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N»« 'Oft- ■*609 US* "JS -'6) *.P^ - 030fJ Phon» sag 'i-S) :88 - ^989 - foo If- h ■ i°'-- ^ 1 i'Ji^ i -ii! I" r!S,; 11 QIi|^ Kniu^ratty of AUtttPBOta STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIKN'CKS NUMBER 12 THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF SIMPLE MODES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE BY RUPERT CLENDON LODGE, M.A. Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Minnesota MINNEAPOLIS Bulletin of the University of Minnesota August 1918 Adti'-^iVi MUfflfctH Price: 75 Cents 3855 # RESEARCH PURLICATIOXS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA These publications contain tW results of research work from various depart- ments of the University an.l are (offered for exchange with universities, scientific societies, and other institution-.. Tapers will be published as separate monographs numbered in several series. Tliero is no stated interval of publication. Application for any of these publications should be made to the University Librarian. STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1. 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Kent, A Study of State Aid to Public Schools in Minnesota. 1918. Sl.OO. .,,,., • .1, 12. Rupert C. Lodge, The Meaning and Function of Simple Modes in the Philosophy of John Locke. I'M-.. $0.7.=;. , „ • , l.V Florence R. Curtis, The Libraries of the American State and National Institutions for Defectives, Dependents, and D-linquents. In press. STUDIES IN THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES AND MATHEMATICS 1. Frankforter and Frarv, Equilibria in Systems Containing Alcohols, Salts, and Water. 1912. S0.50 2. Frankiorter and Kritchevsky, a New Phase of Catalysis. 1914. S0.50. 1! (Continued inside back cover). oil;? XnltiFrBitg of flintvanta STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES NUMBER 12 THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF SIMPLE MODES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE BY RUPERT CLENDON LODGE. MA. Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Minnesota MINNEAPOLIS Bulletin of the University of Minnesota August 1918 Copyright 1918 BY THE University of Minm.sot i SL I i PREFACE Knthdlt nichts Ncues — variicrt nckanntcs. Such is Uie epitaph of five sixths of the monographs on Locke, and it is ahiiost a cominonplacc that nothing remains to be gleaned from that nuuh thrcshed-over field, his Erkcnntnisthcorie. And yet ... is this so very certain ' True, there is a heart-hrcaking sameness alniut most of the lih-rature; Locke is a (juasi- Kantian; "contingent-necessary," "empirical-rational"— such is the magic formula with which the critics (and their name is legion) would open the way to the treasure cave. But is the result Locke' Surely not. The present study is a concrete plea for a return to Locke himself. This docs not mean that we arc to deprive ourselves of the advantages of a more modern standpoint. It diK-s mean tl ' we are not to comr.it the psy- chologist's fallacy, and read our own selves into a writer for whom our two and seventy jarring sects arc still non-existent. Rupert Clundon Lodge University of Minnesota, May, 1917 ACCESSION NUMBEK I3S55 CONTENTS PAGES Introduction. The present state of knowledge concerning Locke's use of "simple modes" ~ Historical rgsumd: the views of Tagart. Webb, Hartenstein, Turbigho, von Bcnoit, Richl, Green, Manly, von Ilertling, Frascr, Martt- nak, Mcsscr, Freytag, Morse, Kayserling, Alexander, Wundt, Dathe, Ollion, Tongers, Kohler, Hartmann ■ • • 1-7 Classified summary of the above criticisms as concerning (a) the meaning, and (b) the function of simple modes ' The view-points of the above interpreters, and the standpoint of the present investigation Part I. The Meaning of Simple Modes Chapter I. Classified list of simple modes and preliminary examination 9-25 The problem and method of the present chapter 9-10 List of simple modes, (1) of number, (2) of duration, (3) of expansion, (4) of motion, (5) of power, (6) of thinking, (7) of pleasure and pain, (8) of matter ^°~^^ Preliminary examination of each of the above groups in turn, m order to discover (a) what is the simple idea in each group, and (b) in what sense Locke's examples in each group are to be regarded as "modes" of their respective simple ideas • 12-24 General conclusion on the basis of the above examination. Preliminary definition of simple mode as a (quantitatively or qualitatively) expanded or diminished idea of sensation or reflection. 24-25 Difficulties involved in the standpoint implied in the above conclusion, as necessitating further examination Chapter IL Simple modes and simple ideas • • 26-40 Classified list of terms used by Locke n^w as simple modes, now as simple ideas V '.' V ' Detailed examination of each of the terms in the above classified hst: (1) In the number group ^0 (2) In the duration group il_^i (3) In the expansion group (4) In the motion group (5) In the power group 7a_^8 (6) In the thinking group •f * •f ° (7) In the pleasure and pain group lolln (8) In the matter group ■ • ^'~*" General conclusion, on the basis of the above examination, as to the relation between simple idea and simple mode *" Chapter III. Simple modes and ideas of relation ■ ■ • • *'"'' Classified list of terms used by Locke now as simple modes, now as ideas of relation Detailed examin-ition of the terms in the above list: (1) In the number group 42I43 (2) In the duration group 43_44 (3) In the expansion group (4) In the motion group vi CONTENTS (5) In the power firou]) 44-45 (6) In the tbinkinR group 45-46 (7) In tlie i>leasure and pain Rrnup •*'' (8) In the matter jiToup 46-47 General eonehision, on the basis of the ahove examination, as to the ilis- tinetion Iietween the modal and the reUilional view-point 47-48 Comparison with the htcrature 48-49 Chapter IV. Modes and substances. The meaning of simple modes 50-56 Sini]ile modes and mixed modes 3(1-3- Modes and substances 52-54 The position of simple modes in Locke's system: (a) Starting from the simple idea 34-53 (b) Starting from the eonce))! of substances • 33-36 Conclusion as to the meaning of simple nindcs 56 Part II. The Function of Simple Modes Chapter V. Locke's theory fjf knowledge— the function of simple moiles 57-71 The meaning of knowledge, especially as dependt r' .n simjile mo'les 57 The problem of interpretation ■■" ' "'•'^''^ Interpretation in the literature: (ai Idc:ilistic ?^-'>'^ (bj Re:distic <'"-"' Locke's own view — the function of mind: (a) In sense-experience 61 -6_ (b) In c.bstraction '^- Thc knowledge-value of simple i^ The meaning of "\vorkm;inship of the mind" 6/-69 The "arliitrarincss" of simple moclcs <'''"' 1 Summary — the validity (if modal knowledge 'I Conclusion — the function of simple modes '1 Conclusion 1"~1 (a) Specific — -lilution of the problems in the literature 7J-7,? (b) General — Locke's pliilosophical position ' ■' Appendix. Locke's use of the term "suggestion" (4-SO The interpretation of this term in the literature: Webb, Manly, Curtis, von Hertling, Kohlcr, OUion, Fraser 74-76 Summary (.f the interpretation in the literature 'f' Locke himself — method of investigation 76-77 List of terms referred to as "suggested" "^ Examinati'm of these terms: (a) Simple ideas / /-/9 (b) Complex ideas '^ Conclusion— the meaning of the term "suggestion" SO THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF SIMPLE MODES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE INTRODUCTION THE PRESENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES The meaning of the term "simple mode" in the philosophy of Locke has been fell as a difiiculty by all Locke students. Leibniz' made many characteristic su^'Rcslions which, if adopted, would involve radical altera- tions in the whole Essay; and even in the modem era of sympathetic interpretation the concept has always been considered unsatisfactory. Ta^'art= feels this unsatisfactorincss in regard to both simple and mixed modes, but perhaps more especially in the case of mixed modes. The terms seem to him to be obsolete, a reminiscence of the jargon of the schools from which Locke has not been able wholly to emancipate himself; difhcult to understand, and without anv corresponding advantaj:e, they are to be regarded as defects in his work. Webb,^ on the other hand, emphasises peculiarities of the simple modes only; to him these appear to involve the admission bv Locke of an a priori element of thought, a suggestion of intel- lect occasioned by an "innate impotence of thought," as well as the uni- versally recognised creation of modes by the mind in composition. To ^Yebb himself this does not appear unsatisfactory, but as it is emphasised by him as a case of "intellectuahsm," his view is tantamount to a state- ment that the simple modes have been seriously misunderstood by all who have not interpreted Locke as an "intellectualist"— in other words, that they have furnished difTieulties too great for almost all writers on Locke up to the time of Webb. Ilartenstein,^ who has no such paradoxical thesis to maintain, though he too lavs stress on the intellectual elements in Locke's philosophy, insists that the conception of modes is indeterminate and vacillating to a degree: the examples do not agree with the definitions, and the distinction drawn between modes and relations is not carried through. Turbigiio,^ who is interested in constructing a priori the empirical philosophy of Locke, notes particulariv that the modes are ideal constructions not arising from experience, and "that consequently all knowledge based on them has a • See espic'illy Nouteaux Essais, ed. Gcrhardt. 5:146 (f . t Lacke-s ■ufilinas and philowphy . . . London. 1855. pp. 401, 40-41 note. • Thf inlelledualism of Locke. Dublin and London. 1857. esp. p. 90. tLockt-sLehrevondermeKscUichenErkennlniss... Leipzig. 1861. pp. 135, 136. 141. • Analisi storica delle filosofie di C. Locke . . . Torino. 1867. pp. 6, 8, 89. RUPERT CLENDOS LODGE merely ideal signification, a value which is hypothetical and relative when we attempt to apply it to the actual world of sense-experience. That Locke should have relegated scientific knowledge in the strict sense to precisely this field, is rci^'ardcd as a serious error.' Von Benoit,' like Hartenstcin, whom to some extent he follows, lays stress on the rationalist elements in Locke's thought. After indicating the Mideterminatc and ambiguous character of the conception of simple modes by showing that many instances are elsewhere treated as simple ideas, while others again are regarded as relations,' he lays especial emphasis upon their ideal nature. As the free creations of thought in accordance with its own laws, the laws of pure logic, they transcend experience, and von Hcnoit, while himself doing full justice to the validity of mathematics and ethics, is astonished that Locke should attempt to attribute to them real as well as nominal essences.' Riehl'" carries this idealistic interpre- tation even further, and argues that Locke's view leads up to and requires a specifically Kantian solution of the problems which his method raises but can not solve. Thus mathematics is seen to depend throughout on construction, and infinity is treated as a product of mental synthesis rather than as the outcome of empirical sense-perception. In a word, L jcke's correct recognition of the synthetic nature of thought is too subjective, too introspective, to do more than call for an objective, "critical" solution, such as is furnished by Kant. Green" finds an impasse in the account of simple modes; it seems to him a hopeless contradiction that Locke should maintain, on the one hand, that modes, as complex ideas, are the mere workmanship of the mind, and on the other, that the simple ideas, of which they are "modifications," are taken from the things themselves. It appears to Green, either that modes are subjective constructions, in which case they can not be "found in things existing," or else that they have objective signification, in which case they can not be the incrc workmanship of the mind. He discovers a further a porta in the relation of simple ideas to the simple modes: if this is, as Locke states, a substancc-afl[ection relation, then the simple ideas are being re- garded as substances, i.e., as complex ideas: so that there is a conflict be- tween Locke's actual treatment of modes, as modifications of substance- ideas which are complex, and his express statements, that they are modi- fication of ideas which are definitively simple. Manly," following up a 'Amilisi slorica dette fitosofie di G. Locke. 57-58. 59. 63. ^ Darslelluna der Lockt'schin ErkennlnissUhrt . . . Bern. 1869. p. 81. Cf. Hartenstcin, o*. HI. 222, 251-52. • Von Benoit, op. cit. 19, 20, 22, 24. • Ibid. il. 25-26. .15-36. 38, 41. 45-46, 52. 79; cf. p. 28. " Der philosofhische Khiirismus. Leipzig. 1876. pp. 36. 48, 56, 58. Cf. W. Wundt. Loeik, 3e Auflate. Stvrttgart. 1907. 2:121. i^ Gfneral introduclion to Hume's Treatise, new ed. 1878. l:sec. 33. pp. 26-27. " C'ontradtcUons tn Locke's theory of knowledge. Leipzig. 1885. p. z. ^-■'■i^^ LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES suggestion o£ Cousin's, but without himself adopting any philosophical position, similarly discovers a number of "contradictions" in Locke's work. Among these "contradictions," particularly good examples for Manly's thesis appear to be furnished by the modes, both simple and mixed. Most of the cases are found to center around the distinction of simple and mixed modes," of simple modes and simple ideas,'* and of modes and relations." Incidentally, many instances of simple modes are criticised as "contradicting" their definition." Curtis" is interested especially in the idealistic interpretation of Locke's thought, and regards the idea of power less as a simple mode and more as a simple id^.. .reated by intellect, and not furnished by sensation and reflection, i: , too, of time and space, right and wrong. In the case of mixed modes especially, he attempts to show that they are combined by Locke not merely analytically, but also synthetically, and argues that it is only by such synthesis that a constructive science of piare ethics can be called into being.'* Von Hertling" points out two tendencies, an empiri- cal and a rational, running through Locke's work. From the empirical standpoint, the activity of mind in forming the various complex ideas is restricted to a purely mechanical combination and separation of unalter- able elements. That is to say, while the mental construction itself may be purely arbitrary, as in the case of mixed modes especially,** all that is objectively present is the elements themselves, which are in themselves isolated, and remain so, whatever relations we subjectively read into them. From this view-point even the simple modes used in mathematical science are treated as if they were mixed modes." Hence arises the problem as to how such subjective constructions can give us objective, scientific knowledge. Von Hertling decides that the problem in the case of both simple and mixed modes is strictly insoluble, so long as Locke emphasises the com.plete freedom and arbitrariness of mental construction." However, in Book IV of the Essay especially, though also in the other books, we meet with a very different line of thought: the ideas are no longer separate ' elements, susceptible of merely mechanical combination; they stand in '• Ibid. 52-53. '*i:>d. 47-40.51-53,58 u Ibid. 46-47. "Ibid. 46, SO, 51-53. Cf. Leibniz, Souv. Ess., ed. Gerhardt. 5:240a. " Locke's eihical philosophy. Leipzig. 1890. pp. 36-37. Cf. Noah Porter. Human inttllttt. 4th ed. p. 521. '• Locke's eihical phihsophy. pji. 69-74; most of the arguments apply also to simple modes and the construction of a synthetic science of mathematics. '• John Locke u. d. Schule v. Cambridge. Freiburg. 1892. csp. pp. 9, 12, 17. >^ Ibid. 21; the argument applies also to simple modes. n IhiJ. 23-26. «• Ibid. 27-30. Cf. 241-42. RUPERT CLESDOS LODGE certain rein lions to one another, and wc intuitively perceive these objective relations whenever we choose to compare the ideas. Aecordinj; to this line of thouRhl, only our decision to compare or not to compare is arbitrary; apprehension of the relation as it is objectively, follows of necessity, and advance in scientific knowlcdj.;c consists in discoverinj.; and systematising l)recisely such relations.'-'' These two lines of thought are never satis- factorily united by Locke.'-* Frascr"' is interested in showing that Locke's logical analysis of con- sciousness docs not sufliciently take into account intellectual and rational cknients. In fad, many of the simple modes are "intellectual suggestions," and can only receive inadequate treatment from Locke's point of view. As compareci with simple ideas, which ire minima scnsibilia,-'' the simple modes are composites produced by "enlarging";" some of them resemble simi^le ideas in many ways, but certain instances obstinately refuse to agree with t'lis statement.^' As compared with "things," Fraser regards them as ideas of the manner of operation of things, or as qualities con- sidered in abstraction from substance."-* Modes and things arc bolli alike ciuality-complexes: the dilTcrencc consists in the absence or presence of a connection with the idea of a supjjorting "something"; in fact, where sueh a connection is present, abstracted modes are transformed into concrete thinj.s.'''" From tlic point of view of the knowledge which they furnish, Fraser regards the modes on the one hand, as giving us merely abstract and ^•c^bal knowledge, in accordance with Locke's "analytical" method, though on the other, perhaps they may give us knowledge of certain special relations.^' Martinak'- is tho first to face the diOicultics connected with the concept of simple modes by attempting to classify the chief instances mentioned by Locke. He divides them into simple modes (1) of primary qualities, (2) of secondary qualities, (.,?) of ideas of reflection, and (4) of ideas of both sensation and reilection. Each of these classes is further divided in accord- ance with indications in the Essay. In regard especially to mixed modes, Martinak insists that they may be derived from experience, and arc not " John Ix)cke u. d. Schulc v. Camb-iJge. 62-73. Of. 8,!. S7-88, 214. 239-41. " Ibid. 87-«8. Cf. 92-93. 241-42. 273. CI. also Wunrlt, op. (it. 120-21. '^I.ocke. London. 1890. pp. 122-27. Ed. o! ILssa- . Oxford. 1894. I pp. 253. 255, 264. 283. 308. 31 1 ; cf. II 236 n.4. 387, notes. " Ed. of lissay. I pp. 265. 293. otc. notes. 5" IbiJ. I p. 20.i. See also infra, appendix. " Ed. of Essay. II p. 42.. cf. Locke, Essay. Ill iv. 17. p. 42. " Ed. of Essay. II p. 401'. cf. I p. 215. notes. »o Ibid. I p. 422. »' Ibid. I pp. 232-34. notes. 236 n. 4. II 373 n. 2. cf. p. 346. and I p. 218. notes. " Dii Logik John Locke's. Halle. 1894. pp. 8-10. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES necessarily arbitrary," Vjut he finds a number of special aporiae arising out of his comparative study. Thus "mode" is, he believes, used (1) as acci- dent, (2) as modification or variety. (3) as combination— a threefold sense which is responsible for much confusion. Hence arises the difficulty as to whether certain ideas arc simple ideas or simple modes, and also the jjcncrally reco},'niscd vacillation between sim]ile modes and relations in other cases." Martin.ik docs not appear to feel Hertlinj^'s problem as to how objective science could rest urion such subjective creations." Messer'" indicates very fnrcil'ly the unsatisfactoriness of Locke's position in rej^ard to simple ideas and simple modes, and believes that he to some extent takes Ijack his earlier statement as to tlie arbitrariness of simple modes: to some extent they are after all received passively, just as simple ideas are. Locke is blamed for bein^' inexact, and Mcsser concludes that such a concept as "ixnver," while being dealt with amon;.; the simple modes, is actually rej^'arded as a simple idea received passively by the mind. Freytag" emphasises the absence f)f a sharji line of demarcation between sim- ple ideas and simiile modes, especially in the ease of succession and power. Morse''' finds that simple-eom])lcx. clear-confused, adeciuale-inade- ciuatc. are not really attributes of the iilea considered as an independent psychological "thing," and further, that if we use these term.s strictly with one identical meaning, we can not say that ideas of substances are less adequate or clear, etc., than arc modes or even simple iccas. — i.e., that simple ideas, modes, and substances, considered as ideas, are all equally and in the same sense adequate or inadequate, clear or confused : the sense being, so far as these terms are taken to signify functions of ideas in judging. Kavscrling'" lays stress on the "contradiction" that simple modes arc, on the one hand, distinguished from simple ideas, while on the other, certain of the instances of simple ideas coincide with instances of simple modes; thus, pleasure, pain, and power are in fact simple presentations, taken in passively, as "given." by the mind. Kayserling appears partly at times by direct reference, partly, as here, by internal evidence, to be influenced by Mcsser. Riehl,'"' in the second edition of his main work, regards the term "mode" as used in an extremely wide and indeterminate sense; it seems to him to "Ibid. 11. M Ibid. 49-50. » Ibid. esp. 79. "Die Bthandlung dts FreiheilsprobUms bet John Locke. Archie f. Cesch. d. Philosophie. 1897-1898. rp. 411-13. " Die Substamenlehre Lockes. Halle. 1898. p. 20. « Ueber den Widerspruch im Wahrheilsbegriff in Lockes Erkennlnislehre. Jena. 1904. pp. 27-36. Cf. A. W. Moore. The functional rersus the representational theories of knoKledge in Locke's Essay. Chicago. 1902. pp. 27ff. and 45. " Die Willenstheorie bet John Locke . . . Leipzig. 1907. esp. p. 17. «« Riehl, op. cit.. 2e Auflage. Leipzig. 1908. p. 50. Cf. Benno Erdmann, Logik, 2c Auflage. Halle a.S. 1907. pp. 100-1. 6 RUPERT CLEXDON LODGE cover cvcrythinR except simple ideas, and ideas of substances and rela- tions. Alexander" points out the peculiar situation which arises from modes bein{,', on the one hand, mere ailections, mere creatures of the mind, and being, on the other hand, applicaV)le, in mathematics and ethics, alao to sensible reality. In mathematics and ethics, he ur^^es, they are treated, not as mere affections, but as real in their own ri^ht, "floated off into an atmosphere of their own," in which they constrain us to think about them in various ways, much as if they were sensible objects; and this, not because Locke supposes them to correspond to anything in the nature of mind, but because they are triangles, circlet;, or moral ideas. On the one h .nd, they have no actual existence, and yet they have a reality of their own and arc exemplified in the world of actual existence. Dathc," in dealing with the ideas from a logical point of view, finds "absolutely unintelligible" Locke's regarding as simple such ideas as space, figu.es, rest, and motion, on the one hand, and pleasure, pain, existence, unity, jjower, and time, on the other. He points out that Locke himself subsequently treats space, extension, infinity, the varieties of motion, of the senses, and of thought, i.e., pleasure, pain, and power, as simple modes. From the epistemological standpoint, he finds it strange that Locke should regard such a proposition as "a harpy is not a centaur" as on a different level from the propositions of mathematics and ethics: for these also deal with fictitious mental creations, and in fact it is hard to see how such subjective constructions could have objective validity in the world of sense-experience.*' Ollion** cautions us against attributing to Locke's terms any signi- fication other than that suggested by simple observation. On the one hand, following Martinak, he treats the conception of simple modes as ambiguous: — (1) some modes correspond to the definition: these belong to the logical category of "accidents"; (2) others are combinations of simple ideas, as we see in the case of numbers: these are not accidents, unless perhaps number is to be understood as an attribute of physical objects; (3) others again are modifications of a single simple idea: e.g., the simple modes of color and motion.** On the other hand, he urges that Locke is here speaking conformably to popular notions, i.e., in accordance with "simple observation," and not as a strict scientist. OUion is thus able to account for ambiguities in detail, e.g., as to whether a given in- stance is a mode (popular sense) or a relation (scientific), and even goes so far as to treat the distinction between simple ideas and simple modes as u Loikt. London. 1908. esp. p. 61. " Dir Erkrnnlnistthre Lockti. . . Dresden. 1909. pp. 15, 17. »lbiJ. 31, 54. " La philosophic glnlralt dt John Locke. Pari«. 1909. pp. 168-69. " Ibid. 288, ct. Martinak, op. cit. 49-50. >/ LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES » popular only. From a strictly scientific view-point, he insists, the ca,te- gory of relation would seem to swallow up the other two.«« The question as to the objective validity of moral judgments he tries to solve by sug- gesting that their composition, which is derived, not from experience but from our minds, depends on a fact superior to experience, viz., our true nature as ethical beings." The distinction between idea as representation and idea as concept is appealed to in order to solve such problems as the treatment by Locke of one and the same idea, now as simple, now as com- plex," and also certain questions connected with infinity." Locke's philosophy is interpreted throughout as "critical" idealism.