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 T O T H E 
 
 O B S E R VAT IONS 
 
 OF 
 
 Lieut. Gen. Sir WILLIAM HOWE, 
 
 4 - 
 
 ON A PAMPHLET, ENTITLE]* 
 
 LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN. 
 
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R E 
 
 TO THE 
 
 OBSERVATIONS 
 
 OP 
 
 Lieut. GctL Sir WILLIAM HOWE, 
 
 ON A PAMPHLET, ENTITLEU 
 
 LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN; 
 
 I N WH ICH 
 
 His Misrepresentations are deteflcd, and thofe 
 Letters are fupportcd, by a Variety of New Matter 
 and Argument. 
 
 TO WHICH IS AD^CDi 
 
 AN APPENDIX, 
 
 CONTAINING, 
 
 I. A Letter to Sir William Howe upon his Stridlures 
 on Mr. Galloway's private. Chara^er. 
 
 II. A Letter from Mr. Kir <c to Sir William Howe, and 
 his Anlwer. 
 
 III. A Letter from a Committee, to the Prefident, of theC'on^ 
 ^ grefs, on the 3tate of the Rebel Army at Valley Forge, 
 
 found amoil^he Papers of Henry Laurens, Efq. 
 
 By 
 
 the A 
 
 uihor of Letters to a 
 
 Nobleman. 
 
 
 
 
 Judi alteram partem. 
 
 
 
 LONDON! 
 
 Printed for G, Wilkie, No. 71, Sr. Paul's Church.yaird, 
 
 MPQCLJ^XX. 
 
%^ ,.7i^:tt':'t«iiU 
 
 
ites 
 
 ^ 
 
 R E P L Y 
 
 to 
 
 Sir William HoWe*s Obrervations, &c* 
 
 Wti EN a man, confciolis o^ his own liiif^ 
 condud;, or at lead lying under the charge 
 of having betrayed a public truft, a truft of as 
 great importance as was ever committed to any fub- 
 jedt, finds himfelf under the necefCty of mifrepre- 
 fenting notorious fads^ and even of defcending to 
 perfonal detraftion, for his own vindication, he is 
 truly to be pitied. This, appears to be the cafe of 
 (he late Commander in Chief of his Majefty*s Forcef 
 in Anjcrica. If the Author of the " Letters to a, 
 Nobleman" has contributed to the diftrefs of the 
 General, he has done it with reluctance, fcom a 
 regard to truth and iuftice, and a fenfe of duty to 
 
 B V the 
 
( a ) 
 
 the public, 2nd not from any impulfe of private 
 refentment; for he franicly declares, he never had 
 any caufe of perfonal enmity to Sir William Howe, 
 who neither had perfonally injured nor offended 
 him i and therefore, that the motive': which led 
 him to publifli his ftri<5tures on the conduft of the 
 American war, could not arife from fuch a prin- 
 ciple. He coiifxdered him only in his public ca- 
 pacity, and, imagining that he could throw new 
 light on a fubjeft which appeared to many to be 
 dark an-^l problematical, and in which the public 
 welfare was intimately concerned, he proceeded to 
 animadvert upon his conduA as Commander in 
 Chief. 
 
 Nor was the e;.amination of the management of 
 the American war needlefsly undertaken. The 
 unparalleled failures in that war, the uncommon 
 magnitude of the evils in which they had involved 
 the nation, with the reluftanbe of Government to 
 make judicial enquiry into the caufes of them, 
 loudly called for it. ,,^ 
 
 We had Iccn the General, in the Middle Colo- 
 nies, commanding a force always, commonly four 
 times, and at certain periods eight times, greater 
 than that of his enemy ; a force fo powerful, fo 
 adequate to the purpofes for which it was intended, 
 that he could not' help expreffing his " utter* 
 " amazement" on the occafion, and paying to the 
 Secretary of State of the American department the 
 greateft, though not more than a juft encomium. 
 
( 3 ) 
 
 for his " uncommon exertions." To this wai 
 added a naval force of eighty vcffcls of war, under 
 the command of his Noble Brother, to cooperate 
 with him in fubduing the mod unnatural and un, 
 juilifiable rebellion that ever happened in any coun- 
 try, J 
 . We had feen him, between the 3d of Septem- 
 ber and the 8th of December, dr ving that enemy 
 before him from Long Ifland, over the North 
 River, and the Delaware, killing, captivating, and 
 reducing his army from 18,000 to 3000 men, 
 and taking from him ibe whole provme of New 
 Jerfy, .:.... 
 But fuch was the reverfe of conduft (it could 
 not be of fortune; for fortune, however vari-i 
 able and frolic, has never yet been found to 
 commit fuch blunders), fuch was the derelidionof 
 military virtue, that he fuffered that reduced, panic- 
 ftruck enemy to furprife his advanced poft, and 
 drive him out of Weft Jerfey, and to reconquer all 
 Eaft Jerfey, except his three pofts on the Rariton ;. 
 and, eftablifhed at Morris To v/n, in the neigh* 
 bourhood of his head-quarters, to befiege, hara(s,fJ 
 and diftrefs the -whole Britilh army, from Decem- 
 ber to June, wiibcut making one attempt to iijiodgt 
 him, 
 
 ^ We had fcen himv having under his command 
 at New-York 30,000 men, marching out againlt 
 this enemy, who, by his own exaggerated account, 
 had no more than 10,000, new-railed and undif- 
 •-iV/ B ^ ciplined j 
 
( 4 y 
 
 dpUnedi and, a few days after, fhamefully retreat^ 
 ing before him from HilUborough to Amboy, 
 without taking any one pnper fiep to bring bim to 
 4in engagement. 
 
 We had feen him, after this difgraceful retrear, 
 embarking his army on (hip*board, at an immenfe 
 expenceto the nation} and, forewarned of the dif- 
 ficulties and dangers he muft neceiTarily encounter 
 on the ocean, proceeding, againft contrary winds, 
 700 miles, to meet the fame enemy polled on 
 ftronger ground, and enabling him, by this wafte 
 of 'time, to procure near double bU former nitm" 
 hers. 
 
 We had feen him, contrary to the moft urgent 
 motives, to the plaineft dilates of military fci- 
 ence, and the explicit orders of his Sovereign, 
 lead his force 600 miles from the place where he 
 was direded to join General Burgoyne, and at the 
 very time when that junction was to have been 
 made ; and by this abfurd ^wi^vu^ Sacrifice a wbole 
 $ritijh armiy. 
 
 We had feen him at Brandywine, by the moft 
 judicious and fpkited manoeuvres, perfe6tly fui*- 
 xound and hem in, between the two columns of 
 bis own force and impaflfable waters, the whole 
 rebel army, vigoroudy attack, and fuddenly defeat 
 it i and yet, with an indolence not to be juftified, 
 he fuffered the defeated remains to lie a whole 
 night at Chefter, within eight miles of his camp, 
 fnd on the next morning to efcap unmolefted, . 
 
( 5 ) 
 
 We hflid feen him at Goflien a few days after, 
 when his enemy, vith his reduced force, had in- 
 cautiouily and foolifhly advanced near the van of 
 his army, after one of his columns had a^ually 
 *f engaged with the rebel advanced guard V* in* 
 timidated from his intended attack by a fall of 
 rain^ although that circumftance was much more 
 favourable to his own regular troops than to the 
 undifciplined troops of his enemy ; and although 
 4baf enemy bad a confiderable river in its rear* 
 
 We had feen him at Gertnantown fuflfer him- 
 felf to be furprifed, his advanced pofts defeated 
 and driven back upon the main body of his army, 
 and that army in imminent danger of a total roue 
 py an inferior undifcipUned enemy. 
 
 We had feen him, when the rebel force lay at 
 White Marih, and when he actually had the beft 
 information of its pofition and ftrength, march out 
 of his }ines under a pretence of intending to attack 
 it 5 and yet, after lying three days within two 
 miles of it, return, without attempting to bring it 
 to aflion, either by aflaulr, or turning its right 
 pank or rearj in either of which c^is he muft 
 have cut his enemy off from his magazines and 
 fupplies, and placed him in a fituation from 
 whence he could mt have efcaped without ruin. 
 
 We had alfo feen the General, after he had 
 proved his force in every aflion frpcriqr to that of 
 
 tm 
 
 * $ee Sir William Howe's Letter, 
 
 his 
 
 .-■■- 1: 
 
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 ( 6 ) . 
 
 his enemy, fuBer his whole army to be befieged in 
 Philadelphia, from the month of November to the 
 month of June, by a feeble, Jicklyy nakedy and half' 
 Jiarved arnyy of lefs than 4000 effetlive men *. - jk 
 But further.— We had feen the fame General, 
 with a vanity and prefumption unparalleled in 
 hiftory, after this indolence, after all thcfe wretched 
 blunders, accept, from a few of his officers, a 
 triumph more magnificent than would have be- 
 come the conqueror of America, without the con- 
 fent of his Sovereign, or approbation of his coun- 
 try ; and that at the time when the news of a war 
 with France had juft arrived, and in the very city, 
 the capital of North America, the late feat of the 
 Congrefs, which was in a few days to be delivered 
 up to that Congrels. ^;';v 
 
 n Such was the difgraceful condud, fuch the pre- 
 fumption of the General, and fuch were the mif- 
 fortunes which he had brought on his country ! 
 And yet, had he contented himfelf with the honours 
 he had received from this mockery of a triumph, 
 he might have pleafed himfelf with dreaming of 
 his triumphal arches, decorated with the mottos 
 of vidtory and the emblems of glory, and with 
 his Quixotic tilts and tournaments, and the 
 *' Letters to a Nobleman" would never have ap.- 
 peared. But when the Author faw the General 
 
 V 
 
 v"\ 
 
 • See a Letter in the Appendix, from a Committee to the 
 
 Prcfi ic: t of the C -ngrcfs. ... ' , ^ L * 
 
 I and 
 
and his Noble Brother, fupported by a dangeroui^ 
 fadion, purfuing meafures which he conceived 
 tended to involve his country in dlfgrace and ruin ^ 
 when he faw them, in order to conceal their own 
 mifcondudl, attempting to perfuade the great re- 
 prefentative body of the nation, that America was 
 <' the ftrongeft country in the world *," and im- 
 praflicable in war ; that the people were univtr- 
 fally didoyal} that the immenfe naval and mili- 
 tary force committed to their command was in- 
 competent to the reduction of the rebellion — in 
 order to prevail on the nation to give up the 
 greateft part of its dominions •, the duties of a ci- 
 tizen, a difmterefted regard for the welfare of his 
 country, and an honed indignation at fo flagitious 
 an attempt, called on him to lay before his fellow- 
 fubjefls a true ftate of the matters thus attempted 
 to be mifreprefented. Such were his motives, di- 
 vefted of every other confidcration ;. and he de- 
 clares, that the Letters were wrote without the 
 felicitation or knowledge of any perfon whatever 
 in the adminiftration of Government. 
 
 Had the General, by a true ftate of fails, and 
 by candid argument, free from perfonal abufe, 
 convinced me that I was wrong ; ever h-'ppy to 
 acquit injured innocence, there is no concelTion, 
 no aft of juftice, which iny honour would not in- 
 duce me to perform j but as the reverfe is the 
 
 «* 
 
 • See General Grey's EviJciice in the Narrative, p. 107, 
 
 cafe, 
 
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 i « ) 
 
 •■■■■'.»■ 
 
 tfitlfer'the fame motives which influenced nift td 
 write the Letters^ oblige me to vindicate the truths 
 they contain. 
 
 In my firft letter, " On the Strength and Prac* 
 ticability of the Middle Colonies in refped to mi* 
 litary Operations," in order to refute what the 
 General had attempted to prove, that this part of 
 America was the ** ftrongeft of all countries in the 
 •• world," I have given a true and candid dcfcrip- 
 tion of that country, fupported by the evidence of 
 General Robertfon, who had refided in it many 
 years, and which can be fupported by many gen- 
 tlemen, now in England, who have lived in it > 
 and I had further made a comparifon between it 
 and the fcene of adlion in the laft American war^ 
 fhewing that the latter was inHnitely more difficult 
 than the former. To evade the force of thefe 
 truths, the General obfcrves, 
 
 Narrative, p. 37.] " Tbaf the two laft warSi 
 ** with reJptUt to thefiate of the country of America i 
 •* are in no degree j nilar. In the lafl war^ the dif* 
 ** ficuUies arifingfrom the Jirength of the country i 
 «* were^ for the mofi party removed by the friendly 
 ** diffofition of the inhabit antSy who all exerted them- 
 •' felves to facilitate the operations of the King's 
 •* armyy and to fupply them with every neceffary and 
 •* accommodation^' ' 
 
 "What thefe " necefTaries and accommodations" 
 were, which were thus furnifhed in the laft war> 
 and which the General could not procure, is 
 
 not 
 
« <■/ 
 
 mmimi 
 
 ( ^ ) 
 
 hbt nitjntiohcd; That the inhabitants furnifhed 
 General Braddock in his expedition to the Ohio, 
 Colonel Bouquet in his expedition to Mufkingum, 
 far beyond the Ohio, and Sir JefFery Amherft in 
 his expedition to Montreal, with carriages and 
 provifions, is true — and with nothing elfe — They 
 wanted nothing elfe. But Sir William Howe did 
 not even want all thefe. — He tranfported carriages 
 with him from England, and whatever more he 
 wanted were procured on Long Ifland and Staten 
 Ifland. Large fleets of provifions were conftantly 
 fent to him ; and in every part of the country, 
 where his army marched^ he procured a fupply with- 
 out difficulty. At Bordentown, Captain Gamble 
 was forming a large magazine of provifions volun- 
 tarily, and with every apparent mark of zeal for the 
 fervice^ brought in by the inhabitants when Tren- 
 ton was taken -, and the whole army was fupplied, 
 during two months, in its march from the Elk to 
 Philadelphia, with more provifions than it could 
 confume : and there was nothing which the coun- 
 try produced, either of neccffaries or delicacies, 
 during the nine months it remained in Fhilaoel- 
 phia, with which it was not ftirnifhed by iho 
 inhabitants. 1 '. - ' ?' • 
 
 What then were the advantages which the Ge- 
 nerals in the laft war poflefTed, that were not to 
 be commanded in the prefcnt? There were none. 
 But they had difadvantages and difficulties, infi- 
 niteJy greater to encounter, which their gallantry 
 'ir, " C cafily 
 
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 ( 10 ) 
 
 eafily overcame. The General's operations weritf 
 carried on in the Middle Colonies, where every 
 neceflfary was eafily obtained •, but the expedkion 
 of Sir Jefftry Amherft led him to pafs from Al* 
 banyy by Lake Ontario, to Montreal, near 30Q 
 miles, carrying his prOviAons either through a wil'> 
 dernefs or an enemy's country, over lakes, moun* 
 tains, and fwamps ; and the operations of General 
 Forbes and Colonel Bouquet led them through a 
 wildernefs inhabited only by Indians, where no 
 [ingle article of provifions of any kind was to be 
 procured j the firft to Fort du Quefnc, and the 
 other far beyond it, down to Mufkingum; and 
 yet wc have found that thefe gallant men, in whoTe 
 hearts the honour of their Sovereign and the fer* 
 vice of their country were deeply imprdTed, were 
 not obilruAed or intimidated in the path to glory 
 andfuccels by thefc difficulties, : i ^i^^mxtn^' sa-i 
 To refute my affertion, that ** the flrength and 
 " impfadicability of the Middle Colonics is loft in 
 " idea, when "we compare them with the fcene of 
 « adion in the laft war," the General adduces the 
 teftimony of Major-general Grey, who fays, uiii . 
 ■ Page :^8."| " That pari of America where I have 
 *' been, is the Jlrangejl country I have ever been in i it 
 « is every where hilly and covered with wood, 
 " interfeSled by ravines, and creeks, and narfliy 
 *< grounds; and in eveut (^yARTER of a mils is 
 •* a pofi fitted for ambuscade." And in hisanfwerto 
 another queftion, he adds, ** That America is, of 
 
 : " "all 
 
 i.JJM^..^. ±JL. 
 
** all countries, the beft cdcuiatcd for the defen- 
 ** five i every b«fidre4 yards might be difputcd j at 
 •» Icaft that part of it which I have feen." 
 
 This is a formidable defcription of the Middle 
 Colonies, and well calculated to furnifh the reader 
 with apologies for the want of fucccfs in the Ame- 
 rican war : but it is truly vifionary. What coun- 
 tries the Major-general alludes to, I know not ; 
 j^nd yet to prove that he is mistaken in his 
 fafts, will be no arduous taik. He has feen the 
 plains on Long Ifland, of thirty miles in length, 
 and from feven to twelve in breadth, which 
 are without wood, or a (iiigle obftrudlion that 
 can give one enemy the advantage over ano- 
 ther. He has alfo fccii the country between 
 New -York and Trenton, and between the head 
 of Elk and Philadelphia, in which there is not a 
 hill but what may be either afcended without dif- 
 ficulty, or avoided by an army in its march. And 
 when thefe hills are compared with thofe of this 
 country, they are by no means fo high, fo fteep, 
 or fo difficult of accefs ; but wh<^n we compare 
 them with the country from Albany to MontreaJ, 
 and with Cc^gocheague Ridge, Sideling Hill, 
 Ray's Hill, the Allegheny and Laurel ridge of 
 mountains, which may be ju^ftly ftylcd the Ameri- 
 can Alps, they are iiecle more than mole- hills ; 
 and yet thefe mountains, though full of ravines 
 9nd dangerous defiles, and although covered with 
 
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 wood, 
 
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 wood, and poffeffed by an encrtiy whofe talent in 
 war is ambufcade, did not intimidate the bravery, 
 nor obflrud the nr.arch, of an Amherft, a Forbes, 
 or a Bouquet j they faw them with contempt, and 
 paflTed them in defpite of their oppofing enemy, v 
 f Jf the country which the General has feen is 
 every where covered with woodt where dp thofe im- 
 menfe quantities of wheat, rye, barley, Indian 
 corn, oats, and buck-wheat, which furnilh the 
 inhabitants with food, and are exported to Eu- 
 rope, find room to grow ? Is it pofTible that a 
 country, fettled one hundred years, and having fo 
 many hundred thoufands of induftrious inhabitants 
 in it, can in any degree bear this defcription, and 
 remain to this day a wildernefs ? I imagine not. 
 The real truth is, that the provinces of New Jer- 
 fey and Pennfylvania, where the late operations 
 were carried on, are fettled, and full of planta- 
 tions, and at leaft two-thirds, and in many places 
 five-fixth parts of it cleared of wood j and the 
 wood confifts of large trees, (landing at confider- 
 able dif.ances, free from underwood, and eafily 
 fcoured with cannon. As to the " ravines," they 
 muft be in proportion to the hills which I have 
 defcribed. The " creeks," or rivulets, are all 
 fordable, or may be paflcd by marching a few 
 miles round •, and there are no " marflies" or fenny 
 grounds within the country. This ground, when 
 cleared, is meadow, and of fix times the value pf 
 '.mif" ■ ■ ' \. ' ''''" ' upland^ 
 
) ! 
 
 •• - J. .■ 
 
 rr- 
 
 :w 
 
 upland, and therefore the firft .inproved. Thefe 
 are all fa£ls, well known to the people of that 
 country, and which can be proved by many gen- 
 tlemen now in London. How then can it be pof- 
 fible that this country can be, what the General has 
 attempted to prove in the Houfe of Commons, 
 f the ftrongeft country in the world ?" • « - -^ 
 '" *' IJhall now proceed, fays the General, with my 
 remarks J page by page.** As I have no particular 
 obje(5lion to this method, I will do my felf the ho- 
 nour of ftriclly attending him. -r- '^' V^- - 
 ' In page 3, of the Letters, I have ajjerted, " That 
 •• in this country we have lately fcen two armies, 
 ?* one meditating its conqued, the other its de- 
 *« fence. We have fcen the Britifli army pene- 
 " trating into its heart, a circuit of near two hun- 
 *? drcd miles, from Long Ifland, by the fFJbite 
 " Plains, to Trenton, and from the Elk Ferry to 
 Philadelphia, in defiance of the utmoji efforts of 
 an enemy perfeftly acquainted with every ad- 
 vantageous fpot of ground i and we have feen 
 that army taking, with eafe and little lofs, every 
 ftrong poft poflcfled by the enemy, vjho have 
 " fled at its approach,** ^ " " ^'"'*". ""' ' 
 Page 39.] " This defcription^* fays the Gene- 
 ral, " is introduced to prove that the country is not 
 
 " VERY STRONG NOR IMPRACTICABLE i hut it Ortly 
 
 5* proves, that the Generals and officers, commanding 
 
 5* the fever al corps ^ were indefatigable in their duty, 
 
 • 2 <' and 
 
 cc 
 
 (( 
 
 (C 
 
 (C 
 
 cc 
 
■91 
 
 Si; 
 
 il 
 
 ""^ 
 
 ( H ) 
 ** and fwrwHfttntid all the iifficitltits which they mti 
 y 'Soitb in thcfe marches " ^ rf.rvrt^ ,• 
 
 - I have nev«r enquired, nor am I now enquiring 
 into the condud of the officers of ^e army j nor 
 " have I ever had any rcafon to do fo. /Whenever led 
 on to a€lionf their condu^ has (hewn that they were 
 actuated by honour, and a k>ve of their country *, 
 and I therefore acknowledge, that they were indefa- 
 tigable (that }&, not fatigued) in cheir duty, ^hen* 
 ever called to it; becaufe I am confident that 
 many, if not all, wo^ld have furmounted difficul- 
 ties tenfold as great as any of thoTe to which they 
 were led, and not think it ti fatigue. In the whole 
 tenor of my Letters, I have only cenfured the in- 
 dolence and mifconduifl of their Leader •, my cen» 
 fures could not, in juftice, extend further. 
 
 Ibid.] *^ The Commander in Chiefs however, 
 " will he fuppofed to have had fome Jhare in the 
 " merit of thefe fuccejes" 
 
 He certainly had j I will not only fuppofe it, 
 but frankly corifefs it. Whenever the General 
 found himfelf either difpofed, or under a necejfity of 
 meditating a blow againft the enemy, he never 
 failed of fuccefs. At Long Idand and the White 
 plains, in the progrefs of the army to the Dela- 
 ware^ and at the Brandywine, he fucceeded as far 
 as he chofe : liad he preyed the advantages his 
 truly judicious manceuvres gave him, he might 
 have ended the rebellion. I have not cenfured 
 
 the 
 
( >5 ) 
 the General for want of ahtlities *, this is a failing 
 for which he ought not cp be ccnfured ; the blame 
 in that cafe would juftly fall on his employers. My 
 flrtdures are confined to his oon^^exertion of thofe 
 military abilities which were dcmonftrated in hts 
 manoeuvres on Long Ifland and the Brandywine, 
 and that undaunted courage which was fo appa- 
 rent in the aftion at Bunker's Hill. - t> , 
 
 Ibid.] " But it is no$ true tkat the enemy ahvayf 
 ** fled nt our appreachi nor that ute tfioJk all their 
 " firong pofts with e^fi mid Uttle kfs" 
 
 Here the General takf s advaot^e of the words 
 ^* always fled>" and, to Icrvc the purpofe of con- 
 tradifting me, applies theoi to all the condud of 
 the rebels in the general a^Vions. A fmall (hare of 
 candour, or a little attention to the paragraph he 
 cifies to make out this contradi^on, would have 
 taught him, that I did not alltide to the battles of 
 Long Ifland, Fort Walhingt0n> or Brandywine. 
 I had in the fame paragraph declared, " that the 
 *' Britilh army had penetrated from Long Ifland, 
 ** by the White Plains, to Trenton, in defiance of 
 ** the utmoft efforts of the enemy," including the 
 very inftances he mentions ; and therefore he might 
 have perceived, that the words " always fled'^ could 
 only refer to thole formidable unfortified " pofts^ 
 which are to be found " in every quarter of a mile^ 
 and even in *« every one hundred yards" in that 
 country, the beft of all other countries " calcu- 
 
 »t 
 
 »» 
 
\ 
 
 mmmmm 
 
 t i6 ) 
 
 ** iated for the defenjive** And here my cxptcf- 
 fion will be found ftriflly true ; for it is knowA 
 that the rebels fled at the approach of the Royal 
 army, at Newark, Brunfwick, Princeton, twice at 
 Trehtorti near Newport in Newcaftle county, and 
 at Gofhen in Pennfylvania * •, at feveral of which 
 places, had they been purfued by 5000 Britilb, 
 their army muft have been utterly ruined. » t »« 
 •-\ Ibid.] " Much might he /aid upon the Jiate 
 •' of loyalty in Jmerica^ Some are loyal froiH 
 ''principle, masy from intereft, many from refent- 
 •** menti and there are or heks who wijhfuccefs to 
 '*' Great Britain, from a recolleSiion of the happinefs 
 " they enjoyed under her government" 'p /s • ■ f ^ • : ' 
 "\i) -"While I cxprefs my furprife at, I cannot help 
 thanking the G<?neral for, this candid confeffion 
 refpedting the loyalty of the people of America. 
 It amounts to a full acknowledgment of all I have 
 contended for in the Letters refpedbing it. The 
 'force of the fafts I have alledgcd, has, I truft, ex- 
 torted it from him — but, I apprehend, unwarily ; 
 otherwife he would not have taken up near four 
 pages to difprove the fafls adduced in fupport tff 
 ■ a truth he fo fully confeflcs. The talk of recon- 
 ciling this confeflion to his attempt, in the Houfe 
 of Commonsj to prove that the " Americans were 
 «« almoft univerfally difloyal," I cheerfully leave 
 
 to thofe who will undertake it. ■^> " 
 j> * See the General's Leitcri. 
 
 
 ..-.••>'t 
 
 
 Ihad 
 
fl 
 
 ( 17 ) 
 
 I had faid in the Letters, that fome, who were 
 high in office in America, in order to juilify the 
 negleSi and inhuman treatment which his Majeftys 
 faithful fubjeSls bad received^ and to throw a veil 
 over that mifcondufb which had wafted, unnecer> 
 farily, many millions for the nation, facrificed its 
 true intereft, and loft its honour, were the inven- 
 tors of the report of the univerfal difloyalty of the 
 Americans. To this the General anfwers. 
 
 Page 39.] " I am at a lofs to know what fpe* 
 *' cies of negleS and inhumanity is here meant i I 
 *' am contented that Jiriilures Jhould be made upon my 
 *' profeffional cSndu^t but I feel myfelf hurt as a man 
 •' when J am accufed of inhumanity *' ibjvv fV. r- 
 ' . Ever pleafed to do the General jufticc, I will 
 relieve his feelings as a man ; and I wifli I could 
 alfo relieve thofe which he muft experience as an 
 officer. There is nothing in my Letters which 
 charges him with doing perfonally a fingle aft of 
 inhumanity. My ftriftures were confined to hia 
 ** profeffional conduct •,** and the fublequent part 
 of my Letters explains what I mean by the inhu- 
 man treatment which his Majefty's faithful fub- 
 je£ts h^d received ; and, as he has mifunderftood 
 me, I will again explain it. The inhuman treat- 
 ment alluded to, was the indifcriminate plunder 
 fuffercd to be committed, by the foldiery under 
 his command, on Staten Ifland, Long Ifland, the 
 White Plains, and in the province of New Jerfey, 
 where friend and foe, loyalift and rebel, met with 
 y ■ ^ D the 
 
V 
 
 ( 18 ) 
 
 the fame fate ; a feries of continued plunder, Which 
 was a difgracc to an army pretending todifcipUne, 
 and which, while it tended tc relax the difcipHne 
 of the- troops, could not fail to create the greateii 
 averHon, even in the bread of loyalty itfcif, to a 
 fervice which, under the fair pretence of giving 
 them protf ^ion, robbed them, in many inftances, 
 -of even the neceflaries of life. • 
 
 In vain, I imagine, will the General plead, be- 
 fore the candour and huttianity of the public, his 
 orders and proclamations i^rbidding plunder. 
 4^aws, without execution, are but a dead letter ; 
 and his orders and proclamations, Ux often re- 
 peated, without punilhing the atrocious offenders; 
 were confidered as blank paper y and the plunder- 
 ing continued' as much after as before they were 
 iflued, until he pafled into Pennfylvaoia, where, 
 having made an example or two of the delinqueats, 
 the plunder in a great meafure ceaied. Had this 
 mifchief been nipped in the bud by a few exam- 
 ple^, whijch might have been eafily done in an 
 army io perfcflly flibmiffive; ta discipline in every 
 other refpedt as the Britifh was, the relaxa- 
 tion in difcipline which k>ft Trenton, the im- 
 prelTions made on the minds of the Loyalifts, to 
 the prejudice ofthe King's fervice, atid thedifgrace 
 that was brought on the honour, juftice,'and hu- 
 manity of Britain, could not have taken place. - ^ 
 . To vindicate himfelf againft this vifionary charge 
 of perfonal inhumanity, he tells us, page 40, of 
 :' 6 '■'*■' his 
 
I I 
 
 his great humanity and bdievolencc to the people 
 of Bofton, and that " it is upon record (Pr^clama- 
 *f tion i'itb 05loher, 177SJ, that their firvices ijoere 
 *' cottrtedi by recommending a defenfive affiociation ; 
 *^ and that arms were offered to all who would declare 
 ** thev^felves willing to contribute their affiance in 
 *J the preferuation of good order and government 
 'f within the town of Boflon," ■ ■;•* rv';: - 
 .^rWhat his .behaviour was to tne-people of Bof- 
 tOHi they can bed inform the public ; the taflc I 
 have alUjnied* Is, only to enquire into his condu£b 
 in the. Middle Colonies. , Why, then, not tell us 
 oi Iwr> wife and prqdenf conduct there? Was 
 it beeaUfe he i% confc^ous that it was not fo 
 wife and prudent in the Middle Colonies as at' 
 Boftjon ?, If this fcnfe of the matter did notprevail 
 W'ih him, it W4s irppolitii; to mention this procla- 
 itiation'T becaufe it only informs us, that he knew 
 lyhat ought to be done, and did it not. To draw 
 afliftance to tlie Britilh force, wherever he ope« 
 rated,' was moft certainly his duty. If the Loy- 
 alifts in BoHon were to be trutled, when alToci- 
 atcd, with arms, men of the fame principles were 
 to be eq^tally trufted in the p/ovinces of New 
 York, New Jerfey, and Pennfylvania, where they 
 were more numerous. Why then was there not a 
 like proclamation iflued in any of thcfe provinces ? 
 Had this been done, the falutary effeds are obvir 
 ous, from an indubitable fad. Since his refigna- 
 tion, upwards of 5000 Loyalifts are embodied in 
 
 D 2 arms 
 
 '1^ 
 
I 
 
 ( 20 ) 
 
 arras for the defence of New York. Had this 
 been done, it would have enabled Sir H. Clinton 
 to have ledj inftead of between two and three, at 
 leaft 8000 men, in a diverfion jn favour of thje 
 Northern army, and <aved jti for Sir Henry 
 did not leave more regulars, than the number of 
 Loyalifts, thus embodied, for the defence of New 
 York, when he pafTeicI up the North river, and 
 found himfelf too weak to proceed. Had this 
 been done, he might, if he did not choof|; to fup- 
 port the Northern army, have taken at leaift 5000 
 men more wir.h him to Pennfylvania ; a number 
 equal to Wafhington*^ whole force, the greater 
 part of the lime the two afmies were ja that pro- 
 vince. 
 
