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i 
 
REMARKS 
 
 ON 
 
 THE MILITIA 
 
 OF 
 
 CANADA. 
 
 KINGSTON: 
 
 PRINTED AT THE DAILY NEWS OFFICE. 
 1364. 
 
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 J 
 
 ■/^: 
 
 an 
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 w 
 
 ac 
 
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PREFACE. 
 
 Ill offering these remarks to the consideration of the Canadian public, 
 and more especially of my brother legislators, I have to apologize for the 
 haste with which they have been unavoidably thrown together. 
 
 I think, however, that they will find the fa(!t3 stated correct, and not 
 without interest to those who wish to examine this subject for them- 
 sclvs. 
 
 To avoid increasing the length, already perhaps too great, I have 
 added in an appendix some extracts and speeches which deal in detad 
 with one or two points only slightly alluded to in the main body of the 
 pamphlet, but to which I think some attention should be directed. 
 
 R. J. CARTWRIGHT. 
 
 Kingston, Aug. 26th, 1864. 
 

1!- 
 
 "A: 
 
 It is now not much leBS tlian four years since the outbreak 
 of the American civil war disclosed alike to Canada and to 
 England how completely this Province was placed at tho 
 mercy of its republican neighbors, so long as it continued in 
 its present unprotected state, and how enormous were the 
 resources of the enemy with whom it might bo called to 
 contend. 
 
 It is nearly three years since the capture of the Confederate 
 Ambassadors revealed with equal clearness the deep-rooted 
 feeling of jealous enmity by which the bulk of the American 
 people are actuated towards Great Britain and her dependen- 
 cies, while it showed also how flimsy were the barriers which 
 commercial interests could interpose to prevent collision 
 between the two nations, when once their angry passions were 
 aroused. 
 
 It is two years and more since the rejection of the Militia 
 Bill brought in by the Cartier Government drew forth from 
 the English press and from not a few English statesmen the 
 most emphatic declarations — many times repeated since — that 
 England could not and would not undertake the defence of 
 Canada, unless Canada was prepared to contribute, and that in 
 no slight measure, towards her own protection ; — and about an 
 equal space of time since the special commission, appointed 
 by the Imperial and Colonial Governments to inquire into the 
 position and resources of this coimtry, reported in due form 
 
that without a thorough and effective organization of the 
 militia, entirely apart from the volunteer c()ri)S, it would be 
 impossible to make anything like a proper provision for that 
 purpose. 
 
 Nevertheless, in spite of all this, and although the leading 
 English journals have of late (under a misconception of the 
 real facts of the case, which would be ludicrous if it were not 
 calculated to do immense mischief) ceased commenting on our 
 alleged indolence and apathy, and instead betaken themselves 
 to expressing their surprise that, to use the words of the 
 Times, " The Canadian Parliament should have adopted the 
 " measure introduced by Mr. Sandtield Macdonald almost 
 " unanimously, after rejecting the much moi'e moderate scheme 
 " oj M. Cartler and his colleague ! ! /" it is unfortunately too 
 true that up to the autumn of 186-i not one single company 
 of militia has been oi'ganized, or received even the miserable 
 six days' drill which is the maximum permitted, not enjoined, 
 by the much lauded enactment of Mr. Sandtield Macdonald 
 above referred to. 
 
 K either is tlie recklessness of our present course much 
 lessened by the reflection that in thus leaving the whole 
 burthen of our defence to rest on our volunteers in the event 
 of any sudden emergency like the affair of the Trent, it is 
 thrown on a body which, however valuable as an auxiliary, 
 and however creditable to the zeal and patriotism of the people 
 as apart from the Government, has been again and again pro- 
 nounced inadequate to such a task, not only by the special 
 commission above named, but also by each successive Minister 
 of Militia who has spoken oflicially on the question, and who, 
 no matter of what party, have all concurred in declaring that, 
 without in the least disparaging the gallantry of the volunteers, 
 the simple facts that they have the power of disbanding them- 
 selves, in most cases at two and in all at six months' notice, 
 and are drawn in most disproportionate numbers from one 
 particular section of the population — four-fifths being supplied 
 p towns and villages, i.e. by about one-tenth of our people 
 
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 — would, 2^(f '''^1 niako it unfair, iiulecd imposj^iblc, to treat 
 them as a regular force available for continuous Bcrvico. 
 
 Such, then, in brief, after four years' warning anil -wrangling, 
 is the position in which we find ourselves — without one bat- 
 talion of organized militia — without any embodied force whoso 
 services we could command for six weeks together — relying 
 on a i»lind belief in tho utter exhaustion of the North at the 
 cx])iration of the present contest, or on the equally gnmndless 
 KU})position that if liostilitics occur at any future period, wo 
 shall be sure to have ample notice, ample time to organize and 
 discipline our forces and obtain succor from abroad — choosing 
 utterly to ignore the fact that we are now, f» r the first time in 
 our history, side by side with a first class military power ; and 
 that wliile the very geographical position of Canada, wedged 
 midway between the north-eastern and north-western Bectif^ns 
 of the Federal States, is avu-e to render her acquisition an 
 object of inteuFo desire to the ambition of American statesmen 
 — if not indeed absolutely indispensable to tho preservation of 
 the remainder of the Union* — so our enormous frontier and 
 conq)arative total want of back country, coupled with tho 
 extraordinary facilities allbrded by modern science for tho 
 transport of large bodies of men at short notice, render it to 
 the last degree improbable that any lengthened breathing time 
 will be allowed should the Northern Goveniment ever resolve 
 on assailing us. 
 
 That such an attitude is likely to redound to the credit of 
 Canada at home or abroad, few, we think, are likely to main- 
 tain; and w^hile we admit that it is quite possible that no such 
 invasion may ever take place — especially if proper precautions 
 were taken to repel it — it still becomes all who have the honor 
 or the safety of their country at heart, who prefer to hold it by 
 some better tenure than the pleasure of an arrogant and capri- 
 cious neighbor, and all who know the vigor and celerity with 
 which the Americans are wont to push any scheme of conquest, 
 
 •Vide Appent'uc A. 
 
i ' 
 
 to considor well how they would propose to resist the onset of 
 200,000 or 300,000 Holdiors trained in no lioliday school of war 
 and led by commanders who, whatever their technical deficien- 
 cies, arc at least well used to handle largo masses of men, and 
 reckless at what cost they achieve their end. 
 
 Two things at any rate seem obvious — that in a country like 
 Canada, which is for the most part singularly devoid of natural 
 defences,* such an attack can only be combatted successfully 
 by opposing to it a very considerable numerical force of disci- 
 plined trooi)8 ; and secondly, that while it is always a matter of 
 doubt how far England may bo able to assist us with additional 
 soldiery at the critical moment, no one can believe that our 
 10,000 or 20,000 volunteers and garrisons of perhaps half as 
 many regular troops could stand the shock for a fortnight; 
 or that if Canada was once overrun and occupied by the 
 Americans, they could be expelled without an expenditure of 
 blood and treasure frightful to contemplate. 
 
 It follows therefore that any scheme which proposes to pro- 
 vide eflfectnally for the defence of Canada must do three thingb. 
 
 It must provide a large numerical force. 
 
 It must ensure this force being so far disciplined as to permit 
 of its being embodied at short notice. 
 
 And lastly, it must oifer a reasonable prospect of hok'ing the 
 enemy at bay long enough to admit of assistance arriving from 
 England, and to allow for the chance of her being engaged in 
 other wars. 
 
 That such a scheme is feasible, and even easy of execution, 
 we fully believe — nay, more, we are prepared to show that in 
 the end, calculating the expense over a reasonable term of 
 years, it will be found both relatively and absolutely cheaper 
 than the most unsatisfactory system now in vogue, though wo 
 do not pretend to say that it is capable of being carried into 
 eifect without some sacrifice on our part, or without the active 
 and energetic co-operation of the mother country. 
 
 •Vide Appendix A. 
 
 th 
 
 
w 
 
 9 
 
 Before entering on details, however, it may not bo amiss to 
 contrast the present relative expenditures of the two countries in 
 this direction. On doing so wo find that England, or rather the 
 British Isles, with a population of about thirty millions and a 
 revenue of seventy, expends jmnually rather more than one- 
 third on her army and navy, while Canada, with a population 
 of two millions and a half and a revenue of two millions 
 sterling, has consented latterly, not without reluctance, to 
 devote one hundred thousand pounds, or one-twentieth of her 
 income, to the same purpose. 
 
 In like manner, while England maintains a standing army 
 (vide estimates for 1864) of about 146,000 men all told, inde- 
 ]>endently of volunteers or militia, at an annual cost of fourteen 
 millions* (allowances to non-etfectives included), and while she 
 sends some 12,000 of these to form the garrison of Canada, at 
 a yearly cost of some five or six millions of dollars to her, and 
 a proportionate benefit to the country for whose sake this 
 expenditure is being incurred — Canada on her part, leaving 
 army and navy entirely out of the question, has not seen fit 
 hitherto to i)rovide one single regiment of militia, preferring 
 to rely wholly on a body of volunteers whoso services are 
 terminable at brief notice at their own will and pleasure. 
 
 The bare recital of these facts, it must be confessed, goes far 
 to justify the censures wiiich have been heaped upon us for 
 our lukewarmness in this matter ; and indeed so keenly has the 
 utter indefensibility of our present position been felt on all 
 sides, that no party has had the hardihood to defend it in the 
 abstract, but have rather confined themselves to idle assertions 
 that there can be no war, and will bo no war bet\. • 3n England 
 and the North — or else that we will always have a.^andance of 
 time to prepare for it if it does come, and that at present our 
 poverty is so great, and tlie expense of any really efficient 
 scheme so heavy, that it is quite out of our power to do any- 
 thing. And indeed it is but fair to say in mitigation of the 
 
 *The exact sum is £14,844,888 stg. for 1864-5, but this includes a little orer 
 a millioQ for volunteers and militia. Vide Appendix D. 
 
10 
 
 ,\ 
 
 U I 
 
 '' i 
 
 apparent apathy of the Canadian Legislature, that this last plea 
 is so far true, that besides being heavily in debt, the amount of 
 accumulated taxable wealth is relatively much siiialler in a 
 country like ours ; and that on the occasion of the rejection of 
 vhe first Militia Bill our Paiiiament had been frightened out 
 of its proprietj'' by the introduction of a very heavy budget, 
 showing a deficit of nearly one-fifth as between regular annual 
 income and outlay — wholly apart from proposed cost of militia. 
 Possibly, had a British minister been obliged to come down to 
 the House of Commons with a statement that there was an 
 annual deficit of fourteen millions for which it waa necessary 
 to provide by laying on fresh taxes, and a further intimation 
 that he would require about ten millions more for an entirely 
 new purpose, he too might have encountered similar diflSculties. 
 Be that as it may, however, it is apparent that now that the 
 deficit has been provided for in a most satisfactory manner, all 
 these arguments ad miseric(yrdiam have lost their force, nor 
 would they at any rate have affected the main point at issue, 
 vi?:., under what system the sum voted by the Legislature can 
 be expended to the best advantage, whether the amount of the 
 grant be large or small. 
 
