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M.P., IN THB HOUSE OF OOMMONS, ON THE 10th of APRIL, 1851, FOA A REDUCTION OF THE COLONIAL EXPENDITURE OFTHS "-ill 1^. :4 UNITED KINGDOMS. LONDON: JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY. FBIOE OKE BfUUa», o o S P E E C H, Ktll, KTO. Sib, — I must apologbo to the House for again bringing iiea^nn roi under its consideration a subject to which I have repeatedly «not'»n called its attention in the course of the last two or three years — I mean, the amount of the expenditure of this country on account of the colonics. One of my chief reasons for asking the House to reconsider this question is, that there is a strong desire amongst various classes of the community, that certain obnoxious taxes should be repealed; in .order to repeal them, there i» a great wish that our national expendi- ture should, if possible, be diminished. Can any reduction jeduce" be made in that cxpendituro without injury to the interests expenditure. of the British empire ? The greater portion of that expendi- ture is on account of the interest of the national debt, and in that no reduction can be made. The remainder of the na- tional expenditure is on account of the government of the united kingdoms and of the colonies. I will not now express any opinion whether any considerable reduction can be made, and ought to be made, in the expenditure on account of the united kingdoms ; but I must say, that I entertain a strong conviction that a considerable portion of our expenditure on account of the colonies is excessive, and that it can be di- minished without injury to the interests either of the united kingdoms or of the colonies; and, therefore, I think that steps should be taken to relieve the people, as speedily as possible, from a portion of that burden. In order to sustain these positions, I will first state, as cor- Expen>ii- rectly as I can, the amount of the annual expenditure of this '"'■e lace, and with prudence in the second. . . . You have thirty-five battalions at home, not, as it is supposed, for the purpose of restraining the popu- lation, but for the purpose of maintaining the system of relief for your regiments serving abroad. Your rule is five years at home and ten years abroad for your reginicnts." The other night the Secretary at War, on proposing the army estimates, stated that one of his great arguments for keeping up an effective military force at home was to maintain the system of relief established by Sir R. Peel's Government. According to that system, for every two regiments serving in the colonies one regiment would be required to be main- tained at home to afibrd relief. Last year the military force in the colonies, exclusive of colonial corps, which do not re- quire to be relieved, amounted to about 30,000 men, and that force would consequently require 1 5,000 men in this country for their relief. I should likewise be entitled to charge to the colonial military account a considerable sum for native wars, rebellions, and other extraordinary events. If I put Extraonii- nothing down for these two items, I can scarcely be accused ""'y- of over-estimating the military cost of the colonies to the united kingdoms when I reckon it at not less than 4,000,000/. a-year ; a sum amounting to about nine shillings in the pound sterling on our exports to the colonies in 1849 ; exceeding by 600,000/. the whole of the local revenues of the colonies for that year; and equal to the sum collected from the window- tax and the excise duties on soap, [)aper, and hops. Can any reduction be made in this expenditure ? It is Cm it in evident that no immediate reduction can be made in the 'educudi' 1,000,000/. of dead weight, for that depends upon the number of troops which have been maintained in the colonies. If, however, the military force there were permanently reduced, ultimately the dead weight would be reduced. It is only, then, in the 3,000,000/. of efl:ective expenditure that any immediate reduction can be made. How is this sum ex- H„^y ,pp„t;> pended? The greater portion of it is spent on the pay, clothing, and maintenance of the troops in the colonies. In the year 1846-7 the military force there consisted of 42,000 regular troops, 3,000 artillerymen, and about 700 engineers, in all 45,700. At present, I believe, the number is about 43,000, exclusive of the reinforcements which have been sent to the Cape of Good Hope. In 1846-7 the pay, clothing, Pay, and maintenance of the troops in the colonies cost this clothing; country about 2,100,000/. These troops were scattered over ^'""'^' Cominiua- riat; Barracks ; Salaries ; Slorus ; Wurhs ; Repairs; Transport ; In propor- tion to force. Can force be reduced ? How em- ployed ? 6 thirty-seven colonies ; in each colony there is one or more stations ; in each station there is a commissariat, ordnance, or barrack establishment, and, generally, all three ; to these establishments are attached commissariat officers, barrack- masters, storekeepers, clerks of the works, and sundry work- men. The salaries of these persons cost this country, in 1846-7, 280,000/. In each station there is a storehouse; in each storehouse there is a quantity of stores ; according to a return presented to the committee on ordnance expenditure, the value of the stores in the colonial storehouses in 1846-7 amounted to 2,500,000/. — a quantity of stores sufficient for twenty years' consumption during peace, if they do not perish previously ; yet in that year we spent in ordnance stores for the colonies 140,000/. In connection with these stations there are gen'^rally either fortifications, or ordnance works, or other military buildings ; these buildings have been erected at a great expense, and cost this country annually a large sum for improvements and repairs. We expended, in the interval between 1829 and 1847, 3,500,000/. on these buildings; and in 1846-7 we paid 330,000/. for improvements and repairs to these buildings. The last item I will mention is the transport of troops and stores, which in 1846-7 cost 110,000/. Adding these items together, their sum is about 3,000,000/. It is evident that the cost of all these things must, in a series of years, be in proportion to the number of troops we maintain in the colonies. For if we keep a large body of troops in the colonies, they must be well paid, fed, and clothed ; there must be barracks for them to dwell in, stores for them to consume, fortifications for them to defend, ships to transport them to and from the colonies; and, finally, half-pay and pensions for them when unfit for service. I will not deny that some saving might be made in the details of this expenditure, but that saving cannot but be trifling compared to the whole sum expended, as long as we maintain the present amount of military force in the colonies. There- fore, if we wish to make a reduction in the military cost of the colonies, we must begin by making a reduction in the military force maintained there at our expense. Can we reduce the military force in the colonies without injury to the interests of the British empire ? Do we require that 45,000 troops should be maintained in the colonies at the expense of the United Kingdom ? and, if so, for what pur- poses, and how are they employed? In 1846-7 about 3,000 men were serving in the convict colonies of Bermuda and Van Diemen's Land; about 16,700 men kept garrison in the military stations, including Ceylon ; and the remainder. I I I I I » t A \-i I mmm .4- amounting to about 26,000 men, were stationed in the colo- nies, properly so called. I will say nothing on the general question of convict co- Conviot Ionics, exceut that in such colonies troops must be kept to colonies: preserve oruer among the convicts. In Bermuda, in 1846-7, Bermuda: the military force amounted to 1,361 men, and cost about 74,000/.; in Van Diomen's Land, in the same year, the military force amounted to 1,500 men, and cost about 93,000/. With regard to Van Diemen's Land, I have given notice that Van Die- on an early occasion I will move an address, praying Her •""»» ^'"'"W Mojesty to comply with the prayers of the inhabitants of that colony, by discontinuing transportation to it. If their uni- versal prayer be listened to, and transportation discontinued, the troops might be ultimately withdrawn from Van Die- men's Land, with a saving in the effective military expendi- ture of this country to the amount of about 93,000/. a-year. I next proceed to the military stations. Omitting those Military which are situated within the boundaries of the colonies •'ai'ons: Sroperly so called, our chief military stations are Gibraltar, lalta, the Ionian Islands, the stations on the west coast of Africa (including the newly-acquired Danish forts), St. Helena, the Mauritius, Hongkong, Labuan, and the Falkland Islands; and to these I will add, for the sake of brevity, Ceylon. The military force in these stations in 1846-7 amounted to about 16,700 men, and they cost about 710,000/. I will not now inquire whether we ought to maintain a garri- son in every one of these places. On a former occasion I attempted to prove that it was not worth while to keep about 3,000 troops in the Ionian Islands at the cost of about Ionian 90,000/. a-year; that we had thrown away about 400,000/. Wond.; on fortifications at Corfu ; and that the fortresses of Malta Malta ; and Gibraltar, which we were then repairing and improving, Gibraltar; at an estimated cost of about 460,000/., were sufficient for all the wants of Great Britain in the Mediterranean. I also attempted to prove, with regard to the stations on the west West Coast coast of Africa, that, by abandoning our crusade against the o'" Africa; slave trade, these stations might be dispensed with ; and that, by so doing, and also withdrawing the African squadron, a saving might be made in the military and naval expendi- ture of this country to the amount of 450,000/. a-year. I also remarked that Ceylon properly belonged to our East Indian Ceyion. system of states ; that, in all probability, it would be better governed if it were transferred to the East India Company, and that a saving might thus be made of about 83,000/. a-year. Sir, I must observe, that the motives which have led this Why Eng. land ao' quired military ■tatioua. Wiiat they •hould be : Few ill number ; C^^ Coininand- ing pgei- tions; Costing little; 8 country to acquire military Btntiuns arc very diiforcnt fruin those which have induced ub to promote the plantation of colonies ; and that our policy with regard to military stations is quite of a different cnaracter from our policy with regard to colonies properly so called. The motives under the influence of which this country has acquired military stations may be stated in a very few words. Great Hritnin has lone been, and in the opinion of its statesmen, its Parliaments, and its ])eople, ought to continue to be, essentially a naval power. It aspires to be the first naval power on the earth, to carry on commerce in every portion of the globe, and to protect that commerce with its fleets. It desires that those fleets should patrol the ocean, and be the maritime police of mankind. In order to refit those fleets, to afford snelter to them, and to give protection to its merchant ships when war is raging, it has been the policy of the statesmen of England, with the consent and approbation of the people and Parlia- ment, to take military possession of harbours in various parts of the world. Assuming this policy to be a sound one, I ask, what are the rules which should determine the number of our military stations, and the selection of their sites? I think the rules should be, that, subject to the condition of accomplishing the objects of the naval policy of Great Britain, our military stations should be as few in number as possible, and that each station should be selected so as to cost as little as possible. They should be as few in uumber as possible ; for every military station must cost a considerable sum of money annually ; therefore every super- fluous military station is a permanent source of unnecessary expense. It is also a cause of weakness; for an empire is strong, cwteris paribuSf in proportion as it has fewer points to defend; for the fewer points it has to defend, the more it can concentrate its forces, and