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Tous las autres axamplaires originaux sont filmte en commenpant par la pramlAre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impraasion ou d'illustration at an terminant par la dernlAre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la derniire image de cheque microfiche, seion la cas: le symbols — ^ signifie "A SUIVRE". le nymbole V signifie "FIN ". Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre fiimte A des taux da reduction diff6ronts. Lorsquo le document est trop grand pour Stre reproduit en un seul clichA, il est fiim« d partir de I'angle supArieur gauche, de gauche A droite, at de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nicessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la m^thode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 ex ..^••v^-^ e^5 ■' JESUIT MAXIMS flic, ioral Till' «lf an o i( The End and the Means.— Mental Reser- vation. Restitution and Charity. (No. 2.) I ^' PREFACE. 1' '■:■» ■ 'J'he 'loronto Mail (March 9, 1889, page 8) favours its readers with a long extract from the English Quarterly Review of 1875. We must thank " our friends the enemy" that they have, in the i)resent anti- Jesuit craze, shown little inventive genius, but have deigned to confine themselves to the old calumnies so often brought forward, but inva- riably met with a crushing rejoinder. The motive of our gratitude may be conjectured ; for amid many other and more interesting occu- pations we have little leisure left to devote to original apologetic papers. But as those of fourteen years ago, and we might just as well add of one hundred and fourteen, meet fully the charges made, we have reproduced in these pages a series of articles from the London Month, which we respectfully dedicate to the 'I'oronto Afai/, whose editors have not blushed to adopt as their Moral Theologian, the Theolo- gian quietly laid to rest by the Reviewer of the Month. This pamphlet forms the second of the series o( Jesuit Maxims. The following, if our share in the $400,000 be not entirely exhausted, will treat on Probabilism, Tyrannicide, and Jesuit Loyalty. A. E. JONES, S. J. St. Mary's College, Montreal, March 12, 1889. ^O'^S^O PROPERTY OF LAKEflEAD -•■ ' ••■>i ■ ' ' t **«^s**»».,, rr I MOIU L OK iiir. Q I J li TEliL 1 ' E K ] I /•; W 1*11 i:i.iinixAU Y II i::»i A ii ks. ('I'Ik: Mdmh. London, l'\'l)riiary 1S75, ]). 22$.) : The Quarterly for January contains a pa])er on ilie Jesuits, i:> continuation of the article that appeared in the number for last Octo- l)er. This time the Reviewer addresses himself to the doctrines of the Society. We feel at some loss how to proceed in noticing this fres!;. effusion, and that t'or t^\o reasons. In the first place, in our rfniark.s upon his first article we pointed out a comiiderable number of inaccu- racies and misconceitiions into which this writer had fallen, both from his own ignorance of the matter on Avhich he professed to treat, and from his relying upon the work of an author whose claims to the title of historian are laughed at in Germany, and indeed, a\ hose autlu^ritv the Reviewer regarded on his own showing as worthless. As our allegations have neither been admitted as true nor denied as false, wo should be quite entitled to regard the Reviewer as outside the boun- daries of fair controversy, and so dismiss him as beneath further recog- nition. We will venture to say that in his wanderings in the ktby- rinths of Catholic moral theology he has nowhere found a doctrine which teaches that the honest and honourable course for a man detec- ted in the propagation of injurious falsehoods is to take no notice of their exposure, and go on to something else, as if he had no debts or' conscience to discharge before he can claim any further hearing. In the second place, inasmuch as his present article is addressed to the discussion of principles of moral doctrine and casuistry, which are on his own avowal, those that are lecognized by the prevailing theo- logical schools of the Church, writers of the Society are free from any special obligation to f jIIow this writer through the mazes of miscon- ception and sciolism in which he involves himself in this equally as in his former paper. At least these considerations leave us at liberty to deal with him at our own convenience, andrelie/e us from the demand for an immediate reply. We shall therefore content ourselves with I'oiiU'Mg out one or two more palpable absurdities into wliich the Reviewer has fallen, as samples of the rest. Of the well-known letters, A.M.D.Cl., whicii signify, " to the greater ^lory of God," we have the following account : "Through the miitto >ibl)reviated into these four initial letters, the Society of Jesus ostenta- tiously advertises itself as in possession of a superior knowledge in divine things, that can furnish nieans of specific efficacy for insuring the upward progress of humanity ttnvards a state of purified exister.cj « iipahle ot retlecting the bright imagery of dod's enhanc-.-d glorifica- tion." We do not ])rofess to understand tiMs conglomeration of words, but as far as we can extract any .sense out of them, they are both false and absurd. The principle of action symbolized by the letters A.M.D.Cl. is simjtly this, that the members of ilio Society should strive to choose such actions, where free to choose, and perform them in such a spirit, as may conduce to tlie greater glory of God. Ic is simply a question of proposing the highest possible standard of moral and religious life, not of ])retension to higher lights, nor of invidious com|jarison with other religious corjjorations. Than suc:h assump- tion, nothing could be more contrary to the spirit of St. Ignatius. The Reviewer discourses largely, of course, on Probabilism. Let us take an example of his trustworthiness from his manner of dealing with Its first principle. W'c take his tianslation of (Jury's definition of a probable opinion, as " any judgment resting on some really grave motive, even though combined with dread (s/r) of the opposite." Wiiereupon he proceeds to comment — " This means tha', notwith- standing an irrepressible inward impression that truth is really in opposition to a given opinio piohabilis, yet any opinion, in behalf whereof can be adduced what is technically termed a grave motive, may be safely accepted in full warrant for taking action in its sense." Now what does this writer mean by "an irrepressible inward impres- sion"? Does it amount to moral certainty, grounded therefore on certain reasons? If so, there can be no probable opinion opposed to it, for moral certainty excludes all probability on the other side. If this irrepressible im|)ression, on the other hand, does not amount to moral ceitainty, it is itself only a probable opinion ; and then all that remains is a question of balancing i^robabilities, and of deciding the ])recise amount of obligation to this line of action or the other. Then what is "termed technically a grave motive," is theologically a motive resting on reasons sufficiently solid to justify the action of a prudent man ; and thus the opinion based upon it becomes probable. In short, we have the " gravest motives " for thinking that this Quarterly Reviewer is absolutely ignorant of what the Probabilism means about which he undertakes to write. Again, the Reviewer saysofCiury: "He then considers whether absolution can be obtained by one who ignores {sic) the Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation " ; and again, afier some circimilocuMon, his conclusion is, "that according to the more probable opinion, he can be validly absolved if only he be living in invincible ignorance." (Jf course Gury is speaking of a man who is ignorant of\\-\t Mysteries. His " circumlocution " here referred to only contains some rules to the effect that a coiifessor cannot absolve such a penitent except in case of necessity, as in danger of death for instance, otherwise he is lie to instrucl him to the benefit of the sacrament. Should it he found that his if^norance is invincible, then is such case the Sacrament of I'enance may bo administered: for why should the mercies of (lod bo closed against him ? We take one other example. The Reviewer (|uotes the dicta o; liusembaum, l.aymann, and Voit, to the effect that when a ligitimate end is in view, it is also legitimate to use the means re(|uisite to th- attainment of that end; and hence concludes that the doctrine im- plies that all means are legitimate and may be used where the end is good. It so happens that Oury explains this maxim by saying that only means that are in themselves indifferent, that is devoid of inhe- rent , ilice, are permissible; yet the Reviewer is not satisfied witli this distinction, but assures use on his own authority that " the word^ fier St' ifidifft'ienthx cannot be held to limit in any effective degree \\\t license involved in the other terms of the jiroposition." Oury also declares that "all choice of evil means is evil ;" that *' he who uses an evil means to attain a good end, contracts the giiilt attaching to the use of such means" (i). 'I'hat is, this writer's object is to fasten on the Jesuits a charge of maintaining that the end justifies the means. And to attain this holy end of misrepresenting the Jesuits, he has used th-,*^ ecpially holy means of attributing to their writers that which they expressly deny. VVe close our remarks for the jjresent with the writer's view of invincible ignorance. " Lei," he says, '-an individual be surrounded by preachers straight from heaven, speaking with tongues of divine per- suasion, and yet according to the definitions given of what constitute i invincible ignorance, he might with imi)unity withhoKl acquiescence, alleging nural inability to comprehend what was spoken, while in f'act. he was obdurately bent on not expressing assent, from the design t) establish a i)lea for the indulgence of a selfish purpose." Now, these words prove at least one thing, the utter ignorance, whether vincible or invincible we do not |)relend to decide, of the writer, as to what invincible ignorance is. (iury tells us that vincibi ' ignorance is th.U which can be dispelled by the use of adequate dili- gence; invincible ignorance is that which cannot be so renuved" (2). But according to the words above quoted it seems that a man may be in invincible ignorance who is "obstinately bent on not expressing assent, from the design to establish a plea for the indulgence of .1 selfish jMirpose." Such a man would be in bad faith, and bad faith and invincible ignorance are incompatible. 'I'his common-sense doc- trine is ilie best excuse which we can find for the Reviewer. Hi i ignorance is so portentous as to excuse him from the charge of malice. Jkit it is not the less a phenomenon worthy of the attention of all who are interested in English periodical literature, that the pages of our chief Quarterly Review should bj op^n to an article on so important j. branch of learning as moral theology, the writer of which displays throughout the mast childish ignorance of the very elements ofth.' science and of th,; meaning of thj terms used by its professors. (1) To ////<'■ /t 7. TheoK Mor. toiu. i. p. J!*. Rome. 18 W. <2) /hr{[>. 1.-). , , PART I. I'lio I'ihI liiMliliOM thv Hf'iiiiM. (\'\\v Mm\iii, Ia)iuI 1, Muicli I ''75, p. ^(i^-) . W'c li;i\i- ahead)-, in our last mmihiT, giwii hiii'l" 'jx]trfssi()ii lo our .sense of till' \aluf oftlu' \Ki\)i.-r in tlic current nuinltcr dI" tlvj Qiitfitiily 'J^i'7\'ta', on "'riic Docirint's ol the Jesuits. " 'J'he writer of the article 's!)o\v>. ahnost ni every line, his utter incapacity to tleal with the sub- ject lie has ventured lo treat ; so nuich so, nuleed that were it not for the literal) dignity of the organ whij^h iuis admitted his lucubrations into its pagCM. we should not considi.-r him worthy of further notice, ll'.it as till' conductors of the Qiunttrlij have yielded so far, in a moment of weakness, as to endorse his stri<:tures on the moral tloc- triiK'N. wc \mI1 not say of the Jesuits, Ijut of the Catholic Church, a few W(,»rd> to point out one or two of the Review er's numlxMless blunde'rs and ini*apprehi'nsi(in> may. piTchanee. h;iv(' the eff.'ct of infusing a little cau- tion into their counsels for the future, and rend'T tln.'m less precipitate in gi\ing their sanction to articles that have no hi-lier nv.'rit than that of being decorated with a sensational title. ]|}I14' IIm' J4><,ii;t«> \\\\y (C, particularly recommended it to the whcjle clergy of h.s diocese 'on the special ground of its kee|iing to the happ) mean between *• rigourism and laxity. " S ) far, then, as the case of Moullet is con- cerned, it goes to show the identity of the Jesuits' teaching with that of the Church, at least in the instance of the diocese of Lausanne. }{ut the Reviewer further attempts to fasten the charge of specialty of doctrine on the Society, frc^m the fact that the Society's official ////- primatiir must be aflixed to any book published by a Jesuit author, and *ihis, he argues, must throw the responsability for the opinions con- tained in any such work upon the whole body of the Society, and that r.ll the more on account of the minute regulations laid down in the Constitutions to secure uniformity of doctrine and o])inion in the t-jaching of the Jesuits. \\\ support of this he says : '■ \\\ the ' Consti- ■~«t*»wiyji..