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 /(.p 
 
 
 
y 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 or 
 
 MR. CALIIOUI, OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 
 
 OM THE nESOLUTlONB 
 
 GIVING NOTICE TO GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 OF THE 
 
 ABROGATION OF THE CONVENTION OF JOINT OCCUPANCY. 
 
 Drlivrrrd in thk Sk.natk or thk United States, March 16, 1846. 
 
 
 1 
 
 Mr. CALHOUN, being ontitled to the floor, rose and addressed the Senate ; 
 The question under consideration is, whether notice shall be given to Great 
 Britain that the convention of joint occupancy between us and her shall ter- 
 minate at the end of the year. To that question, and those immediately grow- 
 ing out of it, I shall confine my remarks. I shall say nothing in reference to the 
 title to Oregon. Having been connected with the negotiation in its early stages, 
 it would be indelicate on my part to discuss the .abject of title. I shall. abstain 
 ft-om all personalities and every thing calculated to wound the feelings of others ; 
 but shall express myself freely, fuUy, and candidly on all the subjoctis on M'hich 
 I may touch, in the course of my remarks. With these prefetory obsen-ations, 
 I ; hidl proceed at once to the discussion of the question of notice. 
 
 There is one point in which all must be agreed ; that a great change has taken 
 place since the commencement of this session in reference t j :!Oti>'.e, in its bear- 
 ings u|K)n the question o^ peace and war. At that time, notice was a ques. 
 tion of the first inugnitudo, on Uie decision of which, to allappeara. cc, depended 
 the question of ponce or war; but now it is one of oomparativ"'ly Minor Import- 
 ance, and may be decided any way, witlio . any decisive eflect on either. The 
 cause of this* cluin<je will i>e explained in the course of my remarks. So great, 
 indeed, has been the change that it has not only rendered inapplicable the rea. 
 sons urged in the Ine.J5sng(^, re<H>mmending notice to l>e given, but has altered 
 materially the position of the KxorutJve, and that of the several parties iu the 
 Senate to whic^ it has {liveu origin, a3 I shall next proceed to show. 
 
 That the reconimciidatioa of the message is founded on the conviction that 
 there was no hope of (•oin^)ro<uise of the ditTicuitiejj growing out of the Oregon 
 question, is too clear to a<irait of any rational doubt. Its liuii^^age is express. It 
 .states in so many worris tli(> conviction, that no compromise could be offectod which 
 ought to l)c rtcrepted. On that conviction it announces that the offer which had 
 been made to the British minister to settle the controversy on the 4!)th parallel 
 of liititudf h;id been witliirawn after it^' rejection, and our title to the whole as- 
 .serted. On thr s;imc CKiiviclion, if recommends. to Congress to give the notice in 
 order to annul the convention wiih the view to remove all impediments to the as- 
 sertion of our rif^lil to the whole of the territory. Assuming, then, that there 
 would lie no compromise, it informs us that, at the Expiration of the twelve months, 
 a period would arrive when our title to the territory must bo abandoned or Srmljf 
 
 T«wcr k^iriiiter ,tJuUi airMi ,«ouih of i'cDDsjivania Avenue. 
 
 r. ^ V J 
 
maintained ; and that noitliorour honor nor our interest M-onld permit us to abandon 
 ii; in other words, that wo must tiien nnsert our exclusive sovereignty to the 
 whole, to the exclusion of that of CJroiit Britain, unless the latter should, in the 
 interval, abandon its claims to the territory. Throughout the whole recommenda- 
 tion there is not the sliglitost intimation that any compromise is expected. On 
 the contrarj', the very opposite is constantly assumed, 
 
 But it is alleged that the reasons tor believing that there could be no compro. 
 raise was derived from the evi.'i uce which the negotiation itself furnished, and 
 especially by the n^jection of the offer to compromise on 4'J^. Such I admit to bo 
 the case, and also thiit it may be iiiirly inli'rred, if England should renew on her 
 part the proposition rejected hy her minister, or one substantially the same, our 
 Executive would ac((>pt the otier, and settle by com])roniise the conflicting claimH 
 to the territory. Jbit the message intimates nowhere tlu; slightest e\|)ectation 
 that such an otP'r would bo made, or, if made, that any com|)romise could be 
 etlccted. 
 
 Such is the view which I have lieen constrained to take, afler a most careful 
 and candid examination of the portion of the message recommending notice; and 
 such, I inti'r, is Ihc view taken by the |)ortion of the Senate who believe our title 
 to the whole territory to i)e clear and unquestionable. On no other vitnv can 
 their warm and decided su|)port of notice lie explained. They not only believe 
 thf>t olir title is clear and nn()uestionable to the whole, but also that the honor of 
 the country demands that it should be asserted and maintained by an apjieal to 
 arms without the surrender of any part. Acting on this conviction, it is manifest 
 that they can only support notice on the belief that it would not lead to compro- 
 misc. On the opposite, they would be compelled to oppose it. 
 
 Such, also, would seem to be the vit'w taken of the message by the commu- 
 nity at large at the time, if we may judge from the tone of the public press, or 
 what perhaps is a still truer index — the conduct of our intelligent business men. 
 
 The message had a most decided effect in that respect. Stock., of every de- 
 scription fell, marine insurances rose, commercial pursuits were suspended, and 
 our vessels remained inactive at the wharves. 
 
 Such, also, was the view taken by a great majority of that portion of the Senate 
 who were opposed to giving notice, and among whom I include myself. We op- 
 posed it on grounds directly the reverse of those on which those who believed our 
 rights to the whole territory to be clear and unquestionable supported it. 
 
 They supported notice because they believed there neither ought to be or would 
 be any compromise. We, on the. contrary, opposed it because we believed there 
 might be, and ought to be, compromise. Theyopposed compromise because, as 
 has been stated, they believed our title to be perfect to the whole ; while we sup- 
 jKJrted it because we believed the title of neither to the whole to be clear and indis- 
 putable ; and that the controversy might be adjusted by a fair partition of the terri- 
 lory. With such impression, we believed that two such powerful and enlightened 
 countries as the United States and Great Britain, woukl not resort to arms to set- 
 tie a controversy which might be peacefully and honorably settled by negotiation 
 and compromise. 
 
 Entertaining this opinion, we were compelled to oppose notice, W-cause it was 
 necessary to prevent an appeal to arms, and instire the pcacefiil settlement of the 
 question. By defeating it, a breathing time wonH at least be afforded to both 
 parties for calm and mature reflection, under the influence of which it was hoped 
 that negotiation might bo renewed, and the cKflercnce honorably compromised. 
 Or, in case that should &il, things might remain as they have been without a re- 
 sort to force. In that caso, the territory woukl be left open to emigration, and 
 the question, to whom it should ultimately belong, would be decided b} settle- 
 ment and colonization, unless Great Britain should give notice on her part, in 
 order to prevent it. If she shouki, we would at least gain the advantage of tran*- 
 ferring the responsibility &om us to heri ehotild war encue> 
 
 An( 
 notice 
 deve 
 elude 
 the m 
 
8 
 
 lis to abandon 
 Mgnty to the 
 should, in the 
 rccommenda. 
 tpected. On 
 
 t' nn compro. 
 irnishcd, and 
 I admit to bo 
 ''iii'w oil her 
 ho saini", our 
 ictinff rlaims 
 '■ oxpecfation 
 lise could be 
 
 most careful 
 ; notico ; and 
 ievc our titlo 
 er vi(!w can 
 only liclievo 
 tho honor of 
 an appeal to 
 t is manifest 
 i to compro. 
 
 the comma- 
 ilic press, or 
 siness men. 
 !)f every de- 
 pended, and 
 
 rthe Senate 
 If. We op. 
 believed our 
 ortod it. 
 be or would 
 lieved there 
 because, as 
 lile we sup- 
 tr and indis- 
 ^f the terri- 
 enlightened 
 irms to set- 
 negotiation 
 
 a»«e it was 
 ment of the 
 tied to both 
 was hoped 
 nproinised. 
 ithout a re- 
 ration, and 
 I by settle, 
 ler part, in 
 {eoftran** 
 
