IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 1.1 Lia|Z8 1 2.5 |iO ^^" ■■■ tt£ ^ 12.2 Sf 1^ 12.0 i L25 ||1|_U |L6 p^ n '^J^/ «. i» Iff V '/; >> '/ m y/M Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WBT MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14S80 (716)t72-4S03 4^^ 4^^^ ^A' CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHJVI/ICIVIH Collection de microfiches. Canadirn Institute for Historical ly/licroreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes tachniquaa at bibilographiquas The ci toth« The institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the Images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. D D D D Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur I I Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagte Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaur^ et/ou peiiiculAe Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque Coloured maps/ Cartes g^ographiques en couleur Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) Coloured plates and/or Illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur D Bound with other material/ ReilA avec d'autres documents Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ La re liure serr^e peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge intirieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutAes lors d'une restauratlon apparaissent dans le texte, male, iorsque cela 6tait possible, ces pages n'ont pas its fiimies. Additional comments:/ Commentaires supplAmentaires; L'Institut a microf ilm* le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a M possible de se procurer. Les details de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-Atre uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la mAt'/iode normale de filmage sont indiquAs ci-dessous. D D D D D D D D Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur Pages damaged/ Pages endommagtes Pages restored and/or laminated/ Pages restaurtes et/ou pelllcuites Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages dAcoiortes, tachetAes ou piqutes Pages detached/ Pages d^tachtes Showthrough/ Transparence Quality of print varies/ Quality InAgale de I'impression Includes supplementary material/ Comprend du materiel suppKmentaIre Only edition available/ Seule MItlon disponible Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been ref limed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partieilement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont 4tA filmtes A nouveau de fa^on A obtenir la meiileure Image possible. Their possil of thfl fllmin Origlr begin the la sion, other first F sion, or illu Theli shall I TINUI whict Maps differ entire begin right requli meth This item Is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est filmA au taux de reduction indiquA ci-dessous. 10X 14X 18X 22X 28X 30X X 12X 16X 20X 24X 28X 32X Tho copy film«d hare has bMn reproduced thanks to the generosity of: Library of the Public Archives of Cenada L'exempiaire fiimi fut reproduit grAce A la ginArosit* da: La bibliothique des Archives publiques du Canada The imeges appearing here ere the beet quelity possible considering the condition end legibility of the original copy and in Iceeping with the filming contract specif icetions. Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover end ending on the lest page with e printed or illustrsted impres- sion, or the becit cover when eppropriete. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first psge with e printed or illustrated impres- sion, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression. The lest recorded frame on each microfiche shell contein the symbol — ^^ (meening "CON- TINUED"), or the symbol ▼ (meaning "END"), whichever eppiies. Les imeges suiventes ont M reproduites avec le plus grend soin, compte tenu de le condition et de le nettetA de rexemplaire film*, et en conformity evec les conditions du contrst de fiimege. Les exemplaires originsux dont la couverture en pepier est ImprimAe sent filmte en commenpant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernlAre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustrstion, soit par le second plet, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires origineux sont filmAs en commenpent par la premlAre pege qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminent par la darnlAre pege qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaftra sur la dernlAre imege de cheque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbols -^ signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbols ▼ signifie "FIN". Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction retios. Those too lerge to be entirely included in one exposure ere filmed beginning in the upper left hend corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many fremes ss required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent 6tre filmte A des taux de rMuction diff Arents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour Atre reproduit en un seui clichA, 11 est film* A pertir de I'angle supArieur gauche, de geuche A droite, et de haut en bas, en prenent le nombre d'images nAcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mAthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 N, REMARKS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE NAVAL ADMINISTKATION OF GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1815. BY A FLAG OFFICER. WITH A PREFACE BY REAR-ADMIRAL BOWLE^S. FAS KST ET AB HOSTB DOCRRI. THIRD EDITION. LONDON: JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY. 1847. ,d*Mi.awi*»w^.«„,,.^-. ye R th in im CO un vai en poi tho ent per teei mig me com fusi whe tant the me phle deai "f i I PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. SiNce the publication of a small pamphlet last year, the chief object of which was to vindicate Sir R. Peel's Naval Administration, and to prove that the exertions made during that period, both for the improvement of our great maritime arsenals, and the increase of our Navy, deserved the gratitude of the country, many of my friends have pressed me to undertake some more extended and popular obser- vations on this subject, in the hope of dispelling the erroneous impressions which prevail on many im- portant points, and directing public attention to those great questions which are at present almost entirely lost sight of, amidst the petty political and personal attacks with which our newspapers daily- teem. I at first declined a task which I foresaw might, if fully and conscientiously executed, involve me in disputes and controversy ; but on further consideration, I could scarcely feel justified in re- fusing to lend my assistance (such as it may be), where the object to be attained is so vitally impor- tant, and I was encouraged by the recollection of the success which attended a similar effort made by me on a former occasion, when having, in a pam- phlet (to which I did not then afHx my name), en- deavoured to draw the attention of the public a2 ^Sk^AiJS^Sm towards many points in the conduct of our Naval Administration, which at that time (1830) appeared to me dangerous and objectionable, I had afterwards the secret satisfaction of observing that almost all my suggestions were gradually adopted ; and I have thought that I should be enabled to place my sub- sequent observations in a clearer point of view, if I republish, on the present occasion, the Remarks to which I have alluded, and thus enable my readers to divide into two distinct periods, the measures pursued by our Naval Administration from the Peace of 1815 to 1830, and from thence to the pre- sent time. They will observe that, during the former period, my suggestions were chiefly directed to the following points. The inferiority of our Naval Architecture (jene- "^ally, and more particularly the disparity of our frigates and smaller vessels, when compared with those of other nations. Our neglect of artillery practice, and disregard of the recommendations of various officers (but more especially Sir Howard Douglas), on this subject. . The necessity for assembling an annual squadron for exercise and instruction. Our backwardness with respect to the commence- ment of a Steam Navy. The unnecessary haste with which our newly com- missioned ships were hurried off to foreign stations, in an imperfect state of discipline and equipment, overloaded with stores and provisions, and too little ; t prepared for any sudden emergency ; and I recom- mended a more careful and detailed inspection im- mediately previous to their sailing, which would guard against this evil. I suggested some improvements in our code of Naval discipline (which were very soon afterwards introduced), and I took a short review of the Naval preparations and improved systems of foreign Powers as contrasted with our own. If those who may honour these pages with a perusal will turn, in the first instance, to those Remarks, they will then be ens bled to accompany me more readily in the histo- rical glance which I now propose to take over sub- sequent events. A new Administration came into power in 1830. Sir J. Graham was appointed First Lord of the Ad- miralty, having Sir T. Hardy, as Senior Naval Lord, under him ; and a series of measures were soon afterwards undertaken for remedying many of the evils, of which they were fully aware. The construction of small frigates and ten-gun brigs was entirely stopped. The School for Naval Artillery was established at Portsmouth, on board the Excellent, on the exact plan proposed and sketched by Sir Howard Douglas. A squadron of exercise was fitted out, and towards the latter end of 1831 we commenced that progress of im- provement in our Naval architecture, which bids fair to place us as far in advance as we formerly were in arrear of our maritime rivals. () I I I would by no means assert that our new ships are perfect, or that farther modifications of their shape may not correct some defects complained of j yet when I observe their great superiority in almost every important quality, the ease with which they carry their heavy armament, their stability, fast sailing, roominess, and stowage, I am much inclined to suspect that the future alterations will be few and trifling ; and I am more strongly led to this opinion by observing how closely they are copied by all later competitors, and that no one ventures to reject the great advantage of their bold increase of breadth. The result of the change of system which has taken place since 1830, may be thus recapitulated. We have entirely abandoned the construction (and I hope the repair) of all those classes of ships which, from their great inferiority in size and force to those of other maritime nations, were no longer calculated to maintain our Naval superiority. Our new ships of the line, of all classes, are such fast sailers, that decisive actions will be brought on with much more facility than formerly, when the slowness of a great proportion of our fleet (and of the three deckers more especially), so frequently perplexed and retarded our manoeuvres ; our large frigates are most powerful and efiective ships, and only require to be increased in number without delay, while our corvettes of twenty-eight guns (carrying, as all the new ones will do, two long guns on the upper deck, to enable them to reach steamers) will be equal to anything iUM»*r-it.