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' NATIONAL INTERESt. ti ( Price One Shilling. ) .>■ ;.%,■ 4 t %' "■» ;',f J ■ ->! «' if. , National Prejudice^ Oppofed to the National Intereft, Candidly Confidered in the Deten-- tion or Yielding up Gibraltar and Cape-Briton bytheEnfuing Treaty of Peace : With fome Ob- fervations on the Natural Jea- loufy of the Spanijh Nation, and how far it may Operate to the Prejudice of the Britip Con^- merce if not removed at this Crisis. InaZ,£'//rrto Sir John Barnard, Knight, LONDON: Printed for W.Owen, near T'empk-Bar -, and J. Swan, near St. Martirii-Lant in the Strafi J. 1748. 1 4 L. J'ii (li i_ '^ti i^'- ■■• r •- cm f-A* ..<•■!- i! r!?' ■/ ; i > * 1 /.\> V t ii «.* •■' I *- th^. National Prejudice, I ■: Oppofed to the NATIONAL INTEREST. Sir, April 2. 1748. THOUGH it be a well known Truth that too many Gentlemen in the Oppof-:! on to the late Sir Robert Walpole had urged on the prefent War with Spaitiy more out of Pique to that Minifter than Concern for either the Trade or Honour of this Nation ; yet, Sir, it was never fo much as fuggefted that Sir yohn Barnard was of the Number. If you difapproved of the Convention^ it was becaufe you thought it diflionourable and unfafe : and if you gave your Suffrage for the Sup- port of a War with Spain, it was not to •diftrcfsthe Minifter, but to repair the Ho- , B nour. !^- [ lo] nour, and feciire the Trade of your Coun- try. And for this Reafon, I affurc myfelf, you will give your Sandion as a Legiflator to, and approve as a Trader, any Peace that fliall fcem to you to anfwer the Ends for which the War was begun. It need not be told you, who are fo tho- roughly verfed in the Theory and Pradice of Commerce, that a trading Nation fhould enter, reludlantly, upon even a juft War, and (hould embrace, chearfully, Overtures of Peace, be fuch a War never fo fuccefsful. This will ever hold a {landing, as it is a fa- lutary, Maxim, in regard to the whole World ; bccaufe it can never be the Intcreft of a People fubfifting by Trade and Induftry, to be at Variance with any that take off their Products and Manufadures, not to mention the Expence and commercial Im- pediments that are the natural and neceflary Comcommitants of War, i\ ' But if it be found Policy in a trading Com- munity, if it be unalterably their Intereft to live upon good Terms with all Nations with whom tl>ey have, or may hope to have In* tercourfe of Commerce, how much more neceffary does it appear that a Nation fub- fifting by Trade, fliould feek the Fiiend- fhip, and cultivate the Hfleem of a People from whom more commercial Advantages may [.I] may be cxpeded than from half the Globe bcfidcs ? The falfe Policy of many, and the Ambi- tion of more, plunged this Nation into a War with Spain^ the Country in the whole World whom we fliould moft avoid quar- relling with. And what ftill aggravates the Miftakes of thofe who precipitated their Country into this expenfiveContcft, is, that our Trade had been on the Wean for many Years before, and required rather to be che- riflied and nurfed than cramp'd and impeded by affording our Rivals an Opportunity, by our Abfence, of neftling among a People from whom we drew fo great Advantage. But it was the Bufinefs of the Ambitious in thofe Days of Party and Oppofition, to hang out falfe Lights in order to deceive the unwary Multitude, who feldom judge for themfelves, or indeed preferve fuch Temper as qualify Man to judge impartially. And yet how effentially is it the Concern of the People to guard againft Deception ? For when they are deceived, they are foon in- fluenced. When angry, they are unfit to judge properly j and when very angry, they are unable to judge at all. And thus by Degrees they are often wrought upon to their own Undoing, blindly fubmitting to be the Tools of Leaders whoconfider them only B 2 as i] ^,i [ 12 ] as Guilders do the Scaflfolding of an Edifice, whicli is thrown a fide as foon as the Work is finillied. Without intending to nfperfc any Set of Men whatever, I think I could prove that the prefent War with6]^^//;/ might have been avoided with Honour and Safety, if the Minds of the People had not induflrioufly been pur into a Ferment, by Men who have not (liice proved thcnifelvevS to be equal to their Profcffions. }3ut, Sir, 'tis evident from your Condud down to this Time, that you aded from Convidlion ; but a Conviclion, 'which, I beg Leave to fay, was ill founded 5 :{nd which, I am afTured, you