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COLONIAL 
 MILITARY EXPENDITURE. 
 
 THREE SPEECHES 
 
 OF 
 
 ARTHUR MILLS, ESQ^ M.P. 
 
 IN 
 
 The House of Commons 
 
 March 5, 1861 } March 4, i86s} 8c April 28, 1863. 
 
 REPRINTED AND REVISED. 
 
 LONDON: 
 EDWARD STANFORD, 6 CHARING GROSS. 
 
 1863. 
 
The three following Speeches have been reprinted from 
 Hansarcts Parliamentary Debates, The firji was delivered 
 in moving for a Sele£f Committee on Colonial Military 
 Expenditure ; the second in moving a Resolution founded on 
 the Report of that Committee ,- the third in calling attention 
 to Correspondence respecting the Defences of Canada and 
 New Zealand, 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Speech on moving for a Select Committee, 
 March 5, 1861 3 
 
 Speech on moving a Resolution founded on 
 Report of Select Committee, March 4, 1862 . 15 
 
 Speech on calling attention to Despatches on 
 Defences of Canada and New Zealand . . 27 
 
SPEECH. 
 
 Mr. Arthur Mills said; that in rising; to move 
 for a Select Committee on Colonial Military Expen- 
 diture, he need hardly apologise for bringing* under 
 the notice of the House a question involving an 
 expenditure of nearly £4,000,000 sterling, nine- 
 tenths of which were raised from the taxation of 
 the people of this country. The usual official objec- 
 tion would probably be raised to the Select Com- 
 mittee for which he was about to ask — namely, that 
 it would involve an interference on the part of Par- 
 liament with the proper functions of the Executive 
 Government, but he thought he should be able, in a 
 few words, to prove that that objection could not 
 fairly apply to the Motion to which he asked the 
 House to assent. In 1834, a Committee for the 
 same object, was granted by the Government of that 
 day. It was presided over by the present Lord 
 Fortescue. On the Report of that Committee action 
 was taken by the Government, to the great advan- 
 tage of the public , but many changes had taken 
 place since 1834 — changes both in the home admi- 
 nistration, and in the actual expenditure in the 
 Colonies, which tended to make inquiry still more 
 necessary than it was when granted at that date. 
 From the beginning of the present century up to 
 
1854 the administration of the Colonies and that of 
 the War Department were under one head. In 
 that year, owingf to the pressure caused by the Rus- 
 sian war, the two departments were separated ; and 
 they had the testimony of men of experience, that 
 ander the present system g^reat inconvenience was 
 caused to the public service from the absence of any 
 iixed or recog'nised principle in respect to colonial 
 military expenditure. He did not intend to trouble 
 the House with leng^thy quotations, but he would 
 refer to a passag'e in a letter, written in March, 
 1859, by Mr. Hawes, on behalf of the right hon. 
 and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel), 
 then Secretary of State for War, to the Secretary 
 of State for the Colonies. In that letter the Colo- 
 nial Secretary's attention was called to the extreme 
 inconvenience felt in the War Department by reason 
 of the absence of any fixed and recognised principle 
 on which to decide questions relating to military 
 expenditure in the Colonies ; and the desirability of 
 a distinct understanding between the several Colo- 
 nies and the Imperial Government was pointed out. 
 It was suggested by the right hon. and gallant 
 General that the matter should be submitted to the 
 consideration of a Committee composed of one 
 member from the War Office, one from the Colonial 
 Office, and one from the Treasur3^ Such iei Com- 
 mittee was accordingly appointed. They were all 
 men of ability, but they presented a Report in 
 which two members of the Committee materially 
 
differed from their colleague. That seemed to 
 have been made an excuse for doing* nothing ; but, 
 at all events, no action had been taken on the sub- 
 ject. His object in now proposing the appointment 
 of a Committee was not to embarrass the Govern- 
 ment, but to give them a basis for action. The 
 average annual expenditure incurred in the defence 
 of the Dependencies, including transport^ dead- 
 weight, recruiting, and departmental expenses, was 
 nearly £4,000,000* annually. Of that amount 
 the Colonies contributed one-tenth. The Committee 
 he proposed would have to operate only on that 
 portion of the British Colonial Empire which com- 
 prised the '^ Colonies*' properly so called. The poli- 
 tical garrisons, convict depots, and the philanthropic 
 settlements in Western Africa, with regard to which 
 the question of apportionment of expenditure did 
 not arise, would be excluded from the inquiry. 
 Whatever opinions might exist as to the value of 
 these dependencies to Great Britain, it was evident 
 that they must be retained, if at all, at Imperial 
 cost. They were thirteen in number, and the cost 
 of our military expenditure in regard to them was 
 about £1,500,000, while there were twenty-four or 
 twenty-five colonies and dependencies that absorbed 
 
 * For the years ending March 1858 and 1860, for which 
 alone complete returns have been given, the totals including 
 the Colonial contributions, are £3,968,599 and ^3,594,805 
 respectively. For the current year the total cost (including 
 that of the New Zealand war) will probably exceed j64,000,00Q. 
 
the remainder. The total amount of contributions 
 from Colonial sources towards makings up the total 
 sum was £370,000. The twenty-four colonial de- 
 pendencies on which he proposed the Committee 
 should operate contributed about £350,000 a year, 
 and of that sum nearly £240,000 was contributed 
 by three colonies, namely, Ceylon, Victoria, and 
 New South Wales. This fact showed the incon- 
 sistent and inequitable results of the present system, 
 both in regard to the Imperial expenditure and the 
 proportions paid by the Colonies. Ag*ain, the mili- 
 tary defence of the North American Colonies and 
 the West Indies was organised on no established 
 rule or principle. Vast sums were squandered on 
 fortifications which were often worse than useless, 
 while small g^arrisons were dotted about on our in- 
 sular possessions which, in the event of war with 
 European or other Powers, would be simply caugfht 
 in traps. It was to him quite inconceivable that 
 they should go on keeping* fragments of troops in 
 all the small dependencies that they possessed. The 
 colonial power of England rested on her naval supe- 
 riority alone. The Report of the Departmental 
 Committee called attention to the enormous military 
 expenditure at the Cape of Good Hope, amounting^ 
 to £830,000, side by side with which was an item 
 in the estimates of £68,000 for the civilization of 
 the Kaffirs. Anything more monstrous than that 
 expenditure of £830,000 he could not imagine^ and 
 he was quite at a loss to understand how Parliament 
 
