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CJ 'f 1 R E TO THE OBSERVATIONS OP Lieut. GctL Sir WILLIAM HOWE, ON A PAMPHLET, ENTITLEU LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN; I N WH ICH His Misrepresentations are deteflcd, and thofe Letters are fupportcd, by a Variety of New Matter and Argument. TO WHICH IS AD^CDi AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING, I. A Letter to Sir William Howe upon his Stridlures on Mr. Galloway's private. Chara^er. II. A Letter from Mr. Kir <c to Sir William Howe, and his Anlwer. III. A Letter from a Committee, to the Prefident, of theC'on^ ^ grefs, on the 3tate of the Rebel Army at Valley Forge, found amoil^he Papers of Henry Laurens, Efq. By the A uihor of Letters to a Nobleman. Judi alteram partem. LONDON! Printed for G, Wilkie, No. 71, Sr. Paul's Church.yaird, MPQCLJ^XX. %^ ,.7i^:tt':'t«iiU ites ^ R E P L Y to Sir William HoWe*s Obrervations, &c* Wti EN a man, confciolis o^ his own liiif^ condud;, or at lead lying under the charge of having betrayed a public truft, a truft of as great importance as was ever committed to any fub- jedt, finds himfelf under the necefCty of mifrepre- fenting notorious fads^ and even of defcending to perfonal detraftion, for his own vindication, he is truly to be pitied. This, appears to be the cafe of (he late Commander in Chief of his Majefty*s Forcef in Anjcrica. If the Author of the " Letters to a, Nobleman" has contributed to the diftrefs of the General, he has done it with reluctance, fcom a regard to truth and iuftice, and a fenfe of duty to B V the ( a ) the public, 2nd not from any impulfe of private refentment; for he franicly declares, he never had any caufe of perfonal enmity to Sir William Howe, who neither had perfonally injured nor offended him i and therefore, that the motive': which led him to publifli his ftri<5tures on the conduft of the American war, could not arife from fuch a prin- ciple. He coiifxdered him only in his public ca- pacity, and, imagining that he could throw new light on a fubjeft which appeared to many to be dark an-^l problematical, and in which the public welfare was intimately concerned, he proceeded to animadvert upon his conduA as Commander in Chief. Nor was the e;.amination of the management of the American war needlefsly undertaken. The unparalleled failures in that war, the uncommon magnitude of the evils in which they had involved the nation, with the reluftanbe of Government to make judicial enquiry into the caufes of them, loudly called for it. ,,^ We had Iccn the General, in the Middle Colo- nies, commanding a force always, commonly four times, and at certain periods eight times, greater than that of his enemy ; a force fo powerful, fo adequate to the purpofes for which it was intended, that he could not' help expreffing his " utter* " amazement" on the occafion, and paying to the Secretary of State of the American department the greateft, though not more than a juft encomium. ( 3 ) for his " uncommon exertions." To this wai added a naval force of eighty vcffcls of war, under the command of his Noble Brother, to cooperate with him in fubduing the mod unnatural and un, juilifiable rebellion that ever happened in any coun- try, J . We had feen him, between the 3d of Septem- ber and the 8th of December, dr ving that enemy before him from Long Ifland, over the North River, and the Delaware, killing, captivating, and reducing his army from 18,000 to 3000 men, and taking from him ibe whole provme of New Jerfy, .:.... But fuch was the reverfe of conduft (it could not be of fortune; for fortune, however vari-i able and frolic, has never yet been found to commit fuch blunders), fuch was the derelidionof military virtue, that he fuffered that reduced, panic- ftruck enemy to furprife his advanced poft, and drive him out of Weft Jerfey, and to reconquer all Eaft Jerfey, except his three pofts on the Rariton ;. and, eftablifhed at Morris To v/n, in the neigh* bourhood of his head-quarters, to befiege, hara(s,fJ and diftrefs the -whole Britilh army, from Decem- ber to June, wiibcut making one attempt to iijiodgt him, ^ We had fcen himv having under his command at New-York 30,000 men, marching out againlt this enemy, who, by his own exaggerated account, had no more than 10,000, new-railed and undif- •-iV/ B ^ ciplined j ( 4 y dpUnedi and, a few days after, fhamefully retreat^ ing before him from HilUborough to Amboy, without taking any one pnper fiep to bring bim to 4in engagement. We had feen him, after this difgraceful retrear, embarking his army on (hip*board, at an immenfe expenceto the nation} and, forewarned of the dif- ficulties and dangers he muft neceiTarily encounter on the ocean, proceeding, againft contrary winds, 700 miles, to meet the fame enemy polled on ftronger ground, and enabling him, by this wafte of 'time, to procure near double bU former nitm" hers. We had feen him, contrary to the moft urgent motives, to the plaineft dilates of military fci- ence, and the explicit orders of his Sovereign, lead his force 600 miles from the place where he was direded to join General Burgoyne, and at the very time when that junction was to have been made ; and by this abfurd ^wi^vu^ Sacrifice a wbole $ritijh armiy. We had feen him at Brandywine, by the moft judicious and fpkited manoeuvres, perfe6tly fui*- xound and hem in, between the two columns of bis own force and impaflfable waters, the whole rebel army, vigoroudy attack, and fuddenly defeat it i and yet, with an indolence not to be juftified, he fuffered the defeated remains to lie a whole night at Chefter, within eight miles of his camp, fnd on the next morning to efcap unmolefted, . ( 5 ) We hflid feen him at Goflien a few days after, when his enemy, vith his reduced force, had in- cautiouily and foolifhly advanced near the van of his army, after one of his columns had a^ually *f engaged with the rebel advanced guard V* in* timidated from his intended attack by a fall of rain^ although that circumftance was much more favourable to his own regular troops than to the undifciplined troops of his enemy ; and although 4baf enemy bad a confiderable river in its rear* We had feen him at Gertnantown fuflfer him- felf to be furprifed, his advanced pofts defeated and driven back upon the main body of his army, and that army in imminent danger of a total roue py an inferior undifcipUned enemy. We had feen him, when the rebel force lay at White Marih, and when he actually had the beft information of its pofition and ftrength, march out of his }ines under a pretence of intending to attack it 5 and yet, after lying three days within two miles of it, return, without attempting to bring it to aflion, either by aflaulr, or turning its right pank or rearj in either of which c^is he muft have cut his enemy off from his magazines and fupplies, and placed him in a fituation from whence he could mt have efcaped without ruin. We had alfo feen the General, after he had proved his force in every aflion frpcriqr to that of tm * $ee Sir William Howe's Letter, his .-■■- 1: m m r-' ( 6 ) . his enemy, fuBer his whole army to be befieged in Philadelphia, from the month of November to the month of June, by a feeble, Jicklyy nakedy and half' Jiarved arnyy of lefs than 4000 effetlive men *. - jk But further.— We had feen the fame General, with a vanity and prefumption unparalleled in hiftory, after this indolence, after all thcfe wretched blunders, accept, from a few of his officers, a triumph more magnificent than would have be- come the conqueror of America, without the con- fent of his Sovereign, or approbation of his coun- try ; and that at the time when the news of a war with France had juft arrived, and in the very city, the capital of North America, the late feat of the Congrefs, which was in a few days to be delivered up to that Congrels. ^;';v n Such was the difgraceful condud, fuch the pre- fumption of the General, and fuch were the mif- fortunes which he had brought on his country ! And yet, had he contented himfelf with the honours he had received from this mockery of a triumph, he might have pleafed himfelf with dreaming of his triumphal arches, decorated with the mottos of vidtory and the emblems of glory, and with his Quixotic tilts and tournaments, and the *' Letters to a Nobleman" would never have ap.- peared. But when the Author faw the General V v"\ • See a Letter in the Appendix, from a Committee to the Prcfi ic: t of the C -ngrcfs. ... ' , ^ L * I and and his Noble Brother, fupported by a dangeroui^ fadion, purfuing meafures which he conceived tended to involve his country in dlfgrace and ruin ^ when he faw them, in order to conceal their own mifcondudl, attempting to perfuade the great re- prefentative body of the nation, that America was <' the ftrongeft country in the world *," and im- praflicable in war ; that the people were univtr- fally didoyal} that the immenfe naval and mili- tary force committed to their command was in- competent to the reduction of the rebellion — in order to prevail on the nation to give up the greateft part of its dominions •, the duties of a ci- tizen, a difmterefted regard for the welfare of his country, and an honed indignation at fo flagitious an attempt, called on him to lay before his fellow- fubjefls a true ftate of the matters thus attempted to be mifreprefented. Such were his motives, di- vefted of every other confidcration ;. and he de- clares, that the Letters were wrote without the felicitation or knowledge of any perfon whatever in the adminiftration of Government. Had the General, by a true ftate of fails, and by candid argument, free from perfonal abufe, convinced me that I was wrong ; ever h-'ppy to acquit injured innocence, there is no concelTion, no aft of juftice, which iny honour would not in- duce me to perform j but as the reverfe is the «* • See General Grey's EviJciice in the Narrative, p. 107, cafe, \ 'A - ■ m* i « ) •■■■■'.»■ tfitlfer'the fame motives which influenced nift td write the Letters^ oblige me to vindicate the truths they contain. In my firft letter, " On the Strength and Prac* ticability of the Middle Colonies in refped to mi* litary Operations," in order to refute what the General had attempted to prove, that this part of America was the ** ftrongeft of all countries in the •• world," I have given a true and candid dcfcrip- tion of that country, fupported by the evidence of General Robertfon, who had refided in it many years, and which can be fupported by many gen- tlemen, now in England, who have lived in it > and I had further made a comparifon between it and the fcene of adlion in the laft American war^ fhewing that the latter was inHnitely more difficult than the former. To evade the force of thefe truths, the General obfcrves, Narrative, p. 37.] " Tbaf the two laft warSi ** with reJptUt to thefiate of the country of America i •* are in no degree j nilar. In the lafl war^ the dif* ** ficuUies arifingfrom the Jirength of the country i «* were^ for the mofi party removed by the friendly ** diffofition of the inhabit antSy who all exerted them- •' felves to facilitate the operations of the King's •* armyy and to fupply them with every neceffary and •* accommodation^' ' "What thefe " necefTaries and accommodations" were, which were thus furnifhed in the laft war> and which the General could not procure, is not « <■/ mmimi ( ^ ) hbt nitjntiohcd; That the inhabitants furnifhed General Braddock in his expedition to the Ohio, Colonel Bouquet in his expedition to Mufkingum, far beyond the Ohio, and Sir JefFery Amherft in his expedition to Montreal, with carriages and provifions, is true — and with nothing elfe — They wanted nothing elfe. But Sir William Howe did not even want all thefe. — He tranfported carriages with him from England, and whatever more he wanted were procured on Long Ifland and Staten Ifland. Large fleets of provifions were conftantly fent to him ; and in every part of the country, where his army marched^ he procured a fupply with- out difficulty. At Bordentown, Captain Gamble was forming a large magazine of provifions volun- tarily, and with every apparent mark of zeal for the fervice^ brought in by the inhabitants when Tren- ton was taken -, and the whole army was fupplied, during two months, in its march from the Elk to Philadelphia, with more provifions than it could confume : and there was nothing which the coun- try produced, either of neccffaries or delicacies, during the nine months it remained in Fhilaoel- phia, with which it was not ftirnifhed by iho inhabitants. 1 '. - ' ?' • What then were the advantages which the Ge- nerals in the laft war poflefTed, that were not to be commanded in the prefcnt? There were none. But they had difadvantages and difficulties, infi- niteJy greater to encounter, which their gallantry 'ir, " C cafily ^mmmmmm \ ( 10 ) eafily overcame. The General's operations weritf carried on in the Middle Colonies, where every neceflfary was eafily obtained •, but the expedkion of Sir Jefftry Amherft led him to pafs from Al* banyy by Lake Ontario, to Montreal, near 30Q miles, carrying his prOviAons either through a wil'> dernefs or an enemy's country, over lakes, moun* tains, and fwamps ; and the operations of General Forbes and Colonel Bouquet led them through a wildernefs inhabited only by Indians, where no [ingle article of provifions of any kind was to be procured j the firft to Fort du Quefnc, and the other far beyond it, down to Mufkingum; and yet wc have found that thefe gallant men, in whoTe hearts the honour of their Sovereign and the fer* vice of their country were deeply imprdTed, were not obilruAed or intimidated in the path to glory andfuccels by thefc difficulties, : i ^i^^mxtn^' sa-i To refute my affertion, that ** the flrength and " impfadicability of the Middle Colonics is loft in " idea, when "we compare them with the fcene of « adion in the laft war," the General adduces the teftimony of Major-general Grey, who fays, uiii . ■ Page :^8."| " That pari of America where I have *' been, is the Jlrangejl country I have ever been in i it « is every where hilly and covered with wood, " interfeSled by ravines, and creeks, and narfliy *< grounds; and in eveut (^yARTER of a mils is •* a pofi fitted for ambuscade." And in hisanfwerto another queftion, he adds, ** That America is, of : " "all i.JJM^..^. ±JL. ** all countries, the beft cdcuiatcd for the defen- ** five i every b«fidre4 yards might be difputcd j at •» Icaft that part of it which I have feen." This is a formidable defcription of the Middle Colonies, and well calculated to furnifh the reader with apologies for the want of fucccfs in the Ame- rican war : but it is truly vifionary. What coun- tries the Major-general alludes to, I know not ; j^nd yet to prove that he is mistaken in his fafts, will be no arduous taik. He has feen the plains on Long Ifland, of thirty miles in length, and from feven to twelve in breadth, which are without wood, or a (iiigle obftrudlion that can give one enemy the advantage over ano- ther. He has alfo fccii the country between New -York and Trenton, and between the head of Elk and Philadelphia, in which there is not a hill but what may be either afcended without dif- ficulty, or avoided by an army in its march. And when thefe hills are compared with thofe of this country, they are by no means fo high, fo fteep, or fo difficult of accefs ; but wh<^n we compare them with the country from Albany to MontreaJ, and with Cc^gocheague Ridge, Sideling Hill, Ray's Hill, the Allegheny and Laurel ridge of mountains, which may be ju^ftly ftylcd the Ameri- can Alps, they are iiecle more than mole- hills ; and yet thefe mountains, though full of ravines 9nd dangerous defiles, and although covered with C 2 wood, 'PH^ \. ...■r < 12 ) wood, and poffeffed by an encrtiy whofe talent in war is ambufcade, did not intimidate the bravery, nor obflrud the nr.arch, of an Amherft, a Forbes, or a Bouquet j they faw them with contempt, and paflTed them in defpite of their oppofing enemy, v f Jf the country which the General has feen is every where covered with woodt where dp thofe im- menfe quantities of wheat, rye, barley, Indian corn, oats, and buck-wheat, which furnilh the inhabitants with food, and are exported to Eu- rope, find room to grow ? Is it pofTible that a country, fettled one hundred years, and having fo many hundred thoufands of induftrious inhabitants in it, can in any degree bear this defcription, and remain to this day a wildernefs ? I imagine not. The real truth is, that the provinces of New Jer- fey and Pennfylvania, where the late operations were carried on, are fettled, and full of planta- tions, and at leaft two-thirds, and in many places five-fixth parts of it cleared of wood j and the wood confifts of large trees, (landing at confider- able dif.ances, free from underwood, and eafily fcoured with cannon. As to the " ravines," they muft be in proportion to the hills which I have defcribed. The " creeks," or rivulets, are all fordable, or may be paflcd by marching a few miles round •, and there are no " marflies" or fenny grounds within the country. This ground, when cleared, is meadow, and of fix times the value pf '.mif" ■ ■ ' \. ' ''''" ' upland^ ) ! •• - J. .■ rr- :w upland, and therefore the firft .inproved. Thefe are all fa£ls, well known to the people of that country, and which can be proved by many gen- tlemen now in London. How then can it be pof- fible that this country can be, what the General has attempted to prove in the Houfe of Commons, f the ftrongeft country in the world ?" • « - -^ '" *' IJhall now proceed, fays the General, with my remarks J page by page.** As I have no particular obje(5lion to this method, I will do my felf the ho- nour of ftriclly attending him. -r- '^' V^- - ' In page 3, of the Letters, I have ajjerted, " That •• in this country we have lately fcen two armies, ?* one meditating its conqued, the other its de- *« fence. We have fcen the Britifli army pene- " trating into its heart, a circuit of near two hun- *? drcd miles, from Long Ifland, by the fFJbite " Plains, to Trenton, and from the Elk Ferry to Philadelphia, in defiance of the utmoji efforts of an enemy perfeftly acquainted with every ad- vantageous fpot of ground i and we have feen that army taking, with eafe and little lofs, every ftrong poft poflcfled by the enemy, vjho have " fled at its approach,** ^ " " ^'"'*". ""' ' Page 39.] " This defcription^* fays the Gene- ral, " is introduced to prove that the country is not " VERY STRONG NOR IMPRACTICABLE i hut it Ortly 5* proves, that the Generals and officers, commanding 5* the fever al corps ^ were indefatigable in their duty, • 2 <' and cc (( (C (C cc ■91 Si; il ""^ ( H ) ** and fwrwHfttntid all the iifficitltits which they mti y 'Soitb in thcfe marches " ^ rf.rvrt^ ,• - I have nev«r enquired, nor am I now enquiring into the condud of the officers of ^e army j nor " have I ever had any rcafon to do fo. /Whenever led on to a€lionf their condu^ has (hewn that they were actuated by honour, and a k>ve of their country *, and I therefore acknowledge, that they were indefa- tigable (that }&, not fatigued) in cheir duty, ^hen* ever called to it; becaufe I am confident that many, if not all, wo^ld have furmounted difficul- ties tenfold as great as any of thoTe to which they were led, and not think it ti fatigue. In the whole tenor of my Letters, I have only cenfured the in- dolence and mifconduifl of their Leader •, my cen» fures could not, in juftice, extend further. Ibid.] *^ The Commander in Chiefs however, " will he fuppofed to have had fome Jhare in the " merit of thefe fuccejes" He certainly had j I will not only fuppofe it, but frankly corifefs it. Whenever the General found himfelf either difpofed, or under a necejfity of meditating a blow againft the enemy, he never failed of fuccefs. At Long Idand and the White plains, in the progrefs of the army to the Dela- ware^ and at the Brandywine, he fucceeded as far as he chofe : liad he preyed the advantages his truly judicious manceuvres gave him, he might have ended the rebellion. I have not cenfured the ( >5 ) the General for want of ahtlities *, this is a failing for which he ought not cp be ccnfured ; the blame in that cafe would juftly fall on his employers. My flrtdures are confined to his oon^^exertion of thofe military abilities which were dcmonftrated in hts manoeuvres on Long Ifland and the Brandywine, and that undaunted courage which was fo appa- rent in the aftion at Bunker's Hill. - t> , Ibid.] " But it is no$ true tkat the enemy ahvayf ** fled nt our appreachi nor that ute tfioJk all their " firong pofts with e^fi mid Uttle kfs" Here the General takf s advaot^e of the words ^* always fled>" and, to Icrvc the purpofe of con- tradifting me, applies theoi to all the condud of the rebels in the general a^Vions. A fmall (hare of candour, or a little attention to the paragraph he cifies to make out this contradi^on, would have taught him, that I did not alltide to the battles of Long Ifland, Fort Walhingt0n> or Brandywine. I had in the fame paragraph declared, " that the *' Britilh army had penetrated from Long Ifland, ** by the White Plains, to Trenton, in defiance of ** the utmoft efforts of the enemy," including the very inftances he mentions ; and therefore he might have perceived, that the words " always fled'^ could only refer to thole formidable unfortified " pofts^ which are to be found " in every quarter of a mile^ and even in *« every one hundred yards" in that country, the beft of all other countries " calcu- »t »» \ mmmmm t i6 ) ** iated for the defenjive** And here my cxptcf- fion will be found ftriflly true ; for it is knowA that the rebels fled at the approach of the Royal army, at Newark, Brunfwick, Princeton, twice at Trehtorti near Newport in Newcaftle county, and at Gofhen in Pennfylvania * •, at feveral of which places, had they been purfued by 5000 Britilb, their army muft have been utterly ruined. » t »« •-\ Ibid.] " Much might he /aid upon the Jiate •' of loyalty in Jmerica^ Some are loyal froiH ''principle, masy from intereft, many from refent- •** menti and there are or heks who wijhfuccefs to '*' Great Britain, from a recolleSiion of the happinefs " they enjoyed under her government" 'p /s • ■ f ^ • : ' "\i) -"While I cxprefs my furprife at, I cannot help thanking the G<?neral for, this candid confeffion refpedting the loyalty of the people of America. It amounts to a full acknowledgment of all I have contended for in the Letters refpedbing it. The 'force of the fafts I have alledgcd, has, I truft, ex- torted it from him — but, I apprehend, unwarily ; otherwife he would not have taken up near four pages to difprove the fafls adduced in fupport tff ■ a truth he fo fully confeflcs. The talk of recon- ciling this confeflion to his attempt, in the Houfe of Commonsj to prove that the " Americans were «« almoft univerfally difloyal," I cheerfully leave to thofe who will undertake it. ■^> " j> * See the General's Leitcri. ..-.••>'t Ihad fl ( 17 ) I had faid in the Letters, that fome, who were high in office in America, in order to juilify the negleSi and inhuman treatment which his Majeftys faithful fubjeSls bad received^ and to throw a veil over that mifcondufb which had wafted, unnecer> farily, many millions for the nation, facrificed its true intereft, and loft its honour, were the inven- tors of the report of the univerfal difloyalty of the Americans. To this the General anfwers. Page 39.] " I am at a lofs to know what fpe* *' cies of negleS and inhumanity is here meant i I *' am contented that Jiriilures Jhould be made upon my *' profeffional cSndu^t but I feel myfelf hurt as a man •' when J am accufed of inhumanity *' ibjvv fV. r- ' . Ever pleafed to do the General jufticc, I will relieve his feelings as a man ; and I wifli I could alfo relieve thofe which he muft experience as an officer. There is nothing in my Letters which charges him with doing perfonally a fingle aft of inhumanity. My ftriftures were confined to hia ** profeffional conduct •,** and the fublequent part of my Letters explains what I mean by the inhu- man treatment which his Majefty's faithful fub- je£ts h^d received ; and, as he has mifunderftood me, I will again explain it. The inhuman treat- ment alluded to, was the indifcriminate plunder fuffercd to be committed, by the foldiery under his command, on Staten Ifland, Long Ifland, the White Plains, and in the province of New Jerfey, where friend and foe, loyalift and rebel, met with y ■ ^ D the V ( 18 ) the fame fate ; a feries of continued plunder, Which was a difgracc to an army pretending todifcipUne, and which, while it tended tc relax the difcipHne of the- troops, could not fail to create the greateii averHon, even in the bread of loyalty itfcif, to a fervice which, under the fair pretence of giving them protf ^ion, robbed them, in many inftances, -of even the neceflaries of life. • In vain, I imagine, will the General plead, be- fore the candour and huttianity of the public, his orders and proclamations i^rbidding plunder. 4^aws, without execution, are but a dead letter ; and his orders and proclamations, Ux often re- peated, without punilhing the atrocious offenders; were confidered as blank paper y and the plunder- ing continued' as much after as before they were iflued, until he pafled into Pennfylvaoia, where, having made an example or two of the delinqueats, the plunder in a great meafure ceaied. Had this mifchief been nipped in the bud by a few exam- ple^, whijch might have been eafily done in an army io perfcflly flibmiffive; ta discipline in every other refpedt as the Britifh was, the relaxa- tion in difcipline which k>ft Trenton, the im- prelTions made on the minds of the Loyalifts, to the prejudice ofthe King's fervice, atid thedifgrace that was brought on the honour, juftice,'and hu- manity of Britain, could not have taken place. - ^ . To vindicate himfelf againft this vifionary charge of perfonal inhumanity, he tells us, page 40, of :' 6 '■'*■' his I I his great humanity and bdievolencc to the people of Bofton, and that " it is upon record (Pr^clama- *f tion i'itb 05loher, 177SJ, that their firvices ijoere *' cottrtedi by recommending a defenfive affiociation ; *^ and that arms were offered to all who would declare ** thev^felves willing to contribute their affiance in *J the preferuation of good order and government 'f within the town of Boflon," ■ ■;•* rv';: - .