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6/\N/\DI/\N ^IL1T/\RY Ij^STITUTE
j|nfentr[^ Jfiire J actJcs
FOR THK
(^anadian fl]9ilitia
MAJOR C.
B. MAYXE, R.E.
Professor of Surveying, etc.,
At the Royal Military College, Canada.
U IP
I'lUNTKK F()l! Till-: CANADIAN MIMTAKV INSTITI Ti:
liV JIIK
MAIL ,1015 I'UlNTlNii < 'O., LTD., TultoNTU
THBJ
Canadian ^ H^ilitaitg ^ Institute
944 KING STREET WEST. TORONTO
•#
aFI!lCBRJJ F0J? 1&90
LlEl'TENANT-Coi.ONEI, W. D. OTTKII, II.A.O.
B
X)icc-Pro:?ibcnts :
LiKi'TKNANT-CoLONEi, The Hox. J. M. G111S..N, 13th Rattalioii.
LiKl'TENANT-COI.OXKI. H. .1. (illASKTT, H. L.
Committee :
MA.10R J. IJ. Meal, T.F.R
G. H. STAitKE, :{rd V.H. ^
W. McSl'ADDEN, 12th Y.U.
Cait. W. (i. Mutton, Q.O.H.
G. P. Ei.ioT, ll.G.
" W. Hamilton' Mkhuitt, G.G. E.G.
I
Secretary :
Mr. L. Homkkav Ii{\in(;, li I..
Crea^urer :
Mr. I{om:i!T Mvi.ks, late T.F.B.
CluMtors :
CaI'T. H. M. I'El.l.ATT, Q.O.H.
1). M. How Aiu), ii.a.
3nfantry ^irc (Lactics f iiitabic to tl^c £anaMau
niilitia.
A I.iariHi; iii;i.ivi;ni;ii hn 2(iTii Ai-uii., isitO, at tiii: ianahiax .Mii.i i auv Insii-
n IE, TtimiSTu, iiv MA.IOI! C. 15. .MAVNi;, H.i:., I'uoKKssdit or
Sri(\ i:yin(.. i;t( ., IU>\ \i. .Mii.i i auv ("oi.mk.i:. Can aiia.
jfiitli I'll iiiiiiiUiiiJ iij l/ir n\,ft( " Tuct lC>i."
1'lit' .suliit'C't lict'iire us tlii> cNciiiiii;' is niir which is sfcouil tnnoiu'
in iiiii'ortiiiicT ill thf wlmlr i-anui' ot" iiiilitiiiy art. iJnt liffore
i)ro«.'t'0<liiiu' t'urther, it mav he rriiiarkt'il thiit of lute viai's the
wiirW ■"tactics "" has iK'Nclopcil a wiih'T tin'miiiin' than the mho
usually attachfil to it. namely, the nicrc handlini;- of truojis under
tire, so as to ensure and, if jiossihlc. to .secure victory. The newci-
ainl more useful meaning- n(j\v attaclied to the woril 'tactics" is
bi'st expressed hy tiie Word 'V.iviv///'*/),"' in tlie sense of "///'' inctliodx
(iilt)/)h(l for Ct(i')'>/iin/ out' anythiiiL:'. In this sunse we now tind in
most military writitiu's of note the woril "tactic^" usually i|Ualitied
hy some other W(>rd. for instance, iJattle 'i'actics, l-'irc Tactics,
Miirchine' Tactics, etc. meaniii^- the execution of, (tr methods
adopted for canyinu' out a l)attle. tire, mai'ches, etc., n'spectixely,
and it is in tliis wider sense that the word ""tactics" is used in the
title employee! to e\]>ress the suliject matter of this lectUl'e.
Oatlinr Di'ftcriitllon of n Mudcni. Jint/le.
The importance of the suhject of Infantry Fire Tactics will
perhaps lie liest uiiilerstood if we first consider for a moment what
a mod.ern hattle is.* Jn this term ""liattle" 1 do not mean a
guerilla .skirmish, or the tie-hting- that takes place in irregular
warfare, hut the comliat undei'taken l)etween two hiuhly organised
and trained forces, ai'iiied with modern weajions and >killei! in
tlu'ir use. I'^urther. we jiiust suppose that the tight takes place in
davliu'lit and in ordiiiarx" counti"\-. over which the adxance to the
attack can he seen, to a ct>rtaiii extent, liy the defenders.
I'lider such conditions the liattle is not a quickly decideij act.
On the contrary it cannot he too strongly rememhere(l that the
hattle is a long ili'awn out au'l Continuous act. in which 4 jieriods
can usually he distinguished, though they cannot always lie cleai'ly
si'parated. These periods are :
1. The Period of Recoiuiaissance.
2. The Period of Preparation or ]_)esti"uction.
.'>. The Period of Decision.
4. 'I'he l'erio(i of Completion or Retreat.
The Period of Reconnaissance is (haily urowiiiLr more and more
important as weapons improve. During this period tlie mounted
troops will dri\e in tlie enemy's advance<l troo])s, di-aw hi.s tire, and
a.scertain wliere his Hanks end. The drawing of the i-nemy's fire
is necessary to ascertain tlie disposition of his infantry anil
*The following remarks refer to army corps units and uiuier.
'1 l.\l.\.\TK\ I IkK TAL TICS
jiitillcry ill liis ficMit lini-. I)miiii;- this pciidil. whicli it iiuiy Ik-
jii'iic'iiiM^ to j)r<>lniin- until iil! the rt'iiorts of tin- niciiiy -^ jMisitinii
ami ili-<)Misit iiiii Imvm iDiiif in. tlif jinsitioiis I'or the aitillfry of tin-
attiick arr cliosni ;iiii| tlic raiiurs nn'asurt'il.
Wln'ii tlii'sc )'i>-,itii)iis have ln'cii cliosi'ii aii>l tin- artillny has
arrived aii<l is Irawii up ready to enter into the li^ht. then the
period of I'lejiaration or I )estru('ti(Mi eonmieiices. 'Thj^ )(i'e)»ar,ilion
is lie'^un h\ t he art illery eoniin^' into aetinii. ]>roteeted hy a small
portion of the infiinlry, and until tlii> )ire]iaratiiry artillei-y lii'e
has |»rodueed a considerahle I'tject, which it may taUe Minie hour-
to do in siinii' cases, it woidd he makiiiL;' a useless >acritiee to
attempt to pu>h forward the hulk <'l the infanti-y. Hut as the
artillery succeeifs in its uliject of ilestruction ^>\• pri'piirin'4 the wny.
the infantry and machiue-nuns are pushed forwaid until they c,in,
with their tire, lie^in to etl'ectively assist in the de--truction of the
enemy: this pushing; forward of the infantiy an<l niachine-uuns
will usually take place itfttr the enemy's jirtillery has iieeu sonie-
what suhdue(j and our own Liuns haxe heen turned on tlie enemy's
infantry. It may he assumed that dui'inu' this jieri..d of de>truc-
tion the attJW'kiiii;' line will arrive at a <li^tance pn-liidily ahout
(iOO yarils or less, from tlw defender's jMoitiiUi. It is espi'cially
during- this pei-iod that till' ( !. ( >. ('. must decide on the point of
assault and t;.. '•" direct the hulk of his i-eser\es.
The period 'rejiaration haxinLT heen conijtieted as judued hy
anv disordi-r i)earin!J' in the eueinv s ranks, or hv the lesseninti'
I'Hicacy of his tire, the oi'dei- is e;iven foi- the decision, "which is
then carried out with the greatest energy and celrrity. 'I'he tin' is
maintaineih h\it with as few and as short stoppages as possil.le.
Hayonets are lixeij, a ivipid tire is (hiixcreil at al)oiit IOO yariis
from the enemy for a few minutes, when the advance is souuiled and
the charu'e takes place over the last ■")() yards with chi-ers. hueles
soundiuL;'. drums heatini;'. colours tiviiiL;'. and ail tlie pomp anil dash
t of war.
Then follows tlu' final ))eriod of completiuL;' the xictoi'v oj- of
I'l'treat. into wdnch we need not enter more than tt» say that if the
pursuit Ci'iinot he taken up hy fresli troops, the retreating" enemy
should he suhjected to volley liriny' and not he followed Up reck-
lesslv hv disore'anised tro()i)s. who would lie e.isjlv checked, and
|)erhaps even routed, hy any organised and intact reserve.- the
enemy may still ))ossess.