** Tongers" shows that the objectivity of modal knowledge rests upon the nature of the ideas themselves, so far as these ideas can b^ seen to fit into an a priori system. This ideal system, however, is not epistemo- logical, but ontological. and is naively presupposed by Locke. K6hler»* emphasises the remarkable treatment accorded to the idea of power, which is at times regarded as a simple idea, at other times as a simple mode; he insists upon the ideal nature of the simple modes of space and duration, as mental constructions," and on the question of objectivity, points out that Locke paves the way to a modem view of thought as simple intuition of relations subsisting between the elements of the thinkable." Summary The chief difficulties experienced in modem interpretative criticism, as exemplified in the above historical sketch, fall into two main groups. To the first group belong all questions concerning the meaning of the conception;— whether the term is ambiguous, whether the instance;! given square with the definition or not, whether some simple modes are also simple ideas or relations, and whether some instances are treated as if they were "mixed" modes. In the second group may be placed all questions concerning the epistemological function of simple modes. These are of two kinds:— (1) as to whether modal knowledge is synthetical, or merely analytical, and (2) as to how any manipulation of merely subjective con- structions can be supposed to give us objectively valid knowledge. A study of these difficulties experienced by the critics is complicated by the difference of standpoint among the critics themselves: some of • Ihid. 200-1, n., cf. 235. n. " Ibid. 221 «nd 211, where "power" b limilarly treated. • Ibid. 227, 233. • Ibid. 238-39, n.2. c(. ftlao 465, 471. -Ibid. 471. " Lockes WirUichktitsbtpiff. Halle. 1910. pp. 23-28, 38-44. 51-52, 58-59. nDitAklitittUdernunsMichenSiiUbii Locke. Borsdorf— Leiptig. 1913. pp. 36-37. " Ibid. 40. •» Ihid. 55. 75-76, cf . Wernicke. VitrUhahrssckrift f. wisstiisch. Pkil. 1882. p. 106. S RUPERT CLESDON LODGE thcni regard Locke as a sensualist,"' or as a pure empiricist ;** others as a realist;" many as an idealist," and, since Drobisch, not a few of them are more specific, and proclaim him a "critical" idealist." These radical dilTerenccs of interi)retation say mueh for the endurinj; vitality and sugges- tivencss of Lock,."'s work. Hut the conclusion can hardly be avoided that he is at the same lime all and none of these: and an attentive and unbiased reading confirms the conclusion. In Locke's writings empiricism and realism, sensualism and idealism, psychologism and "criticism," are all held in solution; ;ind if we wish to be just to Locke himself, instead of critically nconst meting his work from some special stand[)oint, we shall not bc^in by selecting one or even two'" of his many-sided tendencies as all-important, but shall try lo deal with him as he is: a philosophic enquirer after truth, rather than a representative of any one particular school." He has himself indicated the spirit in which he should be studied: — "First, I endeavor to understand the words and jihrases . . ., i.e., to form the idi'as they stand for; and if there be any exi)rcssion which . . . seems to have a pectdiar meaning, that idea also I endeavor to form in my mind, by comparing the author with himself, and ol)serving the design of his dis- course, so that, as far as 1 can, by a sincire endeavor, I may liave the same ideas in every place when I read tin- words, which the author had when he writ them."'"- It is in this s])iril tlial the following pages are devoted to investigating the meaning and function of simple modes in his philosophy. •» Cousin. •• Turbinlio. " Mcssir, Tonncrs. •• IlartiTstcin, von Btnoit, Wilili. '• Richl. D.ilhc, Ollion. II. G. Hurtin;inn rctj.iril-; I.ncke us Ji "fonstructivi- relativist." '" .\i vr.n Hcrlling and WiinJt do. •' Cf. Locke's attitude to "parties." pa^sintt c^p. letter to Molyiicux, March 30, 1696. Works (Lon- don, I X-'.t). IX |>. ,f7«. "Works. IV pp. 311-42. CHAPTER I CLASSIFIED LIST AND PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION In Locke's use of latiRuaKC, "mode" and "modification" appear to be used intcrchan^jcably. One and the same idea is said to "be modified" or to "have modifications in it" indifferently, and the terms "modification," "mode," and in some cases "de^'rec," arc applied in the same sense to the same instances.* Th'- problem before us in the present chapter on the meaninK of simi)le modes is thus (1) to present a complete list of the terms rccoRnized by Locke as simple modes, modifications, or, in some cases, decrees; (2) to examine briefly the instances in question in order (3) to frame a tentative conclusion as to the meanin>j of the concept for Locke. For this purpose, the relevant material is drawn primarily from the Essay, particularly from the second and fourth books, and secondarily from the Stillinjiflcet controversy and Conduct of Understanding, and also from cer- tain other minor writings, of which some are published in Locke's Works, while others are found in the journals and miscellaneous i)apers in the biography by Lord King. The material from these minor sources can only be used to supplement material drawn from the Essay. In presenting such a list of simple modifications, it seems advisable to adopt, at least provisionally, some plan of classification. With this view we might select some fundainenium divisionis not contradictory' to the spirit of Locke's thought, and useful as a means of introtlucing order and clearness into the considerable amount of material.' But perhaps it 's less arbitrary, and no less clear, to adopt the hints scattered through Essay, which seem to indicate the way in which Locke himself may h ; felt about the simple modes from the point of view of furnishing a com- plete list. There appear in fact to be two bases for possible classification of which he is more or less cleariy aware. On the one hand, he tends to I Of. n xix I, V- 2««: "variety of modijicalinns in thinkinR." the chapter being entitled "of the modtt of thinking." Cf. also "thinking ■.■! ... modifitd" (11 xxii 10, p. .(87). In il iviii 2. p. 294, to roll, ilide, etc.. are siioke.i of as 'modificalions of motion." while the section-heading reads "simple modes of motion." Cf. also II xviii 6, 7. pp. 29,S, 2Q7; xxii 1 1, p. 388; xxiii 30, pp. 416-17, etc. In the caie of "modi- lioations of matter" (the primary qualities) these, while not strictly in pari mattrii. are also definitely referred to as "modes" in the Stillingfleet controversy. They are therefore added to our list in this chapter. t Martinak (Die Lonik Lockes, p. 10) classifies simple modes as (1) derived from timple ideii of primary qualitii-3 (space, duration, number, motion). (2) derived from simple idcr» of secondary qualities (sound, color, smell, and taste). (3) derived from reflection (modes of thinking), (4) derived from simple ideas of both sensation and reflection (pleasure, pain, power). This classification appears to be arbitrary, and ii inconsistent not only with the general indications of Locke's view mentioned below (in the text), but abo to express detailed statements of Locke. Thus, for Locke, secondary qualities (2) are modification* of primary qualities, and should thus be classed under (I); primary qualities (I) are derived from both sensation and reflection, and should thus be classed under (4); "anger" and "envy" are mixed, not simple, modes of pleasure, and "fearing" and "hoping" are regarded by Locke, not only as modes of pleasure- pain, but also explicitly as modes of thinking (3). There are also serious omissions. Cf. with bis list, II xxiii 5, p. 395, xxiii .'0, p. 417. 10 RUPERT CLENDON LODGE rfjjnrd simple nKxlcs as (a) "collective." i.e., as "varieties" arising from the priKCss of aililint; a simple idea to itself.' and (b) as "dcRrecs" of some simple idea, as for example satisfaction and happiness represent different denrccs of pleasure.* At other times he apjx-ars to think of the classes of simple modes in terms of the simple ideas of which there arc very many reco^;nisal)lc modificatiims. as number, duration, expansion (including fiRure), motion, power, thinking.* For the purpose of preliminary classi- fication, it seems preferable to attempt to carry out this second hint of Locke's. It can not be carried through i)crfectly, but is at least thoroughly Lockian. even in its imperfection.' We shall therefore proceed to classify all simple modes, as far as possible, under the headings (1) simple modes of number, (2) simple modes of duration, (3) simple modes of expansion, (4) simple modes of motion, (5) simple modes of power, (6) simple modes of thinking, and shall then add two further groups. (7) simple modes of pleasure and pain, and («) simple modes of matter. The instances in the last K^'UP appear to Ic at least partly anomalous, but there is sufficient authority for including them at the present btagc. 1. i>mple vwdis oj tiuniber. Number, numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 20, 90, 91, 100, 144, 20O, 1,000. 9.000, 1,000.000, etc.). fractions {H, K. etc.). finite, infinite.' 2. Simple modes of dtiralion. Measures or lengths of duration (seconds, minutes, hours, days, years, ages), time, finite duratijn, eternity or infinite duration.* 3. Simple modes of expansion. Distances, measures or lengths of expan- sion (inch. foot, pace, cubit, yard, span, perch, furlong, mile, parasang, square feet, cubic feet), superficies, figure, lines, diagonal, radius, corners, angles, triangle, rectangle, square, round, circle, arc of circle, circumference, center of circle, oval, ellipse, conic sections, cube, chiliacdron, globe, place, space, finite expansion, immensity or infinite expansion.' • 11 xvi 5. vv 27t?J: ixiv 2. p. 424. •II vii 2. p. 161; xviii 6, p. 295. • II xiii 5, p. 221; xvii 6. 22. pp. 280-81. 293: xviii 6. p. 298; xxil 10. pp. 386-87. • II XV Q, p. 265. note (liictatcd to Co«e); Noux (icvonx asjortcr Its choxei le mieuxqu* nous pouvoni, docl'inae rauta. mais, aprps tout, il ie trouvcra louiouri quantity de choscs qui ne pourront pax »'«juiter exactement avcc noj conceptions et nos fa?oni df parlcr. I.ocke is he« dealing with the question whether ipacc is to be classed an a simple idea; his answer, according to Manly (Coiilradicliom in Locke's thtoty d kn'Mltdn, p. 47), shows that it is a simple mode. ' IV xxi 2. p. 461. cf. Jour. 1676. King 1:123. Numbers: 11 xii 5, p. 2IS; xvi S, pp. 271-72; xxir 1. p. 424. Fracticns: II xvii 18, p. 290. Finite and infinite: II xvii 1. 12, pp. 276, 285. • II xiv 1, .U, 37. pp. 238. 2.S2-53, 2,^5; xv 1, 3. 9, pp. 258. 259. 266; xvii 6. 15. 20. pp. 280. 286. 291. Time: II xiv 1. 31. pp. li». 255-56; xv 5, p. 271. Finite and infinite duration: II xiv 30. p. 255; xvi 8, p. 274; xvii 2, p. 277. • II xiii 4. p. 220; XV 1, 9. PP 258, 266; xvii 18, p. 290; IV v 6, p. 247; cf. Jour. 1678, Kinn 2:182-85. Foot . . . : II xi 6. p. 205; xiv 21. p. 251; xv 2, p. 258; xvii 19, p. 283; cf- Jour. 1678, King 2:177. Superficies . . : II xiii 5. 0, pp. 2JI-22: xxxi 2, p. 503; IV xxi 2. p. 161. Lines . . : V iv 9, p. 234. V 6. p. 247; WorVs IV p. 232; Cndu,! nf U. sec. 9. (ed. St. John) p. 49; cf. Jour. 1681, Kinj! 1:226-27; Tri.inKle: II xii 4, p. 215; x.iv 6, p. 429; III iii 18. pp. 28-29; ix 19, p- 118; cf. Ex. MaUbr. sec. 47, (ed. St. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 11 4. Simple ttioJei of ntolioH. Slide, roll, tumble, wnlk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, etc.'" 5. Simple modes of pouvr. 6. Simple modes of thinking. Sensation, rcnicmhorinR, rcrnllcctinK, im- agininj;, reverie, drcaniinR, ecstasy, intiiition or study (with ilt'!.;rres of attention), contemplation, apprehendinK, coniprehendinj;. discerning', pcr- ceivinf;, conceiving, judfjinj;, reasonin>:, thinking, k' owin^;, believing (faith), adllerin^;, deforces of assent, instilling-, preUrrink', cluKJsin^', \villin^;, ordering;, directing;, eoniniantlin^', doubting', conjecture, iiucv,s, wavering, diiilrust, disbelief, fearing;, hoI)in^;, disnusl, disturbance, tranfjuillity. 'in these should perli.'ios be added: — sagacity, illation, ckiiiunslration, intu- ition, probable reasoninjj." 7. Simple modes of pleasure and pain. Satisfaction, delif;ht, pleasure, happiness, infinite hapi)incss; uneasiness, trouble, pain, tonnent, ani;ui.s!i, misery, etc. ; the passions (love, hatred, desire [with its de^irees, such as velleity], joy, sorrow, hope, fear, despair, shame); more simple modes (pleasures of catin."; and drinking, of music, of rational conversation wiih a friend, of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth; jiain of hunger and thirst, of teeth set on edge, pain from captious unin- structivc wranRlinn)." 8. Simple modes of matter (anomalous?). Primary qualities (extension, figure, bulk, solidity, texture or cohesion of parts, motion, rest), secondary and tertiary qualities, dej;recs of secondary qualities (dej;rees of whiteness, sweetness, lifiht; shades of co'or modifications of sovmd such as words, tones, tunes; all compounded ta s and compounded smells)." These eight i;rou])S contain i. complete list of the instances of simple modes actually mentioned as such or necessarily implied by the context to be such, in the writing's of Locke. The instances niven do not represent u complete list of simple modes, i.e., of all terms actually so used by men, and there is, in the nature of the case, no means of furnishing a list of all the possible modifications of simple ideas; but it is reasonable to expect that an examination of all the instances actually furnished by Locke should John) p. 450; cf. Ja«r. KinK 1:224. Rectangle. . . : 11 xi« 2. p. 2"J9; IV i p IftO; iv 1. 6. 8, pp. 227. 231. 2,U. Round . . . : II xxiii 6, pp. .196-07; III iii I'), n. 30; IV v 4. p. 245; xvii 14. p. 4il7;cf. R«/««. Norris see. 4. (ed. St. John) p. 462. Oval . . . : III in I ». p. 2S; II ^xix IJ. p. 4').f; xxii 11. p. 511; cf. yoKf. 1677, Kind 2:176. Place . . . II xiii 10. p. 225; xv S. 9, pp. 2ol. 266. Finite cxpaniion . . .: II xvi «, p. 274; xvii 2. 3, 15. pp. 277-78. 286-87. i» II xviii 2, p. 294; xxi 17. p. 322. " II i 20. p. 139; vi 1. p. 11'»; xix 1-2. pp. 2')«-<>9; xxi 5. l.s. 17. pp. 313. 320-22; xxiil 30. p. 417; III i 5. p. 5; IV xvi 9. p. 377; xvii 2, 15, pp. .1.H0-H7. 407-S; LJut. sees. .14, 44. 78; Works IV pp. 32 3.1. " II vii 2. p. 161; xxiii 33, p. 418; III vi 11, p. 66. Pas.ions: II xx passim. More simple moucs: II XX 18. p. 307. i« II xxiii 3, pp. 393-94: xxxi 2. p. 503; IV vi 14, p. 264; Workl IV p. 29; cf. .Va(. Phil. sec. xi. (fd. St. John) p. 492; t.t. MuUbr. sue 10. p. 4'l. S.con Urv. >tc.. quilitits: II viii /'.iswm. csp. sees. 23-24. p. 179; xxiii30.pp.416-t7; xxi3. 75.pp. .fl011.373;cf. .Vu(. ;'*!.'. p.491; /Jijoy, II xxiii ;.p.397. Degrees . . .: 11 iii 1. p. 149; xiv 14. p. 245. xvi 3. p. 271; xviii 3-6. p. 2')5. i< 12 RIPEKT CLEXnOX LODGE ]'rovc sufl'icii.'.n at KtisI t<> let \is disc-iivcr what he iiicans l)y them, and what llieir funelion i-^ in his jihilDsophy. We sliall proeeeil in(hiclively, lakins (it;c i;rnui> at a. tin.r, niid endeavorini; to (hscover on wliat i,'roun(l the in- s'.ant'i's in each Krcu') arc elas^cil lo^'elher as simple modes. 1. SiMiM.ic M(l that there is no idea "more simple, than that of unity, or one . . . it is the most universal idea . . . for number ajiplies ... to everything;." The second section is entitled, "Its modes" — sci. modes of number — "made by addition," but t!ie content of the section shows plainly that it is not "num- ber," but ones or units which arc added. Elsewhere he expresses himself more explicitly. It is by ])uttin^' top;ether the repeated ideas of unity, or by jiiinj.i;; the idea of one to one, eti., that we construct the numbers; and Locke seems to think of "numl)er" as a com])lcx idea, "consisting of addi- tions of finite units one to another," in fact as a i^rogrcssive series consist- ing of collections of units. From a consideration of this evidence,'-' it appears that unity or one is the simi)le idea, of which the instances in this group arc simple modifications. In what sense arc the various numbers to be regarded as "modes" of unity or one? Simple ideas arise from sensation or reflection, etc., and the sim])le idea of unity arises from both: but the numbers themselves, two, a dozen, a million, etc., do not come into the mind by sensation and reflec- tion. They are man-made, mental constructions generated by a process which first aljstracis the unit from the simple sense-experiences of unity, "11 viii 9. p. 170; r 6, p. 197; ivi 1, p. 270; x\i 7^. p. .171; III ix IQ. p. IIS. '-11 lii 5, ;:. ;i3; -iii 1. p. 2 IS; r.\i =. ;•;■. 271 :?.; r.:': 7. p. 27 i; .wi'l I', p. 296; ssiv 7, -■ *''-*■ LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 13 ■unil then V)y a further proo-ss, known as comiioundin^', or more specifically "cnlar^inj;," extends the numerical scries by adding one to one so as to produce two, one to two so as to ]iroduce llirce, etc., and providing:; each member of the pro<^ressivc series so obtained with a special name, which serves to distinj^uish it from every other number. Abstractini;, enlarpng, namin.v- these are the three phases of the process of j,'eneratinf;; the ni.inber- series; and numbers are accordingly regarded, qua complex ideas consist- ing; of units or collections of units, as "collective ' modes. It is as repeti- tions, enlargements, collections of units, that the numbers are regarded as simple modes of unity."' What are we to say of finite and infinite' Are these also complex ideas, formed by adding units together? Locke refers to them definitely as "modes of quantity," applicable primarily to that which has parts rnd is capable of more or less, i.e., especially to the number-series with its addibility and divisibility. They arise from contemplating the power of the mind to enlarge its quantitative ideas without end. This power of the mind suggests the idea of infinite, as the units themselves give us the idea of finite. Infinite and finite are thus not exactly "collective modes," but arise from a consideration of the collectively-generated series, by reflection on the way in which our minds produce it.'' 2. SiMPLK Modes of Dur.\tiox What is the simple idea modified in the second group? Is it "dura- tion"? At first sight it might seem so. Duration is referred to as a simple idea, one of the most modified of simple ideas, one of the primary and original ideas from which all other ideas can be derived.** And yet, just as "number" for Locke consists of units, so here also* examination shows that the simple idea in this group is a kind of unit in duration, a moment or instant, the brief portion of duration during which one idea can be held Viefore the mind in the natural succession of ideas. The simple idea, then, of which the instances in the second group arc simple modifications, is thus the "moment" or psychological duration-unit." In what sense are the various lengths of duration to be regarded as "modes" of this duration-unit? The sim])le idea is here fundamentally I" I i IS, i.p, 48-4'}; xi 6. p. 20.'; xii 5. ji. 21,S; xiii 1. p. 21S; Jtvi 2, S. 7, pp. 270-74; xxiv 2. p. 424; \\x\ 14. p. 5i3; Works IV p. 11; cf. Jnur. 1678, KinR 2:123. i'ractions arc obtained by an ati.iloRous proc- ess of division, and small numbers can be obtained irom larger ones by subtraction: 11 xv 9, p. 266; xvi 2. p. 272; xvii I. 12, 18. pp. 276. 285, 290. >' tl xvii I. 7, pp. 276, 284; xviii 1. p. 2fl4. Cf. Riehl. Philo^nfhhrher Krilirismus. 36. 44. 48. SO. Against th" implied idealism of the text (in Riehl it is exitlicit). see infra, ch. v. " II X fi. p. 197; XV 9, pp. 264. 266; xvii 22. p. 293; xviii 6, p. 296; xxi 75, p. 373; xxiii 33, 34. pp. 418, 420; III vi 11, p. 67; fit ilaltbr. sec. 43. p. 444. '• 11 xiv t, 10, pp. 238, 243; xv 9, pp. 264, 266-67. 14 RUPERT CLENDON LODGE an idea of reflection. It comes into the mind in the simplest act of re- flecting on the succession of our thoughts, whether such succession follows logical laws, or is dependent on psychological associations or on the succe,;- sion of scnsc-perceivablcs in the physical world. But days, years, nges, etc., do not come into our minds in this simple way. They are derived from the revolution of the earth in relation to the sun, and would so far seem to be ideas of sensation, rather than ideas of reflection. How arc we to understand their relation to the simple idea, the psychological duration- unit? Locke's position may perhaps be stated briefly as follows :— There is (1) duration in itself, or absolute duration, a constant and uniform temporal progression, strictly continuous and indivisible.^" There is (2) what we may call our psychological duration-sense, which furnishes us with a kind of working scale for measuring that portion of absolute duration which coincides with our individual experience. This duration-sense is in effect an apprehension of the dilTerent ideas which succeed one another in our minds. That is to say, wc measure any brief d- ration-period by referciu-e to the number of ideas which we can observe to succeed one another in that peri ^d. Locke assumes that variation in the rate of succession of^ our ideas is so slight as to be neghgiblc, so that this succession-rate furnishes a fair index to the rate of absolute duration. The unit of this psychological scale is the "moment" mentioned above." So far, all is clear enough: but complications ensue. This duration- scale can be applied directly only to a narrow extent. It can serve as a measure of successions in the physical world only so far as the physical rate of change is comparable to the psychological rate of succession of ideas. Physical motions which are very rapid or very slow are, as we should say nowadays, beyond the upper or lower limen of the duration-sense. Conse- quentlv, in dealing with physical changes, wc use an objective, instead of a subjective, test of duration. We make use of certain periodical changes among physical phenomena as the objective standard or measure of tim'^ progression. Any constant periodical appeai-ancc, if universally observable, would serve to distinguish time-intervals, but in ^jractice wo have come to use, as a type of such phenomena, the "diurnal and annual revolutions of the' sun," so that minutes, hours, days, years, etc., represent portions of time measured out by the motion of the heavenly bodies, or in modem times (c. 1670), by the more accurate motion of a pendulum." Such motions,' however, conduce to the measurement of duration only so far as they constantly bring about the return of certain sensible ideas ••Ilxiv 1, 21, 2,1, pp. 2,i8. 249. 2.S1; Jv 11. p. 267;cf. xv9 note Mictalcd to Costc). pp. 264-65. " II liv, esp. 3, 4, 9, 1-'. 15, 21, pp. 2,19-49. "II xiv 10. 11, 19. 21, pp 243-44, 247, 249-50. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES IS in seeming equidistant periods. In other words, it is the equidistant period, and not the motion as such, which is important; and if we ask how we know that the motions of the heavenly bodies or of the pendulum are equidistant, we are ultimately thrown back on our psychological time- sense, especially in judging the smaller intervals, which are more nearly comparable to its "moments." Thus we see that it is as corresponding to various groups or collections of duration-units, that hours, days, etc., can be used as measures of time.'^ It is from this view-point that they are regarded as simple modes of the duration-unit: they are the kind of mo^.e known as "collective," formed, like the numbers, by the processes of abstracting, enlarging, and naming. What are we to say of time, and of finite and infinite duration or eter- nity? In what sense are these considered as simple modes of the duration- unit? Time for Locke is that portion of absolute duration which enters into oiu- human experience, and is articulated and rendered suitable for human uses by the various objective measures of duration, employed as "landmarkr " for denoting the position in duration of finite real beings, in respect tc .ne another. That is, it is a complex system of relations, in which events can be dated with reference to one another. As a complex idea of this kind, it involves the indefinite enlarging of the simple dura- tion-unit so as to fill out the whole sphere of human history and human experience, and may in this sense be regarded as a collective mode of the simple idea."* The concept of finite duration is given along with any and every group of "moments," but eternity or infinite duration, though acquired as an idea by a process of enlarging the duration-scale without ceasing, stands on a slightly different basis from the others. It is no mere collective mode, for no amount of repeating finite moments could give us infinity, but we conceive it by reflecting on the endless capacity for enlarg- ing our ideas which v.'e have. It arises from reflection on the progressive enlargement of the scale and is thus concerned primarily with the progres- sion-side of the process, and only in a secondary sense with the content of the scale enlarged, in this case, its duration-quality. It is thus not certain how far infi'^ite duration is to be considered strictly as a mode of the simple idea of duration}^ In summary, we may say that Locke's view of duration contains three fundamental conceptions:— (1) absolute duration. (2) the subjective measure of duration, of whicr. the simple idea is the "moment," and (3) time, or duration articulated and systematised for human uses by refer- ence to physically objective measures. These objective measures are dependent for their duration-value ultimately upon our duration-sense and "11 niv 21-22. pp. 249-50. " II xiv 17. p. 246; 31, p. 2.S6; xv 5. 