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 M. ' i. 
 
 
 BRIEF 
 
 EXAMINATI O^ N 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PLAN AND CONDUCT 
 
 OF THE 
 
 NORTHERN EXPEDITION in AMERICA, 
 
 In 1777., 
 
 [ Price One Shilling. ] 
 
 
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 BRIEF 
 
 EXAMINATION 
 
 I 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PLAN ANb CONDUCT 
 
 O F T H E 
 
 i^ORTHERN EXPEDITION in AMERICA, 
 
 In 1777. 
 
 AND OF THE 
 
 SURRENDER of the ARMY 
 
 UNDER THE COMMAND OP 
 
 LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BURGOYNE. 
 
 ^-a- 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 tuxNTSD roR T. HOOKHAM, Hanoyer-jtribt, 
 Hanover-s qjj a R Ei 
 
 ^ Dec I.XXIX* 
 

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 BRIEF 
 
 EXAMINATION, ^c. 
 
 IT has been fo much the fafhion, 
 lately, to enquire into the condudl 
 of all our Commanders, both by fea and 
 land, upon every event of our efforts, to 
 quell rebellion, or refift our natural ene- 
 mies, that, I wonder amongft the num- 
 berlefs inferior misfortunes and failures, 
 which have been lo ftri(flly inveftigated, 
 that nobody has yet entered into a ferious 
 confideration of the caufe and necefHty, 
 which loft the nation a flourifhing army, 
 " in the full vigour of health, difcipline, 
 
 B " and 
 
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( 4 ) 
 
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 " and valour." The Legillature have de- 
 clared, that fo long as the Commander 
 of that expedition is American property, 
 they cannot examine him, whom they 
 have not the power, either to releafe, or 
 punifh, in confequence of his innocence 
 or guilt being proved: but individuals, in 
 a free country, have a right in all cir- 
 cumftances, to examine and judge of the 
 condu<ft of men adling for them, in a 
 public capacity j the charaderiftic huma-* 
 nity ot the Englifh, prevents their oppref- 
 fing the unfortunate and unhappy, and 
 their natural fpirit and generofity, inclines 
 them to pity and efteera a brave man 
 flruggliiig with hardfliips, and partaking 
 adverfity, with thofe who would have 
 conduced to, and in a lefs degree fliared, 
 his prufperity had he been fuccefsful ; but 
 when we Tee % m.an callous to the fuf- 
 ferings of his fellow-foldiers and una- 
 bafhed by the dil'approbation of his fel- 
 low-citizens, at the fame time, the fole 
 caufe perhaps of the capuvity of an army, 
 
 and 
 
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( 5 ) 
 
 
 and certainly the only one exempt from the 
 confequent miferies, and inconvenJencies 
 of it; humanity and efteem, no longer 
 check our indignation at prefumption and 
 mifcohduft ; how far thefe can be proved, 
 will te the fubjedt of confideration, in 
 the following (heets. 
 
 A pamphlet, entitled, " Remarks upon 
 ** General Howe's Account of his Pro- 
 " ceedings on Long Ifl^nd, &c.'* (pub- 
 lifhed in 1778, and attributed at the time, 
 to a perfon high in office ) makes this 
 very indifputable obfejvatinn — " If a mea- 
 ** iur^ have been originally wrong, and 
 ** ill concerted, or was it in itfelf too ha- 
 " zardous, or impradlicable; and we lay 
 " upon the Commander the blame of not 
 *' having fucceeded in it, we may lofe a 
 " good General and retain a bad Mini- 
 " fter. If on the other hand, the mea- 
 " fure, as originally planned, was right 
 ** and proper, and we blame the Minfter 
 ** becaufe the General milbehaved in the 
 
 B 2 ** execu- 
 
 '\\ 
 
( 6 ) 
 
 " execution, in that cafe, we may lofe a 
 " goc»d Minifter and retain a bad Com- 
 ** mander:" as there is a poflibility of both 
 being unequal to their fituations, I will 
 venture to carry the idea flill farther^ and 
 fay, that when it (hall be proved, that 
 equal ignorance attended the plan and 
 execution of any meafure, it is the duty 
 of every honeft man and good citizen, to 
 endeavour, to the utmoft of his power, 
 to expofe the weaknefs, and punifli the 
 prefumption, both of the Minifter and 
 General, that the country may no longer 
 fufFer, both by their mifcondu(5l; and by 
 being deprived of the fervices which abler 
 men in their ftations would render it. 
 
 
 u 
 
 1 
 
 I will, upon thefe principles, examine 
 the plan and condu<ft of the Northern 
 Expedition 3 and I hope Sir William 
 Howe will excufe me, if in the courfe 
 of this examination, I fhould fpeak my 
 fentiments of a part of his condud:, upon 
 
 which 
 
I . , 
 
 )fe a 
 !^om- 
 • both 
 
 will 
 , and 
 
 that 
 and 
 
 duty 
 ;n, to 
 ower, 
 h the 
 and 
 longer 
 id by 
 
 abler 
 it. 
 
 [amine 
 rthcrn 
 '^illiam 
 courfe 
 K my 
 upon 
 which 
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 which he has demanded a Court of En- 
 quiry ; if 1 have miftaken his motives, 
 his explanation of them will clear it up, 
 if 1 have gueffed right, the obvioufnefs 
 of them cannot hurt his caufe. 
 
 The Campaign of Jyj^ was defigned 
 for the decifive one 5 every preparation 
 was made to render it adlive, and, no 
 doubt, it was intended to be well con- 
 certed. The Generals, as ufual, were to 
 fend home their plan of operations, which 
 the Minifters were to adopt if they ap- 
 proved it, or to fuhftitute others if they 
 judged it expedient : their approbation of 
 any fcf^eme made it their own 5 for they 
 w^ere aware, and have confefled, that the 
 wifdoni or impradticability of any PJan^ 
 was to be attributed to the Minifter. 
 Upon thefe grounds I may therefore ven- 
 ture to fay, that the Minijler invefted 
 General Burgoyne, in preference to Gene- 
 ral Carlton, with the adive Command in 
 
 the 
 
 ! 
 
 \ 
 
 r**-' ':«*«•> 
 
 •r!*-=-'-^-. 
 
( 8 ) 
 
 ;i 
 
 I 
 
 the Northern American Army*, and di- 
 reded him, after having pofleffed him- 
 felf of the important poft of Ticonde- 
 roga, to proceed through the Northern 
 Provinces, pafs the North River, and 
 fujh on to Albany. How far the prefe- 
 rence of one Man to another is proper, 
 I ihall not examine, nor, as it is mere 
 matter of opinion, can I determine -, the 
 event, which decides in the judgment 
 formed of them, as it could not influ- 
 ence, cannot in juftice be objected to the 
 choice made between them. The pro- 
 priety of pofleffing Ticonderoga was ob- 
 vious, it was an expedient, nay a nee ffa- 
 ry ftep J fo far I coincide in opinion \ ith 
 the Minifter, approve his plan, and \ fs 
 over his preference; but I own my/ If 
 at a lofs when I attempt to difcover le 
 prudence of pafling the Noith River, jr 
 
 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 4 
 
 * In the courfe of the American war we have 
 feen two inftances of the imprudence of the Chief 
 in Command, fuffering the fecond to go near the 
 Court, hei ebjtns §nt toujours tort* 
 
