IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I ^1^ Ui mm jm 4^ iV ri>- <^ CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Instituta for Historical IMicroraproductions institut Canadian da microraproductions historiqua* 1980 Technical Notes / Notes techniques The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Physical features of this copy which msy alter any of the images in the reproduction are checked below. L'Institut a microf ilm« le meilleur exemplaire qu'ii lui a 4t4 possible de se procurer. Certains dAfauts susceptibles de nuire h la qualitA de la reproduction sont notAs ci-dessous. D Coloured covers/ Couvertures de couleur D Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur D Coloured maps/ Cartes gAographiques en couleur D Coloured plates/ Planches en couleur D Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages d6color6es, tachet6es ou piquAes D Show through/ Transparence D Tight binding (may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin)/ Reliure serrA (peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge int6rieure) D Pages damaged/ Pages endommag6es D Additional comments/ Commentaires supplAmentaires Bibliographic Notes / Notes bibllographiques D D Only edition available/ Seule Mition disponible Bound with other material/ Reli6 avec d'autres documents D D Pagination incorrect/ Erreurs de pagination Pages missing/ Des pages manquent D Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque D Maps missing/ Des cartes gtegraphiques manquent D Plates missing/ Des planches manquent D Additional comments/ Commentaires suppMmentaires The imagat appearing hara ara tha baat quality poaaibia conaidaring tha condition and lagibiiity of tha original copy and in Icaaping with tha filming contract apacifications. Laa imagaa auivantaa ont Ati raproduitaa avac la plua grand aoin, compta tanu da la condition at da Ifi nattatA da I'axamplaira film*, at an conformit4 avac laa conditiona du contrat da filmaga. Tha laat racordad frama on aach microficha ahall contain tha aymbol — »>(maaning CONTINUED"), or tha aymbol V (moaning "END"), whichavar appliaa. Un daa aymboiaa auivants apparattra aur la dar- nlAra Imaga da chaqua microficha, aalon la caa: la aymbola — ► algnlfia "A SUIVRE", la aymbola y algnlfia "FIN". Tha original copy waa borrowad from, and f ilmad with, tha icind cona«nt of tha following inatitution: Library of tha Public Archivaa of Canada IVIapa or plataa too iarga to ba antlraly includad in ona axpoaura ara filmad baginning In tha uppar laft hand cornar, laft to right and top to bottom, as many framas as raquirad. Tha following diagrams illustrata tha mathod: L'axamplaira film* fut raproduit grAca A la g^nArositA da ritabiiaaamant prAtaur auivant : La bibllothAqua daa Archivaa publlquaa du Canada Laa cartas ou las planchas trop grandaa pour Atra raproduitaa an un saul cllchA aont fllmAaa A partir da I'angia supArieura gaucha, da gaucha A drolta at da haut an baa, an pranant la nombra d'imagaa nAcaaaaira. La diagramma auivant illustra la mAthoda : 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 m X-XI-XII FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN CANADA JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES nr Historical and Political Science HERBERT B. ADAMS, Editor. HlBtory is past Politics and PoUUcs present History — /fVecman. SEVENTH SERIES X-XI-XIl FEDERAL GOVERNMENT m CANADA By JOHN G. BOURINOT, Hon. LL.D., D. C. L. Chrk PYBIOHT, 1889, BY N. MUBRAY. JOHN HUBPHY A CO., PBINTBBS. BAI/IIMOBB. TAB1.E OF CONTENTS. PAoa. Lecture I. Historical Outline op Political Development... 7 II. General Features op the Federal System 29 III. The Government and the Parliament 77 IV. The Provincial Governments and Legislatures.. 121 /^ C!0BRIGENDA. Page 32, line 21, fm third " 130, " 17, " two or three " 147, " 22, " $1500 read fourth. " five. " $10,000. '*•> -"■"> The preamble of the B. N. A. Act of 1867 sets forth that " the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their desire to be federally united into one dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a constitution similar in prin- ciple to that of the United Kingdom." 489] Fedeixd Oovemment in Canada. 33 ters naturally and conveniently falling within their defined jurisdiction, while each government is administered in accord- ance with the British system of parliamentary institutions. These are the fundamental principles which were enacted into law by the British North America Act of 186/. Before I proceed to refer to the general features of the fed- eral system I may here appropriately observe that the practical operation of the government of Canada affords a forcible illus- tration of a government carried on not only in accordance with the legal provisions of a fundamental law, but also in con- formity with what has been well described by eminent writers as conventions or understandings which do not come within the technical meaning of laws since they cannot be enforced by the courts. It was Professor Freeman ^ who first pointed out this interesting and important distinction, but Professor Dicey has elaborated it in a recent work, in which he very clearly shows that " constitutional law " as we understand it in Eng- land and in this country, consists of two elements : " The one element, which I have called the ' law of the constitution ' is a body of undoubted law ; the other element which I have called the ' conventions of the constitution,' consists of maxims or practices which, though they regulate the ordinary conduct of the Crown and of Ministers and of others under the constitu- tion, are not in strictness law at all."'' In Canada this distinction is particularly noteworthy. We have first of all the British North America Act' which lays down the legal rules for the division of powers between the respective federal and provincial authorities, and for the government of the fed- eration generally. But it is a feature of this government that, apart from the written law, there are practices which can only be found in the usages and conventions that have originated in the general operation of the British constitution — ^that mass 'Freeman's Growth of the English Constitution, pp. 114, 115. ' Dicey's Law of the Constitution, p. 25. » Imp. Act, 30-31 Vict. c. 3. 34 Federal Oovemment in Canada, [490 of charters, statutes, practices and conventions, which must be sought for in a great number of authorities. For example, if we wish in Canada to see whether a special power is given to the dominion or to the provincial governments we must look to the written constitution — to the ninety-first and ninety-sec- ond sections, to which I shall refer later on — but if we would understand the nature of the constitutional relations between the governor-general and his advisers we must study the con- ventions and usages of parliamentary or responsible govern- ment as it is understood in England and Canada. The courts accordingly will decide whether the parliament or the legisla- tures have a power conferred upon them by the constitutional law whenever a case is brought before them by due legal pro- cess ; but should they be asked to adjudicate on the legality of a refusal by a government to retire from office on an adverse vote of the people's house, they could at once say that it was a matter which was not within their legal functions, but a political question to be settled in conformity with political con- ventions with which they had nothing whatever to do. Or if Parliament should continue to sit beyond the five years' term, to which it is restricted by law, and then pass certain acts, the constitutionality of such legislation could be questioned, and the courts could declare it null and void. Or again, the con- stitutional act requires that every vote of money must be first recommended formally by the governor-general, and if it should appear that parliament had passed an act without that legal formality, the courts could be called upon to consider the legal effect of this important omission. On the other hand, it is a well understood maxim that no private member can ini- tiate a measure imposing a tax on the people, but it should come from a minister of the Crown — a rule rigidly observed in parliament — but this is not a matter of legal enactment which the courts can take cognizance of though it is a conven- tion of the unwritten constitution which is based on well- understood principles of ministerial responsibility. I might pursue this subject at greater length, but I think I have said 491] Federal Government in Canada. 80 enough to show you how interesting is the study of our con- stitution and what a wide field of reflection it opens up to the student. We have not only a written constitution to be inter- preted whenever necessary by the courts, but a vast store-house of English precedents and authoritative maxims to guide us — in other words, an unwritten law which has as much force practically in the operation of our p<>litical system as any legal enactment to be found on the statute book. The British North America Act gave legal effect to the wishes of the people of Canada, as expressed in the addresses of their legislatures, and is consequently the fundamental law, or constitution of the Dominion, only to be amended in its material and vital provisions by the same authority that enacted it.^ Power is only given in the act itself to the Canadian legislature for the amendment or alteration of cer- tain provisions which are of a merely temporary character, or affect the machinery with which the parliament or legislatures have to operate — such as the readjustment of representation, the elections and trial of controverted elections, the constitution of executive authority in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and other matters which do not really affect the fundamental principles of the constitution. All those provisions which con- stitute the executive authority of the Dominion, regulate the terms of union, and define the limits of the jurisdiction of the several governments, are unalterable except by the supreme legislature of the empire. We have now to consider, in the first place, the position that the Dominion of Canada occupies in the Empire, and then the relations ia government occupies towards the govern- ments of the provinces, with such remarks on the powers and * The act of 1867 has been amended by two acts, Imp. Stat. 38-39 Vict., c. 38, to remove certain doubts with respect to the power of the Canadian parliament under section 18 ; and 34 and 35 Vict., c. 28, to remove donbt« as to the powers of the Canadian parliament, to establish provinces in the territories. 36 Fideral Qovemment in Canada, [492 functions and practical operation of the Constitution as are necessary to make the system intelligible. The Queen is the head of the executive authority and gov- ernment of Canada.^ She is as much the sovereign of Canada as of England or Scotland, and her supremacy can be alone acknowledged in all executive or legislative acts of this dependency. As she is unable to be present in person in Canada, she is represented by a governor-general appointed by Her Majesty in council. In the following chapter I shall refer to his duties in Canada, and it is therefore pertinent here to make only a few necessary references to his im^^rial position. This high functionary, generally chosen from public men of high standing in England, has dual responsibilities, for he is at once the governor-in-chief of a great dependency, who actr under the advice of a ministry responsible to parliament, and at the same time the guardian of imperial interests. He is bound by the terms of his commission, and can only exercise such authority as is expressly or impliedly entrusted to him.^ He must report regularly on all those imperial and other mat- ters on which the secretary of state for the colonies should be informed. For instance, in the negotiations for the recent fishery treaty he was the avenue for all communications be- tween the Canadian and imperial governments. Canada being a colony, and not a sovereign state, cannot directly negotiate treaties with a foreign power, but must act through tl 'nter- mediary of the imperial authorities, with whom the governor- general, as an imperial officer, must communicate on the part of our government not only its minutes of council, but his own opinions as well, on the question under consideration. In case of bills reserved' for the consideration of the imperial ^ B. N. A. Act, sec. 9. " The executive government and authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen." ' Musgrove «. Fulido, 5 App. Cas., 102. 'A bill affecting the fishery dispute between Canada and the United States was formally reserved in 1886. 493] Federal Oovemment in Canada. 37 government he fonvards them to the secretary of state with his reasons for reserving them. The British North America act provides indeed that copies of all acts of the Canadian parliament should be transmitted to the secretary of state for the colonies, that they may be duly considered and disal- lowed within two years' in case they are found to conflict with im[)erial interests and are beyond the legitimate powers of Canada as a dependency, still in certain essential respects under the control of the imperial state. The commission and instructions, which the governor-general receives from the Queen's government, formerly contained a list of bills which should be formally reserved, divorce bills among other meas- ures ; but since the passage of the British North America Act, and the very liberal measure of self-government now conceded to Canada, these instructions have been materially modified. ^ B. N. A. Act, 1867, sec. 55. Where a bill passed by the houses of the par- liament is presented to the governor-general for the Queen's assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion, but subject to the provisions of this act and to her majesty's instructions, either that he assents thereto in the Queen's name, or that he withholds the Queen's assent, or that he reserves the bill for the signification of the Queen's pleasure. 56. Where the governor-general assents to a bill in the Queen's name, he shall by the first convenient opportunity send an authentic copy of the act to one of her majesty's principal secretaries of state, and if the Queen in council, within two years after receipt thereof by the secretary of state, thinks fit to disallow the act, such disallowance (with a certificate of the secretary of state of the day on which the act was received by him) being signified by the governor-general, by speech or message to each of the houses of the parliament or by proclamation, shall annul the act from and after the day of such signification. 57. A bill reserved for the signification of the Queen's pleasure shall not have any force unless and until within two years from the day on which it was presented to the governor-general for the Queen's assent, the governor- general signifies, by speech or message to each of the houses of the parlia- ment or by proclamation, that it has received the assent of the Queen in council. An entry of every such speech, message, or proclamation shall be made in the journal of each house, and a duplicate thereof duly attested shall be delivered to the proper officer to be kept among the records of Canada. 38 Federal Government in Canada. [494 and it is only in very exceptional instances that bills are ex- pressly reserved. The general power possessed by the impe- rial government of disallowing any measure, within two years from its receipt, is considered as a sufficient check, as a rule, upon colonial legislation. The cases where a bill is disallowed are now exceedingly limited. Only when the obligations of the Empire to a foreign power are affected, or an imperial statute is infringed in matters on which the Canadian parlia- ment has not full jurisdiction, is the supreme authority of England likely to be exercised. The imperial parliament has practically given the largest possible rights to the Domi~'on government to legislate on all matters of a Dominion character and importance which can be exercised by a colonial dependency ; and the position Canada consequently occupies is that of a semi-independent power. Within the limits of its constitutional jurisdiction, and subject to the exercise of disallowance under certain conditions, the Dominion parliament is in no sense a mere delegate or agent of the imperial parliament, but enjoys an authority as plenary and ample as that great sovereign body in the plentitude of its power possesses.^ This assertion of the l^islative authority of the Dominion legislature is quite reconcilable with the supremacy of the imperial parliament in all matters in which it should intervene in the interest of the empire. For that par- liament did not part with any of its rights as the supreme authority of the empire, when it gave the Dominion govern- ment " exclusive authority " to legislate on certain classes of subjects enumerated in the act of union, and to which we shall later on refer at length. This point has been clearly explained by Mr. Justice Gray of the supreme court of British Columbia, whose opinion as an eminent judicial authority is strengthened by the fact that he was one of the members of the Quebec con- vention of ] 864. In deciding against the constitutionality of * See Begtna vs. Burah, 3 App. Cas., 889 ; Hodge t». the Qaeen, 9 lb., 117. 496] Federal Oovemment in Oanada, 39 the Chinese tax bill, passed by the legislature of his province, he laid down that "the British North America Act (1867) was framed, not as altering or defining the changed or relative positions of the provinces towards the imperial government, but solely as between themselves/' Proceeding he said that the imperial parliament " as the paramount or sovereign au- thority could not be restrained from future legislation. The British North America Act was intended to make legal an agreement which the provinces decided to enter into as between themselves, but which, not being sovereign states, they had no power to make. It was not intended as a declaration that the imperial government renounced any part of its authority." * * Judgment of Mr. Justice Graj on the Chinese tax bill, Sept. 23d, 1878. An imperial statute passed in 1865 (28 and 29 Vict., c. 63) expressly declares that any colonial law " in any respect repugnant to the provisions of any act of parliament extending to the colony to which such law may relate," shall to the extent of such repugnancy be " absolutely void and in- operative." And in conntruing an act of parliament, " it shall be said to extend to any colony, when it is made applicable to such colony by the express words or necessary intendment " of the same. Since the passage of this act Canada has received a larger measure of self-government in the provisions of the B. N. A. act, which confers powers on the Dominion and the provincial authorities. No one can doubt that it is competent, as Mr. Justice Gray has intimated, for parliament to pass any law it pleases with respect to any subject, within the powers conferred on the Dominion or provinces : and any enactment repugnant to that imperial statute would be declared null and void by the courts, should the question come before them. But the point has been raised, whether it is in the power of the Canadian parliament or legislatures to pass an act repealing an imperial statute passed previous to the act of 1867, and dealing with a subject within the powers granted to the Canadian authorities. It must be here mentioned that the imperial government refused its assent to the Canadian copyright act of 1872, because it was repugnant, in the opinion of the law oflScers of the Crown, to the provisions of an imperial statute of 1842 extending to the colony (Imp. Stat., 5 and 6 Vict., c. 45; Can. Sess. P., 1875, No. 28). On the other hand, in the debate on the constitutionality of the Quebec Jesuits' bill mentioned later on, it was contended by the minister of justice that a provincial legulatnre " legislating upon subjects which are given it by the B. N. A. act, has the power to repeal an imperial statute, prior to the B. N. A. act, affecting those subjects." In support of this position he 40 Federal Government in Canada. [49G But, as I have already shown, this supreme authority of the imperial government will be exercised only in cases where interference is necessary in the interests of the Empire, and in the discharge of its obligations towards foreign powera. In the case of all matters of Dominion or Canadian concern, within the rights and privileges extended to Canadians by the British North America Act, and in accord with the general policy now pursued towards all colonies exercising a full sys- tem of local self-government, the imperial authorities can con- stitutionally claim no authority whatever. That is, they can interfere, to quote a distinguished Canadian statesman, "only in instances n which, owing to the existence of substantial imperial, as distinguished from Canadian, interests it is con- k I II x referred to three decisions of the judicial comtnittee of the privy council. One of these, in Harris V8. Davies (10 App. Cas., p. 279), held that the leg- islature of New South Wales had power to repeal a statute of James I. with respect to costs in case of a verdict for slander. The second case was Powell vs. Apollo Candle Co. (10 App. Cas., p. 282), in which the princi- ples laid down in Regina vs. Burah (3 App. Cas., 889) and in Hodge vs. the Queen (9 App. Cas., p. 117) were affirmed. The third and most important case as respects Canada was the Queen and Biel (10 App. Cas., p. 675), in which it was decided that the Canadian parliament had power to pass legislation changing, or repealing (if necessary) certain statutes passed for the regulation of the trial of offences in Rupert's Land, before it became a part of the Canadian domain (see Sir /. Thompson's speed). Can. Hansard, March 27, 1889). But several high authorities do not appear to justify the contention cf the minister of justice. See Hearn's Government of England, app. II.; "The Colonies and the Mother Country;" Todd's Government in the Colonies, pp. 188-192, etc. ; Dicey's Law of the Constitution, pp. 96, et aeq. The question is too important to be treated hastily, especially as it will come up soon in connection with the copyright act of 1889, in which the same conflict as in 1875 arises. No doubt the fundamental principle that rests at the basis of our constitutional system is to give Canada as full power over all matters affecting her interests as is compatible with imperial obligations. The parliament and legislatures must necessarily repeal, and have time and again repealed, imperial enactments, especially those not suitable to the circumstances of the country. See debate of April 20, 1889, Canadian Commons, on the new copyright bill, which by sec. 7 can only come into force by a proclamation of the governor in council. 497] Federal Qoveimment in Canada. 41 sidered that full freedom of action is not vested in the Cana- dian people."* The ooniplete freedom of action now enjoyed by Canada in matters affecting the commercial interests of the empire, can be understood by reference to the fiscal systen now in operation in Canada. This system, generally known as the *' National Policy/' since its adoption in 1879, imiK)se8 a protective tariff, which is in direct antagonism with the free trade policy of the parent state, and is chiefly intended to assist Canadian manu- jfactories against British and foreign com))etition. This policy, at the outset, was naturally received with much disfavor in England, but when an appeal was directly made in the impe- rial house of commons to disallow it, the secretary of state for the colonies, on the part of the government, presented, as a reason for non-interference, that the measure in question was not in excess of the rights of legislation guaranteed by the British North America Act, under which (subject only to ti'eaty obligations), the fiscal policy of Canada rests with the Dominion parliament. He further stated that, however much the government might regret the adoption of a protective sys- tem, they did not feel justified in opposing the wishes of the Canadian people in this matter.' The queen's privy council of England has also the right to allow appeals to the judicial committee— one of the survi- vals of the authority of an ancient institution of England — from the courts of Canada. This right is only exercised on principles clearly laid down by this high tribunal, but it is * Hon. Mr. Blake in a despatch to the secretary of state for the oobniefi. Can. Bess. P., 1877, No. 13, p. 8. '"The cluuse with respect to differential duties, (English Hans. Deb., Vol. 244, p. 1811), is now left out of the governor-general's instruc- tions, and the imperial goremment arc content to reljr upon the prerogatiTe right of disallowance, as a sufficient security against the enactment of anjr measure by tlie parliament of Canada, that should be of such character •■ to call for the interposition of the royal veto." Todd's Pari. Goyemment in the Colonies, p. 187. 