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Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont film6s en commenpant par la premidre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernidre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la dernidre image de cheque microfiche, selon le cas: le symboie — »- signifie "A SUIVRE ", le symbole V signifie "FIN". Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre filmis i des taux de rdduction diff6rents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul clich6, il est filmd d partir de Tangle s jp6rieur gauche, de gauche i droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images n6cessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 I } i EVOLUTION AND- THE POSITIVE ASPECTS — OF — MODERN THOUGHT t IN KKI'LY ro — THE BISHOP OF ONTARIO'S Second Lecture on Agnosticism By WJ). LeSUEUR. B.A. ■ * * I ^ r > I . - tit > ' •• ^ «"^^^>^»^fe^-- OTTAWA : I'KINTKI) BY A. S. WOOHUIKN, KLiilN HTUEKT. 1884. I ^^„,_^_,,__^ ' n AgnoHtieirtUi, by th«' lii^'ht-reverend the Lord Hisliifp of Onturio." t A Criticism i>f Mr. LeSueur'.s pamphlet by V'indfx. ' 58564 ^ 2 — Second Lecture simply confirm the proof offered by the first of his insufficient preparation for the discussion on which he has ventured ? 1 have reason to believe that this question has already been decided, in a sense not favorable to the Right- reverend Lecturer, by those whose studies fit them to pro- nounce a prompt judgment upon it ; but there arc others who frankly confess that a little guidance in such matters is helpful to them ; and it is for their benefit that I go over the ground in the following pages, everywhere inviting, and doing all I can to facilitate, the fullest investigation of any statements I may make. Apart, however, from the critical examination of the " Second Lecture on Agnosticism " now before us, I hope to be able, before I close, to say some words in confirmation of the general views which I ventured to put forward in my first pamphlet, and which have been vigorously attacked in several orthodox quarters. The learned Lecturer does not approve of the suggestion contained in my previous pamphlet, that instead of seeking a (jaarrel with modern thinkers on the ground of Agnosti- cism, he should do it on the ground of their rejection of the miraculous. In making the suggestion, however, I was governed by very practical considerations. I knew that an issue could much more readily be joined on the latter ground than on the former. Comparatively few men of science are pronounced agnostics, while very many avow more or less plainly their disbelief in miracles. As regards the belief in God there is a general desire, on the part of those who profess their inability to arrive at it by scientific processes, to exempt it from criticism. In this matter at least men of science are not aggressive ; and I felt that in combating them upon this point the Lecturer was not making the best use of his dialectical resources. Moreover I knew that, in I 1 — 3 — attacking the doctrine of evolution, as a kind of cover and shield of Agnosticism, he was taking a position which some of the most learned and discreet defenders of Christianity have abandoned Even Cardinal Newman, if I mistake not, has declared that there is nothing in the Darwinian theory which is necessarily incompatible with any essential Christian doctrine. If we open a book of which the Bishop has made some use, though not as much as he might have done, "The Unseen Universe," we shall find the eminent authors distinctly taking up the position that "it is not so much the right, or privilege as //le hounden duty of the man of science to jmt back the direct interference of the Great First Cause — the unconditioned — as far as he possibly can in time. This is the intellectual or rather theoretical work which he is called u^jon to do — the post that has been assigned to him in the economy of the universe." Again : they observe " If two possible theories of the production of any phenomenon are presented to the man of science, one of these implying the immediate oper- ation of the Unconditioned, and the other the operation of some cause existing in the universe, we conceive that he is called upon, by the most profound obligations of his nature, to choose the second in preference to the first." * Now, what is here recommended, in a book designed as an aid to faith, is precisely what evolutionists are doing to-day. Some further proof of how the doctrine of evolution is regarded in enlightened theological (juarters may not be unacceptable. " Let us ask," says the Rev. Francis H. Johnson in the newly established Atidover Review (Congregational) " why it is that the scientific doctrine of evolution should be so repeatedly and conspicuously associated with philo- sophies antagonistic to Christianity ? Is it the fault of * (I Unseen Universe " — Am. edition, 1875, pp. 131-2. — 4 — evolution ? Or it is the fault of Christianity ? Shall we conclude that the new-comer has disclosed a fatal aflinity for atheistic society, and must therefore be avoided ? Or shall we, on the other hand, be forced to acknowledge that Christianity has re|)ulsed evolution, often ridiculed it from its pulpitsjoften condemned it without a hearing, and thus surrendered the revelation which it contains tcj be construed atheistically? Brave attempts have been made by Christian scientists to rescue its truths, and to induce theologians to give them an unbiassed hearing. Such men as I)r, Asa Cray and Dr. Joseph Leconte have, on the part of science, clearly shown the way. But the policy of 'I'heology, with some notable exceptions, has been one of masterly inactivity. Preserving its traditional attitude toward scientific discovery, it has devoted the main force of its energy, so far as evolu- tion is concerned, to the setting forth of its weak points, as if the weakness of evolution were the strength of Christ- ianity."* I could proceed to quote the acute and learned President of Princeton College, Dr. McCosh, and many other eminent Christian writers who all consider the case in favor of evolution as practically proved ; but what has already been given may suffice for the present. The Bishop of Ontario, however, has not abated one jot or tittle of his hostility to the doctrine in cjuestion ; and we must therefore proceed to consider his further arraignment of it. Let us, in the first place, see hew he handles the authorities to which he appeals. Mr. (Irant Allen, a few years ago, wrote a telling article entitled " The Ways of Orthodox Critics : " . we may perhaps discover that we have here, an orthodox critic whose ways are, to say the least, peculiar. At the outset he gives uj) Lyell as an anti- evolutionist, but seeks, in a far from commendable * Audovcr Bcviin; April, 1884, page 3(i8. -5 manner, to minimize the error which he committed on this point, by representing it as a mere matter of (juoting the wrong edition of a particular work. It was really a matter of not kncnving anything about one of the most notable facts in the history of science in our day. To talk about not having consulted the last edition of Lyell's book, is as ridiculous as if one were to excuse himself, on similar grounds, for having referred to Dr. Newman as still an Anglican clergyman. To be sure Dr. Newman's conversion occurred a little longer ago than Lyell's ; but, after all, twenty years affords time enough in these days for news to penetrate even to the most sequestered regions. The adhesion of Lyell to the Darwinian theory was really the adhesion of the modern school of geologists of which — so far at least as England was concerned — he was the recog- nized head. In lieu of Lyell. however, we are offered the celebrated Professor Virchow, with whose views the Lecturer appears to have become acquainted through an article in that res- pectable publication "The Leisure Hour." It will, I think, strike most intelligent readers that to go to *' Leisure Hour" to find out what V^irchow thinks on the subject of evolution is rather a funny way of working up a scientific thesis ; and when I add that what is given to us as a (juota- tion contains words which Virchow never spoke or wrote, the precariousness as well as the oddity of the proceeding will be evident. Virchow, however, is far from being a sub- stitute for Sir Charles Lyell in this controversy. Lyell, thirty years ago, was a leading opponent of the theory of the mutability of species, whereas Virchow, in his Munich address of 1877, ^''O"! which the Lecturer purports to quote, merely asserts that the evolution theory is not yet sufificiently proved to justify us in teaching it dogmatically, as a thing 6 — cslal)lishcd. Had the learned Lecturer been aware that Virchow, in that very address, had used the words I am about to quote, it does not seem likely that he would have brought him forward so triumphantly, as an authority on his side. " At this moment," says the great investigator, "there are probably few naturalists who are not of opinion that man is allied to the rest of the animal world, and that a connec- tion will possibly be found, if indeed not with Apes, then perhaps in some other direction, as is now the opinion of Professor Vogt. I acknowledge openly that this is a desideratum of science. I am quite prepared for i., and I should not for a moment wonder or be alarmed if the proof were found that the ancestors of man belonged to some other order of vertebrates." Later on in his discourse, he almost goes out of his way to suggest a reason why the palaeontological evidence of man's descent from some lower type of life has not yet been discovered. " We cannot avoid the consideration," he says, " that perhaps it was on some quite special spot of earth that Tertiary man lived This is quite possible, since, during the last few years, the remarkable discovery has been made that the fossil ancestors of our horses occur in countries