<>J^>

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)

1.0

I.I

>- ilM

■ 63

^ 1^

111=
111=-=

1.8

1.25 1.4

1.6

^ 6" —

►

^;.

CTA

'%V.^ '^

/fS^

Photographic

Sciences
Corporation

33 WEST MAIN STRHT

WIBSTER.N Y 14SB0

(716) 872-4S03

f<^ip.

CIHM/ICMH

Microfiche

Series.

CIHIVI/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.

Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques

Technical a;id Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques at bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best
original copy available for filming. Features of this
copy which may be bibliographicaily unique,
which may alter any of the images in the
reproduction, or which may significantly change
the usual method of filming, are checked below.

Coloured covers/
Couverture da couleur

I I Covers damaged/

Couverture endommagie

□ Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurAe et/ou pelliculie

I I Cover title missing/

Le titre de couverture manque

Coloured maps/

Cartes g4ographiques en couleur

□ Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)

pn Coloured plates and/or illustrations/

Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur

Bound with other material/
ReliA avec d'autres documents

Tight binding may cau^o shadows or distortion
along interior margin/

La re liure serrAe peut causer de I'ombre ou de la
distorsion !• long de la marge int^rieure

Blank leaves added during restoration may
appear within the text. Whenever possible, these
have been omitted from filming/
II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajouties
lors dune restauration apparaissent dans le texte,
mais, lorsque cela Atait possible, cas pages n'ont
pas tti filmias.

Additional comments:/
Commentaires supplimantairas;

L'Institut a microfilm^ le meilleur exemplaire
qu'il lui a it6 possible de se procurer. Les details
ca cet exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du
point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier
une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une
modification dans la methods normale de filmage
sont indiquAs ci-dessous.

I I Coloured pages/

Pages de couleur

Pages damaged/
Pages endommag^es

Pages restored and/oi

Pages restaur^es et/ou pelliculies

r I Pages damaged/

I I Pages restored and/or laminated/

Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages ddcolor^es, tacheties ou piqu^es

□Pages detached/
Pages ddtachees

~1\ Showthrough/
-^ Transparence

Quality of prir

Quality inAgale de I'impression

Includes supplementary materii
Comprend du materiel suppl^mentaire

Only edition available/
Seule Edition disponible

r~~| Quality of print varies/

I I Includes supplementary material/

I I Only edition available/

Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata
slips, tissues, etc., have been ref limed to
ensure the best possible image/
Les pages totalement ou partlellement
obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure,
etc., ont M filmies A nouveau da fapon d
obtenir la meilleure image possible.

This item Is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/

Ce document est film* au taux de reduction indiquA cidassous.

10X 14X 18X 22X

30X

12X

16X

20X

24X

28X

32X

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks
to the generosity of:

Douglas Library
Queen's University

The images appearing here are the best quality
possible considering the condition and legibility
of the original copy and in keeping with the
filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed
beginning with the front cover and ending on
the last page with a printed or illustrated impres-
sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All
other original copies are filmed beginning on the
first page with a printed or illustrated impres-
sion, and ending on the last page with a printed
or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche
shall contain the symbol -^ (meaning "CON-
TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"),
whichover applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at
different reduction ratios. Those too large to be
entirely included in one exposure are filmed
beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to
right and top to bottom, as many frames as
required. The following diagrams illustrate the
method:

L'exemplaire film* fut reproduit grflce A la
gAn^rositA de:

Douglas Library
Queen's University

Les images suivantes ont tt6 reproduites avec le
plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et
de la nettet« de l'exemplaire film«, et en
conformity avec les conditions du contrat de
filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en
papier est imprimie sont filmto en commen^ant
par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la
derniAre page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second
plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires
originaux sont filmfo en commenpant par la
premiere page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par
la dernlAre page qui comporte une telle
empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaftra sur la
dernlAre image de cheque microfiche, selon le
cas: le symbols — ► signifie "A SUIVRE ", le
symbols V signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent Atre
filmAs A des taux de reduction diffirents.
Lorsque le document est trop grand pour Atre
reproduit en un seul clich«, 11 est film* A partir
de I'angle supArieur gauche, de gauche h droite,
et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre
d'images ntcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants
illustrent la mAthode.

32X

DOCUMENTS

AND

FACTS,

RELATIVE TO

ILITARY EVENTS,

DlJ«IN<r llIE LATE WAR.

In the reduction of the army at the conclusion of the war,
and in adapting our military establishment to the circum.
stances jind wants of a time of peace, it was the fortune of
Oen. Boyd not to find his name among the officers retained.
The exclusion of an officer of experience, whose onl^ pro-
fession was that of arms ; whose life, even from hin youth,
had beeji spent in camps, and in the hazards of war ; one,
too, who had borne an active part in the late war, and whose
name had necessarily become associated with some of the
11 most important events of that period. The exclusion of
jl an officer under such circumstances must, almost unavoida-
l^bly, in the mind of the public, carry with it an implied cen-
sure. Whether this neglect was merited, he must leave
to time and the public to determine. But he has friends,
to whom he is auxious to vindicito his military character,
and who, in truth, will listen to this vindication with plea,
sure. It is for their use that this Memorial is printed,
which has been unavailingly communicated to the govern-
ment. It contains a more'detailed actnunt of the military
transactions of the late war, in which he was personally
codcerned, than has yet been presented to the public ; and
•perhaps they may think that the services he has rendered
his country on these occasions, deserved some other noti> u
than is contained in the siibjoiuod iRcnnin letter fr«m thtt
M^ar Department.

f/052.4.B7

(CIRCULAR.)

Department of fVew, 22d Mai/, 1815.
iS7fl.„.Enclo8ed you wi!! receive the National Intelligencer, containing
a statement of the organization of the military peace establishment cf the
United States, which you will be pleased to consider as coming authen*
tically from this Department, and act accordingly.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

A. J. DALLAS.
Brigadier Gen. Boyd, Nem York.

The Hon. Wm. H. Crawford, Secreta/nj of War,

In presenting myself once more to the attention of the
National Government, I am aware of assuming both a deli,
cate and unpleasant office. It would have been far more
grateful to have owed the exhibition of my claims to the
justice and candor of my seniors if* command. But their
indifference and neglect have deprived me of so eligible a
mode, and imposed on me a necessity as painful to myself
as it will no doubt be irksome to the Government. A sense
of imperious duty left me no alternative ; the vindication
of my military character was too dear to me to be neglected ;
and if the trouble I impose cannot be justified by the claim*
I exhibit, the soldier's love of fame will at least furnish an
excuse for my weakness. This task, so unpleasant at all
times, is rendered doubly so by the lateness of the applica-
tion. But it is humbly conceived the merits of a claim can-
not be effected by a delay, the result of other's omissions ;
more especially when the delay itself augments the misfor-
tune, and leaves in an act of recompense, but a small part
of its advantages.

Under the conviction of the truth of this sentiment, the
attention of the Government is respectfully solicited to some
of the facts attending the capture of Fort George, to the
separate command of that post by the undersigned, together
with a few reflections on the battle at Chrystler's Field.
This measure has been adopted from a belief that the facts
connected with the first of those events, have never been
disclosed to your department by the General in command,
and from an intimation received on one occasion, that such
a disclosure would have been followed by the object of this

A.B7

2d May, 1815.
encer, containing
Ablishment cf the
B coining authen«

lent servant,
J. DALLAS.

y of War.

tention of the
ig both a deli,
leen far more
claims to the
d. But their
so eligible a \
nful to myself
2nt. A sense
le vindication
be neglected ;
by the claimt
Eist furnish an
leasant at all
f the applica.
fa claim can-
's omissions ;
:s the misfor-
b a small part

sntiment, the
icited to some
)orge, to the
ned, together ;
stler's Field,
that the facts I
e never been |
in command, |
on, that such |
object of this J

communication : that, perhaps, the President would have
thought proper to have conferred on the undersigned a bre-
vet as a compliment to his zeal and efforts on that occasion.
It is the design of the undersigned to supply such omissions
by documents which can neither be controverted nor sus-
pected. When the merits of that transaction are fully dis-
closed itt the Government, he will be satisfied ; his confi-
dence in their justice precludes a doubt that, if any individ-
ual merit was exhibited, it will still be noticed, notwith-
standing the lapse of time $ and it is to his country he re-
fers a question so dear to him, to whose judgment, and not
to his own, he yields implicit confidence.