-i-,MiilU of their class belonging to oth .r nations, and will, I hope, supersede those infinite varieties with which our Navy has hitherto abounded, and which have, from their diversity of equipment, formed a source of perpetual expense and perplexity in our dock- yards, as well as a constant obstacle to that uniform system which we have been endeavouring to establish since 1832, with respect to the masts, yards, &c. throughout the service. With respect to our smaller vessels, it has now become so obvious that almost all the duties required from them during former wars must in future devolve on steamers, that it would, in my opinion, be an unjustifiable expense to keep up so large an establishmeut as heretofore. The protection of our coasts and coasting trade will be confided entirely to steamers, and on all foreign stations they will also, in all probability, gradually supersede small sailing vessels. Our best policy will, therefore, be to avoid increasing the number of sloops and small brigs beyond the actual wants of the service during peace, and to confine our new constructions to brigs of the largest class, the only ones now equal to those of other nations. Our fu- ture Navy would then consist of one class of three deckers, one (or at most two classes) of two-deckers ; one of large frigates ; one of twenty-eight gun cor- vettes ; and one uf eighteen gun brigs. We have still so much to learn with respect to steam vessels, that I will not venture to offer any decided opinion upon the classes and dimensions to 8 '1 ! which it may he advisable to restrict ourselves in future, but the enormous cost of the Terrible, and othiirs of that* description, leads me to think that equal advantages r ay be obtained at a much smaller expense ; because it is obvious, that in the present state of maritime warfare, steam vessels will be auxiliaries rather than principals in Naval engage- ments, and that arming them with any large number of broadside guns, will only tempt them to expose their most vulnerable points to the enemy's fire. T am therefore inclined to think that the largest class shoulH not exceed 1600 tons; while our great en- deavour should be, to obtain the most buovant form with the lightest draught of water, and that the bows and sterns are so shaped as to ensure the greatest amount of head and stern fire. And as soon as experience has determined the simplest, lightest, and most enduring engine, producing in vessels of the same form and construction the great- est velocity, it should be very generally introduced, taking all possible care that each part is identical, and applicable to every vessel of the class to which it belongs. I doubt the advantage of continuing the construc- tion of ninety -gun ships on two decks. They are in all respects nearly as expensive as three deckers, and their superiority in sailing is not (as was ex- pected) so great as to counterbalance the loss of a whole battery. The Rodney (the first of this class built by Sir R. Seppings) sails indifferently ; the 9 Queen has, during the trials of the last two years, been generally equal, if not superior, to the Albion ; and if the sailing of our first-rates can (as I see no reason to doubt), be relied on to this extent, their superiority in action is very decisive. Our frigates of thirty-six guns, built at a period when we could not screw up our courage to construct larger ones, are so inferior to those of all other nations, that I recommend their entire discontinu- ance. We cannot reasonably suppose they will beat French or Americans of nearly double their force, and yet they will be expected to try. For- tunately we have very few of them, and I hope we shall build no more ; but a very considerable in- crease in the number of our large frigates is so in- dispensable, thp<- I trust no time will be lost in sup- plying our deficiency in this respect. It appears scarcely credible that between J 830 and 1841 only one ship of this class (the Vernon) was built ; and although two have since been launched, and several others are in progress, it should be remembered that the French Navy is still very superior to our own in this description of vessel, so important at the commencement of hostilities. In determining on the model to be preferred in our future con- structions, I trust we shall proceed with more caution, patience, and seamanlike discretion than has hitherto characterized our proceedings on similar occasions. A new experimental ship should never be sent to a foreign station until she has been 11 l> \ 10 subjected to a careful and prolonged trial at home. Some alterations of stowage, tho position of the masts, and various other points which I need not enumerate, will always be found necessary before the ship is brought to her best sailing and working trim ; and it is one of the great advantages of our present system, that our new ships can be carefully tried in the squadron of exercise, sent into port for any alterations which may be considered advisable, and no longer hurried off to distant stations in almost total ignorance of their good qualities or defects. We are now endeavouring to place our Navy on the highest possible footing, both in point of force and efficiency ; but immense sums of money will be wasted, and our object, after all, only imper- fectly attained, if we neglect those precautions which common sense and prudence so obviously dictate. In my opinion, our new ships, after being fully tried and reported on, should be carefully laid up, and our halfworn ones (of which we have but too many) brought forward for service during peace. Our whole Navy will soon be half worn if we con- tinue our present system, under which a very large additional expense is incurred by perpetually re- pairing our decaying ships at home, while we are wearing out our new ones abroad. It is not sufficiently considered how rapidly old ships deteriorate by remaining in ordinary under these circumstances ; whereas, if they were kept on 11 service as long as they will last without a repair beyond their value, and on their return from abroad immediately taken into dock and refitted, a very great saving would be eflfected, not only by checking incipient defects and decay, but by preserving great quantities of stores and fittings of all descriptions, which, when the ship is laid up, become lost to the service. I doubt extremely, whether we do not lose much more than we gain by our excessive haste to pay off ships which have been perhaps three or four years abroad, but are still in good condition, and only require a slight repair ; and whether, under improved management, they might not be refitted and sent to sea again in less time, and in a state of order and efficiency far exceeding that of our newly- commissioned ships, many of which are two and three months fitting out, and are consequently more expensive. If this plan were adopted, we should no longer see fine and well-disciplined ships' companies disbanded and dispersed, after a period of service barely sufficient to complete their training and organization ; and although many changes of officers and men would necessarily take place, the discipline and arrangements of the ship would never be en- tirely broken up — a large proportion of the crews would either remain or return — the total destruction of everything which coPt so much time, labour and money, to establish and ^>erfect, would be almost entirely avoided — the trim and proper stowage of the ship would be known and preserved, and the principal defects of the hull being pointed out to 12 I til vi. hi the officers of the yard, much unnecessary expense in examination would be saved. It should be an invariable rule to order ships returning from foreign stations to the ports where they were last repaired, and where alone their weak points can be accurately known. A very heavy outlay is often incurred in the repair of ships, by an .unnecessarily minute and rigid examination, which would have been prevented by a previous knowledge of the nature and extent of the last repair, the quality of the timber used, &c. ; and I will here remark, that considering the very large expenses annually incurred in building, repairing, and alter- ing ships, a most careful revision of the practice now pursued in our dockyards is urgently required, not only for the purpose of introducing a system of better-considered ecor \ but also greater regu- larity and uniformity t^. ,^hc':t those establish- ments, and preventing, as tur as may be possible, the many conflicting and contradictory orders by which so much confusion is created, time lost, and expense incurred. The revision I recommend ought not to be de- layed, but I do not hesitate to assert that efficiency and subordination will never be thoroughly esta- blished in our Naval arsenals until all politics and electioneering are completely banished from them, by placing all those employed within their walls under the same incapacities as the Revenue depart- ments, and thus breaking up the partiality, favour, and jobbing, which now so notoriously prevail. 13 e de- lency esta- and nem, walls part- 'our, The success of our School for Naval Artillery has been in the highest degree satisfactory, and has led to the instruction of the whole corps of Royal Marines in artillery practice, on similar principles. If this system is fully carried out, and improved to the extent of which it is capable, by providing prac- tising ground for all the divisions, our Marines, when embarked, will be found thoroughly acquainted with the use of the great guns, and most useful auxiliaries to the officers and men sent from the Excellent to our newly commissioned ships. Political events, and the necessity, real or imagi- nary, for keeping a large force in the Mediterranean (the " Capua" of the British Navy during peace,) have, during this second period,* too often pre- vented the assembling for exercise a sufficient number of ships to instruct our younger officers in the evolutions and manoeuvres of a fleet. We appear to have been equally unaware of the vital importance of this latter object, and of the extreme danger to which we exposed ourselves, by leaving our coast and arsenals wholly unprotected, while every disposable ship was beyond the Straits of Gibraltar j and it is impossible to insist too strongly, or too earnestly, on the deep responsibility which any Government will incur, if the system lately established is departed from, and our Home Squadron — our only reserve force — broken up, and dispersed on foreign service. It was to our state of perfect preparation last * Between 1832 and 1844. ii 11 ; i ■ 14 year, that we owe the peaceful termination of our differences with the United States ; and although I am no alarmist, and very sincerely deprecate any hostile feeling towards France, I ought not to con- ceal the important fact, that the Government of that country is preparing with all possible rapidity, and regardless of expense, for great Naval operations ; that all their establishments and arrangements (more especially those which relate to steam vessels) are on the largest and most formidable scale ; and no reasonable doubt can be entertained that all these preparations are well calculated to realize the aspi- rations and hopes of a strong party, who look eagerly forward to a favourable opportunity for avenging past defeats by some sudden and disgraceful blow, while this country, weakened by domestic discord, and perplexed by political feuds, appears too much inclined to postpone or neglect all those measures of precaution which the change of circumstances so imperiously demands. It seems but too probable that this session of Parliament, like the last, will be suffered to pass over without maturing even those preliminary arrangements, which are indispensable for enabling the Government to call out the Militia on any sudden emergency, while that more perfect and general organization of our maritime population, by which alone an enterprising enemy can be de- terred from insulting our coasts, appears to be alto- gether lost sight of. It is in the earnest hope of awakening my countrymen to the consideration of , ■>*Miaiii.t»;fiMi^:iiL'i-3f- !iE^.S52ii'il 15 these important facts, while we have still time to adopt the necessary measures for guarding against national danger and disgrace, that I reluctantly obtrude myself on their attention. It is our duty to our allies, to Europe, and, indeed, to the whole civilized world, that our defensive precautions should be at least as complete as those of the Con* tinental Powers, and that the general peace should not be endangered by any supineness or want of foresight on our part, which may invite or encou- rage attack. It will be, perhaps, convenient to recapitulate in conclusion, the points to which I am most anxious to draw the attention of my readers and the Execu- tive Government. The first is the necessity of having always at home, or within reach, in a state of perfect prepara- tion, a squadron of reserve and exercise of at least its present strength. That our arrangements for raising men rapidly on any emergency should be matured and complete : at present they are sadly primitive and imperfect. Whenever seamen are wanted in larger numbers than usual we merely open some public-houses as rendezvous, and send a few officers of inferior rank to the out-ports on this temporary service. In 1845 six months had elapsed before six ships of the line were (some of them but indifferently) manned. It is, nevertheless, obvious that on any sudden alarm, or probability of war, our first preparations. 