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UNNECESSARY AND RUINOUS WAR. ADDRESSED TO MIS EXCELLENCY JAMES SULLIVAN, COVBRNOB. OP TBS tAID JT^l, lOSTON : fKINTBO Br CKKBNOUaH AND tTtBHIfi, ■ M W M I M It >»»M«f> 1808. #*'?&■* "H ^,- TO THE READER. THE following is a publitk Letter. It is very properly addressed to the Govwrnor, and through him to the Legislature : by this channel it would have come most regulady to the eye of the whole people. It is not known to the publishers why it has not been already printed for the use. of the pubUck ;— whether it is only delayed, or intended to be entirely with- held. But a copy, which was sent from Washington, after the original, to a private friend, has been happily obtained for the press. If at this day any honest citiecn can doubt of the great credit and weight to which the facts and opinions of the Writer are fairly entitled, such citizen is referred to the Writer's enemies for information. Among these many of the most respectable will say, that his pure patriotism and intrepid publick virtue have honoured the name of Republican in our country, ancl would have honoured the best of the Romans, in the best days of Rome. A//MI, Manh 9/£, 1808. CITY OF WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 16, I«ft§. SIR, IN the even cuirent of ordinary timei} in addrefs- from a Senator in Congrefs to his conftituents might be difpenfed with. Ta {iich times, the proceedings of the Executive and Legiflatur^ of the United States, exhibited in their ,^/tVi4^,rf Blight be fufficient. But the prefent fingular condition of our country, when its mod interefting concerns, wrapt up in myftery^ excite univerfal alarm, requires me to be no longer filent. Perhaps X am liable to cenfure, at fuch a crifis, for not fooner prefenting, to you and them, fuch a view of our national affairs as my official fitu* ation has placed in my power. I now addrefs it to you, Sir, as the proper organ of communication to the legiflature* The attainment of truth is ever defirable : and I cannot per* mit myfelf to doubt that the ftatement I now make mull be accept* able to all who have an agency in direding the affairs, and who are guardians of the interefts of our Common'o/ealth, which fo materiaUy depend on the meafures of the Government of the Nation. At the fame time, I am aware of the jealoufy with which, in thefe unhappy days of party diffenfions, my communications may, by fome of my conftituents, be received. Of this I will not complain : while I earneftly wiHi the fame jealoufy to be extended towards all pub- lick men. Yet I may claim fome (hare of attention and credit- that (hare which is due to the man who defies the world to point, in the whole courfe of a long and pubUck life, at one inftance of deception, at a Angle departure from truth. The EMBARGO demands the firil notice. For perhaps no aft of the National Government has ever produced fo muoh folicitude, or fpr^ad fuch univqrfal alarm, Becaufe all naturally conclude, that a meafure pregnant with incalculable mifchief to all daffes of our fel- low^itizens, would not have been propofed by the Prefident, and adopted by Congrefs, but for caufes deeply affeaing the int-refts and fafety of the nation. It mud have begi under the influence of this opinion that the legiflative bodies of lome States have expreff- ed their approbation of the Embargo, either explicitly, or by im- plication. The following were all the papers laid by the Prefident before Congrefs, as the grounds of the Embargo. 1. The pmrlaoiatinn of the King of Creat.Bntam requiring the return of his fubjefts, the fcamen efpecially, from foreign countrie*, to aid, in this hour of peculiar danger, in the defence of their own. But it being an acknowledged principle, that every nation has a right to the fervice of its fubjefts in time of war, that proclamation could not furnifli the flighteft ground for an Embargo. 