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R
Pro
TACTICAL NOTES
COMPILED
FOR THE USE of the GENTLEMEN CADETS
OF THE
ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA,
BY
MAJOR DOUGLAS JONES, R.A.,
Professor of Military History, MUitary Administration and Law.
KIN(JSTON:
I'KINTKU AT •I'HE.l.XIl.Y NEWS STEAM rfilNTINO HOlTSf
1882.
;«*
l^ ii
\bsJiq
PREPACK.
This compilation contains some lectures it was considered
desirable to prepare for the Gentlemen Cadets of the Royal
Military Colle<^e of Canada so as to supplement the text
books in use. which it is by no means intended to super-
sede. The sole object of printinti^ these lectures, which
have been made more complete, is to save the great labour
of taking copious notes which greatly hinders the intelligent
following of a lecturer.
The endeavour has been made to adduce the latest
development in the art of tactics and not to repeat what
already appears in the text books and official drill books ;
and, as it is intended to have only a small number of copies
printed at one time, it is proposed that future reprints
should embody current changes in tactics.
Illustrations from war. though of the highest importance,
have been omitted as such are useless without diagrams.
and plates to illustrate the operations of troops on fields of
battle would have increased the cost of this work consider-
ably. Examples of modern battles will therefore be
reserved for viva voce lectures, and the battles chosen for
illustration will be varied from time to time.
Many authors have been consulted and reference made
to various works English. French, and German. Among
the former may be named : Home's Precis of Tactics ;
Defence and Attack of Positions and Localities by Colonel
510 n
IV
PREFACE,
Schaw, R.E. ; Modern Tactics by Major W Shaw Ak
pn.e essays by Colonel Smythe' Ma or Frater Cp^X
Clanon, Ljeutenant Gould Adan.s. iieucenant A ' M
Murray, and others. After Thnnf^r r •
ui -^uer \^napter 1 was written i vnl,,
abe paper on the tactics of infantry in battle by Co o i
S.r Lumley Graham, Bart., came to hand, as well a^ '
pamph et on the Attack Formation of Infant , I^ Ld ,'
the Inte hgence Departme.u, War Office a^d as the e
contamed more detailed information than was obtlab
they have been partly embodied in that Chapter '
Kingston, Canada. 1 ■''
November, 1881. I
r
#
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTORY.
(Pai^-e 1-2)
Importance of tlu' study of tuctics ; hut u thooretical study not sutticient,
knowlodgo gained must be applied pnictically.
CHAPTER I.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
(3-62)
PAGE.
Modern system compared with the past. — (roneral ])i'inci])les on
which the modern system is based; development of iiidi-
vidualit}' among both officers and men. Necessity of thoi-
ough training 3
Attack Formation for intantry in the German Army; the com-
pany and I)attali()n 10
Attack Formation of the French intanti-y ; the company and
battalion 17
Attack Ff)rmation of the Austrian infantry; the company and
battalion 23
Advance U|) to storming distance of the above infantries. The
Assault. Summary ol the several stages in an offensive ac-
tion of a single battalion 29
Att;ick formations of larger units: — lit'ginu'nt, Mrig.'ide, and Di-
vision, — in (Jermany, France and Austria 42
Infantry on the Defensive. — A single battalion acting alone. The
Counter-attack 47
Battalions on the defensive forming pai't of a lai-ger body, — in
Germany, France and Austria 52
Infantry against Cavalry 54
New Infantry Tactics in Russia based on the experiences of the
late Jiusso-Turkish wai- , 55
VI
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER II.
MODI'RN INrANTKV IIRE.
Long range mushetrij fire, ami wIhmi it luJiy Ito omployeil liotli in
uttiU'k and (leteiicc : ai'cjuiiKMits tor and at;"ainst its oini»lov-
inciit. Expenditure and su]>j)ly of aninmnition. ^^Fire Dis-
cipline,'' how to Ik^ maintained in action. Limits of loni^
rim^e tire. Effect of tire at ditfcrent ranijes. Eoni>; range
fii-e to l»e properly controlled 6.3
Different himh of fire. — [ndejx'ndent tiriiii;, (iroii]) tirini;-. (Irou])
volleys, Iia])id tirinu'. Kapid independent tirino-. W lien each
kind may be em])loyed, at what i-ani^es, by what units, and
how to bo kept under ecmtrol ; relative advanta<?es and dis-
advantaifes
Judging Distances. — Instruction of soldiers to 1)e limited in
range, but that of otticei's and non-comnussioned oifieers to
bo complete
Combined use of different elerations .*. .
German, Austrian, and French Itegulations regardint!,' the execu-
tion of infantry tire, its due control, zones of tire. etc.. com-
pared
Influence of Ground on Infantrg tire. — I ndircct tire. I nclined tii'o.
A.s affected by slopes of groiind, position of the enemy, ac-
curate knowledge of i-ange, itc
Employment of long range indirect fire at sieges
CHAPTER III.
CAVALKV AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
(11 (.'-152)
Importance of organizing a force of mounted men capable of
operating on foot. Eessons fi-om the ])ast lit!
Instructions by Genei-al Von Schmidt on the dismounted ser-
vice of Cavalry 119
Employment of Cavalry in the future, how only it can be i-eniiei--
ed iiidepondont. vVrguments tbi- and against employing this
arm on foot 121
Importance of Mounted Infantry illustrated from history. — Ameri-
can ('ivil War: — .^^organ"s Corps: Forest's ('()r|)s; (ieneral
Shei'idans Fedei'al Cavalry. — 'I'raiisvaal Boers. Wars of 1870
and 1H7T show how mounted shock action of Cavalry has
been curtailed 125
General conclusions. — Duties of cavalry in the ])ast compared
with the jiresent KJS
Cacalry Tactics on the field of battle. — Attack in three lines
i-ecommen(U'd. duties of each line. Cavalry against ('aval r\\
C-avalrv against Intantrv. Cavalrv attacking Artillerv I-IH
88
96
97
100
104
111
CONTENTS.
VII
63
88
96
91
100
104
111
110
119
121
125
i:5S
CHAPTER IV.
TACTICAl. I'OWEK OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
(15:5- 19.5)
(!hungos ill iIik rt-lativi' pinvt'i' of Iiitimtry ami Ai-lilK-ry.
Power and etVrct of Artillerv in ivcH>tit wars
Success of ArtUli rij in 1S70: — Matties of Marw-la-Toiu'. (IravolotU'.
So< Ian
Failure of ArtUleri/ in 1877: — Hattlo ot Zcwin. Attacks on
Plevna, Nikopolis and Lovlcha. Battle of Aladja J)a,<ili...
Lessons to bo learnt from the above wars and i^eiicral conelu-
sions as to the ])art Artillery will ]»lay in tlu' future
Employ iitent of Artillery in Bosnia: — Austrian Artillery acted on
sound tactical principles
Artillery in Af</hanistan: — Disasti-r at Maiwand partly due to
])aueitv ot li'iins ; results achiiived bv .Vrtilk'rv at .Vhnied
Kheyi : :
CHAPTER V.
DEVELOPMENT OF I lliLD ARTILLERY.
(196-223)
Ett'oct of Artillery on the Held of liattle depends not only on
tactical traininn' but also on the materiel, liecent iin[)rove-
ineiits in Ji'iins aii<l amniuiiitioii
Comparison between the newest i:;uns and thosi- used in iveent
wars
Telescopic sights and Range-tinders necessary to develop the
full power of the gun. Long range tire of ai-tilk-i-y. when to
be made use of. ;
I'se of intrenehments necessitate severer artillery pri'])aration.
Field howi tzers
Summary of re<|uirements for increasing the power and effect
ot artilleix in the lield
Artillery projectiles .-—Ciisii shot, .Shrapm-I, Peiciission shells,
their natures and use
(.'omparison between the physical and moral |)o\\i'r ot infantry
and ai'tillery. Sphere of action ([uite distiiK t. and elVects of
tiri' ditfereiil. ( 'oiiiparative n'sidls obtained at e.xpei'imeiits. .
Spei'ial and i)eculiar advantages ap[(ertaining to ai'liller\'
(■hapti:r \i.
TACTICAI- I:MI'1.()YMENT OI' AiniLI \.H\ IN Till: I ii;li).
( 221-2.-)r> )
Employment of Artilhry in the Attach. — KtVeclixe e(i-(»|ici alion of
artillery with int:mlr\ essential. .Vrlillery tactics, ('oiieeii-
Iration and dis|ie;>ioii of guns. Necessity of both horsi' ai'-
tillerx' and tii'ld aitilli'i'v. Kcipiisites of good artillery posi
tuMis. Preliminary artillery position. Kiist main position.
Second main position. Theii' (listanees trom ciieniN . .Advance
1.53
163
172
1H(»
191
191
19(1
197
199
1:04
207
210
212
216
VIII
CONTENTS.
!i'
of arfillery iiilo the jtosition It (•ii))turo<l. Tlcjdilse to he
covoi'cd l»y Jiitilleiy. (Jmi(< must soiiuHiincs Ijo sacritici'd.
Should any guiiH hv ki'pt in rcHorvc ? 224
JiJmploipnent of ArtiUen/ on the Defrimne. — ArtilU'rv Iidw posted.
Artillery tactics in tliedolcncc. Employed in recoinioissanco
and to make enemy deploy 242
Escorts for Artillery. — StrtMii^thaud composition. Wlien i-eipured. 244
Employment of ArtilUry in combination with Caratry. — Klanlc at-
tacks and turning movements. Artillery attached to cavaliy
in advaiice (,fan ai'iny ; and \\i>en employed with it on in-
dependent enterprises 247
CHAPTER VII.
MACHINE C.U NS,
AND THEIR TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT ON THE FIELD OF B.\TTLE.
(256-2«J5)
Employment of these weaptms for tield service, for foi-tresses
and si(^ge works, and t!)r naval jiurposi's 25(1
For field service, two general <K'scriptions : — Light, tiring infantry
hullet ; and heavy, tiring shell 2r).S
Tactical employment of li(/ht machine </iins. — Whethei- lo form
se])arate hatti'i-ies or to he [icrmanei\tly attached to other
arms .". 2.59
Tactical employment of heavy machine (juns 264
CHAPTER VHI.
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION SELECTED AS A FIELD OF BATTLE.
(2(50-822)
Different hinds of battles. — Strongest, tbrce generally attacks.
Assumption of defensive attitude means acknowK'dgment of
weakness. Ditference between 'nlefence of a place.'' and a
••defensive position"' occupii'd to defeat the enemy 2»i()
J)efcnsivt' actions cither passive or active. Passive defence will
nevi'r gai't a victor}', tor which offensive I'cturns essential. . 26S
Clioice of -positions as affected by considerations of StratCAjy. — Differ-
ence hetwecn sti-aifgy and tactics; the two rt'ally insepar-
al)le. Occupation of an extended line to cover teri'itory
facilitated by modern weajtoiis an<l use of intrenchnu'nts.
Ik'fence of important points now j-csolves itself into in-
trenched camjts ; witness. Rasgrad and Plevna 270
Defence of F laces. — Important strategic points must he defend-
ed. Ext(^nt ot ground to Ik* covered foi* sccuritw and force
rc(juire(l 274
General oltject.s to In; attained in occupyin;/ a. Position. — .\n otfen-
sivc-defensive position to he occupied, for whicji strong
reserves are necessary 27*>
Jiefpiirernents of a (jood defensive posi f inn: — (a). With reference to
the enemy ; (/>). with rclcrcncc to thedel'endcrs. Positions (»f
artiller\- liolh for attack and d(•ft■nc(^ arc important consider-
ations. ( 'Icar tield of tire essential ; cov«'r:iVc 277
CONTKNTS.
IX
224
242
244
247
256
258
259
264
LE.
2(iG
268
27(1
274
276
277
Natural olwtucles. iiiid difVorent 'onus ot jLfi'oniul, how to bo
t.ealcd 282
Proportion of troops to space. — Dosii-aMc to oxteiul jtositiiMi to
utmost consistent with safotv. As torco incivascs so c i i less
ground ho occiiniotl. F<ji'ce deja-ndont on naturo of i^round.
detences, and ohjcct to he attained 286
General arrangement of the defences. — Strong- defensjhU' jiosts all
inxportant. Field to he divided into ottensivc and delonsive
zones. Advanced i^uard or outpost position. .Nfain [)osition.
Uear<^uard position. Oeeisive |»oints to he held in force;
intervals between them. Weak pai'ts of the position how
dealt with- Strong tactical points will draw on themselves
enemy's attacks ; discussion wliether they should he shel-
tered or not ." 290
Acbanced Guard Positions or Outposts. — Wlien may advanced
guard positions he held with advantage? Example, (iermans
covering siege of Belfort. When U> be replaced by outposts.
Distances from main position 297
Dispositions of the infantry ami formation of the several lines re-
quired. — Shooting line has to hear the brunt of the fighting,
SupiDorts to feed shooting line, strength, and position. Local
reserves, strength and jiosition ; to nud<e counter-attacks.
General i*eserve ; its duties, strength, and position. Main
reserve in extensive positions 301
Dispositions of single battalions, brigades, divisions, andai .ny-
corps '. 306
Employment and disposition of Cavalry. — Employment dependent
on nature of ground, and limited by mf)dei'n weapons. Use
ot small bodies. Flanks to he guarded by cavalry 307
Employment and disposition of Artillery. — Objects to be kept in ■
view in posting artillery. Clear field of fire first considera-
tion, security the second. Concentration and dispersion of
guns compared. How artillery positions are affected l)y
slopes of ground and nature of soil. Alignment of artillery,
either in line with oi- in rear of the infantry, advantages
and disadvantages of each position ; combination ot both
position^ necessary as nrtillery should bring an etf'ec.lve
cross-fire to hear u|) to the latest moment of attack. Discus-
sion as to whether any guns should he kept in i-eserve. Ar
tillery jiositions how to be strengthened. Arrangements for
protecting and bringing up amniunition 309
CHAPTER IX.
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, HOW CHOSEN AND PRi:PARED FOR DEFENCE.
(323-352 )
Division of t}(£ field into different lines and sections. — r)ivision of
front into sections, a tactical unit allotted to the defence of
each. Duties of Commander (if each section, .hmctions of
contiguous sections not to i-est on weak points. Strengthen-
ing of the position by field engini'ering. how (executed.
Second position, its distance in rear of main line. Object ot
CONTENTS.
"(.
Ji socond positiuii, inidii'o ofdetbncofs. Tliiril positiuii in some
CJ180S. Viv| ciral ion Oi' Roiirgimnl positions 323
Preparation of a f-Kfensive position. — JK'pondont on tinio and moans
availahlc. Natui'O of defence's to be jji-epared for •• hasty"
fortification, and for '-delibei-ate " foi-titication. Redoubts
oidy constructed wlien time availalde. Nature of works
to be performed tirst according to their importance. Posi-
tions of siiooting trenches. ViUages and woods, liow dealt
"with. 'Enclosed works recpiire nuich labour and bombproof
covoi' ; where placed to best advantage, their size for mini-
mum garrison. Artillery should not as u rule be placed in
redoubts or villages. Importance of obstacles, when re([uir-
cd and where ])laced. ' 'onununications inside and outside the
positiini, how dealt Wi.ii 3li9
Advanced or detached posts. — When in front of position ma}- be a
great advantage, according to theii- nature anil position.
When to be occuj^ied and when destro\ .d. \ dlages and
. Avoods, how dealt with when they run up to the position.
A^illages and woods how to be occu])ied .'540
Railway features on field of battle sometimes of great import-
ance 343
jballoom used as observatories 343
Dispositions for sec ur my the flanks. — Impoi-tance of securing the
Hanks. Obstacles on the flanks. Defensive localities how
dealt with. A village or small wood sufficient for flank of
small force to ivst on, but not so for large forces. Four
courses generally open to the defender for guai'ding a flank ;
features of ground decide which to ad(jpt. Advantage of a
strong advanced post. Detached positions in front or in ex-
tension of a flank. Woods on a flank either a .source of dan-
ger or a great securitv. Fortresses best pi'otection to a
flank, ("jiffs not reliable 3-14
Preliminary Reconnaissance of a position. — Points to be consider-
ed, method to be adopted 350
CHAPTER X.
GENERAL COUltSE OF .\N KNG.\GHMENT.
(353-411)
The attach of an enemy in Position. — Different methods of attack'.
Frontal attack upon whole position. (Combined attack upon
front and one flank. Combined attack upon i'ront and both
flanks, ('oncenli-ated attack u])on a weak j)oint to force the
position. Tiirning movements, how executed, force to l»o
employed 353
Development of flank attacks, and effects of increased use of intrench-
ments. — Moiiern wea])ons and increased use of intrenchments
have nuide local defence more ])owerful, thus leading to
flank attacks. Subject discussed by reference to the Ameri-
can Civil War, Franco-tJerman war. and the Russo-Turkish
war. Intrenchments will not compensate for inferiority in
CONTENTS.
XI
ciuality of troopH. An assailant will tVequoiitly ondcjivour to
turn a position, hut if ho desires to Itrinc; defender to a de-
eisive action he must contain him hy a ti'ontal attack as
well. Strong inti-enehed camps should not be assaulted but
only invested ; example of PlevTia. Consideration whether
the attack or defence has i'ain"d most by nuxlern changes.
Discussion of the stratci^ical results of the prolonged and
successful defence of Plevna 357
On the assailant's chances of success. — llecpiirements on the side
of the assailant. Conditions of the defence which almost
pi'ccl ude success 8()})
Infantry attacking alone. — Attack how to be cari-ied out ; pi-e-
eeded by reconiuussatice yVl
Attack by a force of alt nrv>s. — \ction divided i nto three stages: —
First stcye of the attack. — from the tirst cavalry encounters to
the advance of the iniunti-y up to about SOO yards ot the
position prior to being finally c<Mnmitted to the line of at-
tack. Jieconnaissance of the position by advanced guanl,
how conducted. Artillery- of aJvancetl guard reinforced from
main body. Considerations which determine the (A)mmaiid-
er in his choice of a i>lan of attack. Attack on flanks facili-
tated by modern weajxuis. Advance of ai-tillery into its first
Tuain j)Osition. \aturc of orders to be issued by the (Jcner-
al. infanti'v to support the fire of artillery at long i-angis.
As a rule no guns to be kept in reserve. Advance of the
Infantry ;J7H
Secoml stage of the attack,- — from the infantry being tinally
iaunchetl at the selected ])oints of attack up to the moment
which immediately precides final successor failui-e. Infan-
try now ])lays principal part. Method of advanct dC the fii-st
liiu': — shooting line, su]»])orfs,atul nuiin body. Advance never
1o be allowed to flag for want of reinfbi-cemenl. formations
adopted and mode of advance dependent on the nature ot
ground 'ind the distance from tlu' eiu'my. Ditl'eri'Ut /ones
of fire. Tactics of the Artillery: guns moved ti]) into tlu^
second main position. Hmployinent of ('avalry and Kngin-
eers. Flank attacks how execulcd. Action ot force lett to
contain enemy in front. Frontal attack to have every ap-
pearance of a rea 1 attack 38<I
Third stage of the attack., -from the final reserves being (trdercd
up and terminating in success or failure. Troops ]tushed on
in ra)>id successi(»n, aided by the tiro of »'very available gun.
Fmjdoyment of the sc'wn(/ //«(; of the attack. The Assault.
Duties of Artillery. ( 'avali-y, and Enginciors during this stage.
in case ot' success and of liiilure (00
The Active Defence of an enemy in Position against attack.-- 1 >ivid-
ed into three stages as for the attack : — l(K{
Fir.ft stage of the Defence.- Preliirunary actions by cavali-y.
ifx'connaissancc of the enemy siippoi-led by artillery. ()rdeis
to be iss)ied by the (.'omtuander. Position to be oiil\ occu-
pied in skeleton at lirsl : when the troops are to be brought
up. Tactics of Artillery antl <'niployiiient olCavalry JO t
4 11
w
XII
CONTENTS.
! r
Second stage of the Defence. — Reinforcing of point threatened.
Tactics of the Artilkwy. Delivciy of counter-xti-okoM. Em-
ployment of ( 'iivalry 407
Third stage of the Defence. — Final i-epulse of assailant, or enfoir-
od retreat of dcfendoi-. Kvery gun to lie conciMit rated on the
advancing infantry. Proceedings in case of line being
pierced at any point. Kmployment of the (ieneral Keserve.
Action of Cavalry and Artillery 40!'
Precautions against attacks l>i/ night. — Troops practisetl to fall in
on sound of an alartn. Firing hy volleys recommended.
Lighting of tires. Connter-attacks necessary 410
CHAPTER XI.
COUNTER .\TT.\CKS AM) OFFENSIVE RETURNS.
( 412-41 !V)
Defender always to turn the defensive into offensive action
Avhen possible. Varions modes of makini" counter-
strokes: — Local counter-attacks outsi(k' the jiosition ; local
counter-attacks inside the position ; general counter-attack
inside tlu> position ; the decisive Offensive Peturn by the
(ieneral Reserve. Discussion as to when. how. where, and
Avith what troops, each is to be executed. Ti'oojts in shooting
line sliould rarely take part in tliem. F^xecution of the de-
cisive offensive return more difticull than foi-mei'ly ; as a
rule to be made only after assailants repeated attacks
have failed 412
CHAPTER XII.
NIGHT .\TTACKS.
(420-420)
Night attacks in fornun- years consisted chiefly of attacks on
localities m. le by small bodies. — Advantages of night attacks
increased owing to improvement in weapons. I'robable use
on a large scale in the futun'. Assault of Kars by night.
Night attacks on villages in IH70. Colonel J{oguslawski a
strong advocate for night attacks, also (reneral Brialmont.
How to be executed. Clo^c fornnitions necessar}', also false
demonstrations. Precautions to be taUen 420
CHAPTER XIII.
USE OF FIELD FORTIFICATION BV THE ASSAILANT.
(427-4: U) )
Issue of intrenching tools to soldiers as])art of their e<|nipnu'n(
liable to have a direct bearing on tactics. X'abic of Ihespade
as exeiuplilicd in thi' .Anicricau ('ivil wai- and the wars of
l.S70and IH77 : — fully appi-ccialed by the Turks. Want of in-
trenching tools tcK by (he I'ussiaiis : and al-o at Majuba
Hill. ( 'ircuiiislMiices iMidi-r which assailant ni..,' throw up
intrenchments. Danger oi' losing rapiilily of movement and
dash. Necessity of jtrevious training in the useofthe spade. 127
CONTENTS.
XIII
CHAPTER XIV.
TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS.
(437-464)
Suggestions for rcHtraining the individual initiative of the
iowor ranks which has had too much fi-eedom of late, and
for enabling the higher Commanders to retain more eoui-
plete control over their commands in action. Thestatenent.
that all nianaMivi'ing under tir>3 is almost impossihle, coiihat-
ed. In the attack one conij)any to send forward first skir-
mishers (not two), and this company to he the company of
direction of a battalion ; similarly for larger units. The
Commander to attach himself to the uni'. of direction which
he will direct, other units adapting their movements to it.
Discussion of the proposal to separate the work of ])repara-
tion from that of actual execution of tiie attack, different
troops having these distinct tasks assigned to them
Latest development of tactics in (lermany as evinced in the
recent autumn mano.nivres. (/onn)arison between the
Fi-ench, Austrian, and German methods of executing an in-
fantry attack
437
449
'I I!
Hi
w
r
A
of p(
cieiK
inga
most
appli
guan
Th
ingh
the e
Soi
shoul
branc
chara
point
the ki
to vvh
tactic
large,
with t
TACTICAL NOTES.
INTRODUCTORY.
M
A battle is in tliese days but the attack and defence of a series
of positions, and therefore one of the first requisites for the effi-
ciency of an army is thorough acquaintance with the art of attack-
ing an enemy or defending itself with real skill, so as to make the
most of numbers under all circumstances that may arise. This
applies equally to large forces, composed of all arms, as to a small
guard or patrol of only a few men.
This art, added to the equally necessary requirements of know-
ing how to guard against surprise and to obtain information about
the enemy, is called "tactics."
Some knowledge of tactics is of the greatest importance, and
should be attained by every officer ; for, whereas the other
branches of the military sciences are more or less technical in their
character, tactics embrace all arms and all ranks. From one
point of view tactics may be regarded as the putting in practice of
the knowledge of drill and formations learnt on the drill ground,
to which must be added the application of field fortification ; for
tactics simply mean the art of handling bodies of men, small or
large, in the presence of an enemy, so as tc obtain the best results
with the least loss
w
TACTICAL NOTES.
Until recently the study of tactics was considered of little import
in the British Service. So long as an officer had a good know-
ledge of drill, was smart, and a good disciplinarian, with an apti-
tude for managing men, and was well acquainted with interior
economy, he possessed all the requirements that could be expect-
ed. Gradually, however, the successes of the German armies
have forced the conviction that these would not have been gained
had not all officers been obliged to study all branches of the art of
tactics, and so efficient had they become in the practical execution
of any orders they might receive, and of acting independently in
unforeseen circumstances, that officers could be trusted to carry
out in the right spirit any general instructions given them, since
they had been taught in barracks and in peace manoeuvres what
would be required of them in war. The lamentable ignorance in
the art of tactics, and fear of assuming due responsibility, display-
ed by the generality of French officers in 1870-71, and by the
Russian officers in 1877-78, forms a striking contrast to the tho-
rough grounding of the Germans, and resulted, as might have
been expected, in the loss of many an action which might have
ended otherwise had the troops been better handled by their
officers. But it must be understood that, although a theoretical
study of this military art is absolutely necessary as a ground work,
it is not all that is required, for the profession of a soldier is emi-
nently a practical one. The knowledge gained by officers by study
must be applied on the ground in what is termed "Reconnaissance";
and must also be put in practice by commencing with elementary
tactical exercises on a limited scale, first by handling one or more
companies, squadrons, or batteries, and finally in peace man-
oeuvres or camps of instruction.
Such knowledge and practice is now regarded by foreign armies
as absolutely essential to success in war ; to which may be added
the necessity of officers and men learning unquestioning obedience
to the orders of their superiors.
Unless to a technical knowledge of one's own arm and to a
thorough spirit of discipline be added a knowledge of tactics there
must be failure in the day of battle.
Bravery may be taken for granted, but bravery is not all that is
required, it must be assisted in a very high degree by cultivating
self-reliance based on knowledge.
CHAPTER I.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
Systems of Tactics have from time to time been completely
altered, but no chanj^es have perhaps been so radical as those
which the general introduction of arms of precision combined
with rapidity of fire have brought about in the tactics of infantry.
The wars of the last fifteen or twenty years have produced a mass
of literature on the subject resulting in much discussion and at
first in much variety of opinion. But all the great continental
Powers have during the past few years taken part in great wars,
and all appear finally to have come to the same conclusion with
regard to the general principles to be observed by infantry in
battle, although they differ considerably as to details.
The present system was introduced after the war of 1870, and
it does not seem likely that the; will be any further very great
changes for some time to come, although doubtless further tech-
nical improvements will probably lead to modifications in matters
of detail. The war of 1877-78 has cast no new light on infantry
tactics but has served to confirm views previously held, although
it has certainly brought the value of intrenchments and of long
range infantry fire more prominently into notice, the former point-
ing to the necessity of making a soldier carry an intrenching tool
as part of his equipment.
The modern system of infantry tactics, which has prevailed in
spite of much opposition, is entirely at variance both in tenor and
tendency to the old system of which the Duke of Wellington's
school may be taken as a type. The stern discipline and iron rule
of the great Duke allowed no freedom of thought or assumption of
m
TACTICAL NOTES.
responsibility among his subordinates, he reproved sharply all
officers who acted without orders, even thouf,di their action might
be justified by success, and his pupils have to this day endeavour-
ed to suppress independent thought and stifle all criticism on
existing drill books and regulations.
Meanwhile, while this system of stern discipline and implicit
machine like subordination was in force, the modern system grew
up at first unnoticed and then only noticed with contempt. The
school of Von Moltke and his immediate predecessors, — the first
organizers of the modern system, — hold opinions which are the
exact reverse of those handed down from the Duke. The essence
of the modern system is to develop individuality instead of crush-
ing it, to make every officer and man a thinker as well as a fighter,
and, while enforcing strict discipline, to encourage ideas instead
of suppressing them. It is probable that such a system could
never have become preval it but for the organi;iation which turns
a whole nation into a huge army, thereby filling the ranks with
men of high intelligence and education.
The youngest officer is enjoined to exercise his faculties and
show his originality, if he has any, as early as possible ; and to
such an extent is this carried that in inspections and examinations
an answer, though not orthodox, is allowed to pass provided it
shows signs of original thought. Yet the discipline in the German
army is as strict as ever, only the crime of a few years ago has
become the virtue of to-day.
" The result of this system is that while individual faculties are
developed, the greatest possible amount of intelligence is brought
to bear on every military question, which is turned over, sifted
and resifted by thousands of minds, and the richest grain so select-
ed is always being laid before the Chief of the great General Staff.
The officers, thus encouraged to think and act with originality
'according to circumstances,' are ever ready to accept responsi-
bility. To wait for orders when they ought to be acting would be
visited with rebuke."
But this system of individuality which prevails among officers
of all ranks does not stop here. The same idea, with the modifi-
cations necessary for different levels of intelligence, prevails
throughout the whole military body, descending from rank to rank
INFANTRY TACTICS.
les are
)rouj^ht
sifted
select-
Staff,
iiialitv
)fhcers
iioditi-
revails
() rank
to the private soldier, who is tau^'ht by his officers self-reUance
and to act and think as an individual. In fact, while the Duke of
Wellington was ready to handle the whole military apparatus,
from a general down to a sergeant-major, the new school has
recognized that military genius is rare and cannot be counted
upon, while training may be universal and present so solid a force
that genius itself may be broken by it. A modern battle is a series
of isolated combats over a wide field which cannot be oveiseen by
the most keen-sighted commander-in-chief. Therefore the new
system trains every officer and even man to be, as far as possible,
a student of generalship. You may break up a German army as
you will, when each fraction is prepared to act for itself in at-
tack, defence, pursuit, or retreat.
Yet it is not to be supposed that a thorough grounding in a long
course of drill is not as essential now as before. However neces-
sary it may be that troops when under actual hre should work in
open order, yet the practical experience of war has clearly shown
that no bodies of men can move without confusion and danger in
loose formations till they have been long and carefully practised in
close order ; in fact it has been often proved that troops who have
not been first drilled into perfect steadiness on parade become a
mere rabble when, in the presence of an enemy, they attempt
extended movements.
The following extract from the remarks of the general officer
commanding at Aldershot on a field day held in the autumn of
1881 will also show the absolute necessity of proper training. An
attack was made on an enemy in position, and the General says :
" The front attack was not carried out with the order and discip-
line that the general officer commanding expected to see. The
advance across the valley to the position held by the enemy was,
in one instance, made in no recognized form of attack ; the men
simply crowded forward in an uncontrolled mob, firing uselessly
in the air as they marched, regardless of the heavy fire of artillery
on their flank. In real warfare few would have reached the
heights, and the final charge, if it had ever taken place, would
have been very different from what it appeared on that occasion.
The general officer commanding must once more call the serious
attention of officers to the necessity of keeping their men in hand.
TACTICAL NOTES.
i 4
m
In this case, the officers of the battaUon seemed to have lost all
control, and to have made no effort to regain it."
This necessity for thorough training is clearly recognized in
Germany, and the groundwork of the whole military system of the
German Army is to be found in the most methodical accurate bar-
rack yard drill. When companies (or squadrons) can once work
without the s^lightest error or confusion in closed ranks they can
easily adopt, and practise without disorder, the looser formations
rendered necessary in modern war. There is a great danger of
this necessity being overlooked by auxiliary forces, who are apt
not to pay sufficient attention to the dry groundwork of drill, and
the temptatit)n to attempt more showy exercises with still crude
recruits is not always resisted. It is being recognized more and
more every day that success in modern war depends in the first
place on the rudimentary instruction of the drill-sergeant. In
Germany this is fully recognized, and it is allowed that the skill of
Von Moltke would have been of little effect had not each battalion,
each company, and each squad been long, patiently, and thorough-
ly practised in the most elementary principles of the barrack yard.
The power to march long distances and then win a difficult battle
comes from perfect di ill and unswerving steadiness, and not so
much from the genius of the commander.
These then are the general principles on which the modern
tactical principles are based, and as a sound system of infantry
tactics is a most important element in any force it will be useful
to become acquainted with the systems in vogue in the armies of
the principal Military Powers.
The British system is given in the "Field Exercise" so will not be
considered here. But a comparison between the British system
and the continental regulations here described will show that our
Field Exercise book would appear to need revision. The important
principle of preventing the mixing up of units arid the training of
non-commissioned officers to take charge of small groups of men,
into which men in dispersed order will from the necessities of the
ground be sure to form themselves, are not sufficiently recognized.
It would seem too that the front of the battalion is too wide, and
the depth too shallow, and although a deeper formation is per-
missible, it is evidently not intended to be the rule. From the
INFANTRY TACTICS.
very coinnienceinent of a fi^'ht a inixitif,' up of different companies
must inevitably take place, as no company reinforces its own
men, and soon after there cannot fail to be a mixture of bat-
talions. Then ^Toups of men will be formed and the non-com-
missioned officers, not beinjj trained to take charj^^e of such
j^Toups, will act with hesitation and look for orders, resulting:; in
slowness and confusion and want of dash.
The general principles which have been pretty universally ac-
cepted are summarised as follows by Sir Lumley Graham :
1. The relative value of the firearm (cannon and musket) and
of the sidearm (sword and bayonet) has been much affected by
modern technical improvements. The firearm is now undoubted
mistress of the battle-Held, where everythinj^' is subordinate to it.
2. The formation of infantry for battle must be such as to favour
to the utmost the effect of its own lire, and to minimize the dam-
ap;e done by that of the enemy. Within effective ranjji'es every-
thiuf^f else must ^ive way to these two considerations.
3. For the front or " firinf( line" the only formation, both in
attack and defence, which meets these requirements, is a line of
small sections extended in single rank, which we Enj^dish call a
line of skirmishers, which from bein}i[ at first very open becomes
more and more dense as the antaj^onists come to closer cpiarters,
attaining at last almost the consistency of a line in close order.
4. This "firing line" has a very different mission to that of the
old " line of skirmishers."
The latter had only to prepare the way for the columns or lines
and to supplement their efforts ; the former, on the contrary, has
to fight the battle out through all its stages to the very conclusion
being supported in doing so by the troops in close order. Hence
the conditions are reversed.
5. The intermixture of tactical units, which, under the present
conditions of warfare, occurs more frequently and on a larger scale
than formerly, is an inevitable evil. All that can be done is to put
it off to as late a stage of the battle as possible by means of tac-
tical disp<isitions, and to minimi^ie its bad effects by training and
discipline.
6. The same training and discipline must regulate infantry fire.
If this is to be of decisive effect it nuist not only be hot and well
r
8
TACTICAL NOTES.
sustained, but it must also be entirely under control and conduct-
ed according to fixed principles so as to be concentrated upon any
point desired.
7. A tactical body once thrown into a firing line on the offensive
cannot be relieved ; its remnants, great or small, will remain in
the firing line to the end of the action.
This rule will not apply so generally to troops on the defensive.
8. The comparatively loose formations necessary in the present
day render supervision and control on the part of superiors more
difficult. Tactical dispositions will again do something to remedy
this evil, but thorough discipline and training will do more, con-
tributing as they will to the complete maintenance of the chain of
responsibility from the Commander-in-Chief right down to the
leader of the smallest squad in the fighting line.
9. The importance of the company as a battle unit is much in-
creased, and pari passu the importance of the Captain as a com-
mander. The Prussian company-column is the normal battle for-
mation.
10. The best organi/:ation for the battalion is in four companies
from 200 to 250 strong.
11. Good infantry well posted cannot be dislodged by a mere
frontal attack, unless the assailants are in very superior numbers,
and even then success is uncertain, ^nd only to be purchased at
an enormous sacrifice. Hence, whenever possible an attack on
one or both fianks must be combined with the frontal attack.
12. Although each separate tactical unit now adopts a shallower
formation than of old, the total force of infantry, whether on, the
offensive or on the defensive, occupies a greater depth of ground
than formerly, being distributed into a greater number of lines,
the distance between which is also generally greater than used to
be necessary. The fianks are particularly strengthened.
13. The tactical desiderata for an ideal defensive position are :
First and foremost a clear field for firC; both to the front and
flanks for some three thousand yards ; secondly, ground sloping
gently downwards towards the enemy; thirdly, well secured flanks,
and no prominent salient angles ; fourthly, good cover for sup-
ports and reserves at a convenient distance from the fighting line;
fifthly, good and sheltered communications from the rear and
INFANTRY TACTICS.
jiTiam in
r.long the position ; sixthly, good positions for batteries in rear of
and on higher ground than the infantry.
14. Supports and reserves must be kept, as a rule, in close
order ; whether in line or column will depend on circumstances.
They should be as well up to the front as is consistent with im-
munity from such loss as would impair their efficiency.
15. Good infantry need not fear the attack of cavalry even if in
extended order. As a general rule they should be able to main-
tain the formation m which they happen to be when threatened.
To do otherwise will be only to play the enemy's game.
16. In order to get the full value out of its present armament,
infantry should be trained to firing by companies and smaller
bodies at long ranges, but such firing should only be by word of
command, and the utmost care must be taken to prevent waste of
ammunition. Long range firing will generally be used with more
effect by troops on the defensive than on the offensive. Rapidity
of fire, which is one of the chief qualities of the breech-loader, and
more especially of the repeating rifle, should only be taken advan-
tage of at close quarters, and for very short periods. Deliberate
independent firmg is that most commonly used.
17. Although the bayonet will now only come into play excep-
tionally, soldiers must be taught that there are still occasions for
its use, and that its employment is the last argument to be brought
against an enemy who will not yield to the firearm alone.
18. Although improvements in firearms seem, at first sight, to
favour the defence at the expense of the attack, it is not so alto-
j:;ether, even from the material point of view, whilst from the
moral point of view the advantage remains still as heretofore with
the assailant.
19. A mere passive defence will produce no great result. A
commander when on the defensive must always be prepared to
make a counter-attack at the right moment.
The details of Infantry fighting on the offensive will first be
• lealt with.
F
lo
TACTICAL NOTES.
THE A TTACK FORMA TION FOR INF A NTR Y IN THE GERMAN ARMY.
Tactical units. — The Division is composed of 2 Brigades, each
of 2 Regiments, each of 3 Battahons. Hence there are 12 Bat-
tahons to a Division. Each Battahon on a war footing consists
of 4 Companies of 250 men. On parade and for purposes of drill
the company is formed in three ranks and divided into two "zugs"
or divisions.
THE COMPANY.
When manoeuvring or in action, a Company is divided into
three 2ugs in two ranks, the third zug being formed of what was
the third rank, and is called the Fusilier zug. Each zug is divided
into two half-zugs, forming 6 half divisions, and when skirmishing
each half-zug is sub-divided into sectioKS or groups of from four
to six files.
A captain commands the whole Company, with a lieutenant to
each zug.
In ar preaching the enemy the usual formation it company-
column, that is, in three zugs, formed one behind the other.
The regulations say that "distribution in company-columns will
best enable a battalion fighting by itself to peform the tJi.sk allotted
to it with the least expenditure of power. Fof instance, the fight
may be commenced with only one company, which need only
extend a zug or a half zug. After we have ascertained where best
to attack the enemy or to what point he is directing his attack, a
second company may be brought up in line with the first on the
side re(]uired to strengthen the front of fire, to outflank or turn
the enemy, or to guard ourselves against being outflanked. In the
course of the fight it may perhaps become necessary to bring up a
third company on one side or other of the first. If the enemy has
been shaken by our fire, if some ground has been gained suitable
as a starting point for an attack in force, the fourth company may
also be brought up iu line for the decisive stroke."
When the attack formation is to be assumed the Battalion
usually sends two companies to the front, but sometimes only
one. A company in front is distributed in three lines, ahalf-zug,
usually from the I'usilier zug, is sent forward in the first instance
to form the shooting line. The remaining half-zug follows in
INFANTRY TACTICS.
II
tenant to
close order, at a suitable distance, as a "Support," while the
remainder of the Company, in close order, follows as a " Reserve."
The leadings half-zug, when extended, covers a front somewhat
greater than that of a company deployed in line, — about 75
paces. The two men of a file must be close together, either
side by side, or one behind the other. The distance between
files may vary with the circumstances but should not in open
level ground exceed 6 paces.
Each section forms a united fire group under a non-commis-
sioned officer, and in open ground an interval is left between groups.
The group leader may move about as he pleases, so as to best
carry out his duties. The officer of a zug is with its extended
portion.
The leading zug advances at a quick step, but without doubl-
ing. Supports only double when joining a line on the move.
Alternative rushes at the double are not commenced until within
500 yards of the enemy. The dressing is generally on a central
group which is named.
The remaining half of the leading zug is next extended in
prolongation of the first half, (sometimes this is done at first) and
the extended line now occupies a front equal to two companies,
or about 150 paces. A fresh zug moves up as a support. The
third zug remains as a last support or "Company Reserve."
Another company may now be moved forward as the main
body, and this will represent the fundamental German fighting
formation, i.e., the half-battalion, while the other half acts as
"Battalion Reserve."
The Germans avoid on principle prescribing fixed distances
between the different echelons. Bodies in close order are merely
recommended to keep near enougii to the shooting line to be able
to support it at need, and far enough from it to avoid excessive
loss. The following, however, are considered suitable in open
ground : — between shooting line and support 150 paces, — between
support and comp. ly reserve 100 paces, between company
reserve and main body 150 paces.
The Battalion Reserve, which at first consists of 3 companies,
conforms to the movement of the advanced company, as soon as
the latter has got far enough ahead, that is to say from about
F^
12
TACTICAL NOTES.
500 to 700 paces. They at first form a line of company columns
with a few paces interval, but they cannot keep this formation
long, and one company is sent to the front as immediate support
to the advanced company, while the two other companies open
out, sometimes to deploying interval.
When a shooting line has to be reinforced the reinforcing body
generally moves up in prolongation of the extended line. When
the extent of front allotted to any company is already occupied,
the extended line closes to one flank to make room for the rein-
forcement. The zugs or sections already extended are not if
possible to be separated, or mixed one with the other.
Behind every extended line there must be a closed body near
enough to give timely assistance, but it should not, except when
absolutely unavoidable, be exposed to the same fire as the
extended line. As soon as one zug of a company becomes
absorbed in the shooting line, another moves up to replace it.
When it is advisable to support the shooting line by bodies in
close order the latter double up, if required to fire volleys, in
line, — if to make a bayonet charge, in line or column.
If the second company be moved up to the shooting line, and
there is not sufficient space available, a front zug would kneel,
and a rear zug, standing, would fire over their heads. After a
rapid fire, the whole would rush forward to the assault.
THE BATTALION.
A Battalion when forming for attack sends two companies to
the front, which give half the battalion for shooting line and
supports, and half as Battalion Reserve. This formation may
also be described as two half battalions in attack formation stand-
ing side by side. But the two companies in reserve may move
united as one body, or may move separately, and may join the
shooting line either separately or together. They may move up
into gaps made in the shooting line, or on its flanks ; or they
may take up echelon or flanking positions to oppose or to de-
liver flank attacks.
colunins
"ormation
2 support
lies open
ung body
. When
occupied,
the lein-
re not if
Ddy near
;pt when
i as the
becomes
ce it.
)odies in
>lleys, in
ine, and
d kneel,
After a
lanies to
ine and
ion may
)n stand-
ly move
join the
nove up
or they
r to de-
r*
14
ATTACK FORMATIONS.
4
GERMAN INFANTRY.
J5
|!|
il
(■! .•'■
i6
ATTACK FORMATIONS.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
17
THE ATTACK FORMATION OF THE FRENCIf INFANTRY.
Tactical Units. — The Division is composed of 2 Brigades, each
of 2 Regiments, each of 3 Battahons, Hence there are 12
Battahons to a Division. Each BattaUon consists of 4 Com-
panies of 250 men.
The normal division of the Company is into two divisions
(Pelotons), each of two sections. On a peace footing each
section is divided into two squads, and these eight squads are
designated by the uneven numbers from i to 15. On a war
footing, each of the above mentioned squads is divided into two,
and the new squads receive the even numbers from 2 to 16.
THE COMPANY.
In forming for attack the Company is divided into three
echelons. One section is extended as a "Chain" or shooting
line, one section forms a "Reinforcement," and two sections form
a "Support."
The Captain gives general directions ; the commanders of
sub-divisions are responsible for carrying out these orders ; they
have no fixed post but place themselves where they can best
observe what is going on, and direct their men.
The chain is formed of squads, each consisting of from 4 to 7
files at six paces interval. These groups do not at once extend,
but at first they remain in close order sending forward one or
two scouts ((^claireurs) about 100 metres ahead, the squads on
the flanks send two additional scouts to the flanks.
The maximum distance between the shooting line and the
reinforcement is laid down at 150 metres (165 yards), and be-
tween the reinforcement and support at 350 metres (385 yards.)
Circumstances decide when the company should adopt the i
Attack Formation. The drill book after the preliminary recon-
naissance says : — "The battalion commander pushes one company
forward towards the point of attack selected. This company
begins the engagement, feels the enemy, and obliges him to
deploy his forces. A second company follows to prolong the
line, to make a flank attack, to make a false attack which may
afterwards be converted into a real one, or to support the com-
i8
Tactical notes.
pany first engaged. The two other companies conform. At the
decisive moment one of them is pushed forward to the point
where the first effort is to he made, its mission being to carry the
first two companies on with it to the assault."
The leading company advances to the attack in the order just
described until the enemy's fire begins to take effect. The
squads are then extended into a line of skirmishers, and the
scouts, who are picked marksmen, begin to annoy the enemy
with a steady well-aimed fire. If this is not enough, the whole
chain moves up into line with the scouts and takes up the firing.
The further advance is carried on by rapid advances of about 50
yards at a time.
The Reinforcement and Support follow, moving from shelter
to shelter, either by squads, by files, or man by man.
As the fight progresses the reinforcement is gradually drawn
into the shooting line. This reinforcing takes place by
regular sub-units, or if necessary, by the whole reinforcement.
It may be conducted in three ways : —
(i.) If the extended line is not firing, the intervals are dimin-
ished by closing to a flank. The reinforcing body extends on
the march, and occupies the space left vacant.
(2.) If the extended line is firing, the reinforcing body extends
on the march, and occupies the intervals of the extended line.
(3.) The reinforcing body is brought up on a flank of the ex-
tended line and the latter prolonged.
But the mixing up of units is to be avoided whenever possible,
and only resorted to, as a rule, when the shooting line cannot be
prolonged, or the intervals diminished.
If it is found impossible to continue the forward movement, a
portion of the support is thrown into the shooting line. When
the fire has produced sufficient effect to admit of an assault, the
remainder of the support is moved forward in compact order to
give a fresh impulse to the shooting line. But in delivering the
assault a portion of the support is to be always retained in
reserve to meet a counter-attack, or to cover a repulse.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
19
THE BATTALION.
In assuming formation for attack, two companies of the
battalion move out to the front and act as described.
The extent of front occupied by the shooting line is gov-
erned by the condition, that when the whole of eav.h of the two
leading companies has been absorbed into the shooting line,
there would be a man to every metre of front occupied. It is
thus calculated that, after making allowance for casualties, the
front of action of a battalion would not exceed 300 metres.
The shooting line and reinforcement of each company are
both under the command of the same officer.
The support is commanded by a different officer, but all are
under the command of the Captain. The support is to be kept
intact as long as possibi , and when this can be no longer done
it is to be loplaced from the Battalion Reserve, which is formed
of the two remaining companies of the battalion.
The reserve conforms to the movement at 400 or 500 metres
in rear ; it is generally broken up into company columns of
sections in line at 6 paces interval, but they soon have to open
out to deploying interval.
The advance is conducted as follows : The squads of the
shooting line advance in groups as long as possible, preceded
by their scouts. The reinforcement moves in the order most
conducive to protection from fire, and to taking advantage of the
ground.
This order continues up to 800 to 1,000 yards from the enemy.
The groups of the chain are then extended.
At this stage the scouts only open fire. At about 600 yards
from the enemy fire may be opened along the whole line.
In reinforcing the mixing of sub-units is to be avoided. The
shooting line is strengthened by the advance of regular sub-units
from the reinforcement on the order of the Captain. These
should be brought forward only as they become actually neces-
sary. The support is retained in a formed body in rear as long as
possible.
r^
20
TACTICAL NOTES.
i
ii |l|"'lll
When further progress becomes difficult, the advance is to be
carried on by fractions of the line at a time. The halted frac-
tions cover by their fire those advancing. At this stage it is
already sought to bring a converging fire on the position attacked.
When no further progress can be made, the shooting line is
reinforced from the support up to its maximum of one rifle per
metre, and the Battalion Commander orders a rapid fire along
the whole line.
At this time the shooting line is assumed to have arrived at
about 300 yards from the enemy's position. The rapid fire now
going on aims at shaking the enemy's moral, and preparing the
assault.
The remainder of the supports are now moved into the shoot-
ing line and subsequently the company of the reserve, which
replaced the support, is moved up to the shooting line in close
order.
The remaining company of the reserve follows the movement
of the^leading troops, but is still held in rear as a "reserve."