^(i~_Si^ : tiitions ' it is written that no (liffcrciKcs of opinion are udmissihle, wlu'thcr in conversation (i), or piihlic (li^roursc, or written hooks, which last it is not allowable to publish without ai)|)roval and consent ol" th.e (leneral, who, however, in.iy confine tiicir examination t(i three men endowed with sound do< trine and eminent judgment. Now here, before proceeding further, let us notice one of t'^e Ri-- \iewer's l)al)itUiil inaccuracies in dealing with the Latin text. 'J'he ori- ginal words in the Constitutions are : " J)o,(ii/iii' igitur differentes non adiuiUanlur, nee verbo in conciiuiibus vel lectionibus publii is nee scriptis libris, tpii (piidem cdi non poterant in lucemsine approbalione at(|ue consensu Pnepositi (ieneralis '" 'ITie literal translatii^n of tliese words is as fi;llows : '• Different iloctrines, therefore, are not to by allowed, neither by word of mouth in sermons f'concionibus^ or public lectures, nor in written books, which last may not be publishec without the approval and consent of the (ieueral. " There is ipiesiion, then here of doctrints, and not opini(Mis ; for doctrines and oj>inions may be ver\ diffennt things, and il.e prohibition of (lifferciK e m sut h does not cNteiid to private con\ersation, as the Rrvieuer. by his blundering iranslation of the word " coru ionibiis " would ini|il\, bul has reference to public teaching, whether in the lecture-room or jiulpit. 'I'hen, if the (Juivter/y writer hail turned to the Declaration ajipen- (led to the C^hapler of the ( "on^tiiutions in which tiie loreL'oing words are contained, he would ha\r dix overed w h.al nile i-> to b; iollowed b\ the members of the S iciety in order to exclude differences of opinion. The Declaration in i|aesiion is as f)llows : '• New opinions ari' not to 1k' ateied i-> .ibun- dantly evident ; none other, in fu.i, than confonmtv to ih'.' doctrines and prevailing opinions of the C'atliolic Church. Jlii here wc cannot put the matter more clearly before our readers iha i L)\' ipioting the Words of father de Ravignan. ii|mn()ii!<, u leiivfs iiricrty oi .s])i''ii iii iiiini i or iR'firis niu.'ii was 01 ■ wise uinniiiii of' its t'ouiulLT. A lidily reciuut's, iiliovi! hII tiiinu'.s, interior hii.'incj i\" and pouce ; tliL' iiiiioii of il? meinlii,'rs is its lilV. DiH'iTLMicc ot i)|iiiiio;i mimI of iloclriiK'. Iiy orcii- tiiij; 11 division of tlioiiglits. iuftir.-i tlio risk of crt.-iitinj^- a division of fcc'litiu'. A\'e may well imaji'iiie. then, thai St. Ignatins ~lio ilil have leiiMiiiniMuK'd tlu^ rciijrioiis of iii.-! Society to av(jid. a.-! nincli as [lossilile, that divocsily of ooinion whiidi, 1)}' relrtxiiiji; nnion. weakens streiiji'tli, and ran-es the ruin ot linlli itself. The snjie- riois are l)ouiid cand'idly to wai'd oil' this daiiLi'er. It is with tliis object, and to WiUeh ove.'thc integrit,' tif doctrine, thai onr ("ous- (I) The italics are onrs. (•2) (.'onst. I'ais iii.c. i. § 18. 0. .8 titiitlons submit to prclirniunry oxiunination and nnthorization all th<3 books that a religious of the Society may wish to publish. Tiiis guarantee is necessary; it is morally suflicieut. Never, however — and I fa'i easily understaiiil it — has the tSoeiely, hv those wise preeautiouR, thought of holding out the |)ieteusi(m that tlie least opfuioii of its writers or its professors should become the opinion and the doctrine of the whole body ; nor that the approba- tion of three or four examiners and of a superior, should stamp on a Jesuit's book a sanction of iriefragablo truth. 1 see no difficulty in acknowledging that Jesuit authors, tlieir examiners and their superiors, may )»e, and have been deceived. Uut it ai>])cars to me evidently as e(|ually repugnant to justice and to good sense, to imiMite to a whole liody the opinions or tiie errors of some of its members, as it woula be that the individuals should be considered irreproachable, whilst the whole body is criminal aiid worthy ot condemnation; since sound members will never form a corrupted body (;!). In a word the opinions of the Society are those which are most approved by the ('hurch, those most in accordance with the common opinions of her Doctors ; bi,t more especially St. 'I'homas is declared to be the theologian lO be followed both by masters and pupils in the schools of the Society, without the obligation, however, to follow blindly all and each of his opinions (4). 'I hus in the fifth General Congrega- tion directions were given to professors : In any ciise wlicic the opinion of'St. Tiiomas is ambiguous, or in those (juestions not perhaps treated of by iSt Thomas, in whicii Catholic Doctors ditler, it is per- mitted to ours to take either side, — provided always that due charity and consideration be exercised towards those who hold to the o|)posite view of the question. And this rule is of great importance, because it has in fact go^'erned the practical application of the other riiles of the Society for sectoring uniformity in doctrine and teaching. In the course of the Society's history there has been no manifestation of that servitude with which the members of the Society have been recently taunted by a great authority, on the part of the great Jesuit writers and theologians. To quote Father de Ravignan once more. Thus, in (juestions i'rcely dis(Missed among theologians, the Jesuit is free to embrace that part that is the most consonant to his own views. The onlv com- mand imposed on liiin is to observe nioderatio'i and charity, in omnilnis c/iarilas. The authors of the Society are full of tliese f.ee differences of opinion amongst themselves. Their works are accessible to everyone; and what becomes, in the presence of a fact, so easy to verify — what becomes, I ask, of this doctrine, said to be peculiar to the Jesuit's, and of this system of teaching that belongs only to them? Now once nn)re, I state, we have no doctrines peculiar to ourselves; we have a spirit of our own, but that -is very different. The Kc'^vii^wcr^N Hkill an a traiislMtor. But enough has been said on the general bearing of the question. Before preceeding to the details, let us point out a few more instances of the Reviewer's skill as a translator; for the mistakes he commits may be taken as no bad index of his competency to deal with the sub- ject—a subject .so full of subtle and minute details, and requiring more than any other the possession of accurate technical knowledge on the (3) 77(r; Jesuits, (heir ItuUitute, Doctrinef), ke. C. 4. (4) Const. Pars iv. c. 5, § 4 ; c. 14. § 1 ; Coagreg. v. d. 41. § 5. '9 as It part of any one who undertakes to handle it — into the discussion of which he has so rashly thrust himself. We have already called attention to his rendering of ignorans by " ignoring " Again (5), we meet with the sentence : Father Gury care- fully points out that menial reservations are of two kinds, the j/r/V/Z^ and the latently mental. " Now Father Gury's words are " Restrictio mentalis est : {\) pure saw stricte mentalis, si sensus loquentis percipi nullo modo possit, et hcec, hoprie f/ic/ztalis, d'\c\{UT ; (2) /ate seu hnproprie mentalis, si sensus prcpositionis ex adjunctis possit col- ligi " ('>). Late is here rendered by latently. What might possibly be the difference between a. purely nif.iial, and a latently mental reserva- tion, we do not attempt to realize. Of course the sense of the pas- sage is, *' A mental reservation is (^i) purely or strictly mental being such that the meaning of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is mental reservation projjer ; (2) mental in a wide or improper sense, being such that the se«se of the proposition may be gathered from the circumstances in which it is uttered." And Gury proceeds to say that mental reservation in tiic strict sense is never lawful; but cases may occur in which it may be used in the wider and improper sense. Then we have (7) the following case presented. "In the section about Contracts we find this query : ' If a donation has been promised on oath, but has not yet been delivered, is it still binding?' which is answered negatively on the ground that, as the deed is incomplete, it is void in substance, and consequently no oath in reference thereto can be held to have binding force." Feather Gury's query is, "An obliget donatio jurata, sed non acceptata ?" Does a donation that has been promized on oath bind before it has been accepted not deli- vered I To understand the bhinder, we must understand what moral theologians mean by a donation. According to them it is a contract, " by which the donor deprives himself actually and in an irrevocable manner, of something in favour of the recipient who has accepted the gift." (8) A gift may be accepted either in the very act of receiving it into jjossession ; or by intimating to the donoi; the accession of the recipient to the contract even before the gift is actually delivered. Till such acceptance is given, in one way or the other, the contract does not exist; and therefore no obligation thai might result from such contract can, according to the opinion of some, be binding. The writer plainly either did not take the pains to read Gury on the matter ; or, if, he did read, he certainly did not understand. But more than this. F\ither Gury's reply to the query is twofold. In the first place he answers negatively. A man under such circums- tances is not bound, because an oath follows the nature of the act ; but a donation before acceptance is not a completed contract, there- fore the obligation ceases. And in support of this decision he cites^ St. Alphonsus Liguori. In the next place he gives an affirmative decision, to the effect that the oath is to be observed as long as it can be kept without sin. And for this solution of the question he quotes. (r>) p. 64. (6) Gur}-, t. i. p. 473, Romi', 18tj(j. (7) P (J.-). (8) T. i. 749—751. 10 Laymann. So that it turns out that the Reviewer is convicted at once of ignorance, of suppression, and of stating what is not the fact. For Father Gury does nijt answer negatively, as is impHed ; he gives no reply at all on his own authority ; he merely states the conflicting oj>inions of two most comiietent authorities in moral theology, 5^t. Alphonsus and Laymann ; and as it happens it is the non-Jesuit, St. Alphonsus, who gives the solution as the one commonly received, that the Reviewer seems to reprobate, and the Jesuit Laymann who is ojipused to that solution. Again, (9) we have " Saitfi/i i^ettcratiin loqui'iido ; quia cxcipiunt fion /iiiici, ' (10) thus translated: " 1 say sj>ea/ii/ig gciierir/Zw, for there are not a few e.\ce})tions." 'I'he matter under discussion is occult comjjensation, and Father (airy has answered the query, whether servants can have recourse to i^ccult compensation on the ]ilea that they are underpaid, negatively, at least generally si)eaking, lor not a fnv exc'-pt three cases — not iiidNV cases (i). ]f the labourer has been compelled by force or fear to consent to work, for an inadcfi'iate wage. f2J If he has been driven by necessity to accejJt it, i)r()Vided that the employer could not justly have got others to work for the }-auie low rale of i)ayment, or gave hiin work merely out of charity. (3) Jf he is unwillingly bi.rdened with oppressive labour. It may be said that these mistakes do not amount to much, and jierhnps looked at sim])ly and singlx' in themselves this may be true, liut taken altogether they indicate either great slovenliness and inac- curacy (,>n the part of this writer ; or they l)etray what i.