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2. 
 
 THE ALABAMA CLAIMS. 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OP THE HONOURABLE 
 
 CHARLES SUMNEE, 
 
 DELIVERED IN EXECUTIVE SESSION OP THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 
 
 On Tuesday, April \Wi, 1869, 
 
 AOMNST XHK RATIFICATION OF TUB 
 
 JOHNSON-CLARENDON TREATY 
 
 FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ALABAMA AND OTHER CLAIMS. 
 
 LONDON: 
 STEVENS BROTHERS, 
 
 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.Q 
 
 1869. 
 
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SPEECH 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Hon. CHARLES SUMNER, 
 
 In Executive Session of the United States Senate, 
 Jpril 13, 1869, on the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty 
 for the Settlement of the ''Alabama* and other 
 Claims. 
 
 Mr. President : A Report recommending that the 
 Senate do not advise and consent to a Treaty with 
 a foreign Power, duly signed by the Plenipotentiary 
 of the nation, is of rare occurrence. Treaties are 
 often reported with amendments, and sometimes with- 
 out any recommendation; but I do not recall an in- 
 stance, since I came into the Senate, where such a 
 Treaty has been reported with the recommendation which 
 is now under consideration. The character of the Treaty 
 seemed to justify the exceptional Report. The Com- 
 mittee did not hesitate in the conclusion that the Treaty 
 ought to be rejected, and they have said so. I do not 
 disguise the importance of this act ; but I believe that in 
 the interest of peace, which every one should have at 
 heart, the Treaty must be rejected. A Treaty which, 
 instead of removing an existing grievance, leaves it for 
 heart-burning and rancour, cannot be considered a set- 
 tlement of pending questions between two nations. It 
 may seem to settle them, but docs not. It is nothing 
 but a snare. And sucli is the character of the Treaty 
 now before us. The massive grievance under which our 
 country suft(^rcd for years is left untouched ; the painful 
 
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 sense of wrong planted in the national heart is allowed 
 to remain. For all this there is not one word of regret 
 or even of recognition ; nor is there any semblance of 
 compensation. It cannot be for the interest of either 
 party that such a Treaty should be ratified. It cannot 
 promote the interest of tlie United States, for wc natu- 
 rally seek jtistice as the foundation of a g(K)d understand- 
 ing with Great Britain ; nor can it promote the interest 
 of Great Britain, which must also seek a real settlement 
 of all i)cnding questions. Surely I do not err when I 
 say that a wise statesmanship, whether on our side or on 
 the other side, must apply itself to find the real root of 
 evil, and then, with courage tempered by candour and 
 moderation, see that it is extirpated. This is for the in- 
 terest of both parties, and anything short of it is a 
 failure. It is sufficient to say that the present Treaty 
 does no such thing, and that whatever may liavc been 
 the disposition of the negotiators, the real root of evil 
 remains untouched in all its original strength. I make 
 these remarks merely to characterize the Treaty and 
 prepare the way for its consideration. 
 
 If wc look at the negotiation which immediately preceded 
 the Treatj-^, we find little to commend. You have it on your 
 table. I think I am not mistaken when I say that it shows 
 a haste which finds few precedents in diplomacy, but which 
 is explained by the anxiety to rcacl.. a conclusion before 
 the advent of a new Administration. Mr. Seward and 
 Mr. lleverdy Johnson both nuite in this unprecedented 
 activity, using the Atlantic Cable freely. I should not 
 object to haste or to the freest use of the Cable, if ilie 
 result were such as could be approved ; but, considering 
 the character of the transaction, and how completely the 
 Treaty conceals the main cause of offence, it seems as if 
 the honourable negotiators were engaged in huddling 
 something out of sight. 
 
 The Treaty has for its model the Claims Convention 
 of 1853. To take such a Convention as a model was 
 a strange mistake. That Convention was for the 
 settlement of outstanding claims of American citizens 
 
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 on Great Britain, and of British subjects on the 
 United States, which had arisen since the Treaty of 
 Ghent in 1815. It concerned individuals only and not 
 the nation. It was not in any respect political; nor 
 was it to remove any sense of national wrong. To 
 take such a Convention as the model for a Treaty which 
 was to determine a national grievance of transcendent 
 importance in the relations of two countries, marked on 
 the threshold an insensibility to the true nature of the 
 difference to be settled. At once it belittled the work 
 to be done. An inspection of the Treaty shows how, 
 from beginning to cud, it is merely for the settlement of 
 individual claims on both sides, putting both batches on 
 an equality j so that the sufferers by the misconduct of 
 England may be counterbalanced by British blockade- 
 runners. It opens with a preamble which, instead of 
 announcing the unprccedeuted question between the two 
 countries, simply refers to individual claims which have 
 arisen since 1853 — which was the last time of settle- 
 ment — some of which are still pending and remain un- 
 settled. Who would believe that, under these words of 
 commonplace, was concealed that xuisettlcd difference 
 which has already so deeply stirred the American people, 
 and is destined, until finally adjusted, to occupy the at- 
 tention of the civilized Avorld? Nothing here gives 
 notice of the real question. I quote the pi'camble, as it 
 is the key-note to the Treaty : — 
 
 " Whereas claims have at various tunes since the exchange of 
 the ratifications of the Convention between Great Britain and elie 
 United States of xVnierica, signed at London on the 8th of ' :';• 
 riiary, 1853, been made upon the Government of lier Britanni'; 
 Majesty on the part of citizens of the United States, and upon 
 the Government of the United States on the part of subjects 
 of lier Britannic Majesty ; and whereas some of such claims are 
 still pending and remain unsettled, lier Majesty the Queen of the 
 United Kiiigdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the President 
 of the United States of America, being of the opinion that a 
 speedy and equitable settlement of all sucli claims will contribute 
 nuich to the maintenance of the friendly feelings which subsist 
 between the two countries, have resolved to make arrangements 
 for that purpose by means of a Convention." 
 
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 The proviHiouH of the Treaty are for the trial of these 
 cases. A commission is coiiHtitutcd, whidi is empowered 
 to choose nn arbitrator; hut in the event of a failure to 
 agree, the arbitrator shall be <letorminc(l " by lot" out of 
 two persona named by each side. lOvcn if this aleatory 
 proceeding were a proper device in the umpirage of pri- 
 vate claims, it is strangely inconsistent with the solemnity 
 which belongs to the present question. The moral sense 
 is disturbed by such a process at any stage of the trial j 
 nor is it satisfied by the subsequent provision for the 
 selection of a sovereign or head of a friendly State as arbi- 
 trator. The Treaty not merely makes no provision for the 
 determination of the great question, but it seems to pro- 
 vide expressly that it shall never hereafter be presented. 
 The petty provision for individual claims, subject to a 
 set-off from the individual claims of England, so that in 
 the end our country may poasibly receive nothing, is the 
 consideration for this strange surrender. I borrow a 
 term from an English statesman on another occasion, if 
 I call it a " capitulation.'* For the settlement of a few 
 individual claims we condone the original, far-reaching, 
 and destructive wrong. Here are the plain words by 
 which this is done : — 
 
 " The high contracting parties engage to consider the result of 
 the proceedings of this Commission as a full and final settlement 
 of every claim upon either Government arising out of any trans- 
 action of a date prior to the exchange of the ratifications of the 
 present Convention, and further engage that every such claim, 
 whether or not the same may have been presented to the notice 
 of, made, preferred, or laid before the said Commission, shall, 
 from and after the conclusion of the proceedings of the said 
 Commission, be considered and treated as finally settled and 
 barred, and thenceforth inadmissible." 
 