16 and the equipment of our first squadrons must depend entirely on the rapidity with which volun- teers are collected by officers accustomed to this peculiar service, and who may be depended on, not only for energy and exertion, but also for such a careful selection of healthy and able-bodied men as would prevent the delay and disappointment so often experienced on similar occasions, but which might be attended with such seriou consequences on an emergency of this nature. It is equally certain that officers hastily selected, and hurried off to parts of the country of which they have no knowledge, and where they are themselves unknown, must inevitably act under very great disadvantages ; and my recom- mendation, therefore, is that a permanent Recruiting Staff should be formed, which, dividing the United Kingdom into districts, and having head-quarters at all the great mercantile ports, may be constantly entering and forwarding seamen of the best classes in such numbers as the service may require during peace, but whose still more important duty would be to ascertain and report the probable number of men they could raise whenever circumstances occurred demanding extraordinary exertions. I imagine that the whole kingdom might very conveniently be divided into eight or ten districts having their respective head-quarters in London, Liverpool, Bristol, Newcastle, Yarmouth, Leith, Glasgow, Cork, and Belfast ; and I should propose placing them in communication with the Inspecting 17 ^ery icts Ion, ?ith, )ose ting Commanders of the Coast Guard, from whom they ought to receive much important assistance and information, and whose more exact and minute local knowledge would be found extremely valuable in perfecting an arrangement of this description, as well as a great saving of expense ; for this is a ser- vice they can very easily perform without any risk of their attention being withdrawn from their own more special duties. I should recommend that the officers employed on this service be most carefully selected. They should be either Captains or Com- manders, and as far as can be ascertained of kind and conciliatory tempers and manners ; because I feel confident that if they conduct themselves with propriety and discretion in the execution of this duty, and shew themselves on all occasions the friends and advisers of the seamen in their districts, they will soon acquire much influence . id popu- larity amongst them, and be thus enabled to per- form the duty entrusted to them with more useful- ness and effect. Nothing formerly checked and discouraged the entry of seamen so much as the manner of their conveyance from place to place in small miserable vessels without decent accommodation, or even shelter from weather. This has been since in a great degree remedied, but it still requires the careful attention of the Admiralty. Having thus stated the principal features of the plan, I am desirous of seeing carried into execution, B 18 as well as my arguments in favour of it, I will only add that I contemplate no expense whatever beyond such a remuneration to the officers employed as might be considered advisable, and which at most could not amount to more than the difference be- tween their half and full pay. It has been suggested that the establishment of Sailors' Homes on the model of that now existing in London might be useful at the ports where ships are usually paid off; but although 1 believe no ad- vantage would be derived from such a measure, as regards the mere boarding or lodging of seamen, who in general on being discharged very soon pro- ceed to London, yet there is one part of Captain Elliot's system, which might be very usefully put into operation at Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham, &c., namely, affording all possible assistance to seamen in the care and remittance of their money,* and by this means protecting them from plunder and loss, and I would therefore propose that an officer be stationed at each of those ports for this purpose, who might be considered by seamen as their friend and adviser on these occasions, as well as when they were in want of employment, and who would thus be able to impress on their minds a confidence in that Government by whom he * I am perfectly aware that men are asked at the pay-table, whether they wish to remit any part of their pay to their friends, but this is done at a moment of hurry and excitement, and does not fully meet my views. Hi was employed for their advantage and protection, and also be enabled by his constant communications with them to retain in the service large numbers of those men, whose training and discipline render them doubly valuable, but who, under our present system are too often entirely lost to the Navy. 1 further recommend that all trials of experi- mental ships should be more carefully and patiently conducted, and full opportunity ^iven for every alteration necessary to ascertain their qualities, before they are finally reported upon by the officer com- manding the squadron of exercise, under whose eye all these trials should be carried on. To these suggestions I will only again add my recommendation for the adoption of an improved system of inspection of all ships ordered on foreign service immediately previous to their sailing, and that the inspecting officer be specially directed to report whether the decks are clear and unincum- bered, the ship in all respects prepared for action or bad weather, and the officers and men in possession of their proper accommodation ; and I insist strongly on these points, because I know that none of them are sufficiently attended to, and that many of our ships (especially the smaller ones) often sail so overcrowded and encumbered with supernumeraries, stores, and provisions, that they are not only dangerously deep, but also very soon become sickly, while a great loss is frequently incurred by damage B 2 20 to those perishable articles unavoidably placed m situations exposed to wet and other injury. I had at first contemplated the omission of the introductory prefaces to the first and second edi- tions, but haying been strongly advised by a friend, in whose judgment I place great confidence, to re- publish my Pamphlet exactly as it originally stood, I have made no alteration whatever. I will con- clude by repeating, in the words which I then used, (and which are so much more applicable now) my earnest hope that by exciting the public attention to the errors and omissions which I have en- deavoured to point out, I may in some small de- gree contribute towards averting the dangers to which I confess I cannot look forward without ap- prehension, and that now, as well as at that time, the warning voice of an officer devotedly attached to his country's service, may not he raised in vain. ft 't INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION. The following pages constituted the principal employment of the Author during the last year of a long life passed in the almost constant service of his country, down to the period from which ho com- mences his Remarks ; and they are submitted to the Public as nearly as possible in the shape in which they were found at his decease, except that he had arranged, in the form of notes, such copious extracts from the letters of hb correspondents both abroad and in England, for the purpose of corroborating his own statements, that it was found impossible to insert them without incurring a greater expense in the publication than had been originally contemplated. Many extracts from mo- dern French works on naval subjects* have been omitted for the same reason. The Editor is not aware that any reason exists for suppressing the name of the Author ; but as a draught of the title-page as it now stands was found with the manuscript, his family thought that they should best conform to what appeared to have been his intention, by making no alteration. * Dupin, Tupinier, Annales Maritimes, &c. &c. V U E V A C E TO THE SECOND EDITION. A Second Edition of theso Remarks having been already called for, the Editor embraces this oppor- tunity of expressing his gratification at this proof of the favourable reception they have experienced, as well as at the numerous tefitimonies of approba- tion which have come to his knowledge. He has been most hdj)py to find, that the deference and partiality with which he has always been accus- tomed to receive the opinions of their lamented Author, have not misled him on the present occa- sion, and that the unanimous voice of his profes- sion has been in accordance with those feelings which induced him to lay this work before the Public. The tone and temper in which some inquiries after the name of the Author have been made, tend more fully to convince the Editor of the propriety of his original determination to suppress it. The question at issue is a public, and most important one, and it shall not be lost sight of in a personal controversy, which, however 23 skilfully it might bo conducted, cannot affect the accuracy of the facts stated in the *' Remarks." To these no answer has as yet been attempted, and the Editor has therefore only thought it neces- sary, in reply to a letter which appeared in the Times, and some subsequent remarks in the Ports- mouth Telegraph, to insert, at page 51, a short paragraph explanatory of the Author's views on the subject of inspections of newly commissioned ships, previous to their leaving England for foreign ser- vice, and to which the present practice of merely mustering the crews bears no sort of analogy. Of those who are for keeping everything as it is, and who, from indolence or prejudice, oppose all changes, the Editor begs leave to ask how they will be able to justify their conduct, when a few such paragraphs as the following shall have ap- peared in the newspapers ? " New York, 183 . " We are happy to announce to our readers the gratifying intelligence of another naval triumph. The United States frigate, St. Lawrence, of forty- four guns. Captain , has arrived this morning with her prize the British frigate Mercury, of forty-six guns, Captain , which she captured off Cape Finisterre, on the , after a severe engagement, in which the Mercury lost about one hundred and fifty men killed and wounded, and was completely dismasted, but the St. Lawrence has only eight men killed and twenty wounded, and i24 has not suflFered very materially in her masts or riggings. " The British officers complair heavily of their Admiralty, by whom they were refused a few days time to exercise and discipline a raw ship's company, composed of r.ewly impressed men. They were told they might do this at sea, and the captain was threatened to be superseded if he made any further difficulty. They sailed in bad weather, and met the St. Lawrence the second day afterwards." '• Portsmouth, June 183 — *' We regret to state that accounts have been received of the capture of His Majesty's ship Tyne, of twenty-eight guns, by the United States corvette Concord, of twenty-two. The official letters have not yet arrived ; but it appears that the Tyne was to leeward, and at first chased the Concord^ which ship, on making out the Tyne*s force, allowed her to approach within reach of her long twenty-four- pounders, and then keeping, by superiority of sailing, a sufficient distance on her weather beam, completely dismantled her, taking care not to close until the Tyne became entirely unmanage- able. We hear the Tyne's loss is dreadful : almost all the officers, and above half the ship's company, being killed or wounded before the colours were struck. ** We deeply regret to inform our readers, that 25 accounts have also been received of the capture of His Majesty brig Curlew, of ten guns. She was taken after a severe action by a schooner privateer carrying six carronades, and one long eighteen- pounder, and one hundred and twenty men." The Editor. August 2d, 1830. The foregoing pages were on the point of being forwarded to the printer, when I received this this morning the last U. S. Journal, containing the reply of Sir R. Seppings, to that part of the " Re- marks" which comments on the construction of His Majesty's ships of war ; and, pressed as I am for time, I cannot but offer a few observations in answer to his letter. In the preceding part of this Preface I have already said every thing which appears to be ne- cessary on the personal part of the question. Sir R. Seppings must be fully aware, that in this free country, the public measures of public men form a legitimate subject of public discussion ; and while that discussion is conducted with temper and cour- tesy, it is not usual to manifest any feelings of personal umbrage or hostility. My knowledge of the Author of the ** Remarks" enables me to inform Sir R. Seppings, with equal truth and sincerity, that he was one of those most sures which have been adopted to preserve the dis- cipline, efficiency, and activity of our ships in commission, and to counteract the inevitable effects of a long and profound peace on all warlike estab- lishments. Between 1784 and 1793, we had three considerable naval armaments, and there was conse- quently but little time for either officers or men to forget what they had previously learned; but I remember that it was during this period the con- stant practice to assemble our guard-ships at Spit- head as early in the spring as possible, and to exercise them during the summer months in those various evolutions which would naturally suggest themselves to the mind of an experienced officer. Has this good old system been followed up? I fear the reply will be, that during the last fourteen years (with one solitary exception isi 1818) no squadron has ever assembled for exercise ; that Spithead and Plymouth Sound are generally to be seen without even senior officers' ships to enforce regularity, as well as to stimulate by good example D ■■•it 60 to activity and emulation ; nnd that our ships of war, when fitted out for foreign service, proceed to their respective stations without any previous in- spection or review, and almost always singly, encumbered witli passengers,* and overloaded with provisions and stores, resembling too often a mer- chant-ship with a full cargo making all haste to its port of discharge, rather than a British man-of war in perfect trim and equipment, and carefully pre- serving, during peace, that complete state of order and preparation which can alone secure superiority in war. It is quite unnecessary for me to enlarge on the ill effects which this deviation from our former system must necessarily produce. An entire new set of officers are gradually replacing those whose long experience in war might perhaps have rendered further instruction less necessary ; and if . he rising generation are educated in a system of negligence and inactivity, what will be the result at the commencement of a new war, when our utmost exertions will be required to secure our superiority over rivals who have certainly lost no opportunity of improving and perfecting their naval establish- ments, and whose minds are fully alive to the errors to which they attribute their former reverses ? A regiment, when ordered on foreign service, is always reviewed previous to embarkation, and its * The GhampioD, of eighteen guns, sailed not long since for the coast of Africa with fifty sapernumeraries, for whom there was no room below, stowed on the main deck under canvass. 