Thus we see that a hattlo is a loni>- contiiuied act. and is chiitly
coniposed of n lone- drawn out destructive act or tire comhat, and
a short, sharp, (h'cisive act oi' close condiat. l)oth kinds of comhat
ai'e essential tlioUL;'h their r<'lative values nlti'r with the si/e anil
i|ualit\' of the condiatant forces. iSut time does not jiermit
of our iMiteriiie' into this important (|iicstion. nor as to how it
att'ects the fronts to he taken u)> hy ditfei'ent sized units foi- hotli
the fire and for the close cmnhats. lUit what I desire to inqu'ess
on yon i.s that tlic tire comhat or the ih^strnctive act is. or rathei*
may l»e, of considei'able tlnration. and that durine' its contiiuiance
it is necessai-y to make the very he<t use we can of our tii'e,
whether it lie artiller\-, nuichine-euu, or infantrx" tire. The ad-
4
.1-
srilAKLK It) nil: < ANADIAN MII.UIA. 3
vaiK-e lit' thf filing liiu- <luriiin tlii> iiciioil iumv I"- tiii|Uiiitly
ilni-krd iiiid lln' tiiiii'f liiif t'NcM sway Itack u ai'U auil tnirtaitU
accolililiy as it reels tlie JiresMire of tlie elieiiiy - lire, nr is canie.l
tiiiwanl I'V the impulst's /iveii tt) it liy any t'resli ii'()n|i> sent iiitn
it t'roiii the rear. DuriiiLT lliis lire coiiiliat Ixith .siiles are trviiiir to
Wear ilitWIl thi- re>i>tillL;- aiel 'lestlUcti\ e jinWer if t he (i|)|iul|ellt.
l!<ith siih's M-ft ;^raii daily ijisur.faiiiseil ainl ileiiii)rali>i il. lait \ict<>ry
remains with the siile wliich, > { the ileeisioii, i.s least ilisnr^anixtl
an<l "leiiKH'aliseil. AinI tiiis ilisor^aiiisat ion aiiil i|eiiii.ralisatii>n is
eU'ectetl I ly lire alone. Hence we must coiisiilei- how liest toeniploy
thi.s tire, in oriler td yet the liest results with the least exjiendituri'
d' ammunition, which at such moment.^ is of pricele^^ \ alue nn
acciitnit of the jireseiit im|M)ssihility "f rejileni^hiu'^' in aileipiate
'|uantities.
This consideration we iiiclu'le under the name ol'_^/;v litfl'ifs. and
thoiiLjh this suhjeet is cajialile of many suhdi\ ision->, yit it is ni.t
|iro|M)>ed to ijeline them \ery closely, hecause in dealiie.^' with the
atiairs all'ectin'^ human nature there i> as much danger in too close
and tine detinitions as in no (hdinition-- at all.
Aeain it is ver\' essential in all i.iilitary niatt< i-- to consider //"
iiiiin, ' tlh- rsst' III till mini as Kmersun calls him. We must always
remendier that the valui' of ail weaj'on- lepends >>n the man usin^;
them, and the value of all method- of proceiiure de]iends on the
traiiuuL;' and discipline and characteristics dj' the men anil otlii-crs
who emjiloy them. And herein lies my diiliculty as leclurei-. lam
addre.ssinn' a, liody of ntlicers, who ciaiimand troop- wlio>e tiaininn
and diseipline i- ni/t and cannot he expected to cunie up to those of
Kuropean troops, who ai"c continuously luider arms and traiidni;
for a consideral'le tei-m of years. \Vc can expect and do expect
more from such troops than we have a riuht to exjuct from troops
like the Canadian .Militia, with their limited means of trunin;^'. •
We nuist always reniend'er that men ai-e controlled m ire liy
emotions and liahits than hy a mere knowledge of what they ouu'ht
to do, i.e., liy the truth. TraiiiinLT und discipline are powerful
means of overcominLf the inherent fear of death and pain and the
dislike of the fatieiies and discond'orts so inseparahle from war and
con.sei|nently of makiiiLi" men lietter tii^:htin:^' orLiaiiisms. and nmre
.'unenalile to control durinnr the denioi'alisin^' intlueiices of liattle
and of war treiieraliv. But the i)rolilem that faces everv oMicei- i>.
Hull- to be.^t iiKike llxe of the riU'loiU^ clciiifnis irlmh In' nl /lis Iniiiil
nil tilt' (1(1 If i)f hiiltJe ! The t/icoirf icdl liiU-t then L;i\e way to llu'
jn'iictlcdi. And in thus making' eoo,| use of the availaMe material
lies the test of a eoo,[ oiHcer. Tin.' fault of i.ur text hook- is
that they only consider the theoreticid inuterial and rarely the
actual material that l\as to lie made use of. The l-'reuch in JSTO-
71 had a far hetter ritle than the (lermatrs, and the Turks in I s77-
7^ had lietter rifles and artillery than the Russians, yet hoth the
French and the Turks were defeated, chiefly hccause tlieii- oppon-
ents nuide a hetter use of wliat they actually posses.-ed than did
tlu' French and Turks. Mere snjieriority of armament is not
4 IM.WlkN I IKi; lACTR.s
c'ViTytliiMu', wliicli fact iimy aft"<»ii| soiiif rniiMdiition t" ('uiiudiHii
troops iinnt'il w itli tin Siii'lcr.
With tlii'sr |ir.'iiii>t'N w !■ ciui now inter into tin- siiliicct lift'inc
us tlii.s I'vciiiny;, niiiiiflv : How to nuiU»! the ln-.st u->f in luittlc of
tilt" tin: of the SniiliT Killf with which tlic (.'niuuliiin Militiii is
Mi'nicd ^
h'sl i ladtinii (ij till iiijiH (tn<l Jidrksii/lit I'^li rut 'inns.
I»ut as it is necessary, in all cases, to know the ranm' in onjei- to
olttain an t tl'ective lire-, 1 will lirietly eniinierale the cjillereiit ways
in which the ranL(«j i-an he ascertaineij with more or 1.^-, aeciiracy:
I . I!y direct niea,-.nrenient.
i. I>y ranu'e-tiiulin'i in>trnnients.
.*}. \\y sni\ cyinL: instruments.
4. I»y compariuL: known heinhts. the di-tuuee of one uf them
from the (iliservi'r lieinn' known.
•"». Hy me;isurenients from ma[)s.
»!. |->y estimatini; hy sound.
7. \\y the jtractice of artillery near at hanij.
X. \\\ watehiuL:' the "strike" of the hullets.
!'. I)V estimatin;:- hv e\-e.
< )f thesi! methods the lirst can oidy >>e used hy the defence
liefore the arrival of the enemy; raiint' finders arc a^ yet only
suited for artillery purjiosi's: surveying' instruments can only he
used in stationary warfare, such as sie<fes ; the I'esults olitaineil liy
compai'inL,'' known hei^ht.s ai-e not \ ei-y reliahio ; ami maps of a
suitalile scale for nieasurinn' i-aniies on ai'e rarely availaMe. The
most pi'acticahle methods on the liattle field are the (ith, 7th, Sth,
and !»tli. l)Ut to estimate hy sound, we ha\-e to wait for the
enemy to ojien fire, and it is only suiteil to the commencement of
a fi^ht hefore iiuich firiuLi; takes |»lace ; from the rany'es foiuid hy
the artillery, we mustallow for tlu; distance of the infantry in front
of or in ivar of the artillery ami also for the distance hetween
the tari;vt Iieim^^ fired at hy the artillery ami the tari^^'t that.
the infautiT have to fii'e at. I»ut tins means of lindiuu- the i-aiiije
is onlv .suited to the moment when the infantry are ijassinsf
the artillery ijurini^ their ad\ance. "Picking' up the rnnije'' hy
watchiui;- tihe strike of the hullets should always he done, hut
this reipiires suitable yrountl for the hullets to fall on and oreat
care is reipiire(l in making' such oliservations for reasons to he
stated iiresentlv. In reality the only really availalile means hy
wdiich raUL^es can l)e estimate(l at all times is liy the eye. This,
however, reipiires much practice over varieil eround and under
dirt'erent conditions to ohtain e\en moderately good results. For
instance, the avi-rau'e errors of f ruined men are as follows:
At :^0() yards ,V,th^
At (JOG yards ith - the estimated range.
At 1,200 yanls ,Uh I
This heing the case we must accept it as one of the factors we
have to deal with and make the necessary allowances for it. IIow
this can he done will he explained presently. But a very good
*
te.
[ve
l>\v
m
I
nL'itaiilk to Tin: < \\.\i»ian miittia. o
I'Ustoiii may Inn- lie iinntioiitil. In tlir (ifi-ninii si-rvin-, tin- l>tst
'1 HUM at nui''t' tiiidiiiLT liv »'V<'. in ciu'li cniiMtaiU'. liavc tin* <lutv nl'
iriii'^^iiiM- til,. Duiifr ninl callini: nut tlifii- fvtimatf of it \i< tlif
( 't»iii|uniy ( '(iimiuuiilfr iiitirtly tliniwii nu tlii'iii. Tlif (.'oiiipaiiy
C'oiiiMiuintcr tlu'M uses tlif inraii nl" tlif cstiiiiatt's as a lia>i,s t'oi' liis
onlci>.