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 ( 9 ) 
 
 the expediency of pufovtg on to Albany, 
 By the firft you threw the impediments 
 of a rapid, broad, unfordable River, to 
 the retreat of an army, unweildy with 
 the baggage of neceflaries and luxury, 
 and hampered in an intended forced 
 march with a train of artillery equal (in 
 number at lead ) to what would be re- 
 quired for a fucceflion of Flemifh fiegcs : 
 the end to be anfwered by the fecond is 
 too well concealed for my utmoft atten- 
 tion, with what little ingenuity I have 
 to difcover ; it could not be to raife 
 men, or conciliate friends, for the whole 
 marchj as far as they went, was through 
 uncultivated wood, except a few ill in- 
 habited narrow (lips of cultivation, which 
 fcattered upon the banks of the North 
 River, threw juft light enough upon the 
 Piece to mark the dreary darknefs of the 
 general Defign. Was it their intention 
 merely to fupport their friends at Alba- 
 ny, and encourage them to declare them- 
 felves? Still their meafures appear to me, 
 
 ill 
 
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 ( 10 ) 
 
 ill concerted for the execution of their 
 purpofcs : — An army, hartijlTed by oppo- 
 fition, reduced by the fatigues and dif- 
 cafes incidental to a comfc-rtkfs march 
 through delarts, where the mdulgence of 
 frefli provifions could haidly ever be pro- 
 cured to gratify the adtive and relieve 
 the exhaufled or fickiy foldier ; whofe 
 marches became every day more difficult 
 and lefs expeditious, from the failure of 
 hones ( whofe provender frequently con- 
 fifted of leaves alone ) in a country which 
 afforded no recruit of them : — Such an 
 army, I fay, even fuppofmg it poffible 
 they fliould furmount all thefe difficulties, 
 would, indifputably, not anfwer the pur- 
 pofe for which they were defigned, fo 
 well as they would have done, uncxpofed 
 to thefe hardihips. This, I conceive, 
 would have been the cafe had they been 
 embarked after the redudion of Ticonde- 
 roga, and carried in tranfports to New- 
 York, where they would have had a 
 fliorter march to Albany, through a well- 
 
 inclined. 
 
of 
 
 ( " ) 
 
 inclined, and richly cultivated country; 
 at New- York too, their wants, if they 
 had any, might have been fupplied, and 
 their force, if it was necefTary, aug- 
 mented. 
 
 '.■is 
 
 It has been faid that the ill-fuccefs of 
 the Northern Army, was occalioned by 
 the Southern one going to Philadelphia; 
 that plan it is reported, and I bear be 
 avows it, originated with Sir William 
 Howe ; but it was approved by the W- 
 niftry, and confequently became theirs : 
 the Commander in Ctiief at New- York 
 was to confider what he thouglit expe- 
 dient to be done with the troops under 
 his command, without relation to any 
 other, the Minifler was to judge whether 
 that iruftrated his intentions to the North- 
 ward, and (hould have made bis dccifion 
 accordingly ; he knew that Sir William 
 Howe marching to the fouthward, couJd 
 never join an army marching fiom the 
 northward; Lord George Germaine has 
 
 C declared 
 
 ! 
 
 
 /«*••■«»— ' 
 
I 
 
 ( 12 ) 
 
 declared a junftion never was intended. Sir 
 William Howe therefore is not to be 
 blamed for going to the fouthwardj kis 
 objedl was fulfilled, bis operations were fuc- 
 cefsful, and bis army very little diminiflied 
 by the campaign; any objedions that 
 may be made to his going up the Che- 
 fapeak inftead of the Delaware, I have 
 good reafon to believe he will eafily ob- 
 viate, by producing the intelligence he 
 received off Capes : The reduftion of 
 Philadelphia was a favourite objeft, and 
 with reafon; it was a moft eflentn! one; 
 the pofTeflion of it did not coll more 
 than it was worth, and the country was 
 in faft conquered by the lofs of it, had 
 not the failure of the Northern Army 
 decided the French in the part they 
 were to take, and thereby reduced our 
 troops to the neceffity of abar doning an 
 acquifttion, which w^as become as hazard- 
 ous to us to polTefs, as it had been dif- 
 treffing to the Rebels to lofe. — I could 
 cafily demonftrate the truth of this af- 
 
 fertion. 
 
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, sir 
 
 be 
 i his 
 i fuc- 
 kiftied 
 
 that 
 Chc- 
 
 have 
 y ob- 
 ice he 
 on of 
 c, and 
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 more 
 
 ry was 
 
 t, had 
 
 Army 
 t they 
 ed our 
 ning an 
 hazard- 
 een dif- 
 
 1 could 
 this af- 
 
 fertion. 
 
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 ( 13 ) 
 
 fcftion, but it is foreign from my prc- 
 fent objedj all I wifli to prove, is, that 
 the expedition to the fouthward being 
 known and approved by the Minifter, 
 takes away any blame that has been at- 
 tempted to be thrown on the General 
 for the facridce that was made of the 
 Northern Armyj nay more, he informed 
 General Burgoyne that he was to expedt 
 no fupport from him — but that circum* 
 ilance more particularly relates to Gene- 
 ral Burgoyne's fatal perfeverance in march^ 
 ing. The plan, fuch as it was, I truft 
 appears to have been (at leaft eventually) 
 the Minifter's ; the execution of it was 
 the GeneraPs. I will now examine his 
 conduct in every ftcp towards the Con- 
 vention, and in all his proceedings fince 
 that difgraceful epocha. 
 
 However weak and ill-judged the con- 
 ception of this Plan may appear, the 
 prepofteroufnefs of the Execution by no 
 means fell ihort of it, but bore nearly 
 
 C 2 the 
 
 1, 
 
f 
 
 I' 
 
 
 I 
 
 ( 14 ) 
 
 the fame affinity to the invention which 
 madnefs does to folly. 
 
 General Burgoyne found himfelf, at 
 his own requeft, at the head of an 
 army of ten thoufand men^ compofed of 
 troops from different nations, excellent in 
 their kind, but totally difFtrent in their 
 manners, difcipline, manoeuvres, and in- 
 clinations, a iituation w^hich required all 
 the judgment of an experienced, cool, 
 ileady, war -formed General. When we 
 coiifider the genius and charadcr of the 
 Pha^:ton who to; k the reigns of command, 
 we (hall rather be inclined to blame him 
 for the undertaking than the failure. 
 General EurgoyLe, with good parts, and 
 no judgment; great reading and little 
 experitnce ; very naturally fuppoled him- 
 feif equal to any command, and as na- 
 .turally failed in the performance of what 
 he undertook. 
 
 His 
 
 
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tiich 
 
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 • an 
 ;d of 
 nt in 
 
 their 
 I in- 
 ed all 
 
 cool, 
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 of the 
 Lmandy 
 \t him 
 failure. 
 ts, and 
 little 
 d him- 
 
 as na- 
 )f what 
 
 J 
 
 m 
 
 His 
 
 ( 15 ) 
 
 His firft operations were feebly, when at 
 all oppofed ; the reduction of Ticonderoga, 
 put the finilhing ftroke to that felf-ap- 
 probation which had driven him to foli- 
 cit the command, and from that moment 
 he (hone forth in all the tinfel fplendor 
 of enlighten'd abfurdity: his firft procla- 
 mation, (compofed of metaphorical periods, 
 of harmonious, fele<fted words, whole 
 greateft merit was obfcuring, the Bobadil 
 boafts they were meant to convey) exhi- 
 bited the infubftantial exuberance of parts, 
 unpruned by judgment. 
 
