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:. / 
 
 THE 
 
 MILITARY DEFENCES 
 
 OF 
 
 CANADA, 
 
 Considered in respect to our Colonial Relations 
 
 WITH 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN, 
 
 In a Series of Letters Published in 
 
 THE QUEBEC « MORNING CHRONICLE," 
 
 (Revised and corrected^ with Notes and additions^) 
 
 BY 
 
 AN UPPER CANADIAN. 
 
 ••iimiiwc 
 
 QUEBEC : 
 
 PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OP THE " MORNING CHRONICLE," FOOT OF MOUNTAIH HILL. 
 
 1862. 
 
1. 
 
 OUR MILITARY DEFENCES.— THE MI- 
 LITIA. 
 
 To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle. 
 
 Sir, — Although the recommendations of the Military 
 Commission, now in session, as to the best and most feasi- 
 ble means of organizing the military resources of the Pro- 
 vince may undergo modifications in Parliament, it is of high 
 import that those gentlemen should agree on a system as 
 little open to censure as possible. There are, no doubt, 
 many persons of excellent judgment, as well as experience, 
 whose views would be appreciated by the Commission, but 
 who may be prevented by diffidence or the fear of being re- 
 garded as obtrusive, from communicating their ideas to this 
 military board. Hence there can be no impropriety in ex- 
 citing a public discussion, which may call forth such opin- 
 ions as I have referred to. It is with this aim that 1 propose 
 to offer some remarks. 
 
 The subject, as I view it, naturally divides itself into 
 three propositions. 1st — ^The organization of the land forces. 
 2nd — The defences of the lakes ; and 3rd, (as auxiliary to 
 these) the fortifications of the country. These 1 propose to 
 consider separately in the order in which I have stated them. 
 
 On the subject of the first — the organization of the land 
 forces of the Province — I have very decided opinions, and I 
 may here add that I am glad to find them very well expres- 
 sed in the Toronto Leader of the 7th instant. If the ex- 
 pression of these views in a leading Ministerial journal may 
 be regarded as indicative of the policy likely to guide the 
 gentlemen of the commission in making their report, the 
 country will have no cause to regret their appointment. 
 
 There is one important point which must not be lost 
 sight of — and that is the fact, that in anticipation of hostili- 
 ties with our neighbors, we must rely mainly on ourselves 
 to resist invading armies. The troops which England may 
 be able to spare must hereafter be regarded as allies and 
 auxiliaries. The sooner our authorities recognize this fact 
 the better for us, and the more self-reliant shall we become. 
 
i1 
 
 
 Our system should therefore be made to conform to this view 
 of the case — a view which British statesmen liave long en- 
 deavored to impress on us by words and policy. As yet we 
 have done little or nothing to acknowledge this policy, or to 
 prepare for our altered relations with the mother country ; 
 and hence we found ourselves at the commencement of the 
 present winter, suddenly menaced with danger, and totally 
 unprepared for any unexpected emergency. It is unjust to 
 censure England lor leaving us in such a defenceless con- 
 dition, for we are ourseWes wholly to blame for it. 
 
 The old proverb says, * forewarned, forearmed.' It is 
 fortunate for us that the * Trent' aliair occurred as it did, 
 and at the time it did. We now see what our condition 
 might have been had the exigencies of the great civil war 
 between the two sections of the old Union been such as to 
 have warranted the United States in accepting a war with 
 England. We cannot, now, without being criminally guil- 
 ty of inviting an attack next winter, or on some future oc- 
 casion from our vain-glorious and ambitious neighbors any 
 longer delay the energetic exercise of a clear and manifest 
 duty to ourselves, our children and the empire at lurge. 
 That duty is to provide the best, and in 'jvery way the most 
 efficacious means of resisting iiivasion, and if necessary of 
 carrying the war into the enemy's country. We shall thus 
 greatly lessen the chances of war. 
 
 To accomplish either of these objects requir>^s a well 
 organized and efficient army. Organization requires time 
 and practice, and England can no doubt supply us with ex- 
 cellent drill sergeants ; but where are we to get a supply of 
 experienced officers to command our Canadian army ? Shall 
 we invite the supernumeraries of the British army, if any 
 such there be, to conimand our battalions and to be cap- 
 tains, lieutenants and ensigns ? Admitting that a sufficient 
 supply can be had for the asking, would such a policy, car- 
 ried out on a large scale, be acceptable to Canadians, or 
 even practicable ? It is all very well to assert that there 
 should be no invidious distinctions, bat would Canadians 
 be content to yield positions of honor and responsibility to 
 their transatlantic brethren ? Here i? a possible stumbling 
 block which the commission will no doubt find means of 
 avoiding. But I have been told, lately, by military gentle- 
 men, that wt hav2 no men in the country fit to command 
 regiments, and but few fit to fill the subordinate positions. 
 This is a mistake that is too apt to be made by those who 
 are strangers to the country. Canada is full of intelligent 
 
I 
 
 r 
 
 and high spirited young gentlemen who only require to bo 
 educated in military science to make them first class offi- 
 cers. 
 
 How is liiis to be done ? A few weeks ago you did me 
 the favor to publish in your columns a 'etter in which I 
 pointed this out. I then stated that in addition to the cele- 
 brated military school at West Point, there were numerous 
 private ' military academies' in the Northern States — mostly 
 started since the commeuccment of the civil war, which are 
 conducted by old West Point men. These schools are all 
 filled with youths who are acquiring a scientific knowledge 
 of every branch connected with the military art. I pointed 
 out the necessity of emulating our neighbors in this respect, 
 and starting one, if not two, such schools in Canada, under 
 governm-iut patronage. To those young men who may not 
 afterwards choose, or do not have the opportunity of follow- 
 ing a military profession, such an education will not, by any 
 means be lost. They will come out every way improved, 
 both physically and mentally, and be prepared to fill any 
 position in life to which they may be called— because a 
 course of military instruction comprises, in addition to the 
 necessary professional studies, a thorough education in those 
 branches that are regarded as parts of every gentleman's ac- 
 quirements. 
 
 But it will no doubt be urged that the advantages pro- 
 posed by providing the means of military education in the 
 Province are tqo remote to merit the consideration of the 
 commission, whilst the emergencies of the times require im- 
 mediate action. This would be quite correct if the dangers 
 which menace us were only of a temporary or limited na- 
 ture. Such, however, is not the case, and we ought not to 
 neglect the future whilst we prepare for the present. The 
 United States must, for a long time, if not permanently, be 
 regarded as a great military power. Whether the Confed- 
 erate States succeed in establishing their independence or 
 not, the necessity for a large standing army will remain. 
 This imposes on us a higher degree of forecaste as to our 
 defences, than the military status of the United States has 
 hitherto done. 
 
 The commission will no doubt see the impolicy of plac- 
 ing any great reliance on our present or any future organi- 
 zation of the militia. The only use of a militia organiza- 
 tion, it is to be presumed, from past experience, will be to 
 preserve an enrolment of the men capable of and liable to 
 service. In modern warfare discipline and excellence in 
 
6 
 
 the theory and practice of the military art outweigh mere 
 numbers. The commission will not undervalue the sort of 
 experience which our neighbors are acquiring, and will, if 
 possible, improve on their method of organizing the avail- 
 able material of the country. The great success which has 
 attended the volunteer system in England may well suggest 
 valuable points for our consideration. But it must not be 
 forgotten that, as a general thing, the classes from whom 
 these admirable military forces have been drawn are much 
 more limited in Canada in comparison with our population. 
 To form an efficient volunteer force of 50,000 men in Cana- 
 da — a number in my judgment below the re(|uiremenls of 
 the times, if we wish to preserve peace, we must incur a 
 considerable outlay. The men must be paid during the 
 time deemed necessary for riilc practice — and it is only this 
 practice that will make such a body of men valuable. Al- 
 though we have many fine shots amongst our Canadian 
 youths, they will have to acquire a different description of 
 skill, to enable them to judge correctly of distances, and to 
 become accurate shots beyond point blank range. 
 
 There is little doubt that many thousands would, from 
 the novelty of the thing, turn out and learn the drill and ball 
 practice ; and a very moderate inducement in the shape of 
 pay might for a time suffice. There is a natural exciternent 
 attending rifle-shooting, which, whilst the novelty lasts, 
 ought to be turned to account. But we arc now told by the 
 English press that something must be done to prevent a ra- 
 pid decadence of the volunteer force of England. The Sa- 
 turday Review^ a very able and reliable journal, suggests 
 that so valuable a means of defence should not be allowed 
 to fall away for the want of a little of the " sinews of war." 
 It suggests that the force be paid for the time required to 
 keep up its efficiency. It takes a very sensible view of the 
 principles of all military organizations which are formed for 
 the defence of the whole community. Why should any 
 class of men be called on to sacrifice their time and their 
 money for an object in which all are alike interested ? Be- 
 sides, let it be considered, what a responsibility will attach 
 to those who may claim the merit, or have to endure the 
 disgrace of a break-down. The question is one which 
 ought therefore to be well considered, and its solution placed 
 beyond the chance of failure. 
 
 An Upper Canadian. 
 
 Quebec, 10th February, 1862. 
 
II. 
 
 THE DEFENCES OF THE LAKES. 
 
 ?) 
 
 .'i 
 
 \t 
 
 Sir, — " What is wanting in Canada is not a Generui, 
 " or general olKcer.s and troops, but a naval superiority on 
 "the lakes; till that superiority is established it is impossi- 
 ^^ble to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep an 
 " enemy out ol' the frontiers, much less to make any con- 
 quest from them." Such was the opinion given in his own 
 words, of tJKj great Duke of Wellington in 1814 just before 
 the clo.se of the American War. 
 
 The Governor of Michigan, in a recent message to the 
 I '.>gislalurc of that State, says : "I think we need not so 
 "much fortifications, as a full supply of arras for the people, 
 " and a powerful marine on the lakes. Michigan is to be 
 " defended, if it comes to that, not on our own ground, but 
 " on the soil of Canada. Give us arms for the people, and 
 " the undoubted control of the lakes, and fortifications may 
 " safely be left to the most convenient season." 
 
 " Kxperience confirms the truth of a maxim, that the 
 " master of the sea will always acquire the dominion of the 
 "land."— Gi66on. 
 