^rWhat his .behaviour was to tne-people of Bof- tOHi they can bed inform the public ; the taflc I have alUjnied* Is, only to enquire into his condu£b in the. Middle Colonies. , Why, then, not tell us oi Iwr> wife and prqdenf conduct there? Was it beeaUfe he i% confc^ous that it was not fo wife and prudent in the Middle Colonies as at' Boftjon ?, If this fcnfe of the matter did notprevail W'ih him, it W4s irppolitii; to mention this procla- itiation'T becaufe it only informs us, that he knew lyhat ought to be done, and did it not. To draw afliftance to tlie Britilh force, wherever he ope« rated,' was moft certainly his duty. If the Loy- alifts in BoHon were to be trutled, when alToci- atcd, with arms, men of the fame principles were to be eq^tally trufted in the p/ovinces of New York, New Jerfey, and Pennfylvania, where they were more numerous. Why then was there not a like proclamation iflued in any of thcfe provinces ? Had this been done, the falutary effeds are obvir ous, from an indubitable fad. Since his refigna- tion, upwards of 5000 Loyalifts are embodied in D 2 arms '1^ I ( 20 ) arras for the defence of New York. Had this been done, it would have enabled Sir H. Clinton to have ledj inftead of between two and three, at leaft 8000 men, in a diverfion jn favour of thje Northern army, and <aved jti for Sir Henry did not leave more regulars, than the number of Loyalifts, thus embodied, for the defence of New York, when he pafTeicI up the North river, and found himfelf too weak to proceed. Had this been done, he might, if he did not choof|; to fup- port the Northern army, have taken at leaift 5000 men more wir.h him to Pennfylvania ; a number equal to Wafhington*^ whole force, the greater part of the lime the two afmies were ja that pro- vince. And had the like proclamatiofi been iiTued ifi New T^rfiy, when the General was at Trenton, and had driven Wa(hington*s enfeebled arn.y, of 3006 men, and all the officers of the rebel State, o\it of the province ) and when the General him- felf incautiouQy confefles, ** that his fuccefles had " intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and ** nearly induced a general fubmiffion *," all thofe men in New Jerfey, who were loyal " from prirt- " ciple, from intereft, from refentment, anc from •< a rccolledlion of the happinefs they enjoyed " under the Britifli government," would have alTociaced in arms> and formed a folid barrier of ^ Narrative, p. 40. defence \ 'Y ( ax ) defence agairift every attempt of the rebels, except that of Walhington-s army.tj;u;.i ; ijuu t<?^i^,ii:. ^v And had the General iflfMed the like proclam^* tion, when in Philadelphia, he would have ob- tained a militia of 3500 men. Had he invited the people in the peninfula between the Delaware an4 Cheiapeak, to afTociatey and aflfifl: him in arms; and had he, as he was requeued, landed a few men to fppport them, and to furnifli them with arms and ammunition ; the 2000 Loyaliftsj whq had aiTociated, in lefs than three days, in tjiree of the thirteen counties only, would have been im- . icdiateiy in arms on the part of Great-Britain | and no man, who is acquainted with the general loyalty of the people of that country, can doubt, but that their numbers would have increafed, in a month, to 6000, if not 8000 men. Nothing could have been wanting to have carried this meafure into complete efFedb, and to have reduced this pe- ninfula to the peace of the Crown, but a fmall poft at Wilmington, to cover that country; be* Caufe, while that polV remained, Walhington could not, with any degree of prudeh^?, truft his army, or any part of it, in that peninfula. This would have bejn a fnare into which the Britilh Genera^ ought to have led him, ?.nd out of which he could not have extric3«-ed himfelf : he would in that cafe have been between the aiTociated Loyalifts and the poft at V/ilmingtofi, where the Britifti army might liave been tranfported by water in one, or have marched \ ( »* )" murchird by land in two days, from Philadelphia. All thefe truths mud, upon a flight View of the chart of that coantry, ftrike the military eye with inftantaneoiis convi^ion } and yet that invitatioil< and encouragement which he boafts of having publifhed at Bofton, was in this country Ihame- fully negfcded, :>.'j5 /JUisolis; 01 ,i/-TOriSd J V;The General acknowledges, that he fdund m Philadelphia 44.82 * male inhabitants capable of bearing ' arms;- Of this number there were noe fifty who had taken any part againft the Britifh government; the reit, being about one eleventh part of the inhabitants^ had fled ; kfs than 1000 were Quakers : fo that, had the General purfucd the' fame wife meafure in Philadelphia^ which he did at Bofton, a^nd which General Knyphaufen afterwards purfued at New York •, had he fuffer- ed the people to have chofen their own ofHcers, and' embodied themfelves for the defence of the city; a militia of 3500 men, befides the nume- rous refugees who attended him, would have formed an armed force, which, with a few vefTels of war, and 1000 regular troops, would have been a fofficient defence for that city againft any force of the enemy, except Wafhington's army. This would have enabled him to have marched out with his whole force againft Wafhington, while he remained from December to the middle • Narrative, p. 54* of ( 23 ) of June with his reduced, fickly, and hdf-ftarved army at the Valley Forge, where that army might have been attacked in their weak intrenc^nttents, or furrounded and befieged, and reduced by fa- mine in one week at f)irthe(b, and an end have been put to the rebellion; ;%Jf-'t ;rt)iii uyrJvA v'fiij Page 41 is employed in entertaining the reader with the profufe UheraUty of the General towards Mr, Galloway, and with fame ohlique general charges^ Jlri king at his popularity and integrity, li J'.oinoi c iWhat either that Gentleman's populavitj^ or in« tegrity has to do with Sir William Howe?» mili- tary conduft, the reader will be pilzzlcd to difeern. I dial! not therefore, in this Reply^ undertake a vindication of Mr. Galfoway's perfonal charadter. But, at the fame time, I cannot help obferving, that general charges againft either a public or private character are ti'ttle better thkn afTafTi nations in th^ dark, againd which the- nioft perfect innocence has no chance of guarding itfelf. The charged againft the General in my Letters are io parti- cular, fpecific, and defined, that he might, if he could, vindicate himfdf againft them. But W\i honour, i: feems, has not led him to deal thus ho^ nourably by Mr. Galloway. ^i»i ,rn!.' • ; In order to prove that many of the Pennfylva- nians were attached to the Bfitiih government; • Sec a Letter from a Committee to the Prefidfnt of Con- grcft, in the Appendix., ;,,;,. ;.^ \.^w<^y^\^ \ .r,v v ■ ■■■:, "• I have V. Ml III ( 24 ) i havtf afferted, that during our pofleflion of Phi- ladelphia, the people of the country, at the rifquc of their lives, had fupplied the Britifli army, -navy, and inhabitants, amounting to not lefs than 50,000 perfon^, with all kinds of provifions, while they refufed thefe fupplies to the ^bel General. Thefe fadts Sir William Howe doei not venture to deny. I thought^ and fiill think, they fully fupport the matter I wiihed to prove. In fo grtat a conteft, in the event of which the feelings, the intereft, and happinefs of mankind were fo deeply involved, and their pafl^ons fo violently engaged, neutrality of fentiment or attachment is unprece- dented—is impoinble. Men's opinions and wilhes will become fixed in favour of one fide or the other \ and I concluded, how reafonably the Reader will determine, that thofe men who vo- luntarily fupplied Walhington's army againft thei;' Sovereign, were rebels i and ihat tho(e who, every mile they paiTed, rifqued their lives, and yet at that rifque fupplied the King's troops with provifions, from five to an hundred miles diftance, were friends and faithful fubjeds. But it feems the General is of a different opinion. Hear his arguments. ■ '. .v.v. >•!■, vViM 7f' vlrV/.r'-. , „ Pilge 42.] " That the people of thi country «* brought infrejb provifions to us, and refufed fuib '* ftipplits> tis much as they dared, to the rebel " General, is certain. But I do not admit, that this conduct proceeded from the motives afcribed h (( (C «c cc ( ^5 ) ** i>y the /ittthor. The people of the country had itb *' opinion of the value of Congrefs money. They ** knew they Jhould receive mojlly hard money in ** payment % and they had an oppottitnity of carrying •• back with them a variety of necejfary articles,^^ The/e, I apprehend, were the real motives of all that kind of fiffiftance which wt procured from the *^ country people " > What a horrid idea of human nature muft th6 General have entertained when he drew thcfe c6n- clufions! Would not a little charity have convinced him, that men who v<^erc loyal " from priJici'pli— •• from refentment,— from a recolleftion df for- •* mcr happinefs," and whofe anions ftri^tly correfponded, were afluated by motives more honourable and more virtuous, than that of ac- quiring a little hard money and a few necefTaries ? Can it be pdflTible that he could believe, that th^ honour of "principle," the powerful impulfes of juft refentment for injuries fuftained, and a lively fenfe of formeir ** happincfs," of which they had been wantonly deprived, were all effaced by fuch paltry and tranfitory confiderations ? Did he pafs this fevcre, this cruel judgment on the faithful fubjefts of his Sovereign, and the tried friends of his country, by his own feelings — the tell: of his owii adtions? Were the Loyalifts, whom the General, after all the affiftance they had given to him, has thus ungratefully traduced, to re- taliate, with how much more reiiron might they E fay, * \ I •c C( «c ( 26 > fay, That he had facriBced his military fame, his* duty to his Sovereign and his fellow- fubjedls, and the interen: and fafecy of his country, to the dirty purpofcs of a fa<5lion, whofe whole conduct is founded on private interefl and ambition I Page 43.] " The Author fays, they did this at •' THE RISQUE OF THEIR LIVES. There wos ift fatl THAT APPEARANCE! but I always sus« p EOT ED that General Wajhingtotty through policy, comUved at this kind of commerce** The argument here refts upon the feeble fup- port of the General's " fufpicion," while he ac- knowledges that *' appearance" was againil that fufpicion. If appearance was againil it, upon what was his fufpicion founded ? It could not be upon fadts } for in that cafe his opinion could not reft in fufpicion. In truth, the fa(fls were all £ gainft it : For what could induce Wafhington to keep diflferent pods l^o^unding the Britifh lines, and conllanc patrol^, ^equently coming within fight of them, but to prevent a fupply of provi- fions ? Thefe patroles put to death, without he- fitation, feveral pcrfons, for no other offence than that of fuppl^ing the BritiQi troops. Some were tried by a court-martial, and received two hun- dred laflies; and others were branded by a hot iron in the hand, with G H, and fcnt into the Briti(l\ lines, as a mark of contempt of the Bri- tiflj General. And yet all this is not fufficient to remove his " fufpicions" of the difloyalty of thefe faithf^l i V ) faithful people, nor to irtduce him to believe that his enemy, who was beficging him, intended to deprive him of the means of fubfifting his troops. Ibid.] " Tbg General is ai a lofs to tiiiderjiand what I mem by many tboufands of Loyalijls con- cealing themfehes in diJUnt provinces, and taking refuge among the favngcs^ to avoid entering into the «( (( ct <( war. >i I did not mean, as he fufpeifls, " the infurgents ** of Carolina i" and if I had, I (hould have thought that a General who had commanded his Majefty's army, might have found a word more defcrip- tive of a number of Loyalifts who had taken up arms under the authority of his Majefty's Gover- nor, to fupport his government, than the word infurgent. However, the men alluded to were thofe who, when draughted from the militia of the rebel States, rather than ferve in their army, fled the provinces from whence they were draughted, into others where they were not known. Many took refuge among the Indians, and have fince joined Colonel Butler and Captain Brant, and are now ferving againft the rebels. This was a com- mon praftice ; and it was partly owing to this praftice that Wafliington*s continental army has been fofmall ever fince their defeat on Long Ifland, as not to amount, at any ope time, to more thaa tPjOQOJPcn, . .A k' »- ' » I. <. w ' >i» E 2 To ( 28 ) -Tp my aflertion, " That many thouiands cam» *♦ over to the Britilh troops for protC(5lion," the General anfwers, , >. .,.:.;..*».,,. Ibid.] ** / at^eu 4hat at no time did men in ** nuinhers come over to the Briti/k troops" .- ^ *> Here he does not venture to deny the fa£b alf ledged, yet he manifeftly intends to miflead the reader. And to do this, he is obliged to add the words, " at no time," and *' in numbers.'* Thus he artfully attempts to avoid a fa6^ which cannot be denied* I did not afTert, that thoufands came over *' at one time," or " in numbers." The General fyffercd, Wafhington to fuperintend his lines at New York with fo much circumfpe^ion, as not to fuffer the Loyaliils to come in in num- bers } and when he went to Pennfylvania, the people vy^re ordered, by his declaration, to " rc- •' main peaceably at their ufual places of abode." But had the fadl been denied, it could be fup- ported by the number of refugees, perfecuted on account of their loyalty, who came from time to time into Philadelphia and New York, many of whom are at this time enibgdied in corps in his Majefty*s fer . ice. And it appears from the teftimony of Lord Cornwallis (p. 68.), that, while the Britifh army was at Trenton and Bordentown^ ^ three or four hundred of the inhabitants** came in every day for ten days (that is, while the trqops ftaid therpj, and received cci'tificatcs foi^ If i 29 ) ~ fheir protedion ; and he might have faid wkk truth, that before the taking of Trenton, not llefs than feven thoufand had, in the fpace of tbreo weeks only, received thoTe certificates. But thefe certificates were of little ufe to the unhappy peov pie i-— all who were in or near the Britifh lines were plundered, and the faith of the General, pledged to the people by his proclamation, was iham<;fully violated. Upon my alTertion, That " the foot and caval* ** ry fent over to America, amounted to 52,815 1 *' and of that number 40,874 were under the ^* command of Sir William Howe," the General obferves. Page 45.] '* The Author would here imprefi. tb$ <' Reader with an opinion^ that, at the time o« *' MY ARRIVAL AT Staten Island, my arw^ ♦' amounted to 48,^874, and the rebel army to i8,ooot •' militia included,^* The conclufion here drawn from my worda, I may venture to aflcrt, never was made by any candid and fcnfible reader. The words are inde- finite as to the time or times when the troops wcrd fent^ and convey nothing more, than that all the troops fent over amounted to. 52,815, o£ whicH troops General Howe had 40,874 under, his com* mand. But what could he do ? He could not deny the fa<5t %. and it ^as too important an evidence of his indolence and mifcondu^ to be paJied over in fileoce \ and therefore he refolves $ to V ai iv. < 30 ) to torture my general exprefllons to a particular meaning, in order to divert the reader from rc- flefting on the fuperiority of his force to that of the rebels. Indeed, I have ofcen occafion to ad- mire the like Ikill and ingenuity in the courfc of his obfervations : for where he cannot fafely at- tack in front, he fcldom fails to make ufe of ftra- tagerp to get round his opponent. What pity it is ! What millions would have been faved to the nation, what heavy difaders to his country would he have prevented, had he difcovered equal fkill, or the like (Iratagem, in furrounding and attacking his inferior and undifciplined enemy in America ! The art here made ufe of will appear yet more barefaced, when the reader is reminded, that in the Appendix to my Letters, I ftate his numbers in Auguft 1776, when he was at Staten Ifland, at pot more than 24,000 men. But he contends, that I have exaggerated his numbers ; for that when he landed from Staten Ifland on Long Ifland, he had only " 20,121 rank and file, of which 1677 •' were fick." To diminilh his real force, he here gives us only the rank and Hie, omitting the nu- merous officers, from himfelf down to a drummer, which generally amount, in every corps, to near one fixth part of the whole. I am not a military man*, my defign was to lay before my country his real force, that they might form a juft judg- ment of his conduft. I have not therefore wrote in a tpilit^ry dialeift s and if I had, few of my readers m.. J my ders ( SI ) readers would have underftood me-, and couW * ] believe that I had mifreprcfented his real force in any one inftance, through the want of that knowledge, it would give me pain. But this I have not done. His own returns laid before the Houfe of Commons, in the laft year, will prove, that he had at Staten Ifland 24,464 cfiFedtives, rank and tile, and tit for duty *, and, in the whole> 26,980, officers not included, who, when added, will amount to 31,625. Jbid.'\ He finds much fault with my eftimatc of his real numbers •, and adds, ^^ If I were to «* fol^w the Author* s mode of computation^ when he *' fiates the number of men under my command^ I " ft)ould fay^ and from better authority^ that Gene- " ral Wafhington had under his command in May " 1776, in the fever al provinces, an army of 80,000 •« men \* and he refers to a return of the rebel ftrength in May 1776, printed at New York. Th(; General does not lay any flrefs on this Iham return. He knew its fallacy : It was a re- turn of men raifed, and intended to be raifed, and which were never raifed, calculated to give' him a formidable idea of the rebel force; and being ridiculous in itfelf, it is produced to render my eftimate of his own force ridiculous and falfe.. But to expofe his evation of what he does not venture to deny, I will give the reader his real numbers from his own returns. The firft column Ihall contain the total effedtives rank and tile -, the fccond. ( 3i ) icCond, the total army, officers included ; th^ third, that of the American army *, that every unprejudiced and impartial reader may compare the Britifh force with that of the rebels. For, after all our inquiries into the minute tranfac* tions of any military command, the (irfl: queftion of a man of fenfe will be. What was the refpec- ti'ire force and dilcipline of the two contending j^rmies? 1776. Toul Effeaivej, Total Army, Total Rank and File. Officers included. Rebel Forcci Aug. 9. Nov. 22. Dec* 1777- July 17. 24,247 26,980 30,049 29,308 3^*755 35»^\7 18,000 • 4,000 3»30o t 8j00o Such vfSLi the ftate of the force under Sir William Howe's immediate command, exclufivc! of the garrifon at Rhode Ifland, which added, amouAts, in the whole, to 40^874; and fuch the numbers * General Robertfon (ays, in^ hi« £xami.ii):ioii» the rebel force was only i6,coo. f See the General's Narrative, p. 8. Wafliington atbcked Colonel Rhal with his whole force, except Cadwallader's bri- gldo, which did not confift of ;oo men ; and thofe were pre- vented, by the ice, from crofling the Delaware, and attacking Bordentown^ at which place Colonel Donop had left only 8o- grenadiers. At this time the remains of Lee'» corps had joined Walbiogtoo, who before had not 2800 men. * of '5 •^■'» ( 33 ) of his inferior, and truly contemptible, cnerny, notwithftanding, as the General confVfles, " evc- " ry compiilibry means *" was made ute of to increafe them •, and yet he fuffcrcd that enemy, lying in an unfortified poft, within twenty miles of his quarter?, to harafs and diftrcfs his troops from January to July, without taking a fingle Hep to diflodge them. The fame unjuilifiable indolence and mifcon- du6t attended his proceedings while in Philadel- phia. Here the General lay in his quarters all the winter and fpring, until the month of June ; contenting himfelf with fending out occafional parties to cover the loyalifts, who were continually feeding the officers of his army with all the deli- cacies and luxuries which the country afforded. To fupport this charge, nothing more will be ne- ceflary, than to lay before the public a few fafts notorious in America, and to many gentlemen now in England. Although the General, in page 6o, aflerts, that his whole force at Philadelphia was no more than 1:^,799, rank and file, it does appear, by his own. returns, that he had, on the 3d of Odlober, after the battle of Brandywine, 15,898 cfFcdives, rank and file ; total, rank and file, 17,752 •, and, when the officers are added, 20,680. With this force. • See his Letter to Lord George Germain, February iz, 1777. See alfo his Letter, March 5, 1778. F a few p^p^^l^ N ( 34 ) a few men loft in the battle of Germantown eyc^ Ceptcd, he went into winter quarters in Phila- delphia, where he fays it was " well accommo- •» dated." ' Wafhington, with about 9000 men, took up his quarters at the Valley Forge, within twenty miles of Philadelphia. Having no houfes for his troops, he was obliged to build uncomfortable huts with round logs, tilled in with clay, and covered with loofe ftraw and dirt, in fuch a man- ner as not to fecure them from the weather. This fituation the General, in his letter of the 5th of March, defcribes in thefe words : *' The rebel ^' army continues in the fame fituation as when I " had laft the honour of writing to your Lordfhip, '* huticd at Valley Forge, where their men fuffer ** exceedingly from tlie very inclement weather, which " has induced numbers to defert." The camp- ^iforder raged among hi-> men, which obliged him to eftdblifli no lefs than eleven hofpitals; and many died, many deferted to their feveral pro- vince^, and near 3000 of them came ov-f to the Briti% army. From thefe circumftances, his army was reduced, before the month of March, to lefs than 4000 men •, and by far the greater part of thefe were in a manner naked ; many without flioes or (lockings, and but few, except the Virginians, with the necefiary clothing *. • Mr. Gallowaj's Examination, p. 2j, 28, 29, 30. Hii His ( 35 ) ' , Mis horfes were in a condition yet worfe j they were conftantly cxpofcd to (howers of rain, and falls of fnow, both day and night ; many of them died ; the reft were fo emaciated as to be unfit for labour j and, in addition to this diftrcfsful fitua- tion, Walhington had not in his c;',mp, at any one time, one wcek*s provifions either for man or horfe, and fometimes his men werj totally dcftitute*. Wafliington's camp was by no means difficult of accefs i far lefs fo than the pcfts occupied by him at the Brandywine ; and in one part of the front the afcent was fcarcely perceptible, and his rear was commanded by higher ground. His ditches were not three feet in depth ; nor was there a drummer in the Britifh army, who could not, with the utmoft eafe, leap over them ; and his defences might '. ave been battered down with fix-pounders. Th's is not an exaggerated pifture of the rebel army, nor of the weaknefs of its fituation. A brief account of it I have given in my Letters, page 87, which the General, in his Defence, has not dsnied j indeed, he has thought it prudent to take r.o notice of it, any more than of many of the moft important charges contained in thofe Letters, Upon rhefe fads 1 leave the candour of the public to find. If it can be found, a reafon why the General did not attack, or furround, and • See a Letter, in the Appendix, from a Committee of Con- grefs Appointed to enc^iiire into the Stale of . Wa(hington*« army. F 2 tak« \ IE I 1 1 m ! 'I 1 ' ( 36 ) take by Hege, Wafhington*s whole army. His numbers were greater than thole of the rebels, whoi furronnded and took a Britilh army, under Ge- neral Burgoyne, of 4003 veteran troops, in i^ fituation not fo dillrefsful as that of Walhing- ton. Numerous are the inftances in which the Gene- ral has perverted my meaning to his own purpofes. 1 have charged him with " declining to truft the **. faithful and loyal fubjcds with arms, or to make " ufe of the well affc^ed force in the Colonies^ to ** cjftjl him in reducing^ or iv defending ajter reduced^ *' either cities or provinces, ""^ In this charge I al- luded to his declining to embody the Loyaliits, a' a militia, in New York, New Jerfey, ard Philadelphia. In New York, the militia, which he declined to embody, amounts to 5C00 men. In New Jcrfcy, upwards of fifty of the firll men in the county of Monmouth, &c. car.ie in to offer, their Jcrvice in difarming thedifalTcdled, and to re- ftore the province to the peace of the Crown \ but thty could not procure accels to the General, al- thoiiL'li tlieir wilhes were communicated to his Aicl de Cainp. They returned to their relpedive fa- milies, cha<.i;rintd and difeulled at the hauteur of the (jcneral j lome of them, notwithllanding, are now at New York, under the protediun of the Bririlh army, having abandoned their property, hazarded their livc=s, and facriiiced the happinefs of thtir families. At Philadelphia, at leall :^,5oo faiilitul ( 37 ) t faithful militia might have been embodied in arm^ for the cicfence of that city, while the army ope- ratcu againft Wafliington j and had the General at the fame time cordially inviped the Loyalifts to take up arms, as a militia, in their fevcral coun- ties, under gentlemen in whom they had a confi- dence, for the particular purpolcs oi fcizing on and difarming the difaffcded try Government, and defending their fevcral dillrids, the whole pro- vince of Pennfylvania, and theextenfive peninfula h ''^^ vould have been rcllorcd to the peace of the Crown before the end of the campaign. To parry this charge, the General aiTerts, page g6, " Many of my proclamations contained invifa- f* tions to arms, and promifes of large encourage- " ment.** Where thefe proclamations are to be found, he has not told us i they never were pub- liflied in Pcnnfylvania, New York, or New Jer- fey i and 1 verily believe they never were v^^ritten. The proclam'ition iflued in 1776, in New Jeriey, contained nrrl.ing more than a promile of pardon and proteft: c thofe who fliould come in and take the oaths 1 allfgi;ince ; that at the head of Elk retted only in promihng the people protedion from the " depredations of his army.*' and callmg on the difaffedcd ** to remain peaceably at their " ulual places of abode." The General lurely cannot here mean the *' many proclamations" iflued within hii i les, inviting the people to enlift in the regular Irru-.inciai fervice ? This cannot be j bc- S caufe, , " ( 38 ) caufe, to ufc his own word?, it would be ** a quib- " ble which would never have entered into the •* head of an Engliih" nor of an American ** lawyer," **•■' -"-i ••'-" v--«^ j ■- ii-'.' j<. h ;'■.(•-»■> .'-u >, . Before I leave the lad- mentioned proclamation, I cannor, in juftice to the charader of Mr. Gallo- way, avoid taking fome notice of a paragraph in Page c^X).] '* As ♦■his declaration was calculated «* for the meridian Oi ' '. fylvania, of the people <' of which province fv.. Galloway profeHed an *' intimate knowledge, / confulied him pevioujly ** upon it; I framed it agreeably to his ideas ^ ^* when written, it had h\s full approval ion.'