could sanction — if^ indeed^ it ever had sanctioned — 
 such an enormous outlay. The tendency of such a 
 system was to keep the colony in a state of perpe- 
 tual minority. The Kaffir wars^ ag^ain^ had cost 
 this country not less than £5,000,000. He hrought 
 forward this motion in no spirit of hostility to the 
 Government^ and he, therefore, regretted to hear 
 that it was their intention to oppose it. That op- 
 position, however, rendered it necessary for him to 
 anticipate some of the arg^uments likely to he 
 used against it. He should prohahly be told that 
 the matter ought to be left to the Execu- 
 tive Government ; and that it was not a question 
 for the House of Commons. That was an argu- 
 ment which had been used for the last twenty-five 
 years, and might bo used with equal force for 
 twenty-five years to come. But how could the 
 Government deal with the matter satisfactorily when 
 the average duration of office of each Colonial Mi- 
 nister was little more than eighteen months ? Under 
 such circumstances, unless some sound rules were 
 laid down for that department, any statesman who 
 held the seals of the Colonial Office must find sfreat 
 difficulty in giving satisfaction, either to colonists 
 abroad or tax-payers at home. Many months often 
 elapsed before the missives of the ColonialOffice could 
 reach the Colonies to which they were despatched ^ 
 and when the time came for the return of the mail 
 the Colonial Office had a new functionary, who 
 might fee? disposed to deal with the question at 
 
t 
 
 issue on a diiferent principle. The settlement of 
 important questions between the Imperial Govern- 
 ment and the Colonies was thus indefinitely delayed^ 
 and the seeds were thus sown for future dis- 
 putes. The severance of the War Department 
 from the Colonial Office had only aggravated 
 the difficulty of the case. He disclaimed any 
 desire to invade the functions of the Executive, 
 but the whole history of the matter showed that 
 it was high time for Parliament to interfere. He 
 might be told that one Committee had already sat, 
 that his Committee would do nothing, and that the 
 Colonies would be coming before it in formd pau- 
 peris, to get what they could for themselves. But 
 persons who held this opinion of the Colonies must 
 have forgotten their conduct during the Russian 
 war, when the Australian colonies sent home up- 
 wards of £100,000 to the Patriotic Fund, for the 
 widows and children of those who fell in the Crimea ; 
 and when Nova Scotia offered to maintain a militia 
 of 25,000 men to protect her own shores, in the 
 event of England requiring the services of her army 
 elsewhere. It could not be said that the expenditure 
 proposed to be inquired into was unimportant, for 
 if £1,000,000 of the whole amount now expended 
 could be saved, it represented Id in the pound on 
 the income tax, or it would enable the Chancellor 
 of the Exchequer to take his long-deferred action 
 on the paper duty. The student of history could 
 not but notice the contrast between the Colonial 
 
policy of England and that of Spain and Holland* 
 He did not mention the colonial policy of the latter 
 countries for any purpose of laudation^ but it was 
 worthy of remnrk that they received from their 
 colonies every year nearly the precise sum that 
 England spent upon hers. But it was not only^ 
 or mainly^ on economical or financial grounds that 
 an inquiry into our present colonial policy was 
 demanded. The retention of colonies in an inglo- 
 rious and unlovely subjection was a hopeless enter- 
 prise^ degrading alike to those who imposed and to 
 those who accepted the dominion. If we needed an 
 illustration of the hopelessness of such a policy^ it 
 would be found in the history of Portuguese coloni- 
 zation, and its complete collapse. At this day^ 
 when the Azores and Madeira^ Angola and Mo- 
 zambique^ with a few African Slave dep6ts^ com- 
 prised the colonial roll of Portugal^ it was difficult 
 to realize the fact that there was an age when 
 40,000 armed Portuguese kept the ocean in awe 
 from China to Morocco, and 150 Sovereign princes 
 paid tribute to the treasury of Lisbon. It was not 
 by soldiers, or warlike appliances, that the Colonial 
 Empire of England was to be retained. Sixty years 
 ago Mr. Fox, in advocating the Quebec Bill, told 
 the House of Commons that the only sure mode of 
 retaining our Colonies was to enable them to govern 
 themselves. This advice had been echoed by the 
 late Sir William Molesworth, Mr. Charles Buller, 
 and some distinguished statesmen who were still 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 10 
 
 Members of that House. But to the privilegfe of 
 self-g^overnment was necessarily attached the burden 
 of self-defence^ and the Colonies that were left to 
 govern themselves ougfht, as a logfical consequence^ 
 to defend themselves. It was not necessary to go 
 back to ancient times to shew the accuracy of that 
 theory. Our North American colonies^ before the 
 declaration of independence^ paid the whole cost of 
 their military defence^ including forts and gaiHsons^ 
 out of their own taxes^ and yet provided in addition 
 for the whole expense of their civil government. 
 During the seven years' war they raised^ clothed^ 
 and paid 25^000 men^ at a cost of several millions 
 sterling. In the words of Franklin's evidence be- 
 fore the House of Commons in 1766, "They were 
 governed at the expense to Great Britain of only a 
 little pen, ink, and paper — ihey were led by a 
 thread." ^he policy of England towards her Colo- 
 nies ougnt to be, in accordance with this ancient 
 precedent, to cherish the spirit of self-reliance, and 
 to revive, if possible, the sound principle of Colonial 
 Government from which we had departed. He sub- 
 mitted his motion to the consideration of the House^ 
 he repeated, in no hostile spirit towards the Govern- 
 ment, but because he believed that that man was 
 doing a service to his country who was instrumental 
 in diminishing the drain on the resources of the 
 State, and lightening the burden which pressed on 
 the population — a burden in this case involving not 
 only an enormous expenditure, but the withdrawal 
 
 I 
 
 i_ 
 
11 
 
 of 100,000 soldiers (including that portion of the 
 Imperial army now employed in India) from the 
 service of England and the development of her in- 
 dustrial resources, to the outlyhigf provinces of our 
 empire. But there was a still more powerful argu- 
 ment for investigating and reforming our colonial 
 policy — namely, that by cherishing those principles 
 of self-reliance to which he had adverted^ they would 
 be qualifying the Colonies, which had proved their 
 powers both of self-government and self-defence, for 
 a glorious future and for eventual independence. 
 