from which the horse had entirely disappeared for a long time. When America was first discovered there were no horses there at all ; in the very place where the ancestors of our horses had lived, no living horse remained. Thus it may also be that Tertiary man has existed in Greenland or Lemuria, and will again be brought to light from under the ground somewhere or other." * The Bishop pauses for a moment in his argument for the purpose of convicting me of an error. I said, in my first * I qxiote frt)in a full report of Professor Virchow's speech which appearecf in the Popular Science Monthlji Supplement lor February, 1878, and also in Nature, a month or two earlier. — 7 — out pamphlet, that Huxley would not cl?im more today for the Darwinian theory than Lyell had d<3ne, when he wrote that Darwin, "without absolutely proving " the theory, had rendered it " in the highest degree probable, by an appeal to many distinct and independent classes of phenomena in natural history and geology." To prove nvj wrong, Huxley is quoted as having spoken, in one of his New \ ork lectures^ of *' the demonstrative evidence of evolution," and as having said that the doctrine in question at the present time " rests upon exactly as secure a foundation as the Copernican theory of the motions of the heavenly bodies did at the time of its promulgation." Precisely. Now, did Prof. Huxley, in those New York lectures, take any i>ains to explain the sense in which he used the word "demonstrative," as applied to the evidence for evolution ? He did : three times at least he gave the explanation. In the first lecture of the series, for example, he expressed himself as follows ; and those who are fond of dogmatizing about dogmatism of science would do well to note the words : " We must recollect that any human belief, however broad its basis, however defensible it may seem, is, after all, only a probable belief, and that our widest and safest generalizations are simply statements of the highest degree of probability." Now what does Lyell say? — that the Darwinian theory has been made to appear " in the highest degree probable." The coincidence ot expres- sion is somewhat remarkable. " The occurrence of histori- cal facts says Huxley again, "is said to be demon- strated, when the evidence that they happened is of such a character as to render the assumption that they did not happen in the highest degree improbable : and the question I have now to deal with is, whether evidence of this degree of cogency, in favor of the evolution of animals is, or is not, obtainable from the record of the succession of living forms which is presented to us by fossil remains." (Lecture HI). 8 — I All that Huxley aimed to do was to prove that the negative of the Darwinian hypothesis was " in the highest degree im- probable;" Lyell maintained that the theory itself was " in the highest degree probable." Huxley says : " An inductive hypothesis is said to be demonstrated when the facts are shown to be in entire accordance with it." Lyell says that the hypothesis now in question is supi)orted by *' many distinct and independent classes of phenomena." Huxley allows that inductive conclusions do not admit of absolute proof, and Lyell that the facts adduced by 1 )arwin, though strongly favoring his theory, yet fall short of " absolute proof." How there could have been closer agree- ment between the two men, unless they had consulted togethei and agreed to express themselves in identical terms, I cannot well imagine. Another point is worthy of notice. Huxley says that the evidence at present adducible for evolution is as satisfactory as that oflered on behalf of the Copernican theory " at the time of its promulgation.'^ The Bishop, in quoting those words, quite fails to notice their force. The evidence in favor of the Copernican theory was by no means as strong, wlien that theory was first promulgated, as it is now. On a later page of his pamphlet, he drops entirely the qualifying words used by Prof. Huxley and says : " Professor Huxley gives us what he calls demonstrative evidence of evolution — evidence as clear, he says, as that for the Copernican theory." Again, two pages later : " This, then, is the highest evidence adducible. Huxley calls it as demonstrative as the Coperni- can theory." Prof. Huxley is thus twice miscjuoted, and the impression is created on the mind of the casual reader that Prof. Huxley holds the evidence in favor of evolution to be as .strong as that which to-day exists for the truth of the Copernican theory — a thing which he was very careful not — 9 — to say. The reader will agree with me that this is not a fair method of conducting controversy. Professor Huxley, it will be remembered, argued, in his New York lectures, from the unbroken series of fossil equine forms discovered in the United States and Europe, but par- ticularly in the United States, to the descent of the modern horse from a five toed ancestor. The Bishop finds the argument inconclusive, and quotes Professor Owen as fol lows : " These extinct animals differ from euch other in a greater degree than do the horse, the zebra and the ass, which by Professor Huxley are acknowledged to be true species." The unguarded and innocent reader, who did not know that Owen's work, the " Anatomy of the Vertebrates," from which this quotation purports to be made, was published eight years before Huxley delivered his New York lectures, would certainly conclude that Owen had penned this passage for the express purpose of controverting the views of Pro- fessor Huxley. To the reader less innocent, who knew the respective dates of publication, the quotation would be, to say the least a puzzle. We therefore turn to the page indi- cated (Vol. HI. p. 792), and there we read : " Palaeotherium, Paloplotherium, Anchitherium, Hipparion and Equus differ from each other in a greater degree than do the horse, zebra and ass " — no mention of Huxley's name whatever, no refer- ence whatever to his views. Professor Owen was referred to in the Bishop's first lecture as an opponent of evolu- tion, and the further use now made of his name would strengthen the impression that he was a believer in the special creation hypothesis. Let him therefore speak for himself: "If the alternative — species by miracle or by law ? — be apHied to Palaeotherium, Paloplotherium, Anchitherium, Hipparion, Equus, I accept the latter without misgiving, and recognize such law as continu- 1 ^^ lO ously operating throughout tertiary time. " * Where Owen differs from Huxley is, not in denying the genetic connec- tion, which the latter asserts to exist, between present forms of life and past ones specifically or generically different, but in disputing the sufficiency of such a cause as natural selection to produce specific or generic differences. The most concise statement of his views on the subject which I can find is the following : " Being unable to accept the volitional hypo- thesis, or that of impulse from within, or the selective force exerted by outward circumstances, I deem an innate ten- dency to deviate from the parent type, operating through periods of adequate duration, to be the most probable nature, or way of operation, of the secondary law whereby species have been derived one from the other." f " Now, would anybody who had read simply what the Bishop has been pleased to quote from^Owen (with the sirr'ular addi- tion which we have seen to have been derived from some- body's '' inner consciousness") imagine for a moment that Owen fully believed in the variation of species, and only differed from evolutionists as to the means whereby the variation had been brought about ? I scarcely think so ; and I venture to say that, here again, those who have looked to the learned Lecturer for accurate information and candid reasoning have much cause for disappointment. Before leaving Owen, I should wish to dwell for a moment onjwhat seems to me an inconsistency in his view. He postulates " an innate tendency " to variation, that in- nate tendency having been implanted by the Creator. But he also postulates "adequate time." Why? What is adequate time for the working 'out of a change for which the Creator has made express provision ? Unless it is * Anatomy of the^Vei-tebrateH — Vol. III. page 7*X^. t Anatomy of the Vertebrates, Vol. III. pajfe 807. i — II — known beforehand that the Creator requires time, and plenty of it, to make any important change in organic forms, there is no need to postulate time as necessary for His operations. Why should not any one animal form give birth without further ado to any other, by virtue of an " innate tendency " to vary in a predetermined direction ? It is easily seen why evolutio>iists postulate time : they know that the changes made by varying conditions of life are made slowly and g^-adually. Time, therefore, with them is an all-important element ; but what time has to do with changes resulting from a divinely-implanted '' innate ten- dency," is not so obvious. It strikes me that here Owen himself gives the case away to the evolutionists. Resuming the argument from design brought forward in his first lecture, the Bishop instances the human eye as an organ altogether too complicated in its adjustments to have resulted from " natural selection," and speaks of Darwin as himself giving up the point, and i)ronouncing that to suppose that tJie eye could have been formed by tiatural selection is absurd in the highest degree. Now anyone who knows any- thing of Darwin's writings knows that, tor that author to have expressed himself thus, would have been to throw the whole argument of his "Origin of Species" out of the window. It is as if one were to quote the apostle Paul as saying, not that the gospel of Christ was " to the Greeks foolishness," but that it was essential foolishness ; thus making him bear witness against the very cause to which he had devoted his life. What 1 )arwin says is not that the idea of the forma!;ion of the eye l)y natural selection is absurd, but that, to the spontaneous common sense of mankind — that common sense which it is now well recognized cannot be trusted in matters of I)hilosophy or science — it ^e'ev;/^ absurd; that it is "foolish- ness" to those who know nothing of the development of the i 12 — eye in the individual organism, or of the long series of eyes less perfect than the human which a study of nature reveals; but that it is not foolishness to those who have this know- ledge, and who have duly considered all that the facts imply. I quote in a foot-note Darwin's exact words, so that it may be seen that I have not misrepresented his meaning by one iota.