 And had the like proclamatiofi been iiTued ifi 
 New T^rfiy, when the General was at Trenton, 
 and had driven Wa(hington*s enfeebled arn.y, of 
 3006 men, and all the officers of the rebel State, 
 o\it of the province ) and when the General him- 
 felf incautiouQy confefles, ** that his fuccefles had 
 " intimidated the leaders of the rebellion, and 
 ** nearly induced a general fubmiffion *," all thofe 
 men in New Jerfey, who were loyal " from prirt- 
 " ciple, from intereft, from refentment, anc from 
 •< a rccolledlion of the happinefs they enjoyed 
 " under the Britifli government," would have 
 alTociaced in arms> and formed a folid barrier of 
 
 ^ Narrative, p. 40. 
 
 defence 
 
 \ 
 
 'Y 
 
( ax ) 
 
 defence agairift every attempt of the rebels, except 
 that of Walhington-s army.tj;u;.i ; ijuu t<?^i^,ii:. 
 ^v And had the General iflfMed the like proclam^* 
 tion, when in Philadelphia, he would have ob- 
 tained a militia of 3500 men. Had he invited the 
 people in the peninfula between the Delaware an4 
 Cheiapeak, to afTociatey and aflfifl: him in arms; 
 and had he, as he was requeued, landed a few 
 men to fppport them, and to furnifli them with 
 arms and ammunition ; the 2000 Loyaliftsj whq 
 had aiTociated, in lefs than three days, in tjiree of 
 the thirteen counties only, would have been im- 
 . icdiateiy in arms on the part of Great-Britain | 
 and no man, who is acquainted with the general 
 loyalty of the people of that country, can doubt, 
 but that their numbers would have increafed, in a 
 month, to 6000, if not 8000 men. Nothing could 
 have been wanting to have carried this meafure 
 into complete efFedb, and to have reduced this pe- 
 ninfula to the peace of the Crown, but a fmall 
 poft at Wilmington, to cover that country; be* 
 Caufe, while that polV remained, Walhington could 
 not, with any degree of prudeh^?, truft his army, 
 or any part of it, in that peninfula. This would 
 have bejn a fnare into which the Britilh Genera^ 
 ought to have led him, ?.nd out of which he could 
 not have extric3«-ed himfelf : he would in that cafe 
 have been between the aiTociated Loyalifts and the 
 poft at V/ilmingtofi, where the Britifti army might 
 liave been tranfported by water in one, or have 
 
 marched 
 
\ 
 
 ( »* )" 
 
 murchird by land in two days, from Philadelphia. 
 All thefe truths mud, upon a flight View of the 
 chart of that coantry, ftrike the military eye with 
 inftantaneoiis convi^ion } and yet that invitatioil< 
 and encouragement which he boafts of having 
 publifhed at Bofton, was in this country Ihame- 
 fully negfcded, :>.'j5 /JUisolis; 01 ,i/-TOriSd J 
 
 V;The General acknowledges, that he fdund m 
 Philadelphia 44.82 * male inhabitants capable of 
 bearing ' arms;- Of this number there were noe 
 fifty who had taken any part againft the Britifh 
 government; the reit, being about one eleventh 
 part of the inhabitants^ had fled ; kfs than 1000 
 were Quakers : fo that, had the General purfucd 
 the' fame wife meafure in Philadelphia^ which he 
 did at Bofton, a^nd which General Knyphaufen 
 afterwards purfued at New York •, had he fuffer- 
 ed the people to have chofen their own ofHcers, 
 and' embodied themfelves for the defence of the 
 city; a militia of 3500 men, befides the nume- 
 rous refugees who attended him, would have 
 formed an armed force, which, with a few vefTels 
 of war, and 1000 regular troops, would have 
 been a fofficient defence for that city againft any 
 force of the enemy, except Wafhington's army. 
 This would have enabled him to have marched 
 out with his whole force againft Wafhington, 
 while he remained from December to the middle 
 
 • Narrative, p. 54* 
 
 of 
 
( 23 ) 
 of June with his reduced, fickly, and hdf-ftarved 
 army at the Valley Forge, where that army might 
 have been attacked in their weak intrenc^nttents, 
 or furrounded and befieged, and reduced by fa- 
 mine in one week at f)irthe(b, and an end have 
 been put to the rebellion; ;%Jf-'t ;rt)iii uyrJvA v'fiij 
 
 Page 41 is employed in entertaining the reader 
 with the profufe UheraUty of the General towards 
 Mr, Galloway, and with fame ohlique general charges^ 
 Jlri king at his popularity and integrity, li J'.oinoi c 
 
 iWhat either that Gentleman's populavitj^ or in« 
 tegrity has to do with Sir William Howe?» mili- 
 tary conduft, the reader will be pilzzlcd to difeern. 
 I dial! not therefore, in this Reply^ undertake a 
 vindication of Mr. Galfoway's perfonal charadter. 
 But, at the fame time, I cannot help obferving, that 
 general charges againft either a public or private 
 character are ti'ttle better thkn afTafTi nations in th^ 
 dark, againd which the- nioft perfect innocence 
 has no chance of guarding itfelf. The charged 
 againft the General in my Letters are io parti- 
 cular, fpecific, and defined, that he might, if 
 he could, vindicate himfdf againft them. But W\i 
 honour, i: feems, has not led him to deal thus ho^ 
 nourably by Mr. Galloway. ^i»i ,rn!.' • ; 
 
 In order to prove that many of the Pennfylva- 
 nians were attached to the Bfitiih government; 
 
 • Sec a Letter from a Committee to the Prefidfnt of Con- 
 grcft, in the Appendix., ;,,;,. ;.^ \.^w<^y^\^ \ .r,v v ■ 
 
 ■■■:, "• I have 
 
V. 
 
 
 Ml 
 
 III 
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 i havtf afferted, that during our pofleflion of Phi- 
 ladelphia, the people of the country, at the rifquc 
 of their lives, had fupplied the Britifli army, 
 -navy, and inhabitants, amounting to not lefs than 
 50,000 perfon^, with all kinds of provifions, while 
 they refufed thefe fupplies to the ^bel General. 
 Thefe fadts Sir William Howe doei not venture 
 to deny. I thought^ and fiill think, they fully 
 fupport the matter I wiihed to prove. In fo grtat 
 a conteft, in the event of which the feelings, the 
 intereft, and happinefs of mankind were fo deeply 
 involved, and their pafl^ons fo violently engaged, 
 neutrality of fentiment or attachment is unprece- 
 dented—is impoinble. Men's opinions and wilhes 
 will become fixed in favour of one fide or the 
 other \ and I concluded, how reafonably the 
 Reader will determine, that thofe men who vo- 
 luntarily fupplied Walhington's army againft thei;' 
 Sovereign, were rebels i and ihat tho(e who, every 
 mile they paiTed, rifqued their lives, and yet at that 
 rifque fupplied the King's troops with provifions, 
 from five to an hundred miles diftance, were 
 friends and faithful fubjeds. But it feems the 
 
 General is of a different opinion. Hear his 
 
 arguments. ■ '. .v.v. >•!■, vViM 7f' vlrV/.r'-. , 
 „ Pilge 42.] " That the people of thi country 
 «* brought infrejb provifions to us, and refufed fuib 
 '* ftipplits> tis much as they dared, to the rebel 
 " General, is certain. But I do not admit, that 
 this conduct proceeded from the motives afcribed 
 
 h 
 
 (( 
 
 (C 
 
«c 
 
 cc 
 
 ( ^5 ) 
 ** i>y the /ittthor. The people of the country had itb 
 *' opinion of the value of Congrefs money. They 
 ** knew they Jhould receive mojlly hard money in 
 ** payment % and they had an oppottitnity of carrying 
 •• back with them a variety of necejfary articles,^^ 
 The/e, I apprehend, were the real motives of all 
 that kind of fiffiftance which wt procured from the 
 
 *^ country people " 
 
 > What a horrid idea of human nature muft th6 
 General have entertained when he drew thcfe c6n- 
 clufions! Would not a little charity have convinced 
 him, that men who v<^erc loyal " from priJici'pli— 
 •• from refentment,— from a recolleftion df for- 
 •* mcr happinefs," and whofe anions ftri^tly 
 correfponded, were afluated by motives more 
 honourable and more virtuous, than that of ac- 
 quiring a little hard money and a few necefTaries ? 
 Can it be pdflTible that he could believe, that th^ 
 honour of "principle," the powerful impulfes of 
 juft refentment for injuries fuftained, and a lively 
 fenfe of formeir ** happincfs," of which they had 
 been wantonly deprived, were all effaced by fuch 
 paltry and tranfitory confiderations ? Did he pafs 
 this fevcre, this cruel judgment on the faithful 
 fubjefts of his Sovereign, and the tried friends of 
 his country, by his own feelings — the tell: of his 
 owii adtions? Were the Loyalifts, whom the 
 General, after all the affiftance they had given 
 to him, has thus ungratefully traduced, to re- 
 taliate, with how much more reiiron might they 
 
 E fay, 
 
* \ 
 
 I 
 
 •c 
 
 C( 
 
 «c 
 
 ( 26 > 
 
 fay, That he had facriBced his military fame, his* 
 duty to his Sovereign and his fellow- fubjedls, and 
 the interen: and fafecy of his country, to the dirty 
 purpofcs of a fa<5lion, whofe whole conduct is 
 founded on private interefl and ambition I 
 
 Page 43.] " The Author fays, they did this at 
 •' THE RISQUE OF THEIR LIVES. There wos ift 
 
 fatl THAT APPEARANCE! but I always sus« 
 
 p EOT ED that General Wajhingtotty through policy, 
 
 comUved at this kind of commerce** 
 
 The argument here refts upon the feeble fup- 
 port of the General's " fufpicion," while he ac- 
 knowledges that *' appearance" was againil that 
 fufpicion. If appearance was againil it, upon 
 what was his fufpicion founded ? It could not 
 be upon fadts } for in that cafe his opinion could 
 not reft in fufpicion. In truth, the fa(fls were all 
 £ gainft it : For what could induce Wafhington to 
 keep diflferent pods l^o^unding the Britifh lines, 
 and conllanc patrol^, ^equently coming within 
 fight of them, but to prevent a fupply of provi- 
 fions ? Thefe patroles put to death, without he- 
 fitation, feveral pcrfons, for no other offence than 
 that of fuppl^ing the BritiQi troops. Some were 
 tried by a court-martial, and received two hun- 
 dred laflies; and others were branded by a hot 
 iron in the hand, with G H, and fcnt into the 
 Briti(l\ lines, as a mark of contempt of the Bri- 
 tiflj General. And yet all this is not fufficient to 
 remove his " fufpicions" of the difloyalty of thefe 
 
 faithf^l 
 
i V ) 
 
 faithful people, nor to irtduce him to believe that 
 his enemy, who was beficging him, intended to 
 deprive him of the means of fubfifting his troops. 
 Ibid.] " Tbg General is ai a lofs to tiiiderjiand 
 what I mem by many tboufands of Loyalijls con- 
 cealing themfehes in diJUnt provinces, and taking 
 refuge among the favngcs^ to avoid entering into the 
 
 «( 
 
 (( 
 
 ct 
 
 <( 
 
 war. 
 
 >i 
 
 I did not mean, as he fufpeifls, " the infurgents 
 ** of Carolina i" and if I had, I (hould have thought 
 that a General who had commanded his Majefty's 
 army, might have found a word more defcrip- 
 tive of a number of Loyalifts who had taken up 
 arms under the authority of his Majefty's Gover- 
 nor, to fupport his government, than the word 
 infurgent. However, the men alluded to were 
 thofe who, when draughted from the militia of the 
 rebel States, rather than ferve in their army, fled 
 the provinces from whence they were draughted, 
 into others where they were not known. Many 
 took refuge among the Indians, and have fince 
 joined Colonel Butler and Captain Brant, and are 
 now ferving againft the rebels. This was a com- 
 mon praftice ; and it was partly owing to this 
 praftice that Wafliington*s continental army has 
 been fofmall ever fince their defeat on Long Ifland, 
 as not to amount, at any ope time, to more thaa 
 tPjOQOJPcn, 
 
 . .A k' »- ' » I. <. w ' 
 
 
 >i» 
 
 E 2 
 
 To 
 
( 28 ) 
 
 -Tp my aflertion, " That many thouiands cam» 
 *♦ over to the Britilh troops for protC(5lion," the 
 General anfwers, , >. .,.:.;..*».,,. 
 
 Ibid.] ** / at^eu 4hat at no time did men in 
 ** nuinhers come over to the Briti/k troops" .- ^ *> 
 
 Here he does not venture to deny the fa£b alf 
 ledged, yet he manifeftly intends to miflead the 
 reader. And to do this, he is obliged to add the 
 words, " at no time," and *' in numbers.'* Thus 
 he artfully attempts to avoid a fa6^ which cannot 
 be denied* I did not afTert, that thoufands came 
 over *' at one time," or " in numbers." The 
 General fyffercd, Wafhington to fuperintend his 
 lines at New York with fo much circumfpe^ion, 
 as not to fuffer the Loyaliils to come in in num- 
 bers } and when he went to Pennfylvania, the 
 people vy^re ordered, by his declaration, to " rc- 
 •' main peaceably at their ufual places of abode." 
 
 But had the fadl been denied, it could be fup- 
 ported by the number of refugees, perfecuted on 
 account of their loyalty, who came from time to 
 time into Philadelphia and New York, many of 
 whom are at this time enibgdied in corps in 
 his Majefty*s fer . ice. And it appears from the 
 teftimony of Lord Cornwallis (p. 68.), that, while 
 the Britifh army was at Trenton and Bordentown^ 
 ^ three or four hundred of the inhabitants** 
 came in every day for ten days (that is, while the 
 trqops ftaid therpj, and received cci'tificatcs foi^ 
 
If 
 
 i 29 ) ~ 
 fheir protedion ; and he might have faid wkk 
 truth, that before the taking of Trenton, not 
 llefs than feven thoufand had, in the fpace of tbreo 
 weeks only, received thoTe certificates. But thefe 
 certificates were of little ufe to the unhappy peov 
 pie i-— all who were in or near the Britifh lines 
 were plundered, and the faith of the General, 
 pledged to the people by his proclamation, was 
 iham<;fully violated. 
 
 Upon my alTertion, That " the foot and caval* 
 ** ry fent over to America, amounted to 52,815 1 
 *' and of that number 40,874 were under the 
 ^* command of Sir William Howe," the General 
 obferves. 
 
 Page 45.] '* The Author would here imprefi. tb$ 
 <' Reader with an opinion^ that, at the time o« 
 *' MY ARRIVAL AT Staten Island, my arw^ 
 ♦' amounted to 48,^874, and the rebel army to i8,ooot 
 •' militia included,^* 
 
 The conclufion here drawn from my worda, I 
 may venture to aflcrt, never was made by any 
 candid and fcnfible reader. The words are inde- 
 finite as to the time or times when the troops wcrd 
 fent^ and convey nothing more, than that all the 
 troops fent over amounted to. 52,815, o£ whicH 
 troops General Howe had 40,874 under, his com* 
 mand. But what could he do ? He could not 
 deny the fa<5t %. and it ^as too important an 
 evidence of his indolence and mifcondu^ to be 
 paJied over in fileoce \ and therefore he refolves 
 $ to 
 
V 
 
 ai 
 
 iv. 
 
 < 30 ) 
 to torture my general exprefllons to a particular 
 meaning, in order to divert the reader from rc- 
 flefting on the fuperiority of his force to that of 
 the rebels. Indeed, I have ofcen occafion to ad- 
 mire the like Ikill and ingenuity in the courfc of 
 his obfervations : for where he cannot fafely at- 
 tack in front, he fcldom fails to make ufe of ftra- 
 tagerp to get round his opponent. What pity it 
 is ! What millions would have been faved to the 
 nation, what heavy difaders to his country would 
 he have prevented, had he difcovered equal fkill, 
 or the like (Iratagem, in furrounding and attacking 
 his inferior and undifciplined enemy in America ! 
 The art here made ufe of will appear yet more 
 barefaced, when the reader is reminded, that in 
 the Appendix to my Letters, I ftate his numbers 
 in Auguft 1776, when he was at Staten Ifland, at 
 pot more than 24,000 men. But he contends, 
 that I have exaggerated his numbers ; for that 
 when he landed from Staten Ifland on Long Ifland, 
 he had only " 20,121 rank and file, of which 1677 
 •' were fick." To diminilh his real force, he here 
 gives us only the rank and Hie, omitting the nu- 
 merous officers, from himfelf down to a drummer, 
 which generally amount, in every corps, to near 
 one fixth part of the whole. I am not a military 
 man*, my defign was to lay before my country 
 his real force, that they might form a juft judg- 
 ment of his conduft. I have not therefore wrote 
 in a tpilit^ry dialeift s and if I had, few of my 
 
 readers 
 
 m.. 
 
J 
 
 my 
 ders 
 
 ( SI ) 
 readers would have underftood me-, and couW * 
 ] believe that I had mifreprcfented his real force 
 in any one inftance, through the want of that 
 knowledge, it would give me pain. But this I 
 have not done. His own returns laid before the 
 Houfe of Commons, in the laft year, will prove, 
 that he had at Staten Ifland 24,464 cfiFedtives, 
 rank and tile, and tit for duty *, and, in the whole> 
 26,980, officers not included, who, when added, 
 will amount to 31,625. 
 
 Jbid.'\ He finds much fault with my eftimatc 
 of his real numbers •, and adds, ^^ If I were to 
 «* fol^w the Author* s mode of computation^ when he 
 *' fiates the number of men under my command^ I 
 " ft)ould fay^ and from better authority^ that Gene- 
 " ral Wafhington had under his command in May 
 " 1776, in the fever al provinces, an army of 80,000 
 •« men \* and he refers to a return of the rebel 
 ftrength in May 1776, printed at New York. 
 
 Th(; General does not lay any flrefs on this 
 Iham return. He knew its fallacy : It was a re- 
 turn of men raifed, and intended to be raifed, 
 and which were never raifed, calculated to give' 
 him a formidable idea of the rebel force; and 
 being ridiculous in itfelf, it is produced to render 
 my eftimate of his own force ridiculous and falfe.. 
 But to expofe his evation of what he does not 
 venture to deny, I will give the reader his real 
 numbers from his own returns. The firft column 
 Ihall contain the total effedtives rank and tile -, the 
 
 fccond. 
 
( 3i ) 
 icCond, the total army, officers included ; th^ 
 third, that of the American army *, that every 
 unprejudiced and impartial reader may compare 
 the Britifh force with that of the rebels. For, 
 after all our inquiries into the minute tranfac* 
 tions of any military command, the (irfl: queftion 
 of a man of fenfe will be. What was the refpec- 
 ti'ire force and dilcipline of the two contending 
 j^rmies? 
 
 1776. 
 
 Toul Effeaivej, Total Army, Total 
 
 Rank and File. Officers included. Rebel Forcci 
 
 Aug. 9. 
 Nov. 22. 
 
 Dec* 
 
 1777- 
 July 17. 
 
 24,247 
 26,980 
 
 30,049 
 
 29,308 
 3^*755 
 
 35»^\7 
 
 18,000 • 
 4,000 
 
 3»30o t 
 8j00o 
 
 Such vfSLi the ftate of the force under Sir William 
 Howe's immediate command, exclufivc! of the 
 garrifon at Rhode Ifland, which added, amouAts, 
 in the whole, to 40^874; and fuch the numbers 
 
 * General Robertfon (ays, in^ hi« £xami.ii):ioii» the rebel 
 force was only i6,coo. 
 
 f See the General's Narrative, p. 8. Wafliington atbcked 
 Colonel Rhal with his whole force, except Cadwallader's bri- 
 gldo, which did not confift of ;oo men ; and thofe were pre- 
 vented, by the ice, from crofling the Delaware, and attacking 
 Bordentown^ at which place Colonel Donop had left only 8o- 
 grenadiers. At this time the remains of Lee'» corps had joined 
 Walbiogtoo, who before had not 2800 men. 
 
 * of 
 
 '5 
 
•^■'» 
 
 ( 33 ) 
 of his inferior, and truly contemptible, cnerny, 
 notwithftanding, as the General confVfles, " evc- 
 " ry compiilibry means *" was made ute of to 
 increafe them •, and yet he fuffcrcd that enemy, 
 lying in an unfortified poft, within twenty miles 
 of his quarter?, to harafs and diftrcfs his troops from 
 January to July, without taking a fingle Hep to 
 diflodge them. 
 
 The fame unjuilifiable indolence and mifcon- 
 du6t attended his proceedings while in Philadel- 
 phia. Here the General lay in his quarters all 
 the winter and fpring, until the month of June ; 
 contenting himfelf with fending out occafional 
 parties to cover the loyalifts, who were continually 
 feeding the officers of his army with all the deli- 
 cacies and luxuries which the country afforded. 
 To fupport this charge, nothing more will be ne- 
 ceflary, than to lay before the public a few fafts 
 notorious in America, and to many gentlemen now 
 in England. 
 
 Although the General, in page 6o, aflerts, that 
 his whole force at Philadelphia was no more than 
 1:^,799, rank and file, it does appear, by his own. 
 returns, that he had, on the 3d of Odlober, after 
 the battle of Brandywine, 15,898 cfFcdives, rank 
 and file ; total, rank and file, 17,752 •, and, when 
 the officers are added, 20,680. With this force. 
 
 • See his Letter to Lord George Germain, February iz, 
 1777. See alfo his Letter, March 5, 1778. 
 
 F a few 
 
p^p^^l^ 
 
 N 
 
 ( 34 ) 
 a few men loft in the battle of Germantown eyc^ 
 Ceptcd, he went into winter quarters in Phila- 
 delphia, where he fays it was " well accommo- 
 •» dated." 
 
 ' Wafhington, with about 9000 men, took up 
 his quarters at the Valley Forge, within twenty 
 miles of Philadelphia. Having no houfes for 
 his troops, he was obliged to build uncomfortable 
 huts with round logs, tilled in with clay, and 
 covered with loofe ftraw and dirt, in fuch a man- 
 ner as not to fecure them from the weather. This 
 fituation the General, in his letter of the 5th of 
 March, defcribes in thefe words : *' The rebel 
 ^' army continues in the fame fituation as when I 
 " had laft the honour of writing to your Lordfhip, 
 '* huticd at Valley Forge, where their men fuffer 
 ** exceedingly from tlie very inclement weather, which 
 " has induced numbers to defert." The camp- 
 ^iforder raged among hi-> men, which obliged him 
 to eftdblifli no lefs than eleven hofpitals; and 
 many died, many deferted to their feveral pro- 
 vince^, and near 3000 of them came ov-f to the 
 Briti% army. From thefe circumftances, his 
 army was reduced, before the month of March, 
 to lefs than 4000 men •, and by far the greater 
 part of thefe were in a manner naked ; many 
 without flioes or (lockings, and but few, except 
 the Virginians, with the necefiary clothing *. 
 
 • Mr. Gallowaj's Examination, p. 2j, 28, 29, 30. 
 
 Hii 
 
His 
 
 ( 35 ) ' , 
 
 Mis horfes were in a condition yet worfe j they 
 were conftantly cxpofcd to (howers of rain, and 
 falls of fnow, both day and night ; many of them 
 died ; the reft were fo emaciated as to be unfit for 
 labour j and, in addition to this diftrcfsful fitua- 
 tion, Walhington had not in his c;',mp, at any one 
 time, one wcek*s provifions either for man or horfe, 
 and fometimes his men werj totally dcftitute*. 
 
 Wafliington's camp was by no means difficult 
 of accefs i far lefs fo than the pcfts occupied by 
 him at the Brandywine ; and in one part of the 
 front the afcent was fcarcely perceptible, and his 
 rear was commanded by higher ground. His 
 ditches were not three feet in depth ; nor was there 
 a drummer in the Britifh army, who could not, with 
 the utmoft eafe, leap over them ; and his defences 
 might '. ave been battered down with fix-pounders. 
 
 Th's is not an exaggerated pifture of the rebel 
 army, nor of the weaknefs of its fituation. A 
 brief account of it I have given in my Letters, 
 page 87, which the General, in his Defence, has 
 not dsnied j indeed, he has thought it prudent to 
 take r.o notice of it, any more than of many of 
 the moft important charges contained in thofe 
 Letters, Upon rhefe fads 1 leave the candour 
 of the public to find. If it can be found, a reafon 
 why the General did not attack, or furround, and 
 
 • See a Letter, in the Appendix, from a Committee of Con- 
 grefs Appointed to enc^iiire into the Stale of . Wa(hington*« 
 army. 
 
 F 2 tak« 
 
\ 
 
 IE 
 
 I 
 
 1 1 
 
 m ! 
 
 'I 
 
 1 ' 
 
 ( 36 ) 
 
 take by Hege, Wafhington*s whole army. His 
 numbers were greater than thole of the rebels, whoi 
 furronnded and took a Britilh army, under Ge- 
 neral Burgoyne, of 4003 veteran troops, in i^ 
 fituation not fo dillrefsful as that of Walhing- 
 ton. 
 
 Numerous are the inftances in which the Gene- 
 ral has perverted my meaning to his own purpofes. 
 1 have charged him with " declining to truft the 
 **. faithful and loyal fubjcds with arms, or to make 
 " ufe of the well affc^ed force in the Colonies^ to 
 ** cjftjl him in reducing^ or iv defending ajter reduced^ 
 *' either cities or provinces, ""^ In this charge I al- 
 luded to his declining to embody the Loyaliits, 
 a' a militia, in New York, New Jerfey, ard 
 Philadelphia. In New York, the militia, which 
 he declined to embody, amounts to 5C00 men. In 
 New Jcrfcy, upwards of fifty of the firll men in 
 the county of Monmouth, &c. car.ie in to offer, 
 their Jcrvice in difarming thedifalTcdled, and to re- 
 ftore the province to the peace of the Crown \ but 
 thty could not procure accels to the General, al- 
 thoiiL'li tlieir wilhes were communicated to his Aicl 
 de Cainp. They returned to their relpedive fa- 
 milies, cha<.i;rintd and difeulled at the hauteur of 
 the (jcneral j lome of them, notwithllanding, are 
 now at New York, under the protediun of the 
 Bririlh army, having abandoned their property, 
 hazarded their livc=s, and facriiiced the happinefs 
 of thtir families. At Philadelphia, at leall :^,5oo 
 
 faiilitul 
 
 
( 37 ) 
 
 t 
 
 faithful militia might have been embodied in arm^ 
 for the cicfence of that city, while the army ope- 
 ratcu againft Wafliington j and had the General 
 at the fame time cordially inviped the Loyalifts to 
 take up arms, as a militia, in their fevcral coun- 
 ties, under gentlemen in whom they had a confi- 
 dence, for the particular purpolcs oi fcizing on 
 and difarming the difaffcded try Government, and 
 defending their fevcral dillrids, the whole pro- 
 vince of Pennfylvania, and theextenfive peninfula 
 h ''^^ vould have been rcllorcd to the peace of 
 the Crown before the end of the campaign. 
 
 To parry this charge, the General aiTerts, page 
 g6, " Many of my proclamations contained invifa- 
 f* tions to arms, and promifes of large encourage- 
 " ment.** Where thefe proclamations are to be 
 found, he has not told us i they never were pub- 
 liflied in Pcnnfylvania, New York, or New Jer- 
 fey i and 1 verily believe they never were v^^ritten. 
 The proclam'ition iflued in 1776, in New Jeriey, 
 contained nrrl.ing more than a promile of pardon 
 and proteft: c thofe who fliould come in and 
 take the oaths 1 allfgi;ince ; that at the head of 
 Elk retted only in promihng the people protedion 
 from the " depredations of his army.*' and callmg 
 on the difaffedcd ** to remain peaceably at their 
 " ulual places of abode." The General lurely 
 cannot here mean the *' many proclamations" iflued 
 within hii i les, inviting the people to enlift in the 
 regular Irru-.inciai fervice ? This cannot be j bc- 
 
 S caufe, 
 
, " ( 38 ) 
 
 caufe, to ufc his own word?, it would be ** a quib- 
 " ble which would never have entered into the 
 •* head of an Engliih" nor of an American 
 ** lawyer," **•■' -"-i ••'-" v--«^ j ■- ii-'.' j<. h ;'■.(•-»■> .'-u >, . 
 
 Before I leave the lad- mentioned proclamation, 
 I cannor, in juftice to the charader of Mr. Gallo- 
 way, avoid taking fome notice of a paragraph in 
 
 Page c^X).] '* As ♦■his declaration was calculated 
 «* for the meridian Oi ' '. fylvania, of the people 
 <' of which province fv.. Galloway profeHed an 
 *' intimate knowledge, / confulied him pevioujly 
 ** upon it; I framed it agreeably to his ideas ^ 
 ^* when written, it had h\s full approval ion.'* i 
 ' . Here, I hope, the General's memory has totally 
 failed him. The fafts relating to this tranfadlion 
 arc truly thefe. While the fleet lay at the Hook, on 
 its way to the Chcfapeak, s^nd not before. Captain 
 Montrefor brought this declaration, in manufcript, 
 from the General, to Mr. Galloway, with a requeft 
 that he v;ould confider it. Upon the firft view, a 
 number of objedions arofe ; he immediately com- 
 mitted them to paper, fupported with his reafons. 
 Thefe he returned, with the declaration, to Cap- 
 tain Montrefor, to be carried back to the Gene- 
 ral. Upon Captain Montrelbr's return, Mr. Gal- 
 loway alked, what the General iaid to his objec- 
 tions. The anfwer was, that tlicy were not ad- 
 mitted i for the declarations had been already printed 
 ^ffatNewTork, 
 
 This 
 
• C 39 ) 
 
 ;' This is the whole truth, and nothing but the 
 l.uth. Captain Montrefor, and two other gen- 
 tlemen, were privy to this tranfadion, whofe ho- 
 nour, I have no doubt, will lead them to confirm 
 it. On this paragraph I fhall leave the reader to 
 make his own comment, v.ith only obferving, that 
 the General, in every inftance where he has taken 
 cccafion to mention Mr. Gallowaj *s condudl and 
 opinions, has been guilty of what charity would 
 lead mc to hope are only failures of memory. 
 