In performing the duty he has assumed, he begs leave to
state in a concise manner, the principal events of that day,
though many of them are already known to the Govern-
ment. On the evening of the S6th of May, the enclosed
order (A. 8.) was promulgated to the troops. In obedience
to its commands, before day light on the morning of the
S7th, the troops were embarked, and pi*oceeding to the en-
emy's shore. The advance, consisting of about five hun-
dred light troops, under the command of Col. Scott, was
followed at a short interval by Boyd's brigade, 1300 strong ;
Winder's and Chandler's brigades successively followed,
at intervals of perhaps a mile. It was day light before
they approached the point of landing, at which the enemy
were posted on the bank, consisting of two thousand reg-
ulars, beside militia and Indians, formed in order of battle,
and covered by a one -gun battery. Four armed schooners
were ordered to cover our landing, one of which was brought
to bear on the battery of the enemy. The advance, under
Lieut. Col. Scott, were the first to strike the shore, and
instantly attempted the bank, but without success. After
the interval of a moment, Boyd's brigade landed, and the
bank was carried by the united troops, the whole being
under his command, as senior oflicer on shore. The con-
test was animated, and destructive for about fifteen minutes,
when the enemy broke and fled to the town, before any part
of Winder's brigade had arrived. They were pursued five
miles by the troops who fought them, and by them only,
when the pursuit was discontinued by the positive orders
Qf the commanding Major-General.

176014

In this action, the undersigned was principal commander;
his brigade and Scott's light troops alone fought and beat
the enemy: (A. 3. B.) the remainder of the army did
not reach the shwe till the action was decided; the
Major-General was still later in arriving. From these
lacts It appears, that the merits or demerits of the battle on
shore, are to be referred to the undersigned as commander
in chief. (A. 4.) In estimating these, he begs leave to in-
quire, m what consists the merit of an action ? Is it in gain-
ing a victory? The rout of the enemy was complete. Is it
m gaming it with inferior numbers? The numbers of the
enemy were one-fourth greater than ours. (A. 8.) Is it in
gaming it with raw troops against veterans? That the
American. troops were little more than recruits, and untried
in the field of battle, is too well known to require proof;
of the character of British regulars it is also unnecessary to
speak. It more be wanted to give merit to an acUon, than
beating superior numbers of disciplined troops with untried
recruits, let it consist in the comparative advantages of no-
sition, in the bravery of the contest, and in the comparative
loss sustained. *

The position of the enemy was on the top of the bank,
fronting the Lake, and presenting a front of several hun-
tired yards. Our position was in approaching them in
broad day, under a fire that shivered our crowded boats
and covered the Lake around us with foam. It was in the
tace of such an enemy, that we struck the shore, and form-
ed m order of battle; it was under their fire, supported by
their batteries, that we ascended the steep bank of twenty.
Jeet elevation, up which our cannon were to be dragged,
ueiore they could support us. And it was not till all this
was accomplished, that the advantages of our position
could be compared with those of the enemy.

r ^'^u**u^ ^**^*^ bravely fought by the enemy? They
imed the bank to receive us on our approach; their fire
was rapid and incessant till we sti-uck the shore and mount-
ed the bank: m the few moments of interval between the
andmg of Scott's light troops and my brigade, thrice was
that ga lant officer forced down the bank. But this opno-
sition did mt cease with our landing; for fifteen minutet
the two lines in front, at a distance of from six to ten yards,

exchar
charge
the tov
the firs
engage
is no j
equalle
In c
the wai
the daji
is belie^
Beside
would c
I'ior nuir
not shrii
couragiu
ritory, a
been efi
Forts G(
mortars,
plies, wt
trophies
If the
tions, it j
has been
honour c
the dispa
pear that
than by t
light troo
and beat
Commani
born sane
by the li|
Winder's
I engaged, i

(letter, dati
iScott's am
Winder's
same langi
n action s

1 commander;
ight and beat
the army did
lecided ; the

From these
' the battle on
s commander
8 leave to in-

I» it in gain-
luplete. Is it
mbers of the

8.) Ib it in
1? That the
\f and untded
quire proof;
inecessary to

action, than
with untried
stages of po-

comparative

>f the bank,
several hun-
ing them in
wded boats,
It was in the
e, and form-
upported by
k of twenty,
be dragged,
till all this
)ur position

my? They
1 ; their ftre
and mount,
►etween the
, thrice was
t this oppo-
ien minutes
ten yards,

exchanged a destructive and rapid fire, till the determined
charge of our troops broke their lines and forceclSfnta
the town We buried 107 of the enemy onTetank The "
the first stand was made; 105 prisoners were taken Tth^
engagement ; 175 wounded felf iuto our Lnl'^'whl^
IS no less true than astonishing, that our loss scairelx
equalled a quarter part of that number. ^

the w«?'?n;'"?„**'''/'^r '^'"*^ «*»»«^« «^Weved during

the r^pl n""^" T* '"*^7 ^y **^" «^«*^^1«« surmounted!

s beS S?^' T ?'*" ^'^'''y •^^^"^^d; neither, i

IS belie>ed, will it m the importance of the co?iseouehrP<j

wSV::^^^^^^^^^ *^^ "- armTrAmerS;

would contest with them the palm of victory, against simo

€oln^^!ntZ^u'"""?> °"™ "»'•«•• circumstances oti\U-

ueen ettetted by any other single army diuine the war
m^rtl^^T •"' ^"'' '"'^'y five pieces ot «nno„,^mi

li„n^ «Ti!"*M '""P* "'"''''""' ""y <=>*<>" for their exer-

LT^en ie? ^ ^'"1^ *,'""', """=*' "» ^•«^'' ""^^ '
hon..„r ?/i?? k"^- . ^"' » '"*™t was oonfen-ed in
honour of distinguished individual merit. Neither from

I E l,v ifc , ? r°' *""'"»>»> by these UoJps any more
han by the res of the army. The notorious fL, that the

^^ birr"*" ""T' ""' ^y"'' brigade/Se fough

1 and beat the enemy, has never been promulgated bv tl?e

Commanders i„ Chief. The dispatches of General Cr

brSinsr,"" '-f-^-r' """"""-"«' «tionw«t°St

ITini! 'S''.'™?Ps only, and supported by Boyd's mi
Winder's brigades, or else, that these brigades were aTso

letl'f f'.'S* '"Sn""^ ^y Chandler. In"Gene™l Lewi."

j^ou s and J<orsyth's commands, supported bv Bovd's anri
5 Winder's brigades, sustained the brlint of tlieWn The
,same language is applied to Iwodifferent brigades, re"ative to
.« artion s„ important as that of Fort Geo^X^^S

tv.

one of them took no part in an action in which victory was
achieved by the other. (A. 5, 6 and 7.)