 These opinions, coinciding as they do, will scarcely be 
 disputed by any one. It is only necessary to ascertain with 
 accuracy the present actual condition of the balance of 
 power on the Lakes, in order to determine what must be 
 done by our authorities in regard thereto. In the recent 
 report of the Military Committee in the Congress of Wash- 
 ington, it is asserted that the United States commercial ma- 
 rine on the Lakes numbers 1,200 vessels, whilst that of Ca- 
 nada only amounts to 300 — or in the proportion of four to one 
 against us. But this is not the worst feature of the case. 
 They have 107 Screws (which alone are available for war 
 purposes) measuring in the aggregate 60,018 tons, and ave- 
 raging 467 ; whilst we have b'-t 15 with a gross ton- 
 nage of 4,562 tons and an average of 304. I have in my 
 possession a list of the names and tonnage of 104 vessels, 
 on these Lakes, the majority of which are screws too large 
 to descend the Welland Canal. This list was made out in 
 the autumn of 1860, and the average burthen may be set 
 down at 600 tons. Since then a great number of these large 
 
8 
 
 sized vessels has been added to the Upper Lake United 
 States fleet, whilst th(;re is not a single one of the class re- 
 ft^rred to owned in Canada. A' both governments are de- 
 barnid by treaty from establishing naval stat'ons, and ship- 
 yards, or maintaining armed vessels on the lakes, the Com- 
 mittee of Congress relies on their |)owerful commercial ma- 
 rine, as the Government of Washington is doing to some ex- 
 tent in their present coast operations, for defensive and of- 
 fensive war. That many ot these screw steamers, could 
 speedily be made available for such purposes has been well 
 demonstrated by the improvised fleets so recently fitted out 
 at New York, Boston and other ports. 
 
 This, of course, is a game at which two can play. But 
 do we hold the cards? If we do not how are we to get 
 them ? Our neighbors, moreover claim that Lake Michigan, 
 being wholly an American Lake, is exempt from the stipu- 
 lations of the treaiy, and the authorities of that State have 
 sent agents to Washington to urge the propriety of building 
 a number of war vessels at Grand Haven and other points 
 on the Lake, and to form a regular ship yard, and naval 
 station at some of the ports in Michigan. 
 
 Every body knows or ought to know what has given 
 our neighbors the commercial supremacy of the Lakes, and 
 yet our merchants either from apathy, or want of capital and 
 enterprize have scarcely put forth a feeble effort to counter- 
 act these obvious causes. Prior to 1825 the whole trade of 
 the West found its way to market by the St. Lawrence. 
 The opening of the Erie Canal in that year caused an im- 
 mediate diversion of the rising commerce of the Lakes to 
 New York, and at the same time added such a stimulant to 
 the settlement of the Western States, that from a population 
 of about a million in the whole of them — including Ohio, 
 they have increased to 7,000,000 and the trade has kept pace 
 with the population. 
 
 To counteract this state of things our Provincial Grov- 
 ernment set to work and built the magnificent system of ca- 
 nals which overcome the rapids of our river and form a na- 
 vigation of almost infiiiitely superior capacity. There was 
 one mistake committed in the design of these truly grand 
 works. The Canal which connects the lower with the four 
 great upper lakes, the shores of which are the granaries of 
 the West, is of smaller magnitude except as regards depth, 
 than those of the St. Lawrence. This circumstance nas, 
 until recently, interposed an insuperable obstacle to our en- 
 tering into successful competition, for the trade of those 
 
Western Lakes. It liaH b(M»n demonHtmlcd within tlio last 
 two years, that we can, as regards tlu; grain Irado, which is 
 the chief cominerc*? of \\\v West, mai<e our short lines of 
 railway available as connecting links between the upi^er and 
 lower navigation. This is due to the wonderl'ul economy of 
 " handling" the grain by means of steam ehivators, ancl to 
 the inclination of the gradients in the direction of the trade. 
 
 My remarks, however, thus far mainly apply to the Un- 
 per Lakes. I have one or two to make; respecting the trade 
 of Western Canada, the bulk of which has been drawn lo 
 New York, although our St. Lawrence canals have been 
 completed for nearly twenty years. It is certainly a strong 
 reflection on the spirit and energy of our merchants, and es- 
 pecially those of Quebec, that lliey have not yet built a sin- 
 gle freight vesscd up to the capacity of those canals. Whilst 
 our neighbors are able to maintain almost a monopoly of the 
 Western trade, through their "ditch" of a canal, we with 
 our magnificent lakes, canals, and river, have looked on in 
 stupid amazement at the strange phenomenon. But after 
 all there is no mystery about the matter. The circumstance 
 of New York being a larger ocean freight market, taken in 
 connection with the greater size and economy of their upper 
 lake vessels, more than counterbalances the drawback of 
 their smaller canals. If we think it worth while to enter in- 
 to competition on a large scale, for this trade, thus to regain 
 or divide the control of the lakes with the Americans, we 
 must establish lines of screw freight vessels on the upper 
 lakes, as well as on Lake Ontario, to run in connection with 
 the several railways connecting these waters — and these 
 vessels must meet other and more economical freight steam- 
 ers at Montreal and Quebec than those subsidized to carry 
 the mails. But first of all let us attend to the inland necessi- 
 ties and the ship-owners and merchants of England will pro- 
 vide the ocean craft. When this is done we shall impose 
 additional motives on our Western neighbors to preserve the 
 peace. Chicago, Milwaukie, Detroit and the cities of Wes- 
 tern Canada will then meet London, Liverpool and Glas- 
 gow at Montreal and Quebec, instead of at New York. 
 
 It is all very well, in speaking of the defences of the 
 Lakes, to rely on the numerous gunboats of England, pro- 
 vided they can be got in position in time of need. If a war 
 unfortunately arises out of the present volcanic influences at 
 work on American society, I venture to say that the English 
 gunboats will not be in tlie right place at the right time, if 
 they get there at all. Besides, England will need them all 
 
10 
 
 
 If; 
 
 ■\'\ 
 
 to blockade two thousand miles of a sea coast, where none 
 but vessels of light draft can impose an effectual blockade. 
 If we sincerely desire to obtain maritime supremacy on our 
 great inland waters, we must do so by entering on a new 
 race of competition for the Western trade, in the manner I 
 have pointed out. The history of the world demonstrates 
 that maritime power has invariably followed, and not pre- 
 ceded, commercial greatness. The merchant navy has in 
 all ages and countries been the school for the sailors who 
 have manned the war navies. 
 
 Let Canada not ignore this principle — a principle that 
 hay raised England to the highest pitch of maritime renown. 
 Besides to encourage the establishment of a commercial 
 navy on our inland Avaters will effect both objects in view. 
 Money so laid out does not lie dead or inactive capital. It 
 is like the seed cast on the waters, which in due lime bringeth 
 forth a rich harvest. If our merchants have not the neces- 
 sary capital, let such assistance be offered as may lead to an 
 early and powerful demonstrution towards regaining for the 
 St. 1- iwrence her natural and indefeasible rights. Are not 
 the Western American merchants clamorous for the very 
 improvements I have hinted at ? Do they not frequently in- 
 timate, that, if Canada belonged to the Union they would 
 speedily enrich our Atlantic ports with the vastly increased 
 stream of commerce, which they would pour through the 
 Si. Lawrence ? It is time that such a reproach was wiped 
 away. 
 
 The truth is, that the capital of New York has built up 
 the United States' Western trade, and the capital of Eng- 
 land has been poured with a lavish hand into the lap of 
 New York, until she has grown insolent in her unparalleled 
 prosperity. Her clipper ships swarm in every sea, and her 
 merchants trade in every port. English companies are 
 formed to supply inland vessels for India and China, and 
 Brazil, but Canada is regarded as a hyperborean region, 
 chiefly celebrated for its products of timber. It is not con- 
 sidered that, although the St. Lawrence is closed five 
 months in the year, the Erie Canal which carries 80 per 
 cent of the western trafiic, is likewise closed an equal length 
 of time ; nor can it be known that Upper Canada pro- 
 duces a million quarters of wheat for foreign export, and 
 that more than half of this goes to enrich the New York ca- 
 nals and ship-owners. 
 
 An Upper Canadiam. 
 Quebec, 11th Feb., 1862. 
 
III. 
 
 THE DEFENCES OF THE COUNTRY.- 
 FORilFICATIONS. 
 
 " Britannia needs no bulwarks, 
 No towers along the steep ; 
 H«r march is o'er the mountain wave, 
 Her home is on the deep." 
 
 [Patriotic song. 
 
 " The experience of the world from China to Britain has exposed the vain 
 attempt of fortifying an extensive tract of country. An active enemy who 
 can select and vary his points of attack, must in the end discover some feeble 
 spot, or some unguarded moment. The strength as well as the attention of 
 the defenders is divided." — [Gibbon's Decline and Fall. 
 
 The experience of past faults, which may sometimes correct the mature age 
 of individuals, is seldom profitable to the successive generations of man- 
 kind."— Idem. 
 
 As we are about entering on a new epoch in our 
 national progress — an epoch which will be noted by the 
 future historian of Canada and the Empire, it may serve 
 some good purpose to ventilate those important questions at 
 present engaging so large a share of public attention — 
 questions in fact of momentous importance. In approaching 
 a subject on which there has often been great differences of 
 opinion, even amongst professional men, it will be more 
 becoming an unprofessional writer to weigh opposir;: views 
 and arguments, than to express a decided judgment, One 
 class of persons will be found condemning fortifications 
 almost in toto ; whilst another, with equal obstinacy, de- 
 clares them to be indispensable to the safety of a country. 
 The scientific and public opinion of mankind will also be 
 found to have fluctuated from age to age, on this vexed ques- 
 tion. It was once the boast of Sparta that the smoke of an 
 enemy's watch-fire had never been visible from their capital, 
 and the bravest race of warriors the world ever saw» held 
 stone walls in utter contempt. There is no country, perhaps, 
 where the question of fortifications has been more discussed 
 and where the views of great authorities have differed more 
 widely than in our own beloved mother country. Each suc- 
 cessive improvement in the military art has brought out 
 new points, requiring attention. At one time stone walls 
 have risen high in public favor. At another there was noth- 
 ing like the " wooden walls of old England." Very 
 
12 
 
 recently, a first Lord of the Admiralty, at a public demons- 
 liation given to the first Admiral of England, on the eve 
 of his departure for the Bahic, felt it necessary to restrain 
 his supposed rashness of character by admonishing him to 
 be careful of England's ships, and to beware of the stone 
 walls of Russia. That Admiral, at the close of the sea- 
 son, after having but too faithfully observed his superior's 
 admonition, returned home amidst the clamors of the nation 
 and the jeers of the press. When parliament met, he turned 
 on his assailants and brought them to bay, by quoting his 
 instructions and demonstrating the folly of attacking stone 
 walls with wooden ships. His bravery was vindicated, and 
 the nation set to work to meet the now acknowledged dif- 
 ficulty which presented itself to the power of the Empire. 
 The result has been the ])roduction of the iron Warrior. 
 Alas for the " wooden walls!" Iheir glory and their might 
 have departed. Hereafter, an iron age will require iron 
 walls, and the future poet will sing of the " Iron walls of 
 old England."* 
 
 France and America follow in the wake of England, 
 and the time is at hand when the battles of the sea will be 
 contested between iron navies, propelled at enormous speed 
 by the giant steam. If Sir Charles Napier were living, he 
 might now bid defiance to Cronstadt — whose walls could be 
 made to crumble before the tremendous missiles sent with 
 almost unerring aim, from an impregnable floating iron 
 battery, which, by changing its position under dexterous 
 management, is able to avert the effects of the enemy's fire. 
 Stone walls, like wooden walls, have had their day. This 
 fact may be noted as historical. It is therefore to be presum- 
 ed, that the Imperial commission, now sitting on the question 
 
 * About a month after the publication of this letter the Naval en- 
 gagement at Newport News took place, affording the first practical illustra- 
 tion of the efficiency of iron clad Steamers. The iron plated Steamer Merri- 
 mac (a razeed, 50 gun ship) mounting ten heavy guns and in no respect 
 equal to the Warrior, attacked four U. S. frigates, the Cumberland of 24 
 guns, the Congress of 50 guns, the St Lawrence of 50 guns, and the Minne- 
 sota of 40 guns — 104 guns in all. She first run into and sunk the Cumberland, 
 and then engaged captured and burned the Congress, and would have des- 
 troyed the others had night not put an end to the battle These and other 
 vessels in the port were saved, on the renewal of the attack next morning, by 
 the timely arrival of Captain Ericssons new, turretted iron clad Steamer 
 Monitor mounting two 180 lb. guns, which engaged the Merrimac at close 
 quarters for saveral hours and finally drove her off. 
 
