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SAMUEL DUNNETT. » ^ » BRANTFORD; SutUshtti f»s the ^tttiiott PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OF THE BRANTFORD COURIER. 1862. I: «^ df^ j;^''<". vN 0ior«^flt'jiIt|a gi!fijaolf*H ' f IN' .mnv X O.f ^fH^^Hcl titl CO^^TENTS. PAGE. XNTRODUCTION. CHAPTER 1. On the frequent use of the term memory, and divine benevolence. ■—Memory. Importance of understanding the nature and strength of the memorys The action of the memory. A power in us by which we think. Of the use and application of different terms to the memory. Of words, of figures, and of tacts J CHAPTER 11. Of the position of thoughts when they »re< forgotteu. — Thought* not shelved up in the memory. Thoughts forgotten. When* are the thoughts we have forgotten? Propositions. Do thoughts exist beyond the sphere of the soul's action? Memory said it imply a resurrection of thought. Is tnemory a resuscita- tion of dormant thought? A consciouB perception is thinking. VI. How can thoughts be laid by ? Thoughts not dormont indivi duals. The constant reception of particles a burden. Expan- sion not sufficient to meet the case. Of the three proposi- tions If^ CHAPTER ni. On the elements and actions of the soul. — ^y^nt the elements of - the soul are. Perception in tho present, in the future, and in the past. The fact of transition. Transition consistent — its cause. The power of stretching out, a mystery. The soul does not leave the body at such times. Of time and distance. Of certain forms assumed. What is the office and power ol' imagination ? Cannot perceive and imagine at the same time. Imagination a dull, and frequently, a wrong perception of things. What memory is. Imagination and perceptian in the future. Perception goes into the post. Of partly remember- ing thiags. Perception widely distributed. Steady persever- ance essential. The different stages through which the mind passes. Upon what our suocess piincipally depends. Memory a blank without conscioosness. Perception in the post also assumes different forms. How transition can be proved.. . . .34 On CHAPTER IV. On the different degrees of deception to which the soul is liable. — A deceitful or treacherous memory. What interest may do in the soul. Is the soul deceived at once, or by degrees? The struggle is long, repeated^ and voluntary. Of false forms assumed by the mind. Where does the blame rest ? Momory deceitful — why ? Of different and just rewards. The difficul- ties under which we labour from this state of mind at the mm '^"""IWilll 18 VII. present time are great. Of contradictory evidences. How auch cases involve moral responsibility. An honest forgetful memory •. .'»T s CHAPTER V. On a weak memory and its remedies — What is the caune of a weak or poor memory 7 A want of interest one cause of a weak memory. Cpnnot expect to remember everything. Timely and vigorous effort important to strengthen the momory. Interest felt and effort put forth. Increasing and repeated effort essential to strengthen the memory. Every exertion to remember gives additional strength. Explanation. According to the principle above, memory never comes to be full. Of resorting to writing as a help to the memory. Men will go to extremes 72 CHAPTER VI. In reference to reading being a help to the memory. — Remarks on reading. Reading, a great source of information. Effects of fast reading. Reason of this HI* CHAPTER Vn. How many people injure the memory. — The memory capable of gaining great strength by proper action. Of laying out all the strength in one direction 91 CHAPTER VIH« }.<.\n The actions of oondciouBness in remembering. — Classification of memory and consciousness. Of the will in remembering. Of vm. ^consciousness and the pirt which it fills in remembering. Of the soul's decision. Consciousness has many degrees of action .94 C^APTER IX. "Of the laws of the memory^— The memory is governed by regular established laws. Perception alights, upon the time. Law of relation. Extent of relation. Of relation in the world of mind. Of moral truth. Philosophical truth. Biblical truth* Historical truth. Of attraction and how it applies : 99 CHAPTER X. On Recollection.. ...';.. 108 CHAPTER XI. Consciousness and derangement| and why. — Of consciousness again. Exceptions. Cause of this state of mind* Preventa- .*^r- 'Vo- tive '.I ■*'»'•.);' Ill CHAPTER Xn. Causes of the derangement of the memory .-»-0f habit and deislin- ing interest. Of the effects of certain habits through future life.. Of bodily weajsness-^bhe cause •. ^ ......... .114* CHAPTER Xin. Iti reference to a nonentity.^Cah we remember a nonentity? We become cons 3iou8 of certain facts. Illustration of the above principles. The same motion cannot be made twice .. . 1.18 94 )9 8 IX. ' CHAPTER XIV. The identity of memory and the lower animals. — Identity of the mode of remembering. The thinking principle in the lower animals, what? Why do not men explain this instinct to which they refer in the lower animals ? Instinct a natural endow- ment. This endowment either matter or mind. ' Why men call the lower animals merely creatures of instinct. The popular definition of instinct. The power of choice in brutes. Preference to happiness a controling principle. What it is that has led men to call the lower animals "only creatures of instinct.'- Afraid to meet the infidel on his own grounds. The ground whicl. each assumes. God's way is the best, what- ever that may be . : .. 122 CHAPTER XV, Immateriality and immortality, and why? — Immateriality of memory. Immateriality no sure proof of immortality. God's power is not limited. The immortality of all depends on the will of the Creator. Immortality of the soul cannot be proved from metaphysical reasoning. Immortality proved only from the Christian Scriptures -v. 136 CHAPTER'XVI. On motion and its laws. — Of physical and intellectual motion. No material object created by the motion of a material body. To perceive a similarity requires a new perception. Remarks on the laws of motion. We say things move by the will of Xjj^od. What do we know about the law of attraction? 142 , X. CHAPTER XVII. On perceptions, demonstrations, and impossibilities.- — The opera- tions of the memory in perceptions and demonstrations. Can a person know that which is gone out of his mind ? Imposai- bio to know anything which is out of the mind 147 CHAPTER XVm. (IniversJ»lity of the laws of memory. — Memory in all beings <;overned by the same general laws. Why we have discussed this subject at such length IT)! CHAPTER XIX. An address to the young. — Rule the first, interest in thint^s. Selections. Economy. Time. Idleness. Accidents 154 CHAPTER XX. On the importance of preserving good health. — All desire good health. Physical health contributes to the health of the mind. The object of the.«»e remarks. Be careful what habits you contract : . ;i,U wi i!f*U«?Piii : . . 161 ^ CHAPTER XXI. (containing a few extracts and maxims .164 • PHILOSOPHY OP THE MEMORY. ^HMliM / /M'HMritif' V- INTRODUCTION. In introducing this littJc work to the public, my principal apology is, should any be desired, or looked for, my ardent dedre to serve, though feebly, the cause of truth. And I con- sider that a thorough knowledge of this great and invaluable principle, especially in so far as it relates either to Natural, Mental, or Moral Philosophy, to be essential to the social, civil, moral and religious happiness of our race. And therefore truth being public property, claims protection from evei^ virtuous mind. Hence whenever truth, which has h direct, or even an indirect bearing upon the intellectual, moral, or religious interests of men, comes to be concealed or distorted, any effort which may be put forth in an honorable way, having due regard to the opinions and feelings of others, with a view to correct mistakes, (through oversight or errors transmitted^ or adopted from others, or originated by themselves,) and present this priceless pearl in i^^s proper dress, and in its real-character is, in the humble opinion of the writer, a sufficient apolc^ for any effort of this kind, even though the object contemplated thereby might not in every respect be secured, or especially, be immedir ately realized. I most frankly confess however that I am not a little astonished at myseif, and it is only natural for me to t^ink that many who might condescend to read this little book, •WMMlbMlriWMl 2 INTRODUCTION. will wonder at my boldnesa in presuming to diwscnt, especially in 80 public a way, from popular theories which have been ad- vanced by great and learned men, and which have glided grace- fully, rapidly, and easily on the current of popular opinions, from generation to generation, and are brought down 'to the present time, relating to the Philosophy of the Memory. 1. I have ventured to differ with those who use the term " faculty of the soul" to apply the memory without giving the explanations which the real nature of the case require. The Memory, we admit, is a " faculty of the soul," i. c, if the term " faculty" is understood to mean all the various powers of the soul. But inasmuch as there is a distinction in those powers, and a difference in their dependancy and the degrees of that dependanoy on each other, it comes to be a question whether the simply using of the term " faculty of the soul" to describe the r&ison, imagination or the memory is sufficient to place any one of them in their proper light. If we use the term "faculty of the soul" to the memory, and only use the same term to the perception or consciousness of the soul, without any more explanation than the terms themselves contain, and seeing that the term " faculty" is used to mean the same in kind and degree, in the same individual person at all times, how shall we ever know the difference between an element of the soul, and an act of the soul ? If all the powers of the soul are to be desig- nated faculties, then an explanation of the difference should be given of the different classes of those powers. This however does not come within the limits of my plan. Yet I would venture to ask if percepHon^ coiueiousness, sensation^ and the loi^, do not con- stitute the elements of the soul ? And these, if I were permitted, I would call " faculties of the soul," and the others such as rea- son, imagination, memory, &e., I would call "powers" as they are the result of the action of the other four, but if all must be called " faculties," I have no objection, providing that the distinction V INTRODUCTION. d be kept in mind as it exists in nature. 1. In nature there are tile elements whioh make the soul. 2. There are the powers of the sonl. The men^ory I conceive not to belong to the first class, but to the second. 2. I have ventured to dissent also, from the popular views in reference to the nature of its office, which is supposed to be to recollect and lay up the thoughts for future use. Much as I esteem the name of Locke, Reed, Watts, Upham, and others who have written on this subject of Mental Philosophy to en- lighten mankind, yet on this point, the memory, I beg to differ from them. And I wish at the same time to show why, and also to show where I think they, and all others who have adopt- ed their theory, have misapprehended the nature and office of the memory. I hope that no one will mistake the object of the writer which they surely will if they suppose this work was intended for the learned — ^it is not designed for those deep thinking intellects, and who have given that time and attention to the study of mind which the importance of the subject demands — and who can discriminate minutely between right and wrong — who can compare human experience with metaphysical specula- tions on the nature and office of our intellectual faculties ; but it is for those who have not had these advantages, and conse- quently are not placed in such favourable circumstances. Hence, we have good reason to hope that this effort, weak as it is, and powerless as it necessarily will be on the more intellectual and learned portion of the community because it does not come up to their standard, will not be depreciated by them, seeing it aims af^another class of society. It appeared to the writer that notwithstanding much has been ably written on the Philosophy of the inind, yet something more 4 INTRODUCTION. was needed . to be said on that important power which we call the memory, seeing it has not received, in my opinion its proper share of attention. How far this little book will go towards supplying that deficiency will be for the reader, and not for the writer to determine. Those impediments too that stand in the way of an easy and rapid development of our intellectual powers, and those rules for improving the memory r.t which I have glanced, I hope will be carefully examined^ and especially by the youthful reader. ' I have purposely laboured, according to the best of my ability, to condense my remarks on every topic discussed, so as to say as much as I could in the smallest possible space. This I have done principally, for two reasons. 1st, To save the time both of the reader and writer, and 2d, To save unQCcessary expense. Much more might have been said on almost every point discus- sed especially on some, but we think enough has been said on each particular to fully explain our views on the Philosophy and Identity of the Memory, which is the principal object at which we aim. ON i qu( hui vid . ha& gre tau the ere the the 'str< ma PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY i CHAPTER I. ON THE FREQUENT USE OP THE TERM MEMORY, AND DI- VINE BENEVOLENCE. Section 1 .