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Q N JD a M:^ 1^ Printed forH^GRiFFiTHS, oppofite Somcrfet^ ._(■■ ^:i t\ '^^^ii&i^- Ji t*.^ '.I ': ' Countrymen and Friends^ k r ■•^ IT is inconceivable, to Slaves of other NationSj in what Degree every Individual in this King» dom may juftly boaft himfelf to have a Share^ as well in giving Laws to his Country, as in the in^mediate Adminiftration of its Government. The Sovereign, indeed, makes Choice of his Minifters, and the People have their Reprefenta- tives in Parliament ; but neither, by the Alle* giance they pay the one, nor the Confidence they place in the other, do Britons give up this natu-> ral Right, to be ftill Mafters of their own Pro* perties, and Guardians of their own Liberties. The recent Experience of a few Years pall may furnifh us with ftriking Inftanccs, how loud the Voice of the People is heard in England, both on the Throne and in the Se- nate \ Inftances, that prove the vail Importance of its being diilinguifhed. from the impetuous Clamour of a faftious Multitude, by its Conibr" mity to the more fober Didlates of Reafon and Truth. Non omnini temere ftt, quod vulgb die* titant. It is to youi therefore, my Pel low-Country- men, and not to any of thofe great men, whofe Importance depends, in fo eminent a Degree* on the Conformity of their Condudt to the Voice of the Public, that I conceive it ncceffgry to ad* drefs myfelf at this Jun^ure* B Amiddl [ 2 ] Amidft the Preparations for adling frcfh Scenes of Slaughter and Defolation, the enfu- ing Campaign, a Peace is fometimes talked of ; and we are flattered by many that it is near at Hand. God grant it may ! A favourable Prof- pe£t, indeed, prefents itfelf, of obtaining a no lefs honourable than lading one, if we trifle not with the prefent Opportunity, and the enemy be, as It is furmifed, really deflrous of putting an immediate end to the War. But, perhaps, the latter is not fo certain as is commonly imagined ; and, with refpeft to the former, I confefs it, I am not withoi}t my Fears. For I will make no Scruple to declare it of the utmoft Confequence to this Nation, that the expelled Treaty fhould be hallened, by all the prudent Means the moft artful Negotiator can fuggeft; and that for us wilfully to run the Hazard of unnecefTary Delays, will be as im- politic, as the Confequences may be dangerous. In our prefent Circumftances, it might ill iiecome tw to fue for Peace ; but, to oflTer rea- fonable Terms of Accommodation, and to enter readily into every Meafure, conffftent with our Honour and Intereft, to facilitate it, may, I prefume, be, without Difficulty, proved not only expedient bus necefl[ary. You have, indeed, been frequently told, on this OccaP^i* that you are under no Neceffity to have recourfe to the Arts of Negotiation •, that you are in a Condition to impofe your own Terms t 3 ] Terms on the vanquilhed Enemy ; and that, in your Circumftances as Vidors, you fhould deliberate at Leifure on a Peace ; for no Delay can be dangerous. But havre thefe notable Adr vifers aOTured you how long we (hall remain in thefe vidorious Circumftances? Have they monopolized the Means of Succefs, and left nothing to the future Fortune of War ? You may remember we were not always Vigors •» and it would not be improper to reile we may not always continue fuch. ; [ As it is not my De(ign, however, to indulge romantic Hopes and ill grounded Expedlaitions on the one Hand j fo, on the other, I do not mean to encourage chimerical Sufpicion&, or intimidate with groundlefs Fears. 1 cannot con- ceive, neverthclcfs, that we have any fufficient Rcafon to prefume the Hand of Providence will always continue to be exerted in fo wonderful a Manner, as it has lately been, in our Favour. As Prefcience is not the Gift of Humanity, it is therefore, by the general Experience of paft Times, and the common Courfe of Events, that we mu(t regulate our Condudl. On the prefent Occafion then, let us calmly confider what has contributed to thofe Events^ that have fo furprifingly elated this Nation, and deprcfled its Enemies. Let us take an impar- tial View of our different Circumftanqes at pre- fent, and thence judge by Probabil0 of the future. W-[ B 2 i£*erhat's, [ 4 J Perhaps, notwithftanding all the Rcafon we have had, of late, to be fatisficd with the Mea- fures of a wife and prudent Adminiftration •, notwithftanding all the jull Encomiums fo freely made on the Conduifl of our Commanders, and the Intrepidity of our Troops j if Partiality to ourfelves were entirely laid afide, we (hould find our late Succefs no lefs owing to a providential Concurrence of fortunate Circumftanccs, than either to minifterial Wifdom or military Valour. In like Manner, were our real Situation duly attended to, notwithftanding the Advantages we have gained of the Enemy, we (hould, per- haps, find little Reafon for our immoderate Triunrtph. Perhaps alfo, thofe Advantages would be found lefs decjjive, and the Enemies Lofles lefs irreparable, or at leaft much lefs rui- nous and intolerable, than we now are apt to flatter ourfelves they arc. Refpefting the Means of our Succefs; it would be an invidious Talk to enter minutely into Particulars, and might be conftrued into a mdevolent Defign of depreciating the Merit of many, to whofe gallant or prudent Behaviour, in their refpedlivc Stations, their Country is fo greatly indebted. But, without difparaging the Condufb of any of thofe, who may have dcferved well at the Hands of their Fellow-Country me A, without cafting th^: leaft Soil, by Refleftion, on the Luftre of'Shcir Charadlers, it may be juftly af- ferted of t 5 ] ferted that fomc of our late Expeditions have been ill planned, and worfe directed ; and that the Defign of others, as well as the Perfons and Means employed to carry them into Execution, have been ill adapted to fuch arduous Enter- prizes. This has been palpable enough, where we have been unfuccefsful ; as the feveral Blun- ders made on the Coaft of France^ and in North yimerica^ may inglorioufly teftify. And if, in feme others more prudently direded, we have been fo happy as to fucceed, has it not rather been owing to adventitious Circumflances, and the greateft good Fortune in the World, than to the Meafures calculated to infure Succefs ? I will not infift on our fhameful Mifcarriage at Rochforty or foolifh Retreat at Sf. Cas ; the Siege of ^ebec^ and the Battle of Minden are our favourite Obje6ks of Triumph. But if our Expedition againft the former had not fucceeded, (and how great a Chance has it appeared that it did not I) might it not, at this Time, have been reprefented as a wrong- healed En- terprize, favouring of Quixotifm, and lend- ing only to the Deftru<5tion of the Adventurers ; who were too few, too ill fupplied, or too ill direded, to carry their Point ? Might not the projeded Affiftance of our American Troops, in the Neighbourhood of Crcwn-Point^ have been virulently expoded, as (it indeed appears to have been) premature and chimerical ? Might it not have been efteenr.ed a grofs Inftance of Ignorance Ivl [ 6 ] Ignorance or Imprudence in the Projcftors of fuch an Armament^ to have made the mod for- midable Part of it fuch, as the very Nature of the Place would render ufdefs -, while, at the fame Time, they had fent only a handful of brave Men to oppofe the whole Force of Cana- da *i Nay, might not hence the whole Defign have been condemned, as a futile and infufficient Attempt, unadvifedly and foolilhly calculated to facrifice our Men and Money, without effec- tually indemnifying ourfelves, or annoying the Enemy ? This might have been done ; I may venture to affert, it would have been done, and would have obtained Credit too, among Thoufands of thofe who now attribut? to the Wifdom of the Adminiftration, and the Greatnefs of our mili- tary Force, that Succefs, which the late brave Man, to whom we owe it, once defpaired of, and, urged perhaps by that Motive, to a moft defperaie Attempt, was himfelf the only Means of obtaining, at the Expence of his Life , I fay only Means, as it is more than probable, in the Circumftances the Befiegers then were, that no • Bv the Nature of the River, the mofl formidable Part of this Armament is deprived of the Power of ai?arig, yet wc have almcft the whole Force of Canada to opporc— The Affairs of Grc t Britain, I know,. require vi^orou/. Mt-afures } but then- the Courage of a Handiul of b ;ive Men (houla be ewrted only where there is fome Hope of a favoyrab^e £vent. Woifi% Letter to Secretary Pitt. ' "-'•••• -other [ 7 ] Other General in the Service (without the lead Difparagement to the Bravery of any) would have hazarded the Attempt, which crowned their Enterprize with Succefs. Nay, perhaps, had it not been attended with that Succefs, tlie Attempt itfelf might have been condemned, by Men more cautious than bold, as ra/h and imprudent. Again, the Battle of Minden was as unpro- vided for as the \''i6tory was unexpeftcd j nay, certain it is, that the Commander in chief was fo powerfully poflcffed of the Notion that he muft be defeated, if he fhould be forced, at that Time, into a Battle, that he could hardly credit the Fadb, when, by an amazing Inftancc