 The New York Herald of the 12th March speaking of this, engagement 
 says " henceforth not a single wooden war vessel must bo built. We are 
 indeed entering upon an age of iron — iron in ships, iron in forts, iron in 
 harbor defences, iron in everything that moves, or floats." 
 
13 
 
 of 
 
 of fortifications in Canada, will learn by ** the experience 
 of past faults" and I may add present knowledge, not to sink 
 any more money in the construction of stone fortifications. 
 If bomb-proof works are required at particular points for 
 strategic reasons, nothing but iron can be relied on ; and for 
 temporary protection good earth-works, well flanked by 
 heavy oak timber, if it can be had. 
 
 As I never allow myself, from motives of contempt or 
 prejudice, to refuse to draw instruction from our neighbors, 
 who are practising the art of war on each other, I venture to 
 point attention to the successful application of railway bars 
 to defensive purposes. This new discovery in fortifications 
 is due to the ingenuity or the necessities of the Charles- 
 tonians. It was from behind such an improvised fortress, 
 that the celebrated Fort Sumpter was reduced to submission.* 
 Why not then apply the principle so efficacious as it is be- 
 lieved to be in ocean batteries, to land works ? Its applica- 
 tion would be much cheaper on land than on water. Oak 
 timber, two feet square, can be put together and plated on 
 land, far more economically than the building and adapting 
 a great ship to the same principle. These, however, are 
 matters which have no doubt long since occupied the atten- 
 tion of the Imperial authorities ; and I may, after all, be 
 incomptent to offer advice on a question tht^t has so much 
 puzzled professional men. From the fact that England is 
 laying out fabulous sums of money at this very time in build- 
 ing stone walls for the defences of her coasts, I infer that I 
 must be wrong. 
 
 Speaking of the coast defences of England, I would 
 observe, that I happened to be in London at the time the 
 subject was receiving consideration, in and out of parlia- 
 ment, and must say I could not help thinking that those who 
 condemned the lavish expenditure of money for these objects, 
 at a time when the whole system of warfare was rapidly 
 changing, had the best of the argument. It is true that the 
 Warrior was not yet completed ; but a delay of one or two 
 years could not have made much difference. It so happened 
 that the whole British nation was laboring under a panic 
 about a French invasion, and the government thought it 
 best not to assume the responsibility of delay. It seems 
 strange, however, now, that new light is shed on the science 
 of naval architecture, by the reported success of the Warrior 
 
 * The deck or roof of the Merriniac, was covesed with railway 
 bars at the recent battle, and the 32 pound shot glanced off them lili? " peas 
 from a pop-guns" 
 
14 
 
 and La Gloire^ some material modifications ?re not promptly 
 made in the mode of constructing coast defences. J&12,- 
 000,000 sterling would build a great many Warriors^ which* 
 after all will have to be built, before the perfect safety of 
 England can be assured. The advantages of floating iron 
 batteries are too numerous and too important, to be over- 
 looked or denied. But the dock yards must be defended by 
 land works — so say the great professional authorities. This 
 is no doubt quite correct, because they may be assailed by 
 an enemy superior in the field, who may choose his own 
 point of landing. England, however, ought never to allow 
 an enemy to land in force, and that is just what we in 
 Canada ought to provide against. Let us have the power, 
 or the means at hand of creating such a power, on our lakes, 
 as will enable us to resist invasion until England can send 
 to our aid her iron batteries and gunboats. 
 
 I feel certain that I may venture, without presumption, 
 to say, that I conceive that the best fortifications we can 
 construct, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, will 
 be a goodly number of first-class screw merchantmen on our 
 Lakes capable of being converted into gunboats, and a well 
 organized army of volunteers. 
 
 An Upper Canadian. 
 
 Quebec, 13th Feb. 1862. 
 
IV. 
 
 THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CO- 
 LONIAL DEFENCE— THE QUESTION 
 
 OF COST, 
 
 
 i 
 
 Sir, — I am sure tliat every right-minded Canadian 
 must, in the main, agree with your judicious remarks on 
 Thursday and Saturday last, on this subject. The difficulty 
 to which you refer, namely, the mode of settling the pro- 
 portion of the burthens which shall be borne respectively, by 
 the mother country and the Province — a term which I prefer 
 to colony when speaking of Canada — is by no means a new 
 one. It has often been dissussed, both here and in England, 
 with a view to arriving at some general understanding. Its 
 importance at the present time, however, is very materially 
 enhanced by the possibility of a war arising out of the pre- 
 sent American complications — either on account of Imperial 
 . interests and considerations, or by a deliberate attempt on 
 the part of the Government of Washington or of armed 
 bodies of disbanded soldiers to subjugate this country.* 
 
 The question is so large a one, and has recently been so 
 fully investigated by a Committee ot the House of Commons, 
 resulting in a blue-book of truly formidable dimensions, that 
 it is difficult to bring it within the compass of a newspaper 
 article. Before offering any observations on it, it may be as 
 well to explain what has been the theory and practice of 
 late, in reference to this and the other North American Pro- 
 vinces. This cannot, perhaps, be more briefly stated than 
 
 • The danger to be apprehended from the disbanding of large ar- 
 mies, has been frequently illustrated both in ancient and modern history. 
 Gibbon speaking on this subject says " too idle to work, too poor to beg, 
 " the mercenaries" (of the middle ages), " were accustomed a to life of rapine ; 
 '^ they could act with more dignity and eftp"*, under a banner and a chief; 
 " and the sovereign, to whom their service a as useless and their presence 
 " importunate endeavored to discharge the torrent against some neighboriug 
 •' countries. Macaulay says, "the peace" (ofRyswick) " had, all over Europe, 
 " and no where more than in England, turned crowds of old soldiers into 
 "•marauders." 
 
 The several Fillibuster expeditions got up a few years ago in the U. S, 
 tto subdue Cuba and central America were traceable directly to the discharged 
 soldiers, employed for a single year by the government of Washington, in the 
 Hexican war. What will happen when the vast armies of the present civil 
 war shall be left with out an occupation remains to be seen. A terrible 
 power is in the course of creation and ihere will not be wanting " a banner 
 and a chief" tc direct it against " some neighboring countries." 
 
16 
 
 in the words of Mr. Elliot, Assistant Under Secretary of 
 State for the Colonies, before this Committee. Referring 
 to the arrangements with the North American Provinces on 
 the question of military defence, propounded by Lord Grey 
 in 1851, and subsequently by the Duke of Newcastle and 
 Sir George Grey in 1854, and Mr. Labouchere in 1856, Mr. 
 Elliot, says, " the plan was that there should he a certain 
 " maximu'in force, which should be there on Imperial accoimt 
 " and paid for out of Imperial funds ; and that if the Colony 
 " wanted a greater number of troops they should pay for 
 " their charged 
 
 To meet this altered state of things our present militia 
 system was adopted, which has furnished a volunteer force 
 — the only branch of the militia establishment in the Pro- 
 vince of the least value, (as correctly stated by Mr. Elliot in 
 the course of his examination). This force Mr. Elliot sets 
 down for Canada at 4456, (page 22 of report). The max- 
 imum Imperial for^^e thought necessary p,t that time, (10th 
 of April last), just at the commencement of the American 
 Civil War, was stated at 2220 of all Rrms. The extraordi- 
 nary events which have occurred on this Continent since 
 that time, illustrate the impossibility of laying down any 
 fixed rule in regard to the proportions of military foi-ce to be 
 provided by any particular group of Colonies. It ought to 
 go far to demonstrate that not only each particular Colony, 
 but that every fresh exigency must he dealt with on its 
 merits. 
 
 As I am not writting a treatise on the subject, it will not 
 be necessary to discuss the peculiar opinions of Mr. Ad- 
 derley, M. P., who has given voluminous evidence, and 
 published a pamphlet and recently a speech, to prove that 
 England ought to go back to the Colonial system of 100 
 years ago, which threw all the cost of defence on the colo- 
 nists. That an Imperial statesman, of Mr. Adderley''s stand- 
 ing, should revert to a state of things w^hc-n the only de- 
 fences required by the North Americans were against the 
 natives of the Continent, or the then distant colonies of 
 France, must be quite refreshing to those who believe that 
 " tixoTe is nothing new under the sun," and that all things 
 revolve in cycles. An ingenious theorist, not a very long 
 time ago, wrote an essay to prove that bows and arrows — 
 such as were used by the ancient Britons, and are still in 
 favor with certain savage nations, who know not the use of 
 fire-arms — were the best weapons for a warlike people. 
 Mr. Adderley's theory of Colonial policy may fairly be 
 
n 
 
 classed with that in favor of a return to bows and arrows. 
 Bui as the bow and the arrow are not likely to change po- 
 sition with the Enfield rifle, so neither is Mr. Adderley's 
 Colonial policy likely to prevail — at least in Canada. Nor 
 can it be supposed that Earl Grey's " plan," though it has 
 been indorsed by a series of Colonial ministers, and differs 
 little from Mr. Adderley's, will be available any longer in 
 British North America. Neither can Canada be property 
 treated as belonging to the " group" of North American 
 colonies to which a uniform principle of any kind can be 
 applied. 
 
 The " Lower Provinces" of New Brunswick, Nova 
 Scotia, Newfounland and Prince Edward's Island, being 
 more especially maritime Provinces may continue to be so 
 gi'ouped, and may have some uniform plan settled on, as to 
 the cost of defence, whether in time of peace, or in time of 
 war. What all the North American Provinces have most to 
 apprehend, is war with the United States. As regards 
 Canada, her long inland froniier, which is distinguished 
 only by an imaginary lino drawn through the lakes and 
 rivers, or by the monuments set up by the surveyors — her case 
 is different from the others of the same Colonial office group. 
 
