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E »« 3, rue de il'Untyf::^^ Quebec 4, QUE. ^E MA R K S O N GENERAL BURGOYNE's ATE O F T H E EXPEDITION from CANADA, [ Price IS. ] m i I- w ■ n ii .i i l kiiiii I I ., j.a i my i :!. ! i I - iiUj^jBt'Sigi!' ijim<.4||pW»t9 17 REMARKS ON GENERAL BURGOYNE's S T A T E OF THE EXPEDITION from CANADA. '* Allied, alas ! for ever» to the crime, *' No kind exemption can the perfon claim* *' But blackens downward on the lapfe of time. The equal obje£l of eternal fliame.'* (( LONDON: ^ - Printed for G. Wilkie, in St. Paul's Chj^ch Yard. , J MDCCLXXX. f T O Lieut. Gen. BURGOYNE. SIR, IT A D you fimply informed the Public, A. that the expedition you commanded was originally planned upon the principle of a co-operation with the fouthern army; that Sir William Howe declined a co-operation; that you heartily acquiefced in his determina- tion, and fuppofing yourfelf able to adt inde- pendently of him, undertook the enterprize alone, and thereby loft your army; that you have long been fenfible of your error, and fincerely lament the misfortunes into which you plunged your companions, as well as the calamity with which you overwhelmed your country; you would have made an intereftin the hearts of the compaffionate, that minifte- rial vengeance would have been unable to B reach. ( 2 ) reach. However open you might be to the jiijiice of your country, ingenuoufnefs and misfortune interwoven would have rendered you invulnerable to the fhafts of malice ; the immoveable barrier of truth would have re- fifted the torrent of party rage ; and though no laurel fhould adorn your monument, nor fplendid trophy refled a luftre on it, late po- fterity, while they feel the effeds of your in- difcretion, would have done equal juftice to your candour and intrepidity. But, having rejeded the folid bafis of fad, and refted your defence on equivocation, the fuperftrudure, however finiihed and deco- rated, muft fall, and bury your reputation under its ruins, or (land only to perpetuate your infamy. When we fee you repeatedly making a winter's voyage from America, and on the in- ftant of your arrival foliciting to be fent back on arduous fervice, we cannot think ill health to be the inducement. When a man is known to indulge in open and fhamelefs gallantry, we cannot fuppofe his conjugal afFedion fo J vehement C 3 ) to the fs and idered ?; the ve re- hough it, nor ite po- 3ur in- lice to Df fad, n, the dcco- utation petuate iing a the in- it back health known llantry, tion fo tiement vehement as to a{re(£l his public condudt. When we read in your letters, that you afked Sir Henry Clinton's advice whether you fhould perfevere in executing your orcJersr andadvifed Col. St. Legcr to confult his judg- ment whether he fhould perfevere in executing his orders, it is impoflible to believe that you deemed either ib peremptory as to preclude the exercife of difcretion. While you are argu- ing with Sir Guy Carleton to induce him to depart from his inftru6tions, we cannot fo readily admit your religious attachment to your own. When we learn by authentic docu- ments that the magazine of Bennington was not even known to you till after Col. Baum had received his orders and begun his march, we cannot accede to its having been the prin* cipal objed of the expedition. Convinced that you requefted Sir William Howe to per- mit you to aft independently of him, and knowing that he had acquainted you that you would have no dire6l ajftjiance from the font h- em armyy we can neither admit the juftice of your complaint of having been left to fight your way through a hofi of foes, alone^ or be- lieve that you expeded a co- operating army at B 2i Albany, mm w R ( 4 ) Albany, Evidence is iricfiftible: whatever we may wiai, the mind is lb cgnftruded, that we mult conclude that ill health, conjugal af- fedion, peremptory orders, Bennington ma- gazine, and a failure of co-operation are mere pretexts, for other motives, and fprings of action that you wilh to conceal. When, in one letter, you admit that the Bennington expedition was " out of the beaten track of military fernjice ;" and in another fay it was juftifiable on " naked military prtnci- p!e\' when in your letter to the Secretary of State (before paffing the Hudfon) you fay, " Had I a latitude in my orders, 1 fhould think " it my duty to wait in this pofition (eaft fide), •* or perhaps as far back as fort Edward, " where my communication with lake George ** would be perfedly fecure, 'till fome event *' happened to afli(t my movement forward ;" and in the review of the evidence, *' that you " ivere compelled by the Jiate of things to act " as you did, independently of the peremptory " tenor of your orders ;" when we read in your proclamation, that the prefent unnatural re- bellion has been made a foundation for the completeft ( 5 ) lever , that al af- i ma- mere gs of at the beaten er fay ')rinci" ary of a fay, I thhik t fide), dvvard, George ; event ;vard ;'* hat you r to aci ';mptory in your aral re- for the upleteft completed fyftem of tyranny that ever God, in his difpleafure, fufFered to beexercifed over a froward and ftubborn generation ; that ar- bitrary imprifonmcnt, confifcaiion of pro- perty, and torture unprecedented in the in- quifition of the Romilh church, arc among the palpable enormities ; that thefe are inflicted by aflemblies and committees, who dare to pro- fefs themfelves friends to liberty, upon the moft quiet fubjcdts, without diftindlion of age or fex, for the fole crime, often for the fole fufpicion, of having adhered in principle to the government under which they were born, and to whi :h, by every tie, divine and human, they owe allegiance j and in the ftate of the expedition, find you comparing the fame re- bels with the great prince of Orange and the Englijh parliament \ when you are known fometimes to approve, and fometimes to re- probate the employing the native Indians ; fometimes to extol, and at others to decry the fervices of the loyalifts ; whatever allowances the partiality of friends may make, the world in general will think you either deficient in memory or deftitute of principle. We I L ( 6 ) We may, now, it is prefumed, congratu- late you on the return of your health, with- out incurring your difpleafure • and the Pub- lic might rejoice that the horrors of an Amc rican winter have vanifhed, were they not fucceeded by the terrors of an American pri- fitly and the