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LONDON: rRINTKD FOR |. OEBRBTT, OPPOSITS BURlINCrON'« HOVSa, PICCADILLY* MOCCLXXXVIII. IJl^--.,-^ ' ■ > 1 "■"^nppffiii J - ? f I r wnmmfmummm ■OMmH^p IP" THOUGHTS, &c. TO flatter the people ^vith the fem- blance of political power, has been the common art of demagogues in all ages ; yet a grofler fraud was never prac- tifed on the paflTions of the giddy multi- tude. The great body of the people are, by the unalterable law of nature, incapable of exercifing the powers of government ; and wherever they have been taught to grafp at this obje6l, whether Caefar or Pom- pey prevailed, they have equally given to themfelves a mafler, and eflablifhed a ty- ranny in the ilate. This truth, taught by the hiilory, and exemplified in the ruin of the ancient republics, feems never to have entered into the formation of any go- vernment, until the principles of the Britifli Conftitution, developed in the contefts with the houfe of Stuart, and fully confirmed atf the Revolution, exhibited a ftru6lure of po;^ litical wifdom, which, during a century ^t leaft, has been the pride aild happinefs oi B Briton^— , ■* ',';i Sfji "X>r».i»*,-»" / ¥p^5r'^v1i'.--*.H."-".'W(7.'*««*»'',*'V 9 f i,, I -■'*■ 4 'M V ( 2 ) Britons — tlie admiration and envy of Air- rounding nations. The fundamental prin- ci\)\(i of this conilitution is a renunciation on the part of the people of all the adfive exe- cutiTc powers of government, which they have vefted in one perfon — the King; and that thcje powers may be for ever placed beyond the grafp of ambitious citizens, U"ie\- have rendered them Ixreditary^ paliir\g from fiitherto fon, without ek^ion — becaule tlie ch'cfion of a fupreme magnilrate might afford the opportunity of confounding the feveral orders of the {rate, and defeating the eliects intended to be produced by the other })arts of the conttitution. Ha\ing thus veded the whole executive govern 111. nit of tlie country in one perfon^ taking his oflice by IjerediUuy lucceflion, our aiiceftors have applied the whole remaining powers of tiie conititution to controul this. <*xeeutive magi ff rate, to {)revent or puniih abiiH*. All the privileges of the peers, all The rights and privileges of the people, or t!irir reprefentatives, are adapted to tiiis end — rhcr euatroul of the executive magitrrate. Should ■'HE'' vF II '"(n-* ^"^^^'^Pin^"^^^57v^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Ip^^^V.*"-' "" ( 3 ) Should the houfe of peers, or tlic reprc- fentatives of the people, ajjiime dircdtly or indirectly, any part of the executhe go- vernment, they, or their nominees, from tliat inilant become the executive magillrate ; they themfelves become parties in the abiife ; and the defences of public liberty are carried over by tlie truflees of the people, to the caufe of power. It is not, therefore, with- out reafon, tliat the prefident Montcfquicu, who faw through the whole fpirit of laws, and has pronounced political liberty to be the dire6l end of the Britifli Conitiiution, has affirmed that on?- liberties cannot exiil whenever the two Houfes of Parliament fliall di'aw to themfelves ihe fundlions of executive government. No man, with whom I have ccuiver- fed, has ever denied tiie right o power of the people to dellroy this goodly fabrick, or to model it at their pleafure. Government being conlHtuted wholly for the benefit of the governed, it follows, that force cannot be jullly employed againft them, to eftablifli even the bleflings of the J^ritilh Condi- B <2 tution; D^ /f -i- I- -.4 ■'■y ■P f^' ( 4. ) tution ; and that the people nuift be the iiltiiiiute judges of what is conducive to their benejit. But does it follow, tliat the two Houfes of Parliament can enlarge thofc powers, which they received as a imft for the people ? That there is an oviginal compadt in all government, is a noMe and juft principle, equally fbiid and true, under all circumllances, and in all times — but this principle applies with equal foice to tl^e trufl committed to the two Ihujh of Parliament y as to that veiled in the Crown. Can any man in his fenfes d^ubt, that if the two Houfes of Parliament fliould, as once hap- pened, again unite the legiflative and exe^ ciitive powers, by giving to the procla- mations of the Crown, the force and au- thority of law, the people would le juflified hi refuming a trujl which had been fo wickedly betrayed ? This refumption w^ould be precifely warranted by what our anceitors did at the Revolution ; but in fuch an event, I hope, we would be guided by their example. I hope we fliould not abolidi the two Houfes of i^arliament, or abridge ^ t» ( s ) abridge their pozvers, but merely transfer the trull to more honell hands. Our anceUors did not deny the maxim of law, that the King can