51 state of discipline and appearance confidentially reported on. Such a practice introduced into ilie navy would have the best effects, both by encourag- ing emulation and exertion, and preventing that fatal system of hurrying ships to sea in an imper- fect state of equipment ; and nothing could be more easy and simple than the detail of such an arrange- ment. A newly commissioned ship, after being reported ready for sea, might be allowed any rea- sonable time to prepare for being reviewed, and the captain should have full liberty during this interval to get under weigh, and exercise in any manner he thought proper. The commander-in-chief should then, after mustering the crew, and fully inspecting all the interior arrangements, 8e'> the men exercised at their guns ; and the ship being got under sail, should be put through all the various evolutions which it is of most consequence to perform steadily and correctly in the presence of an enemy. If this regulation were rigidly adhered to at Ports- mouth and Plymouth, no ship could in future pro- ceed on foreign service materially deficient in discipline or preparation, and the thoughtless and injurious system of encumbering and overloading them in the manner I have described must be at least considerably checked, if not altogether put a stop to. Another most important point to which too little attention has been paid since the peace of 1815, is our artillery practice. There can be no doubt that D 2 \f 52 our reverses during the American war are to be attributed, not only to the great superiority of the ships we engaged, but to the imperfect manner in which our officers and men had been trained to the use of their gnus. It will, perhaps, hardly be cre- dited hereafter, that there was at that time no regular system of exercise established by authority in the British Navy, but that each ship had its own paVticular plan and method, varying of course according to the experience and degree of informa- tion possessed by the captain, as well as to the degree of importance which he attached to the subject. I need not detail the fatal negligence which too often prevailed, and which became only known in its full extent by its unfortunate results. At the conclusion of the peace, however, the officers of the navy were unanimous and urgent for the immediate adoption of a better system, and various suggestions were offered to the Admiralty as to the best method of proceeding. Assuming, as appeared most probable, that our ships would be almost entirely in port, some recommended an exercising ground at each naval arsenal, in which the crews of the guard-ships, &c., might be regu- larly trained : others preferred a ship fitted for this purpose ; but all concurred in the necessity of establishing some uniform practice. In 1817 Sir H. Douglas, an officer who combines an hereditary interest in the welfare of that service which owes so much to his father, with all that science and 53 experience in war can afford, laid before the Board of Admiralty a most valuable work, containing a series of suggestions on this subject, which, if they had been properly attended to and acted upon, must have placed our system of artillery exercise on a very different footing from that on which it at present stands. It does not, however, appear that between 1817, when he first offered his manuscript work to the Board of Admiralty, and 1819, when he requesteci their permission to publish it, any attention was paid to the valuable suggestions with which it abounds, beyond issuing by authority a sort of uniform manual exercise for the great guns ; and until 1827» when His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence became Lord High Admiral of England, I was not able to observe that any effec- tual steps were taken to introduce or enforce such a regular system of artillery practice, especially amongst our ships on the home stations, as might enable us to keep pace with the improvements rapidly introducing amongst our maritime rivals. During His Royal Highness's administration, much was undoubtedly accomplished by bis own frequent personal inspections of the ships in com- mission, and the attention he paid to every thing which respected their artillery ; but he was unfor- tunately too short a time in office to establish any material or permanent improvements in this part of our system ; and I cannot therefore do better than give my readers in this place, and as nearly as pos- (TT h i 54 aible in Sir H. Douglas's own words, a sketch of the plan which he^ twelve years ago, suggested to the Admiralty — which at the moment appears to have been received with entire approbation — but which since that time has not (as far as I can learn) been thought worthy of further consideration. " When the navies of Europe, opposed to us in the late war, had been swept from the face of the ocean by the gallant achievements of the British marine, a period of triumphant, undisputed domi- nion ensued, during which our seamen were not in general sufficiently practised in the exercise of those weapons by which that dominion had been gained ; but, in the pride and ease of conquest, were suf- fered, in many instances, to lose much of that profi- ciency in warlike practice which had been acquired in a long series of arduous service. No one seemed to doubt that the decided superiority which we had displayed in every action with a marine generally esteemed expert in gunnery, was owing to a degree of permanent perfection in our own system, which, animated by the well-known gallantry of oar offi- cers and seamen, would always insure us victory over the vessels of any other state, even in conflicts with superior force. Relying with too great confi- dence on this persuasion, we were led to despise expected foes whom we only rated on ? level with those we had uniformly beaten ; and to engage rashly in very unequal contests with the ships of a power whose practice we have since found is not of 55 that character which should render us satisfied with the condition, or indifferent about the improve- ment of our own. ** Reviewing carefully our naval actions with European enemies during the whole of the last war, and comparing them with the battles which were fought in that which immediately preceded, there appears abundant proof that the natives of Europe had very much deteriorated in the practice of g'.m- nery. Iv the war which terminated in 1783, the damage which our ships sustained, even in combats with nearly equal force, was in general much greater than in the actions of the late French war. It appears, indeed, that even in the later periods of Napoleon's reign, when he had certainly effected considerable improvements in his marine, the state of practical gunnery was still so wretched, that we have seen ships, fully officered, superbly equipped, and strongly manned, playing batteries of twenty or thirty heavy guns against our vessels, crowded with men, without more effect tha.i might easily have been produced by one or two well-directed pieces ; and we have seen some cases in which heavy frigates have used powerful batteries against our vessels for a considerable time without producing any effect at all. ** The darker of resting satisfied with superiority over a system so wretched as this, has been made sufficiently evident. It consisted more in relative than in absolute excellence. We became too con- '■1 ■'.'*M 56 fident by being feebly opposed ; then slack in war- like exercise, by not being opposed at all ; and lastly, in many cases inexpert for want even of drill practice; and herein consisted the great disad- vantage under which, without suspecting it, we entered, with too great confidence, on war with a marine much more expert than that of any of our European enemies '* The materiel of our navy is in the finest possible condition. Our ships are greatly improved in every feature of strength and warlike quality. Our ordnance is the best in the world ; every species of store and equipment is perfect. We possess excel- lent seamen, trained by the operations of our com- mercial navy. Our officers, many of them educated at public expense, are good navigators, excellent astronomers, and are full of energy, activity, and courage : but these elements and qualities are not sufficient to constitute a good ship of war, unless the knowledge of warlike science and practice be added ; and that in a manner to become immedi- ately operative at the commencement of a rupture. The practice of a long war, and the talents of many distinguished officers, had formed some expert crews of gunners : but these benefits were partial ; and we shall undoubtedly lose, in peace, all or much of that proficiency, unless we take special care; and shall have again to struggle through years of difficulty^ only to attain what we may not only secure from decay, but most certainly further 67 improve, and even render permanent. After many years of war had afforded us ample opportunities of practice, and yielded us many splendid victories, we were, in some instances, severely disappointed. Let us consider well what may be the case, when, after a long peace, we send out fresh commissioned ships, manned with untrained people, for imme- diate battle. How many gallant officers have gone forth, with splendid reputations and the sacred honour of the British flag, depending upon crews on whom no reliance could be placed, excepting for courage and self-devotion ! I humbly endeavour to provide a remedy for this ; and the reasons which I shall offer in support, will, at least, advocate the case of every man who has been, or who may be, exposed to such perils of character : and I take oc- casion to assure the officers of the navy who may peruse this work, that any remarks on public events which I may think it necessary to make in the course of my essay, are not quoted to criticise, but on the contrary, to justify, or account for operations which were always most gallantly undertaken, and which could not perhaps have been better executed, with the means and qualities they commanded. ** There cannot be any doubt of the vast advan- tages that would result from enlightening by theory, and training by practice, during peace, as large a proportion as we can of those who are to command and serve our naval ordnance in war. It is impossible indeed that we should be disappointed m ■V- I; r m 1' 58 in the conviction we feel, that splendid advantages would result from such a measure. With men im- perfectly trained, no nicety of practice can be attempted or expected. Many improvements which would appear simple, and might be easily practised by well-formed artillerists, may be considered com- plicated and impracticable by people who may, perhaps, be quartered to their guns ybr real action, as one of their first artillery exercises. Thus I have often heard it enforced, that nothing that is not coarsely simple can be practised in Naval Gunnery, and that no innovations should be at* tempted ; and the difficulty which my father expe- rienced, even from officers, in procuring the adop- tion of locks, and many other improvements which he made in naval ordnance, are proofs how far the want of some general cultivation of the science and art of gunnery are impediments to the introduction of improvements, which, instead of being resisted, would be eagerly received, were our people taqght to estimate them. What would now be the condi- tion of our admirable land -service artillery, were it not for the institution which cultivates theory, and the system which has perfected the practice ? It would have remained far behind in the progress to improvement; and, instead of being the very best, might have been, perhaps, the worst artillery in Europe. Suppose that, at the commencement of war, instead of taking the field with a well-trained corps of artillery, we were merely to turn over 59 multitudes of able-bodied men to that duty, (as is the case in our naval artillery) and hurry them off for action, without, more training than may be acquired in the short interval between enrolment and real service ; and, if after the interval of a long peace, under officers destitute of experience, unac- quainted with science, and rusty in the practice of former wars. — To such a corps, much of that nicety of practice which is at present admirably and easily executed, would appear mere refinement, as im- possible to be observed, as it is to introduce or hope for expert practice from our naval artillery, at the commencement of a war particularly. — Should the improvement of Naval Gunnery be less an object of national importance, than the instruction and training of our /awc?