 The attacks to which the Lower or maritime Provinces 
 would, in the event of war with the United States, be subject, 
 would be merely of a predatory nature — such as the landing 
 at some undefended point, of marines from a ship of war or 
 privateersman, to plunder, or destroy property. The United 
 States in the face of so powerful a navy as England can 
 bring to bear on the American coasts, it cannot be supposed, 
 will attempt to land an army on the shores of any of the 
 maritime Provinces proper. Their land forces would there- 
 fore be wholly directed against Canada. By far the best 
 mode of defending these Lower Provinces would be that 
 adopted for the coast defence of England, Scotland and Ire- 
 land during the Russian war — namely by effectually shut- 
 ting up every port of the enemy, and capturing or destroying 
 every armed ship of his, which may have the temerity to 
 keep outside, if this can be done. There being no common 
 principle on which to found a plan for arranging the propor- 
 tion of expenses to be borne respectively by the mother coun- 
 try and the whole of the North American Provinces, it be- 
 comes quite unnecessary to make further allusion to the 
 Lower group. For us the question is purely Canadian ; 
 and must be settled between this country and England on 
 high national principles and according to the peculiar cir- 
 
18 
 
 i 
 
 cumi^*Dn?es and interests which may have produced a resort 
 to arms. 
 
 Having pointed out the impracticabilily of "grouping 
 the Colonies" for Colonial office convenience, in such emer- 
 gencies as the present, and alluded to the circumstances 
 growing out of boundary and geographical position, which 
 are peculiar to Canada, we may fairly find a starting point 
 from which we may possibly arrive at a solution of the ques- 
 tion now before the English and Canadian public — namely, 
 what shall hereafter be the relations between the Province 
 and the mother country, and from this deduce the propor- 
 tion which each shall bear in the defence of common inte- 
 rests. In my first letter I stated it as my view of the subject 
 that we must henceforth, for these purposes, be regarded as 
 allies, and that when the Province is threatened with inva- 
 sion the forces of England would in effect become auxiliia- 
 ries to those of Canada, just as a Canadian regiment sent to 
 assist England in some foreign war would obtain for us si- 
 milar designations. By divesting ourselves of mere ideas 
 and sentiments, which may be embodied in particular ex- 
 pressions of language, we may often find the solution of a 
 difficult problem. Although " a rose by any other name 
 may smell as sweet," we prefer 'o call it a rose — thst being 
 the nnrrij' most proper for it. But if by any process of nature, 
 or art, a rose should be turned nto a tulip, it would be very 
 improper to still call it a rose, and our doing so would only 
 lead to confusion in the science of floraculture. 
 
 Now, if the relations of t Colony with the mother coun- 
 try, being sui generis, have, from circumstances become 
 changed to those of an ally we shall gain much by so consi- 
 dering them. Great inconvenience often arises, in the dis- 
 cussion of questions, which do not admit of scientific de- 
 monstration, by the use of inapnropriate terms, and the force 
 of great moral axioms may be lessened or altogether lost by 
 a wrong application of language. 
 
 To apply these observations, I assume it as an established 
 and admitted fact, that Canada having grown into national 
 proportions, and assumed certain independent functions, 
 occupies a difterent relationship towards the parent ^ tate, 
 from that which she held in her incipient stages of coloniza- 
 tion, or nonage, must nou prepare for the new responsibili- 
 ties which a-e devolved on her. It has, to some extent, 
 been the policy of British statesmen to urge on us the as- 
 sumption of these responsibilities, (see Earl Grey's Despatch 
 of 1851,) and now we can no long?^ avoid doing so. In 
 
19 
 
 considering ihose relations in the light of an alliance offen- 
 sive, and defensive we open up a large question — namely, how 
 far a colony may be bound to assist the Mother country in 
 cases of need? The Greek colonies of antiquity were always 
 regarded as allies, and went by that name. They were vir- 
 tually independent of the parent state, which never interfered 
 in local, or domestic concerns. And yet no people were ever 
 more loyal to the common head than the colonies of ancient 
 Greece. They gloried in the name of Greek, for centuries 
 ifter the prestige of Greece had departed, and gave their 
 blood to support the honor and the interests of the common 
 brotherhood. i Such ought to be the relationship between all 
 the branches of the great Anglo-Saxon family, and such pro- 
 bably would be the case now, but for that unfortunate policy 
 which Mr. Adderley so much advises, and which led to the 
 seperation of the old colonies of North America from the 
 Mother connlry.2 ]y|r, Adderley, I may here remark, seems 
 to have shifted his ground cons^iderably, since he gave his 
 evidence only a few months ago, before the Committee of 
 which he was a member. His late speech, is, to some 
 
 1.— GREEK COLONIES— " The Rreat bulk of the Greek Colonies 
 « were really independent ; and though they ».ommonly regarded the land o 
 " their forefathers with filial respect, though they yielded to its citizens the 
 " place of distinction at public games and religious ceremonies, and were 
 " expected to assist them in time of war, they did so as allies only, on fair and 
 " equal terms but never as subjects " 
 
 ROMAN COLONIES—" The Roman Colonies were, for the most part, 
 " founded by and under the authority of government ; being intended to servo 
 " both as outlets for poor and discontented citizens, and as military stations, 
 
 '•' or garrisons The most intimate political union was always 
 
 " maintained between them and the Mother City Their internal government 
 ** was modeled on that of Rome ; and while their superior officers were mostly 
 " sent from the capital, they were made to contribute their full quota of 
 ' troops and taxes to assist in carying on the contests in which the Republic 
 •' was almost constantly engaged " 
 
 MODERN COLONIES.— " The early Colonies of most modern nations 
 " were founded by private adventurers, influenced either by the, hope of gain, 
 " or by a desire to escape religions persecution, without any wish to relieve 
 " the Mother Country of a surplus population or bridle subjugated Provinces 
 " On their first institution, therefore, the modern colonies approached, though 
 '' with some essential variations, more nearly to the Grecian than to the Roman 
 " model — but the period of their freedom was of very limited duration They 
 " were soon subjugated to laws and regulation framed in the Metropolis, and 
 " calculated, as was to be supposed rather to promate, its interests than those 
 " of the Colony. At a later period the foundation of colonial establishments 
 " was eagerly patronized by most European governments, in the view of ex- 
 " tending commerce and enriching the Mother Country, by securing to her 
 " the exclusive possession of the market of distant countries." — McCulloch. 
 
 2. — The old colonies threw off their allegiance to Britain because 
 British Statesmen attempted to tax them for their own defences. Would 
 Gauada act diSerently, if Mr. Adderley bad the powor to put her to the test? 
 
10 
 
 »^xtent an attempt to reconcile hif» peculiar views to the 
 important events which have recently happened. But it 
 will not inte'- "anadian, and will prove only a waste of 
 lime to poini .lis di8crepanci(;s. 
 
 From these obpervationH, it appears to me that the fol- 
 lowing considerations may be deduced : 
 
 1st. That it will be difficult if not impossible to deter- 
 mine how much of any casus betli^ may be chargeable to 
 Imperial and how much to Provincial account — speaking 
 now for Canada alone. This difficulty must necessarily 
 arise from the impossibility of ascertaining the true motives 
 of an enemy — inasmuch as some pretext instead of the true 
 cause is generally set forth, by one, if not by both parties. 
 No body believes that France and England went to war 
 with Russia, on account of the quarrel between Russia and 
 Turkey about the Greek churches at Jerusalem. And yet 
 that was the pretext put forward by one of the belligerent 
 parties, as the sole cause of the quarrel, and entered largely 
 into the declarations of the allies. So, if the United States, 
 having a furtive eye on Canada, seek a quarrel with England, 
 it will almost certainly be about something else not having 
 the slightest reference to Canada. This proves 2ndly, 
 the im;juiicy of discussing, in advance the question as to 
 whether a future war may be undertaken on account of Im- 
 perial, or Provincial interests. 
 
 If we are going to measure our loyalty and our aid by 
 such considerations, England may well weigh the propriety 
 of casting us off altogether, as a source of weakness, rather 
 than of strength in time of war-especially with our neighbors. 
 Let us well consider this view oi the question, before decid- 
 ing on a niggardly and unstatesmanlike policy. But, for 
 Canada, England would rely wholly on her navy in case of 
 an American war. She would thus be able to damage her 
 enemy more than her enemy could damage her and at 
 an enormous saving to the Imperial Exchequer. In such a 
 war, it must be evident to every man of common sense, that 
 Canada will be England's vulnerable point -., and, if we are 
 going to open a balance account we ought to take into that 
 account what it will cost to maintain our independence, if 
 that can be done at all, if England were to adopt the same 
 narrow view and cast us off, to shift for ourselves. 
 
 If then, we agree on the soundness of this " theory," 
 onr government should endeavor to put it into practice, even 
 if they have to call on our people to submit to a little direct 
 taxation to meet the present and future exigencies of the 
 
81 
 
 country. We may diflTcr amongst ourHelves as to the nature 
 and probables duration of the dang(;ra we are now called on 
 to avert. One; man may think 10,000, another 20,000, and 
 a third 50,000 enrolled and drilled volunteers may be wuf- 
 tieicnt, or necessary to stave off the disasters of war. In 
 considering this (juestion, it may well be affirmed thai it is 
 better to err on the safe side. One, two, or three millions 
 promptly and judiciously expended, may save a future 
 outlay of ten, twenty, or thirty millions in defending our 
 shores from the disasters of war. This moderate present 
 expenditure may now fairly be asked for, by England, and 
 ought to be cheerfully and promptly responded to by Canada 
 — and the proportions, in case of war, may safely be h^ft till 
 such a contingency becomes inevitable. It may then be 
 settled by a convention, similar to that entered into by 
 France and England when they went to war with Russia — 
 a convention that constituted them allies in regard to that 
 particular war, and which has made them friends ever since. 
 
 An Upper Canadian. 
 
 Quebec, 15th February, 1862. 
 
V. 
 
 OUR DL:tENCES FURTHER CON. 
 
 SIDERED. 
 
 Sir, — Our present relief from the apprehension of war 
 has been accidental. It may well become us to consider 
 whether our dimgcrs art; not still pressing, and may not 
 become perpetual ; and if so, whether we ought not to put 
 forth, for a time, extraordinary efforts to guard against them. 
 During the continuance of the American civil war, from 
 whence the elements of danger have sprung, we may not 
 have much to apprehend. But we cannot t(.'ll at what 
 moment, or by what unforseen event that war may be ter- 
 minated by a peace between the two sections. The South- 
 erners are beginning to be more severely pressed, and 
 would probably accept reasonable terms from their old Con- 
 federates. Or let us suppose the Federal arms to prevail, 
 in either case, three quarters of a million of men who have 
 acquired some knowledge as well as some taste of war, will 
 have to find the means of livelihood in a country, whose 
 commercial and financial condition will have become greatly 
 deranged. The Government of Washington must, in any 
 case, for many years to come, maintain a standing army of 
 at least 100,000 men. It will every year add to its navy; 
 and knowing as we do, the reckless enterprize and daring 
 of our neighbors, it would be incredible folly to trust our 
 defences henceforth to a few thousand British troops, though 
 they be the best and the bravest in the world. But I need 
 not dwell on this point. The necessity of adopting efficient 
 measures is fully admitted by all classes in the Province. 
 We have only to determine the nature and extent of the de- 
 fences to be provided, and to supply die means for carrying 
 them into effect. 
 
