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J 22X 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 tmmmmi^. / V SPEECH or T» HON. WILLIAM S. ARCHER, OF VIRGINIA. THE OREGON QUESTION SBUriBBB IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES > MABOB 18y 18««. WASHlNOTONi OALES AND SEATON, PRINTBRS' 1846. '^ ** H i i 'i 'i , I*.;: A c^ :i Kf ¥'■ £<«<.• T «• o :: ; ' i ,; •.? a.t s« ,'-: /'>xD;;i. f.'<; '• r ^' ■»- Pi ' if 15- -L c Wr«;t 4 ' A'^ :i 11.' I '( i,\ I ' ,'h , SPEECH. ' !•• .r,vl Mr. ARCHER said that it had seldom occurred in the lii^tory of the counrry that a question more dennanding honest ind fearless discussion had been presented in Congress. The immediate subject of controversy, a territorial claim of vast extent, was important, but ihe possible issues of the decision were incomparably more so. The people had a right to look for a fair, not one-sided, exposition of the merits of the case, and true char- acter and posture of the question, at our hands, disclosing the defects as well F.s the strength of the claim of the country, the impugning as well as the sustaining considerations, so as to enable them to render a sound deci- sion ou the conclusion to which their Representatives might arrive, by the results of which, as they might be affected favorably in one event, so they might realize very mischievous consequences in another. Above all things, it was desirable that they might be made to look at the question, divested of any of the prejudice or excitement which, if not previously existing from other causes, are so easily awakened and so eftective in communicat- ing distortion and false color to national disputes. Yet, what had we wit- nessed in the treatment of this question, not by the press only, but in the halls, too, of legislation ? The material point, our exclusive title to Oregon, assumed on the ex parte arguments of advocates, our Secretaries of State ; the joint occupation of England under convention represented as outrage, and all real investigation of these subjects put under the ban of an obloquy, which even firm men might be well reluctant to encounter, of collusive de- fence of a claim adversary to that set up for our country, in co-operation with a foreign Power. Imputation in the grossness of this last form had not, indeed, been directly expressed in the Senate ; but even here the ques- tion had been represented as no longer one for argument, but the trial of nerve, patriotism, and sense of the honor of the country. Mr. A. brought these things to view in no temper of offence, however it might bo justified, nor for rebuke, however appropriate ; but for admo- nition how far appeals of such a color, leaders of such a temper os their authors, were to be followed at such a time. The resort in this discussion was not to the people ultimately, as in ordinary circumstances and cases, but to the people directly now. Opinion was known to be undetermined — in fluctuation. It was to be moulded, and would shape the eventual dis- posal of the question in no long period. If influence was exerted ; topics employed; fact or argument garbled, colored, distorted, to mystify or mis- lead, the public should be made to see the operation ; warned to be fore- armed and guarded. For his own personal part, (Mr. A. said,) he had no right to complain of the inuendoes and imputations he had referred to. He confessed himself justly open to them to a great extent. He admitted himself deficient in nerve to involve the country in danger, which, from his position, he was not to partake, or suflfering which he was to partake in a small degree. He had no ambition nf the cheap patriotism which was to be purchased by invectives against England in all seasons and places; and, as to the sense of national honor, he disavowed any which was sepa- 241415 rated from justice. We heard much of the sentiment of Decatur, " Our country, right or wrong." If it meant any thing more than that we were to stand by our country at all events in war; if it meant that we were to sustain unjust claims if asserted for our country, blind her to their true character, and carry her into war for them ; if these made the import of Decatur's sentiment, for himself he abjured it, and disclaimed it for his country. The debate, (Mr. A. said,) worn out as it was, could have no altructiou for any person. His purpose in partaking it was to do what he did not think hud yet been done, at least with sufficient distinctness, not only to strip the question of factitious coloring, but, by separating it from consid- erations not inherent or important, to exhibit its real attitude and aspect. This required no pursuit of detail, brief space of time, or argument, to ac- complish. Without investigation of the forms of resolutions and amend- ments on the table, ihe question, reduced to substance, was the great one of war or peace — war for all Oregon, peace with part. These were the alternatives, presented naked. Between these was to be the choice. The Senator from Ohio (Mr. Allen) had professed his purpose to prepare the hearts of the people for war; it was his (Mr. A.'s) purpose to prepare their minds for peace. [Mr. Allen. I am sure the Senator does not wish to ascribe to me words I did not use. I take this occasion to repeat, what I thought I had oftentimes before stated, that, in answer to certain remarks made by the Senator from Massachusetts with regard to the mode this Government should adopt of quietly debating measures, and saying but little about them, I replied that I held just the opposite of those opinions; that I be- lieved the whole state of the question, that all the dangers which the for- eign relations of the country threaten to its peace, should be fully made known to the country, by open, full, and public dealings. And I remarked, in connexion with that subject, if it was essential to prepare public opinion and the minds and hearts of the people, by the frank disclosure of the reil state of the Tacts, they ought to be staled, wheliier war or any thing ol.je was to follow. It was not, therefore, a declaration, made independent of other questions, that I wanted to throw into the public mind, and excite in it a national predisposition to war. That was not my meaning, as the Senator will see; and I am sure his candor and justice will lead him to accept this explanation. And I repeat: I take not back one syllable of what I uttered then. It is printed and corrected by my own hand; it stands thsre, and I abide the event, whatever it may be.] Mr. Archer resumed. He had no