 Hoiv obtained. 
 
 1. In civili;!ed countries, generally at timber yards ; cut into 
 baulks, planks, etc. 
 
 2. l-5y demolishing houses. 
 
 3. By cutting down trees. 
 *See § 410 F, and Field Exercises. 
 
 
MATKKIAI.S. 9 
 
 Ciittiii^^ (inwii tifts .should only lie rt-sorlrd to wlini tin- \\vn 
 other methods fail, as coiisidLTahlc time is requiii'd and the tirn- 
 hei is not oi)tained in so convenient a shape, unless re()uiriMl Un- 
 abattis. Apart from ohtainin;; tinihci-. trees have to l»e cut down 
 to {^et a clear field of lire. Trees are cut down with — 
 
 Fellinir axes I , 
 
 ^. , lari/e trees. 
 
 Cross-cut sawsi "^ 
 
 Hand a.\(;s i ,, ^ 
 
 ^ ■• small trees. 
 
 Ordmary saws ) 
 
 Ciuncotton or flynamite. 
 
 'I'lic manner of using axes ami .saws Ihmh;,' gmerally umlerstooil it netMl imt lie 
 (U'scrilietl hero. 
 
 'I'liero ari! two methods r)f employing giimotton. In the lir.st a neeklaee of gun 
 cotton discs is hung round the tree, and in the .seconil the eliarge is placed in an 
 aug\ir liolc. In either case the charge is lirttd liy a detonating fuze. The second 
 method rei|uires least guiicotton. hynamite I'an lie used in a similar way; it is not, 
 however, an article of store. ( Kor further infoririation sec I'^xjilosives. ) 
 
 Convci'ti)!!^^ tiuihcr. — Trees can he rou;.,ddy sqnared with an ad/i' 
 or a.xe, hut if recpiired in planks nnist he sawn. Circular saws 
 driven by a special road-en^'ine, called a "Steam Sa|)per," will 
 be sometimes available, l^iilinj.,' this saw pits nuist be employed. 
 
 Tiiiihcr icnrk. — ■^ 405 F. 
 
 ISIiCSHWOOK. 
 
 Ildcc ohliiiiicd. — Can occasionally be obtained cut and reatly for 
 use, but as a j,'eneral rule it must be cut down. 
 
 Method of ivorkiiii^. — >§. j>Si F. 
 
 SIONK AM) r.lUlK. 
 
 Stone and brick are rarely used unless found in the shape of 
 walls and houses. Stone has the disadvantaj^^e o( splinterin.t,' 
 wlien struck by a shot. ■^ N5 F. 
 
 ' 1 HON. 
 
 Iron is principally useful in the form of railway rails, but only 
 in a limited wa\-, owin-.,^ to the difticidties of workin;.; it up with 
 the appliances in the iMeld. It is also lar/^'ely used in the shape 
 of iron do;.;s, spikes and nails. Sheet irf)n may often be turned 
 to accoimt. jJ N5 F. 
 
 Methods of uuikiii'^ the ran'mis uianufactnred materials, 
 Piekets—^ 383 F". 
 Faseines — §, 382 F. 
 Gabions — Delinition, etc., ■§ 5.S4 V. 
 Various kinds — Wicker, § 385 F. 
 
 Jones' iron band, § 386 F. 
 
 Hoop iron, ■{^ 386 F. 
 
 Iron wire net, § 387 F. 
 
10 
 
 i:SF. 0|- IlCl.n FORTIFICATION l?V TIIK nFFENCF.. 
 
 Remarks on tli(.' various kiinls of };;il)ioiis. '^ jS; I'\ 
 
 Illtnih's ii: \S() V. 
 ('(lutiiiiioits lliirdlc-icork <^ yjo \'\ 
 Wiclici- loopholes — § jfjo 1'". 
 SiDnllnif^s — 
 
 Arc oiinvftH Itii^jH which, whun r<'(|uire<l for uho, are lillfd with earth. For 
 fliiiirnsioMM si;c S •V.ti /'. 
 
 Sods — 
 Slioiihl if j)o.sHi))le he cut from iiirailoWH well jirovidcd with ^'r.iss jircvioiiHly 
 mown iiiid Wiitfrt'ij, that the eartii may aiilii're mori; lirinly to the roots of thi; graw.s. 
 
 RKVKTMKNTS. 
 
 As already incntioiud ;i rcvetinciit is iu'ccssar\- wlu-n an earth 
 slope; is retjuired to stand for some time at a steep slope. The 
 neci'ssity for revettin;,'^ depends on — 
 The steepness of the slope. 
 Tlie heij,dit of the slo[)e. 
 The naturt; of the soil. 
 
 Whether tlie earth to l)e retained is "made" or "virt^in." 
 The object of the; slope. 
 The time the slope is required to stand. 
 Aitchoi'iiif^. — Required to prevent a revetment from bcinj^ 
 thrown down 1)\' the earth-thrust. 
 
 The mati'rials eniployc;d in makinj,^ revetments are as follows : 
 
 (lal)ions, Sandbaj^'s, Planks, 
 
 Casks, Sods, Brushwood, 
 
 I'ascines, Stones or bricks, Miscellaneous. 
 
 Loo[s, Hurdles, 
 
 Method of conslnutioii of the various revetments. 
 
 Gabions — § 392 F. 
 
 Casks — in the same way as {,'abions. 
 
 I'ascines — § ]()] V. 
 
 Lojjjs — Similarly to fascuics. Tiiis is an excellent revetment, 
 but is more substantial than },'enerally necessary for Field Forti- 
 fication. 
 
 Sandkif^^s — § 394 I'. 
 
 Sods — § 395 1'. 
 
 Stones or l)ricks- -Like sandbaj^s, rarely used. 
 
 Hurdles — § ^96 1*\ Continuous Hurdlework — '^ ^90 1*\ 
 
 Planks— 
 
 l'\irni an excullont ruvi'tmcnt <|iiicUly made. Pickets arc driven in as for con- 
 tinuous hurdle revetment and ancliored, then the planks are placed aiul held against 
 the pickets hy earth liackiii;.'. 
 
 1 brushwood — § 397 F. 
 
 Miscellaneous— Packin^^ rases, lon^^ .i^rass. corn, canvas, etc., 
 may be turned to accoinit for re^vettin^f if uothinj.,' else is available. 
 
 Comparison of revetments and tpiantities of material required for 
 revetting — ^ 398 F. 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 l 
 
 -m 
 
( l.|;.\UIN(i mi. (IKolNI), (>i;si ACI.I.S. 
 
 II 
 
 r-arth. For 
 
 Itrcvioiisly 
 f the graHH, 
 
 ill! cartli 
 )(-•. Tile 
 
 III. 
 
 uoiiK lo i{i: DoNK n»i; rm; kkkknck oi' a I'osition. 
 ci.KMiiSd riiK a nor SI). 
 (Jhjirt. -T(o expose tlie eiii-iiiy to the (Kfeiider's (ire. !:j S^ V. 
 
 onSTACJ.A'S. 
 
 Ohjat. — To impede the enemy's advanre. 
 rieiieral I'lineiples and CoiKritions, ,:? 90 1-". 
 The)' may he divided into two classes : 
 
 Xcitnrul obstacles such as— lakes, rivers, streams, marshes, 
 swamps, cliffs, steep hanks, woods, (;tc. 
 
 /I r/^yum/ obstacles— i^J; 91-100 I-' an<l loj, 10} l\ 
 
 The followinj.,' obstacles not mentioned in the text-book are 
 worth iioticinj^. 
 
 (.•rrman h,„i,,l, a/jutHs. 'I l.is obstaclt., Fig. <■, iw mack- with small treea or lj„ugh.s 
 Foj. r. 
 
 1 beinj/ 
 
 follows : 
 
 •us. 
 
 Fill. it. 
 
 L'tment, 
 Forti- 
 
 for con- 
 il against 
 
 s, etc., 
 lilable. 
 
 rm] for 
 
 cleared of their thin branches. The butt.^ are placed in small V trenches from T to 
 . tect w..le and from 1 t<. 2 feet dec,,, an.l are secured by poles laid " . ross 'm -n 
 by wire A series ot these trenches are dug one behind the other, the earth f,.., '. ' 
 trench being thrown into the one in front, and this completely .secures the bou.d s 
 I his obstacle can be made of any re.iuired depth. The method of constructi.m fs a^ 
 follows: One party excavates the front trench an.l is followed by a se.ond ,>ar - lav 
 ing boughs. Then a thud party commences digging the second trench, and is ol- 
 lowed by a bough-laymg party, and bo ou, according to the number of rows le.iuire 
 
rsi: (»i I rii I) I oiMii K AiMoN I'.v THi i)i;i I N( i:. 
 
 Ilnmili /'It.i irilli irln i iilil ilijlf nil lit . Slllilll IlitH illMiIlt I ' (>" ll<'t'|» ilHil '!'{)" \\\i\v 
 
 iit'c ilii;^ just Miillii'it'iitly till' :i|i:u't. to ^ivi' loitiii tur tlir cxciivutcil I'ltrtli tn lie iijlcil ii|i 
 lictwffii tlifiii ( Fi'j il ). rirU(!t« iirc tlu'ii ihivcii ImIwith tlic |iits iuhI ••iitiiiiylcil \\\\\i 
 \\ ii'c, mill ,'i |iiiiiit('i| hIiiIvc is <li'i\rii into iimIi pit. 'I'liis ttli.staclr is i|iii('kly maili; 
 iiiul is liiriiiiiliklili'. 
 
 l'ltl<i:\U.\ri(iS OF loVFIl. 
 
 (ic lie fill I'l'iiuipU's. 
 
 Ohjcii. -T(y U^ssi'ii tlu' rtlcct <»! tlu' I'liciiiy's tin' and to dblaiii 
 sociiic tiriii}^ positions. 
 
 Till' cover iciiuhc'ii call, in arrordanrc with the disposition of 
 troops (or tilt: dclcnci' of a Position, be classed under tlie follow- 
 \u<^ heads : 
 
 I'or hi/iiiilry — 
 Shootin.i; hne. 
 Supports. 
 Reser\es. 
 
 I-'or . I riillcry — 
 (inns. 
 Limbers. 
 
 l-'or Cavalry. 
 
 The conli^iiratinn of the jjjronnd or the accidents on its sur- 
 face, sucli as walls, hedj^es, etc., nia\' afford natural cover, which 
 will, lioweser, j^aMicrally rctpiirc iniprovenient. Ck-arly to sa\e 
 time and mati-rials natural cover should he utilized as far as pos- 
 sible, b'ailin;;- this, artilicial cover will ha\c to be preparetl if the 
 Position is to be fortiticd. 
 
 The (lesif,Mi of artificial cover and the choice of natural covt-r 
 is inthu'ncod by various conditions. Some of these conditions are 
 j^aMieralK- ai)i)licable, and each class of .cover has its own special 
 conditions. 
 
 The conditions {generally applicable are — 
 
 1. Concealment, as far as possible, from the eneni}-. 
 
 2. Of no use to the enemy if captured by him. 
 
 3. Adapted to the weapons used by the eneni}-. 
 • 4. Time available. 
 
 5. Adapted to the jjjround. 
 
 (). Dimensions such as to provide sufficient space, head room, 
 etc., for the men or ^uns. 
 
 7. Drainaj^e. 
 
 The followinj^ special conditions are also f^-^enerally applicable : 
 
 (S. No hir.drance to tlie atlvance t)f the counter-attack (active 
 defence.) 
 
PUiaWKAlIdN' ol' (OVl.K, (.I.M.KAI. I'KIM ll'l.ICS. 
 
 Ki 
 
 •J (»' « ill.' 
 
 Ill' pjll'il up 
 iiil;Ii'iI w itli 
 irlily liiliilr 
 
 <> olHain 
 sitioii (){ 
 
 • lollou- 
 
 its siir- 
 
 }', wliicli 
 
 to s:i\c 
 
 ;is |)()S- 
 l-'d if the 
 
 I r()\('r 
 
 ions arc 
 
 special 
 
 room, 
 
 icahle : 
 (active 
 
 (y. Dillu lilt to assault (passive defeiue.) 
 
 Id. To he ready for use at any time hefoie com[)lttion. 
 
 I. Ciiihcahncnt fmiii the oiciny. 'I'he hettt i the works are con- 
 cealed tlu: more difficult) will tlu' enemy have in oi)tainiii;4 iid'oi- 
 ination as rej^^aids the strenj^^th. position, etc., ol the dclenccs, 
 and it will l>i' nioic difiicidt foi' him to takt; aim and to asceitain 
 the effeit of his shots. In some cases, also, it may he wisheil to 
 o|)en lire um!\pi;ctedly from a wf)rk i)revioiisly hidden. The 
 concealment of the woiks can he obtained as iollows : 
 
 !)}• kiH'pin;,^ the parapets low. 
 
 1)\' coverinj^^ earthworks so as to make them a|)pear as like the 
 surroundin;,' j,n()und as possible, for instance with sods, bushes, 
 snow, etc. This is a very necessary precaution, as freshls' tliiown 
 up earth is \isibli' from a f^'reat distance. 
 
 \W placin^f the work behind a hedf^'e, the en st of a hill, stand- 
 in;,' corn, etc. 
 
 In si)ccial cases deep trenches may be du;^' scatteriuj.,' tiic earth 
 about.* 
 
 J. Of no use to the e)iei)iy if captnn'd hy liiiii. — A work will be of 
 use to the enemy if, after capturin;^' it, it will assist him to cap- 
 ture other works or o hold the ^^nound he has won. The condi- 
 tion will therefore, be fulfilled : 
 
 If, owin^' to its i)osition, none of the otlier works within ran;,'e 
 can be seen from it. 
 
 If it affords no cover to the enemy from the lire of the works 
 placed in rear of it. This can be effected in various ways, for 
 instance, by makinj,^ trenches shallow, by makin;; the rear slope 
 flat, or by leaviii}^' the work open in rear, etc. 
 
 1)}' makinj; the trenches too deep to Hre out of, 
 
 J. AiUipled to the lueapuns used by the e)ieniy. — It is self-e\ident 
 that the resistance to penetration of the cover thrown u[) will 
 depend on the nature of the weapons used by the enemy. Hut 
 on them will also depend the " kind" of cover. This will 
 perhaps be best understood by an example. A breastwork of 
 planks would be far more serviceable a;,Minst sa\a^'-es who had 
 no lirearms than a shelter-trench ; in fact the latter would be 
 worse than useless. 
 
 4. Time available. — The nature of the work will evidently larj^'ely 
 depend on the time available for its construction. \\'lien the time 
 is very short special dispo itions have to be made. The (piickest 
 means of obtainin;^^ earth cover, for instance, is to difjf a trench in 
 rear of the parapet when the heij,dit of cover obtained will be the 
 
 *TLis was doue by the Kusniiaus ut Chairkeue iu the war of 1877-8. 
 
'4 
 
 rSI-, Ol' I'llll.I) lOKrilICATloN HV Till:; DKI'-KNCi:. 
 
 luMj^lil (if parapet addrd to the depth of tieiicli. If men are 
 a\ailal)Ie and it is wished to tliicken the parapet a ditcli can be 
 (hi;^'' in front sinudtaneously. 
 
 5. Adapted til tlic L^roiiitd.- -\W judiciously adaptiu}^^ a work to 
 the j^Monnd. and taking advanta}j;^e of tlie features, mucii labour 
 and consequentl}- time may be saved. 
 
 It often happens that the features of the ^M'ouiul arc such tiiat 
 very little work will rendei them defensible, for instance, ridj^^es, 
 walls, hedges, embankments, sunken roads, etc. 
 
 If rock or water is near the surface shallow trenches will have 
 to be emplo\ed and the work will have to be designed accordinj^dy. 
 
 6. J)n>ic)tsi(»is siicJi as to provide sujjieieitt spaee, head-room, etc., for 
 the men or i^'itiis. — The followin;^- are some of the dimensions con- 
 cerned : Width of ban(juette, width of trenches (occasionally), 
 interior space in closed works, head-room and floor space in 
 " blindaj^es," the rise and tread of ste})s, inclination of ramps, 
 dimensions of <^iiu portions, etc. 
 
 7. I)rai)iai^e. — Sunken works should be carefully drained even 
 if constructed in dry weather. For this purpose; a slij^-ht fall 
 should be j^nven t(^ all surfaces which otherwise mij^dit be hori- 
 zontal, and (bains should be cut to lead away the water. 
 
 (S. Xo hindrance to the adiuuice of the counter-attack. — This consid- 
 eration is met by making the trendies shallow and the parapets 
 low, or by leavinj,^ inter\als between the works. 
 
 (J. Dijficnlt to assault. — Some of the works will recjuire to be 
 prepared for a passive defence, as will be afterwards shown, in 
 which case the\- should be such as to render assault difficult, and 
 the defenders should have a "vantaj,'e." For these pur})oses in 
 earthworks the ditch in front should be wide and deep, the slopes 
 steep and the parapet hij^li. Walls and stockades fulfil the con- 
 dition if otherwise suitable. To render assault difficult obstacles 
 should l)e freely useil. 
 
 10. Ready fur use at any time before completion. — This condition 
 applies to the case when a stronj^^ work is desirable liut when the 
 time available is uncertain, and to n\eet it the desi;^Mi and the 
 method of execution of the work will /generally have to be specially 
 arran;;ed. 
 
 ( i>\ i;il Idl; INKANTKV SHOOI'lNli LINK. 
 
 The conditions are — 
 
 1. A clear view of the enemy nnist be obtained. 
 
 2. livery facility for l)rin;^nn<,^ an effecti\e fire to bear on the 
 enemy should be provided. 
 
 J. The men should be protectcui from the enem)''s fire, (a) 
 when firing ami (b) when not firing. 
 
•t^'J 
 
 to l)e 
 
 PKIil'ARATKIN OF COVF.K, CKNI-.KAI. PRINCI PI,I.:s. 
 
 4. Kasy tiic.'uis f)f access to firii);^'- position. 
 
 15 
 
 1. .1 clear ricic of the cncuiy niust he ohtaiiicci.- Suppo?.\Ui; [\\v 
 Krouiid ill front of tiic work to have been cleared the fulfihneiit of 
 this condition is jnincipaily ol)tained by a proper selection of the 
 site of the work, and to a finiited extent by adjustinj,^ the hei^dit 
 above the j^round of the h'ne from wliich tlie hre is deHvered. 
 
 2. Every facility for brin^in^ an effective fre to hear (»i the enemy 
 should he proviiled.- The trace of the work shouhl be so arran^^-ed 
 that the men can fire with easi- in tlie directions required. 'Hiis 
 is completely fulhlled if the trace of any part of the work is per- 
 pendicular to the direction of the Hie to be supplied by that part, 
 l)ut a small deviation is allowable (see rule a, ^ 114 V.) With tlu' 
 present loiij,- ran^^e rifles the main object is to obtain an effective 
 fire to the front, and hence the trace of the works will be as 
 straif^ht as possible, except in the special cases where only a close 
 tlefence is intended. 
 
 The different kinds of fire that a work or part of a work may 
 have to supply are — 
 
 Direct or frontal fire.— When firin^^ at some position occupied 
 by the enemy, or directly at the enemy as he advances. 
 
 Cross hre.— When the fire is directed on to ^qouiid already 
 swept by the hre from another work. 
 
 IHaiikinf,' fire.— When the fire sweeps the front of another work 
 or of obstacles, or when it takes the enemy in flank. (See 
 Flank;^.) 
 
 The posture in which the men are intended to fire must be 
 taken mto account. Men may either fire staiuliiiLs kneelin--^ or 
 lyinj; down. '^' 
 
 When occupyiuf,' walls or stockades fire is -eiierally delivered 
 throii^di loopholes. The followin;:,^ principles should be adhered 
 to in niakiuf,' loopholes— 
 
 (1) The opeiiin;:,^ on the enemy's side should be as •^mall as pos 
 sible so as to present but little mark to the eneniv and to 
 dimmish the chance of bullets enteriu"- 
 
 (2) They must be so placed as to be of no use to the I'licMuy 
 when he closes on the wall, etc. For this they must eitheV 
 be on the f,aound level or placed out of the enemy's reach. 
 
 (J) To enable the defenders to lir(> in different directions the 
 loophole IS "splayed." The amount and direction of si)lay 
 will depend on the duection in which it is inten.led to lire in". 
 
 (4) The distance apart of the loopholes should allow of the men' 
 usm^r their rilles freely. (See Loopholes, j^jj 105 and ii.S ]•.) 
 
 m 
 
r 
 
 i6 
 
 USE OF FIELD FORTIFICATION BY THE DEFENCE. 
 
 3. The men should he protceted from the enemy's fire. — The slioDtinj^^ 
 line has to be protected from four different kinds of lire, nanielv— 
 Direct fire. 
 Curved fire. 
 
 Enfilade, inchidinj,' oblique fire. 
 Reverse fire. 
 
 And the arms prothicinj^' this fire are — ^Kifies, machine j^uns, 
 field j^nms, and occasionally j^uns of position. 
 
 The cover suitable to j,nve protection from these various kinds 
 of fire is as follows : — 
 
 Direct fire — 
 
 When the men are firinpf. 
 
 (i; Natural cover — Existinj; ditches, trees, sharp ridj^es, etc. 
 
 (2) Earthen parapets. 
 
 (3) Wooden parapets — Stockades, lo^' parapets, etc. 
 
 (4) Hrick and stone walls — if found built. 
 
 (5) The above combined. 
 
 (6) Sandbaf^ parapets, furniture, etc. 
 
 The thickness necessary will depend on the nature and inten- 
 sity of the fire to which the cover may be exposed, but want of 
 time will often prevent the required thickness being attained. 
 3 and 4 are, as a rule, only available aj^^ainst musketry. 
 
 Head eover.~\i is most necessary to protect, if possible, the 
 head and shoulders of the men firinj^^, as it diminishes loss and the 
 men lire more deliberately. This head cover is obtained by means 
 of loopholes, by "notchinf;" the tops of walls, and by usinjj;- 
 "head-loj,^s." (See ^ S; E.) 
 
 When the men are not firing. 
 The rover detailed above from i to 6 will suffice. 
 (Curved fire — 
 
 When the men arc firing. 
 
 (i) The cover suitable for direct lire will also shield against 
 curved fire, the men being close to the parapet. 
 
 (2) ICarth covered sheds called " Hlindages." So far blindages 
 have not been much used to cover the men actually firing 
 except in special cases (caponiers — tambours — blockhouses.) 
 
 When th(> men are not firing, 
 (i) Walls or stockades if high enough. 
 
 {2) nigh parapets or a trench in rear, or both arrangements 
 combined. 
 
 I 
 
l'Ri:i'AkATl()N OF COVHK, CWINKKAI, PKINCIPIJCS. 
 
 17 
 
 ic shootin;:^ 
 
 liine j^uiis, 
 ions kinds 
 
 f^cs, etc. 
 
 ind iiitcii- 
 it want of 
 • attained. 
 
 ssihlc, the 
 
 •ss and the 
 
 by means 
 
 by usin^' 
 
 d ai,^ainst 
 
 blindaj^es 
 ;dly fninj^^ 
 khouses.) 
 
 nj^ements 
 
 (j) l)Hndaj,'es. — These are chisscd as "bullet-proofs," "splinter- 
 proofs" or "bomb-proofs," accordin-; to the nature of the lire 
 they are desi,i,nied to withstand. (See Blindaj^'-es, p. 21.) 
 
 Enfilade and ohliqttc Jirc. — 
 
 Protection a^'-ainst entilade hre is principally obtained by so 
 tracing the work that the prolon<,^ations will fall on points inac- 
 cessible to the enemy. If this method is not feasible cover can 
 be obtained as follows : — 
 
 Wiicn the men are tirin;^^ 
 (r) Traverses. 
 (2) l]linda,!<es — limited use as in the case of curved hre. 
 
 When die men are not tiring. 
 
 (1) Traverses. 
 
 (2) The blindages used for curved lire will generally alsf) give 
 protection. 
 
 l\c verse Jin'.— 
 
 Hoth when the men are hring and when they are not liring. 
 
 (i) Traverses — generally called parados in this case. 
 
 (2) IMindages. 
 
 (j) Deep trenches. 
 
 Screens. — If the want of time or means prevents the erection 
 ot suitable cover, a simple screen may be put uj). Although 
 not bullet-proof it will hide the defenders from the enemy antl 
 make it diflicult for the latter to take aim. 
 
 4. Juisy lueans nf access to Jiri)i^i^' positio)!. — This is effected by 
 means of slopes of earth, ramps, steps, and occasionally ladders. 
 
 Description of the various icorks suitable for the Infantry shoolini^^ line. 
 liartJien parapets. 
 
 Shelter trenches, Jj NG I'\ -Fn.m Tabic A it will !.<• aeon that at loni; nm^'os 
 (•JOOO yds.) iiiu.skctry falls \ (ir has what is tt'iiiKjil a ^'icat searching jidwit. Shrai)- 
 iifl has also this [iowt r. Aj,'ainst siiuh tire tlie shallow troiiclH'.s (Figs. 2, .3 ami -I 
 I'L I. !•'), ;,'ivi" little (ir ii" proteitioii, and the tendency is, therefoit!, to einiiloy 
 deeper treiiehes or to put uii '■liiillet-proofs. " Major Fraser, ]{.K , says: "....l.e- 
 fore the war of ISTO, no one had tliought practically of the ellects and results of lony 
 ranue tire; and eonseinu iitly, hy way of not impeding the oH'ensive, very small and 
 
 shallow trenches were i.roposed. In KS70, an.l stilt more in I.S77, necessity s i 
 
 L'ave hirth to a deeper type, an<l one no longer continuous, so that the gaps formed 
 the lines of a.lvance for guns and Cavalry short lengths of the trench pro- 
 vided with o]>en 'hullet sheds' or hurdle arches (Figs. 1 and '2, \\\>\ V\,, 1«) ^vill 
 screen the defender when not actually shooting If the line lie hut little ex- 
 posed to shells a hurdle roof will protect men while tiring against droppini' niusketrv 
 or shrapnel bullets. 'f »i n 
 
 * Drawn hy the Cadets. 
 
 tUold Me.lal Kssay. K.l'.S.l. 
 
;;£;. 
 
 i8 
 
 rsi' ()!• lli;i.i) lOKiii'KArioN i;^- iiir; |)|;ii;nc,i;. 
 
 I'.rcasl works, ;s' M) !•, I'ij,'. .,, I'l. 1, I". 
 
 L;u;^c'r caitlicii parapets will he cDnsidcrcd iiiukr the head 
 of I'ield-Woiks. 
 
 W Odd I'll pdi'dpcts. 
 
 Stockades, Jj|^ ii(S, in^, i_'o, I<\ 
 
 l.iy^ parapets, ^ iji !•". 
 Hurdle parapet, see V'v^. j, V'V. PL, !'■. 
 Defensible hedf^es, ^ 104 l'\ 
 Defensible icalls, ^ 105 I'. 
 Miseellaiienus. 
 
 h'mhankmeuts — cuttiiif^s —roads — palin,t;s- ^^ lot) V. 
 
 liarricades. Jj loi I"". 
 
 C ask parapets. An i xcclU'iit piirapct ;ij,';iiiist iiHiskt'fry i-:\n ln' f(iiiiic(l liy nicaiis 
 lit' li.iiicls or tasks lilliMl with earth. Ildiily (nu- liaiifl liii;h samllia,!,' l(Hi|(iiiilcs or 
 hcail loixs should he aihh'd. If two liairels hii.'h it will he I'oiiin! tiiat siiiall ojieiiin^s 
 are left lietweeii the barrels t'oriiiiii',' eaiiital !oo]iholes. A hetter |)aia|iet can he made; 
 hy usiii;,' two rows of easks hreakiiij; joint. I'"ij;s. land."), I'M-". I'l,. P, i^ive two 
 exaniiiles of ea.sk iiarapets. 
 
 invKi! I'oi: rnK isrANim si i'I'okis. 
 
 The eoiiditioiis are — 
 
 I. ("o\er from tlu~ enemy's lire ii)riiiei[)ally cur\ed.) 
 
 J. .\mi)le means of e.\it. 
 
 J. Une.xposed comnnmieation hetween tlu- sn|)ports and shoot- 
 
 ini 
 
 ime. 
 
 Since the cover for snpjHirts is not siihject to the condition of 
 t)l)tainin,i,^ a clear view of the enemy, the lield of choice for sites 
 will he much lar,y:er than for the works to cover the shootinj.; line, 
 ami hence the natmal featnres of the i.;ronnd, for instance — 
 
 I'olds of the ,!^n-oinid woods — sunken roatls hed;;es (screen 
 only if untouched) houses — 
 will ot'"teu afford the iiecessar\- cover. 
 
 l)iit tailing- the al)o\e recoinse must he had to artificial cover. 
 This artilicial co\er must be desij.^ned in accordance with the 
 above conditions, the lirst of which is fiillilled as ahead}- exj^laiit- 
 ed for the shootinj,' line (when the men are not iirinj;), and the 
 last two as follows : — 
 
 2. .\/c'(///,s- (»/ t-.v// are proxided — • 
 Hy Ramps or steps. 
 Hy leavint; the ends open in the case of blinda^U'S. 
 
 \. rnexposed eontmiDiieatinii belweeii the supporis aud shooting line. 
 The ,i;romid may offer coveretl or at an\' rate screened commiini- 
 
 * Drawn hy the Cadets. 
 
CI:. 
 
 I the llLiul 
 
 iiic(l liy nicaiis 
 ; l(Hi|i|iiih's or 
 iii.ill ii]i('iiiiij;.s 
 
 ('.111 lie iiiadi; 
 
 I \ ^ivi: t\V(i 
 
 uul slioot- 
 
 iiditioii of 
 ' for sites 
 otiii,i; line, 
 
 ice — 
 
 es (screen 
 
 ial cover. 
 
 with the 
 
 y e\i>hiin- 
 
 , and the 
 
 :onununi- 
 
 
 I'Ki.i'Ai^MioN oi coxi'iv', f;i:Ni;K.\i. i'i<i\(in.i;s. kj 
 
 cation l»it\\t'en the snppiuts and shootin;; line, for instance, hol- 
 lows and woods, or when the ^nonnd slopes npwards from tin- 
 snppoits to the shootinj,'' line (such slopes are often exposed, how- 
 I'ver, to a sw•ee|)in,t,^ iniaiined tire). It may sonu.'tinies be neces- 
 sary to make trenches for this pnrpose ; tlii'\' may he traced in 
 /i^-/a;;s or else blinded, as shown in I'i;;. 2, I'M-', i'l.. 11.* (This 
 condition is niniecessary in the case of iMcld-Works. for then the 
 sliootin;^ line and snpports are close toi^cther.) 
 
 Dcsiriptuni oj the vayioiis works siiildhlc fnr liifaiitry snpparls. 
 
 Dfif Ironlics. Available a;^ainst direct lire when open and 
 against cnrved lire when blinded. Im^;. i, I'M'". I'l.. II.* 
 
 Ihillct-piuuifs. Imj,^s. j and 4, I'M''. I'L. 11* show two descrip- 
 tions of bnliet proofs made durinj; the Kiisso-Turkish war of 
 1.S77-7S. 
 
 Ficld-cascDuitcs can either be placed - 
 
 In the open. ^ \z\ V , I'^i-s. 5 and 4, TL. .\.\, V and h'i-s. 1 
 and 2, PL. .\.\I. I'\ 
 
 r.ehind j.arapets. This will be considered under the head of 
 l-ield-W'orks. 
 
 (uVKIl Fi)i; rinc INFANTUM If KSKKX KS. 
 
 The sanu- conditions obtain as for the su|)pr)r(s, and the}- can 
 !>e hdfilled in a similar manner. The cover may, however," be of 
 a much sli-ht('r nature. .As a rule, natural cover will IxMound ; 
 but, if not, artilicial cover should be made'. 
 
 I'i^-. 5, IM'\ PL II*- shows a bullet-shed for reserves i'mi)lo\cd 
 in the war of i>S77-7.S. 
 
 (■o\ i;ii Kiiii in'ss. 
 
 The j^nin, the (hitachnient and the amnninition sliouM be cov<-r- 
 ed. The conditions are — 
 
 1. Facility for delivery of fire, 
 
 2. Cover from the enemy's fire. 
 
 3. Facility for movin^,^ the '^\\\\ in or out of cover. 
 
 I. Facility for the delivery of fire or servinj^-- the ,i;im. — \ <,qm 
 when placed under cover can either lire - 
 
 (1) Over the crest of the parapet. The .^tni is then said to 
 
 be " en barbettt!." 
 
 (2) Throu.i^di an eud)rasure. 
 (j) Through a ^Minport. 
 
 The surface on which the ^nm stands should be as hard as pos- 
 sible, and therefore, if time and materials admit, platforms are 
 laid down. 
 
 * Drawn by the Cadets. 
 
I 
 
 2() 
 
 rsic oi- i-ii:i.l) if)RTiFicATK)\ nv Tin-: ni:i-i:NTr. 
 
 i , 
 
 'I'lu' (l(;t;u:liineiit should as far as j)ossil)lc be scitciKHl whilst 
 workin;^' tiic '^uu. 
 
 The site ol the work should be so chosen that there is no difii- 
 culty in ai^liu^^ This does not necessarily mean that the object 
 fired at need be seen from the f^un, for raised si^^hts can be used 
 or tile ;^un can be sijj^hteil l)y a mark, altliou;^h it is seldom that 
 the Defence will be able to have recourse to tiiis metiiod of fn"in^^ 
 
 When not re(]uired for some special purpose the j^nm should 
 have a larj^^e sweep so as to be able to lire in any direction re- 
 (piired. 
 
 2. Cover from the enemy's fire. — The detaclnnent can be covered 
 in a similar manner to the Infantr\- shootin/j^ line, but no ])rovi- 
 sion need be made for the deliver'- of iruisketry lire. 
 
 Protection for the ;^mui is obtained In- mcjans of — 
 a. Natural cover, either untouched or improved. 
 /;. I'larthen parapets. 
 c. Wood or iron stockades. 
 il. IMindaf^^es. 
 
 Protection of the Ammmiition is ^^auierally obtain(;d b}- makinj,'- 
 recesses or small ma;;a/iues well coxered aj^ainst slu'll lire, into 
 which the ammunition or the limber boxes can be put. 
 
 The statistics of 1870 s]u)w that the loss to Artillerv is -Minci- 
 pally confined to horses and men, and that the injur\- done to the 
 " materiel" is snudl. It would ai)pear, therefore, that it is far 
 more important to cover the detachments than the j^uns. 
 
 J. luicilily fiir iii(yviii<^ the ^un in or out of cover. — When the 
 .qround on which the j,ani stands when in tlie hrin;^'- position is 
 either lower or hi;;her than the natural surface of the j^round or 
 in somi cases than the terreplein of a Work, ramps must be 
 made to enable the f^un to be run in or out of cover. 
 
 Descripliou (f the various icorks siiitalde for covering Artillery. 
 
 Miitural eover—^ 104 l'\ V'l'^. 6, PI.. IX, b\ 
 
 ^ 106 I', Pij^s. 7, S and (J, PL. XII, F. 
 
 liarthen parapets — Oun pits and j^^in epaulments sin<,dy or con- 
 nected into batteries — ^ iS(j V. (inns placed in b'ield- Works will 
 be treated of mider that head. 
 
 Stockades — ^^ 121 F. 
 
 lUi)i(la!^'es — Jj 124 F. 
 
 COVKl! KOli I.lMliKHS AMI SMAIJ, Ali.Ms' AM MlMl'ION (Ali'lS. 
 
 The conditions are — 
 
 I. C'over from the enenn-'s lire. 
 
:i\v(\ whilst 
 
 is no (lifli- 
 . the ()l)jc(t 
 ;ui l)c used 
 L'ldoin that 
 ifl of fn■ill^,^ 
 
 ^uii sliould 
 ircction rc- 
 
 I)C rnvcrcfl 
 : IK) provi- 
 
 PKKPAKATION OF CfU'KK, HASTY IXTRKXCHNrKyTS. 
 
 21 
 
 I)}' inrikinf,'' 
 1 lire, into 
 
 ■ is •>vinci- 
 lone lo the 
 it it is far 
 
 is. 
 
 When the 
 position is 
 .ground or 
 s must he 
 
 ■lillci 
 
 TV. 
 
 ly or con- 
 Yorks will 
 
 2. Means of entr\' and e.xit. 
 
 J. Unexposed coninHUiication to the point where the sui)pl\- 
 ol aninuniition is re<juired. 
 
 Natural cover should be sou^dit for in the tirst instance, h'ail- 
 inj4' this, artificial cover ouj^ht to he made. 
 
 1. Ci'vcr from the oicDiy's /ire. — ('civer from direct lire can he 
 obtained In- di,i,^,i,nn^'- a pit throwin,^- the earth towards enemy's 
 side. 
 
 ("over from curved tire can be obtained by blindinf,^ and 
 althouj^h not s^enerally done now. may have to be done in future. 
 
 2. Means of entry ami exit when recjuired are provided b}- ramps. 
 
 /,. I'nexpused eoiimiiiiiieatio)! to the point -n'here the supply of ammn- 
 lutioii i\ reij II i red. —This condition can be fuUilled as explained in 
 the case of Infantry supports. 
 
 J)eseriptioii if the icorks siiitahle for coveriiii^ Limbers or Auvnunition 
 
 Carts. 
 
 1. For Limbers — ij N9 F, (Service of Ammunition.) 
 
 2. Vox- Ammunition Carts— j? 8N F, (Shelter for Ammunition 
 (^irts.) 
 
 CONKli Mil! CANAI.liV. 
 
 Cavalry owin;^^ to their mobility can always find natmaj cover. 
 They have a wide Held of clu)ice and besides which the labour 
 would be enormous. No artiHcial cover is therefore provided for 
 Cavalry in Field l-'ortitication. 
 
 1 ( AST V 1 X T K H N C H M i: N T S . 
 
 It lias already been noticed that the time available lias a ^^-reat 
 inlluence on the nature of the works erected. The works ad:r])t(>(l 
 to the case when the time is very short are called " Hastv In- 
 treiichments," and the questions of " how" and "where" to inake 
 them and also how to attack them may be said to form one of'the 
 k'ailin- military subjects of the day. '^ This increasinj,' importance 
 of "• Hasty Intrenchments" is due to the eflects of modern tire- 
 arms to.uether with the rapidity with which armies now move 
 It may be said rou-hly that all works that take less than 4 hours 
 to execute may be classed as •' Hastv Intrenchments." See 
 :'>ection J, I'. It must be observed, howeVer, that sucii works can 
 be and are employed, in connection with more substantial works 
 when plenty of time is available. 
 
 liLINDAGKS. 
 
 The introduction of modern lire-arms j^neatly increased the 
 
 "See p. r)<)-(i5, Vol. Iir, H.E. Institute, Occasional papers. , 1- . .fclu •^^Ki if. 
 
^ 
 
 22 rSF. Ol' lir.I.D lOKTIIICATION HV Ttli: DF.I' F.NCr' . 
 
 ;i('ciii;i('\ ;iii<l iiilnisily i>f <ui\i(l i\\\\ ;ui(l a better iic(|uaintaiiCL' 
 with tluMii has still further increased this power. The eoiisc- 
 (lueiire is, a hnj^u- ih'Nclopiiieiit of blinded rover. This was very 
 noticeable in the l'"iaii(d-{ ii^rnian war of icS^o 71, but still more 
 so in the Russo-Tnrkish war of I1S77-71S. •• 
 
 This bein;^' thi' case the construction of blinded cover requires 
 to bi' considered somewhat in detail. 
 
 'I'lic (lilli'iviit kiiiils wtii' classi'cl at \>. 17 aw lioiiilijiroofH or Slifll-]ir(if)f.s, Splintcr- 
 pritofs .iinl I'lilli't-inoiit's. ami tlicy arc' ^.'ciicrally iiiadc liy placing' an ('artli-cu\ crt'd 
 I'ddf over a ticiicli ii'ctaiiijiilar nr tu'aily sd in section. Imt it placcil aj^aiiiHt banks or 
 steep slopes of cartli (Kii,'. I, l*L. XXI, K) a yreat savins,' of earthwork will l>e ellected, 
 tlie (li-aina;;e will lie liettc r, and perfect |irciteotion against ilireid tire will he ohtained. 
 W'luai not so placed this [irotectioii is ol)taine<l hy an urtilieial mound of <'artli (st-e 
 Ki«H. 1, •-', :{an<14, PL. .\.\, K.) 
 
 r.liiKhiges consist of three piincipal parts, namely, the supports, the roof and the 
 roof covering. 
 
 'I'lu! Sii/)iiiirfs are generally made of timber eith(;r ,s(|iiaro or round, hut oceaHion- 
 ally earth, barrels, walln, etc., may bt: utilized. 
 
 Thiihcr Sii/i/iiii-t-!. Thcsi} are best made as rectangular frames consisting of a 
 horizontal l)eam called tli(^ "cap sill," which carrii^s the roof and which is supported 
 by vertical struts of timber called the "standards." To ))revent the feet of th(! stand- 
 ards sjireading or sinking into tli(- ground they are secured to a "ground sill" running 
 parallel to the cap sill. The gr<iunil sill is sonietinu's jdaced at right angles to the 
 cap sill, as shown in l''ig. I I'L. .\.\, F, and occasionally the feet of tlu; standards 
 are sunk in the ground, as in the alternative arrangement of the same Kig. 
 
 The. /'/vn/K.s' can either be ])laced transversely or longitudinally. When placed 
 transversely the cap sill is sujiported by only two standanls, unless not strong 
 eno\igh, wlien a central jirop may lie added ( Fig. I PL. XXII, P. ) Transverse frames are 
 ])Ia(ted at intt;rvals of from 4 to (i feet, according to the material available. Figs. 1 
 aiul 4, PI;. X.\, F, give examples of this arrangement. When placed longitudi- 
 nally the cap sill is carried liy several standards placed at intervals of 4 to (i feet. 
 Fig. .'$ i'li. .\.\, l\ gives an example. As a rule transverse frames arc much preft^r- 
 able, for the work is better tied together and is better al)le to resist the (!arth thi'ust, 
 and if the rooting material is long and cannot be cut they must be used to avoid 
 waste. If, however, there is no material foi- revetting the sides of the trench, and 
 the soil is not lirni, tlie sides will have to be sloped, in which ease it is better to 
 use longitudinal frauK's. (See I''ig. I PL. XXI, F. ) For splinter-jtroofs and ludlet- 
 jiroofs transverse fiames have the further advantage that they can be made before 
 placing in position. 
 
 The riiiiiiir/iiiii.-< are geneially made by means of spikes aiul dogs, but tenons are 
 rarely used. To j)revent the stan<lards slipping either cleats should be naile<l on to 
 the groun<l sill or the standards should be let in one or two inehes. The standards 
 should be let in to the cap sills in a similar manner. See fi 40/5, F. 
 
 Eiirtli siiii/,iirf.<. If the soil is still' the tindier frames nuiy be omitted for splinter- 
 proofs and bullet-proofs, but for the formei' the sides of the trench should be revetted, 
 as shown in l''ig. '2, PL. X.\, F. l''or bullet-proofs, however, no revetment is needed, 
 and even low mounds of made earth nuiy be used, as shown in Fig. 1, F. F. PL. Lt 
 A "wall ])late" should be laid on the earth to distribute the pressure, and on it can 
 be laid eithei' transverse cross beams to carry the rooting, or the rooting itself, aci'ord- 
 ing to the material availabli'. lOarth sui)iiorts are clearly specially suitable for bullet- 
 proofs, as a great saving of time and material is etlected. 
 
 MixcclltiniiiiiK ■•iiiiijiiirls. -These sujiports simply replace thi; standards, and the 
 cap sills can Ik* placed on them either transversely or hmgitudinally. Empty barrels 
 fiuiu good supports tor light blindages, but greater st.ibility and strt^ngth is obtained 
 
 *See p. :n!», .'{•_'(). Minor Tactics, by Lt.-C'ol. Clery, r»th Edition. 
 fDrawu by the Cadets, 
 
.— Ill I 111 «^ 
 
 (■(niaiiit.'iiice 
 
 'lilt; » (HISC- 
 lis was \(r\- 
 t still iiiorc! 
 
 ^'cr requires 
 
 roofs, Si)liiitci- 
 <':irtli-cuv(!if(l 
 iiiii.st hiiiiks or 
 nil l.c clifctfd, 
 ill lie i>l)tiiiiUNl. 
 1 of f'lirtll (.see 
 
 a! roof and the 
 
 but occasioii- 
 
 'oiisistiiii,' of a 
 1 is sii[)|)orte(l 
 t of the staiid- 
 il sill" riiiiiiiiit,' 
 iiiiyl(!s to the 
 the standards 
 
 Wlien placed 
 
 iss not strong 
 irse frames ari' 
 al)le. Ki>,'s. 1 
 jed lon<,'itiidi- 
 f 4 to (; feet. 
 
 nnieh prefer- 
 ■arth thrust, 
 
 isod to avoid 
 
 troueh, and 
 
 it is better to 
 
 s and Imllet- 
 
 niade before 
 
 lit tenons .are 
 nailed on to 
 le standards 
 
 for splinter- 
 be revetted, 
 it is needed, 
 F.F. PI.. I.t 
 lid on it can 
 self, aecord- 
 le for bullet- 
 
 ds, and the 
 
 npty barrels 
 
 is obtained 
 
 l'Ki:i',\l<.\ri()N (»l' CnNT-.K. Mil M ».\( . !• S. I'lANKS. 
 
 2.5 
 
 by lillin;,' them with earth, and l»y iiNin,_; stron;; wall pl.ttrs the wiii^lit can lie distil 
 buted over seveial barrelx. Tlie bottoms ui tlu' barrels should be knock< d out to 
 H'wv, them ii ;,'o(id j,'rip of the earth, and it is also adsisable to ilrive loni; pickets for 
 the same purpose. If a «all is used .'is one support the cap sills must be placed 
 transversely. Suo Fig. .'<, I'L. \.\l, I'. 
 
 liiii;/'. The roof itself consists of one or nioie layers of timber (round or sipiare), 
 f.'vsciiu's or railway rails placed across tlut ca]) sills either separately oi condiiued. 
 See Fi^'s. attached to jj \'2'.i F. The rooting can be iitili/ed to secure tlu' fr.imes by 
 fastening it occasionally with spikes, dogs, etc, to llie cap sills. The eartli should 
 l)e jireveiited from falling through the small openings that arc alw;iys left in tlu; 
 rooting by means of a layer of thin planks, canvas, grass, etc. The roofs of bullet- 
 proofs can be made very light; planks are suitable, ami also arched hurdles or sheet 
 iron. 
 
 Until' iiii'iriiiij. The idof covering shoulil, it possible, lie of such a thickness as to 
 jirevci the roof being injured by the projectiles against wliicii tlu- blindage is 
 intended to give protection. 
 
 In the Field the roof covering m ill generally lonsist of earth, but if scarce it may 
 Ije replaced entirely or partially by timlier. r;dlway rails oi' even stones, if tiicse 
 materials .arc available. 
 
 liiifk struts. If the back of the blindagi; is ojien back struts will iia\c to lie 
 ]ilaccd to resist the pressure of the e.iith, as shown ni Fii;. I I'l,. \.\I, F. It trans 
 verse frames are used it will be sullicient to place a back strut against every secon.l 
 or third frame. 
 
 Sliiit'niij iij f'lilis. I'nless the soil is very still' thi' .--ides of the trench slioidd be 
 revetted, and this can 1k' best done by slippim; sheeting behind the standards. .See 
 FigS' I. •■* i""l ^. I'b. XX, F. 
 
 Eiitrniifi s. If the lilindage is open . it the back thire is, of course, no need to 
 ]irovide sjpccial entrances, but otherwisi' r;im]is or steps at intervals aloiiir the length 
 or at the ends should be made. See Figs. I, -J and 4, I'L. W, ami Fig. 'J, I'L. XM, F. 
 
 Ih'iiiiKiiJi, \'i iitihitiiiii, I Ir. The dr.'iinagc should lie very carefully attended to, 
 and in some cases, w ith sunken trenches, it will be a dilHcult operation. Tiie ventila- 
 tion and lighting should also be seen to. 
 
 J^etails of stores and working parties are given in j; l'_'l{ 1'".* 
 
 1I-.\.\KS. 
 
 A work or j)art of a work so traced that the lire proeeediii.L,' 
 from it takes the enemy in Hank as he advances is called a I'dank- 
 inj; work or simjily a " I'lank." 
 
 These flanks are foimd to In,' of the ;,n('atest imi)()rtance in the 
 close ti-;ht when a stubborn resistance is intended, because the lire 
 thus brou^dit to bear on the enemy is most effective in its natm-e, 
 and also because in s(Mne cases the tire from the work attackecl 
 is j^Tcatly diminished in value at close ([uarters (tlefensible walls) 
 or even becomes valueless (when the eiiemv ;.,^ets into the ditch 
 of a iMeld-W'ork, for instance). lint thinks are clearl\' of no use 
 unless the enemy can be cJiakcd i.'hcn under their Jirc. " T\\v\ are, 
 therefore, ai)plicable to walls and stockades, for instance", but 
 not to shelter trenches unless obstacles arc; i)!aced in front of 
 the trenches. 
 
 *The description of some trials of Shell-proof cover will l)e found in \u\. III. 
 K.E. Institute, Occasional papers. "' 
 
p^ 
 
 24 USK f)I- III.LI) roKTlFICATION 1!V I IIH DKFKNCi:. 
 
 The casL'S in wliicli tlaiikiiij,' works may be r('(|iiirf(l an: — 
 
 1. 'Vd Hank tlu- j^toikuI in front of a shootiu},' line. 
 
 2. To Hank a ditrli. 
 
 5. To flank a line of obstacliis (natural or artificial,) 
 
 Rcquiyoitcnis. — A Hank may contain Infantiy oi' Artillir\- or 
 both combinctl. They must, therefore, be desi^^Mied accordiii;; to 
 the re(|uirenient.s enumerated iindti those heads. The followin;^^ 
 points should also be specially ;i,ttended to. 
 
 1. I'^lanks should be in a serviceable condition when tin; close 
 attack is bej^un. ICxtra stren/^th and care nmst, tlu:refore, be 
 devoted to their construction. 
 
 2. They are ^'enerally exposed to enfilade fire. They should, 
 therefore, be well traversed, and frefpiently blindin.i,' will ha\(! to 
 be resorted to. 
 
 \. It should be difficult for tin- enemy to ca|)tur(! or silence 
 them. This can be effected by keeping,' them in retired positions, 
 or if this cannot be done by constructing,' them substantially and 
 rentleriu},' them difficult to assault. 
 
 4. The j^'arrison of flanks must remain to the last. Secure 
 means of retreat should therefore be provided. 
 
 DcHcripiion of the various ivorks suitable for l-'lanlis. 
 Flanking works may be divided into two classes, naTliely : 
 
 Ordinary shootiuf,' line parapets so traced as to fire in the re- 
 quired direction. 
 
 Special small works placed so as to flank lon/^' lengths of walls, 
 hedges, ditches, etc., called Tambours and Caponiers, Only the 
 second class need be described. 
 
 Tambours, ^ 122 F. — The tambours described in jj 122 F would 
 recpiire such a considerable time for their construction that they 
 are not suitable for b'ield I'ortification. 
 
 Caponiers. — The caponier shown in b'ig. 4 PL. XX\, U, is suit- 
 able for flanking walls. Other special flanking works belonging 
 to Field- Works will be considered under that head. 
 
 l-OKTIl'ICATION Ol' Till': STRONCI I'OINTS OF A I'OSI'I'ION, AND Ol- 
 
 isola'J"f:i) posts. 
 
 It has already been seen that certain points in a Position re- 
 (juire to be strongly held, and they were classed as follows : — 
 
 1. Advanced posts. 
 
 2. Tactical pivots of the main lines of defence. 
 
 . \ 
 
[•i:. 
 ;ili:- 
 
 \itill(iy or 
 :c()r(liii^ to 
 (J following 
 
 II tin.' close 
 crcfoic, br 
 
 If}- sIiouUl, 
 ill li;iv(; to 
 
 or silence 
 1 positions, 
 utiaily and 
 
 ;t. Secure 
 
 ■VS'. 
 
 liely : 
 in the re- 
 
 is of walls, 
 Only the 
 
 2 V would 
 that they 
 
 V, is suit- 
 
 ;, AND ol- 
 
 ositu)n re- 
 )ws : — 
 
 M 
 
 PKi:i'AKATI()N Ol (OVI.K. I Ill-D WoKKS. 25 
 
 And to these must he added a third class, namely : — 
 J. Isolated posts. 
 
 These defensible posts will contain Infantry (Shootin;^ line, 
 Supports and Reserves), and occasionalls' Artiller\- ; the\ nnist, 
 therefore, be desi^'ned accordin;,' to the c-onditions enunuiatcd in 
 tiie precediuf^ paj^'es unch-r these heads. In fact these works are 
 for till' most part combinations of those pieviously considered. 
 
 Hein;^' tiie stronj,' points of a Position they must be capable of 
 niori' or less obstinate and stubborn defence, according,' to their 
 situation, importance and object, and will therefore bi- di'sii,MK'd 
 foi- a passive defence, the active part of the defence beinj; left to 
 the outer troops. 
 
 These defensible posts often take the form of earthworks of 
 stroni; profile called " h^ield-Works," but if a lar;^^e house or a vil- 
 hif^'e or a small wood are tactically well placed they can be trans- 
 formed into defensible posts with far less labour than iMeld 
 Works can be executed, ami further, are capable of defence of 
 some sort at any time. The shape of the ;,Mound may also be such 
 as to enable an earthwoik of slij,dit j^rolile, when assisted by 
 Obstacles, to f,'ive all the streiif^tli recjuired ; such posts ma\ be 
 called " Defensible Knolls." 
 
 The strou},' points of a Position and Isolated posts ma\- tlure- 
 fore consist of either of the following,' : 
 I. I'ield-W'orks. 
 -i. Defensible Knolls. 
 
 J. " Houses, Farmsteads or \'illaf,^es. 
 
 4. " Woods. 
 
 i"ii:i.n WORKS. 
 
 Two nuiin parts have to be considered — the Trace and the 
 Prohle. 
 
 TRMK. 
 
 I-'ield-Works are divided into clt)sed, open and half-closed. 
 § 114 F. ^ 
 
 Names of the various parts of the trace. ^114 I"". 
 Rules of trace. §> 114 F. 
 
 Names };iven to various works according; to the nund)er of sides 
 they possess. § 115 F. 
 
 J'HOFII.K. 
 
 Definitions and names of the various parts. § loS 1". 
 
 Connnand — How determined, and j^^eneral considerations. 
 § log F. 
 
cr 
 
 ir-7 
 
 26 
 
 USK n|- III I.I) I ((Kill ICATIoN MV Till: DI'.rF.NCE. 
 
 Direct Fire- 
 Curved Fire 
 
 Fiifihule I''ire- 
 
 'i'lit' lici^-^lit of |);ii;i|)(l should be sutticietit to (Ujiladc, that is, 
 sciccii the interior of the work from any ^^Mouud within ran;,'e 
 which the cneiiiy uii}.,dit occupy; '^'^ 141. 14^ 1". Tiie ri'(|iiiied 
 hi'i^dit of ])ara|)(!t may also be found by means of Descriptive 
 (leometry, as explained in that Course. 
 
 The j^arrisons of I-'ichi-Works are protected from tire, as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 The Parapet. 
 
 1. Rear treticii. jj no l'. 
 
 2. P>linda;,'es. § 12,^ 1'. 
 
 -r. Traverses. § i2() 1'". 
 2. Hliiida;^'es, as above. 
 Reverse I'ire — i. l^irados. '^ 142 l'\ 
 2. Blindaf^'es. 
 
 Wiliirc (if the profile to he used for the rarioiis sides if a lueld 
 redoiiht. -}\n precise rule can be /^iven and each case must be 
 considered on its own merits, bearinj,'^ in mind the various recpiire- 
 nu'Uts. Cieiieiall}' S|)eakin;;, however, the Junes tirinj,^ directly 
 towards the enemy, bein;.,'^ most e.\i)osed to Artillery fire, will re- 
 (piire the thickest and hi},diest i)arapets. and it will j^-^eiierally be 
 found convenient to place the necessary splinter-proofs behind 
 these faces. I'i^^^s. () and 7. PL. XIII. i and ^, PL. XX, and 
 -', PL. XXI, I"' ;^dv(' suitable profiles. 
 
 The faces flankinj; nei^dibourin;^^ works, or more properly the 
 I'liiitks, will, as a rule, only be exposed to obli(|ue Artillery iire, 
 and will not j^^enerally, therefore, recpiire very thick parapets. As 
 a rule, also, they will not re(]uire much command, and if kept low 
 the front faces will helj) to traverse them. A rear trench will 
 p.MieralK' be jnefcrable to splinter-proofs. 
 
 The manner of closinj,^ the Gori^e will depend on the stubborn- 
 ness with which the work is to be defended. I'or atlvanced 
 works the ^"orj^^e may be li;ft open or merely closed with obstacles 
 (abattis, palisades, etc.). to prevent capture b\ a sudden rush. 
 
 l-'or works in the lirst or second line of deA'nce the j^-^or^^e will 
 f^enerally re(iuire nnisketry parapets, and for the first line it 
 should be possible to render the Gor<(c untenable by the Artillery 
 of the second line if the enemy captures the work, a condition 
 which ma\' also api)ly to the second line if tiiere are works in 
 rear. Shelter tri'uches, lif^dit earthen parapets iI'i},^s. 9 and 10, 
 PL. XIII, F), stockades [Vv^s. i and 2, '.'L. XVII, F), lof,' 
 breastworks (Fij^s. 5, 6 and 7, PL. XIX, F), and similar parapets 
 are suitable. 
 
 Reserve works and Isolateil works will have the same or nearly 
 the same parapet all round. 
 
( K. 
 
 (/(', tliiit is, 
 it hill iaii;,'c 
 11' rcfiiiircd 
 DL'Scriptive 
 
 iiL', as fol- 
 
 (/ ii Field 
 ;(.; must bt; 
 »iis ri'(Hiirc- 
 v^ directly 
 ic, will rc- 
 e tie rail}' be 
 ofs bcliiiul 
 .. XX, ami 
 
 "opLily the 
 illcry tire, 
 apcts. As 
 f kept low 
 reiicli will 
 
 stubborn- 
 advanced 
 obstacles 
 n rush. 
 
 j,^orj,'e will 
 rst line it 
 e Artillery 
 condition 
 works in 
 9 and lo, 
 
 F), loK 
 parapets 
 
 ; or nearly 
 
 I'RI'.l'AKATIoN ol ('()VI:K, III I.I> UoKKS. 27 
 
 Majnr KiiiH.T, K.i;., hhvh:' " 'I'lic way »f HciiriiiK tin- p-rncs of Ki.-l.l WorkH is 
 one ot tlif iiMint vixccl .lUrMtioiiH, l>»'(:iusr till' iiiiiditiniis aio irrt'(«iiM'iiiil>lt'. 'I'hf 
 (Ict't'iHliT uiiiitfi to iii.iki' it us ilillifiilt iis |MiNnililc till- tilt' uHHiiiliiiit to iivi 111, jiikI as 
 uany lis iMWHiidc t<» iliivc iiiiii out mIkmiIiI \\v MiR'ii'cd in ciitiTiii;,'. " 
 
 To jniituct the (Iffciiilui-H (it till- piiKi! from revurHu liiv ;i iiiiiiidoM can In- tlimwii 
 up wliifli ciiii iilsci lie iitili/.td for H|)liiiti'r-|)roofH or ii di'i'p trench roofed over as 
 shown 111 Vi^. 1 !•". !•"., I'l.. I.t iiiiiy lu' fiiiidoyLMl, if looplioles uir iiit.-ii.ind. 
 
 HI'.KKNCK OK rilK |i||i|(. 
 
 The followiiif,^ arc; the different methods emploNcd for 
 in^' the ditches of l*'ield Works :— 
 
 I, Caponiers. § 125 l'\ 
 
 - J-:scarp j,'alleries. 1 ^^ ^^^^ y 
 
 (lelniij- 
 
 3. Counter-escarp j^'alleries. 
 
 4. I)(;fence from paraj)et. 
 
 5. Obstacles. 
 
 i; 
 I If) F 
 
 Considerin;^^ the smallness of th(> ditches of iMeld redoubts it is 
 very (piestionable whether the advanta/^'es j,suni'd by Cajioniers, 
 ICscarp and Counter-escarp j,'alleries repay the labour (Mitailed in 
 their construction. They are better suited for Semi-Permanent 
 Works. Defence from tlie para|)('t was nnich in use ix-fore the 
 introduction of brc^echloadiii},' rifles, but it is unsuitable now be- 
 cause it diminishes the efticienc}- of frontal tire, much intricacy 
 is introduced and much time and labour reipiired. It would 
 apjiear, therefore, that recourse must be had to obstacles. The 
 manner of doin^' this has already been explained. See ^,^ 91, (jf), 
 97, 9.S, and loj, F. 
 
 ARTII.LKKY. 
 
 Special arranj:,''cments must be made if ;^Mins are to be placed in 
 Field-Works. See H ij('-ijj I'. 
 
 There is a considerable diversity of opinion us to wliether it is advisalde to place 
 guns in redoubts or to place them in gun pits or epaulnients outsiile the redoubts. 
 * "As to the (juestion of jiutting guns in redoubts an Kuropean authority writiiij,' 
 this year argues tliat the Turkish use of redoubts at J'levna shows the soundness of 
 doing so ; that they successfully withdrew nearly all the guns out of the few works 
 that were captured, and that Skobelow showed he believed in the plan of mixed 
 
 defence because he brought several guns into one of the two works he took 
 
 As to the withdrawal of the guns it is dillicult to see how the possibility of 
 
 doing so is an advantage and nothing indicates the lieginning of the end more 
 
 ominously to the people who are to stay tliaii the withdrawal of the visible signs of 
 strength ; even were it not so it disorganized defence while it goes on, and it furth(!r 
 
 silences the guns at the time they may be most wanteil Tlie fact is that the 
 
 defence having chiefly moving marks to aim at, must, except in the case of an invtist- 
 ment, cimtine itself to the use of direct tire; and reipiires emiilaceiiioiits to permit of 
 a wide field of tire." 
 
 " The bulk of the defensive Artillery would, however, apfiear to be platted to 
 the greatest advantage in more retired and, if possible, more conimanding positions 
 between the decisive points, the close defence of wliich is chjetly an ailair of musketry. 
 Tile emplacemeut for these retired guns may be of the tield type, or, on very iiiipoit- 
 ant points closed and storm-proof gun batteries may be used. " 
 
 *(Jold Medal Kssay, U.IJ.S.I., Major Fraaer, R.E. 
 tUrawn liy the I'adets. 
 
^ 
 
 il '.. 
 
 28 
 
 rsi-: f)i- i-n:i.D i-ortiiication r.Y thI': ni:i'i:N-CF.. 
 
 ■ '■ III the cast; of 'imihilid imrLs expoHcd mi all siden tin; whole of tluiir iiioaus of 
 (lofiMU'i;, iiicluiliiii,' ijnim, mii.<l //<■ iiisii/f. When, howovor, it can l.e avoided, there ant 
 .several ruaHoii.s why the ^'tiris are hetter outside. I'"irst, the harhettes and traversex 
 cannot In; made in two or three reliefs, while the parapets eaii. Aj^ain, as there is 
 not enoiij,di int(;rior s]iace for teams and limbers the ^'uiis are tied to the works. The 
 stron^'est ohjt^etion, however, seems to he tiiat the attaeking guns ' kill two liirds 
 with one stone,' for while eni,'a;^ed in silencing the Artilleiy they eijuallj disable the 
 Infantry, niilt^ss there has heeii time to cover the latter very etlectiially; while, (lur- 
 ing the elos(; atta(;k, the guns in redoubts are less edicient than, and are only in the 
 way of, the Infantry <lefenders. In fact each arm is in the wrong place during one 
 stagi; of the attat;k." 
 
 .\<,uhi}u' i^itns :iri; most f.,^c'ncnill\- useful for Hdnkiii}.; ditches. 
 Sec Fi-. J VL. XX\III, F. 
 
 i{Kriii;.N(iiMi;.\r .wn kkki's. 
 
 Recjuired in iiii[)oitant works intended to be defended very 
 stul)l)ornI}'. '^ 127 F. 
 
 iii.<»KHoisi;s. 
 
 Those that ran l)e (]uickly constructed can he employed as 
 retrenchments for I"'ield-\Vorks. The huj^^er and stronj^^er ones, 
 especiall}' those desi^nied to resist Artillery, are not suitable for 
 l"'i(!ld l'^)rtiHcation on account of the time recjuircd in their con- 
 struction. Strictly, tiiey come under the head of Semi-Permanent 
 b'ortitication. Altoj.,'etiier it is (juestionable whetiier blockhouses 
 repa\' the labour and materials e.\j)ended on them. Jj 154 V, 
 
 MISCKr.l.ANKOIS. 
 
 I'lutranccs. -f liM 1''. 
 
 CaUulaiiim of liarihwork. — 5; 112 !•". 
 
 Si::: and (iarrismi o^ J'lcld-W'orks. — ■^ 117 V. 
 
 Ji.wciitioit.— In construt'tiu;,^ l-'ield-Works the foliowinj,' opera- 
 tions lia\i' to be performed and in tlu' order mentioni'd : — |- 
 Tracinjj; — §§ 399-400 I". 
 Protilint; ^> 401 and 141, 142, V (l)elilade.) 
 I Ivarthwork. 
 Kexettinj^. 
 ( Nrakin;.,^ blindaj^-'es. 
 Also in some cases Stockading', etc. 
 
 Jixamplc of lucid Rcdoiiht. ~i i 55 V. 
 
 si:i.i:( iioN ui- riii: sitk iok rii:i.i> wokks. 
 
 Till' (diaractt'ristics of a .i^'ood site for a b'ield-W'ork can be 
 deduced from the recjuiremeuts of cover for troops. 
 
 I. To obtain a cleat vicic if the otcDiy the ;.,M'onnd round the 
 work should bi- bare and even, especially in front and round the 
 sides ; if possible within effective ranj.,'e. A slij^dit fall away from 
 
 *'rh(' Pefeiiee of a Position. Hy Cajitaiii Fiaser, U.K. 
 
 + hetailed information will be found at p. SO to 84, liistruetioii in .Military 
 Engineering S. M. M. « 'hathain. I'artl. 
 
NCE. 
 
 tlioir nicaiiM of 
 .'(lidfd, thuroart; 
 s and traveraos 
 till, as there is 
 ;ho works. 'J'lie 
 ' kill two liirds 
 all J disable the 
 lly; while, dur- 
 are only in the 
 auu <lurinj,' one 
 
 illL^ (litclies. 
 
 "ended vei\- 
 
 inj:)!o\-ed as 
 ni<^vA- oii(?s, 
 suitable for 
 tlic'ir coii- 
 Peniianent 
 lorkhoiises 
 IJ4 F. 
 
 I'KllPAKA'l ION ()!•■ COVI-R, 1)H1'1:NSII3L1-, KNdld.S. 
 