 Another portion of the Senat* appeared to be in favor both of compromise and 
 notice. Their views wore not e.\|)licitly expressed ; but, as for as they were 
 developed, ibey, too, seemed to think that our title was not so perfect as to ex- 
 clude ail hoiioralile compromise, and appeared to anticipate it in opposition to 
 tho iiiessiijre in recommending it on the three following grounds: first, on the 
 ground of the gcnernl declaration ofthe President in the latter part of the message, 
 that he hoped an amieab'.e arrangement may be made ofthe question in dispute, 
 in conni'xi(jn with a declaiation of Mr. Buchanan to the same effect, in one of 
 his letters to Mr. Pukeiiham. It is impossible for me, with every disposition to 
 siip|)orf the recomniendation of the President in favor of notice, to concur in the 
 opinion that a merf general expression of the kind, and inserted in another por- 
 tion ofthe message, even when backed by a similar declaration ofthe Secretary 
 of State, could he liiirly construed to overrule the opinion clearly and explicitly 
 expressed by the mes-age in reeominending notice, that no compronriise which 
 ought to be av(!e])fe(i could b(> efiected. I cannot admit of such a construction, 
 not only because I think it unreasonable, but because I regard the duty ofthe 
 President, imposed by the Constitution, to recommend measures to Congress, as 
 one of a solemn <haiacler, and that it ought to be performed with the utmost 
 candor and sincerity. IJeing addressed to a co-ordinate department ofthe govern- 
 ment, it ought to express i)lain!y and explicitly his reasons and motives for re- 
 commending the measure, omitting none which he regards as material, and in- 
 serting none Itut such as he l)elieves ought to have an influence upon the deliber- 
 iitions of Congress. It ought to be free from the suspicion of being diplomatic. 
 To admit the contrary, would destroy all conlidence between the legislative and 
 executive. de])artments to the great detriment of the government. With these 
 imi)ressions, it would be to disparage the character ofthe President for me to concur 
 in tli(f construction. 
 
 The next ground tiiken by a portion of the Senate referred to is, that notice 
 is recommended to be given by the message, not with the view of giving power 
 to the President to assert our rights to the whole territory, but as a moral weapon, 
 to f nfltrce com|)rf)mise. 
 
 To this construction I have the same difTicidty in assenting as to the preceding. 
 There is nothing in the language ofthe recommendation to authorize it. On the 
 contrary, every word it contains looks expressly, as has been stated, to the en- 
 forcement of our rights to the territory on the expiration of the notice. To 
 give a contrary interpretation would he to give a diplomatic character to the mes- 
 sage, and be subject to all the objections which have been just suggested. 
 But admitting that it was intended, as alleged, as a moral weapon to effect 
 compromise, I would ask, how could that be effected, but by using it as the means 
 to intimidate Great Britain — to intimidate, by telling her that she must quit the 
 territory within the year, or bn expelled at its expiration by force ? And what 
 would that be but an appeal to her fear, with the hope of extorting concessions 
 which her reason had refused to yield ? Such an appeal in case of a feeble 
 nation would Ims hazanlous ; but in that of one as great and powerful as England, 
 instead of a weapon to enforce a comprr»misc, it would be one calculated to defeat it. 
 
 Tho remaining reason for voting notice on the part ofthe Senators referred to, 
 is of a very different character. It objects to the convention itself^ and con- 
 demns tho policy of entering into either that of 1818 or 1827, on the ground that 
 instead of being the means of securing and perpetuating our rights in the terri- 
 tory, they have had the Tcry reverse cfft'ct, to weaken instead of strengthen our title 
 to the territory. My opinion, I must say, is precisely the opposite. It would, in> 
 deed, have been desirable to have settled it then by a compromise on the 49th paral- 
 ' lei of latitude ; but that, as is well known, was impossible at the time. The offer, in 
 &ct, was made on our sid e, but rejected on the part of Great Britain. The re- 
 jection lefl no other alternative but an appeal to arms, or a surrender of our rights 
 to the territory, or to enter into the convention. To do nothing would have beea 
 
.to acquiesce in tho claims of Great Britnin, wlu)sc sulyects wore then in actua! 
 pmsesaion. Her possession, being adverse to ours, would have been gradually 
 oiaturing, through the long inter>pning period, into a title too perfect to bo oppo- 
 ■ed by ours. To avoid that, we were compelled to resort to force, or enter into 
 a convention to preserve our rights. We wisely preferred tho latter, and the 
 oonventions of 1818 and 1H27 were tho consequence of that preference. They 
 ■were entered into for tho two.fold objects, as substitutes for war> and the means 
 . of preserving our rights to the territory, as they then stood, unimpaired. To appre- 
 ciate the wisdom of the policy, it must be borne in mind that at that time our 
 means of asserting our rights to the territory or of acquiring possession were ex- 
 ceodingly limited, compared to those of (Jreat Kritain, but that they were steadily 
 and rapidly increasing. Those who had the management of affairs at that period 
 wisely relied uj)on time and the rapid spread of population in a weistern direc> 
 tion, as tho means ultimately of acquiring possession of the territory, and entered 
 into the convention with a view of preserving our rights unimpaired until they 
 could operate with full eflect. 
 
 It is but too common of late to condemn the acts of our pnMlecessors, and to 
 pronounce them unjust, unwise, or unpatriotic, from not adverting to the circum- 
 stances under which they acted. Tlius to jtidge, is to do great injustice to the 
 wise and patriotic men who preceded us. In this case, it is to condemn such 
 men as Monroe, Rush, Clay, and (iallatin — all of whom had an agency in di- 
 recting or conducting the negotiations which terminated in the adoption of these 
 conventions. It would be hard to pronounce men like them to have been un- 
 wise or unpatriotic ut what they did, or to pronounce President Jackson and 
 others aftci him so, because they acquiesced for many years under the operation 
 of the convention of 1837, when they could have terminated it at any time by 
 giving a year's notice. I have not named the most prominent individual con- 
 cerned in directing these negotiations, because his course on thie occasion has, in 
 my opinion^ cancelled any previous credit in that connexion to which he would 
 have been otherwise entitled. 
 
 Such was the state of things at the commencement of the session, when the 
 President recommended notice to be given totomiinato the joint occupancy; and 
 such the position and grounds assumed by the several portions of the Senate in 
 reference to tho notice. Since tl-en, as has been stated, there has been a great 
 change, which has matorialJy afleotfHi the question of notice, and tlie position 
 taken by the difTerent portions of the body in reference to it, as I shall next explain. 
 
 Public opinion has had time to develop itself, not only on this, but on the other 
 side of the Atlantic ; and that opinion has pronounced most audibly and clearly 
 in favor of compromiao. The development has l)een going on not only in the 
 community, Imt also in thin htxly ; and J now feel that I haKard nothing in say- 
 ing, that a large majority of the .Senate is in favor of terminating the controversy 
 by negotiation, and an honorable compromise. And what is very material, the 
 opinion of the British Government on the subject of' compromise has been more 
 cleariy and specifically developed than when the message was transmitted to 
 Congress ; so much so that there ix ground to hope that it is prepared to adjust 
 the difference in reference to the territory iHibstantially on the basis which M'as 
 offered by the President. It seems to mo iro|)ossiblt< that any other construction 
 nan be given to what Sir R. Peel said in rrtply to the question put to him by 
 Lord John Kiuseil. His declaration was made under circumstances calculated to 
 give it great weight. The object of making it was clearly not to censure the able 
 and very faithful representative of Great Britain in this country, but to use the 
 oc(!a«ion to give assurance that he is ready to make a compromise, as it may be 
 inferred, substantially on tht* basis of the rejected offer. I trust sincerely that 
 such is tho interj)retation which our Government has put upon it; and that, rs- 
 garding it as a direct step towards compromise, it has met it with a step on our 
 
) then in actual 
 been gradually 
 tbct to 1)0 oppo' 
 0, or enter into 
 hitter, and the 
 erejico. They 
 and the mcaDH 
 ed. To appre- 
 t that time our 
 ^ssion were ex- 
 y were steadily 
 i at that period 
 western direc- 
 ry, and entered 
 ired until thoy 
 
 lessors, and to 
 
 to the circum- 
 
 injiistice to the 
 
 condemn such 
 
 agency in di- 
 
 iption of these 
 
 have been un- 
 
 Jackson and 
 
 the operation 
 
 t any time by 
 
 iidividual con. 
 
 rasion has, in 
 
 liich he would 
 
 on, when the 
 ;upancy; and 
 the Senate in 
 been a great 
 I tlie position 
 next explain. 
 t on the other 
 y and clearly 
 t only in the 
 »thing in say- 
 e controversy 
 materiaJ, the 
 IS been more 
 ransmittcd to 
 ired to adjust 
 8 which wais 
 construction 
 ut to him by 
 calculated to 
 sure the able 
 tut to use the 
 as it may be 
 inccreiy that 
 md that, r«- 
 stcp on our 
 
 part, by suitable instructions to our minister in that country. It is to be hoped 
 that a comuiunication has already been transmitted to that effect, which may hare 
 the effect of removing what would seem to be the only material difficulty in the 
 way »fttn adjustnietit ; that is which shall makt; the first step towards resuming 
 the negotiation. 
 