-, still worse^ as far as tiiiih is concerned, an entire want of due prep.iraiion, not to say radical unfitness to treat the subjects he has taken in hand. These blunders go far to destroy confi Jence in his j^nvcrs Uj deal thoroughh and completely with any of the matters, so subtle a 11 d so critical in their nature and bearings as so many of Uiem are, that lie lias itut himself forward to discuss, and that too with the view ofaftVct- ing the reputation of other men by the conclusio:is that he pretends to arrive at. JjCt us now follow the Reviewer more into detail. He says, 1 11) "Advocate and antagonist will alike admit that the syste.n of ia\ opi- nion popularly charged against the Jesuit diviiKs rests, on three cardinal ]>ropositions — of probabilism, of mental reservation, and justitication of means by the end;" and he forthwith pr<)ceeds to dis- cuss each subject in turn. We have said proceeds to discuss, though in using such an expression we have conferred an' honour on ine Reviewer's process which it can lay no claim to. Anything more slipshod than his method of treatment can hardly be imigined. There is nothing to indicate the slightest insight into the principles involved in these momentous questions of moral science nothing that gives evidence of any consistent study of those principles : nothing beyond a few garbled extracts, disjecta vienibra torn from their context and surroundings as far as principles are concerned, and then a confused mass of cases the bearings of which for the most part the writer (!)) P. 78. (10) Gurv, t. i. p. (311. (,11) r. all. ^ 11 grossly misunderstands, is to be found in the dre;iry waste of pages that he has filled with liis helpless guesses and speculations. We ])ropose to reverse the Reviewer's order of dealing with the subjects that he has selected, and to begin with the last-named, that is, the charge that the Jesuits uphold the principle that the end justifies the means. We give this matter the precedence for two reasons; firstly b-cause, as the Reviewer observes, " no charge has more i)Ower- fully tended to raise poiiular jjrejudice ayainst the Jesuit l-'athets;" and secondly, because a clear understanding of what Jesuit theologians do teach- is required absolutely as a ])reliminary to the discussion of th.s or any subject whatsoever ; for unless we can show the falsehood of this (haige, we shall always lie open to the aci usation that we are falling back ujion the doctrine in question in our very treatment of it, and ailegmg what we know to be unirue because that is a necessary means for the refutation of the charge and to set ourselves right in the fyes of the world And m connection with this matter we are here led to enter our protest once for ail against the monstrous per- version of truih and outrageous violation of all fairness nf interpreta- tion involvt'd ill the following projiosiiions. ( liii'c mure u r iin|iic'ss on tlic reader tliiil.iii ileclnciiifr inferpiier from iirojiosi- liinis ill .lesiiil w.iK :s, we ailvi.sedl y [iniceed ii|i<)ii llie i).inci[de. tiiat tli'' terms to lie ii|i]ir('eiated at tliei:- value, mii;jt' be tested l)_v every sense they can ))e made to lear w illiDMl a trla iiif,fly forced strain. I'or uecd.dinir to .lesiiit doctrine any e l)r(mi;lit into ai)()ii;enl eunloriniiy witli terms emi>loycd l)y any siiiifle w liier of antlKi.ily. may be siifidy acie|iled and acted n))on by an indivi- ilinil, e\en i:i ii|ii)(i-it;(in In llie mind of in ■ spiritual ailviser (p 8".'). It is sultieient fir the present to record our refusal tn si.bmit the writings of any theologian whaicvcr to a lest so utterly subversive of all ]iriiuiples of honest inter])retation as that jiroposcd in the first of the alxne pro])()sitions. As rcgarrls ihr latter proposition, we meet it with a poim-blunk denialof its iralh, and we cliallenge tlic Review- er to adduce one shred of proof m siijiport of his assertion. ^I'liat the KovicMcr ooiisi<{4'r.>4 a (SouiODistralioii. l)Ut let us now ])roceed to see what the Reviewer has to say with reference to the maxim of tiieans being iusiitied in virtr: of the end to which they are applied. He proceeds as follows — • We bcdieve it to be demoiist. able tlial the ma\im has lieeii liroarlied eleaily and definitely, by .;; nnbrukeii chain of .lesiiit divines of fist rank standinj|, from JJnsembaum down to (Jury and I,ibe;ato.-e. In substantiation of tliis statement we snlimit a series of (|notaliijns from writers wliose ant innity cannot lie disowned iiy the Order. The fist is trom linsembanni (who may be called the patriarch of the maxim), wliose Mnlnl/n has trone tlii'onsrh more than fiftv editions, and, by its reprint, not many yeaisafro, in {{ome, at the ])resi3 of the I'ro]),ig'anda. can claim the continued and solemn approval of the Supreme Antliority of the Church. ' ("nin finis e-t licii;!s, etiam media sunt licitu,'' are his wo.'ds : and again, •• Cni licitns est finis, etiam liceiit meilia." (12) Anionust -lesnit luminaries of first magnitude rank.s l.a>r..ann, of w'liom Giiry says : '' Inter maximos theologia' moialis doctoies sine dnbio refereiidns " In his Tlii-(ihi(/iii Miiritli!< (.Muni(di ltiJi"i) we meet with the same pidpo~ition in almo;t tiie identieul foi'mnla : •' Cni ctincessns est finis, coneessa etiam sunt media ad fiiiem (12) Tp. .iL'ii and ,')04. Edit, I''.aneofo. ti. Iii.l^. \\ \'2 onlinnta." In I'tV.' the Jesuit Waiteinnnn, I'mfrssor of Moinls nt the rniversitjr «if [ii»[*i)rii(k. pulilished n Sviiopsis of Moriil Tl.eolojry. (Jiilv autlu'iiticiited by ufficiHl npprubiitiun, in whiili occurs thin passage: ''f-"5 the nitontion of a goo to that end he conse(|uently' commits; and so (Jaius would be entitled to the merits of charily, though he has aggravated the offence of violence bv the motive- of avarice. VVagenianu is not a doctor wlio deals in obscure words, for he saya : '■ Finis dcterminat proliitatem actus,' a detinitiou of singularly neat precision. C7atliolic toaching on the Morality of lliiiiiaii AetH. Before descending to particulars in replying to the above, \ve will! brierty state the doctrine of Catholic theologians with respect to the morality of human acts. When this has been done, we trust that our readers will be in a position to estimate the bearing of the quotations adduced by the Reviewer, and to appreciate, at the same litne, the utter shallowness and ignorance be rayed by the interpretations he puts upon them. And here we shall simply follow Father Clury, as his work, is accessible to al' After discussing the nature of morality, and some of the conditions that it presupposes in respect of human acts, he pro- ceeds, in his second article to treat of the Sources of Morality, or those princijjles which assign their specific moral character to human acts or modify them, each within its own specific range. (13) These sources of morality are threefold: n) The object of the act: (2) the circumstance of the act, or those accidental determinations that accompany its performance, but do not affect its substantial character,, though they may have a certain effect upon its moral complexion. 'I'hus an act may be differenced \>y the accidental character of the agent, whether he be single, or murried, or charged with some sacred office; or by the diversity of the (jualiiy or the (]uantity of the object of the act ; or by the means and instruments employed by the agent ; or by some accidental extrinsic motive apart from the object proper : or by the consideration whether it is performed in good faith or in bad faith, or with a greater or less degree of intensity or adverteiice ; or by the jjeriod of time consumed in the operation ; (5) the end of the act, or that to which the agent directs his intention in its accomplish- ment. The CoiicIiimIoiim of (aiiry, tlio JoMiiit. Having established the existence of each of these principles, Father (lury goes on to lay down the following conclusions as resulting frcro them — 1. The election of evil means is always evil, but on the contrary it does noi. follow thai the election of yood means is always good. Thus, no one is held to- be worthy ot praise because he abstains fiom drink out of avarice; and he is to be held culpable who steals money in order to give alms. 2. Whosoever chooses an honest means to an honest end. jjcrform? an act of double honesty, if the honesty of th? act in both cases fall<) within his intention. In like munner he is guilty of double malice who elects an evil means to an evi! end, as n.s that laracter^ >p'e.\ion. r of the e sacred e object agent ; Proper : ill bad i<:e : or of the nipli.sh- t^ather J 13 Arising from the clioioe of such tneiins. ih for iiHtiiiicc if any one tttlil ii lie to free liis iieiKJilior from dan^rer. So, oti tlieotlier liami, he whomakes use of honest meitiiH for a hail end contracts only the malice arising from such ciiil. 4. Wiiosoever makes use of u means iinlitferent in itself, that is not having nnv jincoitic chaiiiclei' of good o;- e\ il. in order to a good or a bad end. c-ontracls only trie goodnes.s or malice arising from the end jiroposcd. it is hardly necessary to point out how entirely t>pposed these prin- ci])lcs are to the construction put by the Reviewer on the passages which he has (jiioted from Busembaum, Laymann, and \\'agemann. To account for such difference we are driven to one of two supposi- tions. Hither Father Gury contradicts the above-named tlieologians in the priuci|)lcs he lays down on this subject, and then we have a <'ontlict on this fundamental question amongst the Jesuits themselves ; or the Quarterly writer has mistaken the sense of the passages that lie cites lu proof of his accusation against the Society. \\'e can only decide which of the two supjjositions is the correct one, not l)y forcing any jiossible meaning out of the i)assages in question that the words in themselves may bear, according to the Reviewer's canon of inter ])retation, but by taking them in connection with the context and scope o*" the subject matter to which they belong, in agreement with the hermeneutical rules that are followed in all other cases. If the lieviewer had proceded in harmony with those rules, and •exercised common fairness in their application, he would have e.s])])osing barriers as they best could. Should scrui>les arise as to the legitimacy of using such means of regaining freedom and escaping from death, how w ould comn)oa sense rei)l>'to them? Of course you are at liberty to use thern ; for the actions involved in them arc not evil in diemselves, and you have a right to your freedom, therefore you have a right also to employ those means by which alone you can regain your freedom. The right to perform any action carries with it theright to use all means neces- sary to that action provided they be not absolutely evil by their very nature. And this is all that Iiust mbaum means when he says that the means requisite to un end are lawful when the end itself is lawfuL l)Ut he does not say that evil means can be employed for a lawful end ; far less that a lawful end converts l)ad means into good. It is true that Busembaum does not confine the application of his principle to innocent prisoners only ; but then he considers that under certain circumstances even guilty and condemned malefactors may legitimately effect their escape from prison, a question which we do not enter into here, so that tlie complexion of the case is in no wise altered as regards the principle at stake." (I')i The second quotation, '• To whom the end is lawl'ul, the means also are lawful," has reference to a (ase in which the performance of a certain natural action is concerned, and the reply of Busembaum simply amounts to this, that means which, if employed to give effect to sinful affections and desires would themselves be sinful, may be used without sin in order to the legitimate act in ([uesticjii, for the plain reason, that they are more or less necessary and natural adjuncts to it. The case therefore is merely a repetition of the one we have just considered. (i()) Tlie JoMiiit I..a,viiiaiiii. ■ ^ The Reviewer quotes Laymann, but as he gives no reference, and Laymann's works fill a bulky folio volume, we have been unable to find the passage to which he alludes ; but we have no hesitation in asserting that it will admit of an explanation analogous to those already given. . . . ; ; Tbc JoKiiit IVaKOiiianii. Wagemann is next quoted — " Is the intention of a good end rendered vicious by the choice of bad means ? Not if the end itself be intended irrespective of the means." We do not possess a copy of (15) Busembau'Ti, 1. i. vi. c. .3, Df reo. art. ?. Romir', 1844. (1(5) Busembaum, 1. vi. Tract, vi. c. 11, art. 1. il^ 15 Wagemann's hook, hut lire case referred to is found In the Tractatin Proihonms. wriiten we helieve hy Wagemann, which is prefixed to \'oit's T/icolo^ia Mora/is, a work that is quoted by the Reviewer immediately afterwards. The reply to the above query, which is given under a distinction, stands as follows — If the cml is iiitendoil witli a ilotcrininale roliilion to Imd means, tlie ftct '\i rctnlcicil hiiil ; hut not if the ctul l)o inttMidiMl witlioni any retertMict' to such means. Tiie foilowir.y iirc cxeinplcs— Tiliiis steals in order to five alms out of the prtx'eeds of his thcti; and Cains intends to i,nve alms, tliini\in>f nl tlie moment notlMnjjf ahout tlie means : I)mI nfteiWiiids, heiiit;' moved l>y iivariec, he cliooses to liestowiiis alms ii.V means of theft, wliieh lie cominits with ihalend in view : the lii'st intention of t;iving alms uas i^oud in ('aius. (i?) l"he Reviewer omits the list clause,, and proceeds to say — " And so Caius would he entitled to the merits of charily though he has aggra- vated the offence of violence by the motive of avarice." This sentence is clear in nothing save this, that it is an utter misstatement