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THOUGH the manner of the fol- lowing addrefs may not convey to the public an advantageous prepoffeffion in behalf of the author's modefty, yet the fubjedt of it can create no unfavourable idea of his humanity. If the wifdom and compalTion of the legiflature, equally co- operating, interefted it in the relief of in- folvents doomed to imprifonment for debt, how much ftronger does the cafe of our brave countrymen abroad in Germany, donfigned to the moft uncomfortable of all fates, plead for the attention and com- B niif- .1 i Usi Ji4 it ■ ^f'- ( O fnlferatlon of the fame auguft body ? Every Englifliman capitally tried has his coun- try for his jury ; but in the cafe I now lay before the public, that jury, without the intervention of the legifTature, can do lit- tle more tlian recommend the unhappy prifoners, (for fo in the pr^fent (late I muft deem our army in Germany,) to the mercy of death. The reader is not here to imagine that I plead for the rich and opulent part of our army abroad. Too many, alas! in the fame circumftances at home, confine their notions of want or mifery oh\y to what they themfelves feel, or would feel, were they now ferving in Weftphalia; they never fuffer their ideas to ftoop to the cafe of the needy fubaltern, or the di- Itrefled foldier. This inattention, this, confinement of fentimen,t, has drawn upon the public the prefent addrefs, in which the author will endeavour to prove the- following propolitions: , , ^ , 7, . , H >:. Firji, That our fending an army to Germany is no other than a fecondary meafure, fubordinate, or which ought tq have been fubordinate, to the great caufe of quarrel between France and, Britain « ( 3 ) Secondly y That when Great Britain had fccured the main objcdl flie had in view, in making war, her intereft led her to have recalled her troops from the con- tinent. Thirdly, That (he might have done that, and yet have adhered ftridtly to her en- gagements with her allies in Germany, and have been enabled to have ferved them more efFedlually than flie has done by the ufelefs refidence of her troops in that uncomfortable country for thefe twen- ty months pad. Fourthly, That Great-Britain has now noobjedt of fufficient importance to detaia her troops in Germany. In difcufling the firil of thefe propo* iitions, it is fair and reafonable to afk my reader, whether, though an angel had come down from heaven to perfuade him, he could have believed that the late mi*- nifter and his friends could have come into pods and power upon the anti-conti* nental principles they adopted, and yet have been able to have c^irried the conti- nental fyftem to a height never known in this* country, not even during its moft vi- olent attachments to fuch connections ? I fliall readily admit that France did in a B 2 moft K * :i 11 ■< I. 'X t w ( 4 ) moft fcandalons manner hook into her quarrel with Great Britain, his majefty's electoral dominions in Germany. But forry I am to fay it, that our miniftry, for thefe three or four years pafl, has conneded together two coniiderations that in them - felves are totally dill:in(fl, and ought to have no manner of reference the one to the other J and what is ftill more aggravating, this unnatural conjundlion was firft fug- gcfted by France herfelf. The confiderations I fjieak of are Great- Britain and Hanover, which France from the very beginning of the war, to the pub- lication of her late famous hiftorical me- morial, has ever affe<^ed to bkiid, or more properly fpeaking, to confound together. Had our mi niflry treated thofe coniidera- tions as quite independent of each other, the public could not have fufFered itfelf to have been led ftep by ftep to the ruinous connedlioiis it is now involved in, without the fmalleft emolument to ourfelves, and without offering the leaft relief to our al- lies. The manifefto publifhed by autho- rity at Paris, in the year 1758, goes en- tirely upon the plan that France was juf- tified in attacking the eledoral dominions of Hanover, becaufe they belonged to the king* of Great Britain 5 and the hiftorical me- 3 \ ■ '' I .'i' -»f ■■K i ( 5 ) memorial publiflied by the fame authorltyj in Odober 1761, proceeds upon the very fame fuppolition. 1 fliall not i'ay whether it is the happinefs or the misfortune of Great-Britain that foreigners, even the ableft and moft learned, have a very in*- competent knowledge of her conftitution. Montefquieu, with all his penetration, and the advantage of a long refidence m Eng- land, never could diveft himfclf of the Frenchman's habit of thinking ; and all the precautions which our anceftors took, by the adt of fucceffion, to feparate the interefts of Hanover from thofe of Great- Britain, have not to this day been able to imprefs a (ingle foreigner with a-n idea that our conftitution has rendered them diftindt, andinfome meafure incompatible, interefts. Would to God that this miftake had been confined to foreigners, and that our minifters had not found it too eafy to pro- pagate the fame at home ! The generous concern which the Englifli nation takes in every relation (he bears towards other powers, efpecially to a people who have but one common fovereign with them- felves, is extremely favourable to this ilia- iion ; and while it had not the fatal con- fequences that attend it ^ovv, there was ■ * . not ^ \m II ( 6 ) uot;i man in England (one excepted,) ma* Jcvolent enough to find fault with the af- iirtance we gave to cur friends in Ger- many, till at lafl: our ideas united their cafe with our own, without recurring to a fingle principle of the conflitutio^^. When a meflage was prefented by the mi- nifler, as many were, to enable his majefty to fulfil his continental engagements, the money granted was always, by the good- natured public, confidered as granted for JBritilh purpofes, and in a Britifh quarrel} and our minifters were too polite to tiwaken us from that delufive dream. They were favoured by the injuftice of France. She wanted to impofe a difagre- 4ble neutrality upon his late majefty, as cledor of Hanover, which he magnani- moufly rejedled ; and England was thereby fired with fo flrcng a refentment of the injury offered to her fovereign, that it feemed to require rather the curb than the fpur of the miniftry to dire(fl it. The ). f^: ( 14 ) cooped up in a nook, inftead of taking the other rout, which was only about one hun- dred miles, and would have led them to a place of fafety." I (hall make no obfer- vation upon this fevere remonftrance ; becaufe a public writer is not authorifed to fay that the whole of this march was privately direded by the influence vhich the H n miniftry had at the c — t of n The in juftice, however, and let me add, the egregious folly of the French miniflers, delivered his late majefty from the moft difagreeable fituation he perhaps ever was in. They even protefled againft the va- lidity of the convention, and refufed to ac- cept of his DaniQi n^ajefty's guaranty, un- lefs the H n troops fhould take a fo- lemn oath not to ferve, during the war, againft France or her allies j and Riche- lieu, the new hungry French General, in- fifted upon thofe conditions in the letter he wrote to Zaftrow, the Hanoverian general, who commanded thofe troops after his X — ^1 h fs's arrival at London that fame year. Not contented with that, one of thofe vultures called French financiers, by name Jean Faidy, obtained from the court of Verfailles an adtual farm of the terri- tories of his Britannic Majefty which were con- •f • ( 15 ) conquered, or to be conquered. And the faid Jean, or John, Faidy actually erefted a booth under the diredtion of one Gautier, another financier, his fubftitute, for that purpofe, in the city of Hanover. This was not the only ftrain of French in- juftice inflidted on the unhappy eleftorate. His majefty's fubjedls there were reduced to a ftate equally diftrefled and difgraceful. His troops were confined to a fpot of ground, where, had they continued longer, they muft have perifhed for want of the common neceflaries of life. His palaces, and thofe of his minifters, were threatned with immediate deftrud:ion, if the new terms impofed by France were not inftant- ly complied with ; and a thoufand other violations of the convention of Clofter- Seven were committed,eachofthemfuffici- ent to induce hismajefty to confiderthe vali- dity of it as no longer exifting. Notwith- ftanding all thofe provocations, fo delicate was his late majefty in point of good faith, that after prince Ferdinand of Brunfwick was appointed to the command of the Hanoverian army, and ordered to put it again into motion, that prince on the twenty-eighth of November gave Riche- lieu, in a letter from Stade, fair warninfy of what he was about. His Britannic ma- jefty I u ii ( i6 ) jcf^y, about the fame time, ordered a paper to be publifhed in Germany, entitled, ** A previous detail of the motives which induced his majefty the king of Great- Britain, in quality of eledtor of Brunfwick Lunebourg, to take up arms againfl the army of France, which is again in motion." Accordingly on the twenty-third of Ja- nuary 1758, the Britifh parliament grant- ed, nemine contradicente, one hundred thou- fand pounds for a prefent fupply in the then critical exigency, towards enabling his majefty to fubfift and keep together the army formed laft year in his electoral dominions, and then again put into mo- tion, and a(flually employed againfl the cortimon enemy, in concert with the king of Pruffia. From what is faid above, the falQiood of the fadt charged in the French hifto- rical memorial, as if the chief pretence made ufe of on the part of the king of Great Britain for breaking the convention of Clofler-Seven, was, ** That the army which had capitulated belonged to the eledlor; and that the fame army, which, contrary to the right of nations and all military laws, re-entered into adlion, was from that time to be conlidered as a Bri- ti£h army :" This allegation, I fay, from what ■^ m ( »7 ) what has been obferved, is falfe in fadt. His majefty was juftificd by the anterior infradlions of the capitulation on the part of France ; nor had we, at the time that his majcfly's German army was put into motion, taken either the Heffians or Ha- noverians, Wolfenbuttlers, or Saxe-Gotha troops into our pay. The hundred thou- fand pounds, already mentioned to have been granted, was not voted, as we have feen, till the 23d of January 175^; and the firil vote, rcliting to the Hellian troops, did not pali till February the 23d thereafter. - ^' ^ - ; - Having faid thiis much, I am fenfible of the tendernefs with which the Hanoverian miniflry