8, pp. 261, 263; xxvi 3-4. pp. 436-37; cf. Fraser • II xvi 8. p. 274; xvii 2, p. 277. 'snote 1:263. n. J, 16 RVrr.KT CLEXDOS LODGE its vinit, llie nifiricnt. Hours, days, \cars, linn', etc., arc collective iiumIcs of this simiilc idia, wliilc finite and infinite duratinn are only with difiiculty regarded as niodrs ol" duration at all. ?>. SiMi'i.i; M()i)i:s ov IIxpansion What is the simple idea in the third t;roup? Is it expansion, extension, s])ace? As in the two previous .^Toups, Locke at times writes as thou};h this were the ease. Space is said to he a simple idea, one of the most modified of sinii>le ideas, and extcnsi(jn is mentioned as one of the primary and ori;-;inal ideas on which all others depend.-" But here, too, it is clear that space or expansion is not itself the simjilc idea in questioi.. It could not, e.j;., he rcjKvitcd and added to,i;cthcr in order to give us the idea of a furlont; or a mile. Hence we see that the simple idea mu t be some rela- tively small i)ortion of sivace, and further examination shows that this is indeed the case. Locke insists that the mind makes use of small measures of expansion, such as inches or feel, etc., as simple ideas, in Iniildini,' up the more complex ideas of spatial length. He further i)oints out that the "(ordinary smalle.-t measure we have" of expansion is looked upon like the unit in the case of numher. I-'rom this it would seem that the simple idea of expansion was an inch or something; of the kind. But it is pointed out further that the simple idea is without a name: it is the least particle of matter or space we can discern. Locke suj:;};ests as a name, "sensible ])oint." and clearly means, as Frascr interjirets in his notes, what we should call minimnm ^cnsibilc. \hv kast portion of s]>ace of which we have a clear idea (4" suisalion.-^ In wliat sense are inches, feel, furlongs, miles, etc.. modes of this "sen- sible ])oint""' The simjilc idea is here an idea of sensation, and as the modes in this ^roup aiijicar to Vjc also ideas of sensation, it seems fairly easy to rc^'ard ilieni all as collective modes, due to repetition and enlarging o the sensible point However, Locke's treatment of expansion is in eft'ect not quite so simple, but is strictly ])arallel to his treatment of duration. His jjosition is thus as follows; — There is (1) absolute expansion,"* (2) our expansion-sen.se, with its unit, the sensible point, (3) place, or that portion of ex])ansion which enters into iiur experience and is articulated and svstematised by reference to objective measures, such as the human foot or the diameter of the earth. These objective measures again derive their value as measures of expcmsion, ultimately from our expansion-sense, and ^ II V p. 15S; vili '>. I). 170; x '.. p. 1«"; i;,i :, p. 1\')\ xv '». pp. 264-66; \-:; 11, p. 29.1; xxi 75. p. .17J; xxiii J. p. M4; xx.\ii 18, p. Sll. "II xiii 27, p. 2.56; xv 0. pp. 266. 267; xvi J. ji. 271 cf. Jour. 167 7, Kinff 2:176-77. It is"ttic lo.,,st particle of rr.atter nr space \\e can 'li^. t rn: ordinarily aljou- ;i minute, and scMoin leys than thirty bceonds, of a Lirtle, whereof the e\e ii the centre." -"' II iv 4. p. 155; xni HI. [i. 224; xv 2, 5. .", 9, pp. 2-,^. 261, 26.!, 266; xvii 4, p. 279. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 17 represent colleelions of "]X)ints." All lines, angles, circles, etc., as well as feet, yards, and similar "olijccLivc" or physical measures of space are thus ultimately rej^arded as collective modes of the simple idea or sensible point.-^ The treatment of finite and infinite expansion or immensity is precisely parallel to the treatment of finite and infinite duration. It is doubtful how far they can be regarded le.i^itimately as collective modes of the expan- sion-unit. They arise rather from contemjjlation of our iiower to enlarge our ideas of expansion without limit, and deal primarily with the enlarge- ment-aspect, and only secondarily with the expansion-quality as such.'" 4. SiMi'i-E Moi !;s OF Motion Locke's main purpose m dealing with simple modes is to show, in a number of important instances, that the content is derived from sensation or reflection, in the form oi simple ideas, and that ideas somewhat remote from their "original" represent merely repetitions and enlargements of these simple ideas. This purpose he regards as already adequately ful- filled, and the other simple modes, including those in this fourth group, arc dealt with only briefly, and "for method's sake." However, from the statement that modes of motion correspond to modes of extension, we may hazard the following hypothesis as to Locke's meaning :'' The simple idea in this group is not motion in the generally xmderstood sense, though motion is certainly spoken of as a simple idea, a frequently modified simple idea, and one of the primary and original ideas, in a sense similar to what we have found to be intended in the preceding groups. If we arc to be governed at all by the analogy suggested by Locke himself, we should regard the simple idea of motion as an unnamed unit acquired by a kinaesthetic sense, the smallest portion of motion of which we have a clear idea of sensation. This psychological motion-unit would be the simple idea modified in all the instances in this fourth group.^^ If we allowed oursches to be guided yet further by the suggested analogy with extension, we should say that Lock.>'s view of motion and its modes would contain the following three elemcnis: (I) the idea of absolute motion, a pure continuum, (2) the kinaesthetic miotion-unit, (vV) the com- plex system of motions which fall within human experience, and are articu- lated and systematised by reference to objective measures of motion, taken from moving physical objects. Such objective measures would be: •■' II xi ft. p. 205; xili 4, 6. 7. i.p. J20-22. 236; XV 2, p. 258. '» Cf. further H xvi 8. i). 274; xvii 2, 3. 7, pp. 277. 278, 281. " II xviii 1, 2, p. 294. « 11 V. p. 158; viii 9, p. 170; x 6. p. 197; xxi 75. p. 375; xviii (<. p. 296; III xi II, pp. 66-67. 10. p. 3S7; xxiii 3. p. 394; 18 RUPERT CLENDOS LODGE slidinj;, rolling, walking. runniriK, creeping, etc., and the motion-element in tlicsc ideas would be seen, in the last analysis, to depend for its value on our kinacsthctic sense, and to correspond to collections or groups cf tbe kinacsthclic units. From this view-point all the simple modes of this group would be collective modes of the simple idea. 5. Simple Modes of Power It is by no means easy to discover precisely what Locke understands by power, and it is still more difficult to feel that its simple modes can be discovered and stated in detail. In Chapter XVIII of the second book, which deals professedly with simple modes, we can infer from sections 6 and 7 ; 1. that the simple idea of iiower comes to our minds by sensation and reflection (passive power by sensation, and active jiower by reflection) ;" 2. that when the mind has this simple idea of power, it can variously repeat rmd compound it, and so make new complex ideas or modes; 3. that the simple idea of power has been mv)dificd to a great variety of such complex ideas, with names belonging to them; 4. that the reason for this great variety of modifications of an idea such as flower, is because men frame modes in matters of great and frequent concernment, such as human actions, and supply them with special names for purposes of rapid communication. From these two sections in the chapter on "simple modes," one might be tempted to conclude that the simple idea of active power had for its simiile modes the various human actions, which could perhaps be regarded as various combinations of an elementary sense of activity. Unfortunately for this hypothesis, we are definitely told later, in the chapter which deals officially with "mixed" modes, that while the idea of power is one of the most modified, and deals with the great business of mankind, viz., action, the various types of action form not simple, but mixed, modes. As in- stances we are given (1) consideration and assent (actions of the mind), (2) rtinning and speaking (actions of the body), (3) revenge and murder (actions of both together). These instances are regarded as modes (1) of thinking and power comV)incd, (2) of motion and power combined, (3) of thinking, motion, and power combined. It is for this reason that they are regarded as "mixLd," i.e., as resulting from a combination of two or more simple ideas.'* Thus t.he concrete suggestion of Chapter XVIII is seen to break down, and we arc left without knowing in what direciion to " II 7i7.\ 7. 4, S, 28, p|i. 311-12, 313, 329-.10. «II xxii 10. p. 387. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 19 look for the simple modes of power, though we know that they are many in number, and are supplied with names. In this difilcxilly we might try to extend the line of reasoning already adopted and verified in the cases of duration and expansion, and which is doubtless applicable also to number. If we assume an analogy with the previcus groups, we should construct hypothetically the following theory: 1. There is absolute power, the correlate of change as a whole, pure activity, the attribute of Deity." 2. We have a psychological activity-sense, derived from volition- experiences of different degrees of intensity. The unit degree of intensity of felt activity would be the simple idea of power, an idea primarily of reflection, expressing the smallest degree of activity which could be clearly observed by introspection.'* 3. From observation of the sphere of physical changes, so far as these come within human experience, we derive various physical or objective measures of power, such as horse-power, candle-power, volts, etc., and so far as absolute power enters into human experience, we regard it as an organisable system, measured in tcnns of energy-units such as amperes, volts, horse-power, etc. Each of these objective measures -Itimately derives its value as a measure of power from its correspondence to a group or collection of our felt psychological activity-units, and would consequently be regarded as a collective mode of the simple idea of power. The above tentative hypothesis is not completely verifiable by refer- ence to Locke's writings. Such terms as "horse-power," "amperes," etc., are nowhere found, and the inferences from Chapter XVIII, which to some extent provide a justification for the theor>' suggested, occur in a chapter which professedly deals with the subject only briefly and "for method's sake." For the general view indicated, however, the subsequent chapters of this study will provide some general justification, by showing the consistency of the above hypothesis with Locke's general view-point. In detail, however, it should be regarded as definitely an unverified hypoth- esis, inserted here only for the sake of method. 6. Simple Modes of Thinking Thinking, for Locke, consists psychologically in our having a continued "train" or sequence of ideas in our minds. Each part of this thought- process "perishes the moment it bej:ins," and in consequence, any two thoughts, as successive parts of the same stream, are not identical, but " II xxi 2, p. 309; xxiii 28. p. 414; III vi 11, p. 66; IV iii 27. p. 219; ct. Crous, Die Crundlaten der rtiigtons t^hilosophischen Lehrrn Locker, pp. 29. 35-37. "11 xxi S, 28. pp. 313, 329-30; xxiii 18, 30, pp. 407. 416; cf. Fraser 1:311. n. 6. 20 KVl'ERT CLF.SDOS LODGE must :it lorist liavf diruniu "Inuinuin^s of (.xisti'iui."'' Tliis si'tiucnce of iiUas, v.hicli \\( may irtliaiis synl^oli^c in tlic form a-b-c-d ... 11, may uikr I'laci- "j a^^i^^■ly,■' as wluii our minds a])iiiilan(l, wilhnut much ai'tiw sc'lcflioii, scr.si-!miiri>si(iiis in tlu' iii"<'i'i^>-' order in wliich they aflccl ihc st'n';r-or;.;ans, ilii.- nrdir Iciiii' ^owrncd by sciiurnccs in tho cxU'rnal world. Lorli.n;>(s a second kin(' of pa.s^ivily in the as.^oeiation of ideas, \'iz., wiiiti lialiiuial ; equenees are formed in the basis of ilianee or eu.-lom, V.' til' All lo:.:iial relcvant'i'. He su,uj;ests tentative!)- a ph\-siolo;.;ieal exiilafialii>n of this iihenomimm, wliieh would reduce it, in effect, to tho first kind of ]Ki-sivily mentioned above.'' In such cases, where the con- nection between the elements of the tliou;.;ht-strcam is the ;)roduct of chance and non-rational factors, i.e., where there is no active (rational) choice and direction of our ideas, Locke is inclined to roKard the experience as the lowest decree of what can lie called reason, and as very little removed from having no conscious thoui;ht at all. •'''■' So far we liave been considerin;.: merely the passive power of thinkin.i;. There is always in our waking' life a train of ideas succecdinj; one anotluT in our minds, and attention to this sequence is the essence of thinkin.i;, whether the seciui'iicc is caused irom with.tnit or is self-directed from v,ith- in. But there are \arious dct^recs of such attention, and these are not all "liassive." In passive thinkincr. wo attend merely to the thouj;ht-]irocess as it l-.aiM)cns; but in active ih.iiikin.:^', we can brin^' into view at our choice ideas whidi are c •■.' • 1" •■. l:i. titi'l can thus compare a past with a present idea. We can ((iri;-,d.r ar.d contem]ilate a^y idea, by turning it on all sides, marking its relations and circumstances, and inhibiting irrelevant thou^'hts. In a word, the mind can direct the course of the stream of thought, ])icking out for especial consideration any elements whatever, and arranging them at will.'"' Thinking, then, is attention to the sequence of ideas. What is the simple idea of thinking, of which the instance.; m this group are regarded as simple modific;ai(uisr We are told that thinking is one of the primary and f)rigin:il ideas, one of the primary qualities of spirit;-" but as Locke frequently regards it as covering the whole field of consciousness, includ- ing e.g., willi.-g^- and feeling, it is clear that the simple idea is narrower " II v;i I). .,. 104; xiv J-4. ft. '», U-lft, .57, ;!•,.. J!') HI, Jl.i. ilS, .'5i-.i,(; ,\l.t 1. pp. 298-99; xxvii J, 4»1; a. C.'uhut oj r :l-. Mt. r- i*'- S' 11 x^i 1. 7t, M'. .'IIS, ,?;i; xxxiii .S-T, pp. .^29- .10. " II XIX 1, ^, 4, pp. 29.S..lnl, :V xvii 2. p. (S.><. *' In tcTi;.\ of our syiiilKj'i^ation suKrcitcl in the t(x\ the sc.p.icnce woi:!(l tx" in tl" ■ form a-c-a-c-. or any other cf.n;binati.,n: if. II xix .!, pp. 299- .fOO; xxi .S, 74, pp. .n.i. J71; Works Ciiiulu-t oj V. sees. 7. .in, pp. 4.5-4(1. K3; cf. Kohlcr. „;■. cil. S<). '. II XXI 75, p. 17.1; xxiii .10. p. 4!fi; Works IV p. 21; \at. Phil., xii V- 49.S. >'■ II xix :, ;.. 299; xxi 17. 74. p[). .122. .171; xxvii 11, i>. 448; cf. HJhc. passim. " II xxiii JO, II. 417; III 1 .■,, p. S. a-a-a-.t, or IV p. S9: LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 21 than this. In Cliaptcr IX of the s^o)nlion with a past perception-unit, and would in this way be a collective mode. Recollection also api)cars to be much the same as remembrance, but contains also the idea of a greater intensity-dcRree of "seeking,'." and is thus partly a collective mode, partly a decree-modification of the simple idea. We might similarly say that contemplation could be interpreted as repetition of an apprehension-unit with an identical content (b-b-b-b), and could thus be rcRardcd as a col- lective mode. Hut this would take us rather beyond the expressed view ci Locke, who treats it defmitely as a "dcj^rcc." The possible dual basis of explanation, however, indicates— as indeed Locke himself confesses— that the position with re>;ard to the simple modes of this idea has not been com- pletely worked out.^' If we wish to sum up tentatively Locke's view of thinking and its simple modes, we should say that it contains the following three funda- mental conceptions: 1. the idea of absolute or infinitely perfect thought, attributable to the Deity;" 2. the simple apprehension-unit, our human subjective measure of thinking ; 3. the sphere of human experience in general, and in particular the system of scientific knowledge, which, from the point of view of reflection, is organised with reference to the degrees of probability and of demon- strative and intuitive knowledge, of which degrees the simple modes, sensation, imagination, reasoning, faith, etc., considered above, are in- stances. These simple modes arc ultimately degrees or perhaps in a few instances collective modifications of the simple apprehension-unit which Locke calls "perception."" 7. SiMPi-K Modes of Pleasure and Pain The simple ideas of jjlcasure and pain can not be described or under- stood apart from the simple experiences in which they are given. As the "simple" ideas of such experiences, Locke probably understands the least amounts or degrees of such experiences, of which we have clear ideas of sensation and reflection.'-'' Satisfaction, delight . . . misery, etc., are •' II xix 1. 2. rr' I"""-''"; Koh'.cr (op. (it. 67) regards contemplation as a stopping of the stream; but this seems inntra-lictory to Locke's way of rcnarding the stream: cf. II xiv 9. p. 243. •MI xv.i. n-1f.. pp. 418-22; III vi 3. 11, pp. 57-5«. (16-67; n 0, p. IM; cf. Ex. Malebr. sees. 43, 53; CkkI. II xvi, p. 176; King 1:228; II p. 71; Fox Dournc 1 225; cf. Crous. np. nl. 19, 23. 29-30. «IV xxi 5. p. 462; cf. Frascr 2:462. n. 6. The whole £jsoy is a concrete example and proof of this point. «II vii 10, p. 164; XX 1, p. 302. vT. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES U recognised as simple ni.xles in the sense of decrees of intensity of pleasure and pain." The "passions" and "more simple modes" dealt with in Chapter XX are all dependent on decrees of pleasure and pain arising under various conditions in our experience. They are not strictly modes of pleasure and pain, but depend on. and can not l)c understood without reference to, decree-modifications of pleasure and pain. For a similar reason good and evil, a consideration of which often causes pleasure and pain, though they are not exactly modes (for a cause is not a mode), are yet as bein^,' so inlimalcly bound up with pleasure-pain experiences, considered briefly in tliis chapter." . In brief summary, then, we can say that Locke's view contains the following; fundamental conceptions: 1. the idea of absolute pleasure or infinite happiness, attributable to the Deity;'' 2. our pleasure and pain sense, which furnishes us with the simple idea of pleasure and pain; 3 our affective life as a whole, so far as this is considered by reference to the various passions, which correspond to various modes of pleasure- pain in the sense of degrees. 8. Simple Modes of Matter On the hvpothesis of molecular physics, to which Locke inclines, though without entire acceptance, the simple idea in this group is the least particle of matter of wliich we can have a clear idea; it is not exactly an idea of sensation, but should rather be regarded as an .dea of a kind of microscopic sensation." This simple idea is the atom. Solidity, bulk, texture or cohesion of parts, are regarded as simple collective modes of this idea; figure, extension, and motion also seem to Locke to depend on a nuniber of corporeal particles, in order to retain auv significance for man. Ihe secondary qualities are regarded officially as various combinations of tex- ture, motion, etc.. i.e.. ultimately also as collective modes of the atom. ^ In analogy with the preceding cases, we might point out that Locke s view contains the following three fundamental conceptions: « II vii 2, p. 161. , t •• A «II ^^ 1. 3, 5, pp. 302-04. Martinak (<.^ dl. 101 omits the dogr«.-s of plcasurr-pam of ch. v.. and the "mo" simple mL," of ch. x,. an,l a^lU to hi. list of passions also envy .rA an«er. But cnv, and InBcr are • Wed" .nodes, a, containing a sens, of value for the person env.ed. and some cons.dcrat.oa of revenge, respectively, as well as pleasure and pain (see xi U, p. 306). M n Jtxiii 33 p. 418; III vi p. 66. " II xxiii 12. p. 403; IV x 14 ff., pp. 317 ff. •• II viii 24, p. 180; IV vi 14. p. 264; cf. Jour. 1676, King 2:123. H II viii panim; x«iii 7. pp. 397-98; IV xiv 12. p. 380; Sal. Phil, xi p. 494. 24 KiriHr (7./:.\7'f).v i.oihie 1. tin i>K;i nf t'urr iiialur, nr the "rial roiislilution ni ihiiiK^i." vinder- >ii"i(l l>y thi- Di i' >■ alniu ;■' 2. otir ii'ition of ilir jitdii,, Imniaii ;iiiil liypotlit ti<;il; .V iili\sii;il Hiiiiur, nr llu' svslt tii;ititlKticnl, a ^impU' iilia of a siii>i)osnl iniirosKiiiii- ^(■ll^atioll ratlicr lliaii a siniplo i'lia of aiiual sensation, by so nuicii nnist our physical scicni't' liiiili iijion such a l>aMs fall short of c ^^,, nuulu'niatical knoukil;.'i', which is liasi'd on thi' ill a rami ili^li'ut aiiiinluiision of a siiniilc iilta which is actual." 1; is iloiilitfnl how far the al>ovc ^.Toup can lie compared strinty with tl.c other se\cn rroiips, Ii deals with "qualities" rather than wall "ideas.""' I'roin the point of \iew of ideas, Locke cini'halically rcijardr. priniar'. and secondary ideas, not as modes, l)Ui as simple ideas. It is i/i-,C"i ■>■ "if sweetness, decrees of lit'lit, shaiks of color, etc., i.e., dejjrees of the /./iiJ.s of the secondary iiualilies, which are considered as simple modes. In this sense they are rightly so considered. Words, tunes, etc , arc per- haps to lie re;;arded as collccti\'c modes of a simple idea of souml. So far we have ixamined each of the ei^ht {groups of simple modes in order to discover within each }.:n'up in what sense the instances ;jiven are to l>e understood as modifications of their rcsjiective simple ideas. It remains to put to;;ether the results of these scjiarate enquirii's, in order to realise the v^eneral mcanini^' which the concei)tion of simple mode has for L(xke. In ^riiups 1, 2, 3, X, and perhaps also 4, .^, and to a shrill extent 6, the I'asis on which the mind eonstaicts the simple modes ajijicars to be similar: the instances are collccti\-e modes, consisting; of j;roups of unil-elements added to^:ether in a definitely v;uantitalive manner. Locke is himself well aware of this, and does not hesitate to jioini out that our modal knowledge in these variois },'roups deals jiroperly only with the mathematical aspect of the ideas in question.'"' In ^;roups 5, 6, and 7, the basis is not exactly quantitative. The dif- ference between the various modes in each group is not jirccisely a matter of more or less in terms of C|uantilative units, but rather of qualitative tmits, — more or less in tenns of cjualitalive degree. It is a matter of greater or less approximation to clear and distinct thinking, of greater and less degrees of pleasure and pain, etc.''' In both cases tluri' is a common element, which we have expressed by means of the terms "more" .and "less." Our general conclusion, then, '■' III vi f.i^'itn: IV \ : 1 \-\<<. I'll. Jdl-'.f.; Fra-rr, r'.i. O . .1 J.6J. n. I. ')' . " Cf, ,.K'.. /y/K. 'n . l''il. i,]. lyj (T; I'r^iscr ;:14ll. n. " II viil 7, p. K>». '" II xiv .«!, p. 255; xvi 8, ji. 271, \;'n 1. 9. II), \<\,. J7f>, .'».!; x.Mii 21. [.. 4JII; \yAX H. Ii. V>i\ if. Jour. 1676 KinK 2:123. ■I 11 .\vi .(, pp. 2711-71; xvu ft. |). 2HII; will 6. p, 1^$. -i i.ocKFs .S7.U/7./: .Uf)/)/-:.s U wi.nl.l .-ii.iiar In li«:- /\ ,w'»if/.- »/.•'/.■ n (' <'r qiitilitiilivcly) won- or liss tlum a mhi/'/c ii/ki <'/ .m«m//.(|« <■»■ ),jW\thU. It ariics ly uantts of II mntiil ,ott.'tru,t!o» in thnr ^tucfs: ohstni.titu:, niUnanii ior suhlnid- iMi,i, M(iiiu'»if.'. In (.tliir v.(,r an txpamltil nr iliiiiitii'-lKd iiKa of Mnsatii)ti v \hv niianini; of tin i..nni.tion of siiiq If moilc as I.ockf luwliTstands it. Hut as this vi(\v srrjns to itniily a .l<>(inili'ly nlativislif standpoint wiili rc.nnl to modal knowlc.I-f. ii ninain>; to i\vA with tlic I hill' ihflicultios inliiriiit in smh ri staiulooint. Tlusc aro;-(l) tlif sinipli' idia. (2) rrlalions. so far as m< Irs aro o . I. voted to a iliscii ,011 of these three (litlieuUiev We sh..nM th.n he in a position to answer the litst part of our problem, viz., to state the nu'aniiii; of the eoneej.tion, bilore advancing; to the second part, in which the epislcmo lov:iial function of simple modes is lo be examined, •Cf, IV xii 7. IS, pp. .U7. JSS 56. I *,•* CHAPTER II SIMPLE MODES AND SIMPLE IDEAS At the close of llie I'lst chapter wc found ourselves compelled, in view of th.c relativisiic thcorv of knowledge implied in our conclusions, to in(iuire in ^vhat sense anv ideas could be "simple."' There is, however, a lurtlKT and perhai? more immediately pressing', reason for the present invc^ti-alioa. As a matter of fact. Locke treats many of the terms, whidi xse have, on his authorilv, already considered to be smii'le modes, ie comnlex ideas,-also at times as simple ideas. This fact challenges explanation, and as anx- answer to the first question would have to aceount for ih.is diflicuUv also, we shall proceed inductively, be^mnmR with a cr.nsickration of the aml.i.unous instances in question. The followm}; is a . .