therefore the more powerful it is either for offence or defence. In order that our military stations may be as few in number as possible, consistentlv with the attainment of the objects of the naval policy oi Great Britain, it is evident that they should be carefully chosen, so as most readily to afford shelter and protection to our ships. Therefore they ought to be situated as near as possible to the great commercial highways of the ocean. Secondly, each military station should be selected with the view of costing as little as pos- sible. Now, the cost of a station depends chiefly upon the number of troops required to defend it ; and that number depends upon the military strength or weakness of the position of the station ; therefore the best place, cwteris paribusy for a 'jommumsmmm 9 « < military station is one which can with difficulty be attacked, gujor and can easily be defended by a small garrison. It is evident d«r«nio; that these conditions are best fulfilled by small islands, or peninsular extremities of continents ; the less connected with the adjoining land the better. I think, therefore, that the true policy of this country, with regard to military stations, is to occupy only a few commanding positions witn good har- somii ; hours. They should be small, isolated, salient points ; easily i«<>iutfMi. defended, and close to the beaten j)aths of the ocean. I hold it to be quite contrary to the true policy of Great Britain to take military possession of large islands or vast portions of continents. I consider it to be utterly absurd for an essen- tially naval power to attempt the military defence of exten- sive coasts or long lines of frontier. That attempt has been made in South Africa with disastrous and costly results. If similar attempts be made, and vast, numerous, and costly military stations be occupied by this country, I fear much that the result will be, that the extremities of the empire will gradually drain it of its wealth and vital powers, that the centre will thus become paralyzed, and thatnnally the empire will fall abroad and perish of exhaustion. 1 think that amongst our military stations those which best fulfil the con- our best ditions of good military stations arc Gibraltar, at the mouth of "^i^tioiM. the Mediterranean ; Malta, near its centre ; Bermuda, in mid-Atlantic; Halifax, commanding the coast of North America; Barbadoes, amongst the Islands of the West Indies; the peninsular extremity of South Africa, on the route to India; the Mauritius, on the same road, and com- manding the Persian Gulf; Singapore, at the entrance of the China Seas ; and perhaps Hongkong, amidst those seas. I have named these eight stations, because I am inclined to be- lieve that it is not necessary, for the attainment of the objects of the naval policy of Great Britain, that we should keep mi- litary possession of more than these eight stations. To gar- rison them as they were garrisoned in 1846-7, a military force of 17,000 men would be sufficient ; and they would cost about 850,000^. a-ycar in effective military expenditure. This is not much more than the sum which the colony of the Cape our worst of Good Hope, with its Kafir wars, annually costs us on the one. average of years. I think that this fact illustrates, in the most striking manner, the importance of the rule which I have laid down with regard to the selection of military stations. For if we consider, as some persons do, the whole colony of the Cape of Good Hope to be merely a military station, then the expense of this one ill-chosen station would be equal to the expense of our eight best- chosen stations ; and the sum of I : i ! ; 10 True colonies. Military cost ; Unneces- sary. Why England planted culonics. money which we lavish upon the Cape of Good Hope would, in my opinion, be sufficient to defray the military expense of all the stations which our naval policy requires. I will now proceed to the colonies properly so called. I mean the North American colonies, the West Indian planta- tions, the Australasian colonies, with the exception of Van Diemen^s Land, and our South African empire. The military force in these colonies in 1846-7 amounted to about 26,000 men, and they cost about 2,000,000/. in effective military ex- penditure. If to this sum be added a proportionate amount of the dead weight, the whole military cost of these colonies to the united kingdoms would amount to about 2,600,000/. a-ytar. This sum is equal to 8s. 6;^. in the pound on our ex- ports to these colonies in 1849, and was as large as the whole amount of their local revenues in that year. I have heard some persons who take merely a commercial and economical view of these questions, ask, why do we retain dominion over these colonies ? Would it not be better for us if they were independent ? Our independent colonies of the United States, say these gentlemen, cost us only about 10,000/. a-year for consular and diplomatic services, and we sent them in 1849 12,000,000/. of exports, or twice the value of our exports to colonies which are costing us 2,600,000/. a-year, or 260 times as much as the United States. Now, I answer, that the greater portion of this expenditure is unnecessary, or may ultimately be rendered unnecessary. I maintain, that if these colonies were governed as they ought to be governed, no troops ought to be maintained in them at the expense of the united kingdoms, except for strictly imperial purposes, and that the expenses of all troops required for local purposes ought to be paid by the colonies. And, if these views be cor- rect, it appears to me that the military force maintained in the colonies at the expense of this country might ultimately be reduced to the men required for the military stations. With the permission of the House, I will explain, as shortly as I can, the reasons which have led me to the conclusions which I have just stated. I have said that the policy of this country, with regard to its true colonies, is of a very different character from its policy with regard to military stations; for the motives which have induced it to plant colonies are quite different from those which led it to occupy military stations. We all know that, ever since the new world was discovered, it has been the unceasing desire of England to plant that new world with new Englands. It was the ardent wish of this country that its children should occupy the uninhabited por- tions of the earth's surface, and carry along with them to their •-^■■rjTfiiigji..:. ;^^:^.:^.:^\; 11 new homes the laws, the institutions, and feelings of Engliith- men ; that they should there become bold, energetic, nnd self-relying men, capable and willing to aid their jmront in times of need, and not weak puling infants, ever crying to their mother for assistance, and emptying her purHe. Now, it is as true of bodies of men as it is of individual men, that the best mode of developing in thern energy, courage, and nelf- reliance, is not to coddle nnd fondle them, and to tic them to a mother's apron, but to throw them upon their own rc^tourccs, and to let them rough it and battle it with the world. There- fore, it was the old polity of this country, with regftrles which I have laid down, to answering the question, who ought to pay for the military force which is maintained in a coK>ny? To do so, I must first endeavour to determine, among the various purposes for which a military force may be required in a colony, what are those which ought to be considered as impe- rial purposes, and what are those which ought to be consi- dered as local purposes ? In answer, I say there are only two objects for which a military force can bo required in a colony ; namely, either for war with external foes, or to pre- serve order and tranquillity within the colony, First, with respect to war with external foes ; a military force may be required in a colony in consequence of its being engaged, or likely to be engaged, in war with a foreign potentate (with a lawful power, to use the language of the law of nations), or a military force may be required in a colony for war with savage tribes on its frontier. Now, it is evident that a colony cannot be lawfully engaged in war with a lawful power with- out the empire of which it is a part being also engaged in Why tCiigland plutiled uolonies. Old polity of I'itigland ; Not to pay louul ex- penses. Who «hould pny for troops ? What are they HBDled for? Imperial WHrs. ( ' Native wars. pay 16 that war. Therefore, every such war is, necessarily, an im- perial war; the troops employed in it are employed for impe- rial purposes, and, consequently, their expenses ought to be paid by the imperial government ; though, in certain cases, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the colonies should assist the empire both with troops and money; and I feel convinced that, if the colonies were governed as they ought to be, they would gladly and willingly come to the aid of the mother country in any just and necessary war. They would do as the men of our old North American plantations did during a war with France, when they willingly bore a large portion of the burden of the contest with that monarchy and its Indian allies, and in every way proved themselves to be the hardy and generous sons of England. I will next speak of wars with savage tribes on the frontier of a colony. The answer to the question, whether such wars ought to be considered as strictly local wars or not? wiio should whether any portion of the expense of such wars ought to be defrayed by the local government or not? The answers to these questions depend upon the nature of the govern- ment of the colony. If the inhabitants of a colony have representative institutions, and the management of their local affairs, and if the relations between them and the frontier tribes be conducted by local officers ; then the local Government must be held responsible for the result ; and, if the result be war, and that war be conducted by local officers, and the expenditure on account of it be under local control, then I think that it is quite clear that the whole expense of that war should be paid by the colony, and no portion of it by the united kingdoms. And I feel convinced that, if the local governments had to pay the expense of native wars, those governments would take care not rashly to engage in war ; and, when engaged in it, it would be for their interest to bring the war to a termination as speedily as possible, and at the least possible cost. Unfortunately it is quite different when the imperial Government has to pay for a native war. Then it is the interest of many persons in the colony that the war should be made as expensive as possible. Now, it is very difficult for the imperial Government at home to exercise any efficient control over such expenditure. For instance, no one in this country has a distinct idea how 2,000,000/. were spent in the last Kafir war. Sir Henry Pottinger told Lord Grey tliat it was impossible to convey an adequate idea of the confusion, the unauthorised expense, and the attendant peculation which prevailed during that war. And the Commissioners of Audit have reported that When c(»h)iiy pays Kvouuiiiy, Wlien Kn^litiid pays ; Extrava guiice. i 4!. f) 13 tiicy could not audit the accounts, for no accounts had been v,'Um> kept. I believe that it ia almost impossible for the imperial K")*'""'! Government at home to exercise any real check over such ^^^*' expenditure ; and I believe that it is also very difficult, if not impossible, for the imperial officers in the colony to resiHt the claims poured in ujwn them from every quarter; for, the imperial purse being considered inexhaustible, every one Fraud; in the colony is intent either upon picking it himself, or assisting others in picking it, whenever a fair op[)ortunity like a native war occurs. On the other hand, the resistance offered by the imperial officers in a colony is generally languid, for they have no clear and permanent interest in offending those around them by keeping down imperial expenditure, provided it do not become so extravn}»antly great as to cause a great outcry in this House ; and, gene- rally speaking, honourable members know nothing about the matter till two or three years after the money has been spent. Then it is too late ; fair promises are