ought to be treated; and that it was very natural for them to endeavour, by the bed means they could, to mitigate their miferies of war : but the fame argu- ment holds as good to Britons as to Hano- verians. The latter feem'd to have been fo much convinced of the inutility of all their endeavours to fave their eledlorate, that they appear'd chiefly felicitous, that his late majefty fhould be deprived of the means of making an effedtual oppofition againft the power of France there. For this purpofe they perfuaded one of our moft powerful German allies, I mean the ' •: D- ... duke t'i m ■d if ii ( '8 ) duke of Brunfwick-Wolfcnbuttcl, to ne- gotiate, even before the convention of Clortcr* Seven, a convention with Prance. It is true, this convention was not (igned by the Brunfwick miniftcr till ten day^s after the convention of Clofter-Seven was figned ; but it is equally true, that it was figncd at Vienna ; and that ten days time was too fhort to have negotiated from Brunfwick to Paris, and from Paris to Vienna. We are likewife to obferve, that in the letter, written by the fame duke to his brother prince Ferdinand, dated No* vember 27, 1737, he exprefsly fays, that he had accepted of the convention of Clofter-Scven on the word of the Hanove- rian miniftry, and that he had, in con- formity- TO THEIR iNSTURCTiONS, ne- gotiated at Verfailles and Vienna. If this was the cafe, if the defence of Hanover was given up by that miniftry themfelves> was the Britifh miniftry to undertake it at an ex pence, the moft monftrous that any war we ever were engaged in, coft ? If our good faith, as I think it does, obliges us to affift our allies in Germany, it ought to be by thofe means that provi- dence has put into our power. Had not his PrulTian majefty's unexpeded vidlory at Rolbach favoured his Britannic ma- ' ' 2 ^ ' jefty's ' .. . ( '9 ) jcfty's ftirit in ordering his German army. to re-auemble, it would not have been in our power to have taken the part we have done in the wan; and yet all is infufTicient ; though the fufFerings of our troops have been as unparallell'd, as the aHiilance we have given has been generous. The fitua- tion of Francfort, that had been treache- rouflyfeizcd by the French, gave them ad- vantages that all our courage and efforts could not counterballance. It made them mafters of the Mayne and the Rhine, fe-; cured their communication with the Auf- trian and Imperial armies -, and, at the fame time, opened their way for receiving what reinforcements and provifions they pleafed. The neceflity of diflodging them from that important pofl was apparent ; and as foon as the feafon permitted, in the year 1758; prince Ferdinand the BritiHi general, for fo we muft now deem him, undertook that arduous talk at the head of thirty thoufand men. By this time, the vaft reputation the Britiili troops had ac- quired had entitled them to the poft of honour, which was moft ccmplaifantly allowed to them by that general. Accord- ingly the hereditary prince of Brunfwick put himfelf at the head of the flower of the Britifh troops, led them through ways ti fe D2 that 41 4 that till then were deemed impaffible by an army ; and, after defeating the French wherever became, he obliged the duke dc Broglio to take a ftrong poll: at Bergen, between Francfort and Hanau, where prince Ferdinand refolved to attack him. I {hall not here enquire, though the en- quiry perhaps would not be impertinent, whether his Tercne highnd, had he been at the head of German troops only, would have thought proper to have made that at- tack, confidering the almoft impregnable fituation of the French. The attack, however, was made by the Britifh troops ; and perhaps none but Britifh troops could have been led on to fo defperate a fervice. NothiPig of moment was done but by them; and all the lofs which the Ger- mans faffered, was in the difpolitions made by their general for covering his retreat, Cind thereby faving his army and himfelf from irretrievable deftrudion ; even that he could not have effected, had it not been by the valour aiid the farther expence of Britifh blood. This unfucccfsful attempt loil: to his Britannic majelly's arms all the glorious confequences we had prornifed to ourfelves. The progrefs of the French became more rapid than ever. Prince Ferdinand could fcarcely maintain himfelf upon .'1* (21 ) npbn the defenfive ; and the French muft have wintered in Hanover, had not the aU moft miraculous battle of Minden inter^ pofed. ■'-'■■■ • - ' • ' • ;...'; The reader will be pleated here to re- collect, that we were, at this time, carrying on the whole war at the expence of near eleven millions a year ; of which about three millions went to Heflians and Hano- verians and Ibr his Pruffian majelty's fub- fidy. Belides tltls immenfe lum, we were paying above twenty thoi'Tand of our own troops ; and many officers of great for- tune in our army there, cut deeply into their private eflares, in iupporting them- feL :s and their iellow officers, whofe pay, though greater than that of any troops in the world, was infufficient to relieve them under the inexpreffible hardlliips they fuf- fered. Of all this money, fcarce a lliilling of it came back to England -, Dutch, Jewiih, and German contradors were the only gainers ; and even the niil'erable in- habitants of the country coidd not be faid to have been benefited by it. In the middle of the year 1759, the French extended their inciirfions to the very gates of Hanover, made tbemfelves mailers of Ritbcrg, Liplladt, and Minden ; and it was with diliiculty, that prince Ferdinand 1 ■ II ^ 't ^^ h i ( 2* ) Ferdinand preferved his cdrnmunication with the Wefer. At laft, about the 25th of July, they took Munfter, and in it four thoufand troops. Thofe were conqucfts, that, conlidering the ftate of the war, and the great intercil the Hanoverians had at ftake, did not indicate any fierce fpirit of averfion in them once more to fubmit to French government, efpecially as they had prince Ferdinand's army in the field, which was rendered in a manner inactive, by the rapid fuccefTes of the enemy, and the furrender of that elc6torate*s ftrongeft barrier. At laft the day arrived that was to deliver his majefty*s cledtorai dominions. But by whom were they delivered ? not by German, but by Britifli, valour. A few Hanoverians, indeed, by accident, as it would feem, feconded the irrefiftible im-» pctuofity of the EngliCh infantry ; but the reft of the Germans, in the battle which is properly called that of Minden or Thcnw haufen, adted as unconcerned fpedlators. Though I am far from vindicating the backwardnefs of the Britifh general, in not bringing up his cavalry that day, yet it is certain, tba?t, in the admirable defence he made upon his trial, he proved, paft all contradidion, that the battle was won, bpth agamfl the dilpofitions and the ex- pedlations :4 1 ( 23 ) pedlatlons of the German general ; and the account publifhed by the French themfclves intimated the fame. Another fad: is pail all doubt ; that though the day on which the battle of Minden was fought, was to decide the fate of Hanover and of Hefle-Caflel, yet two thirds of thofe who were killed and wounded in this dif* cifivc a6tion were Britifh foldiers. Before I proceed in my review of the dreadful confequences of continuing our troops in Germany, I muft mention one circu mflanceof the utmoft importance to the welfare and honour of our army ferving in Germany ; and that is the unfortunate fituation they are in, by the Britifh general ferving under the command of a foreigner. I call this an unfortunate lituation,becaufe, could it have been remedied, it would have been fo, by his late or prefent ma- jefty. Gentlemen of the law are the beft judges whether the unfortunate com- mander, who was tried and cenfured for his conduct at the battle of Minden, could have regularly tefufed to be tried for dif- obedience to the orders of a general, who, by the laws of England, was vnot duly qua- lified to command him. I have heard many gentlemen of great knowledge and probity in law, give their opinion in the aflirma- 'J f!' ii" ^t ^•t h I '-/ ( 24 ;) •ffirmative ; and I never heard the nega* five advanced by any, but thofe who think that amyal commiffion conveys every kind of power, civil as well as military j mert who do not reflect that our martial law it- felf has iio exiftence, but in the authority of our municipal law. For my own part, I Ihould have been extremely glad if this material point had been tried and decided previous to the trial of the right honoura- ble perfon ; and that the confcioufnefs of his own innocence had not prepofterouily made him demand a trial, the event of w]iich probably would have fixed, at the head of Britilh troops, a Britifli com- mander in chief, who, without being lavifli of their blood, would have confulted their glory. Bat the opportunity is now loft* perhaps never to be retrieved, becaufe of the precedent that has been introduced. .; As the people of England are equally affeded by the diftrelles as by the fucceffes of fovereigns, the Hipplies granted by par- liament for the fupport of the German war during ij^gi though immenfe, were exceeded by thofe granted for the fervice of the year 1760. In order to enable us to fupply that war with men as well as money, our militia had been embodied. New recruits all over the kingdom, in r ■ .'