* Memory, The memory is a term of very fre- quent use — of every day occurrence. It is used in many cases, hundreds of times, in one shape or another, by the same indi- vidual in the course of a few hours. And the term memory, has hitherto, and is at the present time used, perhaps, by a great majority of mankind, to represent what they have been taught to believe, and do believe, (if they have any belief about the matter at all) to be a faculty of the soul. In vii'tue of the ex- ercise of this " faculty," all who believe in its existence attribute their knowledge of past events to its influence and action. That there is su^h a power associated with every mind, no matter how ' strong and capacious, or how minute and diminutive that mind may be, to remember the past in a greater or le«s degree, \n a 6 PHILOSOPHY OF THK MEMORY. truth which will be readily conceded. And this power we dc- •ignate hy the term memory. And with the existence of such a power and its mode of operation there are many things con- nected which-are of the deepest possible interest to every rar tional mind. And things too which authoritatively demand our most sincere attention and ardent investigation — truths indeed of incalculable, yea of infinite worth, but which facts, sentiments, practices, doctrines, &c., notwithstanding their im- portance, without attention, perseverance and deep research, will never appear within the consequent circumscribed sphere of our mental vision in their full and proper light. Indeed the more we look at the action of the memory the more we are astonished at its amazing energies. And although we are com- jparatively lost in the mystery connected with its complicated and astonishingly active operations, yet intimately associated with its origin and peculiar modifications, with all its power, strength and action, may be seen in legible characters by every truly reflecting mind, the indelible impress of Infinite Wisdom, Benevolence and Power. Yes, the benevolence of the great Au- thor of the Universe is most clearly seen, and forcibly felt, while a reflective mind minutely examines the powers and modifications of the memory, fully as much so as in any faculty of the soul. This great truth is one that should not only be appreciated and applied to the purposes of life at the present time, but one that is worthy to accompany us through all the journey of future li& as a suitable companion, » profitable handmaid, a philosophical instructor, a theologicol expositor, and one that will serve, to a mind inclined to piety, to which great practical principle all minds should tend, like water, to a common level, as' a constant stimulant to faith and virtue. The real value, however, that such a sentiment would prove to us, cannot be fully ascertained without a thorough, impartial, and deliberate investigation into its nature ana associatiopis. — Hence, when we speak of the Benevolence, of God in the con- Structiou of the mind, and endowing that mind with a power to remember, that is to say, with a power to know the past, we not only look at the existence of the power by which we go into tji^ past, and the actual and positive advantages which we de- rive from the action of that pmver, but We are inclined also to look at its opposites. In fact, we find it exceedingly profitable . to look ?it those matters of Providential interposition, liot only ^ I > ' I I PITlLOSorHY Oli; THE MEMORY. 7 poHitivcly to Hce wliat we are with theiu, but negatively, to see what we would be without them. The very acknowledgment, whether publicly or tacitly, that the mark of Divine Benevo- lence is engraven in the human memory, naturally enough sug- gests to the mind that is open to the force of truth, a train of Uiought something like the following : ^' Had the Almighty seen proper to make man without the capacity to remember, and to continue that existence through a series of generations, what 'might we naturally suppose would have been the conse- quences r' To which we might answer, had man been created without a memory, whatever might have been his other quali- fications or endowments, whatever intellectual or physical ex- cellences he might have possessed or presented, he would after all have been entirely incapacitated to answer the purposes of human life— entirely unfit for either social, civil, intellectual or religious enjoyment. Every person knows, I presume, that the enjoyment of civil life depends, in a great measure, upon our knowledge of the civil compact, whidi implies, a knowledge of the science of po- litical government and of the propriety and necessity of a judi- cious civil administration, a knowledge of the customs and usages of nations and the principle on which any law having a general application is founded. Intellectual enjovment de- pends chiefly upon our knowledge of the intellect, its powers and operations, its capacities and the uses to which they may be applied. It implies a knowledge of those laws by which the mind expands, strengthens, and hy which it becomes invigo- rated — a knowledge of the will, the perception, the conscious- ness, the judgment ; also the moral faculty and its ofiice in the soul, a knowledge of the motives, the desires and the actions, with a knowledge of the memory which reveals them. Social enjoyment is derived from a knowledge of others, their dispo- sition and qualities j frqp tjie presence of others, their man- tiers and conversation, all of which brings us into the past. And evesry person can see that there can be no religious enjoy- )aient without aratitude^ which vi,itue is a legitimate offspring bf our knowledge of the past. ' Or, in other words, which pej;- baps will be more comprehensive, we would say, fiad we no power to remember we could possess no grateful feeling »nd if we are riot grateful we are not religious. So that althougji Q viuiomvn\ oT Tin: memouy. we iiKil boon made iiitolkclual beings, aiul with a moral faculty u6 wo now Are, }'ct, bfing at the eaiuc time destitute of memory the moral sense would have been nearly, if not altogether, uee- lees. Hero let me observe, and, ! may this truth be deeply impressed on the youthful reader who may peruse this little book, that, if there were no other argument to be found within the wide range of the human mind to prove a wise and benevo- lent dcs>ip:n in the formation of man, the existence of the me- mory, i's amazing energies, its inooncoivablv rapid movements, its numerous lawn, their actions and the oflfects of them on the emotions and upon every sense and power of the soul, thitt would be BujUiclciit. Facts of thiB kind, which are within the reach of nil, and which are to be seen too in such vast numbers and so groat in their magnitude, by the simplest process of reasoning, suggested by observation, and drawn from this source alone, must surely be sufficient to bring pungent conviction to the most sceptical mind, if he would but take time and pains to invesj-lgate, or, in other words, if he will but refrain from offering violent resii^t- ance to its force, that we have in the human memory an ampli- tude of ever living and irresistible arguments as clearly demon- strated, that Infinite wisdom, benevolence and goodness, as well as Infinite power, are seen in the formation of memory, as any demonstration ever was or ever will be. And from its uni- form and constantly active operations, we know, with as much certainty as we know that we exist, that it is constantly adding to the social, intellectual and moral hat^pincss of all who are disposed to act from right principles. Therefore it was given to us for a wise and gracious purpose. This is the only legitimate and rational conclusion to which we can come ; consequently we conceive the opposite of this to be false. Sec. 2 .* Important of understanding the nature and Btrenoth of the Memory. The fact that there is something withm us that tells us, in language which we cannot fail to understand, that we lived yesterday, or that we have been in a certain place, and that we have been in such and such circum- stances, ten, twenty, thirty, or fifty years ago, as the case may be, ra a fact as universally acknowledged as the existence of that consciousness which tells us that we live at the present tiine. .. PHILOSOPHY OF THK MEMORY. 9 Thu Homething that telb ub these things is what we call memory. Aud yet it does wpear, notwithstanding the universal cxistcnoe, aod tao uniyersal acknowledgment of the exiHtenue of that oper- ative iomething, to be a fact and a lamentable one too, that the nature of the memory, and the laws which govern it is a sub- ject V ith which the great majority of men, even in this age oi'light and intellectual improvement are no better acquaint- ed than an untaught pagan is with the science of Scriptural Theolc^, and the practical working of Gospel truth. In fact this subject, the " Philosophy of the Memoi^" notwithstanding its importance, and how deeply it ought to interest every intc^ leotual ai)d moral being, seems to the great majority to have no beauties in it that they should desire a knowledge of its practi- cal workings. And being so indifferent to tho nature of the memory they will use but little effort to become acquainted with the laws which govern it, and are therefore ignoran,t pf its powers. In oomioquonce of this indifference, and unpardonable Ignorance, they soon become through this neglect, doomed to vacillation and doubt in regard to the past, and perplexed, with fears, and wild in their calculations for the future, are necess- arily un^ucce3sful more or less in their business, and as a natural consequence do entail upon themselves, and frequently upon their posterity, an incalculable amount of physical and mental suffering, which a little intellectual industry and pre- caution might have prevented. If this is true, it follows as a matter of course that it is a duty which we owe to ourselves and to others, apd which cannot be neglected with impunity, to labour hard and spare no pains to understand the philosophy of the memory, its capacity and its use. Hence, it becomes an imperative duty from personal considerations of intellectual and pecuniary advantages, to prize the memory highly, to foster it oarefullv, to strengthen it by action, to employ it constantly, and so improve it. And yet were we obliged to resort to argu- ments and incentives remote from all personal eonsiderations, the very fact of having power to remember is sufficient to attract the attention of all rational intelligences, to excite their admi- ration, and also to increase the gratitude* of every one ^ho values, a^o ought, the free and inestimable gifts of God. Sec.S.\ The action of the Memory. When we say that there is no power of the mind more active than the memory, } lo PHILOSOPHY OF THE MExMORY. ■ we not only speak a great philosophical truth, but we speak also the experience of every rational being. For we know it is almost constantly operating during our waking moments, and frequently when we are asleep. We also know that we are ' continually depending upon this source, and upon this alone for all the knowledge we gather from the past. And the greatest part of the knowledge which we possess comes from the past, indeed I cannot perceive how it is possible to know anything, that is, in the ordinary way of getting knowledge, unless it is derived from the past. It is true, we might, and would, have present perceptions, but they are fleeting as the moments, and are constantly passing away on the wings of time, or in othe^ words, we are constantly pnsing away from them. The truth of this, and the natural force of this truth will be easily enough perceived by any one who might be disposed to watch intently the actions of his own mind for the short space of five minutes. It will be seen, and the fact will be felt, and an honest man will be forced to confess that we cannot hold before the mind one truth, be the same great or small, not even for the space of one moment, or a second, or the thousandth part of a second. These events, whatever may be their nature, will remain in the paiit the only possible sphere of their existence, and we can no more hold them than we can arrest the progress of time, op the motion of the earth. So that the scenes of the present, however much we may be interested in them, exist only in the past when that moment which first produced them is gone, or more properly speaking yhen we are gone from it. And as all yreaent time is so fleeting, and passes from us with such ra- pidity and does not afford sufiicient material from which to draw what information we require for the purposes of life, and as past time is so much more abundant and fruitful in events, we necessarily have to resort to it^ And though this moment which is now present time, will never, so long as eternal ages roll their rounds, be present time again, but will always be past time, yet we can have access to it, however remote that particle of time may be, ^and at our leisure, by the helps of the memory, we can draw information, fully reliable, ^d of the most important and useful character. In view of these indis- putable facts, it must appear more or less interesting to every intelligent being to be able to know the process by which the memi shall si pore he hi "faol made the si of it, J by w| sphei •\ PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY, 11 memory makes us acquainted with the past. This process we shall endeavour hereafter to explain. Sec. 4 .