fear of receiving your death from the hands of a people to whom you have been lo great a benefadoro In the review of the evidenecj you com- plain of the noble lord, with whom you fay you are at iffue, for not making a defence^ nor even contradtSiing any thing you alleged refpedjng his condua:, or your own. • I admit the parliamentary enquiries to have Ijeen as unfatisfadtory as they were unprece- dented ; but I relieve this is the firft inflancc of a trial being challenged ab rmfair, by the pi:rty who reaped all the benefit of the par- tiality. You did indeed ftate your own cale, and produce your own friends and favourites to fupport it, withou;t interruption, oppofi- tion, ci- reply; if, therefore, all mankind do not with one voice approve and applaud your ( 7 ) your condud, it is becaufe your caufe is To bad as not to admit of colouring. To form a juft eftimate of this grievance, we need only refle£t on the change of complexion, that the examination of two witneffes only, wrought in Sir William Howe's enquiry. I agree witn >ou, that there were many confiderations in favour of your committing the care of your defence to your friends, or to anonymoiis publications. Your own pa- negyric would have been written with more grace by fome friend, and ftill greater would have been the etfea, if a difinterefted perfon had been the author of it ; and the declara- tion that " it has been a refledion on your charadier that you addrefled the noble lord as a patron and friend/' would not hay^ jpeea quite lb ludicrous in an anonymous publi- <:ation» I fhall leave you in quiet poflefTion of a great part of your book, becaufe it is imma- terial to the points in queftion. -jW^imBrti' ,T Twr^X"? ( 8 ) > The epifode of Lady Harriet Ackland T^^ould figure in a poem ; a romance without an heroine would be an innovation j a tra- gedy without female diftrefs would be a vio- lation of the laws of the drama : and God forbid that I fhould imitate the impiety of the rebels, who with more than Gothic barba- rity interrupted the funereal honours of the gallant Frazer *! Your having fupplanted Sir Guy Carleton, is rather a private concern between you and him, than a matter interefting to the Public. If he is fatisfied with your condud in that refpedb, or if Sir W. Howe fuppol'es you had not concerted meafures for fupplanting him, in cafe you had been fuccefsful in the Canada expedition, I don't know who has a right to complain. I fhall only remark, that the cir- cumftance you plume yourfelf fo much upon, viz. that the minifter wrote to Sir G. Carleton, * No djfrefpedl is intended to Lady Harriet Ackland, but I do not fee the propriety of G. B. introducing her ladyiliip into this con trover fy. la f 9 ) in Augufl: 1776, that he was to remain m Quebec, is not conclufive, becaufe you were in England in the winter 1775, when you had an opportunity to folicit a feparate com- mand by adulatory intrigue, and at that time your ambition ivas not dead. That Sir Guy ; was both difappcinted and difpleafed, appears from your letter - to Lord George Germaine, of 14th of May, wherein you fay, ** that Sir Guy Carleton was anxioufly defirous of leading the military operations out of the province, is eafily to be difcerned ;'* and by your letter to General Harvey, of May 19, wherein you write, *« that Sir Guy Carleton fliould have wifhed for the lead in adive and important military operations, is very natural. That he thinks he has fome caufe of refent- ment for the general terms of treatment he has received from fome of the king's minif- ters, is difcernible, &c." Let me add, if his refentment did not didate the letter to you, of Nov. 12, it gave a tinge to it. It muft be' prefumed, that when that letter was wrote. Sir Guy was not apprized of the plan of ope- rations that you had laid before the miniflry in which you not only fpecified the corps for ^ the 'i i : t f to ) llie operating army, 'but defcended to ihi pofts and garrifons neceffary for the fecurity of Canada, which plan, fo far at leaft, wa8^ literally adopted. This extraordinary lette^^ is manifeftly a conclufion from premifes con- tained in a letter from you, and it would be but fair to publifh that likewife. You complain of "every difcretionary latitude which. you propofed having been erafed.'* It may not be improper here to ftate the fubftance of your propofals for the operations of the campaign, the part that the miniftry took thereon,' and then confider what inferences may fairly be made. You propofed to pafs Lake Champlain, and to reduce Ticonderoga, Two propofals are then fubmitted. One for the army to proceed to Albany, and form a jundion with Sir William Howe. The other, in cafe there fhould be a fufficient force at Rhode Ifland to co-operate with you, to take the route of the Connedicut. Each pro- pofal fuppofed a co-operation and jundion ; the former, at, or near, Albany ; the latter. Ui.t ( II ) at, or near, Springfield, and whichever was adopted, was to be facilitated by a di-' verfion on the Mohawk. And as a fecurity againft a poflibility of the army's remaining ina^ive, you fuggefted whether it might not ,, be expedient to truft the latitude of embarking ' the army by fea to the commander in chief. With refpea to embarking by fea, you fay, *' more force will be required to be left, behind for the fecurity of Canada, than is fuppofed to be neceffary, when an army 19 beyond the Lakes ; and I do not conceive that any expedition from the fea, can be fo formi- dable to the enemy, or i'o effeaual to clofc the war, as an invafion from Canada by Ti- conderoga. This meafure ought not to be f bought of but upon pojtive conviciion of it* necelfity.'