 As things now stand, 1 no longer consider it as a question, whether the con- 
 troversy shall he pacifieiilly arranged or not, nor even in what manner it shall 
 be arningod. I regard the airangenr.'ut now simply a question of time, and I do 
 frust that, in concluding it, there will lie no unnecessary delay. The business of 
 both countries, and of coinriierce generally, requires that it should be concluded 
 as proni|)tly as possiible. 'j'here is still another and a higher reason why it should 
 be speedily settled. Tlio question is one of a momentous and delicate character, 
 and like all such, should he settled in order to avoid adverse contingencies with 
 the least |>raeticai)le delay. A further inducement for despatch in settling the 
 Oregon question is, that upon it depends the settlement of the question with 
 Mexico. Until the former is settled, there is but slender prospect that the latter 
 can he ; for so long as the Oregon question is left open, Mexico will calculate the 
 chances of a rupture between us and (ireat Britain, in the event of which she 
 would ho prepared to make common cause against us. But when an end :? put 
 to any such hope, she will sj)eedily settle her diffl'rence with us. I trust that 
 when we come to settle it, we will deal generously with her, and that we will 
 ()rove ourselves too jii.st and magnanimous to take advantage of her feeble con- 
 dition. 
 
 It is this great change in favor of the prospect of settling the controversy ia 
 reference to Oregon honorably, by negotiation and compromise, which has occur- 
 red since the comuienceiuent of the session, that has made the great difierence 
 in the importance of the hearing of notice on the question of peace and war. 
 What then was apparently almost hopeless, may be now regarded as highly pro- 
 bable, unless there should be some great mismanagement; but just as compro- 
 mise is more hopeless, notice becomes more important in its bearings on the rela- 
 tions of peace and war; and on the other hand, just as the chances of compro- 
 mise are increased, notice becomes less important ; and hence its importance at 
 the commencement of the session, and its comparatively little importance now. 
 
 I shall next proceed to inquire what bearing the increased prospect of compro- 
 mise has on the position of the Executive, and that of the several portions of this 
 body, in refereiu'e to notice, and the Oregon question generally. That it is 
 calculated to effect materially the position of the Executive must be apparent. 
 That he should recommend giving notice to terminate the convention of joint oc- 
 cupancy of the territory, with a view of asserting our exclusive sovereignty to the 
 whole, according to h view of our title, when there was little or no hope of com- 
 promise, is not at all inconsistent with his })eing prepared to adjust the difference 
 by compromise, substantially on the grotmd offered by himself| now when there 
 is a reasonable prospect it may be effected. Measures of policy are necessarily 
 controlled by circumstances, and consequently what may be wise and expedient 
 nrtder certain circumstances, might be eminently unwise and impolitic under dif- 
 ferent circimistances. To persist in acting in the same way under circumstances 
 essentially different, would be folly and obstinacy, and not consistency. True 
 consistency, that of the prudent and the wise, is to act in conformity with circumstan- 
 ces, and not to act always the same way under a change of circumstances. There 
 is a prevalent error on this point. Many think that the very essence of consis. 
 tency is to act always the same way — adhering to the same party, or to the same 
 measures of policy, without regard to change of circumstances. Their consis- 
 tency is like that of a physician, who, in the treatment of a highly inflammatoiy 
 fever, would administer emetics and calomel, not only at the beginning, but at 
 -every subsequent stage of the disease. It is the consistency of a quack. 
 
6 
 
 which would bo suro to kill tho |)ationt. Tlio |)iiltlic iTwn who would ho coiisig. 
 tent in the sanio way would ho hut a political (|na(k, and in diiniirorous (•n«i"'., hi;* 
 prescription would he not less fatal. If then the Ivveciitive is now really In iiivor 
 of compromise, notwithstanding the strong lan<."in{ie used in his nicssuge recom. 
 Dicnding notice, of which I have no inlorniiilion that is not coninion to all, it ought 
 not to subject him to the charge of iiiconsislen(ry, but frliouhl be. put down to the 
 change of circumstances to which 1 have adverted. 
 
 That it is also calculated to allvr the |)ositioiis taken by the dillerent porMons 
 of the Senate, in reference to notice, is no less <-ertain ; and that my friends (for 
 such I will call them) who go for the whole of Oregon, must, I am sure, leello 
 be the case with them. They cannot, I am con/idcnt, liine the same interest in 
 notice now, when there is great reasoii to believe that fhe dilli'rence vill be <'oni. 
 promised with or without notic(>, as they hnd when there was no ho|)e of compro- 
 miae. It is clear, that under such change of circumst:ui(-es, llie reason li)r giving 
 notice with them has, in a great measure if not altogelher, ceased, so that I should 
 not be surprised to find their votes cast iigainst it. 
 
 But I trust that the change has gone furtlier, iind that they, by this time, begin to 
 aee that there are some doubts as to our title to the w hole of Oregon lieing clear am) 
 unquestionable. It cannot, at least, be regarded as unqiiestionai)le, alier it has been 
 questioned s.o frequently and with such ability during ibis discussion. Hut if their 
 opinion remains unchanged as to the clearness (jf our title, 1 jHit it to them whether 
 there is not some delerencc due to the o|)inion of tli(\ great niiijority of the Senate 
 who entertain different views? Is there not something due to the tiict, that fhc 
 majority even of their own political trituids, whose patriolism and intelligence they 
 cannot regard as inferior to their own, think thai our title is not so clear but that 
 a compromise might be honorably efli'cted ? 'J'o put a still stnmger <]uestion, I 
 ask them, as patriots and friends of Oregon, whether the fact itself of so great a 
 division, even among ourselves, does not alli)rd strong reason why th(> controversy 
 should not be settled by an appeal to fon;e? Are they willing, iis wise and pa- 
 triotic men, desirous of securing the whole of Oregon, to place the country 
 in conflict with so great ji power as England, when the united support and zeah 
 ous co-operation of all would be indispensable to su])port the coinitry in the 
 contest? I appeal to them, in the humbler character, as party men, whether 
 they are justified in persisting to push a course of policy which, whether it should 
 end in war or not, must terminate in the division and distraction of their party? 
 
 Without pursuing this branch of the subject further, I shall conchide what I had 
 to say in reference to it, by saying that I, for one, G>vl and ackncnvledge the change, 
 Nothing could have induced me to vote for notice, in ariy form, while there was 
 apparently no hope of compromise ; but now that there is, 1 am dispos(>d to do so, 
 if it should be properly modified. 
 
 I am thus brought to the (piestion under consideration, to which all the preced- 
 ing remarks were but preliminary — shall notice be given to (Jrciit ]?ritian to tenmi- 
 nate the convention of joint occupancy ? After what has been said, a few words 
 will suffice to dispatch it. 
 
 The question is not free from doubt. Afler a review of the whole ground, I can 
 discover but two reasons in favor of giving it. The first is, to put an end to tho 
 agitation of the Oregon question, which, without it, may run into the next presi- 
 dential election, and thereby become mon; diflicult of adjustment than ever. Tho 
 other is the apprehension, that the Government of (neat Britain may wait tho 
 final action of Congress in reference to notice before it will move on the subject. 
 Were it not for such apprehension, I would be disposed to postpone notice for 
 <he present. 
 