 The General labours hard, in his Narrative, to 
 vindicate his conduft in not fupporting the North- 
 ern army. Nor ought we to be furprifed at it, as 
 it was a neglc<5t which ftrikes the mind on the firft 
 refleftion •, a blunder to which we owe all our pre- 
 fent misfortunes. His arguments may be com- 
 prifed under three heads, ift, That he had no 
 cxprefs orders to fupport it ; 2d, That he had not 
 force fufficient ; and, 3d, That his Southern expe- 
 dition was approved of by the Secretary of State. 
 
 In reply to the firft argument, fliould we agree 
 to what he afferts, that the cxprefs orders to lup- 
 port the Northern army were never received, yet 
 wc know that a letter from Lord George Germain, 
 of the 3d of March, 1777, came to his hands on 
 the 8th of May *. That in this letter he is in- 
 formed, it was his Majefty*s opinion, that " a warm 
 
 i 
 
 * Sec Letter of this date in the Parliamentary Rcgiftcr, 17-9. 
 
 ** diverfio^ 
 
 
riiii 
 
 t 40 ) 
 
 " divcrfion (hoiild be made on the coafts of the 
 •* Maflachufets j" and that the " benefits" which 
 " muft inevitably refult" from it, are pointed 
 our, viz. " That it will not only tend much to 
 " impede the levies'* for the Continental army, 
 but to the fecurity of our trade, and would " keep 
 " the rebels at homc^^ for the internal defence of 
 their own refpeSlive difiridls. A more wife, or a 
 more neceflary diverfion, to fave the Northern 
 army, could not have been devifcd ; and had it 
 been performed at the time General Burgoyne 
 paflcd from Ticondeioga towards Albany, it muft 
 have produced the effc(5ls his Majcfty w / prc- 
 di(fled. Levies never were, nor can be L.ade, in 
 the fcene and buftle of war •, and men will not 
 leave the defence of their fire- fides, their prin- 
 cipal Tea ports, and mod valuable cities, to fight 
 in a different province, and in diftant woods, where 
 there is nothing to defend. 
 
 This diverfion, therefore, had it betfi made, 
 muft either have drawn General Gates, with his 
 whole army, to the defence of the capital cities 
 on the fea coaft, or at leaft have detained at home 
 more than one half of thofe men, which, by this 
 negle<5l, were enabled to join his army j and in 
 that cafe the Northern army could not have failed 
 of overcoming, with eafc, every pofllble difficulty. 
 
 But I will fuppofe that no fuch diverfion had 
 been dire6led. The General could not but know, 
 that the objed: of the two armies was the fame, 
 
 and 
 
( 41 ) 
 
 and that it was the immediate bufinefs of both to 
 form a jundlion. Was it not then his duty to 
 fee fo large and important a reinforcement in a 
 ftate of fafety, at leaft, before he carried his army 
 to a pl^""; which deprived him of the power to 
 fupport it? However, it feems, notwithftanding 
 his Majefty's dircdlions, and the weighty im- 
 portance of the meafure, that the General and his 
 Noble Brother " confulted upon the expediency of 
 " the diverfion *," yet neither made it, nor took 
 any meafures to fupport the Northern expedition V 
 in confequence of which, a Britifh army palTud 
 under the yoke of rebellion. A" 
 
 I have hitherto reafoned upon a fuppoHtion, that; 
 the General had no exprefs orders to co-operate 
 with, and join the Northern army •, and I truft, the 
 arguments I have advanced are fufHcient to prove, 
 that, in not doing ft, he a£ted contrary to his ma- 
 nifed duty. But, to ftrip him even of the fhadow 
 of an excufe, I will prove that he had thofe orders, 
 or what fully amounted to them. 
 
 On the ajth of September, 1775, he received 
 his commiiTion of Commander in Chief f. On th6 
 9th of O(5bober he undertakes to propofe the plan 
 of his future operations j recommends the evacua- 
 tion of Bofton, and that a body of 12,000 men be 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 • Narrative, p. 12. , . - 
 
 f See his Letters to the Earl of Dartmouth, dated the jth 
 of November, and 9th of Odlober, 1775. 
 
 G employed 
 
 ■i 
 
>^ 
 
 y. 
 
 ' ! 
 
 ( 42 ) 
 
 cnripl./cd " from New York, to open the cpmmu* 
 •* mcation with Canada in the Jirjl injiance" and 
 that an army of Canadians and Indians from Ca* 
 nada (hould meet him ; and, that ** the accom* 
 " plifhment of the primary objeft for opening the 
 •* communication, being obtained by the two at" 
 •• mies^ thefe corps might take fcparate routes 
 *• into the province of Maflachufet*s Bay." And 
 in his letter of the 2d of April, 1777, he points 
 out " the advantages that might arife by fecuring 
 " Albany and the adjacent country^* - ?i'' * '-^^ '; «■ 
 *4Stri6lIy conformable to thefe ideas of the Gene- 
 ral, Government proceeded. His own army was re- 
 inforced with numbers fo great, that it llruck him 
 with utter amazement. Another army was formed^ 
 and ordered to proceed from Canada to join his 
 troops at Albany. On the 25th of March, the 
 Secretary of State tranfmitted to Sir Guy Carle- 
 ton, at Quebec, the plan of operations for both 
 armies \ in which he is ordered '* to detach Genc- 
 •« ral Burgoync," and to direft him, " fo dc- 
 •* tached, to proceed with all poflible expedition 
 •• to Albany^ and pit himfelf under the command of 
 «* Sir William Howe \* and further adds, " with 
 ** a view of quelling the rebellion as foon as pof- 
 " fiblc, it is become neceffary that the mo^fpeedy 
 ** junSlion of the two armies Jhould be effe£led" An 
 official copy of this letter was tranfmitted to Sir 
 "Willium Howe for his information and dircdion, 
 
 and 
 
^ ( 43 ) 
 
 and was received by him on the 5th of June, fix 
 weeks before he failed on his wild and unfortunate 
 expedition to theChefapeak. By thefe letters, the 
 following truths are in full evidence: That the 
 plan of the Northern operations was the General*s 
 own, and not the plan of Adminiftration : That 
 he received written orders to " cfifedt a fpeedy 
 '• jun«5lion" of the tvyo armies, and that that junc- 
 tion was to be made at Albany. This is fo plain, 
 that it would be an affront to the reader*s under- 
 Handing to fay more on the fubjeft. In vain will 
 the General plead, that he never received his or- 
 ders. For what end was the official copy of the 
 plan of operations fent to him ? Was it to anfwer 
 no purpofe ? Or was it to fignify his Majefly's 
 pleafure and orders refpeding thofe operations? 
 How idle ! how truly trifling, then, mufl this part 
 of his Defence appear, when the junSfion of the 
 two armies was not only conformable to his own 
 plan, but clearly pointed out by reafon, military 
 duty, and by his Majefty's orders ! 
 
 As to his fecond objedtion, that he had not force 
 fufficienr, 1 need only remind my reader, that the 
 General had under his command, on the 17th of 
 July 1777, as appears by his own returns, 40,874 
 men, officers included. His Southern army.con- 
 fifted of 20,680 ; the garrifon of Rhode IQand re- 
 quired only 2400, as he confclTes in his fecret 
 letter of the 2d April, 1777 » ^'^ remaining force 
 
 Q 2 was 
 
 ■ttv». 
 
\ 
 
 ' Mr 
 
 if' 
 11 1 
 
 ( 44 ) 
 •was 17,794. In the fame letter, he ftatcs as fuf- 
 ficicnt for the defence of New York and New York 
 Ifland 3200, of Paulus Hook 300, of Staten Ifland 
 I200i in the whole 4700. This number, deduced 
 out of 17,794, will leave 13,094, befides 3000 
 efFedives, of the provincial corps under General 
 Tryon. This will make the force under his com- 
 mand, cxclufive pf his Southern army, and his ne- 
 ceflary garrifons, 16,094. I will alio fuppofe, 
 which is a very extravagant fuppofition, that every 
 fixth man was an invalid, and it wil* leave 131412 
 effedives, whom he might have applied to the 
 fupport of the Northern army j but, not inclined 
 to fupport that army, he left ufelefs thoufands in 
 the garrifon of Rhode I^and, apd carried with 
 him, in his wild circuitous voyage to the Chef^- 
 peak, as many thopfands, equally unnecefTary ; 
 for there was not the moftdiftant profpedt that the 
 enemy could ever raife an army, equal, in effec- 
 tive force, to lOjPOo veteran troops. 1; ; r., ? , 
 ' But further. He acknowledges, page 61, that 
 he " left at New York about 8500 rank and file^ 
 *« fit for duty." I have (hewn, that he thought 
 4700 were competent to the defence of all his gar. 
 rifons -, why then did he not order the remaining 
 3S00 to make the diverfion on the coafts of New 
 England, as had been direded by his Majefty ? a 
 force abundantly more than fufHcient, if properly 
 conduifled, to have detained the whole militia of 
 that ecu- try in the defence of their capital towns 
 
 9 and 
 
( 45 ) 
 
 and valuable fea-ports, which muft have enabled 
 General Buigoyne to pafs without difficulty to 
 New York. 
 
 The third argument remains to be examined. 
 The General, in his Narrative, as well as in his 
 Obfervations, repeatedly declares that the Secretary 
 of State approved of his " expedition to Pennfyl- 
 ** vania." This aflertion is of the fame complex- 
 ion with that of Mr. Galloway's approving of a 
 proclamation, at a time he had never heard of it. 
 The fadls are : In his letter on the 20th of Janu- 
 ary, 1777, he propofes " to detach a corp only to 
 *' enter the Delaware by fea^ and the main body of 
 " the army to penetrate into Pennfylvania by way 
 ■* ^SJ^^hy'* T\iv& meafure was founded in the 
 founded policy, and juftified by common fenfej 
 becaufe, had it been purfued, Waftiington, having 
 at that time only 8oco men, muft hu "e fought, or 
 fled before him out of New Jerfey, over the De- 
 laware. Wafhington's fafety depended on his 
 taking this route \ his military ftores and provi- 
 fions were all on the other fide of the Delaware : 
 cut off from thefe eflentials of war, he muft have 
 given up the contcft. Walhington once defeated, 
 or driven over the Delaware, the province of New 
 Jerfey might have been immediately reftored to 
 the peace of the Crown. Philadelphia, altoge- 
 ther without defence by land, and very little better 
 by water, muft have immediately fallen. A gar- 
 rifon, more numerous than Wafhington's whole 
 .• • army, 
 
 \ J 
 
{ 46 ) 
 army, might have been left for its defence, and 
 10,000 men, at Icaft, fpared to operate up tho 
 North River, or on the New England coails, in fa-» 
 vour of the Northern army. All this might have 
 been ^iccomplilhcd with eafe by the latter end of 
 Auguft, altiiough the campaign was not opened 
 until the 12th of June^ but had the General 
 commenced the operations on the 12th of May, 
 the moft proper month in the whole year for 
 military operations in that part of America, it 
 might have been completed by the latter end of 
 July. This appearing evidently to he practi- 
 cable, with the force under the General's com- 
 mand, every candid and fenfible man mud ap- 
 plaud the council which induced his Majefty tq 
 approve of t^e plan for invading Pennfylvania, 
 *f by the way of Jerfey." .r ^- ., ;, 
 
 This approbation was communicated by Lord 
 George Germain, in his letter of the 3d of March •, 
 but before it could reach * the General, he had 
 altered this judicious plan for one truly ridiculous, 
 and ruinous not only to the Northern army, but his 
 own operations ; a plan wliich muft neccflarily have 
 been attended with a great wafte of time, immenfe 
 cxpencc, unneccffary rifque, and innumerable diffi- 
 culties. In his letter of the 2d of April, he informs 
 the Secretary of State, that, *' from the difficulties 
 f* and delay that would attend the pafilng the rivef 
 
 .'■'. 'Y. T 
 
 '(.* 
 
 Fie did not receive it till the 8th of May. 
 
 " Delaware, 
 
' • ( 47 ) 
 «• Delaware, by a march through Jcrfey, I propoffc 
 •* to invade Pcnnfylvania by fea ; and from this 
 *• arrangement wc muft probably abandon the Jcr- 
 •* fcys, which, hy ihe former plant viOxAdL nothwn 
 '* been the cafe." ti-'-^r ;> -< v -jr-'^n'*"' r^-^r ^ 
 / "Will the General affert, that the Miniftcr of 
 the American department ever approved of this 
 material, this mifchievous change, in his plan ? Did 
 he ever approve of his abandoning New Jerfey, 
 his embarking on (hip-board his whole army, and 
 fubjefting them to all the rifques and dangers of 
 the lea, without the leaft neceflity or reafon ? 
 Th'^ American Minifter is too wife, and too well 
 V i in military fcience, to have approved of 
 a ^i<tn pregnant with fuch folly and infatuation ; 
 if he did, the General is called on to produce 
 fome proofs of that approbation. 
 
 This being the truth, the General will labour 
 in vain to throw the blame of his own military 
 abfurditics upon the (houlders of others. The plan 
 was truly his own ; and it bears fo Jirong a re- 
 femblance of his other military operations, that 
 no one acquainted with them can poflibly doubt 
 it. For by this wretched projcdl the three ftrong 
 poRs of Brunfwick, Bonumtown, and Am boy, 
 which had been fortified at an immenfe national 
 expence, were to be given up ; the province of 
 New Jerfey, which had been fo lately reduced, 
 was to be abandoned to an enemy confiding of 
 Icfs than one third of his own numbers ; and a 
 
 Britifh 
 
( 48 ) 
 Brltifli army, both cavalry and foot, ^as to bt 
 embarked ui the hot holds of (hips, in the hotteft 
 months of the year, to pafs into a yet more fouth- 
 ern and (ickly climate, and chat too at a feafon 
 wlien contrary winds never yet failed to prevail. 
 All thefe difficulties, tOj^ether with the dangers 
 and rifqucs of the ocean, were to be encountered 
 in preference to a march oi fifty-eight miles through 
 a fine open country, interfcdled by a variety of 
 roads, and ftored with every neceffary for the ac- 
 commodation of an army. ?: . t foj;4^^ , jc^« ; , 
 •^ * But it feems, " the difficulties and delays that 
 «* would attend the pafTage of the Delaware, and 
 " the want of fufficient me?ns to pafs fo large a 
 «* river *," were the obftruiflions to his firft plan. 
 What will the rfcader fay, when he is informed, 
 that this fo large^ and fo much dreaded, river is 
 ever, in the months of June, July, and Auguft, 
 fordable in a variety of places, between Trenton 
 and Coryel's Ferry, on the different roads to Phi- 
 ladelphia? and yet, if it was not fo, that it is 
 not, in many places, 300 yards wide; that the 
 ground on the Jerfey fide commands, in many parts, 
 that on the Pcnnfylvania fide, fo that our army 
 might have been perfeccir covered by cannon in its 
 palTage ; and that the General had prepared more 
 boats and pontoons, which he carried with him 
 to Brunfwick, than were neccflary for that pur- 
 
 . <^-i ■ .i' 
 
 • Narratiye, p, 16, 
 
 ..i ::'■ - 
 
 pofc. 
 
'( 49 ) 
 
 jpbf^. Thus cifcum^anccd, aiid thus prepared, 
 what would aA Amher((, a Wolfe^ or a Bouc][uer; 
 have thought of di^cultics fo truly infigniBcant ! 
 As i have now before me Sir William Howe's 
 general plans of operation, I cannot avoid taking 
 notice of his change of opinion. As foon as he 
 Was appoinr d, his plan " was to open a conimuni- 
 " cation with Canada, in the firft ihftance *." Soon 
 after, with much good fenfej he refolves lb profe- 
 cute the advantages he had gained in New Jerfcy, 
 and to go to Philadelphia by landf. This refolu- 
 lion fuddenly changes for a worfe, to go Iry fee J, 
 We next fee him alter this refolutiori for one infi- 
 nitely worfe ilill, and to be equalled by none, fave 
 that of going to Philadelphia by way of the Weft 
 Indies j for he refolves to go to Philadelphia, by 
 " taking the courfc of the Chefapeak;" And even in 
 this fourth refolution he does not coilt'inie long, 
 br*- changes it for his third, and again de:ermines 
 to go up *' the Delaware ;** and that for a very good 
 reafon) " in order to be nearer New York ||." 
 And yet, after all this confufion in opinion, we 
 have Isen his moft judicious plan, approved of 
 
 * Sfee his Letter of the 9th of 0£^ober, ijr;;. 
 - + See his Letter of the 20th of J. hiiary, i777' 
 
 { See his Letter of the 2d of April, 1777. 
 
 \ In the laft paragraph of his Letter, of 16th JuV* 17779 h? 
 fays, *' I prooofe going up the Delaware* in or*' »■ to bn nearer 
 •• tbh place (Sqw York) than I Ihould be by taking the couifj 
 ** of Chefapeak Bay, lubicb I once inttfidtJ, and freftrrtd t9 
 •• that efthe Delaware:" 
 
 H by 
 
I 
 
 
 \ 
 
 II 
 
 
 5P 
 
 ) 
 
 by his Majefty, fct afide j and another, founded 
 folely on his own wild ideas, unapproved of by, 
 and uncommunicated and unknown to, any but hi^ 
 Noble Brother and himfelf, and which involved the 
 operations of the campaign in confufion and ruin, 
 ultimately profecuted. He led his army, '.cpntrary 
 to his own declared opinion, that he. .ought to be 
 " near New York,** round Cape Charles, and 
 wafted the l^^ft feafon for military operations, from 
 June to September, encountering difficulties and 
 dangers, which the plan approved of by his Ma- 
 jefty muft infallibly have avoided. Such was 
 the icrange and fatal verfatility of the General's 
 
 councils and condud | .^4 ^, i...,; ^!j:,^v->)^!0 •/ >'*-^' 
 , It would be endlefs to take notice of all the mif- 
 (latt'd and miftaken fadts, and the many difinge- 
 nuoLis arguments, adduced by the General in his 
 Vindication. I fliall, therefore, in future, con- 
 tent myfclf with giving brief anfwers to many of 
 them, dwelling only on the grofier blunders in his 
 condudl. :V "" ■, ■ , ;■ : ^ ' ; ,., 
 He takes much pains to vindicate himfelf againft 
 the charge of not opening the campaign before 
 the motith of June. He begins with contradid- 
 ing my afiertion, in the Letters, that the rebel 
 kvies never cold join the army before that 
 month i and avf . that their levies '•' joined early 
 " in the fpring." Now this was not the fact ; 
 and it will be cal'y to convince the reader of its im- 
 pofTibility. The rebel army confided of more 
 than three- fourths Irifh and Scotch, and lefs than 
 
 il 
 
 one- 
 
— , ( 51 ) 
 
 one-fourth native Americans *. The firft gene- 
 rally came from the back parts of Pcnnfylvania, 
 Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina* 
 the fecond, principally from the difaffefled New 
 England colonies ; fo that at lead three-fourths of 
 the new levies had from two, to five and fevcn 
 hundred miles to march. The inclemency of the 
 feafon prevented them from fetting out from the 
 fouthward until the beginning of April, and later 
 from the northward ; and therefore they could not 
 join the army " early in the fpring f." The time of 
 their junflion, a fmall part from the Middle Colo- 
 nies excepted, was about the beginning of June ; 
 before which time, however reduced the number 
 of the enemy might be, the General would never 
 begin his principal operations. 
 
 But he fays, ** We had not forage in quarters % 
 nor could we have carried any quantities for efj'en- 
 tial fervice.** 
 
 " If he had not forage in quarters, on what did 
 his horfes fubfift ? they were always in high order. 
 In his campnl^n of 1777, he might have com- 
 manded . all that Long Ifland, Rhode Tfland, and 
 
 (( 
 
 « 
 
 • Mr. Galloway's Examination, p. 22. 
 ' + Jn his Letter of the igth of April, he fays, " Their force 
 " has been dinn'niftied, during the courfe of the winter, by dt- 
 *• ferticn, and by deiarhtucnts to the back fettlements }" but 
 he does not fay a word of ihcir receiving reinforcements, which 
 a Geneial, fo expert in apologies for his indolence, we may pre- 
 iiiiTir, would have done, had any joined the rebel army at that 
 lime. 
 
 H 2 Staten 
 
( 5« ) 
 Sxaten I(lan4 produced ; and in that of »7;8, ha4 
 he chofe to open it before, he refigned his com- 
 mand, all that the environs of Philadelphia af- 
 forded, which was immenfe. And could hp not 
 have cajfried a fortnight or three weeks forage, or 
 fufficient tp .enable him to have attacked his enemy^ 
 lying n6t more than a day*s ma^cf) from his quar- 
 ters ? He had horfes and carriages fufficient, and 
 might have had more. Sir Jeffcry Amherft car- 
 ried the provifions for his army from Lancafter tq 
 IVIontreal; General Forbes, from Lancaller tq 
 Fort Pitt i and Colonel Bouquet, from Lancaf- 
 ter, upwards pf three hundred miles, to Mulkin- 
 gum. Put ttfe true anfwer to all thele weak apo- 
 logies for his indolence, is, that the country was, 
 at all feafons of the year, plentifully ftored witl^ 
 dry forage •, and that a fuperior army n-ay procure 
 it, if the Commander of it choofcs, from the fame, 
 parts and places w^ere it is daily obtained by th& 
 inferiof i and more efpecially where the country is 
 generally difaffeifled to that inferior army : befidesjj 
 it is well known tp the people of that country, 
 that the green forage, with which it abounds, i^ 
 fufficiently grown to fupport cavalry, by the lat- 
 ter end of April. In a country thus poflTefled of 
 dry and green fprage, the Gpncral-s horfes could 
 have run no rifque. But there was a magnanimity 
 which dlfcQvercd itfelf in all his condud, anc| 
 which, if the real lovers of their country will not 
 commend, his friends, in the oppofuion to Go- 
 vernment, will fupport and applaud ! He fcorned 
 
( 5J ) 
 
 fo imitate the r^fit imfpeti^ofity tf mtn^ who, too 
 (deeply impreHed with the principles of honour* 
 gnd defire of fame, regard no difHculties ; he 
 therefore would never purfue the enemy whom h^ 
 had defeated, nor acrack him ^hep unprepared \ 
 no ' would he open the campaign until tht levies 
 pf his enemy were joined. 
 
 So much for the campaign in X777. He next 
 attempts to juftify his indolence in 1778. Here 
 he apprehends that ** he need not fay much in hi« 
 •' vindication, becaufe, very early in Aprils hercr 
 •f ceiv^ his OX^^^ f^ rffurn borne.** 
 
 Thp terms " very early** in April, arc founded 
 in mi(la|i:e. He did not receive a permifllon fron) 
 his Majefty to return, until the i4cb of that 
 month * } nor did he r^fign his command until the 
 24th of May, near fix weeks after. He conti- 
 nued, during that time, fhamefuUy inaflive in hit 
 winter quarters, notwithftanding, in the fame let-^ 
 ter which conveyed the leave tp refign, he was or- 
 dered by his Majefty, " whilft he continued in 
 ** command, to lay hold Qf every opportunity of 
 *' putting an end to the rebellion, by a due exer- 
 ** tion of the force under his orders." The only 
 movement of any confequcnce, during that fix 
 weeks, is not mentioned in his letters ; however, 
 as this exploit ought not to be concealed from 
 the public, l will relate it. , . < . 
 
 f See Parliamentary Rcgifler, 1779. 
 
 On 
 
f 
 
 '% 
 
 
 *■'■ bntfie i9thorMay, the Marquis dc ta Faycttr, 
 with the main force of Wafhrrtgton*s army, from 
 Valley Forge, crofled a bridge over the Schuylkill^ 
 and took poft at Norrington. Intelligence of this 
 movement was immediately communicated to the 
 General. Pretending to fliew a dcfire to dofome- 
 thing before his departure, he marched out with a 
 large part of his Pirmy, in two columns, as if he 
 really intended to attack the ehemy. The firft co- 
 lumn, unperceived and unliil^^eded, moved in a 
 circuit round the enemy's. pbft, and got perfeftly 
 in his rear, within fight of his corps, aAd confi- 
 dcrably nearer the bridge, over which only the 
 Marquis could pollibly return, while the other co- 
 lumn advanced towards the enemy's front. Thus 
 completely entrapped, the Marquis gave up all as 
 loft i he cxpeded his retreat would liave been in^ 
 ftantly cut off. Wafliington, dclpairing of the 
 fafety of the flower of his army, immediately pre- 
 pared to fly, with his remaining non efFedtives, 
 baggage, and artillery, to be drawn by a few 
 ftarvcd and, emaciated horfes, towards the Sufque- 
 hannah j and nothing was wanting but a fmall 
 ihare of military exertion, or» perhaps, inclina- 
 tion, to take or dcfl:roy the chief force of the rebel 
 army. But here again, as at Brunfwick, Tren- 
 ton, Hillfborough, Brandywine, and German 
 Town, the enemy was fuffcred to make a yet more 
 fortunate cfcape. The firft column, inftead of pulh- 
 ing towards the. bridge, in a good road leading to 
 
f BS ) 
 ic on the-right, ^n(Jf(<;Mtting o^',, f he 'enemy 'si'c* 
 tr^t, whijk^ci^eoiher.jhp^Id advance, .and attack 
 in<front,K|v/as mai;cb€c| to the lefcv i ii) a route more 
 didant from the bridge, and thu9,'inftead of in* 
 tercepting thertenemyt fell into iiis rear. The 
 GCher column, under the ipimcdiate command df 
 the, General himfelf, leifurely advanced ih front. 
 The paffage tO;tl;ie bridge was left open j and th« 
 Marquis, having recovered from his panic and 
 defpondency, made good his retreat, without lofs^ 
 and unmoleilcd, ■ , : 
 
 Th? words *>or</^rj io relimp are difingenuous, 
 an^ evafive of the fait. They convey the idea, 
 that tjlie General was removed from, his command 
 contrary to his wifli j when the truth is, that as 
 foon as he had ^Q^<s,a5'littUg9oii and as much 
 mif^hief.as pcfftbi€\ as fpon as he had deprefled 
 the (pirits of the i^o^y^alifts, by ;his inacccfllbility, 
 his injudicious appointments, his negledt of them 
 when rifing in arras, in jiis favour,, and the indif- 
 criminate plunder piade by his army j, as foon as 
 he had, revived, by his difgraceful attempts and re- 
 treats, that fpinit of, jeJxiliQn vyhich he had fo lately 
 dcprcfied j as. fpon as he had, by his njanifeft breach 
 of military duty and the explicit orders. of his So- 
 vereign, facrificcd a Britifh army j as foon as he 
 had overcome the hefitation and re{u<5tance of the 
 Houfe of Bourbon, and prevailed, on it, by the 
 indolence of his operations, openly and avowedly 
 to fupport the rebellion j 1 fay, as foon as he had, 
 I--;./;!'.;. with 
 
X 
 
 i i6 ) 
 
 Wkh att Jind addrefs, brought this loid of igftd-^ 
 ihiny on the Britifh arms, and thcfe accumulated 
 evils on hii touncry« and not beforej he petulantly 
 Infilled on hit refignatioh. '^■-»*» ->^ ■ ' ^-^ '«*^*i*' 
 '> The reafon afligned for his refignation is fo in^ 
 decent and groundlefs, that 1 will give it to thtf 
 reader in his own words. " From the uttlb 
 •* ATTENTION, my Lord, given to my recom* 
 ** mendations, fince the commencement of my 
 *< command^ I 'am led to hope that I may be re- 
 " licvcd from this very painful fervice^ wherein I 
 «• have not the good fortune to enjoy the neceflary 
 ** confidence and fupport of my fuperiors, but 
 «* which, I eoncludey will be extended to Sir Henry 
 Clinton, my prefumptive fuceejfor. By the return 
 of the packet, I humbly requcft I may have his 
 " Majcfty*s pcrmiflion to rcfign *." In what this 
 want of attention to his recommendations con* 
 filled, is not mentioned. If we look into the cor- 
 refpondence between the Secretary of State and the 
 General, we Ihall not find it there ; for in that it 
 will appear, that if the General recommended a 
 favourite to his Majelly, he was fure to receive 
 promotion ) and, to incite and oblige him, if ho-^ 
 nour conferred, and a fenfe bf gratitude could 
 oblige him, to do his duty, the order of Knight- 
 hood was beftowed by his Sovereign oh himfclf* 
 And when we confider bis wanton and extravagant 
 
 * See his Letter of the xSih of OAober, 1778, to Lord 
 George Germain. 
 
 8 demands 
 
 <c 
 
 C( 
 
( J57 ) 
 
 clemands for more force» with the exertions made 
 by.Go.yernmejit to gratify him, we IhaUfind, that 
 Im cprnplaint pf a. want ** of the confidence and 
 " fqppori of his fupcriors/* w^s (iiad? ^without the 
 lead fpundatipnj ^M r rf-?' t - - ,^ -- 
 . When the. meafures for reducing the revolted 
 Colonies were refolved on, and the General was 
 appoipted .tp the comtnand, fuch was the difpolif 
 tion of povernment to gratify .him in .whatever he 
 Ihould defire, that the Secretary of Sute declared, 
 5* the meaf»>re§ of .force^ fliould be the wifhes 
 •* pf the General." , '^he.iQeneral, who was then 
 in America, and had (he ilate of the rebellion be*> 
 fore him, was the bed ]\^^gc of the force which 
 wpu)d be competent; ^p its fuppreflion ; on his 
 judgment, therefore, Government relied, and, 
 inftead pf Hinting, furpaHed his wi(hes. In his 
 letter * to the Secretary pf State, after lono; and 
 mature deliberatioti, }ie only requires i9,ooo.men, 
 -yvhich, hefays, will be >'^radequaie to an aftivc 
 ♦* offenfive campaign on; fhe fide of New York 
 *' and Rhode Ifl^nd.** To combat this force, he 
 <* apprehended the rebels would not have lefs than 
 10,000 men on the fide of Rhode Ifland, and 
 20,000 men to a6t againll General Carleton on 
 •* one hand, and the New Yo^k corps on the 
 *' ot(ier." Inftead of 19,000 men, he was fur- 
 ni(hed with 31,476 j and although he expelled to 
 
 <c 
 
 C( 
 
 ♦ See his Letter of the 261b cf November, 1775. 
 