 All this I quote directly from the Treaty. It is Article V. 
 The national cause is handled as nothing more than a 
 bundle of individual claims, and the result of the pro- 
 ceedings undc f the proposed Treaty is to be a " full and 
 " final settlement/' so that hereafter all claims " shall be 
 " considered and treated as finally settled and barred, and 
 " thenceforth inadmissible." Here is no provision for the 
 
real question, which, though thrust out of sight, or de- 
 (liircd to be " finally settled and barred," according to 
 the terms of the Treaty, must return to j)laguc the two 
 countries. Whatever the Treaty may say in terras, there 
 is no settlement in fact, uiul until this is made there will 
 be a constant menace of discord. Nor can it be forgotten 
 that there is no recognition of the rule of international 
 duty applicable to such cases. This too is left unsettled. 
 While doing so little for us, the Treaty makes ample pro- 
 vision for all known claims on the British side. As 
 these are exclusively " individual," they are completely 
 covered by the text, which has no limitations or excep- 
 tions. Already it is announced iu England that even 
 those of " Confederate bondholders " are included. I 
 have before me an English journal which describes the 
 latter claims as founded on " immense quantities of cot- 
 " ton, worth at the time of their seizure nearly two shil- 
 " lings a pound, which were then in the legal possession 
 " of those bondholders ;" and the same authority adds, 
 " These claims will be brought, indiflPerently with others, 
 " before the designed joint commission whenever it shall 
 " sit." From another quarter I learn, that these bond- 
 holders are "very sanguine of success under the treaty as 
 " it is worded, and certain it is that the loan went up from 
 " to 10 as soon as it was ascertained that the Treaty was 
 " signed." I doubt if the American people are ready just 
 now to provide for any such claims. That they have risen 
 in the market is an argument against the Treaty. 
 
 Passing from the Treaty, I come now to consider briefly, 
 but with proper precision, the true ground of complaint ; 
 and here again we shall see the constant inadequacy of 
 the remedy now applied. It is with reluctance that I 
 enter upon this statement, and I do it only in the dis- 
 charge of a duty which cannot be postponed. Close 
 upon the outbreak of our troubles, just one month after 
 the bombardment of Fort Sumter, when the rebellion was 
 still undeveloped, when the National Government was 
 beginning those gigantic efforts which ended so trium- 
 phantly, the country was startled by the news that the 
 
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 Dritish Oovcnimcnt hml iiitorvonod by a proclamation, 
 which acconh^l lM;lligcrciit ri(;ht8 to the rchcN. At the 
 early date wljcn this was (h)iie the rclxiU were, aH they 
 remained to the chHte, withont nhipH on the ocean, withont 
 prize courtH or other tribunal for the adminintration of 
 justice on the ocean, without any of those conditions which 
 are the essential prerequisites to such a concession ; and 
 yet the conccHHion was (general, heinfi; applicable to the 
 ocean and the land, so that by Hritinh Hat they l)ecamc 
 ocean belligerents aswell us land belligerents. In the swift- 
 ness of this bestowal there was very little consideration 
 for a friendly Power ; nor docs it appear that there was 
 any inquiry into those conditions-precedent on which it 
 must depend. Ocean bcllij^crency being a " fact," and 
 not a " principle," can be recognised only on evidence 
 showing its actual existence, according to the rule, first 
 stated by Mr. Canning and afterwards recognised by Earl 
 llussell. But no such evidence was adduced ; for it did 
 not exist, and never has existed. Too much stress cannot 
 be laid upon the rule, that belligerency is a " fact " and 
 not a " principle." It is, perhaps, the most important 
 contribution to this discuMsion, and its original statement, 
 on occasion of the (Jirc«.'k revolution, docs honour to its 
 author, imqucstionably the brightest genius ever directed 
 to this subject. According to this rule, belligerency 
 must be proved to exist ; it must be shown. It cannot 
 be imagined, or divined, or invented ; it must exist as a 
 " fact " Avithin the knowledge of the world, or at least 
 as a " fact" susceptible of proof. Nor can it be inferred 
 on the ocean merely from its existence on the land. From 
 the beginning, when God called the dry land earth and 
 the gathering of the waters called He seas, the two have 
 been separate, and the power over one has not necessarily 
 implied power over the other. There is a dominion of 
 the laud and a dominion of the ocean. But, whatever 
 power the rebels possessed on the land, they were always 
 without power on the ocean. Admitting that they were 
 belligerents on the land, they were never belligerents on 
 the ocean. 
 

 
 " The oak loviatlinnH, wIioho Inigc rilm niiiko 
 Thfir clay ontatur tlitt vain titlo take 
 Of lord of tlioo, aiul arbiter of war ;" 
 
 thpHO tlioy never poNscMscd. Such was the " fact" that 
 nuiHt govern the present qucHtion. The rnle, ho HJniple, 
 plain, and intelligible, as stated by Mr. Canning, is* a 
 (li'ci.sivc toueliHtone of the BritiHli coneesnion, which, 
 when brought to it, i.s found to be -without Hupport. 
 Unfriendly in the precipitancy with which it wuh 
 launched, this conccNaion won more unfriendly in sub- 
 Ntauce. It was the first stage in the depredations on 
 our comnierce. Had it not been nuule, no rebel ship 
 could have been built in Knghmd. Every step in her 
 building would have been piracy. Nor couUl any muni- 
 tions of war have been furnished. The direct consc- 
 (lucnco of this concession was to place the rebels on an 
 ccpuility with ourselves in all British markets, whether of 
 ships or munitions of war. As these were open to the 
 National (iovcrnment, so were they open to the rebels. 
 The asserted neutndity between the two began by this 
 tremendous concession, when rebels, at one stroke, were 
 transformed not only into belligerents, but into cus- 
 tomers. In attributing to that bad proclamation this 
 peculiar influence, I follow the authority of the Law 
 Lords of England, who, according to authentic report, 
 announced that without it the fitting out of a ship in 
 Kngland to cruise against the United States would have 
 been an act of piracy. This conclusion was clearly 
 stated by Lord Chelmsford, ex-Chancellor, speaking for 
 himself and others, when he said : — 
 
 " If the Southern Confederacy had not been recognised as a 
 brlli(/ereiit Poiver, ho agreed with liis noMe and Iciirncd <■ jud 
 [Lord Brougham] that, under these circumstances, if any Eng- 
 lisluiiau were to fit out a privateer for the purpose of assisting 
 the Southern States against tlie Northern States, lie wuuld be 
 ijiiilti/ of piracy." 
 
 This conclusion is only according to analogies of law. 
 It is criminal for British subjects to forge bombs or 
 hand-grenades to be employed in the assassination of a 
 
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 foreign sovereign at peace with England, as when Bernard 
 supplied from England the missiles used by Orsini 
 against the life of the French Emperor ; all of which is 
 illustrated by Lord Chief-Justice Campbell, in his charge 
 to the jury on the trial of Bernard, and also by contem- 
 poraneous opinions of Lord Lyndlmrst, Lord Brougham, 
 Lord Truro, and at an earlier day by Lord Ellenborough 
 in a case of libel on the First Consul, That excellent 
 authority, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, gives a summary 
 drawn frpm all these opinions, when he says : — 
 
 " The obligation incumbent upon a State of preventing her 
 soil from being used as an arsenal in which the means of attack 
 against a foreign Government may be collected and prepared 
 for use, is wholly independent of the form and character of that 
 Government." [Ore Extradition, page 75.] 
 
 As every Government is constrained by this rule, so 
 every Government is entitled to its safeguards. There 
 can be no reason why the life of our Republic should be 
 less sacred than the life of an emperor, or should enjoy 
 less protection from British law ! That England became 
 an " arsenal " for the rebels we know, but this could not 
 have been unless the proclamation had prepared the way. 
 The only justification that I have heard for this extraor- 
 dinary concession, which unleashed upon our country the 
 furies of foreign war to commingle with the furies of 
 rebellion at home, is that President Lincoln undertook 
 to proclaim a blockad^i of the rebel ports. By the use 
 of this word "blockade'^ the concession is vindicated. 
 Had President Lincoln proclaimed a closing of the rebel 
 ports, there cotdd have been no such concession. This 
 is a mere technicality. Lawyers might call it an apex 
 juris ; and yet on this sharp point England hangs her 
 defence. It is sufficient that in a great case like the 
 present, where the correlative duties of a friendly Power 
 are in question, an act fraught with such portentous evil 
 cannot be vindicated on a technicality. In this debate 
 there is no room for technicality on either side. We 
 must look at the substance and find a reason in nothing 
 short of overruling necessity. War cannot be justified 
 
 X^ 
 
11 
 
 merely on a technicality; nor can the concession of 
 ocean belligerency to rebels withont a port or prize 
 court. Such a concession, like Avar itself, must be at 
 tlic peril of the nation making it. 
 