The attack would now be continued by a succession of short
rapid advances, the moments of halt being used for rapid fire.
But for the execution of this final advance the Regulations state
that no rules can be laid down.
The attack from the commencement of the rapid fire to the
final assault is carried out by the shooting line, reinforcement
and support, reinforced by a part of the reserve. The remaining
company of the reserve should be close in rear of the front line,
and enter the position at the same time.
At this moment the dealing with a counter-attack is the chief
business of the reserve. Under its protection the remainder
should be reformed at the first moment of respite.
On all occasions when the Battalion Commander has expended
the last company of the reserve, he should immediately inform
the second line with a view to a fresh reserve being supplied
from it*.
e is to be
ilted frac-
stage it is
t attacked,
ig line is
ii rifle per
fire along
arrived at
1 fire now
)aring the
he shoot-
/e, which
s in close
novement
rve."
I of short
apid fire,
ons state
re to the
brcement
emaining
font line,
the chief
emainder
expended
y inform
supplied
ffr^
22
ATTACK FORMATIONS.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
23
THE ATTACK tORMATlON OF THE AUSTlilAN INFANTRY.
Tactical Units. — The Division is composed of 2 Brigades, the
strength of which may vary ; but a Brigade usually consists of 6
Battalions, — and therefore the Division of 12, and there are 2
battalions of Rifles in addition.
An Army Corps consists of 3 Divisions. The Regiment is
composed of 3 battalions, each of 4 Companies of 250 men.
The Company is divided into two half Companies or 4 Sections.
When skirmishing the section is divided into squads or groups
of not more than 7 or less than 4 files.
The Austrian Drill Book contains no fixed rules for the attack
formation, it only speaks in general terms ot the distribution of a
battalion into a "fire-line" and a "reserve" and remarks that the :
"battalion commander will dispose of his companies as units in
such a manner as to guard his flanks and rear while keeping a
sufficient reserve in hand." It lays down, however, minute
instructions as to what should be done by commanders of units
under the varying circumstances which occur in the field.
The general principles insisted on are the following : — The
company is divided into the shooting line consisting, of a line of
groups or squads, — "schwarm linie," — the support, and reserve.
The former two together compose the "fire-line."
The extended line forms a line of squads rather than a line of
skirmishers. It has a given extent of front to cover, and each
man is allowed a front of two paces ; but within these limits the
squads, while regulating their advance by the squad of direction,
and preserving the general cohesion of the chain, are free to act
as circumstances require. Each squad has a leader of its own.
Every leader or commander is ordered to carefully study the
nature of the ground, and to take every advantage of cover. The
fire is to be carefully regulated and adapted to the different
ranges passed over. Each unit in the attacking force should
endeavour, within the sphere allotted to its action, to act against
the enemy's flanks. Frontal attacks should, as a rule, be only
made to aid a flank attack.
l:r
wm
24
TACTICAL NOTES.
THE COMPANY.
When a company is formed for attack the Captain determines
what proportion of the company he will extend, at first, in the
shooting line. He is guided by the rule that each man is
allowed, in the first instance, a front of about two paces. He
also specifies the squad of direction.
Squads are required to take every advantage of cover, to pre-
serve connection during the advance, and to be always ready to
afford support to each other.
The supports are under ordinary circumstances about 80 yards
in rear of the shooting line. They may move in fours, in line, in
single rank, or in open files. They may be in rear of the centre
or of a wing of the extended line. While taking all advantage of
cover they must be ready to move out quickly to a flank, or to
join the shooting line at any moment.
In advancing they may move rapidly from cover to cover. In
reinforcing the shooting line, supports may either thicken or
prolong it. If an immediate assault is to be carried out, they
should be brought up in a compact body. Supports are some-
times moved forward to stimulate the advance when the shooting
line hangs back from any cause. They would then pass through
the shooting line who would follow them. All mixing of squads
and sections is to be avoided as much as possible.
When the company is employed by itself a small reserve, one
section at least, is retained under the immediate control of the
Captain.
THE BATTALION.
A battalion forms the order for attack as soon as it comes
within the zone of the enemy's artillery fire, but it is not necessary
at that period that the troops in the shooting line should be
extended.
The Commander of the battalion details the companies who
are to furnish the shooting line, and indicates the extent of front
to be covered, and which company is to direct.
If more than one company is to be employed in the front line,
the front to be occupied is divided between them.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
25
3rve, one
Each company employed in the front furnishes a section of the
shooting Hne. Thus the supports and shooting hne belong to the
same unit (the company). Should this become impossible in
practice, then one company must support the one in front of it.
There is no fixed rule as to how many companies should con-
stitute the shooting line when the nature and strength of the
enemy's position has not been yet clearly ascertained. One
company may be used in feeling for the enemy before an advance
is made in "attack order" on a line that may turn out to be the
wrong one. But when a battalion is moving in close connection
with others in the line of battle, it is usual to have two companies
of each battalion to furnish the shooting line.
As a rule the shooting line would extend over a front equal to
that of the whole battalion deployed in line.
Great latitude is allowed to the captains of companies in the
shooting line in conducting the advance, taking advantage of
cover, and regulating the fire.
The battalion reserve is under the command of the senior
Captain with it. He moves it m the formation best suited to the
circumstances. The general principles laid down for the move-
ments of the supports equally apply to the reserve, regard being
had to the special functions of the latter as a "reserve." But no
fixed rules are laid down as to the exact position it should occupy
or the formation it should move in. "The battalion reserve
follows on, as rapidly as possible, to support the attack, to secure
any success that may be obtained, or in the event of failure to
make it possible to rally the beaten troops." In practice it would
be formed up very similar to the reserves of the French and
Germans.
The opportune employment of the reserve at the proper
moment is the important duty of the Commander. Its most
efficient use would be in making attacks on the enemy's flanks.
It may be required to directly reinforce the shooting line when
it would extend, and either fill up intervals or prolong the shoot-
i.ig line to a flank.
When the reserve is employed to take part in the actual assault,
the battalion commander indicates the point it should move to,
and the formation it shciuld assume. Rapid fire having been
26
TACTICAL NOTES.
carried on along the line, the whole then advance at the double
to the assault.
In some cases the reserve may be retained in rear during the
assault to secure possession of the position when carried, or to
cover a repulse.
he double
luring the
ied, or to
^m^B^
28
ATTACK FORMATIONS.
' i
INFANTRY TACTICS.
29
Such are the movements laid down in the different rej^ulations
for the company and battahon. We will now see how the attack
is conducted in practice by the Infantries of the three nations
referred to.
THE ADVANCE UP TO STORMINO DISTANCE.
It is supposed that the Battalion Commander has sent forward
an advanced company to feel the enemy so as to enable him to
form his plans. This company will have had to extend one or
more sections or ;^Uf;s to accomplish this ; and the Commanding
Officer will meanwhile probably have selected one of the enemy *s
winj^s as the object of attack and will attempt to outflank it
whilst at the same time assailinj^ it in front. The exercise books
of all the armies dwell strongly upon the risk of a mere frontal
attack. At the same time wide turning movements are to be
avoided. A battalion acting by itself has no force to spare for
such a purpose. The CommaiKler, therefore, orders up a second
company into the fighting line on the flank of the first.
Now when infantry wishes to make an attack it will, in most
cases, endeavour first to subdue the enemy's fire, and for this
purpose to push up its own fighting line to within effective
range ; but nations seem to differ as to what effective range is.
The actual distance will vary somewhat according to circum-
stances, but as effective range will be longer for the defender than
for the assailant, the defender will not allow the latter to come up
at once to what will be for him an effective range.
Germany. — The Germans are in favour of reserving their fire
on the offensive and enforce the rule that the moment of opening
ftre should be put off as long as possible, and that the enemy's
position should be approached as far as possible before doing so.
They think it will be generally feasible to get within 550 or
650 yards of the enemy before opening fire, when they fire by
volleys or independently, 3 rounds at a time ; it is not till within
450 yards of the enemy that rapid independent firing is allowed.
They insist, however, that from the moment fire is opened it
should become general, because the object of the assailant being
to subdue the defender's fire so as to facilitate his own advance, his
30
TACTICAL NOTES.
aim should be to bring a superior force to bear, at any rate upon
the special points which he intends to assault, and that this can
only be obtained by bringing every available rifle into play and by
concentration of fire.
The advance of the shooting line is to be made at a brisk pace
without doubling, but when an open space has to be crossed
under fire to move from one position to another it may be done
by a smart rush. At times, too, it will be advisable for the
skirmishers to throw themselves down to fire after running 60 or
80 paces, continuing their advance in the same way by successive
fractions after a short pause. The attack will, however, evidently
be delayed by this mode of progress, which uses up the strength
very much, and should thus only be commenced when within 400
yards of the enemy.
The supports and reserves are kept in close order as far as
practicable, either in company-columns or deployed by companies,
and as close up to the front as is compatible with fair immunity
from loss. The book says "It mu^t be borne in mind that ground
swept by the enemy's fire must needs be traversed in order to
arrive at a decisive result, and that a nervous anxiety to keep our
troops out of heavy fire is quite out of keeping with the nature of
war, in which no success can be gained without sacrifice."
France. — The French consider that at 870 yards, rifle fire
becoming dangerous, the groups should extend in rear of the
scouts, who, being picked marksmen, open fire in reply to that of
the enemy. The fighting line pushes on from shelter to shelter,
and as soon as it becomes necessary to do so in order to ensure
superiority of fire, probably at about 650 yards, the chain joins
the scouts. Fire is then opened along the whole front, the
Captains bringing up part or even the whole of the supports if
necessary.
Lately the French have been practising firing voile} s by groups
and sections and these are much practised in their manoeuvres;
rapid independent firing is only allowed with the 200 metres sight.
The skirmishers advance by successive rushes firing between
whiles. At the longer distances all the skirmishers of a company
advance together. As they approach the enemy, however, the
movement is made by alternate half-companies, which run from
INFANTRY TACTICS.
31
cover to cover, the halted part firing whilst the other advances.
Each fraction should have a front of at least 100 paces.
The supports ;ire sent forward from cover to cover, by the
leader pointing out the place in front where the men are to
assemble, and they run across to it singly or l)y hies, and re-form.
They thus approach the chain and groups detached from them
are sent to points where an augmentation of fire becomes neces-
sary. The supports are sometimes broken up into sections which
are distributed along the fighting line.
Austria. — As soon as the leading troops enter the zone of
artillery fire the reserves close up to supporting distance. The
I companies to form the fire line are sent forward, but these move
at first in close order with a few skirmishers in front and on the
fianks to cover the advance. When the next ;^one, between 1830
and 1660 yards from the enemy's position, called ''long range
distance" is entered, the "fire line" companies are kept, as a rule,
in close order ; but when this order affords too much of a target
to the enemy companies move in separate sections. Long range
fire may then be ordered. For this the units to fire must be
[closed, the object to be fired at must be distinctly pointed out,
the range should be ascertained, and volleys only are fired. In
this firing sufficient men should be united to make the results
I effective.
On entering the next zone, 830 to 400 yartis from the enemy,
termed the "mean shooting distance," the advanced companies
[throw out the shooting line if this has not already been done.
The further advance is made by rushes of from 40 to 50 yards
I with intervals of rest between rushes of not less than half a minute.
The advance through the next /one, called the "short range
[ihstance," constitutes the real attack. During this period the
greater parts of the supports will have been drawn into the
I shooting line, companies will have been weakened, and sections
inixed up.
The Austrians consider the system of "sanuneln," i.e. "forward
[assembly," practised by the French the best for bringing supports
[to the front over ground exposed to fire.
The further advance will depend npf)n the arris. il of fresh
[tr(X)ps to reinforce and encourage the men, more or less exhaust-
32
TACTICAL NOTES.
Pilii
ed, in front. For this the reserves must be at hand to prevent
the "Fire Line" from beinp; defeated. It is incumbeait therefore
on all battalions and refjiments in the first line to so feed the fire
line as to bring it up to the "decisive distance," 250 to 160 yards
from the enemy's position, where it will deliver its last and more
rapid tire preparatory to the assault.
The reserves should at this moment be ready to support the
movement, and either directly take part in the assault or take
post to cover a defeat.
The Austrians hold to the principle, like the Germans, of
reserving their fire as much as possible, and only admit of the fire
becoming general at 250 yards. Beyond that distance, either
only the best marksmen are to fire when good marks present
themselves, or firing is done by word of command.
It may here be stated that General Brialmont of the Belgian
Army is in favour of advancing over open ground without hr.lting,
and of keeping up a fire the whole time. He says : "We believe
it to be easier to carry out the plan of firing as you advance,
than of firing between the rushes," (a plan universally adopted at
present), "and that the former system exposes troops to smaller
loss, because it takes longer to get over the ground by a succession
of rushes if you let the men lie down between each rush. It is
true, that you make fewer hits at target practice when firing on
the move, but shooting in battle can never be accurate. Generally
men aim only at the smoke which conceals their enemy, and at
the short ranges, the point blank fire of men standing up produces
as much effect as that of skirmishers lying down."
THE ASSAULT.
When the attacking infantry has worked its way up to storming
distance, the actual' assault will be made. But what is this
storming distance ? the regulations do not define it. The German
practice on open ground is to make it not less than 220 yards: the
French appear to put this distance at 270 jards, though it is laid
down that the assault should commence at the point beyond
which the assailant can make no further progress by the effect of
his fire arins alone.
The Austrians, as we have seen, consider this distance to be
between 250 and 160 yards.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
33
Of course, in all cases it is understood that the above distances
should be reduced as far as circumstances will permit. The
wliole or parts of a hj^htinj:,' line may, if favoured by the ground,
<(et much nearer to the enemy ''cfore makinjj; the final rush. In
tile latter case, the more advanced portion will cover the move-
ment of the more distant portions before joining in it themselves.
The final charge, or rush, must be made in one spurt, and the
maximum distance to be traversed must therefore depend upon
the physical powers of the assailants, on whether the ground is
Hat or steep, or whether, again, the soil is at the time light or
heavy, as there must be no check.
The Order for the Assault will be given in Austria and Germany
by the leaders of the fighting line or foremost bodies, who " can
generally form the best opinions as to the proper time for seizing
the nearest points in the position assailed, and once seriously
engaged, they act in this matter upon their own responsibility."
The French instructions do not specify how the assault is to be
ordered, though it would appear that the impulse is intended to
l)e given by the Battalion Commander.
As regards the execution of the assault the Austrian and Ger-
man instructions agree in the main, although the former recognize
the possibility of part of the fighting line only being employed in
charging, while the remainder keeps up a fire, first of all upon the
points assailed, and then upon those nearest to them.
In Germany it is intended for the whole skirmishing line to
take part in the assault, supported by the closed bodies. "If the
enemy's infantry appears to be shaken at any point, the fighting
line rushes upon that point, together with the nearest supports
which have, up to this, been under cover, the whole making a
rapid and concentrated onset, and on reaching the point, closing.
The officers will then do their utmost to get them in hand, so as
to make head against any counter-attack of the enemy." And it
is inculcated : " Before undertaking the final assault, make very
sure that it is feasible, but make up your mind that if once under-
taken, it must be carried out at any cost."
The French lay down more definite rules. When the proper
ime has come. No. 3 Company is to be brought up in close order
nto the fighting line so as to carry the latter forward with it to
34
TACTICAL NOTES.
lliij
the charge. Drums are to beat, bayonets to be fixed, and the
whole line is to rush on the enemy, shouting "En avant /" If,
however, the assailants cannot reach the enemy at one bound,
they should at least profit by the confusion which the rapid fire
has created in his ranks to continue their onward movement.
This phase of the engagement must be characterized by the
greatest vigour and impetuosity, without hesitation or perceptible
check in the general advance. The fighting line, making use of
a' er and concentrating during its momentary halts, advances
Ca^ jly until near enough to the enemy to gain his position at
one bound.
All three field exercise books agree in making it the first duty
of officers and non-commissioned officers to restore order in their
commands as soon as they have gained the enemy's position.
They all, moreover, lay down the rule that infantry are not to
pursue the retreating enemy, but only to fire after them. If
woods or villages are carried, their further border should be at
once occupied. The interior should be well searched by a por-
tion of the reserves, which should at once rush up to the position,
the remainder joining in the fire upon the retiring enemy.
A . rencli writer has pointed out that there is every inducement
for the assailant to gain the position, about 550 or 650 yards from
the enemy, whence he can seriously prepare for the attack and
open fire as rapidly as possible, and to economize his ammunition
till this position is reached. He will then advance from station
to station, halting at each to fire. But he must not only traverse
the intervals between the stations rapidly, but the number of
these stations must be reduced as far as possible, because every
time firing has to be stopped to resume the advance the
skirmishers experience they have to make a special effort it is
wise to spare them.
Up to 500 yards he considers that at each station no more than
2 or 3 cplridges per man siiould be expended, but as the assailant
approaches the enemy he will remain longer in each station,
when, between unequal pauses, several series of 3 rounds may be
fired ; the pause between each series enabling the officers to
maintain some control over the fire.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
35
At storming distance rapid independent firing would be com-
menced without any limitation as to the number of rounds ex-
pended.
If the defender evacuates his position the task is simple, but if
he stands firm and continues a decimating fire it will be a difficult
task for the assailant to reach him. " We see no other way out
of this difficulty than to run towards the position continuing the
fire. In the final crisis then, firing during the advance becomes
necessary, if only to mask the assailants advance by smoke and
to unsteady the defender in the execution of his fire. At this
extreme moment, waste of ammunition has no longer to be
dreaded, and besides this fire at point blank range will have its
effect even without aiming."
"A repeating rifle recommends itself particularly for this decis-
ive act to enable the assailant to throw himself against the
position while, at the same time, continuing his rapid firing; this
is the object to be attained."
" In future that army which is supplied with a repeating rifle
will have greatest chances of success."
The following is a summary of the several stages in an offensive
action of a single battalion : —
(i.) Opening of the attack by a company divided into skirmish-
ers and supports,
(2.) Fire is opened as soon as no further progress can be made
without it. The fire-line is strengthened, being prolonged by a
second company. Attempts are made to outflank the enemy
without extending the turning movement too far. The fighting
[line gains ground, portions of it alternately firing and moving on.
The two remaining companies follow separately in column or
[line.
(3.) The third company moves up into the fighting line and
[prolongs it, as do also any fraction of the first two companies
which may still be in support. The fire is increased to the
I utmost.
(4.) Final rush of the fighting line (portions of it perhaps re-
Imaining lying down and firing). The reserve company follows in
close order. The whole battalion fires on the retreating enemy
[from the position which the latter has evacuated.
,:*'«
r ■,
I
F—
36
TACTICAL NOTES.
REMARKS.
In the foref^oing outline of the " Formations of Infantry for
Attack," it is seen that a uniform type pervades the armies of the
principal continental nations, and that the same j^eneral principle
serves as a common foundation for the whole. It is well there-
fore to note what this j^eneral principle is. Briefly it is : —
1. That the hrst, and perhaps the chief, part of every attack
must be carried out by infantry lire.
2. That the final and decisive part of every attack must be
earned out by the Shootinji^ Line, reinforced by the reserves, who
move in com.bination to the assault.
3. That the saccess of the hnal assault will depend on the effect
produced on the enemy by the preparr.tory fire.
Certain conditions are observable in the way this mode of
attack is conducted. It is sought in the first place, to gradually
establish in the Shooting Line the number of men necessary to
maintain the most effective hre against the enemy. It is at the
same time sought to keep that number at the lowest that will be
effective.
The formidg.ble objection to this class of "fighting formation"'
is the dispersion of the troops in the first line of battle it entails.
This disadvantage is so fully recognized that every precaution is
taken to diminish as far as may be, and for as long as possible,
the extent to which that dispersion is allowed to take place. But
the necessity for this dispersion, in order to obtain an adecjuate
degree of fire, and at the same time to lessen sufficiently the ex-
tent of target offered to the enemy, is now universally, however
reluctantly, admitted and accepted by continental nations.
Accordingly we find that, in the "Regulations" of these dif-
ferent armies, a very small fraction of the force to be engaged is
first extended in th2 Shooting Line. When a Battalion is to as-
sume the "Attack Order," the G rmans exteml, in the first in-
stance, two half"/ugs (subsequently reinforced by remaining half-
zugs) or a twelfth part of the l^attalicMi. The French extend two
sections or an eighth of the Battalion. But the Austrians allow
great discretion to the Company Commander as to how 'aanv
men he will extend iii the first instance. Here is visible from the
INFANTRY TACTICS.
37
fantry for
lies of the
. principle
/ell tliere-
2ry attack
: must be
jrves, who
I the effect
i mode of
gradually
cessary to
t is at the
lat will be
irmatiou"'
it entails,
caution is
; possible,
\ce. But
adequate
V the ex-
however
us.
these dif-
n gaged is
is to as-
e hrst in-
nmg half-
:tend two
r.is allow
i)\v many
from thr
outset a close adherence to the principle that is at the root of all
power in battle, i.e., the keeping intact und under control the
largest possible part of \our force and for the longest possible
period.
But a closer examination shows that the above disposition
must be regarded rather as a preliminary formation previous to
I attack than as the actual "Attack Order." It is more a precau-
tional order of advance towards the enemy's position previous to
carrying out the actual attack. Here it is to be noted that
j though there is in this a great similarity to that (^f the olri skirm-
lishing line covering the advance of a body of troops in close
order, yet the analogy quickly ceases. The busniess of the old
skirmishing line was the minor one of clearing the front of
[troublesome sharpshooters of the enemy, and then giving way for
I the main body to move forward and attack the position with the
bayonet.
Now, however, the preliminary skirmishing line ii the nucleus
jor skeleton of what is to become the Shooting Line in the attack.
It is taken from those companies which are to form, in the hrst
[instaiice, the front line of battle. This line is never meant to
retire or be replaced by other troops, but it is to be reinforced as
[required, and it is ultimately to form part of the body to storm
the position.
The rules for extension in the tirsi instance s'lnply establish a
[precautionary order of advance, for it is admitted that when the
real attack commences, the Shooting Line should be at once re-
inforced up to the full number of rifles that can be effectively
used.
In (^anying out an aitack on this principle complete uniformity
I in the order of battle adopted may be said to exist amongst con-
tinental nations, the differences being unimportant and onlv of
Idetail. The Hrst line of battle is subdivided into two main
l^roui -
,,. , ^. , . ( ShootiuL'' Line
1. iMghtmg Lme ,. .'^
^ '^ I Sujiports.
2. Reserve.
These are, as a rule, furnished bv the same tactical unit.
38
TACTICAL NOTES.
A battalion in the first line of battle has in —
Fighting Line j battalion.
Reserve j battalion.
Fighting Line.
The Austrians subdivide the Fighting Line into-
(i) Shooting Line.)
(2) Supports. j
The Germans and French subdivide it into —
1. Shooting Line. )
2. Reinforcements. Fighting Line.
3. Supports. )
This subdivision was probably originally adopted by the French
from the Germans. But a Commission of French officers as-
sembled in 1879 to investigate the most favourable formations for
infantry in the attack were unanimous in recommending the
suppression of the "renforts" and for the formation of the com-
pany in two (Echelons. Their reasons for this were :
1. The renforts and supports have absolutely the same duties ;
to reinforce the fighting line, to gradually increase the intensity
of its fire.
2. The reinforcement does not diminish the losses, on the
contrary it augments them, and it has also the result of further
increasing the depth of the formation and in consequence of in-
creasing the difficulties of supervision and command.
The peculiar formation of the German company may, perhaps,
account to some extent for the order adopted in that army.
The normal formation of the German company is in three
ranks, but for fighting order this formation is abruptly changed
into two ranks. The normal subdivision of the company is into
two parts called /ugs, but when it changes to two ranks from three
the whole of the rear rank forms a third xug. ' The zug is held to
be so important a fraction that the whole battalion is numbered by
zugs from one to eight. Hut when the alteration from three ranks
to two takes place, numbers have to be provided for the four fresh
formed zugs, which strangely enough are numbered from one to
four.
This parade order in tiiree ranks which is never used in action,
and this duplicate numbering of sections of companies, would be
probably regarded as both clumsy and confusing if practised by
any other nation than the Germans.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
39
This formation constitutes for the Company three distinct
lunits. Consequently (on the principle of keeping units distinct
land intact as long as possible) when a Company in the first line
)f battle takes "attack order," one zug is extended, one r,dvanced
IS a first support, and the third kept back as a second support or
immediate reserve. But it is quite possible that this order is
iiade more to conform to the sub-division of the Company than
[from any advantage derivable from three lines over two.
As regards the extent of front first occupied by the Shooting
.ine of a battalion a good deal of uniformity exists.
The two half-zugs first extended by the Germans cover only a
space equal to half the battalion deployed. But as soon as the
remaining half-zugs are moved into the shooting line a front ecjual
to the whole battalion deployed is occupied.
With the Austrians and French great latitude is allowed in the
)reliminary extension of the shooting line, but it is laid down that
/hen this line is completed for attack the front occupied should
ilso be that of the battalion deployed.
With regard to the shooting line, there is an agreement of
)pinion in favour of working by groups.
In the German Army each extended section of a company
forms a fire-group. It is under the command of a non-commis-
sioned officer, and it is separated by an interval from the group
)n either side.
In the Austrian Army a similar system prevails, and from the
latitude allowed, would seem to be carried even further. The
kciuads or groups form loose links of a general chain which has a
jivi-n extent of front to cover. But within that front, while
naintaining the general direction of advance, great freedom is
plowed them. They look immediately to their own squad leaders
or t)r(lers and guidance, and they are allowed to move either
klosed in a body, or in extended order, as the groimd and situa-
[iou may determine.
In the French Army the shooting line advances, in the first in-
ance, in a line of stpiads, grouped separately. They retain this
kdcr until the enemy's fire checks the advance, when they extend.
There is some divergence in the diiferent armies regarding the
^l;u:cs taken by the men of each file within the groups.
t '-^
l. '
IH
A
i
ir^
40
TACTICAL NOTES.
Ji
II !M
The Germans require the two men of a file to be close together,
but they may be either side b}- side or one behind the other.
In the French Army the rear rank man is required to come up
on the left of his front rank man immediately the extension takes
place.
Similarly, the intervals allowed between the men in the shoot-
lug line also vary. The Germans make the intervals first taken
dependent on circumstances at the moment, but limit the extent
to six paces.
In the Austrian army the captain of the company is informed
of the extent of front he is to occupy, but the manner of extension
is left a j^ood deal to his discretion. He is bound, however, to be
guided by the rule that when the shooting line is fully formed,
each man in it should be allowed about two paces.
As regards the distances between the different bodies behind
the shooting line, and their position with regard to the latter, it
will be observed that a good deal of difference exists, and that as
a rule great latitude is allowed. The Germans object to layinf^
down fixed rules for distances between lines. They work on the
principle that behind every extended line there should be a closed
body near enough to give timely assistance, but, if possible, not
exposed to the same fire. Though in the other armies certain
distances are given, it is provided that they are not to be consid-
ered binding : while the positions to be occupied by supports and
reserve are left entirely to the discretion of the commanders of]
these bodies.
The general method of advancing to attack is pretty uniform in
these armies, but it may be well to notice the manner in which
reinforcements arc made to the shooting line.
The Germans appear to attacii great importance to the bringin^^
up reinforcements on the ilanks of th(^ extended line, ratlier than
in the intervals between its files. This mode of reinforcing they
regard as the rule, though circumstances may in special cases
require it to be departed from.
The b'rench and Austrians, on the other hand, (h) not appear to
lay such stress on this mode of reinforcing. All agree, however,
on the principle at stake, /.(■., that all reinforcing bodies should j
be kept as far as possible intact. iMnthcr, that all reinforcements
should be maiU' by regular units (sections, /ugs, cS:c.).
INFANTRY TACTICS.
41
The bringing up of reinforcements on the flanks of extended
Ibodies tends more t^zn any other method to the prevention of
mixing of different u its. The practical action of an extended
Hne in action is to close in on its centre. The casualties caused
by fire thus leave gaps on the flanks. If, therefore, successive
reinforcements can be brought up on the flanks, the mixing of
different units would be avoided. And this mixing of different
Itactical bodies is one of the great evils of the extended order of
I fighting.
On the subject of reinforcement a clear distinction should be
[drawn between the mode of action in this respect of the "Sup-
Iports" and of the "Reserve." Taking a battalion as the foremost
[ftghting body in the line of battle, formed as —
(i). Shooting Line.
(2). Supports. "
(3). Reserve.
The missions of the "support" is —
(i). To feed the shooting line according as gaps are made in
I it by casualties.
(2). To give a moral support to the shooting line by being close
I at hand.
(3). To act as occasion may require in covering the flanks of
|the shooting line or meeting attacks of the enemy.
The mixed role given to the supports can hardly be carried out
Im practice. It can only form a reserve of rifles for the shooting
lline, which it must join from the moment rapid fire commences,
[and it is doubtful even whether it can supply all the casualties.
The only duty then and the ultimate mission of the supports is,
lit may be said, to be absorbed in the shooting line in extended
|<jrder.
Hut action of this kind is not what should be aimed at in the
lie.serve. Th(^ugh its connection with the shooting line and
>iipports is of the closest kind, and its mission to afford the most
direct supi)ort to the bodies in front, yet its intervention, when
ihe time comes, should be sought to be made without allowing its
:^()nipanies to bi-conie extended in the shooting line. The order
i»f dispersion is, for all i)in'poses, except fire action, an ordiM" of
'1
" M
1 ,1
■>\
w^
TACTICAL NOTES.
I l||||
weakness. The efforts of the commander must be strained in
keeping intact, up to the last, as large a part of his force as he
can. Hence, when the reserve is brought forward for the final
stroke, it should be engaged in such order r.s will, when the assault
has been delivered, admit of the commander having some portion
of his force under immediate control. Therefore, the reinforcing
of the extended line by the reserve should not, if possible, be
carried out in extended order, but rather by companies in line, or
such other compact formation as the ground and circumstances
may admit of.
In case of a reverse or serious check in an attack, the extended
order contains every element of danger ; and having a formed
body of troops well in hand, however small the number, to make
a temporary stand with, and enable the rest to rally, is of extreme
importance. Hence this principle of bringing the reserve into
action as a closed body when possible, is to be strongly inculcat-
ed, as is also that of on no account using up the whole of the
reserve until fresh troops arrive to take its place.
Therefore we find that when a company is acting singly, it is
required to keep at least one section in close order as a reserve.
Similarly a battalion should keep at least one fourth as a reserve.
It is not to be inferred from this that a whole battalion is never
to be extended in the shooting line. It may frequently occur,
when a considerable force is engaged, that the enemy's resistance
has so weakened the attacking force, it becomes necessary, in
order to keep the fire of the shooting line effective, to extend the
whole of the companies of the battalion. But in this case there
would be fresh troops in rear to form a new reserve, to whom in
turn the above principle would equally apply.
ATTACK FORMATIONS OF LA/{OMIf UmTS : KEUlMENT, BRIGADE,
OR DIVISION.
(;kkmanv.
Bri^fixdc. — The l-?rigade assumes the formation for attack by
placing two battalions in the first line (treffen), two battalions in
the second line, and two battalions in the third line. The forma-
tion of the battalions in the first line have already been described.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
43
trained in
irce as he
the final %
■he assault
ne portion M
einforcing |
jssible, be
in hne, or
umstances
i extended I
a formed
, to make
3f extreme ^
serve into
r inculcat- -1
ole of the
ugly, it is I
a reserve,
a reserve. 41
)n is never
tly occur,
resistance
essary, in
xtend the
ase there
Vvhom in
BJilGAUE,
ittack by
talions in
Ihe forma-
lescribed.
I In the second line they are formed in echelon of half battalions,
land in the third in battalion-column.
The Regiments of a Brigade may be formed up either side by
[side (Flugenweise), or one behind the other (Truppenvveise). If
formed side by side each regiment has one battalion in each of the
three lines. If formed one behind the other, the first line is formed
[of two battalions of the leading regiment, t}ie second line of a
[battalion of each regiment, and the third line of two battalions of
[the rear regiment. The front occupied by the shooting line would
[be about 500 yards, and the total force on that front would give
[about 10 men to the pace. But a front of 1,000 yards would be
[theoretically admissible as an extreme limit, that is five men to
[the pace.
Division. — The attack order of a division is based on similar
[principles. It would be entirely Truppenweise, or entirely Flu-
[genweise, or partly one, partly the other. Thus the brigade might
[with reference to the division be Flugenweise, and the regiments
[in one or other brigade Truppenweise, or the whole Truppenweise.
FRANCE.
No binding rules are laid down for the order in which the larger
lunits should form for attack.
A Brigade would form with one regiment in first line, and the
fother regiment in second line, or it may form with one regiment
^alongside the other.
The Division may form either with one brigade in first line, and
the other brigade in second line, or with both brigades side by
side, each having one regiment in the first line, and one in the
second line. It is laid down, however, as a general principle, that
[he first line of a division would, as a rule, consist of 4 battalions,
"hese would be furnished by two regiments, each deploying two
)attalions in the first line, while the third battalion is retained as
regimental reserve.
The regulations prescribe the following maximum distances be-
tween lines : the two companies forming the battalion reserve
jn first line may be 1,100 yards from the skirmishers. The bat-
lions in second line may be 550 yards fmther in rear,
id therefore 1,650 yards from the fightinj^ ^ine. It would take
i
M
%
It
T^"^i^i
44
TACTICAT. NOTKS.*
them about 20 minutes to cross this distance, a delay sufficient it
is considered to allow of a chanfj^e to take place in the situation
of the first line before the arrival of the expected reinforcements.
But these are maximum distances, and the instructions allow of|
their beinf^^ modified according to the requirements of each case,
and especially are these intervals to be reduced in broken ground.
It is doubtless true that should these wide distances be ever main- 1
tained in practice it would be difficult to maintain connection be-
tween the fighting line and the reserves, and that these latter, even j
in open and flat country, might easily take a wrong direction and}
come upon the reserves or skirmishers of neighbouring baitalions,
and especially is this liable to occur in broken and close country
and when changes of front are executed on a large scale.
AUSTRIA.
Regiment. — The usual disposition of the regiment for attack is
two battalions in first line, and one in second line. But as there
is no fixed rule on this point, the Commanding Officer may reverse i
this order, or may place all his battalions in one line, or mayj
place them one behind the other in three lines.
Brigades and Divisions. — The Austrian Regulations do not lay
down fighting formations for units larg i than the regiment.
The number of battalions to be used in the front line depends]
upon the extent of the enemy's position. The disposition of the
troops is therefore made to depend on the circumstances of each
case.
The following example is given in the drill book :
A division places two regiments in first line. Each regiment]
has one or two battalions in attack formation and the remainder
as a regimental reserve.
The rest of the infantry of the division constitutes the divis-
ional reserve in second line, and is in battalions either in the \
same alignnient or one behind the other.
When it is impossible to outflank the enemy it is recommended I
that the main reserves be placed at points where roads or com-j
munications cross each other.
It is also recommended that the different tactical units, battal-
ions, regiments, &c., be formed up, as a rule, on the same alignment I
INFANTRY TACTICS.
45
instead of one behind the other. Thus, one rejjjitnent should not
fonn the reserve to another regiment, but each regiment having
one or more of its battahons in the front hue forms its- own reserve
with its remaining battahon or battahons.
In this way a mixing up of different units is avoided.
The battahons in reserve are bound to move fonvnrd even with-
out instructions, so as to conform to tlie movements of the first
Hue. The distance between the regimeJital reserves and the at-
tacking battalion should seldom exceed 400 yards, and the former
should be so placed as to at once support the front line when oc-
casion arises.
An important duty of the reserves is to protect the flanks of the
first line, and to reinforce the attack by acting against the flanks
of the enemy's position.
On the subject of these flanking movements the Drill H(K)k lays
down that "a frontal attack alone shall never take place unless
the hostile line is weak and not thoroughly occupied and unless
the ground permits of a concealed approach to a point in the im-
mediate vicinity of the adversary. In all other cases the enemy's
position is to be forced by a surrounding attack."
REMARKS.
Thus, as a rule, the battalions in first line represent about a
third of the whole disposable force, and will be called upon to
carry on the fight up to within storming distance of the enemy's
position, a part of the troops in rear then coming up to reinforce
the first line immediately before the assault, whilst there main-
dor follow the stormers in close order. The battalions in first line
in all cases engage half their strength in the shooting line and sup-
ports, reinforcing them with the other half as the battle pro-
gresses.
Piefore the actual assault takes place the battalions in first line
will almost always be reinforced by those in second line be-
fore the assault takes place. There will then be considerable
difficulty in controlling and directing the heavy fire which prepares
the way for the assault, proceeding, as it does, from such a
•%
mm
46
TACTICAL NOTES.
mingled mass of men. The points to be chiefly insisted on are
that the fire be both rapid and yet aimed, and that it be concen-
trated on the object of attack.
After the assault, the necessity for immediately reforming
tactical units will be even greater than in the case of a battalion
acting by itself, as tactical order will have been much more
seriously disturbed. If the enemy has retired to some distance
it may be advisable to relieve the first line.
Extent of Front. — As regards the extent of front of a battalion
acting with others, all these books agree that the extent of front
of the fighting line should be equal to that of the battalion de-
ployed. This permits of a very loose line of skirmishers at the
commencement of the action with distinctly marked intervals be-
t "een both groups (which have almost become the "fire units")
and companies, which not only facilitate the work of supervision
and command but also help to delay the intermixture of tactical
units. The fighting line is gradually thickened by successive re-
inforcements until it attains its maximum density of about one
man per pace just before the final assault.
The French give from 300 to 350 metres (330 to 380 yards) as
the proper extent of front.
The Austrian and German books name no specific distance :
Brialmont gives 360 yards, and others think 440 yards will not be
too much, as in a well contested action every rifle of the leading
battalions would have to be brought into the firing line before the
assault.
Intermixing of Units. — Although the intermixture of units must
be delayed as long as possible, it must take place sooner or later.
The intermixture of groups and sections is of comparatively little
importance, but the great difficulty arises when the intermixture
extends to companies or battalions, and even to brigades and
divisions, which has often happened and will always occur when
there is a stubborn fight between two large bodies of infantry.
Whenever such derangement occurs, "the senior officer on the
spot must take command and must assign to each of his subor-
dinates a certain portion of the line, as far as he is able to do so,
amidst the battle tumult ;" in which case each officer takes com-
mand of the part of the fire line which is immediately before him.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
47
"The unqualified subordination of both officers and men is in
moments of this sort of the utmost consequence."
Battalions in Second and Third Lines. — These battahons have to
perform, only on a larger scale, the same tasks as the companies
in support and reserve in the case of a battalion acting by itself.
j At the commencement of the battle they will be able to remain in
[column, but as they approach the enemy each battalion will
have to break up into company-columns, which will increase their
I intervals as they advance, and will perhaps be deployed. Some-
I times a battalion will be spread along the whole fighting front in
a line of company columns; sometimes the latter will be concen-
jtrated to one flank ; sometimes they will be in one line, sometimes
in two ; all will depend upon their situation. In one or other of
these formations the battalion follows the first line until called upon
[to join the latter or is detached elsewhere. In most cases, as we
have seen, battalions in first line will carry on the fighting till
[within storming distance (i6o to 360 yards) of the enemy, when
Ithey will need assistance. The battalions in second line will then
Icome up, pouring some or all of their companies into the fighting
jline to join in the rapid firing at this crisis jf the attack.
During the assault, if any companies of the second line have
Ibeen kept back, they, as well as battalions in reserve, will remain
lin close order, continuing to advance and keeping their respect-
live distances from the front. Companies as a rule will be de-
)loyed.
After the enemy's position has been carried, as many battalions
IS possible of the two front lines will be brought forward to take
)art in the pursuing fire : but they must keep well in hand, so as
to be ready for any movement required.
Battalions in rear of the second line do not generally take part
in the fighting but are held in hand to meet any unforeseen emer-
:ncy.
INFANTRY ON THE DEFENSIVE.*
A SINGLE BATTALION ACTING ALONK.
The requisites of a good position are given in the chapter on "The
Occupation of a Defensive Position," and all the principal conti-
W
*]'"r()m tlie Tactics of Infantry in Battle, by Colonel Sir Lumley tJrabani, Bart.
I. . I m
48
TACTICAL NOTES.
nental nations seem ajjreed as to these as well as to the best mode
of occupying a position witii infantry. The principal points to be
noted are as follows :
1. The main line of defence havmg been selected, arrange-
ments must be made for holding it obstinately, Held works bein^'
thrown up where necessary.
2. This line should be from the first occupied in force with sup-
ports close at hand.
3. The bulk of the defender's forces should, whenever possible,
be massed at certain important points of the line of defence, the
intermediate ground being slightly occupied or only observed,
as it will be swept by the fire of the principal posts. This system
is preferable to that of spreading troops equally along the whole
line.
4. Detachments should be pushed forward to the front and
flanks to reconnoitre, but not to fight. They should retire as the
enemy advances.
5. Immediate supports should be as near as possible to the line
of defence and distributed at intervals along it, in greatest force
behind the flanks. In third line will be a body in reserve at
the disposal of the Commanding Officer of the battalion to assist
any part of the first line which may be seriously threatened or to
meet a flank attack.
These three echelons are intended for purely defensive pur-
poses.
It is necessary to keep a fourth body in hand to make the
countet-attack which must always form part of a defensive
scheme. A Commanding Officer has thus to provide a sufficient
strong fighting line ) next to feed and reinforce it at need ; thirdly,
to keep in hand a general reserve ; fourthly, to set apart a special
body to execute the counter-attack when the proper time comes :
and, lastly, to make his tactical dispositions in such a manner as
to prevent as far as possibe, or at any rate to delay to the utmost,
any intermixture of units.
The French recommend the employment of two companies in
the shooting line and supports, the other two companies being at
first kept together in a central position if favoured by the ground.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
49
, arrange-
reserve at
:i.sive pur-
The German and Austrian books give no definite instructions
lupon this matter and leave full freedom of action to the com-
jmanding officer.
During the first stages of the attack the object of the defender
lis to delay the assailant and to make his approach to storming
[distance as difficult as possible. This must be the work of the
[rifle, and the question is how best to use it. The subject of
[infantry fire opens up such a wide field that it will be discussed
[more at length in the next chapter.
In Germany it is considered that after 700 or 750 yards infantry
[fire will have no great effect unless directed at the same time on
[the same point and from a considerable number of rifles ; in fact,
[every available rifle should be brought into play, but that it will
jbe well in the first place to consider whether the expenditure of
[ammunition is justified by the results which may fairly be expected
[from it.
The general tendency is to fire volleys in the earlier part of an
[action when the men are well in hand. Later on, the disturbing
[effects of battle are too great for volleys to be possible under or-
[dinary circumstances. The volleys will be fired by the shooting
jline, in bodies of a "zug," at the same word of command. Of
[course, when deep columns expose themselves they will be the
[first objects aimed at, after that company-columns and lines, lastly
[skirmishers.
It may be advisable before the defender's fighting line has been
fired upon to bring the supports up into it in close order to fire
/olleys, withdrawing them, however, in good time to their original
)osts so as to keep them intact.
In the French book we read : "As long as the enemy is at a dis-
tance, only the scouts who are embusques in front of the line open
ire; as the enemy comes on the scouts withdraw, and the whole
[ine of skirmishers commence firing, part of them replying to the
enemy's skirmishers, whilst the remainder aim at the supports
md reserves. Volleys may be fired with advantage upon masses
it long ranges."
In Austria the general tendency of the instructions is to reserve
ire for the shorter ranges, although it also recommends the fire
)f masses at long ranges.
-^!h
5<^
TACTICAL NOTKS.
The closer the enemy v:omes the more frequent the opportuni-
ties for effective fire. Volley succeeds volley until ;it last the as-
sailant is brou;,'^ht to a standstill and forced to reply. About this
time, t(>o, the defenders give up volleys and take to individual
fire, as they can no longer be kept to firing by word of command
amidst all the increasing turmoil of battle, Thev should not,
however, be allowed to pass from one mode of firing to another
of their own accord. Officers should, therefore, not delay too
long the necessary order.
Now comes the time for the supports to be brought into action
and much judgment is required in choosing this time. If brought
up too early there will be a premature expenditure of fighting power;
but better too soon than too late, for the line of defence must on
no account be anywhere broken. Supports may be brought up
into line either in close order, if only for very temporary use, or in
extended order if intended as a permanent reinforcement. Either
fashion is recogni;^ed by the different field exercise books. The
German says : " When on the defensive it will often answer better ;
to prolong the fighting line by occupying ground which fianks the
enemy's approach, or to strengthen the most important points
and those most favourable for defence than to reinforce the whole \
line." But at the same time the defender nuist not try to gain
security for his flanks by an extreme extension of his front, but
by placing behind them a powerful force whose business it will he j
to oppose any turning movement of the enemy. The supports
on coming up will join in the individual firing, which will have,
already been substituted for volleys.
The fight reaches a climax when the assailant is preparing to I
storm. At that moment the defender must bring every disposable
rifle into action, except the reserve kept in hand for the counter-
attack. Troops brought up at this critical moment should be in I
closer order; they risk little, for the enemy will be stopping his
fire to make his assault*, and they will be more luider control. Tliej
reserve when thus brought into line will fire volleys with advan-
tage if the men are sufficiently cool to do so, but this is specially
the moment, and one of the few moments, when rapid indepen-
dent fire is advisable. -
tiring.
' Witii repeiitiug rifles it is probable the ailvance to the jissault will bo made
'NFANTRY TACTICS.
51
opportuni- I
ist the as- I
About this I
individual |
command 1
lould not, I
to another I
delay too I
nto action I
If broujj^ht I
inj,' power; I
:e must on I
irought up I
Y use, or in I
it. Either I
loks. The I
?\ver better I
flanks the I
ant points I
; the whole I
ty to f,'ain I
front, but I
it will be I
supports I
will have I
eparinfj;- to I
disposable I
e counter- 1
ould be in I
j)ping his I
rol. The I
th advan-l
specially I
indepeii-l
h ill be inaiU' I
THE COUNTER-ATTACK AND FURTHER MEASURES.
The necessity of combining the offensive with the defensive,
and of not trusting to a mere passive defence, is universally ad-
mitted. The question is, when and how is the defender to take
the offensive? There is some difference of opinion upon these
points.
Germany and A iidria. — A body of troops is told oft" for the special
purpose of delivering the counter-stroke, which should be made
from a flank either just before or at the very moment of the
enemy's assault, whilst the troops in the front line of defence re-
double their tire and keep it up as long as they can do so without
endangering their friends.
Sometimes the counter-attack may be deferred till after the
enemy has made his assault without success, when it may be de-
livered straight to the front. In no case will it be advisable for
infantry to pursue the retreating enemy to any distance. They
need only send a shower of bullets after him, the actual charge,
I however, having been made with fixed bayonets in close order, or
i in line of groups. It will rarely be advisable to occupy any post
I in advance of the line of defence after the enemy's repulse, unless
I a change in the situation should induce the commander to take
I the offensive permanently, or unless experience shows that some
I point should be held which has not previously formed part of the
defensive position.
' No subordinate officer may take upon himself the responsibility
of ordering a counter-attack. This order must proceed from the
[ Commanding Officer himself.
I France. — -The French are in favour of an early counter-attack,
[and of its being made with the whole available force: "If the
[enemy continues his approach and is on the point of reaching
the position, the Commanding Officer, being under the firm con-
viction that nothing will affect the moral of his men so much as to
I remain on the defensive whilst the enemy makes his assault, has
[recourse to his reserve and boldly takes the oft'ensive. He uses
[his whole disposable force to make the counter-attack, which he
[(oinbinesas nuich as possible with a movement on the enemy's
[Hank, taking care to pri pare the way for this operation by re-
m
ill
;■+■
I doubling the fire all along his front."
52
TACTICAL NOTES.
Three things may happen as a sequel to a defensive action ;
either the defender may determine to take the offensive, in which
case the parts will be reversed ; or the same positions being re-
tained the attack may be repeated ; or the defender may find it
advisable to retreat.
How is this movement to be conducted? If free to choose his
own time a commander will naturally select the moment imme-
diately succeeding an attack which he has repulsed, as this will
afford the most favorable opportunity for getting clear of thi
enemy in good order. This will be facilitated by previously mak-
ing a flank attack with part of his force, and by redoubling his I
fire. All tacticians are in agreement as to the difficult nature of|
the operation in question.
Germany and France. — The German and French books do not
differ materially as to the details of execution.
The retreat will be made by successive dchelons, each body re- 1
tiring to the nearest good position behind the body in rear of it,
and then covering the retreat of the other by its fire. Each rear-
ward position should be, if possible, clear of that in front of it, or,
which amounts to the same thing, the forward t^chelons when it
comes to their turn to retire should unmask those in rear. Each
echelon should be in extended order, and should, according to the
French, not have a shorter front than 80 yards.
A Hstria. — The Austrians have views of their own upon this mat-
ter : "The movement of retreat should not be commenced simul-
taneously by all the groups of a ' 2Ug,' but all sliould act in perfect
unison while retiring from position to position, and all the groups
of a '2Ug' should reassemble in each new position before the
movement is continued." The same principle is insisted upon
when dealing with larger bodies. Thus the difficulty experienced
on first conmiencing a retreat recurs at each change of position
of the retiring force.
HATTAl.IONS ON THl-
i)i:i'i;nsivi. i'okminc,
HODV.