-service artillery ?*' Sir Howard then proceeds to recommend the formation of Depots of Instruction for the purpose of instructing officers, master-gunners, gunners' mates, and their crews ; and truly observes, that no measure which provides merely for the drill of the men can effectually improve the service prac- tice, for the mere dexterity of a few privates can do little unless directed bv cultivated and well exercised intelligence on the part of the officers commanding, &c. He urges the strongest reasons for composing these depots exclusively of naval officers and seamen, and goes on to propose that in the formation of this new corps we should first '* engage a certain number of seamen expressly i 60 w for the service of the gunner's crew for periods of five or seven years ; renewable at their expiration, attaching a small increase of pay to each conse- cutive re-engagement. The advantages held out to volunteers should be, that master-gunners, gun- ners' mates, and a certain number of seamen gun- ners, will eventually be incorporated ; and that regular advancement in that department will here- after take place according to merit ; so that sea- men gunners may, if they can rjad and write, con- sider themselves in the certain road to gain, ac- cording to their merits situations of gunners* mates, and master-gunners of sliips. Seamen gunners to receive 1s» 4c?. per diem, and to share piize-money as gunners' mates do now, or with some other rank, superior to able seamen. " The practicability of forming such an insti- tution rrsolves itself into this — whether, upon these advantages being made known, a sufficient number of volunteers can be procured to com- mence such an establishment. The experiment might be easily tried ; but the proposal should be accompanied with an explanation that the system provides, eventually, a term of relief, or residence on shore, for men so incorporated. If cha experi- ment answer the confident and puthorized expec- tation that may be entertained of its success, a selection of naval officers, the best practitioners of the late war, should be named, to conduct the Depots of Instruction ; and I have every reason 61 to believe that some very distinguished officers would come forward to commence sucli a system. In this way a number of trained men would always be retained in the service — successions of com- manders, and many officers who cannot be em- ployed afloat in a limited peace establishment, would, at the trifling expense of full pay, be im- proved in this important branch of their military duties ; master-gunners and gunners* mates would be trained ; and a permanent stock of seamen gun- ners brought up, to fill hereafter these important offices ; and should it be extended ultimately in the manner I propose, it would furnish besides a considerable number of very expert captains of guns. " When a sufficient number of men are procured to form one depot of instruction, a proportion of officers, properly proficient in a course of gunnery, and in a general system of exercise, should be appointed. ** One captain, three or four lieutenants, and a certain number of midshipmen, master-gunners, and gunners* mates, should be nominated to a division ; and if the experiment succeed, other divisions of instruction should then be established at the principal arsenals, and the whole placed under the superintendence of a Rear-Admiral. " All seamen gunners should be made perfectly acquainted with the duties of every man, in the exercise of all natures of ordnance, with reduced III $ (\^ complements as well as with '^c full crew ; so as to be perfect masters of every fresh arrangement that may be required to replace casualties. " A level space proper for a good range should be fixed upon, and a sufficient number of guns and carronades mounted in batteries similar to ships* sides, and consequently placed at various and cor- responding heights above the horizontal plane. " Young officers, master-gunners of ships, and gunners' mates training for these important situa- tions, should be instructed in the following mat- ters : — the names of the different parts of a gun and carriage : — the dispart in terms of lineal mag- nitude and in degrees, how taken ; — what consti- tutes point-blank, and what line-of-m^^tal range : — windage, the errors and loss of force arising from it, showing also the importance of preserving shot from rust ; — the theory of the most material eflFects of different charges of powder, applied to practice with a single shot, also with plurality of balls, showing how these affect accuracy, penetration, and splinters. Gunners of ships should also be qualified to judge of the condition of gunpowder by inspection : to ascertain its quality by the ordi- nary tests and trials, as well as by actual proof; and these, as I shall show hereafter, are very in- dispensable qualifications. " Master-gunners should also be instructed in the laboratory works required for the naval service — such as making rockets for signals ; filling 63 tubes, new priming them in particular; making and filling cartridges; precautions in airing and drying gunpowder ; care and inspection of locks, choice of flints, correct mode of fixing them, &c. &c. '* The officers, master-gunners, and those train- ing for such situations, will then proceed to the practice of gunnery, together with the seamen gunners who may have been previously instructed in the exercise. " The practice should be taught, with every de- gree of precision, at the range on shore, in order to show the actual ranges of ordnance, when not affected by the motion of a ship, and thus discri- minate between the errors of gunnery, and those which necessarily arise from the floating motions. Elementary instruction in practical gunnery can- not indeed be properly given afloat ; it is abso- lutely essential that the principles of the practice be shown on shore. ** Practice should first be taught with the dif- ferent nature - of naval ordnance, single shotted, at point-blank distances, with the service charge ; then at line-of-metal ranges, and at some inter- mediate and greater distances, against large tar- gets or screens, some the height of single, others of two-decked ships, and fitted with poles to repre- sent, in height and position, the masts of an enemy. This, for reasons that will be given in Part IV. when we come to treat of the practice, ini '■'i :M t' I I j f>4 i» very important. Practice should then be made at the same distances with two shot, to show the great uncertainty of this practice at long ranges ; and with reduced charges, to show the correspond- ing ravages that may be occasioned by splinters. " Practice should then be carried on, at every hundred yards from 100 to 1000, with all natures of guns and carronades in ordinary use, to show their comparative merits and powers, in regard to accuracy and other effects. Instruction should also be given in mortar practice; and in shell practice from guns, with common shells and also with spherical case. " When expert in the school practice on shore, the gunners should practise afloat from a hulk kept for that purpose at each depot. They will thus learn the comparative uncertainty of naval fire ; and, consequently, be prepared to receive and observe this important maxim — that minute accu- racy and intelligent quickness are more essential in Naval Gunnery than in the land service ; for although it may not be possible to attain equal precision, yet every approximation that can be made towards it by expertness or simple expedient will tend in some degree either to correct or re- duce those errors which arise from the floating motions. " As soon as one set of seamen are returned com- plete in exercise and practice, they should be trans- ferred to commissioned ships, and there drill the 65 .Beumen engaged in the ordinary way, according to the general system ; so that in this respect they would he as well trained, at least, as hy the contemplated plan ; and all the permanent advan- tages of the proposed system would be so much gained. ** FresJi seamen should be engaged as gunners, and drawn in to the Depot oF Instruction, in pro- portion as trained men are turned over to the guard- ships. These again should, by degrees, transfer to the cruisers a certain proportion of the trained gunners that will have been received from the depots ; which however should, together with the guard-ships and home cruisers, always retain a sufficient number of trained men for new commis- sioned ships, in the event of sudden armament. In this manner vast facilities and advantages would be experienced in fitting ships, and in rendering them more immediately efficient. The plan now suggested would provide people not only qualified to assist in fitting the ship, but also to assist in working her ; not only qualified to drill to gunnery the fresh hands — but to examine and arrange all the ordnance equipment — and very soon to make that ship, if properly commanded, a good man of war, *• In all departments of warlike organization depots are allowed to be the very hearts of the system, by which improvement is cultivated, cir- culated, and established. In all services this is E ii m nr Kl I t 66 recognised and observed ; no body can be perma- nently good, no system uniform without them. It is to this general measure that the service efficiency of every branch of our army is mainly to be attributed. It is this which supports the uniform systematic excellence of the whole machine, how- ever remote some of its parts may be. It is from a similar system, connected with the naval profes- sion, that the marines are what they are j and which has so much improved, perfected indeed, the Marine Artillery. If instead of applying it to naval artillery duties, a corps of naval gunners had been formed, composed of seamen and officered by a succession of naval officers, there cpn be no doubt that its proficiency would be equal to, and its utility, as Naval Artillery, infinitely greater than that of the Marine Artillery. Detachments of this corps were embarked on board the ships of the squadron that were sent out last summer on a cruise of exercise and practice ; and it is no uncom- mon thing for naval officers fitting out ships to apply for detachments of Marine Artillery to drill their seamen to the gun exercise. If such detach- ments had been or could be drawn from a perma- nent body composed of seamen-gvLnners trained by naval officers, instead of marines, can there be any comparison between the influence of the two systems on the practice of Naval Gunnery ? If the squadron in question had been to sail on real service instead of a peaceable cruise, which system would have 67 been most efficient? The Marine Artillery have their peculiar duties ; but to extend them to any interference with naval gunnery would be most injurious. For the same reason that the Marines have their divisions, the Royal Artillery their schools of practice, and every regiment its depot, naval gunnery should have its permanent seat of instruction, and store of trained men. The advan- tages that would result from such an establishment are beyond calculation. These depots would be- come the resorts of zeal and talents — the nurseries of improvements; vast numbers of young naval officers of all ranks would resort thither at their own expense. Such is precisely the opportunity which the naval service wants in this branch of the profession. Improvement might then be cul- tivated without pursuing it through other depart- ments, as at presert ; — naval officers would find a field open to them, which is now occupied by others. Courses of practical instruction might bq given to any number of young officers who might choose to attend. Naval gunnery would become, as it most certainly should, an organized department of the naval service, under the direction and control of the naval administration ; and I feel most enthu- siastically certain, that this simple measure would lay the foundation of a system which would soon be cultivated to perfection, by the professional genius and zeal which it would call into action. " As to the extent to which this plan may be E 2 i < , i Vii ! -lil ill I'il H. m m I »! ' 68 carried, present expense and future circumstances must be consulted ; but the system might be coiii- menced without incurring charges of consideration sufficient to defeat this great national object. " The merits of this plan do not depend upon the limited extent to which we may be obliged to con- fine it, at present, on account of the difficulty of making financial provision for a more general ope- ration. If it be plainly calculated to do some good, it should not be rejected because, for contingent reasons which attach not to its merits as a system, it cannot at present yield its full benefits. If it be capable of training people sufficient to furnish master-gunners, gunners' mates and captains of guns for half the number of guns (i. e. a fighting side) of ten sail of the line and thirty frigates, (about 1000 men,) it should not be abandoned be- cause, on account of the expense, it cannot supply double the number. The adoption of a good sound system is the present consideration, not its imme- diate extension. If we found our measure upon a good professional principle, the super-structure may be raised gradually, in proportion as we may require it. The question for consideration is, whether the plan which is suggested does not provide a good professional system for instructing officers, midship- men, master-gunners, and gunners' mates ; for training a proportion of seamen as captains of guns, as well as for drilling seamen engaged in the ordi- nary way: whether such a measure would not 69 eminently tend to encourage the professional culti- vation of artillery knowledge, fornning a good sound system, in which extension of benefit may be made to accompany extension of force. If it promise such advantages, it will be cheaply pur- chased by any expense that may attend it. Were it an experimental measure that could not be com- menced, without first committing the country to vast preparatory expense, we might hesitate about making the trial ; but the system may be instituted at a rate that would not amount to the expense of adding a 20-gun ship to our establishment. " If, by way of commencement, one depot were formed, the following is an estimate of the ex- pense. Average half Average full Diff. of ex- pay per day pay per annum. pense per an. s. d. £. £. Captain 12 6 552 324 As the average full pay very nearly i balances the half-pay of 6«. a-day^ it is ... 