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BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN.

JUNE— OCTOBER, 1777.

JUSTICE TO SCHUYLER, d)

The following article possesses interest at this moment, ( 1866 )
when BAMCROFT, in the ninth volume of his "History of
the United States," has laid himself open to such deservedly
severe attacks hy his depreciaMon of the personal character and
military qualifications of Major General PHILIP SCHUYLER
to whose Practical-Strategy the defeat of BURGOYNE was
due. In lowering SCHUYLER, the historian not only threw
a doubt upon the reliability of all his portraitures and the im-
partiality of his judgment, but did great injustice to the State
of New York, to whose yoemanry soldiers bred on the "Bloody
Ground" — in the '-Flanders of America" — the overthrow of
BURGOYNE must be chiefly attributed. Second to none —
not even to WASHINGTON — in the purity of his patriotism;
sacond only to WASHINGTON and to GREENE in his ac-
complished generalship — one of the deepest investigators and
clearest writers on our Revolutionary struggles has even claimed
for SCHUYLER that he was the superior of the latter.

J «

j i

(1) fSKOROE H. MOORK, Esq, Llbmrian of the New York
Historical Society, a gentleman better read in American History than
nlmoBt any other in the country, remarked (26tii January, 1868) to
Major WILL.VRD BULL.VRD, U. S. V., that he was not satisfied that
" ANCHOR" had not written (referring to the preceding article) the
best Defence of Schuyler which had yet appeared.

1'IV.

1 I

To luisroprewMit SCHUYLKR is to di«honor the Empire
8tate, which in this " time that tried meiiH couls, " did more
than its pi.rtinn of the duty, and bore more than its share of
the burdens. No state suffered more than New York, for New
York was more divided apiinst itself than any other colony. It
was not only the arena of civil war, but of the bitterest fratra-
eidal strife, and the horrors of Indian Warfare were sui>eradded
U) those of a nominally civilized invasion which furnished,
whetted, incited and subsidized the scali)inj>; knife ; this, too,
not only for seven years. (1775,-81) but for over a hundred

yeai-s previously.

In the valley of the upper Hudson, the finest and best ap-
pointed British army marshalled a<rainst the colonies laid down
its arms. On the shore of the lower Hudson, WAYNK, in-
scribed his name imperi.shably in the capture of Stony Point.
All alon« this river, from New York to KiiiKston, the storm of
battle raged and ravaged. On the plains of Flatbush, of Har-
lem, and of \Ve.Htchester county, were bloody battles fought of
momentous imjiortance to Liberty. In the valley of the Mo-
hawk occurre<l the combats of Oriskany and Fort Stanwix—
the former the bl.M)die>«t of the American Revolution save one
(Kings M..unt4.in) in prop.rtion to the luimbera engaged—
and even the famous Bennington was m>t decided in Vermont,
but ill the town of H..osic. in the county of Rensselaer, and
StHt*! of New York, upon an affltient of tin; Hudson.

lu lHti:i. the French Lieutenant Colonel M. J<)i,Y i)K. 8t.
Vamer, published an •• Argumentative Hist^iry ( llistom- Rain-
Hmw.v) of the Milit^.ry and I'olitieal operations of the Last
War." which embraceil our llevi.lutionary Struggles, and which,
when written, amounted to a prophecy. Translate his words:

" In 1777 England agumented still mort' its force in America,
until they numbmMl r>r.AI(MI men. This force is certainly double
what was neces.sary to subjugate the whole of America in less
than two years. All that was reiiuired was to .lispose thein ;,o
as to be able to act advantagw.usly. This the English luiver
knew how to do."'

These viewrt of the French dolone! cliwely corroborate those
of the great German Tactical writer, von BIT LOW, traiinlated
and published in the New York Hixtorlcal Magazine (ar 1865,
pagcH 105, &c., 141, (see Army and Navy Journal, 111,
1865,-(>G) 302, 3d, &c.

As soon as the season became favorable for the operations of
the campai<ni, the English army under HOWE, which lay in
New York, embarked, whilst another army 12,000 strong, with
numbers of Savages, advancing from Canada, under the orders
of General BURGOYNE, moved on Lake Ghamplain, and oc-
cupied the post of Ticonderoga. I then thought the English
had perceived their mistake, and that their army wa« about to
occupy the only post which was proper, and when I leametl the
arrival of BIIRljOYNE at Ticonderoga, I believed the Ameri-
cans to be lost without remedy. I remained a long time in my
erior, because so long n delay was requisite to learn what had be-
come of the army (HOWE'S) which had been shipped; but
having at length understood that it had moved on Philadelphia,
(southward instead of northward, to co-operate with the army
from Canada) whilst BURGOYNE advanced from Ticonderoga
to Albany, occupying the posts or forts which lay on his route,
to assure his communications with Ticonderoga and Canada, I
predicted the destruction of the English army ; and shortly after-
ward news came that BURGOYNE's army had been obliged
to lay down its arms and surrender at Saratoga to the Ameri-
cans. Many people on this occasion blamed BURGOYNE,
but with the greatest inju.stice, and without the slightest reason.
As soon as he hud orders to move from Ticonderoga upon Al-
bany, and the Americans had been able to protect the country,"
(alluding to SCHUYLER'S ruining the navigation of Wood
Creek, breaking up the roads, felling the woods, driving off the
live stock, removing supplies, &c.) — "and BURGOYNE was
thus compelled to march tlirough districts extremely difficult,
in which he could find no subsistence, his destmction was cer-
tain, since it was easy for the Americans, when BURGOYNE
was once caught in these wastes, to cut off his communications,
and starve him out." — (This was exactly SCHUYLER's plan,