of Wage- mann's conclusion ; a misstatement indeed so palpable that it strains the Reviewer's title to indulgence on the grounds of his habitual inac- curacy to its utmost limit. The whole rpiestion is, whether x\\q intent ion of doing a deed of charity — which is tne mental act referred to — is vitiated by tiie, what he may call, collateral intention of using a bad means to perform that good deed ? The reply is given at once. Most certainly. Titius makes an act of the mind that he will steal in order to give alms, and he commits a sin by so doing. Caius. on the other hand, forms his intention irrespective of the means ; and his act of the mind is good. It is only subsequently that he commits sin by the election of a bad means to carry out his good intention. The Reviewer's case is made worse by the fact that he had before his eyes, not more than half a page above the extract that he has given, the following most clear and distinct statement, a statement that en- tirely coincides with the principles laid down by Father Gury. It is asked — " Does a choice derive its morality from the means as well us from the end ?" R. if the malice of the means he specifically distinct from the malice of the end^ the choice contracts a twofold malice, one from the means, the other from the end, and the result will he a sin of a ki?id different from eitiier (.for as we have already said, there will not lie two distinct sins in one act, hut one sin of a dill'erent species) ; the same holds jrood of a good act recognizing and embracing an end and means diverse in specific gi odness ; for example, he who determines to steal that he may have money to give to his concnhiiie; and he who gives alms to an. hidigent person who is )iis enemy that he. may effect u reconciliation with him. The first case of course illustrates the double malice of an act that involves the choice both of an evil end and evil means ; the latter the double goodness resulting from the choice of end and means that are both good. VVagemann then proceeds to say in a corollary — [1] If the means be indiffcrenf , the choice derives neither goodness nor malice froiiv it, as is evident. [2] If tlie means is of the. same specific malice or goodness as the end, the choice docs not superinduce a new species of morality. [3] Every choice of et)i7 mcrt/is is evil ; but on the other hand, not every choice of good means is. (17) Volt, Tract. Prod, c. ri. nn. 27, 25. Lugdnn and Paris. 1850. r ; i HI 16 poRitively Rood ; for, am wiis Raid nbove, to will nn nlijpct tliiit if* known to he I)H(| Hiiflicffl lor till' imriicipation in (!vil ; in orcipi to endow an act witli tiie (goodness of tlie oi)jt'rl, tni« jroodneti.-i muHt lie ponitivelv inienili'd, at least in dotiic way, «rpn tliongli it slioiild lie confnrtud and nndetinod. It is needless to point out how completely the principles laid down in the above extract overthrow the Reviewer's next ignorant objection. *' Wagemann is not a doctor who deals in obscure words, for he says — ' Finis determinat probitatem actus,' a definition of singularly neat precision." All words are obscure to those who cannot penetrate their meaning ; and the Reviewer has utterly missed the meaning of the words he quotes. ''The end determines the jjrobitv of the act." Of course it does. The end, as Father (iury has told us, is one of the sources of the morality of actions. Hut not the only source; for the object and the circumstances also contribute their share ; and Wage- mann has just told us that every choice of evil means is evil ; and Father (lury states that he who employs a bad means to obtain a good end contracts the malice of the bad means. All this is expressed by the axiom — Bonum ex intc^ra laiisa, malum ex quocunu/ua defedn. The Jcvmilt Voit. The Reviewer passes on to an extract taken from Voit's Moral Theology. lie p-.'.ts tlie following case — " Arcailins kills Cains in some city where the law JnHicts cajiital punislnnenf on a innrderer. Arcadins \^ delivered up and condem- ned to death, blithe escapes, forcibly liri-akinjf out of prison, tliounh foreseeing that he may render his {gaolers lialde to grievous injury. The question i.s, whether Arcadiiis, liy eHcapiii}r after sentoice had been pronounced, has done wroni?. Aly Answer is in tlm ne)troiiM doctriiio iiiipiiltMl to Oiiry. We cannot undertake to follow the Reviewer through the hereto- geneous mass of cases that he has huddled together ; nor indeed is it necessary, for we have laid down, as we trust, sufficiently the princi- ples on which his objections and misrepresentations may be easily solved. We will therefore touch upon only one more case, and that because it affords a further and very stricking illustration of helpless blundering. Father Gury is credited [20] with laying down distinctly the monstrous proposition, " that no evil intention can render wicked any deed which in itself must not by nature be necessarily evil." Pas- sing over the clumsiness of the wording, we presume the Reviewer would make Father Gury say that any action may be good, with what- ever evil intention committed, provided the said action be not abso- lutely evil in itself apart from all question of the intention of the agent. The possibility of such a statement on the part of Father Gury has already been precluded by the principles which we have seen that he [20] P. 73. '!| 18 \i|)h()kls. Hesides, the |)ro|)osition bears so great an absurdity on the very face of it, that the serious attribution of it to, we will not say any grave autlior, l)ut to any man of onhnary cnnunon sense seems to be ahnost i)ast behef. However, in support of his charge the Reviewer (piotes in a note the expression, Ad .njuriiun non sit/fuit ma/a iiiteniio "A bad intention is not sufficient to constitute an injury." We do not find these words in (lury, but we have the following: " Prava enim in entio non ettkil, ut injustum sit illud opus, quod ex se res- pectu tertu mjustum non est |2i The case is that of a man who steals, and escapes suspicion, whic i rest on a third party who is inno- cent, and there is (|uestion whether the thief is bound in commutative justice to make compensation to the innocent man for any loss he sustains. (Jury gives the different opinions on the subject, and amongst them one which denies any liability because, even if the thief has contributed to fasten the false charge on the other man, " his evil intention does not make an action unjust, which is not of its own nature unjust with resjjcct to the third person in question." Causing suspicion to light on a man is not a thing that of its own nature causes material loss ; though such loss is very likely accidentally to follow. I'he Reviewer therefore translates injustniii by ' wicked,' instead of by unjust, and thus shows that he entirely mistakes the point at issue, (iury does not say that such an act would not be wicked and sinful, but that in the opinion of some if would not be an unjust act in the technical sense of the word ; that is an offence against commutati\»e justice, and therefore burdened with the obligation of restitution. liidiflVrciii iotioiiH. We will conclude for the present with a few remarks on the Review- er's strictures on (iury's doctrine as to the indifference of certain actions. He quotes a dictum of Father Gury [22] to the effect that where "the end is lawful, the means also are lawful provided they be indifferent in themselves." Tuere is here plainly a limit put to the means available for any end ; what that limit is we shall see presently. We will not follow the writer through his confused discussion, but con- tent ourselves with producing his somewhat impressive conclusion — '• Here we confine ourselves to the opinion — and we assure those who challenge our view that we have arrived at it not lightly — that accor- ding to Father Gury's definitions the words 'per se indifferentia ' cannot be held to limit in any effective degree the licence involved in the other terins of the proposition." Well, let us see what Father Gury's definitions are. In his remarks on the object of an act, regarded as the chief source of its morality, he says that an object may be good, bad, or indiffe- rent, according as it agrees with or is opposed to reason, law, or the right order of things, or as it does not fall within the scope of law and order. Again, an object may be intrinsically good or intrinsically evil ; and in what the intrinsic evil of an object exists he explains as- follows — ., - •• ^ ' [2]] Gury, t. i. p. 647. [22] P. 71. ^L 19 ()hi«'clM llml art' iiiliiii^inillv ••vil ,iif of flirrc ilus'ip'j. 1. Sdiiii- nrr siicli iilifiilulilji, mill iiiilc|n'ini»'iit of all ciiriiiii'^taiK'x's : luMimor tlifv iiiMilvc ii'|iuKnaiiCtt til the y\\i\\X Mini iilisiiliilcly ncci'MKiiiv onlfr, 1114 I'ur iiiMtnmi', Initinl of (lOcT, \>\**- illflllV, Hint Sll fdltll ()\\ icrs III •' iiitrirHii'iill y f\ il, not |nrri-!rly in lliriiifirhfS, liiil liy rciiHO n 0.' Horiii' iiiljiiiici or ciiinlitiiiii tlint iIcim-ikIs on tiit- soVfiiicii |io\mt ot (ioil or iiiiin '. mull iiiv Inking' \\\\\\\. Im'Iuii|.m to otIiiT:*, injiicy to IumIv or rf|MitHtioii, and hik-Ii like, wliic-h Hoim-tiiiii's Ihmoiiu- liiw I'iiI. ;t. Otlicr,-) ll^^llill arc oiiU evil liy ithhoii of tin- ilan^i-r wlilcli onliiiarilv utti'inU tlirni, fiiK'li art lookintr at Imsc olijcrts. fi'iiiiiiiu' '>ail ImioK?-. ainl ho on. Tiii'>(«> for w i'ra.-ioiialilc raiM)', ami wiirri' I hi' danger is r*-iiio\ ol, may lii>i'iiiiii< lirit. The last mentioned class concerns those who arc called to moral, legal, or nicd'.c;il studies for instance, and may be dismissed ; but it i>i the second class iliat falls more immediately within the s( ()|)»' of out present disciissiun ; though of course our principle is lawful and applies to actions within the sphere of both these classes I.et u^ illustrate w liat is meant. Take for instance, a man's right to his property, his good name, his personal security, his life. His right to such things is h.vsed upon (iod's will and order that he shr)uld enjoy them. Tne range of his riglits in such matters is connnensurate with Clod's will and appointment with respect to thetn To deprive a man (jf his possessions within that range is to infringe his right ; and this is in the ordinary course of things always wrong. But contingencies may arise in which (lod, with Whom rests the supreme disposing l)0wer. may deprive him of them; and if so, CI >d can also delegate to men some portion of His power. Thus He concedes to the State the right to take away life when a man has been guilty of a grave crime against public order ; nay, even to a jirivate individual when it is indispensable for just self defence. lUit how do we know that God grants those powers? We reason thus. Clod has cominitted to the State as an end the care of ])ublic order. But the maintenance of public order requires that murderers be put to death. Therefore God must have given to the State the power of life and death in such cases. And why? Because He wills the end, and must therefore to be consis- tent will the means necessary for its attainment. Ciii conceditur finisy. conceit nntur media, (uccessaria.) But as God wills that the criminal's life should be taken froi . him the latter has no longer a right to it ; consequently the means is not bad the putting him to death, that is, in order to the security of public order, for the condition on which, as Father Gury says, the badnes.s of the act is based, the right that a man has to his life, has beer removed. l¥heii a riKliI to the Kiid gives a riglit to the JWt'aiim. From what has been said, then, in order to apply the principle, that a right to the end gives a right to the means, three conditions must be complied with. 1. That the end shall be good. .' 2. That the means be not sinful. 3. That they be necessary for the attainment of the end. As regards the second condition, from what has been said, the following conclusions maybe drawn, (i) That there are certain means, which are absolutely and intrinsically bad in themselves ; and such can 20 never bf employed, (i) Others, that are iiiditVercnl, that is, have no Kpec.itic morality in themselves, such as ;xrr tho anions of walkinjf, j,ittii)|4, and so lorlh ; and tliese may be alw.iys used, (j) A class whuli lies between these two, consistmj,' of a page 430 . of (lury's first volume in confirmation of the above conclusions: but vwc trust we have saitl sulVicient to show upon what a mass of misap- )>u,'hension and misreprcseiiiation the Reviewer's attack upon tho moral teaching of the Catholic Church is based. We believe that some time ago offer was made in the Ciermania to Iteslow a hundred thalers on any one wIkj could produce a l>on^'i Jiluiil be glad to transmit, the name of the successful applicant to the bureau of the Germania^ and we have no doubt his claim will be duly honoured if duly substan- tiated. But the Qimrft'i /y Reviewer has certainly so far not establish- ed his title to the pri/.e ; a matter to be regretted by his friends, as otherwise he might have invested the hundred thalers in a Latin -Dictionar) , an article that he is manifestly much in need of. ill! IL PART II. Moiilail l<4'M4>rvtiti<»n. I*iir<' ** T>> rv ''■ with tliem. Pascal has prepared the way and Voltaire is free to come"(3). After the fall of the Jesuits in 1762. d'Alenibert writing to Voltaire, could estimate its effects, and the hand that Jansenism had had in the catastrophe. " Hy my faith," he says, " this is a very serious matter, and the Parliamentary Courts go to work with no light hand. They think that they are saving religion, but they are aiding reason without suspecting it. '1 hey are the hangmen of philosophy, whose sentence they execute ".