 I know nothing of the determination of the Militia Com- 
 mission, if they have arrrived at any and merely give my views 
 to the public for what they are worth. The Commissioners, 
 will, no doubt, deal with the question in a lucid and com- 
 prehensive manner. But the public opinion of the Province 
 must, after all, determine whether the recommendations of 
 those gentlemen shall obtain sufficient vitality to meet the 
 present and future requirements of the country. As a mem- 
 ber of that public, and I trust a true hearted Canadian and 
 
a good sul)i«'('t of Ilrr Miijrsty, I have* vrntured to nrgf the 
 propriety ot cMtiiblishin^ !i iiiililary hcIiooI Tor the education 
 of young CanadiauM in military .science. Now is a favorable 
 tiiu« to carry this important desideratum into ellect. 
 
 In tile vi(;\v I am taking, and looking forward as I do to 
 a long I'uliire, I diHcard altogether the idea of ollering a Pro- 
 vincial subsidy for Imperial trooj)s to defend our frontiers 
 from attack. Altht)ugh the practice has been a(h)pted in 
 regard to New South Wah's, Ceylon and Mauritius, I cannot 
 conc(!ive that Canadian statesm(!n will make such a propo- 
 Hition to England, Jior is it to be believed that England 
 would adopt it, if it were made. Such a practice, to use the 
 words of the Right Hon. llob(*rt Lowe, before the Committee 
 of the House; of CoMuuons last summer, wouhl be " putting 
 " the ikitish troops more in tin; position of mercenaries, 
 " than, if I were a soldier juyself I should like. They hre 
 *' virtually serving a foreign Government which hires them 
 " from the Government which they are bound to serve." I 
 may furtln^r add th;it sucdi an arrangement, if agreed to, 
 would prove ultiuly unequal to our present and probable 
 future re(iuirements. England will send us every available 
 soldier she has, in case of need, and will pour out her trea- 
 sure as freely as ever. Canada ought not, and must not, con- 
 tribute in money but in armed, drilled and fully ccjuipped 
 men to the extent of her abillity, or in such numbers as shall 
 be settled by a convention, when such a measure becomes 
 necessary. 
 
 What we have, therefore, to consider is, how we shall 
 provide these men. Shall it be in the shape of a small 
 standing army — for we are too poor to recruit and maintain 
 a large one ? Or shall it be by a larger volunteer force, which 
 shall be fully armed, uniformed and taught the practice of 
 the rifle ? Which force will prove most valuable in case of 
 war? How many regulars can be maintained for a given 
 sum — say of a million of dollars a year, or such an amount 
 as we may feel ourselves equal to providing ? How many 
 volunteers would the same sum keep up in time of peace ? 
 These are questions which enter into the very essence of the 
 whole discussion. 
 
 I have favored the volunteer principle for many reasons, 
 some of which I will now briefly allude to. First. What 
 we want, is to develope the military resources and spirit of 
 the Canadian people. — This is rendered indispensable by 
 our proximity to a powerful neighbor, who has put in requisi- 
 tion every available military expedient he possesses to quell 
 
24 
 
 
 a great civil war, and 1 must take leave to say, that on the 
 development of this spirit depends the future safety of our 
 country. Secondly. This neighbor must, for many years, 
 if not for all future time, remain a great military power, and 
 in consequence, a dangerous neighbor. The necessity for 
 having a body of Canadian regulars, in order to add firm- 
 ness and impose confidence amongst the great body of irre- 
 gulars, which, after all, must do a large share of the fighting, 
 will be obviated by the presence of a considerable imperial 
 force, whose prestige and discipline cannot be equalled. 
 Thirdly. We can, for the same money, keep in a tolerably 
 efficient state of organization during peace ten times (the 
 Commission on Imperial Defences of 1860 say twenty times) 
 as many volunteers as we can of regulars. Supposing, 
 therefore, for the sake of comparison, the proportions to be 
 ten to one, we may well consider whether 50,000 trained 
 volunteers will not go further to impress our neighbors with 
 sentiments of respect for us than 5,000 regulars. I know the 
 contempt the Duke of Wellington had for irregulars. But 
 his opinions were formed in regard to the Portuguese. 
 Again I would ask, would not the 50,000 armed and drilled 
 volunteer soldiers more fully demonstrate the determination 
 and spirit of our people, and exercise a higher moral in- 
 fluence than a standing army of 5,000 strong ? These ques- 
 tions carry their own answers. 
 
 But, whether we are to have a standing army or a vo- 
 lunteer army, we must aim at making it as efficient as pos- 
 sible, in its way. The first necessity is to have good officers. 
 Without these, all military organization becomes a mockery 
 and a useless outlay of public money. The men may be 
 taught their drill by experienced sergeants from the line, but 
 the officers can only acquire a knowledge of their duties and 
 of the science of war by long training in some competent 
 school, it is obvious that we cannot send a sufficient num- 
 ber of our piomising youths to England to acquire this 
 knowledge. We must, therefore, from the necessity of the 
 case provide the means to secure this object at home. Perhaps 
 it may not be desirable that the Province should expend at 
 once a large sum, in providing these means, nor that every 
 military aspirant should be qualified to command an army, 
 or even a regiment. What we want is to make a beginning, 
 and to establish a system which may be enlarged on, where- 
 by Canadians may qualify in Canada for at least a limited 
 number of those higher positions, in which such qualifica- 
 tions are absolutely indispensable to efficiency. There may, 
 
 ■ 
 
< ■ 
 
 -- 
 
 25 
 
 ' 
 
 if necessary, be different degrees of education, and the schools 
 themselves may be attached to the colleges and universities 
 of the Province, by creating military professor-ships. 
 Where early indications of military aptitude present them- 
 selves, such youths might be selected for the higher honors 
 and a higher class of qualifications. These are details, 
 but details of the highest importance, and they arc thrown 
 out as suggestions which court investigation from every 
 candid enquirer into our present and futures condition, 
 as a people. — Amongst the ancient llomans a military edu- 
 cation was considered a necessary part of every gentle- 
 man's acquirements, and there is no good reason why an art, 
 now become so important to the liberties of our country, 
 should not be taught by competent masters in all our higher 
 places of instruction. 
 
 Though these observations are made from a Canadian 
 point of view, I trust that I have not, as too many imperia- 
 lists, and perhaps too many provincialists have done, for- 
 gotten the opposite side of the question. Opinions not based 
 on large and even generous principles, of mutal advantage 
 ought to be regarded as unworthy of consideration, 
 
 It will, no doubt, have been remarked that the question 
 of the contingents to be provided by the respective Govern- 
 ments has been left without a suggestion as to its solution. 
 This question as, I observed in a former letter, had better be 
 left until a recessity for its solution arises. Up on this point, 
 England has done her duty to herself and to us, by the costly 
 and successful effort she has made to send out reinforcements. 
 We are the delinquents, and it is not for us to raise such 
 a question. I admit that there has been quite a demonstra- 
 tion in our towns, and some thousands of our best men have 
 enrolled themselves in companies, and are learning the drill. 
 But what proportion of these could leave their counting houses 
 and desks or other avocations, and march to the extreme ends 
 of the Province if required ? Eighty per cent of our popula- 
 tion is composed of agriculturalists, and it is to this class, 
 that we must, after all, look for the bulk of our future mili- 
 tary force. What has been done to organize officer and drill 
 them? Does not all still doj^^nd on the action of the Legis- 
 lature, which will not assemble for another month ? By the 
 slowness of our movement and the consequent delay we 
 shall gain one advantage — time for deliberation, and this is 
 what I think ought to be improved. 
 
 It is perhaps, needless to observe that the organization 
 of our military and naval forces, whatever they may consist 
 
 !.% 
 
26 
 
 of, must at present be regarded merely in the light of a peace 
 establishment — but a peace establishment created to meet the 
 requirements of an exceedingly uncertain future. If war 
 comes, we will have to draw from such resources, as we 
 may have created in time of peace, the means, to be used 
 conjointly with the forces of England, in protecting our 
 shores from invasion and our homes from destruction. The 
 peace establishment should therefore be commensurate with 
 the objects which it is intended to effect. Though England 
 may speedly increase her ten, or twelve thousand men, of 
 all arms to 30,000 or 40,000, can we make 20,000 partially 
 drilled and equipped volunteers into 50,000 tolerable soldiers 
 at such short notice? If we are invaded, it will not be by a 
 handful of men ; and if our object is to preserve peace, let 
 us not by the weakness of our efforts invite an attack. 
 
 An Upper Canadian. 
 
 Quebec, I8th February, 1862. 
 
VI. 
 
 THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
 COLONIAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Sir, — It has aflforded me much satisfaction, in reading 
 your remarks on my suggestions, to find that we so cordially 
 agree on the main question — namely, the necessity of our 
 meeting in a reciprocal spirit the liberality of England in 
 supplying the means of rendering our defences eifectual. 
 On other points, our difference is rather seeming than real. 
 I am inclined to say that we substantially agree and that our 
 apparent difference of opinion is only in the use, or substitu 
 tion of words. 
 
 There are one or two observations, however, in my let- 
 ter (No. 4,) that appeared in yesterday's number of your pa- 
 per, which I think you have misconceived, perhaps from 
 want of clearness of expression on my part. The first of 
 these is where you have arrived at the conclusion that my 
 views, after all, difl'er but little from those of Mr. Adderley, 
 M.P., in regard to Colonial policy. You will therefore per- 
 mit me to make myself better understood. To do so, I will 
 state briefly what that gentleman proposed to the Committee 
 of the House of Commons on " Colonial Military Expendi- 
 ture," of which he was a member. His proposition was 
 made in the shape of a series of resolutions one or two of 
 which I will quote, as being sufiicient to explain his policy, 
 
 1. " That every part of the empire which has represen- 
 " tative government should provide the requirements for its 
 " own safety. 
 
 2. " That the mother country is bound to aid her co- 
 '* lonies in wars, especially in those which may be the con- 
 " sequence of her own policy. 
 
 3. " And may expect in returi. the co-operation of her 
 " colonies, especially in wars which concern themselves." 
 
 4. Mr. Adderley further proposes that the Imperial Go- 
 vernment shall encourage a " gradual return to the old Colo- 
 " nial system of this country, during the continuance of which 
 " British troops were never employed in Colonies for any 
 " purpose, but that of aid against foreign enemies in time of 
 " war." 
 
 I have numbered these propositions for the convenience 
 of reference. As to numbers two and three, taken a8 af- 
 
28 
 
 firming abstract principles, I do not see that any exception 
 can be taken to them. With regard to number one, it strikes 
 me as being inconsistent with number two. It certainly 
 differs widely from the views I have urged. For instance, 
 I have taken the ground that all general and abstract prin- 
 ciples fail when applied to particular colonies and particular 
 cases, which may arise. I have been offering suggestions 
 in reference to Canada alone. It would be presumption in 
 me to oflbr opinions about other colonics, and to manifest a 
 desire to intermeddle in matters about which Canadians can- 
 not be expected to possess more than a general knowledge. 
 