which sufeeedeil.)— "To do this there was no iiwd of fightiii;!
n huttle ; it was sufficient to dispute the ground inch by inch,
and hiiruHS his marches.— (Exactly what SCHUYLER did.)
.—"Thenceforward courage and skill became useless, and (/ the
Americans hud not denuxnded BURGOYNE's siirrendfr, he
wimld have been obliged to beg them to perviit him to yield at
discretion rather than to see his army perish from starmtion
and s(//fer%."— (SCHUYLER accomplished all this; then
came GATES and received the reward— New York as usual
sacrificed to New England. )— " Here we have the history of the
Roman Caudine Forks repeated * * * The English in
moving upon New York intended to sever all communication
between the colonies of the South and those of the North.
They thought that in thus cutting the cake in two, the pieces
would fall into their pockets, and the business would terminate
at once. When they (HOWE) had taken New York, they
j»erceived that, notwithstanding the success they had gained, it
was impossible for them to intermpt these communications.
Nevertheless, persisting in this plan, they brought 1 2,tMt() men
from Canada, who after establishing themselves at Ticondemga,
had orders to move on Albany, where thay should have met the
advanced posts of HOWE's army. Thinking in this position
they could sever any communication by land between the North-
ern and Southern colonies, at the same time being master of
the sea, and counting upon stopping the Americans from getting
out of their ports, the English. believed they could soon compel
the whole of America to surrend(!r at discretion. Let us now
examine the possibility of succeeding in this operation. This
undertaking comprehends nothing less than the est^iblishment
of a chain of posts from the mouth ol the St. Lawrence to that
of the Hudson ; that is to say along u line of more than tiOU
miles, and through a country for the most part a wilderness.
The execution of this monstrous project, even supiwsing it was
susceptible of execution, wotild have i-e4uii-ed an army not of
50,000 men, but of 200,000.

" it is plain that after breaking the smallest link of such an
«xtensive chain, which v .s very easy, the rest wouhl fall oi' it-

self, and it would only be necessary to luake the feeblest eiforts
to. destroy it entirely. Could they have forgotten TUREN-
NE's celebrated winter campaign of 1675, against the Allies
who had established themselves in Alsace? Did they not know
that he destroyed almost in an instttnt an army three times as
strong as his own, although the position of the Allies in Alsace,
in. 1675, was not near so bad as that of the English in America
in 1777 ? In fine, it is easy to perceive that when the English
had succeeded in giving to this immense chain a consistence of
which it was not in reality susceptible, they might have remain-
ed for two centuries iu this position without being able to win
the snialU»t advantage for themselves, and without being able
to do the slighest injury to the Americans. * * * *
Had any people ever proposed to themselves the project of car-
rying on war at a distance of over H,600 miles, from their capi-
tal," (base of supplies) "and subjecting themselves to the ne-
cessity of transporting thence the materials for the smallest
meal for their whole arnjy. * * * * The English army,
however numerous, must have necessarily been employed in
guarding the chain of posts which it had occupied, and it could
not venture to weaken any one without exposing itself to fatal
consequences. In this position it was consequently impossible
to undertake the smallest enterprise against the American Prov-
inces, and the Americans would finally remain peaceable posses-
sors of their whole continent." Results demonstrated the
justice of the French officer's opinion

Before BURGOYNE lefl Skenesborough, (now V' ehall,
occupied or captured July 6th) in the latter part of July
— having lingered chree weeks at this point — (Tome's Battles of
Ameriai I. 500) — that is to say, as soon as the English Gene-
ral had to give up his wattr transport, he himself tacitly ad-
mitted that he coniprehendod that his campaign was a failure.
(^Compare Thatcher's Journal, 86.) Anyone who closely ex-
amines BURGOYNE'S own testimony must admit this. ■ This
was not due to any armed resistance, but to the impediments
which 8CHUYLKR had succeeded in accumulating in his road,
by which the natural difficulties ol the country had been ren-

■ I

dered alniftHt inHuruioiintnblc. BI'RGOVNE'h iiIiiiik of ad-
vancing aouthwnrtl were chiefly ba«ed on the Himultiineons co-
openition of HOWK niovinji northward to meet him; but he
likewise relied, in no small degree, on the equally f<iniultaneou«
invasion of St. LEOER, marching down the valley of the Mo-
hawk, eautward. The objective of all these three columns was
Albany. Having barred the road to BURGOYNE by engi-
neerhig obstacles, iSCHUYLER arrested and disposed of St.
LEGER by promptly detaching ARNOLD to the relief of
Fort Stanwix (or Schuyler), at Rome, 12 miles west of Utica,
and 107 miles West North West of Albany. All this had been
accomplished; "BURGOYNE was already 'Burgoyned' be-
fore GATES superseded SCHUYLER."