\itliout knowing it As regards myself, to whom all things ajjjiear at j)resent (ouleur ih' rose, I see the Jansenists quietly dying next year, after liaving this year brought ihe Jesuits to a violent end, toleration established, the Protestants recalled, the priests married, confession abolished and fanaticism crushed without any one being the wiser " (4). Such were to be the fruits of Pascal's work. Tlu' passage quoted by the Reviewer from the Pioviiuial Letters stands as follows : " ' One of the most embarrassing things in the norld,' says the Jesuit, 'is to avoid telling a lie, especially when you want vsomeihi.ig to be believed that is false. Our system of equivo- cation \s a grout help in tiiis matter. JJutdo you know how to proceed where equivocal words cannot be found? ' 'No father.' I thought as much,' said he, 'that is new ; it is the doctrine of Mental Reservations,''' \Vhereu])on the Reviewer, having made his quotation, falls straightway into the i)iifall of his distinction between i)urely and latently Mental Reservations. Now first (fall with reference to the quotation itself, Pascal asserts in it what is not true, when he says that the doctrine of Mental Reservation was new, and an invention of the Jesuits. Escobar more especially is the reputed father of the doctrine, but he had no real claim to the parentage; for in maintaining it, he did but jiass on the common doctrine of theologians, and he never ta ight the lawfulness «f purely Mental Reservation. ! II t i Eloiiioiitary notions on Triifli hikI FalMoliood. But in order to the understanding of this question a few words of preliminary matter are necessary. We have first to inquire what is meant by truth, or speaking the truth? Or, again, in other words, what is meant by a lie? As Father (iury is the Reviewer's bete noire in this and other matters, we will take his definition of a lie — Mcudaciiim csi lociitio vel signijiidfio contra nientcm iiim voliintate fallcndi. We may explain this definition thus : A lie is a speech or intimation contrary to the mind with the intention of deceiving, or it is a form of words of which the meaning is not in conformity with and does not express the thoughts of the mind of the speaker about any subject of which there may be question, and such form of words becomes a lie formally when uttered with the intention of deceiving others. Truth, then, as far as intercourse with our neighbour is concerned consists in the agreement of the words we utter with the thoughts of our mind on any given subject. A lie is the wilful departure from such agreement with a deceitful intention : these two conditions being requisite to constitute (it) Ilvviio (^(■^= 4f rvo.— T^ord l*»liiicrNt»ii*M llliio Book. Now it is clear that cases like the above will arise in the various relations of life, in which there will be an apparent conflict between positive duties. There is on the one side the obligation to speak the truth ; on the other, the claims of charity, or of public duty, or of self- preservation, which will be set aside and sacrificed in divers cases by speaking the truth. The existence of such difficulties is acknowledged on all hands, and they receive a practical solution by men of the world without much attempt at the construction of a scientific system of the moralities of speech. It is not too much to say that such solutions are too often guided by the rule of thumb alone. As far as statesmen are ■ concerned this is notorious. Without committing themselves perhaps :«lliilttlli«iJlkaaA)iiUiiU -■'■'-' I*'] " i • flBii n i y ; ! ■ \ 24 to the full to the acceptance of the famous dictum that language was j,Mven to conceal men's thoughts, or Sir Henry Wotton's description of an ambassador, as a good citizen sent to lie abroad for the good of his country ; it is to be feared ihat modern statesmen are not troubled with many scruples about acting more or less freely on the spirit of those sayings. Kven the i)ro])er and ])recise M. Guizot could say in a debate in the I'rench Chambers : " I have a few preliminary remarks to offer. When an ambassador does me the honour to call on me and ask me questions, it is not to an interrogatory that I submit. I am in such a case bound to the truth, but I only reply so far as suits the interest of my country " (5). When we find M. Guizot thus falling back upon the itrincii)!e of reserve in the conduct of international affairs, we are quite prepared for a wide adoption of the same by one so little troubled with scrui)les of any kind as Lord Palmerston. The notorious "Afghanistan" l^lue Book is a case in i)oint, wherein des- jjatches were either entirely suppressed or jiartly mutilated, and important matter thus withheld from the knowledge of Parliament by tampering with documents prtjfessedly prepared for its instruction and tnlightenment. The defence of Lord Palmerston for such garblings anil omissions was no doubt that advanced by M. Guizot for the economy of speech, the interests of the public service and the good of the country. (6) Tlio l>) Foluuaiy 5. 1S47 (,t!) Fisi'hel. The l:'ii(/liiis, p. 'JT4, Cf. note t]. (11) Theol. Mor. tom. i. p. 474. <12) Saturdaji Review. ApririO, ISTJ. . Ind a ar.d of a m in for filed, is a Mgh- ^here ison : ler he lan is our the Inder livo- tion, may t the wii. Idfor r its listifi- e to liards own wfiil. 'yed, 27 Tlic Kt'itevKT'iit gnrliled extract**. Let us now pass on to the disjointed mass of garbled extracts that the Reviewer heaps together under the head of Mental Reservations. xVlter his novel and ingenious discovery of the distinction between ])urely and latently mental reservations, the Reviewer proceeds as follows — '• For frrave reasons '' it is ''lawful at times to innke use of tulint reservation?- as also of e(|niv()('al terms," it t)einjr is in (icconl willi tlio divint's of liis OkIit- liiH, iiowovcr, luort' to any in liniitntion of tiic oliiiffiition following mi oallis. Hi- lays it down, tliut nccordinf"' to more |)rol)al)lc .v tliiM ruling, tiie following exemplifi- cation will show. ''Anna having been guilty of adiiltcrj, and being interrogated by her iiusband, who has formed a suspicion, luiswers tlie first time, tliatshe has not violated wedloci< ; tlic second time, having in tiie interval obtained al)3olution, flhe replies, I am i/iii/t/esn o/khc/i crime. The tiiird time siie absolutely denies the adultery, and says, I hare, not committc'l it. meaning within iierself sucii particular adultery as I am bound to reveal, or, I have not committed an act of adultery that Las to be revealed to 3'ou. Is Anna to be blamed?" Gury's reply, too long to be given here, Justififs each answer of the adnlterous woman, supporting his ruling by a grave array of .Jesuit autiiorities, amongs which figure Suarez and St. Liguori — St. Liguori not being a Jesuit all the same. We repeat here that the two cases are quite distinct. In the former there was question cf a priest in the tribunal of penance who had a right to interrogate so far as was necessary to the discharge of his office ; in the latter case the interrogator had no such right. Then, the Reviewer keeps back the trufh, that none of Anna's equivocations would have been lawful if her husband had possessed the right to question her, she was not therefore bound to answer him, [19] Gury, t. ii. p. 516. . ;.. , *■..[. : . .. :. iiili : :{3 and was free to protect herself as she could. To help her to do that, those who hold that the law of truth can never be suspended, would ])trmit her to have recourse to equivocation and mental restriction. ()n the other hand, those who take the opposite view, would say with Paley, that " where the person you speak to has no right to know the truth," a falsehood ceases to be a lie ; or, that in this case the prin<:iple of English law applies, that no one is bound to sj)eak the truth, "when a full discovery of the truth tends to accuse the witness himself of some legal crime." In other words, no one is bound to criminate himself, unless a grave ])ublic danger requires it Now this was Anna's case. Had she acknowledgt'd her crime, she would have been liable to legal penalties; therefore the law of truth was suspended in her case; her husband was seeking to know what he had no right to ask ; she could then reply by flat and absolute denial. For ourselves we can only say that the latter solution commends itself to us as most in keei)ing with straightforwardness and common sense. The matter may perha|)s be made a little clearer by reversing the case. Suppose that it had been Anna who was questioning her husband William about his violations of wedlock, would William have felt himself bound to give categorical answers to Anna's interrogations? Most probably the answer would have been, \'ou have no right to ask me such questions ; mind your own business. But if the urgency of suspicion was not thus easily to be i)ut aside, would William in the long run l:ave hesitated to use Anna's equivocations, or to answer. No ? Our space compels us to jiause here for the present, but we have by no means yet done with the Quarterly Reviewer. PART III. RcHlitiitioii niid Cliaritj (The Month, Lo::don, May 1875, p. 71). We propose to conclude our notice of the Quarterly Theologian by a few remarks in the present paper upon two subjects that exercise him sorely and betray him into endless confusion. We confine ourselves to these, because it would be quite impossible to follow him through his motley mass of disingenuous patchwork without committing ourselves to the composition of sundry and lengthy moral treatises. Two of his topics, besides, have already been discussed in the pages of the M(Wth, and dealt with sufficiently by anticipation to dispose of the Reviewer's blundering and misleading method of handling them. We refer to Probabilism and Tyrannicide. The former was treated of in our January number of 1868, in a Paper entided, "What is Probabilism? " and the latter in an article contained in the number for March — April, 1873. The points to which we shall now direct our readers' attention are Restitution and Charity ; subjects to which the Reviewer addresses himself more or less from page 72 to 85 of his article. We shall not attempt to follow him in all his details, but shall content ourselves, in 34 the first place, with laying down the gcncriil theological principles which govern these matters ; and then, in the second place, showing from some of the examples aildiK ed hy the Reviewer, and from his attempts to understand them, how entirely he is without any intelligent grasp of the principles in question. #! llutl. To begin with Restitution, which is a part of natural justice, and therefore, under certain circ iimstani:es, an obligatory duty. All our duties spring from the various relations in which we stand, either to (lod, to ourselves, or to our fellowinen. Our duties to our fellow-men are of two kinds ; duties of justice and duties of charity. Justice is tlefined by Father (Jury as a moral virtue, which constantly inclines the will to render his rights to another, or to each individual man. The intention, then, of justice is to insist that all shall have their due, and to maintain due equality amongst men in general, or between man and man in jjarticular. Justice, therefore, has regard to such matters as the restitution of what has been unjustly taken from another, the rei)ara- tion of injury, abstention from fraud, the keeping of faith in compacts, and the maintenance of every man in the full enjoyment of his rights. Again, the duties i)rescribed by justice arc divided into different classes, according to the different aspects under which justice is viewed ; for there is a legal justice, a distributive justice, a vindictive justice, and a commutative justice. The three first refer to the relations of the ruler to the subject ; the last, that is, commutative justice, refers, it is suflficient for our jiresent jjurpose to say, to the relations between pri- vate ])ersons. It is under commutative justice alone that cases of res- titution fall ; for restitution simply means the giving back what belongs to another person when it has been wrongfully taken from him. Hence it follows that for an obligation of restitution to exist, there must exist on the other side a right to receive it. The obligation to restitution may arise in three ways : from taking or receiving what belongs to another unjustly ; from unjustly causing damage in goods, in person or in character, to another ; or from unjust co-operation, which results in either of the above ; thus, in matter of fact, the last-mentioned ground of restitution resolves Uself into one of the two former grounds. ■''iiih ii Fonini Kxt^riiiim vt Forum CoiiNCientltp. There is still another matter which requires to be made clear in connection with the obligation to restitution, and that the more urgent- ly because of the utter confusion of mind betrayed by the Reviewer on the subject. We refer to the distinction between the Forum Inter- num and the Forum Externum. I'he word Forum may be taken for jurisdiction, or judicial power in general. The Forum Internum refers often entirely, always principally, to the secrets of the heart. Thus it is sometimes called the Forum Ctf/w^/>///w, because it takes cognizance of acts by which a man, knowing himself in relation to the great law of right and wrong, impressed upon his intelligence by the hand of God, conforms himself or places himself in opposition to that great law.. [rinciples J showing [frum his >tclhgent ICC, and All our it her to low men istice is Mies the 1. 