 The British assumption, besides being offensive from 
 mere techui(!ality, is inconsistent with the proclamation of 
 the President, taken as a whole, which, while appointing a 
 blockade, is careful to reserve the rights of sovereignty, thus 
 piitting foreign Powers on their guard against any prema- 
 ture concession. After declaring an existing insurrection in 
 certain States, and the obstruction of the laws for the 
 collection of the revenue, as the motive for action, the 
 President invokes not only the law of nations but the 
 " laws of the United States,^' and, in further assertion of 
 the national sovereignty, declares rebel cruisers to be 
 pirates. Clearly the proclamation must be taken as a 
 whole, and its different provi'-ions so interpreted as to 
 harmonize with each other. Tf they cannot stand to- 
 gether, then it is the " blockade'^ which must be modified 
 by the national sovereignty, and not the national sove- 
 reignty by the blockade. Such should have been the 
 interpretation of a friendly Power, especially when it is 
 considered that there are numerous precedents of what 
 the great German authority, Heffter, calls " pacific 
 blockade,^^ or blockade without concession of ocean 
 belligerency, as in the case of France, England, and 
 Russia against Turkey, 1827 ; France against Mexico, 
 1837-39 J France and Great Britain against the Argen- 
 tine Republic, 1838-48; Russia against the Circassians, 
 1831-36, illustrated by the seizure of the Vixen so 
 famous in diplomatic history [Hautefeuille des Droits et 
 des Devoirs des Neutres.) Cases like these led Heffter 
 to lay down the rule that "blockade' does not necessarily 
 coustitute a state of regular war {Droit International, 
 § § 112, 121,) as was assumed by the British proclamation 
 — even in the face of positive words by President Lincoln 
 asserting the national sovereignty and appealing to the 
 "laws of the United States." The existence of such 
 cases was like a notice to the British Government against 
 
 
 
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 the concession so rashly made. It was an all-sufficient 
 warning, which this Power disregarded. 
 
 So far as is now known, the whole case for Enf^iand is 
 made; to stand on the use of the word "blockade" by Presi- 
 dent Lincoln. Had he used any other word the concession 
 of belligerency would have been without justification, 
 even such as is now imagined. It was this word which, 
 with magical might, opened the gates to all those bountiful 
 supplies by which hostile expeditions were equipped 
 against the United States. It opened the gates of war. 
 Most appalling is it to think that one little word, un- 
 consciously used by a tinisting President, could be caught 
 up by a friendly Power and made to play such a part. 
 I may add that there is one other word often invoked for 
 apology. It is "neutrality," which, it is said, was proclaimed 
 between two belligerents. Nothing could be fairer, always 
 provided that the " neutrality" proclaimed did not begin 
 with a concession to one party, without which this party 
 would be powerless. Between two established nations, 
 both independent, as between Russia and France, there 
 may be neutrality; for the two are already equal iu 
 rights, and the proclamation would be precisely equal in 
 its operation. But where one party is an established 
 nation and the other is nothing but an odious combina- 
 tion of rebels, the proclamation is most unequal iu 
 operation ; for it begins by a solemn investiture of rebels 
 with all the rights of war, saying to them, as was once 
 said to the youthful knight, " Rise ; here is a sword ; 
 use it." To call such an investiture a proclamation of 
 neutrality is a misnomer. It was a proclamation of 
 equality between the national Government on the one 
 side and rebels on the other, and no plausible word can 
 obscure this distinctive character. 
 
 Then came the building of the pirate ships, one after 
 another. "While the Alabama was still in the ship-yard it 
 became apparent that she was intended for the rebels. Our 
 Minister at London and our Consul at Liverpool exerted 
 themselves for her arrest and detention. They were put off 
 from day today. On the 21th July, 1862, Mr. Adams "com- 
 
 
13 
 
 pleted his evitlr*^<ce/* accompanied by an opinion from 
 the eminent 1 .ster, Mr. Collier, afterwards Solicitor- 
 General, dcclav 1^ the plain duty of the British Govern- 
 ment to stop her. Instead of acting promptly by the tele- 
 graph, five days were allowed to run out, when at last 
 too tardily the necessary order was dispatched. Mean- 
 while the pirate ship escaped from the port of Liverpool 
 by a stratagem and her voyage began with music and 
 frolic. Here beyond all question was negligence, or, 
 according to the language of Lord Brougham on another 
 occasion, " crass negligence," making England justly re- 
 sponsible for all that ensued. The pirate ship found 
 refuge in an obscure harbour of Wales, known as Moelfra 
 Bay, where she lay in British waters from half past 
 seven o'clock p.m. July 29, to about three o'clock a.m. 
 July 31, being upward of thirty-six hours, and during this 
 time she was supplied with men from the British steam- 
 tug Hercules, which followed her from Liverpool. These 
 thirty-six hours were allowed to elapse without any at- 
 tempt to stop her. Here was another stage of " crass 
 negligence." Thus was there negligence in allowing the 
 building to proceed, negligence in allowing the escape 
 from Liverpool, and negligence in allowing the final 
 escape from the British coast. Lord Russell, while 
 trying to vindicate his Government and repelling the 
 complaints of the United States, more than once ad- 
 mitted that the escape of the Alabama was a " scandal and 
 "reproach," which, to my mind, is very like a confession. 
 Language could not be stronger. Surely such an act 
 cannot be blameless. If damages are ever awarded to a 
 friendly Power for injuries received, it is difficult to see 
 where they could be more strenuously claimed than in a 
 case which the First Minister of the offending Power 
 did not hesitate to characterize so strongly. The enlist- 
 ment of tlie crew was not less obnoxious to censure than 
 tlie building of the ship and her escape. It was a part 
 of the transaction. The evidence is explicit. Not to 
 occupy too much time, I refer only to the affidavit of 
 William Passmore, who swears that he was engaged witli 
 
 1 
 
 
 Wi^ 
 
 
X»,i 
 
 m 
 
 
 3W'. 
 
 
 
 'v?£3?•q,^;;'i : , 
 
 •■J 
 
 14 
 
 the express understanding that the ship was " to fight 
 " for the Government of the Confederate States of Ame- 
 ** rica ;" that he joined her at Laird's yard at Birkenliead, 
 near Liverpool, remaining there several days ; that he 
 found about thirty old man-of-war's men on board, 
 among whom it Avas " well known that she was going 
 " out as a privateer for the Confederate Government to 
 " fight under a commission from Mr. Jefferson Davis." 
 In a list of the crew now before me there is a large 
 number said to be from the " Royal Naval "T/Cserve." I 
 might add to this testimony. The more the case is ex- 
 amined, the more clearly do we discern the character of 
 the transaction. The dedication of the ship to the Rebel 
 service, from the very laying of the keel and the organ- 
 ization of her voyage with England as her naval base, 
 from which she drew munitions of war and men, made 
 her departure as much a hostile expedition as if she had 
 sailed forth from her Majesty's dock-yard. At a moment 
 of protbund peace, between the United States and Eng- 
 land, there was a hostile expedition against the United 
 States. It was in no just sense a commercial transac- 
 tion, but an act of war. 
 
 The case is not yet complete. The Alabama, whose 
 building was in defiance of law, international and muni- 
 cipal, whose escape was a " scandal and reproach," and 
 whose enlistment of her crew was a fit sequel to the rest, 
 after being supplied with an armament and with a rebel 
 commander, entered upon her career of piracy. 
 