 > ■ ■ * 
 
 The fame want of judgment, accompa- 
 nied him throughout : — his reading, in- 
 formed him that detachments were ufually 
 made for the purpofes of gathering intel- 
 ligence, recruiting horfes, or eftabliHiing 
 magazines ; the numbers to be detached, 
 might perhaps too, have been fpecified 
 by feme auihor, wridng for the immenfe 
 armies of the European Continent; pleafed 
 at the difcovery, and refolved to proceed 
 
 in 
 
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 S* etffliy ftep fecundem artem^ General 
 ]^rgoyne» with too much genius to bd 
 cmbarrafTed with calculation^ makes a de<» 
 tachm^ent c^ the numbers fo propofed, from 
 Mis fmall army; thus his operations, like 
 a topographical plan, without any fcale, 
 contained every part of military routine^ 
 except its proportions; the confequence 
 Wa» pretty generally forefecn by officers 
 abroad, and not totally unexpected by the 
 people at borne, neither the fears of the 
 firft, nor the fufpicions of the laft, were 
 falfified. Governor Skeene was attacked^ 
 and his detachment overthrown. 
 
 -r 
 
 ' But the General, fuperior to all events, 
 ^^ not conceive it neceflary to change 
 his mode of proceeding upon this repulfe; 
 and in oppofition to the opinion of hi« 
 ^neral officers, but in ftri<51: compliance 
 with the original pofitive orders of the 
 Minifter, he determined to pafs the North 
 River J no bridge however was thrown 
 over it, nor any means of fecuring a re- 
 "^ treat. 
 
seal 
 be 
 de- 
 rom 
 like 
 cak> 
 tine, 
 lence 
 Beers 
 y the 
 I the 
 were 
 icked; 
 
 ivenW, 
 hangc 
 pulfe; 
 f hifi 
 >liance 
 ►f the 
 North 
 thrown 
 a re- 
 treat. 
 
 X 17 )) 
 
 treat, over the fords near Fort Edward 
 concerted, 'till the Rebels, h^ eflabliihing 
 A paiTage lower down, and appearing on 
 the oppoiite ihore, made the attempt im- 
 ^radicable. 
 
 • ■ , 
 
 From this moment he began to fed 
 his fituarion embarrafling, every day aug- 
 mented his difficulties, inverted as he was, 
 by an army hourly encreafing: fo critical 
 a fituation was beyond the precepts of 
 •his reading :—4iis experience was not ex- 
 tenfive enough to furnifli him with pre- 
 cedents : nor his judgment ftrong enough 
 to enable him to a<ft dccifively without 
 them. Confcious that he Should receive 
 no relief from the Southward, diffident 
 of the poffibility of retreat, and ditin- 
 clined to any attempt to force his way 
 through the enemy; he waited inaiftiKe 
 from the 3d to the 13th of Odtober, till 
 the confumption of his provifions, and the 
 augmentation of the cnemys' numbers, 
 might afford a fpecious reafon, for 
 
 deliver- 
 
 I 
 
I* 
 
 1 
 
 ( «8 ) 
 
 delivering up the facrifices of his ignor- 
 ance and mifcondudt: I have his own 
 authority for fuppofing this to be his mo- 
 tive, for in his letter to Lord George 
 Germaine, he fays, with a kind of ex- 
 ulting fatisfa(ftion, ** 13 th at night 
 
 ** at this period, an cxadt account of 
 " the provifions was taken, and the cir- 
 ** cumflances ilated in the opening of 
 ** this letter became compleat." * . j 
 
 The cxpe(fled hour arrived, the nego- 
 clation was opened, and the Convention 
 concluded; in his relation of which, af- 
 ter having reduced the honor of the na- 
 tion, and the reputation of the British 
 foldiery to the lowed ftate of humiliation, 
 he plumes himfelf upon the efFedtual 
 prefervation of national and perfonal ho- 
 nor, by a march of a few yards, and 
 the operation of piling inflead of ground- 
 
 * For the circumftances dated, vide General Bur- 
 goync's letter. 
 
 ing 
 
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 dej 
 
 fai 
 
 hh 
 
 an 
 
or- 
 ►wn 
 no- 
 )rge 
 ex- 
 
 • • 
 
 t of 
 
 g 
 
 cir- 
 of 
 
 nego- 
 jntion 
 a, af- 
 e na- 
 Britifli 
 
 atioDy 
 Fedual 
 il ho- 
 and 
 
 ound- 
 
 al Bur- 
 ing 
 
 m- 
 
 ( 19 ) 
 
 tng their arms, as if an ideal form, art in- 
 confequential ceremonVt could wipe out 
 the flain of a real and unparalklled dif- 
 grace : General Gates, who is an Eng- 
 liihman, faw it in a di^crent light, fome 
 remains of national feelinu; made him un- 
 willing to exhibit an humiliation of Bri- 
 tons, which their leader was ready to 
 partake ; he drew off his troops, and hu- 
 manely fpared his countrymen any addi- 
 tion to the fhame and regret they muft 
 feel, in looking on each other in the ad: 
 of laying afide the arms which their coun- 
 try had entrufted to them for its honor 
 and fupport. 
 
 Sure the General's ftudies might have 
 furnifhed him with precedents more flat- 
 tering to his ambitious mind, than the 
 defeat of the ten thoufand Pruiiians un- 
 der General Fink, had he even had the 
 fame favourable circumftances to plead in 
 his excufe j the particulars of that event 
 are too well known to need being re- 
 
 D peated 
 
 r 
 
( 20 ) 
 
 peated here, and may be folnd at large 
 in the hiftory of the lad war. 
 
 
 Let us now examine the motives ( ac- 
 cording to his own account ot them ) 
 which induced General Burgoyne to wait 
 'till want of provifions obliged him to 
 furrender ; he fays, *' The ditficulties of a 
 ** retreat to Canada were clearly forefeen, 
 ** as was the dilemma, ftiould the retreat 
 " be cffeded, of leaving fuch an army as 
 ** General Gates's to a(5l againft Sir Wii- 
 ** liam Howe ; this confideration operated 
 ** forcibly to determine me to abide 
 " events as long as poffible -, and I rea- 
 '* foned thus j the expeditbn I com- 
 •* manded was evidently meant to be 
 ** hazarded', circumftances might require 
 " it fhould be devoted -, o. critical junction 
 *' of Mr. Gates's force might poflibly de- 
 '* cide the fate of war, the failure of 
 ** my jundion with Sir Henry Clinton, 
 " or the lofs of my retreat of Canada 
 *' could only be a partial misfortune." 
 
 The 
 
( 21 ) 
 
 m 
 
 The General's parts are allowed to be 
 very good, but he overvalues them when 
 he imagines they cm deceive a nation 
 with fuch inconclufive prgjumcnts as he 
 here produces ; he knew the nature of 
 General Gates's army too well to luppofe 
 that they could be marched away to join 
 General Wafhington ; he mufl have known 
 the difficulty ot keeping American Mi- 
 litia together for any length of time ; 
 General Gates's troops too confifted chiefly 
 of New-Englanders and Connedlicut men, 
 whofe averfion to quitting their own 
 Province is proverbial ; and there have 
 been many inftancfs of even what they 
 call their Continental Troops refufing to 
 march to the fouthern Provinces, there 
 was therefore little reafon to fuppofe 
 that the ffcape of the Northern Army 
 would occafion fo formidable a jun(ftion 
 againft Sir William Howe. 
 