The credit due to the undersigned, is a subject he reteri
to with pain and reluctance. But he hopes dehcacy may
not be ^olated in expressing a belief that nis conduct on
that day did not disgrace a life exclusively devoted to mill-
tary pursuits, and inured to the field of battle; that he did
not shrink from his duty, as a leader of untried recruits, to
show an example in his own person of the conduct he wish-
ed to inculcate— to unite the duties incumbent on a soldier,
with the conduct required from a General— m fine, io be the
first in danger, as well as in command. Whatever credit he
deserved, was fully awarded to him by the troops who wit-
nessed his effosts; and the warm, animated, and ardent
congiatulations of the commander in chief, at the close oi
that day— the praises he so feelingly lavished upon him—
if not grateful from the consciousness of deserving them,
were so at least from the implied approbation of his con-
duct. They at least sanctioned the proud reflection, that
in executing a difficult trust, he had discharged his duty to

If it^be*^ objected that the consequences, notwithstanding,
were less brilliant than might have been expected fi-om our
means, permit me to inquire, if more ought to or could have
been done by the brigade I had the honor to command, and
the lieht troops under Col. Scott? The same body of troops
that, unassisted, beat the superior foe, alone pursued him,
and if greater effects would have resulteu from a continued
pursuit? its abandonment cannot be objected to one who
only acted in obedience to the positive commands of his
superior. In suggesting that the undersigned was not
consulted in the plan of the expedition, he is far from re-
fleeting on the commander in chief. He was not author-
ised t^ obtrude his advice, nor were his superiors bound to
consult him ; he was satisfied with the honor conferred
upon him, in being suffered to lead the gallant corps that
.instituted the advance. Neither does he express any
opinion against the mode of the projected attack. But as
fir as his opinion may be of importance, he respectfu%
suggests, that it was freely communicated before the battle
to Commodore Chauncey, and to Gen. Winder. I hat

opinio
neons
pose o
first w
in the
the pla
jected
adoptii
pected,
feet a c
the resi
the mej
Ont
born, tl
devolvf
on the ]
signed
aware t
plished
well foi
services
ing that
that noi
But to t
for a jui
his feeli
struction
of his cc
the instr
no affair
How fai
tions of ]
—•and til
had to gi
B. 1 to 1
were spa
i his succe
i of Gen. J
■i the war,
) Fort Geo
s force of ti

i^ictory was

ct he referi
licacy may
condact on
ited to mili-
that he did
recruits, to
ict he wish-
n a soldier^
le, to be the
er credit he
ps who wit-
and ardent
the close of
ipon him —
fving them,
of his con-
lection, that
I his duty to

ithstanding,
ed from our
r could have
umand, and
idy of troops
lursued him,

a continued

to one who
ands of his
led was not

far from re-
i not author-
ors bound to
lor conferred
it corps that
express any
ck. But as

respectfully
)re the battle
nder. That

opinion was in favor of one feigned and two real simulta-
neous at acks ; the former opposite Newark, for the du^
pose of distracting the enemy's attention ; of the latter the
firs where the invasion occurred, and the other S a pd„t

n the rear of the enemy, and cutting off his retl^u
the p an actually executed was a bad one, it cannot be ob
jected to the undersigned, because he was' not consulted In
adopting It. If the success was less brilliant than wm ei
pected, the cause in not being ascribable to him, cannot iTf"
feet a distinct transaction, conducted by him, and in which
the result, it is humbly presumed, wL fuliradequlte t5
the means confided to him. ^ *uequaie to

On the fifteenih of July, by the illness of General Dear
born, the command of Fort George and its dept^deS
devolved on the undersigned, as senior officer present fbut
on the ninth of September, they were again specialy as
signed to General Wilkinson. During Xs peS he is

SllZd ^'' t: ^^^«^p«^*«d from hiS. thJ7^rJ^z

plished ; and he ,s also aware, that such an objecSif
well founded, would justly have an influence on cla^s for
services previously rendered. He admits, the trooTdur
mg that period were desirous of active enterprize, aSd also
that none was executed which could possibly be avoided
But to the ms ructions of the War D^rtment he looks
for a justification of this apparent inactivity, as irksome to
his feelings as it was prejudicial to his char^ctei^^^ K
structions were positive and precise, that during the per/od
of his command, he should « pay the utmost attentbn to
the ms ruction and discipline of his troops, and engage in
no affair with the enemy that could be avoidedV ?Fn
How far he obeyed his orders, and fulfilled the expecte
tions of his superiors-what difficulties he hadtosSunt
j-and the force of the enemy against whose enteSe he
hadtoguard--maybeseen froS the Documenrmarled
ii. 1 to 15. He will barely remark, that no exertions
were spared to improve the discipline of his troops and

01 uen. Miller, that " he saw no part of the army durinir
the war, ^hose d scipline surpassed that of theToopg^
Fort George, during the command of Gen. Boyd^V*
force of the enemy iu front of his lines was Jt all t^es

I"-

equal to the effective disposable force of his command, and
considerably superior during the latter period. Affairs
between piquets, of greater or less magnitude, were occur-
ring daily, and foraging could only be accomplished with-
in the limits of the enemy, and at the hazard of continual
contests ; and finally, on the 31th of August, a general at-
tack was made on his lines by the British army of four
thousand regulars, beside militia and Indians, under the
command of Sir George Prevost, and repulsed with con-
siderable loss on their part, and very trifling on ours. The
undersigned claims no merit in this transaction, but Major
General Wilkinson's opinion of the importance of the at-
tack, is freely expressed in his letter of the S3d of August ;
(B. IS.) and that of the enemy is witnessed not only by
the language of the General Older, but by the fact, that the
Governor General of all the Canadas hastened with a re-
inforcement from Kingston, a distance of several hundred
miles, to direct it in person. Uiwn this subject, he will
hazard but one more remark ; that his character has per-
haps sustained an injury by the publication of the British
rumor, relative to that event, contained in a letter from Gen.
Wilkinson, while his own official account, previously dis-
patched to the War Department, was never made public.

(B. 13 & 15.)

The importance and responsibility of his command, the
difficulties in maintaining the post assigned him, may be in-
ferred from the fact, that a few days before Gen. Dearborn
left Fort George, a Council of War was summoned to de-
liberate on a proposition to abandon the enemy's territory.
A prompt decision to maintain that post, evinces the gal-
lantry of the army ; but the fact, that such a consultation
was rendered necessary, establishes the belief of its diffi-
culty in the apprehension of the Commander.

The restrictions laid upon the enterprize of this army
were so painful to the undersigned, that he made constant
applications for their removal, from the notification of the
command devolving upon him, till the arrival of Gen. Wil-
kinson. But they were not removed till the 30th of July,

(which letter was received on the day of August) and

then the permission was limited to the co-operation of the
fleet. In the letter notifying the enlarged authurity, tho

imand, and
d. Affairs
were occur-
ished with-
if continual

general at-
rmy of four

under the
I with con-
lours. The
, but Major
e of the at-
of August ;
not only by
■act, that the
il with a re-
ral hundred
!ct, he will
ter has per-

the British
!ir from Gen.
viously dis-
aade public.

mmand, the
1, may be in-
n. Dearborn
loned to de-
ar's territory.
ces the gal-
consultation
'. of its diffi.

f this army
ade constant
nation of the
>f Gen. Wil-
0th of July,
August) and
ration of the
athurity, tho

difference in the expression^ acknowledging those restric-
tions from those in the letter imposing them, was perhaps
calculated to excite a belief that they had been mistaken
by the undersigned. Whether or not this operated to his
injury he leaves to others to determine. No sooner, how-
ever, was this authority enlarged, than the expedition was
projected to the head of the lake, under G«n. Williams, to
attack the enemy in the rear, while the troops at the fort
made a simultaneous attack in front. The enclosed Doc-
uments (B. 9,) show the causes of its abandonment. The
appearance of the enemy's fleet, by producing the absence
of Commodore Ghauncey removed the sole condition on
which the enterprise was sanctioned by the government.
The reinforcement of the enemy, and the continued absence
vf Commodore Chauncey, precluded any new enterprise
until the undersigned was succeeded by General Wilkin,
son, — (Note A.)