* i ' . Here, I hope, the General's memory has totally failed him. The fafts relating to this tranfadlion arc truly thefe. While the fleet lay at the Hook, on its way to the Chcfapeak, s^nd not before. Captain Montrefor brought this declaration, in manufcript, from the General, to Mr. Galloway, with a requeft that he v;ould confider it. Upon the firft view, a number of objedions arofe ; he immediately com- mitted them to paper, fupported with his reafons. Thefe he returned, with the declaration, to Cap- tain Montrefor, to be carried back to the Gene- ral. Upon Captain Montrelbr's return, Mr. Gal- loway alked, what the General iaid to his objec- tions. The anfwer was, that tlicy were not ad- mitted i for the declarations had been already printed ^ffatNewTork, This • C 39 ) ;' This is the whole truth, and nothing but the l.uth. Captain Montrefor, and two other gen- tlemen, were privy to this tranfadion, whofe ho- nour, I have no doubt, will lead them to confirm it. On this paragraph I fhall leave the reader to make his own comment, v.ith only obferving, that the General, in every inftance where he has taken cccafion to mention Mr. Gallowaj *s condudl and opinions, has been guilty of what charity would lead mc to hope are only failures of memory. The General labours hard, in his Narrative, to vindicate his conduft in not fupporting the North- ern army. Nor ought we to be furprifed at it, as it was a neglc<5t which ftrikes the mind on the firft refleftion •, a blunder to which we owe all our pre- fent misfortunes. His arguments may be com- prifed under three heads, ift, That he had no cxprefs orders to fupport it ; 2d, That he had not force fufficient ; and, 3d, That his Southern expe- dition was approved of by the Secretary of State. In reply to the firft argument, fliould we agree to what he afferts, that the cxprefs orders to lup- port the Northern army were never received, yet wc know that a letter from Lord George Germain, of the 3d of March, 1777, came to his hands on the 8th of May *. That in this letter he is in- formed, it was his Majefty*s opinion, that " a warm i * Sec Letter of this date in the Parliamentary Rcgiftcr, 17-9. ** diverfio^ riiii t 40 ) " divcrfion (hoiild be made on the coafts of the •* Maflachufets j" and that the " benefits" which " muft inevitably refult" from it, are pointed our, viz. " That it will not only tend much to " impede the levies'* for the Continental army, but to the fecurity of our trade, and would " keep " the rebels at homc^^ for the internal defence of their own refpeSlive difiridls. A more wife, or a more neceflary diverfion, to fave the Northern army, could not have been devifcd ; and had it been performed at the time General Burgoyne paflcd from Ticondeioga towards Albany, it muft have produced the effc(5ls his Majcfty w / prc- di(fled. Levies never were, nor can be L.ade, in the fcene and buftle of war •, and men will not leave the defence of their fire- fides, their prin- cipal Tea ports, and mod valuable cities, to fight in a different province, and in diftant woods, where there is nothing to defend. This diverfion, therefore, had it betfi made, muft either have drawn General Gates, with his whole army, to the defence of the capital cities on the fea coaft, or at leaft have detained at home more than one half of thofe men, which, by this negle<5l, were enabled to join his army j and in that cafe the Northern army could not have failed of overcoming, with eafc, every pofllble difficulty. But I will fuppofe that no fuch diverfion had been dire6led. The General could not but know, that the objed: of the two armies was the fame, and ( 41 ) and that it was the immediate bufinefs of both to form a jundlion. Was it not then his duty to fee fo large and important a reinforcement in a ftate of fafety, at leaft, before he carried his army to a pl^""; which deprived him of the power to fupport it? However, it feems, notwithftanding his Majefty's dircdlions, and the weighty im- portance of the meafure, that the General and his Noble Brother " confulted upon the expediency of " the diverfion *," yet neither made it, nor took any meafures to fupport the Northern expedition V in confequence of which, a Britifh army palTud under the yoke of rebellion. A" I have hitherto reafoned upon a fuppoHtion, that; the General had no exprefs orders to co-operate with, and join the Northern army •, and I truft, the arguments I have advanced are fufHcient to prove, that, in not doing ft, he a£ted contrary to his ma- nifed duty. But, to ftrip him even of the fhadow of an excufe, I will prove that he had thofe orders, or what fully amounted to them. On the ajth of September, 1775, he received his commiiTion of Commander in Chief f. On th6 9th of O(5bober he undertakes to propofe the plan of his future operations j recommends the evacua- tion of Bofton, and that a body of 12,000 men be i • Narrative, p. 12. , . - f See his Letters to the Earl of Dartmouth, dated the jth of November, and 9th of Odlober, 1775. G employed ■i >^ y. ' ! ( 42 ) cnripl./cd " from New York, to open the cpmmu* •* mcation with Canada in the Jirjl injiance" and that an army of Canadians and Indians from Ca* nada (hould meet him ; and, that ** the accom* " plifhment of the primary objeft for opening the •* communication, being obtained by the two at" •• mies^ thefe corps might take fcparate routes *• into the province of Maflachufet*s Bay." And in his letter of the 2d of April, 1777, he points out " the advantages that might arife by fecuring " Albany and the adjacent country^* - ?i'' * '-^^ '; «■ *4Stri6lIy conformable to thefe ideas of the Gene- ral, Government proceeded. His own army was re- inforced with numbers fo great, that it llruck him with utter amazement. Another army was formed^ and ordered to proceed from Canada to join his troops at Albany. On the 25th of March, the Secretary of State tranfmitted to Sir Guy Carle- ton, at Quebec, the plan of operations for both armies \ in which he is ordered '* to detach Genc- •« ral Burgoync," and to direft him, " fo dc- •* tached, to proceed with all poflible expedition •• to Albany^ and pit himfelf under the command of «* Sir William Howe \* and further adds, " with ** a view of quelling the rebellion as foon as pof- " fiblc, it is become neceffary that the mo^fpeedy ** junSlion of the two armies Jhould be effe£led" An official copy of this letter was tranfmitted to Sir "Willium Howe for his information and dircdion, and ^ ( 43 ) and was received by him on the 5th of June, fix weeks before he failed on his wild and unfortunate expedition to theChefapeak. By thefe letters, the following truths are in full evidence: That the plan of the Northern operations was the General*s own, and not the plan of Adminiftration : That he received written orders to " cfifedt a fpeedy '• jun«5lion" of the tvyo armies, and that that junc- tion was to be made at Albany. This is fo plain, that it would be an affront to the reader*s under- Handing to fay more on the fubjeft. In vain will the General plead, that he never received his or- ders. For what end was the official copy of the plan of operations fent to him ? Was it to anfwer no purpofe ? Or was it to fignify his Majefly's pleafure and orders refpeding thofe operations? How idle ! how truly trifling, then, mufl this part of his Defence appear, when the junSfion of the two armies was not only conformable to his own plan, but clearly pointed out by reafon, military duty, and by his Majefty's orders ! As to his fecond objedtion, that he had not force fufficienr, 1 need only remind my reader, that the General had under his command, on the 17th of July 1777, as appears by his own returns, 40,874 men, officers included. His Southern army.con- fifted of 20,680 ; the garrifon of Rhode IQand re- quired only 2400, as he confclTes in his fecret letter of the 2d April, 1777 » ^'^ remaining force Q 2 was ■ttv». \ ' Mr if' 11 1 ( 44 ) •was 17,794. In the fame letter, he ftatcs as fuf- ficicnt for the defence of New York and New York Ifland 3200, of Paulus Hook 300, of Staten Ifland I200i in the whole 4700. This number, deduced out of 17,794, will leave 13,094, befides 3000 efFedives, of the provincial corps under General Tryon. This will make the force under his com- mand, cxclufive pf his Southern army, and his ne- ceflary garrifons, 16,094. I will alio fuppofe, which is a very extravagant fuppofition, that every fixth man was an invalid, and it wil* leave 131412 effedives, whom he might have applied to the fupport of the Northern army j but, not inclined to fupport that army, he left ufelefs thoufands in the garrifon of Rhode I^and, apd carried with him, in his wild circuitous voyage to the Chef^- peak, as many thopfands, equally unnecefTary ; for there was not the moftdiftant profpedt that the enemy could ever raife an army, equal, in effec- tive force, to lOjPOo veteran troops. 1; ; r., ? , ' But further. He acknowledges, page 61, that he " left at New York about 8500 rank and file^ *« fit for duty." I have (hewn, that he thought 4700 were competent to the defence of all his gar. rifons -, why then did he not order the remaining 3S00 to make the diverfion on the coafts of New England, as had been direded by his Majefty ? a force abundantly more than fufHcient, if properly conduifled, to have detained the whole militia of that ecu- try in the defence of their capital towns 9 and ( 45 ) and valuable fea-ports, which muft have enabled General Buigoyne to pafs without difficulty to New York. The third argument remains to be examined. The General, in his Narrative, as well as in his Obfervations, repeatedly declares that the Secretary of State approved of his " expedition to Pennfyl- ** vania." This aflertion is of the fame complex- ion with that of Mr. Galloway's approving of a proclamation, at a time he had never heard of it. The fadls are : In his letter on the 20th of Janu- ary, 1777, he propofes " to detach a corp only to *' enter the Delaware by fea^ and the main body of " the army to penetrate into Pennfylvania by way ■* ^SJ^^hy'* T\iv& meafure was founded in the founded policy, and juftified by common fenfej becaufe, had it been purfued, Waftiington, having at that time only 8oco men, muft hu "e fought, or fled before him out of New Jerfey, over the De- laware. Wafhington's fafety depended on his taking this route \ his military ftores and provi- fions were all on the other fide of the Delaware : cut off from thefe eflentials of war, he muft have given up the contcft. Walhington once defeated, or driven over the Delaware, the province of New Jerfey might have been immediately reftored to the peace of the Crown. Philadelphia, altoge- ther without defence by land, and very little better by water, muft have immediately fallen. A gar- rifon, more numerous than Wafhington's whole .• • army, \ J { 46 ) army, might have been left for its defence, and 10,000 men, at Icaft, fpared to operate up tho North River, or on the New England coails, in fa-» vour of the Northern army. All this might have been ^iccomplilhcd with eafe by the latter end of Auguft, altiiough the campaign was not opened until the 12th of June^ but had the General commenced the operations on the 12th of May, the moft proper month in the whole year for military operations in that part of America, it might have been completed by the latter end of July. This appearing evidently to he practi- cable, with the force under the General's com- mand, every candid and fenfible man mud ap- plaud the council which induced his Majefty tq approve of t^e plan for invading Pennfylvania, *f by the way of Jerfey." .r ^- ., ;, This approbation was communicated by Lord George Germain, in his letter of the 3d of March •, but before it could reach * the General, he had altered this judicious plan for one truly ridiculous, and ruinous not only to the Northern army, but his own operations ; a plan wliich muft neccflarily have been attended with a great wafte of time, immenfe cxpencc, unneccffary rifque, and innumerable diffi- culties. In his letter of the 2d of April, he informs the Secretary of State, that, *' from the difficulties f* and delay that would attend the pafilng the rivef .'■'. 'Y. T '(.* Fie did not receive it till the 8th of May. " Delaware, ' • ( 47 ) «• Delaware, by a march through Jcrfey, I propoffc •* to invade Pcnnfylvania by fea ; and from this *• arrangement wc muft probably abandon the Jcr- •* fcys, which, hy ihe former plant viOxAdL nothwn '* been the cafe." ti-'-^r ;> -< v -jr-'^n'*"' r^-^r ^ / "Will the General affert, that the Miniftcr of the American department ever approved of this material, this mifchievous change, in his plan ? Did he ever approve of his abandoning New Jerfey, his embarking on (hip-board his whole army, and fubjefting them to all the rifques and dangers of the lea, without the leaft neceflity or reafon ? Th'^ American Minifter is too wife, and too well V i in military fcience, to have approved of a ^i<tn pregnant with fuch folly and infatuation ; if he did, the General is called on to produce fome proofs of that approbation. This being the truth, the General will labour in vain to throw the blame of his own military abfurditics upon the (houlders of others. The plan was truly his own ; and it bears fo Jirong a re- femblance of his other military operations, that no one acquainted with them can poflibly doubt it. For by this wretched projcdl the three ftrong poRs of Brunfwick, Bonumtown, and Am boy, which had been fortified at an immenfe national expence, were to be given up ; the province of New Jerfey, which had been fo lately reduced, was to be abandoned to an enemy confiding of Icfs than one third of his own numbers ; and a Britifh ( 48 ) Brltifli army, both cavalry and foot, ^as to bt embarked ui the hot holds of (hips, in the hotteft months of the year, to pafs into a yet more fouth- ern and (ickly climate, and chat too at a feafon wlien contrary winds never yet failed to prevail. All thefe difficulties, tOj^ether with the dangers and rifqucs of the ocean, were to be encountered in preference to a march oi fifty-eight miles through a fine open country, interfcdled by a variety of roads, and ftored with every neceffary for the ac- commodation of an army. ?: . t foj;4^^ , jc^« ; , •^ * But it feems, " the difficulties and delays that «* would attend the pafTage of the Delaware, and " the want of fufficient me?ns to pafs fo large a «* river *," were the obftruiflions to his firft plan. What will the rfcader fay, when he is informed, that this fo large^ and fo much dreaded, river is ever, in the months of June, July, and Auguft, fordable in a variety of places, between Trenton and Coryel's Ferry, on the different roads to Phi- ladelphia? and yet, if it was not fo, that it is not, in many places, 300 yards wide; that the ground on the Jerfey fide commands, in many parts, that on the Pcnnfylvania fide, fo that our army might have been perfeccir covered by cannon in its palTage ; and that the General had prepared more boats and pontoons, which he carried with him to Brunfwick, than were neccflary for that pur- . <^-i ■ .i' • Narratiye, p, 16, ..i ::'■ - pofc. '( 49 ) jpbf^. Thus cifcum^anccd, aiid thus prepared, what would aA Amher((, a Wolfe^ or a Bouc][uer; have thought of di^cultics fo truly infigniBcant ! As i have now before me Sir William Howe's general plans of operation, I cannot avoid taking notice of his change of opinion. As foon as he Was appoinr d, his plan " was to open a conimuni- " cation with Canada, in the firft ihftance *." Soon after, with much good fenfej he refolves lb profe- cute the advantages he had gained in New Jerfcy, and to go to Philadelphia by landf. This refolu- lion fuddenly changes for a worfe, to go Iry fee J, We next fee him alter this refolutiori for one infi- nitely worfe ilill, and to be equalled by none, fave that of going to Philadelphia by way of the Weft Indies j for he refolves to go to Philadelphia, by " taking the courfc of the Chefapeak;" And even in this fourth refolution he does not coilt'inie long, br*- changes it for his third, and again de:ermines to go up *' the Delaware ;** and that for a very good reafon) " in order to be nearer New York ||." And yet, after all this confufion in opinion, we have Isen his moft judicious plan, approved of * Sfee his Letter of the 9th of 0£^ober, ijr;;. - + See his Letter of the 20th of J. hiiary, i777' { See his Letter of the 2d of April, 1777. \ In the laft paragraph of his Letter, of 16th JuV* 17779 h? fays, *' I prooofe going up the Delaware* in or*' »■ to bn nearer •• tbh place (Sqw York) than I Ihould be by taking the couifj ** of Chefapeak Bay, lubicb I once inttfidtJ, and freftrrtd t9 •• that efthe Delaware:" H by I \ II 5P ) by his Majefty, fct afide j and another, founded folely on his own wild ideas, unapproved of by, and uncommunicated and unknown to, any but hi^ Noble Brother and himfelf, and which involved the operations of the campaign in confufion and ruin, ultimately profecuted. He led his army, '.cpntrary to his own declared opinion, that he. .ought to be " near New York,** round Cape Charles, and wafted the l^^ft feafon for military operations, from June to September, encountering difficulties and dangers, which the plan approved of by his Ma- jefty muft infallibly have avoided. Such was the icrange and fatal verfatility of the General's councils and condud | .^4 ^, i...,; ^!j:,^v->)^!0 •/ >'*-^' , It would be endlefs to take notice of all the mif- (latt'd and miftaken fadts, and the many difinge- nuoLis arguments, adduced by the General in his Vindication. I fliall, therefore, in future, con- tent myfclf with giving brief anfwers to many of them, dwelling only on the grofier blunders in his condudl. :V "" ■, ■ , ;■ : ^ ' ; ,., He takes much pains to vindicate himfelf againft the charge of not opening the campaign before the motith of June. He begins with contradid- ing my afiertion, in the Letters, that the rebel kvies never cold join the army before that month i and avf . that their levies '•' joined early " in the fpring." Now this was not the fact ; and it will be cal'y to convince the reader of its im- pofTibility. The rebel army confided of more than three- fourths Irifh and Scotch, and lefs than il one- — , ( 51 ) one-fourth native Americans *. The firft gene- rally came from the back parts of Pcnnfylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina* the fecond, principally from the difaffefled New England colonies ; fo that at lead three-fourths of the new levies had from two, to five and fevcn hundred miles to march. The inclemency of the feafon prevented them from fetting out from the fouthward until the beginning of April, and later from the northward ; and therefore they could not join the army " early in the fpring f." The time of their junflion, a fmall part from the Middle Colo- nies excepted, was about the beginning of June ; before which time, however reduced the number of the enemy might be, the General would never begin his principal operations. But he fays, ** We had not forage in quarters % nor could we have carried any quantities for efj'en- tial fervice.** " If he had not forage in quarters, on what did his horfes fubfift ? they were always in high order. In his campnl^n of 1777, he might have com- manded . all that Long Ifland, Rhode Tfland, and (( « • Mr. Galloway's Examination, p. 22. ' + Jn his Letter of the igth of April, he fays, " Their force " has been dinn'niftied, during the courfe of the winter, by dt- *• ferticn, and by deiarhtucnts to the back fettlements }" but he does not fay a word of ihcir receiving reinforcements, which a Geneial, fo expert in apologies for his indolence, we may pre- iiiiTir, would have done, had any joined the rebel army at that lime. H 2 Staten ( 5« ) Sxaten I(lan4 produced ; and in that of »7;8, ha4 he chofe to open it before, he refigned his com- mand, all that the environs of Philadelphia af- forded, which was immenfe. And could hp not have cajfried a fortnight or three weeks forage, or fufficient tp .enable him to have attacked his enemy^ lying n6t more than a day*s ma^cf) from his quar- ters ? He had horfes and carriages fufficient, and might have had more. Sir Jeffcry Amherft car- ried the provifions for his army from Lancafter tq IVIontreal; General Forbes, from Lancaller tq Fort Pitt i and Colonel Bouquet, from Lancaf- ter, upwards pf three hundred miles, to Mulkin- gum. Put ttfe true anfwer to all thele weak apo- logies for his indolence, is, that the country was, at all feafons of the year, plentifully ftored witl^ dry forage •, and that a fuperior army n-ay procure it, if the Commander of it choofcs, from the fame, parts and places w^ere it is daily obtained by th& inferiof i and more efpecially where the country is generally difaffeifled to that inferior army : befidesjj it is well known tp the people of that country, that the green forage, with which it abounds, i^ fufficiently grown to fupport cavalry, by the lat- ter end of April. In a country thus poflTefled of dry and green fprage, the Gpncral-s horfes could have run no rifque. But there was a magnanimity which dlfcQvercd itfelf in all his condud, anc| which, if the real lovers of their country will not commend, his friends, in the oppofuion to Go- vernment, will fupport and applaud ! He fcorned ( 5J ) fo imitate the r^fit imfpeti^ofity tf mtn^ who, too (deeply impreHed with the principles of honour* gnd defire of fame, regard no difHculties ; he therefore would never purfue the enemy whom h^ had defeated, nor acrack him ^hep unprepared \ no ' would he open the campaign until tht levies pf his enemy were joined. So much for the campaign in X777. He next attempts to juftify his indolence in 1778. Here he apprehends that ** he need not fay much in hi« •' vindication, becaufe, very early in Aprils hercr •f ceiv^ his OX^^^ f^ rffurn borne.** Thp terms " very early** in April, arc founded in mi(la|i:e. He did not receive a permifllon fron) his Majefty to return, until the i4cb of that month * } nor did he r^fign his command until the 24th of May, near fix weeks after. He conti- nued, during that time, fhamefuUy inaflive in hit winter quarters, notwithftanding, in the fame let-^ ter which conveyed the leave tp refign, he was or- dered by his Majefty, " whilft he continued in ** command, to lay hold Qf every opportunity of *' putting an end to the rebellion, by a due exer- ** tion of the force under his orders." The only movement of any confequcnce, during that fix weeks, is not mentioned in his letters ; however, as this exploit ought not to be concealed from the public, l will relate it. , . < . f See Parliamentary Rcgifler, 1779. On f '% *■'■ bntfie i9thorMay, the Marquis dc ta Faycttr, with the main force of Wafhrrtgton*s army, from Valley Forge, crofled a bridge over the Schuylkill^ and took poft at Norrington. Intelligence of this movement was immediately communicated to the General. Pretending to fliew a dcfire to dofome- thing before his departure, he marched out with a large part of his Pirmy, in two columns, as if he really intended to attack the ehemy. The firft co- lumn, unperceived and unliil^^eded, moved in a circuit round the enemy's. pbft, and got perfeftly in his rear, within fight of his corps, aAd confi- dcrably nearer the bridge, over which only the Marquis could pollibly return, while the other co- lumn advanced towards the enemy's front. Thus completely entrapped, the Marquis gave up all as loft i he cxpeded his retreat would liave been in^ ftantly cut off. Wafliington, dclpairing of the fafety of the flower of his army, immediately pre- pared to fly, with his remaining non efFedtives, baggage, and artillery, to be drawn by a few ftarvcd and, emaciated horfes, towards the Sufque- hannah j and nothing was wanting but a fmall ihare of military exertion, or» perhaps, inclina- tion, to take or dcfl:roy the chief force of the rebel army. But here again, as at Brunfwick, Tren- ton, Hillfborough, Brandywine, and German Town, the enemy was fuffcred to make a yet more fortunate cfcape. The firft column, inftead of pulh- ing towards the. bridge, in a good road leading to f BS ) ic on the-right, ^n(Jf(<;Mtting o^',, f he 'enemy 'si'c* tr^t, whijk^ci^eoiher.jhp^Id advance, .and attack in<front,K|v/as mai;cb€c| to the lefcv i ii) a route more didant from the bridge, and thu9,'inftead of in* tercepting thertenemyt fell into iiis rear. The GCher column, under the ipimcdiate command df the, General himfelf, leifurely advanced ih front. The paffage tO;tl;ie bridge was left open j and th« Marquis, having recovered from his panic and defpondency, made good his retreat, without lofs^ and unmoleilcd, ■ , : Th? words *>or</^rj io relimp are difingenuous, an^ evafive of the fait. They convey the idea, that tjlie General was removed from, his command contrary to his wifli j when the truth is, that as foon as he had ^Q^<s,a5'littUg9oii and as much mif^hief.as pcfftbi€\ as fpon as he had deprefled the (pirits of the i^o^y^alifts, by ;his inacccfllbility, his injudicious appointments, his negledt of them when rifing in arras, in jiis favour,, and the indif- criminate plunder piade by his army j, as foon as he had, revived, by his difgraceful attempts and re- treats, that fpinit of, jeJxiliQn vyhich he had fo lately dcprcfied j as. fpon as he had, by his njanifeft breach of military duty and the explicit orders. of his So- vereign, facrificcd a Britifh army j as foon as he had overcome the hefitation and re{u<5tance of the Houfe of Bourbon, and prevailed, on it, by the indolence of his operations, openly and avowedly to fupport the rebellion j 1 fay, as foon as he had, I--;./;!'.;. with X i i6 ) Wkh att Jind addrefs, brought this loid of igftd-^ ihiny on the Britifh arms, and thcfe accumulated evils on hii touncry« and not beforej he petulantly Infilled on hit refignatioh. '^■-»*» ->^ ■ ' ^-^ '«*^*i*' '> The reafon afligned for his refignation is fo in^ decent and groundlefs, that 1 will give it to thtf reader in his own words. " From the uttlb •* ATTENTION, my Lord, given to my recom* ** mendations, fince the commencement of my *< command^ I 'am led to hope that I may be re- " licvcd from this very painful fervice^ wherein I «• have not the good fortune to enjoy the neceflary ** confidence and fupport of my fuperiors, but «* which, I eoncludey will be extended to Sir Henry Clinton, my prefumptive fuceejfor. By the return of the packet, I humbly requcft I may have his " Majcfty*s pcrmiflion to rcfign *." In what this want of attention to his recommendations con* filled, is not mentioned. If we look into the cor- refpondence between the Secretary of State and the General, we Ihall not find it there ; for in that it will appear, that if the General recommended a favourite to his Majelly, he was fure to receive promotion ) and, to incite and oblige him, if ho-^ nour conferred, and a fenfe bf gratitude could oblige him, to do his duty, the order of Knight- hood was beftowed by his Sovereign oh himfclf* And when we confider bis wanton and extravagant * See his Letter of the xSih of OAober, 1778, to Lord George Germain. 