 1 meet 
 
\ 
 
 .111 
 
 ( 5» 1 
 
 thcet a force of 30,000 men, the whole rebel &tmf 
 did not amount to 18,000. With the force now 
 fent, and which amounted to 11,000 men more 
 than he required, the General appears to be more 
 than fatisBed, and declares his ** utter aftonifli* 
 f^ ment at the uncommon exertions" of Gorern- 
 ment I and yet, in his letter of the 25th of Sep- 
 tember, 1776, after he had defeated his enemy^ 
 and taken^ killed, aod difperfed more than half of 
 his force, he begins his extravagant requifitions *, 
 and, with a manifeft defign to diHrefs Govern- 
 i-nenr, he requires ** ten line of battle Ibips, with 
 •' a number of fupernumerary Teamen, for man* 
 f* ning boats.** Would any pcrfon fufpcdt, that, 
 Sic this time, the Admiral had 65 Hiips of war; 
 13 carrying from 50 to 70 guns, 28 frigates, and 
 34 (loops } and that the whole naval force of Ame- 
 rica was no more than three frigates and fix (loops 
 of war? To what ufe did the General mean to 
 apply the additional *• ten fhips of the line," which 
 could not be performed by the force already under 
 his Brother's command ? Was it to batter down 
 the fortiBcaticns of the rebel ports and harbours ^ 
 We know they had none. Was it to penetrate up 
 their Ihoal and narrow riversj when he had fo many 
 frigates, and (loops of war, only proper for that 
 iervice ? Did he want them to defeat the truly 
 contemptible naval force of the enemy, when the 
 Admiral had upwards of 60 vefTels of war under 
 his command? -^— -* - -- - •-- • 
 
 tTJ'iU : ■ i It 
 
ll 
 
 ( 59 ) 
 ^ It will be as impolTiblc for us to conceive t6 
 what ufc the General intended to apjjly the •* fii- 
 •• pcrniimerary feamien.'* His Noble Bl-dther had 
 not lefs than i2,oco mariners on board tht Ihip^ 
 of war and tranfports theil under his command^ 
 Surdy, out of fo great a number, men fufficient 
 might be fpared to man his boats, at any time, 
 and upon any occafion; and yet, notw'ithftanding 
 the unreafonablenefs of thefe demand^; more Ihips; 
 and of a better and more ufeful fize, thah waS 
 afked, were fent over, viz. ohe (hip of 44 guns; 
 10 of 32, one of 28', and ohe of 8 guns. 
 
 The' General, pigfe 41, acknowledges, that, 
 when Mr. Gallowpy catne over to the army, iri 
 December 1776 (which was on the firft day of that 
 month), " his great fuCceffes had intimidated thd 
 •* leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a 
 •* general fubmiflion." And ihdeed this confef^ 
 fion, however unwarily made, was (tridly true x 
 for further oppofition was univcrfally defpaired t. v' 
 by all America, except a few defperate meh in 
 Wafhihgton's army, and that army was reduced to 
 lefs thah 3500 men. And yet at that very period^ 
 viz. on tht 30th of November; he* makes an'iaddJ- 
 tiohat dehiand df 15,000 rank and file; ahd in his 
 letter of the 20th'of"Jahuary, this denTiand is in^^ 
 creafed to 20,000; and he declares^ that thi^ 
 
 * See h}» Letters of the 3clh of* November, 1776, and thf 
 29th of January, i777« 
 
 ' I z number 
 
I 
 
 < 60 ) 
 rXimber ** would by no means exceed his wants i 
 •• yet 15,000 will give us a fupcriority." .,. 
 
 :^The reader will be as much at a lofs to difco* 
 ver to what ufe the General would have applied 
 this additional 20,000 men, as he has been in re- 
 fpedt to the ten (hips of the line. Both of thefe 
 demands, when his force isconHdered, wiU'appear 
 equally extravagant and unn^ceflary. He had then, 
 as appears by his own returns, 31 9476 men, ofH' 
 cers included, and the whole Continental fotcedid 
 not amount to 3500 •, and yet, in compliance with 
 this extravagant and wanton requifition, fo far as 
 ic was poflTible to be complied with, 7800 troops 
 yrerc, with all expedition, fent over to him. 
 , f he General, U ffms, did not make this ex- 
 travagant demand without alligniug ? reafon for 
 '\t. Reafon^, or what he thought would carry the 
 weight pf reafons, were always at hand, when the 
 Minifter cou|d receive no ftate of fa^s but by the 
 packets under the General's command, and when 
 9II letters frbni America were liable to his. in- 
 fpeftion. Perhaps Government never committed 
 a greater miftake, than that of fuffering the line 
 of intelligence, from countries where its fervants 
 are employed, to be taken out of the hands of the 
 confidential officer. It enables its own fervants tQ 
 mifrepreCent the ftate of th^* country, the difpofi.- 
 tion of the people, the numbers of the enemy, 
 and to pvt what glofs they pleafc on their own 
 
 '.;>! 
 
 2 I 
 
 mifcondud 
 
 'A 
 
ih 
 
 <c 
 
 ( 6£ ) 
 
 mlfcondufb, without a polTibility of detr^ioni 
 iind from theie .nifreprcfentations it has often 
 happened, that men have met with applaufe, when, 
 in juftice, they (hould have received ^pndeoination 
 and difgrace. . • •».*:; 
 
 But the rcafons alTigned were groundlefs and 
 romantic. In his letter of the 12th of February, 
 he informed the Secretary of State, that *^ the re- 
 bels huve profpeds of bringing an army into the 
 field of more than 50,000 men. They are moft 
 ^* fanguine in their expedations, and, confcious 
 " that their whole (lake depends upon the fuccefs 
 ** of the next campaign, ufe every compulfory 
 ** means to thofe who do not enter voluntarily into 
 •* their fci vice " and yer, notwithftanding all 
 this fanguiiienefs of expedlation, and thcfe *' com- 
 ** pulfory means," we know, that, inftead of 
 •• more than 50,000 men," they were notable to 
 bring into the field, when the General met their 
 force at Hilliborough, more than 8000 ; and even 
 at the Brandy wine not more than 16,000, militia 
 included } after he had, contrary to all policy, 
 given them two months to recruit their feeble 
 army by every poffiblc exertion. 
 
 It thus appears, that if the reinforcement fenc 
 fell fhort of the force required by the General, the 
 cxpefled reinforcement of the rebels, which was 
 t^e reafon afllgned for that requifition, failed in a 
 rnvch greater proportion *, more than one- half of 
 |he force required was fent, and not more than 
 
 m 
 
 u^ 
 
 
 nv 
 
 one^ 
 
I 
 
 ( «» ) 
 
 tme^fifth of that of the rebels was r.iifed. The ac« 
 count of the force ftood thus in 1777: Britidi, 
 40,874 veteran troops i rebel regular army at 
 l^illiboroughv 8000 1 at Brandywine, 11^0001 
 and, in the fpring 1778, at the Valley Forge, not 
 4000 undifcipHnfld troops. With what juftke, 
 then, can the General complain of his want of 
 force, and how (hamelcfs and bare-f^ced is his ats- 
 tempt to throw the blame of his own mifcondud 
 onchac Adminiftration, which has, by fuch ** un» 
 ** common exertions,*' thus gratitied him in his 
 extravagant requifitions I ^* ''^'^' ^^'^'^ *' 
 
 ^ Pages from 50 to 59 are employed in attempt- 
 ing to prove that the people of America are almofi 
 nniverfaliy dijloyal^ and that he did every thing in k<is 
 p$wer to encourage them /# take up armSf without 
 fuccefj. - ^- ^^••■""^' •"" '-'" *■' 
 
 Here he aflcrts, that the " only attempt** madfc 
 by a body of men, to aflift in fupprcfling the 
 rebellion, was in North Carolina, in 1776. Did 
 the General iicver hear of two different bodifS, 
 who took arms in favour of Governmchti at dif- 
 ferent times, in the peninfula between the Dela- 
 ware and Chefapeak ? Did he never fee, or hear 
 of the proclamation ilRied by the Congrefs, rn 
 fupprels the n ? If he did not, all America faw it, 
 and the people of Britain may alfo fee it. Did \it 
 never hear* that, in fcvcral counties JOve AU 
 bany, the Loyalifts, being by far the greater num^ 
 bcr, prevented the difaffedcd from joining Gates, 
 ^ when 
 
•c 
 
 «t 
 
 <( 
 
 <i 
 
 ( 63 i 
 
 when going againft General Bwrgoync ? This wal 
 a fa£t known to thouiands within his own linet. 
 Did he never hear of the numerous offers made to 
 Mr. Galloway, while the General was at Philadel- 
 phia, by the gentlemen of many counties, to take 
 up arms, to difarm the difaffe^^ed, and to rellore 
 their refpcdivc diftrifts to the peace of the crown ? 
 He certainly did. 
 
 *• The people of Staten Ifland, he confcflcs, 
 (page 50) teftified their loyalty by ail the means 
 in their power j" and General Tryon, and fome 
 other gentlemen, " who had taken refuge on board 
 ihip, informed him of the loyal difpofition of 
 the people of New York and New J^rfey, &c.**^ 
 But it feems General Tryon, who had been many 
 years Governor of the province, and the other 
 gentlemen, who had lived long in New York, 
 were all miftakcn. 
 
 In order to account for the abfurdl / of his ex- 
 tenSve cantonments, he acknowledges, it was to 
 cover the county of Monmouth, in which there 
 are many loyal inhabitants" But here again the 
 General found himiclf niifinformed ; Governor 
 Tryon, and a number of other gentlemen of New 
 York, had before, as I have mentioned, deceived 
 him. And now General Skinner, whom ,he 
 warmly recommends to his Majefty*s favour, who 
 was the Attorney-gencral of the province, and 
 from whom he muft, or ought to have taken his 
 information rcfpc6ling the people cf Monmouth, 
 
 was 
 
 ('i 
 
 cr 
 
 •II 
 
 m 
 
 
( 64 ) 
 
 yifa^ alfo mlftaken. Thefe gentlemen, it (eems« 
 knew little about the dirpofuions of the people of 
 the country in which the moft of them were born^ 
 and in which they had lived from their infancy } 
 for, fays he, ** tnany, very tnafty of the. people of 
 " Monmouth were taken in arms againit us, with 
 ** my protections in their pockets." tiad the 
 General faid fome, and but few^ of the people of 
 New Jerfey had adled in this manner, he wQjiild 
 have been much nearer to the fadt. Among the 6000 
 people who came in and took the oaths, fome 
 were, in may be reafonably fuppofed, difaffefted ; 
 but even thefe, we ought to fuj^pofe, would have 
 kept their oaths, had not the proclamation beea 
 fhamefuUy violated on the part of the General. 
 The plunder was fo indifcriminate, and fo excefr 
 five, that men were robbed of their all ; and it 
 was thefe difafie6ted men, made defperate by the 
 breach of public faith, and injuries which they had 
 fuftained, who were taken in arms, with his pror 
 teftions in their pockets, and none others. Let 
 Britons, for a moment, fuppofe, that the military, 
 who were fent into the city of London to protcdt 
 their perfons and properties againft the vio!er> "re of 
 the late mob, inftead of affording them that pro- 
 teftion, had robbed their houfes, and polluted 
 their wives and daughters ; would they have tamely 
 fubmitted to fuch outrages ? Would their hearts 
 have felt no difpofition to oppofe fuch enornipus 
 wickednefs ? Their fenfibility will anfwer thefe 
 ' ' " queftions. 
 
( 6s ) 
 
 quellioni. Indeed it is impoflTible for language to 
 defcribethe mifchiefs and difgrace which the want 
 of difcipline in the BritiHi army, in this reTpe^^ 
 brought on the fervice -, and men who are ac« 
 quainted with it, are furprifed that it had not pro* 
 duced, what, from many circumftances, it is pro- 
 bable was intended, an univ^rfal revolt of aU the 
 Colonifts. -....^).\ ■- r-'- u --.- ^.^- ■■ 
 
 '^ As another inftance of the difloyalcy of the 
 Americans, the General fays, " Several corps were 
 *' oStred to be raifed, and were accepted, in the 
 •' winter 1776, to conHft of 6500 men-, but in 
 •* May 1778, the whole number amounted to only 
 *' 3609, including the brigades of Delancy and 
 *' Skbner ; a little more than half the promifed 
 " complement," The gentlemen who offered to 
 raife thefe corps, expected that the General would 
 haveopened the Beld for recruiting. When they look- 
 ed at his force, they faw it was pradlicable ; but 
 they were deceived by the indolence and mifcon- 
 dud of the General. Brigadier-general Skinner^s 
 brigade was to have been raifed in New Jerfey, 
 This province the General had lb amefully given up. 
 Brigud ier-f general Delancy*s corps was to have been 
 raifed in the province of New York, which heexpeft- 
 ed would have been open to his recruiting parties. 
 But the General contented himfelf with the poflcffion 
 of Long lfland,Staten Ifland, and the iQand of New 
 York; and, moreover, fuffered his enemy, who 
 had not 6000 effeflive men, to harafs and befiege 
 
 K him 
 
 1 .'■, 
 
 ^,v 
 
 •a 
 
 ;h 
 
 
 J ill 
 
 lU 
 
 ii I 
 
 if* 
 
 'I! 
 
rrmmmm 
 
 \f 
 
 'ii 
 
 ! 
 
 •»<* 
 
 66 ) 
 
 him in his quarters, during the whole recruiting 
 feafon. When bhefe fai^s are candidly confideredy 
 tog<rther with thefmail number of Americans within 
 the Britifh lines, the man of fenfe, who will refledb 
 how few men in a fociety are willing to fubjcfb 
 their perfons to the dangers of war, and to military 
 dil'cipline, will be furpriled at the numbers enlided 
 under fuch difadvantages, and within fo fmall a 
 compafs of territory \ and will confefs, that it is a 
 ftrong proof of the loyalty of the people, •a'^ff^s A 
 At Philadelphia, the General infinuates that he 
 had made the fame experiment on the loyalty of 
 the people. •* Mr. William Allen, a gentleman 
 •« who y/ as fuppo/ed to have great family influence 
 ** in that province} Mr. Chalmers, much rel'pedled 
 «• in the three lower counties on Delaware, and in 
 «» Maryland i Mr. Clifton, the chief of the Roman 
 *» Catholic perfuafion, of whom there were faid to 
 *< be many in Philadelphia, as well as in the rebel 
 <* army, ftrving againd their inclinations, were 
 *' appointed commandants of corps.*' And what 
 was the fuccefs of thefe efforts ? He tells us, ** they 
 * only amounted to 3oo men, including three 
 f< troops of light dragoons, con filling of 132 
 '* troopers." .i^!"'\j/k-.*^#'.-,^i'>,v.. .^,.' ■''-- ^:->^.'..'ifV-:.j ^.!/i'V. ., 
 
 . All this is plaufiblc in appearance, but fjilla- 
 cious in reality. It was the duty of the General 
 to enquire after popular charadlers. for thefe ap- 
 pointments i but he fought the mod unpopular, 
 ^r, Allen was a young gentl<fman, whofe family 
 
 influence 
 
 infd 
 
( ^1 ) 
 
 influence was confidcrable among the Rcjpublican 
 party, before they fubvertcd the proprietary gos- 
 vcrnment, and threatened to fcizc on the propri- 
 etary eftate i but, after thcfe circuniftanccs took 
 place, that influence was lo(l : he had been .ilfo a 
 colonel in the rebel fcrvice, in the Canada expedi- 
 tion. I do not mention thefe circumftances to 
 prejudice Mr. Allen, becaufc I now believe hlno, 
 from convidkion, to be a loyal fubjcdl \ but yet, 
 a chara(Sler thus circumlUnccd was not the per- 
 fon under whom the General could, in reafon, ex- 
 pert the Loyalifts would inlift. Mr. Chaliucrs, a 
 gentleman from Maryland, who came into the 
 Britilh army at Elk, though much refpe<fled in 
 Maryland, was unconnected, and without any in* 
 Duence, in Philadelphia. Colonel Clifton, if pof- 
 fible, had Icfs influence, except among the Ro- 
 man Catholics \ and of thcfe there were not 200 
 men capable of carrying a mufquet : befidcs, here, 
 as in New York, during the whole feafon for re- 
 cruiting, he fuffercd Wadiington's parties and de- 
 tachments to furround his lines, and render it im- 
 poffible to recruit in the country. Such were the 
 gentlemen appointed, and fuch the embarrafsmcnti 
 under which the recruiting fervice laboured in Phi- 
 ladelphia I and yet the General acknowledges, 
 that, during his (hort ftay in that city, where he 
 found only 448a males from 18 to 60 years of 
 age, of whom near 1000 were Qiiakcrs, he raifed 
 
 ,;,i\-/vt('f. Ui* t?..;. 
 
 K 2 
 
 974 
 
 m: »- 
 
 : 
 
 : ii 
 
 ■alili 
 
 W 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 
( 68 ) 
 974Tit}ktfndfile, and, oMcers included, u|)#jitdi 
 
 ^ The General fi^s nothing of Mr. 6a!l6#ay*6 
 troop of Philadelphia light dragoons ; it did not 
 fuit his purpofe. That very unpopular gentleman 
 oflfered to raife a regiment of hbrle, but he could 
 procure a warrant for raifmg a troop only. Thii 
 corps wa's expeditiouHy raifed^ in two months 
 they were complete, and fo well difciplined as to 
 be rcvrewed by the General, and greatly applauded 
 for their dilcipline. It is known in that country^ 
 ths^t his influence among the LoyaliiVs was fuch, 
 that he could have raifed a regiment in nearly tht 
 fame time, notwichdanding the embarrafTmentb 
 under which the recruiting fervice then laboured 
 But the General declined making ufe of Mr. GaU 
 loway*s influence in the recruiting fervice, and 
 preferred to it that of an unpopular country ta- 
 vern keeper, for whom he thought his fervants in 
 the kitchen the mod praper company. This man 
 received a warrant to raife a troop, and now mixes 
 with gentlemen of rank in the army. Such were 
 the jydicious appointments of the Commander in 
 Chief in Philadelphia ! .. Hj;^viJt^u.yi4. v,,^. 
 
 To the charge, that no ftep was taken by the 
 General to embody the friends of Government in 
 New Jerfey, who were anxious and defirous to be 
 employed in difarming the difaffeded, and in de- 
 fending the country when the army (hould proceed 
 |n its other necelTary operations, he anfwers. 
 
 Page 
 
( «9 ) 
 ^ Page 53.1 " / ntvtr heard of the amtitlif aufi 
 
 ** readinefs here fxpreffed,** ■'^•* -:* 
 
 ' If the General never heard of the anxiety and 
 ^adinefs here exprefled, k was beeaufe he Would 
 hot It is a fa6t which 1 have tnentiohed before* 
 and will here again repeat, that upwards of Rhy 
 gentlemen^ of well-known principle and untainted 
 loyalty, fome of them from the SJlcyal county of 
 JMmmouthy came into the lines of Trenton, with 
 defign to ofTer their ferrices in the b^fbre-mentionisd 
 meafures \ but the General was inaccelTible ( they 
 could not, after feverat days attendance, procure 
 tn audience. Some t>f then^ returned home, cha- 
 ^il'ined and difgufted, and others are now in New 
 York, taking refuge under the protedlion of the 
 King's forces. Bik if the General had really the 
 riedu6tion of the rebellion athekrt, why did he not 
 fet up the King*k fhihdard, and call oh the Loyal- 
 ids of that country to affif^ hm in arms? Why 
 did he reft on his proclamation, with promiAng 
 them protection, and then fufFering that promife to 
 be violated inthoufands of ihftances ? Did heexpedfc 
 that the Loyalifts would impertinently offer their 
 alTiftance to a General who would not deign to aflc 
 it, and who fuflfered his troops to plunder the in- 
 habitants, to a degree more exceflive than ever was 
 known, under a prudent General, in an eneray'i 
 country ? Did he believe, that, by fuch meafures, 
 he iho'uld attach even the well-difpofed to the caufe 
 he was chgaged in ? Did he imagine that it was 
 
 poffiblc 
 
 ii 
 
 M 
 
 m 
 
 \-\-\ 
 
! I 
 
 poffible to execute his trufl:, in reducing a country 
 ib extenfive, without making ufe of the well-af- 
 fe^ed force in it, and whrift he was purfuing the 
 moit e0edtuai meafures to turn that force againft 
 bimfelf ? If he did, he aded upon principles .con- 
 trad idled by common fenfe^ and the pradtice of all 
 other Generals who ever deferved the appiaufe 
 and rewards of their country. !i > -) «"— *» rr<t..,,^T 
 <^ In page 54, the General next attempts to prove 
 that the inhabitants of Philadelphia were not 
 **■ anxious to promote the King's feryice, even 
 5* withaut carrying arms.** ; .,,.. t. «...,-; 
 
 - He ielh us; thai labourers were wanted^ to con* 
 fru3 the redoubts at "Philadelphia ; and he applied to 
 ' Mr. Galloway tp procure them. He prefumes Mr, 
 Galloway exerted himfelfi and yet ^ .<* with all his 
 ^« affiduity, and, the means made ufe of by the chief 
 ** engineer" the whole number that could be pre- 
 vailed en to affijt him, amounted each day, upon an 
 peerage, to no more than between 70 and 80. 
 ) This tranfadtion, like every other mentioned in 
 his Defence, is grofsly mifreprefented. Mr. Gal- 
 loway was applied to, by the chief engineer, to 
 procure the labourers. Near one hundred were 
 immediately procured. The wages offered were 
 8 d. per diem, and a fait ration ; but for thefe the 
 men would not labour. The common wages in 
 the city were from 5 s. 6d. to 6 s. fterling per diem. 
 Beef was fold at 2s. 6 d. ^ 3 s. per pound ; mutton 
 at 2 s. « 2 s 6 d. cheefe at 3 s. and bread at a price 
 ;'. , equally 
 
 <c 
 
m 
 ;al- 
 
 to 
 fere 
 rcre 
 I the 
 in 
 iem, 
 
 ton 
 Irice 
 
 ally 
 
 ( 71 ) 
 
 ^ually high. The men had families to feed. 
 The General was foHcited to raife their wages, but 
 he obftinately and inhumanly refufed ; the men 
 dtfcrted their work, and the officers declared they 
 could not blame them. Very different was the 
 conduA of Lord Cornwallis, when he applied to 
 Mr. Galloway to repair the too long negledled 
 dykes of the Province Ifland,. Mr. Galloway rc- 
 colledting the former condud of the General, in- 
 formed his Lordfliip, that he could not undertake 
 the bufincfs, unlefs the men were to receive rca- 
 Ibnable wages ; and that he ihould afk no more 
 than he had given for the like work in time of 
 peace, although the price of labour was rifen nearly 
 two-thirds more. His Lordfhip replied, the work 
 muft be done, and, without hefitation, allented 
 to the propofal. Near fifty men were immediately 
 procured, at a Spanifli dollar j&sr <//>w, a fait ra- 
 tion, and a pint of rum •, the latter, becaulb they 
 were obliged to work in water. The bufinefs was 
 done in fix days, much to hik Lordfiiip's declared 
 fatisfadioni and then, and not till then, could 
 the chief engineer make any confiderable progrcfs 
 in ereding the main battery againft Mud Ifland 
 fort. ' 
 
 In pages 59, 60, the General endeavours to exte- 
 nuate the plunder^ and other enormities committed by 
 the foldiery in /America, He aJfertSy that ** there 
 " never was lefs plunder^ mr fewer enormitieSy com- 
 ** mitted by any army in the field j'* and intimates, 
 '■--^ that 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 ; 
 
 li; 
 
 ml 
 
 • ;'ii 
 
I f I 
 
 i 
 
 Er 
 
 ( 7* ) 
 
 tbat the nnofp^perf in jfmari<a» IHte tkofe of other 
 efMHtrieJt ^i tbi vehicles of inveMtiom and ialumtufft 
 upw which thefe enormities ure grounded* 
 % I finqerely w,i|b> for (he credit of human natuK* 
 as well as for %\it General's credit, ihat this repre- 
 ientation were ]u(l i bitt all* and more than I havie 
 i^idin my Ife^tecs to a Npbleman, refpe^ing in- 
 diTcriminate and ^xceilive plunder, is known to 
 thoufands within the ^ritidi lines, and to a nymbcr 
 of gentlemen now in England » and in refpe^ to 
 ihc rapes, the fa6b alledged does not depend on 
 the credit of newfpapers. A fol^mn enq»^' v v^as 
 made, and affifdavits takjen* by which it Appears 
 that no lefs (han twenty-thrt? were committed ip 
 one neighbourhood in New Jerfey % fome of them 
 on married women, in the prefence pf. their help- 
 Icfs hufbands ; and others on daughters, while the 
 unhappy parents, witji unavailing t^ars and cries, 
 could only deplore the favage brutality. Thefe 
 affidavits are on record in America } and printed 
 copies of them are now in London. Such were 
 them^afures purfued by the General, to reconcile 
 his Majefty's deluded fubjeifts to his government, 
 ^d to encourage the Loyalills to fuppprt the cavfe 
 of their Sovereign ! 
 
 In page 6i, the General adduces the evidence of 
 Major'gemral Grey^ to prove that the Chefapeak ex- 
 peStion^ occ^fioned ** a powerful diversion m 
 
 •ri^^VOUR. QF THE IJORTJ^E^I^N ARMY."..;/^ , : * 
 
 ■\ .■.■. '^ '■•i,^ V .;. V 
 
 tJ 
 
 .. '-V 
 
 How 
 
IN 
 
 ( 73 ) 
 ' How powerful this diverfion was, the world al- 
 ready knows ; it loft the very army it was intended 
 tp fave, if it can be pofTible that fuch was the in- 
 tent. But I will more particularly conHder the 
 force of the Major generaKs evidence, in fupporc 
 of the fadt alledged by the Commander in Chief. 
 
 •? I think " fays the Major general, *^ ajironger 
 " diver/ton could net have been tnadcy than that of 
 " drawing General IVaJhington, and the whole Con* 
 ** tinental army, near ;^oo miles off " • •" - t 
 
 From this mode of exprelTicn, the reader may 
 pofTibly apprehend that Walhington was drawn 
 300 miles more diftant from the Northern army. 
 But the Major-general could not poflibly mean 
 this ; the fadb beii)g, that Walhington was only 
 drawn, except for a icw days, from Qiiibble 
 Town to the Schuylkill, 50 miles more diftant ; 
 and, to perform this truly ridiculous divcrfion, he 
 carried his army, by fea, at leaft 700 miles, againft 
 trade-winds, and, as he confeftes himftlf, through 
 a " very difficult navigation *." The confe- 
 quences were forefcen by every man of common 
 reflexion. The carrying the main Britifti force at 
 fo great a diftance from the Northern colonies, in- 
 fpired the rebels with new hopes and fpirits, and 
 contributed greatly to increafe their numbers, under 
 Gates, againft the Northern army. It wafted two 
 months of the campaign, deftroyed many, and 
 
 • See his Letter of the 30th of Auguft, 1777. 
 
 L rendered 
 
:f 
 
 ( 74 ) 
 rendered the remainder of the Britilh horfes total!/ 
 unfit for fervice ; and occafioned the dedrudlion of 
 a number of veffcls and (lores, which, *• it feems," 
 could not be removed from the head of Elk *, *♦ 
 -> But to (hew the folly of this extraordinary ma- 
 noeuvre, I will candidly lay before the public a 
 true (late of the Briti(h and rebel force at this con- 
 jundlure, and their refpeftive pofitions. -sw^al r« 
 
 General Burgoyne was on his route from Ca- 
 nada to Albany, where Sir William Howe was 
 ordered to form a jundion of the two armies. 
 
 Wafhington was at Quibbletown, 200 miles 
 diftant from the place where the Northern army 
 mud meet the enemy, and where it was taken ; 
 the General's force was at New York, 40 miles 
 nearer^ and in a manner between the Northern 
 army and Wafhington. -*{«-..,»„? .*i, 
 
 Wafhington's army could not have palled to 
 Albany by water -, he had not (hipping nor craft ; 
 nor could it have marched* by land in lefs than a 
 fortnight, and that only by one road, leading 
 through a gap of the mountain. General Howe 
 had an immenfe fleet of men of war and tranfpotts, 
 fufficient to carry his whole force to Albany in 
 cne week. 
 
 Waihington, when at Quibbletown, lay about 
 nine miles from Brunfwick, with his front on the 
 Karicon, which, at that time, and in that places 
 
 ♦ Sir William Howe's Letter, OtSlober 10, 1777. 
 
 was 
 
( 5^5 ) 
 was hot fordable, and his rear was acceffible with 
 cafe. General Howe, ac the fame time at Brunf- 
 wick, inftead of marching to HilUborough, on the 
 fouth fide of the Rariton, as if dreading his force, 
 might have paiTed in a good road, on th^ north 
 fide, not more than 14 mf'es, and perfedly en- 
 compafTed his enemy. 
 
 ' Walhington's army was compofed of new raifed 
 and undifciplined troops, commanded by inexpe- 
 rienced officers ; they were a corps which had been 
 defeated in every aflion, ftrangcrs to victory, and 
 difpiriied. Sir William Howe's army were Bri- 
 tons and Germans, perfectly difciplined, and com- 
 manded by brave and experienced officers, who 
 had carried vidory and conqiieft with them where- 
 cver they had trod, whofe fpirit had been exalted 
 above the effisfts of fear by numerous and recent 
 fuccelTes. 
 
 Wafhington commanded, by Sir William 
 Howe's own exaggerated account, only j 0,000 
 men •, and, by his own returns, it appears he had 
 under his immediate command, at New York, 
 40,784 i and when we look at his own diftribution 
 ot the force ncceffary for his garrifons, we find 
 7100 * fufficient for that purpofej fo that 33,684 
 remained to be led againll his enemy. 
 