2. The extraft of a letter from the Grand Judge Regnier to the French Attorney General for the Council of Prizes. This contained a partial interpretation of the imperial blockading decree of November 2 i, 1806. This decree, indeed, and its interpreta- tion, prefent flagrant violations of our neutral rights, and of the ex- ifting treaty becween the United States and France : but ftill, the execution of that decree could not (from the fmall number of French cruifers) extenfively interrupt our trade. Thefe two pa- pers were publick. ' 3. The letter from our Minifter, Mr. Armftrong, to Mr. Cham- pagny, the French Minillcr of Foreign Afltfiis : and 4. Mr. Champagny's anfwer. Both thefe ought, in form or fubftance, alfo to have been made publick. The latter would have furniflicd to our nation fome idea of the views and cxpedations of France. But both were withdrawn by the Prefident, to be depof- ited among other Executive fecrets : while neither prefented any aew ground to juftify an Embargo. ' & In the Senate, thefe papers were referred to a committee. The committee quickly reported 9. bill for laying an Embargo, agreea- bly to the Prefident's propofal. This was read a firft, a fecond, and a third time, and pafled ; and all in the (hort compafs of about four hours ! A little time was repeatedly afked, to obtain further information, and to confider a meafure of fuch moment, of fuch univerfal concern : but thefe requefts were denied. We were hur- ried into the paiTage of the bill, as if there was danger of its being reje6led, if we were allowed time to obtain further information, and deliberately confider the fubjeft. For to that time our veffeh were freely failing on foreign voyages ; and in a national point of view, the departure of half a do/en or a dozen more, while we were inquiring into the neceility or expediency of the Embargo, was of little moment. Or if the danger to our veflels, feamen and mer- chandize had been fo extreme as not to admit of one day's delay, ought not that extreme danger to have been exhibited to Congrefs ? The Conftitution which requires the Prefident " to give to Congrefs information of the ftate of the union,*' certainly meant, not partial, but complete information on the fubjed^ of a communication, fo far as he poffeffed it. And when it enjoins him " to recommend to their condderation fuch meafures as he fhould judge neceifary and expedient," it as certainly intended that thofe recommendations lliould be bottomed on information communicated, not on fa3s with- held, and locjced up in the Executive cabinet. Had the publick fafcty been at ftake, or any great publick good been prefented to our view, but which would be left by a moment*, /'-lay; there would have been fome apology for difpatch, though non< for a£ling nvUhout due information. In truth, the meafure appeared to me then, as it (lill docs, and as it appears to the publick, without a fufficit^nt motive, without a legitimate objeft. Hence the general inquiry — " For what is the Embargo laid ?" And I challenge any man not in the fecrets of the Executive to tell. I know. Sir, that the Prefident faid the papers abovementioned " (howed that great and increafing dangers threatened our veflels, our feamen, and our merchandize :" but I alfo know that they exhibited no netu dangers ; none of which our merchants and feamen had not been well apprized. The Britifh proclamation had many days before U n been publiflied in the newfpapen [the copy laid before us by the Prefident had been cut out of a newfpaper ;3 and fo had the fub> fiance, if not the words of Regnier's letter. Yet they had excit- ed little concern among merchants and feamen, the prefervation of whofe perfons and property was the profejfed obje6: of the PreG- dent's recommendation of an Embargo. The merchants and fea^ men could accurately eilimate the dangers of continuing their com- mercial operations ; of which dangers, indeed, the adtual premiums of infurance were a fatisfadtory gauge. Thofc premiums had very little increafed : by the Britifli proclamation not a cent : and by the French decree fo little as not to ftop commercial enterprises. The great numbers of veflels loading or loaded, and prepared for fea ; the exertions every where made, on the firft rumour of the Embargo, to difpatch them ; demonflirate the Prefident's dangers to be imaginary — to have been ajfumed. Or if great and real dan- gers, unknown to commercial men, were impending, or fure to fall* how deiirable was it to have had them officially declared and publifli- ed ! This would have produced a voluntary embargo, and prevent- ed every complaint. Befides, the dangers clearly defined and un- derftood, the publick mind would not have been difquietcd with im- aginary fears, the more tormenting, becaufe uncertain* It is true that confiderable numbers