* The perversion in this case is so gross that I decline to believe it was deliberately perpetrated by the Right- reverend author of the lectures on "Agnosticism." I rather think that he has been himself imposed upon by some garbled account of Darwin's views, such as can only too readily be found in quarters where a business is made of carping at science in the interest of theology. Slill, an author is responsible for the materials he uses ; and it seems to me most discreditable that the Bishop of Ontario should, under any circumstance^ have put forward the erroneous representations which we find in these lectures. And yet this part of my task is not concluded. Mr Spencer is distinctly charged by the lecturer with teaching that "the only way to deal with men whose mental develop- ment is imperfect " is to dress up phantoms and so excite * "To suppose that the eye, with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, f«)r admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, ccmld have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest degree. When it was first said that the sun stood still and the world turned round, the common sense of n)ankind declared the doctrine false ; but the old saying of Vox popun, vox Dei, as every philosopher knows, cannot be trusted in science. Reason tells me that, if numerous gradations from a simple and imperfect eye to one com])lex *iid perfect can be shown to exist, each grade being useful to its possessor, certainly the case ; if further the eye ever varies and the variations ' inherited, as is likewise certainly the case; and if such variations sfiould be useful to any animal under changing conditions of life, then the difficulty of believing that a perfect and complex eye could be formed by natural selection, though insui)erable by our imagination, should not be considered as subversive of the tlx-ory. ■■'*** 'j'},,. ^^implest organ that can be called an eye consists of an ojjtic nerve, surnmnded by jngment cells and covered by translucent skin, but without any lens or other refractive body. Wi' may, however, descend even a step lower. — 13 — their fears, as the priesthoods of the world have been accus- ed of doing, with a view to keeping them under more effec- tive control. (Vide Second Lecture, page 4.) Now there is only one thing to say about this, and that is that it is a misstatement There is not one line in Mr. Spencer's writings upon which such a construction can, with a shadow of fair- ness, be placed. We are referred in support of the indict- ment to pages 1 19-122 of " F'irst Principles" ; but there is no support for it to be found in those paj^es nor in any other page or pages that Mr. Spencer ever wrote. One sentence of Mr. Spencer's which the Lecturer quotes asserts that, just "as certainly as a barbarous race needs a harsh terrestrial rule, and habitually shows attachment to a despotism capable of the no iry rigor, so ceitainly does such a race need a belief mat is similarly harsh, and habitually shows attachment to such a belief." There is nothing here about " dressing up phantoms," but a simple assertion of the truth, that the religions which we find established in different parts of the world do, in point of fact, meet, in a greater or less degree, the needs of the races and communities professing them. Supposing that, on the contrary, it were asserted that the religions existing in the world had no relative fitness to the races under their sway, and answered no useful purpose whatever ; the question would at once be asked : How do and find ;iggn'i,Mt«'s of pigincnt cells, apparently servinjf as organs of vision, witliout any ncrvfs, and testing incn-ly on saicodjc tissiu- Kyt's of the above simple natnre are not capable of distinct vision, })ut merely serve to distinguish light from flarkness. * ♦ * Within the higlu'st division of the animal kingdom, namely the Vertebrate, we can start from an eye so simple that it consists, as in the lancelet, of a little sack of transparent skin, furnished with a nerve and lined with [)igment, but destitute of any other ajiparatus. * * * To arrive, however at a just conclusion regarding the formation of the eye, with all its marvellous, yet not absolutely perfect, characters, it is indispensable that reason shoidd conquer the nnagination ; but 1 have felt the difKculty far too keenly to be surprised at others hesitating to extend the principle of natural selection to so startling a length. Origin of Species, .Vmeri- can reprint of Oth English edition, i)p. 143-140. — 14 — you account then for their existence and for the strong hold they have upon those born under them ? And the question would be unanswerable. How free Mr. Spencer is from the reproach cast upon him may be seen on one of the very pages to which we are referred ("First Principles," page 122) where he explains why, in spite of the fact that " creeds have an average fitness to their times and places," those who have outgrown them should !iot hesitate to give expression to their progressive ideas. Then, on the next page, we read the following noble passage, so nobly exemplified in Mr. Spen- cer's own life : " Not as adventitious, therefore, will the wise man regard the faith that is in him. The highest truth he sees he 7uiil fearlessly inter ; knowing that, let what may come of it, he is thus playing his right part in the world — knowing that if he can effect the change he aims at — well : if not — well also ; though not so well."* Of new argument the Second Lecture on Agnosticism con. tains little or nothing. The author tries to justify himself for having said that Huxley " discredited " the idea of the possible generation of living from non-living matter ; but all he can do is to quote, as before, a passage which signifies nothing more than that the experiments heretofore made to produce life from non-living matter had all proved unsuccess- ful. He i)roceeds to arraign the evolution theory as violating that fundamental conon of " exact science"! which requires us to reason from the known to the unknown. The method of evolution, we are told, is the wholly illegitimate one of reasoning "from a conjecture to the un- * I am glad to find the author of the Lectures referring ua, in coh- nection with the attack on Mr. Spencer, to the Transactions of the Vic- toria Institute. This would seem to show that the unjust charge which he brings forward did not originate with himself. But, alas ! why did he not read the " First Principles " to more profit, if he ever had the work in his hands ? f Geology is clas.-sed by the Lecturer among the " exact sciences " — a position not usually accorded to it. I I known." What then is the conjecture which evolutionists — poor weak-minded men like Spencer, Huxley, Haeckel and the great mrjority, as Virchow informs us, of the scientific leaders of the present day — make the starting-point of their reasonings ? Why, it is the doctrine that species pass into one another ? Well, herein is a wonderful thing. How was it that Huxley, in his New York Lectures on Evolution, did not start from the hypothesis that species pass into one another, instead of laboriously working up to it by a process of inductfon ? The only, but quite sufficient reason why he did not, is that the theory in queston is not the starting- pointy but the goal, broadly si)eaking, of the system of evolution. The learned Lecturer has mistaken the goal fo the starting-point ; that is all. The doctrine of evolution finds its starting-point in a great multiplicity of facts of ob- servation. These facts demand explanation, just as in past times the motions of the heavenly bodies demanded an ex- planation. Evolution brings them all under a common law, and causes them to shed light mutually on one another ; just as the Newtonian law of gravitation did for the phenomena of the solar system. Evolution therefore starts from no "conjecture," but from facts,* and works towards the establishment of a theory, that theory, prior to its establishment representing "the unknown." The learned Lecturer, I think, would do well to take note of this very simple explanation for future use. Examining the argument of Huxley's New York lectures, the Bishop finds it very inconclusive. The discovery of Protohippus and Pliohippus intermediate between Anchithe- rium and Equus, and of Mesohippus, Orohippus and Eohip- * These facts are classified under seven distinct heads in Huxley'** essay, "Evolution in Biology." See Encyclopgedia Britannica 9th edition, or "Science and Culture," page 297. — i6 — pus antecedent to Anchitherium, is of no weight in his judg- ment as establishing the genealogy of Equus. The possession of a less complete series was, however, of much weight in that direction with one of his authorities, Owen ; who also states that this was the precise evidence which Cuvier requir- ed (leoU'roy St. Hilaire, and the other disciples of Lamarck to i)roduce, before he would admit that they had a logical ground for their belief in the transformation of species. Owen (juotes the following from Cuvier to show the stand taken by that great naturalist on the point : " Cependant on peut leur rej)ondre, dans leur propre systeme, que si les especes ont change par degres, on devrait trouver des traces de ces modifications graduelles ; qu'entre le Palaeothe'rium et les especes d'aujourd'hui Ton devrait decouvrir quelques formes intermcdiaires, et que jusqu'^ pre'sent cela n'est point arrive'."