WIh'M tilt' laiii^r is diici' known tliiii allnwanct-s iiiust In- iiiaiif
t'liraiiy niovmu'iits on mir or tlic cutniy s part. \U\i tin- laii^i-
li'-inij kiiowii, tin' iluty of tisosc looking al'tcr tlif iiifii ilot-s nut f ml
witli MrilfriiiLT tlif iiifn tn ailjnst tin- sliilc on tlu- Ipncksinlit to tlif
if.Lji'aNfil i;ra<luati>)ii fur that ran<:c and to scfiiiLT tliut tla-y ilo it
Tlif riflf is siiLjlitcil for a tfiii|ifratnri' of aliont ()() V., a liaro-
nifti'ic |MH's^nrt' of .'{() incln's. a still at nmsjilif i-f , ami a liori/untal liiif
of si^flit. If tin' tfiii]if tatni'f ami Iparoiii.'tric prfssnrc iliU'cr fmin
tlifsf (lata, tlif n tin- rani^c fora'4i\fii I'Mckvi^^rlit Mi-a'lnatioii altci-s ;*
an'l fuitlifr a lifad nr rfiir \vin<l will makf a laillct j^o fui'tlifi- or
fall >liort rts|ifOti\i|y, wliilr a siijc wind will drive tlif I'ullft to
oiif siilf. 'I'lii' lifatinL;' of thf ritif Karrrls and the coiiilition of tlif
fouliii'.^- in tlif I'arrfls will also lia\f tlifir ftl'fct on tin- projur
flt'vatiou to Iif used. So tliat wliatfNcr f If Nation is ordcrfd to l.f
iisfd. it must only lie lookfd on as an approximation to the trutli,
and tlif tiri must l.f carffully watclifd to sff if any coi-i-ection^
arf rfi|uirfd to Ix- madf to tlif luicksiflit flf\ation ordered to Im-
u-fd. Kurtlif r. if tlif line of si^dit is inclined upwai'ds or down-
wards thf flfvations u>fd must lie Ifss tlian wlifii tlif liiif of si^lit
is lioi-i/,ontal. For instance with the Martini Henry riflf. if thf
line of sio'lit is inclinfil upwards 40 . Wf must usf thf ■')()() yards
flevatioii to hit an olijeet <»()() yanls away : and if thf liuf of ^i'.^lit
is incliiifd 40 downhill Wf must use a still lowti* flf\atioii. Thesf
statistics aif only ^iven lo illustratf the UfCfssity foi- otlicfr-^ to
watch thf fti'fct of thf fire of tlifir men carffully in ordfr to
correct, if UfCfssary, tin' haeksi^ht fle\ations hfitei nsfd.
T/i' K'il iif Uiuoiil rolh'il Fi re.
We have always to consider infantry tirf undfr two aspects, \i/.:
((/) rncontrolled or imlfpt.'iidfnt lire.
(/>) Control!. '<] lire.
rvcoiit I'olh'il firl III/ takes ])lace when facli man chooses his own
target, his own elexation, his own rapidity of lirf. and liis own
times for opfuini;- and ceasing; tire, (yitiifrolh'il ji r! n;/ is tlic fxaot
converse o
f th
It is almost nee<lless to say that uncontrolled fjrf should he
ahsoluteh' iirohiliitcd, as it invariaMv leads to confusion, disurdfi',
and demoralisation, wliile causing' a waste of invalualih- amninni-
ti(»n at a period when it is impossihle to replenish it in sutHcient
(juantities to make up foi- the consum]>tion. Further, an uncon-
trolled lire in which each man chooses liis own olijfctive and hack-
sieht elevation, wlifU in a state of ureat moral excitement and
* As far as the atinosplicn' aloiu- is coiicci'iicd tlu- liullet kocs further l-KKKitli
jtart i)f tlie raiiuiMMifrravi'd (in the l)a('k siulit fur eacli 1 !•'. rise of tlie tlicrnKHiictcr
above (iO 1''. and ].") lOddths parts of llic range enp;rave(l on the liaeksijrlit for eacli
1 incli fall of tiic l)ar(mi('ter helow no inches : and rice irrsn.
*
II INJANTKY 1 IKK TA« IK n
iiniitiil strain i-> \ryy iiiitlicficiiniN An iiiicnntiollf.l lire wlicii
iiiici' >turl''il iiihlti- ■'iicli cMii.litii.iis will |ir<>l.ali|y nut (•••hm' tiiitil
tin- last ruuii"! has Iki'M i'\|»»-iiilt'<l, aiul will mtv iir'-liaMy lia\f
1 II •lin-ctt'l I'mi- tin- must part uiMly intn tli<' air. 'i'lif ;,'rfat
fault 'it' all slmntiML; in tlir ti.lil. t^in'cially at the cImm r i'an;;ts, !«.
that it is tuij lii^ii.
I lldi liihuil FiiiiK/.
Thus coiilininLC "ur atti'iititiii to (•(iiitrollcij HrinLT alon.- \vr havi'
to ileal with it uii<lt'r twci ciiii'liliuns :
{ii ) Imliviiliial tiriiiL;'.
(/>) ( 'ollt'L'tivc liriiii:.
( )!' thi'vf tWi) till' latter >ln)UM In- the U'eliiriil cjise ill liaftle ; till'
runner sliuuM unly lie ii^ed in the tiiial st;m('> uf l.at tie ami in suinc
-^peeial cases, lis uii oiitpust wurk. etc. r.iit as inili\i<lnal liriiii; at
all raii'^es is heM in such e^teoin thruuuliuiit t!ie w hule Imperial.
inchiiliiiL: in thi-. term the ('ulunial. I'urce.^. it is necessiir\' lu
tliuruuuhly unih'rs.tan'1 its capaliilitics.
'I'lie tirst tliin:^ I <lesire tu impress un 3'i'U, LTciitleiiK'n. is the
utterly false impression une is apt tu ;;ct of iii(li\i<lual tiring from
urdinary tartlet pnictiee, when tiring' a few runn<ls only u\er
nicasurt'ij ami knuwii rani,fes, with the result <'f each shut lieiii<^
sieiialleil hack. I'nilersuch cuinlitiuiis the nearer we e-ct to the
tar^'et the hetti'i- is the .^huulin^•. Uut ill the liehl, raiij^es are not
known e.\actly. the enemy iloes not signal hack whether you have
iiiisst'(l him oi' liit him ahove or helow the point on him that yuii
uiiiiefl at ; the men are pruhalily tired fur w;iiit of sleep, pairhed
with thii'st, liunury \\>y want of fuud, and fatigued after a lonu-
iimrch uinler a hut sini. u\\r l>ad ruad.s, ur hy an advance hy rushes
under tire : if the ailvance has heeii rapid the men luse their hi'eath,
their chests hi;ave, tln-ir arms eet tire(| ajid the ritle cannut he lu-lil
steadilw esiieciallv if a wind is hluwini;', and when the men aiv
unnerved and excited hy the danifiT urisiiii,' from the tiie uf the
eiiemv. which impurtant cause uf disturhance is al\vav> ahseiit in
ptact- practice The nearer the t^nemy is approaclu'(| the ifreater
is the effect of this adveivse condition of things, added to which i.s
tilt; painful etlect of the recoil after 40 or 50 rounds have heen fired,
and the etlect of the disorder, demoralisation, and excitement which
occurs in all tightin<,' and danyiT. The mass of the men will, under
such oircumstances, foi'^fet to adjust their sights to the range ; they
will use a full furesiirht if they u.se any at all : they will prohahly
aim at the enemy's chest, and many will even dischari^e their
rifles from the hip. ( 'onset|Uently the lire is usually much too hi eh
and decrea.ses in efficacy as tin- range oets sliorter, wdiich is just the
opposite to what we find on the ordinar}" ranges. It is very im-
portant to rememher this, for it has fre(|Uently l)eeii oli,served that
when men tind that they apparently cainiot hit an exposed enemy
at wliat seems to be an easy range, they get discouraged after 2
or '} rounds and then fire wildly. One well-known French writer
asserts that in the field an average shot, will fire at an isolated
standing enemy, wlio is su})pose<l t<^ remain stationary, the follow-
ing numher of rounds to put him out of actit)n : 'i to (i rounds at
I
m
I
Mll.MlM 111 1111. « AN,\l)|.\N MII.IIIN. <
;i:!() vhkU; I(» U> II' nt 440 Mir-1> : 14 to hi at :»:»() yjinls ; mm. I 'M)
tn ;i !■ jit (ItlO ynriU. Aimtlnr l-'riiii-li uritif fstiimito fliiit tliiii'
tiiii)<< tlic aliuN«- aiiiounts nt' ainiiiuiiitioii ui'r I't'iiiiiiiil ai tlit- MtiiM*
raiiLTt'sI
llriitf it I> Vfi-y iiiii"irtaMt ii>'t 'Hily to rfiiu'iiil't r l)iit i:|s<' to
WMi'ti tlif iiicii iii)t t>> •'S|ii'tt \r\\ iittifii t'i'iitii titrir iii'liviihial tiff
ill fill' fit'ld, mill tliat tliiy ^liKiilij ii«pt I"' ili*«ciimiiL:ri| iv»ii l-v r,
.sci'ir> ul" misses. I'ivi'ii ,it tarjt't |irai'tici' a u; i >i 'i ii»ii\' iiiis> n
stiiiiiiiiiLf iiinii fit I'iiiil;.> u\rr 40(» yniiU athl yt-t In- sluupt ii.u' will.