• A power in u$ hy which we think. Now, as every person knows he has a power by which he thinks, that is to say, he has a power, which we frequently designate hy the term "faculty" by which certain impressions called "ideas" are made, and are being constantly made, which we call thoughts ; the simple meaning of this is, according to our understanding of it, that we have a faculty in us, and which is born with us, by which we perceive present events that are within our own sphere of action. And it is equally true, and equally clear to the most ordinary conception, and consequently as readily dis- covered, and adniitted, that the mind has also a power to per- ceive the past. Now that intellectual state in which the mind is found while perceiving the past, we commonly represent by the term remembering. This tei*m "remembering" is under- stood by some to represent a peculiar action of the mind, in the past, by Which action it recollects, or gathers together the events which exist in any given space of past time ; but the use we intend to make of the term "remember" is to express the reperoeption of any event, or of any specific number of events, without any reference to this supposed collecting of thoughts by literally gathering them, and placing them in juxtaposition., And therefore "remembering" is a term which we design to use, for the following purposes, and no other, viz. : to represent two distinct states of mind, namely, perception of that which is in the past, and a consciousness that the thing so perceived has. been, or has not been, as the case may be, perceived by the mind before. Sec, 6 ; ' 0/ the use and applicati(yii of different terms tty. the memory. This mental state which we call "remembering" like everything else in nature is represented by diiFerent terms, and considering that words are only signs of our thoughts, and are always used to represent our perceptions to others, whether these perceptions are in the present or in the past, and are also quite arbitrary m their rule of action, it will make but little differe&oe what words we use, providing nevertheless they fully express, according to the general meaning and application of words, the nature of our perceptions. But when any term or riMa 12 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MKMORV. any number of terms obtain common consent by the approba- tion of public opinion as being proper to apply to such and such things, when they are not thus applied we who make a part of the public who have approved of such application, cannot but fed that we have just cause of complaint. For it must l)e obvious to all, that when words are used which do not express the real nature of our perceptions, they are calculated to perplex and embarrass both our own minds and the minds of others, and it will tend to lead us from the truth instead of directing us to the truth. It happens sometimes with writers and public speakers that half a dozen or perhaps a dozen words are used where one word would answer every purpose, both for explana^ tion and application. This we would call tautology, repetition or a useless multiplication of words. And we look upon this practice as not only unpleasant to the eye of the reader, or offensive to the ear of the hearer, but one for which the more intelligent part of mankind feel unwilling to make any allowance, or to receive any apology, or extend any pardon. If then the useless repetition of words, for the purpose of making: a long discourse, or a large book, excite our displeasure, how much more so should we feel to dissent from the practice of misap- plying words, and calling things by wrong names, and which also have not obtained public consent ? If for example, I should say that I sat at my writing desk and call my children, who all obey that call and rally around me, so that I have them all before me at once, the words which J have used arc such as would justify every person to suppose that my children heard my voice and left their various occupations, the one lays down his book, another his top, and a third his composition and actjially comes to the place where I was sittingT^hat else could any one suppose ? Now, it turns out that they, the public, have misapprehended my meaning, because instead of their coming to me^ I wished to be understood to mean, by what I saiid, that T wont to each of them, in this and all similar cafees the public are not in fault, but I am in fault, because the very words that I have used, and the manner in which I have used them, would lead to no other conclusion than, that th^ came to me, whereas / went to them. I would therefore observe, with all defferenee to those great men, that the language of some writers on the Philosophy of the mind, is calculated to lead the illiterate to the same conclusion, that is. the opposite maataammmm PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. 13 of the truth, and to embarrass, to perplex, and confuse then<, instead of helping them. And therefore persons who write for the public, or who speak to the public, as teachers, should be careful never to misapply words whose meaning have become eetablished by common consent on the plea that "words are arbitrary," or that the wise and learned will underst>and the use of words from the " tenor of the discourse." It is not for the wise we write, but to instruct the ignorant, therefore words which express the simple naked truth, languiige that will come down to the illiterate, even to the child, should not be con- sidered beneath the dignity of any mind however strong he may be, whose object is to enlighten his fellow beings, and defend the cause of truth. Sec. 6: 0/wordSy ofjiguresjandof/acts. It is a truth which is readily admitted that we can speak but seldom, on any subject, that is long enough to be called a conversation, without using comparative terms, or accomodated phrases. But though we claim this right, which public opinion has granted in ail ages, to use such expressions, we must still bear in mind that our latitude even in this respect shoidd be bounded by common consent, and the sense oS the subject. Hence, when we have a knowledge of any particular portion 6f the past, we merely say for brevity sake, "we remember" which term is not only perfectly harmless, but quite appropriate because it merely expresses our knowledge of the past without any reference to the mental process or mode of action by which we obtain such knowledge. But to use the following popular phrases com- monly used by scientific men is, notwithstanding unwarrantable because it does not, and indeed cannot express or lead an illiter- ate person to form anything like a just idea of the action of the mind in remembering. The expression to which we allude is this : "when we remember we called from the deposit of the mind those thoughi:s which are there laid aside fo^ future use." Now, this manner of speaking, though very common, and also very popular, does not express the nature of the memory and its mode of operation, any more than it expi'esses the nature and uses of a crowbar, [or explains the mystery of the philoso- pher's stone. For whatever might have been the idea which those learned men entertained in reference to the nature and mode of operation of the memory, the words which they use, B 14 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. tiieir manner of expression is oalculated to misrepresent its real nature, and its natural mode of operation. Because, the ex- planation of the memory, and its manner of operation as given hy them in this quotation which in substance is this : that the office of the jnemory is to lay aside those thoughts which oome under the mind's notice and call thetm up as occasion may require. This explanation of the memory and its mode of operation as given above, has been, and still is,, regarded as satisfactory by the generality of men. The principal reason appears to be that, like many other things of equal, and some, if it is possible, of paramount importance, it has been received on trust rather than go to the necessary trouble of investigating into its pro- priety and truthfulness. And as the knowledge of Philosophy and literature have been for centuries past .princip^y confindd to the higher schools^ and is yet to some considerable extent, although in this respect the present age is very far;ln advance .of the past, yet there is ^Ibutra small proportion of mankind,: that have access to those higher institutions where the sciences are taught with that facility, and to that perfection as to fully meet the wants of men. And as the mass of men in every ag| and country, have either been contented to remain in ignorance altogether, or take on trust the speculations and Metaphysical explanations of those who had aspired to higher professions, and in a great measure, it is so still, therefore the explanation of the memory now under consideration, and to which we objeot,ha8 liitherto been satisfactory, and still is, so far as our knowledge Dxtends. We have taken the liberty at different times to intro- duce the question, for the purpose of information, but have not had the good fortune, as yet, to find one person who has given sufficient attention to the subject to enable him ta detect the popular error to which I allude, nnd it is difficult so far as my experience goes to find any one who has thoroughly investigated the Philosophy of the meinory, so as to enable him to give a satisfactory explanation of its nature and office, in any other way than by adopting the thoi^hts and theories of others. We repeat it, that we have never, not even once in our life,, heard the "rnilosophy of the explanations of the memory" as given above, called in question. It has passed down from the father to the son, from the teacher to his tcholars, from generation to t 1^ \ PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMOBY. 15 generation/ as an established truth in its stereotyped form, no one appears to intercept its progress, and it claims universal homage, prinoipally on the ground of its antiquity, and the claim is almost universally obeyed. We often read, and hear, from the social circle, the pulpit and the lecture-room, of thoughts " laid in the memory," or thoughts laid in the " countless chambers of the brain," but no one has ever attempted to explain, or even professes to be able to explain to us what this laying aside means ; no one who adopts this theory has as yet been kind enough to show man- kind the proper place of their deposit. They tell us, it is ttVLQ, that they speak figuratively, biu what satisfaction is this to unlearned people? But are men justified in using a figure and living in profound ignorance of the relative fact? If thoughts laid aside in the ^' countless chambers of the brain" is used as a figure, we have no objection, providing it is so ex- plained and so understood. Men have a right to Tifie figures, but then these figures are designed to represent facts, and every one who hears the figure has a right to enquire after the fkot. It is the fact we desire ; figures are good, but facts are better. And for any one to write or speak in ironies, hyper- boles, or figures, and have no facts, is to spend his precious strength for naught, like one who beateth the air. And it is a little remarkable that those who have dealt so freely and fluent- ly in what they call figures, have not seen fit to give us the fact at all. This would lead us to conclude that there is no fact to which the figure will apply. When we say that the wicked man shall be cast into the bot- tomless pit, we use a figure, and a very strong one, and we are justified in the use of it because it is in the bible ; but the same good t)Ook suggests to us its corresponding fact: where is it? We answer, in this, that he shall be shut out of heaven and shall be sensibly confined in eternity. When we say that wicked men shall suffer the fire of hell and brimstofi^, we use a figure, but we have an idea at the same time of its corresponding fact, tfatt Is, that they shall be punished extremely in another world. Ill like manner when w^ speak of good men receiving and wear- ily A ^^erotm" on their heads in Another state of existence, and " palms in their hands/Und dwelling in a city whose streets are 16 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. of pure i^old, &c., we make use of a figure, and where is the fact ? Wo answer, the crown is descriptive of honour, the palm of vic- tory, golden streets, of a glorious residence, &o. Now, in speak- ing of the mind of man, that thoughts are laid in the mind, or in the memory, or especially when xve say they are laid in the brain, it is not sufficient to say " we use a figure," supposing that this willjustifyfor the latitude we use, and the liberties we take with language, unless we can show, especially when called upon to do so, something like corresponding facts. Now, memory, as we before remarked, is that power of the mind by which we come to know things that have passed under our former observation. And thoughts in the memory, if any meaning can attach to it at all, must surely mean thoughts before the mind. Now, there is no difference that I can perceive be- tween the expression " thoughts before the mind," and thoughts that are " present to the mind." If, then, those thoughts that are ** laid in the memory," means the same as thoughts " before the mind," and thoughts before the mind means thoughts that p;re present to the mind, it would follow as a neoessarr conse- quence, that the mind must have a knowledge of all those thoughts said to be laid in the memory. On this principle of ar- gument it will be seen that no circumstance that has ever oome under the mind's observation can possibly be forgotten. Be- cause if the theory i» correct that thoughts are to be laid in the mind, and thoughts that are forgotten are to be laid in the m€^ mory, thpse that are not forgotten, of. course, are also present to the mind. And if those that are forgotten are laid up in the me- mory, that is the same as to be " laid up in the mind," conse- quently they would all be present to the mind. It is something strange that those close thinkers who have made such great dis- coveries, and bro\]^ht tol ight so many interesting truths relat- ing to mental philosophy, should have failed to see these palpa- ble inconsistencies. The inconsistency of this theory to which we allude may be seen by a simple process of argument, com- mencing at the proposition that memory implies a ''calling up of the thoughts that are laid in the mind," we shall soon be forced to the conclusion that a man can forget nothing. And yet this conclusion, to which wo must arrive, will be such as contradiots the experience of all men. Because it m universally aokoow- Icdged that a very great part of those things which come undier PHIliOSOPHY OF THE MEMOIIY. 17 our observation, come to be lost sight of by the mind, and con«e- qxiently forgotten for the time being, and many of them are never perceived again. Hence, it comes to be an acknowledged fact in our experience, that some thoughts, that is to say, »ome perc^tions, which we have had, and we know that we have had such perceptions in times pa^t, not because we can now peroeive them in detail, for tliat would be to have them as before, but we have a consciousness of a kind of outline, although we have for- gotten the minute particulars, which we may not perceive again tbr years, and perhaps never. Now, as these thoughts, whether they be few or many, great or small, of great impor- tance or of no consequence, are forgotten, they are therefore not remembered, and if they are not remembered they are not present to the mind ; and if they are not present to the mind they are not laid up in the mind. Our intention, how- ever, for the present, is to confine our enquiry more particu- larly to those thoughts that appear to' return to the mind at certain intervals, or, in other words, to enquire how the soul obtains a knowledge of events that have so long ago transpired, and whether it can or eaniiot be said of them that they are shelved up in the memory. 