The public have also been disappointed in the result of
the affair of the ilth November, at Chrystler's Fields.-—
They expected the entire destruction of the enemy's corps,
about two thousand strong, by the American army of three
times that force. How far their expectation was reasona-
ble, the undersigned will not venture an opinion : he only
suggests a few facts, from which an inference may be drawn
how far any censure was applicable to himself. It ;ivas
not the object of the Commander in Chief to capture or
even to fight that army if avoidable. This appears from
his own avowal in his report to the War Department ;
from his despatching General Brown, together with the
elite of the army, before the battle ; from his sending into
the field only part of the force contiguous to the battle
ground ; and from sending away a valuable part of the
flotilla, with the two principal artillery officers during the
battle. His disposition to avoid even a serious engage-
ment, appears also strongly from the fact, that although the
action lasted three hours, the reinforcement of three hundred
men sent by the Commander in Chief to our assistance,
only arrived at the close of the action. With this dispo-
sition to avoid a battle, the two Major Generals, although
confined by indisposition, still continued in command. The
conduct of the undersigftpd is therefore to bCxS.^(iraatcd by

'■i.

'li

the manner in which their commands were executed by
him, as senior officer on shore. The strength of the enemy
was estimated by no one, at less than two thousand men.
1 hey were supported by seven pieces of heavy artillery,
and nine gun boats. The whole force under the command
of the undersigned, who fought on that day, did not exceed
one thousand infantry, and three hundred dragoons and
artillery. It was with this force, against such m enemy,
(whose numbers were misapprehended by the commander,
as appears by General Lewis' letter annexed, C. 1.) he had
to execute the orders of the Commander in Chief. These
were on the morning of the eleventh to take up the line of
inarch down the river, and if the "enemy should harrass
tlie rear, to turn and beat him back." The troops were
preparing to move, when the enemy appeared ; they were
•; beaten back," nearly a mile ami a half, after a severe ac
tion, and did not again molest our advance. The partic-
ulars of this battle have been already detailed in my report
to the War Department of the S9th of April, 1815. If
beating an enemy with two thirds his force, he having a
strong and well chosen position, supported by numerous
gun boats and heavy artillery, deserve censure ; or if
fighting him with an inferior force, when a superior was at
hand, be ascribable to him, the undersigned asks no favor
Irom his country. The bravery and good conduct of the
troops actually engaged, were seen through an unfavorable
medium by a disappointed public ; but they have the proud
j^atisfiiction of deserving the respect and meeting the ap-
plause of their enemies. Some justice is done to their in-
jured feelings, by the public declaration cf Major Glego-.
that this action was viewed by the British as one of the
most able, fought during the war.

In the above pages, the Government has been presented
with a general view of the military transactions during the
war, in which the undersigned has been engaged. During that
I)erind, he has commanded a principal army in the territo-
ry of the enemy, in the vicinity of his superior forces ; he
has commanded as senior officer in two several engage,
nients, in which the character of the American army was
involved, and its safety hazarded by an obstinate contest
with superior forces. A life passed in military pursuit<»

a£

i responi
I fcrent i
* was to
in it Wi

> executed by
of the enemy
lousand men.
avy artilleiy,
the command
iid not exceed
Iragoons and
h an enemy,
commander,
C. 1.) he had
liief. These
ip the line of
lould harrass
I troops were
; they were
p a severe ac-
The partic-
in my report
1, 1815. If
ho having a
)y numerous
isure ; or if
lerior was at
sks no favor
iduct of the
unfavorable
vethe proud
ting the ap-
I to their in-
ijor Glegg,
one of the

n presented
I during the
During that
the tcrrito-
forces ; he
ral engage*
1 army was
late contest
ry pursuits

from the age of sixteen — a long experience of the hazards
of war in the field of battle, gave him advantages in a com-
petition with youth and inexperience. With what fee Jings,
then, could he se^ promoted above him Juniors, whom he
was in the habit of commanding, new to the field of battle,
and strangers to experience ? It was not their superior for-
tune ; chance had given him an equal opportunity to meet
the enemies of his country ; like them he has commanded
against superior numbers, and the trophies of victory have
also proved the success, as the destruction of lives has the
difficulties of his eJTorts. Without an opportunity for ac-
tion, he might have found in misfortune a shield for obscu-
rity : but events have forced him into public notice ; Cir-
cumstances of so active a character ; situations of so great
responsibility, have not left him, could not leave him indif-
ferent to praise or censure. To have discharged his duty,
was to have deserved well of his country ; to have failed
in it was to incur disgrace. When, then — ^vhere has ho
incurred such disgrace ? Was it at Chrystler's fields, when
a superior foe was beaten, — because the Commanding Gen-
eral could not stop to annihilate him ? Was it when he
commanded in Canada, because his petitions to be active
were refused ; because he was only suffered to improve the
discipline of his troops, but not to lead them to victory ?
Was it on the shores of Lake Ontario, when a greater ar-
my fled before a less ; when veterans cowered to recruits,
and strength of position yielded to invincible valor ? In
the acquisition of territory, and munitions of Mar, in the
capture of forts and artillery, he could not see the marks of
public misfortune.

Or was it on the plains of Tippecanoe, he has merited
disgrace and neglect? On those plains, where (ho Com-
manding Genera', against his express advice, trusted to
the dissembled hrnesty of Indians, and fell into their snare ;
where the savage war-cry burst upon the stillness of the
midnight camp, and the discipline of undaunted regulars
saved the existence of an army ? It was a different infer-
ence he drew from the plaudits of the military bestowed
upon him, and not upon their General. There was noth-
ing like reproach in the tones of those voices, when <he
fndian howl was lost in the distance, ascribing their safety

s i

« to tho«e bravft rcgulare^.^The thanks of a Territory for
preventing the desolation of a frontier, had taught him to
think on one occasion, at least, he had not failed in his du-
ty. But to his Government he submits the decision : if he
was mistaken, he wishes not even the poor acknowledgment
of having risked his life for his country ; of aiming, at least,
at her benefit, if he should have failed in promoting it.
With much consideration,

I have the honor to be. Sir,
Your obedient servant,
„ _. , JNO. P. BOYD.

Jrlrarf— ."

The am
foops will
oard theii
an will ti
and,

n0f^ jI"

Conrorm

]er was i

lesignated

boats at

kill hold tl

rill form it

regimei

lie 1 5tli an

tt. Col. M

>ve accor
lie 15 th re|

iir to fonr
nd the oth

The lix)o
le. Col. !
'ntre; ant!
t) flaak the

tTcmforyfiMr
taught him to
liled in his da-
lecision : if he
knowledgment
imii^atleas^
imotiDg it.

?. BOYD.

:•! V ■

DOCUMENTS.

(A.l.)

Adjutant GKvtauh^a Orwictf
H. Q. Niagara^ Magf 25, 1813.

PLAN OP DESCEfJT ON CANADA.
Genekal Okder.
^.ztract-^'' Here follows a detail of the troops, &e. &c. for the descent."

(A. S.)

Adjutant Genebal's Office,
H. Q. Niagara, May 26, 1813.

After Order.— Received at 5, P. M.

The army will embark at three o'clock, to-morrow morning. The

»op« will be up at one, eat their breakfast at two, and be actually on

oard their respective boats, ready to move at half after three. Each

lan will take hia blanket and one day's ration, ready cooked. By cora-

»an*'' E. BF.BEE, Assist, Adj. Gen.

(A. 3 A.)

Can^, Fmir Mile Creek, 6, P. itf.
Niagara, Maif 26, ]H13.

BRIGADE ORDER.

Conformably to the General Ortlers of tlie 25th and 2nih Inst. [This

rder was received at 5 P. M. until which hour the boats had not been

lesignated for each regiment or brigade.] The first brigade will embark

^ boats at «iree o'clock to-morrow morning. The several regiments

HII hold themselves in readiness accordingly. The boats of the lirigade

Irill form in three lines, succeeding Lt. Col. Scott's advance party. The

Kh regiment formed in column of battalion right in front, will precede,

lie 15tli and ItJth regiments will successively follow in the same order.