•: ' ■ Scot- 1 ( 25 ) Scotland efpecially, were raifed. An ad- ditional body of Hefiians, confifling of nine hundred and twenty horfe, and fix thoufand feventy-two foot, was taken into our pay. The treaty between his ma- jefty and the landgrave of HelTe-Caflel, was renewed the 9th of November, 1759* (though it had been concluded no farther back than the 19th of January preced- ing ;) and in confequence of the feparate articles of that treaty, the fum of fixty thoufand pounds was, in a manner, made a prefent of to his fercne highnefs. On the 17th of January, 1760, no lefs than half a million of money was granted by parlia- ment upon account, as a prefent fupply towards defraying the charges of forage, bread, bread-waggons, train of artillery, and of provifions, wood, flraw, &c. and other extraordinary cxpences and contin- gencies, of his majefly's combined army under the command of Prince Ferdinand ; a new and a heavy expence, into which our continental connedlions have brought us. On the i ith of February following, thirty-four thoufand three hundred and thirty-tbree pounds was granted for de- fraying the charge of an augmentation of one thoufand one hundred light cavalry, the troops of Hanover, in the pay of E Great- m |1 ^-i I i; . '■',(■' hi ( 2^ ) Grc^t-rBrilain. That fame day, the fmn of twenty thoufand feven hundred 9n4 ieventy-lix pounds was granted for defray t ing the charge of an augmentation of fou^ fquadrons of hunters ^nd huflars, thp troops of the landgrave of HefTe-CaiTel, in the pay of Great-Britain. The next vote, on the fame day, granted the fum of fifty-two thoufand nine hundred and two pounds, for defraying the charge of an augmeqtatipn of five battalions to the king's army in Germany ; each battalion confifting of one troop of one hundred and men, and four companies of foot of one one hundred and twenty-five mpn in each company, with a corps of artillery. Thus, in one d?iy, was voted the annual additio- nal fum (fra ought not to be placed to our German ac- count ; but a (hort anfwer lies to this ob- jection, viz. that had it not been for our maintaining, at an exorbitant expence, twenty-five thoufand of our beft troops in Germany, there would have been no oc* calion to have rendered oUr militia, to all intents and purpofes, regular troops, of embodying them, of harraflln^ them by marches and counter-marches, of putting their officers to extravagant expences, of bringing both them and their men under military law, and of leaving the lands of England in danger of being both unculti- vated and depopulated i About the time thofe votes palTed, our government as well as our people, were feized with amoft ridiculous notion, which the French court had artfully propagated, in order to roufe the generofity and benevo- lence of their own fubjedts, that their king and their government were bankrupt. This notiori, which effedtuallv anfwered the purpofes of his moft chriftian majefty, E 2 was m f: ;-^ r 'i 4 ( ag ) was countenanced by the publication of feveral authentic pieces in France, by the example of many of her great men, who were not in the fecret, and of fome who were in it, who fent their plate to the mint, and their money to the treafury ; and the public of Great-Britain was, at this time, imprefTed with a firm opinion, that the king and queen of France had no more plate for their table, than a iingle falt-feller and a fingle fpoon, which, like boys in a boarding-fchool after dinner, they carefully wiped and put into their pockets. The whole dod;rine in our court, parliament, city, and country was, that the French was in the lafl agonies of their credit ; and that a very few more vigo- rous ileps in Germany would infallibly ruin it paft recovery. This doctrine appeared fo plaufible, that, on the 29th of April, 1760, the fum of fixty-fix thoufand nine hundred and twenty-lix pounds was granted by parlia- ment for defraying the charge of nine hun- dred and fifty-nine cavalry, and one thou- fand four hundred and fifty-four infantry, the troops of the reigning duke of Brunf- wick, in the pay of Great-Britain, pur- fuant to treaty; and that fame day, the fum of twenty-three thoufand eight hun- 4 dred ,Hi [^ ( 29 ) dred and forty-three pounds was granted for defraylni» the charge of an augmenta- tion to the troops of the reigning duke of BrunlVv^ick, in the pay of Great-Britain, purfuant to an uUerior convention, .con- cluded and figned at Paderborn, the 5th of March, 1760. The next refolution which pafled, was for granting the fum of one hundred one thoufand and ninety- iix pounds, for defraying the charge of two additional fquadrons of huflars, and two" companies of phaiTeurs, together with an augmentation to the hprfe, dragoons, and foot, the troops of the landgrave of Heflb-Caffel, in the pay of Great- Britain^ for 1760. Thus, in one day, of the fame parliament was granted, in another addi- tion to the expences of the German war, (fradlions included) the fum of fix hun- dred eleven thoufand nine hundred and eighty-five pounds, thirteen ihiUings, and one penny halfpenny : fo that, exclulive of the additional charge of the militia, of a vote of credit of one million, and many other charges, incurred on account of our German conned:ions, the whole additio- nal fum the German war coft us in 1 760, amounted to feven hundred nineteen thou- fand nine hundred and ninety-eight pounds, five (hillings, and eight pence halfpenny. . - This V'- i' ( 3* ) 'This film added to our former, what I may call our (landing, expences, amounts to above three millions a year. We are now to colifider what we reaped after the battle of Minden, to compenfate for this treafure and the Britifh blood, which now fertilized the uncorafortabld plains of Germany* The campaign of 1759 had been as un- favourable to his Pruflian majefty as it was glorious for us till the nth of Sep- tember, when the caftle of Marpurg fell into our hands. By this time we had driven theenemy two hundred and fifty rtiiles before us in Germany, without being poffefled of i fingle advantage there which we had not at the opening of the campaign ; and which we loft by the ill fuccefs of dur un- accountable attack at Bergen. In fad:, we were in a worfe condition ; for the Ha- noverian general ImhofF did not retake Munfter; and our German general did little more than attempt that fiege, when he abandoned it. Though the public, from the diftreffes of the main body of the French, who had loft upwards of twenty thoufand men, at and after the battle of Minden, by the valour and intrepidity of the Bri- tifh troops (for by reading the news-papers and gazettes, we can fcarcely find that any other A ( 31 ) Other were employed in adtlons of enters prizes and danger) were in the mod fanguine expectations that our German general would have detached part of his army to the afliftance of his PrufTian ma-^ jefly; and though it is faid the latter ex pc«Aed and requefted it in the moft earned manner, he being now in a mofl dangerous iituation from the refpedlivc pofitions of the Auflrians, Imperialifls, Ruffians and Swedes, yet no fuch meafure took place ; though the jundlion was far from being impradicable,- or even hazardous. This pmiflion could not be owing, as was given put, though mod falfely, to any difagree- inent, either amongft, or with, the Britidi generals in the councils of war. They were, moft of them, men ofeftates oreafy fortunes j and thofe, if any, who were not, " were enabled to live in their own country comfortably upon their pay. They, there- fore, could have no reafon for protrading the war. Others, whofe trade as well as profejjion is war, might have realbn fpr continuing a little longer in bujinefi ; and therefore, fo far as the public has been ac* quainted, fuch a reinforcement never was fent ; though, had it been fent, it is more than probable it would have put an end to the war and to the effufion of Britifh Uood ; ( 30 blood ; for little cI*'*'; was flied in that army. The confequcncc was, that the Ruffians drew near to the banks of the Oder, and Dohna, though now his Pruf- fian majefty's favourite general, durft not attack them. Wedel, whom his PrufTian majcfty thought a more enterprifing gene- ral, took Dohna's command ; and though he made a mod defperate attack upon the Ruffians, yet he was repulfeu and obliged to repafs the Oder; and then the Ruffians made themfelves mafters of Francfort upon that river, and of Croflen, and count Daun found mcins to reinforce the Ruffians with twelve thoufand horfe and eight thousand foot under the Auftrian general Laudohn^ which made their army very near one hun- dred thoufand ftrong, and enabled them to beat his Pruffian majefty at Cunnerf- dorf, where he loft more men than he had done in any one adlion during his former campaigns : for his killed, prifoners, and wounded, amounted to twenty thoufand men. As it is not my defign to enter far- ther into the hiftory of his Pruffian ma- jefty *s diftreffes or fuccelTes than as they are connected with thofe of the Britifh army in Germany, I ftiall now, to make ufe of military terms, obferve the motions of the latter. ■ m'j' "^ 1 ne (33 ) The ftate of the Britifh army, after the glorious things they had done in the year 1759, in Germany, can afford the reader no other than the mofl: difagreeable ideas. The deHverers of Hanover were obliged to take lip fuch winter quarters as the meaneft filherman's boy upon the Thames could not have put up with ; and before they could open the campaign of the year 1760, their cavalry was ruined by mere want of food and forage ; while the French troops, by commanding the Mayne, the Mofelle, and the Rhine, had all pro- vifions in plenty. When both armies took the field, nothing but a mifunder- flanding between the two French gene- rals, Broglio, and St. Germain, could have faved the Britiih troops from deftrudtion -, but this difference being removed, the al- lied army was obliged to retire towards the Dymel. It was, at this time, that the hereditary prince formed the glorious pro- jed: of atttacking the French at Corbach ; and here the valour of our German allies proved more confpicuous than ever. The attack proved unfuccefsful ; and through the cowardice of the German horfe and foot, who filed out of the field, the French bade fair to exterminate our army. Already a great body of their cavalry, affifted by a F . nu- iJl J. ■'A r'" k !