 Aciing on this idea, I have pointed out the impropriety 
 of applying the same principles and means of defence to the 
 lower North American Provinces and to Canada. The ma- 
 ritime Provinces, I contend, must be defended mainly by 
 the navy of England — whilst Canada must be secured against 
 attack by a powerful land force and a powerful fleet of gun- 
 boats on the Lakes. I do not propose, nor do I think any- 
 thing I have written can be construed into such a meaning, 
 to " sever Canada from the Lower Provinces," or to urge a 
 " policy without reference to them." I have simply distin- 
 guished between the policy applicable to them as maritime 
 Provinces and that which is imposed on us, by geographical 
 and strategical considerations. Having drawn this distinc- 
 tion I confined my observations to Canada. 
 
 Between Mr. Adderley's recommendation number four, 
 and my suggestions, there is a wide divergence. 
 
 from there ' ' 
 
 propositions, 
 
 agreement. Mr. Adderley's proposition would leave us to- 
 day without a British soldier in tnc country, because we 
 happen to be at peace with our neighbors. My proposition 
 is, always to have such a British force; in the Province, as 
 will, conjointly with our own forces of whatever kind, com- 
 mand the respect of our neighbors and thus avert war alto- 
 gether. Is there no difference in these propositions I would 
 a3k ? If not, I confess myself a very poor master of language. 
 
 There is, in my judgment, more similarity between the 
 late Colonial office policy and Mr. Adderley's as expound- 
 ed by Mr. Elliot the assistant Secretary of State for the Co- 
 lonies. MrElliott states this plan to be, to maintain " a 
 " certain maximum force, which should be there on Imperial 
 " account and i)aid out of Imperial funds, and that if the 
 *' Colony wanted a greater number of troops they should 
 ''^ pay for their charge.^'* 
 
 being 
 
 there is a wide divergence. So far 
 
 "little essential difference between our 
 
 I have endeavored to point out an utter dis- 
 
u»"'*'ii 
 
 
 29 
 
 In quoting this explanation of tho old Colonial office 
 policy, I have italicised those passages which appeared to 
 me to be objectionable. It seems to me to have beon a very 
 loose sort of arrangement, and one which might liave led to se- 
 rious disasters in this Province. I have already pointed out 
 the fallacy of attempting to apply a general rule 1o all the 
 Colonies, or to particular grou))s of them. In doing so, I 
 have only followed the recommendation of the Committee 
 of the House of Commons, who say, " taking into consider- 
 " ation the facts disclosed by the evidence laid before them, 
 ** your Committee are of opinion that no uniform rule can 
 "be laid down which will be applicable alike to communi- 
 " ties so various as those, which compose the British Colo- 
 " nial Empire." The Committee distinguish between those 
 dependencies which are regarded in tb^ light of military 
 stations, and such as are "colonies" p per, and advise that 
 each of the latter shall be dealt with, in regard to tlie expen- 
 ses of military defences, according to the exigencies of the 
 case and the times, " having regard to the local resources 
 of each." The report then goes on to say " with this reser- 
 " vation, it appears to your Committee that the responsi- 
 ** bility and cost of the military defence of such dependen- 
 ** cies ought mainly to devolve on themselves.'''* 
 
 Whilst I am at the " blue book," I tak(; the liberty to 
 quot^ one more passage to show that I have followed pretty 
 closely in the footsteps of the illustrious statesmen who com- 
 posed the Committee of last year. The Report further says, 
 " that it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colo- 
 " nial defence to be borne by the Imperial and Colonial go- 
 ** vernments respectively, should be the subject of negotia- 
 "tions with the various dependeucies." I may make an 
 observation or two on this point again ; but I desire first to 
 remark, that I do not think that British statesmen have 
 shown so much forecaste in regard to the peculiar position 
 of Canada and the peculiar dangers to which she is exposed 
 as they might have done. Stretching as the Province does, 
 from the head of Lake Superior to the New Brunswick line 
 fully two tho'dsand miles along the borders of a powerful 
 and perhaps covetous neighbor, Canada never ought to have 
 been classed, with other members of the Colonial empire in 
 regard to h.er defences. British statesmen ought to have 
 considered this great Province as presenting by far the most 
 vulnerable part oithe Empire, in ease of a rupture with that 
 neighbor, and should have regarded our defences, both on 
 the land, gtnd on the lakes, as in the nature of Imperial de 
 
 '<1 
 
so 
 
 fences, and Canada ought to have done her part to the rea- 
 sonable extent of her ability. Had this view prevailed — 
 had England looked at tiie question in this light, and con- 
 sidered that the dangers arising from foreign invasion in 
 1837 and 1838 might be repeated, and iliat the honor and 
 the power of the Empire might be damaged almost as much 
 in Canada as they might be damaged on the shores of Kent, 
 or the coasis of Ireland, we should not have been frightened 
 out of our propriety at the chances of invasion at the begin- 
 ning of winter ; nor would England have been put to so 
 enormous a cost in aftbrding us relief and in imposing res- 
 pect for her flag on the soil of this Province. 
 
 Here let me quote one more paragraph from the Report 
 of the Committee — the last in that report : — " In conclusion, 
 "your Committee submit that the tendency of modern war- 
 " fare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power ; and 
 " it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops required 
 " for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possi 
 " ble, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing 
 " against aggression the distant dependencies cf the Em- 
 " pire." From what has been said, it will be seen that 
 this rule, as generally laid down by the Committee does 
 not hold good with regard to Canada. Regarding the United 
 States as the great power, with which Britain is most likely to 
 have the next contest, it may be well for her to consider whe- 
 ther the " heart of that hostile power" may not have to be as- 
 sailed on the lakes as well as on the ocean. Be this as it may, 
 Canada inust be defended there ; otherwise such a war will 
 inevitably present the spectacle of having her most power- 
 ful colony detached from her, whilst she remains mistress of 
 the seas, and holds every Atlantic port of the enemy in close 
 blockade, if not in actual possession. 
 
 Permit me to say, that if, in dealing with actual facts, 
 some of my observations presuppose a state of Colonial in- 
 dependence more complete than may be quite agreeable to 
 a high order of sentimentality, the fault is not mine. It is 
 the Colonial policy of the Empire that has done this, and we 
 cannot alter it if we would, and I feel pretty certain that we 
 would not if we could. Provincial statesmen, though they 
 are accused by their opponents of doing all sorts of odd 
 things, will scarcely feel theniselves so embarassed with the 
 responsibilities of independence, as to implore the mother 
 country to take back the troublesome gift. A study of Bri- 
 tish Colonial blue books has a wonderful desentimentalizing 
 eifect. We are there reminded of reciprocal obligations. 
 
31 
 
 " 
 
 interests and duties, and of the doctrine of quid pro quo. 
 
 Now, let us assume the question to bo as you have cle- 
 verly put it " how^ best to consolidate the interests of the co- 
 lony and the mother country." This subject I apprehend 
 would open up too large a field for discussion at the present 
 time, although I most sincerely hope that the present crisis 
 will powerfully direct the public attention of England to it. 
 The object must, I conceive, be accomplished by enlarging 
 the commercial relations between the two, by building up a 
 great Commercial Marine on the Lakes, the St. Lawrence 
 and the Ocean route between the St. Lawrence and Britain. 
 In the second communication which you did me the favor to 
 publish on the question of defences, I entered somewhat into 
 this part of the subject, and need not again dwell on it. 
 
 The question we are now considering is how to dove- 
 lope the largest amount of military spirit and military power 
 in the Province, and I hope, that the suggestions contained 
 in my last letter may not be inappropriate to the occasion. 
 It matters not whether, for the sake of argument, and to got 
 rid of traditional idea which often embart'ss us in a course 
 of reasoning, we call ourselves Allies, or Colonies, or Pro- 
 vinces of England. I used the term ally, as I pointed out, 
 as being more convenient to express the relations which we 
 should occupy in case of war with the United States. But 
 I proposed to leave the application of the principles and du- 
 ties which such a relationship c?c/acfo, would devolve on us 
 mutually, until its necessity arose — until the time came, if 
 ever it should come, when it may be necessary to enter into 
 a convention about quotas and contingents. " Sufficient un 
 to the day is the evil thereof," is a maxim which ought ever 
 to be kept in mind. It may break that charm which you so 
 well allude to, of considering ourselves a part and parcel of 
 the great Empire of Britain, when wo have to set down and 
 possibly wrangle, about how many men and how many guns 
 each party ought to keep in the field. Another question, I 
 have said, ought, if possible, never to be raised, namely, on 
 whose account was the war undertaken ? 
 
 In all our discussions, we ought not to forget that it is 
 our first and highest interest and duty to maintain the most 
 cordial relations with Britain, and second only to those to 
 cultivate similar relations with our neig' )rs. By prepar- 
 ing for war, we are simply providing a guarantee for peace, 
 and I venture to say that if we do not court the former by 
 the feebleness of our precautions to preserve the latter, we 
 shall long enjoy that greatest of blessings, an honorable and 
 
a 
 
 82 
 
 undisturbed peace. And let it never be forgotten that whilst 
 we are educating our rising generation in the elements of 
 military science and military duties, we are doing the very 
 best thing to develope both physical and mental energies. 
 Nothing 'n my judgment will do more to preserve the liber- 
 ties of the people, than to raise up a class of citizen soldiers, 
 by which means wo shall be able to avoid the dangers of a 
 staiiding army. I trust that I have now shown that we do 
 not in reality differ materially if at all on any point, and feel 
 confident that advantage must result from such discussions 
 
 Yours, &c., 
 
 An Upper Canadian. 
 
 Quebec, 19th February, 18C2. 
 
VII. 
 
 : 
 
 ^ 
 
 OUR MILITARY DEFENCE3— IS CANA- 
 DA TO BECOiME A TART OF THE 
 UNITED STATES. 
 
 Sir, — I venture once again to trespass on your patience 
 and to offer a few additional remarks on a subject, in the 
 discussion of which I have already filled many columns oi 
 your paper, without, as I conceive, by any means exhaust- 
 ing it. I do not, however, propose to go over much new 
 gr und. My object is rather to sum up what I have already 
 pa° forward as my view of the duty of the Canadian Legis- 
 lature. The question to be decided in a few months, per- 
 haps in a few weeks, is one which will determine the future 
 destiny of this great and rising Province for generations, if 
 not for all time to come That question is, whether we shall 
 grow up to nationality under the congenial influences of 
 British connection and British power, or be speedily absorb- 
 ed into the Union of the neighborij g States, or become uni- 
 ted with some detached portion of them ? 
 