-.Okie list of terms undoubtedly referred to in this double sense: , One, number. 2. Duration, second, minute, hour, day, year. 3. Extension, inch, foot, cubit, purasang, fit;ure, place, space. 4. Motion. 5. Power. . , , 6. RememberinR, pcrccivin-, judging, discerning, reasoning, knowledge, believing, willing, doubting. 7. Satisfaction, uneasiness. 8. Solidity, bulk, texture, or cohesion of parts, motion, rest. 1. SiMPi-E Ideas of Number The first group has alreadv been dealt with to some extent in the pre- ceding chapter, where it was simply stated that unity or one is a simp e idea arising by abstraction from simple sensc-experienccs of unity, it remains to ask a little more definitely (a) how we obtain this simple idea. (h) what it is when we have obtained it, and (c) in what sense it is simple. Wc shall then be in a position to compare it with "one" considered as a mode, if it is so considered by Locke. No idea is suggested to the mind by more ways than that of unity or one It is suggested to the understanding by every object without and everv idea within. Whatever we can consider as one thmg, whether a real'fphvsical) being or an idea, suggests to the understanding the idea ot unity In other words, we receive the idea of unity or one both from observation and from introspection; i.e., wc receive the idea passively. . Cf. H. G. Tov,nscna, The frinatle of MiriiuaMy ,« the philosophy d Thomas Hill Cr«». ch. ii. patnm. ■m.. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 27 without altering it in any way; it is given to us. Precisely how it is given to us wc can not explain, beyond affimiin<: that it is suggested to us by every occasion of perception, external or -' Uernal." From this it appears that \vc consider every object whatever as "one" ; and for the latter-day student the qviestion at once arises, how this unity is to be understood. Is it something belonging to the objcct-in-itself, which we merclv apprehend passively, or does it belong to the object only in relation to our perception of it, i.e., fo far as it is an object-for-a-subject? In the sec- ond case, unity would pres •.inibly be someibhig in the nature of the percipi- ent subject, "suggested" ■ the mind on the occasion of perception, a "category" with which the ,MUid reacts to the stimulus of the perceivable.* In many cases there is no doubt wl',atever that the unity in question is introduced by the mind into certain m.ental phenomena, as indeed into certain physical phenomena. In all cases of construction, e.g., cases of a synthesis of elements in accordance with some plan, it is the mind which introduces the unity, though the elements must of course be themselves eombinable, i.e., in the present ease, logically consistent. Thus all mixed modes are undeniably cases of arbitrary mental construction, and the unity which the mode possesses is given by the mind and fixed by the process of naming, as in the cases ot "triumph," "procession." "ostracism," etc. T!ie same is true of the unity '-f simple modes, of relations, of nominal essences, in a word, of all complex ideas whatever.* Even in the case of certain simple ideas the same appears to be true. Consider, e.g., the "unit" in duration and extension, dealt with in the last chapter. In themselves, duration and extension are strictly continua, and as such do not admit of units, etc., which are discontinuous. In such cases the so- called unit is only a quasi-unit. and is recognised by Locke to be of a man- made kind, the smallest portion of these continua of which we have a clear idea of sensation or reflection. From his recognition of the fact that such "units" in duration are only approximately equal, and his vacillation on the ciuestion as to what precisely the anit in extension is, we can readily see that there is something relative and only approximately unitary about these conceptions.' Finally, Locke himself admits that there is no uni- versal agreement as to precisely what amounts in the various groups dealt with in the last chapter are to be taken as unitary, so that we infer that in all these cases the "unity" is man-made, arbitrary, approximate, introduced by the mind into phenomena for human conveniences in living here below. We are not, however, to conclude from this to an idealistic interpre- tation of Locke's standpoint. The question as to the part played in • II i J, p. 122; vii 7, p. 163; xvi 1. p. 270; IV xi 2, p. 326; ^.t. Maltbr. sees. 9, 10, 15. 16. 18. •Cf. Frascr's notes 1:145. 163, 270. On the interpretatior of "suggcsteJ." see Appendix, infra. « II ii 2, p. 145; xxii 2, p. 382; III v, 9-15. pp. 49-53; vi mpon.,de.l," and that unity is without "variety or cimposition. he means that we do not perform the mental function of "composition. In dealing with the numerical scries, e.^^, L 2, 3, 4, .=;, 6, 7 .it we wish ,„ ai.prchend 7, we have to ad.l up: 1. 1 plus 1 (2). 2 plus 1 (.), 3 plus I (4) ' 6 plus I (7). In other words, seven is obtained by a process of c.'.mv,osition, or adding' one to one, one to two. etc. But "one" is itself the firs-; number, and no process of composition is necessary to apprehend one' a- it is if we wish to ai>i.rehciul two, three, etc The .simple idea in this erouo is thus the first clcmnit apprchnukd in order to build up the composite numbe-- it is the smallest portion ^ f the series which we can apprehend clearly .nd distinctly. The "simplicity" of the arithmetical unit thus depends cm its relation to our apprehension. If "one" is the first and simplest idea, the number obta.ne.l without composition, an.l if the modes are all expanded or diminished ones, i.e., are all obtained bv -omposilion, it looks as though we must have been mistaken in placing' "1" als., am.ni^ the modes of the simple idea r.f num- bcT in the preceding chapter. In what conceivable sense could one possibly be consi.lcrcd as a modification of the unmodified imit.' Is not this a •'contra.lietion":' It is true that in the third section of the chapter whu'h ,kab oiliciallv with the sin^'le modes of number— a section entitled "each mode distinct- the lan.'uaKc used implies that 2. 1, 200. are all alike "combinations, • i.e., simple modes; but mifiht we not. one could urKc, here hv facing one of the tvpically Lockian "inexactitudes of expression.' Ir. vi. w of the first section of the chapter could not one emend the expres- • For the „!..:.liuly in a loose sense, in which it is intended for the "unit." Taken strictly, then, "number" is not really a simple idea at all, but is cither a collective mode, or else the absolute num- ber-scries.'" ' II xvi 1, .1. .■!; pp. 210, 272; cf. rvii 1, p. 276. • II xvii 10, 12, pp. 283, 285. .■'Rif,ronc and an.des cnelosinK a space. From this ikmiU (.1 vicNv it is pronounced MtVaiallv to be a complex idea, more particularly a .imple mode ..1 space or extension. The various n;.ures (triangles, circles, etc ^ are all rc^anled, as a rule, as simple m..dcs, not of figure, l.ul o space. Conscciucnllv,' it is only loo^clv that f.^ure is referred to as a simple idea. Strict Iv re^ai-dcd, it is to be taken as a mode, as a collective mode ot the simv>le' ide.-i of space, the "sensible point."''-' , Place is unifomih- rc^ar-led by Locke as a simple m-ide. But in one passa^'c 'viluation" is included in the list of primary qualitio, an.l the ideas "of primarv ciualilics are usually trcatc.l as "simple." It has been un-cd that "situation" is identical in mcanin- with "place, an.l tha. consequcntlv, uhat Locke usually states explicitly to be a mode, Nvhich is a compkx idea, he here rep.rds as a dclinilely simple i.lea; m other words, we arc faced bv a typical '■coniradietion."^" File case is p^crhaps not so desperate as this thesis would maintain; at least, if we eomi-are the list of primarx- quautics <;ive" in this passage with the sh^htly dilTenn- list< Hvcn elsewhere,'^' it would appear to be used to take the place .)f the term "extension.- We .shall aca^rdiuKly regard "i.lace," not as a simple idea, but as a simple mode of space. ^ , In sun^i-n-v we mav sav that in this -roup the relation between simple idea and simple mode is based on the relation <,f our apprehension to absolute space. Abs.ilute space is strictly a corunuum, lufr.iitely extende. in evcTv dimension.'^-^ In the abstract, any slarlini;-pomt whatever, and „„v irJasure of expansion miKht theoretically be taken as an mcrement with which to construct simple modes. In the concrete, we, as human bcin.s, take the smallest p..rti(n; of infinite space of which we have a clear idea' of sensation, the sensible point. This represents the point of cxtniact „f the human mind with absolute space, and when expanded m the one direction ^ives us the various Rcometrical fimtrcs, lines, angles, circles, etc., and when expanded as a sort of scale, the units of which represent scnsib e points, serves to evaluate in expansion-terms physical objects frequently met with in our experience, such as the human foot, or the various divi- sions of the diameter of the earth; these we can then use as denvativc >• II xiii -6 1... "1-"; xxi 7?. p. 373 (omits "f.^urcs" in a list of primary iJeus); cf. Frasor 1:158. n.. who points out th..t f.Rure is .lefinablc. .-.n.l therefore not s.mp'.e, but complex. !» II viii 23. p. 178; ef. Manly, op. ril. 51*. S<). !■ II viii 22. p. 178; viii 0, lf,<)-70. etc. ,„.,.,. ■ , -.-• II XV,, 10-11 pp. 2S3-8.. Oll.on ,.r. n<. 227-33^ explams the JifTiculty in terms of Riehl s d:-..,nc. ■ 11 x\„ JU 11. PI . . ,,,,. f ,,.„.,. ,^ ^.,,.,,,,1,., the V..r.5(W.uns ut space li siir.ple. tion between /Vsn/ an.l I nr /,,/«««. 1 „c /..<--i?/ of spue ,> L..i.,,k x. tne Ollion applies this same d.st.nction in the other cases considered in this chapter. U -/ LOCKE'S SIMPLE MOPES 33 nicasurcs (relatively si,.plc ideas) in .leahn, wUh cxte nal ^^^^^^^^^l ena. The niodes in this ^;r'1-a by, means of whieh we come into definite contact with space as it is in itselt. ; 4. SiMPi-K Ideas of Motion Motion is eonsistentlv referred to as a simple idea of sensation, obtained thrmi.h nK,re than une 'sense, as the idea of one of the primary and ..r^i- nal qualities of bodie<, as modified into many ''•''"'''^•V'^'"'' '":,;, T of the simple ideas which ^o to make up our concept of a substance, and. ^•hen expanded to infinity, our idea of God.- In these passages it is almost invariablv associate.l with extension, duration, etc., which ^^e h.i alreadv seen to be. when taken in this general sense, not simple ideas at all. but cither collective modes or absolutes presuppose.! by Locke In the same wav here, it can not eonsistentlv be mamtained that motui. in the general sense is other than complex. In a way. Locke admits this for he alwavs understands it as ineludinK active motion f"^«^;vit^y and passive motion (mobility), which are tu'o i.leas. though he insist that th Lest sense of motion is active moti..n. The strictly simple idea would seem to be some kinaesthetic sense-unit, derived from introspectK>n This would T,resumably represent our hunnm point ol ^-^}-f ^^^^^ relativelv infinite possibilities of motion.- But as the subject is treated onh- briefiv and for method's sake, we are not in a position to draw any mo^c definite conclusions from this «roup, other than to reco-;mse an ap- ;^an^t similarity to the results drawn definitely from the preceding groups. 5. Simple Ideas of Power The idea of power is treated only obscurely by Locke. In the chapter devoted especially to a con.-ideration of this idea, he appears to regard it as fundamentally the idea of active power, i.e.. a productive activity which is the cor;elate of produced change. Active pow-er in the general TcSl is attributed (in an infinite degree) to thr Deity.- and is no more a strictlv simple idea, than are duration, expansion, and motion m the absolute" sense. From the relatively vague hints in Locke s wntmgs. we should expect the "simple" idea of active power to be the least degree of aetfiy oi which we, as spirits, have a clear idea of -A-^"- ^ °f- words, it would be derived introspectively from the sense of activity m r. 11 V. p. .58; viii 9. p. .70; . 6. p. 197; ^viU 6. p. 296; ,.n .0. p. 387; x.i.i 3, p. 3«4; III vi U, p. 67. : iit;;!:" ;"i 1h;::l.« ...... aaa .... ..... .uo. . .. ». .... i pp. ci... 34 RUPERT CLESDON LODGE volition-experiences.'-'' This would s^ivc us a human point of contact with the infinite possibilities of power in general, and expansions of the "uncom- pounded" idea would enable us to realise the powers in other spirits and in nature.-' 6. SiMPLK Ideas of Thinking In the controvcrsv with StillinKfleet, Locke refers twice to thinkinj^ as a "modification" of substance.^' Arc we to conclude that he sometimes rej^ards thinkinR as a mode? It seems plain, from the nature of the ease, that he can not possibly believe that a hypothctically simple idea of sub- stance mif;ht be compounded in such a way that in one compound it would give us tlie mental construction known as solidity, and in another com- pound, the mental construction known as thinkint^. The i)assa:.;c can per- haps best bo explained otherwise. It is in support of his contention that matter mifjht conceivably be endowed with the power of thinkin^.'^that Locke treats solidity and thinking as "modifications." From the context it is plain that he is using the term somewhat loosely in the general sense of "attrilnite," and in the Stillingllcot controversy, as well as in the parallel passage in the Essay, solidity and thinking are, in fact, consistently treated as simple ideas, the correlative attributes of substance. Remembering is at times referred to as one of the "operations of the mind," which in the second book are as a rule regarded as providing us \s\X\\' simple ideas of reflecti.^: "^ At other times, however, it is very defmitelv stated to be a simple mode of the simple idea of thinking, with a suggestion that it is a "collective" mode of this perception-unit.'" Frascr seems to consider it to be a simple idea," and yet, from the account in Chap- ter XIX of the second book, it can hardly be regarded as without "com- position." Considering how indefinite Locke is in the passages referred to for support of the simple-idea theory, and how very definite in the pas- sages which support the view that it is a simple mode, it seems best to •■" II vi 11 l--!- N.TTiii 18 '(I. i.p. 4(17-?. 416. In thr i:ist ;a5«afre the two 'ViiiKiry ni.:ili*ics of spirit," which c!« wh.ri- urc usually r-UTrc.l to ;.s ihi.-.kinr: an,l ■.iUim. are ...LI to h<- thinkin,; .tn.l a fo-.rr, „f arli,.„. if . :i.:'.ivc power. Further refcrenccr, arc tiveu .it the end of the next siroup. under the term "willing." „ ,,,,,^.,.. „-, ,:t ^1. n;ak,s tl-.c ^tr.in^-e nM,t:ikc of rcirirdir.. the ide;, of r^ow, r :ii .1 "mode in th.s eha. ■ '-■ Ind'c ri'V-i^e. I.o. ke f-.r so trea^n., it lie ar, e:.r-. tn think from II xxi I. p. .iO.S, th.-tt it ,-. funda- ment >'.'lv .. "miNcd" mode. If not a "relation," an! beiieve^ this eh,.pter to he in d.rect eontr.a.'u tion lo statcr.ent, els -where to the effect that "power" is a sin-.plc idea. The truth is. that I.oekc is dea ing in eh. x.Ki with the idea of power in general, and does not elearly indi. ate what the s.n,pe id-a is. I have no. been able to discover with certainty what its sim^'o tnod.es are: Martinak. of. cM. 10. sUKRests active and passive j.owcr. and liberty: Fraser l:2')'l. n., sut.-Rcsts vohtion. "Works IV p. 33. "II i 4. 2i. 24. PI- 1J3. 141-42; vi 1. p. I^'); perhaps ilso x 2. p. 2<>4; xi 14, p. 211. "Hi 20. p. 1 10; VI I.p. 150; xix 1. p. 2i»8. Cf.also the similar treatment of "memory." I iii. pp. 109-11; memory is the passive correlate of the art.ve (unction of rememberitu: (II x 7. p.p- 197-98). •1 Fraser 2:42. n. 2. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES i$ recognise the fact that at times Locke tends to regard the various opera- tions of the mind as furnishing us with clear simi-lc ideas— he is definite about this, though not ven,- defm'c as to whether "remembrance" is one of these— while at other times he tends to i educe all the operations of the mind to the fundamental one of "i erception" or simple apprehension, treating sensation, remembrance, etc., as modifications of this one fun- damental idea.'^ That "perceiving" is a simple idea, in fact tlic simple idea of tlnnkmg, our investigation in the previous chapter has already sufticiently estab- lished." In what sense, then, could perceiving be itself considered as a simple mode ? There is one passage in the second book, in which perceiving is referred to, along with choosing, as a mode of thinking. Thinking seems here to be used in its most general sense, as equivalent to conscious- ness," and perceiving appears to mean a definite degree of thinking, i.e., a degree of thinking which is definitely apprehending, as opposed to a less definite degree of consciousness, in which choosing, perceiving, etc., are not yet sufficiently clear to be distinctly apprehended. This passage, however, presents us with an isolated case: and in general, Locke's view undoubtedly is, that perceiving is not a mode in the sense of a degree of thinking, but that it is the simple idea of which the various modes of thinking arc degrees or compounds. "Judging" appears to be regarded by Fraser as a simple idea, doubtless on the ground that it is an operation of the mind observable in introspec- tion.'* But whenever Locke mentions it definitely, he refers to it in ways which indicate that for him it is a mode of thinking. Thus, in the chapter entitled "of the modes of thinking," it is referred to officially as an "opera- tion of the mind and mode of thinking, ''' and from the official account of it in the fourth book," it appears to be distinctly complex: for in it we apprehend the probable agreement or disagreement of two ideas mediately, i.e., by the intervention of others; and this would seem to give us a mode of perception which is partly a degree, in that it falls short of perfect knowl- edge, and partly a collective mode (as involving the apprehension of many ideas, each of which apprehensions would presumably be a simple idea). We shall therefore regard ''■ .Iging," not as a simple idea, but as a simple mode of the simple idea of ilunking. "ReasoninK"' is referred to as a simple idea of reflection, on the ground that it is an operation of the mind about its simple ideas received through "Cf. II xxi 75, p. 373. » II i 4, p. 123; rh. ix. csn. p. 192; xi 14. p. 211; xxviii 14. p. 481; Works IV p. 21; Fraser 1:192. n. •• 11 xxi 17, p. 322. ami I'raser's note ad toe. "Fraser 2:42. n. For further references sec SBfra, note 29. "11 xix 2, p. 299; ct. II vi 1, p. l.')9. •' IV xiv 4, p. 352; xvii 17. p. 409; ct. Misc. Papers. King 2:106. 36 Kit'EKT ci.r.snos i.oiKii: si'iisation. an oiH-ration whidi, wlu^ii ulk-i't..l iip'-n. ii'-, in intn.spcclioii, rurnislus us wiili a siniplr i;reemenl or di.sa-rei'menl of ideas," a.s com- pared with the simple i.k-a of thinkin- (mere apprehension of an id.a or its meanin-), is at once seen to be complex." In fact, it seems to be a, Minple mode of the simple idea, either when considered as a "dcKree hi-her than probabilitv," or as a collective mode of perception.'' "••Hclievinu" is taken bv rra.-.r to be a simple idea, i.resumably (,f an .1" But Locke relers and in the account of belief which wo lind in the f..urth book, il is verv plainly a complex process, at least as complex as knowled-e. from whicli ine tempted to infer from Chapter I of the second book that "doubtiuK" was taken by Locke to be a simple idea of an opera- tion of the i.:ind revealed in introspection,^'' yet it is mentioned too deh- nitelv as a mode of thinking for us to be in doubt as to Locke's real inten- tion.'' It appears to be understood as a simple mode, in the sense of a "11 i 4. -M. J4. M'. IJl. 141; M 1;, J.. Jll; Wnrks IV p. 21. '" II .\ix 2. ],. i'l'l- if. vi J. J.. 1^'), ail.! I -'!>. |,. tV). " l\- xvi! .t, n. 11'. !".'<. 40M. •1114. ;.. I.M; .xv.ii 15. .i2-14. pp. 4'm. 417. 41X. IJO. 11! vi 11, pp. M>->> siH. 4.i. p. 444. '■ 11 XX' 5, ,'. .(14 (wilh rr.i^ir-, n..U' a4 /"<-.); xxi.. .!-'. PP. 417-I.H; III v, II. p. .. " IV i I. p. Um; Tr.i-ir 2:16,S. n. <' Cf. .Vij). riul. X!i, p. 4V.S. " II xxiii .VI. p. 420. "II I 4. p. I-'!. " II xxiii 3I>. p. 417; cf. IV -Tvi 9. p. 377. operation of the mind apprehended in introspection."' detinitelv to "faith" as a mode,'' \V .rk-i IV 21. /■;v. Milli'hr. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES yi dt^Tcc of (isscnt or prohabiliiv, s.iim'lhinK' less than certainty, though it is also iK-rhaps complex, in ihu sense in which a proposition, which contains two i.kas, is more complex tlian a simple apprehension of one idea, and may thushealsoreKarde.lusaclleeiive mo.le uf the simple idea of thmkmt;. •■niscerninK"' appears tn l,e referre.l to as one of the nperatums which the mind, mav relied on a nd observe in itself, and would thus seem to be a simple idea;^'' but in the onlv passage in which Locke speaks decisively, it is dcfmitelv slated to be a mode of thinkinK,'" and as the account of it in ("liaptcr XI seems deliniicly to regard it as complex t it presupposes at least Uo shnple apprehensions, in order that one eas oc distiuKUished from the other), it would thus appear to be a collective mode of the simple idea of thinking;. "Willing" iKiiurallv j^ives rise to doubts. In the preceding chapter wc re^;ardcd it as a simple mode of ihinkiuK. in accordance with the olbcial dccl-iration in the chapter .m the modes of thinking, that volition, equally with reasoniuK. 3U'lKi"!>'. and knowlclKC is such a mode.-'" Furthermore, the account of volition as the power of the mind to .lelermme Us thou^'ht to the producing ... of any action, or an act of the mind knowmv;ly excrtin" that dominion,-" seems to indicate that the co-mtive elements 'iserib.'d to it arc certainlv more complex than the simple apprehension of an ide;, an.l :.ceordinKlv it appears to be a collective mode ot the simple idei ot thinking. However, there are undoubtedly many passav;cs m which Locke re-ards willing, not as complex, but deliniicly as a simple ulea of rcflecti.jn, analogous to thinking." We have ourselves sujJKeslcd, in ac- cordance with indications in Locke's work, that some snnple volitum- experience is the simple idea of active power, and it is clear that Locke ter '3 to identifv willing; and :ictivc power. Ccmscciuently. unless we are prepared to regard power, with its modes, as all modes of thinking;. I't looks as though wc ou^^ht to regard willinR, in the sense of some simple mtro- spcctivc experience of active power, as a simple idea, rather than as a simple mode of thinking. On the other hand, the reasons adduced in the hrst part of this paragraph are similar to grounds which, in other cases, have decided us to treat the terms in question as modes rather than as simple ideas The onlv conclusion which can be at all just to all the evidence is to say that Locke uses "volition" or "willing" in rather a loose sense ar^l understands by it in effect two elementary conceptions: on the one hand, it is definitely cognitive, and as containing a complexity of cognitive «II 14. p. 12.1:51 2. 14. pp. 202. 211. "11 vi 2. p. 159; xi. 1. p. 202. •• II xi.\ 2. p. 2W; xxi 17, p. 322. >i II ixi 15, p. 320. « II i 4. p. 123: vi 1, p. ISO; xxi 30. p. 331; xxiii 15, IS. 30. 32. pp. 40f.. 4U7. 416. 41-; xxvm 14. pp. 480-81; III vi 11, p. 67; cf. Sal. Phit. xii p. 4V5. s> HI I'liKT CLESnOX LODGE «trni(>iits is rii'anUil as a <'<>1U'ctivo iikmU- i.f tin- simplo idea (^f ihinkinR. On iho otliiT liaml. in \\\v sonso nf "mniiviiy." or tlit- arliw jiowtT whirh can initiale flianv'fs <'f inction. wIuiIut aiimnj; ilii)U).;lils nr in the WDrUl of I'lnsical Dbjcrts, it api'iars to W lo iiU-a of thinking;, and prrhaiis rontains, in sonic clriiuntary activily-sonsc, a "simple" idea of active powtr or williii;;. Mor«- than this \vi- tan not say: and cvrn to sav this is to inlroduco a sharper analysis into the prohlcni than is dune 1)y I.oeke liiiuself.''' In smninary, we inij-ln say lluil in this Kf'*"!' ll"' rekitiun of simple idea to sinii)le mode is somewhat similar to the relation diseoverod in the precediii;' !.;ronps. However. I.oeke's aversion to "stieeulalion" jirevcnls him Irom wnrkin- out clearly what lie tindcrstands by perfect thouf^ht, l!ie thon^hl attrilnited to the Deity. It appears to include the whole eoiiteiit of pnssiMc thinkin;.:, and to 1)C intuitive rather than discursive.** McTc than this we are not told: we are not therefore in a pf)sition to draw clear and definite eondusinns. Hut wo may suK}:est hypothelically that perfect thou.ht seems to 1>o like our thouKht, expanded in content, and p- contractions of this cnnlact-unit which is simple apprehension, cither collectively or as a matter of dej^rcc of clearness, etc. 7. SiMri.i; Ii)i:.\s ok Pi.kasuki: and Pain Sati^f-iclifm and uneasiness are referred to both as simple ideas and as mo.l.s.i The ^Touud for their "simpb'ity" is that they arc apprehended in rcileciion. Tlie i-Tound for their bein;; considered as modes is that they are complex forms of pleasure and pain. Locke deals with the whole matter < f i^lensure and pain somewhat briefly. \Vc can, however, extract the fiulowinK conclus'.nns from his treatment: -Pleasure and pain arc used in a somewhat -eneral sense, as c-lass-names which include satisfaction, etc.,— thou-h "uneas'ness" is sometimes iilentilied with "pain." What the r.trictly simjilc idea of I'leasure niul pain may be, is not stated. lUit satisfaction, uneasiness, and the other alTcclive terms in Chaiiter VII of th.c second book seem to be used for the various dcL-rces of these sim]ile ideas wh.ieh liavc ! >cen reco-nised in lan-ua;;c. It is i)robably only in a loose » WilUnR ::ii.l thoui'ht uro u.