• , ( 34 ) numerous train of artillery, had begun the work, when the hereditary prince, in this defperate fituation, puthimfelf at the head of Howard's and Bland's dragoons, whofe horfes, by this time, had been recruited at a vaft expence, and not only ftopt the pur- fuitof the enemies cavalry, but drove them back to their pofls, and fecured the retreat of the fugitives to their main army. An adlion fo fpirited, fo fortunate, and fo glorious, gf\vc the young a6ive prince a higher opinion of the Britifh fidelity and valour, th.'in he had reafon to conceive of the German ; and having formed the bold defign of relieving Ziegcnhagen, he chofe Elliot's dragoons as his chief dependence for fuccefs. It is true he had with him at the fame time fix battalions of German troops, two brigades of hunters, and a re- giment of hufi!ars. But, by the even*, they fecm to have been led to the field rather for parade than ufe. Before they came up to the enemy, which was not till after a march of fixty miles, the Germans could do no more than juft break a fmall party of the French troops j and, in doing that, they pretended to be fo fatigued as to be unfit for farther adion. Bv the courage, however, of Elliot's dragoons, who, by the bye, had never been in a field of battle be^ ( 35 ) before, he obtained the moft glorious vic- tory the allies could boaft of, excepting that of Minden, fince the commencement of .the war. It may be here aiked, how was the German cavalry of hunters and huffars employed during the a(ftion ? All I can anfwer to this queftion is a fadt, which is, that no more than eight Germans fell in the whole engagement, while the brave Britiih regiment was almoft ruined by their own fuccelTes, and by conquering for others. '■ . '..:■''■■ I can give little or no lealon for our German general in chief's inadivity at Saxenhaufen, during, and after the glori- ous expedition of the hereditary prince to Corbach. It is certain that his fituation was far from being (o defperate as it was when the BritiQi infantry gained him the battle of Minden ; but it is likely that the credit gained by our countrymen, at that battle, made him cautious of his employ- ing their cavalry in the battle of Warburg, ^gainfl: the chevalier de Muy, which he was in hopes of carrying by his Germans alone. The Englilb cavalry, at that ad:ion, was left five miles behind j but their ge- nerals and they had too much fpirit to re- main inacftive. Though the former com- mander of the Britifh troops had, in the F z dc- ^t- m 'n ■% *-1 ( 36 ) defence he made upon his trial alledged, that riding about half, or at moft three quarters of a mile at a full trot, (which feems to have been admitted of by fomc general officers who fate judgei on the trial,) muft have blown their horfes, and have rendered them unfit for adtion ; yet the new Briti/li General, and he who was next in command, advanced with their cavalry, as is faid, without orders, to have a ihare in the glory of this adtion. They marched the five miles upon fomewhat that was more than a full trot, came up without any inconveniency or diforder, to engage thc^ir enemies, who upon this charge fell back. The Briti(h infantry and artillery made the fame noble eflforts. Some of them ..nder the hereditary prince had gained confiderable advantages over the flank and rear of the French, which had already turned the fcale of vidlory in favour of the Germans, and the reft were fo eager to engage, that n.any of them dropt down dead, in their endeavours to pals morciles and defiles, to come at their enemy, and rendered the vicftory decifive. But that was not a glory referved for Britiili troops. Decifion in war is formi- dable to general in chief who fights for Pay. The generous ciforts^of the Britifli troops I v'vyrfiH^Wf'^ ( 37 ) troops came too late ; and they only had the glory, as ufual, of lofing fuch a num- ber of men, that the German general was ashamed to publifh the number he loil in the engagement. Nothing is more certain than that, if the detachment under the ch-valier de Muy had, at that time, been ruined, there muft have been an end of the war ; but fo far from that, though by the valour of the Engli(h, the advahtage lay plainly on the fide of the allies, yet by our German general keeping his camp at Kalle, he loft all the landgraviate of HefJe, with G. tt. 'en and Munden, in the elec- torate or Hanover, and even expofed his majefty's German capital to the fame fate. Thofe unaccountable events, after what was boafted of as being a victory, created prodigious uneafinefs in Great Britain. It was plain, that wherever the Briti(h troops had been engaged, they had been vido- rious; that not a lingle advantage, during the whole camp:;ign, had been gained but by the Britir ■ ^ly; and yet like the man who died otg v d fymptoms, our af- fairs in Germany Vv'ere daily going from one ruin to another. I fhall not here ad- vance for certain, v/hat has been more than infinuated, tliat in all the warlike de- liberations ther^, the Britifh generals were always ( 38 ) always outvoted in every meafure but that of having the preference of themfelves and their troops being knocked on the head, which, in the terms of the military vulgar, is commonly called the pofl of honour. Be this as it will, a great many Englifh- men of plain, and therefore flrong, fenfc, began to open their eyes, after the battle of Warburg. They faw that they had been deceived by the fum total, through their in* attention to items ; that they had, upon plaufible pretexts, been led "^om ftep to flep ; and, like the dupes of the hemift, made to believe that the projection was juft at hand, when the whole procefs was ready to blow into the air. Great num- bers of the moft fanguine votaries for con- tinental connexions began now to be cured of their propenfities. They per- ceived that Mr. Face, the undertaking al- chemift, had gulled them of prodigious fums of money, under pretext that the projecftion every moment was to be ex- peded ; but, to fpeak the moft favourably, they were yet very diftant from the defired hour. The former profeffions, however, of their operator, remained fo flrong upon their minds, that their complaints feldoni went farther than doubts, or at mofl grow- linyfs ; and next year it was held to be an 3 un- IJWI H ' an in- ( 39 ) undoubted fad, that all matters would be juil as we could wi(h them. The reader may perceive, that in all I have faid, I have confined myfelf entirely to the dreadful fituation of our fuffering countrymen in Germany, for whofe deli- verance this addrefs is intended, without regard to any other objed:. I have not endeavoured to difpute the very difputable merits of our minifters, as to the con- quefts we have made in America and other parts of the globe. I readily admit thofe conquefls to be great and important ; but I think, at the fame time, that their great- nefs and importance are the ftrongeft ar- guments to prove, that we ougiit, before now, to have given up the German war. It is extremely plain, from the original pa- pers publifhed by France in her hiftorical memorial, that during the laft negociation for peace, France offered us both in Eu- rope, Atrica, and America, a thoufand times more than we could have had the confidence to have afked at the commence- ment of the war. Were thofe conceflions owing to our German conquefts ? No, they were owing to conqueits in thofe parts of the globe, and on that element, where, under providence, we were fure we could conquer. Let us luppofe that a tenth ( 40 ) tenth part of the blood and trearure we have expended in Germany, had been em* ployed againfl the remaining pofleflions of France in America and the Weft Indies 5 and, (which is no unreafonable fuppofi- tion) that we had fucceeded, can a doubt be entertained that the French would irt fuch a cafe have enlarged their conce(fions> by granting all that we afk for, nay more than what the ultimatum of our minifter contains? • * ' ' '' ^ ^ ' Let us, on the other hand, fuppofe we had carried our original point in Germany^ which profeffedly was no other than to protedl Hanover, which feems now ready to fink under the French arms, could that have induced France tc have ceded to us a iingle foot of land in any quarter of the globe, more than what fhe has offered to do by her ultimatum? No: that I may keep othe words of my firfl propofition^ the protedlion of Hanover was but a fe- condary meafure, incidental to the mairi caufc of quarrel between the two crowns/ and whatever fuccefs the Britifli arms have had, or could have had there, it neve? could have influenced France to havd given up one Cmgh fort or foot of land ' that lay within the compafs of our pri- mary quarrel. After (41 ) After the deviation from the anti-con- tinental fyflem had varioufly affecfled the people of this ifland, conqueil and fuccefs reconciled the inconfiftency, and drew a veil over the ferious refiedtions of the pub- lic. But, at the fame time, anti-continental maxims and profeflions were fo recent, that fome apology feemed to be neceflary to certain people v/h . ftill prefumed to judge for themfelves, by making ufe of thtir own fcnfes. This apology was nei- ther more nor lefs than, that, by fighting the.French in Germany, we, in facfl, fought t^"'em in America ; becaufe the armies they ire obliged to fend there, would have been employed in America. But unfor- tunately this was the very reverfe of the dodtrine with which our m — r fet out, when he fawthe neceffity of either parting with his power, or aboliiliing fbme part of his anti-continental fyftem. The language then was: Now that the interefts of Great- Britain, fo far as concerns her American pofTeflions, are fecured, let us obferve the terms of good faith, by aflifting our allies in Germany. But how, in the name of common fenfe, are we to afiift them ? By fending twenty-five thoufand men to be butchered, or to rot there ? But thofe men kept a French army in Germany, which G might "Ik f^i 'V'.i.i ;; h ( 42 ). might have been employed in America ; fo that the fecondary objedt becomes the fame, or at lead of as mu'^h importance as the primary one. This way of i.xCc ng, had it been made ufe of in the beginning of the war, when the anti-continental fyflem was in full bloom, and before its bloflbms had fallen off, might have been very unpopular; but ll:ill it might have carried with it fome fliadow of reafon. But it happened, that the more' difabled the French were to tranfport a lingle battalion to any part of the globe, the more did we multiply our force in Germany. France, at the begin- ning of the war, had no defpicable marine, and it might have been poffible, (though not very probable, as appears by what ac- tually happened in the cafe of the Lys and Alcyde,) that, ifflie had been in luck, fhe might have found means to have thrown over two or three regiments to North- America. It will however puzzle the grcatefl latitudinarian in hiftory and po- litics, to prove that it was, even at that time, in the pov/er of France to have thrown over into North America a Euro- pean force numerous enough to have baf- fled our expeditions againft her colonies. During the progrels of the war this diffi- culty r ( « ) culty increafed ; and at lall, by the dcflruc- tion of her marine it became unlUrmount- able, and has continued fo lor thele two years ; and yet, during that time our con- nedlions in Germany have been flrcnger, and our army more numerous than ever. Thus the advocates for connedting the continental war with the primary caufes of our differences with P'rance, fpeak the very language of our enemies. *' The hoftilities, (fay they in their hiftorical me- morial) in Weftphalia andLowei jaxony, have had and ftill have the fame objedl as the hoflilities in America, Afia, and Afri- ca ; that is to fay, the difputes fubfifting between the two crowns concerning the limits of Acadia and Canada." But this is a grofs mifreprefentation of the fadl, and evidently arifes from the advocates for a German war, joining fo far with the French miniftry as to confound the poli- tical charader of a king of Great Britain with that of the eledtor of Hanover, though they arefeparated,by every principle of this conftitution, with