 He would, therefore, move, 
 
 '* That a Select Committee be appointed on Colo- 
 nial Military Expenditure, to inquire and report 
 whether any and what alterations may be advan- 
 tageously adopted in reference to the Defence of 
 the British Dependencies, and the proportions of 
 cost of such Defence as now defrayed irom Imperial 
 and Colonial funds respectively.'' 
 
 . After a debate (in which Mr. Adderley, Mr. 
 Baxter. Lord Bobert Cecil, Mr. Chichester For- 
 tescue, Mr. Marsh, and Lord Peimerston took 
 part), the Motion having been adopted by the 
 House, a Select Committee was nominated on the 
 Idth of March, consisting of the following Mem- 
 bers :— General Peel, Mr. Ellice, Sir George Grey, 
 Lord Stanley, Mr. Boebuck, Mr. Childers, Mr. 
 Chichester Fortescue, Mr. Thomas George Baring^ 
 Mr. Adderley, Lord Bobert Cecil, Mr. Baxter, Mr. 
 
ml* 
 
 I 
 
 : V 
 
 4 
 
 13 
 
 Marsh, Mr. Fitzgerald, Sir James Fergusson, and 
 Mr. Arthur Mills. 
 
 The Committee having considered the matters to 
 them referred, and having examined the Chief 
 and Assistant Under-Secretaries for War and the 
 Colonies^ the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the In- 
 spector-General of Fortifications, Naval and Mili- 
 tar}'- Officers, and other witnesses connected both 
 officially and otherwise with various Colonies, pre- 
 sented, on the 11th of July, 1861, a Report which, 
 together with the Minutes of Evidence and docu- 
 ments appended thereto, has been printed by order 
 of the House of Commons. 
 
 ■ 
 
 ii 
 
 The Eeport of the Committee divides the British 
 Dependencies (exclusive of India) into two classes^ 
 1. Colonies proper; and 2. Military garrisons, naval 
 stations, convict dep6ts, and Dependencies main- 
 tained chiefly for objects of Imperial policy. 
 
 The Committee submit the following, among other 
 recommendations, as founded on the evidence laid 
 before them : — 
 
 ( I .) That in the case of the Australian Colonies 
 of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and 
 Tasmania, the number of Imperial Troops ought to 
 be reduced. 
 
 (3.) That with respect to New Zealand, while it 
 may not be right, under all circumstances, to with- 
 hold from the settlers iu that Colony assistance in 
 protecting themselves against the attacks of native 
 
18 
 
 tribes^ so long' as the Imperial Government retainis 
 a control over native policy ; their principal reliance 
 ought to he on their own resources. 
 
 (3.) That with respect to the South African Colo- 
 nies, and all those similarly circumstanced depen- 
 deifties which contain large European populations, 
 their security against warlike tribes or domestic dis- 
 urbances should be provided for, as far as possible, 
 by means of local efforts and local organization 5 and 
 that the main object of any system adopted by this 
 country should be to encourage such efforts, not 
 merely with a view to diminish Imperial expendi- 
 ture, but for the still more important purpose of 
 stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in Colonial 
 communities. 
 
 (4.) That the settlers in South Africa should be 
 called upon to contribute a larger sum than they do 
 at present towards the military expenditure of those 
 colonies. 
 
 (6,) That the expense of the troops in Ceylon 
 should be in a greater degree borne by the Colonial 
 Treasury. 
 
 (6.) That with respect to the West Indies, it ap- 
 pears that about 4,200 troops (consisting of Euro- 
 pean and coloured regiments, in nearly equal pro- 
 portions), are now maintained there, mainly for the 
 purpose of securing those colonies against internal 
 disorder ; that the defence in time of war of these 
 possessions of the British Crown, as well as of other 
 distant colonies, must be principally naval, and that 
 
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 it is for many reasons inexpedient that the duty of 
 a local police should be performed by scattered de- 
 tachments of Imperial troops^ at the cost of this 
 country ; it is therefore, in the opinion of the Com- 
 mittee, desirable that, due reg^ard being* had to the 
 peculiar circumstances of these Colonies, the £E»rce 
 now maintained in them should be gradually re- 
 duced. 
 
 (7.) That in the opinion of the Committee the mul^ 
 tiplication of fortified places and the erection of for- 
 tifications in distant Colonial possessions, such as 
 Mauritius, on a scale requiring* for their defence a 
 far ^eater number of men than could be spared 
 for them in the event of war, involve a useless ex- 
 penditure, and fail to provide an efficient protection 
 for places, the defence of which mainly depends on 
 superiority at sea. 
 
 (8.) In conclusion, the Committee submit that the 
 tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at 
 the heart of a hostile power ; and that it is there- 
 fore desirable to concentrate the troops required for 
 the defence of the United Kingdom as much as 
 possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for 
 securing against foreign aggression the distant de- 
 pendencies of the Empire. 
 
SPEECH 
 
 ON MOVING A RESOLUTION FOUNDED ON THE 
 REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE. 
 
 March 4, 1862. 
 