8 demands <c C( ( J57 ) clemands for more force» with the exertions made by.Go.yernmejit to gratify him, we IhaUfind, that Im cprnplaint pf a. want ** of the confidence and " fqppori of his fupcriors/* w^s (iiad? ^without the lead fpundatipnj ^M r rf-?' t - - ,^ -- . When the. meafures for reducing the revolted Colonies were refolved on, and the General was appoipted .tp the comtnand, fuch was the difpolif tion of povernment to gratify .him in .whatever he Ihould defire, that the Secretary of Sute declared, 5* the meaf»>re§ of .force^ fliould be the wifhes •* pf the General." , '^he.iQeneral, who was then in America, and had (he ilate of the rebellion be*> fore him, was the bed ]\^^gc of the force which wpu)d be competent; ^p its fuppreflion ; on his judgment, therefore, Government relied, and, inftead pf Hinting, furpaHed his wi(hes. In his letter * to the Secretary pf State, after lono; and mature deliberatioti, }ie only requires i9,ooo.men, -yvhich, hefays, will be >'^radequaie to an aftivc ♦* offenfive campaign on; fhe fide of New York *' and Rhode Ifl^nd.** To combat this force, he <* apprehended the rebels would not have lefs than 10,000 men on the fide of Rhode Ifland, and 20,000 men to a6t againll General Carleton on •* one hand, and the New Yo^k corps on the *' ot(ier." Inftead of 19,000 men, he was fur- ni(hed with 31,476 j and although he expelled to <c C( ♦ See his Letter of the 261b cf November, 1775. 1 meet \ .111 ( 5» 1 thcet a force of 30,000 men, the whole rebel &tmf did not amount to 18,000. With the force now fent, and which amounted to 11,000 men more than he required, the General appears to be more than fatisBed, and declares his ** utter aftonifli* f^ ment at the uncommon exertions" of Gorern- ment I and yet, in his letter of the 25th of Sep- tember, 1776, after he had defeated his enemy^ and taken^ killed, aod difperfed more than half of his force, he begins his extravagant requifitions *, and, with a manifeft defign to diHrefs Govern- i-nenr, he requires ** ten line of battle Ibips, with •' a number of fupernumerary Teamen, for man* f* ning boats.** Would any pcrfon fufpcdt, that, Sic this time, the Admiral had 65 Hiips of war; 13 carrying from 50 to 70 guns, 28 frigates, and 34 (loops } and that the whole naval force of Ame- rica was no more than three frigates and fix (loops of war? To what ufe did the General mean to apply the additional *• ten fhips of the line," which could not be performed by the force already under his Brother's command ? Was it to batter down the fortiBcaticns of the rebel ports and harbours ^ We know they had none. Was it to penetrate up their Ihoal and narrow riversj when he had fo many frigates, and (loops of war, only proper for that iervice ? Did he want them to defeat the truly contemptible naval force of the enemy, when the Admiral had upwards of 60 vefTels of war under his command? -^— -* - -- - •-- • tTJ'iU : ■ i It ll ( 59 ) ^ It will be as impolTiblc for us to conceive t6 what ufc the General intended to apjjly the •* fii- •• pcrniimerary feamien.'* His Noble Bl-dther had not lefs than i2,oco mariners on board tht Ihip^ of war and tranfports theil under his command^ Surdy, out of fo great a number, men fufficient might be fpared to man his boats, at any time, and upon any occafion; and yet, notw'ithftanding the unreafonablenefs of thefe demand^; more Ihips; and of a better and more ufeful fize, thah waS afked, were fent over, viz. ohe (hip of 44 guns; 10 of 32, one of 28', and ohe of 8 guns. The' General, pigfe 41, acknowledges, that, when Mr. Gallowpy catne over to the army, iri December 1776 (which was on the firft day of that month), " his great fuCceffes had intimidated thd •* leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a •* general fubmiflion." And ihdeed this confef^ fion, however unwarily made, was (tridly true x for further oppofition was univcrfally defpaired t. v' by all America, except a few defperate meh in Wafhihgton's army, and that army was reduced to lefs thah 3500 men. And yet at that very period^ viz. on tht 30th of November; he* makes an'iaddJ- tiohat dehiand df 15,000 rank and file; ahd in his letter of the 20th'of"Jahuary, this denTiand is in^^ creafed to 20,000; and he declares^ that thi^ * See h}» Letters of the 3clh of* November, 1776, and thf 29th of January, i777« ' I z number I < 60 ) rXimber ** would by no means exceed his wants i •• yet 15,000 will give us a fupcriority." .,. :^The reader will be as much at a lofs to difco* ver to what ufe the General would have applied this additional 20,000 men, as he has been in re- fpedt to the ten (hips of the line. Both of thefe demands, when his force isconHdered, wiU'appear equally extravagant and unn^ceflary. He had then, as appears by his own returns, 31 9476 men, ofH' cers included, and the whole Continental fotcedid not amount to 3500 •, and yet, in compliance with this extravagant and wanton requifition, fo far as ic was poflTible to be complied with, 7800 troops yrerc, with all expedition, fent over to him. , f he General, U ffms, did not make this ex- travagant demand without alligniug ? reafon for '\t. Reafon^, or what he thought would carry the weight pf reafons, were always at hand, when the Minifter cou|d receive no ftate of fa^s but by the packets under the General's command, and when 9II letters frbni America were liable to his. in- fpeftion. Perhaps Government never committed a greater miftake, than that of fuffering the line of intelligence, from countries where its fervants are employed, to be taken out of the hands of the confidential officer. It enables its own fervants tQ mifrepreCent the ftate of th^* country, the difpofi.- tion of the people, the numbers of the enemy, and to pvt what glofs they pleafc on their own '.;>! 2 I mifcondud 'A ih <c ( 6£ ) mlfcondufb, without a polTibility of detr^ioni iind from theie .nifreprcfentations it has often happened, that men have met with applaufe, when, in juftice, they (hould have received ^pndeoination and difgrace. . • •».*:; But the rcafons alTigned were groundlefs and romantic. In his letter of the 12th of February, he informed the Secretary of State, that *^ the re- bels huve profpeds of bringing an army into the field of more than 50,000 men. They are moft ^* fanguine in their expedations, and, confcious " that their whole (lake depends upon the fuccefs ** of the next campaign, ufe every compulfory ** means to thofe who do not enter voluntarily into •* their fci vice " and yer, notwithftanding all this fanguiiienefs of expedlation, and thcfe *' com- ** pulfory means," we know, that, inftead of •• more than 50,000 men," they were notable to bring into the field, when the General met their force at Hilliborough, more than 8000 ; and even at the Brandy wine not more than 16,000, militia included } after he had, contrary to all policy, given them two months to recruit their feeble army by every poffiblc exertion. It thus appears, that if the reinforcement fenc fell fhort of the force required by the General, the cxpefled reinforcement of the rebels, which was t^e reafon afllgned for that requifition, failed in a rnvch greater proportion *, more than one- half of |he force required was fent, and not more than m u^ nv one^ I ( «» ) tme^fifth of that of the rebels was r.iifed. The ac« count of the force ftood thus in 1777: Britidi, 40,874 veteran troops i rebel regular army at l^illiboroughv 8000 1 at Brandywine, 11^0001 and, in the fpring 1778, at the Valley Forge, not 4000 undifcipHnfld troops. With what juftke, then, can the General complain of his want of force, and how (hamelcfs and bare-f^ced is his ats- tempt to throw the blame of his own mifcondud onchac Adminiftration, which has, by fuch ** un» ** common exertions,*' thus gratitied him in his extravagant requifitions I ^* ''^'^' ^^'^'^ *' ^ Pages from 50 to 59 are employed in attempt- ing to prove that the people of America are almofi nniverfaliy dijloyal^ and that he did every thing in k<is p$wer to encourage them /# take up armSf without fuccefj. - ^- ^^••■""^' •"" '-'" *■' Here he aflcrts, that the " only attempt** madfc by a body of men, to aflift in fupprcfling the rebellion, was in North Carolina, in 1776. Did the General iicver hear of two different bodifS, who took arms in favour of Governmchti at dif- ferent times, in the peninfula between the Dela- ware and Chefapeak ? Did he never fee, or hear of the proclamation ilRied by the Congrefs, rn fupprels the n ? If he did not, all America faw it, and the people of Britain may alfo fee it. Did \it never hear* that, in fcvcral counties JOve AU bany, the Loyalifts, being by far the greater num^ bcr, prevented the difaffedcd from joining Gates, ^ when •c «t <( <i ( 63 i when going againft General Bwrgoync ? This wal a fa£t known to thouiands within his own linet. Did he never hear of the numerous offers made to Mr. Galloway, while the General was at Philadel- phia, by the gentlemen of many counties, to take up arms, to difarm the difaffe^^ed, and to rellore their refpcdivc diftrifts to the peace of the crown ? He certainly did. *• The people of Staten Ifland, he confcflcs, (page 50) teftified their loyalty by ail the means in their power j" and General Tryon, and fome other gentlemen, " who had taken refuge on board ihip, informed him of the loyal difpofition of the people of New York and New J^rfey, &c.**^ But it feems General Tryon, who had been many years Governor of the province, and the other gentlemen, who had lived long in New York, were all miftakcn. In order to account for the abfurdl / of his ex- tenSve cantonments, he acknowledges, it was to cover the county of Monmouth, in which there are many loyal inhabitants" But here again the General found himiclf niifinformed ; Governor Tryon, and a number of other gentlemen of New York, had before, as I have mentioned, deceived him. And now General Skinner, whom ,he warmly recommends to his Majefty*s favour, who was the Attorney-gencral of the province, and from whom he muft, or ought to have taken his information rcfpc6ling the people cf Monmouth, was ('i cr •II m ( 64 ) yifa^ alfo mlftaken. Thefe gentlemen, it (eems« knew little about the dirpofuions of the people of the country in which the moft of them were born^ and in which they had lived from their infancy } for, fays he, ** tnany, very tnafty of the. people of " Monmouth were taken in arms againit us, with ** my protections in their pockets." tiad the General faid fome, and but few^ of the people of New Jerfey had adled in this manner, he wQjiild have been much nearer to the fadt. Among the 6000 people who came in and took the oaths, fome were, in may be reafonably fuppofed, difaffefted ; but even thefe, we ought to fuj^pofe, would have kept their oaths, had not the proclamation beea fhamefuUy violated on the part of the General. The plunder was fo indifcriminate, and fo excefr five, that men were robbed of their all ; and it was thefe difafie6ted men, made defperate by the breach of public faith, and injuries which they had fuftained, who were taken in arms, with his pror teftions in their pockets, and none others. Let Britons, for a moment, fuppofe, that the military, who were fent into the city of London to protcdt their perfons and properties againft the vio!er> "re of the late mob, inftead of affording them that pro- teftion, had robbed their houfes, and polluted their wives and daughters ; would they have tamely fubmitted to fuch outrages ? Would their hearts have felt no difpofition to oppofe fuch enornipus wickednefs ? Their fenfibility will anfwer thefe ' ' " queftions. ( 6s ) quellioni. Indeed it is impoflTible for language to defcribethe mifchiefs and difgrace which the want of difcipline in the BritiHi army, in this reTpe^^ brought on the fervice -, and men who are ac« quainted with it, are furprifed that it had not pro* duced, what, from many circumftances, it is pro- bable was intended, an univ^rfal revolt of aU the Colonifts. -....^).\ ■- r-'- u --.- ^.^- ■■ '^ As another inftance of the difloyalcy of the Americans, the General fays, " Several corps were *' oStred to be raifed, and were accepted, in the •' winter 1776, to conHft of 6500 men-, but in •* May 1778, the whole number amounted to only *' 3609, including the brigades of Delancy and *' Skbner ; a little more than half the promifed " complement," The gentlemen who offered to raife thefe corps, expected that the General would haveopened the Beld for recruiting. When they look- ed at his force, they faw it was pradlicable ; but they were deceived by the indolence and mifcon- dud of the General. Brigadier-general Skinner^s brigade was to have been raifed in New Jerfey, This province the General had lb amefully given up. Brigud ier-f general Delancy*s corps was to have been raifed in the province of New York, which heexpeft- ed would have been open to his recruiting parties. But the General contented himfelf with the poflcffion of Long lfland,Staten Ifland, and the iQand of New York; and, moreover, fuffered his enemy, who had not 6000 effeflive men, to harafs and befiege K him 1 .'■, ^,v •a ;h J ill lU ii I if* 'I! rrmmmm \f 'ii ! •»<* 66 ) him in his quarters, during the whole recruiting feafon. When bhefe fai^s are candidly confideredy tog<rther with thefmail number of Americans within the Britifh lines, the man of fenfe, who will refledb how few men in a fociety are willing to fubjcfb their perfons to the dangers of war, and to military dil'cipline, will be furpriled at the numbers enlided under fuch difadvantages, and within fo fmall a compafs of territory \ and will confefs, that it is a ftrong proof of the loyalty of the people, •a'^ff^s A At Philadelphia, the General infinuates that he had made the fame experiment on the loyalty of the people. •* Mr. William Allen, a gentleman •« who y/ as fuppo/ed to have great family influence ** in that province} Mr. Chalmers, much rel'pedled «• in the three lower counties on Delaware, and in «» Maryland i Mr. Clifton, the chief of the Roman *» Catholic perfuafion, of whom there were faid to *< be many in Philadelphia, as well as in the rebel <* army, ftrving againd their inclinations, were *' appointed commandants of corps.*' And what was the fuccefs of thefe efforts ? He tells us, ** they * only amounted to 3oo men, including three f< troops of light dragoons, con filling of 132 '* troopers." .i^!"'\j/k-.*^#'.-,^i'>,v.. .^,.' ■''-- ^:->^.'..'ifV-:.j ^.!/i'V. ., . All this is plaufiblc in appearance, but fjilla- cious in reality. It was the duty of the General to enquire after popular charadlers. for thefe ap- pointments i but he fought the mod unpopular, ^r, Allen was a young gentl<fman, whofe family influence infd ( ^1 ) influence was confidcrable among the Rcjpublican party, before they fubvertcd the proprietary gos- vcrnment, and threatened to fcizc on the propri- etary eftate i but, after thcfe circuniftanccs took place, that influence was lo(l : he had been .ilfo a colonel in the rebel fcrvice, in the Canada expedi- tion. I do not mention thefe circumftances to prejudice Mr. Allen, becaufc I now believe hlno, from convidkion, to be a loyal fubjcdl \ but yet, a chara(Sler thus circumlUnccd was not the per- fon under whom the General could, in reafon, ex- pert the Loyalifts would inlift. Mr. Chaliucrs, a gentleman from Maryland, who came into the Britilh army at Elk, though much refpe<fled in Maryland, was unconnected, and without any in* Duence, in Philadelphia. Colonel Clifton, if pof- fible, had Icfs influence, except among the Ro- man Catholics \ and of thcfe there were not 200 men capable of carrying a mufquet : befidcs, here, as in New York, during the whole feafon for re- cruiting, he fuffercd Wadiington's parties and de- tachments to furround his lines, and render it im- poffible to recruit in the country. Such were the gentlemen appointed, and fuch the embarrafsmcnti under which the recruiting fervice laboured in Phi- ladelphia I and yet the General acknowledges, that, during his (hort ftay in that city, where he found only 448a males from 18 to 60 years of age, of whom near 1000 were Qiiakcrs, he raifed ,;,i\-/vt('f. Ui* t?..;. K 2 974 m: »- : : ii ■alili W I i ( 68 ) 974Tit}ktfndfile, and, oMcers included, u|)#jitdi ^ The General fi^s nothing of Mr. 6a!l6#ay*6 troop of Philadelphia light dragoons ; it did not fuit his purpofe. That very unpopular gentleman oflfered to raife a regiment of hbrle, but he could procure a warrant for raifmg a troop only. Thii corps wa's expeditiouHy raifed^ in two months they were complete, and fo well difciplined as to be rcvrewed by the General, and greatly applauded for their dilcipline. It is known in that country^ ths^t his influence among the LoyaliiVs was fuch, that he could have raifed a regiment in nearly tht fame time, notwichdanding the embarrafTmentb under which the recruiting fervice then laboured But the General declined making ufe of Mr. GaU loway*s influence in the recruiting fervice, and preferred to it that of an unpopular country ta- vern keeper, for whom he thought his fervants in the kitchen the mod praper company. This man received a warrant to raife a troop, and now mixes with gentlemen of rank in the army. Such were the jydicious appointments of the Commander in Chief in Philadelphia ! .. Hj;^viJt^u.yi4. v,,^. To the charge, that no ftep was taken by the General to embody the friends of Government in New Jerfey, who were anxious and defirous to be employed in difarming the difaffeded, and in de- fending the country when the army (hould proceed |n its other necelTary operations, he anfwers. Page ( «9 ) ^ Page 53.1 " / ntvtr heard of the amtitlif aufi ** readinefs here fxpreffed,** ■'^•* -:* ' If the General never heard of the anxiety and ^adinefs here exprefled, k was beeaufe he Would hot It is a fa6t which 1 have tnentiohed before* and will here again repeat, that upwards of Rhy gentlemen^ of well-known principle and untainted loyalty, fome of them from the SJlcyal county of JMmmouthy came into the lines of Trenton, with defign to ofTer their ferrices in the b^fbre-mentionisd meafures \ but the General was inaccelTible ( they could not, after feverat days attendance, procure tn audience. Some t>f then^ returned home, cha- ^il'ined and difgufted, and others are now in New York, taking refuge under the protedlion of the King's forces. Bik if the General had really the riedu6tion of the rebellion athekrt, why did he not fet up the King*k fhihdard, and call oh the Loyal- ids of that country to affif^ hm in arms? Why did he reft on his proclamation, with promiAng them protection, and then fufFering that promife to be violated inthoufands of ihftances ? Did heexpedfc that the Loyalifts would impertinently offer their alTiftance to a General who would not deign to aflc it, and who fuflfered his troops to plunder the in- habitants, to a degree more exceflive than ever was known, under a prudent General, in an eneray'i country ? Did he believe, that, by fuch meafures, he iho'uld attach even the well-difpofed to the caufe he was chgaged in ? Did he imagine that it was poffiblc ii M m \-\-\ ! I poffible to execute his trufl:, in reducing a country ib extenfive, without making ufe of the well-af- fe^ed force in it, and whrift he was purfuing the moit e0edtuai meafures to turn that force againft bimfelf ? If he did, he aded upon principles .con- trad idled by common fenfe^ and the pradtice of all other Generals who ever deferved the appiaufe and rewards of their country. !i > -) «"— *» rr<t..,,^T <^ In page 54, the General next attempts to prove that the inhabitants of Philadelphia were not **■ anxious to promote the King's feryice, even 5* withaut carrying arms.** ; .,,.. t. «...,-; - He ielh us; thai labourers were wanted^ to con* fru3 the redoubts at "Philadelphia ; and he applied to ' Mr. Galloway tp procure them. He prefumes Mr, Galloway exerted himfelfi and yet ^ .<* with all his ^« affiduity, and, the means made ufe of by the chief ** engineer" the whole number that could be pre- vailed en to affijt him, amounted each day, upon an peerage, to no more than between 70 and 80. ) This tranfadtion, like every other mentioned in his Defence, is grofsly mifreprefented. Mr. Gal- loway was applied to, by the chief engineer, to procure the labourers. Near one hundred were immediately procured. The wages offered were 8 d. per diem, and a fait ration ; but for thefe the men would not labour. The common wages in the city were from 5 s. 6d. to 6 s. fterling per diem. Beef was fold at 2s. 6 d. ^ 3 s. per pound ; mutton at 2 s. « 2 s 6 d. cheefe at 3 s. and bread at a price ;'. , equally <c m ;al- to fere rcre I the in iem, ton Irice ally ( 71 ) ^ually high. The men had families to feed. The General was foHcited to raife their wages, but he obftinately and inhumanly refufed ; the men dtfcrted their work, and the officers declared they could not blame them. Very different was the conduA of Lord Cornwallis, when he applied to Mr. Galloway to repair the too long negledled dykes of the Province Ifland,. Mr. Galloway rc- colledting the former condud of the General, in- formed his Lordfliip, that he could not undertake the bufincfs, unlefs the men were to receive rca- Ibnable wages ; and that he ihould afk no more than he had given for the like work in time of peace, although the price of labour was rifen nearly two-thirds more. His Lordfhip replied, the work muft be done, and, without hefitation, allented to the propofal. Near fifty men were immediately procured, at a Spanifli dollar j&sr <//>w, a fait ra- tion, and a pint of rum •, the latter, becaulb they were obliged to work in water. The bufinefs was done in fix days, much to hik Lordfiiip's declared fatisfadioni and then, and not till then, could the chief engineer make any confiderable progrcfs in ereding the main battery againft Mud Ifland fort. ' In pages 59, 60, the General endeavours to exte- nuate the plunder^ and other enormities committed by the foldiery in /America, He aJfertSy that ** there " never was lefs plunder^ mr fewer enormitieSy com- ** mitted by any army in the field j'* and intimates, '■--^ that ii ; li; ml • ;'ii I f I i Er ( 7* ) tbat the nnofp^perf in jfmari<a» IHte tkofe of other efMHtrieJt ^i tbi vehicles of inveMtiom and ialumtufft upw which thefe enormities ure grounded* % I finqerely w,i|b> for (he credit of human natuK* as well as for %\it General's credit, ihat this repre- ientation were ]u(l i bitt all* and more than I havie i^idin my Ife^tecs to a Npbleman, refpe^ing in- diTcriminate and ^xceilive plunder, is known to thoufands within the ^ritidi lines, and to a nymbcr of gentlemen now in England » and in refpe^ to ihc rapes, the fa6b alledged does not depend on the credit of newfpapers. A fol^mn enq»^' v v^as made, and affifdavits takjen* by which it Appears that no lefs (han twenty-thrt? were committed ip one neighbourhood in New Jerfey % fome of them on married women, in the prefence pf. their help- Icfs hufbands ; and others on daughters, while the unhappy parents, witji unavailing t^ars and cries, could only deplore the favage brutality. Thefe affidavits are on record in America } and printed copies of them are now in London. Such were them^afures purfued by the General, to reconcile his Majefty's deluded fubjeifts to his government, ^d to encourage the Loyalills to fuppprt the cavfe of their Sovereign ! In page 6i, the General adduces the evidence of Major'gemral Grey^ to prove that the Chefapeak ex- peStion^ occ^fioned ** a powerful diversion m •ri^^VOUR. QF THE IJORTJ^E^I^N ARMY."..;/^ , : * ■\ .■.■. '^ '■•i,^ V .;. V tJ .. '-V How IN ( 73 ) ' How powerful this diverfion was, the world al- ready knows ; it loft the very army it was intended tp fave, if it can be pofTible that fuch was the in- tent. But I will more particularly conHder the force of the Major generaKs evidence, in fupporc of the fadt alledged by the Commander in Chief. •? I think " fays the Major general, *^ ajironger " diver/ton could net have been tnadcy than that of " drawing General IVaJhington, and the whole Con* ** tinental army, near ;^oo miles off " • •" - t From this mode of exprelTicn, the reader may pofTibly apprehend that Walhington was drawn 300 miles more diftant from the Northern army. But the Major-general could not poflibly mean this ; the fadb beii)g, that Walhington was only drawn, except for a icw days, from Qiiibble Town to the Schuylkill, 50 miles more diftant ; and, to perform this truly ridiculous divcrfion, he carried his army, by fea, at leaft 700 miles, againft trade-winds, and, as he confeftes himftlf, through a " very difficult navigation *." The confe- quences were forefcen by every man of common reflexion. The carrying the main Britifti force at fo great a diftance from the Northern colonies, in- fpired the rebels with new hopes and fpirits, and contributed greatly to increafe their numbers, under Gates, againft the Northern army. It wafted two months of the campaign, deftroyed many, and • See his Letter of the 30th of Auguft, 1777. L rendered :f ( 74 ) rendered the remainder of the Britilh horfes total!/ unfit for fervice ; and occafioned the dedrudlion of a number of veffcls and (lores, which, *• it feems," could not be removed from the head of Elk *, *♦ -> But to (hew the folly of this extraordinary ma- noeuvre, I will candidly lay before the public a true (late of the Briti(h and rebel force at this con- jundlure, and their refpeftive pofitions. -sw^al r« General Burgoyne was on his route from Ca- nada to Albany, where Sir William Howe was ordered to form a jundion of the two armies. Wafhington was at Quibbletown, 200 miles diftant from the place where the Northern army mud meet the enemy, and where it was taken ; the General's force was at New York, 40 miles nearer^ and in a manner between the Northern army and Wafhington. -*{«-..,»„? .*i, Wafhington's army could not have palled to Albany by water -, he had not (hipping nor craft ; nor could it have marched* by land in lefs than a fortnight, and that only by one road, leading through a gap of the mountain. General Howe had an immenfe fleet of men of war and tranfpotts, fufficient to carry his whole force to Albany in cne week. Waihington, when at Quibbletown, lay about nine miles from Brunfwick, with his front on the Karicon, which, at that time, and in that places ♦ Sir William Howe's Letter, OtSlober 10, 1777. was ( 5^5 ) was hot fordable, and his rear was acceffible with cafe. General Howe, ac the fame time at Brunf- wick, inftead of marching to HilUborough, on the fouth fide of the Rariton, as if dreading his force, might have paiTed in a good road, on th^ north fide, not more than 14 mf'es, and perfedly en- compafTed his enemy. ' Walhington's army was compofed of new raifed and undifciplined troops, commanded by inexpe- rienced officers ; they were a corps which had been defeated in every aflion, ftrangcrs to victory, and difpiriied. Sir William Howe's army were Bri- tons and Germans, perfectly difciplined, and com- manded by brave and experienced officers, who had carried vidory and conqiieft with them where- cver they had trod, whofe fpirit had been exalted above the effisfts of fear by numerous and recent fuccelTes. Wafhington commanded, by Sir William Howe's own exaggerated account, only j 0,000 men •, and, by his own returns, it appears he had under his immediate command, at New York, 40,784 i and when we look at his own diftribution ot the force ncceffary for his garrifons, we find 7100 * fufficient for that purpofej fo that 33,684 remained to be led againll his enemy. Upon this (late of fads, it is natural to aik the following queftions : ^..