-l «i -..,!,;•,:>..:, !v '.r i.i rnn^unrti"!! in the MV.wip;; i,:>i5r..-i-,: II xxi 4, p ,1H; Txiii IX, .'.!. ;». I.I.. 'o;-K. 41)1), iU;.f. K.M\-u op. til. I''. Su. ."^a. K>.ht..r Liimi'^m-s IJcscarteJ, Ptincifi" I'hils. 1 ■'). for a siniil.ir u^.d;!'. "II .xiii VI. n. 420. IV ,\vii 14.!.. 107; .[. ^onr. Ifj77.and Study. KinK 1;161-'j2, 171; cf. also Crous. of. til. 29-Mi. ,H "II i 4, p. 123; vii I, p. 100. LOCKE'S SlMPl.F. MODES sense thai Loeke refers to the siinfle i.l.'.is utukr the names of satisfaction and tuieaMness resiK. .lej:rec- mclincalions of an (utUK.ine.l ) simi'U' i'lea of pleasure an.l ot pam. respeetive- ly This unnan.e.1 unit probaMy represents ihi' human p-.mt of eontaet with the infinite posMhilitics of happiness realise.l in .livine exi)cncnec. 8. SiMi'i-i; Ii)i:ah ov Matti.r The eighth j-roup hanllv recjuires discussion in this place. For it is only as "dualities" of matter that solidity, hulk, etc.. are regarded as complex or as modes ..f the atom." Considered as"ideas." they arc consistently reurre.l to as simple. Conse(iuenllv there is not even an api-arent contra.hclion. such as we have met with in the preceding ^;roups. But the ider.s of secondary qualities belong to this ^roup. and in view of the dinieulties which these have occasioned to interpreters, it is perhaps worth while to consider the relation of simple idea to simple mode in the sphere of c<,lnr. as an example of this portion of the j^roup. .,•,•.• As a matter of direct sensory experience, Locke rcRards the ,»ssib.htics of color, which, considered in the abstract, may be taken to be infmitc, as bcine croupcd. for possessors of human sensc-orKans, around certain unitary experiences, white, red, yellow, etc. There is no simple idea of "color " of which W. R, and Y mi^;ht be re^-ar.le.l as complex modihca- tions. ' The simple experiences arc W, R. Y, and "color" is a general term which refers, not to their aspect as experienced contents, but only to the way in which they arc experienced." The modes of these elementary color-experiences are accordiuKlv of t^vo kinds. On the one hand, we have shades or decrees of intensity, saturation, etc.. of the same elemen- tary color-experience, as pink an.l extreme scarlet"" are modes of the simple R-cxpcrience. On the other hand we have such colors as oranue or purple, which result from a combination of R-Y, and R-B, respectively Of these two kinds of modes, the first are dearly "simple" modes, in the sense of dcRrces of the same simple idea, while the second kind, as involving a combination of more than one simple idea, might seem to be nnxcd modes. Locke, however, includes them in the class of simple modes, presumablv because they bcL^ng to the same Koncral class of coL.r. A defi- nitely "mixed" mode would then be. e.g., any example of aud.tion colorce. Manlv^' objects to the first class, on the ^^round thai "shades of^thc same color" is a self-coniradiclory expression. "One simple , color, .he M In addition to th- references given in the preceding ch.apter, cf. also /•..«,. II xxi 42. v '40. " Cf. Fraser. E.l. of Essay, introd. I p. xcvii. ••Cf. Commonpta '■ H„„k. 1671, King 1:10-11. ••Ill iv 16. pp. 41-4i. ••Scarlet \uM is a simple id-a: Xal. Phi!, xii p. 495. •I Op. CI'. SI- 40 RVI'RRT i!.E.\DOX LODGE wrj^cs, "can onlv be itself." Ik would consequently reduce all shades of color to the second ekv of qua. ril. IS. " II ivii ■;, PI'- 40.5-6; IV xi 8. pp. 322-23. */ \/ju r'lpfi-^ ■V' Kinf! 1:197 9^. 22»; .> •V"^" ■-') :> \ "■' CHAPTER III SIMPLE MODES AND IDEAS OF RELATION In view of the relativistic view of knowledge suggested by the con- clusions of our first, an.l eonf.nned by our second, ehapter, it has become advisable to in<,uire what Loeke understands by ideas of relation. Thi. inquirv becomes yet more pressing when wc observe that certain of the terms'hitherto regarded as simple modes-are also explicitly reated by Locke as ideas of relation. As this appears inconsistent with his genera division of complex ideas into modes, substances, and relations, wc shall proceed inducth-elv. beginning with a consideration of the ambiguous Lances in question, and considering in detail how we are to underst nd this apparent contradiction. The following is a complete list of terms undoubtedly referred to in both senses: 1. Numerical relations— all ideas of number. "> Temporal relations— all ideas of duration; time. 3' Spatial relations— all ideas of extension; figure; place. 4 Motion-relations. .S. Power-relations. 6. Thought-relations. 7 Pleasure and pain relations. 8. Matter-relations— primary qualities; secondary qualities. 1. Numerical Relations In regard to the first group, we are told that all our ideas of number contiin in them a secret relation of the parts.'^ This applies, e.g., to ideas ^IZZc. a hundre.1, a million, etc.. i.e.. to all numbers generated Iw the process of compounding simple units so as to produc^^ a new unit> whicli is complex. The elemems within such a com,.lex have a definite J^tion to one another. For instance, in the number five which consists of five "ones," each of these units bears to the whole number the relation of one fifth, and stands to the sum of the remaining mfits in the propor- tLal relation of 1 A. On the other hand, in such a nun.ber as one hundred each of the hundred constituent units, while in itself the same as any urn n the complex group called five, stands to its whole m the relation, not of on fifth nt oi one hundredth, and to the sum of its felk,w-units in the rdatln. not of 1:4, but of 1:99. In calling this a "secret" relation of the parts, Locke apparently means that we do not ordinarily take notice of ■ II sii 3. p. 215; cf. Manly, op. cU. 46, 50. 53. « II xii 3, p. 310. t \ G .jr M.ANi 42 RUPERT CLENDON LODGE this relation of the elements amonj; themselves in the various complex groups known as five, one hundred, ctr . we notic' almost exclusively the position of the particular comiilex group in the number-series, and regard each of the numbers as an enlargement of a unit v.'hich is considered as throughout identical with itself.' Arc such numbers as five, one hundred, etc., to be regarded as ideas of relation? Simple modes they certainly are: for they are all enlarged The ([ucslion seems to indicate that, in dealing with such a corn- ones. plex as the idea five, there are two view-points present in Locke's thought:— (1) that which regards such a number as a complex idea composed of many simple ideas, which are identical, all equally "ones"; and (2) that which regards the value of the unit as relative to the whole of which it is a part, varying according as it is a component part of five, or one hundred, etc. In the first view, emphasis is laid on the genesis of the ideas from the simple idea of unity, all larger numbers being considered as mental mul- tiples of this. The second view is not concerned with genesis, ^ut the numbers correspond to points on an absolute series from zero to mnnity, within which relations may be discovered.* The first view is concerned with the human understanding: the second with the objective knowable. The first view is psychological, the second purely logical.' 2. Ti:.Mi'('K.\L Rf-LATigns We are sinii::'.\- Uul Uiat all our ideas of duration contain in them a secret relation <.d '.l.e parts. By "secret" Locke appears to understand what we should call "implicit." i.e., a relation of the parts which passes unnoted because our attention is directed elsewhere— in other words, be- cause our view-point is dilTercnt from a view-point in which the relation would become explicit. The statement means that such ideas as minute, hour, day, etc., contain in them an implicit relation of the parts of which they are composed. Assuming, e.g., that one minute contains twenty "moments"— i.e., that during that time the passage of twenty ideas can be apprehended in the train of their ordinary succession— the relation of one of these elementary "parts" to the whole would be one twentieth, whereas in an hour the relation would be one twelve-hundredth. Similarly, the proportional relation of the unit to the sum of its fellow-units would » II \vi 5. 7, pp. 271-72. 273-74. •Su'h reLitions m.-»y be either internal or ext-.>rnal. Locke has only mentioned internal relations. But tlusc art uUim.ittly intellitiiblc only I,y reference to the external relations furnished by the i.nsition of the numbers in the absolute si-rics. For example the internal relation of parts (say 2 and 3) in the numbir five can only be undirstood by reference to the relative position of 2. 3. and 5, on the infinite nUTiibiT-ieries. • For thi'; distinction, see further, Carl Muller-Braunschweig, Die Melhode tiner rtinin Elhik. Derlin. 1908. pp. 6-l(). LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 43 be, in the first case 1 :19, and in the second case 1 :1199. From a point of view, then, in which such relations would become explicit, ideas such as minute, hour, day, etc., would be termed "relative." "Time" is also dcfmitcly treated by Locke as a relative idea, even in the chapters which are dealing with ideas of duration officially as simple modes. The point of view from which it is an idea of relation regards it as a determinate, distinguishable jwrtion of infinite duration, i.e., as a system of time-distances reckoned from certain known human points of contact with absolute duration. These constitute landmarks in the boundless ocean of eternity, and enable us to answer by reference to them all questions of "when^" "how long?," etc. Temporal ideas are thus seen to be all "relative."' In our earlier chapters, however, we have considered all these ideas to be simple modes of the simple idea, i.e., as expansions or multiples of the elcmcntarv' duration-unit. No emphasis whatever has been laid upon a possible relation of the "parts" of such ideas: attention has been focused solely upon the building up of such complexes by repeating and adding, i.e., iay "enlarging" the simple idea. It is clear, then, that wc have to do with two different view-points. The modal view-point is genetic, and deals with the human formation of complex ideas on the basis of a human poin of contact with the infinite series of the knowable. It is concerned with the human understanding, and may be termed psychological. The relational view-point has nothing to do with genesis, or with the distinction of simple and complex ider ■. Relational thought moves solely in the sphere of the intelligible, the objective knowable, which in the present case is an absolute duration-series within which certain relations can be discovered. This point of view is not psychological, but rigidly logical. 3. Spatial Relations As with duration, so with extension. All ideas of extension contain in them a secret relation of the parts. That is to say, a relation between the "parts" of an Inch, a yard, a mile, etc., which has hitherto remained implicit, would, if a certain view-point were adopted, become explicit. Hitherto the ideas of inch, yard, etc., have been treated as simple modes of the sensible point, the unit in expansion: but from the new standpoint we should realise that they are all ideas of relation. Amongst these relative ideas of extension, two stand out as especially clear cases of relativity: the idea of figure, and the idea of place. Figure is described, in the chapter on the simple modes of space, as nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extension, or circum- scribed space, have amongst themselves; and place, in the some chapter, • Cf. e.J.. 11 xiv 17-18. pp. 246-47; xv 5-8. pp. 261-64; xxvi 3-4, pp. 436-37. 44 RUPERT CLEXDON LODGE as inciccd elsewhere also, is described as a system of distance-relations, orKanised around certain human points of contact with absolute space. These points of contact serve as landmarks, to denote the position of liniie real beings, in respect to one another, in the uniform infinite ocean of space.' From tliis we see that figure and place, as well as all other ideas of extension, arc "relative." Hitherto, however, we have consistently treated these ideas as simple modes of the sensible point ; and, in fact, it is sutficiently clear that they can legitimately be regarded as expansions of this simple idea. If then they are defi..itcly treated by Locke as "relative," his standpoint must be diilerent, and we must here also have two points of view. In the modal view, the genesis of the complex ideas from the simple idea is prominent. This is a human action, on the basis of a human point of contact with absolute space. As concerned, therefore, primarily with the human un- derstanding, such a view-point may fairly be termed psychological. The relational view, on the other hand, is not primarily concerned with genesis, or indeed with the human standpoint, at all. It deals essentially with the objective knowable,— in the present case with absolute space— and must be regarded as purely logical. 4. Motion-Relations Motion is mentioned by Locke as an idea which clearly has something relative in it. If we turn to a later chapter, we find that he regards motion as a continuum, the parts of which come into being successively, in such a way that there is a relation of diversity between all the "parts" of any motion which can be considered as complex.* In this way a complex idea of motion, .-;uch as we find in the mo-les, sliding, walking, running, etc., would be treated as an idea of relation, the relativity being constituted by the diversity of the successive "parts" of the motion. Here too, then, we have two view-points:— (1) the modal, the nat' e of which has been sufhcienlly indicated, in the present as well as in preceding chapters; and (2) the relational, which contains no reference to the genesis of the com- plex idea "sliding" etc., from repetitions of the simple motion-idea. Motion is here taken in the absolute sense, as an infinite continuum, and is considered apart from human unacrstanding and psychology. The view-point is here objective or logical, in the sense already explained. 5. Power-Relations The idea of power is stated definitely to mclude in it some kind of relation— a relation to action or change— and "powers" in substances are ' II Jiii 7-10, pp. 222-24; :jv 5-8. rp- 261-64; Jsi .1. p. .110; xjvi 3. 5. pp. 436, 4.!7-38. In the Journal (KinR 2:176-82) sij.m is itself rnnsidcred as a complex of relations. • II .ixi J. pp. JIO, 311; i.-.vii 3, y. 441. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 45 ikcliircd to be only relations to other substances .» In view of the obscurity which appears to attach to Locke's treatment of this idea, we have not been able to discover its simple modes. But in ihc passages with which we have at present to do, it is sulTiciently plain that ideas of power are rc},'ardcd as correlative to changes or actions, in much the same way as that in which cause and effect are correlative ideas."> For our present purpose it is enough to point out that the view-point here is other than the modal view elaborated in preceding chapters. The standpoint here is "olijccii\e," and the view-point from which ideas of power are considered to be "relative," is not psychological, but logical. 6. Thought-Relations Thought, like motion, consists in a continuous train of succession. Consequently, between the different "parts" of this train, relations of diversity are discoverable, and all complex thoughts can thus be regarded as "relative." For instance, in a train of thought symbolised by a-b-c-a-f, not onlv are the contents ot the ideas for the most part different, but also, since o "perishes the moment it begins," i.e., as b comes into being and takes its pli'oc in consciousness, the second o differs from the first a at least in having a "different beginning of existence." Hence in any com- l)lcx idea-sequence, as in the case of modes such as remembering, reasoning, etc., there are always relations of diversity between the constituent elements of the thought-sequence, and such modes can be regarded as ideas of relation." Furthermore, when we reflect, such ideas as thinking, reason- ing, fearing, etc., are always considered, not as self-subsistent, but as relative to the idea of a "supporting" mind, or spirit-substance. We apprehend the "necessarj' connection" of such ideas as perceiving, think- ing, reasoning, knowing, etc., with inherence or being supported. Inher- ence, however, is a "relative idea" superadded to thinking in a inan, and the idea of thinking on the one side, and the idea of a "support" on the other, are plainly correlatives." Arc we to infer that the above statements are inconsistent with the view previously maintained, viz., that such modes as reasoning, knowing, etc., are qualitative or quantitative enlargings of the simple apprehen- sion-unit? It seems more cautious to conclude that we are dealing here also with two different, but not necessarily inconsistent, view-points. On the one hand we have the genetic, psychological, aspect, from which rea- • II ^%i i. 19. pn. .110, .123: xxiii ly .17. pp. 420-21. 422-2,1; %xx\ 8. p. .SIO. There appear. »l»o '» »« a rciat.on of coexistence between the .liflcrciit "powers' in a substance: see, e.g.. II xxiu 6, pp. 396-97. i°Cf. Fraser 1:30S. n. " n Jxiii 35, pp. 420-21; xxvii 3. p. 441. '• II xxiii 5. p. 395; cf. Works IV p. 21. 46 RUPERT CLENDON LODGE soninK, thinking, etc., have been treated as simple modes. On the other we have the objective, logical, aspect, from which they are here regarded as relative. 7. Pleasure and Pain Relations The simple modes of the pleasure-pain group are nowhere referred to explicitly as ideas of relations. But in two definite ways it is implied that they also can be considered as relative. In the first place, like other complexidcas, they would necessarily contain in them a "secret relation" of the parts, such as we have already considered in the cases of number, duration, and expansion. There is, however, a diflerence, in that the above groups are quantitative enlargements of their respective simple ideas, whereas the pleasure-pain modes are qualitative. But in any case there is room here also for proportional relations." In the second place, as ideas of sensation and reflection, they are not self-subsistent, but, like the ideas of thinking dealt with in the preceding paragraphs, are relative to the idea of a spirit -substance, in which they are thought to "inhere." So that here also we are aV)lc to distinguish from the genetic, modal view already considered, a relational view which is not psychological, but logical. 8. Matter-Relations Under the heading "simple modifications of matter" we have included all primary and secondary qualities. Are these considered as also relative? Figure and motion we have already found to be relative; but what are we to say of bulk, texture, and the other primary qualities? In the second book of the Ei:say it is stated that bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts (5c I. of a substance), all include some kind of relation in them. From the context it is to be presumed that a relation between the "parts," i.e., atoms which compose these qualities, is intended; so that bulk, texture, etc., arc relative in a sense similar to that considered above in dealing with the groups of numerical, temporal, and spatial relations. In the fourth book we find that primary qualities in substances are related (1) to one another in the same substance, by way of coexistence, (2) to motions, etc., occurring in other substances, and (3) to the secondary qualities which their "hidden constitution" in the substance tends to produce in percipient subjects. Similariy, secondary qualities are relative (1) to relations of bulk, figure, motion, etc., in the physical substance, (2) to similar relations in surrounding physical objects, with which their particular substance of ■•Ilxxviii l.p. 471. y -} LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 47 inherence stands in ccmmercio, and (3) to the constitution of the sense- organs in a sense-percipient subject." ..,,.. u* Here again we find ourselves forced to distinguish in Locke s thought two different view-points, whether we are dealing with "qualities" in the strict sense, or with "ideas" of such qualities. In the former case, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, texture and color, etc., can be regarded as physical complexes of physical atoms; the point of view is physical, and deals with the genetic relation between simple atoms and the complex qualities which they build up. From the strictly relational view-point it is ultimately the physical relations between the atoms which constitute complex groups to which attention is drawn. In both cases the view- point is physical, and deals with physical relations between atoms, so far as these enter into complexes; but in the modal view, it is the genetic relation between simple atom and complex quality, which is emphasised; whereas the specifically relational view-point is logical rather than genetic, and draws attention especially to relations of coexistence between the atoms which constitute the complex. Finally, in the first case, the com- plex is considered as a whole, whereas in the second it is a mere aggregate. So far we have been considering primary qualities in the stnct sense, in which they are taken as "qualities" rather than as "ideas"; and so far as we confine ourselves to this atomic view-point, the distinction between genotic and "logical" aspects may appear somewhat subtle. But if we attend to the truly modal view-point, from which the secondary tdeas^ve considered as simple modes of the simple ideas of color, sound etc., here we notice at once the sharp distinction between human and physical, psychological and logical, which we have already discovered m the pre- ceding groups. The truly modal view-point, then, here as elsewhere, is psychological. The relational is physical, or, in the sense above indicated. ^°^'ln summing up the results obtained from our study of the separate groups, wc can state (1) that in every group Locke has treated certain ideas sometimes as simple modes, and sometimes as relative, without any apparent consciousness of inconsistency; (2) that a further examination has disclosed two main view-points, which may very weU be consistent (a) the modal, and (b) the relational. Both deal with relations-as indeed does all knowledge; but the modal view is concerned with the relation between simple and complex ideas, whereas the specifically relational view deals mainly with the relations between the elements which together con- stitute complexes.-' In the modal view, the complexes are regarded as> wholes, as unities bound together by the name which symbolises them; in ..II iv 4. p. .54; viii W. pp. 175-76; xxi 3, pp. 3i0.1.; IV vi 7 ,2. .4 pp. 255-63. 264-65. etc. Cf. Fraser 2:261 n.; Tongers, o^ cit. 13-15. 19. 26-29, 32, 38-49, 52-53. 57-58. 64. » Cf. al»o II »xv 6, p. 429. 48 RUPERT CLEXDOX LODGE the relational view, the eoniplexes arc treated as a^'Rrcpates. Finally, as we have seen throu-hoiit, the modal view is Kenelie, and is concerned with the human understandinK. with its human points of contact with the abso- lute series; whereas the relational view is concerned only with the objective knowable. 'lln- modal view is psycholoj^ical, the relational loj^ical. We may now, perhaps, compare with our results so obtained, the posi- tion taken generally in the literature. In the first place we may notice that Locke's treatment of the same ideas now as modes, now as relations, is usually considered to be a serious inconsistency. The basis for this judgment is usually the belief that the classification of complex ideas as modes, subslances,"and relations, is intended as a strictly logical division, in which the species are mutually exclusive." This belief is not shared by Fraser, who regards the division as a "history of the gradual awakening of the individual mind to an ever imperfect interpretation of the reality first presented in sense"; but he too regards Locke's position as inconsist- ent." In connection with our second gc ral conclusion, we may observe that, while the double view-point is generally recognised, it is not understood in the sense indicated above. The distinction between complexes viewed as wholes and complexes viewed as aggregates is not accepted," the dis- tinction between the genetic and analytic view-points is hardly recognised at all in the present case;'' and it is usually held that the relational view is fundamental, while the modal is a mere species of this, being found where Locke's thought is not sufficiently profound to penetrate down to the rela- tional view. The difference thus apparent between what we have found m Locke on the one hand, and the views attributed to him in the literature on the other, suggests that the relativistic view current in the literature, and the view of ideas of relation really held by Locke, are not the same. Locke's view, for instance, is very specific, and deals only with very definite kinds of relations— e.g., relations between elements of an aggregate, between elements and the whole which they constitute, whether this whole is a material or spiritual substance, the inter-relations of substances, and finally, such general relations as cause and effect, equal, more, etc.,— these are typical of the relations actually dealt with by Locke. To attribute to him in any modem sense the relativistic view of knowledge is an anachronism : ..C(. von Benoit, op. eil. 19, 24; .Ma:,Iy. op. cil. 46-47; Green, op. cit. 20. 