yourfelf are by this Time convinced not to have been founded on fuch Principles as arc (haped to the true Intcreft of a trading People. But I will fuppofe, like many other wor- thy and well-meaning Gentlemen, that you expedted our naval Force would have brought Spain to Submiffion in a few Months. But had you thought the War would hold to this "Time, lam fatisfied you would haveadvifed the grafting a Peace and Harmony on that Conventmi which you join'd to oppofc. >»' ^ I have already fliid, that you oppofed that Compad, as thinking it an unfafe Meafure. But, Sir, let me afiv you, now you are cool, and Iv )f It II y c 1 J i [ X3] and have had the Experience of the War, whether you did not then luffer yourfclf to be carried away, perhaps interceptibly, by the Tide of Party ? If it be fo, you need not blufli at the Avowal, the Current of Party having often fwcpt away the Refolution, and even the Underftanding of Men of the greatcft Probity and Fortitude. Party Animofity has been produdive of infinite Evil among us in iatter Days -, yet of all the Evils it has produced, you will agree the SpaniJJj War not to have been the leaft. It has already fubfifted too long ; wherefore it fliould be not only the Defire of every good Subject to wifli it ended, but his Bulinefs to contribute the putting a good and fpeedy End to it. 'Tis therefore, becaufe I think it my Duty to offer my Mite, while a Congrefs for a general Peace is fubfifting, that I venture to publifh my Thoughts concerning the Difficulties that appear to me moil likely to retard or impede the Peace. Could we detach Spain from Fra?7ce^ and wean ourfelves from an Appetite for a Land War, I (hould not care how long the Con- teft with France continued. But as we can have but very diflant, if any Hopes of ei- ther, I am for a general Peace, if it can be obtained [H] obtained on reafonablc Terms. Tis not for Loofers to carve, nor for a loofing Gamefter to continue playing, if he can throw up the Cards with any tolerable Grace. What more would we have j what more could we expedt, even had we been fuccefsful, than the Security of our Trade on one hand, and of our Allies on the other ? But fuppofe our Allies fliould not care for fubmittinr;, to fuch Terms as we fliould deem reafonable, in the prefent Nature of Things, ought we to continue the unequal Burden we bend under, bccaufe of their Wayward- nefs ? For Inftance, ought we to continue the War, rather than agree to a moderate Settlement for Don Philips becaufe Spain can't in Honour end it without obtaining fuch a Settlement for that Prince } How (hall the Poffeflion of Parma and Placen^ ita^ by a Son of Spain^ afFed the trading Intereft of thefe Nations 5 or even the Ba- lance of Power y a Phantom we have been vainly hunting after many Years ? The Enemy has already that Pledge in his Hands, which muft command fuch a Settlement, as is contended for in Favour of Don Philip, And unlefs the King of Sardinia can wreft by Force the Dutchy of SavQTj^ the County 01 Nice ^ ^nd Villafranca } from [»5] from Spain^ I cannot fee, that he ought, in Juftice to himfelf, or this Nation, to willi the Continuance of the War, rather than part with, as an Equivalent, that Part of the Dutchy of Placentia ceded to him by the Court of Vienna, And as for the other Part of the ancient Inheritance of the Houfe oi Farneje^ the Dutchy oi Parma^ I have too high an Opinion of the Juftice as well as Gratitude of the Emprefs Queen, to fup- pofe (he would contribute to the Conti- nuance of the unequal Burden, born by this Nation fince the War, by a wilful De- tention of fo fmall and infignificant a Ter- ritory, which could make no Addition to her Power (hould fhe detain it. In this View then it may be prefumed, that a reafonable Settlement for Don Philip in Italy would not be any great Obftruc- tion to the Work of Peace. Nor can I fuppofe any thing fo unwife and unjuft of our Statefmen here at home, as to think their Country fo far engag'd by the Treaty of Worms^ that they can't put an End to the War, unlefs the Houfe of Savoy be in- dulged with the PoiTeffion of the Marqui- fate of Finaly or fome other Territory be- longing to the Republic of Genoa.