 Hitherto, so far as we are aware, but three distinct systems 
 can be said to have been brought under the notice of Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 Foremost of these stands the measure introduced by the 
 Hon. John A. Macdonald in May, 1862, shortly after the 
 Trent difliculty, which proposed, in brief, to enrol from thirtv 
 to fifty thousand militiamen, and to drill these for one monia 
 each year for three or five years, and which, whether or not 
 objectionable in some minor details, was probably the best 
 suited to begin a piv per militia c"ganization on a scale suffi- 
 ciently large to be useful in that particular emergency, and 
 was besides recommended by the special commission, and we 
 understand approved by the Imperial authorities. At the same 
 time, while doing full justice to the merits of this plan as a 
 whole, and as adapted for an extraordinary crisis like that 
 
 I * 
 
" 
 
 I * 
 
 n 
 
 which it was designed to meet, we may be permitted to express 
 some doubts whether it would work equally well as a permanent 
 system of instruction. There seems reason to think that the 
 withdrawal of so large a body as 50,000 men from industrial 
 pursuits, though only for a short time, might cause inconve- 
 nience, and, which is much more important, that the constant 
 recurring service for five years would worry and annoy the 
 men, be much more expensive, and leave them, after all, far 
 less efficiently disciplined than an equal or even shorter period 
 of continuous instruction. , 
 
 The second scheme, of which Mr. Sandfield Macdonald is 
 the author, and which is the one now actually in operation, 
 can hardly be said to propose the organization of a militia at 
 all, as it barely permits the Governor to call out a part of the 
 first class, i.e. the unmarried, militiamen for six days' drill in 
 each year, without specifying any number whatever ; and in 
 fact relies almost entirely for efficiency (in Mr. S. Macdonald's 
 own words) on the establishment of a couple of military schools, 
 to be attached to regiments serving in Canada, in which the 
 militia officers were to be trained for some two months, if they 
 chose to attend — a very useful and proper measure in itself, 
 but hopelessly inadequate to meet the exigencies of the case. 
 
 The third system, which it is the object of this pamphlet to 
 explain and discuss, may be best described as consisting of the 
 following propositions : — 
 
 1st. That taking into consideration the peculiar position of 
 Canada, it is indispensable to have a distinct understanding — 
 most probably a formal convention, treaty if any like to call it 
 80 — with the Imperial Government, in which the contribution 
 which Canada, as a Province of the Mn^pi/re, ought to make 
 towards her own defence, should be precisely defined. 
 
 2nd. That it should be laid down as a fundamental principle 
 that the volunteers were to be regarded purely as an auxiliary 
 body, and that the chief portion of our expenditure ought to be 
 devoted to disciplining a certain proportion of the regular first 
 doss militia, the total number to be fixed by convention as 
 
12 
 
 i> i 
 
 it 
 
 above stated, but supposed likely to range from 50,000 to 
 100,000 men. 
 
 3rd. That as the number required would probably be too 
 large to admit of their being called out simultaneously — even 
 were it desirable to do so — they should be drilled in annual 
 instalments of so many thousand a year, each detachment to 
 serve for say six months in open field. 
 
 4th. That these militiamen, after having once received six 
 months' instruction, should be thenceforward free from all 
 further duty in time of peace, but should continue liable for 
 actual service for a period of ten years, and thereafter be 
 formed into a reserve, not to be called out except in extreme 
 emergency. 
 
 5th. It was further proposed* — though not at all as part of 
 the original system, which contemplates the formation of a well 
 organized militia on a footing suited to the resources of the 
 country, and so adjusted that it might bo kept up by ourselves 
 without any extraneous aid — that as Canada was very much 
 in arrear, and a sudden emergency might arise before such a 
 scheme could be fairly carried out, a special offer should be 
 made to the English Government, agreeing to train a double 
 or treble number of men in the first two or three years, pro- 
 vided they would* assist us with a loan of money for that 
 purpose at three per cent, and allow a portion of the troops in 
 garrison here to be brigaded with and act as instmctors to our 
 militia — ^by which means, without any actual outlay on their 
 part, we could probably afford to drill twice as many men as 
 we could otherwise. 
 
 It ought perhaps to be noted in connection with this project 
 that the demands proposed to be made on England are made 
 solely on the ground that such a war would be in the strictest 
 sense Imperial, and not Colonial ; and in the next place, that 
 althe^igh the author does undoubtedly believe that Canada is 
 quite able to maintain a militia 100,000 strong, giving each 
 
 *yide Appendix B. 
 
 It 
 
13 
 
 00 to 
 
 e too 
 -even 
 mnual 
 tent to 
 
 ed six 
 om all 
 ble for 
 fter be 
 xtreme 
 
 part of 
 f a well 
 } of the 
 arselves 
 y much 
 ) such a 
 lould be 
 I doable 
 are, pre- 
 fer that 
 Toops in 
 rs to our 
 on their 
 r men as 
 
 B project 
 ire made 
 strictest 
 ace, that 
 Canada is 
 ing each 
 
 man six months' actual discipline in the manner above detailed, 
 the system itself might be applied equally well to any smaller 
 number of men, serving for a shorter period, provided it be not 
 less than three months; and therefore, that those who shrink 
 from the cost of disciplining 100,000 men for six months, might 
 be ready to consent to that of maintaining 60,000 men for 
 three. 
 
 Apart from this, it only remains to observe that none of the 
 systems we have been endeavoring to describe are intended to 
 conflict with those fundamental provisions of our original 
 militia law which have subsisted from the very earliest period 
 in Canada, and by which every adult male inhabitant between 
 the ages of 18 and 60 is placed at the disposal of the Govern- 
 ment in case of war or imminent danger thereof, and are 
 capable of being called out in due order — ^first, the unmarried 
 men from 18 to 45 ; pecond, the married men between the 
 same ages ; and lastly, those between 45 and 60. 
 
 This power, whatever its value, remains untouched *, and 
 when it is remembered that the total number liable to serve 
 under this law, which is not only unrepealed, but actually 
 repeated and embodied in our very latest enactment,* is little 
 short of 500,000 men — that 25,000 youths annually attain their 
 majority in Canada, and that there are now on our militia 
 muster rolls nearly 200,000 u/imarried men, almost all under 
 thirty years of age, all of whom are bound by law to serve in 
 the militia when called out, it certainly does not seem an ex- 
 travagant proposal that 10,000 or even 15,000 of their number 
 should be embodied in rotation for a few months each year, 
 and taught the duties of a soldier's life by actual experience in 
 open field ; while it may be afiirmed with some confidence, 
 that six months of such discipline would imprint the lesson so 
 indelibly on our hardy rural population that they would con- 
 
 *Vide Dep. Adj. Gen. Keport for 1863, by which it appears that we have some 
 470,000 militia of all ranks, and about 160,000 first class service men. These 
 numbers are estimated from returns confessedly imperfect, and from comparing 
 them with the census of 1861 there seems reason to think the figures in the text 
 are nearer the real number. 
 
14 
 
 tinue perfectly able to take their places in the field, at very 
 short notice, during the whole term for which it is proposed to 
 hold them liable to active service.* 
 
 It is not pretended, of course, that such a force can be looked 
 on as the equals of regular troops, though it has been proved 
 repeatedly that they very soon attain a wonderful degree of 
 proficiency if mixed with a fair proportion of veteran soldiers ; 
 but it must always be borne in mind, that except in the now 
 improbable contingency of an immediate contest with the 
 North, they would probably be found not much inferior to 
 their antagonists in point of mere discipline, and, which is of 
 yet more importance, that since it is impossible, in cases where 
 a large numerical force is to be organized with but limited 
 means, to give each man more than a few months' drill in any 
 given number of years, the question is narrowed down to this 
 — not whether six months' drill is enough to make a man a 
 good soldier for the rest of his life, but whether, having only 
 six months' instruction to give him altogether, it is better to 
 instruct him for that period continuously and once for all, at a 
 time of life when such lessons have a natural tendency to infix 
 themselves in mind and body — or whether it is better to call 
 him out for a week or a fortnight for ten or twenty years in 
 succession, taking care to allow plenty of time to elapse on 
 each occasion to enable him to forget any smattering of drill 
 he may have picked up before.f 
 
 It may be added that, independently of the fact that this 
 plan of training men for a few days every year has proved a 
 most signal failure in many of the American States, one-half 
 at least of a militia disciplined by annual instalments would 
 always be pretty fresh from their instructors' hands ; and it is a 
 fair question whether the volunteer movement, if judiciously 
 managed, might not be turned to good account as a means of 
 keeping a considerable number of these men in a very respect- 
 able state of discipline. While as regards the continuous length 
 
 *yide Appendix C. f^ide Appendix B. 
 
very 
 ed to 
 
 15 
 
 of service which some parties may consider objectionable, wo 
 are convinced, after careful inquiry, that the majority of our 
 agricultural classes, so far from looking on it as excessive, wonld, 
 decidedly prefer undergoing the necessary amount of training 
 once for all in early life rather than be dragged away from 
 their business year after year, as they must be under any other 
 system which proposes to create any eflfectnal organization 
 at all. 
 
 These considerations, however, are of the less consequence, 
 because, while most objectors are willing to admit the superior 
 efficiency of such a militia, at least as compared with any 
 other within our power to raise, they are wont to take refuge 
 in the alleged enormous expense of such a course of discipline, 
 conveniently ignoring the fact, that although it may make a 
 vast difference in the ultimate efficiency of the men themselves, 
 it can make none in the absolute cost to the people of Canada 
 whether they drill a given number of militia for a fortnight a 
 year for twelve years, or drill one-twelfth of that number for 
 six months each year during the same period — unlcES indeed 
 it should prove that the former operation costs considerably 
 more than the latter, owing to the larger and proportionately 
 more expensive drilling apparatus, staff, etc., which would be 
 required to impart the least semblance of instruction to a large 
 number of men suddenly called together. 
 
 But waiving this point, and taking it for granted that all 
 parties, convinced of the practical uselessness of these six 
 day militia musters, tacitly allow them to drop into oblivion, 
 as there seems much reason to suppose will be the case — it is 
 evident to demonstration that we are about to expend within 
 the next ten years, in the mere payment of staff and volunteers' 
 allow^ances, a sum fully adequate to train and discipline a most 
 respectable militia. 
 
 In proof of this it is only necessary to call attention to the 
 following figures, which can be verified from our own official 
 BtatisticB : — 
 
*!W 
 
 t lu 
 
 I f 
 
 16 
 
 Ist. It appears that in the years 1863 and 1864 Parliament 
 has voted about a million of dollars for military purposes, 
 though it is probable the entire appropriation may not be 
 expended. 
 
 2nd. That we are now committed to an annual expenditure 
 in this direction of some half a million of dollars, which, if the 
 militia get any drill at all, will probably be increased to three 
 quarters. 
 
 3rd. That up to this moment every penny we have spent 
 has gone to staif or volunteers, with the exception of the grant 
 to schools for officers. 
 
 4th. That it is manifest, therefore, if we go on as we have 
 begun, we will expend a sum of five millions of dollars, perhaps 
 much more, within the next ten years — while as sole result of 
 this large expenditure, we will have possibly 10,000 or 12,000 
 volunteers (the latest returns to March, 1864, show the average 
 attendance at drills to be under 7,000 men, and we know they 
 have not increassd since) free by operation of law at the end 
 of each term of five years, even if they do not choose to avail 
 themselves of their right of disbanding on giving two months' 
 notice, and all for the self-same cost for which we might obtain 
 a most efficient* militia 50,000 strong, every one of whom 
 would have undergone his six months' service, and who would 
 be completely at our disposal if required through the whole 
 period of vigorous manhood I 
 
 Startling as these facts really are, and incredible as they 
 may appear to those who are ignorant of the prodigious 
 wastefulness of a false economy and a Radically bad system, we 
 think a very little reflection will serve to convince our readers 
 not only of the real extravagance of our pr «sent arrangements, 
 but also of the truth of the remaining pf ,rt of our proposition, 
 viz., that it is quite practicable to drill, leed, pay, clothe, and 
 maintain any reasonable number of our unmarried youth at a 
 cost of $100 per head for the six months — or at least that there 
 
 •Vide Appendix C. : I ; =^ 
 
"^ 
 
 'H 
 
 [iture 
 the 
 three 
 
 17 
 
 is noting prima facie absurd in declaring that a lew thousand 
 lads of eighteen or twenty with no families to provide for, may 
 be support 'jd comfortably and even remunerated, in spite of 
 all deductions, at the rate of three shillings per working day, 
 which is quite as high a rate of wages as they would probably 
 obtain in most parts of Canada. Even were it otherwise, and 
 were the drawbacks for their rations and other inevitable 
 deductions so heavy as to absorb the great proportion of their 
 wages, the sacrifice of a few months' time in early life would 
 be no great price to pay for being taught to defend their 
 country efficiently, and would be amply compensated by the 
 moral and physical advantages which every man, high or low, 
 derives from being subjected at some time or other to strict 
 military discipline and systematic training in any athletic 
 exercise. 
 