1 proposed to pay the lieutenants as 1st \ lieutenant of ships, viz. IIZ. 10«. per I mensem, on account of the expense of V living on shore. 65. each 138/. 114 30 midshipmen at 3/. 9^. per mensem . . 1345 Lodging 1 captain at 12s. per week . . 31 4 lieutenants at IO5. per week . 104 150 1st gunners at Is, 4d, per day 3650 150 2nd gunners at 1^. 2d. per day 3193 f ' ;■■ !.. f • t irtr I 70 Brought forward 8761 Provisions for 300 gunners, rate not known Expense of hulk for reception of ] lieu- tenant, 30 midshipmen, and 300 gunners Total, exclusive of the two last items £8761 " As the Marine Artillery is established, some of their best non-commissioned officers should at first be attached to each Naval Depot a? drill- masters; but hereafter these situations should be held by some intelligent seamen-gunners, to be called acting master -gunners, to receive 4/. I2s. per mensem, (the pay of gunners to sloops,) and to be promoted, on proper occasions, to master-gunners of ships." If these arguments fail to convince my readers, none that I can offer will I am sure be more fortu- nate ; I will therefore only add that up to the time I write (1829) I cannot discover that the slightest attention has been paid to Sir H. Douglas's recom- mendations bv the Board to whom they were ad- dressed ; but in France, on the contrary, it appears that this work having been considered by the go- vernment as of great value, has been translated, and is now used as a class book at the schools for the instruction of naval gunners, established in some of the chief naval arsenals in that country agreeably to its suggestions.* * See Preface to the second Edition, and remarks by the French translator ttud Editor.— Paris, 1826. 71 Having thus pointed out (more in sorrow than in anger) the principal defects which I have re- marked in our naval administration for the last fifteen years, (the annual expense of our navy during this period being rarely under five millions,) let us turn our eyes towards those nations whom (without forgetting that there exist other consider- able maritime powers) we have been usually accus- tomed to consider our most formidable rivals. To begin with France : — The termination of hostilities found that country in nearly the same state as our- selves with respect to the " materiel " of its marine, which, from the peculiar circumstances under which most of their ships had been constructed, was in 1818 rapidly falling into decay, when the govern- ment of that country, after the withdrawal of the allied armies, had first leisure to turn their thoughts to naval affairs. They appear to have very soon directed their attention towards the construction of a superior class of frigates in imitation of the Americans; and although their first experiments did not fully succeed, owing I apprehend to thei^ falling into the too common error of putting more guns and weight of all kinds into them than they were calculated to carry, a very curious and im- portant book published in 1822 by a French naval architect (Tupinier) is full of the most interesting details of their progress during this interval, and clearly developes the system on which their naval administration intended to proceed. Without en- f B' ■'■ ' ^i I h> it-lfl "< m IF 72 tering into technical and professional duties, which might fatigue my readers, I will shortly state the most important features of the new plan. It is assumed that the application of steam to the purposes of maritime warfare will render it almost impossible for us in future to blockade the ports of France, or to insult its coast, as we have done during former wars. They argue tlierefore that France having now but few colonies, and their foreign trade with them being comparatively un- important, it can no longer be an object to as- semble large fleets for the protection of their coasts or commerce, and that their principle in a war with England should be rather one of universal annoyance and attack on our most vulnerable and distant foreign possessions. It is suggested there- fore to turn their chief attention to the construction of very superior and powerful two-decked ships, carrying like the Americans from ninety to one hundred guns, possessing the best qualities of sail- ing and stowage, (six months' provisions and four r^onths' water,) and calculated to accompany and strengthen the flying and predatory squadrons of frigates, (also of the largest dimensions,) with which it is proposed to assail and harass our colonies and commerce in every quarter of the globe. That this system has been actually adopted by the French Government, and steadily acted on since 1822, is clearly proved by the speech of the Minister of Marine, M. Hyde de Neuville, in the ! Il 78 debate which took place in the Chamber of Depu- ties on the Navy estimates for 1829. It there ap- pears that since 1822 the number of ships of the line had been diminished to fifty-twtf, but the frigates had increased to seventy-three, and that a very great proportion of the latter were of the largest classes, being either seventy-fours raze(:d, and carrying thirty-two pounders, or ships equal in size to the Americans, and built on the same principle of decided superiority over those eighteen- pounder frigates, with which our naval arsenals unhappily abound. I understand also that while we have for so long a period disregarded every thing like exercise or evolution amongst our ships in commission, the French Government has been in the constant habit of assembling their ships intended for foreign stations at Brest, previous to their departure ; that they have then proceeded in company to some central point, such as the West Indies, Rio de Janeiro, &c. &c. before they finally separated for their several destinations ; profiting of course by every opportunity which such a system aflTords of instructing their officers in naval evolutions, signals, artillery practice, and general discipline. I will only ask which of the two naval admin- istrations appears to be conducted on the best and wisest principles ; whether it ought not to be ap- prehended that great supineness on one hand, and great attention on the other, may, before many "1 ' 'I ' I ft I ?,■ J :i 74 years are passed, verv materially change the former scale of relative inferiority ? and whether our brilliant successes in T797, 1798, and 1805, when our own navy was in the highest state of discipline and preparation, and those of our opponents in the worst, can justify our neglecting in 1829, all the precautions which are more than ever necessary to secure ovv future superiority ? With respect to tic Amtrican lavy, the com- parative size of their ships cf tl luic, frigates, and corvettes, is now so universally known, u at I shall content myself with two short extracts from a work just published by a very intelligent naval officer on on this subject, (Travels in North America, by Captain Basil Hall, R. N.) in 1827, 1828. "At the Navy -yard (at Gosport) there was a line-of-battle ship, the New York, (called a seventy- four,) of ninety guns, and the St. Lawrence, (called forty-four) of sixty guns : the frigate is round- sterned, and they are both built exclusively of live oak, in a compact and apparently skilful manner. " It occurred to me, when looking at these large ships, that there was no good policy in building such an expensive class of vessels ; for other nations would of course profit by past experience, and avoid unequal matches in future. ** * That is very true,' said an American naval officer, who was present when I made this observa- tion, * but we calculate in this way : in the event of a war with you, or France, for instance, it may 76 happen that our enemy will have many times our number of ships such as these, but he will have a still greater proportion of smaller ships. If one of our *' ^ates shoulc' chant 3 to mejt with one of you^s (»f tiie same clc*ss, she must of course take her chant. < , anH we trust she will play her part as be- come Her ; but as the greater number of your ships are smaller jne^ of the old sort, the chances are more in favour of our meeting them, and if we do, the balance will telt on our side: thus in either way, we hope to preserve the advantage we have already gained.*" — Vo\ iii. p. 83. ** In the course of the same morning, we visited the Delaware (called a seventy-four), lying fully equipped, and all ready for sea in Hampton Roads. Although not a very handsome ship, she is certainly a fine man of war, and apparently in good order. There were mounted, when I went on board, thirty- two long guns on the lower deck, forty-t>^^ pounders ; on the main-deck thirty-two guns, thirty-two pounders ; on the quarter-deck and forecastle twenty-eight forty-two pound carronades, in all ninety-two guns ; eight ports were left unoc- cupied on the upper deck, so that she may be said to be pierced for one hundred guns. ** The crew of the Delaware, as I understood from the officers, was seven hundred and seventy- seven, including one hundred marines ; but eight hundred and fifty were mustered in all, the extra % m *! I 76 number being, I believe, supernumeraries for other ships in the Mediterranean. ** I went over the decks, passed through the wings, store-rooms, and into all parts of the ship. Every thing was in good man-of-war-like order, clean and well-arranged, and really surprising, when it is considered that she had been little more than two months in commission." — Vol. iii. p. 88. Let me now state shortly to my readers, what would too probably be the result, if unluckily a war should commence unexpectedly, and before we had sufficient previous warning to reinforce all our foreign stations with ships of proper descriptions. Our present force, in which be it remembered nearly the whole of our best seamen are dispersed, consists chiefly of those objectionable classes I have already so severely censured, and being conse- quently, whenever they are found, notoriously in- ferior to the enemy's ships in that part of the world, will in all probability be sought and attacked with all the confidence naturally resulting from the con- sciousness of superiority ; and even if they escape capture, will be reduced to the humiliating neces- sity of a purely defensive system, until reinforce- ments arrive; while our merchant-ships will fall an easy prey to privateers, &c. The twenty-eight- gun frigates and ten-gun brigs, must inevitably be overpowered by any vessel of war (nominally of their own class) to which they may be opposed, and 77 with which they cannot honourably decline an en- gagement ; but what will be the feelings of the officers and men, whose blood and hononr will have been thus wantonly sacrificed, and of their coun- trymen at large, when the light of truth breaks in upon the nation ? when it is seen that enormous sums have been lavished on injudicious and inade- quate preparations, and that after seventy millions expended in putting our navy into what was consi- dered a perfect state of equipment, we have to throw aside the greatest part of our smaller ships, and again recommence operations ; — will not the burst of public indignation be loud and tremendous, and will it be admitted as a sufficient vindication to allege that, in many particulars, the British Navy was far more inferior at the commencement of former hostilities ? Lord North, I recollect, after the appearance of the combined fleet in the Channel in 1779, boldly asserted the impossibility of our hoping single- handed to outnumber the joint forces of France and Spain ; but I do not think that in these days a minister will be found daring enough to hold similar language, and I conjure those on whom the fearful responsibility will rest, to beware in time, and not to suffer either an undue adherence to ancient systems, or that repugnance to wholesome changes and improvements, which, alas ! is one of the strongest proofs of the imperfection of human nature, more especially as we advance in rank and Hi] i ivf I I I 14^^ :! 