 2Q 
 
 m 
 
 •A <^Knn- 
 
 "k can he 
 
 round tlie 
 loiind tlie 
 iwa}' from 
 
 in -Military 
 
 tin; work is an adxantaj^a- in tliis resjiect, as on a \vyv.] plane tlu- 
 sli;;lilL'st iiTf^iilarit}- j^nves cover. A slope fallin.i,^ towards the 
 work cxjxiscs tlu; cncni}- but reduces the eflect of lire, excej)! per- 
 haps at close ian,i;es. 
 
 2. I'dv ctrrcr the terre[)lein of the work should fall awa}- from 
 the front so that its plane passes above any j^n'ound within ranjji-e 
 that can be occupied by the (Miemy. If tliis re(iuirement cannot 
 be tidlilled the work will have to contain more traverses and 
 splintiM-proofs. In order that the men may not have to expose 
 themselves when lirinj.,' the slopes in front of the work shoidd not 
 be too steep : slopes of from 5" to 10 ' fnltil this and the former 
 refpiirement best. Lastly, the work should, if {)ossible, not be 
 commanded b_\' any <.,aound whicli the enemy can occupy."* 
 
 i)i:i'i:NsinLi-: knoi.ls. 
 
 As already mentioned, favorable positions for transforming' into 
 stron,-; points may be offered by the contij^uration of the f^Mound. 
 In such a case a slif^hter prohle than that necessary for a iMeld 
 Work can be employed, such, for instance, as the section j,Mven 
 in Fi--. (j, PL. I, F; an<l Vh^. i, V.V. PL. It would be suitable, if 
 loopholed, when overhead cover is required. In some cases 
 shelter trenches mij^ht prove suflkient. 
 
 The .t^eueral trace of such works will follow the principles laid 
 down for !• ield-W'orks, but in detail it will have to follow more or 
 less the sinuosities of the j^aound. The conhj^Mu-atiou of the 
 .ground should, if possible, be such as to make assault difficult, 
 but in most cases obstacles will have to be freely used.]: 
 
 i)i:fi:nsi]5i.I'; H()Usi:s and villac.hs. 
 Se(> §'^ 143-15') F.Jj 
 
 •For t'urtlu'r information on FieId-ri'doul)ts see - 
 
 !'. 'A:\, 'M, Defence of a Position, hy ("aittaiu Kraser, I! E 
 
 1'. •-".» ;W, Vol. I. It.K.I., Occasional i.ai.ers. 
 
 1'. 7;{-7!l, Vol. II, „ „ „ 
 
 P. (1.-) 7(». Vol. [11. „ „ „ 
 
 P. L>-'l '.':{.•{, Vol. V,„ „ „ (Pl„vna.) 
 
 P. 4.-) 4(;. .-).S. -.4, Vol. .Wiil. .lou.aal, R.l.S.I 
 
 P. :W0 .S!):-, Vol. .Will, Jo.unal, il.U.S.l 
 
 IDrawii liy the Cadets. 
 
 :;.!'. '2H, '2U, Vol. I, JM.;.!., Occasi.mal papers. 
 
 §For further information see 
 
 P. ."{0, ."{I, Defence of a Position, hy Cajitain Fraser, U.K. 
 P. 17 •-'(;, \'ol. 1, It. Iv r., Occasional papers. 
 P. I'.M '204. Pre.isof .Mod('rn Tacti.,s, l,y .Major Home, \l K. 
 I '-'(.S •'->. Minor Tactics, hy Lt.-Col. ( 'lery. .".tli Ivlition. 
 (.hap \ I'ortilication. l)y Lt.-Ctil. Philips, U.K. 
 
TT 
 
 30 
 
 iisr: ov iii:ld i-ortification by thk defencf.. 
 
 I)i;i"l':NSIliLL WOODS. 
 
 Sec ,§g 151-15.^ F.'- 
 
 I'liKl'AJiATIoy OF COMMUNIVATIOXS. 
 
 Object. — To facilitate tlic movement of the clefenders. 
 
 It is evident!}- of the }^neatest importance that tlio defenders of 
 a Position should be able, with ease, to move from pcwnt to point. 
 Part of this subject has been incidentally considered in the fore- 
 j^^oinj^f — such, for instance, as the coinmunica*^'ons between the 
 supports and the shootinjj^ line, the entrances to works, etc. 
 
 The nature of the },adund may be such as to require no prepa- 
 ration, but whatever is done in this respect will come under one 
 of the following,' heads : 
 
 Makinj^f or improvinj^ existin^^ roads. 
 
 Clearinjf roads throuf,di brushwood or woods. 
 
 Makiufj; roads over swamps or marshes. 
 
 Nfakinj,^ opcninj^^s in walls and hed^^^es. 
 
 lUowinj,' down houses. 
 
 I'illinj^' in ditches. 
 
 Bridj^Mnp: openings — such as large ditches, streams, rivers. 
 
 Cutting ramps. 
 
 Marking fords. 
 
 Tlu.'se are really pioneer duties, and the manner of canying out 
 the work will be considered under that head. 
 
 DEMOLITloy OF COMMUNICA TIOXS. 
 
 Object. — To impede the advance of the enemy. 
 
 For this purpose the following may have to be done : — 
 
 lireaking uj) roads and railways. 
 
 Demolishing bridges. 
 
 Deepening or obstructing fords. 
 
 If the comnuuiications to be destroyed can be of no use to the 
 defenders the demolition should take place at once, but if there 
 is a jiossibility of their being useful then they should only be pre- 
 pared for demolition. 
 
 These, again, are pioneer duties ; reference is therefore made 
 to that part of the subji-ct. 
 
 *Vw furtluT inforiiiatiim si'c 
 
 V. .S4, .'{r>, I K^fi'iici^ <if a I'oiiitidii, l)y (\iiit.iiii Kniser, Iv.K. 
 1'. If) 17, Vul. I, H.K.I., (»i(:isi..iiiil itiip.TH. 
 I*. KSrt 194, I'rwiH (if Modern 'riuticH, l>y Major Home, \\.\i. 
 i\ 'AH.l 'i!!'.), Minor 'ractiia, ))y Lt.-Col. C'leiy. ith Kdition. 
 
NCR. 
 
 TROOPS TO EXIiCUTJ-. THE WORK. 
 
 rs. 
 
 defenders of 
 iiit to point, 
 in the fore- 
 jetween tlie 
 s, etc. 
 
 e no prepa- 
 under one 
 
 s, rivers. 
 
 arryni^' ont 
 
 use to tlie 
 It if there 
 ily be pre- 
 
 "ore made 
 
 DiHTRinrTioy of tiik rnoopf; for the FXEcrriox of tiif wouk. 
 
 In the l^)ritisli service it has been decided l.)y authorit\- that the 
 Commanding' Royal Kiij^ineer. actin.i,' under instructions from the 
 General connnandin^'', will supervise all the works undertaken for 
 the defence of a Position, that the Infantry and Artiller\- will 
 execute the necessary works to cover tiiemselves, and that the 
 Knj^Mneers will be available to superintend and also tt) execute the 
 more technical parts. 
 
 Hence the work would be carried out as follows : 
 
 Clcariui^ the ij^roiDuL — The work would be executed and super- 
 intended by luij^nneers assisteil by Infantry workinj^^ parties. 
 Trained men should be selected for fellinj^-- trees. 
 
 Ohstaclcs. — Would be executed by Infantry under the superin- 
 tendence of Enj^Mueers. 
 
 Cover for troops. — Shelter trenches would be thrown up by 
 Infantry under the direction of their own officers, and in the same 
 way the Artillery would throw up the necessar\- f^nm-jiits or epaul- 
 ments ; but additional emplacements, if recjuired, ;^aui-batterit's 
 or limber-pits and the covt.-r for Infantry su])ports and reserves 
 vo'ild be undertaken by Infantry workin;^' parties superintended 
 ! Sappers. 
 
 The construction of b'leld-V.'orks and the fortification of vil- 
 laj^^es or woods would be superintended by ICn^^Mneers, who would 
 also furnish trained workmen for the execution of the technical 
 parts, and the Infantry would supply the iiecessary workinj^^ par- 
 ties for eartliwork, etc. 
 
 Prepur''tion and demolition of comniiDticdtiotis.— The work in these 
 cases bein;,' inincipally of a technical nature would be superin- 
 tended and executed by En},'-ineers, the Infantry providing,' work- 
 ing' parties, when refpiired, for earthwork, etc. 
 
 A ver\- ;,'oo(l ide;i of the amoimt and kind of work that can be 
 underti'.kon with various al!owan.cf>s of time will be obtained from 
 an extract ^rom Defence of a Position, by Captain b'raser, R.E., 
 },Mve!! in ^ "t «j V. 
 
rr 
 
 32 
 
 US1-: 0'<- FIELD FORTIFICATION BY THF I)i:i" ICNCi:. 
 
 
 « ' 
 
 APPLICATION TO THK fJHOUNI) OF THE WORK TO HE DONE FOR 
 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 GKSEUAL riilSCll'LES. 
 
 It is shown ill works on Striitcf^^y and Tactics that a Position 
 may be defended for cither of the following,' <)l)jects : 
 
 1. To shatter and tlcfeat the enemy by the k^ss incurred in 
 attackiiiff — Ordinary battletichls. 
 
 2. To liold the Position either to deny its possession to the 
 enemy, or else to keep him at bay for a time — Coveriiij^^ and con- 
 taininf,^ actions. 
 
 And it is also shown that tiierc are two kinds of defence, 
 namely, the Offensive -defensive and the Pure defensive, the latter 
 bein^' sul)divided into the Active and Passive defence. 
 
 In the Offensive-Defensive the defensive is maintained until a 
 favourable opportunity occurs for assumin;^ the offensive " en 
 masse." Application — ■ 
 
 Ordinary battle-he '■ Vv 
 
 In the Active defence the nsivc is maintained throu^diout the 
 
 action, but counter-strokes oii a limited scale are dealt whenever 
 a favourable opportunity occurs. Application — 
 
 Ordinary battle-fields, when the defenders are inferior 
 numerically or otherwise. 
 
 Lines of investment. 
 
 Defence of the environs of a fortress. 
 
 Defence of defiles, bridj^^e-heads, mountain jxisses. 
 
 Defence of Intrenched camps, depots. 
 
 Rear-j^niard actions. 
 
 In the Passive defence no counter-strokes are dealt, aud the 
 enemy's blows are simply parried. Application — 
 
 Localities, either as part of the defence of a Position (stron;^^ 
 points) or in exceptional cises when the localities are iso- 
 lated, for instance : Rorke's drift. 
 
 Now Field P^ortification, if judiciously employed, will confer 
 considerable advantaj^^^s to the defence, but if unskillfully used 
 the reverse effect may be produced. The solution of the problem 
 thus presented is by no means easy, and there are many tjues- 
 tions ui)on which considerable differences of opinion exist. All, 
 however, are aj^n"eed that the arranL:^enient of the li.'orks must conform 
 to the troops and not the troops to the xcorks. This is, in fact, a de- 
 duction from the ist Princijde of defence. It must not be over- 
 
 U 
 
iNCH. 
 
 APPLICATION TO THK GROUND, GENERAL PRINCIPI.I.S. 
 
 J.) 
 
 5K DONE FOR 
 
 it ;i Position 
 
 1 incurred in 
 
 L'ssion to the 
 "in;; and con- 
 
 ; of defence, 
 v, the latter 
 
 lined until a 
 ffensive *' en 
 
 ou^diout tile 
 lit whenever 
 
 arc inferior 
 
 s. 
 
 it, and the 
 
 tion (strong'' 
 :ies are iso- 
 
 will confer 
 ilifuily used 
 he |)rol)K ni 
 nany (jues- 
 exist. All, 
 uiist cdiifonii 
 fact, a de- 
 ot be over- 
 
 looked, however, that there is a reaction, that Tactics are intlu- 
 enced by l"'ield-b^)rtitication ; and ftu'ther, not only Tactics but 
 also Field-l'^ortitication is affected by niunerous minor circum- 
 stances. Taking' the whole of the above into consideration it 
 will be seen that it would be futile to attempt either to form rules 
 embracing; every case or to consider each case separately. Hence 
 the only course is to establish broad ;;eneral principles the appli- 
 cation of which must be made a special study in each case, as it 
 arises. 
 
 Since the arran^^ement of the works is to follow the arran^^e- 
 meiit of the troops that woulil obtain supposing no works were 
 thrown up, the first eiuiuiry must be how the three arms — Infan- 
 try, Artillery and Cavahy — ^should be j)osted when defc'iidin^^ a 
 Position. In works on Tactics it is shown that the following; 
 conditions should be fulHlled in defending' a Position : — * 
 
 1. To force the enemy to deploy early. 
 
 2. To subject the enemy to an effective fire as he advances to 
 the attack. 
 
 3. To provide means to prevent, if possible, the enemy break- 
 ing' throuj^h the line of defence if the tire does not stop him. 
 
 4. To provide means to cover a possible retreat. 
 
 In accordance with which the trooj-)s are posted as follows : 
 
 Ailvanccd pasts. — To force the enemy to deploy early small 
 bodies of Infantry and a few ^^uns are sent to the front to occupy 
 favourable points. 
 
 Infantry Shootini^ Line. — The men are posted alon^^ the further 
 border of the decisive points and at suitable places between these 
 points, thou;,di not /generally to form a continuous line. In fact 
 the tendency is to leave wide ^Mps and to concentrate the defence 
 about the stron<,' or decisive points, as this accords better with 
 the third condition and also tends to define the enemv's attack. 
 These stron;; points will be indicated in ^^eneral bv the features 
 of the ;.,a-ound, and the intervals between them will depend, there- 
 fore, not only on the tire-arms in use but also on the confi^Mua- 
 tion of the Position. 
 
 Infantry Snppurts.— They are formed up in small bodies and are 
 placed from 50 to 100 yards in rear of that part of the shooting' 
 line they are inti-ndi'd to U^c^]. Two classes of supports can be 
 distinguished, and they can be called the " immediate suj)ports" 
 and the "supports" respe(-ti\elv. 
 
 *For the evuluiuo finil rwiaons on which those comlitionH and their fuitillincnt 
 are ha-stMl, reference is nia(h! to the Course of Tactics. 
 
34 
 
 US1-: <)|- i-ii:li) FouriiicArioN r.v rui': di.fknci:. 
 
 f.oiiil reserves I Infoutry.) — These reserves are drawn up in more 
 or less compact l)odies of siifficivnt stren;^fth to be able to deliver 
 a powerful counter-stroke, and are placed about ^^oo or 400 yards 
 in rear of the slKjotinj^^ line. They are sometimes called "outer 
 reserves" wlien in connection with iMeld-Works, defensible vil- 
 laj^^es, etc. 
 
 Artillery . — ^Some of the '^\n\^ in action are massed in larj^'e bat- 
 teries s(j arranj^'ed as to concentrate the tire as much as possible 
 on the enemy's Artillery and Infantry, and the remainder are 
 |)lace(i so as to tire alonjj^ the lines of approach. In order that 
 the fire from the ;^'uns may continue until the enemy reaches the 
 Infantry shootinj,^ line and also that it may support the stron^^ 
 points, it is jj^enerally thouj^dit atlvisable to plac(.' them in rear of 
 the shootinj; line ; l)ut points from which the forej,a'ound can be 
 enfiladed, if secure from assault, should be occupietl. 
 
 Cavalry. — Apart from the outpost duties the Ca\alry should be 
 ready to deliver clunj^'^es when the opportunity offers. r\)r this 
 they should be kept in compact bodies as close as possible to the 
 j^Mound wiiere such char^^es may have to be delivered, but they 
 must be covered from the enemy's H.e. 
 
 General reserves. — These consist of a concentrated force of all 
 arms, and would be kept out of hre. The nund)er of such 
 reserves (le})ends on the extent and shape of the Position, but 
 wtndd not ;^^enerally exceed three. 
 
 (;1':n'i-:kal akkaxc.iimmn t oi' riii': works. 
 
 To deduce from the above the j^^eneral arrani^^ement of the 
 works to fortify a Position it should be observed that the intrench- 
 ments to cov^ r the Infantry shootinj^ line are the most important, 
 and that therefore on their situation will principally depend the 
 arranj^^ement of the other works of Glearin},^ obstacles, shelter for 
 sup[)orts and reserves, Artillery and communications. Hence 
 evidently the .y^eneral arran^^^ement of the works will In; as follows : 
 L-ocalities alon,;^^ the line of defence such, as villaj^^es, woods, or 
 knolls, will be fortified, or failinj,' these b'ield-W'orks will, if time 
 admits, be prepared, thus forminj,' fortified stronj^^ points. The 
 intervals between these strong; points will eitiier be left untouchetl, 
 or else shooting' trenches (seldom continuous) or obstacles may 
 be placed in tliem, accordin;^; to circumstances to be hereafter 
 considered. In these intervals, and j^^enerally retired, will princi- 
 pally be placed the Artillery covered by j^un-pits or .u^un-epaul- 
 ments, etc. To further complete the- defeiice advanced works 
 will in some cas(>s be prepared to cover the small parties of 
 Infantry and Artillery sent to the front. Lastly, a second or 
 even in some cases a third line of intrenchments, to act as a de- 
 fensive reserve Position, should if ])ossd)le be prepared on tiie 
 
NCE. 
 
 (;i: n'i;kai, AKi\.\Nc.i:Nfi':NT oi" 'riii. woi^ks. 
 
 -in 
 
 II up Ml niori; 
 )le to deliver 
 or 400 yards 
 :;dlc(l "outer 
 jfcnsiblc vil- 
 
 in larj^'c bat- 
 1 as jxjssible 
 niaindcr arc 
 n order that 
 reaches the 
 t the strouj^f 
 111 in rear of 
 DUiid can be 
 
 iiy should be 
 ■s. I'or this 
 )SsibU; to the 
 ed, but they 
 
 force of all 
 ber of such 
 .'ositioii, but 
 
 iieiit of the 
 
 he intrench- 
 
 t important, 
 
 depend the 
 
 s, shelter for 
 
 Ills. Hence 
 
 e as follows : 
 
 , woods, or 
 
 will, if time 
 
 )oiiits. The 
 
 t untouched, 
 
 )stacles may 
 
 be hereafter 
 
 1, will princi- 
 
 r ,i;un-epaul- 
 
 aiici'd works 
 
 parties of 
 
 ;i second or 
 
 act as a de- 
 
 )ared on the 
 
 same ])i iiicii)les ;is the first line of defence. 'I'hc second line 
 should, if the coiiti^Miration of the i^Monnd admits, be placed so 
 far behind the liist line as to be beyond effective musketry fire, 
 iianieK', not less than looo \ards. so that the eneni\- cannot use the 
 first line as a steppinj^-stoiie to take the second, and will therefore 
 have to commence a new attack ; this distance also j^reatly dim- 
 inishes the chance of the second line bein^' "rushed" after the cap- 
 ture of the first line. The second line should, however, be within 
 effective Artillery fire of the first line so as to assist in recajjturin;^^ 
 tlu! first line if taken. If the ^^aound is much covered with woods 
 the above conditions clearly do not appl}', and the second line 
 would then ^^enerally be placed closer. 
 
 The above arranf,''ement is known as " Lines a'///; Ijitcnuih.'" 
 The advairaf^^es of this arraiif^-'ement, irresi)i'cti\'e of its beiii}^^ the 
 natural outcome of the tactical requirements, will become appar- 
 ent on comparisf)n with the only other method of fortifyinj,' a 
 Position, namely, "'Continuous Lines."* It will then be seen that : 
 
 1. In Lines with Intervals the enemy's attack will be more de- 
 lined in direction, as he must capture one or mf)re stronj,-' points 
 before J)r()ceedill;^^ 
 
 2. In Continuous Lines the defenders will be weaker nunu'ri- 
 cally at any ;^nven ])oint than the attackers. 
 
 3. The time and materials required for Lines with Intervals is 
 considerably less. 
 
 4. Continuous Lines offer difficulties to counter-attack. Lines 
 with Intervals need offer none. 
 
 5. Lines with Intervals are more easily applied to irre/:,nilar 
 sites, and such sites are the rule, not the exception. 
 
 In fact when but a short time is available Continuous Lines are 
 out of the question. And yet prior to the Wars of the ImciicIi 
 Revolution they were preferred. The chan;^^e is principally (lue to 
 tiie increased power of fire-arms, so that now fire-tactics and not 
 shock-tactics have to \)v. provided for. 
 
 INKI.IKNC r. (iK IIIK KlNli (IK PKKKNI E. 
 
 The above f,^en(-ral arran.^i'ineiit of the works will obtain wlu^- 
 ther the action is to bi; offensi\-e-defensivt! or purely defensive. 
 What, then, is the infiuence of the kind of defence ? To answer 
 this fpiestion the manner in which the action is fouj^ht must be 
 considered, and, as will preseiitl}' be shown, it will thus be found 
 that the distance apart of the stronj; points, the treatment of the 
 
 *For iiifdiin.-itioii (III ('iiiitiiiuous Lines , ct! Klcmeiitary ('oursf (if Field and IVr- 
 iiiainiiit Kiirtilieatiiiii, by Lt. Col. I'hilips, 1{.K., Chap. Vlll. 
 
36 
 
 nsi'. ()!■ I'lKr.n roRTii-icATioN n\ thI': dicifn'ci:. 
 
 iniiiiodiatc forej^Motincl iind of the intervals hetwecn tlie stroiij; 
 j)()iiits and thv. nature of the works nill be the elements specially 
 affected. As re;,^ards tlu' natiiie of tin; works, however, the time 
 and means available will have a far j^^eater inlliience than the 
 kind of defence. 
 
 Offoisivc-Dcfcnsivc. — In this case the intention is to eiideavonr 
 to crush the (.'neniy by hre as he advances aj^ainst tlu; Position, 
 and then, when the favourable moment occurs, to become the 
 assailant and advance "en masse" to the attack. Evidently, then, 
 the works must offer no hindrance to this counter-attack. For 
 this the forej^nound must be free of obstacles either natural or 
 artificial, except round the stron},' points, and likewise no ob- 
 stacles should be placed in the intervals between the stronj^ 
 ])oints. For the same reason any works to cover Infantry situ- 
 ated in these intervals must either be of small extent or else of 
 such a profile that troops can pass over them without difficulty 
 (sh(;lter trenches.) 
 
 The time available for preparation will j^'enerally be short, the 
 works therefore will, as a rule, be of a hasty description, but so 
 \ou<^ as the counter-attack is not hindered the stron^^'er they are 
 the better. 
 
 A variation may occur in which the role of part of the Position 
 is purely defensive. This part of the Position would then be pre- 
 pared as explained in the following. 
 
 Pure defensive. — In the Pure defensive counter-strokes will be 
 made whenever a favourable opportunity occurs, but only on a 
 narrow front ; and thus, in order to keep the enemy as lonj; as 
 possible under fire, obstacles should be placed on the fore/around 
 and in the intervals between tiie stronj,^ points, if natural ones do 
 not exist: but openings should be left for the counter-attack. 
 And for the same reason if the Position offers a good natural ob- 
 stacle its passage by the enemy must be stubbornly contested. 
 To do this the first line of defence should, if possible, be placed 
 within close musketry fire of the obstacle, and further, to econo- 
 mise troops, some works should flank the obstacle. These flank- 
 ing works can often be conveniently arranged so as to act as 
 bridge-heads to the passages over the obstacle. 
 
 As it is all important that the enemy sliould not break through 
 the line of defence, special attention will be paid to the strong 
 points, and they will generally be closer than in a Position occu- 
 pied for an offensive-defensive action. 
 
 The time available will vary very considerably according to tiie 
 object for which the Position is defended. Only a few hours may 
 be available if, for instance, the Position is to be prepared for an 
 
CK. 
 
 the stroll;,^ 
 ts specially 
 ;r, tlie time 
 :e than the 
 
 I endeavour 
 le Position, 
 become the 
 lently, then, 
 ttack. For 
 
 natural or 
 ,vise no ob- 
 
 the strouf; 
 fantry situ- 
 t or else of 
 Lit difficulty 
 
 i short, the 
 ion, but so 
 er they are 
 
 he Position 
 hen be pre- 
 
 ikes will be 
 : only on a 
 as l(^nj^ as 
 forej^round 
 nal ones do 
 nter-attack. 
 natural ob- 
 ■ contested. 
 , be placed 
 •, to econo- 
 riiese flank- 
 5 to act as 
 
 iak throuf^h 
 
 the strong 
 
 sition occu- 
 
 (ling to the 
 ' hours may 
 )ared for an 
 
 CHOICF. OF A POSITION. 
 
 37 
 
 ordinary battle-field, and in this case hasty intrenchments will 
 have to l)r employed ; but on the otliiM" hand, in the defence of 
 intrenched camps or depots the time may bt; practically unlimited; 
 the works will then be substantial, approachin;^^ in some cases to 
 semi-pi'rmaneiit works.* 
 
 INKI.rKNCi; 11!' Tin: OD.IKCI- KoI: Wlliril TIIK I'liSITIUX IS liKKKNI>Kl>. 
 
 There is another circumstance iiiHuencinfj the arrangement of 
 the works, and that is the object for which the Position is de- 
 fended. This point can, however, be best considered when treat- 
 ing of the various cases of the application of the defence of a 
 Pt^sition. 
 
 The general arrangement of the works having now been deter- 
 mined the subject can be entered into more in detail, and the 
 first incpiir}- will be into the circumstances inrtuencing the choice 
 of a Position and the selection of the sites of the various works. 
 
 CHOICE OF A PO.SITIOXA 
 
 The general locality of the Position will be fixed by or chosen 
 on strategical grounds, its actual site depends principally on 
 tactical and secondly on technical considerations. 
 
 The strategical considerations (with which the present enquiry 
 is not concerned), may define the Position very nearly, but 
 wherever latitude is allowed the following requirements should be 
 taken into account, and the more nearly they are fulfilled the bet- 
 ter the Position. 
 
 General ycijuiroiicnis. 
 
 1. The foreground such as to allow of an effective fire being 
 brought to bear on the enemy during the u^Jiolc time of his 
 advance. 
 
 2. Well marked features suitable for transforming into stronL' 
 points. ^ 
 
 J. ("rood natural cover for all arms. 
 
 4. Good Artillery positions. 
 
 5. Unfavourable positions for the enemy's Artillery. 
 
 6. Exposure of the dist;. )t movements of the enemy. 
 
 7. Secure Hanks. 
 
 8. Good conununicatlons in the interior of the Position or else 
 easily made so. 
 
 •'I'lio works tlirown up for tl.,' .kfence <,{ T'hn-na are a case in point. 
 
 tThe eonHi.Ioration of tiio .hoico of a Position belongs strictly to Tactics but is 
 inserted here for the sake of completeness. ^ latiits, out is 
 
.i-^ 
 
 usi: ()\- I ii.i-i) I oKTii icAiiDN I'.v Tin: 1)i:ii:n(:i:. 
 
 (). ICxtciit of tlif Position proportionate to tlif iiuiiiber of 
 troo|)s. 
 
 lo. Depth of llic Position siifluicut to keep the lines of Defence 
 well separated, and to allow of free movement within it. 
 
 r I. Secinc retreat. 
 
 12. The surface such as to deaden tlie effect of Artillery lire 
 and such as to conceal the "strike" of musketry fire. 
 
 15. Soil suitai)le for earthworks. 
 
 14. The timber, brushwood, etc., required for intrencliments 
 close at hand. 
 
 15. Ciood wa+er su])j)ly. 
 
 Special rc(jitirc)iiciils;, according' to the kind of defence. 
 Offensive-defensive. 
 
 16. l'orc}j[round suitable for an assumption of the offensive "en 
 masse." 
 
 17. Foref^round unsuitable for the enemy to assume the defen- 
 sive. 
 
 Tliose ]iarts of the Position which are to be Jield purely deftn- 
 sively should conform to the special recpiirements for such a kind 
 of defence (iS and 19.) 
 
 Pure defensive. 
 
 i(S. Difficulty of ai)})roach for the enemy. 
 
 ig. Natural obstacles sejiaratinj,' the attackinj^ fractions. 
 
 These retiuirements can be fulfilled as follows : 
 
 I. The fon\i:;y(>imci siicli as In alUnn' of an effective fire hciui:; hrou^ht 
 to bear on the enemy. — A perfect forefj^round would have a {^'entle, 
 even slope fallinj,^ away from the Position, no nndulations behind 
 which tiie enemy could find cover, and no vej^'etation, houses, 
 etc., that cannot be easily cleared away ; and tliis clear p^round 
 should extend uj) to the limit of effective musketry fire, and if 
 possible up to that of Artillery. For offensive-defensive actions 
 the best inclination of the slope is about 5", as tliis ^aves a suffi- 
 cient vantajjfe to the defence, the men can fire witiiout exposinjj^ 
 themselves and the slope is not steep enou^^ii to interfere with the 
 assumption of the offensive (see recpiirement 16.) For the pure 
 defensive the best slopes lie between 5° and 10°. The more 
 usual shape of the ^nound, however, is an increasin}^ slope from 
 the foot to the crest, and this is not so favourable for the close 
 defence, for the men liave to expose themselves when firinjj^. A 
 ver}' steep forej^Mound is bad for the same reason, as was exhibit- 
 
 ^•ii 
 
 I 1 
 
ci:. 
 iimiil)C'r of 
 
 of Dcfi'iice 
 it. 
 
 rtillery tiro 
 renchnients 
 
 rnoKi-: of a I'osiiion. 
 
 JO 
 
 fonsive "en 
 the (lefen- 
 
 irely defen- 
 uicli a kind 
 
 ions. 
 
 'nf( hrotif^hi 
 i a j:,'entle, 
 ons beliind 
 •n, honses, 
 jar p^ronnd 
 ire, and if 
 ve actions 
 'es a suffi- 
 t exposing' 
 re with tlie 
 r the pure 
 The more 
 dope from 
 the close 
 firinj::^. A 
 as exliibit- 
 
 t:d. for instance, at the KothiMherg (hnin/^' the l)attle of Spit henii 
 and at the action on the Majidia Inll. A clear forcf^Monnd is 
 un<loul)tedly the most important riMpnremi'iit of a ;,'ood I'osition, 
 because a clear held of hre is essential and the labour of clear- 
 in j^' is very j^'reat. 
 
 J. Well marked fciiliin's sititahlc for transfonnin^ into str(»i!^ puiuts. 
 — It is not imperative that there should be wi'll imirki'd fixtures, 
 but the labour of i)reparation is nnudi dimiinshed either if the 
 surface of the j^Mound is of such a shape or if there are woods or 
 villa;;es snital)ly situated to be easily placed in a state of defence. 
 
 The selection (f sites for stronj,' points has already been con- 
 sitlered, and as rej^ards their distance apart see paf^'e 
 
 _;. Ciixnl natural cover for all arms. — Natural cover will be most 
 useful to supports and reserves, and the best is formed bv woods, 
 decided undulations of the j^MOund, houses (bi-hind), railwaN' and 
 road cuttings. A bare reverse slope may offer good cover, but it 
 may just be of such an inclination as to be grazed by the hre 
 which nnsses the shooting line ; or again it may be too "steep and 
 prevent the supports and reserves from easily moving up it. To 
 be of use this cover should be at tiie proper distance for supjjorts 
 or reserves in rear (jf the shooting line. 
 
 4. (uH)d Artillery positions. — The requirements of gcxxl Artillery 
 ])ositi()ns are considered at page 44. 
 
 5. U nfivoiirablc positions for the enemy's Artillery. — The charac- 
 teristics of an unfavourable Artillery position can obvioiislv be 
 deduced from those of a good })osition. 
 
 (). Exposure of the distant moveuunts of the enemy. — It is not im- 
 perative that tin; enemy's distant movements should be over- 
 looked, but it will evidently be a great advantage if they can be 
 seen so as to make timely dispositions to meet them. 
 
 7. Secure thinks.— The ground will afford security to the Hanks : 
 
 <i. If there are natural obstacles to the advance of the eneniv, 
 such as dehles, and to his assault of the tlank, such as a river or 
 precipitous ground. 
 
 b. If the tlank attack is overlooked. 
 
 c. If an effective hre can be brought to bear on the flank attack. 
 A good Position should have at least one strong natural flan'.. 
 
 A flank may also be secured by resting on a fortress, or again, 
 m the case of intrenched camps or lines of investment, the flanks 
 are protected by the shape of the Position that has to be occupied 
 
 I'd 
 
 M 
 
40 
 
 IISK OF MKI.I) I-ORTIFIC-ATION UY Till. Dl.l I Nr|;. 
 
 .S. Cnxnl CDiiuittmicatioiis in tin interior of the Position or else eiisily 
 made so. -The best coniinuiiiciitiotis that can he ()l)taiiii(l \\ill he 
 the cxistiii;^^ roads, but rarcl\- will these be suriicieiitly nuiiieroiis, 
 and often the}' will not lead in the re()iiire(l diie( tions. A hard 
 surface is of course best suited for coniniunic'ations. A Position 
 in which the natural features of the ^^Mound are very marked will 
 ^.^eiu'rall}- offer difticulties, so also will woods and marshes. 
 
 9. li.xtent 0/ the Position proportionate to the number of troops. '['0 
 ascertain whether the Position is proportionate to tin; number of 
 troops is a matter of calculation. 
 
 10. J)epth of the Position sufficient to keep the lines (f defence icell 
 separated and to alloiv of free movement within it. — The depth of th(; 
 I'osition should be sufficient to allow of the second line bein;^^ 
 placetl about 1000 yards behind the first line. 
 
 11. Secure retreat. — -The conhj^uration of the j^ronnd will assist 
 to cover a retreat if there are features, readily transformable into 
 defensible posts, cominandiuf; the line or lines of retreat, but ob- 
 stacles such as rivers, woods or marshes, if extensive, will f;ener- 
 ally j)rove a disadvantaj^e. 
 
 12. The surface such as to deaden the effect (f Artillery fire and such 
 as to conceal the "strike'' of musketry fire. — The effect of the attack- 
 er's lire on the defenders will depend to a certain extent on the 
 nature of the surface. Thus, as re{j[ards Artillery fire, a hard 
 rocky surface increases the effect l)y insuriii}^' the burstin^,^ of 
 shells and by the splinters of stone, l^ut a soft surface on the 
 contrary diminishes this effect. Ajj^ain a hard surface, but not 
 rocky, increases the ricochet of musketry. Since the introduc- 
 tion of lonj; ranj^'e "nuiss firintr" a new consideration has arisen as 
 rej^-'ards the surface, for the "strike" of the bullets is visible at a 
 \ou^ distance and enables the enemy to rej^ailate his hre ; dry 
 earth, shows the "strike" best and ^.growth-covered or wet ;^aound 
 least. 
 
 13. Soil suitable for earthicorks. and 14. The timber, brushwood, 
 etc., required for intrenchments close at hand. Re(piire no comment, 
 and althoujj^h important, will jj^enerally have but little influence 
 on the choice. 
 
 15. Good water supply. — This is a very important consideration, 
 especially if the Position has to be held for any lenj,'th of time. 
 See " Camp Duties." 
 
 16. Forci^^round suitable for an assumption of the offensive '"en masse.''' 
 —In order that the foref^^round may be favourable for an offensive 
 advance it must not be too stc-ep, the n^.tximum is about 5"" ; it 
 should further be devoid of obstacles and the surface should ncjt 
 offer any ji^reat hindrance to the advance of the troops. 
 
 ft 
 
* !•: 
 
 CIIOICI'; (>!• A I'OSI lIoN. 
 
 41 
 
 (ir else easily 
 
 
 iifd will 1)(! 
 
 
 iiuiiicroiis, 
 
 
 s. A hard 
 
 
 A Position 
 
 
 iiarki'd will 
 
 
 dies. 
 
 
 I roups. To 
 
 
 iimuhcr of 
 
 
 dcfcuic well 
 
 
 t'|)tli of tlu; 
 
 
 liiK.' bfin;^' 
 
 
 will assist 
 
 1 
 
 iiiahle into 
 
 
 -■at, but ob- 
 
 
 will f^'iMier- 
 
 
 '\ye and such 
 
 
 the attack- 
 
 
 enl on the 
 
 
 iL', a hard 
 
 
 bnrstinj,"^ of 
 
 
 face on the 
 
 
 cc, l)ut not 
 
 
 c introduc- 
 
 
 is arisen as 
 
 
 visible at a 
 
 
 s tire ; dry 
 
 •5 
 
 wet ^Mound 
 
 ^- 
 
 brushwood, 
 
 
 comment, 
 
 J 
 
 e intluencc 
 
 i 
 
 isideration, 
 
 1 
 
 til of time. 
 
 1 
 
 "t'« masse.'" 
 
 i 
 
 in offensive 
 
 m 
 
 )out 5''; it 
 
 ■'.- 
 
 should not 
 
 
 17. I'ore'f^round uusuitahle for the eiteiity t<> iisstinie the defensire. — 
 The foref,q-ouii(l will be unsuitable for the enemy to assume tlu- 
 defensive: if there are no rallyin,!,' points and if the ground be\ oud 
 does not form a j^mxxI defensive I'ositiou. 
 
 itS. Dijj'uiilty 0/ approach fur the enoiiy.- Natural obstacles such 
 as rivers, streams or marshes, will impede the advance of the 
 enemy. I'"orests are effecti\i', but the enemy, if he has time, can 
 cut his wa\' throuj,di them and his movements cannot be seen. 
 Cliffs are },'enerally not reliable owin;^ to tlu' difruull)' of brin/^'in;^' 
 an effective tire to bear on the iiiem\ . In any case the obstacle 
 should be in such a position that it can be placecl thorou;,ddy 
 under the Hre of the shootin.L,^ line. 
 
 It). Xatural ohstacles separatiu:^ the attackiiit^ /ri(i7/(';/.s.-- Natural 
 obstacles such as streams, riv'ers or even woods separatin;^^ the 
 attackers will assist tiie defenders in that these obstacles prevent 
 or at any rate render difticult a concerted action of the enem\' 
 and fmther assist the defenders to beat him in detail. 
 
 now TO KI:Mi I)V DliFIiCTS TIIAr MAY ofClK IN POSITIONS. 
 
 A Position fuUillin;,^ all the precedinj,' recpiirenn'Uts in their 
 entirety is in all probability nowhere to be found, but any siiort- 
 comin;^' nnist be rej,^irded as a blemish more or less serious ac- 
 cording,' to the amount of shortcominj,' and the importance of the 
 requirement. It is of the f,'reatest moment to at once discover 
 these weak points in the Position and then make e\'ery endeavour 
 to neutralize them as far as possible. 
 
 It is precisely in these cases that l'"ield-P'ortirtcation will prove 
 of the /^neatest assistance to the defenders of a Position, and often 
 it will be able to entirely overcome the difficulties. Hut often, 
 also, it will only be able to do so to a partial extent : that ])art of 
 the Position must then be defended by the most trustworthy 
 troops backed by stroii;^' reserves. 
 
 Two examples are added to show the nature of some of these 
 defects and how they can be remedied. 
 
 Wood extoidi)!!:^ icell into the Position and so far to the front that tlie 
 further border cannot be occupied (in force), and too larji^'c to clear 
 away. — A wood such as this woukl act injuriousl\- in ^ivin;^' the 
 enemy a covered approach into the Position and also by acting 
 as an obstacle separatin,t,f the Position, but it would at the same 
 time separate the attackers. The actual treatment will, of course, 
 depend to a j^Mcat extent on the nature of the timbe'riii,^-, on the 
 undulations of the j^qound and on any clearings that niav exist in 
 the wood, but to check the advance a line of j)arapet (probablv a 
 log parapet) should be made tiirough the wood on a level with 
 
■y^^ 
 
 42 
 
 usii OF I'liiLU lORTii'icATioN i'.Y riuc ni:r' liNci;. 
 
 the first line of defence, inakinj; us wide a cleaiinj,^ and as nuicli 
 abattis as possible ; and, as the frontal tire will only have a short 
 range, Hanking tire should be given a great development. To 
 meet the enemy as he debouches from the wood a line of intrencii- 
 ment;> should be thrown up from 100 to 400 yards from the imier 
 bolder and encircling that part of the wood contained in the 
 Position. As regards the communications they must either go 
 round the wood or else tracks can be cut through it. 
 
 Insecure flank. — The greater distance the troops making the 
 tlank attack have to march the more difficult will it be to carry 
 out the movement successfully, hence strong advanced posts well 
 to the front will assist in covering an insecure tlank. Colonel 
 Schaw, R.E., says that the first line of these posts should be 2 or 
 3 miles to the front. l'"or the actual defence of the tlank a short 
 line of intrenchments should be prepared, if time will admit, 
 somewhat at right angles to the first line of defence, " but let us 
 
 not be led away so far as to sup[)ose that the tire from a 
 
 redoubt will really protect the tlank of an arm\-."'* The best 
 protection to an insecure flank will, however, be the power of 
 manceuvring of the troops themselves. 
 
 DETERMiyAriOy OF THE SITES OF THE WOIiKS RFAiVIIlED FOIi THE 
 FORTIFICATION OF A POSIT I OS. 
 
 Hy means of the foregoing tlie approximate site of the various 
 works can be found. It remains now to discuss the conditions on 
 which these sites can be definitely fixed. 
 
 . CI.KAKINC. 
 
 Tile ground should bc> cleared in front of the Position, as far as 
 time will admit, up to the effective limit of niusketr\' tire, namely, 
 about 1000 yards. 
 
 OBSTACLES. 
 
 Artificial obstacles should be well under fire, but at the same 
 time they should not be too close to the work defending them, so 
 as to keep the enemy at a certain distance. I'rom 50 to 200 yds. 
 in front fulfills both conditions. As already mentioiu'd the 
 obstacles will be principally placed round the strong points, and 
 also in the intervals in the case of a purely defensive action. 
 
 COVER FOR TROOPS. 
 
 INKANTKY SHIKITINU I.INI'.. 
 
 The re(iuiremcnts are — 
 
 I. To expose the enemy to an effective liii' during the whole 
 time of his advanci". 
 
 "" b'ield Works, from a tactical point of view." I.t.-Col. Sciiaw, 15. K. 
 
 ■,^- 
 
 
i:. 
 
 i>f'.'ri:kMiN.\ii()N oi' Till': siti:s oi- riii-: wokks. 
 
 4 J 
 
 I as Muicli 
 
 vc a sliort 
 
 lent. To 
 
 iiitrcnch- 
 
 thc ijiiier 
 
 c(l in tlic 
 
 cither ^o 
 
 akin;j^ the 
 : to ran\' 
 posts well 
 Colonel 
 lid be 2 or 
 ik a short 
 ill admit, 
 but let us 
 re from a 
 The best 
 power of 
 
 FOR TIIK 
 
 )e various 
 itious on 
 
 as f;ii" as 
 iiamelv. 
 
 le same 
 them, so 
 !oo yds. 
 ie<l 'the 
 Mts, and 
 on. 
 
 2. Protection from the enemy's tire. 
 
 3. The works to be of no use to the enemy if captureil by him. 
 These re(]uirements can be fulHlled as follows : 
 
 1. To expose the enemy to an effective fire ditrini^' the ichole time of 
 his advance. — When the foref,Tound has a uniform inclination or 
 when the inclination increases towards the summit, tiie shootinj,' 
 trenches should be placed close to the summit.* But if the foot 
 of the slope cannot be seen without i)laciiif; the work too low 
 down the slope it is better to slij^htly retire the main \\ork behind 
 the summit, so as to obtain a clear held of fire of some extent (if 
 jiossible 500 yards but not less than 100 yards) in fi-ont of it, <]e- 
 i'endinj,' the remainder of the slope by one or more lines of slioot- 
 in^^ trenches, which would also furnish hre up to the effective 
 limit. The shootinjj^ trenches for this purpose should evidently 
 be of slij,dit proHle so as to offer but little cover to the enemy. 
 
 The slopes immediately in front of works, but inadecpiately 
 swept by frontal tire, can in some cases be defended by tlaiikinj^ 
 iire. 
 
 2. Pr<iteciio)i from the eueniy'sfire. — Time bein^^ almost invariably 
 an object the site should be so ( hoseii as to obtain cover as 
 rapidly as possible. It is for this reason that folds of the ^q-ound, 
 hedi((js, walls, woods, villaj,a.'S, etc., will be prepared for defence, 
 althouf,di their situations may not otherwise l.)e the best, in pre- 
 ference to throwing up entirely artificial cover. 
 
 P'urther, the site should be level, or better still, with a slight 
 slope to the rear. A site sloping to the front is disadvantageous 
 as regards protection, but must sometimes be occupied. 
 
 In order that the work may not be entiladed the prolongations 
 of its trace should not fall on points within range accessible to 
 the enemy, l^ut considerable and even comi)lete protection may 
 be afforded to an otherwise eiitilatled shooting line bv woods, vil- 
 lages, houses and folds of the ground placed between the work 
 and the enemy, or even if the work is at a considerably higher 
 level than the point which can be occupied by the enemy. 
 
 The work should, it possible, not be comm;uided by ground 
 available to the eneiii)-, and tor this it should be placed at as high 
 a level as possible. 
 
 J' 
 
 w holi 
 
 The 'u'orks to he (f no use to the enemy if captured hy /(/;;/. —A 
 shooting trench will not afford comi t<> the enemy against works 
 in rear of it if placed slightly below t\]c crest of tlu- slope. 
 
 *'rii(,' iiK'thiiil (if liiidin^' tlic limits witlim wliii'li :i wurk cjiii Ik' iiliicfil so as t(» 
 ilftVuil a, given sloUf is exiiliiiiii'd in «; llll) F. 
 
f 
 
 44 
 
 USI', OF FIELD FORTIFICATION P.V TUF DFFEN'CR. 
 
 INKANIliV sri'l'OKTS AND KKSKKVKS. 
 
 The rcfiuiremcnts arc ^avcn and it is shown iiow they can be 
 ftillilled at paj^^es i8 and 19. 
 
 ai;tii.i,ki:v. 
 The reqnircmcnts arc — 
 
 1. To fire on the enemy's advancinj:^ Infantry. 
 
 2. To fire on the enemy's Artillery. 
 
 3. Protection from the enemy's fire. 
 
 4. Difficnlt to assault. 
 
 5. Good communications. 
 
 6. Suitable positions for limbers and teams close at hand. 
 
 These requirements can be fulfilled as follows : — 
 
 T. To fin- oil the enemy's advaiuin<j; Infantry. — The enemy's In- 
 fantry should if possible be exposed to Artillery fire from within 
 effective ranj^^e to close up to the Infantry shootiii;^' lii'- As 
 already mentioned some ^ums should be sent to the from. the 
 be},dnninj^^ of an action to force the enemy to deploy early, and 
 these fjuns wovdd be retired later to prepared emplacements in 
 rear or on the flanks of the Infantry shootinj^ line. Occasionally 
 suitai)le sites, secure from assault and enfilade, will be found for 
 Junius on a line with the Infantry shootinj^ line, from which the 
 forej^Mound can be enfiladed. Such sites will, for instance, be 
 offered by dominant points, " for retirement above the f^^eneral 
 level is, as re<.;ards safety, in a measure e(]uivalent to retirement 
 from the front."* A hill or a wood may also serve to screen the 
 battery, when of course the hill or the wood must be denied to 
 the enemy. 
 
 In order, however, that the Artillery fire may be kept up until 
 the enemy's Infantry have arrived up to the shootinfj^ line the 
 fj^rcater proportion of the {,nms will have to be placed from 400 to 
 boo \ ards in rear of the shootinj^ line in connnanding positions, 
 situated in the intervals between the strong points. 
 
 The lines of api)roach such, for instance, as roads nearly per- 
 pendicular to the Position, valle\s, fords, points where natural 
 obstacles might be crossed, should be efiiciently swept by Artil- 
 lery fire, and when close to the Position by cross and enfilade as 
 well as by direct fire. It should be remembered that guns caimot 
 be depressed more than 12°, and that the effect of shells is greater 
 when liring down a gentle slope. 
 
 2. To file on the enemy's Artilleiy.~~Thc positions likely to be 
 occupied by the enemy's guns can be foreseen, and batteries 
 
 'Miijor KifUicr, U.E. Cold Medal Easiiy, 1!. U.S.I. 
 
E. 
 
 DETERMIVATION OF THE SITES OF THE WORKS. 
 
 45 
 
 net" 
 
 ley can be 
 
 hand. 
 
 lemy's In- 
 om within 
 hi' As 
 :ni1. the 
 early, and 
 ;ements in 
 :casionany 
 ; found for 
 which tlie 
 stance, be 
 be f,^eneral 
 retirement 
 screen the 
 denied to 
 
 it up until 
 
 fj^ line tiie 
 
 oni 400 to 
 
 positions, 
 
 learly per- 
 re natural 
 by Artil- 
 iMiHlade as 
 ins cannot 
 ; is greater 
 
 vely to be 
 batteries 
 
 should therefore be posted so as to be able to concentrate their 
 fire on these positions, and to obtain the best effect the j^niiis 
 should be massed in large batteries so placed as to command 
 the enemy's position. 
 
 The necessity of sweeping the approaches by Artillery fire 
 tends to disseminate the guns and hence, although the same ad- 
 vantages would be gained by massing the guns, namely, a more 
 concentrated and united effect, it cannot be resorted to to the 
 same extent by the defence as by the attack. 
 
 I'""or economy the same battery should combine as many of the 
 above functions as possible. 
 
 ]. Protection from the otoiiy's fire. — -To save time and labour the 
 site should, if possible, afford natural cover. Such sites have 
 already been considered at page 20. Sites hidden from the enemy 
 bv hedges, etc., are good. A short, steep slope in front of the 
 guns is an advantage, as it catches the shells that fall short, and 
 they will not be able to ricochet. 
 
 Lastly, the sites should not, if possible, be commanded or 
 enfiladed. 
 
 4. Difficult to assault. — The guns will be more or less secure 
 against assault — 
 
 a. If they are retired behind the shooting line. 
 /). If there is a good natural obstacle in front. 
 
 5. Good communications. — Although guns can go almost any- 
 where the means of access should be considered in choosing the 
 site for a battery, and likewise the communications to tlu; front, 
 in case the guns have to advance, and those parallel to the Posi- 
 tion, in case the guns have to take ground to the right or left. A 
 favourable site in this respect would therefore be close to roads 
 parallel and perpendicular to the Position. 
 
 6. Suitable positions for limbers and teams close at hand. — This re- 
 quirement needs no comment. 
 
 Summary of Duties. 
 
 The following is a summary of the duties to be performed by 
 \rtillery in defending a Position : 
 
 (i) To fire on the advancing Infantry by direct, cross and <'iili- 
 lade fire. 
 
 (2) To sweep the lines of approach, 
 (j) To fire on the enemy's Artilleiy. 
 
 m 
 
 > 11 
 
w 
 
 '■■^; 
 
 46 
 
 USI-: (II' I'lKI.n lORTII'ICATION i;V THE DKFENCE. 
 
 (4) To support the strong,' points — 
 
 a. GciuMally from ])ositioiis outside. 
 
 h. Occasionally from inside. 
 
 (;avai,ky. 
 The requirements are — 
 
 1. To be prepared to deliver a charj^'c. 
 
 2. Protection from the enemy's fire. 
 J. (jood communications. 
 
 To fulfil the lirst rcfiuirement the Cavalry must be kept in com- 
 l)act bodies, and, as already mentioned at paj^'e 21, natural cover 
 must be found. 
 
 UTRONG POINTS. 
 
 It has already been seen that the stronj^ points of a fortified 
 Position will consist either of defensible Knolls, Houses, Vil- 
 la;^^es or W'cjods, or failing,'' these, of b'ield-Works. The conditions 
 to be fulfilled by the sites of these defensible localities and Field- 
 Works, irrespective of their relative positions, have already been 
 considered. It therefore now remains to decide on their relative 
 positions. 
 
 ADVANCKIJ WDKKS. 
 
 These works should be supported by the main line, and for this 
 purpose their distance in front of the main line should not exceed 
 1500 yards. Occasionally, however, advanced posts, if of suffi- 
 cient stren.i^'^th not to recpiire support, mij^ht be placed consider- 
 ably further forward. I'or instance, in the battle of Belfort the 
 old citadel of Montbeliard was hekl by the Germans as an ad- 
 vanced post, althouj,di 2500 yards in front of the main line, but it 
 was takiMi by the I'reiich. 
 
 These works are iiuU'pend(Mit of each other, and theieforc no 
 rule can be formed j^H)vernin;^'' their distance ajxirt. Their sites 
 will hence entirely (lei)end on the features of the jj^round, and they 
 will be so chosen as either to command the lines of apjiroach, or 
 the passaf,^e of a natural obstacle, or a/^^ain to i)rf)tect an otherwise 
 exposed tlank. It will be noticed that these atlvanced works 
 form the salients of the Position ; they should, therefore, be "few 
 in number and well marked." 
 
 The outposts would be sent much further to the front, but rarely 
 would they be intrenched. In the si)ecial case of the investment 
 of a fortress these outposts and ad\anct'd posts obtain a {greater 
 (U'velopment, for their dut\- is then to detain a sortie for a suffi- 
 cient lenj^th of time to I'uablc the main line to be occupied, as 
 this allows of fewer men beiu}^ kept on duty. 
 
 [i k 
 
DETERMINATION Ol' Till: SI IKS Ol' THE WORKS. 
 
 47 
 
 c no 
 
 sites 
 
 tiiey 
 
 ;li, or 
 
 ;r\vise 
 
 vorks 
 
 'few 
 
 a rely 
 
 nieiit 
 
 'ater 
 
 sr.ffi- 
 
 as 
 
 
 I'lViirs iiK Kllisr LINK iiK IH'.KI'.NCK. 
 
 The relative positions of the decisive points and tin; iiilcniiaiialc 
 sliootinf; trenches shonld be such that tlie latter will be sujjported 
 by the former, wiiich for this purpose nuist be phiced sH^ditly in 
 advance of the shootin;^^ trenches. 
 
 Tlie only point now to decide is the ilistance apart of these de- 
 cisive points. In the first place, if the decisive jioints are not 
 sufficientlvstrouf^f to defend their own front, their inunediate fore- 
 • "■round must be swept by lire from sonu* other works themselves 
 more or less secure. The conti^^uous shootin.i; trenches are theie- 
 fore not suitable, but the neij^dibourin^' strong,' points or else works 
 in the intervals well retired, can be utilized for this purpose, and 
 the thinking' fire thus obtained may consist either of musketry or 
 of Artillerv. Takinj,' the limiting; effective ranj^^e of nmsketry for 
 this purpose at 500 yards, and that for Artillery at 1500 yards, the 
 maximum distance for decisive points which nnitually support 
 each other will be 500 yards for musketry and 1500 yards for 
 Artillerv ; but if the flankinf^ work is situated in the centre of the 
 interval these distances can be increased to 1000 and 3000 yards 
 respectively. Evidently the weaker the decisive points the closer 
 they must "be, so that the sujiportin;^^ fire may be intensiiied. 
 
 There is, however, a minimum distance between the decisive 
 points, for the interval nuist be wide enou^^di to allow the counter- 
 stroke to issue. Thus if the counter-stroke is to be on the front 
 of a brij^'adc the minimum distance is 900 }ards, but if a smaller 
 counter-stroke on the front of a battalion is intended the distance 
 can be reduced to 300 yards. 
 
 It should be remend)ered that, as already mentioned,* the ten- 
 dency is to keep the decisive points as far separate as possible, 
 and this has the advantaj^e of economisin;^' di'fenders and labour. 
 
 Secondly, if the decisive points are stron^^ en<)u,i;li to defend 
 their own front it will be sufficient, to prevent the enemy bn-akin^^ 
 throu,t,di tlK> intervals, if these intervals are sw pt by nmsketi\- fire. 
 This nuisketr}' fire can be supjilied either by the decisive points 
 themselves or else by intermediate trenches or posts. In the first 
 case, takin.i,^ the effectixe liniit of nmsketry \\vv for this i)m})ose at 
 Soo vards, the maxinuun distance bitwceii the dfcisi\-e points 
 would be 1600 yards. In the second ease tlie liniit to the dis- 
 tance has to be fixed on the consideiation that the interxal ouj^lit 
 to be swept by Artillery fire, and takin;^ the limitinj^^ ranj^c; of 
 Artillery for this purpose at 3000 yards, the maxinmm distance 
 arrived at is 6000 yards, siipposin.i; the batteries i)laeed in the 
 ni'ii;hbourhood of the decisive points. IWit unless the features of 
 the f^Mound are favourable (such as a foiniidable natural obstacle 
 in front of that p-art of the Position) it is doubtfid whether the 
 decisive points should be further apart than 3000 yards. 
 * Pago 33. 
 
■3?^ 
 
 48 
 
 USE OF MKI.I) FORTIFICATION IJY THH DKFENCi:. 
 
 ! I 
 
 i'l 
 
 The (ulual distances between the stroni; points will in all cases 
 depeiul on the features and accidents of the |,'round. 
 
 When a decisive poini is a keep of the Position its <lefence 
 should be reserved by beinj,^ hidden from view of the enemy dur- 
 iu}!; the earlier staj^'es of the attack. 
 
 The foUowiiiff instances will illustrale the above remarks : 
 
 "hi till! (Jerniaii (h'fensive line south of Paris (l.S7() 71), wliuro it fared the 
 plateau of \illejuif, the villaj,'es of Ha^'ueux, liourg-la-IIeiiie, I'Hay, and Tiiai.«, and 
 jiark of Chovilly were deeisive poiiitH, I'Hay heing KXK) yards to tlu! left and Thais 
 '2,'J(M> yards to the riglit of C'hevilly; while further east the decisive points of the 
 parks of Cu'uilly and Villiers-le-desert were .about 1,(!(M) yards apart. "J 
 
 At the hiittle of I'elfort (1!S7(>-71 ), in the I.isaine Position the decisive points 
 of Bu.ssurel and Hericourt were about .S.'iCM) yards ai)art, those of Hericourt an»l Luzu 
 about ;{,(KK) yards, and those of C^hagey Chenebier about 4,000 yards. 
 
 "Between the works on the Hlazigas slioulder at I'levna and the grouj) on tluiOpanets 
 heigiits there was a clear ;?,(MK) yards; while from tlie < Ipanets position, which was 
 exceptionally strong, and the works at Hucova, the almost unfortified interval, was 
 4,000 yards, which was evidently (juite secure.' ;i 
 
 I'lVOIS OK THK SK((INI> M N" K Ol' I iKKKNCK. 
 
 The same rules will apply to these works as to those of the fust 
 line. They are sometimes placed with advantaj^^e in the intervals 
 between the pivots of the tirst line. 
 
 FLAXKS. 
 
 The object of these works is to d< *^Ln(l those jiortions of the 
 «,M()und which are not sufficiently swept by frontal rtre. This may 
 be due either to the shapt; of the },aound or tt) the imjiortance of 
 the point. In choosinj,^ sites for these works the conditions j4;iven 
 at paj^^e 24 should be kept in view. 
 
 I'"or the purpose of tlankinj^^ pivots small Heches are sometimes 
 placed in tlie intervals between two pivots and well retired. 
 
 In the pure defensive, flanks slu)uld be prepareil to defend the 
 obstacle* so as to minimize the number of troops required. t 
 
 I'Ki:rAUATI()N Ol-" COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 (lenerally speakinj,' the communications can be divided into 
 two classes — railial and lateral ; and their arranj^^Muent will 
 depenti on the points to l)e connected and also on the uiululations 
 and features of the j^Mound. 
 
 DKMOl.nioN OF Tin: FNIIMV's COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 Great care should be exercised in selectinji,' the points at which 
 to interrupt the eni'm\'s comnnniications, and unless it is evident 
 
 "See iet|uirement No. IS, page 41. 
 
 tSee p. ;{(). 
 
 :{: Defence of a Position. Captain Kr.iaer, K.E. 
 
 HUAiX Medal Kssay, 1{. U.S.I. Major Kraser, U.K. 
 
ADVAN 1 A(;i:S CoNFHKRliD HY INTKKNCHING. 
 
 49 
 
 11 all cases 
 
 :s (Icfctice 
 iiciiiy dm- 
 
 irks : 
 
 it fiU'L'd till! 
 I Tliai.v, an<l 
 !t iind 'I'liais 
 [M)ints of the 
 
 L'isivc points 
 lilt aiul l.u/,0 
 
 I tlioOpaiicts 
 , which was 
 nterval, was 
 
 if the lirst 
 intervals 
 
 IIS f)f the 
 rhis may 
 rtaiice of 
 :)iiS 'f^ixcu 
 
 mietiines 
 •ed. 
 
 -■feud the 
 ed.t 
 
 (led into 
 lent will 
 itilations 
 
 at which 
 i evident 
 
 that the communication can be of no use to tiie defenders the 
 ilemolition should only be prepared. The passages of natural 
 obstacles will generally be the points to select. 
 
 OllhKli I.\' WIIIVII TllK VAlilOVS WORKS SHOULD UK KXKUVTKD. 
 
 The following list gives the order of precedence in wliich tiie 
 various works should be executed :* 
 
 1. Clearing the foreground for fire. 
 
 2. Covering the shooting line. 
 J. Covering the guns. 
 
 4. Covering the suj)ports and reserves. 
 
 5. Placing obstacles. 
 
 6. Making communications. 
 
 7. Laying field telegraphs, putting up field ol)Scrvatories and 
 signal stations, measuring and marking out ranges. (See Pioneer 
 duties.) 
 
 8. Preparing rear-guanl stand-points. 
 
 DISCUSSION OF Tilt: ADVAyTAUES COSFKliltSD DY INTRESCniSii. 
 
 The whole science of war may be briefly defined to be '* the 
 art of placing in the right position at the right time, a mass of 
 troops greater than your enemy can there oppose to you."t 
 
 Now P^ield-l'ortification tends to fulfil tliis maxim, because — 
 
 1. The field of fire is improved by clearing and placing ob- 
 stacles, thus causing atlditional loss of men and morale to the 
 attackers. 
 
 2. The advance of the enemy's troops is impeded by the inter- 
 ruption in his comnumications. 
 
 3. The loss in men and morale of the defe; ce is diminislied by 
 the cover thrown up. 
 
 4. The movement of the defender's troops to threatened points 
 is assisted by the improvement in his connnunications. 
 
 The ultimate effect of Iweld {-"ortification is therefore to dim- 
 inish the number and morale of the attackers and to increase the 
 number and morale of the defenders at the decisive point and at 
 the decisive moment. Clearly, then, fewer troo|>s are reiiuired 
 to defend a fortified Position than the same Position unfortified, 
 and the difference in the number can be taken as a measure of 
 the gain conferred by the Intrenchments, provided the enemy atttuks 
 them. 
 
 "'rakfii fniiu the Uoyal Kiigiiiiitr I'rize Easay, 1S75, ))y C'ai)tain Fraser, K.K. 
 tMacdoiigall, Theory of War. 
 
^mrm^^K^W^ 
 
 [•<>}■■. <)!■ II1-.I.I> lOKTIlIl AI'IoN I^.V llll'. I)|-.I'1-;N(I'.. 
 
 'I'liis ;i(l\;iiit;i^M' will opriatt; (liffcMcntly, iirrordiii},'' to tlic object 
 (if the action. I"or instance, in a covering,' action a Position of 
 .<,M-catcr I'Xtcnt could be occnpied. The battle of Ikdfort is a case 
 in point, where 42.000 (lernians held the Position of the Allaine 
 and I.isaine successfnlly for three days with i\ men to the pace. 
 In an offiiisive-defeiisive action, however, the troops relieved by 
 the Iiitrenchnients wonld be added to the reserve, thus nicreasiiif,' 
 the power of the counter-stroke. 
 
 Next, consider an army iiuiipahlc of nuuueuvrin^^f intrenclied in 
 a Position and attacked by a mobile army. Supposin}^^ in the 
 first instance, that tlu; llanks are secure, then the mobile army 
 must attack in front, and the intrenchmeiits will confer their full 
 ailvantaj,fe to the defence. ]-)Ut if tlu' Hanks are not secure the 
 mobile army can in perfect safety circle round and attack in 
 llank, and the iiitrenchnients, not luivi)ii; hccn attacked, will confer 
 no adxantaj^e to the defence in such a case. 
 
 Tlic t'lilldwing ('vanillic illiistnitcs Ixitli cases : "AfttT the si'cdiid liiittlc (if Hull 
 l!iiii, ill August, ISti'J, the (k'fcatL'd Koderals (iinnijiied a lint- nl' tii-ld wiirks near 
 Ci'iitrc'villc. life, with iiilcrinr iiuihIkts and weary tniniis. did not wisli to ha/.ard a 
 direct attack (in an encniy wlm liad licen reinfdrced, and was occupyinj,' so stron;,' a 
 ]i(isiti(iii; lint sent 1). IlilTs corps niund tlu' riglit (if the Kedcials to thn^ateii tlieir 
 coiiiinunicatioiiH with Washington. Then (ieiieral I'ojie, inmli/i /u ijlrr luitllf mt iif- 
 i-iiinil 11/ till ih iiinniriKttiiiii nf his triiiijis, retreated. > « •> ♦ Tliiis we see fiero 
 intrrnchnieiits lield liy inferior troojis, proof against direct attack, Imt wlien tlic 
 ]iosition can lie turned, losing tht.'ir eftieacy in the face of troops of superior ((uality, 
 and of skilful and liold generalshiii,"* 
 
 Aiul tinally, "tlu; j^'eiieral co'iclusion which seems to offer itself 
 to us from our examination of the modern conditions of war, 
 ou.i;ht not to be displeasing,' to us as Enj^dishmeii if we still retain 
 old traditions and (]ualities. It is that iiitrenchnients j,Mve an 
 advaiitat^e to small and mobile armies composed of <;oo(l lij^ditinj,' 
 material as ojiposed to larj^'er forces with less maiueuvrinj; power 
 and of inferior (]uality This advantaj^'e is },''aine(l by the power 
 ,L;iven by intrenchmeiits to a small resolute force of lioldin;.,'' its 
 ,i,M'ound for a time a^^^iinst superior niimbers, in virtue of which 
 power vital jjoints may be safely left in charge of a small miniber 
 of troops, while the bulk of the army is usiii^' its superior mobility 
 and li.i^litin.i,'' jxiwer to pu/zl(!. outwit aiul defi'at the more cum- 
 brous masses of the eneinv."t 
 
 I 
 
 API'IJCATIO.W OF THE MioVK To TIIK DKFKSCK OF POSITIONS OCCUPIED 
 
 FOR VAJUors oliJECTS. 
 
 As meiitionetl at |)aj,^e \'j the object for which the Position is 
 di^feiided will influence tlie arran}.,'ement of the works, and to 
 exhibit this tln^ application of intrenchmeiits to the cases ,i,Mven 
 at pai;e 52 will now be coiisidere(|. 
 
 'I'ri/e Kssay, IST'.t, l! I". S.I MMJor ( 'laytoii, i;..\. 
 