made, which are invariably broken. It appears to me to be of the utmost importance that we should not, if possible, be made liable for any bill on account of native wars; for such a bill will always be a most extortionate one ; and yet in no one case Kximtlmi. that I remember were the extortioners contented, but invari- ably accused us of being mean, shabby, and not paying enough. If in any exceptionable case it should be ucenicu expedient to assist a colony possessing self-government, in a native war, I am inclined to think tliat the wisest plan would be to give the colony a round sum of money, and let the local government employ it in the manner which it doein« best. On the other hand, I must admit that if the inhabi- vviicn Km«- tants of a colony do not possess representative institutions, '"'"' *'"'"''' if they have no voice in the management of their local affairs, if they are governed by the Colonial-office, and if the rela- tions between them and the native tribes are conducted by officers responsible to the Colonial-office; then the Colonial- office, that is, the imperial Government, must be held responsible for the result, and if the result be war, as the w^ar will be conducted by imperial officers, as the expendi- ture on account of it will be under imperial control, as such wars are apt to be hastily produced, unnecessarily prolonged, and conducted with lavish expense, it would not be just to throw the whole burden of such wars on the colony ; but a portion at least of the expense ought to be paid by tlic imperial Government. I will now proceed to the question, who ought to \uiy the expense of the troops which may be required in a colony to I swsr fusssn 14 Troop* to keop ord^r. Wlipfj co« loriy itUould Vay. Wlion Eiij?. litnil iliould pay, KiiKlitiid JiiKtIy iiiiml. I! I preserve internal order and tranquillity ? I think the answer to this question depends, also, upon the nature and form of the government of a colony; for disorder, riots, and insurrec- tions are almost invariably the consequences of bad govern- ment. Therefore, if the inhabitants of a colony have repre- Bentative institutions, and the management of their local affairs, and if they mismanage those affixirs, then they should be held responsible for the result; and if the result be riots and insurrections, then it is clear that the expense of the troops, required to preserve internal order and tranquillity in the colony, ought to be paid by the colony. On the other hand, if the inhabitants of a colony do not possess represen- tative institutions, but are governed by the Colonial-office, then the Colonial-office, that is, the imperial Government, should be held responsible for the result ; and, therefore, if troops be required to preserve internal order and tranquillity, the expense ought to be paid by the imperial Government. For the C'^Ionial-office is responsible to Parliament; there- fore, if the Colonial-office misgovern a colony, Parliament is to blame; and it is but just that the people of this country should pay the penalty. It is also a good thing that they should every now and then be severely fined on account of Colonial-office misgovernment. Because, generally speaking, little attention is paid in this House to the grievances of the colonies, and little redress given, unless those grievances are likely to be presented to us in the shape of a long bill for a war, or a rebellion, or something else of the same kind. For instance, Canada obtained responsible government by sending us in, according to my honourable friend the member for Montrose, a bill of 5,000,000/. for a rebellion. The last Kafir war, with a bill of 2,000,000/., set us all a-th! iking about representative institutions for the Cape of Good Hope; and I have no doubt that the present Kafir war, with another bill of 2,000,000/,, will convert us all into Lycurguses and Solons, so far as that colony is concerned. C«iifiliif»lon(i. Sir, if the arguments which I have used are sound, they lead to the conclusions — 1st, that no troops ought to be maintained at the expense of the united kingdoms, in any one of our true colonies, after it has obtained self-government, either for war with native tribes, or to preserve internal peace and tranquillity ; 2d, that when the British empire is engaged, or likely to be engaged, in war with a foreign poten- tate, then the expense of the troops required to defend the colony should be paid by the imperial Government; and, 3dly, if it be expedient, for imperial purposes, to garrison certain fortresses or naval stations, situated within the boun- 15 t dnrics of our true colonies, then the expense of those garri- sons oup;ht also to be paid out of the imperial revenues. I will now proceed to consider separately each grour of North Ame- colonies. I will begin with our North American ci' £».• a. "5"" ""'"' In the years 1834 and 1835, a committee of this Houst, v/ks appointed to inquire into our colonial military expenditure. Lord Fortoscuc was chairman of that committee. Lord Hardinjic, the late Sir Henry Parnell, and my right lion, friend the member for Coventry, were members of it ; and I am sure that my views with regard to the North American colonics differ very slightly, if at all, from those of my right hon. friend. I am delighted to see him in the House, because I know that there is no person in the House who understands colonial questions better than he understands them ; and I feel deeply grateful to him for much good advice he has given me on these subjects. This committee recommended that the strictest economy should be observed in every branch of our Colonial military expenditure. According to a return presented to that committee, I find that the number of troops, Force in including artillery and engineers, in the North American colo- ^'^*'- nies in 1835, was 5,369 men. The effective military expendi- ture for these colonies in that year amounted to about 337,000^. Since that period there has been a great increase in the military force and expenditure in the North American colonies. In the interval between 1829 and 1846-7 we spent 1,300,000/. on ordnance works in these colonies ; and in 1846-7 the number of troops in these colonies amounted Force in to 9,743 men, and the effective military expenditure was ^846-7. 645,000/. — an increase, therefore, as compared to 1835, of 4,374 men, with an augmentation in expenditure of 308,000/. I find that in 1846-7, we spent for military objects in these colonies a sum equal to six-sevenths of their local revenue, and amounting to 5*. Sd. in the pound on our exports to them in 1849. Last year the military force in the North American cohniies was about the same as it was in 1846-7. This year the noble lord the Prime Minister stated that it is somewhat less timn it was last year; still, according to the noble lord's own statement, it far exceeds what it was in 1835. I ask the llou^e to consider whether there is any necessity for tliis force being greater than it was in 1835. I ask, wiiy wns it increased? It was first increased in con- why in- scquence of tlie rebellion in Canada. That rebellion was *''^^"*'^' caused by Colonial -oflice mis-government, for which we were justly fined. Since then the North American colonies, and especially Canada, have obtained responsible government, and far more self-government than they had in 1835; in 16 of Lord Troops not wanted ; To resist annexation. i fact, at the present moment they possess in some respects more control over their local affairs than the neighbouring States of the American Union ; and I must say tiiat I think Wisepoiicj Lord Grey deserves much credit for the wise and prudent policy which he has pursued with regard to these colonies, and especially for having determined to empower the Assem- bly of Canada to settle the question of the clergy reserves. According to the principles which I have laid down, no troops ought to be maintained at our expense in those colo- nies, except for strictly imperial purposes. Now, are there any imperial purposes for which it is necessary that troops should be maintained in these colonies? I have sometimes heard it said that we must keep a military force in these colonies to prevent annexation to the United States; but there is no danger of annexation to the United States, unless the majority of the inhabitants of these colonies desire annex- ation ; and if they were to desire it, it would be great folly to attempt to resist annexation by force of arms; for such an attempt would certainly be unsuccessful, and the presence of a body of troops would only tend to lead to a disastrous, fruitless, and costly struggle. But I believe that there is, and will be, no wish on the part of the North American colonies to separate from us, as long as the wise and prudent policy of Lord Grey towards those colonies be adhered to. I have also heard it said that we must maintain a military force in the North American colonies, to guard against a sudden aggression from the United States. But before we fear such an aggression, let us consider the amount of the regular military force of the United States. In 1850 I believe it amounted to about 10,000 men. Now, if this amount of military force be sufficient for all the vast territories of the United States., extending from the river St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, how very much less than a third of 10,000 men, would, according to the standard of the New World, be sufficient for our North American colonies ? There is no danger of a sudden aggression from the United States as long as our North American colonists are sincerely attached to the British empire ; and if such an event were to occur, I firmly believe they would be willing, as well as capable, to resist it. I have admitted that Halifax is a valuable naval station, and some persons consider Quebec to be an important imperial fortress, and consequently it is said that garrisons should be maintained in them at the expense of the united kingdoms. What amount of force would be required for these purposes ? In 1835 the garrison of Halifax consisted of 1,549, and that of Halifax and Quebec military stations. i| 17 Quebec amounted to 1,107 men, making in all 2,656 men: Reduction therefore, according to my view, 3,500 men would be more "«" '^"»«'«- than sufficient for nil imperial purposes in the North Ameri- can colonies. By reducing the force in these colonies to 3,500 men, a savlnpf Ujight bo made in our effective military expen- diture for the North American colonies to the amount of 400,000/. n-yoar, ns compared to the expenditure in 1846-7. I will now proceed to our West Indian plantations ; they Westindie*. are IG in number; in 13 of them we have barrack establish- ments and troopB ; a couple of hundred men in one insig- nificant iHland, 1/50 in another, and so on. In the interval between 1829 and 1846-7 we spent 600,000/. on ordnance works in these colonies ; and in 1 846-7 the military force in Force in them amounted to 6,261 men, and our effective military ex- '***''• penditure on account of them was 496,000/. — a sum equal to 6-7thB of their locid revenues, and amounting to 5s. 6d. in the pound on our exports to them in 1849. In former times, when slavery exluted, a military force was required to keep down the slaves ; but with the cessation of slavery that rea- son for a military force ceased. But if a military force be now required for thcHO colonies to preserve internal order, it follows, from the principles which I have l.iid down, that the expense of such a force ought to be defrayed by the colonists; Colonies for most of them poi«i8cs8 representative institutions, and "''""^"^ P"^' therefore they ought to defray the expense of all troops re- quired for local purpoies, and troops required to preserve order in a colony nr© evidently required for local purposes. Now, are there any imperial purposes for which it is neces- sary to maintain a military force in these colonies ? I have heard it said that a military force must be maintained in those colonies to guard against aggression from the United States, But 1 rciMmt that there is no danger of aggression from the United State^t, unless the majority of the colonists wish to separate from us; and if they were to entertain such a wish, I maintain that it would not be worth our while to retain them by force of arms. But if it be necessary to guard against foreign aggreasion, as most of the colonies are islands, it is evident that a naval force would be the best means of defending them ; and as the House determined the other night not to diminish our naval force, we have abundant naval means to defend these colonies from aggression from any quarter. It is also said that Jamaica and Barbadoes are im- Jamaica and portant naval stations, in which garrisons ought to be kept, n^"*^"^*^* in conformity with the naval policy of Great Britain. If so, stations. I ask what amount of troops would be required to garrison those stations? I find that in 1846-7, the number of troops MM M I Austral- asian coln- nie». Van Die- Reduction in Jamaica was 1,602 ni6n, nnd in Barbadoes 1,353 men; offeree. consequently about 3,100 iH«n would be sufficient for all im- perial purposes in tho Wt!