disposition to impute to the Senator any sentiment he disclaimed, nor any intention to charge hiui as the reck- less advocate of war. He had supposed the Senator conceived that war would be demanded by the exigencies of the question, and had therefore employed his expression that the hearts of the people should be prepared for war. In such an aspect, so they ought; and. if the Senator viewed the question in that aspect, as, with his opinions, he ought to view it, and if consistent, must view it, he was right to employ the expression. It was his duty in such a contingency to prepare the hearts of the people for war. The adoption of his views ought to sound as a war trumpet through the land. It was because he (Mr. A.) did not partake those views, regard- ed the question in the directly contrary aspect, believed that nothing could be less demanded than war, however it might be brought upon us, that he €5 \ ai \ espoused the opposite olTice, invoked the preservation of peace, and desired to prepare (not the hearts, which he hoped were prepared) (he minds of his countrymen for the reception of these opinions. The question wa^, then, of war; and, if it came, war of what sort ? To he estimated in its mischief by men slaughtered or ships sunk ? This would be a most erroneous view of the subject indeed. No ; it would be a war marked by the largest destruction of the elements of human pros- perity recorded in human history. It would be marked by another pecu- liarity — that, to the account of injury which the parties should sustain directly, the waste and impairment of resources they must respectively incur in the conduct of the conflict, must be added, in conclusion, the amount of all the injury of l\\^ same kind they would inflict. The elements of the prosperity of the contending Powers were blended in a luiion which made it impossible to strike them apait, so that the blow would not recoil on the hand which had given it. The hour of termination of the conflict, the day of the restoration of intercourse, must come. Suppose our ad- versary prostrate, sinews worn out, resources exhausted: where were you to look again for the resources which had supplied the main element of your growth and power, and which would be so much wanted for their renovation after exertion ? Our declamations were habitual on the subject of the probable destinies of our country in the development of prosperity, social improvement, and power. And on this point it seemed ditfioult, comparing past progres.s with causes, to indulge exaggeration and extravagance. Realities would be transcended ; certainly speculation might be. But the mystery of this progress of development was a talisman, and that talisman was peace. On peace depended the expansion of commerce ; on this expansion de- pended the growth and the application of productions; on these the de- velopments of prosperity, improvement, and power — the verification of visions, the highest interests and the best hopes of humanity. This war, then, was to be of a character of peculiar destructivenesi;, should it come. Would it come ? Here was a territory held in joint occitpancy between ourselves and Great Britain ; the question of title suspended for thirty years. At whose instance ? Onrs! The proposition of this state of things had come from us, and had been resisted in the first stiggestion by Great Britain. Were we, in these circumstances, to seize the whole subject of controversy, adjust the dispute by the strong hand, and deal thus with a Power the most rapacious, we were told by those who incited us to this course, and the most arrogant as well as the most formidable in the world? Would the most contemptible Power, the least excitable, submit to it? Was the rapacity which sought indulgence in all quarters, armed with the most formidable power, to have the poss3ssion already iu its grasp torn away? The arrogance which never submitted to law or restraint, to lie down passive and quiet under this contumely? Was all this reversal of nature to take place — Canute giving law to the wave? But this was manifestly the only condition of peace, if we carried our claim over all Oregon. Was there question, then, whether we were to have war in this event? When nations incurred war in the era of civilization to which the world had arrived, important related questions were presented for their own con- sideration and that of the world. He had reference to no general decla- mations on the anti-christian, the immoral character of war. He knew that * f~t 6 theso (Icclnmatioiu, however entitled to regard, weighed for nothing. But others there were which did weigh, oirnriiig themselves for discussion, in regard to this and all war, which would form part and parcel of the judgment to be pronounced on it. Would the war be a war provoked on the part of our adversary ? Would it be a war necessary for the attainiusut of its al- leged purpose, or even conducive to it ? Would it be a war consistent with the obligations of the national faith and reputation ? Would it be a war for something which certainly belonged to us, without which it could not be just war ? And, finally, would it he a war of which, even in success, the fruits would be advantageous? These were the inquiries which hd meant (Mr. A. said) to review, and to every one of which he had no fear but that lie should be able to prove a negative, and a clear one. And then it would be for the people to say whether thev would have a war of such a character for the difference between the whoie of Oregon and the far most valuable part, of \\hich wo already occupied the larger share, and could have the remainder if we elected to settle the controversy by amicable di- vision and adjustment. Would, then, this be a war provoked by our adversary ? It had been seen already that the two conventions, in virtue of which the territory of Oregon had been held for thirty years in a joint occupancy between this country and England, had been entered into on the proposition of our ne- gotiators. In the instance of the formation of erch of these arrangements, it had been declined in the first suggt^stion, by the negotiators on the part of England, and yielded only to the reiteration of our instances. If Eng- land were in possession, then, of any of our rights in Oregon, the fact of this possession was not to be imputed to her, nor could the continuance of that possession constitute provocation to us. She had in no respect de- parted from the terms, or violated the intendment, or intruded upon the conditions, or complained of the