of veflels were collcded in our ports, and many held in fufpenfe : not, however, from any.new dangers which appeared ; but from the myflerious conduct of our aflairs, after the attack on the Chefapeakc ; and from the painful apprehenflon that the courfe the Prefident was purfuing would ter- minate in war. The National InteUigencer (ufually confidered as the Executive newfpaper) gave the alarm ; and it was echoed through the United States. War, probable or inevitable war, was the conflant theme of the newfpaper 3, and of the converfations, as was reported, of perfons fuppofed-to be beft informed of Executive defigns. Yet amid this din of war, no adequate preparations were feen making to meet it. The order to detach a hundred thoufand militia to fight the Britifli navy (for there was no appearance of an enemy in any other fliape) was fo completely abfurd, as to excite, with men of common fenfe, no other emotiou than ridicule. .Kok ..■»■: •■-;■*: the ihadow of a reafon that could operate on the mind of a man of common underftanding can be oifcred in its juilification. The re- fufal of the Britifli officer to receive the frigate Chefapeake as a pr'i%ei when tendered by her commander, is a demonftration that the attack upon her was exclufively for the purpofe of taking their deferters ; and not intended as the commencement of a war be- tween the two nations. The Prefident knew that the Britiih had no invading army to land on our (hores ; and the detached militia would be ufelefs, except againft land-forces. Why then was this order for the Militia given ? — The nature of the cafe, and the aAu- al (late of things, authorize the inference, that its immediate, if not its only object, was to increafe the publick alarm, to aggravate the publick refontnipnt againft Great- Britain, to excite a war pulfe; and in the height of this artificial fever of the publick mind, whick was to be made known in Great-Britain, to renew the demands on her government ; in the poor expeflation of extorting, in that ftate •f things, concefiions of points which (he had always confidered as her rightst and which at all times and under all circumflances, (he had uniformly refufcd to relinquKh. The refult of the fubfequent negociation at London has (hown how utterly unfounded was the Prefident's expe£katiun, how perfeAly ufelefs all this blufter of war. While no well informed man doubted that the Briti(h Government would make fuitable reparation for the attack on the Chefapeake. The Preiidcnt himfelf, in his proclamation, had placed the affair on that footing. A rupture between the two nations, faid he, ** is c- qually oppofed to the interefts of both, as it is to affurances of the moil friendly difpofitions on the part of the Britiih Governmenty in the midft of which this outrage was committed. In this light the fubjeft cannot but prefent itfelf to that Government, and ftrengthen the motives to an honourable reparation for the wrong which has been done." And it is now well known that fuch rep- aration might have been promptly obtained in London, had the Prefident 8 inftruftions to Mr. Monroe been compatible with fuch an adjuftment. He was required not to negociate on this fingle, tranfient aft (which when once adjufted was for ever fettled) but in connedion with another claim of long (landing, and, to fay the leaft, of doubtful right ; to wit, the exemption from impreffment ^ 8 of BritUb feamen found on board American merchant vcffels. To remedy the evil arifing from its exercife, by which our own citizeni were fometimes impreffed, the attention of our Government, under every adminiftration, had been eameftly engaged : but no praftica- ble plan has yet been contrived : while no man who regards the truth, will qucilion the difpofition of the Britifh Government to a- dopt any arrangement that will fecure to Great-Britain the fervices of her ovmfuhjeBs. And now, when the unexampled fituaticn of that country (left alone to maintain the conflict with France and her numerous dependent States — ^left alone to withiland the Power which menaces the liberties of the world) rendered the aid of all her fubjedls more than ever needful ; there was no reafonable ground to expeA that (he would yield the right to take them when found on board the merchant veflels of any nation. Thus to infill on her yielding this point, and infeparably to conneA