78 age, to indispoRc them towards those measures, which the general spirit of the times renders so in- dispensably necessary. If I am asked what practical suggestions I have to offer, and by what means I would propose to remedy the defects 1 complain of, without incurrigf; an expense which the national finances cannot at this moment conveniently bear, I reply tliat I can only recommend our discontinuing, without loss of time, all further expenditure on any of those classes of ships which I consider so useless and ob- jectionable ; to suspend in a great degree the con- struction of ships of the line, (except perhaps one of the new class now in progress of ninety-guns on two decks, for the purpose of ascertaining their qualities by actual experiment before any larger number are laid down,) and to turn our thoughts chiefly towards those to which I have principally alluded in the course of these observations. I should recommend our satisfying ourselves, by full and careful trial, whether the first and second classes of frigates, such as the Barham and South- ampton, are in all respects equal to the expectations entertained of them, especially whether the razied seventy-fours answer so well as to justify the expense incurred in altering them. From these experiments certain rules may be laid down for their stowage, trim, armament, &c. &c. and prevent that general uncertainty on these points, which must inevitably prevail, if they were hastily fitted out by officers 79 unacquainted with their peculiarities, who couhl only try experiments which might or might not succeed, and would in the latter case occasion much disappointment and delay. These experiments would necessarily lead to much of that increased exercise and experience afloat, which I so strongly recommend. It is only by seeing ships of different classes together, in all the various circumstances of wind and sea, that any correct opinion of their real qualities can be formed; and many of our younger officers must necessarily be completely uninformed in these particulars. I should therefore try together one or more of our first-rates, new eighty-gun ships, razM seventy- fours, twenty-four and eighteen-pounder frigates ; and as we have unfortunately a considerable num- ber of almost new twenty-eight-gun ships, which in their present state are only calculated to disappoint and disgrace us, I should see whether, by convert- ing them into corvettes, their sailing qualities might not be considerably improved, and they would at all events be reduced to their real deno- mination in point of force. A larger class of cor- vette, with sufficient breadth to carry heavy long guns, is however so indispensably necessary, that I should not rest until I had succeeded to my full satisfaction in this particular. Here, such officers as Captains Hayes and Symonds, who are expe- rienced seamen as well as excellent naval architects, would afford the greatest assistance; and I have ^ ■^■•/' irf •, r,t * 1 i 80 no doubt that the second, if not the first attempt, would produce a most desirable vessel of this class. The Americans say that their corvettes, armed with long twenty-four pounders for chace-guns, will be able to beat off our eighteen-pounder frigates ; and certainly if their superiority in sail- ing is equal to their extraordinary weight of metal such an event is by lio means impossible. The French, I hear, are building some of nearly equal force : and shall we, while these improved and superior vessels are rising up on all sides around us, obstinately persist in our old system, until defeat and shame too late convince us of our error ? I further recommend entirely discontinuing our ten-gun brigs, considering them most inefficient vessels of war, and the expense they occasion a most complete waste of the public money. A cer- tain number of the eighteen-gun brigs, on the con- trary, as brigs, would, I have no doubt, always be found very useful as small cruisers when judiciously employed, and kept chiefly on those stations (the West Indies, for instance, and the Mediterranean) where enemies vessels of their own class are prin- cipally to be found. To employ them indiscrimi- nately in all parts of the world, or to keep them on the coast of North America, or in the Bay of Biscay during winter, could prove only that total want of consideration as well as professional knowledge. 81 wliich is most discreditable in the conduct of naval affairs. Having thus satisfied myself that all our most important classes of ships were both fully equal in point of force to those which they would be ex- pected to encounter, and also that they possess the indispensable qualities of fast sailing, stability, and stowage, I should then carefully avoid all unneces- sary expenditure on those countless varieties with which our dock-yards abound, and adhere steadily to those only with which I had full reason to be satisfied. Our ships of the line might be confined to two or at most three classes, namely, first rates, like the Caledonia,* of one-hundred-and- twenty guns — second rates, of ninety on two decks— third rates, of eighty-four guns ; and our smaller seventy-fours being so very inferior in all respects to the two- decked ships of other nations, it may be advisable gradually to discontinue them, converting some * I regret to hear that this beautiful ship is undergoing not only a complete repair, but a complete alteration at Plymouth ; and that great fears are entertained of her former good qualities being totally changed by this injudicious attempt at improve- ment. An extraordinary experiment has also been lately tried on the Royal George, of one-hundred-and-twenty guns, lately launched at Chatham ; she has been doubled with three-inch Jir plank to increase her breadth ; forgetting apparently that, as fir does not last more than three or four years, her doubling will soon begin to rot, and if (as in all probability will be the case) the oak is infected, wc shall have a new first-rate to take to pieces within five years after her launching. F 'I 1^ . ' 1 • ji i 5' I 'fl II i 82 into frigates, if the result of the proposed experi- ments fully justify such an expense, and others into troop ships, for which service they would be admirably calculated. I should think two classes of frigates amply sufficient, and the large corvettes I have proposed would replace with great advantage our imiumerable pigmy squadrons of twenty-eights, ten-gun brigs, cutters, and so forth ; because it must be recollected that the invention of steam will entirely change the whole system of maritime warfare on coasts, narrow seas, and rivers, and that instead of the swarms of small vessels with which we were formerly accustomed to protect our convoys in the British Channel, North Sea, &c., we must now rely almost entirely on armed steam-boats for the effectual performance of this service. It is there- fore inexcusable to incur heavy expenses in the construction of vessels, which, after the first six months of war, will become totally useless ; and it is for this reason that long heavy guns in all, even our smallest classes of ships, become of such urgent necessity. I observe that in the French navy estimates for 1829, the minister of marine demands an extra sum of 7,000,000 francs for the express purpose of the construction of steam-vessels ; but i have not yet been able to learn that our attention has been turned as seriously as the importance of the sub- ject requires, towards any preparations for this new species of maritime warfare. Here I am afraid our I i: S3 old habits and prejudices again oppose the progress of improvement, and that while we look back with deep regret on those golden days when an order in council directed that no two-decked ship should in future be built larger than the Repulse, and no frigate than the Euryalus,* we cannot yet screw up our courage to try experiments with armed steam- vessels, trusting, I suppose, that sailing will last our time ; but that in the event of any extraordinary emergency requiring it, we may be able to pur- chase a sufficient number of the Leith and Dublin traders to answer our purpose. It is very true this may be possible to a certain extent ; but as it is the bounden duty of those entrusted with the conduct of public affairs to prepare against evident dangers, and not to lavish the public resources in guarding against those which no longer exist, why, may I ask, do we not reflect that we are misapplying the funds granted for naval purposes when we employ them in the construction of vessels which are no longer required ? and that half the sum expended since 1815 in twenty-eight-gun ships and ten -gun brigs, would have created a respectable flotilla of steam-vessels, and enabled us to try in time all those experiments with this new species of force. ' ii * A small seventy-four aad frigate, long considered at the Navy Board the most perfect ships of their respective classes. Forty seventy-fours were ordered to be built at one time on the model of the Repulse. They cost about three millions and a half sterling, and were all bad ships. F 2 -it 4 '-^ 84 which appear now to be delayed until the emer- gency for its employment actually arrives ? We have still everything to learn with respect to their equipment for war ; and how many invaluable days and weeks will be lost, while (with all the mistakes and miscarriages inseparable from the want of full information and experience) we are hastily arming and fitting out a number of vessels constructed for other service, and but imperfectly adapted to the purposes of war. I strongly recommend, therefore, that now, while we have still time and opportunity, such experi- ments may be entered upon on a small scale, and merely in the first instance with one or two vessels built by the best practical engineers, fully informed of the service for which they are intended, and the weight they are expected to carry, as may establish with sufiicient precision the principal points which are of the greatest importance for our future guidance in this respect. I am fully aware of the almost daily improve- ments in this wonderful discovery, and am therefore very far from proposing any indiscreet or expensive measures, which still newer discoveries might pro- bably in a short time induce us to repent. All I ask is, that we should not persist in constructing those clas";?s of vessels which we already see can never with noj thince of success be opposed to sieam-boats ; and that with respect to the latter, we ma^^ oalv iul^y kucp pn^e v 1th the progress of i! 85 1 1 Sun discovery, instead of being dragged reluctantly for- ward in the wake of our more enterprising and vigilant rivals. I shall close these observations with two more recommendations. Having already stated at some length the principal features of Sir H. Douglas's plan, I need only now urge its speedy adoption under such regulations and arrangements as would naturally suggest themselves to the experienced officers under whose guidance it would of course be placed ; that the valuable time we have already lost may plead loudly against any further delay, and that it may be recollected the sacrifice of one twenty-gun-ship annually will enable us to defray the whole expense. I had earnestly hoped, in common with many of my brother officers, that advantage would have been taken of this long period of profound peace, to digest and introduce some material improvements into our general system of naval discipline , and that while our civil and military codes have been gradually and almost imperceptibly assuming a milder spirit, and becoming more in unison with the altered temper of the age, and with the general disposition which prevails amongst enlightened men, to govern, as far as may be possible, by reason rather than force — I had hoped, I say, that this important subject would not have escaped the attention of our naval administration. I am fully aware of the difficulty and delicacy of the ta&k, and that any undue relaxation of the reins i i IP fA '. \ ■>■■ . • (.: ?N ir it; 4 -li ^1 i< 86 of discipline might be to the full as dangerous and pernicious as the opposite extreme ; but I cannot believe that in this, as well as in all other human affairs, there is not a happy medium by no means impossible of attainment ; and remembering, as I too well do, all the occurrences which led to the fearful explosion in 1797, I feel doubly anxious that our system of discipline afloat should be so regu- lated and mitigated as to prevent, as far as possible, those sad instances of individual harshness and se- verity, which I would gladly expunge from my memory, but which I have no doubt contributed very materially towards the subsequent discontents. The present seems to me a most favourable op- portunity for correcting our deficiency in this im- portant particular. It is very remarkable, that while the act of Parliament by which our naval dis- cipline is regulated, has, I believe, received no raa- teriul alteration since its first enactment in the reign of George II., our successive codes of naval instruction have been almost entirely silent on