the greateft care andpre- cifion. His late majelly himfelf was fo fenfible of this, that in the famous, but now forgotten, paper publiflied by his au- thorityin the year 1 757, or the beginning of theyear 1758, entitled "The king of Eng- G 2 land's ( 44 ) land's conducfl a<» eleflor of rianover," he makes a clear diftindlion between the two capacities ; for in that paper he fays, that " None but fiRh as are unacquainted with the maritime force of England, can believe that, without a diverfion on the continent, to employ part of the enemies force, (lie is not in a condition to hope for fudccfs, and maintain her fuperiority at fea. Eng- land had therefore no intcrefl to foment quarrels or wars in Europe." In another palTage of the fame paper, the fame di- flinclion is more clearly exprefled. *' The king, (fays the author,) defrayed the ex- pences of the campaign of 1757, at his own proper charge ; and, except the pay- ment which the HefTian troops recei- ved from England, that crown contri- buted only two hundred thoufand pound fler^'ng to that campaign ; a fum which, it is eaiy to fee, was fuiiicient but for a fmall part of the necedary expences. Had it been in the power of the king to fhun this war, the Hanoverian troops would have flood in no need of fubfidies." The reader is here to obferve, that when the above paper was publifhed, the war was above eighteen months old .; and that France herielf has been jufl as incon- futent on this head, as fome have been nearer { 45 ) nearer home. For when the cmprcfs queen began her operatrona agaiivfl: Pniffia, fhe prevailed upon the court of France, as appears by a paper, publifhed by authority of his moft chrilfian majefty, 1:0 offer a neutrality for Hunover, during all the time the war (l^ould continue between France and Great- Britain. This was a plain reparation of the two capacities of king and eledtor ; and as things have fince turned out, it had been happy for this na- tion had that neutrality been accepted of, notwithftanding the difadvantageous terms attending it. France, it is plain, neither had nor could have any motives for at- tacking Hanover, but on account of our American differences; and thus has fhe conneded the caufe of the king with that of the eledtor. But, by this paper it is evident fhe waves that plea which, upon the neutrality being rejedled, fhe was, in a manner, obliged to refume. It is true, one of the conditions of this neutrality, viz. the fourth, requires the elector not to aflift either diredly or indirectly the king of PrufHa or his allies, either with men or money. But this article, if the courts of Vienna and Verfailles are not the mod egregious blunderers in point of ffyle ever heard of, does not bind up the king of Eng- f^ ( 46 ) England from fupplying his Pruflian ma- jedy both with men and money. The fixth article requires the town of Hame- len to be depofited into the hands of the emprefs queen ; but then it was to be re- ilored at the end of the war, in the fame condition as it was received ; and by the eleventh article, the emprefs of RulBa and the king of Denmail:, were to be required to guaranty the convention. This, un- doubtedly, was an article hard of digeftion; but had it been coai plied with, it might have faved thnt electorate from many dif- agreeable vicifiitudes which it has fince experienced. I have been the more full upon the fub- jedl of this neutrality, which was proffered fo early as the fourth of January, 1757, becaufe it plainly fhews, that we were at firfl no other than volunteers in the fervice of Hanover. For, on the twcnty-firft of February thereafter, our parliament voted the two hundred thoufand pounds, above mentioned, from the paper called "The king* of England's reafons" for alTillin^ his majefty to foim an army of obfervation in Ger- many, whofe operations, as we have al- ready (cen, terminated in the convention of Cloller-Seven. From this detail, I (hall not take the advantage, which I am fairly- entitled e » or O y ill ( -f? ) entitled to, of attempting to prove, that our connections with Hanover were not originally entitled even to the epithet of fecondary to our interefts in America ; be- caufe, it is plain, that it was in our power, fuppofing thofe conditions to have been laid before our miniflry, which I cannot doubt of, to have carried on the American war, independently of all confiderations but thofe of fulfilling our treaty with the king of Pruflia, concluded at London in January 1756. But it is to be obferved, at the fame time, that this treaty was de- fenlive, and that the ofFenfive fteps which his Pruflian majefty took afterwards, I do not fay in confcquence of this treaty, were difavowe' hy his Britannic majefty in his quality t ^icdior; becaufe they furnifhed France with a pretext of throwing upon the treaty of London, concluded iii Ja- nuary 1756, the odium of kindling the war in Germany. This leads me, before I finifh what I have to advance in fupport of my firft pro- polition, to a moft important confidera- tion, which is, that the members of the Germanic empire, appear evidently to have been of opinion with the court of France ; and that the invafion of Saxony was an adlual breach of the tranquility of the . empire. ■'^,A I 'mi".' ,'U « \%i linti ( 48 ) empire, by their having furnifhed his im- perial majefty with their contingencies for forming what is called ** the r.rmy of the .empire". This is the more remarkable, as thofe princes feem very accurately and very wifely to diflinguiQi between the re- gard that oaght to be paid to the Ger- .manic conftitution, and the caution they ought to obferve for circumfcribing the -unbounded ambition of the houfe of Auf- .tria. The proteflant princes of the em- pire, the Mecklenburg family in partica- jar, as well as the popifh, had the fame views in this particular. The fuccelTes of Pruflia could not intimidate them, and the -intrigues of the aulic council coi^ld pot win them over. The fame principle that made them condemn his Pruffian m^jeiiy for the invafion of Saxony, led them to oppofe the annihilating his PrulHan ma- jefty, fo far as to fufxer him to be put to the ban of the empire. They did, indeed, declare him a public enemy, but they did not think a breach cf the peace amounted tohigh treafon. Thefriends of the Hanover .family, viz. the landgrave of Helfe-CafTcI, and the dukes 0^ Brunfwick and Saxs- Gotha, oppofed the refclutions taken againlt him in the diet of Ratifbon ; and the reafons why they did fc does not re- quire ^ ■ 'vyvw ( 49 ) quire to be pointed ut. But that diet could not be brought to go farther lengths againfi: him j and confidering the vaft in- fluence, which ever fince the peace of Weftphalia, the French have had over that body, there is the flrongeft reafon for be- lieving that the court of Verfailles was of their opinion, and fecretly traverfed the intrigues of the court of Vienna. I call the above a moft important con- fideration, becaufe, had we fufficiently at- tended to it, it would have rid us from all our engagements, to keep an army of Englifhmen in Germany on account of his Pruflian majefty*s concerns ; and in fadb, the conduct of the diet tended to bring the Germanic conflitution back to its firft principles, which they thought had been violated by the irruption into Saxony. The private evidence his Pruf- fian majefty had, which, by the bye, never was authenticated till he had got poffeflFon of Drefden, was no object of the diet's confideration ; and they, perhaps, very properly, judged of the fadts which they did fee, and not of the motives which they could not fee. It is extremely remark- able, that this refolution of the diet his Pruflian mi igaini fty place till the 17th of January, 1757 i^ H when (. 50 ) V'hen It was publicly known not only in England but all over Europe, (and I be- lieve even notified to fome courts,) that an army of oblcrvation was forming in the empire; for the refolution of the Britifti parliament to grant his majefty two hun- dred thoufand pounds, to enable him to form that army, pafTed on the 2ift of February following. Let us now, upon the whole, fee how the aff rs of Germany, with regard to Great-Britain, flood at that momentous period ; and whether Hanover was in lUch diftrefs, the king of Prulfia in fuch danger, and the protellant religion under fuch calamity, ds to induce us to plunge, as we did, into the continental fyflem, and to fpend twenty millions of money in, or upon, Germany. That his Britannic majefty did not think Hanover in diftrefs is evident; be- catife, on the fourth of January, before he h\L\ rejccfted the neutrality for that el'.ctor.ue under a mofl: unexceptionable guaiajUv, lup^tofing he had accepted of that iniarant\ , what mnll have been the confeqncnces r V^ery probably, thatthe king ol i-r'idla would liave abandoned his ex- peditions aga-nd ^-^axony and Bohemia, wlii.h his Biii: k in.ijefty fecmed to 2 ' ^^^^^ ■ ( 50 condemn, and in which it wa;^ never pre- tended Great Britain had, or cculd have, the leafl: concern or interefl:. Had that defirahle event taken place, the army of the empire never could have been brought to the field. Trojaque nunc flares, Priamique arx alt a maneres, Pruffia never had been loft to the Ruf- fians, nor Hanover to the French. The faireft dominions of the houfe of Bran- denburg would not have been in pof- fefllon of the houfe of Auftria, its de- clared enemy ; and had the empire flood neutral, as in fuch an event it certainly would have done, the two emprefies never durft have puflied their arms againft his Pruflian majefty. SeJ, quorjumhcec, to what does all this tend ? My anfwer is, that the crifis, far as we have gone into conti- nental meafiires, and unfortunate (for fol muft think) as we are, is not nowirretrieve- able by the wifdom and ftcadinefs of a Britiih parliament, as I Ihall prove in the fubfequent pages, becaufe it is the prin- cipal object of this :uidrefs. ' It is true, had Hanover accepted the proffered neutrality, his Pruifian majefty muft have been deprived of the harvcft of \}cit laurels, and the thorns he has fince i II z reaped ( 52 ) reaped ; but could that have afFeded Great' Britain? As to the proteftant reli- gion, the guardians of it in Germany did not think it to be in danger ; nor do I re- member that his late majefty, or the king of Pruflia, every^r/o«/7y declared that liwas', nor to this day has the public any reafon to apprehend that it is, flaving thus difcufled my firft, and by far my moil important propofition, the reader may perhaps think that I have proved too much, and that our war in Germany is rather foreign i\\2LX\ fecondaryy ' t) the quarrel between