^ ..^, :._ - ,= • Sir William Howe's fccret Letter, of the 2 J of April, \^^7^ L 2 Did w^ ■» ( 76 ) j Pid Sir William Howe imagine that he was taking the neceHary meafures to fulfil his orders to join the Northern army at Albany, by leading his own army round Cape Charles, 350 miles more diftant from Albany than he was at New York F^f, ^ Did he really imagine that leading Wafhington, already 200 miles from Saratoga, from Quibbler town to the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, could poflibly be a diverfion of the leaft importance t^) the Northern army ? If Wafhington had intended 10 have co-operated with Gates againft the North- ern army, could Sir Williati^, Howe think that he fliould prevent it by hiding his army in the ocean-, and by his circuitous route to the Chefrpeak, going 600 miles from Saratoga, and leaving Walhing- ton within 200 miles of it ? .-rr.n iii.fi -.a; ; . » If the General really intended to preven-Walhn ington from aflilting Gates, why did he not take a pod between them in New Jerfey, on the only road and pafs through which Wafliington could rtjarch ? ,.;,, ■;, . . v. , - .: . - :::<-' v i -,.■• ^ ; ':';^)1 If he really intended to put ah end to the rebel- lion, by defeating the main army in the field, why did he not lead 25,000 men from Brunfwick, ai the north fide of the Rariton, and attack Walliing- lon's 10,000 men in his unfortified camp ? Or, if Walhington had been ib fortified and ftrong as to render an aflault improper, wliy did he not> with, fiich a fuperior force, furround, and, by cutting ojjhis fupplics, with which he was very fcantiiy : • i: fuppliec^, ^i—^B mm -■A-''- if. Ito \th ( 77 ) Cuppiied, fiarve him? All thefc mcafurfes Wcfc pointed out by common fenfe. The benefits which Would have accrued from them were 6bvious to all, and of the greateft importance to the ftipprcffion of the rebellion j while that ^vhich he purfucd did not afford the lead profpeft of a fin^i^le adva/slagc to the fcrvice, and bfefid-s v/as attended with an iftt- menfe unneeeffary expence, was pregnant with mi- merous difficulties, rifques, and dangers, and jprd- fnifed the ruin of the camppagn. Major-general Grey, in his evidence, further fays, *' I do not think there was any one objeS " which would have tempted General Walbing- ton tb rifque a general adion fo much as the fear of lofing the capital of Pennfyivania." This I btilieve to be true: but, what does i^ aveiil in the defence of the General's condud ? Ndthing. It Contains a fall condemnation of his Chefapeak ekpcditiom For Walhingcon would have foughs: *3etween Hilfborough and that city from the fame motive. He engaged Sir William Howe's army at Brandywine for that reafon, and he would have done it in New Jerfey. Why then did not Sir William Howe, having his boats and pontoons with him all prepared at Brunfwick, pafs his army from that place to the Delaware ? If Wafliington had come from his pretended ftrong noft to attack the Britifti army, he muft have fought his enemy upon equal, if not difadvantageous terms, as Sir William Howe might have chofe his ground. If cs «( Ml- "■1 ■A- " fill m\ A.-. he i. ( 78 ) he hiid remained in his camp, the cit) of Philadd- phia, and all his magazines of military and other (lores, mud have fallen without oppofition into the General's hands.; ">' r ~-^l' i'-^--^ -; 1 >: Una- To thequellion, " Was there any probability of «* bringing the war to a termination that campaign, •• without forcing General Walhington to a gcne- ** ral engagement?" the Major-general anfwcrs, « Certainly not." ^P^.?. v.,., .v, Here the General appears to be fcnfible of the great importance of bringing Washington to a battle. Why then did he not take one rational ftcp to effcdb this purpofe ? Was it pofilble that he could imagine, that his taking polt on the fouth fide of the Rariton would bring an inferior enemy down from his advantageous poft, acrofs an un- fordable river, to attack him ? Why did he not march up on the fame fide of the river on which Walhington lay, and offer him battle ? Wafh- ington mult have fought in a little time, or llarved his army. Or, why did he not make a feint by pafTiPg towards Philadelphia ? This muft have brought Walhington from his poft, or he mud have given up the " capital of Pennfylvania," for which the General himfelf believed he would fight. Surely any of thefe meafures were preferable to the unpromifing and unfortunate expedition round by fea to the head of Elk. It will not be thought a digreffion, fliould 1 here igive the reader a defer iption of the great advan- tages -eel by iges ( 79 ) tagjs which a fuperior army miift have over an in- ferior, in their operations in New Jcrfcy. The provinces i$ bounded on the eaft and fouth by the North River, New York Bay, and the Ocean j on the weft, by the Bay and River Delaware ; and on the north, k runs into the uninhabited moun- tains, forming a pcninlula to the fouth. The waters inclofing it on the caft, fauth, and weft, are not more than 50 miles dilUnt from each other, and until the month of June are never fordable ; nor even then, except in the Delaware above Tren- ton. And there are very few countries to be found, lefs difficult and better adapted for military operations. What then is the cafe ot an inferior army in a country thus fituated, when a fuperior force is properly led againft it? If it fhould march to avoid its enemy fouth ward, it runs into a fnare from whence it cannoc clcapc. If it turns to the north, it muft combat every difficulty which moun- tains deftitute of provifions can afford ; and if he attempts either on th'. eaft or weft to efcape, he may be attacked in the moment of croffing a con- fiderable river. And yet the General, by the in- dolence of his movements, although he had his tru'y contemptible enemy in this very country, fufti^red him to crols the Delaware with his heavy baggage and artillery in 5776; and in June 1777 ftiamefuUy retreated before him, fuffering him conftantly to harafs the Britifti rear from Brunf- wick to Amboy. And what was yet more abfurd in 1 'I' 1i! i i( So ;) in military policy, he left this icene of operations, 'i4>lun of a^vantagoi to hitniclf, and mifchievous to his enemy, in order to draw him into a filel^l more eKC«nlive< where none of them exiftod. ?^i''i J'r'I he Major-general further lays, << With the -« force Sir WiUiam Howe had under hi» com- *♦ mand, I think, rf General VValhington had a •^ wifH, it w^s for him to haye go^^e up the North ^* Mivcr '*^ f^;-.'v*- f"' -mH p"-5''-7t "'"■ "■•;^t «»•«/.»*. •»f>/-. ,• * This is only matter pf opinion and altogether illi-founded. Waihington dreaded the army's pafTing up che North River. He knew too wcU the dilH- culties he muil have to encounter in following it. He knew the Britilh army would be tranfported •with cafe, »nd in a (hurt time, by water ; arid that his own muO; march over mountains, and through •ravines and ftrong defiles ; and that he mud re- ceive his provifions from the fouthern Colonies. And he alfoknew, that it would dcprefs the fpirits \©f the eallcrn militia, prevent them in a good de- gree from joining Gatesj and infallibly fave the northern army. Such being his fixed opinion; when it Wjis fuggelled to him that Sir William Howe was gone to the Chelapcak, he would not .believe it, and contended that tlie mcaliire was too ablurd to be poHible. Agreeably to this opinion he adcd. When Sir William Howe with the fleet failed trom the Hook fotithwardy Walhingtor moved his army from Qiiibblctown northward, in order tu be more conveniently fituated to follow the ( 8i ) the '^ritifh General up the Nortli River. He be- lieved the failing from tlie Hook to be a ffint, and cxpedled each day tliat he ihould hear of the Ge- nfral's return, and of his failing with his army towards Albany. And as loon as he heard that the Britifh fleet was at the Capes of Delaware, and not before, he marched fouihward ; biu upon re* ceiving accounts thnt the fleet had again flood out to fea, rtill perfuadcd that Sir WiHiam Howe could not ad: fo contrary to rcafon and obvious policy, as to go up the Chelapeak to I'hiladclphia, and tiiat he would yet go to the northward, he returned to his northern pofl, which he did nor leave until it was perfedly afcertained tiiat the Ciitifh fleet was near the head of Mk. This condud of the rebel General a<^;rced with his declared ienti- nicnts, and proves tlic reverie of the Major general's opinion. Page 62.] ** My rejjhi for goim^ by fea fully " fet forth in my Narrativey page 16.'* ■ 'I'he only reafons afligned by the General to his Sovereign, in his letters, were the diflicukies he flio*3M meiM with in croflln«j the l^elaware. To thcte I have alrcdy replied. Since that letter, he has difeovered a number of others, equally ill- iounded i and for thefel am referred to the Nar- rative. Page 16.] " STi? have attacked JVrfljin^ton in " that fir 011^ pofi (i^ibbhtcwn). I muji necefjhrily " have made a conftdcrable circuit of the country."' M Tht IF Ml m : ii .^ i^ i: ( 82 ) The utmoft diftance of this circuit would not have exceeded fifteen miles, about fix miles further than to Hiillborough. Neither Quibbletown nor Hiilfborough is ttrn miles from Brunfwick •, fo that this confiderahk circuit of country might have been performed in one day. A circuit which will bear no comparifon with the one he adopted in its (lead, and which ho took by fea and land, to fight Walh- ington at Brandywine on ground equally ftrong. Page 16.] " / did not think it advifeahle to *' lofe fo much time as mujt have been employed in ** that march during the intenfe heat of the feafon,** The time whith would have been loft in that march could not have been more than ten hours ; — the time wafted in his Chefapeak circuit was three months, - '< • ■ Ibid.] " Exclujive of this conftderation, our return mujl have been through an exhaujied country y where there was no poliibility of keeping up the communication zvith Brunfwick** The reader, by this account, may be led to think that Quibbletown is one hundred miles fiom Brunfwick, when in fatSl it is but ten at moft ,— and the communication might have been as eafily kept up with Quibbletown, as with Hillft)0- rough J — and bcfi^'cs, as Sir William Howe had only ii.ooj men v/ith him, he might have had as many more to have fccured the communicadon if he had wanted them. In myLetters I have afierted, th.it " in the midll of vido) y the ardour of his troops was fup- ti (< prefled .!» ( 83 ) ** prefled j" and the General fuppofes, page 62^ ** that the author alludes to his condud near the " lines of Brooklyn, -ind introduces the evidence " of Lord Cornwallis and Major-general Grey " to difprovc it." Here the General is miHaken. I did not allude to his conduct at Brooklyn, but at the Brandywine, Goftien, and at Gcrmantown. Men of the firft reputation for candour and inte- grity at New York declare, that this was alfo the cafe at Brooklyn and the White Plains i but, as I have not treated of the General's conckKH: at thofe places, I (hall take no further notice of his evidence. In the Letters, I havefaid, " that at Brunfwick, •* Lord Cornwallis was upon the heels of the ene- ** my; the deftruiflion of a bridge over the Kari- *' ton faved them only for^a few hours j their " further lecurity was owing to the orders received *' by that nobleman to halt at Brunfwick." To diiprove thefe fafts, he again, page 6^^ refers to the teflimony of harl CornwaHis. Oa this teftimony I fhall make no re narks ; but con- tent myfclf with only obfcrving, that the fadts I have alledgcd are ratified not only by the univerlal re- port of the country, but by the General's own letter of the 20th December 1776, written at the time when the tranfaflion happened, to give joit information to his Sovereign, whom he ought not to have deceived, and when the General did not think of his Defence. And therefore I preliime, M 2 the I' I' »» 'hi ( 84 ) the Public will give full credit to it. The words of the letter are : ** In the Jerfeys, upon the approach of the van " of Lord Cornwallis*s corps to Brunfwick, by a " forced march on the firft inftant, the enemy •• went off moft precipitately to Prince Town j and had they not prevented the paflage of the Rari- ton, by breaking a part of Brunfwick bridge, y^ great was the confujion among them, that their army mujl inevitably have been cut to pieces** " Myfirjl defign extending no further than to get poffejjion of Eajl Newjerfey^ Lord Cornwallis *' HAD ORDERS NOT TO ADVANCE BEYONL ijRUNS- " WICK, WHICH OCCASIONED HJM TO DISCONTINUE cc cc cc iC cc *t »> HIS PURSUIT. Here every fa6l I have allfdged, and which the General has denied, Hands fully confefled by himfelf; and when it is known that the Rariton is fordable at Briinfwick at every recefs of the tide, no man can doubt but the fpirit and activity of his Lordfhip would have led him, had not his orders been— "not to *' advance beyond Brunfwick," to have purfued, an enemy thus precipitately " flying,"* thus ready to be " cut to pieces," and having fo " difficult a river to pafs as the Delaware. The advantages which mud have been derived from continuing the purfuit were fo critical, fo momentous, and obvious, that we cannot fuppofe that an C;fficcr fo aftive and enterprifing, and who had purfued his enemy more than 90 miles, re- ducing their numbers from 18,000 to 3)000 men, would ( 85 ) would have difcontinued his purfuit at the moment that enemy had before him all the difficulties of crofling a confiderable river. • ■ ^ • •" -^t: •': ' t» Page 67.] WaJhingtorCs force at this time {when he was followed to Trenton) conjijled of 6000 men^ exclujive of Leis corps of 4000 ; GeneralWaJhington loft no time in croffing his artillery and heavy baggage ever the Delaware at 'Trenton^ before we could move from Brunfwick. He alfo crojfed part of his troops , keeping a corps on the e aft fide to obferve our motions. This paragraph contains three miftakes ; one of them, I truft, the General himfelf will confefs. He here fays that Wafhington's force confided of 6000 men. In his Narrative, page 8, he acknowledges that force to be only 3000 when it attacked Co- lonel Rhal at Trenton. He alfo aflerts that Lee*s corps confided of 4000 men. In his letter * to the Secretary of State, giving an account of Lee's capture, which happened only a few days before, he fays it confided of 2000 men. Thcfe con- tradidions in his opinions, at the time he was writing to the Secretary of State, and when he is making his defence before the Public, the reader will be at no lofs to account for. However, the truth is, that Wafliington, by hi3 own returns made on the day before he crofied the Delaware, had no more than 3300 ; and a number of thtrfe deferted immediately after. Lce*s corps did not 11'. M f See his Letter, dated Dec. 20tb> 1776. amount M' ( 86 ) smounc to 1590*, and on his capture, many of them defertcd i To that when Wafhington made his great, and what many thought would be, ius lall effort to recover his defperate affairs, he could only bring over againd Colonel Rhal 2800 men, or- dering Cadwallader with his brigade ct' 500 men to crofs the Delaware, and to attack Bordentown, where only 80 Heffian grenadiers were left by Colonel Donop. The ice in the Delaware prevented this intended manoeuvre. And yet Sir William Howe fuffered Walhington with this army, then the whole Continental force of America, to cake from him all Eaft and Weft Jcrley, except his pofts on the Rariton, and that too at a time when he confeffcs in his Narrative, page 41, that his *• great fuccejfes bad intimidated the leaders of the <« rebelliofiy and nearly induced a general Juhmijfion^ Nor is it a faft, that " Walhington loft no time in *« croffing his artillery over the Delaware at Tren- ** ton before we could move from Brunfwick." "Wafhington believed that the Britifti General had no defign of moving his army from Eaft to Weft New Jerfey. Upon what Walhington's belief was found- ed, 1 know not. But it is certain, that he afted as if he was acquainted with the General's firft intentions. That he had,if we may credit his own letters to Con- grefs now in Britain, copies of returns of the Britifh army, is a faft. It is therefore highly probable, this refolution might inadvertently tranfpire through the fame chanAd, Poffeffed with this belief^ Walhing- ^- ^ ton >t ifh lis the ( 87 ) ton did not leave Princeton until the Britifh van was within three miles of it. Nor had he pre- pared boats at Trenton to tranfport his army over the Delaware. The fame boats which Lord Corn- wallis fays, in his tcftimony, " he had hopes of " finding at Corycl's Ferry," did not get down to Trenton until lute in the fame night ilut the Britifli army Jlept at Princeton. And ti^ere- fore it was, that Wafhington did not begin to tranfport his baggage and artillery over the Do- laware, until •••vclve o'clock that night •, and could not get his b^ ; ^ anr^ troops over, until a few ininuttrs bcfo.. wlc arrival of the Britifli army*, which had iv'ttfcd fcventcen hours within twelve miles of Trenton. For this confidence of Wafhington in the ind ilcncc of the Britifli Gene- ral, his principal officers who were no in his Iccret councils blamed hii, And it was < on this oc- Ct. ion that Wceden, a rebel Gencrax; wrote the letter I have mentioned n page 48 of the Letters to a Nobleman, declaring, ** that General Howe .ad ^* a mortgage on Wafliington*s army for fomc " time, but had not yet fortclofed it.' It is alio a miftake, that Wafliington * crofleda " part of his troops over the Delaware, keeping a • See Sir Willi im Ilnwc's Letter, zoth Dec. 1776. The truth is, the lall rebel embarkation h;;i' i.''t left the Jerfey ihore when the Btiiifh van appeared in figii- -/VdaMr. Sanjucl Morris, one of the rebel officers, whofe fc,,a:)i was taken, mtide his efcapc on horfeback, bccaufe he could not reach the laft boau " corps In' "I t "i !iI'm il' m ^"^ '^T^.-' IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) .»'. ' " 1.0 I.I -lis 1^ Ui IS '- 1-25 1 1.4 1 1.6 ^ 6" ► Photographic Sciences Corporation 73 VflST MAIN STRIET vVSBSTER.N.Y. 14S80 (716)872-4503 ";;,'»■'( . . ,« cc €€ C »8 ) corps on the caft fide to obferve our motions j'* no corps was crofled over until the morning of the day on which ihe Britifti army took up their quar- ters at Trenton. " : -^ -f -^r,*.*; :,,r r . .. ► .-^ ,. •'' "- Page 66,'] " Tbe troops of the left column were not in their cantonments in the evening of the march to Princeton until darky and thofe of the right " column not till fome hours after dark, *^ ' )K - • How illufive is this ! I have aflerted that the army arrived at Princeton at four o'clock jii the afternoon. This fa(5t the General does not deny; but to evade it, we are told, when the two columns were fettled in their cantonments. How long it was before the two columns were in their cantonments, I know not; perhaps the fame indolence prevailed in cantoning the army as in the other operations. But that both the columns were Britifli troops, per^ feftly relieved from fatigue by their ftay at Brunf- wick, and zealous for adion, and either of them fuperior in numbers to the flying and panic-ftruck enemy, are truths that cannot be concealed or evaded. And therefore it is evident, that they eafily might have overtaken, in the courlc of feven- teen hours, the enemy ,who were within twelve miles of their quarters, and that in the very ad of croff. ing the Delaware -, that river, of which the diffi- culties in crofling have been fo magnified to ferve another purpofe. Page 6y,] The caufe of not mcrching earlier the following day was^ that the enemy had broke down the bridge :ve ( «9 ) bridge which could not be foonc*' repaired^ and rendered fit for the pajfage of artillery. This bridge was over a creek which an Englilh hunter would leap with eafe. It was within a mile of the Britifh head-quaiters, its banks (loping to the water's edge with the gentleft declivity, and fordable at the high-road, and in twenty other places within half a mile of it. The bridge itfelf, which was only ufcd occafionally by the inhabitants on heavy falls of rain, might have been repaired in one hour, and a* four o'clock in the morning as well as ten o'clock in the day — there was nothing to prevent it. There are people now in London pcr- fedly acquainted with this formidable bridge and creek. , ; , , , , Ibid.] 1^0 account for his'not crojjihg the jyild- ware after his reduced and "panic -{truck enemy y at a time when he had brought the country nearly to a •' general fubmiffton J ^ he again refers to Lord Corn* wallis^s evidence, who tells us, " as the Delaware was *' 72ct fordable^ and we could get no beats, it was cer* ** tain.y impra^ic :ble** ,' ■ That the Delaware could not have bd^n pafled at this time without boats or rafts, is true. But the General muft tell us in his rejoinder, why he did not conftrud rafts or pontoons, which might have been done in a few days with the materials in Trenton *. This is a queftion to which the Public • See Mr, Galloway's Examination, p. 42. N haa . > 'i>' II I !li^ ll'B I i I i h has arightj and will expefb, a fatisfadlory, and not an cvafivc anfwcr j cfpccially as the croffing thci Pelawarc at this time was moft critical and mo- mentous, and mult have put an immediate end tq the rebellion. ..^^ . *^„ ,. At this lime, the models of Government in the rebel States were fcarcely formed, and their au- thority by no means cftabliihed. Every member of the rebel State of New Jerfcy had fled out of the province ; and the Congrefs themfelves, witl^ the utmoft precipitation, had alfo fled from Penn- fylvania into Maryland. A univerfal panic, with a deflre of immediate fubmifllon, then prevailed throughout all North America. Wa(hington*$ army was reduced to 3000 men. The city of Phi- ladelphia was diftant no more than two days eafy inarch i it was Intirely defencelefs*, 3000 Britifli might have been fpared to have taken immediate poiTeflion of it } while the other, and by far greater part of the Britifli army, might iave been em« ployed in thp Bnal deftrudion of the rebel force and magazines. The Britilh fleet, or fuch a par^ of it as might be thought neceiTary, with tranf- ports loaded with ftgres and proviflpns for thq armyt might have failed round in one week, and, without a fingle obftrudlion *, have pafled up to ^Philadelphia, >vhich every circumftance demon- ; * At this time Mud Ifland fort was not built, the chevaux. de-frize and chain were not madet nor were their iire-rafts or water>guard in an)* kind of force. ^ ., ^.; ilratecj ( 9' ) ftrated to be the moft comfortable and moft pro>* per quarters for the army in winter. Had this nrtea- fure, which plain common fenie fo evidently die* tated, been purfued, the reader will determine* whether that country, which the General has in* cautiouQy confeflfed, was, by the previous fuccelTes of the Britifh arms, brought ** nearly to a general *' fubmifiion," would not have ended the rebellion, prefcrved the Northern army, prevented a war with France and Spain, faved the millions which have been expended, and prel'erved the nation from thofe imminent dangers and diftrefTes which lately threatened the Independence of the Britifli i-^j"V«;«T>* >-.'>*4i'- A.J. . +■. 9 1 i nation. Page 68.] The General again adduces the t0i'- mowf 9f Lord Ccmwallis and Sir George Ojborne^ to vindicate bis conduSi in having taken Trenton into the tbain of cantonments^ and for pofting the HeffioH troops^ with. the ^id regiment^ there and at Borden^ town, under the command of Colonel Donop, <^ Here he attempts to evade the force of the charge againft him. I have not cenfured his con* dud for *' taking Trenton into his chain of caa- ** tonmcnts." Seeing he would not crofe the De- laware, this was a prudent and necefiary meafure. It was neccffary to xover New Jcrfey, which he had then conquered, and might have been fecuced, had he taken pnc proper ftep ior that purpofe. There is not, therefore, afentiment in the Letters that can bear this me&ning : I ha-ve only blamed . r.:. '. N 2 himj. ! ' < 9* ) , . him, imoj for giving the command of his frontier cantonments to foreigners, who did not under- ftand the language or policy of the country •, and fidloy and principally, for leaving the weakcll com- mand, or feweft number of men, next to the main force of the enemy, and the ftrongcft and greatcft command where there was no enemy to fear. i M» The reader will here permit me to refer him to a perufal of Lord Cornwallis's evidence, where he will find, that no faft, which his Lordlhip affcrts, tends to cpntradid any of the charges in this para^ graph ; all that he fays, relates to the covering of Trenton, which certainly was judicious and nc- ceflary. But had his Lordlhip been confuked on the quantum of force which ought to have been lef( at Trenton, or upon the expedience or pro- priety of placing foreigners in the frontier pofts, I am confident he would have advifed againlt either of thofe meafures j and had he been alked by the General, whether the greateft or weakeft force ought to have been placed in the frontier canton- ments, he would, without any hefitation, h^ve advifed the greateft. Page 69.] Sir George OJhorne.^ whofe evidence I have mentioned i tells us, that^ after the mis f or'- tune of Trenton, Colonel Donop acquaint'ed him, that if Colonel Rhal bad executed the orders he had deli- vered him from Sir PFllam Howe, which were, to ' ere^ redoubts at the poft of Trenton, that his opinion was, it would have been impo£ible to have forced RhaVs I : ( 93 ) RhaPs brigade, before he could come to his ajjijiance from Bor dent own, x . If this was the declaration of Colonel Donop, as we mud fuppofe, inafmuch as a gentleman of Sir George Ofborne's eUabliOied credit has de- clared it, it can only convince us, when the real fafts are known, of the impropriety and ill policy of placing HelTian commanders in the advanced and molt dangerous poft, with a command fo weak, to oppofe the whole force of the enemy, •l he truth is, that Colonel Donop, when Tren- ton was aflfaulted and taken, was drawn down to Mount Holly, twelve miles diftant from Borden- town, and eighteen from Trenton, with his whole corps, except 80 grenadiers, contrary to the in- formation and advice received from Mr. Galloway. 7^ his gentleman told him, that the enemy's force at Mount Holly, which he fuppofed, from the information he had received from a number of the difafFcfted, who had grofsly impofed on him, to be 3000 men, were no more than 450, men and boys, prevailed on to make a Ihow, and to draw hini irom his poll, while Trenton was attacked. This information the Colonel difregarded i the confe- quence of which was, that Colonel Donop was not at Bordentown, from whence he could fupport Colonel Rhal j and therefore Colonel Donop told Sir George what was not a fadl, to apologife for his own unmilitary conduft. j r . • ,■•■ ^•«-' ... 