21; Martinak. op. cU. 50; OUion, op. cit. 200-1, note. "Fraser 1:215,216,426 notes. >• For example von Benoit regards all complexes as wholes, and von Ilertling regards them all as mechanically conjoined aggrcRatcs (von Hcrtling, op. lil. 9, 12). .. Unless the distinction between Vor-.tMung and Pcnrif is intended to convey this distinction. Oll.on borrows the distinction of VorsUllung and Bfsnff from Riehl. Riehl does not thmk Locke makes the distinction: Ollion. on the contrary, believes that it is recognised by Locke. y LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 49 and consequently, as far as the literature treats the relatmstic view as fundamental, and the modal view as a half-understood species of this, the view expressed is that of von Bencit or Ollion. etc.. but not of Locke. From Locke's own standpoint, the results stated in the text may be per- fectly consistent. From a genetic, psychological view-point, certain ideas > are regarded as mental m'Jtiples of what, for the human understanding, are "simple" ideas. From an analytic, logical view-point, the same ideas > are treated as points in an infinite, objective, absolute series, within which relations can be discovered between any one point and any other point. ; » Cf von Bcnoit. op. cil. 22. 24; Ollion, op. cit. e.p. 201. Fra«r point, out clearly that "Locke has in view .i'the rettToni. con.titution 'a, .uch" etc., (. :426). From the view-pomt of X^Zi^Zrl^t- H irunneccsary to enter upon a detailed examination o. the -' »' «'«;;™" ;"i^°'7 ^ ,^^^^^^^^^^ ence to Ucke. by H. G. Hartmann, Lockf a conslructnt relatmsl. New York, 1912. and A ntw tonc,p»on of relativity and Locke, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1914. " Cf. II XXV 5. 7, pp. 428-29; Prater 1 :42S. CHAPTER IV MODES AND SUBSTANCES. THE MEANING OF MODES It remains to consider the relation of simple modes to substances. But before this can be done at all adequately, it will be necessary to indi- cate briefly the relation of simple modes to complex modes: for in relation to substances, modes arc taken without qualification, and in fact the majority of the modes discussed in this connection by Locke arc "mixed" or complex modes. If we add to this the fact that certain terms (e.j,'., "running") are spoken of in the chapter on simple modes, as simple, and in the chapter on mixed modes, as mixed, and that in the literature con- siderable difTiculty is experienced in attempting to regard as simple, modes which are, however, definitely so designated by Locke,' it will be realised that here is a probleni which should, if possible, be solved before we proceed to inquire into the relation of modes to substances. Let us first of all consider the ambiguous instances in Locke's work. The idea of running is said to be a simple n de of motion: that is, it is a multiple or complex form of the simple idea of motion, a kind of movement in which the simple idea is repealed in such a way as to constitute the com- plex idea of running-movement. So far as it is considered merely as a com- plex movement, it is regarded as a "simi)le" mode. But if we consider it as swift or slow, this introduces considerations of time and space, and thus our idea becomes "mixed," i.e., is constituted by complex considerations, not only of motion, but also of duration and extension. Similarly, if it is regarded as a mode of action, there is usually some reference, explicit or implicit, to the correlative idea of power, and "running" is again a mixed mode, formed by the complex admixture of the two simple ideas, (1) motion, (2) power, especially active power. In the same way, apparently, Locke would regard the idea of "speaking" as a simple mode, so far as we treat it merely as a scries of complex motions, but as a mixed mode, so far as we regard it as an action, i.e., so far as the correlative idea of power also enters into the idea. "Consideration" and "assent" are also simple modes, so far as we treat them as complex forms of thinking alone, but as soon as they are regarded as actions of the mind, i.e., as soon as the cor- relative idea of power also enters in, the ideas in question constitute mixed modes. So too with colors. So far as these are regarded merely as different shades or degrees of simple color-ideas, they are treated as simple modes; ' Names which may be regarded as either simple or miied modes, according to Locke, are: — (I) modes of motion (slide, roll, run, walk, speak, etc.), as in II xviii 2, pp. 2')4-'>.S; cf. also xxii 10. p. 387; (2) mod<< of thinking (consideration, assent, etc.), II xxii 10. p. 387; (3) modes of color. II xviii 4. p. 295. In the r.ature of the case, almost any 'errn might be so regarded. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES SI but if considerations of shape also enter in (and it is seldom that this spatial factor can be entirely banished), then our ideas of scarlet, purple, etc., arc mixed modes. For example, the idea of the rainbow is constituted, partly by reference to simple ideas of color, but partly also by reference to its bow-like shajx;, if not also to its position in the sky. Such an idea is readily seen to be "mixed," i.e., constituted by reference to more than one kind of simple idea. Locke's thouRht is here not difficult to grasp. It has reference, not to the names, which can stand, as we see, either for simple or for mixed modes: but to the ideas themselves, i.e., to how we think the idea. If we think it in reference to one kind of simple idea only, we have a simple mode; but if we think it in reference to more than one kind of simple idea, we have a mixed mode.' This seems clear enough. But if we turn to the literature, we find that a number of considerations appear to reveal diffi- culties underlying this simple treatment. Thus, for instance, Manly follows Leibniz in regarding the idea of figure as a mixed mode, on the ground that it is compounded of (1) straight lines and (2) curved lines, which are two very different ideas. He similarly follows the same author- ity in regarding the modes of motion as mixed instead of as simple modcE. He points out further that "tunes" include, not only sound, but also pitch, time, and rhythm, and states that "words" also are not exact repetitions of any one simple sound, and further are always associated with some meaning. Tunes and words therefore are regarded as constituting mixed modes. Shades of color, he further insists, are always mixtures of different colors, and our only knowledge of tastes and smells is also of different kinds, so that these, too, are mixed, not simple, modes. Similarly, certain modes of thinking, such as remembrance and contemplation, contain a time- reference, and other conceptions which are certainly not multiples of "thinking" in any strict sense; and "love, hatred, desire, joy," and other modes of pleasiu-e-pain, are too complex to be regarded as simple modes.* These criticisms show traces of a common misconception of the differ- ence between simple and mixed modes. They seem to rest upon an erro- neous conception of what constitutes a simple idea. For instance, the view which regards "figure" as a complex mode insists that straight lines and curved lines are different simple ideas. For Locke neither of ihem is a simple idea. Both arc alike simple modes, constituted by repetition of the simple expansion-unit, and consequently "figure" is only a more com- plex form of that same unit, and, so far as it is thus a multiple of one simple idea, certainly answers to the definition of a simple mode. In the other cases insisted upon by Leibniz and Manly, it is simply a question as to Ml xxii 1, p. 381. • Leibnii, SoHt. Ess. 240a, 24.Sa, etc. Msaly, of. cil. 46, SO-SJ. )....,/ <> RiPEKT ci.iisnos i.onoE wluit is lh.m;;ht in ihr idea; if, r^. in a Uiiic, ali, loo, cmisiili rations ol vilch would not fall oiit-i.h' thf itlia of souml; hut nuisidcralions of t^W]-') would certainly ituroduee alien considerations. The 'ase stems to h< Iiarallil to the ca •• of "swift or slow" motions considered ahovc. That is, if atu-ntion is ]>aid aho to tempo, the tune wouhl h« a mixed mode, jusl as it would also if we paid attention to its affective qualities; hut if we consider it from the point of view of sound alone, wilhoul thinkiiiL'. <•: temp«)-(iucstit>ns at all. it would lej;itimatcly enough be regarded as a simple mode. So loo in the other cases. In fact, the criticisms onl^ serve to imlieate a dilTennce between a view which is that of the critics hut not of Locke, and the view which he does hold: viz., that so far as any mode is thought as a complex multii)le of one idea, it constitutes a simple mode: and that so far as it is thoujjht as a muhipl*- ol more than one idea, it constitutes a mode which is "mixed." We can now turn to the question as to the relation between i.-iodc and substance. In the literature, forr the most i)art, emphasis is laid, us indeed it is so larKely by Locke himself, on their diflerenccs. Modes are adequate and tme. Modal knowled^;c constitutes science, so far as this i , possiljle for man, simple modes furnishing the filling out of mathematics, and mixed modes constituting the main loncepts of ethical science. Subsiance. nt)):i-nio that modal constructions, instead of hanging loose in the air. rtxeive a local habitation and a name. Apart from such a • Works IV n. 21-22. tti. Cf. T./>/•;.U-s, an- im-rc ab- straction^, atv! ofinsi.(i»u-ntly tlu-ir imtllii)U-s, Uie minlcs, w hitli (lerivi- what contact they ba\c with physical reality primarily IhrouKh the inclia- tin?^ of the Mm\Ac ideas, ar«; also the mcnst abstraction;;. Hut wi far as the siniple idea., arc treated strictly as '.he "|.o\\vrs" of substatucs, so far also the modal construclioti , based iiiion such "powers" receive a connec- tion with ihe world of interacting substances. Thus wi- see that, from the view-point of structure rather th.-n of function, substaneis are immediately corfvlaliv*- to simple idias, and mediately correlative to the n\ulliple^ of these, VIZ., to the mixlcs, both simple and niixcd.^ So much for the Rcneral view. It is pos^ihle, however, to -ipprchend somewhat more clearly the strvutural relation between mohus and ostrakismos. A nominal essence is a collection of simple ideas (and also often of their multiples) of various kinds: the collection, hert: aiso. is made by the minil, though it may 1 e obsirvtd in nature, and its unity is given by the mind and fixed by the name, as e.g., in the cases of Kold and horse. In both casts the "unity ^iven by the nr.nd" means that the structure must exhibit logical consistency, and it is easy to see that mixed modes and nominal essences have thus a certain resemblance." Fraser goes so far as to regard them, not merely as closely resembling, but as identical, and there is warrant even for this extreme view in Locke'.s own words. But a close comparison indicates certain ditlercnce Thus, the mode is composed wholly of multiples, whereas the nomimd essence may contain also simi)le. un-multipliod ideas, and thus may consist oiJy V>artially. if at all, of n.uUiples. From thi.s would follow the further differ- ence, that the correlation between nominal essence and -'support" is more close and immediate, as a nile, than that between mode ami s"pport. which would always be mediated by the simple ideas multiplied in the mode. Dther differences.' as e.g.. thtt, while both arc constructed in accordance vith ideals of consistency, the nominal essence has a more definite relation than the mode, to the acrlual world of physical existence— such differences •11 lii 4. p. 215; Works IV pp. 11. 17; c(. Fraser 1:42.S. II xxii 1, 5. 0. pp. .IHl. .!8.3, JlCi, .^«x 4. PV). -.9«.5IK); III v 4, 6, 7, 10, pn. 41, 44-47, 49-50. 54 RVPERT CLENDON LODGE bclonf;, perhaps, rather to the function-side than to the St.. .spect, with which alone, however, we have at present to deal. Summing up, then, the results of our investigation, wc can say that simple modes closely resemble the nominal essences of substances, but that the structure of the mode is on the whole (l^l more complex, and (2) less directly related to the "support "-idea found in substance, to which, however, it is mediately correlative.^ The Meaning of Simple Modes Up to the present point in our inquiry, we have prepared and classified a complete list of the simple modes referred to by Locke, and have con- sidered them with reference to simple ideas, to ideas of relation, to mixed modes, and to ideas of substances. We should now, perhaps, be in a posi- tion to sum up our conclusions as to the meaning, or structure, of simple modes, V>cforc passing: on to consider their epistemologieal function in Locke's philosophy. With this object, it is possible, cither to take as our starting-point the simple idea, and to deal with the question on its psychological side, i.e., as concerned with the human understanding, or on the other hand, to begin with the conception of i system of interacting substancL-s, and maintain the objective, logical, view-point. We shall begin with the simple idea. For Locke the simple idea represents a human point of contact with the objective knowablc. This knowablc is a vast ocean of being in which oxu- thoughts might lose themselves, but the simple idea is finite, clear, deter- minate, and represents from its various aspects, the smallest portion of the knowablc of which we have a clear and distinct idea. All knowledge which is to have value for human beings must have reference to the simple idea; all conceptions, however sublime and remote they may seem, must, if they are to possess human meaning, ultimately terminate m these simple ideas of sensation and reflection. The simple mode possesses such a reference. It is a simple idea writ large, a multiple idea of sensation or reflection, a complex idea formed by compounding or enlarging a single simple idea, by repeating mentally the simple idea, and joining together into a new unity the mental repeti- tions. To such enlargement there is no limit in the nature of things. A simple mode may represent I, 2, 3 . . . n rei)elitions of the simple idea of sensation. The only iimilations to the process are, theoretically, the demands of logical consistency, and practically, the usefulness of such a complex constniciion for jiurposes of human inter-communication in life or in science. In all such processes of mental construction, the human ' II xxiii .17, P 422; III v U. r- 52; vi 28. pp. ^S■T^. Work* IV pp. 13. 17. 21-22. 29. etc.; d. von H«rtlini!. op. 111. JS; cl. Fraser l;42i, n. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MOPES 5$ value is derived from the content or "material" of the conccpaon: and this is given in the simple idea of sensation or reflection, of which the mode represents n repetitions. So much for the "matter" of the simple mode. It is necessary to consider also its "form," i.e.. the law which guides the repetitions and conjunctions, and gives to the new compound that unity which is marked by the name. Locke lavs very little emphasis on this aspect of the simple mode; but what he does say indicates that the demands of logical consist- ency plav an important part in such constructions. That is to say, the laws of identity and contradiction would have to be observed in repeating the same identical idea, and the totality would have to represent the sum of its parts. As to the unity, while Locke is far from anticipating Kant s doctrine of the Categories as laws of the "functions of unity in synthesis." it does seem that the new unity is introduced into the synthetic process of mode-formation by "the mind."' In other %vords, modes, as mental con- structions, obey the laws of mental construction, i.e.. the laws of logic. Comparison with ideas of relation and ideas of substances emphasises the close relation between simple ideas and simple modes, and shows that (1) the view-point as regards modes is genetic rather than strictly analytic, (2) substances and modes are to be considered as mediately correlative, i.e., modal constructions do not hang in the air, but have, in human knowl- edge, an ultin- e relation to a system of interacting substances, which for Locke appears constitute the final view of the knowable. If we now reverse our standpoint, it is possible to commence with the concept of substances, and ivLrace our steps. Reality for Locke consists, as we have seen, in the system of interacting substances. But in relation to human knowledge, each substance consists of (1) an eleme it of "sup- port" and (2) a correlative complex of "ideas." These ideas which con- stitute the complex nominal essence of the substance, are of two kinds:— (a) apprehension-units, i.e., apprehensibles which are clear and distinct, and are of so small extent that no process of mental composition goes into their apprehending, and (b) multiples of these apprehension-units, built up out of such units by the mental process of composition. The first kind arc what Locke calls simple ideas: the second include what Locke terms modes, both simple and mixed. A simple mode is any multiple of any one simple idea: a mixed mode is any multiple of two or more different simple ideas. Simple modes may thus be met with in expenence. viz., as con- stituent elements of nominal essences. But they may also be produced by purely mental construction without reference to actual expenence ot them in given substances, though always with reference to actual expenence (in substances) of the simi)le ideas of which they are mental enlargements. • II xtU 20. p. 291; cf. von Bcnoit, of. eit. 23, 30-31, 78. 50 inpKRT CLExnoy lodge The rxtcnt lo which such simple ideas arc enlarged depends always on considerations of practical convenience, for the purposes of intercommuni- cation in actual life ;ind in scientific research.' A simjilc mode is thus, from th? point of view of structure, a logically constructed multiple (or fraction) of experienced units which help to constitute the nominal essences of substances which, in their real essences, are sujtposed to he in a process of interaction. • This ii not tn be r.ndrrstood in a too utilitarian st-nsc. I-ocke also admits the aesthetic and play impuL-ics: ?ee 11 xviii 4, p. J95. CHAPTER V LOCKE'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE-THE FUNCTION OF SIMPLE MODES All knowledge, according to Locke, consists in propositions. Proposi- tions are the statement in words of an apprehended relation of agreement or disagreement between two ideas. 'Consequently, knowledge in general is a body of statements, each of which corresponds to an apprehended agreement or disagreement of ideas. General knowledge is constituted by apprehcntlcd agreements, etc., between general ideas, sensory knowledge by apprehended agreements between sensory ideas, and modal knowledge by apprehended agreements between ideas which are modes.' Thus niathematics presents us with a body of agreements apprehended in the case of points, lines, surfaces, numbers, and other simpV :iodes of the same kind. Ethics similarly presents us with a body of cc .r rmities or agree- ments discovered between proposed actions on the one hand, and the eternal law of right and wrong, on the other. If we now narrow our enquiry- to the case of modal knowledge where the modes known are "simple," as in the case of mathematics, we at once notice that this knowledge has two opposite poles. On the one hand, it is a mental construction, a systematic edifice erected, in accordance with the laws of logic, on the basis of agreements apprehended between simple m.odes, i.e., between ideas which are themselves mental constructions, complex ideas. On the other hand, vhe ultimate basis in content is prc- cisclv the elements which constitute these complex ideas, i.e., is the given content of the simple idea, of which the simple mode is, as we have seen, a mental multiple. To which of these poles are we to ascribe the knowl- edge-value of modal knowledge? To the "form," to the laws of thought, in accordance with which the mind frames its various constructions,— or to the content, to the ultimate "material," which is given in the simple ideas? . . Let us take an instance. A triangle, as Locke is perpetually pointing out, has its interior angles together equal to two right angles. On what does this truth depend? Does it depend on the mental construction, which out of "points" has gradually, by the processes of repetition and juxtaposition, built up lines and angles, and so formed the triangle, and similariy also ihe right angles? Is it a case, as Kant would say, of reason apprehending only what she has already, in accordance with her own laws, constructed, or herself placed in the figure? Or, on the other hand, are 1 Cf. e.g.. IV iv 12, p. 2M. In what follows, we shall confine ourselves, for the sake of brevity and clearness, to ideas of sensation, rather than include ideas of reflection. J 58 KLTERT CLEXDOS LODGE we to regard such a figure as a lrian):le as, after all, only a sense-perceivable "point'* writ large, mukiplicil, indeed, by the mind, but still rctaininR its sense-perteivalile eliaraeler, its given character peculiar to every point in the triangle, a given content distinct from the given contents of all other sensible ideas'' Are we to regard the truth of the proposition as de]>eiuiing less on th" rational nature of the construction and more on the peculiar cliaraclcristics given in the constituent elements of the dilTercnt lines and angles' Is the straightness of the lines and the angularity of the angles son^.chow given along with the given points out of which the figure has been put togeilier? That is, as no amount of rational mental construction could give us triangles by using colors or sounds as its ultimate material, but necessarily confines itself to jidints capable ot expansion into lines and angles, does n. til. 178, 195-98. L. i. ;/.At\'^- LOCKE'S OIMPLE MODES 59 I stimulus and the mcntai reaction, that there is nothing in the idea as such to suggest that it has any external cause, and that in fact we infer to the cxistci.ce of a world of physical causation only because of the involuntari- ness with which certain ideas come to us, and of the f)leasure-pain expe- riences which accompany them. We do not know the relations which ex- ternal objects may possess, whether to one another or to the knowing sub- ject ; and the whole question as to the origin of our ideas is thus unanswer- able. But such a question is, after all, of secondary importance. The real ^ problem for Locke is not the origin, but the knowledge-value, of our ideas. This knowledge, so far as we consider ideas from their empirical aspect, as they are given in contingent experience, can only be empirical, contingent, probable. A knowledge which is to transcend contingency must deal with"^ relations apprehended between ideas as ideas, i.e., as mental constructions v. which present us, not with the contingency of fact, but with the universality and necessity of logic. Consider, e.g., a complex idea, such as is exempli- fied by any mode. It is formed partly by a process of abstraction. Tliat is to say, we omit the context, the "here" and "now" of the empirically given, and retain the bare core of meaning, the conceptual essence nf the simple experience. The further mental operation of "enlarging," whicli culminates in the mode, presents us with an expanded logical content, en' :'elv loosed from its empirical moorings, and endowed \%nth a new imity which is the work of the mind. The mode is thus a structure in which the empirical characteristics of the original datum have been transformed and fixed by the mind in such a way that the resulting concept is self-identical and changeless, a sort of mental counter with which further operations can now be undertaken. It ceases to belong to the world of empirical - flux and enters the changeless world of logical construction. Relations apprehended between such changeless entities arc themselves changeless, and present us with timeless truths {aciernae veritates). A system of such truths constitutes a knowledge which is universal and necessary, aiid transcends the contingencies of the empirically given. On what does this universality and necessity depend? We began with the contingent and empirical, and have ended with a strict ideal of knowl- edge which transcends experience. How has this been done, and %vhat is its value for life and for science? The answer is clear and consistent. Knowledge depends, not on experience, but on ihc mind. The distinctness ' and iixcdness, on which the permanence desiderated by strict knowledge depends, is from beginning to end. ■ work, not of nature, but of the mind. Logical thought endows its concepts with these ideal characteristics, and on this imnlal basis builds up a system of relations which arc as distinct and "* permanent as the ideas which they relate. Knowledge thus begins and ends in the sphere of the mentally constructed, and it is only what tho 60 RUPERT CLEXDOS LODGE mind, in accordance with its own laws, has put into its objects, which can constitute s-ience in the strict sense. Mathematics and ethics are strictly demonstrable precisely because they have their object in themselves, and do not need to ro outside the system of concepts in order to refer to. e.g.. a physical object. In fact, it is precisely this reference to somethmg out- side the concept, this reference to the contingently given physical object, which r..bs the researches of physicists of the universality and necessity of nrict science. Such types of knowledge as are furnished by mathematics and ethics constitute standards, in the light of which we organise and give what meaning we can to the contingent approximations of expenence and of the merclv empirical sciences. It is. in short, such mental construc- tions as modes, with their necessary connections grounded in the nature of mind which alone satisfy the ideal demand of mind for necessary and strictly universal knowledge. They do not. it is true, have objective reality but empirical objects, to become known by mind, to lose their fragme'ntariness and contingency, must conform, as far as this is possible, to the absolute standard fumisl.. d by modal knowledge.' ;. N On the whole, this kind of view is prevalent throughout the literature. The majority of the critics are openly idealistic, and even in the case of the professedly realistic interpretations, a closer inspection convinces us that plus (a change, plus c'cst la meme chose. For example, Tongers, per- haps the most definite of the realists, insists that Locke assumes a world of interacting substances, and with this as a background, proceeds to inquire as to the origin, validity, and limits of human knowledge in such a'worid He has little difficulty in showing that in such a world real essences can never be completely known, and that consequently our nomi- nal essences can give us only contingent, empirical approximations to knowledge of realitv. He further examines Locke's conception of ideal knowledge of reality, in which what we human beings at present appre- hend as color, sound, etc.. would be perceived as modifications of the primary qualities, and shows that Locke's ideal presupposes a more perfect sensation, a fuller givenness. That is to say, Locke's ideal treats the logical processes employed in constructing nominal essences as a mark of imperfect knowledge, a Notbehelf, which would be done away with in a more perfect knowledge, in which substances would be fully given. In other words. Locke's theory is treated as a sort of empirical realism.