18 PHII^OSOPHY OF TIIK MEMORY. t f* . CHAPTER II. OF TH£ POSITION OF THOUQHTS WH]SN THET ARE FORGOTTEN. - Sec, 1 ; Thoughts not shelved up in the memory. To un- derstand this matter correctly we will need to be very explicit, and perhaps may have to^indulge in a little repetition. There- fore we would remark that the business of the memory is to take cognisance of the past, as it has nothing to do with the present, nor , :with the i^ture. , And no power of the spul can noticey perceive, and know the past put the memory. But this does know the past. And if memory implies to know the past, and if to know the pa^t implies the^ calling up of those thoughts that have been "deposited in the memory," the mind must of necessity have a consciousness of their deposit, viz. must know the place where they are laid, as well as the number of those thoughts deposited, and also the proportionate strength and nature of each thought. This, so far as we are able to perceive must be the case, unless it were possible for thoughts to exist in the mind, of which the mind at the same time has no know- ledge. Should it be urged that thoughts can exist in the mind of which the mind has no knowledge, the query would then be how any man could convince himself that thoughts exist in his mind about which he knows nothing, of which he has no consciousness whatever. It looks to me that a man would find himself as much embarrassed, and perplexed in attempting to convince himself of a proposition of this kind being true, as he would be, should he attempt to convince him- self that he is not the same man that he is, but that he is another man altogether. And he would, were he to test both by his own original powers, meet with no more success in the first proposi- tion, than he would in the last. Now, the same obstacles, both in regard to number and magnitude would exist, were we to attempt the same imposition on any other person, who is capable of appro- PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMOllY. ly M elating an argument, and has deeision enough to chose the right and reject the wrong, because the theory, which we here repudi- ate, beipg 80 completely destitute of proof, he who adopts it must lail when it is brought to the test, seeing ho cannot appeal to the judgmQPt; or consciousness of himself, or those of any other jpersoia^ with the least chance of success. I^o say that thotiiguis ciriB "laid up ia the memory" merely because a certain train of tJb[oughts wHch we once had and have forgotten for a con- siderable Ipp^th of time, perhaps several years,appear again to the mind, thatls, come again under the mind's observation, proves nothing to the point, so far as we can perceive. NeitJber would an assertion of this kind, that " thoughts are laid up in the memory" because they appear again after having been forgotten, a]?ord tlie least satisfaption, or be in the least appreciated as an a^gliment, but wpuld t)«i. looked upon oiily in the light of a detclpat^tion, by any jperson who is accustomed to look into the natu^rd of things a^ judge .for himself. To say that thought |cu« iii,ihe> inemory^ and at the same time are not pi:esent to the mincT, ,i|^ in'fpjb^t^oe Ijli^isan^e as if we should say we remember that If Hch is noi pr^i^t to the mind. And in fact every one tacitly admits this who. lipids to the doctrine of shelving up in the ipemory, thoughts^or future use. This beii]g shelved up sef^ to iittply^ that;vriiil®^key are "shelved up" they are forgot- ten, wl^ch is just, as i^uch of a oontradiction as it would be to say ; we remiember that which we have forgotten, we know that which we*do not know, we perceive that which we dp not per- ceive, we feel that of which we have no sensation. It must be obvious to evei^y person, who will reflect a uxpment, that thoughts which we do not now remember^ although they were once pres- ei^t to the mind, and at which time we, had a knowledge of them, bepa\ise we perceived them ; yet the soul has no more know- ledge of them noM7 seeing it does not remember them, than it has of perceptions which it never had. The question then which we need to understand is this : Do these thoughts, while they are forgotten, lay in any department of the mind? To this we answer, if they do we conceive it is possible to find them out, although, this can only be done by the person himself, yet surely it oan be done by him if ^ey lay on his mind, as it IS »4d tb^ose ihoui^hts do that are forgotten. To {^dli^it the oppodte would 1^ fatal to our moral accountability, because, if one class pf thought^ are in the mind of whicK.^^ul Js not .^.. 20 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMOHY. 'conscious, why should there not be another clasfl in iha game position ? And if thoughts lay in the mind of which we are not oonscious of their exsitence, we of course would be ignorant of their nature, whether they-are good or bad, and therefove could not with any degree of justice be held accountable for such men- tal operations. Therefore the doctrine that teachee that thjoushts which are forgotten are laid in the memory, we conceive to be a great philosophical error, and one which, wnen properly investi- «ited, if fully believed must effect, more or less, our belief in the Christian Scriptures, the Goodness of God, and our conduct towards him. Sec. 2 ; Thouahta forgotten. Thoughts which we have . forgotten appear to be nothing more or less than events or circum- stances, which were once present, but when forgotten are absent from the mind, or more properly speaking the mind is absent, viz : it leaves them. And this appears to be ihe view which the mind is naturally inclined to t^e of it when it exerdses its own original powers free from any previous bias. Such ex- pressions for example, as the following, when reference is made to us of past events which we know were once observed by some one present, the person to whom the reference li made, if he has forgotten the circunistance at once makes use of the very familiar and common sense phrase, " the thing is out of my mind," or, "it has escaped mv mind." The first is philosophically correct, the second is designed to convey the same idea, but must be understood to mean the opposite of what it savs, viz : when we say "it" "the thought has escaped my mind the expression gives action to the past thought, as if it had actually run away from the mind, whereas the truth is, that the mind has gone away /row that. "We say, when we have forgotten any thing that, "we have no knowledge of it at present." And this is the fact in reference to that thing which we have forgotten. This being our experience, the idea that these things, thotights, are all the while in the " memory" safely deposuced for future use, we see, is, repudiated by the common sense expression of every man, who explains his own mental operations by his own origin- ality, in his own common sense way. And when we listen to the jumbled mass of half digested thoughts of a certain clapft of public speakers, how much inclined, with their adopted coWec^on of metaphysical declamations, they are to display their vocabulary ijiv \ 1 d e PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. 21 of words, whioh exoito tho astonishinetit of the ignorant, and the indignation of tho wise, did we not know that uey live entirely on borrowed oapital, we should be inclined to think, if not tempt- ed to say to Bu,^^ because ihey are present to the perceptive faculty and con£^ > quently under the very act of thinking, at tie ssone time tiiat ijS PHILOSOPHY OP THE MEMORY. 27 wpt they are so perceived, involves a contradiction, and is therefore impossible in the nature of things. Sec. 8 ; A conscious perception is thinking. It might not be amiss to remark here, although we shall have occasion to speak more fully on this point hereafter, that thinking im- plies an action of the mind ; and an action of the mind docs not appear to ns to be a possible thing without thinking at the same time. The one appears to be identified with the other, so much so that it does not appear possible for us to be the subject of intellectual action without thinking, or to produce a thought, great or small, without an action of the intellect. It is true, Iwwever, that sometunes, for want of interest in those actions of the mind, many of them are but slightly noticed, but that does not make them any the less real. And at other times, owing to mental derangement, though the action of the mind at such times may be more rapid and intense than when acting under ordinary circumstances, l^ut for want of t*. proper eqili- brium and corresponding activity in the operating faculties it is unconscious of the greatest part of its actions. But stilt he thinks as really, though not as correctly, »s he ever did. And these, of course, are properly actions of tud mind, though they are not rational, therefore these are exoeptio»»-to the general rule, and as such should be treated. But with such exceptions anything in the mind implies a conscious action of the percep- tion, and such action implies sensible and rational thought. See, 9 .* How can thmghts be laid by f But another diffi- culty which the doctribe oishelving up in the brain, or in other words, depositing in the mind produces, is this : that those thoughts represented as individuals whose number is in a con- stant and rapid increase, and some of which appear in tremen- dous magnitude, must be subject to a very extensive classifica- tion and constantly new plans of arrangement, and which arrangement must be made for every rising thought, because every thought is new. For it should be remembered that our thoughts are constantly springing up, and out of circumstances too for which no previous calculation can provide. Now, if such work of arrangement must be made, there must of neces- sity bti some faculty of the mind whose business it is io keep in order those thoughts so to be arranged and dcpoifited. To 28 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. say that a law of our mental nature does this, will not meet the case nor help the matter at all, but will rather throw new obstacles in the way. Because this, as it appears to us, would impeach the Divine Being by representing him as having made a law whose operations, in spite of anything which we can do to the contrary, force us to retain within the mind any and every unprofitable thought which we may have had, and which we in after life would gladly discharge. Now such thoughts w^ know ariB not at all toi the glory of God lior to the benefit of ourselves or our fellow men, but yet on this principle of mental deposit, the mind, or some faculty of the mind, must be employed in laying them in their destined place with as much care and at- tention as it does those that are of a better class, or those of the best class. ' Sec. 10; Thoughts not dormant individuals. We would further remark that the philosophy which teaches the individu- al deposit of thoughts ,in some department of the mind is ex- ceedingly questionable from another consideration, namely: what appears to us to be an^ unnecessary burden that such a process would entail upon the mind. Now, the mind of every finite being every man must acknowledge has its bounds ; and the mind of man is reasonably enough supposed to be more cir- cumscribed in his present stage of existence than some other orders of beings. Now, as those thoughts that are said to be deposited, and are consequently represented as individual things, have to lay in the mind as their only place of residence, they could not fail, so far as we can perceive, to prove a clog to the understanding, and consequently an impedimenft to the progress of the mind. Should it be said that the expressions "laid in the brain," and " shelved up in the memory," are not designed to represent thoughts as individual things laying one upon another in the mind; what such expression as the fol- lowing was designed to represent and what it does represent are two things. We cannot tell what a person means by what he thinks, b^ause we do not know his thoughts ; we therefore have to tell what he thinks (moans) by what he says, because we know his words. How then will any person understand the following ? 0^l' - _,., PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. 29 " Lulled in the countless chambers of the brain, Our thoughts aro linked with many a hidden chain ; Wake but the one and lo ! what myriads rise, Each stamps his image as the other llieL."- - Upham. Mr. Locke, who is justly held in very high repute by tlie learned and intelligent of all nations for his original powers of close thinking, conclusive reasoning, and deep penetration into the nature of things, and especially into the laws of raind, of which he has given the fullest evidence in his "Essay on the Hu- man Understanding," yet it appears that there is a degree of ob- scurity that attaches to that pan of his "Essay" where he treats on the human memory. We will take a sentence or two, for example : " For the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once, it was necessary to have a repository to lay up those ideas which at another time it might have use of."- — Locke's Essay ^ Book 2, CJiap. 10, Sec. 2. On the defects of the memory, Mr. Locke in the same chapter, section 8, page 104, speaking of the first defect says: " That it loses the idea quite, and so far it produces perfect ignorance ; for since we can know nothing far- ther than we have the idea of it, when that is gone we are in perfect ignorance." And of the second ho says : " That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in store, quick enough, to serve the mind upon occasion. This, if it. be to a great degree, is stupidity, and he who through this default in his memory, has not the ideas that are really preserved ready at hand when need and occasion call for them, were almost as good without them quite, since they serve him to little purpose. The dull man, who loses the op- portunity whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas that should serve his turn, is not much more happy in his know- ledge than one that is perfectly ignorant. It is the business therefore of the memory to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas which it has present occasion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occasions consists that which we call In- vention, fancy, and quickness of parts." The explanation which the author gives is simply this : that the mind has a power to revive dormant ideas or perceptions which we once had ; but the whole tenor of his remarks go to show that he looks to the mind to produce those " dormant ideas" from itself. I will not trouble the reader with lengthy quotations but will ao PHILOSOPHY OF .THE MEMORY. refer him to the work itself, and I will only add th^t I con- ceive Mr. Locke's view of the memory not to bo exactly cor- rect, and his explanations I think are not sufficiently clear to place this part of his work, from which we have made the ex- tract, on a level with the rest of his Essay. Sec. 11 ; The constant reception of particles a burden. — We leave the references which we have made, without any fur- ther comment on them, with the reader, and rfiall proceed to make some further observations pursuant to a fuller explana- tion of our own [Views of the memory. Now, as we before re- marked, thought is nothing more nor less than mental action. And a little reflleotion will soon lead us to discover that pleasure or pain depends, to a very great extent upon the na- ture and degree of that action in which we engage, or of which we are the subjects. We say, upon the nature and d^ree of the action, because, if the action be a bad one, though it might afford a little sensual gratification, yet the fact is, that from bad actions, whether they apply directly to God, to ourselves or to others, no true happiness ever springs. And if the action \a good its legitimate product \b happiness. Yet to continue that state we need so to study and ascertain, not only the kind, but also the d^ee of action in each kind that is necessary, least we overstretch the mark of prudence, and become so wedded to some good actions, as to think that the whole duty of the Christian is there. When we become thus extravagant in the degree of attention and time which we pa]^ to, even those religious duties, the actions themselves fail to produce that degree of religious enjoyment which they otherwise would do. Perhaps our idea would be better under- stood by the following illustration, for example : suppose an in- dividual to be placed in such oircmnstances as to be obl^;ed to constantly receive upon himsOlf particles of matter, though they might be as small as the finest dust, yet continually falling, and each particle remaining in its place as it falls ; this process, every person may see, Would eventually become burdensome, and in the course of time unendurable. So in like manner^ does it appear that, it would be with the mind if it is constantly receiving thoughts as individual things and has no way of dis- I 1^ tc;- PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. 