 I I'rize Kssay, KS"'.*, It. l. S.I. Major ( 'laytoii, i;..\. For further information on 
 tills point sec p|"i. .'i'_'(t '.VMK "f tlic .siiiic es.say, Vol. \.\lll, .journal IM'.S.I. 
 
 ii 
 
 L..., 
 
the object 
 ositioii of 
 t is a case 
 le Allaiiie 
 the pace, 
 lieved hy 
 ncieasing 
 
 iiched in 
 K^ ill tile 
 )ile aniiv 
 their full 
 ;cuie the 
 ittack in 
 ill confer 
 
 ttle of Mull 
 kvorks near 
 to liaziinl a 
 
 iO Strollrr a 
 
 eaten tlieir 
 iffle (IK (If. 
 
 Wllfll tlio 
 or (juality, 
 
 1 OK lillCATloX oi I'OSI lioNS (>('( riil'.D lOK WXKIols ( i|'. J I .(' IS. 5I 
 
 (l) Oiilinaiy iiattlcriclds ( I'nrc drfeiisisei. ,^ liSj !•". 
 
 {2} Lines of in\estuitnt. ?' iNi ]•". 
 
 (j) Defence of tilt- en\ irons of a I'oitress. 'vN iN^ 1*\ 
 
 (4) Defence of deliles, hridj^^e- heads and mountain passes. 
 § iS4-iN(j F. 
 
 (5) Defence of intrenched rain|)s and depots. '^ 190 I*\ 
 
 (6) l\ear-<,niard actions. The arranf^enient of the works in 
 these cases will l>e the same as in m or (4), accordin;,-^ to circum- 
 stances. t 
 
 •OHeiiHive-defeiiHivo battlelieMs have already Keen eoiisiilered, jia^'c HCi. 
 
 1l'"or examples of fortilied I'oHitioiis see 
 
 I'. .Sr> ti."). Hawty IntreiK'linieiit.s, l>y Col. I'rialniont. 
 
 I'. 14 1(1. The befeiiee of a ro.sitioii, livCaiit. l-'ra.ser, 1! K. 
 
 y. '2m 'Mi). Vol. XXIIJ. .loiirnal. K.l'.S.I. 
 
 The {''ortilieatioiis of l)('li;«rad, translated l>y Major ('. Woodward, IM:. ^"ol. 
 
 l\', l!.K. I., Oeia.sioiial |ia|ierH. 
 I'. •_>;<. :{•-', 4'-', <IJ '.t4. Itili \M. Vol. \', l!.i;.I., ( tcxasional ).ai»is. 
 
 i 
 
 fer itself 
 of war, 
 II retain 
 f,'ive an 
 'i^litiiif,^ 
 f^'' power 
 i power 
 din;.,' its 
 f which 
 number 
 nobility 
 e cum- 
 
 m 
 
 'CCiJ'/AIJ 
 
 ition is 
 and to 
 s ^dven 
 
 latioii on 
 
^ 
 
 HP 
 
 52 
 
 USE OF FIFI.n lORTIIirATION r'.V Tlir. ATTACK. 
 
 ili 
 
 USK of FIELDFoirriFICATloN liY THE ATTACK. 
 
 It is sc'lf-C'vidciit that this use of iMfld-l^ortiliratif)]! must, from 
 tlie nature of the Attack, he very Mmited. Nevertheless the 
 l)eiietits conferred l)y l''ield-I''ortitication on the Attack are con- 
 siderahh; and are i^nowin;,' in importance, and this because the 
 increased accuracy of Hrearms demands increased cover.* It 
 wouhl seem, therefore, that this part of the subject now recpiires 
 separate treatment from tlie apphcation of I'"ieUl-I"\)rtitication to 
 the Defence. + 
 
 The nature of the work, and wliere it is to be done, can be 
 arrived at from a consideration of the manner in which the attack 
 of a Position is carried out, bearin/^' in mind tlie f^'eneral principles 
 of attack j^'iven at paj^^e }. It will be sufficient fortius purpose to 
 consider the main phases of the attack. 
 
 In the first place for a frontal attack : 
 
 The lirst phase is the Artillery preparation, ajid it calls for the 
 followinj,' works : Cover for j^muis, clearinf,' the line of fire of ^Mins, 
 communications, and shelter for the Infantry party coverini,^ tlu> 
 ;^Mms. 
 
 When the Artillery preparation is completed an advance will 
 be made a},^'unst some stronj; points of the enemy's Position, and 
 the capture of one or more of these points may decide the action. 
 Durinj^ this advance clicks will probably be experienced, when 
 cover, natural or artificial, will be found of f^neat advantajj^e not 
 only to protect tiie troops but also to meet a possible counter- 
 attack. And further obstacles may have to be surmounted durinj.,' 
 tl'.e advance. 
 
 If, liowcver, the capture of one or more of the stron;^^ points 
 does not decide the action, only two cases can occur as rej^^ards 
 any one of the captured stron;^' points. 
 
 1. In the tirst case the stroiif^ point can be held ; it can then 
 be used as the fulcrum of a lever, as it were, to obtain access to 
 contif^'uous parts of the Position, and thus finally to capture the 
 whole line of defence. This implies securin;^' captured jj^round. 
 
 2. In the second case the stronjij point cannot be held, when, if 
 possible, the captured works should be destroyed so as to lessen 
 the difficulties of the succeedinj,' attack. 
 
 A second line of defence must, almost invariably, be treatetl 
 similarly to the above. 
 
 •Seep. 321, Minor Tactics, by U.-Col. Clery, r>th Edition. 
 
 fTliis distinction in the uses of Field- KortiHcation is made hy Major Fraser, 
 R.E., in bisliold Medal Essay, Vol. XXIII, Journal, K.U.8.1. 
 
OIIKNSIVF. rSK ; NATl'RK OF TIIK WORK TO V.V. DONE 
 
 53 
 
 list, from 
 -'less tilt; 
 are roii- 
 aiisc the 
 crJ It 
 rc(|uircs 
 'atioii tf> 
 
 , ran \)c 
 le attack 
 riiiciplcs 
 
 lI'|)()St' to 
 
 ; for the 
 of f^nins. 
 riiif,^ the 
 
 lice will 
 on, and 
 actif)!!. 
 1, when 
 af,'-e not 
 :ounter- 
 I durinjj^ 
 
 ; points 
 rcj;,far(ls 
 
 m then 
 cess to 
 nre the 
 Dund. 
 
 vlien, if 
 lessen 
 
 treated 
 
 r Fiaaer, 
 
 ^1 
 
 I 
 
 In the second place, \{ ',\ JJank attack in force is to he made the 
 ^Moiind in front of the Position to he captured may he held de- 
 fensively so as to contain the entMiiy. Hy the use of intrechments 
 this can he effected with a smaller number of im-n, so that a 
 larj^'er force can he enii)lo)ed in the tlank attack. The flank 
 attack will of course proceed locally as a frontal attack. 
 
 Lastly, i)rovision should be made aj^'ainst possible reverse, thus 
 a Position ojiposite to that held by the enemy may be intrenched, 
 under covi'r of which a frontal attack can be delivered, and fur- 
 ther, rear-},Miard Positions alon;,^ the line of retreat should, if pos- 
 sible, be prepared. 
 
 I'rom the above it will be seen that the assailant of a Position 
 iiia\- use I'^ield-l'^ortification for two distinct purposes. 
 
 The first is to assist and cover the advance towards the enemy's 
 Position. This is the offensive use and it consists in— 
 
 1. Clearinj^' the field of fire for guns. 
 
 2. Covering troops. 
 
 J. Making communications (for the advance towards the 
 Position.) 
 
 4. Demolition of the enemy's works. 
 
 The second is to secure certain Positions against the counter- 
 attac-k of the enemy. This is a purely defensive use, and it ma\' be 
 applied to three different cases, namely — 
 
 1. Securing captured ground. 
 
 2. Preparing rear-guard Positions. 
 
 3. Intrenching a Position opposite to the enemy's — 
 (a J To free troops for a Hank attack. 
 
 (h) To cover a frontal attack if unsuccessful. 
 
 The nature of the works required will first be considered and 
 afterwards then- application to the ground. 
 
 OFKEXSIVK USE. 
 NATl'IiE OF TllK WORK TO liR DONE. 
 
 Owing to the very short time available and to the fact that the 
 greater part of the work will iiave to be executed under fire, it is 
 clear that only that of a very hasty type will be suitable, and 
 further, the amount of work that can be done will generally be 
 much limited for the same reasons. 
 
^ 
 
 54 
 
 rsic (»i' I II I 1) loKiii icAiioN' I'.v riir attack. 
 
 ( I I. AKIM, 
 
 III', I lll.j) (II I IKi:. 
 
 ) I 
 
 M- 
 
 'riif wni k tli:it iii;i\ li;i\c to l>c done is the same as tliat dcsciilt- 
 va\ in 's> N4 I''. 
 
 I'KI.I'AU'ATKiN Ol" COVl-.K. 
 
 Tlic (-((Ncr for IiifaiitiA w ill. in most rases, be limited to slielter 
 trenches of sli,i;lit piotile foi the shootin;^' line. Tiie cover for 
 ^MUis will consist of the f^Mui-jiits and i^am-epauinients (lesciibcd 
 in vN .S<j I'.* 
 
 "On tlic cvciiiii;; of tin- T-'tli Si|ptiiiil)cf tlif Allied Army lu'id ^inicticiilly t)i«> 
 H.aiiK^ ]i(>Mitiiiii HH (111 tlic Kttli, witii tll<■^^(llt• iiilditiipii uf the (Jrivitza rcdmilit. Tin- 
 lifittcrifs still ri'iiiiiiiH'il witliin slimt riinf.'c of tiic Turkish works, liiit ^wnt clloits 
 were iiiiiilc to iiii|ii'ov(' tlifir covci', aiiil tlinnit;liout tlic liJtli aixl I4tli, in view of the 
 ](ossiliility of :i 'PurkiHli attiu'k, tlie lliiMsiaii troops worked diiy hikI nij^lit, tlirowiiin 
 up Infantry trenehes iill ;ilon>; the front, from the (irivit/.a redoubt south to the 
 l!iidicht!V(i ridgi!, imd then west ivlonj; the latter nearly to the Tutsehenit/.a ravine, "t 
 
 l'Ki:i'AUAri()\ Ol- COMMCMCATIONS. 
 
 Apart from the commnnications re(|iiired between the various 
 bodies of troops npproiiclws will bo needed to enable the trf)ops to 
 advance to thi' assault. The work to \)v. done in the execution of 
 these apjiroaches will jiarti ilK' bi; tlit^ same as that reciuiicd for 
 the comnnniications of the defence, but it must be executed in 
 much ;,'rcater haste and frecpiently nnder fire; and further, in- 
 cludes makin.t,' ojx'uinj^^s in some kinds of parapet.s and surnionnt- 
 in;.; artificial obstacles. 
 
 "The French put a sinmihir, new and iJromlHinK iiuxle of .ittaek in practieo 
 iigainst l,e IJour^'et and also aL'ainst Chateau Ladonchamps, north of Metz. They 
 ad\aiii'etl from Oranuy and Woippy respeetively, against these |daees hy Hying sap. 
 The armistiee, and in the other case the capitulation, interrupted this work which 
 had already progresaed far. "t 
 
 MAKISd lil'KNIN(.S IN DKFKNCKM. 
 
 Tlu-' Old}' defences to which this api)lies are stf)ckade.s, lo<,f 
 parapets and walls, when over a certain hei^^dit. If an openinj,' 
 cannot be made by Aitiller\- lire it can hv. effected by ^'unpowder 
 or i^MUicotton as ex|)lained in " Use of Ivxplosives." 
 
 sriiMnI NTIMi AKTIKICIAI. 1 ilisrACI.KS. 
 
 It is of course unnecessary to make tiie ol)staclc passable at 
 every point, ant! in fact a passa;,'e about 20 yards wide is all that 
 is necessary for eacli assaulting,' cf)lumn. 
 
 *A description of the works executed hy the Russians in their attack on the 
 (ireen-hills (I'lcvna) will he found at ji. 'J.'U and '2.3.">, and the methods of tracing an<l 
 executing these works at p. 'I'M to 'J4l, \'ol. \', K.K. 1., ( tccjinioiuil papers. 
 
 +"Plevna," l>y Cajit. (i. S. Clarke, H.K., Vol. V, H.K.I., Occasional papers. 
 tl>uke of Wurtemlierg. (Translated by [{obinson. ) 
 
 i 
 
OFFKNSIVI-: t'SI". : NATl'KI <H IIll \M>lxK I<i IW IX'NI'. 
 
 .■)D 
 
 S-; 
 
 Several ()l)st:iclfS, siuli as (litclu-s, al»attis. ciitaii^jlriiinits, 
 crow's fut't, etc., can l)e passed by iiiakiii;^' roii;,'!) hriil};;i's over 
 tliein by iiuaiis of sacks of straw, bay oi sbaviii^'s. fascims. bur- 
 dies, planks, doors, ladders, etc. Tbese iiiatirials would be 
 bronj,dit up l>y a carryiuj,' part\- sptcially told oft". 
 
 In addition to tbc abosc f^^iiicral iiu'tliod various kinds of 
 obstacles can be surmounted as follows : 
 
 .l/nf///.s.— This obstacle is most <lifficult to demolisli if made of 
 <;reen timber. Probably tlir only feasible plan is to ;;radually cut 
 away the branches with axes, pullin;,' out the disentan^^led poi- 
 tions, usin;; ropes if necessary. If the abattis is interwoven with 
 wire the difficulties will be nnich increased ; the wire can be cut 
 throu},di by means of })liers or a sword. If tlu- tind)er is dry, 
 whi(h is not veiy likely, or if pine; or fu" ha^ bi'cn employed, pro- 
 bably the best way is to si't lire to the abattis. either \)y nuans of 
 incendiary shells or by pouring' coal oil over it and i^niitin;^'. 
 
 lintaui^lcmcuts. — Those made of brushwood oi- trees can be 
 treated somewhat in the sanu' maimer as abattis. 
 
 W'^c cntaui^lcmcnt. — The wire can \)v cut throu^^di with pliers or 
 witli ;i sword. Or if the j^rounil is soft the pickets ma}' be torn 
 out of the f,n"onnd. 
 
 7<'"<-'.v gabion band trip. — The wire connectin;^' the hoops can be 
 severed. 
 
 C7u'T'(n<.v-Jt'-/r/.sr. — This obstacle can be rolled to one* side, but 
 if it has been connected b}- wire or chains the connections should 
 be cut throuj^di by means of ;;uncotton. 
 
 Palisades and I'^raiscs can be cut down by means of a.\(.'S or bv 
 detonatinj;- j^uincotton or dynamite aj^'ainst them, as explained in 
 " Cm: wl Explosives." 
 
 Pointed stakes can be cut with an axe, or can be pulled up if the 
 j^Mound is soft. 
 
 Imtndatiims may be crossed by means of hj^ht Infantry pon- 
 toons or Berthon's collapsible boats. I"!very att( uipt should, of 
 course, be made to cut throuf^h the dam either by Artillery fire 
 from a distance, or by manual labom- if the dam can be reached 
 by a workiu}^' j)arty. 
 
 DivMOLiTioN t)i- IIII-, i:ni;mv's works ai ri:K cAiTrKi;. 
 
 It has already been seen that the endeavour to destrox' the 
 works captured from the i iiemy wouM '>•■ made, when these 
 works cannot be ludd and it is intended to renew dn ittac k be- 
 fore the dama^a; dont- could be li'paired. The nietlicl of dciiuL; 
 he work beinj,^ nearly self-evident it will \^v mniecessary to enter 
 into any details. 
 
 'i 
 
mrnKmr^rm^ii^rv^ 
 
 P«flfJ,,y„. 
 
 5^) 
 
 USli OF Ml LI) F-OKTIFICATION UV THE ATTACK. 
 
 MTLlt'ATlOX TO THE allOVXJ). 
 
 It is evident that in the nuijority of cases the sites of tht: works 
 are very nearly determined by circumstances over wliic'i eitlii'r 
 no control can be exercised, namely, the position of the enemy's 
 works, or which caimot altof^ether be foreseen, namely, the course 
 of the hf^dit ; and further, the choice must, in most cases, be 
 made on the spur of the moment, there beinj,' no time for a tielib- 
 crate choice as in the case of the defence. Nevertheless, how- 
 ever small the field of choice, it will nt)t in ^^enerai be a matter of 
 indifference what site is selected for the work, and this selection 
 will depend in the first place on tactical and to a minor extent on 
 technical considerations. The tactical considerations will partly 
 be the same as those for the defence, and the tc'clmical consider- 
 ations will evidently be rrecisely the same. Only the former neeil 
 therefore now be mentioned. 
 
 CLEAKINC; THE 1TI:L1) OI- ITKi:. 
 
 This is the "one thinj^ the attack cannot dispense with,"- and 
 will principally consist in clearing; the line of lire for the ;;ims. 
 Any cover close to the j,'uns that mij^dit conceal the enemy's skir- 
 n ushers should also be cut down. 
 
 PKErAKATloN OF COVER. 
 
 IN KAN TRY. 
 
 The protection of the Infantry covering,' the j,Mms is, at pn-sent, 
 the only case in which cover for Infantry is used purely offen- 
 sively. 
 
 The duty of the Infantry coverin;^' the j,'uns is to prevent the 
 j^^nnners from bein^j; annoyed by the enemy's skirmishers, and the 
 tactical reciuirements infiiiencinj^' the choice of the site are — 
 
 I. A clear view of the ;,u"ound in front, if pt)ssible up to the 
 enemy's Position. 
 
 2.. Protection from the defender's fire. 
 
 \. Sufficiently far in front of the j^miiis to keep the enemy's 
 skirmishevs beyoml musketry rauf^^e of them. 
 
 The first two considerations re(|uire no comment, and the third 
 will be frdfilled if the site is not less than Noo yards in front of 
 the Junius. 
 
 The fdlUiwing incident from the attack of Lovtcha l)y thi; Hiissiaii.s in 1.S77 « ill 
 exciiiiilify tlie ahovt". 
 
 "During t)it' iiij^lit of tlic lut Sf|(tfiMl)t itlu- hill At was iiitr<^iii'ht'il, ami liatt<'ri«'H 
 for 1\ ^uiiH wcrt' thrown \\\< on the hill lit, covcrfil hy .shelter trenches in front. "J 
 
 *(!oltl Medal KsHay, IM'.S. I., Major Fraser, I!. K. 
 
 tThese hills were Hituatecl ahoiit IO(K) yards in front ol the Turkish Position. 
 
 i" rieviia," hy Capt. «i. S. Clarke, U.K., Vol. \'., K.K.I., < kcasional jiajiei-.s. 
 
OFFENSlVIi USE ; Al'l'LlCATIoN To Tllh t,Kt)LND. 
 
 57 
 
 and 
 
 AKTII.I.F,)!V. 
 
 In selecting sites for f:^uns tlic following requirements shouUl be 
 kept in view : 
 
 1. To concentrate the tire on the enemy's works and guns. 
 
 2. Protection from the enemy's fire. 
 
 3. Good conmiunications. 
 
 4. Favourable positions for lind^ers close at hand. 
 
 'To fulfil the rtrst recjuirement it is considered that the guns 
 should be nuissed in large batteries so arranged as to concentrate 
 their lire on the v.irious strong points and guns of tlu; defensive 
 Position, i.e., their hre should converge. In deciding on the 
 number of guns to bear on each point it should hv considered 
 that, although the heaviest hre ought to be brought to l)ear on 
 the point or jioints which it is intended to attack, yet at the same 
 time the enemy should be kept in ignorance of the real point of 
 attack, and thus .\rtillery tire will have to be brought to bear on 
 ]>oints which it is not intt'uded to attack. There should further, 
 if possible, be some batteries from which the enemy's Position 
 can be enfiladed. 
 
 The remaining reciuirements can be fulfilled as in the case of 
 the defence. t 
 
 PKIir.AK.ATloN OF COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 The communications to the above works will in no wise differ 
 as to site from those recpiired by the defence. The conmumi- 
 c.itit)ns retjuired for the advance to the attack will of necessity 
 depeml on the direction of the attack. 
 
 "Ill ortlrr to I'lHiiu'ct tlic caiiturcd redoulit ((Irivit/.a) with tin; i!<iuiii;iiiiiin I'u.si- 
 tioii, a deep trench, almiit lIKWt yards 111 lerigtli, was carried fnnii tlie former to a 
 small outwork .ajitured on the Sth Sept., forming' a covered way hadinj,' to tho 
 redoulit. "X 
 
 "!)uriiig the actions of tiie .'{Otli and .'{1st Auj^'ust. culminating,' in the catastroplie 
 of Sedan, tlie KnL;iiieers of the Army of tlie Meuse not only constructed and restored 
 many hrid>,'e« over the .Meuse and the Chiers, hut also fou^'ht with the infantry in 
 'he storming of iteaumout and Mon/.on "s 
 
 "When the \lth Corps arrived i)efore the j-Vcnch i'osition at Worth, the Com- 
 manding i'lngineer (Mlicer strongly urged that the light liridgc train shoidil at once liu 
 hrought up for the passage of the Saui-r. The <;eneral, ho\ve\cr, did not accede to 
 
 liiH re(|uest, which appears to have I n a mistake, as innsiduraiile delay Jind loss 
 
 occurred in crossing the stream. The pontoons did not arrive untd I cm., liut the 
 
 ''I'heHe consider.'itions lielong strictly to Tactics, hut are inserted for the sake of 
 completeneHs. 
 
 tSee p. !t7, \ ol. \', U.K.I., Ociasional papers. 
 
 .!;'I'levna,' hy ('apt. <i. S, Clarke, l!.K., \'ol. \', K.K.I., Occasional pap( rs. 
 
 i^Seo OtHcial account of the Kranco-Cierinan War, 187<> 71, p. .■<(>'_', I'urt I, \ ol, •_'. 
 
 S"FieI<l Kngineering," l>y l<t..Col Schaw, H.K., Vol. Will, .hmrnal U.l'.S.l. 
 
 s1| 
 
 I 
 
mt 
 
 58 
 
 USK OF l'Ii:i.l) lOKTIIICATIoN liV IMK ATIACK. 
 
 i , 
 
 third jiioiieer company siu'ccedi'd in conntriiutin^ tlin^o foot l)ri(lj,'fs out of lioji ]u\\c» 
 at^pachhac'li, niiiuli earliiT in tliu day, l)y wliic'li the tirst troops crossed. 'I'lu'Si' 
 biWgt's, although occasionally injiirctl ))y I'rench shells, were of great value, and 
 saved part of the Vth Corps from disast(;r, when they weri' forced hack from tiieir 
 first unsuccessful assault on Kro'schwiller. As soon as the \illage of Worth was car- 
 ried by the Vth Corps, the 1st pioneer company attached to them repaired the tiiri'c 
 ])ridges over the Saner, in that village, which the Krench had destroyed. The '2nil 
 pioneer company also made twc) ailditioual bridges helow Worth, out of such mate- 
 rials as could he found there. During tlie execution of these works both companies 
 Huirere<l severely from the French lire "* 
 
 "As the various corps concentrated around Sedan, the engineers M'ere employed 
 in bridging tiit; Aisne and the Meusc (the latter here a sticani about fl"> yards wiile 
 and 1*2 feet deep), and in destroying the bridges and railways that miijht be of us<! to 
 tiic Kreneh." Some of these bridges had been maile unilcr lire "* 
 
 "During the course of the battle of Sedan, tin? pioneers of the l\'tli Corps con- 
 tttructed a nundierof small foot bridgesover the streams and ravines east of iia/eilles. "* 
 
 DKFKNSIVE T'SK. 
 
 x.irinf-: of riiE woiti< to he dosk. 
 
 Tlie principK's rcj^Milatiii^' the dt-sij^ni of works for piiii'K' (K'fVii- 
 sivc pmposcjs liavc already been j^nven, and are clearly apjdieahle 
 in the present case without alteration, so that the work to be done 
 will not, as a rule, differ from that already described, but since the 
 time available is {.generally short, works of a hasty descrij)tion 
 will be the most suitable. I""or securing,' captured j.,a"ound, how- 
 ever, tlu; cover thrown uj) by the defenders may have to be adapted 
 for use a,i,Minst him, and the way of doin.i;' this must therefore be 
 considered. 
 
 ADAiTATioN OF Till': f:ni:mv's wokks. 
 Tools. 
 
 The tools available will be such as the troops can carr}- with 
 them when advancinj.,^ to the attack. This is one of the cases in 
 which i^Meat advantaf,^es would hv gained were each Infantry sol- 
 dier to carry an intrenchin;.,'^ tool. 
 
 This was cxemplitied on many occasions tluring tlie investment of Plevna, as the 
 following extracts will show. 
 
 "The residt of this miserable provision (of tools) was seen iluring the night of tlie 
 Iltli September, when the troops, in sheer despair, were driven to use their haiicls, 
 their canteen covers, ,>nil their bayonets. Tiie position of the force on tiie morning 
 of the I'ith would have been very ditl'creiit had a night's labour with a proper supply 
 of tools been acliii'ved. This instance of tin- dire want of tools was not by any means 
 is(dated; and the whole ex]ierience ot the war points to the absolute necessity of pro 
 vjding Infantry with a liben-tl supjdy of intrenching tools for executing hasty trciuli- 
 work, and these tools must on oi'casion, even if not .always, be carried i)y the soldier. 
 This provision is as nei'cssary in the iitlml: ;is in the defence, ami the a|)horism that 
 in the present day troitjis must 'ilig or die', is no mere tigure of speech, "t 
 
 •"Field Kngineering, " by l,t. Col. Sdiaw, IM': , Vol. W III. .bnirnal il.l'.S.I. 
 t"l'levna," by ('.apt. (i. S. Clarke, It.K., in \ ol. \', It. K.I., 1 (ccjisional papers. 
 
 «^ 
 
Di'i'i'.N'sivi'. rsi-; ; naitu'I'. (»i" thi-. uokk io r.i. doni:. 
 
 5'' 
 
 Th 
 
 .'U(l 
 
 'I'lii' iiii'idciit rolVrrcd t(i \v:ih the l!iissi:in dctViici' ut' tin' ciiiitmi'd Tiirki.sli re- 
 (li)nlits, Nos. '.U'l jiiid .'{7; and M.'ijor KrasiT, li.K.. siicakiii^' of the .same iruideut, shvh: 
 
 "So when the Turks a;4aiii advanced, tlie Ku.s.sians, to repel tlieiii, had ti> 
 
 form line ontMilt, and tioTe, with the few tools they had, tiirew up two hits of shel- 
 ter-trench across the 'I'nrkisli trench, Witli means to do it, tiiey might have hceu 
 secured in the redoidits at 5 !•. M.; instead of tliis, all the night long this same struggle 
 to intriiuli went on. Footings in the counter scar[i, to use tht- glacis as a parapet, 
 were iiotcheil out with sword hasduets, ai\d witii these and their hands they tttre 
 doun the sod traverses ami the lilindages to harricade the gaps. 15ut with all this, 
 and in s[(ite of the consummate hravery with wliich tiiey n^sisted all attacks, tliey 
 could develop no length of intrenched front with wiiich to rt^iel attacks or to soreeii 
 their flanks. Hence, with losses too great for them to face the final etl'ort, the works 
 of the defenders had to l>e abandoned, ami the strength of an army corps had heen 
 spent for naught."* 
 
 If tlicit; is ;i likelihood of work of a technical nature l)ein}.( re- 
 quiii'd, and it should he possihle- to foresee sn(di an eventuality, 
 then Kn;.,Mneers should aeeonipany the attackin^^ troops, and they 
 would carr\- wuh tlieni picks and shovels, crowlxirs, mason's 
 points and haiuniers, saws, ^.(uncotton and j.,'unpowder, etc. 
 
 Matcriah. 
 
 The niatm'ials will he those of which the defender's works are 
 constructed. 
 
 AKAl'T.iriciN OK V.\l;IOlS WoUKS. 
 
 Shelter trenches. — -The hest way will prcjhahly be to shovel the 
 parapet across the trench. 
 
 Earthen breastworks, such as the one j.,Mven in FiJ.,^ 9 PL. T, F, 
 can he adapted by scarpiu;.; the orij.,Mnal exterior slo[)e, usinj.; part 
 of the earth thus obtained to reverse the su})erior slope, and, if the 
 soil is not stiff enou.^h to stand at tin.' recpiired slope-, the defetider's 
 revetment can, in some cases, be utilized. Tlu; oii'^nnal front 
 trench becomes the rear trench, and steps may be cut in it. 
 
 Larger earthen parapets can be treated in the same way, but the 
 tinu! recjuired may be excessive. It would then be best to com- 
 mence with rude lod.i^ments in the extiaior slope. 
 
 Hecli^^es, 7i'alls, /oo- parapets and even stockades reijuire as a rule 
 but a l)an(inette which can be made of earth, or of the niati-rials 
 composing; the defender's bampiette if other than earth. 
 
 Field-Works. — If the j^^orj^e is opiii or only closed by a slij.,dit 
 paraj)et conunanded b\' works in rear, the best plan will probabl\- 
 be to adapt the parapets of the tornu'r faces .is dc'scribed above ; 
 the flanks will very probably be entiladed, and, therefore, in most 
 cases shelter trench Hanks will be required. If the ;.;or;.,''e is closed 
 its parapet should be streiij^theiied and repaired if necessar\-. and 
 lor conmnmication a passaL,^' should Ix; cut tluou^^h the parapet 
 of the orij.^Mnal faccis i-onnected to ramps leadin^'^ in and out of the 
 ditch, or if the materials are at haml a brid;.;e may b(' thrown 
 across. 
 
 "Gold Medal Kssay, R. U.S.I. 
 
Go 
 
 usi: or Fii.r.n fortification r,v ruv. attack. 
 
 I 
 
 liliiKhi'^cs may be oft(Mi tunuMl to accouiil, bill bcin;^^ as a niK- 
 open to tlw. rear portions iiia\' have to Ixj dcstroyi'il to coinplcte 
 tlic hlindiii}^^ of the riMiiaindLT. 
 
 " The covcriiif,' of j^miiis, always difficult in woiks, is in sncli 
 cases a qiu.'stionable task."* 
 
 At I'lovna Sk(>lielotl'br(Hij,'lit HitiiU! {(iins into one of tlu; two works Jie captured, 
 li:it of t'» whicli he eitlier Itroiiglit in or civ|itiireil in tlie work ,'> were ilisniountt^l. 
 
 "On tlif apjiroiicli, too, of nij,'lit, tlio i-oiiHtruction of lo(lf,'nu'nts on tlie sidi! of 
 tlie Krisliina rt'doiiht, and tlit^ i-onvt^rpion of the captured trenches for tlu; use of our 
 troops, waH at once put in liand. Stall-Captain Kourop.-itkina was aide, whilst th<!re 
 was still day!i;;ht, to trace these lines. 'I'liey were traced one hundred paces in rear, 
 on th«! open side of the redoubt; and a part of these trenches in front of the Krishina 
 redoubt were worked into the j,'eneral front by two new lodj,'nients, the least advanced 
 of which prolonj,'ed tht; line of the enemy's trenches, conneetini; the two redoidtts 
 (captured.) 'J'lie almost entire absence of field intrenching,' to(ds renderiMl this task 
 very clillicidt for the troops. The soldiers who understood the importance of cover, 
 tluji up thi^ earth with the covt'rs of their mess tins, with th(^ bay<met, or with their 
 sabres, and removed it by hanil. The shelter huts of the Turks were demolisheil, 
 ;ind the branches used to strenjithen the earthen parapt^ts. 'A'e found tlie traverses 
 constructed by the enemy of sods particularly useful, as they wiM-e so easy to demo- 
 lish by hand. 
 
 "In order to turn tht; enemy's intrencdiinents to account, the soldiers were 
 ordered to strip tlit^ sods from the ]iarapets, and to shelter thcmselvt^s with them 
 froiu the atlversary. Finally, in the ditches of the redoubts, which were twelve feet 
 deep, the soldiers duj^ tliijmselves pits in the counterscarp, which took them breiist 
 hiyh. The larj,'est works were carried out in No. 1 redoubt. t 
 
 \'illa;^i's iDul uukhIs. — This is not strictly an adaptation of the 
 lU'fcnder's works, for the assailant will recpiire his works for 
 secnrin}.,' such localities just where in all probability there will be 
 none; of the defender's works, namely, on tlu> border on the de- 
 fender's side. This border should \)c defendtMl accordin;^ to the 
 usual rules in the first instance, and if time allows, a second line 
 of defence and accessory works can be prepared. 
 
 APPLICATION TO rilE G/i'ilX/). 
 
 'idle (dioiei' of the Position to be oerujiied and of the sites of 
 the vaiious works will evidently be subject to tiic r(!(|uircnieiits 
 oiven when treating' of the defence of a Position, althou;.,di in 
 many cases these reiiuirements can only be fulfilled to a very 
 limited e.vtent, for instance, when securinj,' captured j^round. 
 
 The three cases in which iMeld-l'ortification can be employed 
 defensively by the attack will be considered separately. 
 
 SF.CURINf; CAPriKI-.I) C.ROrNI). 
 
 In this case there is clearlv little or no latitude for choice, and 
 the recpiirements of the defence will have but a small infhieiice. 
 
 (odd Me.Ial Kssfty, It. I'. S.I. .\I.ijor Tra.ser, IM:. 
 tlJeport of Lieut, (leneral Skobclell, \ ol. II, K.IO.I., Occasional 
 
 papers. 
 
ni.ir N'si\'i: rsi: : aim'i.ka'iiox to riii: r.Korxn. 
 
 f.r 
 
 ".\lt<'l- tlir li;;lit ;it S;i;irlprurki'ri, we learn tliat ill tin- I'liui'.sc nt tin' Stli Aiimist 
 tlu! I'ositiim sii ilcaily \miii at S|iiilii;n'ii was fnrtil'u'il, lest tlic I'liciny rctiirniiiu; in 
 fiircc! sliduld ri'j^'aiii what ln' liail lost. Tlio fortitiraticins cnnsistnl iif min-jiits north 
 
 lit Spii'licrcn, lit ahatti.-i furnicil alnnj^ tlic eclj^'o uf the w lot" S|iic'licrcn, and of fuiti- 
 
 tvinn the \illau'('uf Ilt/Iin;.'. hut the works were nut cciniiplctfil, as tlie news uf the 
 retreat of the P'runeli niaile theiri unnecessary. "' 
 
 "Karly in the day tho I'nissians ;4aineil iicssessinn nl' \"i(in\ iUe, on the \'erdun 
 road: the instant tlie Infantry "^nt in, two eiini|panies of Mn^ineers su|i|ilied with six 
 wageoiis of tools were ])iishecl om; tliey were < hari^ed liy a rei^inientof I'lcneh hussars 
 and lost some of tlie wau'oiis and a sertion of one of the eonipanies, Imt tlie reniainiler 
 ^ot in to the village, and so streniitlieiied it that ail tlie attenqits iriadi- to retake it 
 failed. .And althonuh at the elose of the day the I'russi m i'i.;ht and left wini;s wc^re 
 forced hack l>y the French, yet the vdla;^«' of \ionville, forniin;,' the apex of the 
 Prussian I'osition, was never lost, and etl'ectually harred the road to N'erdun. Here 
 fortitication was used correctly; it eonlirnicd and estahlished the success of the In- 
 fimtry, and secured the object for which the I'russians struj,'j^le<l so hard on the l(!th."l' 
 
 "The moment the I'russians carried St. I'rivat their Kn^ineers strengthened it, 
 and formi'd a shelter trench between it and the crest of the hill, with an epaulnicnt 
 on its ri>;ht tiank threatening; that portion of the French I'osition still defended. "+ 
 
 "At '2 A.M. on the '.(til Senteniher, Skohidefl' received orders that the jfencral as- 
 sault was )M»*tponcd, and he drew liack his Itii^ht Win:; slit;litly, intrenching,' it on 
 till' 1st Knoll lietween the Kovtcha-I'levna road and tin,' Tnf sclienit/a ravine. Here 
 'two deep trencin's' were «IulC, and the ^'idiinil in fi'ont, forniini,' a natural j^lai'is, 
 atl'ordiMl a good lield of fire. "I; 
 
 "We took possession of the line of advanced ]iosts after a desperate I'ncoiinter. 
 I hastened to have such works executed as were necessary to enalile nie to defend it 
 liy tiirnin;; its front aj,'aiiist the reltels, and I maintaineil the conipiered I'osition in 
 Hpite of all their etl'orts to dislodge me. "j 
 
 i'Ki;i'.\Ki.\'<; Ki;.\K-r,rAKi) i-osniox. 
 
 A rcar-j^nard Pi^sitioii will only conif into use after a iK'fi'at, 
 an<l in this (-onditinn tlu,' .issailant is in nowise (liffcrcnt from the 
 hratcn (k'fcndrrs of a Position. .\ tcar-^uard Position woidd 
 therefore hi" ocrujiied i)in('ly defeiisivcly. 
 
 I.! 
 
 •inrl 
 
 iNrKi;N"(iiiX(", A I'osri'iox oi-posiri". ro rn:-. i:xi:Nn- s rosrnox. 
 
 This is an ordinary case of the defence of a Position, and wlie- 
 tlier it is held to assist a tlank attack or to coxcr a frontal attack 
 it would be occupied imrely defi'usively. It niiL;hl he objected to 
 this, that in the cas(> when the Position is held tocoxrra possible 
 unsuccessful offensix'e ino\-enient that it should be occupied offen- 
 sivel)'(lelensively. but the "offensive-defensi\t' ' in\(il\i'S approxi- 
 mate ('(piality of the conteiidin^'^ paities, whereas the necessit\- for 
 usini,' a defensive coverin,!.; position i)y tin; attack implies tempo- 
 rary inferiority, namely, durint; tlii' time such aid is re(piire<l. It 
 
 ""Field KiigitietMing," hy Lt. ( 'ol. Schjiw, l!.i;., Vol. \ \' 1 1 1, .lournal lt.r..S.|. 
 t"rreeis of Modern Tactics," hy Lt.Col. Ilonu', U.F. 
 
 I'Tlevna." l.y Captain <i. S. Clarke, I!. I]., \'ol. \', U.K.I., (Iccasional papers. 
 See also "Skoheled's trench attack on thedreen hilU" in the same \oluine, p liM. 
 
 i^iCinei'al Wright's report on the attack of llirlimoinl and I'etersliurg American 
 War of SeeesHiiui. 
 
^ 
 
 MP 
 
 (Vl 
 
 HSIC Ol- I'lI'.I.I) FORTIFICATION l;V rill'. ATTACK. 
 
 f: 
 
 ' 
 
 will also l)c ()l)S('r\i.'(l that in tiu,' latter case the attack takes place 
 before the works an: used, and that if successful the works would 
 not directly he einploxcd. In a Position occupied offensively- 
 defensivel}- on the contrary the use of the works precedes tht; 
 attack. In clioosin;;' the I'osition the two followin^^ special con- 
 siderations must 1)0 taken into account. 
 
 1. To he able to meet an attack ol the defender's comin;;' from 
 their Position. 
 
 2. To be within strikin.i,^ distauci' of the defender's Position. 
 
 The object of the fn-st re(iuirement is self-e\ident, and is hd- 
 tilled if the Position ( liosen is approximately parallel to that 
 occupied by the defenders, and is co-extensive witli it. 
 
 As rej^ards the second recpiirement. if the Position is occupied 
 to assist a flank attack it can onlv do so if it can contain the 
 enemy ; and if occupicul to cover a j)ossible reverse it nnist a;^^ain 
 be within strikinj^' distance to assist the beaten trooi)s. This 
 re(juirenu'nt is fultilled if the two Positions are about 1500 }ards 
 aj)art in the first case, and from 1500 to joot) yards from each 
 other in the second case.* 
 
 " And t)ii tl>e '■l'ti\\ Hinikcr's ooriis of Sherman's army canu! upon Hood's corps of 
 
 Johnston's army, strongly intrenched across its road at New Hope. 
 
 Then followed a series of reniarkahle <i]ieratii)ns, each army throwing up intrench- 
 ments and mann'uvring to outllank or tind a weak point in its a<lversary's lines. 
 Sherman grailually extended his left to reach the railway on the south side of the 
 Allatoona I'ass, while .lohnstoii followed his movements, watching for a chance of 
 attacking him successfully if lie weakened any part of his line too much in extending 
 it. Once he thought he saw his oportunity and attacked, hut the Federals were 
 found well protected by lireastworks and the attack failed. Kventually Sherman 
 reached the railway and opened the Allatoona I'ass to his trains and Johnston again 
 fell hack to a new I'osition from Kent'snw Mountain to Lost Mountain. Opposite 
 this I'osition again Sherman intrenched himself, waiting till a I'.dl in the heavy raiiiH 
 iiliould enable liim to reconnnence active operations. He still, however, kept U]) his 
 contact with Johnston. He says himself : 'Still I pressed ojierationa with the utmost 
 earnestness, aiming always to keep our fortified lines in absolute contact with the 
 enemy, while with the surplus force we felt forward, from one tlank or the other, for 
 his line of communii'ation and retreat. ' 
 
 Sherman himself, speaking in his memoirs of this campaign, says thiit his tactics 
 therein were to intrencii a moiety of his army in front of the enemy and turn his 
 Hank with the rest, "t 
 
 "Till! Kngineer, in virtue of the character which is jiarticular to his branch of 
 the Service, may hold an eijuilibrium in military operations. He may n-nder the 
 
 *For further information on tlie I'se of Field Fortification by the Attack see — 
 1'. 70 ~'l, \'ol. II. I{. M. I , Occasional papers. 
 1'. 7'!, Vol. Ill, li.F. I., Occasional [)a|)ers. 
 I'. KIS. 11.'), lllf. 7. \'ol. V, |{. K. I., Occasional p.apera. 
 I'. '.Vl\, Minor Tactics, by Lt.-('ol. Clerv, nth Kdiiion. 
 I'. WM :<70, Vol. X.\l II," Journal U.U.S.I. 
 
 1'. 'SM. 'lU, 'J.SS, I'art I, Vol. I. and I'. 'J!», S8, SIT), \VM\, SnO, .T.r., I'art I, \ol. 
 II, Franeo-lierman War of lS7<t 71, Otlicial account. 
 
 tl'ri/e lOssay, IS7!», It.U.S.i., Major Clayton, ILA. 
 
CONNECTION To THK SIKC.K OF A l-OKTRFCSS. 
 
 ^'3 
 
 KHi'cesH ^^ainiMl hy jiii iiniiutiiniiH attack secure ]>y <|uii'kly tlirowing up tield W(irkn 
 ln'liiiiil the attacking' furce, and in tlic same luaiiiier .stop a retreat l)y liastily-eou- 
 structeil intrenclinu'iits.tlie Imliling (if wliirli tlieii eoiu'eni.s tlie honour of the tmopH.'" 
 
 The Position intrenched hy the Turks in front of the Servian Position at PjuniH, 
 during the war of iSTli, was a ease of a I'osition occupied to cover a frontal attack. t 
 
 from 
 
 COXNK(TI(>N HKTWKKN TlfK ISH OK FIKF.D-KoltTl TICATION BY THK 
 ATTACK A.\l> TIIK .s I IK IK oK A I'oKTllKS.S. 
 
 That tlRTc i.s a coiiiuctioii hutwecii tlic use of I-'icld-Fortitica- 
 tioii 1)V the .\ttack and tin- Sicj,'t- of a Fortress will at onri' heroine 
 a|)|)arcnt when it is considered that the .\rtillerv is used for prac- 
 ti( all\ till- same purpose in hoth cases ; that tlu; lim- of invest- 
 ment and the defi'nsi\'e Position occupied hy the attacki'is are to 
 check the sorties of the lietenders, that the \arious parallels have 
 for one of their ohjects the securing,' of capturiMl ^^Mound, and that 
 the ap})roaches are l)ut co\ered communications. The main 
 principles involved .are the sanu.', and it is hut the nu-thod of exe- 
 cution which is difft-riMit. 
 
 To account for this differenci' it is necessary to compan; an 
 ordinary defensive Position with a fortiess. and it will he seen 
 that in the case of a fortress the woiks ari' proof a,L,^ainst assault 
 so lonj; as they are intact, but that in a defensible I'osition the 
 works are, as a rule, only partiall}- assault-j^roof a<.^ainst open 
 force. And it is for the very purpose of allowin-,'- of a successful 
 assault beinjj; made that a siej,'e is undertaken to make a hreacli 
 in the defences of the fortress and to ad\ance up to this breacdi ; 
 althou;.,di of course the fortress nui}' yit:ld before the rc;^niar sie},'e 
 is completed. 
 
 It would follow, therefore, that tlu' more difficult the assault of 
 the works of a fortilied l\)sition the mori' ni'arh' will tiie att.u k 
 approximate' to a sie^^U', i)i(nidi'(l always a iVontal attaid< is neces- 
 sary. And this is in fact the case : witness the investment of 
 lMe\na and more particularly the sici^c of the (iri\it/a retloubt.J. 
 
 *"Tactic<il rctrospi'ct," l)y Cajitain May. translatid liy Oiivry. 
 t.See Paper No. ill, \dl. I \', It.K. 1., Oceasion.tl |i;ip(is. 
 
 tPor a deseriptioii of these sii'ge works see pa^'es "J.'ili and •J.'^T, \'ol. \', I! !■!. I., 
 Occasional papers. 
 
 ■ fj 
 
 I. 
 
i 
 
 '» 
 
 .N. 
 
 ^'4 
 
 USI. ()!• IIi:i.I) lOKTIIlCATlON liV llll', ATTACK. 
 
 I ' 
 
 *» 
 
 ATTACK AND Dh'FLWCK o/' I'l KI.D-WollKs. 
 
 '\'\\v iiiciisurcs a(l()i)tc.'cl in tlii' attack and defence of I'^ield- 
 W'orks and the disposition of tlu' troops for tlie purjjose are 
 strictly (jucstions of Tactics. I5nt se\eral of tlii' oi)erations are 
 of a more or less technical nature, and as such come untler the 
 domain of the Military ICnj^dneer, beyond which a study of the 
 above will materially assist in j^dvin;^^ a clear idea of the nature 
 and arran;^a'ment of l*"ield-\\'orks. 
 
 These (piestions are dialt with in ^ 192-206 l'". 
 
 Tlu: I'dllowini,' iiiuiiU'iits lULniirud duriiii,' the attack of Fifld-rcdoiiljt.s in the 
 Uiisso-'riiikisli War of 1S77 S. 
 
 ". . . .As llu' ifdoiilit was iRari'd, a jioitioii of tlio IStli Hef,'imeiit carried some of tin: 
 llankiii;^ trunolu'.s, ami tiic iiitirval ln'twcfii tli<; two Itt'LjiiiU'iits. tliroiigli wliicli tlic 
 tu o liattdii'H had dircctctl tlicir tiri', lucaiiii' cIosimI uj). 'I'hu 17th Uc^iiiiciit linally 
 iiiadu a nisli for the ncloiiht, dt-sci'iidud into tlic ditch and dindicd the stce]i ami 
 slippery exterior slo]ie ou to tile parapet, wln're Colonel Sclditter, eoniinandin^' the 
 l!»;yiinent, was mortally wouiidi'il. A jiortion of the Istli Kei,'iment entered the 
 Ljor^'e ahoiit the same time, together with some Itoumanian troops of the 'Jnd Itille 
 liattaiion, who arrived from the Ndrtli-l')ast, wliile the rest of the hSth lleginient, 
 passin;4 round to the left of redoubt .No. 1, made an attack on No. 2, which, thonj^li 
 uiism icssfid, servetl to pruvent the arrival of reinforcements for the garrison of the 
 former work."' 
 
 " lint the want of artillery residts was not confined to I'levna; one of the most 
 
 reniarkalile instances occurred at (Jorni houhniak, on the Orclianie road, where 
 ( iourko, witii "Jd.OlM) men and r>4 ;,'nns, ailvanccd on three lines and made a concentric 
 attack on the two redoid)ts and outlying shelter trenches tiiat formed the post. 'I'ht; 
 former were muih inferior in resistiiii,' power ti> .-ome ot those at I'lexiia, and it 
 seemed, one Would iiave thought, that tlie yuns alone would sweep away not only 
 defenders liut diffcnccs. The aitiliery, whicii surrounded the post, tired for ti luuirs 
 at from '2, 100 to l.lSlMt yards ami less. The 'I'lirks (4,000 men with 4 guns) had to 
 depend oil infantry lire. 
 
 The (luard came on with a coui'ago beyond all praise. They had been sent for 
 
 th 
 
 e s;iv lours o 
 
 a8 
 
 vanceil, diet 
 
 f th 
 
 army: unworn oy war 
 
 iinhiiulered with th 
 
 ack, tliev ad- 
 
 invisi 
 
 blc f 
 
 ■red by their own guns, and fearful only of linding themselves afraid. 
 ore than a mile from the post tluir i;uiks licgan to thin, struck down by 
 
 Uut when more than a mi 
 
 orces tliat no I'over seenu 
 
 .1 ti 
 
 as tiiev rcachei 
 
 I tl 
 
 le /one wljcro 
 
 rushes alone were possible, eacii last resting pl.ice was marked, as they rosi', by a 
 
 lint 
 
 if dead. < >ver and over airain tl 
 
 mam wo 
 
 cli an< 
 
 le clum|i 
 rk: each time the bulk either fell, or fell back: a fi' 
 
 s of skirmishers ailvanced to storiii the 
 
 reached the sti'c 
 
 • lit 
 
 1> 
 I tlii're found slitdter, ami as tlii^ tide ebbed, all the hollows and bits of co\er 
 
 remained tenanted by rilleiiien. These kt'pt working for tlii^ ditch, and at dusk the 
 iiumbeis in it increased. The Turks, iiiisu|iported liy the army of which they were 
 an outpost, resolved to wilhdr; 
 ers of tlu' main redoubt were una 
 
 iiid ,"> of tli<' 12 battalions ii'treated. The defeiid- 
 
 ibie t 
 
 o scare 1 1 
 
 the ditcii, and tiie linssians cut foot- 
 holds in tile scarp with tluir liayomts and bravely storinei! the work in the dark. 
 
 riiey lost, all tolil, .'i.iUK) men, capturing si 
 
 line 
 
 ,OlHI Turks 
 
 'I'iie loss of the latter 
 
 Irom lire was sin.i 
 
 ll.'t 
 
 " 'Towards the end of the day, some i>aities succeeded in approaching still nearer 
 to the redoulit: thus 2 battalions of the IsmailoU' lleyiment, with tlii'ir <'oloiiel. 
 Major (ieiieral Ellis II, at their head, advanced about I.'iO yards by crawling, and 
 lodged themselves at less than .")0 paces from the redoubt.' l''iiially a general rush 
 
 was 
 
 made from all sides, and tile redoubt was c 
 
 arried. 
 
 *" I'levna," by (apt. (i. S. Clarke, U.K., Vol. V, U.K.I., Oeciiainnal papers. 
 t(i old Medal K.ssay, it. I'. S.I. , Major Kraser, 1!.K. 
 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATION. 
 
 • i'' 
 
 i,, I 
 
 I. -isrnnDucTonY. 
 
 rh'/iiiilloii. The t(Miii I'cniiaiic'Ut I-'ortitication is applied to 
 those works of (lefciicc, wliicii. thrown up at leisure in time of 
 peace ; are cap.ihle of resisting,' prf)Ion;^'ecl and powerful attacks 
 made with apj)liaiices specially l)rou;,dit up for the purptxse, and 
 superior to those available with a field army. These works are 
 constructed at vast expense, and since they are intended to last 
 throuf^h loni; peri(jds of time — of the most durable materials 
 (masonrv and iron), and in tli(' most substantial manner. All 
 
 the 
 
 resources of civil enj^'ineerin^' 
 
 beintr as a rule available. 
 
 :io I'" 
 
 Principles r;/c7;i/;i.i;i'(/. T>ut while Permanent I'ortitication 
 differs thus widel\ from I'ield I'ortitication in its constructional 
 details, the principles upon which both are founded are identical 
 and ma\- be recapitulated as follows, viz.: 
 
 3. 
 4- 
 
 ICxposure of the enemy to the defenders tire. 
 Difhculty of movement for the enemy. 
 Cover for the defenders from the enemy's fire. 
 Freedom of movement for the defenders. 
 
 ^211 y and \v^. 2 Supra. 
 
 These principles are applied with the same object as in field 
 fortification, viz., to obtain for the weaker force an advantage due 
 to tlu- security of their position, in fact to render this position 
 practically inaccessible : and so to avert the risk of personal con- 
 tlict with a superior Uncc, at the same time {^ivinj^' to the 
 defenders full opportunity to use their weapons for the destruction 
 of the assailant under the most favourable conditions. 
 
 Details Suhjcct to Cluvii^'c. — While the principles of fortification 
 are thus seen to be of universal a{)plication to all works of defence, 
 it is t.'vidint that the details must be subject to continual chanj^'e 
 t)\\in,t; to the improvements always in pro<;ress, in the means of 
 attack and defence ; and, further, that in an af^'e like the present, 
 of j^aeat mechanical improvements in the old weapons, and numer- 
 ous inventions of new, and powerfiil engines of war, these changes 
 must be expected to \)v. hirger in degree, more freriuent, and jiK)re 
 sudden than in any previous age. 
 
 Many examples may bi: adduced to show that this is so ; the 
 two following will suffice: 
 
' ;i 
 
 t 
 i 
 
 <)() SI It A I IONS will. ui. I'lKMAM.M lou Ti I UA ih )N IS Ai'i'iK A r.i.i:. 
 
 I . 'I'll!' r|iiiii(,'c'H in till' ilc'^iL'n i>f caiMiniirs ainl rctrcnclimciits for i>eriiian<'nt workH, 
 frotii tlifir inti'iiiliii'tjciii in tlif ( icrm.ui works ruiistriirtrcl in tin' I'iiily I'^rt ol' the 
 proHL-iit tuMitury, to thnAi: ilcMciilicil liy \Vii;,'nrr' as Hiiitalilc to «'\i.stin>,' coiiilitionH. 
 
 '2. Till' rxtraonliiiary i;lianu<;n i" tin- dctailn of i-nast ItattcM-itss wliicli liave taken 
 Jilacr silicf IStl.")t. 
 
 Sihinlidus rclicrc I'cniiiiinitl VOrtifuiilion is applicahlc. ~}\^\'>o]cou 
 Ikis poiiitcfl out ill forcible laii}^Miaf,'c " 'I'liat it is the ^^Mcatrst of 
 all absurdities " to leave the capital (»f a j^icat nation nnfortitied. 
 1^ jN.5 1'". Since bis day the pi();^M"ess of ci\ili/ation has tende(l 
 tiiort? and more to ceiitrali/e the life of a State in its capital, 
 which should, therefore, as a rule be protected by juMinanent 
 works, and be the central point in the (lefi-nce of the country, 
 ("ircunistances may, however, render it advisable to choose some 
 othi'r point than tli;,' cai)ital for this purjjose, as for instanci' in 
 the cast! of Antwer|). selected insti'ad of IWiissels to fuUil this 
 object in Hilj,num, l)Ut tlu-re should be very powerful military 
 reasons] to juscify such a decision. 
 
 In addition to the Capital .ill points of j,'reat strate;^'ic impor- 
 tance, such f(tr instance, as f,Teat road and railway junctions, de- 
 tiles, whether consistinj^' of brid/^'es ov(>r j^M'eat rivers, or mountain 
 passes; j^'reat arsenals, docksards or depots of war mat«'riel ; and 
 also )^Meat commercial cities, containing,' larj^'e stores of pro- 
 visions and other articles, nt'eded for the supply of armies : should 
 be secured by |)ermanent works; care beiu}^' taken that the object 
 to be attained is o( lastin;^' importance, and commensurate with 
 the expenditure re(iuire(l. 
 
 Chissificalioii of For Ir esses. — All fortitied places may therefore be 
 assijjjned to one of the followiu},' classes : — 
 
 id) Thf)se refjuisite for the orj^Mui/ation and :idministration of 
 armies, and their maintenance in readiness for war. 
 
 These serve : — 
 
 a. As intrenched camps or war harbours, for shelterinj^or for- 
 mation of an active force. 
 
 j'i. As arsenals or dockyards, for the secure preparation of war 
 matt'riel. 
 
 J'. As ma^^^a/ines or di'pots of stores. 
 (b) Those necessary for the movements of armies. 
 
 *rrinci|)les of rortitication, ])g. .'JS -40, 45 45. 
 
 tTlioso chaiijios Itciii),' (liic, in orii'li case, to the pn gresH niaile liy aitillery in 
 ()tf(!iiHivi! powor in tiic inti-rvalM. 
 
 *Sf(' lirialninnt, l'"ortilication I'olyyonalc (< 'liap. I, Section 1 1 1 1 as rej,'arils the eoni- 
 parative merits of Hrusseis ami Antwerp from a military point of \ iew. Uriahnont 
 in liis l''ortitii-ati<in, I'olyj^'onale, ('hap. I., j,iv(!s reasonw auaiiist .selecting the ( 'apital 
 as the central keep. This [loiiit u ill he noticed later. 
 
UKtjriKKMKNTS ol A IKKTKKSS. Ti; 
 
 These serve : — 
 
 II.. As l)aiiiLTS. In Mock tlir ciitiiiy's |>assri,L,'e o( a (Icl'ilc. 
 
 (i. As brid^'i'-lu'ads, to stcuie one's o\\ ii passa^^e in the presence 
 of the enemy. 
 
 Most larf,'e fortresses will fnllil more than one of the above 
 hnK:tit)ns, those whieh comliiiie the larf^cst imml)er heinj; the 
 nujst important. '^ ^>»5 1'". \\'a,i,Mier I'l niciples l-'ortiticationp;^. ;. 
 
 The primarv object of a fortress is then the defence; of a 
 locality, and since the ji^arrisons required for fortresses diminish, 
 to some tjxtent the number of men a\ailable for the field aimies, 
 (as they should include a ci i tain number ot j^^ood troops) it is evi- 
 dent tiiat fortress('s should bi' flefensible by a mininunn number 
 of men, their vahu; dependin;^' in fact on their ability to secure 
 important loca'ilies by small ;^Mrrisons : hence it will api)ear that 
 the elenie'uarv idea of a lortress is a walled encKjsure or iiiceinte. 
 
 n. HKijriUKMKXTS OF .1 F(>i:TI!ESS. 
 
 There arc two conditions which must be hihilled by a fortress, 
 in order that it ma\- be effi-ctive for the purpose stated above. 
 These conditions are as follows, vi/. : 
 
 (a) ICvery fortified place should be absoluti;ly secure aj^'ainst 
 attempts made by the enemy's field army. 
 
 The means at the disposal of a field arm\- are as follows, vi/. : 
 
 a. Open assault. 
 fi. Surprise. 
 y. Bombardment. 
 3. Hlockade. 
 
 {h) It should possi.'ss the maximum amount of security attain- 
 able, aj^ainst attack by re;;ular siej^'e. 
 
 (<i.) AiisiPi.i ri; sKriKiiv Ac.UNsr kikmi Ai;\n. 
 
 a, Scciirily di^^tiiiist iissiinll is obtained as follows: 
 
 I. \u enclosed enceinte, or a space surrcniiided on all sides bv 
 a sufficient obstacle, vi/. : hi^di walls, deep dry, or broad wet 
 ditches. 
 
 Sinct 
 
 th 
 
 IS obstacle to be e 
 
 ffect 
 
 ive must be activeh' defeiidi'd. 
 
 an 
 
 f( 
 
 o 
 
 nice 
 
 r'S 
 
 bstacl 
 
 tl 
 
 le L'^arrison is assumed to be reduce 
 
 d t 
 
 o a minimum, it 
 
 o 
 
 f necessitv, that flank defence must be proviih:d for the 
 
 
 /it i 
 
 I 
 
 '31 
 
 i 
 
 1 M 
 
■5" 
 
 (.S 
 
 KKnlIK|.;M|.;NTS <»l A l« )l< TUI.SS. 
 
 ]. The iiicmy sIidiiM he kept at :i (lislaiici,- as loii^^'as possihlr. 
 and cxpdscil to liir (Imiiij; liis ailvaiuc. 
 
 This will necessitate the innvisioii of an ele\ate(l platform for 
 anaitilieiy position, ami an open held of hre: also tiii- nse ol 
 ohstades, such as imuidatioiis. abatis, and in se i fortresses, sub- 
 marine or lloatinj; obstructions, and lasti\. Ia( ilities for makin;,' 
 strong sorties; uhicdi render m-cessary nnnuions and seinic 
 nii'ans of exit from the fortress, and places of assembly (outworks), 
 outside the main obstacle. 
 
 .}. Inteiioi defences, which are arranf,'ed so as to prevent the 
 (Mieniy from spifadinj;, and establishing,' himself insid(? the enceinte, 
 even should he force an entranci'. They consist of retrench- 
 ments, and of ;,'()()d communications for biin^in^'^ up reserves. 
 
 j'i. Security tii^ainst surprise depends upon constant vii^ilance 
 on the part of the j^'arrison. In order to obtain which, means 
 must bi' afforded for placinj,' successi\'e lines of sentries in such 
 l)osilions that they can supervise closi'ly the j^round in front, the 
 main obstacle, the f^'ates, cvc. 
 
 This implies detached works and outworks for super\ ision of the 
 f^Tound outside, Arranj^ement of prohle to j^u^t closi- observation of 
 tile obstacle (c. jtf. chcmin dcs rondcs.) (iates placetl in re-enterinj; 
 positions, and the communications across the obstacle easilv ob- 
 structed. Secure bombjjrool co\-er lor ;^uards. Special ;ittenti<in 
 is now f^Mven to lij,ditinj^ up the j^rouml or water in front by the 
 electric li^ht. 
 
 }'. Security ii'^ainst Iwmhardmcni is obtaiucd : 
 
 1. By keeping; the enemy at a distance ; by obstacles, as inunda- 
 tions, &.C., on land; by obstructions, or submarine mines a,i,Miust 
 ships ; and by iletached forts in both cases, 
 
 2. By provision of cover a;^'ainst thu effects of the enemy's liri'. 
 This implies sutlicient bombproof cover for men. j,nins, provisions, 
 war-like stt)res, hospitals, cVc, &.C., on the ramparts for those 
 actively employed, and in the interior of the fortress for those oft" 
 duty, reserves, staff, c\:c. 
 
 0. Security ii!^iii)tsl blockade is uhlained : 
 
 1. By increasin},^ tiie size of the fortress. This implies de- 
 tached forts, and also takiu}^' tlu- full advanta;,'e of all llu- natural 
 features of the surroundiu},' country, in order to delay the eneiu}- 
 in his advance, and defer as lonj; as possible, the lompletion of tlu; 
 investment. 
 
 2. By keepin;^' the fortress fully supplitnl with provisions and 
 war matt'riel of all kinds, thus post[)onin',f as loii},^ as possible, the 
 ill-effects of the investment, even if it is succeasfulh' formed. 
 
KEyl'IKKMKNTS ol' A lOKTKF.SS. 
 
 "<) 
 
 
 Tlir rfi|iiii (iiiriits of :i fnilitss iili(l<I this liciid Iii;i\ In- lit'St 
 • Icilnccd ri(tiii;i Cfiiisidfriitioii of tin- iipt'iatioiis of a irf^iihir si«'>,'f, 
 ;iii(l (»r till- iiu'.isiiiis wliicli tlif ilrfciidcr must take ti> resist tliiiii ; 
 as britlly skctclud Ixlow. 
 
 I"'ir lliis |)iii|)()Sf the attack ina\ !•(■ ili\idrd into twn |)rri(i<ls. 
 
 '/. riif distant or artilltiy attack. 
 fi. I lie ell )Sr attack. 
 (Ai '/. ihc ilisliiiit attack. 
 
 1. ( )i)( rat idiis ai'c coiiiiiiciiccd by tli!- coiiiplctc iiiNcstiiiciit of 
 the foitrcss. the investiiu'iit line Ixiii^^ secured as stioii^dy as 
 possihli' h\ tield deliMlccs. 
 
 2. Tlu- ;^'rouiid in front u|) to the position of the ist paiallel 
 (qoo to l,.i()()yds. from the jjlace*^) is then j^Miuhially occupied, the 
 (hienders heinj,' pushed, by di,-^M"ees insi(h' the works of the pku e, 
 and the capture(| f^round securtd by the occupation of defensil>le 
 points, ami linally by the constructit)n of tht! ist parallel. 
 
 ;. Idle occupation of this f,aonnd is onl\- rendered possible 
 owin;,' to the reduction of the lire of the place, by the battt-ries of 
 the fust artillery position. \vhi( h are constructed and opiii hre, 
 as earK as possible after the investment is completed. 
 
 'I'o /v,s.\/ these uicasiircs on the part kJ the attack the defenders should : 
 
 I. To delay tlu' investment; hold as !on<,^ as possible fa\ourable 
 positions. \vhi( h have been previously strenj^'thened by tield works ; 
 outside the works oi the fortress: such as wo(tds, villaf^'es, farm 
 steads, cVc, these advanced positions beinj^^ used as points of 
 su[)port for \i;^()rous sorties, to interrupt the completion of the de- 
 fences of till' investmi-nt line. TIk; j^round must also be patrollecl 
 and carefully watched, in ordcir to determine as early as |)()ssibl(; 
 the dispositions of the besii'f^er. (jn which side he intends to make 
 his attack, the position of his parks and dcp«")ts, and of his lirst 
 position batteries. 
 
 z. To hinder the occupation of the ^'round in advance of the 
 investment line, and the formation of the fust parallel. .Same as 
 in (I) for lirst period, and when the besie;^'er lias succeeded in 
 pushinj; the defence back within the works of the place larj^'e 
 sorties from the place, lij;litinj,' uj) and watching; ilie {^Mouncj where 
 it is anticipate!' the hrst parallel will be opi-ned, tiring' on work- 
 in;; parties if discovered. 
 
 *'l"liis tlistaiice is given iipproxiiiiatoly. I'lie coinlitiuiis im wliirh it di'iieiuls will 
 be disousst'il when tt'outiiig of the attack u£ fortresses. 
 
 til 
 
 * 4)1 
 
■y 
 
 7" 
 
 l<i;i'l KICMI.MS ()!• A lOKIKliSS. 
 
