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 6/\N/\DI/\N ^IL1T/\RY Ij^STITUTE 
 
 j|nfentr[^ Jfiire J actJcs 
 
 FOR THK 
 
 (^anadian fl]9ilitia 
 
 MAJOR C. 
 
 B. MAYXE, R.E. 
 
 Professor of Surveying, etc., 
 At the Royal Military College, Canada. 
 
 U IP 
 
 
 I'lUNTKK F()l! Till-: CANADIAN MIMTAKV INSTITI Ti: 
 
 liV JIIK 
 
 MAIL ,1015 I'UlNTlNii < 'O., LTD., TultoNTU 
 
 
THBJ 
 
 Canadian ^ H^ilitaitg ^ Institute 
 
 944 KING STREET WEST. TORONTO 
 
 •# 
 
 aFI!lCBRJJ F0J? 1&90 
 
 LlEl'TENANT-Coi.ONEI, W. D. OTTKII, II.A.O. 
 
 B 
 X)icc-Pro:?ibcnts : 
 
 LiKi'TKNANT-CoLONEi, The Hox. J. M. G111S..N, 13th Rattalioii. 
 
 LiKl'TENANT-COI.OXKI. H. .1. (illASKTT, H. L. 
 
 Committee : 
 
 MA.10R J. IJ. Meal, T.F.R 
 
 G. H. STAitKE, :{rd V.H. ^ 
 
 W. McSl'ADDEN, 12th Y.U. 
 
 Cait. W. (i. Mutton, Q.O.H. 
 G. P. Ei.ioT, ll.G. 
 " W. Hamilton' Mkhuitt, G.G. E.G. 
 
 I 
 
 Secretary : 
 
 Mr. L. Homkkav Ii{\in(;, li I.. 
 
 
 Crea^urer : 
 
 Mr. I{om:i!T Mvi.ks, late T.F.B. 
 
 CluMtors : 
 
 CaI'T. H. M. I'El.l.ATT, Q.O.H. 
 
 1). M. How Aiu), ii.a. 
 

 3nfantry ^irc (Lactics f iiitabic to tl^c £anaMau 
 
 niilitia. 
 
 A I.iariHi; iii;i.ivi;ni;ii hn 2(iTii Ai-uii., isitO, at tiii: ianahiax .Mii.i i auv Insii- 
 
 n IE, TtimiSTu, iiv MA.IOI! C. 15. .MAVNi;, H.i:., I'uoKKssdit or 
 
 Sri(\ i:yin(.. i;t( ., IU>\ \i. .Mii.i i auv ("oi.mk.i:. Can aiia. 
 
 jfiitli I'll iiiiiiiUiiiJ iij l/ir n\,ft( " Tuct lC>i." 
 
 1'lit' .suliit'C't lict'iire us tlii> cNciiiiii;' is niir which is sfcouil tnnoiu' 
 in iiiii'ortiiiicT ill thf wlmlr i-anui' ot" iiiilitiiiy art. iJnt liffore 
 i)ro«.'t'0<liiiu' t'urther, it mav he rriiiarkt'il thiit of lute viai's the 
 wiirW ■"tactics "" has iK'Nclopcil a wiih'T tin'miiiin' than the mho 
 usually attachfil to it. namely, the nicrc handlini;- of truojis under 
 tire, so as to ensure and, if jiossihlc. to .secure victory. The newci- 
 ainl more useful meaning- n(j\v attaclied to the woril 'tactics" is 
 bi'st expressed hy tiie Word 'V.iviv///'*/),"' in tlie sense of "///'' inctliodx 
 (iilt)/)h(l for Ct(i')'>/iin/ out' anythiiiL:'. In this sunse we now tind in 
 most military writitiu's of note the woril "tactic^" usually i|Ualitied 
 hy some other W(>rd. for instance, iJattle 'i'actics, l-'irc Tactics, 
 Miirchine' Tactics, etc. meaniii^- the execution of, (tr methods 
 adopted for canyinu' out a l)attle. tire, mai'ches, etc., n'spectixely, 
 and it is in tliis wider sense that the word ""tactics" is used in the 
 title employee! to e\]>ress the suliject matter of this lectUl'e. 
 
 Oatlinr Di'ftcriitllon of n Mudcni. Jint/le. 
 
 The importance of the suhject of Infantry Fire Tactics will 
 perhaps lie liest uiiilerstood if we first consider for a moment what 
 a mod.ern hattle is.* Jn this term ""liattle" 1 do not mean a 
 guerilla .skirmish, or the tie-hting- that takes place in irregular 
 warfare, hut the comliat undei'taken l)etween two hiuhly organised 
 and trained forces, ai'iiied with modern weajions and >killei! in 
 tlu'ir use. I'^urther. we jiiust suppose that the tight takes place in 
 davliu'lit and in ordiiiarx" counti"\-. over which the adxance to the 
 attack can he seen, to a ct>rtaiii extent, liy the defenders. 
 
 I'lider such conditions the liattle is not a quickly decideij act. 
 On the contrary it cannot he too strongly rememhere(l that the 
 hattle is a long ili'awn out au'l Continuous act. in which 4 jieriods 
 can usually he distinguished, though they cannot always lie cleai'ly 
 si'parated. These periods are : 
 
 1. The Period of Recoiuiaissance. 
 
 2. The Period of Preparation or ]_)esti"uction. 
 .'>. The Period of Decision. 
 
 4. 'I'he l'erio(i of Completion or Retreat. 
 
 The Period of Reconnaissance is (haily urowiiiLr more and more 
 important as weapons improve. During this period tlie mounted 
 troops will dri\e in tlie enemy's advance<l troo])s, di-aw hi.s tire, and 
 a.scertain wliere his Hanks end. The drawing of the i-nemy's fire 
 is necessary to ascertain tlie disposition of his infantry anil 
 
 *The following remarks refer to army corps units and uiuier. 
 

 '1 l.\l.\.\TK\ I IkK TAL TICS 
 
 jiitillcry ill liis ficMit lini-. I)miiii;- this pciidil. whicli it iiuiy Ik- 
 jii'iic'iiiM^ to j)r<>lniin- until iil! the rt'iiorts of tin- niciiiy -^ jMisitinii 
 ami ili-<)Misit iiiii Imvm iDiiif in. tlif jinsitioiis I'or the aitillfry of tin- 
 attiick arr cliosni ;iiii| tlic raiiurs nn'asurt'il. 
 
 Wln'ii tlii'sc )'i>-,itii)iis have ln'cii cliosi'ii aii>l tin- artillny has 
 arrived aii<l is Irawii up ready to enter into the li^ht. then the 
 period of I'lejiaration or I )estru('ti(Mi eonmieiices. 'Thj^ )(i'e)»ar,ilion 
 is lie'^un h\ t he art illery eoniin^' into aetinii. ]>roteeted hy a small 
 portion of the infiinlry, and until tlii> )ire]iaratiiry artillei-y lii'e 
 has |»rodueed a considerahle I'tject, which it may taUe Minie hour- 
 to do in siinii' cases, it woidd he makiiiL;' a useless >acritiee to 
 attempt to pu>h forward the hulk <'l the infanti-y. Hut as the 
 artillery succeeifs in its uliject of ilestruction ^>\• pri'piirin'4 the wny. 
 the infantry and machiue-nuns are pushed forwaid until they c,in, 
 with their tire, lie^in to etl'ectively assist in the de--truction of the 
 enemy: this pushing; forward of the infantiy an<l niachine-uuns 
 will usually take place itfttr the enemy's jirtillery has iieeu sonie- 
 what suhdue(j and our own Liuns haxe heen turned on tlie enemy's 
 infantry. It may he assumed that dui'inu' this jieri..d of de>truc- 
 tion the attJW'kiiii;' line will arrive at a <li^tance pn-liidily ahout 
 (iOO yarils or less, from tlw defender's jMoitiiUi. It is espi'cially 
 during- this pei-iod that till' ( !. ( >. ('. must decide on the point of 
 assault and t;.. '•" direct the hulk of his i-eser\es. 
 
 The period 'rejiaration haxinLT heen conijtieted as judued hy 
 anv disordi-r i)earin!J' in the eueinv s ranks, or hv the lesseninti' 
 I'Hicacy of his tire, the oi'dei- is e;iven foi- the decision, "which is 
 then carried out with the greatest energy and celrrity. 'I'he tin' is 
 maintaineih h\it with as few and as short stoppages as possil.le. 
 Hayonets are lixeij, a ivipid tire is (hiixcreil at al)oiit IOO yariis 
 from the enemy for a few minutes, when the advance is souuiled and 
 the charu'e takes place over the last ■")() yards with chi-ers. hueles 
 soundiuL;'. drums heatini;'. colours tiviiiL;'. and ail tlie pomp anil dash 
 t of war. 
 
 Then follows tlu' final ))eriod of completiuL;' the xictoi'v oj- of 
 I'l'treat. into wdnch we need not enter more than tt» say that if the 
 pursuit Ci'iinot he taken up hy fresli troops, the retreating" enemy 
 should he suhjected to volley liriny' and not he followed Up reck- 
 lesslv hv disore'anised tro()i)s. who would lie e.isjlv checked, and 
 |)erhaps even routed, hy any organised and intact reserve.- the 
 enemy may still ))ossess. 
 