Lt. Col. M'Clure's volunteers will flank tho right of the brigade and

Jove acconlingly. Four pieces of light artillery to move in the rear of

fie 15th regiment, and four in the rear of the 10th regiment. The first

"wir to form immediately on landing on the right of tiie 15th regiment,

ad the other four on the right of the IGth regiment.

J The troops will land in onler, and form immedintely in order of bat-

§e. Col. Miller of the Cth on the right; Major King, of the 15th, in the

t«ntre; and Col. Pierce, of the 16lh, on the left. M'Clure's voluatrers

t) flaok the right.

The boiftt of the Brigadier General will be designated by a green hough.
The commanding oflBcen of regiments by their regimental standards. To
guard the stores and camp equipage of each regiment, a commissioned of-
ficer, and a sufficient number of non-effectives will be detailed. Tlie
commanding officers of regiments will be responsible that their boats are
in perfect readiness to receive the troops.

The troqis which compose the first brigade have already once triumph-
ed over the foe they have now again to encounter — their country expects
much from them, and will not he disappointed : With their accustomed
bravery, they will plant the United States' flag in the territory of Canada.

JNO. P. BOYD,
Broodier General Commanding "ist Brigade.

(A. 8 B.)

First Brigade.— H. Q. Newark, May 28, 1813.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

The General commanding the first brigade feels a peculiar satisfaction
in congratulating the troops on their glorious achievement of yesterday.
Their conduct was such as entitles them to the thanks of their command-
er, and the gratitude of their country.

Col. Miller of the 6th regiment, deserves great applause for steadiness
in action, the rapidity with which he supported the advance under the
gallant Scott. The 15th, under Major King, impatient to share the
honours of the day, immediately succeeded and formed ander a most gall-
ing fire. The 16th, under Col. Pearce, urged (heir boats to the shore,
and bore an honora^ participation in the contest. The light artillery,
under Col. Porter, merits the highest credit in bringing them up the
steep bank, &c. Much was expected from Col. M'Clure's volunteers, and
the General has not been disappointed. It will be his duty as well as
inclination to make their claims known to the Commander in Chief: as
all the troops composing the brigade behaved so well it would be a diffi-
cult task to discriminate those who were pre-eminent, but the General
cannot suppress his admiration of the fortitude of Mtyor King, who
continued to lead his regiment through the severity of the contest, long
after having received a painful and debilitating wound. The exertions
of the officers and men who ascended the bank and formed amidst such a
destnictive fire, excited his admiration and astonished the enemy ; and
will convince their countrymen as well as foes, that their valour will
overcome every resistance. The General will find great satisfaction
in obeying the ordw of the Commander in Chief, which required him to
make a " report of conspicuous merit, whether found in the commissioned
officers or in the ranks," and they may be assured tliat their distinguish-
ed actions shall not pass without proper encomiums. Although the Gene^
ral has not particularised individual merit, tie may perhaps be excused in
recording the intrepid conduct of his Aid-de-Camp, Lieut. Whiting, and
Brigade Miy. Capt. Grafton: they have justified his expectations, and
are entitled to his applause.

If there is any honour to your Brigadier General, it is his having had
command of such a valiant band. .INO. P. ROVD,

Brigadier General Commanding \st Brigade.

"Oft
at the h
ade mai
formed,
himself ;

Sia,-

as volun

portunit>

particula

sure to St

duct of C

The Is

British a:

The^

right, un

Winder's

was elfeci

of musquf

such was

and led ii

brigade b

Gen. B<

of that da,

and forme(

up the bai

of the higl

With c<

ey's most

Dear S
your frien<]
Gen. Boyd
on the dep
and police

I served
Lt. Col. Sc
diately by (
formed uud

iff

(A. 4f.)
Extract o/Maj. Gen. Lends' Utter to the Secretary ^ War

ade made the landing 3rTheavf^,^ 7™^'.; ^^' «^ ^^•
formed, and he led it ud the hant »j»h J? "'"»?"«*fy' « was instants-
himself to gain it.» ^ ^ ^"^ «"** «"***°^» '"d w«« the fost

S.n^'l'!;*' t!^^':^ «* ^ ^"'i^ ofdu Uniicd states.

as^vi^e^et^lldS^elg^^Tot^^^ I -ted

portunity, not only of knowing the puietf one^ffiL'??^
particularly the mJnner in which if wi execuL a.S ir?^ *""*'?"«
Z^T^Xl "^" "^ ^'^^ - -?dTnrhat::i^e^i^^^^^^^^^^

Winder's, and lastly. Chandler's. The lanS of G«n^ Ji W*' ?**
such was the promptitude and order iSdi wh£hT?l *''® '"''* ' *'"*

oy'r^JirotlSt ^^^^^^^^^ ' ^^^ *«•« ^- *« ^« your Excellen-

PETER B. PORTER.

(A. 6.)
General MUUr's letter to a General in Boston.

1 1 c7''ilt\^!!'^'"^1 "* ""^ ^"''*"'« of *'<»'» O^orR^*. on the Niagara

Lt Col Scott led the advance and struck the shore firs , followed imm?'

ately by our brigade, which land^l in succession from i^t^ leftTnd

formed uuder a most deslrnctive fire of „„«quetrv from t^ Inemy wSo

li!

4»

nned the bank for some hundred yard.. The contest was principally, or
all over, before any other brigade landed. *"viii«uiy, oi

Gen. Boyd was the senior officer on shore. I have ever considered
h« conduct on that occa^ brave, anima«ng, intrepid, ^nd offlTu^

He was among the first to ascend the bank of theUe.and proclSmed
our victory by three cheers. proclaimed

My impreMion is that the contest continued ^arm for about fifteen
mmutes. Three musket shot hit General Boyd's clothes. He "seS
every exerhon to mspire those under his command with a zealZ vS

tK^v ^fT— f 'T!'?^^^* Pi^minentshareoftheholrof
i,HlS«i'I ""'^f? i^ ''^^^'^^^d up after the other brigade
had landed,* as ou^ht^to have l»done, it would been one of the fiwt
and most brilliant achievements during the war " "• we nrst

MJ«!n^n°;^^ commanded at Port George, after the departure of
S; nf «: '?*^''*^' »•« r ' "defaUgable in his attention to uTe disci
pline of the troops, and police of the camp.

Very respectfully, dear Sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES MILLER,

Brig. Gen. United StaUt Amy,

• After the gthej brigade landed, Ceo. Lewi, came on .hoie.

(A. 7.)

Qenerta Miller speaking if the capture of Fort George, says,
"General Boyd inspired the whole by his mtous and animatinff con-
?"H^ He rushed up the steep b.nk at the head of his briirad7whe^f
'Z^J^':^-«^^-^^^^^mn,, the charge ^^Ten. alidX'

rv bf tlLf^hJr" "«"^J.«®«*:; in the battle, and proclaimed the victc
.^^2":rai;'*t::^he3S^r^^^ ^'^^ '™^ acknowledgedap..

«.l}'^^ .conquMt he ever considered one of the most brilliant achieve
« wte *'»«^«'!."'« "ortie «^t Fort Erie excepted. "

f Gen K^frtom L •''rr!!?'** *! ^"^^ ^"^'K^' *f*«' ^^e departure
I^ni{«f '. J r ' '•« »ntf«l"ced and established as high a state of dis.
cplme and polH^e, as ever existed in our army, at any p?riod Sthe war '"

(A. 8.)