I'AKT oi- A i,akc;i:k
A battalion acting by itself has to )^o through all the stages of
a figlu without external aid, whereas a battalion which forms part
of a brigade or larger body h:'s only to undertake a share of thf
INFANTRY TACTICS.
53
»ks do not
work, larger or smaller according to its proportionate strength to
that of the whole force engaged. The larger the share the greater
the freedom of action allowed.
The distribution of a defensive force into four echelons holds
good for the larger bodies as for a single battalion. Each t^chelon
will have the same work cut out for it in the former as in the lat-
ter case.
A counter-attack upon the flank of the assailant will only,
however, be possible if the battalion happens to be on the flank
of a flank division, or of a division acting by itself. In other cases
the defence will be merely frontal.
There seems to be little difference of opinion as to the best way
of occupying a position. A division will be best disposed if its
regiments are drawn up side by side, a certain part, or perhaps
the whole of one brigade, being kept back as immediate support.
Each regiment will then have its own section of the position to
occupy, furnishing fighting line, support, and local reserve. Either
one or two battalions of each regiment will be in front (fighting
line and support), the remaining battalions or battalion forming
the "local reserve."
A battalion in front line may occupy its share of the position in
two ways :
1. Two companies in fighting line and two in support;
2. Each company extends one or more sections, keeping the
[Others in support.
Each plan has its advantages and disadvantages. The second
I system seems to be the one most favoured. Each companv will
then have its own sub-section of the position to guard, and during
the first stage of the combat, at least, there need be no intermix-
tures of companies, as such intermixtures would occur almost
Ifrom the first /ith the other formations.
There can be no positive rule as tt) the extent of front occupied
Iby each battalion in the line of defence. This depends much
more than it it does when on the offensive upon the nature of the
ground, because many (juestions are involved, such as: the cover
afforded by the ground ; the field of fire to the front of the posi-
|ti(iu: the possibilitx' of occupying only certain points in the linr
and of commanding intervening si)aces by cross lires, tS:c.
^11
54
TACTICAL NOTES.
A battalion may however, as a rule, occupy a broader front when
on the defensive than when on the offensive ; a front of 650 yards
would, in many cases, be allowable.
Battalions in the line of defence carry on the figiit pretty much
in the same manner as when acting independently. Battalions in
rear are kept quiet and under cover till required to act, when thev
will be handled in the same manner as the reserves of a singK
battalion.
INFANTRY AGAINST CAVALRY.
All are agreed that in case of a cavalry attack infantry!
should allow itself to be as little disturbed as possible from the
formation in which it happens to be at the time. Skirmishers
may even receive cavalry without closing if the nature of the ground]
be at all favourable to them: if not, they may close to any con-
venient point. Supports may often be brought with advantage!
close up to the skirmishers on such occasions. A body of troops |
in close order had best receive cavalry in line if already deployed,]
or if it have time to do so.
These rules apply to really good and steady infantry. Should]
a commander have reason to doubt the coolness and firmness of!
his men, he may lind it advisable to have recourse to formations |
calculated to give them the confidence in which they are deficient,
that is to say, to the square or column ; but in doing so he will prob-[
ably be playing the enemy's game by delaying his own movements,
and by exposing his dense formations to fire. This is especially
the case if the enemy has artillery to shake the infantry, and the!
Germans hold that cavalry charges against infantry shaken by ar-
tillery fire are possible and very effective.
Germany. — The Germans know three sorts of squares : battalion!
sfjuares, company squares, and, for the skirmishers, group or|
rallying scjuares.
France. — The I'rench use company scjuares or circles, but nei-|
ther battalion nor rallying squares.
A battalion in open column forms company -columns and!
echelons them, or forms line. A battalion in line of company-
columns, or in quarter-column, echelons the companies so that
they may support one another, taking rvery advantage of tlu'
«:roun(.l.
INFANTKV TACTICS.
55
Austria. — The Austrians, if forced to adopt any special forma-
jtioii a^ifainst cavalry, make skirmishers form rallying square, whilst
[supports form company squares.
A battalion attacked by cavalry follows the same rules as those
|in force amongst the French.
INFANTRY TACTICS IN RUSSIA.
Russia being the last of the great Europer.n military Powers
[which has been engaged in warfare on a large scale, it is both in-
Iteresting and instructive to take note of the system of tactics
[which their experiences from the war of 1877-78 have led them to
[introduce.
The infantry tactics in force when they entered upon this war
[seemed to place more reliance on shock tactics than on fire tac-
Itics, consequently close formations under fire were persevered in,
{and it is generally admitted that their system of tactics must have
largely contributed to their defeat and to the high percentage of
|losses they suffered.
The Russian fighting line was practically a skirmishing line,
IfoUowed by the main body consisting of one or more lines in a
jclose two-deep formation, and the general impression is that the
[lessons of the Franco-German war had been very imperfectly
llearned.
This may partly be due to the fact that since the Crimean war
Ithe Russians had never fought against a European arm\-, and their
[frequent campaigns against Asiatic tribes tended to the continu-
lance of closer forinations. Moreover, the Russian soldiers pos-
[sess a lower average intelligence than those of other European
larniies, and their officers probably were afraid of letting them get
)eyond their immediate control, so that they sought for tactical
strength in masses.
The battalion organization was in five companies, the fifth, a
rifle company, being composed of picked marksmen. This fifth
:ompany was being done away with when the war broke out, and
was carried out only in the Imperial Guard and the army of the
[Caucasus. Now they are etitirely abolished.
The Russian order of attack for the battalion prescribed
56
TACTICAL NOTES.
two lines of company-columns, the comptinies in first line beinj;
either deployed into line or retained in columns of half-companies.
The second line was also in columns of companies with a front of]
half a company.
Each company in the first line extended a half company as I
skirmishers, who advanced in groups of four men at a distance of
125 to 160 yards from the supports or first line. The skirmishers I
were supposed to advance in rushes of about 50 yards, makiu},'
use of cover and lying down to fire; but actually Russian skir-
mishers took little advantage of natural cover, a certain indication
of faulty training in both officers and men.
The second line followed the first at a distance of about 30(1
yards.
The formation, therefore, consisted of three lines : the skir-
mishers, the supports or first line, and the reserve or second line.
Both supports and reserves appeared to retain the close two decii
formation. There was also a simpler formation occasionally
adopted, which consisted merely of extending the rifle company
of the battalion as skirmishers, followed by the remaining com-
panies deployed into line.
These formations were evidently very different to the dispersed!
order now universally adopted. They were quite unsuited when
opposed to the breech-loader, and they serve fully to explain the |
heavy losses of the Campaign which usually exceeded those of the I
Franco-German war.
An eye witness of the Russian manoeuvres of 1876, where these]
tactics were in force, was much struck by the density of the in-
fantry formations, he says : —
" They offer an enormous target to fire at. To the very end]
tactical bodies are so crowded together that they would all at the
same time be under intense fire and form one great line from 300
to 400 metres deep. The skirmishers pass in front of the artil-|
lery, and lie down as do the two or three foremost lines. These
are so rigid that the men never move to gain shelter ; where they
halt they lie down." ^. ^ _.-
The Russian attacks have been thus described :
" In these engagements, whole companies drawn up in com-
pany columns followed the skirmishing line at no great interval.!
it 2,00(
idversa
lalt anc
[he firiii
Ihe ad\;
^scape
/as imp
\.s they (
^ions in
l>anies si
hot."
This d
Turkish :
The Ri
hling t(
instead o
holding t(
INFANTRY TACTICS.
57
It 2,000 yards of the enemy the zone of tire was entered. The
idversary's well sustained fire compelled the skirmishing line to
lalt and immediately the companies in rear became mixed up in
[he firing line, resulting in a pernicious mixing np of units, and
[he advance was then continued as rapidly as possible in order to
bscape from the heavy loss they suffered. Whenever this advance
/as impossible the troops were often unable to do anything : for
Is they could not see their adversary, they followed the instruc-
lions in their regulations and did nothing ; so that many com-
banies suffered considerably even before they had fired a single
ihot."
This doubtless is one of the chief causes why the long range
Turkish fire was so effective.
The Russian infantry has with justice been much blamed for
[elding to shock tactics which led to the above faulty dispositions,
istead of gaining experience from recent wars which have so
llearly brought to light the power of fire ; in the haste with which
pay carried out their assaults ; and in their infantry allowing itself
be led on by a partial success, such as the capture of the first
[ne of defence without reassembling their forces before attacking
second line of works, a mistake which frecjuently led to heavy
3sses and failures.
After the war many Russian officers pointed out the defects in
eir system, and one says: "The best way of diminishing the
sses of troops attacking under the murderous rifle fire of the
resent day, is to have thinner formations, to brake up units into
ictions, then to loosen these fractions even to the point of open-
g out files, and to increase the distance between lines." This
riter recommends a distance of from 400 to 500 yards between
e first and second lines.
The Russian attacks on Plevna and elsewhere seem to have
ien begun at distances of 1,000 to 1,200 yards or even more with
[chain of skirmishers leading, but followed closely by the sup-
)rts in company-columns, and the reserves in battalion masses
[hich soon became more or less mixed up in the fighting line,
ul as a natural consequence the advance was often disorderly,
lie disorganized swarm passing out of the control of the battalion
)ininanders. The losses rapidly accumulated, and the whole
58
TACTICAL NOTES.
mass of men would then come to ji standstill, they would try toj
obtain cover and would open an ineffective Hre until they couldl
be again set in motion, but only by bringing fresh troops into the J
fighting line. ,
General Skobeleff in his attack on the Plevna redoubts on the I
nth September, made the best of the faulty tactical system, |
Placing himself well to the front, so as to be able to judge person-
ally of the exact moral condition of his fighting line, and retaininf;!
fresh bodies of men ready to be ordered up directly the critical
moment was reached, he succeeded with a relatively small force
in carrying two redoubts, and his generalship has deservedly re-
ceived universal commendation.
Skobeleff's own opinions are worth quoting; "The only forma-
tion in which troops can successfully assault intrenched positions!
is in successive lines of skirmishers. The Division General must
be perfectly thoughtless of his own comfort and safety, and put
himself between the skirmishers and the reserves, where he can]
feel the pulse of the battle and have his troops in his own hand,
and judge himself of the moment when the successive battalions]
in reserve should be sent forward.
"There are in every command a small percentage of cowards
who will slink awc^y at the first opportunity; a certain number of]
men of rash bravery who will go too far forward and get killed ;
and the great majority of men of ordinary courage, but liable to|
waver as the fight gets hot.
"The reserves must be sent in at the moment when the reason-
ably brave men have been long enough engaged, and have met with I
sufficient resistance to begin to feel nervous, but before they have
actually begun to retreat ; and it is in deciding upon the oppor-
tune moment for sending forward his reserves that the art of aj
Division Commander consists."
The Russian attacks too were almost always directed frontall
against the enemy's position, attempts to turn one or both flanks]
of the enemy having been very rare.
On the defensive the Russian infantry often proceeded too early
to a counter-attack, without beforehand making full use of that |
rapid fire, which, if rightly employed, is so destructive at short
ranges : the pursuit also of the repulsed enemy was sometimes I
INFANTRY TACTICS.
59
carried out with the bayonet where firing would have been far more
lefficicaious.
The Russians appear to have attaciied little value to infantry
[fire in preparing the attack. The fire seems usually to have been
wild and ill regulated, and the advance was conducted as if the
great idea was to get over the ground as (juickly as possible in
order to close with the enemy. When firing did take place, it was
not in general a rapid preparatory fire previous to the last rush,
[but rather a sign that the force of the attack was already spent,
and that a retreat was impending unless fresh troops were at once
Ibrought forward.
Dragomiroff, one of the best known military writers in the
[Russian army, speaks in his orders before the crossing of the
Danube of 30 cartridges as the maximum which a soldier should
[expend ; this, and the directions not to lie down except under
ders, serve to indicate the general backwardness of the Russian
tactics at that time. A well matured and carefully taught system
|of field firing does not appear to have existed.
General Zeddeler writes that it is necessary: "to change gen-
erally our ideas of fighting, to place in the first rank fire tactics
ind not those of the bayonet, to seek and employ all the means
)f giving all possible development to fire, having recourse to the
)ayonet only when fire and other measures, among which flank
ittacks hold the first place, are insufficient to reduce the enemy."
Captain Kouropatkin in pointing out the causes of the failure of
^lie Russian attacks before Plevna says : "even when we had ar-
rived within 500 yards of the enemy we made but little use of our
rifles, and attempted to advance without firing a shot, without
faking advantage of the natural cover which the ground afforded.
We mixed up the advance and the charge, and even began the
[atter at 1,650 yards. Not content with that, we often deemed it
)ossible to make the charge at this distance in a single rush.
When heavy losses, physical exhaustion, and moral deterioration
lad brought the attacking troops to a standstill before they had
[■cached their goal, they did not then hold the best ground when
latural cover existed, but remained where they stood, so that they
Frequently found themselves in the open at 30 to 100 yards from
the enemy when there was acttuUly excellent cover before or bu-
liiiKl them."
m
6o
TACTICAL NOTES.
In 1879, after the conclusion of the war, fresh instructions
were issued for the guidance of infantry ; the following are some
of the points deserving of special notice :
Each battalion now consists of four companies ; each company
is divided into two half-companies, each of two platoons, each!
again of eight sections in war. The sub-division ot the company
into groups of four men is done away with, the smallest fraction|
being now the section.
A battalion formed in two lines, each consisting of two compan-
ies will occupy a front of 420 yards, each company in front line|
being broken up into line of skirmishers and supports.
Before opening fire the formation is two deep whether at the!
halt or on the march. As soon as firing commences, rear-rank
men come up into line with front-rank men, no firing is to be done]
on the move.
The distance between a line of skirmishers and the immediate!
support should not exceed that between the former and the fight-
ing line of the enemy. During the advance every endeavour mustl
be made to get over the ground as quickly as possible, and to gain
a point where effective fire may be opened; consequently, thej
fighting line moves upon it with as few halts as possible, without]
being broken up and without running, so as not to tire the menj
prematurely.
If, during this forward movement, it becomes necessary to make]
the whole or any part of the line open fire, it is to be halted to do
so. Once within effective range of the enemy, the advance is
made by successive rushes, so as to shorten the time during which
a visible mark is presented. When the assailants are not firing,
all the skirmishers of a company move on together; when!
firing they move by smaller fractions, which alternately advance |
and fire from the halt.
When the ground affords cover to an advancing body, it moves
in ordinary quick time, even when at close quarters. The time
for commencing the advance by rushes, the length of each rush,
and the strength of the fraction which makes it, all depend upon
the situation and upon the nature of the groutid. The length of
a rush should not exceed from about 80 to 12s xards.
INFANTRY TACTICS.
6l
On open ground and under fire, supports and reserves are
ideployed, and may even loosen their tiles. Once arrived at the
second stage of the combat, they, like the skirmishers, advance
by rushes. If, however, there is good cover, it will be preferable
to keep them in column, as order can be better maintained in
Itliis formation.
If, after arriving within from 125 to 160 yards of the enemy, he
Isliovvs symptoms of retiring, the skirmishers should at once
charge, the leaders running to the front and the men rallying on
them. Supports and reserves follow the skirmishers without any
Icheck.
If it does not appear probable that the skirmishers alone can
[carry the position, they halt and redouble their fire until the
supports come up, as these do in quick time and deployed, the
[battalion reserves advancing at the same time. The whole then
rush forward, the skirmishers preceding the supports b>' a few
[paces.
The frontal attack being always a difficult matter, the enemy's
Itianks must be threatened.
When a position has been carried, it is absolutely necessary to
Ipursue the enemy without delay, so as to rout him completely.
JThis pursuit must be confided to fresh troops brought up from
Ithe rear.
The field exercise book gives an example of an attack as it
should be made by infantry.
FIRST STAGE.
Arrived at from 3000 to 2000 paces (2500 to 1650 yards) from
the enemy, battalions form company-columns.
In order to gain greater facility for directing the operations,
the Commander may reduce the interval between the companies,
the usual interval being deploying distance. Companies exposed
[o fire are deployed, and files open out if cover is bad. A line of
Bkirmishers is sent to the front, supported' by the remainder of
the companies to which they belong, at 500 paces (400 yards)
listance. Battalion reserves are by companies at the same
fiistance in rear of the snjiports. The whole advance as far as
possible without halting : when, however, good marks offer
62
TACTICAL NOTES.
tnemselves, they come to a halt and fractions of the fighting hnej
should be S( much strengthened as not to require further rein-
^forcement except in case of extreme necessity.
SECOND STAGE, COMMENCING AT FROM 66o TO 500 YARDS.
Advance by rushes. The fire is gradually increased, the sup-
ports close up to within 160 yards of the fighting line, and asl
the latter reaches the furthest point which it can attain before|
making the final assault, get as near to it as possible.
The signal to charge is given.
THIRD STAGE, COMMENCING AT FROM 160 TO I25 YARDS.
The supports, preceded by the skirmishers, move on without ai
check and closing their ranks. The drums beat a charge. At
50 paces from the enemy the men cheer and bring the rifle downj
to the charge.
CHAPTER II.
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
In consideriii}^ the question of modern infantry fire it is neces-
sary to point out that in no campaif^n yet fought has the fire of
infantry been such as we may expect to see in any future war,
;onsidering that the infantry now have an arm which will kill up
to 3000 yards and carry with accuracy up to over 2,000. It is
true that in 1877 the Turks were armed with weapons which
kvere practically equal to those now in possession of any nation,
put they were not trained to their use and were opposed to the
Russians who had a very inferior arm. So also in 1870 the
Tench Chassepot, though inferior to arms of the latest type, was
^ery much superior to the Prussian rifle which had but a com-
)aratively short range.
The modern infantry rifle has now become such a deadly wea-
)on at long ranges that in any future war long range fire will pro-
)ably be much used. Hitherto the soldier has been taught that
maimed fire is almost useless ; but it is impossible to deny that
In all modern wars the accidental destruction caused to troops in
[he rear by bullets aimed at the fightinf< line in front was a re-
markable feature. It is a curious fact that contending lines when
[lose to each other fire for the most part wildly and too high. The
|oldier, when his enemy is close to him, is always on the watch
)r a rush and is often too nervous to take steady aim. Were it
^ot so, two fighting lines could not approach each other without
uitual destruction. On the other hand, at long ranges, the men
[an fire with the greatest steadiness and exactly as ordered. The
j)ullet of the modern rifle will kill at ranges so great that aiming
6^
TACTICAL NOTES.
at a mark becomes quite impossible, but many contend that it is
possible so to train the soldier tliat he will by word of command
set the sight of his rifle for a certain range and fire by volleys in
the direction ordered. Some of the bullets will fly high, others |
low, but the general effect of the men's firing is to cover a very
large extent of ground which it besprinkles with bullets. Toj
ensure this effect some nations have tried a plan of causing part |
of the men employed in mass firing to set their sights for high
ranges and another part for lower ranges. It has also been pro-
posed that troops within intrenchments should have fi'ed boards
or troughs placed for them upon which the rifles when laid must
have an elevation corresponding with the distance of the enemy's
batteries or supporting troops.
This question of infantry long range fire, which is exciting a
considerable amount of attention, has some stout advocates but
also many opponents. The questio^i for decision is, shall infantry
fire up to the full rang'^ of the rifle, or shall it reserve its fire ?
There can be little doubt that if troops on the defensive are
under cover or intrenched, with plenty of ammunition, a good
view of the ground in front, and skilled in the use of the rifle, it
would be sacrificing the advantages conferred on the defensive
atti; wde not to use the powers of the arm at long ranges provided
fitting objects, such as the enemy's reserves, present themselves.
But rnch fire must always be kept under due control by the offi-
cers, and should be regulated by the probablt effect it will pro-
duce, and the quantity of ammunition available.
In the attack, when troops are in constant movement changing
the range every fev minutes and unable to replenish their ammu-
nition, it would be unwise to waste cartridges by shooting un-
steadily over an ever-changing distance ; for, for long range fire
to be effective the ranges must be known with accuracy, and this
is an advantage which remains principally with the defence:
therefore in the attack it should only be resorted to by troops
judiciously posted to cover the advance of the actual attacking
colunms. Hut when judiciously kept under control, it must be
conceded that vsry serious loss may be inflicted on an enemy by
long range fire, altliougli a great difference of opinion exists as to
the nature of its employment and the range at which it is to be
used.
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
05
Formerly it was considered that beyond 500 or 600 yards fire
|vvas thrown away because tfte individual soldier's chance of hit-
tiw^ an opponent was small beyond those ranges. In fact the
rcrmans in 1870, when on the defensive, v.ere content to have a
:lear ranj^e of only about 400 yards and g'enerally reserved their
ire to that ranj^e, and yet in every case they were successful in
kvardin;^' off the enemy's attack. But this, and the later wars,
|iave shown that it is the mass fire of troops and not that of in-
[[lividuals which has to be dreaded. Since then, beyond say 600
(•ards, the effect of fire is due to the probability of a certain pro-
3ortion of the bullets fired at a given object taking effect, .-luch
ire should not be independent but should be delivered only at the
:oinmand of the leaders of the fighting units, namely by volleys
)r by independent fire the number of rounds being named.
The main arguments advanced by those who are opposed to its
Introduction are the following : —
ist. That long-range fire necessarily involves the exj cnditure
)f a great amount of ammunition, and that, therefore, if men
ne allowed to open fire at long distances they will be likely to
run short of ammunition before the decisive moment ol battle
urives.
2nd. That it will be fatal to the offensive spirit of any force
onstantly employing it. That, in other words, it will be found
|inpossil)le to rally forward a line of men which hr^s once been
illowed to lialt at a great distance from the enemy to open upon
liin a long range fire.
jrd. That if men are allowed to fire at long ranges they will get
jiito the habit of shooting wildly and without aiming, and that,
tf>iisequently, thc'r fire will decrease in efficiency as the enemy
jpnroaches the position.
Now there is doubtless much force in the first and se-^ond ob-
Ifctions, but they both aj)ply more to the use of long range fire by
jlic assailant than to its employment by the defence. Still it will
vv rarely possible, except perhaps in the defence of intrenched
[amps covering an arsenal or depot in which the stores of am-
|iiiuiition ari' very large. th:'.i -1 defendei', who wishes to retain his
uantKUvring power in the field, will be able to expend as many
iriiKJ.i^rs as, for instance, the Turks generalK- liiti in the late
66
TACTICAL NOTES.
war. If it is admitted that long range fire can inflict serious
losses on the enemy, it must also be* acknowledged that such fire
will not deter a determined enemy from advancing to close quar-
ters, when it would be absolutely fatal for the defender to run!
short of ammunition, or at any rate to run so short as to cripple
his action after the battle by depriving him of all power of further!
resistance until a fresh supply can be obtained. The employment
therefore of long range tire by the defence will not be so much in-
fluenced by the actual range of the weapon, but by the consider-
ation as to how far the losses that may be expected to be inflictedl
will justify the expenditure of ammunition, arid this will evidently
depend on a variety of considerations such as the nature of the!
ground, the quantity of ammunition available, the formations ofj
the enemy, &c. . [
\\'ith reference to the attack, having due regard to the supplv
of ammunition with the army, these two objections would be mot
if the use of long range fire be confined to special troops detailed
for tlie purpose and not executed by the assaulting infantry. The
extreme range for long ninge fire, according to some advocates,mav[
be taken as 3,000 yards, over which distance the infantry of theat-
tack will have to advance under fire. In that distance tiiey must!
lie down at frequent intervals. They nnist lie down for fire and
also for breath, always under cover if possible. Breathless hastel
may for a time avoid loss, steady fire alone can inflict it, but
speed of movement and steadiness of aim arc irrciconcilable. llj
it is attempted to combine both it will be to the sacrifice of both;
and as neither can be dispensed with, it has been proposed tol
use them separately by assigning distinct functions to separatel
troops, some to yirepare the advance, some to cover its nearerl
approach, and some to reach the ultimate goal.
But in addition to the exhaustion of the nun tlu' exhaustion ofi
the ammunition has also to be cor .dered, and it would seem asl
if i* were impossible for the ammunition, with which the infantrv
of the atUick is at jHestMit supplied, to last if tl)e\- do all the hrhvA
Consequently, in ordiT for the assailant to make full use of hisl
rifle it would seem possible for him to supplement the [)reparatory
artillery action with infantry liri- which ct.'.Jd be dejK'nded upon
to hold its ground and |il\- the eiieiiiy witli an eti'ei ti\ e lire uiitiil
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
67
lustioii oil
the columns destined for the execution of the assault move up
land push the issue to closer quarters. Such a force of infantry
jmight be advanced as near as circumstances will allow, say at
[first to within 1,300 or even 800 yards of the enemy, its front and
manks being protected by the cross fire of artillery. A delib-
lerate fire from such troops, who will have thrown up some hasty
Icover where natural cover does not exist, will greatly assist the
[artillery in its preliminary task of subduing the fire of the defence,
land at that range this stationary infantry may be kept supplied with
Ifresh ammunition so that its fire need not cease. Subsequently,
Ito cover the advance to the attack, this infantry might be pushed
[nearer to the eneni} .
What is most required at the present day, unless the attack is
Ito be overmastered by the defence, is a preponderance of counter-
[fire. To establish this preponderance a combination of long
jrange rifie fire with the preparatory action of artillery seems re-
|([uired to assist the advance of the assaulting columns, who
jsliould advance as rapidly as circumstances will allow and reserve
their fire until within effective range.
How to bring up supplies of ammunition into the firing line in
the attack, and how to distribute them to men actually engaged
lis udmitedly one of the most difficult, at the same time that it is
jone of the most important problems which has yet to be solved in
modern warfare. But on the other hand, it ought to be no
[(liificult matter to organise arrangements which shall ensure
that a stationary line of defenders shall, within certain limits,
bcver run short of cartridges. In this the Turks were eminent-
ly successful. The number of rounds fired by them during
the late war was enormous. In some of the more obstinately con-
gested struggles ot the campaign meti fired 200, joc. 400, and
ivcn up to 500 rounds in a few hours and yet nc instance appears
\() \h: recorded of their running short of ammunition.
The Turks were certainly favored in this particular by the cir-
cumstance that they stood almost always on the tactical defen-
sive, bui even in the few cases where the Turkish infantry carried
)nt great offensive movements the good organisation of the am-
uniition trains, which extended their operations up to the fire
puic, were noticeable. To quote an ins<"ancc', on one occasion the
1
w^
68
TACTICAL NOTES.
Turkish soldiers were provided each with 150 rounds; they carried
50 rounds in their pouches, and the remaining 100 in pockets!
made in the breasts of their tunics, in tlieir havresacks mixed \vitli|
their biscuits, or in any other place where they could find room.
In addition to what was carried by the soldiers themselves there)
were 30 ponies for each battalion, each carrying 2,000 rounds,
which on some occasions were actually taken up to the line ofj
skirmishers to provide them with fresh ammunition : and wheiij
on the defensive this was constantly done.
Immediately a shooting trench was excavated receptacles werej
hollowed out for ammunition barrels or boxes, which were kept
constantly hlled with cartridges by mules or ponies laden witli
aminunition being led along the shooting lines during the action,
In cases where the Turks advanced to attack Russian positions!
it has been proved that Turkish soldiers who had established I
themselves in front of the Russian position have then fired away
in a comparatively short time 120 or 150 cartridges. The Rus-
sian assertion that they captured in the course of the war no|
less than 500 million cartridges corroberates these statements,
especially when it is considered that the war supply of a German!
Army Corps including the ammunition columns consists in roundj
numbers of 4,500,000 cartridges.
With reference to the expenditure of ammunition in the attack,|
it may here be noted that some experiments conducted in Ger-
many showed that no less than 100 or 120 cartridges were tired
as a mean per man within a supposed attack lasting three oil
four Hours during which fire was conducted with the greatest
calmness and ccono)iiy. If allowances be made for the excitement
of battle and conseipient unsteadiness among the men, it would
not be too much to allow one-third or even one-half more rounds
per man than what the (icrman soldiers found necessary
in manoeuvres in time of peace ; and thus as a mininuin 165 01
170 cartridges per rifle should be allowed for a battle. l>oth in
the Austrian and in the German armies no reliance is placed on
any schemes for supplying attacking troops with fresh ammunition
during an action. It is therefore absolutely necessary that ourj
soldiers i)i> made to carry more than the 70 rounds now allowed, |
and to make such arrangements for maintaining a propter sujtplyj
MODERN INFANTRY FIRK.
69
|s() as to ensure the aininimition not runninji^ shc^rt, as a sufficient
supply for infantry is "a necessity of its very existence to which
[nnist be accorded complete and ample satisfaction."
To send men back to the rear with ammunition baj^s to get
I them tilled is a swstem adopted by most nations, but is very un-
satisfactory considering,^ what a small amount a man can carry, at
niost about 240 cartridf^es. If 30 minutes be allowed to bring
[the ammunition uj) to the skirmishing line, and 2 men be em-
ployed per company, these can only supply about 500 rounds every
half hour, or 5 rounds per man, which can be expended if firing
[slowly in less than one minute. Seeing then how difficult it is to
supply the firing line with fresh ammunition in the attack, the
'troops should be well supplied before commencing the engage-
inent,and it is for the above reasons that the German and Austrian
regulations direct that before an action the battalion reserves of
ammunition should be distributed to the men in whole or in part.
A greater supply is usually distributed to them when on the de-
Ifensive than in the attack.
Since then it is most difficult to supply the assaulting columns
[of the attack with fresh ammunition, such troops should reserve
their supply to the utmost and not commence tiring until within
[effective range. Their advance should be covered and rendered
[feasible by a well sustained artillery fire, and also, as already sug-
jgested, by fire from lines of infantry at long ranges, disposed
lin suitable positions behind cover or hasty intrenchments if pos-
Isible, and which can then hv kept supplied with fresh ammunition
las in the defence. This replies to the second objection urged.
As concerns the last objection, the evil will only make itself
licit when the *' fire discipline " of the troops is imperfect, or vdiere
jofticers and men have not been sutftciently practised in the use
jnf long range fire. Up to the present time long range fire has
jtinly l)e;Mi used by the troojis of two armies, the French and the
iTiirkish, and of both of these the fire decreased in efficiency, as a
jrule, as the enemy drev; nearer to them, because the bullets fired
jby tlie defenders Hew over the heads of the assailants as these
jlatter advanced to closer (juarters. This doubtless was not al-
|\va\s lite case, for General Zeddeler, speaking of the attack on
|<"ii>ii;i Dubniak. sa}-s that as the Russian attacking troops drew
-^^r:v.
70
TACTICAL NOTES.
near to the position, the rain of lead which fell upon them was
such that none but those who saw it can form any conception of
what it was like; still it happened as a rule though at times it
was partly due to the steep slopes in the immediate front of the
Turkish lines. But, in any case, it must be remembered that
both by the French, and especially by the Turks, long range fire
was employed in an unmethodical and reckless manner. There]
were no regulations prescribing how, when, or where it should be
used, no "fire discipline" had been taught, nor did the officers |
exercise any control over the fire; the men simply opened fire,
frequently without orders and without the enemy being in sight,
but in directions where he was supposed to be, and then kept up
rapid independent firing ^vithout any aim whatever and with the
muzzles of their rifles, as a rule, well inclined upwards. SuchI
shooting must indeed be termed wild, but there is no necessity
for long range fire being so. If the manner in which this fire I
should be employed has been carefully regulated beforehand, if j
the fire of the men be kept under control by their leaders, if, for |
instance, they fire by volleys only, or if independently only a cer-
tain number of rounds at a time, that is, if "fire discipline" bel
properly maintained, it is difficult to see why the fact of men
having fired at long ranges should afterwards make their shoot-
ing wild at short distances.
It would therefore appear that the objections to the employ-
ment of long range fire can no longer be maintained, provided al-\
ways it is kept well under conirol, and only resorted to when the resultl
is likely to justify the expenditure of ammunition, which will of course
be greatly influenced by the supply available at any particular |
time or place, and must be judged of by the responsible officers.
On the defensive this fire will doubtless prove of the greatest
advantage, as, by its employment, and in no other way, can loss]
be inflicted simultaneously upon all the lines, upon skirmishers,
supports, and reserves of an attacking force.
It has been urged that it will often be possible to bring up thej
main body in a much closer formation than is often supposed,
bei use the fire of the defender will be mainly directed upon the I
assailant's shooting line. Another writer argues that "the fire of
the defender will be diverted as the attack progresses from that
..' I<,-
i
MODERN INFANTRY FIRK.
71
portion of the attacking force which comprises the main body or
assaulting party, by the necessity of checking the advanced Hne
lof attackers ; and it is upon this diversion of the fire from the
main body that the possibiHty of an attack mainly rests." But
(if the defensive force be disposed, as the Turks frequently were,
lin two or more lines, and if, by taking advantage of sloping
ground, these lines are posted so that the men in rear can
[fire with safety over the heads of the men in front, the troops in
jthe rear lines may keep up a high angle and exceedingly effective
jfire upon the supports and reserves of the attacker, whilst the
Imen in the front line confine their attention to checking the
(advance of the skirmishers or foremost fighting line. This will
lof course only be feasible at the longer ranges while the enemy is
jstill ?t some distance and with troops having "fire discipline."
It may then be assumed that in future wars long range fire
|will be resorted to by the attacker as well as by the defender.
But are the infantry destined to carry out the actual assault not
to fire at all until within close range ? The Russians have been
uich blamed for pushing on to the attack whilst still 1000 yards
lor more away from the defender's position ; for rushing forward
jto the final onslaught before the way had been sufficiently pre-
jpared by the fire of skirmishers. In other words, they are
jcensured for not employing long range fire. That they did not
Ido so was owing to the inferiority of the weapons the}' carried,
land also to their antiquated system of tactics which taught the
Isoldicr to rely more on shock than on fire tactics. When once
■the Russian infantry did open fire the men advanced more
Icheerily. A writer in the Russian army, speaking of one of the
{attacks upon Plevna, said : "This part of the advance was terri-
)le, men were struck down on all sides and we could not reply.
I\\'lien once we opened fire it was not So bad ; we were so busily
jfiring at the enemy we did not think much of his bullets." Hence,
[to loud a moral support to the attacking troops in their advance,
it may be desirable to let them occasionally reply to the long
lan-^e fire of the defender, but this should he done only with the
^[iX'atest circumspection, as abovr all things, their ammunition
|uust not be allowed to run short at the final assault.
The necessity for the employment of long range lire being
Conceded, the (juestion arises what is long range fire ? At what
72
TACTICAL NOTES.
distance from the shooting line of the enemy may long range fire '
be said to commence and when should it cease ?
It has already been pointed out that since 1870 the ;cone of|
musketry fire has largely increased, and that during the Franco-
German war, as far as musketry was concerned, the Germans!
were content with a clear field of joo to 400 yards, and when on
the defensive they were always successful in heating off the
French attacks; whereas the latter, when on the defensive, fired at |
far greater ranges, 1200 yards, yet with this greater zone they did
not always succeed in warding off a Prussian frontal attack.]
Although the difficulty of crossing the short zone of 400 yards,
then considered sufficient by the Germans, is now more difficult I
than ever, the defender who cannot use his weapon over a much]
greater area will not be getting all he can out of his advantages:
in fact the power to shoot up to the most effective limit should
always be striven for with as little artificial help as ma}' be ; but
what this effective limit is is a matter of controversy.
We will first consider what the Germans have to say on this
subject, for they must still be considered as the great masters in
the art of war. They consider that fire at long ranges should be
left exclusively to the artillery, infantry fire being employed only
at the shorter ranges. For the latter they divide the space in I
front of a line of infantry into three zones, which they know-
respectively as the short, middle, and long distances. The first j
extends to 400 metres from the firing line, the second to 700, and
. the tliird to 1,200 metres, or say 450, 750, and 1,300 yards
respectively. After the long distance they consider that for all
practical purposes fire action must be resigned into the hands of
the artillery, on which devolves the preparation of the work
which the infantry will have to complete at the right m(Mnent.
For, though the rifles will carry much further, distances camiot
be judged, and the fire is so uncertain as not to be worth the
expenditure of cartridges. The short zoiu- is supposed, as arule,|
to be handed over to the free fire of the troops, tliat is each man
fires independently, choosing his own mark, because at tiiis range.
to obtain an effect, it is not neressar\- to direct several rifles]
simultaneously on the objective. Rapid independent fire entails
tile largest expenditure of amnumilion, makes the men unsteady,
and t>ften renders all aiming nnjiossible, a>;, after a few rounds.
h 'iiu nam
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
73
[the whole line is wrapped in smoke. This sort of fire is only to
Ibe used exceptionally and very sparin{:,dy, and only therefore
Iwithin 450 yards. The middle /one is covered by a carefully
Icouccniraicd fire of groups of men in dispersed order upon the same
[object under the orders of the officers. After 750 yards it is not
Iconsidered worth while to fire at any object which does not pre-
Isent a very considerable extent of surface both in breadth and
{depth, such as a column of infantry or cavalry, or a battery of
{artillery.
The distances are partly judged by eye and partly by obscrva-
{tion of the strike of bullets fired with a known elevation ; they
jdo not appear to make ur.e of range finders, as the Germans do
[not seem to think that range finders can be used in practice dur-
{ing the din and in the smoke caused by the engagement of large
{bodies of troops.
When in the proximity of artillery the range ma}' be obtained
from this arm, otherwise if distances are judged it is usual to let
{several observers, at least four, judge the distances when the
Imean is taken. To regulate the fire by watching the strike of
the bullets, volleys fired by at least a whole zug are directed on
[the objective.
It may also be stated that the general principle which guides
German infantry fire is that it should be sudden and unexpected
md should accomplish a maximum effect in a minimum of time,
rather than slow and sustained which entails a considerable ex-
)enditure of ammunition, in order that a sort of offensive
:liaracter may be given to it, and the nerves of the enemy corres-
pondingly impressed. This effect is to be produced by successive
xniods of fire but of very short duration separated by certain
)auses more or less long during which the smoke will be carried
iway ; this time is taken up in transmitting orders relative to the
)l)ject to be fired at, the range, the elevations to use etc. But
ill this can only be obtamed with troops thoroughly drilled and
33' "fire discipline."
What it may be asked is meant by this "fire discipline" about
{vliicli so nmch is heard at the piesent day? It consists in so
Iiaining the troops as to enable the leader at pleasure to open or
[ease liring; to render it more rapid or less so ; to conceni.ate it
h any named object, (.\:c. ; in fact for the officers to maintain com-
74
TACTICAL NOTES.
plete control over the firin^^ The leader will have to regulate thel
tiriiif^ by choosinj^' the objects to be fired at by different fractions|
of his command ; to judg^e the distances and regulate the sights to
be used ; to estimate the number of cartridges to be consumed inj
order to attain a definite object ; to determine whether thel
particular phase of the battle, as well as the supply of amn:unitinn,|
will justify this expenditure; to regulate the strength to be given!
to the firing line in order that the number of cartridges deemedl
necessary to attain the desired effect may be fired in the requisitel
time ; to prescribe the kind of fire to be used; and, finally, to payf
attention to the supply of fresh ammunition. In the German)
battalion all this devolves at present on the Company Com-
mander, while the 2ug leaders have to see that their men obey thtl
instructions given ; but the tendency is to make these leaders ofl
zugs direct the firing, leaving it to the non-commissioned officers!
to see that their instructions are carried out. The Captain mustl
always endeavour to retain control over the fire as long as possible,
and, consequently, independent firing is not to be begun untilj
absolutely necessary.
It will be interesting here to give some 'extracts bearing on this!
subject from instructions issued by General Skobeleff to thel
troops of the Trans-Caspian expeditionary force sent against thel
Akhal Tekkes, who had hitherto successfully defended themselvesj
in their stronghold of Geok-Tepe.
Two sets of instructions were issued, one in July and the otherl
in December, 1880. These instructions show that SkobeleftJ
realized fully the necessity of the officers retaining complete con-
trol over the fire of their men ; but it must be pointed out that thel
troops had not then received any training in fire discipline. Hc|
says :
" During any engagement I recommend the troops of all thtl
three arms not to develop the i"i.'l power of their fire, unless they
are forced to do so by the obstinacy of their enem}-."
*' Consequently, when fighting in daylight, the infantry audi
artillery, and the cavalry as well (when fighting dismounted),
should only employ their best shots at long ranges, and, except!
in rase of need. I insist that only those who arc the best shot^l
should be selected.
MODERN INFANTRY I'IRE.
75
'Ajjfain, if the enemy continues to advance, I recommend
,oIley tiring, except in the case of the artillery who will act inde-
3endently. But if the enemy cannot hold together and dissem-
inates, then the commanders of companies and squadrons may
lennit temporary independent firing on the condition that they
)rder ' cease firing ' the moment it becomes imnecessary.
'• Even in European wars it is most important to observe the
|foremost groups of the enemy ; it is not really the mass of indi-
aduals present on the ground that decides the victory, but the
progress which, thanks to different circumstances, a few brave
lien may make advancing in isolated groups. Consequently,
£very attention must be paid to the appearance of groups of this
lature, and direct on them, by means of volleys, the full power
)f your fire, for if you neglect to inflict great losses ou them, these
groups will increase in size in a wonderful way and decide the
iffair in their favour.
"As we have to deal with a fanatical mob without organisation,
counsel the leaders of all fractions to keep a watchful eye on
[hese advanced groups ; there is not a doubt but that, in annihil-
|iting them, we destroy (in the germ) all the initiative force of the
test of the mass. That is why I cannot urge too strongly on the
tommandefs to have the fire of their men under control; and in
brder that this grand maxim may be a reality and not merely
feinpty words, it is necessary that each commander of a unit
[hould ' knoia how to make the hearts of his soldiers heat in unison
nth his own ' before the battle.
" He must have his troops completely in hand at the critical
loment of the action, and they must be in his hands an instru-
bent which serves him to express with a supreme energy, his
[lioughts, will, and feelings."
"Though in a battle by day, success is obtained by the gradual
ind rational utilization of the ground and resources at our dis-
posal, circumstances may so happen during the night that it may
[e necessary to produce the maximum effect with one single blow.
I'his is why, in night actions, we should always adhere to volley
Iriiig. We must remember that, at night, all judging distances
illusory, it is also of the first importance to keep impressing
\n the men to aim low."
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'iW^T
76
TACTICAL NOTES.
In Germany tlie most rigid economy of ammunition is always
practised, but in France there is not the same feehng. The
French have always wasted and probably always will waste a
great amount of ammunition, and they do not appear to have
made such stringent regulations on this subject as the Germans,
yet it is not made clear how they propose to keep up the shoot-
ing efficiency of a huge line of battle, such as that of Gravelotte,
where the turning point of the day was the retirement of Can-
robert's corps from lack of ammunition. If the Turkish fire at
Plevna be urged in reply, it must be pointed out that the rapidity
of the German movements were such as to preclude the French
from making the elaborate preparations for defence performed by
the Turks; and seeing how great is the advantage intrenchments
give to the defender, an invader will in future wars endeavour more
than ever, by manoeuvring and by the rapidity of his movements,
to give the defender's armies in the field no time for preparing an
intrenched camp like Plevna nor of supplying it with such an
unlimited store of ammunition ; and even should this be done
it would in all probability only be masked, like Metz, and not
again made the turning point of tlie war.
In Germany, the commanders of companies in the first line are
not to commence firing when the enemy's fire becomes dangerous
but when they are sufficiently near to the enemy as to be able to
open an effective fire. In an attack therefore, after the preparatory
artillery fire has accomplished its work, the endeavour should be
made to approach the enemy up to within effective range as
speedily as possible, that is in principle, up to 450 yards, when
the shooting line should be reinforced by a second zug, and firing
then commenced. "In the offensive, the moral and material
superiority consists * * * * in not being afraid to sacrifice
the requisite number of men, but in approaching so near to the
enemy that the necessary effects of fire be obtained very rapidly
by speedily inflicting on the enemy the proportion of losses which
will achieve success." Still the greatest advocates for this fire at
short ranges admit that the troops in first line will only be able
to approach so close to the enemy on ground particularly favor-
able, and they consider that generally the assailants will have to
open fire at a greater distance than 450 yards, and especially will
MODERN. INFANTRY FIRE.
n
this be the case when advancing over open level ground when
tire will have to be opened between 450 and 750 yards.
Lieutenant Colonel Clearv,* on the other hand, in his remarks
on this Russo-Turkish war speaks of the heavy losses sustained
by the Russians from infantry fire at distances up to 3,000 yards,
and is of opinion that the employment of infantry fire at this
range is a matter of necessity and he adds, "to continue to theorize
any longer against long range infantry fire would be to advocate
the surrender of an important elemf at in the destructive force of
an army."
The fact is fully recognized that in the war of 1877-78, the
Martini-Henr}', whether aimed or not, unquestionably created a
very large number of casualties among the Russians at 2,000
yards and upwards. The same thing happened in France in
1870, where, even by the French Chassepot, men were killed at
ranges of 1,600 to 2,000 yards ; but no battle has been, or ever
can be, decided at such ranges.
But the G'^rmans laugh at the idea of an efficacious infantry fire
at ranges beyond 1,300 yards, and in this view they are support-
ed by most of the great European military powers.
In General SkobelefTs instructions, just alluded to, he directed
that against an enemy advancing to attack, volleys were to be
commenced at a ran^e of about 500 yards, but the fact was not
to be lost sight of that against compact masses volleys were very
effective at greater distances, whether they be stationed in open
f^round, or even hidden behind walls or parapets. "In a case of
this kind, firing by volleys might be commenced at ranges of
2,500 yards by raising the sight to its full e.xtent and aiming at
the top of the intrenchment or wall should the enemy be behind
these obstacles. A plunging fire of this kind, which is very
effective up to 2,500 yards, should never be undertaken by a
smaller unit than a company, and it behoves the commander to
control it most carefully." But the circumstances here were
somewhat similar to the attack of a fortress when plunging fire
may indeed be used with effect, as will be pointed out presently.
Nevertheless the Russians themselves do not seem as a rule to
favour the employment of infantry fire at such very Umg ranges,
'Miuor Tactics, 5th Editiou.
78
TACTICAL NOtfeS.
although within 3,000 yards range they doubtless suffered some
casualties owing to the shower of bullets to which they were ex-
posed from the Turks, yf *^ this long range fire did not deter them
from advancing when the\ were really prepared to do so. There
is little doubt that the Russian losses at this range were chiefly
due to their close column formations, and also generally to their
endeavour, at first, to undertake an attack with too small a force,
and to their neglect of the fundamental principles of the attack,
namely, the preparation by a preponderating artillery fire
and the attack in front combined with one on a flank.
Had the modern recognized rules of warfare been adhered
to their losses would have been less, and, as is pointed out else-
where, no army desirous of retaining its power of marching or
manoeuvring would be able to fire away ammunition as recklessly
as did the Turks; consequently, fire at these extreme ranges is not
likely to be carried on to the same extent in any future civilized
war. Be this as it may, we are thus confronted by two opposite
schools; the one, which may be called the German school, regard-
ing all who advocate infantry fire at very long ranges as mere
theorists, whereas the other retaliates on it in the same strain.
It is, therefore, to be expected that military literature will, for some
time, be full of discussions on this subject, both sides having
much to urge in support of their views, though the matter is not
likely to be settled until the next great war ; still it is generally
conceded that, though under certain conditions long range fire
may exercise great influence on the issue of a battle, yet it cannot
be regarded as sufficiently effective to play a really decisive effect
in war, and this is apparently the opinion held in Russia in spite
of their heavy losses at long ranges.
The following are amongst the rules given in the new official
Russian regulations to guide the soldier in the use of his rifle,
which are instructive, considering how the Russians suffered from
Turkish long-range fire : "The accuracy of the arm only shows
itself fully when the dimensions of the object aimed at are in keep-
ing with the range. You will take advantage of the rapidity with
which your rifle can be loaded when you wish to attain a certain
resul'^ in a very short time ; for instance, in case of a sudden
attack by the enemy, or just before you yourself charge with the
bayonet."
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
79
" You must only make use of the long-range power of your rifle
with extreme reserve, remembering that close fire alone has any real
accuracy and importance in battle, long-range shooting being only
allowable when the result is pretty sure to justify the expenditure
of ammunition. In such cases two or more sights will be used.
It will only be exceptionally advisable for a body of troops to use
one single sight in firing beyond 500 yards. In firing with two
sights, rear rank men should use that intended for fifty paces
beyond the supposed distance, and front rank men that for fifty
paces under it. Skirmishers should never fire when on the move
because their practice would be completely ineffective.
" They may fire either individually or by fractions, if the object
aimed at is in keeping with the distance. Individual fire is effec-
tive up to 650 or 750 yards, beyond which distance you cannot
count upon any but chance effect from this sort of fire, so that to
concentrate a certain number of shots upon a special point you
employ the fire of fractions at the longer ranges. The latter
description of fire is of course equally eifective at the shorter
ranges. It is executed by volleys or naming the number of
rounds which each man will fire at his own time and with de-
liberation. Thus three descriptions of fire are employed by
[skirmishers; free individual firing, volleys, and individual firing
of a stated number of rounds."
With reference to the limits for long range fire it is evident
[that the minimum limit must be the range at which individual fire
[of one man against another cannot give any effective results.
This distance according to French ideas is apparently 650 yards,
jwheroas the Germans appear to fix this limit at 450 yards and
[beyond this distance the rifle is only considered effective on
I larger targets than the surface of a single man, and it then be-
jcomes necessary to employ concentration of fire.