do no ivrong \" on the con- trary, it continues now, for very wife pur- pofes, the conllitutional law of the country But they hdd, that a King, violating the original compact, and manifefting a deli- berate purpofe to fubvert tlie fundamental laws, was an evil too inveterate for the forms of the conftitution to reach. — They, there- fore, aeclarcd the throne vacant, excluding the mifguided Prince, antl his immediate defcendants ; yet they re/labli/Ijed the con- ilitution, and declared the monarchy here- ditary in another family. All that the friends of liberty contend for is, that where no forfeiture is pretended, or abufe fuggell- ed, the two Houfes of Parliament have not the power fo render the Monarchy elediivc ; and they iatreat th'e people, whofe power is acknowledged, not to concur in this a(^t ' .^o^i)oliti«aj fuioide, becaufe they think they can demonftrate, that fuch an dleilion, even 1; tp the temporary exenffe of ,reffal power, will '^. be m ism '» ,1" ii ( 6 ) be deflni6live of the principles of the Britifh ConOitutio-j. It is remarkable, that a Regent, with kingly power, was the meafure infilled upon by that party who oppofed a change in the luccelhon. All parties, therefore, at the Revolution, agreed on the* point for which we contend — to preferve the exercife of the Regal authority entire. Lawyers have confounded themfelves and others with the idea of a perfe6l analogy, be- tween the fucceflion to private property, and a fuccefhon to xhe fimdiiom of public duty. The analogy holds as far as the different nature of the two fubjefts will admit ; but the nature of the fubje6l muft decide in xvhat rcentSy and to what extent this right flia'.l attach. The interefl of the community is beft advanced, by giving to each individual the entire abfolute doniijilon over his own pro^ perty. — He may apply it to his oim perfoiial gratijicathu, or he may hoard it in his ftrong box, and m.iy difpofe of the whole when life expires, according to the dictates of caprice. If. ■«%t:>= VVn^RKSV-'^"^ 'e probable objects ofJjui bounty. The powers of government are di- re6lly oppofite in their nature. Hiefe are trujls given for the benefit of tlje community ; not of the individual, Tlie exercife of thefc powers cannot be fufpended by the difability of the truflee to await his future difpofal. The neceflity of good government, and Confequent demand for the means of ob- taining it, are the fame to the public, whe- ther the particular individual has or has not the capacity of a6>ing his part. I'he me^ns of good government, i^juftly proportioned to their objed, muft be the fame, whether adminilkred by the hands of one man, or by thofe of another. It follows, therefore, that if the people be not the property of the King, but the King be confidered as the in- ftrvmient of good government to the pi pie, the ■I r % J ...Afi' ■■■t''m(^'-fz-l f ( 8 ) Xh^fame potvers proportioned to the fime eiidy niuft be verted in another, during the /^/*- jbiial incapacity of the individual. It will be aiked ; mufl no attention be paid to the rights of the Sovereign ? Yes : — all poflTible attention ; — not for his benefit, but for that of the people. — Not bccaufe an in- divlaual, broken by infirmities, is better qualified for the tafiv of government, than one in the vigour of life ; — but becaufe it is necefiary for our our Gzvnjkunfvj to pre- lerve the hereditary title to the monarchy, as a fundamental law of the confi:itution. The fame principle excludes every other individual, and all bodies of men, from par- ticipating with the Heir Apparent of full age, the exercife of regal power during the incapacity of the King. The fingle dif- tinc^lion between this cafe, and an a6fual demife of the crown is, that the right of the King t( refume the government, muffc be uniformly acknowledged, by a continual ex^ ercife of the regal powers in his ?iame ; and this u?uform acknowledgement, is all which the God ~ ~-^..« . iw- m;^^ ^'^>''-*^!iW»i'^^^p^\T'jrfaiiiii^mr: ■ { 9 ) God of nature permits him perfonally to poflels, until a capacity to refume the a6lual exercife of power fhall return. The quef- tion, therefore, is not, Whether the King fhall perfonally exercife the pegal power himfelf, for this the God of nature has prohibited; but whether the exercife of the ex- ecutive, fhall be united with the legiflative power in the two Houfes, or devolve on the Prince, the hereditary fuccefrion being ellab- lirtied, to exclude a poffibility of this union. \yhether thefe powers, once united, fl:all again be feparated, mull depend on th^pJea^ fare of the two Houfes ; and that the liberties of Great Britain fliall depend on their plea- fure, I affirm, not to be the law of theCon- llitution. On the contrary, our liberties depend on the balance of the three eftates, upheld in their refpediive rights by the people. But Mr. Pitt fays, we mufl, in the inter- mediate time, preferve the rights of the So- vereign. If by the rights of the Sovereign, be meant thejuft and legal prerogatives of the crown, how can thefe be better fecured, than in the hands of the Heir Apparent, C who. ...