 Mark now a new stage of complicity. Constantly the 
 pirate ship was within reach of British cruisers, and from 
 time to time within the shelter of British ports. For six 
 days unmolested she enjoyed the pleasant hospitality of 
 Kingston, in Jamaica, obtaining freely the coal and other 
 supplies so necessary to her vocation. But no British 
 cruiser, no British magistrate, ever arrested the offending 
 ship, whose voyage was a continuing " scandal and re- 
 " proach " to the British Government. The excuse for this 
 strange license is a curious technicality, as if a technicality 
 could avail in this case at any stage. Burrowing a 
 
 ■'i.v; 
 
15 
 
 phrase from that master of Admiralty jurisprudence. Sir 
 William Scott, it is said that the ship " deposited " her 
 original sin at the conclusion of her voyage, so that 
 afterward she was blameless. But the Alabama never 
 concladed her voyage until she sank under the guns of 
 the Kearsarge, because she never had a port of her own. 
 She was no better than the Flying Dutchman, and so long 
 as she sailed was liable for that original sin which had im- 
 pregnated every plank with an indelible dye. No British 
 cruiser could allow her to proceed, no British port could 
 give her shelter, without renewing the complicity of Eng- 
 land. 
 
 The Alabama case begins with a fatal concession, by 
 which the rebels were enabled to build ships in England, 
 and then to sail them without being liable as pirates ; it 
 next shows itself in the building of the ship, in the arma- 
 ment, and in the escape, with so much of negligence on 
 the part of the British Government as to constitute suffe- 
 rance, if not connivance; and then again the case reappears 
 in the welcome and hospitality accorded by British cruisers 
 and by the magistrates of British ports to the pirate ship, 
 when her evasion from British jurisdiction was well 
 known. Thus at three different stages the British Govern- 
 ment is compromised -, first, in the concession of ocean 
 belligerency', on which all depended ; secondly, in the 
 negligence which allowed the evasion of the ship in 
 order to enter upon the hostile expedition for which she 
 was built, manned, armed, and equipped j and thirdly, 
 in the open complicity which, after this evasion, gave 
 her welcome hospitality and supplies in British ports. 
 Thus her depredations and burnings, makiig the ocean 
 blaze, all proceeded from England, which, by three 
 different acts, lighted the torch. To England must be 
 traced, also, all the wide-spread consequences which 
 ensued. 
 
 I take the case of the Alabama, because it is 
 the best known, and because the building, equipment, 
 and escape of this ship were under circumstances most 
 obnoxious to judgment ; l)ut it will not be forgotten 
 
 I i 
 
 
 
 
 Mm 
 
 
 
iS' 
 
 iiS 
 
 m 
 
 
 ■Hit 
 
 i.« 
 
 WJ 
 
 
 't\a 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 that there were consort ships, built under the shelter of 
 that fatal proclamation, issued in such an eclipse of just 
 principles, and, like the ships it unloosed " rigged with 
 ciu-ses dark/' One after the other, ships were built ; 
 one after the other, they escaped on their errand ; and, 
 one after the other, they enjoyed the immunities of 
 British ports. Audacity reached its height when iron- 
 clad rams were built, and the perversity of the British 
 Government became still more coispicuous by its long 
 refusal to arrest these destructive engines of war, de- 
 signed to be employed against the United States. This 
 protracted hesitation, where the consequences were so 
 menacing, is a part of the case. It is plain that the 
 ships which were built under the safeguard of this ill- 
 omened proclamation, which stole forth from the British 
 shores, and afterward enjoyed the immunities of British 
 ports, were not only British in origin, but British in 
 equipment, British in armament, and British in crews. 
 They were British in every respect, except in their com- 
 manders who were rebel; and one of these, as his ship 
 was sinking, owed his safety to a British yacht, sym- 
 bolizing the omnipresent support of England. British 
 sympathies were active in their behalf. The cheers of a 
 British passenger ship crossing the path of the Alabama 
 encouraged the work of piracy, and the cheers of the 
 House of Commons encouraged the builder of the Ala- 
 bama, while he defended what he had done and ex- 
 claimed, in taunt to him who is now an illustrious mem. 
 her of the British Cabinet, John Bright, that he " would 
 " rather be handed down to posterity as the builder of a 
 " dozen Alabamas" than be the author of the speeches of 
 that gentleman "crying up" the institutions of the United 
 States, which the builder of the Alabama, rising with his 
 theme, declared " as of no value whatever, and as re- 
 " ducing the very name of liberty to an utter absurdity," 
 while the cheers of the House of Commons echoed back 
 his words. Thus from beginning to end, from the fatal 
 proclamation to the rejoicing of the accidental ship and 
 the rejoicing of the House of Commons, was this hostile 
 
 ri6>^*^ I 
 
17 
 
 expedition protected and encouraged by England. The 
 same spirit, which dictated the swift concession of bel- 
 ligerency with all its deadly incidents, ruled the hour, 
 entering into and possessing every pirate ship. 
 
 There are two circumstances by which the whole case is 
 aggravated. One is found in the date of the proclamation, 
 which lifted the rebels to an equality with the National 
 Government, opening to them everything that was open 
 to us, whether ship-yard, foundries, or manufactories, 
 and giving to them a flag on the ocean coequal with the 
 flag of the Union. This extraordinary manifesto was 
 issued on the day before the arrival of our Minister in 
 England, so that when, after an ocean voyage, he reached 
 the British Government, to which he was accredited, he 
 found this great and terrible indignity to his country 
 already perpetrated, and the flood-gates opened to infinite 
 woes. The Minister had been announced ; he was daily 
 expected. The British Government knew of his coming. 
 But in hottest haste they did this thing. The other 
 aggravation is found in its flagrant, unnatural departure 
 from that anti-slavery rule, which by manifold declara- 
 tions, legislative, political, and diplomatic, was the avowed 
 creed of England. Often was this rule proclaimed, but, 
 if we except the great act of Emancipation, never more 
 pointedly than in the famous circular of Lord Palraerston, 
 while Minister of Foreign Affairs, announcing to all 
 nations that England was pledged to the universal aboli- 
 tion of slavery. And now, when slaveholders, in the very 
 madness of barbarism, broke away from the National 
 Government and attempted to found a new empire with 
 slavery as its declared corner-stone, anti-slavery England, 
 without a day's delay, without even waiting the arrival 
 of our Minister, who was known to be on his way, made 
 haste to decree that this shameful and impossible preten- 
 sion should enjoy equal rights with the National Govern- 
 ment in her ship-yards, foundries, and manufactories, 
 and equal rights on the ocean. Such was the decree. 
 Rebel slaveholders, occupied in a hideous attempt, were 
 taken by the hand, and thus with the official protection 
 
 
 
Ml 
 Alt 
 
 .* . 
 
 m 
 
 
 18 
 
 and thcOod-spcedof anti-slavery England^ commenced their 
 accursed work. I close this part of the argument by the 
 testimony of Mr. Bright, who, in a speech at Rochdale, 
 among his nei{!fhbours, February 3, 18G3, thus exhibits 
 the criminal complicity of England : — 
 
 " I regret, more than I have words to express, this painful fact, 
 that of all the countries in Europe this country is tlie only one 
 which has men in it who are willing to take active steps in favour 
 of this intended slave Government. We supply the ships ; we 
 supply the arms, the munitions of war ; tve f/ive aid and com- 
 fort to this foulest of all crimes. Englishmen only do it." — 
 Bright's Speeches, vol. i. p. 239. 
 