4 ... . i' -^ But [ ■•. \r. ( 94 ) fiut if the Colonel had received orders to d\tt(k Colonel Rhal to fortify Trenton, one would ima- gine the General had taken the fanne precaution in refpeft to Bordentown. And yet we know that Colonel Donop aded the fame indifcreet and un- military part with Colonel Rhal, and indeed worfe } for he left his poft, although equally ex- pofed to the entmy, who had boats to crofs their vhole force over, to the afluult of either poft, then vnfortiBed. Wafliington was not unmindful of thefe military blunders, and therefore fent his con- temptible body of new raifed militia, mod of them hoys, to draw Colonel Donop from his pod, while he fhould ^ttick it, -as well as Trenton } and no- thing faved Bordentown, at the time Trenton was taken, but the ice in the Delaware, which pre- vented a corps of 500 men, under Cadwallader, from pafling that river. Had Colonels Donop and Rhal received orders from the General to fortify their refpcdlive pofts, is it credible that officers of their rank and experience would have prefumed to difobey them ? I (hould think not, wlien their own fafety and honour de- pended on their obedience. If Colonel Donop had received fuch orders, it was his duty to have fecn them executed •, if he did not, why did not the General call him to anfwer for fo great a breach of duty? Why did he afterwards rntruft a man, whQ.had tranfgr^ned the military law in a point fo ?" * -important. ( 95 ) important, and which had brought difgrace and ruin on the Britifli fervice, with the important command againft Red Bank ^ But there are other quellions, to which we may call on the General for explicit anfwcrs. "Were the orders to Colonel Donop in writing, or not ? If they were in writing, why are they not produced ? If they were not, they certainly ought to have been, in a matter of fo much confequence. But further. Why did not the (General fee that thofe redoubts were built, before he withdrew his force from Trenton ? If they were necefTary at all, they were immediately neceflary. The aifaults upon Trenten might have been mad^ the next day after the enemy had left it, as well ag the eleventh. The General, with his whole army, remained on the fpot, from the 8 th to the 14th of December* i and in half of that time the redoubtg ^t both pods might have been completed, and the fubfequent difgraces and misfortunes, to the Bri- tilh fervice, prevented. The General, therefore, muft yet Bnd a better apology for thofe two blun- ders } of leaving his frontier pods, which were the mo(t expofed, and in fight of the whole forcQ pf the enemy, in a ftate altogether dcfencelefs, and with the fmalled number Ci* troops of any of his cantonments i blunders that would difgrace ;he weakcft officer in his army. * See his letter to Lprd George Gcrmaio, of the aothof Pccexnbcf, 1776. ; . ^ ^r. , v :. Ibid.1 , ''>.'j*ifc'-' ^' ;&-, II a r' I r I I I nr». Ibid.] fVaJhingtony after Lee's corps joined kirH^ bad never kfs than 8000 men, * v ] J General Lee was taken, on the 12 th of De- cember, by Colonel Harcourt, at the head of his corps, near Trentonj oh their way to join "Wafh- ington. A few days after the fcattered remains of that corps, not confiding of 700 men, joined Wafliingtorf, who, reinforced by that corps, attackedTrcnton ; and the General confefles, in his Narrative, page 8, when he intends to throw the blame on Colonel Rhal, for fuffcring Trenton to be taken, that *^ he was credibly informed, that «« the num'^crs of the enemy did not exceed 3000 •," but in his Obfervations, when he has another pur- Jsofe in view, he affcrts, that Wafiiington had never Icfs than 8000 men, afier the jundion of Lee's corps. Thv General did not recoiled, at the time he made ufe of this argument, that it proves too much for his own reputation j and that, if it' vindicates it in one cafe, it more ftrongly con- demns it in another. For if Wa(hington*s force «* was not lefs than 8000" men, when he left Tren- ton wiih only 1200, under Colonel Uhal, in a ftate entirely unfortified, to oppofe that 8000, did his military knowledge lead him to believe that the poft of Trenton was fafe ? Did it juftify his not feeing that poft in a ftate of defence, at leaft for one day, before he left it ; before he drew the main Britilh army from it ? I wifh fomc reflec- tions, yet moi? to the General's difadvantage than thofe ( 97 ) thofe I have yet enumerated, may not obtrude themfelves upon the mind of the candid enquirer into his conduct. If there were 8000 men within fight of thedefencelefs pod of Trenton) did General Howe intend to facriBce that poft to the wicked defigns of a fadtion, combined againft the honour of his Sovereign^ and the happinefs of his coun- try ? Or (hall we impute it to his ignorance in mi- litary fervice ? But yet even this excufe his friend Major-ge- neral Grey will not fuffer us to admit. He de« clares, page 96, that the " divifion of the army, •' before the battle of Brandywine, was a mafterly ** movement^ deceived the enemy^ and brought on •* an adlion with almoll certainty of fuccefs •," we cannot, therefore, impute fo grofs a blunder to ignorance. The reader will afcribe it to another caufe. I have aflerted, in page 61 of my Letters, that Wafhington was encamped at Quibbletown, about nine miles from Brunfwick, with fewer than 6000 .undifciplined and badly appointed troops, which, with a corps of 2000 men, under General SuHi* van at Prince Town, compofed his whole force. To this the General anfwers. Ibid.] From the intelligence 1 then had, and which I have not ftnce had reafon to doubt y fVaJhing' ton had not lefs than ic,ooo men in his camp, on the hill above Sluihbletown* The General (hews no want of ingenuity ia (lating his own numbers, and thofe of his enemy. O In 1 M «t »i : ■, I I m V'- I fn treating of the former, he gives us only his ef- fcdiive rank and file, exclufive of officers, an important part of his force i but in fpeaking of the rebel army, he always extends his ideas to its vrhole force. This is artful, and tngeniouOy adapted to miflead men unacquainted with fuch calculation. However, allowing him what he con- tends for, and fuppofing that he had *' 11,000 " fighting men," and Wafhington 10,000^ yet the former were veteran troops, intired to viftory, and eager for adtion ; and the latter were new raifcd and undifciplined, and at leafl: one-half militia *. Was he afraid of attacking Wafhington with fuch men i If he was, why did he not add to their numbers 11,000 more? His own returns 'will prove, that the numbers then under his.im- jpediatc command, were not lefs than 35,000. Page 70.] His (IFaJhingtotCs) camp was to the full as inaccejfibk in the rear as in the front, and an attack upon his right flank (from every account I could get) would have heenjiill more hazardous* **"""- The furveyor of the county, who kn^w the fpot on which Washington was encamped, was; at New York when the General proceeded taHilUbo- rough ; he was attending on the army to render his fervices. He had drawn a chart of the roads round Wa(hington*s camp ; and he communicated * It will occur to the Reader, that Lord CoinwalUa, with.. \ti^ than 2000 v^tei^n troQps, ^s ^IfljT ^'^^'^'^^t ^3^ t^^l'/ rout i, 7000. ^< , r\ hia t 99 ) his ideas to General Skinner, who had constant accels to the General. He was ordered to hold himfelf in readinefs to attend the army in Jerfey ; but he was left at New York, without any notice of its movement to Hillfborough. Of thcfe fafts, whenever called upon, he will make folemn affida- vit J and further, that Wafhington*s camp was ac- cefTible both in the rear and on the right fiank, on higher and more commanding ground. ' ' ** '^ Ibid.] fVaJhington was certain^ induced to be- lieve that my intention was to attack him \ and had he not been -perfeElly fatisfied with the ftrength of his foft^ he would not have remained fo long in it. It was impoffible that Wafhington could con^ ceivc, from the movement of the Britifh army, that the General intended to attack him. It did not in the lead indicate fuch d( fign, but manifeftly the re- verfe j indeed, it rather difcovered a fear in the Ge- neral, of an attack from the rebel army. Could Wafhington, when General Howe, with all the ap- pearance of caution and fear, in his whole march from Brunfwick to Hillfborough, and during his (lay. at that poft, kept *^z Rariton, an unfordable river, between him and the poft of his enemy, a (ituation from which he could neither attack nor be attacked, poftibly believe he intended to attack him ? It was this unmilitary condu6it which en- cour^ged Wafliington to remain in his camp, be- caufe he knew he was fafe white Sir William Howe jrefnaintd thus polled. Had the General wifhed 2 O to ¥ m ( 100 ) to have induced Walhington to believe he intended to bring on an aftion, there was one obvious and infallible mode of doing it. A march of five or fix miles would have carried the army to Wafh- ington*s right flank or rear. Ic would then have been ported between Walhington and all his re- fources ; it would have cut him off from his ma- gazines of provifion, his military (lores,- and his boats, then lying Ibme within feventeen, and all within thirty miles of the Briiifh poft. In this cafe, Walhington mpft have deferted his camp, or ftarved ; and if he had moved, the General might have attacked, or purfued him to his boats, tq which the Britilh army would have been many miles nearer than Walhington, as he muft have taken a conliderable circuit to have reached them, and to have avoided an aflion, fuppofing it to have been prafticabk*. But inftead of this mar noeuvre, the General did riot move his army to- wards the Delaware, far enough to induce a be- lief that he intended either to crofs it, to get in the enemy's rear, or to cut him off from his fup- plies. From page 71 1096, the General has introduce^ the tejiimony of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond.^ to apo- logize for mt going up the Delaware, when he ar^ i'ived with his feet at the Capes of that Bay, It would be a tedious talk, and littl? entertain- Incr to the reader, Ihould I travel through all the miftakc;s contained in this teftimony, r^fpe<Jling in- lO* ( lo; ) ^hc numerous " fhoals, and rapidity of the tides** in tWe Delaware j the force of Walhington at Willmington j the narrownefs of the channel a( J^ewcaftle ; the difficulties of landing the troops, ^nd the great ilrengih of the rebel water-guard. I will, therefore, content myfelf, becaufe I truft the reader will be fatisfied, with a few brief and ge- neral obfervations on the whole. The Jhoals are to be feen in Fifher's chart of the Delaware. The fide does not run two niiles and an half in an hour. As to the mrrownefs of the channel at Newcaftle, every (kilful mariner, who has failed up the Be- laware, knows, that from the Pea-patch below, tp lylarcus Hook above, that town, a diftance of 20 miles, it is at leafl two miles in width. The ftrength of Washington, at Willmington, was pc rfeftly vi- fionary \ becaufe it is known he was not at that time in Pcnnfylvania : And there are a number of gen- tlemen, now in London, who can prove that the fort at Mud Idand was in an unBnifhed and defencelefs ftate, and pofleffed by 130 militia only; that the water guard was unprepared and unmanned, and the chain not finiftied \ and that there are a vari- ety of places between the Bite of Newcaftle and Marcus Hook, perfedlly adapted to the landing of an army with the utmoit cafe. Of 'his. Sir Andrew, in his crofs examination, notwithftand- ing all the imaginary diffiicukies he had before enumerated, makes a full confeffion j for, in page 8/, he candidly declares, that he ** never pre- ^\ ^enc^ed to deny the practicability of landing an ■sf'. •:|;;;' Vi% «c ( 102 ) army in the Delaware." But, to put this mat- ter beyond difpute, I need only remind the Pub- lic, that the fame fleet which Sir "William Howe has endeavoured tot perfiiade us would be in danger from the difficulties in the navigation, and the rebel force, by his own orders, fhortly after, when Wafhington had poficfllon of the country on both fides, did fail up the fame river uninjured and unmolefted, and in lefs than half the time it had taken to fail up the Chefapeak, and Wafhington's troops were in pofTcfiion of both banks of the river, when the water-guard was prepared, and in com- plete force. Pages 104 and 105 are partly employed in an at* temp to prove there was no time loft in ftopping the hanks of Province IJland^ to enable the workmen tQ tre£i the batteries againft Mud I/lind, To fupport the charge of neglf(n;, I fhall apply to the General's own declarations j by which it will ij>pcar, that the city of Philadelphia was in the General's pofleflion on the 26th of Septem- ber "*, and that the batteries v;ere opened againfl: Mud Ifland on the 15th of November, exadly fevcn weeks after f . What were the carpenters and working parties employed in during this time ? Wc are told they were repairing the dykes, and (lopping out the tides. If the engineer employed them in that labour, when he had .liberty to pro- • See Sir William Howe's Letter to Loril Gcorg« G«raiaio» uf the ! oth of October, 1777. . ' , ■f Sec Obfervations, p, loj. curi cur^ ( toy ) cure artifts, he was very abfurd. This bufincfs is a particular art, and to be performed only by ex- perienced men. Their wages are from 7 s. 664 to Ids. per diem i while the wages of an upland ditcher is only 2 8. ; and I have known a malkp artift fent for from Virginia, and paid 150 /. per an^ num falary. Hence it was that the carpenters and working parties, if they were employed in repair- ing the dykes, laboured in vain, in a buHnefs that they knew nothing about •, but the truth is, they were as fruitlefsly employed in mud and water, to eredl the batteries. This occafioned the applica- tion to Mr. Galloway, by Lord Cornwallis, who, as is before mentioned, had them repaired in Hx days. The number of men employed by him^ were upwards of forty. An attempt is made, in page 106, to vindicate the General's condudl, in not attacking the rebel ^rmy at White Marlh. " I bad, fays he, the beft •* intelligence that the enemy* s fojl was not ajfailablty *' in the rear.** The guides who attended the General in this truly ridiculous expedition^ and tvho lived from their infancy on the fpot, and many others, will prove, on oath, that the ground in Wafhington'a rear commanded his camp ; and it is not le& true, that he was prepared, at a moment's notice, of the General's movement towards his rear, for > flight. His heavy baggage was fent off toward Skippack, and his light was in readinefs for a pre- cipitate 7. 1 p m \ ■ ^^ m A'!.: .* 4. tipitatc movement. Men of undoubted repu'tdJ tion, within his lines at the time, have confirmed thefe fafts,*^"*^-'*!*^* i'Mfi-w "'Wiyi i*-?- .;:?^^'ii *->->-.?- j^iRi But the General here again calls to his aid the teftimony of Major-general Grey, who fays, " I •' think an attack on the enemy, fo very ftrongly *« fituated as they were at White Marlh, would " have been highly imprudent." Did the Major- general ever reconnoitre the rear of Walhington's camp ? Was he ever on, or near that ground ? He does not aflert it ; and the truth is, he never was. May he not then have been miftaken in his opinion ? He in the'next page as pofitivcly afferts, that the war was carried on, " in the ftrongeft ** country in the world, with almoft art unani- *' mous people to defend it j" and in both of thefe opinions, there are now but few men who do not know that he is grofsly miftaken. I have faid, that the General " fupinely fuf- •* fcred himfelf to be furprifed at Germantown.*' To dilprove this charge, we are referred to Sir George CHborne's teftimony ; and, when we can- didly examine what he has faid on the fubjeA, we find it rather fupports than difproves it. All that Sir George has faid in favour of the Ge- neral, is, that he ordered him to move in front of the line of infantry i and told him, he ** might expeft the enemy at day-break,*' C( .'.\ ..\ '^ K ?;>' ?■?>;■: •"':! f'j".Sl 'ij. This ■\ i 105 ) ; X This only proves, that the General had fome rufpicions of the enemy's defign ; but not that he had, in confequence of that fufpicion^ given the ncceflary orders to the army, to prepare them for ;:cceiving , the enemy, and to prevent a furprife. If he really believed he (bould be attacked, he is yet more culpable than I had imagined ; for it is evident, from the teftimony of his own witnefs, that no fuch orders were given. Four different queftions were put to Sir George, in order to draw from him his opinion on the furpjrife of the army ; all of which he declined to anfwcr. If he did believe the army was not furprifed, would not his honour, apd the jultice due to the General^ have induced him to have declared his opinion ? And, as he de- clined it, is there not wh^t amounts to the ftrongeft prefumpiron, that he could not deny it without violating his honour and the truth? But if the General really gave the neceflary orders to the fe« veral officers of his army to prevent a furprife, all his Aides de Camp, and his Secretary, were in London during the examination of his witnefTes before the Committee of the Hpufe of Commons, why then did he not prove fuch orders by them ? His honour, his military character demanded it} and yet we find he has prudently avoided to examine them on the fubjeft, ' -;•-';"• f--- ,r^rr~'*-' •' ''-'■ '* In the Letters to a Nobleman, page 86 to 89, I have faithfully defcribed the diftrelTed fituatioii iif the rebel army at the Valley Forge, and charged ■' "JP ' ' ' th9 I m I ifc'.r m . ( |o6 ) the General with a high breach of his duty to hl9 Sovereign, in not attacking or befieging it, and bf that means faving his country from all its fubfe- quent misfortunes. As this is a high charge, th<; Public will excufe me if I repeat it at large, and ihen confider his anfwcr. *»^» *■ ^'i^^S'^f ^Kk^ M ^ «* Here" (at the Valley Forge) «« Wafhington *• lay all the winter and fpring, encountering dif- '* ficukies whjch language can fcarcely defcribe, *' His army labouring under bad appointments^ *< almoft in every refpeft j his troops in a manner *' naked, in the moft inclement feafon of the year, ** having no fait provifions, and little fait to ea^ ** with their frelh j often on (hort allowance in rc- ♦• fpeft |o both } rapidly wafting by ficknefs, that •' raged with extreme mortality in all his different « hofpitals, and Without ahy of the capital medi- " cines to relieve them. His arnriy was likewitf; " <Jiminiflied by conftant defertions, in companies «' from ten to fifty at a time ; hence in three « months his number was reduced to lefs than *« 4000 men, who could not, with propriety, be «* called effc(5lives. " Wa(hington*s army continued in this weak w and dangerous ftatc from December till May ; « while the Britifh troops, who nad the beft ap- « pointmencs, and were in high health and fpirits, ** lay in Philadelphia, in a great meafiire inaftive, «» fuffering the rebels to diftirfs the loyal inhabit- ♦« ants -on every fide of the Britifli lines, to deftroy their (C < >^7 ) , . •* their mills, fcize tjieir grain, their horre$, their •* cattle i imprifon^ whip, braddi and kill the •• unhappy people, who, devoted to the caufe of ** their Sovereign, at every rifque^ were daily fup- •' plying the army, navy, and loyal inhabitants •* within the lines, with every necelTary and luxury ^ that the country afforded.** - , ^ ^ To the chiirge thus made, with {q many circum- ftances precifely defined, the General, as upon mafly btheroccaiions, contents himfelf with making only a general anfwer. He does not prefume to deny one of the fafls I havd ailerted ; he does not deny the defcription I have given of the weaknefs of the enemy's campi and of its lines and redoubts } of its numbers of men ; of its truly diftrefTed llatei arifing from the want of comfortable lodgings, of provifions, and of clothing ; or of the conftant dc* fertions, and extreme mortality raging among his troops; All tliefe faA$ he gently glides over in filence, and artfully refts his defence on the (qU lowing riaked aflertion : That Page 106.] ** The Author's plah of befieging « the enemy at the Valley Fbrgej is ia the hjghcft <* degree abfUrd. Had I made a divifion of the '* troops in the manner he propofes, I (hould have <* expofed them to be beaten in detail/' Surely ih^s caftnot be deemed a fatisfadtory an- fwer to thofc numerous fads, (hould I (ay nothing iti reply*, however, fatigued dS I am with the dif> agreeable talk of refuting fo many pofuivc affer- P 5{ tions. 'ir '111 '-'?: ( io8 ) ' tions, and fuch numerous mirreprefentations, I cannot pafs it over in filence. On my reader's ac- count, as well as my own, I will be brief. The reader will fee, in the Appendix, a genuine letter from a Committee c" Congrefs, appointed to ex- amine into the caulti of the dillrefled (late of Waflilngton^s army, and fitting at the Valley Forge at the time I have mentioned. It is Hgned Francis Dana, one of the Committee, in behalf of the reft, direfted to the Prefident of the Congrefs, and indorfed in the hand-writing of Mr. Laurens, the then Prefident, from whofe trunk, among other interefting papers, it was taken i the aii<< thenticity therefore cannot be difputed. From this letter, it will appear that I have been modcft in xTiy defcription of the diftreffes of Wa(hington*a army v I truft I have been fo in every other piece of information, which 1 have, from the beft of motives, given my country ; and I cannot help acknowledging, that I etleem it a fortunate event, . that I am thus juftified in a particular which car-, ried with it a greater degree of improbability than any other that I have communicated to the pQb(ic», Having perufed this letter, the reader will re- coUefb, that the General had under his immediate, command near 20,000 veteran troops ; that his enemy had not 3000 men, who could with pro- priety be called effcftives -, that thefe were in a manner deftitute of almoft every neceflary ; and that he had not horfes to carry off his cannon and military mUitafy ftorcs. What^ then, could prevent the Ge- neral from marching out with 5000 men, and at- tacking this enfeebled, Gckly, and naked enemy, thus deftitute of provifions ? Was he afraid chat 5000 veteran Britons would be beaten " in detail" ^y«^i& an enemy f'SNhy^ then, did he not take his whole army (as there was at that time no other body of men in arms on the whole continent of America), and attack, or furround, and ftarve him into, a furren- der, agreeably to the plan 1 have mentkHied in the Letters * P Could any thing be more pradicable i Did not every fenfe of military duty, the recent lofs of the Northern army^ and the critical ftate of affairs at that time in Europe, all urgently prefs him to take this meafure ? Had this been done^ the honour of his country, fhamefuUy lod at Sa- ratoga, would have been regained ; all the valu- able artillery, and military (tores of the continent; would have fallen into his hands. The Congrefs, feeing their whole force taken or difperfed, muft have defponded of further oppofitipn \ all America mu(t have fubmitted ; and the Court of France muft have feen the folly of its new alliance, and receded from it ; and. thus the General might have favcd his country from all its prefcnt difficuliieSj cmbarraffments, and diftrcfles. . x.^. '^^^i^.l uij to • See Letters to a Nobleman, p. 8g, and the chart, fhow- ing the pofition of the rebel army, and of the ports propofed to be taken by the Britifh. ; ^ \ i :i^ i W, i , t l^i'. ii * it there wa& not a want of inclinatidh^ why wai net this done ? The General cannot plead want of perfeft knowledge of the defpondency and weak ftate of his enemy. If he wanted charts of Wa(h- ington's quarters, and his redoubts and defences, feveral of them were brought in to him by men of crediti who took them on the fpot. If he wanted intelligence of the ftate, pofition, or movements of the army> he received it conftantly from officers, and other perfons confidential in every department of the enemy's army *, befides his conflant intelli* gence from defertefs, fpies, and the people of the country, daily coming. into his lines. In (horr^ there was no movement, or other material circum- ftance that happened^ but what the General was ibon acquainted with. The ftate and condition of the rebel army was as much before hifii as before Wafhington himfclf. ^^ (Turf^;.T}>ba; .y^ fmjiis aidii r^ It has been problematical with many, what mo- tives could lead an officer^ whofe reputation ftood high in the opinion of his Sovereign and country^ into all this miiconduft. The humane and cha* rkable impute it to his real ignorance in his owni profeffion. But thefe ihen have taken- only a fu- perfkial view of the General's a£lions. H is plani of the battle of Long JJland and Bfaniywim<t are irreftftible proofs that, when he intended to gain an advantage over his enemy, or even to cut oflT his retreat, he poffefted military, judgment fuffici* 6 ent ;; ( III r jcntto iftfure it. At both of thefe t>lace$, Tie knew, that if he had been defeated he muft hare loft hU fLtmy, Had his troops been routed at Long Ifland, he could not have efcaped in boats to his Ihips^ when purfped by a viflorloiis enemy. Thus cir- cumftanced, his military abilities were exerted $ nor would his manoeuvres have difgraced a gene- ral of the firft abilities } he turned his enemy's lefc flank, unfufpeded, by a circuitous route, ant} . killed and took prifoners One-third of his army. At Brandy wine, when he thought his fleet haci; left him, and he had no fafety but in viAory, hi9 Hieafures werfc equally judidousj he fuddenly, and unperceived, hemmed in the whole rebel army between his two columns and impairab)e waters. In (horr, he was never defeated, nor compelled tq retreat ; and always fucceeded in every attack, he thought proper to make, as far as he chofc. to fucceed j knowledge, therefore, could not be wanting, whenever inclination called it into a(5lion. ^v . ,. There are others, and but few, who imagine ^hat the war was prog-aftinated from lucrative; views. But from this charge I readily acquit the General. His difpofition is liberal ; and his par** ticular friends acknowledge, that the love of mo- pey is the leaft of all his pafllons ; and therefore^ although he ifufFered his favourites, while he was profufely waftiiig the wealth of the nation by J!^is tnaSfion and extravagant demands^ to colleifl much 01 !'!??» :»'*■! I ^1 ■CW? ^)k ( 112 ) of it into their own coffers, yet little of it found its way into that of the General; » t.