 The next question is, in what form should it he given, if given at all ? I, for 
 one, can, under no circumstances, vote for absolute notice, although I admit it 
 would be less dangerous now than when recommended by the message. I can- 
 
 f 
 
voiild ho. consig. 
 (M'oiis cnxcs, his 
 
 V ifully ;n liivnr 
 uicMsufic rt|coiii. 
 n to nil, it ought 
 put clow n to the 
 
 illtTpnt por'ions 
 niy liicnds (for 
 am sure, li'»>| to 
 <ain<' iiilciTst in 
 CO V ill \n\ coni- 
 io|)i^ of cnnipro. 
 ■aHoii tor ffiviiip 
 so that I should 
 
 s time, JM'friii to 
 l)ciii<; clear and 
 ilh'r it has lu'cn 
 1. I5iit if their 
 ) them \i liethor 
 
 V of the Senate 
 ic tiut, that the 
 tellip-nce they 
 ) clear Init that 
 ifrcr (|Mestion, 1 
 f of so jrreat a 
 he controversy 
 s uise and pa- 
 •c the country 
 )port and zeal- 
 oinitry in the 
 men, whether 
 ether it should 
 their party ? 
 
 ide \vhat I had 
 tfe the change, 
 ii!e there was 
 losed to do so, 
 
 ill tlie preced- 
 ritian to teimi. 
 I, a few words 
 
 ground, I can 
 an end to the 
 lie next presi- 
 
 in ever. The 
 may wait the 
 
 n the subject. 
 
 )ne notice for 
 
 at all ? I, for 
 Ligh I admit it 
 sage. 1 can- 
 
 
 
 not coHHcnt to give a vote which might Ite construed to imply, that there was no 
 hope of compromise, and which might, if given in that form, leave a doubt in the 
 public mind as to the real opinion of the Senate in n^fereiice to compromise. 
 
 Nor can I vote tor notice in the tiirm which has been sent to uh from the other 
 House. I ol)jecf to it as ecpiivocal. If the resolution means simply to declare 
 that the President maysi'ttle the controv<M'.sy by compromise, it means nothing, us 
 the President has that right under the ('onstitution, and can neither be clothed 
 or divested of it by the authority of ('ongress. Hut if it be intended as a hint to 
 him to settle the qu(<stion by negotiation and co[n|)roinise, I object to it for not 
 plainly saying so. I am utterly opjHJsed to all ecpiivocation, or obscure expres- 
 sions, in our public acts. We are bound to say |)lainly what we mean to say. 
 If we mean negotiation and eom|)romise, let us say it distinctly and plainly, in- 
 stead of sending to the President a resolution on which he may put whatever in- 
 terpretation he |)leases. 
 
 If we give notice at all, it seems to me, for the reasons just stated, it should bo 
 substantially as has beitn proposed by the gentleman from Georgia, (iMr. Cot- 
 Ui'iTT,) which plainly ex|)resses the desire oi'the Senato that it should bo settled 
 by negotiation and compromise. For it I am inclined to vote, as at present ad- 
 vised ; but reganling notic(^ in all its titrms as subonlinute to settling the con- 
 troversy without resort to arms, I r<-serve my decision until I am called upon to 
 vote; and then [ shall decide in the attirmative or negative, according as I shall 
 judge that one or the other is best calculated to advanc(! the end I have in view. 
 
 I have thus stated my reasons for su])porting a compromise, and for favoring, at 
 present, the giving of notice. 1 have been governed, as to both, by tho cir- 
 cumstances under wliieh ( Hnd myself |)laced, but t!ir which I am no ways respon- 
 sible. I am doing tli<' b(^st I can, where I find myseltj and not what I would un- 
 der different circumstances. So tiir from being responsible for the present state 
 of things, I early took my stand against that line of policy which has placiMi us 
 where we are. I refer to 1S4:K Then the Oregon (juestion for the first time 
 assumed a dangerous aspect. After having been long and frequently brought to 
 the notice of Congress, without exciting attention, I then saw, or thought I saw, 
 that it was destine at no distant jjcriod, to lieoome an absorl)ing and dangerous 
 question, and accordingly felt it to be my duty, before I decided on my course in 
 reference to it, to t'xamine it in all its bearings with care and deliberation. After 
 much reflection, I came to the conclusi<m, which I on that occasion explained, 
 in a speech delivered on the subject. 1 then saw that there were two distinct 
 lines of policy, which might be pursued : one was to adhere to the convention of 
 1827; oppose (!very attempt to annul it, and strictly observe its provisions. I 
 saw, that although for a time the convtMition had operated beneficially for Great 
 Britain, a period was at hand when our torn would come to enjoy its benefits. 
 Its operation had, therefore, thrown into her hanils the whole fur-trade of the 
 region; and we had looked on, while she reaped the rich harvest, when it was 
 in our power at any time, to annul the convention by giving the year's notice. 
 But I saw that our fJirbearaiice would be compensated by the advantages which 
 the convention was about to confer on us, if we should have the wisdom to adopt 
 the proper line of policy to secure them. The increase of our population, and 
 its progress westward were rapidly extending our settlemeins towards the Rocky 
 mountains, through which a pass had been discovered ))ut a few years before, 
 which greatly increased the facility of colonizing the te->': — v- 
 
 In this state of things, it was #iear to my mind that if we adhered to tho con* 
 vention, and respected its provisions, the progress of events would ulti- 
 mately give us possession of the whole territory ; as our power to settle tho ter- 
 ritory, and thereby obtain possession, was far greater than that of Great Britain. 
 Its distance from us was far less, and the approach through an open, grassy, 
 country, affording great facility to the active and hardy pioneers of the West, 
 
8 
 
 who oinigratc wi'h thoir fninilioN nnd hords, with little PxpeiiNO or fatigue, 
 Very (iitlpiviit wns tiio ciino with (Jrcat Ilritiiin. Tiio distancr to Oregon, by 
 Water, t'roin her shores eaiiiuit lie much h'ss than twenty thmisand miles — a (liHtHnce 
 but little short of the entire eircumferenee of the jjlobe ; while her ii|)|inmch to 
 jt through her Am(>ri<un possessiims opjioses great <lini( iilties U> rinigrntioii on a 
 Jarge seule. Of all the spots on the glolie uow open to eolonization, and 
 PUHCt'irtilde of heing eolonized, it is the most remote from her, and the most difTi. 
 cult of aeeess. She has many colonies much nearer to her, to which there is 
 much greater liicility of access, with ecpial soil and climate, as yvt very partially 
 settled. Kveii New /< aland in all these respects is superior to it. With theHo 
 mlvantages in oiu' tiivor in settling the territory, and which were yearly rapidly 
 increasing, it was clear to' my mind that all we had to do was to adhere to the 
 convention; to ohserve all its provisions with tht- most scrupulous fidelity, in or- 
 der to obtain the actual occupiUion and possession of the whole country. 
 
 As tin ns I could perceive, there was hut one impediment in the way, and that 
 wa?, that (Ireat Uritain, in order to |)rev -nt us from olitaiiung possession l»y set. 
 llement, might give notice heiseif to ti oiinatc the convention ti)r joint occupancy. 
 But of this I entertained hut little apprehension. I had read the correspondence 
 of former neg((tiations \\ ilh attention, and my inli rence was, that sh(^ jdaced hut 
 little value on Oregon, as a place litr a permanent settlement, and that she had, 
 in a great measure, made up her mind, from ilsgeogra|diieal position, that it would 
 idtimately pass into our baiuls. Uiit he this as it may, I coulil not hut see that there 
 were great im|)edimentsiii her way of giving such notice, as wr)ul<l precluileusfrom 
 fhft right of settling. She has, indeed, the same right to terminate the con- 
 vention nf lyo? that we have, as it is expressly provided that either may give it. 
 But there is another convention which sli»( claims to he still in existence, and to 
 Xvhieh we, hrdding under Spain, are parties with her. I refer to the iNootka 
 Sovmd convention. It is strictly analogous with that of lS'27, though dissimilar 
 in its language. But unlike th(^ latter, it contains no provision t(>r giving notice, 
 nnd can only he annnled liy violation. I'nder it, we, according to her own show- 
 ing, have e(]ual rights with herself to joint occupaticy and settlement, of which 
 we cannot he de|)rived on the ground on which she places her rights to the ter- 
 ritory, without a breach of faith. 
 