it with the affair of the Chefapeake, was tantamount to a determination not to negociate at all. . I write. Sir, with freedom ; for the times are too perilous to al- low thofe who are placed in high and refponfible fituations to be fdent or referved. The peace and fafety of our country are fuf- pended on a thread. The courfe we have feen purfued leads on to war — to a war with Great-Britain — a war abfolutely without ne- ceflity — a war which whether difaftrous or fuccefsful, mud bring mifery and ruin to the United States : m'tfery by the deftru6lion of our navigation and commerce (perhaps alfo of our faircft fca- port towns and cities) the lofs of markets for our produce, the want of foreign goods and manufaftures, and the other evils inci- dent to a ftate of war : and ruin^ by the lofs of our liberty and in- dependence. For if with the aid of our arms Great-Britain '.vere fubdued, — from that moment (though flattered perhaps with the name of allies) we fliould become the Provinces of France. This is a refult fo obvious, that I mull crave your pardon for noticing it. Some advocates of Executive meafures admit it. They acknowl- edge that the navy of Britain is our (hield againll the overwhelm- ing power of France. — Why then do they perfift in a courfe of condud tending to a rupture with Great- Britain ? — Will it be » believed that it is principatly, or folely, to procure inviolability to the merchant ^ag of the United States \ In other words, to pro- tect all feamen, Br'tti/b fuhjeltsy as well as our own citizens, on board our merchant veflels > It is a faA that this has been made the greateft obftacle to an amicable fettlement with Great-Britain. Yet (I repeat) it is perfectly well known that (he defires to obtain 9mly her own fuhjeds ; and that American citizens, imprefled by miftake, are delivered up on duly authenticated proof. The evil we complain of arifes from the impoflibiUty of always diftinguiftiing the perfpns of two nations who a few years fince were one peo- ple, who exhibit the fame manners, fpeak the fame language, and poiTefs ilmilar features. But feeing that we feldom hear complaints in the great navigating States^ how happens there to be fuch ex- treme fympathy for American feamen at IVaJbington ? Efpecially in gentlemen from the interiour States, which have no feamen, or from thofe Atlantick States whofe native feamen bear a ver)' fmall proportion to thofe of New-England ? In faA, the caufes of com- plaint are much fewer than are pretended. They rarely occur in the States whofe feamen are chiefly natives. The firft merchant in the United States, in anfwering my late inquiry about Britifh im- preflrnents, fays, •* Since the Chefapeake affair we have had no caufe of complaint. I cannot find one fingle inftance where they have taken one man out of a merchant veflel. I have had more than twenty vcfTels arrived in that time, without one inftance of a man being taken by them. Three Sivedes were taken out by a French frigate. I have made inquiry of all the mafters that have arrived in this vicinity, and cannot find any complaints againft the Britiili cruifers. ' . 'i'-im 4 Can gentlemen of known hofliVity to foreign commerce in our own vejfels — who are even willing to annihilate it (and fuch there are)— oan thefe gentlemen plead the caufe of ouryrflmrn becaufe they real- ly wi(h to proteS them ? Can thofe defire to proteff our feamen, who, by laying an unneceflary embargo, expofe them by thoufands to ftarve or beg ? — One gentleman has faid (and I believe he does not ftand alone) that fooner than admit the principle that Great- Brit- ain had a right to take her ownfuhjeBs from nnr merchant vefels, he B >:iii': 10 ■■& would abandon commerce altogether ! — To what will every man in New-England and of the other navigating State8, afcribe fuch a fen- timent ? A fentiment which, to prevent the temporary lofs of five men, by imprefs, would reduce fifty thoufand to beggary ? But for the Embargo, thoufands depending on the ordinary operations of commerce, would now be employed. Even under the reftraints of the orders of the Britifh Government, retaliating the French im- perial decree, very large portions of the world remain open to the commerce of the United States. We may yet purfue our tiade with the Britifh dominions, in every part of the globe ; with Afri- ca, with China, and with the