- ' With regard to the commercial, that is, the true Intcrefl of thcfe Nations, it can never u w [ i6] never be advantagious to us to have the whole, or beil Part of the Trade of Gejioa transferred to any Port under the Jurifdic- tion of an abfolute Prince ; which would inevitably happen, fhould Final be ceded to the King of Sardinia, . And as for our political Intereft, I think it is evident that it muft be lefs affedted by Final and Savo7ia remaining to the Genoefe^ than if fuch ex- cellent Ports fhould get into the Hands of a defpotic Prince, who might very naturally have future Views to Commerce and a naval Force. But laying afide the Confideration of Self- Interejl^ with regard to Finals which cer- tainly preponderates more in Favour of G^- noa than the Court of I'urin^ what is there fo alluring in the Treaty of Worms ^ that it fhould be deemed binding at all Events ? Sure I am it is not the yiiftice of that Com- padt that can warrant our continuing the War, till we obtain the in tire Execution of it by Force of Arms. And now I am treat- ing this Part of my Subjed, give me leave to fay, that the Injitjlice of carving out a Do- minion for the Houfe of Savoy ^ at the Ex- pence of the State of Genoa, by the Treaty of Wort72s^ has given no fmall Difguft to the honeft and confiderate Part of thefe Na- tions. Was it for a Nation that had ex- pended four hundred Millions, within the laft t 17 ] laft half Century, in Support of Liberty, to iVipulate that a rightful Pofleflor, fliall be (Iript of his Property, unheard and unpro- voking ? That the State of Genoa had pre- ferved the ftridleft Neutrality between the Powers at War, till after the Treaty of Worms had forced her to feek Alliances for her own Safety, is notorious and indifputa- ble. So that it may bcjuftly faid that that Republic had been tinprovoking^ when the hardeft Meafure had been dealt out to her. And as for the Conduct 6f that haplefr, brave People 11 nee, I perfuade myfelf there is not a virtuous EngUJIoman living, who won't hold them much more excufable than thofe that had forced them to Extremities, by the moft flagrant Injufiice on one hand, ind the moft unheard-of Cruelties and Ex- aSliom on the other. t '.. Thus, Sir, you may perceive me clearing my way to the main Difficulties that are moft likely to impede the defireable Work of Peace. I flatter myfelf to have fliewn, that no Confideration, relative to Italyi fhould induce us to continue the enormous Burden of the War, fhould our Allies be more tenacious than becomes Powers fo im- menfely obliged to this Crown. — And if it be true, that France offers to reftore her Conquefts in the Netherlands y tlie fmall and \, . C infig- M I, if "^t [ i8 ] infignificant Fortrefs of Fumes excepted, I fhould think that common Prudence might incline us rather to Peace,on Terms fo advan- tageous and honourable, than to the Con- tinuance of a War with no very aufpicious Afpedl. For with regard to the Safety of the Dutch y or the vague Balance of Power, how can either be affcdcd by the Detention of fo inconlidcrable a Place as Fumes ? And with regard to the trading Interefl: of thefe Nations, which fliould be tlic con- ftant Objetfl of our Attention, I believe it won't be controverted, that it is clearly out of the Queftion. Sure I am that the Trade and Independency of Great-Britain can never be affedted by Furnes^ or any other inland Fortrefs fever'd from the Auflrian 'Netherlands. Not but that I fhould be as averfe as any Man in England to every Increafe of the French Power or Territory. But in fuch a Cafe as the prefent, I am for bending to Neceffity, rather than holding out too fliffly again fl: all Convidion. The Condition of France may be bad, tho' I am perfuaded 'tis not fo deiperate as fome among us aiJedt to paint it. But let us look at home, and fee if we be in Plight to fupport an Increafe of [ '9 ] of the Burthen we groan under, in order to ruaintain an unequal, unfuccefsful Con- flidl. But this being a Subjedl as ungrateful to niyfelf as it muft be to you, and withal too delicate to be treated publickly, I chufe to wave it at prefent, in order to come to that which chiefly occafioned this Addrcft to you. As then I can't gain upon myfelf to be- lieve, that any Difficulties will arife, in re- gard to Italy and the NetherlandSy which can weigh with a Britijh Miniftry, to con- tinue the War, under almoft infuperable Hardships, I muft fuppofe that" Spaifi and France may in lift on certain Rejlitutions^ which may afford a colourable Pretext for its Continuance. This is the Point I would difcufs 5 this the Obftrudtion I fliall endea- vour to remove, becaufe I think the re- moving it would be fcrving my Country effentially. I am fenfible of the unpopu- larity of the Task I have impofcd on my felf ; but fo ftron^ is my Biafs to ferve a bleeding, brave Nation, that I fcruple not hazarding the Lofs of their good Opinion, in attempting to wean them from Prejudices injurious to their Intereft and Welfare. And, Sir,. I addrefs my Thoughts on the Subjc'dt to you, becaufe I think you moft capable of any Gentleman in the Kingdom C 2 to m i ■M [ao] to judge of the Redtitude or Incongruity of what I fliall advance. 