It is for this reason that the Germans do not approve of single
|iiiarksmen being called upon to fire at greater ranges.
The extreme limit must be that distance at wiiich, under
[favourable conditions, that is with the width and depth of a coni-
jpany column, scpuidnm, or battery of artillery, and concentra-
jtion of fire, the result becomes insignificant. M'hcn ranges are
l< uiliilly measured and other circumstancis are favourable, as at
8o
TACTICAL NOTES.
target practice for instance, this limit may be said to be the ex-
treme range of the weapon at which it will kill, namely 3,000!
yards, but in war on varied ground, at unmeasured distances and
with perhaps smoke obstructing the view this outside distance will|
have to be reduced to 1,300 yards.
The German musketry regulations give the effect of experimen-|
tal fire at different ranges upon troops in various recognised for-
mations. These experiments were carried out by picked marks- 1
men and showed that 250 such, firing three rounds upon targets
representing a company of 220 men lying down in close order,
at a distance of 430 yards, would hit about 90 of them, and at 650
yards about half that number. If the company fired at is extend-
ed, the loss is diminished by about two-thirds. But German
writers estimate that the average effect of fire throughout the
infantry in peace would be to that of picked marksmen in the
proportion of 2 to 5, and that the effect of the fire of infantry in
battle would be to that of the same infantry in peace, at target
practice, as i to 10 ; hence, from this calculation, it would take
six rounds from 250 men to hit one man out of 220 in extended |
order at 650 yards.
In Germany it has been ascertained that 100 rounds fired
against a line of men standing yield the following number of hits;
at 450 yards, 20 men; at 750 yards, 10 men; at iioo yards, 5!
men. Against a line of men kneeling only one-h"lf of these results
are obtained, and lying down one-fourth. Against a line of|
skirmishers the results would be half the above, or even one-third
according to the density of the chain ; against a company-column
the losses up to 750 yards would be greater and beyond that
distance they would be double.
Experiments conducted in F'rance have shown that a single
sharpshooter lying down or half covered cannot be hit at a greater
range than 200 yards, kneeling he is nearly safe at 330 yards, and
standing at 450 yards.
And further it has been shown that the percentage of hits
obtained by a single sharpshooter firing at a man at 650 yards
distance is as follows : when the latter is standing, 4.6 per cent. :
kneeling. 3.7; lying down, 1.7; mean, ^^.^i; and in actual war
this result nnist be much reduced, on account of the excitement
e the
ex-
ely 3
,000
nces
and
ance
will
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
81
|of battle, the varying range, smoke, etc., and it is considered in
iFrance as in Germany that only about one-tenth of the results
jobtained at peace experiments can be counted on in war. On
the field of battle ranges can rarely be ascertained with any
iccuracy, and the required elevation to be given varies very much
^vith the weather, wind, etc.
Almost exactly similar results were obtained in. Germany, and
^t may therefore be concluded that beyond 450 or 500 yards, if
the distance is not correctly known, and the elevation correctly
regulated, things very rare in war, that no real effect can be any
[longer counted upon unless a considerable number of shots be
ired simultaneously.
As a result of these experiments, and considering that it is
leemed to be waste of ammunition to fire unless a loss of 10 per
:ent can be inflicted, the French regulations limit the commence-
ment of independent firing to 650 yards, except for picked marks-
len who may fire at longer distances, (goo yards), but at knoivn
\anj^cs, and even at this range it is laid down that the fire must
36 deliberate, well aimed, and reserved for good shots. In Russia,
IS we have seen, the above limit is fixed at 750 yards.
But these limitations do not evidently prevent mass firing at
greater distances, without however going beyond 1,300 yards
A-hich should as a rule be considered the extreme range of in-
[fantry fire, and even then only at well marked objects.
The following results have been obtained by the fire of 100
ben against a body of 200 men in line two deep on a front of
pout 80 yards, and when in column, respectively :
At 1,200 yards 20 per cent in line, 65.7 'n column.
" 1,600 " 5 " " 16.1
" 1,950 " 3 " "9 "
'' 2,600 " o " " 2 to 3 "
This latter may then be considered the extreme limit at target
Practice. The above results have been adduced to show that the
lepth of an object fired at is more important than its breadth ;
jnd other results might be shown to prove that the height of the
[bjective is also more important than its breadth. The losses
jtiffered in the column formation are 3 or 4 times heavier than
82
TACTICAL NOTES.
when in line, and when men are lying down their loss is aboutj
four times less than when standing in line or in column.
For instance, the following results were obtained in Germany!
by rifle fire against a company of 250 men in line:
Do.* lying down.
5 and 15
4 " ID
3 " 9
2 " 8
Per centage of hits standing
At 650 yards between 25 and 50
" 760 " " 18 ■" 35
" 870 " " 15 " 30
" 980 " " 10 " 25
All these results, it must be noted, were obtained in time of|
peace without any of the excitement of battle.
The range then at which fire may be with advantage openedj
on the enemy will therefore greatly depend on his formation^
and as to whether he is infantry or cavalry.
Owing to the difficulty experienced in obtaining the range vvithl
any accuracy, it is recommended to test the range by firing twol
or three volle3's and watch the strike of the bullets, but if the!
ground is at all stony or hard or covered with grass, or in wetl
weather, the strike cannot be observed at comparatively closel
ranges, and even with a good telescope and on favourable groundl
the strike cannot be seen beyond 1,300 yards nor consequently!
the elevation corrected. To remedy this it has been recommen-
ded to employ severf-d elevations varying 50 or 100 yards or more|
so as to sweep a greater zone with fire, but even then very littlej
effect may be produced, besides at ranges over 1,300 yards even!
a light wind causes the bullets to deflect considerably; and it mayf
be assumed as a general rule that when the strike of the bullet?!
cannot be observed long range fire cannot be depended uponj
In the field, therefore, the extreme limit of long range fire mayj
be fixed at 1,300 yards as a rule, and then is it only to be employ-
ed when the object fired at is of sufficient dimensions, a column!
of 200 men, a battery, or a squadron, and it is only up to 1,000!
yards that any really serious results need be expected.
On the defensive this fire will be principally used at the com-
mencemert of the action and its use restricted to small detach-
ments whose object will be obtained if they compel the assailant|
to assume open formation ]n-ematinely, and the Prussian regula-
tions prescribe that before cointiiencing to fire the rommaiKieil
ft
:;;iiiii!:
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
83
lust always consider whether the expenditure of ammunition re-
Ijuired is justified by the result to be expected, by the partitular
)iiase of the battle and the supply of amnmnition available, as '
:are must always be taken that there is sufficient for the large
expenditure necessitated in the decisive phase of the action.
It must ever be borne in mind that ineffective fire weakens the
\noral of the troops executing it when they see no resu-ts, while it
raises that of the adversary.
Assuming then 1,300 yards to be the general limit for long-
trange fire, when may this kind of fire be employed within that
mge? On the defensive it would appear evident, from what has
een said, that only so long as the skirmishing line is 650 yards
ff may it be directed on the closer formations of supports and
eserves in rear, but as soon as the lighting line of the attack
pproaches that distance the fire of the defence must be concen-
rated on that line the fire being controlled by the section leaders
[and only good shots being allowed to fire. It is urged that- the
roops of the shooting line of the defence should not carry on
ong-range fire, but that this should be done by advanced troops
[or outposts, or by guns supported by an escort of infantry sent*
brward to compel the enemy to deploy sooner. These guns and
etachments would, of course, have to withdraw when attacked
f superior forces, so that the troops destined to carry on the
ain defence will be intact when the enemy approaches, and will
ave their full supply of ammunition which may not, in conse-
uence, require replenishing during the heat of the action.
The employment of long-range fire by the attack has already
3een discussed, namely, that it should not be used by the infantry
lestined to execute the actual assault, but by lines of infantry
Sudiciously posted so as to facilitate by their fire the advance of
the former, and especially, as we shall see presently, is long-
pnge fire useful in the attack of field works or fortifications. The
expenditure of ammunition may be judiciously regulated by firing
/olleys. But the effect of the infantry fire at ra^^ges above 450
3r 650 yards, cannot, as we have seen, be depended on for
Individual fire ; but at these, and greater ranges, in order to obtain
[he full advantage afforded by modern weapons, the want of
accuracy of a single rifleman must be made up by placing a large
H'rtii
84
TACTICAL N0TF:S.
number of rifles in line, concentratinj^ their tire on one and the
same objective ; and it is evident that the greater the number of
bullets fired simultaneously the j^reater will be the chances of|
hittinj^ the objective.
This squad or group firing^, as it is called, to be effective, re-
quires a large number of rifles to be brought into play, and this I
can only be done, as a rule, when the men are formed up in single
rank or in double rank. But long lines are difficult to command]
with the voice, and the ground rarely lends itself to their move-
ments. A foreign company of 250 men is then, in general, too
large a unit to execute group tiring by command of its com-
mander. A British half-company of 50 rifles, or exceptionally
the company of 100 men, and then generally only when in two!
ranks, or, also under exceptional circumstances, the section of
25 men are suitable numbers. In having recourse to a lesser!
number than 50 the number of rifles become too much reduced at
the risk of losing the great etfects which mass firing is destined to
bring about, and, besides, the control of the firing would then too
frequently fall into the liands of inexperienced leaders. The unit
most to be recommended for group firing is, therefore, the half|
company of 50 men.
This is a very important consideration, as it is very essential
that the command of each group, that is, that the direction and
mode of fire, the judging of distances, &c., be performed by an
officer and that these important duties do not devolve upon non-
commissioned officers. Sergeants and corporals should see that
the men firing conform to the instructions of the officer, and when
necessary they transmit these instructions, especially is this is
the case when men are extended.
Of the different ways of firing by groups, volleys constitute the
most certain means of directing the fire on the object chosen by
its leader, and it must be remembered that one essential point to be
sought in long-range firing is to concentrate the fire on particular
spots and not allow it to be scattered. The point to be fired at
is indicated, and che men loading and firing only by word of|
command, the consumption of ammunition is strictly regulated
and all waste is rendered impossible. But volley firing requires
great coolness on the pan of the leaders as well as on that of the
troops, and it can, therefore, only be employed at a certain dis-
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
85
taiicc from the enemy unless the troops are covered from view
and fire of the adversary ; and unless troops are thorouf;^hly well
trained and disciplined it is doubtful whether volley firing can be
maintained in action at all and will not degenerate into indepen-
(^ent firing. Even the Germans admit that although they
practised volley firing in peace time they could not accomplish it
in war, although at the time of their wars they had not laid so
much stress on the necessity of fire discipline as now ; but if the
difficulties of volley firing in war cannot be overcome the only
other alternatives are to fire independently a stated number of
rounds, or by the section leaders naming the men or the files who
are to fire ; but this latter plan does away with the idea of mass-
firing. Volley firing has, however, its advantages over indepen-
dent firing under certain circumstances. For instance, when the
object is a body of troops in movement, especially cavalry, when
volleys have a great superiority. When squadrons charge the
elevation must be rapidly I'educed at each round, and then volley
firing by alternate companies may be resorted to reducing the
elevation by about 200 yards at each round since the cavalry may
he supposed to be advancing at the rate of 400 yards a minute,
and two rounds a minute may be fired with accuracy. If inde-
pendent firing were permitted the men could not be trusted to
regulate their sights at each round. When the cava'^y has
approached up to 300 yards, no further confidence can be placed
in the steadiness of the men to fire volleys, and independent
firing must be resorted to. Should the cavalry be advancing at a
trot only 100 yards difference in range need be made.
But the method of firing by volleys necessitates grouping the
men in close order of some kind, either in a skirmishing line
nearly full, or in one, or even two ranks, shoulder to shoulder.
Now, as retaining troops in any formation approaching to close
order in the fight, is only possible from about 800 yards upwards,
it results that volley firing in close order can only be executed at
the longer ranges, and the distance of 600 to 800 yards, or the
extreme range of effective individual firing, can be regarded as the
minimum distance. The advantages of volley firing, as opposed
to independent firing from the point of view of economy of ammuni-
tion and supervision of fire, are so evident, that there is every
incentive t'o keep up this fire as long as possible. But as close
86
TACTICAL NOTES.
formations are impossible at close ranj^es, attempts have been
made to make the skirmishers in the fif^^htinj^f line fire by volleys,
provided these skirmishers are not too far apart. But brin^inj,'
the gun to the shoulder and firing is not, in this case, done by
word of command. The leaders only give the necessary caution,
care being taken to leave sufficient intervals between each round
so as to allow the men to aim and fire at leisure.
From what has been already said there is a difficulty at pre-
sent experienced in fixing the extreme range at which volley
firing should be practised. Some military writers, struck
with the results obtained in the war of 1877 by the Turkish ride
at distances at which infantry was till then deemed impotent,
and captivated principally by the results obtained at target
practice, have not failed to proclaim the downfall of artillery and
the supremacy of infaivtry (ire on the field of battle up to the ex-
treme range of its weapon and to suggest that the infantry
soldier should carry a spare sight enabling him to fire up to 2,600
or even 3,000 yards; but this outburst of enthusiasm for the em-
ployment of infantry fire at extreme ranges has not been of long
duration.
The zone of ground effectively swept by musketry fire at differ-
ent elevations have been pretty accurately ascertained. For in-
stance, at a range of 500 yards the depth of the effective zone is
very considerable since at that range the highest point of the
trajectory of the Martini-Henry is only about 8 or g feet, that is
to say in group firing at an elevation of 500 yards an error in range
of alxnit !'"> }.i'^l" will mikf no practical di erence; but at an ele-
vation of 1,000 yards the highest point of the trajectory is about 45
feet and the ground is only swept for about 50 or at most 80 yards.
This is why at long ranges columns are much more exposed than
lines and why it is proposed in France to do away with the re-
inforcements which have the same duties as the supports. It
has further been shown that group firing between 1,100 and 1,300
yards when directed upon troops in line is in the field practically
of no effect, and that against small company columns it is but
slight and ceases altogether at 1,500 yards. From this range up,
the lateral scattering of the bullets increases sensibly, and without
an enormous consumption of ammunition the ground can no
longer be properly swept.
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
87
It is by no means intended by, what has just been said to abso-
lutely preclude firing at longer ranges against such objects as
whole battalions in column, cavalry or artillery in masses, but
such opportunities will be rare and would show great laxity on
the part of the enemy. Besides, from 1,300 yards up the strike
of the bullets cannot be observed, and moreover as a rule the
advantage of ricochet fire is lost and the effect of the fire is con-
sequently much diminished. It would therefore appear that the
extreme range of infantry fire under ordinary circumstances
should be 1,300 yards..^
From the foregoing it is evident that with perfect steadiness in
tiring, the shooting ought to be fully five times as good at 500 as
at 1000 yards, especially when distances are unknown. But in
actual service, the near approach of the enemy often causes an
amount of unsteadiness sufficient to derange seriously the shoot-
ing of even the best marksmen.
The German instructions prescribe that on the defensive firing
may be commenced sooner than on the offensive, and at a range
of 750 yards. This they justify by the following reasons : the
ranges are better known and may even be corrected, the supply
of amniunition is easier, the firing lines are sheltered and they
can use natural rests for their arms.
Should the enemy offer very favourable objectives beyond 750
yards, mass firing would be directed on them.
On the offensive as well as on the defensive all scattering of
fire must be avoided. In consequence, the objectives fired at
must be changed as seldom as possible, and should fresh objects
of particular importance show. themselves, it will be better, they
consider, to reinforce the firing line and assign the new objectives
to the fire of the units sent up into the chain for the purpose
than to allow the troops previously engaged to alter the direction
of their fire.
It is particularly directed that all leaders of unita who have
not yet arrived within effective range of the enemy must be care-
ful to estimate how much ammunition will have to be expended
to obtain a certain definite object, and to consider wheth ;r the
particular phase of the action, the supply of ammunition avail-
able, and the facility of replenishing it, will jnstif}' the expendi-
ji t
88
TACTICAL NOTES.
ture. In the case of a false attack, or of an engagement under-
taken to gain time, it may be indispensable to keep up a well
sustained fire or to maintain a fire more or less lively, at distances
more or less great, even though one may not thereby expect to inflict
any serious losses on the enemy. The result to be obtained, under
these circumstances, is to deceive the enemy or to occupy him at
any point ; the fire should then be regulated with these objects
in view, but the leader must always make the question of ammu-
nition a matf-^r of special consideration.
Also in the attack if, artillery is not to prepare the way for the
infantry, the latter will have to open fire at greater ranges.
These considerations of the supply of ammunition must also
exercise considerable influence on the question as to when the
order to commence firing should be given. It is certain that a
force having an unlimited supply of ammunition will not need to
fear any waste of amnnmition and can open fire at far greater
ranges than those fixed for ordinary circumstances. And besides
it must not be lost sight of, that in an attack, if the fire be com-
menced too soon, the offensive spirit of the troops will sufter and
will give the attacks a prolonged character. F'urther, the moral
of troops will suffer as soon as they perceive their own fire to be
ineffective while that of the adversary increases in power.
DIFFERENT KINDS OF FIRE.
This subject has already been referred to, but it is of such im-
portance at the present day that it well deserves further consider-
ation. Since infantry in action now acts almost exclusively by
fire, it results that it can only obtain a superiority over the
adversary by means of a superiority of fire. Hut how is this
superiority to be obtained ?
It is evident that it can only be gained by a numerical superior-
ity or by the introduction of a more rapid shooting weapon
such as a repeater, in both cases supported by a great consump-
tion of annnunition. It is not our purpose now to enter upon the
subject of repeating rifles, hut to imagine the opponents armed
with e(iually effective fire arms.
Numerical superiority is limite<l by tlu; spar(> available for
troops, and the ccjusumpt'ion of annnunition in action as a rule In
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
89
the amount carried by the soldier to which may be added the
quantity carried by the regimental reserve. Now supposing we
have a line of infantry in double rank, or even in three ranks, the
first lying down, and each man to be supplied with 100 or 120
rounds, the maximum in both senses wll have been obtained; but
will a superiority of fire have been obtained ? Certainly not, for
(such a formation would not be manageable, the losses it would
[suffer would be considerable, and the men, escaping from the con-
trol of their chiefs, would fire at random straight before them
probably without aiming, and would speedily consume all their
lammunition without any appreciable result. It is thus seen that
numerical superiority and a great consumption of ammunition do
Inot suffice of themselves to procure superiority of fire.
Infantry fire, in order to be efficacious, must be directed on a
{single objective and executed by a number of rifles firing simulta-
Ineously : in a word, grouping of skirmishers and concentration
lof fire. The great range of modern rifles allows of the concen-
Itration on a single object not only of the fire of the troops im-
Imediately opposite it, but also of that of neighbouring trcops; and
Ithe grouping of these, in placing them under the leading of their
lofficers facilitates the direction of fire and permits the needful
Iconcentration which is necessary for effect. Besides, the officer
[only is capable of appreciating when the opportune moment
irrives to open fire, he alone can judge of the results to be ex-
jecte 1, and judge whether the consumption of ammunition will
he remunerative or not.
The following are the different kinds of fire recognized in
iGerniany :
Independent firing of skirmishers, employed with a '^'igle eleva-
tion at distances within 450 yards. The men may choose the
ihjects they fire at, but in principle the leader is still supposed to
ix the number of rounds to be expended at a time, usually not
linore than three.
Group firing is also executed by skirmishers, generally with two
Isifjhts between 450 and 750 yards, and with three sights between
[750 and 1300 yards. The object to be fired at is fixed by the
ili'ader. When the number of rifles used at a time is considerable,
ii company for instance, it is called mass firing.
90
TACTICAL NOTES.
Group volleys, are volleys fired by a line of skirmishers of the
strength of a zug at least. These volleys by groups may be used
at the middle distances (450 to 750 yards), either with troops
liable to get out of hand, or when the view has become obstructed
by smoke. The use of this method of firing is becoming more
and more restricted and is now almost exclusively used for ascer-|
taining the range.
Volleys in closed ranks may be employed under special circuml
stances, as when troops in close order have successfully assaulted
a position and desire to pursue the enemy with their fire, or when
troops in second line are threatened by a sudden attack ofj
cavalry, &c. These volleys may b ^ executed by any units fromj
zugs and companies even up to battalions.
Rapid firing, is considered an exceptional kind of fire only to I
be used in rare cases, as before the reinforcing of a firing line,
before the assault, &c. The number of rounds to be fired must |
still be limited.
This latter prescription is by many considered as useless since,
at short distances, " the fire of skirmishers will degenerate of itself]
into rapid firing, and the men will no longer pay attention to the
directions of their leaders limiting tli'* number of rounds to be|
fired, and so the pauses will disappear."
Of the different methods of firing, that one which most facili-l
tates due control and supervision is, without gainsaying, volley
firing. Its advantages are considerable. Not a round is fired
without the orders of an officer, all the rifles are directed on a
chosen point. The smoke which is produced in front is allowed
time to dissipate during the intervals between the volleys, and
these pauses can be lengthened or shortened at the will of the|
leader. Firing ceases inmitMliately at an order or whistle, just
as it can be moved instantaneously from one objective to another:
to oppose an unexpected charge of cavalry for instance, which
would take some time to <lo if the troops are firing independently;
besides it allows at every instant of a change of elevation, in fact|
the officer alone is capable of r"t>iilating the fire when all means
of judging the distances are wanting.
The prop(!rties of Nolley Jiring are so seductive that they have
led to their freiiueiit use in peace exercises. Its emi)loymenl lia;|
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
91
been so much in favour that volleys have even been practised
within the range of effective individual hring, i.e., at distances
within 500 or 600 yards ; but this is not to be recommended.
Peace exercises should never give to troops or their leaders false
lideas of what is feasible in war, when volleys are absolutely im-
Ipracticable at short ranges. The noise and excitement of battle
Idisconcert the troops ; orders are no longer heard distinctly or
[even punctually obeyed ; every man seeks to obtain from the
Iground a shelter from the enemy's fire ; the groups break involun-
Itarily into skirmishers ; and independent firing supplants that of
Ivolleys without any human power being able to prevent it. It
(belongs to the leaders to foresee this moment ; recognizing it in
time, they will themselves order independent firing to commence
jcfore it commences of itself; they can then, perhaps, preserve
the direction of fire, limit the number of cartridges to be expended
jy naming the number to be fired at each pause, and make
these pauses sufficiently long to allow the smoke to disappear and
(the sights to be rectified.
But, it is simply illusionary to think for a moment that all these
results are to be obtained in war ; still they should be aimed at as
^ar as possible, and it is none the less certain that the more troops
lave been trained in time of peace to pay attention to the
slightest sign or gesture of their leaders, the greater will be the
iiscipline and power of control over them in the fight. It is a
natter of peace training and constant practice. Troops which have
\wt been broken into it will not possess fire discipline however much they
may be disciplined in other respects.
Independent firing proper, or by limiting the number of rounds.
Is then the only fire possible at short ranges, when all efforts must
36 directed to prevent its deviating from the original direction
md from its degenerating into a wild irregular fire so wasteful of
immunition. Pauses in the firing are therefore very necessary.
)n the offensive they naturally occur at every successive rush,
)ut on the defensive the limitation by the commander of the
lumber of rounds to be fired at each pause will, in practice, be
met by insurmountable difficulties, and here a shrill whistle must
3e the signal for firing to cease; but this will only avail on the
Supposition that officers and non-commissioned officers have been
trained to it in peace. This is, in fact, what the Germans have
I- ,'■
'?"•
93
TACTICAL NOTES.
I';
h if
SO aptly termed " fire discipline," which must be well practised
at peace exercises and manoeuvres as it cannot be improvised on
the field of battle. The method adopted of keeping the fire under
control by the leaders designating the men, or files, who are to
fire, cannot either be maintained at short ranges, and at the longer j
ranges it cannot be so effective as firing by volleys, as the sud-
denness and offensive character of the latter is thereby lost, asl
well as the possibility of shaking the mo ' of the enemy which |
the sudden loss of a large number of men is liable to produce.
This firing can only be recommended at very long ranges, when]
picked marksmen might be called upon to fire.
It was thought, on the introduction of the individual order of
fighting which took place on the introduction of breech-loading
weapons, that troops would in future require less training than
of old, and that in consequence of the rapidity of fire of modern
weapons, raw levies and only partially trained and disciplined
militia or volunteers would be more reliable than formerly.
Actual experience in war has shown that this is very far from
being the case, and that fire discipline is more difficult to regu-
late and requires more peace training than the old drill in close
order. It was also thought that even the private soldier must be
thrown to a great extent on his own responsibility, and be
emancipated from that rigid control which would only be cal-
culated to check the freedom of action so essential to success
under the new order of things. Whilst these ideas were held,
there was considerable risk of infantry combats degenerating into
disorderly scuffles between armed mobs, and such are almost sure
to occur with improperly trained troops. The difficulty of pre-
venting the firing becoming wild in the excitement of battle is
very great, and it is almost impossible to expect anything else
from imperfectly trained troops, who cannot, in consequence, be
depended upon in these days so much as formerly. The firing of
the French in 1870 and of the Turks in 1877 should be a warnin;;
to be taken to heart by all. The men knew their rifle could
carry long distances, and with little regard to aiming or to range,
they fired away in the direction of the enemy without guidance
or control. Although doubtless heavy losses were inflicted such
firing can never be expected to beat off a determined attack ; and
it is liable, moreover, at the most critical moment, to cause the
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
93
troops usinj^ it to run short of ammunition as so frequently hap-
pened to the French, necessitatint; of course tlieir retirement.
[The Germans on the other hand, when on the defensive in 1870,
never opened fire beyond a range of about 400 yards, yet their
iire being steady and well delivered, the result of stern discipline
and training, was invariably successful.
The Germans say that the independent fire of individuals is of
[little value ; the only really effective fire is that which proceeds
simultaneously from a great many rifles directed on the same
[point. Officers must have clear ideas upon the principles to be
observed in directing the firing line, and fire discipline must be
sufficiently strict to ensure attention and obedience on the part
(if the men to the orders of their officers, even under the disturb-
ing influences of battle. It should be remembered by the leaders
Jtliat the moral effect of fire upon troops is the greater the more it
lis concentrated, not only as to place but also as to time. A whole
[company firing five rounds per man will produce a greater im-
[pression than the third of a company firing fifteen rounds per man.
Another kind of fire, but which is only a variety of independent
Ifire, consists in what may be termed rapid independent firing. This
Ikind of firing was introduced into the German regulations and
[served them well in their wars against Austria and France, but it
appears now to have fallen into disfavour. Independent firing
knves to a man, when well trained, the means of obtaining from
Ihis arm the maximum effect. To desire to further exceed this
jmaximum is to practically direct the men to suppress some of the
movements indispensable to good shooting, such as bringing the
ritlc 'to the shoulder, or taking aim. A man, under fire, has
lalready a sufficient inducement to suppress these movements of
Ihis own accord for it to be useless to encourage him to it by
[regulation. Rapid firing as executed in action, can be nothing
jbiit a wild and noisy fire, leading to an enormous consumption of
lammunition, depriving the men in an instant of all coolness and
Iself {)ossession, and in the end rendering them incapable of obey-
\\\\^ the orders of their leaders, in short this is just the kind of fire
jit is so important to prevent.
There are then only four methods of employing infantry fire :
hy naming the men or files, volley firing, independent firing, the
luumber of cartridges being limited and the direction of fire and
> i
t*|.
94
TACTICAL NOTES.
elevation kept under control as in the first two methods, and inde-
pendent firing,'. The first, as pointed out, is only of real use at
lonj^ ranges when particular marksmen may be called upon to
fire ; the second by the discipline it allows to be maintained and
the resi'lts obtained by it constitutes the firebar excellence, but it
necessitates on the part of the men great calmness, which is
hopeless to expect as soon as the losses become sensible and
ranges short. But so long as volley firing can be continued the
men can be kept better in hand, and the fire kept under proper
control ; moreover with volleys you can see better where the
bullets strike and regulate the sights accordingly. Volley firing,
even when executed by skirmishers, becomes impracticable at
about 600 or 700 yards. Troops particularly well trained and
steady might at times continue this fire at shorter ranges, but
this will always be an exception.
Firing by volleys will be succeeded by independent firing, the
fire being carefully concentrated upon particular objects under
the orders of the officers who will also limit the number of
cartridges to be expended between each pause, and give the
range so as to prevent the fire becoming disorderly; this fire
allows the men to fire more at their ease, to assume the positions
they find most comfortable, and to make use of all shelter afford-
ed by the ground. To expect the men, however, to count the
number of cartridges to be expended is not practical if the num-
ber named be too many, three rounds would appear to be the
outside limit and this caimot be always counted upon; but at all
events they must be made to cease fire at the signal of their
leader and this must be the object to be attained by all ; for with
regular independent firing the smoke which soon gathers about
makes aiming difficult, and thus materially reduces the effect;
but by ensuring the necessary pauses after say every three rounds,
during which the smoke can clear off and orders can be com-
municated, will contribute very materially to the effect of the fire.
Colonel Boguslawski, a great German writer, does not approve
of this method of independent firing by limiting the number of|
rounds ; he thus expresses himself:
" If you hear the constant monotonous repetition of the ' three
rounds individual fire' on the drill ground when no ammunition
is being used, and if you watch the behaviour of the men, you are
i A
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
95
almost inclined to believe in the efficiency of this method; but the
case is very different if you begin to work across country with
blank ammunition, or if you practice field-firing at targets with
ball cartridge after the fashion now in vogue. One ' zug ' wishes
to make a little movement to the front ; another must lie still to
take aim ; a third has already aimed and begins firing; a fourth
opens fire a good deal later. Each ' zug ' will therefore cease
firing at a different time. In real work all this will be moonshine.
If the next ' /ug ' goes on firing, if the excitement of battle gains
upon the men, if the enemy's bullets come dropping in and the
officers are falling, you may repeat your ' three rounds per man '
as much as you like, but you won't produce the shortest pause in
the firing. * * The whistle, and one specially constructed for
I shrillness, is the only thing which will have any effect at such
moments." This may be, still the method is being extensively
I practised and will be certain to be attempted in the next war,
Iwith what effect remains to be seen.
In 1879 at the annual exercises carried out in Germany, the
[periods for troops to fire were regulated by whistles which at
times created some confusion, and the number of rounds fired in
I a single period varied from two to six.
When this fire can no longer be controlled independent firing
[must per force be resorted to, but all the efforts of the leaders must
jbe put forth to limit the consumption of ammunition and to
inaintain the fire in the appointed direction. The action of the
leaders should be able to make itself felt at any moment, even in
[independent firing it must not cease to exist ; but this result can
jonly be arrived at by most painstaking training and by repeated
[exercises in time of peace.
It is with these objects in view that the education of soldiers
Ishould be directed as regards their annual practice, and not with
jthe sole object of gaining a high figiu'e of merit at target practice
Iwith the number of cartridges allowed to be expended annually.
Iliistruction in individual firing should also be carried (Ui with the
hief object of teaching the men to utilize all accidents of
,T()un(l for shelter and as rests for the rifie, to choose rapidly the
•bjective point, to calculate the distance from it, and to judge
[whether the distance is within the limits \\ ithin which a single
1 »
1
yWZ
mh
filial
','f'H
4f
96
TACTICAL NOTES.
shot may be expected to yield a result, to choose the elevation to |
be given according to the apparent height of the object, to profit
by the monrients when the objective is visible, and finally to accus-
tom him to regulate his own movements with the rapidity and
direction of the advance.
These exerci .es should consequently be executed at unknown
ranges and within the range when each round may be expected
to take effect, i.e., within about 500 yards ; and also at moving j
objects.
JUDGING DISTANCES.
It has been seen that in action, except at close ranges, firing
should only be executed by word of command. Soldiers fire on I
the objectives indicated to them and with the sight raised as
ordered by the officers : they are, consequently, not called upon
to judge distances beyond 500 or 600 yards at most. But this is
not the case in outpost or reconnoitring duties where a group of|
scouts or sentries may find themselves compelled to open fire on
the enemy's skirmishers. But, as we have seen, the range of effec- 1
tive individual fire ceases at 500 yards at most, and consequently
sentries or scouts should not open fire beyond this range. It is j
therefore only necessary for the soldier to be able to appreciate
all distances inside this range ; to exercise him in judging longer
distances is only liable to mislead and lead him to open fire under
unfavourable conditions. The ranges given above are the out-
side ranges, for, as a rule, a single soldier should not fire beyond
400 or 500 yards. As for the officers, and even the senior non-
commissioned officers, their instruction cannot be too coniplete.
They should be able to judge all distances within effective
musketry range at least, that is within 1,300 yards, and even!
further as many cases may occur when it will be found necessary
for them to judge even greater distances.
Infantry on account of its frequent movement, and from the I
necessity in which it will frequently find itself of opening fire
promptly, will rarely be able to have recourse to range finders. |
To judge distances accurately, and on every variety of ground, is a
very difficult matter especially if these are great ; there will then I
remain generally no other means by which certain results are nl)-|
tainable than by having recourse to several elevations.
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
97
THb COMBINED USE OF DIFFERENT ELEVATIONS.
The employment of this method is founded on the known zone
I of ground which is swept at each elevation. It is known for in-
stance that when all the rifles of a group of men are directed on
the same object, the ground swept by the fire at the shorter ranges
has a depth of say about lOo to 120 yards. Hence if all the
sights be raised at one elevation it is sufficient if the distance be
judged correctly within 50 or 60 yards for the firing to take effect.
At longer ranges errors of judging distances are often 100 yards
and even more, but then to obtain any effect it is not sufficient
jeven if distances be judged correctly within 50 yards, it is there-
jfore seen that the latitude of error allowed must be much greater.
Hence recourse is had to the use of two, three, or even four ele-
|vations, divided between the men called upon to deliver their fire.
For instance, one section may be directed to fix their sights at
J8oo yards, another at goo, and another at 1,000 yards. In this
lexample the zone of ground swept by fire is about 300 yards in
[depth, (from 750 to 1,050 yards), so that the actupJ distance need
jin this case be only judged accurately within about 150 yards.
|lt must be conceded that such a proceeding is barbarous and
wasteful of ammunition, but it is none the less a fact that it yields
:ertain positive results. Thus suppose a battalion or other unit
)n the defensive to see the enemy in front advancing in formation
jfor attack with his skirmisht i s, supports, and reserves. The dis-
tance has not been accurately ascertained, nevertheless the
enemy's skirmishing line appears to be distant about 700 yards,
"he commander of the defence orders: — On the skirmishing line;
^'0. I section, range 700 yards; No. 2 section, 800 yards ; No. 3,
900 yards; No. 4, 1,000 yards. (Or at this range only two eleva-
[ions might be given.) "Ready" — "Fire," — or " Fire three rounds
Independently; commence firing." Every rifle is directed on the
'hain and the zone of ground swept by the fire is about 350 or
\oo yards in depth. Thus the chain and supports may find
[heniselves simultaneously exposed to the same shower of lead
provided the distance has been approximately judged, and even
[he reserves may also suffer. If the skirmishing line is in reality
further off than was estimated the sights need not be altered but
Ihe fire continued. At the commencement the shooting line
ii
98
TACTICAL NOTES.
alone will be hit, but as the enemy advances his supports and
even reserves will soon come within the dangerous zone. As the |
depth covered is about 400 yards every (Echelon of the 'enemy wi
remain exposed to the fire of the defenders for 4 or 5 minutes at I
least, and there will always be a time when two or even three |
<5chelons will be simultaneously exposed to it.
It appears that between 450 and 750 yards the Germans I
generally use two sights with a difference of 100 yards between
them. Beyond 750 yards the use of three sights in a similar
manner is recommendetl, but within 450 yards only one sif,'lit|
would be used, and it is prescribed that the number of rifles em-
ployed must be at least of the strength of a zug (60 men.)
But the emj )yment of different elevations is not had recourse]
to when the range is exactly known, when the object is immove-
able, and when the state of the atmosphere and the slopes of the I
ground near the object fired at are such as not to exert mucin
influence on the firing.
It is difficult to predict what results such a mode of procedure!
will give in war. It will doubtless cause a great expenditure of I
ammunition, but it is at least incontestable that it does away
with all hesitation and trials in the choice of range, and that at|
any moment it is calculated to produce a certain percentage.
This method of firing has been introduced in the regulations ofl
the principal European powers, and will without doubt be put in
practice in any future war.
Since the above was written some modifications in the German I
instructions have come to hand as a result of exercises carried out
in 1879. When possible, ranges are to be obtained from the
artillery, but when this cannot be done trial volleys are fired, and [
the following methods are adopted :
Volleys are only to be fired by the skirmishing line to ascertain I
the range, and only when ground is favourable for it. In future,
volleys will be, it is directed, rarely made use of during the coursei
of an action by skirmishers as they are considered impossible
when once within the zone of effective musketry fire of the enemy. |
The independent fire of skirmishers, kept under proper control,
generally yield better results than volley firing even when smokel
has obscured the front.
"1!
MODERN INFANTRY l-IRK.
99
Before a line of skirmishers open fire the number of rounds each
man is to expend is fixed. In this manner it is hoped certain
pauses will be secured in the firinj;^, so necessary to allow the
smoke to disappear.
The most perfect supervision will lead to no result unless it is
supplemented by the most strinfjjent fire discipline, and it is only
when every soldier has been well /mictised in this that the full effect of
modern small arms can be obtained. This can only be done by
practisiu}^ the soldier to rapidly correct his elevation and to take
careful aim, to rapidly discern certain named objects and to fire
on them regulatinj^ the range carefully, and to show instant and
complete obedience to all orders received.
The idea of making the captain alone direct and supervise the
fire of the whole company has been given up, and now it is con-
sidered that a zug on a war footing (about 80 men) is the largest
unit which can be superintended by an officer in the midst of the
excitement of battle.
It must be pointed out with reference to the question of doing
away with the employment, of volleys by lines or skirmishers,
and only usipg them for ascertaining the range, that some emin-
ent German writers are much opposed to this and warmly main-
tain the great advantage of volley firing if executed with care.
The reasons alleged for discontinuing fire by volleys are the
necessity for using cover, the tumult in battle, Hie great expendi-
ture of ammunition, and finally the superiority of individual fire.
They combat these conclusions and affirm that the effect of vol-
leys is quite as great as individual fire, and further maintain that
the great superiority of volleys is the power it affords of being
able to direct the fire of a number of muskets simultaneously on
a certain object, to obtain from men the necessary submission
to discipline, to drive skirmishers out of any shelter they may
have momentarily obtained, and to subject their desire to obtain
cover to that of obtaining a good position for firing. In other
words, it is owing to volleys that fire can be maintained in the
desired direction, which cannot always be obtained from in-
dividual fire. It is a well authenticated fact that the skirmisher
is, in practice, more preoccupied with seeking to obtain shelter
than with obtaining a field of fire, and that careful aiming and
100
TACTICAL NOTES.
; I' ', i<M
Steadiness can only be maintained in the heat of action by firt|
discipline. They also maintain that the expenditure of ammuni-
tion need not be so great as with individual firing, provided thel
volleys are not incessant but executed at intervals so long as tlu\
troops are beyond effective range.
Another advantage claimed for volleys is that they will keep!
the troops opposite to the objective assigned to them and preventj
that tendency to incline to the flanks, a tendency so noticeable iii|
all recent battles in the endeavour to seek a zone of safety.
AUSTRIAN REGULATIONS.
The Austrian regulations prescribe that the action of every
combined force of infantry or artillery must be prepared by the
fire of artillery. *'To this arm must be given the means and thel
time necessary to effectively prepare for the infantry attacks, bv|
the fire of masses."
As soon as the preliminary operations of the action are com-
'pleted, the infantry advances at a stretch, if that be possible, up
to the limit where commences the mean, or better still, the short
ranges. They then open a fire superior in energy to that of the
adversary, and regulate their fire so that it may always increase |
gradually in intensity until it attains its maximum effect at storm-
ing distance, that is, at the distance at which the assault has to|
be made.
For infantry fire the Austrians divide the distance between
two opposing forces into -three zones : short, mean, and long
ranges ; the limits of these zones are respectively 500, 1,000 andj
2,000 paces ; say 400, 830 and 1,660 yards.
The short zone, up to 400 yards, is mostly reserved for the in-
dependent firing of skirmishers. The mean zone, between 400!
and 830 yards, is principally reserved for the fire of picked men]
and to volley firing by skirmishers. In the long range zone,
between 830 and 1,660 yards, firing is to be principally executedj
by volleys from troops in close order directed on objects presen-
ting a certain width and depth. But firing at these long rangesl
is prohibited unless the object is distinctly visible and wheneverl
it is not easy to judge the distance accurately. Moreover, thel
MODKKN INFANTRY FIKH.
lOI
depth of the object fired ;it and the effective of the troops firinj,'
inust be large enouf:;h so that satisfactory results may be counted
upon with certainty. But even these conditions are not deemed
sufficient to justify the use of fire at these ranges ; the quantity
of ammunition available must in addition permit of the necessary
consumption of cartridges to enable the ultimate object of the
operation to be attained ; or at least there must be a certainty of
being able to obtain a fresh supply of ammunition during the ac-
tion. The battalion commander can reserve to himself the right
when to order firing to commence at these long distances, al-
tiiough in principle this authority belongs to the captains of com-
panies placed in the firing line. The leaders of sections are not
authorized to order firing to commence at these ranges on their
own authority except when they may be acting independently.
Beyond i,66o yards the exclusive sphere of action commences
[for the artillery, and infantry has not to fire in this zone.
For ascertaining distances, infantry on the offensive will either
[judge distances by eye or by trial volleys: in the neighbourhood
lof artillery this arm can furnish the ranges. On the defensive,
infantry ascertains the ranges to different conspicuous points by
Ipacing the distances. The use of range finders may be had
Irecourse to and also of maps if there are any on a sufficiently
llarge scale. At short distances the firing is regulated by noticing
the strike of the bullets, at mean and long ranges by trial volleys.
iWlien ranges cannot be ascertained with accuracy by any of
Ithe above means several elevations may be used, two elevations
[being used at mean ranges and three at long ranges.
The Austrians do not agree with the Germans as to the effects
to be produced by musketry fire. The latter, as we have seen,
[consider that the effect of all firing should be sudden, unforseen,
[and powerful, and that they only make this action felt for suc-
:essive and very short periods separated by intervals, when firing
[ceases; in fact the Germans advocate periodical firing the number
)f rounds being limited, and the concentration of fire on the same
Dbjective. In Austria, on the other hand, the system of limiting
the number of rounds is not practised, but an endeavour is made
to give to .the firing an ever increasing power, from the fire of
kicked marksmen up to the rapid firing of the chain reinforced
Mp to its maximum density.
r
102
TACTICAL NOTES.
Now this gradual development of fire, as well as the effects ofj
suddenness ?.nd of power, can only be obtained with troops perl
fectly trained to " fire discipline," and when the direction and!
conduct of the firing is under the control of the leaders.
The " direction " of the firing consists in choosing the objecl
tives, in judging distances, in regulating the consumption oi
am_munition by directing the description of fire to be employed,
by retaliating the density of the chain, and by attending to tliti
supply of fresh ammunition. The "conduct " of the firing consistil
in ordering the elevation, the objective to fire at, and the kind oil
fire to employ, and then in controlling the fire, that is in watchinj
that the men take careful aim with the required elevation, andl
on the desired object.
In the Austria 1 army the direction of the firing is confided tij
the leaders of sections in the chain. Their authority in these
respects is only limited by the restrictions previously pointed outj
as regards the employment of fire at long ranges. The actual
conduct of the firing is left to the leaders of squads or groups,
The leader of a section has the choice of six different kinds o:|
fire :
1. Independent fire of skirmishers.
2. Independent fire of picked skirmisliers.
3. Fire by volleys executed by the skirmishing line.
4. Rapid firing.
5. Volley-firing in close order.
6. Rapid-firing in close order.
1. The independent fire of skirmishers is only employed in tliij
short zone ; it is a dow and continuous fire.
2. The fire of picked marksmen is the customary fireemployeJ
at the mean distances.
The complete divergance of opinion between the Austrian aiiJ
German armies must here be noted. The Germans maintain thail
beyond 450 yards* nothing is to be expected from single shotj
and declare that at these distances the skill of the marksmal
cannot avail to counterbalance the unfavourable influences whiclj
*The Russiaus tix this diHtance at 550 yards.
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
103
[are independent of his action. For instance, instead of letting
[eight marksmen fire, choosing their own objects, 60 cartridges in
[two minutes on eight or ten different objectives, they prefer to
Icoiicentrate during half a minute the fire of 60 men on the same
[objective, and then arrange for a temporary cessation of fire.
It is very remarkable to see two large armies, who have both
Istudied this question of fire tactics with the same earnestness and
{for several years, come to such different conclusions on a ques-
jtion of so much importance.
It must be remarked that the Germans are very decided on this
Ipoint and consider the fire of single marksmen at these ranges as
la veritable waste of ammunition. They condemn this mode of
[fire at the mean or long ranges because the theoretical danger-
|oiis zoner of the fire-arm at these ranges are not of sufficient ex-
tent to correct the results of errors in judging distances, errors
lAvhich they estimate at one-sixth of the distance judged, even
Mien estimated by picked men.
The answer which is at times made to this objection is that, in
practice, the dangerous zone, obtained by firing a series of rounds,
:;ven with a single weapon, is as great as five or six times the
|theoretical dangerous zone, and that, in consequence, the extent
bf this practical dangerous zone can compensate for the inac-
(cmacy of aim and the mistakes in appreciating the distances
kvhich a marksman is liable to at these mean ranges.
Hut, the opponents of this method reply that in real war the ob-
ject and the marksman generally move their positions after a very
hort space of time, and hence the impossibility for a single marks-
|iiKm to fire a sufficiently large number of rounds under the same
conditions. The marksman on the contrary, will first fire on one
)bject, then on another and so on. Can it be possible for the
trajectories of the bullets fired in different directions to cover the
Banie dangerous zone ?
It would appear to the writer that the German view will in
practice be found to be the more accurate one, and that the fire
if picked inarksmen will be more effective in sieges when the
kxisitions of the men and of the objectives are more stationary
!ian on the ordinary field of battle.
104
TACTICAL NOTES.
3. Volley firing by skirmishers is employed at mean ranges]
when fire is to be directed on troops of a certain eftective,
These volleys are also made use of at short ranges when it is I
possible to concentrate the fire for a sufficient length of time on
a certain point of the enemy's chain, or on fractions of troops |
placed in rear of this chain. This method of firing is held in higL
favour in the Austrian army whereas the German infantry scarcely
ever employ it except for trial volleys.
4. Rapid firing is to be employed under decisive circum-
stances. The chain, as well as troops in close order, make use of|
this fire with the elevation of 400 yards.
5. Volley firing in close order is particularly reserved for firing
at long ranges. These volleys are limited to a company (250
men), and even then the company commander only indicates the
object and the range; it is the leaders of sections who, after, if
necessary, placing their men facing the object to be fired at, give
the executive words of command. The firing ceases at the order]
(if the company commander.
6. Rapid firing is employed by troops in close order under
pressing circumstances, such as in case of a sudden charge of
cavalry. The leaders of sections placed in the chain must see
that firing is commenced as soon as that of the enemy begins to|
be effective ; they direct picked marksmen to commence firing.
On the other hand, the regulations also direct troops who are to I
carry out an attack, as soon as the preliminaries of the action
are over, to endeavour, as mentioned above, to arrive at a stretch
if possible and before opening fire, up to the extreme limit where |
the mean ranges commence, or better still up to short range.
It may be stated that the fire tactics in the French army are |
in general very similar to those in vogue in the Austrian army.
INFLUENCE OF fl HOUND ON INFANTRY FIRE.
All that has been said hitherto is applicable to fire on hori-
zontal ground, or ground approximately pnrallel to the line of
sight. But when, at a certain distance from the troops firing, the
ground slopes down below the line (jf sight, the /one covered is
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
105
naturally increased, and will be a maximum when the slope of the
ground conforms to the inclination of the trajectory. When the
ground rises in front the extent of ground covered is shortened
and so much the more as its steepness is great.
As in the field the exact slopes of the ground in front can
[seldom be ascertained, and it will rarely be possible, even if
[ascertainable, to place your troops in exactly the positions whence
he slopes can be effectively swept, indirect or plunging fire cannot
e made accurate. In sieges or investments, however, where the
lopes, etc., of the defences are known, indirect fire can be largely
ade use of as will be seen presently. Since the shape of the ground
as an influence more or less on the effect of fire, it is necessary
)r an officer who has to direct it to understand this influence in
rder to obtain every possible advantage when the ground is
"avourable, and to neutralize it when unfavourable. The consid-
ration of this subject is to be found in treatises and regulations
n musketry, a few suggestions will only be given here.
Slight folds in the ground hide from view but not from the fire
)f an adversary. The range once obtained the firing may be con-
tinued with success, even though the enemy disappear momen-
tarily behind a fold of ground.
Firing from the top of a slope downwards is always more or
pess inaccurate, and the extent of ground swept by the fire is
iecreased, but it permits of the enemy's position being seen, the dis-
tances appreciated, the effects produced observed, and it enables
\he leaders to open or cease firing at the opportune moment ; in
iddition, the commanding position gives the troops a feeling of
Superiority which acts favourably on their moral. All these
idvantages are wanting when firing from below upwards ; besides
In this case it is seldom easy to judge the distance or to appre-
liate the inclination of the slopes it is desired to sweep, neverthe-
less some resu' ^ can often be counted on when placed at such a
listance from the crest as to obtain the most grazing fire.