of Valour in. the Britijh Infantry, he faw the Enemy beaten out of the Field. Is it now from the miraculous Succefs of un- timely and ill-planned Projects ; is it from the accidental Gain of defperate Battles, into which we have been furprized, and wherein Vjdory turned only on the fuperior Bravery of a Hand- ful of Men, that we confidently promife our- felves Security and future Conqueft ? It may be remembered, the Plains of Fontenoy, as well as thofe of Minden, have witnefled the Superiority of Brifijb Valour, though not with equal Suc- cefs. Nunc pluity €t claro nunc Jupiier athcrefulget. But, r [ 8 1 But, leaving this apparently invidious Sub- je6t, let us consider what Reafons we may have to flatter curfelves with the Continuation of our prcfent Superiority in the War, either from our own peculiar Abilities to profecute it, or thofe which our late Advantages over the Enemy may have given us. Perhaps, a View of our prefent Circumftanccs> ftript of that Glofs and falfe Colouring, which recent Succefs has thrown upon the Perfpedtive, will not be pleafing. Nay, were it not contrafted to fome Advantage by the more cloudy Profpedt of the Situation of the Enemy, it were enough to make us tremble at our own. The Government an hundred Millions in Debt, the neceffary Expences of the War in- creafing this immenfe Sum yearly, by additional Millions, in what can this monilrous Burthen of national Credit end? Will not the enormous Weight of fuch a Debt very foon infallibly crufli the Author of its Being ? Nay, what Ihall wc not have to fear on this Account, even {hough a fpecdy Peace (hould enable us to (it down with only a few Millions added to the prefent Sum ? Might we not, in fpeaking on this Subject, join heartily with the zealous Patriot, who lately expreffed his Apprehenfions for the Independency of the Conftitution, when refleding on that in- finite Dependance on the Crown, that has been created by Means of the national Debt * ? * See a Let;er to Tofo Great Men, p, 44. Does / [ 9 ] Docs not another Confideration, alfo, as Jittle attended to as greatly important, naturally arifc, when we think on the Numbers of thofe who arc fupportcd in Indolence or Luxury, by the Intereft of the Funds ? Indolence in every State is deflrudlive-, and though moderate Luxu- ry (if fuch an Expreflion may be ufed) in Pof* fcflbrs and Cultivators of Land, in Artifts, Ma- nufacturers, &c. may have its Ufe, as it can be fupported only by Ingenuity and Induftry, in the Cultivation of the mechanical or economical Arts ; yet nothing can be more pernicious than the Luxury of thofe, who live idly on the La- bour of others. There are Men, it is true, fo fhort-fighted as to fuppofe the Confumption of thofe Commo- dities, from which the Government draws its Revenues, fo neceffary, that, while the Pro- prietors of Stock fpend their Income at home, they conceive them to adl the Part of ufeful Ci- tizens, and to be profitable Members to the Commonwealth. Did Art or Nature, indeed, fo gencroufly reward the Labour of Individuals, by fo plentifully providing them thereby, with the Articles of Convenience or Luxury, as to afford befides a Superfluity of thofe Articles for others, thefe ufelefs Confumers might be over- looked as infignificant : But, fince the Cafe is far otherwife, it is evident the whole Tribf of Stock- holding Gentry, with their numerous At- tendants, are fupported at the Expence cf the C landed r S't.-* ?» [ lO ] haded and laborious Part of the Nation ; and, though made Ufe of as the Means of raifing the Taxes, inftead of facilitating their Payment, add grievoufly to the Burthen and increafe the Difficulty of fupporting it. As the Increafe of Taxes, alfo, tends to in- creafe the Number of Stock- holders, fo muft the Price of all the Means of Life, and confe* quently of Labour, increafe, till it come to a Degree incompatible with the Profperity, or even the Being, of many of our Manufactories. It is further a melancholy Refledlion to think, in how many Inflances the NecelTity of raifmg fuch vaft Sums as the Exigencies of State re- quire, contributes to promote Idlenefs and De- bauchery, in the lower Clafles of People. It may be fufficient here to hint only at the Diftil- leryj and barely to mention the Cafe of Tipling Houfes, the unlimited Number of which are fo pernicious to the Morals and Manners of thofe, on whom both the Wealth and Strength of the Nation ultimately depend. Can it be denied that in thefe, as in many other Cafes, the moft prudential Maxims of do- meftick Polity have not been difpenfed with, under Pretence of the Neceflity 6f promoting the Revenue ? Nothing, indeed, can be more abfurd than to imagine the Duties, arifing from the Means of intoxication. Debilitation and Riot, more beneficial to a (iate, than Sobriety 3 • and V any do- th, ing ore om and iety and [ " ] and Regularity of Manners : but while Thoufands find their Intereft fo intimately conne6led with the increafe of the Revenues, it js no wonder, while fuch a Plea is at Hand, that it fhould be too often made Ufe of, to dangerous Purpofes. Waving thefe Confiderations, however, as perhaps too general for the prefent Occafion, let me afk, if the Weight of this Incumbrance is not likely very foon to affcA us too fenfibly, in the Means of carrying on the War ? Can it be conceived that the Danger attending our immenfe Debt is ftill at too great a Diftance to be feared, or provided againft ? May we not be faid to have already felt the contrary? Reflect on the mortifying Inftance of the Lofs the Sub- fcribers fuftained lafl: Year, in being obliged, many of them, to fell out, at almoft Twenty per Cent, under ?ar. Tell me at what Price does their Stock Hand now ? The World may, for awhile, be blinded by the fecret Allowance of Premiums to large Subfcribers ; but this Method of raifing Money, if ever it Ihould be pradlifed, cannot lad long. I know Occafion has been taken, from our hav- ing been able to provide fo immertfely for the Supplies of pother Year, to boaft that the like may be done for Years to come *. If it be put to the Proof, we (hall, perhaps, find * See Letter to Two Great Men, p* 51. C 3 our- I :] m M, E:l« [ " ] ourfelves greatly miftaken. I hope, therefore, we (hall not run the Rifque of fo mortifying a Difappointment ; which, after our inordinate boafling, may fubjed us to the Ridicule of all Europe. But, fuppofing we may yet borrow, at the Hazard of National Ruin, five or fix Millions annually, for fome Time longer ; at what rate is this Money to be had ? It is mod infallibly certain that we muft foon give greater Intereft than we have as yet done y and perhaps than the Purpofes for which we borrow will enable us to pay. The Rife of Intereft was plainly forefeen laft Year; and, though the critical Bankrupccy of the French Government gave ours a temporary Advantage in their late Subfcription, do we not fee the Adventurers already in a fair Way of repenting their Bargain ? > 'lefle(5l on the ordinary Expences of Govern- ment, at the prefent Jundure. From twelve to fourteen MilHons Sterling annually ! What an immenfc Sum ! It may have been neceflary. It may have been well applied. But, for God's fake, what poffible Advantage* can we think to gain, by continuing the War beyond the prefent Period, fufficient to indemnify us even in thq Article only of thefe exorbitant Expences ? j In aniwer to this Queftion, we are naturally Jed to the more pleafing Profpcdt o^ our Circum- ftances, relieved by Contraft with thofe of the Enemy. \' \ [ «s ] Enemy. On a careful Infpedlon, however, favourable as it is, even this may be found to afFord us too barren a View, to give us hope of reaping a more glorious Harveft by the Pro- fecution of the War. As I have not exaggerated our own Situation, refpefting the Rifque our National Credit will infalHbly run,' by continuing the War, and our Inabilities to carry it on, but at the Hazard of domeftick Ruin ; I (hall admit only of as juft a Reprefentation of the Circumftances of the Enemy. I fliall not fcruple to fay, therefore, thefc have been much exaggerated -, as future Experience will, in all Probability, convince you. That the French Nation have fufFered ex- tremely in their Navigation and Commerce, and confequenily the State muft be greatly diftreffed in its Finances, are undoubted Truths-, fuch, indeed, as we cannot refledt upon, as Britons, but with the greateft Satisfaction. Stript of their Colonies, and ruined in their Marine, they arc undoubtedly, as a commercial and maritime Nation, reduced low indeed. But let us not plume ourfelves too much on this Reflection. France is ftill formidable as a military Power; ftill capable of doing an infinite deal of Mif- chief to others, though but little of benefiting itfelf. However cxhaufted its Finances; however ruined in its Trade ^ it hath ftill its Refources. Ic [ H 1 It IS a Country to which Nature has been fo indulgent, that It is not eafiiy eat up at home ; and what is it that a Sovereign, who is in a great Degree abfolute Mafter of the Lives and Pro- perties of his Subjefts, cannot cffeft, when urged by the Ncceflities of the Times to take defperate Mcafures to fupport a defperate Caufe. God grant, indeed, their Caufe be aftually fo ruinous as the lead fanguine among us fuppofc. And yet, perhaps, Circumftances, really def- perate, may, eventually at leaft, be the word a Nation, prudently defirous of a Peace, (hould wifti their Enemy reduced to. To have little or nothing more to lofe that can be loft ; and to have every Thing to hope, that can at all be hoped for, from their Perfeverance in the War, are not Motives to excite them to fpeedy Terms of Accommodation. On the contrary, will not fuch Motives na- turally induce them to try the Fortune of ano- ther, and yet another. Campaign ? at the End cf which, who can tell how far our own Situa- tion may be comparatively changed for the worfe ? l^efcis quid ferns vefper vehit. It has, indeed, been roundly aflcrtcd, and that with the moft egregious Affurance, that ' it is entirely owing to the German Part of the * prefent War, that France appears fo low in * the political Scale of Strength and Riches, ' that [ »5 ] * that (he IS found to ^« a (inking Monarchy, nay * a Monarchy already funk.