* ^^'ell this has now been done ; and the question, therefore, as Owen observes, as to " whether actual races may not be modifications of those ancient races, which arc exem- plified by fossil remains, presents itself under very different conditions from those under which it passed before the minds of Cuvier and Academicians of 1830." We may therefore reasonably conjecture that, had Cuvier been presented, as he might be at this day were he alive, with the precise evidence which he himself had called for, he would have abandoned the ground of the immutability of species. The Bishop o^ Ontario, it is true, is still unconvinced ; but it does not follow from this that the evidence is weak. An objection is next found to the doctrine of evolution in the fact that the horse, according to Huxley, had in very remote ages a five-toed ancestor. Were the doctrine true the five-toed horse ought, we are told, to be the horse of to-day, and the one-toed horse should have lived in the % See " Anatuniy of Veitebrate» "' — Vol. Ill, p. 7S\). Note G. — 17 — Eocene period. A criticism of this nature simply shows that if the Bishop of Ontario has studied the writings of evolu- tionists at all in their original sources, he has studied them to little i)urpose ; otherwise he would understand that the doctrine of natural selection provides equally for an increase in complexity or an increase in simplicity just as one or the other may prove of benefit to a developing form. The Lecturer assumes that the loss of its toes must have been of disadvantage to the horse. But palaeontology shows that the toes gradually dwindled away or became consolidated with the middle toe because they had ceased to be separately of use. Wallace, in his "(ieographical Distribution of Ani mals," says expressly that in Protohippus and Hipparion " the lateral toes are developed, but are small and functiunkss.''''* The theologian asks us to believe that these creatures, with their "small and functionless " toes, were direct and special divine creations. The evolutionist, on the other hand, says : these animals were derived from others in which the toes were better developed ; we see in them the toes already superfluous and becoming rudimentary ; in a later species we shall see that the toes have vanished altogether. The gradual disappearance of the toes took place concurrently with other structural changes, involving changes probably in the habits of the Genus. The earliest distinctly equina form, Eohippus was an animal not much larger than a fox, with the canine teeth much more developed than in the later specimens of the race. Beginning with this minute form, the type, as Wallace says, " is gradually modified by gaining increased size, increased speed by concentration of the limb bones, elongation of head and neck, the canine teeth decreased in size, the molars becoming longer and being *V()1. I, page 135. 2 i8 coated with cement, till at last \\c come to animals hardly distinguishable specifically from thr living horse."* Human experience might almost suggest a possible ex- planation of the substitution of a solid hoof for a lot of sprawling toes. What does man do but make a solid hoof of his foot, whenever he encases it in a boot ? In so doing he virtually parts with his toes as being, not only of no use, but decidedly inconvenient things to knock about with in this rough world. As we find Wallace remarking, the ecjuine race gained in speed — a most imixjrtant point for survival — by the consolidation of the limb bones. A further i)oint is that, as weapons of offence and defence, hoofs probablv h^d the advantage over toes. Theciuestion, however, as to how one i)articular structure came, in point of fact, to supersede another is almost too complex a one to enter upon with safety. It would be quite possible to make a dozen plaus- ible conjectures, every one of which, if we only knew the exact facts, would turn out to be wrong. What we know with certamty is, that animals do not survive by virtue of what in them is weak or ill-adapted to surrounding con- ditions, but by reason of what is strong and well-adapted. The hoof, we may be sure, came in its own good time and for very sufficient reasons. The Right-reverend author states that he is only concerned with the doctrine of evolution, "so far as it is used as a device to eliminate (lod from the universe." This declara- tion is not very consistent with the actual course of his criticisms. 1 )oes it follow that, if Huxley's genealogy of the horse is correct, God is eliminated from the universe ? By no means. Yet he has attacked Huxley's argument. Does it follow that if the eye was formed by " natural selec- tion," as Darwin labors to prove, God is eliminated from * Ibid- \'(.l. 1. page 130. a — 19 - the universe? Uv no means. 'I'licre are hundreds and thousands of convinced theisls who accept Darwin's cone lu- sions on the point : only, they pla( e (lod, as Darwin hini- seh" seems to have done, at the commencement of the evolu- tionary process. \'et the doctrine is assailed on this point also. The fact would seem to be that the whole subject is a little new to the Kight-reverend author, and that he has not been able to settle (juite satisf:irtori!y, in his own mind, what view he should take of it. My own position in the matter was j)lainly stated in my last pamjjhkt, where I said that the doctrine of evolution was simjtly the form in which the dominant scientific thought of the day was cast. " As a working hypf)thesis," I added, " it presents very great advantages : and the thinkers of to-day would find it hard to dispense with the aid it affords." I (juoted a leading evolutionist as admitting " that the difficulties in the way of the doctrine are many and for- midable," and that '* the solution of still unresolved i)rob- lems will very possi!/ly result in important modifications of the theory as now entertained." 'J'here was nothing, I think, in this jiresentation of the subject, which could l)e considered unduly dogmatic or aggressive. The fact is that the doctrine of evolution is not held in at all an absolute way, even by its leading exponents, with perhajjs one or two exceptions. Darwin's statements and reasonings on the sub- ject were always marked by great moderation, and so, it may be said, are Huxley's, when rightly understood. The general argument from design I shall not enter ui)on. Those who have grappled with such treatises as Paul Janet's upon " Final Causes," know to what lengths and dejjthsand heights the discussion can be carried. Here I would just remark that the instance, cjuoted by the Lecturer, of a par- ticular insectivorous plant, proves no more than any simpler — 20 example of apparent adaptation which might he brought for- ward. The language used in regard to it, moreover, borders on the ludicrous. " A more wontlcrful, coni/^licakd^ and effective insect trap could hardly be imagined than the pitcher-plant." I have emphasized the word "comjjlicated," in this quotation, to draw attention to it. 1 )oes not everyone know that, not complication, but simplicity is the mark of perfection in any device or contrivance ? Then as to effect- iveness — is the pitcher-plant, considered as a Jly-trap, really as effective as the wire-gauze ones commonly sold ? No reasonable man, we are told, can deny "that the pur- pose, the design, of the pitcher-plant is to kill flies." Has then Providence made too many flies, that it must set about constructing traps to catch and kill them ? I wonder the extreme crudity of the language he has used did not strike a man of the reputed ability of the Jiishop of Ontario. If it could be shewn that the pitcher-plant had started into existence, just as we find it, and that there was, in its case, no gradual development of parts and functions, no preservation, by "natural selection," of useful variations upon earlier forms, our ideas would, no doubt, be thrown into confusion. But nothing of the kmd can be shewn ; and the evolutionist, who has worked out so many confirmations of his general theory, is entitled to assume that the pitcher- plant combines in itself, to-day, a great variety of adaptations secured by a "struggle for life" continued through long ages. Let any one compare for a moment the two con- ceptions. First, that of the Bishop — the Divine Being planning to feed the pitcher-plant vvith flies, and giving the plant the wherewithal to catch them, including, in some cases, the Right-reverend author tells us, " external fringes calcu- lated to lead insects the right way to destruction." Second, that of the evolutionist — the pitcher-plant, like every other — 21 form of life, (:()inj)ctin^' with rivals for the ground it occupies, producing a inultitu(linf)U.s offspring, some specimens of which have slight variations favorable to life and survive ; while others vary, if at all, in the wrongidirection, and perish ; the favored si»ecimens transmitting their improved construction to their descendants, some of which carry the improvement further, until, in the lapse of time, forms are found which present the a[)penrance of an intricate, purposive adaptation to special ends. 1 ,et anyone, I say, comj)are these two conceptions, and say which is the more satisfactory to a reasonable mind, which awakens deeper thoughts, suggests more fruitful lines of enquiry, and, generally, promotes a more elevated way of looking at things. The real fact is that the first is almost incompatible with true religious reverence, and leads to absolutely nothing in the way of useful thought. The second furnishes us, or seems to furnish us, with a key to the operations of nature through- out the length and breadth of her realm. It enlarges the mind, by holding out to it indefinite possibilities of know- ledge. My remark that " science does not attribute purpose to nature," is described as a "very dictatorial utterance.'