 Upon this (late of fads, it is natural to aik the 
 following queftions : ^..^ ..^, :._ - ,= 
 
 • Sir William Howe's fccret Letter, of the 2 J of April, \^^7^ 
 
 L 2 Did 
 
w^ ■» 
 
 
 ( 76 ) 
 
 j Pid Sir William Howe imagine that he was 
 taking the neceHary meafures to fulfil his orders 
 to join the Northern army at Albany, by leading 
 his own army round Cape Charles, 350 miles more 
 diftant from Albany than he was at New York F^f, 
 ^ Did he really imagine that leading Wafhington, 
 already 200 miles from Saratoga, from Quibbler 
 town to the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, could 
 poflibly be a diverfion of the leaft importance t^) 
 the Northern army ? If Wafhington had intended 
 10 have co-operated with Gates againft the North- 
 ern army, could Sir Williati^, Howe think that he 
 fliould prevent it by hiding his army in the ocean-, 
 and by his circuitous route to the Chefrpeak, going 
 600 miles from Saratoga, and leaving Walhing- 
 ton within 200 miles of it ? .-rr.n iii.fi -.a; ; . » 
 
 If the General really intended to preven-Walhn 
 ington from aflilting Gates, why did he not take 
 a pod between them in New Jerfey, on the only 
 road and pafs through which Wafliington could 
 rtjarch ? ,.;,, ■;, . . v. , - .: . - :::<-' v i -,.■• ^ ; ':';^)1 
 
 If he really intended to put ah end to the rebel- 
 lion, by defeating the main army in the field, why 
 did he not lead 25,000 men from Brunfwick, ai 
 the north fide of the Rariton, and attack Walliing- 
 lon's 10,000 men in his unfortified camp ? Or, if 
 Walhington had been ib fortified and ftrong as to 
 render an aflault improper, wliy did he not> with, 
 fiich a fuperior force, furround, and, by cutting 
 ojjhis fupplics, with which he was very fcantiiy 
 
 : • i: fuppliec^, 
 
^i—^B 
 
 mm 
 
 -■A-''- 
 
 if. 
 
 Ito 
 \th 
 
 ( 77 ) 
 Cuppiied, fiarve him? All thefc mcafurfes Wcfc 
 pointed out by common fenfe. The benefits which 
 Would have accrued from them were 6bvious to all, 
 and of the greateft importance to the ftipprcffion 
 of the rebellion j while that ^vhich he purfucd did 
 not afford the lead profpeft of a fin^i^le adva/slagc 
 to the fcrvice, and bfefid-s v/as attended with an iftt- 
 menfe unneeeffary expence, was pregnant with mi- 
 merous difficulties, rifques, and dangers, and jprd- 
 fnifed the ruin of the camppagn. 
 
 Major-general Grey, in his evidence, further 
 fays, *' I do not think there was any one objeS 
 " which would have tempted General Walbing- 
 ton tb rifque a general adion fo much as the fear 
 of lofing the capital of Pennfyivania." 
 This I btilieve to be true: but, what does i^ aveiil 
 in the defence of the General's condud ? Ndthing. 
 It Contains a fall condemnation of his Chefapeak 
 ekpcditiom For Walhingcon would have foughs: 
 *3etween Hilfborough and that city from the fame 
 motive. He engaged Sir William Howe's army 
 at Brandywine for that reafon, and he would have 
 done it in New Jerfey. Why then did not Sir 
 William Howe, having his boats and pontoons 
 with him all prepared at Brunfwick, pafs his army 
 from that place to the Delaware ? If Wafliington 
 had come from his pretended ftrong noft to attack 
 the Britifti army, he muft have fought his enemy 
 upon equal, if not difadvantageous terms, as Sir 
 William Howe might have chofe his ground. If 
 
 cs 
 
 «( 
 
 Ml- 
 
 "■1 
 
 ■A- " 
 
 fill 
 
 m\ 
 
 A.-. 
 
 he 
 
i. 
 
 ( 78 ) 
 
 he hiid remained in his camp, the cit) of Philadd- 
 phia, and all his magazines of military and other 
 (lores, mud have fallen without oppofition into the 
 General's hands.; ">' r ~-^l' i'-^--^ -; 1 >: Una- 
 
 To thequellion, " Was there any probability of 
 «* bringing the war to a termination that campaign, 
 •• without forcing General Walhington to a gcne- 
 ** ral engagement?" the Major-general anfwcrs, 
 « Certainly not." ^P^.?. v.,., .v, 
 
 Here the General appears to be fcnfible of the 
 great importance of bringing Washington to a 
 battle. Why then did he not take one rational 
 ftcp to effcdb this purpofe ? Was it pofilble that he 
 could imagine, that his taking polt on the fouth 
 fide of the Rariton would bring an inferior enemy 
 down from his advantageous poft, acrofs an un- 
 fordable river, to attack him ? Why did he not 
 march up on the fame fide of the river on which 
 Walhington lay, and offer him battle ? Wafh- 
 ington mult have fought in a little time, or llarved 
 his army. Or, why did he not make a feint by 
 pafTiPg towards Philadelphia ? This muft have 
 brought Walhington from his poft, or he mud have 
 given up the " capital of Pennfylvania," for which 
 the General himfelf believed he would fight. 
 Surely any of thefe meafures were preferable to the 
 unpromifing and unfortunate expedition round by 
 fea to the head of Elk. 
 
 It will not be thought a digreffion, fliould 1 here 
 igive the reader a defer iption of the great advan- 
 tages 
 
-eel 
 
 by 
 
 iges 
 
 ( 79 ) 
 tagjs which a fuperior army miift have over an in- 
 ferior, in their operations in New Jcrfcy. The 
 provinces i$ bounded on the eaft and fouth by the 
 North River, New York Bay, and the Ocean j on 
 the weft, by the Bay and River Delaware ; and 
 on the north, k runs into the uninhabited moun- 
 tains, forming a pcninlula to the fouth. The 
 waters inclofing it on the caft, fauth, and weft, are 
 not more than 50 miles dilUnt from each other, 
 and until the month of June are never fordable ; 
 nor even then, except in the Delaware above Tren- 
 ton. And there are very few countries to be 
 found, lefs difficult and better adapted for military 
 operations. What then is the cafe ot an inferior 
 army in a country thus fituated, when a fuperior 
 force is properly led againft it? If it fhould march 
 to avoid its enemy fouth ward, it runs into a fnare 
 from whence it cannoc clcapc. If it turns to the 
 north, it muft combat every difficulty which moun- 
 tains deftitute of provifions can afford ; and if 
 he attempts either on th'. eaft or weft to efcape, he 
 may be attacked in the moment of croffing a con- 
 fiderable river. And yet the General, by the in- 
 dolence of his movements, although he had his 
 tru'y contemptible enemy in this very country, 
 fufti^red him to crols the Delaware with his heavy 
 baggage and artillery in 5776; and in June 1777 
 ftiamefuUy retreated before him, fuffering him 
 conftantly to harafs the Britifti rear from Brunf- 
 wick to Amboy. And what was yet more abfurd 
 
 in 
 
 1 'I' 
 
 1i! 
 
i 
 
 i( So ;) 
 
 in military policy, he left this icene of operations, 
 
 'i4>lun of a^vantagoi to hitniclf, and mifchievous 
 
 to his enemy, in order to draw him into a filel^l 
 
 more eKC«nlive< where none of them exiftod. ?^i''i 
 
 J'r'I he Major-general further lays, << With the 
 
 -« force Sir WiUiam Howe had under hi» com- 
 
 *♦ mand, I think, rf General VValhington had a 
 
 •^ wifH, it w^s for him to haye go^^e up the North 
 
 ^* Mivcr '*^ f^;-.'v*- f"' -mH p"-5''-7t "'"■ "■•;^t «»•«/.»*. •»f>/-. 
 
 ,• * This is only matter pf opinion and altogether 
 illi-founded. Waihington dreaded the army's pafTing 
 up che North River. He knew too wcU the dilH- 
 culties he muil have to encounter in following it. 
 He knew the Britilh army would be tranfported 
 •with cafe, »nd in a (hurt time, by water ; arid that 
 his own muO; march over mountains, and through 
 •ravines and ftrong defiles ; and that he mud re- 
 ceive his provifions from the fouthern Colonies. 
 And he alfoknew, that it would dcprefs the fpirits 
 \©f the eallcrn militia, prevent them in a good de- 
 gree from joining Gatesj and infallibly fave the 
 northern army. Such being his fixed opinion; 
 when it Wjis fuggelled to him that Sir William 
 Howe was gone to the Chelapcak, he would not 
 .believe it, and contended that tlie mcaliire was too 
 ablurd to be poHible. Agreeably to this opinion he 
 adcd. When Sir William Howe with the fleet 
 failed trom the Hook fotithwardy Walhingtor 
 moved his army from Qiiibblctown northward, in 
 order tu be more conveniently fituated to follow 
 
 the 
 
( 8i ) 
 
 the '^ritifh General up the Nortli River. He be- 
 lieved the failing from tlie Hook to be a ffint, and 
 cxpedled each day tliat he ihould hear of the Ge- 
 nfral's return, and of his failing with his army 
 towards Albany. And as loon as he heard that 
 the Britifh fleet was at the Capes of Delaware, and 
 not before, he marched fouihward ; biu upon re* 
 ceiving accounts thnt the fleet had again flood out 
 to fea, rtill perfuadcd that Sir WiHiam Howe could 
 not ad: fo contrary to rcafon and obvious policy, 
 as to go up the Chelapeak to I'hiladclphia, and 
 tiiat he would yet go to the northward, he returned 
 to his northern pofl, which he did nor leave 
 until it was perfedly afcertained tiiat the Ciitifh 
 fleet was near the head of Mk. This condud of 
 the rebel General a<^;rced with his declared ienti- 
 nicnts, and proves tlic reverie of the Major general's 
 opinion. 
 
 Page 62.] ** My rejjhi for goim^ by fea fully 
 " fet forth in my Narrativey page 16.'* 
 ■ 'I'he only reafons afligned by the General to his 
 Sovereign, in his letters, were the diflicukies he 
 flio*3M meiM with in croflln«j the l^elaware. To 
 thcte I have alrcdy replied. Since that letter, he 
 has difeovered a number of others, equally ill- 
 iounded i and for thefel am referred to the Nar- 
 rative. 
 
 Page 16.] " STi? have attacked JVrfljin^ton in 
 " that fir 011^ pofi (i^ibbhtcwn). I muji necefjhrily 
 " have made a conftdcrable circuit of the country."' 
 
 M 
 
 Tht 
 
 IF 
 Ml 
 
 m 
 
 : ii .^ 
 
 i^ 
 
 i: 
 
 
( 82 ) 
 
 The utmoft diftance of this circuit would not 
 have exceeded fifteen miles, about fix miles further 
 than to Hiillborough. Neither Quibbletown nor 
 Hiilfborough is ttrn miles from Brunfwick •, fo that 
 this confiderahk circuit of country might have been 
 performed in one day. A circuit which will bear no 
 comparifon with the one he adopted in its (lead, 
 and which ho took by fea and land, to fight Walh- 
 ington at Brandywine on ground equally ftrong. 
 Page 16.] " / did not think it advifeahle to 
 *' lofe fo much time as mujt have been employed in 
 ** that march during the intenfe heat of the feafon,** 
 The time whith would have been loft in that 
 march could not have been more than ten hours ; — 
 the time wafted in his Chefapeak circuit was three 
 months, - '< • ■ 
 
 Ibid.] " Exclujive of this conftderation, our 
 return mujl have been through an exhaujied 
 country y where there was no poliibility of keeping 
 up the communication zvith Brunfwick** 
 The reader, by this account, may be led to think 
 that Quibbletown is one hundred miles fiom 
 Brunfwick, when in fatSl it is but ten at moft ,— 
 and the communication might have been as eafily 
 kept up with Quibbletown, as with Hillft)0- 
 rough J — and bcfi^'cs, as Sir William Howe had 
 only ii.ooj men v/ith him, he might have had as 
 many more to have fccured the communicadon if 
 he had wanted them. 
 
 In myLetters I have afierted, th.it " in the 
 midll of vido) y the ardour of his troops was fup- 
 
 
 ti 
 
 (< 
 
 prefled 
 
 .!» 
 
( 83 ) 
 ** prefled j" and the General fuppofes, page 62^ 
 ** that the author alludes to his condud near the 
 " lines of Brooklyn, -ind introduces the evidence 
 " of Lord Cornwallis and Major-general Grey 
 " to difprovc it." Here the General is miHaken. 
 I did not allude to his conduct at Brooklyn, but at 
 the Brandywine, Goftien, and at Gcrmantown. 
 Men of the firft reputation for candour and inte- 
 grity at New York declare, that this was alfo the 
 cafe at Brooklyn and the White Plains i but, as I 
 have not treated of the General's conckKH: at thofe 
 places, I (hall take no further notice of his 
 evidence. 
 
 In the Letters, I havefaid, " that at Brunfwick, 
 •* Lord Cornwallis was upon the heels of the ene- 
 ** my; the deftruiflion of a bridge over the Kari- 
 *' ton faved them only for^a few hours j their 
 " further lecurity was owing to the orders received 
 *' by that nobleman to halt at Brunfwick." 
 
 To diiprove thefe fafts, he again, page 6^^ 
 refers to the teflimony of harl CornwaHis. Oa 
 this teftimony I fhall make no re narks ; but con- 
 tent myfclf with only obfcrving, that the fadts I have 
 alledgcd are ratified not only by the univerlal re- 
 port of the country, but by the General's own 
 letter of the 20th December 1776, written at the 
 time when the tranfaflion happened, to give joit 
 information to his Sovereign, whom he ought not 
 to have deceived, and when the General did not 
 think of his Defence. And therefore I preliime, 
 
 M 2 the 
 
 
 I' I' 
 
 »» 
 
 'hi 
 
( 84 ) 
 the Public will give full credit to it. The words 
 of the letter are : 
 
 ** In the Jerfeys, upon the approach of the van 
 " of Lord Cornwallis*s corps to Brunfwick, by a 
 " forced march on the firft inftant, the enemy 
 •• went off moft precipitately to Prince Town j and 
 had they not prevented the paflage of the Rari- 
 ton, by breaking a part of Brunfwick bridge, y^ 
 great was the confujion among them, that their 
 army mujl inevitably have been cut to pieces** 
 " Myfirjl defign extending no further than to get 
 poffejjion of Eajl Newjerfey^ Lord Cornwallis 
 
 *' HAD ORDERS NOT TO ADVANCE BEYONL ijRUNS- 
 " WICK, WHICH OCCASIONED HJM TO DISCONTINUE 
 
 cc 
 
 cc 
 
 cc 
 
 iC 
 
 cc 
 
 *t 
 
 »> 
 
 HIS PURSUIT. 
 
 Here every fa6l I have allfdged, and which the 
 General has denied, Hands fully confefled by himfelf; 
 and when it is known that the Rariton is fordable at 
 Briinfwick at every recefs of the tide, no man can 
 doubt but the fpirit and activity of his Lordfhip 
 would have led him, had not his orders been— "not to 
 *' advance beyond Brunfwick," to have purfued, an 
 enemy thus precipitately " flying,"* thus ready to be 
 " cut to pieces," and having fo " difficult a river 
 to pafs as the Delaware. 
 
 The advantages which mud have been derived 
 from continuing the purfuit were fo critical, fo 
 momentous, and obvious, that we cannot fuppofe 
 that an C;fficcr fo aftive and enterprifing, and who 
 had purfued his enemy more than 90 miles, re- 
 ducing their numbers from 18,000 to 3)000 men, 
 
 would 
 
( 85 ) 
 would have difcontinued his purfuit at the moment 
 that enemy had before him all the difficulties of 
 crofling a confiderable river. • ■ ^ • •" -^t: •': ' t» 
 
 Page 67.] WaJhingtorCs force at this time {when 
 he was followed to Trenton) conjijled of 6000 men^ 
 exclujive of Leis corps of 4000 ; GeneralWaJhington 
 loft no time in croffing his artillery and heavy baggage 
 ever the Delaware at 'Trenton^ before we could move 
 from Brunfwick. He alfo crojfed part of his troops , 
 keeping a corps on the e aft fide to obferve our motions. 
 
 This paragraph contains three miftakes ; one of 
 them, I truft, the General himfelf will confefs. He 
 here fays that Wafhington's force confided of 6000 
 men. In his Narrative, page 8, he acknowledges 
 that force to be only 3000 when it attacked Co- 
 lonel Rhal at Trenton. He alfo aflerts that Lee*s 
 corps confided of 4000 men. In his letter * to 
 the Secretary of State, giving an account of Lee's 
 capture, which happened only a few days before, 
 he fays it confided of 2000 men. Thcfe con- 
 tradidions in his opinions, at the time he was 
 writing to the Secretary of State, and when he is 
 making his defence before the Public, the reader 
 will be at no lofs to account for. However, the 
 truth is, that Wafliington, by hi3 own returns 
 made on the day before he crofied the Delaware, 
 had no more than 3300 ; and a number of thtrfe 
 deferted immediately after. Lce*s corps did not 
 
 11'. M 
 
 f See his Letter, dated Dec. 20tb> 1776. 
 
 amount 
 
 M' 
 

 ( 86 ) 
 
 smounc to 1590*, and on his capture, many of 
 them defertcd i To that when Wafhington made his 
 great, and what many thought would be, ius lall 
 effort to recover his defperate affairs, he could only 
 bring over againd Colonel Rhal 2800 men, or- 
 dering Cadwallader with his brigade ct' 500 men 
 to crofs the Delaware, and to attack Bordentown, 
 where only 80 Heffian grenadiers were left by 
 Colonel Donop. The ice in the Delaware prevented 
 this intended manoeuvre. And yet Sir William 
 Howe fuffered Walhington with this army, then 
 the whole Continental force of America, to cake 
 from him all Eaft and Weft Jcrley, except his 
 pofts on the Rariton, and that too at a time when 
 he confeffcs in his Narrative, page 41, that his 
 *• great fuccejfes bad intimidated the leaders of the 
 <« rebelliofiy and nearly induced a general Juhmijfion^ 
 
 Nor is it a faft, that " Walhington loft no time in 
 *« croffing his artillery over the Delaware at Tren- 
 ** ton before we could move from Brunfwick." 
 "Wafhington believed that the Britifti General had no 
 defign of moving his army from Eaft to Weft New 
 Jerfey. Upon what Walhington's belief was found- 
 ed, 1 know not. But it is certain, that he afted as if 
 he was acquainted with the General's firft intentions. 
 That he had,if we may credit his own letters to Con- 
 grefs now in Britain, copies of returns of the Britifh 
 army, is a faft. It is therefore highly probable, this 
 refolution might inadvertently tranfpire through the 
 fame chanAd, Poffeffed with this belief^ Walhing- 
 
 ^- ^ ton 
 
>t 
 
 ifh 
 
 lis 
 
 the 
 
 ( 87 ) 
 ton did not leave Princeton until the Britifh van 
 was within three miles of it. Nor had he pre- 
 pared boats at Trenton to tranfport his army over 
 the Delaware. The fame boats which Lord Corn- 
 wallis fays, in his tcftimony, " he had hopes of 
 " finding at Corycl's Ferry," did not get down to 
 Trenton until lute in the fame night ilut the 
 Britifli army Jlept at Princeton. And ti^ere- 
 fore it was, that Wafhington did not begin to 
 tranfport his baggage and artillery over the Do- 
 laware, until •••vclve o'clock that night •, and could 
 not get his b^ ; ^ anr^ troops over, until a few 
 ininuttrs bcfo.. wlc arrival of the Britifli army*, 
 which had iv'ttfcd fcventcen hours within 
 twelve miles of Trenton. For this confidence of 
 Wafhington in the ind ilcncc of the Britifli Gene- 
 ral, his principal officers who were no in his Iccret 
 councils blamed hii, And it was < on this oc- 
 Ct. ion that Wceden, a rebel Gencrax; wrote the 
 letter I have mentioned n page 48 of the Letters to 
 a Nobleman, declaring, ** that General Howe .ad 
 ^* a mortgage on Wafliington*s army for fomc 
 " time, but had not yet fortclofed it.' 
 
 It is alio a miftake, that Wafliington * crofleda 
 " part of his troops over the Delaware, keeping a 
 
 • See Sir Willi im Ilnwc's Letter, zoth Dec. 1776. The 
 truth is, the lall rebel embarkation h;;i' i.''t left the Jerfey ihore 
 when the Btiiifh van appeared in figii- -/VdaMr. Sanjucl Morris, 
 one of the rebel officers, whofe fc,,a:)i was taken, mtide his 
 efcapc on horfeback, bccaufe he could not reach the laft boau 
 
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 corps on the caft fide to obferve our motions j'* 
 no corps was crofled over until the morning of the 
 day on which ihe Britifti army took up their quar- 
 ters at Trenton. " : -^ -f -^r,*.*; :,,r r . .. ► .-^ ,. •'' 
 "- Page 66,'] " Tbe troops of the left column were 
 not in their cantonments in the evening of the march 
 to Princeton until darky and thofe of the right 
 " column not till fome hours after dark, *^ ' )K - 
 • How illufive is this ! I have aflerted that the 
 army arrived at Princeton at four o'clock jii 
 the afternoon. This fa(5t the General does not deny; 
 but to evade it, we are told, when the two columns 
 were fettled in their cantonments. How long it was 
 before the two columns were in their cantonments, 
 I know not; perhaps the fame indolence prevailed in 
 cantoning the army as in the other operations. 
 But that both the columns were Britifli troops, per^ 
 feftly relieved from fatigue by their ftay at Brunf- 
 wick, and zealous for adion, and either of them 
 fuperior in numbers to the flying and panic-ftruck 
 enemy, are truths that cannot be concealed or 
 evaded. And therefore it is evident, that they 
 eafily might have overtaken, in the courlc of feven- 
 teen hours, the enemy ,who were within twelve miles 
 of their quarters, and that in the very ad of croff. 
 ing the Delaware -, that river, of which the diffi- 
 culties in crofling have been fo magnified to ferve 
 another purpofe. 
 
 Page 6y,] The caufe of not mcrching earlier the 
 following day was^ that the enemy had broke down the 
 
 bridge 
 
:ve 
 
 ( «9 ) 
 
 bridge which could not be foonc*' repaired^ and rendered 
 fit for the pajfage of artillery. 
 
 This bridge was over a creek which an Englilh 
 hunter would leap with eafe. It was within a mile 
 of the Britifh head-quaiters, its banks (loping to 
 the water's edge with the gentleft declivity, and 
 fordable at the high-road, and in twenty other places 
 within half a mile of it. The bridge itfelf, which 
 was only ufcd occafionally by the inhabitants on 
 heavy falls of rain, might have been repaired in 
 one hour, and a* four o'clock in the morning as 
 well as ten o'clock in the day — there was nothing to 
 prevent it. There are people now in London pcr- 
 fedly acquainted with this formidable bridge and 
 creek. , ; , , , , 
 
 Ibid.] 1^0 account for his'not crojjihg the jyild- 
 ware after his reduced and "panic -{truck enemy y at a 
 time when he had brought the country nearly to a 
 •' general fubmiffton J ^ he again refers to Lord Corn* 
 wallis^s evidence, who tells us, " as the Delaware was 
 *' 72ct fordable^ and we could get no beats, it was cer* 
 ** tain.y impra^ic :ble** ,' ■ 
 
 That the Delaware could not have bd^n pafled 
 at this time without boats or rafts, is true. But 
 the General muft tell us in his rejoinder, why he 
 did not conftrud rafts or pontoons, which might 
 have been done in a few days with the materials in 
 Trenton *. This is a queftion to which the Public 
 
 • See Mr, Galloway's Examination, p. 42. 
 
 N haa 
 
 . > 'i>' 
 
 II 
 
 I !li^ 
 
 
 ll'B I 
 i I 
 
 i 
 
 h 
 
has arightj and will expefb, a fatisfadlory, and not 
 an cvafivc anfwcr j cfpccially as the croffing thci 
 Pelawarc at this time was moft critical and mo- 
 mentous, and mult have put an immediate end tq 
 the rebellion. ..^^ . *^„ 
 
 ,. At this lime, the models of Government in the 
 rebel States were fcarcely formed, and their au- 
 thority by no means cftabliihed. Every member 
 of the rebel State of New Jerfcy had fled out of 
 the province ; and the Congrefs themfelves, witl^ 
 the utmoft precipitation, had alfo fled from Penn- 
 fylvania into Maryland. A univerfal panic, with 
 a deflre of immediate fubmifllon, then prevailed 
 throughout all North America. Wa(hington*$ 
 army was reduced to 3000 men. The city of Phi- 
 ladelphia was diftant no more than two days eafy 
 inarch i it was Intirely defencelefs*, 3000 Britifli 
 might have been fpared to have taken immediate 
 poiTeflion of it } while the other, and by far greater 
 part of the Britifli army, might iave been em« 
 ployed in thp Bnal deftrudion of the rebel force 
 and magazines. The Britilh fleet, or fuch a par^ 
 of it as might be thought neceiTary, with tranf- 
 ports loaded with ftgres and proviflpns for thq 
 armyt might have failed round in one week, and, 
 without a fingle obftrudlion *, have pafled up to 
 ^Philadelphia, >vhich every circumftance demon- 
 
 ; * At this time Mud Ifland fort was not built, the chevaux. 
 de-frize and chain were not madet nor were their iire-rafts or 
 water>guard in an)* kind of force. ^ ., ^.; 
 
 ilratecj 
 
( 9' ) 
 
 ftrated to be the moft comfortable and moft pro>* 
 per quarters for the army in winter. Had this nrtea- 
 fure, which plain common fenie fo evidently die* 
 tated, been purfued, the reader will determine* 
 whether that country, which the General has in* 
 cautiouQy confeflfed, was, by the previous fuccelTes 
 of the Britifh arms, brought ** nearly to a general 
 *' fubmifiion," would not have ended the rebellion, 
 prefcrved the Northern army, prevented a war 
 with France and Spain, faved the millions which 
 have been expended, and prel'erved the nation 
 from thofe imminent dangers and diftrefTes which 
 lately threatened the Independence of the Britifli 
 
 i-^j"V«;«T>* >-.'>*4i'- A.J. 
 
 . +■. 9 1 i 
 
 nation. 
 
 Page 68.] The General again adduces the t0i'- 
 mowf 9f Lord Ccmwallis and Sir George Ojborne^ to 
 vindicate bis conduSi in having taken Trenton into the 
 tbain of cantonments^ and for pofting the HeffioH 
 troops^ with. the ^id regiment^ there and at Borden^ 
 town, under the command of Colonel Donop, <^ 
 
 Here he attempts to evade the force of the 
 charge againft him. I have not cenfured his con* 
 dud for *' taking Trenton into his chain of caa- 
 ** tonmcnts." Seeing he would not crofe the De- 
 laware, this was a prudent and necefiary meafure. 
 It was neccffary to xover New Jcrfey, which he 
 had then conquered, and might have been fecuced, 
 had he taken pnc proper ftep ior that purpofe. 
 There is not, therefore, afentiment in the Letters 
 that can bear this me&ning : I ha-ve only blamed 
 . r.:. '. N 2 himj. 
 
! ' 
 
 < 9* ) , . 
 him, imoj for giving the command of his frontier 
 cantonments to foreigners, who did not under- 
 ftand the language or policy of the country •, and 
 fidloy and principally, for leaving the weakcll com- 
 mand, or feweft number of men, next to the main 
 force of the enemy, and the ftrongcft and greatcft 
 command where there was no enemy to fear. i 
 M» The reader will here permit me to refer him to 
 a perufal of Lord Cornwallis's evidence, where he 
 will find, that no faft, which his Lordlhip affcrts, 
 tends to cpntradid any of the charges in this para^ 
 graph ; all that he fays, relates to the covering of 
 Trenton, which certainly was judicious and nc- 
 ceflary. But had his Lordlhip been confuked on 
 the quantum of force which ought to have been 
 lef( at Trenton, or upon the expedience or pro- 
 priety of placing foreigners in the frontier pofts, I 
 am confident he would have advifed againlt either 
 of thofe meafures j and had he been alked by the 
 General, whether the greateft or weakeft force 
 ought to have been placed in the frontier canton- 
 ments, he would, without any hefitation, h^ve 
 advifed the greateft. 
 
 Page 69.] Sir George OJhorne.^ whofe evidence 
 I have mentioned i tells us, that^ after the mis f or'- 
 tune of Trenton, Colonel Donop acquaint'ed him, that 
 if Colonel Rhal bad executed the orders he had deli- 
 vered him from Sir PFllam Howe, which were, to 
 ' ere^ redoubts at the poft of Trenton, that his opinion 
 was, it would have been impo£ible to have forced 
 
 RhaVs 
 
I : 
 
 ( 93 ) 
 
 RhaPs brigade, before he could come to his ajjijiance 
 from Bor dent own, x . 
 
 If this was the declaration of Colonel Donop, 
 as we mud fuppofe, inafmuch as a gentleman of 
 Sir George Ofborne's eUabliOied credit has de- 
 clared it, it can only convince us, when the real 
 fafts are known, of the impropriety and ill policy 
 of placing HelTian commanders in the advanced 
 and molt dangerous poft, with a command fo 
 weak, to oppofe the whole force of the enemy, 
 •l he truth is, that Colonel Donop, when Tren- 
 ton was aflfaulted and taken, was drawn down to 
 Mount Holly, twelve miles diftant from Borden- 
 town, and eighteen from Trenton, with his whole 
 corps, except 80 grenadiers, contrary to the in- 
 formation and advice received from Mr. Galloway. 
 7^ his gentleman told him, that the enemy's force 
 at Mount Holly, which he fuppofed, from the 
 information he had received from a number of the 
 difafFcfted, who had grofsly impofed on him, to be 
 3000 men, were no more than 450, men and boys, 
 prevailed on to make a Ihow, and to draw hini 
 irom his poll, while Trenton was attacked. This 
 information the Colonel difregarded i the confe- 
 quence of which was, that Colonel Donop was not 
 at Bordentown, from whence he could fupport 
 Colonel Rhal j and therefore Colonel Donop told 
 Sir George what was not a fadl, to apologife for 
 his own unmilitary conduft. j r . 
 
 • ,■•■ ^•«-' ... 
 
 4 
 
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 But 
 
[ 
 
 ■•. \r. 
 