colonics of France, Spain, and Hol- land. And let me afk, whether in the midll of a profound peace, when the powers of Europe poffefllng colonies, would, as formerly, confine the trade with them to their own bottoms, or admit us, as foreigners, only under gtoat limitations, we could enjoy a commerce much more extenfive than is prafticable at this moment, if the Em- bargo were not in the way ? Why then fliould it be continued ? Why rather was it ever laid ? Can thofe be legitimate reafons for the Embargo which are concealed from Congrefs, at the moment when they are required to impofe it ? Arc the reafons to be found in the difpatches from Paris ? Thefe have been moved for ; and the motion was quafhed by the advocates for the Embargo. Why are thefe difpatches withhold by the Executive ? Why, when all clafTes of citizens anxioully inquire " For what is the Embargo laid ?" is a fatisfa£lory anfwer denied ? Why is not Congrefs made acquainted with the ad\ual fituation of the United States in relation to France ? Why, in this dangerous crifis, are Mr. Armftrong's letters to the Secretary of State abfoluetly withheld, fo that a line of them cannot be feen ? Did they contain no information of the demands and intentions of the French Emperor ? Did the Revenge fail from England to !• ranee, and tliere wait three or four weehs foi- difpatches of no importance ? If fo, why, rcgardlefs of the publick folicitude, arc their contents fo carefully concealed ? If really un- important, wiiat harm can arife from telling Congrefs and the Na- tion, ojicially^ tiiat they contain nothing of moment to tlie fafcly, the hberty, the honour, or the intcreils of the United States ? On the contrary, arc they fo clofely locked up becaufe they will not ia,y 11 bear the light ? Would their difclofure roufe the fpirit of the peo- ple, ilill numbering in bHnd confidence in the Executive ? Has the French Emperor declared that he will have no neutrals ? Has he required that our portsy like thofe of his vafTal ftates in Europe, le Jhut againjl Briti/h ommerce ? Is the Embargo a fubjiitutey a milder form of compliance with that harfh demand, which if exhibited in its naked and infulting afpeft, the American fpirit might yet re- fent ? Are we ftill to be kept profoundly ignorant of the declara- tions and avowed defigns of the French Emperor, although thefe may ftnke at our liberty and independence ? And, in the mean time, are we, by a thoufand irritations, by cherifhing prejudices, and by exciting frefb refentments, to he drawn gradually into a war with Great-Britain ? Why amidil the extreme anxiety of the pub- lick mind, is it ftill kept on the rack of fearful expeftation, by the Prefident's portentous filencc refpeAing his French difpatcbes ? — In this concealment there is d^i^^er. In this concealment muft be wrapt up the real caufe of the Embargo. On any other fuppoH- tion it is inexplicable. I am alarmed. Sir, at this perilous ftatc of things, I cannot re- prefs my fufpicions ; or forbear thus to exhibit to you the grounds on which they reft. The people are advifed to rcpofe implicit confidence in the National Government : in that unbounded confi- dence lies our danger. Armed with that confidence, the Execu- tive may procure the adoption of meafures which may overwhelm us witli ruin, as furely as if he had an army at his heels. By falfe policy, or by inordinate fears, our country may be betrayed and fubjugatcd to France, as furely as by corruption. I truft, Sir, that no one who knows me will charge it to vanity when I fay, that I have fomc knowledge of publick men and of publick afTiiirs : and on that knowledge, and with folemnity, I declare to you, that I have no confidence in the wifdom or correftnefa of our publick meaf- ures : that our country is in imminent danger : that it is efTential to the publick fafcty that the blind confidence in our Rulers ftiould ccalV ; that the State Legiflaturos fliould know tiie fafts and rea- I'ons on which important general laws are founiicd ; and ifpeda'Iy that ih'jfc Staid nvhoft favnu are on the oceanp and ai'/jo/f hariejls are m gathered in every feayjhould immediately and ferioujly confuler honu to preferve them. In all the branches of Government, commercial in- formation is wanting ; and in " this defert," called a city, that want cannot be fupplied. Nothing but the fenfe of the commer- cial