4 42 Federal Government in Canada, [498 If ,11' m m emphatically a right to be claimed by the Canadian people as forming part of the 6.npire under the sovereignty of England. It is a right sparingly exercised, for the people of Canada have great confidence in their own courts, where justice is adminis- tered with legal acumen and strict impartiality ; but there are decided advantages in having the privilege of resorting in some cases, especially those affecting the constitution, to a tribunal which is generally composed of men whose great learning illustrates all those traditions which make the decisions of England's courts respected the world over. In the foregoing paragraphs I have mentioned the relations that should naturally exist between the supreme head of the empire and its colonial dependencies. I may here add, what will be obvious to every one, that the power over peace and war, and the general control of such subjects as fall within the province of international law, are vested in the home govern- ment, and cannot be interfered with in the least degree by the government of the Dominion. With these exceptions which limit the jurisdiction of the Dominion as a dependency, Canada possesses under the British North America Act, and in accordance with the general policy of England towards her self-governing colonies, a prac- tically sovereign authority within the limits of her territory, and has assumed all the proportions of an empire. Her constitution enables her to establish new provinces with complete systems of government, as large as any of the commonwealths of the American Republic. The province of Manitoba has already been formed out of the North-west Territories acquired in 1870 from the company of Hudson Bay adventurers who held a charter from the days when sov- ereigns recklessly granted their followers vast areas of lands, larger than the great kingdoms of Europe. The territories are r^ulated by the Dominion and granted from time to time such privileges as are commensurate with their increasing pop- ulation and c ipacity to carry on a system of local self-govern- ment. The Dominion appoints the governors of the proviooea 499] Federal Oovemment in Canada, 43 and can dismiss them under the provisions of the consti- tution, occupying in this respect the position that England formerly held with reference to the provinces before the union of 1867. Perhaps no one fact more clearly illustrates the in^portant position which Canada has attained within a few years, than the recognition by the imperial government of her absolute right to be consulted, and have a direct voice in the negotia- tion of all treaties which immediately affect her interests. In the arrangement of the Washington treaties of 1871 and 1883, which dealt with the question of the fisheries — still unhappily unsettled owing to the refusal of the Senate to ratify the last treaty — Canada was represented by one of her ablest states- men in each case.^ In negotiations between Canada, France and Spain for a commercial treaty, the imperial government specially commissioned the Canadian high representative in London with full powers to act. The appointment of the high commissioner of Canada was of itself a concession to the growing importance of Canada as a dependency of the empire and of the consequent necessity that has arisen of having in London a representative who would occupy a higher position than the previous agents of the colonies. In the case of all treaties affecting Canada directly, their ratification depends on the assent of her parliament.^ In fact, the history of all impe- rial legislation with respect to extradition and other treaties, also proves the desire of the imperial authorities to give due scope to Canadian legislation as far as it is compatible with ^In 1871 by Sir John Macdonald, then as now, Premier. In 18S8 by Sir Charles Tapper, now High Commissioner of Canada in London. ' See Can. Stat, for 1888 (treaty of Washington), c. 3, sec. 3, and art. xvi of schedule. The 132d section of the B. N. A. Act provides : " The parlia- ment and government of Canada shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any province thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards foreign countries, arbing under treaties between the empire and such foreign countries." Also comments of Dr. Todd in Pari. Govt, in Colonies, p. 205. 44 Federal Government in Canada. [500 the interests of the empire. In some treaties it is expressly stipulated that they shall be only applicable to the colonial possessions " so far as the laws, for the time being, in force in such colonies will allow."* The large measure of self-govern- ment that Canada enjoys in other particulars will be seen in the course of these lectures. We come now to consider the nature of the federal system, the respective powers of the dominion and provincial govern- ments, and the relations that they bear to one another under the constitution. We have already seen by the three reso- lutions of the Quebec conference that I have cited, that the object of the founders of the union was to give to the central authority the control over matters of general or qimsi national importance, and to the provincial governments jurisdiction over matters of a local or provincial nature: In arranging the details of the union the framers were naturally called upon to study carefully the American constitution in its origin and development. In 1864 the civil war was not yet brought to a close, and statesmen, the worl J over, were naturally in doubt as to its effects on the constitution and union at large. Cana- dian statesmen saw that ever since the foundation of the weak confederation of 1776, and of the constitution that was subse- quently adopted in 1787, to give efficiency, strength and pCTmanency to the union, — " to form a more perfect union," in the language of its preamble, — a great struggle had been going on between the national and the state governments for the supremacy. They saw that certain states had persistently asserted the doctrine of State sovereignty, and the right of nullifying or refusing to be bound by certain acts of the national government. Nullification and secession, it was seen, wer« justified by lawyers and statesmen, as the last resort of sovereign states, when what was believed to be their inherent rights were invaded by the national government. The states- men that assembled at Quebec believed that it was a defect in ' See treaty with Russia in Can. Statutes for 1887. 601] Federal QovemmerU in Canada, U the American constitution to have made the national govern- ment alone one of enumerated powers, and to have left to the States all the powers not expressly taken from them.^ For these reasons mainly the powers of both the Dominion and the Provincial governments are stated, as far as practicable, in express terms with the view of preventing a conflict between them; the powers that are not within the defined jurisdiction of th*" T)rovincial governments are reserved in general terms to the central authority. In other words " the residuum of power is given to the central instead of to the state authori- ties." In the British North America Act we find set forth in express words : 1 . The powers vested in the Dominion government alone ; 2. The powers vested in the provinces alone ; 3. The powers exercised by the Dominion government and the provinces concurrently ; 4. Powers given to the Dominion government, in general terms. The powers vested in the parliament of Canada are set forth in the ninety-first section of the constitution, which enacts that the Queen with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons may " make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces ; and for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the fore- going terms of this section, it is hereby declared that (notwith- standing anything in this act) the . exclusive legislative authority of the parliament of Canada extends to all matters coming within the classes of subjects next hereinafter enumer- ated, that is to say : 1. The public debt and property. 2. The regulation of trade and commerce. ' See remarks of Sir John Macdonald, then attorney-general, now pre- mier of Canada : Confederation debates, p. 33. 46 Federal Government in Canada, [502 !•' m m 3. The raising of money by any mode or system of taxation. 4. The borrowing of money on the public credit. 5. Postal service. 6. The census and statistics. 7. Militia, military and naval service and defence. 8. The fixing of and providing for the salaries and allow- ances of civil and other officers of the government of Canada. 9. Beacons, buoys, lighthouses and Sable Island. 10. Navigation and shipping. 11. Quarantine and the establishment and maintenance of marine hospitals. 12. Sea-coast and inland fisheries. 13. Ferries between a province and a British or foreign country, or between two provinces. 14. Currency and coinage. 15. Banking, incorporation of banks and the issue of paper money. 16. Savings banks. 17. Weights and measures. 18. Bills of exchange and promissory notes. 19. Interest. 20. Legal tender. 21. Bankruptcy and insolvency. 22. Patents of invention and discovery. 23. Copyrights. - 24. Indians and lands reserved for the Indians. 25. Naturalization and aliens. 26. Marriage and divorce. 27. The criminal law, except the constitution of the courts of criminal jurisdiction, but including the procedure in crimi- nal matters. 28. The establishment, maintenance, and management of penitentiaries. 29. Such classes of subjects as are expressly excepted in the enumeration of the classes of subjects by this act assigned exclusively to the legislatui*es of the provinces." 603] Federal Oovemment in Canada. 4t And the section concludes, with the view obviously '^{ giv- ing more definiteness to its provisions and to lessen the chances of conflicts of jurisdiction with the provincial authori- ties, that "any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in this section shall not be deemed to come within the class of matters of a local or private nature com- prised in the enumeration of the classes of subjects by this act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces." Having, as they believed, definitely stated the general powers that appertain naturally to a central government, exe. jising jurisdiction over the whole Dominion, the framers of the Act defined in the ninety-second section the powei*s that the local governments can exercise within their constitutional limits. * The legislature may, in each province, " exclusively make laws " in relation to the classes of subjects enumerated as follows : 1. The amendment, from time to time, notwithstanding anything in this act, of the constitution of the province, except as regards the office of lieutenant-governor. 2. Direct taxation within the province in order to the rais- ing of a revenue for provincial purposes. 3. The borrowing of money on the sole credit of the province. 4. The establishment and tenure of provincial offices, and the appointment and payment of provincial officers. 5. The management and sale of the public lands belonging to the province, and of the timber and wood thereon. 6. The establishment, maintenance and management of public and reformatory prisons in and for the province. 7. The establishment, maintenance and managemient of hos- pitals, asylums, charities and eleemosynary institutions in and for the province, other than marine hospitals. 8. Municipal institutions in the province. 9. Shop, saloon, tavern, and auctioneer and other licenses, in order to the raising of a revenue for provincial, local or municipal purposes. 48 Federal Government in Chnada, [504 .•1 10. liocal works and undertakings other than such as are of the following classes : a. Lines of steam or other 8lii|>8, railways, canals, tele- graphs and other works and undertakings connecting the province with any other or others of the provinces, or extending beyond the limits of the province; 6. Lines of steamships between the province and any British or foreign country ; 0. Such works as, although wholly situate within the prov- ince, are before or after their execution declared by the parliament of Canada to be for the general advantage of Canada, or for the advantage of two or more of the provinces.* 11. The incorporation of companies with provincial objects. 12. Solemnization of marriage in the province. 13. Property and civil rights in the province. 14. The administration of justice in the province, including the constitution, maintenance and organization of provincial courts, both of civil and of criminal jurisdiction, and including procedure in civil matters in those courts. 15. The imposition of punishment by fine, penalty or imprisonment for enforcing any law of the province made in relation to any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in this section. 16. Generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province. A careful consideration of the foregoing section will show how large and important a measure of local self-government is given to all the provincial members of the confederation. It was the object of the framcrs of the constitution to leave to ' In 1883 Ihe parliament of Canada passed an act declaring certain rail- ways to be "works for the general advantage of Canada" within the meaning of the section. (See Bourinot's Parliamentary Practice in Can- ada, pp. 687-589). This subject was ably argued before the Supreme Court of Canada in 1888. See Hon. Mr. Blake's argument in the Manitoba case. 606] Federal Oovemment in Canada, 4« the old provinces as many of those powers and privileges that they exercised before the confederation, as are necessary to the efficient working of a local government and at the same time to give the central power effective control over all matters which give unity and permanency to the whole federal organi- zation, of which the provincial entities form political parts or divisions. It will be seen, however, that the all important question of education does not fall within the enumeration of matters belonging to provincial legislation, which I have just given, although it is above all others a subject of local or provincial interest. The reason for this must be sought in the political history of the question. While the different provinces before confederation were perfecting their respective systems of education, the question of separate schools attained a great prominence. Tiie Protes- tant minority in Lower Canada, and the Roman Catholic minority in Upper Canada, earnestly contended for such a separation as would give the Protestants, in the former, and the Roman Catholics, in the latter province, control of their own schools, and not oblige the children of the two distinct religious beliefs to mix tc^ther. The religious instruction which the Roman Catholics consider inseparable from any public school system could not be accepted by the Protestants. Non-sectarian schools are at direct variance with the principle^ of the Roman Catholic Church. Finally, in all the provinces, except New Brunswick and Prince £dward Island, separate schools obtained at the time of the union, and it accordingly became necessary to give the minorities guarantees for their continuance, as far as such could be given in the constitution. The British North America Act now provides that while the legislature of a province may exclusively make laws on the subject of education, nothing therein shall prejudicially affect any of the denominational schools in existence before July, 1867. An appeal lies to the governor-general in council from any jt of the provincial authority affecting any legal right or privilege that the Protestant or Roman Catholic minority 50 Federal Oovemment in Canada. [506 enjoyed at the time of the union. In case the provincial authorities refuse to act for the due protection of the rights of minorities, in accordance with the provisions of the consti- tution, then the parliament of Canada may provide a remedy for the due execution of the law provided in this behalf.^ Parliament, so far, has not been called upon to act on the pro- visions of this section. The questions that arose in 1872 and in subsequent years, with respect to the New Brunswick school act of 1871, providing for a compulsory rating and assessment for non-sectarian schools, did not come under the law, for the Roman Catholics of New Brunswick did not enjoy separate privileges from other classes of their fellow-citizens previous to confederation ; and all the authorities of the Dominion, as well as of England, the minister of justice of Canada, the (2.) (3.) * 6. N. A. Act, 1867, sec. 93. In and for each province the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to education, subject and according to the following provisions : — (1.) Nothing in any such law shall prejudicially affect any right or pri- vilege with respect to denominational schools which any class of persons have by law in the province at the union ; AH the powers, privileges and duties at the union by law conferred and imposed in Upper Canada on the separate schools and school trustees of the Queen's Boman Catholic subjects, shall be and the same are hereby extended to the dissentient schools of the Queen's Protestant and Boman Catholic subjects in Quebec ; Where in any province a system of separate or dissentient schools exists by law at the union, or is thereafter established by the legis- lature of the province, an appeal shall lie to the governor-general in cou "'I from any act or decision of any provincial authority affec' right or privilege of the Protestant or Boman Catho- ''' ^ of the Queen's subjects in relation to education ; . any such provincial law as from time to time seems to the jrnor-general in council requisite for the due execution of the provisions of this section is not made, or in case any decision of the governor-general in council on any appeal under thi'' section is not duly executed by the proper provincial authority in that behalf, then and in every such case, and as far only as the circumstances of each case require, the parliament of Canada may make remedial laws for the due execution of the provisions of this section, and of any decision of the governor-general in council under this section. (4. 507] Federal Government in Canada, 51 courts, and the colonial secretary of state, and the judicial committee of the privy council, concurred in the opinion that the legislature had a right to enforce the assessments objected to by the Roman Catholics of the province, and had acted legally within the powers conferred upon them by the act of confederation.^ The Dominion and Local governments also exercise cer- tain rights in common. Among the subjects on which they have concurrent powers of legislation are agriculture and immigration.' The dominion parliament may make laws on these subjects for any and all of the provinces, and each legis- lature may do the same for the province over which it has jurisdiction, provided no provincial act is repugnant to any dominion act. These provisions have so far worked in the interests of the provinces separately and of the dominion as a whole. Both these authorities are equally interested in the promotion of matters so deeply affecting the development of the natural resources of all sections. The provinces, excepting Manitoba, have the control of their lands and mines, while the dominion is interested in the opening up of the vast terri- torial area which it has in the north-west ; and it is conse- quently clear that these concurrent powers are wisely arranj::.:^ in the constitutional act. If we study the t'vo sections, enumerating the respective powers that fall within the jurisdiction o^^ the dominion par- liament and the provincial legislatures, we shall see that there are certain subjects, which may, as the operation of the act * For history of this case see Todd's Pari. Govt, in Cblonies, pp. 346-862. ' B. N. A. Act, 1867, sec. 96. In each province the legislature may make laws in relation to agriculture in the province, and to immigration into the province; and it is hereby declared that the parliament df Canada may from time to time make laws in relation to agriculture in all or any of the provinces, and to immigration into all or any of the provinces ; and any law of the legislature of a province, relative to agriculture or to immigration, shall have effect in and for the province, as long and as far only as it is not repugnant to any act of the parliament of Canada. 62 Federal Oovemmeni in Canada^ [608 il ;r proves, fall, under certain limitations, within the province of both. For instance, there is insurance, on which both the dominion government and provincial authorities have fully legislated — the former under the . general provision giving it the jurisdiction over " the regulation of trade and commerce;" the latter under the very wide ■ ;ght to incorporate companies " with provincial objects." The question of jurisdiction has been decided by the courts of Canada, and affirmed by the privy council, and principles laid down of much impoi*tance since they serve to prevent conflict of authority on other sub- jects and give each jurisdiction that power which it should exercise in accord with the general spirit of the constitution. It is now authoritatively decided that the terms of the eleventh paragraph of the ninety-second section are sufficiently com- prehensive to include insurance companies, whose object is to transact business within provincial limits. If a company desires to carry on operations outside of the province it will come under the provisions of the general fed- eral law, to which it must conform and which contains special provisions for such purposes. But the authority of the dominion parliament to legislate for the regulation of trade and commerce does not comprehend the power to regulate by legislation the contracts of a particular business or trade, such as the business of fire insurance in a single province. There- fore while the dominion parliament may give power to contract for insurance against loss or damage by fire, the form of the contiact and the rights of the parties thereunder, must depend upon the laws of the country or province in which the business is done.^ Although the Dominion parliament has exclusive jurisdic- tion over the criminal law, the local legislatures must necessa- rily have it within their power, as provided for in the act, to > See Ctrtwright's caaes on B. N. A. Act, vol. I., pp. 265-350; 4 App. Rep. O irio, 96, 103 ; 43 U. C. Q. B. 261, 271 ; Sup. Court R., vol. IV., pp. 215- S.rf;45 L. T.N. S., 721. 509] Federal Government in Canada. 53 impose punishment by fine, penalty or imprisonment, for enforcing any law of the province within its legislative authority. The legislature may add " hard labor " to confine- ment or restraint in prison in legislating on a subject within its jurisdiction. Such a power is not in conflict with the authority of the dominion parliament over criminal matters.^ This seems a necessary incident to a legislative power. It is a prin- ciple which parliament itself applies with respect to civil rights over which the legislatures have exclusive jurisdiction. All the legislative authorities must act, however, within their constitutional spheres, and not push their pretentions to extremes. As in the insurance .case just mentioned, powers should be sought from each legislative body within its v^nsli- tutional limits. .Nor should parliament interfere with such details of an organization as are wholly within the jurisdiction of a provincial sovereignty.' It must necessarily happen in the operation of a written constitution like ours thjsA conflicts of jurisdiction will arise in cases where the respective powers of the distinct legislative authorities are not sufficiently defined. Sometimes it is diffi- cult, while the constitution is working itself out, to decide wliere the jurisdiction rightly lies. The difficulty that may arise in such cases can be seen by reference to the decisions of the Canadian courts and of the judicial committee of the privy council on questions affecting the traffic in intoxicating liquors. The privy council has decided that the Canada temperance act of 1878 which, in effect, authorizes the inhabitants of each town, parish or county to prohibit or to regulate the sale of liquor, and to direct for whom, or for what purposes, and under what conditions, spirituous liquors may be sold therein, does not deal with matters of a purely local nature, nor with prop- erty nor civil rights, nor with the raising of a revenue for pro- I Bee Hodge va. the Queen, 9 App. Cu., 117. * Beniarks of Sir John A. Maodonald, Mr. Blake and others, Can. Han- sard, 1883, pp. 499, 500. 54 Federal Government in Canada, [510 mi J.' ni J: Ki vincial, local or municipal purposes, as assigned exclusively to the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures ; but is rather one of those subjects relating to public order and safety which fall within the general authority of parliament to make laws for "the order and good goverufnent" of Canada. On th^i other hand, the same body has decided that it is competent for a legislature of a province to pass an act regulating the issue of licenses for the sale, of liquor in the municipalities of a province, and authorizing the appointment of commissioners to define, by resolutions, the conditions and qualifications re- quired to obtain licenses. This learned body has pointed out that the powers of such a provincial act are confined in its operations to municipalities iu a province, and entirely local in its character, and in fact identical for the most part with the powers that belonged to municipal institutions under the laws that had been passed by the legislatures previous to con- federation. In short, such an act was considered, by their Lordships, as in the nature of police anjJ municipal regulations, calculated to preserve in the municipality peace and public decency, to repress drunkenness and disorderly and riotous conduct.