^">^^'\i'^^^A^ There are others, who, having '^'.refuUy examine ed the conduSl of the General in America^ and com4 pared it with the proceedings of a wicked fa£tion in pritain^ are convinced that the defign of both was ihefam^ \ and that the General, inftead of accepts ing the command with an intention to execute the truft repofed in him by his Sovereign and his county try, accepted it by the advice^ and with dejign to facilitate the wicked purpofes, of his con- federates in Britain. I Hncerely wilh there were no ground for fuch a conclufion. But there ar& circumftances fo ftrong, and aftions which fpealc fo loudly in fupport of it, that, when examined, they* will amount to pofitive proof. Indeed, it is im^ poflible to trace his condufb, by fair and jud ar- guments, from any other motive. A private letter from Mr. Samuel Kirk, of Not- tingham, one of the Generars conftituents and colleagues in fadion, with his anfwer, is before the Public ^. Mr. Kirk charges him with a breach of promife, in accepting of the command of the forces about to be fent to Amerita for fupprejfwg the rebellion ; tells him of the ** confufion it had *f made among his friends ;" gives his reafons ^painft it ; and concludes with faying, " I do nut U ; '•-■ ■^'■'\ >■ ■'■ '^^ -"^^ -.5 ■■->?■' * See the detail and conduft of the American >yar, and tho Appendix to Uus Reply. , \ . ^ '' * wilh u C( .1/ «■■ C( cc cc ( "3 ) ** Wi(h you may fall> as many do^ but I cannbt f^y •* Iwijhfuecefs to the undertaking" To this con- fidential and truly feditious letter, the General re- turns an anfwer as conBdential. He tells Mr. Kirk, that " he had flattered himl'elf he had removed all " tho/e prejudices he had entertainer againft him •,*' ** that he had been highly complimented" upon his accepting the command, by thole who are *• averfs «' to the meafures of Adminiftration •," and ** intreats him in particular to fufpcnd his judgment, until the event Ihould prove him unworthy of his fup- port." ..4 ./;^»M('u^^t'-«fiv,>K''vis»irt mr<s.. ,!j.Thefc letters, which were not intended for the public eye, furely furnilh us with a clue to the dark and heinous confpiracy of the Faction, with which the General was connected. From them ic appears, that, before thefe men had concerted their plan of oppofition, he had pledged his honour to his conftituents, that he would not accept of a com- mand which was to fupprefs the rebellion ', aild that notwithftanding, he was led by fome, we muft fuppofe, powerful motive, to violate his promife. »«> What that motive was, is like wife fufficiently evident. It s,as the advice of the men who were thus " averfe to the meafures of Jdminijlration" whofe " compliments" he immediately received on accepting the commitTion, whofe approbation he pleads as an excufe to his friend for his breach of promife, and of whofe public reputation he was the conftant and careful guardian while in Ame- 11 jfif^- ill 1: i I m . 'J. rica. "IPP ( 114 ) rica *. And it further appears, that after he had received his command, to remove the " prejudites" of his particular friend, who had declared ** he " could not wi(h him fuccels" in fuppreffing the rebellion^ *« to fufpend his judgment** on the Ge- neral's Londudl, " until the event fhould prove him tmworthy of his fupport** Upon thele plain •( * It is an tnrcr!otc as true as it is curious, that, when the General was at Fhilsdelpliia, a Loyalifl was about to publifl) a piece rcflcf^irtg on the conduit of tlic Minority in Pailiamen 1'he General by fbme nicnns heard of it: upon which Mr. GaU loway received the following billet fioin his Secretary: ** Captain M'Kensie's compliments to Mr. Galloway ; the Ge- neral defircs he will be pleafed to enquire into the authority by which Mr. Towne publiihcs his Evei>..ig Pod, and to make any regulations he thinks necc/Tary xo J'upprtjt politUal piitts, which may have an tvii ttnitntyy from either of the premies, as it is %%ntti, that fonre oftbrtjtamp are defipned for pubiicRtion." Mr. Galloway, engaged in other I'lfinefs, negledled to per* form the duty recommended by this billet, not knowing the immediate urgency nor the cxtrtmi importanct of it j • and the pieco was publilhed. The Seciecary came down to Mr. Galloway, much vexed, and complained of the Printer. The Printer w»- fent for by the St-cretary, and riprimanilid far thi»^ hiintmt tffen(*\ and the Author of the piece was tuld, that the General would not fuffcr j'ucb pieces to be publiflied. This anecdote, however trifling it may feem, fully proves, tiiat the General held himfelf bound to preferve the conduA of the Op- pofition t6 his Sovereign's meafures, from the mdt RViiaures of the Loyaliih within his lines; and, for that purpofe, even to mak« ufeof the power veiled in him by his Majelly ; although that very Oppofiticii was conftantly holding up to the view of ihe people, the condu^ of the fervants of the Crowr, and eVen of Majelly itftif, in terms the moll opprobrious- and inlulting. ( "5 ) fa£ls the Public will determine, whether there is not fatisi'a£lory proof of a refolution in the General CO CO operate witli the delign of a Faction, who were averfe to that measure, a defign as unconfti- cutional as it was wicked -, and which was nothing lefs than to wrcft from their Sovereign his confti- cutional right to appoint his confidential and exe- cutive fervants (a right which, by the conftitution of the Brinfli government, is as firmly cftablilhed in the Crown, as that of electing reprefentatives in Parliament is fixed in the People) •, to compel hini to turn out the prefent Adminiftration*, and to put his own pcrfon^ his family^ and his crown, into the hands of tbefe confpirators. To accomplifli this defign, all their powers were to be united and exerted. One great line of con- dudl: was to be adopted •, Adminiltration was to be proclaimed the authors of all the national misfor- tunes J and their meafures, however honed, wife, or receff.iry to the honour and fafety of the em- pire, were to be oppofed and obfl:ru(3:ed in Parlia- ment, and tire execution of them defeated,if poflible. Men's adions are the ftrongeft proof of their fecrtc defign«. If we examine the condufb of the Fadlion in Britain, we find that it has ftridly cor- relponded with thefe preconcerted meajtires. The American rebellion was an event, which thefe men thought would furniih them with all the means neccflary to 'he ^^ccomplilhment of their defign. They faw it would call for theexertipn$ of Govern- <J^2 ;,„...' meat, I .1 I m 'H't ( ii6 ) ■ ■ i ^ ' ^ ment, and that thofe exertions would afford a large field for oppofition. The real rebel, who wiflied to overturn the government, and the hungry patriot, whofe lull could only be fatisfied by power and places, united therefore in tbftering and fupporting it. And, left ihe wifdoni of the rebel colonifts fhould fail in their plans, the meafures of fedition from time to time were concerted, and tranfmitted, by the Fadlion in Britain, to their confederates in America. " The non-importation agreement, the ** union of the Colonies, and the meeting of a Con- ^* greis ; a folemn league and covenant, under oath, «« not to purchafe the manufaftures of Great Bri- •* tain, and to make an united and invincible ftand f againft the BritiJJj Government" were all mea- fures which originated in Britain, and were adopted in America. ' * Whilft thefe fccret intrigues againft the State were carrying on with the rebels in America, the meafures of Government at home were loaded with the moft opprobrious epithets. The fteps which were taken to fupport the dignity and auihorityof the State over the Colonies, were called a ** cruel^ •* tyrannous^ and ruinous fyjiem of policy" And thofe which were adopted to fubdue the moft un- juftifiable and obftinate rebellion, were ftyled " an " unjuji and ruinous '^var" Every engine was in motion, and every feditious fcribbler was em- ployed to poifon the minds of the people, and to render the meafures of Adm'.iiftration odious in the eyes of the nation, Thofe mifreprefentations and falfe- an ( "7 ) falfehoods, which they thought would moft readily captivate the vulgar, were induftrioufly propagated. The prefles poured forth their pamphlets and oc- cafional pieces, to Ihew th diftreflcd ftate of the kingdom, the decreafe of its inhabitants, the im- menfe debt and poverty of the nation, the want of the refources of war, the impofiibility of raifing the neccflary aids, the lawfulnefs of American oppofition, and the injuftice and cruelty of the war; which, it was boldly alTerted, was intended, by the councils in which their Sovereign immediately pre- fidcs, to introduce defpotic power in the Colonies. Nor were thefe dodtrines confined to Pamphlets and News-papers. Th^y were the conftant themes of inflammatory declamations in both Houfes of Parliament. ? : ,„ , .^ , Having, by thefe feditiousmeafu res, raifed the po- pular clamour cgaintt Government, and prevailed on a confiderable part of the deluded people to fupport them ; having diftracled the councils of the State, and induced them to treat with rebels,and to ofi^t. to give up the mod eflential right of the fupreme au- thority, the right to tax thofe Colonies which it was bound to protect \ they advifed their colleagues in fedition in America, to rejedt the propofuions, as " unreafonable and infidiousJ'' And thefe op- probrious epithets were tranfmitted from Weftmin- ller to Philadelphia, and echoed back from the Con- grefs to Weftmmfter again. And afterwards, when, through their private intrigues, they had facrificed f|)e Northern Army,involyed their country in a war 7 with I Ml: .1- 1^' i^lS jr M ( ii8 ) with France,thrown the nation intoagcncraldcfpondf ency, and compeJied Adminiftration to offer ta the rebels terms of accommodation, little fliort of in- dependence itfelf ; their objefl: not being as yctfe- cured, their ambition ungratified, the loaves and • fifties unobtaincd, and the firmnefs and virtue of their Sovereign not yet conquered, they dreaded the profpeft of accommodation and peace with America ; and therefore they adviled the leaders in rebellion to rcje<a even thofe terms ; afluring them, that jidminijiration could net fupport the ■loar, and that they mu/t foon grant to them inde- pendence. How happy is it for Britain, that thelQ feditious men were miilakcn, and that the Congrefs •jjurfued this foolifli advice ! foolifti in refped to the views of Congrefs, as well as thofe of the Fa^iqn • in Britain \ They weakly imagined, that his Majcfty, alarm- ed at the profped of a war with France, and of the .)ofs of America, would change his confidential fer-* <yants, and receive into his bofom thofe men who were the fole authors of thofe diftrelTes i who, when in f)ffice, by their feditious counfels, had laid the foun- • -dation of the rebellion, and, through its whok prc- grefs, had encouraged and fupported it *, who had enjoyed the firft offices of the States and whole " honour, integrity, and abilities, when weighed in the balance, had been found wanting -, men who had avowedly op pof<!d every meafure which his Ma- jelly had wifely projeded to fupport the authority of the Scate, and the independence of the nation- • :< ■ V 5ut, >; / ut» ( "9 ) ^ ^uti finding that his Majcfty met all thediftrelTes* <vhich thefe conrpirators had brought on their coun- try, with a virtuous firmncfs, which bafilcd ■ ^if cxpeftations, they determined to proceed to yd more infolent and violent meafures. They rc- folved, in their fecret cabals, to impeach his confi- dential fervants, and by that means to wreft thertt from his fervice. Such impeachments were im- pudently and boldly threatened in the great coun- cil of the Stare. While they were thus bringing their plot to maturity in Britain i while the natural refources of this country were cried down, to the great encouragement of our foreign enemies, and a national defpondency in a manner effe<fledj while the Fadion wasftrcnuoufty advi(ing,and zeal- cufly contending, in both Houfes of Parliament, for Withdrawing the troops from America, and at the fame time oppofing every meafure which was ne- ceffary for the recovery of the revolted Colonies j their jtrch-agent, the General, with honourable fidelity (for, in fome men's opinion, there is honour even among the confpirators againft the public weal), was taking every ftep to procraftiuate the war i to plunge the nation yet farther in debt, and a more general defpondency ; and to render Adminiftration more odious to the people. We have feen, that, although by his " great fucceflcs** bbtained in lefs than four months, by only one half of his force, he " had nearly inducted a gc- ^ neral fubmiffion** of the rebels j yet, by his itido- i iff ; 1 I wnr^ .It- k-W. ■ ( no ) ;^ indolence and inadlion, he procraflinated the <Nif during the fpace of (ixteen months longer, and left the rebellion in more fpirits than when he began ^ his operations. He fulfered his enemy, with lefs than 35CO men, to reconquer a province which he had lately reduced -, — he f^fFered that enemy to bcfiege his whole army in its quarters \ — he wan- tonly walled the feafon of military operations>giving his enemy time to recruit their reduced force. By va- rious meafures, he continually deprelTed the fpirit of loyalty, and always declined to avail himfelf of its '^ ailiftance. He alternately funk and revived the fpirit of rebellion, always taking care not to reduce it. He ^ often met his enfeebled enemy, and as often, with ; his vaftly fuperior force, retreated before it i and, with an unaccountable verfatility, adopted one plan after another, always choofing that which was mod expenfive to the nation^ and ruinous to the fuccefs of his own operations. In addition to all this, with a (Iritfl: confiil- "; cncy of dcfign to waftc the public money — to ren- ^ der the nation tired of the American war, and ^i hopelefs of fuccefs, — and to multiply the difficulties of Government in carrying it on ; we have feen ^ him, in proportion as his enemy's ftrcngth and refources dccreafcd, conftantly incrcafe his wanton, f linnecejfary^ and extravagant 'demands for more force, until, conjuniStly with his colleagues in fadion ^ at home, he had laid the foundation of a war with I France and Spain. This done, he immediately refigncd. • ^ ^. . *^-"^ . That That the Fa£Hon, or thfc General* incipabid of feeling for ihc diftreflcs of their country, in- tended 10 involve it in a mifchief of fo great a magnitude, white it was embroiled in a war with its Colonics,' charity forbids me to determine i al- though their infatiable luft for power, and»»hirft for the emolunri^iits of ofiice, with the general tenor of their conduct/ would perhaps even judify fuch a decifioil. However, this is evident, that, upon the General's arrival in Britain, with a large retinue of his'cdnHdential friends, who were 'o be the vindi- cat6rs of his ihameful condud in America, the Faftion recei' ed him in their arms, and boldly vin« dicated hi^ condud both in and out of the fenate. Their force thus coUeded, they conceived that their plot was brought to its wi(hed-for maturity. They prepared for, and loudly threatened, im- peachments and the block. But, previous to this meafure, the whole cenfure and odium of the mif- carriagcs of the American war, of which they them felves had been the authors, were to be caft on the fervants of the Crown. To effeft this, anony- mous charges againft the General were carried into Parliament, and his character wai to be vindicated in the great councils of the State, and no where elfe. In vain did the officers of Government, to whom he was alone accountable, declare, that they had no accufations againft him. Inilead of peptioning their Sovereign for a Court- marcialj the only proper court by which he could ft bf ^'\ ^^Uj> ( 122 ) ■■' ''' be tried, they ^nftituted an unprecedented cxamioft' tidrt in the Hoiufe of Commons, under the pretence ; of vindicating the General^ when their real defign ^V wis to condemn the conduSi of yidminiflration, and ; ta prepare ihc way for their threatened impeach- j mtnts. " ' ' I In this examination, they hoped to run alone, j For a time they did fo ; but at length their fecret j defign appearing cvident,Adminiftration was called v ori to vindicate the meafures of their Sovereign. ) Many gentlemen of undoubted reputation, per-,^ fcdly acquainted with the condudk of the war, and 5 the (late of America, were fummoned to give evi- 1 dencc rcf->ci1ing them. Of this theFadlion was ap- '3 prifed. Only two witncflcs were examined. Butf fuch was the credit and force of their evidence»!j ; that the Fadion fhrunk from the enquiry ^ the great council of the nation was convinced, that the condudk of Adminiftration, in refpeft to the American war, Aood clearly juftiBed ; and the deep-laid plot of theFaftiOn was totally fruftrated. > ; (^;j^q ijm j-r^hi Such has been the conduct of tlie men, who»^< in exad imitation of their confederates in America, have, by their fpecious and falfe clamours for liber«<u ty, been feducing their unwary and too credulous country to tiie brink of ruin ! And fuch are the evils, in which they have, by their cabals, with unabating indullry, involved the nation ! Wl||n will Britons, the mofl: wealthy, tiie mod C ^,.^w^ »4''*'^' • nmii iMict'lx^n^ j^^J r,free. V4 •■^■.- ■'■' ^' ' -' ■■ free, and the mofl: happy people on earth, difcern their own good I. When will the voice ©f wlfdom teach them to Tupport thofe meafures, and that power, which alone can prefcrve their freedom and independence among nations ! When will they ceafe to be the in(^ruments of faiflion, ard the un- happy dupes of lawlefs ambition ! .? . : • — r *' Time has been, when the Princes on the throne have piid no regard to law, and broke over the fa- cred bounds of their happy conftitution } when they have deprived the worthieft men, without law, of their pcrfonal liberty, and robbed the people of their property j and when they would have extend- ed the prerogative to the utmOft bounds of arbi- trary power. How different, at this day, is the fituatlon of Britons ! They have a Sovereign on the throne, into whofe heart a wi(h never yet entered that interfered with the happinefs of his fubjedts*, who never yet received a farthing from his people without their confent -, who, inftead of attempting to extend the prerogative, has^ of his own acco;d>. given up a part of that prerogative to fecure the rights of his people-, — a Sovereign, who, when the diftreffes and ncccflities arifing from their own folly and Tedudtion, lately compelled them to put un- limited confidence and power into his hands, to fave the capital city of their kingdom from imme- diate dellrudllon, and the nation itfclf from ruin, excrciled it with more than parental lenity •, and,, having complied with the wiflies of the virtuous R Z part mm 1 1 ( 124 ) ^ part of the nation, and' faved his country from confufion and ruin, inftantly. With a vir- tuous generofity, gave it up; — a Sovereign, ^ whofe heart^felc wifli, if we tnay judge from the whole tenor of his conduft, is, to prefcrve their conltitution of government inviolate, and to fup- port its independence, its digniiy and ghry among nations ; to recover the loft dominions of the State ; and to reduce his faithlefs. and perHdibus enemies to jufticei which there can be no doubt of his ef« feding, if not obftrufted by the foUy of his people, and the lawlefs and fedirious views of a Fadion, which has too long diftraded his councils, and prevented the exertions of his power. And yet too many Britons, fafcinated by the fpecious arts and delufive wiles of thofe political impoftors, are conftantly giving them their fupport, in op- pofition to the truly patriot meafures of their {Sovereign ; facrificing their own happinefs at th^ altar of lawlefs ambition, and precipitating th^ moll powerful and beautiful fabric of civil liberty Kipainin^ on the globe, to its final Twin.. ^.^^ ^^^ ,^ ■¥^r fi-r ':>i,a; USv •ri, f ■A ,'U.' . • -' \M - 'i; »Hl f^ I,- :i jft. P P E Nr f' ■ I \ ■ •' ;( «?5 )) ••■v.- %^l ^ ^, A P P E N P I X. , -• ♦ ■;■ '; It •■ t'o Lieutenant General Sir William Howe, K, B, SIR, AviNo, in the preceding iheets, travelled in much hade through your laboured De- fence, permit me to pafs from the difagreeable^ though too often neccflary, office of an accufer, to that of vindicating the accufed. I hoped, that, as a gentleman, you would have followed, in your Obfervations, the example I had fet you in my Letters^ in which, >vith a$much delicacy of language as truth would polTibly admit, I h^d confined my ftriclures to your « profeflional condudl,^, without fuffering one fyllable of perfonal abufe. Of one hint at the dcfeds in your private moral ch^ rafter, however fair the mark, to efcape from my pen. But in this hope, on your own account, I ao^ forry to fay, I am difappointed. Confidering Mr. Galloway as theAuthor of "Letters to aNoolecpan*/' and wilhing, by defaming his perfonal character, to ieiTen his credit i and that the impofitions on the - ' JPublic, l\ i li ! Public, in your Defence, might more readily pa(* for truths *,. you defert the field of decent and man- ly argument, and take a mean refuge under the abufe of his private repatation. A condudl of this kind can need no comment *, it can have no weight with a candid and fenfible Ji^ublic; it is the ufual pradlice of the guilty, and the common wea- pon made ufe of to wound the innocent. You do not venture to accufc him of, although you ftrongly infinuate his diQoyalty : — You deny his influence in the province he lived in: — You boldly charge him with giving you falfe intelli- gence*, and you meanly eondefcend to boaft of your liberality towards him. Now, although no man .can. perceive what relation thefc matters can pof- fibly have to a vindication of your •' profeffional «' condudt," • 1 IHail, on Mr. Galloway's account, examine them.'- '- V '-■/■', r ■■'{ To give a glofs to your infinuations refpefting his difloyalty, you fay : " This gentleman, in the *' beginning of the rebellion, was eleded a Mem- «* ber of Congrefs." What. Sir, does this prove to your purpofe ? It is well known tXi ihe Public, that many gentlemen, who had before, and have fince, given the moft demonftrative'proofs of their loyalty, were eleded by the then conftitutional Affemblies, and fent to the firft Congref?^ with the moft laudable and loyal defigns, — to accom- modate the alarming controverfy, to eftabUlh a ■I i iM y 4. ;,■ • (( »27 ) more permanent union between the.two qo^ntri/^s, :: ' and to (lop the rifipg fedition. This was eieaftly ^ v the circumftance of that gentleman, who rcfufcd i the delegation on any other terms *. His Inftruc- >t ' tipns are long fince before the Public, and prove ^ the fa6b i and it is known to many gentlemen now "l \'- ' in London, from Pennfylvania, that, while in-^ '• Congrefs, he faithfully purfucd thbfe Inftruc-'i tipns-f", uniformly exerting his influence and abi- ^ lities to carry them into execution. That he, * boldly, and unawed by the dangers which threat-** ened his perfon, in the tumults of riot and fac- "^ tion which he was oppofing, reprobated and condemned every meafure which tended to fedi-"' tion, and a reparation of the two eountrie?.*-! • That when he found he could not flcm the torrent'^ of rebellion, he returned f^ the AlTcmbly ; and there again, as the ultimate mealure he could pur-"'*^ fue, to fave the province he lived in, he refolutcly exerted hi* influence to induce them to difapprove of the meafures of Congrefs, and totally to fecede from all connexion with it. That having failed in this meafure, on the queftion, by one vote only, ' he was again ele^ed a Member of the fccond Con- grefs, contrary to his own folemn and repeated refufals to fcrv?. That he continued thus eleded utjtil long after that Congrefs met } but as he did lire • Sec Mr, Galloway's Examination, p. 47, &c« f See Appendix to Letters to a Noblcmin. ii }!lH tsd » JioC ^1^ i not Attend, another was etched in his room. And yet fuch was the earncft dcfirc of the Congrcfs to obtain his influence and concurrence in their meafures, that Do^or Franklin came up to his feat in the country, to which he had retired, to folicit his union with them, and offered to i3rocure his immedkdce re*eleclion) all which he reiolucely refufed. And afterwards, that, although his life was repeatedly threatened by the independent fac- tion, and while his friends trembled for his fafety^ he, unawed by his danger, condemned in his publi- cations the meafurps of Congrefs, and charged them with views of independence and treafon, ;^t a time when they publicly difavowcd them. Could it be pofTible for the candour of the Public to afl( for further proof c?f this gentleman's uniform fidelity to his Sovereign, and attachment to the legal confti- tution of his country i his having abandoned a very valuable eJate, and facrificed the independent happinefs of his fr.mily to thofe piirciples, muft certainly be that proof. But yoM further add, " When my Brother and " 1, in the character of his Majefty's Commif- «* fioners for reftoring peace, published a /)rtff/<j- «* matioK of indemftity, for all thofe who had taken ** part in the rebellion^ provide*^ they fliould fur- *' render themfelves, and fubfcribe a declarii/ion •* of allegiance within e limited time, Mr, Gal" ** loway was among the firft who came over to us <* from Phuladelphia j" thus intimating that he «! had 1 ill r^ ( 1^9 ) had talceii part in the rdbeilion» at\6 caO^e OHt iO you CO take the benefit of the (>ai'clon offiencd hf tht prockmation. Now, Sir, although this ii all Lnvicndon, \ do not fuipcd it ifl yotur own. T wifh, for the iiike o^' jrour own chara^er, to believe it to be tliat of your venal tlcperKUnt, whom you have lung fincc ampJ) newarded for writing your Vin*" dication ^ for yoL know you was nor, where you ought ito havt: be^n, with your amy at Brunfwick^ wnen iMr. GdllowA7 came over to it| but in Mew* York ; nod, flaould I dcfcend to follow your cs- iim{>]e4 of attacking private reputation, 1 could# l^erhaps, infonn the. Public: what alkremeui led you thither. However, as this ii n practice of which I «tijr*pproye, I ih«ll not adopt it, although youf own condudl has juiilkiM ^c> But, Sir, the real truth is— Your proclamation is c '.t^d 30th No' vember, ajid was not publiihed within your own lines »\. f funfwickt in New Jerfey, near 60 milep fiiltiint fr(Mln PhihidelphiA:* ^rom whence you fay Mr. Galloway came, until the day tdlowkigt and on this very day, early in the morning* htf wfti within your lines, with Gener.1l V^ughan, in BrunlWkk. Uriven from his family, by an order of the Can.vefition at Philadelphia hr t\\t impri<< fonment of his ptrfon, he left Pcnnfylvania c. th# aSth, two days before the date of your procla- tiiation, and eleven day* befow; one of them was fcnc 10 the province he left ♦, for you may recoiled, ^hat ihofe proclamations were not fcnt to Pennfyl- S vaniii « I II iii vaniiitJritU after yqur; arrival at Trenton, on the ;8th of Dfccennbcrj when your Aid dc Camp re- fiquerted Mr. Galloway tofcnd fifty of them to FhU uJ ladelphia i which he accordingly did^ by a pcrfoa Hi On whom he could depend. I have mentioned General Vaughan, who, I have no doubt, will itcolleft the time of Mr. Galloway's coming intd Brunfwick, and that he was the Hrfl who ihewed to him the proclamation; Thus, Sir, you will perceive into what a dilemma you have brought ■yourfelf, by trullihg to the invention of one who was with you at New York, and could know no- thing about the time when Mr. Galloway came over to your lines. But^ if yon really thought Mr. Galloway '* had taken part in the rebellion/' why did you afterwards appoint him to fo many places of high truft and importance in his Majefty's fer- vice, giving him> an opportunity daily to betray it ? How can you acc<)unt for a condud, fo in- confift^nt with your manifeft duty, either to your Sovereign or Country ? '"5 tpn^j Xn'imlh/t./^ .im ''^ ■ You next meanly deftend to mention your libe- k'ality to Mr. Gallov/ay. Mean, indeed, it will appear, when that gentleman's fervices and facri- ■fices are confidcred, had it flowed from your pri- vate purfe ; and yet meaner ftiii, when it is known you paid it out of the public motley. And how much did this profufc liberality amount to ? No more than 770 1. in which the wages of a clerk are , u-cm^^t^ '^P,f^'^'ijSy.'