31 does I Mt charging them, but must keep them for ever within its own circumference, either in an active or in a dormant state. Sec, 12 ; Eoopannon not sufficient to meet the case. Should the idea of expansion be urged as sufficient to meet the emergency of such a case as we have supposed ? To this we remark that though the body, it is very true, is capable of growth and expansion, yet not at all in proportion even to the addition of particles here supposed. And what would our physical frame now be', were it not relieved from its increasing bulk by constantly evaporating particles ? Hence, the expan- sion of our bodies is not such as would sustain it under the .continual dropping of the smallest imf^inable particles of mat- ter, supposing them to be equal in their decending number, only^ to the thousandth part of those thoughts that occur to the mind and, according to the theory here alluded to, and from which we dissent, rest upon or in the mind. And yet if the body, cm this principle of growth could be made equal to the pressure of matter here contemplated, it could only be for a certain portion of ^he life of the body, seeing, according to the principles and laws of nature no organized being is capable of growth* at all, b.eyond a certain stage, when it arrives at its maximum and can expand no more : so that the addition of matter to the oxganuEcd body, even under the circumstances here supposed that it were possible to sustain the pressure tiU the maturity of the organised body, without the relief which evaporating particles afford in all ordinary cases, the same rule could not apply after the maturity of the organized body, be- cause, expansion would then cease. The mind in like manner, if Uie memory is a depository of individual thoughts,would natur- ally become encumbered with their bulk, and exceedingly bur- dened with the weight of those intelleotual somethings with their constantly increasing pr^sure. And should it be said that the perpetual expansion and devdopment of our intellectual faculties is sufficient to sustain this mental pressure, we b^ to say that it appears otherwise from the following consideration, viZi : the mind is the subject of constant action during its waking moments, to say nothing of its sleeping hours, and those intellectual actions we call thoughts. Now, if those thoughts aro individual somethings, as they must be if they lay deposit- cd in the mind, to be "called up as ocjpasion may require;" 32 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. or are laid anywhere else for the same purpose ; the mind there- fore becomes the receptacle of a constant succession of intellec- tual particles. And in order that these particles may not prove an intolerable burden, it would be necessary for the mind to enlarge with equal rapidity. Now, wo cannot say, if experi- ence is to be our expositor, that this is the case with mind of man. It is true, he is capable of vast improvement, and to what extent no one can tell, and never will be able to do any more than guess, because, the mind of all pious intelligences, at least, will be continually improving. But great as this improve- ment is and long as it will continue, it is not now, and in the nature of things never will be, in proportion to the influx o£ thought which every man has, and always will have, all through time, and whether they are rational or irrational they will be equally effectual, in the principle here ^luded to, and so on through eternity. For every person Jcnows, that is if he takes any notice of the operations of his mind at all, that thousands of thoughts in the course of one day occur to the mind, in other words, takes place in the mind, whidi are in no respect calculated to improve the mind, in any sense what- ever but rather prevent its improvement. This is true in any department of study, whether it is Philosophy, Litera- ture, Politics, or Religion. Let any nuin who is not satisfied already of the fact, try any one of these, or any department of any one of them, and he will soon find that to make any improve- ment he must wade his way through a sea of opposing, conflict- ing and troublesome thou^ts, which instead of helping him in his studies are constantly throwing impediments in his way. And as the expansion of the mind is not in proportion to the thoughts which it has, and if thoughts are individual things, and memory means laying them by in the mind, and seeing that the mind cannot expasid in proportion to the number of thoughts which it has, it do^ appear that by t)iis process it would gradu- ally become weakened^ and eventually of its own weight be over- powered and unable to adt at all. So that mental action ao- Gording to this principle, instead of being as we suppose it is, a help to the mind, it is a hinderance, and though under such circumstances would eventually render the memory inactive. Bi|it all this is contrary to our experience, for every man^ and every child who is large enough to know that he has a mind thatoan think, reason, and remember; knows that habitually 41 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MEMORY. 33 romombering daily ocourrences has the opposite effect to this above mentioned. So much so that the more we remember, the more we can remember, and the more the memory docs in any one line of thought, the stronger it gets and the more it is able to do. ' * Sec. 13 •• 0/ the three propositions. Now, it will be per- ooivbd by the att;entive reader that we.made three propositions, and two of them, we conceive, prove to be false, and only two of them, ther^ore the remaining one is the true proposition. That is to say, the thoughts which were once before the mind, but are forgotten, cease to be in the mind, for as the mind passes on it takes not these events (thoughts) with it, and never can bring them after it, but leaves them all in the past. Never- theless, tills proposition requires some explanation which we shall endeavour to give in its appropriate place. Still, it might be propr for me here to remind the reader that thought implies an action of the mind, and anything that is forgotten is not under the mind's observation, therefore it is not inaction, and conse<][uently ceases to be as an action. The fact may be the same m the history of the past, but the fact may not be the thought, indeed it is not the thought, and cannot be made to be the thought ; but the peroepition of the fact is, because, to per<»ive is an act of the mind, and an act of the mind is think- ing. 84 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. CHAPTER III. 1 ON THE BL74MENTB AND ACTIONS OF THE SOUL. Sec. 1 ; What the elements of the soul are. Having made those observations, many of which are of a negative character, principally to show what the memory is not, we shall next pro^ ceed briefly to show what we conceive the memory to be. And fo^ the better undenstanding of this part of our subject, upon which we are now about to enter, it will be something to our advantage to take a glance at that immaterial and i*Jinmortal principle which dwdls within us, and by which we think, rea- son and remember. We do not mean tnat we are to stop here for the purpose of explaining its various powers^ and all the laws by which it is governed, but simply to remind the reader that the soul, as we understand it, is made up of different Acuities. But if we a|^ly the term faculty to all the powers of the soul, then I conceive a distinction should be noticed, as it appears to exist in nature. Some appear to be essential to its existence, and others only to its rational action. Some of these look to me to be elements of the soul, others more like intellec- tual compounds. The elements I would like to e^ faculties, or at any rate I would like to have the liberty of calling them primary faculties, because they are essential to the soul's being, which appear to me to be these ; Perception, Consciousness, Sense and Will. Now, it is evident that all these are essential to the very being of the soul, and neither one of them can cease to act without rendering the others useless in a great degree for practical purposes. And again they cannot be analyzed, any more in imagination than in fact, for who would presume to start the question with any expectation of success, in reference to what perception is made up of, the answer is in itself, it is made up of perceiving, and how much further can we get if we PHILOSOPHY OP THE MEMORY. 35 repeat the attempt a thousand times ? We might indeed turn and say, what is perceiving made up of? The answer would be, of perception. The same may be said of consciousness. What is it made of? The answer is, of being oonsoious. And what is being conscious made up of? It is like reasoning in a circle, ibr we have simply to answer, of conscipiMnets, and so of the others. It is true, oonsoiousness has its degrees of action, and so has perception, but that does not disprove the fact that they are elements of the soul. But when we speak of reason, imagination and memory, although important, and even essential to the intelleolual, moral, and religious well being of the soul, . yet, they are not to be looked upon as primary, or what we call, elementary faculties, because they cannot exist without the others, and they cannot exist only as t?Mi existence is produced by the others. Reasoning^ as we understand it, is merely perceiving the argument or disagreement of things, and consciousness that the things so perceived do agree, or disagree, and hence it is the result of certain modifications of the elementanr faculties alluded to. Imagination is simply another modincation of perception, and memory is the result of the action of two of these faculties. But as these will all be noticed in their appropriate places, we do not deem it |Hro-> per to dwell ,on them any longer here. Whatever may be the opinions of learned men in reference to a distinction of the faculties of the soul — or the number of them — ^and wheUier they may properly be considered as some dements, and others secondiury, compounds, and subordinate to, and depending on the elements for their existence and their action, or not, one thin^ is certain that the existence of the faculty to perceive things, is so apparent, so plain and operative that no parson can doubt it, no matter how hard, and hoiw long he may try. And if it were possible for him to entertain a doubt of its existence, the VQry doubt itself would prove the existence of a power in the soul to perceive, because he peroeivesi a doubt existing in himself. Sec, 2 ; Perception in the present^ in the future and in the past. The faculty of the soul which we call perception, possessed the power to look into the future and into the past^ as. 3G VHILOSOPUY UP THE MEMOKV. well m iato the present. And as wo shall have oooosion tre< quently to speak of those intelleetual states in the course of our remarks on this topio now under consideration, and to avoid any misapprehension that might arise through the use of ambig- uous terms, that iutoUcctuul state into which the soul enters when looking into the future, we shall hero represent by the term conttrnplation. This state of the mind is sometimes re- presented by the term imaginationj which will apply equally to the past and the present ; but the former term though it applies more forcibly to the present, vet perhaps less forcibly to the post, and is equally as appropriate for the future as the term inwginationj and appears on the whole to be more comprehen- sive. And here I beg to remark, that this faculty which per- ceives, or looks into the future, is not another faculty from that which perceives the present; and that which looks into the pro- sent is the same as that which looks into the past. Taking this view of the subject, the supposed number of faculties of the soul will be greatly diminished, for instead of being faculties of the soul many of them will be seen to be only modifications of the some faculty. And in proportion as the philosophy of the mind proves a reduction of the number of its elementary faoulties from the general estimate, in the same proportion will it be bet- ter understood, viz : it will be better understood by that chuss of the community whose circumstances in life will not allow them a very greaX many books, nor much time to read them. •Sec. 3 ; The fact of transition. Now, it is important to remark that this intellectual state, of looking into the future, is not the result, as some seem to imagine, of some abstract in- dividual thought or thoughts, thrown by a mighty effort of the mind, into the future, far beyond the boundary of the sciul's exis- tence, and there to exist independent of the soul. That is to say, it is not to be regarded as a separate existence, as if the soul existed here, and the thought existed yonder^ We do not wish to be understood to mean, by what we here say, that the soul while contemplating the future is not in the act of thinking at that time, for the very opposite of this is the fact. We only design to repudiate the idea as unphilosophical, that thought means individual somethings coming to the soul fcr practical purposes, and returning after having been used. But the true PHILOSOPHY OP THE MEMORY. 