 It seemed then to me clear, that our true policy was such ns I have stated ; to 
 adhere to the convention, and let settlement del«Minine to whom tlu^ territory 
 should belong, affording in the meantime whatever fiieilities we might think pro. 
 per to our people emigrating to the territory, not inconsistent with the |)rovision8 
 of the conve tion, and extending our laws over tliem in like manner, and to the 
 same extent that (ireat Itritain had by act of Parliament. To me it seemed 
 clear that xve ought not to go beyond, and that we should by no means extend 
 our laws over it territorially. The necessary ellects of that would In; to extend 
 our tariff acts to the territory, tmder an express provision of the Constitution, 
 "which requires that all duties and taxes shall be laid unifl)nnly throughout the 
 United States. The restrictions im|)osed by our high tariff duties, on the infant 
 commerce of the territory, would go far, not only to diminish the inducement to 
 emigration, but to alienate the alHiction of its people. To enjoy the blessings 
 of free trade over the broad Pacific, with its numerous islands ajid widely-extend- 
 ed coast, will prove in the end to be the strongest inducement to emigration ; and 
 lo impose high duties, would do more to check emigration, to alienate its inhabit- 
 ants, and separate them frr)m our Union, than anj other cause. Oregon will be to 
 the Pacific what New England was to tlie Atlantic in its colonial state ; and its peo- 
 ple will contend as earnestly for the unrestricted enjoyment of the trade of the Pacific 
 as the New Englanders did for that of the Atlantic betiire the revolution. It was, 
 indeed, one of the princi])al causes which led to the revolution. Sh""'d we re- 
 strict by our high i'ariff duties their infant trade, they might rcadilv ti d » power 
 
 i 
 
 pr«| 
 
 coil 
 
 I 
 
 «o| 
 pa| 
 
 til 
 
 S'1 
 
 toil 
 
 <lo| 
 foif 
 thd 
 
I 
 
 'UNO or fatigue. 
 T lo Orpgon, bjr 
 ill's — 11 (listHiice 
 lif-r ii|>iir(mcli to 
 «'iiiif;r(iiioii on a 
 Ionization, and 
 I I 111' most (liffi. 
 wiiitli there ig 
 t vci V |)urtiiilly 
 '. Willi th«>Ho 
 ' .vi'iiWy rnpidly 
 I arlluTc to tlio 
 
 /idi'iit}, in or- 
 iiiiifrv. 
 
 \viiy« 11 nd that 
 
 M'ssion ],y HVU 
 
 lint (i<(ii|mncy. 
 orr('.s|(()iKleiice 
 she idncpd hut 
 I thai s\w had, 
 II, that if would 
 sec that there 
 reclndi' lis from 
 inalt' (ho con- 
 r may jjive it. 
 stt'iici'. and to 
 o the Nootka 
 i<;li dissimilar 
 (iivin^r notice, 
 IT own show- 
 K'nt, of which 
 hts to the ter. 
 
 vc stated ; to 
 the territory 
 ;ht think pro. 
 h(! provisions 
 r, and to the 
 ne it seemed 
 mans extend 
 lie to extend 
 Constitution, 
 rouphont the 
 t>n the infant 
 dncement to 
 he. blessings 
 idely-extend. 
 ^'ration ; and 
 its inhabit, 
 on M'ill be to 
 and its peo- 
 )f the I'acific 
 '"• It was, 
 n.iifj we re- 
 i-'l A power 
 
 prepared to extend to them all the advantages of free trade, to be followed by 
 consequences not ditficult t« bo perceived. Influenced by these considerations, 
 I camo to the conclusion that our true policy was to let our people emigrate and 
 govern themselves for the present with as little interference us possible on our 
 part. In that respect they possi^ss great ca|)acity from their origin and their na- 
 tive instincts. I would let them go there and settle the country in their own way, 
 giving them all the aid, countenance, and support which we could, without ex- 
 tending our authority over them territorially, until it could be properly and safely 
 done. Hut be it dona when it may, great judgment and caution will be reipiired, 
 for there lies the great ditliculty of reconciling the interest on the eusteru side of 
 the Rocky mountain with that of the western side. 
 
 The other line of policy looked to the termination of thi^ I'onvention by giving 
 notice and taking adverse possession of the territory. The liill of 184!^, already 
 alluded to, was intended as the first step. I oppos' '' 't, not only because I be- 
 lieved that some of its iirovisions violated the convention, 'mt because I believed 
 that the course it indicated was highly impolitic. It si'^ nied to me, indeed, to 
 reipiire little reflection to perceive that if the bill sh iilil pass, and the policy it 
 indicated be adopted, that negotiation or war would nece'«-i:'rily follov/ ; and that, 
 if the former should be resorted to in the first instance to p'ovent war, it would 
 tcrmii'H'j either in compromise or war. There could be i,o other result. Nor 
 was It more ditlkult to perceive, that if the question was compromised, it must 
 be on the basis of the 4(ith parallel. The past history of the aflUir, the fivct that 
 it had been frequently oflered by us sul)stantially as an ultimatum, added to the (Sict 
 that 49" was the boundary on the side of this Rocky mountains, left no 
 <loubt on my mind that, if settled by compromise, it must be on that basis. 
 It is true that our offer heretofore on that basis had been rejected, and that it 
 might thence be inferred that Great Britain could not accede to it consistently 
 with her honor. I am not of that impression, 'i'hings have greatly changed 
 since our ofl'ers were made and rejected by her. I'hen the advantages under the 
 convention were all in her favor; but now they have turned in fivvor of us. Then 
 our capacity to settle the country was small ; but now, for reasons already stated, 
 they are great; and what is far from being immaterial, this increased capacity 
 lo settle and colonize stre.'gthens the foimdation of our claims to the territory. 
 The capacity to settle and colonize a contiguous open region not capable of Vic- 
 ing settled or colonized by any other power, goes back to the original principles 
 on which all claim to territory is founded. 
 
 Seeing that such would necessarily be the consequence of the line of polkv 
 indicated by the bill, and wishing to avoid both compromise and war, I took a de- 
 cided stand against it. I was very ably seconded in my opposition ; so much so that 
 notwithstanding the apparently large majority in its fiivor, when the discussion 
 commiuiced, it passed this body by an ecpiivocal majority of one. I say equivocal, 
 because one of the Senators felt himself constrained by accidental causes to vote 
 for the measure, after he had avowed his opinion against it. Since then, session 
 after session, measures have been introduced to give notice and extend our au- 
 thority over the territory, with a view ultimately of taking possession of the 
 whole. As anticipated, negotiation, in order to avoid war, followed ; and now we 
 are brought to the alternative of compromise or fighting, as ought to have been 
 foreseen from the beginning. I again repeat, that I am in no way responsible for 
 the present atatc of things ; and if I am compelled in consequence to vote for 
 compromise and notice, the responsibility rests on my friends behind me, whose 
 course has forced the Government into it by the line of policy they have pursued. 
 I do not impeach their patriotism; but I cannot but think that they permitted 
 their zeal in behalf of the territory, and the impatience of those they represent 
 to occupy it, to get the control of their bettor judgment. 
 
10 
 
 Hai-ing been thus brought, by the line of policy to which I was opposed, ti> 
 choose between compromise and war, I without hesitation take the former. In 
 making the choice, I am actuated by no unmanly fear of the consequences of 
 war. I know that in the existing state of the world, wars are necessary — that 
 the most sacred regard for justice and equity, and the most cautious policy, can- 
 not always prevent them. When war must come, I may appeal to my past his- 
 tory to prove that I shall not be found among those who may falter; but I shall 
 take care never to contribute by my acts to precipitate the country into a war, 
 when it can be fairly avoided. I am, on principle, opposed to war, and in favor 
 of peace, because I regard peace as a positive good, and war as a positive evil. 
 As a good, I shall ever cling to peace, so long as it can be preserved consistently 
 with the safety and honor of the country ; and as opposed to war, I shall ever 
 resist it, so long as it may be resisted consistently with the same considerations. I 
 am emphatically opposed to it in this case, because |)eace, in my opinion, can be 
 preserved consistently with both, and war avoided without sacrificing either. I 
 am opposed to it for the additional reason, because it would be, in my opinion, 
 highly impolitic — a consideration never to be overlooked when a question of the 
 kind is under consideration. I regard it a.^ highly impolitic in this case, because- 
 I believe that, should we resort to it, we would lose, instead of securing, the lwo> 
 objects for which it would be avowedly declared, as I sliall now proceed to show. 
 