 ; I 
 
 /,. Td liiiidir tin; coiistnictiou and to silciici' the liro of tlu.' 
 first |)(jsiti()ii batteries. Tlu: jK^sitioii of tlii' batteries liaviii};j 
 been tixetl, as nearly as jiossible; lire should bt- concentrated on 
 each battery in succession, from eveiy avaihd)le piece ; with the 
 object of silencing or intiirtiptin;^^ their lue. 
 
 lui/iiiriiiiciil'^ iif tlic fniircss /(!)■ I he purposes named above : 
 
 I and 1. Tlie reiiuireinents aic chietly secure and sufficient 
 means of exit lor sorties, and places of assembl)- outside the 
 main dit( h, ami i.:) t<>r a rainpart well or^Mui/ed as an artillery po- 
 sition ; to l)rinj; a stron;^^ direct tire upon the j^Tound in front. This 
 also implies a L^^ood arrani^U'inent of trac(\ in f)rder to f^'i\e space 
 for as larj^e a number of i;uns as possible, fuiu},' to the front. 
 Arran^^u.inents for lij^htin;; up the j^aound at nij^ht, antl special 
 means (such .is lofty observatories or balloons) of observing' the 
 eviemy's movements durin;^' the day, are also recjuired at this stage 
 of the <iefeiu r, 
 
 J. A,L;ainst the Inst position batteries, the chief rc(|uirement of 
 a fortress is a capacit)' to brinj; a powerful lire of artillery to bear 
 on the attack. Ilere, however, the fortress is at a disadvantaj^'e. 
 It is admitted that, owing to their i)osition, extended over a large 
 area, and their exact site btniig unknown; the batteries of the 
 attack ha\ (' a \v\\ Avvu\(i(\ ad\antage over the guns of the fortress, 
 wiiich. ])laced on a loft\- and conspicuous rani[)art, are exposed 
 to the « oiicentrated, and (their exact position being known) 
 tlu! accurate tire «»f the attack, to which the\ can only oppose a 
 dispersed and coiiipa/atively inaccurate return. The result lias 
 generally been, that tlu'attack has (piickly obtained a siiperiorit\'of 
 lire over the defence. lUit since this artillery ctJiiibat is now 
 carried on at \ery 'oi;;' ranges, antl coiiseipiently with high angles 
 of (ili'vation, tlier',- is no reason why the heavy guns of the be- 
 sieged. inten<U'f' t<i take part in it, should be mounted on the 
 ramparts. It is thought that they sho-iild rather be placed in con- 
 ceale<l positioiis, oiil\- selected at the (diiunencenient of the siege, 
 and thus unknown to the eiuuii}, who will almost invariably be 
 loimd to ha\e inlormatioii. more or less accurate respecting the 
 permaiu-nt works. Thus in the case of tlu? large modern foi tress 
 with detached forts, instead of crowding the guns for the distant 
 defence into the forts, where tlie\- will ci-rtainly be ra])idl\- silenced; 
 it has bet'ii proposed to place tiieiii in low batterii-s on the tlanks 
 of the forts, near enough to be under tlii' jnotection of those 
 works, but incKipi'iidi'iit of them ; or, which appears the better 
 plan; to mount the guns tor this i)urpose in batteries of similar 
 construction to siege batteries, placed in rear of, and in the in- 
 ti'r\als bit ween the forts. I'>y this iiu'ans the giuis of the ilefence 
 would rij)l\ on much more e(|ual terms to the besiegers distant 
 batteries, as being tluMiiselves scattered over a wide extent of 
 
cr.osF". Ai r.\( K. 
 
 71 
 
 j^'roniul. and tlii'ir cx.'irt jiositions iinkiiown t<i tln' enemy. 'I'lie 
 construction of tlic l)att('ries for tliest; j^nnis, llieir protection 
 aj^'ciinst attacks by force, niaile at ni;L,dit or durini,^ fo;^. between the 
 permanent detached forts, and the i)rovision of sutficiently secure 
 ina;^'a/ini'accointnodation,aiid safe con ununicat ions, are prol)Ienis 
 yet to be worked out. Uiit it appears piobaiile that the type of 
 battery niij^dit approxiniatt: to tliat usetl by the bi sicLTtr. Jj 4 ^(^ 1'", 
 its d(>fencc bcinf( secured by tht^ aceuiinilat ion < >f material obstacles 
 on the f^Tound in front, defended b)' a powtiful musketry lire from 
 works of siif^dit i)rorile, .n the Hanks, and slij^htiy in advance o{ 
 the batteries.* 
 
 I'or maf,'a/ine accommodation some moilitieation <>! the existin;,' 
 fudd ma^'a/ine, § 454 l\ ^M\anj^^ "greater pioteclioii fiom vertical 
 tire, mi^dit be made to answer; and since the works are well re- 
 tired, there should be little difficidty in seciniiiL; miintei i nptecl 
 communications with the iortress in rear. 
 
 It is also veiy important that abundant bo-abproof cover should 
 l>e provided for tlu; protection ot the men in I stores of the ^'ar- 
 rison, aj,'ainst the effects of bond)ardment l'\ the distant batteries 
 of the attack. The pcnetratioii of lai'j^'e shells at lon,i,' ran;4es 
 bi'inj,' very j^'rcat these bombprools must be of sidistantial I' con- 
 struction, J; jiN, and 555 sub-head 5 1', and should be suflicient 
 to provide secure cover for the ;,,Mrrison, its artillery, annnunitioii, 
 provisions, hospitals, «.S:c.:|.' 
 
 (h) I'i. I'hc close attack. 
 
 After tl'.e establishment of the ist parallel, the bntlKr opera- 
 tion of the sie.L^e may be divide(l info li\e staijes. \i/.: 
 
 I. Construction of batteries behind the [laiallel. to reduce the 
 fill' of the place. 
 
 J. .\d\auce from fust parallel to the foot of the glacis. 
 
 ill 
 
 « 
 
 f 
 
 I 
 
 fl 
 
 'u 
 
 *\'iil(! "attiiok of F'ortrt'HH in i\\v Kiitmi'." by Major l-'ia«tr, l;.lv, pL'. Ill 'J(i. «itli 
 rcfcrt'ni'c to till' ilisjjoxitioii of ilcfcndcrM \i\\\\s in tlir intci\als lictwi'i'ii flic forts. 
 AIho waiiif Work, Y\i. .">7, for <!\.'iiii))li- of ilitiiciilty of >iliiicm^' (li'fciulcrs' iirlillory 
 wlicrc its fxiii't position is iint- "own, as sliowii li\ tlir j-'ri'iicli Mortar Itattoiy li<- 
 liiiiil railway I'liiliuiikiiitiit near ( iiiiart Station, an>l in iiian\ iiistainiH at llclfort. 
 
 f\'i<lc also "attack i!" l''onrcss(s in the I'litiirf, " pi.'. il4-(ir>. 
 
 I'PIh' introduction of ioii>,'-r.inp' infantry lire which im\ I niployol with j.'rcat 
 
 facility a)L,'ainst fortri'sstis .iiiil which will rciiilcr it < oinparativclv easy for parties 
 of infantry to takt^ iij) the pniloiii^'ation of the fa'-es of jtennaiient works, more 
 
 e-Iiecially iletailieil forts ; and sweep the teiTeplcins with ;v hail of luillcts, has;idilci| 
 a new and important ad\anta!;e to (he distant attack. Special niwisiires of pioiec- 
 tioii. m the dii'i'ction of head cover, Himilar to that nM'd in tii !d works; Mill nn- 
 doiiliteilly have to lie adopted to mi'ct this daii.:i'i'. Thi-. lire will not iiei e-isai il\ lie 
 coiiliiieil to the period of the distant attack, Init <'aii lie continued with .>afet \ 
 tlirouLjlioiit tln' sii-^e, for since the ex.ict raiij;e \\\\\ I.e known, ;;,!reat ai-ciiracy can l>e 
 attained. See "Notes on 'ractics," liy Major I >. I'', .luncs, l!..\.. 1114 ll'J. 
 
iiiihiiii^r^« . 
 
 ".^""I'mwi^P^ipiB 
 
 7- 
 
 < I.osl. AITA( K. 
 
 r .. 
 
 ,i. Advuncc: from tin* foot of the ^^liicis to the cicst <>( tlic 
 covered w.iy. 
 
 4. Descent into and passaf^e of the ditch. 
 
 5. Capture of the breach. 
 
 I. A seciut! position havin;,' been ol)tained close to llu- fortress 
 by the construction of the hrst paralh;!, the ni'Xt o|)cration of the 
 attack is to ri'(hice to sili'iice the; artillery lire of tlu' fortress, which 
 has been p;irtiall\- accoinplishi'd by distant artillery tire. I'lidcr 
 cover of tlif troops who occupy the tirst parallel, innniions 
 batteries are thrown up at distances of from (joo to i ,f)oo yards 
 hinn the fortress, the work beini; rapidly done. These batteries 
 open lire siinidtaneonsly and should soon obtain a superiority 
 over the j^muis of the place, wliich are reduced to silence. H 
 
 J. 'Pin- advance, wliich at this distance from tlie fortress, 
 would be impossible in the face of artilK'ry lire, is now resumeil 
 by tlu,' foiniation of covered approaches and parallels, an*! is con- 
 timied to the foot of the f,dacis. § Jj J.ii-Jj4 b'. 
 
 ]. 'I"he advanci' across the f,dacis is made in a similar manner 
 by forming; a covered road up to the crest of ihe coveriil w;i\', 
 unless the operations art- interrn|)ted by mines placed under the 
 },dai:is by tlie defence, when another method of advance, by coun- 
 termining'* has to be atlopted. Jj 3^5 V. 
 
 4. The crest of a [)ortion of the covered way bein-j; occupi<'(l 
 (crownetl), and tlu* defiiiders driven out of this outwork, the ditch 
 has to bi; crossed, lor which puiposi' a ;,^dlery of descent is made 
 into the ditch, or the counterscarps is blown in, and a passaj^^e 
 formed across the ditcdi, (by a bridj^e if the ditch is wet) to the 
 foot of the breach. § '§> jjb, J57 1*'. 
 
 5. 'I'he breach is taken, either by assault, or by ;^r.idual occuj)a- 
 tion. 
 
 To resist these upcriilicns the defenee sliould : - 
 
 I. Ciirehdl) watch. h,i;ht up at nij^ht, and fire upon, the ground 
 wlu'ic the enemy will ha\e to throw up hu batteries; if the work 
 is discovired in pro^'ress, a powerhil sortie should be attrmpted. 
 
 _'. As before, watch for and lire upon the eneinv's workinj,' 
 parties, now within musketry ranf,'e; lij,dit up the;^Mdund at ni>,'-ht, 
 and briiiL; li.s^ht ,!4uns and wall pieces to bear on the woikmni. 
 interrupt the work b\- small sorties from the covered wa\, and 
 
 "See liiinilij;. Ji .'!;{S \\ 
 
ClOSli ATTAi K, 
 
 7^ 
 
 a.lc 
 tiio 
 
 IIIHl 
 
 -ik 
 
 lit. 
 I II. 
 iiiil 
 
 
 (•(tVL-r tlic whole of the ^roiiiiti occupied !•>■ llu' .itt.uk with ;i 
 .scaicliiuj; iiioi tiir tire. 
 
 J. If countermines do not exist, and are not improvised, the sanu; 
 measures should be taken as in [i.) IWit if countermines exist, 
 the defence will he carried on at this sta;.;c by their means. (See 
 mining,'. 
 
 4. A,L,Minst the construction of the j^'allery of tiescent the de- 
 fence can operate l>y mines, if available, anil bysi)rties. A;^'ainst 
 the cn)Ssin;.,M}f the (Utch, if (hy, by sorties in the ilitch ; if wet, l>y 
 water man(;.uvres, JJ 220 l'\, and in both cases by brinj^'in;; all 
 possible tlankiui; tire, to bear on the' t-neniy's passa;.;e. 
 
 5. The briiach should be defended by the close tire of muske'try, 
 by coimtermiuis uniler the breaih, and iiy fouj^asses at its foot, 
 and across the ditch, by sorties in the ditih, aucl by the accumu- 
 lation of materi.d obstaile.s to the enemy's advance. 
 
 I'hc JdUthcin'^ arc the rcquncmcuts of Ihc foiti-LSs in uriicr In (uny 
 mil Ihcsc licfciisivi (ipcriitiaiis, ; /:,. ; — 
 
 1. As in reMpiirements i and J., h a. 
 
 2. 'Ilie same. Means should be taken to obtain i^ood lit ad 
 (■o\er for rilleiiun to lire- on working,' parties of attack. ()\er 
 head cover will probably be reipiiretl (or this purpose in Inline.' 
 
 ,. Same as in ^, and countermines under the ^dacis. il'drthe 
 latter see mininj;. ) 
 
 4. I""or dry ditches; lii;^di escarj) walls, well covered from enemy's 
 distant artillery lire, as a protection aj^ainst assault. I'Or wet 
 ilitches ; a couHuand of the wati'r hivels by nutans of sluices, in 
 order to be ,d)le to empty or till the ditch at pleasure; for all 
 ditches ; ellicieut tlauk defi'UCe, so arran;^'ed as to be secure from 
 destruction by the enemy's distant lire. 
 
 5. I'or the defence of the bn-acli ; countermines. See miinnj,'. 
 sj 4ij() II. l"*acilitii.'S foi' kc-epini,' a larj^'e body of troops under 
 covi'i , close to the raiiiparts, which implies |)lenty of 'lombpioof 
 cover under the ramparts. Improvised woi ks for brinf,'inf,' 
 musketrv oi- mitrailleiir tire to bear on the stornu-rs; facilities 
 for briiif^int; up ri'serves on a broad fiont, to expel the t.;nem\- if 
 he ^'aiiis a iootiiij,'. l'"inally retrt'iichnients with \\ilI-( oNcird 
 escarps, the tire ol which will lender the eiieiiiys portion on thi' 
 ramparts untenable when ;;ained, the retrenchments beini,' tluin- 
 >elves secure a.t^ainst assault. 
 
 llavin.L; tliii>. bnelly noticed the reipnreinents of a |ortreb>, ir 
 '.Sco I'diit iiiitf ; pfi 71. 
 
 
 f 
 
 I 
 
 
 I, f 
 
 ! rr. 1 
 
74 
 
 l.l.MI.N I .s ()| I ttKIKI'.SSI-.S. 
 
 Older tliat it ?ii;i\' icsist cfTii (n.ilK tin ciicmy's ;ittark, flic next 
 stt|) i^, t'» coiisidci" ill detail, the \,iii(>us parts, oi eleineiits, ol 
 wllicll it luiisists, wllitli liavi heeii desij^lied to give ellet I thereto. 
 
 r. i:i.i:mi:.\"I's nr r(>/:r/:/:ssr:s. 
 
 I hi lorlicss has Ixeii (oiiiid to consist in it-^ cleim iitat\ idea, 
 ol ail iii(|nse(| space, or em ciiife, siiiioniided li\ works which 
 foiiii an olistaiic sec niiii.t; it hoiii assaiih. .iiid whu h ;;i\e protcc- 
 tiiiii hoiii the \ iew ami liK' of the ciiciiin. 
 
 IIk works which lomi tliis enceinte iiia\ lie ( onsichicd in de- 
 tail nmhi tlif fMlldwiiiL; lieails. w/.: 
 
 ill) 'jlie I ampart ; considered as a platloiin Idi artillei\- and 
 niii--kctr\ tire, and as attoi-dim; protei tioii (or iiieii and mins. 
 
 \h) 'Idle rampart and dit( I) ; considered with Klcreiice to their 
 [)rotile and plan, as an ohst.ule aL,Miiist assault, and as a means 
 of pio\ idini; llaiikin;^' liri'. 
 
 l( I Works (iiit->idi' the main ohstai le ; to w ileh ,iild delemi it, 
 ami to secure the jiassaj^es across it, to tip' deleiideis. 
 
 u/i K'(i I eiicli!iii-nts or keeps, and cilad' Is; to prevent the e!ieiii\- 
 hoin seeiinir^ Ins |i ( it III;; inside the elicelllle, even il the mam 
 olistai le lie roiced at aii\' pomt. 
 
 ill) niK i; \Mi'\i;r. 
 '/. Its object, CMHi'ii Hid, width, lericplcin and slopes. '^ ji j I'. 
 
 'I'lir liit.'li I'diiiiiiaiiil 111 till' i'.'iiii|t;ii'ts iil Antwi r|i, >; '.T" I'".. slmtiM lir niitiii'ij. 'I'lu- 
 I'Hcit, IS, III Ihliil; ,1 MTV |(lim:,'IIIU lili' mi tllr rlutc .iiiIiiu.Ii'Iu'H hI tlh' ;illark. ,'illil sn 
 
 urciitly til a'_'L;i"iv;itr tin' ililliriilty i<\ iiiikiii^; tliciii ; tn uliviiitc tlir ilofcct, niiiiiiiuii tu 
 
 IIIiihI, ii|i| InllrcHSfH ul' tlli' iilist I llilluli iil till' lilr ll'illl till' I ;illl|i.irt,s, liytl Ill- 
 
 \viii'k>; ,mi| tu in'iilcrl, lii'ttiT tin- spier iiiiTiii'ili.'iti'l V lii'liiiiil lilt' laiiipiit. 
 
 ,1 /'//r /ii/;'.//'i7 ,• its oliject.ctc. ,^ ji| [•". [lie tniin (iftlie 
 para|)et is the same as in I". !•".. and its ( omniaiid \arie^■ iVom N' 
 to lo'. The superior slope should he so arraiif;<'d that the 
 musketry lire iroiii the ramiiait should strike not more than 4' 
 above the top o( the counterscarp; but should not in anv case 
 
 exceeij ,1.. 
 
 ;•. \lriiii\ fur llw /<si' nf tiitiskdry and avliUcrx five : 
 
 I. Ihe bampietle li n mnskeliv. ■^ _m.( !•'. 
 
 _'. i'lirait II ly: bat bettes. embi isiires, etc. •v^_'l3i''. In recent 
 wot I licll .e. AlltWi Ip eNlellsivc ( .•lltillUollS balbetles lla\e been 
 
 coiiaiiKiid l.ii till' Niixiii' III aitillei\, till' I iiipli i\ nil ht nl em. 
 biasiiie. 'Ill til' main lamp.nt bi in;; \i i\ imii li 1 1 --t 1 ii tei|. 
 
^ 
 
 ll 
 
 I I.I Ml. NTS (>l 1 I iK I Kl SSI-.S. 
 
 /.T 
 
 I I;iN() ciiSL'tiKitcs art' now iiiaiiiiiissiibK' in [Mi.sitioiis wlifit' ex- 
 posed to (liirct liir. Itiil tliry an: lar}.;rly i iiiploycd toi llaiikinj^ 
 \\i ii ks. -iji v^ _' i'>, -'75 1' . 
 
 Moitar casciiiati s iiia\ lie Iniilt in .i pel iiiantiit niaiinci of 
 masonry and arc then i^tiicralK placed iindcincatli tin- lanipait 
 at salients. .^' Ji() I". Sec (ainots system, v^ ^i>j l\ TIicn are 
 lar;^M'ly used in manv recent ("icrman works, as lor instance at 
 I'osen. ,^ 570 I'. Tlu'y ina\ lie \i'V\ readiK e.\t( iiiporiseil at tlie 
 comment emcnt of a siej^e ot the torni sliowii in j; ;()5 l'\. pi, n til 
 lieliind an\' available liank ofcarili wlii(li atloids t lie re>)m>ite 
 i:o\er. 
 
 MoiicrielT caniaf^cs, •^ ,^ JiOand 50; 1"'.. offer a \alual)le i>ractical 
 solution of till' dilliculties re,i;arilin;,' the scrsice of artillery m 
 lortress(!S, inider tlu- lire of modern arms of jjreeision. 
 
 When I'lnluasuri'S. either in open or casemated hatteries. are 
 (.'.\posed to the direct tire of hea\y ^uns. the only resourct left lor 
 tlu; (K'fence, is to provide rover for the men and j^MUis by means 
 of iron shii'lds: these on account of their ;,,M(.'at cost, will as a riiK', 
 he restricttnl to works of coast defence, where it is necessar\' to 
 pio\ide a.i^ainst the heaw ;,Mins carried by war \essels, and 
 nndei- this head the subjtct will be coiisidi-red mon; fully hert'- 
 after. ,:i ji() 1'. 
 
 Iron turrets will, like shields, be used chielly lor coast deftMice, 
 but they may be occasionally used for iniportant po>itions in laud 
 defences. J; ,^ Jl<), 507 I'". 
 
 lirinliiiDiit |ir<(|Miscs tn use tliitiiini tlic Kci |is ul' ilit.i'luil luil.s. .iinl in tlii' Salient 
 of till' lavulin III Ills aiiii'jiilcil tr:i< i' ol the Aiilui ni liniiL^' 
 
 o. ihc ti\uc nj the iiiiiiptirls : loi- strong houtal lire -should be 
 as stiaij.^lit as possible. '^ - I 5 I"-. 
 
 -'. Means fi I shcUciiu'^ men a,id iinti'itcl : tiax'crsi's and parados. 
 \N J 17 I'. 
 
 Slulli'is for men, ,i.;ims, eic.. .lu the laMijiai t. ;;' j |N I-'. " 
 
 The maL^a/ines should be placed nihlt 1 the ramparts, and be 
 Connected with the shell looms in th" tia\erses by means ol lilts, 
 ilie anhes o\ei the ma.L;a/iiic-.. with ( oik (etc (ovciin;.^. oii'^ht ti» 
 provide ample prote(ti<»n a;;am>l heav\ shells. rmmbpiools lor 
 it'serves should be |ilac( d under llu' lear slope ol the lamjiarts, 
 ami shouM have numerous and wide exits. Separate sti>res 
 
 •••I''.l|li|iiilll<>ll I'lllyu.lll.il.'. \ 111, I!., ClMp. I.. S.cdnll \ II. 'i'llC Vlillt iii-t 1.1 
 tlirrctK Mill, iix U rule, incilnlut thru llsr. i-\i'i'|it lur cua^l iliti'inc.«(. See ;il,S(> rii;itt 
 l»rfillc«' 
 
 .Sei liMitlKiti', I jii;. 71 . 
 
 V. 
 
 
 '(••i'l, 
 
 ill 
 
 I 
 
76 
 
 i:i.1':m1'.n is ni iok i ki:ssi s. 
 
 slmiiM l>f |>r(i\ iilcd, :is far as possihh; Ikuii tlir nia^ja/iiK ^ : Ini 
 fii/cs and otiicr explosive inat«'i iel of that iiat lire; they shi iiiM con- 
 sist ol small archeil buildinj^'s jilaced nniiiilhe rear slope o| the 
 rampart. 
 
 ('') iiiK i; \Mi'Ai:r \M> m i< ii. 
 
 '/. ('ouditiows of defence wIulIi all peiDUiiieiit pnfdes dundd fiil/il. 
 ^ ^ 2]d, J4 ;. The condition that the fire of artillery Irom 
 tin; main work may sweep the j^lacis sinmltaiieouslv with the 
 nnisketiy fire from the coverecl way. which is j^cneralK' insisted 
 on. appears nnpiactical. Colonel Schaw. K.ll., says "ai(illii\- 
 on the 1 amparts wonld lire at reserves or distant objects, whili' 
 inf.mtry in the covered way sweep the j^dacis l»y their lire, oi tin 
 artillery mij,dit lire casi- at an enemy on the j^lacis should the 
 coverecl way he ahandonecl ; \m[ the simnllaiieons liic of inlantr\' 
 in the co\-ere(l way, and arliHery on the ramparJs at an enem\ on 
 the Ljl.icis, would 1)1' too dan;,'erotis to the (letendei s of till- co\-ered 
 way, and now more than e\-er mmei-essary." See also lootiioti', 
 
 ("oiistrnction of prohles. >j 2]] F. 
 
 ,1 Vrofiles a'ith u'et and dry ditches. ^ ^ jn^-jj ',, j ;o \- . 
 
 The ordinal \' width ol wet ditclx's is not more than 2^ to 50 
 yauls, lint at Antweij) the main dit( h is SS yarils wide at the 
 salient. '^ 22n l'\ 
 
 Wet ditches, wliicdi nia\' he ilrained, or wlii( h are liable to In 
 fro/en, on.ijhl to have an obstacle to assault in ailditi'in to the 
 writer. 
 
 Hrialmont shows desij^Mis for this purpose in the atlas of his 
 I'ortiliiation l'oly;^'onale, consistinj^^ ol a casem.ited escarp, sunk 
 as it were in the thickness of the parapet, tlu' oiiti i portion of 
 w hit h forms a counter j^nard lor the |>rotectioii ol the ma-dniN. 
 
 ('(iilioriiB first systt^ni ;illiiri!i ii l;ii(m1 <'x;»iii|il(' of ;i similar I'linstriiitiini, li;i\iii'.: a 
 rt'M'tti'il I'scarii for tlic iiiiiri hastioii. sf '>'t~ V. 
 
 y. \'ari(ius kinds <f rc'clnioils; their c(Uislrnction. etc. ■^ ,^ 
 224-221) \'\ 
 
 n. riie Irace to ohtain flankin'^ fire: wh\ necessar\ . \\i>\\ ob- 
 tanied, svstenis. jj xj 2\,\, -'40. -'5(1. 
 
 I'lankin^f lire is necessary for two reasons:-- 
 
 1. To economise the number ol men mpiiicd lor the didetit'c. 
 
 2. To adil to the secuiity ol ihc obstacle, by pinvidiiii; that 
 
 
I I I Ml N I S < i! I MKIKKSSI S. 
 
 11 
 
 tlicic sImII 1m' iio (l(';i(l i^idiiikI in ilif ilitclics ; as in tliat case the 
 
 ini'in\- (Mil III (Icstiov I lie IS' ail IS niiilisttn jiid. it li i||( iws that tlit- 
 
 tia(<'(ii i>lan nl tlir u^ik^ nin^t lie (icsi,;;nri| \\ it li t liis oliji'ct in 
 \icw.*' 
 
 'I"lu' anaiiLjcnicnt i if the lines of a fmnt of fortiticat i<>n. in mi ,]■ r 
 lit provide t liis llaiik ilrlcncc, is railed a "System dt luititira- 
 lion." I lieie aie tlu'ec sncli sN'stcins. \i/. : 
 
 The Tenaiile s\steni, ,^ 1\U V . 'Iliis system has lieeli advo- 
 V(i( ated |i\ MoiitalemJiert and ("arnot. '^ ,%' 5(11 and 5'ifi !■"., l»iif it 
 is iinsnited to tlie conditions of the present da\' and nia\ he con- 
 sidered ohsolete. Its L;i'eatest defect is the want of direct liic to 
 the front, which nndef exislint,' conditions is fatal to etliciencN. 
 
 The liastioMed system, n^ j^J-J'/* '• Tliis systcMU isdesi^Mied 
 to see into the dead anj,des in the ditcji horn the parapet. \\hi( h 
 in the 'I'eiiaille trace is impossihle. Tile metiiod of constructing,' 
 the iJastioned trace for tliis juirpose is },Mven fnll\- in the text lio()i<, 
 lioni wliicli it will he evident that the profile and the tract- depend 
 one upon tlic otluM". a hi;,di relief necessitating,' a itni;,' ciiitain, a 
 slioit curtain iK'C.essitatin.i; a low relief. 'I'iie dirninisiieil aii.i,d(! 
 too de|)ends on tlic. leii;,'tli of tlie Hanks, and iicic a^'aiii there are 
 ii recoiicilahli conditions to he hilfilled : it is re(|iiireil to iiave a 
 considei able length o( flank to j^it room to mount ;,'uns foi liic 
 defence of the ditch, and to o|)p()se the enemy's counterdiatt erics, 
 tlius necessitating; a considerahle diminislied au;,de. i>ut on the 
 otiier iiand the diminished aiii^le ou^^iit to iu; as small as possil>ii\ 
 in order to j^'et room\- bastions, witli stroii;.; liri' to the fimit. and 
 
 to lessen the exposure of tile flceS of tile hastioiis to eiitiiade ; 
 hut a small diminished amde means a short flank. .\L;ain owinj; 
 to the crossing,' of the lines of defence, tlu exterior side for a f;i\-eii 
 leiiL^th of line of lieleiice is sliortcr tliaii tlie exterior side of a 
 l'ol\L;onal fi out isee lulowi, under tile saint' conditions ; and tlieic 
 is hirthei. an inferior limit. Ix'Sotid wiiitdi, if tlie line of defence 
 is re<iiiced, the hastioiis hec.ome so small and cramped as to l)e 
 piacticalK indeleiisilile. 'i'iie simplest wa\' to ;,'('t over tliese 
 ■ litii( iilties is to casemati- tlie flanks. li\- whicii nie.ans tin- curtain 
 ma\- lie shortened witlioiit losing; the power of llankiiii.; tin- ditcli. 
 the bastion can be eiilarLjed, and, sinct; the ^nnis in casements can 
 be placed closer loj^'etliel than on open r.imparts. exposed to 
 tiitalade : the flanks can be made slioiter without loss of power, and 
 f Ih dimmisheil ani^li^ can be reduced, 'lliis 'atter tends to oIt\iale 
 one of tin- ol)jections to casenmted lianks, vi/.. that tiiev can be 
 dest!ffoyt;d by distant tire iloun tlie ditch, as it tends b\ reilucin;;' 
 tile liiiminished iiiL;le ti> withdraw tlie pid|oiiL,Mt iiuis of the 
 iiitcli»s from tile enemy's rcacli. TIuMe remains the ditfi< iilts o| 
 
 Si<r :i|t. > ji^ "JH :ii1miv c. 
 
 
 
 k 
 
 
 i:u 
 
 r^ij 
 
IT 
 
 7« 
 
 III \ll N I S I •! I I <\< I KI.SSI.S. 
 
 ( <i\(iiiiL; tlif ( ->! :i!|i III ilic ( iirt.iiii Imni (ii>t,iiil liif. :i-^ tlir cin- 
 plnyiiifiit ol (iiMiiialcd llaiiks Inildds the use ol a tfiiaillc. '^ J ;<j !•". 
 'I'lic ((iiiipaiatisc sliortiicss of (licsc Hanks wlicii casciiiatffl t«'iiils, 
 li(iuc\( I , Im iciliicr I III' w ill til III tlir (litcii in front of tlic ciii tain, 
 and so til li'ssiii tiii-^ ilili > I : iiul tlicic appears to ln' no reason 
 why a tiiniielli il mask coiilii not be anaiiired to com r the escarp 
 of the cm tain, without ohstnictiiiL; the lire fron: the llank case- 
 iiiiitcs. '^ 374 !•". 
 
 The I'leiH'li. wlio lia\i' ailliiici] loii^^'est to the hastioiied s\s- 
 leiii. have in their latest theoietiial traces retained the teiiaille 
 with llank detriice honi open laiiipai'ts. '^-5''^ 1'. " In adaplili;; 
 the haslioned system to short honts as in detached loits they 
 have as a rule omitted t he tt iiaille and adopted various expedients 
 for the defence; of the ditch of the c in tain. 
 
 In i-'iitt \ illcmii.uirir at l.yiHi.-^ lascmatoil ihiiiUs ;irr iisnl. 
 
 Ill Fort ilii IJoiilc at ( 'Iii'iImuiix' tln' i:iiM]iai't is caiiii'il iVom tlii' ciiil nS tlic I'liit.iiii 
 straiijiit lUTiisH till! umm' lit' tiif liastidii, tiw llank ilcfciu't' uf tln' ilitrlii-.s ln'iiiji ulitaiii 
 oil l»y iniisk»-'ti'y tire I'miii tin- rrust nt thf rc\rtiiii'iit wall "T tlif llaiiks. 
 
 The I'olyLTou.il System. ■^ ^40 [•". 
 
 This system has heeii so called hecanse the maf^Mstral lines of 
 tlu' principal t.ices, coriespond \ei\- iiearK' with the ])oly,L;on ol 
 detelicc. 
 
 This system since its iiitiodiu tioii by .MoiilaKinhert (>^ 5(12 \') 
 has rapidly ;;ained {.(round, and is now almost nniversall}' adojjti'il 
 in ( onstructinL; new works. It has many adxantaj^'es oNcr the 
 ISastioiied System. ol which almost all the (liief defects are ahsi'iit 
 in the roly,L,M)nal. Tlu loii^: straight Imnts offer ;^'reat ad\aiita{,^es 
 lor niotmlin!:; j^'uns. to obtain a strmii; frontal tire. Tlu^ salii'iits 
 beini^, as a rule. \(i\ obtuse; tlu' capitals arc well defended b\- 
 direct lire, but abo\e all tlw trace and i>rorile are (piiti' indepen- 
 danl of each other, since the llankiu'.; tire is obtained iVom s»4)ar- 
 ate caseinated buililin,L;s (capoiiiersi in tin dilih. I'loiii this re- 
 sults the very impoilant property th.it the command of tlu' main 
 work may be made so lii,i;li as to insure that the outworks, when 
 ^dveii till- coinmaiid iiece>sar\ |oi them, mav still not interrupt 
 the lire from the central portions of the fronts. ,^ jjo l'\ 
 
 'Idle leii;.;th of the front may be made twice that of the lines of 
 <lefence as a maximiim, while tlu-re is evidently' no indiior limit. 
 This jLjives ,i;reat I,h ilit iis in the application of this s\ stem to slu irt 
 fronts, such as di'taiiied forts. ,r.id to irri'.i,Milai sites. 
 
 Ml t III' tori r'-^scss l.iiill III Km .>iu 4iiiiii^ t lie [u'l'si'iit I'i'iitiiry, <'V,'f|it tlmsi' oni 
 stj-iii IimI ill l""in««*'«'. ;ir>' (III till l'i>j\ -I'lial systi'iii, ami tin' I'liiu'li ii ivr tln'iiischi's 
 
 *.\t (li'i'in«k»k' tli>' iTi'i'iit liuiils liavi' a iiiiitiiii'.iiiis mask in Irniit nl liastimis ,'iiiii 
 •Mii'titins. At l<»yiiiin<' a tfiiailli' is iisi'il, ariaii^nl I'm' iiilaiitry liii', in tlir limn wurk 
 uliii'li has lii'cn aililol, ■••^•ipaiat i\ i'l> ri'i'dilly. tu that loitri'.SM. 
 
^m 
 
 1 I I.Nfl N 1^ < 'I I < >\< 1 Kl SSI ^. 
 
 7') 
 
 iiii- 
 
 I ImIs, 
 
 t.iin, 
 ;is(iii 
 s(;ir|) 
 (■;isc- 
 
 •s of 
 
 lii'Idi'o ISTll, as I'di' iii.sl'iiii'i' ill I'litts \ illi'iii li.'iiiiit', I 'ill ill 'III \ .iiiil I., I Mi'lii , ai |.\iiii.-<, 
 iihimI ail iiitiTiiir iviiiiinvrt nl' |iii|y^iiiial I'liriii, iii.tiilr a liiisliniii'il unik, liii'iiiiii;^ in 
 cUVi-t ii iMi|y),'"iiiil t'H't 111' lar^jf si/.c* witliiii tin- li;i-<tii>iH(l I'mt. In mumic iii.^taiii'i'M as 
 at Kiiil t '((Iciiiiliirr at l,\ mis tin' tnu-- iisi'<l is piiri'lv |>ii|\ ;;iiiial. All tlir new lurts 
 liir ilfl'fiiri' iif I'aris limit since Is7n an' |iiil.\)^iiii.il in tian', ainl tin- liastiniKil traic 
 may Im! saiii to lir ilrliiiitcly ali;iii<l<iiii'il tiir .>ii<'li wrnks. 
 
 Ill tilt' I'oK L;n|i;il s\Stc|ii till' ilcfi iir c (if tin ililfll « 1('[ icIK 1 i IIl; ( iij 
 tllf lilf iif tllr I ,l|ii>|iit'| S. '^H-Ai (Mlf IllllSt lie l;iki II to ( ii\rl llurSO 
 
 works Iruiii ilist;iiit uitilldv liif, and to jiicsii \»' lliciii iiil.ui till 
 the cml of tilt: sit',;;f, wlnii tln'ii' siTviffs .iif rt(|iiiif.|. riif cuii- 
 stnittioii 'if ('apoiiit'is will l»f IouihI tuatftl nf in coiisitlfMlilf tit - 
 tail. >! '^ jfi-j.j; I". 
 
 Tllf tfiiili'iH y I'l iiiiiili'iii jirotjress a|i|ii'ai-; tn Iif ti> it (luf thf 
 III i;^lit I if capon if IS ainl to |)Ia<"f tlifiii at tlif salif ill aii,L;lf s, i .il In i 
 than ill tlif ff litres of loii^' fronts, w Iif if it is \-f i \' tlifluiilt ti > pi f - 
 Sfi\f llifiii fidiii tllf e'lifiiiy's artiilfiy fut.'. 
 
 The later tvpf of caponifr is that ilcsctibf il in the text hook, 
 it shoiilil he eoiiiparetl with the lar^'er capdiiif rs nj earlier ilate, 
 as for iiistanee those at I'oseii. .;' 570 I'"., w hie h an- iiiiiiu'iise llruc; 
 stmied hanacks with .111 earth paiapt t mi tup. 
 
 The tpit'sti'iii 111 the ilefeiici? of masonry ('a|ioiiiers and llaiikiii,i; 
 hatti'ries of all kiinls fimii ilist.ant artillery lire is ii<iw eninin.i^; into 
 proinineiiee, tlui solutions hein;^' snii^ht for in making,' the caponi- 
 ers very low, placiii;^^ iheiii at salients insteati til in the centres of 
 lon.i; hiMils. iisiii;; masks, either attai In d nr detachetl, <;. _'|5 h"., 
 ainl as a last resource, platin;; them with iron. If all otlu-r means 
 fiil resort will ha\e to he matle to coimterscarp i^alleiies, whit h 
 are s»;ctirc fniiii artillery lire, hut are \t'ry siiliject tn attack hv 
 minin,l,^ care mii>>t he takt 11 tn leiidi r all (apuiiiers secure a,i,'ain^t 
 captiiri' h\ a siiildeii rush tliifiu:;li the -mipnits, by siirroiiiidim; 
 them with tirop ditches, which shoiiM theiiiMlves he llanked, 
 
 A iletailetl comparison of the llastioiieil and I'nK i^'iial S\stt ins 
 will he found iii ,^ ^5') I'". 
 
 ((■) iir I\Mi|;K'<. 
 
 m 
 "i 
 
 ill 
 
 i^ • 
 
 '' ' . 'I 
 
 i'-i 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
 </.. ()i(!,C(irks : This term is applied [n \\\i<<r wi.ik. whitli 
 are oiitsitle the main ditch hut within tin' L;lacis. 
 
 !. ("owretl way ainl L;lacis. '^'^ J 51. J5_', J3 ; h". 
 
 I'alisadin.i; the co\tred wa\- iiia\ imw he < onsidt leil njiMiliie. 
 Illtickhouses of semi-|iei main lit ct net 1 in t inn will in fntme lie 
 
 ''I'liis inti'i'iui' loll .i|i|ii .ir'~ tn in tlii' main umiv nii \\lii<li \m>ii!<I Im- iiimhiiIi'iI tin 
 j^iiii-i till- ilistaiit 'li'li'iii'f, tlir lii'i' III till- lia--! luiii'il ti'.nr in inuit lirin.^ ii>iil |iiiiiii 
 jially liir tljinkiiij,' the ditrlifs. 
 
 IS'l 
 
 wM 
 
■» il 
 
 i§ 
 
 ) ' 
 
 .So 11.1. MI-NTS ol I i)l<l Kl.SSI-.S. 
 
 Hint II ii^.(.il its kri'|is fi»r rc-i'iitci in;,' and salinit pl.it ts ol .nnis. 
 I liiy iiinsl \>v kt'|tt very litw as a |irott;(:tioii a^'aiii^l tin i nt!n\'s 
 lire.' 
 
 Kavclin, ^ J50 1'. 
 
 J. { (iiinlt i|,'nai(ls. >^ J51 !•". 
 
 1)1 ialiiioiit in Ills iiiii>ro\i;(l dtsi;.,'!! lor drtai lied Imts inakis a 
 (oiisidfiaMc list-' of i;oiint('r;.,Miaids. Sec atlas ol lii.s " I'lirtilic .ilion 
 I'olyj^'tjlialc." Sec also \('. h. ^i) abovi'. 
 
 TIh' acciitmilatioii of ontwoiks, f(jrinirly llioii;.,dit dcsiiablr, is 
 now never used. ,^ J.SO I'". 
 
 fi. .!(/.■.(;(( I'l/ iO()rl<s : This term is applietl to those wot !•; \vlii(li 
 are in advanct; of the main ^Maeis, bill an; still tlaiiked l>\ the 
 iiHisketiy tire of tlu; works in rear. 
 
 Horn works, crown works, lunettes, lleclu.s, etc. 'i^ jSd !•". 
 
 .\dvaiu I'd works an; /^'etierally used to o(-eii])y :;rouii(| whi( h 
 cannot bt; lonveiiieiitly bron;.,dil inside the main works, but which 
 It is important lor the deU'iiee to hold, or, aiul this is their < hief 
 use, for the purpose of seeing' into hollows of the j^'round, wim h 
 from any cause cannot be exposed to the lire of the main works. 
 
 ;-. Detached woyks : Works so called ;ire those which are so 
 fir in front of the main works as to retjuire that they shall pro- 
 vide for the defence of tli(;ir own ditches. 'I'lie ;4eneral uses of 
 detacdied works are staled in ,^ z'Sj \' . and ,^ jNiS !•"., ^'oes on to 
 show, how since iiSi5; the employment of worksof this kiiul has 
 been ^Meatls' extendiil, by tlu' necessity llieii clearly iec:o;^Miised, for 
 ^Meatly increasin.i,' thesi/eof fortressi;s. ' IC.xamples of places thus 
 coiiverti:d into intri;n(du;d camps bein;.,' ;;iven. 
 
 Keceiit imi)rovements in artillery, the ;;reatl}- increased si/e of 
 modern armies, and the increased holding' power of rilli'tl bre(.;cli- 
 loailin;.; small arms, have however ^Meatly extended the useful- 
 ness of such works. Tlu; protection of dockyards and arsenals 
 reipiires a \erv ;;reat extension (tl the defeiisivt; works, in order 
 to keep the enemy's batteries at a sullicieiit distance from the 
 places to be protected, and in ordinary fortresses the power of 
 lutldin^' a loii^; line of investment vvitli comparatively weak forcis, 
 as exi;mj)lilie(l at I'aris an<l Met/; has shown the necessity of a 
 vast increase in tlu; si/e of modern fortresses, if they are to be safe 
 from blockade. 
 
 It is evident from these; considerations that a stroii;.; modern 
 fortress must bi; of laij.;e exUiiit, and since it is out of the (pies- 
 
 'Scr liruiiniTH Kiirtri'ss warliiii', I'l. III., h'i;;. 'J,"), Section mi .V. I!. 
 
 iL. 
 
^'« I 
 
 I I.IMI.M;-. (11 lOKTKKSSI-S. 
 
 Nl 
 
 tioii Id (Ntciiil tlif Liiuxiiitc sutriciciitly, tin; liutliod of sill loinxllll^' 
 tlic place l)y II circle o{ iletachccl forts has hccii universally 
 adopted. 
 
 Since detached forts are dependant upon theniselves for their 
 llaiik defeiHc each iiidi\ idiial foit must he a powerful work, so 
 strong' as to conipil the enemy to attack it hy re^'ular sie;,'e, hefoie 
 he can attempt to assail tiie enceinte, and tiiey must therefore 
 afford {^'oovl artillei\' positions and must themselves he secure 
 a;;ainst assault, havin;,' capoiiiris or other means of llank defence, 
 SIM iirej,'ori;es,aiidaium(laiicfot homhprootcover for nieiiand stores. 
 
 The methods for securiu;,' the fullilment of these conditions are 
 till' same as already di'xiihed, the special features of the cas(; of 
 deiached forts hein;; due to the shortness of their fronts, for 
 which reason the I'olvf^onal trace is peculiarly adapte(| foi- such 
 works. The! two small iorts di'scrihed in >j '^ 2()o-j(jj !•"., are 
 worthy of study and should he atteiitivi'ly considerecj. In huj^er 
 works, as for instanct; the detached forts at Antwerp, powerhil 
 casemated keeps should he provided for interior defence, and also 
 to hriii;^' the direct lire of heavy ^^iins on the ground in front of, 
 and hctween the forts, hy means of iron cupolas i)laced on the top 
 of till! keejis. The ,!,'eneral retrenciimeiit of poly^^'onal form inside 
 some of the hastioiiiMl forts at Lyons, mentioned ahove (pK'. /</) 
 should he noticed in this connection. 
 
 In detached forts a chemin-des-rondes may ^'enerally he suh- 
 stituted with advaiita;;e for the covered way, the advantaj^'e of 
 extra cover for the caponiers and escarp wall, ohtained by hrinj;- 
 iu;,' up the crest of the ^dacis close to the counterscarp heiii}^ very 
 important, and from the small size of the works tiie covered way 
 loses its importance as a place of assemhly for sortie troops, any 
 attacks of this kind proceeding from such a fort, would he made 
 round the ixtremities of the },'or}j;e, hut would rather, as a f^eneral 
 rule ; he made hy troops outside the ^'arrison of the forts. 
 
 The difficulty of jnovidiuf^' for the security of tiie heavy j;uns 
 reipiired to reply to the batteries of the attack, in the necessarily 
 limited area of a detached foit, visible from a distance, and ex- 
 posed in coiisi'iiuence to the concentrated fire of heavy shells, is 
 so j^a'cat that there appears to be a tendency towards reducing' 
 the si/e of such works, and reserving; them for the close defence 
 of the immediate fore^^nound, the heavy ^niiis of the defence beiii},' 
 chiefly mounted in batteries in tin; intervals between the forts. 
 (See attack of iMUlresses in the I'uture, Major I'ra/er, K.1^.,1)^'. Kj.) 
 
 The Antwerp forts with their i^arrisons of i,c»oo men may i)0 
 taken as examples (tf most powerhil works of this class.' The 
 
 ' i'"nrtilic:itiiiii {'oly^rmiiilt', ririaliiiKnt. 
 
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 Photographic 
 
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 23 WEf T MAIN STREET 
 
 VEBSTlK.N.Y *4580 
 
 (716) 872-4503 
 
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 82 
 
 .Mi;Nrs oi' i()i<rKi;ssi;s. 
 
 tirst-class forts of the new line at Paris will have j^arrisoiis of 
 1.500 iiRMi.i- On tlu.' other hand the new forts built by the (ier- 
 mans at Strasbour;^-^ are much smaller, there bein;^' little doubt 
 s-i}-s Major b'raser, R.J:^.,;{; that they are so (U;sif;ned with a view 
 to bein^f used cliieH}' " as a line of keeps and observatories in a 
 f^'reat defensive jiosition, the forts themselves only mountin;^^ such 
 ;^MUis as can be lhoroii;^dil\' well covered ; while a num])er of their 
 j;ims, as well as a projxirtion of tlie artillery fron'i works not en- 
 ^^■a^^ed, will be posted in sie^ji'e batteries between or just in rear of 
 the line of forts." See also (/>. b. a. 3.) 
 
 o. Coiuiiinnicatidiis, §§ -4S, i4(j V. 
 
 'V\\v. piincipal retpiirements for communications are that they 
 should be simple, in plan ; easy, as to .^-radin.^ of ramps, (S:c., and 
 safe, from the enemy's lire. ^>J 264, 279 I'. 
 
 ('/) liKlliK.NCllMKNIS. 
 
 These w<M'ks arc; rcMjuired to prevent the enemv from spiead- 
 inj; and cstablishinj^'' himself inside the enceinte, when he has suc- 
 ceetled in forcin,i,'<in entrance, and should luUil the following con- 
 ditions : 
 
 Tiiey should not interfere with the defence of the works in front 
 of them. 
 
 They should be secured against destruction by distant artillery 
 Hre. 
 
 They should be tenable during a bombardment, secure against 
 sudden assault and against being turned. 
 
 ('.. PcniiiVicnt vdrciichincnts, as ap[)lied to Hastioned fronts by 
 (Vjrmontaingne and his successors are 'fully treated of in J^ Jj 254, 
 55J 1'". The kee]")s of the ravcdin and re-entering })laces of arms, 
 and the coupures of the ra\(.'lin in the bastioned Systt^m, Fig i, 
 P. F. PI. IX. F. are projierly speaking retrenchments, though 
 not generall}' so considered. N'auban in his sece)n(l and third 
 systems really created a general retrenchment formed by the 
 tower bastions and their connecting curtains jj 547 F\, and we 
 Hnd a similar arrangement in the general retrenchnu.-nt of C'arnot's 
 Hrst system, <; 5()6 l'\ The main redans of Montaleml)erts tenaille 
 system are retrenched b\ interior redans \\ ith coupures, >j 561 V . 
 In Choumaras' impro\eil bastioned system it is ])roposed to form 
 a retrenchment in the gorge of eaidi bastion, turned towards the 
 interior of the place, but so arranged as to bi; defcuisible also from 
 the interior ot the bastion by tln' expenditure of a little Ial)Our, 
 thus acting as a i-etreiichment to tlu' l)astion attacked, while if this 
 
 I li.r.S. I, ,I,,iiiiimI, vol. I'.t. |i.r. ss. 
 
 .;l!. Iv I'li/c i:-is;i\ Is7<f. !':•. l!». 
 
m 
 
 i"i,i:mi:\ 
 
 (M' i(iK i'Ki:ssi':s. 
 
 ^^3 
 
 is taken the <;ai"rison can rftirr into and liold tin' (Uliri- bastions, 
 each retrenclnnont bcin^ i)r()vi(k'(l with f.\ti'nsi\f cascniat'Mi cnwr. 
 
 All tile retrcnchnuMits alhidcd to above arc (.[n-n works and 
 liave the faults enumerated in >J 254 !•". (detects), ni a .greater or 
 less dc^'ree, their j^n'eatest defect bi-ini; their expostne to distanr 
 fire ecjually with tin; main works, and the constMpient probabilit) 
 that their powers of defence will be i,'r('atly impaind bcfori' they 
 are recjuiretl to come into action. 
 
 All these works liave been applied to bastioned or tenaille s\s- 
 tenis, but since tlu' introduction ol the poly.^onal system in (\cr- 
 inany dnrinj^- the i)resent century, the desi,;;!! of interior works has 
 been completely altered. I'or the open parapets of Cormon- 
 taingne, casemated works havi^ been substituted, varying greatly 
 in design from lofty buildings with threi? tiers of casemates and 
 an open parapet or. the top. down to small casemated blockhouses 
 of one tier with a sim()le earth cover. See Wagner Principles of 
 Fortitication, pg. 44, 46, ;$ 293 l\ 
 
 This change in profile has been the gradual result of the in- 
 creased power of curved artillery fire, and since 1870 it has been 
 recognised, that against ■•such hre, interior works must be pro- 
 tected, either by an interior glacis, covtaing the escarp from iivv 
 descending ^ ; or if this be inadmissable, b)- iron })lating.l' 
 
 The trace of these casemated works varies so much that no 
 definite system of construction can be said to exist. The follow- 
 ing general principles should be consichned in designing them, 
 \\z. : In works liable to attack by assault, they should l)e so 
 traced as to direct their Hre over the whole of the interior of the 
 main works, while in fronts liable to a regulai' siege, they should 
 be traced to direct tlieir tire on those portions of the defences 
 which are most liable to be forced.]: 
 
 Attuiitiim is callud to the mrtliod nf ri'tioiu'linit'iit niipliiil at Aiitvfi'p, where tho 
 inner emls of the Hanks of the det'eiisihle Ijuiraeks, lieiiij,' e<'iineete(l l»y a strong 
 stoekade, constitute a continuous retrernhnnint. S "JT.'i 1''. 
 
 A siniilav design may lie oliserved in many of the Pcdygonal works iccently eon- 
 strueted, as for instanee Kort Viuiari, the eitadel of I'usen, the fronts of w.'ieli (Con- 
 sist in (irt'eet of strong lU'.taehed forts at the salieiit-<, eoiineeted l)y sliglitly Itrokeii 
 lines, aiul these forts or ha^tions exti'iiding as tiiey ilo sutiieiently to the rear to ll.ink 
 the rampart of the eonneeting eiiitains, and licin.' closed at the gorge, form a series 
 of retrenchments all along the line. 
 
 /9. Scmi-pcrmancnt i-ctrcnchinculs : In addition to works of a per- 
 manent nature as above, works may be thrown up during tlu- pro- 
 
 fSee Antwerp Forts, Hrialmonts Fortitication I'ohgonale ; alsd \\ a^ners altas pi. 
 XVI 11, Fig. 'Jl. 
 
 tFor various examples see Wagner's Fortilieation atlas, I'late .Wll. 
 
 'Wi( 
 
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wmsmammssm 
 
 Rip«Hiiii.i,^in jip.i 
 
 84 
 
 ARRANGEMPINT OF THK KLKMKNTS IN FORTKHSSHS. 
 
 1; 
 
 ^'ress of a sicjjfc to retrench the portions of the main work attack- 
 ed, of a Hcitl or senii-pernianent proHle, and protected with 
 ohstacles as in field fortification. ^? ]()() V. See also Scini- 
 Pernianent l'*ortilication. 
 
 y. Citadels are intended to act as the keeps of fortresses, into 
 which the ^'arrison may retire, and either compel a second siej^e, 
 thus prolon{:;jinf^ the defence; or at least obtain more favourable 
 conditions from the victor. They should be situated in the outer 
 line of the defence so as to retain the possibility of communica- 
 tion with the outside, but their site should be so selected as to 
 render them practically unassailable from the outside. Since 
 tiien they will be attacked, if at all, from the interior of the place 
 after the fall of the main work, they should be separated from the 
 other defences and from the enclosed town',; by a broad esplanade, 
 across which the enemy must advance to attack them. Citadels 
 should be provided with ample bombproof cover for the whole of 
 their ji^arrisons. In addition to their use as keeps, they may also 
 be required to overawe the inhabitants of towns, held by force in 
 the face of an unfriendly population. >J 294 F. 
 
 The citadel of Antwerp is a fi;ood modern example of such 
 a work, fulfilling the conditions (]uoted above. 
 
 D.-AlillAXaEMENT OF TIJE ELEMENTS /X FORTRESSES. 
 
 The combination of the elements already considered to form 
 Fortresses is influenced by the followinf,^ considerations. 
 
 The nature of the site, whether wet or dry, level or broken. 
 
 The kind of attack to which the works may be subjected. 
 
 The objects for which the works are desij:^ned, which determines 
 the extent of the works themselves. 
 
 The various combinations may be considered under the follow- 
 ing heads. 
 
 {a) Detached forts. 
 
 (/>) Contiimous enceintes. 
 
 (c) Combination of a and b to form a first-class modern fortress. 
 
 (a) DETAOHKI) KOKTS. 
 
 It appears very doubtful whether the term fortress is 
 properly applied to a place which is simply surrounded by a circle 
 of detached forts without any continuous interior line, but as the 
 term is used in this sense, and important })laces are so defended, 
 it would be well to note briefly the conditions which should ap- 
 parently be fulfilled by such works. 
 
 :!:t*eriuaueiit b'ortilicatiuiis tuay be aiiijuiusd always) to fticloau a tmyn. 
 
 I 
 
mw 
 
 AKKANCKMHNT Ol' Till-: HLKMllNTS IN l-()KTKi:sSi;S. 
 
 «5 
 
 such 
 
 'I'he }Miiu;u\- object of the works will be the defence of a l(x:;ilit\', 
 s;iy ail arsenal, from the enemy's lire. The forts will therefore be 
 pushed forward, perhaps lo.cjoo yards, to secure the arsenal, etc., 
 from bombardment, and there will l)e in rear of them a vast space 
 very imperfectl\- commanded by the tire of their ^'orj^^es. The 
 forts themselves must, as di'scribed in section ('. be powerful self- 
 tlefensive works, capable of mounting- a larj^^e innnber of heavy 
 f(uns to keep the enemy's batteries at a distance, and nnist have 
 especially powerful and secure flanks, as upon the Hankinj^' Wva of 
 the forts alone, depends the tlefence of the intervals, and the j)re- 
 vention of the enemy fi om marchinj^^ throuj,di these intervals. 
 From these considerations it appears that the intervals between 
 the forts would have to be small in order to secure thorouj,ddy the 
 defence of the intervening'' },a"ound by the artillery tire of the tianks 
 of the forts, and further that in the case of a place so defeniled 
 being attacked, an equal amount offeree would have to be dis- 
 played on the whole circuit of the place, no matter which side was 
 deiinitely attacked, every flanking gun especially being manned 
 and ready to open at any time upon columns which might en- 
 deavour to force their way through the girdle of forts. 
 
 But this theory of defence by forts alone is untenable, and there- 
 fore one finds it always connected with projects for the defence 
 of the curtains or intervals between the forts, either by works of 
 Heltl or semi-permanent profile, to be erected when war is innnin- 
 ent, or by a field force. The former reducing it to a case of a 
 ))ermanent enceinte hastily completed by semi-permanent works, 
 the latter to that of a defensive position, strengthened by \'(,'rv 
 powerful permanent pivots. This, owing to the power and close- 
 ness together of these pivots, may be defensible by a very small 
 field force, but it still needs for its defence a held force, suflicient 
 to occupy all or portions of the intervals between the forts, accord- 
 ing as the enemy's force is sufficiently large to enable him to 
 threaten one or more points of tiie circumference ; or to meet tiie 
 enemy in the space within the girdle of forts if he should succeed 
 in forcing an entrance. 
 
 Since the construction of a fortress is generally a question of 
 money, there is no doubt tiiat a circle of forts, with the intervals 
 left open, may be necessarily used for economical reasons, though 
 it may be fully recognized that additional works would be desir- 
 able, if funds could be obtainable for their construction. 
 
 The only influence the nature of the terrain appears to exercise 
 on a place of this kind is, that the ilefence of the intervals will be 
 more easy as the site is more level, and that the less commanding 
 ground there is in front, the less necessary will it be to push works 
 to a great distance to the frf)nt. and the less danger of having a 
 
 n 
 
 
 iii 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
86 
 
 K'A\('.i:mi:\ r or 
 
 I'll 
 
 I-,I,1MI.\1S l\ I (»K I kl-.SSIiS. 
 
 I 
 
 M 
 
 ii' 
 
 ! t 
 
 hir/^'e uiulcfeiKK-'l s|)acc behind the forts. I'^or such ;i placi; then 
 a level site woiiM he vc;r\' advantaj^'^eous. 
 
 'I'liu (|iU'.sti(pii as to t\u; sulliciuiicy <>t a lim^ <'f ilutiiclitMl fdits witlumt any iiitorior 
 (■(iiitiiiUDiis I'Micititr lias ln'cii iimoh (liscMss((l, ami tiii)iij,'li in tlin context the 
 iK'ct.'ssity fur siicli an ciiciMntu has Iuhmi a^Sfitcil it will |ii.'i'iia]is hu wi'll to indicate 
 here Home nt the ciiief points ot the controveisy. 
 
 The (|uesti<in as to tlie form wiiich shoulil lie u'iven to the tlefences of I'aris was 
 actively discnsseil for twi'iity years and ollioer.s of n;rcat eniinc^nce took jiart on both 
 .sides. A commission lejiorted in ISIS in favour of dctaeheil forts, hut the diHcus- 
 sioii went on till after tin; report of a commission in 18-10, it was <le(,'ided to liuild hoth 
 an enceintt! and detached forts. The cause of the detached forts alone was hu]>- 
 ])orted hy (ieid. iiof^niat while (!enl. Ilaxo took the side of tin- continuous enceintis 
 \'aulian in IdS'.t pi-oposed to foitify i'aris and his proj«n't included two continuous lines 
 of which the outer line v\as to lie "J, 0(10 to 2,ri0(» yards in advance, to prevent bom- 
 bardment. 
 
 After 1S40 I'aris was actually foi'tilicd with a rej^'ular continuous enceinte, ii.'ul a 
 circle of detached forts in frctnt, to increase the ditliculty of investment and prevent 
 bondiardment. It is reinark;d)le that all those who in this louit controversy took the 
 side of the detached forts alone, did so on the distinct ^'round that the use of the forts 
 was to supj)ort a tield aiiny, which was toeiiga^'e the enemy in the intervals, thus ad- 
 mitting, as indeed the final decision of the French ( iovernment proves, that such a line 
 of works constitute a strong defensive position, suitable for active defence by an army, 
 not a fortress, one charactertisti(; of which is, that it is to defend the locality which 
 it covers, by means of tlie minimum garrison. The point at issue, viz., detached forts 
 (V';\s«.s' continuous lines, was again raised by Col. Owen, K.K. , in a paper which he 
 read before the corps of Koyal Juigineers and which gave rise to much discussion. 
 
 Col. Owen l)oIdly attacked the system of defending an arsenal, etc., by a line of 
 detacluMl forts alone, and \\as answered by ('apt. Wilson, It.K., in papers which are 
 to be found in the I'rofe.'jsional rajieis of the Koyal lOngineers and are all worthy of 
 study. i The real point at issue, putting aside (piestions as to e.xpense, upon which 
 the (lisputants ditlered, and the ((uaiiHcations of tioops and oHicers re(|uired to defend 
 (uther (dass of works, may be stated as follows, viz. ; With a circle of detached forts, 
 placed say S,(J0O yards in front of an arsenal and without any continuous interior line, 
 will the enemy bi; able to jiush thiough the intervals <luring darkness or fog, without 
 having taken possession of any of the forts. If so the forts are useless for the pur- 
 j)ose for which they were built, until supplemented by other defences, or by a large 
 lield force ; as even a temporary occupation of a few hours, would be sufficient to en- 
 able the enemy to fullil his object, which is assumed to be the destruction of the 
 arsenai, at a sacrifice probably not at all disproportioned to the importance of the 
 object to be gained. The great distaiu'e in front of the place to be defended, at 
 which the forts must necessarily be placed, if they are to prevent bombardment ; 
 makes it almost certain that large sjiaces undefended by their fire, will be left in 
 rear of them, where the enemy, once thrtiugh the girdle of forts, might assemble his 
 forces, and even it is argued might erect batteries to tire on the aisenal, or on any 
 liasty interior defences. 'I'he possibility of erecting or serving batteries in such a 
 situation may well be doubted, but it appears to be eijually clear that the oj)eration 
 of forcing an entrance between a line of forts as assumed, at soiue point of an extend- 
 ed circumference, would be a jiiacticable one, and hence that for a fortress it is not 
 sufficient to have a girdle of detached forts, there must be an interior "enceinte de 
 surete;"and all the ground in rear of the forts must if possible be exposed to lire fi'om 
 the interior works Sir John lUirgoyne says "none wjuld atteiujit to penetrate be- 
 tween such works (strong detached forts) iiiih'xi t/ie// could at once, ijet at c'dal 
 
 Jin the discussion in the IMC. Corps Papers the point at issue appears to have been 
 somewhat confust^d by the assumption that the continuous line, and the detached 
 forts, were to occu[)y the same site, it appears (|uite evident that the detached forts 
 were in their right place, and only wanted souu; interior defensive line to complete 
 the defensibleness of the place, not that they should be replaced by an immensely 
 long continuous line on the same ground. 
 
ARKANCl. MI;N r Oh Illl 
 
 . I.l. MI-.N r> IN I (iK I KI.SSl-.S. 
 
 s- 
 
 then 
 
 piiiiifs," MriiiliiKHit maintains "cvcuy iiitri'iidii'il caiiiii iiiii.-;t iiavr a fortillcd niiclciiH, 
 and all the ground Ix'twfcn tlu^ forts ami tliu iMUfintr ums/ l,r salijict tn nrlilli ni lin ." 
 Tlic vast extension of nioilern fortri'ss(!s ('■.//. I'aris simu' ISTO) will rendtrr this lat- 
 ter condition very ditticiilt <tf fultilini'nt hut will not lessen its inii>ortanee. 
 
 (Iij i.Mi.nsKn KscKiN ri;s. 
 
 The elementary idea of a fortress is, as has l)een shown, a space 
 enclosed by an obstacle, and this we find to be the prevailin;^' idea 
 in th(; construction of fortresses up to very recent times. The 
 ori^dnal wall which formed a sutHcient defence aj^^ainst the weapons 
 of the savaf^e was developed as shown in section (", until a very 
 complicated arrangement of works took the place of the simple 
 enclosure. 
 
 l'\:)rtresscs such as Strasbourl,^ theoretical desij^Mis such as 
 Ilaxo's system, are jjfood examples of the extreme minuteness of 
 detail, and complication of design, which has resulted from at- 
 tempts to strengthen great places of arms. whi(di have kept their 
 importance as fortresses for centuries, and have been successively 
 improved by succeeding generations of engineers, antl also from 
 the speculations of theorists who are constantly developing new 
 designs in advance of the works actually existing in their day. 
 
 The modern development of lire arms has however given a fatal 
 blow to this accumulation of small de-tail, which had been un- 
 doubtedly fostered by the error, common to the I'^rench ICngineers 
 since Cormontaingne's time; that the t^ank defence of the ditches 
 of a fortress was to be sought for, from musketr^• rather than from 
 artillery fire, that the provision of this ilank defence was the main 
 object of fortification, and that the artillery of the defence should 
 bi;, as a rule, reserved for the later stages of the siege: artillery 
 has had its value fully recognised, and the result has been a great 
 revival of fortification, the recognised princii)les of construction 
 being the necessity f(^r securing a strong tire of artillery to the 
 front, and artillery flank defence for the ditclk:s. The Polygonal 
 system, lending itself readily to these princii)les, has been univer- 
 sally adojited and its long simple lines substituted for tlu; shorter 
 and more broken basticMU'd front. 
 
 The nature of a p)articular enceinte will dc;pend to a great ex- 
 tent on the nature of the attack to which it is likely to be exposed 
 and the subject may be considered imder two headings, viz.: 
 
 a. When a n'}j;Hlai' attack is not po^siljlc. 
 
 1. Long simple fronts with a central caponier should In; used. 
 
 2. The outworks should be few and simple and max- be contine<l 
 to a covered w.iy with a re-entring |)Iace of arms, proxiiled with a 
 casemated keep, opposite the centre of the i-.urtaiii. 
 
 M 
 
 '■4 
 
 f 
 
 W 
 
 m 
 
 .!'] 
 
 W 
 
 
 ^Is' 
 
,s,s 
 
 AKKANdEMliN r Of THI': lUJiMENTS IN 1 {)KTl^i:ssi:.S. 
 
 
 >■ 
 
 3. The escarps and caponiers to be completely concealed from 
 the view of the enemy. 
 
 The northern fronts of Antwerp afford a good example of such 
 a construction.* 
 
 j-i. When a regular aliack is possible. 
 
 1. The fronts should be shorter and more elaborate in detail, 
 and should combine all the elements which go to form a sti. ng 
 prohle. Bombproof cover in abundance for men and materiel 
 should be providetl. The ramparts should be well traversed, and 
 shcjuld provide secure emplacements for a numerous artillery to 
 fire to the front. 
 
 2. There should be strong salient outworks to cover the com- 
 munications across the main ditch, and to protect the ca})oniers, 
 to provide large and safe places of assembly for troops outside the 
 main ditch, and to bring a flank and reverse fire to bear on an 
 enemy advancing on the salients of the enceinte, the glacis should 
 be countermined. 
 
 3. All escarps, caponiers, and keeps, should be covered from 
 artillery fire, hence tunnelled masks, iron plating, or interior 
 glacis, will have to be used. 
 
 The nature of the site will necessarily have a powerful influence 
 on the general plan of a fortress. In those cases where a place 
 has to be surrounded on all sides by defensive works the salients 
 will be more obtuse as the form approaches the circular, and if the 
 site were perfectly level and uninterrupted, a regular polygon of 
 many sides would probably be the form adopted. But as sites of 
 this kind rarely exist in nature, the usual method is to select the 
 principal salients from the tactical conditions, and then connect 
 them with one or more fronts as may be desirable, bearing in 
 mind that the more nearly the consecutive fronts are in a straight 
 line, the more dilKcult they are to attack. Any point where the 
 general direction of the line changes more acutely will be a weak 
 salient, and unless it can be withdrawn from attack by a judicious 
 arrangement of plan ; such a point must be specially strengthened. 
 It is evident from the above, that in selecting the sites for de- 
 fensive works of the nature of large enceintes, the engineer should 
 endeavour to present as straight a front as possible on the side 
 most subject to attack, covering his acute salients by placing them 
 in positions, where from the nature of the terrain in front, in- 
 undable, or rough and rocky, it would not be possible to conduct 
 a regular attack against them. 
 