 Thus we see that a hattlo is a loni>- contiiuied act. and is chiitly 
 coniposed of n lone- drawn out destructive act or tire comhat, and 
 a short, sharp, (h'cisive act oi' close condiat. l)oth kinds of comhat 
 ai'e essential tlioUL;'h their r<'lative values nlti'r with the si/e anil 
 i|ualit\' of the condiatant forces. iSut time does not jiermit 
 of our iMiteriiie' into this important (|iicstion. nor as to how it 
 att'ects the fronts to he taken u)> hy ditfei'ent sized units foi- hotli 
 the fire and for the close cmnhats. lUit what I desire to inqu'ess 
 on yon i.s that tlic tire comhat or the ih^strnctive act is. or rathei* 
 may l»e, of considei'able tlnration. and that durine' its contiiuiance 
 it is necessai-y to make the very he<t use we can of our tii'e, 
 whether it lie artiller\-, nuichine-euu, or infantrx" tire. The ad- 
 
4 
 
 .1- 
 
 srilAKLK It) nil: < ANADIAN MII.UIA. 3 
 
 vaiK-e lit' thf filing liiu- <luriiin tlii> iiciioil iumv I"- tiii|Uiiitly 
 ilni-krd iiiid lln' tiiiii'f liiif t'NcM sway Itack u ai'U auil tnirtaitU 
 accolililiy as it reels tlie JiresMire of tlie elieiiiy - lire, nr is canie.l 
 tiiiwanl I'V the impulst's /iveii tt) it liy any t'resli ii'()n|i> sent iiitn 
 it t'roiii the rear. DuriiiLT lliis lire coiiiliat Ixith .siiles are trviiiir to 
 
 Wear ilitWIl thi- re>i>tillL;- aiel 'lestlUcti\ e jinWer if t he (i|)|iul|ellt. 
 
 l!<ith siih's M-ft ;^raii daily ijisur.faiiiseil ainl ileiiii)rali>i il. lait \ict<>ry 
 remains with the siile wliich, > { the ileeisioii, i.s least ilisnr^anixtl 
 an<l "leiiKH'aliseil. AinI tiiis ilisor^aiiisat ion aiiil i|eiiii.ralisatii>n is 
 eU'ectetl I ly lire alone. Hence we must coiisiilei- how liest toeniploy 
 thi.s tire, in oriler td yet the liest results with the least exjiendituri' 
 d' ammunition, which at such moment.^ is of pricele^^ \ alue nn 
 acciitnit of the jireseiit im|M)ssihility "f rejileni^hiu'^' in aileipiate 
 '|uantities. 
 
 This consideration we iiiclu'le under the name ol'_^/;v litfl'ifs. and 
 thoiiLjh this suhjeet is cajialile of many suhdi\ ision->, yit it is ni.t 
 |iro|M)>ed to ijeline them \ery closely, hecause in dealiie.^' with the 
 atiairs all'ectin'^ human nature there i> as much danger in too close 
 and tine detinitions as in no (hdinition-- at all. 
 
 Aeain it is ver\' essential in all i.iilitary niatt< i-- to consider //" 
 iiiiin, ' tlh- rsst' III till mini as Kmersun calls him. We must always 
 remendier that the valui' of ail weaj'on- lepends >>n the man usin^; 
 them, and the value of all method- of proceiiure de]iends on the 
 traiiuuL;' and discipline and characteristics dj' the men anil otlii-crs 
 who emjiloy them. And herein lies my diiliculty as leclurei-. lam 
 addre.ssinn' a, liody of ntlicers, who ciaiimand troop- wlio>e tiaininn 
 and diseipline i- ni/t and cannot he expected to cunie up to those of 
 Kuropean troops, who ai"c continuously luider arms and traiidni; 
 for a consideral'le tei-m of years. \Vc can expect and do expect 
 more from such troops than we have a riuht to exjuct from troops 
 like the Canadian .Militia, with their limited means of trunin;^'. • 
 We nuist always reniend'er that men ai-e controlled m ire liy 
 emotions and liahits than hy a mere knowledge of what they ouu'ht 
 to do, i.e., liy the truth. TraiiiinLT und discipline are powerful 
 means of overcominLf the inherent fear of death and pain and the 
 dislike of the fatieiies and discond'orts so inseparahle from war and 
 con.sei|nently of makiiiLi" men lietter tii^:htin:^' orLiaiiisms. and nmre 
 .'unenalile to control durinnr the denioi'alisin^' intlueiices of liattle 
 and of war treiieraliv. But the i)rolilem that faces everv oMicei- i>. 
 Hull- to be.^t iiKike llxe of the riU'loiU^ clciiifnis irlmh In' nl /lis Iniiiil 
 nil tilt' (1(1 If i)f hiiltJe ! The t/icoirf icdl liiU-t then L;i\e way to llu' 
 jn'iictlcdi. And in thus making' eoo,| use of the availaMe material 
 lies the test of a eoo,[ oiHcer. Tin.' fault of i.ur text hook- is 
 that they only consider the theoreticid inuterial and rarely the 
 actual material that l\as to lie made use of. The l-'reuch in JSTO- 
 71 had a far hetter ritle than the (lermatrs, and the Turks in I s77- 
 7^ had lietter rifles and artillery than the Russians, yet hoth the 
 French and the Turks were defeated, chiefly hccause tlieii- oppon- 
 ents nuide a hetter use of wliat they actually posses.-ed than did 
 tlu' French and Turks. Mere snjieriority of armament is not 
 
4 IM.WlkN I IKi; lACTR.s 
 
 c'ViTytliiMu', wliicli fact iimy aft"<»ii| soiiif rniiMdiition t" ('uiiudiHii 
 troops iinnt'il w itli tin Siii'lcr. 
 
 With tlii'sr |ir.'iiii>t'N w !■ ciui now inter into tin- siiliicct lift'inc 
 us tlii.s I'vciiiny;, niiiiiflv : How to nuiU»! the ln-.st u->f in luittlc of 
 tilt" tin: of the SniiliT Killf with which tlic (.'niuuliiin Militiii is 
 Mi'nicd ^ 
 
 h'sl i ladtinii (ij till iiijiH (tn<l Jidrksii/lit I'^li rut 'inns. 
 
 I»ut as it is necessary, in all cases, to know the ranm' in onjei- to 
 olttain an t tl'ective lire-, 1 will lirietly eniinierale the cjillereiit ways 
 in which the ranL(«j i-an he ascertaineij with more or 1.^-, aeciiracy: 
 
 I . I!y direct niea,-.nrenient. 
 
 i. I>y ranu'e-tiiulin'i in>trnnients. 
 
 .*}. \\y sni\ cyinL: instruments. 
 
 4. I»y compariuL: known heinhts. the di-tuuee of one uf them 
 
 from the (iliservi'r lieinn' known. 
 •"». Hy me;isurenients from ma[)s. 
 »!. |->y estimatini; hy sound. 
 7. \\y the jtractice of artillery near at hanij. 
 X. \\\ watehiuL:' the "strike" of the hullets. 
 !'. I)V estimatin;:- hv e\-e. 
 
 < )f thesi! methods the lirst can oidy >>e used hy the defence 
 liefore the arrival of the enemy; raiint' finders arc a^ yet only 
 suited for artillery purjiosi's: surveying' instruments can only he 
 used in stationary warfare, such as sie<fes ; the I'esults olitaineil liy 
 compai'inL,'' known hei^ht.s ai-e not \ ei-y reliahio ; ami maps of a 
 suitalile scale for nieasurinn' i-aniies on ai'e rarely availaMe. The 
 most pi'acticahle methods on the liattle field are the (ith, 7th, Sth, 
 and !»tli. l)Ut to estimate hy sound, we ha\-e to wait for the 
 enemy to ojien fire, and it is only suiteil to the commencement of 
 a fi^ht hefore iiuich firiuLi; takes |»lace ; from the rany'es foiuid hy 
 the artillery, we mustallow for tlu; distance of the infantry in front 
 of or in ivar of the artillery ami also for the distance hetween 
 the tari;vt Iieim^^ fired at hy the artillery ami the tari^^'t that. 
 the infautiT have to fii'e at. I»ut tins means of lindiuu- the i-aiiije 
 is onlv .suited to the moment when the infantry are ijassinsf 
 the artillery ijurini^ their ad\ance. "Picking' up the rnnije'' hy 
 watchiui;- tihe strike of the hullets should always he done, hut 
 this reipiires suitable yrountl for the hullets to fall on and oreat 
 care is reipiire(l in making' such oliservations for reasons to he 
 stated iiresentlv. In reality the only really availalile means hy 
 wdiich raUL^es can l)e estimate(l at all times is liy the eye. This, 
 however, reipiires much practice over varieil eround and under 
 dirt'erent conditions to ohtain e\en moderately good results. For 
 instance, the avi-rau'e errors of f ruined men are as follows: 
 
 At :^0() yards ,V,th^ 
 
 At (JOG yards ith - the estimated range. 
 
 At 1,200 yanls ,Uh I 
 
 This heing the case we must accept it as one of the factors we 
 have to deal with and make the necessary allowances for it. IIow 
 this can he done will he explained presently. But a very good 
 
 * 
 
te. 
 
 [ve 
 l>\v 
 
 m 
 
 I 
 
 nL'itaiilk to Tin: < \\.\i»ian miittia. o 
 
 I'Ustoiii may Inn- lie iinntioiitil. In tlir (ifi-ninii si-rvin-, tin- l>tst 
 '1 HUM at nui''t' tiiidiiiLT liv »'V<'. in ciu'li cniiMtaiU'. liavc tin* <lutv nl' 
 iriii'^^iiiM- til,. Duiifr ninl callini: nut tlifii- fvtimatf of it \i< tlif 
 ( 't»iii|uniy ( '(iimiuuiilfr iiitirtly tliniwii nu tlii'iii. Tlif (.'oiiipaiiy 
 C'oiiiMiuintcr tlu'M uses tlif inraii nl" tlif cstiiiiatt's as a lia>i,s t'oi' liis 
 onlci>. 
 