**t hidian colonies. If this opinion be correct, then our militHry force in these colonies might be reduced to half the (unouttt it wati in 1846-7, with a saving of about 250,000/. a-yuar in i'ffbctive military expenditure. Next, I will speak of tluj Aunfrnlasian grouj) of colonies. I have omitted Van DitJineM'i* liftud, because Van Diemen's Land is a convict Hettl(3in@n( ; titu1« as convicts are transported to that colony for tho ftlUm'd advantnore of the people of England, it is but juufc that tlio people of England should pay for the troops required to proMorvo order among the convicts. Strictly speaking, I \m\(i nothing to do with the question of the number of troops whiyli ought to bo maintained in Van men's Land. DJemeu's Land ; but I nniii observe that, in determining the number of troops to bo kept in that colony, two facts should be borne in mind ; ftrnt, that wo have just given to the in- habitants of Van Diomen'i Land representative institutions ; secondly, that the great majority of tJiese inhabitants are most strenuously opposed to the ccmtinuance of transportation; therefore it is probable that the first use they will make of their new institutions will be to resist the continuance of transportation. Now I beg the honourable gentleman, the Under-Secretary of Btate ibp tho Colonies, to remind his noble friend the Secretary of Htate for the Colonies of these facts, and *,o tell the noble Lord, that if he do not wish to repeat the farce he acted with rcg;ard to transportation to the Cape of Good Hope, if Jje do JJot intend to yield to threats and menaces, and if he be determined to continue transporta- tion to Van Diemen's Land, he must augment the number of troops in that colony» in order to keep down the free colo- nists, as well as to preserve (»rdcr among the convicts. On the continent of Australia tlie number of troops in 1846-7 was 2,286 men, and tlie effective military expendi- ture was 92,000/. Since that period the greater portion of these troops have been withdrawn* I am glad to find, from despatches lately presented to Parliament, that Lord Grey intends to apply to the eolonies of New South Wales and Victoria the principles whieh, in my opinion, ought to regu- late our military expenditure with regard to our colonies properly so called. The noble Lord has stated his intention to reduce the military foree, in the colonies which I have just named, to a simple guard in their capitals, namely, in Sydney and Melbourne, lie lm« informed the Governor of New South Wales, that " if a greater amount of force is re- quired, the local Legislature must either make provision for Australia. ' ' • 19 raising a more considerable body of police, or provide for the Sound pay and allowances of an additional number of troops." In lo^'qJo another despatch the noble Lord makes a remark well de- "' '*'^' serving of attention with regard to the next colony which I am about to mention, namely, New Zealand. That remark is, " That in the earlier d&ya of British colonization the colo- nists were left to depend, in a fur greater degree than at pre- sent, on their own exertions. The inhabitants of what are now the United States of America were left, with exceed- ingly little assistance from the mother country, to defend themselves from the numerous and warlike tribes of Indians by whom they were surrounded." Now, I only ask you to return to the old policy of England with regard to her plan- tations, and to leave them to depend upon their own exer- tions, giving them, at the same time, local self-government. I am sorry next to inform the House, that a considerable New Zea portion of the troops which were stationed in New South '""''• Wales have, by Lord Grey's directions, been transferred to New Zealand. In 1846-7, the military force stationed in that colony amounted to 1629 men, with an effective military expenditure of 85,00O^. Since then there has been a consi- derable increase both in force and expenditure. In 1848 the number of troops was 2948, and they must have cost us at least 160,000^., exclusive of the 20,000?. or 30,000/. which we ^^^^^^^ vote every year for civil expenses. This is a i)repo8terous expendi- amount of expenditure for these islands; it is equal to more *«'«»• than 208. in the pound on our exports to them, and is four times the amount of their local revenues. I must mention, also, with regard to these most costly possessions, that in the northern island, where the troops are stationed, there were, in 1848, almost as many soldiers as European men : the number of European men being only 3157, and therefore exceeding the number of soldiers only by 209 men. And, in fact, in the province of New Ulster the number of soldiers, amount- ing to 1798 men, exceeded the number of European men by 298 men. Why do we maintain this amount offeree in New Zealand ? For native wars. I will reserve my observations on native wars till I reach South Africa, and 1 will only ex- press my conviction that if we were to give to the colonists of New Zealand free institutions, and the management of their local affairs, we might withdraw our troops from New Munster at least, and the colonists would be able to defend themselves, and would take care to be on good terms with the natives. Lastly, 1 arrive at South Africa. The committee of 1834 Sou'h on colonial military expenditure, approved of a reduction of ^''"'■* D South Africn. Kafir War. Who is to pay? Causes of War. 20 six men per company, in the military force which was then stationed in the Cape of Good Hope. It amounted to about 2000 men, at a cost, in 1832, of about 100,000/. Since then there has been a lar^e increase, both in force and expenditure, in consequence of Kafir wars. In 18Ii5 there was a Kafir war, and our effective military expenditure in that year was 240,000/. In 1846-7 there was another Kafir war ; the mili- tary force was augmented to 6196 men, and our effective military expenditure became 685,000/., a sum equal to 268. for every i)ound of our exports to that colony, and three times the amount of its local revenues in 1849. The last Kafir war cost us 2,000,000/. The present Kafir war appears to be even more formidable than the last one, and I am afraid is likely to cost as much. I wish now to call the most serious attention of the House to the present Kafir war. It confirms and illustrates every one of my positions. The outbreak of that war was one of my chief reasons for giving notice of this motion, and I must therefore ask the indulgence of the House while I make some observations with regard to it. There are three important questions with regard to the present Kafir war, namely. Who is to pay for it? What has led to it? And what steps ought to be taken to relieve this country from any liability on account of similar wars ? To the first question I answer, that, according to the principles which I have laid down, we are not entitled to throw the whole burden of the present Kafir war upon the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and that we are bound to bear a very considerable portion of the expenses of this war. First, because the inhabitants of the Cape of Good Hope do not possess representative institutions; they have not the management of their local affairs ; they are governed directly by the Colonial-office, through the agency of Sir Harry Smith, and the relations with the Kafir tribes have been conducted by Sir Harry Smith, and very strangely have those relations been conducted. Secondly, we arc not entitled to throw the whole expense of this war upon the co- lony of the Cape of Good Hope, because it has broken out in British Kafraria, which is no part nor portion of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, but a separate province, governed by Sir Harry Smith, under a commission separate from that under which he is governor of the Cape of Good Hope. There can be no doubt, therefore, that we shall have to pay. I proceed next to the question, what have been the causes of this war, and who is to blame for it? I think the papers which have been lately presented to the House clearly prove one of two things, cither that Sir H. Smith was very igno- i f 21 rant of the state of British Kafraria, and the feelings of the i«„oranceor Kafirs, or that this outbreak has been produced by his mis- SirU.Siuitii; management. The despatches which I now hold in my hand were delivered to hon. members at the commencement of this session. In every one of them Sir 11. Smith described, in glowing language, " the unprecedented state of tranquillity " of British Kafraria. He consoled Lord Grey for the failure of his attempt to transport convicts to the Cape of Good Hope by the gratifying intelligence, that " everything pro- gresses most satisfactorily on the eastern frontier of this colony ;"" that the Kafir police was most useful; that frontier depredations were almost unknown; that "wo are overcoming witchcraft ;" and that " the Kafirs were contented and happy under the British rule.'" Lord Orey was delighted at this or Lord intelligence, and the noble lord declared that he had no doubt ^'"T- of the wisdom of Sir Harry's arrangements, and of their bene- ficial results. Thus the noble lord and the gallant general bandied compliments, and wc, relying on their statements, began this session under the happy delusion that British Kafraria was a sort of terrestrial paradise ; that our eastern frontier was safe, and, above all, that our jiockets were safe from Kafir inroads ; and, therefore, that we might enjoy a squabble among ourselves about the disposal of a surplus revenue. Alas I all is now changed. The wise arrange- ments of Sir Harry Smith are upset ; the frontier system of Lord Grey is a failure ; the sanguine anticipations of the noble earl are disappointed ; the Elysium of British Kafraria has become a Tartarus ; our pockets are in the act of being picked, and our surplus revenue is disposed of. What are causes <.(• the causes which have led to this sad change ? I think they War. may be classed under three heads: — L Encroachments by Europeans on the lands of the Kafir. 