 It is evident that an infinite number of cases may be imagined, 
 
 '.See Uriivlinoiits Koititication Polygoiiale, Atlas PI. XII. 
 
AKKA.N'CKMKNI ()»• Till: KI.KMKNTS IN I OKTRHSSKS. 
 
 S9 
 
 in 
 
 tlie simplest hcinj,' tliat where only one side of a place is attackable, 
 as for instance the huul defences of a fortress situated on a nar- 
 row peninsula, which might consist of one or more fronts almost 
 in a straight line. In almost every case the probable side of 
 attack will be determined by the conditions of the site, and the 
 works must be designed accordingly. 
 
 Whether the site is wet or dry will largely influence the profile 
 of the works, as indicated in section C. The chief difficulty of a 
 wet site being the effective covering of the flanking cajioniers, etc., 
 fron. long range artillery fire. The works of the Antwerp enceinte 
 afford a good example of the application to a wet site. 
 
 The (le8cri]ition given by Briivliiiont* of the causes whicli (letermined tlu geiieial 
 flfsign of the Antwerp enceinte, is a very interesting example, as sliowing the reasons 
 which governed him in actually settling on the ground the plan of tliat great fortress. 
 
 ((•) fOMBINATlON OK KNCI.OSKI) KNIKINTES ASK DKTACHKl) KOKTS TO F(tl;M A KIKST- 
 
 CLASS MODEKN FORTKKSS. 
 
 II.. The enceinte : 
 
 As in D. b. [-i. above. 
 
 fi. The detached forts : 
 
 1. The individual forts as in C. c. — o above. 
 
 2. The forts considered in combination with the enceinte. 
 
 The reasons for the combination of detached forts with closed 
 enceintes have been briefly touched upon in (C. c. 0) above. Tiie 
 advantages gained for the fortress by the addition of detaciied 
 forts may be fully stated as follows : 
 
 Tliey increase the security against assault ; by tlieir fire on the 
 intervals, and on the ground between the forts and the enceinte, 
 they being themselves secure against assault. 
 
 They increase the difficulty of Investment ; by enlarging the 
 circumference occupied by the works. 
 
 They increase the difficulty of bombardment; by keeping the 
 enemy's batteries at a great distance from the enceinte. 
 
 They add greatly to the difficulty of a regular siege ; by neces- 
 sitating a regular attack on the forts before that against the 
 enceinte can be commenced. 
 
 They facilitate large sorties; by affording secure places of as- 
 sembly in rear of the forts for large bodies of troops. 
 
 They increase the strategic value of the fortress; by fitting it 
 
 ■"'{•'ortilication I'oiygnnale," Vol. I, Chap V. 
 
 I 
 
 '.W 
 
 ii\ 
 
 '§ 
 
 m 
 
 I 
 f.'j 
 
 ii! 
 
 ill 
 
 t 
 
 ill 
 
on 
 
 \KK \N<,I.MI;N I 111 nil. l.l I.NiI.NIS I\ IoK IKI SSIvS. 
 
 '■' : ' 
 
 for (n-cu|);iti()ii 1)\' ;i I.iij^m- army as an iiiticnclitil cami) (Waj^iicr 
 I'riiicipU's of lw)rtiru-ation. \i<^. 50, ,^ 2SN 1'.) 
 
 The distance of these forts from the enceinte and from each 
 other is sliown, ;; jcS.S l'\, to ha\-e heeii orif^'inally al)ont half a 
 mile, which mif,dit be extended, in the former case, to 2, 000 yards 
 for protection from homhardmi'nt ; hut the- increased power of 
 rilli'd weapons has j^reatly extended these limits, and now to form 
 a protection a/^'ainst bombardment, the forts must be from 5,000 
 to i(),(j()0 3'ards in front of the; object to be defended ; while Ibrts 
 intended nu-rely to stren,i,'then tlu' defenctM)f tin; iMiceinte a[,^'unst 
 u ref^Milar sief,^; should be pushed forward as far as is compatible 
 with the condition that the whole of the j^Mound in rear of them, 
 must be fully exposed to tiie j^nms of the enceinte. 
 
 The distance ai)art of detached forts may be taken to be one to 
 one and a half miles as a minimum, and is only limited as a maxi- 
 mum by the important condition, that the whole of the /.^Mound 
 between must be fully exposed to the fire of the forts, or to that 
 of supplementary works placed in the intervals. ^ 290 I". 
 
 Tlie wliole of tliis ((uestion of (liHtanco is involved in considerable doubt, and thero 
 Iian been j^rcat variety of practice amongst Kngiipjers of eminence. 
 
 Tlie fact is, tliat in each particular case tlio local cinnimstances, botli as regards 
 the object of the fortifications, the nund)er of men likely to be available for the de- 
 fence, and above all the nature of the terrain, exercise a most important inlluenceoii 
 tlie dimensions reipiired. The following examples will illustrate the princiiiles in- 
 volved. 
 
 At Antwerp on a ])racticiilly level site the forts are placed at ilistances of from two 
 to three miles in front of the enceinte and at an average distance apart of 2, 100 yards. 
 The whole of the ground between the forts and the enceinte being fully exposed to 
 the fire of the latter, a point insisted upon by Brialniont. 
 
 The forts for the defence of the English dockyards are ])lace(l 8,000 yards in front 
 of the object to be defended, when the ground is open an<l gives the enemy a clear 
 %'iew, and at intervals of about one mile apart, when the ground is ojjen. 
 
 The forts on the south of Paris, designed in 1840, are only about 2,000 yards in 
 front of th(5 enceinte, and being commanded by the heights of ("hatillon in front, 
 were ineffective as a means of preventing the bombardment of the city, which was 
 earned out over tin; forts, by the (!erman batteries [ihn'cd upon the eommandinj^ 
 heights. The position of these forts was evidently bad, and (ienciral Noizet hau 
 pointed out in 1840, that even with the sliort range guns then available, the city 
 could be bombarded from the heights of (,'hatillon. 
 
 The cause of the failure of these foi'ts is found then in the c'onimanding and broken 
 ground in their front, which gave remarkable facilities for the erection of siege bat- 
 teries, and for the defence of the investment line, and thus we find that the Com- 
 missiou entrusted with the improvc-nient of the fortifications of I'aria, has placed 
 the new forts commcnci^d in 1874. at distaui;os as great as ten and eleven miles from 
 the enceinte; their selection of ground being based on the true principle that the 
 great necessity of the case was to obtain a clear field of tire, and that the ground in 
 front of the forts should otter no assistanci' to the <ipcrations of the enemy. The 
 forts on tlie north side of l';iris are placed on the same principle, and owing to the 
 unfavourable nature of tht^ ground in front of St. llenis, have had also to be carried 
 f;vr to the front. Ittiniont is II miles from th<' enceinte ami (H from St. |lenis,+ 
 
 Moiiriial 1;. r. S. 1.. \i,l. lit. P-. 74, rtM(j. 
 
.\KK.\N(,I.\II;N |- III 'I'lll. I I IMIMS IN I OKI'KI SSIS. 
 
 <H 
 
 Tlu! ililclMil.s lii't\Miu the new I'll lie h luitH arc in sdiin' ciiscs very ^;rc,i.t. tin re liciil;,' 
 nil iiitcrviil III' II iiiilcx liitMciii l,<s I'liittiH ( liiiiiiiiiiiit anil N'lik'iiciivf St. < Ji'iir;.'!', iiiul 
 ii I'olmiin cmilil aiUiuii'i- Ixttwci'ii tiiesi' wmks witliniit ln'iiig witliiii tuur un\vn ut 
 either.' 
 
 ('/) KXAMI'I.KS 
 
 Tlie c'xamiiKs j^mscu in tin; 'I'cxt Uook to illustrate the ajv 
 plicatioii of foi'titicati(Hi to the construction of I'ernianent 
 Fortresses are : 
 
 The Modern French System (theoretical) Jj^ -57--''5 !'• 
 The Fortress of Antwerp, ^.^ 2(A), 280 and jSy l'. 
 
 Detached l-^irts. ^ 290-295 F. 
 
 In studying'' the first of these examples it must be borne in mind 
 that it is purel}- theoretical, no exactly similar front beinj^^ in ex- 
 istence. It f^nves the result of the labours of successive }j;-enera- 
 tions of Fn^dneers in the I'^rench lilny:ineer School, to eliminate 
 the faults admittedh- existin^^ in C'orniontaingne's trac ., and it may 
 be considered to be the best type of bastioned trace. It must be 
 remembered however that many important modifications have 
 been proposed by officers of eminence, who without abandoning 
 the bastioned trace, have endeavoured to amend it on lines some- 
 what different from those followed at Met;j. Many examples may 
 be quoted; four, vi/. : those of Carnot, Chasseloup, Dufour and 
 Choumara being treated of in some detail, §^ 566-568, 572-582 V., 
 to which may be added a very elaborate system proposed by the 
 celebrated Cienl. Haxo in 1826. These examples all refer to dry 
 sites. The applications (jf tlie bastioned trace to wet sites was, 
 owing to the, nature of the country, much studied in Holland, 
 and Coehorns systems described in detail, ^§ 55^-557 F. afford 
 examples which are worthy of study, though their details are of 
 course unsuited to the requirements of the present time. 
 
 In Antwerp we have an excellent example of a Polygonal For- 
 tress applied to a wet site; the work is on the largest scale, has 
 been designed in view of all the modern improvements in the 
 means of attack, except perhaps the very latest, and has as a 
 study the further advantage that we have, in his 'T'ortification 
 Polygonale," a full explanation b}- the author, of the design itself, 
 and' of the reasons which lead him to adopt it. 
 
 The only example at present available for study at the R. M. C. 
 of the application of a Polygonal trace to a dry site is the so called 
 Prussian system described. §nJi 569-510, Plate XXX, P. I*"., which 
 represents a front of the enceinte of Posen, but it must be re- 
 membered that the Polygonal works built in Iun"o[)e since 181 5 
 present a great variety of detail, and even in the fortress of Posen 
 
 "As to the uiiilefeiuleil spaci.' hetwuuii tiu:Hf forts ami the ulil cin-if nl' ilffciisivi: 
 wurks, See pg 80, above. 
 
 •h 
 
 3 
 
 ' i.i' 
 
 i 
 
 •f 
 
 li 
 
 m 
 
 S''l>: 
 
 |V)!<] 
 
'H 
 
 ■|f 
 
 H2 
 
 ri<it(,KI SS n| n KMANi;.N I I OK' I II I( \| |(i\. 
 
 f'f 
 
 ill 
 
 li iii 
 
 iiin 
 
 itself, the Citadel or I'Dit \'iiiiiiia, is i|iiitf iliftciciit in dt'si^ii 
 from the maiti (•nccinti'. 'riirie caiiiiot tluucfoii' be said to be 
 any dcfiiiiti' system for the (■onstnictioii of l*oly;^^onal fronts, eac'h 
 woik heiiif,' suited to its own site, and preserving; only the ^a'lieral 
 (■jiaraetcristic; feature, of tlank defence by casemated caponiers, in 
 common. 
 
 In lulditioii to tliu (Ictiii'hutl fortn ilcHcrilitul in Text Hook uiul iioteil aliove, s|>('i'iiil 
 iitt«'iition in (lirci.ttid to tii(! Antwuij) (letiichtMl forts of wliii^li a full ilnHiriptiou will 
 1)1! found in tlie "Fortitication I'olygonale," Cliiiii, X. 'rinmo arc vi-ry jtov^frful 
 woi'kH, and will repay a careful study. 
 
 li. SKETCH OF mod It ESS of I'EKMAS'KNT FoltTlFICATloN. 
 
 TIk: subject which can be but brieHy touclied upon may be 
 sub-divided as follows, vi/. : 
 
 (d) Media-Nal fortiHcation : 
 
 Permanent l'\)rti[ication before the intro(hiction of \:,n\\- 
 pnw<ler. 
 
 Methods of attack to which it was exposed, and means taken 
 to resist them. 
 
 (/>) The transition jieriod : 
 
 ICffects of the introduction of cannon and of miniuf^ with .i;un- 
 powder. 
 
 On the site. 
 
 On the construction. 
 
 On tlie profile. 
 
 On the Trace. 
 
 (c) The early Italian, Dutch and T^rencli schools. 
 
 The elaboration of the bastioned system, its adaptation to wet 
 sites by the Dutch, application by French Engineers before 
 Vauban. 
 
 {d) The French school under Vauban and ' ' s successors. 
 
 \'auban's systems, ist and jrd,Cormontaingne's improvements, 
 llie school of Mezieres, the school of Metz (Modern l-'rench 
 System) other proposed bastioned systems. 
 
 Opposition to the bastioned system by Montalemlfert, sketch 
 of his proposals as partly adopted by Carnot. 
 
 (fi The German school : 
 
 Kise of the Polygonal system in Germany ; wiiat it owes to 
 M nitalembert and to the early designs of Durer. 
 
\'*i 
 
 I'lCiiClvl.ss ol I'l.U'MANI- N r I DIM II K A I loN. 
 
 «».< 
 
 •iin- 
 
 'llif l'i>l\},'()iial system iis applied in llinDpi' (lining; the pics».'iit 
 
 (■('lltUlV. 
 
 ill) MKIH \K,\ Al. liilITIKII'.VTKlN. 
 
 The methods of attack described in -^ 5K) I''., are sutticieiit 
 to show that the assaihiut was formerlv ()l)li;,'ed to come ch)se up 
 to the ol)staclo in or(U"r to breach it, hence the exposure of the 
 obstacle to be seen from a distance was immaterial, and inacces- 
 sibility to assault bein/^ the chief object soiif^dit for, it necessarily 
 follows that fortification before the introduction. of ^Minpowder 
 consisted mainly in surrounding,' the enceinte to be defended with 
 lofty and comparatively slif,dit walls of masonry, flanked and 
 commanded by towers at intervals, and ran;^dn;^' from lo to jo 
 yards in hei;^dit ; and further when possible, in perchinj,'' these 
 walls on the hij^diest and most inaccessible j^round available. It 
 is true that Hank defence was not nej^dected, but the short raiifje 
 of the offensive weapons used, made it ineffective and hence more 
 reliance was placed on vertical defence. § 518 I*". The inacces- 
 sibilit}' of site often found in feudal fortresses, was also valuable 
 as a protection aj^^ainst the methods of mininj,' then in use. The 
 },'eneral result us regards mediii'val fortresses i.~ described in § 
 
 5-20 ^' 
 
 All cxculleiit exaniiilu of iiiediibval fortitiuatioii ia to be seun in iturtioiid of the 
 wiilla of C'uiiHtuiitiiiopie, whiuli are fttill Htuiuliiig, and wliicL coiidiHt of three walla 
 oiu! within the other. The cominanil of the outer wall ia "> c. with a wet ditcii in 
 front, (if the seeond wall (5() feet in rear t)f the first), 2ij leet, an<l of tlie third 
 wall 1' ft. ill ri'.i.' of tlie second), 4,')i ft., the two inner walla are llat.U'id by project- 
 iiif,' towels, tia.-.i '( tilt! inii>;r wall dividing the intervuia of those ol the outer wall. 
 The I'oiiiniaiid of these towel i being about 7i") feet, and .'Itii feet i cispictively. The wet 
 ditcl, \'2 feet deep and M feet wide. 
 
 (//) TlIK TUANSITION I'KIUOI). 
 
 The introduction of cannon, and of gunpowder for minmg 
 caused a vast revolution in the art of fortification. Cannon are 
 said to have been used by the Moors in Spain as early as 1118, 
 but it was not till the end of the 15th century that they became 
 really effective for siege purposes, ):J 522 I-"., and the discovery 
 of the use of gunpowder for mining in 1505, J^ 5.^3 I'., increased 
 the effect of the improvement of artillery. It became at once evi- 
 dent that very large alterations in the sites, and in the construc- 
 tional details of fortresses were rendered inevitable. § 5- j-526 l'\ 
 Tlu; necessity for obtaining cover from artillery fire even for the 
 better constructed walls, and for protecting the escarps from being 
 breached by mines, was also apparent, and lead to important 
 changes in the profile of the obstacle, which very soon attained to 
 the modern normal type, subsequent changes being rather in 
 degree than in kind. § 527-629 F. Flank defence was also much 
 increased in value by the improvement of weapons of offence, and 
 we find in the designs of Martini and Durer, provision for artillery 
 flank defence of tiie ditches by means of caponiers, and also b}' 
 direct tire from escarp galleries. § 5.<o F. 
 
 4 
 
 
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wmmiimmim''HmMmi h mmmmiimmK . 
 
 lit 
 
 04 
 
 1'1<o(;k'i:ss oi' 1'i:i<m.\ni:n'i ioktikicaiions. 
 
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 ('•) TiiK l;.\l;L^ itai.ian, hi ii ii \M) i-ukmii sciioni.s. 
 
 Tlir Italian ICii'^iiuicis liowevcr placed a very hij^^li value on 
 plun^^MUL;' lire. owin.L,'' ddubtless to the want of penetration of the 
 projectiU-s then in use : they objected to the |L(ra/in^'' tire of the 
 c;iponiers, and settinj^' to work to ini])rove the old bnhvarks, they 
 (iesi,L;ned the anj^ndar b,istion which has kept its place ever since. 
 >j 5JI l'\ 'Hie caponier lon^' ne;^dectcd h;is, duriiij; the past cen- 
 tnr\' aj^Min been brouj^dit forward, and has now apparently beaten 
 its ancient rival from the lield. 
 
 A sketch of the pro;^aess made by the Italian cnj^ineers in per- 
 fectinj{ the bastiont^d s\stem up to the date of the constructi(jn 
 of the citadel of Antwerp by Pacciotto in 1567, is given in §vj 531- 
 534 V. This citadel is remarkable as beinj^ the first complete 
 work built on the bastioned system, the previous applications beinj:^ 
 ciiieiiy to the improvement of fortresses already existinJ^^ 
 
 The early Italian bastioned works had usually very short flanks 
 co\ red by projectiuf,' orillons, the flanks being arranged for two 
 or three tiers of lire, the lower flank being sometimes casemated, 
 (see Wagner's Atlas, PI. XX., I^g. 5), and the bastions very fiat. 
 The bastions were soon made more salient approaching the pres- 
 ent form, but with Hanks still much retired behind orillons and at 
 right angles to the curtain. 
 
 Other traces were also tried, vide ■^ 533 F., for a description of 
 Alghisis' trace. 
 
 The adaptation of the bastioned system to wet sites by the 
 Dutch, was the result of their wars of independance and is de- 
 scribed in ^§ 535-53*'^ I •' i" which is also included a sketch of 
 .Speckle's systems. The natural features of the country largely 
 influenced the Dutch system of fortification, water being always 
 at hand, the broad wet ditch as an obstacle, and the absence of 
 masonry, for the construction of which the haste in which, many 
 of these towns were fortitied, left no time available; are charac- 
 teristic of their works. Coevorden fortified l)y Maurice of Nassau 
 affords a good example of this mi'thod. J^ 537 F. The Dutch 
 system remained unaltered till they were forced again to defend 
 themselves against the powerful French invasion of 1672. This 
 crisis produced a celebrated Engineer Minno Haron de Coehorn 
 who improved and constructed man\- places in the Low Countries 
 and elaborated three systems of fortification, jj^j 555-559 F. His 
 first system is described in detail in the paragraphs quoted above. 
 Anu)ngst other improvements the conversion of the old Dutch 
 "fausse braye" into an outer and an inner ram|)art, the former 
 with a broad wet ditch, and the latter with a dry ditch and a 
 masonry I'scarp. is remarkable as an expedient lor obviating the 
 danger to which wet ditches are e\[H)si'(l, ol being rendered 
 
^:i1 
 
 
 rKC)c.Ki;ss i)|- ri;i<M.\\i;N r loK ill ua iiox. 
 
 •)3 
 
 if 
 
 passable by frost, and thus lfavin,<,^ a fortress which depi'iids on 
 tlieni alone, without an obstacle tt) assault. 
 
 In the lirst half of the 17th century two celebrated enj^nneers 
 were produced in France I)e Ville, antl de Paj^^an, the former is 
 remarkable as havin;^^ hxed the lenj^th of his line of defence with 
 reference to the ran^e of the nuisket only, f^nvin^' as he does a 
 decided preference to this weapon over artillery for flank lire, and 
 tluMi^di Paj^^an, who followed him, l)uilds wholK' on sheltered 
 artillery flank lire, he still retains the len<;th of lines of defence 
 laid down by DeVille, and this appears to have had ,t,a-eat influ- 
 ence on the subsecpient de\elopment of I'ortihcation in b^rance, 
 as even in the latest trace of the school of Met/., the nnisketry 
 limit is adhered to. De Villc also opposes casemates, and larj^^e 
 bastions. >J§ 5 59-542 V. Both De Villi; and Paj^Mn api)ear to 
 liave based their S}st(!n)S rather on the Dutch than the Italian 
 lines, Pagan's trace, P. V., PI. XXII. I", bears a singular resem- 
 blance to Ccwhorn's ist system, P. I''., PI. XX\'I. F,, which it 
 preceded in point of time. 
 
 It hIkhiIiI l)t! miticud tljivt almost all tlio l)a-<ti(iii<'il frontn up to this tiini; (middle 
 of 17tli century) wuri; provided with orilloiis to which great impoitaiioo was attached. 
 X'auhaii eoutiiiiied to use them in liis earlier workn in comhiuatiou with curved 
 Hanks, hut finally ahandoued their use, which has ever since lieeii given uji in the 
 liastioned system, hut has recently heen introiUiced in the Polygonal fronts at 
 Antwerp. 
 
 ('/) TIIK KHKNCll SriKioI. INDI'.K VAlliAN, KTi '. 
 
 The latter part of the 17th century marks a \'ery distinct 
 stage in the progress of fortitication by the de\-i'lopment of Van- 
 ban's ist system, which has formed the basis for tin; subsequent 
 improvements of the French I'2ngineer School. \'aiiban's 
 systems are found fully described, 5^§ 54.)-55f' ^' • 
 
 In Vanban's early designs he abandoned the low flanks of his 
 predecessors, in conseciuence of his habitual use of the tenaille with 
 which they were incom{)atible, and he also gave up the orillon 
 which had been used by De Ville and Pagan, he thus defi- 
 nitely adhered to the system of tlank defence of the main ditch 
 bv the plunging Hre from high open Hanks, without ,iny special 
 arrangements for covering the thinking guns. It may be supposed 
 however that he altered his o[)inion on these points, as in his 
 third system whileretaiiiingtlu'<)i)(Mi llankdefmicc.' unaltered for the 
 main ditch, he constructed inside the main bastions a continuous 
 retrenchment, consisting of small masomy tower bastions con- 
 nected by curtains, broken inwards to afford room lor casemates, 
 in which, as well as in the Hanks of the tower bastions themselves, 
 gnus covi'red from distant tire, wi're preser\i'd in st'curit)- lor the 
 llcfence of the <liteli of the iclitiirhiiirnt b\ .1 closi and -;ia/ilig 
 lire. See P. b. PI. XXIN' b". 
 
 
 '$ 
 
 V ;i 
 
 % 
 
 ■m 
 
 m 
 
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 "U 
 
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.jG 
 
 I"K<)(;ki:ss ui- permanmn r ioktikaiiun. 
 
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 This tliird system of \'auban's is reinaikahle as beinj:^ in fact, 
 so far as the retretichnient is concerned, a Folyj^onal trace with 
 caponiers (the towers) at tiie anj^les. In this system he ^^ave also 
 ^^"eatly increased sahency to the ravehn, and provided it witli a 
 revetted keep, thus addinj^ much to the power of the defence. 
 
 The third system embodies the results of Vauban's immense 
 experience, and is particuhirly valuable as showinj; his dissatisfac- 
 tion with his earlier works, and his recognition of the necessity 
 for providing casemated cover for the guns which were recjuired 
 to be kept intact fc.i. the defence of the ditch. 
 
 After Vauban's death the tower bastions were given up, and the 
 improvements in the bastioned trace made by Cormontaingne, and 
 subsequent leaders of the French Engineer school throughout the 
 whole of the eighteenth century, were based rather on the earlier 
 works of Vauban, which he distinctly disclaims as of his own in- 
 vention. It appears therefore as if the name of this great man 
 was used to gain acceptance for a system which he had himself 
 abandoned. At all events the trace now known as Cormon- 
 taingnes', J;j^ 55i'554 !'•» is in effect Vauban's first system with an 
 enlarged ravelin, and later improvements down to the close of the 
 eighteenth century are merely in matters of detail. See PI. IX, 
 Fig. I. F., which represents the system as it stood at the time of 
 the removal of the Engineer School from Mezieres to Met/ in 1793. 
 This system differs very little from Cormontaingne's trace, the in- 
 troduction of coupures into the ravelin being the only important 
 addition. The retrenchments "cavalier" and "gorge," shown 
 in PI. IX. F. are those attributed to Cormontaingne, and do not 
 belong exclusively to the latest trace of the Me/ieres school. 
 § 265 F. 
 
 P\irther improvements were introduced at the Engineer School 
 after its transfer to Met/, and the trace described, '§>§ 257-265 F., 
 is the embodyment of these improvements, which are attributed 
 chieHy to Genl. Noi/et. 
 
 An examination of this latest trace or '.'Modern I'rench System" 
 will show that the changes introduced since Cormontaingne's time 
 are rather of detail than of principle. The grave faults of the 
 system; the open Hanks, short lines of defence, and loss of tire 
 from the curtain, owing to the obstruction caused by the works in 
 front, still remain : the most noticeable improvements being in 
 the arrangements for closing the inner ends of the ravelin ditch, 
 in the keeps of the ra\'(!lin and re-entering places of arms, and in 
 the ronnniniications, wliirh are grt-atly im]iroved. i^ 2()5 b". While 
 this system was thus getting slvMfotyped in tlu; l'"rench I'^ngineer 
 School, the lea<lers of which, notably l'Niurcro\, assunu.'d that no 
 other system was possible, and tliat no improvements on its 
 
i'R()(;ri:ss oi- i'i.kmam:nt i oktification. 
 
 97 
 
 1 fact, 
 '. with 
 e also 
 vith a 
 
 principles ouj^'ht even to be souj^'ht for; an encrp;etic attack was 
 made upon tlie system, and its supporters the corps of ICnj^'ineers, 
 by the Marcpiis de Montalembert: an outhne of his objections to 
 the existing system, and of his proposed reforms is to be found in J^"^ 
 560-563 1*\, and need not be particularized here, further than ."^o 
 say tliat his }:^reat principle was the necessity for the development 
 of artillery defence, and the provision of casemated cover for the 
 guns required ; and it is curious to note that the defenders of the 
 old system fell back for support in their objections to casemates, 
 about which the conflict ranged most furiously, not on Vauban, 
 whose views they were supposed to represent, but on De \'ille. 
 Of tile I'^ench l'2ngineer corps Carnot alone, ^ 564 V., supported 
 M(Mitalembert, though not going to the same lengths in his op|)osi- 
 tion to the existing system: but the revolution and the wars of the 
 I'2mpire gave a fresh impetus to all military studies, and Napoleon 
 strongly impressed with the poor defence offered by many fort- 
 resses, committed to Carnot the task of restoring to fortresses 
 their legitimate value, § 566-56S. The result was the publication 
 in 1810 of his work "De la Defence des Places Fortes" in 
 which he proposes three systems, the first and principle one, on 
 the bastioned trace, is fully described in the Text Hook. 
 §^ 5^>6-568. 
 
 About the same time Chasseloup an officer of engineers under 
 Napoleon, brought forward an improved bastioni'd system, which 
 more fortunate than most inviuitors, he was allowed to carry 
 into execution in the defences of Alessandria. He makes con- 
 siderable use of casemates, and invented the Chasseloup mask, 
 which is now largely used. He however practically abandoned 
 the pure bastioned type by using a casemated caponier in front ot 
 the tenaille, for flr.nking the main ditch. §§ 572-574 F. 
 
 The termination of the long wars of the Republic and l^mpire 
 in I1S15, left men who had been educated in the Held, free to 
 apply themselves to deduce the lessons to be learned from their 
 varied experience, and consecpiently we find many writers coming 
 forward with proposals for the improvement of the art of fortih- 
 cation. In France, whose school we are now exclusively con- 
 sidering; Dufour hrst made j)ro})osals for closing the ditch of the 
 ravelin]: by increasing the si/e of the reduit of the re-entering 
 place of arms so as to extend across the ravelin ditch. He also 
 proposed alterations in the ravelin in order to secure it from 
 enhlade. §§ 575-578 V. The first of these proposals appears to 
 have given to Noizet his idi.\i of closing the ravelin ditch by a 
 traverse as carrieii out in his s\stem published in 1822, and em- 
 bodied in the Modern iMcnch Systc-m, 1'. [•"., I'l. \. l'\ Noizet's 
 
 ti'liis liail already heeii |)i'(ii)i)»(.>(l by Mniisiiiaril !iiul ('li:i!tselou|>. ;iuil I'anifil mit liy 
 the latter at Ale«saii(lria. l>v aiiotlicr iiietlu"!. See SS r)IH-,")74 K. 
 
 ¥ 
 
 m 
 
 I 
 
 Pi 
 
 * 'M 
 
 m 
 •I 
 
 Pi 
 
■-r^^ 
 
 mmmmmmmm 
 
 mmmmmmsmfimmmmsHi^^fk 
 
 % 
 
 08 
 
 PROGRESS or PF.RNfANKNT FORTIFICATION. 
 
 ! ■ ili 
 
 m 
 
 \- ' 
 
 system is in other ics[)0(:ts wxy similar to the Mi'/ieies tr;le(^ 
 the coupures of the ravehn beinj,' retained. In iiSif) Genl. Ha.xo 
 produced a system in which he makes a lar^'e use of the case- 
 mates called after him to jj^et a powerful tire to the front, but 
 following' ('hasseloup, he abandons the distinctive characteristic 
 ot the bastioned trace by usinf:^ a larj^e central caponier in rear of 
 the. keep of the ravelin, for nankinj:^ the main ditch, etc. No at- 
 tempt has been made to introtluce this s\stem into any of the 
 French fortresses, but tiie Ha.xo casemates have been freely used 
 both in France and in other countries. Choumara who published 
 a work on b^ortificiition in I1S27 has produced some modifications 
 of the details of the bastioned trace which are worth study. 
 Sec §^ 579-582 1' . 
 
 If we consider the woiks that have been built in b'rance durinj^ 
 the present centur\- we shall lin<l, that althou}.,di the bastioned 
 system has been generally adlK-red to, indications are not wantinj.; 
 that opposing influences have been at work, and have ^'ained some 
 ground. 
 
 The new works are remarkable for simplicity ctf design, take 
 for example the new fronts at (irenoble, which consist of a 
 bastioned trace with a continuous earthen counterguard, and a 
 simple unrevetted ravelin, without keeps either in the ravelin 
 or tlie re-entering places of arms, the ditches of the ravelin and 
 counterguard are wet or dry at pleasure, while the main ditch is 
 dry. Again a recent horn work at Hayonne is of very simple 
 design, a bastioned trace with tenaille, and a simple ravelin with- 
 out a keep, as are also the reentering places of arms. The ravelin 
 ditches in both these examples are closed by glacis traverses. 
 Again the enceinte of Paris built since 1S40 is of the simplest {X)s- 
 sible design, a continuous bastioned trace with a countijr-sloping 
 glacis and without ravelins or outworks of au}' kind. The land 
 defences of Toulon and Cherbourg arc, as far as the enceintes are 
 concerned, of the same general tyjae. All these works are re- 
 markable for the comi)lete absence of casemated cover of all kinds. 
 Again take the detached forts of Paris as existing before iS^o, 
 these works are invariably of bastiofi>d trace, are insufficiently 
 provided with cover, and of very simple design. No tenaillesare 
 used. 
 
 Todlehon states the faults of the detaclied forts at Paris as foUows, viz. : 
 
 1. The fronts wliioh bear (Hi the forei,'r()iuKl liiivf insiitrR'ieiit action tliereon. 
 
 2. The main fronts are suhjeet to entilaih'. 
 .'}. Tiie ilitehes are badly tlanked. 
 
 4. The masonry, ('Spei-ially of tlu' cni-tains, is niinh e\[)oseil. 
 
 5. The o|)eninL,'s of the posti'rns arc cx|iosc(l to the enemy's lire. 
 ('». The bonili|irool cover is insnUii'ient in i|nantity. 
 
 : 
 
 i 
 
 it 
 
 ;» 
 
T71 
 
 }if 
 
 PUDCKMss ()i- ri:KMAN'i:NT i-oirriFir.\Ti()\. 
 
 99 
 
 lurm}^ 
 
 Wlien \vc come to examine the detached forts at Lyons how- 
 ever, nioditications are observed. Takinj^^ the detached fort of 
 Villenrbanne as an exanlpU^ we lind a re^ailarl}- formed bastioned 
 work witli a wet (htch. inside which, and separated from tlie onter 
 rampart b\' a revetted (hy ditch, there is an interior work of poly- 
 f^onal form with caponiers for the defence of its ditches: and in 
 the Colombier fort we iiave a Polygonal work pnre and simple 
 withe. . any exterior bastioned rampart. '■ These works show dis- 
 tinctly that even amonj^st the French enj^ineers the difficulty of 
 adapting the bastioned trace to short fronts has been fully recog- 
 nised. Another remarkable example is to be found in l"\)rt du 
 Koule at Cherbourg, where the rampart of one front is made in a 
 straight line in production of the curtain, and (juite independent 
 of the bastioned escarp, the top of which is arranged for musketry 
 fire to Hank the ditch of the curtain, the guns for distant fire being 
 mounted on the straight rampart above. Similar arrangements 
 exist at some of the Met/ forts. § 265 F. 
 
 (''} TlIK (iKKMAN SCHOOl,. 
 
 Leaving the Frencii school we find that the ideas of Monta- 
 lembert, which found small favour in France owing to tlie weight 
 of official opposition, especially by I'ourcroy and d'Arcon, were 
 taken up in Germany and soon bore fruit in a completely new 
 method of I'^ortification, which, following his nomenclature, has been 
 called the Polygonal system. The German nation were delighted 
 to find a system, which they were r.ble to call national, the inven- 
 tion of the casemated Hank defence, which is the distinguishing 
 characteristic of the Polygonal system, being claimed for Albert 
 Durer, who in the sixteenth century, made proposals similar in 
 principle to Montalembert's, for the flank defence of the ditches 
 of permanent works ; but the honour of putting these proposals 
 into a practical form, and of forcing them into notice by forty 
 years of controversy, belongs undoubtedly to Mt)ntalembert. 
 The great uprising of the German people in 1S14-15 against 
 P'rench domination, favoured the construction of works destineil 
 to render impossible in the future a repetition of Xaj^oleon's rapid 
 incmsions across the Rhine, and a large number of fortresses wen: 
 constructed or imprcn-''d on the Polygonal system. I)Ut while all 
 the fortresses built uutside I'^ance, during the present centur\- 
 , .-cj.; -Q ^Yl^^ distinguishing characteristic of the Polygonal system, 
 nank defence from caseinated caponiers, it must not be sup- 
 posed that any detailed system such as Cormontaingne's. or the 
 Modern French has l)i;en elaborated. No two fortresses are built 
 on the same plan, and even in the same place great differences 
 exist between different [)arts of the works e.g. at Posen, already al- 
 luded to. 
 
 *A11 the bastioiiL'd forts at Lyons aro without teiiailles ami some hasu caseiiiatcd 
 tlaaks. 
 
 
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 loo 
 
 1 1 . 
 
 ii 
 
 I'Kor.Kicss oi" i'i:kmani:n r I'oKrii-icA'rioN. 
 
 Tlic inuiii princi[)lc.-; ii|)()ii which tht;su fortresses have been de- 
 signed, may however be laid down as follows: 
 
 Casemated Hank defence as already stated. 
 
 Simplicity of trace the object being to get the heaviest possible 
 artillery fire to bear on the ground in front. 
 
 Construction of strong points by the erection of powerful works 
 capable of an independent defence at the main salients, connected 
 by long lines of very simple trace. 
 
 The fortress of Kastadt consisting of three strong independent 
 forts connected by simple lines, may be quoted as an example of 
 this method of construction, while the citadel of Posen (Fort 
 Viniara) affords an example of the same principle applied in a 
 somewhat different manner, the independant forts in this case, 
 being small flattened lunettes placed at each salient, and so traced 
 that their faces are in line with the connecting curtain which is 
 broken inwards, and are flanked by the central caponier, while 
 their tlanks, extending backwards within the rampart of the cur- 
 tain, take it in reverse and in flank; these forts are closed at the 
 gorge by a casemated wall defended by a masonry blockhouse in 
 the centre of the gorge, and each fort thus forms a retrenchment, 
 being isolated from the remainder of the works by its gorge walU 
 
 But the most important use to which the Polygonal system has 
 been put, is found in its application to the construction of de- 
 tached forts. These works being themselves small, but neces- 
 sarily of such strength as to be capable of resisting assault, require 
 short fronts of strong profile, a combination which cannot be at- 
 tained by the bastioned trace, and we find in consequence, that 
 all European nations (including the French since 1870) have 
 adopted the Polygonal trace for works of this kind. 
 
 The Polygonal system may now be said to be the universal 
 method of fortification, but such is its elasticity and adaptability 
 to ground, that there is no possibility of its hardening, as the 
 bastioned system did, into a theoretical trace with fixed dimen- 
 sions. It is greatly favoured too in having had no Vauban to 
 cover by a great name, the prejudices and the incapacity of suc- 
 ceeding generations, and under the pretence of orthodoxy to stifle 
 progress. 
 
 F-AFPLlt'ATJOX OF FoNTRESSKS To TllF DFFEXOEoF A COUNTRY. 
 
 It remains now only, to consider how fortresses may be em- 
 ployed to the greatest advanta'ge for the general defence of a state. 
 It is shown in z'6i V. how fortresses having been originally con- 
 
irsal 
 
 Ai'i'i.iCAiioN oi-- FOR'i'Ki:ssi:s TO Till'. I)i:i'i:n(i-; oi' a roiN ik-n . loi 
 
 structcel for local purjxjscs, j^'radiuilly fell into tlio liands of tlie 
 central authorities, and were orjjfanized as national defences, their 
 relations to each other, and to the ^'enercd stratej^dc reciuirenients 
 of the defence, beinj; given due prominence. This scientific or- 
 ganization of the defence led to the construction of new places, 
 to supplement the old local fortresses and complete the general 
 defensive design. The change being very distinctly marked by 
 the adoption of Vauban's scheme for the defence of the I-'rench 
 frontier in 1678. He* proposed for the defence of a frontier a 
 double line o<" fortresses at close intervals, and his system with 
 its development by his successors C'ormontaingne ami d'Arcon, 
 will be found described in 282 F. The general theory was, that 
 the fo'tresses should be concentrated on the frontier in several 
 lines m order tt) delay the advance of the enemy, and give time 
 for the concentration of the national force behind them. This 
 theory was generally accepted as true, and was acted upon 
 throughout the eighteenth century and up to the epoch of the 
 revolutionary wars, with successful results. 
 
 The invasion of France in 1814-15 when the allies twice caj)- 
 tured Paris, merely masking the frontier fortresses, showed that 
 the system of frontier lines liad broken down, although the small 
 fortresses of the Spanish-Portugese and French-Spanish frontiers 
 had played an important part in the Peninsular war, 1811-14. 
 
 Distinguished military writers, Rogniat, Jomini, \'on Aster, 
 V'on Clausewitz, began at once after the peace of 1815, to show 
 that the then existing system was faulty, and the direction in 
 which improvement was to be sought for, Von Aster pointed out 
 the true principle of fortification, viz. : that it must be based on 
 the general principles of strategy and tactics, and the true method 
 of its application, viz.; that fortresses should be placed at the 
 points most suitable for meeting and fighting the enemy, and if 
 a choice exists, not too near the frontier. §§ 283-284 V. 
 
 The reason for the failure of Vauban's system appears to be 
 not far to seek. That system was designed for, an(l was suitable 
 to a period when armies were small and immobile, and communi- 
 cation slow and difficult; the detachment of troops to mask 
 fortresses was too great a strain on the armies in the field, and 
 they were threfore obliged to reduce certain fortresses before ad- 
 vancing into the enemy's territory. This lead to such delay that 
 campaigns consisted often of little more than the siege of one or two 
 towns. The ditHculties of movement in bad weather were so great 
 that armies went into winter (juarters, the time available for 
 
 *Hi'ialm()iit states that N'aubau liiiusulf thought that tin; troutior fiii-trt'SHes in 
 I'VaiiCL' wurt! too iiiiiiiuroiis, aud that in i'iiiistriictiii.t{ thoiii he pnilialily gave way to 
 the upiuiuti uf l^uuvuis. 
 
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lO^ AIM IC MKiN (tl- I i)KTKi;sSI.S TO llll': 1 )i; IT'IN'CI : ' >!■ A CoC N IK\'. 
 
 .iclivf (i|)(;r;iti()iis hciiij,' c(Misefiiiently very short. l)Ul Niipolcoii 
 showed that hirj^^c; armies could be l)rou;^dit into the Hehl, and kept 
 there all the Near roimd, and havin;^' j^aadually tau;;ht liis enemies 
 how to make War. tlu.'y at last, in 1^14, put into tiie held forces, 
 which, thouj^di cumbrous and immobile as compared with modern 
 armies, were still sutliciently powerful to enal)le them to mask 
 the frontier fortresses and [)ush on to the heart of the nation. 
 'IMie success of the Spanish fortresses resulted apparentl}' from 
 the fact that the old conditions still survived in that tlieatre. Thi- 
 ainiies wi're too small in mnnbers to be able to advance thronj^di 
 the hontii^r lines, leavin;^' detachments to mask tiiem, and the 
 connnunicatioiis wen; ver\' bad. Hut notwitlistandinj^- the eviMits 
 of 1.S14 the old systi'in was. to a f,neat extent, still adhered to in 
 1 'ranee. The frontier fortresses were kept up with few excep- 
 tions, in the condition in which they were left by Vauban. Met/ 
 iiowever was converted into a modern stronjj place, and Paris was 
 fortified. The result was seen in 1870-71; the frontier fortresses 
 were i)owerless to stop the German invasion. Strasbourj,', 
 which, thouf^h sufficiently powerful to compel a siej^^e, was ill- 
 adapted for defence under modern conditions, quickly fell ; while 
 Metz and Paris (fortresses of modern type) made a vigorous 
 defence, and ver\- nearl\- succceJed in tnrning the scales aj^'ainst 
 the invader. 
 
 The provision of one more strong place, sufficiently powerful to 
 conii)el a siege, l)etween the frontier and Paris, might ])robably 
 have altered the course of events. <> 284 F. 
 
 How then should the defence of states be attempted ? Napoleon 
 sa}'s: — '' Do you pretend to defend a frontier by a cordon; yon are iveak 
 everywhere.'^ This is the key of the whole subject, the defence 
 must be concentrated. Numerous systems have been invented, 
 but as in all othi;r military matters, it is impossible to lay down 
 any dehnitc arrangement of fortresses which will suit every case ; 
 principles alone should be established, the application rnnst vary 
 with the geographical and strategical necessities in each particu- 
 lar case. 
 
 Brialmont, in discussing this cpiestion, gives the preference to 
 the theory of the I'rench (General Sainte Suzanne, who, in 1819 
 published his ideas on the subject. Sainte Su/anne lays down 
 that on each vulnerable frontier there should be three or four fort- 
 resses, one at least to serve as a depot; in rear of this first line, a 
 great fortress with an entrenched camp, to serve as a pivot for 
 the active army, and at the centre of the country a last point of 
 support, forming the general keep of the defence. 
 
 On these Brialmont observes : 
 
 1 1 
 
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 i ' 
 
APrr.irATioN oi- i'ofmki.ssi^s to rni, di-.i !■ n( i. < >i ,\ coin no . lo ; 
 
 1. The places of the first Hue sh()iil<l occupy the imutioiis of 
 j^'reat roads or railways, which the ciiciin- ciuiiiot a\-oi(l witlioiit 
 chanj^'inj,' his hue of operations or inakiii;,'' a dctoiir, wiiicii woiihl 
 expose his Hanks. 
 
 2. Passaj^es of rivers which should bi; occupied only when their 
 denial to the enemy forces hitn to make a lonj,' detour or causes 
 other f,'rcat inconvenience. Tht.'se are most favorably situated 
 when l)otli hanks are occupied, and especially when at the contin- 
 ence of two rivt;rs. 
 
 ]. Points which conmiand mountain passes. 
 
 4. Cireat harboms. (See Coast Deleiice). 
 
 He points out that ^eoj^'raphical stron;^^ points arc liable to lose 
 their importance by tlu: opening,' of new routes, and this espt'ciallv 
 by the construction of new lines of railway turiun;^' the old stra- 
 tef^ical points. The depot places ouj^dittobe selected with respect 
 to tlie lines of operation of the defender's arm\', in case of its 
 takinf^ the offensive. 
 
 The i^^reat fortresses in second line should be similarly placcM], 
 that is at points which command the natural lini'sof the invader's 
 advance; beinjj;' very lar^^e and with powerful j^sirrisoiis these placi-s 
 will exercise a wider influence than the smaller places in front line, 
 and there will not therefore be the same necessity for occupyin;^' 
 the exact pcjint to be defended. Such places are too powerful to 
 be turned with impunity, they must either betaken, or masked by 
 a force so hiv^e as to seriously reduce the invaders active arm}-. 
 The choice of position for such jilaces is therefore not strictly 
 limited, and a place otherwise suitable should be chosen, thouf,di 
 it may be some distance from the actual line <jf advance. 
 
 The central keep should occupy the decisive; stratej^dcal point 
 in the state, which the enemy must take in order to subdue the 
 resistance of the nation. This point in old and centralized states 
 would i^'enerally be the capital. 
 
 Hrialmont jj^oes on t<^ sa}' that the capital sIkjuKI only be chosen 
 for the central keep. 
 
 1. When its fall would disorj^ani/e the national life. 
 
 2. When the countrv had no other central position of <;reat 
 stratef^ic importance. In thus apparently i)referrinf,^ any other 
 suitable point to the capital he is influenced by the opinion, that 
 the ])opulati()n of the capital is seldom, from its habits, capable 
 of l)earin;^' with e([animity the hardships and pri\ations of a sie,ii;e, 
 and that the ,i;reatt;r antl richer tlie citw the more this difliculty 
 increases, as does also the material difficulty of pro\idinj4' for the 
 
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 104 ai'I'I.icahon ()!• I'OKTKFcssKs TO Till-: i)i:i i:n{:i-; 01 acountky. 
 
 subsistence of the popul.itioi). In all this he is prohahly nn- 
 consciotisly influenced hy his decided preference for Antwerp over 
 Hrussels as the central keep for Helf^'iuni ; for which it has been 
 chosen by his intluence, in opposition to the claims of Brussels as 
 the capital : that this decision is amply justified on purely mili- 
 tary jjfrounds there can be no doubt, and in cases whert' such 
 ^'rounds exist the capital must be abandoned ; on the whole 
 however it appears probable that in ordinary cases the capital is 
 the most suitable position for the central keep, unless expressely 
 debarred by unsuitability for defence from a military point (jf view.* 
 
 As an exam[)le, to show that no system should be blindly fol- 
 lowed, Hrialmont quotes his project for the defence of Hel;^Mum in 
 which he abandons the successive lines of SainteSu/anne, and con- 
 centrates the whole power of the defence on Antwerj), the central 
 keep, a modification evidently required, where as in Belj^'ium, the 
 centre of the country is only three marches from the most 
 distant frontier. 
 
 The conclusion to be drawn is that since in modern war for- 
 tresses must be larj^'e, in order to influence the movements of 
 larjj;c armies ; it will evidently be necessary to concentrate the 
 defence in a few positions so selected for their stratej^Mcal impor- 
 tance, that the enemy cannot pass them by unnoticed, and that 
 there should be a succession of such places, disposed on the 
 really important stratef,ncal points between the frontier and the 
 central keep, which should always exist, as a last resource for the 
 defenders. The construction of a cordon of fortified places alon^ 
 a frontier is, under present circumstances, to be altoj^'ether con- 
 demned, the real stratej^ical points of to-day are to be found as 
 heretofore on the /:(reat lines of railway and water conmiunication. 
 The a|)i)lication of thes(! principles to' the defence of maritime 
 fortresses will be discuss I under the head of Coast Defence below. 
 
 'radical uses. — Fortresses may be used as tactical pivots, battle 
 bcinjj; },nven on jj^round immediately in front of, and supported by 
 the j^uns of the fortress, or in the intervals between detached forts. 
 For example the battle of Gravelotte fought under the guns of 
 Met2. 
 
 In this case the object of the action being the defeat of the 
 enemy's field army, not the retention of the place as in ordinary 
 fortress warfare, the fortified place assumes the character of a 
 fortified position, the permanent works of the fortress taking the 
 place of field works; and they will be most effective for this pur- 
 pose, when they have been designed with this view, viz., of pre- 
 paring a battle field for a decisive action. 
 
 * For the extended iliscUMsioii (if this .subject see lirialiiiunt's Fortilieation Poly- 
 fionale, Cliap. J. 
 
 
APIJCATION OF lOKTKIiSSKS TOTHK DKFKNCH OF A COINTKY. I05 
 
 Von Claiisewitz insists stronf,'iy on the distinction between the 
 (lefence of a place and of a jjosition, but as pointed out by C'olonel 
 Schaw, "we constantly tind that the special characteristics of 
 these widely different cases nier/^'e insensibly one into the other, 
 approaching,' more nearly to the former as the defenders are 
 weaker, more nearly to the latter as they are stron^^er compared 
 with their adversary."* 
 
 In fact the fortress is a special case of a defensive position, and 
 the analojj^y may be carried farther by comparing' tlie ^'reat modern 
 fortress, with detached forts and a powerful j^nirrison able to oper- 
 ate in force in the intervals between them ; to a position occupied 
 with the object of fif^ditinj; an offensive-defensive battle; while the 
 small continuous enceinte corresponds to a purely defensive posi- 
 tion. (See application of F.F,, pg. 63.) 
 
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 "K. VV. fiorna tactica.li>oiiit«i(' vii!W, pg. 1»4, (!ol. Sdjaw, li.lv, Wagner's rrinciplcs 
 of Fiiititicatioii, ni'. .">. 
 
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 SEMI-PKKMANENT FORTIFICATION. 
 
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 A JNTJiOjJUCTOffY. 
 
 Dcfiniiion. — ^Tlic term Seini-Perinanciit or Provisional P'ortihca- 
 tion, is applied to those defensive works which approach in profile 
 Xo the dimensions of permanent works ; but which, ovvin^ to lack 
 of time, or money, or because they are only required for some 
 temporary object, have their revetments, bomb-proofs &c., con- 
 structed in a less durable manner : timber, and iron in portable 
 forms, beinj; substituted for the solid masonry of Permanent 
 F'ortitication. 
 
 Objects to be attained, and yequircwcnts which the works should fulfil. 
 
 The objects for which semi-permanent works are constructed 
 are similar to those for which permanent works are erected, and 
 their recpiirements are the same as for these latter, but the extent 
 to which these requirements are satisfied will be much less than 
 in the case of permanent works, owinj;^ to the lack of time and 
 means for their execution, or to the fact, that the works beinj^ 
 built for a temporary object, their completion on the scale of per- 
 manent works, would lead tf) an expenditure of inoney incom- 
 mensurate with the benefit expected to be j^'ained. 
 
 The principal retpiireinents may be stated as follows : — 
 
 1. A profile sufficient to secure the work aj^ainst open assault : 
 This will be best attaineii, as the command is grt.iter, the ditch 
 deeper if dry, wider if wet, the flanking more effective, and the 
 accessory tlefences stronger and more numerous. 
 
 2. The ditches most exposed to attack should be flanked by 
 artillery or mitrailleur fire.* 
 
 '^'I'liuiriipci'taiicc of .(.rtillcry llaiik (iet'ciicu tor tlitchcK is duo, iKitoiiIy tc itHiiiateml 
 ctlV'ct ill dt-8ir(»yiiij{ ladtlers &(•.. Imt also t«> its great mural t^tt'intt, whicli is very sii- 
 liirridi' til that (if iiuiMkcti'y, i'H|n'i'ially wlii-re as in iiairuw diti-licsi, the actual 1o.sh<-ii 
 lUiiscd l)y artilli'i'y or iiiitraiMfiir Mih; will proltahly \w. \i;ry largti. 
 
 Is 
 
MKANSAVAII.AHI.I'; VOU CoNS TK'lc Tl N( . SI,N«|-I'I KM AN I :\T WOKKS. To; 
 
 \. The principal tliinkiiij,' battcrifs should \n- covi'icd as far as 
 possil)lt.' from distant artilicrv tir«;, the pieces heinj,' hliiide(|, or 
 very well traversed. 
 
 4. To secure the ;^'arrison from heavy loss, and consefiuent dis- 
 couragement by a bombardment, bombproof cover. sufHcieiitl)' 
 strong to resist the long range hn of hea\ y shells, must be prf)\ i- 
 ded close to the ramparts. 
 
 5. In the case of semi-permanent enceintes great care should 
 be taken to provide strong points at intervals, so arranged as to be 
 tenal>le even after an enemy has penetratecj the enceinte at any 
 point between them, these strong points resemble retrenchments 
 in their capacity for prolonging the defenci" after tb.e euceinti? is 
 forced at intermediate points, but differ from them in forming 
 themselves portions of the main defensive line.* 
 
 Means available for the coustruction of Simi-Permanent works. 
 
 These are, timber which can almost always be obtained in 
 sufficient quantity for the construction of the roofs of bombproofs, 
 Hanking caponiers &c., and iron in its portable forms, as railway 
 rails, T iron, p.ngle iron, ike, which may generally i)e found in 
 large towns. 
 
 The parapets are of course of earth ; and since the ditches are as 
 a rule unrevetted and consequently offer but little hindrance to the 
 enemy's advance, there will usually be a great accumulation of the 
 ordinary field obstacles, in front of these earthworks : as for in- 
 stance, palisades in the ditches, abatis, entanglements, and fou- 
 gasses on the glacis. 
 
 The shortest time which can be assumed as sufficient for the 
 erection of good semi-permanent works, is commonly stated to 
 be about 14 days, but this time may be prolongerl to several 
 months with great advantage. 
 
 With reference to this subject Brialmont states that, "To se- 
 cure a place from insult it is not sufficient to surround it with re- 
 dans and fleches, of field profile." "Good Semi-Permanent For- 
 tification of to-day differs from Permanent Fortification onl}- in 
 the substitution of timber and iron for masonrv in the roofs of 
 magazines &c." The examples usually given, in his opinion 
 prove nothing as to the possibility of hasty construction of such 
 works, and he instances as follows: viz.. The lines of 1 orres V'edras, 
 had been a year under construction when Massena sat down before 
 them (1810.) The semi-permanent works constructed at \'erona 
 
 *Todleben thinks these strong points are best designed as strong redoubts, placed 
 at intervals in rear of the enceinte and themselves secure un all sides against sudden 
 assault. See pg. 116 below. 
 
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 Io8mI-:ANSAVAII..\IM.F. I-oKCONSTRUCTINC.SKMI-rKUMANIA'T works. 
 
 and Maf^uleburt,' (1866) which were of earth and timber, took four 
 months to execute. Olmutz was three months in hands {1866) 
 but the works were not completed. The forts round Dresden 
 commenced July 1866 were not completed in Oct.* thouj^h larj^e 
 parties worked night and day. The works thrown up by the 
 Austrians (1866) to covei the bridges at Florisdorff were com- 
 pleted in 7 weeks, but Brialmont says that they were evidently 
 not secure against assault. t 
 
 Brialmont concludes that "the experience of recent war 
 therefore proves, that good semi-permanent fortifications caiuiot 
 be constructed in a few days, or even in a few weeks." 
 
 This is confirmed by the experience gained at Washington, 
 (1861-63). The city being threatened at the outbreak of the war, 
 by the near approach of the Confederate forces, was hastih' 
 fortified, and the works which took about 3 months to complete 
 were when finished of field profile only. The work was then dis- 
 continued owing to successes in the field, but when another panic 
 was caused, in tlie fall of 1862, by the unsuccessful operations in the 
 field, the work of fortification was hastily resumed, and the grea- 
 ter part of the defences were completed of good semi-permanent 
 profile, early in 1863. Here the work was not interrupted by any 
 attack. 
 
 The Plevna works serve also to some extent to confirm tliis view : 
 the excellent redoubts and trenches which formed the defences of 
 that place, having been the gradual growth of from two to three 
 months steady labour of the troops assisted by a large number of 
 civilian labourers. See Plevna by Captain Clark, K.K., R.E. 
 Corps Papers Vol. V. Here however it must be noted that the 
 works were thrown up under fire, and were during their progress 
 in many cases subjected to severe attacks from the enemy, all of 
 which doubtless caused delay. 
 
 On the whole, it appears probable, that though the time named, 
 vi/., 14 days, would be amply sufficient for the construction of 
 individual works, it would not be safe to count on the possibility 
 of constructing the extensive defences of a large city, in such a 
 short period, under ordinary circumstances. A thorough organi- 
 zation before hand of the means available, both in men and ma- 
 teriel, such as should exist at every point of great strategic impor- 
 tance, which is unprovided with permanent works will however 
 
 "Col. Wf])ber, R.E., however states that the forts to the south of Dresden were 
 Jin'shed in 14 days. 
 
 tOiK! of the redoulits of the outer line (No 14) had a brick rovettod counterscarp, all 
 the others were unrevetted and the ditches were usually unHanked. The redoubts 
 of the inner line had all revetted counterscarps except in two cases where the ground 
 was marshy. Lt-. Nolan, H.A., Proceedings U.A. I. N'ol. \'. 
 
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CASI-.S \Vin:Ki: SKNfl-PKKMANi:\T FOKTIFICATMN IS ArPfJC Al'.LI.. 1(H) 
 
 tend materially to reduce the time required for the construction 
 of senii-periiianent works. This orj^'^ani/ation should include the 
 preparation of detailed plans of the works, and of their intended 
 sites, as well as estimates of the labour and materials required, and 
 the actual provision and stcn'a^e of all necessary articles, which 
 are not always readily available on the spot. See below, p^. no. 
 
 Cliaracti'i'istics of semi .permanent works. 
 
 The characteristics of semi-permanent works, are the substi- 
 tution of timber and iron, for masonry walls and arches, smaller di- 
 mensions than permanent works, and more rapid execution, en- 
 tailing^ the employment of very lar^'e workinj^^ parties, obtainerl if 
 necessary by rt^juisition on the civil maj^istrate, and possibly tlu! 
 takinj^' possession of the site and materials bv force. 
 
 Cases in which sojii -permanent fortification is applicable. 
 
 It is impossible to provide before hand for all possible contin- 
 tinj^encies, by the construction of permanent works at all the 
 points wbi'^h might become strategically important in any war. 
 
 On the breaking out of war, and during its continuance there 
 will be numerous cases in which existing works will have to be 
 strengthened, or new ones created ; and in whirh, though time 
 and means may not admit of permanent works, something supe- 
 rior to ordinary field works will be required. As for instance: 
 
 On the Defensive. 
 
 1. The completion of permanent works, up to a state of full 
 preparation for an active defence. 
 
 2. The completion in haste of important permanent works which 
 may be unfinished on the sudden breaking out of hostilities. I'or 
 example the detached forts at Belfort 1870." 
 
 J, The execution of work which though recognized as necess- 
 ary, may have been prevented by political causes, or forbidden 
 by treat\-. 
 
 4. The occupation of points, which though important for some 
 temporary purpose, are not of permanent value, and do not there- 
 fore warrant the expenditure of large sums of money on perma- 
 nent defences. 
 
 5. Work the necessity for which may not have been recognized 
 at all before hand, it being due to the unforeseen course of the 
 field operations. 
 
 On the Offensive. 
 
 I. Work to secure magazines and dep»jts of provisions 
 
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 (echelloned oti tlio lines of coniniiiiiicatioii) from hostile jiopu- 
 lations. 
 
 2. Works for sccurint,' important strategical points, witliont 
 having to detach large l^odies of men from the mancwuvering army. 
 
 J. Works to strengthen the fresh bases, which an armj' ma)- 
 establish as it advances. 
 
 The semi-permanent works erected in a hostile country would 
 be intended to last only during the continuance of the war whicii 
 necessitated their construction, while those built in ones own 
 country would, in manv cases, be retained and afterwards com- 
 pleted at leisure as permanent works, the two classes of work 
 should therefore be designed with these oljects in view. 
 
 For those works erected in ones own country, the necessity for 
 which is foreseen, it is of great importance that all possible pre- 
 parations should be made before hand, as follows : — viz. 
 
 1. A general project for the defence of the required locality, 
 should be got out. 'I'his should include detailed drawings of the 
 proposed works, and estimates of the labour, tools, materials, 
 time &€., recjuired for their execution. 
 
 2. When possible the materials, tools &c., should actually be 
 collected beforehand, and stored on the spot. 
 
 3. The actual position of the works on the ground should be 
 indicated by a few marks of durable construction. 
 
 n. -APPL/CAT/OX. 
 
 The application of semi-permanent fortification may be con- 
 sidered under two heads. 
 
 a. To semi-permanent detached forts. 
 
 b. To semi-permanent enceintes. 
 
 a. SKMI-l'KRMANENT DETACHED FOHTS. 
 
 Works of this description would be similar in form and gene- 
 ral design, to permanent works of the same class. See pg. 80 
 above. Their command will be superior to that of field works, 
 (10 to 15 ft.), and their parapets thicker, approaching in both parti- 
 culars to the dimensions of permanent works ; the ditches will be 
 wider and deeper, the escarps and counterscarps should be re- 
 vetted if time permits,* and the ditches, especially on the faces 
 and flanks, will be flanked by artillery, or mitrailleur fire, ne- 
 
 *See Footnote t, pg. 108. As to the Counterscaii) revetments at Florisdorff. In many 
 of the Washington Forts, log resetmeiits were used for the ditches. 
 
SEMI-PERMANEXT DETACIIF.D FOISTS. 
 
 Ill 
 
 popu- 
 
 would 
 which 
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 coin- 
 work 
 
 DC 
 
 ccssitating the use of caponiers or counterscarp j^alleries. Since 
 the ditches will, from the nature of the work, form a much less 
 formidable obstade to assault than those (^f permanent works, 
 every effort should be made to accumulate on the },dacis, and in 
 the ditch, obstacles similar to those used in Held fortihcation, but, 
 since the time and means at disposal are ^^'eater ; brou^dit pro- 
 bably to a higher state of perfection. If the escarps are not revet- 
 ted, a strong palisade in the ditch, close to the foot of the escarj) 
 so as to be flanked by the caponiers, will be a valuable addition 
 to the defensive power of the work. 
 
 Since the chief condition which these forts should fulfil, is (as 
 in perrnanent fortification) that they shall be secure against open 
 assault, their gorges must always be closed by a line of works ful- 
 filling this condition of security. This will generally be effected 
 by constructing a parapet of held proHhi with the best possible 
 obstacles as accessories, the trace of the gorge parapet may be 
 much varied, the necessary flank Hre may be got either by break- 
 ing up the gorge into a bastioned front, (See PI. I. S-P. ¥.), or 
 by tracing it in a straight line, and having a projecting lunette or 
 redan for that purpose. 
 
 A good type of a semi-permanent detached fort is shown in 
 Wagner's fortification atlas PI. XXI. The tlank defence for the 
 gorge being obtained from guns firing from a blinded battery iti 
 the flank of a projecting lunette. 
 
 The interior details of these forts reipiire much attention, the 
 great desideratum being the provision of ample bombproof cover 
 for the garrison and stores. It is obvious that this cover will be 
 safer from the enemy's fire, as it is closer to the front parapet, 
 the best position for such cover will tlu-refore be underneath the 
 terrepleins of the faces, but since the defenders of the i)ara{)et 
 should have cover provided for them as close as possible to the 
 position the}' would have to occupx' on the ramparts, a certain 
 amount of cover should be arrangctl under an interior traverse, 
 or under the curtain of the gorge, if bastiongtl, (See PI. I. S-P. 
 F.) in order to provide for the defenders of the gorge.* 
 
 The details of the construction t)i llu.'sc bonibproofs, as well as 
 of the caponiers, are similar in kind to tliosi' of iield works, but 
 superior in degree, iron in portable forms is largely used to sup- 
 plement the timber roof coverings, and abnvi- this it should ge- 
 nerally be possible- to place a hiyer ot ct iiient com retc (Si'c S-1*. 
 ]'". PI. II.) If block-houses are constiucted for coxei' of tio()j).s, 
 antl to act as keeps, thc^y should be kept as lar as possible under 
 
 '.>t'o lor iiiti'iitir (lutiiils (if l'|e\ii;i wiiilis, I'lcv ii:i l)\ < '.ipt. ( 'lark. It.lv, It.K. ('oriH 
 I'apci'fi Vol. \'. and for tlioMc at, Wa-^liiiiLilnii. 'Uiiioit nii tlif ili'lriicc. ul Wasliiii;.- 
 lull, 1>\ (li'ii. Kariiaril I'.S. 11. " 
 
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 SKMI-PKRMANENT DETACHED FORTS. 
 
 cover of the fnjiit f)arapet* Existing buildings may sometimes be 
 bombproofed, and act as block-houses. 
 
 Every fort should be provided with a keep, which would gener- 
 ally be in connection with the gorge flanking lunette, when such 
 exists. In the Austrian works at Elorisdorff the retrenchment 
 consisted of a practically square interior redoubt, under the faces 
 of which splinter proof cover was provided, and the rear faces of 
 which formed the flanking work for the gorge. When block 
 houses are used as keeps they should have their tloors sunk if pos- 
 sible 4 below the surface of the interior of the fort, and these 
 floors ought to be boarded, and fire places, sutHcient openings 
 for ventilation, and guard beds, should be provided, to secure the 
 comfort of the troops. The roofs are covered with timber, railway 
 rails, and concrete as already stated, above which there should be 
 at least 4 to 6 feet of earth. 
 
 Semi-permanent caponiers being very vulnerable to artillery 
 fire, great care should be taken to secure them from being struck 
 by shells, by keeping the roofs as low as possible, and placing 
 them if possible at the outer extremities of the lines which they 
 flank. 
 