'J he liie, and lan and rsas the rej)ara- nipacts, rights. liflcrent 'iewed ; justice, s of the i ■rs, it is ^een pri- m ? of res- 9 belongs a Hence 'm St exist H taking 1 :a using ^m unjust ^m tter of ^1 one of ^H rgent- 'iewer Inter- n for refers us it ;ance : Jaw d of law.. 3R The periiliaritv of this court is that there is li^it one witness who is able to j,'ive testituony. " No man knowelh the thoughts of a man save th ; spirit of a man tliat is within him." The accused and the accuser are ideiiiiciil. Milt what miarantee is there that tiie evideiu e given l)y such .1 partial witness shall lie true ? Tlurre is this guarantee, and it is abun- dantly sutfu ient. The absolution given in the tribunal of Penance, the special court of this foium Interuiim, must indeed be pronounced b\ (lod's Minister, but (iod Himself must ratify .r d execute it. (iod cannot l)c deceived. If he who anuses himsell tells the truth, and is otherwise properly disposed, the pardon pronounced will take effect ; if he tells untruths, the pardon is worthless — nay, worse than worthless, for it adds the guilt of sacrilege to his other sins. In the I'ontm /'.xtftinuii, on the other hand, it is the Churc h or the State, each in its own resp*'(tive courts, wlii(h both jironounces and exe- cutes the sentence. The matter to be judged consists of external acts and of inteiili(Mis only so far as they can be judged of Irom their out- ward expression. The accused may elude by untruths the sentence of r.uch a court ; il becomes his interest then to bear lalse witness. ]iut on the other hand, the matter of offence l)eing external, is such that others also can bear testimony to its existence and its nature. Thus, in this external court, it is both necessary and i)Ossible to hear wit- nesses other than the accused, and to suspect him rather than to trust him in his own ( ause. 'J'he bearing of this distinction between the J-'oniiii ittrnuin and the Forum /'.x/crnum, more esjjecially upon the (piesti-'n of restitution, w ill be evident from the following principles laid down , , Kathcr Gury in connection with the obligation to repair any loss that may have been unjustly caused to another ; in the case, that is, where injury has been done to the rights or goods of another person without any benefit accruing to him who causes the injury. It is clear that the matter of restitution pertains both to one Forum and the other ; this being so. the question naturally arises whether the decisions of the two separate; courts may not sometimes come into collision. PriiiciplvN wliicli ri'Kiilato KoMlitiilioii In llic' Foriiiii CoiiHCiviititP. Now, the i)rinciples that regulate the Forum Conscientiae in this matter of restitution are (i) That the action causing the loss for which restitution is sought, shall be unjust ; for otherwise, where there is no violation of strict right, or of commutative justice, no obligation to restitution can exist. If John's cattle damage a field unjustly occupied by James, whatever restitution may be due, it is certainly not due to James. (2) Then, the action causing the loss, must be the truly effica- cious cause ; must be such that is, that the loss can be truly said to follow from it ; and also, that it be truly imputed to the person incrimi- nated. For clearly, no action can be imputed to a person unless it be his own proper action ; nor can the loss resulting from any action be attributed to the doer, unless that action be the true and efficacious cause of damage. Thus, if William gives Peter a sword without the slightest suspicion that Peter will make bad use ofit, could William for 36 i -I !l one moment be accountpd responsible for the murder committed by Peter with that sword, or for the damage resulting to the family of the murdered man ? Or again, suppose Edward rushes hastily into the middle of the Strand to save a child's life that is in danger of being run over, and by so doing causes a carriage-horse to take fright and rush througli the plate glass of a jeweller's window, to the sore detriment of both window and carriage : would any one in his senses say that Kdward would be liable to restitution? His praiseworthy action would be said to be the accidental^ but certainly not che efficacious cause of the loss ensuing ; it could not be imputed to him with a view to res- titution in any real sense. But let us vary the supposition. Instead of a man engaged in a benevolent action, take the case of a thief who has been detected in the very act, and is rushing across the street with the police in full pursuit. A dog. terrified by the uproar lakes to llight, and dashes amongst the legs of the horses of a passing carriage. The catastrophe suj)posed in the last case is repeated ; horses and carriage, and windows and jewels, come to great grief. Who is responsible for the damage ? Would any court of justice in the world say that the thief was ? The unjust action which was the origin of the whole affair, was obviously of such a kind that no ingenuity could twist it into the relation of effi- cacious cause with respect to the remote consequences that followed from it. As tar as these consequences are concerned, the whole thing can only be regarded as accidental. Nor again, is the connection of the consequences with the act of pilfering* so close, as in any way to imply the omission of any prudent precaution that might have pre- vented the disaster. The results were beyond the ordinary range of human prevision; iheie could be, therefore, no valid plea ofnegligence against the culprit, nor again of evil intention. The whole occurrence in the street could not but be utterly unforeseen. All this brings us to another condition that theologians require that the obligation of restitution may lie in any given case, at least in Foro Jnterno. The damificatory act must be theologically culpable. By theological fault is understood a fault which in the forum of conscience involves an offence against God either mortal or venial. There is also according to the P -^'nan law a fault that is called juridical, which involves some degree ot negligence, varying in degree, by which loss is entailed on another in person or property. Now, it is clear that such negligence may involve sin, or it may not ;it may arise from sheer inadvertence, without the slightest prevision, even in a con- tused way. of the evil :onsequences that may ensue from it ; or it may ])e uegligence voluntarily allowed with the bad intention of bringing about the very consequences that follow. Of such intention the Forum F.xteruuuu conversant as it is with external acts, can take no cogni- zance , nor again can it judge of the measure of advertence or inad- vertence. The Forum Externum can only proceed b}- the constructive method ; judge, that is. whether such external indications exist, as to justify the imputation of negligence or evil intention. If such indica- tions are sufficiently ascertained, then the presence of negligence or bad intention is consideied to be sufficiently made out for ail legalpur- poses. On the other hand, in the forum of conscience, the conscience itself 'A fed by J of the (to the igrun rush Jent of that [would (use of |to res- Id in a in the rsuit. St the Imposed s and age ? ? 'i'he iously 'of effi- lowed ^ thing ion of kay to 'e pre- hge of igence rrence 37 claims to be heard, and appeals to the judge that judges righteous judgment in the last resort, when cases of this kind occur. Occasionally, then the two judicatures will come into collision and the Forum Internum will sometimes pronounce the accused guiltless and free from all obligation, when the Forum Externum judges him to be guilty, and burdens him with the obligation of restitution. At the same time the Inner Forum is careful to uphold the authority of the Outer Forum, and acts upon the principle that, where the fact of negli- gence has been established, even though inadvertent and free from all bad intention, and the sentence of a court of law has imposed the obligation of restitution, then such sentence is also binding in Foro conscientiac ; and this on the broad grjund that the public security depends on obedience in such cases, and therefore obedience cannot be withheld The exception, however, must always be made of the case where there is a talse presumption of fact, for the law always presup- poses the fact, something that has been done, in which negligence ha> intervened, though possibly without blame in the Forum of Con- science. But if such fact be falsely imputed, then the sentence is unjust and can carry no obligation to restitution with it. Such brietly is the teaching of Father Gury on this subject, (i) Tli4' l<<'ii4'M4'r*!x 4l4M*4»;;iitory oxpre.^MioiiN. TiK'ii* L'iiti*utlii'iiliie.S!>. Having laid down these ]jrinci])les let us now turn to the Reviewer's examples and interpretations. But, in the first i)lace let us premise, that the explanation we have given, of the distinction between the Forum Externum and the Forum Infernum, at once shows the futility and untruthfulness of the derogat(jry expressions with which the Reviewer so jilentifully interlards his pages, 'i'hese expressions are inspired by his estimate of " that capital feature of the Jesuit doctrine, ])roviding the unfailing sanction for laxness in the application of prin- ciples, namely, the unlimited discretion accorded to the individual in assertion of justificatory jjleas " (2) Thus we have jjhrases like these used with reference to a penitent in the tribunal of penance, " provided he will allege ;" " the unlimited discretion accorded to the individual ; " "will posses an inward disposition;" " that a person should vehe- mently affirm ; " and so forth ; the object of foisting such phrases into, or of connecting them with Gury's text, being entirely to falsify hi-- decisions as interpreted by the princijjles that he lays down. They refer of course to the solemn act by which a penitent by his own act and deed constitutes himself a criminal in some degree or other before (rod ; he opens his mind to his confessor, audit then becomes the con- fessor's part not to be .satisfied with allegations, or vehement asser- tions, or any amount of professions ; but to judge that the penitent is sincere and truthful in his statements and accusations. Fven when satisfied on this point, his subsequent action can only be equivalently interpreted in some such fashion as this. " ^Vell, I accept the truth of your statements, and in consequence I can only declare that this or (1) (inrv. I>f Jtiri' of .hut'ih 1, cap. ii. art. 1. 2. (2) V. T.i. ! 