 At last the rebellion succumbed. British ships and 
 British supplies had done their work, but they failed. 
 And now the day of reckoning has come ; but with little 
 apparent sense of what is due on the part of England. 
 Without one soothing word for a friendly power deeply 
 aggrieved, without a single regret for what Mr. Cobdeu, 
 in the House of Commons, called " the cruel losses^' in- 
 flicted upon us, for what Mr. Bright called " aid and 
 comfort to the foulest of crimes," or for what a generous 
 voice from Oxford University denounced as a " flagrant 
 and maddening wrong," England simply proposes to 
 submit the question of liability for " individual losses" to 
 an anomalous tribunal, where chance plays its part. This 
 is all. Nothing is admitted even on this question ; no 
 rule for the future is established ; while nothing is said 
 of the indignity to the nation, nor of the damages to the 
 nation. On an earlier occasion it was otherwise. There 
 is an unhappy incident in our relations with Great Britain 
 which attests how in other days " individual losses" were 
 only a minor element in reparation for a wrong received 
 by the nation. You all know from history how in time 
 of profound peace, and only a few miles outside the Vir- 
 ginia capes, the British frigate Leopard fired into the 
 national frigate Chesapeake, pouring broadside upon 
 broadside, killing three persons and wounding eighteen 
 some severely, and then boarding her carried off" four others 
 as i3ritish subjects. This was in the summer of 1807. 
 The brilliaut Mr. Canning, British Minister of Foreign 
 
19 
 
 Affairs, promptly volunteered overtures for an aceommo- 
 (lation, by declaring his Majesty's readiness to take the 
 whole of the cireumstances of the case into consideration, 
 and " to make reparation for any alleged injury to the 
 '' sovereignty 0/ the United States, whenever it shoidd be 
 " clearly shown that such injiiry has been actually sus- 
 " tained and that such reparation is really due." Hero 
 was a good beginning. There was to bo reparation for 
 an injury to the national sovereignty. After years of 
 painful negotiation, the British Minister at Washington, 
 under date of November 1, 1811, offered to the United 
 States three propositions : first, the disavowal of the un- 
 authorised act ; secondly, the immediate restoration, so 
 far as circumstances would permit, of the men forcibly 
 taken from the Chesapeake; and thirdly, a suitable 
 pecuniary provision for the sufferers in consequence of 
 the attack on the Chesapeake ; concluding with these 
 words : — 
 
 " These honourable propositions are nuulc with the sincere 
 desire that they may prove satisfactory to the Government of the 
 United States, and I trust tlicy will meet with that amicable 
 reception which their conciliatory nature entitles them to. I 
 need scarcely add how cordially I join with you in the wish 
 that they may prove introductory to a removal of all the differ- 
 ences depend' ig between our two countries." — State Papers, 
 Foreign Affairs, vol. iii. p. 500. 
 
 I adduce this historic instance to illustrate partly the 
 different forms of reparation. Here, of course, was repa- 
 ration to individuals ; but there was also reparation to the 
 nation, whose sovereignty had been outraged. There is 
 another instance, which is not witliout authority. In 
 1837 an armed force from Upper Canada crossed the 
 river just above the Falls of Niagara and burnt an 
 American vessel, the Caroline, while moored to the shores 
 of the United States. Mr. Webster, in his negotiation 
 with Lord Ashburton, characterised this act as " of itself 
 " a wrong and offence to the sovereignty and the dignity 
 " of the United States, for which to this day no atone- 
 " mcnt, or even apology, has been made by her Majesty's 
 " Government ;" all these words being strictly applicable 
 
 B 2 
 
 
 515 
 
 m^ 
 
 
 

 'f^'^ir. 
 
 
 20 
 
 to the present case. Lord Aslibiirton, in reply, after 
 recapitulating some mitigating circumHtanccs and ex- 
 pressing a regret " that some explanation and apology 
 " for this occurrence was not immediately made/' proceeds 
 to say : — 
 
 " Iler Majesty's Govornmnnt earnostly doairo tliiit a rociprocal 
 respect for the independent jurisdictii)n nnd autliority of neif^h- 
 bouring States may be considered among the first duties of all 
 Governments ; and I have to repeat tlie assiiranoe of rejiret they 
 feel that the event of which I am treating should liave disturbed 
 the harmony they so anxiously wish to inaintain with the 
 American people and Government." — Webster's iVorkSf vol. vi. 
 p. 300. 
 
 Here again was reparation for a wrong done to the 
 nation. Looking at what is due to us on the present 
 occasion, we are brought again to the conclusion tliat the 
 satisfaction of individuals whose ships have been burned 
 or sunk is only a small part of what we may justly expect. 
 As in the earlier cases where the national sovereignty was 
 insulted, there should be an acknowledgment of wrong, 
 or at least of liability, leaving to the commissioners the 
 assessment of damages only. The blow inflicted by that 
 fatal proclamation, which insulted our national sovereignty 
 and struck at our unity as a nation, followed by broad- 
 side upon broadside, driving our commerce from the 
 ocean, was kindred in character to those earlier blows ; 
 and when we consider that it was in aid of Slavery, it 
 was a blow at civilization itself. Besides degrading us 
 and ruining our commerce, its direct and constant influ- 
 ence was to encourage the Rebellion, and to prolong the 
 war waged by slave-masters at such cost of treasure and 
 blood. It was a terrible mistake, which I cannot doubt 
 that good Englishmen must regret. And now, in the 
 interest of peace, it is the duty of both sides to find a 
 remedy, complete, just, and conciliatory, so that the deep 
 sense of wrong and the detriment to the Republic may 
 be forgotten in that proper satisfaction which a nation 
 loving justice cannot hesitate to offfer. 
 
 Individual losses may be estimated with reasonable ac- 
 curacy. Ships burned or sunk with their cargoes may be 
 
•21 
 
 counted, and thoir value dcternniied ; but this leaves with- 
 out recognition the vaster damaj^c to eommeree driven from 
 the ocean, and that other damage, immense and infinite, 
 caused by the prohjugatiou of the war, all of which may 
 be called national in contradistin(!tion to individual. Our 
 national lonsta have been frankly conceded by eminent 
 J'higlishmen. I have already (piotcd Mr. Cobden, who did 
 not hesitate to call them " cruel losses." During the 
 same debate in which he let drop this testimony, he used 
 other words, which show how justly he comprehended the 
 case. " You have been," said he, " carrying on war from 
 " these shores with the United States, and have been inflict- 
 " ing an amount of damage on that country greater than 
 " would be produced by many ordinary wars. It is esti- 
 " mated that the loss sustained by the capture and burn- 
 " ing of American vessels has been about 15,000,000 
 " dollars, or nearly .t;3,000,000. But this is a small part 
 " of the injury which has been inflicted on the American 
 " marine. We have rendered the rest of her vast mer- 
 " cantile property useless." Thus, by the testimony of 
 Mr. Cobden, were those individual losses, which are alone 
 recognized by the pending Treaty, only " a small part of 
 " the injury inflicted." After confessing his fears with re- 
 gard to " the heaping up of a "gigantic material grievance 
 " such as 
 words : — 
 
 was then rearing," he adds, in memorable 
 
 "You have already done your worst towards the Amorican 
 mercantile marine. What witli the high rate of inaurance, what 
 witli theae captures, and what with the amount of damage you 
 have done to that which is left, you have virtually made value- 
 less that vast property. Why, if you had gone and helped the 
 Confederates by bombarding all the accessible seaport towns of 
 America, a few lives might have been lost, which, as it is, have 
 not been sacrificed, but you coiild hardly have done more injury 
 in the way of destroying property than you have done by these 
 few cruisers. [Hear, hear.]" 
 
 With that clearness of vision, which he possessed in 
 such rare degree, this statesman saw that Engl.aud had 
 " virtually made valueless a vast property," as much as if 
 this Power l>"d bombarded " all the accessible seaport 
 
 '^^^slil 
 
 '•'f;Si 
 
82 
 
 mi. 
 