* But between the sort of empirical realism championed by Tongers. and such a theory as von Benoit's. there is no necessary antagonism. On the con- trary such an empirical realism and such a transcendental idealism are two complementary aspects of the same philosophical theory: each is the • Von Bcnoit. o^ apprehended clearly as it is, that we receive the ideas of color, I)ain, etc.* In sensc-cxpcricncc, then, the mind is passive. The material of knowl- cdf^e is given: and as ^;ivcn, in its ultimate elements, the simple ideas, it can not he created, altered, or destroved." When certain changes take place in the nervous system, it is imjwssible for the attentive mind to apprehend anythin}; other than the ideas annexed to those chanRcs. All that the "activity" t>t mind can perform, is to rearrange what is given to it : to alter in any way the content of the elements given, is beyond its power. The given, the jiassively received, thus rejjresents in one direc- tion the final barrier to the knowledge-seeking mind. All rearrangement, all organization of the given which the mind can bring about, can never change the position of this barrier. It represents an absolute limit.'" Consider, e.g., what takes place in abstraction. In scnse-expcriencc we have been iirescnted with a chaotically complex mass of sensory mate- rial. The mental process of .abstraction isolates various elements, omits some, and retains in consciousness certain others, a,h, c . . . Where a, b, c, etc., occur frequently in varying connections, wc gradually become able, by this process of abstnicting classification, to reduce to some kind of order the otherwise chaotic mass and number of individual experiences. This analytic i)roccss results ultimately in giving us dis- tingirishable elements, the various simple ideas." In other words, in acquiring distinct elements, on the basis of which some attempt to build up a s\stem of knowledge may be made, we merely analyse out what is given. We add nothing; we merely leave out what is irrelevant, and re- tain what is relevant. Thus, so far as the content of the elementary simple ideas is concerned, we have, by our imx-ess of analysis, altered nothing but our own mental chaos. By sifting and rearranging the complex sense-content, we have cleared up our ideas, but have changed nothing in the content of the given ideas themselves." It is important that no alteration of content should take place. For this passivity of the sense-organs in causal connection with the external world alone guarantees the real validity of our ideas." It is only as pas- sively annexed to physical changes that our ideas can be used in building up a scientific theory oi such changes. It is only as unalterably accom- panying certain changes in the nervous system that the idea of unity is a «II .;h. viii.ev *<•"■ II. !'■ >'■ 22. 2h !>;.. ITI. ITJ 71. i;7-78; cf. II xx.ii 1). p. KM; III iv 10. p. 35; cf. Flayer 1:178. 17V. • II i 24, pp. 142-41; ii .'. p. 1 IV jii 2. p. 211; \\n II. p. fSS; III v 2. p. 4i. '•11 ii i. p. 146; Txiii l.». 2H. pp. 4'>.'>. 117; III \' 21. p. IfiO. ■ I \';t: llcrtlin„'. "r- ('' '-'■ ''• n II XI 1. p. 202; xixi 12, p. .M 1 ; (.«/«,! of L'. sec. M, p. ■". Cf. Fraser 1:20J. n. 2; US. n. 1. " II xxxi 12. p. 511. Cf. ivi the phiLw-iphy ■,! ;e — i.e., of its applicability to the world of sense-experience. Any attempt to interpret Locke's thought without recoj^nizinj; the funda- mental imjiortance of this fact, without realizing that in the simple ideas alone are we in direct contact with reality,— is doomed from the very biginning to misunderstanding and failure to reconstruct the views of Locke." The content, then, of the simple ideas gives us so far direct knowledge of realit>-. The pnxress of analysis which has resulted in clearing up our idea.';, has in no important respect altered the content of these elementary conceptions. But the analysis has not only made our ideas clear. It has also made them distinct, or at least sharply distinguishable.'* It is not only the redness of a red object that we apprehend: wc also apprehend it ill distinction from objects which are blue. In other words, there is a mgative, as well as a positive side, to every apprehension. We know in- fallibly that the idea of white is what it is, and is not the idea of red; the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow, and not the idea of blue. As with these, so with all our simple ideas.'* So far as they have been analysed out, their content is not only clear, but also distinct from the contents of other simi)le ideas; and in virtue of these distinctions of content, which are at once apprehended or "discerned," wc are given a large number of propositions of definite knowledge-value." The clear apprehension of the elementary contents is what gives us a point of contact with reality. The distinct apjirehension of these same simple ideas is the basis which permits us to organize them into an elementary system. Finally, as systematised in accordance with distinctions which are of real validity, such a system gives us real knowledge, i.e., knowledge which is not only consistent, but also has a definite connection with the knowablc world of sense-experience." Such a system, however, docs not take us very far. To apprehend these elementary contents clearly in their own nature, and also as distinct from one another, after all leaves us with the merest A B C of knowledge. For purposes of scientific construction, more is needed." This "more" seems, however, to depend upon the basis previously established. As we have seen, in analysed-out experience we can distinguish one simple idea i« II viii 17. p. 174; xxx 1. p. 498; xxxi 2. p. SOI; xxxii 14. p. SI9; HI iv 17, p. 42; v 2, p. 4J; IV iv 4. pp. JJ9-30; vii 4. p. 269; xi 8, p. .122; cf. Works IV pp. 75-77; Cond. of U. sec. 31. pp. 86-87. " 11 »i J. p. 204; xiii 11. p. 226; Worki IV pp. 29. 42. 221; Cond. oj U. »c. 39, p. 97. '• II XXV 2. p. 428; IV i, p. 169; vii 10. p. 277; vii 4, p. 271. " Cf. also Cond. of V. MCi. 29. 31. pp. 82-83. 86; Works IV pp. 383-84. " U xi 1. i. pp. 202, 204-5; xxviii 19. p. 484; xxix 4. d. 487; IV iv 8, pp. 252-53; vi« 4. pp. 269-70; xii 14. p. 354; cf. Works IV, pp. 239-40. <• III vii 2. pp. 98-99. \ 64 Rl'PERT CLEXPOy LODGE from another. But on this basis wo can at once ro further: we can also (listin^;uish a simple from a c-oinpUx idea, e.j;., the idea of one from the idea of two or of two lumdnd, or the ideas of red and blue from the idea of purple. This ability is of especial importance when wc come to deal with simple nodes, i.e., with complex ideas which represent nmltiples of one and the same simple idea. For example, two is one plus one. and it is the ability to distint;uish the number of simi)lc ideas in two, which enables \is t' distiiiKuish two fn^m one, i>r also from three. So also in distinKl^^^hin^; 9<> from 91. a sciuare from a circle, etc.. and in Rcneral we can distin^;uish all complex idtas from one another, just so far as we can analyse out the qua»tity. as well as the quality, of the simple ideas therein contained. =" On this basis, then, of distinj.;uishinK our clearly apprehended simple i.Ieas, depends (1) the ability to dislin^;uish a simple from a com- plex ietween two quantities, can be recognized and noted, in terms of some scale of units: 99 is as distinct from 100 as 1 is from 2. In the case of qualitative relations— degrees of sweetness, of whiteness, of spatial sensations, etc.,— such accurate distinctions are not possible. Locke is not, of course, aware of the Weber-Fcchner law, but he »«II vui IH. II, IT.I; .xili 1, p. 2i». » It xvi 4, », |.p. 271. 274, III .X 11. P 118; IV v 6. p. 247; vii 9. pp. 273-74; xiii 3, pp. 3S8-59; xv I p. 363; cf. J«Hr. 1681, Kinn l:-'27. \bi;d.Jii. 7. pp. 346-47; xvii 10. pp 405-ft; cf. Educ. «ci. 190. 194. pp. l82-»3. 186 (the application of mathematic. to physics by "the incomparable Mr. .Newton ). 66 Kl ri.KT Cl.EMHKS J.DIHIK |.luii 'iinna, i-~ .111 iilral i.i uliii h \vf i;m only intlui'livfly npproxiniativ" Tin- riasini wliy we liavi- In niiuiiii lalistit'd witb |pri)l)abilitirs, with aptmix- inuitions \(> scitntitK kimwli il;;> ni I'lair of kno\vKil>;i' itstlf, i> Ikjimusi' wo luiM a-- \ri (liMovirnl nil ntaiis of insight into lavisal relations at all loinfaratik- to our in^i^•lll iiuo tiiatlu'tnatical nlalioiis; our analysis is iiuoiiipli ti', ami until \\t iliscoM-r lu w im tl.ods of r»n(K'rin>; u as compli'ti' as Ml matliniiatiis. onh jirolialiiltl) lan In alliiinod. How ilots analyse (1 «xiitritnif dilYcr from tliis? Mathematics for in- stance, in llu' ]iri-seitiitilic ai;e hefore "Tliales, or whoever it may have been." was itself a matter of imiiirieal ^roiiini; Acconlinj; to Locke'-: view, the :eiemi!ie n.ethoil was 'i-uhed l>y mean- (pf an analysis which hasiil all maihemaliial ion-tru( tioii I'f modis on the clearly and distinctly ai'i rilundid unit. Hy thi' a])]>licaiion of the unit in arithmetic, any two numhers, however slij^hl their relative dillercnce, can he accurately dis- li'ij;uislud in terms of the nuniher of units whiih enter into ilieir Ci.mposi- tion, and it is on the ilearness and ly to this (Kantian) question. Hence, undoubtedly tlie common iilealisiir interpreta'.ion, with its two tyiiical sides of eminrica! realism and transcendental idealism. Our present task is to discover, if ] possible witliout Kantian bias, precisely what Locke's own answer to this question is. Locke holds that in our simp'c ideas we are in direct contact with reality. The idea is sometimes ditlercnt from the reality, as in the obvious case tpf secondary {lualities, but in every case there is at least a constant connection between the idea and reality, on which we can rely. So far as analysis enables us to distinguish clearly our simple ideas, we are still in contact with reality, and the same is true of our complex ideas also; for our analysis has added nothing; it has merely cleared up our subjective confusion, anil enabled us to apprehend distinctions which arc there to be api)rehended, as sfx>n as ever the rijjht methotl of analysis is applied. •• 11 xiii 2i<. p. 2.17; III V .10, p. 80; IV vi 10. |ip 2.S«-.S0, vil S. p. 271. " Cf. II »XPX 2, r- ■♦<*'; l^' VII 9, pp. 27 J-74. LUCKLS SIMPLE MODES •7 Insight iuto tlu- rtlalinns of idintily i\rn\ ditTrnmc i.s ihus insi^;hl into tin- iiaKirc ol' a:ilii\, ami m> far as nuitlunialics is tons I nut rd on this luiMS, r«:iliiy is inatliiiiiatical/" In iiiojlal scit-ncc it is not astonishing or para- (l.txiail,'" 1 ul slriitly and lilt rally trur, to say that ihc nominal essence ' ar.d the rial i ssinii loincidc. Riality is not only mathniiatiilily. Hut where wt have direct insij;ht into the structure of reality where the nominal ami real essences do coincide, as in the ease of niathematies— there we have more than prob- aliiliiy: we have knowledKc in the strict sense. We no lon^tr relate apprehensions in a hypothetical and e\pirinuntal way: wc apprehend relations as they are." Relations Ix-tween our clearly and distinctly apprehended simple ideas are j;ivcn; relations between such ideas and the complex ideas ba3cd on them are also ^iven; and finally, relations between the complex ideas themselves, such as modes, are also jjivcn. Knowled>;e is, then, s^)mehow t,'iven: and the result of our study of Locke seems to contradict the ^;encral interpretation which we have found in the literature. But how "given"? Surely any reader of the first book of the F.ssay must feel at once that there is nothinR easy-Roinj; al>out knowledt;e, from Locke's standp«I8. 21:512. 513. Cf. Workt IV, p. 405. •" Cf. Uathf, op. ,1/. 54. In f.-ict n iKisitio.i tiimtwhat a.ia'ogouj to Locke's !• taken in our own time by Wunilt. Cf. W. Wundt. iMgik. Stuttgart. 1907. 2;IH9-92. " II viii 17. 22. 2.1, pp. 174. 177-7»; xxxi 2. p. 503; Works IX, pp. 305 6 (letter to Molyneui. Jan. 20. t6<)2). » III xi 16, p. 1S5; IV xii 8. p. .147; Cond. of V. «ec. 36. p. "9. • Cf. KOhlcr. o^. III. 74-77. " Cf. Moore, op. til. 48; Morse, op. fit. 14, 43: Dathe. «?. eil. 54. 68 RUPERT CLESPOS LOPCE point, are we not m'Kli'<-"tinK this vital question: if knowlcf1>;c is given, how can it be the workmanship of the mind, and if it is the workmanship of the mind, how can it possiMy be j;ivcnr" In ansv. .r to this ciucstion. we must first introduce and carry throuj^h a distinction which appears, in this (onneclion at least, lo have been over- looked in the literature: the distinction l)ctween logical and psychological. Both arc important for Loeke: and for a correct understanding of his thought, it is necessary to keep them somewhat sharply distinct." From the psychological view-point, knowledge is not given: it must V)c worked for. Only bv •\xereise," unsparing ;ind unremitting, only by hard work is anvth.ing si) valuable as knowledge to be attained. It is from this view- 1 .oint that knowledge is said to be the '^vrk of the mind. The chief emphasis is on tlie uvrk, and not, as the idealistic critics have placed it, on the mind. This view-point is quite characteristic for Locke, and von Hertling rightly points out that in the first book it is the pelagoguc, rather than the cpistc- mologist, who speaks. It should, however, be added that this is true, not only of the first book of the Essay, but generally, throughout Locke's writings." This psychological view-point has been generally recognizeil in the literature: it is the logical view-point which has tended to be ovcr- kx.kcd. From this standpoint, the question is not as to the process-side of acquiring knowledge. What Locke is dealing with is the fact that we !), I.p. 4() -It X -XW .'„t,ru f.m i< ..I u.ufM-. !ri-.jv>.M.!lv wu>\ in th< l,t. r.vV.ir.-. but r...l in th.v cmnctiun; we Trey \.w. ..p. ..(. i\. T..i,KerH, .,(>. .1/- IV Mur'in^k .■>i.c.mlly ih,ir,. faniM. » .^s. e.K.. the transiti.in from iihy»i<-»l stimulus to [isyrhiral I'lta. "11 »>i. J. pp. 502-4; xxj.i 4. i-. S\s IV iii 6. 28. pp. Wl. in:^\. yon llcrtlmg, op. t/Vi>VVi LOCKE'S SIMPLE MOPES 69 of rerccption, rcterlion, pbstraclion. naminR. comparinR. etc.. the mind sifts out and ch n. ,«— in a word, analyses into its component parts, the elementary " le ideas." As we have seen, this process of analysis, while it does res i clarifyinfi and "determining;" our ideas, is a mere matter of rearranj ivf. what is pven. without alterinR its content— i.e., is a matter of rcmovii g the chaos and confusion from our minds. It leaves us with clear and distinct, in place of obscure and confused, ideas. But it does not in anv wav alter the contents of those ideas; those contents are, as wc have seen. Riven once and for all, and no mental process can create, 'alter or drstrov them. P-sycholoRically, then, the work of the mind con- sists in sifting an.l analysing out the given mental content, and results in exchanging for the confusion of mental chaos, a clearness and distinctness which is the basis of mental organisation; more simply, it results in clearing up our ideas. But logically, the contents of the simple ideas have been present from the very first, and the process of analysis has not altered them - on their content-side, as knowables. at all. The process of synthesis, by means of comparing, compounding, naming, etc., then builds up. on the analysed-out simple ideas as foundation, ideas which arc complex, modes, substances, relations. But here too the mental process is merely a r tter of external arrangement of contents: the contents, from the epistemological view-point, remain unaltered. The workmanship of the mind, then,^ ; whether in analvsis or in constniction. adds nothing to the given contents.' ) It is alwavs a process of classification, a rearrangement which alters the relative iwsition of the ideas in our minds, but does not alter their ultimate meanings." The function of this mental activity is so to order our ideas that wc are enabled to apprehend relations which really subsist between . the contents, but which, without such rearrangement, would have remained unnoted by us. Bv analvsis we are enabled to apprehend the relations which subsist between ideas which are simple, and by synthesis, the rela- tions dealt with in science, relations which subsist between such ideas as modes, which are complex." , ,.i n One further point remains to be discussed. Simple modes, like all complex ideas, have something "arbitrary" about them, and this arbitrari- ness has proved a serious stumbling-block to the interpreters.*^ On the other hand, number and figtire, which are certainly simple modes, are explicitly recognized by Locke as modes or affections of bodies and spuits. and as accordingly coming under that division of the knowabl(;,which he «III iii 1.1. pp. J3-2«- « Ct. von HertlinK. up. cil. 0, 12, 13, 33. ,. • . « Even writer. .<. recent .. Dath. .nd Kohler entirelv m..uqcler.Und this pomt. D.the h^^ '» '• .rue the "i«li.tic b.«; but K.^lcr r.«.rd. Locke .. . re.L.t (,.^ .... ». U-) But perh.p. »l'o K"»>^' i. hV,n«lf .d...,«>c.Uy .nCned (cf. pp. 311, 77). Both «g.rd h.m « . ••.ub,«t.v..f .n account of h« definitiun of knowledKe. " Cf. von Hertl.ng. pp. 17. JJ-24. 27.30. M 87-M. 214, 241.42. 70 KITEHT CI.KSnoX LODGE calls "phvsica."*'' This wdulil soim to In- incoiisislcnl with any consider- able dej^ree of "arbitrariness," and Fraser. as well as certain of the Con- tinental ,' to as clear and distinct sim]>le idea as the arithmetiial unit, the ciuantitative relations betv.nn units are also {^iven. In the nature of the case, there is no limit to tlu 1 ro^res.sively apjirehcnded arithmetical series, 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . , and Locke e.ndoubiedly tends to regard the "vast extent of thinjjs" as greater ilian our thoughts, i.e., as lar^e enou:.;h for our thoughts to lose themselves, if mdeed it be not actually inl'inile. The content, then, of any simple mode in arithm.;iven," i.e., has real validity, its nominal essence so far coincides with the real essence, as is indeed the case, not only in arithmetic, but also in mathematics j;enerally. What, then, is "arbitrary" about the simjile mode? From a study of the third book of the Hssay, in which, perhaps, Locke is most definite, we iind that, while in "ihiuKs" the relations which mi^ht conceivably have been united into modes are infinite, only some few of these have actually been so united and fixed with a name by man, and tha.t this has been done difTerently in ditTerent countries and i'.kcs. Expressed symboliealh', we mi^ht say that in "reality," elements a, h. i . . 461. •' Frasff l:5il; 2:42. n 2; Ollmn. o^. ii(. 201; KaywrimR. o/>. rit. 17, <> S. fl-^i; i!. v.m llertling, of l%t. 2i-l%. ImluniM o( iULh iin.ple miiiles are. numbcri (II ivi S-6. pp. 272-73). kora, pfi. etc. (Ill v above). » III lii 19. l>. 30; cf. Ftaier 1 :499. n. 1. —v,^ / 4 LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES 71 about the simple modes. The knowledge which consists in the appre- hended relations between simple modes is thus given, and is merely a more complex form of the distinctions between simple ideas, the relations of identity and diversity, which are also, as we have seen, given.'" After this brief sketch of Locke's theory of knowledge, wc vnay, per- haps, summarise what we have discovered concerning the position, in that thcorv, of simple modes. Analysis of the empirically given sense-complex has provided us with simple ideas. In these simple ideas wc arc, from the logical view-point, in as direct contact with "reality" as is possible for human l)cings. Wc are al)1e will, certainty to distinguish our simple ideas from one another, and sucb knowledge is valid of reality. We arc also able to distinguish simple ideas frc.ii simple modes; such knowledge als'^ is valid of reality. We are further able, on the same foundation, to distinguish simple modes from one another; this knowledge is also "real" knowledge. These distinctions are j)artly quantitative, partly qualitative. On the quantitative side we have succeeded in i)enetrating down to the arith- metical unit, a simple idea capable of all the clearness and distinctness desid- erated for ideal knowledge; all modal knowledge based on such simple ideas —i.e.. the whole of mathematics— is equally clear and distinct, and gives us certain real knowledge." Our qualitative analysis has not succeeded in penetrating .so far, and consequently -n this side wc can. in our modal constructions, attain, not certainty, but only probability. Locke is, how- ever, hopeful, that here also some quasi-algebraic method will le dis- covered, which will enable us to attam in other subjects a certainly equal to that of mathematics." The knowledge given by simple modes is then alwavs of real validity as far as it g(X's. but only in the case of quantitative relations has the work of the mind so far succeeded in attaining also ideal clearness and distinctness. \ If we now ask .wsclves definitely, what the function of simple modes is, we are in a position to answer, (1) psychologically, i.e., from the process- side of knowledge, simple modes are rearrangem.ents of mental contents. , which place us in surh a i-osition tliat we are enabled to apprehend rela- ; ions which reallv subMst b.lween elements of reality;^' 1 2 > logically, i.e., from !he content-side of kno.vl.M'.-r, simple modo-. in spite of Ix-lng mental con- structions, do not somclv AV come U't w een us and reality, as sonu'thing subjec- - live might be contrast i^l with snmeihin,; objective. On the contrary, it is pre- cisely so far as th.e mental proetss of sifting and building up our ideas has • been carri< (' through most rigomnsly, as in the ca.sc of mathematics, that we an- in closest ci't-u i with objectlvi' reality, and are guiding .mr thought by ^^ "I he nature of things." si) that i;uir,inal essencr and real essence e.nncide. " IV ill ."). pp. :2\-22: (f v..n ncrllu-M. " 11 .1V1 i-4. l>p. i7n-71. " CI. vjn Hcrtlinu. of. iil. 69. " < f. IV viii .\. p. I'rn. iil. 61 '.'', !*s i^ f^. — '-y>. CONCLUSION This section falls naturally into two parts. In the first, we shall attempt, from our present position, to resolve briefly the diffictillics raised by pre- vious interpreters, as set forth in our introduction. This will be followed by a restatement of our own conclusion as to the meaning and function of simple modes. In the second part we shall state yet more briefly the general conclusions to which wc have come concerning the philosophy of Locke, so far as our siwcific investigation has thrown light on this wider question. A. Specific. When the critics state that the term "simple modes" is ambiguous, they mean that Locke uses it in three definite senses:— (1) as "accidents." (2) as combinations of a single simple idea, (3) as modifications, or varieties, or sorts, of some simple idea. The answer to this difficulty is:— (1) All modes arc accidents, i.e., are correlative to substances: this is a general statement, and is true of "combinations" and "varieties," which are thus not mutually exclusive species. (2) All simple modes are "combinations" of a ;;inglc simple idea. It should, however, be added that some modes are quantitative combinations, while others are combinations of quality— "degrees" of a single simple idea. (3) In regard to the third distinction, this is a inistakc. A careful comparison of all the instances shows that (a) Locke never uses "mode" in the sense intended by the critics —i.e., as a "sort" or "variety"--, and (b) "varieties," whenever the term is used, is for Locke synonymous with "combinations." What the critics are trying to express in this distinction is that certain of the modes are "degrees," but they have not succeeded in making the tnie division clear. The true division is into quantitative and qualitative, and it is actually made by Locke himself. The other criticisms in the group which is concerned with the meaning of simple modes are relatively trivial. The lists at the beginning of Chap- ters II, III, IV, (above) a Manly, op- cit. ifi-40. ' Curtis. o,'>. . . dc arc '•f'r .UtTcrcU i.lcu." an.l arc ro sonu- extent felt even .y Locke to call for .onu. other n>o.U. of trcatnu-nt. as is s.