 Such a sacrifice, if sacrifice it be, is one which every country 
 has a right to exact in time of need, nor do we fear that many 
 will be found to murmur at the proposed scale as insufficient if 
 they will reflect that even now, in spite of many exceptional 
 circumstances which tend to augment the expense in that 
 service, the total outlay for an American private soldier is 
 very considerably less than $300 a year in gold, probably 
 about $120 for the six months — ^while in the British army, 
 which we may fairly take as our proper standard, the average 
 cost of the individual foot soldier is decidedly under £40 stg. 
 per man, showing that $100, the sum namcc by us, is a very 
 fair estimate for the half year.* ^ - * 
 
 It is of course true — and we call the especial attention of 
 our readers to the fact, for nothing has tended to create more 
 confusion on the subject — that the cost of maintaining a 
 standing oflrmy^ complete in all its branches, staff, cavalry, 
 artillery, and so on, is vastly greater, in proportion, than that 
 of maintaining an equal number of trained infantry ; so much 
 greater indeed, that while the extreme cost of the individual 
 British foot soldier is less than £40 stg. a year (it appears to be 
 
 *yide Army Estimates for 1864 and Appendix D. 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 i' 
 
T 
 
 "•*»» 
 
 18 
 
 just that sum if allowances to officers and to higher paid portions 
 of the service are included), the average cost as a member of 
 the standing army is swelled to fully £100 stg. per man. 
 
 But it must always be borne in mind that it is of the very 
 essence of our plan to provide a militia and not a standing 
 arrm/j and to train that militia by actual service in camp 
 during the summer months, thereby dispensing with all the 
 costly and cumbrous paraphernalia of stores, barracks, arsenals 
 and the like, and reducing our expenditure to the very lowest 
 minimum consistent with the health and efficiency of the men 
 — a minimum which certainly ought not to exceed the sum 
 usually spent on an English foot soldier. 
 
 If, indeed, the Imperial authorities, not content with this, 
 were to call on us to provide a standing army adequate to 
 defend a country one thousand miles long by some fifty deep, 
 at the odds of ten to one, the bravest might well decline the 
 hopeless task ; but England, if we understand her meaning 
 aright, does nothing of the kind. 
 
 All she asks, or rather all she warns us of, is simply this — 
 thai since it is impossible in her peculiar position to keep more 
 than a small number of trained soldiers at command for a 
 sudden emergency, it is absolutely necessary that we should 
 provide a reasonable contingent of disciplined men, the which 
 if we do, she on her side, as becomes the richest nation and 
 the greatest naval power in the world, will not stint to supply 
 us to the utmost with ships, with stores, with arms, with 
 leaders, with a nucleus of veteran troops, and in one word, 
 with everything we may need to give strength and stability to 
 our levies. 
 
 As to those cavillers who are perpetually harping on the 
 disturbance of the labor market, and the demoralization of our 
 youth by idling about in camps, it is enough to say as regards 
 the first ground of complaint, that it is as hard to suppose the 
 withdrawal of 10,000 or even 15,000 lads per annum out of 
 200,000 first class militia (being an average of say ten per 
 township or one hundred per county throughout Canada), 
 
19 
 
 this, 
 
 
 
 would bo likoly to interfere seriouBly with industrial pursuits, 
 as it is to beliovo that our liardy backwoodsmen, half of whom 
 think nothing of passing whclo winters in the lumber shanty, 
 scores of miles beyond the furthest verge of settlement, would 
 bo alarmed at the prospect of spending a few summer months 
 in open field — though this objection also has been gravely 
 advanced. 
 
 While, as to the other plea, that a camp life of the kind 
 proposed would tend seriously to demoralize the youth of thh 
 country, surely these virtuous critics hav« forgotten that there 
 is the widest possible difference between die life of a finished 
 soldier in a garrison town and that of a recruit in a camp of 
 instruction ; and further, that Jioy are most signally mistaken 
 if they suppose that discipline of the nature and extent of that 
 to which our militia would be subjected would allow them to 
 lead a very idle existence, or that six months* steady training 
 in athletic exercises is one whit more calculated to dispose 
 those undergoing it to profligacy or debauchery than the com- 
 paratively idle objectless career of many of these very youths, 
 if left to vegetate on their fathers* farms. 
 
 And lastly, passing by these trivial objections as ones which, 
 If applicable at all, apply equally to any scheme for creating a 
 sufiicient force, we would fain ask those Canadians who, careless 
 of the vast issues involved, still murmur against the expense 
 incurred by any effective measure of defence, whether, when 
 they cry out against an annual expenditure of £200,000 stg. or 
 £100,000 stg. as excessive and disproportionate to the resoiu'ces 
 of a country numbering near three millions of people, they are 
 aware, that if we were to adopt the lowest European standard, 
 which is about one in every hundred of the population — a 
 proportion which most political economists are agreed is not 
 too great in any well regulated government — we should be 
 called on to maintain a regular standing army from 25,000 to 
 30,000 strong? 
 
 Or to pursue the comparison a little further, and assuming 
 the cost of the English army as a fail* criteiion, are they aware 
 
20 
 
 ill: 
 
 
 t i 
 
 ^1 
 
 i: V 
 
 
 f I 
 
 that the oxpenne of maintaining a standing army of baroly 
 2,000 men for one year would equal that of embodying 10,000 
 militia for six months; or in other words — and we hardly know 
 how we could well put the whole case more forcibly before the 
 reader— that in ten years we might raise and discipline one 
 hundred thousand militia, giving each man half a year's 
 instruction in the manner proposed, for precisely the sum 
 which it would cost its to support a standing army of two 
 thousand men for the same period. 
 
 Let us be honest in this matter. We cannot pretend, with 
 the example of the American States before us, that it is out of 
 our power to maintain an army of 2,000 men if we choose to 
 do so; but if we will not do this, or its equivalent, let us at 
 least cease to delude England and ourselves with idle profes- 
 sions of loyalty and anxiety to preserve the alliance between 
 us, while refusing, as a government and in our collective 
 capacity, to take any sufficient steps to contribute towards our 
 own defence. 
 
 Let us remember that so far, nothing like a fair or definite 
 proposition has been submitted to the Imperial authorities. 
 
 Let us remember that if their demands have in any instance 
 appeared captious or excessive, they have been made in sheer 
 despair of seeing us take any action of our own accord. 
 
 Let us remember, too, that there are many reasons why such 
 a proposal should emanate from our own Government, who 
 may be supposed to know our wants and resources better than 
 any other parties. 
 
 Rarely, if ever, have any two countries been better able to 
 supplement each other's deficiencies, and rarely have the 
 elements of strength and weakness been more curiously com- 
 mingled in any case than in ours. 
 
 On the one hand, constituting in ourselves a State far from 
 contemptible in mere numbers and intrinsic resources, forming 
 an integral part of one of the greatest empires now existing, 
 and completely protected from attack on all sides saye one— 
 
^p 
 
 barely 
 
 10,000 
 yknow 
 fore the 
 ine one 
 
 year's 
 ?ie swm 
 
 of two 
 
 id, 'vrith 
 Is out of 
 [loose to 
 3t us at 
 ) profes- 
 aetween 
 jUective 
 ards our 
 
 definite 
 ities. 
 
 instance 
 in sheer 
 
 L 
 
 7hy such 
 Bnt, who 
 ^ter than 
 
 r able to 
 lave the 
 isly corn- 
 far from 
 forming 
 existing, 
 76 one— 
 
 4 
 
 21 
 
 wo yet find onrsolvcs, as regards that single enemy, entirely 
 without defences of any kind, natural or artificial, beyond those 
 which our own arms and the distant succor of the parent state 
 can afford. 
 
 Ourselves again, without even the semblance of a navy, 
 without arsenals, without veteran soldiers, and with a half 
 exhausted treasury besides, we yet possess a brave, hardy, and 
 intelligent population, containing the best possible material for 
 the formation of a most efficient militia, and wo are at the 
 same time most closely connected with a country which is 
 able to supply us in abundance with the ships, the stores, the 
 experienced officers, and the available wealth we stand in need 
 of, and which is deficient only in that one thing which wo 
 might easily contribute, namely, a body of disciplined men 
 numerous enough to repel a sudden and vigorous onset. 
 
 >/ In our antagonist, on the other hand, we have to deal with 
 a people who, though possessing, and certain to possess, during 
 the lifetime of the present generation at least, a very powerful 
 even if imperfect military organization, and able to hurl an 
 immense force against us at a very short notice, are withal 
 likely to emerge from their present conflict seriously exhausted 
 and incapable of any very lengthened effort for some time to 
 come. 
 
 Surely, we may ask, do not all these indisputable facts prove 
 beyond a doubt the absolute necessity of coming to some clear 
 understanding with tho Imperial Government, and of providing 
 such a force, if we provide any at all, as may enable us to resist 
 the severe but brief attack of an enemy who knows well that 
 his only chance is ' to overwhelm us at once before tardy 
 assistance can arrive ? 
 
 Doubtless, in approaching the English Cabinet on this subject, 
 the offers we should make ought to be of a substantial nature, 
 if only for the reason that while a proposal to provide a well 
 trained militia 50,000, much more 100,000 strong, would beyond 
 question ensure a most attentive consideration of our requests, 
 it is hardly likely that a demand for aid to carry out our 
 
3Si 
 
 % 
 
 ( 
 
 i 
 
 H 
 
 f f 
 
 I' ■ 
 
 99 
 
 present most iliiDBy schomo of defonco could oven obtain a 
 hearing. 
 
 As regards the convention itself, what we believe wo might 
 reasonably offer on the one hand and demand on the other, is 
 briefly this. 
 
 We should agree to provide within a certain fixed time a 
 militia of not less than 50,000 men, who should all undergo a 
 given period of service in open field. 
 
 But wo might fairly ask in turn, that the British Oovemment 
 should allow part of their garrisons to be brigaded witli our 
 militia iu their camps of instruction, and so soon as a section 
 had finished the stipulated term of service, that they should 
 lend us a certain specified sum at three per cent, and, it might 
 be, supply the militia themselves with arms, drill instructors, 
 and perhaps uniforms, gratis or at reduced rates. 
 
 For it must be remembered by any who object to such 
 requests as unreasonable, that the task of Canada after all is no 
 light one, and that such a militia so trained and embodied 
 would be placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government 
 and their commanders in this Province in a very different 
 sense from that in which any body of volunteers can be said to 
 be so, and consequently (the more especially as they would 
 remain available for some ten or fifteen years) demands may 
 properly be advanced on their behalf which it would be 
 preposterous to urge in the case of a transient and irregular 
 force such as volunteers must necessarily be. 
 
 Neither should it be overlooked that such assistance, though 
 of the most material benefit to Canada, need not cost the Home 
 Government one farthing, with the exception of the arms and 
 clothing, which being actually in store in Quebec, as we are 
 informed, might possibly be thrown in by way of encourage- 
 ment in the event of our agreeing to raise the larger number 
 of militia, a number which it may be as well to observe would 
 equal one-^fth of our whole adult male population. 
 
 Of the great direct advantages to England herself which 
 would result from the Buccessful establishment of such a 
 
3tain a 
 
 ) might 
 >tIior, iB 
 
 time a 
 dergo a 
 
 irnment 
 itli our 
 section 
 ' shonld 
 ,t might 
 TUctorB, 
 
 to Buch 
 all iB no 
 nbodied 
 smment 
 different 
 B Baid to 
 Y would 
 odB may 
 ould be 
 rregular 
 
 , though 
 le Home 
 krmB and 
 s we are 
 courage- 
 number 
 re would 
 
 If which 
 such a 
 
 23 
 
 ByBteni, both Jii cMiablin}^ licr to roduco l»or garriHonfl hero In 
 tiinu of i)ea('o, and in freeing lier from the noecsHJty of making 
 thuHO sudden extraordinary exertions to reinforce us whicli 
 have already cost her so much, wo have hardly room to speak ; 
 nor for the same reason can we do more than hint at the 
 dcrtirability to us in Canada, even if our negotiations failed, of 
 removing from ourselves the onus of negligence and indilfercnce 
 to our own defence, and tlie extreme importance in every point 
 of view of knowing exactly to what extent England could or 
 would come to our assistance. 
 