operation, or impugned the character of these arrangements, which we had put upon her. She had, indeed, pur- sued her people in Oregon with protection, in the form and the measure she was authorized to do — not beyond them; and she made no obstruction to the exercise of the same extent of privilege on our part, professing to have no objection to offer to it. The compacts between us may stand for her. If to be disturbed, ours is to be the disturbing hand, and this hand to seize the whole subject of controversy, as the form of the disturbance. This will hive been tlie mode and source of the provocation to war, if it is to come. Next, will it be war required for its object, the obtention of Oregon, or even be conducive to it ? No man denies that Oregon is under a process of migration and settlement on the part of the people of this country, whicu must, in no long time, secure to us the whole. Our people go there by thousands, the English by units; and the disproportion augmenting in our favor every year, under the rights of the common occupation. What more effective, more assured process for obtaining the whole country, thinly oc- cupied as it is by English subjects, than this ? As was well remarked by the Senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) if we go into war for all Oregon, we may come out with none of it. But can we fail of getting all, if the process of occupation, under the right of joint occupancy, is to ope- rate for us with a thousand times the effect it does for our adversary, and the proportion of effect varying each year in our favor ? We may Jose the country by war ; we must gain it by peace. If we go to war in these ;Ctrcu isth N that to*"" do in (hini all conv I a rat But g. But ssion, in I j circumstances, will not the appearance be, and the fair conclusion, that it is the war we aim at, (it may be for other causes,) and not the territory ? No iin|)cachment of this inference can be drawn from the suegestion, that oui people going in such numbers to Oregon, we are under obligation to '*'^'!ow them with protection. Certainly ! And what is to obstruct our doing so in the fullest manner, with no disturbance to the present state of things? What is the guaranty of security, good order, legal protection, in ; all forms and extent, which we are not at full liberty to give under the convention ? What is the single reserve to the completeness of this dec- laration — the solitary franchise which we are under obligation to withhold ? But one — the allodial title to the settlements our people may make — the grant of title deeds ! And of what consequence is this to them ? Have not all our Territories, now foimins? so many States, been first occupied and S3ttled in the same condition ? The settlers preceding, the portions of land selected, the confirmation and full ascertuinmont of title following in due lime, in full time — that is to say, as soon as, from the multiplication of oc cupants, there may be dangers of collisions in occupation. Have our pi- oneer population in the Territories any fear on the subject of their rights of pre-emption ? Will iliey have any difficulty in obtaining the titles on them ? Has not the disposition to favor this class of our citizens run noto- riously into abuse ? Wo promise preemptioners titles before they settle. They have never had cause of dissatisfaction — never been incommoded by delay of their full titles. What is there to hinder us from promising the emigrants to Oregon similar confirmation of title when our conventional arrangements put us at liberty ? In the interval, there is no authority to disturb their possession and improvement, which is valid under the con- vention, and differs from property in full title in nothing but the form and the name. There can be only a single source of disturbance of their pos- session and eviction, letting loose in their territory a force superior to their capacity of resistance ; ani this can only be the bequest (as probably it would be) of war to tlieiri. The unquestionable interest of the settler, in this respect, runs with the unquestionable interest of the Government. Then this war will no more, if it occur, be a war required by or condu- cive to its object, than it will have been a provoked war. It will be not only a war not necessary, but adverse to occasion and necessity; without pretext to give a color to it. Next, will it be war consistent with na- tional faith and reputation ? Our alleged clear and unquestionable title to the whole is made the justifi- cation of the seizure of the whole territory. Let the unquestionable title to the whole be conceded, still the conclusion will not follow from this assump- tion. Why ? Another element romes in to intercept and qualify the con^ elusion. Our title goes back to the dates of our conventions. In 1818, in 1827, we alleged we had full title. Then we had the power to alienate, transfer, or recognise modified title in others. We might have made re- linquishment or transfer, in whole or part, fully or under modification. Have we not done so to Great Britain ? If we propose to her a joint occupancy ; force it on her acceptance ; permit it to continue thirty years ; in the inter- val offer four times a division nearly equal of the territory; press at these several times this proposition — does all this amount to no relinquishment of part of our supposed full right to the grantee and recipient of so much concession ? Is it to be construed as involving no recogisition of right of ome character, to some extent? Suppose it were to be held as only an 8 argument of comity, concession to the advuntugtis ol conimorct) witli Great Britain, or the love of peace — does not ihe same argument of high policy apply now ? The same considerations of interest or of reputation, are they not entitled to weight now, if they were en'iiled to it formerly, at the in- ception of the conventions? If he- were asked, then, (Mr. Archeb said,) where was Great Britain to find a claim to set up against the United States, his answer was, if not from discovery or Spain, or elsewhere, from the United States. If Gray gave us good title to the whole country, or Spain distinct from him, or France by treaty, or Lewis and Clarke by exploration, or Astor by settlement, or England by restoration of Astor's settlement, we had all these grounds and forms of title as complete as we have now when we made our last conven- tional concession in 1827. What is all ground of title to any thing, to property in any form ? Conventional recognition. By this private properly