 ,W 
 
 
 towns of America." So ulrong and complete is this Htatc- 
 moit that any further citation Heenis Huperflnot'.!* ; hut I 
 ruiiiKi' forheur u(l(hu*iii}r a pointiMl remark in the Haine 
 ilehatc, by tluit able genthMuan Mr. VVilliani K. Forster : — 
 
 " ThtTo ct)»il(l not be a stronger illuHtnition of tlin diuiwi^i! 
 which 1ms been done tn the Anieriean trade by theK(' eiiiiHein, 
 thu!i the liict that ho coii^ilttely was the Anieriean ll.'!!.> (Umvoii 
 from the ocean, tliat tlie (ii'i>njiii, on licr Heeond eriiihu, tliil not 
 meet a .yini/le Amen'iuin vfxsi'l In nix wcekn, thiUKjh she naw no less 
 thiin seventif vi'hscIh in a ver// J'ckj ilai/n.''^ 
 
 This is most su}(f?estive. So entirely was our commerce 
 driven from the oeean, that for six weeks not an Ameri- 
 can vessel was seen ! 
 
 Anotljer Englishman, in an elaborate pamphlet, bears 
 similar testimony. I refer to the pamphlet of Mr. Edgo, 
 published in London by llidgway in lS(i|., and er titled 
 "The Destruction of the American Carrying Trud , ' 
 After setting forth at length the destnietion of our com- 
 merce by Uritish pirates, this writer thus foreshadows 
 the damages : — 
 
 ♦' Were wc the snffcrera, wo should certainly demand conipon- 
 sation tor the loss of the jyroperty captured or destroyed — for Uio 
 interest of the capital invested in the vessels and their cargoes, 
 and niay))o a fair compensation in addition for all and any injury 
 accruing to our business interests from the depredations upon our 
 shipping. The reiniineration mnji redch a hiijh Jujure in the present 
 vase ; but It ivouli/ / u simple act of justice, and might prevent 
 incomparably greater loss in the future." 
 
 Such is the candid and explicit testimony of English- 
 men, pointing the way to the proper rnlc of damages. 
 How to authenticate the extent of national loss with rea- 
 sonable certainty is not without difficulty j but it cannot 
 be doubted that siich a loss occurred. It is folly to 
 question it. The loss may be seen in various circum- 
 stances, as in the rise of insurance on all American 
 vessels; the fate of the carrying trade, vlui-h was one of 
 the great resource^ of our country; t'ic ''ir.Miution tf 
 our tonnage, with the correspondir , \,u. of British 
 tonnage ; the falling off in our exports and imports, with 
 due allowance for our abnormal curreucv and the divcr- 
 
 
CrillHCIH, 
 
 23 
 
 Hioii of war. Tljosn arc Romo of the clrmrnts ; and hero 
 nuaiii wc havo Hritisli tosti-nouy. Mr. W. K, ForHtcr, in 
 tlic Hpcccli alrea<ly (|Uot('<l, imii<Mir\r(>8 tliat " tlu* caiTying 
 " trade of the rnitod States 'ns translirreil to British nior- 
 "chants ;" and Mr. ('ohden, witli liis ehara('teri«*tie maNtery 
 of details, hIiows that, u< ordiiig to ,i , otHcial document 
 laid on the tahh; of Parlianieiit, American shij'pin};^ had 
 he(!n trauHferred to English capifdiits a8 follows; — In 
 IHilS, 33 vessels, 13,()3H tons; 18r>9, 4!) vcshcIm, 21,073 
 tons; 18(50, 41 vessels, 13,(538 tons; 18(51, 12(5 vessels, 
 71 ,(573 tons; 18(52, 135 vessels, (51,:) 73 tons; and 1803, 
 :'AH vessels, 252,r)79 tons ; and he adds, " I am told that 
 " 11 i-i operation is now going on as fast as ever ;" and this 
 circumstance he declares to be " the ijruvest part of 
 " the question of our relations with America." Hut this 
 " gravest part" is left untouched by the pending treaty. 
 Our own ollieial documents arc in liarinony with thcsA's 
 English authorities. For instance, 1 have before me now 
 the report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 18(58, 
 with an appendix by Mr. Nimmo ou shipbuilding in our 
 country. From this report it appears tliat in the New- 
 England States, during the year 185."), the most prosperous 
 year of American shipbuilding, 305 ships and barks, and 
 173 schooners were built, with an aggregate tonnage of 
 320, 129 tons, while during the lust year only 58 ships and 
 barks, and 213 scliooncrs were built, with an aggregate 
 tonnage of 98,(597 tons. I add a further statement from 
 the same report: — 
 
 "During the ton years from 1852 to 18(52 the aggregate ton- 
 nage of American vessels entered at seaports of the United 
 States from foreign countries was ;J0,225,t75 tons, and the 
 aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 11, 099,11)2 
 tons, while during the five years, from 18()3 to 18(;h, the aggre- 
 gate tonnage of American vessels entered was 9,299,877 tons, 
 and the ngmegato tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 
 14,]1(!,427 'ins — showing that y\merican tonnage in our foreign 
 trade had fallen from 2(K) tn 06 per cent, of foreign tonnage in 
 the same trade. kStated in other terms, during the decade I'roni 
 1852 to 1802, 07 per cent, of the total tonnage entered from 
 foreign ountrics was in American vessels, and during the five 
 years from 1863 to 1808, only 39 per cent, of the aggregate 
 
 .•.•'4i 
 
 ii ' 'i* rt!j 
 
 
 
 1 f 
 
 i ' 
 
 
 
■ ■■(•■•!»• ,^5.;;,if' 
 . ■'*.,M';j ■■«■ 
 
 •■ <--V.-' < •It.'^- 
 
 
 ; ',";- -1"; '" \ 
 ['r:*.^'^^ ».irv 111 
 
 24 
 
 tonnage entered from foreign countries was in American vessels 
 — a relative falling off of nearly one-lialf." 
 
 [Finance Kei)ort for 18G8, page 49G.J 
 
 It is not easy to say how much of this chauge, which 
 has become chronic, may be referred to British pirates ; 
 but it cannot be doubted tliat they couti'ibuted largely to 
 produce it. They began the influences iinder which this 
 change has continued. There is another document which 
 bears directly upon the present question. I refer to the 
 interesting repoi't of Mr. Morse, our Consul at London, 
 made during the last year, and published by the Secretary 
 of State. After a minute inquiry the report shows that, 
 on the breaking out of the Rebellion in 18G1, the entire 
 tonnage of the United States, coasting and registered, was 
 5,539,813 tons, of which 2,61'2,()25 tons were registered 
 and employed in foreign trade ; and that at the close of 
 the Rebellion in 1865, notwithstanding an increase in 
 coasting tonnage, our registered tonnage had fallen to 
 1,602,528 tons, being a loss during the four years ot 
 more than a million tons, amounting to about 40 per 
 cent, of our foreign commerce. During the same four 
 years the total tonnage of the British empire rose from 
 5,895,369 tons to 7,322,604 tons, the increase being 
 especially in the foreign trade. The report proceeds to 
 say that as to the cause of the decrease in America and 
 the corresponding increase in the British Empire "there 
 " can be no room for question or doubt.^^ Here is the 
 precise testimony from one who at his official post in 
 London watched this unprecedented drama, with the out- 
 stretched ocean as a theatre, and British pirates as the 
 performers : — 
 
 " Conceding to the rebels the belligerent rights of the sea, 
 when they had not a solitary war ship afloat, in dock, or in pro- 
 cess of construction, and when they had no power to protect or 
 dispose of prizes, made thoir sea-rovers, when they ajipeared, 
 the instruments of terror and destruction to our commcrco. 
 From the appearance of the first corsair in pursuit of their ships, 
 American merchants had to pay not only the marine but the 
 war risk also on their ships. After the burning of one or two 
 ships with their neutral cargoes, the shipowner had to pay the 
 
25 
 
 war risk on the cargo his ship had on freight as well as on the 
 ship. Even then, for safety, the preference was, as a matter of 
 course, always given to neutral vessels, and American ships 
 could rarely find employment on these hard tcrm« as long as 
 there were good neutral ships in the freight markets. Under 
 such circumstances there was no course left for our merchant 
 shipowners but to take such profitless business as was occasionally 
 ofTored them, let their ships be idle at their moorings or in dock 
 with large expense and deterioration constantly going on, or to 
 sell them outright when they could do so without ruinous sa- 
 crifice, or put them imder foreign flags for protection." — Report 
 of F. H. Morse, United States Consul at London, datedJanuary 
 1, 1868. 
 