^Z.^ IkMaflit^'^ of tlu troops stationed between F • Gorge a,ul
G^J W?' ■ ^^L "'**^* /'" *'•*" ("^ hands at the cap. .re of FoH
nZ!e;edlT.r,^r'rT "^ ^"^'^ ^'^'^ ^ ^ «/?^«'-* ^^ <%

« These troops, with the exception of a small Korrlson left at Vnrt

were S nXtf"' '^T'' P^"-"^"' "^'^^ the bK wis fo^ ,?„
wTh! A Vrobamuy reinforc«l, from the know,, intention of an n tack

"^t'^!:7S.J''''''''^^-' '-«- known to haJetL'

as priucipally, or

ever considered
and o^eer like.
> and proclaimed

tor about fifteen
otbes. He used
h a zeal for vic-
e of the honor of
le other brigade
1 one of the first

the departure of
ion to the disci-

MILLER,

I ^ate» Army.

animating con-
gade, whenaf-
given, and the

med the victo*
wledged a pre-

lliant acliieve-

the departure
a state of dis-
id of the war.'

' ■* Qorge Oiul
p. .re rf Fort
lears that they
tie) 1925 reg-

n left at Fort
»s fought, and
I of an attack
to have beeu

17
(B. 1.)

Sir— General Dearborn being about to withdraw from the commawl
of the army, until his health shail be re-established, this trust wUl de-
volve upon you, as the senior officer, until the arrival of some person to
whom it will be speaaUy assigned. During this period you will pay the
utmost attention to the instruction and discipline of the troops, and en-
gage m no afifair with the enemy, that can be avoided. The orders of
Crenerals Hampton and Lewis, you will obey.

I am, Sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

„.„,„„ „ ^ JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brig-. Gen. Jno. P. Boyd, Fort George.

(B. S.)

„ , . Fort George, U. Canada, July 15, 1813.

Hon. John Ambtrong, Secretary at War.

Str—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your commands
of the 7th mst. and to iuform you that Gen. Dearborn left camp this af-
ternoon. Conformably to your orders, I have assumed the command of
the army at this post.

It now becomes my duty to report to you the want of officers to this
section of our army. Not long since, when our army was in high health,
and elated with victory, we had t^vo Major Generals, and three Brigadier
Generals ; now our force, diminished by prisoners, sickness and deaths,
IS left almost destitute. The enemy ha^ve been able, during our inactivity,
to recruit his effective force, of regulare, militia and Indians.

« I shall adhere to your instructions, which prohibit an engagement
with the enemy, when avoidable, &c."

(B. 3.)

Extract of a letter from Brig. Gen. Boyd, to the Secretary of War, dated

" Port George, July 22, 1813.
"I now conceive it my duty to say, that when Gens. Dearborn and
Lewis were in command, they did not think it necessary to consult a sub-
ordinate; I, therefore, am not in possession of any information relative to
the present campaign; or instructions lor my own government."

(B. 4.)

Extract of a Utter from Brig. Gen. Boyd, to Commodore Chauncey, dated

"Fort George, July 22, 1813.
^' Allow me once more to remark, that the presence of the fleet, or nait
of it, would enable us to act against the enemy with great effect."

(B. 5.)

Extract of a Idler from Brig. Gen. Boyd, to tlu Secretary of War, dated

" Fort George, jiily 24, 1813.
" We are anxiously expcctint; the fleet, wilii whose co-operation Uie
enemy's annihilation would be certain.'

I 1

(B. 6.)

Extract of a letter from Bi-ig. Gen. Boyd, to the Secretary of War, daU4

•^ -^ "Fort George, July 27, 1813.^

•' Our troops are becoming oiore healUiy, and anxious to be moving,"

(B. 7.)

Extract of a letter from Brig. Oen. Boyd, to the Secretary of War, dated

" Fort George, August 4, 1813.
" Since I had the honor to address you last, two deserters have come
in from the enemy, by whom we learn that he is entrenching in the woods,
in expectation of an attafek, rather than having an intention to make one
himself. His position in the wooils, where his red auxiliaries are so form-
idable, may render him strong. But rve trust, when yon shall deem it
proper to allow the army to act offensively, that we shall be able to dis-
lodge, perhaps with the co-operation of the fleet, to capture, or drive him to
bis strong hold at the head of the Lake."

(B. 8.)
Hon. Secretary of War's letter, {after rqjcatcd application from Ocn. Boyd to

allow him to act.)

War DEPARtMENT, July 30, 1813.
giR_The restrictions put upon you with regard to the enemy, were
but commensurate with the enemy's command of the lake. So long as
they had wings, and you had only feet, so long as they could be trans-
ported, supplied, and reinforced by water, and at will, common sense, as
well as military principles, put you on the defensive. These circumstan-
ces changed, the reason of the rule changes with them ; and it now be-
comes your business, in concert with the fleet, to harrass an<l destroy the
enemy, wherever you can find him. Of the competency of your force,
there can be no doubt, provided your estimate of his be but tolerably cor-
rect. A general plan of campaign, formed upon existing circumstances,
is under deliberation, and will be forwarded by the next mail.
I am. Sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

"^ '^ J.ARMSTRONG.

Brig. Gen. John P. Boyd, Niagara.

(B. 9.)

Head Quttrtas, Fort George, Aug. 8, 1813.
Hon. Jonw Armstrong, Secretary of War.

Sir— By Thursday's mail, I had the honor to receive your commands
of the 30th.

Conceiving myself at liberty to act offensively on the arrival of the
fleet, an expedition was immediately concerted, against the enemy, and
acceded to by Commodore Chauncey. One tlioiisand men were to embark
on board the fleet, under the command of Brig. Gen. Williams, to land at
the head of the Lake. The army at this place was to move in two col-
umns, Hgainst the enemy's front, while Gen. W. assailed his rear, and cut
off his retreat. Yesteruay morning, when the troops were to have em-
barked, the enemy's fleet was discovered off this place. Com. Chauncey
weighed anchor, ap])roached him, and by every indication that a leeward
position would afford, offered to engage. Sir James, after raauojuvrijig

^ar, dated

',1813.

noving."

Var, dated
I, 1813.
have come
the wtvods,
a make one
are bo form-
all deem it
ible to cli»-
rive him to

\cn. Bwjd to

JO, 1813.
aemy, were
8o long as
Id be trans-
n eense, as
circumstan-
it now be-
destroy the
your force,
lerably cor-
:uautance»,

DRONG.

,8,1813.
r commandH
rival of the

enemy,

and

etc embark
8, to land at
ia two col-
•ear, and cut
o have em-
I. Chauncey
at a leeward
nauoeuvring

«ome time at a distance, bore away for the head of the Lake, whither lie
was pursued by the Commodore. This morning our Heat is seen off in the

~f .^.^u ® *"* *"^"'y " "^*'" ^^'® «hore, on which his army is encami)-
ed, still havmg the wind in his favor.

I am sorry to be obliged to report that the unusually warm weather has

increased our sick list. The olficers, in particular, have suffered.

With much respect, I have the honor to be. Sir, your obe<rt servant,

JNO. P. BOYD, Brig. Gen. Com.

(B. 10.)
Extract of a letter from Gen. Boyd, to the Hon. Secretary of War.

" Head Quarters, Fort George, Aug. 12, 1813»
" Commodore Chauncey is still in pursuit of the enemy. This circum-
stance has necessarily delayed the attack on the enemy, which was con-
templated in my address of the 8th inst. Gen. Porter is assembling a body
of volunteers and Indians, at Buffaloe, with a view to co-operate in this
enterprise. He will, probably, be here soon. Any thing which can be
effected, mVmd the fleet, shall be attempted. To attack the enemy, mth-
out being abU to eut off" his retreat, would be only to ''beat, without captur-
ing him." "^

(B. 11.)

Extract of a letter from Gen. Boyd, to the Hon. Secretary of War.

" Fort George, Aug. 16, 18t3.
« I had the honor to address you on the 12th instant, since wliich time
nothing of importance has occurretl. Commodore Chauncey has left this
part of the Lake, and the enemy have now so far the ascendancy, as to
render the proposed enterprise against the land forces, impracticable."