* After having condemned the meafure, it is ^ little extraordinary, that you fhould com- plam of your not having been at liberty to purfue it, eipecially as no neceffity of the army's remaining ina^ive ever did exift. C2 It , ( 12 ) : It was neceffary that the army (hould pafs the Lakes, and there were fufficient objeds for •ts employment without proceeding to Al- bany. The total deftruaion of the rebels force' on the Lakes, and the redudion of Ti- conderoga, the key to the communication between Canada and New England, were neceflary to preferve Canada from infults. The reducing Fort George, Fort Edward, Port Stanwix, and the adjacent country, were momentous objeds, and mull be as efficacious towards quelling the rebellion, as any expedition by fea. Befides, the fervice neceffary to be performed for the fecurity of Canada, would require fo much time as not to admit of your returning to Quebec, and embarking with any proipea of efFeaing much in that campaign. Therefore that la- titude was altogether unneceffary, and had it been given, would have anfwered no pur- pofe. ' Let us now examine your propofal of an expedition by the Connedicut. In the firft place, this propofal refted intirely on the ^ principle in) principle pf the army at Rhode Ifland being ftrong enough to co-operate, which was by no means the cafe, and therefore it was alto^ gether inadmiflible. In the next place, fup- pofing a co-operation, it was by far the moft arduous and dangerous of the two propofals, becaufe it required land-carriage for upwards of fixty miles on the outfet, through a moun- tainous country, that abounded with danger- ous defiles. Add to this, that when you fliould have reached the Connedicut, you could have had no water-carriage, unlefs the craft had been carried with you in your prp- grefs from the Lake ; and when the delays occafioned by the fliort carrying- places, on the route to Albany, are confidered, it fhews that this idea was utterly impradlicable, and therefore wifely rejefted by adminiftration. In the original plan, you mention it as the moft difficult of the two propofals, and yet, in your f^ate of the expedition, fuggeft that it was an expedient of precaution, and com- plain of not being at liberty to avail yourfelf of it. I venture to affirm, that had the pur- pofed latitudes been given you, at no one period of the campaign would you have feri- oufly .( M ) ouny thought of returning to Quebec m order ,to embark by fea, or of taking the route by the Connedicut, as being more pradica- ble and lefs hazardous than that you attempted. It is impoffible that you fhould think your force adequate to an expedition againft the New England colonies, in cafe it were mfut- ficient to force your way to Albany; or that the army would have been more fecure on the banks of the Connedicut, than it was on the banks of the Hudfon. In the career of your fuccefs, indeed, you thought yourfelf equal to the attempt, but the Bennington difafter con^ vinced you of the error. Therefore the, remaining propofal, viz. " to *• efFed a jundion with Sir William Howe to ** be facilitated by a diverfion on the Mohawk, " which was the only pradicable one (even ♦' by your own fhewing^ was adopted.'^ But to conclude, from government having cautioufly reftrided you to the fafeft, and indeed only pradicable propofal, that the one adopted ceafed to be yours, or that you were obliged at all events, even to the facrificing your whole ( '5 ) whole army, to carry it into execution, is a mode of reafoning that I cannot fee the force of. i. The peremptorinefs of your orders feems to be your principal fort. There, whenever you are prefled, you fly for fan6tuary. This therefore deferves particular attention. Your orders are comprlfed in the letter from the Secretary of Sta^e to Sir Guy Carleton. The material claufes of which are thefe : *V With a view of quelling the rebellion ad foon as pdffible, it is become highly necelfary that the moft fpeedy junilion of the two ar* miesjhould be effected, &c,^* ** It is his Majefty's pleafure that you put under the command of Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne, the grenadiers and light infantry, &c. toge- ther with as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought neceffary for this fervice; and after having furnifhdd him, in the fulled: and completeft manner, with artillery, ftores, provifions, and every other article neceffary fnr ( «« ) for his expedition, and fecurcd to liim every afliftance which it is in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to pafs Lake Champlain, and from thence, by the moft vigorous exertion of the force under his command, to proceed with all expedition to Albany, and put himfelf under the command of Sir William H5)we." " It is the King's further pleafure, that you put under the command of Lieut. Col. St. Leger detachment, 8cc. together with a fuf- ficient number of Canadians and Indians ; and after having furniflied him with proper artil- lery, (lores, provifions, and every other necef- iary article for his expedition, and fecured to him every afliftance in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to proceed forthwith to and down the iMohawk river to Albany, and put himfelf under the command of Sir IVilUajn HouueJ* " I (hall write to Sir William Howe by the firft packet ; but you will neverthelefs endea- vour to give him the earlieft intelligence of this meafure, and alfo dired Lieut. Col. St. Leger C 17 ) leger to negled no opportunity of doing the fame, that they may receive injlruaiotis from Sir William Ho-we. You will at the fame time inform them that, until they Jloall have received orders frcm Sir William Hozve, it is his Majefty's pleafure that they ad as exigent cies may require, and infuch manner as they Jhall judge moft proper for making an impref fton on the rebels, and bringing them to obe^ dience; but that in fo doing, they muft never lofe view of their intended junctions -with Sir William Hoive as their principal ohjeBs:^ The fenfe and meaning of thefe orders, viz. That the tnvo armies (liould co-operate fo far as was neceffary to effe^ a junaion, as the primary ohjed of the campaign, and that until you fliould receive orders from Sir William, you fhould remain at liberty to adt as exigencies fhould require, or your own judgment dired, only taking care that you Ihould do nothing that would any way in- terfere with, or prevent a jundion, whenever the correfpondent arrangements fhould be made, -are fo very obvious, that common men could not miftake them ; a mere foldier P could ( i8 ) could not. I will, however, endeavour to follow you in your excurfion from the plain road of intuition and common fenfe. By reading the correfpondence as it is placed, and blended with a variety of matter, in the Parliamentary Regifter, there is dangci of confounding fituations, and the inrtruc. tions they gave rife to. It is only neceiiary to feled, and arrange in their natural order thofe that relate to any given point, to be convinced that the fcveral inftrudions which were from time to time ilTucd by Govern- ment, were well digefted, perfedly confift- ent, and wifely adapted to the circumftancea that occafioned them; and that your infi- nuation