 The first is to secure what is claimed to be our rights to the whole of Oregon, 
 under the cry of " all of Orrgon or none." Those who would go into it for that ob- 
 ject will, in my opinion, find in tlie end that '^nane" is much more probable than 
 **all." In coming to this conclusion, I concede to my countrymen the highest 
 bravery, energy, patriotism, and intelligence, which can be claimed tin' them. 
 But these cannot overcome the great obstacles we would have to encounter, com- 
 pared to what Great Britain would have in a contest for Oregon. As long as she 
 has a large fierce in the East, and remains mistress of the Pacific, she will bo 
 able to place there a much more cflicicnt force, and at far less expense, than w& 
 possibly can at present, which would there decide the contest in her favor. 
 
 But were it otherwise, from the nature o*' tlie contest, Oregon, though 
 the cause of the war, would be speedily iiirgotten. Tlie struggle once be- 
 gun, would soon cease to be for Oregon. Higher and far more powerful mo- 
 tives would soon guide the contest. It would speedily become a struggle for 
 mastery between the greatest power inthe world on one side, against the most 
 growing on the other. Actuated by all the feelings beIoii{>ing to such a struggle, 
 both sides would put forth all their vigor, energy and resources, and overlooking 
 minor points, woidd aim to strike the most vuliu^raljle, and where each 
 might have the greatest advantage, leaving Oregon to be won or lost as the con- 
 tingencies of so mighty a contest might decide. 
 
 The next object, as is alleged, is to protect our citizens in Oregon. What has 
 just been said is enough to prove how utterly it must fail. Instead of protection, 
 war would most certainly sacrifice th"m ; and that is a strong reason, with me, for 
 opposing it. I feel our obligation to protect them as citizens, and brethern, and 
 kindred. We have encouraged them to emigrate, and I will not give a vote 
 which in my opinion would ruin and alandon them. But what war would fail to 
 effect, would be certainly accomplished by compromise on the line offered by the 
 President. There are none of our citizens, if I am correctly informed, settled 
 north of 49°. Establish that line, and we at once give our citizens in Oregon 
 peace and security, and with them full opportunity to realize their object in emi- 
 grating. 
 
 But passing from Oregon, I take broader ground, and oppose war for rea- 
 sons looking to the whole. I .see nothing to hope from war, be its result what 
 it may. On the contrary, I believe that the most successful and triumphant war 
 that could be waged— one in which all would be accompUshcd which its moai 
 
 ext| 
 
 C« 
 
 Br 
 
 trel 
 
 its! 
 
 fol{ 
 
 alll 
 
 br 
 
 in I 
 
 bo I 
 
 Bi 
 
 sH 
 
 ina 
 
 wq 
 
u 
 
 8 opposed, t» 
 former. Is 
 equences of 
 essary — that 
 policy, can- 
 my past his- 
 l)iit I shall 
 into a war, 
 and in favor 
 lositive evil, 
 consistently 
 shall ever 
 orations. I 
 lion, can be 
 f cither. I 
 ny opinion, 
 stion of the 
 se, because- 
 ig, the two' 
 '<! to show, 
 of Oregon, 
 for that ob- 
 ibable than 
 lie highest 
 lor them, 
 inter, com- 
 ong as she 
 lie will be 
 % than w& 
 vor. 
 
 •n, though 
 once be- 
 vorfiil mo. 
 iviggle for 
 t the most 
 struggle, 
 erlooking 
 ere eacli 
 the con- 
 
 ^Vhat has 
 rotection, 
 h me, for 
 lern, and 
 o a vote 
 lid lail to 
 ■d by the 
 1, settled 
 
 Oregon 
 
 in emi- 
 
 for rea- 
 lit what 
 ant war 
 its moai 
 
 extravagant advocate could dare hope for — in irhich wo should conquer the 
 Canadas, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia — in which wo should drive the 
 British flag from the continent, and compel Great Britain to yield the whole by 
 treaty, in the short space of ten years, would be disastrous to us. 1 allude not tu 
 its ravages or devastations — to the oceans of bluod that must flow, and the mani- 
 fold losses and miseries which would accompany the war. They arc common to 
 all wars ; but however vividly painted, they have but little effect in deterring a 
 brave people from a resort to it. No doubt these 'inflictions would be very great 
 in a contest between two nations of such imm,'nsc power, and so situated as to 
 bo able to do each other the greatest harm in war and the greatest good in peace. 
 But as groat as the devastation and destruction of life would be in such a strug- 
 gle, they are of a nature to be speedily repaired on our side. The indomitable 
 industry and enterprise of our people, with the great resources of the country, 
 would soon repair the former, while our rapidly increasing population would 
 speedily repair the latter. War has far heavier calamities for a ftee people than 
 these, though loss visible— calamities in their nature not easily remedied. I 
 refer to permanent and dangerous social and political changes, which often follow 
 in its train, in the character of the people and their institutions. A war between 
 us and Great Britain, such as has been described, in which every nerve and 
 muscle on either side would be strained to the utmost, and e\ery dollar put in re 
 quisition which could be commanded, could not fiiil, under present circumstances, 
 to work ir'^st disastrous, and, I fear, incural)le changes in the social condition ot 
 our people, and in their political institutions. To realize the consequences in 
 this respect, which must follow, it is necessary to look at the immense extent to 
 which it would rage. It would, in all probaljility, prove a Mexican and an Indian 
 war, as well as a war with Great Britain, and as such would extend to every 
 portion of our jntire frontier, including the Athmtic and the Pacific, the inland 
 and exterior, constituting a circuit uC probably not less than 7,000 miles. It 
 would require, in order to conduct it with tht! energy necessary to bring it in so 
 short a time to the successful termination supposed, especially in a war for 
 mastery, immense exertions on land and water. Two navies — one on the At- 
 lantic and the other on the lakes — and six or seven armies, would be required for 
 the purpose, even on the supposition that Oregon would be abandoned. One 
 army would be required on the M(>xican frontier ; and let no one snc'er at the men- 
 tion of such a power. Feeble as it now is, when paid and supported by British gold, 
 and trained and conmiaiided by British oflicers, Mexico would prove a f()rmidable 
 enemy. See what British skill and training have made the feeble Sepoys. The 
 Mexicans are a braver and a hardier people, and, what is no small point, would 
 constitute the chea|)cst of all armies. There •>' -si be in addition, one to guard 
 the gulf frontier; another to guard the soui..erii; another the northern fron- 
 tier on the Atlantic ; another to assail the nortlufastern frontier on the side of 
 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; and another to assail the Canadian; and final- 
 ly another to protect our widely extended Indian frontier. All these, in so 
 mighty a struggle against the greatest of all powers, |)utting forth her utmost 
 stren^^tii, woukl require a force, in(;luding the two navies, of not less, I would 
 suppose, than 200,000 men continually in pay. The expense would be enor- 
 mous. One of the most venerable and experienced of our citizens, Mr. Gallatin, 
 has estimated it at 65 or 70 millions of dollars annually, ifniy memory serves me. 
 My impression is that it falls far short of the actual cost, and that ^100,000,000 
 would not be an over estimate. Supposing the sum of <S50,000,000 could be an- 
 nually raised by taxation — a sum far greater than he estimates, and in my opin- 
 ion much beyond what could be effected — it would leave $50,000,000 annually 
 to bo raised by loans, or a forced paper circulation. Now, allowing the war to 
 continue for ten years, there would be incurred a debt in the time of $500,000,000,. 
 according to these estimates. Even that, it is probable, would fall much short 
 
12 
 
 fvf the reality, assuming tlie sum stated should be annually required. It would 
 be difficult to obtain loans in Europe ; for owing to the conduct of some of the 
 States in reference to repudiation, and other causes not necessary to state, the 
 feeling of Europe would, I fear, be generally against us, while our own resources 
 would not be sufficient to raise the sum required without a great depreciation of 
 our credit, with a loss of 20, 30, or even 40 per cent., before the termination of the 
 war, in contracting loans, or in couseqnence of the depreciation of our paper cir- 
 culation. Includir,g all, our public debt would, at the end of the struggle, be 
 probably not less than six or seven hundred millions of dollars. But this is not all. 
 