Ilri'f 1 iiiu-t riiiiiinl yiMi aufiin. -ciitliincii, that wr must ii('«t|it
liiliiitiii iiatiiif a> Wf tiinl it aiiil iiiaki- tin- I'ot use if wliat '.\i' lia\f.
Tlir jirulilfiii. tliiTi'l'iiri'. is: Acfr|itiiiu' tin' t'ln'l ti.al iii<ii\ iihial tire
ill tlir li'l'l is, as a niii'. i'>|iirially at Iuml; raiii;rs, iiiarciiratr Imw
can wr ii'ijuri- tlii.'^ iiiai.'cMU:iry aiiij iii'«!-.ij the I'fst Use ui the lilt nl'
till' lri>i)|i-. :•
.Majin' Nlii-ij;, ut' the lla\ariaii aiiny. otiriTil u s(»lutinii to tliis
|triil'li-iii ill alioiit J.sT'i aii'l hi- suhitioii iiukIi' )ail'l'c in 1 s7^ was
aijojitiil tirst hy li .• ( iiTiiiaii ariiiy. aiiW thni ly <'\rry l'jirii|ii an
army, I'lit our ow n ////,,/... \Vi- arr 'jradualfy at|(>|it iiiL;' thc^c i.ii as.
\vlii"li I will now t'\|>laiii.
Ill thi' lirst |ilaci' to ri'ilii<'<' tlir iiiai-ciiracy of iiidix iiliial lirt' iis
imicli as jiossiMf. it must Iw cuiitiin'il to such rair.;'i's at which the
liiillrt ilois not ri-c more than tin' hei'^lit of ,'i man alio\r the line
ot' siyht. Thi* liiiiitiii'4 raiiue I'or the Sniilej' rille i>. uiiijcr such
coiiilitioiis, :!.")() yai-ils. Then hy Usinii' the :IIM) yarils hacksiirjit to
make u|i tor the .trect oi' thr full t'orcsii.fht wliicli the men '''//
always usi- in the tieM. and liy always aimiiiL; at the ruemys feet, he
will he hit somewhere SI) liiiiM as he is any where iiisid> of .'{.')( ) yards
distant. In this way the raii^e need imt he ^Miesseij imr the Imck-
.siuht.s touchi'd when the enemy is om-e within .'!')() yards. Sdiuc
writers advocate the use of the :2()(> and e\ en the 100 yar>!s cle\ ation
tlirout;'hout tliese slimt rani;e>, with low aimiiii;. to counteract the
well-known tendi'iicy to t;.e hiM-h. i s|iecially when men areexcited
Such !i lire is a ///'■';///'/ /'/', and is called a /'O o/' .■(■/7<//' //''//.
r-'lativcly of course, to disriiiiiuish it from tln' collective lire at
loiiLfer raui^es, of which we are to speak of jn-eseiitly. and w liicli is a
<h'i>/>i)i III/ li)'>' or a ///v "f /i iihnhil It i/. \\\ a i;'ra/.inL; lire wr do not
ri.'i|uire to know the rani;'! : lait it is e-sential to apjiroxiniately
know the rauLCe for a droi)j)inu- lire if wo desire e\en fair results.
Suhi/iri.stou of Rii}iiji'!<.
Hc^forc passing on to consider tlie characteristics of a collectiv e tiie
of prolialiility, we must refer to the siihill risimi uf I'n iniis which is
uow Usually accepted. These suhdivisions are as follows:
.-NUlKlt.
yil".
:}.")0
M. liKNKV.
400
SOO
1. S/nDi — up to extent of era/.iui;' tire
'2. Mediuin — from the short up to doul>le the
extreme .short rautfe . . . . 700
8. J.ong — from the medium u])to hiylicst graihi-
atiou of enemy's rifles, aliout .- - iTOO 170(>
4. Extreme — all ranges over the extreme ioni^- ranges.
H
INIANTRY I IRK TACTICS
111 till' sIkii'I nuinrs, t'ontrollcil individual iiriiiiL,' i>i jiUoNviiliIe,
liccausf tlif tiiiM- has jiasscd tor coiiccnti'atini;- the tirt'on ]iarticulai'
jioiiits: thi'si- |Miints have already Imth iirfjiaifd for liciiii;- assaulted
iiy ha\iiii; heeii sul)je('ted to a heavy tire, and the assaultiiiy' troops-
have lieen directed on them, and eacli man has now to advance to
his direct IVoiit and fire at the eneiii\- imiiiediatelv in hi^ t'loiit.
m
('I'llcclirc Fir/ ii;/.
IJut at ranges over the short ranu'es the mens tire must lie
directed on such jioints \vln'i'e the enemy s resistance is ;_Mt atest.
ami for this purpose a ('((/*(r//^/vr/rJ co/ZrcZ/rr ///r must In- employed.
Suppose that the statement is correct that in the lield a man lia>
to tiri' ."{() shots .-it ()()(/ yards to hit an upriuht enemy. In making
this atatemeiit we have to further suppose that the enemy will
stand still to he tired at, which, however, he will not do: >o that
the soldier, if lie misses in his liist shot, will not have the op|)or-
tuiiity of tiriuLT his ,'i() rounds. To overcome tiiis ditiieiilty we ''an
make .■{() men tire at the enemy and then one or more i-> ^uie to hit.
Another advantaife is (jained in so doiuLT, nanu l\' : That when one
man fires .SO rounds, half his aminunition sn]tply is uone and he has
taken some time to i\o this, whereas if ^^0 men tire, they have only
expi'iidid OIK! rotnid each, and have ohtaiiied the doired result at
once. This is the jirinciple involved in eoncenti'a^inij: collective
firiiiLf on certain stated olij"cti\'es. It is very important to reniem-
lier this ])rinciple, esjiecially in ii-renular warfare, when, as so often
ha]i]iens, the enemy aiv; indiviilually hetter shots than our own men.
The peculiar cliaracteristic of this kind of fire is that it co\ers a
helt of >;'round at least 100 yanls in depth on hoi-ixontal ni'ouml
with drop[)iny laillets. The mass of the Imllets tired (70 ])ercent,^,
fall within this hcatrn -.(nic, as it is called, of 100 yards in de]>th
on a horizontal surface. This hoMs t'or all ranu'es heyond the
sliort ranges. The cause of this s])reail of Imllets is due to the
f ;(■! Oiat different men will not adjust their l.acksi^'hts to the same
p(.':;i v''l not use the same amotnit of foresiLi'ht. and will not keep
t^ ')■ .-s- i.iits uin-iLrlit: some will jerk tlie tri^irer. otiiers will not
iiUM' their ritles steady at the instant of dischar^i'. (>tc. It is on
a.\-ri '\\.\ •>♦' tins longitudinal spread of the Imllets that a collective
!ii> at tlie loi'e-er raui^'cs is called a jlrr nf pri>h(ihi(lf>j ; theolijectis
tu so cover the eTound on which the enemy is with laillets. as to
make it iirohahle that some of the Imllets will take etiect. The
etiicacy of such a collective tire, sup]>osinLj it well placed, depends
on the draj) of the Imllet measured with reference to the line of
sie'ht. The less the dro]i the hetter the etiect of tlie fire, and as
the dro)-) decreases as the ivuii^'e decreases, a collective tire also
rapidly increases in etHcacy as the raiiLi'e ilecreases.
The (lanrjerous innr of a oollecti\e tire is the heaten zone (ahout
100 yards on horizontal u'round)/)/('.s' th(^ nra/.ed /one of th(> t»ullets
falline- at the end of the lieaten /one nearest the firei'. This u'razed
zone is the distance over which tl;e laillet remains under the
heiirht of the tare-et ahove the ground on which the target stands.