 At any rate, bo that as it may, whether England aid us or 
 whether she refuse to aid us — whether we pay six per cent or 
 three per cent — whether we spend five millions or ten — it is 
 equally important that the money we do spend Bhould be laid 
 out as profitably as possible, and that it assuredly will not bo 
 under a system which at best only promises to supply us with 
 Bonie 12,000 dissatisfied volunteers for the self-same outlay 
 which might produce a most excellent militia of at least four 
 times their strength.* 
 
 In conclusion, we may bo pardoned for saying, that momen- 
 tous as this question undoubtedly is — momentous as it is to 
 decide on the best mode of employing our resources and to 
 ascertain how far or on what terni^ we can count on the 
 assistance of Great Britain in this particular emergency — it is 
 of yet more importance that some distinct line of policy should 
 be settled on as between the parent state and her colonies. 
 
 At present it would almost seem as if England, after having 
 spent two centuries and ransacked half the world to find Bites 
 for new colonies — after driving off every European rival who 
 attempted to secure the least fragment for himself — and even 
 waging the bitterest hostilities with such of her own colonies 
 as had grown strong enough to aspire to independence — was 
 suddenly resolved to exert all her energies to rid herself of the 
 troubles and responsibility of presiding over the immense 
 empire which is springing up around her. 
 
 *yidQ Appendix 0. 
 
24 
 
 With this in the abstract wo can have no qitarrel. If the 
 duties of the position be too great for her strength, England is 
 in the right to abdicate it as soon as possible ; but it is useless 
 to deny that the cor tant semi-official proclamations of her 
 anxiety to be rid of ns, and her inability to protect us, no 
 matter what the cause or origin of wa/r, while at the same 
 time she liersclf will take no active step to sever a connection 
 which on her own showing is full of peril to both — are not 
 calculated to increase our respect for British statesmanship, or 
 to lessen the undercurrent of dissatisfaction which is sure to 
 exist in such a case. 
 
 Kor, while we own frankly that wo do not think Canada has 
 hitherto ta,ken reasonable precautions for her own defence, can 
 we by any means admit that it lies in the mouths of English 
 statesmen to speak of our supineness as if they had always 
 maintained their own country in a perfect state of defence, 
 much less to talk of the past connection of England with the 
 Canadas as if it were one long record of benefits and f'^vors on 
 the one side and apathetic indifference on the other. They 
 may have forgotten, but we have not, that their only claim on 
 the inhabitants of one large section of Canada was the forcible 
 subjugation of their forefathers — while the retention of the 
 remaining portion is mainly due, not to the success of their 
 generals or the wisdom of their statesmen, but to the devotion 
 of a little band of detenuined loyalists who preferred to sacrifice 
 every jTospect they had in life rather than fail in their 
 allegiance to the British flag, and whose descendants have, 
 once at least since then, held their own against as desperate 
 odds as ever England herself has had to contend with. 
 
 Neither can we allow — even without discussing vexed ques- 
 tions of former interferences in our domestic politics — ^that we 
 have derived those peculiar benefits ftovL our alliance with her 
 which most Englishmen choose to assume we have enjoyed. 
 
 We believe, indeed, that our union with the British empire 
 was and is productive of great benefits, both morally and 
 socially ; but at the same time there is no denying that in order 
 
 "!!: 
 
25 
 
 to secure those advantages we had to submit to great immediate 
 material sacrifices, so great indeed that nothing but the peculiar 
 race and religion of the bulk of the Lower Canadians, and the 
 peculiar circumstances which attended the foundation of Upper 
 Canada, could have prevented this country from casting in its 
 lot with the Union in former days. 
 
 Now, no doubt, the position is widely diflferent ; but, even 
 now, it would be well for our English friends to remember 
 that wo have risks to encounter and arguments to advance as 
 well as they. 
 
 They may say, and doubtless with tnith, that but for the 
 position of Canada they might go to war with the United 
 States, or rather with what is left of them, without the least 
 fear of consequences. 
 
 We on our side might maintain with equal reason, that but 
 for our alliance with England we would have no fear of going 
 to war at all. 
 
 And if it be urged that we are no help, but vather the 
 reverse, in carrying out the Imperial policy, it is fairly open 
 to us to retort that, as we have no voice in deciding what tliat 
 policy is to be, we ought not to be taxed heavily on account of 
 or exposed defenceless to dangers which that very policy may 
 inflict upon us; and that when we find English authorities 
 expressing their determination not to allow their 10,000 or 
 12,000 troops to be sacrificed because of our apathy and 
 neglect, but by no means equally explicit in their assurances 
 of adequate support even if we do exert ourselves to the utter- 
 most — ^we Canadians, with certain episodes in our own past 
 history before our eyes, may be pardoned if we have some 
 uncomfortable doubts how much worth the assistance of the 
 mother country may prove should she chance to be engaged in 
 other wars at. the critical moment, or how far the ravage and 
 invasion of the richest and most populous parts of Canada 
 wcild be compensated to us even by the greatest ultimate 
 success or the most complete blockade or devastation of the 
 Yankee seaboard. 
 
26 
 
 In fact, it is not too mucli to say that there are one or two 
 questions yet unanswered, floating dimly in the minds of the 
 people of Canada, and raising doubts which we fear will have 
 to be removed before any great national effort is to be expected 
 from them — and these are, first, whether the English Govern- 
 ment are really willing to assist us to this full extent of their 
 power; and secondly, whether, granting their willingness, their 
 and our combined resources are sufficient to hold out a reason- 
 able prospect of defending Canada as a whole against American 
 invasion. 
 
 As to the firet, the English Government will, wo doubt not, 
 speak for itself at fitting time and place ; but as to the second, 
 which is the more important, inasmuch as a very great 
 immber have secretly taught themselves to look upon it as 
 impossible to protect Canada, at least beyond the point to 
 which British fleets can ascend the St. Lawrence, it may not 
 bo amiss to state briefly the grounds on which a contrary 
 opinion is advanced. \ - 
 
 It may be admitted at once, as now clearly evident to all 
 parties, that the old United States could have overpowered all 
 resistance had it chosen to hurl itself on Canada as it did on 
 its own seceding States ; but granting this, it by no means 
 follows that it is equally in the power.of the Northern fragment 
 to crush us altogether, or even to maintain a violent and 
 protracted warfare. 
 
 Kor is this opinion urged merely from considering the extent 
 to which their resources have been diminished by their present 
 conflict, severe as it is, but still more from the fact that in any 
 future war they would never dare to fling their forces upon 
 us in the same headlong fashion they did upon the South, so 
 long as that South exists as a powerful and bitterly hostile 
 nation adjoining their frontier for almost as many hundred 
 miles as theirs does ours ; or, in shorter phrase, that their power 
 for mischief is no longer to bo measured as thirty millions 
 against three, or even as twenty, but rather as 20 — 10 is to 3 
 — a vastly different problem. ^ 
 
27 
 
 We may add, too, as a consideration by no means to bo lost 
 sight of, that whereas the North all through this present war 
 have been receiving enormous supplies of men and material 
 from Europe, and at the same time extracting the bulk of their 
 real reveniie from their customs, all these resources would bo 
 at once and hopelessly cut off in the event of a war with 
 England, and they in their turn would find themselves sub- 
 jected to those privations and inconveniences which have 
 heretofore pressed so heavily on tlio South — without the 
 stimulus of fighting for home and liberty which has alone 
 enabled the latter to bear up under the ordeal. 
 
 And though it would be both unsafe and unwise to lay too 
 much stress on the exhaustion of tho North ; and though wo 
 do not doubt that even after tho termination of tho present 
 straggle they could still contrive to array an army of two, 
 three, or even five hundred thousand men, in any cause they 
 had at heart, still we think, in view of the imperative necessity 
 they would labor under of maintaining a large force in reserve 
 to watch their Southern frontier and protect their seaboard, all 
 must admit that it is scarcely probable they would be able to 
 support such an armament for any great length of time, or 
 that they would ever have more than 250,000 men at the 
 outside at their disposal for the conquest of Canada — a force 
 which, how great soever, is yet not so overwhelming but that 
 the combined resources of England and of Canada might suffice 
 to meet it, if the former can furnish but 50,000 regulars to 
 back tho 100,000 militia which, as we have shown above, we 
 hold it quite possible for Canada to supply on her part. 
 
 Large as these numbers may sound, we liave only too good 
 proof in the recent history of America that it is abundantly 
 j^osaihle to make such exertions ; and at any rate as resrards 
 ourselves, we have a right to say that such odds, great as they 
 are, ought not to terrify men fighting on the defensive and on 
 their own soil, nor are they at worst one half as formidable as 
 those which our own forefathers overcame in 1812, or as the 
 gallant Southerns have defied for four long years of desperate 
 
 .1; 
 
 ; t ft 
 
38 
 
 i 
 
 struggle, unaided and unrecognized by a single European 
 
 Nor is it to be forgotten while discussing this subject, that, 
 as nothing tempts to crime so much as apparent facility for its 
 commission, so, on the other hand, the bare knowledge of the 
 fact that the conquest of Canada would require so large an 
 armament would operate most powerfully to prevent the 
 attempt ever being made — not merely from the evident mag- 
 nitude of the enterprise, but also because that very magnitude 
 would necessitate such preparation and consequent delay as 
 would give American statesmen time to reflect, and English 
 and Canadian ones opportunity to prepare to repel it. 
 ^ But so long as Americans believe (and we admit, looking at 
 our existing state of preparation, with every appearance of 
 reason) that an army of 50,000 men, easily collected at a 
 few days' notice from any part of the North, could overrun 
 Canada to the very gates of Quebec, before the news could 
 well reach London — just so long as this continues possible, so 
 long will the temptation to feed fat their ancient grudge and 
 repair their losses at our expense continue to be almost too 
 great for human virtue to withstand, though if it were once 
 well understood by the people of the North that war with 
 England for the acquisition of Canada meant a standing army 
 of half a million, and a bloody, protracted and desperate 
 contest, neither Congress nor Cabinet would bo likely to drift 
 into it unawares, or to choose that path as the easiest route te 
 popularity at all events. 
 
 For the rest, we must say plainly that while yielding to none 
 in our anxiety to see Canada do her duty as a Province of the 
 Empire, it is not in the interests of Canada alone that we wish 
 te have that duty clearly defined, and to know whether the 
 Empire in its turn is prepared to fulfil its part towards its 
 Province. ., .^^. f .. , 
 
 We desire to see Canada take her proper place as an ally, 
 and no longer a mere dependency on the mother country, and 
 we admit distinctly that up to this time she has not folly 
 
29 
 
 recognised her obligations in that behalf. But that once done 
 — those obligations faithfully discharged — we are prepared to 
 claim for her the privileges as well as the duties of such a 
 station, and if England disdains our alliance, or professes her 
 inability to perform her fair share in a contract for mutual 
 defence, then, in Heaven's name, let us bring our connection to 
 an honorable close before it involve us and them in further 
 difficulties, and perhaps in a ruinous and unprofitable contest. 
 
 The people of Canada, at least, have no sort of desire to 
 become a drain or an incumbrance on England. And if the 
 people of Great Britain have really come to the opinion that 
 they derive no adequate benefit from their connection with us 
 — if they are really of opinion that they have nothing to lose 
 in losing control over half a continent — and in losing the 
 Ganadas they will assuredly lose every foot of ground they 
 hold in British North America — ^if they consider that it will 
 redound to their credit and advantage to let the keys of the 
 North Atlantic drop into the hands of a bitter and jealous 
 rival, the only one, too, who has shown the power and the 
 will to dispute their maritime supremacy — all we ask is that 
 they should acquaint us with their decision quickly and 
 explicitly. *Only it is well that the British public should know 
 that we in Canada are not prepared to admit that England 
 maintains her connection with\i8 wholly on our account and 
 for our benefit ; and further, that although unwilling to part 
 so long as the tie between us is one of mutual affection and 
 respect, we have no wish to continue as a drag and a burthen 
 ontheEmpire. 
 