* * Full of the Projedb,* it is faid, « of con- * quering Hanover^ (he faw herfeif obliged to en- ' gage in exorbitant Ex^'nces 5 Armies were to ' be paid and maintained in Weflphalia, and * on the Rhine ; vaft Sums were to be ad- * vanced to the Court of Vienna^ always as in- ' digent as it is haughty ; the ravenous Ruf- ' lians, and the degenerate Swedes, would not ' move unlefs allured by Subfidies; and the * Mouth of every hungry German Prince was to * be ftopt with the Louis d*6rs of France, In- * volved in Expences thus enormous, our Ene- * mies have been prevented from ftrengthening ' themfelves at Sea, where England had moil * Reafon to dread their becoming (Irong *.' This declamatory Method of Argumentation, however plaufible it may feem, is little con- clutive. General AiTertions prove nothing. It is not, for Inllance, made as yet very clear tha^; the Conqueft of Hanover coft France fuch an immenfe Sum in the Acquidtion, as is here hinted at; The Armies maintained in Weftphalia, and on the Rhine, coft the French Government little more (I have been told lefs) than they would have done, had thofe Troops been all the while idling at home. And, in general, the • Letter to Two Great Men, p. 36, 37, 38. it ml great \i-( t i6 ] great Number of Men which the French keep on foot, even in Time of Peace, makes the ad- ditional Expence of a War on the Continent much lefs to them than is commonly imagined by us, on whom the Maintenance of a handful falls fo burthenfome. In fad, alfo, the Quan- tum of the Subfidies paid by the Enemy to their Allies, during this War, has not been fo pro- digious as to impoverifh the fo much as you have been taught to believe. No ; it has not been the continental but the naval Part of the War, in which the natural Force of Great Bri- tain has been properly exerted, that has reduced France fo low in the political Scale of Strength and Riches. That the Enemy's Want of Money, occafion- ed by the exorbitant Expence of their Alliances and the Maintenance of their Armies in Ger- many, was the only, or at leaft the principal Reafon, that prevented their ftrengthening them- felves by Sea, is a Pofition, indeed, almoft too abfurd to be debated. There is not a Man of Common Senfe in the Kingdom, but muft be fcnfible that the Lofs they fuftained, before and after the formal Declaration of War, by the Capture of their Ships, and the Detention of their Seamen in our Prifons,' was more efFedtual in preventing their ftrengthening themfelves by Sea than all the extraordinary Engagements they have entered into, or Armies they have paid and fupported on the Continent, After [ >7 3 After the War broke out, alfo, many Diffi- culties prefented themfelves, from their Want of Materials for building, repairing and equip- ping their Ships, which no Money, had they ever fo much in the Treafury, or were their Fi- nances in ever fuch good order, could ob- viate. With refpeft to Hanover too, it is certain that, had they been as fuccefsful in keeping, as in acquiring it, they would have found them- felves Gainers by the Expedition ; abftradted from the Confideration of what general Ufe it might have been to them, in profecuting the War, or in negotiating a Peace. It is notorious that Hanover fell an eafy Sacrifice : And there is Reafon to believe that, had not that expe- rienced and able General •, who conquered it, been obliged to leave the Army, on Account of the Intrigues and Cabals of his perfonal Ene- mies at Court, his great Prudence and Fore- fight would have taken fuch Meafures as would have more effedtually fecured its PofTeflioni Even as it was, however, the accidental Mortality among their Troops undoubtedly operated more than any other Caufe to the Enemy's evacuating that Ele(florate. It is not without fufficient Reafon, alfo, (houlu it be aflerted that the Caufe why they have not been already in Pofl*eirion of it again, is rather owing to the clafhing of perfonal In- teretts at Court, and divided Councils both in the • Marihal D'Etrees. D Cabi- ■ [ 18 ] Cabinet and the Field, than to their natural In- ability, either from want of Men or Money, to profecutc the War on the Side of Germany with Succefs. This having been the Cafe, who can tell but repeated Ill-Succefs may have the fame Effect on the disjointed Councils of France as it had, not long fince, on thofe of this Kingdom ? Self- intereft and private Refentment may fubfide ; Mi- niflers and Commanders may unite to do their Duty *, and the Confequence, as in our own Cafe, be the Revival of a difpirited, defpifed People to Conqueft and to Glory. Confider, my Fellow Countrymen, what a mortifying Stroke this will prove to us, after having indulged ourfelves, as we now do, in the utmoft Excefs of Triumph and Exultation. Let us not, therefore, give Occafion for it by relying too much on the Diftrefs and fuppofed Weak- nefs of the Enemy. This, at lead, is certain ; that they may reap fome Advantages, as to their future Abilities of carrying on the War, even from their ill For- tune. The Gain flowing into the Treafury, from the Duties laid on the Articles of their extenlive Commerce, is, indeed, put a Stop to. But, at the fame Time, on the other hand, the Charge of fupporting a large Marine, and a diftant expen- five Colony, is rendered needlefs, by the peftruc- tion of the one and the Lofs of the other. They will, therefore, hardly, for the future, fit out Fleets at a great Expence to fail without an Er- rand, f c f t 1 p o t( a t «9 ] rand, or freight Ships only to be taken. Fatal Experience will, doubtlefs, teach them a Lelfon we ourfelves have fo great); profited by, not- withftanding we appear at prefent fo very willing to unlearn it again ; which is, to employ their natural Strength againfl their Enemies, and pufh with all their Force on that Element and in that Quarter, where their Endeavours are moft likely to fucceed. They fee, or have Reafon enough to fee, very plainly, that their Trade and Colonies are inde- fenfible by any Effort they can now make with their Marine ; and that it may be as well to let their few remaining Ships of War rot in their Harbours, as to fit them out only to fall into the Hands of the Enemy. They have, therefore, no other probable Way of indemnifying themfelves for the LofTes already fuftained, or of prevailing on us to accede to a Treaty of Peace on any Terms, ihortof the moftdifgraceful and difadvantageous, than to profccute the War with all their Force in Germany. To do this, they will probably begin to think of aflifting the Queen of Hungary in earneft, and pufh forward to make themfelves again Mailers of Hanover: In which Cafe, who can pretend to fay what may be our Situation at the End of another Campaign ? You have been told that we fhail, in all Proba- bility, lofe none of the Advantages gained in the lad Campaign, by the enfuing one, * if our * Army, ftill headed by Prince Ferdinandy who ^i I i D 2 has [ »o ] • haJ already gained fo many Laufets, be render* • ed more formidable by fending to ic fome Thou' • fands more of our national Troops ♦.* I liopc we fhall not ; but as to tlie Probability of it, I mud confefs I am of another Opinion. Not that I doubt the Capacity of Prince Ferdinand, :he Condud of our prefent Britifh Generals, or the Valour of our Troops. But unlefs, inflead of fome 7'boufands, we could fend as many as we ihould have Reaibn to chink would fufiice, I conceive it more probable that we fhall lofe, thaa gain. Advantages in that Quarter. I have already mentioned that our Succefs in the laft Campaign was in a great Degree accidental, and very reafonabiy unexpected j nor can I be perfuaded that we (hall, or indeed th^t we have it in our Power, to augment Prince Ferdinand's Army fo much as the French caa, aivd. actually will, do theirs. r/p*^) . We may flatter ourfelves that they will be pre- vented from fending fuifigient .Supplies into Ger- many, lefl we fhould again make. Attempts on their Coafls. Buc what fufficient Reiafon have we to think this will be really the Cafe ? Let thofc, who pretend that the prefent diftrefled Condition of France is enthely owing to the German Part of the War, tell us, whether her Coafts were left unguarded when her Troops laft invaded Han- over. Did we find her Coafls, in fadV, fodefti- tuteof Troops .