is held— on this basis national rights repose, and derive from it their au- thority. On this basis England has a claim to participation in this territory. He thought this her only ground of just claim north of Vancouver's island and Frazer's river. It would not, then, as he (Mr. A.) thought, consist vvith the concessions we had made to England, with the faith which was implied in those con- cessions, and the reputation for upright dealing in all things, which was worth more than Oregon, to set up pretensions which would exclude Eng- land entirely from Oregon. He had been placing the argument on this point (Mr. Ahcher said) on the assumption that our title in 1827, when we made the last convention with England, was undoubted to the whole of Oregon ; and he had been contending that still there were imperative considerations rehitive to the position in which, by that convention, we had placed ourselves, requiring abatement at our hands of this extreme pretension. But the more direct question intervened. Were we invested in fact with this indisputable title to the whole of Oregon ? It was matter of delicacy to draw into question a claim which had been set up for one's country -, but it was matter of much higher obligation of duty not to permit our country to be plunged into war on false grounds of claim, in ignorance of their inadequacy, and from want of exposure of this fact. The delicacy and the ditficnlty, liow- ever, in this case admitted of reconcilement. The essential part of the claim of our country did rest on valid title. It was the part of inconsidera- ble value, of value far below the cost of asserting it by force, which alone would be lost by compromise through division, the title to which was lia- ble to be impugned. The removal of the persuasion of title, as regarded this part, would be a service, not a disservice, to the coiuitry. What he proposed, then, on this part of the subject, was the examina- tion of the extreme claim which had been asserted to the parallel of lati- tude of 54° 40'. If he could succeed in disproving that, then the way was left open to adjustment by division of the territory, the exact conditions of the division remaining the subjects of arrangement by negotiation. The claim asserted to the line of 54° 40' rested for its support entirely on the title of Spain, which had become the subject of concession to us by the treaty with that Power of 1819. No other of our alleged grounds ol title ranged to that extent. In removing this ground, therefore, the object which he (Mr, A ) had in view, of restricting our claim within this ex- xxvi coil wl att^ of Pol mc bad naii by if ass ne^ arri Po tai to an( Po tie: rul coi of tht 9 tremo exlonsion, and so allowing room for compromise by division of the country, would be edectcd. Did the Spanish lillo, then, give us the oxtrnnic claim we founded on it? Was this form of our title, as alleged, invulnerable? Ridicule hud been attempted to be cust on this title of Spain, as d> rived under the Pa^^al bull of 1792, which made partition of all newly discovered countries between Portugal and Spain. He (Mr. A.) did not regard this ridicule as ju.st. All modes of title in property, as he had already had occasion tu say, traced back to conventional arrangement in some form. Th -• was as true of the national as the municipal forms of properly. An assignation of property by the Pope was us much entitled to observance and respect as any other, if men and nations agreed that this should be ilie established mode of assignation of title. It wa.s the fact of the agr<;ement, not the reasonable- ness, which gave the character of law and the force of obligaiion to the arrangement. In this predicament of fact, a title from the grant of the Pope would be as valid as any other which tliu suuie foundation of ascer- tained consent could establish among natir>ns. The object of all rules was to exclude controversies, have peace j aii.l any rule distinctly assented to and recognised was good. The defect of the title of the grant under the Pope was, that it had never huu assent, except of the two immediate par- ties to reap the benefit; and therefore never attait;ed to the cliaracrer of :• rule of public law. From an early period, afie.r annunciation, it hud been conteamed and disregarded. All the cstui)lishmenis on the .\tlantic side of the North American continent had been fuinided in contempt of it, and therefore it was that it was null. Had the Goverrunenl of Spain any better title to the norlhwestern coast of America? Undoubtedly the vessels of this Power were the first to sail along the coast to a point higher than the line of 54° 40' of north latitude. If this might be called discovery, (one of the admiltt d sources of title to waste torritories and countries.) was it ever perfected in the mode which the validity of title from this source demands? It is matter notorious and undeniable that it was not ; hiis never been. Settlements made by Spain north of latitude 42'^ had been abandoned certainly before the transfer of her title to tis. Had Spain any other or further sanction to her claim of tule? She might have had the ground of prescription. Claim without foundation, having long and sufficient acquiescence to uphold it, may be rendered valid m national law, as in municipal law. Tiie title of Spain to tho whole Pacific coast, on the ground of discovery, had been always asserted, never acceded to. It had been contested by England, contested by Russia, con- temned by ourselves. This last predicament of it was decisive in the present discussion. We could set ifp no pretension after we had acquired it, which we had invalidated before it had been acquired, and with full knowledge of it. This was the case inconlestably with the title of Spain. We offered in 1818 to make a disposition in full title of the whole territory in arrangement with England, with no regard to the title of Spain. The Secretary of State had argued that, of two titles acquired separately, one might be brought to sustain the other, even though the fir.st had been denied before it was acquired. But this could, iu any event, be Umi only of titles wl.u !i Jid not stand in repugnance to each other. Now, the title which we Litmned under Gray did stand in this repugnance to the title which we h&d acquired under Spain. If th»5 force we ascribed to the dis- 10 covery of Gray was just, Spain had no antecedent title. If she had, our claim was dishonest intrusion on hers. Right by Spanish discovery left no room for our right by subsequent discovery. Or