 Beyond the actual loss in the national tonnage, there 
 was a further loss in the arrest of our national inerease 
 in this branch of industry, which an intelligent statisti- 
 cian puts at five per cent, annually, making in 186G a 
 total loss on this account of 1,384',958 tons, which must 
 be added to 1,229,035 tons actually lost. The same sta- 
 tistician, after estimating the value of a ton at 40 dollars 
 gold, and making allowance for old and new ships, puts 
 the sum total of national loss on this account at 
 110,000,000 dollars. To these authorities I add that of 
 tlic National Board of Trade, which in a recent report 
 on American Shipping, after setting forth the diminution 
 of our sailing tonnage, says that it is all to be traced to 
 the war on the ocean, and the result is summed up in the 
 words, that " while the tonnage of the nation was rapidly 
 " disappearing by the ravages of the Rebel cruisers and by 
 "sales abroad, there was no construction of new vessels 
 " going forward to counteract the decline even in part." 
 Such is the various testimony, all tending to one conclu- 
 sion. 
 
 This is what I have to say for the present on 
 national losses through the destruction of commerce. 
 These are large enough ; but there is another chapter 
 where they are larger far. I refer, of course, to the na- 
 tional losses caused by the prolongation of the war and 
 traceable directly to England. No candid person, who 
 studies this eventful period, can doubt that the rebelli(ni 
 was originally encoiu'agcd by hope of support from Eug- 
 
 
 
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m^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ .1 ,' ■■■; < 
 
 26 
 
 land J that it was strengthened at once by the concession 
 of belligerent rights on the ocean ; that it was fed to the 
 end by British snppliesj that it was qnickcncd into re- 
 newed life with every report from the British pirates, 
 flaming anew with every bnrning ship ; nor can it be 
 doubted that without British intervention the Rebellion 
 would have soon succumbed under the well-directed eflbrts 
 of the National Government. Not weeks or months, but 
 years were added in this way to our war, so full of the 
 most costly sacrifice. The subsidies which in other times 
 England contributed to continental wars were less effec- 
 tive than the aid and comfort which she contributed to 
 the Rebellion. It cannot be said too often that the 
 naval base of the Rebellion was not in America, but in 
 England. Mr. Cobden boldly said in the House of Com- 
 mons that England made war from her shores on the 
 United States "with an amount of damage to that country 
 " greater than in many ordinary wars.'^ According to this 
 testimony, the conduct of England was war ; but it must 
 not be forgotten that this war was carried on at our sole 
 cost. The United States paid for the war waged by Eng- 
 land upon the National Unity. 
 
 The sacrifice of precious life is beyond human com- 
 pensation; but there may be an approximate estimate 
 of the national loss in money. The Rebellion was 
 suppressed at a cost of more than four thousand mil- 
 lion dollars, a considerable portion of which has already 
 been paid, leaving twenty-five hundred millions as a 
 national debt to burden the people. If, through British 
 intervention, the war was doubled in duration, or in 
 any way extended, as cannot be doubted, then is 
 England justly rcsjionsible for the additional expenditure 
 to which our country was doomed ; and, whatever may 
 be the final settlement of these great accounts, such 
 must be the judgment in any chancery which consults 
 the simple equity of the case. 
 
 This plain statement, without one word of exaggeration, 
 is enough to exhibit the magnitude of the national losses, 
 whether from the destruction of our commerce or the 
 
 
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 M'-^- 
 
 ^•: 
 
27 
 
 prolongation of the war. They stand hcfore U8 mountain 
 liigh, with a base broad as the nation, and a mass stu- 
 ])cndoiis as tlic rebellion i.tself. It will be for wise 
 statesmanship to determine how this fearful accumulation, 
 like Pelion upon Ossa, shall be removed out of sight, so 
 that it shall no longer overshadow the two countries. 
 
 Perhaps I ought to anticipate an objection from 
 the other side, to the effect that these national losses, 
 whether from the destruction of our commerce or the 
 prolongation of the war, are indirect and remote, so 
 as not to be a just clause of claim. This is expressed 
 at the common law by the rule that " damages must 
 l)c for the natural and proximate consequence of au 
 act/' — (2 Greenleaf, Ev., p. 310). To this excuse the 
 answer is explicit. The damages suffered by the United 
 States are twofold, individual and national, being in 
 each case direct and proximate, although in the one case 
 individuals suffered and in the other case the nation. It 
 is easy to see that there may be occasions where, over- 
 topping all individual damages, are damages suffered by 
 the nation, so that reparation to individuals would be 
 insufficient; nor can the claim of the nation be ques- 
 tioned simply because it is large, or because the evidence 
 with regard to it is diffferent from that in the case of an 
 individual. In each ease the damage must be proved by 
 the best possible evidence, and this is all that law or 
 reason can require. In the ease of the nation the 
 evidence is historic j and this is enough. Impartial 
 history will legard the national losses from British inter- 
 vention, and it is only reasonable that the evidence of 
 these losses should not be excluded from judgment. 
 Because the case is without precedent, because no nation 
 ever before received such injury from a friendly power, 
 this can be no reason why the ease should not be consi- 
 dered on the evidence. Even the rule of the common 
 law furnishes no impediment, for our damages are the 
 natural consequence of Avhat was done. But the rule of 
 the Roman law, which is the rule of International law, 
 is broader than that of the common law. The measure 
 
 
 
 
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 (iSil 
 
 Mills 
 
 . ■■•,>.•.» i" -■ 
 
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 28 
 
 of damages, accordiug to tlic Digest, is, " whatever may 
 " have been lost or miglit have been gained :" quantum 
 mihi abest, quantumque lucrari potui ; and tliis same rule 
 seems to prevail in the French law, borrowed from the 
 Roman law. This rnle opcnis the door to ample repara- 
 tion for all damages, whether individual or national. 
 There is another rule of the eommon law, in harmony 
 with strict justice, which is applicable to the case. I find 
 it in the laAV relating to nuisances, which provides that 
 there may be two distinct proceedings — first, in behalf of 
 individuals, and secondly, in behalf of the community. 
 Obviously, reparation to individuals docs not sui)crsedc 
 rej)aration to the community. The proceeding in the 
 onu case is by action at law, and in the other, by indict- 
 ment. The reason assigned by Blackstone for the latter 
 is, " because the damages being common to all the king's 
 " subjects, no one can assign his particular proportion of 
 " it."" — (3 Black. Com., p. 219.) But this is the very case 
 with regard to damages sustained by the nation. A 
 familiar authority furnishes an additional illustration, 
 which is precisely in point : — 
 
 *' No person, natural or corporate, can have an action for a 
 public nuisance, ox punish it; but only the king in his public 
 capacity of supreme governor and pater J'uniiUas of the kingdom. 
 Yet this rule admits of one exception ; where a private person 
 suffers some extraordinary damage beyond tlie rest of the king's 
 subjects." — Tomlin^s Law Diet., Art. '■Nuisance.^ 
 
 Applying this rule to the present case, the way is 
 clear. Every British pirate was a public nuisance, in- 
 volving the British Government, Mhich must respond in 
 damages, not ojdy to the individuals who have suffered, but 
 also to the National Government, acting as jjute?' faini/ias 
 for the common good of all the people. 
 
 Thus by an analogy of the common law, in the case of a 
 public nuisance, also by the strict rule of the lloman law, 
 which enters so largely into International Law, and even by 
 the rule of the common law relating to damages, all losses, 
 whether individual or national, arc the just subject of 
 claim. It is not 1 who say this, it is the law. The 
 
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 ivate person 
 
 29 
 
 colossal sum total may l)c seen, not only in the losses of 
 individuals, but in those national losses caused by the 
 (Icstruetiou of our commerce and the ])rolongatiou of the 
 war, all of which may be traced directly to England : 
 
 — illud ab uno 
 Corpore, et ex unii pcudebat originc bellum. 
 