^ These decisions, to a certain extent, dealing as they do with cognate subjects, will perplex the ordinary lay mind not accustomed to legal subtilties; and there are those who say^ that in the first decision their Lordships had not the ben- efit of a very complete argument in favor of the contention i: I -i i I'M * See 7 App. Caa., 829 : Legal News, January 19th, 1884. 'The late Mr. Justice Henry, one of the authors of the confederati j, in a judgment on a cognate question, reiterated the opinion he had expressed on the Canada Temperance act, that the British North America act, "if read in the light which a knowledge of the subject before the passage of that act would produce, plainly gives the {lower of legislation to the local legislatures in respect of licenses." His whole argument went to show " the right to make laws for the peace, &c., of Canada is as fully restricted to such subjects as do not come within the classes of subjects assigned to the legislatures of the provinces as language can make it ;" and that the privy council did not give due consideration to the power of the legislatures over those special subjects. Sup. Court B., vol. XI., pp. 3S-39. 611] Federal Oovemment in Canada, 55 for local jurisdiction, and hardly well appreciated the full weight that should be given to the paragraph giving the prov- inces complete jurisdiction over all matters of a merely local or private nature in a province. At all events, the second decision has recommended itself as in harmony with the gen- eral spirit of local powers granted to the provincial legisla- tures. As it was, the immediate effect of these decisions, in a measure involving contradictions, was to throw the liquor- licensing legislation of the country into much confusion ; for the Dominion government considered itself justified in passing a general license act, which subsequently was declared ultra vires, except where the act dealt with wholesale and vessel licenses, or carried into effect certain provisions of the Canada Temperance act.^ The conclusion we come to after studying the operation of the constitutional act, until the present time, is that while its framers endeavored to set forth more definitely the respective powers of the central and local authorities than is the case with the constitution of the United States, it is not likely to be any more successful in preventing controversies constantly arising on points of legislative jurisdiction. The American constitu- tion is remarkable for its precision, the generality of its principles, the avoidance of too many details, and the elasticity of which it is capable when applied to the needs and exigencies of the nation and states. The effort was made in the case of the Canadian constitution to go in the other direction, and more fully define the limits of the authority of the dominion and its political parts ; but while great care was evidently taken to prevent the dangerous assertion of provincial rights, it is clear that it has the imperfections of all statutes, when it is attempted to meet all emergencies. Happily, however, by means of the courts in Canada, and the tribunal of last resort in England, and the calm deliberation which the parliament is * See Bonrinot's Manual of Constitutional History, pp. 139-146. "m 56 Federal Government in Canada, [512 ■Hi il •I' : 'II ■1! 1 V it:il! k J;!ii 1 i !fjj nil I I learning to give to all questions of dubious jurisdiction, the principles on which the federal system should be worked are, year by year, better understood and the dangers of continuous conflict lessened. It is inevitable, if we are to judge from the working of a federal system in tlie United States, that tliere should be, at times, a tendency either to push to extremes the doctrine of the subordination of the provinces to the central power, or on the other hand to claim powers on behalf of the provincial organizations, hardly compatible with their position as members of a confederation based on the principle of giving complete jurisdiction to the central government over ail mat- ters of national and general import. It is obvious that in certain legislation the Dominion parliament must trench upon some of the powers exclusively given to the local organiza- tions, but it cannot be argued, with a due regard to the true framework of the constitutional act and the principles that should govOTn a federal system like ours, that the powers of the provinces should be absorbed by the dominion or central authority in cases of su(^ apparent conflict. Referring to this point the privy council calls attention to the fact that the gen- eral subject of "marriage and divorce" n given to the jurisdiction of the dominion parliament, anu the " solemni- zation of marriage" to the legislature of a province. It is evident that tlie solemnization of marriage would come within the general description of the subject first mentioned ; yet no one can doubt, notwithstanding the general language of the ninety-first section, that this subject is still within the exclu- sive authority of the l^islatutes of the provinces. "So," continues the privy council, "the raising of money by any mode or system of taxation is enumerated among the classes of subject in section ninety-one, but though the description is sufficiently large and general to include direct taxation within the province in order to aid the raising of a revenue for pro- vincial purposes assigned to the provincial legislatures by the ninety-second section it obviously could not have been intended 613] Federal Oovemment in Canada, 67 that in this instance also the general power should override the particular one." ^ It is now laid down by the highest judicial authorities that the dominion parliament has the right to interfere with " property and civil rights " in so far as such interference may be absolutely necessary for the purjxjse of legislating generally and effectually in relation to matters confided to the parliament of Canada. Laws designed for the promotion of public order, safety or morals, and which subject those who contravene them to criminal procedure and punishment, belong to the subject of public wrongs rather than to that of civil rights. T' ey are of a nature which fall within the general authority of parlia- ment, to make laws for the good order and government of Canada, and have direct relation to criminal law, which is one of the enumerated classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the parliament of Canada. Few if any laws could be made by the parliament for the peace, order and good government of Canada which might not, in some incidental way, affect pro- perty and civil rights ; and it could not have been intended when assuring to the provinces exclusive legislative authority on the subject of property and civil rights, to exclude the par- liament from the exercise of this general power whenever any such incidental interference would result from it.* As on the one hand the federal parliament cannot extend its own jurisdiction by a territorial extension of its laws, and legislate on subjects constitutionally provincial, by enacting them for the whole dominion ; so, on the other hand, a provincial legisla- ture cannot extend its jurisdiction over matters constitutionally federal, by a territorial limitation of its laws and legislate on matters left to the federal power, by enacting them for the province only, as for instance, incorporate a bank for the province.' »L. T. N. S., 721 : Cartwright, vol. I., pp. 272, 273. n App. Cas., 829. •Can. Sup. Court R, IV., 310. 6 68 Federal Government in Canada. [514 It If ^: ill m m When the British North America Act enacted that there should be a legislature for a province, and that it should have exclusive authority to make laws for the provinces and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in the ninety-second section, it conferred powers not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from, or as agents of, the impe- rial parliament, but authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by the section, as the imperial parliament, in the plenitude of its power, possesses and could bestow.* In short, each legislative body should act within the legiti- mate sphere of its clearly defined powers, and the dominion parliament should no more extend the limits of its jurisdic- tion, by the generality of the application of its law, than a local legislature should extend its jurisdiction by localizing the application of its statutes.^ I might cite other opinions bearing on the same important question, but I have already given enough to show the prin- ciples that should generally prevail if the federal constitution is to be efficiently carried out with a true consideration of all the interests involved.' The federal government should work in harmony with provincial institutions, and by leaving them full scope within the limits of the constitution at once give strength and stability to the central government and confidence to the various local organizations without which it could not exist. In one most important respect the dominion government exercises a direct control over the legislation of each province. While the imperial government can disallow any act of the » 9 App. Cas., 117 ; Cartwright, vol. III., p. 162. The same power exists in the States. " When a particular power," says Judge Coolej, " is found to belong to the States, they are entitled to the same complete independence in its exercise as the national government in wielding its own authority." * Legal News (the late Mr. Justice Ramsay) on Hodge vs. the Queen, January 26th, 1884. ' See Bourinot's Manual of Constitutional History, chap. xiy. 515] Federal OoverriTnent in Canada, 59 CaDadian parliament at variance with the interests of the Empire, the governor in council can, within one year from its receipt, disallow any act of a provincial legislature. Here is one of the evidences which the constitution affords of the subordinate position in certain particulars of the pro- vincial authorities. It illustrates the fact that the dominion government now occupies those relations towards the provin- cial governments that England, before the confederation, held with reference to the provinces, and still does in the case of all colonies outside of Canada. This power of disallowance is not limited in terms by the British North America Act,* but may be exercised even with respect to an act clearly within the constitutional jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures. It has so far been exercised in a very insignificant number of cases, compared with the vast amount of legislation that annu- ally passes the provincial bodies ; but in some of these cases it caused much irritation, notably in Manitoba, whose provincial railway acts were vetoed on several occasions on the ground that they were in conflict with obligations that the dominion had assumed towards the Canadian Pacific Railway. These restrictions were only removed after parliament had given the Pacific railway certain privileges as compensation for the removal of their railway monopoly in the north-west. From these and other instances of the exercise of this political power, the student will see that it is one to be exercised with great discretion and judgment, as otherwise it may involve conse- > Sec. 90. The following provisions of this act respecting the parliament of Canada, namely, — the provisions relating to appropriation and tax bills, the recommendation of money votes, the assent to bills, the disallowance of acts and the signification of pleasure on bills reserved, — shall extend and apply to the legislatures of the several provinces as if those provisions were here re-enacted and made applicable in terms to the respective pro- vinces and the legislatures thereof, with the substitution of the lieutenant- governor of the province for the governor-general, of the governor-general for the Queen„ and for a secretary of state, of one year for two years, and of the province for Canada. 60 Federal Govenimenl in Canada, [516 Ml 1 •( ?, S|l m *:4^ quences fatal to the harmony and integrity of the confedera- tion. Thi8 power can be properly exercised when the act under consideration is beyond the constitutional competency of the legislature, or when it is repugnant to dominion legislation in cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction, or when it is hostile to the rights enjoyed by a minority under the constitu- tion, or when clearly hostile or dangerous to the peace and unity of the dominion generally. Before advising the gover- nor-general on an act of dubious import, or only partially defective, the council must consider whether it will not be sufficient to inform the legislative body, responsible for its passage, of the objectionable features, and allow it to go into operation on the understanding that they will be removed by an amending act. Or in cases where the act is useful, though ultra vireSf the government has recommended confirmatory legislation by the dominion parliament, or in matters of doubt they have been left to the courts to decide whenever a question should arise for their determination. The cases are so numerous when the dominion government is called upon to exercise its power of allowance or disallowance, that it is out of the question that I should here attempt to lay down with any accuracy, the various reasons and principles that should guide it in this important work of supervision. The danger arises from the exercise of the power, on the grounds of public policy, in the case of a question clearly within the constitu- tional powers of a legislature. The principle that should prevail, as a rule, is to leave to their operation all acts that fall within the powers of the provincial legislature, which within its legal sphere has as absolute a right of legislation as the dominion parliament itself; and if the dominion authori- ties, at any time, for sufficient reasons, consider it necessary to interfere in provincial affiiirs, they must be prepared to justify their action before parliament and the country, so deeply inter- ested in the preservation of the union. Opinion is divided as to the wisdom of a provision which gives so sovereign a power to a political body, and it may be doubted if in this 517] Federal Oovemmeni in Canada. 61 respect our constitution is an improvement upon that of the United States. The veto is so much valued in the states that while originally only one state, Massachusetts, vested it in the governor, now all but four have it. The President vetoes the acts of Congress, which can, however, override his decision by a two-thirds vot« in each house ; and the governors in each state, as just remarked, exercise the same power with respect to state legislation. But the disallowance of' state legislation by the executive at Washington, has never existed, and was never suggested in the case of the American federal system.^ The adoption of such a principle in 1787 would have been, in all probability, fatal to the passage of the constitution of the states, many of whom agreed to that measure with doubt and suspicion. They agreed, wisely, as experience seems to show, to leave the judicial branch of the constitution to determine the constitutionality of all acts of congress or of the legislature. Political considerations cannot enter into this judicial determination. As long as a statute is within the constitu- tional jurisdiction of a body that passed it, the federal judiciary cannot do otherwise than so declare, even if it be objectionable at the time on grounds of public policy. The future will soon prove whether this extraordinary supervision, given to the dominion over the provinces, is calculated to strengthen ' " While the constitution was being framed the suggestion was made, and for a time seemed likely tu be adopted, that a veto on acts of state legisla- tures should be conferred upon the federal congress. Discussion revealed the objections to such a plan. Its introduction would have offended the sentiment of the states, always jealous of their autonomy ; its exercise would have provoked collisions with them. The disallowance of a state statute, even if it did really offend against the federal constitution, would have seemed a political move, to be resented by a political counter-move But by the action of the courts the self-love of the states is not wounded, and the decision annulling their laws is nothing but a tribute to the superior authority of the supreme enactment to which they were themselves parties, and which they may themselves desire to see enforced against some other state on some not remote occasion." — Prof. Bryce's American Com- monwealth, I., p. 343. I ' ! 1 ' I V ! 62 Federal Oovemmeni in Canada. [518 W: t I II i f 'i ■■. ' the confederation, or has in it the elements of political discord and disunion. As long as the dominion and provincial gov- ernments are politically identified, the danger from conflict is minimized, but it is possible to suppose the case of violent antagonism between these governinente when the central power mi^ht in a moment of passion or arrogance use its authority to check or thwart the government made subordinate to it in this particular. Happily, so far, the history ^ of this large power is not calculated to raise apprehensions that it is likely to be recklessly exercised ; for the cases which have heretofore created much discussion, and even discontent, have been defended on grounds of public policy or the public faith, though the wisdom and soundness of that policy has been doubted by others who have looked at the whole question from a purely provincial point of view. The sound sense of the people must always prevail in a country like this, and keep all governments from unduly and rashly interfering «vith the constitutional rights of the different sections of the domin- ion, to whom has been granted such a complete system of local self-government as is compatible with the unity arid per- manency of the dominion at large.' ^ See correspondence, reports of the Ministers of Justice, and orders in council upon the subject of provincial legislation, 1867-1887, compiled under direction of the Ministers of Justice, by W. E..Hodgins, for a com- plete history of the exercise of this important responsibility thrown upon the dominion government. ' The inexpediency of disallowing any measure believed to be within the constitutional jurisdiction of a province was strongly asserted in the debate in the Canadian House of Commons in 1889, on the Quebec Statute, 51-52 Victoria, c. 13. " An act respecting the settlement of the Jesuits' Estates." The Jesuits had been suppressed by the Pope in 1773, and their property taken possession of in 1800 by the British government, which applied the revenues thereof to public instruction in the province of Lower Canada ; but the Roman Catholic Church, always through its Bishops, contended that it should be vested with all the estates as a result of the suppression of the society. This body, however, has been reinstated in these later times, and an act of incorporation was granted it by the Quebec legislature in 1887. The Quebec government then carried through the first-mentioned 519] Federal Oov&rnment in Canada'. 63 It is on the courts of Canada, aided by the ripe judgment and learning of the judicial committee of the privy council, we mu'^t, after all, mainly depend for the satisfactory operation of our constitutional act. The experience of the United States has shown the inesti nable value of the decisions given by the judges of the supreme and the federal courts on questions that have arisen, from time to time, in connection with their con- act, authorizing the payment of $400,000 as compensation for the sale of the estates formerly held by the Jesuits, and as a means of settling a longstand- ing difficulty. These estates, it must be remembered, became the property of the province after confederation and were entirely at the disposal of the legislature. The negotiations with the See of Rome, and the Society are formally set forth in the preamble of the act in the shape of correspondence between the Quebec government and the representatives of those reli- gious bodies, and it is expressly stated that the agreement will be bind- ing only in so far as it shall be ratified by the Pope and the Legisla- ture, and the amount of compensation was to remain as a special deposit until the former had made known his wishes respecting its distribution. The government in treating on the question, did not "recognize any civil obligation but merely a moral obligation." Subsequently the funds were distributed by the Pope — the greater part to certain educational insti- tutions in the province, and the remainder to the Society. Out of this settlement a heated controversy, involving old world and ancient issues, lias arisen in Canada, and was transferred to parliament by a resolution, formally asserting that the government should have at once disallowed the act as beyond the power of the legislature because, among other things, "it recognizes the usurpation of a right by a foreign authority, namely, His Holiness, the Pope, to claim that his consent was necessary " to dispose and appropriate the public funds of a province. It was contended on the other hand that the Pope, as the head of the Church, was simply called upon to act as an arbitrator between the disputants in a matter in which the inter- ests of the Church were involved. The inference that may be drawn from the debate on the whole question in the House of Commons is this : that the almost unanimous vote in favor of the course of the government in allowing the bill when it came formally before them (one hundred and eighty-eight against thirteen) was chiefly influenced by the conviction that the legislature of the province had an unquestionable right to dispose of its own funds as it might think proper, or in the words of the minute of council, approved by the governor-general, " the subject matter of the act is one of provincial concern, only having relation to a fiscal matter entirely within 64 Federal Oovemment in Canada. [620 stitution. The name of Chief Justice Marshall, especially, must be always associated with their fundamental law ; for it is in a great measure owing to his great legal knowledge, to his broad views, to his capacity of comprehending the true spirit, scope and meaning of the principles laid down in the constitution, and to his ability to apply them to the circum- stances that surrounded him at v^ y critical times, that the Ail ii'i the control of the legislature of Quebec." In the course of the learned debate' that took place on the merits of this very vexatious issue a very clear exposition was given by several speakers from their respective points of view of the principles by which the relations between the dominion and the provincial governments should be governed. But there is another conclusion which I think may be fairly deduced from a debate of this char- acter. An executive power which can be thus questioned in the political arena seems obviously fraught with perilous consequences. If all questions of the constitutionality of a provincial act could be decided only in the courts, parliament would be saved the discussion of matters, which, once mixed up with political and religious issues, must ne'^ssarily be replete with danger in a country like Canada, with a population nearly half Roman Catholic. In Canada and the United States, there is so much respect for the law and the bench that the people rarely question the wisdom of a judicial decision on any subject of importance. Can as much be said for the judgment of a political body, however honestly rendered it may be ? The following remarks of a very judicious writer, Professor Dicey, in the Law of the Constitution, (p. 166) may well be quoted in this connection : " The main reason why the United States have carried out the federal system with unqualified success is that the people of the union are more thoroughly imbued with constitutional ideas than any other existing nation. Constitutional questions arising out of either the constitutions of the sev- eral states or the articles of the federal constitution are of daily occurrence, and constantly occupy the courts. Hence the people become a people of constitutionalists ; and matters which excite the strongest possible feeling, — as for instance, the right of the Chinese to settle in the country, — are determined by the judicial bench, and the decision of the bench is acqui- esced in by the people. This acquiescence or submission is due to the Americans inheriting the legal notions of the common law ; that is, of the most legal system of law, if the expression may be allowed, in the world." See also Hare's American Constitutional Law, vol. I., pp. 122, 123. I Se' Canadton Hansaid for April 26, 27 and 28, 1889,, ^ 521] Federal OovemmerU in Canada. 