of ** plans fo inconfiftently formed, and managed by the Secretary of State with lb much feeming confidence, as to miflead his generals, and fo much real referve as to deftroy them," is as unfounded as it is illi- beral. Qdt. 9, 1775", Gen. Howe wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth, as follows : " I would propofe I2,ooo men for New York. This corps ( '9 ) corps to be employed in opening a commu- nication with Canada in the firft inftance. The primary object of opening a communi-' cation being obtained by the fwo armies, and fccured by proper polls, &c. thefe corps might take feparaie routes, &c." In November, ijj^. Sir William Howe," in his letter to Lord George Germaine, makes the following propofal for the cam-' paign, 1777, viz. for an offcnfive army in the province of New York to move up the North River to Albany ^ to confift of io,coo men. Dec. 20, 1776, Sir W. Howe alters his plan, and propofes going, to Philadelphia, with the main army, and to have only 3000 men on the Hudfon. This propofal was approved by Govern- ment. But Sir W. Howe, on the 20th of January, 1777? after demanding a reinforce- ment of 20, or 15,900 men, writes, ** that if the reinforcements fhould be fmall, his operations would be much curtailed ; and if . D 2 none ( 20 ) none {hould arrive, he fhould be confined to a£k in one body in the JerfeytSi leaving only a frrall corps at Rhode Illand, and another of fuffiqier't force for the defence of New York and its dependencies. This difpatch was received March 3, 1777, and this was the laft intelligence from Sir W. Howe, that arrived, prior to your orders be- ing iflued. Thus flood the various propofals. His letters were as replete with indecifion as his condud. He was balancing whether he fhould go north or fouth, or ad in Jerfey only : to which point he feemed inclinable and likely to fix. If any confidence was to be placed in Sir W. Howe, or any depend- ence to be made on his advices, ajundion of the tv;o armies was ablolutely neceffary for an operative campaign, as the reinforce- ment from Europe would be but fmall, at beft, and even that could not arrive till late. It could not be fuppofed, after what he had written, that he would go fouthward with the main army, without a reinforce- ment. And therefore your complaint of I being "*» * ( 21 ) being *' fufFercd to fail, ignorant of Sir Wil- liam Howe's plans," is groundlefs, for at that time he had none, and that which Go- vernment gave bim was but the counterpart of your own. In this ftate of things, Government com- plied with Sir W. Howe's requeft, and gave him the outlines of a plan, at leaft for the firft operations of the campaign, at the fame time they adopted yours, which was ** to effect a fpeedyjundion of the two armies." The foregoing inftrudions were accord- ingly given to Sir Guy Carleton, and Sir W. Howe was immediately furnifhed with a copy of them, that he might make his arrangements correfpondent to thofe of the northern army. And left there fhould be a want of under- fta«ding, both you and Col. St. Leger are required to give Sir W. Howe the earlieft intelligence of the meafure ; and left there ihould be a failure of co-^operation, and you or Col. St. Leger fhould force a paffage to Albany, without a communication having been opened with New York, arid be defti- tute h [l I ( 22 ) tute of fupport, the inftruaions dired, J that until orders {tiould be received from bir W. Howe, both you and St. Leger fhould ad as exigencies might require, or Ihould be judged moft proper for making an impreffion on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience, only taking care not to lofe fight of the intended junaions, as the principal objea." It is evident, from once reading the inftruaions, that this claufe was introduced to guard ae-ainft thofe very evils that you rufhed head- long into. And as Sir W. Howe neither gave you orders, co operated, or even took ^eafures that admitted of a junaion, you were, through the whole campaign, at full liberty to ad as exigencies might require, or your judgment direa, as to proceeding to Albanv or not. and in every other relpea confift'ent with making an impreffion on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience. It is aftonifhing that you fhould hazard a charge fo unf .unded, as *' that the Secretary of State made no mention of the northern expedition in any of his difpatches to Sir W. Howe, in March, or Jpril, or fo qnmili- tar y* ;■ r ( 83 ) tary, as that he did not mention any orders or recommendation relative to co-operation, verbally^ to Sir W. Howe's aid de camp, or any other confidential perfon, who failed about that time." Government could not be {6 intimately acquainted with the circumftances of the Southern Army, as by means of your written propofals, and oral information, they were with thofe of the Northern. Admiriiftrationi had been informed, in general terms, that little was to be expeded from Sir W. Howe, unlefs he was confiderably reinforced, but probably did not think themfelves competent to furnifh him with a plan in detail ; nor in this inftance could it be deemed neceflary, for he had already chalked out the mode in cafe a jundion of the two armies was to be efFeded. But every one that cafts an eye over the inftrudions muft fee, that fo far as relates to a jundion, as the primary objed of the cam- paign, they apply to and embrace both armies^ and are equally obligatory on Sir William Howe : ^ ( 24 ) Howe and Sir G. Carkton. The junSiion of the two armies is the objed of thefe orders. Philofophers tell us, that adlion and re-adion are equal. If this be an immutable law of nature, the Northern Army could not join the Southern Army, unlefs the Southern joined the Northern at the fame time. After de- claring that it was neceffary that a fpeedy junction of the two armies Ihould be effected, and giving inftrudions for Gen. Burgoyne and Col. St. Leger* to proceed to Albany, and put themfelves under the command of Sir W. Howe, to communicate as early as poffible with, and receive orders from, him, and after furnifhing Sir W. Howe with a copy of thofe inftrudioris, it was furely un- neceffary to fay to him, that he muft make correfpondent arrangements; and it muft have difcompofed the mufcles of a ftoic, if they had added, " You (Sir W. Howe) are not to go fo far fouth, or enter upon any mea- fure whatever that will render a jun^ion or communication impojfihle^'* \i. \i