>yhen we were lately facrificing our Men and Mopey in expenfive Expeditions, that neither paid Cods, or did us Honour ? It is • Letter to Two Great Men. true. W IS W [ 21 ] true, we deftroyed one of the Enemy's Ports, and levied Contributions on a few petty Villages . which done, they had nothing more to fear, nor did they on that Occafion recal one fingle Regi- ment from Germany, You may flill fay, indeed, that though they were not obliged on any particular Occafion to recall their Forces, the Apprehenfion of the Con- fcqucnces of thofe Expeditions in general, pre- vented them primarily from fending more. I'his, however, is to ailerc a Negative that cannot cafiiy be proved. • But, be this as it will, certain it is> they did not appear on thofe Occafions under any great Ap- prehenfions for the Event of fuch Attempts; well knowing in what they mud necefiarily end. And can it be fuppofed they will be much more fo now, when even the Security of their Ports is of lefs Confequence to them, than at the Beginning of the War ? as in their prefent Situation they cannot hope to recruit their Marine, fo far during the War as to cope with us again at Sea. Can this be fuppofed, I fay., when they muft be efFedually convinced that their afting merely on the defenfive can be to no Purpofe ? Let us fuppofc them then ever fo nard put to it to find Troops to guard their Coafts, and at the fame Time to pulh the German War, we have all the Reafon in the World to think they will exert every Limb, drain every Nerve, and at leaft neglefk nothing to infure Succefs on the Side of Germany, where only perhaps any Thing can now be done to It f 21 ] to retrieve their (hattercd Affairs. Inftead, there- fore, of the Probability being on the Side of thofc who conceive, we are not likely tp Jofe in another Campaign the Advantages we gaii^ed in the lafl:^ the contrary appears not only probable, but not unreafonably to be feared, and, indeed^ too judiy to be expeded. :^ir?itb'=)rn ■( ; Confider further the Situation of our bi^ve and indefatigable Ally, tiie King of Pruffm} who, ''fter having furprized the admiring World with the moft aftonilhing Inftances of Fortitude and military Skill, finds himfelf at length furround" cd by his Enemies, overpowered by fuperior Numbers, his Country exhauited^ and his Caufe fupported only by thofe who are in no Situation to recruit his Armies, and but very Itttleable to fecond his Operations. icji^dotq jijg^r You may plume yourfelves, from the uncoM- mon Difficulties this great Prince hath hitherto encountered and furmounted, with hopei5,'that he will be ft ill able to defend himfelf fromhU Ene- mies, and keep them at bay till they fhall be willing to enter into a Peace, on Terms neither dilhonour- able to himfelf, or difadvantageous to his Allies* Be not too fanguiiie; you may be deceived. 7'he court of Vienna, indigent as it is, hath power- ful Refources. The Emprefs Queen can never want Men ; and while her Arms are crowned with any Share of Succefs, Money, at fome rate or other, will certainly be had. If werefled, alfo, on the prefent Syftem of Aullrian Policy, adopted by her Neighbours and AI- [ n ] Allies, it is become neceffary to tlielr common Intcrcft and Security, that the Wings of the towering Eagle of Brandcnburgfliouldbe clipp'd. Can it be imagined then they will not piirfue thofe Advantages, which the prefent embar- raffed Situation of his Pruffian Majcfty gives them, to accomplifti their Defign: A Defign long premeditated, and which has unhappily been too earneftly purfued. Should Hanover then again fall a Prey to a rapacious Enemy, or (hould the Kingof PrufTia be reduced to Extremities, fhould not we be called upon, to deliver the one and extricate the other, by all the Ties of Honour, Juftice and Humanity ? And, cao it be thought that, in the Cafe of either, we fhould be able to obtain the fame advantageous Terms of Peace that we might probably do at prefent ? But we will luppofc this heroick Prince fliould be able, for fome Time, to fuftain the united Ef- forts of his Enemies againft him j that, under the Protedion of that Providence, which has hi- therto fo fignally interpofed in his Favour, he may continue to deted their Intrigues, to difap- point their Machinations, and dill to (hare in the Honours and Advantages of the Field. More cannot reafopably be expeded. It cannot be expelled that, harralTcd as he has been, and is, onei^ery Side, in his Pcrlon, his narrow DiftridVs depopulated, his Veterans wafted by continual Slaughter, h., (hould he ever, during this War, in a State to reduce his imperious Enemies fo low, as to beg or accept of Peace on his own Terms. Such [ 24 ] • ' - Such an Expedation would be in the higheft Degree extravagant. The moft fangi'ne of his Friends, the moft zealous Admirers of his great Qualities, cannot hope this with any Ihcw of Reafon. Let us fuppofe further that, by the Unanimity and prudential Condudb of our Generals, aflifted by the Valour of our Troops, the French may be kept out of Hanover. What can we gain at beft by prolonging the War .? How long may we not Jiege and battle it on the Continent before we oblige them to accept of Terms mere advan- tageous to this Nation than they may be difpofed to do at pre lent ? In the mean Time, let me afk, at whofe Ex- pence is the King of PruHia to be fupportcd ? At whofe Coft is Hanover and the reft of his Majefty*s German Dominions, and tho'eof his other Allies, to be protcfted ? Atwhofe,butatthis Nation's ? Wnat a Refleftion ! What wafte of Blood and Trealure muft neceflarily attend our maintaining a continental War, in Gonjundtion only with a few exhaufted Allies, againft the uni- ted Forces and Intercft of France and the Houfe of Auftria ! What, for God's fake, can it be cxpcftcd that in thele Circumftances we (hall be able to do, even though the Increafe of our national Debt, and the Hazard we thereby run of domeftick Ruin, were Matters of no Confideration ? By fending a large Feet into the Baltick wc might perhaps over- awe the Swedes and Ruffians, and thereby prevent their adting forcibly againft Pruffia. 3 By [ 25 ] By keeping another large Fleet at Home, and Troops continually ready for Embarkation, or by keeping thofe Troops ftifling on Board Tran- fports, and hovering on the French Coafts, we might keep them from fending fo formidable a Reinforcement to their Armies in Germany^ as perhaps they might otherwife do. How little may all this avail ! How fhort may it fall of counterballancing the Expence ! The King of Prujfia does not want, at pre- fent, the united Forces of all his Enemies to keep him low enough ; and to crulh him entire- ly ^vas, perhaps, never the Intent of any. At leaft, fo it has appeared from all the Motions ">£ the Swedes and Ruffians^ and even of the French themfclves. Without the Afliftance, therefore, of the Ruffians and Swedes^ the Emprefs-Queen will, in all human Probability, prove a tolerable Match for the Prujfmn Hero, in his prefent State of Depreflion, Lofs, and Fatigue. The Advantages, however, which his Caufe is likely to gain, by our taking a Step of that Nature, (fuppofmg by the Way too, that it might give no Umbrage to the Court of Den- ^mark) will evidently never compenfare for the Expence we muft be at on the Occafion ; fincc, if the Aujirian Troops (hould find the Pruffian full Employment, the Ruffians would moft pro- bably, as they have hitherto done in like Cir- cumftances, remain voluntarily inactive; and, if the contrary Ihould happen, it might not be in our Power to oblige them to deiift frem ful- filling then: Engagements wiih their Allies, in a E Caufe [26] Caufe which they feem earneftly to have efpoufcd, on Principles not very diftant from thofe of Self- Prefervation J^nd private Intereft. With refpedt alfo to our Expeditions on the French Coaft ; the Number of Troops we muft ourfeives employ therein, will as efFefbually pre- vent us reinforcing our national Troops in Ger' many, as thofe Expeditions will hinder the Ene- my's fending fufRcient Reinfoi;cements to theirs: So that, if a continental War muft be carried on, it may differ to us very little, whether we main- tain an additional Number of Troops in Pf^ejipba" lia, or harrafs them out with Embarkations and Re-embarkations on fruitlefs Expeditions againft the Coafts of Brittany and Normandy. Nay, per- haps, it might be even better to do the former, that, in the mean Time, our Fleets may be bet- ter employed. But \:t us employ our naval Force in the beft Manner we can ; though we ftrip the Enemy of the few Settlements they have left, they have no better Method of avenging themfelvcs, or of obtaining the Rcftitution of any thing at a Peace, but by invading the Dominipns of Great Britain or Hanover. As to the former ; the prefent Condition of their Fleet feems to have' entirely incapacitated them for making the Attempt. Let us not put too much Confidence, however, in our own Ad- vantages, or the Weaknefs of the Enemy. The Race does not always belong to the