this point, although often tediously minute on so many minor regulations. The effect o^ this omission has naturally been to leave too much to the discretion and temper of commanders; and fully disposed as I am to render ample justice to the humanity, kindness and almost parental care with which a very large majority of our naval officers are accuse tomed to treat those under their orders, yet it can- not be denied that there must, amongst so large a niunher, be others who, froiii mistaken zeal, want 87 of consideration, early bad example, or ungovern- able tempers, may fall into the same errors which, within my own memory, extended so widely. This can only be properly guarded against by regulations issuing from authority, and laying down, as far as may be possible, some uniform system with respect to offences and punishments, fixing the greatest number of lashes permitted to be inflicted without the sentence of a court-martial, suggesting minor punishments, such as solitary confinement, &c. &c., where they can be substi- tuted, directing full inquiry and deliberation before corporal punishment is inflicted, and, in short, in- culcating the same rational and conciliatory spirit in the discipline of our fleet, which has, 1 under- stand, produced so gratifying an effect since it has been generally introduced mto the army. Justice towards both our officers and men, de- mands some such measure as that which I now recommend ; and that while our civil and military laws are undergoing revision, and gradually adapting themselves to the more humane spirit of the times, our naval code should not be left the sole remaining monument of a less civilized period. If the regulations I propose were embodied in the instructions, and couched in the discreet and temperate language which has characterised orders of a similar tendency issuing from the Horse- Guards, their good effects would be soon generally '.M 1 m m Hi 88 diffused through the navy, and an improved and more uniform system established in our fleet, be- fore any sudden emergency obliges us to resort again to impressment, and to assemble hastily large bodies of seamen serving (at first at least) compulsorily and reluctantly, and whom it should be our first object to attach and conciliate. All who best know them will agree with me in assert- ing, that no class of men is so capable of strong gratitude ana devoted attachment as our maritime population ; and those who, like me, have remarked with heartfelt pleasure the ample return they have received for a steady system of kindness and con- sideration, will I am sure agree with me in depre- cai ng all unnecessary harshness and severity towards 'Vim. It may perhaps appear to savour of personal or professional vanity, if I presume to attribute the remarkable perseverance in old systems, and the strong distaste tow; 'ds modem improvements in naval affairs, on which I have somuch animadverted, to the determined and apparently systematic ex- clusion of naval officers from those departments where it would naturally be supposed that profes- sional experience and information must b- indis- pensably necessary. I am far from wishing to draw invidlont! com- parisons, or to repine at the superior advantages enjoyed by our sister profession, which leads to, in- stead of e.xcludingyrow, the higi < st honours of the Bi) state ; yet I cannot but see that our naval depart- ments are degenerating into political engines, and the smallest possible number of professional men permitted to take part in their deliberations. Let me only contrast this system with that pur- sued in our military offices. At the Horse Guards the commander-in-chief is a general officer : all his staff, adjutant and quarter-master-general, and their deputies, military secretary, &c. are ex- clusively military. The secretary-at-war is a colonel in the army ; the whole of the Board of Ordnance, master-general, lieutenant-general, sur- veyor-general, &c. &c. are all military men ; not a single naval officer is admitted, although all the alterations and experiments on naval ordnance are tried at Woolwich, and (as I have heard) very great unnecessary expense often incurred from the want of that information which professional experience can alone afford ; all the minor branches, comp- trollers of army accounts, &c. are equally filled by valuable officers, whose previous habits peculiarly qualify them for the duties of their station ; but when we turn our eyes towards our naval depart- ments, what an extraordinary contrast do they present? Our first Lord of the Admiralty, two out of the four junior lords, and the two secretaries, can lay claim to no professional knowledge or ex- perience whatever — thus forming a majority of five to two in the great council, where all naval affairs are decided. If we turn to the navy-office, a ■-'■ ■ ii ^ ■ ' I !t 90 similar disproportion will be found. A distinguished officer is, it is true, comptroller of the navy j but the deputy-comptroller, the joint surveyors, and the accountant-general, are all unprofessional ; and it is only at the bottom of the list, that we find two Captains in the navy employed as store-keeper and snperintendant of transports ; although it is here that every thing which relates to building, repairing, modelling, and in short the whole detail of the materiel of our navy is supposed to be considered and arranged.* I am quite aware that our sur veyors of the navy are the naval architects of the department, and, as far as practice in our dock- yards extends, are always expected to be regularly educated ; but I must be allowed to doubt (and I think some facts which I have stated, will induce my readers to join me in entertaining those doubts) whether an education in which experience and observation at sea is considered unnecessary, can possibly produce a complete and thoroughly ac- complished naval architect; and I cannot but at- tribute a great proportion of the mistakes on which I have animadverted to this glaring defect in our system — a defect which Mr. Yorke, when First Lord of the, Admiralty, most wisely endeavoured to amend by the establishment of a school for naval architecture in the dock-yard at Portsmouth, where * The chairman of the victualling-board, which superintends not only that department but the medical staff of the navy, is a major-genc)*al ! 91 ull young men looking forward to the higher em- ph)ytnent8 in the naval yards were to be reguhirly educated ; and, after being thoroughly grounded in the mathematical and mechanical parts of the subject, to serve for a certain time afloat on board some of his Majesty's ships of different classes, and thus learn by actual experience the application of those principles in which they had been previously instructed. How, during the existence of the school, this latter condition was constantly evaded, and by what influence the whole establishment was gradu- ally undermined, and has now fallen entirely to the ground, it is not in my power to explain. Perhaps my readers may think that this circumstance ac- counts for much of the affection for old routine which they must have already remarked. It is evidently impossible to expect that one officer at the Navy Board, and two at the Admiralty, how- ever laborious and distinguished for zeal and exer- tion, can superintend and direct, not only all that daily current business of their departments which requires a professional opinion, but the various al- terations and improvements which equally call for attention. Under these circumstances too much is inevitably left to inferiors, who pursue the beaten track in which they have been brought up, and too much is postponed until a more convenient season, which, alas ! never arrives. The Comptroller of the Navy, and the two junior 1 T 1 I*.': f. i'ml '.'!■ I i t t. . 'I '•••;1 IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) > y ^ Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STRUT WEBSTIR,N.Y. 145SO (716)872-4503 Ii Mil 92 Lords of the Admiralty, are also generally in Par- liament, and v^onsequently obliged to attend the House of Commons regularly during the session. It is therefore obviously impracticable for them to exercise that personal superintendance over various branches of their departments without which the public service nevertheless cannot be satisfactorily carried on. If they had sufficient leisure, or the assistance of efficient and competent colleagues, I have no doubt that many of the experiments and improvements which I have suggested would have been already tried. It is to our system therefore, and not to individuals, that I impute blame ; and until that system is changed or modified, and a few votes in Parliament considered of less value than the well-being of the British Navy, I confess I shall see but little hope of permanent improvement; being unable to understand on what other principle naval officers are excluded from naval employments, as, whatever prejudices may formerly have existed against them, they are now (if my own in their favour do not entirely mislead me) fully on a par with their equals in society in information and science ; and on many remarkable occasions have shown themselves perfectly competent to the con- duct of the most important affairs. If any of those members of the House of Com- mons who watch vigilantly over the public expen- diture, do me the honour to read these pages, let me advise them to scrutinise our navy estimates 93 more rigidly than they have hitherto been accus- tomed to do ; to call for more detailed accounts, and to ascertain satisfactorily in what manner the sums voted have been actually expended j whether in the repair or construction of those classes of ships which I have recommended, or in improvident and injudicious expenses on those of inferior and ob- jectionable descriptions. Above all, let me advise them not to be silenced or mystified by any official replies which they do not perfectly understand, and to be assured that there is nothing mysterious or unintelligible in naval affairs, where a disposition exists to explain them openly and candidly. The French minister of marine gives in a full return of the whole navy, specifying the state and condition of each ship, and the measures proposed to be taken with those requiring repair. If a similar plan had been adopted here in 1815, and some little pains taken by independent mem- bers of the House of Commons to acquire correct information, I am sure many hundred thousand pounds might have been saved during the last fifteen years. It has often vexed me to see such warm and eager debates on the most insignificant items of the estimates, when I well knew that every ten-gun brig voted was ten thousand pounds thrown away, and so on in proportion with respect to the twenty-eights, &c. ; but " the whale went after the tub," and these, which were the really in- judicious expenses, passed without comment or observation. If i 'J. :■ III i ! I 94 I shall here conclude roy Remarks in the earnest and fervent hope that they may, by exciting the public attention to the errors and omissions which I have endeavoured to point out, contribute, in some small degree, to avert the dangers to which I con- fess I cannot look forward without apprehension. I am old enough to remember that, only fifteen years after almost as successful a war as that which we saw so gloriously terminated in 1815, Plymouth was blockaded by a superior fleet, and our ships of war at Spithead obliged to take refuge in Ports- mouth harbour. This great national disgrace was entirely attributable to the impolitic and inconside rate manner in which our naval administration had been conducted ; and although I am far from intending to draw an invidious comparison, yet I cannot avoid recalling to my recollection both this fatal period and the commencement of the war of 1793 ; and fears will then arise in my mind, that even all this dearly bought experience has not produced the desired effect. These considerations have induced me, however reluctantly, to undertake this painful task : I hope I may have performed it with a due regard for the feelings of those whose public measures I cannot entirely approve, but to whose zeal and integrity in their official capacity I render the fullest justice. If in the course of these observations I have mis- stated or mistaken facts bearing materially on my argument, I can only assure my readers that I have 95 spared no pains to obtain the best and most accu- rate information, and from 1816 down to the present time I have been in such constant corres- pondence on this subject with my brother officers, both at home and abroad, and have so carefully rejected every circumstance of doubtful authenti- city, that I do not think any of my important assertions can ever be seriously controverted. If I can succeed in my object, my declining years will not have been unprofitably employed ; and I sometimes fondly hope that an old officer, who has witnessed the reverses as well as the successes of the service to which he is still devotedly attached, may not raise his warning voice in vain,, »i If' :i.; I M.i IT, J •* A-t' fl_ ■I I ■1 il f- '< , .. >' ■; ^t:' I THE END. NORMAN AND SKEEN, PRINTERS, MAIDEN LANE, COVENT GARDEN. .; 8 i I l\ ; i