[f the heaten grouml slopes upwards with reference to the lin<^
I
I
I
*
I
I
SUITABLI". TO TIIK <ANAI)IAN MIMTIA.
9
of >in'lit, tin.' fxtciit of licutni fiinl (laiinci-uus /ones arc (iiiiiiiii--lii'il :
liiit if tlu' lifiiti'ii ui'oiiii'l slopes ijow iiwiinls witli I'CLTanl to tlif liii'-
of siijlit, till* ix.'fttoii aiiil <lanLr«'i"<"ns /ones art' oftrii "Tfath" iiicn ast.l
For this latter I'eason the reserve troops of the ilefellCe slmuld \)v
ki'pt well in rear of tlie tiriiin' line at the early sta^rt's of the fiuht.
and close up to them at the lalter sta;j;es, whieh is a favorahle coii-
• lition for the ilefence.
Further, it must neVfi- he fnrti'otten that in eollective lirinu'. us
in all kiiulsof tii'in^, a careful watch iiiu--t lie maije as to the cti'rct^
of the tire so as either to stop it if no ctlects are Iteini:' proiluccil
which only <le])resses the men and elates the enemy, or to ((.n'cct tlic
eIe\ations used if necessary, for atmospheric conditions, the inclin-
ation of the line of si<;iit, and the slojie ■•!" the l.caten L;)'oun<l. and
for the una\ oidalile ei-rors maile in judiiinL;' the raiiui'.all of which
atl'ect the tire and the pi'oper elevation to lie rsed.
On accomit of the lonij'itudinal spi-ead of the l.ullets in a collective
tiro, We must be N'cry careful not to he ndsled in watching the -trike
of the hullets. \W' mu>t reiiieiidier that e\ en thou^^h many of the
liullets fall sh(^rt yet the (ii-e niay he well directed. If eithei' >ide i-
•stationary, or if the ranges are i-apidly decreasing' from either side
ailvaneinu". it is hettei- for a tire to fall rather short of than i-ather
over the tar^'et, i'ol' in the fiiniier case W(! i;-et the lielietit of lico-
chetiiiLT ladlets. which ai'e lost when the mass (if the hullets pas^
ovc)' the tai'e'et. if the ranges are I'apidly increasiuLf. oxcrsiirht
for the supposed rane'e^.
Sometimes it is neci"-s;iry to co\ei' a eiTater /one than 100 yaiils
with hullets. This is done liy making- half the men tire with an
elevation for oO yards under the sup|iose>l rane'e, and the nther
half with an elevation for oO yards over the supposed I'an^e. In
this way a /.one of 200 yards is co\ered with hullets. Hut at ' ast
a whole company should he used in this way sd as to U'et a result
as I'ajiidly as possihle, hecause proloneed hi'iuL;' ouuht always to he
avoiiled when possilile from the had etlect it has on the men in
reducine- their oHeusive spirit. A hold use of men and an n nun it ion is
always a <:;ood policy when once thi'tii-e is etl'ecti\e. lint as khc/i <i
Id^c of Conih'i lU'il I'lcrdt lini.^ nicniis n jimporf Itiinifrli/ ijruit cinisii iiij>-
iloii. of rdbiiible (iiinnuiiiflon. It shuui I onli/ lie iifo'il h-Jk h l/icir is
ample ammuvitlirii, ir/ien (hf t'nerii_, oftfrii <i (jainl fari/el. ■'lien thf
range is imf (WCai'dtchl I'IP^'I'h, "'h<'H i '' side is in inorcnirnt ,ii ml
)r/t(n) till' atiliosp/wric i Dtf I" itC's aihl tlir slojirs < if t //(• f/ roll. ii il lirtir
tha ciu'iii// (ivc not favorahle. aial fin' strilr of the Inillits eon not hi'
ohserreil. Further, such a use of comhined siehts is only [lossihle
at the loiaj and at the Ioniser of the meiHuhi ranui'^^ while men are
sufficiently under control for the pui'pose.
Hut in all cases it camiot he too sti'oiie-ly im]ii'e^s;i| on l.oth
orticei's and nuni that as the range increases (e\-en when oidy one
elevation is heine- used), the amount of annnunition e.xpendeil ha-^
also to he <,n'eatly increased in order to L,^et the same results in the
same time, and if more than one elevation is used a )U-oji<irtionate
amount of annnunition must he used.
10
IXIANTk\ FIkE TACTK S
TIh- (Jiif'slii)ii of LiiiKf H(in;jr Flrln;j.
Hut iiiucli liii> lircii saiil for ami ai-ainst loiii;' i'aii<ft' tiriuo-. No
• luiilit lonij- ranijt' tiiiiii'' liiis iK'Vrr i>i-o<luetil aiiv dtcisive ii'.sults
m war. tlioiinli it may have produci'il fxt'ellcnt n'sults in sprcial
(.•ast's. X'ictorv is ileciilrd at the s/nirf riun^cs, l»ut it is jiivparcil for
ill till' iiicilinni. raiii^L's. Hence these are the important ones.
Loni;- lanu'e firing' to he efi'ectivt' reijuires a ]ar>j;c consumption of
ammuiiition aii<l a prolon<^e<l concentration of Hre. iJnt this pro-
loni^id tiriiiijf takes awa}' from the ott'ensive spirit of the men.
Hut ii-ltirc thi'fc is (iiu/)h' tiviiiiiinitioii, ii'/ilch can he nisilij rc-
j)/eius/it'tl. hihI iftlic I'diKjcs are Iciioii'n or tin- eftrcts of f lie fire con
he ohserveil, if llie dt mosphet-ic coinfil ion a lol f/ie slopes of the t/roK lul
of reception are not too uiifKrornh/e, if tin- ohjecf fired (if is of
saiti(hle (limensions espceialli/ OS rr(/<i I'ds (/rpf/i. mid if t/o' jire is
e.recuted h'/ f roups sjtt'ciidli/ delnil'd for the j^mrims)'. there is no
rea.son why tlie lonj;' ran^ini;' power of nKxlern rifles may not lie
ju'licionslv and cautiouslv indid<ied in as a treat. IJut it shouM
he stoj)i)ed if, after some minntes, no results are ol).serve(l from its
use. and it should never he permitteil without tlie consent of the
senior oMicer within reach.
Fii
e.
The Jfi rret nut. Coidrol mid Uisci pi i n
We now come perhaps to the most imixiftant of oursuhject,
— the dirrctioii of, the eoidrol of, and the iliseip m. \ uiretl for
modern infantry iive. The dutf/ of direefinn die jt ■", falls on the
company leaders and otlicers senior to them : thedidy jf t\<tdrol/i u;/
the lire falls on the junior otHcersand the N. < '. Os. ; the diseipH lo'
I'eipiired to t-nahle this ilirection and control to he carried out rests
with the nu-n.
A (jooil lire dit^cipUne is ohtained when the soldiers will not fire
until ordori'(l, ntjr when in motioii, when they will only tire at tlu^
oliject nametl and with th(,' elevation ordered, and when they will
cease Hrin^' wlien ordereil. Simple as tliese re<piirements are, yet
they can only he attained by a careful peace trainiiit;.
T/w coid)-ol of the jiriivj consists in impartinu' to the men the
or(h'rs e;iven hy the company and hi;j,'lier ccjiiiiiianders, and in seeint;'
that these' orders are obeyed and even in enforcing their execution.
Thi' direction, of the ji re consists in determining', at each moment
of the tii^lit, (1 ) the ojieninjr and the ceasiui.;' of the Hre; (2) the
amount of ammunition to be expended at each moment to attain the
object ill \ iew, takine- into account the available supply of ammuni-
tion and the facilities for replenishing; it : (8) the number of men
re(|uired in thi- tiring line to expend this ammunition in the desired
time: (4) the selection of the olijects to be tireil on, and their allot-
ment to dirt'erent portions of the tiring line; (')) the I'ange and
ele\ation and number of elevations to be used; ((i) the observation
of the results of the fire: (7) the kiml of tire to be used; (S) the
rapidity of the tire: (9) the moments of advancing an<l halting;
(10) the attitu<les of the men during each halt; (11) the moment for
fixing bayonets: and (12) the replenishing of the expended ammu-
nition, etc.
i
- 1
(
SUIT. Mil. F. TO THE CANAltlAN MILITIA.
11
SiiiiK'ot' tlii'sc |)uints liiivf alrt'Uily iM'fii tuucln'il on, anil so I
shall contint' my remarks lirii-tly to siifli fioiiits as liavr not ain'Uily
lii'fM I'ft'flTi'il to.