apparently Swift, or the Battle to the Strong. It is true, the mofl :c, of ed :be oft [27] moft timid of our Fellow-countrymen, even fuch as have been under a conftant Pannic, ever fince the Beginning of the War, on account of a threatened Invafion, are now cured of their Fears, and, fince the Defeat of Conflans^s Squadron, be- gin to triumph in their Security. It does not yet follow, that what cannot be executed To day, may not be, neverthelefs, fuc- cefsfully attempted To-morrow. There is no Man in Eigfand, indeed, lefs apprehenfive of fuch an Event than myftlf ; although I do not think the Difficulty of it, even in the Circum- ftances the French Marine now is, fo great as is generally conceived. But, whatever are the Difficulties, while it is not totally impradicable, who can tell what Opportunity our future Ope- rations may give them ? Or what Reafon we may not have to repent the laft Efforts of defpairing Poverty and difappointed Ambition ? Suppofing, however, the Hydra of Rebellion unable to lift up its Head j fuppofingthe deftruc- tive Monfter oi Invafion, at which we have fo often trembled, be a mere Chimera, while we keep our Eyes on Germany, we fhall behold fuf- ficient Caufe to embrace the firft, as the heft. Opportunity of making a Peace. At all Events Hanover muft be protected or redeemed, and Pruffia be prefer ved from Deftruc- tion. This muft be done too by us. None elfe either will, or can do it*, and if the Enemy (hould prove to have the longeft Sword on the Continent, (the Probability of which, as I have £ 2 already »ii tl U^iJ. t 'I t 2S ] Already obfervcd, is greatly againflt us) what Is likely to become of our Conquefts at a Peace ? With Fire in your Eyes, and Impatience in your Hearts, methinks I hear fome few of you (difUnguilhed by your, at prefent, unfafhionable Antipathy to continental Connexions) cry out on this Refledllon, ** What are Pruffia and Ha- *' iiover to Great Britain? What is their Intereft *' to ours, that we (hould renounce the Cbnquefts «* obtained at our own Expence, and with the *' Lives of our Fellow-countrymen, to procure ** them Indemnification and Security ? What is " the real Proteftion or Afliftance either of them •* can afford us in Time of War ? What do we '* get by them in a Time of Peace ? What are *' the reciprocal good Offices they can do us for ** fuch important Services ?" What think you, my Countrymen, of the Proteflant Caufq in Germany ? Is it not worth your Care and Support ? Would you not mod , willingly give up one Branch of your Commerce ? none of your newJy-acquired Settlements ? not a Sugar-Ifland, or a Diftridl in Canada, to pre- ferve from Ruin, or reward the Magnanimity cf that Hero, for whofe Succcfs you have ,.. publicly put up your Prayers, for whofe Vifto- ries you have rhade fuch extravagant Rejoicings, and for the Support of whofe Caufe you have fo generoufly propofed, and fo liberally prorhoted, pecuniary Subfcriptions ? If Things are really come to that Pafs in Ger- many, that the Ruin of the King \A Prujfia will be cc cc cc cc C( t 29 ] be foon followed by the Ruin of the Proteftant Religion in the Empire, it may not have been witK^ut Reafon, perhaps, that you have been told, " That whatever Conquefls we have made, or may ftill make, upon the French, except- ing only North America, fhould be looked upon as given back to France, for a moft im- portant Confideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Prujfta from any " unforefeen DiftrelTes *." But you will be perverfe and fceptical enough, perhaps, to doubt the Truth of the above Suppofition j you will bfc curious enough to afk, in what Particular has the Proteftant Caufe appeared To imminently endan- gered by the Circumftances of the prefent War ? Or, if it really has been in any Danger, what are the Steps its pretended Champion has taken, in what has he appeared zealous to fupport it ? In what kefped have the Interefts of the Proteftant Re- ligion been (hewn to be the Motive, Means, or End of the prefent War ? I cannot, indeed, give a fatisfaftory Anfwer to thefc Queftions. I fhall wave it therefore, and alk in my Turn, what you think of the Danger in which the Balance of Power muft be, of being entirely overthrown, unlefs fupported on one Side of its Beam by the Force and Riches of Great Britain ? Equally impatient as about the Interefts of Religion, you reply, by alking me further, why Great Britain is to be always the heavy Weight at the ftiort End of the Lever ? •* What, fay • Letter to Two Gnat Men, p. 41. you, «€ I prefume, that if I have not demonftrated the abfolute Ncceffity, I have at leaft ihewn, plainly enough, the Expediency, if it were in oi>r Power, of putting an immediate End to the War; and the little Probability there is of our being hereaf- ter in a Situation more promifmg of an: advanta- geous Peace \ I (hall now, therefore, beg your Pa- tience, my Fellow-countrymen, while I commu- nicate thofe Reafons on which my Appreh^pHons, of our trifling away the prefent Opportunity, arc grounded, ^nd endeavour to point put the Means whereby, 1 conceive, fo defirable an Evene may moil probably be brought about, and that to our k^ Difad vantage. With refped: to the former ; let me aik, if thofe Appj ehenfions are not too juftly founded ? Have we not, in the fir^ Place, too much Reafon to fear t 33 i Tear that, fluftied with our late extraordinary Suc- cefTcs, wc may pertinacioufly infift on Conditions, which the moft artful Negotiators will not be able to procure us ? Or, at lead, that whatever Condi- tions it may be thought proper to ftipulate, they will be propofed, and infilled on, in fuch a Man- ner as to raife infurmountable Difficulties, and protradb the Negotiation of the Treaty ? Have not already our Gredt Men, as well as the Public, been addrefled by Patriots, real or pretended, in order to excite a Spirit of national Pride, by which our Intereft may be facrificed to our Vanity ? P£avc we not heard fome talk in the unadvifed and haughty Strain of demanding Hoftages, before we know in what Particular any may be neceflary i and of requiring the Demoli- tion of Dunkirk as a Preliminary to Treaty ? Have we not heard others, equally fdnguine and imperious, advife our infifting on having the Con- grefs of the Negotiators held in London ; on hav- ing the Articles of the Treaty debated in Parlia- ment ; and on fubjefling the Plenipotentiaries to the Mortification of dancihg Attendance On the kefolutions of an Houfe of Commons ? Surely nothing of this Kind is the eflential and neceflary Prelude to a good Peace ! I hope no fuch impo- litic Pertinacity Will reduce uS to the Neceflity of acceding to a bad one ! ? But what it the French were indeed fo humbled as to fue for Peace in the moft abjedt Manner 5 what if we could impofe our own Terms in our own Method ; would it be of any good Confe- F quencc t 34 ] quencc to this Nation, to behave, on fuch an Occafion, with HaugJitinofs and Infolcnce ? The Fortifications of DuD^kUkrhavc. ipdccd, long afforded a glaring Inftartce -pf hthe Enemy's Breach of Faith and the Regdr4 tbey pay to the moft foiemn Treaties. It might not* therefore, be improper to infifl: on their Demolitton as a Preliminary to Treaty, were there aiay Probabi- lity it would be complied withyi.pr, were it not likely to delay its Conclufion. ijj 't^ But the Suppolition of the £)p^9iiyi\ fubmit- ting to fuch a Fropofal, were it ifla^<;, is ridi- culous *i and, were It not (q, ^hfi JPelay occa- fioned by putting it in £xecutjk)n jQight prove of much greater Conlequeoce tOithisNatipn, than even giving up that Circumftfince entirely. Nature feems herfelf detern^ine4i 19 Spite of the Efforts of the moft able and, appi'Qyed En- gineers, tochoak up that Pori;i,fp;Afit,tl?ere is not the leaft Appearance, at ptf^Hs^^ of it^ being ever made ^capable of receiving jSji^ip^ o^ Force or Burden i and dqftroy the For)(ifi^atiop|s and ^^orks as you pleafe, it will be al^ajff in^a Sute ^to afiford, in a very ihort Time, a fecure lie^ling JPlace for fmall Privateers, v-jiij ^uuiw ,vji Suppofing, neverthelefs, that we do not think Jt.fafe to trufl to the dilatory Operations of ^ature, all that it can be prudent to do, is to ^'^ It <^nnotbe imagined that any Nation Is f ignorant and ^i«td(h/%not to know that the weakettteg its Haads before ^a Negotiation for Peaofi, is not the Way ,ta fecore it good Termi in tl^at Negotiation. Su RiKor^tM a tttttr to Jv/o Grtitt Men, p. 15. ^ make d te to >re C 35 ] make the Demolition of this Port an Article in the Treaty V but It never can be fo, to infift on it as a PrelimlnaVy. For, let me repeat it again, k is highly expedient for us to haften the Peace by every Method confident with our Honour and Intereft: And I fhould be forry to find my Countrymen had fo little Share of Solidity and good Senfb, as to think thefe dependant on 4*un6bilio*s of this Nature. - Let us rtot coriceive that, were it in our Power thus to mortify the Enemy, their abject Com- pliance with &n unprofitable Demands would make thetii hereafter more afraid or alhamed of Ihuffling with Trfeatics, or of breaking their Faith with us, when Opportunity fhould enable them t6 do it with