(B. 12.)
Gen. Wilkinson's Letter to J. P. Boyd.
H. Quarters, Sackefs Harbor, Aug. 23, 1813, 7 o'clock, P.M.
Sir — I have this evening received information, lo be relied on, that Sir
George Prevost was met, on the 18lh inat. al)out 50 miles north of York,
pressing forward with an aid-de-camp, and a light escort of cavalry for
your neighborhood. And on the 2l8t, a detachment of regular troops, in
boats, were met between Earnest-Town and Hamilton, bound up the Lake.
These movements indicate some extraordinary enterprise, and therefore
I dispatch a courier, to reach you in forty hours, if possible, that you may
be prepared, at all points, to meet the bayonet.

Were I to hazard a conjecture, I should say he intends a stroke on
Niagara, and your batteries and magazines east of the Strait. Be atten-
tive to those points, and bear in mind, that their loss would disgrace our
arms, blast your cause, and ruin the campaign. Be prepared at all quar-
ters ; spurn the thought of yielding to numbers, and your character Avill
be exalted on the discomfiture of a distinguished chief.*

With consideration and respect, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMEB WILKINSON.
Brig. Gen. J. P. Bovd, Commanding at Fort George.

* Sir George made hU nttack, and was repulsed on the S4th.

IT >

(B. 13.)
Head Quarters, Fort George, Aug. 20, 1813.
How. John Armstrong,

Sir— I had the honour to address you on the 24th inst. The troopa
had not then ceased to skirmish in the woods. In the repulse of Sir
George, our loss wa« greater than was then reported, having five killed,
and twenty-seven missing. The enemy suffered more in killed, and left
in our hands one captain of the 49th regiment, and six privates, prisonera.
The attack was made by the enemy's whole force, with the intention, no
doubt, should he fail in an attempt on our entrenchments, to draw us into
the woods. Gen. Williamfl, with a part of his brigade, advanced some
distance into the plain, but it was conceived inexpedient to pursue the
enemy into the woods, when he retired.

With much consideration and respect,

I have the honor to be, sir, your's, &c. &c.

JNO. P. BOYD.
(B. 14.)
Head Quarters, Fort George, Sept. 0, 1813.
Hon. John Armstrong,

Sir — " I have the honor to report the arrival of Major General
Wilkinson."

I have the honor, &c. &c.

J. P. BOYD,
Brigadier General Commanding.

(B. 15.)
Earad of a letter from General WiUcinsoti, to the Secretary of War, datcd^

" Sacket's Harbor, Aug. 30, 1813.
" Sir — I have commenced barely, the arrangement of the department
of intelligence. An intelligencer left Kingston or its vicinity, last even-
ing, to tell me that Sir George Prevost commenced his operations against
Boyd, and had driven in his picquets, and taken sixty or seventy prisoners,
but had been repulsed."

(C. 1.)
Extract of a letter from Major Gen. Lewis, to Gen. Boyd, on the subject of
the battle of Chrystler's field.
" Your force certainly did not exceed one thousand infantry, and three
hundred dragoons and artillery. The reinforcement which marched to-
wards ev^ming to support you, were too late for any effective aid, and my
inspector informed me, consisted only of about three hundred men. Th«
enemy was certainly driven back, and effected no object."

(C. 2.)
Extract of a letter from Brig. Gen. Swift, {who mas in the action) to an affi.-

cer in Washington.
"Hearing many remarks as to the campaign of 1813, down the St.
Lawrence, I think it proper to mention to you that relative to the affair
of (he 11th November, at Chrystler's field : no one doubts Gen. Boyd's
having fought with his usual bravery on that day. In my opinion, a
more zealous and brave officer than Gen. Boyd, never placed himself at
the head of a column."

(C. 8.)

"'"%^yZI' y ^^'^'^Z District,
^^^ Jiork, Aprd 29, 1813

S,R In ? '^"^ ^^^- SECRETARY OP WAn *

portBo impartial stateS of Z evS7"' '''° ** ^''^ '*^« ^'^"^"o re!
eUIy -K^rb.'^^^^^^^^^^^^ made me unde.erv-

' ^'^S^:i^^ to leave Port

Grenadier's Island, I was kenf in s^I 1° ^'''^ moment of leaving

r .°^ '"t,."""" "■ -s KaiTs^' " Ar'""^, '"^

scendmg the St. Lawrence thp frAnnoL • ,- . .Afterwards, while de-
often threw the comm^roite,'^ ,^^^^^^^^^ two genera s

fa^U relative to the object of ouTmovtmtfXi!-^^^^ «f "'«««

^^on%rs!r&rc;rth^^^^

had joined us and crossed ove^ml^^^^^^ 3^ .h* V'.^ '''^S^"'' (-"<>
residue of the army embarked aiTnroceeJeht ^^^. ^""'^* »^«'« the
dezvoused at Chrystler's field at t«nn'!? ^ ^t'^*'^'"' "'e whole ren-
having bad anj, Section ofte o^er of hX J^'' f '"S"'' without
relative situation of the troons «T1k«i .^'/^"^ ""^ knowledge of the
chief suddenly informed me Ihat in l^;^'' ^'""^ '^ commander a
health of himself and of Gen LewrilT?"" °^ ^'" *^^t^«'"« i"
boats, the command on shore devolvp7n' ^'' '^^'"6 *=*»"fi"«d ^ thdr
boats, and a body of troops bvtnM '"^' """^ "''''* ^^^^ «n«"y'8 u-u

«ents were --edte^ll ?or^^^^^^^^^ °"""^- ^"- -

ord^C^irnS^arX ?^^^^ commander in CefV

that the army ehou'ld n'ot be Ttt^'TL '* ^-"y ^-.^^ opinio^n
Wdkinson for my counsel was sd<fom or'^^ ^JrlT "'" ''^ ^*^''-

vance, beat him back." N^L. wt 1 1 n T^ '""P°" "'« «•«»••, ad-
Gen. Wilkinson's health warsuThTs tnl'^^ «oyd.

had not seen him for several dav« V^* ^^.^ "^ ^'^ '"" ''**^^'"' ""<* «

^^Th^^cirh^^^n^^^^^^^^^^^^ hei'ihTrrar ^^^^^ ^" ^^^ -

mill ;?^^;ToKlt'^^^^^^^^^ P-eeded about two

brigade, and -rf^S S the cl^^^^^^ detanked i^^m the first

a party of the enemy,*^;^,. J/o hat "' fj^^^ t" f ""'^^rk and disperse
islands. Ere this could be executed « v? r 'o^Igment on one of (he

rear, reported a column of 15oo nt u-^ ^*'"' ^"'^"' *'"'" "''^

wiumn 01 1500 ol the enmy approaching iu tliat direc-

Mrati*<*(MMMMI|||k<

SJK

I'i

tioa. The detachment was immediately brought to the right about,
marched up the river, and formed in line of battle.

Gen. Lewis landed, and came to the field, viewed our position, gave
•ome directions, and returned to his boat. I pushed forward with Capt.
Selden's dragoons to reconnoitre the enemy— he opened his artilleiy, our
line advanced, skirmished, and the enemy retired.