 We would be plunged into the paper system as deeply as we were in the days of 
 the revolution ; and would terminate the war with a mortgage of six or seven hun- 
 dred millions of dollars on the luljor of our people ; — for on labor the whole must 
 fall ultimately, while a large portion of this vast amount would go into the pockets of 
 those who ^ruck not a blow, nor lost a drop of i)loo(l in the contest, and who ac- 
 quired thoir gains by seizing \ipon the distress of the government to drive hard 
 and usurious bargains. In addition, wo should have the ditlicult task to perform 
 of restoring to a sound state a greatly depreciated paper circulation, or of extricat- 
 ing ourselves from it whatever way we might — a task which cannot be performed 
 without great distress to the country and ruinous eflTect to that large and usually 
 the enterprising portion of the community, the debtors. The eflects of all this 
 would be highly injurious to the social relations of the people. A powerful arti- 
 ficial class would be created on one side, and a poor and dependent one on the 
 other. 
 
 Nor would its effect on our political institutions be less disastrous. Such a war 
 would obliterate the line of distinction, in a great measure, between the Federal 
 and the State governments, by conterring on the fbrnifr vastly increased power 
 and influence. We would hear no more of State rights. The federal govern- 
 ment would then become a great national consolidated government.. Our very 
 success ^'^ollkl give a military impidse to the puijlic mind and to the character of 
 "the goveriuneut which it would be hard, if |)ossib!e, to overcome, and which would 
 seek conquest after conquest until a spirit would be engendered totally inconsis- 
 tent with the genius of our system of government. It would then be in the straight 
 and downward road, which leads to where so many free States have terminated 
 their career — a military despotism. In the meantime, we would have to provide 
 for three or four successful generals, who would soon l)e competing ti)r the presi- 
 dency ; and before the generation which waged the war would have passed 
 away, they might possibly witness a contest between hostile generals fi)r that 
 supreme office — a contest between him who might conquer Mexico, and him who 
 might conquer Canada, termin.ated by the eword. 
 
 I appeal to the gentlemen who are the warm advocates for "all of Oregon or 
 none," regardless of this miglity hazard, and whose separation from us on this 
 <luestion I regret, and solenmly put the question to them — is ii tor you — ^jou, 
 who assume to be democrats par excdleiicc — you who arc the enemies of the paper 
 system, and of all artificial classes in society — is it for you to support a course of 
 policy which might lead to such disastrous consequences? 
 
 But I oppose war not simply on the patriotic ground of a citizen looking to the 
 freedom and prosperity of his own country, but on still broader grounds, as i^ 
 friend of improvement, civilization, and progress. Viewed in reference to them, 
 at no period has it ever Ijeen so desirable to preserve the general peace which 
 now blesses the world. Never in its history has a period occurred so remarli- 
 able as that which has elapsed since, the termination of the great war in Europe, 
 with the battle of Warterloo, for the great advances made in all these particulars. 
 Chemical and mechanical discoveries and inventions have multiplied beyond all 
 former example, adding with their advance to the comforts of life in a degree far 
 greater and more universal than all that was over known before. Civilization 
 
 ha 
 
 P' 
 pe 
 
 wo 
 
 and 
 
 tel 
 
 to' 
 
1 '• 
 
 13 
 
 has during the same period spread its influence far and wide, and the general 
 progreus in knowledge, and itH difTuaiftn through all ranks of society, has outstrip- 
 ped ail that has over gone before it. The two great agents of the physical 
 world have become subject to the will of man, and made subservient to his wante 
 and enjoyments ; I allude to steam and electricity, under whatever name the lat- 
 ter may be called. The former has overcome distance bo'h on land and water, 
 to an extent of which former generations had not the least conception to be {ws- 
 sible. It has in effect rethiced the Atlantic to half its forncr width, while, at the 
 same time, it has added threefold to the rapidity of intercourse by land. Within the 
 same period, electricity, the greatest and most diffused of all known physical agentsi, 
 has been made the instrument for the transmission of thoughts, I will not say with 
 the rapidity of lightning, but by lightning itseltl Magic wires are stretching them- 
 selves in all directions over the earth, and when their mystic meshes shall. have 
 been united and perfected, our globe itself will bocojno endowed with sensitive- 
 ness, so that whatever touches on any one point, will be instantly felt on cver)° 
 other. All these improvements — all this increasing civilization — all the progress 
 now making, would be in a great measure arrested by a war between us and 
 Great Britain. As great as it is, it is but the commencement — the dawn of a 
 new civilization, more refined, more elevated, more intellectual, more moral, then 
 the present and all preceding it. Shall it be we who shall incur the higf re 
 dponsibility of retarding its advance, and by such a war as this would be ? 
 
 I am, in this connexion, opposed to war between the United States and Great 
 Britain. They are the two countries the furthest in advance in this great career 
 of improvement and amelioration of the condition of our race. They are, besides, 
 the two most commercial, and are diffusing, by their widely extended commerce, 
 their blessings over the whole globe. We have been raised up by Providence 
 for these great and noble purposes, and 1 trust we shall not fail to fulfil our high- 
 destiny. I am, besides, especially op|iosed to war with England at this time ; 
 because I hold that it is now to be decided, whether we are to exist in future as 
 fi-iends or enimies. War^at this time, and for this cause, would decide supremacy, 
 we shall hereafter stand in that of enemies. It would give birth to a struggle 
 in which one or the other would have to succumb before it terminated ; and which 
 in the end, might i)rove ruinous to both. On the contrary, if war can be avoided* 
 powerful causes are now in operation, calculated to cement and secure a lasting — 
 I hope a perpetual — peace between the two countries, by breaking down the 
 barriers which impede their commerce, and thereby uniting,them more closely 
 by a vastly e.ilargod commercial interoourse, equally benehcial to both. If we 
 should now succeed in setting the example of free trade between us, it would 
 force all other civilized countries to follow it in the end. The consequence 
 would bo, to diffuse a prosperity greater and more universal than can be well 
 conceived, and to unite by bonds of mutiiitl interest the people of all countries. 
 But in advocating the cause of free trade, I am actuated not less by the political 
 consequences likely to flow from it, than the Hdvnnt.tges to be derived from it iu 
 an economical point of view. 1 regard it in the dispensation of Providence as 
 one of the great means of ushering in the happy period foretold by inspired 
 prophets and poets, when war should be no more. 
 
 I am linally opposeil to war, because peace — j)eace is pre-eminently our policy. 
 There niiiy be nations, restricted to small territories, hemmed in on all sides, 
 so situated that \xar may be nec<'ssary to their greatness. Such is not our case 
 Providence has given us an iidieritunee stretching across the entire continent 
 from Kiist to W est, from ocean to ocean, and I'roni North to South, covering by 
 far tile greater and better part of its temperate zone. It compriees a region not 
 only of vast extent, Ijiit abundant in all resnurceH; excellent in climate; fi;rtil« 
 and' < lerant in soil; capable ol" sustaining in the plentifvl enjoyment of all th» 
 necesouries of" lite a popul-atioii ol" ten tiinos our pri'siMU number. Our great 
 