if there had been room for right by our discovery, it could only be from the absence of right under Spanifh di«covery. Gray and Heceta could not both give claims to dis- covery of the same river, because, supposing either valid, one must have been consummated before the other supervened. Our title might, indeed, be indefeasible under either take:i separately, and our people elect, there was little question, to stand on that of Gray. The view of the subject which excluded the Spanish title put aside, of course, all occasion for discussion on the subject of the Nootka convention. But supposing otherwise, there had been very undue importance attached to this Nootka convention, founded on what seemed to him (Mr. A.) a very mistaken apprehension of its proper character and import. The ar- gument of the Secretary of State was, that the whole pretension of Great Britain to title in Oregon rested on this convention with Spain ; that this convention had been terminated by war between these Powers; and that the effect of the subsequent treaty between them revived treaties of com- merce only, in the number of which, that convention was not to be included. Ttie conclusions in this argument did not require to be examined, as they fall with the basis of it. The pretensions of Great Britain were not de- rived from the Nootka convention. It was not necessary, to support this proposition, to refer to the terms of the convention, which did not sustain, or to the preamble, which clearly excluded, any such deduction — the terms carrying no import of the concession of rights by or to either party, the preamble importing mutuality of arrangement, which excluded the idea of such concession. The very fact of the existence of the convention was conclusive in disproof of the character im[)Uted to it. The convention was framed in termiuLition of a controversy which had proceeded to the eve of rupture and war. Rupture and war for what ? The breaking up of an English settlement on the coast by Spain, on the alleged ground of its in- trusion on the exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty of Spain. Did not this vindication of a right of settlement by England import the denial of the exclusive sovereignty of Spain ? And the effect of this convention — was it not the vindication of this denial, and the placing it on impregnable ground in virtue of the concessionary arrangement on the part of Spain which the convention established ? Why should En-jland make complaint and menace war, if it was she, not Spain, who had connnitled the violation of jurisdiction ? What else was the appeasatory arrangiunent of the convention, but an admission of injury to England, and that injury consisting in the assertion against her of the claim of exclusive jurisdiction theretofore of Spain ? The conven- tion then established, in place of the proposition that the claim of England to a right of seitlcment in the territory had been derived under or from Spain, that, on the contrary, it had been exercised independently of Spain, and against her ineffectual eftbrt to resist this exercise, successfully asserted, and vindicated effectually. The language of the English negotiators, in the conduct of the controversy with us on this subject, had uniformly been conformable to this view of the character of the convention. The language of the English commissioners in 1826 was, that if the conflicting claims with Spain had not been " finally adjusted by the Nootka convention, * and all arguments and pretensions definitively set at rest by the signature 11 ' of that convention, nothing would be more easy than to demonstrate that < ihe claims of Great Britain to that country, as opposed to those of Spain, ' were so far from visionary or arbitrarily assumed, that they established ' MORE THAN A PARITY OF TITLE to the posscssiou of the couHtry in ques- < tion, either as against Spain or any other naiion." They add, th»t the rights of Great Britain are " recorded and defined in the convention.'* They speak of them as " fixed," never as created by the convention ; treat- ing this instrument as evidence of a recognition of these pretensions, never as importing any grant or institution of them. This, then, was the view (said Mr. A.) in which this convention was re- garded by Great Britain, and in which she was authorized by the circum- stances and history of its formation to regard it. But the inference derived from the opposite view, that this instrument was to be regarded as the ex- clusive source of the British claim which had expired in its extinction, was the sole basis of our extreme claim to Oregon to the latitude of 54° 40'. In the failure of this inference, our claim in this extreme extent fell. None of our other grounds of our claim taking it to this extent, it was not re- quirod (Mr. A. said) by his purpose to institute any rigorous examination oftl)em, that purpose being, by showing that we could not claim clearly to this extent, to let in adjustment by arrest of the claim short of this point. It might not be an unadvised course, indeed, when the question was of the assertion of our claim by the extreme mode of force, to look into every ground assigned for it with narrowness, to have assurance of its impregna- bility. The ground of title from the discovery of Gray had been that 'he most insisted on. His Iriend, the Senator t>om Maine, (Mr. Evans,) had disclosed perplexities and difficulties surrounding this foundation of our claim which it might not he found easy to resolve. He (Mr. A.) could suggest others, which he had been surprised should have escaped the pene- trating observation of that Senator. He (Mr. A.) chose not to advert to them, with the exception of one which he had to commend to the attention of the patent constitutional coiistrnciioiiistsof Democracy. Their doctrines recognised no substantive power in our Government, wliich was not found by name, was not directly expressed, in the Constitution. The power to acquire territory had been regarded as of a character so highly substantive as lO have fixed a limitation in the (.'onslitution on acquisition in even the confined form and extent of a lew acres for forts, arsenals, or dock yards. Even this moderate exercise of the power was submitted to the consent of the State Government.s. In what mode of intcrprttation, then, was to be derived the huge anomalous faculty of acquiring 'vvelve and a half degrees of latitude, by the process of its discovery by aii individual, and he not acting, or professing to act, or claim, on behalf of the Government, moie than by its authority ? Discovery was not one of tli^ titles to authority to be found in the Constitution, though it now appeared in recent construction to be a very large one. We were not without auth irity, indeed, to make acquisi- tion of territory to the extetit in question, under the Constitution. But the form of exercise of this authority was by treaty, and discovery was no ex- ercise of a treaty -making faculty. By this mode of treaty and its sequences, he (Mr. Archer) was of opinion i.iat we had acquired impregnable title in Oregon. It did not reach to the extent of latitude 54° 40', however, and presented, therefore, no valid obstacle to the mode of compromise by di- vision of the territory, as the only available avenue to adjustment of the controversy, except at the expense of consequences of far greater cost than the value of the territory. 