2. The frontier system of Sir H. Smith, sanctioned by the Colonial-office, which consisted in a minute, perpetual, and irritating interference with the affairs of the Kafirs, and in an unceasing and galling attempt to subvert the influence and authority of their chiefs. Lord J. Russell. — Just the reverse. Sir W. MoLESWORTH. — I hope the noble lord will hear me, and then answer me. The noble lord relies on the statements of the Colonial-office, and those are generally erroneous. The third cause of war was, the complete igno- rance of Sir H. Smith, and the consequent ignorance of the Colonial-office of the feelings which the Kafirs entertained with respect to Sir H. Smith, and his proceedings. I must observe, with regard to the first mentioned cause of war, that almost all wars between Europeans and native 23 Diiputn tribes tnav be traced directly or remotely to disputes about kbont Und. land. Tnese disputes generally arise from the encroachments by Europeans on the lands of the natives. These encroach- ments drive away the wild animals, the game of the hunter tribes, and curtail the pastures of the pastoral races : then the native tribes, deprived of their means of subsistence, must cither starve, or encroach upon the lands of neighbouring tribes, and war with them, or rob and assail their European foes. The timid and gentle races lie down and die; the fierce and energetic resist. Sir, among savages few excel the Kafirs in vigour, courage, and audacity ; and thev have often declared that they prefer death by our swords and bullets to death by starvation. Now, we have extended our empire in South Africa, not slowly, not gradually, as our population increased, and the natives decreased, slain by our liquors, diseases, and civilization ; but Sir Plarrv Smith has, within the last five years, extended that empire by huge, gigantic, and extravagant strides. South Africa To explain Sir Harry Sinith''8 proceedings in South Africa, described. I must ask permission to describe in a few words the form and character of our South African empire. South Africa is a lofty and elevated tableland : it projects from the Equator towards the Southern Pole in the shape of a huge promontory, bathed by the Atlantic, Southern, and Indian oceans. From the shores of these oceans the land mounts up by flights of mountain steps to the tableland of the interior. Between these mountain ranges and the Southern and Indian oceans there is a narrow strip of fertile land. There, in former Hotttentoto. timcs, dwclt the tribes of the Hottentots. Just two centuries ago the Hottentots were assailed simultaneously by two most formidable foes. From the north-east came the Kafirs, a negro race, probably with a large mixture of Arab, or rather Caucasian blood. Increasing numbers, or a want of pasture for their cattle, or the attack of hostile and kindred tribes, had compelled them to abandon their homes under the tropics, and, like the Huns and Scandinavian swarms of old, to seek in the south new lands whereon to subsist. One of these swarms, called the Amakosa, under their great chief Togul, wrested from the Hottentots the territory between the Kei and Keiskamma rivers, now known by the name of British Kafraria, the seat of the present war. About the same time, in the year 1650, the Dutch landed at the south- western extremity of Africa, where Cape Town is now situ- ated. The Hottentots, assailed on the one side by the Dutch, and on the other by the Kafirs, were exterminated or enslaved. Finally, Kafir and Dutch, advancing from oi)po8ite direc- Kafirs. Dutch. 23 tions, met in the province of Albany. Tliere a petty warfare ensued) similar to the border warfare of England and Scotland. The Kafir, like the Scot, deemed it a meritorious act to steal the cattle of his foe ; and the Dutch, like the English, were not slow to retaliate. The Dutch Boers, cncamptid in miiitury villages, were able not only to defend tberaeelven, but, as thei:* numbers increased, they gradually nui«^ed the Kafirs back. In 1806 we took final podscssion of the Cape of Good Hope. We soon began to interfere with the border system of the Dutch, and establish military posts on the frontier, with garrisons of regular troops. The imperial expenditure on account of those garrisons attracted very many Europeans to the frontier. The presence of the troons encouraged, facilitated, and hastened the encroachments oi the Europeans on the lands of thcKafirs ; and, on various pleas, we took pos- session of their territories, and claimed authority over their chiefs. The Kafirs resisted, stole the cattle of the colonists, and committed numerous depredations. The colonists retali- ated ; the troops were called out ; and a Kafir war ensued. With the termination of each war we added to our territories, and thus sowed the seeds of more cattle-stealing and more As war followed on war, the Kafirs improved in the ilonlar Wan. Fnglish arrive. Military Foata. Incroa!«n of Tcrrilory. wars. art of war, acquired something of the skill of their opponents, and learnt the use of European weapons. Therefore, succes- sively, every Kafir war has become more formidable than the preceding one, requiring more troops, and costing a larger sum of money. In 1832, as I have already said, our military force in South Africa amounted only to 2,000 men, and our military expenditure for that year was about 100,000^. In 1835 there was a Kafir war, and our military expenditure for that year amounted to 240,000/'. In 1846-7 there was another Kafir war, and the number of troops in South Africa was 6,196 men, and our military expenditure for that year amounted to 685,000^. On the conclusion of that war Sir Harry Smith, with the sanction of the Colonial- office, added to the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, on its north-eastern side, the provinces of Victoria and Albert, containing about 3,600 square miles. Beyond these pro- vinces, still to the north-east, Sir Harry Smith then added to our South African dominions, but not to the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, the territory of British Kafraria, in which the present war commenced, and which contains about 3,900 square miles. Not content with these acquisitions, Sir Harry Smith then crossed the mountains which guarded the northern frontier of the Cape of Good Hope, and took possession of the whole tract of country between them and the Orange River; Victoria; Albert; British Kaf. raria; Nortbarn Desert; 2^ Orange Sovereignty Flying Bt>er8. Increase of OH area of the size of England, containing about 50,000 square territory, milcs of as barren a desert as any on the face of the earth. This desert had made our northern flank secure against the attacks of barbarians. Having uncovered this flank, Sir Harry Smith, still travelling northwards, crossed the Orange River in pursuit of the rebel Boers. These Boers had fled Natal; from Colonial-officc oppression to Natal. There we first permitted them to establish a government. Then we sent our troops to subdue them, and thus added to our dominions 10,000 square miles, situated on a harbourless ocean, with Kafirs on one side, and their kinsmen, the equally warlike Zoolahs, on the other side. The taking possession of this worthless territory was an achievement of a former govern- ment. In consequence of it, the Boers fled again, and crossed the mountains to the plains of the interior. Sir Harry Smith, as I have said, pursued them, and defeated them, and proclaimed the sovereignty of Great Britain over all the plains between the Great Orange River and the Vaal or Yellow River ; an area of about 48,000 square miles, with a frontier of 600 miles, exposed to the incur- sions of the Zoolahs and other tribes of the same origin as the Kafirs. Again, some of the Boers have fled northwards, and crossed the Yellow River, and if we persevere in our policy of pursuing them, we shall have to follow them to the Mountains of the Moon, and to add to our dominions all Africa south of the Equator. Thus Sir H. Smith, with the sanction of the Colonial-ofiice, has since 1847 added 105,000 square miles to 'our South African possessions ; an area nearly equal to that of the united kingdoms j and our South Afri- Extent of cau empire now covers the vast space of 282,000 square miles, Empire. an area equal to the whole of the Austrian empire, including Lombardy, and adding Piedmont to it.* I calculate that on the frontier of this empire there is a line of 1,000 miles, as far as from here to Rome, exposed to the attacks of savages of the same blood as the Kafirs, and as fierce, warlike, and energetic, as the Kafirs, whom Sir H. Smith in his last des- patches describes as the most determined and reckless of barbarians. As yet we have fought only with the Kafirs along a line of 200 miles ; but the same causes which gave birth to wars with the Kafirs are coming into operation along I'lnntierof the wholc of this frontier of 1,000 miles, and are likely, in 1,000 miles, coursc of time, to embroil us with all the native tribes which I have mentioned. I dare not attempt to calculate what it would cost us to defend this frontier with regular troops, in the same manner as we have defended the north-eastern * See Note, page iO. I l%- rl «n 25 frontier of the Cape of Good Hope. To defend thone 200 miles we have spent of late years not leisis than 600,000/. annually. From these data hon. gentlemen nmy cnlculato what the defence of 1,000 miles would cost, To show some of the consequences of tho oncroacliing policy of Sir H. Smith and of the Colonial-ottloo, I will now refer to the blue-book which has last been delivered to us. I open it, and the first subject I see in it is entitled, " Boun- dary Dispute between Dutch Farmers and Tunibookies." I will give the substance of Sir Andries Stockonntrofu'i* account of that dispute. It was about land. Tho land belonged to the Tambookies, a Kafir tribe, who had generally been on friendly terms with us. Prior to Sir Harry Huiith'M arrival on the frontier, in the winter of 1847, this land wm Bituatcd without the colony. The Boers on the frontier momorittlised Sir H. Smith to annex it to the colony, and give it to them. Sir Harry Smith, in a reply written and signed by himeelf, granted the prayer of the memorial. A portion oi the land in question was forthwith measured out for mu\Q of tho Boers, and it so happened that the land so nieafiiured otit be- longed to a chief who had been our ally in tho last war. This, said Sir Andries Stockenstrom, rendered tho governor pro- digiously popular at the time. The Tambookien, however, refused to give up their land. The Boers threatened to expel them, and bitterly complained that they had been deceived by the fine words of the governor. Sir Andrie« Stocken- strom, in his letter of the 1st of July last, addressed to the Colonial Secretary, commented ui)on these proceedings of Sir H. Smith in the following words. Those procceaings were calculated to " set the Boers and Tambookies at mutual slaughter," " to convert Her Majesty's most devoted servants into desperate rebels," and "it was with tho most gloomy forebodings that he (Sir A. Stockenstrom) trembled at the prospect of the almost inevitable consequence of these pro- ceedings." Unfortunately these gloomy forebodings have come to pass. According to the last accounts in this blue- book, these Tambookies have attacked the frontier, eaptured a quantity of cattle, and committed a long list of murders, and the Boers throughout the colony have displayed n, rebel- lious spirit by their " dogged inactivity." The next subject of importance in this book to which I will refer is entitled, *' Excitement throughout Kafirland, by the Prophecies of a Witch-doctor." Sir Harry Smith had assured Lord Grey that he was putting down witchoraft: Sir Harry Smith was not so successful as he thought. Last autumn the belief in witchcraft sprang up again in Knfirland, in consequence of the want of rain. From a long-continued Increase of territory. Tlie Consc- quences. Iloprs and Tuniboo- Uien, Conduct of SirH. Siiiilli. Forebodings of Stockeu- Rtroni. Witch Doc- tor. Want of Knin. 2G Want of drought, the pastures of the Kafirs were burnt up, their cattle win. became skeletons and lost their milk, one of the chief means of subsistence of the Kafirs ; the calves died, the hopes of the future were destroyed, and the suiferings of the Kafirs be- came intense, and produced amongst them feelings of despe- ration and animosity towards us. For before we came among them, when there was a want of rain, the Kafirs used to lead their cattle from the plains to the mountain sides, where water is generally to be found; or they used, by changing their pastures, to follow the rain, for frequently when there was a drought in one part of their territory, rain was falling in another. In consequence of our encroachments, the power of the Kafirs to change their pastures was greatly diminished, Sufrering8of and, consequently, their sufferings from drought greatly the Kafirs, augmented. In former times, I believe, the Kafirs were per- mitted to pasture their herds at certain seasons on the unoc- cupied lands of the provinces of Victoria and Albert, which were then called the neutral ground; but since Sir Harry Smith added these provinces to the colony of the Cape, that permission has been refused. Sir, under the influence of these sufferings, the feelings of the Kafirs towards us are (as the well-informed writer of an interesting tale of the Kafir wars justly observes) the same as those of the Gael to the Saxon, described in the verse of Sir Walter Scott. The They hate Kafir chicf would cxclaim, like Roderick