 ' And much as we hear of the risks and the difficulties to 
 which England and English garrisons are exposed in defending 
 Canada, it is impossible for us not to remember that such risks 
 are trifling after all compared with those to which near three 
 millions of people would have been exposed, for a quarrel in 
 which they had no sort of concern, had war broken out at the 
 time of the Trent imbroglio ; and that heretofore, whenever 
 disputes have arisen in matters where wo were directly inter- 
 
 i 
 
 11 
 
80 
 
 W 
 
 m 
 
 ested, British statcsraanship has invariably delighted to display 
 itself at our expense, as in barinj; the channel of the St. Law- 
 rence to attack, and in surrendering our only path to the 
 sea through British territory, and thus throwing great and 
 needless obstacles in the way of our confederation for mutual 
 support with the maritime provinces. , . -. .; 
 
 Of the fact that in the last attempt to conquer Canada we 
 were left to struggle for full two yeare with very scanty succors, 
 we say the less, because we are fully awai'o that England at 
 that crisis was scarce able to assist us ; but if it be made a taunt 
 to us that our loyalty has risen marvellously since it became 
 manifest that annexation to the North could hardly benefit 
 us much in a pecuniary point of view, we may retort that 
 after disregarding for some sixty years the great material 
 advantages that union would have bestowed upon us, it is 
 something more than ungenerous to talk of abandoning us 
 now when our fidelity to England has lost us all the gain ol 
 half a century of unexampled progress, and her desertion 
 might leave us to bear a large share of burthens which we had 
 no voice m mcurnng. -■■•'- •* < ' « •' ,*.«.! 
 
 t^ For it is mere trifling to deny that without a still further 
 schism among the Northern States, the position o{ Canada or 
 of British Nortli America, as an independent power, is quite 
 untenable as yet, whatever [t may become at some future 
 period ; and therefore, that abandonment of Canada does not 
 mean the erection of a friendly neutral state, but, in all human 
 probability, the addition of three and a half millions of people 
 and the whole North American seaboard to a foe, already too 
 powerful, who will know well how to extract from such an 
 acquisition resources and means of mischief of which English 
 statesmen are perhaps but dimly aware. 
 
 Certainly, the events of the last few years, if they have 
 taught England nothing else, ought at least to teach her rulers 
 that there lurks deep in the minds of the American people a 
 feeling of jealous and unreasoning enmity to England, which 
 needs but a pretext and an opportunity to break out into open 
 
 ^JLVjLr ._'!„ 
 
 w ja'.^i*itr> c^i\*^ti 
 
31 
 
 name — and if they snppose that allowing the North to acquire 
 possession of British North America, and with it a hundred 
 times more facilities for assailing English greatness in its most 
 vital point — is at all likely to diminish their vindictivenQss 
 and their determination to wreak a full revenge for the 
 thousand imaginary, and, it may be, some few real, wrongs 
 they believe themselves to have sustained at our hands, then 
 they have paid but little attention to the whole current of 
 American affairs for the last two generations, or to the effect 
 which four years of savage civil war have wrought in the 
 national character. 
 
 As for us, though outwardly it may seem as if our fate 
 depended most on our own exertions, it will turn in reality, 
 as is oftenest the case with dependencies, however powerful, 
 on the tone and attitude of the mother country ; hence it is 
 tliat it is doubly needful her decision should be made and 
 acted on without delay. ^ ^ ji;. ... , ,.; -;x,yi 
 
 • If Canada is to bo held, coute qui coute, we have no more 
 
 If Canada cannot be kept, and England wishes us to ask for 
 our independence— let us know it at once. • ' 
 
 If, on the other hand, England will stand by us to the last on 
 certain conditions, it is high time those should bo stated and 
 our course be shaped accordingly. 
 
 In any event, it behoves both parties to put an end to the 
 vacillating and irresolute attitude in which they stand, each 
 doubting the other's loyalty or ability to protect or defend — 
 afraid to break off, and yet unwilling to come to an under- 
 standing — afraid to give offence, and yet practically in some 
 measure taunting and alienating each other — >afraid of war, and 
 yet afraid to act on the supposition that such a thing is 
 
 It is time, we repeat, that this state of things were brought 
 to a close — time that English statesmen should avow their 
 deteriminations, and caU upon us for ours. 
 
 
 i 
 
8S 
 
 n 
 
 it 
 
 This at least wo liave a right to require of them ; and if 
 hcforo tliis he (lone Canada should bo conquered or even over- 
 run and occupied for any length of time in a war originating 
 out of some question of Imperial policy, or which had for its 
 object avowedly the wresting of this country from the domi- 
 nions of Great Britain — it needs but little foresight to perceive 
 that the humiliation and soreness which such a calamity would 
 inevitably produce in the minds of the Canadian people would 
 be sure to react in the shape of a feeling of bitter resentment 
 against the parent State for having neither protected them 
 against such attack, or, if unable to do this, for having allowed 
 them to drag on a connection which was likely to terminate 
 in such a result. 
 
 How far such feelings would be modified or intensified by 
 tho reflection that we were ourselves considerably to blame, is 
 an open question, though wo fear that tho knowledge that 
 Canada individually has no sort of ground for quarrel with the 
 l»Jorthem States, (for an assault on us for tho express purpose of 
 revenging themselves on Great Britain cannot surely be treated 
 as arising out of any policy of ours, and they would find easier 
 modes of compelling us to enter their confederacy than open 
 war, were our connection with England at an end) — would go 
 far to produce the latter consequence. 
 
 And yet, loath as wo are to believe in the bare possibility of 
 such an issue, none can deny that this or something like it 
 would bo the natural and appropriate termination of a state 
 of things like the present, if Canada continue to decline taking 
 any effective measures for her own defence, and if England 
 persist in making audible proclamation to all the world that 
 her colonies are in future to lie at the mercy of any opponent 
 strong enough to overpower them — nay, that she would be 
 rather thankful than otherwise to any one who would relieve 
 her from the care of possessions which it would appear to be 
 out of her power either to preserve or to relinquish. i 
 
 A'i 
 
 u 
 
 :'■;■ ;' - 
 
 ■ jM". «*-•.; 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 A. 
 
 SPEECH ON THE ADDRESS, AUGUST, 1863. 
 
 Mn. CARTWRIGHT.— As I have the misfortune to differ from the 
 member for Brant in toto, in the view he has taken of the position of the 
 country, I would like, with the permission of the House, to state the 
 grounds on which I have based my opinion. I confess I have much 
 hesitation in addressing the House on a subject of so much importance. 
 But I may, perhaps, be pardoned for reminding the House that there is no 
 other subject at all approaching this in importance in which so complete 
 a revolution has been effected by the events of the last few years — none 
 other in dealing with which we will be so completely deprived of the 
 benefits of past experience. Formerly, if we had met together to delib- 
 erate on the best mode of defending ourselves against a like danger, wo 
 might have fairly argued that it would require many months for the foe 
 to concentrate x)r organize his forces — that his preparations could never 
 be made in secret — mat it would be time enough for us to prepare when 
 we saw his troops assembling on our frontiers, and that even if the worst 
 came to the worst, as between two brave undisciplined mobs, both 
 equally brave and equally unorganized, the one which fought on its own 
 soil, especially if backed by even a very small number of veteran troops, 
 was almost sure to win against the heaviest odds. Now, however, as 
 every member of this House well knows, the whole conditions of the case 
 are completely changed ; and though I would not flinch from the struggle 
 because it may have to be maintained against heavy odds at the outset— -I 
 trust no man who hears me would do that — still it is worse than idle to 
 disguise from ourselves or from the country that now, if war does come 
 upon us, we shall have to deal with an enemy who has become, whatever he 
 may have been before, a first-class military power in every sense of the word 
 — who can bring against us, at the very shortest notice, an immense body 
 of well-trained troops, amply provided with transports and munitions of 
 war, and who, despite the deficiencies of some of their leaders, have 
 proved again and again, on many a hard-fought field, that they possess 
 their full share of we courage and endurance we are apt to arrogate 
 as th' birthright of our race. And therefore, Mr. Speaker, although 
 I am very far from despairing of the safety of our country, 
 because, as I said, wo may have to hold our ovm against 
 heavy odds at the outset, I cannot but feel that no ordinary exertions 
 and no ordinary precautions will be needed to enable us to maiataia 
 
 i 
 
84 
 
 ourselves against an antagonist like this, especially when wo remember 
 that we occupy a country which is, at this moment, one of the most 
 defenceless in the world— which, neither by climate, by geographical 
 position, or by its natural or artificial fortresses, presents one single 
 obstacle to the invaders' path — which, in one word, if assailed, must rely 
 almost solely on the courage and the discipline of its sons to stem the 
 torrent, at least till distant succors can arrive. Such, Mr. Speaker, is the 
 counti7, and such the position, for whoso defence wo are called to pro« 
 vide ; nor do I believe we can point out, along a frontier of more than a 
 thousand miles, one single place of importance, which is two good 
 days' march from American soil, or one single town, except, perhaps, 
 that in which wo stand, which could retard an invading army for an 
 hour. And it may bo well for us to bear in mind that though there are 
 numerous instances in which small States, relatively weaker than we are, 
 have baffled all the attempts of superior powers to subjugate them to 
 their sway, there are none, none at least which I can recollect, in which 
 the contest has terminated in their favor, except in cases where they were 
 
 {>rotected by inaccessible mountain ranges, as in Scotland or Switzer- 
 and, or by numerous artificial defences as in Holland, or by the very 
 vastness and solitude of the territory which it was attempted to subdue, 
 as with the United States themselves some eighty years ago, and with 
 the Southern States to-day ; or else, gentlemen, mark mo, by the skill 
 and forethought with which their government had trained their people 
 to meet the coming shock. And am I to bo told, Mr. Speaker, as some 
 hon. gentlemen have not scrupled to hint, that, granting all I say is true 
 — granting that we do actually lie helpless at the mercy of the American 
 people, still there is no need for apprehension here — that we may all 
 stay quiet, each man under the shadow of his own vine and his 
 own fig tree, because the American people are too great and too 
 mighty a people to care for tho acquisition of such an unconsid- 
 ered trifle as this Canada of ours — because they are too wise, too 
 calm, too generous, I suppose, to assail their ancient foe in her only 
 vulnerable quarter ? If we are to bo told, and if the country is to be 
 told, that we are in no danger, because it is not worth while for the 
 Americans to go to war for the sake of obtaining possession of 
 Canada — that they would have no object to gain in conquering us — then 
 I beg to call the attention of hon. gentlemen to one or two geograph- 
 ical facts, which can neither be gainsayed or denied, and which go lar, 
 indeed, to show that if this present struggle terminates unfavorably for 
 the North, if the South does succeed in establishing its independence, 
 then, Mr Speaker, then, and in such case, our Northern neighbors will not 
 only have the strongest possible interest in obtaining possession of 
 Canada, but what is more, they must obtain it, unless they are prepared 
 to submit to yet further disintegrations of their still enormous empire. 
 I do not know whether it has attracted the attention of the members of 
 this House, but it is nevertheless the fact that the battle of Antictam 
 itself was fought a short two hundred miles from the southern shores of 
 Lake Erie, and that General Lee's outposts during both this and the 
 preceding campaigns are said to have penetrated to within five or six 
 days' march of the same quarter — or, in other words, that if the State of 
 Virginia succeeds in accomplishing her secession, the great regions of the 
 North-West and the North-East must remain as it were banging apart, 
 connected only by a comparatively narrow isthmus of temtory, and 
 