Great- Britain and France. How far it originally might have been foreign^ the reader from what has been laid, may judge for himfelf ; but I mufl be of opinion, that progrejjively, it be- came fubordinate. I (hall now proceed to my fecond proportion, which is, *' That when Great-Britain had fecured the main ohjcd (he had in view, in making war, her intcreil: led her to have recalled her troops from the continent," Tlie chiel' quellion to be difculTed un- der this propgfition, is, whether in fadl Great-Britain has ftcurcd vhe main ohjedt f r which flie went to war wiih France ? The warmelt advocate for continental mea- fuies mufl, I apprehend, allow ilnt priwa- rily^ -'•*:,■ ( 53 ) rtfyy neither the prefervation of Hanover, nor the houfe of Brandenburg, were our main objedts, and, at the fame time, he muft admit, that the retrieving and fc- curing our American pofTeffions, were the profefled caufes of the war. I know not, however, by what fatality it has happened, that in our late negotiation with France, (if we are to believe the French memorial on that fubjedl) in the very iirft conference our minifter at Paris had with the French minillry, he declared that his mailer would fupport his allies with efficacy and good faith. Tho' I have perhaps a worfe opinion thaa many have of French ^ood faith, and not fo high an opinion as others may entertain of French good fenfe ; yet I cannot help furmizing with them, that this language in fo early a period of the negotiation carried with it an air, as if our fupporting our allies in Germany had been at that time our pri- mary objed. That it hae become a pri- mary objedt with us, I am forry to fay, after the obfervations I have already made on the fubjedt. But as I intend thefe pages to prevent future^ rather than blame paji, mifcarriages (for fuch, I cannot help thinking have mingled with our continental meafures) I fliall confine myfelf to the prefent mo- ment, Jill ¥ W w 1 ,1.*^ ( 5+ ) ( 56 ) queen, by far the moil confiderable power in the empire, will take it from him. I admit this to be a melancholy confidera- tion J but can Great- Britain help it ? She herfelf had the poffeflion of Port Mahon guarantied to her by almoft all the powers in Europe. But to what guaranty is fhe to appeal now that (lie has lofl it ? Should the Spaniards bcfiege Gibraltar to-morrow j IS there a power in Europe who guaranties our poffeflion of that important fortrefs, that would not laugh in our face, fliould we apply to her for fulfilling the terms of her guaranty ^ But I am far from think- ing, whatever other courts do, that Great- Britain ought to be deficient in good faith. Let her fulfil her guaranty by fupplying his Pruflian majefly even with heaped mea- fure, that is, let us continue our fubfidy to him, till we fee what turn affairs will take, Suppofing the moft unfavourable turn, and that his PruiTian majefty is ftript of Silefiaj does the fate of Great-Britain depend up- on that ? No, we had an exigence, we had credit, we had power, we had a conftitu- tion, before the houfe of Brandenburg came into pollellion of that territory. I will take upon me to fay, that we once looked upon his Prufiian majefty 's acquifi- tion of it, to le an over- weakening of the houfe ( 57 ) houfe of Auflria, and of prejudice to the balance of power in Europe. I (hall not ^ even difTemble my apprehenfions, that his Pruifian niajedy may lofe Silefia. But can our continuing our troops in their flaugh- ter-houfes hinder that event from taking place ? I am afraid it will forward it, and that their remaining in Germany has for- warded it too much already j but I mull be of opinion, that the inflant the Emprefs queen is reinftated in the poffeffion of Si- lefia, the former and the natural fyftem of Europe will take place. France will be- come the protestor of Pruffia, Great-Bri- tain will be his friend, and the princes of the Empire, perhaps, the houfe of Auflria itfelf will join in reftoringhim to all the im- portance he had in the Empire before he required Silefia. What I have faid, with regard to his Pruflian majefly, holds in a great -meafurf^ true, as to Hanover, if we admit that our engagements with that Electorate has ren- dered it a primary objeift in the prefent war. It is idle, it is againft common fenle, to imagine that France, (and no other power is at war with it) were flie at this very time pofTefTed of Hanover, could be able to keep it for fix months, without expending ten times more than the vyhole T electorate •t. ;» . ( S8 ) cledloratc is worth. Were I to fpeak my own fentiments, I would fay that ihe great misfortunes of the Hanoverians have pro- ceed from their having had Britifh troops for their defenders -, becaufe it is a de- fence of fuch a nature, as fpreads either in- difference or jealoufy through the princes of the empire, whofe natural intereft leads them to wifli his Britannic majefly to be the peaceable pofTcffor of his own eledtorate. From what I have faid, 1 muft conclude, that either our aflifting the king of Pruffia, or defending Hanover, were not our pri- mary objeds in our war withFrancej or, if they were, that they were miftaken ones, and ought to be conlidered as fuch for the future. Having premifed this, the reader needs but to throw his eye upon the «///- matum of France, to be convinced, that Great-Britain has more than fecured the main ohjedl (lie had in view, in making war, which was the retrieving and fecur- ing her American poffeflions. I, therefore, proceed to my third proportion, which is, **Thatflie might have recalled her troops from Germany, and yet have adhered flridly to her engagements with her allies there, and have been enabled to have ferv- ed ihem more efiedlually than fhe has done C 59 ) done by the ufelefs refidence of her troops in that uncomfortable country, for thefe twenty months paft." I am free enough to own, that when I fketched out the plan of this addrefs, I . did not imagine that I (hould have been obliged to have anticipated, under the heads of my firft and iccond propofitions, fo much matter as is applicable to this. Somewhat, however, flill remains to be obferved. It is certain, that his late ma- jefty rejedted the neutrality of Hanover, only becaufe of the harfli terms impofed upon him, by granting Hamelen for a place of arms, and a free palTage, or what the German Civilians call a Tranfitm In^ noxiusy through his eledloral dominions to the troops of the emprefs-queen, and her allies. If the reader is acquainted with the hiftory of that time, he muft be fen- lible that had the neutrality been properly modified, his majefty would have accept- ed of it ; and I believe the modifications he required are producible. I mention this only to prove, that our agreeing to a proper neutrality for Hanover could have been no breach of our engagements with our allies in Germany. But whether fuch a neutrality (hall be entered into or not, even fuppofing us, againft all probability, I 2 to m 'tt* * IS). ■■i " ( 6o ) to be able to obtain it, does by no means affcdl the prefent queftion. We were un- der no engagements but thofe of honour and gratitude, to fend our troops to that more tlian inhofpitable country. We arc under no engagements to continue them, where their abode is only fatal to themfelves. Had we been able to deliver that elec-^ torate, our aflidance muft juftly have been deemed magnanimous, nay virtuous ; but the extreme of every virtue becomes a vice. Magnanimity in a defperate caufc is no other than Qmxotifm ; and liberality in reclaiming what is irretrievable, prodi- gality in the higheft degree. Let us, in the name of good Jaithy fulfil our engage- ments, both with his PrufTian majcfty and with Hanover j but let us not, in the name oi humanity y extend them a fingle moment beyond that which determines them. Are we to imagine, becaufe we do not hear the groans, perhaps the reproaches, of our ftarving, flaughtered, expiring countrymen, in Wellphalia, that none fuch are vented ? Becaufe, perhaps by the rigid rules of war and politics, the complaints of the furvi- vors do not come to our ears ; becaufe the militarv law does not even admit of fuch complaints being either publiQied in the camp, or tranfpiring into the public, can we ( 6i ) we imagine they do not exift ? if they arc fuppreft by authority, they claim our animatlrcrfion j if through modefty, our companion. That there is foundation for fuch complaints is undeniable ; nor does it claim the lead cunfideration to anfwer the fuggeftions that the French, the PruA- fians, Hanoverians^ HefTians, Ruffians, and other foreign troops, ferving in Ger- many, undergo the fame hardships. Per- haps they do : but the date of a German, a French, or a Ruffian foldier, in fummer or winter, in camp or out of camp, is al- moft the fame 5 they have but a little ad- dition of mifery. Add to this argument, that they are enduring that mifery in their own quarrel. Very different is their fituation from thdt of Britifh fubjeds un- der the fame circumftances. This country, with her freedom, purchafed opulence to all her natives -, and their fubjedion to the hardfliips they fuffer is embittered by the reflcdlion, which I am afraid is but too common amongft them, that they are fuf- fering in a foreign quarrel. Their prefcnt fituation is perhaps the firfl inftance in hiftory of fo numerous a Britifh army ferving in a foreign country, without be- ing able to command the common necef- faries of life. In another refpedt, they are ftiU nW j| ( 62 ) ftill more unfortunate, becaufe, for feme time paft, they hive been dead to fame, to themfelves, and to their country* I am fenfible the battle of Fellinghaufen maybe objected to this affertion; but what was that battle, even according to the German accounts? The French geneial confidered his german opponentvS as being in a manner below his notice ; and our German General had taken care that the Britidi troops fliould be ported without the line of his encampment. This was more than the French generals, Soubife and Broglio d\ui\ hr ve hoped for j and there- fore they bent the whole of their force againft the Britifli army. Their motions and intentions were known to the meaneft foldier in the camp, who faw lord Gran- by's advanced pofts dillodged v/ithout a lingle German fent to fupport them ; and all the comfort the Britidi troops had, was an order to their general, from the Ger- man general, his fuperior, to n'^intain his ground to the lad extremity. The brave Britiih troops did fo : but not a fingle mention is made (in the German account of the battle) of iheir amazing intrepidity againft fuch a difparity of numbers be- tween ihem and their affailants. From