 Mr. Arthur Mills faid, that he rofe for the pur- 
 pofe of calling the attention of the Hcufe to the 
 Report of the Seledl Committee of laft Seffion upon 
 Colonial Military Expenditure. It would be recol- 
 lected that that Committee was inflruAed to inquire 
 and report whether any and what alterations might 
 be advantageoufly adbpted in regard to the defence 
 of the Britifh dependencies, and the proportions of 
 coft of fuch defence as now defrayed from Imperial 
 and Colonial funds refpedtively . That Committee 
 had been very impartially feledled, and comprifed 
 many Hon. Members who had devoted much atten- 
 tion to the fubjedt. The queftion being at once of 
 a financial, colonial, and military nature, the heads 
 of the Colonial Departmeht, the Secretary for War, 
 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Infpector- 
 General of Fortifications, and other experienced 
 witnefTes (among them Lord Grey and feveral 
 gentlemen who had held office under Home and 
 Colonial Governments) had been examined, and all 
 the attainable evidence which appeared to have any 
 
^WiPPP 
 
 i6 
 
 T 
 
 
 Mil 
 
 
 J!^ 
 
 i 
 
 ! 
 
 bearing upon the queftion had been taken by the 
 Committee. The refult was, that a Report was 
 prefented to the Houfe which, in all its main recom- 
 mendations, he might fay, had been unanimoufly 
 adopted. That Report was now on the table of 
 the Houfe. Before alluding to the motion which 
 flood in his name, and which was founded on the 
 recommendations of that Committee, he might be 
 allowed to difclaim the imputations which had been 
 too freely caft upon thofe hon. Members who had 
 thought it their duty to take any adlive part in 
 reducing our colonial military expenditure. It had 
 been faid that thofe who, whether in or out of Par- 
 liament, ventilated this queftion, in which the De- 
 pendencies and the parent State were alike interefted, 
 were, in fa<5t, aiming at the difmemberment of our 
 Colonial Empire. For his own part and that of the 
 Committee, he entirely difavowed any fuch inten- 
 tion. Throughout the inquiry it was not only 
 afTumed that Great Britain defired to maintain her 
 Colonial Empire, but that fhe aimed at developing 
 the refources of her Colonies, and qualifying them 
 for prefent felf-government and eventual independ- 
 ence. It was alfo affumed by the Committee that 
 Great Britain recognifed the claim of all portions of 
 the Britifh Empire to Imperial protectioti from 
 perils arifing from the confequences of Imperial 
 policy, and that the naval afTiftance of England was 
 eflential — indeed, was the only fubftantial protedion 
 which the Colonial Empire could expedb to receive 
 from the Imperial Government. But the Com- 
 mittee never entered into any queftion which would 
 
I? 
 
 at all involve the difmembertnent of our Colonial 
 Empire, or invite a policy which would tend to the 
 premature feverance of a Angle province which 
 now volunteered allegiance to the Britifli Crown. 
 Though the terms of the reference were very wide, 
 embracing in the comprehenfive term * Dependen- 
 cies ' all the outlying portions of the Empire, India, 
 the Mediterranean garrifons, the Weft African 
 Settlements for the.fuppreffion of the flave trade, and 
 all the military and naval ftations wherefoever 
 fituate, the Committee thought it beft not to extend 
 their inveftigation to thofe ftations which were main- 
 tained for Imperial purpofes, and which muft neces- 
 sarily be maintained, if at all, at Imperial coft, but 
 to limit their inquiry to thofe which came ftriAly 
 under the defignation of * Colonies.* The area of 
 inquiry, therefore, comprifed the North American 
 Colonies, the Auftralian Colonies (with the excep- 
 tion of Weftern Auftralia), the Weft Indies, the 
 Cape of Good Hope, New Zealand, the Mauritius, 
 and Ceylon. His hon. friend the Member for 
 Montrofe (Mr. Baxter) had given notice of an 
 amendment by way of addition to the motion now 
 before the Houfe with reference to fortification^. 
 He would merely remark, therefore, that the main 
 evidence given before the Committee on that fub- 
 ject related to the Mauritius, and tended to fnow 
 that while enormous expenditure had been incurred, 
 it was extremely doubtful whether the works that 
 had been carried out would ever prove of the leaft 
 utility to the Imperial Government. Upon the 
 queftion of fortifications, a refolution was pafled 
 
 VW-'- 
 
i8 
 
 .;i 
 
 m 
 
 1.* I 
 
 m 
 
 ;i t 
 
 ,:^h' 
 
 which conveyed the opinion of the Committee ; and 
 if any hon. Member would take the trouble to read 
 the evidence of Lord Herbert, Lord Grey, Admiral 
 Erfkine, and others, they would, he believed, agree 
 with him in thinking that the paragraph taken from 
 the Report of the Committee was well founded. 
 But to return to the motion of which he had given 
 notice : — Hon. Members might consider that his 
 refolution was a mere abftract proportion, and that 
 the adoption of it by the Houfe would be either 
 fuperfluous or mifchievous ; but he begged to fay 
 that the opinions embodied in the refolution were 
 by no means original, but opinions which had been 
 publicly exprefled by Lord Grey in his official cor- 
 refpondence with Lord Elgin and other ftatefmen 
 of high eminence in this country, and were to be 
 found in the defpatches of Sir William Denifon, one 
 of the ableft of our Colonial governors. They had 
 -been fupported by the right hon. and gallant Mem- 
 ber for Huntingdon (General Peel), who ftated, 
 when the Departmental Committee on Colonial 
 Military Expenditure was appointed, that this coun- 
 try ought to affifl the Colonies againft external 
 aggreflions, and, in a lefTer degree, againft the 
 attacks of formidable tribes ; but that in no cafe, 
 except where the Colonies were mere garrifbns, 
 fhould the mother country afTume the whole re{pon- 
 (ibility of their defence. That principle had been 
 alfo fully fupported by the evidence of Lord Her- 
 bert, who ftated that, inftead of keeping the troops 
 fcattered about the Britifh Dependencies, he would 
 concentrate them more at home ; and that the main- 
 
.<■ 
 
 19 
 
 tenance of large garrifons in the Colonies furnifhed 
 them with an excellent excufe for not raifing any 
 militia of their own. He would alfo refer to the 
 evidence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who 
 gave it as his opinion that the fact of the parent 
 State undertaking the defence of the Colonies had 
 an enervating and mifchievous effect upon the latter; 
 and likewife to that of Lord Grey, who maintained 
 that the introduction of the fyffc m of felf-govern- 
 ment into the Colonies made a material difF rence 
 in refpect to the policy to be purfued, \nd that 
 power and refponfibility ought to fo together. 
 There were differences in the different groups of 
 Colonies both as regarded their internal refources of 
 defence, and their expofure to external perils ; but 
 the principle fet forth in his refolution was the right 
 principle on which the Government fhould adl in 
 dealing with the Colonial Empire. All the wit- 
 neffes examined by the Committee had agreed that 
 where refponfible government was given to a Colony 
 the primary refponfibility of its military deftnce 
 fliould alfo be caft upon it. That was the principle 
 he had embodied in his refolution. He admitted 
 that to enunciate a found principle and to carry 
 it into pradbical operation were two different 
 things ; but he did not admit, as fome were pre- 
 pared to contend, that they muft fubmit in defpair 
 to the condition of things now exifting ; and that, 
 as in giving the Colonies refponfible government 
 no contraA was made that the Colonies fhould 
 undertake their felf-defence, therefore the whole 
 cofl of the defence of the Colonies mufl for ever 
 