 WIh'M tilt' laiii^r is diici' known tliiii allnwanct-s iiiust In- iiiaiif 
 t'liraiiy niovmu'iits on mir or tlic cutniy s part. \U\i tin- laii^i- 
 li'-inij kiiowii, tin' iluty of tisosc looking al'tcr tlif iiifii ilot-s nut f ml 
 witli MrilfriiiLT tlif iiifn tn ailjnst tin- sliilc on tlu- Ipncksinlit to tlif 
 if.Lji'aNfil i;ra<luati>)ii fur that ran<:c and to scfiiiLT tliut tla-y ilo it 
 
 Tlif riflf is siiLjlitcil for a tfiii|ifratnri' of aliont ()() V., a liaro- 
 nifti'ic |MH's^nrt' of .'{() incln's. a still at nmsjilif i-f , ami a liori/untal liiif 
 of si^flit. If tin' tfiii]if tatni'f ami Iparoiii.'tric prfssnrc iliU'cr fmin 
 tlifsf (lata, tlif n tin- rani^c fora'4i\fii I'Mckvi^^rlit Mi-a'lnatioii altci-s ;* 
 an'l fuitlifr a lifad nr rfiir \vin<l will makf a laillct j^o fui'tlifi- or 
 fall >liort rts|ifOti\i|y, wliilr a siijc wind will drive tlif I'ullft to 
 oiif siilf. 'I'lii' lifatinL;' of thf ritif Karrrls and the coiiilition of tlif 
 fouliii'.^- in tlif I'arrfls will also lia\f tlifir ftl'fct on tin- projur 
 flt'vatiou to Iif used. So tliat wliatfNcr f If Nation is ordcrfd to l.f 
 iisfd. it must only lie lookfd on as an approximation to the trutli, 
 and tlif tiri must l.f carffully watclifd to sff if any coi-i-ection^ 
 arf rfi|uirfd to Ix- madf to tlif luicksiflit flf\ation ordered to Im- 
 u-fd. Kurtlif r. if tlif line of si^dit is inclined upwai'ds or down- 
 wards thf flfvations u>fd must lie Ifss tlian wlifii tlif liiif of si^lit 
 is lioi-i/,ontal. For instance with the Martini Henry riflf. if thf 
 line of sio'lit is inclinfil upwards 40 . Wf must usf thf ■')()() yards 
 flevatioii to hit an olijeet <»()() yanls away : and if thf liuf of ^i'.^lit 
 is incliiifd 40 downhill Wf must use a still lowti* flf\atioii. Thesf 
 statistics aif only ^iven lo illustratf the UfCfssity foi- otlicfr-^ to 
 watch thf fti'fct of thf fire of tlifir men carffully in ordfr to 
 correct, if UfCfssary, tin' haeksi^ht fle\ations hfitei nsfd. 
 
 T/i' K'il iif Uiuoiil rolh'il Fi re. 
 We have always to consider infantry tirf undfr two aspects, \i/.: 
 
 ((/) rncontrolled or imlfpt.'iidfnt lire. 
 (/>) Control!. '<] lire. 
 
 rvcoiit I'olh'il firl III/ takes ])lace when facli man chooses his own 
 target, his own elexation, his own rapidity of lirf. and liis own 
 times for opfuini;- and ceasing; tire, (yitiifrolh'il ji r! n;/ is tlic fxaot 
 converse o 
 
 f th 
 
 It is almost nee<lless to say that uncontrolled fjrf should he 
 ahsoluteh' iirohiliitcd, as it invariaMv leads to confusion, disurdfi', 
 and demoralisation, wliile causing' a waste of invalualih- amninni- 
 ti(»n at a period when it is impossihle to replenish it in sutHcient 
 (juantities to make up foi- the consum]>tion. Further, an uncon- 
 trolled lire in which each man chooses liis own olijfctive and hack- 
 sieht elevation, wlifU in a state of ureat moral excitement and 
 
 * As far as the atinosplicn' aloiu- is coiicci'iicd tlu- liullet kocs further l-KKKitli 
 jtart i)f tlie raiiuiMMifrravi'd (in the l)a('k siulit fur eacli 1 !•'. rise of tlie tlicrnKHiictcr 
 above (iO 1''. and ].") lOddths parts of llic range enp;rave(l on the liaeksijrlit for eacli 
 1 incli fall of tiic l)ar(mi('ter helow no inches : and rice irrsn. 
 
* 
 
 II INJANTKY 1 IKK TA« IK n 
 
 iiniitiil strain i-> \ryy iiiitlicficiiniN An iiiicnntiollf.l lire wlicii 
 iiiici' >turl''il iiihlti- ■'iicli cMii.litii.iis will |ir<>l.ali|y nut (•••hm' tiiitil 
 tin- last ruuii"! has Iki'M i'\|»»-iiilt'<l, aiul will mtv iir'-liaMy lia\f 
 
 1 II •lin-ctt'l I'mi- tin- must part uiMly intn tli<' air. 'i'lif ;,'rfat 
 
 fault 'it' all slmntiML; in tlir ti.lil. t^in'cially at the cImm r i'an;;ts, !«. 
 that it is tuij lii^ii. 
 
 I lldi liihuil FiiiiK/. 
 
 Thus coiilininLC "ur atti'iititiii to (•(iiitrollcij HrinLT alon.- \vr havi' 
 to ileal with it uii<lt'r twci ciiii'liliuns : 
 
 {ii ) Imliviiliial tiriiiL;'. 
 (/>) ( 'ollt'L'tivc liriiii:. 
 
 ( )!' thi'vf tWi) till' latter >ln)UM In- the U'eliiriil cjise ill liaftle ; till' 
 
 runner sliuuM unly lie ii^ed in the tiiial st;m('> uf l.at tie ami in suinc 
 -^peeial cases, lis uii oiitpust wurk. etc. r.iit as inili\i<lnal liriiii; at 
 all raii'^es is heM in such e^teoin thruuuliuiit t!ie w hule Imperial. 
 inchiiliiiL: in thi-. term the ('ulunial. I'urce.^. it is necessiir\' lu 
 tliuruuuhly unih'rs.tan'1 its capaliilitics. 
 
 'I'lie tirst tliin:^ I <lesire tu impress un 3'i'U, LTciitleiiK'n. is the 
 utterly false impression une is apt tu ;;ct of iii(li\i<lual tiring from 
 urdinary tartlet pnictiee, when tiring' a few runn<ls only u\er 
 nicasurt'ij ami knuwii rani,fes, with the result <'f each shut lieiii<^ 
 sieiialleil hack. I'nilersuch cuinlitiuiis the nearer we e-ct to the 
 tar^'et the hetti'i- is the .^huulin^•. Uut ill the liehl, raiij^es are not 
 known e.\actly. the enemy iloes not signal hack whether you have 
 iiiisst'(l him oi' liit him ahove or helow the point on him that yuii 
 uiiiiefl at ; the men are pruhalily tired fur w;iiit of sleep, pairhed 
 with thii'st, liunury \\>y want of fuud, and fatigued after a lonu- 
 iimrch uinler a hut sini. u\\r l>ad ruad.s, ur hy an advance hy rushes 
 under tire : if the ailvance has heeii rapid the men luse their hi'eath, 
 their chests hi;ave, tln-ir arms eet tire(| ajid the ritle cannut he lu-lil 
 steadilw esiieciallv if a wind is hluwini;', and when the men aiv 
 unnerved and excited hy the danifiT urisiiii,' from the tiie uf the 
 eiiemv. which impurtant cause uf disturhance is al\vav> ahseiit in 
 ptact- practice The nearer the t^nemy is approaclu'(| the ifreater 
 is the effect of this adveivse condition of things, added to which i.s 
 tilt; painful etlect of the recoil after 40 or 50 rounds have heen fired, 
 and the etlect of the disorder, demoralisation, and excitement which 
 occurs in all tightin<,' and danyiT. The mass of the men will, under 
 such oircumstances, foi'^fet to adjust their sights to the range ; they 
 will use a full furesiirht if they u.se any at all : they will prohahly 
 aim at the enemy's chest, and many will even dischari^e their 
 rifles from the hip. ( 'onset|Uently the lire is usually much too hi eh 
 and decrea.ses in efficacy as tin- range oets sliorter, wdiich is just the 
 opposite to what we find on the ordinar}" ranges. It is very im- 
 portant to rememher this, for it has fre(|Uently l)eeii oli,served that 
 when men tind that they apparently cainiot hit an exposed enemy 
 at wliat seems to be an easy range, they get discouraged after 2 
 or '} rounds and then fire wildly. One well-known French writer 
 asserts that in the field an average shot, will fire at an isolated 
 standing enemy, wlio is su})pose<l t<^ remain stationary, the follow- 
 ing numher of rounds to put him out of actit)n : 'i to (i rounds at 
 
 I 
 
m 
 
 I 
 
 Mll.MlM 111 1111. « AN,\l)|.\N MII.IIIN. < 
 
 ;i:!() vhkU; I(» U> II' nt 440 Mir-1> : 14 to hi at :»:»() yjinls ; mm. I 'M) 
 
 tn ;i !■ jit (ItlO ynriU. Aimtlnr l-'riiii-li uritif fstiimito fliiit tliiii' 
 tiiii)<< tlic aliuN«- aiiiounts nt' ainiiiuiiitioii ui'r I't'iiiiiiiil ai tlit- MtiiM* 
 raiiLTt'sI 
 
 llriitf it I> Vfi-y iiiii"irtaMt ii>'t 'Hily to rfiiu'iiil't r l)iit i:|s<' to 
 WMi'ti tlif iiicii iii)t t>> •'S|ii'tt \r\\ iittifii t'i'iitii titrir iii'liviihial tiff 
 ill fill' fit'ld, mill tliat tliiy ^liKiilij ii«pt I"' ili*«ciimiiL:ri| iv»ii l-v r, 
 
 .sci'ir> ul" misses. I'ivi'ii ,it tarjt't |irai'tici' a u; i >i 'i ii»ii\' iiiis> n 
 
 stiiiiiiiiiLf iiinii fit I'iiiil;.> u\rr 40(» yniiU athl yt-t In- sluupt ii.u' will. 
 