66 union gained strength during the years he preblJcv! over the Supreme Court.' The Quebec convention of 1864 appears to have fully ap- preciated the neccHsity of having a Supreme Court of Canada which would bear as much resemblance as |)ossible to the American tribunal ; for they agreed to a resolution, which is now embodied in the section of the British North America Act which provides " for the constitution, maintenance and organ- ization of a general court of appeal for Canada, and for the establishment of any additional courts for the better adminis- tration of the laws of Canada." The Judiciary of Canada, from the lowest to the highest, can and do constantly decide on the constitutionality of acts, passed by the various legisla- tive authorities of the Dominion. They do so in their capa- city as judges and expounders of the law, and not because they have any especial commission, or are invested with any political powers or duties by the constitution.^ Unlike the United States, Canada has no federal courts established in the provinces, although the section just quoted seems to provide for some such courts, should they be consid- ered necessary. The constitution, maintenance and organiza- tion of the courts in the provinces will be seen, by reference 'Professor Bryce (The American Commonwealth, II., p. 1) very tersely shows the importance of the influence that the decisions of the supreme court have exercised on the constitution : " Hence, although the duty of the court is only to interpret, the considerations affecting interpretation are more numerous than in the case of ordinary statutes, more delicate, larger in their reach and scope. They sometimes need the exercise not merely of legal acumen and judicial fairness, but of a comprehension of the nature and methods of government which one does not demand from the European judge, who walks in the narrow path traced for him by ordinary statutes. It is therefore hardly an exaggeration to say that the American constitu- tion, as it now stands, with the mass of foregoing decisions which explain it, is a far more complete and finished instrument than it was when it came first new from the hands of the convention. It is not merely their work but the work of the judges, and, most of all, of one man, the great Chief Justice Marshall." 'Seell. Bryce, p. 184. !i' 66 Federal Government in Canada. [522 i if 1:1 i 1:1 ■Li* -li 'm to the ninety-second section, to be within the matters placed under provincial jurisdiction, though the judges are appointed and paid by the dominion government, with the exception of the courts of probate in Nova Scoti?, and New Brunswick.^ In 1875, however, it was deemed advisable to pass an act providing for the establishment of a Supreme Court and Ex- chequer Court of Canada.' But the court is only a general court of appeal for Canada in a limited sense, since the exist- ing right of appeal in the various provinces to the privy council has been left untouched. Nor can it be called a final court of appeal for Canada, since the privy council entertains appeals from its judgments by virtue of the exercise of the royal prerogative.' This court consists of a chief justice and five puisne judges, two of whom, at least, must be appoiuted from the bench or bar of the province of Quebec — a provision intended to give the court the assistance of men specially versed in French Canadian law. With certain exceptions set forth in the act, an appeal can lie to this court and from the highest court of final resort in a province. The governor- general in council may refer to the supreme court for hearing or consideration any matter which he deems advisable in the public interest ;* but in certifying their opinion, the judges, m m ^ Sees. 96-97. The Maritime Court of Ontario is, however, a federal court. ' 38 Vict., ch. 11. The act was amended in 1887, by removing the Exche- quer Court jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and giving it to a judge especially appointed for that purpose. 50-51 Vict., ch. 16. ' Cassell's Practice of the Supreme Court of Canada, p. 4. *No such provision exists in the case of a federal judiciary. That branch of the government can be called upon " only to decide controversies brought before them in a legal form ; and therefore are bound to abstain from any extra-j'idicial opinions upon points of law, even though solemnly requested by the executive. President Washington, in 1793, requested its opinion upon the constitution of the treaty with France of 1778 ; but they declined to give any opinion for the reasons just stated." Story's Commen- taries (Cooley*s ed.), g 1571. Some of the state constitutions provide for a similar reference by the governor or legislature to the Supreme Court of the state. *' The 623] Federal Oovemment in Canada. 67 following the practice of the judicial committee, do not give any reasons. On more than one occasion this power of refer- ring a question, on which there is a legal or constitutional difficulty, has been found very useful ^o the parties interested, as well as to the country at large.^ It is also provided that controversies between the dominion and any province, or between the provinces themselves, may be referred to the exchequer court, and on appeal from that court to the supreme court, and cases in which the question of the validity of a dominion or provincial act is shown to be material to the issue, ma)* come within the jurisdiction of the court, whenever the legislature of one province has passed an act — as has been done by Ontario, Nova Scotia, and British Columbia — ^agree- ing to such references. Either house of parliament may also refer to the court any private bill for its report thereon, but so far the senate alone has availed itself of this provision in the case of a bill of doubtful jurisdiction.* It will be seen from this summary of the powers of the court that it is intended to make it, as far as practicable, a judges of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts suggest in their very learned and instructive opinion delivered to the legislature, December 31, 1878, that this provision, which appears first in the Massachusetts consti- tution of 1780, and was doubtless borrowed thence by the other states, evi- dently had in view the usage of the British constitution, by which the King as well as the House of Lords, whether acting in their judicial or in their legislative capacity, had the right to demand the opinion of the twelve judges of England. This is still sometimes done by the House of Lords; but the opinions of the judges are not necessarily followed by that House, and though always reported are not deemed to be binding pronounce- ments of law similar to the decisions of a court." Bryce's American Com- monwealth, II., 48, 49. * Cassell's Practice of the Supreme Court of Canada, p. 4. The latest case of reference to the judges was one of a serious controversy between the government of Manitoba and the Canadian Pacific Bailroad, which refused permission to a Manitoba railroad to cross its track ; but this case was re- ferred under section 99 of the Railway Act (57 Vict., c. 29, 1888). The question of the validity of the Liquor License Act wor referred under sec. 26 of a special act, 47 Vict., c. 32. ' Bourinot's Pari. Practice in Canada, pp. 606-607. 68 Federal Government in Canada. [524 li II 1 li i^r ill. I' ill a^v court for the disposal of controversies that arise in the work- ing of the constitutional system of Canada. So far its decisions have won respect in Canada, and have been rarely overruled by the judicial committee of the privy council, which, by virtue of Her Majesty's royal prerogative, enter- tains appeals from the court where it is considered that any error of law has been made, and substantial interests have been involved/ As I have in the first paragraph of this lecture referred to the importance of this appeal to the privy council, it is not necessary that I should dwell here on the subject. I have now shown you the leading features of the constitu- tional relations that exist between the dominion and the pro- vinces, and have stated some of the principles, as I understand them, that should guide the construction of the fundamental char- ter under which each authority acts. In other lectures, I shell review the duties and functions of the executive, administra- tive and parliamentary bodies by which the federal system is governed ; but there are a few other points that properly fall within the scope of this lecture. First of all, and the most important in many ways, are the methods that the constitution provides for meeting the financial necessities of the dominion and of the provinces. The ninety-second section shows that the dominion parliament can raise money by any mode or sys- tem of taxation, borrow money on the public credit, issue paper money and regulate trade and commerce. Revenue is ' See Sec. 71 of Supreme Court Act, which after setting forth that the judg- ment of the court shall be final, adds the proviso, " saving any right which Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to exercise by virtue of her royal prerogative. But by an act passed by the Canadian parliament in 1888, (61 Vict., c. 43) it is provided that " notwithstanding any royal prerogative" no appeal shall be brought in any criminal case from any judgment or order of any court in Canada to any court of appeal in the United King- dom. Exception was, I understand, taken to this act by the imperial author- ities, but it does not appear to have been disallowed. This strong assertion of Canadian judicial independence rests on the powers given to the Cana- dian parliament by sections 91 (sub-s. 27) and 101 of B. N. A. Act, 1867. 525] Federal Government in Canada. 69 accordingly raised principally from duties imposed on imports, and on certain articles, chiefly tobacco and liquors, manufac- tured in the dominion, and in addition to these there are cer- tain minor revenues collected from the sale of lands in the north-west territories, over which the dominion government has exclusive control. All these moneys are paid into the treasury, and form what is known in law as "the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada," out of which are paid all the costs, charges and expenses incident to the collection and manage- ment of this fund, and all the expenses of government.^ ^ fi. N. A. Act, 1867, sec. 102. All duties and revenues over which the respective legislatures of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick before and at the union had and have power of appropriation, except such por- tions thereof as are by this act reserved to the respective legislatures of the provinces, or are raised by them in accordance with the special powers con- ferred on them by this act, shall form one consolidated revenue fund, to be appropriated for the public service of Canada in the manner and subject to the charges in this act provided. 103. The consolidated revenue fund of Canada shall be permanently charged with the costs, charges and expenses incident to the collection, management and receipt thereof, and the same shall form the first charge thereon, subject to be reviewed and audited in such manner as shall be ordered by the governor-general in council until the parliament otherwise provides. 104. The annual interest of the public debts of the several provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick at the union shall form the second charge on the consolidated revenue fund of (Canada. 105. Unless altered by the parliament of Canada, the salary of the gov- ernor-general shall be ten thousand pounds sterling money of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, payable out of the consolidated revenue fund of Canada, and the same shall form the third charge thereon. 106. Subject to the several payments by this act charged on the consoli- dated revenue fund of Canada, the same shall be appropriated by the par- liament of Canada for the public service. 107. All stocks, cash, bankers' balances, and securities for money belong- ing to each province at the time of the union, except as in this act men- tioned, shall be the property of Canada, and shall be taken in reduction of the amount of the respective debts of the provinces at the union. 108. The public works and property of each province enumerated in the third schedule to this act shall be the property of Canada. ' PS5I!3ISI 70 Federal Oovemment in Canada. [526 These moneys are, in every instance, voted by parliament, but while certain sums are autliorized annually by the appro- priation act — which comprises the annual grants voted every session in supply — other payments are made under the sanc- tion of statutes. These statutes,' which are permanent and can only be repealed or amended by act of parliament, provide for salaries of the governor-general, lieutenant-governors, ministers of the crown, judges, and other high functionaries, II m 109. All lands, mines, minerals and royalties belonging to the several provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick at the union, and all sums then due or payable for such lands, mines, minerals or royalties, shall belong to the several provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in w^hich the same are situate or arise, subject to any trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any interest other than that of the pro- vince in the same. 110. All assets connected with such portions of the public debt of each province as are assumed by that province, shall belong to that province. 111. Canada shall be liable for the debts and liabilities of each province existing at the union. 112. Ontario and Quebec conjointly shall be liable to Canada for the amount (if any) by which the debt of the province of Canada exceeds at the imion sixty-two million five hundred thousand dollars, and shall be charged with interest at the rate of five per centum per annum thereon. 113. The assets enumerated in the fourth schedule to this act, belonging at the union to the province of Canada, shall be the property of Ontario and Quebec conjointly. 114. Nova Scotia shall be liable to Canada for the amount (if apy) by which its public debt exceeds at the union eight million dollars, and shall be charged with the interest at the rate of five per centum per annum thereon. 116. New Brunswick shall be liable to Canada for the amount (if any) by which its public debt exceeds at the union seven million dollars, and shall be charged with interest at the rate of five per centum per annum thereon. 116. Incase the public debts of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick do not at the union amount to eight million and seven million dollars respectively, they shall respectively receive, by half-yearly payments in advance from the government of Canada interest at five per centum per annum on the difference between the actual amounts of their respective dehu> and such stipulated amounts. 117. The several provinces shall retain all their respective public pro- perty not otherwise disposed of in this act, subject to the right of Canada to 627] Federal Government in Canada. 71 whose remuneration it is understood should not depend on the annual votes. All moneys are paid out of the treasury under certain forms required by statute, and a thorough sys- tem of audit prevents any public expenditure not authorized by parliament, although the law permits the issue of governor- general's warrants in certain cases of emergency, but these, too, must at the first opportunity he laid before, and be sanc- tioned by parliament. Large sums are, at times, borrowed on assume any lands or public property required for fortifications or for the defence of the country. 118. The following sums shall be paid yearly by Canada to the several provinces for the support of their governments and legislatures : DOLiiAne. Ontario Eighty thousand. Quebec Seventy thousand. Nova Scotia --..-. Sixty thousand. New Brunswick ..---. Fifty thousand. Two hundred and sixty thousand ; and an annual grant in aid of each province shall be made, equal to eighty cents per head of the population as ascertained by the census of one thou« sand eight hundred and sixty one, and in the case of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, by each subsequent decennial census until the population of each of those two provinces amounts to four hundred thousand souls, at which rate such grants shall thereafter remain. Such grants shall be in full settlement of all future demands on Canada, and shall be paid half-yearly in advance to each province ; but the government of Canada shall deduct from such grants, as against any province, all sums chargeable as interest on the public debt of that province in excess of the several amounts stipulated in this act. 119. New Brunswick shall receive, by half-yearly payments in advance from Canada, for the period of ten years from the union, an additional allowance of sixty -three thousand dollars per annum ; but as long as the public debt of that province remains under seven million dollars, a deduc- tion equal to the interest at five per centum per annum on such deficiency shall be made from that allowance of sixty-three thousand dollars. 120. All payments to be made under this act, or in discharge of liabilities created under any act of the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick respectively, and ' assumed by Canada, shall, until the parlia- ment of Canada otherwise directs, be made in such form and manner as may from time to time be ordered by the governor-general in council. 72 Federal Oovemmefni in Canada. [528 li the public credit, under the conditions laid down by parlia- ment, in order to meet the heavy expenditures required for the extensive system of public works in which the dominion is engaged. The treasury also issues a number of notes, of which the sum of four dollars is the highest denomination — the banks of Canada being banks of issue for large suras within fixed limits — but the dominion issue in any one year may not exceed four million dollars, and the total amount issued and outstanding, at any time, may not exceed twenty millions, secured for redemption by gold and Canadian guaranteed securities.^ '11;, I \::\i\ 121. All articles of the growth, produce or manufacture of any one of the provinces shall, from and after the union, be admitted free into each of the other provinces. 122. The customs and excise laws of each province shall, subject to the provisions of this act, continue in force until altered by the parliament of Canada. 123. Where customs duties are, at the union, leviable on any goods, wares or merchandises in any two provinces, those goods, wares and mer- chandises may, from and after the union, be imported from one of those provinces into the other of them, on proof of payment of the customs duty leviable thereon in the province of exportation, and on payment of such further amount (if any) of customs duty as is leviable thereon in the province of importation. 124. Nothing in this act shall affect the right of New Brunswick to levy the lumber dues provided in chapter fifteen of title three of the Revised Statutes of New Brunswick, or in any act amending that act before or after the Union, and not increasing the amount of such dues ; but the lumber of any of the provinces other than New Brunswick shall not be subject to such dues. 125. No lands or property belonging to Canada or any province shall be liable to taxation. 126. Such portions of the duties and revenues over which the respective legislatures of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had before the union, power of appropriation, as are by this act reserved to the respective governments or legislatures of the provinces, and all duties and revenues raised by them in accordance with the special powers conferred upon them by this act, shall in each province form one consolidated revenue fund to be appropriated for the public service of the province. > Can. Rev. Stat., chaps. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, etc. 629] Federal Oovetmment in Canada. 78 As respects the provinces, their revenues arise from the proceeds of royalties from mines (chiefly valuable in Nova Scotia), the sales of Crown lands and minerals, and the subsi- dies granted by authority of the British North America Act for the purposes of enabling them to carry on their govern- ment. The ninety-second section authorizes the legislatures to impose direct taxation on the province in order to raise a revenue for provincial purposes, to borrow money on the sole credit of the province, and to raise money from shop, saloon, tavern and auctioneer licenses, in order to the raising of a rev- enue for provincial, local, or municipal purposes. When the Quebec convention sat this question of provincial revenue was one that gave the delegates the greatest difficulty. In all the provinces the sources of revenue were chiefly customs and excise duties which had to be set apart for the general govern- ment. Some of the delegates from Ontario, where there had been for many years an admirable system of municipal gov- ernm. , in existence which provided funds for education and local improvements, saw many advantages in direct taxation ; but the representatives of the other provinces could not con- sent to such a proposition, especially in the case of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, where there was no municipal system, and the people depended al- most exclusively on the annual grants of the legislature for the means to meet their local necessities.^ All of the delegates, in fact, felt that to force the provinces to resort to direct tax- ation as the only method of carrying on their government, would be probably fatal to the success of the scheme, and it was finally decided to grant annual subsidies, based on popu- lation, the relative debts, the financial position, and such other facts as should be brought fairly into the consideration of the case. These financial arrangements were incorporated with the act of union,* and necessarily entail a heavy expense ' See speech of Hon. George Brown, C!onfederation Debates, 1865, p. 92. 'See Can. Bev. Stat., c. 46. 6 I!; 74 Federal Government in Canada. [530 annually on the exchequer of the dominion. In consequence of the demand that arose in Nova Scotia for " better terms," previous to and after the union, the parliament of the domin- ion, in the session of 1869, legislated so as to meet the diffi- culty that had arisen, and it was accordingly decided to grant additional allowances to the provinces, calculated on increased amounts of debt as compared with wiiat they were allowed to enter the union.* Manitoba, British Columbia, and Prince Edward Island also obtained similar annual subsidies in accordance with the general basis laid down in the constitution. It is from these subsidies t"hat the provinces derive the greater part of their annual revenues. Ontario is in the most favorable posi- tion from the very considerable revenue raised from lands and timber dues. The provinces are also at times bor- rowers on the money market, especially Quebec, in order to meet pressing liabilities. In the maritime provinces a system of municipal institutions, except in Prince Edward Island, has been at last adopted, and the local treasury in a measure relieved ; but still on account of the lavish expenditure, at times considered necessary by the legislature, there is too often a complaint that the local funds are insufficient for general purposes. From this necessarily meagre summary of the financial methods by which the dominion and the provinces meet the large expense required for public purposes, it will be seen that there is an intimate connection between the go^'ernraents that does not exist in the American union, where each state meets all its local requirements by direct taxation and is not depen- dent on the federal authority. The wisdom of this policy has been more than once ques- tioned since the union has been working itself out. As a large portion of their revenues — in certain cases the largest portion — is not derived from local sources, there has not been always, • See Can. Rev. Stat., c. 46. 531] Federal Oovemment in Canada. 