-en from his half unconscums us.- of ihe term •su.Kcstion • in this reference. But a .l.fl.culty ar.scs. D.ks Frascr insist on a slurp .listincti.m Ktween ideas which are e.np.ncal. ami i.le:;s whuh are -SukkcsIcI" these latter hein^ trauscemletUal u eas .lue snnuhow to the -latent constitution of the numV" ()r .1ck-s he ultuuateh rcv;ar.l ..// i.ler.s as transcendental, all ec,ually -sUK^ested ' The genera i,npress,on left on the nnnd of the student of Frasc-r .s that the .hst.nct.on is emphasis,-d (1. for the sake of rea.lcrs who may U- iK-KUtmnv; the stud> of philosophv, and ( 2) in order to in.licate that such a d.stmct.on .s mM-r- lant for understanding the ph.losophy of the seventeenth and e„hteenth eeniuries, Lut that Frascr himself ultimately Ulieves that all ..leas what- ever arc transcendental, an.l arise in the mind on the .Kcasu.n of s.,mc sti,nt.lus ..r -suK.estion r This is stated to l.c the case with ,K-rcept.on « real existence, with secondary (,ualities. an.l with the "matena s ..f .mr kn..wle.l^e, i.e.. with all simple ideas, as well as with ideas such as umty an.l space, which have U-en already considered. It remams uncertatn whether Frascr believes that L.Kke "unconsciously" shares this view, though this is to s.mie extent implied." .... Fr.>m this brief review of the literature bearing on this ,K,mt. there appear to Ik^ iw.. main c,uestu>ns: (1) the problem ..f the relation of st.eh iileas as pleasure. pain,'= existence, p..wcr, unity, successum. to the other simple i.leas. an.l (2) the reflecti.m of this half-felt problem in Ufkes use of lan^;ua^;e. as indicate.l by the term "su^Kcstion" l-eing empU.yed m regard to such ideas. , , , . • \o So much f<.r the literattire. What are we to say of I^ke h.mself. Does he have anv stnse of .lifr.eulty in the rclati..n of such i.leas as power, unitv etc.. t.. i.ieas of sensati.m and reflect ,. .n > The implication m the literature that he is not clearly aware of this problem is amply lK,rne out bv a stu.lv ot his publishe.1 writings. Is there, however, some /.u//-aware- ness' The evidence .,n which the exi)onents of this view rely is linguistic, an.l is based especially on his use of the tenn "sugKesti.m.""' The questi.m is thus one as to his us.' of lanKua^c an.l .an only be answered by a stu.ly of that l.-m^'ua«e. We shall a.-.-..r.linv;ly first make out a list of all the cast-s explicith rcKanlcl bv Locke as "su^j^jestcl." We shall then, with refer- cn.v to each .asc. .onsi.ler also the other . xprcssions empL.yed by Locke, n, .„.>. I. „„.U«vi,.,.v„.. ,,.,.,. (■;..v,v..B.n.,<..,. .,. .M4,.6-it;K..hWr.„r.„M7.... ..Frus..r .U„., „o. h,.>.rl, r.-«r,l ,.l...,ur,- .n,l , a,„ .. , .J,,. ..lly ■•..■KK^lcd.' In >>» ■•'■>._^<;" jh« „...unm« of •■.,,«....,.,:,■ . I. „. MS, n, .■.. he «,»■, r.Ur...., wh>, h on,., plc.u,. .n.l ,..-• -'l iiuiudr r«i»t.iui-. uni'.v. etc. u- u . . I ... »'. .t tS.'"ip n\f^% aft ■ rami '1 Ult'i IW lliino »lo:,« w.th" ,.ka, '.f «-n«c. c-.. a. W.t.h, nr. „i. T,m. .-.n ll«-.!m«. np. ,.., i..^u. LOCKE'S SIMPLE MOPES 77 with a view to discovering whether the term "suKKestcletc list of the terms to which Locke refers explicitly as sun- Rested to the understanding contains instances from the following groups: — simple ideas, including simple ideas of one sense.'* simple ideas of divers senses," simple ideas of reflection," simple ideas of Ixith sensation and reflection;" complex ideas, incUwUng simple modes," and the essences of mixed motles.'* The list does not include ideas of substances or relations. We can now proceed to ask whether the expression "suRRCsted" is typiial or accidental for these various Rrnups In the Rroup of simple ideas taken Rcnerally, the typical expression is that such ideas are fur- nished'" or offered" to the understandinR. There is a secondary type of expression in rcRard to sense-ideas, viz., that they are "obtruded" on the mind, and that the mind is "forced" to receive them." All other terms apjK-ar to t)c colorless and unimijortant.** If now by the term "sugRcsted" we tmderstand that the senses (external and internal) provide merely an occasion or stimulus, ujMm which the mind reacts with an idea thus sur- Rested to it, there is little in Locke's language to indicate that such a view- point is commonly in his mind in connection with simple ideas. In fact, an unbiased c«)nsideration of the evii> I, p. i'n. '• Fur nample, motiim (II ii I. D. 144). 'MI ii 2, p. 145. " For example, pNasurc. pain, imwer. eaistcnce. unity, imceision: II lii 1. p. I4«; vii 7, 9, p. 16J; in I, p. no. '• For example, infinite, anKlc. of a trianide CII xvii 13. p. i«6; Worki IV. p. 59). The latter paaiag* ri(er» primarily to "idean ujrd in ilem<>n»tration." hut as Ui-monstrative science deali -mly with modet (cf. Harienstrin. op. iti. 195.9ft). and the only mitance given i> mathematical, i.e., a aimpla mod*, the i.;4»e iH eUH»(-(l under the heading of "simple mode*-" !• Ill V 1. PI.. 4.1-44. " II i 2. 4-7. 2''fns "f 'x'th si>nsalion atul rcflcctu.n, wc f.nd that for lUasurr aii.l j>ai« two expressions arc typical. Those ".liriiTitU constituti. .tis oi ihc luiiKl" are most fri-qurntly said to U- "caust'd" or "producKl.-^^ wliilr in a siioiulary si use ihty arc "annexed t<." uKas of sensation and nlketion.'* The latter expression has received the greater emphasis in the literature, but the way of rcKardinR these i.leas which is dominant f..r I-.Kke. is undoubtedly the first. Pleasure and pam are "j.rodu.td" in us. in aeeonlanee with natural law. cither l.y external objects f.r bv otir own thouKhts. The fact that certain ideas proear to Ihj synonyms for "furnished ■ or "pven."'"' ^^ The idea of unity is four times said to be "suKk'«-stcd. Objects or thouj;hts are four times 'sai.l to "brniR this idea along with" them. Ai other times the idea is said to "make itself way" or "convey itself mio the mnul." What are we to regard here as typical? Three of the four occasions on which the tern. "sugKCSted" is used have already been con- sidered, and have been ju''»»'•• tenrc. unity, etc.. arc (m h,» upmrnn, .ntrn.lcl. W.l.b and Manly, ho«.^»er. c.,n,.drr the appl.^tion valid. •• II vii 8. p. 16); xxi 4. pp. .111-11. ■• F„r r.ample. we •■,*rrr,vc' or -ha r km.wlrdge of c.i.tcn«; ..b,.ct. •giv.. ui notice" or •■mform*. fon' of the.r r.i.Un.c: IV u 2.1, pp. .104-.V »> \i. PP- i""". '•" ■ C" '■"^^•"' '"'• '"■ "' '"■ '""• " II Vli I. 7, pp. 160, 16i; «iii 26, p. 215; xvi 1. p -'"0; cf i» 1. P- 148. l'U,6 LOCKE'S SIMPLE MODES and that idcaa of objects, etc., "hrinj; aloni" with thi-m" this idea, would seem also to preclude any creative function of mind. So that here also, the term api)cars synonymous with "furnished" or 'Vtven." Finally, the phrases applied to the idea of succession, though no one of them can be c.nlled definitely typical, similarly apiK-ar to preduile any idealistic interpretation of the word "suKiiested,"** which here too, may he rej^arded as equivalent to "furnished." So that, if wc wish to sum- mari.'C our results in regard to simple ideas, we must conclude that the term "sUKRestctl" is relatively colorless, and is intendetl to convey the same notion as the more common expression. "prolied. it is not distinguished by Locke from "produced" or "furnished." In the case of the idea of infinite, Locke docs seem to be describing what might, perhaps not altogether unfairly, be interpreted as an unfolding of the latent constitution of the mind.** But a careful reading shows that his attention is fixed here, as ever, on the "material" from which the idea is derived— in this case, the addition of units— and the idealism which to Fraser seems so clearly implied is no- where taken into the focus of consciousness.** Where the question is — Fur cumpic, we pcrc«ivc or obitrve, g«t or com* by, the idea; h U oBcrtd »nd (amiilwd to as. or produced in ui. II vii », p. >6J; »iv J-4. 6-11, 10. 16, pp. J4I-4J. J45. •• For the interpreUtion contained in thii paragraph, which ii. of roune, in the •enie ol the literatur*. am! not at chapter v o( thia atudy.— cf. A. Riehl. o^. cU. 23. S2-5J: Falckenberg. <./>. ol. 117, IJ2, 127; Ceil, Uie Gottcjidea bei Locke . . . Arthit f. Cetik. i. PkU.. 1M9-U90. 3:5«7.|I8; von Herthnf. of. lU. 17, 2I-2J. 27, SJ-3S. etc.; W. Freytag. Ol* .S"»»i/«»«»i<*rr J^»M. Halla. 1»9». p. 22. "II avii 2-3. 6-«. pp. 277.7J. 280-«2. etc. C(. RichI, oP. cil. SO. » C(. Falckenberg. o*. lit. Ill; Riehl. op. ill. 61. So alio in the caie of Ae mathematical demonttra- tioni. it ii the iiatr'm which "tuggeiU"— i.e.. furniahei— the "intermediaU ideat" (Worki IV, p. S9; cf. Enay. Ill V 3, p 44). MICROCOPY RISOIUTKJ^ TEST CHART ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No 2 ^ dgPUED^IfVMGE Ir =■-= '?'"•"•'; '«■• 'J" U6U9 j^ •■^S ■ ''^' 'Si - OJOC - Phone ^^ '■'5; iSe - 5989 - Fc ft'^ a 80 RUPERT CLENDOX LODGE M definitely raised — perhaps most forcibly in the Examination of Male- tranche — the answer is an absolute n: io.^ The only possible conclu- sion appears to be, that the term "su„ ■ stion" contains no subtle flavor of idealism. It is not employed as an index-finger pointing to the pleasant pathways of Bcrklcianism, but is simply one of many expressions used by Locke to accommodate his thought to the comprehension of the "vulgar." Furnished, produced, given, occasioned, caused, suggested, — all are but variations on the one theme, expressions of one and the same thought. What then is this thought? We have seen what "suggestion" is not. It remains to ask what it is. Locke is no idealist. Is he, then, a realist? No. Still less is he a "sensualist." What then w he? His central thought belongs to all and none of these schools: for it is practical. Life and the needs of life, both here and hereafter — these occupy for him the center of interest, and it is to these that he appeals for a solution of his theoretical problems also. His prudence and piety are empirical, not certain, tolerant rather than dogmatic, and aim not at strict knowledge, but at reasonable faith. It is this faith which furnishes the connecting link between object and idea, and fills out with meaning what would otherwise be a hopeless riddle; and if "suggestion" has any specific meaning, it is this: viz., that it expresses the wisdom and modesty of Locke's t' ought, which shrinks from the "necessities" and "certainties" of abstract speculation, and remains con- tent with the concrete hints and suggestions furnished by experience. " Ex. Matebr. passim. BIBLIOGRAPHY The following list contains only such publications as have a definite bearing on some aspect of the present investigation. For a fuller list of books on Locke, consult Uebcrweg-Heinze. A fair classification of the literature is given by OUion. For Locke himself, the Works are referred to in the ten-volume edition published in London, in 1823; the minor philosophical works are referred to in the Bohn library edition in two volumes, edited by St. John; and the Essay is always referred to in the Oxford edition of A. Campbell Fraser. The unpublished small pieces and diaries are referred to in the Life by Lord King, and the Life by H. R. Fox Bourne. A brief digest of each of Locke's writings (including the chief entries in the Journal and Commonplace Books) is given by Krakowski, who arranges them in chronological order. Alexander, S. Locke. London. 1908. Baei'MKer, Clemens. Zur Vorgeschichte zwcier Lockescher Begriffe. Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 21. (neue Folge 14) Leipzig. 1907-8. Benoit, Georg von. Darstellung dor Locke'schen Erkenntnisslehre verglichen mit der Leibniz'schen Kritik derselben. Bern. 1869. Cousin, Victor. Philosophie de Locke. Paris. 1819, 1829. 4th ed. 1861. Crous, Ernst. Die Grundlagen der religionsphilosophischen Lehren Lockes. Halle a. S. 1909. Curtis, Mattoon Monroe. An outline of Locke's ethical philosophy. Leipzig. 1890. Dathe, Hans. Die Erkenntnislehre Locke's. Unterschied zwischen Glauben und Wissen bei diesem. Dresden. 1909. Erdmann, Benno. Jahresbericht uber die neuere Philosophie bis auf Kant. Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 1, 2, 7. Leipzig. 1887-94. Logik. 2' Auflage. Halle a. S. 1907. Fahrion, Karl. Die Sprachphilosophie Lockes. Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 26. (neue Folge 19) Leipzig. 1913. Fowler, Thomas. Locke. London. 1880. Fraser, Alexander Campbell. Locke. Edinburgh and Philadelphia. 1890. Freytag, Willy. Die Substanzenlehre Lockes. Halle a. S. 1898. Geil, Georg. Die Gottesidee bei Locke und dessen Gottesbeweis. Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 3. Leipzig. 1890. Green, Thomas Hill. General introduction to Hume's Treatise on Human Nature. London. 1878. Hartenstein, Gustav. Locke's Lehre von der menschlichen Erkenntniss in Ver- gleichung mit Leibniz's Kritik derselben. Leipzig. 1861. Hartmann, Henry G. Locke a constructive relativist. New York. 1912. A new conception of relativity and Locke. Cincinnati, Ohio. 1914. Hertling, Georg von. John Locke und die Schule von Cambridge. Freiburg i. B. 1892. Kayserling, Herbert. Die Willensthcorie bei John Locke und David Hume. Leipzig. 1907. KChler, Willy. Die Aktiviiat der menschUchcn Seele bei Locke. Borsdorf- Leipzig. 1913. 82 BIBLIOGRAPHY Krakowski, Edoiard. Sources mddidvales lie la philosophic de Locke. Paris. 1915. Mani.y, fU.oRCE \V. Contradictions in Locke's theory of knowleilgc. Leipzig. 18S5. Martinak, Kdiaru. Die Logik John Locke's zusaininengesttllt unJ untersucht. Halle a. S. 18<)4. Messek, a. Die BohanJlung des Freiheitsproblcnis bei John Locke. Arch. f. Gc.uh. (1. Phil. 11. (nciic Folge 4) Leipzig. 1898. Moore, Addison Wedster. The functional versus the representational theories of knowledge in Locke's Essay. Chicago. 1902. — Kxistencc, meaning, and reality in Locke's Essay and in present cpisle- niology. Chicago. 1903. Morse, M. Rowena. tlbcr den Widcrsjiruch im Wahrheitsbegriff In Locke's Erkcnntnislchre. Jena. 1904. Ollion, Henri. La philosof hie gdndralc de John Locke. Paris. 1909. Riehi., Alois. Der philosophische Krilicismus und seine Bcdeutung fur die positive Wisscnschpft. Band I. Leipzig. 1876. Band II, Theil I. 1879. Band I. 2* Auflage. Leipzig. 190S Tagart, Edward. Locke's writings and philosophy, historically considered, and vimlicatcd from the charge of contributing to the scepticism of Hume. London. 1855. Tongers, Heinrich. Lockes Wirklichkcitsbegriff. Halle a. S. 1910. Turbiclio, Sebastiano. Analisi storica delle filosofic di G. Locke e di G. Leibniz. Torino. 1867. Weub, Thomas E. The intellcctualism of Locke. Dublin and London. 1857. WuNDT, Wilhei.m. Logik. 3" Auflage. Stuttgart. 1906. i ' INDEX Absolute, 14-17. 19, 22. 23, 29-32. -JC, 42-44 Abstraction, 4, 12, 13, 15, 25, 26, 62, 69 Accident, 56, 72 Action, IM-IV, 44-45, 50 Activity, 18-21, 33. 34 n., 37-38, 50, 62, 69, 79 Addition, 12, 16, 21, 28, 29, 43. 79 Adhering, 11,21 Aesthetics, 56 n. Atttrnae veritates, S%,S9 Ages, 10, 14 AgKregatc. 47-48 AKreement, 35, 36, 57 Alexander. 6 Algebra, 65, 7! Ambiguity, 5-7, 26, 40, 41, 50, 72 Analysis, 62-66, 68-69, 70-74 Anger, 9 n. Angles, 10, 17, 32, 57-58, 77 n. Anguish, 1 1 Annexed to, 61, 62, 78 Anschauung, 72-73 Apprehension, 4, 11, 21, 24. 28. 29, 32, 35-38, 45, 55 unquestionable, 62-64, 66-69, 71 A priori, 1, 7 Arbitrariness, 3-5, 27, 67-70 Arc 10 Assent, 11, 18, 37, SO Association, 14, 20 Atom, 23, 24, 39, 46, 47 Attention, 11, 20, 21, 68 Audition colorfe, 39 Bacumker, 67 Being, 29, 54, 70 Belief, 11, 21, 26, 36 Benoit, 2, 8 n.. 40 n., 48 n., 49, 55 n., 58, 60, 76 n., 77 n. Berkeley, 73, 74, 77 n.. 80 Blue, 63-64 Body, 61. 69 Bourne, Fox, 22 n. Bulk, II, 23, 26, 39. 46.61 Category, 27, 55 Cause, 23, 45, 48, 59, 61- S2, 64-66, 78 Center, 10 Certainty, 37, 65, 67, 71, 73. 80 Change. 33. 38. 44-45. 59, 61-62 Chiliaedron. 10 Choosing. 11, 20. 21. 35 Circle. 6. 10. 16 n.. 17, 32, 64 Circumference. 10 Clearness. 5. 16. 17. 21, 22, 24. 27. 28. 30. 35. 38.62- 66,69. 71 Coexistence. 45 n.. 46. 47. 65 Cohesion, 11, 23. 26 Cold, 77 n. Collective modes, 10, 13, 15-18, 22-24, 29-32, 34-38 , 24, 32. 39-40, 47, 50-51. 58, 60-62, Color. 6. 9n., 11 64, 77 n. Combination. 5. 6, 18, 22. 23, 27, 28. 39-40. 72 Command, 1 1 Commercium, 47, 52, 53 Comparing. 69 Complexes. 4. 15, 17, 36-38. 41-43. 47. 62 Complex ideas. 2. 3. 7. 12, 13. 15. 16. 18. 27. 30-32, 35. 37. 42, 46. 50. 54. 64, 66. 67. 77, 79 Composition, 4. 7. 12. 13, 18. 28-30. 34. 40. 41. 54, 55, 66, 69 Comprehending, 11, 21 Concept, 7, 11, 48 n., S8, 59, 63 Confusion, 64-66, 68-69 Conic sections, 10 Conjecture, 11 Connection, 45, 60, 65, 66 Consciousness, 20, 28, 35, 45, 01 Consideration. 18, 20, 50 Consistency, 27, 47, 49, 53-55, 63 Constitution, 46-47, 7S-76. 79 Construction, 7, 12, 13, 24-25. 27-29. 32. 34. 40. S3, 55, 57-60. 66. 69. 71. 72. 79 Contemplation. 11, 20. 21. 51 Contingent. 58-60 Continuum. 14. 17, 27, 30. 32. 44 Contradiction, 3, 5, 28. 30. 32. 39-41. 47-48 Corner. 10 Correlative, 45, SO, 52-55, 72 Costc. 10 n., 14 n. Cousin, 3, 8 n., S5 Creation. 77, 79 Creep, 11, 18 Crous, 19 n., 22 n., 38 n. Cube, cubic, 10 Cubit, 10, 26,31 Curtis, 3, 74 Dance, II Dathe, 6, 8 n., 67 n., 69 n. Day, 10, 14-16, 26. 42 Degree, 9-11, 21-24, 35-40. 64, 72 Delight. II. 22 Demonstration, II, 22, 73, 77 n., 79 Descartes, 38 n. Desire, II. SI Despair, II Diagonal, 10 Difference, 63-64, 66-67. 71 Directing. 11, 20-21 Disagreement, 35, 36, 57 Disbelief, U Discerning, II, 21. 26, 37, 63 Discursive thought. 38 Disgust, II Distances. 10, 43, 44 Distinctness, 21, 24, 28, 35. 38. 59, 63, 65-66, 69, 71 Distrust, II Disturbance, II 84 I.\DEX i i Doubting, 11. 21, 26, 36-37 Dozen, 10, 12 Dreaming. 11,21 Drobisch, 8 Duration, 7, 9 n.. 10. 1.M7, 19, 36, 27, 30, 31. S3, 40-42. 46, .SO Ecstaty, II, 2 > Effect, 45, 48 EUipM, 10 Empiricism, 1, 3, 8, 73, 75, 76. 80 Enlarging, 4. 13. IS- 17, 2S. 42, 43, 45, 46, 54, 55, 59 Envy, 9 n.. 23 n. Erdmann. 5 n. Essence. 2. 27, 54-56. 60. 67. 71, 77 Eternity, 10, 15, 43 Ethics, 3, 6, 7, 52, 57, 60, 64, 65. 73 Evil, 23 Existence, 6, 74-76, 77 n.. 78 n. Expansion. 10, 16, 17. 19, 31-33, 46 Experience, 4-7, 12, 22, 23, 30 n., 39, 40, 55, 60-61, 63-65, 80 divine, 39 individual, 14, 48, 62 human, 15-17, 19, 22, 29, 30. 32, 40 Extension, 6, 11,16, 17,23,26,27,32,33,40-44,50, 75 Faith, II, 21, 22, 36, 80 Palckcnberg, 52 n.. 79 n. Fearing, 9 n.. 11. 21 Fcchner's law. 64 Feeling, 20. 75 Figure, 6, 10. II, 23, 26, 31, 32. 41. 43-44, 46. 51, 57-58. 61. 69 Finite. 10, 13, 15-17. 74 Five. 10. 41-42 Foot. 10, 16, 26. 31, 32. 70 n. Form. 55. 57 Fractions, 10 Fraser. 4. 15 n.. 16. 19 n.. 22 n.. 24 n.. 27 n., 28 n., 31, 32 n..33n.. 34n.. 35n .36, 39 n.. 40 n.. 45 n., 47 n.. 48, 49 n.. 53. 54 n.. 60 n.. 61 n., 62 n., 70, 74-76, 77 n., 78 n.. 79 Freytag, 5. 68. 79 n. Function of modes. 7, 12. 25, 52, 73 Furlong, 10, 16 Geil, 79 n. General ideas, 74 Given, 5. 22, 27, 57-62. 67-71, 80 Globe. 10 God, 19. 22-24. 33, 38. 39. 78, 79 Gold. S3 Good. 23 Green, 2, 48 n.. 68 n.. 78 n. Green color, 40 Guess, 11 Happiness. 10. 11. 23. 39 Hardness. 77 n. Hartenitein. 1, 8 n.. 58, 77 n. Hartmann, 8 n.. 49 n.. 61 n. Hatred, II, 51 Hcrtling, 3-4, 8 n.. 48 n.. 54 n.. 60 n.. 62 n., 68, 69 n.. 70 n.. 7 1 n., 74, 76, 79 n. Hoping. 9 n., 11, 21 Horse, 53 Hour. 10, 14-16, 26, 42-43, 70 n. Human uses, 15, 27, 29, 31, 32. 40, 54-S6, 65. 70, 80 Hjndred, 10, 41. 42, 64 Idealism, 1-2, 13, 27-28. 57-60. 66-68, 78, 79 Ideas, clear, see clearness distinct, see distinctness original, 12. 13, 16. 17. 20 origin of, 17. 59, 60 primary, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 39 secondary, 24, 39-40, 47, 61-62 sequence of, 13, 14, 19-22, 30, 42, 45 Identity, 63-64, 67. 71 Illation, 11 Imagination, 11, 21, 22, 79 Immensity, 10, 17 Inch, 10, 16, 26, 31, 43 Induction, 66 see also probability Inexactitude, S, 10, :<< see also contradiction Infinite, 6, 7, 10, 13, 15-17, 29-31, 33, 38-40, 42, 4 9, 70. 75, 76, 77 n . 79 Inherence, 45-47 Insight, 66-67, 73 Instant, 13 Instilling, 11 Intellect, 1, 74 Intelligence, 75 Intention, 11, 21 Introspection. 2, 19. 26. 33. 35-37. 40 Intuition, 4, 7. 11. 22. 36. 38 Joy, 11. 51 Judging. 11, 21, 26, 35-37, 75 Kant, 2, 55, 58, 66, 73. 74 n. Kayserling. 5. 70 n. Kinaesthesis. 17. 18. 33 Knowable, 43-44. 54-58. 63. 68-70 Knowing. U. 21. 26. 36. 37. 45 Knowledge. 4. 22, 40, 52. Ch. V Kahler, 7, 20 n„ 22 n.. 38 n., 61 n., 67 n., 69 n., 74 . 76n.,77 n. Latent judgment. 75 Law, 14, 55, 57, 60. 64. 65. 67, 75. Leap. II Leibniz, 1. 3 n., 51. 75 Light, 11,24 Line. 10, 17,32, 51, 57 INDEX 85 Locke. Emptricitt, 1, J, 8, 80 Idealist, 1-4. 8. 58-60, 69 n.. 80 RealUt, 60, 69 n.. 73, 80 Relativist, 8 n., 25, 26, 49 n. Sensualist. 8 n., 80 Subjectivist, 3-4, 6, 69 n., 71, 72 Logic. 20, 27, 36, 42-49, 53-55, 57-60, 68 Love. 11, 51 Manly, 2-3, 10 n., 30 n., 32 n., 34 n., 39-40, 41 n., 48 n., 51, 74. 78 n. Martinak. 4-6, 9 n., 23 n., 34 n., 48 n., 68 n. Material, 55, 57, 62. 76, 79 Mathematics, 2. 3 n.. 6. 24. 29. 52. 57, 60, 64-67, 7U, 71, 73. 77 n.. 79 n. Matte:, 9 n., 10. 16. 23-24. 39, 41, 46. 61 Memory, 34 n.. 75 Messer, 5. 8 n. Method. 17, 19, 33,66, 73 Microscopic sensation, 23-24 Mile, 10, 16, 43 Million, 10, 12, 41 Mind, power of. 13. 15. 17, 37, 53, 55, 59, 62, 64 workmanship of, 2, 59, 62, 67-68, 71 A/ffitifiMm sensibiU, 16 Minute, 10, 14, 16 n., 26, 30, 31, 42-43 Misery, 11, 22 Mobility, 33 Mode, simple, function of 7. 12. 52-54. 73 meaning of, 5, 7, 24-25, 52-54 mixed, 1, 3-5, 7, 9 n., 18, 27, 39, 50-53 Moment, 13-16, 30, 42 Moore, 61 n. 67 n. Morse, 5, 6, 7 n., 68 n. Motion, 6, 9 n.. 10, 11. 17-18. 23, 26. 31. 33. 38, 41, 44. 46. 50, 51. 61. 63, 75, 77 n. Motivity, 33, 38 Maller-Braunschweig, 42 n. Murder, 18 Pace, 10 Pain. 5.6. 9 n., 10, 11. 22-24.38-39.41. 46.51.61. 62. 74. 76. 77 n., 78 Parasang, II, 26, 31 Passion. 1 1 , 23 Passivity. 5, 20. 21. 26-27. 61-62, 70 Perceiving. 11. 21-22, 26, 27, 35, 36. 45. 69 Perch, 10 Pkysica 69 Physical objects, 6. 14. 17, 19,20, 26,32,38. 44, 46, 47,52-53,59.61.65-66. 78 Pink. 39 Pitch, 51-52 Place, 10. 16, 26. 32. 41. 43-44 Play. 56 n. Pleasure. 5, 6, 9 n., 10, 11, 22-24, 38-39. 41, 46, 51, 64, 74, 76, 77 n., 78 Point, 16, 17, 31, 32, 43-44, 57-58 Porter. 3 n. Power. 3. 5.6, 7 n., 9 n., 10. 11. 18-21.33-34,37-38, 41, 44-45, 50. 52. 74-76. 77 n., 78 Practicality. 38, 65, 70, tO Pre-Copernican. 73 Preferring, 11, 21 Primary ideas, 12, 13, 16. 17. 20. 32 Probability. 11, 22, 35-36, 59, 65-67, 71 Procession, 27 Proportional relations. 41-42, 46 Proposition, 57-58, 72-73 Purple, 39-40, 51. 64 Quality, 24, 39-40, 47, 64-65, 71-72. 75 original. 31. 33 primary. 4, 9 n.. 11. 23. 31-33, 39-41, 46-47. 61-67 primary of spirit, 20, 34 n. •econdary, 4, 9 n., 11, 23-24. 39-41, 46-47, 61> 62,76 tertiary, 11 Quantity, 13, 24, 29, 40, 46, 64, 65, 70-72 Name. 13, 15, 18, 19, 25, 27, 38-39, 47. 51. 53. 55. 69. 70 Necessity. 4. 45, 52, 58-60, 65-66, 80 Newton, 65 n. Ninety, ninety-nine, ninety-cne. 10, 64 Nominal essence. 2, 27. 53-55, 6; '1 Nominalism, 53, 73 Number, 6, 9 n., 10. 12-16, 19, 26. 28-3!, 41-42, 46, 57, 66, 69, 70 n., 74 Object, 26, 27, 60 Objective validity, 3-4, 6. 7, 71. 72 OUion, 6-7. 8 n.. 32 n.. 48 n., 49, 68 n.. 70 n., 74 n. One, 10, 12. 13, 21, 26-29. 41-42. 64, 70 Orange, 39-40 Ordering. 11 Original ideas, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20 Origin of ideas, 17, 59. 60 Ostracism. 27. 53 Oval. 10 Radius, 10 Rate of change, 14 Realism, 60, 69 n., 73. 80 Reality. 6, 24. 29, 48, 52, 55, 60-63, 66, 67, 70. 71 physical. 14-15. 24. 26. 44. 54-53. 67 Real knowledge. 60, 62-63. 66, 71-72 Reason, 20, 52, 57-58 Reasoning, 11, 21. 22. 26, 35-37, 45-46 Recollecting, 11, 22 Rectangle, 10 Red, 39-40, 61, 63, 64 Reflection, 4. 9 n., 12. 14. IS. 17-19. 21, 25, 33-37, 64, 68, 74, 77 Reid, 75 Relation, ideas of. 2. 6. 7. 25, 27, 69, 77, 79, Ch. Ill Relations between ideas, 4, 7, 15. 20. 41-43. 46. 59.61, 64-67.69. 71. 72. 74 Relativism. 25. 48-49 Remembering. 11. 21-22. 26. 34-35, 45. 51 Representation. 7 86 l.XDEX Reicnil'liinic. 61 Rest. (>. II, .'A RctiiilKin, <<') RevcuK'. If Rivrnc, II. 21 Rhythm. ft-H Richl, 2. .<-,( tho York and Towncley Cycles. In prt'ss. CURRENT PROBLEMS 1. William Anderson, The Work of Public Service Commissions. 1913. $0.15. 2. Benjamin F. Pittenger, Rural Teachers' Training Departments in Min- nesota High Schools. 1914. $0.15. 3. Gerhard A. Gesell, Minnesota Public Utility Rates. 1914. $0.25. 4. L. D. H. Weld, Social and Economic Survey of a Community in the Red River Valley. 1915. $0.25. 5. Gustav P. Warber, Social and Economic Survey of a Community in Northeastern Minnesota. 1915. $0.25. 6. Joseph B. Pike, Bulletin for Teachers of Latin. 1915. $0.25. 7. August C. Krey, Bulletin for Teachers of History. 1915. $0.25. 8. Carl Schlenker, Bulletin for Teachers of German. 1916. $0.25. 9. William Watts Folwell, Economic Addresses. 1918. $0.50.