 lH^iiKliUXi ■•-' :» ;»A^.*.: - 
 
 ■JS 1 
 
 VJ tpf* >J^«fc'i 
 
35 
 
 liable to be rent asunder by a hundred accidontfl. While on the other 
 hand, juBt between these two great divisions of the North-West and thu 
 North-East, filling up the gap, and, as it were, the very key-stone 
 required by manifest destiny to bind them together, lies. Canada, so 
 completely enveloped by their protecting arms that an air line drawn 
 from St. Paul's, Minnesota, to the northern boundary of the State of Maine, 
 wonld pass full one hundred miles north of the most northern portions 
 of Canada, at any rate one hundred miles north of Ottawa and of Pene- 
 tanguishine. Are we to be told, Mr. Speaker, that there is no danger 
 here, that here is no temptation to a warlike and ambitious people? 
 Why, sir, there is not one single statesman in Europe, or in America 
 either, who would not tell us that the bloodiest wars have been waged, 
 from time immemorial, for objects not one-tenth part as valuable to thu 
 people that coveted their possession. They would toll us that God has 
 provided but two main arteries for the Continent of North America ; that 
 no dominant State can by possibility exist on this Continent which does 
 not possess the absolute control cither of the St. Lawrence or the Missis- 
 sippi. They would remind us that the fate of North America has been 
 fought out, once and again, on the very ground on which we stand, and 
 they would warn us that men who, like the loaders of the Northern States, 
 have trodden under foot their own most sacred traditions — who have 
 sinned against light and knowledge— who have kindled a conflagration 
 which may yet wrap the world in flames, and which will most certainly, 
 I fear, consume their own rights and liberties, and done all this solely to 
 gratify the insane lust of boundless empire, are not the men who will 
 pause to count the cost, if any chance presented itself, to repair, at our 
 expense, the losses and tno humiliations they have incurred. And, 
 though it is true wo shall not have to face them alone (if face them wo 
 must), although in our mother-country we possess a most powerful and 
 determined ally, ready and willing, if only time be given her, to aid us to 
 the last, sustained by whom, I doubt not, we shall oe able, if we only do 
 our part faithfully und well, to roll back the fiercest tide of invasion from 
 our shores ; yet we must never forget that such is the nature of England's 
 power, such the conditions of her greatness, that the very constitution of 
 her empire compels her, more than any other people of equal strength, to 
 scatter her armaments far and wide, over land and sea, and that her aid, 
 though certain, can hardly help being tardy, too tardy to avoid thu 
 worst consequences from our negligence, if we cannot provide some efifec- 
 tual means of self defence till help can come. All that she has to give I 
 doubt not we shall have in time of need. Arms, supplies, funds, leaders, 
 ships — ^if we can use them — ^will be furnished without stint ; but men, 
 trained men, in sufficient numbers to repel a sudden invasion she cannot 
 supply, for the best of all reasons, that she has not got them to send ; and 
 even the mightiest nation cannot extemporise them at an hour's notice, 
 as our Northern neighbors have learned to their cost. Men, therefore, I 
 repeat — trained men in sufficient numbers to repel a sudden attack — are 
 what the Imperial Government, and I think justly, demands at our 
 hands ; and surely the very instinct of self-preservation would teach us to 
 comply with the request, when we know that our enemy, in six weeks, 
 could place one hundred thousand men on our frontier, while our protec- 
 tress could scarcely, in as many months, with pain and difficulty, bring 
 together half that number to our aid. How and in what manner that 
 demand can best bo answered, are matters which can be more fitly 
 
 H 
 
 '\ 
 
 \ f! 
 
86 
 
 li"! 
 
 N„ 
 
 discusaed hereaftor. All I can say, in conclusion, Mr. Bueakor, is this, 
 that I trust thia House will then show itself mindful that it is the choice 
 of a people who haye made it their proudest boost that, of all England's 
 hunored colonies, they alone are the representatives of men who sought 
 this northerp land, not driven forth by the pressure of penuily at home ; 
 not through restless love of change ; but because they preferred to give 
 up house and land, to risk life and liberty itself, rather than swerve one 
 inch from their duty to their country and their sovereign. And I trust 
 also that they will show by their zeal and liberality on this momentous 
 occasion that they are determined to wipe off the stain which untortu- 
 natelv now rests on the loyalty of Canada, and which I believe every 
 man in this House, bo his politics what they may, regrets as deeply as 
 I do. 
 
 SPEECH ON HON. J. SANDFIELD MACDONALD'S 
 , ., MILITIA BILL, SEPTEMBER 1863. 
 
 Mr. OARTWRIOHT.— Mr. Speaker— I entirely agree with the 
 honorable introducer of this measure in believing it to bo one of momen- 
 tous character; probably, all tilings considered, the most momentous 
 which has ever been submitted to a Canadian Parliament. We may 
 escape a war with the Northern States, or we may not. I for one believe 
 that that result is to a great extent under our own control, and that tho 
 moment which sees us placed in an effective position of defence, sees the 
 danger largely diminished, if not altogether removed. But war or no 
 war, every reflecting man must clearly perceive that the time has come 
 for a thorough reconsideration of our relations with the mother country 
 — that we must either rise to the rank of allies and confederates of Eng- 
 land, at least so far as North America is concerned, or else must prepare 
 to sever a connection whicli we lack either the will or the ability to 
 maintidn. So long as we remain allies of England, and so long as England 
 continues mistress of the scab, there is but one foo whom we have to 
 dread ; and the question is practically narrowed down to this, whether wo 
 are prepared to face the risk of a collision with that enemy, or whether, 
 rather than run that danger, we prefer to burst the bond of union and 
 establish ourselves as an independent State. 
 
 We have lived in peace and safety under the el\4dow of tho British flag 
 for flfty years, but still I think there is no denyir.g that, even though we 
 be the cause and temptation to war, our chief di'i;ger does arise from our 
 connection with England. Were we once an in« lependent State, I do not 
 believe the Northern States would feel at all disposed to molest us, 
 because they know that in all likelihood the course of events would soon 
 induce us to unite our fate with theirs, or that even if we proved blind 
 to our manifest and glorious destiny, a little wholesome pressure on onr 
 commerce would soon bring us suppliant to their feet. I need hardly 
 say, Mr. Sj>eaker, which way my own personal wishes tend. All I desire 
 is that this House should see clearly the issues which really lie before us. 
 We know that Canada will probably ultimately become independent ; and 
 if any man or any considerable party in this country honeaUy believe that 
 
87 
 
 the time has como to prepare for becoming independent, in the intcrents 
 idike of England and ouraelvoH, their ari^uincnts miKtit deserve coiiHidora- 
 tion. At any rate, Mr. Speaker, it would be a fur more lionorable, far 
 more respectable, attitude to declare themselveH convinced that we ou^ht 
 to prepare ounelves for independence, than, while outwardly profetwing 
 the utmost loyalty and anxiety to maintain our union, yet practically 
 refuse all efficient co-operntion even for our own defence. Be sure, Mr. 
 Speaker, the people of England will not much longer bear patiently with 
 the listless indifference our government, if not our people, have displayed, 
 or consent to add to their own heavy burthens the task of entirelv 
 providing for the protection of a nation three millions strong, wlto will 
 not take one effectual step on their own behalf. I wish to be clearly 
 understood. I have not the least desire to impeach the loyaltv of any 
 man or any party in Canada. I fear no treason or treachery at the hands 
 of any Canadian, but I do fear the apathy and listlossness shown in 
 many influential quarters, and the determined blindness which refuses to 
 admit th'j least possibility of war. I have no wish to tax the patience 
 of the House by a recapitulation of the arguments which I used on a 
 previous occasion to prove the extreme deroncelessness of our position, 
 and the temptation it presents to the cupidity of our American 
 neighbors. It is scarcely worth while to argue these matters with men 
 who will persist in expressing their confidence in the peaceable and 
 amicable intentions of a people who, according to their own official 
 statistics, have embodied every third male adult in their country for the 
 prosecution of a war of conquest — who will persist, in the face of a 
 thousand proofs, in denying that that people is actuated by a feeling of 
 the bitterest hostility, if not to us, at all events to the nation of whom 
 we form a dependency — and who ignore, apparently at least, the fact so 
 well known to every student of American nietory, that, from the very 
 moment the pil^m fathers first sot foot upon its shores, the absolute 
 dominion of this continent has been an object of the intensest desire, not 
 only to them and their (descendants, but to every Englishman who 
 inhabited it. Surely, Mr. Speaker, we Canadian" ourselves a living 
 proof of the desperate struggle the two great powers of Europe so long 
 maintained for its mastery, must know full well how deeply rooted is 
 that idea in every American mind, even if we did not now see that 
 passion culminating in one of the most desperate and desolating wars 
 which history has ever recorded. But I will not attempt to convince 
 men who are prepared to assert that we are now in an effective state of 
 defence, or that the American people do not entertain feelings of hostility 
 towards England, and have no end to serve in conquering and annexing 
 us. All these things must be taken for granted, Mr. Speaker, before the 
 necessity of discussing such a measure as that now before us could ever 
 have arisen, and we must presume that the government at least are fully 
 convinced of the truth of these assertions before they would have 
 consented to introduce it. 
 
 As regards the details of this Bill, Mr. Speaker, I shall only say that I 
 believe many of them may be turned to good account ; and at any rate I 
 am glad to find that the honorable Minister of Militia has distinctly 
 enunciated the principle that the country must rely mainly on her militia 
 for defence. I am as proud as any man, Mr. Speaker, of the zeal and 
 devotion of our volunteers, and I believe this country lies under a very 
 deep obligation to them for preserving the courage and loyalty of our 
 
38 
 
 1-^ 
 
 if S ; 
 
 I;: 
 
 people from the imputations which would otherwise have been thrown 
 upon them. Bu'; for all that, I must say plainly that the more I reflect 
 on the subject, the more I am convinced that their proper place is only as 
 an auxiliary body to a regular force, whether it be composed of an 
 effectively trained militia, as it should be with us, or a standing army as 
 with other powers. I believe, sir, that the opinion of the people of 
 Canada, if fairly ascertained, would be found to agree with what I have 
 just expressed ; and that they, too, while justly proud of the patriotic 
 spirit of our Volunteers, do not, nevertheless, desire to place their chief 
 reliance on that movement as a means of defence. I believe that the 
 feelings of the people of Canada have been much misrepresented on this 
 subject ; and while it may be true enough that the utter inefficiency of 
 previous militia organizutions may have prejudiced then somewhat 
 against the various systems which have been proposed for their accept- 
 ance, it was really but the defectiveness of the systems of which they 
 complained ; and that once satisfied of the possibility of creating a really 
 effective militia, they will submit without a murmur to any expenditure 
 which this House may see fit to impose. But I believe also, Mr. Speaker, 
 that the instinctive good sense of our people has long since convinced 
 them that it is impossible to obtain an effective solmery, or even an 
 effective militia, without subjecting them to some continuous discipline 
 for a reasonable length of time. They know, sir, that something more is 
 needed to make a man effective than mere knowledge of a few elemen- 
 tary manoeuvres — that he must be taught how to handle his arms, how to 
 march, how to encamp; must, in one word, be subjected to actual 
 military discipline for a length of time, which, without rendering him 
 unfit for the ordinary duties of life, would make him efficient at short 
 notice for the whole remainder of his existence. Depend upon it, Mr. 
 Speaker, we cannot safely entrust the defence of a country to the amuse- 
 ment of a holiday afternoon. If we arc ever to have an efficient force, 
 that force must be trained by continuous discipline. I repeat, it is idle 
 to suppose that a soldier or a militia man needs onl^ to be perfect in his 
 drill, or even to possess a tolerable aptitude in the use of his weapons- 
 he requires to be trained to habits of obedience, to acquire the capacity 
 of undergoing fatigue; habits which can only be attained by some 
 temporary separation from the ordinary pursuits of life. And I must 
 say, that I believe it has been a radical defect in many of the systems 
 which have been proposed for our consideration, that they have all pro- 
 ceeded on the idea that it was possible to render men effective by training 
 them for a few weeks or days in each successive year, and then turning 
 them loose to forget during the remainder of the period all they had 
 gained in each brief interval. Why, Mr. Speaker, what would be the 
 result were we to apply such a principle to any ordinary scheme of 
 education ? I put it to the common sense of this House, were you to take 
 a lad from the plough and attempt to instruct him in the commonest 
 branch of learning, on the system of teaching him for two or three 
 weeks "in each year, and then dismissing him to forget during the 
 remaining fifty all that he had previously acquired — I ask this House 
 how long this hopeful system might be prolonged before he would have 
 mastered the first principles of knowledge ; whereas, had one-tenth part 
 of the time thus fruitlessly wasted been spent in continuous instruction, 
 he would have learned the lesson once and forever. Why should we 
 apply to the education of our citizen soldiery a system which all would 
 
39 
 
 admit to be hopelessly vicious were it applied to any other pursuit what- 
 Boever. Let this House fix the number of men whom it thinks should 
 constitute the permanent militia of Canada — let it decide how many 
 months of consecutive training would suffice to render these men really 
 efficient — ^I am contending for the principle not for the details — but let us 
 at least determine that the contingent oi Canada, be it large or small, shall 
 bo e£fective as far as it goes, and that every man it contains shall be so 
 far trained that he may be able without shame to take his place in the 
 field beside the soldiers of England. 
 