'Ill Hi 88 ;nat obligation rests upon you in the matter of commutative justice— for it is that which we are discussing at present— or that you are free from all obligation ; but then remember after all that you are here speaking especially before (lod, and He will judge all this just as it is. If such be the true testimony of your conscience, He will ratify what I have done and decided ; if it be false, you will have to answer to Him. Upon your own soul be the responsibility." Either conscience •s to have something to say in such matters or it is not. If the latter, then cadit tjuccstio ; if the former, then we cannot conceive any other rnai.ner in which its claims can be recognized and its dictates allowed •lieir due M'eight than that which is based on the principles of Catholic •/neology on the subject. And these principles are, that man knowing himself, and not only knowing himself but knowing himself relatively to (jod and to God's law, is ultimately responsible for his own judg- jnents. His judgments when according to such knowledge, are the ]>ractical guide of his life. When in practical opposition to such know- ledge, they are the grounds of his final condemnation. Nothing can -elease him from th;s responsibility of standing or falling by the judg- ments formed at every moment in the innermost recesses of his intel- lect and heart. No mere human law can oblige or absolve, where the ]>ractical dictates of man thus consciously acting, acting that is with the full knowledge of himself, of his relations, and of the facts in any par- ticular case, pronounce against obligation or absolution. It is into this supreme court of conscience that a man puts himself when he enters the tribunal of penance, and according to the true dictates of his con- scious intelligence in that tribunal he must stand or fall. If then our readers would substitute the word " is " for the misleading expressions so freely used by the Reviewer, or rather so ignorantly and unfairly inserted into Gury's text, such as ''if he but professes." " if he alleges," and so forth ; they would find that doctrines, which according to the Reviewer's method of handling them, seem to outrage every right ins- tinct, resolve themselves into conclusions in agreement with the highest right and the soundest common sense. A I'OM <'lioi<*e oxaiiiplcx from Hit' <(iiai'tei*l.v. Now for one or two of the Reviewer's examples ; we shall not weary our readers with many. The first we shall cite is that ofQuirinus, H hich the Reviewer introduces with the following remark : *' The following exemplification of what roguery may perpetrate with every security against disturbance of conscience, will probably seem yet Htranger." Who .says that the act that the Reviewer proceeds to com uient upon can be " perpetrated without disturbance of conscience ? " Certainly not Father Gury ; certainly no Catholic moralist. The man would be guilty of sin who did such act, and would be amenable to (rod in the forum of conscience for it. But sin is one thing, and the effects of sin, as affecting the question of commutative justice, another. The man would be a sinner before God, most certainly ; but would the obligation of repairing the damage following upon his bad act exist in such a case ? That is the question Father Gury considers, and not whether there would be disturbance of conscience or not. Disturbance of conscience there must be, if the malefactor ever came to reflect. But ice- free here it is. what er to iience atter, other lowed thohc wing tively judg. e the know- g can judg- inteJ- re the ith the y par- to this enters s con- n our ssions nfoirly leges," to the ht ins- ighest 39 this is only one other instance of the helpess incapacity of the Reviewer to see the most common distinctions. If he dislikes the charge of ignorance, we can offer no other alternative than that of wicked and criminal misrepresentation. There is no middle term between these two extremes. <|HiriiiiiH tlu' HiirKliir.— UiiUility ticcordiiiK *» ihitiy. But let us have the case. It is this. " Quirinus, with the intention to steal a piece of cloth, breaks into a shop at night and lights a candle, taking due precaution to guard against the danger of fire ; but by some sudder. chance, for instance, the leap of a cat, the candle is pitched into the straw ; quickly the whole shop is in Hames, and the thief taking flight only just gets off safe. What about Quirinus ? Why he is /iad/i' 1o nothing, inasmuch as he never contemplated the danger. He is certainly not liable for the cloth it was his intention to steal, even though he had laid his hand on it, for its destruction is also involun- tary ; neither is the seizing of the cloth the cause of the injury, nor did the carrying of the candle create the immediate i)eril of conllagralion,' sUlIlcient care having been employed." (3) Now, as has been said, there is no question here about the sin of Quirin'is. That is clear and admiitcd. The sole question is about the damages ensuing. Is he lial)le to restitution ; and, if so, to what amount of restitution ? Gury's reply is that he is not liable to all; and for the two fold reason, that in the first place the theft of the cloth had not been accomplished ; and in the second place, the con- flagration could not be attributed to the criminal act of trespass of which he had been guilty by his burglarious entrance into the house, for conflagrations do not follow ujx^n acts of that kind in the ordinary course of things. Nor, again, however guilty he was in his burglary, as far as the fire was concerned no fault, either theological or juridical, can be attributed to Quirinus, for there was no intention to burn the house; and not only that, he had taken all the ordinary, prudent pre- cautions against such an concurrence. We are not sufficiently versed in English Common Law to offer a definite opinion on the question as to how far the i)resence of Quirinus in the house with a felonious inten- tion would affect the question of consequential damages. It is certain tha*" the charge of arson could not be sustained. And it is ec[ually certain that the question of wilfulness or inadvertence enters into the estimate of damages from trespass, as well as in cases of consequential damages in breaches of contract. Thus Chitty says that a claim for such damages may be made good, " ])rovided such damages may be fairly and reasonably considered, either as arising naturally — i.e.., according to the usual course of things — from the breach of contract itself, or may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it." (4) Here the element of absence of wilfulness and of advertence is fully admitted in abatement ; but how far a:i English ■ court would carry it in the present case we do not undertake to decide, (3) P. 7.5. (4) Blackstoue, Com, iii. bk. Hi. c. lU; Cliitfy, Luv of Conlracis, p. 810. tl m C^HMe of Kxtrrme lVvec«een made, nerer can (kroi/ate from the natural rii/ht ajifieriainini/ to ereri/ one to prorirle. for hitnxi'lj] irhi'H mijf'enni/ from rxtreiin- nerenniti/. In xuch rircuniKtancex all thinf/x Ihercfore becunii- common, .vo that an;/ one rereirini/ another /lerxon'K /iro/ierti/for his own succour receives a Iriiti/ common Ihini/ which hi' converts iiilo his own, Just as if this wi'Ti' ha/nionimi luforc the dieixion ofi/oodx. ( 'onsei/uenlli/ hr commits no theft (p. 7()). A m^yivnfvi'nl FalHifieatioii. We have here, in the first place, one of those disgraceful falsifica tions of Gury's doctrine, and not his alone, but tliatof St. Thomas and St. AIi)honsus as well, of which we have already so many times con- victed the Reviewer. In the present case, however, he convicts him- self. He states what according to (iury extreme necessity is ; that, namely, in which a man's life is in peril from want ; and then Gury's doctrine that a man in this plight may take what is required to sustain life without being guilty of the sin of theft. This doctrine is twisted into a case of conscience after the act — as to whether a man when he took something belonging to another, really was in extreme necessity or not, and if so how it can be verified. We reply as before, in no other way than by the testimony of a man's conscience speaking before God, accompanied by such indications as justify a prudent judgment of veracity. But to twist the matter into a case of this kind is to alter the whole issue of the question. It is not the question whether this man or that is sincere in stating that he was on a certain occasion in extreme necessity, and took something belonging to another to relieve it, but whether granting the fact that a man is in such necessity, the taking so much as enables him to sustain life is a sin and a theft or not. It is no question as to whether a man "vehemently affirms," oris ^'prompted by inscrutable dread of threatened distr, .<" (5) but whether he is in actual, not threatened distress ; whether in one word he is starving, and within a few hours of the end of his life unless his hunger be relieved. In such a case Gury says, the starving wretch who snatches a loaf from the baker's stall does not commit the sin of theft ; and that, as we have seen, on the ground that the law of property yields in such an emergency to the great law by which every one has a right to his life. I'roperty then becomes common, so far as such community is necessary to meet the exigencies of the case. (5) The italics arc ours. 41 Paley^H Principle CorroborulCM Cjliiry'H. Nor is Giiry alone in holding this principle. Paley makes statements that lead directly up to it. He says, speaking on what the right of property is founded ; "We now speak of Property in'Land ;and there is a difficulty in explaining the origin of this property consistently with the law of nature ; for the land was once, no doubt, common, and the question is, how any particular part of it could justly be taken out of the common, and so approi)riated to the first owner, as to give him a better right to it than others, and what is more to exclude all others from it." (6l Subsequently Paley states that "the real foundation of our right is the Laiv of the Land" Property then rests on positive law, according to this ; the right that a man has to his life, and therefore the means of life, rests on natural law ; therefore in a case of collision between the two the inferior must yield to the superior ; positive law to the law of nature. But this is not all. Paley bases the obligation to bestow relief on the poor precisely on this principle. He says — " Besides this, the poor have a claim founded in the law of nature which may be th"s explain- ed : All things were originally common. No one being able to pro- duce a charter from heaven, had any better title to a particular pos- session than his next neighbour. There were reasons for mankind's agreeing upon a separation of this common fund : and Ood for these reasons is supposed to have ratified. But this separation was made and consented to upon the expectation and condition that every one should have left a sufficiency for his subsistence, or the means of pro- curing it : and as no fixed laws for the regulation of property can be so contrived as to provide for the relief of every case and distress which may arise, these casf s and distresses, when their right and share in the stock was given up or taken from them, were supposed to be left to the voluntary bounty of those who might be acquainted with the exigencies of their situation, and in the way of affording assistance. And, therefore, when the partition cf jjroperty is rigidly maintained against the claims of indolence {sic) and distress, it is maintained in opposition to the intention of those who made it, and to His Who is Supreme Proprietor of everything, and Who has filled the world with plenteousness, for the sustentation and comfort of all whom He sends into it." (7) ]>r. Wliewell and Blaciitone on C'a^CH of Noco.M»ity. Again, Dr. Whewell, speaking of cases of necessity, says — In such cases It has been decided by tlie Roman Law and its commentators, that the Right of'Proi)erty must give way. Necessity, they say, overiuies all laws. But tliis is to be required only in e.xtrcnie cases, when all other courses fail. To which is added by most Jurists!^ that when it is possible, restitution is to be made for the damage committed A liiie iiile is recognized in English Law. It has been held by some English lawyers, that a starving man may justly take food; but others deny that sucli a necessity gives a right; inasmuch as the poor are otherwise provited for by Law. (8; (6) Moral. Phil. bk. iii. c. 4. . ' • (7) Moral. Phil, bk iii. p. 2. c. 5. (8) Elements of Moralilji, n. 700. Cambridge. 1804. Whewell cites in support of these statements, Grotius ii. 2, (3, 4 ; Kent's CommvntarkH, ii. 3.38, bk. iv. :-2. 