On the 19th of Jpril., the Secretary of State writes to Sir William Howe, and re- ferring ferrlng to the inftrudions refpedlng .the Northern Army, informs him, that theHanau Chafleurs were alfo ordered dowiithe Mohawk to join his army ^ and gives him orders refpefling employing the Indians, and difcontinuing the ading Brigadiers in the Northern Army after a juiiHion lliould have taken place. Thia' letter was alfo received before Sir William Howe left New York ; and had a doubt ex- ifted in his mind, refpeding the line of con^ dud that Government intended he (houid^pur- fue, it muft have removed it. •# r* r^ On the 1 8th of May, Government having received a Copy of Sir W. Howe's Jet t^r 19 Sir Guy Carleton, the Secretary of State writes, " As you mufl, from your fituation and military (kill, be a competent judge of every plan, his Majefty does not hefitate to approve the alterations which you propofe: frujlmg, hQivenjer, that ivhatever you may meditate, it ivill be executed in time fqr. yon fo co-operate with the army orderedjOr^^yfee^ from Canada, and put it/elf under jozir eqni^ mandr Thus it is evident, that Goy^rt^ment never varied from the original idea: ai^vl fh.f E it ( ^6 ) was conformable to your own, appears from yoiirpropofals, wherein you fay, "Thefe ideas (your and St, Leger's expeditions to Albany) are formed on the fuppofition that it be the fole purpofes of the Canada army to efFed a junSiion with Sir William Hoive, or after co- operating fo far as to get pojfejfton of Albany^ and open the mmnunication to New York^ to remain on theHudfon's River; and thereby en- able that General to ad with his whole force to the fouthward.'* I am therefore juftified in faying, that the infinuation of the para- graph refpeding co-operation having been in- ferted in the official letter of the i8th of May, to ferve a finifler purpofe, does you no honour. The outlines which were fketched, or ra- ther adopted, by Government for the cam-* paign 1777, were thefe : The Northern Army was to proceed to Albany, the Southern to fco-operate fo as to form a jundion ; and thefe great movements to be facilitated by two powerful diverfionsj one on the Mohawk, the other on the coaft of Maflachufets and ?sJ<>w HamniTvire. We ( 37 ) We have already feen the inftrudions re- fpeding the three former operations ; thofe for the latter are contained in the letter from the Secretary of State to Sir William Howe, of March 3d, 1777. *' I muft inform you, that his Majefty is alfo of opinion, that a warm diverfion upon the fea-coafts of theMaf- fachufets Bay and New Hampfhire would not only impede the levies for the Continental Army^ but tend much to the fecuriiy of our trade ; and indeed it fcarcely admits a doubt, but that thefe benefits muft inevitably refult from fuch an arrangement; for as on one hand, it is fcarcely to be expected that thofe ■provinces ivill part ivith men, when their pre- fence muft be wanted for the internal defence of their own refpedive diftrids; fo on the other, a falutary check will unavoidably be put to the fuccefles of the rebel privateers, &c. This order was very wifely adapted to the fituation of the New England provinces ; for they had been exempted from furniftiing their quota of men for Waftiington's army that campaign, that they might be at full liberty to oppofe the Canada Army, The relu6t- X>J ^•m ance ( «8 ) ance of the militia to leave the fea-coaft, when there was no apprehenfion of an invafion by fea ; and the violent * means that the Com- mittees had recourfe to, in order to compel them to march to the frontiers, leave no room to doubt, but that if Lord Howe had detached a fmall fquadron of the eighty-one fhips of war that he commanded, even if no land forces could be fpared, it would have been attended with the moft falutary effeds. Go- vernment made fuch dependence on this mea- fure, that on the 6th of Auguft the Secretary of State writes to Sir William Howe: " Your letter of the 3d of June, together with the intended diftribution of the troops, has been laid before the King, and I am commanded to inform you, that his Majefty is concerned that you fhould find the propofed diverfion on the coaft of Maflachufets Bay not con- fident with the other operations now carrying on ; as great advantages would certainly have arifen from that mode of diftreffing and alarm^' ing the enemy." • The prifons in. the New England Colonies were filled with the (kjinquents, Some were hand-cuffed, and driven o^ t^rt^d through the country in tenorem> Nono ( 29 ) None of thefe orders were ever counter- manded ; and had any one collateral opera- tion taken place, it would have infured fuc- cel's to the Northern Army. This will be granted, I imagine, fmce the officers you called to the Bar of the Houfe of Commons were of opinion, that if Sir H. Clinton's at- tack on the Highlands had been only a week fooner, it would have prevented the cata- flrophe of your army. Had a communication between Canada and New York been opened and fecured by proper pofts, the Northern and Southern Colonies thus feparated, and the great peninfula of New England been thus inclofed, I believe every one that knows any thing of America will allow, that it would have put an end to the rebellion. Your fentiments, at leaft your declarations, are well known. Si- 5ir William Howe wrote exprefsly, '* That little refiftancc ivould be made to theprogrefs of his l ( 30 ) his Majejlys arms in the provinces of New England, the Jerfies, and Pennfyhania, after the jun^ion of the Northern and Southern ArmyP The dcfpondency every where vi- fible amongft the Rebels, till it was known that Sir W. Howe had gone fouthward with the main army, evinces that his opinion was founded. Reafon is confounded, and at a lofs for even pretexts and pretences for fome of Sir William Howe's condud. ?