But in action infantry fires on what it sees and not on imagin-
jiry objects. Infantry has generally enough to do to regulate its
lircct fire and to obtain some decided results without going to
leek for probabilities more than doubtful to be obtained by in-
]irect fire.
it'
io6
TACTICAL NOTES.
INDIRF.CT FIRE.
A great deal has been written lately about indirect fire, but,
although favourable results are obtainable at practice, it is doubt-
ful whether it would be so in war. At 1,000 yards an obstacle!
three yards in height covers a depth of about 35 yards in rear as
the bullets passing over it do not strike till about 35 yards behind
the obstacle, a company column therefore behind the obstacle j
would be perfectly sheltered. To hit this column at a point say
seven yards behind the obstacle would necessitate the shooting I
line retiring to about 1,600 yards, and even then if deployed in line
the troops behind the cover would still be sheltered, and even j
should they begin to suffer, as the enemy cannot see them, bv
their moving 40 or 50 yards to the right or left they will evade
the fire.
It is thus seen that to ensure any results from indirect fire in
the field the range must be accurately known as well as the
direction of the obstacle and the nature of the ground in rear of it,
besides it may so happen that the distance to the .obstacle is not |
suitable and you may therefore have to retire so as to increase the |
range. In spite of all these difficulties there are cases in which
indirect fire may be effective, as against redoubts and enclosed
works generally unless well protected by traverses and parados,
the interior of which may be well searched by long range fire
necessitating blindages for the garrison, but if these are provided
plunging fire will do no injury. This result is rendered feasible!
because the height of parapet of a redoubt cj-n be calculated and
the range ascertained, and the object being immoveable the most |
favourable range can be taken up to render this fire effective.
But it is almost universally admitted that for the ordinary circum-
stances of an engagement indirect fire will be of little use.
INCLINED FIRE.
When firing from a low position to a higher, such as from a |
valley at an enemy on a lidge, a case which often happens, a wide
dangerous zone is obtained and the results of the fire may be great. I
Now suppose a defender to occupy a plateau 30 yards high ; the
shooting line occupies the crest the supports and reser.es being in
rear, and the assailant to i)e from 600 to 700 yards from the position.
Then it is evident there will be two ;?ones of ground swept bv lire.
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
107
the one at the crest, and, if the bullets are high, another 2one when
the}' strike. The first zone will be about 70 yards wide, then
tiiere will be a clear unsvvept space of about 200 yards, whence
the second zone will extend for about 60 yards, which is evidently
liable to do injury to the reserves, especially if these are on a
reverse slope parallel to the trajectory. On the other hand, in
considering the defenders fire from the crest, the dangerous zone
will be diminished owing to the plunging nature of the fire which
will also diminish the results produced by ricochets, and besides
there will only be one zone swept by fire, hence, in this particular,
the position of the defender will be worse than that of the attack.
Now suppose the line of defence to be retired on the plateau
500 or 800 yards from the crest: if the defenders fire on the
assailant's skirmishing line arrived on the edge of the crest, its
fire on these will perhaps not be very' effective, but the bullets
which graze the crest will sweep the slopes and create destruction
among the rear <^chelons of the attack, and thus the situation will
be reversed.
As regards the effect of infantry fire it would therefore be prefer-
able to place the position in rear of the crest if the plateau is open
and affords a good field of fire : there are however other consider-
ations which render such a position still more advantageous.
In considering the fire of infantry as opposed to that of artillery^
there are two zones of fire which have to be considered : the first
zone extends from the extreme effective range of artillery which
we will for the moment consider as 4,000 yards, to the extreme
effective musketry range say 800 or 1,000 yards. The second
zone commences from the moment artillery comes within effective
infantry fire when the guns lose all their advantages and are Table
to become silenced. Artillery then will seek to remain in the
tirst zone and will endeavour to evade the second, whereas the
infantry will endeavour to do just the reverse. The real effective
range of artillery is not limited by the power of the piece but by
the power of sight or size, etc., of the object which must be visible
otherwise the fire is uncertain, and consequently the defender
will gain a great advantage if the line of defence can be so placed
as to be sheltered from distant view. Now if the line of defence
be placed at the crest, the infantry will very probably be exposed
io8
TACTICAL NOTES.
to long range artillery fire to which it cannot reply, and that por-
tion of the artillery of the defence which must be placed in line
with, or near to, the infantry shooting line, as it cannot all be
posted 400 to 600 yards in the rear of the infantry shooting line,
as is often suggested, since it would not then see or command the
approaches nor bring a cross fire to bear on the ground in the im-
mediate front of the position, will be liable to suffer from the
enemy's artillery fire directed on the shooting line and may possi-
bly even be silenced if the assailant can employ a powerful artil-
lery fire. The infantry shooting line will be exposed to this pre-
paratory artillery fire, and, as the assailant approaches, to his
infantry fire as well which will also take effect on the supports
and reserves, and thus even before the close stages of the attack]
the defender may have already suffered severely.
Instead of defending the crest, suppose the line to retire on
the plateau to the effective limit of infantry fire, say 800 or 1,000 1
yards, what happens ? The crest becomes a screen which pre-
vents the enemy's artillery from seeing the defensive line and of I
firing on it at long ranges, and it will be compelled in order to
prepare for the attack to establish itself on the edge of the plateau
where, however, it comes within effective musketry fire of the de-
fence, which, supported by the defender's artillery, both fresh,]
will be able to prevent the enemy's artillery from coming into
action. In fact the preparation of the attack by artillery fire will
be rendered impossible, and the assailant's infantry will find itself
opposed to the unshaken infantry and artillery of the defence
well posted under cover. In this case the choice of ground does
away with the superiority which the preponderance in number of
guns gives to the artillery of the attack.
Moreover this method of defence will be often capable of being
put into practice. There will frequently be met, crests, undula-
tions, high standing crops, woods, etc.,- which will often reduce
the field of fire to effective nuisketry range, thus placing artillery
at an enormous disadvantage.
But the crest should not be entirely abandoned, it should be
held as an advanced post to which even some batteries may be
sent. From this crest an extensive view may be obtainable, the
enemy's movements may be descried, and the defenders of the
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
109
advanced post may open fire on him at long ranges. The assail-
ant will thus be compelled to deploy and assume formation for
attack at a great distance. But no serious resistance must be
made at the crest : whenever the attack becomes really serious
the troops occupying this crest must withdraw behind the regular
defensive line drawing the adversary after them.
Some examples of this mode of fighting deduced from the
Franco-German war will be instructive.
BAITLE OF CHAMFIONY DUKINO THE DEFENCE OF PARIS.
The French made a sortie against the German lines, the princi-
pal objective being the Castle and park of Villiers. The Ger-
man infantry was posted behind crenelated walls and their artil-
lery behind epaulments. From the left bank of the river Marne
the ground rises forming undulations more or less pronounced,
I and about 400 yards in advance of their line of defence a crest of
f;fround commanded it slightly the slope being gentle. This line
I and its keep, the castle of Villiers, were completely hidden from
I the view of the French artillery, and was at from 400 to 500 yards
in rear of the crest.
The French found no difficulty in dislodging the adversary
[from his advanced positions in front of the crest. At
the crest itself the resistance was firmer, still not seri-
ous; the Germans retired seeking to entice the French
after them. These on arriving at the crest are sub-
jjected to a heavy fire, but they succeeded in obtaining some
jshelter and returned the fire without doing the enemy, who was
jwell sheltered, any serious damage, and awaited the arrival of
Itheir guns which were necessary to effect a breach so as to
|enablc them to assault the position,
As soon, however, as the guns showed themselves, and before
Ithey could even be brought into action, a withering fire was dir-
lected on them inflicting heavy losses and preventing all but a
Ifew ^ims opening fire, and even these were speedily silenced and
[the artillery was ordered to retire. The infantry which had also
Ibeen arrested was not able to resume its advance and had there-
jfore also to retire. General Ducrot narrating these events says :
r'Nons avons ^t^ vaincus par le terrain."
iii
no
TACTICAL NOTES.
IIATTLK OF BUZENVAL.
The same thing happened at Buzenval. The French ascended
the slopes of the plateau on the side of Mont Valerien : they arrived
on the crest, but it was found impossible to bring a single gun
into action. The French infantry found itself singly in face of
the two united arms of the enemy, infantry and artillery, covered
by walls and epaulments.
But this principle of the occupation of ground is not. a new one|
by any means, as it was put into practice by the Duke of Wel-
lington, who, whenever he wished to take up a defensive position,
sought some heights and established himself on the plateau. Hei
defended the slopes with numerous skirmishers thrown out in ad-
vance ; at the crest on the edge of the plateau, which was heldj
as a sort of advanced post, the resistance was more seriousi
nevertheless the British defenders of this advanced line retired!
before the heavy French colunms; but when these latter endea-
voured to advance on the plateau, they were met with a heavy tirej
of bullets and case shot from the real line of defence carried 200 1
or 300 yards in rear of the crest, followed up by a charge in line,
The French had then to retire pursued by the skirmishers whol
reoccupied the crest. The French artillery, it is true, pre-[
pared the way for the advance of the columns of attack by firin?j
on the crest, but this was not enough ; they could not bring upl
a single gun on to the plateau where it could have seen the!
enemy's line and commenced anew the work of preparation : thel
infantry consequently arrived alone in face of the two arnis|
united.
These same dispositions were frequently, as we have seen,
adopted by the Germans, only owing to the increased range ofl
weapons the line of resistance was not placed at 200 or 300 yards!
but at least at 600 or 1,000 yards in rear of the edge of the!
plateau. When the infantry weapon had only an effective rangel
of 200 yards the line was well placed at this distance in rear!
of the crest, although it was not entirely secure from the ricochet!
fire of round shot, but the British line was usually kept further!
back at the commencement and only moved forward to about 200J
yards when the time came for it to open fire.
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
Ill
In the present day at 600 or 1,000 yards in rear of the
crest there is a sufficiently wide limit to make use of localities
and favourable p^round, and in nearly all positions the line will be
hidden from distant view, though if within 700 or 800 yards the
main line of defence will be exposed to the splinters of shell
bursting near the crest, but still their effect will not be very great
I if the troops are well sheltered.
As concerns the attack, whenever the crest of a ridge or edge
lof a plateau has been carried, the assailant must not continue the
advance thinking himself victorious l)ut will have to ascertain
first whether the enemy is not firmly established in rear in the man-
ner already explained. In this case, in order to occupy him,
Ifaise attacks may be made in front but the artillery must not be
(compromised, and a different point of attack must be sought for
jin another part of the field, especially on the flanks, where the
Iposition may be turned and where perhaps more favourable
(ground for the attack may present itself.
If an attack in front has to be carrried out at all hazards the
Inecessary artillery preparation must be made by indirect fire.
iThe object is stationary, consisting of villages, walls, epaulments,
Ishelter trenches, etc., and although it will require time yet
|artillery may be expected in the end to weaken the defence ; and
It should be supported, when feasible, by long-range rifle fire, and
land by infantry posted at the edge of the plateau whence the
leffect of the practice can be watched and any information signal-
Bed to the rear.
To sum up, the extreme limit of long-range fire may be put down
It 1,300 or at most 1,500 yards, and at that distance, and even at
[,000 yards, it will be only efficacious against large bodies such
IS a company column, a squadron or a battery. Its use will be
nfined to small detachments on the defensive who will seek to
iiake the enemy deploy early at the commencement of the action.
Long range indirect fire can also be executed on unseen objects,
Jmt it necessitates a thorough knowledge of the ground and
il)articnlar conditions which appear to render this nature of fire
impracticable in war except in two special cases :
112
TACTICAL NOTES.
The one, when the objective is a fortification, when the fire is
plunging. There is nothing new in this nature of fire except that
it can now be executed at longer ranges and with greater accur-
acy. But owing to the modern use of traverses and blindages the
assailant will not find this fire so very effective. The other, when
inclined fire may be used, as experience has shown that when
firing from a plain on to the crest of a plateau a dangerous 2one
is obtained much wider than on level ground, and that direct
shots, aimed on the shooting line occupying the edge, effect their
devastation in rear on the supports and reserves, the results of |
indirect fire ; whereas the fire of a shooting line from high ground
to low is even less effective than when horizontal. When however
the defender withdraws himself from the edge of the plateau the
advantage passes to the defender, who then hits directly the
enemy's shooting line when it reaches the crest and his echelons
by indirect fire on the slope.
But it is in fortress warfare, as pointed out by Colonel Bogus-
lawski, and chiefly on the side of the attack, that the greatest
development of long range indirect musketry fire may be expected
to be applied in the future. Infantry will no longer, as of old, be
reduced on the one hand to direct its fire exclusively on the be-
siegers sap heads, or on the other on embrasures of the fortress
to keep down the artillery fire. It will have ? more extended role,
in that it will be able in future to combine its fire with that of the
siege artillery, and help in sweeping the ramparts and rendering
them for a time untenable by the garrison.
The use of this kind of rifle fire seems destined to give im-
portant results against detached forts and more especially so
against isolated works, and had the Russians employed it before
Plevna it would have facilited their attacks considerably.
It will be almost always possible to surround detached forts or
isolated works on two or three sides by strong detachments of
infantry who can intrench themselves rapidly. If these detach-
ments are well placed so as to enfilade the faces of the works, the
effects of their fire will far surpass the old ricochet fire of Vauban
and will more surely drive the garrison to seek shelter. Further,
the musketry fire from the ramparts of the latest pattern forts is
apt to be exceedingly weak owing to the numerous hollow trav-
Ireverse its r
MODERN INFANTRY FIRE.
113
erses occupying so much space. Hence the fire of the attacking
infantry, putting artillery fire out of consideration for the moment,
can only be returned with effect from the covered way or from •
shelter trenches placed in front of the works, unless in front of
the main rampart be placed a low parapet affording to the in-
[fantry sufficient space to deploy.
It has been already stated that long range infantry fire should
loiily be resorted to in masses, and when judiciously used it will
Iprove
Igreat assistance to the fire of artillery
of the greatest advantage in fortress warfare and will bo a
There can be no comparison between the results of this fire in
la siege and in the field, for in the former it can be directed by
Kvell covered detacliaients at ranges exactly known and on an object
jclearly visible and very easy to aim at, whereas in the latter
linfantry are exposed to all the excitement of battle, fire has often
Ito be directed on a moving adversary wfto can only be seen at
Ishort intervals, at unknown and continually varying ranges, and
with no clearly defined stationary objectives ; further, it is pre-
Isiiined that with a siege train can be brought up an unlimited
Isupply of infantry ammunition, and that there need consequently
Ibe no fear of its running short. A body of infantry intrenched in
Ithe prolongation of the face of a work could, by the use of several
jelevations, cover its whole extent with its fire. At 1,000 yards
Ithe drop of the Martini-Henry bullet is i in 14, at 2,000 yards it
lis I in 4; consequently in addition to the enfilading fire a direct
land plunging fire may be employed on the fort, which will prevent
Itlie garrison from moving freely on the rampart and will take in
Ireverse its rear faces even over any parados that may exist.
At the commencement of an attack on large intrenched camps
the role of infantry will be still more considerable. The detached
[forts surrounding such a camp will be joined by lines of trenches
1 position batteries. The besieger, by appearing suddenly
jefore the place and by seconding the fire of the first siege
|batteries with a heavy infantry fire, moy be able to so sweep the
[round between the two or three forts chosen for attack as to
prevent the besieged from maintaining or reinforcing these inter-
mediate lines. Under these circumstances Colonel Boguslawski
Ithinks that the besieger may be able to penetrate by main force
114
TACTICAL NOTES.
throuf^h the line of exterior defences and completely surround
one of the forts, when it can be attacked like an isolated fort.
*To effect this purpose it is of course assumed that the besieger
disposes of greatly superior forces, and to so employ infantry in
masses at intermediate lines of defence will, it is considered, be|
the most effective manner of employing the preponderating force.
This is in principle notiiing but a reproduction of the ordinary
conditions of attack on a defensive position in the field, a heavy
fire disorganizing the defence and preceding the assault. This
distant fire will not, it is true, have the same efficacy as if executed
at close ranges and will entail an enormous consumption of
ammunition, but the obstacle presented by the field works being |
but slight, the lines which distant fire have compelled to bt
evacuated may fall before an attack rapidly executed in great |
force.
Against the forts themselves these results will be far less since
distant fire, although it may inconvenience the defenders, cannot
prepare for the assault ; because even supposing the defenders
driven from their parapets the assaulting columns would be stop-
ped by the passive obstacle undestroyed by artillery, where they
will be fully exposed to the unsubdued fire of the flanking defences.
This does not of course apply to works open to assault such as |
the Turkish defences at Plevna.
Even if it be found impracticable to employ infantry in the
above vigorous manner, yet there can be no doubt that the duties
of infantry at the commencement of sieges will in future be very j
much transformed and developed. Hitherto its action has beer.
more passive than active, the duties of infantry having been
chiefly confined to investing the fortress and protecting the erec-
tion of the first batteries, but now, owing to their improved
weapons, their action will become more active.
The new regulations in Holland on the subject of infantry firej
deserve to be quoted :
"Individual fire being inefficacious at long ranges, a belt of|
ground must be covered by the aimed fire of groups firing at
different elevations. But it is absolutely necessary in this method
MODERN INFANTRY TIRE.
115
of tire that fire discipline be strictly maintained, and whether the
txiu'iiditiirc of ammunition is justified by there being sufficient
reserves available."
"Volley firing at long distances have for their object to pro-
loiij; the preparation and to compel the adversary to assume early
a more open formation and to seek for shelter. Hut as the re-
sult of any battle is decided at short ranges, sufficient ammuni-
tion must always be maintained for the close light, and all useless
expenditure of ammunition mu^t be avoided."
''Since in attacking a defensi\>- position the defender will be
under cover, indirect fire must be resorted to aimed at the front
line as well as at the reserves in rear. The effect of this fire is
k'reater at long ranges where the fall of the trajectory of the
bullets is greater. To effect this, (>ndeavour should be made to
fire from flanking positions so as to obtain oblique fire and to be
able to continue firing while tin- attacking troops are continuing
their advance. Against tro behind cover volleys should be
employed with a single elevation a little higher than the distance
ascertained. Distances are ascertained either by telemeters, by
artillery fire, or by the volley fire of skirmishers pushed to the
front, and great care is necessary to assure a proper supply of
ammunition being at all times at hand."
' Hi
CHAPTER III.
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY/.
Every year more attention is bein^' paid in military circles to
the subject of mounted infantry, and during the last session of the
British Parliament (1881) the Secretary of State for War was
repeatedly urged to give the subject his consideration.
Several years ago Sir Evelyn Wood said : " The experience
gained during the war of 1870-1 has confirmed the opinion, long
held by many soldiers, that mounted riflemen are now essential
to every enterprising army."
As might be expected, though all appear to be unanimous as to
the great importance of having bodies of mounted men capable
of operating on foot with the facilities of infantry, there is a great
divergence of opinion as to how this object is to be brought
about. It is incontestible that cavalry, as at present equipped
and trained, is not, when dismounted, capable of coping with in-
fantry on equal terms; consequently, some advocate that the equip-
ment and training of cavalry should be altered so as to enable
them to act freely on foot, while others are clamouring for the
introduction of an entirely new arm, neither infantry nor cavalry,
but what may be called '* Mounted Infantry " or " Mounted Rifle-
men." In fact, up to the present time there appears to be no
very clear understanding as to the best manner of providing the
army with this verj' essential class of combatants.
The importance of organizing and training some force of this
kind in time of peace is evident, as the difficulty of speedily
organizing a good mounted force on the outbreak of war is well
known. It is admitted that not every man who can ride make?
a good cavalry soldier, neither is it an easy matter to transform
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
II'
every good man into an efficient trooper, hence if it is taken into
account that many excellent riders are worthless as cavalry
soldiers, and that many good soldiers can never become good
riders, it is evident that it is no easy matter lo organize and keep
up a really first-class mounted furce. The evident difficulty of
providing good cavalry would of course be very much increased
if there was an immediate demand for a large contingent of
mounted infantry to be added to the existing military organiza-
tion. The idea of employing infantry on horse back, or of mak-
ing cavalry fight on foot, is no new one.
In the days of the Assryians, 705 B. C, cavalry was organized
so as to fight on foot; and later, Alexander the Great, besides his
regular cavalry, had a special mounted force intended to tight both
on foot and on horseback. The Romans also occasionally employ-
ed mounted infantry; but the custom seems to have died out, and
not to mention other examples and to come to more recent times,
it was not till the thirty years war that such a force was per-
manently raised, as it appears that Gustavus Adolphus at the
beginning of the seventeenth century was the first to regularly
I organize a force of foot soldiers to be conveyed on horseback.
I An accident, it is said, led to their introduction at the time of his
first invasion of Germany. A number of his soldiers went on a
i marauding expedition forty miles distant, on horses captured in
the ti'^lds, to pillage a castle defended by a good garrison ; they
returned within twenty-four hours laden with booty. Gustavus,
surprised at their success, employed thfsn same men on another
expedition which also proved successful, and henceforth he always
maintained a corps of 3,000 or 4,000 of these mounted infantry,
[who were then called "dragoons."
Dragoons, or mounted infantry, were then introduced in several
[Other countries under different names, and they rendered im-
portant services when they consisted, as they did originally, of the
best shots and bravest men, the pick of the infantry regiments, and
|\vho at first remained attached to their regiments ; but, as soon
as they were detached from their regiments and united to form
inounted .trooi)S they no longer preserved their use nor their
Iprestige. The reasons for this are not far to seek ; they had lost
jtlio (pialities of the arm from which they were separating them-
IscKis without having yet acquired those of the one to which they
ii8
TACTICAL NOTES.
desired to be joined. As time went on dragoons passed through
many transformations, being at times cavalry, more often infantry,
sometimes both. It was not till lygo that they definitely took
rank in the cavalry, and when, during the wars at the commence-
ment of this century, the attempt was made to employ them in the
double duties of the two arms, events soon showed that thev
performed both duties badly. Marshal Marmont, the greatest
cavalry leader of that day, describes them as " a species of soldier
on horseback of very ancient origin but which have become
denaturalized it is not known why." " In principle they were
simply infantry on horseback, they should a! vays have retained
this character. On these conditions, dragoons may in a thousand
circumstances render immense services as detached detachments,
to effect surprises, during a retreat and especially in pursuit.
But they must, in accordance with their establishment, be
mounted on horses too small to be placed in line, otherwise the
desires and pretensions of the Colonels will soon convert them
into cavalry, and they will become bad cavalry and bad infantry."
" The minds of the soldiers must not be confused by teaching!
them two opposite opinions, declaring solemnly, when drillinf;|
them on horseback, that cavalry must always triumph over
infantry, and when the time arrives for drilling them on foot,
teaching them, on the contrary, how good infantry is invincible
by cavalry." " In practice, axioms come to the soldier's recollec-
tion, nearly always inverted. As infantry, he will recollect how
very formidable are cavalry ; as a cavalry man he does not forget
how much infantry is to be feared by cavalry."
" I repeat, there is no arm mcMc useful than that of dragoons,
but it must not be perverted. The horses should be small, as 1
have already said, the saddles as well as the equipment of the
men and horses should be arranged solely with the object of per- 1
forming the duties of real infantry with ease and rapidity; they
should be armed with good muskets, with bayonets, be well sup-
plied with ammunition, and finally the dragoon should be clothed
and shod for marching easily."
These opinions describe pretty clearly what a force of nioniiti'(
infantry should be, and they Inn'r been expfcssed over antl over]
again by many able military writers, who. w ith Marshal Marmont.
condemn all attempts at making CMNairy perform the ijoublci
w
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
119
service of cavalry and infantry. Many instances can be quoted
from history of the unreliableness of a force of dragoons when
they were neither cavahy nor infantry, and the inference raised
therefrom is that any troops organized to perform the double
duties of cavalry and infantry are sure to prove inferior to troops
who have received only their own particular training. There is
in consequence a very wide spread and deep seated prejudice
against employing cavalry on foot to any very great extent.
Nevertheless the German instructions for cavalry by General
Von Schmidt contain the following passage : " We must have
more thorough independence for our arm resulting from the
possession of a good long-range firearm, and from careful instruc-
tion in its use and in dismounted service ; this will enable us to
perform every kind of duty which it is impossible to do on horse-
back. There is no occasion whatever to fear that this will impair the
true cavalry spirit; indeed, it can only gain by it, as our arm will
be able to accomplish its object in all situations, and will not
j have always to remain mounted and abandon the field or retreat
[before every occupied village, defile, etc., which would certainly
deteriorate the spirit of the arm. I even go so far as to assert,
that if cavalry is not able to fight effectively on foot nnder all
icircumstances, it is not up to its work, and is not worth the sacri-
fices which the State makes to maintain it. Effective diversions
against the rear and flanks of an enemy could not be made, if
Icavalrv were not able to fight on foot by whole regiments offen-
Isivcly and defensively, if it could not attack localities or defend its
Icantonments. Its activity and enterprise, so necessary to cavalry,
|wili thus be infinitely developed."
Nevertheless some advocates for cavalry are very much opposed
Ito training the cavalry soldier to act on foot, and consider that it
[will prove most deleterious to this force to accustom it to adopt, as
lii primary and habitual role, that which should only be secondary
land occasional, and they contend that cavalry should remain
|nuich as it is and that a new arm should be organized. To this
is objected that, as occurred with the old dragoons, ifa corps of
^nounted infantry were formed, it would gradually grow into
cavalry. But the conditions of war have materially changed of
[late years. Formerly, firearms were only effective at 150 or 200
kards and the dragoon, therefore, had no time after delivering
I20
TACTICAL NOTES.
I
his shot to mount before the enemy was upon him. With our
long-range and rapidly firing rifles it is quite different, and each
dismounted man would be able to fire several shots at eftective
ranges before he sought the saddle ; and if mounted infantry are
provided with arms which can only be used with effect on foot,
the instinct of self-preservation will prevent them from aping
cavalry in their method of fighting. The distinction between the
two arms must be borne in mind, l^oth are mounted, but
whereas the weapon of the cavalry is the sword or lance, that of |
mounted infantry is the rifle. Mounted infantry proper only
employ their horses in order that they may be quickly carried to
the spot where they may fire with effect: their horses are not
used for shock purposes at all, and when mounted they never
engage in hand-to-hand combat.
But the same reasons which have been urged against the regular
mounted infantry becoming cavalry would also lead one to infer
that the former difficulty of having a mounted force to fulfil the
dual duties of cavalry and infantry is not so insurmountable at the
present day as is generally supposed. With, the modern rifles a
mounted force might easily engage an enemy either on foot or
horseback according to circumstances ; if on foot, the action will
bo commenced at a considerable distance from the enemy which
will enable them subsequently, if necessary, to regair their horses
and move rapidly to another point or to a flank, or act as cavalry
provided they have attached to the saddle a suitable sword.
There are then two main schools of diametrically opposite
views as to the role which in wars of the future is to be assigned
to the cavalry arm. In these pages it is not desired to give one
view greater prominence than another but to discuss the question
fairly, adducing the arguments of both sides and leaving the
reader to form his own conclusions on this vexed question.
It is universally acknowledged, putting aside the (juestion of
mounted infantry fcr the moment, that cavalry is to be the eyef
and ears of an arrny, and that this arm is useful for the execution
of secondary operations such as rapid movements to seize a
bridge, defile, or any position it will have to defend on foot with
its carbines. It is further believed that the opening of any future
campaign will see manv cavalry engagements. That this was
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
121
not the case in the Franco-German war is explained by the fact
that one only of the opponents had a just view concerning the
employment of his cavalry at the commencement of operations.
During the preliminary stages of a war the functions of cavalry
will be : to discover the movements of the hostile armies, to veil
those of it own, to protect the frontiers of its own country while
the other arms are being mobilized, to seize and hold important
posts far in front in order to gain time for the concentration
of the army and for its strategic advance ; to cover important
communications, railways, and depots, to make raids against the
enemy's communications, and diversions against his flanks, &c.
So far all are unanimous.
But, on the one side it is urged that the improvements in fire
arms, the rapidity, range, and deadly effect of fire, whether artil-
lery or infantry, have completely revolutionized the formerly
accepted theories, and that henceforward cavalry charges can no
longer take place on the field of battle except against cavalry, and
that this arm is now reduced to a purely accessory one unable to
retain its old position as a chief fighting arm. On the other it is
strenuously denied that the action of cavalry is restricted to
reconnoitring and escort duties, &c., and it is contended that
many occasions will still present themselves when great masses of
cavalry, energetically led, will be able to act with great efficacy on
the field of battle.
In considering the future employment of cavalry the questions
at issue are mainly these :
1. Can cavalry retain the high position which it gained by its
[shock tactics on the field of battle during the wars of Napoleon,
jfultilling at the same time all its other duties of security and
i information, etc. ?
2. Or, ill consequence of the considerable progress of the other
[arms, artillery and infantry, must it definitely abdicate its former
[role of decisive action in battle ?
j. Or lastly, are the double properties of fire and shock action
[to be given it so as to enable it to perform the double service of
Kavalry and infantry.
The supporters of the shock action of cavalry are afraid, now
[tiiat all the regiments are armed with carbines, that there is a
122
TACTICAL NOTES.
danger of its degenerating into the latter, especially since, in
spite of the advocacy of many able writers for the introduction of |
a special force of mounted infantry, no such force has yet been
raised, it being apparently intended to employ cavalry on duties
for which mounted infantry would be most suitable. A tendency
to do this was manifested in arming the cavalry regiments pro- 1
ceeding to the Transvaal in 1881 with the infantry rifle. They
do not maintain that cavalry should not be supplied with car]
bines, provided these do not become the principal weapon but
are only used by cavalry for self-defence and to enable it to defend
itself without the assistance of infantry; a uivouac for instance in
case of surprise, and notably in case of an attack b}' night when
cavalry must perform the work of infantry as it can do nothing
at night. Besides it has not the facility of being able to turn out
promptly, and to act as infantry cavalry need only take lip their
carbines and are at once ready to resist the enemy. They also
admit that under certain circumstances cavalry may have to be j
sent rapidly to occupy, for a time, and before the arrival of infan-
try, any positions which it may be necessary to hold for the success
of the general operations and to prevent the enemy establishi; ;|
himself in them.
Verdy du Vernois has said with much reason : " A division of I
cavalry furnished with a good fire arm must seek for and find in |
itself sufficient force to carry out to a successful issue all the
enterprises which its mission imposes on it." It is also true, I
"that a cavalry which does not know how to fight on foot as well]
as on horseback is retrograding and is below its mission and
doomed to reverses."
In the' German instructions for cavalry we read as a necessity
for cavalry progress, "the greatest independence of the other
arms in all the duties which can fall to cavalry, consequently tiie
abolishing of the frequently heard call for infantry, which reduces
us to an auxiliary arm and makes us incapable of independent
actions and operations, finds its principal argument in the arming
of cavalry with an improved fire arm and an increased instruc-
tion in the use of it, which can in no way be prejudicial to the
proper professional instruction of the cavalry soldier. Tlie|
dragoon must not become a mounted infantry man, but when hi
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
123
cannot attain on horseback the object indicated to him, he must
be able to accompHsh it on foot with his firearm,"
But the idea of further extending its action on foot, and to
transform all cavalry into a sort of dual arm for the purpose of
fighting indifferently whether mounted or on foot, is maintained
by this party to be a fundamental error, and one which has already
been attempted with signal failure. . Nevertheless, even the advo-
cates of these views do not as a whole deny that the brilliant part
played by cavalry under Napoleon when he frequently employed
it in masses to carry intrenchments and batteries, to break through
infantry in position, and to turn a doubtful action into a victory,
I will probably never again be repeated to the same extent in
j civilized warfare ; but they contend that many opportunities will
occur in battle when cavalry may be employed as of old with
[great effect, as for one thing it must not be forgotten that its
I moral effect is very great, and it need hardly be said that
[moral effect has a great influence on the issues of a battle and is
I often far out- of proportion to the material effect produced.
According to this view, and speaking generally, the action of
[cavalry on the field of battle may be briefly summed up as follows:
: Before the action a veil of cavalry is spread out masking the
I forward movements of the main columns or the front of the
lines of defence, thus fulfilling the tasks of providing for security
[and information. But the cavalry of one side or the other will
jnot be content to allow its movements to be harassed or its
[purposes hindered by that of the enemy, and it will therefore seek
jto drive in his cavalry and push on to reconnoitre the position or
nKivenients of the main force in rear. Hence, it may be expected
•iliat most actions will commence by great cavalry engagements in
jwhich masses of cavalry will charge each other as of old, the
result producing, it is urged, great moral effect on the other arms
|\vhich cannot f;iil to have considerable influence on the ulterior
(t^perations. Now, for cavalry to engage that of the enemy, it
iiiuist, to be victorious, retain its former spirit of energy, audacity,
esolntion, rapidity of movement, and be able to work in line for
|ts shock action to be effective.
While the infantry and artillery are passing through all the
honts whirl) load to a final decision, the cavalrv of the assailant
l, !■
124
TACTICAL NOTES.
should seek to gain, by a wide circling movement, the flanks nay
even the rear of the enemy. Under such circumstances the two
opposing cavalries cannot fail to become engaged a second time,
and here again the result of the encounter will doubtless exercise
a great moral effect on the general engagement, and the assailinf;
cavalry, if victorious, can then operate on the enemy's line of
communications and rear. Besides more extended raids on the
enemy's line of communications may produce unforeseen results.
The cavalry of the defence has an important part to play when
the attack is imminent and while the movements preparatory to
the attack are being made, since, it is urged that, cavalry by a
rapid and bold intervention may surprise the enemy's infantry
and produce great effect. In any case, it will compel him to halt
and assume fresh dispositions to oppose an attack which may
have great consequences. And now the enemy's cavalry may
arrive in his turn and thus another cavalry engagement will
have some effect in influencing the fortune of the day.
Finally, at the moment of assault, at the moment of the supreme
crisis, which the least circumstance may compromise, when the
whole attention of the assailant is concentrated on the important
point for the capture of which he has already made such great
sacrifices, an unexpected charge of cavalry may crush this last
effort of the attack. Lastly, one great role of cavalry will be that
of engaging energetically in pursuit, or of sacrificing itself if
necessary to cover a retreat against pursuit.
Still, as laid down in the German instructions for cavalry, infan-
try should only be attacked when it has been broken by iiie,
except under very exceptional circumstances and w^hen it is abso-
lutely necessary in the general interest to gain time.
But even the advocates for the shock action of cavalry just I
described admit that a separate force of mounted infantry adds
largely to the efficiency ofhn army, and that for certain duties
such a force would be more suitable than cavalry. In the Ameri-
can war of secession many corps of mounted men were raised, |
which were in reality mounted infantry, and it will be instructive
to consider the organization, equipment, and method of fightind
of some of these corps as it is well known how their eminent |
services contributed largely to the successes of the armies ofwliicli
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY,
125
they formed a part. The importance attached to the employment
of mounted troops may be inferred from the fact that when hostili-
ties commenced there was only one regiment of Northern cavalry
in existence, and that before the conclusion of the war there were
no less than 150,000 mounted men in the field.
Two corps of Confederate irregular cavalry will be first taken as
an illustration, and then General Sheridan's Federal cavalry.
iittt :1 1
GENERAL MORGAN'S CORPS.
This Corps comprised 10 regiments, each of 10 companies of 50
men. They were all armed with carbines and bayonets, and one
or more revolvers, some carrying as many as four. Only two
companies, which were destined always to fight on horseback,
carried the sword.
In conducting a raid the men carried no provisions nor kit of any
kind, generally not even a great coat, the horse-cloth was folded
under the saddle as a numnah, and each man was provided with
about 100 rounds of ammunition.
A body of scouts was farmed chosen from the most intelligent
and bravest men of the whole division, who, two or three weeks
before an intended raid, were sent 150 or 200 miles into the heart
|of the country in which the raid was to be carried out. These
jmen spread out in all directions, at times disguised, at others in
uniform, obtaining all information possible relating to the forces
of the enemy, his positions, depots, movements and intentions.
They sought for the best fords, paths least known, etc., and they
remained in the country until the arrival of the division. Such
perfect scouting will not be always feasible because Morgan's
men were chiefly raised in Kentucky, and it was in that State the
jinhabitants being hostile to the Northerners, in which he executed
his principal raids, and his scouts received therefore every help
iind support from the inhabitants, whereas the Federals operating
|in a country hostile to them were debarred from obtaining the like
[reliable information.
The normal rate of march of this cavalry division was always
ja walk, a more rapid pace never being resorted to except to fight
l<»r under special circumstances. Three miles including halts were
126
TACTICAL NOTES.
traversed in an hour, and as frequently twenty or twenty-ont
hours of march were performed in the twenty-four, sixty miles a
day were sometimes covered. At times only three hours sleep
were given to the men in the forty-eij^ht hours, who, in conse-
quence, frequently fell asleep on horseback from excessive fatigue,
The slow pace of the main body permitted of foraging parties
being sent out to search the neighbouring villages and farms for
provisions for men and horses, to requisition fresh horses when
necessary, and also to act as reconnoitring parties, and guard the
main body against surprise. As a rule neither man nor horse
ever entered a house or stable for the night, but the troops
bivouacked along the high road each man sleeping with the
horse bridle on his arm, and the horses were never off-saddled
except to inspect their backs.
Morgan was always most careful to guard against surprise,
for which he always threw out an advanced guard formed per-
manently of two picked men from each company, a post which
was always much sought after and regarded as a reward for
bravery and good conduct. The advanced guard was generally
about 400 yards in front of the colunm, which was followed by a
small rear guard. But in addition he sent out scouting parties
of irom five to ten men each in all directions, to the front, flanks,
and rear, those in front preceding the column at times thirty or
forty miles.
Fighting tactics. — The fighting was almost always on foot, sd
that this division was in reality mounted infantry. There were
onlv one or two companies which were always retained mounted
as cavalry to operate on the enemy's flanks, act as a reserve,
cover a retreat, or engage in pursuit. On meeting with the
enemy two companies were sent to the front sometimes on horse-
back, at other times on foot, when they dismounted and extended
as skirmishers, the main body meanwhile dismounting and form-
ing up for attack like infantry. One man held four horses or
even as many as eight when it was necessar}- to employ every
available man. Morgan frequently employed his power of rapid
movement by holding the enemy in front with a portion of his
force while the remainder, by making a rapid and sufliciently wide
circling movement, attucke<l the enemy in flank or roar.
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
127
At close ciuarters instead of usin^' the bayonet Morj^an's men
usimlly slunfj^ their carbines and charged the enemy revolver in
hand, and both officers and men of this corps were agreed that
this method was far more effective than the use of the bayonet.
Morgan had attached to his corps two mountain howitzers,
carried in carts drawn by two horses, of which he made great
use during an action, and employed them for demolishing walls
or houses. Finding these so useful, he afterwards raised his
artillery by an addition of four guns which proved however to be
too heavy for the work refjuired of them.
GENERAL FOli REST'S CORPS.
This corps was at first raised and equipped at Forrest's own
expense. When fully organized his corps consisted of about
6,000 men divided into three divisions, each division into three
bri;,fades, each of two regiments.
At first the men were armed with a sword attached to the
saddle, a revolver, and a carbine. But soon the men became so
convinced of the utter uselessness of the sword that they threw
them away and replaced them by one or two additional revolvers.
When any expedition was in prospect scouts were sent out in all
directions usually disguised as Federal soldiers. Each brigi'.de
furnished two companies of scouts who were picked men. When
1 the enemy was to be attacked scouts were sent into the
enemy's camp, who studied his positions, strength, etc., and
I either returned with the information gained or sent back infor-
mation by a previously arranged plan. When long raids were in
view scouts were sent into the country similar to Morgan's.
For operations of short duration the men carried two or three
days" rations, but in raids of any length rations and implements
[for destroying lines of railway, roads, etc, were carried in light
[carts.
hi marching the pace was a walk with an occasional trot. A
halt of one hour and a half was always made in the middle of the
day, and 40 or 45 miles were covered. The men always
bivouacked ; if near the enemy every man lay down holding his
horse's bridle, but when in comparative security the horses were
128
TACTICAL NOTES.
tied to a tree and the men lay down at their side. On the march
the column was always preceded 24 hours in advance by two
companies of scouts, besides advanced ^uard and flanking parties. |
Fighting tactics.— \u the attack Forrest generally left his ad-
vanced guard to contain the enemy on foot, while he with tht
bulk of his force, made a detour as rapidly as possible and fell on
the enemy's flank, dismounting for the attack.
On meeting with a force of cavalry his leading regiment en-
gaged the enemy for some time, then withdrew drawing the I
enemy, elated with his easy success, after it, and so unmasked
the second regiment which had meanwhile dismounted and ex-
tended under cover and which opened fire as soon as the first]
regiment had withdrawn.
Forrest had two light field guns attached to each brigade, iS|
guns in all, of which he made great use.
i^^^
THE FEDERAL CA VALKY.
The Federals had no corps of regular cavalry who performed
exploits similar to the Confedenites. At the commencement of
the war the Federal cavalry was very inferior to the cavalry of|
the latter, but learning from experience this arm was much im-
proved upon, and in 1865 General Sheridan successfully carried I
out that celebrated raid which was to bring about the final defeat
of the Confederates and the surrender of General Lee's army at |
Richmond.
Sheridan employed scouts, generally disguised as Confederates
as much as possible, but owing to the hostility of the inhabitants]
he could not make the same use of spies as the enemy.
His force consisted of about 10,000 cavalry all armed with the
sword, which were directed to be carried by the men, but it]
ended in their being attached to the saddle, also a repeating car-
bine and a revolver.
On the march the pace was always a walk, and 15 to 16 miles]
formed a day's march, but sometimes this was increased to 30.
The force was covered as usual by an advanced guard and]
scouts.
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
129
Each man carried on his horse four day's rations, two of oats,
his tent, great coat and horse cloth, the transport carrying
scarcely anything but ammunition. The men nearly always
bivouacked at night, the horses being picketed.
Fii^htinf^ tactics.— This force only fought on horseback against
cavalry when they charged sword in hand. But the Southern
cavalry rarely awaited the shock, they hastened to dismount and
open tire from behind any cover obtainable. When time did not
admit of this they met the enemy on horseback with their revol-
vers, and the Federals, it is said, frequently experienced to their
! cost that in these engagements the sword was less effective than
I the revolver.
Whenever they were opposed to infantry, or whenever they acted
[on the defensive, the force dismounted. One man held from 4 to
Is horses, and thus, by reason of their repeating carbines, they
[were able to open a territic fire on the enemy, which at close
I quarters was supplemented by that from the revolvers.
At first four batteries of artillery were attached to this force,
[but the guns were heavy and not well equipped and the tactical
employment of this arm was not apparently understood, so that
the artillery was gradually reduced to a single battery of which
[but little use was made.
This force engaged in several severely contested fights against
[all three arms of the enemy, and on one occasion, at Five Forks, it
[caused a loss of 13,000 men to General Lee's army. This battle
linduced Lee to evacuate Richmond and virtually decided the fate
|of the war.
General Sheridan's opinions on the employment of cavalry de-
jserve to be recorded as his principles, when put to the test
proved so successful against the enemy. He was the first in
hodern war to use with success his regular cavalry like infantry,
liting the firmness and fire tactics of the latter with the power
:if eusy and rapid movement from one point to another of the
|f"imer. He is firmly convinced that in action cavalry acting as
such, that is mounted, is incapable of opposing well trained in-
i'lutry armed with modern rifles, and that cavalry can only act
is such when opposed to cavalry, and even then it should only do
|o when it has not time to ilismount. Moreo\er even in charging
I30
TACTICAL NOTES.
cavalry he puts no f'litli in the sword but considers the revoh'er
to be the only effective weapon in a charj^e.
He further maintains that with 10,000 cavahy (the largest force
which he thinks can be properly handled by one man), led accor-
ding to his principles, he could hinder the concentration of an
army of 100,000 men. To effect this General Sheridan would
commence by attacking the enemy's cavalry which i.« would
speedily destroy, lie says, if it acted as cavahy, by the fire of hh
own dismounted. He would then operate against the rear of tlu
enemy and would there execute whatever work was necessary to
impede the communications and the transport trains, by destroy-
ing railways, bridges, etc. lie would then prevent the junction
of the different fractions of the army by moving to engage each
in succession. He also contends that the extreme mobility ot |
his 10,000 men would allow him to accept or refuse an engaf,^e-
ment at his will, and he does not doubt but that he would be cer-
tain of success thanks to the intelligent use of what he calls tlu
new cavalry tactics.
It may be remarked that in principle these views are similar tc
Napleon's when he expressed the opinion that an army of 10,000
men which could average 20 miles a day would conduce as niucli
towards the success of a campaign as one of 20,000 moving only
10 miles a day.
And it may be said that in the United States generally, at tli
end of this long and deadly civil war, the conviction was very
general both in the North and South, that cavalry should hence-
forward be employed chiefly as mounted infantry, acting during;
an engagement by its tire and very rarely by shock, and haviiif:,
owing to its being mounted, the power of refusing or accepting;
an engagement at will, and able to make sudden incursions on
decisive points.
In the United States the opinion is ;vlso pretty
sword is of but little use even in a charge, and th
more etficient weapon, iiie advocates of t
apon
op
li ^
p^nt theii views by adducing a great number of examples of wliicli
two of the most strikinj..; are the following :
Official statistics of llu- Medical De^ artment of the Cicniiaii
E iipire give the nunibi 1 of (ii'rnians klllml and Uouhded in llu
CAVAIJ'Y AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
131
war of 1870-71 ?,s 65,160. Of this number only 212 were wounded
and six killed by the sword. Also in November, 1864, in a single
engaj^ement between one squadron of Federal regular cavalry
using the sword and one squadron of Confederate irregulars using
only revolvers, the latter in a mMee of only a few minutes
duration killed 24 and wounded 12 men, or 36 out of a total of
about 100. But it must be noted that the sword has still its
advocates in the American army as opposed to the revolver.
But even supposing one is not prepared with General Sheridan
and others to regard the shock tactics of cavalry or the use of
the sword as things of the past, what are the experiences of this
war ?
It would appear to be urgently necessary and of the greatest im-
portance, either to organize corps of mounted infantr}- equipped with
rifles, and preferably a repeating rifle, bayonet or sword bayonet,
and revolver, and clothed so that when dismounted they may be
as free in their movements as the ordinary infantry soldier, and
retain the present cavalry as it is ; or to somewhat alter the organ,
i^ation and equipment of the regular cavalry, arming them with
a repeating rifle, and a revolver, and to attacii the sword to the
saddle, and to aiter the uniform so that when dismounted the
cavalry soldier may be as free in his mo 'cments as infantry.
The mounted man of the future should also carry a large supply
of ammunition, and a proportion of portable spades, and tools
and explosives for destroying railways, bridges, etc.
A force so equipped would not be stopped by small detachments
of infantry or armed citizens when on foraging, reconnoitring, or
outpost duties, or wIkmi detached from the main army to seize by
a rapid movement an important point.
Whenever a mounted force is put into a pt)sition to cope on
e(iual terms with a force of infantry, distant enterprises will be
undertaken with success which it was impossible to execute with
I the ordinary cavalry. It will then be more possible than form-
erly to throw large bodies of mounted men on the flanks and rear
jof the enemy's army without their being supported by infantry,
though their effect will, be increased by the aid of horse artillerv.
During the Indian mutiny the experiment of mounting infantry
132
TACTICAL NOTES.
was tried with inariced success. Sir Huj^^h Rose made wonderful
marches witli troops mounted on ponies and mules, and tlie
success of Sir H. Havelock's mounted riflemen is referred to as
follows in Mallesou's History of India : " Thus 60 men, organised
on a novel plan^ — that is to say, is mounted riflemen — had effected
with almost nominal loss in five days, durinj^ which they marched
about 40 miles a day, what 3,000 reg'ular troops had for six montli,=
failed to accomplish, viz., the complete expulsion of- 4,500 rebels
from the province, and in the infliction on them of a punishment
which has not to this day been effaced."
THE BOERS OF THE TRANSVAAL.
In the Transvaal war of 1881 the Boers furnished an excellent
type of what mounted infantry should be. Capital horsemen, well
armed with weapons of precision and good shots, they moved with
rapidity on any point they wished to attack or defend ; they then
dismounted to fight leaving their horses within accessible dis-
tance a few hundred yards in rear either for retreat or for sonic
new offensive movement. They proved to be most efficient skir-
mishers, taking advantage of all cover afforded by the ground
their heads were scarcely perceived from behind their cover, and
the smoke of their rifles alone showed the positions they occupied.
Their fire was slow and of great accuracy. But what was most
noteworthy was in their method of attack the extreme ability to
move, without being seen, from one flank to another and suddenly
opening fire most unexpectedly from positions which were never
supposed to be in their occupation. Thus, if in one position they
realized that they were drawing on themselves a vigorous attack.
they would retire to their horses, mount, and carry the offensive
to a new point, thus uniting the rapidity of movement of cavalry
to the fire of infantry.
A victory against such enemies as these is not likely to to be
decisive. A rout is nothing to them, they have only to withdraw
out of reach of the enemy's guns in order to come together af,'aiii
at their own time and place. They have at once the ubiquity ot
cavalry soldiers and the arms and solidity of infantry.