^'^^^M^^f^kf^*^}i3^ i included. n i »3' ) included, by your own Recount, for fcrvices per- fcrmed during 18 months. ,,.f And what were the fcrvices he pcrformiS ? He afted as Superintcndant of the Police, which he digefted, regulated, and eftablilbed, at your requeft. In this office was included the pre^ fervationof the order, internal peace, and fafety pf the firft city in America. He ferved you as Superintendant of the Port; an office eftablKhed to receive an account, of all the cargoes imported for the ufe of your army, and the people within your lines, and to prevent their being clandeftinely carried to the enemy. He ferved you as Superior tendant of the prohibited Articles. In this office the utmoft care and attention was necelTary, to prevent the enemy from being fupplied with them* He alfo fuperintended every avenue of your lines^ and nightly^ received the reports of perfons apr pointed to attend them. He was conftantly em- ployed by you, from the time of your arrival at rhe head of Elk, to the day of your reHgnar k 'on, in obtaining for you intelligence of the (late ; ad movements of the enemy } and gained more liTjportant and better intelligence for lefs than 50Q !• than you paid for at New York, as your friends confcfTed, upwards of 5000 1. He was often ap-c plied to by the Commiffaries and Quarter- matters, for his advice and affiftance in procuring forage and provifions for your army. He was incefr fantly cj^lied on to f urniHi yqu wi(h guides and , ; ' " '' S ^ ; horrc5 % fummmmmmm ,1 .te.t hoffes fof youf panics. He tiiM i trOop 6f JigK^ yfiorfc, ^nd embodied eighty loyal v0furt?ecr$, whu fervcd ^ichopt pay or clothing i pCffofhllrtg, uttdcr ills QfMvn dire^ibn, thofe many and uneontmofi fer- Vices mentioned in a note of his Examination, page 80. fie alfb furnifhed you With many maps^ aelirtcktlrig the roads fp^ the march of your army i ^nd ^. nrincip^ one, With all th<tf roads bet WeCti the iX uand the Suft|uehanrtih, either dfawh by himfeii. if under hU immediate dire6Hon i witH a variety of other fervices, totally Jndeptendi^nt of bis public offides ; which, hatStlifcy been ddnti by your favourite officers, would 'have coft ybu tert times the amount tof the whole fwm of your pto*- fufe Hberality to him. Such 'arc the fervices of Mr.Oaliovray, which ydU ha Ve ndt^dthe honout to thcntion. Your liberality, knS ih^k fervices, are ho\v before the 'Public, tb whpfe candid' re^ fleftions both are fiibmltccd. I fhall on!y remark^ thstt, had you dealt blit the public riloncy, com» rnittcd to your charge, with the fame cdconomy to your favourites, as you did to thls^fntlemtin^ we Ihould not have fecr> fo many American Nabobi foiling in wealth, and luxurioufly living on the Ipoils of their country, as have lately returnee! from America. In refped to Mr. Galloway's popularity in the provinces in which he had lived, it is too well af- Certained by a variety of fa6h too notorious to be afFc6led by your negation •, but as the charge Pf fr: i'l^. 1 ,'.::.A.;,,.. ( .,33 ) of kfs wmc ofinfl^eticedocs not injuie ha private ind. moral charaAer^ I ihtU fiy no inore oa that Of a ycTy^ficretit nafivxt it your next and laft charge. ^ You fay. You *< at firft paid atiention to ** hi9 opinions, and relied upon htm iSoir procuring f* you fecrer in^tigence^ but you a^Krwards '* found your conkidehce mifplaced '^ his ideai yolu ^ <iifcorefed tobe^ifionary } and his intdligencs *' was either iU-^foiinded, pr ib frequently ekaggei- ^ rated, that it woakt not have been fafe to ad ** Mpoti it^* If tWefe^dlcrtioni be truths, why did you continue conftandy to employ him in the line of intelligence, to the day of your refjgnation ? Why was your Aid de Camp almoft daily coming down from you to him, deiiring him to fend out for. intelligence ? Why did you not altogether rely on yo<ur ** other channels of fecret communication ?** How uABitcountable then muft it appear to men of fenie, that you ihould be ki weak as to continue tp truft a perfon, whofe ** ideas you had diicovered to ** be vifionary," and whofe ** inteUigence to be *• ill-founded, exaggerated," andfalfe? But you further add, ** Having once detected ** him in fending <ne a [Mcce of intdligence from • ^ perfon, who afterwards, upon examination, gave a very different account of the matter, I immediately changed the channel of iecret com- *^ munication, and, in fMturc, confidered Mr, *[ Qajloway as a nugatory informer/* How dark • ' '\ iin4 •c u ■■' » /-•• ( 134 ) and unmanly is thi& charge ! ' Againft charges fo general, fo perfe^Iy undefined, and fo. artfully made, it is impollible for the moft innocent per- fon to vindicate himfelf; for you have prudently avoided either mentioning the perfon who ** gave ♦•a very different account of the matter," or the matter itfelf. Can you believe, that this (tab in the dark, at a private chara^fctr, will not be con- demned by the candour and good fenfe of the Pub- lic ? It will foon. Sir, appear, that, to the laft hour of your command, you entertained a high opinion of Mr. Galloway's honour and probity. Did you at thfe time, or d ig your command in America, give him the It tt hint of your fufpedt- ^ ing the intelligence he fent you ? Had you done this, he would, in all probability, have convinced you that he did not deferve your fufpicion, if, in reality, you ever entertained one ; he might have -convinced you of his having received the intelli- •gence from the perfon who denied it, and that this •perfon had deceived you. This would not. Sir, ;have been th<; only inftance in which you were de- ceived. Qne I will beg leave to remind you oi^ in which your favours and confidence were totally ^ anifplaced. Mr. Willing, and his partner Mr. Morris, had been, from the beginning of the re- bellion, the agents wf the Congrefs for fupplying ^ their naval and military (tores. Their difaffe^ion to their Sovereign, and their rebellious principles, were proved by a number of letters, intercepted by : ( 135 ) your Noble Brother -, and therefore Mr. Galloway 'Called on Mr, Willing in Philadelphia, by your cxprefs order, to rake the oaths of allegiance ; and although he refufed, yet he found fo much favour in your fight, as to obtain a countermand of that order, and a difpenfation from taking the oath ; and even after this, you made him and his flour- broker, Mr. Brown, your confidential negotiators with the Members of the Congrcfs. The rebel records will fupport this truth; and further, that both Mr. Willing and his notable broker deceived and betrayed you. However, dark and infidious as this charge is» it is fortunate for Mr. Galloway, that there is proof abundantly fufficient to convince the un- prejudiced, that all you have aflerted refpeAlng his diiloyalty, his unpopularity, and deception, is of recent invention, and had no exigence in your mind when you left America i it is proof which you yourfelf will not deny the credit of, being no kfs than the teftimony of Sir William Howe him- felf, under his own hand, and the feal of his arms. ' Six days only before you left Philadelphia, im- prefied with the faithful fervices of Mr. Galloway» you not only warmly recommended him to the at- tention of your fucceiror, but wrote to him the following letter : l£jkY*1('ls4 SIR, .... :.,. (( .,6;) '\r, l^ ** S I K* PlttadeJphu, Mtry it, ijp:^ f", «« THE faktary effeSts o*^ the regulations itl the eftabliflimenc of the police in this cl^y, have S6 iully jufliifiied my choice of the gentlemen in whole hands I placed the important tmjii tHst t cannpt^ either as a public or private man, withhold tkis tefiimoty efng/fen/t cj their Jervices % and 1 beg, •that^ to the general r^fpeSi paid yoUj as an upri^hty able magifirate^ zxAfrier^i to the legal conjlitution of your country^ 1 rniay be permitted the hooour of adding wy particular ajfurance of the great perjonal ^r^fli with Wihich I sEOj SIR, tt "! . 'i&:^^M jj^ii {i^ Yow rooft obedient^ ^^,^^,V, 3^;/;;^ G^«i^. EJiHire,^^^^ '■-rfmfm- *]^"^1^ow/Sir, permit meidiiflc^f^If Mr. GaHbway "Was di/loyalj how could you give hkn yotjr teftt- mony that jhe was •* z friend to the legal cokftitii- *» 4uin of Us country /** If he was unpopular, how coul3 he poffefs " the general refpeSt as an upright f* magijlrate ?" If he had deceived you, in giving you falfe iateHigcnce, why could you not Very jUftly, ** either as a puHlic or private man, withhoii '\pour fenfe of his fervices T' And^ if he was «»- ivorthy of your confidence^ how unworthy was it in Sir William Howe to give him particular etffk* ranees of his great perfonal ejleem ? Thcfe are pa- radoxes which we muft kave to be unfolded in r --■ ■ -':; -■:'-■ ■ ;■■ your rv' «1 "'\. H. , ; 1. ( 137 ) your next attempt to .vindicate, your condudl in the American war. » Such was your opinion of Mr. Galloway when you kft Americai and f'uch it continued to be for fome time in England ; for you was the firft gentleman, your own and your Noble Brother's Secretaries ex- cepted, who paid him the honour ofavifiton his arrival in London. Nor was it changed the day before his examination in the Houfe of Commons, on the conduft of the American war; for you well remember, that, on that day, your Nobli Brother, who was pleading in your defence, and therefore we may prefume fpoke your fentimcnts, delivered, when Mr. Galloway was prefent, an high, though fulfomc panegyric on his honour and integrity. But how changeable and uncertain are the good opinions of mqn ! Mr. Galloway being examined, the film which had before in- verted his Lord (hip's optics, and reprcfented Mr, Galloway as a man of integrity, became fuddenly removed •, and from that inftant he flood meta- morphofed from an honourable man into *♦ Shakc- «* fpear*s apothecary ;" and now, by the fame ma*, gical influence, you have transformed him from a man worthy of " general refpeft as an upright (' magiftrate," into one of no />d'/>«/^r/Vj)' ; from an upright matt, into a deceiver •, and from a " friend to *f the legal conllicution of his country," uytoa reb^f^ l^ovember io, ?73q» . THE AUTHOR. ■ ■ ■ "-^ ■ ■ -S. ' ■ . ■ Nq, IP .V' f-l: No. II. V Copy qf a Letter from Samuel Kirk, Grocer] in Nottingham, to General Howi;. , j SIR, , ^ 1 Cannot cafily dcfcribe the difcontent and difappointmenc which appears among a very great number of your constituents here, on acr count of your having accepted a command in the ex' pedition ogainft our American hretbrfn. From the opinion I had of your integrity in genera], I voted for you at the late ele£tion, notwithftanding you )iad, in fome recent inftances, a6ted contrary to my fentiments. I took the liberty to tell you fo, an^ afked you the following questions, viz. . "Whether you thought our whole army woul4 not be infufficient to conquer America ? If you did not think the Mniftiy had pujhed this fnatter too far ? ^ Whether^ if youjhould he af pointed to a fommand^ you would refufe ? And, Whether you would vote for the repeal of the four Afts of Parliament, which you are now goin^ to enforce ? If I am nqt miftaken, and I believe that you \yill allow that I am not, you anfwered to every on^ 0f thefe ^eries in the affirmative. This, out of pure regard to yoyr ijitcreft here, I have made Jtnow^ • - ( 139 ) ^kndwh to numbers, who were in the fame (late of fufpenfe with myfelf, as to the propriety of our i condudt at the election \ and it has ferved to re- move, in a great meafiire^ the ill imprejfionsy by which you yourfelf was very fetijibly afFefted while among usi We are however aflured, that General Howe ' is preparing to embark for America to enforce the ■ ASls, Judge, if you can, the confufton this occajions among your friends. The moft plaufible excufe that !s made among us» is^ that the King fent for youk and what could you doP -f Now I muft beg leave to fay, that I think you might have aftcd the part of a great man, in refu- fing to go againji this people on many accounts. But to fay nothing of politics, your Brother died there. They have Ihewn their gratitude to your name and family, by eredin^ a monument to him, who bled {in the caufe of freedom amongft them -, to him, who dared to ad in oppqfitionto a Court, when his judg- ment informed^him his oppofition was right} and yet he died a loldier. Our pafllons were wrought upon at the eledion by the mention of his honour- ed name, in a paper which you may perhaps re- member ; and may I not mention it to you, with a wifli that you may follow fo amiable, fo difinte- rcfted, fo revered a charadter ? I believe you have not even an enemy, who would impute your refuf- ingtogo, to want of courage*, nay, your courage would be made more confpicuous by the refufal. •*r^^^/iiA.X' ,mitn,ijab; '^:. *. ,lh.i-. If II ii5gt."r.-4?i •^ (140 ) ' If yt>u (hould refolre, at oU evtnts^ to go, I don'c fn^ you may fall^ as many do^ but I catmat fay 1 • mjh fuccefs to the undertaking, Thcfc, Sir, areeiie ii^ntifnents of many here, as well as of . Nottingbamy Your obedient fervtnt, Feb, 10) 1775. Samuil Kirk. General Hows to Mr, Kirk. SIR, ■^.v J Have read your Icttterof the lotb, with fo much the greater degree of concern* as I had flattered myfelf I hiid removed all tJbafe prejudires you had entertained againji me, when I had the plea* fure Oi being with you at the election. The ran cour and malice of thofe who w6re hot my fViend^ at the election, fiUnne with aftoniihment at the inftance you mention of their wiihes for my fall in America. ' My going thither was not my feeking. I vttis ■ordered, and coold not itfufe, wkhout incurring the odious name of backwardnefs to ferve my country in diftrefs.^-^o contriary are men^s opinions berei to feme with you, that, inftead ©f the groffcft ^bufe, I have been moft highly corHplimented upon the oecafion^ by thofe who are even averfe to theinea* fures of Adminifiratian, Every man's private feelings ought to give way to the fervice of the Public at all times 5 but par. ticularly, when of that delicate nature in which our affairs ftand at prefent. Whatever opprobrious names I may be called at Nottingham, I am en- 8 cou raged V* • ( »4i ) couraged to fay, that no fuch epithets will be put on it in any other quarter, I intreat you in particular^ to fufpend your judgmeot In tbofe matters^ until the event proves me unworthy of your fupport* One woFd for America: You arc deceived, if ybu Aippofe there are not many loyal 4ind peaceable fuhjetts in that country. 1 mny fafely aflert, that the infurgents are very few, in comparilbn of the whole people. •.There are certairtly thofe who db not agree to ift taxation from hence, but who do not wi(h to Htwtt thtmfelves from the fupremacy of this coun- try. /Ithis laft fet of men, I fhould hope, by their 1)cing relieved from thegHevante, will moft readily return to all due obedience to the hm, ' With fd*pea to tksfetvt who, I am told, defire to feparate thedfelvesfrom the' Mother Country, I truft, when they find they are not fupportcd in their frantic ideas by the more moderate, which I iiave defcribed, they will, from fe^r of punilh- mertt, fubfide to the laws. With regard to trade, this country mull now fbt ■ the foundation of its inability with America, by procuring a lafting^ obedience to our laws, without which it can never arrive at that permanency fo abfolutely requifice for the well being of this em- pire. I am, SIR, Your faithful and , !^een Street, obedient Servant, ^ JRf^. 21, 1775. William How-; : 1 ^. •^. «"«"«■ ( Ha ) V\^.^73)ft^t!tA^<!^ ^Nb. III*. ■''•^'Tij^H^'-^'^* yi Letter from the Committee of Congre/s to T the Frefidenti found among tke Papers cff ■,...^m^J.H'fw^•^r.^. iv , „h *u>sf§v<»kii . - ; SIR, Camp at Valley Forge^ Feb. 12, 1778. WE had flattered ourfclves, t!.at, before this time, the pleafure of Congrcfs would be made known to us, rcfpcdting theQiiartcr-mafter's department. We fear our letter upon thi" fubjedt has mifcarricd, or the confideration of '^t. yielded to other buO.nefs. You will therefore pardon us, Sir, when we '^gain folicit your attention to it, as an objc^ of the lajt imporiance j on which not only the future fuccefs of your arms, but the prefent ex- ijtence of your army, immediately depend. The influence of this office is fo diffufivc through every part of your military fylem, ihat neither the wif- dom of arrangement, the fpirit of cnterprife, or favourable opportunity, will be of any avail, if this great wheel in the machine (lops, or moves heavily^ "We find ourfelves cmbarrafl^ed in entering on this fubjcfl, Icfl: a bare recital of fads (hould carry an imputation (which we do not intend) on thofe gentlemen who have lately conduced it. We are , fcnfible. •• jT. ^f nfible, great and juft allowances are to be made for the peculiarity of their fituation, and we are perhaps not fully acquainted with all their difficul- ties. It is our duty. Sir, to inform you it is not- our intention to cenfure ; and be alTured, nothing but a fenfe of the obligation we are under, to po(t» pone all other confidcrationrj to the public fafety^ could induce us to perform the unpleafing tafk.-^ We find, Sir, the property of the continent dif- perfed over the whole country ; not an encampment, route of the army, or confiderable road, but abounds with waggons, left to the mercy of the weather, and the will of the inhabitants ; large quantity of intrenching tools have, in like manner, been left in various hands, under no other fecurity that v/e can learn, ihan the honcfty of thofe who have them in poHenicn. Not lef: than 3000 fpades and fhoveiS, and thi tike number of tomahawks, have been lately difcovered an i collected in the vicinity of the camp, by an order from one of the general officers. Ir the fame way, a quantity of tents and tent cloth, after having lain a whole fum- mer in afarmer's barn, and unknown to the officer of the department, was lately difcovered,*; id brought to camp by a fpecial order from the General.— From thefc inllances, we prefume there may be many other (lores yet unknown and uticollefted, which jreauire immediate care and attention. ,*>**-• t ♦ ' When, ■ \ \ .o. ■S..'. X ' ■■■■ I 144 > ■ Wbeti) in compliance with the expedlations of CoQgrefs, and the wifhes of the country, the army wai thrown into huts, inftead of retiring to more diftant and convenient quarters, the troops juftly expeded every comfort which the furrounding country could afford. Among thefe, a providential care in the article of ftraw, would probably have iaved the lives of many of your brave foldicrs, who have now paid the great debt of nature. Un- provided with this, or matmals to raife them from the cold and wit earth, ficknefs and mortality have fpread through tksir quarters in an ajlomjhing degree* J^otwitbfianding the diligence of the pbyficians and fmgeenSi of whom we hear no complaint^ the fiek emd dead Uft has increafed one-^third in the lafi week's returns, %vhich was one third greater than the week preceding \ and^ from the prefent inclement weather, will probably increafe in a much greater proportion»-r Nothing, Sir, can equal their fufferings^ except th^, {>ati€nce and fortitude with which the faithful part nf the army endure them. Thofe of a different chom ra^er defer t in confiderahle numbers, j. ,.;>}. t>,-,ii '•m ■ j We muft alio obferve, that a number of the troops have now fome time been prepared fop in "Mlationj but the operation muft be delayed, foy ^\.ut of this and other neccflfaries within the pro-* vidence of this department. We need not point out the fatal confcquences of this delay in forming H new army, or the prefervation of thi^, Almoft \\ ^^ ( 145 ) t^iery day furnifhes inftances of the fmall pox in the natural way. Hitherto fuch vigilance and care has been ufed, that the contagion has not fpread ; but furely it is highly incumbent upon us, if pofli- ble, to annihilate the danger. We need not point out the efFeifl this circum- fiance will have upon the new draughted troops, if not carefully guarded ; they are too obvious to need enumeration. In conference with the l^oragc- inafter on this fubjed (which, though in appear- ance trivial, is really important), he acquainted us, that, though out of his line, he would have procured it, if waggons could bavs been furnijhed him for that furpofe. The want of horfes and waggons for the ordinary as well as extraordinary occajions of the army^ prefles upon us, ifpoflible, with equal force; aiuioft every fpecies of camp tranfportation is ow performed ^ men, who, without a murmur, puaeHtl) yoke them- felves to little carriages of their own making, r load their wood and provijions on their hacks — Shculc the enemy, encouraged by the growing weaknefs of your troops, be led to make afuccefsful imprejjion upojtyour camp, your artillery ziould now undoubtedly fall into their hands, for wai:t of horfes to remove it. — But thefe are fmaller and tolerable evils, when com- pared with the imminent danger of your troops, perijhing with famine, or difperjing in fearch of food » The Commiflaries, in adtlition to their fupplicsot U . live 1. 1 ■1P!^"^^^^«P» mmw^O'^^ '1,1 ( 146 ) live cattle, which arc precarious, have found A cjuantity of pork in New Jerfey, of which, by a failure of wagons, not one barrel has reached the €amp. The orders were given for that purpbfe as early as the 4.th of January, — In yefterday's conference with the General, he informed us, that fame Bri^ gades had been four days without meat •, and that even the common foldiers had been at his quarters to make known their wants. — At prefent, Sir, there is not one gentleman of any rank in this department, though the duties of the office require a conftant and unremitted attention. In whatev er view, therefore, the objc(5t prefcnts iifclf, we truft you will difcern* that the mod cflcntial intercfts arc conneded with it. The feafon of preparation for next campaign, is pafTing fwiftly away. Be afllired. Sir, that its operations will be intHTcdual, either for offence or proteSlion^ if an arrangement is not immediately made, and the moft vigorous exertions ufed to pro- cure the neceflary fupplies. — Permit us to fay, that a moment* s time fijould not be lofi in placing a man of approved abilities and extenfive capacity at the head of the department, who will rcftorc it to fome degree of regularity and order ; whofe provident care will immediately relieve the prefent wants of the army, and extend itfclf to thofe which muft be fdtisfied, before we can cxpedl vigour, entcrprife, or luccefs. — When your Committee reflcdl upon the ' ' $ increafed \) Xi \) ,.-:<i: ( HI ) ^ 'iicreaied difficulties of procuring waggons^ horfcsy tents, and the numerous train of articles dependrnc on this office, without which your army cannot even move ; they feel the greatcft anxiety, left the utmoft jkilU diligence^ and addrefs^ will prove ineffeSiual to ffltisfy the growing demand, A 11 other conUdcrations vanifli before this objcft ; and we molt earncftly wifli, Congrefs may be impreffed in a proper de- gree with its necejftty and importance, A report has reached us, that Col. Lutterlogh is a candidate for the office of Quarter-mafter Ge- liieral \ we have therefore been led to make fome inquiry into his chara6ler and condudl. — Wc 0iould be far from doing injuflice to his abilities and experience in a fubordinate line-, but, exclufivc of the danger of entrufting lb confidential an office to a ftranger, whofe attachment to this country muft be light and tranfient, and whofe intereft may be fo eafily didinguiflied from ours, wc cannot find that he poiTefies talents or a<5livitv equal to this important office. — We find, in the courfe of the campaign, neceflary tools and (lores have often been wanting •, important and fcafonable move- ments of the army delayed ; in fome inftanres, wholly frullrated \ and favourable opportunities Joll:, through the deficiencies of this department.— ? The rapid marches of our army, and unforefeen difarters which attended it during the fummer fealon, U * partly .A* mm mm // V ( 148 ) Y partly claim fome allowances -, but that diibrder and confufion prevail through the departmentj which requires fome able hand to reform and re- duce it to a certain and melancholy truth. Unacquainted with the refolution of Congrefs with refpeft to General Schuyler, we have hefitated what further to propofe. Time is fo extremely pre- carious, th^t we are unwilling to lofe a (ingle un"* necefTary moment ; and have therefore been in- duced to extend our views to the difapprobation of this gentleman, and make fome provifion for that; event. A character has prefented itfelf, which, in a great degree, meets our approbation^ judgment, and wifties.— We have opened the fubjed to him, and it is now under his confideration. When we are at liberty, we Ihall introduce him to your notice j but delicacy forbids our doing it, until he has made up his mind on the fubje6l, and given his confenc to the nomination.— Another gentleman of exten^^ five connexions, great a<^ivity, and comprfehen-? five genius, but intircly in civil life, has alfo been propofed. As he is at a diftance, we have not been able to confult him } and are reftrained» by fimilar motives of delicacy, from making his character and name a fubjed): of difcuffion, without his con- fent. By the time we are favoured with the determin- ation refpedting General Schuyler, and he fhoulcf { »49 ) pot be approved, we hope to be able to announof both thcfe gentlemen for your confideratioii.' :Wc are, with the grciteft regard and refpcdt,; ' SIR, your moft obedient, and " ., very humble lervants; '-'': ^ .:. .^KxM^kiao (TheCommitwiuJ : ^ ^Signed Fra, Pawaj fffi the Pr^fiJenf 6/ Cet^refs,. r ..^S'X^ *. ; t'i- '.t/i *,jla e I F I < • .,'-j'iH .-: .-:-.> .mw;;!.^ ' * 1 , . I j: .-/^' .!! . ''/I /^/iL?>J'I ,ii! fit fv < /:i. . K ' ... .1 .^t . <■. , ^^4 16 'i » k\ ',i . Z .\-,%>'., -*' .»..' ,;,^ '• -.;; ■ ^ 1 . ". .' k, v;- ,. ; '.J ^} i.Jt ,u •ft^ •^'' ,ulJ> 7' ''Ait ir •-;■■«, •■r \ ''■-' >'- :::.:: ./ ^a-i * t'i '>' . -!'i^ i: nvs k ■: J ^ *i 1 iv) ',; :>0 PPi^V^M iW^^PWWH^W^^^ Latily fullijhed^ By G.JWUKWi No. 7i/$,t. 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