Dhu : — us ; " These fertile plains, that softened vale, Were once the birthright of the Gael. Where dwells he now j * * * Think 'st thou we will not sally forth To spoil the spoiler as we may, And from the robber rend his prey ? While of ten thousand herds there strays But one along yon river's maze, The Gael, of plains and river heir, Shall, with strong hand, redeem his share. " i Cannot be Extemii- nnted. These were the feelings of the Gael, and are the feelings of the Kafir towards us. We subdued and civilized the Gael ; but then their numbers were limited. We cannot subdue and civilize the Kafir races, because their numbers are unli- mited. We may, to use the words of Sir Harry Smith, ex- terminate those on our immediate frontier ; but beyond them are others, and beyond them are innumerable others, extend- ing to the Equator and beyond. In course of time we might exterminate them up to a given line — I mean the line beyond which the European race cannot increase and multiply, and which line intersects the eastern coast a little to the north of Natal ; but beyond that line there are innumerable and pro- S7 ht id o- lific hives of barbarians, whence they will for evor ewnrm forth to attack us with wars perpetual and costly. I will now return to the subjects of the want of rain and witchcraft, the witch-doctor. Tiiere is a belief in Kafirland, m there is in certain parts of this country, that certain ])crHonB called "witches," and certain thinj^s called "bewitching things," can cause injury to human beings, and to cattle, and prevent the falling of rain. The Kafirs also believe that tlierc are certain persons called " witch-doctors," who can dincover witches and " bewitching things." Now, the Kafirs attri- buted the drought of last year to witches, and a great witch- witcii-doc- doctor appeared in British Kafraria. He pretended, lilto Sir 'of. H. Smith, to put down witchcraft. Sir Harry was nmch asto- nished at his pretensions, and, as two of a trade never agree, Sir Harry ordered Colonel Mackinnon to secure this ^l^d»o- met, as he termed him, and to transport him to liobbcn Island. Colonel Mackinnon, however, told Sir Harry that this seizure would cause great irritation among the Kafirs, and would en- danger the tranquillity of the colony ; that there had been nothing mischievous or warlike in the conduct of the witch- doctor ; and that he ought not to be molested. On the other hand, I must state that it was generally believed in the colony that the witch-doctor had prophesied against the Euro- peans, and had attributed to them the sufferings of the Kafirs; and that these prophecies had produced much excitement in Kafirland. Sir Hariy Smith and Colonel Mackinnon, on tho contrary, attributed the excitement in Kafirland to tho cfltbrts Excitement of Sir Harry Smith to overthrow the authority of the native '"kafirland. chiefs. Without attempting to decide whose opinion Wtt8 right, certain it is that great excitement did exist last autumn among the Kafirs in British Kafraria. That excitement pro- duced much alarm among the frontier farmers; that alarm Alarm of was increased by finding their Kafir servants suddenly leave Farmer*, them ; they began, therefore, to take precautions against an attack from the Kafirs; and those precautions, according to Sir Harry Smith, alarmed the Kafirs, who thought that the Boers were going to attack them. In the midst of this alarm and excitement. Sir Harry Smith wrote to Lord Cirey, on Sir H. the 14th of October last, that though " he attached uo inipor- f"^^i^*^'°' tance to this excitement," he would proceed at once to the "^' '"^''' frontier, and, on his arrival, he would report without delay. Accordingly, he wrote to Lord Grey on the 21st of October, and stated that " his Lordship need be under no apprehen- sions of an outbreak," and that a meeting of Kafir chiefs was (.„,], ^^g^_ summoned for the 26th of October, when he, Sir Harry, lugofKnflrs. would explain to them their true position. That meeting V, 28 SlfH. Hmilh'H prO' cvi'iMnifn, Ilcpoups Hnnililli. Sir Hnrry's mlKtakus. (!|-isis rived; ar- Hnppiljr passed. I'.Tfect f|uiet. ■I * K/fieieneyof Kufir police. had very important consequences. The great Gaika Kafir chief, Sandilli, did not attend it. He had been informed that he was accused of being on friendlv terms with the witch- doctor, and he knew that an attempt had been made, by the order of Sir Hurry Smith, to seize the witch-doctor. San- dilli declared that he was afraid of attending the meeting, lest he should be put in prison, for that once before, when he had attended a meeting, he had been put into prison. He there- fore disobeyed Sir Harry Smith's order. Sir Harry imme- diately issued a proclamation, deposing Sandilli from the rank of chief. On the Slst of October Sir Harry announced this event to Lord Grey, and assured the noble Earl that San- dilli possessed neither influence nor respect among his people. Never did Sir Harry Smith make a more incorrect statement. Twice has an attempt to capture Sandilli caused an outbreak of the Kafirs. They rose one and all to defend him last winter, and there is not a man among them who would not gladly rush between a bullet and the person of Sandilli. In the same despatch Sir Harry stated, with reference to the de- position of Sandilli, that '* a crisis had arrived which would test his system," that " he had no apprehension of the result," that the Kafirs " were as fully sensible of their position as the most civilized beings could be," that " every Kafir who pos- sessed anything was a supporter of the present government," and that " if the chiefs had endeavoured to excite the people they had signally failed." In the next despatch, dated the 6th of November, he assured Lord Grey that the crisis had passed most happily, and that therefore he should immediately leave the frontier and return to Cape Town. On his arrival there he wrote again to Lord Grey, on the 26th of November, assuring the noble lord that " he had left British Kafraria in a state of perfect tranquillity, the Kafir people fully satisfied, and the chiefs expressing similar feelings." In the same des- patch there is a passage which deserves the attention of the House, for it j^hows how events have falsified every expecta- tion of Sir H. Smith. In that passage he informed Lord Grey that he was going to organize, in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, a rural police, analogous to the Kafir police, which had been " so remarkably eflScient in British Kafraria."" According to the last accounts, almost every one of the Kafir ])oHGe has deserted to the enemy with their horses, arms, and ammunition. Whereon Sir Harry moralizes in the following strain: — " Thus is again recorded in history another instance of the danger to be ajiprehended from arnnng men from hos- tile populations." And, with this sentiment in his mouth. Sir Harry Smith proceeded forthwith to order the governor \ > \ 29 of Ntttal to arm anil lead into the field, against the Amagaika, sir iiair) s 3000 warriors of the hostile population of the Amazoolah. '"'*'»i*^'»- To return, however, to my narrative, the " perfect tranquil- lity" which Sir Harry Smith described in his despatch of the 26th of November, did not continue long. On the 5th of December he wrote: — " My dear Lord Grey, — The quiet I have reported in Kafirland, and which I had so much and so just grounds to anticipate, is not realized. I start this evening. The moment I reach King William'a-town you shall hear from me." Accordingly, on the 12thof December he wrote again, and assured Lord Grey that •' he perceived little or no difficulty in restoring tranquillity." Lord Grey was delighted at re- ceiving this despatch, for in reply he wrote how " glad he was to learn that all immediate danger of an outbreak was at an Nodunsemf end." Unhappy Lord Grey ! This letter was written on a»">"'break. the 5th of March ; the next day he received intelligence that the outbreak had commenced with fearful violence. It is evident, therefore, that the two persons who ought to have been pre-eminently well-informed on these matters were pre- eminently ignorant. One (Sir Harry Smith) was either stone-blind to all that was going on around him, or this out- break has been caused by his mismanagement. The other (Lord Grey) reposed blind confidence in the wisdom of Sir Harry Smith's arrangements. The next and last despatch to which I shall refer displays, in the highest degree, the blind- ness of Sir Harry Smith. It is dated the 20th of December last, four days before the commencement of the Avar. It begins with an account of a meeting between the T'Slanibie Tsimiibies tribes (who dwell in the neighbourhood of King William's- '^""^''"' town) and Sir II. Smith. He stated that the conduct of the chiefs and tlic feeling of the assembled people were all thnt ho could possibly desire. The chiefs expressed their determina- tion to adhere faithfully to the present order of things, and to obey Her Majesty. According to the last accounts, they have fought against our troops, and intercepted the communica- tions with King William's-town. In the same despatch, Sir Harry stated that he " had received accounts of a very im- proved character as regards the conduct of the Tarn i)ookie Tamimoiiies chiefs, and he looked forward with every confidence to being tranquil. able to restore general harmony and tranquillity." Tlicse are the chiefs about whom Sir Andrics Stockenstrom enter- tained such gloomy forebodings. According to the last accounts they have, as T have already said, attacked our frontier, carried oflP a quantity of cattle, committed a long list of murders, and, I am afraid, Cradock is in great danger «w» 'I 30 Sir Harry's mistakes. Panic of farmers. Colonists loyal. Gaikns con' tented. S.vstemever- lusting. Outbreak. Its cause. Saiidilli. from them. Next, Sir Harry was sorry "to inform Lord Grey that the majority of the farmers on the frontier had abandoned their homes, and removed far into the inte- rior." *' His advice and influence had been exerted to in- duce them to remain," but, " unfortunately they had disre- garded his counsel."" Most fortunate it was for them that they did disregard his counsel — that his advice had no weight nor influence with them — that they did abandon their homes and move far into the interior ; for if they had believed in Sir H. Smith most of them would have been slaughtered. In the same despatch he stated that he was happy to bring under Lord Grey's notice the good and loyal feelings which prevailed among the colonists. According to the Colonial Secretary, they have displayed the most dogged inactivity, and cannot be induced to move to Sir H. Smith's assistance. Lastly, in this same despatch. Sir Harry de- scribes his great meeting with the Gaika tribes, on the 19th of December last, at which 3,000 Kafirs were present. Ac- cording to Sir Harry, the meeting went ofl" in the most satisfactory and gratifying manner. He informed Lord Grey that it was evident that " Sandilli and other Gaika chiefs had endeavoured to excite the people against the present rule ; that they had signally failed ; that the people saw the advantages they derived from the present state of things :" that they were tranquil, contented, and happy ; that he anticipated that his system would be perpetuated ; and he declared that he had "every confidence in the prospect before them." Four days after this despatch was written, the Gaikas rose in arms, defeated Colonel Mackinnon, then surrounded Sir H. Smith in Fort Cox, and then repulsed Colonel Somerset when he attempted to open communications with Sir Harry. Sir, I ask what made the Gaikas rise in arms ? I have said it already — it was the attemj)t to capture Sandilli. Now, one word with regard to Sandilli, who is unfor- tunately too well known to us. He is of the purest Kafir blood. Son of the great Gaika by a wife of the sacred race of the Amatcmbu, he is ninth in descent from the conqueror Togul. Tiie Kafir war, which began in 1846, was rekindled in 1847, in consequence of a dispute between him and Sir H. Pottinger. That dispute arose about tliirteen or fourteen goats which had strayed, or had been stolen, from the colony. Sir H. Pottinger ordered Sandilli to restore them, and to give up the thief. Sandilli did restore twelve