Impunity. We ought to know thfe French Nation too well to think fo. Thdr IiiTirtcerity, and that Art they are Ma- ilers of to* esthete themfelves out of Diffical- ties, whichlliH^'hiivc fubmitted to by the moft folemn'TreatWi, isfo notorious, that evenHof- tages themfelves might be no fufiicient Security for the efitaiial Performance of any Part of a Treaty, which they might fee their Advantage to break. So good a Reafon as this for our accepting them, however, is not even afUgned for the pro- pofed Pemand, No: The Motive is iperely vain- glorious and impertinent. At the laft Peace we condeffcended to fend Hoftages to Paris as pledges oPour good Faith to bind us in the Peir- formance of an Article, to which the Epemy had F a it jfi [ 3mpcl them , to do, but merely for the Sake of I^aradc, and that the good People of London mfX Weftmin^ /fler may have f ^mething to ft^re at. ^v 3'-l If we have really reduced the Enemy fo low as to kifs our Footftool, while we fit fecurely deli- berating at Leifure on the Terms of a Peace, let us not Ihew them, by accepting Hoftages on any Account, that we think they dare to trifle , with us in the Performance of every Article of the Treaty. ^^^^ ijwow «ij iv Inftead of refledting on our former Condef- cen^on as difgraceful to our National Charader, let us regard that Circumftance only as a tacit Confcffion that the Enemy were in no. Condition to enforce Refped to the Treaty by other Means. And if the Vanity of the French will (till make them conftrue it otherwif.*, let them comfort tbemfelves, and boaft to other Nations, with Refledions on their Importance at the laft Peace, for the Lofs of the more fubftantial Advantages we may reap by that which is at hand. I might give another, and perhaps a better, ". Reafon why unneceffary and ufelefs Hoftages ought not to be infifted on. Indeed I could wi(h ' never to have fo infidious and dangerous an Ani- mal as a French Man of Quality refide at our Court, or even in our Country, unlefs very K . il C 37 ] clofcly confined, on any Occafion or Pretence whatever.'^ i»J^ " Need 1 explain myfelf ? What have not the French learned of our national Weaknefs by rc- fiding among us ! How have we not laid our- felvcs open to the Enemy by carefling even our Prifoners of War ! But you defpife the Power, the Genius, the Arts of thefe reduced, impotent, infignificant People. You laugh at the diftant Confequences of my Infinuations. Alas! my Countrymen, how foon and how greatly u your Note changed ! How little a while is it ago, fmce an infignifi- cant French Man, landing iit one of our Out- Ports would have been imagined the Fore-runner of an Invafion, or his known Departure been conftrued into the Prelude of a fpeedy Rebellion \ How little a while ago is it fince, dejeded by 111-Succcfs, one would have thought, by the Virulence of your Complaints and the Loud.iefs of ycur Clamours, that you were on the Brink of Deftrudion! I do not, I need not, afk what has produced this extraordinary Change, I admit, in great Part, the Jufiice of your Motives and rejoice in the Concurrence of fuch a Number of glorious and fortunate Events. But with all this, lot us remember to what kind of Caufcs thefe Event* have been owing. Neither tlie Ferfons or Mca- fures of the Adminiftration have been fo inncb changed as to give us any Realbn to depend on the fuperior Wifdom at the • cim. Or, were \ [ 38 ] i I ft ii !t fo. Men ftill are Men, the bcft fometimes forget, and the Wifeftof them are not immor- tal. Let us not, therefore^ gro^vn imperious by cafual Succefs, wantonly tnfalt the-rEnemy, or enhance the Terms of our Demiiid'pcilefl:, being obliged hereafter to accept of itoVich kfs, we fhould bring upon ourfelves thaC' Contempt in which we now hold the late idle Gafconades of the Enemy* r .it^mi loihoo.^ - Far be it from me to mean to Ihrmr oitt any invidious Infinuations againft refpedabteCha- raders. Far be it from the R^efy alfo^ to think me (o little of an Englifhman, as not to rejoice, equally with the moft fanguine of my Countrymen, in our prefent Superiority over the Eiemy. It is, indeed, for this very Rea&n 5 it is becaufe I take fo great a Part in the Honour and I'^-ereft of my Country, that I am anxious to prevent^ if poffible, any Diminution of its prefent Superiority and Glory. ;uvjj/ .-u Tenacious of our prefent Advartta^esj^^ffifere- fore, let us L/;have with Refolucion} but not Haughtinefs. Elevated by Conqueft, let us pre- fctitfi our acquired Dignity, by not (looping fo low as to piqu;: the Vanity of the vaineft Court in the Univerfc, in captioufly ftickling for ThfieS : And if any Thing maUt be given up to facilitate fo nece(&ry an Event as a Peace, let our Conceflions be made with as good a Grace as poffible. Thi^k not, I hold National Honour ohjoapi or that, leafl of all, I would have vi6i:orioui Britons 1 [ 39 ] Britons fubmit to Indignities. The OccaHon cannot demand it« We do not fue for, but {hoiMi^ScTi Sitrna of Pacification. But I fee romo^ijof you look gnvty my Countrymen, at raf talking of Cohceffions, as a Matter almoft: indi^enfiibie; ' You are willing, perhaps, tore- ftoRi noUtingi I hope you ivili not be obliged to gife op naub : Na]r> were a Treaty of Peace now edWly on the Carpet, periiaps, an able Negotiator might find a Neceflky of reftoring but Huk^ but I tremble for the Delay. I trem- ble attlte'Gofifequencesof the War in Germany: At theClofe of the iaft War the Mimllry gave up Cape Brcton. The l^ation in general, and tr? People of New-England in particular, were dUi4ii8§ed;with this Conceiiion. But might not the ^viflry, at that Time, have excufed them* felves, in the Manner Demodhenes once did on a Am^l^ Qccafion } might they not have faid, '* It -^ i^ we that give up Cape Breton i it is ** the Neceflities of the Times ; it is the fatal " Eflfedts of the Rebellion ; it is the Battle of *« ^ntmey i the Skgc of Bergen-op-Zoom ; it is ** the Cowardice and Impotence of the Dut(h ; «' it is 'he S-curity of Hanover that give ^ God gr?i.i fhat, by any finifter Event, the prefent, or any future, Miniftry may not have as good a Plea, for giving up the more confide- rable Advantages we are now pofTefTed of. But letthofe ivho have the greateil Avcrfion to Con- tinentai Connexions (if any can have greater than i [ 40 1 fhan myfelf) reflefl on the Confcquence of Hi" nover's falling again into the Hands of the French. Let them refledt on the Confequence of the Dutch being hereafter impolitickly in* duced to do fomething, which the French will conftrue into a Breach of Neutrality *. It is impoflible for us to think of a Peace without procuring the Reftitutioxi of the Eleftorate, or providing for the Security of a daftardly and impotent Ally. And can we do cither without making the Enemy fome valuable Confideration ? Nay, who can think of a Peace without in- cluding the Rcftitutio- of Minorca? and will the French infift on noth.' ' i the Room of it? Doubtlefs they will : and certu^aly muflhaveittoo^ But you objeft that Hanover is not yet in the Enemy's Hands, that the Dutch have taken no Part in our Quarrel, and that probably neither of tbefe Circumftances may ever happen. I hope we fhall be^ble to fay we fee no Appearance of either, this Time Twelvemonth. It matters, however, little whether we ai'e obliged to give up any of our Conquefts, to ob- - • #/• There is perhaps more fear of this, than the Publick i^ctieral imagine. The late grumbling, and half infolent. Tone of this Republick is changed. In ConjunAion with our Enemy, they imagined they might have controuled our Authority at Sei. But fince the French Navy has been fo terribly reduced, their Fears are prevalent ; and, acquiefcing in our Superiority, they feem more ready to oblige us, by infulting the Enemy, than it is our Intereft they ihould. It is not long lince they were juft on the Point of unadvifedly feizing fome Cannon belonging to the French, in its trans- port through their Territories. tain / I t4«l tain thcReftitutlon of Hanover and Security for any of our Allies ; or are neceffitated to fpend the Value of thofc Conquefts in their Defence and Protcdion. Before we form liafty Refolutions, therefore, to give up none of our Acquifitions for a prefcnt Peace, but to keep them at the Ha- zard of prolonging the War 5 let it be calmly deliberated, whether we may not in the End be Sufferers by fuch Condud *, and that, in (lead of our being conHdered hereafter as, in this Inflance, juftly tenacious of the Honour and Intereil of our Country, we may not, in lamenting the Confe- quences, reflect on ourfelves as adlng under the Influence of pertinacious Infolence and invincible Obftinacy. Aut minus aniniij aut plus potentU, Again, as to the Place where, or the Perfons by whom, a Peace is to be negotiated ; it matters lefs that we ^ould make a vain- glorious Choice, in either of thefe Particulars, than that in both we ihould confult Expedition, and the Expediency of Terms* Here alfo a thoufand Difliculties are ftarted, that can ferve only to protradt the Negotiation : The greateft Difficulty, however, is not to know what Terms it isour Intercft to demand, or cof^' * fent to i but to prevail on the Enemy to accecKr* . to fuch Terms, as every Man in England knows we ought to get, if we can. Toeffedthis, doubtlefs, all the Abilities of the moft artful Negociators are requifite : But I cannot think fuch Abilities exclufively annexed to the Perfon of any particular Minifl:er of State, Ql whofe m u m [42 ] whofe Office would prevent his attending a Coii- grefs at the Hague, or clfewhere. It is pretended further, that the indefinite and equivocal Manner of Expreflion, common to former Treaties, might be avoided in this, by our taking Time for fufficient Deliberation, and debating the Terms of each Article in Parlia- ment *. 