(1). With r.'i^ar'l t*) lln' <listiinci >< nl. ii'/iirh inj'ii iil ri/ ji re ii(ii;/l»'
ojii, It'll ill hiiltli' \uii\i-v normal foiiditioiis. thr tollowin^' may ht-
sai<l :
/// f/ic (ittdck, a |)i-t'maini'f o|)i'nin^' ot" tire only lrn,L,'tht'n.> out the
tiL;ht. iliniinishcs the oti'msivc spirit, and may cause an exliaustion
of the ammunition when the closer jnul more inqtortant ran,ijes are
reache(l at which the hattle is ilecided. 'I'he French (jefemlini;- the
\illage of St. Privat. which foi-meil the French i-ie'!jt at the liattle of
(iravelotte (l.Sth Xwj,., IN?*)), had to retire liefore the (ierman
assault for want of annnunition, althoueh they hail practically
annihilated l>y infantry tii-e a ))i'evious assault on the same village.
Hence the attack should try and eet as close to the enemy as
possible liefore opening tire, that is as close as possilde without
sufferi!l^^ uinhi.e losses. liut even in o])en counti'y, lire shouhl not
he opened in a <^feneral manner hy the attack until the medium
rauLjes are I'l.'ached. at all events for troojjs armed with the Snider
rifle and carryiuLj the \ery limited supplies of annnunition which
heavy ammunition entails.
I ii till' (.b'fi'ucc, howe\fr, lire may he a(l\antae,'eously opened at
the /"/*// rani;-es, esjtecially if the conditions for etiective long ran <^e
tii"e are ]ll•e-^ent. The defenders wonld. f)r should, always know
the rangi's of various jiromineiit olijects m front of them !in<l they
ha\e, as a rule, eiiod opportunities for oliSL-rving the effect of the tii'e.
But in tenniorisinu- actions or in false attacks, tiro mav lieopenci
at long ranges: also if tlu-re is no artillery or if the aitillery ;irm
is Weak, iiifantry may o])en at longer i-anges than usual to prepare
the way for its own attack : l>ut in this case a large supply of
amnuinition should he provided and special ti'oops detailed for the
long range tiring.
But it must never he forgotten that as a rule too nuich is ex-
pected of infantry tire. Always remeiidx'i- that nt 'ill runijcssover
IliC short VdtK/es, epicdCi/ i>J jrrr rd il mily In- uhfdi iicil lii/ d rcldtirili/
lniii/-ci>iitl niu'il Colled ice tire Couce at rated mi nh/ecti rpf< f^jiecnilli/
selecteil on dccoant of tfieir ufr'ensire or ilefensire importance at
the inohient.
(2,.'}). As regards the amount of amnuinition to he e\]iended
and thenvniiher of men to h<' employed in the tirii;g line to expend
it in a reasonahle time, wt^ must remendier that the moral etie( t
of losses inflicted on an enemy is greater, as these lo.sses are more
(luicklv inflicted. This is oiu,' reason for eniphiving as manv men
as possible. On the other hand we must not have so many men
exposed as to cause tuidue exposure to and losses from the enemy s
tire, ant'd the effective ranges are reached. When such )-anges are
reached, we must seek to avoid losses not by mere formations, l>ut
by the destruction ami demonilisation of the enemy. At this
period of the tight, boidn(?ss and not caution is real prudence. When
long range fire is indulgeil in, as inany men as pos.sible should take
part in it to arrive as i'aj)idly as possible at the desired result.
(4). As regards the choice of objectives, it is very necessary to
12
INl'ANTKV FIRK T.\( TK S
reineinlM'r that in tht; luiii;- and ine<liuni ranf,'es the tire of larije
portions of thu fii-inii' line shoiilil I)0 dircctfl on cfi'tain .statfil
targets, and that each man shonld not tie ullowcil to fire at a separ-
ate tarti'et.
Thi' ditlieulty lies in the selection i>f tlie oltjccts to hi- Hred at
and in ap[)ortioninLr the diti'i-runt oltjects si-lcctcd tt> ditierent parts
of the fil•in^• line. Thr means of cHectinij this latter point we shall
deal with presently. But the general rule for the choice of
olijectives at any j^nven moment is to choose such parts of the
l('iid!ii<f portions of such fractions of the enemy's troops as are the
most dany-er(jus for the time lieini;-, I.e., which for the time heiiiLj
constitute the chief ilani,'er to lie "guarded ai^^ainst. The most
advanced portions of the (Miemy are as a rule the most daiiiferous,
as they draw the other portions after them. Hence they should
he crushed. A freipicnt chaiit,a' of the ohjectives .scatters the fire, so
when you have chosen an<jli)ective,fire on it initil you havt; destroyed
it, or at least paralysj<l its action, for some tim<\ Choose for pre-
fei'i.'uce olijectives in front of your own men before selectiuLi' others
to the right ov left in orilei' to assist tlx- advance of ii iehlioi--
ine- troops. If th(; enemy's leadiuf,' line is checked or offers a had
tare-et, then choose suitahle olijectives to the right or loft or in rear
of his leading line. In cases of douht choose as targets tlmse
olijects which can he most easily hit. Ihit as a rule the usual
mark to aiui at is the smoke of the enemy's rifles ;uid artillery.
In choosing ohjectives we must let the (|Uestion of range (involving
effect of tire and errors f)f estimation of range). atmos|(hta-ic condi-
tions, sIop(,'S of grcnmd, etc, have their full weight. The ofHcer
commanding the firing line app(n"tions the targets to the different
parts of the firing- line during the pauses in the fii'e (see page 14).
(.')). As regards the range and elevations and nnmher of
elevations to lie useil, much has nlread}' heen saiil. hut it cainiot
he tot) strongly remeudiered that the efKcacy of all fire de])ends
more on the range lieing known than on the indixidual skill of the
men in firing. The worst shot nia}' hit if the range is known, hut
the hest shot will not hit if the' raiige is wrongly estimattfl. Heiic(;
the value of carefully watching the effects of the fire, and of making
any suitahle corrections to the elevations employed.
Tlu' effects of the inclination of the line of sight and of atmos-
pheric conditions must not he forgotten in oi-deringthe elevation to
he us(m1.
In cases of douht use too low than too high elevations. If either
side is advancing, always undersight for the supposed range, ami
only alter vour elevations hv at least 100 yards at a time.
Against charging cavalry, only use the 400 yards elevation and
aim at the hoofs of the hoivses.
()). As regarils the observation of the tii-e. we must reniendier
that in a well-directed fire half the bullets will fall short, and
conse(iuently the dust jiroduced by bullets 50 to 70 yards in
advance of theoliject is not a proof that the fire is too short, though
no dust //; <i fdviirahlc soil for ohf^''i'>'(itlon is a certain indication
that the fi.3 is too long. If you are to one side of the men firing,
say on the right of thetn. then a too shoi-t fire will appear to fall fo
I
f
SUITAI'.I.K TO IIIK ( ANADIAN MILITIA.
13
the k'ft of tliL' mark, ami a too loiifj tire to the riijlit of it, cvm if its
"iircction is Lfijod. This fact imi>t h,. earffully reineniberiMl.
With n-t^ard to cstiiuatiiiL;' the raiiijes, the (Jei'iiian jiractice of
■ raiii^e fi.nliii^' s(|ua(ls"' is worthy of imitation.
(7). 'I'he (|Uestion of the kind of tire to he used is of \try ^reat
iinportaiice, for it is ijreatly aHt'ctrd l.y considerations of lunnan
n.itnre and of the means nf handling' trooj)s under tii'e. Then- are
t\\(j kinds of controlled tire :
1. Individual tire.
.) / < n ^- /• \ <i. Volley Hriu"'.
2. ( ollective hre. , ,, ► . .
I h. .M;iss tirini;'.
I'neontrollcd tii-c will eonu' of its own accord when the moral
and mrntal strain of hattlf Incomes too ^rcat foi- control.
Ht-ncf it need never he ordei'ed. Hvei-y eH'ort. iieh-ed, should he
maile to avoid .such tirini,'. We lia\e only to deal with controlled
tirinir, and we can control collective fii'ine' cither hy eniplo\-ine'
volleys, or hy em])loyine' mass Hrini;- (which i> rc-dly only a moi-e
l)erfectly controlled individual tiring than the individual lirine- w..
have already co!isidei'e(l) of ;i limiteil nund.ier of rounds (4 at the
most), when the tin; must cease until ordered to he renewed after a
slii;ht pause.
In individual firini;- the trin'j^er is pressed directly the alieinncnt
is ohtained ; in volley firinif tlie alietniient, when ohtained, has to
he maintaineil until the order to tire is eiven. As this is not easy
to do. and as some men ai-e. more oi- less, disturhed hy heariiiL;- tin-
sudden command to tire, the result is that in ])eace expei'imeiits
• leliherate indi\idual tii'ing has always ^'ixen lietter results than
\«»lley tirine-. 'J'he ad\()cates of xolley fii'in^- say, that though this
is the case on the practice rani,'e. 3'et the reverse will he tlie case
on th(! hattle tield, foi- the men will he kept in hand hetter when
volleys are tired. Here is a delicate (piestion of human natui'e.