States, clcarfy and emphatically exprefled, will fave them from ruin. Are our thoufands of (hips and veflels to rot in our harbours ? Arc our fixty thoufaud feamen and fiftiermen to be deprived of em- ployment, and, with their families, reduced to want and beggary ? Are our hundreds of thoufands of farmers to be compelled to fuffer their millions in furplus produce to perifl\ on their handd ; that the Prcfident may make an experiment on our patience and fortitude, and on the towering pride, the boundlefs ambition, and unyielding perfeverance of the Conqueror of l.urope ? Sir, I have reafon to«be- lieve that thu Prefidcnt contemplates the continuance of the Embar- go until the French Emperor repeals his decrees violating as well his treaty with the United States as every neutral right ; and un- til Britain thereupon recals her retaliating orders ! — By that time we may have neither fliips nor feamen : and that is pvecifely the point to which fome men wiHi to reduce us. — To fee the improvi- dence of this projeft (to call it by no harfher name, and without ad- verting to ulterior views) let us lookback to former years. Notvviiliftanding the well-founded cqmplaints of fome ividividuals, and the niurn)nr8 of others ; notwithilanding the frequent Execu- tive decIarntioDS of maritime ajjgrelTioiis committed hy Great- Brit- ain ; notwithilanding tl>c outrageous decrees of France and Spain, and the wanton ipoliations pradifcd and executed by their cruifcrs and tribunals, of which we fumctimes hear a faint whifper ; — the commerce of t!ic United States has hitherto profpered beyu;id all ex:imj)le. Ourcilizens havr accujnulated wealth ; and the publick tcvoiiue, annually increafing, has been the Prefident's annual boast. Thefe fafts dimonflrate, that although Great-Britain, with her thoufaiul fliips of war, conld h;ive dellroyed our commerce, flie has rcaiiy done it no elTentiai injury ; and that the other bdiige^'iiti 13 heretofore reftrained by fome regard to National Law, and liniit- ed by the fmal) "inber of their cruifers, have not inflicted upon it any deep wou Yet in this full tide of fuccefs, oiir commerce is fuddenly arrelied : an alarm of war is raifed : fearful apprehcnllons are excited : the merchants, in' particular, thrown into a ftate of confternation, are advifed, by a voluntary embargo, to keep their vcflels at home. And what is the caufe of this mighty but mif- chievous alarm ? We know it in its whole*extent. It was the un- authorized attack of a Briti/h naval officer on the American frigate Chefapeahey to fear ch for and take fome deferters known to have been received on boards who had been often demanded^ and eu often refufedto be delivered up. As was expedted by all confiderate men, and by the Prcfident himfelf (as I have before obferved) the Britifh Gov- ernment, on the firft information of the unfortunate event (and with- out waiting for an application) difavowed the a£l of its officer— dif- claimed the principle of fearching National armed veflels — and de- clared its readinefs to make fuitable reparation, as foon as th^. ilate of the cafe (hould be fully known. Under fuch circumftances, who can juftify this alarm of war ? An alarm which greatly difquieted the publick mind, and occafioned an interruption of commerce extremely injurious to our merchant* and fea-faring citizens. I will clofo this long letter by dating all the exiding pretences — for there are no caufce — for a war with Grcat«Britain. 1. The Btitifh fiiips of war, agreeably to a right claimed and cx- ercifed for ages— a right claimed and cxcrcifed during the whole of the admiiiillrations of Wafhington, of Adams, and of Jcffcrfon, — rontinue to take fome of the BritHh feamen found on board our merchant vefTda, and with them a fundi number of ou-s, from the impoflibihty of always dillinguilhing EiigHflitncn from citizens of the United States. Oii this point our Government well know that Great-Biitain is perfctlly willing to adopt any arrangement that can be devifed, which will fccurc to her fervice the fnmcn who mc her awti fiiljecit ; and at the fame time exempt ouis from imprell- ment. m 14 2. The merchant veffels of Fiance, Spain and Holland, being driven from the ocean, or deftroyed, the commerce of thofe countries with one another, and with their colonies, could no longer be carri- ed on by themfelves. Here the