After a long, harrassing and stormy day, the troops were directetl by
an order from Gen. Lewis to return and take post for the night (which
was inclemently stormy) so as to cover the flotilla. Late in the evening
I waited on Gen. W. on board his boat, to report the events of the day,
to receive orders for the night, and to ascertain who commanded. The
general was so indisposed that I was not permitted to see him, and wag
directed tocall on general Lewi8,whose boati boarded and received orders
to defend my position and the flotilla. Early the next morning, (11 th)
general Lewis sent an aid ordering us to move down the river. The
troops were put in motion, the commander in chief arrested their march.
At 10 o'clock the enemy's gun boats turned a point and commenced a
cannonade on our boats, without any effect on either side. During the
fore part of the day a variety of verbal orders were received, but counter-
manded before executed, occasioned, as I understood, by the want of in-
formation from general Brown. At 12 o'clock, im[)atient for some deci-
sive or discretionary orders, the troops having been nearly 48 hours under
arms, exposed to incessant rains, I rode to the bank of the river, re-
quested and obtained a specific order, written by pencil, " that the flotilla
would be put off in 20 minutes— 4 pieces of artillery would be landed to
feinforce the rear guard, which WJidd follow the boats — should the enemy
harrass the rear, turn and beat him back." While expecting the signal
for movinj5, report from the rear announced the approach of the enemy in
the woods" which intersected the fields and were flanking our right. Gen.
fiwartout was directed to disperse them. Gen. Covington to support him.
Swartout dashed into the wootls and drove the advance back to the main
body. Here he was joined by Covington. The enemy had judiciously
ehosen his ground among deep ravines of an extensive plain beyond the
woods, and discharged a heavy and destructive fire on our advance col-
umns. No oinK)sition could check the invincible ardor of our troops. —
By resolute and repeated charges, the enemy were driven more than a
mile, disputing every inch of ground. Colonel Coles with a detachment
of Boyd's brigade came up, and was immediately directed to turn the ene-
my's left flank, which was promptly executed amidst a shower of musket-
try and shrapnell shells. Two pieces of artillery under Capt. Irvine now
arrived in the field, which had been delayed by a circuitous rout ; ' ^ four
other pieces which were landed, reached th' field soon after, and UaC • ir
effect. The squadron of dragoons, under Major Woodford, wer'^ f avh ...
the field, but the nature of the ground did not admit of successfu. c ■ r^^es.
The enemy had now been driven under the protection of their gun boat»,
which sui)ported their right, and enfiladed by their numerous and heavy
artillery tl"? field in front— their left rested on the woods, obliquely to the
rear, supported by light artillery, Indi and incorporated militia. Many
of our troops l.v -l vdng to break, and ainly endeavored to rally them,
it became re. svvff for Ihe whole to fan back, and re-form out of the range
of the enejiiy's latbii batteries, which was executed without inducing

him to mov<

300 men mv

engaged evi

early assists

return to tin

the flotilla a

and joined C

remaining fa

reinforceme

-would have

mander in c

of the enen

strength inf

so large a fo

The strei

pal ofScer c

artillery, an

■tate tluir •.

amounted U

was not so

promised, y

(or four day

had no sheL

lion comme

with a cool

and that th

that this af]

the Americ

ed and woi

names of tl

flict, were

which was

with their

hers 7000 i

the despat(

I would

which was

day. The

oblivion, an

with indifii

to rescue t]

not entitlec

neglec ,, bj

«8

e right about,

position, gave
ird with Capt.
3 artillery, our

re directe<l by
B night (which
in the evening
ats of the day,
nanded. The
him, and was
■eceived orderg
lorning, (llth)
le river. The
il their march,
commenced a
. During the
d, but counter-
the want of in-

for some deci-
le hours under
f the river, re-
ihat the flotilla
I be landed to
Mild the enemy
ing the signal
f the enemy in
ur right. Gen.
Lo support him.
Bk to the main
ad judiciously
in beyond the

advance col-
' our troops. —
I more than a

a detachment
a turn the ene-
wer of musket-
ipt. Irvine now
rout ; ' ' f""'!!*"
, andUaC ■ Jr
, wen esTti^ xu
essfu. c

heir gun boats,
ans and heavy
iliquely to the
nilitia. Many
Lo rally them,
lUtof the range
thout inducing

ies. I

him to move from his strong position. At this time a reinforcement of
300 men under Colonel Upham, came into the field, whose activity while
engaged evinced tht benefit that might have been derived from their more
early assistance. After the troops were re-formed, I received orders to
return to the ground near the boats, and to embark. A valuable part of
the flotilla and the two principal arlillery officers had descended the river
and joined Gen. Brown at Cornwall, during the action, and many of the
remaining boats were already in the stream. Had an early and sufficient
reinforcement come into the field, as was expected, the result of this day
would have been very different. It is evident, throughout, that the com-
mander in chief acted with a misapprehension of the force and the designs
of the enemy — when the action began, it is probable he considered his
strength inferior to ours, i ise he would not have retained, in inactivity,
so large a force ii the boat j.

The strength oi the enemy, according to the calculation of the princi-
pal officer engaged, cfild not have been less than 2500 men, 7 pieces of
artillery, pad 9 gun boats (manned from the fleet ;) the British prisoners
state tlijjr slivngth 2100. Our force, exclusive of artillery and dragoons,
amounted to not more than 1200 men. Though the result of this battle
was not so decisive as I could have wished, and as the first part of it
promised, yet when it is recollected, that the troops had been exposed
for four days to incessant fatigue, and inclement storms, from which they
had no shelter, that we carried into the field so small a force, that the ac-
tion commenced unexpectedly, and without artillery, and was sustained
with a cool determined valor never surpassed, for more than three hours,
and that the enemy were superior in numbers and position, it is hoped
that this affair may justly be considered as having added new glory t»
the American arms. The field was crimsoned with the blood of 339 kill-
ed and wounded, whose deaths or scars will immortalize this day. The
names of the officers whose bravery and activity characterized this con-
flict, were reported to the commander in chief. The praise, however,
which was so parsimoniously bestowed on this occasion, but ill accords
with their deserts. In the account of the enemy, who reported our num-
bers 7000 men, a greater compliment is implied than could be found in
the despatches of the commander in chief.

I would not here again give an useless exhibition of the valor and skill
which was displayed by many individuals and corps on this important
day. The time for reward has passed %— those who fell must sleep in
oblivion, and those who survive, conceal their scars, which are seen only
with indifference. But, I cannot forbear from making one more struggle
to rescue the character of this army from unmerited aspersion. If it be
not entitled to the , '.-aiseof their country, let it not meet with undeserved
Beglec'^j bjc receive the common rewards o{ justice.
With much consideration and respect,

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN P. BOYD,
Brig, Gen. Commanding.

ti'

(C. 4.)
Letter of Major Ofcg^, Dcp. A^. Qcn. British army, to a gentleman in

PMudelphia,

« New York, July 25, 1815.

" Having been stationed in Upper Canada during the late war, and
holding tile staff appointment of Assistant Adjutant General, I may per-
haps be permitted to venture an opinion upon most of the military events
of that period. I have always regretted that it was not my good fortune
to have been present at the battle of Chrystler's farm, which took place
on the left bank of the river St. Lawrence, in the month of November,
1813. My regret has arisen solely from the circumstance that the op-
erationsof that day were considered by the distinguished officers present,
as conducted with more science and gallantry, than any that had previ-
ously taken place in Canada during the war.

« The event was not only gratifying to the British from its successful
result, (a) but it derived much additional interest from having surmounted
obstacles which had not been previously encountered ; I mean those aris-
ing from the good military disposition and gallantry, which were equally
conspicuous on the part of the enemy. I derive my opinion from infor-
mation from the principal officers engaged, whose written evidence is at
present in my possession.

" I have been greatly surprized since my arrival in thi« country, on
hearing that the battle of Chrystler's farm, was considerrd (b) "disgrace-
ftil to the name and military reputation of America." In Canada" it ia
considered a well contested day, and the fortunate result attributable
solely to a very decided superiority of (c) discipline and experience. No
•lame was ever imputed fo the American commanding Geuecal."

{a) The British were beaten back nearly two milei from where the engagement com-
inenced, and did not follow the Americana when they rcturiKd to their boats, after the
battle, and embarked.

(A) By fome oiicera not in the battle.

Jf i •>;{

DATE DUE

A fine of five cents will be charged for each
day overdue.