:?'«'i*ii'
ffWfUir
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
133
In Afghanistan, in 1880, durinji^ the operations round Cabul, Sir
Frederick Roberts, aHve to their value, raised a force of mounted
infantry. One officer and 60 men were selected from each regi-
ment from men best able to ride. They were mounted on ponies,
carried 60 rounds of ammunition, 3 days rations, and one day's
f^rains for the pony. Blankets, great coats, picketting ropes,
spare shoes and nails were also carried. The equipment of the
men was not altered but when mounted the}' carried their rifles
slunir across their backs.
■ .1
I'fli
Before considering the best method of providing the new force,
now almost universally admitted to be a necessary portion of
futnre armies, it will be well to consider briefly the use cavalry
has been put to in late wars.
In the Franco-German war the German cavalry astonished the
world by their intrepidity and boldness in scouting and recon-
noitring duties in which they were unopposed by the cavalry of
the enemy, and they were therefore able, at flrst, to scour the
country far and wide; but later, when " Franc-tireurs " or armed
peasants were raised, a small number of these latter were able to
compel the German cavalry to curtail their movements consider-
lably. On one occasion 12 chasseurs d'africjue armed with car-
bines stopped a whole German cavalry brigade of three regiments.
On the actual held of battle cavalry was of but little use and
whenever employed they suffered great loss, and their success was
only partial as they never succeeded in disorganizing the infantry
opposed to them but were only able to at times check them, and
their effect was at best of only a very local nature. A study of
inilitary history proves conclusively that as fire arms improved so
Ithe nMe of cavalry became more and more reduced on the actual
tield of battle, and the introduction of breech-loading small arms,
jto which may now be added that of long-range Are, has still
jfinther considerably lessened its employment on the Held.
In the old days of mu/zle-loaders cavalry could swoop down
[upon infantry with full contidence that they would be into their
lopponents before the latter could Are more than one volley, and
jtlie infantry were correspondingly nervous as they felt they could
lli'liyor but one round before their enemies would be upon them.
'mW
i.H
TACTICAL NOTES.
The modern breech-loader, however, with its long-range and great
rapidity of tiring enables the infantry to stop any charge of|
cavalry with very little, if any, risk to themselves; hence the con-
dition of affairs is completely reversed, and no cavalry can now
make any real impression upon steady infantry. It is true that
a desperate cavalry charge, similar to Von Bredow's, may force
an advancing infantry line to halt for a moment to repulse the
attack ; but if tiie latter are good soldiers and properly handled,
that charge will be the last one ever made by those squadron?,
The question resolves itself into whether it be possible for
cavalry to move over a distance of 1,300 yards, or more, under
an incessant fire from modern rifles ? It would take nearly four |
minutes to traverse this distance at a gallop, and in that time each
infantry soldier, with the present weapons, could fire nearly iv
fairly aimed shots; could any cavalry live through such a storm-
The splendid exploit of the German cavalry at Mars la Tour.
which is frecjuently quoted, cannot fairly be alleged as a proof to
the contrary. The third Prussian corps being engaged to thej
last man, and the artillery to the last gun, Von Bredow's cavalry
brigade was ordered, at all risks and at any self sacrifice, to hold I
in check the attack of the 6th French corps until German rein-
forcements could come up. It is known how these squadrons]
galloped through the French skirmishers, penetrated the support?.
and ultimately engaged the heads of the cohnnns of the main line. I
They partly effect their object but with a loss to themselves of hall]
their numbers. Moreover the German official account of this war
shows conclusively that the effect of this charge was only local I
and temporary and its results insignificant. This is not there-
fore, a precedent for reckless imitation unless under circum-
stances of exactly analogous necessity, and even then, against!
stead}- infantry, more thoroughly trained to the use of their weapon |
than were the l-'rench, it is doubtful whether such a charge will
ever be again attended with such a measure of success.
Captain Lumley, a German cavalry officer who served in the
war, referring to this battle says : " Although the object in view
was obtained by the noble sacrifice made by the Prussian
cavalry, still, although a cavalry officer, I cannot help admittini,'
that the same result would have been obtained at a very niucli
"a
'i ■
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
T35
less expenditure of life and money had mounted infantry been
employed."
Nevertheless occasions may present themselves durin^^ the
course of a battle when a small body of cavalry may reap a
sudden success. But the chief element in such a case must be
surprise, which necessitates cavalry being hidden up to the last
moment and then falling;;- suddenly on the enemy before he has
time to rally, thouf^h such occasions will probably be of rare
occurrence. The employment of cavalry in the defence (see
chap, viii.) describes the opportunities cavalry still have for such
operations.
The chances that occur for cavalry were well shown in Skobe-
leff's retreat from the captured Plevna redoubts. Turkish infan-
try endeavouring to turn the Russian withdrawal into a rout
advanced right through the Russian skirmishers, but were taken
in tlank by a squadron of Cossacks hid behiiid a fold on the
j,Tound and suffered severely.
If we turn now to the Russo-Turkish campaign, we hnd that
although the Russian army of invasion \Vas very well provided
with cavalry, well mounted drilled and armed, yet they did very
little towards breaking down the Turkish military strength in
comparison with tlu cost of forming and maintaining its organiza-
tion, although the theatre of operations between the Danube and
I the Hosphorus has no fences or ditches, and, with the exception
[of a portion of the Balkan range, is excellently adapted to the free
use of cavalry.
It nuist be admitted that the cavalry leaders seem not to have
.taken to heart the lessons of previous wars, as this arm was not
properly employed in its duties of reconnoitring and keeping
[touch of the enemy, man\' failures of which might be adduced,
Init especially the occupation of Plexna by the Turks w liich was
[not discovered by the Russians, although at the time only twenty
[iniles distant, until their march on Plevna was suddenly arrested
1)\ fnc being opened on them from (iri\it/a. There was also a
[i^teat want of enterprise evinced in the employment of this arm
i^tnt rally, as in tlie case c^f Kryloffs cavalry division which had to
li'ivei tlu' investment of Plevna from Orchanic in the early part of
lie inxestnient. ' ' .
136
TACTICAL NOTES.
But there are severaHnstances when the Russian cavalry was
properly handled as in Gourko's raid across the Balkans ; but bv
far the most valuable work done by the Russian cavalry was per-
formed by the brigade originally under Skobeleff consisting of
regiments from the Caucasus. These regiments were, however,
really mounted infantry as they were armed with long-ranginj,'
rifles, and were accustomed to act on foot.
Towards the connnencement of the investment of Plevna a
great cavalry corps of 6,000 cavalry and _^o horse artillery guns
was formed under Kryloff to shut in Plevna on the west side and
cut of all communication from Orchanieand Sofia. The strategical
task of this corps was a manifold one : it had to watch the arnn
of Plevna, to reconnoitre the country towards the west end south,
and to meet any relieving force advancing from these directions.
In the idea of stopping a threatened attempt at relief in force
by cavalry alone there lies indisputably an over estimation of the
fighting value of cavalry alone, equipped as it is, without the sup-
port of infantry ; still it caimot be denied that this force was badh
handled and did not fulfil the task assigned to it, but permitted
large convoys to be thrown into Plevna almost without a strug^de,
The task of preventing the provisioning of Plevna could only be
done in two ways, either by taking up a defensive position on the
Plevna-Orchanie line and waiting to be attacked, or by rapid
movements and vigorous offensive tactics. The latter course was
evidently the most natural role for a cavalry force especially as
the country was favourable for the employment of this arm.
Kryloff, however, followed neither course, Init retreated before
the advancing Turks almost without striking a blow, a course
which cannot be considered justifiable under the circumstances
seeing the great importance of preventing the sending of provis-
ions and amnmnition into Plevna.
Still it is hard to conceive that ca\alry could eventually li;ive
succeeded in keeping an infantry corps of 10,000 men at a distance
from Plevna. The tasks assigned to,the German cavalry in 187"-
71 never recjuired of it to carry out a decisive combat against
large masses of hostile infantry. The blockade of Plevna on the
west side only became effective after Gourko tookconnnand there,
and also afier very considerable forces of infantry were made
available to support the cavalry.
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
137
As regards the tactical employment of cavalry one is struck by
their excessive employment of dismounted action. The dis-
mounted combat of the Russian cavalry is an essential fac-
tor of its activity, that of the German cavalry is only a re-
source in case of need. The ideal Russian cavalry division is a
combination of the three arms, capable of employment for any
sort of fighting and endowed with great rapidity of movement,
the dragoon regiment representing in a measure the infantry ele-
ment of the division being meant to fight in two ways, either on
foot or mounted.
On the field of battle the cavalry did but little service. The
lance did little if any execution worthy of mention, while the
sabres came into play onl}' upon one or two occasions when the
Turks were completely surrounded, and, refusing to surrender,
were cut down to a man. Such incidents could scarcely be ex-
pected to occur with any troops except Moslems, as any other
soldiery would surrender upon finding themselves hopelessly sur-
rounded and overpowered. The " arme blanche " whether lance or
sword, proved of so little practical use, not only in this war but in
previous ones as well, that their banishment from future armaments
is advocated in some quarters. But it must not be forgotten that
the lance, which is a far more efficient weapon than the sword,
may still be very useful in the attack of infantry disorganized or
shaken by artillery or infantry fire, or in pursuit, and the sword in
charges of cavalry against cavalry. That such charges were not
I of frequent occurence in the last two wars, of 1870 and 1877, ^^e
chiefly due to the cavalry of one side in the previous war, and of
I both sides in the latter, not being properly handled ; and it seems
isi:enerally taken for granted by most military writers that great
cavalry combats will in the next war form a prelude to the action
of the other arms. F"or such occasions the sabres may therefore
still be of use, provided they be manufactured of good cutting
steel, are made lighter than the English sword, and are carried in
leathern or wooden scabbards. The present cavalry sword is
heavy and perfectly useless as a cutting weapon, and the steel
scabbards', besides being noisy and conspicious, dull the edge of
|the blade.
Enough has been said to show that the great changes in
jinndprii fire-arms have rendered \alueless a great part of the for-
138
TACTICAL NOTES.
mer effectiveness of the existing cavalry organizations, and the
necessity of making some important modifications in the nature
of the drill and armarnenf of this branch of the service is becom-
ing more and more felt, but the exact character of these changes
has yet to be determined.
The necessity of providing a large contingent of mounted in-
fantry for future armies Ixnng admitted, the problems to be solved
in this connection may be summari;ced as follows :
1. Shall the existing proportion between the two arms of the
service, that is between the cavalry and infantry, be preserved,
modifying, of course, the existing cavalry as far as they may re-
(juire improvement in drill and armament, and then add a new
and distinct arm of mounted infantry ?
2. Shall the existing force of cavalry be maintained, and shall
part of the infantry be taught to ride and act as mounted infantry
when occasion requires ?
3. Shall the infantry be maintained as at present, and shall the
cavalry be armed and taught so as to enable them to discharge
the duties of mounted infantry ?
With regard to the first question, considering that mounted in-
fantry is destined to perform many of the duties hitherto de-
volving on cavalry, to retain the existing organization of that arm
will make the mounted force belon^dng to an army, which is always
difficult to maintain and equip, too lunnerous. The great con-
tinental powers have decided that to keep special bodies of in-
fantry for mounted action is to add a fifth wheel to the coach.
They all consider that there are many occasions on which men
carried on horses to the point of action and then dismounted to
right may be of very great value ; but they have decided that
such :r.anoeuvres should be executed by cavalry, which must all
be trained to act in this manner.
The second (juestion nia\ be disposed of in a few words. To
go through the infantry regiments and withdraw from them every
man who can ride on the outbreak of war would be to disorgaiii/f
and weaken the chief fighting force of modern armies to such an
extent as to be manifestly impracticable ; and yet it would appear
to be the intention of the authorities in luigland to teach sonio
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
139
infantry soldiers in every regiment to ride for this express purpose.
Besides, an ability to ride forms but a small part of what is
required from mounted infantry as they must be thoroughly
trained and taught to act together in the l fecial duties that will
(ievolve upon them if they are to prove a really efficient force.
Also this plan, like the first, would increase the mounted force
unduly, and the mass of horses would be both an encumbrance on
the field of battle and difficult to feed.
The third problem evidently suggests the means for providing
this new force with the least possible expense and without any
derangement of the other branch of the service, and is the plan
to be adopted by all the great military powers. To accomplish
this, a careful examination of the armament and drill of the exist-
ing cavalry organi;;ations will be necessary, useless weapons must
be tiirown away or improved and others substituted, which, with
modified systems of instruction, will enable the cavalry to fulfil the
new duties of mounted infantry efficiently. For this, whatever
other arm they may carry, they must have a long-range rifle.
The problem then to be solved would appear to be, to change
the armament and drill of all or nearly all the existing cavalry
regiments into a homogeneous mounted force which will com-
bine all the useful features of the old cavalry organization, still
capable of being employed at the present day, with the new duties
of the force universally admitted to be a necessity.
It will now be useful to investigate what the duties of cavalry
formerly were in order that those may be discovered which
have been rendered impracticable by the introduction of breech-
loaders, and to see which of them can be more efficiently per-
formed by mounted infantry.
Speaking generally, the former duties of cavalry were as follows :
1. Breaking infantry lines and squares by desperately charging
and overwhelming them by sheer impetus.
2. Charging batteries of artillery and sabring the gunners.
3. Attacking infantry when it is executing some important
movement depending for its success upon rapidity of action, and
delaying them by reckless self-sacrifice long enough to defeat the
object of the enemy.
140
TACTICAL NOTES.
4. Covering the retreat of their own army, or pressing on tin
rear of the retreating enemy.
5. Opposing other cavalry and preventing them from accomp-
lishing their purposes, whether on the field of battle or before or
after.
6. Protecting convoys of all kinds.
7. Foraging for, and requisitioning supplies for the army.
8. Scouting and outpost duties.
To these ancient duties may now be added :
9. Masking the front of the main army, and concealing the real
movements from the enemy.
10. Making great raids in rear of an enemy destroying every-
thing that can be of use to him.
Now considering, as before remarked, that infantry with its
long range and rapidly firing rifles can generally annihilate a
cavalry force before it can come within striking distance, it would
appear that cavalry can no longer perform the first duty here
enumerated unless previously broken by fire. But it must be
conceded that' the value of cavalry on the field of battle remains a
matter of controversy. No one doubts the importance of its use
for reconnortring purposes, or for closing the appi^oaches to and
exit from a frontier while molilization is in progress. The ques-
tion now before us is, whether or not the day of great charges
has passed by? One thing is certain, none of the continental
powers have yet reduced their cavalry or laid down any rule for
excluding it from the chance of performing great deeds during
a battle. The enemies of this arm point to the terrible destruc-
tion which befell cavalry on several occasions during the Franco-
German war when it attempted great charges against infantry,
and to its want of success in the Russo-Turkish war. Its friends
admit that there must be sometimes much loss of life, but assert
that certain successes could never have been attained except by
the action of cavalry, especially when combined with artillery.
They quote such battles as that of Mars-la-Tour where the
movement of Bazaine's army was checked by the action of a
small German force the chief factors of which were cavalry and
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
141
artillery, and they say if Benedek had used his cavalry boldly
against the Crown Prince of Prussia in 1866 it might have been
possible for him to defeat Prince Frederick Charles while the
Crown Prince was delayed. Again it is clear that, supposing two
contending portions of infantry to be equally matched, a vigorous
charge by masses of cavalry on one side ought to turn the scale.
Nevertheless many are in doubt whether such successes are really
attainable by cavalry as is claimed by its friends, and, compared
to former years, there can be no question that its action on the
field of battle is very considerably curtailed.
The second duty is also now generally impossible unless the
flanks of artillery are left unprotected, for to charge modern artil-
lery in front will be almost certain annihilation. A French g^
pounder gun of 4 J cwt. fired 16 Shrapnel shell at about 1,100
yards at targets representing a regiment of cavalry advancing and
made 3,657 hits.
As has been before remarked, Von Bredow's charge at Mars-la-
Tour would not, exdept under very special circumstances, en-
courage a frequent resort to number three.
Number four has been very much weakened ; bodies of infantry
(or mounted infantry) following a retreating enemy would make
short work of an ordinary cavalry force detached to check the
pursuit. Also with the long-range and destructive weapons of the
day the main force of one side or the other usually gives way
before the lines are close enough to cause an old-fashioned panic
wherein pursuing cavalry had it all their own way and were able
to ride down the helpless infantry; besides now, a handful of
determined infantry could keep off a considerable body of pursu-
111},^ cavalry, and a modern retreat is generally made in sufficient
time and good order to prevent the enemy's cavalry doing much
dan^age.
The balance of opinion seems to be that the old days of bearing
[down an infantry formation by sheer weight may be regarded as
over, never to return, for the fact is being more and more
reco^niized every day that cavalry can, as a general rule, only
charge infantry when partly shaken or disorganized, and then
only when they ace not in close formations; consequently the
mounted man of the future, instead of being tall and heavy.
142
TACTICAL NOTES.
needinpf a correspondiiifj^ly big and voracious horse to carry him,
should be a lij,dit. active, and intelligent trooper, mounted on a
hardy and nimble animal easily fed and capable of long endurance,
Also for the proper execution of his reconnoitring duties, which
" require so much reflection and exercise of the mental faculties "
the cavalry soldier should be intelligent and able to draw
correct inferences from what he sees, and report accordingly, if he
is to be the "eye of the general." Here we are coming to the
ideal of what a mounted infantry soldier should be, and if this
trooper be armed with the infantry rifle and trained to fight on
foot like an ordinary infantry soldier, we at once obtain this force
which will form such an important element of the army of the
future.
With such a man, horse, and armament, it would appear that
the duties under heads 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, can be far more
effectively performed than by the old type of cavalry ; while,
besides, such a force may often act with success (mounted or dis-
mounted according to circumstances) in cases i and 2, which,
as already stated, are almost impossible for the old fashioned
cavalry. In addition to these vital advantages they would be
much more effective in 4 than the former organizations in their
most palmy days. Thus it would appear that mounted infantry
can perform all that existing cavalry can accomplish and that
more efficiently, besides a great deal that they cannot do.
■
i
1
^
These conclusions are based on the very universally acknowl-
edged fact that cavalry acting as such can very rarely hope to
contend against modern infantry in any formation without being
decimated. Instead therefore of launching cavalry against infan-
try, as under heads i, 3, 4 and 10, or against artillery as under 2.
which would generally end in destruction, mounted infantry may
be made to attack them by galloping up within reasonable distance
of the enemy where they would dismount and leave their horses
under any cover that may be available, and the dismounted men
would then advance in the ordinary infantry formation for attack,
or a modified formation, and act as infantry ; or they would, if
provided with spades as they should be, intrench themselves
rapidly and keep in check the advancing columns of the enemy
until reinforcements can come up.
Tm^rn
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
143
Greater execution could also in most cases be produced when
acting against cavalry, as under head 5, if the mounted men dis-
mount and act as infantry, as was done in the American civil war
and as recommended by General SheVidan, ;ind this too applies to
the protection of convoys under 6. As we have seen,, the opera-
tions of the Gorman reconnoitring cavalry were frequently held
in check in 1870 by insignificant detachments of infantry or of
armed peasantry ; but had the cavalry been equipped and trained
as mounted infantry they would easily have overcome these
French " franc-tireurs" ; this shows how far more effectively the
duties of foraging, scouting and masking the front of an army
(7, 8 and 9) can be performed by mounted infantry than by cavalry.
These views it will have been observed incline to the side
which considers that cavalry can no longer, under ordinary con-
ditions, contend with infantry with any hope of success, and the
writer is certainly inclined to favour this view of the matter,
although it is fully conceded that the supporters of the shock
action of tactics have a good deal to urge in support of their
views.
I
CA VALRY TACTICS ON THE FIELD OF HA TTLE.
In a preceding page it was stated that the great military powers
of Europe have not yet reduced their cavalry or laid down any
rule for excluding this arm from performing its old duties on the
battle tield by charging infantry and artillery whenever a favour-
uhle opportunity occurs : it will therefore be instructive to see how
it is still proposed by them to employ cavalry in action. For
this we cannot do better than examine the performances of this
arm in the autumn manoeuvres which take place annually and are
made to conform as nearly as possible to actual war operations. As
an illustration the German cavalry manceuvres of 1880 will be
taken. Hut it will be first necessary to consider some of the
instructions laid down for the employment of this arm.
In the formation and employment of a ca\ airy division, the
distribution into first, second and third line; or advanced guard,
Hrst aiul second line, will always be observed.
The ist lino is the nttackiuij:; line, the 2\u\ the inavcviivring line.
144
TACTICAL NOTES.
the 3d is the reserve line. From these designations it is evident
of which arms the hnes would as a rule be composed supposing a
distinction to be made between heavy and light regiments. The
first would be formed of cuirassiers and lancers ; the second, as
it requires the greatest manoeuvring power and agility, would con-
sist of dragoons and hussars; the third would also be composed
of light regiments as it also requires great rapidity and mobility
in order to cover comparatively long stretches of ground in the
shortest possible time ; still, heavy regiments can be employed in
the 3d line but not as a rule in the 2nd.
The three lines have distinct duties to perform and act in
concert with one another in certain definite formations. The
fundamental formations are squadron columns, and close squadron
column according to the formation of the next preceding line.
It is understood that line is the only formation for attack. The
principal formations in which lines will generally be formed by
preference are :
For the ist line, squadron columns and line.
For the 2nd line, squadron columns and close squadron column
(the two regiments at full deploying interval from each other).
For the 3d line, close squadron column (the two regiments
being at close or full deploying interval).
On commencing to advance, the istline opens out to squadron
columns -Mid puts off forming line for attack as long as possible.
It manoeuvres against that Hank of the enemy which is most ex-
posed or easiest attacked, always endeavouring to outflank him,
but within 500 paces of the enemy no more flank movements can be
made. The 2nd line advances in close squadron column, out-
flanking the ist line on its threatened flank, and as a rule opens
out to squadron columns when the ist line forms line, sending
generally two squadrons as " succour squadrons" to the ist line
either in line or in /ug column at considerable intervals apart,
and at from 100 to 150 paces in rear of the ist line. The rest of
the 2nd line maintains a distance of 300 paces from the ist.
When there is a reserve (3d line) the whole of the 2d line :na\ he
employed to succour the 1st line, filling up the gaps caused by its
changes of direrticMi, and serving for flank attacks and to deride tho
m
•■^i .V;" \A '■ '5^**" ''t'!JPr;?'f^
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
145
issue of the fight, secure the victory, and force back the enemy.
Should the enemy's 2d Hne advance against the flank of the ist
it must be energetically opposed with the whole strength of the
2d line. If, however, there is no 3d line this must never be done.
In that case the leader of the 2d line must always keep a portion
intact as a reserve for any eventuality, to meet a sudden flank at-
tack of the enemy, or to cover the retreat of the ist line and at-
tack the pursuing enemy. The 2d line will change direction
when the ist line is so near the enemy that he cannot change his,
and when the movements oP the enemy render such changes
necessary. Should the enemy's 2nd line advance against the
tlank of the first, it must be energetically opposed with the whole
strength of the 2nd line.
The jd line (reserve) follows the ist at 450 paces distance in rear
of the flank opposite to that where the 2d line is placed. It is
formed in close squadron column, the two regiments being as a
rule at full deploying interval apart. As soon as the 2d line is
engaged the 3d line usually opens out to squadron columns and
takes the place of that line when it is expended, assuming its
functions, but always keeping a portion intact. In changes of
direction, and when it is necessary to fall on the enemy's flank,
the attack will be made by the 2d or 3d line. The 3d line will
frequently find favourable opportunities for manoeuvring against
and attacking the enemy's flanks, while the 2d line attacks him
in front.
The attacks of the ist and 2d lines must not be made instan-
I taneously as the effect of the latter will be greater if it allows
time for the shock of the ist line to throw the enemy into con-
fusion, but it must not be made too late, and 300 paces is there-
[fore the maximum distance allowed between the two lines.
Never in advancing, or retiring is the passage through the in-
jtervals of another line allowed, and every repulsed body must
Iretire perpendicularly to its line of front and never obliquely to
[it.
While advancing all three lines should throw out scouts to
Itht'ir front whose duty is to point out the way and sec that the
liidvance is not impeded by obstacles ; similarly small patrols
Isliould be sent out to the flanks to watch them and observe the
Icuemv.
•(■«( iE(! Si '■?«? ? * iiW. (i (IK
146
TACTICAL NOTES.
The 1st line is the striking hne and is designed to break into
the enemy and as far as possible run him down wi'h the first on-
slaught, i<^ cannot do more than this. The 2d and 3d lines have
to afford vigorous support to the first and protect it against the
enemy's reserves or 2d line, to follow up the fight, to complete
the victory, or disengage the ist line in case it has been repulsed.
In every attack carried out to the actual shock there will be
the collision, the melee with the enemy, and the most utter dis-
order ; and in peace oxercisesthe passage from disorder to close
formation on the trumpet sound and in the direction indicated
by the leader's sword and the direction of his horse is constantiv
practised since good order cannot be too soon re-established.
As regards the principles of the employment of this arm, it is
prescribed that cavalry leaders must be allowed to act with great
independence on the field of battle and on their own responsi-
bility, conforming of course to the general instructions they may
have received.
A cavalry leader must keep near the other arms so as to be
ready to act in support, and he must watch with the utmost vigi-
lance both the enemy and the course of the combat and take the
initiative at the right moment and without waiting for special
orders, as when the enemy appears shaken, is on the point of re-
tiring, or gives other chances of success, always endeavouring,^ to
fall on the enemy's fiank, and no favourable opportunity for at-
tack should ever be lost, but a charge should only be made when
there is a prospect of success. To wait for orders on such oc-
casions is to lose the favourable moment, ;ind the leader must
therefore, of his own initiative, get to the place where his action
will be effective. If no other orders are given the cavalry should
always be posted on one of tiio flanks of the line of battle and as
much under cover as possible.
Ground that is to be passed over in a charge nnist always be
reconnoitred by scouts in advance, so that ditches, hollow roads,
or other obstacles ma}- not check or disorder the attack and put
the troops in danger.
Infantry should onlv be attacked when it has been bn^ken by
fire. Unbroken infantr> should onl}' be attacked as a very excep-
tional case when it is absolutely necessary, in the general inter-
est, that time be gained.
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
147
These instructions also state that "it is of the highest impor-
tance to regulate the attack properly. The horses must reach the
adversary in good wind and with their full powers so as to be able
to pursue a flying enemy or to resist any intact bod)' immediately
after the former has been charged. It must therefore be a fixed
principle not to assume the increased pace nntil we are certain
that the enemy cannot be reached at a slower pace, or when we
have approached him so closely as to be able to run him down
by the shock of a charge, or when, in the attack on infantry, we
have entered the sphere of most effective fire.
" At peace manoeuvres we may take as the rule to begin the
attack at the walk, then pass to the trot, which must be continued
for about 1,000 paces, and then commence the gallop; the last must
be kept up for 600 paces, or, in the attack on infantry, for 800
paces; the charge will be of 120 to 150 paces duration."
The time required for the attack would accordingly be as
follows :
1,000 paces at the trot = 3 mins. i?o sees.
600 '' " gallop = I " 12 "
150 " " charge = o " 19 '*
= 4
41
Total... 1,750
Against infantry :
800 paces at a trot ^=2 mins. 40 sees.
800 " " gallop = I " 36 "
150 " " charge = " 9 "
Total. ..1, 750 4 25
This is the normal attack but accidents of ground and othc
circumstances may of course vary figures.
Every year in Germany there take place grand cavalry
inanceuvres in which cavalry are either operated by divisions or
by brigades. A cavalry division is composed generally of three
br'f ules, each of two regiments, making a total of six regiments
Two batteries of horse artillery are usually attached to each
division. A regiment of cavalry in the field comprises four squad
rons each about 150 strong.
On the line of march a division marches in very compact order
preceded by an advanced guard and a screen of scouts. As soon
148
TACTICAL NOTES.
as these signal an enemy the commander of the division moves to
the front, and, after a hasty reconnaissance, j^ives the necessary
instructions for forming the division for attack and indicates the
primary direction. Meanwhile the horse artillery batteries have
generally galloped forward to take up a position and open fire on
the enemy to cover the deployment of the division which is always
formed up for attack in three lines, each line consisting of one
brigade. Subsequently, if necessary, the artillery moves to a flank
so that its fire be not masked by the advance. The general of the
division then places himself 200 or 250 yards in front at the head
of his division and directs the advance. The commanders of the
different lines and regiments also act as guides to their respective
commands maintaining the cohesion of the whole until the first
line receives from the general of the division the signal for attack.
From that moment the commanders of lines and of regiments
co-operate with the general plan of action but with complete inde-
pendence and at their own responsibility. When opposed to
cavalry unsupported by infantry, the first line moves at a trot
straight at the enemy's first line. Nevertheless during the advance
it is generally sought to extend beyond one of the adversary's
wings by an oblique march in columns of troops, and this the first
line never failed to do when the accidents of ground enabled it to
conceal this movement. The two other lines conform their
movements to that of the first, and thus, as a rule, the whole force
inclined towards one of the flanks.' Several times the division
found itself inclining in front of its artillery thus masking its fire.
but more frequently it inclined towards the other flank, thereby
compelHng the enemy, if he also wheeled to meet this turnin|;|
movement, to expose a flank to the artillery. During the whole]
of the preparatory advance up to within about 400 or 500 yards
of the enemy, the first line remained at a trot in line of squadron
columns of (juarter (^) squadrons at deploying intervals. At 400
or 500 yards it deployed into line for attack and breaking into aj
gallop charged when within about 100 yards of the enemy.
The second line follows the first at a distance of about 300J
yards in echelon on the exposed flank, it usually moves in quarterl
distance column of regiments at deploying intervals. During tliej
preparatory advance at a trot it reduces the interval separatinJ
it from the front line, and at the moment when this latter d('i)loy>[
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
149
vesto
sssary
2S the
; have
fire on
always
of one
a flank
I of the
;ie head
s of the
spective
he first
• attack,
"iments
;te inde-
osed to
t a trot
advance
versary's
p the first
Died it to
:\n their
lole force
division
: its fire,
thereby
he whole I
300 yarci^
.quadroiil
I At 400
[:\'^ into ;i|
ay.
I bout 3001
in quartei|
IJurin^'
the
separatmc
tor deploys!
for attack the second line forms squadron columns of quarter
(|) sfiuadrons at deployinfj intervals, from which they subse-
quently deploy either wholly or in part, according to circum-
stances, and fall upon the flanks or rear of the enemy's line or
advance to meet his reserves. Generally two squadrons are
detached as supports to the first line which deploy into line and
follow one in rear of each regiment at a distance of about 150
yards.
The duty of the second line is to protect the exposed flank of
the first, to supj^ort it and act on the flank or even the reserves of
the enemy according to circumstances. The third line follows
about 450 yards in rear of the first in echelon on the inner
flank. It usually advances in quarter distance columns of regi-
ments with or without deploying interval between the two. This
line composes the reserve, and, when the second line comes into
action, it forms itself into squadron columns of quartersquadrons at
deploying intervals and takes the place of the former ; and when
required it deploys one or both its regiments to meet the leserves
when the second line was unable to perform this duty. The third
line operates always in echelon in order to defer as long as possible
the moment when the last squadron, hitherto held intact, should
have to take part in the fight, so as always, if possible, to keep in
hand a final reserve.
These different attacks are not simultaneous but succeed each
other at short intervals of a few seconds. For the fulfilment of
these duties the lines in rear cannot follow immediately behind
the line in front, but the second line usually follows in rear of one
flank (if the first line, while the third is behind the other flank.
Should the front line succeed in extending across the flank of
[the enemy and is hidden from his view by the ground, the second
line sometimes makes the frontal attack while the first line attacks
lin flank, the inner regiment of this line forming column to allow
[sp: ce for the second line to advance. When this is not done, the
Isecond line during the advance prolongs to a flank while gradually
jdiminishing the distance separating it from the first line, and takes
the enemy in flank and rear.
While the first and second lines are hotly engaged in a general
m'lo('\ till' third line attacks the enemy in flank and rear or
I50
TACTICAL NOTES.
engap^es the reserves. At this moment not a squadron remains
intact but all form a confused mass of cavalry. Suddenly, at the
sound to rally, the scjuadrons and regiments reform in an instant,
and an impetuous pursuit is commenced either by the flank
squadrons of each regiment, or by an entire regiment, or even by
a whole line, according to whether the attack had absorbed the
whole force of the division or only a portion of it.
When opposed to infantr}-, a cavalry division always seeks to
act by surprise by debouching suddenly from behind an obstacle
which had hid it completely at a distance of i,ooo or 1,500 yards.
It then crosses this distance separating it from the enemy at full
speed and attacks him in front, flank, and rear, before he has time
to prepare for his defence.
For this attack, the division is formed in 6chelon of regiments,
more rarely in echelon of brigades, all the regiments being in
double column of squadrons at full distances. The two leading
regiments fall on the front of the enemy's infantry, the two next
charging straight to their front take them in flank, while the two
last fall on their rear, thus completely surrounding them, or this
third line moves to oppose the enemy's cavalry should he show
signs of moving to the assistance of his infantry.
It is very difficult to appreciate what chances of success such
an attack on infantry would have in time of war; it would for its
success have to depend mainly on the moral shock in the ranks
of the infantry produced by the apparition of such a living ava-
lanche. The only chance for the cavalry lies in the possibility that
the infantry will lose nerve and fire at random, in which case most
of the bullets will pass over the heads of the rapidly approaching
cavalry without inflicting on them any injury. If the infimtryare
seasoned troops and fire steadily the cavalry cannot fail to be
decimated, and the success of such a charge will therefore greatly
depend on the quality of the infantry attacked.
Against artillery the principle of attack is the same as against
infantry, acting by surprise and enveloping the artillery on all
sides, while a portion of the cavalry engages the escort, if any.
Cavalry always attacks in front in extended formation, while closed
bodies sitnnltaneonslv attack the flanks of the batteries.
CAVALRY AND MOUNTED INFANTRY.
151
In all these exercises the excellent training of the German
cavalry was very conspicious, amonj;; other points so necessary
for the effective employment of cavalry may be mentioned : regu-
larity of march, and of all changes in formation and direction
when in attack formation, excessive rapidity in deploying, im-
petuositv and energy in the attack as well as in pursuit, and lastly
but speciall}' the instantaneousness with which they rallied im-
mediately after a charge.
It is seen that the special principle of cavalry tactics, just ex-
plained, consists in attack in three lines, the first as a rule charg-
ing; more or less straight down on the enemy, while the second
attacks in flank, and the third line the rear or further reserves, or
engages in pursuit.
This same principle is carried out with smaller bodies than
divisions. Thus take for instance a cavalry brigade of two regi-
ments. One regiment might charge the enemy in front en-
deavouring as explained to overlap his flank, while three scpiadrons
of the other would attack the enemy oblicpiely, and the fourth
would complete the rout and pursue.
This principle of a three-line attack may also be practised by a
single regiment of four S(]uadrons. The rtrst line in this case
might be formed by a single squadron, the second by two squad-
rons in echelon to the right and left to guard against a flank attack
and also to deliver one, and the third line would then consist of
the fourth squadron to serve as a reserve or rall}'ing point.
In 1.S81 grand cavalry monceuvres were also held under the
direction of the greatest cavalry leader of the day. Prince b^rederick
Charles, but the manoeuvres were kept secret no foreigners being
allowod to attend them, and conseciuently but little information
rospecting them has yet come to hand. It appears however that
all the cavalry manoeuvres were founded on this broad principle
of tactics, namely the three-line system of attack.
It is stated that Princ;c brederick Charles is not oik; of those
who think that the days of the mounted arm of the service are
luunhered, and that Field Marshal \'on Moltkf thinks that the
tinutions of cavalry hasc been uuxlihed though certainK not
I abolished, and that an etiually useful if not an i'(piall\' glorious
liitinc awaits it. It would be vi'r\- instrii(:ti\i' to know in what
m
m
m
152
TACTICAL NOTES.
rf;spects he considers the functions of cavalry to be modified and
whether his opinions tend to their conversion into a type of
mounted infantry. This would appear to be the case as the Grand
General Staff at Berlin, of which Von Moltke is the head, admit
that the Federal horse in the American war of se':ession, and in
all probability Sheridan's corps specially, opened up quite a new-
field of activity for cavalry, and it is now a matter of regret at
the Berlin headquarters that the German cavalry in the campaij^n
of 1870-1 were so backward in profiting by the lessons of the
American raiders who proved themselves to be more daring and
inventive strategists. It is believed that had the German cavalry
leaders boldly pushed forward their divisions into the heart of
France immediately after Sedan they might have brought the
war to a much speedier close, by preventing the provisioning of
Paris and the organi^^ation of an army of defence by wedging
themselves in between the various strategic units of the Gambet-,
tist Icv^e en masse. But the opportunity was lost, and remember-
ing how the German cavalry were checked by small bodies of in-
fantry, for such extensive operations to be successful, cavalry must
be trained to act on foot.
It may be stated here that all the European cavalries recognize
that they cannot attack a steady infantry ; but an infantry demor-
alized by an artillery fire may be attacked.
It is said that during the cavalry manoeuvres of 1881 in Ger-
many some very important functions of cavalry of a new but non-
tactical nature were exercised. Small dynamite parties were
sent out on the sly to destroy britlges and cut railroad communi-
cations, while a few swift and intelligent troopers, accompanied
by an able telegraphist, secretly stole into the enemy's country
with an apparatus for tapping the wires, a process which has
been of the greatest service to the Germans in more than one
campaign. And here it may be mentioned incidentally that there
are always some intelligent soldiers in the head telegraph office at
Berlin for the purpose of acquiring the art of manipulating the
wires, and that there is also in tlu' capital a cor[)s of non-com
missioned officers whose business it is to transmit all military
orders to the various regiments etc. of the garrison, thus qualify-
ing themselves for the exigencies of war.
I
CHAPTER IV.
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
Since the improvement of Infantry weapons, and especially
since the Russo-Turkish war, it has become the fashion in some
quarters to decry the value of Artillery and to look upon this arm
as havinj^f lost comparatively all influence in the field; it is con-
sequently considered desirable to devote some pap^es to the study
of this subject and endeavour to ascertain what effect Artillery,
when properly handled, may be expected to produce in the future.
The excuse for dwelling at such length on the question of artil-
lery tactics is the fact that they do not appear to be very generally
understood, yet the importance of studying this subject is evident
and the following words of Sir Garnet Wolselely's endorse this :
"hefore any officer can really be fit to command troops in action,
it is absolutely necessary that he should have thought out for
himself this artillery question as thoroughly as any Artillery
Officer can have done so. Until he has done this I believe it will
be impossible for him efficiently, or with due regard to the inter-
ests of the country, to command Her Majesty's troops in action.
As I have already said, we are, as an army, too much inclined to
iikvoteour attention to the special branch of the service in which
we have been brought up."
It is generally admitted that the effect of smooth-bore held
suns of former days was greater in comparison with that of the
infantry arm then used, than is the effect y)roduced by rifled guns
relatively to that of the breech-loading rifle. This is due to the
development of infantry fire having been much greater than that
of artillery at close ranges.
i
154
TACTICAL NOTES.
We have only to read the Campaigns of the great Napoleon
to be convinced of the decisive effects produced by artillery on
the field of battle, as at Friedland or Aspern, and to come to the
conclusion that, except under favourable circumstances such as
Sedan, artillery is not so powerful comparatively as it used to be.
So much being admitted, it is not to be inferred that artillery is of
less importance now than formerly ; on the contrary, the necess-
ity for a powerful forde of artillery has become of more essential
importance than ever. The very fact that infantry fire has be-
come so powerful that a direct attack on infantry in a good posi-
tion is impossible without the co-operation of artillery, which
was not the case formerly, has rendered the presence of artillery
on the field of battle of more consequence than ever : and to per-
form its work effectually it must be in sufficient force to cope
successfully with the enemy's artillery. The necessity then for
its existence has in no way diminislied.
The causes which have led to this change in the relative power
of the two arms are not difficult to find, for in former times in-
fantry fire was not really eftective over 300 yards, a range at which
the case fire of smooth-bore guns was most deadly and at which it
could certainly overwhelm the fire of the infantry ; but although guns
were so effective in those days the number sent into the field was
greatly limited by their want of mobility, for in Napoleon's battles
one is struck by the wholesale nanner in which guns fell into tlif
hands of the victor ; also the fire of artillery is most effective
against troops in close formation, but the more open formation?
of the present day have without doubt defrauded it of an appro-
priate target for its fire.
The objections sometimes urged that the opportunities of effective
artillery fire have diminished with the improvement of the infan-
try weapon are scarcely borne out by the facts, owing to the far
greater range and accuracy of modern artiller}', and to their more
powerful projectiles which are far superior in their effect to those
used by smooth-bore guns beyond the range of case. A word of
caution against being led away by conclusions too hastily formed
is here necessary.
War between civilized nations afibrd in these days important
lessons in military science. As soon as a campaign commences.
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
155
its events are followed from day to day by a large number of
officers who seek in the formidable experiences of the battle-tiela
the confirmation of views which they have previously expressed,
or some additional facts with which to combat the opinions they
contest. The result is that every important struj^j^le is followed
by certain new principles or formuhe, sometimes too hastily
formed, and the falseness and error of which is made evident later
on. It was thus that the principle of the necessity of constantly as-
sumin}^ the offensive and of bayonet attacks, too hastily ac-
cepted by the Austrians after the war of 1859, cost them so dearly
in 1866. It is thus too, that an exaj^gerated idea of the defensive,
so much extolled in France after this campaign, had such fatal
consequences for that Power in 1870, The greatest care has
therefore to be taken not to come to premature conclusions in the
all important and difficult studies in tactics.
One of the chief facts which comes clearly to light from a study
of recent wars, is the predominance which fire-arms have attain-
ed over the " arme blanche." The effect of fire 'akes the lead in
everything. Modern tactics consist entirely in means for increas-
infj the effect of fire or in endeavours to avoid its effects. There
are no longer any studied formations, as formerly, for resisting
charges of cavalry, but instead, every day new ones are tried for
the purjiose of approaching with as little loss as possible posi-
tions defended by infantry and artillery fire, the deadly effects of
which have increased so much of late years.
The history of modern artillery may be divided into three
epochs. The first, the introduction of rified cannon in the Italian
campaign of 1859, which showed the advantages of the new
j weapons. The second, their general adoption b\- all European
Powers and their employment in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870-
i/L The third, the introduction of the present armaments by the
different European Powers after the Franco-German war, which
showed the necessity for improved ;'.nd more powerful guns. At
the present day the field artilleries of Europie are all armed with
L'uns of high initial velocities, firing shrapnel and improved forms
jof common shell.
In the first campaign, that in Italy in 1859, jn which rifled
Iguns were used their effect would seem to have been chiefly
4m\
156
TACTICAL NOTES.
moral. The Austriaiis found they were struck at ranges at which
they had hitherto been saff* from artillery tire. But the records
of the war by no means j^'o to show that the physical effects of
the l"~i iich j^uns were ver}' great, for, altlu)Mgh an improve-
ment on the old smooth-bores, the new weapons were still ex-
tremely inaccurate, and the projectile they tired, an ordinary
common shell, was, so far as its man-killing powers were con-
cerned, very inefficient. Moreover, by the introduction of rifled
guns, the artillery were deprived o'" the use of grape shot, whilt
the range and effect of case were much diminished owing to tln'
small powder charge employed and consequent low nui/zle velocity.
But the general introduction of rifled fire-arms had a reflex action
on the artillery. It had become necessary, since the infantry
could now act against artillery at far longer ranges than formerly,
for the latter to recover their old position by improvements in
their weapons. Since at comparatively close ranges they now
suffered infinitely more than formerly, their object would evident-
ly be to obtain guns which, by increased accuracy at lonj^er
ranges, would enable them to tire as effectively from them as they
had formerly at close ranges. Hence it followed, since smooth-
bores were susi. ptible of no further improvement, that ritled guns
, became a necessity of the times and were adopted by all military
powers.
But none had thought of adopting the breech-loading rifle
which Prussia had alone the temerity of introducing 25 years
previous to the war of 1866, where its brilliant result, which the
Danish war of 1864 had not been sufficient to manifest, awoke all
Europe to its position.
As regards rified field guns, the war of 1864 increased the gen-
eral impression in their favour, which was further confirmed by
the war of 1866. In this campaign the Austrian artillery was
armed with a bronze muzzle-loading ritled gun of no gi^eat range.
while the Prussian w ^ equipped partly with smooth-bores and
partly with steel breech-loaders. The Austrian artillery was well
handled and on account of its tactical use was more than a
match for that of the Prussians, whose rifled guns were however
far superior but not so well handled, and in consequence ob-
tained but poor results which therefore were laid almost entirely
to this head, while the Austrians, conscious of having obtained
TACTICAL POWER OF TIELD ARTILLERY". I57
good results from their weapons, saw no reason to change them.
Unfortinuitely for the artillery tiierefore this arm diil not come
fiirward conspicuously in this war, since the artillery of the victor
had only played a very subordinate role. Prussia, too poor to re-
place all her old smooth-bores by rifled guns was doing so gradu-
ally when the war broke out, and this is why she seat into the
tield both rifled and smooth-bore guns without yet having learned
the tactical v.inploymcnt of the former. The Austrian artillery
luiwever gained considerable laurels, as it alone supported the
infantry crushed by the breech-loading rifle, and after the battle
of Sadovva, this artillery, by sacrihcing itself, had saved the re-
mains of the army and covered its retreat. But the Austrians
were vanquished and but little attention was paid to them, all
eyes being directed on the remarkable successes of their oppon-
ents, and it was from them alone that it was thought lessons
could be culled. Even a great military writer, carried away by
his enthusiasm for the Prussians, gave them credit for retaining
a proportion of smooth-bore guns, and he, as well as others,
thought they saw in this fact one cause of their success !
The effect of this war was to magnify the extraordinary power
of breech-loading small arms at the expense of guns, the days
of which were by some considered numbered. In consequence,
all countries armed themselves with breech-loading rifles
of a pattern far superior to that of the Prussians and but
little attention was paid to the artillery. This was not however
the case with the Prussians, who, better advised, thought chiefly
I of improving their artillery the weakness of which in the war had
[not escaped them, though any other nation would probably have
ieclared artillery useless and out of date because such signal
I victories had been gained without it. Tiie same was said of the
cavalry, the role of which was declared to have come to an end ;
instead of this, however, it went on increasing in importance each
jday, though its sphere of action became altered. The Prussians
Itheu, unable to meet the expense of rearming tlieir whole forces,
jcontented themselves by improving their artillery and studying
lits tactical employment seeing how this arm had, in 1866, signally
jlailed to perform the work expected of it, and they did not improve
[the infantry weapon whicli was already a good one. Thus, for
Ai:
■ift
^■1 II « "I'll'-I-'
158
TACTICAL NOTES.
them, the war of 1866 was a lesson in artillery, whereas in other
countries it was one of small arms. With the latter the require-
ments of artillery were little thought of in comparison with the
introduction of a breech-loading rifle, and what was refused to the
artillery owing to a complicated breech mechanism was accorded
to the infantry.
Affairs were in this state when the war of 1870 broke out. The
F'rench artillery, armed with an inferior weapon and with no tactical
instruction but purely technical, was utterly incapable of co{)iii};
with the far superior guns of the Germans handled in a manner
worthy of all praise. Tlie French " chassepot," however, discon-
■^erted enemy and friend alike when its deadly effects at long
ranges became evident, and when it was found to even decimate
at distances to which artillery scarcely ranged. The experience
then of the Prussians in 1866 stood the German artillery in good
stead in 1870-71. In the former war we find a great want of unity
of command over artiller}- masses. There was too much inde-
pendence of action with a corresponding diversity of objects in
view and want of unity of purpose, and concentration of fire on
important points was consequently seldom attained. In 1870-71
we find a complete contrast to this state of things ; large masses
of guns were concentrated under one command with one special
object in view, as at Mars-la-Totn" where late in the day 19
batteries were concentrated near the Bois de Vionville, and at
Gravelotte 31 batteries on St. Privat.
The guns were constantly pushed on to the front into most
dangerous positions and were often recklessly, sometimes use-
lessly, exposed to infantry fire. Heavy losses were not minded so
long as the fire of the guns was conducive to the success of the
general plan. They were moreover full}- alive to the in:portance
of closely supporting tiieir infantry in the close attack after the
preliminary stage of preparatory fire, and this was often carried
out with noble self sacrifice on tlic part of the artillery.
The want of this close support to the infantry was on sonu'
occasions severely felt as their infantiy haa the greatest conii-
dence in the sister arm, and justly. A notable instance of the want
of this support from no fault of the artillery, was at Spichcrcn,
where <^he infantry could make no impression until closely sup-
ported by guns (on the north edge of the plateau), an operation
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
159
rendered most difficult owing to the want of artillery positions at
close ranges.
As a natural consequence the victories of the Germans were
attributed in great measure to the better armament of their
artillery, and one of the first efforts made by the French, even
during the war, was to provide better guns for their artillery.
Similarly in Germany, the first thing done on the termination of
the war, was to entirely remodel the armament of the arti'lery
with a view to obtaining more po'.verful guns, not that their guns
had not liad great effect in the struggle, but it was seen that in
the face of the improved fire arms, and in the use of long range
fire by the infantry, the artillery in its turn must again move for-
ward; and the far superior rifles of the French xiuca sitated their
re-arming their infantry with an improved breech-loader as well.