 
 >' 
 
 The 
 
 But to take the General's own ground, 
 fuppofing no part of General Gates's army 
 
 D 2 would 
 
 *; ;'*»'--?!>»» --sn'-^iS-t 
 
..,»^,««.i^»^.a>>t,«««^-.^,r..:^ 
 
 K 
 
 % 
 
 
 ( 22 ) 
 
 would moulHer away in confcquence of 
 their being difappointed in their hopes 
 of taking or deflroying the Northern 
 army; ftill it was natural to imagine they 
 would follow him in his retreat, and by 
 that means lofe fo much time, and fo 
 far increafe their diftance from the 
 fouthern Provinces, that the feafon would 
 be too f<ir advanced for them to join 
 General Walhington before the armies 
 had got into their winter quarters ; fo that 
 the retreat towards Canada, not the in- 
 adive delay near Saratoga, appears to have 
 been the moft obvious means of retard- 
 ing the formidable jundion of the Rebel 
 armies : For what end could be an- 
 fvvered by abiaing events ? the Conven- 
 tion did not extend its inactive effects to 
 the Rcrbel army, they were flill at liber- 
 ty to adl: for thofe who had employed 
 thtm, and to. join Gcnel-al Washington, 
 improved by all the fpirit and ardour 
 which compleat vidory and felf approba- 
 tion invariably infpires ; and reinforced 
 
 by 
 
 ^M 
 
 I 
 
 A 
 
( 23 ) 
 
 by the folid advantages of an immenfe 
 train of well-appointed artillery, together 
 with at lead three thoufand five hundred 
 ftand of well-conditioned arms, and a 
 plentiful ftore of amnriunition for both. 
 
 But the event is the beft confutation 
 of General Burgoyne's falfe reafoning; 
 General Gates with what force he could 
 bring, did join Mr. Wa(hington, but Sir 
 William Howe was not overwhelmed, nor 
 even beaten, repulfed, or checked, in confe- 
 quence of that jundion. 
 
 i 
 
 w 
 
 "I* 
 
 i 
 
 That the army from Canada, was 
 hazarded'^ is too fatally apparent; if it 
 was trxani io be fo, the Minifter fliould 
 be culled to a flrid: account, and upon 
 proof punifhed as fo flagitious an inten- 
 tion , defer ves : that they were devoted too 
 is ccitain, and it is equally io by 
 
 by 
 
 * By hazarded, 1 underftand he means, the total 
 lof? of the army rifked. 
 
 whom 
 
 ,^i.(llf?''!<lP» ■■muKiZ.'i^ 
 
 M 
 
( H ) 
 
 whom ; whether from mifconduft or 
 mislortune j let the unprejudiced public 
 judge, if from the former they have a 
 right to expedt the inadequate atonement 
 of the deftrudlive head, which has fa- 
 crificed fo many protedling hands ; if 
 from the latter, he may claim their pity 
 and forgivenefs : at all events, however, 
 the Jate of war was indubitably decided 
 by the facrifice of thofe troops -, the con- 
 fequences which might cafily be forefeen, 
 from the total lofs of a whole army, 
 imraediately followed j our pods at Ti- 
 conticroga, &c. were expofed to imminent 
 dangt^r, and the victorious enemy, beiides 
 the diminution of our force, and pofTef- 
 fion of our arms and artillery, acquired 
 the cuuntenaiice of a powerful ally, and 
 the aililtance of a formidable fleet. 
 
 ■ % 
 
 The Military Hiflory affords numberlefs 
 examples of the efcape of troops fur- 
 rounded by fuperior numbers. The army 
 under General Gates, compofed of Mi- 
 litia 
 
if 
 
 , ''Wi-'- 
 
 i^ 
 
 .# 
 
 < 25 ) 
 
 litia levied for the occafion, and aflTem- 
 bied on the fpot, were the kind of ene- 
 my moft to be defired for fuch an at- 
 tempts the well difciplined and gallant 
 troops under General Burgoyne were 
 equally well calculated for a defperate 
 coiip de main ; what reafon was there 
 then why they fhouid not be divided 
 into eight or ten different columns, under 
 the comm^ind of approved good officers 
 with four days bread in their blankets : 
 In (his fituation they might have forced 
 their way through the enemy, and by re- 
 maining leparate and avoiding roads, the 
 columns might have arrived at an appoint- 
 ed rendezvous, in the neighbourhood of 
 Albany, or at Port Clinton or Montgo- 
 mery, where they would have joined Sir 
 Henry Clinton, (who with a linail force, 
 had made his way within forty miles of 
 them, and upon their furrender retreated 
 uninfulted) thofe who had perished in the 
 attempt would at leaft have died with 
 unfullied honor j and the furvivors inftead 
 
 of 
 
 /'tW*-- ^ - 
 
 .^•flBRjW^WPB^ 
 
 * // 
 
■f-« 
 
 % 
 
 !■ 
 
 ( 26 ) 
 
 of fuffering captivity, would at this md- 
 ment have enjoyed the grateful admira- 
 tion and applaufe of their fellow^-fubjects ; 
 but Dis aliter njifum efl ! The Die was 
 caft, and the objedt now was to make 
 the beft of affairs as they flood; lavifli 
 encomiums were befhowed on the vidtors 
 by the vanquiQied Chief; their politenefs, 
 courage, affability, and humanity, were 
 applauded, and in conclufion, leave de- 
 manded that the General might return 
 home to vindicate his own cor.du6l, and 
 protedl the reputation of his army. The 
 requefl was complied with ; and the ignis 
 fatuusy which had led the unfortunate 
 troops into fo inextricable a dilemma dif- 
 appeared, to millead if poffible the refl 
 of his fellow-fubjeds at home ; and (as 
 it appears by his condu(fl) to avoid par- 
 taking the troubles and diflreffes of his 
 own creation. 
 
 His exclufion on his arrival from the 
 prefencc of his Sovereign, was the firfl^ 
 
 though 
 
 m 
 
 
 
 
 u 
 A 
 
 A 
 
fT^' 
 
 ( 2f ) 
 
 though not the only mark of the almoft 
 tiniverfai difguil and difapprobation his 
 condud had excited. He demanded foon 
 afterwards an enquiry into his conduct 
 which was refufed for the reafons I have 
 already mentioned in the beginning of 
 this Pamphlet j he remained neverthelcfs 
 in England, and indeed with fome colour 
 of reafon fo long as any probability ap- 
 peared of the convention being ratified, 
 and the troops releafed. But as foon as 
 it was known that the Congrefs had 
 determined not to fulfill the agreement ; 
 no immediate profpe(fl: of enquiry into 
 the General's condudl remained: what 
 then detained him here, unlefs an efFemi- 
 nate preference of luxurious defertion, to 
 the duty fo peculiarly his, of fliaring the 
 captivity of his army. 
 
 For //jame. Sir ! Confider you are ftill in 
 
 the Jervice, and though you have lojl all ef" 
 
 timation as a GENERAL, do not render your* 
 
 Jelf defpicable as a MAN. Fly to your proper 
 
 £ Jituation, 
 
 ►---«. 
 
 ,;«ff*W*"» . 
 
ieamui 
 
 *"'^V:i.frt;-**i»»,».-..v 
 
 #1 
 
 •: » 
 
 ( 28 ) 
 
 Jituation, left the ivorU Jhould fufpeSi that 
 the forenefs you once felt on the fubjeSl of 
 honor has grown to the laft infenfibility of 
 mortification, and that you are now become 
 calkusi But if common report be true, even 
 this effort has been procraftinated, till it is 
 become impofftble, and the RECALL fent 
 you by the Congrefs, has given the death" 
 flab to your long wounded honor. 
 