20 
 
 }l 
 
 be borne by the mother country. Was it for a 
 moment to be contended that becaufe no claufe had 
 been inferted in the Act or Order in Council which 
 conferred reprefentative government on a Colony, 
 expreffly ftipulating for its felf-defence, that burden 
 was eternally to reft on the parent State, whatever 
 power or wealth the Colony fo circumftanced might 
 attain ? He protefted againft that argument as 
 altogether unfound, and maintained that the accept- 
 ance by the Colonies of the advantage of felf- 
 government implied at the fame time a compa(5b on 
 their part to undertake their own defence againft all 
 perils, except thofe to which they might be expofed 
 by the refults of Imperial policy, and, at all events, 
 to provide for their own internal order and fecurity . 
 But it was faid that, after all, the Colonies of Great 
 Britain, though they might be expenfive to the 
 parent State, could only be regarded as prodigal 
 fons, and mud be treated accordingly. He denied 
 that the parental analogy held good at all ; but if it 
 did, the only fucceflTul mode he knew of treating a 
 prodigal fon was to throw him upon his own 
 refources. It was faid, again, by fome, that in cer- 
 tain Colonies, fuch for inftance as New Zealand and 
 the Cape, the colonifts muft not be left to deal 
 (ingle-handed with the natives, as in that cafe 
 fcenes would refult which would aroufe the indigna- 
 tion of the people of England ; but he thought that 
 after trufting the Colonies with the entire manage- 
 ment of their own affairs, it was an infult to them to 
 infinuate that in coUidons with the natives they 
 would refort to barbarous and difgraceful praAices. 
 
 
21 
 
 With refpedb to the argument as to the inhumanity 
 of throwing our Colonies on their own refources in 
 the matter of their defence, he could only fay it was 
 criminal to give them the right of felf-government 
 if they were totally incapable of protedbing them- 
 felves ; and he believed that fo long as we went on 
 giving them unlimited power to draw on the Im- 
 perial army in the cafe of every quarrel of their 
 own, there could be no certainty that we fhould 
 not have a perpetual fucceflion of Kaffir wars, which 
 had already coft this country five millions fterling, 
 and fimilar difficulties in other portions of our 
 Empire. There was, moreover, an additional and 
 cogent reafon for compelling the Colonifls to take 
 upon themfelves the main refponfibility of keeping 
 themfelves out of thofe quarrels. The commifTariat 
 expenditure in thefe wars was enormous, and the 
 Colonifls had a direcfb interefl in the increafe of 
 thefe expenfes. Sir Harry Smith faid, fpeaking of 
 an unfucceflFul attempt on the Cape frontier to cap- 
 ture Sandilli, * This bit of a brufh with Sandilli cofl 
 us 56,000/. in waggon hire alone.' That outlay all 
 went into the pockets of the Colonifls at Cape 
 Town. He did not blame the Colonifls for endea- 
 vouring to put money into their pockets when they 
 could get it out of the commifTariat expenditure ; 
 but he did blame the Imperial Government for 
 perpetuating the prefent fyftem of keeping the 
 Colonies in a flate of everlafling minority and 
 childifh dependence. The fadl was, that our pre- 
 fent fyflem was not only far more extravagant but 
 little lefs cruel than the old Commando fyflem. 
 
22 
 
 I; 
 
 I. 
 
 .1! 
 
 II; : 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
 p-l:. 
 
 :i! 
 
 m 
 
 ;i • f 
 
 In 
 
 Not many years ago the 1 2th Lancers were almoft 
 maflacred in an impenetrable thorn-bufh on the 
 Cape frontier, on a fervice on which it was inhuman 
 to employ them ; and, according to the evidence of 
 Mr. Owen, whofe experience in the command of 
 frontier levies in that Colony gave weight to his 
 opinion, it feemed that there was little to choofe 
 between the old fyftem and the modern one on the 
 ground of philanthropy. In New Zealand a pecu- 
 liar difficulty exifted, and the refult of the prefent 
 fyftem was, that Sir George Grey was placed in a 
 moft anonialous pofition — that of having to ferve 
 two mafters — the Imperial Government and the 
 Legiflative Aflembly. He knew it might be 
 alleged that the troubles in which the Colonifts 
 became involved were in a great meafure the refult 
 of Imperial policy, but there could be no doubt 
 that the hoftilities had for the moft part a purely 
 local origin ; and he did not fee why the Govern- 
 ment and the people of this country fhould have for 
 ever to undertake the defence of the Colonies in 
 wars in which they might engage from motives 
 which we could not gauge, and under a policy 
 which we could not control. It appeared to him 
 that it was a cafe in which we muft either go for- 
 ward, and leave the Colonies more to their own 
 refources, or draw back, and deprive them of the 
 privileges of felf-government. But that latter courfe 
 was now pradically impoffible. He confefled that 
 he was not of thofe who were difpofed to indulge in 
 farcaftic obfervations on the ihode in which our 
 Colonifts had made ufe of their free inftitutions, for 
 