■'- April 5th, Sir W. Howe writes to Sir G. Carleton : " Having but little expedation that I ftiall be able, from the want of fufficient ftrength in this army, to detach a corps in the beginning of the campaign to a^ up HudJ'ons River ^ confident with the operations already determined on ; the force which your Excel- lency may deem expedient to advance be- yond your frontiers, after taking Ticonderoga, will, I fear, have little qffijiance from hence to facilitate their approach,'^ o. This ( 31 ) This paragraph, and the tenor u^ the whole letter, evinces that Sir William Howe knew that a co-operation was expedcd. It is in-* deed an apology for not co-operating. ** As I fhall probably be in Pennfylvanid when that corps is ready to advance into this province, it will not be in my power to com-* municate with the officer commanding it fa foon as I could wifh ; he muji therefore pur* fuefuch meafures as may from circnmjiances ks judged moji conducivt' ia the advancement of his Majcjifs fervid;, confiftently with youB Excellency's otder for his conduC^^ ( 3^ ) Incredible as it may feem, Sir W. Howe carried the main army to Philadelphia at a time when he thought it not improbable that you would have Wafliington's army, as well as all New-England, to contend with, and without making any diverfion on the fea-coaft. Thus the nieafures which Government had adopted, and the inftruaions they had iffued, were totally difconcerted and counteraded, ftnd the plan formed on the beft information ?ind moft mature deliberation, the execu- tion of which muft have brought all our trou* bles to a> period, was totally fruftrated. ^ ....-■ On the 8th of May, Government received a copy of the letter from Sir W. Howe to Sir Guy Carleton. But, as you obferve, it was known, that when the letter was wrote, Sir William Howe had not received the inflruc- tions refpeaing the Northern Army, and therefore Adminlftration could not fuppofe that he would be wanting in attention to from Staten Ifland was only a feint, and remained fo long in the Jerfeys, that had Sir W. Howe landed at the rfelaware, he vrould have met with no oppofuion at Philadelphia, the water them-, |Oft^ tJvCvjfJ»^°t ( 37 ) them, when they (hould come to hand. And as he had wrote that the Northern Army muft not he expcded at Albany before the middle of September ^ had exprefled an impa" tience to begin the campaign, and had alfo wrote, " That he had reafon to believe, ia cafe of fuccefs in Pennfylvania, there would be found a confiderable body of the inhabi- tants, who might be embodied as militia, and fome as provincial troops, for the interior defence of the province , which xnu^hQ vl great aid in the further progrefs of the JVar;' it was natural to fuppofe, that in cafe the in- ftrudiona refpeding the Northern -Army fliouid not divert him froni going lo.uttirward, that he would be able to co-operate with the Northern Army, after the redudion of Phi- ladelphia. Hence it is evident, that the pa- ragraph in the Secretary of State*s lettef of the 1 8th of May, ^^'herem his Lord/^ipWujfls, that ivhatever he (Sir William Ho'we) may meditatCy it ivill be executed in time '0 (fo'dpe- rate with the Northern Army^ ordered io proceed from Canada^ and put itfelf under his com- mandy was the natural refult of the corre- fpondence between the Miniftei and Sir Wil- i: — ( 38 ) . liam Howe, as well as perfedly conformable to your own ideas ; and it places the malevo- lence of the fuggeftion, of its having been inferted 5n confequence of the fall of your army being foretold, in a ftriking point of light. True it is, that this difpatch was not re- ceived by Sir W. Howe till Auguft. But furely this is not the fault of the Minifter. Had Sir W. Howe either attended to the difpatches he received from Government be- fore he left New York, or adhered to what lie had written himfelf, this letter alfo would have been received in time to have had its full cfFea:. But when this difpatch arrived at New York, no one there could divine in what part of the terraqueous globe Sir William Howe and his noble Brother were. After having counteracted the inftrudions they had received, they had betaken themfelves out of the reach of any new ones that might be tranfmitted, and, for upwards of four months, Govern- ( 39 ) Government knew not where to dired to their general and admiral. It is curious to trace the route of Sir W. Howe. The operations of the whole cam- paign indeed are believed, only becaufe we have living vouchers. The hiftory will be read by pofterity with the fame incredulity that the fabulous legends of antiquity are read by us. * On the 14th of June, he took the field with the whole army, and marched within a few miles of Wafliington, at Quibbletown. With a force fufEcient to have crufhed the enemy to atoms in his works, or after leav- ing a force fufficient to hold ^JVa{hington in check, to have advanced with the remainder, and reduced Philadelphia (which might have been effeded with eafe in three days, as the army was provided with pontons for pafling the Delaware, and there were not at that time an hundred continental troops in all Pennfyl- vania) ; to the inexpreffibie joy of the rebels and equal mortification of the King's troops, he turned his back on the enemy, and re- ■ ■ M lUiiiw 4 C 4° ) turned to Briinfwick. From thence lie marched to Amboy, .crofled over to Stateri Ifland, and embarked his troops in tranfports, in which he lay till the 23d of July before he failed. On the qoth of July, he arrived off the Capes of ?. > ware. After taking a look into that river ^as fomt one obferves, to fee if it were navigable), he .put to fea again, and arrived at Chefapeak Bay on the i6th of Auguft ; and on the 25th, debarked his army in fo fickly and exhaufted a condition, that a fortnight more was neceflary to refrefh and recruit the troops, as well as to fupply the lofs which the long voyage, and longer con- finement on (hipboard, in that fultry fcafon, had occafioned in his horfes. So that all the ipring and fummer, and a great part of au- tumn, were intirely wafted, and the remain- der of the campaign turned to no other ac- count than that of getting comfortable winter- quarters at Philadelphia. On the 2sd day of 0(Stober, having received intelligence of the fate of the Northern Army, as though he had now arrived at the fummit of his fublu- nary wiflies, he writes to Adminiftration for leave to refiga his command. I cannot ( 4» ) I cannot forbear juft to give a (ketch of thi$ General's indecifion. In November he pro- pofes that an army of 10,000 men fhould move up the North River to Albany. In December he propofes going to Philadelphia with the main army, and to have 3000 mea only on the North River. In January he writes, that unlefs he received a re-inforce- ment, he fhould a ixrao nr%t n confc- ( 42 ) » confequence. He firft propofecl to go north, then fouth, and afterwards became ftationary. He firft propofed to invade Pcnnfylvania by land, then to do it by land and fea at the lame time, and finally by fea only. On the i6th