 This will no doubt strike many thinking persons as a 
 bold, if not an exaggerated mode of putting the subject be- 
 fore the public. Others may possibly set me down as an 
 alarmist. It is to prevent such assumptions and meet such 
 charges that I desire to sum up the dangers of the present 
 and the menaces of the future, and to urge on the legislature 
 and the country the necessity of adopting measures for de- 
 veloping the military spirit of the people and bringing out 
 the military resources of the country. Since the adjustment 
 of the Trent affair, the public seem to have settled down in- 
 to a dangerous state of indifierence or contempt for what 
 may grow out of the great revolution in progress amongst a 
 neighboring people, fourteen times more numerous, if not 
 fourteen times more powerful, than ourselves. It is only a 
 few brief weeks since we all drew a long and a free breath 
 at the unexpected relief from the apprehension of a war, 
 which we were in no manner prepared to meet ; and already 
 we hear it repeated from mouth to mouth, that " the Ameri- 
 " cans will so exhaust themselves by their own internal 
 " strife as to incapacitate them from attacking Canada, or 
 " measuring swords with England. No, no, depend on it," 
 
 hear it remarked,) " we are now quite safe* The North 
 
 ( 
 
34 
 
 t 
 
 J 
 
 "will be beaten in the end, and the independence of the 
 " South will aftord a' guarantee for our safely. If this result 
 " is not attained by the South, the war will be long, and we 
 " shall in any case be safe — either from exhaustion of our 
 " neighbors, or from a divided Union." 
 
 Here lies, in my judgment, a serious, if it does not 
 prove a fatal delusion. VVhether the Union be restored, or 
 whether it be permanently divided, our risk of attack, at no 
 distant day, remains pretty nearly equal. Indeed it would 
 be difficult to say from which event we may have most to 
 apprehend. If the Union be restored, the United States will 
 be the most powerful and overbearing nation in the world. 
 With a million of men who will have acquired a pretty 
 thorough knowledge of war in the field and in the camp ; 
 with a navy, which will have become equal to the defence 
 of her principal seaports, and with the ocean swarming with 
 privateers to prey on the commerce of England, is there any 
 one who knows anything of American character and Ameri- 
 can audacity, who dare assert that the United States will 
 hesitate one moment to measure strcagth with the rival she 
 both hates and fears, but which she nevertheless hopes to 
 humble ? Besides the popularity of such a war, can any 
 one donl)1 llie policy of seeking it in order to consolidate the 
 government which just now is shaken with the revolution- 
 ary earthquake ? The darling doctrine of President Monroe 
 will be at once asserted, and Canada, Cuba and Mexico 
 will be promptly invited to join the then irresistible Union. 
 
 On the other hand, if there are to be two governments 
 in the place of one, the government of Washington will be 
 compelled to maintain a great standing army, and it may at- 
 tempt to indemnify itself for the loss of the South by the ac- 
 quisition of Canada. It by no means follows, because th e 
 government of Washington may be unable to subdue eight 
 millions, or twelve millions including the slaves (who do the 
 labor, whilst the whites do tae fighting, and w^ho ought, 
 therefore, to count in the military resources of the country) 
 that it may not be able to crush us with only two and a half 
 millions, although backed by all the power of England. 
 Look at the map and there it will be seen that the Confed- 
 erate States are a great compact country, skirted along the 
 sea coast by a chain of mountains, covering a considerable 
 breadth and extending many hundreds of miles. This coun- 
 try too — larger than all that part of Europe lying west of the 
 Rhine and the Rhone, or rather the mountains of Piedmont, 
 is filled with rivers and other defensive lines, and has a cli- 
 
 tl^ 
 
1 
 
 J 
 
 35 
 
 
 t 
 
 ^ 
 
 mute unfiivornbh; tomilltury operations at nearly all seasons 
 ol" tliu year. Now look at Canada, llert; it lies, a lon^, 
 narrow, and (^oinparalivcly sparsi^ly settled country. From 
 the head ol" Lake Superior to the boundary line of New 
 Brunswick, a distance* of mon; than 2000 miles, is bounded 
 by the territories of this dangerous neighbor. 
 
 But we are earnestly reminded of how the brave militia 
 of Upper Canada, with the aid of one or two regiments of 
 the line, drove back the 'Yankees' in the war of 1812-14, 
 when that part of the Provim^e had under 100,000 inhabi- 
 tants. " If w(! were able then, with such linuled means, to 
 defend ourselves," it is argued by a porticm of the press and 
 by gentlemen everywhere, "we shall give good account of 
 " any foe who diires to set foot on our soil. Look at our 
 " population — two and a half millions, and look at our rail- 
 " ways and our steamers, and at the British troo})s already 
 " in the country and those that will come, when more are 
 "" needed, and at the British gunboats," (which may never 
 float on tlie waters of our lakes) " what more do we need, 
 " than an enrolment of our militia." These are words I have 
 heard very often of late ,and those who use them pretty gen- 
 erally do so, deprecating the necessity of additional taxation 
 to provide defences. 
 
 Those who can so readily compose themselves into a state 
 of fancied security had better reflect on the result of the 
 American Revolutionary war, as well as on the progress of 
 events since the war of 1812. Did not a larger British force, 
 of the hardiest and finest veteran soldiers Britain ever had 
 — a force larger by half than that now in this country, lay 
 down their arms to three millions of the old Colonists, and 
 five or six thousand French soldiers, after an exhausting 
 war of seven years ? And whilst the population of Upper 
 Canada has grown from 100,000 to 1,500,000 has not die po- 
 pulation of Western New York and the Western frontier 
 States grown from 400,000 or 500,000 to 8,000,000 ?* Then 
 
 • The population of Ohio and the territories noAV forming the Western Lake 
 States contained in 1812, in round numbers about 300,000 souls. Of these 
 230,000 belonged to Ohio alone, and 70,000 to the Western territories, 
 In 1860 the Western Lake States contained the following population : 
 
 Ohio, 2,339,599 
 
 Michigan, 749,112 
 
 Indiana, 1,350,941 
 
 Illinois, 1,711,753 
 
 Wisconsin, 775,873 
 
 Minnesota, 172,022 
 
 7,090,300 
 The 30 Western Counties of New York (out of GO comprising the whole 
 State) contained, in 1812 about 200,000 souls. They had increased in 1860 
 
 li 
 
36 
 
 i 
 
 It I 
 
 look at the Mhipping of our neighbors on the lakon, number- 
 ing four to ont! as compared with ours, ami showing in ton- 
 nage a still greater disproportion against us. Look at their 
 lines of railway, tapping our frontier everywhere, and the 
 vast material of war they will have on hand when the day 
 of peace amongst themselves arrives. Nor can it be sup- 
 posed, that in the event of a war with Great Britain, they 
 will again commit the blunders they were guilty of in the 
 last contest, of sending small detachments of men against 
 us at numerous points. Leaving fifty or sixty thousand men 
 to guard their frontier cities of Detroit, Buffalo, Oswego and 
 Ogdensburg, and a score of improvised gunboats manned by 
 a few thousand sailors, to menace our shores of the lakes, 
 and keep our Western militia at home, they will next time 
 send a hundred thousand men against Montreal and fifty 
 thousand against Kingston. Th^ former will endeavor to 
 cut off all succor from England, and the latter to pierce the 
 Province through at a vital part. As for Montreal, if at- 
 tacked by such a force in winter — a ft»rce that can be direc- 
 ted against it with the utmost facility, by the old line of mi- 
 litary operations, via the Hudson and Mohawk rivers and 
 Lake Champlain, now traversed all the way by iron rails, 
 it can only be defended by an imposing army of the line, 
 backed by all the irregulars of Lower Canada.f 
 
 If we are going to provide the means to avert such dan- 
 gers, it must appear to every sensible man, clear that those 
 means must be proporti(>ned to the end they are to accom- 
 plish. In case of actual war, England will, no doubt 
 promptly take ?\ir forces into her pay, to an extent to bring 
 our own burthens within our ability to bear them. But we 
 must first provide a force, which may be made so available. 
 
 to 1,750,000. Western Pennsylvania, which is also a Lake State, contains 
 fully 750,000. Adding Vermont and Maine, the population of the frontier 
 States will be as follows : 
 
 Western Lake States, 7,099,300 
 
 Western New York, 1,750,000 
 
 Western Pennsylvania, 750,000 
 
 Vermont, 315,000 
 
 Maine, 620,000 
 
 Total 10,534,300 
 
 ■J- If Montreal were held in force by an invading army for six months, thus 
 cutting of all external aid at the point where all our lines of communication 
 meet, it requires no military prescience to see that all British America to the 
 West as far as the Rocky Alountains must fall within six months. With the 
 West gone Lower Canada would no longer be worth holding and must speed- 
 ily follow. 
 
[tains 
 pntier 
 
 thus 
 
 ition 
 
 the 
 
 the 
 
 peed- 
 
 SI 
 
 This is what England asks of us and it is reasonable and 
 jnst, and I say it is most dosirabh; for tlu; Province that wo 
 should do it ours('lv«!s ; bucausc; it will develope the spirit 
 and energy of the people, and qualify us to shape and guide 
 the destinies of the tuture. But if we are going to be nig- 
 gardly and ort'er 2(),0()() men when 50,000 or more will not 
 be loo many for a peace establishment on the voluntary 
 principle, we had better do nothing and leave the future to 
 chance, or to Providence, or to the forbearance of our neigh- 
 bors. A let;blo policy would argue that we are (Mther want- 
 ing in will, or are deficient in resources, and the feebleness 
 of our preparations would be regarded as an invitation to 
 detach us Irom our present Imperial connection. 
 
 Yours, &c., 
 
 Av Upper Canadian. 
 
 Quebec, 6th March, 1862. 
 
Vllf. 
 
 OUll DEFENCES— SUGGESTIONS 
 ABOUT ORGANIZING OUR MILI- 
 TARY FORCES. 
 
 ■'1 
 
 
 i I 
 
 ■' ' i" ■ 
 
 SiRj — My observations hitherto have been based mainly 
 on leading general principles, such as a layman might be 
 supposed to understand or be able to master. Although the 
 application, or carrying out of such principles in their work- 
 able details must necessarily be left to more practical and 
 professional men, 1 hope that the suggestions I am about to 
 make may advance, in some small degree, the cause which 
 we ought all to be sincerely desirous of aiding — namely, how 
 to provide the most efficient means of bringing out the mili- 
 tary spirit of the country, at the least cost in money. Even 
 though very different views, in regard to the peculiar method 
 or organization, may be recommended to Parliament, the ob- 
 servations of persons having access to common sources of 
 information, and having the same objects at heart, may be 
 of some value by affording scope for comparison. At any 
 rate a mere layman may hope to escape severe criticism from 
 those who are qualified by professional knowledge for the 
 exercise of higher efforts of statesmanship and for the sug- 
 gestion of more practical details 
 
 I have favored the volunteer principle, as being calcu- 
 lated to come within our means, and to develope the largest 
 amount of military enthusiasm as well as power in ihis 
 country. Others I notice, favor a small standing army for 
 Canada. I have seen some detailed estimates for recruiting 
 and maintaining such a force ; but the writers have evidently 
 never looked into an English blue book on this subject, as 
 the figures are absurdly incorrect, and below the mark. 
 