the plan of the battle, it appears very plain, that i i ( ^3 ) ^ eftablifh my third propofitlon, which, in fadt, is too felf-evident to admit of difpute. I therefore proceed to my fourth : *' That Great Britain has now no objedt of fufficient importance to detain her troopb in Germany." Five and twenty thoufand Engliflimen were formerly thought fufficient to con- quer all France : and that number, ex- cepting thofe that the fword or ficknefs have deftroyed, is now rotting by peace- meal in the wilds of Germany. I (hall admit Hanover to be a proper objed: for their operations ; but from the courfe of the campaign, I can by no manner of means fee, that the defence of that eledto- rate has diredly employed our German general. It appears, on the contrary, that the French at any time were welcome to walk into Hanover, and that the door was open for them ; at leaft, fuch was the fitu- ation of affairs, when the battle of Felling- haufen was fought. The difagreeable events which, lince that time, have happen- ed to his Pruffian majefty, render the litua- tion of our brave countrymen in Germany more and more uncomfortable. Againft what objedl can they advance ? The pro- grefs of the French in Hanover has render- ed their valour ufelefsj and our German general U^ ( 64 ) that the marquis of Granby was polled between the rivers Lippe and Aeft ; and that for about eight hours, he fuflained a moft dreadful attack from mar/hal firoglio at the head of the flower of the French army. Two fmall detachments at lail« one under general Wutgenau on his left, and another under the prince of Anhalt, on his right, were fent to fupport him ; but not till after the French had been re* pulfed, through incredible efforts of cou- rage, by the BritiQi troops. It will per- haps puzzle the ableft miliary connoiileur in Europe, to account for the reafon, why lieutenant-general Conway, who was at the head of eight battalions and {even fquadrons, Briti(h troops, was not fent to fupport his brave countrymen, under the marquis of Granby j and why he was obliged to lie inadlive on the heights of Rinderin, with the Aeft on his left, as if our German general had been afraid of making the vidlory too decifive. Since that day, viz. the 1 6th of July, 1761, the Britifh troops \i\ Germany have fcarcely been heard of ; and matters have been fo managed, that the vidtorythey gained at Fellinghaufen was but a prelude to the triumph of the French over Hanover. Little more, I think, needs to be fiiid, to eftabliHi ( 65 ) general feems to remember the prodlgioua things they did in the plains of Minden, only to put him upon his guard againft giving them another oppgrtunity of display- ing the fame valour. I am almoft afhamed to infift longer on a proportion fo evident in itfelf, and yet fo reproachful to others. Where is the man, (to ufe the words of a late fpeech,) who vy^iU ftep forward to guide? io guide our troops to victory, or, what is almofl the fame, to battle ? Where is the man, who can declare for what purpofe they are now detained in Germany ? And if the progrefs of the French ftiould continue fo as to make themfelves mafters of Stade, where is the man who will infure their return to Eng- land, as freemen, Britons, and foldiers ? Here I fhould willingly reft the merit of this mepiorial, were it not that a great aur thorty in point of fadl may be urged againft me, and that is, no lefs than the condtjdt pf a late great minifter, who rather than admit even the propofal, or any thing that looked like a propofal, of abandoning our allies on the continent, treated the Frepch piinifter in a manner that no gentleman would have borne froni another, by fending him back the memorial rel ati vc to th^ king of Pruflla, ^s implying an attempt upon the K honour 5iK|t .,., '<;ii ',>\ ( 66 ) honour of Great-Britain. National honour undoubtedly ought to be facrcd j but I can by no means fee, as his Pruffian ma- jefly, as v/ell as the allies of France, con- fentcd that a feparate peace (hould be treat- ed of between France and Great-Britain, that our recalling our troops from the con- tinent could, in any refpecSt, operate to our dirtionour, or to his prejudice. It is paft all doubt, that if we fent our army to pro- tect Hanover, the end is as unattainable as the meafure was miftaken. If we fent them to aflift the king of Pruffia, their er- iand was ftill more abfurd, unlefs we could have locked the French out of Germany. But be this as it will, tho* the honour of the nation is concerned in her fulfilling her engagements, after they are formed, yet her wifdom calls upon her to be cautious in forming them. I (hall admit that while our treaty with Pruffia fubfifted, by which we obliged ourfelves not to make peace but with his confent, it would have been di(honourable to have broken that engage- ment, or to have fa'ed in fulfilling the other articles of the fame treaty. But we are under no manner of obligation, either in honour or juftice, to renew that treaty, after the term of it is expired. Great-Britain has made efforts in favour of i ( 67 ) of her allies, that aftcr-agcs will Icarcely credit. She has even attempted impoflibi- lities to ferve and to fatisfy them, that no- thing in her power fhould be wanting for their deliverance. She has been fo far from fucceeding, that her affiftance, inftead of relieving, has diftrefled her friends j and in fadt, fhe may be faid to have been, all this while, fighting, for fighting fake. France, fo far as regards the German war, is in the fame abfurd fituation, but feems to be fen- fible of it. She, in fad, tells the Britifh court, that the French and the Engliih in Germany arc cutting one another's throats in other people's quarrels, and without do- ing their friends the leaft fervice ; and that by withdrawing the weight of their refpec- tive troops from thence, the ftate of the war between his Pruflian majefty, and the two emprefiTes, can receive no manner of alteration j according to the poet, NowEurope's balanced, neither fide prevails. For nothing's left in either of the fcales. This ofifer from France, of withdrawing from the war in Germany, is the ftrongeft confirmation of what I have already faid, that it is not underftood either by France herfelf, or by the diec of the empire, that fhe (hould keep pofTefiion of Hanover, or K 2 that t M ■it %■ m I I iiii :1* ( 68 ) that it is even worth her while to attempt it. Therefore, without doing any thing to impair the national honour, I own I cannot help wifhing, that our great mini- fter had been a litde more tradable on this head than he was, and that he would have tried to have got fome mitigation of the means i as the end was fo delirable. I have no idea, that France, in earned, defires or intends, that the king of Pruffia fhould be ruined j on the contrary, it is her apparent intereft to prevent his ruin. Might not our minifter have felt the pulfe of, that court, in trying how far (lie would agree to our continuing a pecuniary afHflance to that monarch. It is true, that in the definitive propofitions delivered to Mr. Stanley from the court of Great-Britain, the feventh article requires France to make a general evacuation of all her conquefts, and the feventh article of the ultimatum of France, in anfwer to thofe propofals, agrees, that the landgraviatc of HefTe CafTel, the dutchy of Brunfwick, and the elec^torate of Hano- ver, fliall be evacuated of French troops ; but the French add to the fame article, that they have no power to reftore Wefel, or the conquefts held by the Emprefs queen. The flate of the queftion, there- fore, is very plain, and very fliort, as fol- lows : ( 69 ) lows : Whether we ought to confcnt to his Prufiian majefty being deprived, in the mean while, of a country that brings him in about 20,oool. a year, (for the yearly revenues of Wefel and Guelders, which the French took for the Emprefs queen, are not eftimated above 100,000 crowns,) or we fliould continue to fpend yearly about fix or feven millions, and throw away 8 or 10,000 lives in a war, that can be of no manner of fervice either to ourfclves or our allies ? Can fuch an option admit of one mo- ment's hefitation, efpecially as the matter was to have undergone a future difcuflion in the congrefs of Augsbourg. While 1 fay this, I am far from juftifying the de- mands of the French in behalf of their ally the emprefs queen -, and it is more than probable, that, in their hearts, they condemn her obflinacy, as much as v/e, or his Prufliaji majefty, do. Btt what does that avail, as neither we nor they can bet- ter ourfelves? As the common proverb fays, we are to make the bcjt of a bad bar- gain^ and that we have a bad bargain is certain to too melancholy a degree. Can any man doubt, which condition it would be preferable for us to have? our brave countrymen doing duty in this kingdom, 2 or fi ( 70 ) or in Germany, where, inftcad of being of any manner of fervice, cither to them* felvcs, or our allies, they only awake the jealoufy, and confirm the obflinacy, of other powers. There is not a prince in Europe, ourGerman generals excepted, who can be benefited thro' their abode there, nor can any honell man reap the leaft ad- vantage by it. It is with great pain I murt: obferve, that the manner of wording the intelli- gence we have had of our army in Germany, ever fince they had the misfortune to go thither, has been generally fo perplexed, fo dark, and fometimes fo enigmatical, that we have all along known little or no- thing of their iituation or operations. To day we find them encamped near a vil- lage, never before known to Britifli ears j to-morrow they are marching through wilds, never before trod by human foot 5 and, the third day, they emerge upon fome bleak uncomfortable height for the bene- fit of the frefh air. It is true, that while a march or meafure is in agitation, it is very proper to conceal the particulars from the public. But I think the people of Great Britain, who have even with roman- tic magnanimity fupported this war, have fome right, after the operations are over, to ( 7' ) to be made acquainted with the motives that influenced them. They ought, at leaft» to be fatlslied, that our German general docs not expofo them to unnec^^ffary fa- tigues ', that he does not lead them into wanton danger ; that he does not render them food for that powder^ of which, alas 1 they have been the voluntary obje<5ls. Can any man alive take into his hand the gazettes, that preceded the firft of Auguft, i759> and fay, that the vidtory of Minden was obtained in confequence of our German general's difpofitions ? and that his deliverance was not owing to the moft amazing exertion