 ( 94 ) 
 fiut if the Colonel had received orders to d\tt(k 
 Colonel Rhal to fortify Trenton, one would ima- 
 gine the General had taken the fanne precaution in 
 refpeft to Bordentown. And yet we know that 
 Colonel Donop aded the fame indifcreet and un- 
 military part with Colonel Rhal, and indeed 
 worfe } for he left his poft, although equally ex- 
 pofed to the entmy, who had boats to crofs their 
 vhole force over, to the afluult of either poft, then 
 vnfortiBed. Wafliington was not unmindful of 
 thefe military blunders, and therefore fent his con- 
 temptible body of new raifed militia, mod of them 
 hoys, to draw Colonel Donop from his pod, while 
 he fhould ^ttick it, -as well as Trenton } and no- 
 thing faved Bordentown, at the time Trenton was 
 taken, but the ice in the Delaware, which pre- 
 vented a corps of 500 men, under Cadwallader, 
 from pafling that river. 
 
 Had Colonels Donop and Rhal received orders 
 from the General to fortify their refpcdlive pofts, is 
 it credible that officers of their rank and experience 
 would have prefumed to difobey them ? I (hould 
 think not, wlien their own fafety and honour de- 
 pended on their obedience. If Colonel Donop 
 had received fuch orders, it was his duty to have 
 fecn them executed •, if he did not, why did not 
 the General call him to anfwer for fo great a breach 
 of duty? Why did he afterwards rntruft a man, 
 whQ.had tranfgr^ned the military law in a point fo 
 ?" * -important. 
 
( 95 ) 
 
 important, and which had brought difgrace and 
 ruin on the Britifli fervice, with the important 
 command againft Red Bank ^ But there are other 
 quellions, to which we may call on the General 
 for explicit anfwcrs. "Were the orders to Colonel 
 Donop in writing, or not ? If they were in writing, 
 why are they not produced ? If they were not, they 
 certainly ought to have been, in a matter of fo 
 much confequence. But further. Why did not the 
 (General fee that thofe redoubts were built, before 
 he withdrew his force from Trenton ? If they were 
 necefTary at all, they were immediately neceflary. 
 The aifaults upon Trenten might have been mad^ 
 the next day after the enemy had left it, as well ag 
 the eleventh. The General, with his whole army, 
 remained on the fpot, from the 8 th to the 14th of 
 December* i and in half of that time the redoubtg 
 ^t both pods might have been completed, and the 
 fubfequent difgraces and misfortunes, to the Bri- 
 tilh fervice, prevented. The General, therefore, 
 muft yet Bnd a better apology for thofe two blun- 
 ders } of leaving his frontier pods, which were 
 the mo(t expofed, and in fight of the whole forcQ 
 pf the enemy, in a ftate altogether dcfencelefs, 
 and with the fmalled number Ci* troops of any 
 of his cantonments i blunders that would difgrace 
 ;he weakcft officer in his army. 
 
 * See his letter to Lprd George Gcrmaio, of the aothof 
 Pccexnbcf, 1776. ; . ^ ^r. , v 
 
 :. Ibid.1 
 
 , ''>.'j*ifc'-' ^' 
 
 ;&-, 
 
 II 
 
 a 
 
 r' 
 
 I 
 
 r 
 
I I 
 
 I 
 
 nr». 
 
 
 Ibid.] fVaJhingtony after Lee's corps joined kirH^ 
 bad never kfs than 8000 men, * v ] 
 
 J General Lee was taken, on the 12 th of De- 
 cember, by Colonel Harcourt, at the head of his 
 corps, near Trentonj oh their way to join "Wafh- 
 ington. A few days after the fcattered remains of 
 that corps, not confiding of 700 men, joined 
 Wafliingtorf, who, reinforced by that corps, 
 attackedTrcnton ; and the General confefles, in 
 his Narrative, page 8, when he intends to throw 
 the blame on Colonel Rhal, for fuffcring Trenton 
 to be taken, that *^ he was credibly informed, that 
 «« the num'^crs of the enemy did not exceed 3000 •," 
 but in his Obfervations, when he has another pur- 
 Jsofe in view, he affcrts, that Wafiiington had 
 never Icfs than 8000 men, afier the jundion of 
 Lee's corps. Thv General did not recoiled, at 
 the time he made ufe of this argument, that it 
 proves too much for his own reputation j and that, 
 if it' vindicates it in one cafe, it more ftrongly con- 
 demns it in another. For if Wa(hington*s force 
 «* was not lefs than 8000" men, when he left Tren- 
 ton wiih only 1200, under Colonel Uhal, in a 
 ftate entirely unfortified, to oppofe that 8000, did 
 his military knowledge lead him to believe that 
 the poft of Trenton was fafe ? Did it juftify his 
 not feeing that poft in a ftate of defence, at leaft 
 for one day, before he left it ; before he drew the 
 main Britilh army from it ? I wifh fomc reflec- 
 tions, yet moi? to the General's difadvantage than 
 
 thofe 
 
( 97 ) 
 
 thofe I have yet enumerated, may not obtrude 
 themfelves upon the mind of the candid enquirer 
 into his conduct. If there were 8000 men within 
 fight of thedefencelefs pod of Trenton) did General 
 Howe intend to facriBce that poft to the wicked 
 defigns of a fadtion, combined againft the honour 
 of his Sovereign^ and the happinefs of his coun- 
 try ? Or (hall we impute it to his ignorance in mi- 
 litary fervice ? 
 
 But yet even this excufe his friend Major-ge- 
 neral Grey will not fuffer us to admit. He de« 
 clares, page 96, that the " divifion of the army, 
 •' before the battle of Brandywine, was a mafterly 
 ** movement^ deceived the enemy^ and brought on 
 •* an adlion with almoll certainty of fuccefs •," we 
 cannot, therefore, impute fo grofs a blunder to 
 ignorance. The reader will afcribe it to another 
 caufe. 
 
 I have aflerted, in page 61 of my Letters, that 
 Wafhington was encamped at Quibbletown, about 
 nine miles from Brunfwick, with fewer than 6000 
 .undifciplined and badly appointed troops, which, 
 with a corps of 2000 men, under General SuHi* 
 van at Prince Town, compofed his whole force. 
 To this the General anfwers. 
 
 Ibid.] From the intelligence 1 then had, and 
 which I have not ftnce had reafon to doubt y fVaJhing' 
 ton had not lefs than ic,ooo men in his camp, on the 
 hill above Sluihbletown* 
 
 The General (hews no want of ingenuity ia 
 (lating his own numbers, and thofe of his enemy. 
 
 O In 
 
 1 
 
 M 
 
 
 «t »i 
 
 
 : ■, I 
 
 I m 
 
 V'- I 
 
fn treating of the former, he gives us only his ef- 
 fcdiive rank and file, exclufive of officers, an 
 important part of his force i but in fpeaking of 
 the rebel army, he always extends his ideas to its 
 vrhole force. This is artful, and tngeniouOy 
 adapted to miflead men unacquainted with fuch 
 calculation. However, allowing him what he con- 
 tends for, and fuppofing that he had *' 11,000 
 " fighting men," and Wafhington 10,000^ yet 
 the former were veteran troops, intired to viftory, 
 and eager for adtion ; and the latter were new 
 raifcd and undifciplined, and at leafl: one-half 
 militia *. Was he afraid of attacking Wafhington 
 with fuch men i If he was, why did he not add to 
 their numbers 11,000 more? His own returns 
 'will prove, that the numbers then under his.im- 
 jpediatc command, were not lefs than 35,000. 
 
 Page 70.] His (IFaJhingtotCs) camp was to the 
 full as inaccejfibk in the rear as in the front, and an 
 attack upon his right flank (from every account I 
 could get) would have heenjiill more hazardous* **"""- 
 
 The furveyor of the county, who kn^w the 
 fpot on which Washington was encamped, was; at 
 New York when the General proceeded taHilUbo- 
 rough ; he was attending on the army to render 
 his fervices. He had drawn a chart of the roads 
 round Wa(hington*s camp ; and he communicated 
 
 * It will occur to the Reader, that Lord CoinwalUa, with.. 
 \ti^ than 2000 v^tei^n troQps, ^s ^IfljT ^'^^'^'^^t ^3^ t^^l'/ 
 rout i, 7000. ^< , r\ 
 
 hia 
 
t 99 ) 
 his ideas to General Skinner, who had constant 
 accels to the General. He was ordered to hold 
 himfelf in readinefs to attend the army in Jerfey ; 
 but he was left at New York, without any notice 
 of its movement to Hillfborough. Of thcfe fafts, 
 whenever called upon, he will make folemn affida- 
 vit J and further, that Wafhington*s camp was ac- 
 cefTible both in the rear and on the right fiank, 
 on higher and more commanding ground. ' ' ** 
 '^ Ibid.] fVaJhington was certain^ induced to be- 
 lieve that my intention was to attack him \ and had he 
 not been -perfeElly fatisfied with the ftrength of his 
 foft^ he would not have remained fo long in it. 
 
 It was impoffible that Wafhington could con^ 
 ceivc, from the movement of the Britifh army, that 
 the General intended to attack him. It did not in 
 the lead indicate fuch d( fign, but manifeftly the re- 
 verfe j indeed, it rather difcovered a fear in the Ge- 
 neral, of an attack from the rebel army. Could 
 Wafhington, when General Howe, with all the ap- 
 pearance of caution and fear, in his whole march 
 from Brunfwick to Hillfborough, and during his 
 (lay. at that poft, kept *^z Rariton, an unfordable 
 river, between him and the poft of his enemy, a 
 (ituation from which he could neither attack nor 
 be attacked, poftibly believe he intended to attack 
 him ? It was this unmilitary condu6it which en- 
 cour^ged Wafliington to remain in his camp, be- 
 caufe he knew he was fafe white Sir William Howe 
 jrefnaintd thus polled. Had the General wifhed 
 
 2 O to 
 
 
 ¥ 
 
m 
 
 ( 100 ) 
 
 to have induced Walhington to believe he intended 
 to bring on an aftion, there was one obvious and 
 infallible mode of doing it. A march of five or 
 fix miles would have carried the army to Wafh- 
 ington*s right flank or rear. Ic would then have 
 been ported between Walhington and all his re- 
 fources ; it would have cut him off from his ma- 
 gazines of provifion, his military (lores,- and his 
 boats, then lying Ibme within feventeen, and all 
 within thirty miles of the Briiifh poft. In this 
 cafe, Walhington mpft have deferted his camp, or 
 ftarved ; and if he had moved, the General might 
 have attacked, or purfued him to his boats, tq 
 which the Britilh army would have been many 
 miles nearer than Walhington, as he muft have 
 taken a conliderable circuit to have reached them, 
 and to have avoided an aflion, fuppofing it to 
 have been prafticabk*. But inftead of this mar 
 noeuvre, the General did riot move his army to- 
 wards the Delaware, far enough to induce a be- 
 lief that he intended either to crofs it, to get in 
 the enemy's rear, or to cut him off from his fup- 
 plies. 
 
 From page 71 1096, the General has introduce^ 
 the tejiimony of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond.^ to apo- 
 logize for mt going up the Delaware, when he ar^ 
 i'ived with his feet at the Capes of that Bay, 
 
 It would be a tedious talk, and littl? entertain- 
 Incr to the reader, Ihould I travel through all the 
 miftakc;s contained in this teftimony, r^fpe<Jling 
 
in- 
 
 lO* 
 
 ( lo; ) 
 
 ^hc numerous " fhoals, and rapidity of the tides** 
 in tWe Delaware j the force of Walhington at 
 Willmington j the narrownefs of the channel a( 
 J^ewcaftle ; the difficulties of landing the troops, 
 ^nd the great ilrengih of the rebel water-guard. 
 
 I will, therefore, content myfelf, becaufe I truft 
 the reader will be fatisfied, with a few brief and ge- 
 neral obfervations on the whole. The Jhoals are 
 to be feen in Fifher's chart of the Delaware. The 
 fide does not run two niiles and an half in an hour. 
 As to the mrrownefs of the channel at Newcaftle, 
 every (kilful mariner, who has failed up the Be- 
 laware, knows, that from the Pea-patch below, tp 
 lylarcus Hook above, that town, a diftance of 20 
 miles, it is at leafl two miles in width. The ftrength 
 of Washington, at Willmington, was pc rfeftly vi- 
 fionary \ becaufe it is known he was not at that time 
 in Pcnnfylvania : And there are a number of gen- 
 tlemen, now in London, who can prove that the fort 
 at Mud Idand was in an unBnifhed and defencelefs 
 ftate, and pofleffed by 130 militia only; that the 
 water guard was unprepared and unmanned, and 
 the chain not finiftied \ and that there are a vari- 
 ety of places between the Bite of Newcaftle and 
 Marcus Hook, perfedlly adapted to the landing 
 of an army with the utmoit cafe. Of 'his. Sir 
 Andrew, in his crofs examination, notwithftand- 
 ing all the imaginary diffiicukies he had before 
 enumerated, makes a full confeffion j for, in page 
 8/, he candidly declares, that he ** never pre- 
 ^\ ^enc^ed to deny the practicability of landing an 
 
 
 ■sf'. 
 
 
 
 •:|;;;' 
 
 Vi% 
 
«c 
 
 ( 102 ) 
 
 army in the Delaware." But, to put this mat- 
 ter beyond difpute, I need only remind the Pub- 
 lic, that the fame fleet which Sir "William Howe 
 has endeavoured tot perfiiade us would be in 
 danger from the difficulties in the navigation, and 
 the rebel force, by his own orders, fhortly after, 
 when Wafhington had poficfllon of the country on 
 both fides, did fail up the fame river uninjured and 
 unmolefted, and in lefs than half the time it had 
 taken to fail up the Chefapeak, and Wafhington's 
 troops were in pofTcfiion of both banks of the river, 
 when the water-guard was prepared, and in com- 
 plete force. 
 
 Pages 104 and 105 are partly employed in an at* 
 temp to prove there was no time loft in ftopping the 
 hanks of Province IJland^ to enable the workmen tQ 
 tre£i the batteries againft Mud I/lind, 
 
 To fupport the charge of neglf(n;, I fhall apply 
 to the General's own declarations j by which it 
 will ij>pcar, that the city of Philadelphia was in 
 the General's pofleflion on the 26th of Septem- 
 ber "*, and that the batteries v;ere opened againfl: 
 Mud Ifland on the 15th of November, exadly 
 fevcn weeks after f . What were the carpenters 
 and working parties employed in during this time ? 
 Wc are told they were repairing the dykes, and 
 (lopping out the tides. If the engineer employed 
 them in that labour, when he had .liberty to pro- 
 
 • See Sir William Howe's Letter to Loril Gcorg« G«raiaio» 
 
 uf the ! oth of October, 1777. . ' , 
 
 ■f Sec Obfervations, p, loj. 
 
 curi 
 
cur^ 
 
 ( toy ) 
 
 cure artifts, he was very abfurd. This bufincfs is 
 a particular art, and to be performed only by ex- 
 perienced men. Their wages are from 7 s. 664 
 to Ids. per diem i while the wages of an upland 
 ditcher is only 2 8. ; and I have known a malkp 
 artift fent for from Virginia, and paid 150 /. per an^ 
 num falary. Hence it was that the carpenters and 
 working parties, if they were employed in repair- 
 ing the dykes, laboured in vain, in a buHnefs that 
 they knew nothing about •, but the truth is, they 
 were as fruitlefsly employed in mud and water, to 
 eredl the batteries. This occafioned the applica- 
 tion to Mr. Galloway, by Lord Cornwallis, who, 
 as is before mentioned, had them repaired in Hx 
 days. The number of men employed by him^ 
 were upwards of forty. 
 
 An attempt is made, in page 106, to vindicate 
 the General's condudl, in not attacking the rebel 
 ^rmy at White Marlh. " I bad, fays he, the beft 
 •* intelligence that the enemy* s fojl was not ajfailablty 
 *' in the rear.** 
 
 The guides who attended the General in this 
 truly ridiculous expedition^ and tvho lived from 
 their infancy on the fpot, and many others, will 
 prove, on oath, that the ground in Wafhington'a 
 rear commanded his camp ; and it is not le& true, 
 that he was prepared, at a moment's notice, of 
 the General's movement towards his rear, for > 
 flight. His heavy baggage was fent off toward 
 Skippack, and his light was in readinefs for a pre- 
 cipitate 
 
 7. 
 
 1 
 
 p 
 
 m 
 
 \ ■ ^^ 
 
 m 
 
 
A'!.: 
 
 .* 4. 
 
 tipitatc movement. Men of undoubted repu'tdJ 
 tion, within his lines at the time, have confirmed 
 thefe fafts,*^"*^-'*!*^* i'Mfi-w "'Wiyi i*-?- .;:?^^'ii *->->-.?- j^iRi 
 
 But the General here again calls to his aid the 
 teftimony of Major-general Grey, who fays, " I 
 •' think an attack on the enemy, fo very ftrongly 
 *« fituated as they were at White Marlh, would 
 " have been highly imprudent." Did the Major- 
 general ever reconnoitre the rear of Walhington's 
 camp ? Was he ever on, or near that ground ? 
 He does not aflert it ; and the truth is, he never 
 was. May he not then have been miftaken in his 
 opinion ? He in the'next page as pofitivcly afferts, 
 that the war was carried on, " in the ftrongeft 
 ** country in the world, with almoft art unani- 
 *' mous people to defend it j" and in both of thefe 
 opinions, there are now but few men who do not 
 know that he is grofsly miftaken. 
 
 I have faid, that the General " fupinely fuf- 
 •* fcred himfelf to be furprifed at Germantown.*' 
 To dilprove this charge, we are referred to Sir 
 George CHborne's teftimony ; and, when we can- 
 didly examine what he has faid on the fubjeA, we 
 find it rather fupports than difproves it. All 
 that Sir George has faid in favour of the Ge- 
 neral, is, that he ordered him to move in front of 
 the line of infantry i and told him, he ** might 
 
 expeft the enemy at day-break,*' 
 
 C( 
 
 .'.\ 
 
 ..\ 
 
 '^ K 
 
 ?;>' ?■?>;■: •"':! 
 
 f'j".Sl 
 
 'ij. 
 
 This 
 
■\ i 105 ) ; 
 
 X This only proves, that the General had fome 
 rufpicions of the enemy's defign ; but not that he 
 had, in confequence of that fufpicion^ given the 
 ncceflary orders to the army, to prepare them for 
 ;:cceiving , the enemy, and to prevent a furprife. 
 If he really believed he (bould be attacked, he is 
 yet more culpable than I had imagined ; for it is 
 evident, from the teftimony of his own witnefs, 
 that no fuch orders were given. Four different 
 queftions were put to Sir George, in order to draw 
 from him his opinion on the furpjrife of the army ; 
 all of which he declined to anfwcr. If he did believe 
 the army was not furprifed, would not his honour, 
 apd the jultice due to the General^ have induced 
 him to have declared his opinion ? And, as he de- 
 clined it, is there not wh^t amounts to the ftrongeft 
 prefumpiron, that he could not deny it without 
 violating his honour and the truth? But if the 
 General really gave the neceflary orders to the fe« 
 veral officers of his army to prevent a furprife, all 
 his Aides de Camp, and his Secretary, were in 
 London during the examination of his witnefTes 
 before the Committee of the Hpufe of Commons, 
 why then did he not prove fuch orders by them ? 
 His honour, his military character demanded it} 
 and yet we find he has prudently avoided to examine 
 them on the fubjeft, ' -;•-';"• f--- ,r^rr~'*-' •' ''-'■ '* 
 In the Letters to a Nobleman, page 86 to 89, 
 I have faithfully defcribed the diftrelTed fituatioii 
 iif the rebel army at the Valley Forge, and charged 
 
 ■' "JP ' ' ' th9 
 
 I 
 
 m 
 
 I 
 
 ifc'.r 
 
 m 
 
. ( |o6 ) 
 
 the General with a high breach of his duty to hl9 
 Sovereign, in not attacking or befieging it, and bf 
 that means faving his country from all its fubfe- 
 quent misfortunes. As this is a high charge, th<; 
 Public will excufe me if I repeat it at large, and 
 ihen confider his anfwcr. *»^» *■ ^'i^^S'^f ^Kk^ M ^ 
 
 «* Here" (at the Valley Forge) «« Wafhington 
 *• lay all the winter and fpring, encountering dif- 
 '* ficukies whjch language can fcarcely defcribe, 
 *' His army labouring under bad appointments^ 
 *< almoft in every refpeft j his troops in a manner 
 *' naked, in the moft inclement feafon of the year, 
 ** having no fait provifions, and little fait to ea^ 
 ** with their frelh j often on (hort allowance in rc- 
 ♦• fpeft |o both } rapidly wafting by ficknefs, that 
 •' raged with extreme mortality in all his different 
 « hofpitals, and Without ahy of the capital medi- 
 " cines to relieve them. His arnriy was likewitf; 
 " <Jiminiflied by conftant defertions, in companies 
 «' from ten to fifty at a time ; hence in three 
 « months his number was reduced to lefs than 
 *« 4000 men, who could not, with propriety, be 
 «* called effc(5lives. 
 
 " Wa(hington*s army continued in this weak 
 w and dangerous ftatc from December till May ; 
 « while the Britifh troops, who nad the beft ap- 
 « pointmencs, and were in high health and fpirits, 
 ** lay in Philadelphia, in a great meafiire inaftive, 
 «» fuffering the rebels to diftirfs the loyal inhabit- 
 ♦« ants -on every fide of the Britifli lines, to deftroy 
 
 their 
 
 (C 
 
< >^7 ) , . 
 
 •* their mills, fcize tjieir grain, their horre$, their 
 •* cattle i imprifon^ whip, braddi and kill the 
 •• unhappy people, who, devoted to the caufe of 
 ** their Sovereign, at every rifque^ were daily fup- 
 •' plying the army, navy, and loyal inhabitants 
 •* within the lines, with every necelTary and luxury 
 ^ that the country afforded.** - , ^ 
 
 ^ To the chiirge thus made, with {q many circum- 
 ftances precifely defined, the General, as upon mafly 
 btheroccaiions, contents himfelf with making only a 
 general anfwer. He does not prefume to deny 
 one of the fafls I havd ailerted ; he does not deny 
 the defcription I have given of the weaknefs of the 
 enemy's campi and of its lines and redoubts } of 
 its numbers of men ; of its truly diftrefTed llatei 
 arifing from the want of comfortable lodgings, of 
 provifions, and of clothing ; or of the conftant dc* 
 fertions, and extreme mortality raging among his 
 troops; All tliefe faA$ he gently glides over in 
 filence, and artfully refts his defence on the (qU 
 lowing riaked aflertion : That 
 
 Page 106.] ** The Author's plah of befieging 
 « the enemy at the Valley Fbrgej is ia the hjghcft 
 <* degree abfUrd. Had I made a divifion of the 
 '* troops in the manner he propofes, I (hould have 
 <* expofed them to be beaten in detail/' 
 
 Surely ih^s caftnot be deemed a fatisfadtory an- 
 fwer to thofc numerous fads, (hould I (ay nothing 
 iti reply*, however, fatigued dS I am with the dif> 
 agreeable talk of refuting fo many pofuivc affer- 
 
 P 5{ tions. 
 
 'ir 
 
 '111 
 
 '-'?: 
 
( io8 ) ' 
 
 tions, and fuch numerous mirreprefentations, I 
 cannot pafs it over in filence. On my reader's ac- 
 count, as well as my own, I will be brief. The 
 reader will fee, in the Appendix, a genuine letter 
 from a Committee c" Congrefs, appointed to ex- 
 amine into the caulti of the dillrefled (late of 
 Waflilngton^s army, and fitting at the Valley 
 Forge at the time I have mentioned. It is Hgned 
 Francis Dana, one of the Committee, in behalf of 
 the reft, direfted to the Prefident of the Congrefs, 
 and indorfed in the hand-writing of Mr. Laurens, 
 the then Prefident, from whofe trunk, among 
 other interefting papers, it was taken i the aii<< 
 thenticity therefore cannot be difputed. From 
 this letter, it will appear that I have been modcft 
 in xTiy defcription of the diftreffes of Wa(hington*a 
 army v I truft I have been fo in every other piece 
 of information, which 1 have, from the beft of 
 motives, given my country ; and I cannot help 
 acknowledging, that I etleem it a fortunate event, . 
 that I am thus juftified in a particular which car-, 
 ried with it a greater degree of improbability than 
 any other that I have communicated to the pQb(ic», 
 Having perufed this letter, the reader will re- 
 coUefb, that the General had under his immediate, 
 command near 20,000 veteran troops ; that his 
 enemy had not 3000 men, who could with pro- 
 priety be called effcftives -, that thefe were in a 
 manner deftitute of almoft every neceflary ; and 
 that he had not horfes to carry off his cannon and 
 
 military 
 
mUitafy ftorcs. What^ then, could prevent the Ge- 
 neral from marching out with 5000 men, and at- 
 tacking this enfeebled, Gckly, and naked enemy, thus 
 deftitute of provifions ? Was he afraid chat 5000 
 veteran Britons would be beaten " in detail" ^y«^i& 
 an enemy f'SNhy^ then, did he not take his whole army 
 (as there was at that time no other body of men 
 in arms on the whole continent of America), and 
 attack, or furround, and ftarve him into, a furren- 
 der, agreeably to the plan 1 have mentkHied in the 
 Letters * P Could any thing be more pradicable i 
 Did not every fenfe of military duty, the recent 
 lofs of the Northern army^ and the critical ftate of 
 affairs at that time in Europe, all urgently prefs 
 him to take this meafure ? Had this been done^ 
 the honour of his country, fhamefuUy lod at Sa- 
 ratoga, would have been regained ; all the valu- 
 able artillery, and military (tores of the continent; 
 would have fallen into his hands. The Congrefs, 
 feeing their whole force taken or difperfed, muft 
 have defponded of further oppofitipn \ all America 
 mu(t have fubmitted ; and the Court of France 
 muft have feen the folly of its new alliance, and 
 receded from it ; and. thus the General might have 
 favcd his country from all its prefcnt difficuliieSj 
 cmbarraffments, and diftrcfles. . x.^. '^^^i^.l uij to 
 
 • See Letters to a Nobleman, p. 8g, and the chart, fhow- 
 ing the pofition of the rebel army, and of the ports propofed to 
 be taken by the Britifh. ; ^ 
 
 \ i 
 
 
 :i^ i 
 
 W, i 
 
 , t l^i'. 
 
 
 
 ii 
 

 * it there wa& not a want of inclinatidh^ why wai 
 net this done ? The General cannot plead want of 
 perfeft knowledge of the defpondency and weak 
 ftate of his enemy. If he wanted charts of Wa(h- 
 ington's quarters, and his redoubts and defences, 
 feveral of them were brought in to him by men of 
 crediti who took them on the fpot. If he wanted 
 intelligence of the ftate, pofition, or movements of 
 the army> he received it conftantly from officers, 
 and other perfons confidential in every department 
 of the enemy's army *, befides his conflant intelli* 
 gence from defertefs, fpies, and the people of the 
 country, daily coming. into his lines. In (horr^ 
 there was no movement, or other material circum- 
 ftance that happened^ but what the General was 
 ibon acquainted with. The ftate and condition of 
 the rebel army was as much before hifii as before 
 Wafhington himfclf. ^^ (Turf^;.T}>ba; .y^ fmjiis aidii 
 
 r^ It has been problematical with many, what mo- 
 tives could lead an officer^ whofe reputation ftood 
 high in the opinion of his Sovereign and country^ 
 into all this miiconduft. The humane and cha* 
 rkable impute it to his real ignorance in his owni 
 profeffion. But thefe ihen have taken- only a fu- 
 perfkial view of the General's a£lions. H is plani 
 of the battle of Long JJland and Bfaniywim<t are 
 irreftftible proofs that, when he intended to gain 
 an advantage over his enemy, or even to cut oflT 
 his retreat, he poffefted military, judgment fuffici* 
 6 ent 
 
 ;; 
 
( III r 
 
 jcntto iftfure it. At both of thefe t>lace$, Tie knew, 
 that if he had been defeated he muft hare loft hU 
 fLtmy, Had his troops been routed at Long Ifland, 
 he could not have efcaped in boats to his Ihips^ 
 when purfped by a viflorloiis enemy. Thus cir- 
 cumftanced, his military abilities were exerted $ 
 nor would his manoeuvres have difgraced a gene- 
 ral of the firft abilities } he turned his enemy's lefc 
 flank, unfufpeded, by a circuitous route, ant} 
 . killed and took prifoners One-third of his army. 
 At Brandy wine, when he thought his fleet haci; 
 left him, and he had no fafety but in viAory, hi9 
 Hieafures werfc equally judidousj he fuddenly, 
 and unperceived, hemmed in the whole rebel army 
 between his two columns and impairab)e waters. 
 In (horr, he was never defeated, nor compelled tq 
 retreat ; and always fucceeded in every attack, 
 he thought proper to make, as far as he chofc. 
 to fucceed j knowledge, therefore, could not 
 be wanting, whenever inclination called it into 
 a(5lion. ^v . ,. 
 
 There are others, and but few, who imagine 
 ^hat the war was prog-aftinated from lucrative; 
 views. But from this charge I readily acquit the 
 General. His difpofition is liberal ; and his par** 
 ticular friends acknowledge, that the love of mo- 
 pey is the leaft of all his pafllons ; and therefore^ 
 although he ifufFered his favourites, while he was 
 profufely waftiiig the wealth of the nation by J!^is 
 tnaSfion and extravagant demands^ to colleifl much 
 
 01 
 
 !'!??» 
 
 :»'*■! I 
 
 ^1 
 
 ■CW? 
 
 ^)k 
 
( 112 ) 
 
 of it into their own coffers, yet little of it found 
 its way into that of the General; » t.^">^^'\i'^^^A^ 
 
 There are others, who, having '^'.refuUy examine 
 ed the conduSl of the General in America^ and com4 
 pared it with the proceedings of a wicked fa£tion in 
 pritain^ are convinced that the defign of both was 
 ihefam^ \ and that the General, inftead of accepts 
 ing the command with an intention to execute the 
 truft repofed in him by his Sovereign and his county 
 try, accepted it by the advice^ and with dejign to 
 facilitate the wicked purpofes, of his con- 
 federates in Britain. I Hncerely wilh there were 
 no ground for fuch a conclufion. But there ar& 
 circumftances fo ftrong, and aftions which fpealc 
 fo loudly in fupport of it, that, when examined, they* 
 will amount to pofitive proof. Indeed, it is im^ 
 poflible to trace his condufb, by fair and jud ar- 
 guments, from any other motive. 
 