My own impression is that it reipiires hi^-hly disciplined troo[)s to
use volleys under an etlective lii'e, for duriuL; the fre(|uent pau.ses
they will hear the enemy's hulletsaml the sound of his tire, Avliereas
ii.Mli\idual tirinu', hy making- a continuous noise, prevents this.
Further, volley tirine- at even me(lium ram^e n-quirc^s more control
than can he expected from any liut hi:;'hly traineil troops.
Volleys should only he Hreil l)y conqianies in close order, oi- half
companies in rank entire, or sections in open order. Other units
are too lari^e for the purpose.
Other advantages are claimed f(M' \olleys, such as economy
of anuuunition. facility for chaneine- oiiji-ctives and ele\-ations,
e-;pecially when the target is charginn- civalry, etc. Ihit these
advantae-es can l»e equally claimed for inass tirine- conducted on
the lines to he presently indicated.
Now volley tiring, however good in theory, requires for its
execution the maintenance of the organic units. Hence volleys
are only practicable .so long as these unit.s are maintained intact,
which will only occur when clos( order fornations an; used (as in
savage "warfare), or so long as the enemy's tiie has not necessitated
heavy reinforcing. But when the organic urits have Ijeen hroken
up hy losses or have been nrixed up by an ailvance under tire oi-
14
INI ANTRV MKi; TACTICS
*
()V«.'r roUifli LTrniinil or l>y lifuvy i-ciiifoiciiiif, tht-n volleys ceusotolie
praetioililf t'oi* ordinary ti'oops uiul bcconnj v».'ry ditliL'ult tocxceutu
with liiLjlily trrtiiiL'd troo|is.
CoiistMiuciitlv \dllr\- tiriiiL:' should lie contincd to the loiisjcr
rani.>-('s licfon' the oi'MHiiic units an; niixi'd or hrokcii up. ludi'cd
tlu'V an- fssciitial at >ucli raii^t's to fuulilc tlit- fti'cct of tiie lire to
lie i>n)pfrly watcht'd ami the tlcvations corrrctcd if nccussary.
I Jut afti-r u whih,' when volk'Vs arc no lontier possilpli", mass tii'iiii"'
must lit; rosf)rtt'd to. Many (ifrman wi-itcrs will not vwm rt-jy on
tilt' nuMi stopping tlir tiring' of tln-ir own accoi'd aftci' :} or 4r(annls.
Itut i-cly on the use <>[' a sln'ill whistlt; for this purjiosc. an instru-
iM"iit which cvciT oflic(.'r and X. ('. ( ). should ciii .and on the
sound of which every man should he trained to cease liriny. 'I'liis
I would advocate for the ('anadiiin Militia.
Now to .secure the w'leatest elHcacv of tire one very important
detail must never lie forgotten. To a\ (jid a multiplicity of esti-
mates of the same ranee and to avcad adjacent sections tirine- with
Very ditl'erent elevations, which has often happene(l, /Ar /r/'/z/r/ /ir.r
nf f'licli l>att<illnv hiV.st hi' Uiulcr <i (l/sflncf coDUini ihlcf (one of the
jield ojjirrrs of tli«' huttdlluH.) dinl (Usllnct iidilsfs mAist hr iixdle
noil' II 11(1 till' I) ill till' I'li'iiii] iiluiig II n-'iilc front, t/uil of u Ixitlnlion
III li'ii.st. This pause can he easily otitainecl liy traininu'. l.y the
use of the whistle, and liy the exertions of all the otlicei-s and
N. C. ()s. in the tirini;- line. During- these pauses the smoke will
he allowed to clear away, ohjectixes can he chosen and naimd
anil apportioneil to different [)ortions of the tii-in^' line, the
raUL^'es decided on hy the raULje-fiiidin^ sipiads, and any necessary
alterations made in the (devations used, or the tire stopped for good.
or tln' men made to advance. These distinct ])auses on a wide
front are reipiired even in volhy tirine-. ami too nuich stress can-
not he laid on tlu'm, for without them it is im])ossihli;' to maintain
a proper control over the i\\\- to usefully direct it. In this way alone
can an united action hetween all the ])arts of the tii'iny- line lie en-
sured, and only in this way also can we employ company and even
half hattalion volleys, evi'U when the smaller units are mixed up,
for the })urpose of "pickini,^ u]) the rano'e,"* or for stea<lyini;' the men
if they are gettiuL; excited. The j^avatest stress must he laid on
haviiijjj a distinct otHcer conunandini;- the tirini;' line, anrl on these
rey'ular distinct pauses in the tii'e over a wi(k» front durino- any
kind of tirine', if a control over the tire is to he maintained.
Thus, as a i-ule, vollcN'fii'ini,' is hetter adapted to the defence than
to tlie attack and to lonij rane(- tirinn-, while mass firing is best
suited to the medium and short ranges wlien so nmch reinforcing
has taken place that the units liave got mixed up. This nuiss tiring
seems to he in complet*^ accordance with the I'djuirements of battle
in those periods when organic luiits have ceased to exist as such
and when reinforcement are being boldly pushed into the tiring
lines to drive it forward. By making use of it the men will tire
more naturally and more etiectivelv an<l will be less afi'ected Itythe
*Volleys are rennired for piekinp \\\^ the Vcaiifje by watcliing the strike of the
bullets. Volleys .sliould also lie usedatiaiiist a rotreatingeneiny after his j)08ition
has been carried.
*
SUITAilM. TO THE ( ANAI»IAN MII.ITIA.
!.■)
i
• listurl)in<^f sounds of lijitth.-, aii'l it is iiujst ]in»l»fil)K' tliat tlir cnu-
trol (.f tlio iiit-'U will 111- less (litlicult. iiroviilfl rt'uiilur distiiut
pauses ill the tire iire iiunle after e\ei-y iVw roiimls.
Mass Hriiifj; reciuires just as mucli ti'ainini; and ]iractice as \olley
firing; to obtain good I'esults. We uainrnt lay tco i^reat stress mi
the iiiijiortance i>f liahit and custom. Men must he aocustdiiied in
jieace time to the use of mass tiring-, if we de.'iijv to make use of it
in war.
(S). As rt'umrds the ra]iidity of lire, a slow rire (1 round a
minute) should ho maintaineil against had tar{j;cts and a (juick Hre
(4 to ') rounds a minute) against L^ood targets. ;\\>() the shorter the
I'ani^e the more I'apid should the tire he. I'lUt it must lie eare-
fully I'eniemiieiM.Ml that i|uic'k tiring' must only I'e nhtaiiied hy </(/ /(.•/,•
liitnlini/ and not iiierelv li\' hastv aimin''.
It should also he reiiieiidiei'ed that in the \n\\>^ and meilium
I'annes accui'acy of tire is ninie essential than rajiidity of fire.
direful ii'niiiiKj <i ml ji ri h;/ ii rr r('(/ul I'fil far <iH fi ri in/ i ii urili'i-li)
(/('f giioil rcsa/fs. Rapid tirinu' u'ained ''V nipid aiminn'hasa \ery had
eti'ect on the men and leads to loss of control and waste of ammuni-
tion, while it soon creates a thick cloud of smoke, which ]ii'e\ eiits
proper aiin heiny- taken.
(!)). The moments of advanciiiu' and halting must he left to the
judgment of the senior officers in the tiring line. As a rougli rule
it may he said that, when advancing hy altei'iiate rushes, at each
halt the men after adjusting their sights to the new range should
he allowt^l to fire l] roinids. It will then he tfme to ad\ance again.
( 10). As regards the attitudes of tlie men, tliey should lie down at
the longer ranges, and then as the ranges decrea>etliey >uld kneel,
and finally at tiie shorter ranges stand. If they are allowed to lie
down at the shorter ranges it will take' away from the vigor of tlu;
attack and it is hard to make the men get up again. .Material losses
are not the only losses to he considered, — hxss of mural is even
more important. Further, when the men are hreathing hai'd for
want of hreath the lying down jiosition is a had one for good
firing, and long grass and small foMs in the ground will prexcnt
a recumhent man from seeing the enemy.
(11), Bavonets should he fixed at ahout .SOO yards from the
enemy fi'om the moral effect produced hy .so doinu'. The men
should he taught and thoroughly impressed witli the idea tliat the
fi.xinu' of bayonets is a simi that it is safer to go on than to retire
over the tire sweiituround over which the\' have already advanced.