14 
 
 ^ni«flion, as a people, is to occupy this vast domain; to replenish it with an inteUi- 
 gent, virtuous, and industrious population ; to convert the forests into cultivated 
 fields ; to drain the swamps and niorassos, and cover them with rich harvests ; to 
 buikl up cities, towns, and villages in every direction, and to unite the whole by 
 ihe nK)st rapid intercourse between all the parts. War would but impede the ,1il. 
 Hlment of this high mission, by absorbing the means and diverting the energies 
 which would be devoted to the purpose. On the contrary, secure peace, und 
 time, under the guidance of a sagacious and cautious policy, "a wise and masterly 
 inactivity," will speedily accomplish the whole. I ventured to say ''a wise and 
 masterly inactivity," in desi)iteof the attempt to east ridicule upon the expression. 
 Those who have made the attempt would seem to confound such inactivity with 
 mtire inaction. Nothing can be moie unlike. They are as wide apart as the 
 poles. The one is the oH'spring of indolence, or ignorance, or inditlerence. The 
 other is the result of the proioundest sagacity and wisdom — a sagacity which 
 lotiks into the operations of the great causes in the physical, moral, and 
 political world; which, by their incessant operation, are ever changing the con- 
 dition of nations for good or evil ; and wisdom, which knows how to use and di- 
 rect them when acting favorably, by slight touches, to facilitate their progress, 
 and by removing impediments which might thwart or impede their course — and 
 not least, to wait patiently for the fniits of their operation. He who does not 
 under.stand the ditferenre between such inactivity and mere inaction — the doing 
 of nothing — is still in the horn-book of politics, without a glimpse of those higher 
 elements of statesmanship by which a country is elevated to greatness and pros- 
 perity. Time is operating in our favor with a power never before exerted in 
 i'avor of any other people. It is our great friend ; and under the guidance of such 
 a policy, it will accomplish all that we can desire. Our popul.ition is now in- 
 creasing at the rate of about 600,000 annually, and is progressing with increased 
 rapidity every year. It will average, if not impeded, nearly a million during the 
 next twenty-tive years; .at the end of which period our population ought to reach 
 to upwards of forty millions. With this vast increase, it is rolling westwardly 
 with a strong and deep current, and will, by the end of that period, have spread 
 from ocean to ocean. Its course is irresistible. The coast of the Pacific will 
 then be probably as densely populated, and as thickly studded with towns and 
 villages, in proportion to its capacity to sustain population, as that of the Atlantic 
 now is. At the same rate, we shall have increased to upwards of eighty mil- 
 lions of people at t]ie end of another twenty-five years; when, with one foot on 
 the Atlantic and the other on the Pacific, and occupying a position between the 
 eastern and western roasts of the old continent, we shall be in a position better 
 calculated to control thr commerce of both oceans, and to exert an influence over 
 both continents, than any other country in the world. If we avoid war, and ad- 
 here to peace, all this will be efi'ected — efli'cted, I trust, without the loss of our 
 free popular institutions. I am aware how difllcult is the task to preserve free 
 institutions over so wide a space, and so immense a population ; but we are 
 blessed with a Constitution admirably calculated to accomplish it. Its elastic 
 power is unequalled, which is to be attributed to its federal character. The hope 
 of" success depends on preserving that feature iu its full perfection, and adhering 
 to peace as our policy. War may make us great ; but let it never be forgotten 
 that peace only can make ue both great and free. 
 
 With a few remarks relating to myself personally, I shall conclude. I have 
 been charged with being more strongly inclined to secure the annexation of Texas, 
 than our righta to Oregon. It has been attributed to my greater partiality to the 
 South than to the West. Hut I am yet to learn why Texas should be considered 
 as belonging to the South rathem than to the West. I always thought that it 
 formed a part, and not an unimportant part, of the valley of the Mississippi; and 
 «n that account, as well as tor giving greater security to the southern portion of 
 
 *he V 
 Texa 
 north 
 the 
 had 
 
l$i 
 
 the valloj, tho West dosirod its annexation. Bosidea, I have yet to learn that 
 Texas is conflned to a southern latitude. I had supposed that it extended far 
 north and west, up to the latitude of 42^ in tiie neighborhood of the great pass of 
 the Rocky mountains, on which the value of Oregon to us so much depends. I 
 had supposed that what are called the Southern States had not so direct and deep 
 an interest in its annexation as the West; but it would seem, from language held 
 on the occasion, that in all this 1 was mistaken, and that the annexation of Texas 
 was purely a Southern question, and only supported by the West under the ex- 
 pectation of obtaining in retiuii the support of tho South to the whole of Oregon 
 up to 54* 40', and, if necessary, at the certain hazard of a war. 
 
 But |)assing by all this, and assuming that Texas was purely a Southern, and 
 Oregon a Western question, I repel the charge of partiality, and shall now pro- 
 ceed to show, that if a diHorcnt line of policy was piu'sued i)y me in reference to 
 tho two, it was because it was right and proper it should i)0. I treated both 
 questions iri the manner best calcidated to etlt^ct the object in view, and indeed 
 the only one by which both could l)e secured. The circumstances of the two 
 cases were entirely ditfercnt. In the case of Texas, time was against us, in 
 that of Oregon, time was with us ; and hence the ditlerence in my course of policy 
 in reference to them. To understand the diflerence it is necessary to premise, 
 that Texas had readied that period in her history when it was clear that she 
 would be compelled to form intimate and dependent relations either with us or 
 England, if she continued independent. But it was manifest, if left alone, with- 
 out any movement on our part, that her connexion must be with England and 
 not with us. She could extend to Texas commercial advantages liir greater than 
 we possibly could, and aflbrd her greater facilities in obtaining means to relieve 
 her from her great pecuniary embarrassments. England saw this, and had ac- 
 tually commenced h( r movements to avail hersell'of its advantages. We, too, 
 poTceived it; and also that annexation aflbrded the only means of counteracting 
 her movements, and preventing Texas from being plac(!d exclusively under her 
 control. In this emergency, I was called to the State Department, with a view 
 of taking charge of the jiending negotiation for annexation. I saw that the time 
 had arrived when immediate and decided action was ri^quircd ; that time was 
 against us, and that to resist the eftects of its operation boldness and decision were in- 
 dispensable. I acted accordingly, and success proved the soundness of my policy. 
 It v»'as not a case for masterly inactivity. Not so the case of Oregon, where 
 time was with us, and iience the diflerent line of policy which I adopted in rc- 
 -^rence to it, and which would have secured the whole, had my advice been fol- 
 lowed, as has been explained. 
 
 In ore particular my |)olicy was the same in both cases. I aimed in each to ■ 
 avoid war and preserve peace. I clearly perceived that in annexing Texas there 
 was no danger of a war with England, if managed judiciously. She was an in- 
 depent state, and had been so acknowledged by England, France, and other pow- 
 ers. She had a right, as such, to dispose of herself, and to unite her destinies 
 with ours, if she saw proper, without any right on the part of England to resist it, 
 or ground or pretext to make war in consequence. I also perceived that there were 
 no just grounds to apprehend a Mexican war in consequence. She was not in a 
 condition to make war, without the aid of England, and there was no reason to ap- 
 prehend that she would be aided or countenanced in it by the latter; unless, indeed, 
 the Oregon question shoul4,tenninate in a war l)ctween us and her, in which event, 
 I regarded a Mexican war as inevitable, as has been stated. Thus far my antici. 
 pations have been realized — Texas annexed, and peace preserved, by the policy 
 which I pursued. A diflerent line of policy — one which would have permitted 
 England to obtain the ascendency over Texas, which she would have acquired 
 without annexation, would have inevitably led to a state of things, involving us 
 and England finally in war. It would have been impossible to prevent feelings of 
 Jvftloasjr and enmitj from growing up between us and Texas. The very similari- 
 
u 
 
 i 
 
 
 ty of our character and pursuits, and the rivalry which they would give birth to» 
 would necessarily lead to that result; while the long and ill-defined boundary be> 
 tween the two countries, extending for more than a thousand miles through 
 forests, prairies, and navigable rivers, without a natural boundary in any part, 
 would produce frequent collisions between our people and these of Texas. Contro. 
 versies and conflicts would have been the result. Texas, ns the weaker power, 
 would throw hcrsetf upon Great Britain for support ; and wars, ir(>(|uent and bloody 
 wars, between us and her would have followed. Annexation has fortunately re> 
 moved these causes of war. Should the Oregon controversy terminate in peace, 
 every cause of war between the two countries would be removed, leaving the pros> 
 pect of lasting peace between them. n 
 
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five birth to^ 
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 liles through 
 in any part, 
 tas. Contro. 
 Baker power, 
 nt and bloody 
 •rtunately re. 
 ate in peace, 
 ing the proa.