75 |n it is believed, that effort for economical expenditure that would probably have been made if all the funds were raised from local sources, and from direct taxation as in the United States. The consequence already has been that demands have been made from time to time, on the dominion treasury for the sub- sidizing of railway and other schemes, which are really provincial undertakings, and which are assisted as a means of relieving the local treasury and satisfying the representatives from that section. Each province should be, as far as possi- ble, in a position of local independence, and free from suspicion of political pressure on the central government at critical times. The federal government executes its postal and revenue services through its own officers ; but, unlike the United States, it has ^o courts of its own in the provinces for federal objects. Still thv> result is practically the same, for it can use the whole system of the administration of justice should it l>e necessary to resort to it. The dominion government can claim the allegiance of the people of the whole country to assist it in working out efficiently and securing those great national interests, of which it is the guardian under the con- stitution. It has the control of the militia, and can protect the existence of the dominion, and repress rebellion as in the case of the unfortunate disturbances in the north-west in 1886. The government of Canada has a quasi national character, and is bound to maintain by all the means that the constitution gives it the union into which the provinces freely entered in 1867. On the other hand, the province in many respects touches more nearly the civil and the political side of the people within its limits than the central authority with its more general or national attributes of power. The exaction of indirect taxation does not come home immediately to all classes in every day life like the tax collector who presents himself under the municipal system in vogue in the provinces. Comfort and convenience, liberty and life, civil rights and property, endless matters that daily affect a community are mm 76 Federal Oovemmeni in Canada. [532 I directly within the jurisdiction of the provincial organisms. If the dominion should cease to-morrow to exercise its consti- tutional powers, the province would still remain — for it existed before the union — and its local organization could very soon be extended to embrace those powers which now belong to the central authority. The federal structure, whatever may be its defects and weak- nesses in certain details, on the whole seems well adapted to meet the wants and necessities of the people. From the foun- dation to the crowning apex it has many attributes of har- mony and strength. It is framed on principles which, as tested by British and American experience, are calculated to assist national development and give full liberty to local insti- tutions. At the bottom of the edifice are those parish, town- ship, county and municipal institutions which are eminently favorable to popular freedom and local improvement. Then comes the more important provincial organization, divided into those executive, legislative and judicial authorities, which are essential to the working of all provincial constitutions. Next comes the central government, which assumes a national dignity and affords a guarantee of protection, unity and secu- rity to the whole system. The apex of the structur? is the imperial power — in other words, the Sovereign who holds her exalted position, not by the caprice of a popular vote, but with all the guarantees of permanency with which the British constitution surrounds the Throne. LECTURE III. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARLIAMENT. Sir Henry Maine, in common with other eminent writers on government, lias dwelt on the fact that the framers of the existing Federal Union of the United States regarded the opinions expressed by Montesquieu in the Esprit des Lois as of paramount importance, and that none had more weight with the writers of the Federalist, that admirable series of commen- taries on the constitution, than that which affirmed the essen- tial separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. The lines accoi*dingly that separate these respective depart- ments are drawn with remarkable distinctness in the American system. Their object was to impose every possible check upon the several agencies of government, so that one could not com- bine with the other, to the injury of the third. In the Cana- dian as in all other systems that derive their origin from England, this same wise principle is carefully carried out, though not to the same extent a« in the United States. The judiciary has been wisely kept entirely distinct from all other authorities since 1841, and it is now impossible for the judges to sit in the legislative and executive councils and exercise a direct influence in political affairs. In the case of the execu- tive, however, as I shall show later on, there is a direct con- nection between it and the legislative department, which in many respects operates in the direction of good government and efficient legislation. As I have already shown in a previous lecture the head of the executive authority is the Queen, who is represented by 77 ^^ ■•i 78 Federal Oovemment in Canada. [634 the governor-general advised by a privy council.* The gover- nor-general us the acting head of the executive of Canada, assembles, prorogues and dissolves parliament and assents to or reserves bills in the name of her majesty ; but, in the dis- charge of these and all other executive duties which are within the limits of his commission, and in conformity with the con- stitution, he acts entirely by and with the advice of his council who must always have the support of the house of commons. Even in matters of imperial interest affecting Canada, he consults with the council and submits their views to the colonial secretary of state in England. On Canadian questions clearly within the constitutioii.il jurisdiction of the dominion he cannot act apart from his advisers, but is bound by their advice. Should he differ from them on some vital question of principle or policy he must either recede from his own position or be prepared to accept the great responsi- ^ B. N. A. Act, 1867, sec. 10. The provisionH of this act referring to the governor-general extend and apply to the governor-general for the time being of Canada, or other the chief executive officer or administrator for the time being carrying on the governtiient of Canada on behalf and in the name of the Queen, by whatever title he is designated. 11. There shall be a council to aid and advise the government of Canada, to be styled the Queen's Privy Council for Canada ; and the persons who are to be members of that ccuncil shall be from time to time chosen and summoned by the governor-general and sworn in as privy councillors, and members thereof may be from time to time removed by the governor- general. 12. All powers, authorities and functions which, under any act of the parliament of Great Britain, or of the parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the legislature of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Canada, Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, are at the union vested in or exercisable by the respective governors or lieutenant-governors of those provinces, with the advice, or with the advice and consent, of the respective executive councils thereof, or in conjunction with those councils, or with any number of members thereof, or by those governors or lieuten- ant-governors individually, shall, as far as the same continue in existence and capable of being exercised after the union in relation to the govern- ment of Canada, be vested in and exercisable by the governor-general, with the advice or with the advice and consent of or in conjunction with the 636] Federal Oovemment in Canada. 79 bility of dismissinf^ them ; but such an alternative is an extreme exercise of authority and not in consonance with the sound constitutional practice of modern times, should his advisers have a majority in the popular branch of the legisla- ture. Should he, however, feel compelled to resort to this extreme exercise of the royal prerogative, he must be prepared to find another body of advisers, ready to assume the full responsibility of his action and justify it before the house and country. For every act of the crown, in Canada as in England, there mu»t be some one immediately responsible, apart from the crown itself. But a governor, like any other subject, can- not be "freed from the personal responsibility for his acts nor be allowed to excuse a violation of the law on the plea of having followed the counsels of evil advisers."^ Cases may arise when the governor-general will hesitate to come to a speedy conelusii>n on a matter involving important conse- quences, and then it is quite legitimate for him to seek advice Queen's privy council for Canada, or any members thereof, or by the gov- ernor-general individually, aa the case requires, subject nevertheless (except with respect to such as exist under acts of the parliament of Great Britain or of the parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland) to be abolished or altered by the parliament of Canada. 13. The provisions of this act referring to the governor-general in coun- cil shall be construed as referring to the governor-general acting by and with the advice of the Queen's privy council for Canada. 14. It shall be lawful for the Queen, if her majesty thinks fit, to author- ize the governor-general from time to time to appoint any person or any persons jointly or severally to be his deputy or deputies within any part or parts of Canada, and in that capacity to exercise during the pleasure of the governor-general such of the powers, authorities and functions of the governor-general as the governor-general deems it necessary or expedient to assign to him or them, subject to any limitations or directions expressed or given by the Queen ; but the appointment of such a deputy or deputies, shall not affect the exercise by the governor-general himself of any power, authority or function. 15. The command-in-chief of the land and naval militia, and of all naval and military forces, of and in Canada, is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen. ^ Hearn's Government of England, p. 133. l'\ I 80 Federal Government in Canada. [636 from his official chief, the secretary of state for the colonies, even if it be a matter not immediately involving imperial interests. For instance, when a question arose in 1879 whether the governor-general ought to follow the advice of his council and dismiss the lieutenant-governor of Quebec, Lord Lome, at the suggestion of the premier, referred the whole matter to her majesty's government for its consideration and instructions, as it involved important questions connected with the relations between the dominion and the local government^ as well as the proper construction to be put on the constitu- tion.^ This case, however, shows that the government of England, in accordance with their fixed policy, will refrain from expressing any opinion upon the merits of a case of a purely Canadian interest, and will not interfere with the exer- cise of the undoubted powers conferred upon the governor- general by the British North America Act, for determining the same. Indeed we may even go further and say that the eflFect of the advice of the imperial government in this partic- ' I refer here to a remarkable episode in the political history of Canada, (1878-1879) in which we find abundant evidence of the bitterness of party Conflict in Canada. M. Letellier de St. Just was appointed lieutenant-gov- ernor of Quebec by a Liberal administration at Ottawa, and thought proper to dismiss his executive council, though it had a large majority in the leg- islature. The constitutionality of his action was at once sharply attacked in the dominion parliament by the Conservative party which was politi- cally identified with the dismissed ministers, but it was only in the senate where it had a majo'^ty that a resolution was passed censuring him for an act emphatically declared to be at variance with the principles of responsi- ble government. The conservatives soon afterwards came into power and a similar resolution was again proposed and passed by a very large majority. The government, who had not up to that time, tl:ci!£fht it incumbent on them to assume any responsibility under section 59 of B. N. A. Act which gave them the power of dismissal, then recommended to Lord Lome that the lieutenant-governor be dismissed ; but the governor-genv.ral, as stated in the text, hesitated to accept the advice and preferred to ask instructions from the imperial authorities. In consequence of their answer, he had no other alternative ^° to consent to the removal of M. Letellier on the ground as set forth ' : ^6 '^rder in council, that his usefulness was gone. The cause assigned had not quite the merit of novelty, for siiuilar language had been can 637] Federal Government in Canada. 81 ular matter must be to restrain within very narrow limits the occasions when a governor will hereafter h&sitate to accept the advice of his constitutional advisers, and refer to England a question which is clearly among the powers belonging to the Canadian government. In matters affecting imperial interests, of course the governor-general is not confined by any such limitation ; but it is impossible to lay down any rule available for such emergencies. The truth is, as it has been well ob- served by a Canadian statesman and constitutionalist ^ whose opinions are deserving of the highest possible respect, " that imperial int M ^ Lord Dufferin's public speeches during his administration in Canada directed large attention in Europe to the remarkable capabilities of Canada. * During the regime of the Marquis of Lome and H. R. H. the Princess Louise, the rojal academy of arts and the royal society of Can? 'a were established on a successful basis. ' The executive council of the little state of Delaware was originally called the privy council — the only example we have of such a title in the old colonies. * " It is our good fortune to be the inheritors of institutions in which the spirit of freedom was enshrined and to have had forefathers who knew how to defend them. The king of England was a rex politieua, a political crea- 86 Federal Government in Canada. [642 the unscrupulous instrument of the sovereign, and by the time of Elizabeth it had practically supersede*! the parliament, except when money had to be raised by the taxation of the people. But with the end of the Tudor dynasty, its power began to wane and the parliament increased in strength and influence. The Stuarts made use of it to establish a secret star chamber to usurp the functions of the courts, and we hear later of the formation of a committee called enviously a cabal or c»biuet, on account of the king finding it convenient from time to time to have a small body of advisers on whose ability to serve him he could have every confidence, and in whose deliberations he could find that secrecy which would not have been possible in the consultations of the privy council as a whole. In the course of the various changes that have oc- curred in English constitutional history its judicial functions disappeared and now only survive in the judicial committee, while it has been practically denuded of all former executive functions, and exists only as a purely honorary and dig- nified body. The cabinet council — a name originating in the days of Charles I — is now the great executive and adminis- trative council of state, though in no other respect does it referable that irresponsible creation of the Stuart king. Still the cabinet which is the governing power of the ministry of modern times, is a name unknown to the law. The privy council is the only body legally recognized, and on the for- mation of a new ministry it is usual to inform the public simply that her majesty has been pleased to appoint certain members of the privy council to certain high offices of state. The cabinet, or inner council, is only a portion of the ministry tion, l;he highest functionary and servant of the state, not a merely personal ruler, tinrl that was his recognized capacity. In the next place, from early times, earlier than the beginning of regular parliaments, the people of England held a firm hold on the idea of ministerial responsibility. They acted upon it fitfully and sometimes capriciously, but they never let it go. If the king ruled ill, it was because he had bad advisers." Contemporary Beview, January, 1889, p. 53. 643] Federal Government in Ckmada. 87 and varies in numbers according to the exipjencies of state. This ministry is drawn from members of the two iioiises of parliament, chiefly from the house of commons, and their tenure of office; d(!pends upon their having and retaining the confi Remarks of Sir John Macdonald, Can. Hansard, 1887, pp. 862, 863. 645] Federal Government in Canada. 89 branch. The ministry, then, is practically a committee of the two houses. Its head is known as the premier or prime min- ister, who, as the leader of a political party, and from his commanding influence and ability, is in a position to lead the house of commons and control the government of the country. His title, however, is one unknown to the law, though bor- rowed from the English political system. It originates from the fact that he is first called upon by the sovereign (or in Canada by her representative) to form a ministry. The moment he is entrusted with this high responsibility it is for him to choose such members of his pjlrty as are likely to bring strength to the government as a political body, and capacity to the administration of public affairs. The gover- nor-general on his recommendation appoints these men to the ministry and the occasions that can arise when he may see reasons for objecting to a particular nominee are so exceptional — indeed we have no case in our recent history — that we may practically consider the choice of colleagues by the premier as final and conclusive. As a rule, on all matters of public policy the communications between the cabinet and governor take place through the premier, its official head. If he dies or resigns the cabinet is ex-ojficio dissolved, and the ministers can only hold office until a new premier is called to the public councils by the representative of the crown. It is for the new premier then to ask them to remain in office, or to accept their resignation. In case a government is defeated in parliament, the premier must either resign or else convince the governor- general that he is entitled lo a dissolution on the ground that the vote of censure does not represent the sentiment of the country. This is one of the occasions when the governor-gen- eral is called upon to exercise an important prerogative of the crown in circumstances of great delicacy ; but fortunately for him the principles that have been laid down in the course of many years in the working of the British system in England and her dependencies can hardly fail to enable him, after a full consideration of all the circumstances of the case before 7 90 Federal Government in Canada. [646 il !1 II ;M t M l^li him, to come to a conclusion that will satisfactorily meet the exigency. If the circumstances are such as to justify a disso- lution of parliament the premier must lose no time in obtain- ing an expression of public opinion ; and should it be apparently in his favor he must-call parliament together with as little delay as possible ; or if, on the other hand, the public sentiment should be unequivocally against him he should resign ; for this course has been followed in recent times both in England and Canada. Strictly speaking, parliament alone should decide the fate of the ministry, but the course in ques- tion is obviously becoming one of the conventional rules of the constitution likely to be followed whenever there is a decided majority against an administration at the polls. From what precedes it will therefore be seen that while there is a constitutional separation between the executive and legislative authorities, still it may be said that, in Canada as in England, parliament governs through an executive dependent on it. The queen is at once the head of the executive autho- rity and the first branch of the legislative department. The responsible part of the executive authority has a place in the legislative department. It is a committee of the legislature, nominally appointed by the queen's representative, but really owing its position as a government to the majority of the leg- islative authority. This executive dependence on the 'jgis- lature is an invaluable, in fact the fundamental principle of parliamentary government. This council thereby becomes responsible at once to crown and parliament for all questions of public policy and of public administration. In a country like ours legislation is the originating force and the represent- atives of the people are the proper ultimate authority in all matters of government. The importance then of having the executive authority represented in parliament and immediately amenable to it is obvious. Parliament is in a position to con- trol the administration of the executive authority by having in its midst men who can explain and defend every act that may be questioned, who can lead the house in all important 547] Federal Government in Canada, 91 matters of legislation/ and who can be censured or forced from office when they do wrong or show themselves incapable of conducting public affairs. By means of this check on the executive, efficiency of government and guarantees for the public welfare are secured beyond question. The people are able, through their representatives, to bring their views and opinions to bear on the executive immediately. Every branch of the public service may be closely examined, every question- able transaction siftefl, and every information obtained, by the methods of parliamentary inquiry, as ministers are present to answer every question respecting the administration of their departments and to justify and defend their public policy. The value of this British system of parliamentary government can be best understood by comparing it with the American system which so completely separates the executive from the legislature. In the United States the President is irremova- ble, except in case of a successful impeachment, for four years, and he appoints his cabinet, who are simply heads of depart- ments responsible to no one except himself. This cabinet may be well compared in one respect to the cabinet councils of the Stuarts, since like them its existence does not depend on the confidence or support of the legislature. Its members have no seats in either the senate or house of representatives and are in no way responsible for, or exert any direct influence on public legislation. A thoughtful American writer * comparing the two systems, shows very clearly how inferior in many respects it is to that of England or of Canada : — " It is this ^"It is therefore the executive gOTernment which should be credited with the authorship of English legislation. We have thus an extraordi- nary result. The nation whose constitutional practice suggested to Mon- tesquieu his memorable maxim concerning the executive, legislative and judicial powers, has in the course of a century falsified it. The formal executive '.^ the true source of legislation ; the formal legislature is inces- santly concerned with executive government." Sir H. Maine, Essay on the ([Constitution of the United States, Quarterly Review, No. 313. ' Congressional government. By Woodrow Wilson. M 1 ■(« IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) 1.0 I.I 11.25 ULt2.6 M 12.0 ■ 2.2 K IMS M 1.4 11.6 ^ 92 Federal Government in Canada. [548 ) ' ir I V w < constant possibility of party diversity between the executive and congress which so much complicates our system of gov- ernment. Party government can exist only when the abso- lute control of administration, the appointment of its officers as well as the direction of its means and policy, is given immediately into the hands of that branch of government whose power is paramount — the representative body. . . . At the same time it is quite evident that the means which congress has of controlling the departments and of exercising any searching oversight at which it aims are limited and defective. Its intercourse with the president is restricted to the executive messages, and its intercourse with the depart- ments has no easier channels than private consultations between executive officers and the committees, informal interviews of the ministers with individual members of the congress, and the written correspondence which the cabinet officers from time to time address to the presiding officers of the two houses at stated intervals or in response to formal resolutions of inquiry. Congress stands almost helpless outside of the departments." ^ * Professor Bryce (The American Commonwealth, I., p. 304) expresses the same opinion after a thorough study of the imperfections and weak- nesses of the American system : ' In their efforts to establish a balance of power, the framers of the constitution so far succeeded that neither power has subjected the other. But they underrated the inconveniences which arise from the disjunction of the two chief organs of government. They re- lieved the administration from a duty which European ministers find exhaus- ting and hard to reconcile with the proper performance of administrative work, — the duty of giving attendance in the legislature and taking the lead in its debates. They secured continuity of executive policy for four years at least, instead of leaving government at the mercy of fluctuating majori- ties in an excitable assembly. But they so narrowed the sphere of the executive as to prevent it from leading the country, or ev^n its own party in the Coventry. They sought to make members of congress independent, but in so doing they deprived them of some of the means which European legislatures eqjoy of learning how to administer, of learning even how to legislate on administrative topics. They condemned them to be architects without science, critics without experience, censors without responsibility." See also De Tecqueville, I., p. 124. 549] Federal Government in Canada. 93 I have so far briefly explained some of the constitutional duties and responsibilities that rest upon the head of the exec- utive and his advisers, and must now proceed to review the nature of the functions of the senate and house of commons, who, with the queen, constitute the parliament of Canada.^ LEGISLATIVE POWER. ^ B. N. A. Act, 1867, sec. 17. There shall be one parliament for Canada, consisting of the queen, an upper house styled the senate, and the house of commons. 