veffels of neutral nations came in to their aid, and carried on nearly the whole commerce of thofe na- tions. With their feamen thus liberated from the merchant fer- vice, thofe nations, in th* prefent and preceding wars, were enabled to man their (hips of war ; and the neutral vcifels and feamen fup- plying their places, became in fa^j though not in name, auxiliaries in war. The commerce of thofe nations, without one armed fliip on the fea appropriated for its protection, was intended thus to be fecured under neutral flags ; while the merchant veffels of Great- Britain, with its numerous armed (hips to guard them, were cxpof- cd to occafional captures. — Such a courfe of things Great- Britain has refifted, not in tlie prefent only, but in former wars ; at lead as far back as that of 1756. And flie has claimed and main- tained a right to impofe on this commerce fome limits and rc- ftraints ; becaufe it was a commerce which was denied by thofe na- tions to neutrals in-times of peace ; bccaufc it was a commerce of immenfe value to the fubjefts of her enemies ; and becaufe it filled their treafuries with money to enable them to carry on their wars with Great-Britain. H 3. The third and only remaining pretence for war with Great- Britain, is the unfortunate affair of the Chefapeake ; winch having been already ftated and explained, I will only remark here, that it is not to be believed that the Britifh Government, after boing defeated, as before mentioned, in its endeavours to make reparation in Lon- don, for the wrong done by its fervant, would have fent hither a fpecial envoy to give honourable fatisfaftion , but from its fiiicere de- firc to clofe this wound, if our own Government nuouldfiiffcr it to Ir healed. Permit me now to alk, what man, impartially viewing the fub- joct, will have the holdiiefs to fay that then- exifts any caufe for plunging the United States into a war with Great-Uritain ? Who that refuedls his reputation a* a man of common difcernment v.iU 15 £ay it ? Who that regards the interefts and welfare of his country will fay it ? Who then can juftify, who can find an excufe for a courfe of conduft which has brought our country into its prefent ftatc of alarm, embarraffment and diftreft, ? For myfelf, Sir, I mull declare the opinion, that no free country was ever before fo caufe- Icfsly, and fo blindly, thrown from the height of profperity, and plunged into a ftate of dreadful anxiety and fuffering. But from this degraded and wretched fituation it is not yet too late to efcape. Let the difpatches from our Minifter in France be no longer con- cealed. liCt the Prefident perform the duty required of him by the Conftitution ; by giving to Congrch full information ofthejlate of the unwn in refpoA tu fureign nations. Above all, let him unfold our atlual fituation with France. Let him tell us what are the de- mands and propofals of her Ruler. Had thefe been honourable to the United States, would not the Prefident have been eager to dif- clofe them ? that they are of an entirely diiTerent nature, that they are rlifhonourahle, that they are ruinous to our commercial interefis, and dangerous to our liberty and independencCf we are left to infer. I hope Sir, that the nature and magnitude of the fubjeft will furnifli a fufficient apology for the length and ftyle of this letter. Perhaps feme may deem it prefumptuous thus to queftion the cor- reftnefs of the proceedings of our Government. A ftrong fenfe of duty, and diftreffing apprehenfions of National ruin, have forced the taflc upon me. To fome the fentiments which, in the fincerity of my heart, I have expreflcd, may give offence : for often nothing offends fo much as truth. Yet I do not dcfire to offend any man. lUit when I fee the dangerous extent of Executive influence : when I foe the Great Council of the Nation called on to enaft laws deep- ly affei^ing the interefts of all clafTes of citizens, without adequate information of the reafoiis of that call : when I obferve the decep- tive gloflfs with which the mifchiefs of the Embargo are attempt- ed to be palliated ; and p'flirior events adduced ar. rcafons to juftify the meafure : when I know that tlie rifles of continuing their com- mercial purfuits aj:jainft all Itwwn diingers can and will be more ac- curately calculated by our mercliaiHs than by our Government : when if anv tic-.o dun^rrs t