'Tis probable that France may infifl: on the Reftitution of Cape-Breton^ and Spain on that of Gibraltar. The Qneftion then remaining to be difcufled, is, whether we fhould give thofe Places up for the Sake of Peace, or keep them at the Expence and Hazard of continuing the War ? Methinks I hear already the full Cry of popular Pre^ judice againft me. *' What, part with *" Cape-Breton^ that puts us in Pofleflion of " all the Fifh and Furr Trade 5 and with Gibraltar^ the Flower of our Conquefts in the glorious Days of Queen Anne^ *' which befides is a Curb to Spain and ** France, and a Key to the Mediterranean" Such, and much more to the fame Purpofe, very likely will be the Language of Prejudice, when this Epiftle makes its iirft Appearance in the publick. Nor fhall I wonder if I am painted out as an Agent for the Miniilry, or even for the Enemy, after fuch a Deluge of Ink as has been al- ready fpilt to decorate the Conqueft of Cape- Breton, and cry up its Importance. But nor the dread of perfonal Altercation on one Hand, nor that of being borne down by the Tide of Prejudice^ on the other, (hall deter me from purfuing my Plan for unfeal- ing the Eyes of my Countrymen, when I conceive (C • ' But I, Li : ! Mt f 32] But admitting this Infinuation to bear too hard on the Memory of his late Ca- thoiick Majefty, who was known to be a Prince of great Honour and Integrity ; or to be over refined and fpeculativc in itfelf, is there any want of plain Evidence, that Spain has embraced all Opportuni- ties of convincing us fhe bears us no Good-will ? And have we not abundant Reafon for believing that fhe never will be heartily and fincerely in Friendfhip with us, 'till we agree that her Kingdom (hall be unfever'd and intire. For 'tis not the Court alone that ftomachs our Poffeffion of Gibraltar 'y 'tis the whole Nation ; infomucb that there is not an individual Spaniard in the Kingdom that interefts not himfelf as deeply as the Prince and his Miniftry, and that thinks not himfelf difhonourcd in the having a Foot of Spain in the Power and Pof- feffion of Foreigners, i j ifl ;; >-A -v.. ..ut f> Such patrial Love may feem, to the Tepid and Lukewarm, to be enthufiaftic and romantic, but it will be deemed other wife by the virtuous and warm Pa- triot, whofe Breaft glows with Love of his Country. How fhould we like that Ply?nouth or Falvionth were in the Pof- 4.-.* fcffion [ 33 1 .. feffion of Spain ? Is there one among us, who bears, or deferves the Name of EngliJJoman^ that would not fpill his Blood fpontaneouQy to wreft fuch a'pre- cious Pledge out of foreign Hands ? Yet might we be a great and happy Nation, tho' any one or both thofe Ports had not been in our Poffeflion. What elfe then but that national Prejudice na- tural to Man, that patrial Love im- prefs'd on his Mind, fhould caufe fuch Anxiety as would certainly engrofs every Englijh Heart if the Fate of War had obliged us to yield up to an Enemy any Port and Fortrefs in this Part of the United Kingdom ? I mention this Part, becaufe I think Englijhmen, for I judge by my felf, would not be fo ftrongly affected with an Encroachment on the Northern as on the Southern Part of our Ifland, tho' with regard to Safety or Intereft, the Damage would be equal : And what, but that Love which one bears to the individual Place of his Birth, could occafion the Partiality ? But befides this Inclination of Nature to the Place of one's Nativity, there are E to 'J? r' 'vr. M [34] other Motives that weigh with Spain to wifh getting PoiTeflion of that Fortrefs, The Court particularly wifhes it, to pre- vent the Smuggling which may be car- ried on from thence with the neighbour- ing Towns and Villages ; and the whole Nation have Reafon to wllh it, that they may more fecurely proted: their Coafting Trade from the Pyracies of their Neigh- bours of Barbary, with whom Spain is ever at War. But none of thefe Mo- tives can be of any Weight with us. As any illicit Trade from Gibraltar to the adjacent Parts of Spain^ muft leffen our