 The principle I advocate, Mr. Speaker, is neither new nor untried. It 
 is one which has long been in use among many of the European powers, 
 with slight modifications, and notably, I believe, in Prussia, from the 
 time of Frederick the Great downwards ; and it is one which, in somo 
 shape or other, has always been adopted by small States as the only 
 mode in which they could possibly raise and discipline a force at once 
 numerous enough and effective enough to oppose a barrier to the onset 
 of a much superior foe. It is not my intention, Mr. Speaker, to enter into 
 any minute details of this measure ; but for the sake of illustrating my 
 meaning — though I beg the House to remember that I introduce my 
 figures for tht, sake of illustration chiefly — let us suppose that the House 
 saw fit to decide on raising and disciplining a militia of 50,000 strong, 
 to be raised say 20,000 next spring, 20,000 the year after, and thencefor- 
 ward at the rate of 10,000 men in each successive year, each man to be 
 subjected to at least six months consecutive actual training (in the open 
 field if possible), and to be afterwards freed from all further military 
 discipline, but required to hold themselves in readiness for a period of say 
 five or ten years in case of actual war, thenceforward to constitute a body 
 of reserve, only to be called out in circumstances of the most urgent 
 national peril. Can any man say that such an efibrt would be out of fair 
 proportion to our population and resources ? I shall not stop to point 
 out how useful our Volunteer system might become, were such a militia 
 once trained and distributed through the country, or what privileges and 
 exemptions might fairly be accorded to these men during the time they 
 remain liable to active service. Neither will I do more than hint at the 
 great benefits both physical and moral that would accrue to the vast bulk 
 of our youthful agricultural population from being subjected to a little 
 wholesome military discipline in early life. But I do say, that while no 
 man can justly maintain that our youth would be exposed to any undue 
 hardships by being obliged to undergo a single summer's training in a 
 country which sends forth tens of thousands of hardy lumbermen and 
 woodcutters to brave all the rigors of our Siberian winter, so neither can 
 any man justly declare that such an exertion would be disproportionate 
 to our resources and our numbers, whether we take for our standard of 
 comparison the efforts put forth by the American colonies on many occa- 
 sions prior to their separation from Great Britain, or of our own 
 forefathers in the war of 1812, or of the smallest and poorest of the 
 American States at the present moment. 
 
 Why, Mr. Speaker, even the little State of Maine has already furnished 
 a quota of more than 40,000 men to the Federal Army ; and Illinois, 
 Indiana, and Ohio, have each severally contributed contingents, as I am 
 informed, of more than 100,000 each ; and will any honorable member 
 dare to rise on the floor of this House and declare that it is impossible 
 
40 
 
 It I 
 
 
 
 III : 
 
 for Canada, with a population five times that of the former, and I belier* 
 double that of some of the others, to raise and discipline 60,000 men for 
 one single summer for the purpose of her own defence, or rather, and 
 which would be the fairer mode to describe my proposal, to train 10,000 
 each 8ucc«»siye year ? 
 
 I know well, Mr. Speaker, that many, eycn of those who admit the 
 substantial truth of my assertions, will take refuge in the deplorable 
 position of our finances as an all-sufiicient excuse for refusing to take one 
 really effective step in our own defence. If this be all, Mr. Speaker, if 
 this House be willing to admit the truth of the principle, though 
 unwilling to incur the cost of carrying it into effect, then I say that, 
 humiliating as the confession may be to a country like ours to admit that 
 our own extravagance has deprived us of the power to protect our very 
 existence, it would be far better to state our real position frankly and 
 honestly to the Imperial Cabinet, and obtain from them as a temporary 
 loan, at low rates of interest, the wherewithal to put ourselves at last in 
 a reasonable state of defence. I know something, Mr. Speaker, of the 
 temper of the English people, and something of the temper of the men 
 who now stand at the head of their affi&irs ; and I feel perfectly assured 
 that, once convince them that we are at last thoroughly awake to the 
 duty of our own defence, once propose a really satisfactory military con- 
 vention, and there is no fear that they will turn a deaf ear to our request. 
 Moreover, there are good and sound reasons why England should gladly 
 accede to such a proposition. We know that the mere effort of reinforc- 
 ing her garrisons in North America is stated to have cost her first and 
 last some ten millions of dollars, and that she is even now annually 
 expending some $6,000,000 in the maintenance of those very troops ; and 
 it is hardly to be supposed that her government would hesitate to lend 
 us the utmost amount which we would require rather than sink perhaps 
 five or six times the sum in the probably useless attempt to repair the 
 consequences of our neglect. 
 
 But at any rate, Mr. Speaker, be this as it may, let England aid us or 
 not, I must altogether refuse to believe that while it was possible for us 
 to expend more than forty millions of dollars in improving our internal 
 communications, and to squander millions upon millions m erecting an 
 extravagant and costly pile of buildings at Ottawa, it is utterly out of 
 our power to incur any extraordinary outlay for the preservation of our 
 national existence — or that a country like ours, equal in wealth and 
 numbers to many an independent European Kingdom, can afford to 
 declare itself a cipher in affairs of peace and war, to act as if it were 
 practically wholly unconcerned with the question whether or not it 
 should be made the battle-field of contending armies — ^the theatre of all 
 the miseries which we have seen infiicted on States that but a few 
 months ago deemed themselves as safe from the scourge of war as we 
 can possibly hope to be. And if this were not enough, did we need any 
 additional incentive to do our duty, we might find it in the consideration 
 that whatever course we, the premier colony of England, may decide ou 
 pursuing, will in all likelihood materially affect not only ourselves but 
 the whole circle of colonial relations with the Empire. If we return a 
 sufficient answer to England's just demand — if we show that ours is no 
 fictitious lip loyalty, but that we do earnestly desire to maintain our con- 
 nection with our parent land, and are willing to bear a fair proportionate 
 
■ 
 
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 41 
 
 share in tlie burthen of our own defence, it will go far to prove the possi- 
 bility of erecting our whole colonial system into a great British confederacy. 
 If, on the other hand, the people of this country see fit to declare that the 
 effort is beyond their ability, and that the interest of England no less than 
 ours requires that we should put an end to a union which, so long as we 
 continue in our present position, is indeed but a source of weal^ess to 
 her and danger to us, why then we might have some right to congratu- 
 late ourselves on our discretion, if not on our loyalty. But if after three 
 years' warning, we can find no better answer than is contained in this 
 mockery"of a measure which I hold in my hand, then I do assert, Mr. 
 Speaker, that we shall stand for ever degraded as a people who, whilo 
 unable to deny the existence of tiie danger, yet showed themselves devoid 
 alike of tlie courage to prepare to meet it manfully, or of the prudence 
 to withdraw from it while there was yet time. 
 
 c. 
 
 SPEECH ON THE ADDRESS, 24th FEBRUARY, 1864. 
 
 Mk. CARTWRIGHT.— Mr. Speakeu— Before this paragraph of the 
 Address be finally disposed of, there are a few points to which I wish to 
 call the attention of the House. It will be in their recollection that there 
 was much difference of opinion last session as to the proper system to be 
 pursued, both with militia and volunteers. Now, sir, though I am far 
 from asserting that I have been able to give this matter the attention it 
 deserves, I may be permitted to say that I have taken some pains during 
 the recess to make myself acquainted with the condition and feelings of 
 our Volunteer Force, and the result of my inquiries has been to convince 
 me that there is a pretty gener»'l and widespread feeling of discontent 
 amongst them at the treatment they have received from Government. I 
 must add, in common justice to the Hon. Minister of Militia, that 
 some of their complaints did not appear to me very well founded, or at 
 least that they entertained expectations out of the power of the Province 
 to gratify, if any expense is to be incurred on behalf of the regular 
 militia. But, at the same time, after making all reasonable deductions, 
 no oru can deny that there is much in the position in which they find 
 the:iicjil' o;^ to justify dissatisfaction. Right or wrong, Mr. Speaker, it is 
 certuiM iat they are the only embodied force now existing in Canada, 
 and it if c y natural that they should hold themselves entitled to the 
 special C)^.f4i deration of Government, so long as that continues to be the 
 case. I have been charged myself, though most unfairly, with depre- 
 ciating the services of the volunteers. So far from that, I say now, as I 
 have always said, that they have done a most excellent piece of service, 
 and that their country will ever owe them a deep debt of gratitude for 
 throwing themselves into the breach till some proper organization can be 
 matured — an organization which should distribute the burthen, as 
 statesmen ought to do, evenly over the surface of the whole nation — not 
 leave it as now so arranged as to crush to earth the willing few. But 
 1 ly also, Mr. Speaker, that now that time has been given, it is absurd, 
 Ir h: unworthy of the Government, to wrest these gallant fellows' devo- 
 tion into an excuse for throwing the whole burthen of the defence of the 
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42 
 
 
 p< 
 
 country upon them — much more, to make it a taunt to men who step 
 forward to relievo Canada from the ignominy which their factiousness, 
 their mismanagement, had brought upon us, that, forsooth, the volunteer 
 movement was a failure, because, though avowedly intended as a 
 temporary substiflite, avowedly designed as an auxiliary to our regular 
 militia, it is not of itself enough to do what it never pretended 
 to do — is not able, with a force drawn from one-tenth of our 
 population, to defend not merely that portion, but the whole remaining 
 nine-tenths to boot I Sir, the volunteer movement is not a failure, 
 but I very much fear Her Majesty's present government in Canada is 
 a failure — notably in their militia department, and, par excellence, in 
 that part of it which concerns our volunteers. Why, sir, the whole 
 system as it stands is an absurdity and an anomaly: the very titles 
 are misnomers, the very provisions of the law self-contradictory. Wo 
 have volunteers serving of their own free choice, subjected or attempted 
 to be subjected to strict discipline — enrolled militia bound by law to do 
 duty exempt from all drill or training whatever — we have hon. gentlemen 
 in one breath denying that six. • 'i.^Xa* continued instruction is enough to 
 qualify men to serve on an emerg r 'a another asserting that six weeks 
 in a military school will not only. L. ' n to act as officers, but even to 
 instruct others In the elements of hi dership. We have them at one 
 moment declaring that there is not the slightest ground for apprehending 
 danger from the United States, and straightway proposing to appropriate 
 one-seventh of our available Income to the task of preparing against such 
 a war. We have them in one and the same speech avowing that volun- 
 teering was a failure as a means of defence, nnd that it was their fixed 
 intention to have no other means of defence whatever ! 1 ! If the volun- 
 teers are to be maintained, as I hope they may be, let us treat them as 
 such, not attempting to enforce strict discipline upon men over whom, 
 from the very nature of the case, we can never exercise any real control, 
 not harassing them and perplexing ourselves with innumerable regula> 
 tions, or fretting ourselves too much as to how they attain proficiency — 
 but as is done in England, and as was suggested, I believe, by my hon. 
 friend the member for Kingston, assigning a certain sum per man to each 
 efficient corps, and confining our interference to taking careful precau- 
 tions that no payment be made for any man who is not fully up to the 
 proper standard. Such a course, I have reason to know, would be at 
 once far more popular with the volunteers themselves, and far more 
 economical to the public purse, besides being far more consistent 
 with what I hold to be the only true theory with regard to volunteers, 
 viz., that they are to be looked on purely as an auxiliary body, most 
 useful, most admirable in that respect, but no more to be considered 
 our sole or even chief means of protection than our volunteer country 
 justices the sole and final dispensers of justice throughout our commu- 
 nity. As to the existing Militia Law, Mr. Speaker, for the amendments 
 to which I see so much credit is claimed, I am not disposed to find 
 much fault with it — in fact, I believe that with a few alterations it could 
 be made to suit our purpose well enough. Neither do I know that it would 
 be advisable to ask for any great addition to our present annual expendi- 
 ture for military purposes — our yearly outlay being perhaps as much as 
 we can well afford to incur — but I do deliberately assert that having 
 regard to our peculiar position, to our internal resources, our means of 
 defence, our relations to the Imperial Government — and lastly, but not 
 