 A private letter from Mr. Samuel Kirk, of Not- 
 tingham, one of the Generars conftituents and 
 colleagues in fadion, with his anfwer, is before 
 the Public ^. Mr. Kirk charges him with a breach 
 of promife, in accepting of the command of the 
 forces about to be fent to Amerita for fupprejfwg 
 the rebellion ; tells him of the ** confufion it had 
 *f made among his friends ;" gives his reafons 
 ^painft it ; and concludes with faying, " I do nut 
 
 U ; '•-■ ■^'■'\ >■ ■'■ '^^ -"^^ -.5 ■■->?■' 
 
 * See the detail and conduft of the American >yar, and tho 
 
 Appendix to Uus Reply. , \ . ^ 
 
 '' * wilh 
 
 u 
 
 C( 
 
 .1/ 
 
«■■ 
 
 C( 
 
 cc 
 
 cc 
 
 ( "3 ) 
 
 ** Wi(h you may fall> as many do^ but I cannbt f^y 
 •* Iwijhfuecefs to the undertaking" To this con- 
 fidential and truly feditious letter, the General re- 
 turns an anfwer as conBdential. He tells Mr. Kirk, 
 that " he had flattered himl'elf he had removed all 
 " tho/e prejudices he had entertainer againft him •,*' 
 ** that he had been highly complimented" upon his 
 accepting the command, by thole who are *• averfs 
 «' to the meafures of Adminiftration •," and ** intreats 
 him in particular to fufpcnd his judgment, until 
 the event Ihould prove him unworthy of his fup- 
 
 port." ..4 ./;^»M('u^^t'-«fiv,>K''vis»irt mr<s.. 
 
 ,!j.Thefc letters, which were not intended for the 
 public eye, furely furnilh us with a clue to the 
 dark and heinous confpiracy of the Faction, with 
 which the General was connected. From them ic 
 appears, that, before thefe men had concerted their 
 plan of oppofition, he had pledged his honour to his 
 conftituents, that he would not accept of a com- 
 mand which was to fupprefs the rebellion ', aild that 
 notwithftanding, he was led by fome, we muft 
 fuppofe, powerful motive, to violate his promife. 
 »«> What that motive was, is like wife fufficiently 
 evident. It s,as the advice of the men who were 
 thus " averfe to the meafures of Jdminijlration" 
 whofe " compliments" he immediately received 
 on accepting the commitTion, whofe approbation 
 he pleads as an excufe to his friend for his breach 
 of promife, and of whofe public reputation he was 
 the conftant and careful guardian while in Ame- 
 
 11 
 
 jfif^- 
 
 
 ill 
 
 1: 
 
 i I 
 
 m 
 
 . 'J. 
 
 rica. 
 
"IPP 
 
 ( 114 ) 
 
 rica *. And it further appears, that after he had 
 received his command, to remove the " prejudites" 
 of his particular friend, who had declared ** he 
 " could not wi(h him fuccels" in fuppreffing the 
 rebellion^ *« to fufpend his judgment** on the Ge- 
 neral's Londudl, " until the event fhould prove him 
 tmworthy of his fupport** Upon thele plain 
 
 •( 
 
 * It is an tnrcr!otc as true as it is curious, that, when the 
 General was at Fhilsdelpliia, a Loyalifl was about to publifl) a 
 piece rcflcf^irtg on the conduit of tlic Minority in Pailiamen 
 1'he General by fbme nicnns heard of it: upon which Mr. GaU 
 loway received the following billet fioin his Secretary: 
 
 ** Captain M'Kensie's compliments to Mr. Galloway ; the Ge- 
 neral defircs he will be pleafed to enquire into the authority by 
 which Mr. Towne publiihcs his Evei>..ig Pod, and to make any 
 regulations he thinks necc/Tary xo J'upprtjt politUal piitts, which 
 may have an tvii ttnitntyy from either of the premies, as it is 
 %%ntti, that fonre oftbrtjtamp are defipned for pubiicRtion." 
 
 Mr. Galloway, engaged in other I'lfinefs, negledled to per* 
 form the duty recommended by this billet, not knowing 
 the immediate urgency nor the cxtrtmi importanct of it j • 
 and the pieco was publilhed. The Seciecary came down to Mr. 
 Galloway, much vexed, and complained of the Printer. The 
 Printer w»- fent for by the St-cretary, and riprimanilid far thi»^ 
 hiintmt tffen(*\ and the Author of the piece was tuld, that the 
 General would not fuffcr j'ucb pieces to be publiflied. This 
 anecdote, however trifling it may feem, fully proves, tiiat the 
 General held himfelf bound to preferve the conduA of the Op- 
 pofition t6 his Sovereign's meafures, from the mdt RViiaures of 
 the Loyaliih within his lines; and, for that purpofe, even to mak« 
 ufeof the power veiled in him by his Majelly ; although that very 
 Oppofiticii was conftantly holding up to the view of ihe people, 
 the condu^ of the fervants of the Crowr, and eVen of Majelly 
 itftif, in terms the moll opprobrious- and inlulting. 
 
( "5 ) 
 
 fa£ls the Public will determine, whether there is 
 not fatisi'a£lory proof of a refolution in the General 
 CO CO operate witli the delign of a Faction, who 
 were averfe to that measure, a defign as unconfti- 
 cutional as it was wicked -, and which was nothing 
 lefs than to wrcft from their Sovereign his confti- 
 cutional right to appoint his confidential and exe- 
 cutive fervants (a right which, by the conftitution 
 of the Brinfli government, is as firmly cftablilhed 
 in the Crown, as that of electing reprefentatives in 
 Parliament is fixed in the People) •, to compel hini 
 to turn out the prefent Adminiftration*, and to put 
 his own pcrfon^ his family^ and his crown, into the 
 hands of tbefe confpirators. 
 
 To accomplifli this defign, all their powers were 
 to be united and exerted. One great line of con- 
 dudl: was to be adopted •, Adminiltration was to be 
 proclaimed the authors of all the national misfor- 
 tunes J and their meafures, however honed, wife, 
 or receff.iry to the honour and fafety of the em- 
 pire, were to be oppofed and obfl:ru(3:ed in Parlia- 
 ment, and tire execution of them defeated,if poflible. 
 
 Men's adions are the ftrongeft proof of their 
 fecrtc defign«. If we examine the condufb of the 
 Fadlion in Britain, we find that it has ftridly cor- 
 relponded with thefe preconcerted meajtires. The 
 American rebellion was an event, which thefe men 
 thought would furniih them with all the means 
 neccflary to 'he ^^ccomplilhment of their defign. 
 They faw it would call for theexertipn$ of Govern- 
 
 <J^2 ;,„...' meat, 
 
 
 I 
 
 .1 I 
 
 m 
 
 
 'H't 
 
( ii6 ) 
 
 ■ ■ i ^ ' ^ 
 
 ment, and that thofe exertions would afford a large 
 field for oppofition. The real rebel, who wiflied to 
 overturn the government, and the hungry patriot, 
 whofe lull could only be fatisfied by power and 
 places, united therefore in tbftering and fupporting 
 it. And, left ihe wifdoni of the rebel colonifts 
 fhould fail in their plans, the meafures of fedition 
 from time to time were concerted, and tranfmitted, 
 by the Fadlion in Britain, to their confederates in 
 America. " The non-importation agreement, the 
 ** union of the Colonies, and the meeting of a Con- 
 ^* greis ; a folemn league and covenant, under oath, 
 «« not to purchafe the manufaftures of Great Bri- 
 •* tain, and to make an united and invincible ftand 
 f againft the BritiJJj Government" were all mea- 
 fures which originated in Britain, and were adopted 
 in America. ' * 
 
 Whilft thefe fccret intrigues againft the State 
 were carrying on with the rebels in America, the 
 meafures of Government at home were loaded with 
 the moft opprobrious epithets. The fteps which 
 were taken to fupport the dignity and auihorityof 
 the State over the Colonies, were called a ** cruel^ 
 •* tyrannous^ and ruinous fyjiem of policy" And 
 thofe which were adopted to fubdue the moft un- 
 juftifiable and obftinate rebellion, were ftyled " an 
 " unjuji and ruinous '^var" Every engine was 
 in motion, and every feditious fcribbler was em- 
 ployed to poifon the minds of the people, and to 
 render the meafures of Adm'.iiftration odious in the 
 eyes of the nation, Thofe mifreprefentations and 
 
 falfe- 
 
an 
 
 ( "7 ) 
 falfehoods, which they thought would moft readily 
 captivate the vulgar, were induftrioufly propagated. 
 The prefles poured forth their pamphlets and oc- 
 cafional pieces, to Ihew th diftreflcd ftate of the 
 kingdom, the decreafe of its inhabitants, the im- 
 menfe debt and poverty of the nation, the want of 
 the refources of war, the impofiibility of raifing 
 the neccflary aids, the lawfulnefs of American 
 oppofition, and the injuftice and cruelty of the war; 
 which, it was boldly alTerted, was intended, by the 
 councils in which their Sovereign immediately pre- 
 fidcs, to introduce defpotic power in the Colonies. 
 Nor were thefe dodtrines confined to Pamphlets 
 and News-papers. Th^y were the conftant themes 
 of inflammatory declamations in both Houfes of 
 Parliament. ? : ,„ , .^ , 
 
 Having, by thefe feditiousmeafu res, raifed the po- 
 pular clamour cgaintt Government, and prevailed on 
 a confiderable part of the deluded people to fupport 
 them ; having diftracled the councils of the State, 
 and induced them to treat with rebels,and to ofi^t. to 
 give up the mod eflential right of the fupreme au- 
 thority, the right to tax thofe Colonies which it 
 was bound to protect \ they advifed their colleagues 
 in fedition in America, to rejedt the propofuions, 
 as " unreafonable and infidiousJ'' And thefe op- 
 probrious epithets were tranfmitted from Weftmin- 
 ller to Philadelphia, and echoed back from the Con- 
 grefs to Weftmmfter again. And afterwards, when, 
 through their private intrigues, they had facrificed 
 f|)e Northern Army,involyed their country in a war 
 7 with 
 
 I 
 
 Ml: 
 
 .1- 1^' 
 
 i^lS 
 
 jr 
 
M 
 
 ( ii8 ) 
 
 with France,thrown the nation intoagcncraldcfpondf 
 ency, and compeJied Adminiftration to offer ta the 
 rebels terms of accommodation, little fliort of in- 
 dependence itfelf ; their objefl: not being as yctfe- 
 cured, their ambition ungratified, the loaves and 
 
 • fifties unobtaincd, and the firmnefs and virtue of 
 their Sovereign not yet conquered, they dreaded 
 the profpeft of accommodation and peace with 
 America ; and therefore they adviled the leaders 
 in rebellion to rcje<a even thofe terms ; afluring 
 them, that jidminijiration could net fupport the 
 
 ■loar, and that they mu/t foon grant to them inde- 
 pendence. How happy is it for Britain, that thelQ 
 feditious men were miilakcn, and that the Congrefs 
 
 •jjurfued this foolifli advice ! foolifti in refped to the 
 views of Congrefs, as well as thofe of the Fa^iqn 
 
 • in Britain \ 
 
 They weakly imagined, that his Majcfty, alarm- 
 ed at the profped of a war with France, and of the 
 
 .)ofs of America, would change his confidential fer-* 
 
 <yants, and receive into his bofom thofe men who were 
 the fole authors of thofe diftrelTes i who, when in 
 f)ffice, by their feditious counfels, had laid the foun- 
 
 • -dation of the rebellion, and, through its whok prc- 
 
 grefs, had encouraged and fupported it *, who had 
 enjoyed the firft offices of the States and whole 
 " honour, integrity, and abilities, when weighed in 
 the balance, had been found wanting -, men who 
 had avowedly op pof<!d every meafure which his Ma- 
 jelly had wifely projeded to fupport the authority 
 of the Scate, and the independence of the nation- 
 
 • :< ■ V 5ut, 
 
>; / 
 
 ut» 
 
 ( "9 ) ^ 
 
 ^uti finding that his Majcfty met all thediftrelTes* 
 <vhich thefe conrpirators had brought on their coun- 
 try, with a virtuous firmncfs, which bafilcd ■ ^if 
 cxpeftations, they determined to proceed to yd 
 more infolent and violent meafures. They rc- 
 folved, in their fecret cabals, to impeach his confi- 
 dential fervants, and by that means to wreft thertt 
 from his fervice. Such impeachments were im- 
 pudently and boldly threatened in the great coun- 
 cil of the Stare. While they were thus bringing 
 their plot to maturity in Britain i while the natural 
 refources of this country were cried down, to the 
 great encouragement of our foreign enemies, and 
 a national defpondency in a manner effe<fledj 
 while the Fadion wasftrcnuoufty advi(ing,and zeal- 
 cufly contending, in both Houfes of Parliament, for 
 Withdrawing the troops from America, and at the 
 fame time oppofing every meafure which was ne- 
 ceffary for the recovery of the revolted Colonies j 
 their jtrch-agent, the General, with honourable 
 fidelity (for, in fome men's opinion, there is honour 
 even among the confpirators againft the public 
 weal), was taking every ftep to procraftiuate the 
 war i to plunge the nation yet farther in debt, 
 and a more general defpondency ; and to render 
 Adminiftration more odious to the people. We 
 have feen, that, although by his " great fucceflcs** 
 bbtained in lefs than four months, by only one 
 half of his force, he " had nearly inducted a gc- 
 ^ neral fubmiffion** of the rebels j yet, by his 
 
 itido- 
 
 i 
 
 iff 
 
 ; 1 
 
 I 
 
wnr^ 
 
 .It- 
 
 k-W. ■ 
 
 ( no ) 
 
 ;^ indolence and inadlion, he procraflinated the <Nif 
 during the fpace of (ixteen months longer, and left 
 the rebellion in more fpirits than when he began 
 ^ his operations. He fulfered his enemy, with lefs 
 than 35CO men, to reconquer a province which 
 he had lately reduced -, — he f^fFered that enemy to 
 bcfiege his whole army in its quarters \ — he wan- 
 tonly walled the feafon of military operations>giving 
 his enemy time to recruit their reduced force. By va- 
 rious meafures, he continually deprelTed the fpirit of 
 loyalty, and always declined to avail himfelf of its 
 '^ ailiftance. He alternately funk and revived the fpirit 
 of rebellion, always taking care not to reduce it. He 
 ^ often met his enfeebled enemy, and as often, with 
 ; his vaftly fuperior force, retreated before it i and, 
 with an unaccountable verfatility, adopted one plan 
 after another, always choofing that which was 
 mod expenfive to the nation^ and ruinous to the 
 fuccefs of his own operations. 
 
 In addition to all this, with a (Iritfl: confiil- 
 
 "; cncy of dcfign to waftc the public money — to ren- 
 
 ^ der the nation tired of the American war, and 
 
 ^i hopelefs of fuccefs, — and to multiply the difficulties 
 
 of Government in carrying it on ; we have feen 
 
 ^ him, in proportion as his enemy's ftrcngth and 
 
 refources dccreafcd, conftantly incrcafe his wanton, 
 
 f linnecejfary^ and extravagant 'demands for more 
 
 force, until, conjuniStly with his colleagues in fadion 
 
 ^ at home, he had laid the foundation of a war with 
 
 I France and Spain. This done, he immediately 
 
 refigncd. • ^ ^. . 
 
 *^-"^ . That 
 
That the Fa£Hon, or thfc General* incipabid 
 of feeling for ihc diftreflcs of their country, in- 
 tended 10 involve it in a mifchief of fo great a 
 magnitude, white it was embroiled in a war with 
 its Colonics,' charity forbids me to determine i al- 
 though their infatiable luft for power, and»»hirft for 
 the emolunri^iits of ofiice, with the general tenor of 
 their conduct/ would perhaps even judify fuch a 
 decifioil. However, this is evident, that, upon the 
 General's arrival in Britain, with a large retinue of 
 his'cdnHdential friends, who were 'o be the vindi- 
 cat6rs of his ihameful condud in America, the 
 Faftion recei' ed him in their arms, and boldly vin« 
 dicated hi^ condud both in and out of the fenate. 
 Their force thus coUeded, they conceived that 
 their plot was brought to its wi(hed-for maturity. 
 They prepared for, and loudly threatened, im- 
 peachments and the block. But, previous to this 
 meafure, the whole cenfure and odium of the mif- 
 carriagcs of the American war, of which they them 
 felves had been the authors, were to be caft on 
 the fervants of the Crown. To effeft this, anony- 
 mous charges againft the General were carried 
 into Parliament, and his character wai to be 
 vindicated in the great councils of the State, 
 and no where elfe. In vain did the officers of 
 Government, to whom he was alone accountable, 
 declare, that they had no accufations againft him. 
 Inilead of peptioning their Sovereign for a Court- 
 marcialj the only proper court by which he could 
 
 ft bf 
 
 ^'\ 
 
 ^^Uj> 
 
( 122 ) ■■' ''' 
 
 be tried, they ^nftituted an unprecedented cxamioft' 
 tidrt in the Hoiufe of Commons, under the pretence ; 
 of vindicating the General^ when their real defign ^V 
 wis to condemn the conduSi of yidminiflration, and ; 
 ta prepare ihc way for their threatened impeach- j 
 mtnts. " ' ' I 
 
 In this examination, they hoped to run alone, j 
 For a time they did fo ; but at length their fecret j 
 defign appearing cvident,Adminiftration was called v 
 ori to vindicate the meafures of their Sovereign. ) 
 Many gentlemen of undoubted reputation, per-,^ 
 fcdly acquainted with the condudk of the war, and 5 
 the (late of America, were fummoned to give evi- 1 
 dencc rcf->ci1ing them. Of this theFadlion was ap- '3 
 prifed. Only two witncflcs were examined. Butf 
 fuch was the credit and force of their evidence»!j ; 
 that the Fadion fhrunk from the enquiry ^ the great 
 council of the nation was convinced, that the condudk 
 of Adminiftration, in refpeft to the American war, 
 Aood clearly juftiBed ; and the deep-laid plot of 
 theFaftiOn was totally fruftrated. > ; (^;j^q ijm j-r^hi 
 Such has been the conduct of tlie men, who»^< 
 in exad imitation of their confederates in America, 
 have, by their fpecious and falfe clamours for liber«<u 
 ty, been feducing their unwary and too credulous 
 country to tiie brink of ruin ! And fuch are 
 the evils, in which they have, by their cabals, 
 with unabating indullry, involved the nation ! 
 Wl||n will Britons, the mofl: wealthy, tiie mod 
 
 C 
 
 ^,.^w^ »4''*'^' • 
 
 nmii iMict'lx^n^ j^^J r,free. 
 
 V4 •■^■.- ■'■' 
 
 ^' ' -' ■■ 
 
free, and the mofl: happy people on earth, 
 difcern their own good I. When will the voice ©f 
 wlfdom teach them to Tupport thofe meafures, and 
 that power, which alone can prefcrve their freedom 
 and independence among nations ! When will they 
 ceafe to be the in(^ruments of faiflion, ard the un- 
 happy dupes of lawlefs ambition ! .? . : • — r 
 *' Time has been, when the Princes on the throne 
 have piid no regard to law, and broke over the fa- 
 cred bounds of their happy conftitution } when they 
 have deprived the worthieft men, without law, 
 of their pcrfonal liberty, and robbed the people of 
 their property j and when they would have extend- 
 ed the prerogative to the utmOft bounds of arbi- 
 trary power. How different, at this day, is the 
 fituatlon of Britons ! They have a Sovereign on the 
 throne, into whofe heart a wi(h never yet entered 
 that interfered with the happinefs of his fubjedts*, 
 who never yet received a farthing from his people 
 without their confent -, who, inftead of attempting 
 to extend the prerogative, has^ of his own acco;d>. 
 given up a part of that prerogative to fecure the 
 rights of his people-, — a Sovereign, who, when the 
 diftreffes and ncccflities arifing from their own folly 
 and Tedudtion, lately compelled them to put un- 
 limited confidence and power into his hands, to 
 fave the capital city of their kingdom from imme- 
 diate dellrudllon, and the nation itfclf from ruin, 
 excrciled it with more than parental lenity •, and,, 
 having complied with the wiflies of the virtuous 
 
 R Z part 
 
mm 
 
 1 1 
 
 ( 124 ) ^ 
 
 part of the nation, and' faved his country 
 from confufion and ruin, inftantly. With a vir- 
 tuous generofity, gave it up; — a Sovereign, ^ 
 whofe heart^felc wifli, if we tnay judge from the 
 whole tenor of his conduft, is, to prefcrve their 
 conltitution of government inviolate, and to fup- 
 port its independence, its digniiy and ghry among 
 nations ; to recover the loft dominions of the State ; 
 and to reduce his faithlefs. and perHdibus enemies 
 to jufticei which there can be no doubt of his ef« 
 feding, if not obftrufted by the foUy of his people, 
 and the lawlefs and fedirious views of a Fadion, 
 which has too long diftraded his councils, and 
 prevented the exertions of his power. And 
 yet too many Britons, fafcinated by the fpecious 
 arts and delufive wiles of thofe political impoftors, 
 are conftantly giving them their fupport, in op- 
 pofition to the truly patriot meafures of their 
 {Sovereign ; facrificing their own happinefs at th^ 
 altar of lawlefs ambition, and precipitating th^ 
 moll powerful and beautiful fabric of civil liberty 
 Kipainin^ on the globe, to its final Twin.. ^.^^ ^^^ ,^ 
 
 ■¥^r 
 
 
 fi-r 
 
 ':>i,a; 
 
 
 USv 
 
 •ri, f 
 
 ■A ,'U.' . • -' 
 
 \M - 'i; 
 
 »Hl 
 
 f^ 
 
 I,- 
 
 :i 
 
 jft. P P E Nr 
 
f' ■ I 
 
 \ ■ •' 
 
 ;( «?5 )) 
 
 ••■v.- 
 
 %^l ^ ^, 
 
 A P P E N P I X. 
 
 , -• ♦ ■;■ '; It •■ 
 
 t'o Lieutenant General Sir William Howe, K, B, 
 
 SIR, 
 
 AviNo, in the preceding iheets, travelled 
 in much hade through your laboured De- 
 fence, permit me to pafs from the difagreeable^ 
 though too often neccflary, office of an accufer, to 
 that of vindicating the accufed. I hoped, that, as a 
 gentleman, you would have followed, in your 
 Obfervations, the example I had fet you in my 
 Letters^ in which, >vith a$much delicacy of language 
 as truth would polTibly admit, I h^d confined 
 my ftriclures to your « profeflional condudl,^, 
 without fuffering one fyllable of perfonal abufe. Of 
 one hint at the dcfeds in your private moral ch^ 
 rafter, however fair the mark, to efcape from my 
 pen. But in this hope, on your own account, I ao^ 
 forry to fay, I am difappointed. Confidering Mr. 
 Galloway as theAuthor of "Letters to aNoolecpan*/' 
 and wilhing, by defaming his perfonal character, to 
 ieiTen his credit i and that the impofitions on the 
 - ' JPublic, 
 
 l\ 
 
 i 
 
 li 
 
 ! 
 
Public, in your Defence, might more readily pa(* 
 for truths *,. you defert the field of decent and man- 
 ly argument, and take a mean refuge under the 
 abufe of his private repatation. A condudl of this 
 kind can need no comment *, it can have no weight 
 with a candid and fenfible Ji^ublic; it is the 
 ufual pradlice of the guilty, and the common wea- 
 pon made ufe of to wound the innocent. 
 
 You do not venture to accufc him of, although 
 you ftrongly infinuate his diQoyalty : — You deny 
 his influence in the province he lived in: — You 
 boldly charge him with giving you falfe intelli- 
 gence*, and you meanly eondefcend to boaft of your 
 liberality towards him. Now, although no man 
 .can. perceive what relation thefc matters can pof- 
 fibly have to a vindication of your •' profeffional 
 «' condudt," • 1 IHail, on Mr. Galloway's account, 
 examine them.'- '- V '-■/■', r 
 
 ■■'{ To give a glofs to your infinuations refpefting 
 his difloyalty, you fay : " This gentleman, in the 
 *' beginning of the rebellion, was eleded a Mem- 
 «* ber of Congrefs." What. Sir, does this prove 
 to your purpofe ? It is well known tXi ihe Public, 
 that many gentlemen, who had before, and have 
 fince, given the moft demonftrative'proofs of their 
 loyalty, were eleded by the then conftitutional 
 Affemblies, and fent to the firft Congref?^ with 
 the moft laudable and loyal defigns, — to accom- 
 modate the alarming controverfy, to eftabUlh a 
 
 ■I i 
 
 iM 
 
 y 4. 
 
 
;,■ • (( »27 ) 
 
 more permanent union between the.two qo^ntri/^s, :: ' 
 and to (lop the rifipg fedition. This was eieaftly ^ v 
 the circumftance of that gentleman, who rcfufcd i 
 the delegation on any other terms *. His Inftruc- >t ' 
 tipns are long fince before the Public, and prove ^ 
 the fa6b i and it is known to many gentlemen now "l \'- ' 
 in London, from Pennfylvania, that, while in-^ '• 
 Congrefs, he faithfully purfucd thbfe Inftruc-'i 
 tipns-f", uniformly exerting his influence and abi- ^ 
 lities to carry them into execution. That he, * 
 boldly, and unawed by the dangers which threat-** 
 ened his perfon, in the tumults of riot and fac- "^ 
 tion which he was oppofing, reprobated and 
 condemned every meafure which tended to fedi-"' 
 tion, and a reparation of the two eountrie?.*-! • 
 That when he found he could not flcm the torrent'^ 
 of rebellion, he returned f^ the AlTcmbly ; and 
 there again, as the ultimate mealure he could pur-"'*^ 
 fue, to fave the province he lived in, he refolutcly 
 exerted hi* influence to induce them to difapprove 
 of the meafures of Congrefs, and totally to fecede 
 from all connexion with it. That having failed in 
 this meafure, on the queftion, by one vote only, ' 
 he was again ele^ed a Member of the fccond Con- 
 grefs, contrary to his own folemn and repeated 
 refufals to fcrv?. That he continued thus eleded 
 utjtil long after that Congrefs met } but as he did 
 
 lire 
 
 • Sec Mr, Galloway's Examination, p. 47, &c« 
 f See Appendix to Letters to a Noblcmin. 
 
 
 ii 
 
 }!lH 
 
 tsd 
 
 » 
 
 JioC 
 
 ^1^ 
 
 i 
 
not Attend, another was etched in his room. And 
 yet fuch was the earncft dcfirc of the Congrcfs to 
 obtain his influence and concurrence in their 
 meafures, that Do^or Franklin came up to his 
 feat in the country, to which he had retired, to 
 folicit his union with them, and offered to i3rocure 
 his immedkdce re*eleclion) all which he reiolucely 
 refufed. And afterwards, that, although his life 
 was repeatedly threatened by the independent fac- 
 tion, and while his friends trembled for his fafety^ 
 he, unawed by his danger, condemned in his publi- 
 cations the meafurps of Congrefs, and charged them 
 with views of independence and treafon, ;^t a time 
 when they publicly difavowcd them. Could it be 
 pofTible for the candour of the Public to afl( for 
 further proof c?f this gentleman's uniform fidelity to 
 his Sovereign, and attachment to the legal confti- 
 tution of his country i his having abandoned a very 
 valuable eJate, and facrificed the independent 
 happinefs of his fr.mily to thofe piirciples, muft 
 certainly be that proof. 
 