* That, it seems to me, depends upon whether it is true or not. If it is true, as I maintain it is, it is no more dictatorial than to say that the earth revolves round the sun ; a statement, by the way, which certain bishops and others, in the early part of the 17th century, thought Galileo very '' dictatorial " for making. What I meant was that the man of science, in his character as a man of science, cannot penetrate to the designs of nature (if it has any) or of Providence. All he can possibly do, in that character, is to observe and correlate facts, and bring them under some law which serves to render their mode and order of occurrence 22 intelligible. The test of a scientific statement is that it lends itself to verification, now or hereafter. 'I'he test of an unscientific, or extra-scientific, statement is that it does not lend itself to verification, either now or hereafter. When, theret'ore, Professor Owen says — //"he says it, for the learned Lecturer does not tell us where the quotation is to be found — that " the correlated modifications of the maternal and fcetal structures * * * afford, as it seems to me, irrefragable evidence of creative foresight," he does not speak as a man of science, though, possibly, he may think he does. As a man of science, he has no more knowledge than anybody else of what constitute the marks of creative foresight. The statement he makes is one which, neither now nor at any future time, can be brought lu the test of verification. Say that Professor Huxley or Professor Haeckel disagrees with him, who is going to decide ? I therefore repeat that '■ science does not attribute {purpose to nature ; " and, that, when men of .science do it, they speak, not in the name or on the authority of science, but in the name, and on the authority, of their theological or philo' sophical i);"cpossessions. I must pass over the effort which the Lecturer makes to break the force of my reply to his contentiun that those who acce])t the doctrine of the survival of the fittest should, in c )nsistcn{y, "abolish all hospitals for the idiot and the insane, \\\c. blind and the dumb." I tliink I made it suffi- ciently evident that the learned Lecturer did not understand the sense attached t^ the words "survival of the fittest " by modern scientific writers, and I r;:gret to say that the Second Lecture reveals continued misunderstanding on the point. I certainly cannot congratulate him on the discovery he has made, that some laws of nature are positive and others negative, some saying to us " thou shalt," and others " thou 23 — shalt not." It would be very interesting to see all the laws of nature separated into these two categories. Into which would the law of gravitation fall, or the law of the diffusion of heat or the law of the expansion of gases ? Unfortunately, when the Lecturer sets to work to illtistrate liis meaning, the very first law he cites says both " thou shalt ! " and " thou shalt not ! "' * To pass on to another point, it is a complete misstate- ment to say : " All my reviewer's dissertation on intelli- gence is irrelevant, as he treats of it as a condition of mind, whereas I spoke of it as mind itself." Any one who will take the trouble to compare the language of my pamphlet with that of the first lecture, will see that I used the word intelligence in a sense precisely similar to that in which it was used by the Lecturer himself For example : replying to the argument : " It requires intelligence to understand natural laws, and how much more to have established and worked them ?" I asked : " AVhat ratio is it possible to es- tablish between the intelligence necessary to discover a natural law and the intelligence necessary to create the law?" Could there possibly be greater congruity than exists between my question and the remark that called it forth ? Let any one go over the whole ground, and he will see that there was, on my part, no such illicit substitution of one meaning for another as has been charged ; but that it is [he author of the lectures himself, who seeks to flit from one meaning to another. The confusion which meets us at this point is indeed lamentable. It is admitted that there is in nature no " background " of unorganized matter, against * When ii tire, we do s«'e a law of nature at work — the law by which carl Mill and oxyj^'eii combine to form tire; and the knowledge of this law /or/>/'/.v our callinir it into operation ko as to bum our houses, and o/zu/un/f/.s UH to use it in cooking our footl.*' Second Lecture on Agnosticism, page 27. Crudity of exjiression could hardly be carried further than here, where we are told that "carbon and oxygen combine to fonii fire." I — 24 — which we can recognize the distinctly purposive works of the Supreme Mind ; but this is explained away by the observa- tion that the "raw material," of which such works are formed, lies beyond our ken, human science not having " yet discovered the ultimate structure of atoms and mole- cules." Then there exists somewhere — or has existed — some absolutely propertyless form of matter — the real raw material of the universe. Any one, however, accustomed to exact thought knows that the idea of tnatter ivithout prope?- ties is self-contradictory. On the other hand, matter endued with properties, however few or simple, is organized matter ; and between the lowliest forms of organized matter and the very highest ones the difference is but one of degree. We are asked to see proof of a Divine Mind, in the fact that the universe must have had a beginning, and that life in the universe must have had a beginning. Is it not evi- dent, however, as I stated in my first pamphlet, that, the moment we begin to speculate on these subjects, we are left at the mercy of mere hypothesis ? All verification fails us, and, when verification fails, enquiry becomes sterile. Say we assume a Divine Mind, are we really helped to understand how nothing became something, or how that which did not potentially contain life, produced life? Not at all. The case, therefore, stands thus : if these are the problems before us, the assumption of a Divine Mind does not really aid in their solution. If these problems a''e not before us — that is- to say, if we do not believe that nothing ever became some- thing, or that that which did not contain life potentially ever produced life — the assumption in question is, for intellectual purposes, superfluous. This whole line of thought, however,. I judge to be extremely unprofitable, whatever thesis it may be employed to support. Whether we postulate a spiritual origin for all things — supposing that we know what we mean. — 25 — by the expression — or whether we labor to prove the etern- ity of matter — sui)posing we know what that means, what advantage have we ? "The world is what it is, for all our dust and din." If there is anything that is clear to the practical intelli- gence, it is that man has no faculties that fit him to grapple with such questions. He can see things in relation to him- self; he can know things by their likenesses and contrasts ; he can see where one form of existence conditions and limits another ; in a word, his whole knowledge is of the relative. Should he try to transcend his powers, in order to grasp the idea of the absolute, he finds that, after much trouble, he is simply gazing at zero. Should he try to force upon nature as a whole — upon the universe — the analogies of those laws and processes which he has observed within nature, he is similarly baffled and defeated. The condition of mind pro- duced by such vain efforts is well described by the artist poet Story : — "Oh dreadful mystery ! thought beats its wings, And strains against the utmost bound of things. And drops exhausted back to earth again, And moans, distressed by vain imaginings." But wheref jre the struggle ? Why not recognize the unreasonableness of seeking a key to the ivJiole in the laws of production and succession that obtain between \.\\q. parts. We seek to apply the data of experience to that which transcends experience ; is it any wonder that the proceeding fails to give any sure footing to speculation — that it ends only in confusion and disappointment ? If I might venture to characterize, in a very few words, the intellectual aspect of the theistic hypothesis, I should say that it was the suniinary assumption of an adequate cause for everythin^^ coupled unth an arbitrary deteniiination to make the demand for causes cease with that assumed Cause. r — 26 — But as I i)ointed out in my first pamphlet, there is another point of view from which tlie idea of God may be considered. If we cannot make it an element in strictly intellectual reasoning, we can, by means of it, symbolize to' ourselves the unity of the universe, the unity of truth, and that moral harmony and perfection towards which our natures are ever tending. The poet Shelley was reputed an atheist, yet in his Adonais we read that wonderful verse : •' The One leniaias, the iniiny change and pass ; Heaven's light forever shines, earth's shadows Hy : Life, like a dome of many-colored glass, Stains the white radiance of eternity, Until death trample it to fragments * * ." Here was the effort of the heart to fix before it a bright ideal of truth and goodness, ^\'e see the same effort, the same aspiration, in another poet of very different temper, Arthur Hugh Clongh : " O Thou that in our bosom's shrine Dost dwell unknown, because divine, I thought to speak, I thought to say, 'The light is here,, ' IJehold the way, 'The voice was thus,' and ' Thus the word,' And ' This I saw,' and 'That I heard — ' • lUit, from the lips that half essayed. The imperfect utterance fell unmade. Thou, in that mysterious shrine Enthroned, as I must say, divine I 1 will not frame one thought of what Thou mayest either