■\ vitei» ■»^ .mm00 &ii rrA. ., } ■ t ( 10 ) who, having an acknowledged title to the fucceflion, has the fame inter ejl in the pre- fervation of thefe prerogatives with tne reigning King ? If, by tlie rights ' of the Sovereign, be meant a facihty, when he fliall recover, of, indulging his perfonal predeli<5lion in favor of individuals: — this is an argument un- worthy even of difcufTion. — It is in other words, to affirm, that we muil: fubmit to a / a6lious, disjointed government, for an inde- finite term, perhaps for twenty years, that . in the pofTible event of a recovery, the King may find no obftacle to the gratification of a fuppofed private perfonal inclination. This is to treat the people of Great Britain, as the private property of the Sovereign ; and in ef- fect:, to revive the Ipng exploded nonlenfe of w jure divino right in Kings. Such is the claim made by the miniiler of a prince of the Houfe of Brunfwick ! After all, this fupp fed perfonal predeliction, in a court whei'c Mr. Wilkes I;as become a favourite, is, m fail as ridiculous, as in juft reafoning con- temptible. Kings ha\e no fiiends.— They "^Mi^ "••fci.*- 'Wt^fpwp" ( 11 ) Ihe fele6i: their inftruments of government ac- cording to the neceflities of the hour ; and if Mr. Pitt was preferred to Mr. Fox, when the latter encroached on the prerogative, why may we not fufpedt a change of fenti- ment in the Royal bread, when he learns that the gigantic ambition of this young fiatefinan has fhaken the hereditary right ot the Monarch ? Whatever may be the views or motives of contending llatefmen, the care of the peopje ouglit to be dire6led to one obje6l— to preferve the Conftitution entire. Mr. Pitt propofes to defalcate the Royal autho- rity, in order to preferve it. Mr. Pitt has maintained, that in the year 1784,, the King, in full poflefTion of the whole Royal autho- rity, with difficulty prelerved his Jutland legal portion of the government, againft a party, aided by accidental advantages. He therefore propofes, that a Regent, whofe government, under all polTible clrcumflanc^s, rnuft be weak(;r than that cf a King, fliall have ^^'fspoxver, Why ? — becaufe he believes the Regent priWs another to himfelf ; and C 2 h^ msmm. 'vr» "wm^r^frnrn'tMrn' '^■' J { J« ) he wifhes to prepare a fcene, In whicli lie may a6l the part, which in his adverfary, he himfelf condemned. When I hear thefe things, I am loft in amazement at the con- fidence of the individual, and the folly of thofe who liften to him. What portion of the royal authority is deemed unneceflkry in a Regent, this great legiflator has not condefcended to difclofe. Fame reports two particulars — the power of creating Peers — and of difTolving Parlia* ments. That the power of creating Peers may be abufed, no man can deny. The hiftory of the laft four years, in which Mr. Pitt has added a feventh part to the Peerage of Great Britain, would confute? him, if he did. Should the recommenda- tions of Mr. Fox, in fome degree, counter- balance the influence thus acquired, the meafure does not appear ruinous to the Conftitution. In :his, as in every other part of the momentous fubje6l under dif- ciilFion, the people have no intereft in the contentions of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox. Their intereft is tp preferve the juft balance of th«i ^.-^ ' ■ ■ ''•■»?^"^Wf'f^-'?51iffl»W?W ( »S ) the Conftltution. If this power be ufeleft, or mifchievous, in the executive magiftrate, let him, who maintains the ppfition, openly propofe its abolition. No man is abfurd ' enough to advance fuch an argument This, like every other prerogative, is given for the wifeft purpofes ; and is more neceC^ fary to a Regent than to a King. This prerogative is given to the executive magif-^ trate, to reward eminent talents and dif- tinguiflied public fervice; and to difljpate, in the Houfe of Peek's, any cabal, deflruc* tjve to the harmony of the three cftates, or. to the juft rights of either. To contend, that thefe ob]e6ts fhall await the death, or recovery of the King, is to confider the royal authority as the private property of the Sovereign, not as a trufl, confeired for the benefit of tlje people. It is as abfurd, as to maintain, that a King fliall not create Peers, becaufe the particidar exertion of' this power may not meet tlie approbation of his fucceflbr. The. other propofed defalcation of rpyal ^litliority, is yet more monftrous. To pre-* vent i vJP,VHI|B^l.'