1 will not deny it. It is polTible that by making the whole Body of the Reprefenta- " tives of the Kingdom, in a Manner, Negotia- tors, the Articles of the Treaty might be betttr expreflfed, and attended with greater Precifion than othcrwife; but the Query ftill recurs, whether the Advantages we are likely tc. gain thereby will compenfate for the Danger of the Delay fuch a Method of Negotiation muft nc- ceflarily caufe, in bringing the Treaty to a Con- clufion ? Will not our Deliberations, in that Cafe, too much refemble thofe of fome Republican States, from the Nature of whofe Conftitution we find them fo long debating about War and Peace, till they often lofe the Opportunity of Ven- geance meditated in the one, and the Advan- tages they propofed to fccure by the other. I do not deny that Precifion in the Terms and Expreffions of a Treaty are material, and ne- ceflary to be well attended to : But, however indifpenfible it may be in Cafes determinable by eftablifiied Laws and equitable Courts of Juftice, I will venture to fay it is not fo eflTential in Mat- ters of Agreement between Nations, wherein * See Re^/ons ivhy the approaching Treaty of Peace Jhould he debated in Parliament, thq ^ f '' ,IJ [ 43 ] the Lex ultima regtim^ the Sword of Power, de- termines much oftcner than that of Juftice. Can we think that the French^ had they wifely confidered they were not a Match for us in North- America^ would have taken Advantage of the indefinite Terms of the Treaty of Utrecht^ to make Inroads on Nova Scotia and the Territories of New E* ''land and the Ohio ? There is a wide Difference between the Preci- fion required in wording the polemical Themes . of Academics, or in drawing up a Bill in Par- liament, and that acquired in the Terms of Treaties between Sovereigns. And I make no doubt that, by our keeping Pofleflion of all Canada^ by Virtue of an Article, however inde- finitely expreffed in the Treaty, we ihall be more advantaged, and the Peace will be more lafting, than if we gave back the lead Part of it, how- ever limited it might be, even by a<5lual Surveys and Land-Marks erected on the Spot. For, be the Articles of the Treaty as definite as Words can make them, there is no doubt that , the French will make little Scruple of breaking them when their Intereft and Ambition interfere ^ with the Letter, and either is feconded by their Power. Could any Thing be more precife and definite than the Article relating to the Demolition of Dunkirk^ in former Treaties ? And yet did they not readily break it, and that in the Face of all Europe^ without blulhing ? The Experience of two Centuries pafl: may, indecdj fcrvc to convince us (if we yet need any G 2 farther i [ 44 ] ^ farther RctrofpjA to be convinced of it) that nothing but Power and Refolution on our Part, to compel '* in: *o be juft, can keep them fo* Our pri. 'p • 3Lriners, therefore, is to obtain a Peace on Ter.ns that will in fome Meafure keep themfelves •, that is, enable us to make the Ene- my, at all Times, refped our own Conftrudbion of them. Now the prefent Circumftances are fo favour- able to us in this Particular, that we ought to trufl nothing; nceclJefly to the future, iii hopes of better j left, like the Dog in the Fable, anxious, with our Mouths already full, after more, we are obliged to relinquifh what we have already acquired. Ne umbra pro corpore, I (hall next, therefore, my Countrymen, en- deavour to point out the Means, whereby an Event fo defireable, fo requifite to the Welfare of this Nation, may poflibly be brought about. I flatter myfelf you arc already convinced of the little Probability there is that the French will accept of a Peace, and fit down with their pre- fent LoflTes. The Outlines of the Profpeit of the Confequences of the German War, which I have not unjuftly drawn in their Favour, are yet greatly fo. Minorca too is in their Hands. Something muft, therefore, neceflarily be given up to prevail on them to enter immediately into. Terms of Accommodation. What this is to be, becomes thus the princi- pal Obiedt of our prefent Confideration. Much d and written on t - , has already, been Subjed. The [45] The Importance of our feveral Acqulfitions have been debated, and that of each been enhanced and undervalued, in turn. This Confideration, however, is not the only one we fhould attend to, in the prefcnt Cafe. In order to bring the Enemy to a fpeedy Accommodation, it is necef- fary to confidcr as well the real as imaginary Value of thofe Acquifitions to them. That which is of the lead Importance to us is doubtlefs what we (hould the fooneft chufe to rclinquifli : But if this, at the fame Time, be equally unimportant to the Enemy, they will no doubt fet as juft a Value on the Conceflion as we. It has been maintained, by fome of our Pa- triots, that no Part of our Conquefts on the Continent of North America, fhould be given up on any Confideration whatever ; while the Infignificancy of Senegal and Goree, and the in- ferior Confequence of Guadeloupe have been of- fered, as Reafonslor our relinquifhingthofe Places. On the other Hand, again, it has, with no lefs Appearance of Reafon, been alledged that the fingle Ifle of Guaflelotipe is of more Importance to this Nation than all Canada. It is faid that the whole Trade of Canada confifts in that of Furs and Skins, and fell fhort in its mod flourilhing State of 140,000!. a Year; while Guadeloupe produces more Sugar than any of our Iflands, except Jamaica i by which Branch of Trade alone 300,000 1. per Annum might be cleared by pur Merchants : For that, having fufficient from our l m [ 46 1 our own Iflands to fupply our Home Confump- tion, the whole Sugar Produce of Guadeloupe might be exported, and would confequently be fo much clear Money to Great Britain *. Might we not afk, however, on this Occafion, at what Rate is our Home Confumption at pre- fcnt fupplied ? Were Sugars cheaper, there is little Reafon to doubt our Home Confumption would be much more confiderable. Has it not, alfo, been long notorious that our own Iflands would produce much more Sugar than they have lately done, had not injurious Combinations been entered into, to prevent the bringing fuch Quantities to Market as muft lower the Price ? J have been further very credibly informed that, notwithftanding it is pretended by many that the Lands of Guadeloupe are much better than thofe of our own Sugar Iflands, yet its Su- gars are confiderably lefs valuable th:n ours, or thofe of the Ifland of Martinico, I will not pretend, however, to aflert the fu- perior Value and Importance of Canada, taken folely in a commercial Point of View : Since in Guadeloupe they raife, befides Sugar, great Quantities of Indigo, Cotton, Coffee, Ginger, &c. all which is not only fent to the European Markets ; but a confiderable Trade is alfo car- ried on between that Ifland and the Caraccas, and other Parts of the Spanifli Main, which Trade is wholly confined to the Manufactures of Eu- rope, the Returns for which are chiefly in Ready * See Remarks on a Leitqr to Two Great Men, p. 40. Money, ^ I [47 3 Money. If to this wc add that the Slaves now in the Ifland arc alone, at the lowed Valuation, worth upwards of One Million Sterling, there is no doubt but Guadeloupe is of more Confe* quince in a commercial View than Canada. As an Acquifition, alfo, that may be of Ser- vice in a Time of War, Guadeloupe is by no Means inconfiderable. The infinite Di fad van- tage it has been of to us during the prefent, is univerfally allowed. The Ifland of La Dejirade, being the Hrft Land ufually made by our Ships bound to the Weft-Indies, they are eafily per- ceived in their Courfe from thence, by the Pri- vateers of Guadeloupe ; which could not have a more convenient Station to annoy us, in this particular, than that Ifland. Notwithftanding thefe Confiderations, how- ever, I muft give my Voice entirely for thofe who would rather give up Guadeloupe, with every other Acquifltion we have made, or may make, in the Weft-Indies, than part with one fingle foot of Canada. In my Reafoos for it I differ, how- ever, from thofe who affeft to efteem it impor- tant, on account either of its Trade, the Num- ber of Inhabitants, or the Fertility of its Soil i the principal Objeftion that appears to me, againft giving up any Part of Canada is the Danger we thereby run Ot giving Occafion, in a few Years, for another War : An Objedtion that does not equally oppofe the relinquilhing Guadeloupe. It has been (aid that, by eftablifliing proper Limits, an4 , / [+8] thd fecuring them properly, we might