The great defect of rifled field guns, for a long time after their
introduction, was their low mnz/Ae velocities and therefore their
want of power, since accurate shooting at knovvri long ranges was
for long considered the only essential, and hence their long range
tire was more like that from a howitzer than from a gun except
that their shell had a small bursting chargi . The Germans
clearly understood this in 1870, and their constant endeavours to
•^(it to close range show that they appreciated thr only method of
(ven partially counteracting this weakness. On tlie other haad,
the want of self defensive power on the part of the guns at close
nuifje from their inferior case rendered this course a peculiarly
fkui.i,^erous one, and it was only by the skill and valour of the
i^'unncrs, and the large number of pieces which were generally
Ill;^^sed, that these tactics wete carried out to a successful issue,
in 1877 the Russians generally employed their artillery in a very
jflifferent manner and with consecpiently very inferior results.
The great curvature of the projectiles alscj rendered a very
irxaot knowledge of the range essential. This, under tlu' condi-
tions of battle and without range finders, was often impossible
Inving to the difficulty of judging where the shells burst. More-
lover, this evil of curved trajectories was agg "avated by the want
if a jf()od man killing projectile and by the almost sole use of
llHicnssion fu/es. The Prussians used onl\' common shell, and
I'lie iMench shrapnel were almost useless on account of the wortli-
tssness of their fuzes and inferiority of their guns.
i6o
TACTICAL NOTES.
Increased power was to be sought by the Germans in three
ways. First of all the light held batteries were abolished and one
heavy gun adopted for all. Secondly, the power of guns wa?
much increased b}' firing larger shells with heavier charges givinf;
considerably higher velocities. Thirdly, the man killing power
of the common shells was increased and a shrapnel introduced,
'i hese improvements have since been followed by all the principal
European powers.
This war was followed by that between Russia and Turkey in
1877-78, in which the world witnessed an army with very indiffer-
ent organization and training, and which man}' deemed beaten in
advance, hold its own with success against the Russians inflict-
ing on them bloody defeats, and that too by the use of musketry at
very long ranges firing at random and without aim.
The Turks thus seemed to have conquered the great objection
made against this rapid firing, that of not being able to maintain
it long on account; of failure in ammunition. The Turkish re-
doubts were furnished with two, three, and even four lines of in-
fantry, who, as soon as the enemy was signalled in the distance
and without his being even seen, commenced throwing bullet?
with the continuous action of a machine *and with the greatest
rapidity possible, without caring in the least whither they went;
and in spite of this enormous expenditure of ammunition it never
appeared to run short.
This method of fighting, barbarous enough from a tactical
point ^f view, was nevertheless in some quarters eulogized as the
best modern progress. Nothing more was needed to keep the
assailant at a distance than to cover the ground with a sheet of
lead constantly sustained l)y a rolling fire of musketry. The first
soldiers to hand would suffice for this, for there was no lonjjer
any necessity for precision or aiming. The-fallac\' of these views
has been exposed in the chapter on Modern Infantry l-'ire. Never-
theless this mode of fire was certainly one of the eccentric features
of this campaign, so that this war seems further to confirm the
conclusions previously formed as to the greater power of small
arms. But it appears that the Russo-Turkish campaign has shown
many false lights to the students of strategy and tactics, and great
discrimination is therefore necessary in forming conclusions ba?ed
on the events of this war.
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
l6l
In the first place, the opinions upon which some EngHsh
writers found their arguments differ in a remarkable degree from
those formed by the three great nations which have within the
last few years been at war, namely, Austria, Germany, and France,
to which may also be added Russia. The Franco-German war
impressed upon the minds of all military tacticians two things
especially, the great power of modern artillery when properly
handled, and the practical impossibility of carrying a position by
frontal attack when it is defended by good troops. The first of
these conclusions was of course derived from the great results
produced by the German artillery, which was, however, much in-
ferior in materiel to that possessed by all the great European
Powers in the present day. The second conclusion was derived
from the known effect of the breech-loading rifle, which also has
since been improved, but not to so great an extent as the artillery,
for the French rifle, the Chassepot, was an excellent weapon of
great range, accuracy, and rapidity of fire.
As already remarked, since the campaign of 1866, and especially
since that of 1877, a curious controversy has been waged in Eng-
land as to the relative merits of the two arms, infantry and
artillery, a controversy which needs investigation.
In the campaign of 1866, as we have seen, but little notice was
taken of the lessons to be learned in artillery except by the Prus-
sians, all other nations having their attention drawn to the Prus-
sian breech-loading rifle which proved itself so infinitely superior
to the Austrian mu2;ile-loader. After this war the Austrians, like
ill other nations, adopted the breech-loading rifle, whereas the
chief improvements made by the Prussians were in their artillery,
and by adopting and developing the system of artillery tactics
j which they had learnt from their adversary.
In iN/o the French infantry rifle was innriensely superior to that
if the Prussians, and after the war the French were almost unani-
!'iiou!.!y of opinion that their armies had beer crushed partly by
superior numbers and partly by the extraordinary effect of thd
I'nissian artillery. Nor were the French singular in tiiis opinion.
Ill the Ci(;rman official account of the war we find success ascribed
jai^'ain and again 10 the concentration of large masses of artillery
|aiul the overwhelming lire thur divtdoped, a fir, which fre<|uently
1 ..'
l62
TACTICAL NOTES.
paralyzed the attacks of the French. From that day till now,
French, Germans, and Austrians have devoted themselves to
increasing the number of their artillery and the power of the
rifled gun. Even since the Russo-Turkish war steps have been
taken in the same direction, nor has any sign been shown that
the campaigns in Turkey have had the effect of diminishing the
reliance of those three great military nations on the power of
artillery fire ; on the contrary, in 1880 the Germans and also the
Russians even increased their force of artillery. On the other
hand some writers in England seem, especially from the experi-
ence of the war of 1877-78, to have come to the conclusion that
artillery is nearly played out.
Several causes have led to this conclusion. In the first place
the artillery on both sides was very defective. The muzzle
velocity of the Russian guns was only about 1,000 feet a second
and therefore ill fitted for shrapnel, and the Turks carried only a
very limited supply of this projectile, and though their Krupp guns
were superior to those of the Russians yet their powder was so
inferior as to give but low velocities. Then again the roads, both
in European and Asiatic Turkey were so bad that guns could not
frequently be brought up ; and further the same fault in the em-
ployment of artillery was committed on both sides as was com-
mitted by the Prussians in 1866 and by the French in 1870,
namely, a sprinkling about of guns instead of their being massed.
We see then that the artillery on both sides was not only very
much below the average but was restricted in its operati(<a both by
the tactical ignorance of the Commander and by the nature of the
country, while on the other hand the Turkish infantry were armed
with the best rifles in existence (a pattern of the Martini-Henry),
and tiiey carried practically an unlimited supply of ammunition
on their ])ersons, b'uithcr the infantry fire, which is quoted as
superior to that of artillery, was delivered almost exclusively
from behind intrenchments where the men were all but safe
from the missiles (jf their enemy, and the conditions of their]
ijmpknnient w'ere therefore utuisiially favourable.
Taking these ficts into consideration wi- mas' come to the
conclusion that llie Russo-Turkish campaign aflords no evidence j
to contradict tlic experience gathered f'om the previous Europoaii
Campaigns, as to the value of artillery in tln' lidd.
TACTICAL I'OWliK OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
l6
It must be admitted that the power of the field guns hitherto
brought into the field against troops behind intrenchments,
especially when they are of a semi-permanent character with
overhead cover, as at Plevna, is totally inefficacious, and always
has been. Neither field gun nor musket has any power worth
naming under such circumstances unless a position can be
enfiladed or taken in reverse. It would appear therefore to be a
great mistake, taking all things into consideration, to undervalue
the terribly crushing effect of modern field artillery against its
proper object of attack, troops in the open. This is not to be
estimated by the feeble action of old fashioned guns in presence
of the best rifles, ill served, scattered about, and directed against
men concealed under bomb-proof cover. Further, the defence
of the country to be successful must be active, not passive, and to
sit down as Osman Pasha did at Plevna until completely invested
is to court certain defeat in the end. The use of intrenchments
on the field of battle must become more or less universal, but
with them must be laid down the principle that the defensive
works are only temporary and that individual soldiers as well as
j armies must be ready to seize the first favourable opportunity of
issuing from them to attack the enemy. To remain on the
passive defensive has, it is true, the effect of neutralizing the
power of the enemy's artillery but with the sui-e result of ultimate
defeat. Such strides are, however, now being made in gunnery
that it is fully expected that the guns of the future will be able to
|destroy even such works as were constructed at Plevna,
In order to show the tactical power of artillery in the field
Iwhen properly handled, the manner in which the Germans em-
Iployed their artill ry in the campaign of 1870-71* with such
[marked success will now be considered, and then the failure of
[this arm in the hands of the Russians in 1877-78.
Some of the instances in the employment of field artillery in
I1870 have been adduced more with the object of showing what is
possible than of what is to be always recommended.
THE SUCCESS OF ARTILLERY IN LVO.
In trying to estimate the modern place of field artillery it is not
ToKtiiel C. B. Hrackeiibury, li.A., has written a forcible paper on this subject
("»iu which extracts have been made.
ir>4
TACTICAL NOTES.
necessary to study old wars because of the want of mobility of
this arm. Even so late as the battle of the Alma ji^uns, at a critical
period, had to be worked partly by officers because the gunners
toiling on foot could not keep pace with them. In the present
day field batteries can move for short distances at a gallop carry-
ing the gunners requisite for the service of the pieces, while the
fire of the guns has increased to an extent which would then have
been considered impossible.
The battles round Metz are especially interesting both because
the Germans there met the flower of the French army, and
because a German artillery officer (Captain Hoffbauer) has given
a capital account of the work of his own arm in these engage-
ments.
MARS-LA-TOUR.
The battle of Mars-la-Tour on the i6th August was undertaken
to check the supposed retreat of Bazaine's army from Metz to
Verdun. The Germans were not aware that the French had four
corps close at hand, though it is doubtful whether they would
have acted very differently had they known this. Their faith in
attack is profound, and the French army had to be held fast at
all hazards to prevent its junction with MacMahoii's retreating
columns and the troops assembled at Chalons.
The battle commenced by the Advanced Guard Battery of a
Prussian Cavalry Division opening fire on hostile cavalry near
the village of Vionville. A panic ensued, and presently a P'rench
battery replied, when three Prussian batteries marching with the
main body rushed forward to support the battery of the advanced
guard, and drove back the enemy. Meanwhile, as usual, the
artillery of the nearest Infantry division was ordered forward by
the Corps Commander and came into action ; but the French
now advanced with swarms of skirmishers against the guns. The
two batteries closest to Vionville having no friendly infantry near
them were ordered to draw back under cover of the hill ; but one
of the batteries which had been sent forward from the infantry
division and was now not far off. moved up close to the village
and came into action under a heavy fire, several horses beinfj
killed or wounded. " Swarms of skirmishers again rushed out
from Vionville and the moment became critical. The battery
had recourse to case and succeeded in driving tiie enemy back
^'F?Sf.
TACTICAL POWER OF rilU-D ARTILLERY,
165
into tlic villaf^e ; but as the close and bitinf^ iiiuskctrv fire con-
tinued to make many casualties it retired some 250 or 350 5'ards
and took up a fresh position." So here we have an example of
batteries quite unsupported by infantry holdinj^ back large forces
of the enemy's infantry. However, the French continued to
;,'ather in swarms, and the artillery had to fight a delaying action,
retreating here, advancing there, till the Prussian infantry came up.
After this, and throughout the battle, the guns continually
checked the advance of French infantry, while on the other hand
it is remarkable that they often suffered greatly from the fire of
infantry at 1,000 to 1,350 yards.
It is sometimes said that the fire of artillery has little physical
but only moral effect, yet later on in this battle Hoffbauer says
that: *' Two dense columns of infantry, issuing suddenly from
buildings to the north-east and south-east (of Flavigny)
were shelled by the whole of the batteries at a range of 1,200 or
i,joo yards and retreated to Re^onville leaving the ground
hterally covered with corpses, while strong Fi"ench columns,
which advanced from the hill to re-occupy the village, shared the
same fate."'
Again and again we find artillery pushed forward within short
distances of the enemy to disengage exhausted or overwhelmed
infantry, and even of a battery withdrawing so as to bring it into
Hue with the infantvy skirmishers who had already retired. On one oc-
casion an infantry brigade being utterly overwhelmed by numbers
and losing more than half its strength, three supporting batteries
had to risk everything to extricate it. Two of them actually held
their ground till the enemy's infantry had approached close to the
muzzle of the guns, when they were saved in their turn by gal-
hint charges of cavalry.
During the latter portion of the battle 19 batteries (114 guns)
lield the line between the Bois de Vionville and the high
road beyond Flavigny, supported the attacks and always checked
pursuit, because so long a line of guns can play at once on the
front and flanks of the advancing enemy.
Remembering how overmatched the Germans were in numbers
in this battle, it is not surprising to find that the casualties were
!^o numerous, that drivers and even officers had to work the guns
1 66
TACTICAL NOTES.
some of wliicli had temporarily to cease tirinj^ for want of gunners.
Most of the teams weru re(hiced t(^ two horses, yet they were not
driven back, and in the eveninj,' some of these batteries were
actually sent forward to attack. At the close of the battle the
artillerymen were for the most part exhausted. Their losses had
been heavy, an averaf,''e of one-fourth of the men and more than
three-fourths of the horses in killed and wounded. The losses in
materiel were (juite insignificant ; but the want of ammunition
M'as often experienced, no less than 20,000 rounds having been
fired. The ranges were various, from more than 3,400 yards to
650 frequently, and more than once 250 or 300 yards. The
enemy often advanced under fire to within about 700 yards bu
were almost always checked at about that range.
GRAVELOTTE.
This battle was also commenced by artillery, 10 batteries of
the 9th corps escorted by two squadrons of cavalry being sent
forward within effective range of the enemy who were near Aman-
villers. The enemy replied from batteries under cover, mitrail-
leuses, and infantry fire at about 800 yards, pushing forward skir-
mishers even closer. The fire was so hot that the cavalry escort
was sent back. Many officers and men fell, but the guns re-
tained their position and drove back the French infantry.
The left of the line had now been pushed so far forward, acting
on the supposition that they had only the right wing of the French
army to deal with, that it soon found itself under fire from French
artillery and mitrailleuses on the left and in rear. The German
battery on the left wheeled outwards, advanced 170 yards, and
opened fire in reply. But in less than half an hour it lost two
officers, three-fourths of the men, and all the liorses except eight.
It had, however, silenced the enemy's mitrailleuses at a range of
goo yards when suddenly a French battalion, which had buen
concealed in a near hollow, appeared close to the battery. There
was no time to i\:e even with case. Only eight horses were un-
wounded yet two guns of the battery were saved. The French
battalion pressed on to the flank of the next battery, whose com-
mander, occupied with his own struggle, had not perceived the
fate of the battery on his left. As soon as he felt the fire of the
chassepots, he turned his guns upon the French battalion and
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELIJ ARTILLERY.
167
hliWIII
disen{]faged himself by firing shell at close quarters. Deciding on
instantaneous retreat he saved all his guns though of course
with heavy loss.
So here we find two batteries surprised by infantry at close
quarters when they were entirely without support. In one case
all the horses but eight and three-fourths of the men are already
killed or wounded, yet this battery carries off two guns ; the other
battery suffers great losses but carries off all its guns. Then
German infantry arrived and the rest of the batteries were order-
ed to withdraw one by one to make good their losses. This they
did with reluctance. Two batteries retired, but the next one was
attacked by French infantry at J30 yards ; it fired case, checked
the enemy, and then followed the others.
It must be remembered that this line of guns had been pushed
right into the midst of the enemy. French infantry and mitrail-
leuses were in front, on both flanks, and in the left rear, yet all
the guns were carried off except four from the left battery which
was actually among the enemy, and only two were permanently
retained by the French. But for lack of horses at a critical mo-
ment not a gun would have been lost. To show the severity of
the French fire at this time, it may be sufficient to say that the
German fusilier battalion, sent to extricate the left wing of the
artillery, lost in twenty minutes more than half its numbers and
had to retire without effecting its purpose.
On the other hand when the Saxon corps were advancing, after
the storming of Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, two batteries which were
pushed forward '■■ sustained considerable losses from the enemy's
artillery, and especially from swarms of skirmishers which had
ensconced themselves in the folds of the ground towards Ran-
court." Two officers were wounded, two guns very soon lost all
their horses and nearly all their gunners. 'The ])attories retired
but canio into action further back.
After all the Saxon artillery werr in position the encn)\- made
repeated attempts to dislodge them as well as otluM- portions of
the (jcrnian artillery which wert? now massed in the neighbour-
liood, hut tlui value; of large masses of guns now Itcc.ainc apparent.
Whatever point the bVencli selected to attack, their way to it was
lint only covered by the tlireit lire of the guns against which tlitir
mt^
MSlI
i68
TACTICAL NOTES.
assault was directed but also by tiie flanking fire of other parts
of the great artillery line, Hoftbauer says, " as a rule the ranges
varied from 1500 to 2600 yards, but they were often much shorter,
as for example, when the enemy's skirmishers, advancing against
our front to within 660 yards, were completely stopped by the
German shells."
Towards the right of the German position the first army mass-
ed 156 guns, with the fire of which it completely crushed all
efforts of the French to advance.
During the first attack of the Guard upon St. Privat, the Ger-
mans succeeded in seizing a part of the hill with an infantry
detachment which was presently attacked by strong columns
from Amanvillers. This important point was in danger of being
lost, and there was a great longing for the support of artillery.
"But the cry from the hill for support had already reached the
2nd battery of the Guard. Without waiting for orders it advanc-
ed up the slope, and coming into action near the hard-pressed
infantry, maintained the important point against all attacks. In
its advance three guns were temporarily left behind, one of them
having lost all its drivers. In this position the battery fired on
the hostile columns and skirmishers at a range of 660 yards with
such effect that they were conipelled to halt."
Numerous other examples of the boldness with which artillery
was used in this remarkable battle might be described, suffice it
to add that after the capture of St. Privat the artillery pushed
on to hold the advantage gained. Thus was formed by degrees
the last great artillery mass in which finally 38 batteries (22S
guns) were crowded together. The right wing of this force, aljout
half the batteries, by its flanking fire, without any infantry attack,
constrained the whole 4th French Corps first to change front,
and then to retreat.
The ranges in this battle varied between 3,300 yards (in one
case 4,000) and 700 yanis, for we may consider as exceptional the
few rounds of case occasionally fired at rk)se ranges.
The losses of the artillery amounted to nearly 1,000 officers ami
men and over 1,500 horses, the casualtijes to the materiel l)cin;(
comparatively insignificant. They had fireil 34.080 rounds.
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
i6g
SEDAN.
Near the beginning of the description of the battle, the German
Official Account says : " The artillery had taken part in the en-
^'apeiiioiit side by side icitli the foremost detachments of infantry.'' And
later: " The artillery position of the 2nd Bavarian Corps at Frenois
had been reinforced by the Crown Prince's order so that
■ji German batteries, 426 guns in all combined their fire
from three different sides upon the French Army which was now
crowded toj^ether in a confined space Not only their
batteries and foremost lines of infantry, but also their reserves
moving? backwards and forwards and the masses of cavalry vainly
seekiiif,' cover were overwhelmed with such an iron hail that they
fell more and more into disorder, and found their power of resis-
tance well nif^h broken before they were even able to enf^age in
the struggle. The fate of the battle was already, to a certain
extent, decided by this deployment c» masse of the German artillery
even without the further advance of the infantry."
A little later, the official account says : " And so annihilating
was the fire of the artillery, that the French were scarcely capable
of any organized resistance, when the German infantry, towards
j p.m., moved forward from all sides against the wood.'' Again :
"But before these measures could come into operation, the
aheady enfeebled strength of the enemy was utterly broken by
the annihilating fire of the German artillery. The French Com-
mander-in-Chief, from his position at Balan Church, saw the
troops which he had brought forward gradually melting away.''
In the general retrospect of the battle, the official account
s|)eaks thus of the work of the artillery, and be it remembered
that all this is the voice of Marshal Von Moltke speaking through
the historical section of the General Staff: "The German
artillery, in the battle of Sedan, produces an especially grand and
(le.'jive effect. Only the surprise undertaken during the morning-
mist towards Bazeilles, as demanded by this sort of attack, is
liiade by the infantry alone, but at all parts of the extensive
h;ittlefiel(l the whole strength of the batteries was from the first
I'lon^^ht into play. Inserting themselves in the colurrms of route
111 a position favourable to early deployment, they hastened for-
l^van] to the battle-field u-ith the advanced parties of the infantry
s.aj
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23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503
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170
TACTICAL NOTES.
As a general rule the attack of the infantry is deterred until the
artillery has produced its full effect. From the Calvaire d'llly
the enemy is almost exclusively driven off by the fire of the guns.
whereupon a few companies take possession of this important
height without a struggle. The shells bursting thickly in the
Bois de la Garenne prepare the attack of the battalions of the
Guard, and spare the tremendous losses with which previous
victories had been purchased."
What it may now be asked are the main lessons to be learned
from these battles as concerns the artillery ?
The artillery was, as a rule, pushed forward in advance of the
infantry of the main body to develope a powerful artillery fire as
early as possible with the object of gaining time and establishing
a superiority of fire early in the battle by silencing the enemy's
artillery, and to so demoralize that of the infantry as to prepare
the way for the attack so that the infantry should suffer as few
losses as possible and not be delayed longer than necessary before
attacking. This was done in every case, whether the enemy were
superior or inferior in strength. To secure this object the greater
proportion of the artillery must on the march be kept well to tiie
front in the column of route, and guns must be massed when de-
ployed to secure unity of com.mand and concentration of fire.
We find the artillery always able to hold its ground when at-
tacked by infantry in front in any formation, even as skirmishers,
but suffering terribly and sometimes obliged to retreat from infantry
lying down behind cover or in folds of the ground. In such
cases there was always felt the want of some troops fitted to dis-
lodge the annoying skirmishers.
But it must not be supposed from this that artillery should act
independently and without the co-operation of the other arms;
but in commencing an action the Germans hold that the infantry
and cavalry of the Advanced Guards afford sufficient protection
to enable the artillery of the n\ain body to push forward in hne
with the Advanc(;d Guard. The necessity of ])roper protection
for the artillery is laid down in the following words in the Ger-
man Ofiicial Account : " The increased losses of artillery through
musketry fire, however, demand more and more that that arm
should be afforded ample protection b\- tin owing forward ditacli-
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
171
inents of infantry. Whe):e the German batteries, with almost
too great hardiness and self-dependence, as at Vionville on the
morning of the i6th, and at Verneville at noon on the i8th, pro-
ceeded beyond the line of their own troops, they indeed surprised
the adversary, but at the same time were on their part engag-
ed under very critical conditions."
But the superiority of the French rifle made itself felt, and at
a distance of 700 yards the artillery losses from infantry fire were
generally considerable, and when opposed to unshaken infantry
great losses were suffered even at greater ranges, the batteries
being indeed sometimes compelled to retire; yet their having to
do so at times is no argument against their employment in this
manner as artillery rr.ust expect to suffer losses as well as the
other arms.
Good work was done at both very short and at what were then
considered long ranges, from 3,300 yards down to 250 or 300 yards.
Whenever it was possible the batteries closed to 1,000 or 1,500
yards, but frequently the nature of ground or their position on
the flanks of long lines prevented anything like near approach to
the enemy.
The German artillery deemed it to be its duty not only to pre-
pare the way for the infantry but also to assist the infantry in its
attack, for which guns were pushed up to within close range of
the enemy ; though generally the shortest range for offensive
purposes varied from 700 to 1,000 yards, and as a rule they did
not open fire beyond about 2,000 yards.
The artillery on several occasions broke off from the fight in
which it was immediately engaged an4 made flank marches in
presence of the enemy, but it must be remembered that the
French artillery was decidedly inferior.
Whenever it could be done the batteries were massed in long
lines, under the fire of which nothing could continue to exist in
formation, and the habit became more fixed as the Germans
gained experience.
The losses were almost entirely in men and horses, and
these were sometimes very great ; nevertheless the batteries
continued in action at the same place after extremely heavy
I ,■'■■*
172
TACTICAL NOTES.
losses, and, if too hard pressed, succeeded in carry in;^ oft
their guns ; but this result was greatly due to the Germans beinj;
always successful, had they been defeated many guns would have
been captured for the reaso. that some batteries had lost so
many horses that frequently tL^y would only have been able to
withdraw one or two guns of a battery. Guns sometimes held
their ground when infantry had to retire. The damage to the
materitU was insignificantly small ; at the battle of Gravelotte for
instance only two guns were rendered unservicable, besides two
which were lost.
There are no really accurate means of ascertaining the actual
losses of the enemy by artillery fire. Whatever they were, thev
can have been but trifling compared with what they will be in the
next war, for the Prussians had no shrapnel but only common
shell, no range-finders and no telescopic sights. Also their guns
were not nearly so po\yerful as the present ones.
THE FAILURE OF ARTILLERY IN 1S77.
Having considered the successes of the artillery in the hands of
the Germans in 1870 we will now investigate the causes of its
failure in the Russo-Turkish war.
There is no doubt that, in the earlier battles of this campaign
at least, artillery played but a very insignificant part, and this has
led, as has been already mentioned, to many losing all faith in
this arm as an effective weapon on the field of battle. Forgettinf;
the astounding successes achieved by the German artillery in the
Campaign of 1870-71, and looking only at the failure of the
Russian artillery in the battles around Plevna and in Asia, many
English writers on the late war have raised an outcry against
modern artillery in general and have sought to discredit its value
in modern warfare.
In comparing the employment and effect of artillery in the war
of 1877-78 with those of 1870-71 many considerations come intn
play.
The invader in each case had a very inferior small arm com-
pared ^r, the adversary; the German artillery was, however,
superior in all points to the French, and although the shooting;
qualities of the Russian guns were inferior to those of the Turks
■! I
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
173
this was more than compensated for by the small number the
latter put into the held.
But it is impossible to conceive a wider difference than existed
between the two theatres of war. In France the land is not much
enclosed and centuries of civilization have perfected all the means
of communication, so that the invader, possessed of a manoeuvring
power never before surpassed, had everything in his favour for
making the rapid and decisive strokes which, in the early part of
the war, had the effect of denying to the French the time for
defensive preparations ; though this would not have been so much
felt iiad the latter made full use of the time available. In Turkey,
with the exception of two lines of railway of which good strategical
use was made, the communications in Europe and in Asia are as
bad as are to be found in any part of the uncivilized world ; hence
the difficulties of supply were excessive, and movements, with the
exception of those of cavalry, were extremely slow ; but it must
be admitted that this was as much due to the bad arrangements
of the Russians as to any other cause. Ample opportunity was
thus given for the preparation and defence of positions, and
further the employment of artillery was much restricted, for on
both sides the piec;^s and carriages, designed for the roads of
civilization, were ill suited for the difficulties to be overcome.
Ill France, the Germans, with a superior artillery and unhamp-
ered in the movements of their guns but conscious of the short-
comings of the needle gun, gave great prominence to their action.
Many think that this prominence will not be sustained, the reasons
for this are not apparent considering that the effect produced by
the German artillery was often independent of support from infan-
try tire for a considerable time at least owing to the short range
;it which the infantry opened fire, and that it was opposed to the
very efficient ch?ssep6t rifle. Again in France the existence of
houses and villages chiefly built of stone, and many masonry
enclosures, supplied with but little preparation convenient points
of defence. The important part played by village fighting in this
war gave a further prominence to the employment of artillery Are
whicli would not have been the case had the defences all been of
earth. Thus in the battles before Met/, the villages of Coigny
;md l'"lanville were flred and rendered untenable by artillery alone.
In Turkey, on the other hand, most of the villages for the sake
^74
TACTICAL NOTES.
of water and shelter lie very low in valleys, and the bulk of the
houses are of mud on wattle or wooden frames and with ibe
exception of garden fences there are no enclosures in the country :
consequently habitations and enclosures played no part in the
war, but earth intrenchments were everywhere used : indeed so
universal was the employment of field works that hardly an action
was fought in which they did not play some part.
Since 1870 Shrapnel shell had been universally introduced, and
during the war of 1877 the effect of this projectile appears to have
been very marked whenever it was skilfully used, which, however,
was not of frequent occurrence owing to the bad training of the
gunners on both sides. These effects moreover were produced in
spite of the inferiority of the guns which gave very low velocities
and made the shrapnel fire comparatively very weak. In the
Shipka Pass, for instance, its effect on the attacking Turks is
spoken of by one correspondent as being awful. He says "they
were cut down by thousands by Shrapnel." Again during the
Turkish sortie from Plevna on the 31st August, when an attack
in force was made on the Russian intrenchments, it was repulsed
mainly by the fire of the Russian batteries.
Experiments have shown that the effect of shrapnel fired from
rifled guns is five times as great as that of the ordinal y common
shell, hence had this projectile been used by the Germans they
would have produced results five times as great as those "grand
and decisive" results of the German field artillery at the battle of
Sedan. Since then too an enormous progress has been made in
the power of the guns themselves.
But where is the cause of the failure of the Russian artillery to
be looked for ? Not in the general dt^cadence of the arm as a
whole but in the faulty tactics of the Russian artillery, in their
inability to appreciate the necessity of combined action with the
infantry, in their want of confidence in their arm, and from having
neglected to learn all those lessons which the war of 1870-71
taught concerning the employment of artillery in the field.
What was said of the French artillery in 1870-71 is equally ap-
plicable to the Russians in this war : "The right tactical idea
was wanting all through, as well as practice in deployment and in
the execution of the necessary manoeuvres."
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TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
175
When, therefore, it is asked how it was that the Russian artil-
lery, which in respect of armament was acknowledged to be as
cood if not superior to the artillery of the German Army in 1870,
broke down so completely, the answer appears clear. The Ger-
man artillery won its successes because it was used according to
certain definite laws or principles of tactics, which, after the cam-
paign of 1866, were formulated into a system. But a study of
the battles of the war of 1877-78 will show that, with but very few
exceptions, these laws and principles of artillery tactics during
the greater part of the Campaigns both in Europe and in Asia
were invariably and systematically disregarded by the Russian
Commanders, who, with the exception of General Skobeleff,
worked on the old and obsolete sytem ; and it was not till towards
the close of the campaign that they recognized their errors and
modified their tactics accordingly. And as they suffered grievous
losses at first by the feeble use they made of their artillery, so
they won great successes in the end when they learnt how the
full tactical power of the arm can be developed by right employ-
ment. The best weapons put into the hands of those who do
not know how to use them must be nearly useless, and it is there-
fore no matter for surprise to find that they failed to secure the
results which the German artillery did when they acted in obedi-
ence to right tactical principles.
The battle of Zewin in Asja (25th June, 1877) may be taken as
a type of the early battles of the war, and will serve to illustrate
the faulty tactics of the Russian artillery.
The Turks under Mukhtar Pasha were strongly intrenched in
a position of great natural strength. The main Turkish position
was on a terrace in front of a high mountain, and owing to the
configuration of the ground it could not be turned but would
have to be captured by a front attack. The Turkish force con-
sisted of 24 battalions of infantry, and 12 guns which were skill-
fully placed so as to sweep all the approaches with a powerful
cross fire. The Russian force, advancing from Kars under
(leneralLoris Melikoff(i 7,000), consisted of i() battalions of infantry
with 52 guns and some cavalry.
Now if there ever was a jiosition which demanded ;i thorough
artillery preparation before it was assaik'd by iiifantrv it was
that of Zewin. Mut how did tlif Russian (Commander, General
1
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176
TACTICAL NOTES.
Heimann, who acted under the orders of General Melikoff, em-
ploy his preponderating force of artillery ? Did he, knowinj^
how weak the Turks were in artillery, mass his guns and en-
deavour to crush the enemy's artillery with an overwhelming and
concentrated fire ? Did he then advance his batteries, the
Turkish artillery being silenced, and at close and decisive ranges
pour in a demoralizing fire upon the Turkish infantry, and so
render the position untenable before his own troops attempted to
storm it ? He did nothing of the kind. He began by dispersing
his guns all over the field of battle. Dividing his attacking force
into three main columns, he sent three batteries with the right
column, one with the centre, and another battery with the left,
while two horse artillery batteries, which might have proved of
the utmost value to him during the action, were sent with the
cavalry to execute a long flank march to the southward and there-
fore took no part in the action.
The batteries had instructions to act independently ; there
was no attempt at unity of command or concentration of fire. At
long and impossible ranges, varying between 2 and j miles, they
came into action "one after the other" firing when and where
they could. The Russian gunners, it is said, found some diffi-
culty in hitting off the range of the Turkish batteries, which is
not surprising when we consider the distance at which they opened
fire. Field guns having only a velocity of 1000 f.s., and of large
calibre in proportion to weight of shell, are the very worst guns
one could have for shrapnel fire, and about 2000 yards should
have been considered as the extreme effective range of shrapnel
shell fired against troops in the open, although this projectile will
kill with a velocity of 400 f.s.
Here then we find the Russian guns iKjt only opening fire but
remaining in action for several hours at ranges varying between
4,000 and 5,000 yards against troops who were strongly intrenched,
and a correspondent speaks of them as firing for a long time
without ever bursting a shell within 500 yards of them, no attempt
being made to ascertain the range by a round or two of common
shell. So little effect harl this desultory fire on the 'i'urkisli
batteries that for a long time they did not even reply, their obstin-
ate silence, indeed, leading the Russians at onetime to imagine that
the Turks had abandoned the position. The Turkish giumcis
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TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
177
were in reality doing just what thev should do under the circum-
stances, reserving their lire until the Russians came within effec-
tive range of their guns. Meanwhile, although the Turkish
artillery was in no respect overpowered, the Russian infantry were
ordered to attack. Against this position, held by artillery and in-
fantry perfectly unshaken, the Russian battalions were hurled ; no
less than three separate attempts were made but all in vain, they
were driven back after immense losses. The only allusion made
by an eye witness to the effect of the Russian artillery throughout
the action was that a shell fell among their own first line -of
skirmishers killing several men ! It does not indeed appear that
a single battery was advanced to support the infantry attack. In
place of boldly pushing on as the German batteries did at
Spicheren, Gravelotte, Sedan, &c., side by side with the infantry and
pouring in a hot fire of shrapnel the effect of which is practically
annihilating at short and decisive ranges, the Russian guns seem
to have remained stationary during the whole of the battle doing
little or nothing to divert either the enemy's artillery or infantry
fire which was concentrated with " terrible effect " on the
Russian columns.
The third attack on Plevna serves as another illustration of the
faulty handling of the artillery. Captain Clarke, R. E. gives a
clear description of this attack which commenced by an artillery
bombardment on the 7th, September* Great deliberation in the
execution of the attack was to be practised instead of the pre-
cipitate nature of the first two attacks. The infantry would be
for some days in the immediate front of the positions to be assail-
ed and a careful scheme of final attack, based on a full knowledge
of the ground, might be matured by each of the subordinate com-
manders ; but as it turned out the several assaults were delivered
on comparatively distant points and were detached and practically
independent.
In place of a mere artillery preparation, the failure of which in
the previous battles had been attributed to its short duration and
to the want of guns of heavier metal, a long bombardment of
several days duration maintained during the night was now to
hi! tried in which 20 Russian siege guns would take part, the bat-
ttijcs being constructed and armed by night. Under cover of the
I artillery fire, the infantry was to advance gradually and gain or
178
TACTICAL NOTES.
'i
create cover as near as possible to the Turkish works, and the
artillery was also to approach the redoubts as the fire of the latter
became subdued. When. the moral of the enemy's infantry would
be considered sufficiently shaken and the works damaged, the
assault was to be made by the infantry over the whole front. A
considerable force of cavalry was, before the general assault, to
make a detour and cut the Turkish line of retreat.
On the night of the 6th September siege batteries were thrown
up.and armed at a distance of about 4,500 yards of the Turkish
works, and field batteries were also placed in position at ranges
varying from 2,600 to 4,000 yards. Fire was opened the follow-
ing day and continued all day and night ; the field guns wc-e
subsequently brought somewhat closer, and on the 8th no less
than 24 siege and 226 field guns were taking part in the bom-
bardment. The Turkish artillery replied vigorously at first, but
then became silent for want of ammunition.
On the loth the Russian fire began to slaken as the ammuni-
tion was beginning to run out, and heavy thunderstorms rendered
the roads almost impassable. Under these circumf'ances the
bombardment could not be maintained, and the assault would
have to take place at once if the advantages gained by the vast
expenditure of ammunition were not to be lost. It was estimated
that the four days bombardment had considerably damaged the
Grivitza redoubt, and another one, but that the other works had
suffered but slightly. The infantry attack in three columns was
ordered to take place on the nth. The right attack was generally
unsuccessful except the attack on the Grivitza redoubt which was
captured after severe fighting. The centre attack failed com-
pletely, but the left attack led by General Skobeleff was more
successful. Here only was the infantry of the attack well sup-
ported by artillery, and though the Russians suffered heavily
they succeeded in cape iring two redoubts, but they were ex-
hausted; and though practically in Plevna Skobeleff was unable
to follow up his success, and in spite of his entreaties no rein-
forcements were sent him; and on the 12th. after several un-
successful counter-attacks, the Turks succeeded in recapturin;,'
the works.
One of the most striking features of this third battle of Plevna
is considered to be the extrcini'ly small t (Tect produced by tht
TACTICAL roVVEK Ol" VIEIA) ARTILLERY.
179
immense expenditure of artillery ainniunition. In the previous
battles the artillery preparation had lasted only for a few hours,
and there is no doubt that ^'reat results were expected from the
four days' bombardment aided by the 24 siege guns. No idea
of the actual loss caused to the Turks during the artillery
bombardment can be formed, but all accounts agree in stating
that it was extremely small. The Turkish infantry either turned
out of the redoubts or sought shelter in their blindages from
which they could emerge and man the parapets in ample time
to repulse the infantry attacks.
This great failure in the artillery fire is partly due to the weak-
ness of the guns themselves, excluding of course the siege guns;
their field guns had only a we^v low muzzle velocity, their fuzes
were bad, the practice does not seem to have been good and was
carried on at long ranges, and besides a large number of guns
available the Russians did not bring into action at all. But the
chief cause of failure appears to have been due to their employing
the guns in a general bombardment of the defences at extreme
ranges instead of concentrating their fire upon particular points.
It must be remembered that through the whole month of August
the Turkish troops, assisted by about 1,000 Bulgarian peasants,
had worked continuously at their defences without the Russians
making any effort to disturb them, so that they now took the
form of a regular intrenched camp; and consequently from this
time the operations before Plevna should necessarily have partaken
largely of the character of fortress warfare. Plevna, as regards the
works at least, had become more of a fortress than Kars. For
the first time in the history of field works a thoroughly sufficient
amount of over-head cover had been provided making then,
practically as safe as permanent works except from escalade.
This has to be remembered as the future operations of the Rus-
sians should have been more of the nature of siege operations
than of tactical operations against an army in position retaining
its power of manoeuvring. Now every beginner in the study of
permanent fortification knows that against strong and extensive
works, provided with over-head cover and defended by a deter-
mined garrison not to be influenced by a civil element, a general
bombardment is utterly inefficacious. If such a place is not to be
reduced by a lengthy investment the only other alternative is to
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TACTICAL NOTKS.
capture it by means of a siege, choosing the most favourablt
points to be attacked and concentrating the artillery fire so as to
silence the fire of the works in their immediate front. The infan-
try will, according to circumstances, either approach the defences
by means of trenches, or, where the works are liable to escalade,
they may, when the fire of the defenders is sufficiently subdued,
carry the works by open assault. It was never to be expected
that a general bombardment from weak guns at great ranges
would produce any appreciable results.
With reference to the employment of the artillery. General
Todleben writes : " The salvoes of our batteries concentrated
unexpectedly, sometimes on one redoubt, sometimes on another,
seemed at first to produce a great moral impression upon the
enemy, but soon they only succeeded in stopping the works dur-
ing the day. The enemy was not slow in taking his measures,
the garrisons of the redoubts were withdrawn and placed in
trenches at a certain distance from these works ; the deep and
narrow ditches were alone occupied by the Turks. It is unneces-
sary to say that against the trenches and ditches our artillery
found itself powerless." Now this is not the way in which the
attack of fortresses such as Sebastopol or Strassburg were carried
out.
Instead then of a species of bombardment along th( whole
front, all the siege guns should have been concentrated on two or
three redoubts; under cover of their fire the field guns could have
pushed to closer ranges and supported the fire of the siege guns.
There should then have been no cessation, no giving time to the
defenders to recover or repair damages, but the fire should have
been kept up without intermission till the moment of assault.
The enemy's artillery would have been subdued to a great extent
if not entirely silenced and his infantry driven from their para-
pets, when the infantry assaulting columns could have advanced
gradually in open order covered by the fire of the field guns at
short ranges, which, if judiciously posted, need not have been
masked until the infantry had arrived close up to the works. The
fire of these guns might have been supplemented by that of infan-
try fire at long ranges, as some of the Russian troops were
armed with long range weapons. This fire would have kept down
the infantry fire of the defence and should have been kept up
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD AUTILLERY.
I8l
until near the moment of assault, lint the Russian orders for
the assault prescribed a {j^eneral cessation of artillery fire at the
moment wiien the infantry attack was to begin ! The Turks
therefore had warning to man their parapets, and in a very short
time a few sentries and guards swelled into a mass of men able
to pour a crushing tire into the dense Russian columns of attack.
Moreover, the Russians at Plevna employed direct fire only. It
is noticeable, however, that General SkobeleiT who commanded
the left attack made a proper and more successful use of his guns,
bringing a flank fire to bear on the Turks, pushing a battery almost
into the advanced line when the infantry was checked, and finally
bringing up a half battery into a captured redoubt which proved
i)f great service; in fact he haudled his artillery on similar princi-
ples to the Germans. Also in the attack on the Grivit/a redoubt
which was also captured two batteries accompanied the attack,
and as Captain Clarke points out, it is not an unfair inference that
the somewhat bolder handling of the artillery contributed to the
success of these two attacks.
All who witnessed the artillery attack on Plevna which pre-
ceded the infantry assaults in September allude to the incredible
conduct of the Russian artillery in continuing to fire day after day at
long ranges which rendered their fire harmless. The following
extracts from the Daily News Correspondence a.'-e to the point:
"Although yesterday evening the necessity of advancing the
batteries nearer the Turkish positions was admitted on all hands,
we found this morning, on looking at the position, that nothing
of the kind had beeu done. The fire of the Turkish redoubt of
Grivitza does not seem to have slackened in the least."
Again speaking of the attack on the extreme left, near the
Lovtcha road, we read: "Imeretinsky's artillery is where it was
yesterday, fully 2j miles from the redoubts which he was attacking,
and which cannot even be visible to his artillerymen."
Again, "The Russians seem to be very much afraid of losing
their artillery. I have already spoken of the unaccountabe con-
[ duct of their artillery in stopping fire upon the Turkish redoubts
when the attack began, and when it ought to have been hottest."
The same thing occurred in Asia. An eye-witness of the battle
of the Yahni-Tepe fought on the 2nd October remarks: "on
l82
TACTICAL NOTES.
seeing from tlie Kaback-Tepe some forty guns firing with a range
of three miles at earthworks which wi^re prudently left empty
by the Turks it seemed to me that the attack lacked the cht;ra:tei
which was likely to secure victory."
Time would fail us to narrate the many instances of conspicuous
failure in the handling of the Russian artillery, but sufficient has
been said to show that it would indeed have been marvellous had
this arm produced the results we have reason to expect from it,
We find, as n rule, infantry attacking positions without waiting
for the artillery preparation, the guns are dispersed instead of
being concentrated, they fire for hours even days together at dis-
tant ranges, they remain station? 'y and -^ven cease firing altogether
while the infantry are attacking, and they are withdrawn for fear
of loss just at the very time their fire would be most useful ; we find
in short, frequent instances where all the first principles of modern
artillery tactics are openly, repeatedly, and systematically disre-
garded. But, on the other hand, when the seprinciples are ad-
hered to, we find the artillery, having regard to its inferior
materiel, fulfilling all that can be expected of it; and, moreover,
those attacks in wljich the guns were properly handled were
usually successful.
On only one occasion during the opening part of the campaign
was the Russian artillery well handled, namely, during the attack
on Nikopolis. Finding the Turks as usual strongly intrenched
in a well selected position. General Kruaener commenced the at-
tack by bringing up no less than 48 guns, which, by their
superior fire, silenced the Turkish batteries in a few hours. Not
till this was effectually done were the infantry ordered to advance;
this they did the guns advancing ivith thou and taking up
fresh positions close to the enemy. Throughout the action the
artillery rendered most important aid to the infantry. Thus,
when Russian infantry failed to carry the Osma bridge a battery of j
horse artillery was sent up to their aid, which opened fire from a
position which took the Turks in Hank and compelled 'hem to
fall back. When General Krudencr saw this he ordered a general |
advance of the infantry, and six batteries moved forward to a fresli i
position nearer to the Turkish line. The Russians eventually!
obtained complete possession of the heights commanding the
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TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
183
town and fortress of Nikopolis which had no option but to sur-
render. Here we have an instance of sound artillery tactics on
the Russian side. The attack is first thoroughly prepared by the
artillery and the enemy's artillery fire subdued, there is thenco;n-
bined action between the artillery and infantry whose united efforts
compel the Turks to retire.
The successful attack on Lovtcha by General Skobeleff on the
3rd of September presents another instance of sound artillery
tactics. The Turkish position was a very strong one by nature and
was further strengthened by shootingtrenches and epaulments. On
the ist and 2nd of September a line of heights opposite to the
Turkish position was occupied by the Russian advanced troops,
who intrenched themselves and erected batteries for fifty-six guns,
besides two more batteries to the north of these. The orders
issued to the troops in anticipation of the attack by General
Skobeleff contained the following : "The principal role in the
first period of the combat which is about to take place belongs
to the artillery. The order of the attack will be communicated
to commanders of batteries, who are recommended not to dis-
perse their fire. When the infantry advance to the attack they
are to be supported by the whole power of fire. The greatest
attention is necessary ; the fire is redoubled when the adversary
presents his reserves and attains its last limits when the attacking
troops are arrested by an unexpected obstacle."
At 5 A.M. on the 3rd the artillery opened fire with sixty guns
and continued their fire till about 2 p.m., bv which time the
Turkish batteries were nearly silenced and the Turks had been
much shaken, so that when, at 2 p.m., Skobeleff advanced he met
but slight resistance, and consequently ly ,; p.m. the whole of the
Turkish positions on the right bank of the river Osma fronting
Lovtcha were in the hands of the Russians. I'our bat*^nies were
now brought up to assist Skobeleff, who, witli a portion of his
infantry, now followed the Turks across the river and occiipied
the village of Lovtcha.
He[ore the second Turkish position above this villagr could be
att.icked a pause had to be made to rest and reform the troops,
i but meanwhile thirt\"-two gnus slu-IIed tlif works forming tli<'
Iscrond i»osition. 'iMiis attack was undertaken at 5.J0 P.M. the
niftV
m
i84
TACTICAL NOTES.
Russians having to advance up the steep slopes under a heavy
fire, which however became more and more wild as the Russi'ins
neared the redoubt. The main redoubt was obstinately defended,
but the Russian guns shelled the work up to the last stages of the
attack and it was finally carried by a general rush from all sides
at about 7 p.m. ; in their retreat a large number of Turks were
killed bv Russian shells.
The following sentence is extracted from General Skobeleff's
report after this battle : " The very small losses suffered by our
columns, whilst they moved to the assault of the enemy's first
line, show how useful, in the present war against the Turks, was
the fire of our artillery and how important is the period of pre-
paration by artillery for every attack directed against fortified and
armed positions." This opinion is well worth noting as it is that
of the most successful Russian General. Here then we find the
infantry assault of the first position thoroughly prepared bv
artillery fire, and directly this position is carried, guns are brought
up and posted in it to prepare the attack on the second position.
and these guns were moreover employed in close support of the
infantry up to the last. One more instance of successful artillery
tactics must be cited, but it was not till quite towards the end of
the war that the generality of the Russian commanders, taught
by bitter experience, learnt how to make a right use of their
artillery in action. At the battle of Alad, i-Dagh on the 15th of
October 1877, General Heimann, the same who had commanded
at Zewin where he had made such improper use of his artiller\-,
did not venture to attack the Aulia-Tepe, the centre and key of
the Turkish position, until he had massed no fewer than 67 guns,
which, advancing to within 1,800 yards range (not kept as at
Zewin two or three miles off) poured in for the space of three
hours a storm of shrapnel shell such as threatened the annihila-
tion of the defenders. The hill, rendered untenable by the
artillery fire alone, was then easily stormed.
A correspondent of the Daily News who was with the Russians
during the attack and visited the j)osition after its capture docs
not seem, from the description of what he saw, to have considered
the material effect of rilled guns *o bi' slight, for he writes as
follows: "Rows of dead Turks, some horribly disfigured by shell
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
185
fragments, were to be seen upon the earthworks and at the bottom
of the ditches. Some were Hterally torn to pieces by the shrapnels.