 Ilri'f 1 iiiu-t riiiiiinl yiMi aufiin. -ciitliincii, that wr must ii('«t|it 
 liiliiitiii iiatiiif a> Wf tiinl it aiiil iiiaki- tin- I'ot use if wliat '.\i' lia\f. 
 Tlir jirulilfiii. tliiTi'l'iiri'. is: Acfr|itiiiu' tin' t'ln'l ti.al iii<ii\ iihial tire 
 ill tlir li'l'l is, as a niii'. i'>|iirially at Iuml; raiii;rs, iiiarciiratr Imw 
 can wr ii'ijuri- tlii.'^ iiiai.'cMU:iry aiiij iii'«!-.ij the I'fst Use ui the lilt nl' 
 till' lri>i)|i-. :• 
 
 .Majin' Nlii-ij;, ut' the lla\ariaii aiiny. otiriTil u s(»lutinii to tliis 
 |triil'li-iii ill alioiit J.sT'i aii'l hi- suhitioii iiukIi' )ail'l'c in 1 s7^ was 
 aijojitiil tirst hy li .• ( iiTiiiaii ariiiy. aiiW thni ly <'\rry l'jirii|ii an 
 army, I'lit our ow n ////,,/... \Vi- arr 'jradualfy at|(>|it iiiL;' thc^c i.ii as. 
 \vlii"li I will now t'\|>laiii. 
 
 Ill thi' lirst |ilaci' to ri'ilii<'<' tlir iiiai-ciiracy of iiidix iiliial lirt' iis 
 imicli as jiossiMf. it must Iw cuiitiin'il to such rair.;'i's at which the 
 liiillrt ilois not ri-c more than tin' hei'^lit of ,'i man alio\r the line 
 ot' siyht. Thi* liiiiitiii'4 raiiue I'or the Sniilej' rille i>. uiiijcr such 
 coiiilitioiis, :!.")() yai-ils. Then hy Usinii' the :IIM) yarils hacksiirjit to 
 make u|i tor the .trect oi' thr full t'orcsii.fht wliicli the men '''// 
 always usi- in the tieM. and liy always aimiiiL; at the ruemys feet, he 
 will he hit somewhere SI) liiiiM as he is any where iiisid> of .'{.')( ) yards 
 distant. In this way the raii^e need imt he ^Miesseij imr the Imck- 
 .siuht.s touchi'd when the enemy is om-e within .'!')() yards. Sdiuc 
 writers advocate the use of the :2()(> and e\ en the 100 yar>!s cle\ ation 
 tlirout;'hout tliese slimt rani;e>, with low aimiiii;. to counteract the 
 well-known tendi'iicy to t;.e hiM-h. i s|iecially when men areexcited 
 
 Such !i lire is a ///'■';///'/ /'/', and is called a /'O o/' .■(■/7<//' //''//. 
 r-'lativcly of course, to disriiiiiuish it from tln' collective lire at 
 loiiLfer raui^es, of which we are to speak of jn-eseiitly. and w liicli is a 
 <h'i>/>i)i III/ li)'>' or a ///v "f /i iihnhil It i/. \\\ a i;'ra/.inL; lire wr do not 
 ri.'i|uire to know the rani;'! : lait it is e-sential to apjiroxiniately 
 know the rauLCe for a droi)j)inu- lire if wo desire e\en fair results. 
 
 Suhi/iri.stou of Rii}iiji'!<. 
 
 Hc^forc passing on to consider tlie characteristics of a collectiv e tiie 
 of prolialiility, we must refer to the siihill risimi uf I'n iniis which is 
 uow Usually accepted. These suhdivisions are as follows: 
 
 .-NUlKlt. 
 
 yil". 
 
 :}.")0 
 
 M. liKNKV. 
 
 400 
 SOO 
 
 1. S/nDi — up to extent of era/.iui;' tire 
 
 '2. Mediuin — from the short up to doul>le the 
 
 extreme .short rautfe . . . . 700 
 
 8. J.ong — from the medium u])to hiylicst graihi- 
 
 atiou of enemy's rifles, aliout .- - iTOO 170(> 
 
 4. Extreme — all ranges over the extreme ioni^- ranges. 
 
H 
 
 INIANTRY I IRK TACTICS 
 
 111 till' sIkii'I nuinrs, t'ontrollcil individual iiriiiiL,' i>i jiUoNviiliIe, 
 liccausf tlif tiiiM- has jiasscd tor coiiccnti'atini;- the tirt'on ]iarticulai' 
 jioiiits: thi'si- |Miints have already Imth iirfjiaifd for liciiii;- assaulted 
 iiy ha\iiii; heeii sul)je('ted to a heavy tire, and the assaultiiiy' troops- 
 have lieen directed on them, and eacli man has now to advance to 
 his direct IVoiit and fire at the eneiii\- imiiiediatelv in hi^ t'loiit. 
 
 m 
 
 ('I'llcclirc Fir/ ii;/. 
 
 IJut at ranges over the short ranu'es the mens tire must lie 
 directed on such jioints \vln'i'e the enemy s resistance is ;_Mt atest. 
 ami for this purpose a ('((/*(r//^/vr/rJ co/ZrcZ/rr ///r must In- employed. 
 Suppose that the statement is correct that in the lield a man lia> 
 to tiri' ."{() shots .-it ()()(/ yards to hit an upriuht enemy. In making 
 this atatemeiit we have to further suppose that the enemy will 
 stand still to he tired at, which, however, he will not do: >o that 
 the soldier, if lie misses in his liist shot, will not have the op|)or- 
 tuiiity of tiriuLT his ,'i() rounds. To overcome tiiis ditiieiilty we ''an 
 make .■{() men tire at the enemy and then one or more i-> ^uie to hit. 
 Another advantaife is (jained in so doiuLT, nanu l\' : That when one 
 man fires .SO rounds, half his aminunition sn]tply is uone and he has 
 taken some time to i\o this, whereas if ^^0 men tire, they have only 
 expi'iidid OIK! rotnid each, and have ohtaiiied the doired result at 
 once. This is the jirinciple involved in eoncenti'a^inij: collective 
 firiiiLf on certain stated olij"cti\'es. It is very important to reniem- 
 lier this ])rinciple, esjiecially in ii-renular warfare, when, as so often 
 ha]i]iens, the enemy aiv; indiviilually hetter shots than our own men. 
 The peculiar cliaracteristic of this kind of fire is that it co\ers a 
 helt of >;'round at least 100 yanls in depth on hoi-ixontal ni'ouml 
 with drop[)iny laillets. The mass of the Imllets tired (70 ])ercent,^, 
 fall within this hcatrn -.(nic, as it is called, of 100 yards in de]>th 
 on a horizontal surface. This hoMs t'or all ranu'es heyond the 
 sliort ranges. The cause of this s])reail of Imllets is due to the 
 f ;(■! Oiat different men will not adjust their l.acksi^'hts to the same 
 p(.':;i v''l not use the same amotnit of foresiLi'ht. and will not keep 
 t^ ')■ .-s- i.iits uin-iLrlit: some will jerk tlie tri^irer. otiiers will not 
 iiUM' their ritles steady at the instant of dischar^i'. (>tc. It is on 
 a.\-ri '\\.\ •>♦' tins longitudinal spread of the Imllets that a collective 
 !ii> at tlie loi'e-er raui^'cs is called a jlrr nf pri>h(ihi(lf>j ; theolijectis 
 tu so cover the eTound on which the enemy is with laillets. as to 
 make it iirohahle that some of the Imllets will take etiect. The 
 etiicacy of such a collective tire, sup]>osinLj it well placed, depends 
 on the draj) of the Imllet measured with reference to the line of 
 sie'ht. The less the dro]i the hetter the etiect of tlie fire, and as 
 the dro)-) decreases as the ivuii^'e decreases, a collective tire also 
 rapidly increases in etHcacy as the raiiLi'e ilecreases. 
 
 The (lanrjerous innr of a oollecti\e tire is the heaten zone (ahout 
 100 yards on horizontal u'round)/)/('.s' th(^ nra/.ed /one of th(> t»ullets 
 falline- at the end of the lieaten /one nearest the firei'. This u'razed 
 zone is the distance over which tl;e laillet remains under the 
 heiirht of the tare-et ahove the ground on which the target stands. 
 
 [f the heaten grouml slopes upwards with reference to the lin<^ 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 I 
 
* 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 SUITABLI". TO TIIK <ANAI)IAN MIMTIA. 
 