18. The privileges, immunities and powers to be held, enjoyed and exer- cised by the senate and by the house of commons and by the members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by act of the parliament of Canada, but so that any act of the parliament of Canada defining such privileges, immunities and powers shall not confer any privi- leges, immunities or powers exceeding those at the passing of such act, held, enjoyed and exercised by the commons house of parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and by the members thereof. 19. The parliament of Canada shall be called together not later than six months after the union. 20. There shall be a session of the parliament of Canada once at least in every year, so that twelve months shall not intervene between the last sit- ting of the parliament in one session and its first sitting in the next session. The Senate. 21. The senate shall, subject to the provisions of this act, consist of sev- enty-two members, who shall be styled senators. 22. In relation to the constitution of the senate, Canada shall be deemed to consist of three divisions — 1. Ontario; 2. Quebec; 3. The Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; which three divisions shall (subject to the provisions of this act) be equally rep- resented in the senate as follows : Ontario by twenty-four senators ; Quebec by twenty-four senators ; and the Maritime Provinces by twenty-four sena- tors — twelve thereof representing Nova Scotia, and twelve thereof repre- senting New Brunswick. In the case of Quebec each of the twenty-four senators rer.i resenting that province shall be appointed for one of twenty-four elector il -divisions of Lower Canada specified in schedule A to chapter one of consolidated stat- utes of Canada. 23. The qualifications of a senator shall be as follows — (1.) He shall be of the full age of thirty years. •II i IfVI 94 Federal Government in Canada. [650 if I I*'' I'm m ! m ' sfe'il it lis' ii In all countries possessing a parliamentary system, and espe- cially in those which have copied their institutions from the British model, an upper chamber has been generally considered a necessary part of the legislative machinery. In the United States the necessity of having such a check upon the acts of the body directly representing the people, was recognized from the outset in the constitution of the congress and of every state legislature. Two hou3es always formed part of the pro- vincial legislatures of British North America from 1791 until 1867, when Ontario, whose example has been followed by other provinces of the confederation, decided to confine her legislature to an elected assembly and the lieutenant-governor. (2.) He shall be either a natural-born subject of the queen, or a subject of the queen, naturalized by an act of the parliament of Great Bri- tain, or of the parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the legislature of one of the provinces of Upper Canada, Lover Canada, Canada, Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick, before the union or of the parliament of Canada after the union. (3.) He shall be legally or equitably seized as of freehold for his own use and benefit of lands or tenements held in free and common socage, or seized or possessed for his own use and benefit of lands or tene- ments held in franc-alleu or in roture, within the province for which he is appointed, of the value of four thousand dollars, over and above all rents, dues, debts, charges, mortgages and incumbrances due or payable out of, or charged on or afiecting the same ; (4.) His real and personal property shall be together worth four thousand dollars over his debts and liabilities ; (5.) He shall be resident in the province for which he is appointed ; (6.) In the case of Quebec, he shall have his real property qualification in the electoral division for Avhich he is appointed, or shall be resi- dent in that division. 24. The governor-general shall from time to time, in the queen's name, by instrument under the great seal of Canada, summon qualified persons to the senate ; and, subject to the provisions of this act, every person so sum- moned shall become and be a member of the senate and a senator. 25. Such persons shall be first summoned to the senate as the queen by warrant under her majesty's royal sign manual thinks fit to approve, and their names shall be inserted in the queen's proclamation of union. 26. If at any time, on the recommendation of the governor-general, the queen thinks fit to direct that three or six members be added to the senate, the governor-general may, by summons to three or six qualified persons (as 551] Federal Government in Cmmda. 95 The upper house of the Canadian parliament bears a name which goes back to the days of ancient Rome, and also invites comparison with the distinguished body which forms so im- portant a part of the American congress ; but neither in its constitution nor in its influence does it bear auy analogy with those great assemblies. An eminent authority on such ques- tions, the late Sir Henry Maine, has very truly observed that on close inspection the senates of the ancient world will be found to answer very slightly to the conception of second chambers of a legislature, but that the first real anticipation of a second chamber, armed with a veto on the proposals of a separate authority, and representing a different interest, occurs the case may be), representing equally the three divisions of Canada, add to the senate accordingly. 27. In case of such addition being at any time made, the governor-gen- eral shall not summon any person to the senate, except on a further like direction by the queen on the like recommendation, until each of the three divisions of Canada is represented by twenty -four senators, and no more. 28. The number of senators shall not at any time exceed seventy-eight. 29. A senator shall, subject to the provision of this act, hold his place in the senate for life. 30. A senator may, by writing under his hand, addressed to tl:e gov- ernor-general, resign his place in the senate, and thereupon the same shall be vacant. 31. The place of a senator shall become vacant in any of the following cases : — (1.) If for two consecutive sessions of the parliament he fails to give his attendance in the senate : (2.) If he takes an oath or makes a declaration or acknowledgment of allegi.".nce, obedience or adherence to a foreign power, or does an act whereby he becomes a subject or citizen, or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign power : (3.) If he is adjudged bankrupt or insolvent, or applies for the benefit of any law relating to insolvent debtors, or becomes a public defaulter : (4.) If he is attainted of treason, or convicted of felony or of any infa- mous crime : (5.) If he ceases to be qualified in respect of property or of residence : provided that a senator shall not be deemed to have ceased to be qualified in respect of residence by reason only of his residing at the seat of the government of Canada while holding an office under that Government requiring his presence there. h¥ dd Federal Government in Canada. [652 li:M! ^11 I it iw ,i' V in that much'misunderstood institution, the Roman tribunate.' Nor does the Canadian senate compare in legislative authority with the -A merican body of that name. The first is nominated by the crown for life and has limited powers even of legislation, since it cannot initiate or even amend money or revenue bills ; the other, which is elected by the state legislatures for a limited 32. "When a vacancy happens in the nenate, by resignation, deam or otherwise, the governor-general shall, by summons to a fit and qualified person, fill the vacancy. 33. If any question arises respecting the qualification of a senator or a vacancy in the senate, the same shall be heard and determined by the senate. 34. The governor-general may from time to time, by instrument under the great seal of Canada, appoint a senator to be speaker of the senate, and may remove him and appoint another in his stead. 35. Until the parliament of Canada otherwise provides, the presence of at least fifteen senators, including the speaker, shall be necessary to consti- tute a meeting of the senate for the exercise of its powers. 36. Questions arising in the senate shall be decided by a majority of voices, and the speaker shall in all cases have a vote, and when the voices are equal the decision shall be deemed to be in the negative. 147. In case of the admission of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, or either of them, each shall be entitled to a representation, in the senate of Canada, of four members, and (notwithstanding anything in this act) in case of the admission of Newfoundland, the normal number of sen- ators shall be seventy-six and their maximum number shall be eighty-two ; but Prince Edward Island, when admitted, shall be deemed to be com- prised in the third of the three divisions into which Canada is, in relation to the constitution of the senate, divided by this act, and accordingly, after the admission of Prince Edward Island, whether Newfoundland is admitted or not, the representation of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in the senate shall, as vacancies occur, be reduced from twelve to ten members respec- tively, and the representation of each of those provinces shall not be in- creased at any time beyond ten, except under the provisions of this act, for the appointment of three or six additional senators under the direction of the queen. 1 " The Constitution of the United States," Quarterly Review, No. 313. Mr. Goldwin Smith has said on this point : " The illustrious council from which the name of Senate is derived was not an upper house, but the gov- ernment of the Boman Republic, having the executive practically under its control and the initiative of legislation in its hands." See Doutre's Consti- tution of Canada, p. 66. 553] Federal Government in Canada. 97 term, has a veto on treaties and important appointments to office, can amend appropriation bills so as to increase money grants to any amount, and can sit as a court of impeachment. In one respect, however, the senate of Canada can be com- pared to the American house ; it is a representative of the federal, as distinguished from the popular principle of repre- sentation. The three great divisions of Canada, the Maritime Provinces, Ontario and Quebec, have been each given an equal representation of twenty-four members with a view of affording a special protection to their respective interests — a protection certainly so far not called into action even in the most ordinary matters. Since 1867 the entrance of other provinces and the division of the territories into districts has brought the number of senators up to seventy-eight in all, but at no time can the maximum number exceed eighty-four, evein should it be necessary to resort to the constitutional provision allowing the addition of three or six new members — a position intended to meet a grave emergency, such as a deadlock in a political crisis. The senators are appointed under the great seal of Canada by the governor-general on the recommendation of his council, and must be of the full age of thirty years, and have real and personal property worth four thousand dollars over and above their liabilities. The experience that Canada had of the working of an elective legislative council since 1854 was considered in the convention of 1864 to be such as to justify the delegates in preferring a nominated body. The great expense entailed by an electoral contest in the large districts into which the province was divided was one feature which was strongly pointed out at the conference.^ It was not deemed advisable to have two bodies elected by the people, since the danger of legislative conflict was rendered more imminent. While the experience of Victoria in Australia certainly seems to support this opinion, the history of the American congress might be considered to support an argu- 'M ' See remarks of Hon. George Brown in Confederation Debates, p. 89. 98 Federal Government in Canada. [654 iti I ment the other way. The object of the framers of the consti- tution has been, in this as in other cases, to follow the model of the British parliamentary system as far as our circumstances will permit. Hence the Louse of commons can alone initiate revenue or money bills, and the senate is confined by usage to a mere rejection of such measures — a rejection justified only by extraordinary circumstances. In every respect it shows the weakness of an upper house under the British system and none of the prestige that attaches to an ancient body of hereditary legislators and of judicial powers as a court of appellate juris- diction like the house of lords. The senate, imitating the lords, tries divorce cases ; ^ but this is a matter of convenience to which the commons agrees without objection, since under the constitution the upper house has no special privileges in this respect. It is expressly set forth in the British North America Act that the powers and privileges and immunities of the senate and house of commons cannot at any time exceed those of the English commons. As a body of legislators the senate can compare favorably with any assembly in Canada or other dependencies of England. It has within its ranks men of fine ability and large experience in commerce, finance and law ; and its weakness seems inherent in the nature of its con- stitution. The system of the nomination by the crown — practically by the government of the day — tends to fill it with men drawn from one political party whenever a particular ministry has been long in office and fails to give it that pecu- liarly representative character which would enlarge its useful- ness as a branch of the legislature and give it more influence in the country. It is a question worth considering whether the adoption of such changes as would make it partly nomina- tive and partly elective would not give it greater weight in ' In Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and British Columbia the courts of law continue to try divorce cases, as before 1867, and parliament has not interfered with those tribunals under the power con- ferred upon it by the fundamental law. See Gemmili's Parliamentary Divorce, c. 4. 555] Federal Government in Canada. public affairs. For instance, if the provincial legislatures had the right of electing a fixed number at certain intervals, and the universities were given the same privilege, the effect would be, in the opinion of some persons, to make it more representa- tive of provincial interests, and at the same time add to its ranks men of high culture and learning.^ But no doubt as long as our parliamentary system is mod- elled on the English lines, an upper house raust more or less sink into inferiority when placed alongside of a popular house, which controls the treasury and decides the fate of ad- ministrations. It is in the commons necessarily that the majority of the ministers sit and the bulk of legislation is ini- tiated. In 1888 the two houses passed one hundred and eleven bills and of these only three public bills and five pri- vate bills originated in the upper house, and the same conditioi; of things has existed since 1867, though now and then, as in 1889, there is a spasmodic effort to introduce a few more gov- ernment bills in the senate. In the session of 1888 twenty-six commons bills were amended out of the one hundred and three sent up to the upper house, and the majority of these amend- ments were verbal and unimportant. Under these circum- stances it may well be urged that by arrangement between the two houses, as in the English parliament, a larger number of private bills should be presented in the senate,'' where there is a considerable rumber of gentlemen whose experience and knowledge entiJ.i them to consider banking and financial questions, and the various subjects involved in legislation. ' In the Prussian upper house the universities are represented and the .owns of a certain number of inhabitants by their mayors. In principle it is far more of a popular assembly than the English house of lords. See an interesting article in the Nineteenth Century (vol. XVI., No. 89) on the federal states of the world. * As I have already shown, divorce bills invariably originate in the senate, which has recently adopted an amended set of rules under the able super- vision of Senator Gowan, and the select committee to which all such bills are referred! is governed by the rules of evidence and other formalities of the courts as far as possible. 100 Federal Government in Canada. [556 For reasons already given, government measures must as a rule be introduced in the commons, but still even in this respect there might be an extension of the legislative functions of the upper chamber, and the effort made in 1889 by the gov- ernment in this direction ought certainly to be continued until it becomes a practice and not a mere matter of temporary con- venience. In 1887 there were only ten private bills presented iu the senate out of the seventy that passed the two houses j in 1888 the figures wert five out of sixty-seven, and the same state of things was shown in 1889. The majority of these bills were of a character that could have originated in the senate with a regard to the public interests and the expedition and convenience of the business of the two houses. From time to time the senate makes amendments that show how thoroughly its members understand and are compe- tent to consider certain subjects; and the sometimes hasty legislation of the commons — hasty because that body is too often overweighted with business — is corrected greatly to the advantage of the country. This fact alone should lead to a reform in the direction indicated. It is in the commons house that political power rests. As I have already shown, it has both legislative and executive func- tions, since through a committee of its own it governs the coun- try. Like its great English prototype it represents the people, and gives full expression to the opinions of all classes and inter- ests, to a greater degree indeed than in England itself, since it is elected on a franchise much more liberal and comprehensive. At the present time the Canadian house of commons contains t o hundred and fifteen members, or about one irember for every twenty thousand persons. The representation is rear- ranged every decennial census by act of parliament in accord- ance with the terms of the constitutional law. The French Canadian province has a fixed number of sixty-five members which forms the ratio of representation on which ' a decennial ' At the last cenBus the population of Canada was given as 4,382,810 per- sons ; it is now about 5,000,000. 657] Federal Oovemment in Canada. 101 readjustment is based. Each of the other provinces is assigned such a number as will leave the same proportion to the num- ber of its population as the number sixty-five bears to the population of Quebec when ascertained by a census.* The o-reat province of Ontario, with two millions of people, is now represented by ninety-two members, or fifty-eight more mem- bers than the state of New York, with over five millions of souls, has in the house of representatives.'* Quebec has, as just » B. N. A. Act, 1867. {The Home of Commons.) * Sec. 37. The house of commona shall, subject to the provisions of this act, consist of one hundred and eighty-one members, of whom eighty-two shall be elected for Ontario, sixty-five for Quebec, nineteen for Nova Scotia and fifteen for New Brunswick. 38. The governor-general shall from time to time, in the queen's name) by instrument under the great seal of Canada, summon and call together the house of commons. 39. A senator shall not be capable of being elected or of sitting or voting as a member of the house of commons. (Sections 40-43 refer to electoral divisions and make temporary provi- sions for elections.) 44. The house of commons, on its first assembling after a general election, shall proceed with all practicable speed to elect one of its members to be speaker. 45. In case of a vacancy happening in the office of speaker, by death, resignation or otherwise, the house of commons shall, with all practicable speed, proceed to elect another of its members to be speaker. 46. The speaker shall preside at all meetings of the house of commons. 47. Until the parliament of Canada otherwise provides, in case of the absence, for any reason, of the speaker from the chair of the house of com- mons for a period of forty-eight consecutive hours, the house may elect another of its members to act as speaker, and the member so elected shall, during the continuance of such absence of the speaker, have and execute all the powers, privileges and duties of speaker. 48. The presence of at least twenty members of the house of commons shall be necessary to constitute a meeting of the house for the exercise of its powers ; and for that purpose the speaker shall be reckoned as a member. 49. Questions arising in the house of commons shall be decided by a majority of the voices other than that of the speaker, and when the voices are equal, but not otherwise, the speaker shall have a vote. 102 Federal Government in Canada. [668 I'! stated, sixty-five; the maritime provinces, foity -three; and the remaining members are distributed in Manitoba, British Cohimbia and the territories. Previous to 1885 the franchise for the several provincial legislatures was the franchise for the house of commons ; but in that year an electoral franchise act was passed by parliament for the whole dominion. It was contended, after the most protracted debate that has taken place for years in Canada on any one question, that this radical change was not justified by any public necessity, and was sim- ply entailing an enormous expense on the treasury without returning any corresponding advantage to the country. It may be argued with truth that generally in a federal system it 50. Every house of commons shall continue for five years from the day of the return of the writs for choosing the house (subject to be sooner dissolved by the governor-general), and no longer. 51. On the completion of the census in the year one thousand eight hun- dred and seventy-one and of each subsequent decennial census, the repre- sentation of the four provinces shall be readjusted by such authority, in such a manner, and from such time as the parliament of Canada from time to time provides, subject and according to the following rules: — (1.) Quebec shall have the fixed aumber of sixty-five members: (2.) There shall be assigned to each of the other provinces such a number of members as will bear the same proportion to the number of its population (ascertained at such census) as the number sixty-five bears to the number of the population of Quebec (so ascertained) : (3.) In the computation of the number of members for a province a frac- tional part not exceeding one-half of the whole number requisite fur entitlin'? the province to a member shall be disregarded ; but a frac- tional part exceeding one-half of that number shall be equivalent to the whole number: (4.) On any such readjustment the number of members for a province shall not be reduced unless the proportion which the number of the population of the province bore to the number of the aggregate pop- ulation of Canada at the then last preceding readjustment of the number of members for the province is ascertained at the then latest census to be diminished by one-twentieth part or upwards : (5.) Such readjustment shall not take efiect until the termination of the then existing parliament. 