The advei-saries which SCHUYLER has massed in front of
BURGOYNhi were pnsnirr not acfivf, mnterlol not prriunwl;
but even more potent than reliabje Militia, or even half organi-
zed Continentals. There were few men in arms, but there were
obstacles, material and moral, piled up by patriotism and sagaci-
ty; fearless. sl(H>pless, indefatigable forgetfulness of self, and
res«>lute laborioiisneKS — every thought of a first-class military
mind concentrated iar the public good, regardless of private
losses and pMl)lic misjiidgment of motives and actions, the heav-
en-reaching, and thence force-deriving determination of an
honest New-Netherland(n'.

In the treatment experienced by SCHUYLER, we have a
perfect type of HO()KER's at the hands of HALLECK,
and his supersedure by MEADE, in July, IHGH. When
GATES took the command BURGOYNE's tower was already
tottering to its fall ; a comparatively slight efl'ort wius only neetled
to push it over. This was what wonld havt been termed in our
Great Civil War "l)u«h-wliacking" on a big scale. The shock
was given and it fell in ruitn. It was tottering as the French
Colonel predicted, not through the shock of arms, but through
want of fiiod. The latter sapjwd its strength and undermined
its efficiency. Before GATES appeared ( IDtli August) mor-
ally and physically the work was done. Of all soldiei's the
English most n-ipiire a full stomach, and BURGOYNE's were

•7

empty. On the lOth and 1 1th of Aujrust BUROOYNE had
been compelled to send off BAUM and BREYMAN to gather
in food. August KUh this expedition was ntterly routed, not
at Bennington, as usually stated, but at Wulloomscoick, (Sanco-
iek Mills) within the State of New York. BURGOYNE now
had to depend upon supplies drawn from England, by way of Que-
bec and Lake Champlain. Three days aflcr Bennington, thirteen
days after Oriskany, and simultaneously with the relief of Fort
Stanwix (this relief due alone to SCHUYLER's firmness)
GATES superseded SCHUYLER, and assumed command
nominally of the Northern Army — in the latter part of Au-
gust; Thatcher would lead the reader to suppose about the HOth.

Arnold hud been already detached to the relief of Fort Stan-
wix as soon as it« danger had become known, about the 7th.
After the toils of five weeks — toils due entirely to the engi-
neering ability of SCHUYLER— BURGOYNE, on the 30th
September, moved forward again. Then it was GATES, act-
ting under the spur of ARNOLD, presented the barrier of
arms.

On the 24th September the Americans had already cut
BURGOYNE's lines of c<jmmunication and supply, and Colo-
nel BROWN had re-captured Ticonderoga. On the 17th Oc-
u»ber BURGOYNE capitulated on terms. Had GATES been
a true native-born American (i. e. even in feeling, for he was
English born, bred and educated) a prescient soldier or a firm
man, or had SCHl-YLER been continued in command, BUR-
GO Y^NE must have surrendered at discretion, which would have
saved an immense amount uf recrimination, and conseijuent
difficulty.

A tew words more of remarks which ought to be exceeding-
ly interesting to American soldiers. A flag, intended for the
Stars and Stripe.-*, first flouted over captured standards on the
ramparts of Fort Stanwix, August 5tli, P. P. M., and the Stars
and Stripes as we now see them, except as to the number of the
Stai-s, was fii-st unfurled to grace the Surrender of Surutoga, 17th
October, 1777.

h'^j^T"

"This position." (referring to that of BURGOYNE's army
depending for everjthing, even it« supplies of daily food, on
Quebec as a secondary base, but having its primary or real base
in England,) " was thus excessively bad, and they (the English )
had labored to render it even worse yet; for, not content with
wishing to establish a chain of posts from the St. Lawrence, t^)
that of the Hudson, Oeneral HOWE desired to extend this
chain to the mouth of the Delaware, and had captured Phila-
delphia. We have seen that the destruction of B URGO Y N E's
Army was the inevitable consequence of an operation so well

(sarcastic) combined." "As soon as General HOWE

started for Philadelphia, the troops of North America fell at
their ease upon the Army of Great Britain."

Thus it is that minds truly military, predict the inevitable in
war. Thus M. JOLY de St VALIER foretold the ruin of
BURGOYNE; von BULOW the fall of Prussia, in 180«;
..and SCH ALK the c<mrae of the campaign in 1862, culminating
-at Antietam, putting his finger almost on the very spot where
the decisive battle would be fought; and thus it is that solid
men like SCHUYLER are sacrificed to such overrated men as
.GATES; or supeweded the moment when the tree of their
.labors is about to fli)wer and fruit in victory.
. THOMAS, another SCHUYLER, came near experiencing a
. pimilar fate in 1864, when a few days respite enabled him to
win the most resultive battle of the war,— Nashville. Mf8 «

■ '. / Anchor.— tJ. Watts UE Peybter.

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