 9 
 
 of >in'lit, tin.' fxtciit of licutni fiinl (laiinci-uus /ones arc (iiiiiiiii--lii'il : 
 liiit if tlu' lifiiti'ii ui'oiiii'l slopes ijow iiwiinls witli I'CLTanl to tlif liii'- 
 of siijlit, till* ix.'fttoii aiiil <lanLr«'i"<"ns /ones art' oftrii "Tfath" iiicn ast.l 
 For this latter I'eason the reserve troops of the ilefellCe slmuld \)v 
 ki'pt well in rear of tlie tiriiin' line at the early sta^rt's of the fiuht. 
 and close up to them at the lalter sta;j;es, whieh is a favorahle coii- 
 • lition for the ilefence. 
 
 Further, it must neVfi- he fnrti'otten that in eollective lirinu'. us 
 in all kiiulsof tii'in^, a careful watch iiiu--t lie maije as to the cti'rct^ 
 of the tire so as either to stop it if no ctlects are Iteini:' proiluccil 
 which only <le])resses the men and elates the enemy, or to ((.n'cct tlic 
 eIe\ations used if necessary, for atmospheric conditions, the inclin- 
 ation of the line of si<;iit, and the slojie ■•!" the l.caten L;)'oun<l. and 
 for the una\ oidalile ei-rors maile in judiiinL;' the raiiui'.all of which 
 atl'ect the tire and the pi'oper elevation to lie rsed. 
 
 On accomit of the lonij'itudinal spi-ead of the l.ullets in a collective 
 tiro, We must be N'cry careful not to he ndsled in watching the -trike 
 of the hullets. \W' mu>t reiiieiidier that e\ en thou^^h many of the 
 liullets fall sh(^rt yet the (ii-e niay he well directed. If eithei' >ide i- 
 •stationary, or if the ranges are i-apidly decreasing' from either side 
 ailvaneinu". it is hettei- for a tire to fall rather short of than i-ather 
 
 over the tar^'et, i'ol' in the fiiniier case W(! i;-et the lielietit of lico- 
 
 chetiiiLT ladlets. which ai'e lost when the mass (if the hullets pas^ 
 ovc)' the tai'e'et. if the ranges are I'apidly increasiuLf. oxcrsiirht 
 for the supposed rane'e^. 
 
 Sometimes it is neci"-s;iry to co\ei' a eiTater /one than 100 yaiils 
 with hullets. This is done liy making- half the men tire with an 
 elevation for oO yards under the sup|iose>l rane'e, and the nther 
 half with an elevation for oO yards over the supposed I'an^e. In 
 this way a /.one of 200 yards is co\ered with hullets. Hut at ' ast 
 a whole company should he used in this way sd as to U'et a result 
 as I'ajiidly as possihle, hecause proloneed hi'iuL;' ouuht always to he 
 avoiiled when possilile from the had etlect it has on the men in 
 reducine- their oHeusive spirit. A hold use of men and an n nun it ion is 
 always a <:;ood policy when once thi'tii-e is etl'ecti\e. lint as khc/i <i 
 Id^c of Conih'i lU'il I'lcrdt lini.^ nicniis n jimporf Itiinifrli/ ijruit cinisii iiij>- 
 iloii. of rdbiiible (iiinnuiiiflon. It shuui I onli/ lie iifo'il h-Jk h l/icir is 
 ample ammuvitlirii, ir/ien (hf t'nerii_, oftfrii <i (jainl fari/el. ■'lien thf 
 
 range is imf (WCai'dtchl I'IP^'I'h, "'h<'H i '' side is in inorcnirnt ,ii ml 
 )r/t(n) till' atiliosp/wric i Dtf I" itC's aihl tlir slojirs < if t //(• f/ roll. ii il lirtir 
 
 tha ciu'iii// (ivc not favorahle. aial fin' strilr of the Inillits eon not hi' 
 ohserreil. Further, such a use of comhined siehts is only [lossihle 
 at the loiaj and at the Ioniser of the meiHuhi ranui'^^ while men are 
 sufficiently under control for the pui'pose. 
 
 Hut in all cases it camiot he too sti'oiie-ly im]ii'e^s;i| on l.oth 
 orticei's and nuni that as the range increases (e\-en when oidy one 
 elevation is heine- used), the amount of annnunition e.xpendeil ha-^ 
 also to he <,n'eatly increased in order to L,^et the same results in the 
 same time, and if more than one elevation is used a )U-oji<irtionate 
 amount of annnunition must he used. 
 

 10 
 
 IXIANTk\ FIkE TACTK S 
 
 TIh- (Jiif'slii)ii of LiiiKf H(in;jr Flrln;j. 
 
 Hut iiiucli liii> lircii saiil for ami ai-ainst loiii;' i'aii<ft' tiriuo-. No 
 • luiilit lonij- ranijt' tiiiiii'' liiis iK'Vrr i>i-o<luetil aiiv dtcisive ii'.sults 
 m war. tlioiinli it may have produci'il fxt'ellcnt n'sults in sprcial 
 (.•ast's. X'ictorv is ileciilrd at the s/nirf riun^cs, l»ut it is jiivparcil for 
 ill till' iiicilinni. raiii^L's. Hence these are the important ones. 
 Loni;- lanu'e firing' to he efi'ectivt' reijuires a ]ar>j;c consumption of 
 ammuiiition aii<l a prolon<^e<l concentration of Hre. iJnt this pro- 
 loni^id tiriiiijf takes awa}' from the ott'ensive spirit of the men. 
 Hut ii-ltirc thi'fc is (iiu/)h' tiviiiiiinitioii, ii'/ilch can he nisilij rc- 
 j)/eius/it'tl. hihI iftlic I'diKjcs are Iciioii'n or tin- eftrcts of f lie fire con 
 he ohserveil, if llie dt mosphet-ic coinfil ion a lol f/ie slopes of the t/roK lul 
 of reception are not too uiifKrornh/e, if tin- ohjecf fired (if is of 
 saiti(hle (limensions espceialli/ OS rr(/<i I'ds (/rpf/i. mid if t/o' jire is 
 e.recuted h'/ f roups sjtt'ciidli/ delnil'd for the j^mrims)'. there is no 
 rea.son why tlie lonj;' ran^ini;' power of nKxlern rifles may not lie 
 ju'licionslv and cautiouslv indid<ied in as a treat. IJut it shouM 
 he stoj)i)ed if, after some minntes, no results are ol).serve(l from its 
 use. and it should never he permitteil without tlie consent of the 
 senior oMicer within reach. 
 
 Fii 
 
 e. 
 
 The Jfi rret nut. Coidrol mid Uisci pi i n 
 
 We now come perhaps to the most imixiftant of oursuhject, 
 
 — the dirrctioii of, the eoidrol of, and the iliseip m. \ uiretl for 
 modern infantry iive. The dutf/ of direefinn die jt ■", falls on the 
 company leaders and otlicers senior to them : thedidy jf t\<tdrol/i u;/ 
 the lire falls on the junior otHcersand the N. < '. Os. ; the diseipH lo' 
 I'eipiired to t-nahle this ilirection and control to he carried out rests 
 with the nu-n. 
 
 A (jooil lire dit^cipUne is ohtained when the soldiers will not fire 
 until ordori'(l, ntjr when in motioii, when they will only tire at tlu^ 
 oliject nametl and with th(,' elevation ordered, and when they will 
 cease Hrin^' wlien ordereil. Simple as tliese re<piirements are, yet 
 they can only he attained by a careful peace trainiiit;. 
 
 T/w coid)-ol of the jiriivj consists in impartinu' to the men the 
 or(h'rs e;iven hy the company and hi;j,'lier ccjiiiiiianders, and in seeint;' 
 that these' orders are obeyed and even in enforcing their execution. 
 
 Thi' direction, of the ji re consists in determining', at each moment 
 of the tii^lit, (1 ) the ojieninjr and the ceasiui.;' of the Hre; (2) the 
 amount of ammunition to be expended at each moment to attain the 
 object ill \ iew, takine- into account the available supply of ammuni- 
 tion and the facilities for replenishing; it : (8) the number of men 
 re(|uired in thi- tiring line to expend this ammunition in the desired 
 time: (4) the selection of the olijects to be tireil on, and their allot- 
 ment to dirt'erent portions of the tiring line; (')) the I'ange and 
 ele\ation and number of elevations to be used; ((i) the observation 
 of the results of the fire: (7) the kiml of tire to be used; (S) the 
 rapidity of the tire: (9) the moments of advancing an<l halting; 
 (10) the attitu<les of the men during each halt; (11) the moment for 
 fixing bayonets: and (12) the replenishing of the expended ammu- 
 nition, etc. 
 
 i 
 
- 1 
 
 ( 
 
 SUIT. Mil. F. TO THE CANAltlAN MILITIA. 
 
 11 
 
 SiiiiK'ot' tlii'sc |)uints liiivf alrt'Uily iM'fii tuucln'il on, anil so I 
 shall contint' my remarks lirii-tly to siifli fioiiits as liavr not ain'Uily 
 
 lii'fM I'ft'flTi'il to. 
 