legal Imports into that Kingdom, it muft therefore neceflkrily be injurious to our general Trade, And while we are in Poffeffion of Minorca, we fliall al- ways hold the Rod over all the Infidel Sea-Rovers of thofe Southern Scaa. Jv ■ij ; This laft Confideration leads me to examine the greater Importance of Mi" jiorca than Gibraltar^ or rather how ufelefs the Pofleffion of the latter feems. to be to this Crown vyhile we are Mafters of the former. Pcrtmahone is allowed to be one of the faireil anc^- l-eil: Ports in all the Mediterranea7i ; and 'tis fo fitua- led, that with our iupcrier naval Force we f r 35 ] we may command, by means of it, all thofe Seas, and equally bridle the French^ Spaniards^ Italians and Barbarians, But Gibraltar, either by its Nature or Situ- ation, can never anfwer thofe Ends ; nor indeed any eflential Purpofe that can weigh againft the injurious Effects that attend our PoiTeffiion of it. We may perceive in this Inftance the Force of national Prejudice. Minorca^ in the Hands of an Enemy, is of tea times the Damage to Spain that GibraU tar is, yet we have not found the Spaniards make much Complaint of our PoiTeffion of the former, but have never ceafed complaining of the latter. So, probably, (hould we murmur much more at 'Plymouth' % being in the Hands of Spain or France^ than the Iflands of SciU lyy which commands both Channel?, and from whence, confequently, an Enemy might annoy our Trade much more than from the former. But were the Situation of Gibraltar. hy Nature, what it is not, better fituated for the Protedion of our Trade th^in Minorca^ it is become almoft intirely ufelefs to us fince the Court of Spain has caufed fuch E 2 Forti- I . lis il [ 3^;;/yZ? Trade to be fuperlatively beneficial, whether con- , fidercd in our Exports for ^pairiy or Im- ports from thence. You, Sir, that have been bred up in the %pantfb Trade, and had followed it, ufefully for your Country before the pre- fent Broils had rendered it impracticable, beft know if I exaggerate in the Sketch I have drawn of that lucrative Commerce. You know it was this Trade that furnifh- ed moft Employment for our Artizans of all kinds, and particularly for the Manu- fudlurers of our Staple, that is, our WooU len Goods. Of this, the Spariiards, both in Europe and America ^ con fumed more than all the other Nations of the Con- tinent. * \ * t^^ *. ' J..: —* I -.> ^ V- f ,1 wkin iX- i.t» tJJ.t ,*.'. itiV-/ A'l' ■> Thus, by Confequence, w^ere it the Spaniards, who gave molt Value to our Lands, who increafed our national Stock the moft, and who contributed moft to our Opulency and Power -, to that Pow- er, which I am forry, we have employed againft thofe very commercial Benefadors more and oftner than perhaps became us as a trading Nation. . ^^^^■•.-•.~ . • * '.' ' We [43] We complained before this War, and very juftly, that the French had rivaird us in the SpaniJJ:) Trade. But had not our own Conduct towards ^pain^ from the Acceffion of Philip V. given occalion for the Encouragement which thofe Rivals had had among the Spaniards ? The French were not encouraged, as they were more agreeable to the Spaniards than the Englifi ; but becaufe the Court of England \\2id fought all Occafions to dif- guft the Spanijh Nation 5 and particular in the Detention of Gibraltar^ which every true born Spaniard looks upon as an indiredt Badge of Infamy, an Infult, a Stain on the Honour of his Natiotu If then the French have fupplanted us in any Branch of this beneficial Trade, we may thank ourfelves. We were more the commercial Favourites of the Spani^ ards- than any Nation in Europe, before the Politics of our Cabinet had eftranged them from us : And there is fcarce a Doubt that we (hall again return to their Favour and recover their Confidence as much as ever, if we are not wanting to ourfelves in the prefent Conjuncture. •i 't ' • F 2 We 11 [ 44 ] Wc are, *tis to be hoped, at the Eve of a general Peace, which in all human Ap- pearance, will be durable, at leafl 'twixt us and Spaift, The prefent, therefore, is the Seafon for recovering the Confidence of that ufeful Nation. This is the Time for healing Animofities and removing Prejudices. But you will agree, that un- lefs the Caufe be removed, it cannot be ex- peded that the Effedt will ceafe. Gibral" tar is that Caufe ; and till it be reflored 'tis vain for us to hope for the cordial Fricnd- ihip or Confidence of the Spanijh Nation. This fhould be confidered as a lucky Conjun