37 sense and proper idea of the state alluded to, appears to be this r that when we contemplate the future the mind takes a transit ; that is to say, the soul, or in other words, a faculty of the soul, whose province it is to perceive things, by a power with which the Divine Being, who is its Author, has endowed it, stretches itself bevond the present state of things. And this appears to be the view which here and there those, who have exercised their own natupid discrimination and judgment, have taken of the subject. This sentiment is expressed, and beautifully too, in the fbUowing verr appropriate words of a certain poet : " My soul leaps forward at the thought." See. 4; Tranntion consittent — %t» catue. This leaping into the future, or rather, this view of the transition of the per- ceptive faculty in contemplating the future,, will, we think, appear perfectly conMStent with the philosophy of the mind, which is according to, and will be corroborated by our expe- rience. And though it will not be difficult for a close obser- ver of mental operations to see that many of those transitions are the result of accident, while others are produced in the mind from portions of Divine Revelation with which we are acquainted, containing predictions relative to future* events, yet both are real transitions, only the one is based upon sup- position and ends in imagination, and the other, being baaed upon Revelation, eventually ends in fact. But, in oont^nplat- ing the future, whether in fact or in fancy, that faculty of the soul which is the principal acting agent in this internal opera- tion, seems evidently to leap out, or in other words, it seems to stretch itself beyond the present existence of the man. Now, this stretching out is what we call, not (mother faculty of the 9oul, but a power of the perceptive faculty, assuming that pe- culiar modi^cation adapted, to some extent, to the investigation of things that have not yet arrived^ -t But to make this subject appear as plain as possible, and it is important that we get a correct idea of this item, let me ob- serve that the perceptive faculty seems to possess what 1 would call, a peculiar relaxing quality by which it stretches itself to an amazing and immeasurable distance^ and so much so that we offcen become astonished at ourselves. Indeed any attempts to follow this faculty of the soul, through the various stages of its 38 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. rapid exita, especially whea it soars to its pvi\fileged heights, or penetrates to its accustomed depth»,or extends to the length of ita intellectual fidds, would be fruitless. It is all a mystery to us, in reference to how the perception exercises this power, we only know the fact that it does. But to undertake to explain its mode of operation through all its various stages, or even through any of its stt^es, we make no attempts, and we do not feel dis- graced by a confession of Our ignorance therein ; and ihjeiefor& we shall leave this for others who may feel that the difficulties connected with such exphuiations, are far less than we atpfeseat conceive them to be. Sec. 5.* The power of '9tret6hing out, a mystery* This power however that the mind possesses of stretching into the future, though it is a mystery, is no greater mystery than that power which it possesses to. return, neither is it any greater truth. This power we have to Represent by another name, and . would call it mental eontractibility. By this wi^^mean that the fUoulty whose business it is to perceive things by a certain modification, stretches itaelf into the future, and by another modification adapted to the purposes thereof contracts itself back to 4he present. These mental states to which we here allude may, perhaps, be to someeixtent illustrated by the following reference to anat(»ny. The anatomist tells us that in the body of man there are about 400 fleshy strings called muscles, which are endowed with powers of elasticity and oontracUbility, operating thereby upon the bones which serve as Zevcrf or pries, the joints set ve as fulcrums or baits, and the muscles are the moving power, or in olher words, the lifting cU the pry » From this it will be seen that the motion in the body originates in the muscle, which motion is continued by the shortening and stretching of the fibers that compose the muscle. So that the power to move is in the muscle, which power when stimulated by the nervous system aotsof itsdf. Now, although we connot tell how those muscles stretch themselves, so as to produce motion, so incon^ ceivably quick and powerful as they do, yet we can no more deny the lact, than we can d. .y the fact of motion itself. And so we might say in reference to the mind, or rather, in reference to the perceptive faculty. We cannot see how the muscles can *.» MiLOiSIOPHY OF THE MEMORY. 38 stretoh thenselves to prodnoe the motion of the arm or the leg, all is rm/sterfff but we cannot deny the fact. Neither can we see how the mind can stretch itself into the future, and so far into 4he future too, and return again in such an inconceivablj short space of time, and yet it appears, upon deliberate reflec- (ioii, to be a truth eaualiy as great and forcible in the mind, as the other is in the i>ody . Now, the mnsoular ^tem is en- dowed wiih power to move from the benevolent hand of our Ahni^ty Creator ; yet that same Infinite wisdom that provid- ed su% powm* haSj at the SMne time, for reasons best and only knowA to himself, made it necessary that the muscles should receive iheir stimulating power from the nervous system ; by which rekzation and contractibility alternately act* So also has that same wise and benevolent hand endowed the mind with a motive power, which power is intimately connected with, and very operative in th# modification ef tibe peroqptive faculty which looks into the future. In virtue of the same motive power, by l^e law of inental oostraotibility it is called back from any inmginable distance, ini ftime immeasurably short. A)ld into the fu^tP*^ While ooatemj^lating, or mother words, it is not the soul thai lei^es the body when the man looks (thinks) ahead o£hiinBel|',tin ordw thathemay|>repai!e.for a ^'m^inyc^ay/^ Yet Ihere is pereep* tion, though it mSght exist, in its weakest [fbrm (4*46. iuMgina- tibn) but it is still peoeeptioin that is beyond the present 4xi8t- eiice of the man^ and beyond the present state of ^ngs. : And therefoce wd ihumbly .o(^oeite that the true philosophy of sueh intellectual stated, is to; > be . explained .only ion the pyfinciple of mental elas^dty (ind coQtraotibility. i HJl k ' r - :• ; i niSfee. 7 ; : 0/ timetmddiakiniDei^ It itf woiihy ^ remark that lidther time nor distance appeiar, so fetr lus ,we.^4^-wtfm PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. 41 part of the soul's existence ; but it is merely a power of percep- tion, in other words, another modification of the perceptive faculty. But this /orm appears, for some cause which I con- fess I have failed to discover, exceedingly prone to associate itself with perception in its operations botSi in the past, and sometimes ip the present, as well as in the future. Hence, in consequence of the forwardness of thei mind, in our fallen and corrupt state, for there is no reason to believe that this inor- dinacy in any part (^ the mind would ever baive taken place had not sin through the faU of man spread it(^ paralyzing influences thr6!^h ^ h ■'-•■■A pire of the soul, thousands of things in the course of ai^'yr i ime, are seen in a kind of phantasma that never will exist iu any other form^ while contemplating Ihe future. And so it is when perception extends itself into the past. For there? is very frequently a kind 6f fancitul vision of ^ings pre- sented to the mind. -This is the work of what We ebll imagina- tion, whi^his a v^ryi^aeful power of the soul when kept under proper discipline, yet if it is hJ ^ '^nly by a; loose rein, which is too often the ease, for Urant of sulttejient m^tal cultivation, it, tX- (oertain times, becolnea very troublesome. ■■|iaPi«».f«r«f «)«i*-«l-'i^^^^^ ■• ■ •■,.-■ ;•{!( See^ ■: ' What i$ the office ctrid power of vmagination ? To e(xplain the officie, |)0wer, and usefulnei^ of this form of mind, which is called tmojjftnalion, does not come within the limits of our plan of arrangement, yet, as it frequently presents itself, while perception and consciousness act in reference tp the past, which i$ mhat.we caU memorif ; and as we have already advert- ed >to tkis power, and may again hereafter, it-might be proper to devote a shc;t t space to the consideration iof this mental itate. • . ■'■ ' M ■ ■ • . ': ■ ■ i":-' \ n,ii.: See. 10 ; (1) And first, we remark, ^at its bipedal buii- nestt appears to be to assume oertain fornis totiklly> irrespective (^ their character or the e£fect that they would be likely to prbduoe, : the imagination doea nc^ appear to have any regard for eiecta or consequences that might result from its fanciful modificati3'Ml ^eci 13; (4))' Bi the fourth plaee, we remark that imetgi'nation is not as well deabribed by the term " faculty of the soul," seeing it is so closely identified with perception as it is by oallin^ it by what we conceive to belts proper name, viz : a power of the pereeptive fiiouity. At all efvetits^ there does not appear to be any good grounds for calling perception and imag^tton two ditttnet faculties, unless it i9 proper to call every aot^f the soul) a fietculty of the soul ; beeause their actions do not iippear to be distinct and indMte&dent ti«iions» For it does not appear tiliat there is any difbrenoe In the kind of ac< tions produced by the imagination and those produced bv the perception, fi)r die actions of both are actions of perceiving what diflerence there is in the degree of perception. The one p&r«^Yes but diml^v or inipitft, ^£e other clearly, imd distinct. VM'tf y .'^Jf.•f ■,*ji«'J.f.^','-.W- loTo illustrate the principle of idenUiyiiii perception and imagination more fully, let a man imagiite himself to be in a ^tui^ statCj and in that place whete< we all desire to go^ whicti we call hea.ven ; let him not. merely entertain th^ diesire to go %h«ite, or the hope that he will get Uiere, but let him if he can im^dhe himself to be aiisent &om the body and present wijl^ the Lord, and then le^^hifii see if he can disoovi^r any difier- ence between thit- intelleetual| statciy in refisren^e ta its kittdf and his perceiving liimself to be . iti: h^v^n. "Vi^iat difference there is, is in the d^ee. The imagination draws the form of what it fMipposefis leaven to . be ; it peroeives tiiat form ;: it draws also the foriktofihe bod^^ but it has no form for the soul, that form of body it pievoeiyeB to beiin ^leftvem .'Hit . ; 'Ifcjf U'(].Ni': '.Kv't'i-' v'i.i-r 44 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MEMORY. Sec. 14 ; Cannot perceive and imagine at the tame time. If a man imaghie himself to be in France, he perceives nothing that transpires in Canada, 'the place of his residence^ at tliS same time tiiat he imagines himself to be in France. If he perceives himself sitting in his parlor, or writing at his desk, he cannot imagine hims^ to be in the' l^islative hall, or to stand pleading at the btUr at the same time. We do not say he cannot sit in his parlor ahd iniage himself -to be in some other plaoOj but we say h^ ' cannot percdve or imagine himself to be sitting in his parlor, by his own fiveside in Oanada; and perceive or imagine himself to be in France or any distant part of the globe ' at the same Hme. If thiJEi view Which we here expreiss is a bni9, ind agrees with onr experience, it is clearly established that ima^nation is nothing more nor lc«s than a certain ^ojdificatioA or the perc^iive &culty ; iti other words^y«low degrees come to entertain veiy^ aibsurd ideas of theacrtiousof our^ownmindf. And so we get in the haMt of raying we imag(ttO lii^if or ffta^, aittd when askedt'to explain the philosophy of the' imagiuation^ - i we rtodily stiswer we fonn <^*tain figures and pla^ them before ^ mind. It i#ould not be a very diffieult thing for a man in iCiuiada to imagine him- self in England^ but it would be irverr different thing were he to atteiiipt to *lrt?ing England to CanadL • Ditivl^^wi^sti «iii te cation of things. To say, 'as is ^ti^uently ' said; that we ''bring things to the mind," add '< hold them beibre the inind," may answer as a figure, if it is bo e3n>lained, and not allowed to pass as a fact. For strictly speaking it is not philosophically PHILOSOP«y OF THB MEMORY. 45 ;«; correct. Whatever expressions we may use, aii4 whatever may be the sense they ai^ intended to convey, the fact is, we hold nothing before the mind in the 8ense.inwhic|i it appears gener- ally to be understood. The action of the mind appears at times as if it were tftrested.; ai^d held >^ ^ ii,nJlndit tobie impraoti,ca1»letphQliTf,;i^PFa^^^l^to hold the mind th^e for ten , seco^d^v, , 4f< j^cmH wpuldbe so difficult to hold thC/mipd for so shpr^, %,4i])(ie,t^ a^^r^tain mo- tion^ hoiW much more lo iini^t we, .^m^pse i^^ij^^d he to hold ^he . mijid . without: «ny motion at aU ? ;.-, fvhai appears to a fl^peracMl, obs^iFer. a^ an airTesting;or steying Jj^ prffg^^9* i^^d dipiinishuig it9: acition, ^ in fe^ ^e yeiy , opp^^t^vji^, ffit- sruch Hm)^., when wd seem tq hold t^i^ .hefp^ ^ iml^d^ ^e acitipn of the mind ip increased* . A^d: i tbiit e^ormpup fvrray, of events which ar^t! i(«Fire^nted: ap st^qdlng ibefore J^ 9i4^dy all take p]AO0 by viiiiue of the Uw of m@iiti4^ai^i^9P.>^ ><4l^4 4^ir oonr tiguQu^poeiUon which tho^f appear/f^qoQppy/atjOprtain. times, is not becaiise these individw , someiihu^ whii^. we tQall thottght9> by (I d^sfi^rate. intelleotual; effort are br4)ug^into a phaliini;^ And plao«4i into ^ !poi»|ignous positiotLbjefor^^Uie mind ; Wtthls mentfdstate/is posij^VjeTy the .^epult. oC,<% rapidity of those transits dithe peroeptiye faculty ifrp^.