 (1). With r.'i^ar'l t*) lln' <listiinci >< nl. ii'/iirh inj'ii iil ri/ ji re ii(ii;/l»' 
 ojii, It'll ill hiiltli' \uii\i-v normal foiiditioiis. thr tollowin^' may ht- 
 sai<l : 
 
 /// f/ic (ittdck, a |)i-t'maini'f o|)i'nin^' ot" tire only lrn,L,'tht'n.> out the 
 tiL;ht. iliniinishcs the oti'msivc spirit, and may cause an exliaustion 
 of the ammunition when the closer jnul more inqtortant ran,ijes are 
 reache(l at which the hattle is ilecided. 'I'he French (jefemlini;- the 
 \illage of St. Privat. which foi-meil the French i-ie'!jt at the liattle of 
 (iravelotte (l.Sth Xwj,., IN?*)), had to retire liefore the (ierman 
 assault for want of annnunition, althoueh they hail practically 
 annihilated l>y infantry tii-e a ))i'evious assault on the same village. 
 Hence the attack should try and eet as close to the enemy as 
 possible liefore opening tire, that is as close as possilde without 
 sufferi!l^^ uinhi.e losses. liut even in o])en counti'y, lire shouhl not 
 he opened in a <^feneral manner hy the attack until the medium 
 rauLjes are I'l.'ached. at all events for troojjs armed with the Snider 
 rifle and carryiuLj the \ery limited supplies of annnunition which 
 heavy ammunition entails. 
 
 I ii till' (.b'fi'ucc, howe\fr, lire may he a(l\antae,'eously opened at 
 the /"/*// rani;-es, esjtecially if the conditions for etiective long ran <^e 
 tii"e are ]ll•e-^ent. The defenders wonld. f)r should, always know 
 the rangi's of various jiromineiit olijects m front of them !in<l they 
 ha\e, as a rule, eiiod opportunities for oliSL-rving the effect of the tii'e. 
 
 But in tenniorisinu- actions or in false attacks, tiro mav lieopenci 
 at long ranges: also if tlu-re is no artillery or if the aitillery ;irm 
 is Weak, iiifantry may o])en at longer i-anges than usual to prepare 
 the way for its own attack : l>ut in this case a large supply of 
 amnuinition should he provided and special ti'oops detailed for the 
 long range tiring. 
 
 But it must never he forgotten that as a rule too nuich is ex- 
 pected of infantry tire. Always remeiidx'i- that nt 'ill runijcssover 
 IliC short VdtK/es, epicdCi/ i>J jrrr rd il mily In- uhfdi iicil lii/ d rcldtirili/ 
 lniii/-ci>iitl niu'il Colled ice tire Couce at rated mi nh/ecti rpf< f^jiecnilli/ 
 selecteil on dccoant of tfieir ufr'ensire or ilefensire importance at 
 the inohient. 
 
 (2,.'}). As regards the amount of amnuinition to he e\]iended 
 and thenvniiher of men to h<' employed in the tirii;g line to expend 
 it in a reasonahle time, wt^ must remendier that the moral etie( t 
 of losses inflicted on an enemy is greater, as these lo.sses are more 
 (luicklv inflicted. This is oiu,' reason for eniphiving as manv men 
 as possible. On the other hand we must not have so many men 
 exposed as to cause tuidue exposure to and losses from the enemy s 
 tire, ant'd the effective ranges are reached. When such )-anges are 
 reached, we must seek to avoid losses not by mere formations, l>ut 
 by the destruction ami demonilisation of the enemy. At this 
 period of the tight, boidn(?ss and not caution is real prudence. When 
 long range fire is indulgeil in, as inany men as pos.sible should take 
 part in it to arrive as i'aj)idly as possible at the desired result. 
 
 (4). As regards the choice of objectives, it is very necessary to 
 
12 
 
 INl'ANTKV FIRK T.\( TK S 
 
 reineinlM'r that in tht; luiii;- and ine<liuni ranf,'es the tire of larije 
 portions of thu fii-inii' line shoiilil I)0 dircctfl on cfi'tain .statfil 
 targets, and that each man shonld not tie ullowcil to fire at a separ- 
 ate tarti'et. 
 
 Thi' ditlieulty lies in the selection i>f tlie oltjccts to hi- Hred at 
 and in ap[)ortioninLr the diti'i-runt oltjects si-lcctcd tt> ditierent parts 
 of the fil•in^• line. Thr means of cHectinij this latter point we shall 
 deal with presently. But the general rule for the choice of 
 olijectives at any j^nven moment is to choose such parts of the 
 l('iid!ii<f portions of such fractions of the enemy's troops as are the 
 most dany-er(jus for the time lieini;-, I.e., which for the time heiiiLj 
 constitute the chief ilani,'er to lie "guarded ai^^ainst. The most 
 advanced portions of the (Miemy are as a rule the most daiiiferous, 
 as they draw the other portions after them. Hence they should 
 he crushed. A freipicnt chaiit,a' of the ohjectives .scatters the fire, so 
 when you have chosen an<jli)ective,fire on it initil you havt; destroyed 
 it, or at least paralysj<l its action, for some tim<\ Choose for pre- 
 fei'i.'uce olijectives in front of your own men before selectiuLi' others 
 to the right ov left in orilei' to assist tlx- advance of ii iehlioi-- 
 ine- troops. If th(; enemy's leadiuf,' line is checked or offers a had 
 tare-et, then choose suitahle olijectives to the right or loft or in rear 
 of his leading line. In cases of douht choose as targets tlmse 
 olijects which can he most easily hit. Ihit as a rule the usual 
 mark to aiui at is the smoke of the enemy's rifles ;uid artillery. 
 In choosing ohjectives we must let the (|Uestion of range (involving 
 effect of tire and errors f)f estimation of range). atmos|(hta-ic condi- 
 tions, sIop(,'S of grcnmd, etc, have their full weight. The ofHcer 
 commanding the firing line app(n"tions the targets to the different 
 parts of the firing- line during the pauses in the fii'e (see page 14). 
 
 (.')). As regards the range and elevations and nnmher of 
 elevations to lie useil, much has nlread}' heen saiil. hut it cainiot 
 he tot) strongly remeudiered that the efKcacy of all fire de])ends 
 more on the range lieing known than on the indixidual skill of the 
 men in firing. The worst shot nia}' hit if the range is known, hut 
 the hest shot will not hit if the' raiige is wrongly estimattfl. Heiic(; 
 the value of carefully watching the effects of the fire, and of making 
 any suitahle corrections to the elevations employed. 
 
 Tlu' effects of the inclination of the line of sight and of atmos- 
 pheric conditions must not he forgotten in oi-deringthe elevation to 
 he us(m1. 
 
 In cases of douht use too low than too high elevations. If either 
 side is advancing, always undersight for the supposed range, ami 
 only alter vour elevations hv at least 100 yards at a time. 
 
 Against charging cavalry, only use the 400 yards elevation and 
 aim at the hoofs of the hoivses. 
 
 ()). As regarils the observation of the tii-e. we must reniendier 
 that in a well-directed fire half the bullets will fall short, and 
 conse(iuently the dust jiroduced by bullets 50 to 70 yards in 
 advance of theoliject is not a proof that the fire is too short, though 
 no dust //; <i fdviirahlc soil for ohf^''i'>'(itlon is a certain indication 
 that the fi.3 is too long. If you are to one side of the men firing, 
 say on the right of thetn. then a too shoi-t fire will appear to fall fo 
 
 I 
 
f 
 
 SUITAI'.I.K TO IIIK ( ANADIAN MILITIA. 
 
 13 
 
 the k'ft of tliL' mark, ami a too loiifj tire to the riijlit of it, cvm if its 
 "iircction is Lfijod. This fact imi>t h,. earffully reineniberiMl. 
 
 With n-t^ard to cstiiuatiiiL;' the raiiijes, the (Jei'iiian jiractice of 
 ■ raiii^e fi.nliii^' s(|ua(ls"' is worthy of imitation. 
 
 (7). 'I'he (|Uestion of the kind of tire to he used is of \try ^reat 
 iinportaiice, for it is ijreatly aHt'ctrd l.y considerations of lunnan 
 n.itnre and of the means nf handling' trooj)s under tii'e. Then- are 
 t\\(j kinds of controlled tire : 
 
 1. Individual tire. 
 
 .) / < n ^- /• \ <i. Volley Hriu"'. 
 
 2. ( ollective hre. , ,, ► . . 
 
 I h. .M;iss tirini;'. 
 
 I'neontrollcd tii-c will eonu' of its own accord when the moral 
 and mrntal strain of hattlf Incomes too ^rcat foi- control. 
 Ht-ncf it need never he ordei'ed. Hvei-y eH'ort. iieh-ed, should he 
 maile to avoid .such tirini,'. We lia\e only to deal with controlled 
 tirinir, and we can control collective fii'ine' cither hy eniplo\-ine' 
 volleys, or hy em])loyine' mass Hrini;- (which i> rc-dly only a moi-e 
 l)erfectly controlled individual tiring than the individual lirine- w.. 
 have already co!isidei'e(l) of ;i limiteil nund.ier of rounds (4 at the 
 most), when the tin; must cease until ordered to he renewed after a 
 slii;ht pause. 
 