goats, but declared he knew nothing about the remainder, nor about the thief, if there was one. Sir H. Pottinger was ^ i -{ t 81 meetings; not sntiMfiod. He sent a secret expedition to capture Sandilli. War of The Kivfirg romo in his defence, and the expedition failed. *®*'' Acconlinjx to Sir H. Smith, "in this bit of a brush with Sandilli 5n,()()()/. were spent on wa{;gon-hire alone." This fact will i^lvo the House some faint idea of the probable expoiiMU or a contest with Sandilli. Sir H. Smith, soon after sir Hurry his arrival in the colony, assembled the Kafirs at King '»"'^'«"': William'M-town. At these meetings, Avhich took place in Decumbur, I H47, and January, 1848, Sir Harry Smith pre- f'""". tended to dciiosc Sandilli from the rank of Great Chief, and """ ' " to apj)olnt hiniHclf the Inkosi Inkulu of the Kafirs. He did 80 with the strangest ceremonies. He described to Lord Grey hii nrocecdmgs on one occasion in the following words:—" Tho Kafirs being arranged in a circle, I rode into the midst of them, bearing in my right hand a sergeant's halbcrt, wull sharpened, the emblem of war; in my left hand a maglo wand, my baton of peace and authority, surmounted with a brass knob. I directed each chief to come forward, and touch whichever he pleased — it was immaterial to me. They all touched the symbol of peace; then each chief kissed my loot, exclaiming ' Inkosi Inkulu.' I then shook hands necomes with each, never having done so before. Three cheers were J"';"*' given ; and thus I commenced the foundation of their social " " " ' condition." At another meeting he made the Kafir chiefs swear " to obey his commands," " to disbelieve in witchcraft," " not to buy wives," and every year to give a fat ox to Her Majesty. On the same occasion he treated the Kafirs to a little conjuring. He had a waggon stationed on an eminence at a considerable distance, with no one whatsoever near it. " Now,'' said Sir Harry to the Kafirs — I quote his own words — " You dare to make war ! You dare to attack our wag- gons I See what I will do if you ever dare to touch a waggon or the oxen belonging to it ! Do you see that waggon, I say? Now hear my word — Fire! (The waggon is blown bio„,<, up a up.) Ah! do you see the waggon now? And you would, waggon; and shall, lu^ blown up with it if you ever again attempt to touch another. So be good, and believe in your father." Sir Harry said, that the astonishment of the Kafirs at this trick was excessive, and so ougiit to have been Lord Grey's when he rend it. Sir Harry also harangued tlie Kafirs in B;»eeches full ol' bombast and rliodomontade, with a mixture iiHrangiies of religion, or rather of blasphemy, beginning with a curse Kafir*. and ending with a prayer, niucli after the fashion of a mock oration of a trooper of Cromwell. Thus, by alternately coaxing ;vn"oci'»'"'p«i- last war ; and throughout the whole of the eastern provinces martial law has been proclaimed. Sir, I fear much that a serious war has commenced, and that ^''»'" "''" •'• it will be a costly one. I have seen in the colonial newspapers *'"*"^" an official notice, calling upon all able-bodied men to enrol, offering them a bounty of 21. for six months' service, with the ominous promise of an additional bounty of U. for every ad- ditional three months'" service. These men are to have Gd. a-day pay, with arms, clothing, and accoutrements, and ra- tions for themselves and families. I do not doubt that all this is necessary, yet I read this notice with great alarm. For I remembered the vast sums which had been expended during the I'.ist war on rations, the fraud and peculation which had attended their distribution, the impossibility of the im- perial government to control the expenditure on account of them. I remembered the statement of Sir H. Pottinger that a few persons on the Kat River had, on the plea of defending the frontier, been receiving rations at the rate of 21,000/. a year, and that a number of Kafirs, while fighting against us, had been receiving rations from us. I read this notice, therefore, with great alarm, and thought what we should have to pay. For pay we must ; because Sir H. Smith and Lord ^^^ ""'"' Grey are responsible for this war. It has broken out in their ^''^' own peculiar kingdom of Britisii Kafraria, which is no part nor portion of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope. It is the consequence of the encroachments which they have sanc- tioned, of their ignorance of the feelings of the Kafirs, and of their frontier system of perpetual and vexatious interference in the affairs of the frontier tribes. That frontier system has completely failed, and Sir Harry Smith, in despair, de- clares, that " what is ultimately to be done with these barba- rians remains a problem." The last question is, what steps ought to be taken to relieve ^^''^«* this country from any expense on account of future wars with j^j^'^^ ^ the Kafirs? It is clear that, first, we must defeat the Kafirs and reduce them to subjection, and pay for so doing. What should we then do? Adhere to the present system of de- fending the frontier by troops at the expense of this country? In 1848 I presumed to warn the House that, under that sys- tem, we should have a Kafir war every three or four years, wit-; a long bill to pay for it ; that there was only one way to save our pockets, and that was to give to the colonists of the Cape of Good Hope the freeest institutions, and the un- 84 Self-nnvrni- meiit nnil selt-det'eiico. Siimmarv. Reduction of military expenditure controlled mnnngement of their local affairs, and especially of their relations with the savage tribes on the frontier. Then we should make them distinctly understand that they must, like the men of our old North American ])lantation8, defend themselves against the savage, and pay the expense of so doing; and, finally, we should withdraw our troops from the frontier, and only retain a garrison in the military station of Cape Town. If the House will not sanction these measures, we must make up our minds to pay roundly, there will be no use in grumbling. We shall to have to pay at least from 600,000/. to 700,000/. a-year for the Cape of Good Hope— a sum exceeding our exports to it. Now, I say that the Cape of Good Hope is not worth that sum of uioney. The only portion of it which is worth anything is a narrow slip of land between barren mountains on one side, and a harbourless sea on the other, the rest being as barren a desert as any on the face of the earth. With free institutions, and the manage- ment of their own affairs, I believe the colonists of the Cape of Good Hope would be slow in embroiling themselves with the savage, and when necessary they would be quite able to defend themselves. A short time ago, they bid defiance to the might of England, and threatened to resist by force of arms any attempt to land convicts on their shores ; let them display similar energy and self-reliance in their wars with the Kafirs, and they will be more than a match for Sandilli and all his followers. I have now concluded my observations with regard to the military expenditure of Great Britain on account of the colo- nies, which are neither military stations nor convict settle- ments. I have attempted to prove that no troops ought to be maintained at our expense, in any one of those colonies, after it has obtained free institutions, except for strictly imperial purposes ; and that it is not just to call upon the people of this country to defray out of their taxes any portion of the exfjense of the troops required for local purposes. I have endeavoured to show that by applying these principles to our North American colonies and West Indian plantations, a considerable reduction might immediately be made in the amount of force which we maintain in these colonies, with an ultimate reduction in our effective military expenditure ■ on account of them to the amount of about 650,000/. a-year. I have also attempted to show, that if we were to give self- government to our colonists in New Zealand and South Africa, a very considerable reduction might ultimately be made in the amount of force which we maintain in these ■' M 35 .: a oulonies, with an ultimate saving to this country of about 550,000/. a-yenr, in effective military expenditure. There- fore, the total saving which I now propose for the considera- tion of the House, would amount to about 1,200,000/. a-year in effective expenditure ; if to this sum be added a propor- tionate amount of the dead weight, the whole saving would in course of time amount to about 1,600,000/. a-year. If ray views with regard to military stations be correct, and were to be acted upon, then a much larger reduction than that which I have mentioned might bo made in our Colonial military expenditure. I have still to mention the civil expenditure of this country on account of the colonies. On this subject I have very little to say ; for it is evident that the principles which I have laid down with regard to colonial military expenditure are equally applicable to colonial civil expenditure ; and if they are cor- rect, it follows that whenever a colony which is neither military station nor a convict settlement has representative institutions, all civil expenses for local purposes ought to be paid by the colony, while all civil expenses for imperial pur- poses ought to be paid by the united kingdoms. In 1846-47 our colonial civil expenditure was 500,000/. Of this sum about 300,000/. were for the clothing, maintenance, and transport of convicts; and 70,000/. were expended on the military stations ; these two sums, therefore, were required for imperial purposes, and It was proper that this country should pay them. Of the remaining 130,000/., 11,000/. were paid to the North American clergy — that charge will cease with the lives of the present clergy ; 14,000/. were paid in the shape of presents to the Indian tribes in Canada ; about 80,000/. were spent in the West Indies in salaries to clergymen, stipendiary magistrates, and governors ; and, lastly, about 20,000/. were spent in New Zealand. It appears to me that the whole of this sum of 130,000/. ought, according to my principles, to be ultimately saved, with the exception of the sum required for the salaries of colonial governors; for, in my opinion, as long as colonial governors are appointed by the imperial Government, they should be looked upon as imperial officers, and, therefore, their salaries should be paid by the united kingdoms. In concluding my observations on our colonial expenditure, I must remark, that in every colony there are many persons w^ho have a strong sinister interest in the amount of imperial expenditure. These persons have made, or expect to make, large gains by contracts, jobs, and by the innumerable other modes of robbing the mother country. They rejoice on every P Hntliictiiii of military expeiuU- tiire. SnviiiK l,fl(M»,0(IO/, a-yuar. Civil expt'iiditiiro Huw speiil. Convifts ; Clergy: Preients ; Mtigiiitrates; Governors. Sinister interests. Siniiter intomt. Hostile to reduction. Return to old polity. Self-govern- ment and self-pay- ment. 36 increase of imperial expenditure. To them a Kafir or a Maori war or a rebellion is a Godsend. I have heard on good authority that in the Canadian rebellion the enormous gains of these persons were equal to the losses of the rest of the community, and that they have been heard to toast the good old times of that rebellion, and the speedy com- mencement of the next. Sir H. Smith has stated in one of his despatches that during the last Kafir war many persons amassed large sums of money ; that the consequences were a redundancy of money at the Cape of Good Hope, with general prosperity, and a tendency to over-speculation. I have heard similar statements with regard to New Zealand. And it is self-evident, that, with an imperial expenditure many times greater than the local revenues of a colony, there must be a fine harvest for the jobbing and peculating tribe, and that noxious race must flourish and multiply. To this class, and it is not an uninfluential one in our modern colonies, any proposal for a reduction of imperial expenditure is in the highest degree distasteful. Corrupted by that expenditure, they have not the feelings of self-reliance and self-respect, which, according to the just remark of Lord Grey, our old colonies displayed in their conflicts with the Indians, and even with the might of France. Many of these unworthy Anglo-Saxons would, in their hearts, prefer Colonial-office despotism, with huge imperial expenditure, to the freeest institutions with imperial economy. We are to blame for this degeneracy, which every high-minded and every right- minded colonist deplores. We are to blame for having departed from our old colonial polity, and demoralized our colonial children by our waste and extravagance. The sooner we return to the old polity the better for them morally, for us pecuniarily ; their character will be elevated and ennobled by becoming self-reliant, and obtaining self-government ; and our money will be saved by bestowing upon them the freeest institutions, and strictly enforcing the maxim — no imperial ex- penditure for local purposes. That maxim is the sum and substance of my first resolution. These resolutions express my idea of the true colonial policy of Great Britain, which is self-government for true colonies, and no imperial expendi- ture except for military stations. With that policy the more true colonies we have, and the fewer military stations we have need of, the richer and more powerful the British empire will be. I move these resolutions in no hostile spirit to the Government, but, on the contrary, to encourage them to pur- sue boldly and vigorously the policy which they have com- menced on the continent of Australia. I ask them to assent M - X ' .