52. The number of members of the house of commons may be from time to time increased by the parliament of Canada, provided the proportionate representation of the provinces prescribed by this act is not thereby disturbed. ~^^ 559] Federal Government in Canada, 103 is desirable to use whenever practicable all the institutions of the local government in order to bring the centre and its members into as perfect harmony as possible with one another. This is the practice in the United States, where congress is elected on the franchises of the several states — a system which has been found in every way satisfactory. However, these and other arguments against the change were considered by the majority in parliaraant as insufficient compared with the belief that they entertained that it was expedient to have the do- minion parliament perfectly independent of provincial control. The franchise, though somewhat complicated in its details, is so broad as practically to be on the very border of universal suffrage. Every intelligent, industrious man, who is a British subject by birth or naturalization and not a convict or insane or otherwise disqualified by law, is now in a position to qualif^^ himself to vote for a member for the commons ; even the Indians in the old provinces can also avail themselves of the same privilege if they come within the liberal conditions of the act. Members of the house, as well as of the senate, receive a sessional indemnity of ^1,000 in case the session extends beyond -thirty days, and an allowance of ten cents a mile for travelling expenses ^ No property qualification is now demanded from a member of the commons nor is he limited to a residence in the district for which he is elected, as is the case in the United States by law or usage ; and should he not be able to obtain a seat in the locality or even in the province where he lives be can be returned for any constituency in the dominion. This is the British principle which tends to elevate the representation in the commons ; for while as a rule mem- bers are generally elected for their own district, yet occasions may arise when the country would for some time lose the * In the colony of Victoria, Australia, where salaries are much higher than in Canada, members of the assembly receive $1,500 a session, and after seven years' service passes over railways. ''-I "I 104 Federal Qovemment in Canada. [560 services of its most distinguished statesmen,^ should the Amer- ican rule prevail. The senators in Quebec, in view of the exceptional position of that province, must reside in their own divisions or have their property qualification therein ; but while the constitutional law requires that in the case of the other provinces senators must reside within the provincial limits, yet there is no legal necessity that they should live in a particular county or district. In a country like this, with many legislative bodies, demandinj^ the highest capacity, it would be unfortu- nate were there such limitations in existence as it is admitted tend in the United States to prevent the employment of the highest talent in the public service.'' The house of commons may be regarded as fairly represen- tative of all classes and interests. The bar predominates, as is generally the case in the legislatures of this continent ; but the medical profession, journalism, mercantile and agricultural pur- suits contribute their quota. It is an interesting fact that a large proportion of members have been educated in the uni- versities and colleges of the provinces, and this is especially true of the representatives from French Canada where there are a number of seminaries or colleges w.hich very much resemble the collegiate institutes of Ontario, or the high schools of the United States, where a superior education, only inferior to that of the universities, is given to the youth of the country. Another matter worthy of mention is the fact that a good proportion of the house has served an apprenticeship in the municipal institutions of Ontario^not a few of the leading men having been wardens, reeves, or mayors. Of the sixty-five representatives from Quebec, there are fourteen English-speaking members, chiefly from the cities and the eastern townships where a British population is still in ^ For instance, the present premier (Sir John Macdonald) when he lost his seat in Kingston, Ontario, in 1878, was immediately returned for a con- stituency in Manitoba, and subsequently for a seat in British Columbia. ' See Professor Bryce's comments on this point in the American Com- monwealth, I., p. 258. 661] Federal Ooverrtment in Canada. 105 the majority. In Ontario, moreover, two of the constituen- cies on the border line return two members to represent the French population that is now living in those districts. To this number we must add another representative from the largely French half-breed constituency of Provencher in Manitoba. As a matter of fact, the house of commons comprises many • of the ablest men of the country trained in law and poli- tics. In this respect it must be compared rather with the senate than with the house of representatives at Washington. Rich merchants and banlcers do not as a rule seek seats on its -benches, but still all classes of business find their representa- tives within its walls. The man who can win success and influence in the house has many objects of ambition to reward him, though he must necessarily sacrifice the many opportuni- ties for acquiring large wealth that oifer themselves to those who keep aloof from active politics. The executive has many prizes in its gift in the shape of lieutenant-governorships, judgeships, coUectorships, postmasterships, and many places in the public service which do not fall within the provisions of the civil service act. Thirteen or more positions in the privy council are in view of an ambitious politician. Then there is always the senate as a place of dignity when other plans fail of achievement. The cabinet controls the public expenditures, and it is all-important to an aspiring politician to have as much money as possible spent in his constituency. All these influences help to strengthen the executive under a rigid sys- tem of party government. Party lines are very closely drawn in Canada, and the occasions are very rare and exceptional when men can aflbrd to break loose from the trammels that bind them to a certain political body or set of opinions. In these days a strong executive can exercise a powerful control over its supporters in a legislature, perhaps more so than in England where there always exists an independent sentiment which shows itself at important crises in and out of parlia- ment. The danger now-a-days arises not from the encroach- n 106 Federal Govemmerd in Canada. [562 ment of the royal prerogative, but from the power of the responsible executive which, nominally dependent on the legislature, can, through the influences of party government and individual ambition, make itself the master for the time b?ing as long as it has a strong majority in parliament. The caucus ^ is an instrument that may be and is used to strengthen a party. The strongest ministry does not pretend to deal with important questions during a session without seeking the advice of all its supporters in parliament from time to time. The caucus is a place for strong speaking at crises of political excitement, but, with careful management, party considerations, as a rule, prevail, and occasions seldom arise when it breaks up without an understanding to support the " party " at all haz- ards. Dissolution is a weapon which an executive can always threaten to unsheathe, and recalcitrant followers may prefer that it should remain as long as possible in the scabbard. It is better perhaps for the public interest that the government should be strong than that it should be Aveak ; for in the former case it can spare defections, and ran afford to be deter- mined in a political crisis. It is a misfortune, when, as in France, there are numerous political cliques and sections, incessantly warring against each other and preventing the establishment of stable administrations. The laws enacted for the preservation of the independence of parliament and the prevention of corrupt practices at elec- tions, are in principle and details practically those in operation in the mother country. The former law derives its origin from the statute of Queen Anne'* which established the valu- able principle that the acceptance by a member of the house ' Both government and opposition hold such a caucus when necessary. We have not yet reached the perfection of the political system of primaries, conventions and caucuses in the United States ; but conventions are now generally held in the different electoral districts to nominate candidates for the legislature, and the.e is a thorough organization of the two partieii pre- vious to a general election. ' 6 Anne, c. 7, sees. 25, 26. 563] Federal GovemmerU in Canada. 107 of commons of an office of emolument from the crown, shall thereby vacate his seat. Members of the house when called to the government as heads of departments must at once resign their seats and be reelected, though an exchange of offices can take plawi betwo' n ministers after their election under the con- ditions laid down in the law. All officers of the public service and contractors /ith the government are forbidden to sit in parliament — an exception being made, as in England, of officers in the military service. Since 1874 the house has given up its jurisdiction over the trial of controverted elections, which pre- viously had been considered by committees exposed to all the insidious influences of purely political bodies. The courts in the several provinces are now the tribunals for the trial of all such contested elections; find the results have so far in Canada, as in the parent state, been decidedly in the public interests. The laws for the prevention of bribery and cor- ruption are exceedingly strict; and members are constantly unseated for the most trivial breaches of the law, committed by their agents through ignorance or carelessness. The expenses of candidates must be published by their legal agents after the election. The whole intent of the law is to make elec- tions as economical as possible, and diminish corruption. A candidate may be disqualified from sitting in the commons, or voting, or holding any office in the gift of the crown for seven years, when he is proved personally guilty of bribery, and the voters in a constituency may be also severely punished by fine and imprisonment when corruption is proved against them. Yet while these grievous offences against an honest •expression of public opinion are prosecuted and punished so severely, it would be too much to say that all elections are run any more in Canada than in England without a heavy drain at times on the purse of a rich candidate or on the con- tributions of a political party. It is safe to say, however, that our system is a vast improvement on that of the United States, and purity of elections is largely promoted compared with the si of things in old times. 108 Federal Government in Canada. [564 The methods of business which ihe houses follow are well calculated to promote the efficiency of legislation and secure the satisfactory administration of public affairs. Their rules and usoges are, in all essential particulars, derived from those of the Eiiglish parliament,' and there has been no attempt made to adopt the special rules and practice of congress in any respect. On the day parliament has been summoned by the crown to meet, the governor-general, either in person or by deputy, proceeds to the upper chamber and there seated on the throne, surrounded by a brilliant staff and the high officers of state, reads in the two languages the speech, in which his government sets forth the principal measures which they pur- pose to present during the session. This speech, which is a very concise and short document compared with the elaborate message of the president, is considered as soon as possible in the two houses and generally passes without oppt>8ition or amendment, since it is the modern practice to frame it in terms that will not evoke political antagonism, though of course occasions may arise when a different course will be pursued in order to test the opinion of the house on a par- ticular policy of the administration. As soon as the formal answer to the address has been passed, the houses proceed to appoint the committees, and commence the regular business of the session. The proceedings commence every day with prayers, taken from the church of England liturgy, and are read by the speaker, alternately in English and French, in the commons, and by a paid chaplain in the senate. The rules of the two houses do not vary much with respect to the conduct of business, but more latitude is generally given to members in asking questions and in other proceedings in the senate than in the commons, where there is greater necessity for economizing time. As it is in the popular house that nearly all the business of importance is transacted I shall confine myself to such a brief review of its rules and proceed- ings as may be interesting and useful to a student of our legislative system. 666] Federal Government in Canada, 10& While the committees are an important part of the legisla- tive mac^hinery of the Canad an. parliament, still they do not occupy the place they have reached in congreasional govern- ment. They are few in number, only ten, exclusive of some small committees generally appointed to consider special ques- tions in the course of a session. The important bcuies are these : The committee of public accounts, in vvhicl Siiunci; \ inquiries are made, and particular expenditures o^ ■ '■ '^' ■'' ernment reviewed whenever expla' iition or invesst':^" ' is deemed to l)e necessary ; the committee of agriculture and colonization, in which matters affecting those subjects are fully considered ; the committee of privileges and elections, which explains itself; and four coramitteos to which all pri- vate bills respecting banking and commerce, navigation and shipping, railways and canals, telephone and telegraph lines, bridges, insurance and the incorporation of companies for other purposes, are referred for full consideration. There are also two committees on which members from the two houses sit to consider the printing of documents and the library, which are matters of common interest and management. The committees vary in number from twenty-six to one hundred and sixty members. The most numerous is the railway com- mittee which has one hundred and sixty-four members ; agri- culture and colonization, one hundred and eight; banking and commerce, one hundred and four ; miscellaneous private bills, seventy-five. They resemble, therefore, in this respect the grand committees of the English house of commons rather than the small bodies into which congress is divided — by the speaker in the house of representatives and by ballot in the senate.' Canadian committees are appointed by a committee of selection on which the government has of course a majority; and both sides of the house are fully represented. The speaker ! 'In the house of representatives there were in 1884 fifty-four standing committees; in the senate forty-one. Sixteen is the highest number on a committee in the former, eleven in the latter house. 110 Federal Govetmrnent in Canada, [666 has no concern wliatever in this important matter and acts only as the presiding officer of the assembly, bound to main- tain the rules and usages of parliament and to exercise the functions of his high office irrespective of all political con- siderations whatsoever. He is elected by the majority at tho opening of a new parliament and holds his office until it is dissolved or he resigns. His functions are those of the speaker in the English commons, and in no way does he per- form the political duties of the speaker of the house of repre- sentatives, who is now practically the legislative chief of the party.^ All bills must go through several stages in both houses before they can receive the assent of the governor-general and become law. The second reading is the stage when the prin- ciple of the measure should be properly considered, and it is only in committee of the whole that its clauses can be regu- larly discussed. All bills are considered in committee of the whole ; but private bills are first sifted in one of the standing committees just mentioned, and if reported favorably they come again before the house for further examination. I may as well explain here the distinction between the two classes of bills. All measures involving questions of public interest — the criminal law, customs, post office, militia and other matters within the general powers of parliament — are styled public bills. These bills are generally brought in directly on motion l^ the member in charge, or on a resolution in committee of the whole whenever a public burden is imposed, on the prin- ciple that the house should have as long a time as possible to consider matters of revenue and expenditure. As the govern- ment is practically responsible for all important measures of public policy, the great bulk of public legislation is prepared and presented by them ; but it is competent for any one to introduce any bill he wishes, provided it does not impose taxes or appropriate public moneys, which are questions con- ^ Congressional Government, by Woodrow Wilson, p. 108. 5G7] Fedei'ol Government in Canada. Ill stitutionally within the purview of the executive alone. The order of business, laid daily on the desk of every member, is divided into government orders, public bills and orders, and private bills, besides questions put to the government, and not'ces of motions, all of which are taken up on particular days in accordance with the rules of the house. If a member has a bill of importance on the paper, the government will give him every assistance in passing it before the house is pro- rogued and even will take charge of it themselves should it be expedient. Certain days are set apart for the government business and for private members ; but near the close of the session the administration control all the time, since theirs is the all-important legislation. The private bills, which always outnumber the public and government measures, are presented and passed in conformity with special rules which do not apply to the other classes. Any persons who desire the incorporation of a banking, insurance, railway, or other company, or to con- struct a bridge, wharf or other work, must give notice in cer- tain journals of their intention, and then come before parlia- ment by petition. This petition must be immediately considered bv a standing committee to see if it is in accordance with the published notice and the standing orders of the house ; and then, if the report is favorable, the bill is presented, read a second time, and referred to one of the committees to which it should properly go. Its consideration in that committee is the most important stage to which it is submitted ; for its promoters must now show that there is no objection to its pas- sage, and it is the duty of the committee to see that it inflicts no injury and is in conformity with the rublic interests. If there is opposition to the bill, full opportunity is given by the rules to the contestants to appear and set forth their case. The house, through committees of this sort, acts in a quasi judicial capacity. Members of the government sit on such committees and pay particular attention to all the details of legislation of this class. It will consequently be seen that the administration becomes practically responsible for the charac- \' I \& t .'i ? ' ! V! 112 Federal Government in Canada. ms I iii ter of all the legislation that )as8e8 parliament. The average nnmber of measiiios that pas3 the two houses every session is ore hundred nnd ten, of which three- fourths at least are of a private nature. Tlie total number of bills presented as a rule during the session does not exceed one hundred and thirty, and it is therefore evident that very few desirable measures fail to become law. The fact that on the average seven thou- sand bills are brought every year into congress, of which not more than one thirtieth* ever becomes law, stands out in strik- ing contrast with the limited amount of legislation in the Canadian parliament. In both countries there are legislatures to relieve the central authority of a great number of bills which otherwise would come before it. The difference between Canada and the United States with respect to population and wealth does not by any means explain this difference in point of legislation. In all probability the reason must be sought in the fact that in the Canadian, as in the British parliament, there is an administration which is immediately responsible for all important matters of public policy, and always bound to give a vigilant scrutiny. to every measure that comes before the house. The principal duty of parliament is very truly considered to be the voting of supply. From early times in English history the kings were obliged to resort to the nation and ask them to provide the money necessary to meet their financial necessities. One of the most famous statutes in England is that of 1297, which followed the great charter wrung from John at Runnymede, and declares that no tallage shall be taken without the good will and assent of archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land. Since that day, parliament has had the power of taxa- tion. The three estates originally voted supply separately, but in the course of time the right of initiating all taxation and voting money rested with the people's representatives. In ' Professor Bryce in the American Commonwealth, I., 181, 182. 669] Federal Government in Canada. 113 Canada, as I have already shown in the second lecture, the commons houses in the various provinces, from the very com- mencement of legislative institutions, asserted their claims to full control over the public grants. Now for many years the rules and images that have so long obtained in England with respect to money votes and taxes prevail in Canada and govern the relations between the two houses. The crown, with the advice of the council, recommends all appropriations of public money.' All rjeasures of taxation can only be introduced by ministers of the crown and must be shown necessary for the [)ub- lic service. Appropriations and taxes are invariably first voted in committee of the whole in the shape of resolutions which, when agreed to at a subsequent stage of the house, are incor- porated into bills. Permanent grants, such as ministers' or judges' salaries, are passed in this way in ordinary committees of the whole. All suras of money, however, for the service of the year, are voted every session in committee of supply, when the estimates, giving all the votes in detail, are formally laid before the house by message from the governor-general. These estimate" contain several hundred votes arranged in the order of the various public services. For instance, — civil government, militia, penitentiaries, administration of justice, immigration, Indians, public works, railways and canals, quar- antine and the numerous other subjects for which parliament votes annually large sums of the public money. These esti- mates contain the expenditures for the current and the pre- vious year in parallel columns, for purposes of comparison, and it is the duty of the minister responsible for a particular I til ^B. N. A. Act, 1867, sec. 53. Bills for appropriating any part of the pub- lic revenue, or for imposing anj tax or impost, shall originate in the house of commons. 54. It shall not be lawful for the house of commons to adopt or pass any vote, resolution, address, or bill for the appropriation of any part of the public revenue, or of any tax or impost, to any purpose that has not been first recommended to that house by message of the governor-general in the ses- sion in which such vote, resolution, address, or bill is proposed. 114 Federal OovernmerU in Canada. [670 expenditure to give tull explanations on the subject when they are demanded by the house. As every vote is carefully scanned a very considerable part of the session is occupied by debates on this important committee, over which a permanent chair- man, v/ho is also the deputy speaker, presides. When all the votes are passed in committee, then they are reported to the house, and a further opportunity given for debate, though members are permitted to speak only once at this stage. Res- olutions are next passed in committee of ways and means to authorize the necessary payments out of the consolidated fund, and finally the appropriation bill, containing all the votes of supply in full, is introduced and passed through all its stages. The committee of supply votes the money, and the committee of ways and means provides the means of payment. It is in the latter committee all taxes are imposed for purposes of public revenue. When the estimates have been brought in it is the duty of the finance minister to make his financial statement, or, in parliamentary phrase, present the " budget." * He will on this occasion review the expenditure of the past, and estimate that for the following year, give his opinion on the financial situa- tion and lay before the house a statement of any scheme of tax- ation that the government may have decided on, or of any changes that may be deemed necessary in the existing tariff. One of the most important and interesting debates of the ses- sion generally takes place after the delivery of this speech. From the beginning of the session, members ask questions of the government on every imaginable public topic, and make formal motions for papers relating to matters of general or local interest. All such motions and inquiries are made after two days' notice ; for the rules are very properly framed so as to prevent surprises, and give the house due information of the business to come daily before it. Bui; in the Canadian house, ^ From the old French word bougeite, a bag. In making this Btatement, the minister opens the money bag of the people, figuratively speaking. 671] Federal Govemment in Canada. 