 1 1 2' 
 
 ^^i 
 
 Ui'' 
 
' m 
 
 Jls it may be inconvenient to ma- 
 ny^ and impojfthk to fome of 
 my Readers to turn to an old 
 Gazette, / have here printed 
 General Burgoyne's Letter 
 to Lord George Germaine. 
 
 
 _ .jttf'.^^mft .iaar_; 
 
I 
 
 m 
 
 .Kj 
 
 m 
 
 ^.h)< 4 <i>MP> lUWlMJF' 
 
( 31 ) 
 
 GAZETTE. 
 
 'im. 
 
 Whitehall^ Decembers 15, 1777. 
 
 'T'HIS afternoon Captain Craig, of the 
 47th regiment, arrived from Quebec 
 with the following duplicate of a letter from 
 Lieutenant-general Burgoyne, to Lord George 
 Germaine, the original of which has not yet 
 |)een received. 
 
 jllbany, OSlober 20, 1777. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 No pofnbility of communication with your 
 Lordfhip having txifted fince the beginning 
 of September, at which time my laft [dif- 
 patches were fent av/ay, I have to report to 
 your Lordihip the proceedings of the army 
 
 under 
 
 \ 
 
 V 
 
 I 
 
 V, 
 
 
 
 yA 
 
 r 
 
r ii 
 
 iliiliri 
 
 i\.f 
 
 n 
 
 ( 3» ) 
 
 under my command from that period ; — a 
 
 feries of hard toil, inceflant effort, ftubborti 
 
 aftion, till difabled in the collateral branches 
 
 of the army by the total defe<ftion of the 
 
 Indians ; the deferiion or timidity of the 
 
 Canadians and Provincials, fomc individuals 
 
 excepted ; difappointed in the laft hope of 
 
 any timely co-operation from other armies j 
 
 the regular troops reduced by lolTes from 
 
 the befl parts to 3500 fighting men, not 
 
 2000 of which were Britifb j only three 
 
 days provifions, upon fhort allowance, ia 
 
 ftore 'j invefled by an army of fixteen 
 
 thoufand men, and no apparent means of 
 
 retreat remaining, I called into Council all 
 
 the Generals, Field Officers, and Captains, 
 
 commanding corps, and by their unanimous 
 
 concurrence and advice, I was induced to 
 
 open a treaty with Major-general Gat-.'s, 
 
 Your Lordfhip will f e by the papers trarf- 
 mitted herewith the difagreeable prolVedt 
 which attended the fitfl overtures, and when 
 the terms concluded are compared, I trufl 
 that the fpirit of the Councils I h:^ve men- 
 tioned, which, under fuch ciicumflinces, 
 
 dictated 
 
 U 
 
 
 h 
 {\ 
 
 P 
 
 V 
 
 a 
 o 
 n 
 
 fc 
 in 
 
 ^f \ 
 
—a 
 jra 
 hes 
 the 
 the 
 aals 
 t of 
 ies; 
 Tom 
 not 
 :hree 
 e, ia 
 xteen 
 
 [18 of 
 
 :il all 
 
 tains, 
 
 mous 
 
 d to 
 
 tranf- 
 
 when 
 truft 
 men- 
 
 •^nces, 
 dated 
 
 
 
 M 
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 di<flated inftead of fubmitting, will not be 
 refuted a fliare of credit. 
 
 Before I enter upon the detail of thcfe 
 events, I think it a duty of jullice, my Lord, 
 to take upon myfclf the meafure of having 
 pafled the Hudfon's River, in order to force 
 a } aflage to Albany I did not think my- 
 felf authorized to call any men into Council, 
 when the peremptory tenor of my orders, 
 and the leafon of the year, admitting no al- 
 ternative, 
 
 Provifions for about thirty days having 
 been brought forward, the other neceflary 
 ftores prepared, and the bridge of boats com- 
 pleated, the army palled the Hudfon's Ri- 
 ver on the 13 th and 14th of September, 
 and encamped on the heights and in the plain 
 of Saratoga the enemy being then in the 
 neighbourhood of Still-water. 
 
 15th. The ^vhole army made a movement 
 forward, aiid tsc imped in a good pofition 
 in a place called Dovogot, 
 
 16th, 
 
 « * 
 
 fVimfmim -^sm^: 
 
I ^ 
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 i6th. It being found that there were fe- 
 veral bridges to repair, that work was begun 
 under cover of ftrong detachments, and the 
 fame opportunity was taken to reconnoitre 
 the country. 
 
 17th The army renewed their march^ 
 repaired other bridges, and encamped upon 
 advantageous ground, about four miles from 
 the enemy. 
 
 18th. The enemy appeared in confiderable 
 force to obftrud the further repair of bridges, 
 and with a view it was conceived, to draw 
 on an adtion where artillery could not be em- 
 ployed; a fmall lofs was fuflained in fkirmifti-- 
 ing, but the work of the bridges was effected. 
 
 19th. The paffages of a great ravin, and 
 other roads towards the enemy, having been 
 reconnoitred, the army advanced in the fol- 
 lowing order: 
 
 Brigadier- general Frazer's corps, fuflained 
 by Lieutenant-colonel Breyman's corps, 
 made a circuit in order to pafs the ravin com- 
 modioufly, without quitting the heights, and 
 
 aftcr- 
 
 tw 
 
 tini 
 of 
 
 (mi 
 
 an 
 
 th( 
 
 tacj 
 
 but 
 
 ■■-^mr 
 
> 
 
 J 
 
 pon 
 rom 
 
 :able 
 iges, 
 draw 
 sem- 
 
 [eacd. 
 
 and 
 been 
 fol- 
 
 ic 
 
 gained 
 corps, 
 n corn- 
 Its, and 
 after- 
 
 B^-' 
 i?'. 
 
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 iafterwards t^ cover the march of the line to 
 the right: thefe corps moved in three co- 
 lumns, and had the Indians, Canadians, and 
 Provincials upon their fronts and flanks. The 
 Britifh line, led by me in perfon, paflVd the 
 ravin in a dircft line South, and formed in 
 order of battle as faft as they gained the fum- 
 mit, where they waited to give time to Fra* 
 zer's corps to make the circuity and to enable 
 the left wing and artillery, which, under the 
 command of M^jor-general Philips and Ma- 
 jor-general Reidefel, kept the great road and 
 meadows near the river, in two columns, and 
 had bridges to repair, tb be equally ready to 
 proceed. The 47th regiment guarded th-s 
 batteaux. 
 
 The fignal guns, which had been previoufly 
 fettled to give notice of all the columns be- 
 ing ready to advance, having been fired be- 
 tween one and two o'clock, the march con- 
 tinued, the fcouts and flankers of the column 
 of the Britiih line were foon fired upon from 
 fmall parties, bui with no efFed ; after about 
 an hour's march, the picquets, which made 
 the advanced guard of that column, were at- 
 tacked in force, and obliged to give ground, 
 but they foon rallied and were fuilained, 
 
 F On 
 
 
^mmmitm 
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 On the firft opening of the wood, I formed 
 the troops ; a few cannon fhot dillodged the 
 enemy at a houfe from whence the picquets 
 had been attacked; and Brigadier-general 
 Irazer's corps had arrived with fuch preci- 
 fion in point of time, as to be found in a very 
 advantageous height on the right of the 
 Britifh. 
 