 ()r^uini::(ition of the Ramparts.. — This should be arranged as in 
 permanent fortification, thick hollow traverses being provided at 
 about JO yards central interval, giving room for two guns in each 
 interval if retpiired. On the flanks which are necessarily nnicli ex- 
 posed to enfilade fire, ample traverses should be provided, or it 
 may be advisable to blind the guns.t 
 
 (■' 
 
 i 
 
 , 1 
 
 w 
 
 M 
 
 ll 
 
 Expense magazines in the hollow traverses, or under the para- 
 pets, and a main magazine for the whoie work, (generally placed 
 under tlie terreplein of the rampart near the iimer end of a flank) 
 should be provided. 
 
 The designs for these various shelters will be similar to those 
 shown as suitable for the completion of the defence of a perma- 
 nent fortress in chap. \'. F. section 2.1 
 
 The parapets may be provided with a continuous barbette ris in 
 the Dresden forts, the level of which must depend on the na- 
 ture of gun carriage in use. 
 
 Arrangements should however be made to enable the whole 
 
 III tlie forts coiiMtnictod at Drontlen by the I'nistiianis in 18K(5, the lilock-houses 
 were niucli ex|iose<l to liigh ungle Hro. See almi tlie description of the block houses at 
 Diippel pg. I'J'J, Tart I. V. 
 
 tSeeSS-'ir., '217. K. 
 
 ISec alstj Wagner'n l-'ortiruiitinii \tla» I'l. NX I. 
 
SEMI-PERMANKNT DETACHKD FORTS. 
 
 I 13 
 
 tliey 
 
 parapet to be used for musketry fire when required, and in future 
 the provision of overhead cover to protect the infantry firinfj; 
 from the parapets, from the long range infantry fire of tlie 
 attack, will undoubtedly be required. — See footnote lpg.71 above. 
 
 Cases in which scmi-pennanent detached forts are applicable. 
 
 1. The completion of fortresses to resist regular attack under 
 the new conditions, in cases where permanent detached forts 
 have not been proviiled, or are unfinished. A good example of 
 this case is afforded by the detached forts at Belfort which played 
 so large a part in the defence of that fortress in 1870-71. 
 
 2. The rapid fortification of important points, as intrenched 
 camps ; in one's own c(>untry, (defensive use) or in the enemy's 
 country, (offensive use) to secure important defiles, as bridges over 
 large rivers, mountain passes, or large railway junctions. Exam- 
 ples. — Dresden, Florisdorff, and the works round Washington ; as 
 isolated works, or stronir posts; to secure field depots, &c., in the 
 line of communication. Examples— Allatoona, Pardubit/. 
 
 The distance of such works in front of the place to be defended 
 will vary much, according to the object for which the works are 
 constructed, and the nature of the site. It should be noted how- 
 ever, that in all cases where protection from bombardment is 
 sought for, the extension of the works, owing to the great range 
 of modern Artiller\-, will often be out of all proportion to the time 
 and means available ; and therefore for the protection of depots 
 of stores, &c., on a line of communication, where cover from shell 
 fire is the object to be attained, while very extensive works are 
 out of the question, the solution must be sought for in the con- 
 struction of bombproof cover inside isolated semi-permanent forts, 
 or in utilizing for the purpose of concealment special features f)f 
 the site, such as deep railway cuttings cS:c., the approaches to 
 which should be secured by strong semi-permanent forts.* 
 
 The following examples of works actually constructed will illus- 
 trate the above. The forts constructed round Dresden by the 
 Prussians in 1S66, which formed an intrenched camp, were on the 
 south of the Elbe, about one mile apart, and about two miles from 
 the bridge in the centre of the city. At Washington the forts 
 varied from five hundred to one thousand yards apart and from 
 two to four miles from the outskirts of the city, the total length 
 occupied being about ^50 miles. At Florisdorff the outer line of 
 forts, varied from five to eight thousand yards in front of the 
 bridges, and from five hundred to one thousand yards apart : the 
 inner line averaged about eighteen hundred yards from the 
 bridges, and the redoubts were about one thousand yards apart : 
 
 *.Se«' "Field workH from a tactical point of view by Col. Schaw, R.E, 
 
 •I 
 
 1 .■) 
 
 '.ii 
 
 .11 
 
 ■vf 
 
 m* 
 
 
 f ! r 
 
'I; 
 
 'I 
 
 Tt4 
 
 S J: M I - 1 ■ ( . K M A N K N T I'. N C F. I \ T }■: S . 
 
 tlie latter wore connected by works of field profile flanked by 
 fleches. 
 
 h. SKMI-rKIiMANKNT KNCF.I NTK.S. 
 
 In order to fortify hurriedh- a iarf,'e enceinte, BriaJmont recom- 
 nientis the erection of stronjj^ forts at from 1700 to 2200 yards 
 apart, to l)e connected by lines of simple trace, the tianks of the 
 forts beinj,^ so arranged as to flank the terrepleins of tin.' connect- 
 inj:^ lines, and to take in reverse an enemy at the counterscarp). 
 These forts should be placed at the; salients of the line to be taken 
 up, and since they would hv obli^^atory points of attack, they 
 should be made as secure as p<jssible aj^'ainst assault, and every 
 means which time admits of, should be taken to strenj^then 
 them. The detached forts described in ''a" would be suitably 
 employed at tiiese stronj^^ poir.s, tiie only difference in plan bein^' 
 in the directions of of the tianks. which should be traced so as to 
 flank directly the lines of parapet connectinj^ the stronj^ points, 
 and should be produced inwards sufficiently to hre upon their 
 terrepleins, thus formin;^' effective retrenchments in case the line 
 is forced in the intervals between them. 
 
 The connectinj.'' lines should be as simple as possible in trace, 
 and fully submitted to the hre of the stronj^ points, if very Ion;? 
 additional Hank defence ma}' be obtained from a small lunette, 
 placed in front of the centre of the line. All kinds of obstacles 
 nuist be accumulateil in front of the connecting' lines. 
 
 The entrances to semi-permanent enceintes should be close to, 
 but not throuf,di the strons:,' points, and their exits should be 
 covered !)>• places of arms outside the ditch. If an entrance is 
 formed in the centre of the connectinj; line, it should be covered 
 l)y a small ravelin, which may itself have a blockhouse for a keep. 
 
 The works proposed liy Brialmont for the defence of Malines, 
 on a wet site, are to be found in his Fortification Polygonale and 
 are worthy of study, as illustratinf? these principles. 
 
 On dry sites the difficulty of securing,' the connecting; lines 
 af;ainst ass.iult will be much greater than on wet, and here there- 
 fore every effort should be made to render assault impracticable, 
 bv accumulating; obstacles, and b\' perfectin;; the flankinj; fire. 
 
 The followini; example from the defence of Richmond illustrates 
 this lar^e accunuilation of obstacles. 
 
 " A few yards in front of tlie ciiuntcrsciirj) tliero was a line of almtis, about .SO 
 yards to tlv- front a lino of licld torpedoes, a line of inclined palisades at tlie same 
 distance in front of the torjiedoes, and 1()U yards more to the front, covers (small 
 lunettes) revetted with lo^s, for advanced sentries. ' 
 
 Cases in iciiicli Soui-Vcnnanct liiicci)tlcs arc applicuhlc. 
 
 The reasons j;iven (|>,t;. N'» abo\c) in pioof (d the necessity of a 
 
m 
 
 SEMI-PKKMANKNT KNCHINTI'.S. 
 
 If5 
 
 line 
 
 continuous enci.:inte us the nucleus of a permanent fortress arc of 
 still fi^reater force, where the detached forts, beini; of seini-penna- 
 nent profile only, are necessarily less secure aj^'ainst assault than 
 permanent works of similar type, and can, conse(]nently, still less 
 be depended npon to prevent the success of a coup-de-niain direc- 
 ted under cover of darkness or foj,^ aj^Minst the locality which they 
 are intended to defend, through the intervals between them. It 
 appears then that a continuous enceinte of senii-jiermanent typi'. 
 will be tlu! necessary complement to a line of semi-permanent de- 
 tached forts, if the maximum of securitx is to be (ibtained without 
 the employment of a large field force to act in the intervals bt:- 
 tween the forts. Unt since time and means will often fail for the 
 constructionofanelaboratedouble line of works, as indicatetl above, 
 it will undoubtedly be found, that the first lineof forts, constructed 
 as detached works, will frequently be themselves convertetl into 
 a continuous enceinte by being connected by lines of lighter pro- 
 file, in preference to the construction of an entirely new interior 
 line. This will lead of course, to a very great extension of the 
 lines of defence, and will necessitate a corresponding increase of 
 the garrison retjuired for the defence of the works, which will in 
 this case probably not amount to a technically continuous encein- 
 te, but will rather consist of almost continuous works, constructed 
 originally in haste of field profile, but gradually strengthened, and 
 improved, if the defence is successfully prolonged.* 
 
 
 K[ 
 
 : 
 
 k 
 
 The 5Hibject of semi-permanent enceintes cannot be dismissed 
 without some notice of the defences of Sebastopol which form per- 
 haps the most remarkable instance on record, of the successful 
 construction of such works. 
 
 oi a 
 
 When in Sept. 1854 the allied forces sat down to besiege Se- 
 bastopol the land defences on the south side of the harbour con- 
 sisted of the following works only : On the west front from 
 the central Tower, to the harbour in rear of Fort Alexander. 
 a distance of about 2500 yards, there was a loopholed wall 
 with a ditch in front, and occasional casemated flanks for 
 two guns, from this tower to Careening Bay, a distance of 
 of 6500 yds. there was no defence of any kind except the Malakoff 
 tower, a miserably small masonry structure having two tiers 
 of musketry casemates and five guns, mounted en barbette on the 
 top, behind a masonry parapet. The diameter of the tower was oidy 
 about 60 ft. and its weakness may be estimated from the fact that 
 its fire was completely silenced in less than an hour, on the open- 
 ing of the first bombardment. (Oct. 17). 
 
 •The works at Washington, where tlie the tletached torts were oonnocteil hy al- 
 most continuous lines of trendies for musketry defence, \\ itli ofcasidniii emplafemeuti 
 for tield guus, ure u, case iu point. 
 
 I U 
 
 'II;, 
 
TW 
 
 ii6 
 
 SKMI-PEkMANIiNT ENCEINTKS. 
 
 The inoinciit tlie Russians saw that the attack was to be made 
 in rej,'ular form aj^'ainst the south side of the city, they set to 
 work to fortify the hne of crests commandiufj; tiie liarbour and 
 dockyard, and duriufj^ the ensuinj,'- months of the siej^'e, up to June 
 1855, the defenders constructed, under hre, the whole of the 
 formidable defences which successfully resisted the powerful 
 attacks of the allies, prolouf^ed over twelve months, and supported 
 by an extraordinarily heavy tire of artillery. 
 
 The numlier (if pic<'e.s of ordnance uaed ])y the allies duriug the sieye reached tlie 
 enonnous total of 2,r)87. 
 
 That this result was due to the highest ability or the part of 
 the defence, to very exceptional material advantages in the 
 number of men and guns available, and to the insufficiency of the 
 besieging force, as well as to the great material difficulty of want 
 of earth, under which they laboured, is undeniable ; but still the 
 fact remains that the works which made this memorable defence 
 were never proof against assault, and consisted simply of a 
 continuous enceinte of at best semi-permanent profile, supported 
 by strong retrenchments in the form of redoubts, placed in rear of 
 the front line, and themselves capable of all round defence. 
 
 The general principles on which the enceinte was constructed, 
 may be best illustrated by a description of the works near the 
 Malakoff tower. The work was commenced by surrounding the 
 tower with an earthen parapet of circular trace having a com- 
 mand of 14ft. and a ditch varying from 6 to 12 ft. deep. This was the 
 so called Korniloff bastion, and from its extremities branches or 
 curtains were carried to the right and left, the groimd in front of 
 which was skilfully flanked by the fire of some of the faces of the 
 Malakoff Fort in rear ; this fort was a large enclosed work con- 
 structed in rear of the Korniloff bastion, the gorge of which it 
 closed, and was skilfully traced to afford flanking fire on the 
 ground in front of the curtains, as already noticed, while owing 
 to the fall of the ground on which it was placed, these Hankini^ 
 faces were covered from direct fire by the bastion in front, this 
 fort is stated by Marshal Niel to have been J90 yds. in length and 
 120 yds. wide, (these dimensions include the total length from the 
 front of the bastion to the rear of the fort,) and affords an excel- 
 lent example of Todleben's method of securing the semi-perma- 
 nent, and consequently weak, enceinte, by strong points at inter- 
 vals , these strong points consisting, as in this case, of enclosed 
 redoubts in rear of the front line, and acting as retrenchments 
 thereto.* See I'ootnote pg. 107 above. 
 
 The other commanding points of the line of defence viz.: The 
 Mast bastion, the Great Redan, the Little Redan, &c., were 
 occupied in a similar manner. It should be noted that one of the 
 
 *!See Kejjort on the Art of War iu Europe, by Col. Uelatield, U.S. E. 
 
sp:mi-pekmanent enceintes. 
 
 117 
 
 l^aeat difficulties of the attack on these works was that they were, 
 from the Mast bastion to Careening Bay, or along the whole of 
 the south side of the city, almost in a straight line ; thus necessi- 
 tating immense labour in mounting guns, to dismount their nu- 
 merous artillery by direct tire. 
 
 The defence of Sebastopol, offers also a very valuable example 
 of the advantage of an active defence, where men and mat«jriel 
 are available. After the fortification of the Mast bastion, Korniloff 
 bastion, and the Great Redan, had enabled the defenders success- 
 fully to resist the first bombardment (Oct. '54) the same policy was 
 continued ; the Little Redan was fortified after that date, and then 
 as time and opportunity was offorded the connecting curtains were 
 constructed ; but when all these works were completed, and the be- 
 siegers were found still to be at a great distance from the works, the 
 defenders boldly advanced and occupied a series of positions in 
 front of their original line, securing them by works of such strength 
 that it required the labour of months, and much severe fighting to 
 dislodge them; of these the Mamelon Vert, about 580 yds. in front 
 of the Korniloff bastion, and the Quarries in front of the Great 
 Redan, may be specially mentioned as having given great trouble 
 to the besiegers, who did not get possession of this line of defence, 
 thrown up after the first bombardment, till the June 15th, 1855. 
 
 EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF SEMI-PERMANENT WORKS. 
 
 Under this head various examples will be selected from time 
 to time, and will be made the subject of lectures in further illus- 
 tration of the principles stated above, but since it is intended that 
 those examples shall be varied as often as possible, no special 
 case will be detailed here. 
 
 1 
 
 'iH 
 
 
 f 1 
 
 '-% 
 
 
T F 
 
 
 coAS'i' 1)i:I'1:n(i:. 
 
 .1. IM'nolU'dTollY. 
 
 '<^ 
 
 m 
 
 Vvinciplcs nmdtcrcd. -'I'lie principles of coast defence (lifter in no 
 respect from those applicable to the defence of land frontiers, 
 which have been already shown (p/^^. 104 above) to consist in the 
 concentration of defensive works at the points which are strate- 
 {^'ically important, and the abandonment of the fntile attempt to 
 defend a lon^j^ line by a continuous cordon. 
 
 Coimdcnitions ichicli iiiflta'iicc the selection of the points to be defended. 
 
 The i)oints on a coast line which are stratef^^ically important, 
 and should therefore be defended, may be classified as follows, viz.: 
 
 1. Harbours which have been converted into great naval depots 
 by the establishment of dockyards. 
 
 2. Harbours or estuaries of large rivers which are themselves 
 useful as aft'ording shelter to fleets, and favourable positions for 
 the disembarkation of troops, or which are rendered important 
 by the existence of large and wealthy commercial towns, the re- 
 sources of which are of great advantage to the defence, and the 
 capture of which would afford a rich pri^e to an enemy. 
 
 3. Harbours or beaches favourable for the disembarkation of 
 troops, which may exist at intervals on coasts otherwise gener- 
 ally inaccessible. 
 
 But again the principle of concentration of defence comes into 
 play in the defence of the individual points selected for occupa- 
 tion. Suppose, for instance, that a great river leading to a large 
 town be the object to be defended, the question arises whether 
 this defence is best obtained by placing works at intervals along 
 the banks, or by selecting some particular point, where from any 
 cause, the ditticulties of the passage are greatest, and there con- 
 centrating all the works of tlje defence.* 
 
 The former course has often been adopted and justified on the 
 
 *See fuotuote pg. lltf below. 
 
INTKnntTTOKV 
 
 ITQ 
 
 f^rouiid that since slii|>s have a lii^'li latc of s|)(hmI tlicy can run 
 past oiu; fort or a ^^Moiip of ff)rts so (luickly as to remUn" tlu; lire 
 of the defence comparatively harmli'ss in most cases, whereas if 
 the forts are so (hstril)iite(l that the attackinj,^ \'essel in Iea\inj,' the 
 /one of tire of one fort enters that of the ntxt. shi' will he ke[it 
 much lon;^'er under tire and will he more likely to he struck, more 
 especially as the ditliculty arisiu;^' froii- the accumulation of smoke 
 where many heavy ;^Mnis are tirin^^ in a limited area, is much 
 diminished by distrihutiiij,' the j^uns. l^ut forts thus distributed 
 alon;^ the bank of a river are liable to be taken in reverse' by troops 
 hiiided from the attackinj^^ tleet, and marchiuf; aloiij^^ the banks of 
 tile river, and they irnist therefore either iia\e tiieirj^orfj;es secured 
 a},Minst attack at considerable cost, or else a stronj; force of field 
 troops must be kept in readiness to meet and oppose the attack- 
 in;^' force in the open field. 
 
 This difficulty is ^'ot rid of by couceiiti itin;; the lorts at tlie 
 most ditticult point of the passaj^e, as their ^^or^^es may then be 
 arran^'ed to Mank each other and so be rendered secure at com- 
 paratively small cost. 
 
 Hut the chief advanta^'e ^nven b\ concentration of the defeiisive 
 works arises from the fact, that no forts, howevi-r powerful, can 
 hope to stop a fleet, even of wooden ships, running past at hi^h 
 speed, and hence to ensure this, the desired result, it is absolutely 
 necessary to supplement the forts by obstructions (either active 
 or passive) in the clianmd. which shall dela\ the shi|)S under the 
 close fire of the ;^'uns ; and since the construction of these obstacles 
 is difficult and costly, they will of necessity be confined to those 
 parts of the channel where they can bi' most easily and cheaply 
 arranged and here therefore the defenders j^uns should be concen- 
 trated as being the position where their fire will be most effective.* 
 
 Where a long line of coast is absolutely open and suitable at 
 all points for the disembarkation of troops, the defence can only 
 be attempted by means of bodies of troops concentrated at 
 selected fortified points from which the\ c.an reach any threatened 
 point of the coast without delaw To render such a defence suc- 
 cessful the following conditions should be fulfilled, vi/. : 
 
 1. There should be a perfect s\ stem of telegraphic communica- 
 tion with every point of the coast line. 
 
 2. Rapid means of transport (.strategic railways* should exist 
 from the fortified places to the various points of the cf)ast. 
 
 Mt is not meant tliiit thi; wliole of the works hiiikI he (onri'iitnitud at one point, 
 two or more points may he occnpied ; but that the works should ne groni)ed rather 
 than scattere(i. It should he noted, however, that a dill'ertMK^e in practice exists on 
 this point amongst the hest authorities. Tlie arrangement of tin- forts for the defence 
 of the TliauKts may he ({noted against eoneentration. 
 
 
 ■ I i 
 
 I 
 
 ■A 
 
 
 i:- 
 
 h 
 
 Is:- 
 
 • 
 
!• I 
 
 [' i 
 
 
 I20 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 .i. A llect should be held in readiness, to interrupt if possible 
 the hindinj,', rut off straj^'f^'has from the enemy's main body, and 
 harass and dtjhty the disembarkation. 
 
 The operations of disembarkinj^' an armv with all its stores, 
 &c., on an open coast, is at all times a very hazardous one, and 
 a very slij^jjt interruption either from bad weather, or from 
 opposition by the defenders ships, will be likely to interrupt it 
 altoj^'ether, and may possibly result in a serious disaster. 
 
 Comiderations whicli infiucncc the modifications in detail, character- 
 istic of coast defences: 
 
 The special considerations which effect the desij^'n of works of 
 coast defence are to be souj^dit for in the nature of the attack to 
 which they are subjected, and the sites on which they may have 
 to be placed ; not in any new principle of defence. 
 
 The peculiarities of the attack are mainly as follows, vi/. : The 
 assailant advancing; in ships is able to brinj,' a very lar{,'e number 
 of the heaviest guns to bear on the defenders works, these f,nms 
 being mounted in vessels capable ^^i very rapid motion possess 
 the higliest degree of mobility, and being protected by powerful 
 armour, they are very dithcult to silence necessitating a great 
 amount of lateral training and facility of manoeuvre for the guns 
 mounted on shore to oppose them. 
 
 The nature of the site has also a large inHuence on the design 
 of coast defences. Situated as these works must often neces- 
 sarily be, on small shoals standing up out of deep water, in 
 marshes, or on loose sands covered with water, it is evident that 
 the cost of their foundations may be very great, and the resnlt is, 
 that to get a sufKcient number of guns mounted without undue 
 expenditure, casemates in tiers will often have to be used. 
 
 Again, coast batteries must be armed with the heaviest natures 
 of guns, if they are to be effective against powerful armoured 
 ships, and the dimensions and interior details must be suitable 
 for the service of heavy guns. To protect these valuable guns, 
 against those of equal power carried by war vessels, the ordin- 
 ary resources of land fortification have been found insufficient, 
 and in consequence the use of iron, first for the protection of em- 
 brasures, and later for the whole superstructm-^ of works exposed 
 to the fire of fleets, has within the last few sears been largely 
 adopted. 
 
 The general conditions which influence the sites to be selected 
 for coast defences have been already indicated, but there are some 
 points of detail to be further noticed. 
 
 The cases to be considered may be divided as in '^ 498 V\ into 
 the defence of open roadsteads, and of channels. 
 
fv* 
 
 iNTKonrrroKY 
 
 121 
 
 The (listiil)Utioti of tlu; hatterit^s ami the objects to ho attained 
 in the hist cast.', arc suftieiently indirated in thi" para^'tapli just 
 quotcfl. 
 
 I'^)r channels the [K)ints which will l)e found most defensible, 
 are, as a rule, at sudden bends, for the following reasons, vi/. : 
 
 1. The ships will have to slow. 
 
 2. Thisslowin,!; facilitates the striking,' of the; ships by tin- shore 
 batteries, and lessens the capacity of the shii)s to overcome fixed 
 obstructions in the channel. 
 
 \. The navigable chan:>el often changes its din^ction from one 
 side of the stream to the other at si:ch points, tiius affording:; the 
 batteries an oi)j)ortunity to enfilade ships comin.t,' end on. 
 
 There should be at least two batteries at such points, but 
 better three, crossin/^' their tire on the site of the obstructions. 
 The defences of the anj^de of the Scheldt below Atitwerp is a {,'()od 
 example of channel defence on the above princij)le3. (See I'ig i, 
 C. I)., PL. I. I'.) 
 
 liut thou;,di concentration of guns is thus necessary it must not 
 be forj^otten that the ditHcult pass may be forced, and that there- 
 fore batteries should be prepared to command the interior of the 
 harbour, tS:c., and deny its use to the enemy even if he sliould 
 penetrate the outer line, otherwise one ship which succeeded in 
 forcing her wa\' through the defences, say at Calloo on the Scheldt, 
 would have the town of Antwerp at her mercy. The citadel at 
 Antwerp, commanding as it does both the approach from Calloo 
 and the reach of river in front of the town, fulfils this condition. 
 
 Requirements of Coast Batteries : 
 
 Since then coast batteries are clcsigned with the view to re- 
 sisting the attack of fleets carrying large numbers of the heaviest 
 guns, their requirements are, to moimt a sufficient number of 
 similar guns in such a way as best to preserve the men and 
 materiel, and enable the batteries, by the superior steadiness of 
 their platforms, &c., to contend with advantage against a proba- 
 bly superior number of guns. 
 
 This is done: 
 
 a. By a Special Arrangement of the Batteries 'vtth Reference to 
 their Site : 
 
 Ships are most vulnerable to a plunging fire, their decks being 
 comparatively weak and shots striking with a high angle of 
 descent being thus likely to penetrate to, and damage the vital 
 
 i 
 
 J ' 
 
 I 
 
 I: 
 
 I 
 
■f ■■''^!' 
 
 ■"wi 
 
 
 I 
 
 l! 
 
 
 ■■ (K 
 
 T22 
 
 INI KODrcrOKY. 
 
 parts of the vessel, or by passiiij; out below the water hue to 
 cause dangerous leaks. 
 
 It is therefore very advantageous to place batteries at a height 
 of at least loo feet above the water level, and since the ditKculty 
 of hitting sucii batteries from a ship, is greatl>' increased by their 
 elevation, theie is the further gain that works of a nnich simpler 
 and cheaper construction can be used in such situations. 
 
 b. By special mcihods of construction : 
 
 Low batteries have however to be used in numerous instances, 
 the sites along the banks of marine estuaries, and large navigable 
 rivers being generally low and marshy, and in such situations the 
 required conditions must be sought for by building works of a 
 very powerful nature, the guns of which being subject to the 
 direct fire of heavy ships ordnance, must be covered b}- iron 
 shields, or in cases where the works mav be exposed to the con- 
 centrated fire of many vessels, such for instance, as isolated 
 works at the entrances of harbours, or on shoals ; the whole of 
 the superstructure ma}- have to l)e of iron, as in many of the 
 latest linglish harbour defence works. 
 
 c. By obstructions : 
 
 All experience shows that fleets, owing to their high speed, can 
 run past the heaviest shore batteries with but little loss. But it 
 is equally the result of experience that ships brought to a halt in 
 front of such batteries cannot maintain a conflict with them but 
 must retreat. Hence it follows that for any position defended 
 by batteries it is absolutely necessary to utilize the existing natural 
 oi)structions by withdrawin^r buoys, lights, 6ic., or to create arti- 
 ficial obstructions which will have the result of delaying the ships 
 under fire. 
 
 B ^APPLICATION OF THE ABOVi: PlliyCIP],E>i TO CO AfiT DEFENCES. 
 
 It will be evident from the previous section that the defences 
 of coasts will consist of combinations of batteries mounting 
 heavy ordnance, with obstructions either active or passive, to 
 delay the attacking ships undi-r their fire, and in the case of the 
 latter, to supplement the destructive effects of the artillery by sub- 
 marine (explosions. The subject will be considered under the 
 following lieads : 
 
 {a) Batteries. 
 
 {b) Passive obstructions. 
 
 (r) Active obstructions (sid)-marine mines.) 
 
 I c i 
 
 ll. 
 
iiArTi,:Rii:s, 
 
 I-2J 
 
 (d) General discussion of the combinations of a, b and c in 
 coast defences. 
 
 ((/) ilATJ'KKlI'.S. 
 
 Four varieties of coast batteries are noted in '^ 501 F., as 
 follows : 
 
 a Earthen barbette batteries : 
 
 The details of a battery of tliis nature will be found in § 502 F. 
 and also a description of the situations in which such batteries 
 may be suitably employed, the Hmit laitl down bein^^ that the 
 battery must be at least 100 feet above the water level. For 
 batteries of this description the Moncrieff carriaf,''e offers j^a'eat 
 advanta^^es, enablinj,^ us, as pointed out by SirW. Jervois, to dis- 
 pense v.iiii embrasure shields in open batteries, and thus greatly 
 to lessen the expense while increasin",^ the security of the gun de- 
 tachments, and the lateral range. This method of mounting guns 
 affords no security against vertical fire, and is not applicable as a 
 substitute for casemates.* (See ^ 50 j V.) 
 
 Since high batteries are much the most effective against ships 
 (ricochet fire being now comparatively useless against armoured 
 vessels), and since guns iiring en barbette, are from their great 
 amount of lateral training, much more efficient against rapidly 
 passing vessels, than those confined in casemates, and also for 
 reasons of econom\-, such batteries will probabh' continue to be 
 used in favourable situations. It must however be admitted tiiat 
 the latest experience that we have of the use of such batteries is 
 very unfavourable to them. In the war of secession in America 
 a very large experience of fighting between ileets and shore bat- 
 teries was obtained, antl the general result as regards barbette 
 batteries may be stated to have been, that the terribly severe fire 
 of shrapnel brought to bear on the land batteries by the concen- 
 trated fire of the heavy guns of a tleet, was in all cases sufficient 
 to silence the former, by driving away or destroying the gun de- 
 tachments, andthis in the case of batteries dispersed, and well 
 elevated above the water (as at Vicksburg^, as well as in the case 
 of batteries at tlic water's cd-^ii. At tlu; opening of the American 
 war tlie barbetf.e batteries had their guns mounted at about 30 
 feet intervals, p.m'- without traverses or protection of any kind, and 
 Admiral Portei." states that three rounds of shrapnel was gener- 
 ally suificient to cle ir away the gun tletachments. Towards the 
 
 •("apt. MoiK'ritiir claims tliat his imdhoil of iiKUiiitinj!; jiuns can be combine*! with 
 y»otectiou from vertical lire, and used as a substitute for casemates, but the weight of 
 authority appears to be ajfainst liim, and in favour of coMsiderin; .hia system only aa 
 ,; ibstitute for|,'uns tirinj,' en barbette, or thrimj^'h endirasure sliioMa in open batteriea. 
 ^ijere would not appear however to be much ditliculty in proviciing for Moncrietf 
 pits light overhead cover, sullicient to protect the gun detiichmentH from anmll arm, 
 luitrailleur, ur ithrapuel tire. 
 
 It 
 
 h 
 
 % 
 
 
 
 
I' I' : ,' 1 
 
 124 
 
 HATTERIES. 
 
 t ;• 
 
 Ml 
 
 ;l-!i 
 
 end of tlie war the C-oiifcfUuate En/^nuecrs had j^reatly iiiiuroved 
 these works, nsiii;,'' hl<^h traverses between the j^'uiis which were 
 spaced 60 feet to 100 feet apart. But Porter points out tiiat 
 these improved batteries resisted his tire no better than the old 
 ones; the sand tinown into the nni//le of the j^muis by shells 
 strikin;^' the traverses, rendered them unservicable very quickly, 
 and the men were killed or injured by the sand baj^s thrown about 
 from the traverses when struck. 
 
 It is clear that if batteries of this kind are to be used, the best 
 disposition will be to scatter the j^uns as nmch as possil)le, plac- 
 ing only too or three toj^'etlier at one point, and having' them at 
 many different levels above the water, as well as bein^'' dispersed 
 in plan.* It appears also to be evident that if Moncrieff carria^^es 
 are adopted for the heavier natures of j^Mins they should be used 
 in preference to all others in such batteries. 
 
 The recent attack on Alexandria by the British fleet affords 
 evidence corroborative of the above. The works enj^aj^'^ed, twelve 
 in number, were scattered over a distance of about ii.j nautic.d 
 miles and consisted almost exclusi\ely of earthen batteries (there 
 were some old casemates at Fort Pharos) with j^ims tirinjj^ en 
 barbette, or throu,<;h open slightly revetted embrasures. These 
 works were indifterently traversed and in some cases had escar[)s 
 of inferior masonry full}' exposetl to direct hre, while in every case 
 there was exposed masonry in the shape of stores, barracks, tvc, 
 standing,' up above the crest. The maj^azines were badly con- 
 structed and ill-protected from tire. The forts thouj^h they ful- 
 filled the condition of beinj^' scattered in plan, were not suttici- 
 ently elevated above the water level for works of this description. t 
 The attack on such forts by a fleet such as that present at Alex- 
 andria, could have had but one result; 
 
 I'i Eiirthcn batteries icith onljyasurc sliichis. 
 
 A description of these batterii's and of tlu? situations in which 
 they are suitable will be found in § 504 F. 
 
 Thou^di these batteries afford nuM^e protection than barbette 
 batteries (unless the former are provided with Moncrieff carriages) 
 tiiey are still exposed to suffer severely in men from shrapnel and 
 from the tire of machine guns, unless they are provided with light 
 overhead bulletproof cover ; they restrict the lateral range as 
 nnich as casemates, and since they recjuire to be traversed as 
 elHciently as barbette batteries, they occupy a large space for 
 each gun moimted. The advantages which they ap])ear to 
 possess over casemates are that the guns being less crowded there 
 
 *See description of works iit Vicksburg, Vuii .Sulieliha, pg. HO. 
 fC.'ipt. C. S. Clivrk, U. H.. in IJ. K. .lonriul, Nt Nov., ISS'2. 
 
 t«l 
 
it 
 
 I'.ATTRKIKS. 
 
 125 
 
 used 
 
 li^^it 
 
 is less clianc(; of the view heiuf,^ obstructed 1)\- smoke, that tlie\' 
 are cheaper, if extensive j,'orf:;-e works are not re(iuired, and less 
 destructible than masonry casemates. The j^uns and detach- 
 ments are obviously much better protected than in open barbette 
 batteries, b'or details of armour see below. 
 
 y Casonatcd batteries with Eiiilirasitre Shields. 
 
 For general description see j^ 505 V. C'asemated batteries 
 should be used when coast l)atteries are subject to a plun,t,Mng 
 tire from ;^a"oun(1 which an enemy may occupy ; or t(-) musketry, 
 or machiru,' '^iiu lire from the tops of ships ; when placed close to 
 the base of high cliffs from which splinters are to be feared ; 
 when subject to enfilade, without their being room for eftectual 
 traversing ; when many guns liav(.' t>) ])e mounted in a limited 
 space : and for the protection of costly guns and carriages ex- 
 posed to a vertical tire. 
 
 These works were formerly built of stone and brick with wide 
 splayed embrasures, (see § 505 V) but the experience of tiie 
 American war proved conclusively that such wcjrks were not able 
 to resist the tire (^f large numbers of heavy guns, such even as 
 were then carried by the Federal fleets, and that further, from 
 the penetration of shrapnel bullets with the wide embrasures, and 
 the bursting of shell inside the casements, they were liable to be 
 turned, as stated by Admiral Porter in describing his attack on 
 casemates at Arkansas Point, into ref;'ular slaughter houses. 
 
 To remedy this, first the throat of the embrasure, and after- 
 wards the mask wall of the casemate were constructed of iron, 
 aud it is now fully recogui/ad that iron shields should re[)lace the, 
 mask wall in masonry casemates, and that tlu; si/e of the gun- 
 port cut in the shield should be reduced to a minimum, h\ the 
 use of mu;^/le pivoting carriages. 
 
 The embrasures of the casemates atArkansas point, mentioned 
 by Porter, must have been large, as it is thought that the C'on- 
 fedi rates had not got mu/;;le pivoting carriages, but at all e\-ents 
 t!ic iL.'e of the ports is now very nuich reduced. 
 
 .\ series of experiments carried on at Shoel)ur\ness in iiS65 
 *si. Aved that casemati's of this construction could not rt,'sist bat- 
 tering from heavy guns, owing to the large amount of masonry 
 still exj)osed to view, and hence for absolute safety it was con- 
 tended that the wiiole front of the batter\- should be covered with 
 iron. Sir W. Jervois dissented rather from this view, maintain- 
 ing that the battering to which the Shoebiuyness casemates were 
 exposed, was so exceptional that unless in very exposed situations, 
 where the fire of many ships could be concentrated on one fort, 
 
 *Si.'i' IvldW iJg. l'J.S 
 
 m 
 
 Hi 
 
 i: 
 
 'i'')\ 
 
 •■ 1 
 
 t. 
 
 \i 
 
n "! 
 
 -PgoiM^pqmiTiyiwwi iiiwyniip WJP{ ^ w >jji«,. ii » jlWii.WiWWHW1»" ^1 
 
 r2<'i 
 
 r.ATTi:Kii:s. 
 
 IJ 
 
 *?ii 
 
 : ! 
 ' 1 1 
 
 thos(; cast'iiients would l)c suttiriciil. The neccssitv for r.bsolute 
 safety liaviii^j^ however been insisted on as necessary for many 
 of our important coast batteries, the resuh has been the design- 
 ing of iron fronted casemates. 
 
 o Irun fruntcd batteries. 
 
 For a general description of this class fi battery see § § 506 
 and 507. l'". 
 
 The exau^.ple given in the text book shows the general design 
 of such a battery, nian\ of which are to be found in the English 
 dockyard tiefences. These l)atteries may be considered to be 
 practically indestructible, as the iron walls can be thickened from 
 time to time by the addition ot extra iron plates, as the power of 
 the guns increases. These batteries are enormously expensive, 
 and their use is therefore necessarilv restricted to those situations 
 the great importance of which more than counterbalances the 
 cost, such for instance; as important points in the defences of 
 harbours which shelte l.'rge dock\ards, f. .if., Portsmouth. 
 
 The roofs of iron froi. >atteries, which are constructed as 
 
 shown C\ D. plate VIl. b., le proof against the heaviest mortar 
 sliells. 
 
 Of all ft)rms of iion fronted battery the revolving turret or 
 cupola has the greatest advantages, but, its great cost, (;£"2o,oo() to 
 £25.000 each,) even as compared with the ordinary armoured 
 wall will materially limit the employment of this means of defence. 
 Many turrets have l)een constructed in the English dockyard 
 ilefence work:-. A less expensive substitute has been found in 
 the seguKMital shield with three gun ports, the gun being man- 
 eeuvered frcMu one port to the t)ther,-by means of a turn table 
 placed behind the shield, on which the gun carriage is mounted. 
 
 Admiral Porter, as the result of his great experience during the 
 American war, has stated his opinion, that the only effective 
 method of mounting guns for coast defence, is in revolving turrets. 
 
 Sir W. Jervois says, that when very heavy guns are mounted 
 near the water level, and it is necessary to protect very costly 
 guns anil carriages and give them their greatest lateral range, 
 cupolas must be used. 
 
 When cupolas are used tiie roofs should be bombproofed. 
 
 Sketch of the proi^n-ees iinide in the uppHcatioii of aniionr plating to 
 forts. 
 
 The following brief account of the experiments which have 
 lead to the existing results in the use of armour plating in defen- 
 sive works, is condenseil from the papers published from time to 
 
 1, i 
 
ARMOUR PLATING. 
 
 r-^7 
 
 time in the Corps Papers by Col. Inj^^lis, K.IC, and from his "Lec- 
 tures on Iron I'ortifications." 
 
 As early as 185.J Gcnl. Totten, of the U. S. Army, conducted 
 some experiments to ascertain the value of iron checks for 
 embrasures, but he obtained no satisfactory results even a^N'iinst 
 the b8 pr. smooth bore, then the heaviest j^nm used. 
 
 The Enf^lish experiments were, howewr, the first on a lar,u[e 
 scale, and since there was no previous ex])erience to j^aiide the 
 officers who carried them out ; every result was obtained by 
 actual experiment under conditions approachinj; as nearly as 
 possible to those of actual service. 
 
 In 1859 Sir f . Burjj^oyne took up the subject anrl tried at Ports- 
 mouth an embrasure shield of 14" bars of iron, tonjjfued and 
 grooved, which was found to resist fairly the 68 pr. <i;nn. 
 
 In i860 a shield made of 10" bars of iron, and a wrouf,dit iron 
 throat for an ordinary etnbrasure, were tried at ShoL-buryness. 
 These stood well afi:ainst the 68 pr.. and the 40 pr. and 80 pr. 
 Armstronj^ f^uns, but failed to resist the ijo pr. Armstrong,' [;un. 
 This is remarkable as the first trial of rifled ortlnance a/^^ainst iron 
 shields, and it lead incidentally to two \ery important results. 
 It demonstrated the weakness of masonry H^^ainst the fire of 
 rifled fj[uns, and that owing to the accuracy of the rified guns, 
 embrasures with sjilayed checks were no longer admissablc. 
 
 F.xperiments carried on in 1861 jm'ovcmI that rigid backing to 
 the armour strengthened the plates at the expense ot the fasten- 
 ings, an'd that a given mass of armoui" in a vertical position will 
 offer as much resistance if placed in an inclined plane, covering 
 the same vertical height. 
 
 \'arious experiments carried on up to 1865, chiefiy against tar- 
 gets representing the sides of ships. pro\ed the value of elastic 
 backing for armour plates, though they did not decide between 
 the various materials used for backing. 
 
 About the end of i8()j Sir W. Armstrong's ()oo pr. (wtight 2\ 
 tons, calibre ij"j) was introduced, and advanccil the power of 
 of artillery with a great stride. About the same time Sir W. 
 Palliser's chilled, pointed headeil, cast iron shot was brought for- 
 ward with a similar result. This shot ga\(> much better r«'sults 
 in penetrating arniom-, than the heuiisplierical iieaded shot 
 previously used. The defence also gained at this period l)\ thi' 
 introduction of the I'alliser armour bolt. Hitherto great difficul- 
 ties had been experienced in securing armoiii plates, owing to 
 the sheering ofthe bolt heads, under the lieaw and sudden strains 
 to which they were sul)jected. This was to a great extent 
 
 2^ 
 
 iV" 
 
 it . 
 
 It H 
 
 I 
 
 11 
 
 "'Ml 
 
 ft'- i 
 
 ■ ! .i 
 
 •» :i 
 
auHiHWIiyU! iMy'lHW^aiBigaBiiPJ JMBllliW j-'^'^!! 
 
 i^.S 
 
 AKMDUR IM.ATING. 
 
 ' ^! 
 
 obviated by Sir W. Palliscr's invention, which consisted simply 
 in redncing a portion of tlie shank of the bolt to the size of the 
 lesser diameter of the thread of the screw. The effect of this 
 may be shown as follows : 
 
 Sui)pr)se 'I' to Ik! the iiioaii force; wliich produces in tlie liolt an elongation /, tiien 
 T / is the Work done on tliu liolt. Now let a he tiie area at any section of the liolt, 
 
 and then is the intensity of the force at that section. The le s therefore the sec- 
 tion tlie greater will he the intensity of the force. Hence a holt nicked ronnd and 
 siihjected to sudden tension, Htretche& practically only at the point of the nick, or in 
 other words at the least section, where the intensity is greatest. Hut when the 
 whole («• a coiij-iderable part of the shank of the holt is reduced to a section slightly 
 loss than that of the bottom of the thread, the greatest intensity of force is (level- 
 ojied in this portion which tends therefore to stretch along its whole length, and thus 
 inanife.stly, by increasing the total amount of elongation, the strain (juthc bolt 'I' may 
 be greatly diminished. 
 
 The armonr bolts now manufactured have the whole leni,^th of 
 the shank thus reduced, either by turninj: down the shank, or 
 more usually by upsetting the head of the bolt. A rounfled and 
 shallow thread has been proved to be much better than the \' 
 thread, and is now always used in fortification work. 
 
 In 1M65 the celebrated experiments against masonry casemates 
 with iron shields,* took place at Shoeburyness, with the object of 
 determining 
 
 1. What resistance the masonry of modern casemated works 
 would make to the 1,'test guns, 
 
 2. Whether such casemates were suitable for the reception and 
 working of heavy guns. 
 
 The result of this exi)eriment was that the shields stoo^ well, 
 but that at U.c. .S4th round the masonry was completely destroyed, 
 and in consequence it was determined to use iron fronted bat- 
 teries for the more exposed situations, while for inner lines it 
 \vas thought that the masovry casemates might still be used, the 
 amount (jf battering which the casemates stood fairly well, being 
 much in excess of anything they would have^been likely to suffer, 
 in actual war. 
 
 Tlie casemates were found to be suitable for the working of 
 heavy guns. 
 
 In this same year the Hercules target was designed and stood 
 Weill even against the boo per Armstrong gun at 700 yds. range. 
 
 This target was composed as follows; !(" iron backed by 1'2" teak with iron 
 stringers, tlien \h" skin with ribs 1(1" deep, placeil 2 feet apart. The space between 
 the libs, and for o\er a foot behind them, was tilled with teak, behind which there 
 was anotlier ,^'" skin, backed by ribs 7" deep, and 2 ft. apart. 
 
 In 1S67 plates of steel and iron combined were tried instead of 
 soft iron plates: various arrangements were tried, as steel faces 
 with iron backs, and vice versa, and also plates with steel centres 
 
 *.See page 125 above. 
 
AKMOCK PLATIN(.. 
 
 129 
 
 Xt of 
 
 of 
 
 and iron faces and backs, but none of these were successful, the 
 ditticulty of welding,' the steel and iron toj^'cther in such large 
 masses without spoiHng both, having been found for the time in- 
 superable. 
 
 Trials conducted in 1867-68 settled a very important point, 
 viz., that the plate upon plate system was better that the solid 
 plate, for several reasons, two 5" plates were tried against a solid 
 10", and three 5" against a solid 15" })late, the result being that 
 the slight ailditional resistance to penetration developed by the 
 solid plate, was more than compensated for by accom[)anying 
 faults, \i/..: The thick plates were much more costly, and owing 
 to difticiiltics of manufacture, broke u[) generally under a few 
 heavy olows. into their constituent tliin plates. Again in thick 
 plate structures all joints must be through joints, while in the 
 plate upon plate joint mav be broken, the plate upon plate sys- 
 tem also admits of being strengthened by the addition of extia 
 plates, more readily than the other system. 
 
 In 1868 large masses of chilled cast iron were tried as an 
 armour material, but owing to the brittleness of this sul)stance 
 without useful results. 
 
 The Gibraltar shield* was designed in 1867, In the trials 
 there were many failures of bolts, and the following impcjrtant 
 improvement resulted: The iron of which tlie bolts were made 
 was now, for the first time, tested by a falling monkey, bringing 
 a sudden strain on the bolt, instead of by the usual gi'adually 
 increasing strain obtained from a hydraulic machine, and more 
 suitable material for bolts was thus obtained. 
 
 At the same time a further improvement in the fastenings of 
 armour plates was effected by enlarging the bolt holes (they were 
 slightly coned) in the plates, and filling round the bolts with an 
 elastic material (ash), in order to obviate the sheermg or nipping 
 action which took place from the plates ir.oving slightl}' trans- 
 versely when struck by shot, the edges of the bolt holes were 
 rounded with the same object. These were very important steps 
 in the perfecting of the armoiu" fastenings. In 1868 (in the l-'lv- 
 mouth breakwater fort, experimental), a further improvement was 
 made by the introduction of the ball antl socket joint between 
 the head of the bolt and the plate, and finally by the introduction 
 of Capt. English's new nut, which allows a certain amount of 
 "give," when the bolt is suddenly j)ut in tension. f 
 
 In 1868 an iron fronted casemate representing the proposed 
 •See K. E. Corps Papers, 1870, Vol. XV III. 
 tSee Lecturek on Iron Fortifications, pg. 10. 
 
 f ' 
 
 I'M 
 
 hji 
 
 III' 
 1 1' 
 
 if 
 
 
 m\ 
 
 
 II 
 
 
 III 
 
f ff]^^ 
 
 130 
 
 AKMOUK PLATING. 
 
 PlyriKJUth breakwater fort, was erected and tested at Shoebury- 
 ness. Three 5" plates (four in one portion) were used in this 
 structure, separatcul onl}- by thin layers of rawhide, the new bolts 
 witii ball and socket arranj^'einent bein},^ also used. The result 
 went to show that more (elastic backing' was recpiired, ami this 
 was [)rovided, to a thickness of 5", in the fort as actually built. 
 Mantlets of rope were now also detinitely adopted.* 
 
 The roof as shown (,see note to last paraf,a'aph), was proved to 
 be quite bombproof, a 13" shell fired at 1000 yds. range, having 
 penetrated only S" into the concrete. Various substances were 
 tried at this time as backing for armour plat'^s, and the under- 
 mentioned were found to afford resistance in tiie order stated, 
 the first named being the best ; old Portland cement concrete, 
 iron concrete, teak. 
 
 A target was now designed, consisting of three 5" plates, with 
 6' intervals filled with irf)n concrete, in order to contrast it with 
 the experimental shield with small intervals, just described. The 
 result of the trial of this shield was the adoption of 5" plates with 
 5" intervals. Great difficulties were experienced in preventing 
 the concrete from being stjuee/ed out from between the armour 
 plates, round the edges of the ports, ike, and for this purpose 
 very strong port frames were designed. t 
 
 In 1869, the principles of construction most suitable for iron 
 armour plating having been fully determined b\' the previous 
 experiments, as briefly noted above, a shield was designed to 
 embody all the newest ideas. The first dithcuity was to get plates 
 8' wide, which was the height fixed for the shield, it iiaving been 
 decided that each j)late should be tiie full size of the shield, 
 8'xi2'. This difficulty was surmounted by a method suggested 
 by Capt. I'^nglish, R. li., viz : to pass the plates in both directions 
 through the rolling mill, which was successful, and the shield was 
 built of three 5" plates, with 5" intervals filled with iron concrete, 
 each plate being bolted to one next to it only..t The jjort frames 
 were made of i" plate 12" wide and strengthened by angle irons, 
 but were found to be too weak, and gave way at the 4th round. 
 The shield was supported by a shield frame which extended all 
 round it, and consisted of a boxgirdcr 2 6" deep, which was filled 
 with iron concrete. The whole was oolted to a i^" baseplate, 
 and tiiis again to a 3" plate, buried 2 below the floor of the 
 casemate. 
 
 This shield was very severely tested, getting altogether 17 
 
 *For ilravriiigs of this tort aeu R. E. ('orps I'apera, 1870, Vol. XVIII, 
 
 tSee K. S. Corps papers. 1870, Vol. XVIII. 
 
 +.See R. E. Corps Papers. 1871. Vol. XIX, for drawiugs of this method ol securing 
 plates. 
 
ARMOUR PLATING. 
 
 131 
 
 loebuiy- 
 l in this 
 c\v bolts 
 ic result 
 and tins 
 lly built. 
 
 "oved t(j 
 , havinj,^ 
 X's were 
 e under- 
 stilted, 
 oncrete, 
 
 es, with 
 t it with 
 :d. The 
 ites with 
 eventing 
 armour 
 purpose 
 
 for iron 
 previous 
 igned to 
 et plates 
 ing been 
 Li shield, 
 uggested 
 irections 
 lield was 
 ;oncrete, 
 t frames 
 ^le irons, 
 h round. 
 ;nded all 
 vas filled 
 aseplate, 
 )r of the 
 
 sther 17 
 
 t seeuriug 
 
 blows which amounted to 1000 ft. tons, per ft. super of surface ; 
 and it successfully resisted the 12" Pallis(>r shell. The fastenings 
 stood well. The result of these experiments was the abandoning 
 of iron concrete for backing armour plates, as being costly, and 
 dilHcult to make and to keep in position, under heavy blows. 
 
 A curious result obtained accidently at this time attracted 
 attention, namely, that when void spaces were left between the 
 armour plates, the I'alliser shot, after penetrating the first plate, 
 broke up line, a 'id was found splished on to the face of the 
 second plate. Various subsequent e>periments confirmed this 
 residt. A 4" plate ])laced in front of a granite wall caused the 
 shot to break up, but the fragments were sufficient to destroy the 
 wall. It was thought that this indicated that tlu; limit of power 
 of Palliser shot was' nearly reached, and that the discovery was 
 not of practical value, for the following reasons : 
 
 1. The unsupported plates were liable to be broken up. 
 
 2. Bursting charges might, it was thought, be carried into, and 
 exploded in, the void spaces, thus destroying the target. 
 
 5. Improved projectiles might not break up so easily. 
 
 In 1878 this latter supposition was discovered to be correct, as 
 a steel shot was found not to be affected bv the void space. 
 The j5 ton, jS ton, and 80 ton guns, having been successively 
 introduced, i xperiments were made to tletermine their penetra- 
 tion. It will be sufficient here to note, that the target built to test 
 the 80 ton gun consisted of four 8" plates, with 5" intervals, with 
 teak backing. Against this target a blow of nearly 30,000 ft. 
 tons was obtained in 1877, from the chambered 80 ton gun. The 
 point of the shell r^.iched the fourth plate, and cracked and 
 slightly bulged it. 
 
 In 1875 the problem of manufacturing compound plates (iron 
 faced with steel) was solved, by pouring molten steel on to the 
 irou plate raised to a red heat. A perfect weld is thus formed, 
 ^th to f\th inches of a semi-steel being formed between the iron 
 and the steel. The experiments of 1877-78 showed that the steel 
 faced plates were pr if against the Palliser shell, steel shot being 
 required to penetrate the latter. The result of these experiments 
 was, that the combined plate was better than the solid steel, as the 
 latter broke up under a series of blows, while the former, though 
 the steel face might crack, was held together by the iron back. 
 The result has been that combined steel plates have been largely, 
 introduced into the navy, they being better able to withstand a 
 single heavy blow than the soft iron plates, though more liable to 
 crack and go to pieces under continuous battering, a good com- 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 t:!i 
 
 lit 
 
I i 
 
 ■trr 
 
 KV^ 
 
 F'ASSIVK OllSTRTC TloNS. 
 
 billed plate will stop :i shot which would j,'(>t throii;;li an iron 
 plate { to i thicker, and they re(|iiir(! costly steel shell to attack 
 tlieni.* 
 
 (//) TASSIVK. OltSTIMCMiiNS. 
 
 lCx|)eritMice has demonstrated, as alreadv pointed out, that ob- 
 structions are absoiiiteh- lU'cessary to SMpi)lenuMit the action of 
 coast batteries, which without their assistance, niav always be 
 passed by ships of war (set; § 50S I'ljjiit this result has not been 
 arrived at without opposition. l)istin.L,Miislied naval ol'ficers have 
 objticted, that for the dt;fence of coasts tlects alone are sutH- 
 cient, that obstuctions are objectionable, as hatnperinj; the move- 
 ments of the defenders vessels, and that ileets even if not sullici- 
 ently [)owerful to meet the attack in advance of the shore bat- 
 teries, mi,<;ht \)v. kept in reserve behind them, ready to fall upon 
 such of the enemy's vessels as succeed in rumiin.t; past the bat- 
 teries; but this systein ri'sulted very disasti'onslv at the defence 
 of tlu" Mississijjpi, the defendiuLT vessels had no room to manoeuvre 
 in the narrow waters, and wi-re all forced ashore and burned, 
 while it is absolutely ci'rtain, that the provision of an eilicient 
 passive obstruction above the batteries, would have resulted in 
 the defcNit of l''arra,i;ut"s fleet. The obj(>ct of passive obstruc- 
 tions beiii,;;- simply to brin.^- the atta(d<i)i^^ ships to a halt under 
 the fire of the batteritjs, tlu-ir position should clearlv be within 
 close artillery ranj,'e of the batteries, and for reasons stated in '^ 
 50tS 1'. somewhat above them. 
 
 The followinj;' are the conditions which a j^ood obstruction 
 
 should fulfil, viz. 
 
 1. It must be strong,' enou^di to resist the shock of a. heavy 
 vessel at hif^h spe(;d. 
 
 2. It must interfere as little as possible with the jj^eneral fea- 
 tures of the channel. In cases where stronj^^ currents exist, any 
 considerable obstruction of the natural flow of the water, may- 
 cause {j^reat local changes, such as the opening" of new channels, 
 &c. 
 
 ,5. It must allow jiassage to ice and drift wood. 
 
 If - 
 
 
 f i 
 
 *The moat recent progrrss in iirtillcry proves, tliao greatly increased power will lie 
 olitained with guns ligiiter tlian those now in use. The tendency of this great in- 
 crease of p'iiietrative power in lie guns, though it will not upset the general i)riaci- 
 ples, which have been estahlished liy experinient, will he undouhtedly to necessitate 
 considerable, and very expensive alterations in the way of increased strength; this 
 may be sought for, either by the substitution of steel faced plates for the soft iron 
 plates, or else, by inci'easing the thickness of existing iron walls anrl turrets, by the 
 addition of extra plates, for this latter necessity, which was anticipated, provision 
 haM been made in constructing the workw. 
 
PASSIVl', OHSTKUCTIONS. 
 
 UJ 
 
 t 
 
 f ■'■ 
 
 heavy 
 
 111 till' Ainiiriciiti wrtr, tlm tli.'itirii; (ilntruotintis, (vinHtrui'tidl }iy tlu' (^onfeflnrateH, 
 wrri! ill ovcry cisu (sarriod away, \>y the acciimiiliitioii of drift wood iilinve, 
 
 4. It should offer a very small iiiaik to the artiHery tiie of tlie 
 attack. 
 
 5. If the ohstriictioiis an; tloatin;^' tliev should he Hexihle. in 
 orcjer not to he l)i"ok('(i up l)y waves. 
 
 (). h'loatiii^' ohstruetions should also Ix- so arran;^'e(|, as to 
 yield to the liist shock of vessels stiikin,!^' them, and then, hy a 
 {gradually increasing' pressure, hrinj^' them to a sto|i. 
 
 7. The cost should he pnjportioiiate to the importance of tiie 
 position to he defended. 
 
 8. In Certain climates, where they are exposiMJ tf) distinction by 
 the attacks of se-a worms, the timber, for wooden obstructions, 
 should be specially prepared by creasotinj,', (S:c., &.c. 
 
 Obstructions should be [)repared in time of peace. The inter- 
 val which may ela{)se between a declaration of war and the ap- 
 pearance of a Sfpiadron of 'hostile steamers, is now so sluirt, that it 
 is not safe to le;rve so larj^^e a work as the provisif)n of obstruc- 
 tions, to be executed after war has actually commenc(;d, especially 
 as the work is of such a nature that it is very ditlicult to carry 
 it out effectividy in the presence of blockadinj,'' shijis, and (;ven if 
 there' is no interruption from this cause, obstructions hastily de- 
 sif^nf (i and ])laced in position, will be certain to be very costly, 
 and will probably be less etlicient, than if di;liberately and care- 
 fully plam)ed in timt; of peace. Under the most favourable cir- 
 cumstances tlu; placing,' of obstructions is no eas_\- rnritter owinj,' 
 to the {^^reat materird difficulties which havi; to be overcome, as 
 for instance stron;:,' currents and tides, deep water, heavy seas, 
 ^c, &c., and therefore thorouf,'h or^-.'inixation of, and prepara- 
 tion for, the actual work of placin;^' the obstacle is a lu-cessary 
 condition of success. Tiie distance in front of the place; to be 
 protected at which the defences must l)e placed, has ^^neatly in- 
 creased with the increased [>ower of j^muis, and since; the entrances 
 to j.(reat rivers, &c., j^'enerally increase rapidly in width, the ex- 
 tent of water to be obstructed is likcdy to increase, and with it the 
 difficulty of placinj^f satisfactory obstacles. 
 
 It is alwaj's well to have mc^ri' than one lini; of ot)stacles, but 
 the outer line should always be constructed tirst, and till '; i, ma 'u 
 as stron,^^ as jjossible;, no labour should be ili\irtfd from i*. ' 1 T,,, a 
 a second line. 
 
 Passive obstructions may be subdivided into: 
 
 tf Sunken obstructions. 
 
 ■U 
 
 ^U 
 
 
 
 i: 
 
 Hi 
 
 
 » 
 
mrr 
 
 naBPBwr^-^B 
 
 , i 
 
 134 J'ASSIVE OBSTRUCTIONS. 
 
 /? Ploatiiif,' ol)structions. 
 
 The consi(l(.Triti()iis wliicli dt'ti-niiine the cl;iss of ohstnictiotis 
 to be used, uio to \n: found (h^tiiilud in ^ 50S l-". To these may 
 be added the following,', v'l/..: I'revailiM;^ vvhids, uid the seas 
 raised thereby; size and <hauj,dit of \fssels niakinj,' thi: attack; 
 whether tliere is to be ;.n opeuinj^' left for the |)assaf,'e of friendly 
 vessels; and also the time and means at (bsposal for their con- 
 struction, 
 
 a Sitnkcn ohstnictious. 
 
 These are, as a rule, only possible in comparatively shallow 
 water.* 
 
 Some of the most generally used may be enumerated as fol- 
 lows, vi/. : 
 
 1. Dams — Solid dams may be constructed in various ways 
 across a water way which it is required to obstruct, but they have 
 many serious disadvantaj^'es, which restrict their use to shallow 
 channels where there is no How of* water, a channel where there 
 is a flciw of water, which is even paitially blockeif up by a solid 
 dam, is ver}' likely (with a soft bottom), to shift its position, and to 
 cause great inconvenience and perhaps permanent injury to a 
 port. 
 
 Dams may be formed of rows of piles placerl close to- 
 gether, and with the intervals between the rows filled in with 
 stones. &c. (see Von Scheliha, pg. 191-193), or simply by sinking 
 in the chamiel vessels filled with .;tone, tS:c.. but this latter con- 
 struction is to be avoided, for it not only deprives the defender of 
 a number of useful vessels, but it is also the most expensive kind 
 of obstruction. ^ 509 F. 
 
 2. Non-continuous arran'^cmcnts of piles, &c. 
 
 In diamond shaped groups with connecting booms, see § 509 F. 
 
 As sawyers, see §. 509 F and fig. \, plate C. D. VIII. ¥. The 
 points of sawyers, at intervals, being fitted with contact torpedoes 
 to explode on being struck by a vessel. 
 
 A barrier formed of sawyers was formed across the Tombigbee 
 river above Mobile during the war of secession, but it was not 
 attacked, t 
 
 tSoe Von Sc}n?liha pg. I'Jfi. 
 
KT"^ 
 
 PASSIVK OBSTRUCTIONS 
 
 I.i5 
 
 fol- 
 
 ^ Floating ohstntctioua.- 
 
 Moatiii;^- ubstiiictions lia\'e several a<lvantaj,a'S. as noted in ij 
 510 1'. aiicl in advlition. that tlu'\- do not tiMid, as do the sunken 
 obstructions, to alter materially the j^^neral features of the 
 channel by (jbstructin},^ or di\ ertin^' the tluw of water. The ^^eneral 
 recjuireinents of such obstructions are stated p'^i;. ijj above. 
 
 The various kinds of tloatinj^ obstructions are brietU noted 
 below. 
 
 1. iluoins — These consist in j^'eneral of combinations of lof,''s, 
 forniin;,'tloats, with heaxychains.. Thee.\{)erience of the American 
 war was unfavourable to their use. \'on Scheliha thinks they 
 could always be run over by powerfid vessels, and it is very diffi- 
 cult to secure them effectually. '^ 510 F. Genl. F.rialmont pro- 
 poses a mcjdilication, consisting'' of a network of heavy chains 
 carried on barj^es, for the defence of the anj^le of the Scheldt at 
 Calloo (see Vv^. I, C.U. PI. IX. F), and this is itself a modification 
 of a desij,ai b\' the late C'.ai)t. Coles, R.N. All such plans have 
 the j^reat defect, ihat the bar^'es are liable to be sunk by artillery 
 tire, and the obstruction thus rendered useless. 
 
 2. Rafts — -These have as obstructions many serious defects, 
 tiiey take an immense amount of timber, and are very expensive 
 in consequence, they are also tedious to put together. 
 
 Thf raft {Jii'iiareil l>y the ConfeckTatcs for the Ahiliiiiii.i liiver at C'lmctau Hlufl' 
 took !)U, (100 ciiliii' feet of tiiiihor, and 'J,.")00 iiiuii, with limit: teams for liauling the 
 tinilier, worked at it from Decemlier till March. Kiiially the raft broke up before it 
 was got into its iiiteiideil position. The zig-zag raft in the Yazuo ri\er, nientiuued 
 in 510 F, succeeded blotter, but it too (inally gave way. 
 
 For proposed modifications see § 510 F, and Von Scheliha pj;. 
 205. 
 
 J. Rope obstructions — See § 510 F for a description of those 
 used at Charleston, also Von Scheliha, p'^. 20G. This class ot 
 obstructions has many advantaj^es. They are very efticatious 
 as has been proved by experience, at Charleston and elsewhere. 
 They are simple and easily made. They can be kept ready in 
 store till recjuired. They can be placed any where an anchor 
 will hold. They are the cheapest kind of floatinj,' obstructions. 
 They are however dilficult t(j secure and to prevent from tangling. 
 
 Nets made of heavy cables have been tried, but were not found 
 effective, except that when torn by impact of a heavy ship, the 
 loose ends acted as rope obstructions. 
 
 A committee which was appointed to consider this subject 
 has reported that rigid booms of spars, vessels supporting 
 cliains, and rigid rafts, are inadmissable. The first cannot be 
 
 t 
 il 
 
 l-'J 
 
 'il 
 
UWlMUKJi. im 
 
 \f 
 
 uo 
 
 hassivf: obstructions. 
 
 made stronj^ cnouf^h to resist the shock of heavy ironclads, the 
 second can be destroyed as already stated, the third they th(jii;^ht 
 ])ossible, bnt very expensive and very difficult to secure in ronj^h 
 water. This committee recommended a boom composed of 
 timber strunj^^ on to a continuous wire rope, ami secured to Hoats 
 anchored so as to Hoat end on to the stream. The principles on 
 which such booms should be constructed had been very clearly 
 pointed out by Von Scheliha. Since a vessel even if she succeeds 
 in passin;^- one boom will have almost entirely lost way, thort; 
 should be a second boom lixt'd close in rear of the Hrst, which 
 will be almost certain to stop her. The most important condi- 
 tion howe\i;r for a boom is, that it shall be so secured as to have 
 alwa\s a considerable amoimt of slack, so that when struck it 
 shall yii'ld ;;radually to the shock, and so take the way off the 
 attackiui; vessel bv de,L;rees. 
 
 The j^'rcat princii)le to be insisted on is the necessity for elas- 
 ticit}', so as to yield to the first shock of contact, and to accumu- 
 late a gradually increasin;^' i)ressure, against the bow of the vessel. 
 
 W'hatever be the system of obstruction adopted, all such de- 
 fences, to be efficient, should be protected by liglit advanced de- 
 fences, against the (Miemy's boats, t)r self-acting torpedoes, such 
 as submarine mines or light floating chevaux de fise (see \'on 
 Scheliha. pg. 195.^ They should also be carefully patrolled at 
 night by armed boats, both front and rear, and if {lossible illu- 
 minated by the electric light when required. 
 
 The examjiie of the Peiho river, (juoted in ^ 510 F, is an im- 
 portant one, as showing the great value of obstructions in opposing 
 the attack of fleets. 
 
 The mouth of the Peiho was defended by powerful forts, mount- 
 ing 2(S4 guns, man}' of tliem of large calibre. The forts were 
 attacked b\- an .\nglo-I<>ench tieet in May 1858, and (the ships 
 being able tt) run past the forts and take them in reverse and en- 
 filade), were easily taken. The forts were given up again to the 
 Chmese, and wln'U, in June, i^^q, it was found necessary again to 
 attack them, it was eliscovered that the (Tiinese had placed three 
 lines of obstructions in the river, under fire of the forts, viz.: 
 
 1. Iron stakes just reaching high water level. 
 
 2. A boom of chains and timber floats. 
 
 J. A mass of |)iles, 4(- metres wide, firmly bound together. 
 
 The fleet succeeded in getting through the first obstacle, but 
 was stopped by the boom, and the gun boats were obliged to 
 withdraw with severe loss. In August another and more power- 
 
:!)" 
 
 ACriVi: oUSTRUC'IIONS. 
 
 K^7 
 
 the 
 
 fill attack succeetlod by landiiif,' troops, but the obstructions, then 
 increased to six hues, were not forced. 
 
 {<•) Al IIVK (IDSTKUCTIONS, 
 
 Under this liead will be considered : 
 
 a Submarine mines. 
 
 I'i Torpedoes. 
 