7-^ 1415 12 Mr. Archer went on to say, that lie persuaded himself that he had not been unsuccessful in establishing the propositions he had announced for his discussion, that the pressure of our claim to the whole of Oregon would lead lo war; that the war would not be one provoked by any offensive conduct of our adversary ; would be inconducive to its object, the obtention of Oregon ; would as little be conducive to the reputation of the Govern- ment for adherence to the requirements of its conventional arrangements; and, finally, would be waged for a claim which was not sustainable in the extent to which it would be asserted. If these propositions had beer, sus- tained, the conclusion could not be resisted, nor made a subject of question, that the controversy for Oregon ought not to be carried to the resort of war, but referred to a less violent form of adjustment. And now he wished to lead attention lo the consequences which might be anticipated from this war, which presented to his inind,in the views he had been led to take of them, topics for the gravest and most anxious re- flection. Ho had no reference in this allusion to the ordinary forms of ca-nalty and injury, the characteristics of all war, especially on a large scale. These were heavy enough, surely, in persons not divested of so- briety by the presence of some dominating coNCKPrioN.to induce the ex- tremest forbearance in the resort to war, if not demanded by an imperative exigency of national interest or honor. The more obvious forms of the calamity of war — destruction of men and ships, waste of money and prop- erly — had the least claim incomparably in estimating the amount of this calamity. It was not what n-arked the progress of war, but the sequel, that had the first claim to estimation. Circumstances attendant on the progress pass away; t.hose which attached to the sequel ensured for long continued influence. And such were going to be the circumstances attach- ing to this war with England, if we should become engaged in it. Some of these circumstances, the most obtrusive because the most essen- tial, it was his purpose (Mr. A. said) briefly to consider. He was in no condition to expand the view of them, however they might merit it. He began by discarding from account all notice of military or naval disasters or loss. He believed that his countrymen would always be found sustain- ing fully the reputation we had earned in naval and military conflict ; and that in this war, if it came, they would add largely to the national titles to renown. This he stated from the fullest conviction and belief The pur- poses of his argument required that he should go further than this in admis- sion. He conceded that, with no interruption, we should triumph on every wave, be the victors on every field ; that no current of adverse vicissitude or accident might be expected to come athwart the stream of our success to break it; that the freest vision of the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Allen) on this subject might be realized. That honorable Senator indulged the impression that this imbecile Power, England, would not venture on war with us single-handed. Why, then, single-handed? Why not double- handed ? Was not the favorite theme of the Senator from Ohio, the vigil- ant propensity of the great Powers, in alliance with England, to pounce on this seductive exemplar of ours, of the pernicious vitality and perilous progressiveness of free institutions, to extinguish it before the attempt might be too late ? What occasion more favorable than this of war with England for the indulgence of this propensity and policy ? Then the prob- ability in this view was not, as the Senator supposed, that wo should 13 have no war with England, but that we should have war with more than England in association witli her. Not concurring in the supposition, however, he (Mr. A.) would not reason from it. But he insisted that England, despicable as she was de- scribed in strength, might be trodden into war. The worm, trodden on, will turn, and, feeble as it is, may sting. He (Mr. A.) assumed that if we terminated discussion, seized the entire subject in controversy, and this, too, accompanied by great, however just, vituperation of England in our public councils, England, in all her imbecility, and however signal the indiscretion, will be exasperated into war. Let us suppose this, and that the first result will be to realize the luminous conception of the Senator from Ohio, that the English fleets, in place of agglomerating on our coasts, as might have been expected, will, at the first onset of war, take to their winged heels, and huddle for detence around the mother country and the colonies. Even in this view, and assuming they were never to turn again, we must still make provision for defence, as if they were at any lime to be expected on our shores. Well, excluding from calculation the large consideration of naval and maritime armaments, what is the reasonable estimate of the provision for land security and operations which will be required ? He preferred (Mr. A. said) to substitute the estimates of the honorable Senator from South Carolina for his own. His estimate was for seven armios, which would be required, to be composed of not fewer than two hundred thousand men. To these was to be added (Mr. A. said) a consideration peculiar to our forms of force. Regular force we could have to only a moderate extent. We would have to depend on draughts of citizens for periods of three, six — let it be twelve months. A force of this kinu was known, in its wastefulness, and the expense attending fre- quency 01 change and distant removal, to involve a much larger