23 
 
 he could make a large allowance for the many and 
 great difficulties with which they had to contend in 
 attempting to carry out a fyftem of government for 
 which they had undergone no previous preparation; 
 and he entertained fanguine hopes, that under a 
 founder policy they would prove themfelves tp.jbe 
 as well qualified to bear the burdens as to exfrcife 
 the privileges of freedom. But perhaps he might 
 be told that a correA theory was one thing and 
 that its pradlical application was another ; and 
 he might be aflced what courfe he would recommend 
 the Imperial Government to purfue in the matter. 
 The fyftem he would fuggeft would be to leave off 
 the undignified haggling with local Governments, 
 hitherto of fuch frequent occurrence, and which had 
 invariably ended in bitter recriminations, and often 
 in Imperial humiliation, and purfue the courfe 
 adopted by Lord Grey in the cafe of our Auftralian 
 Colonies fome ten or twelve years ago — namely, 
 that of (imply announcing to them that certain aid 
 would be allowed them by the Imperial Government 
 in the fliape of troops from England ; and that if 
 more than that was required, it muft be at their own 
 expenfe. If that principle were adhered to, the 
 Colonifts would not be fo ready to involve them- 
 felves in war, and would be rather more circumfpedb 
 in their dealings with the native population, and the 
 Imperial Government would be fpared the ever- 
 lafting drain which was made upon its treafury for 
 the defence of the Colonies. He might be told that 
 the prefent was a very inopportune moment for 
 faying anything that could poflibly give offence to 
 
W: 
 
 ,|i 
 
 I 
 
 our Colonifts. So far as our North American 
 Colonies were concerned, he admired, in common 
 with others, the fpirit which they had recently dif- 
 played ; nor fhould he have complained if even a 
 larger number of tr jops had been (ent out there 
 4uring the winter for the reinforcement of the gar- 
 rifons ; but he begged to remind the Houfe that in 
 thofe Colonies there were from 80,000 to 90,000 
 Volunteers either already trained or in courfe of 
 training, and he regretted very much that thefe 
 defenfive operations had not been (boner commenced. 
 He hoped Canada would never forget that the train- 
 ing of her militia was a matter of the greateft 
 importance, and one which deeply affected her own 
 fecurity. All our Colonies, indeed, fhould be made 
 to feel that they were primarily refponfible for their 
 own defence againft all dangers in which their own 
 and not our Imperial policy had involved them. 
 He might mention that about three years ago a 
 member of the Legiflature of New South Wales 
 moved a refolution, which was carried by a majority 
 of 39 to II, in almoft precifely the fame terms as 
 that which he had now the honour to fubmit to the 
 Houfe. If, in a Colonial Legiflature, fuch a 
 propofition was moved and carried, it could not 
 be regarded as difcourteous to the Colonies that 
 the Imperial Parliament fliould adopt a flmilar 
 refolution. He hoped the Houfe would believe 
 that he had not intended to utter a Angle word 
 which could be confidered as difcourteous or un- 
 friendly towards the citizens of any portion of our 
 Colonial Empire. So far from wifliing to alienate 
 
25 
 
 the Colonies, or to prejudice their interefts, his 
 objed was to draw clofer the bonds of alliance which 
 united them with the mother country, and to qualify 
 them for all the rights, privileges, and duties of 
 felf- government. He concluded by moving, ' That 
 this Houfe, while it fully recognifes the claim of all 
 portions of the Britifh Empire on Imperial aid 
 againft perils arifing from the confequences of Im- 
 perial policy, is of opinion that Colonies exercifing 
 the rights of felf-government ought to undertake 
 the main refponfibility of providing for their own 
 internal order and fecurity.* 
 
 After a debate (in which Mr. Buxton, Mr. 
 Baxter, Mr. Chichefter Fortcscue, Sir James 
 Ferguson, Mr. Haliburton, and Mr. Childers took 
 part), the resolution, with an addition moved by 
 Mr. Baxter, was unanimoufly agreed to. 
 
SPEECH 
 
 ON CALLING ATTENTION TO DESPATCHES ON THE 
 DEFENCES OF CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND. 
 
 April 28, 1863. 
 
 Mr. Arthur Mills faid, he rofe to call attention 
 to the correfpondence which had recently been laid 
 before Parliament between Her Majefty's Govern- 
 ment and the Governors of Canada and of New 
 Zealand refpedbively, concerning the military de- 
 fences of thofe Colonies. In the courfe of the dif- 
 cuffions which had taken place on the Army Efti- 
 mates he (Mr. Arthur Mills) had been requefted 
 by feveral hon. Members to originate a debate in 
 which the general queftion of the relations between 
 Great Britain and her Colonies, in refpect to the 
 defence of the Empire, might fairly be raifed. A 
 more appropriate text for fuch a difcuffion could 
 not, in his opinion, be fuggefted, than the corref- 
 pondence to which he alluded, relating, it was true, 
 to two Colonies very differently circumftanced, 
 but - pointing, neverthelefs, to precifely the fame 
 political conclufions. It was fometimes infinuated 
 that thofe who ventured to impugn the extravagant 
 and unftatefmanlike principles which had governed 
 our Colonial policy were, in fact, aiming at the 
 abandonment of our dominions. For his own part. 
 
28 
 
 Pv 
 
 he (Mr. Mills) could only difclaim any defire to 
 alienate the allegiance of any of the Colonies, or to 
 precipitate the difmemberment of the Empire, while, 
 on the other hand, he did not defire to retain them 
 in fubjedlion one hour longer than they chofe. 
 Nor had he any wifh to enter into the queftion of 
 Colonial party politics, which more particularly 
 belonged to the colonifts themfelves. He would 
 briefly flate the fads of the cafe to which he wifhed 
 to call attention. 
 
 During the laft year a Commiflion had been 
 appointed in Canada, confifting of eight members, 
 feven of whom, he believed, were Canadians, to 
 inquire into the defences of Canada. They recom- 
 mended to the local Parliament that a militia force 
 of 50,000 men fhould be raifed and trained, toge- 
 ther with a referve force of the fame number. He 
 believed that the recommendation of the Commrs- 
 floners was unanimous. A Bill was brought in to 
 carry it out, but the Canadian Parliament did not 
 adopt it. And inftead of a local force of 50,000 
 men they embodied and trained only 15,000 — not 
 much more than one-fourth of the force recom- 
 mended by their own Commiflion as abfolutely 
 eflential for the defence of the Colony. At the 
 prefent moment there were little more than the 
 above named number of volunteers and militia men 
 armed, equipped, and partially trained in Canada. 
 In addition to the local force of 15,000, there were 
 about 1 2,000 Imperial troops in Canada, including 
 two battalions of Guards and the Canadian Rifles, 
 borne on the ftrength of the Britifli army. 
 