 In the mean time the enemy, not ac- 
 quainted with the combination of the march, 
 had moved in great force out of their in- 
 trenchments, with a view of turning the 
 line upon the right ; and being checked by 
 the pofition of Brigadier- general Frazer, 
 countermarched in order to direcft their great 
 effort to the left of the Britifli. 
 
 From the nature of the country, move- 
 ments of this nature, however near, may be 
 efFeded without a poflibility of their being 
 difcovered. 
 
 •':lfe 
 
 About three o'clock the aftion began by a 
 very vi^rorous attack on the Bntilh line, and 
 continued with great obflinacy till after fun- 
 fet. The enemy being continually fupplied 
 
 with 
 
he 
 
 sts 
 
 ;ral 
 
 ci- 
 
 ery 
 
 the 
 
 ac- 
 rch, 
 • in- 
 
 the 
 d by 
 azer, 
 great 
 
 love- 
 lay be 
 Ibeing 
 
 by a 
 
 , and 
 
 Ir fun- 
 
 pplied 
 
 wiih 
 
 ( 35 ) 
 
 with frefli troops, the ftrefs lay upon the 
 20th, 21 ft, and 62d regiments, moft parts 
 of which were engaged near four hours with- 
 out intermiflion : the 9th had been ordered 
 early in the day to form in referve. The 
 grenadiers and 24th regiment were fome 
 part of the time brought into a(ftion, as 
 were part of the light infantry j and all thefe 
 corps charged with their ufual fpirit. 
 
 The riflemen, and other parts of Breyman's 
 corps, were alfo of fervice ; but it was not 
 thought advifeable to evacuate the height 
 where Brigadier-general Frazer was pofted, 
 othcrwife than partially and occafionally. 
 
 Major-general Philips, upon firft hearing 
 the firing, found his way through a difficult 
 part of the wood to the fcene ot adion, and 
 brought up with him Major Williams and 
 four pieces of artillery, and from that mo- 
 ment I ftood indebted to that gallant and 
 judicious fecond for incefTant and moft ma-< 
 terial ferviccs j particularly for reftoring the 
 a<ftion in a point which was critically preflcd 
 by a great fuperiority of fire, and to which 
 
 F 2 he 
 
( 36 ) 
 
 he led up the 2Qth regiment at the utmdft 
 perfonal hazard. 
 
 Major-general Reidefel exerted himfelf 
 to bring up a part of the left wing, and ar- 
 rived in time to charge the enemy with rc^ 
 gularity and bravery. 
 
 Juft as the light clofed, the enemy gave 
 ground on all lides, and left us compleatly 
 mafters of the field of battle, vsrith the lofs 
 of about 500 men on their fide, and, as 
 fuppofed, thrice that number wounded. 
 
 % 
 
 The darknefs preventing a purfuit, the 
 prifoners were few. 
 
 The behaviour of the ofRcers and men in 
 general was exemplary. Brigadier-general 
 Frazcr took his portion in the beginning of 
 the day with great judgment, and fuftained 
 the adtion with conftant prefence of mind 
 and vigour. Brigadier- general Hamilton was 
 the whole time engaged, and acquitted him* 
 fclf with great honour, a(5tivity, and good 
 condu(ft. The artillery in general was dif- 
 tinguilhed, and the brigade under Captain 
 
 T^- 
 
 "•wPj 
 
dft 
 
 felf 
 ar- 
 
 gave 
 ;atly 
 ilofs 
 i, as 
 
 the 
 
 len in 
 eneral 
 ing of 
 ^aincd 
 mind 
 )Vi was 
 him- 
 good 
 
 as dir« 
 aptain 
 
 I 17 ) 
 
 Jones, who was killed in the adHon^ was con*- 
 ipicuoully fo. 
 
 The army lay upon their arms the night of 
 the 19th, and the next day took a pofition 
 nearly within cannon fhot of the enemy, 
 fortifying their right, and extending their 
 left fo as to cover the meadows through 
 which the great river runs, and where the 
 batteaux and hofpitals were placed. The 
 47th regiment, and the regiment of Hefle 
 Hanau, with a corps of Provincials, encamp- 
 ed in the meadows as a further lecuiity. 
 
 It was foon found that no fruits, honor 
 excepted, were attained by the preceding 
 vid:()ry ; the enemy working with redoubled 
 ardour to ftrengthen their left j their right 
 was unattackable already. 
 
 On our fide it became expedient to ereft 
 ftrong redoubts for the prote<flion of the ma- 
 gazines and hofpital, not only againfl a fud- 
 den attack, but alio for their fecurity in cafe 
 of a march to turn the enemy's flank. 
 
 2ifl. A meffenger arrived from Sir Harry 
 Clinton, with a letter in cyphers, informing 
 
 me 
 
 i i 
 
 \ 
 
 , 1 
 
[•■^^ i) 
 
 ( 38 ) 
 
 mc of his intention to attack Fort Montgo- 
 mery in about ten da\s from ^hc date of his 
 letter, which was the loih of September. 
 This was the only meflei.ger of many that I 
 apprehend were difpatched by Sir William 
 Howe and him, that had reached my camp 
 lince the beginning of Auguft. He was lent 
 back the fame night to inform Sir Hary of 
 my fituation, and of the neceffity of a diver- 
 iion to oblige General Gates to detach from 
 his army -, and my intention to wait fa- 
 vourable events in that pofition, if poflible, to 
 the 1 2th of Odober. 
 
 '4»':, 
 
 In the courfe of the two following days, 
 two officers in difguife, and other confidential 
 perfons, were difpatched by different routes 
 with verbal meffages to the lame effedt -, and 
 I continued fortifymg my camp and watch- 
 ing the enemy, whofe numbers increafed 
 every day. 
 
 3d Odlober. I thought it advifeable to di- 
 minifh the foldier's ration, in order to length- 
 en out the provifions, to which meafure the 
 army lubmitted with the utmoft chtarfulnefs. 
 The difficulties of a retreat to Canada were 
 
 clearly 
 
di- 
 th- 
 
 the 
 efs. 
 vere 
 arly 
 
 ,1 , TiSTJJ 
 
 ( 39 ) 
 
 clearly forefeen, as was the dilemma, fliould 
 the retreat be efFcded, of leaving at liberty 
 fuch an army as General Gates's to slCl againft 
 Sir William Howe. > 
 
 This confideration operated forcibly to de- 
 determine me to abide events as long as puf- 
 fible, and I reafoned thus : The expedition I 
 commandtd was evidently meant at firft to 
 be hazarded, Circumftances might require 
 it fhould be devoted-, a critical jundlion of 
 Mr. Gates's f jrce with Mr. Wafhington 
 might poflibly decide the fate of the war ; 
 the failure of my jundlion with Sir Harry 
 Clinton, or the lofs of my retreat to Canada, 
 could only be a partial misfortune. 
 
 7th. in this fituation things continued *till 
 the 7th, when no intelligence having been 
 received of the expeifted co-operation, and 
 four or five days for our limited flay in the 
 camp only remained, it was judged advlleable 
 to make a movement to the enemy's left, 
 not only to difcover whether there was any 
 poflible means of forcing a paffage (hould it 
 be neceilary to advance, or of diflodging them 
 for the convenience of retreat, but alfu to co- 
 ver 
 
 i 
 
 K\ 
 
 ) ii 
 
 ' ') 
 
 (■ : 
 
 l\ 
 
^>rmtptmtWr»w,Av^.mi^, 
 
 li 
 
 { 40 ) 
 
 ver a forage of the army, which was in the 
 grcateft diArefson account of the fcarcity. 
 