 But yoM further add, " When my Brother and 
 " 1, in the character of his Majefty's Commif- 
 «* fioners for reftoring peace, published a /)rtff/<j- 
 «* matioK of indemftity, for all thofe who had taken 
 ** part in the rebellion^ provide*^ they fliould fur- 
 *' render themfelves, and fubfcribe a declarii/ion 
 •* of allegiance within e limited time, Mr, Gal" 
 ** loway was among the firft who came over to us 
 <* from Phuladelphia j" thus intimating that he 
 «! had 
 
1 
 ill 
 
 r^ 
 
 ( 1^9 ) 
 
 had talceii part in the rdbeilion» at\6 caO^e OHt iO 
 you CO take the benefit of the (>ai'clon offiencd hf 
 tht prockmation. Now, Sir, although this ii all 
 Lnvicndon, \ do not fuipcd it ifl yotur own. T wifh, 
 for the iiike o^' jrour own chara^er, to believe it to 
 be tliat of your venal tlcperKUnt, whom you have 
 lung fincc ampJ) newarded for writing your Vin*" 
 dication ^ for yoL know you was nor, where you 
 ought ito havt: be^n, with your amy at Brunfwick^ 
 wnen iMr. GdllowA7 came over to it| but in Mew* 
 York ; nod, flaould I dcfcend to follow your cs- 
 iim{>]e4 of attacking private reputation, 1 could# 
 l^erhaps, infonn the. Public: what alkremeui led you 
 thither. However, as this ii n practice of which I 
 «tijr*pproye, I ih«ll not adopt it, although youf 
 own condudl has juiilkiM ^c> But, Sir, the real 
 truth is— Your proclamation is c '.t^d 30th No' 
 vember, ajid was not publiihed within your own 
 lines »\. f funfwickt in New Jerfey, near 60 milep 
 fiiltiint fr(Mln PhihidelphiA:* ^rom whence you fay 
 Mr. Galloway came, until the day tdlowkigt 
 and on this very day, early in the morning* htf 
 wfti within your lines, with Gener.1l V^ughan, in 
 BrunlWkk. Uriven from his family, by an order 
 of the Can.vefition at Philadelphia hr t\\t impri<< 
 fonment of his ptrfon, he left Pcnnfylvania c. th# 
 aSth, two days before the date of your procla- 
 tiiation, and eleven day* befow; one of them was 
 fcnc 10 the province he left ♦, for you may recoiled, 
 ^hat ihofe proclamations were not fcnt to Pennfyl- 
 
 S vaniii 
 
 
 « 
 
 
 I 
 
 II 
 
 
iii vaniiitJritU after yqur; arrival at Trenton, on the 
 ;8th of Dfccennbcrj when your Aid dc Camp re- 
 fiquerted Mr. Galloway tofcnd fifty of them to FhU 
 uJ ladelphia i which he accordingly did^ by a pcrfoa 
 Hi On whom he could depend. I have mentioned 
 General Vaughan, who, I have no doubt, will 
 itcolleft the time of Mr. Galloway's coming intd 
 Brunfwick, and that he was the Hrfl who ihewed 
 to him the proclamation; Thus, Sir, you will 
 perceive into what a dilemma you have brought 
 ■yourfelf, by trullihg to the invention of one who 
 was with you at New York, and could know no- 
 thing about the time when Mr. Galloway came 
 over to your lines. But^ if yon really thought Mr. 
 Galloway '* had taken part in the rebellion/' why 
 did you afterwards appoint him to fo many places 
 of high truft and importance in his Majefty's fer- 
 vice, giving him> an opportunity daily to betray 
 it ? How can you acc<)unt for a condud, fo in- 
 confift^nt with your manifeft duty, either to your 
 Sovereign or Country ? '"5 tpn^j Xn'imlh/t./^ .im 
 
 ''^ ■ You next meanly deftend to mention your libe- 
 k'ality to Mr. Gallov/ay. Mean, indeed, it will 
 appear, when that gentleman's fervices and facri- 
 ■fices are confidcred, had it flowed from your pri- 
 vate purfe ; and yet meaner ftiii, when it is known 
 you paid it out of the public motley. And how 
 much did this profufc liberality amount to ? No 
 more than 770 1. in which the wages of a clerk are 
 
 , u-cm^^t^ '^P,f^'^'ijSy.'^'^^^M^^f^kf^*^}i3^ i included. 
 
n 
 
 i »3' ) 
 
 included, by your own Recount, for fcrvices per- 
 fcrmed during 18 months. ,,.f 
 
 And what were the fcrvices he pcrformiS ? 
 He afted as Superintcndant of the Police, which 
 he digefted, regulated, and eftablilbed, at your 
 requeft. In this office was included the pre^ 
 fervationof the order, internal peace, and fafety 
 pf the firft city in America. He ferved you as 
 Superintendant of the Port; an office eftablKhed 
 to receive an account, of all the cargoes imported 
 for the ufe of your army, and the people within 
 your lines, and to prevent their being clandeftinely 
 carried to the enemy. He ferved you as Superior 
 tendant of the prohibited Articles. In this office 
 the utmoft care and attention was necelTary, to 
 prevent the enemy from being fupplied with them* 
 He alfo fuperintended every avenue of your lines^ 
 and nightly^ received the reports of perfons apr 
 pointed to attend them. He was conftantly em- 
 ployed by you, from the time of your arrival at 
 rhe head of Elk, to the day of your reHgnar 
 k 'on, in obtaining for you intelligence of the (late 
 ; ad movements of the enemy } and gained more 
 liTjportant and better intelligence for lefs than 50Q !• 
 than you paid for at New York, as your friends 
 confcfTed, upwards of 5000 1. He was often ap-c 
 plied to by the Commiffaries and Quarter- matters, 
 for his advice and affiftance in procuring forage 
 and provifions for your army. He was incefr 
 fantly cj^lied on to f urniHi yqu wi(h guides and 
 , ; ' " '' S ^ ; horrc5 
 
 % 
 
fummmmmmm 
 
 ,1 
 
 .te.t 
 
 hoffes fof youf panics. He tiiM i trOop 6f JigK^ 
 yfiorfc, ^nd embodied eighty loyal v0furt?ecr$, whu 
 fervcd ^ichopt pay or clothing i pCffofhllrtg, uttdcr 
 ills QfMvn dire^ibn, thofe many and uneontmofi fer- 
 Vices mentioned in a note of his Examination, 
 page 80. fie alfb furnifhed you With many maps^ 
 aelirtcktlrig the roads fp^ the march of your army i 
 ^nd ^. nrincip^ one, With all th<tf roads bet WeCti 
 the iX uand the Suft|uehanrtih, either dfawh 
 by himfeii. if under hU immediate dire6Hon i witH 
 a variety of other fervices, totally Jndeptendi^nt of 
 bis public offides ; which, hatStlifcy been ddnti by 
 your favourite officers, would 'have coft ybu tert 
 times the amount tof the whole fwm of your pto*- 
 fufe Hberality to him. Such 'arc the fervices of 
 Mr.Oaliovray, which ydU ha Ve ndt^dthe honout 
 to thcntion. Your liberality, knS ih^k fervices, 
 are ho\v before the 'Public, tb whpfe candid' re^ 
 fleftions both are fiibmltccd. I fhall on!y remark^ 
 thstt, had you dealt blit the public riloncy, com» 
 rnittcd to your charge, with the fame cdconomy to 
 your favourites, as you did to thls^fntlemtin^ we 
 Ihould not have fecr> fo many American Nabobi 
 foiling in wealth, and luxurioufly living on the 
 Ipoils of their country, as have lately returnee! 
 from America. 
 
 In refped to Mr. Galloway's popularity in the 
 provinces in which he had lived, it is too well af- 
 Certained by a variety of fa6h too notorious to 
 be afFc6led by your negation •, but as the charge 
 
 Pf 
 
 fr: 
 
i'l^. 
 
 1 
 
 ,'.::.A.;,,.. ( .,33 ) 
 
 of kfs wmc ofinfl^eticedocs not injuie ha private 
 ind. moral charaAer^ I ihtU fiy no inore oa that 
 
 Of a ycTy^ficretit nafivxt it your next and laft 
 charge. ^ You fay. You *< at firft paid atiention to 
 ** hi9 opinions, and relied upon htm iSoir procuring 
 f* you fecrer in^tigence^ but you a^Krwards 
 '* found your conkidehce mifplaced '^ his ideai yolu 
 ^ <iifcorefed tobe^ifionary } and his intdligencs 
 *' was either iU-^foiinded, pr ib frequently ekaggei- 
 ^ rated, that it woakt not have been fafe to ad 
 ** Mpoti it^* If tWefe^dlcrtioni be truths, why 
 did you continue conftandy to employ him in the 
 line of intelligence, to the day of your refjgnation ? 
 Why was your Aid de Camp almoft daily coming 
 down from you to him, deiiring him to fend out 
 for. intelligence ? Why did you not altogether rely 
 on yo<ur ** other channels of fecret communication ?** 
 How uABitcountable then muft it appear to men of 
 fenie, that you ihould be ki weak as to continue tp 
 truft a perfon, whofe ** ideas you had diicovered to 
 ** be vifionary," and whofe ** inteUigence to be 
 *• ill-founded, exaggerated," andfalfe? 
 
 But you further add, ** Having once detected 
 ** him in fending <ne a [Mcce of intdligence from • 
 ^ perfon, who afterwards, upon examination, 
 
 gave a very different account of the matter, I 
 
 immediately changed the channel of iecret com- 
 *^ munication, and, in fMturc, confidered Mr, 
 *[ Qajloway as a nugatory informer/* How dark 
 • ' '\ iin4 
 
 •c 
 
 u 
 
 ■■' » 
 
/-•• 
 
 ( 134 ) 
 and unmanly is thi& charge ! ' Againft charges fo 
 general, fo perfe^Iy undefined, and fo. artfully 
 made, it is impollible for the moft innocent per- 
 fon to vindicate himfelf; for you have prudently 
 avoided either mentioning the perfon who ** gave 
 ♦•a very different account of the matter," or the 
 matter itfelf. Can you believe, that this (tab in 
 the dark, at a private chara^fctr, will not be con- 
 demned by the candour and good fenfe of the Pub- 
 lic ? It will foon. Sir, appear, that, to the laft 
 hour of your command, you entertained a high 
 opinion of Mr. Galloway's honour and probity. 
 Did you at thfe time, or d ig your command in 
 America, give him the It tt hint of your fufpedt- 
 
 ^ ing the intelligence he fent you ? Had you done 
 this, he would, in all probability, have convinced 
 you that he did not deferve your fufpicion, if, in 
 reality, you ever entertained one ; he might have 
 -convinced you of his having received the intelli- 
 •gence from the perfon who denied it, and that this 
 •perfon had deceived you. This would not. Sir, 
 ;have been th<; only inftance in which you were de- 
 ceived. Qne I will beg leave to remind you oi^ 
 in which your favours and confidence were totally 
 
 ^ anifplaced. Mr. Willing, and his partner Mr. 
 Morris, had been, from the beginning of the re- 
 bellion, the agents wf the Congrefs for fupplying 
 
 ^ their naval and military (tores. Their difaffe^ion 
 to their Sovereign, and their rebellious principles, 
 were proved by a number of letters, intercepted by 
 
 

 : ( 135 ) 
 
 your Noble Brother -, and therefore Mr. Galloway 
 'Called on Mr, Willing in Philadelphia, by your 
 cxprefs order, to rake the oaths of allegiance ; and 
 although he refufed, yet he found fo much favour 
 in your fight, as to obtain a countermand of that 
 order, and a difpenfation from taking the oath ; 
 and even after this, you made him and his flour- 
 broker, Mr. Brown, your confidential negotiators 
 with the Members of the Congrcfs. The rebel 
 records will fupport this truth; and further, that 
 both Mr. Willing and his notable broker deceived 
 and betrayed you. 
 
 However, dark and infidious as this charge is» 
 it is fortunate for Mr. Galloway, that there is 
 proof abundantly fufficient to convince the un- 
 prejudiced, that all you have aflerted refpeAlng 
 his diiloyalty, his unpopularity, and deception, is 
 of recent invention, and had no exigence in your 
 mind when you left America i it is proof which 
 you yourfelf will not deny the credit of, being no 
 kfs than the teftimony of Sir William Howe him- 
 felf, under his own hand, and the feal of his 
 arms. 
 
 ' Six days only before you left Philadelphia, im- 
 prefied with the faithful fervices of Mr. Galloway» 
 you not only warmly recommended him to the at- 
 tention of your fucceiror, but wrote to him the 
 following letter : 
 
 
 l£jkY*1('ls4 
 
 SIR, 
 
 
.... :.,. (( .,6;) '\r, 
 
 l^ ** S I K* PlttadeJphu, Mtry it, ijp:^ 
 f", «« THE faktary effeSts o*^ the regulations itl 
 the eftabliflimenc of the police in this cl^y, have 
 S6 iully jufliifiied my choice of the gentlemen in 
 whole hands I placed the important tmjii tHst t 
 cannpt^ either as a public or private man, withhold 
 tkis tefiimoty efng/fen/t cj their Jervices % and 1 beg, 
 •that^ to the general r^fpeSi paid yoUj as an upri^hty 
 able magifirate^ zxAfrier^i to the legal conjlitution of 
 your country^ 1 rniay be permitted the hooour of 
 adding wy particular ajfurance of the great perjonal 
 ^r^fli with Wihich I sEOj SIR, tt "! . 
 
 'i&:^^M jj^ii {i^ Yow rooft obedient^ ^^,^^,V, 
 
 3^;/;;^ G^«i^. EJiHire,^^^^ '■-rfmfm- 
 
 *]^"^1^ow/Sir, permit meidiiflc^f^If Mr. GaHbway 
 "Was di/loyalj how could you give hkn yotjr teftt- 
 mony that jhe was •* z friend to the legal cokftitii- 
 *» 4uin of Us country /** If he was unpopular, how 
 coul3 he poffefs " the general refpeSt as an upright 
 f* magijlrate ?" If he had deceived you, in giving 
 you falfe iateHigcnce, why could you not Very 
 jUftly, ** either as a puHlic or private man, withhoii 
 '\pour fenfe of his fervices T' And^ if he was «»- 
 ivorthy of your confidence^ how unworthy was it in 
 Sir William Howe to give him particular etffk* 
 ranees of his great perfonal ejleem ? Thcfe are pa- 
 radoxes which we muft kave to be unfolded in 
 r --■ ■ -':; -■:'-■ ■ ;■■ your 
 
 rv' 
 
 «1 
 
 "'\. H. , 
 
; 1. ( 137 ) 
 
 your next attempt to .vindicate, your condudl in the 
 American war. » 
 
 Such was your opinion of Mr. Galloway when you 
 kft Americai and f'uch it continued to be for fome 
 time in England ; for you was the firft gentleman, 
 your own and your Noble Brother's Secretaries ex- 
 cepted, who paid him the honour ofavifiton his 
 arrival in London. Nor was it changed the day 
 before his examination in the Houfe of Commons, 
 on the conduft of the American war; for you 
 well remember, that, on that day, your Nobli 
 Brother, who was pleading in your defence, and 
 therefore we may prefume fpoke your fentimcnts, 
 delivered, when Mr. Galloway was prefent, an 
 high, though fulfomc panegyric on his honour 
 and integrity. But how changeable and uncertain 
 are the good opinions of mqn ! Mr. Galloway 
 being examined, the film which had before in- 
 verted his Lord (hip's optics, and reprcfented Mr, 
 Galloway as a man of integrity, became fuddenly 
 removed •, and from that inftant he flood meta- 
 morphofed from an honourable man into *♦ Shakc- 
 «* fpear*s apothecary ;" and now, by the fame ma*, 
 gical influence, you have transformed him from a 
 man worthy of " general refpeft as an upright 
 (' magiftrate," into one of no />d'/>«/^r/Vj)' ; from an 
 upright matt, into a deceiver •, and from a " friend to 
 *f the legal conllicution of his country," uytoa reb^f^ 
 
 l^ovember io, ?73q» 
 
 . THE AUTHOR. 
 
 ■ ■ ■ "-^ ■ ■ -S. ' ■ . ■ Nq, 
 
IP 
 
 .V' 
 
 f-l: 
 
 No. II. V 
 
 Copy qf a Letter from Samuel Kirk, Grocer] 
 in Nottingham, to General Howi;. , j 
 
 SIR, , ^ 
 
 1 Cannot cafily dcfcribe the difcontent and 
 difappointmenc which appears among a very 
 great number of your constituents here, on acr 
 count of your having accepted a command in the ex' 
 pedition ogainft our American hretbrfn. From the 
 opinion I had of your integrity in genera], I voted 
 for you at the late ele£tion, notwithftanding you 
 )iad, in fome recent inftances, a6ted contrary to my 
 fentiments. I took the liberty to tell you fo, an^ 
 afked you the following questions, viz. 
 . "Whether you thought our whole army woul4 
 not be infufficient to conquer America ? 
 
 If you did not think the Mniftiy had pujhed this 
 fnatter too far ? ^ 
 
 Whether^ if youjhould he af pointed to a fommand^ 
 you would refufe ? And, 
 
 Whether you would vote for the repeal of the 
 
 four Afts of Parliament, which you are now goin^ 
 to enforce ? 
 
 If I am nqt miftaken, and I believe that you 
 \yill allow that I am not, you anfwered to every on^ 
 0f thefe ^eries in the affirmative. This, out of 
 pure regard to yoyr ijitcreft here, I have made 
 
 Jtnow^ 
 
 
• - ( 139 ) 
 ^kndwh to numbers, who were in the fame (late of 
 fufpenfe with myfelf, as to the propriety of our i 
 condudt at the election \ and it has ferved to re- 
 move, in a great meafiire^ the ill imprejfionsy by 
 which you yourfelf was very fetijibly afFefted while 
 among usi 
 
 We are however aflured, that General Howe ' 
 is preparing to embark for America to enforce the ■ 
 ASls, Judge, if you can, the confufton this occajions 
 among your friends. The moft plaufible excufe 
 that !s made among us» is^ that the King fent for 
 youk and what could you doP 
 -f Now I muft beg leave to fay, that I think you 
 might have aftcd the part of a great man, in refu- 
 fing to go againji this people on many accounts. But 
 to fay nothing of politics, your Brother died there. 
 They have Ihewn their gratitude to your name and 
 family, by eredin^ a monument to him, who bled 
 {in the caufe of freedom amongft them -, to him, who 
 dared to ad in oppqfitionto a Court, when his judg- 
 ment informed^him his oppofition was right} and 
 yet he died a loldier. Our pafllons were wrought 
 upon at the eledion by the mention of his honour- 
 ed name, in a paper which you may perhaps re- 
 member ; and may I not mention it to you, with a 
 wifli that you may follow fo amiable, fo difinte- 
 rcfted, fo revered a charadter ? I believe you have 
 not even an enemy, who would impute your refuf- 
 ingtogo, to want of courage*, nay, your courage 
 would be made more confpicuous by the refufal. 
 
 •*r^^^/iiA.X' ,mitn,ijab; '^:. *. ,lh.i-. 
 
 If 
 
 II 
 
 ii5gt."r.-4?i 
 
 •^ 
 
(140 ) 
 
 ' If yt>u (hould refolre, at oU evtnts^ to go, I don'c 
 
 fn^ you may fall^ as many do^ but I catmat fay 1 
 
 • mjh fuccefs to the undertaking, Thcfc, Sir, areeiie 
 
 ii^ntifnents of many here, as well as of 
 
 . Nottingbamy Your obedient fervtnt, 
 
 Feb, 10) 1775. Samuil Kirk. 
 
 General Hows to Mr, Kirk. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 ■^.v 
 
 J Have read your Icttterof the lotb, with fo 
 much the greater degree of concern* as I had 
 flattered myfelf I hiid removed all tJbafe prejudires 
 you had entertained againji me, when I had the plea* 
 fure Oi being with you at the election. The ran 
 cour and malice of thofe who w6re hot my fViend^ 
 at the election, fiUnne with aftoniihment at the 
 inftance you mention of their wiihes for my fall 
 in America. 
 
 ' My going thither was not my feeking. I vttis 
 ■ordered, and coold not itfufe, wkhout incurring 
 the odious name of backwardnefs to ferve my 
 country in diftrefs.^-^o contriary are men^s opinions 
 berei to feme with you, that, inftead ©f the groffcft 
 ^bufe, I have been moft highly corHplimented upon 
 the oecafion^ by thofe who are even averfe to theinea* 
 fures of Adminifiratian, 
 
 Every man's private feelings ought to give way 
 to the fervice of the Public at all times 5 but par. 
 ticularly, when of that delicate nature in which our 
 affairs ftand at prefent. Whatever opprobrious 
 names I may be called at Nottingham, I am en- 
 8 cou raged 
 
V* 
 
 • ( »4i ) 
 
 couraged to fay, that no fuch epithets will be put 
 on it in any other quarter, I intreat you in particular^ 
 to fufpend your judgmeot In tbofe matters^ until 
 the event proves me unworthy of your fupport* 
 
 One woFd for America: You arc deceived, if 
 ybu Aippofe there are not many loyal 4ind peaceable 
 fuhjetts in that country. 1 mny fafely aflert, that 
 the infurgents are very few, in comparilbn of the 
 whole people. 
 
 •.There are certairtly thofe who db not agree to 
 ift taxation from hence, but who do not wi(h to 
 Htwtt thtmfelves from the fupremacy of this coun- 
 try. /Ithis laft fet of men, I fhould hope, by their 
 1)cing relieved from thegHevante, will moft readily 
 return to all due obedience to the hm, 
 ' With fd*pea to tksfetvt who, I am told, defire 
 to feparate thedfelvesfrom the' Mother Country, I 
 truft, when they find they are not fupportcd in 
 their frantic ideas by the more moderate, which I 
 iiave defcribed, they will, from fe^r of punilh- 
 mertt, fubfide to the laws. 
 
 With regard to trade, this country mull now fbt 
 ■ the foundation of its inability with America, by 
 procuring a lafting^ obedience to our laws, without 
 which it can never arrive at that permanency fo 
 abfolutely requifice for the well being of this em- 
 pire. I am, SIR, 
 
 Your faithful and , 
 
 !^een Street, obedient Servant, ^ 
 
 JRf^. 21, 1775. William How-; 
 
 
 : 1 
 
 ^. 
 
•^. 
 
 «"«"«■ 
 
 ( Ha ) 
 
 V\^.^73)ft^t!tA^<!^ ^Nb. III*. ■''•^'Tij^H^'-^'^* 
 
 yi Letter from the Committee of Congre/s to 
 T the Frefidenti found among tke Papers cff 
 
 ■,...^m^J.H'fw^•^r.^. 
 
 iv , „h *u>sf§v<»kii . - ; 
 
 SIR, Camp at Valley Forge^ Feb. 12, 1778. 
 
 WE had flattered ourfclves, t!.at, before this 
 time, the pleafure of Congrcfs would be 
 made known to us, rcfpcdting theQiiartcr-mafter's 
 department. We fear our letter upon thi" fubjedt 
 has mifcarricd, or the confideration of '^t. yielded 
 to other buO.nefs. You will therefore pardon us, 
 Sir, when we '^gain folicit your attention to it, as 
 an objc^ of the lajt imporiance j on which not only 
 the future fuccefs of your arms, but the prefent ex- 
 ijtence of your army, immediately depend. The 
 influence of this office is fo diffufivc through every 
 part of your military fylem, ihat neither the wif- 
 dom of arrangement, the fpirit of cnterprife, or 
 favourable opportunity, will be of any avail, if this 
 great wheel in the machine (lops, or moves heavily^ 
 "We find ourfelves cmbarrafl^ed in entering on this 
 fubjcfl, Icfl: a bare recital of fads (hould carry an 
 imputation (which we do not intend) on thofe 
 gentlemen who have lately conduced it. We are 
 , fcnfible. 
 
•• jT. 
 
 ^f nfible, great and juft allowances are to be made 
 for the peculiarity of their fituation, and we are 
 perhaps not fully acquainted with all their difficul- 
 ties. It is our duty. Sir, to inform you it is not- 
 our intention to cenfure ; and be alTured, nothing 
 but a fenfe of the obligation we are under, to po(t» 
 pone all other confidcrationrj to the public fafety^ 
 could induce us to perform the unpleafing tafk.-^ 
 We find, Sir, the property of the continent dif- 
 perfed over the whole country ; not an encampment, 
 route of the army, or confiderable road, but 
 abounds with waggons, left to the mercy of the 
 weather, and the will of the inhabitants ; large 
 quantity of intrenching tools have, in like manner, 
 been left in various hands, under no other fecurity 
 that v/e can learn, ihan the honcfty of thofe who 
 have them in poHenicn. Not lef: than 3000 fpades 
 and fhoveiS, and thi tike number of tomahawks, 
 have been lately difcovered an i collected in the 
 vicinity of the camp, by an order from one of the 
 general officers. Ir the fame way, a quantity of 
 tents and tent cloth, after having lain a whole fum- 
 mer in afarmer's barn, and unknown to the officer of 
 the department, was lately difcovered,*; id brought to 
 camp by a fpecial order from the General.— From 
 thefc inllances, we prefume there may be many 
 other (lores yet unknown and uticollefted, which 
 jreauire immediate care and attention. ,*>**-• t ♦ 
 
 ' When, 
 
 ■ \ \ 
 
 .o. 
 
■S..'. X 
 
 ' ■■■■ I 144 > ■ 
 
 Wbeti) in compliance with the expedlations of 
 CoQgrefs, and the wifhes of the country, the army 
 wai thrown into huts, inftead of retiring to more 
 diftant and convenient quarters, the troops juftly 
 expeded every comfort which the furrounding 
 country could afford. Among thefe, a providential 
 care in the article of ftraw, would probably have 
 iaved the lives of many of your brave foldicrs, 
 who have now paid the great debt of nature. Un- 
 provided with this, or matmals to raife them from 
 the cold and wit earth, ficknefs and mortality have 
 fpread through tksir quarters in an ajlomjhing degree* 
 J^otwitbfianding the diligence of the pbyficians and 
 fmgeenSi of whom we hear no complaint^ the fiek 
 emd dead Uft has increafed one-^third in the lafi week's 
 returns, %vhich was one third greater than the week 
 preceding \ and^ from the prefent inclement weather, 
 will probably increafe in a much greater proportion»-r 
 Nothing, Sir, can equal their fufferings^ except th^, 
 {>ati€nce and fortitude with which the faithful part 
 nf the army endure them. Thofe of a different chom 
 ra^er defer t in confiderahle numbers, j. ,.;>}. t>,-,ii '•m ■ j 
 
 We muft alio obferve, that a number of the 
 troops have now fome time been prepared fop 
 in "Mlationj but the operation muft be delayed, foy 
 ^\.ut of this and other neccflfaries within the pro-* 
 vidence of this department. We need not point 
 out the fatal confcquences of this delay in forming 
 H new army, or the prefervation of thi^, Almoft 
 
 \\ 
 
^^ 
 
 ( 145 ) 
 
 t^iery day furnifhes inftances of the fmall pox in 
 the natural way. Hitherto fuch vigilance and care 
 has been ufed, that the contagion has not fpread ; 
 but furely it is highly incumbent upon us, if pofli- 
 ble, to annihilate the danger. 
 
 We need not point out the efFeifl this circum- 
 fiance will have upon the new draughted troops, 
 if not carefully guarded ; they are too obvious to 
 need enumeration. In conference with the l^oragc- 
 inafter on this fubjed (which, though in appear- 
 ance trivial, is really important), he acquainted 
 us, that, though out of his line, he would have 
 procured it, if waggons could bavs been furnijhed him 
 for that furpofe. 
 
 The want of horfes and waggons for the ordinary 
 as well as extraordinary occajions of the army^ prefles 
 upon us, ifpoflible, with equal force; aiuioft every 
 fpecies of camp tranfportation is ow performed 
 ^ men, who, without a murmur, puaeHtl) yoke them- 
 felves to little carriages of their own making, r load 
 their wood and provijions on their hacks — Shculc the 
 enemy, encouraged by the growing weaknefs of your 
 troops, be led to make afuccefsful imprejjion upojtyour 
 camp, your artillery ziould now undoubtedly fall into 
 their hands, for wai:t of horfes to remove it. — But 
 thefe are fmaller and tolerable evils, when com- 
 pared with the imminent danger of your troops, 
 perijhing with famine, or difperjing in fearch of food » 
 The Commiflaries, in adtlition to their fupplicsot 
 
 U . live 
 
 1. 1 
 
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 mmw^O'^^ 
 
 '1,1 
 
 ( 146 ) 
 
 live cattle, which arc precarious, have found A 
 cjuantity of pork in New Jerfey, of which, by a 
 failure of wagons, not one barrel has reached the 
 €amp. 
 
 The orders were given for that purpbfe as early 
 as the 4.th of January, — In yefterday's conference 
 with the General, he informed us, that fame Bri^ 
 gades had been four days without meat •, and that even 
 the common foldiers had been at his quarters to make 
 known their wants. — At prefent, Sir, there is not 
 one gentleman of any rank in this department, 
 though the duties of the office require a conftant and 
 unremitted attention. In whatev er view, therefore, 
 the objc(5t prefcnts iifclf, we truft you will difcern* 
 that the mod cflcntial intercfts arc conneded with 
 it. The feafon of preparation for next campaign, is 
 pafTing fwiftly away. Be afllired. Sir, that its 
 operations will be intHTcdual, either for offence or 
 proteSlion^ if an arrangement is not immediately 
 made, and the moft vigorous exertions ufed to pro- 
 cure the neceflary fupplies. — Permit us to fay, that 
 a moment* s time fijould not be lofi in placing a man of 
 approved abilities and extenfive capacity at the 
 head of the department, who will rcftorc it to fome 
 degree of regularity and order ; whofe provident 
 care will immediately relieve the prefent wants of 
 the army, and extend itfclf to thofe which muft be 
 fdtisfied, before we can cxpedl vigour, entcrprife, or 
 luccefs. — When your Committee reflcdl upon the 
 ' ' $ increafed 
 
 \) 
 
Xi 
 
 \) 
 
 ,.-:<i: ( HI ) ^ 
 
 'iicreaied difficulties of procuring waggons^ horfcsy 
 tents, and the numerous train of articles dependrnc 
 on this office, without which your army cannot even 
 move ; they feel the greatcft anxiety, left the utmoft 
 jkilU diligence^ and addrefs^ will prove ineffeSiual to 
 ffltisfy the growing demand, A 11 other conUdcrations 
 vanifli before this objcft ; and we molt earncftly 
 wifli, Congrefs may be impreffed in a proper de- 
 gree with its necejftty and importance, 
 
 A report has reached us, that Col. Lutterlogh 
 is a candidate for the office of Quarter-mafter Ge- 
 liieral \ we have therefore been led to make fome 
 inquiry into his chara6ler and condudl. — Wc 
 0iould be far from doing injuflice to his abilities 
 and experience in a fubordinate line-, but, exclufivc 
 of the danger of entrufting lb confidential an office 
 to a ftranger, whofe attachment to this country 
 muft be light and tranfient, and whofe intereft may 
 be fo eafily didinguiflied from ours, wc cannot find 
 that he poiTefies talents or a<5livitv equal to this 
 important office. — We find, in the courfe of the 
 campaign, neceflary tools and (lores have often 
 been wanting •, important and fcafonable move- 
 ments of the army delayed ; in fome inftanres, 
 wholly frullrated \ and favourable opportunities 
 Joll:, through the deficiencies of this department.— ? 
 The rapid marches of our army, and unforefeen 
 difarters which attended it during the fummer fealon, 
 
 U * partly 
 
 .A* 
 
mm 
 
 mm 
 
 // 
 
 V 
 
 ( 148 ) Y 
 
 partly claim fome allowances -, but that diibrder 
 and confufion prevail through the departmentj 
 which requires fome able hand to reform and re- 
 duce it to a certain and melancholy truth. 
 
 Unacquainted with the refolution of Congrefs 
 with refpeft to General Schuyler, we have hefitated 
 what further to propofe. Time is fo extremely pre- 
 carious, th^t we are unwilling to lofe a (ingle un"* 
 necefTary moment ; and have therefore been in- 
 duced to extend our views to the difapprobation of 
 this gentleman, and make fome provifion for that; 
 event. A character has prefented itfelf, which, in a 
 great degree, meets our approbation^ judgment, 
 and wifties.— We have opened the fubjed to him, 
 and it is now under his confideration. When we are 
 at liberty, we Ihall introduce him to your notice j 
 but delicacy forbids our doing it, until he has made 
 up his mind on the fubje6l, and given his confenc 
 to the nomination.— Another gentleman of exten^^ 
 five connexions, great a<^ivity, and comprfehen-? 
 five genius, but intircly in civil life, has alfo been 
 propofed. As he is at a diftance, we have not been 
 able to confult him } and are reftrained» by fimilar 
 motives of delicacy, from making his character 
 and name a fubjed): of difcuffion, without his con- 
 fent. 
 
 By the time we are favoured with the determin- 
 ation refpedting General Schuyler, and he fhoulcf 
 

 { »49 ) 
 
 pot be approved, we hope to be able to announof 
 both thcfe gentlemen for your confideratioii.' 
 
 :Wc are, with the grciteft regard and refpcdt,; ' 
 
 SIR, 
 
 your moft obedient, and 
 " ., very humble lervants; 
 
 '-'': ^ .:. .^KxM^kiao (TheCommitwiuJ 
 : ^ ^Signed Fra, Pawaj 
 
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 iW^^PWWH^W^^^ 
 
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