propor- tionate cost v'lan any other. The provision must be for the expense of a considerably arger force than two hundred thousand men, admitting these to be sufficien . Whence were the resources for this and other expendi- tures to come ? ThtJ resource from customs must be Tiearly cut off in the inevitable interruptions to commerce. Direct taxes, excises, loans, must be tht; dependence. Whence was lo be the resource lo pay these, if our markets for a great part abroad were to be cut off, and the portion, or the proportion of the products of our industry which might reach market, by tne effect of insurance and the loss from indirect communication, to be greatly impaired? The expense, every one knew, must be supplied by loans If, from the sources of taxation, enough could be derived to pay the interest on loans, and so sustain ihe credit of the Government, that was the best to be ex|)ected. We should be precluded, from various circum- stances not necessary to be adverted to, from efi'ecting loans to any ex- tent abroad. The reliance must be on domestic resources. Flow long could we stand this? The estimate of Mr. Gallatin is, that the expendi- ture must be seventy-seven million dollars a year; fifteen or eighteen millions to be raised by taxes, sixty millions or more by loans. The Sen- ator from South Carolina thinks these estimates too low. That (Mr. A. said) was his own distinct and well-considered opinion. But suppose the estimates correct, how long would our capacity of standing up to the con- test last, or with what results ? The conflict must be expected to be en- during, as neither party was a Power to ' subdued. The Power that, 14 for a great part of twenty years, a portion of the time with the resources of all Europe at his control, withstood the hostility of Napoleon without succumbing, could not be expected speedily to quail in our conflict. Our loans to sustain the war, after a short period, must be drawn entirely from banks. Aflbrding loans to the amount of sixty-two millions a year, (Mr. Gallatin's calculation,) our banks must speedily become unable to sustain a specie basis. Our Governments, Federal and State, as in England after the trials of 1797, would find themselves constrained to authorize the de- parture from a specie basis. We should then have the rush of the unre- sisted paper system — not the paper system of the war of 1812, when we paid forty per cent, on loans, but of the war of tlni Revolution, when pa- per alone, depreciated past computation, was the only medium of ex- change and standard of value. In proportion to the depreciation of the currency and the multiplication of Government demands for loans, the amount of loans required nnist augment with each year. To what must the amount swell in a few years? When peace came, besides that crudest of all the trials through which a social community can pass, the restoration of a ruined currency to credit, what would be the amount of debt we should have to meet with provis- ion? The Senator from South Carolina says seven hundred and fifty million dollars for ten yer.rs of war. Let this be the amount. How are you to meet it? Revenue from commerce will have passed away. Man- ufactures, coerced by the denial of external supply, will have covered the land, to exclude any other than the most penurious supply of revenue from the custom-house. Your resources to pay the interest of this debt in peace, (not the debt,) as to pay it in war, must be direct tax and the hateful excise — excise mainly on manufactures. You will not ho able to break up or reduce to proportion the prevalence of the manufacturing system. It will have found its unnatural expansion in the nnavoiciable incitement of war, in the unavoidable incitement of your pledged and committed legislation. You will be unable to break it up, from its extent. The attempt would induce convulsion. You will be forbidden to make the attempt, for your pledges will be a bridle on you. Our whole economical system, ^vith our whole financial system, which depends on it, will have undergone convulsion, overthrow, revolution — convulsion unappeasable, revolution to which no remedy can be brought. But this (said Mr. A.) was far ''rom the worst view of tlie mischief that was to come. We could get on with an economical system in derange- ment, a financial system perverted and in disorder ; but what was to come to our social system ? The war would last long. It would wax fierce. In proportion to the duration and the fierceness would be the change which always came from long war in the temper of the people. The effect was as inevitable as the progression of the seasons — a moral law. The mili- tary would take the place of the civil spirit — the military of the civil men. The proneness of the people to abasement to military success, the pro- clivity of military success to ab'-se — trade winds were not more inevitable and regular. In protracted war, contempt of law became the law. When the military men wanted to supplant the civil administration in the first French revolution, the cry was. " Throw the lawyers into the river." This cry carried every thing. Arms and laws do not flourish together. Among arms the laws are silent, says the adage. The Senator from South Caro- lina has supposed that we should have the general of the army of Texas content Marius I le resources '■on without iflict. Our itirely from year, (Mr. 5 to sustain gland after rize the de- f the iinre- wheii we > when pa- lun of ex- 'tiphcation lired must few years? [I» which a y to credit, th provis- arid fifty How are 'y. Man- 'vered the f revenue this debt "f and the ho able to ufacturing avoidable dged and its extent, make the Jonotnical will have pea.sable, chief that derange- ! to come fierce. In ?e which ffect was 'he mili- ivil men. the pro- levitable When the first ••" This Among h Caro- f Texas m^ 15 contending with the general of the army of Canada for the first magistracy. Marius and Sylla — Ca;sar and Pompey. Perhaps so. But suppose things not so bad ; that our generals, in place of rending their country by arms, submit in war and after war to the forms of election — take office from the hands of the people. Is a military ascendency less inevitable ? Have not our people, as in all the popular States of which history gives us any record, already instructed us in the caiastroplie ? Will they have any other than military men in high office — with the spirit of command, and con- tempt of civil control, which defines the real and eminent military man? If this were to be a war, then, as