 The destinction between submarine mines and torpedoes is de- 
 fined in § 511 V, the former bciufr stationary, the latter locomo- 
 tive. 
 
 « SuJ.imarinc Mines. — This class of obstruction forms a most 
 valuable adjunct to the artillery defence of coasts and channels, 
 but they are n(jt themselves sufficient to provide for the security 
 of coasts, &c., unaided by artillery for the following reasons. 
 
 Their sphere of action is \ery limitetl ; a vessel to suffer from 
 the effects of tlieir explosion having to be almost directly over, or 
 in contact with, the mine. 'I'hey can only be used once; a mine 
 yvhich explodes without injury to the attacking vessels cannot, 
 like a gun, be re-loaded and fired again ; its usefulness is destroyed. 
 
 They can be removed if tin; mine field is not defended by effec- 
 tive artillery fire. They ha\v. however, the great advantage of 
 having a more powerful effect than any gun if successful, one mine 
 exploded in the proper place b^jing sufficient to sink the largest 
 ironclad, and this at a slight '-ost as compared with the fire of an 
 armour piercing gun. The moral effect of submarine mines is 
 also very great, far exceeding that of the fire, even of the heavi- 
 est guns. 
 
 Submarine mines may be divided into two classes: 
 
 1. Mechanical mines. 
 
 2, Electrical mines. 
 
 I. Mechanical mines are those which are unconnected with the 
 shore, and are exploded by contact with a vessel, the firing arrange- 
 ment being put in action b\' the blow. These arrangements may 
 be either mechanical, chemical, or electrical, but of whatever 
 kiml thev are contained in tlu iiine itself, and their action is un 
 controllable from the shore. '1 liese mines should fulfil the fol 
 lowing conditions: 
 
 1. Should be sure in action. 
 
 2. Should be cajiabh^ of being put down and i(>moV(^d with 
 safety. 
 
 .11 
 
 , ;■ 
 
 : -*! 
 

 . -f 
 
 i.V^ 
 
 AC rivi; ()i;srkr( I'KiNs. 
 
 I -, 
 
 J. Slioukl l)t; ;iii;iii;^t'(l so as to become luuinlcss, aiitoiiiaticHlly, 
 on breakinj^' loose from their moorings. 
 
 If these conditions can \)c snccessfnll}' fiillillecl these mines 
 wonhl be very nst'fiil for blockin.i,^ up channels, (Src, where; the 
 passaj^e of friendh' vessels is not dcsiri'd, as for instance to block- 
 ade an enemy's jxirts. Tlie\- have the advaiitaj^e of bein^' mucli 
 less expensive than electrical mines; as re(]uirin,L,' no cables from 
 the shore, and (since they are exploded in contact with the strik- 
 inj^' vessel) comparativel\- small ch;ir,i,'-es, they are more ([uickly 
 laid, rt.(inire no special kno\vltMl|;e of electricitx', and may pos- 
 sibly in some cases be improvised. TlK^y cannot however bo 
 tested, cannot be safely taken up for examination, and are likely 
 to be exploded b\- countermines. Some of the min(;s tested in 
 America were found to have had the i-fficiency of their iirinj,' ap- 
 paratus destroyed by the operations of marine worms, an(l this 
 danj^'cr should be borne in mind. 
 
 2. Electrical mines. This class may he. subdivided into observa- 
 tion mines, which are tired from shore when an attackint,' vessel is 
 found by observation to ho. within ranj^'e, ami clcctro-cotlaci iiiitics, 
 which are tired by cotitact of the nu'ne or circuit closer, with the 
 attackiuf^ vessel, either automaticallv, or from the shore on a 
 sij^nal i,dven by the actual contact witli a vessel. In both cases 
 the hrinj; batteries are nn shore and the action of the mines is com- 
 pletely under the control of the observer. 
 
 Ohscnuition mines can be used in deep water, and are therefore 
 apjilicable in the princi])al ship channel, in },'aps left in obstruc- 
 tions tor the passa,t;e ( if friendly vessels, and in otlu'r similar situa- 
 tions. They have the advanta,i;i' of beinj^' less liable to removal 
 by the methods ot attack a\ailable, and since lar_i,'i' char^^a's are 
 used, each mine j^uiards a larj^i r area. They ha\e however the 
 defect of dcpeiulin^' for their itlicac y on the unremittinj^' attention 
 of tilt? observer, and on the coolness of judi^nient of one, or in 
 •some cases two, independent observers, and this of course intro- 
 duces a la' ;(' eK-nunt of uncertaint\'. 
 
 \'arious methods o{ observation aic in use. the most effective 
 beini; that where a sint;K! obser\ cr placed in prolonj^'ation of a 
 line ol minis, fui's the whole ,L,'roup when he sees a. vessel i)assin,i; 
 ovtu" the line, if the \essel is within tlu' mined area, and the 
 mines are pro[H'rly spacc^d, slu' camiot escape, the disadvantaj^e 
 is that many char^'es are I'Xploded where only one is i'ffecti\e. 
 Hv arran^^dn;; lor the intersection ol two visual ravs from sej)arati' 
 ot;servers on eacdi mine in succession, the mines can be exploded 
 separately as the vi'ssel conies within iaii;;c, but this method, de- 
 pending^ as it does, on the simultani'ous action of separate observ- 
 er^; it distant statiiijis. is a \trv uncertain mie. A combination 
 
AC ri\ I. I n'.s I'lvi I 1 loxs. 
 
 j.;v 
 
 >. 
 
 ol tlic two iiu'tlioils, vi/.: rniii,!4 a ,i;r<)ii|) nl iiiiius li\ iiiciuis of two 
 ol)Scrvei".s, is soiiictiiiics used, and is iiioK.- certain tiiaii tiu; scci iiid. 
 Till! diflicnlty of tlif Inst motliod is that it is (•Itcii, iVoiii local 
 causes, vci"}' dillicult to secure.' tlic^ station of tlu: obscrvir Ironi 
 attack, as it may have to be far in adsancc of tlic shoie batteries. 
 
 lilcclro-coiiliut iiii)u-s lia\e the j^reat ad\anta;^e, that when 
 made to si,i;iial, and then fired by ;in obseivii, thexcan bt; trusted 
 to prevent tlii' pjissaj^e of hostile Ncssels either at ni,L;lit or <lurin}^ 
 a fo^, under which conditions the obser\alion mines are useless, 
 and further, that friendly vessels may still be allowed to pass. 
 Since these mines are lired in contact with the vessel small 
 clKUj^''es are sutlicient and economy is also one of their advantages. 
 
 Tlu!y have, however, tin; disadvantage of being more exposed 
 to attack l)y the means available, and mori' liable to injury and 
 disi)lacement by storms, than the observation mines. §511 !'• 
 
 I'^or general principK'S of disi>osition of mines see ^ 51J l". 
 
 I'^or various details see >^ 51J 515 1'. 
 
 It is now clearly proved that the attack on a system of sub- 
 marine! mines can bt; carried out by means of coiniter-mines ver}- 
 much as in a huul attack, but there are two s[)ecial diificulties for 
 the attack which should be noted. 
 
 ii 1 
 
 ■\i 
 
 There is no cover available; that formerly afforded b\- darkness 
 being now destroyed by the use of tin; electric light: and there is 
 no limit, as in lanil delence, to the amount of charge which may 
 be used by the defence ; tluTc being no danger of lt.:a\ ing a crater 
 for the attack to occu])y. ,^ 5i(). 
 
 Various mechanical means ha\c been usee] as as grapnels, cSrc, 
 for removing mines, b\- means ot boats searching \\\r. mine field, 
 which aie more or less e'ltectiial : tlif precautions against attacks ol 
 this kind being obviouslv, good connn;ind of the mine field b\ 
 artillery, careful {)atrolling, and edectric lighting, '["he attack 
 on a system of countermines where tlu; mine field is propi'rl} 
 connnanded by hea\}- guns, and where jiroiier patrol ariangt;- 
 meiits are organized will doubtk'ss be a ver\' tedious and danger- 
 ous operation. 
 
 j'i. Torpedoes — Offensive. -The term Torpeiloes has been already 
 detined. The j)rincipal torpeiloi's now in use in the service' are 
 
 I. The W'iiiteliead locomotive t(»r[»edo. 
 
fpfp 
 
 ■> II 
 
 140 
 
 Acnvi-. oi!s'iK'r( iioNs. 
 
 i. 
 
 
 tKHi 
 
 
 ^R i; 
 
 
 M|^.'' 
 
 
 ^wl' ' 
 
 
 Wmf i 1 
 
 
 WflU^ ! 
 
 
 Hji' 
 
 
 ' 
 
 n 
 
 1 !■ 
 
 2. TIic Outrif^'j^'cr torpcdoe.* t 
 
 The ]Vliitcliccicl torpcdoe is a lon;^' cii.^<'ii shaped steel case, hav- 
 ing interior arranj^enienls l)y whieli it is propelled throiif^li the 
 water at a high rate of speed, and by which it can be caused to 
 explode the charge, contained in tiie head o*" the torpedoe, on 
 striking any object. The details )f this weapon are not made 
 public. 
 
 This torpedoe can be fired either from a tube arranged below 
 the water line in a ship of war, and directed either straight ahead 
 or on either side of the vessel, or it can also, in ships not so 
 specially fitted, be fired from the deck from an arrangement of 
 the nature of a rocket tube ; it also can be fired from steam 
 launches, and its value as a weapon of offence against vessels of 
 war is obvious, as it can be made to advance at any given depth 
 below the water, and so to attack them below the armour plating. 
 
 The outrigger torpedoe is simply a mine carried on the end of 
 long spar by a small swift torpedoe boat, the object being to 
 a 'vance rapidly against the side of a vessel under cover generally 
 of darkness, lower the spar when within range so as to strike the 
 vessel well below the water line, and then, on making contact, 
 to fire the charge by electricity. The improvements in machine 
 guns, which will doubtless be carried by ships of war in consid- 
 erable numbers in future, will militate seriously against the 
 possibility of success, of such attacks, when the attacking boats 
 are discovered in time. 
 
 (/—COMltl NATION OK AltOVK IN 1!KFK.N('K OK COASTS. 
 
 It is obvious from the brief sketch given tmder previous 
 heads that the effective defence of a coast will depend on a 
 
 * Tho llarvoy or towing torpedoe is dilficull tn uae, iind has, it is believed, heeii 
 pr»etieally abandoned. 
 
 tTlie I^ay torpedoe, though not introduced into the service, is too important to bo 
 passed over without notice. This torpe(h>e, a^ recently tried in the Hosporoiis, is a 
 cigar shaped l)oat, 2t) ft. h)ng and '24 in. in gieatest eircuinferenee, weigiis U tons, 
 and carries a charge of !)()ll(s. of gun cotton, witli a guaranteeil speed of nine knots, 
 and a range of one mile. Hut an inijirovcd machine is already made which will 
 carry a charge of 150 lbs. of explosive material to twice the distance of the 
 first, and at a speed of twelve and a half knots, 'i'he steering of this torjiedoo is 
 effected electrically from the shore, the electric cable, which is of a vi^ry light 
 description, being paid out from the torpedoe as it advances. So great is thi; aiicui- 
 acy obtainable, that at the trials mentioned above, the torpedoe was successfully 
 B^eered at night through the powerful and compIi<ated currents of the Hosphorus, to 
 pass between two boats moored at a distaiue of a mile from the shore, and only 
 (>0 ft. apart. The value of such a weapon as an adjunct to coast defences can hardly 
 be over estimated, its great superiority lying iii the fact that it can be steered from 
 Bhorc! during its whole itourse, which renders it etl-'etive in currents which woild be 
 certain to dellect a Whitehead torpedot' fmni its course'; j-iid for the defence of chan- 
 nels, whei'e there is a nipid tideway, it would therefure be invaluable. The l!ussiari 
 (iovernment has already given large ortlcrs lo 1 'olenel Lay. 
 
I)i:i-i:n'(1'. oi' coasis. 
 
 14 r 
 
 4n 
 
 ')-«• 
 
 'IliUI- 
 
 jiidicioiis combination of artillery tire, obstacles, and torpedoes. 
 
 'I'lie principles upon which the sites of batteries should be 
 selected have been already stated, in A above, and it has also 
 been shown that it is admitted that f^anis alone, without the 
 assistance of obstacles, are not capable of resisting,' the advance of 
 fleets of powerful vessels rinniinj^ at a hi;,di rate of speed.*- Tiie 
 first question then is as to the positions in wiiich obstacles should 
 be placed with respect to shore batteries. 
 
 It is desirable to expose the attacking ships fully to the fire of 
 the batteries, t(j render their retreat as difficult as possible, and 
 to expose tlu.-ir most vulnerable parts to the fire, and all these 
 conditions are best fulfilled when the obstructions are above the 
 batteries, but under the close fire of their guns, advantage should 
 be taken of those situations wiiich offer the greatest facilities for 
 placing and securing the obstacles, and which present the great- 
 est difficulties to the approach of the attacking fleet. Narrow 
 and tortuous channels, where ships are obliged to proceed slowly, 
 best fulfil the latter condition. 
 
 If passive obstacles are used they should always be protected 
 in front by a number of submarine mines, interspersed with 
 numerous dummy mines, to mislead and delay the enemy if he 
 attempts to remove them, and obstacles of whatever kind must 
 be carefully watched by armed boats at night or in thick weather, 
 the electric light conferring great power of illumination on the 
 defence of the present day. It should be borne in mind that the 
 task of removing obstacles of any kind is comparatively easy, if 
 the assailants are allowed to carry on work without meeting an 
 active resistance. There would appear to be a large scope for 
 the use of torpedoes, both Whitehead and Outrigger, in opposing 
 the operations of attacking slii[)s against obstacles, both against 
 the smaller craft and boats engaged in the actual operations of 
 attack, and also against the larger vessels, which would be 
 deterred from lying m.'ar shore by the threat of torpedoe attack, 
 the dilHculties of the assailant being thus much increased. 
 
 Obstacles should always, if possible, be placed in more than 
 one line, the conditions for each line being similar, but care must 
 be taken in constructing them, to connnence with the outmost 
 line and not to begin a second luitil the tirst has been rendered 
 as strong as U is possible to make it. 
 
 *'I'lit' rate ';f spcod ;it wiiich vewstsls can run past slion' t)attorie8 is proliably ^cinsr- 
 ally ((Vi'Tcstiiiiatiid. In time of war all liuoys would l(e ri'iuovccj. and landniarkH 
 falsili'-d HO that in .siio:il water, or intriuati: navigation of any kind, the pro^ross of 
 atti'i tviii^' Ih'fts Would lio nciessarily Vfry slow; and for the reason alwo that from 
 ships runniiii; at hi>;h spved it wouiii he more dillicult to make ^ood practicf at the 
 shore hatteries. 
 
 ■it 
 
 i 
 
 ■I 
 
TfW 
 
 m\9Mnt\\%ZVr h .WJW^ffBHM 
 
 ' 
 
 11 J 
 
 CI'.NI' K'AI (il'l.KAlloNS \i)l< I )i:i' I.NC !•, (il (OASIS. 
 
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 ■ 
 
 
 il 
 
 i 
 
 c ^7•;.\7•;/,M /. MILII'AHY (il'i:i:.\TI(>SS FollTIIE /H'JFEXCEoFCnASTS. 
 
 Wliilf the (k'rL;iisi\(; ai raii^^u'iiu^nts iioti'd above aru coiiccn- 
 trat(Ml at the iinportaiit stratc^Mc points, as alrcad}' stated, it is 
 exident that some pieraiitioiis aie iiccessaiA' for the security of 
 other portions of the toasl frontier, which, thouf^h of minor ini- 
 [lortance as comi)ared with the j^aeat stratej^nc j)oints, may yet 
 from thc^ir plissical conli^^uration lend themselves easily to the dis- 
 embarkation of trooj)s for the puri)ose of turning' the important 
 difences from the land side. The landin;^' of the allied troops on 
 tin; tlat shores of the Crimea, north of Sebastopol, is an instance 
 of such an operation successfully carried out without loss, because 
 unopposed. 
 
 To i)ri;vent such enterprises the whole coast should be divided 
 into sections, for each of which a bodx' of troops should be told off, 
 the numbers bein;^' dependant chietly on the accessibility or other- 
 wise of their section of coast line. I'"or difiicult coasts, posts of 
 observation, comnuniicatinj,'- by telegraph with the reserve of the 
 section, would be sufficient, l)ut the numbers in hrst line should 
 be increasetl as the features of the coast become more accessible. 
 The trcops would form a cordon of small posts with sentries 
 placod in the usual maimer. Mounted Mifantry would be of f^reat 
 value foi- watchin}^' extended lin-es of coast in tliis way, since they 
 would be able to concentrate rajiidly on a threatened point, 
 and to o{)pose the enemy's endeavour to ^^ain a footing on shore, 
 by an effective musketry fire. In rear of the extended line of posts 
 just described, or at the most exposed portions of that line, small 
 l)o(lies of troops should be massed in support of the advanced 
 posts, it beint,^ \ery imjiortant that ready means shoulcl exist to 
 convey the supi)orts raj)idly to a threatened point. There 
 should be in addition a j^eneral reserve for each section 
 concentrated at some convenient central point, and at the dis- 
 posal of the conuuander of the section. Two or more sections, 
 according to their length, and their strategic importance, may 
 have a general reserve, consisting of a large body of trooj)s, con- 
 centrated at some jioint from which access to all the threatened 
 points is safe and easy. A railway junction where several lines 
 meet, may be most suitably selected for the concentration of this 
 force. It is impossible to lay down any dehnite rule for the num- 
 ber of troops required for this dut\-, the accessibility of the coast 
 line defended, its proximity t<> inii)ortant strategic points which 
 the enemy desires to obtain j)ossession of, and above all the 
 number of troops available, are important factors in the decision 
 of this (piestion. 
 
 As to the material defences, special precautions should 
 be taki'U at those places most favourable to a descent by 
 
r.KNKKAl, olMIKATIoNS lOK I)1|-|:N( I (H (OASIS. 
 
 M.; 
 
 the enemy, by fdrininj^' foitilicd posts fm tli<; pickets, 
 and ^nu emplacements into whicli ;^qnis of position can he 
 moved if reqnircd. Tliesc defences would he of licld t\ pe as a 
 f^'cneral rule, their object hv'w^ not to contend with powerful 
 vessels, but to op[)ose a vij^^orous nuisketry lire to tlie Ian<b"nf,' of 
 troops, and to j,ave the defenders protection aJ^^ainst the projectiles 
 from rifles, machine <;uns, and hj,dit held pieces, such as would be 
 carried in ship's boats. In addition to these })reparati()ns on 
 shore, cverythinj,' possible should be done to increase the difhcul- 
 ties of navigation by the removal of all buoys and li,i,dit ships, and 
 the withdrawal of tlie lij^dils from li^^hthouses. the white coloin- of 
 h^dithouses, whicli render them f,'ood landmarks by da\-, should 
 be altered to some inconspicuous colour, and at ni,i;ht f;dse li,t,dits 
 may be shown ; measnres should also be taken to j>rL;vent the 
 enemy K^ttinj; any assistance from the local i)ilots ; all of whicli 
 will tend to render the navigation extremely hazardous. 
 
 Since tiie number of troops which can be detached for the 
 duty of watching a coast line in this manner will alwa\s be 
 extremely small as compared with the length of line to be watched, 
 it is evident that the preparation of the most effective means of 
 rapidly conveying information: electric telegraphs, signals. «S:c., 
 and of concentrating troops on threateiii:il points; strategical 
 railways, and roads, is of the utmost importance, and rliould 
 receive the attention it merits, not only when war is imminent, 
 i)ut more especially in designing and" laving out roads and rail- 
 ways in time of peace.* 
 
 11 
 
 
 'A 
 
 ill 
 
 by 
 
 'See WagUHi's J'riiicipks ot l-'ortilii-itious, pt;. 7(i. 
 
fm 
 
 i^i 
 
 
 ATTACK 01< FORTRESSES. 
 
 4 
 
 ; f 
 
 ! h 
 
 I* 
 
 /I INTUODUCTOKY. 
 
 Owinj; to tlie fact that the whole of the subjects treated of are 
 MOW uiuler s[)ccial consideration with a view to deterniinin;; the 
 chanfj;es which nuist be intnxhiced with reference to recent 
 improvements in ordnance, &c., it has been tiiouj^ht better to 
 confine this, and the two followin;j^ sections, ahnost entirely to 
 (looting the paraj^n'aphs of the Text IJook, in the order of the dif- 
 ferent iieadinjj[s, as laid down in the Syllabus. 
 
 Brief notes have, however, been added occasionally to iliaw 
 attention to jioints which appear to be of importance, and which 
 can be cnlarj^ed upon in lecturiiif^, as the various subjects to which 
 they refer become more settled. 
 
 The considerations which determine the modes of dealinj^^ with 
 fortresses, and the various methods of attack, which can l)e car- 
 ried out with the mei'ns at the disposal of a field army under the 
 following headings, 
 
 a — By Surprise. 
 
 /) — By Open Assault. 
 
 c — By Bombardment. 
 
 d — By Blockade. 
 
 are to be found in the paragraphs of Text Book quoted below. 
 
 Considerations which determine the modes of dealing with 
 fortresses, § 296. 
 
 (a)—}\\ SCKIMUSK. 
 
 § 298 F 
 
 § 299 F, 
 
 (h) nV OIT.N ASSAII.T. 
 
 I r I 
 
INTKODUC Ti )1<V (ATIACK.) 
 
 145 
 
 )1 ;irc 
 the 
 
 ; car- 
 31" the 
 
 "A little time a;,'()," sajs ("oj. Muller, in liis work on l-Oitress 
 Warfare, published in iScSo, "there was a j^^eneral prechlectitMi for 
 those iiio(li:s of attack which promised to f^ive escapi; from a 
 re^Milar sie;;e. Ikit this has lessened with discussion, cNcc, (S:c." 
 Streimous advocates of the more ra[)id methods, however, are 
 still to he found. Major Scheibert, in a work published in i(S(Si, 
 arj^ues stronj^dy in favour of storminj^'- the new l"'rench frontier 
 fortresses, on the outbreak of another war. He ar;^nies that the 
 fortress is at its weakest when the enemy first comes before it 
 within the first three wcjeks of a war, the j^'arrison sure to consists 
 of second rate trooj)s, half or^'ani/ed, and new to their work. He 
 dwells on the wide intervals bi:tween modern detached forts, the 
 smallncss of the force available for the defence of these intervals, 
 and the imjxjssibility of prcparin;^' them j)roi)erly for defence in 
 the time named. Kscalade is not, he thinks, so clifficult as people 
 imagine, and Caponiers are iield in too nmch awe.* 
 
 (1) V.\ IKJ.MllAliliMKNT. 
 ^ 300 P\ 
 
 Witli the excejition of the wt)rks at Paris, the forts recently 
 built have l)een, as a ride, within j miles of the enceinte. It has 
 been reconnnended by Brunner and J^irialmont, that this distance 
 should be increased to 4.] miles, in order to preclude absolutely 
 the bombardment of tiie town.t 
 
 (dj—ny BLOCKADE. 
 
 § 297. F. 
 
 An important point as to the possibility of blockade is raised 
 by tiie enormous extension of places like Paris as it now is, with a 
 perimeter of about 90 miles. A (jerman writer, in discussing 
 this question, while he admits that the investment of such a place 
 in the usual manner as practiced in 1870-71, would be impossible 
 even for the German army, still asserts tliat a sufficient invest- 
 ment is quite possible, all that is required being to restrict the 
 besieged to those resources wiiich exist within the space occupied 
 by them, which becoming exhausted, deprives tlie defence of its 
 essential elements; and that for such an investment, the occupa- 
 tion of the great lines of communication, (roads, rivers and rail- 
 ways) by compact Corps d'Armee will be sufficient. The sup- 
 plies, which in small cpiantities may doubtless be smuggled 
 through the intervals,* being altogether too inconsiderable, as 
 cornjxired with the immense garrison of such a place, to affect 
 the result. i 
 
 'The Korts of Today, l)y Major Lloyd, I!. M, .Fournal, H.t\S. I. Vol. XX Vr, 
 ]%. Km. 
 
 tf^noted in Major Lloyd'.s j)ai)i!r. See precediug note. 
 
 |:|iiiliiirtaiice aotuolle do Paris an point <\v. vuc Mtrategi(|ue dan« une j^uern; aveo 
 L' Alleiiiagne.'' Tg. :W. 
 
 i'-V 
 
 i 
 
 4 
 

 146 
 
 y I 
 
 I 
 
 IIII Kl <,ri \U Ml' \(K. 
 
 /; /•///•; i!i:i:tiM; .\ri'.\ci<. 
 
 {il) IN IMiiKI iliiKV . 
 
 Willi icli'ifiift" to tlif stifii^lli of llir sit'^"' corps, llic lolldwin^ 
 iiK'thotl of cilciiliit iiiu; till' iioiiii.il iiuiiilui o| tio(i|)s 1 r(|iiirc(l, 
 Jiroposrd l)\- (ol. Si li.iw, KM... is woltliv ol note. ^ 
 
 Assimiiiii,' till' loitii'Hs til lie armril u it li lir.iv \ lilliil ^'iiiis, t lir iiimiii I him imiiikiI, he 
 tliiiiks, lie ti.uTii iiiaiiT than iiImhiI '1\ iiulrs. .iiiil tlir iiiit|iiisl liiu' finin I Id I ', iiiiIi-h 
 fl'DIll till- Wiil'ks. lltMlic ill till' slltilllt'Nt roi'tlCNs till' lllii' III lll\ rst llirllt Will lir ,'iliiiiit 
 l.'iiniirs, iuiil in lar;^i' Im t itsncs, liUi' Mrl/, aliiiiit ,'<l) niiirs in ii'iij^tli, tlir iiiit|MiHt. 
 liiii's licin^', in rarli I'aHC, nlmiit f> null's aiiil 'Jtt niilcM ir'><|ti rt ivcly. VsNiiiiiiii),' llin 
 ginriHKii of tlir small tnitrrss t" In' ."i.tMMl nicii, nut ninir than I.IMMI umihl In* infiiiitry, 
 aiiil not, iiiiiri' than .'I. (1(H) availaMo Im a smtir. 11 in r it. wonhl In' siillii'it'iit if thii 
 iiivi'st 111^ lorcr liail lour liatt.ilions ill out piist liiir imii' to two iinh'sl loiir more in 
 main lini' in Hii|i|iiirt. ami toiii' ul) ilnt v in nsirvr, in all t\M'l\i' liattalioiis. ('i|mil to 
 alioiit two I'lii^'lisli iij\ isions, wliii'h u 1. h t licir |iro|iri |ii'o|iiii t ions nf I'livali v artillrry 
 ami I'liLiini'i'is woiiM imiiilM'r alioiil t lini' t inu's t lu' i^ariison, w liirli is tin' iiiimln'i' ic- 
 romnniiili'il liy Cajit. r>niiiini'. 
 
 Aj;ain, for a ;,'riiat I'ortrrss, tho iii\ I'stiin,' liiii' ami oiit|iosts must ho iniirli st ioiii;rr 
 in iiro]ioitii>n, to iitaiii Ihr iiirniv in I'usi' ol luryi' smtirs, w hilo t loops art' usscmli 
 liiiL; in sii|iiiorl. Tlif oiit|iost liiir is tin ri'foii' |iiit. at twiiity liattalimis (oiii' pi-r 
 mill'), twj'iity inori' arr in main |iosition, ami foity in itsitvi' lantoiiril in n-iir, 
 ^'iviiif; il total III' alioiit SO.tHHl inl'antiy or twiri' the j^arrison, as hciiig n'i|iiirri| for 
 invoxtinoiit. 
 
 l''or a r»'i;ular sicm' tlii'ic will In' rii|iiiriil in aililition. troops lor workim,' pnrtins, 
 iiuil for unard of tho trrmlns. 
 
 Sii]i|)osinj; il to ho 11 >ssar; in tlii' laruo fort icss to at lark tliri'i' ilrtai'licil forts, 
 
 till' workiiij; jiartii's arc assnmi'il to lie as follows ; 
 
 For tho small fortnss lotH) imn at four iiImI's (;0(M). 
 
 For till' large fortii'--s. l.'.dd im'ii at. four nliifs for oavh fort attailinl I."i(M» .3-4 
 IStHX* iiiiMi. 
 
 Kir i:iianl of tlio tirin'hi's tlioii' is aln aily tin" invi'stiiiL; fono, wliirli iiiiisi In' 
 
 imii'ast'il on the fronts at tarkcil In a small fortnss, supposiii;; flio works of tlm 
 
 regular attack to oi'cnpy oiii'-lhiril t'"' ( h. iii\i 'nii'iit line, the troops of that portion 
 
 if iloiil'lv:!, H oiili! ..iiiiii'i' lor L,'n«ril of the trem'hes, which woiihl he laliiilateil as 
 
 f'^ll.iws: (iarrison .'•(KM); therefore investing force .")(KK> -, U irt.tKNI, tinil ailililioiiill 
 
 , , , l,'">(K)(l 
 
 men tor guard of trenches 
 
 .■|(I(H). 
 
 l''or the large fortress, sii])posiiig the forts to he L'lMIOy.ls. apart, tile length of tlu' 
 lirst trenches woiiiil he alioiit 4 miles, snpporteil on liotli ll.inks liy aliont I | miles of 
 the investing line piislieilforwanl ine<'liellon, the troopsof alioiit ( of investing line will 
 tlinrofore lie a\ailalile for giianl of trenches. ;inil if ilonhleil will siilliee, the niimlier 
 being caleulateil as follows; ( laii'ison 4(),tK)0 ; therefore, investing force 40.0(10 ■ 2 
 
 SO.OOO, .ami aililitioiml men for mianl of trenches ' ' L'O.OOO. 
 
 4 
 
 lleailila two-tenths of the whole niimher in each case fur camp iliities. 
 
 TIr- sicj^c train, a.-; iletailed in '\\\{ I'xiok. has iiiidcrf^'oiic altt-r- 
 ation. owiii^ to tlu' lU'cision not to liic tlu' ,i;iins with rciliiciMl 
 ohari,'rs at hij.,di an^U's ol" cK'Nalion in thr lutiiii'. The nnnihcr 
 of hoavv howitzers lias consc'iiiUMitly l"i'ii increased, tlu'sc piccus 
 i>ein.L; most snitablr for Itrcai-hiiii; cscariis, foi scarchinj; the 
 
I III Kl (,l I \lv' \ 
 
 ACK. 
 
 i>7 
 
 :\ I 
 
 iiitfiioi III wmlss, iVc. iVc, ;il loiiv i;iii;;(s (nji !<• .VV" N'l;^.) witli 
 llif^ll ;inj;l('S of (Icsrcnl. ()\\iii;; to 1 lie ;;ic,it siipti if ii ity i )| tlic 
 lu'Mvii'i natures »)| Imu it/iis, it has Imcm pi uposcd to coiistriict 
 
 |)i('((!S ill sections, to he s(l(\V»'(| toj^rtlni, loicolivcllicncc ol 
 
 ( aniaf^c in (IiITk nil ( ountiics, \vlii( li will (loiil)tl(ss he cairicMl out 
 snccesshilly. 
 
 ( ajStaiii r>iiiiiner la\s ilowii tlie nnniliei ol |iie( cs re(|iiire(| as 
 (Volii loo to 150 ^niis Imi {■■,[< \\ Id! attaekeil, hiit the nilliil)er will 
 vai> i^icatly with the < ii( nnistaiices of particular cases. ^.','>S ''• 
 
 (li) INS KSI.MKN r. 
 
 '^ .',<'S, ; 10, I', also '^ iSi h', and p^'. i.|5 ahove. 
 
 I'Or streiij^th o| iii\istiii.!.; force see also \)^. i jfi ahove. 
 
 It should he noted that the ahsolilte jjicveiit ioli of comiininlra- 
 tioii hetweeii tlu" hesiej^ed and the outside world is practically 
 inipossihle, caiiier pif^^eoiis and haljooiis hein;^' availahle, ;;nd 
 nion; or less reliahle for this piiipose. llelirt^'iaph sif^Mialliii^' 
 <^\\vs also the |)ower of coniiiiunication at loii;^' latij^M-, c. /,^, 
 ICkowe to Tiif^H'la River; without the enemy havinj^' the power to 
 read or inteicept tlu; ini'ssai^'^e. 
 
 (1 ) iM!F.r.\i; \i ION Kiin i(i:<a r.M! sikuk. 
 
 § JII, , .{I/, I'" 
 
 With refer(MiC(; to the; ns(; of captive halloons it should In; not(;d 
 that tlicsc machines may be hroii^^dit down with shrapnel at U>n^ 
 rnu^cs. lint owinj: to the slowness of descent it is believed 
 without danj^'er to the occupant (;f the car. 
 
 The adoption of the Steam Sapp(;r, a traction eiij^ine of special 
 construction, into tlu; s(;rvice, facilitati;s ^'reatly tlu: preparation 
 of materials in en^dneer parks, these eii;,Miies beinj^ used to brin^ 
 uj) the nt'cessary machiiuiy, and then to drive it. These e-nf4in(;s 
 will also, doubtless, be us(;d for brin^^inj,^ up the heavy ^uu^ and 
 material for sie/^es where railways are not available, as they ar(; 
 suitable for traction either on ordinary roads or on tiamways.* 
 
 Th(; use of j)reliminarv batteries to test the resolution of the 
 besiej^M;d c:in only bi; recomineiuh)d in tlie case ol small lnrtresses 
 which are ill-provided with bombproof cover and ;^'arris(jiied by 
 inferior troops. 
 
 (il) UIK HKi:! I.AK siKiiC. 
 
 a The first luiillcry position. 
 
 *For detuilu of Steam Sapper see I'art \', 1. M. E. 
 
 4 
 
T48 
 
 rill'. KI'.C.UI.AK' AlTAi K. 
 
 I''*)i type and cotistnictioii uf liattciii'S sci; below iiiidii siili- 
 head (•/-) 
 
 fi Prof^rcss nf attiuk up lt> jirsl parallel. 
 
 8§.ii8, 322, 32.}, 407, 414, 4i<), 420, szy, 415. .526, 524, .525, V* 
 The following' paraf(ia[)li is voluntary, 41S V . 
 
 y The second artillery position. 
 
 ^ 32Q, ,U<>» 437.— 44-2' 445' 44^'' 44/. 44'"*- 45'' 453- 451' I'- 
 The following; paraj^'iaphs are vohinlary. 44 5, 444, 449, 450, 452, 
 
 455' 45<J' I'- 
 
 The number of {^'uns may be taken as from three to five for 
 each face enfiladed, and for counter batteries nearly as many 
 a^'ain as are mounted on the face attacked. The niuiiber of 
 puns in each battery should not as a rule exceed four, since tlu' 
 service maj^a/ine is suilicient for two j^mhis onl\-, and these ma;^M- 
 zines should be i)lace(l in rear of tlu; llanks of the batteries, and 
 not behind the /,'un portions. The rectanj,'ular maj,^a/ine needs 
 additional head cover, and the more so, the farther they are from 
 the place. There would be no dilllculty in providing,' this. The 
 type of battery described ^ 439 may be very considerably modi- 
 fied accordinj,' to circumstances, in favoinable ])()sitions tin; j^mui 
 portion may be entiiely sunken in the rear slopi' of a hill, the 
 guns firing just over the crest. 
 
 Tiic provision of disappearing carriages for the guns, and of 
 splinter proof cover for the gun detachments in siege l)atteries, 
 is, under, modern shrapnel fire, a very important consideration. 
 
 Owing to the increased weight, (70 cwt.,) of the new howit;^er, 
 and the higjj angles at which it is fired, great strains are brought 
 upon the platforms; great care shoukl therefore be taken in laying 
 them, and the present construction $J 44S, ^vill probably rctpiire 
 strengthening. 
 
 It has also been suggested that all siege platforms should be 
 laid with a slope to the front, which greatly facilitates the service 
 of the guns. ^ 448, F. 
 
 There appears to be considerable doubt as to whether it will 
 be necessary in the future to establish a second artillery position, 
 as contemplated in the text book immediately in front of the 
 first position, the increased power and accuracy of the guns in 
 use will permit the breaching of escarps, &c., to be dom- 
 ranges up to 2500 yds., and the substitution of howit^ei 
 guns will tend also to keep the batteries distant frotn 
 place, the effect of high angle fire being greater at the gre.i, 
 
 *With reference to the use of lonjf raiij,'i' musketry lire at this staj^e of tlie attack, 
 see footnote, pg. 71 aliove. 
 
Till' KIT.ri AK ATTArK. 
 
 r.f) 
 
 Sllll- 
 
 aiHl 
 
 ranj^'t's. Tlii! j^Mcat difliciilts ol iii(i\iii^' up heavy j^miiis IVoiii tlic 
 first position, and rt'inoiintiii/^ tluiii in tin- scroiid, and tin; facili- 
 ties for inakinf,^ Ixttcr battfiii's, wliirli, owinj,' to tin* rlioicc! of 
 site, can he made at k-isnru without 1(jss, and piohahly armed by 
 tramway, all t(;nd in the same direction. If the place holds out, and 
 the approaches are rej,Milarly continni'd, it will doubtless be 
 necessary to erect some batti'ries in more advanced positions as 
 the sie^H; proceeds, but still it appears probable that the j^Meater 
 portion of the j^'uns will be left at the lonj^'er ran;,'es, and the bulk of 
 the breachinj,'^ done from there. 'I'he increased value of musketry 
 tire will render the construction armin;,' and workin;; of the 
 close batteries, opcirations probably involvinj,^ ^^reat loss. 
 
 o Advcimc to third parallel. 
 
 hi 3jr, 4i<'), 417, 3,^2, 421, Sappin;^', Sinj^le Sap, ICxecution of 
 Saps. 422 Sinj^de Shallow Sap, 42,;, 424, .^3.i, .534, 32N 1'. 
 
 The following,' para^^aaphs arc voluntary, 425, 42^), 427 1". 
 
 £ Advance to covered way. 
 
 §!^ J35, 422, Deep Sap, 421 Double Saj:). Head Parapet, Trav- 
 erses. Intervals. Cube Traverses. General Rules for Traverses, 
 l^linded Saps. 42^,429,336,337,345 fourth and fifth parallels* l'\ 
 
 The followinf^ paraj^raphs are voluntary, 430, 431, I'. 
 
 ^ Ih'cakin<j[ into enceinte. 
 
 ^i 33«> 343' 432, 433. 43f'> ^'^ 
 
 The followinj,' para{,naphs are voluntary, 434, 435, V. 
 
 The breachinpj of well screened escarps will now be possible up 
 to raupi'cs of 2,500 yards. 
 
 The tire of shrapnel from heavy siej^e howitzers will probabl}- be 
 very effective in preventinj; the enemy from wi rking in the breacii 
 with the object of rendering it inaccessible. 
 
 As to the strength of assaulting columns see ^299 I*". Wagner 
 lays down that the assaulting columns should be from one and a 
 
 *lii the theoretical attfick, as drawn at the R. M. C. of Canada, it is assumed that 
 tlie lirst parallel and its approaclu'S are i'.v«'<'utetl hy Cnniinoii 'I'rench Work, the 
 second ])arallel and its approaches hy Flyiiif^ Trend, '^'oik, the third paraUel and its 
 approai'iies hy Single Kneeling Sap, and all Single Saps ni front mi the tliird 
 parallel bj' Deep Sap. It is liardlv necessary to add that the ,e assiiiiiptions are 
 purely arl)itrary, and are made with the object of familiarizing „he Cadets with these 
 various descriptions of work. Hut it should always be borne in mind that in actual 
 service the nature of the work adopted would depend on the nature of the soil, the 
 activity or otherwise of the defence, tiie time available. &<;.. ratiier than on the 
 perii'd of the siege arrived at. 
 
 ;i 
 
I! 
 
 t 
 
 150 
 
 11 1 1'. Ki:(.ll AN ATI ACK. 
 
 iiall to tuicf as imiin Kuis as tlic (Icfciidt'i's. A separate: column 
 should l)c (Iclaili'il for each Ijicach. and a dctaihiiicnt in each 
 cohnnn tohl oft to pcifoini all special duties, and he <,Mves the 
 detail of each cohunn as follows : 
 
 \'olunteers as advanced i)aity, and with them an ICngineer 
 officer and miners, to seek out and cut off the means of ij^'nitin;^ 
 the enemy's mines. 
 
 A Saj)per detachmem, provided with tools, to clear away ob- 
 stacles. 
 
 The Storminj; P'^rty, strength dependinj,' on circumstances. 
 
 Artillery detachment to man j^uns when captured. 
 
 Detachment of workmen, with tools and j^abions, to form lodg- 
 ment on sununit of breach, etc. 
 
 Reserve colunms of same strength as the storming column. 
 
 SupptMting column for any purposes that may sudtlenly apjiear 
 feasible (attacks on gorges of ravelins etc.) and to protect the 
 Hanks of the main column against attacks coming down tiie ditcli. 
 
 The head of the cohnnn should be posted in the gallery of de- 
 scent, with the various detachments behind it in order as given 
 above. 
 
 The supports next the main column and in front of the reserve. 
 None of the columns to cross each other in their advance.* 
 
 i*"or time of execution, see jj 2(j(j I'", 
 
 I'or attack by mining, see Mining below. 
 
 C. KKAMrLKs. 
 
 This si:ction is treated under the following heads, vi/.: 
 a. Application to the attack on the Modern I'reiich System. 
 /(. Probable course of ;U. tack on a PolNgonal front. 
 c. Attack on a chain of detached forts. 
 
 (11) AllACK ON M(i|>i;i(N H!|;N('1I sysikm. 
 
 The ordii'ar\ theoretical attack on a front of the Modern 
 I-'rench systtiii is di-scribed in v^ .545 I'", and is drawn at the K. M. 
 CoUegi". This attack is j>urt'l)- theoretical, and is intended to 
 show the proper succession oi tlu' \arious works employed in a 
 siege, their di-sign. and the method of executing them. The 
 
 *\Vuguer'8 l'riiicipk'8 i)f Fortilicatioii, pg. 17"). 
 
r.XAMPI.l.S. 
 
 151 
 
 n 
 
 journal of attack, written bv the ("adets, is intended to impress tlu' 
 subject on their minds, and to i,Mve an idea of the jnactical 
 methods of calcuhitin^' the time and labour rcijuired for the vari- 
 ous works, and the best methods of executin;,' them, an<l this is 
 undoubtedly useful as an exercise, since whatever course a parti- 
 cular sief,'e may take, the works re(|uired to carry it on success- 
 fully will be similar in their nature, thou;,di their combinations 
 may be varied by circumstances and by the natuic of the j^'round. 
 It is open to ^M'eat doubt whether in the case of the ordinary 
 small bastioned fortress with a ^^Mirison of live or six thousand 
 men and without detached forts, it will vwv be necessary to 
 carry on a re;^Milar sie^^e to its conclusion. The exjieriiMice ob- 
 tained in the war of 1.S70--1 ^M)es to prove that such places will, 
 as a rule, fall easiU' to l)oml)ardment. their small area subjectin;^ 
 them to ;^a"eat loss, and ct)nse(iuent demorali/atiim. both of the 
 ^^arrison and the civil population, from a bombardment evtii with 
 field },'uns. «^ joo I'. Larj^'er places, thou^di without detachetl 
 forts, will, if a(le(]uately defendetl, probably make a lon;,'er stand, 
 and for such places it is (juite possible that the whole of the 
 operations of the ri'^^'ular sie;^-^!' will be carried out in order, as for 
 instance at the attack on Strasbur;;- in 1S70 (see A.cvD. PI, II 1. 1'.) 
 when the place did not surrender till after the capture of two of 
 the advanced works, which involved the crownin;^^ of the covered 
 way by sap, and the passa^^e of a broad wet ditch by brid;;inj^. It 
 is noticeable too, that on this occasion ^'""^ were brou^^dit up and 
 mounted in batteries in the crowninj;, and eveti into the captured 
 lunettes. 
 
 fli) ATTAIN (IN A I'lilA (iciN A I. KHdNT. 
 
 § J4f)-1"\ There is no experience of the attack on a ,t,^»od I'oly- 
 ,i,^onal front, the para^ra])h of Text Hook <pioled supposes that 
 the destruction of tlii' caponiers will usualix' be attempted by 
 miniuj;. It is however worthy of note that in most of the exist- 
 in;^' I'oly-^onal fortri-sses the caponiers, placi'(l as tlii.-y are in the; 
 centres of lonj,' fronts, would most probablv be I'xpost'd to the 
 distant curved tire of heavy howit/eis, theslu'lls of wliich an- now 
 eflecti\f for bri'achiuf,' purposes at auLdts iA' descent ,L,Meater than 
 were contemplated when these places were built. 
 
 M 
 
 lodern 
 
 K.M. 
 
 U-d to 
 
 I in a 
 
 The 
 
 (f) \ir\i K OS li|'.l\rlli:i> KnIMS. 
 
 The attempt to take a lai'^^e fortress, surrounded b\ j^^ftxl pei- 
 maiient detached forts, by rej^jnlai' siej^e has \ et to be made. The 
 j>laces of this kind, Nb-t/ and Paris, attacked m iSjo. surrendered 
 to blockade. The attack on Helfort is tin- best example we have, 
 but it is (>xce|)tional for two reasons, \i/.: the tjre.it inferioritv in 
 numbers of the besiej,dn^' arm\- at the out -(I o| t lie sie^M-. an<l the 
 natui'e ol the deta(die(l loits. which < .ni oiil\ be ( allecl s»-mi-pei- 
 
messsm 
 
 awijuasm 
 
 ^mf 
 
 w^mnm^nm'^ 
 
 ^^-st 
 
 152 i:xAMri.i;s. 
 
 iiiancnt works at best. Still, however, the ener;,'y with which tlie 
 defenders lieUl on to these works inferior thouj^h they were, and 
 by their aiil to the villaj^^es and woods which they held outside 
 the fortress, is sufficient to show the vast difhculty of the attack 
 of a fortress of this description when ade(]uately defeiuletl, and if 
 surrounded by j^'ood permanent forts. '^ jtSo V. 
 
 The general course of the operations is detailed in § ^S V. 
 
 In the attack on such a fortress the sie;,'e works will be much 
 exposeil to be turned by larj,u^ sorties, throuj^h the intervals be- 
 tween the adjacent forts, and special care should be taken in 
 securing the tianks of the parallels. 
 
 ; i'- 
 
 
 »«, 
 
 I » 
 
1". 
 
 DEFENCE OF FORTRESSES. 
 
 A IXTRoDUCTORY. 
 
 I'Ortresscs cannot, as a rule, he kej)t during' peace in absolute 
 readiness to resist an attack, and there will always be some time 
 at the disposal of the commandant to make his final preparations 
 when attack becomes immincnit, Great care should, however, 
 be taken to preserve the fabric in thorou^^di repair, and to see 
 that, on war beinj,' threatened, the work remaining,' to be executed 
 siionld only consist of those details for which time may probably 
 be afforded; to put off the execution of any extensive alterations 
 or repairs to this period is simp'y to court disaster. 
 
 Since, in these days of rapid movement, the communications 
 of a threatened fortress may be cut off very unexpectedly, it is 
 absolutely necessary that the wiiole of the armament and amnm- 
 nition, and a supply of provisions for, say, six months, should be 
 kept in store. <? 35^^, V. But as soon as attack is threatened, 
 all the provisions of every kiiul that are available in the surround- 
 ing country should, in addition, be swept into the fortress, as it 
 will be the first object of the enemy to intercept these sujiplies, 
 the j^'arrison bein;^' at the same time made up to full war strength. 
 
 The (piestion of appointment of commandant and strength of 
 garrison are treated in J;'^ ^49. 550, I'\ 
 
 On the latter point it will be seen tliat it is impossible to lay 
 down (i(-linite rules, but the innutility of collecting immense 
 masses of ill-organi/ed and ill-<lis(i|)lined troops in a cam[) for- 
 tress, however large, is well illustrated by the case of Paris in 
 1X70-71, where 500,000 men ofthis class were blockaded, and starved 
 into surrender by about _'5o,ooo Cicrman troops. And on the 
 other hand the sup|)ly of adcwpiate garrisons of trained soldiers to 
 fortresses ofthis class will, if attempted, prove; so serious a drain 
 on the field armies as dangerously to limit their offensive power. 
 
 1 
 
L.ti'M'rir'," 
 
 ES^ 
 
 lit 
 
 154 
 
 IN IKODIC 1010 (i)|-.l HNCI-..) 
 
 U 
 
 This daiif^cr ajjpoars to threaten the I'leiich aniiy of to-thiy, the 
 vast extension of Paris, and the construction o( a continuous 
 chain of works from \'er(hni to Helfort. alonj,' the' exposed north- 
 cast frontier, will no doubt ha\e the effect of seriousl}' hainpcrinj^^ 
 the operations of the I-'rench armies in the tield.* 
 
 Arniarneni, cS:c. '^ J51, ]^2. .55J, l'. 
 
 The weight of tlie ;,Mnis usetl in the defenci- is not strictly 
 htnited as in the attack hy (piestions of transport, and tlierefore 
 very powerful j^nnis may be expected to l)e found in important 
 positions, even on the land fronts of fortresses in future, and 
 these guns, if adecpiateU' protected either by disappearing car- 
 riages or revolving plated cupolas, will render the ordinary 
 methods of approach impossible, while they remain unsilenced. 
 The introduction of a wall piece which wouKl penetrate filled 
 gabions and sap rollers at a considerable range, twcjuld add greatly 
 to the power of the defence. Machine guns would also seem to 
 be very valuable against sapheads, the effect being to drive the 
 attack to the slow process of deep sap. Long range nuisketry 
 fire used by the defence may also be relied on to cause great loss 
 in the trenches, and so materially hinder the attack. 
 
 Interior organi;^ation of place. '^ 554, 1'. 
 
 Works wliich re(iuire to be carried out. J;§ J55, J5(), l\ 
 
 l^rialmont assumes that T. r all the necessary preparations a 
 period of 15 days would be re(juired. 
 
 Distribution of troops. '^.557, l*". 
 
 Tiie measures recpiired to resist attack i)y the eiienu's tield 
 army are considered under the following heads. 
 
 a and b. Against Surprise or Ojieii .\ssault. 
 c. Against Bombardment. 
 
 (f. Against Blockade 
 
 (,i)(l,) SI l;l'l;isl-: (i|; iil'KN AssMI.I. 
 
 ^i*.K5''^' .><'!. I'- 
 
 5?$^ jC,o, I. 
 
 (rj IIDMIIACIIMKN I'. 
 
 (•') 
 
 lU.cM K MH;. 
 
 *St'c " liiiportiiiii'e ActuL'Ilt' (If |-'iiri><." .ilrciuly i|iiiitiMl in Itiittimte \m. l-l'inhovp, 
 iiiitl for tln' ilisjmsitii'ri nl the new t'ri.ntirr ('(uticsscs ami fmfs-, " l.cs Ndiivcllcs dc- 
 fcni'cs tic i.i l''i'.iini'." K. 'I'ciiiit. 
 
 fSiii'li a |>ifir lias liiTii ai|(i|ii.iil in tlir riiissian scrv ici', 
 
I 
 
 field 
 
 ACAINST ia:(,ll,AK AITACK. 1 55 
 
 /y-.w/.i/Axy iu'j.I'i.m; attack. 
 Considered under the followinf,' heads : 
 a. Preparatory arran{,'ements. 
 h. Resistance to investment. 
 
 c. Obstruction of tlie preparation lor ri',i,Milar sic,<;e. 
 (/. Resistance to tiie operations of re^ndar sii-^^e. 
 
 (n) ntKl'AKAInKV Al; KANOKMKNTS. 
 
 .^§ 355. 35^J. I'- 
 
 (li) IIKSISIANCK in 1 N \ KSI M KNT. 
 
 § 359. I^- Tiie resistance to investment is j^^eatlv facilitated 
 by the occni)ation and strenj^^thenin-,' of advanced positions in 
 villa^'es, farm houses, woo.ls, i.\:c., outside the works, which should 
 be held as lon^' as possible, 
 
 fr^— (iliSTlUCTluN (IK I'KKI'AltATKiNS KoK SIK(;K. 
 
 For this purpose every effort should be made to ascertam the 
 position of the enemy's parks, with a view to destroyin;^' them by 
 means of powerful sorties, and constant attacks and alarms on 
 the part of the besie;;ed, will keep the investin.t,^ force continually 
 on the alert, and materially delay the various works which should 
 be in progress, ami for which hu^^e bodies of men are recjuired. 
 Such, for instance, as the manufacture of ;;abions, cS:c., and the 
 construction of connnunicaticns from main existinj^- lines of sup- 
 ply to the parks, and thence to intended site of the siege works. 
 
 The retention of advanced positions by the besieged will 
 evidently favour these operations. 
 
 ^(/> liKSlSTANCi; TO UKiMI.AH SIKIJK. 
 
 a A f^iiimt first artillery position. 
 
 %^ 364. 3^^5, 3f>(>, i(^7, !• .* 
 
 [i Against advance to first finallcl. 
 
 h% 3f'«, 3('^9. S7^^ F. 
 
 X Ai!^ainst second artillery position. 
 
 § .\7"- 'I'll*-' n^t^ <'i" tlif electric light will, under favourable cir- 
 cumstances, be effective in discovering the working {)arties of the 
 attack at this stage of their advance, and the execution of the 
 second jxisition batteries under the lire of shrapnel, if their exact 
 position can be determined, would be impossible. \U\\ for this 
 use of the electric light the weather must be clear; nothing can 
 be seen during fog. 
 
 •With rimp.'.t t.. tlir provision of ■,v,.rli.'!i.i .•ov(.r, as a i.n.ttvtiou aL'.-iiiist loim 
 raugi' iiiuskftry liiv. at this stago of th.- .i.f.-ii.f. si-e footiioto. pg. 71 al.ovu. 
 
156 
 
 AC.AINST Ki;(;ri.AR AITACK. 
 
 li'l 
 
 h; f 
 
 Captive balloons will be probably iniicli used at this staj^'c of 
 the defence for observing; the exact positions of the attackinj^' 
 batteries, which are commenced on the nij^dit previous to that on 
 wliich the bulk of the work is done, and may therefore be detected 
 on the day previous to their completion. 
 
 3 Against advance to third parallel. 
 
 U M'^, 372 F. 
 
 e Against advance to covered way. 
 
 S 57S F. 
 
 ^ Against breaking into enciente. 
 
 C -EXAMPLES OF DEFICNCE OF FoHTIlESSES. 
 
 Under this head it is not proposed to j^nve any particular case 
 in detail, in addition to the example of the Text l^ook,vi/., Hel- 
 fo't, § j8o F. But to leave the selection of specific examples to 
 the lecturer, who may vary them from time to time. 
 
 D—(lENEIiA L DISVUSS/OS. 
 
 ; -a 
 
 ^>? 37^^^. 379 F. 
 
 I . 
 
 Recent siege operations have on the whole shown that, while 
 modern improvements in artillery and musketry tire, and the aj)- 
 plication of the electric teleg^raph, &c., «S:c., to the operations of 
 war, have modified to a certain extent the relative advantages of 
 the attack and defence; the balance of advantage still remains 
 with the attack, and though the operations of the close attack as 
 formerly carried out, may be rendered very difficult by the ac- 
 curacy and power of modern musketry and machine gun fire, this 
 will not compensate for the inevitable wearing down of tlu- 
 strength and resourses of the garrison under the prolonged strain 
 of an energetic attack by greatly superior numbers. The diffi- 
 culty of breaking through the investment line even in the case of 
 camp fortresses like Met;^ antl Paris, where immense forces in ad- 
 dition to the actual garrisons were at the disposal of the defence, 
 was fully proved in the war of 1870-71, and as at this period of a 
 siege, the conditions are more ecpial than at any subsequent 
 period, it appears clear that a place once fully invested by a de- 
 termined enemy with a sufficient force nuist eventually succumb, 
 unless relieved from the outside, and that therefore the policy of 
 resting the defence of a state upon the strength of a fortress, how- 
 ever powerful and well defended, unless there is a probability of 
 such relief, is a mistake. On the other hand the great dif^cul- 
 
 m ■ 
 
CKNKKAI. DlSCl'SSION (ATTACK.) 
 
 157 
 
 tics of tlic clost; attack, on a well oifjani/ed and well (lefciuled for- 
 tress will teiul to convert siej^-^es into siiii[)le blockades, hastened 
 when possible by boinbardinent, and the slowness of operations 
 of this kind will add f,Meatl> to the value of fortresses, properly 
 disposed at points of real stratefjfic importance, as a means of de- 
 layin^j^ invasion, or, by necessitating^' huj^'e detachments tiierefrom, 
 of serit)usl} weakenin},' tlie assailants Held force. It should be re- 
 membered, however, that the f^arrisons of ^'ood Tuodern fortresses 
 capal)l(! of sustaininj^' this role must be very considerable, and that 
 therefore a f^reat multiplication of strong places will have the 
 effect of seriously diminishing,' the defenders force available for 
 active operations in the field, upon which tiie fate of war must 
 chiefly depend. The return to Vanban's system of a chain of 
 frortier fortresses, which has been adopted on an exaf,'f;erated 
 scale in the new l<>ench frontier defences, appears from this point 
 of view, to be a serious stratej^ncal error. • 
 
 'i 
 
 li 
 
 ^^ 
 
'^f k 
 
 MINING. 
 
 *>■!, *'■ 
 
 A JNTJi'(U)UCT()IiY. 
 
 * 
 
 Sketch of earlier methods of niininjj and of the introduction of 
 f;[unpowder for tliis purpose. Its application tirst by the attack 
 and then by the defence. (Subheads a and b.) 
 
 ^§ 492, 52 J F. 
 
 ((•) SUBMARINE MINKS. 
 
 See Coast Defence, p;:,'. 137 above. 
 
 Ji-h'EQU/h'KMENT.S OF AflNES. 
 Means for placing charges for land and submarine mines. 
 
 (a) U.KSU MINKS. 
 
 « Shafts and (galleries, §§ 457, 470 F. 
 
 /? Bored mines, §§ 471 V. 
 
 Y Ventilation 0' mines, § 472 F. 
 
 <5 Preparation of cliay<ics, c^V., J$^ 373, 378 F. See also 
 "Explosives," by Capt. Sankey, K.E., Cliapter III. 
 
 (It) srHMAItINK MINKS. 
 
 The details of mine cases, &c., for submarine mines are not 
 included in the course. 
 
 C- A'A' PLOS/ 1 'A'.V a EN SUA L L Y USED. 
 
 (n) KXl'LOSIVKS. 
 
 a Sketch of explosives in use. 
 
 ^ 479, F. See also "|Explosives," Chap. I. 
 
 ^ Calculation of charges land mines.* 
 
 *The whole of this Huliject is now under revision, and experiments are being made 
 to determine relialde data for the calculation of charges, the fonnulo- j^iveii in 
 the text hook having been found to he liased on inaulticient data. 
 
also 
 
 AIMM.ICATinN OF MINKS. 1 5() 
 
 jf 480, 481, F. Also "Explosives," p^'. 74. 
 
 ;' Charges Joy suhntarinc mines. 
 
 This subject is only mentioned incidentally in lecturing on 
 Coast Defence. Details are not given. 
 
 1>- APPLICATION OF MIXES. 
 
 (n) TO TIIK KKKKNCK. 
 
 ii Defence of i^lacis. 
 
 i 487, Defence. 493, 494, 4^5, F. 
 
 fi Defence of breach. 
 
 (h) TO THK ATTACK. 
 
 a On countermines under j^lacis. 
 
 H 4«6, 487 Attack. 488, 489, 490 V. 
 
 fi On countermines for defence of breach. 
 
 These would have to be attacked bv countermines driven 
 under the ditch, a difficult operation, the more usual method 
 IS to attempt to induce the enemy to explode them prematurely. 
 
 J- On escarp and counterscarp revetmentts. 
 ^§482,485, F. 
 
 (C)—T0 OKMOUTION OF PERMA.NENT WoKKS. 
 
 This may have to be done hastily, as in the case of works 
 ordered to be destroyed immediately after capture, to prevent 
 them from again falling into the hands of the enemy. In the case 
 of casemates, or other strong buildings, this would be effected by 
 placmg large charges inside the buildings, closing all the open- 
 ings, and exploding ; for revetment walls some of the methods 
 already mentioned, {b, y) above, should be resorted to; for oridges 
 large charges placed on the crown of the arch and exploded 
 without tamping would be used.* 
 
 Charges— For square bombproof casemates, k \J placed in 
 centre of building. 
 
 F'or bombproof casemates of two and three scjuares, respec- 
 tively, ^ and I L3 in centre of each scjuare respective'ly (trun- 
 powder.)t ^ ^^ 
 
 •See Demolition of Communications holow. 
 
 tin aJI .l.-moliti..ns of massive huil.lings, such as n.a-»/ii„.s an.l casemates ecom.mv 
 o - -plosive w, he effected l.y taking into .•onT.i.Ier.aion the ^Z^:^. 
 of the roof, which will often cause the collapse of such a l„.il,ling ,f a small nortu , 
 <if the supporting wall be blown away at the right jKiint. Portion 
 
 I 
 
 i. 
 
I 
 
 
 |ii 
 
 • t 
 
 I'.' 1* 
 
 Mi 
 
 160 
 
 AI'IM.ICAl Ion 01 MINICS. 
 
 For rcvetinent walls and hridf^es, see "ICxph^sivcs," \^^s. 72 
 aiul 76. 
 
 If time for (lclil)cratc (lemolitioii of lar/^c and strong,' buildin/^'s 
 is f^iven, the most economical method will he to Kxl^^'c char^^'cs in 
 the walls; if thick enonjjfh, by j^'alleries, otherwise by jum|)inf,' 
 holes with an ordinary jumper ; for bridj^'es, the haunches should 
 be attacked in the case of bridfjes with low thick piers ; the piers 
 themselves where they are lofty and slif,dit. 
 
 Charges — See "l^xplosives," pf:;s. 78 and 72. 
 
 ■, J 
 
 1^ 
 
 ! i 
 
IMONKKH DITIKS. 
 
 It is shown in wcnks on the art of war that an army in the ticM 
 requires. 
 
 1. Coinnuinications for tlie conveyance of troops and stores. 
 
 2. Coniniunications for tlie transmission of niessaf^es. 
 
 The selection of the coinnuHiications rc(|iaired and tlicir }^v\i- 
 eral inana^'enient are (juestions of stratej,'y and achninistration, 
 the workiiif^ of some of them, namely, tele^^raphs, and occasion- 
 ally signals and railways, devolves upon the military engineer. 
 
 Cases will occur in which the necessary comnnmications do 
 not exist, and they must then be constructed. 
 
 Further, the necessity for communication points to the advan- 
 tage (if destroying those required by the enemy, and this involves 
 the restoration of communications. Therefore the various com- 
 munications must be considered under three heads, namely. 
 
 1. Construction, including the working of some. 
 
 2. Demolition. 
 
 \. Restoration. 
 
 And these constitute tlie Pioneer duties of the military engi- 
 neer. 
 
 In civili/ed countries the necessary coUitnunications are for the 
 most part already in existence and henc ; tlu'ir demolition and 
 restoration will be the chief duties ; but in ,<n uncivilised country 
 on the contrary communications will frecpicntly have to be con- 
 structed, and may in some cases be one of the chief difficulties of 
 the campaign, as, for instance, in the Abyssinian and Ashantee 
 wars. 
 
 !l 
 
 !l 
 
 t 11 
 
 I 
 
41 
 
 ;| \M\ 
 
 ill 
 
 162 ((iNSTKt ( lloN (>l ( (iMMlNK A I t<)NS (Iv'OADs.) 
 
 COMMI'NKAIIONS l(»K Mil ((»N\I.VAN(i ol IKOOI'S AM) SlOKKS. 
 
 The txistiii;,' iiiraiis of convc) iiij; tKiops ;inil stores can be 
 classed as follows. 
 
 1. ( )r(liiiarv loads. 
 
 2. Railways. 
 
 \. Inland waters, namely, rivers ami ( anals. 
 
 4. Transport by sia or larj^'e inland lakes. 
 
 Of these onK the- fust three concern the military eii^^ineer, the 
 third, however, but to a limited extent. He may be called upon 
 to destroy or restore canals, but tin; time available \M)uId not be 
 sulTicient f^)r the construction. As r<j^'ai(ls rivers cases may occur 
 in which tin- channil requires improvenunt owin;^^ eitluT to 
 natinal obstructions or to those placed there by the enemy. 
 
 I'he military en}.,dne(r nnist, howtscr. be thorouf^dd)- ac()nainted 
 with the construction of roads and railways, and also with the 
 best methods of destroyin.i,' and re>torin^f them. 
 
 C'oNSTfiUCT/o\ or TI/KCoMMiy/CA T/nSS t'lii; TIIKCoNVKYANCK 
 
 OF ri!(K)l'S AM> STultKS. 
 
 kdAKS. 
 
 The more usual cases in which roads will have to be con- 
 structed durin;^ time of wai- will be to connect standin;^' camps, 
 parks, depots or batteries to existinj,' roads, but in special cases 
 louf,^ linj^^ths may havi' tti be constructed, as in the late Afj^dian 
 war, where several roads were constructed a^'ji^ref^atiuj^ 400 miles, 
 one of which was joo miles lonj^'. 
 
 Selection of Roiili. 'V\\v points to Ix; connected bv the road 
 bcin;; ;^Mvi'n the layin;^' out of the line of road will be iuthiencecl by 
 the same considerations that would appl\ to a road for commer- 
 cial purposes joininj,' the same points.* Hut it must| be'remem- 
 bcred that hea\y earthworks and eii.^ineerin;^^ works are not ad- 
 missible on a nnlitary mail owin;^ to want of time and labour and 
 the lini' of till' road will be altered act'or<linf,d\ .t 
 
 )^>j I.S2 to iS,S (I'ait \ .. I.M.b:.) 
 
 It will lre(juently hajipen (hat bi id;4es will liaNc to be con- 
 structeil to cross xarious obstacles, tor instance ^"o bridges were 
 made durin,;; the Ashaiitvc wai. These bridj^cs nuist be specially 
 
 'TIksc cciii^iilcrat imis ju( iltiilt witli in t lir cm i| i'iii_'iin'('iiiM' cmirsr. 
 
 I Kiir (Xairiiilcs 111 tlic' I'mistriirt imi ut luads set' pi;. 4J.S,*'\'iit \ \ \' I .Iniitiijil 
 IM'.S.I.. pu. SS. \'..l. I\'.. l:i:.l.. O.ci.sw.ii.il l',i|i.is. 
 
(•()\S'rK'l( I |(»N ()| I (»\IMt \1( ATloNS ( I'.KI I >i . I :S.) 
 
 I^i 
 
 (X)iisi(lciL(l, lor ouiii;^ t(i the r.i|iiility iiiiil the niiitti i;ils with wliicli 
 tlu'y liiivf to be riiiuif, tluir const met ion is \ir\ (litTcmit liom 
 tliiit of oidiiiiiiy luidj^cs. 
 
 Mii.ir.\u\' i^iAi) i:kii)(.i:s. 
 