of July he wrote to Government that he Ihould go up the Delaware, and in a fort- night after failed for Chefapeak Bay. I will now return from wafle, where the fpe^ator dolence, indecifion, and where catch his eye, to a more cheerful clime; to with rafh.projeds, vifionai difaftrous events. that dreary barren fickens at the in- error, that every different, but not a region teeming y enterprizes, and . • • ' . , i, I mull indeed apologize for being detained fo long by Sir William Howe. He is not in- tended for the principal figure: but in order to give your proportions, it was neceflary to draw him at full length. It will not foften your features, though his complexion (hould be deemed a fhade or two darker than youv own*: Bei ore ( 43 ) Before you left Montreal Sir W. Howe's letter was communicated to you, by which you knew, that according to the operations then determined on, the principle on which you had relied in propofmg, and Government in accepting the plan for the expedition to AU bany^ would not take place, and that the ob^ jedt of that expedition could not be attained. Had you not acquiefced in Sir William Howe*s determination to go fouthward, you furcly would have made him acquainted with your diffatisfa<5tion : and, for the honour of human nature, I will fuppofe, that had you informed him that the fafety or fuccefs of your army depended on a co-operation, he would not have deferted or betrayed you. In your letter from Ticonderoga, which waaf received by Sir William before he left New- York, you fay nothing of a co-operation. Camp before Ticonderoga, July 2, 1777. •* I wait only fome necefTaries of the heavy " artillery vvhich have been retarded by con- ** trary winds upon Lake Champlain, to open G 2 ** batteries ( 44 ) ** batteries upon Ticonderoga. The army is ^ in thefuliefipQivers of health andfpirits. / •* have a large body of fava^esy and Jhall be ^'joined by a larger in a few days. Ticonde- •• roga reduced, I fliall leave behind me pro- «* per engineers to put it in an impregnable <* flate ; and it will be garrifoned/row Canada, ** where all the deflined fupplics are fafely ar- ** rived. My force will therefore be left cQm- *^ flete for future operations,^^ The evidence rifes ftill higher. In your letter from Skeenlborough of July i ith, you write, ** Your Lordfhip will pardon me if I a *' little lament that my orders do not give me •* the latitude I ventured to propofe in my <* original projeft for the campaign ; to mak? ** a real effort inftead of a feint upon New-Eng- «* gland. As things have turned out, were I ** atJiberty to march in force immediately by «* my left infkad of my right, I fliould have ** little doubt of fubduing, before winter, the ^* provinces where the rebellion originated, ** If my late letters reach Mr, Hoiue, IJlil] *^ hope this plan may be adopted frqm Albar^.''^ The ( « ) The letters alluded to are fuppreffed, and. «» you and Sir W. Howe make common eaufe, it is not probable that the Public wUl tver have a fight of them. There i«, how- ever, fufficient ground to conclude, that they contain the fulleft affurance of your ability to aa independent of the Southern Army, and a requeft for liberty to do it ; and that it wag upon the ftrength of thefe advices, that Sir William Howe, notwithftanding he had wrote on the 7th of July that no jundioa could be formed that campaign, as you would *nd fufficient emjJoyment againft the rebel, oppofed to you. only nine days after writes, that you would men with little interruption unlefs Wafliington ihouW attempt to force 70U ; and even then, fuch was your ftrength, that he ftould be under no apprcbenfionfrom the event. And in this way only can we ac fount for his abandoning the idea of a corps aamg on the Hudfon in your favour, ca^ rymgi4, inftead of U, 000 troops to Phila- delphm. and thereby leaving the garrifon at WW York toQ we ;>fe to detach, On ( 46 ) On the 17th of July, Sir William Howe writes to you from New York, " My inten- * tion is for Ptinnfyhfania^ where I expe*^ to meet Wafhington; but if he goes to the north- ward, contrary to my expectations, and you can keep him at bay, be aflured I fhall foon be after him, to relieve you.'* •' After your arrival at Albany, the move- ments of the enemy will guide your's ; but my wilhes are, that the enemy be drove out of this province before any operation takes place in ConneSUcut, Sir Henry Clinton rp 4iban^," you are partial partial in a double fenfe ; for you rejed the latter hal£ of the fentence, ** and put your/elf tinder the command of Sir William Hoiue,** as pugatory. In the inflance of a few detached words you adhere to the letter, againft the fenfe, and in every other part countera^J: both fenfe and letter. You were not, indeed, by the letter of your orders, reftrained from advancing, in cafe you found it impofRble to feed youif army, becaufe fuch an exception had hitherto been deemed a needlefs precaution. You were not infcnfible of the neceffity of cftablifhing a chain of pofts as you advancedi or of your duty in that refpedl ; for in your letter of July 29, to Sir G. Carleton* you write, " A breach into my communication muft either ruin my army intirely, or oblige me to return in force ; to rcftore which, luigbt be the lofs of the campaign. To prevent a breach, Ticonderoga and Fort George muft be }n very refpcdlahle ftrength ; aAd I muft, bc- fides. ( 53 ) fides, have pofts at Fort Edward and other parrying'^IacesJ* I muft ftand acquitted of judging hy events^ or from after^knoivledge of fails and cireum" Ranees, becaufe your own letters and evidence furnifh me with almoft every faft that I ftatet and indeed amoft every inference that I fhould have made, and evince that they occurred to you at the time. In your lucid intervals, truth and reafon appear, though the infatua- tion that feized you was fatally predominant in the end. Under the before-defcribed circumftances, it is demonftrably certain, that you were not bound by your orders to proceed to Albany ; of courfe you became refponfible for the ope- rations of the campaign. Friendship may wifli to conceal, and intd- reft may labour to remove, but the land- marks of truth are fixed and permanent. The faithf^l pen of hiftory will record, that * The '( 54 ) The Canada expedition was planned upon the principle of a co-operation of the South- ern Army, fo far as to effed a jundion of the two armies as the primary objedt. Sir W. Howe and Gen. Burgoyne