very p^-u-* dcntjy reftore Canada to the French. But the Misfortune isj that no Limits we can make in that Part of the World would be proper, for the very Reafon, that it is impoflible they can at pre- fent be properly fecured, without putting both Nations to an Expence much greater than the prefent Value of the Matter in difpute. It is alfo much to be doubted whether, if this were prafticable, the French would not be as willing to defift entirely from the Demand as to be effeftually reftrained within thofe Bounds to which it is abfolutely ftecelTary for us to con- fine them. If they (houldgive up their long- dnce- projec- ted Scheme of elbowing our Colonies, and of* edging down by Degrees to the Sea-Coaft, Ca- nada will certainly be of little Advantage. But, fuppofing the two Courts could come to a right Underftanding in thi§ Point, and be fatif- fied with the Limits afligned; we have an Exam- ple, in the Manner in which the prefent War com- menced, how very foon it is likely to be difturbed. It is well known what Kind of Men our Colo- nifts, and in particular the Traders with the In- dians, generally are ; nor do we fuppofe tliofe belonging to the French are a Jot more fcrupu- lous in their Morals. Now, let the Harmony fubfifting between the two Courts be ever fo well eftablilhed, or kept up in Europe ; let them be ever fo defirous of remaining on good Terms with each other ; how long can we promife our- fclvcs / [ 49 1 fclves thL xiarmony will continue; when, on the firft Temptation of any confidcrabic Profit, the adventuring Borderers will infult each other? their Complaints will be heard by their refpedtive Sovereigns, and the two Nations be involved again in a ruinous and bloody War. Hence, although, by reftoring Guadeloupe, we fhould in Faft give up an Acquifition of more Importance, in almoft every other Confideration ; yet the Expediency of our taking fuch Meafures as will not only procure an advantageous, but fccure a lading. Peace, requires that Guade- loupe, with the other Idands attendant on that Conquefl, be rather reftored entire to the Enemy, than that we (hould give up one Foot of Canada. , As it is of great Moment, however, toward the Negotiation of the Treaty, that we fhould "onfider in what light the French look on thefe o different Conceflionsj perhaps it will be tound that, feeing the little Profpedt there is of their ever fucceeding in their grand Scheme, againft our too powerful Colonies in North- America, they will give up the Defign ; and, confidering the vad Importance Guadeloupe is of to their Commerce, they will more readily enter jnto this Meafure than the other. As they will require, alfo, the Convenience which Senegal and Goree afforded them, of pro- curing Slaves for their Wefl- India Iflands, the Reftoration of thofe Places, added to that of Guadeloupe, &c. will appear fo valuable a Con- fideration, that we have all the Reafon in the H World -t w^ Ur t 50 ] World to think they wih, on fuch m Offer, enter gladly into Terms of PaciBcation, and fit down contented with the Lofs of their Ship* preceding the Declaration of War. On giving up, further. Cape Breton, after demolifhing the Fortifications, and on renew^ ing their Privilege of Fiftiing, &c. on the Banks and Coaft of Newfoundland, they will alfo very probably refign Minorca in exchange* and be fo ready to concur in the neceilary Mea- furesto afpeedy Accommodation, that the £m- prefs Queen will think it prudent, alfo, to enter into the like with the King of Prujfta. As the latter may, even at prefent, iland in need of our AlTiftance, it will doubtlefs be requi- fite to lend a helping Hand to this brave Ally; which, rather than give any further Advantage to the French^ fhould be done by Means of a Sum of Money, to be paid to the Court of Vienna^ and another to the Eledor of Saxony. I prefer this Method to any other, as ready Money will be fo likely to be accepted of ; and the Sums we need give will not probably amount to a twentieth Part of what it may coft us to carry on the War, if no fuch Steps iire taken. I doubt not but many of you will break out on this Propofal, and exclaim againil it, as ^n Indignity. What! after all our Succefs and Conquefts, you will fay, fhall we at laft fhamc- fully buy a Peace ? But let me advife you, my good Friends,, to recoiled that celebrated Adage, fo familiar in every i. > \ 3 1 [ 51 1 every economical Nation, ' A Penny laved is a * Penny got :' And reflect that a good Peace, cheaply bought, will redound more to the Ho- nour and Advantage of this Kingdom, than all the Bargains we may make in the Continuation of the War, by the inhuman Purchafeof Rapine and Blood. In the prefent Succefs of our Arms, the DiL burfement of Money cannot be fuppoicd a re- proachful Circumftancc ; fince it will appear as well a Proof of your fuperior Wealth, as be evident to all Europe, that the Purchafe of a Peace [is not neceffary for own Sake, but only for our Allies. The ^ota, deftined to the Indemnification of the Eledor of Saxony, nuft alfo be eftecmed rather as a Mark of Generofity than Meanncfs; and it will doubtlefs appear, in the Eyts of all the World, as a noble Inftance of ours to relieve that unfortunate, though perhaps blameable. Prince. As to the Terms on which the King of Pruflia and the Emprefs Queen may agree, with regard to Silefia, I do not fee that we have any 3ufinefs to intermeddle with Particulars. The former, it has been juftly obfcrved, has not been reduced to his prefent Diftrefs in Confe- qucnce of his Connexions with us ; and, as we have already been an ufeful Ally, fo, ia our endeavouring thus, at our own Expence, to bring about a general Pacification, although we ihould not be able r.o procure him all he could wiih, he ought to be content. "-^ X ■ Again, m'/T^ f 52 ] Again, as to the Manner in which France and the Court of Fietina may agree about (baring the Expences of the War, and their mutual Indem- nification ; I do not feea'fo that it much concerns us. The French did not move to the Affiftance of the Emprefs Queen, till they had firft taken a few Towns in Flanders into their Pofleflion, apparently by Way of Security for the Repay- ment of their Expences. As their principal Operations, alfo, have tended rather to diftrefs the Eleflor of Hanover, by Way of avenging their own Caufe of Quarrel with England^ the T^mprefs has doubtlefs Reafon to expeft her Towns again at the Peace. But (hou'd it prove otherwife, we are too little interefted in it to make any farther Conceffions, as fome incon- fiftent Politicians would have us, in order to take them out of the Hands of France, and put them into hers. A Britilh Adminiftration, it has been faid *, muft tremble at feeing Newport and Oftend be- come French Property. I would not have it fo: And yet it is not every Adminiftration that would tremble at it. We have had e'er now very great Men at the Helm, who knew little of the real Value or Im- portance of the Places they have bought, fold, or bartered for, with Foreign Powers. Th© great Earl of Clarendon has affured us, that when Dunkirk was fold to the French, it was a good * Letter to Two Great Men, p. 42. Bar- '' , I [ 53 ] Bargain on our Side ; and yet, by his own Con- fefllon, this fame eminent Statefman did not even know whereabouts th:: Ifle of Sheepey, at the Mouth of the Thames, was fituated. I make no fcruple, however, that our prefcnt Adminiftration are well apprized of the Impor- tance of Newport and Oftend, and that they are under no very great Apprehenfions of tliere be- ing a Port opened on that Coaft, from which this Nation has fo much hereafter to fear, as to jnake it now worth while to facrifice any Thing of Confequence to prevent its falling into the Hands of the French, If the Queen of Hungary were, indeed, our Ally, and had fufTered in our Caufe, fomething might be faid for it : But, as it is otherwife, and we can place no Dependance on her Honour or Gratitude, who knows but, after we (hould have purchafed the Evacuation of thefe Towns of the French, fhe might put them again into their Hands? Is fhe not capable of it? IngraV ifi dixerisy omnia dixeris. But, fuppofing it be not quite fo prudent to leave the Flemifh Towns, now in the PoiTefllon of the French, in their Hands, at a Peace ; all that we can at prefent propofe to do, is either pn Confide ration of their evacuating them, to recede from the Demolitior of the Fortifications of Louifbourg •, or in Lieu of it to pay them a Sum of Money, as a better and more acceptable Equivalent. Thus WHfjWf^. I ■""'", ^ 'I;' ?fK| * Thus have I taken a curfory Ejiamination o? thofe Circuipftances that (hould induce us to f&den a Peace^ and the Terms which I cooceivd the Enemy may, at prelent, be brought to accede to* H_ my fem^rks are jufb* if itty Propolis •re«rejje(cifitbte; rhey will, T doubt not, haVfe their ddc Weight with the Publick. If they are not lb, it is Pity they flbould. I fliaW Ms re- gret my Lofs of Time and Trouble thaft the being, m any Degree, inftrumental in miQead- Ing my Fellow-Countrymen, cither to their Publick or Private Ditadvantage. CsV ;o • • '- ■ - -^- My Friends and QoumythtOti Yours, dr>c. &c. ■•'i \o ■■■i( vm'mi f ->