-J«Hl^JV''»»'W».W^H\'WW^ f-' ( H ) vent a dinbliition df Parliament, without their own confent, is an exadl counterpart of the c<6\ of the long Parliament in 1640, which deluged this country with blood, overturned the church and monarchy, and left this ifland, at the clofe of a civil war, expofed to all the liorrors t '^ military def- potifm. From the change wnich has taken place in public affairs, to convene the ex- ifling Parliament annually, is no longer in the choice of the executive magiftrate. It is an a6l of necefTity. The duration of the ieflion depends wholly on themfelves — on their own management of the public bufi- nefs. If, therefore, the executive magif- trate has no power to diifolve Parliament, and to appeal to the People, the phrenzy of an hour may irrecoverably deftroy the laws and Conftitution. Thefe two meafures feem to be intended to conciliate the two Houfes to other mea- fures, hereafter to be adopted. The im- portance of the Peerage is increafed by the exclufion of new Members, and the repre- fejitatives 1 I. \ 5 "r!!!'«Wfcj:.- ( Ijl ) fentittives of the people acquire an indepen- dent pofTeflion of their feats, until a lapfe of time ihall reftore the rights of the nation at large. In the mean time, the temptation to the abufe of truji, in both branches, is increafed, becaufe it will no longer be in the power of the executive magiftrate, even aided by the people, to arrefl: the prografs of their ambition, and to prefcrve the juft balance of the Conftitution. . ; We, who are no politicians, have been in the habit of regarding the Britifh Con- ftitution, as the moft perfe6l model of civil liberty, which the mind of man has ever conceived. Liberty here appears, according to the prefident Montefquieu, as in a mirror. We, therefore, are not difpofed to relifli innovations. We are apt to imagine our rights may be as well fecured, by th^pre- fcnt laws and conftitution controuling the executive powers of Government in the liands of the Prince of Wales, as in thofe of his father. If we are alarmed at in- fidioiis attempts to fupplant the Prince, by giving I, > ■'1 ■^ *^».' . ■ mmjkumlM yii^w Hfi I i { 16 ) giving liim the name of Regent, and with- holding the neceflary means of Govern- ment, this alarm is not diminifhcd by the procefs employed to produce this effedt. The King's authprity, figniiied by both Houles, was the phrafe iifed by the long Farliament of 1640, when they overturned the monarchy, and fubverted the liberties of tile people. The refemblance is ftriking, hut the prefent abfurdity is greater^ — an /w- capacity in the King to a6l, is now declared by one vote of the rfoiife of Commons, and a Commifiion, under the Great Seal, propofed in another, affirming the con- fent of that King, to an ordinance of the two Hou&s. The fame artifice, we are in- clined to fufpedl, is now employed to the fame end — to cheat the public ear with the name of the King as a part of the Legifla- ture, while the fubftance is withheld. We, therefore, intreat to have the a6lual eflec^- live exercife of the kingly power redored, before his fandlion be given to the adts of the two Houfes. An r ,.^r -.-.-— «a-Jiia 'Mmm ^MtMiM fr^ ( 19 ) * ^ '> ' t*rerogativc even iti' the liumblp tone of Aip** plication. JFrom fucb examples I can not learn — and upon fuch foundations I difdairl to reafon. A PRIVATE CITIZENS FINIS. -V^ I ■ I -cMMiM^m^.:. Ki'Vi 'li" ' ii'iiH — ~ i NEfT PmLICATIONS Printed for J. DEBRETT. A SHORT VIEW OF THE PRESENT GREAT QUESTION. Price \s. REFLECTIONS on the FORMATION of a RE- GENCY. In a Letter to a Member of the Lowe? Houfc of Parliament. The Second Edition. Price is. AN ADDRESS to thofe Citizens who, in their public and private Capacity, RESISTED the Claim of the late HOUSE OF COMMONS to NOMINATE the MINISTERS of the CROWN. The Second Edition. Price 6d. The LAW OF PARLIAMENT, in the PRESENT SITUATION of GREAT BRITAIN confidered. Price IS. 6d. AN ANSWER TO THE CONSIDERATIONS on the EltablilhmePt of a REGENCY. The Fourth Edition, Price is. ARGUMENTS concerning the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT of PARLIAMENT to appoint a REGEN- CY. The Second Edition. Price is. BRIEF DEDUCTIONS, relative to the aid and fupply of the Executive Power, in Cafes of INFANCY, DELIRl UM, or other INCAPACITY of the KING. Price 6d. REPORT of the LORDS' COMMITTEE, appointed to EXAMINE the PHYSICIANS who have attended His Majcfiy, DURING his ILLNESS, touching tlicf State of His Maje(ty's Health.' Price is. AN EXPLANATION ^ f the MISTAKEN PRIN- CIPLE f.n which the COMMUTATION ACT is FOUNDED, md the Nature of the MISCHIEFS that mult follow from a I'EKSEV FRANCE iji it. In a Second Addrcfs to the Public, iVom THOMAS B.'\TES ROUS. Efq. Price I s. 6d. ■^•1- E- )• )lic :he rE )n4 ed. on irth AL ;clto ided the IN- cr La