115 and in the English commons in a more limited sense under the new regulations adopted since " obstruction " showed its objectionable features, there are certain methods which enable members to move motions or ask questions without number, and even v 'thout notice in the Canadian commons. It is always open to a member to bring up an important question immediately — except, of course, when there is a subject under consideration — and debate it at any length on a motion for the adjournment of the house. Then, as soon as committee of supply is moved on any day, a member may make a motion on any question he wishes, unless it refers to the voles to be discussed in supply. As the rules do not permit any amend- ment to be made to a motion at such a stage, " the previous question," in the English parliamentary sense, is practically in force and it is possible to get a direct vote on an issue, with- out the evasions that amendments offer on other occasions. While in the case of all bills and other motions, amendments must be relevant to the question, members can here bring up any subject they please. This is a practice which has its his- torical origin in the fact that in old times, when the English parliamentary system was developing itself, the people's repre- sentatives laid down the principle that the king must redress their grievances before they should grant him the supply he asked from the nation. Those times have long since passed away and the people now fully control all taxes and expendi- tures, but the crown still asks for money through the council, and the commons grant it in due form. It is no longer neces- sary to threaten the crown with a refusal of supplies unless the people's grievances are redressed ; but still they ain refuse it to an unfaithful government should the necessity arise. As a matter of fact, should the government be defeated in a session before supply is voted, the honse would pass only such votes as are necessary to meet the exigencies of the public service, and leave the whole question of supply open until the crisis is over and there is in office a ministry which has the confidence of the house and country. The privilege of obtaining an I * fifS 116 Federal Oovemment m Cajiada. [672 te expreBsion of opinion on any qu&<3tion of interest, and of setting forth any public grievance is one which is often nseeeches on impor- tant occasions, however, are sometimes unnecesHarily long; for it is not unusual for a member to take up three hours before he closes. Debates are in such cases pr(jlongee to enterprise and energy in coloniza- tion. In addition to the Iwily of the common law, Canada has also availed itself of those statutes which have been framed in England from time to time, in consonance with the condition of things to which the old maxims of the law could not apply. The establishment of legislatures in the provinces, we have seen, was only a little later than the entrance of the large British population, and it was therefore in their power to adapt English statutes to the circumstances of this country at the very ccniiiiencement of our history, or to pass such enact- ments as were better suited to the circumstances of the coun- try. Thus it happens that gradually a large body of Cana- dian statutory law has been built upon the common law base of the legal structure, and with a view of making the law more intelligible, it has consequently been wisely ordered, at different times since 1854, that all these statutes should be revised and consolidated by commissions composed of learned lawyers and judges. The people of the dominion and of all the provinces have now easy access to the statutory law that governs them within the respective constitutional limits of the parliament and the legislatures. It is also found convenient in the intervals between the consolidations of the statutory law to collect together, from time to time, all the enactments on a particular subject and incorporate them, with such amend- i\ i;;i .' 1 f 'il: 146 Federal Government in Canada. [602 ments as are found necessary, in one statute. This has been found especially useful in the case of laws affecting railways, insurance companies, the territorial government, and other matters of large public import. The other advantage of this practice lies in the fact that it lessens the labor of a greater consolidation at a later period. The criminal law has been consolidated in this way and forms a distinct code. While it is only in Quebec that there is a system of muni- cipal or civil law distinct from the common law, there are at the same time in all the other provinces certain differences in the statutory law, affecting civil rights and property, that have grown up from the commencement of their history as separate political entities, until the present time. But as the principles that lie at the basis of their private law are derived from the same source of law and are in the main identical, the authors of the constitution have granted a gen orsl authority to the parliament of the dominion to give uniformity, at any time, to the laws relative to property and civil rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick ; but in case of parliament making such provision, it shall not have any effect until it is formally ratified by the l^islatures.* No effort has been made so far in this direction, and it is now hardly probable that the provinces would be willing to sanction such a radical change, since it would give parliament thenceforth unrestricted powers over property and civil rights. The provinces having had the enjoyment of their jurisdiction for so many years and seen how ^B. N. A. Act, 1867, sec. 94. Notwithstanding anything in this act, the parliament of Canada may make provision for the uniformity of all or any of the laws relative to property and civil rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and of the procedure of all or any of the courts in those three provinces, and from and after the passing of any act in that behalf, the power of the parliament of Canada to make laws in relation to any matter comprised in any such act shall, notwithstanding anything in this act, be unrestricted, but any act of the parliament of Canada making provision for such uniformity shall not have effect in any province unless and until it is adopted and enacted as law by the legislature thereof. 603] Federal Government in Oanada. 147 closely it is identified with provincial rights, and interests, would hardly now consent to place themselves in a position of entire subordination, in this important respect, to the dominion government. The position of the judiciary of Canada may be compared with that of the federal judiciary of the United States, since the latter has a permanency and a reputation not enjoyed by the courts of all the states. The president appoints, with the approval of the senate, not only the judges of the supreme court at Washington, but the judges of the circuit and district courts. In the majority of the states, however, the judges are elected by the people, and in only four cases is there a life tenure. The average terra of a judge's official life in that country is from eight to ten years ; but there have been no instances of removal during that term, while they have faith- fully discharged their functions. As in Canada, judges may be removed, in thirty states, upon an address of two-thirds of each branch of the legislature. Their salaries are not large : the judges of the supreme court of the United States receive $10,000 each and the chief justice $500 in addition ; of the circuit courts, $6,000 ; of the district courts, from $3,600 to $4,000; of the supreme courts in the states, from $1,500 to $2,000 ; the average being from $4,000 to $5,000.^ All writers who have studied the relative positions of the American judi- ciary agree that the influence of the elective system, of short tenure, and of small salaries has not been always favorable to the standard of the bench in the several states. The small salaries especially deter lawyers of conspicuous ability and large practice from accepting such positions. The supreme and circuit courts of the Unit ed States, hovvever, occupy a vantage ground from their permanency and the nature of l;heir functions, which embrace a wider sphere of study and interest. On the whole, however, with all the disadvantages under which the state judiciary labors, it is generally admitted that the dignity I'li ):t' ■>; 11 I • ' See Spofford'B American Almanac, 1889. 148 Federal Oovemment in Canada. [604 of the office, and the general respect for the law — an inheritance from their British ancestors — tend to act as a counterpoise to the influences of which I have already been speaking. In Canada the salaries are even less than in the United States, and there are also inequalities between the prov- inces, which ought to be removed, and salaries generally increased. The judges of the supreme court of Canada receive $7,000 each, and the chief justice ^8,000; the chief justices in Ontario and Quebec $6,000, and the judges of the superior court from $6,000 to $3,500 ; the chief justices in the other pro- vinces $5,000, and the judges $4,000, except in Prince Edward Island where the amounts are $4,000 and $3,200. The county and district judges only receive from $2,000 to $2,400 — too small a sum for a hard worked class — but in the case of these and other judges there are sufficient sums allowed for travelling expenses. On their retirement they are entitled to a consider- able annuity fixed by law. Although the salaries are small compared with what a leading lawyer can make at the bar, yet the freedom of the office from popular caprice, its tenure prac- tically for life, its high position in the public estimation, all tend to bring to its ranks men of learning and character. Since those deplorable times in Canadian history when there was a departure from the wise principle of having the executive and legislative department in separate hands, the bench has evoked respect and confidence ; and there have been no cases of the removal of a judge on the address of the two houses. It says much for the different governments of Canada, and especially for the present premier^ who, more than any other Canadian statesman, has had the responsibility of such important appoint- ments through his long tenure of office, that they have never been led for political reasons to lower the standard of the bench by the elevation of improper persons. Such positions are not necessarily given as a reward for political services ; for in numerous instances the ablest men have been chosen from » The Right Honorable Sir John A. Macdonald, P. C, G. C. B. 605] Federal Government in Canada. 149 the bar without reference to their political status. The legis- lative arena, however, necessarily attracts not a few of the finest intellects of the bar in all the provinces, and the very experi- ence they there gain of legislation is undoubtedly favorable to their usefulness, phould they, as often happens, accept the dig- nified and relatively comfortable (that is compared with active political life) position of a seat on the bencii in whose merito- rious history all of us take ^ very proper pride. I must now direct your attention briefly to the important place occupied by local self-government in the provincial structure. In the days of the French regime, as I have already shown you, a system of centralization was established by Louis Quatorze, who so pitilessly during his reign enforced "that dependence which," as Saint Simon tells us, "reduced all to subjection," everything like local freedom was stifledj and the most insignificant matters of local concern were kept under the direct control of the council and especially of the intendant at Quebec. Until 1841 the legislature of Quebec was practically a municipal council for the whole province, and the objection of the hahUants to any measure of local tax- ation prevented the adoption of a workable municipal system until after the union of 1841. In Upper Canada, however, the legislature was gradually relieved of many works and mat- ters of local interest by the adoption of measures of local gov- ernment which infused a spirit of energy and enterprise in the various counties, towns and cities. The union of 1841 led to the introduction of municipal institutions in both the pro- vinces, in conformity with the political and material devehjp- ment of the country. By 1867 there was an exceedingly lib- eral system in operation in Upper and Lower Canada, but the same thing cannot be said of the maritime provinces. It has been only within a few years that tIXe legislatures of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have organized an effective muni- cipal system, on the basis of that so successfully adopted for a long time in the larger provinces. In Prince Edward Island, however, matters remain pretty much as they were half a cen- il ■•^il fi I .ii\ 150 Federal Government in Canada. [606 tury ago, and the legislature is practically a municipal council for the whole island. At the present time all the provinces, with this one exception, have an excellent municipal code, which enables every defined district, large or small, to carry on efficiently all those public- improvements essential to the comfort, convenience, and general necessities of the different communities that make up the province at large. Even in the territories of the North-west, ever^ proper facility is given to the people in every populous district, or town, to organize a system equal to all their local requirements.^ The municipal institutions of Canada are the creation of the respective legislatures of Canada, and may be amended or even abolished under the powers granted to that body by the ninety-second section of the fundamental law. The various statutes in force establish councils composed of wardens, reeves, mayors, and councillors or aldermen, in every county, town- ship or parish, town and city in the provinces. These coun- cils are representative in their nature, in accordance with the principle that rests at the basis of our general system of local government. The wardens and reeves are elected as a rule by the council, and the mayors directly by the rate payers in cities. The powers and authorities of the various municipali- ties are regulated by general statutes, but there are also special acts of incorporation in the case of many cities and towns. These various municipal organizations have the power of im- posing direct taxes for municipal purposes, including public schools, and all other objects that fall within the legitimate scope of their local requirements. Taxation is limited to a certain rate on the dollar, and is imposed on real property, as well as on bonds, stocks, and other personal property, and on incomes in the province of Ontario. All the municipalities have large borrowing powers, and the right to issue debentures to meet debts and liabilities incurred for necessary improvements, or * See Bourinot's Local Government in Canada, in Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Studies. 607] Federal Government in Canada. 151 to assist railways of local advantage. This power of assisting railways by subsidies has been largely used, though chiefly in Ontario ; by the end of 1884 the municipalities had already paid $12,472,000 to secure railway communication. The councils, however, cannot directly grant this aid, but must pass by-laws setting forth the conditions of the grant and the means of meeting the prospective liabilities, and submit them to the vote of the rate-payers, of whom a majority must ap- prove the proposition. The reference to the people at the polls of such by-laws is one of the few examples which our system of e:overnment oflers of a resemblance to the referendum of laws passed by the Swiss federal legislature to the people for acceptance or rejection at the polls. It is a practice pecu- liar to municipal bodies, though the same principle is illus- trated in the case of the Canada Temperance Act, which was' passed by the dominion parliament, and can only come into operation with the consent or at the option of the community to which it is referred, in accordance with the provisions laid down in the statute. Even after it has been adopted it may also be repealed by submitting another by-law to the people immediately interested, as in fact we have seen done in so many cases during the last few months, on account of the unpopularity or the unsatisfactory operation of the law. It is an interesting question how far it is competent for a legis- lative body entrusted with the power of making laws to refer the adoption or rejection of a general law like that of the Temperance Act to the people of the whole province or of a particular district. A very high American authority has well said that ''it is not always essential that a legislative act should be a competent statute which must in any event take effect as law at the time it leaves the hand of the legislative department. A statute may he oondUional, and its taking effect may be made to depend upon some subsequent event." The highest courts liave declared this local option law of Canada as within the competency of parliament under the powers granted it by the constitution, but in any case it does not appear to be any surrender of the law-making power to i 4 I ,.,.i 162 Federal Government in Canada. [608 submit simply the question of its acceptance to the voters of the locality especially interested in such questions. To cite again the eminent author just quoted : "Affirmative legislation may in some cases be adopted, of which the parties interested are at liberty to avail themselves or not, at their option. A private act of incorporation cannot be forced upon the corporation ; they may refuse the franchise if they so choose. In these cases the legislative, act is regarded as complete when it has passed through the constitutional formalities necessary to perfect leg- islation, notwithstanding its actually going in operation as law may depend upon its subsequent acceptance." The necessity of submitting by-laws to the people in a mu- nicipality, however, rests on the constitutional authority of the legislature which, in the general law passed for the regu- lation of municipalities, has thought proper to provide such means of reference to the rate-payers of a locality. On gen- eral principles, indeed, the powers of legislation bestowed in this way on municipal corporations cannot be considered " as trenching upon the maxim that legislative power must not be delegated, since that maxim is to be understood in the light of the immemorial practice of this country and England, which has always recognized the propriety and policy of vesting in the municipal organizations certain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the parties immediately interested may fairly be supposed more competent to judge of their needs than any central authority. As municipal organizations are mere auxiliaries of the state or provincial government in the important business of municipal rule, the legislature may create them at will from its own views of propriety or necessity and without consulting the parties interested ; and it also pos- sesses the like power to abolish them, without stopping to inquire what may be the desire of the corporation on that subject.' »i ^AU these citations are from Cooler's Constitutional Limitations (pp. 139-148) where the whole subject is fully discussed. His remarks apply to Canada as well as to the United States. 609] Federal Government in Canada. 153 Of the right of the provincial legislatures to delegate powers specially given them by the constitution to any body or authority also created by themselves, we have a decision of the privy council in the case of the liquor license act of Ontario (the most important yet given by that tribunal on the constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces), which authorized certain license commissioners to pass resolutions regulating and determining within a municipality the sale of liquors.^ The maxim delegatus non potest delegare was distinctly relied upon by the opponents of the measure, but the judicial com- mittee emphatically laid down that such an objection is founded on an entire misconception of the true character and position of the provincial legislatures. Within the limits of its constitutional powers "the local legislature is supreme and has the same authority as the imperial parliament, or the par- liament of the dominion, would have had under like circum- stances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make by-laws or resolutions as to the subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation and effect." Such an authority is, in their opinion, "ancillary to legislation, and with- out it an attempt to provide for varying details and machinery to carry them out might become oppressive or absolutely fail." A legislature in committing important regulations to agents or delegates, it is decisively stated, does not by any means efface itself ; for " it retains its powers intact and can, when- ever it pleases, destroy the agency it has created and set up another, or take the matter directly into its own hands." And how far it " shall seek the aid of subordinate agencies, and how long it shall continue them, are matters for each legisla- ture, and not for courts of law, to decide." ^ * See supra, p. 54. ' See 9 App. Cas., 117 ; or Legal News, Vol. VII, p. 23. The learned judg- ment of the Ontario court of appeal in this famous case contains abundance 11 m il 1 \ ilji EHH '* 111 -i^ rj f ■'• 1 f \ I 164 Fedei'ol Oovemment in Canada, [610 The power of passing by-laws and imposing taxation accord- ingly gives to the various municipal councils of the provinces a decided legislative character. The subjects embraced within tlieir jurisdiction are set forth with more or less distinctness in the municipal acts of the provinces, especially of Ontario. The council of every township, city, town or incorporated vil- lage may pass by-laws for the construction and maintenance of waterworks, the amounts required to be collected under local improvement by-laws, licensing and regulating transient traders, the purchase of real property for the erection of public school houses thereon, cemeteries, their improvement and pro- tection, cruelty to animals, fences, exhibitions and places of amusement, planting and preservation of trees, gas and water companies, public morals, giving intoxicating liquor to minors, nuisances, sewerage and drainage, inspection of meat and milk, contagious diseases, fevers, prevention of accidents by fire, aiding schools, endowing fellowships, markets, police, indus- trial farms, charities and numerous other subjects immediately connected with the security and comfort of the people in every community.^ The most important duty of every municipality, especially in the cities, is the imposition and collection of taxes. The burden of taxation is on real property, and the difficulty is felt in the same measure in Canada as in the United States of obtaining accurate returns for taxation pur- poses, of all intangible property in the shape of bonds, mort- gages, and other securities held by individuals. The same may be said of returns of incomes, except in the case of public officials and clerks, of whose salaries it is easy to obtain information.' The statistics of this kind of property, of precedents for legislation entrusting a limited discretionary authority to others, and gives many illustrations of its necessity and convenience. ' See Bev. Stat, of Ontario, 1887, chap. 184, for examples of the large powers entrusted to municipalities in probably the best constructed muni- cipal system in the world. 'The oflScial incomes of the o£Bcers of the dominion government cannot be taxed by the provinces or the municipalities thereof. Leprohon v. City of Ottawa, 2 App. Bep. Ont., p. 622. 611] Federal Oovei'nment in Canada. 155 as given in assessment rolls, are very unreliable. For instance, we find that while the assessed value of real prop- erty in Ontario increased from ^325,484,116 in 1873 to $583,231,133 in 1883, the assessed value of the personal property only increased during the same period of prosperity from $49,010,772 to $56,471,661 ; and it must be remembered that the assessors, especially in rural districts, generally place the value of real property at a low rate. The exemptions from taxation comprise all government and public property, places of worship and lands connected therewith, and a great number of buildings occupied by scientific, educational, and charitable institutions. In the province of Quebec, where the Church of Rome has accumulated a vast amount of valu- able property, especially in and near Quebec and on the island of Montreal, the value of exemptions is estimated at many millions of dollars. In Ontario an agitation has commenced against the continuance of a law which restricts the assessment in certain localities to relatively narrow limits, but the religious and other interests that would be eflFected are likely to prevent any change for a long time to come. In Quebec it is quite impracticable. The municipal system on the whole is creditable to the people of Canada. It has its weaknesses, owing in some measure to the disinclination of leading citizens, especially in the cities and large towns, to give much of their time to mu- nicipal duties, although every person is so deeply interested in their efficient and honest performance. Jobbery and corrup- tion are, however, not conspicuous characteristics of municipal organizations in the provinces; and we have no examples happily in our history at all inviting comparison with the utter baseness of the Tweed ring in New York. In the rural municipalities of Ontario there is a greater readiness than in the large cities to serve in the municipal councils, and as I have already shown, those bodies have given not a few able and practical men to parliament. On an effective system of local self-government rests in a very considerable degree the , ,, ! .1 3 I 15C Federal Government in Canada. [612 satisfactory working of our whole provincial organization. It brings men into active connection with the practical side of the life of a community and educates thera ibr a larger though not more useful sphere of public life/ The Territories of Canada, to whose organization I must now refer, comprise a vast region stretching from the province of Manitoba to the Rocky Mountains, an