l)e or not. I will not prate of ' thus ' and ' so ', And be profane with ' yes ' and ' no,' ' Enough that, in our soul and heart, Thou, whatsoe'er Thou mayest be, art." How much more of true religious feeling t!u;re is in this attitude and tone of mind, than in the theology which finds a peculiarly striking manifestation of the Deity in the arrrange- 27 — } ments by which the pitcher-i>lant catches and kills flies, needs hardly to be pointed out. An ideal enshrined in the heart exerts an influence upon the whole life ; but a Deity whose function is to descend out of the hanging-basket, not to untie, but to cut, every little nodus* that presents itself to scientific en(|un-y — whether the genealogy of the horse or the develop- ment of the eye — is less a source of moral inspiration, than a pretext for intellectual sloth. Towards the close of the Second Lecture on Agnosticism the author quotes what he calls '' the last utterance of the High Priest of Agnosticism, Herbert Spencer." I need not repeat the sentence. The Lecturer says tiiat it " is a step in the right direction," but that Mr. Spencer cannot vest there, but must "goon," and ask certain fjuestions in regard to that " Infinite and Eternal Energy," the existence of which he recognizes. If the Bishop of Ontario had read Mr. Spencer's " First Principles," published twenty-two years ago, he would have known that this "last utterance" marks no new phase of his thought, and no advance beyond the position taken in that work. Any congratulations, therefore, on his having taken a step in the right direction, are altogether untimely. As to the questions he is recommended to ask, they were all asked, in effect, and answered, to the best of Mr. Spencer's ability, in the work mentioned.! As, however, attention is called by the Bishop to Mr. Spencer's " last utterance," it is to be hoped that many of the readers of the lectures will turn to the article in question. 'I'hey will see there a clear and powerful description of the course of attenuation that theological beliefs undergo, with increasing knowledge and intelligence. *"Nec Deus iiitersit, iilsi dij,'niis \ indict' uodus" Inciderit." ?[<>r., Kp. ad Pis,, 1!>1. fSt'M "First Piinciiik's," pii. lOS-llf), where Mr. Spencer fully con «iders the (question of uwcribing jiersoiiality to the Unknowable Cause. r 28 So anxious have I been to do justice to the argument of my opponent, and to place before those who take an interest in this discussion, tlie means of deciding between the opposite views wliich he and I represent, that I fear I have left myself but scant space in which to s})eak, as from the outset I have pr()])osed to do, on the positive aspects of " modern thought." By the narrower sort of religionists, the " sceptic " is figured as a man the whole cast of whose mind is negative. 'I'he truth is that it is the religionist whose mind is negative, and the sceptic (if he is at all abreast with the age) whose mind is positive, affirmative, constructive ; whose thought is inclusive and comprehensive ; and who has conceived the grand idea of a harmony of life, based on what life itself contains, based on the elements of this so-called "wicked world." The religionist, it is true, affirms God and a divine Revelation, and says very hard things about those who cannot join him in doing so ; but think what a host of negative and exclusive views have been, and still are, connected with both conceptions ! In ancient times the God of the Hebrews was the God of that race only. He fought for them n-rninst their enemies, and. except when the latter had iron chariots, enabled them to win great victories* Even in the time of Christ, Jewish usage sanctioned the calling of all Gentiles "dogs ;" and, in a vision sent by God to Peter, they were represented by "unclean" animals. Had it not been for Paul, the probability is that Christianity would never have been efficiently preached to the outlying, nations ; since even Peter, who had received so special an intimation from Heaven, was overborne, as Paul himself tells us, by the prejudices of his Jewish brethren. How exclusive the spirit of Christianity has been throughout the ages, how persecuting it has been towards other forms of religion, how it has refused to recognize any good in them. 29 every student of liistory is aware. True, to-day we hear somewhat different accents even from the [)ulpit ; for the ** modern spirit" is more or less everywhere, and certain harsh utterances, which our forefathers could listen to and enjoy, have largely gone out of fashion. The modern spirit, as I have already said, is constructive and comprehensive. It is in quest of truth, and recognizes it just as gladly on heathen as on Christian ground. Take in illustration a passage from Edgar Quinet's " Genie des Religio^^s," (I should like to quote the author's own words, but perhaps a translation will on the whole be better) : '* In this pilgrimage through the religions of the past, wandering from shrine to shrine, it is no part of our intention, infatuated with our modern superiority, to make a mock of the aban- doned gods ; on the contrary we shall question the deserted sanctuaries as to whether they have not, in their day, heard an echo of the life-giving word ; we shall search in the dust of these temples, to see whether we cannot discover some fragment of truth, some trace of a universal revelation." I close the book and I open another, in which I read : " Who- ever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith, which Faith, except everyone do keep whole and undefiled, he shall without doubt perish everlastingly." This is not the modern spirit. In declining to be bound by any alleged revelation, modern thought does so, again, in the interest of a more comprehensive philosophy than any revelation heretofore promulgated will allow. What fetters theology has cast upon science in the past, from the days of Anaxagoras down to those of Lyell, whose uniformitarian views were looked upon, not so many years ago, with great suspicion, every one must be aware. Not indeed in physical science only have the cramping effects of theological faith been seen. What — 30 — was it that kcj)! alive, until a comparatively recent period, the belief in witchcraft and demoniacal possession ? Simply the distinct recognition of both in an alleged infallible revela tion. If modern thought sets aside the revelation it is not in a mere spirit of contradiction, but in order that it may be free to judge of these, and a hundred other matters, in accordance with an enlarged knowledge of facts. The one " revealed " doctrine of hell is, in itself, the negation of every instinct of justice and mercy in the human breast. To deny hell is to make the most glorious affirmation rjossible to the human sj)irit. If, finally, modern thought rejects the miraculous, it does so, not for the sake of denial, but because the negation leads to a wider affirmation, that of the uniformity of nature's operations, not only now, but throughout the whole period of human experience ; and also because it facilitates, or rather renders |)ossible what, without it, were impossible, the scientific study of universal human history. It should be borne in mind that the point we have arrived at is this : such is our confidence in the uniform action of natural law, that we unhesitatingly discard every vestige of miracle that we discover in the annals of every nation under the sun, sa7'e the Jeiuish. We do not ask what evidence the Romans had that their brazen shields, or the Ephesians that their image of Diana, descended from heaven. We pronounce both stories, in the most off-hand manner, fabulous invent- ions. Well, " modern thought " says that it is not enough to have banished miracle from so-called " profane " history ; we must treat all miraculous stories alike, if we wish to be consistent, or to place historical criticism on sure ground. It is too ridiculous, when we approach Jewish legends, to throw aside all the canons of criticism which we have applied with confidence in dealing with similar narratives of every I _3i — other nation ancient and modern. I say then, that here again, it is modern thought that is aftirmative, as aiming at universality, and the thought of past times (prolonged unhappily into the present) that is nega- tive, as maintaining exceptions, and breaking the authority of a principle which else would be unchal- lenged. We may be certain that, if the Hebrew and Christian miracles be finally maintained, other miracles will come back to keej) them comjiany. The present condition of things, under which an excei^tion is made in favor of Hebrew and Christian legends, while all others that have any miraculous tinge are contemptuously dismissed, is not natural or normal. Either the exceptions must go, or the rule will be discredited ; and all history will be to write over again. Modern thought, however, is, above all, positive in that it seeks to base both philosophy and conduct on tb.e laws of the known. The services of theology in establishing, or rather in giving a powerful sanction to, certain emj)irical rules of conduct, while the human intellect was yet in a very im- mature condition, should not be lightly valued. The Ten Commandments do not constitute a code destined for per- petuity ; but that so much of sound ethical precept should have been packed into them was, in relation to the history of the Jewish race, a very fortunate circumstance. The task of moral science in our day is, however, to study the essential qualities of actions, and to place the world in pos session of a moral law resting on no personal or arbitrary authority, but on verified experience. I know that here I enter on difficult ground, and that many able writers — prominent amongst whom is Mr. Goldwin Smith — are of opin- ion that a code based simply on experience, and not on the de- clared will ot a Supreme Being conceived as infinitely holy, — 32 — would