it had been said it would be, between the republican and monarchical principles, the conflict would be at home — among ourselves ; and the first were certain to succumb, and the last to be triumphant. He (Mr. A.) had heard the suggestion that, under the severe pressure of the distress in the continuance of this war, the Union might give way — break up. He did not concur in this apprehension. War lagmg, lii! honorable termination had been reached, our people would never sunder. But the case was ditl'erent entirely when, in the restoration of peace, a military dynasty, in the forms of our republican institutions, would supervene. Then the heart of the patriot would be turned to dis- ruption, the impulse at once of incontrollable feeling, and the dictate of in- violable duty. Such (Mr. A. said) were some of the consequences — they were only a part — which might come, whicii he believed in his inmost heart, to a great extent, would come, from this war proposed for Oregon, if it occurred. What were to be the compensations, independently of these ulterior con- siderations, for the ordinary sacrifices in blood and expenditure which the war would involve? Not Oregon. That was too small a thing to think of. Still less a part of Oregon, or the use of a river, (the Columbia,) with a hundred and twenty-five miles of available stream, and fifteen miles of nearly impracticable and absolutely irremovable shoal at the mouth of it. The compensations were to be the occupation of the English territorial possessions in our neighborhood. Wellj suppose these occupied, as prob- ably, not certainly, they would be in the progress of the war — what were we to do with them on the restoration of peace, supposing fwhat was im- possible) that we were not to restore ' 'u as the indispensable conditions of peace ? Retain them as pavts of our Confederacy ? That would be the signal for the dissolution of the Confederacy, which would break to pieces, too, in no long time, under the weight, even if this were not to prove the signal of dissolution. And was it certain that these provinces would be willing to come into our Confederacy ? They had been fostered in attachment to monarchical as we to ropublican institutions. Were we to force their inclinations, put our institutions on them as a yoke ? That would, indeed, be the policy of a part of our people, but not, it must be pre- sumed, of the majority. Were we to restore these possessions ? Then, where was to be the compensation for all the enormous cost in blood and treasure of the acquirement ? Was it to go in satisfaction for that worth- less part of Oregon — the only part that England, was not ready to surren- der to us to day? Or were we to establish these British provinces, if we did not wish to take them, or they did not wish to come to us, as an inde- pendent republican confederacy ? Then the cost of suffering and blood of our people would go to their establishment, as a great neighbor, and there- fore rival, in place of a foreign Power. 16 He (Mr. A.) had now given a sincere expression of his views of the policy of asserting a claim to all Oregon. There was a topic in connexion, to which he was reluctant, and yet thought it necessary, to advert. It had been brought into the debate on the other side of the chamber, and this put him at liberty to make the allusion to it. The authority of the Baltimore Convention had been openly invoked, in the discussion, as one of the appropriate means to influence it. It was proper that the people should be made acquainted with the fact, and with the fearful bearing of this appeal. The Baltimore Convention ! What was it ? The authority of an association unknown to the institutions of the country, made the subject of appeal to control the legislation of the country ! This body, really self-appointed, or nearly so, convened for an alleged specific object, to carry into eflect an assumed public sentiment in relation to that ob- ject. Its first proceeding had been to discard the admitted public senti- ment which it purported to nave met to effectuate. Its notorious oouw© of proceeding had been, not to receivtt but to make a public sentiment, in substitution of that which it professed to have been sent to execute ; and then to raise political issues which might be inflamed in aid of this opera- tion. A junto, with no authority of any kind, or acting in admitted con- tradiction and violation of its professed authority, had been successful in dictating i's most important election to the country ; and its authority was nov/ employed, on the prestige of that success, to dictate the legislation of the country on a subject of the most vital importance. This was the first open avowal the country had ever known of Jacobinism in its halls of legislation. It was yet to be seen how the avowal would be received. A supposed peculiar Western interest on this subject of Oregon had been adduced to explain the propensity to extreme measures manifested in that quarter of the country, and by its representatives here. He (Mr. A.) did not ascribe the vehemence of this propensity to the influence of any such selfish consideration. But he did ascribe it to a peculiarity of Western temperament, the incident, perhaps, of their stage of social con- dition. The people were notoriously brave ; but this bravery ran into recklessness of all consequences in controversy with foreign Powers. They were as undoubtedly generous ; but they had the quality too often found in alliance with spirit and generosity — impatience of resistance to their views, and the disposition to domineer over it. He (Mr. A.) admitted his indulgence of an extreme anxiety on the subject of this Western tempera- ment, not in relation to the present instance only of its display, but the large future which was before us ; the political power of the country being destined, probably, to pass to that region, before this temperament passed away from it, under the influence of its only corrective, diffused education. Rumination on this topic, he had to confess, had for some time kept him in terror. Yes, " westward the star of empire holds its way." The fact was as true as the expression was poetical. Great results were probably to come. His (Mr. A.'s) prayer to Heaven was.j that, before this planet of power culminated, its beam might so refine as not to wither our enjoyment of freedom at home, and not to aff'right other climes and times, which a tem- pered brightness in our example might lure to the admiration and the adoption of popular institutions. r . , , l,!' .wi