 *(iciK'i;il I'l i lie ii lies aii<l rc(|iiirfiiu'iits. '^ i to h., |';iit 1 1 1, I.M.I',. 
 
 Selection of site. .^5'^ 5.S5, 5M7 I'", 
 
 I laviiif,' selected the site of the hridf^'c, tin- m \t step is to ol>- 
 taiii a section of the opening;, and since not onl\ the dimensions 
 of the various paits, l)ut also tlu; natnre of the hricfj^i; will depend 
 on this section, it should In- determined with all possible accm- 
 acy and then plotted on papiT, aiKl in some; cases, as will appeal 
 further on, it should be laid out hdl si/e on the -ground to enable 
 the spars to be- marked. The method usuall}- a(lo[)ted is de- 
 scribed in § r/.S to i.So. Part \'., I.M.i:. When the secticjii has 
 to be taken throii^di water, and the shape of the bed is required 
 (for Irestlinj^), the (K.-pths can be; taken by means of a pole, while 
 the nature of the bed can be ascertained at the same time. i'lii' 
 methods of ineasurin;.,' the widths of rivcus will be considered 
 under the liead of water bridj^dn;,'. 
 
 Calculation of the Dimensions of Spars. 
 
 The dimensions of the various-spars can be found b\ applyin-^ 
 the methods for determinin},' the dimensions of the members of 
 structures. These metluxls are fully entered into in (jther 
 courses* and will therefore not be consideretl here. Moreover, 
 in the present case the problem is not so much, "what are the 
 dimensions to be," as "will certain spars, which happen to be 
 available, be strong' enou<,di."' The followin-,'' rou;^di rules seem, 
 therefore, sufficiently accurate : 
 
 Havin<,' first determined the loa<l to be borm; at each point of 
 support, a stress dia^Mam can be made, whiih will always be of 
 the simplest descri])tion. Then the followiiif,'^ rules can be 
 applied : 
 
 Roadbcai'crs and Transoms, (supposed round.) 
 d-'= L. u: 
 {Standards and Struts, i^supposecl ri lud.j 
 d^= 0.4 L \ u-. 
 
 where i/ is the diameter in /;/c7k'.s, L the lenj,'tli (btitwecn points 
 of support) in /ft'/. 
 
 *Mathcniatif8 ami Civil Kiij{iiit!i!riny. 
 
 t'l'liese 8tni88-<liiij;riiiiiM will lie i;ivfii in the sfi|Ui'l fui- tlu' viuio is kiiiils df liridge.^ 
 
 
mmmmm 
 
 r64 
 
 ( (i\S I IvTC III »N (>l lOMMt'NK" A rioNS ( UK' I I )( ; I- S. ' 
 
 r ~ . 
 
 Ill tile (miiiiiiI;i tni !( ),i( I l)c;i it'ls aiid stiiits ii' is tin- total ilisln- 
 Imtcd load in tii'As, so that when the load is coiiciMitratcd at 
 various points, tin* ajniralcitt distiihiitcd load must first Iw found, 
 l)L'foi\' ;ip[>lyiiij^^ the fovniiila. tliiu 
 
 s 
 
 wlicn,' M is tlic Ix'iidinj; iiioiiifnt of the actual concfMitratcil loitds 
 at tlir (•(■litre ol the loadhcarcr or transom. 
 
 In till' toniiula for standards and struts tf is tlit," total load in 
 cwfs. 
 
 Conhij^c. 
 
 'V\\c spars can be framed to^^n-tlicr hy moans of iron holts and 
 spikt'S, or bv trcxMiails, but tlic nioif nsnal inotliod is to lash tin- 
 spars toL,'('tli('r with rope. 
 
 I'lirthci. the tics arc made with rope or (diain, and in the (Con- 
 struction various kiKJts arc of constant occurrence. This reduires 
 ■.\ kn(nvled^,'e of cordaj^e and its a{)plication. 
 
 ^JsN li) to (i(). Part III.. I.M.I-:. 
 
 Lashint,' spars, .^ Nf). Part III, I.M.I-:, 
 
 Plant I'scd in Ih'id^in^r. 
 
 The following' is the |)rinciprd plant that may l)e re(|uirod for 
 brid^^dnj,'. 
 
 Tackle. nS (,y 71. Part III.. I.M.I'. 
 
 Maciiinc^s such as crabs, jacks, etc.. ,^ 72-79. Part III.. I.M.h:. 
 
 Derricks, ^ No. Part III.. I.M.E. 
 
 Shears, jj Ni S4. Part III., I.M.i:. 
 
 Cyns, Jj^ 75, yi) and S5. Part III., I.M.H. 
 
 liarth .1 ;;c/;(;nf,i;d',s. -These are used when holdinj,' powtr is re- 
 (piiriMl. ICarth anchora^'es t)f various constructions and lioldinj,^ 
 power are ,L,dvi'n in the followinj^^ fi,i,nnes. I'i^^ i and 4. PI. XI., 
 l-i-s. !, _\ and S PI. .\II., I' if:. I PI. \\., I-ip. I, 2, J, 4 and 5 
 PI. \.\II., and the data for calculating their holdiuf,' power in 
 H 25 to 2H. Part III., I.M.E. 
 
 Road 
 
 Vi'(M' 
 
 The arrani^emetit of tlu' roadwa\- is the same whatever the kind 
 of brid^^e. It consists of three parts, the roadbeareirs, the tlooi- 
 
 ii|^' ami tile ribands. 
 
 ri 
 
 le roadliearers. \v\\ iisualh' hve 111 iiiim- 
 
CONS rixlt III )N (i| I ( iMMlNK A I l()N> ( llKl 1 x; l-.S.) 
 
 !()' 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 J 
 
 i. 
 
 for 
 
 I)t'i. .ire sii|)|>(»rtt'i| 1>\ the transoms of tlu' luidj.^-. 'riu:y arc 
 tlu;i\;fo!(' parulU'l to the li'iii^tli of the briiii^f. Across thciii is 
 laitl the tlooi iii^' ^^cncralU iiiatic of planks called chesses, or else 
 of hiinlles when no planks are available. riu; flooring' is kept in 
 position by the ribands, which are placed inunediatc-ly over tlie 
 ontside loadbearers and sc-cnrc'd to tluin by lashinj^'s ; for this 
 piir|)ose rack sticks and lashin;,^s are oft(;n eTn|iloye(l iind the 
 fasteiiin;^Ms inad(! as shown in I'h^. j PI. Ill, Tart III. I.M.K. 
 iMirther details concerning the roadway are ^nven in '^ 112, Part 
 111, I.M.IC. In order that the road-bearers may be of reasonable 
 dimensions the sp;'.n bridi^^'il b\- them should not exceed 15 feet, 
 nnless they are trnsse.l, as shown in b'ij^^s. 1 and 5 IM. XUI., and 
 5^142, Tart III. I.M.IC. Part of the roadbearers for a trestle- 
 brid.L,^.' mad(.' in I'Sycj across the Cabiil river consisted of trussed 
 beams. Thest! beams were 20 feet lon-^, {jjivinj,' an available s|)an 
 of iS' ()", and thit'c were used for each l/iy. The beam was ()' 
 deep and y broad, and thi> tie was 2'-|" .a.'nmferencee. 
 
 liKSCKII'llciN oK rilK * MMiirs KlShSiiK UltllKIK.S. 
 
 The stress-diagrams of several of the followin;^' brid^'es are 
 f^'iven in lM,i,^s. i to (), and the remaindt;r can be easily deduced 
 from these. 
 
 Trestle [)ridL,'es. vj§ NN to 97. 
 
 Pile br!dj,"-es. i^Jj (jN, ()(). 
 
 I'rame bridf^'es. jj roo to 152. 
 
 Tension biidj^^es. 5$ IJJ to 141. 
 
 Suspension bridjji^es. '^^5 171 to 1(^7. 
 
 Hiid^Mni,^ expedients. -^^ kjS and 14J. 
 
 Water biid.^in}.,'. ^ H)i) to 22 1, 225 to 235, 2.S4 to .'.HS, 2<S(j to 
 2<)i. 2()t) to v)i.* T!)« paia^aaphs here (juoted are all from Part 
 III. I.M.b:.' 
 
 *Kiir further iiif- iinatiDii nu lindjiiii;,', nei* 
 
 l*j{. 141 1(1(1. Vol. I, Iv.K.I.. o.'cvsiiiiiiil I'apcrs ( I'oiildoniiig. ) 
 
 I'H .'{l'_» :tj(l. Vol. (II, I!. K.I.. (l.caHioiml Piipers. 
 
 \'ii '.to iH iiii.l I4S 157. Vol. IV, Jt.KI., ( >l■t•il^■iolllll I'lipi-rH. 
 
 IV' f'HT V2'2. Vol. .\l.\. .loiiniiil K. r.S.I. 
 
 ' ' 
 
 
mmm 
 
 
 1*1 
 1 1 ^' 
 
 )• I 
 
 ■P 
 
 If 
 
 Pi 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 I! 
 
\\\ 
 
 1 68 
 
 CONSTRUCTION Ol < < )M M C NK A lloNS ( KAI I.W AS S. I 
 
 itoAi) i;n(;ini:s. 
 
 koiid oii^'inc's, f)r as tlicv arc soiiictiiues calli-d road sti/aiiurs. 
 and a^'aiii Steam Sappers in the I'.ritisli service, are ver\' iisi;fiil. 
 and arc coniinj^' into {,'cneral use for niovinj^' licavy wei^dits alonj; 
 roads. Most of the continental nations are now |)rovide(l witli 
 these cnj^ines. Tlie Knssiaiis in iNjj-.S had i^ of them, hiit do 
 not appear to luive worked them satisfactorily. '^'§ JJ, /(j. Part 
 V, I.M.E. 
 
 KMLWAVS. 
 
 The princijial nses to which railways can he put in time of 
 war are. 
 
 1. To move troops. 
 
 2. To forward snppiies. 
 
 J. To remove sick and woimded. 
 
 The selection of railways for these pur})oses will eitlur he a 
 strate|,Mcal, or an administrative (piestion. 
 
 In civilized conntries lines of railway will f,'ener;dl\- he foinid 
 which will serve the ahove purpoxs more or li'ss hilly, and, as 
 the time availal)le does not in j^'eiieral a<lniit of the construction 
 of any lonj^ lenj^jths of line in time of war. these are all that can 
 as a rnle* be connteci on, and the most that can be done is to im- 
 prove or slightly extend the existiiij,' lines. 
 
 Tile following,' are therefore the piiiici|)al cases in which tlie 
 necessity for constructing a b'i'.'ld r;iilw;iy ma\ arise. 
 
 1. To connect existing,' railways. 
 
 K(ir itist.aiu't', in tin- war of IS"?-!^ tlie Itnssians coiistiiictcil a railway in'twccn 
 RundtT anil (ialatz, to ronnrct tin- IJiissian II.iii«ay> \\itli tlie Tiii'ki.-*li liiK's. 
 
 2. To auf,'ment the cai)acity of .m existiiij,' liiu'. 'i'hiis, por- 
 tions of a sinf,de line mif^dit require to be doubled. 
 
 "A cane in jxtint in the oonstniction of a scconil line of railN lictwccn Wimlcii ami 
 Wondcnheini, ami alxo liftwi'cn WcisHcmln';-),' ami ila>.'i'naii I'V tln' Havarian l-'i<'l<I 
 Railway Division in tlic cani|iai>,'n of IN7<*-7I."I 
 
 'l/DDj,' len^tlis of railway have, however, !utrl\ Ipfcn suci-rsKhilly lonstnu'tcil 
 during' time of war, as, for instaiici', tiic Kcnilcr (ialat/ F?ail«ay nM'iitioincI in flu- 
 Kf'(|UPl, or ;if;ain tlic Sil)i railway in tlic late Aft,'lian war. Thf rati' of ailvamr 
 attained liy tlu' Canada I'ar.itir ICK., naim-ly, of oni- niilr | rr day. aNo poinlN to tin- 
 iio.iHiliility, (imli'r favonralil*' circunistum't's, of ronstriiitin^ lonj; It'ii>.'tli« of radway 
 in tiino of war. I 'ndfr exceptional lireiimstaines, when th«' eountry is level and there 
 IS r.o sti'iie (.as in Manitolial a railway lan he more rapidly, ,'ind more i.-i.^^ilv eun- 
 striiefed tlian an iirdinfuy road. 
 
 tAiiHtrian miid«' to railWiiyM tranulati cl hy l.ient. .le.s.-ep. It Iv 
 
(ONSIKTi I h IN I il ( < <M\II Ml A I h iNs ( N' \ 1 1 W \ S S. ) l(ii) 
 
 ( )i :i lilit II iii.il si(|ii,M^ iii.iN l»f iit^itss.ii \ ;it station-, tn iiK iiMsc 
 tlir lii.nliiiL; and iiuli Milling (a|i.n il\. And lastl\ tin- i ullini^ stdck 
 nia\ rii|iiiii- alttialion in nuil tin- (lian^c in tlir natiiif ol l]\v 
 tiailic. 
 
 To a\oid poitioii-. Ill till- liiii- wIikIi aif cnih iscd to the 
 
 (inmost lifi|iiiMit 1\ in tln' in\ (--tnu.iit 
 
 lliis case u il 
 
 (•niiii\ . 
 
 o| a 1,11 <■(■ Il lit less. 
 
 M. 
 
 ic of 
 
 i.ctWI'll 
 
 'I'liiis. till' < ill III, Ills III ISTII iMuili' .1 liiaiM'li liiii' ImIvni'i'Ii I!i'IiiiII\ ainl I'mit-ii 
 
 IIISSllll. 
 
 j. To avoid an ol'st i ii< tion on tlir lint- ciii-id l>\ tlir cihiiin. 
 This is a case o| icstoiatioii and will oca in wlun tin i()n>tiil(> 
 tioii of tilt • loop line will lake l(--s t iiiic 1 1 la II t lie ii'-.toration ( ■} the 
 original line 
 
 Till' (iirin^iiiM ill IsT'l Ii'kI tn iiiy .1 liiii' niilis Imi^ tn aMml a tiiinu'l at 
 
 NalltlMlll, wllli'll llilil lii'i'll liln\MI III li\ till' I'l'i'lli'll 
 
 5. To ( onilcrt an exist iiu; lilli' with soine |iollll lelldcKil illl- 
 poitalil li\ tile militaiA >iliiatioii. Ini instance .1 luaiuli line 
 nia\ lie made to the R.A. am! KM'., jiaiks duiinL; the sie'm' ot a 
 loi tress. 
 
 (). To obtaiH iiioie diieet coiiiniiinieat ion lietwi-eii imiioitant 
 points than is atfoided l'\ the e\istiii,L; railw,i\s. 
 
 I'"iir tins rcii.Hnii till- llrui'litlial < ii'iiiirrhliriiii railway was ciiiislnirlini liy tliu Ha- 
 vai'iaii l''ii'|il llailway I )iv isinii iliiriiii; tlit' IS7<*'7I riiiii|iai^ii. Likcwisf in tlu> war 
 nt' \S~~ 7'H tlic Hiissiaiis jniiii'ii lii'iiili'i' aiiil ( iaiilt/ liy a rail Way lS!t iiiili's Imi^; tn avniil 
 till' riiiiiiitaliniit aiiil liailly rniistnu'tiil Knuinatiiaii railways. 
 
 When opeiatniL; in an miei\ili.^ed ((UintiA' it nia\ headvan- 
 tajjjcoiis to ( mistriiet a new liiii' ol lailway to tacilitate the loi- 
 wardiiii; ol siipplii'S. iiotw ithstandiiiL; the iiiereased difruiilt\' i^^ 
 obtaining; tlu' ne( I'ssary niateiials, 
 
 'I'liiis, a .sliiirt line was inaiii' ilmiii^ tln' .\lpysiiiiiaii 1 ,iiii|iaimi, ami the lliissiaii.i an' 
 iinw rnii^tnietiiig a rail\\a\ tn a.s.sJNt tlu'ir ailvaiiri' un Mi'a. 
 
 The eonslnui ion of a i'ield l\,iilwa\ is the same as that ol an 
 oidiiiaiy line, but as time is an objeet and last and smooth rim- 
 ninj,^ ai'e immaterial in the c.ise of a mihlaiA line, the work will be 
 of a rou>,diei' desei iptioii and will, in lact, b' like whit aie known 
 as eoiiti at toi's lines. Ill ■ |ii im iples and methods ol eonstnie- 
 tion of iailwa\ s beiiii; liilly ente'i'd into m the (i\il en;;inee!in;i 
 eoinse it will onl\ be iieeessaiy In ii to con.-^idei a lew special 
 points. 
 
 Sl-lcitidll (>f NclilC. 
 
 The lollow in^ ol>\ lolls consideiationr> must be added to those 
 intliieni in.i; the selection ol tlu- loiite ol a i cimiiei t ia! line, namicls'. 
 that the line must not be e.\posed to the eiiem\. 
 
Bn3HCS5!5"? 
 
 170 ('ONSlKl'i' I li >\ 01 I (>M\HM( \ ridS-^ I Iv' \l I W \S s.) 
 
 'I'lic follduiii^ ( \li;it t (Nciiii'litiis tlii^ |Hiiiii. 
 
 At first it was ilctrniiiiiftl til take tlh' line (railway truiii Sistova to Tirnova) liy 
 way of Nariliiif. Novijirail, ami tin- valley "f tin- St riilciiara, as tar as fJiiriii Stmlcii, 
 
 liiit alter tlii' eartliwurk liail lieeri aetiially luiniiici I, sirnliiinul r, usimt* eaiiseil tlie 
 
 military aiitliorities tn oriler' that it -.liniild lie shit'tiil t'lirtlier a\N ay trinri tlie val!e\ 
 of the .iHiitra. I 
 
 I'"iiitlicr. \[\\<f^v ('iis^iiuciiii;,^ works luiiio iiia(lniissil)l(' (siicli. lor 
 iiistiiiicc. as (1(('|) ciittiii^s. tiiiiiitls and f\cii modcratr size 
 l)ri(if,^i'S) the line will lia\f to l>c a ■^iiifact' line and licaviiT ,i;ra- 
 diciits will Iiavc ti> lie aIlowc(l than on an oi'dinai\' line. 
 
 As reyarils this !a>t iMiiiit ttie railway lietween rxinler ami (ialat/ already men 
 tioiied aildiils a most iiintiiietis e e\am]ile. "A ]priiji'et tor the eniistmcf ion ol this 
 line as a part ol the J'losi.m net-work of railways had, in faet, lieeii drawn np some 
 time liet'cire the war liy tho railway ailniinistration. » . . . 
 
 Certain preliminary snrseys had lieen made and a j,'reat pari ol the line had Keen 
 traeed ; as sdoti, however, as it eanie to lie necessary to eonstinet tlir^ line in the 
 shortest possilile tinn', this preliminary traie was disearded. as it involved ciiisssin^' 
 the principal drainage lines ot' the cdiintry , and necessitated tin- construction of sev- 
 eral hiL.'li cniliankmeiits, which could iicit lie rapidly throw n ii|i, and even when made 
 cdiild hardly ln' used at uiice. IIcikc the trace wliiih had heeii worked out was 
 aliandiiiicd hihI an in/in /// new line taken, which turned se\(r;il of tlie water cuiirs(!s 
 and was less diiect, hut whiih, mi tlu' other lia.d, reiliii'cd the earthwork and luidj,'- 
 
 iiig to a iiiinimiim." I 
 
 « 
 
 When tlir oliji.'ct ol tlic line is to coiuit'ct or piolono;^ cxistino; 
 lini's. the ^ati^M' ol tjic exist in,!; liiii' slmidd (A idciitK' he adojileii. 
 Hilt if the line is entirely separate, when luiilt in an unci\ili/ed 
 country for instance, or, in some cases, when eonnectiiij; detaeht il 
 lorts, a smaller };aii}4(' than the usual 4 Nl' ma\- with advantao^e 
 1)1" employed, bi'causo sliarper lurves caji hv. iiset!. the eiii^dneeriiio 
 works uilll he of less maj^Miitude, and the lollino stock and eiioines 
 li,L;liter. The metre K'i"K*-' siH'ins sihtahle for siudi a cast.' ; as 
 rolling; stock foi this ;;au}^a' can freciiuntly hi; ohtained reuil\- 
 made ; while lor smaller j4;;in;^'es wiiicdi mifjjht otherwise offer 
 advantages rollino stocl< would ha\c td he constriicti'd. 
 
 Rolliii!^- Stock tiiul liiii^ii.cs. 
 
 W'lu'ii connected with an existin.i,^ line the rollin;,^ stock of that 
 and nci;.;hhorin;,' lines will lie used. It may. howc\ir, he neces- 
 sary, as previously mentioned. t<> ailapt some of this rolling'- stock 
 to othiT purposes. Some (A the mo>t iiii[ioilant adaptations are 
 as follows : 
 
 ''Tln! italics are our own. 
 
 f'rii iistruction of militaiN railwavs dm Iiil; tiic l.'iisso 'i'nrkisli w.u oi IsTT-TS. 
 
 liy < "apt. Sal.'. I!.K. .lomnal I! i'.S, I.. Vol \\|\ 
 
h. lor 
 c si/e 
 
 I (JNSlKll rioN nl ( oMMl NK AlloNS ( KM I W AN >. / I/J 
 
 Adllpttltidl! (if luillil!^ SlOik. 
 
 The principle alterations lliat ma} be re(|iiirt(l to In' Mi.ule to 
 tile lolling stock are 
 
 'rraiisforniiiif,^ |)assenf,'er or ^Miods vans into anibulances. The 
 provision of ainbnlance trains is a most nn|(ortant ([nestion, 
 and the tittinj^^ np of the (•arria;^^es for the pnrpose re<piires S(jnie 
 ct)nsitleratioii. 
 
 The principle conditions to he tnllilled are as tollows: 
 
 I. I'lasy tl"aveIlin,^^ and ahsenct; of joltinj,'. 
 
 J. I'ree connmniication throu,t;liout the train to allow of medi- 
 cal inspi'ction en ronte. 
 
 ;. Arran;,a'nu'nts to permit the patients to \\r down. 
 
 -j. (.'on\eni( ncc for cookin,-,'. 
 
 As r'..|L,Mrds the lirst conilition. a ^^ood arrangement i- to he able 
 to briiiL,^ the i)ationt in on a stretcher, which should be hunj,' on 
 india rubber rinijs. or s])rin,i,'s. 
 
 i'"or the second condition the carriaL;es >houid ha\i- end doors. 
 
 The cars in use in America are very snitabK'. and (an with 
 little difficulty i)e made into ambulances, as was done in tlu: 
 American war. Attention should be paid to th-' li,i,ditin^. \eiiiil. 
 ation and heatiii^^ ot a'!ii)iilances. ' 
 
 In convertin.L,' freii,dit \va^'}j^ons into horse l)o\es tlie followiii}; 
 j)oints should bt: considereil. The horsi'S can be placed either 
 transversely or lon,t,Mtudinally, the former plan strains the horses 
 less, but till latti'r affords more looni for the men in cliar,L;t . and 
 the horses can be' easit'r U'A and watered. Means tor se'Curin.L; 
 the horses must be provided. 
 
 .Irniour Plated ir((,i,',;;e;;.s. 
 
 Dminfj; the siej^'e of I'aris, ami ([uite lately at Alexandria, some 
 railwa\- waj,'^'ons were armour i)lated and Htted to mount a ,i,Min. 
 rhe\ were, in fact, moveable batteries. 
 
 Mullet proof carri.i,i,^es. It may societimes be necessary to 
 make the sides of carria,i;es bullet-pio' i; this < ni be done by 
 •tttachinj.,' .[' steel j)latea, or i,' wroii-ht ,ion phites. I".ii;.;ines ( .in 
 Ik-.' protected in the same manner. 
 
 The Steam Sapper can be employi' 1 as a locom()tive ot 4' S| ' 
 U.ti'iLjc by jinttin,!.; on Han^aMl wheels, which are supplied with 
 e\. rv enL,Mne. See .^ 77. I'art \ , I.M.I !. 
 
 *hii Itirthcr iiitoriiKiliuii stM- I', ;U:{, N I'l ill , I!. K. I . Oi<u.si<iiiiil I'ajN'. 
 
f 
 
 
 T72 
 
 1: 
 
 ' } 
 
 1. • 
 
 !■; 
 
 
 |)|\inini<iN «)1 I < >MMtM< A'||( )N?;. 
 
 \iitiptiitii>n .>/ Stiilimis l<i Mililtiiy I'lirfinscr. 
 
 Sc:c >; 5.S. I'.iit \ . I.M.I.. 
 
 As ;ilii';nl\ iiKiilioiud lic;i\\- iMi lliw 1 »rks ami t iiiiii»l> ai c iii.nl- 
 miss;il)Ic. and tlir bridj^'i.'S that may liii\f to l)i.' roiistiiictcfl will 
 l)c of a tfiii|)orarv nature, and as tliey t Ik; ft -fori.' diftcr from oidi- 
 iiaiA raiiww hrid^^'cs tin \ nni>t he si)cciall\' coiisidcnMl, 
 
 Sec JJvN 14.;. i;o. Tan III. I.M.i:. 
 
 /\(//i' ti/Cdiislniilinii (if /.inc. 
 
 In an ta>\ (oiiiitr\. with iinliiinlcd material and a [u < >|iti |\- 
 off^Miii/ed vail\v.i\' eoips. a late of \\ mile^ |ier da\ ma\ possihlv 
 l)r ;itt:iined. The l\ii>sians, or rather a coiitraetor emploxcd hy 
 tKi'm. (• :)nsti Ui ted tin |i(nder-( ialat/ 1 ailwax' at the 1 ;ite of three 
 miles per ..nvkui'^ ila\ ." 
 
 iKi N( II l\.\ll\\\^. 
 
 I he n>e ot tlies( tr,im\va\s is at present limitid to pioxidin;^' 
 easy eommimie.il ions in the sie<,T of a iorti'ess. It is thoii;^dit, 
 lio\\c\ri. that tlie\ nn,;lit he emplo\cd loi tlif mole i^ciieral pur- 
 poses. al)o\e lie^eiihcd. in sjn'cial (■a•^l■s, white the eoiist 1 net ion 
 ol r;iilua\s ol the oKJinary t\pe would invoKc too nnn h lahoiir 
 and time, tor mslanee. in moinitainons roiintrit's, hecanse steeper 
 i;radients and sh.irper <urves ( 14 o radius) can he workeij and 
 hecaiise- the load <an he made much narrower and the works Kss 
 heav\. 
 
 I'or (It tails ol eoii-,tMiit ion set- ,N'^ 7o--(), I'att \ ., I.M.Ii. 
 
 /'/•.•.l/o/,//7oV ../•• /7//; ro.l/.l// \7r.l /7".v\ I'ol! I'llF. < < > \ V h.) A S<r: 
 
 <>/• ri;<iiil's A .\/» sTnltF.s. 
 
 The ohjcc t of destroxiiii: t he etit m\ 's eonimiinicat ioiis. 01 those 
 ihat III i\ he ol use to him. Iia-^ alle,id\ hecli pointed out. Siieli 
 d( iiinlit ions ma\ he undettakeu. 
 
 .J. I'.\ all eiitei ].|t isiii.Lf aitii\. whether retitini; or advancinj,'. 
 sending sm.ill [laitiesto ent the eommiinicat ions in rear of the 
 erM'm\ . 
 
 /'. t'>\ .III iMii\ w hiUt letuiii}^ to iiiti I (•( pt Ol liiinlei till .id\ati(H' 
 
 • if t he (111 l|;\ . 
 
 *y\tt furtibwr iiit«>«m,«tii)ii ■•n lln- • (iii>l mi> 1 imi nl iiiilit.'irv r.iilwiivs sec 
 
 I*. 2i'-;m. \ ..J II . i;.i: I . o,,asi.'ii!ii i*!i|.hiN. 
 I'. ;,«»;. sTtr. \'.i. ill. 1. r..l.. (».-,;isi<.ii.il |i.i|i<r.s. 
 I' •-"-•.". -r:.".. \..i i\ . i;.K 1.. u.-.,iKi.ii.ai I',i|mi> 
 
 !• nil. \ ..I \\\ I imimal. I! I' S I 
 
Ill \|( >l I ri' IN ('I ( I iMMINh .Vl|( )\S. 
 
 17.5 
 
 In the former case the work must lie done with ^^^icat r;i|ii(h't\ ; 
 ill the liitter there will ,i,'t lier.illy he .iliiple time to e.irry out tlii! 
 iliIiiMlifioii tn tile extent illteiKhd, liut ill this ease also' the time 
 may he limiteil. IIciicc mh the wjidle the ilcmdlitinii of com- 
 nninieations may he cDiu-eniciitly (|i\ii|f.| into two classes luisly 
 and del I he rah- -althou^^'h it cannot he said that there is any dis- 
 tinct boundary hetweeii the two. 
 
 The (jcjiherate dciiiojitioiis, inchideil miiler A. are itiTforiiicd |)\- 
 eii^diieers. Those included under.? re()iiirc. e\id(iit |\\ troops of 
 f^reat mohihts-, and hence in flir liritish service a certain nnmlu'r 
 of cavalry soldiers are tiaiiii'd to eiiahle them to |ieiloiiii. 
 anionj^st other simple lield foi tifu ation duties, the liast\ dcnioji- 
 tion of cominnnications. Thesi- men are cillid ca\;dry pioneers.^" 
 It is, liowevtM'. considered hy soinr anthoiities that it would 
 he preferaiih' to attach mounted engineers to cavalry re<;iments : 
 others, aj^Miii, advocate a li^^dit eiij^nieer train. 
 
 In till' 15ritish service it is now contemplated to ha\-e an eii- 
 ^'ineer 4-horse demolition wa;,,'on. for efiVctin.iL; hastv demolitions 
 in concert with cavalry. 
 
 The demolition ot commimicat ions work can lu' carried oiit 
 in three diffiMcnt wa\s. nanieh : 
 
 1. I>\ hand lahour. 
 
 2. By explosives. t 
 
 .5. I'.y fire. 
 
 Tile SccoikI nietlio<i is ^'eneraiis tiie (ini(d<est and mo:^t ( ftective, 
 hut sonu'times tiie lirst must he resorted to; tlie tliird is iimitc^d 
 to those cases in wh'cii the materials can he <lestroycd (wood) 
 or rendered useless (rails and iron viidcis) iiy lite. 
 
 Tools. 
 
 I he tools reipiiicd arc pi(d<s and --!io\ol>^. Icvtis, saws and 
 liammer^. axes and the \aiioM> minim; tools. 
 
 .SV/l'(7/e// ri/ ///(• ( '('linitlflll(\lll(>l!s III he / >i-n!nll\lir,{. 
 
 I he sclc(-| i(Ui ol llie lim-^ o| con 1 m im ica t ion to he stxciccj and 
 tile decision as to wliith<'i the intei 1 upt ion is to Ik' icmpoi.nv 01 
 complete are stratet^jcal ijuestioiis. and do not. t liei ifoic. cone ti n 
 tli(^ militarv cm^ineei in liis i .ipacitv as such, 
 
 ■fill III! t ill r lllt.illll.ll lull sii- |i. I.')'_'. l;.l'!.l , Ol i;i.,ii.|i;il r.i|ii|-. \'ii| I. 
 
 I riic iMi't liiiils III iiiakjii:: ii|> ;uiil lii'iiii: rli.'ii'L'<'< ^^ ill In l<'iiiiil riilis tii.itiil ul ill 
 "llxplii.'-ivcs, liy('ii|it. S;iiiLi\, It.iv" 
 
I' ■' ! 
 
 
 '71 
 
 |ilM(i| I I K i\ n| ( ( )M Ml M( A I 11 >N ( I lU' 1 1 »< . I.S. ) 
 
 :'*■ 
 
 
 i;i 
 
 , I 
 
 It is fdiiiiil 1 1 Ml (Ml ;tll lilies oT CI II 1 1 II I III I i(.i til III tlui c ;ii c cri tain 
 parts iiiiiic iiadily <li.'Strr)\X'(l than ntliris. ami wliiili arc also 
 iiioic ilillicnlt to ripair. Siiili, for iiistaiici;. arc l)iiil;^'cs, ciit- 
 tiii.ijs, tiiiiiicls. I'tc. It must tlicrcfoii' hv. dcciilcil uhich ol these 
 Miliicrahlc points arc to Ix; (Iciiiolishcil. aiul to what extent, and 
 this decision will be haM'd on the lnllow in;; considerations. 
 
 I. Tiio extent of the interruption as ordered li\ lii;;lier au- 
 thority. 
 
 J. Tlic means, materials and time available. 
 
 ]. Whether the inti'rriiptioii effected repays the expenditure of 
 time, labour, etc. 
 
 Tiu.' first consideration will depend on the time tiie eiieiny will 
 reiiuire to re-establish the coiiiiiiiinicatioii. and this time >lioiilil 
 be e(jual to tlu; time the interruption is to last. It should be 
 observed that tlu; tendency is to destioy more than is necessary. 
 "In the war of i,St)b tiicre was much useless destrurtion of lint'S, 
 etc.. such as the total di'stnictioii of In id^^-s, when, fnini tli<' cir- 
 cumstanci'S of the cr.si-, the reino\al of the lails would have been 
 siilficicnt. [aci|iiiin ^mvcs a Ioii.l; list of lines. l)riil;;i!S. etc.. in 
 I'lance whicdi weii' iicstro\ed diiriii;,' the war of 1^70-71: and 
 there is little doubt that a lar^e portion ol this was uiiiiecessar\."* 
 
 Sonic of the Prussian instructions bear on this point : 
 
 "In retreat the (' 01 1 1 ma llde i-in-C "hie f details the lilU'S to be pli- 
 serve<l, and those to be dismantled or lompletcly destroyed." 
 "No wolk of art to be destroyed without special iiidci.-' from tlu; 
 Commander-in-Chief." I 
 
 The last two considerations ari' simply matters of estimate. 
 m.Moi.i I'll i\ 01 i!Uiiii.i;s. 
 
 The (IcMiiolitioii ofbriil^'es will be tii'atcd of scp.iiattK, because 
 tlie\ occur both oil loads and railways, and the wmk is done in 
 tlu- same wa\- in either case. 
 
 The demolition of a brid.L^c may bi' effected: 
 
 1. I)V ciittin;; thriuii^h tlu- arch or girders. 
 
 2. r>v destroy ill,!; the abutments or piers. 
 
 Wlu'ii a bridal; has more than imk' span, and is built of 
 masoiir\'. two andies will be bioui^lit down by cuttiii;; throiii^h a 
 pier, but in the case of wooden or iron brid,L;es it is ;;('iii rally best 
 
 "K.K.I.. (Iiiiisidiial ra|i''is, \ di. Ill , IscmI llailu.iNs m \V;ic 
 li;.K. I. Ociiisiiiiiiil l';i|Hrs, \ ul. I, Nn. 'A. 
 
in \l< i| I I h '\ 111 I ( i\|Ml \|( \ IK )\ ' I'.KIIK ,1 >^.) 
 
 /.") 
 
 to (ll'Stl'>\ llir L^lli|( I-., unless ,1 ( 1 i||i|ilttc ilflimllt lull is llltcili In I, 
 wllfli till- pin s slidiilil lie ilisl I ( i\ cil. 
 
 Stoiic nr llruk lliidi^is. I )c.sti net h mi 1)\ i\|il(isi\i^ is tlif diiIv 
 iintlii 1(1 :i\ ailahlf in this < use. 
 
 Dclihciiilr iKinolitii'ii, Tlic <U'lil>ci:itc di im ijit loii dl a stmii' nr 
 i)ru"k 1)1 idf^c can !•»• iiii(lfitak«ii svlicii (i'mn ;(• in (m Ikhms ;iri' 
 available. When inline I of a siiiL,de at cli ^iich luidj^es aie hest 
 (leiiinlislied li\ idaciiiL; charj^cs hehiiid the jianiii In s of the arch, 
 a iar^^MT Ineacll heini; tliele|t\ el'tecled. I'nless the l>liili,fe js 
 
 narrow two or nil He cliaij^'cs should he used in iiiciereiice to a 
 sitijL;le char;^M\ for with a sinj,de cliaif.;e then' is a [xissihilitv of only 
 blowing out a hole. Iea\iii;,' the arcji staIldin^^ The char^^es bein;.^' 
 |ila( cd behind the haiiiic In s a >halt will Iia\c to be sunk from the 
 road abo\t' and coiiiH'cted to a short hoii/oiital i^alK iw 'llie dis- 
 tance (if the ceiitle of tile <diaij.^e iVolli tile soffit of the arch is the 
 l-.L.K., and its l«n;;tli will, of eoiiise. depend on the (lepthofthc 
 voiissoirs within the limits, howcsei, ot \\ to 5 feet. If less than 
 I.', feet the number ol (diaii^es would be e.\<('ssi\e and a failure 
 nii^ht occur in simultaiKoiis firin.^^. If more than 5 feet the 
 rharj^'es would be two lai;^e and tno tew. and the effect niij,dit be 
 to blow out a se-ries ot holes, as in the case of a siii^de cliaij,''e. 
 When the brid;,'e is narrow ami a siii;.;le cliai;.,^' is used th(^ L.L.R. 
 should be {til the breadth of the brid-^v. 'Idle depth of the 
 c-harj^es below the siirl.ice of tlu' load should be at least 
 ;^ L.I..K. to insure that the least resistance is in the direction 
 of the .iK h. The resistance of the winj; walls is f^ciu'riillv less 
 than that of the an li liii;,', therefore the outer rliarj,^es should be 
 ke|)t at .1 ;^Mtatei distaiKc than L.L.R, htuii the face of the win;.,' 
 walls : as a general rule this distance c-an be taken as _' > L,L.I\. 
 The dist;ince, apart of the centres of the cliar;4es should not be 
 more than j •' L.L.K, To arr.in^'e the char;.;es, in any f,nven case, 
 the L.L.K, must Hist be decided on: but the best value cannot 
 be determined until some idea is obtained of the si/e of 
 the chai^(,'s. The process is therefore tentative, namel\-, as- 
 sume an approximate L.L.K.. and calculate the cliar^'e.s re- 
 (luiied, if they are not of suitable si/e the L.L.K, must be in- 
 creased or diminished according,' as the char^^'es are too small or 
 too lai'i^e; the char^'es are then recalculated and so on. With a 
 little practice the best \alne of the L. L. K. should oe aili\cd at 
 in one or [\\i, trials. idie ioi muhe lor calciilatiii;,' the dimensions 
 of the cliar^'cs w ill be found in ■•Table of data, Te.\t-book on 
 lilxplosive.s." 
 
 A bridge ioriiied ol two or more arcdies is best demolishe(l b\- 
 attacking; the piers, if the latter are hij^h, but, il the\- ,ire broad 
 and short it is safer to attack the liaiiiudies, as in the case of a 
 sintjle arch: tVu" tlu- arcdies abutting on tlie pier to be blown 
 
IMAGE EVALUATION 
 TEST TARGET (MT-3) 
 
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 Hiotographic 
 
 Sciences 
 Corporation 
 
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 21 WEST MAIN <iTREET 
 
 WEBSTER, N.Y. 14S80 
 
 (716) 873-4503 
 

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 lyb 
 
 Dl'.MOI.IIIoN ()!• lOMMlNK A TloXS ( l-!K 1 1 )( ; KS.) 
 
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 down iiiif^lil, ill such a case, oiiIn \n: slii;litl\' HIUmI and subside 
 as;ain in a SLTxiccablu, allhoiif^li dclapidatL'd, (-(judition. Such a 
 case occurred at Maj^enta when the Austrians attempted to 
 destroy tlie brid^^e by niinin.i;' the i)iers. Several charj,'es are 
 preferable to a sinj^Ie larj,^' one for the reasons advanced in the 
 case of a sin^de arch. The char'^es shouKl be placed as close as 
 possible to the base of the piers, at twodined intervals, and tired 
 siniultaneousK'. The chand)ers are reached by drivinj,'' j^^alleries 
 into the piers, a work which may be much expedited, when the 
 piers are built or larj^^e stones, -by blastin;^ with j^amcotton or 
 d_ynainite. If the labour of drivinj,' the <;"alleries is very j^'reat a 
 sinj^de uvenhar'^cd mine may be preferable. 
 
 Hasty Dfuidlition. —For the liasty demolition of a stone or brick 
 arch the charj^^e must be placed where there is the least amount 
 of coverinj^-, /. c. near the ke\' stone. Over the key stone itself 
 would rc(]uire the least amount of excavation, but j^enerally it is 
 preferable to cut two trenches, one on either side of the centre 
 and lodj^^e two char;^es, as a lar^^er breach is thus obtained. If 
 j^unpowder is the explosive used as much tamping as time will 
 admit should be placed over the clKuj^^e, but if ^amcotton is em- 
 ployed the charjj^e may be left uncovered. The charj^e in each 
 trench can be placed in a mass, but if the bridf;e is wide a better 
 effect will be obtained by placin^^ a line or charf,fes across the 
 arch, a lonf,^er time will be required, howe\er, for preparing the 
 ciiarges, and a {)artial or total failure to explode the charges 
 may occur urdess the Hring arrangements are in good working 
 order. When nsing guncotton the charge can advantageously be 
 fitted to a board and placed under the crown of the arch. 
 
 Iron Brid'^cs. — Occasionally iron bridges.may be demolished by 
 hand, namely, when the bridge is put together by bolts which 
 can be unscrewed and knocked out. The bolts connecting the 
 bracing at the al)utments are the best to take out, as this can be 
 done without risking the lives of the workmen. If plenty of time 
 is available, however, a staging might be erected and the bridge 
 dismantled, and the various parts removed. 
 
 It is better, however, to use explosives, and preferably guncot- 
 tt)n or d)'namite. The point of attack in this case is best chosen 
 in small bridges on the lower boom at the centre of the span. 
 In large bridges a sa\ing of explosive can be effected by placing 
 the charge closer to the abutments, there being then less metal 
 to cut through. 
 
 Wooden Bridi^cs. — The three methods are applicable in this 
 case, but the last two are preferable. When using hand labour, 
 perhaps the best plan is to partiall\- saw the louver bcom so that 
 the bridge will come down by running a loatl o\er it. When 
 
DEMOLITION OF COMMUNICATIONS (ROADS, iSrC.) 
 
 177 
 
 lid^e 
 
 using explosives the work would be done as in the case of iron 
 bridges. The destruction by lire requires no description ; it is 
 advisable, in order to insure success, to apj 'v sonic tar or coal oil. 
 
 ROADS. 
 
 The vulnerable points are bridges — cuttings and embankments. 
 Bridges are clearly the most vrlnerable, not only because they 
 require less time to destroy, but also because the interruption is 
 far more complete. 
 
 Cuttings and embankments can be demolished by hand labour 
 but preferably by mines charged with gunpowder. The obstruc- 
 tion thus caused is, however, in general not wortli the lal)our, as 
 the road can easily be diverted. Still in special cases the enemy 
 may be delayed for a considerable time, for instance in the case 
 of a cutting on a steep hill side, or of an embankment crossing 
 an extensive marsh. 
 
 Hasty Demolition of Roads. — Bridges are the only vulnerable 
 points in this case. \ 
 
 RAILWAYS. 
 
 The vulnerable points are : Bridges, cuttings, tunnels, em- 
 bankments, permanent way, rolling stock and engines. 
 
 The demolition of bridges (when of sufficient span) will- gener- 
 ally, as in the case of roads, be the most effective, but unlike 
 roads the interruption caused by demolishing embankments, 
 cuttings and tunnels, more especially the two last, is very great, 
 because of the time required to divert the line. The destruction 
 of the permanent way will only produce a very temporary ob- 
 stacle, and the same may be said of the destruction of the rolling 
 stock and the engines, unless the enemv cannot obtain anv. See 
 §§ 66 67, Part V., I.M.E. 
 
 Hasty deiiwlitiuii oj railways will generally be such as can be 
 performed by means of small charges of guncotton applied to 
 bridges, the permanent way or the rolling stock.* 
 
 CANALS. 
 
 The vulnerable points arc: locks, cuttings and embank- 
 ments. 
 
 Locks can be rendered useless by removing the gates or by 
 blowing down the side retaining walls. Damming up a cutting 
 or breaking through an embankment may cause considerable in- 
 undations of the surrounding country, and due consideration 
 should be given to this point before effecting these demolitions. 
 
 'I'"<ii' fmtlicr inforinatioii nil the iluiiiolitidii of r;»ilu;iyN si^c 
 IV. :{47, Vol. in., It. K. I., Occa.sion.il I'apfivs. 
 F«. 1 24, Vol. I, it.E.I., TraiiHliitions. 
 
1^ 
 
 I'M 
 
 iil^ 
 
 'm I 
 
 > ,, 
 
 S' , I; 
 
 17S 
 
 NM-;S'l()KAri().N 01 COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 liESToliATniX OF THE Co.VM l'\/OAT/i>XS FdI! THE CONVEY ANCE 
 
 nr TRiiol'S AXJ) STO/.'ES. 
 
 The restoration of these coininunications will be required: 
 
 ' I. When they have been cut in rear of the army by an enter- 
 prising'' enemy. 
 
 2. When they have been destroyed in front of the army by tiie 
 enemy whilst retirin;,^ 
 
 The work to be done^will be the same in both cases with this 
 difference, however, that in the second case the demolition will 
 probably be more deliberate and therefore more difficult to repair. 
 
 The restoration may be effected in two different wa\'s, 
 
 1. l^y deflecting; the line of communication so as to avoid the 
 obstacle made by the demolition. 
 
 2. P>y re-establishinj; the orij^inal line by temporary means. 
 
 Which of these methods to adopt in any particular case can in 
 general only be decided by estimating the time and materials 
 required. In some cases, however, the decision may be arrived 
 at without the necessity of making an estimate. 
 
 For instance : A bridge, crossing a river, has been destroyed. 
 It will be best to restore it, for, if the connnunication were de- 
 ilected a bridge would still be recpiired, and further, the original 
 bridge often assists in the construction of the temporary bridge, 
 as parts may be left standing, or else the remains of the piers may 
 assist in the formation of points of support. 
 
 A tunnel on a railway has been blown in. It will generally be 
 advisable to deflect the line, as was dene by the Germans in the 
 case already (juoted of the tunnel at Xanteuil. It is instructive 
 to note that the Germans attempted in the first instance to 
 restore this tunnel, but after repeated failures, caused to a con- 
 siderable extent by heav\- rains, they were forced to deHect the 
 line. J-5ut cases may occur in which there is no option but to 
 restore the tunnel, or else the tunnel may be short and the thick- 
 ness of superincumljent earth small, in which case a transft)rma- 
 tion of the tunnel into a cutting may be advis.able. 
 
 Tims the (it'iinauN in IS70 "I'l'iidi'ied tlic timnel of AiiiU'iititM', wliicli \\;is l)]n\\ii 
 ill for a lt'iij,'tli nt' .■)()() feet, jias.saliln in this way ; no tiinher to t'oriii fraininj; ujts to 
 t>e had, ami tho hill aliovc; the tuniiel had a lu'ij,dit(if only KlO tVet. Here the work 
 was l)egiui at the top, the ne(UJssarv slopes were i/iveii to the eiitting, and the sid(!s 
 were partially revt'tted. for which pnrpuse S((.(l(l() luieUs were re(|iiired.'"* 
 
 What('\er has been destroyed ma\- have to hv, restored, and 
 the nature of the work to be done can tlicrclorc be inferu'd from 
 
 *Aiistriiin (iiiidefo Itailuays, Translated troni the ( icrnian hy l,ieul. .lessep. K. K. 
 
Ki:sT(>lv'ATI<i.\ ()!■ CONtMrNICAlloNS ( KA II.W AVS.) 
 
 179 
 
 M 
 
 i hlnwil 
 
 le Wdrk 
 ic si(l(!S 
 
 and 
 
 III) 111 
 
 tlie dt;inoliti()!i of coiniiiiinications. As regards the method of 
 doinj,' the work it will he, in j^^eneial, but an adaptaticjn of the 
 c:onstnictioii of connniinications, and in fact some restorations 
 ha\'e been incidentally considered under that head. 
 
 It is generally advisable to harlially re-establish the communi- 
 cation at once. Thus in crossing a river, boats or rafts can be 
 used until the l)ridge is completed.*' 
 
 From strategical considerations it will appear that the con- 
 struction, demolition and restoration of railways are most im- 
 portant duties, and from the foregoing it will be evident that con- 
 siderable technical skill and practice are recjuired for their due 
 fultihnent. Thus, it is that in the American war a cori)s of 10-, 
 000 men was organi;ied whose sole duty was the demolition and 
 restoration of railways, and that the Germans and other conti- 
 nental nations have set apart technical trcx^ps specially for this 
 purpose, t who are constantly kept practiced in their duties, as 
 will be gathered from the amount of work done by the German 
 railway regiment. 
 
 "In the tirat year of its existoniue, 1872, the battalion Cdnstructeil 100 miles of per- 
 manent crossings, one roadside station, enlarged four termini, restored two dyltes 
 deSitroyed by inundations, and a railway bridge at Itykgraben, near <ireifswald. In 
 1874 the battalion made tlie tunnel under the circular railway round Berlin." * * 
 In 187ti the battalion constructed a line from Berlin to Lossen, thirty mdes long, 
 and the whole management of the line is entrusted to the battalion. + 
 
 The work required to be done can be best seen from actual I'x- 
 amples, of which a few are therefore appended. 
 
 The following i,s an extract from (Jcneral McCallum's report : "(Juerillas and 
 raiding parties were more or less successful in destroying portions of track during tiie 
 whole time we held this line; but the crowning effort was made by the enemy in Oc- 
 tober, 18t)4, when Hood, getting to Slierman's rear, threw his whole army on the 
 road (first at Big Shanty, and afterwards north of Itesaca) and destroyod in the ag- 
 gregate 35.\ miles of track and 144 lineal feet of bri<lgtM. killing and capturing a large 
 numljer of our men. Fortunately, how'iver, the detachments of the construction 
 corp.s which escaped were so distril)uted, that even before Hood had left the road 
 two strong woi'king parties were at work, one on eai:li end of the break at Hig Shanty 
 and this gap often miles was closed, and the force ready to move to the great break 
 of twenty-tive miles in the length north of Kesaca, as .soon as the enemy had left it. 
 The (lestru(!tion by Hood's army of our depots of supplies compelled us to cut nearly 
 all the cross-trees rei|uired to relay this track and to send a distance for rails. The 
 cross-ties were cut near the line of the roail, and many of them carried by haml to 
 the track, as the train to be furnished for hauling them did not get t,) the work until 
 it was nearly completed. The rails used on the southern end of Vlie break had to lie 
 taken up and brought from the railroads south of Atalanta, and thosB from tin; north- 
 ern end were mostly brought from Nashville nearly two hundied miles distant. 
 
 Notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which the labour was performed the 
 twenty-tive miles of track were laid and the trains were running over it in seven and 
 a half days from the time the work was coimiieiiced." 
 
 * For further information on IJestoration of Hallways, see pg. '^~^\^ .'{.")8, \'ol. Ill, 
 H. \i. I. Occasional Papers. 
 
 fSiuce writing the above the 8th Co. H. H. has been organized as a railway com- 
 pany. 
 
 iThe Oerman Uailway Uegiment, Lieut. Kawson, U.K., \'ol. XIX., .Journal, 
 K.U.S.1. 
 
sammiimmimmmmmmmmmm 
 
 liiV' 
 
 
 iNo (oxsria ( ri()\ oi' ((immixk aiions (Mi:ss.\(;h;s.) 
 
 "Ill tlui l''i;uicn-( Icniiaii wjir of I.S7<l-71 <m tln' railway fnnii Mctz, l)y Tliioiivilli', 
 Mniitiiu'ili and Mc/icivs to I'iiris. tlie 1 rendi lili'w in tlio tiiiiiicl at Mdiitnimli at oacli 
 011(1 fur a length of 'M fuot, and 140 feet rcH])octively, and tilled the remaining space 
 in the eentro with locomotives, tincks, &e. "* 
 
 "On three Schitlkorn bridf^es of l'J4 feet Kpan on the Turnau-Kralupor railway, 
 the iron cross-girders were removed from a central sjian, after taking U]) the perma- 
 nent way, etc.. this was completed at each hridge l)y 14 men of the engineer troojjs, 
 besides railway lahonrc^rs, in three hours, wliile thetempoiary restoration cU'ected by 
 the I'russians, occupicil aliout three days on eaeii of these bridges." This occurred 
 in the cam])aign in Bohemia, of bS(>(). ' 
 
 The French in the campaign of I.S70-71 had (b>molished a railway masr)nry bridge 
 ov('r the Marne at Chalifort, and the (Jcrmans lestored it in the following manner : 
 "The ex[)losion had caused a gap of 8f» feet ; the scattered masonry had lilled up the 
 opening to suih an extent that the course of the stream was hindered, i'y stone- 
 ]>acking, witli the inter-stices tilled uii with rul)bish. a dam reaching H! feet above 
 the Wfiter level, was formed and there remained a height of .'50 ft. for the construction. 
 There were 11 trestles S' 4' apart from centre to centre. The cross-braci.igs were 
 secured with iron cramj)s, while strong nails only were used with the longitudinal 
 bracing. The corbc;! pieces were connected with the bearers by two screw bolts."* 
 
 *Austrian guide to railways, translated by Lieut." .Iessei>, U.K. 
 
 *: 
 
 !' 
 
 ' i 
 
 ri;i 
 
 11. 
 
 COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF 
 
 MESSAGES. 
 
 aONSTIiUCTloX. 
 
 The c.\istin<^ means of conveyinjj^ messaje^es can be classed as 
 follows. 
 
 1. Electric Telej^^raphs. 
 
 2. Signalling, 
 
 3. Balloons. 
 
 4. Carrier Pigeons. 
 
 5. Orderlies f mounted or otherwise.) 
 
 Further, when in the presence of the enemy, it is sometimes 
 necessary to establish elevated stations, to obtain information. 
 Such stations are called Field Observatories, arid their consider- 
 ation falls naturally in the present division of the subject. 
 
 ELECTRIC TELECRAl'II. 
 
 The subject of telegraphs is too extensive to enter into details, 
 and therefore a sketch only will be given. 
 
 Troops. — The work being of a very technical nature only highly 
 trained men should be employed. I'\)r this reason in England a 
 troop of the Royal Engineers (the C troop) has for its solo duty 
 
CnNSIKrc IIO.N n\' COMMrNICAlloNS (mI'.SSAC.I'S.) 
 
 t8i 
 
 the construction and workin;^- of lu'ld-ti'lc^^naplis, and dirtlici', 2 
 companies of the Ko\al ICnf^Miic'crs are at present eni|)loyed in the 
 Postal telej^uaphs, so as to be kept constantly in })ractice. 
 
 Coniniunication is estal)lishe(i by means of an electrical cur- 
 rent conducted by insulated wires conncctinj; the two or more 
 points between which messaj^'es are to be sent. Hy the use of 
 suitable apparatus this electrical current enables an operator at 
 one station t(3 produce sij^nis or sounds at the other, and thus to 
 transmit a tnessaf^'e. There are, therefore, three essential parts 
 to consider, namely. The line, the source of electricity, and the 
 sifrnallinj^ apparatus. 
 
 The line consists either of an iron or a copper wire insulated 
 in some way from the ground. The telegraph lines in the country 
 are to be utilized as far as possible, but failing,' these a military 
 line must be constructed. If sufficient time is available it is best 
 to put up a light aerial line, similar to those in ordinary use, but 
 for hasty operatit)ns an iiisitUited wire laid on the ground is most 
 suitable. In England the telegraph troop has wagons fitted with 
 rollers, from which the insulated wne can be laid on the ground 
 as the wagon proceeds, or if the ground is impassable the roll 
 can be placed on a specially constructed wheelbarrow. In 
 India the rolls of wire are placed on mules. A ground line can 
 follow troops on the march : the line so laid may only have a 
 temporary use, but if it is likely to be required for any length of 
 time it should be replaced as speedily as possible by an aerial 
 line. The experience in the late Afghan war points out that it is 
 difficult to keep a ground line over 35 miles long in working 
 order.* 
 
 When working the existing telegraph lines the batteries and 
 signalling apparatus in use on the line would be employed ; for a 
 description of the various kinds that might be met with, reference 
 is made to Ganot's Physics. Hut for the equipment of a Field 
 Telegraph some of the apparatus will require modification to 
 render it portable. The following is the apparatus in use in the 
 British service. 
 
 For battery a special pattern of Leclancht? cell is used. The 
 cells are made up into batteries of 10, and the equipment for 12 
 stations is 48 such batteries. 
 
 The signalling apparatus consists of two parts, namely, the 
 transmitting instrument and the receiving instrument. 
 
 The transmitting, or sending instrument, is simply a key, by 
 
 •Report of operations of tlie Field I elegrapli Train during the campaign in Afghan- 
 istan with the 1st Div. Peshawar Valley Field Force, 1878 79. By Major (Jeneral 
 Mannaell, R. K. ^I'e page 14.S, Vol. IV, R.K. 1., Occasional Papers. 
 
li'i 
 
 ■SIj \ 
 
 I' 
 
 
 li- 
 
 1S2 
 
 (ONSI KCC'I'loN Oh COMMINK'A llo.NS ( M l'.SSA( ; IvS. ) 
 
 rn<.-ans of which the circuit c;m he iniidc, or broken, ;it plcasuii'. 
 The rtjceivint; apparatus is anaii^^fed to work with the Morse 
 alphabet, and tliere are two patterns, the military Morse sounder, 
 in which the sif^ns are in(Ucated by a sound, and the niiUtary 
 Morse recorder, in which the sij^nis are marked on a paper ribl)on. 
 
 In adtUtion to the above instruments, apparatus is necessary 
 for tlie purposes of testinf^^ i:tc. 'I'his testing,', as well as other 
 work done in a telej^naph olHc-e, is, however, of too technical a 
 nature to be entered into here.* 
 
 With reference to military telej^naph lines Major Webber, K.E, 
 says: "A lij^dit telef,'ra{)h, carried on pack animals, and manned 
 by hi^^'hly trained soldiers, may, in the hands of a skilful j^^eneral 
 be worth more than a stronj^' brigade, yes, even than a division. 
 Such a tek'j^naph is now in use by the Spaniards, whose experi- 
 ence has tauf^dit them that wheeled vehicles are not adapted to 
 the work, and such ou;,dit, in my opinion, to be the telej^'raph of 
 an army : able to move without occupyinj^f the roads, carrying a 
 thor(jn<,ddy reliable lij^ht pole line constructed and worked by 
 men hij^ddy trained in time of peace to foresee all the accidents to 
 which telegraphs are liable. "t 
 
 SICNALLINC. 
 
 The transmission of messages by visual si^^mals would be sub- 
 stituted for the electric telegraph under the following circum- 
 stances. 
 
 1. When tliere is no time to lay down a telegraph line, or there 
 is no apparatus for the purpose. 
 
 2. When the stations are to be occupied for a short time only. 
 
 3. When the line wires would be liable to destruction by the 
 enemy, or otherwise. 
 
 Troops. — A certain percentage of men in the cavalry, engineers, 
 and infantry are trainerl as signallers in the Hritish service. 
 
 For method of workmg see Manual of army signalling! 
 
 *For fiirtlier iiifonuatiou on Telegraphs, see 
 IV. 1.% -US, Vol. IV, U.E.I. Occasional Papers. 
 Pg. B44— (557, ^'ol. XXIU, Journal li.U.vS.I. 
 
 tJournal R.U.S.I. Vol, .\XI1I. 
 
 *For further information on signalling see 
 Pg. 2.1»i '2-t8, Vol. XXIV., Journal, H. U.S.I. 
 Pg. t!l4 (W Vol. XXV., Journal, K.U.S.T. 
 Pg. .i:U r)4S, Vol XIX., Journal, K.U.S. I. (Heliograi)h). 
 Pg. 447, Vol. XXVL, Journal, K.U.S.l. (lleliograpli.) 
 
 li ;V 
 
m 
 1 
 
 CONSTRUCTION Ol' (OMMINKAITONS (mICSSAC.I.S.) iN^ 
 
 I'.AIJ.OONINO. 
 
 Balloons may be umployL'd in two diffiMi'nt ways. 
 
 1. To convey inessaj^es, as was done during,' the sic,t,'e of Paris. 
 
 2. To },'et an elevated station (that is an ohsi'ivaton ) to ob- 
 tain information, to be afterwards communicated by telej^naph. 
 telephone, or signals. 
 
 In the hrst case the balloons are free and move with the cur- 
 rents of air, and in the second they are captive. Tne use of 
 balloons for military purposes may be said to be still imperfectly 
 known, but already some important results have been ol)tained. 
 Until something,' definite is <^'ciicrcilly known, however, it would be 
 premature to enter into any details.* 
 
 CARRIER I'lCKONS. , 
 
 There are only a few special cases in which these birds can be 
 used, but these are often the very cases in which other means of 
 communication are unavailable. 
 
 These birds, if taken away from the place where they have been 
 reared, will, on being set free, even if two or three years have 
 elapsed, immediately endeavour to fly back, and as they have a 
 wonderful power of observation and are very strong on the wing, 
 they will, after some training, find their way home from places at 
 very considerable distances. Thus in the annual Belgian pigeon 
 matches, the birds are started from some town in the south of 
 France. 
 
 It will thus be seen that carrier pigeons can be utilized to carry 
 messages from any place to one particular place, namely, where 
 the pigeon was reared. To communicate from the outsiiie tt) a 
 completely invested fortress is a case in point. The (icrmans 
 and the I'Yench have organi;ied a pigeon service at each of their 
 important fortresses. I'or this purpose old birds are procured 
 and shut up in aviaries to breed, and when the young birds are 
 old enough they are trained to fly back to the fortress from short 
 distances, then from two or three miles, then from five or six, and 
 so on, and lastly from distances of \o, 40, 50, bo, or even 100 
 miles. If the fortress is besieged jo or 40 birds would be sent 
 away before complete investment, or even afterwards by means of 
 balloons. 
 
 During the siege of Paris in 1(871 a very large use was made of 
 carrier pigeons. The pigeons were taken out by means of 
 balloons, and they brought back desi)atches j)rinted, in the first 
 
 *See above, Pg. 147. 
 
1 84 
 
 UKMOI.ITION ()!• COMMUNICATIONS (MI-.SSACilCS.) 
 
 instance on very small pieces of paper, but afterwards by a pro- 
 cess called niicrophotoj^aaphy, when tiie dimensions of each de- 
 spatch were made so small that each pigeon c(juld have carried 
 300,000 of them, limited to 20 words each despatch. 
 
 As rej,'ards the rate of tlight, with good weather and a favour- 
 able wind it will api)roach 60 miles an hour for shcnt distances. 
 Pigeons have been known to fly 45 miles an hour f(jr eight hours 
 in succession ; of course the longer the distance the slower the 
 rate.* 
 
 FIELD OiiSKRVATOKIHS. 
 
 The use of field observatories has already been stated, and by 
 their means a more extended and scarchiWf^ view can be obtained 
 than the conHguration of the ground allows. See >j'^ 22 to 28, 
 PartV, I.M.E. 
 
 DEMOLITION OF COMMUNICATIONS FOli THE TRANSMISSION OF 
 
 MESSAGES. 
 
 Electric Telcf:;niphs. — The communication can be immediately 
 severed by cutting the wire, but to render the work of restoration 
 as difScult as possible, the wire should be cut in several places, 
 and if possible the poles (if the wire is thus carried) should be cut 
 down. Sir G. Wolseley recommends the following plan: Being 
 furnished before starting with some non-conducting wire having 
 the outward appearance of the ordinary wire in use, cut the 
 wire and unite it again by the non-conducting wire. * * * 
 It is advisable that a pole here and there should also be destroyed 
 and the wire cut, so that it should be supposed at fust that the 
 interruption simply resulted therefrom. 
 
 Tapping. — By connecting a receiving instrument to the wire 
 and to earth, a part of the current flowing through the wire will 
 pass through the receiving instrument, and any message that was 
 being sent can be received. It is to guard against this, amongst 
 other things, that messages are often sent in cypher. 
 
 RESTORATION OF THE CoMMUNICA TIONS FOR THE TRANSMISSION 
 
 OF MESSAdES. 
 
 Electric Telegraphs.— \i is of great importance that the fact that 
 a disconnection, or bad leak has occurred, in the circuit wires 
 should be speedily discovered. This can be done in two ways. 
 First, a continuous current can be kept flowing through the wires, 
 this current will be immediately stopped if a disconnection occurs 
 or will be considerably diminished by a bad leak, and this will 
 affect the galvanometers at each station. The secon 1 method is 
 
 *The iuforiiiiitioii for the above lias bueii deiived from a leiture hy W. B. 
 Tegetiiieier, F.Z.S., delivered at tlic H.E. Institute in 1877. 
 
a pio- 
 ch de- 
 :arried 
 
 favour- 
 tanccs. 
 t hours 
 vver the 
 
 and by 
 )btaine(l 
 2 to 28, 
 
 sioy OF 
 
 lediately 
 jtoration 
 1 places, 
 Id be cut 
 : Being 
 e havinj; 
 , cut the 
 
 lestroyed 
 that the 
 
 the wire 
 
 wire will 
 
 3 that was 
 
 amongst 
 
 ;SMISSI0N 
 
 e fact that 
 cuit wires 
 two ways. 
 I the wires, 
 :ion occurs 
 d this will 
 method is 
 
 ,.iu l.y W. B. 
 
 RFCSTOKATION ()\- COMMUNICATIONS (MKSSAGES.) 185 
 
 to send a signal at stated intervals along the line from the head- 
 qmirter office or accordnig to the technical expression the head 
 ofhce calls up- the other offices. If no answer is received a 
 taiilt must nave cnxurred. 
 
 The existunce of a fault having thus been -discovered line 
 men are sent out, taking with them testing apparatus and repair- 
 mg stores, to examme tlie line by eye, or by testing, if necessary, 
 and repair the disconnection, when found. 
 
('AMI' IMTIKS. 
 
 The selection of the sites and the arranf^emcnt of camps are 
 duties belonginj,' to the yuarter-master General's department. 
 The only (juestions to consider here are therefore the various 
 measures to be taken to provide water, cooking,' arran^'ements, 
 shelter for the troops and sanitary precautions. 
 
 Troops. — The more usual arrangements such as shelters, drain- 
 age, latrines, cooking arrangements, are undertaken by the troops 
 themselves aided by their Pioneers. Hut the more extensive 
 works such as hutting, boring for water, &c., would be performed 
 by the Engineers. 
 
 For the methods of doing the work, see Part V'., I.M.E., as 
 under. 
 
 Water supply, J^ 133—172. 
 
 Cooking arrangements — 
 
 Field kitchens, j5 ^7 — 90. 
 
 Field ovens, "^ 92 — 93. 
 
 Latrines, § 94. 
 
 Hutting and bivouacs, § 95 —130. 
 
 Bivouacs and shelters, vji 82 — 86. 
 
:aiiips are 
 partrnent. 
 le various 
 nj^'ements. 
 
 its, (Iraiii- 
 
 the troops 
 
 extensive 
 
 DerfonneH 
 
 M.E., as