 A detachment of 1 500 regular troops, with 
 2 twelve-pounders, 2 howitzers, and 6 fix- 
 pounderSy were ordered to move, and was 
 commanded by myfelf, having with me Ma- 
 jor-general Philips, Major-general Reidefel, 
 and Brigadier-general Frazer. The guard 
 of the camp upon the heights was left to 
 BrigadierS'general Hamilton and Speicht; the 
 redoubts and the plain to Brigadier-general 
 Goll; and as the force of the enemy imme- 
 diately in their front coniifled of more than 
 double their numbers, it was not pofiible to 
 augment the corps that marched beyond the 
 numbers above flated. 
 
 ■«-' j 
 
 I formed the troops within three quarters of 
 a mile of the enemy's left j and Captain Fra- 
 zer's rangers, with Indians and Provincials^ 
 had orders to go by fecret paths in the 
 woods, to gain the enemy's rear, and by 
 fhewing themlelves there to keep them in 
 check. 
 
 The further operations intended were pre- 
 venteU by a very luaden and rapid attack of 
 
 the 
 
 %;"*!»«, , 
 
 ■-•«*"-Ni>Jk..'., 
 
( 41 ) 
 
 the enemy on our left, where the Britifh 
 grenadiers were pofted to fupport the left 
 wing of the line. Major Acklund at the 
 head of them fuftained the attack with 
 great refolution j but the enemy's great num- 
 bers enabling them in a few minutes to ex- 
 tend the attack along the front of the 
 Germans, which were immediately on the 
 .right of the grenadiers, no part of that bo- 
 dy could be removed to make a fe- 
 cond line to the flank where the flrefs of 
 the fire lay. The right was at that time 
 unengaged j but it was foon obferved 
 that the enemy were marching a large corps 
 round their flank to endeavour cutting off 
 their retreat. The light infantry and part 
 of the 24th regiment, which were at that 
 poft, were therefore ordered to form a fecond 
 line, and to fecure the return of the troops 
 into camp. 
 
 While this movement was proceeding the 
 enemy pufhed a frefh and flrong reinforce- 
 ment to renew thea(ftion upon the left, which 
 overpowered by lo great a fuperiority, gave 
 way, and the light infantry and 24th regi- 
 ment were obliged to make a quick move- 
 
 G ment 
 
 ^|(^ 
 
 JS^' 
 
( 42 ) 
 
 ment to fave that point from being entirely 
 carried, in doing which. Brigadier-general 
 Frazer was mortally wounded. 
 
 The danger to which the hnes were ex- 
 pofed becoming at this moment of the mofl 
 ferious nature, orders were given to Majors- 
 general Philips and Reidefel to cover the re- 
 treat, while fuch troops as were moft ready 
 for the purpofe returned for the defence of 
 them. The troops retreated hard prefTed, 
 but in good order. They were obliged to 
 leave 6 pieces of cannon, all the horfes hav- 
 ing been killed -, and moft of the artillery 
 men, who had behaved as ufual with the 
 utmoft bravery, under the command of Ma- 
 jor Williams, being either killed or wounded. 
 
 The troops had fcarcely entered the 
 camp, when it was flormed with great fury, 
 the enemy ruflung to the lines under a fevere 
 fire of grape fhot and fmall arms. The poft 
 of the light infantry under the command of 
 Lord Belcarres, affifted by fome of the line, 
 who threw themlelvcs l?y order into thofe 
 entrenchments, was defended with great 
 fpirit ; and the enemy, led on by General 
 
 Arnold, 
 
( 43 ) 
 
 Arnold, was finally repulfed, and the Ge- 
 neral wounded ; but unhappily the en- 
 trenchments of the German referve, com- 
 manded by Lieutenant-colonel Breymen, 
 who was killed, were carried, and although 
 ordered to be covered they never were (o ; 
 and the enemy by that misfortune gained an 
 opening on our right and rear. The night 
 put an end to the adtion. 
 
 Under the difadvantages thus apparent in 
 our fituation, the army was ordtred to quit 
 the prefent pofition during the night, and 
 take poft upon the height above the holpital j 
 thus, by an entire change of front, to reduce 
 the enemy to form a new difpofition. This 
 movement was efFedled with great order and 
 without lofs, though all the artillery and 
 camp v^ere removed at the fame time. The 
 army continued offering battle to the enemy 
 in their new pofition the whole day of the 
 8th. 
 
 8th. Intelligence was now received that 
 
 the enemy were marching to turn the ^right 
 
 and no means could prevent this mei- 
 
 fure but retiring to Saratoga. The army 
 
 G 2 began 
 
 
 i, 
 
 .^' —»»-.-, rf> ..;'•=!■ 
 
 J 
 
( 44 ) 
 
 beg'an to move at nine o'clock at night ; Ma- 
 jor-general Reidefel commanding the van 
 guard, and Major-general Philips the rear. 
 
 This retreat, though within mufquet {hot 
 of the enemy, and encumbered with all the 
 baggage of the army, was made without 
 lofs 5 but a very heavy rain, and the difficul- 
 ties of guarding the batteaux which contain- 
 ed all the provifions, occafioned delays which 
 prevented the army reaching Saratoga, till 
 the night of the 9th -, and the artillery could 
 not pafs the fords of the Fifh-kill till the 
 morning of the I oth. 
 
 At our arrival near Saratoga, a corps of the 
 enemy, of between five and fix hundred were 
 difcovered throwing up intrenchments on 
 the heights, but retired over a ford of the 
 Hudfon's River at our approach, and joined 
 a body ported to oppofe our pafTage there. 
 
 
 It was thought proper to fend a detach- 
 ment of artificers, under a ftrong efcort, to 
 repair the bridges and open the road to Fort 
 Edward. The 47th regiment, Capt. Pra- 
 ter's markfmen, and Mackoy's provincials 
 
 were 
 
 .jf. 
 
■1 
 M 
 
 * 
 
 ( 45 ) 
 
 were ordered for that fervice 5 but the ene- 
 my appearing on the heights of Fifh-kill in 
 great force, and making a difpolitlon to pafs 
 and give us battle, the 47th regiment and 
 Frazer's markfmen were recalled : the pro- 
 vincials left to cover the workmen at the iirft 
 bridge, ran away upon a very flight attack 
 of a fmall party of the enemy, and left the 
 artificers to efcape as they could, without a 
 poflibility of their performing any work. 
 
 :i 
 
 
 During thefe different movements, the 
 batteaux with provifions were frequently fired 
 upon from the oppofite fide ot the river ; 
 fome of them were lofl, and feveral men 
 were killed and wounded in thofe which re- 
 mained. 
 
 :.M 
 
 ! f 
 
 nth. Attacks upon the batteaux were con- 
 tinued ; feveral were taken and retaken ; 
 but their fituation being much nearer to the 
 main force of the enemy than to ours, it was 
 found impoflible to fecure the provifions any 
 otherwife than by landing them and carrying 
 them upon the hill : this was efFeded under 
 fire, and with great difficulty. 
 