lack authority. It might possibly for a time, for everything new lacks authority ; but it does not seem un- reasonable to believe that, as time wore on, and as illustra- tions of its fundamental soundness multiplied, it would gather authority, and obtain at least as great an ascendancy over men's minds as any of the " revealed " codes. What has really given momentum to the Christian system hitherto, has been its doctrine of future rewards and i)unishments — rewards such as it has not entered into the heart of man to conceive, and punishments baffling all imagination in their endless cruelty and horror. Such a stimulus as this might well have i)roduced mighty works, and it has done so ; but there remain greater works yet to be done— the revelation of a self-evidencing moral law, and the bringing liome of that law to the minds and hearts of men, the doing away with all that is merely formal in religion or conventional in morality, the rooting out of superstition and all trust m chance, and the implanting in their place of reliance on law, the placing of the individual in right relations to society at large, of nations in right relations to one another, and of our whole present life in right relations both to the past and to the future. Some of these problems are as yet barely con- ceived by the vast majority of men ; but they all have a real and important significance ; they all await solution in a patient study of facts and laws, apart from all theological prepossessions and restraints. Now, towards establishing a sound philosophy and religion of human life, the doctrine of evolution promises to be of great assistance. At the very outset, it unifies the whole system under which we live. Theology, it is true, asserts the common Divine origin of all things, but evolution asserts that the things themselves blend into one another. More- over theology, as we see from these very lectures on Ag- nosticism, makes it a pious duty to believe that there are — 33 — innumerable breaks in the continuity of nature's oi)erations, so that we may have the opportunity of saying, when we see a pitcher-plant or a horse, " I.o here ! and Lo there ! " As an aid to education, the doctrine in cjuestion is of the highest importance. " Both teachers and pupils," says Haeckel, " will take infinitely greater interest in the subject matter of instruction if, first of all, they put to themselves the question, ' How did this thing come into existence — how did it develop ? ' The knowledge of the simple general causes to which phenomena the most diverse and the most complex are referable, at once simplifies and deepens our instruction. The understanding of causes changes a dry science into one of vivid interest."* The moral effect of that revelation of unity which the evolution theory affords, cannot fail also to be beneficial. It will give such an idea of the supremacy of law as the world has never yet had.f We shall see ourselves included in a vast and practically infinite system of cause and effect ; and what are we,- that we should rebel against the very con- ditions of our being ? It will be felt that it is a matter of * Address di-livert'd at Munich, October, 1877. See Pojtular Science Montldij .Siijiji/oncut, February, lcS7S. t "Tliiiik only." says Prof. Max Mailer, "what it was to believe in a Kita, in an order of the world, though it be no more at first than a belief that the sun will never overstep his bounds. * * * How many souls even now, when everything else has failed them, when they have parted with the most cherished convictions of their childhood, when their faith in man has been jioisoned * * * have found their last peace and comfort in a contemplation of the Rita, of the order of the world, whether manifested in the unvarying movement of the stars, or revealed in the unvarying number of th'^ petals and stamens, and l)istils of the smalli'st forget-me-not I How many have felt that to lie- long to this kosmos, to this beautiful order of nature, is something at least to rest on, something to trust, something to believe when every- thing else has failed. To us this perception of the Rita, t>f law and order in thti world may seem very little ; but to the ancient dwellers (>n earth, who had little els»; to su})i)ort them, it was everything : better than tht^r bright beings, their Devas, better than Agni and Tndra : be- cause, if (»nce iH'rceived, if once understood, it could never be taken from them." Lectures (Hibbert) on Origin and (Jrowth of Religion — Am. Kd., page 242. 8 — 34 — the utmost moment to discover the true laws of life — those by conformity with which happiness is to be secured for ourselves and others. Instead of trusting to outside in- fluences to repair the errors we may make in the conduct of life, we shall feel that the only forces available are the very ones against which we have transgressed. Instead ot trusting to prayer to deflect, in our interest, the natural line of the succession of phenomena, we shall assume that that line is never deflected ; and we shall labor the more as- siduously to understand the conditions upon which we can obtain, from the working of natural laws, the results we de- sire. Instead of asking for miracles we shall make a duty of submission. " A duty ! " those who think, with the Bishop of On- tario, that "resignation is an utterly unmeaning word in the mouth of an Agnostic," * will here exclaim. Yes, a duty ; why not ? We have the choice of two courses. One is to rail and fret at an order of things that we cannotalter; the other is to accept that order and summon all our powers to make the best of it, to lighten the incidence of such evils as it may entail, to augment the benefits — always more numerous — that it bestows. One is to waste our strength in angry and fruitless struggle ; the other is, by submission, to husband our strength for the duties that yet lie before us. One is to destroy the unity of our moral nature by rebellion* the other is to perfect it by the contemplation of those larger and abiding interests which the constancy of natural law promotes. It seems to me that I see a duty emerging here — the duty of submission, of resignation — if it can ever be a duty to choose the better, and turn aside from the worse, of two lines of action. I feel, indeed, that resignation * Let it be fully understood that I quote this word everywhere, when applied to myself, under protest. -35- on these grounds is a much nobler and purer thing than resignation in the Christian sense, which is simply a matter of personal submission to an irresistible will, coupled with the ho[)e that all will be made right some day. It should now, I think, be sufficiently evident why I entirely refuse for myself the designation of " Agnostic." * To my mind the whole virtue of modern thought lies in its positive teachings and constructive tendencies. I am, in- deed, much more struck by thj agnosticism of church members, and even ministers of the Gospel, than by that of the so-called agnostics. The amount of don't-know- what-to-say-about-it feeling which one discovers on the part of men who are pillars of the churches is amazing. They don't like the doctrine of eternal punishment, but will not say distinctly whether they believe in it or not. They find the notion of Satanic agency rather barbarous and repulsive, yet they feel that if Satan goes, other things will have to go with him. They begin to recognize an extraordinary and uncomfortable likenets between the Jewish miracles, which orthodoxy requires them to believe, and the heathen miracles which sanity requires them to reject. Whether the demands of sanity are fully met by the rejection simply of the heathen ones, is a dif^cult and painful question. It is hard to understand why it should be so very false that Orpheus piped up the walls of Troy, and so very true that Gideon blew down the walls of Jericho ; so utterly absurd that an ox should have discoursed in Latin at a grave crisis in the affairs of Rome, and so reasonable that an ass should have addressed Balaam in good Hebrew ; so preposterous that Arion should have made a sea voyage on the back of a dolphin ^ and so thoroughly credible that Jonah should have made * See " Defence of Modern Thought," page 5. one in the belly of a whale. Then comes up the question of the infallibility of the Bible, whether it extends to every- thing contained in the sacred volume, or only to certain parts ; if the latter, where and how and on whose authority, the line is to be drawn. On all these points thousands are sadly at sea ; and the general refuge is a kind of agnosticism which exclaims : " We don't know, we can't know — what's the use of bothering ? " Well, to a world halting between two opinions, and more or less sensible of the confusion into which its moral ideas are being thrown by the uncertainty existing as to the final and authoritative standard of conduct — ^supernatural revela- tion, or the laws of life as ascertained and formulated by human reason ?