^piieiiabject to aaothet, stimulated by the increasing interest wh^oh the soul has in j^,invei(t)gatiQp:of- the^joiatter, apd promp^d to act by the authority of the will, it leaps &ga|i,t()|ne oirpuxosMmce to another with that astonishing swiftness, that though a close ob- server of himself will be fully, ponsQious of , th^ \ trani||its being made,, yet the intellectual aotivijbyjwhiph ia ixuuKi%it-inni[aking them is such, that the mind m becomes so itstopish^d at itseu that it finds it, difficult at twines tp <;ri8dit its pwn, achievements. B«t the observations which' we* h ojin .soiM^y entfirtaJm a hope that they wiU be; regarded a^;;4)onolu^y6 and satisfactory by all that may read th^ miist suffice, jbrHJiliQ pr^ai^t, and ][ will only 46 PI!IL0S0PH¥ OF THK MBM0B1?. ad(^ that their relevancy will be more fvSfy seen and'inore forci- bly felt as we proceed in oui^ explanatioiw of the nature and operation-of the memory. Sec. 16 : "WluU inemoty it. To remember is to peroeire the past. And" we cannot perceiHB the piMt only by that fiuml- ty of tho wui which poaMnOs the po#er to go andlook into the p^t. Sol that aoooraii^ to this, memory impHeit^An aetion of the pevoeptiv<$f<^ ture of memory than the i^eading of huge t^ohimesof opinloM. Not tMt we sm>uld dOpreciato^ the labours, nor the tatento«of thos6 who hftve written ^ asmst the «inderstaftdtng|^ ttad dSffiise use^l informi^ofi through' ' society^ but neverthem, we i^ould leani to eierdse our owtti judgment, tes should hold thiit in^^HienaMe r^7i< as a sacred treasure^ and yidtd not that prerogative to any man, howeveif great or goodj or to any class Of; men, howetidr wise or numerous. Neither should we aUow> ourselves t*tl]lnk,tio, 9to^;/b»'>te^ Mi^vnen^j* however diminutive.we may i^^peartoolir' selves to bery operative faculty, and of which w« shall have occasion to speak hereafter, constitutes that jpo^trer of the mind which wc call memory. And therefore memory^ as wei before remarked, is not, according to our eon^ ception of its nature, another faculty distinct from perception and opnsdiousness, as they are from each other, but we appre< hend it io.be the result of a mutual and natural combinatioil of the two original elementary and independent faculties, via : perception and oonsoiousnese. And let it be remembered also that the peroeiving part, of the m^oily is affected on the principle of mental transition. The strength whieh the memoify sains by action oanpwe thinkj' be accounted for and explained Mtter on this .pilifaoi]rie than A\.N;ri:. /- . -jhhfT U-rr- i •rrr vtiw ill' .i/o'jr'^iJ'if I'll' ;!?'<; .rv ■ • V See* IQ : X^fpaHfyrmMTniermff'thdngt^ 'A tn^dierous mem(Miy,.aS: it is frequently termed, can be better comprehend-* edai^ explained, in our humble 6pinio% on this principle of meHtal tranntion, than on any other. : Now, all men know that they experience, and too often too, that mental ,Btate which ihej em partial remembrance, which if memory is a deposit of tAoiig^, would be so destitute of meaning, so contradictory, so absurd^ as to be utterly unworthy of notice. For such ex- pressions as, " I partly remember," &o., would be just equal to E »• PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. saying, I have thoughts partly asleep and partly awake, or, partly dead and partly alive, or partly dormant and partly active, thtit IS to say, neither in motion nor at rest. How can these inoon- 8isienoi(t^8 be reoonoiled,how can these opposites be mad« to agree? Whose experience will agree with this description of the memory? Who can see any philosophy therein? But if we admit that mem- ory does really consist in « transition of the perceptive fkculty, * which appears to be the true state of the case, we see a philosophy in this intellectual state of jHifticU remtmhrdnce^ which can be brought down to the comprehension of evenr one who is capable of knowing that he is endowed with perception and consciousness. Sec, 20 .* Perception widely distributed. Now, the power to perceive, that is, the perceptive faculty,- we remark, is widelv distributed among the inhabitants of earth, but man possesses it in a very high d^ree. Yet that which he has dilers not, ac- cording to owe conception of its nature, in kind, as some have supposed, from that with which the lo#er animals are endowed, although there is a vast difference in the degree. To say that Inferior animals are not endowed with perception would be to assume, and to say a great dea)^ and would be tantamount to Baying they have no knowledge of their being. And to say that they have no knowledge of their being would be to say that whioh is opposed to the sensible observations of every man in the daily occurrences of tife. No being can remember without the existence and exercise of the faculty of peroeption. Those that do remember must therefore have Uiis facility, and we leave the reader to decide for himself whether he thinks he has reasons or not for believing that the lower akiimojS can re- member things relating to their existence, interest, safety and general welfare. For if they know anything, they knaw their existence, and no one could suppose for one moment, that it is possible for any being to know its existence and not perceive it, any more than it is possible for a being to perceive its existence and not to know it at the same time. Now, perceptiota, wherever it exists, and in whatever degree it may be found to exist, we mean so far as applies to this our present state of be- ing, whether its action is directed to the futwre, the present, or the past, and whether it acts in its simple or complex form, it is quite liable to meet with obstacles in itis way, and which indeed is a very common occurrence. ''•ftWiK^wd y awake, or, >artly active, these inoon- ^d« to agree? the memory? it that mem- tive foculty, • I philosophy hioh oan be is capable of aaoiousness. I the power K >a widely poflsessesit wm not, ao- I some have ro endowed, To say that would be to tamount to And to say Id be to say 'M of every I remember peroeption. wnlty, and ) thinks he •« retire and abandon the enterprise ; and perhaps in no future period of h'^n life could be induced to make another attempt, and if he sho* .id he might meet with no better success. And so it is, to a con- siderable extent, with this fiusultv of the mind, whose business it is to penetrate into, and perceive the nature of thingii^ But it is not verv difficult to perceive the mere existence of com- pounds within our sphere of action, the discovery of wh'oh depends upon the natural exercise of our intelleotual powers ; but of all those simj^e items that combine to make up those compounds, whether thejr are of a physical or mental nature, we often know but little. Yet a mind possessed of a great amount of vitality, courage, perseverance, resolution, de^^miined to see all it oan see, to know all it can know, at all *- ;:iirds, at all expense of Ume and means within its ifeaoh, makes repeated and vigorous effi>rts to look into the nature of things, into these knotty questions, and it often succeeds. Aud this is the kind of mind that will succeed, and no othei can be verv successful in intellectual advancement. And this is why miliionB of our fellow race live and die ignorant of the simplest truths, in Politics, Domestic government. Literature and Religion; Knowledge hcu its price I Therefore, when perception, thus engaged m the pursuit of a certain subject or thing, assumes that ipodification which represents the truth of the case, it must be remembered tliat such discovery is not the result of a sudden and eai^ transition into the depth of such subject, or into the nature of such thing, but ra^^er it is to be considered as the result of arc^ent and p}*o^re««ive research. 8ee» 22 ; The different stages through i/ohidi the mind pcissesi But to be a little more explicit, and to piace our views beifore the reader, in such a way as to preclude the possibility of any misiinderstanding, we would observe that, the idea is &is. When this inconceivably swift transition of the perceptive 52 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MEMOBY. 'i ^1 ! « faculty is made from the present existenoe of the man, to some cireumstance of which the mind has only a land of general outline, its progress appears to be at once arrested the moment it arrives at the object of its pursuit. Having but the general outlines to direct its course, and the authority of the will .to direct its action, and having arrived at the territory, to be ex- plored, or having struck upon the compound, and aa the per* ceptive faculty can only go in one channel atthesame>^imey it must now proceed to examine its parts, and every eampl6|Murt too, which make up this comipound, in order that it ]](i^jHitight upon the circumstances of which the mind requires iull and correct details to serve its present purpose, ^he pereispti^e faculty, having entered upon the special work now . before ity progresses through itS: various stages ^till it arrives at the centre, or More properly speaking, till, as we commonly siajj! we partly remember, tliat is, we partly peroeive again that whioli hajs beeii^ under our observation before. There is evidently am intelloo- tual state of this kind which we ftlwayap^s through ill, remem- b^ering, though at certaintimes,. owii^ priAci|) rtenl-y p-;'-vu-t:f!, t-m^rotj ft-' fifec. 24 ;- ' Jtfej^ry a htanh without consciouiness. The inOHiOry Would be^perfect blanks notwithstanding the exist- ence, activity, and penetrating power of the perceptive faculty, were it not for the existence and oontiiiufil action of cohscious- ncas. For while it itf the business of the peroeptibn to' go itito the past apd pereeiiv6, and investigate certain circumstances which the sotil irequires for its immediate uisiB ; the adtion of consci- Ottsnei^s is hidispensible to constitute that dtate of mind which We call remembran^. iW action is required that we may know whetheir su6h bircumstanoe^ taow "under the mind's obser- vation, was eter tiilkder our obset*Tati6n before ; and whether it was ever investigated in any part of our past life. If it were not for the action of this feoulty which We call consciousness we should be continually per^slexed with unoettainties, and never ciouldkiiow Whether anythi% which we nowperoeivfe, was ever before the inind in any former period or not, or whether it origi- nated yesterday, or twenty years ago. But cbtiscibusness, which is an essential element of the soul, is also a constituent part of the memory, whose province it is to decide in all such cases; and al^ to deoide ^c difference between real things and linagitiaty ones. i'i>,\,fx tf 5';'''ii t 64 PHI5.0S0PHY OF THE MEMORY. This may be illustrated by the following example, viz. : a person perceives his having beei\ in the town hall, in the city of London, in the Province of Canada, in the month of May, and heard an eloquent and interesting lecture on a certain subject. And again, he perc^ves himself to have stood by Paul, the great Apostle of the Gentiles, in the country of the Bar- barians, when the viper jumped out of the fire and fastened upon his hand, and he shook it off and received no harm. Now, the one case is a real thing, he perceived himself in the town hall because he was there, and he was there when he perceived him- self to be tJiere, so that it is the perception of a fact and not of a phantom ; but the other, though it is an acknowledged fact in sacred history, in reference to Paul and the viper ; in reference to his being there vriiAi Paul and at the time of the circumstance, is purely imaginary. And how does the soul come to know the difference between this fact and this phantom? There is inward consciousness which decides with irresistible authority, that although both circumstances alluded to really exist in past time, yet only one of them was ever before the mind, as a fact connected with its own life. And from this decision there is noplace of appeal, and no power in the soul to dissent — ^no disposition to murmur — -no ground of complaint, it is r^arded by the soul as a settled truth, and remains as such. Hence, though we cannot remember without the action of the percep- tive faculty ; neither c n we without the interference and prompt decision of consciousness. But we cannot conceive that anything more is required to constitute the act of rememberii]^, and anything less than the mutual co-operation of these two Acuities, would not be sufficient to answer the purpose. See. 25 .* Pereeption in the past also assumei different forms. It should be observed also that the pere^tive while en- gaged in the past as well as when in the future, often appetirs to be burdened with strai^ and perplexing imaginations. When- ever a oiroumstanoe is supposed to have transpired, of which we possess but a faint conception of its genwal outlines, which conceptions are often the result of involuntary mental action, the particular business of the peroeptiiw faculty is to go in search of its details. Now, whatever it perceives in. that sphere, or channel, in which it moves through past life, it presents to the mind, whether such are real circumstances or whether they PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. 