29 
 
 The Canadians juftified themfelves for their 
 apparent fhortcomings in self-defence, on the 
 ground that they were in no danger, and did not 
 think they ought to fubmit to the inconvenience 
 and expenfe of raifing a large force when they were 
 in no peril. He admitted that the Canadians were 
 the beft judges as to whetlier they were in peril or 
 not. But he would put the cafe thus. They were 
 either in peril or they were not. If they were in 
 peril, then they ought to have raifed a larger force 
 for the defence of the province, for if Canada were 
 really in danger of invafion, it was worfe than ridi- 
 culous to fuppofe that a frontier of i,ooo miles, 
 available by land or water at every point, could be 
 adequately protedled againft the incurflons of a 
 hoftile army by ten or a dozen Briti/h regiments, 
 unfupported by an adequate local force. If they 
 were not in peril, then they did not require 10,000 
 or 12,000 Imperial troops in Canada, whofe 
 expenfe was defrayed by the taxpayers of this 
 country. 
 
 It might be faid that to advocate the withdrawal 
 of the troops from Canada would, on grounds of 
 Imperial policy, be to make a monflrous propor- 
 tion ; but when the Houfe of Commons accepted, 
 by a formal Refolution laft year, the liability of 
 England for the protection of her Colonies from 
 perils occafioned by * Imperial policy,' could it be 
 contended for a moment that Canada was thereby 
 releafed from all refponfibility for her own defence ? 
 If England had bombarded New York or Portland, 
 or any city on the American feaboard, and had 
 
.. 
 
 ''€ 
 lift'' 
 
 30 
 
 thereby provoked an attack on Canada, England 
 would undoubtedly be bound to bear the brunt of 
 fuch an invafion as her own policy had invited ; but 
 he Ihould wifh to know in what eftimation the 
 loyalty of the Canadians was to be held, if they 
 ihowed no sympathy with us in fuch^afes, for ex- 
 ample, as that of the 'Trenty in which an infult to 
 the Britifti flag involved an infult to every citizen 
 of the empire over which that flag waved ; nor 
 could he underftand upon what grounds the inhabit- 
 ants of a wealthy and profperous Colony could be 
 juftified in cafting upon the mother country the 
 whole of the refponfibility which flie was willing to 
 fliare with them. 
 
 The relations which ought to fubfift between this 
 country and Canada in refpedb to the queftion of 
 her defence had, he thought, been very well laid 
 down in a defpatch of the Duke of Newcaftle, in 
 which he ftated that the main fecurity againfl: 
 aggreflion which the latter enjoyed, confifted in the 
 fadt that a war with Canada meant a war with 
 England, but that it did not therefore follow that 
 England could aflFord to maintain there an unlimited 
 number of troops, while it ftill remained true that 
 the defence of Canadian territory muft mainly de- 
 pend on the Canadians themfelves. 
 
 In bringing the fubjedt forward he was not ac- 
 tuated by any fpirit of hoftility to Her Majefty's 
 Government ; on the contrary, he introduced it 
 hecaufe he believed the executive Government of 
 lis country needed the fupport of Parliament in 
 cii -rying on a correfpondence in which it appeared 
 
31 
 
 from the papers, Canada had aded the part rather 
 of a hoflile power than of an integral portion of 
 the empire. The total fum paid by the Parliament 
 and people of Canada in 1862, for the various 
 purpofes to which he had referred, was only be- 
 tween 60,000/. and 70,000/. as againft a fnm 
 (excluiive of extras) paid by this country of little 
 lefs than a million fterling. But this was not a 
 caufe in which Imperial England could be called 
 upon to bargain and wrangle with a dependency to 
 which fhe had conceded the full privileges of free- 
 dom. In the right folution of this queflion were 
 involved the interefts and fafety of Canada, far 
 more clofely than thofe of the Parent State. He 
 did not think that they ought to be carrying on 
 protra(fted negotiations on the fubjedt with the 
 Government of Canada. He confidered that the 
 time was come for taking a more decifive attitude, 
 and for putting an end to the undignified and un- 
 fatiffactory wrangling between the Secretary of State 
 and the Parliament of Canada — ^whether by the 
 Canadians increating their militia force or the 
 Government of England withdrawing the troops 
 from Canada he did not pretend to fay ; but one of 
 thofe two courfes ought in the interefts of Canada, 
 no lefs than of England, to be immediately adopted. 
 Paffing from Canada to New Zealand, he might 
 obferve that though the cafe of the latter Colony 
 was widely different from that of Canada, they 
 were almoft identical in that both were nearly inde- 
 pendent. The colony of New Zealand had pof- 
 fefled a Conftitution for ten years. When that 
 
m 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 32 
 
 Conftitution was granted, the Crown thought pro- 
 per to make a refervation with reference to the 
 right of dealing with the native races — not in the 
 fpirit of interference with the powers of the local 
 Parliament, but in obedience to the principles which 
 had adbuated this country in dealing with thofe 
 portions of the empire which were inhabited by 
 warlike tribes. Whether that refervation was 
 wifely made or otherwife he would not difcufs, but 
 its effect had been from that time forward to throw 
 nearly every expenfe incurred for the defence of 
 the colony upon the Imperial Government. 
 