 In individual firini;- the trin'j^er is pressed directly the alieinncnt 
 is ohtained ; in volley firinif tlie alietniient, when ohtained, has to 
 he maintaineil until the order to tire is eiven. As this is not easy 
 to do. and as some men ai-e. more oi- less, disturhed hy heariiiL;- tin- 
 sudden command to tire, the result is that in ])eace expei'imeiits 
 • leliherate indi\idual tii'ing has always ^'ixen lietter results than 
 \«»lley tirine-. 'J'he ad\()cates of xolley fii'in^- say, that though this 
 is the case on the practice rani,'e. 3'et the reverse will he tlie case 
 on th(! hattle tield, foi- the men will he kept in hand hetter when 
 volleys are tired. Here is a delicate (piestion of human natui'e. 
 My own impression is that it reipiires hi^-hly disciplined troo[)s to 
 use volleys under an etlective lii'e, for duriuL; the fre(|uent pau.ses 
 they will hear the enemy's hulletsaml the sound of his tire, Avliereas 
 ii.Mli\idual tirinu', hy making- a continuous noise, prevents this. 
 Further, volley tirine- at even me(lium ram^e n-quirc^s more control 
 than can he expected from any liut hi:;'hly traineil troops. 
 
 Volleys should only he Hreil l)y conqianies in close order, oi- half 
 companies in rank entire, or sections in open order. Other units 
 are too lari^e for the purpose. 
 
 Other advantages are claimed f(M' \olleys, such as economy 
 of anuuunition. facility for chaneine- oiiji-ctives and ele\-ations, 
 e-;pecially when the target is charginn- civalry, etc. Ihit these 
 advantae-es can l»e equally claimed for inass tirine- conducted on 
 the lines to he presently indicated. 
 
 Now volley tiring, however good in theory, requires for its 
 execution the maintenance of the organic units. Hence volleys 
 are only practicable .so long as these unit.s are maintained intact, 
 which will only occur when clos( order fornations an; used (as in 
 savage "warfare), or so long as the enemy's tiie has not necessitated 
 heavy reinforcing. But when the organic urits have Ijeen hroken 
 up hy losses or have been nrixed up by an ailvance under tire oi- 
 
14 
 
 INI ANTRV MKi; TACTICS 
 
 * 
 
 ()V«.'r roUifli LTrniinil or l>y lifuvy i-ciiifoiciiiif, tht-n volleys ceusotolie 
 praetioililf t'oi* ordinary ti'oops uiul bcconnj v».'ry ditliL'ult tocxceutu 
 with liiLjlily trrtiiiL'd troo|is. 
 
 CoiistMiuciitlv \dllr\- tiriiiL:' should lie contincd to the loiisjcr 
 rani.>-('s licfon' the oi'MHiiic units an; niixi'd or hrokcii up. ludi'cd 
 tlu'V an- fssciitial at >ucli raii^t's to fuulilc tlit- fti'cct of tiie lire to 
 lie i>n)pfrly watcht'd ami the tlcvations corrrctcd if nccussary. 
 I Jut afti-r u whih,' when volk'Vs arc no lontier possilpli", mass tii'iiii"' 
 must lit; rosf)rtt'd to. Many (ifrman wi-itcrs will not vwm rt-jy on 
 tilt' nuMi stopping tlir tiring' of tln-ir own accoi'd aftci' :} or 4r(annls. 
 Itut i-cly on the use <>[' a sln'ill whistlt; for this purjiosc. an instru- 
 iM"iit which cvciT oflic(.'r and X. ('. ( ). should ciii .and on the 
 sound of which every man should he trained to cease liriny. 'I'liis 
 I would advocate for the ('anadiiin Militia. 
 
 Now to .secure the w'leatest elHcacv of tire one very important 
 detail must never lie forgotten. To a\ (jid a multiplicity of esti- 
 mates of the same ranee and to avcad adjacent sections tirine- with 
 Very ditl'erent elevations, which has often happene(l, /Ar /r/'/z/r/ /ir.r 
 nf f'licli l>att<illnv hiV.st hi' Uiulcr <i (l/sflncf coDUini ihlcf (one of the 
 jield ojjirrrs of tli«' huttdlluH.) dinl (Usllnct iidilsfs mAist hr iixdle 
 noil' II 11(1 till' I) ill till' I'li'iiii] iiluiig II n-'iilc front, t/uil of u Ixitlnlion 
 III li'ii.st. This pause can he easily otitainecl liy traininu'. l.y the 
 use of the whistle, and liy the exertions of all the otlicei-s and 
 N. C. ()s. in the tirini;- line. During- these pauses the smoke will 
 he allowed to clear away, ohjectixes can he chosen and naimd 
 anil apportioneil to different [)ortions of the tii-in^' line, the 
 raUL^'es decided on hy the raULje-fiiidin^ sipiads, and any necessary 
 alterations made in the (devations used, or the tire stopped for good. 
 or tln' men made to advance. These distinct ])auses on a wide 
 front are reipiired even in volhy tirine-. ami too nuich stress can- 
 not he laid on tlu'm, for without them it is im])ossihli;' to maintain 
 a proper control over the i\\\- to usefully direct it. In this way alone 
 can an united action hetween all the ])arts of the tii'iny- line lie en- 
 sured, and only in this way also can we employ company and even 
 half hattalion volleys, evi'U when the smaller units are mixed up, 
 for the })urpose of "pickini,^ u]) the rano'e,"* or for stea<lyini;' the men 
 if they are gettiuL; excited. The j^avatest stress must he laid on 
 haviiijjj a distinct otHcer conunandini;- the tirini;' line, anrl on these 
 rey'ular distinct pauses in the tii'e over a wi(k» front durino- any 
 kind of tirine', if a control over the tire is to he maintained. 
 
 Thus, as a i-ule, vollcN'fii'ini,' is hetter adapted to the defence than 
 to tlie attack and to lonij rane(- tirinn-, while mass firing is best 
 suited to the medium and short ranges wlien so nmch reinforcing 
 has taken place that the units liave got mixed up. This nuiss tiring 
 seems to he in complet*^ accordance with the I'djuirements of battle 
 in those periods when organic luiits have ceased to exist as such 
 and when reinforcement are being boldly pushed into the tiring 
 lines to drive it forward. By making use of it the men will tire 
 more naturally and more etiectivelv an<l will be less afi'ected Itythe 
 
 *Volleys are rennired for piekinp \\\^ the Vcaiifje by watcliing the strike of the 
 bullets. Volleys .sliould also lie usedatiaiiist a rotreatingeneiny after his j)08ition 
 has been carried. 
 
* 
 
 SUITAilM. TO THE ( ANAI»IAN MII.ITIA. 
 
 !.■) 
 
 i 
 
 • listurl)in<^f sounds of lijitth.-, aii'l it is iiujst ]in»l»fil)K' tliat tlir cnu- 
 trol (.f tlio iiit-'U will 111- less (litlicult. iiroviilfl rt'uiilur distiiut 
 pauses ill the tire iire iiunle after e\ei-y iVw roiimls. 
 
 Mass Hriiifj; reciuires just as mucli ti'ainini; and ]iractice as \olley 
 firing; to obtain good I'esults. We uainrnt lay tco i^reat stress mi 
 the iiiijiortance i>f liahit and custom. Men must he aocustdiiied in 
 jieace time to the use of mass tiring-, if we de.'iijv to make use of it 
 in war. 
 
 (S). As rt'umrds the ra]iidity of lire, a slow rire (1 round a 
 minute) should ho maintaineil against had tar{j;cts and a (juick Hre 
 (4 to ') rounds a minute) against L^ood targets. ;\\>() the shorter the 
 I'ani^e the more I'apid should the tire he. I'lUt it must lie eare- 
 fully I'eniemiieiM.Ml that i|uic'k tiring' must only I'e nhtaiiied hy </(/ /(.•/,• 
 liitnlini/ and not iiierelv li\' hastv aimin''. 
 
 It should also he reiiieiidiei'ed that in the \n\\>^ and meilium 
 I'annes accui'acy of tire is ninie essential than rajiidity of fire. 
 
 direful ii'niiiiKj <i ml ji ri h;/ ii rr r('(/ul I'fil far <iH fi ri in/ i ii urili'i-li) 
 (/('f giioil rcsa/fs. Rapid tirinu' u'ained ''V nipid aiminn'hasa \ery had 
 eti'ect on the men and leads to loss of control and waste of ammuni- 
 tion, while it soon creates a thick cloud of smoke, which ]ii'e\ eiits 
 proper aiin heiny- taken. 
 
 (!)). The moments of advanciiiu' and halting must he left to the 
 judgment of the senior officers in the tiring line. As a rougli rule 
 it may he said that, when advancing hy altei'iiate rushes, at each 
 halt the men after adjusting their sights to the new range should 
 he allowt^l to fire l] roinids. It will then he tfme to ad\ance again. 
 
 ( 10). As regards the attitudes of tlie men, tliey should lie down at 
 the longer ranges, and then as the ranges decrea>etliey >uld kneel, 
 and finally at tiie shorter ranges stand. If they are allowed to lie 
 down at the shorter ranges it will take' away from the vigor of tlu; 
 attack and it is hard to make the men get up again. .Material losses 
 are not the only losses to he considered, — hxss of mural is even 
 more important. Further, when the men are hreathing hai'd for 
 want of hreath the lying down jiosition is a had one for good 
 firing, and long grass and small foMs in the ground will prexcnt 
 a recumhent man from seeing the enemy. 
 
 (11), Bavonets should he fixed at ahout .SOO yards from the 
 enemy fi'om the moral effect produced hy .so doinu'. The men 
 should he taught and thoroughly impressed witli the idea tliat the 
 fi.xinu' of bayonets is a simi that it is safer to go on than to retire 
 over the tire sweiituround over which the\' have already advanced. 
 