43 
 
 
 leaatly, to the strength and character of the only antagonist whom vo 
 have to fear, it would bo hardly possible to spend our money to less 
 advantage than wc arc now doing ; and, in a word, that given the prob- 
 lem how to get through the largest sum with the least beneficial result, 
 our present system would afford an almost perfect solution. It seems to 
 have been assumed on both sides, Mr. Speaker, that that system having 
 no other merit that I know to boast of, perhaps because it had no other 
 merit, must therefore of necessity be a cheap one. The House, and 
 the country, too, seem to have imagined that it was impossible that 
 gentlemen whose sole claim to office lay in their supposed frugality, could 
 have committed themselves to a scheme which, as I shall presently show, 
 costs us double, nay quadruple, per head more than any other need do if 
 properly managed. This assumption of cheapness I can by no means 
 acquiesce in. I maintain, and I think the House will agree with me 
 therein, that there is but one mode of thoroughly testing any of these 
 systems. Given the total expenditure for military purposes during a 
 sufficiently long period, and given also the number of men you have fit for 
 service at the end of that period, and the total sum expended, divided by 
 the number of efficient men so produced, will give you the exact cost per 
 man under that particular system. Now, sir, apply that test to our 
 present arrangement, and what do wc find ? Why, we find that every 
 efficient volunteer now produced costs the country on the average more 
 than $40 per head per annum, that is to say, over |200 each in every 
 period of five years, and over $400 in every period of ten years ; and what 
 is more, that even without exercising their right to withdraw on giving 
 a few months' notice, every volunteer isj ipso facto, free from further 
 service on the expiration of five years — while on the other hand, a most 
 effective militia, ready for service during the whole period of manhood, 
 might be trained and disciplined for a cost of $100 per man, perhaps less. 
 These are facts worth attention, Mr. Speaker; and surely no man, whatever 
 his prejudices, will be found to declare that a well drilled militia 50,000 
 strong is -not in every way preferable to one-fourth their number disso- 
 luble at a bare six or two months' notice : and yet this is precisely the 
 result we will arrive at, on the expiration of any given period of ten 
 years, the cost in either case being exactly the same. It would be easy, 
 Mr. Speaker, to go on to multiply examples of the absurdities and incon- 
 veniences of a system which absorbs one-third, if not one-half, of our 
 whole appropriation in mere allowances to staff officers and instructors, 
 and which professes to be administered by a gentleman who combines in 
 his own person the three-fold offices of Minister of Militia, Attorney- 
 General, Premier, and, we mi^ht almost add, whipper-in for his whole 
 Cabinet. But, as time is drawing on, I shall merely take occasion to notico 
 briefly two or three objections which were thrown out to-day against the 
 scheme which I had the honor of submitting to this House last session. 
 As to the cost, which is so great a stumbling-block in the minds of many 
 hon. gentlemen who have chosen to confound the cost of maintaining a 
 militia with that of a standing army, and who are terrified by visions of 
 stores, arsenals, barracks, and I know not what costly and cumbrous 
 paraphernalia thereto belonging, let it suffice to assure them that my plan 
 contemplated nothing whatever of the kind. All it proposed was simply 
 this, to assemble a certain proportion of our first-class service men, and to 
 encamp them for a few summer months in convenient positions in 
 company with a few detachments of regular soldiers, and my estimates of 
 
44 
 
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 the cost were in fact based on the amount requisite for maintaining an 
 ordinary English or American foot soldier for an equal time, assuming only, 
 — what we have every reason to expect we may rely on obtaining, m any 
 such attempt — the active and cheenul co-operation of the mother country. 
 As to the much more important question whether the amount of training 
 proposed, viz., six months, would suffice to make them always thereafter 
 capable of serving in the field at a few weeks' notice — I must speak with 
 some caution — smce while perfectly certain that it would go much 
 further towards effecting that end than a much longer period of desultory 
 instruction, with frequent breaks and long intervals between, nothing 
 but actual experience could determine this point absolutely. This, how- 
 ever, may be said, which is indeed well known to every trainer and 
 gymnast, that when once a certain proficiency in any athletic exercise 
 has been attained, the person attaining it, though without constant 
 practice he very soon falls off from any high degree of proficiency, is 
 always able, so long as health and vigor remain intact, to regain his 
 former skill in a venr short period; and further, thaC most men can 
 be brought to the highest point of perfection they are ever likely 
 to reach in six months or less. If this prove true, as there seems every 
 reason to suppose it may, with regard to military habits and exercises as 
 well as athletic pursuits, it would go far to prove my case — at any rate u 
 brief experience would show whether it is correct or not. As to the 
 other objections, which, so far as I know, are these three, the injury to 
 industrial pursuits and demoralization to the young men themselves 
 caused by withdrawing them from their occupations and shutting them 
 up in camps, and also the necessity of obtaining them by conscription or 
 ballot, I have to reply that the slightest consideration might have shown 
 those hon. gentlemen that the withdrawal of so very small a number as 
 one hundred lads per county for a single summer can hardly by any 
 
 {)ossibility retard the commercial or agricultural interests of a country 
 ike ours, while as to the demoralization consequent on collecting a few 
 thousand young men in camp in proper situations, passing over ttie very 
 bad compliment which these gentlemen pay to our Canadian youth, in 
 supposing mutual contact is likely to corrupt them to so alarming an 
 extent, it is as well to remember that theirs will be no life of idleness or 
 garrison routine, but one which, if properly managed, will provide abun- 
 dance of healthy exercise for body and mind. And I may add, I have 
 yet to learn, Mr. Speaker, what there is in strict and systematic physical 
 training to predispose men to that profligacy and debauchery which some 
 affect to dread, and which is in truth rather the invariable concomitant 
 of an effeminate and luxurious mode of living. As for the necessity of 
 obtaining the re(]^uisite number by ballot, though it ought to be enough to 
 point out that this is the mode prescribed by our existmg law, I shall just 
 observe that no man has a right to assume that our militia would refuse 
 to volunteer for the purpose till the experiment had been tried and failed, 
 but that even if tney did decline to come forward in that manner, 
 it would be as absurd to leave the country undefended on that score as to 
 leave our taxes imcollected because the contributors would not pay unless 
 compelled. There are some powers, Mr. Speaker, which no nation and no 
 government can possibly resign without giving up the power of maintain- 
 ing its very existence ; and if there be one of those wmch is plainer than 
 another, it is that of requiring that a reasonable number or its inhabi- 
 tants should submit to be trained to defend themselves and their country 
 
45 
 
 in such manner as tho government of that country shall prescribe. But 
 this, Mr. Speaker, is a point on which it ought to be unnecessary to dwell 
 at length, nor do I wish to detain the House by entering into more minute 
 details on the general sut)jcct, though I do unhesitatingly assert that tho 
 sole and only result of our present system, whether persisted in for five, 
 ten, or twenty years, will be to leave us in possession of a small and 
 comparatively inefficient force, over whom we can have no proper 
 control, for the self-same cost which might furnish us with double, qua- 
 druple, or octuple their number of disciplined militia, who would always 
 be thoroughly at our disposal, and who, with the assistance we might 
 expect from the mother country, would be able to maintain their ground 
 right manfully against all comers. And I assert also, that while every- 
 thing that has transpired — (outside the walls of this House, that is to say) 
 — since the time of the Trent difficulty, has gone to show that thepeoiAe 
 of Canada, as a whole, are anxious and earnest to do their duty m this 
 matter, loyal to their ?.llegiance, ready to bear any burthen Ministers may 
 see fit to impose for that object, those hon. gentlemen on the other hand 
 have squandered most valuable opportunities and failed most deplorably 
 in taking advantage of the facilities which the then temper of our people 
 afforded them for making every reasonable provision for the defence of 
 this Province. Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, considering the circumstances 
 under which those hon. gentlemen obtained power, this is not much to 
 be wondered at — perhaps it may be that their factious folly on that occa- 
 sion has tied their hands and prevented them from taking those steps 
 which their better judgment would have dictated had they left them- 
 selves free agents on this question. Be that as it may, though I fear they 
 have flung away chances which may never return, I do trust most 
 sincerely that ere this session be brought to a close we shall see 
 something like an adequate system of defence set on foot, and may bo 
 able to return to our homes with the knowledge that we have at last 
 obtained some better safeguard against danger than our present most 
 flimsy organization — some better security for peace than the guileless 
 moderation of our Yankee neighbors — some better means of repelling 
 attack than a revised militia muster roll. 
 
 'J 
 
 D. 
 
 The figures from the Army Estimates for 1864-5 arc as follows:— 
 
 Ist. Clothing £ 596,694 stg. 
 
 2nd. Provisions 520,301 « 
 
 3rd. Allowances and Pay 5,051,257 « 
 
 Total £6,168,252" 
 
 This includes pay ef regimental staff; officers, cavalry and artillery, and 
 a few other items not at all requisite to include in estimating the true 
 cost of a foot soldier. Prices of provisions, fuel, and so forth, arc also 
 much higher at most stations than in Canada. 
 
 The number of men (exclusive of those serving in India) is 145,654 of 
 all ranks, and the total vote demanded for them amounted in 1864-5 to 
 £8,619,087 stg., of which about two millions and a half were for forage, 
 
Hi 
 
 46 
 
 special staff allowances, and some other items no way directly affecting 
 tuo cost per head. 
 
 The remainder of the expenditure required to make up the whole sum 
 of £14,888,884 stg. consists of votes for stores, ammunition, works and 
 buildings, and so on. 
 
 In the Comhill Magazine for August, 1864, appears an analysis of the 
 exact cost of a British soldier per week, which wo subjoin : — 
 
 «, d. 
 
 "5} lbs. of butcher meat, at 6d. per lb 2 10 
 
 101 lbs. bread, at lid. per lb 1 4 
 
 Expenses of vegetables, tea, coffee, milk, &c., at 2id. per day 1 Si 
 
 Washing at jd. per diem 3) 
 
 Lodgings, at 3d. per night 1 9 
 
 Pocket-money (after deducting washing, and expenses of 
 
 clothing for which the soldier pays), at 4d. per day 2 4 
 
 (The dragoon clears about 6d.) ,- 
 
 Olothing fonnd gratis, value about JC4 per annum 1 6 
 
 Advantages of the absolute certainty of these allowances at 
 the same rates, no matter what the coat to Qovernment 
 may be, of medical care and attendance, and full pay when 
 sick, the value of bounty and free kit received on enlist- 
 ment, the likelihood of a small pension if invalided, pros- 
 pect of good-conduct pay, promotion, Ac, estimated at. . . 1 
 
 Total weekly substantial receipts of the soldier under the 
 present r«^tm« 12 6" 
 
 From this, which appears approximately correct, the probable cost of 
 rations for a large number might be set down at from 5s. to 6s. stg. per 
 week. As before observed, there is no reason why this should be 
 exceeded or indeed equalled in Canada. 
 
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