of Britifh courage, that her hiftory can produce ? It is true, that after the valour of our country- men had broken through the toils that the French had fpread around them, ten thoufand beauties were found in his ma- nceuvres, as they are called, and every mo- tion, which really was efFedlcd by chance, was then cried up as being planned by judgment. But are we to tire out providence, (for the victory of Minden was the mod: pro- vidential one ever known) ? Shall we continue, like Sir Martin Mar-all, to make motions on the flute after the mu- fic is ceafed ? or what is fl:ill worfe, are I 1 ^i ^1 we ( 7« ) we to be flill amufed with idle German paragraphs, till we are brought into a iituation, worfe than that of the Farcce Condince of the Romans, by the enemy cutting ofF the communication of our ar- my with Stade, and with any fea-ports, by which they have a chance of efcaping to their own country, Thefe confidera- tions are the more important, as the com-- plexion of the war in Germany is, at pre-^. Tent, iruch more unfavourable, both for us and his Pruflian majefty, than it wa^ on the fifth of Auguft lafl. If we are to compare the accounts of our gazette with fadls, it will appear that, like the man who died of good fymptoms, our army is now languishing, even iu a mortal (late, after having been victorious through the whole of this year, and never once having received a misfortune. They have not; had ev^n the poor comfort of purchafing mifery by glory. They have b^en doomed to the infipid manoeuvres, diredted by thofe whofe interefl: it is to protradt the war, three times beyond the duration of that of Troy. Though I am far from impeaching thq good intentions of the right honourable gentleman, who recanted his opinipn pf continental connedtions, by making it the facrificc ( 73 ) facrifice which follj and ptrpojjeffion cffned to wifdom and experience \ yet, though I do not condemn his condudt, 1 muft at the fame time acknowledge, that I do not underjlcind it ; and I thinlc Tome mea- furcs have pafled under his adminiftration, that no minifter need to boaft of having guided. When the flake for which his Pruf- fian majefly plays upon the continent, and which he has to lofe, is compared to the expence of Great Britain there, it is about a (hilling to lifty pounds ; and yet Great Britain, to win that fliilling, is at three times the charge he is at, that he may lave his fifty pounds. But that is not all ; wefurniflihim with money to flake on his part. Should he gain, not a fhilling of it ever can come back to us ; becaufe he is under no obligation to refund a farthing. If he fhould even not only lave his own, but win from others, by the help of our money, we are not intitled to a farthing of indemnification. It is true, it may be pretended, that the treaty between Great- Britain and Prullia is only defenfive ; but it is as true, that his Pruflian majefly was enabled, by that treaty, to conquer Saxony, and invade Bohemia. It is likewife cer- tain, thatj at the time that treaty was con- L eluded 'r i u I ( 74 ) eluded, his Pruflian majefly had a prodi- gious army on foot, and knew that the emprefs-queen intended to attack him with cighty-thoufand men, and the emprefs of RufTia with a hundred and twenty thou- fand : and that their defign was to have been executed in the fpring of the year 3756 ; only it feems the Britifli money, which we had flipulated to pay to the em- prefs of RufTia, by the treaty of Septem- ber preceding, did not arrive time enough to put her troops in motion, though it did very foon after. This, at leaft, is what his Pruflian majefty pretended, while her imperial royal majefty, in a counter- decla- ration (he publiflied, flatly denied that any offeniive alliance had been formed againft Pruflia, between her and the emprefs of Ruflia J neither indeed, as I have hinted before, did the diet of Ratisbon appear fatisfied, that the difcoveries his Pruflian majefty bad made in the cabinet of Dref- den fufliciently warranted him to invade Saxony and Bohemia ; and even his late majefty, as eledtor of Hanover, publifti- ed his difapprobation of that invafion. So many circumftances of the powerful confederacy formed againft his Pruflian majefty appearing, we ftiould have na- turally ( 75 ) turally thought, that our patriot miniAer could not have given (o efFedtual a de- monftration of his patriotifm, after he came again into power, than by reviewing the ftate of affairs between '^Treat Britain and Pruffia, and examining whether any accidental or natural attachment for Ha- nover had rendered the terms of the trea- ty concluded between us vaftly too bur- denfome for Great Britain. But this was fo far from being the cafe, that, though the treaty, during his adminiftration was again and again renewed, Great Britain never was eafed of the oppreflive part of it, I mean that article which binds her up from concluding any feparate treaty of peace, but by common advice and con- fent, each exprefly including therein the other. When our connedlions with Pruffia were firft formed, the friends of the houfe of Hanover, little imagining what a dread- ful alliance had been concluded againft him, did indeed exprefs fome apprehen- fions, left his Pruflian majefty, after getting our money, fhould have made his own terms j and therefore they thought this mutual ftipulation was very proper. Un- doubtedly it was for Hanover and for Great Britain too, if we confider their in- L 2 terefts ■SWP ( 76 ) terefts as being the fame -, but when enemy upon enemy multiplied upon his Prufliai> majefty ; when eighty thoufand Auftrians, and eighty thoufiind Ruflians, had taken the field againft him, when the armies of France, of Sweden, and the Empire, were pouring into his dominions ; when the wonderful efforts he exe»-ted, and the vic- tories he gained, ferved only to render his fall the mor'=* glorious, but withou better- ing his condition, was it prudent, was it patriotical, was it juft, to link Great-Bri- tain to fuch an ally, and that in fuch a manner, as to put it in his power to keep fuch hold of us, as that, if he fliould fink, we mufl 20 to the bottom with him. If the caufe of the proteftant religion, and even fentiments of humanity, have called upon us, or fhould further call upon us, to afiift his Pruflian majefty, let us do it in fuch a manner, as to be for his advantge, and not to our own ruin, without being even able to ferve him, at lead, with any efficacy. If we give h'm money, let him make the befl ufe of it he can; but let us not trifle with the healths, the liberties, and the lives of five and twenty thoufand of our brave countrymen, vv4io can give him no affiftance. But ( 77 ) But can they aflift Hanover, may, per- haps, He called the great queftion ; and if they can aflift it, ought they not to do it ? I (hould be as fanguine as any one, in the caufe of Hanover, if I thought it in any manner of danger, but from our at- tempts to defend it. Nothing, to me,feems to be more evident than that, if there v/as not a fingle regiment of Britifh troops in Germany, the French army neither would nor durfl, winter in that eledlorate. Who- ever has traced the operations of this year, upon the maps of Germany, can fee with half an eye, that the French, fo far back as the middle of June laft, had the polleffion of Hanover been the real objed: of their arms, might have marched almoft without refiftance to that capital. But, in the name of common fenfe, to what purpofe could that have ferved, unlefs they had mafiacred three fourths of the inhabitants, that they might facceed to their victuals ; for I be- lieve there is no truth more univerfally ac~ knowk'dged at prefent, than that Hanover is now fo exhaufted as not to be able to fubfift its own natives -, and that every (hil- ling of the revenues of its government is adually employed for that purpofe, and yet all is infufiicient for alleviating its miferies ? The f 1 1t $1 um ( 78 ) The French, therefore, have a much more fenfible objed. in view than the pof- feffion of that eledlorate, where they muft abfolutely perifh for want of the neceflaries of life, and that is, their keeping the army and aUies of Britain, employed in plans, and upon purpoles, at an expence no nation can fupport, wir.hout their being able to bring the leaft advantage, to, what we affedt to call, the common-caufe. Suppofing our national troops to be inftantly recalled by his majefly, could the king of PrufTia pre- tend that to be an infradlion of our treaty with him ? No, furely, there is not, in that treaty, a lingle fyllable about Britifh troops, ii'»r any ftipulation about the matters I have already mentioned, excepting the two following, that his Britannic majefty fhould pay his Pruflian majefty 670,0001. ller- ling, and that his Pruffian majefly /hould employ the faid fum, in keeping up and augmenting his forces, which (hall adt in the moft advantageous manner for the common caufe. This I look upon as a for- tunate circuraftance for us ; nay, as the on- ly fortunate one in all our German con- nedions ; and I hope our parliament will confider it in che fame light. If we are to believe the accounts that come ( 79 ) ■ _ come from our own private officers In Ger- many, not only their own didrelles are un- fpeakable, but the diftrelTes to which they are obliged to put the miferable natives, f *iends, as well as foes, are fo iikewife. I 1 know, at the beginning of every new par- liament, and every new feffion of parlia- ment, nothing is more common, than for a party who has a point to carry to pro- pagate rumours, to influence the members to come into their meafures, efpecially if fubfidies are to be raifed ; and I fcarcely rc- ir.ember a year of Sir Robert Walpole's long adminiftration, in which the feffion was not ufhered in with fome dreadful accounts of an invafion threatened, of troops affembling on the coafls of Britanny, or Galicia, of a rebellion at home, or fome other impending calamity. The fame game feems now to be going forward; and it is aflerted with great confidence, that our German general has obtained a confiderable advantage over the French. Perhaps he has J and very probably he might have his reafons, for taking fome vigorous fleps juft before our parliame;it fate down ; but I muft be of opinion, that he has obtained no decifive advantage ; and that (hould he beat the French five hundred times, his 5 luccefles I ( 8o 1 fucceffcs never can relieve Germany, while our troops continue in it. Succefs, and even inadion, may defeat,^ may prolong, the lucrative poft he enjoys ; but it is re- calling our troops alone, that can be of fer vice to Great-Britain. ... . % F I N I M ;