--" modern thought" comes with an invi- tation to try the methods of science, to taste and see whether the laws of the finite are not sufficient for finite man. The offer is met by many with scorn, and by none with a fiercer scorn than by the helpless devotees of a mere formalism in religion. But there is much in it, nevertheless, that is worthy of serious attention. It is an offer of whole- ness in thought, and of freedom from all entanglements unfavorable to the most active and unrestrained exercise of the intellectual powers. No need any longer to turn away the eyes from the spectres of strangled doubts — doubts that came as servants and forerunners of the truth, but that were treated as the wicked vineyardmen treated the messengers of the lord of the vineyard. No more of pulpit sophistry and triviality ; no more weak and trashy sentimentalism in religion ; no more conflict between the intellect and the heart of man ; but a steady and harmonious advance of the whole man towards such perfection as he is capable of. And if it be asked, whether all this involves the definitive turning away of humanity trom the idea of God, I would answer, in the words of Professor Max Muller : " There is an atheism which is unto death ; there is another atheism which is the very life-ljlood of all true faith. It is the power of giving up what, in our best and most honest moments, we know to be no longer true ; it is the readiness ^ to replace the less perfect, however dear, however sacred it may have been to us, by the more perfect, however it may be detested as yet by the world. It is the true self-surrender, the true self-sacrifice, the truest trust in truth, the truest faith. Without that atheism religion would long ago have become a petrified hypocrisy ; without that atheism no new religion, no reform, no reformation, no resuscitation would ever have been possible ; without that atheism no new life is possible for any one of us." * The "atheism" that is wanted to-day is that which will strike from the Christian conception of Ciod all and there is much — that is oppressive to the heart, the conscience and the intellect. But, the more strictly and courageously this duty is performed, the more devoutly shall wo cherish whatever in that conception can nourish our moral life, and build us up to the full stature of perfect men. * Hibbert Lectures, Am. edition — page 297. APPENDIX- Although I might be excused for confining myself en- tirely to the rejoinder of the Bishop of Ontario, with whom alone I have entered into any discussion, it may be well that I should say a word or two in regard to the pamphlet of " Vindex." The writer of that pamphlet is understood to be a highly-respected Presbyterian clergyman of this city. I would not refer to the question of authorship, did it not seem to have a practical bearing, I shall not say on the merits, but on the significance, of the pamphlet itself For exami)le, " Vindex " objects to my remark about the priest- hoods of the world laboring " to put back the thoughts of men, so that all that was credible to their forefathers may be credible to them ; " and claims, for his own part, to belong to a class of persons who are laboring, in their own way, to put forward men's thoughts. I should be sorry to deny that " Vindex " and others like-minded are employed as he says ; but I think that, if it were distinctly understood that he and they were laboring to put forward men's thoughts ivithin the limits^ say, of the Westminster Confession^ the force of my remark would not be very much impaired. When I spoke of making everything credible to the men of to-day that was credible to their forefathers, I meant simply making the grossest forms of the miraculous credible ; and so I imagine intelligent readers for the most part understood me. It is easy of course for shallow critics to carp and say that nobody is proposing lo teach over again the Metamor- phoses of Ovid ; the point is that we might just as well be- lieve the Metamorphoses of Ovid, as believe what theolo- gians who siand by miracles ask us to believe. I would give nobod)' ' thank you ' for exempting me from believing the story of Daphne's transformation into a laurel-tree, if he required me to believe in Satan's transformation into a ser- pent (involving the unhappy serpent in severe condemnation) or Nebuchadnezzar's transformation into a strange kind of grass-eating beast, with hair like eagle's feathers and claws like a bird. — 39 — " Vindex " apparently mistakes entirely the stand- point from which my " Defence of Modern Thought " was written. He seems to think that I offer the doctrine of evolution as a substitute for the theological doctrine of creation. By no means. I would, at the most, offer it as a substitute for the non-natural views of the actual course of events on the earth which theology teaches. I prefer evolution to the special creation, hypothesis ; but as to ask- ing evolution to undertake the task of bringing the universe into being — I would rather not. I prefer to postulate the universe, and run all the risks of that rash act. I may re- mark at this point that I notice the same looseness of expression, on the subject of evolution, in the pamj)hlet of " Vindex " as in the lectures of the Bishop. ^Ve are told that " it is necessary in order to establish Darwinian devel- opment to give a sufficient explanation of the origin of life." On the contrary Danvinian development has nothing to do with the origin of life; and "Vindex" himself (juotes Darwin as saying that the problem of the origin of life is a ''hopeless" one! Again, I find him (page 5) using the phrase, "survival of the fittest," precisely as the Bishop used it, in the sense of survival of what is intrinsically the best. We have not so learned either Darwin or Spencer. " Vindex " talks of " well-worn sneerings at the miracles of the Old Testament." It might have occurred lo him that the phrase is perhaps even better-worn than the sneers ; and I doubt not he is fully aware that many have used it, whose own minds were in a state of great uncertainty about those same miracles. Somehow I never hear that smooth, pebbly phrase, " well-worn sneers," with- out being reminded, I scarcely know how, of a remark made by the Rev. l-'hillips Brooks, of Boston : " 'Hicre is nothing so terrible as the glimpses we get occasionally into a minister's unbelief; and sometimes the confusion which exists below seems to be great, just in proportion to the hard dogmatism which men sec upon the surface." I do not seek to apply this to " \'index," but its aj)pli(:ation to the matter in hand is obvious. This unbeliet of winch Mr. Brooks gets glimpses from tim..' to time relates, it may reasonably be supposed, to just such matters as the miracles — 40 — of the Bible. It is also thoroughly known that, amongst the laity, the belief in miracles has been greatly undermined. Such being the case, we should expect that clergy and laity would be lal)oring together, to find out just what ought to be believed under this head. Instead of this, there is a general, and as it were concerted, avoidance of the subject : and when anyonj takes it up openly, and treats the mir- acles as things in which he does not believe, he is at once credited with indulging in " well-worn sneers ; " or, if he is too serious for that, then in "well-worn arguments." The question is, how do the arguments stand the wear ? I fancy they are standing it better than the miracles. The door through which witchcraft disappeared is still open, and other things are making towards it. As a preliminary to discussing the sudden collapse of the walls of Jericho and other incidents of a like nature, my critic would wish to go into the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, holding apparently that the former fact would be- come much more probable if the latter could be proved. It is doubtful hovv far this is wise policy. To tell people before hand that, if they once admit the resurrection, they will be forever estopped from questioning any marvel, how- ever grotesque, that may be asserted to stand in any kind of relation to it, is perhaps not tr.e best way to secure a per- fectly unprejudiced consideration of such evidence as may be adducible for the central miracle. Moreover, there are those who believe the miracle of the resurrection, who do not believe that of Jericho. There are clergymen who hold that there are miracles and miracles, even in the Bible ; and, for all that distinctly appears in his pamphlet, " Vindex" may be one of them. If, instead of saying what he would like to see done as a preliminary to the discussion of miracles in general, " Vindex " had stated, in a brief, direct and unmistakable way, that he himself fully and firmly be- lieved that all the miracles of the Old and New Testaments took ])lace jjrccisely as recorded, the effect would, I humbly submit, have been better. In these days people like some- thing they can lean upon. When " Vindex " states that the resurrection of Jesus " survives, a clearly-attested fact of history," what he must mean is that the belief in it survives. 41 — ■f i As to the attestation it is neither clear nor satisfactory to a ^reat many of the best judges of evidence ; as is amply proved by the ever increasing number of intelligent men and women who do not believe in miracles at all. The evidence is just of this character, that if one wants to believe in the alleged fact he can find plausible grounds for domg so ; to say that it is of a nature to convince those who are not, antecedently, believers in miracle, is quite to overstate the case."^ " Vindex " speaks in a very earnest manner of the practical value of Christianity ; but, did space permit, I think his statements might advantageously be submitted to analysis. If there is life in the churches, there is deadness also, and more of deadness than of life. There is much of religious sentiment, but very much less of that subjection of the life to law in which the essence of religion consists. There is practical activity, but not always, if often, associated with any truly elevated feeling — resorted to sometimes, I think, as an escape from the demands of thought. The fact is that Christianity, like every other religion that ever existed, has its limitations. It sets out to do certain things and those things are exclusive of certain other things of equal importance. To my critic's remark that " there is no motive or plea or influence for good in this creed of material- ism which is not at the service of Christianity," I reply : first, that I have never professed " a creed of materialism," and second, that in the " creed," if such it may be called, of which the barest outline sketch is given in the preceding *I find a very timely, find soinewhat striking', confirmation of tlie position I here take up, in Dr. Heinrich (ieffck<'n"s article on "Contem- jiorary Lif