 Three times is this liability fixed : first, by the concession 
 of ocean belligerency, opening to the rebels ship-yards, 
 foundries, and manufactories, and giving to them a flag 
 on the ocean ; secondly, by the organization of hostile 
 expeditions, which, by admissions in Parliament, were 
 nothing less than piratical war on the United States with 
 England as the naval base ; and. thirdly, by welcome, 
 hospitality, and supplies extended to these pirate ships in 
 ports of the British empire. Show either of these and 
 the liability of England is complete. Show the three and 
 this power is bound by a triple cord. 
 
 Mr. President, in concluding these remarks, I desire 
 to say that I am no volunteer. For several years I have 
 carefully avoided saying anything on this most irritating 
 (picstion, being anxious that negotiations should be left 
 undisturbed to secure a settlement which could, be ac- 
 cepted by a deeply injured nation. The submission of 
 the pending treaty to the judgment of the Senate left me 
 no alternative. It became my duty to consider it care- 
 fully in committee, and to review the whole subject. If 
 I failed to find what we had a right to expect, and, if the 
 just claims of our country asstxmcd unexpected propor- 
 tions, it was not because I would bear hard on England, 
 but because I wish most sincerely to remove all possi- 
 bility of strife between our two countries ; and it is evi- 
 dent that this can be done only by first ascertaining the 
 nature and extent of difference. In this spirit I have 
 spoken to-day. If the case against England is strong, 
 and if our claims are unprecedented in magnitude, it is 
 only because the coiiduct of this Power at a trying period 
 was most unfriendly, and the injurious consequences of 
 tliis conduct were on a scale corresponding to the theatre 
 
 
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 30 
 
 of action. Life and property were both swallowed up, 
 leaving behind a deep-seated sense of enormous wrong, 
 as yet uuatoucd and even unacknowledged, which is one 
 of the chief factors in the problem now presented to the 
 statesmen of both countries. The attemjjt to close this 
 great international debate without a complete settlement, 
 is little short of puerile. 
 
 With the lapse of time and with minuter conside- 
 ration, the case against England becomes more grave, 
 not only from the questions of international respon- 
 sibility which it involves, but from better compre- 
 hension of the damages which are seen now in their true 
 proportions. During the war, and for some time there- 
 after, it was impossible to state them. The mass of a 
 mountain cannot be measured at its base. The observer 
 must occiipy a certain distance, and this rule of perspec- 
 tive is justly applicable to damages which arc vast 
 beyond precedent. 
 
 A few dates will show the progress of the contro- 
 versy, and how the case enlarged. Going as far back 
 as 20th November, 1802, we find our Minister in 
 London, Mr. Adams, calling for redress from the British 
 Government on account of the Alabama. This was the 
 mild beginning. On the 23rd of October, 1863, iu 
 another communication, the same Minister suggested to 
 the British Government " any fair and equitable form of 
 arbitrament or reference." This proposition slumbered 
 in the British Foreign Office for nearly two years, during 
 which the Alabama was pursuing her piratical career, 
 when on August 30, 1865, it was awakened by Lord 
 Russell, only to be knocked down, in these words : — 
 
 " In your letter of Oct. 23, 1863, you were pleased to say that 
 the Government of the United States is ready to ngree to any 
 form of arbitration." « * * * « Her Alajesty's Govern- 
 ment must, therefore, decline either to make reparation and 
 compensation for the captures made by the Alabama, or to refer 
 the question to any foreign State." 
 
 Such was our repulse from England, having at least 
 the merit of frankness, if nothing else. On the 1 7th of 
 
31 
 
 Octo])cr, 18G5, our minister informed Lord Russell that 
 tlic United States had finally resolved to make no effort 
 for arbitration. Again the whole question slumbered 
 until the 27th of August, 18GG, when Mr. Seward pre- 
 sented a list of individual elaims on aecount of the pirate 
 Alabama. From that time negotiation has continued 
 with ups and downs, until at last the pending treaty was 
 signed. Had the early overtures of our Government 
 ])ecn promptly aceepted, or had there been at any time 
 a just recognition of the wrong done, I doubt not that 
 tliis great question would have been settled ; but the 
 rejection of our very moderate propositions and the pro- 
 tracted delay, which aflForded an opportunity to review 
 the case in its different bearings, have awakened the 
 people to the magnitude of the interests involved. If 
 our demands arc larger now than at our first call, it is 
 not the only time in history where such a rise has 
 occurred. The story of the Sibyl is repeated, and 
 England is the Roman king. 
 
 Sha^I these claims be liquidated and cancelled promptly, 
 or allowed to slumber until called into activity by some 
 future exigency ? There are many among us, who, taking 
 coimsel of a sense of national wrong, would leave them to 
 rest without settlement, so as to furnish a precedent for 
 retaliation in kind, should England find herself at war. 
 There arc many in England who, taking counsel of a per- 
 verse political bigotry, have spurned them absolutely ; and 
 there are others, who, invoking the point of honour, assert 
 that England cannot entertain them without compro- 
 mising her honour. Thus there is peril from both sides. 
 It is not difficult to imagine one of our countrymen 
 saying with Shakspeare's Jew, " The villahiy you teach 
 " me I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better 
 " the instruction ;" nor is it difficult to imagine an 
 Englishman firm in his conceit that no apology can be 
 made and nothing paid. I cannot sympathize with either 
 side. Be the claims more or less, they are honestly pre- 
 sented, with the conviction that they are just, and they 
 sliould be considered candidly, so that they shall no longer 
 
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 ■Ki^' 'i\ 
 
 
 iM- 
 
32 
 
 lower like a cloud ready to burst upon two nations, which, 
 according to their inclinations, can do each other such 
 infinite injury or such infinite good. I know it is some- 
 times said that war between us must come sooner or 
 kicr, I do not believe it. But if it must come, let it he 
 later, and then I am sure it will never come. Meanwhile 
 good men must unite to make it impossible. 
 
 Again I say this debate is not of my seeking. It is not 
 tempting, for it compels criticism of a Foreign Power with 
 which I would have more than peace, more even than con- 
 cord. But it cannot be avoided. The truth must be told, 
 not in anger, but ii; sadness. England has done to the 
 United States an injury most difficult to measure. Con- 
 sidering when it was done, and in what complicity, it is 
 most unaccountable. At a great epoch of history, not 
 less momentous than that of the French Revolution or 
 that of the Reformation, when civilization was fighting a 
 last battle with Slavery, England gave her name, her in- 
 fluence, her material resources to the wicked cause, and 
 flung a sword into the scale with Slavery. Here was a 
 portentous mistake. Strange that the land of Wilber- 
 force, after spending millions for Emancipation, after 
 proclaiming everywhere the truths of liberty, and 
 ascending to glorious primacy in the sublime movement 
 for the universal abolition of Slavery, could do this 
 thing ! Like every departure from the rule of justice 
 and good-neighbourhood, her conduct was pernicious in 
 proportion to the scale of operations, affecting individuals, 
 corporations, communities, and the nation itself. And 
 yet, down to this day, there is no acknowledgment of 
 this wrong; not a single word. Such a generous ex- 
 pression would be the beginning of a just settlement, 
 and the best assurance of that harmony between two 
 great and kindred nations which all must desire. 
 
 %* The Treaty was rejected by a vote of 54 to 1. 
 
 ^ 
 
19, Mrhich, 
 ;her such 
 b is somc- 
 aooner or 
 I, let it be 
 [eanwhile 
 
 It is not 
 ower with 
 than con- 
 it be told, 
 )ne to the 
 re. Con- 
 icity, it is 
 story, not 
 jlution or 
 fighting a 
 le, her in- 
 iause, and 
 ere was a 
 )f Wilber- 
 jion, after 
 erty, and 
 movement 
 do this 
 of justice 
 nicious in 
 idividuals, 
 f. And 
 gment of 
 erous ex- 
 ttlement, 
 sreen two