 The intricate and complicated queftion of New 
 Zealand native policy, with its unpronounceable 
 names and unintelligible diflinctions was a field of 
 difcuffion on which he (Mr. Mills) had no defire 
 to invite the Houfe of Commons now to enter; 
 but he would venture to afk one queftion — Was 
 the claim on the part of the people or the Legifla- 
 ture of New Zealand well founded ? They faid, 
 * You, the Crown of England, by your reprefenta- 
 tives, have been meddling in Colonial affairs, fo you 
 muft bear all the refponfibility of conflidls with the 
 natives.* But to what extent, as compared with the 
 Colonial Legiflature, had the Crown of England 
 interfered? In 1858 alone, no lefs than four Ads 
 dealing with the natives were paffed in the Colonial 
 Legiflature, none of which were difallowed or in- 
 terfered with, but received the Royal affent. The 
 Imperial Parliament, during the laft fix years, had 
 only paffed two A6ts of any importance — one by 
 which the Queen relinquiftied zny Jcintilla of power 
 
33 
 
 that might previoufly have been referved, and the 
 other guaranteeing a loan of half a million to New 
 Zealand. In the mean time, the war expenditure 
 occafloned by fettling difputes in which we, as a 
 nation, had not the minuted intereft, had been 
 almoft entirely borne by Great Britain. For five 
 years negotiations had been carried on between fuc- 
 ceflive Secretaries of State in England and the 
 New Zealand Government with the object of in- 
 ducing the Colony to pay the moderate fum of 5/. 
 a man for the foldiers employed in its defence. 
 Every one of thofe foldiers coft England 100/. per 
 man per annum, and it was fought to make New 
 Zealand bear one-twentieth of their coft. Sanguine 
 economifts hoped that fuch an arrangement had 
 been effected, but it would appear from the lateft 
 accounts that of the proportion of 35,000/. to be 
 fuftainedfor the year 1862 by the Colony, 25,000/. 
 were fwept away by various deductions, leaving 
 only 10,000/. to be contributed by the Colony 
 towards the vaft military expenditure of which Sir 
 George Grey fpoke in the following terms :— 
 
 The rate of military expenditure now going on, allowing 
 nothing for the coll: of operations in the field, amounts to nearly 
 400,000/. a year, and to this a fum of 260,000/. will have to be 
 added for each fix months' operation in the field, or a fum of 
 520,000/. a year, making a total of 920,000/. a year if opera- 
 tions are continued ; and I concur with the Lieutenaht-General 
 in thinking that the fum actually expended would be more likely 
 to exceed than to fall fhort of this fum. When to this amount 
 are added the sums due to the fervices not included in the 
 Eftimates the total military expenditure will be very largely in- 
 creaied. 
 
I 
 
 Iki 
 
 I 
 
 34 
 
 The Colonial Treafurer, moreover, gravely sug- 
 gefted that no prefent attempt fhould be made to 
 meet thefe liabilities, but, after the native difficulty 
 was at an end, and the refpedlive proportions to be 
 borne by the Imperial Government and the Colony 
 had been afcertained, that a loan fhould be raifed 
 to cover the latter. The practical inference to be 
 drawn from the correfpondence was, in his mind, 
 that the time had come, not for negotiation, not 
 for despatch writing, but for distindfc and definite 
 adion. That a(5lion need not involve any hardfhip 
 upon the people of New Zealand. The cafe was 
 argued as if England was leaving the Colonifts to 
 their fate, or, ftill worfe, leaving the Colonifts to 
 murder the Maoris, a fuppofition which was (hock- 
 ing to thofe philanthropifts who before contended 
 for the granting of reprefentative inftitutions to 
 thofe very Colonifts, and for absolute rights of 
 self-government. Surely, if men were capable of 
 managing their own affairs, they ought to know 
 how to behave in face of a warlike race like the 
 Maoris. Nor was it lefs than a libel on the ioo,cx)0 
 European inhabitants of New Zealand to infinuate 
 that even if they were left to fight their own battles 
 with the 50,000 natives of that Colony, the refult 
 would be an indifcriminate mafTacre in the caufe of 
 civilifation. He did not fay that England would 
 be able to retire altogether from thefe contefts, but 
 if the Colonifts, without being deferted, were taught 
 to lean more on themfelves, there would be fewer 
 difturbances, and they would behave with greater 
 circumfpedion towards the native race, knowing 
 
3S 
 
 that they would no longer be backed up in all their 
 unrighteous claims. 
 
 Accufations of injuftice might be levelled againft 
 the Parent State, for pradbically enforcing the doc- 
 trine, that Englifhmen who, as Colonifts, have volun- 
 tarily taken up their lot in diflant lands, mud 
 accept the rifles of their own adbs together with 
 their prefumed advantages ; but it mud be remem- 
 bered that the relations of England towards her 
 Colonies had entirely changed. She could no longer 
 legiflate for them; fhe could not recall the days 
 when they were bound to her by exclufive commer- 
 cial treaties, or when they were compelled to receive 
 her criminal population. The queftion in the prefent 
 day was no longer whether Great Britain ihould tax 
 her Colonies, but to what extent the Colonies fhould 
 be permitted to tax Great Britain. The problem 
 to be folved involved not merely a compenfating 
 adjuftment of burdens as between Great Britain and 
 her dependencies, but the graver queftion whether 
 the inhabitants of the Britifh iflands (an area of lefs 
 than 130,000 fquare miles) could for ever undertake 
 the defence of a fcattered empire of 4,000,000 
 fquare miles, fpread over all quarters of the earth. 
 Men were now aflcing, very naturally, whether, at 
 this time efpecially of fevere commercial diftrefs at 
 home, the diftant Colonies of our Empire were to 
 be permitted permanently to garrifon their fron- 
 tiers with our troops, while they excluded our 
 manufactures from their markets. He believed 
 ihat Great Britain had it in her power to retain 
 her Colonies not in a fubjugation, like that of 
 
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 36 
 
 the Colonies of ancient Rome, by ftringent laws, 
 and vaft armies, but in an afFeAionate and far 
 more enduring allegiance. If the Home Govern- 
 ment were really about to inaugurate a better 
 fyftem, he believed, that fo far from the days of 
 their Colonial empire being numbered, the affections 
 of the Colonies for the mother country would be 
 more clofely cemented than if they continued to be 
 alternately dandled and overawed. The Colonies 
 had fhown the moft generous feelings towards the 
 mother country by their benevolent contributions 
 during the Ruffian war, the Indian mutiny, and 
 now during the diflrefs in the cotton diflrids. 
 What they had now to be taught by a refolute and 
 decifive policy on the part of that Houfe was that 
 communities mufl fhare in the burdens and refpon- 
 fibilities, if they would participate in the privileges, 
 of free men. The hon. Member concluded by 
 moving an Addrefs for the Correfpondence. 
 
 
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