 (12). The (|Uestion of replenishing the ammunition that lias been 
 expended cannot well lie entered into here. It is a suliject which is 
 large enough to form the subject of a separate lectin-e : but it may 
 1)6 remarked that the re|)lenishing of expemled ammunition to any 
 considei'able extent under an effective fire is considered to be so 
 ditHcult that nearly every military writer of note insists on the 
 necessity of the men beinu' u'iven all the ammunition they may 
 reiiuiiv before they are sent into action. Conseiiuently the lea<lin<'- 
 troops should have from loO to 200 rounds per man, while those 
 intended for the assault nee(l only have .')0 to 70 rounds per man on 
 their persons. 
 
10 
 
 TACTICS SL'ITAIiLK TO THE CANADIAN MILITIA. 
 
 Concladii);/ RemdA-x. 
 
 I must now, nfiitK'iiK'ii, draw my rt-mjirks to ii close. J liiiv(( 
 • •iiilravi>rc(l to ])lfK't' liclort! yc^u us ,siiij|i|y uinl {•()ncis(.'ly us i coiiM 
 till! vitally important sultjcct of hoiv fit lankr fitehesf aseof riff e fire 
 i II till' fu'iil. I have i)t)iiiti'il out to you the nature of modi-ni liyhtiiiLj 
 against a civilised I'nc, and thf im[»oitunt part assii^netl in that 
 tii^ditini,^ to the pivtlonu'ed tire Hi^lit. It is in this fire tiidit that the 
 foundations of victory ai-c laid, and hi'iice it is ahsolutely essential 
 to uwike this tii'f tjnht as eU'ectivf as posssiMe. The advance of the 
 tii'iiiL;' line may fi-eipiently l)e checked, and the tirinj,^ line will e\en 
 swav hackwards and forwards, accord inn' as it feels the pressure of 
 the enemv s tire, or is carriefl onwartls l>v tlie impulses Ljiven to it 
 hy any fresh troops sent into it from the rcai-. These losses atid 
 reinforcemrnts will s(jon hreak up an<l minu'le tou'ether the smaller 
 units, and this disoi^'anisation will lead to demoralisation and loss 
 of control unli'ss means are taken to pre\ ent it. These means must Im- 
 hased on the possihilities and peculiarities of human nature, and on 
 the characteristics impressed on it liy training-, discipline, custom 
 and habit. Custom and habit are prime factors on the battle field, 
 for i)i time tliey become a .second natin-e. What men are tauii'ht and 
 iire habitiiated to in peace training tlu-y wdl do in war, even in 
 moments of th<' greatest moral and mental strain. Herein lies the 
 great value and necessity of training to correct })rinciples and 
 methods, and consei|Uently for the necessity for ]iracticing the imn, 
 in Nolley ami mass tiring, in ceasing and opt-ning tiri' by connuand, 
 and in aiming at then^neniy's feet on all occasions with a full fore- 
 sight, and with the elevation ordered ; the N. C. Os. in the control 
 of lire : and the officers in directing the tire. 
 
 The pi'esent lines of progress in the development of infantry 
 fire in the tiehl lie: 
 
 (1). In the inechaniciil iniprorement of the rife (iml itsdvimuiii- 
 tion, giving it a higher unizzle velocity, a lower trajectory, and a 
 greater rapi<lity of loading. 
 
 (2). la (( iiiechanical use of llw rifle as far as possible inde- 
 pendent of the nerves of the man using it, and re(|uiring no adjust- 
 ment of sights for the sliort ranges, and hence no estimation of such 
 ranges and no fine aiming. 
 
 (8). In (( 'mechanical loicering of the trajectory by aiming at the 
 foot of the objective : and 
 
 (4). Id a'nu'chanical ohedience of the men, called ///"<' <ll>:cii)li)ie, 
 the result of routine, and which allows, as far as possible, of tlie 
 direction and control of the tire at all periods of the tight and con- 
 sequently of its best Use. 
 
 Wluit will be the result of these lines of progress in the next 
 war is difficnlt to foresee, for I may remind von that the whole sub- 
 ject of Fire Tactics, as now understood and practiced, has never as 
 yet been tried in war. Improved guns and rifles, smokeless 
 powder, shrapnel fire, and improved methods of utilising infantry 
 tire, have yet to tell their tale. In the meantime, we can only try 
 and realise \vhat is the best thing to be done, in the light of peace 
 experiments, and train our troops accordingly. And this, gentle- 
 men, I have endeavored to do this evening. 
 
 .1 
 
a.xlraGl3 fFom Gon^lilulion 
 
 II. (»ii.ii:ns. 
 
 'I'lif inMiiM'tii'ii iif .Miiiiiirv Alt, Scii'iicr, iiial l.itfiuturi'. ami fnr v^Mial 
 
 piirpi 
 
 III. Mi:.\iiii;i{sim' 
 
 'I'lli rr 'illiill 111 tlilic ilii'i'-t'H "f 111! inliiTS ; — 
 
 I'/l < )|-ililuil> , 
 
 (/■■ i'l 1\ lli'^iil, -111(1 
 
 |i'i I liiiiui'iirv . 
 
 (II I iriliniii \ iiuiiihrrs iiniv Ik iiiIht rcsidoiit. ni- nuni'i'^iilfiit, iind >linll lie 
 (•oiifiiu<l til iitlii ci's ami I'X iitliccrs of il.M. Kcj^iiliir lunl Anxiliiirv I'diriM uinl nf 
 
 li ^.liall li;i\r till' I iL;llt to viiti'. 
 (■ wlnisv rusKlfiiCL' or iiliieu of ImsiiifHS is wiiiuii 
 
 till' ( 'iVIIKiililll M lill III. Illhl 
 
 (■_'i A rrshlfiil nil' 
 if t 
 
 iiilii'r IS nil 
 
 Id null's (if t III' I iii'iiiitii |io-t 1 tlii-c. 
 
 (4) All otlici'i's iif tlic .\riii\ mill .\ii<,iiiiu'\ I'nri'cs niul of tlic ( iiiiiiili;iii 
 Miiitiii sliiill tei' mliiiissiilili' as |)ri\ ili't^t'd ini'iiilnis (iiiriiij^ ii pcriuil not t'.Xii'i'ilinu 
 two wci'ks, nil liciiij^ intiiiiliii't'il li\ u meiiilu'i' ; siirli privili'^i' not to ho rupuiitcil 
 
 witliiii >i.\ nioiiths. 
 
 i\. siiiscKirrioNS. 
 
 1 lie iiiiiiiiiii siihscripl inn of rcsiili'iit in 
 
 -Imll III' "^.'lUO ; of iion-ri sidijiit 
 
 iiii'iiilxrs, *•_'.. "ill. payiililc in uilviimc m. tin- l-t .laimarv nt itu li \ciir, 
 \ II. KI.F.t IION ol'' .MK.MHI'll^S. 
 
 Cl 
 
 irl'sons ili'slloiis ol lii'lli',' adl 
 
 r 1. 
 
 initti'il to till- liistitiitr ii> nil ini 
 
 1 
 
 I |•^- niii.st 
 
 1)1' jii'oposi'd liy a mcnilicr anil >.('('iiiiii('il iiy anotiicr, ami his naiin' iinstcd ii: tlif 
 rootus of the Inslitlltc fof at least t w i) \M't'l<s pllof to elect ion. 'I he ( 'oiiinilt tee 
 of .Mana^^cinent shall eleet all iiieiidiei's \,\ liallot. tivL' thereof to fnrina (|iloi'llIll 
 for tills piirpo-e, and two hlaek halls -.liall exclude, 
 
 (•_'; Iliiliorary li.eiiihers iMilst ln' feci iliiniended liy the < 'oiiilnit tee, a inl their 
 
 itli hefore u ceiieral 
 
 nil 
 
 icli twi ht> 
 
 lird-s Nnie of thiiKu 
 
 iiaiiu's shall he no;. 
 
 -.teil ill the rooms for it hast o 
 
 nu'ctin^; of the menihers. The election of llnnoraiv nieiuhi is to he liy cent 
 
 h 
 
 it of the liieinhers ;i t ailV l'ei.'!!lar liiei 
 
 ■t iiiL; of the I list itute. at \\ 1 
 
 nienihers are present, and all candidali-s inusl recriM' a two-; 1 
 present. 
 
 // 
 
 ijiiliiilfi/ ii lit ill /)iif( iJ Hull llii- I iisl il iilc. Ill/ I'll rttisli i iiij 
 
 i II I'liiliiill inn 11/11). I lililililii/ siili'/irls. ill III! I'm III iil /.irl ii ris, ii /.ilirili'i/. 
 
 luiiiHiiij I 
 
 \lllllll . I 
 
 II 
 
 <■.. mill /ir ir III I IIIJ II 
 
 ('lull. II ill III llir iiiiinif< iif iiiiilirinlli/ 
 
 'ill inn III/ III liiiriiiiniiiiiiii.s nl ii 
 i III ri ii.si III/ lill I lliririiri/ iif llir 
 
 Mililtiii I'l 
 
 iirrr III' ( 'il iiililil. 
 
 riiii'iiiiiiliilliiiiiiiLslnrii Hill rill sii n/inrl I riiiii llm.si iijin iinir II n . 
 • liiirr liirii. rnii iiiiliil iis ( tjliiirs nilli nil'/ nl llir mil ilii ri/ linilirs nl' llir 
 iii/iii'i'. null iiniilil lis/: fnr nn i ii rl i/ n /i/J iriil inn fnr ini iiihi rsh i p. nliiili 
 
 inn 11 lir iiniilr In I lir Srm In rij, nr n n if uf I In Cnni inilli i