 1 shall briefly contrast the two descriptions of force. 
 According to the report of the Imperial commissioners of 
 1860, paragraph 14 the cost of raising recruits for the regular 
 army is £11 and cost of barracks £100 stg. per head. As labor 
 is dearer in Canada than in England we may fairly set down 
 the cost of recruiting at double this sum or at least at ^100 
 per man. All the Imperial barracks in the Province are 
 required for the Imperial troops. We should therefore have 
 to set to work to build for ourselves, and we cannot hope to 
 
39 
 
 do so at a less cost than those built in England — say $500 
 per man — the first cost, therefore, for each soldier will be 
 $600. Then to this must be added his outfit. This, in Eng- 
 land is about £6 stg., covering uniform, rifle, knapsack, 
 cartridge box, and necessary changes of clothing. In Ca- 
 nada we must not count on less than $50.00 per man, in- 
 cluding his winter requirements and camp equipage. To 
 raise and equip 4000 regulars would therefore cost $2,400,- 
 000. 
 
 The annual cost of maintenance of British troops in 
 Canada, of all arms, appears from the report of the Com- 
 mittee of the House of Commons on Colonial Expenditure 
 for 1861, page 279 appendix, to be about $400 per man. 
 
 In regard to volunteers, the Imperial Commissioners 
 estimate such a force at only a little over one-twentieth tiiat 
 of regulars — as well in the organization as annually. This 
 of course refers only to the peace establishments ; but that is 
 just what this country is called on to provide. When it 
 comes to war England must draw her purse strings, and 
 take all our troops whom we are unable to keep in the field, 
 into her pay. But as we have not the same classes from 
 which to recruit our volunteer army, as the volunteer force 
 of England is drawn from, we must find the men else- 
 where. To get them elsewhere we must offer stronger in- 
 ducements. Instead of merely supplying a musket, or a 
 rifle, the Government must furnish to each man, and to each 
 officer, a full suit of uniform, including a winter great coat 
 and cap — in addition to the rifle and the officer's side-arms. 
 The first outfit of each volunlner may therefore be set down 
 at the same as for a regular — say $50. But there will be no 
 barracks required, and here we shall save $500 per head, as 
 also the bounty. 
 
 We next want to know what each volunteer will cost 
 per annum. This will depend on the number of days he 
 may be called out for continuous drill and rifle practice. 
 If a week were considered sufficient time and a dollar a 
 day — (including all arms of the service, and officers' pay,) 
 the wages, per capita, covering also rations, the cost per man 
 would be $6 a year, to which must be added $2 more for 
 munitions of war. Add to all these a round $100,000 a year 
 for the expenses of the war department and incidentals, and 
 we shall have a pretty fair gu ide as to comparative expenses. 
 Let us carry the comparison a little further and sec how the 
 matter will stand. 
 
I 
 
 40 
 
 ■ I 
 
 > 
 
 ', 
 
 '.»■ 
 
 1 
 
 1! 
 
 I 
 
 I assume that this country ought to provide 50,000 vol- 
 unteers, to be organized on the best plan that can be devised 
 for efficiency. As there will be no bounties to be paid, the 
 first cost will be ^50 a head — to estimate lower, for an aver- 
 age of all arms, will only be to deceive. This will require 
 an appropriation of ^2,500,000, a sum which, a few years 
 ago, when railways were all the rage, would only have re- 
 quired the dash of the Inspector General's pen to carry 
 through parliament. The annual charge (at ^8 a head) 
 would be $500,000, the $100,000 for departmental and in- 
 cidental expenses being added. 
 
 It will thus be seen that the first cost of providing 60,- 
 000 volunteers will be less than that of raising, equiping and 
 housing 4,200 regulars, whilst the annual charges on the 
 former will be about equal to the annual maintenance of 
 1250 of the latter. Those who favor the establishment of u 
 regular force will do well to study the costliness of such a 
 forje. 
 
 In conclusion of these observations I shall venture to 
 express an opinion as to how and where the volunteer force 
 should be enlisted. To incur a large expenditure in raising 
 men on a wrong principle would be highly impolitic. Those 
 who may desire to enter a volunteer service should be re- 
 quired to hold themselves ready to march at any time they 
 may be called on, and to any part of the Province, and to 
 serve for a period of not less than a year in case of war, or 
 threatened invasion. Such as will not enter on those terms 
 (being provided with pay and rations equal to the United 
 States service,) are not worth having. Possibly not over 
 half of those now drilling in our towns and cities would be 
 able to leave their avocations if asked to do so. 
 
 We must therefore look to bur agricultural population 
 which constitutes about 80 per cent of the whole, for our 
 volunteer forces. It strikes me that the best mode of dis- 
 tributing this force would be to give to every township or 
 parish the right to raise a company of infantry, cavalry or 
 artillery, of a strengtli proportionate to its inhabitants. 
 Towns and cities may be better adapted to some branches 
 of the service. If so, let them have such branches. By this 
 arrangement every part of the country will have ocular de- 
 monstration of the result of our military organization. The 
 people everywhere will see that the money they are called 
 on to contribute is expended for the object for which it is 
 raised, and it will be spent equally all over the country. 
 Besides, it may reasonably be supposed that the presence in 
 
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I 
 
 41 
 
 each local! :y of a company of uniformed and drilled men, 
 will inspire a certain degree of military spirit amongst all 
 classes and thus add moral weight to the organization. 
 
 To carry out this suggestion, the Province might be di- 
 vided into a certain number of military districts, which may 
 be made to correspond we will say for example, with the 
 48 electoral divisions of the Legislative Council, or accord- 
 ing to any other more convenient method. Each of these 
 might form the territorial limits of a regiment — and four or 
 five of the districts contiguous to each other, might constitute 
 brigade divisions. The annual trainings or week of drill 
 and ball practice would naturally take place at regimental 
 head-quarters, and the volunteers from the mere love of the 
 thing, and to appear in uniform would no doubt meet, with- 
 out pay for a few hours each month for company exercises. 
 
 Here, we are once more brought to think of the ques- 
 tion, what are we to do for officers ? This I have already 
 answered. Establish military professorships in all our high 
 schools and colleges, on the same principles as other pro- 
 fessorships, and let all who desire to obtain a military edu- 
 cation have a chance. If instances of professional merit are 
 discovered in any of the schools, let such students be pro- 
 moted at the public expense to a course of higher education. 
 In a few years we shall thus have the country filled with 
 competent young men to officer our volunteer army. It is 
 not too much to say that every township in the Province 
 might be able to furnish two or three, or more families pos- 
 sessed of the necessary means to qualify some one or more 
 sons for such positions. Meantime we must make the best 
 shifts we can. For instance, it might be made a condition 
 to the issuing of a commission, that the person seeking it 
 should attend a school of instruction, to be improvised for 
 the occasion at some convenient point, for a few weeks or 
 months. 
 
 I have now done with the subject for the present, and 
 shall rejoice as much as any man in the country to find, 
 when the Commission on Militia affairs makes its report, 
 that some equally good, or better and more comprehensive 
 scheme of organization and defence has been matured. 
 
 Yours, &;c., 
 
 An Uppek Canadian. 
 
 Quebec, 10th March, 1862. 
 
•1 ". 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 'I i 
 
 ■ I 
 
 ■ ! 
 
 Since this pamphlet was in type the mail brings us the 
 unanimous resolution of the House of Commons confirming 
 the Recommendation of the Report of the Commissioners on 
 Colonial expenditure, to which the writer has so often re- 
 ferred. The resolution was moved by Mr. A. Mills, the 
 Chairman of the Commission, and is in the following words : 
 "That this House while fully recognizing the claims of 
 *' all portions of the British empire to imperial aid, in their 
 *' protection against perils arising from the consequences of 
 " imperial policy, is of opinion that colonies exercising the 
 " rights of self-government ought to undertake the main res- 
 " ponsibility of providing for their own internal order and 
 " security ; that such colonies ought to assist in their exter- 
 " nal defence ; and that^ as a rule, except in the case of great 
 ^''fortresses, no further charge ought to he made upon the 
 *' imperial treasury for colonial fortifications. '*'' 
 
 The italicized portion was added as an amendment by 
 Mr. Baxter, in order to inform the Colonies more explicitly 
 of the firm determination of the Imperial Governmv'nt to 
 carry out the recommendation of the Commissioners. Our 
 Legislature, can therefore have no loop-hole out of which to 
 escape from the necessity of providing more efficient means 
 of defence. It is the result of that larger degree of national 
 independence which mother England has devolved upon us, 
 and which we have no alternative but to except. 
 
 The following ex .ract from a recent number of the United 
 Service Magazine confirms the assumption of the writer 
 that the British forces, sent to aid us in case of war must 
 hereafter be regarded as allies and we as principals in any 
 such contest. 
 
 This writer says, " it is plain absolute infatuation 
 to ignore or blink at the fact, that either we must 
 keep a large army permanently in Canada, occupying 
 in force all the more exposed and important points, or 
 the Canadians themselves must entirely alter the existing 
 state of things, and keep up a regular army fairly propor- 
 tionate to the danger that menaces them. Such danger 
 has been arrested for the moment, but it is still there, and 
 in all probability will increase daily. Our utter incapor 
 bility of being the principals in a land defence of Canada 
 
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43 
 
 
 " ought to be evident enough. Jf we are to be so, our 1 1,000 
 " men will need to be doubled or trebled very shortly." 
 
 The writer of these letters has not felt it proper to make 
 specific suggestions about the organization of the Militia, or 
 Volunteer forces of the country, or in regard to what points 
 ought to be fortified. To have done so, whilst two Military 
 Boards were in session to whom these questions have been 
 referred, would have been presumption. He cannot, how- 
 ever, allow his observations to go to press in their present 
 form without pointing out two indispensable objects requir- 
 ing the earliest attention of the Legislature. The first of 
 these is the establishment of a capacious graving dock at 
 Quebec, capable i receiving vessels as large as the War- 
 rior. To secure this object, important alike io the Ocean 
 Commerce of Canada, and in case of war, to its military se- 
 curity, all that is required is to afford the necessary facilities 
 to the Quebec Harbor Commissioners to raise a revenue, in 
 the same manner as is done at Montreal and indeed at every 
 other sea-port of any importance in America, or Europe — 
 that is by levying tonnage dues. 
 
 The second object, of even greater present importance, 
 is td push forward the completion of the Houses of Parlia- 
 ment at the permanent seat of government, so as to remove 
 all doubts on a question calculated to distract the public 
 mind, and weaken the national sentiment of the country. 
 Concurrently with the progress of these buildings, some iron 
 towers , or fortifications should be designed and constructed. 
 This might be done at a very moderate expense by buying 
 a few thousand tons of old railway bars, which can be had, 
 in any quantity at half the cost of new iron. After the ex- 
 perience of the Monitor and the Merrimac, it cannot be 
 doubted, that a few such towers mounting heavy artillery, 
 would defend Ottawa against any force that could be sent 
 against it. 
 
 Quebec, March 22, 1862. 
 
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