 The 
 
 «.., _ - -^•■■m 
 
( 46 ) 
 
 The pofliblc means of further retreat were 
 now confidcred in councils of war, compofed 
 of the general rfiivjcrs, nanuti-s of which will 
 be tranfmitted to your Lordfiiip, 
 
 i/i 
 
 The only o',e that feemed at all pradti- 
 cahle was by a night march to gnin Kort Ed- 
 ward, wi b the troops carrying their provi- 
 fions upon thtir backs j the impoflibility of 
 repairing bridges, putting a conveyance of 
 artillery and carriages out of the qucftjon; 
 and it was propoled to force the ford at 
 Fort Edward, or the ford above it. 
 
 r*''» 
 
 : ' ,1 
 
 Before this attempt could be made, 
 fcouts returned with intelligence that the 
 enemy were intrenched oppolite thofe fords, 
 and poffcfled a camp in force on the high 
 ground between Fort Edward and Fort 
 George with cannon -, they had alfo parties 
 down ihe whole fh ore to watch our motions; 
 and polls fo near to us upon our own lide of 
 the water as muft prevent the army moving 
 a finglc mile undilcovered. 
 
 '9: 
 
 III 
 
 The bulk of the enemys* army was hourly 
 joined by a new corps of militia and volun- 
 teers 
 
 
( 47 ) 
 
 teers, and their number together amounted 
 to 16,000 men, 
 
 Their pofition, which extended three 
 parts in four of a circle round us, was from 
 the nature of the ground, inattackable in 
 all parts. 
 
 ^ ' , ■ ■ 
 
 In this (ituation the army took the heft 
 pofition poffible aod fortified ; waiting 'till 
 the 1 3th at night in the anxious hope of 
 fuccours from our friends, or the next ciefi- 
 rable expecftation, an attack from our enemy. 
 
 During this time the men lay continually 
 upon their arms, and were cannonaded in 
 every part; even rifle ftiot and grape (hot 
 came into all parts of the line, though 
 without any confiderable cflfeft. 
 
 At this period an exad: account of the 
 provifions was taken, and the circumftances 
 ftated at the opening of this letter became 
 compleat. 
 
 The Council of War was extended to all 
 the Field Officers and Captains commanding 
 
 corps 
 
 ( 
 
 '! 
 
 ■jv- 
 
( 48 ) 
 
 corps of the army, and the Convention in- 
 clofed herewith, enfued ; a tranfadlion 
 which I am fure was unavoidable, and 
 which I truft in that fituation will be 
 efleemed honourable. 
 
 After the execution of the Treaty, Ge- 
 neral Gates drew together the force that had 
 furrounded my pofition, and I had the confo- 
 lation to have as many witnefTes as I have men 
 under my command, of its amounting to 
 the numbers mentioned above. 
 
 :'( ?l 
 
 During the '^vents ftated above, an attempt 
 was made againft Ticonderoga by an army 
 affembled under Major-general Lincoln, who 
 found means to march with a conliderable 
 corps from Hubberton undifcovered, while 
 another column of his force paffed the 
 mountains between Skenelborough and Lake 
 George; and on the morning of the i8th 
 of September, a fudden and general attack 
 was made upon the Carrying-place at Lake 
 George, Sugar-hill, Ticonderoga, and Mount 
 Independence, The fea« officer command- 
 ing the armed Hoop Rationed to defend 
 the Carrying-place, as alfo feme of the of- 
 ficers commanding at the polls at «he Sugar- 
 hill 
 
( 49 ) 
 
 hill and at the Portage were furprized, and 
 a confiderable part of four companie? of the 
 53d regiment were made prifoners ; ablock- 
 houfe commanded by Lieutenant Lord of 
 the 53d regiment was the only poft on that 
 fide that had time to make ule of their 
 arms, and they made a brave defence, 'till 
 cannoij taken from the furprized velTel was 
 brought againfl them. 
 
 After bating and lamenting fo fatal a 
 want of vigilance, I have to inform your 
 Lordfhip of the fatibfadory events which 
 followed. 
 
 jij; 
 
 The enemy having twice fummoned Bri- 
 gadier-general Powell, and received fuch 
 anfwers as became a gallant officer en- 
 trufted with fo important a poft ; and hav- 
 ing tried during the courfe of four days fevc- 
 ral attacks, and being repulled in all, re- 
 treated without having done any confider- 
 able damage. 
 
 Brigadier-general T^'owell, from whofe re- 
 port to m< i wXf-adf this relation, gives 
 great conjrncndations to t^ie regiment of 
 Prince ticdenck and the other troops fta- 
 
 tioaed 
 
 \ 
 
4 « 
 
 n 
 I 
 
 H • 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 ( 56 ) 
 
 tioned at Mount Independence. The firj- 
 gadier alfo mentions with great applaufe thfe 
 behaviour of Captain Taylor of the 21ft regi- 
 ment, who was accidentally there on his road 
 to the army from the hofpital, and Lieute- 
 nant Beecroft of the 24th regiment, who, 
 with the artificers in arms, defended aft 
 important battery. 
 
 On the 24th of September the enemy ena- 
 bled by the capture of the gun boats and bat- 
 teaux which they had made after the furprize 
 of the (loop to embark upon Lake George, 
 attacked Diamond llland in two divilions. 
 
 Captain AulDrey and two companies of the 
 47th regiment had been pofted at that ifland 
 from the time the army pafTed the Hudfon's 
 River, as a better fituation for the fecurity 
 of the ftores at the fouth end of Lake George, 
 than Fort George, which is on the continent, 
 and not tenable againfl artillery and numbers. 
 The enemy were repulfed by Captain Aubrey 
 with great lofs, and purfued by the gun boats 
 under his command to the eafi: fhore, where 
 two of their principal veflels were retaken, 
 together with all the cannon ; they had juft 
 
 time 
 
( 51 ) 
 
 time to fet fire to the other batteaux^ and 
 retreated over the mountains. 
 
 i 
 
 t 
 
 I beg leave to refer your Lordfhip for fur- 
 ther particulars to my Aid-de-Camp Lord 
 Peter fham ; and I humbly take occafion to 
 recommend to His Majefty's notice that No- 
 bleman, as one endued with qualities to do 
 important fervices to his country in every fta- 
 tion to vtrhich his birth may lead. In this 
 late campaign, in particular, his behaviour 
 has been fuch as to entitle him to the fullefl; 
 applaufe, and I am confident his merit will 
 be thought a fufficient ground for preferment, 
 though deprived of the eclat and fort of claim 
 which generally attends the delivery of for- 
 tunate difpatches. 
 
 I have only to add, my Lord, a general 
 report of the killed and wounded. I do not 
 give it as corred: ; the hurry of the time and 
 the feparation of the corps, having rendered 
 it impoflible to make it fo. The Britifh of- 
 ficers have bled profufely and moft honoura- 
 ably ; all who have fallen were valuable, but 
 the extenfive merits which marked the pub- 
 lick and private charader of Brigadier-gene- 
 ral 
 
 t«.v 
 
:#»■ 
 
 vm 
 
 () 'i 
 
 liiFfastf wlH Iwig reftiain upon the irkiSiory 
 of this army, and make his lofs a^fubjed of 
 particular regret. Thofe who remain un- 
 woitonded have been equally forward ; and 
 tlie G^eneral Officers from the mode of fight* 
 ifig, have been more expoled than in other 
 ferviccs. Among the: reft I have had my 
 efcapea It depends upon the fentencft his 
 Majefty ihall pals upon my condudl ; upon 
 the judgment ot my profeffion, and of the im* 
 partial and rtfpedable parts gf my country, 
 whether I am to cilecm them blefSngs or 
 
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