under- Hood the inftruaions in that fenfe, but wilhed to aa feparately; the Northern Colonies having as powerful attraaions for the one, as the Southern Colonies had for the other. In this ftate of mutual repulfion, Sir W. Howe propofed, and Gen. Burgoyne heartily acquiefced in, the carrying on their opera- tions intirely independent of each other. Atfirft, General Burgoyne's fuccefles were rapid and brilliant ; and had they been fol- lowed up with all poffible expedition, the iffue would probably have been fortunate; but his unneceflkrily forcing his way thiQugh ^n immenfe foreft, with incredible labour and fatigue, gave time for the panic the rebels had been throwij intOj to fubfide *. Incum- • To force a paflage, it was ncceflary to conftruft above forty bridges, befides repairing caufeways, one of which wa» ^ Of C S5 } ' Incumbered with forty-two pieces of artll^ lery, befides baggage incompatible with a rapid march, his movements were flow. In order to obtain a fupply of liye cattle and haggage f horfes, he detached five hun- dred men to make a detour of two hundred miles, through the moft dangerous and rebel- lious part of the country, and diredly in the face of the rebel army. This detachment was intirely cut off, having fcarcely advanced of log work; and ihorethkn tiVo rtiles in extent; by which means the afrty was twenty days in adrancing as many miles, when, by taking the route of Lake George, they would have had level roads, and plain failing. Thofe that conclude, that the operations of the campaign were not retarded by this inovementi becaufe the enemy was finally a-head of the pro- vifions, do not confider the difference that the fame labour, applied to the tranfport of provifions from Lake Champlain to Lake George, would have made. The fame kind of logic is ufed to prove, that the artillery and baggage were no impe- diment. They affeft not to confider, that if the horfes, car- riages, and water craft, which tranfported the park of heavy artillery and the baggage, had plied only in the commiflary of provifions depariment, that it would have enabled the army to move with celerity. t Col. Baym was ordered to obtain 1300 horfes to aHift in tranfporting the no baggage of the army. % . J thirty ( 56 ) thirty miles, and a reinforcement came ndaf fhariog the fame fate. This difafter turned the fortune of the war, completed the defedion of the Indian auxiliaries, whom the General had before difgufted, occafioned the failure of the expe- dition on the Mohawk, difcouraged the well- affeded provincials from rifing, and drew together the whole rebel force of the Northern Colonies *, Knowing that every collateral operation had failed ; with only a month's provifion ; having an enemy in front confejfedly fuperior ; and affured of a large body taking place im- mediately behind him, Gen. Burgoyne croffed * Gen. Burgoyne's obfervation, *• That when a Miniflef ftatcs a common accident of war to have been fatal to a whol6 campaign, of which he direfted the progrcfs, and apportioned the force, he makes but an ill compliment to his own judg- ment," is unfounded, becaufe it fuppofes the Minifter to have dire^ed the army to proceed to Albany without any co-opera- tion. This fallacy pervades all the General's exculpatory and criminating performances. It is abundantly proved by the General's own witneifes, that the means were adequate to the end, in cafe there had been a co-operation, and therefore the Miniller muft for ever ftand acquitted. » the ( 57 ) ' the Hudfon, aijd abandoned his comrnunica* tion with Canada and his magazines, with- out any profpea: of one being opened with New York. Five days afterwards, the rebels gave him battle, the fortune of which was fo equivocali that each army claimed the vidlory. If the royalifts were not repulfed, they were effeaually checked, and the impraaica- bility of advancing was felf-evident. It was, however, yet in his power to retreat ; but he fat down (" in the jaws of famine, and invefted by quadruple numbers"), and be- trayed a confcioufnefs of inferiority by forti' fying his camp *, In order to keep up the fpirits of his army, he gave in orders, *' that powerful armies were co-operating with them f," and re- mained * Gen. Burgoyne began to fortify his camp before the re- ceiptof Gen. Clinton's letter. t Gen. Burgoyne conftantly held up this idea from the time he iflucd his proclamation at Putnam Creek, to the 3d of Oaober, when he gave it in orders. The officers tell us, that i they ( 58 ) . malned fo long^in his fortified pofition, that in a council of war he declared, " Should General Clinton be where reported, yet the diftance is fuch as to render any relief from him improbable, during the time our provi- fions could be made to laft." <« A defeat is fatal to the army ; a vidory does not fave it, as they have neither provifions to advance or retreat againft an enemy." After fighting another battle, in which the enemy had the advantage, he retreated two days with all his incumbrances, without lofs, and in good order, then halted; and without any further ftruggle committed his brave companions to the honour and faith of rebels and traitors, upon the vain expedation that they would allow his army a free paflage to England, to relieve an equal number of troops, who were to affift in quelling the re- bellion the next campaign. they did not know the contmy till after the convention. It is not therefore to be wondered at, that the Generals PhilHpi 2nd Frazer expreffed no difapprobation at paffing the Hudfon, cr that Gen. Burgoyne's orders were executed with alacrity. Thus ( 59 ) . Thus, by a feries of mifcondua. increafing in fuch a ratio, that each ftep feems calculated to efface the memory of a!! that preceded • by n.an«uvres which were all his own, and pre- cluded a poffibihty of furcefs ; by means, the bare ftating of which carries with it fuch in- tu.t.ve evidence as to ' jperfede all argument. General Burgoyne totally loft his army, and reduced h.s country to a predicament dif- graceful as it was calamitous; and finally, having exhaufted all the refources of fimula- tion and d.ffimulation, he forfeited the claim to prty. Thus this uncommon meteor, eccentric as a comet and baneful as a malignant planet, rufted from a blaze of light into darknef, and obicunty. P I N I S. ERRATA, .,^ -t .. , I*ago3i, line ig, for, Jfle tbert, read. He then. Page 47> line 1 8| for, a quie/ctntf read dcquiijctnt. 'i&v ^^ X-