^v>J«-i.. ^miif*^^ to this motion. I ask all bonournble members to support it yfho wish to reduce the national expenditure ; for if there be any portion of that expenditure in which a considerable reduction can bo made without injury to the empire, that portion is our colonial expenditure ; and that expenditure can only bo reduced by acting in conformity with the principles contained in the resolutions which I now beg leave to move: — " 1. That it is the of)i' um of this House that steps should Ke»oiutioni. be taken to relieve this country, as speedily as possible, from its present civil and military expenditure on account of the colonies, with the exception of its expenditure on account of military stations or convict settlements. 2. That it is expe- dient, at the same time, to give to the inhabitants of the colonies, which arc neither military stations nor convict set- tlements, ample powers for their local self-government, and to free them from that imperial interference with their affairs which is inseparable from their present military occu- pation." NOTE ON PAGES 4, 5, 6, And in con'ection of an error in an article in the " Edinburgh Review" for April, 1851. Authority for state- ments of CO' lunial ex- penditure. Par. Pa. (224) 1S19. Error of Edinburgh Reviewer. The statements contained in these pages, with reference to the effective colonial military expenditure of Great Britain for the years 1832, 1835, 1843-4, and 1846-7, are taken from a series of Parliamentary papers, the first of which was pre- pared for the committee on colonial military expenditure, which sat in the years 1834-5 ; the last (No. 224, 1849), was ordered for the use of tlie committee on army, navy, and ord- nance expenditure, which sat in the years 1848, 1849, and 1850. Asa member of this committee I had ample means of inquiring into the details of the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain ; I carefully examined the estimates of this expenditure under its various heads in the army, ordnance, and commissariat estimates; I 'compared these estimates for several years, with the returns of the expenditure ; and I ar- rived at the conclusion, that the Parliamentary paper (224), 1849, gives, with considerable accuracy, the effective colonial military expenditure of Great Britain for the year 1846-7. This paper has unfortunately escaped the notice of the writer of an article on the colonies, in the number of the Edinburgh Keview for April, 1851. In that article the Reviewer alludes to a speech of mine delivered in 1848, and quotes the Parlia- mentary paper, dated April 27, 1849, (239), as authority for his statements of the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain, and for his assertion that, since 1843-4, this expendi- ture '* has been greatly reduced " (page 485). This assertion is quite at variance with mine, in page 4, in which I aiBrm, that in 1846-7, our colonial military expenditure exceeded by 500,000/. the expenditure for 1843-4. I do not know what it was in the intervening years, for, in consequence of the difficulty of making out the returns, the order of the House of Commons, that it should be made out for every year since 1835, has been disobeyed, except for the years 1843-4 and 1846-7. The Reviewer s Parliamentary paper is a useful 89 ■i {< i I and, I believe, correct return. I relied upon it nis my autho- Error of rity for the distribution of the troops in the colonies in the Edinburgh year 1846-7, and it confirmed me in the belief of the general i^«*'«^" accuracy of the Parliamentary paper (224) 184D, upon which, as I have already observed, all my stfttements of colonial military expenditure in 1846-7 are founded. If the Reviewer's Parliamentary paper were such as ho supposed it to be, it would return the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain for 1846-7, at 2,170,000^,, or 830,000^. less than I have stated it to have been. The discrepancy between my statements and those of the Reviewer is easily accounted for. The Reviewer's Parliamentary paper contains, its cause, not as he supposed, a return of the wlmU colonial military expenditure of Great Britain, but only of the portion of the expenditure which the House of Commons ordered to be returned in that paper. The title of the Reviewer's paper is a return not of the " colonial military/ expenditure of Great Britain^'' (which is the title of Parliamentary paper No. 224, 1849,) but of ^Hhe cost for pay m well at commissariat expenses'^ of her Majesty's troops stationed in the colonies. This return contains, therefore, only the eOBt of the first of the five items of colonial military expenditurei which I have enumerated in page 5. For that item, namely the net cost, (after deducting colonial contributions) of the pay, clothing, and maintenance of troops, I put down for 1 846-7, 2,100,000?., or about 70,000?. less than the gross cost of that item, according to the Reviewer's paper. The four other Omission of items of colonial military expenditure of which the Re- e^Ji'ndTre! viewer has taken no account, are military establishments, ordnance stores, military works and repairs, and transport of troops. In 1846-7, the first of these items cost about 280,000?., the second about 140,000?., the third about 330,000?., and the fourth about 110,000?.; and their total cost in 1846-7, was about 860,000?, This sum is about Amount, the difference between the amount of the effective colo- ^^^°»o"^- nial military expenditure of Great Britain, as stated by the Reviewer on the authority of what he mistook to be a complete return of that expenditure, and the amount as stated by myself, on the authority of what the chair- man of the committee on army, navy, and ordnance ex- penditure obtained for the use of that committee, as a complete return of the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain. I believe both of these Parliamentary papers rre accurate within a limit of error of probably from five to ten per cent., and within the same limit of error I believe my statements of the colonial expenditure of Great Britain Ignorance of Colonial- office. Its returns likely to mislead. 40 are likewise correct. I must, however, observe, that there is great difficulty in obtaining accurate statements from the Colonial-office on the subject of colonial expenditure. The chief functionaries of that office are very ill-informed on that subject. For instance, on the 10th April last, Mr. Hawes made, in reply to me, precisely the same erro- neous statements with regard to the amount of the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain as the Edinburgh Re- viewer has made ; and Mr. Hawes quoted, as his authority, the same Parliamentary return as that quoted by the Re- viewer. This return was presented to the House of Com- mons by Mr. Hawes himself, and had been made up at the Colonial-office probably from estimates; though substanti- ally correct, it was likely to lead persons unacquainted with the details of colonial military expenditure into erroneous conclusions with regard to the total amount of that expenditure. The return upon which I have chiefly relied was furnished by the Treasury, and made up from the accounts of monies paid by the commissariat officers, who are the bankers of Great Britain in the colonies. f 1 NOTE ON PAGE 24. Authority for extent of South African empire ; The statements contained in this page, with regard to the area of our South African Empire, were given to me by my friend Mr. Wyld, the Member for Bodmin; and from his maps, and those presented to Parliament, I calculated the extent of the frontier of that empire. In a debate in the House of Commons on the Kafir war, on the 14th April last, my statement that " on this frontier there is a line of 1,000 miles exposed to the attacks of savages of the same blood as the Kafirs," was contradicted ; and it was asserted that there are no Kafirs in the vicinity of Natal, that the Zoolahs are not Kafirs, and that the Zoolahs are a peaceful race, from whom no attacks need be apprehended. All these assertions are For length crroncous. For according to the maps which I have men- of frontier; tioucd, ou the north-eastcm frontier of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope there is a line of about 200 miles, along which we are now fighting with the Amakosa and the Amatembu ; on the southern frontier of Natal there is a line of about 120 miles exposed to the Amaponda ; on the northern frontier of Natal there is a line of about eighty miles exposed to the .#j«-% 41 i • Amazoolah ; on the northern and western frontiers of the Orange sovereignty there is a line of about 600 iniica along the Vaal River, exposed likew^ise to the Amazoolah, and kindred tribes. The extent of these four frontiers is, there- fore, about 1,000 miles. According to Prichard, and every FoniescHp- other writer of repute on the subject of the races of men, uU the "<"» «>• tribes who dwell along these frontiers belong to the great """^'^ ''"'^'"" South African race of negroes; they all speak dialects of the same language, can generally understand each other, are very warlike ; and the more northern and central tribes, especially the Amazoolah, possess a considerable amount of military organisation/ The name " Kafir " is not used by MeaninR any of them; for it is an Arab word, applied by the Arabs to of word all the South African negroes, and generally to all nations '^"'''■• who are not of the faith of Mahomet. Our South African colonists have confined the meaning of the name " Kafir " to the tribes with which they first came in contact on the north-eastern frontier ; namely, to the Amakosa, the Ama^ tembu, and the Amaponda ; the latter dwell on the southern frontier of Natal, and therefore there are in the vicinity of that settlement Kafirs in the limited sense of that name, as used by the colonists. And lastly, the Amazoolah are a very zooiaiis warlike race ; within the last half century, under their ruler very Chaka, they have been a conquering people, and their con- ^n"""!""- quests produced great commotions and movements of tribes in South Africa ; they drove out of Natal the tribes wo call the Fingoes ; and then attacked, and would have destroyed the Amakosa, if we had not come to their assistance. Under Dingaan the Amazoolah fought with the Boers, both in the Orange Sovereignty and in Natal, and at first inflicted great losses on the Boers. Finally, under Panda tliey have been a constant cause of apprehension to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal ; and, according to the last accounts, the feor of an attack from the Zoolahs has prevented him from sending, to the assistance of Sir Harry Smith, any portion of the fugitive Zoolahs who now reside under our protection in Natal. RICHARDS, 100, ST. MAHTIN'h LANK.