(12). The (|Uestion of replenishing the ammunition that lias been
expended cannot well lie entered into here. It is a suliject which is
large enough to form the subject of a separate lectin-e : but it may
1)6 remarked that the re|)lenishing of expemled ammunition to any
considei'able extent under an effective fire is considered to be so
ditHcult that nearly every military writer of note insists on the
necessity of the men beinu' u'iven all the ammunition they may
reiiuiiv before they are sent into action. Conseiiuently the lea<lin<'-
troops should have from loO to 200 rounds per man, while those
intended for the assault nee(l only have .')0 to 70 rounds per man on
their persons.
10
TACTICS SL'ITAIiLK TO THE CANADIAN MILITIA.
Concladii);/ RemdA-x.
I must now, nfiitK'iiK'ii, draw my rt-mjirks to ii close. J liiiv((
• •iiilravi>rc(l to ])lfK't' liclort! yc^u us ,siiij|i|y uinl {•()ncis(.'ly us i coiiM
till! vitally important sultjcct of hoiv fit lankr fitehesf aseof riff e fire
i II till' fu'iil. I have i)t)iiiti'il out to you the nature of modi-ni liyhtiiiLj
against a civilised I'nc, and thf im[»oitunt part assii^netl in that
tii^ditini,^ to the pivtlonu'ed tire Hi^lit. It is in this fire tiidit that the
foundations of victory ai-c laid, and hi'iice it is ahsolutely essential
to uwike this tii'f tjnht as eU'ectivf as posssiMe. The advance of the
tii'iiiL;' line may fi-eipiently l)e checked, and the tirinj,^ line will e\en
swav hackwards and forwards, accord inn' as it feels the pressure of
the enemv s tire, or is carriefl onwartls l>v tlie impulses Ljiven to it
hy any fresh troops sent into it from the rcai-. These losses atid
reinforcemrnts will s(jon hreak up an<l minu'le tou'ether the smaller
units, and this disoi^'anisation will lead to demoralisation and loss
of control unli'ss means are taken to pre\ ent it. These means must Im-
hased on the possihilities and peculiarities of human nature, and on
the characteristics impressed on it liy training-, discipline, custom
and habit. Custom and habit are prime factors on the battle field,
for i)i time tliey become a .second natin-e. What men are tauii'ht and
iire habitiiated to in peace training tlu-y wdl do in war, even in
moments of th<' greatest moral and mental strain. Herein lies the
great value and necessity of training to correct })rinciples and
methods, and consei|Uently for the necessity for ]iracticing the imn,
in Nolley ami mass tiring, in ceasing and opt-ning tiri' by connuand,
and in aiming at then^neniy's feet on all occasions with a full fore-
sight, and with the elevation ordered ; the N. C. Os. in the control
of lire : and the officers in directing the tire.
The pi'esent lines of progress in the development of infantry
fire in the tiehl lie:
(1). In the inechaniciil iniprorement of the rife (iml itsdvimuiii-
tion, giving it a higher unizzle velocity, a lower trajectory, and a
greater rapi<lity of loading.
(2). la (( iiiechanical use of llw rifle as far as possible inde-
pendent of the nerves of the man using it, and re(|uiring no adjust-
ment of sights for the sliort ranges, and hence no estimation of such
ranges and no fine aiming.
(8). In (( 'mechanical loicering of the trajectory by aiming at the
foot of the objective : and
(4). Id a'nu'chanical ohedience of the men, called ///"<' <ll>:cii)li)ie,
the result of routine, and which allows, as far as possible, of tlie
direction and control of the tire at all periods of the tight and con-
sequently of its best Use.
Wluit will be the result of these lines of progress in the next
war is difficnlt to foresee, for I may remind von that the whole sub-
ject of Fire Tactics, as now understood and practiced, has never as
yet been tried in war. Improved guns and rifles, smokeless
powder, shrapnel fire, and improved methods of utilising infantry
tire, have yet to tell their tale. In the meantime, we can only try
and realise \vhat is the best thing to be done, in the light of peace
experiments, and train our troops accordingly. And this, gentle-
men, I have endeavored to do this evening.
.1
a.xlraGl3 fFom Gon^lilulion
II. (»ii.ii:ns.
'I'lif inMiiM'tii'ii iif .Miiiiiirv Alt, Scii'iicr, iiial l.itfiuturi'. ami fnr v^Mial
piirpi
III. Mi:.\iiii;i{sim'
'I'lli rr 'illiill 111 tlilic ilii'i'-t'H "f 111! inliiTS ; —
I'/l < )|-ililuil> ,
(/■■ i'l 1\ lli'^iil, -111(1
|i'i I liiiiui'iirv .
(II I iriliniii \ iiuiiihrrs iiniv Ik iiiIht rcsidoiit. ni- nuni'i'^iilfiit, iind >linll lie
(•oiifiiu<l til iitlii ci's ami I'X iitliccrs of il.M. Kcj^iiliir lunl Anxiliiirv I'diriM uinl nf
li ^.liall li;i\r till' I iL;llt to viiti'.
(■ wlnisv rusKlfiiCL' or iiliieu of ImsiiifHS is wiiiuii
till' ( 'iVIIKiililll M lill III. Illhl
(■_'i A rrshlfiil nil'
if t
iiilii'r IS nil
Id null's (if t III' I iii'iiiitii |io-t 1 tlii-c.
(4) All otlici'i's iif tlic .\riii\ mill .\ii<,iiiiu'\ I'nri'cs niul of tlic ( iiiiiiili;iii
Miiitiii sliiill tei' mliiiissiilili' as |)ri\ ili't^t'd ini'iiilnis (iiiriiij^ ii pcriuil not t'.Xii'i'ilinu
two wci'ks, nil liciiij^ intiiiiliii't'il li\ u meiiilu'i' ; siirli privili'^i' not to ho rupuiitcil
witliiii >i.\ nioiiths.
i\. siiiscKirrioNS.
1 lie iiiiiiiiiii siihscripl inn of rcsiili'iit in
-Imll III' "^.'lUO ; of iion-ri sidijiit
iiii'iiilxrs, *•_'.. "ill. payiililc in uilviimc m. tin- l-t .laimarv nt itu li \ciir,
\ II. KI.F.t IION ol'' .MK.MHI'll^S.
Cl
irl'sons ili'slloiis ol lii'lli',' adl
r 1.
initti'il to till- liistitiitr ii> nil ini
1
I |•^- niii.st
1)1' jii'oposi'd liy a mcnilicr anil >.('('iiiiii('il iiy anotiicr, ami his naiin' iinstcd ii: tlif
rootus of the Inslitlltc fof at least t w i) \M't'l<s pllof to elect ion. 'I he ( 'oiiinilt tee
of .Mana^^cinent shall eleet all iiieiidiei's \,\ liallot. tivL' thereof to fnrina (|iloi'llIll
for tills piirpo-e, and two hlaek halls -.liall exclude,
(•_'; Iliiliorary li.eiiihers iMilst ln' feci iliiniended liy the < 'oiiilnit tee, a inl their
itli hefore u ceiieral
nil
icli twi ht>
lird-s Nnie of thiiKu
iiaiiu's shall he no;.
-.teil ill the rooms for it hast o
nu'ctin^; of the menihers. The election of llnnoraiv nieiuhi is to he liy cent
h
it of the liieinhers ;i t ailV l'ei.'!!lar liiei
■t iiiL; of the I list itute. at \\ 1
nienihers are present, and all candidali-s inusl recriM' a two-; 1
present.
//
ijiiliiilfi/ ii lit ill /)iif( iJ Hull llii- I iisl il iilc. Ill/ I'll rttisli i iiij
i II I'liiliiill inn 11/11). I lililililii/ siili'/irls. ill III! I'm III iil /.irl ii ris, ii /.ilirili'i/.
luiiiHiiij I
\lllllll . I
II
<■.. mill /ir ir III I IIIJ II
('lull. II ill III llir iiiiinif< iif iiiiilirinlli/
'ill inn III/ III liiiriiiiniiiiiiii.s nl ii
i III ri ii.si III/ lill I lliririiri/ iif llir
Mililtiii I'l
iirrr III' ( 'il iiililil.
riiii'iiiiiiliilliiiiiiiLslnrii Hill rill sii n/inrl I riiiii llm.si iijin iinir II n .
• liiirr liirii. rnii iiiiliil iis ( tjliiirs nilli nil'/ nl llir mil ilii ri/ linilirs nl' llir
iii/iii'i'. null iiniilil lis/: fnr nn i ii rl i/ n /i/J iriil inn fnr ini iiihi rsh i p. nliiili
inn 11 lir iiniilr In I lir Srm In rij, nr n n if uf I In Cnni inilli i