55 are merely imagiDary. It does not appear +o he the business of the perception to raake selections in the general of appropri- ate items to present to the soul, while it acts in the capacity of memory. This intellectual state, or rather, these modifications of the mind which we represent by the terms, selection and application, or " collecting our thoughts," &c., which terms ex- press that state of the mind which we call reasoning, appears to have nothing to do in the direct act of remembering. For it is not for the soul to act upon the principle of selection of items in remembering, as much as to say, Is it pleasant to admit this or that circumstance as a part of past experience? But it is for consciousness to settle the question in regard to the simple fact; which it invariably does whenever the perceptive faculty extends itself to all the circumstances conaected with 1^ ca«e, Uiat are necessary to produce a verdict. Now, it would appear that when the soul is engaged in a course of reasoning, and when we particularly stand in need of the assistance of the memory ; for reasoning requires a compli- cation of circumstances that are principally in the past to prove the point in hand; that the mind coUeots and holds these circumstances before it for the time beipg, by an unusual e£fort of its own. This hbwever,-is ndt true. The mind does indeed put forth vigorous efforts, owing to the intense interest which it feels in the subject, but it is not to hold before it those thoughts like so many soldiers in battle array ; but to adapt its increased activity to the circluustanoes required. This state of mind then, which we call rectsoning is in a great measure the result of the increased, rational, regular, and systematical activity of the perceptive faculty. SeCi 26 ; Jlaw trantition can he proved. In times of very deep interest, j^hich are occasionally experienced by the soul, when the perceptive has to fly into the past with its uttermost speed in search of truths, which are at the present moment required ; it would be impossible for the most discriminating, the most acute, and the most "retentive" mind to form any conception of its speed and power, in those extraordinary cases. Nevertheless, in all ordinary oases its transitions are obvious. And more especially are they to be seen in cases in which the soul takes but little interest. Seeing this is the case, we come to 56 PHILOSOPHY UF THE MEMORY. the oonolusion that inasmux. i as in matters of little interest, the transition of the perceptive faculty can be traced into the past, and also in matters of ordinary interest there is a consciousness of transition identified with the act of remembering ;. and as the soul has but one general mode of operation in remember- ing things, rtmenibering is done in all cases^by the transition of the perceptive faculty into the past. Increased motioii in the perceptive faculty is all that istequired of that part' of the memory in the time of the soul's most important reasonings. For; it makes no difference, in a course of reasoning, wheii the memory is called to action, whether a circuiiistancc lays as high by our present existence as ycStferday, or fifty years fr-^m us, if the velocity of the perceiving faculty cim be increast^ ir projpiortion to l3ie distance ol" each circumstance, an(? the 'num- ber of the whole that may be necessary to meet the emergency of the case. The extension of the perceptive faculty mto the paiit it) any oodceSvabte distance, appeltrtt Whe & natural tction, and therefore quite ^y ; b^t those tran^itioiial reactions which are necessary to bd ittade'fr6m one drcumstan^ to anoth'^i, and tilie jselection th:;t always needs to h6 madid, to form a coh necting link between them, and more especially to become expert and judicious in making those sehi^nSjU the Ifesult, at least to a great extent, of pi*acti(«, which m this, as well as in otli^t departments of life, comparatively speaking, mak^ ^<«perfect." ■iJrt.'tJlif. ilf- 7rJi»'>.i;^ ^.di Sir* 9 li H K B f S i' B K' 9 f^ ^■v' ■ ^H K 1 li ■tij;4 VJ- ■ '. J . ^.■' PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY; 67 .!'- «; CHAPTER ■i-tive faculty, tends to produce that modification, both in kind and degree, which at every presentation places the truth further firom the mind. And this form of mind under such circumstances is generally very active, and can be made to present any congenial forms ; seeing that it can bend any way, and can go to any extravagance. And it appears also to be governed principally by .present ruling eniotions, whatever may be their nature. :i, ,-,.■;.. Sec 3 .* Is the soul deceived cU once, or 6y decrees f It must not be supposed that in thus remembering and in thus being deceived, that the lamth immediately disappears, fer this cantiot be the case. Because, it is reasonable to conclude that in every case of this kind, via : of self deception, the soul must be the subject of opposite and extremely painful feelings. And what produces this inward struggle is this : tiie natural tenden- cy of the soul to the truth, which prfnci]»le the conscience of every man tells him should be prefer^d to falsehood. In con- sequence of this ruling principle of our nature, notwithstanding the selfish interest of the soul to the contrary, will occasionally be presented, that is to say, the perceptive j^ulty mWnow and then assume a true and correct form. - And therefore to perfect such deception, it requires a vigorous effort of the wiU to oppose the truth, to modify it, ana to misrepresent it to the soul. For I presume that every person's experience will goto Say that it requires no effort of the mind to an internal adcnow- ledgment of the truth, althongh it might, to give an outWard expression to it. But to reject the truth tttwar€%, and erp^ it from the mind, requires not onl^ an effort, but a desperate one. And before it can become easy to the soul, and the con- science be quieted and put to rest, it will require a long course of intellectual violence tb be used against thiis invaluable prin- ciple. This can be proved by reference to our experience in all matters relating to practical morality, but more especially by referring to o\;r youthful days. A child who has been taught r i< «o PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. Ill the home oirole hy his parents and friends, to respect the truth, and never to tell a lie^ knows well what amount of effort it cost him when he first made up his mind to equivocate, or modify any truth, or especially when he resolved to tell a lie, how many restless hours, how many pangs of conscience, how many chills ran through his hlood, how many soher thoughts on what a fond mother, an^ affectionate^ father, kind brothers fuid losing ^ters have told htm in refeirenee to the conse^ quenoea of telling a lie. Yes, his cc^tations would alight upon the hour 1 of Sabbath School, its appropriate leMonis, ^e teach- er 'S advice, the miperintendent's exhortation ; and f^om there to the circulating library, what warnings have been given to others^ what punishments have foUcnif ed ' and. befell the disobe- dientji the disgraoe he has brou^t. upon himself^ and the grief that he has brought upon his parents, teachers and friends, BAd ft thoi^Mtnd ! thoughts of a similar nature and t^ndest'cy, will {HerCeikfm. tike daggers . plun^i]^ itohis h^t, producing alarmittg^fMHTB^ oooasiotMl regrets, trembling neryesy awfid;ifore^ bodingsy'thesueni teary a moimentaiy rd|)entance, di partial re^ tr^ but ftibex xeQalvd, ifiid; tnith,.;aiy a&!&cte<^^ ^ ugam JP^|[«llsedo?Ht-3? hi'nnrq vj ■ ,\i"s>y::j bjtu 'i.Mr'Vjifn'if !-.;j^!i;h''''ift 'ni ; i8^4 4i.% ; mhe^sfrw/ifflf it Ung^ repeated, and^vohinteny^ But ^s struggle is not itf ecdiy one of a moment land then patttoSi awaiy to he no 4qoi!9 s^en ; it iis repeated, and although irith diminished foroC) is neventlieless cogent, brings with it O^nvictioli andit^emonsttance. which may be feltfby ;the epul for j«su»i .Mk^) i^fi treason of this isbeoanse the truths though ^p0Uisd,;;iHll occasii^naUy b» s^Uj and when it is seefi the soul jpAturfdly iDcUnes tp; th«itt . Hence, when the real circilmstance is percc^yeii in its tfue and prq^r light, the will interferes nmdt^lDiftliiiAirepftkfid. J !6tut ^e other fonnwhich has been DAodiM to sui^. the. si^sh ipxOmm of the soul, is indulged Pttk^ cherisheA-hy the j»me iiusultj;, vi^ ;; % the preferring or choosing. pow<«f ofithe sieult iAwd; Iqr a repetition of this pro- oess 4fc»<{which' in reality is >ut a phantom, by a constant succe^sioRjof prcisentations,; by the direction and authority of- the.witt;je^ proof as inany other tbin^ in riatnrie, Vbt. a careful o&aerver o^ buxhan dottduot, b^ tlOdng |iart1ibuW notice of countenance, gestures, and frequently a de^iWof en^i;ras8inent ^lat attaobes to t|ie person, who relates, a oire^ii^lanQe in whioh be W deeply ihtei^^Bi^ied, will be liolly justed in opminjKjfco IIms coiiclttsion. Nevertheless it is ail uniYC9»a)|y acicnowl^dged irntli. tbait tb6 iskM it^ m^ tbe^ naii|^ Pl?^®'^ of tbe Aiemoiry'iiie mor^ tiHel ani ddbdved by it, ani^^i» more ^e pr^^ce 4«&I^ti6n oti oiie ft(mHy of tb^'soiU^ th^ Wier \i oany M d^po "Offi^ indtbcaf^ anii so on u]^n all. Apa>Q ti fp^ows iM^9 soul, irhbiie buiuntf tendenc^'ili to tm^yiBJ wat^ ^ a obnimoh leVel, may b^ debeired relative td^^ th^g^ ^bipi^Li^ has SM and thus create bt iC own yo%iWy eff^H that state dT ii&Ptital cl^n^gement ^hS^ we ^llfi'i^yM^ But if a miafi is sp deceived W the iuem|[^tj,as to observe a pblbitdm iliBtead of aihet, and id in^uipea^ tp m^ye ih<^ phantom foi^ the ikcl, the bWie, a8 d' genem t^iAg^^ Inhere is ceilaitily a>rdn|^ soitie^ w^ece, ^t i^t wri^ng |s not in nature; its ori^n nifty b^ att^)ated t9 ibe pi^bininanoy of Vibluikif^ selfish prin6iple^ '% -li>r'-:r; i&<;;. 5,: ^/oUeif&rfMMtiumed tv t%4 miudJ It i^o^ild be OD^jrved also t3^t after liavin^' ^t^ht ISbie mind to priuiitice deception jiy sueh a. rigorous di^ipl^ibe, Md violent ana i^|>^t- ed, Qut)rag^; bi]| our mental nature, it will.lbebome ba^^ td. thd PfTc^tJlvei^m^^ and alihidtiiigh the;|ttd|ibent oau im^f 4«ci4€i tbai/l£&t whioh ^tieftrs t6 thd sout'to bb a ^)se lonn is & ti^ onoi jfet, by hftvi& It M oohs^btty tiiider the ipbscmtioh iu» a sub^t^^U^ fdir ^e truibj^iifbry.fhpm^^ pp^r pf^ jBouI may eyent^aUy lose Sdi fiviplk of itstistivef strpi^R^i vitality, ima acUto^ on^^i^f )>c)mJ7^^a9tobboome de- oeiv4^/m : the soul isln a wrong poieln6n-7-iE»sunies improper aU^lnborreot mo^^ftbpns. ' 4-i^a biB(viiE%;b^n deceived by sucli i iei^ble proJDols in any giyen case, f he ilnagiitation, which W been a prominent agent of the mtlm the one instance, and when that agency, in that form and d^pree, is quite acceptable to the will, or preferring. or choosing part of me soul, as we p ¥'^ C2 PHI J4OSOPHY , OF TIU^ J^^I^IOftX' bpth in.c^raQtctr audi circmimtancefll to which siibli dooeption bered thai'in thp above cases,' an^ ii^^aD 'caa^s of a,8iiililar nature, the j^lj^jli^ pot to be attribu^ci t^ thi^ iki^on, ' 5tti( to the wiitf The p^y^Qep]tiye f^Hl^ p^ .^^^^^K ^^*^*^^*! ,"* ^^^T®" 8eQtatj[hat ii;|3 %ite M^ V^ 1^^^^^ perception m its^i«im« form |^nyarial>iy sedfches for fitotfi i^hd not mr ^ihai^tomg^ Xnd- ^j^^wM^ jrhiih ^ \M <^ther V;dn>- sUiiiiieut, part of meinbry, cannot TO'oriti^i po£,nnot be any qtW , if»^. ' Neither cm tonscwwmeroh iijit t^sjlfiii^^ exCj^^ ijb IS ^oijb % 'a^loiiig^9dnJtfhtie8(i>nces, aijd % iiknadny which 6X18(19, Ih meyepc^ 4o >»qK cmjp, b^twetn the m'ehiorjr and the willp i|[^ ijit^P^alcjd iijy^tiga^i^i^R thereof, that i^rough hahit the ^ransi^ion^, 10. ih^^ course :Qf jtiipne^ h^pae 'Me'ziii^ecnngl^ easy, and the peroeptive fabul'ty fio acGd8tom6^ that soine^w^ areeaf to^^ mf^^r^^^ as it ooourp, find a«,ti^ej( i!;new it.dw pccu^^^ it to hcL either diriBGjfcly oir iiidirectty" connected wAH- thew Ititer^. ^ . , v.^^ ,>^ A.^,*^.^ < -^p6rtioW^inankiftd (^i;ciaiiiistanbes« ■ For j^ .^ qiaiam $im^ to time, wo ban ioajbilv learn from c6nyersaii<^ wiih iiien| t|iiduiey inyiUi this sta^ of linind by . yo)^n^rily prao^islngp'subh n^lnrepreetatatiOns,. and thereby dec^iive itiemselycfl, an4 iA«^ PV ^ ^dfcetve , iKenisetvdif they hm /atBehffoiif mA at & v^ty deir ra^ i^, cindfdt ttnoL' All mcA who are disponed ^ db rigliit, take tlie bptipntti; course, becam they/^fe'tiie'ti^^^^ 8elF|i',^t.'V Tb^^ it a^ut i^l^eirln^k&fhey chain it to their aiaiiSy'iheywntb' it pn mbrar such persons ' reap neb'' diambi^Sy (nyiyttable pj^rls, s jewels, brilliant latirels, and tmtnbr^f l^^fWie^ m their 1 bh^ interest, tbi(>ngii even iii Uili, m liiipiety-nina cakes but of a hundred, they prove ueniflelves mistaken, and vet they seem to r^oioCj 11^ eyenr (itaj^ of mi (|e6$ip^0|i. And it is not verv ||a;^ow^ yicjtory m : ipo ;'j|^ut a! -,...,-,- ^^,^;- - -, .. rrr'.u • ' .-t r 7T"» r-.- ■-" n ' '^ ^- ejrof . ' ^ii|t wi^t' is the, j^esufij , loss of ifite^^ li^^^^. we herfi mu^e, tot it is an in^posi^iop ^ on the intellept^ violence 4one to the moral nature, (Jba insulted, man deceived,Va|lniu9ed, and wronged ; loss of confidence b^ all the better ^lass of society. PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEMORY. 65 a person tf ho. will thus lie to himself and to others, will not ho really respected hy any ; loss of ehjoj^ent, no man can be happy without ^ends ; loss of character, tab matl lias a duirac- ter tnat is worth a fig unless he is oountehahc^od hy the intclli- gont, respeotabte, moral, and religious portion of dommunitv. And does he not get his reward ? But time wtould fall to tell, for in many instanoes Eternity only will devdop the results and show the oonseqiiendeB of such nienial dbuie/ •t t"!'.'' Sec. .' The diffiekdtiei under whitK iot labour fiom thlt state D/mind at the prennt time are great. One .incoiiviBnience under which Hii^e labour, and Wch arises from thli^te of mind is, the wantqftHat truth, in its plain, n'4k^ ibrmj ind in i^hich light we once peiioeived it, but cftnifiot haVe it nQM^f be^atise it has become so mixed np with error ' that It! ioalniibt im scivered there- from. And however vahikble it may be ib 8efVe'the:|)resent purposes of life, the soiiil cannot have it ttoiri' " Th^' tble tnay have arrived f6r the soul tomourh over its itnpi^denoe 'ihd past follies tbuohiA^this mtftter, but no Ubpur, h'o iMtnduht of aniiety^ can plkc0 it within reach of tl^e. mind f^in^ and self-con- demn^ the'soul must do the bedt it c/an Wiihout it. ' If the person haslaboured to deceive miQ/wlft he ibM uow. beghi tp i%el someof theconsequ^noes;'*'^'''^^^^ • .■•... r,'»,r» ,.: T^u ..,.>,::■ And thia oftdn proved a vetr serious injury i6a nifoVc^iti^c- tor. $Ui>po8e, for e^mple, thitt a olrcumst^ucd o6bdhi^[ say; severiEd years'ago. to whuh Wte were' iiyi6^WitneBs, And 0intt)bee:W9 thought ni that'iime that It w^idd lieryifi our intei:ei^ to pit sdme degree df misconstruction on it, anutiii|ii^tbT]e foM We mlj^t be 66iibpivrfttiVJ^ inift i teilii^ft Wooers. Afffit te^nHt bidce iii 'tiliis'Mi^tod^rin, knowing 'it was not, oorreb^, ySr,' to app^r bb^l^tdJift, wheh relitingiiWii HmiutbeitQldidflifetoU^Wgy; MirM tHis timein^'iref^h^leto^m huinaiiCond!u<^inh>V^lt tlji&f thd'^ui^^ ^enbb lii its ^d^irt^kiiig,' aid feeU li^Ht to l^ui^d^^ ^^r pblfgiiiio^s tb'r^ate th^ ci;if6uiAsiEidce the third tim^'sigref^e to the two fornier times; this must also be done to ap^iir cbtisSsit^ht. Thus having related the circumstance severaltiiheSy and iu rv H'- ri M rt PHILOSOPHY OF THE >||JMORY. different places, the man is driven to one- of three things, Either (1) to abandon the,,siib]^jt altogether aqisl a»^ |it jisfprgot^n, which is a very di^c^lf thijftg, and nejtt. io ^Ji ipipQS8iHHty,,for h^ could not ftuji U^ cprnpAit himself upon j^eing interrogated, especially as Ife ha^openly jprofessed to hay.e ^vitn^ssed. such cirquinstattce. Xr)>Q' else jhe must deny of ^ver haymg know^ the subject at f|ily or any part of it, and'this he cbiildriotdo without proving hi^jpiflelfgunty^ffobricaJi^Wtl^^ (3) Or else he must come out and frankly confess mte imth, viz.: that he has misreprefjented It to. himself and to, ptj^er^, atjiing which to the jaioflt of men is very bayd to be, 'ioAe.; .. H^»tycircupMtonces, the first.if ^j^kpjace ana .the afeoiid.^ w^^ Wppld he lppi|;ii]x>.n \^ as tepihg the't^ "Forjattkough WQ might i,pd!e^d desire to tell the tVuik and at this time mij^t be strongly ipcliped to believe it wa9 the