42 This last is Blackstone's doctrine. But notwithstanding Poor Laws and charitable organizations, every now and then we hear of some poor wretch's being found stiff and stark, and wasted to a skeleton under an archway on a bitter winter's morning. How did poor laws and Howing soup kitchens help that poor srul in the last bitter agony of hunger and thirst ? If you tell us that such a man was guilty of sin before Ciod for stretching out his hand to a loaf to save himself in his bitter extre- mity, we can only say in the name of outraged humanity, and in the name of the God of love and mercy, "Out ujjon you, hypocrites I you forget that man was not made for the law, but the law for man." This is certainly true of all human law ; a truth borne out in the present case by that eternal law according to which man has been fashioned, and which alone is a rule of life that admits of no dispensation. Of course what has been said would have much greater force where poot laws do not exist. Ih il C'oiiiiuiiniMiii ? The passage that we have been discussing is followed by another page filled with base insinuations on the subject of Communism, the presence of which the Reviewer affects to detect under the above prin- ciple of Roman Law. Communism we have always understood to mean the denial of the rights of private proper y altogether. T) attempt to confound this with the above principle as applied and confined to the case of extreme necessity, betrays the source of the writer's insjjiration. It is merely one more shaft drawn from the quiver of (Icrman misrepre- sentation ; it is worthy of Bismarck and his unprincipleil crew of slaves and sycophants, but shameful as proceeding from one of free linglish blood. Mistranslations and blunders as usual abound in the i^age in question ; but out of mercy to our readers we abstain from exijosing them. We pass, therefore, on to one other topic, that we shall constrain ourselves to touch upon as briefly as possible. The <|iiarlcrly'N iiiii«ldlc(l notions on llie liiiw ol* Charity. The Reviewer has, as we have seen, been placing the law above all the dictates of what we should call charity in the preceding case. He now passes to the other extreme, and gives charity a development that might have very uncomfortable consequences in respect of some of his readers, if fully realized in actual practice. We will let him speak for himself. Amongst not a few Christians it has become an acciedited notion that charity is a virtue of capital merit : but if we accept Father (Jury's ruling we can hardly avoid looking upon it as a trivial, if not a downright silly practice. In the section devoted to a detinition of wh.it is demanded by love of one's neighbour, we find the following canon : "First Rule — Every one is bound .■««;«/>/// and a hsoluteti/ to love himself more than his neighbour, for the reason that every one stands nearer to himself than does any one else. Hence, love of oneself is by Christ laid down as the standard for love of a neiglibour — Lore t/ii/ nriijhhoiir ax t/ii/Kc/f This, besides, is clear from the natural and insuperable disposition to love oneself more than one's neighbour, whence the common ma.xin — Charity, well ini lers/ool, lifi/ins at home." In Montaigne or La Rochefoucauld such a sentence would have sounded not out of character, but in an approved " handbook of morals. " it falls on us with a rather startling ring (p. 72). .4? With a startling ring doubtless in empty heads, but not in others it would seem. A Catholic theologian regards man as a being comi)osed of soul and body, and believes that the end of his creation is the union of the soul with (iod in eternity. 'I'his end indicates man's place in the divine order of creation, and it supplies also the divine rule of his being and of his life. For a man, therefore, to prefer anything to the attainment of this end, or to speak in ordinary terms, to his own salva- tion, would put him out of harmony with the divine order, and be a breach of that highest charily by which he is united to Clod even in this world, and is intended to be united to Him in fullest measure in the world to come. It would therefore be a violation of God's order, a contravention of His designs, a contradiction to the fundamental principles of his own being, for a rnan to love in this sense any created thing as much as himself, St, ThnniaH niKl Ciiii'.v on uoll-ordoroil Ciiarily. And this is the meaning of the somewhat subtle reasoning by which St. Thomas arrives at the same conclusion. He says> " A man loves (lo,d as the principle of good, which is blessedness ; he loves himself, as a sharer in that good ; but he loves his neighbour as associated with himself in the enjoyment of the same good. But it is a weightier motive for loving to participate of blessedness in oneself than to have a tcllow-sharer in that blessedness ; just as unity trans- cends union : therefore a*man by virtue of charily ought to love him- self more than his neighbour." (9) In other words, (iod is the Supreme Source and the Supreme Object of love ; to be united to Him, there- fore, in one's own person must sujiply a greater motive of love and gratitude than the mere fellowshi[) of another with us in the same union and resulting blessedness. The full bearing of this doctrine will be brought home to us more clearly by considering (Jury's rules in regard to the order of charity j rules which the Reviewer as usual garbles and misrej^resents. Thus Gury says that we must succour our neighbour in extreme spiritual necessity, that is, where his salvation is at stake, even at the risk of our own life : and this for the reason that the eternal life of our neighbour is of higher value than our own temporal life. On the other hand, in extreme temporal necessity, where, that is, there is danger of temporal life, we are bound to succour our neigh- bour at the risk of great loss, but not of the greatest; of laying down our own lives, for instance ; for this exceeds the demands of duly ordered charity. These instances are sufhcient to illustrate the meaning of the maxim, *' Charity, well understood, begins at home " In other words, the prescription, " Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself," even if tuken to involve equality of affection as regards our neighbour and ourselves, cannot be taken to mean equality as to effects. To suppose that a man is bound to show the reality of his love for his neighbour in the only way in which it can be shown, by its real effects, in precisely equal measure, tirst to himself and then to each man and woman in the (9) St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 20 a. 4. 44 . world, would be a simi)le absurdity, which it re(|uires no words to expose. There must therefore be order in giving effect to our love for our neighbour, and if so, such order must have a starting point ; and where can that starting point be but in ourselves ? I'rotestaiil l>ivlii«H on the love ol'oiir .\eiKliboiir. What has been said is borne out by Protestant divines. Pole in his .Synopsis, commenting on the words "Thou shalt love thy neigh- bour as thyself," after a preliminary discussion of the text, in which he says it is not prescribed, "more than thyself, that is, in the same order of benefits, but we ought to sacrifice our lesser good for the greater good of our neighbour; thus for our brethren, that is for their salvation, we ought to lay down our temporal life," so agreeing with Gury's rule ; goes on to add : "Christ here wished two things ; (i) To correct that vice of selfishness by which, to the neglect of others, we care only for ourselves; (2) to prescribe the mode of loving our neighbours. He therefore here places our neighboi:rson an equal footing with ourselves, and joins each and all in one body and as in one mutual embrace. But if you understand by this that we should regard all with the same love as ourselves, it would follow that there are no degrees of love, but that all are to be equally loved, since the love with which we love our- selves in one. The meaning therefore is, as has been said, Be thou thyself the measure of thy love to thy neighbour. Love each as thou wouldst be loved by them wert thou in their place." We have in the new IV/ioie Duty of Man the following passage : " In like manner, the duty to love our neighbour as ourselves is not, cither that we should love any neighbour with equal tenderness as our- selves — for that I conceive is hardly possible — or that we should love every neighbour alike, which, if we suppose possible, were neither just nor natural ; or that we should do for our neighbour all that he now does or that we, if in his circumstances, might perhaps wish and desire to be done for ourselves for such desires may be irregular, or if not sinful, yet unreasonable ; but it is to do all that for him which, were our case his and his ours, >ve should in reason expect and be glad to have done to ourselves." (10) ' Itiitler on tlic manic Hnbject. So again, Butler, in his second sermon upon the love of our neigh- bour, on the hypothesis that an equality of affection is commanded, shows that even so there must be inequality of effects, from the very of man's nature as regards our love to ourselves and our love to our neighbour ; and that for the sole reason that no man can be closer to any one than to himself. The passage is somewhat long, but it is worth quoting at length — If the words " as thyself were to he undeistood of an [emiality of affection, it would not be attended with those consequences which perliaps may be thouglit to follow from it. Suppose a person to have the same settled regard to others as to himself; that in every deliberate s:;hemc or pursuit he took their interest into " - . # (10) Sunday xii. .'..;.. 4» N t It IS ccoiint in tlio Hiimo (h'jyrce as liis own, so fur ii.-< ati cqiinlitv of uffpcfion woiilrl rod iico tl'>H : yt^t li» would, in fiict, ami diifrht In lie, mii'li niort> riikcn up annt upon seekiiif,' ami in ikiujj use of the means of ^rfaliticalion, by the feeling of those alfections, ai>i)Ctites, and pa-i-iions. must necessarily b > peculiar to ourselves. That there are particular passions f siipiiose .shiiuie. resentnientl which men >ei*<^!iiro|>rliillnK C'liiirlltihU' Itcqiit'MlM. At the same time wc are haunted by an uncomfortable misgiving. We si'cm lo remember hearing within the last year or two of moneys left for pious and charitable purposes being confiscated for the uses of the .State, or otherwise diverted from the ohiccts to which the (lonors had devoted them. Communities of men an len too, who had dedi- cated their lives, given up not their substan .»nly, but themselves, to the work of relievmg human distress, have been tlriven out of Muro- ])ean lands, and iheir loving labours thus frustrated and brought to nought. What we fear is that this s])irit of .Swiss honesty, Italian uprightness, and (lerman culture will militate against the grand future that bus been opened to mankind. Hut no doubt the Kevuwer is deeper in secrets of this kind than we are, and we can only express the hope that our appreliensions will prove groundless. CoiiM^loiioo VN. military I>Im*I|>IIii4>. There is one other point u])on which we will touch very briefly. The Reviewer says : " It is decl.ired that every soldier who consents to .serve in an unjust war will be t/irnt/y cliar^cahlc with responsibility for every act of injury i)er])etrated by hir If individually during its course, \xx\(^ proportional iy for the total i ' wrought by the army ; thus mtroducing a principle absolutely Su. sive of all military disci- pline, that at eve-y call to arms each soldier is to make himself judge whether to obey it will be in accordance with his conscience." So then it seems soldiers are to leave conscience behind them when they enter the ranks, and to content themselves with killing any one they are told to kill. An army is to be regarded in fact as a collection of bravos. And perhaps this is only the necessary sequence of the vast system of standing armies that oppresses the world. At any rate it is well to have this principle avowed and plainly put before us. But it is not thus that Catholic theologians look upon war and the soldier's trade. According to them war is the last weapon in the hands of justice, and can only be used justly. And every soldier can demand some guarantee, and ought to demand it, that the war in which he is asked to engage is just. This guarantee is, that due examination into the causes of the war has been made by the competent authorities, that reparation has been sought for at the hands of the aggressor, and that a solemn judicial pronouncement, after all such preUminary steps duly taken, has issued, sanctioning the declaration of war. Upon such a guarantee every soldier can. and is bound to form his conscience as to the justice of the war in which he engages ; if such guarantee is wanting, war not having been declared in legal form, he cannot embark in it with a safe conscience Legal declaration of war is not a final proof of the justice of the war, but it furnishes the presumption of that justice sufficiently for the formation of the conscience of the soldier 4» ami of the nation. Such prt'suinplion would not yield to mythinf,' short of positive proof of the injustice of the war Sucli is the teaching of Father (itiry and of Catholic theologians generally on this suhjecl. Nor of Catholic theologians alone (irolius, for instance, says, " 'i'hat if soldiers were certain that the prince was dinibtful as to the justice of the war, it would not he lawful for thcn\ to fight, how niurh soever they Plight be his subjects, because su( h war would be unjust ; just in the same way as a licior could not lawfully execute the sentence of a judge that he knew to be unjust iij) The Wf :o [d 's 3f sh ns :rs th tin .■■J!^S^isc-sl r This pamphlet and others bearing on the Jesnit Question may be had at SADLIER & CO., Montreal and Toronto.