I think mo^ of them were killed by the artillery, whicl' indeed
liad done its duty this time. The inside of the redoubt was
ploughed with shells and strewn with their fraerments and bullets
flattened on the stones." "I don't think," he goes on to say,
•'that the Russians have sustained great losses by that assault ;
because the shrapnels told terribly on the Turks, and had greatly
diminished their number and demoralized them before the storm-
ing began."
To this testimony of an impartial eye witness must be added
that of Mukhtar Pasha himself who has attributed his defeat, as
Xapoleon III. attributed his at Sedan, to the enemy's artillery.
The capture of the Aulia-Tepe broke the Turkish centre, and the
Russians gained a victory which, due as it principally was to the
brilliant action of the artillery, is not unworthy of being placed
side by side with some of the artillery feats of Napoleon I.
Aladja-Dagh was, in fact, the Sedan of the campaign and forms
another instance of " the grand and decisive results " that can be
obtained by a commander who knows how to use his artillery
boldly and fearlessly in action.
What conclusions are we to draw from this war ' Surely
enough has been said to show that the role of artillery is by no
means played out as some have asserted, but that this arm is
more than ever necessary on the field of battle. The general who
hurls his infantry against an intrenched position which has not
been previously submitted to a searching artillery preparation is
sending his men to certain slaughter ; such attempts can only end
I crushing disaster, witness Zewin and Plevna.
And further, this campaign does not prove that, by means of a
powerful artillery fire, an assault may not be given with success
jaf^'ainst a position defended with earthworks unless the defend-
ers have had so much time for preparation as to enable them to
throw up works of a very strong and semi-permanent character,
with a second line so far retired that a fresh preparation is needed
jhefore assaulting it. If this has been done, and such the works
|of Plevna had become, the position has assumed the character of
|a regular fortress, and like it cannot be taken by assault but
imiist be approached by works resembling those of .1 siege.
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TACTICAL NOTES.
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1- :1
The main lesson to be learnt by artillerymen from this war is the
same as that which, as long ago as 1866, was pointed out by the
author of the " Tactical Retrospect," who recognized that it was
the tactical not the technical training of the Prussian artillery
which was chiefly at fault in this campaign. " What," he asked,
" is the use of an artillery which makes capital practice indeed,
but which is never in the right place?" Discredited during the
war of 1866, the Prussian artillery officers during the fouryearsof
peace that followed re-modelled the tactics of their arm in accor-
dance with the changed conditions of mod fighting. The
result was that in the campaign of 1870-71 the action of the
artillery was the theme of universal admiration.
The great artillery lesson then which the war of 1877-78 has
to teach is that which the wars of 1866 and 1870-71 previously
taught, namely, the necessity for a thorough tactical training of
artillery during peace. However excellent the materit^l may be,
however scientific the teaching of the gunners, however perfect
the equipment, unless the use of artillery in the field in conjunction
with infantry be also thoroughly understood and practised the
tactical power of the arm in battle will not be fully developed.
Artillery badly handled and badly led is only an incumbrance.
This appears to be the correct teaching of this war, and what the
author above referred to affirmed to be the case in 1866 is as true
now, namely, that *' in the next war, that side will obtain an un-
conditional tactical preponderance which best knows how to
make use of its artillery, or rather that side which does not put
off this practice till the moment that the war commences: in fact
the side whose artillery has had the best tactical training."
" Hence it is that we find modern tactical writers laying groat
stress on the fact that commanding officers of Artillery and
Engineers should be first-rate tacticians and strategists, and that
commands of these important auxiliary arms should in the field
be held by men who possess a good deal nune than a technical
knowledge of their profession which, however valuable in peace
time, cannot in the field cdinpensate for ignorance of the points
of contact between their own and the otlu-r anns."
l'>om all that has \)vv\\ said we come to the conclusion that tin
teaching of Napfihon is as true tmw as in his dav when he say^:
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
187
" The better the infantry is the more necessary and expedient it
is to protect and support it by a very powerful artillery. Good
infantry is doubtless the sinew of an army, but if the very best in-
fantry have to hght for any length of time and support several
encounters against an enemy very superior in artillery, it will lose
its courage and be ruined. It may be that a General very skilful
in manoeuvring, more able than his adversary, and possessing
better infantry, will obtain successes during part of a campaign
notwithstanding that his artillery is very inferior; but on the day
of a decisive general action he will find most cruelly his inferiority
in artillery."
To sum up the conclusions to be formed from the employment
of artillery in this war, it may be asserted that in consequence of
the great numerical superiority of the Russian over the Turkish
artillery it might have been expected that their influence would
have been very perceptible in battle, and that their fire would
have effectively prepared for and supported the attack of the
infantry, but little of such a preparation is observable, most of
the engagements give the impression that the co-operation of the
artillery had no influence worth mentioning on their whole pro-
gress.
The cause of this, as pointed out by CaptrJn Von Trotha, is to
be looked for in two directions :
a. In the way in which they were tactically employed.
b. In the material eff"ect they produced, which did not satisfy
the expectations made of them.
a. With reference to the first cause, the tactical employment of
this arm, the following points are to be noticed :
1. The batteries present were from the begimang usually dis-
tributed almost regularly along the line of battle instead of their
being massed and their fire concentrated ; there is no holding to-
gether of a part of the artillery for combined action on a fixed
point of the line of battle. In 1870 the utmost use was made of
the encircling and converging power of masses of artillery, in
1877 an utter want of belief in its use hindered its devglopement
and led to a feeble sprinkling about of guns.
2. The preparatory fire of the attack is opened and continued
i88
TACTICAL NOTES.
at very great distances and almost always frontally against the
enemy's position ; an endeavour to obtain enfilade or oblique fire
being made but rarely. It must however be admitted that in
Turkey the nature of the country, cut up by frequent ravines,
often left no choice for artillery positions.
3. The Turkish artillery, always far inferior numerically to th(;
Russian, generally gives up very soon its opposition to the Rus-
sian artillery and (;retires into covered positions ; and as soon as
the Russian infantry advances to the attack, comes into play
again quite ready for the light.
•
4. The frontal position of the Russian artillery generally neces-
sitates the cessation of its tire at the commencement of the infan-
try attack.
5. Cases in which batteries follow the infantry in their attack
and try to support them in the forward positions they have taken
are only exceptional ; usually the artillery remains in its original
positions, and during the second part of the attack plays quite a
secondary part, whilst in this second period the far weaker
Turkish artillery is generally very active and made its effects con-
siderably felt. An energetic advance of the artillery to support
the infantry attack hardly ever takes place except under Skobe-
leff 's leadership.
b. Turning now to the material effect produced by the fire of the
Russian artillery we find but few examples of really successful
working.
It was only in comparatively few cases that the Russian artil-
lery had the opportunity of firing on uncovered troops; its fire is
generally directed on infantry lines behind natural cover, against
shooting trenches, or against more or less regular intrenchnients.
and is almost entirely without effect. In spite of a preparation of
several hours by the fire of a powerful body of artillery the infantry
attack almost always encounters an unshaked adversary.
On the supposition that extensive field fortifications will play
an important part in the future it would appear necessary to arm
the artillery with guns of heavier calibre. Light field artillery
must seek its usefulness not in positions in the rear, but in direct
co-operation with the attacking infantry, and by skilful and bold
m
d■■^,
'^ki
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
189
mancEuvring direct a heavy fire on some especially important
points of the enemy's position. Acting in this way great losses
in men and horses, and under some circumstances even the loss
of guns, will be unavoidable, but to gain decisive results artillery
must not shrink from such contingencies.
The Russians, recognizing the failure of their artillery in the
war of 1877-78, have since issued special instructions for the em-
ployment of artillery in the field. There is not much to note in
the.e instructions as they appear to be founded on the same
tactical principles as those approved of in other countries, and it
may be safely asserted that had these principles been put into
practice during the war the artillery would have retained the
laurels it gained in the hands of the Germans in 1870. It is laid
down that the assailant must, from the very commencement, deploy
a formidable foixe of artillery so as to obtain a preponderance of
tire over the defender. " Neverthless," it says, "however desira-
ble it is to place a large force of artillery in line from the very
commencement of an action, yet it is necessary to retain a por-
tion of it in reserve. The situation generally only becomes
cleared up gradually and not all at once. It is only after an
action more or less prolonged that the strong and weak points of
the enemy's position become correctly ascertainable, and it is only
then that the Commander-in-Chief will be able to decide on what
part of the field his artillery needs being reinforced, and on what
point the principal attack should be directed. If the whole of
the artillery were engaged from the outset, it might happen that
later on a portion of it might have to be moved to the right or to
the left against another objective, a step necessitated, not by the
failure of the preliminary reconnoissance, but by the development
of the action ; such changes of position are always accompanied
In f,aeiit loss of time and tiiey become still more disadvantageous
when, according to the course of the engagement, the necessity
I of executing a rapid flank attack on the enemy is recognised. It
is evident that in such a case it will be necessary to dispose of a
special reserve to hide from the enemy the preparations for this
[attack and to execute it unexpectedly and with sufficient force.
I Also, in immediately deploying all his batteries the Commander-in
K hief would not only reveal to the eneiny the whole strength of
Ihis artillery and the principal direction of his attack, but would
' m
I go
TACTICAL NOTES.
If w-
also deprive himself from all possibility of directing the action."
The instructions therefore lay down that after the Advanced
Guard has effected its preliminary reconnoissance all the batteries
of Corps Artillery will move up into action, as well as the bat-
teries of those Divisions of infantry or of cavalry which are to take
part in the attack ; but that the batteries belonging to those divis-
ions which are to form the particular reserves of an army corps, or
the general reserves of the whole army, are to remain with
those reserves. Hut during the course of the action, when the
commander's plans are fully made up, or when the artillerv
batteries hrst engaged have advanced to closer positions, those
batteries hitherto held in reserve may also be sent forward to
support them. For an infantry division acting singly two light
batteries are to be held in reserve, and in the case of a cavalry
division one of the two horse artillery batteries.
It will be seen that these views as to the retaining of such a large
force of artillery in reserve are at variance with what is advocated
elsewhere.
** Within certain limits the artillery is free to choose its own
positions, and this will always be the case until the infantrv
advances to the attack. The latter arm will therefore at tirst
regulate all its movements and formations by the artillery, but at
the moment of attack the contrary will be the case, the principal
role passes to the infantry and then the artillery must conform
its movements to that of the infantry."..," In the line of battle the
infantry is best placed in the intervals separating the artillery
groups, and on the flanks. In order to protect the batteries
against the enemy's skirmishers, some infantry must be posted
460 yards in front of the guns." "Concentration, of fire is
to be obtained by massing batteries, and the artillery is to closely
support the advance of the infantry ; its second decisive position I
is to be about 800 yards from the enemy's position ; and if circum-
stances are favourable a portion of the artillery should be pushed
forward with the infantry to within case shot distance. At these
close ranges the gunners must not think of their losses but must
be solely preoccupied in the endeavour to assist the advance
of their infantry as much as lies in their power."
When infantry pushes on in front of the guns, fire is to be con-
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
191
tinued over their heads but with common shell only, not with
shrapnel for fear of premature bursts, but care must be taken to
cease firing before the moment of assault.
EMPLOYMENT OF AHTILLERY IN BOSNIA.
The manner in which the Austrian guns were handled in the
war in Bosnia forms such a glaring contrast to the unintelligent
and clumsy employment of the same arm by the Russians in 1877,
that a short description of their artillery tactics will be appro-
priate considering that the Austrians applied and carried out the
German artillery tactics of the war of 1870-71. It must be re-
membered that the country of Bosnia is very. mountainous and
rufjged, and that consequently the Austrians had to prepare for a
regular mountain warfare, and fought against enemies who, from
their thorough knowledge of the country, their warlike disposition,
and the presence of a large number of regular Turkish artillery
and infantry, were by no means to be despised. The Austrians
were met on all the roads by bodies of armed peasantry, strong-
ly posted covering defiles. When defeated, these bodies van-
ished only to reappear again on some other point.
The fact was recognised by the Austrians that artillery is an
indispensable adjunct to infantry, and we therefore find that every
column, however small, had always a few guns with it. In the
mountains it is seldom that an entire division of from 6,000 to
9.000 men can operate by one ri ite or in one bod}-, and brigades
have therefore frequently to work independently ; consequently
four guns were, for this campaign, permanently attached to each
brigade which they always accompanied, when the brigade was de-
tached. In addition independent divisional artillery batteries
were retained under the hand of the General in command. These
;,'uns attached to brigades were found most useful for opening
ileliles. etc., and for clearing the road for the advance of the
infantrj- which they often did without further fighting, aiul w ithout
tlieni the infantry would frequently have had to become engaged
111 difficult attacks.
The necessity of a good preparation by aitilleiy fire was shown
[ill the failure of the attack f>n Kret)ien.-c which infnntry attempted
192
TACTICAL NOTES.
11 "i?.
to storm but had to be withdrawn after sufferinf^ heavily, and
were forced to wait until the houses had been set on fire by the
guns.
The artillery, attached to small columns operating by narrow
and bad roads, were expected to push forward with boldness and
be always ready to open the way for the infantry and cover their
deployment, and for this purpose the position of the guns in the
column of march was the same in these mountainous regions as
no the plains, namely near the head of the column.
The Austrians used advanced guards of one-quarter to one-
third of the strength of the column and had generally a mountain
battery attached to them, and they marched usually from half to
three-quarters of an hour in advance of the small main columns.
The tendency was plainly shown to push guns even more to the
front than was usunl in 1870, and wherever a collision with the
enemy was expect- i the advanced guard was always strongly
reinforced in artillery. Special escorts were told off to the guns
only when they had to act independently of other troops, and
this is specially necessary in the mountains as the facilities for
surprise are so much greater than on the plains.
The employment of artillery on the battlefield was governed by
the principles systematized by the German artillery. In all cases
we see the artillery of the advanced guard brought at once into
action and the artillery mass gradually formed and covering
the deployment of the long columns. The ground rarely per-
mitted of all the guns being united in one big battery, but in gen-
eral they were all employed for the attainment of one object
though compelled to be brought into action at different points.
The tendency too to push forward guns to decisive ranges is
strongly shown in several actions; the first artillery position
varied in distance from about 3,000 to 1,200 yards, and the second
was as close as 650 yards.
In attacking the enemy, enveloping attacks were generally
carried out by the infantry the principal work being left to the
flank columns, while the centre carried on a demonstration sup-
ported by a strong fire of artillery. Batteries too were invariably
advanced to the conquered position to fire on the retrcatinf;
enemy.
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
193
In these enveloping movements it was however very difficult to
maintain concerted action between the different columns owing
to the difficult and impassable nature of the country, which com-
pelled the columns destined to take part in the flank attacks to
quit their bivouacs long before the centre column, and it may be
mentioned that the Austrian centre column was sometimes left
(ian^'crously weak ; and although the method pursued was on the
whole in accordance with the principles of modern tactics, yet, if
opposed to an enterprising enemy seeing that proper concert
could not be maintained between the colunms, one of them might
have been beaten before it could have been supported. As an
example of their mode of attack may be cited the attack on the
fortified position of Jaitze, defended by 5,000 men and one moun-
tain battery of artillery, on the 7th of August under the Duke
of Wurtemberg with seven battalions and sixteen guns. He
attacked the position in front with 2j battalions and one
mountain battery and he directed the bulk of his force, 4^
battalions with artillery, to execute a turning movement against
the right wing of the enemy. The fight engaged in front became
very warm and nearly ended in a defeat for the Austrians. The
insur},'ents took the offensive several times and were on the point
of f^aining the day when at last the turning movement began to
be felt ; the attack was now renewed and the position gained, but
not till after the last reserves had become engaged.
This campaign in Bosnia would seem to teach us that the
tactical employment of moimtain artillery in no way differs in
principle from the employment of this arm on the plains, except
that guns must be apportioned to each column of infantry. On
the contrary it appears all the more necessary to push guns to
the front to protect the deployment of a long column marching
nn one narrow road, and to effect the formation of the big battery
as soon as possible, for which it is advisable to place the guns as
far forward in the column of route as is consistent with their
safety.
The nature of the communications and the configuration of the
country must greatly influence the question as to whether moun-
tain guns only, which should be able to go wherever a foot soldier
can march, or a proportion of field artillery should be attached to
I'livisions destined to operate in the mountains. Field batteries
194
TACTICAL NOTES.
■*,»:
i '-'^
are liable to retard the movements of a column in a mountanous
country, nevertheless if the communications are sufficiently good
their presence may prove of the greatest advantage, as shown at
the capture of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Ali Musjid in Afghanistan;
although as we shall now see the necessity of a powerful force of
artillery does not aj^pear to our cost to have been always recog-
niijed in this latter campaign.
ARTILLERY /N AFOHANISTAN.
In the late Afghan campaign we appear to have considered
that the lessons of war as taught by the greai masters were not
applicable to Afghanstan, so far at least as artillery was concerned,
and that we might safely disencumber ourselves of a considerable
proportion of this inconvenient arm. The result was that when
Ayoob Khan attacked us at Maiwand we had only six guns to op-
pose to his twenty. Ayoob was represented by General Burrows as
marching ^' encumbcvcd by an enormous (piantity of ordnance," yet
in the subsequent action some of the troops were so demoralized
by the heavy tire to which they were exposed from these "encum-
brances " that they gave way with unaccountable facility, almost
before they experienced the shock of the enemy's cavalry and
the gha^is, the troops evidently feeling that they were hopelessly
overmatched. General Burrows says in his report that when
the infantry were giving way, he went himself to bring up the
cavalry, " but the terrible artillery fire from which they had suf-
fered had so shaken them that General Nuttall was unable to
give effect to my orders." How cruelly this inferiority in artil-
lery must have been felt by General Burrows when he saw his
infantry losing^ its courage shaken by the fire of Ayoob's 20 guns:
and how sad the reflection that the fate of the day might have
been far different had there only been a few more guns in action
on our side so that they might have coped successfully with
those of the enemy.
The battle of Ahmed Kheyl, fought on the 19th April, by Sir
Donald Stewart, affords a good illustration of the effect of artil-
lery when in sufficient force, as here there were two batteries
acting together, and had it not been for the fire of the artillery oni
infantry, who had .been somewhat shaken by the impetuosity of
the onslaught of large masses of fanatical troops, might have suf-
fered considoiably. " The batteries opened fire at a range of
TACTICAL POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
195
1,500 yards, but the advance of the enemy was so rapid that the
ranfje had quickly to be chanj^ed to 800, 600, 400, and finally
to case shot distance. In spite of the accuracy of the fire, the
enemy pressed on with the {,'reatest determination, and within
20 minutes of the first round both batteries had expended all
their case shot and were oblij^ed to use shrapnel shell loaded the
wronf: way— that is with the head towards the charge of powder,
so as to burst in the muzzle. Even then many of the enemy were
killed within twenty yards of the muz/les of the guns. This
withering fire completely shattered the enemy's line in front,
the plain was covered with his dead, and within an hour " cease
firing" was sounded, the Afghans being in full retreat.
CHAPTER V.
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
But althouf^h so much depends upon the tactical training,' of
artillerymen yet of necessity the effect of artillery in action must
also, to a great extent, depend on its materit^l; and it is evident
that now infantry fire has so increased in range and power, artillery
fire must, to regain its proper position, do so likewise. Guns with
high initial velocities and firing powerful shells are necessary. It
is to shrapnel fire, hitherto untried in war except to a small
extent in minor operations and in the last great campaign, an J
then according to Russian accounts most successfully, and to an
improved kind of common shell never yet used in war, that we
must look.
The successes of the German artillery in 1870 were, as we have
seen, obtained with comparatively feeble guns giving curved tra-
jectories which do not cover a great zone of ground, but do require
very accurate aiming. These drawbacks were aggravated by the
want of a good man-killing projectile, having onlj' common shell,
and by the almost sole use of percussion fuzes. In 1877 the
Russian guns were very similar in power to those of the Germans
in 1870, but they had a few shrapnel shell. After the Franco-
German war most other great Powers had improved their tielci
guns, and in England the 9 and 16 prs. had been introduced which,
although considerably superior to the guns employed in 1870, are
now, and have been for many years, far surpassed by all great
military Powers who have replaced their old guns by others
yielding far higher velocities and lower trajectories. They have
also for the most part replaced their common shell, which had
but little effect owing to the small bursting charge they contained
and to the i"ew irregular fragments into which they burst, with ;i
kind of segment shell which on bursting give between about 120
and 150 effective fragments, instead of only about thirty or forty.
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
197
and they thus in a measure act as shrapnel. It is possible, how-
ever, that by the use of gun cotton the man-killing power of com-
mon shell may be greatly increased without diminishing too much
it- explosive force. No war has yet been carried on with the
i;uns which now form the armament of the different artilleries, to
which tiie 13 pr. and others will be soon added in England.
Moreover attention is now again being drawn to guns of posi-
tion which, although of great use in former wars, have somehow
been allowed to drop out of sight, and such powerful guns yield-
ing flat trajectoiies and firing improved shells of some 50 lbs. in
weight with huge bursting charges cannot but prove most effective.
Tlie use ot shia;^nel, and of common shell constructed tc yield
a large number of fragments four or five times the number obtain-
able from the ord'nary shell, fired from guns which give very
high velocities cannot fail to greatly enhance the effect of artillery.
After the war of 1870 German writers laid down the axiom,
which has been pretty universally accepted, that artillery should
not lire at masses of troops beyond 2,500 yards, nor approach
unbroken infantry within 800 yards. This was doubtless a right
and sound rule for the time, but the guns which will be brought
upon any future battle field will be far more powerful and effec-
tive ; improved powder will render them more accurate, and they will
be provided with range-finders, telescopic sights, and also possibly
with some protection to men and horses, and will fire projectiles
of far superior man-killing power ; improvements, which it may be
safely predicted will to some extent revolutionize the tactics of
artillery and show tiiat this arm is as eftective now as ever it was.
The necessities for a fiat trajectory are evident as it is necessary
that shells, when burst, should cover a very large depth of danger-
ous ground and so neutralize to some extent errors in the estima-
tion of range, inaccurate laying, and setting the fuze ; and also to
embrace more than one line of infantry in formation for attack or
defence, such as the shooting line, supports, and even reserves.
The Russo-Turkisli war having shown the harmlessness of
artillery fire from light field guns against earthworks, Russia has
iinned her field artillery with new weapons firing much heavier pro-
jectiles than those of any other nation. To destroy earthworks a
powerful shell is doubtless required, but there is a danger of in-
creasing the weight of field guns over nuich merely on account of
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198
TACTICAL NOTES.
the increased power of their shell. In some countries with numer-
ous good roads heavy guns can be moved about anywhere, but
when in a campaign horses lose health and strength, and roads are
heavy and bad, heavy guns cannot often be brought up. The
direction of modern artillery progress is in getting the greatest
possible effect out of the lighest possible gun.
Here it may be pointed out incidentally, that considering it to
be as a rule the duty of the divisional artillery to begin the artil-
lery duel and to advance with the divisions while the corps artillery
is more stationary, it would appear that the latter should consist
of heavy field guns. It has hitherto been considered that corps
artillery, as in the English organii^ation, should be composed largely
of horse artillery which must be armed with light guns, so that a
reserve being ke})t in hand may bv.- available to meet any unex-
pected attack or support a particular point. There is great
force in this, but the question arises whether this is of greater
importance in the present day than the greater effect produced
by heavier guns. Moreover, sudden and unexpected attacks are
now comparatively rare. Lines of battle are so much further
apart than in former days that the distance to be passed over by
an attacking force is much greater and, consequently, unle" . local
circumstances enable the enemy to approach unseen, a sudden
attack is almost impossible : also the retaining power of the
rifle enables a General to hold such an attack back and to
give time for the slower but more powerful artillery to come up.
When it arrives its effect will compensate for the slowness of its
coming, while its superior range permits its being brought into
action further off. Besides which, it is ahr.ost universally con-
sidered that artillery should not be kept in reserve but that every
available gun should be pushed forward into the fight. Undoubt-
edly the tendency of modern warfare is to give greater value to a
powerful artillery. Infantry fire has now become so terrible and
its range has been so much prolonged that it has become abso-
lutely necessary to increase in like manner the power and range of
artillery. It is of course well known that the effect of the latter
increases as the range diminishes, but it is capable of greater in-
crease of power at long ranges than is rifle fire : thus at 3,000
yards the effect of artillery fire will be very considerable, while
that of infantrv would have lost its value.
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
199
n^ it to
le artil-
irtillery
consist
it corps
i largely
that a
ly unex-
is great
■ greater
)roduce(i
;acks arc
1 further
i over by
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ol the
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ess of its
ight into
ally con-
hat every
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alue to a
rible and
nre abso-
range of
the latter
reatcr in-
at 3,000
)lc, while
The French have for some years had one of the best field
"uns in the world, which at a range of 7,500 yards are as effective
and as accurate as the guns they used in 1870 at 1,800 or even
1,000 yards. The British artillery, armed up to the present with
the worst weapon in Europe, will soon be rearmed with guns simi-
lar if not superior to the French in effective power, apd the old
rules limiting artillery fire to 2,500 or even 3,000 yards will no
longer hold good.
Hitherto the zones of artillery fire have been considered small
up to 1,000 yards, medium up to 2,000, great above 2,000, but
now these ranges may well be altere4 to: — Small up to 1,600
yards, medium up to 3,000 or 3,500, great above 3,500 or 4,000
yards, at which range the French field guns can lodge half their
number of hits in a rectangle 20 yards long by 2f yards wide.
Seeing how the effective range and the accuracy of guns has in-
creased, it would appear necessary, if their full power is to be de-
veloped, to supply them with improved sights since it has been
found in practice that even at ranges of about 1,600 or 2,000
yards it was impossible to distinguish the enemy's batteries when
they were well placed.
Captain Scott K. E., has proposed an entire new system of
sighting, by which telescopic sights arc made to revolve about
an axis parallel to the axis of the gun so that inaccuracy need
no longer arise from any inclination of the sights due to the
fjuns not being on level ground. These telescopic revolving
sights have been tried in France ; they magnify 12 or 15 times,
50 that with them objects at a distance of 2,700 yards can be
seen as well as at 200 or 300 yards with the naked eye and,
moreover, these instruments are simple and not liable to get out
of order. In the course of several competitions for rapid liring,
400 rounds were laid on objects in\isible to the naked eye at
ranges varying from 4,ck)o to 7,000 yards, against a marksman
laying with the naked eye on a whitt; target at a range of 200
yanis; and tiie results were superior with the telescope notwith-
j standing the great differenct; of range. Also in practice lor pre-
cision, one gun with the telescoi)e was laid ;it a range of 2,700
yards against three others at 200 yards laid on white targets with
[tlie naked eye ; the rectangle obtained with tin; former was four
■iHt
.('•i.
200
TACTICAL NOTES.
times smaller than with the latter, and the French Committee
of Officers who experimented on this sight reported as follows:
" By its use the firer can aim accurately at distances equal to the
range of the piece;" " he can aim at objects invisible to the
naked eye," "he has not to trouble himself with the inclina-
tion of the wheels, and therefore always fires as if the wheels were
on level ground," " a shot having been fired, he can judge of
its effects," " even at the longest distances;" " the Com-
mittee consider it their duty to lay stress on the splendid results
which have been obtained, and to call special attention to the
fact that Scott's telescopic sight solves completely and practically
the problem of a telescopic sight ; and that its adoption by an
artillery will give to that arm a very considerable advantage if it
has to engage an artillery unprovided with an analogous system."
Now the long-range fire of artillery may afford important
services in war. It has been justly remarked by General Lewal
that artillery, which during the march is escorted and reconnoitred
for by the other arms, in its turn reconnoitres the way for them
on the field of battle. This is especially the case since cavalry
only exceptionally appears on the field and since the engage-
ment is commenced at distances at which the opponents can
scarcely see each other. Cavalry as it were leads the army by the
hand until the presence of the enemy is discovered. It then sends
back information concerning his force and his probable disposi-
tions, but when once the two armies are in presence of each other
its role is terminated for the time. It is not its province to reveal
the manner in which the opponent has drawn up his troops for
the fight, the strong and the weak points of his line of battle, and
his most probable intentions. These duties devolve upon the
artillery. Both sides know and feel the enemy to be in front but
often he remains invisible, although masses of men may have
taken position behind villages or woods which appear deserted, or
are massed in unseen folds of the ground. Before commencing
the attack the situation must be cleared up, and this is done by
the artillery. Under its fire of shell at long ranges the enemy
commences to show some signs of life. Troops, which it was tn
the enemy's interest to keep massed as long as possible to keep
thetn well in hand, are obliged to deploy sooner. The enemy will
also be led to open fire and show his dispositions to some exteiit.
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
20I
and consequently the battle commences with what has been"
called the " artillery duel." At this stage this is scarcely the right
term to give it for it is not the business of the artillery of either
side to silence that of the enemy, as in the case of the attack and
defence of a fortified place, but each has to perform the task of
making the adversary show himself. This essential purpose must
never be lost sight of and neither side must allow itself to be led
away by the natural desire to reply to the fire of the opposing
artillery, though a proportion of guns may be allotted to this
accessory purpose while the greater number are kept at the
principal work, namely the reconnoissance of the enemy. It must
not be lost sight of that this reconnoissance will be rendered the
more difficult by the game of the opposing artillery whose busi-
ness it is to prevent it. It is for this reason that it must be com-
menced as soon as possible and with the greatest number of
batteries possible. At the commencement of an engagement,
as in that of a campaign, the advantage will remain with
him who is ready first, and who by an energetic, prompt, and
proper use of his artillery will have succeeded in discovering the
dispositions of his adversary without the latter having been able
to discover his own. Colonel Von Scherff has ably summed up
the role of artillery in opening an engagement in saying : " The
artillery must have the skill to simulate a serious action in order
only to disappear as soon as it has succeeded in making the
i-'neniy deploy."
It is not our purpose at present to deal with the tactical employ-
ment of artillery, still what has been said shows how advantage-
ously the long range of modern artillery can be made use of.
But it is not only necessary to ascertain the extent of front of the
enemy's line of battle, but also to sound its depth and ascertain
where the enemy's reserves are posted. May not the long range of
modern artillery be used to fire at ranges from 5,000 to 7,000 yards
to search out such and such villages or ravines which can con-
ceal reserves all the more massed because placed in rear ? It 11
i'lot a question of making ravages in his ranks but of compelling
j'lim to deploy or change position, and from this to ascertain
cleady his positions and even derange the combinations of the
opposing commander by compelling him to modify his disposi-
titms ;it the last moment, and by preventing him from retaitiing
r/T .'/■»,
202
TACTICAL NOTES.
the troops he intended using at the decisive moment in the most
convenient positions and under his hand.
It must be understood that no blind and violent cannonadin?
n
is here advocated in which ammunition would only be wasted;
for the longer the range the more deliberate must the fire always
be, but this need not so paralyze artillery as to prevent its using its
advantages of long range when circumstances render it advisable
to do so. It is partly due to the artillery that an army can now
extend its sphere of action to distances far greater than formed} ;
and why it may be asked should it not make its power felt atloiif;
ranges, seeing that its effect now at 7,000 yards is as great as it
was 15 years ago at 1,000 ? Why also should not the presence of
the enemy in a certain village be ascertained when it can be done
by means of a few shell ? One objection urged against fire at
such ranges is that it is executed at distances further than the
eye can reach ; still if say a village can be distinguished in the
distance it can be much more effectually searched out by guns
than by telescopes and, as we have seen, by means of telescopic
sights guns can be laid at these ranges with the greatest accuracy.
As concerns range, the principal role of artillery maj' be said to
commence where that of the infantry terminates. The one has to
complete the effect of the other. Between ranges of 800 yards
and 1,300, or even at times 2,000 yards, artillery supplements the
fire of infantry, beyond these ranges artillery can alone act.
It is not however only at the commencement of engagements
that this arm may be used with advantage at long ranges ; at the
termination too and even during the course of an action it may
be so used, as for instance to turn defeat into a route, to cover a
retreat, or to disconcert the reserves of the enemy.
Because infantry can shoot straight at long ranges, it must not
be supposed that anything approaching the effects obtainable at
short ranges can be obtained at long ones, owing for one thing to
the drop of the bullet, and here it is, owing to the flatter path of
the shell, that artillery fire has a great advantage at all ranges
and especially at the longer ones.
It is generally taken for granted that artillery fire is only useful
or much more; useful at long ranges than at short. The fact is
however exactly the reversi-, and if the gunners are able to hold
Z2^K..,
.,'-...!;
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
203
■f
their own and to exist in the face of infantry at short ranges, the
effect of their fire at these distances becomes astonishing. At
some experiments at 1,000 yards 18 per cent of hits were made in
a minute ; at 600 yards 33 per cent ; at 400 yards 40 per cent ; at
200 yards 50 per cent ; and at 100 yards 75 percent ; and at some
competitive practice made in France in October 1879, between
artillery and infantry, the results were in favour of the artillery
even at 800 yards range.
But, hand in hand with the increasing range and rapidity of
tire of the infantry weapon, we find the use of field intrenchments
becoming more and more common until they have come to be
recognized as an important factor of success for an army acting
on the defensive.
In the Austro-Prussian campaign of 1866 field intrenchments
were conpicious by their absence. It is true that a few were
thrown up by the Austrians at Sadowa, but they had been erected
to suit pure technical and not tactical requirements, and their im-
portance was so Httle recognized that most of them were never
occupied, the troops for whom they were intended not even know-
ing of their existence ; and even the villages along the front of the
position were not propt^rly prepared for defence.
In 1870-71 intrenchments were more used, as on the heights of
Shicheren and Gravelotte, (not to mention the numerous invest-
ments of fortified places), but they were not of a very formidable
character ; and in consequence the preparatory artillery fire was
usually found effective in preparing the way for the infantry.
But in Turkey field intrenchments were carried to a pitch never
attempted before, as at the Schipka and at Plevna, and the guns
brought against these were found to be powerless especially when
provided with over-head cover. We must not, however, expect
to meet with a Plevna in every future campaign. Writers are
rather apt to jump at the conclusion that future wars are to be
wars of intrenchments and counter-intrenchments, but this idea
must be received with caution, and the case of Plevna must be
[looked upon as exceptional, not only on account of its natural
topographical advantages and to the errors of the Russians, but
owing 1) the fact that a purely defensive attitude was probably
forced on Osmau Pasha owing to the bad organization of his
li
m
i „ iMpXil!
i
It
I
■'-Vs ■■
-i
204
TACTICAL NOTES.
army which did not permit him to manoeuvre or take the offen-
sive, or surely an energetic commander would have done so after
the two blundering and unsuccessful attacks made on Plevna in
July.
The greater use of intrenchments and the greater defensive
power of infantry have combined to render a longer and severer
preparation by artillery fire necessary, with the object not only of
damaging the material defences, but also of overcoming the de-
fender's power of resistance both by the losses inflicted on him
and by shaking his moral. This can only be effected by a con-
centrated fire from many far more powerful guns than those used
by the Russians directed on the chief points of his defensive line.
The Russians found comparatively few opportunities of firing
against uncovered troops, most of their artillery fire was against
infantry behind either natural or artificial cover, and was almost
entirely ineffective. Notwithstanding hours, nay even days, of
preparation by the fire of large artillery masses the infantry gen-
erally advanced to the attack of an unshattered enemy.
The little part played by the Russian artillery was without
doubt in a great measure due to want of efficiency ; still a power-
ful field work well provided with blinded cover may be cannon-
aded for hours and the result be almost nil, and on the artillery
having to cease fire owing to the advance of their infantry, the
defenders will be in a position to offer almost as desperate a re-
sistance as if the cannonade had never taken place.
It is evident then in considering the recjuisites of artillery at
the present day that firing at troops in the open, with guns of
high velocity and flat trajectory, where shi-apnel is the effective
projectile, is not the only one necessary, but that the increased im-
portance given to field fortification demands that artillery must
make advances in its power of destroying material defences,
because against well defended works iiilantry is powerless, and
their attacks, as ^the late war has shown, only end in useless
slaughter.
The frequent Russian repulses in the last Campaign appear, as
we have already seen, to have been due in a great measure to
their sending unsupported infantry to attack works the defenders
of which had not been sufficiently shaken by their artillery owing
"M
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
205
to bad handling, bad shooting, and want of power in the guns.
Artillery must now, if it is to be effective, come to the front and
hv its tire render work& untenable, or at least shake the moral
force of the defence to such a degree as to render an attack possi-
ble. For this purpose great accuracy, weight, and velocity of
shell, and a powerful bursting charge are necessary. The intro-
duction of bursting charges of gun cotton will increase the effect
of common shells enormously, and it may be predicted that its
introduction, when tired from guns of high velocity, will not ren-
der the destruction of ordinary tield parapets a very difficult
operation, since the effect of gun cotton is 3 or 4 times that of an
equal weight of gun powder. But against tield works of any
strength the ordinary field guns have but little damaging effect.
Experiments have shown conclusively that a one pound bursting
charge of powder has only a small effect on earthv/orks, under that
there is little or none. A shell of large capacity therefore, and with a
fjun cotton bursting charge, can be the only solution to this ques-
tion as no shell large enough to be effective, if filled with powder,
could be carried in the field.
Seeing then the powerlessness of infantry against even trifling
earthworks, as demonstrated in the last campaign when the as-
sailant's artillery was not able to supply the deficiency an4 which
resulted in the virtual failure of the Russian summer campaign of
1877 in Bulgaria, a great opportunity is now afforded to artillery,
by the prospect of a vast increase of power, of supplying the need
which is so much felt.
The increased value and development of field fortification
consisting of powerful works with blindages and overhead cover
would point to the advisability of re-introducing light field how-
itzers into the service ; for, however powerful the ordinary guns
may be made, numerous instances will arise where troops can
only be dislodged, or sufficiently shaken to render an assault pos-
sible, by an accurate and powerful curved fire, and for this purpose
howitzers must be employed as the high angle fire of guns, owing
to the small bursting charges of their common shells, are practi-
cally useless. In a good tield work well provided with blindages
and splinter proofs below the level of the ground, we might al-
most destroy the parapets without seriously imparing the power
of the defence against assault, or even without causing many
2o6
TACTICAL NOTES.
I
casualties. Still the parapets will have to be reduced, and for
this powerful j;uns of position yielding a hif^h velocity, flatness
of trajectory, and a larj^e shell must be introduced ; but even
these may take a considerable time in rcducinj:^ semi-permanent
works which have taken months to construct, such as those at
I^levna, and to destroy such it would be better to call up the siege
train. If however the direct fire of the },nm proper be combined
with a searchiuf^ hif^h an<,de fire of tolerably heavy shells tilled
with f^un cotton, aj^ainst which ordinary blindaj^^es etc, would
yield but little or no protection, tiie moral o{ the j^arrison will be so
shaken by their heavy losses that an assault will probably suc-
ceed. Such pieces can be constructed to lire at lon^ ranges with
great accuracy and they can be used from behind cover whence
they can neither see nor be seen. For the defence direct shoot-
ing will be the rule, nevertheless howitzers will be very useful for
searching out natural cover taken advantage of by the assailant,
and also in the close attack they will prove a most effective
weapon owing to the great capacity of their shell.
As to the place to be assigned to these weapons, should they be
introduced as is advocated, the old plan of mixing guns and
howitzers in one battery would not seem advisable as it would
tend to complication and confusion, besides preventing the use of
the full power and proper application of both descriptions of
ordnance at the same time, one being as it were tied down by the
other. They should be formed into separate batteries belonginj,'
to the Corps and not to the Divisional artillery, and be thus at the
immediate disposal of the Corps Commander who could use them
whenever their services v/ere especially required. In addition to
their special qualities as throwing heavy common shells, their
shrapnel would be of a most effective character at close ranges.
The reasons above given for the introduction of howitzers might
be greatly extended in number. Numerous instances occur in war
where troops are sheltered by natural cover from direct, but where
they may be greatly injured by curved fire. To use guns with
reduced charges for the purpose of searching them out is a waste
of power. Their shells have not the same capacity or weight
that those projected from a howitzer of equal weight would have.
and the bulk of their ammunition (shrapnel) is not suited to this
DEVKLOPMENT OF I IKLl) ARTILLEKV.
207
class of fire, besides such firin/T^ is apt to be inaccurate.* On the
other iiand a shell projected with a low velocity so as to ^'et a
large angle of descent must depend mainly on its bursting charge
for effect. Other cases where a powerful bursting charge is
essential, such as against obstacles, abattis, stockades, walls,
villages, etc., will frequently present themselves.
Hut even should field guns not be sufficiently powerful to
destroy strong earthworks it would appear that they can at least,
if in sufficient numbers, so keep down the fire of the troops protect-
ed by them as to render an attack possible. Plevna is no posi-
tive proof that the fire of the defence cannot be sufficiently Ij^ept
down. Todleben indeed says that against trenches and ditches
the Russian artillery proved ineffective, but Skobeleff on the
other hand, as seen elsewhere, speaks strongly of the way in
which the artillery facilitated the advance of the infantry, and
consequently we may conclude that if handled with boldness even
inferior guns are of considerable use against earthworks. The
tire of their shrapnel may prevent the defenders from showing
their heads over their parapets, even if it cannot actually reach
them in their cover, and if they cannot see to aim their fire can-
not be absolutely prohibitory to the advance of the assailants,
and if the artillery advances so as to be able to keep up its fire to
the moment of assault, the attack may be crowned with success.
From the preceding brief sketch of the causes influencing
modern tactics, and on the supposition that in futine field intrench-
nients may play an important part in a campaign the following
deductions may be made :
1. That artillery, far from having decreased in importance on
account of the improvement in the infantry weapons, has increased
in value owing to the wider use of intrenchments. The enormous
losses sustained by the Russians in their unsuccessfid attacks at
Plevna in July, and at other times, show the folly of attenq)ting
such attacks without a systematic and prolonged preparation of
artillery.
2. That owing to infantry having now more than ever to be
*lt should be mentioned, however, that niiiny are opposed to the introduction of
howitzers for field service and .idvocate the employment of hi^h an^le tire from i^una
with rt'dut.'ed charges.
208
TACTICAL NOTES.
supported by artillery in the attack on account of the increased
use of earthworks, it would be advisable to introduce light field
howitzers throwing heavy shells to act as supporting guns to the
infantry. Such pieces, from the nature of the work required of
them, must be light, and owing to the greater angle of descent of
their projectiles fire could be maintained much longer over the
heads of advancing infantry without endangering them, with per-
cussion fuzes almost up to the moment of assault.
3. That in order to sweep a considerable depth of ground at
long ranges against troops in the open, powerful guns yieUiiiif,'
higfi velocities and flat trajectories must be employed, for which a
considerable proportion of the artillery must be of larger calibre
than heretofore, yet not of such a weight as to destroy its mobility,
and guns of position should be introduced.
4. That every battery should have a sufficient supply of in-
trenching tools sufficient for throwing up cover for the whole
battery in the shortest practicable time. The number supplied in
the British service is inadequate. As seven men can throw up a
gun pit in one hour, it has been suggested that a battery si aid
have, 42 pick-axes, 42 shovels, and six spades for cutting sods and
revetting, all to be carried in a two horse cart.* At present a battery
could not intrench itself under two hours.
If, as some think, intrenchments are to piny a great part in
future wars, the intrenching tool will become one of the most im-
portant items of equipment. With an extended use of intrench-
ments great battles will be rarely decided in one day unless the
attacker weakens himself so severely nv the first day as to be
forced to retire ; but we may expect to see the assailant proceed
with greater caution and, knowing the danger of throwing him-
self against an intrenched position, take more time over the pre-
paratory stage of the attack. Should battles last more than one
day batteries will probably be thrown up during the night, as at
Lovtcha, at important points from which fire can be concentrated
on the tactical pivots of the enemy's line of defence, advantage
being taken of the darkness to push forward guns to points whicli
they could not reach during daylight except with great losses.
*At present a battery carries Itt pickaxcH, 1<» shovcln, 1(» spades tind 1 erowliar.
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
209
5. The idea of silencing fieUl artillery by damaging; the materidl
has now quite e.\i)loded. and it is generally recognised that this
object must be atta'wed by disabling the men and horses; every
Liicieavour shouh' therefore be made to protect these latter as far
as possible frotn the fire of shrapnel and infantry, and the intro-
duction of steel shields has been advocated for both gun and
limber behind which, if the guns are breech-loaderst, the gunners
can work in comparative safety from all fire of bullets. The great
objection urged against shields is the extra weight that would
I'dve to be carried tending to detract from the mobility, but this
would be more than compensated for by the extrr protection
afforded, and the prolonged maintenance of mobility, since
mobility becomes lost with the lo of horses. Moreover, it has
been found that steel plates three-twentieths of an inch thick will
resist the fire of the Martini-Henr\ at 100 yards. Such plates
weigh about 6 lbs. to the square foot, or altogether about ii| cwt.
for a whole shield, and would protect the men and horses against
both shrapnel and musketry fire. Also long range infantry fire is
being rapidly reduced to a system and there seems great proba-
bility of its being employed to <i considerable extent in future
wars, it is therefore more thai: necessary for men and horses
to be protected, as otherwise, as has so often happened, guns
will be silenced owing to the casualties amongst the men and lost
or unable to advance to more favourable positions owing to casu-
alties amongst the horses.
6. Range finders and telescopic sights should be supplied to
every battery as they are at times a most useful and necessary part
of a battery's equipment. When ranges are short and fire hot
and rapid, these instruments are of no good. The advantages of
telescopic sights have already been pointed out, and it is obvious
how, l)y the use of range finders, a battery in position can ascertain
and note the ranges of all landmarks in its front and of all likely
artillery positions available for the enemy, so that an effective
and accurate fire can be opened on him at all stages of his ad-
vance. Further in the attack before a battery is sent up into posi-
tion, that position should be first reconnoitred, and if a range party
he sent on in front of the battery it might with care ascertain un-
<jm , 'V*^wt'!!*'
«H
tit is to he hoped England will in this matter at last follow the uuiversal opinion
iu favour of the breech-loader.
2IO
TACTICAL NOTES.
observed the distances of various points in the defensive line, so
that the moment the battery unhmbered it could open a useful
fire ; whereas, if the rouf,di and ready way of finding the range
by a few trial shots be resorted to, a fire at knon'ii range would be
imms.liately returned by the defender's guns, and the attacking;
battel y would probably .:uffer severely before it was able to reply
with effect.
7. Lastl}', a^ further improvement in the defensive power of
artillery might be made by arming all the gunners with a revolver.
The present carbines (12 per battery) are utterly useless in the
field, and are only useful for guard purposes where pistols could
take their place. The only occasions when fire arms are likelv
to be of use to an artilleryman would be exactly those on which
the deadly power of the revolver at close range would be of infinite
service, such as when attacked by cavalry. The short range of
the pistol would prevent any tendency of the men to leave off
serving the gun to take to their fire arm, which would only come
into play when the guns were temporarily useless. With deter-
mined gunners sheltered beneath the guns, a comparatively large
force of cavalry might be in possession of a battery for some time
without doing any serious harm, but would themselves suffer
severe loss.
ARTJLLERY PROJECTILES.
It does not belong to the scope of this work to enter at any
length upon artillery projectiles and their uses, yet a brief descrip-
tion of their development will not be out of place.
Case Shut is a most useful projectile at close quarters and its
value in grave emergencies is great as was shown m 1877 when it
was the means of saving Russian guns ; and in 1870 at Mars-la-
Tour we read that "swarms of skirmishers again rushed out from
Vionville, and the moment became critical ; the battery had re-
course to case, and succeeded in driving the enemy back into the
village." In our recent wars in Afghanistan \\u\ South Africa
this projectiU? also proved of the greatest service. Hut the old
pattern of case shol can be nuich improved upon and by increas-
ing the weight of till! bullets and somewhat altering its forniit
can be made efiicient up to at least 500 yards. The Austrians
consider that casi' can be firetl with good effect up to 700 yards,
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
211
Shrapnel Shell. Against troops in the open there is no projectile
that can compare with Shrapnel shell, it does not break up
and disperse at random but opens and al'ows a large number of
bullets to pursue very much the same well defined path as the
shell. The cone of dispersion (8°) is so small, the effect is so
directly in the path of the projectile, the velocity and power of
the bullets is so long retained, and their ricochet is so effective,
that the results obtained by this projectile are very great, and it
is specially suited against the present deep attack formations
and to enfilade defensive lines ; but when an enfilading fire can-
not be brought to bear it is not very effective against intrench-
inents, except in the final stages of the attack when it is very
effective in keeping down the fire of the defence by preventing the
defenders from showing themselves above the parapet and taking
correct aim. This projectile is therefore not so suitable for em-
ployment from the preliminary or first decisive artillery positions
for the frontal or direct attack of troops holding a defensive posi-
tion, unless, as already remarked, the defender's lines can be en-
filaded or taken obliquely. But in supporting the attack from
the second main position, or in repelling counter-strokes, the
shrapnel shell will be most effective. On the defensive it will
probably be the most useful projectile in all the stages of the
fis:ht, except where the assailant may be massed under covrr.
Against field works, buildings, woods, etc., this shell is compara-
tively useless. Shrapnel shell are most effective when fired with
time fuzes and yield excellent results beyond 3,500 yards, though
when the ground is favourable very good results are also toLe ob-
tained with percussion fuzes, yet the chief role of a shrapnel is es-
sentially that of a time shell, and it is consequently also necessary
to provide artillery with some form ot percussion shell.
Percussion Shells are required for two distinct purposes which
cannot well be combined in any one nature ; and it would
seem desirable therefore to have two distinct natures of
percussion shells, one designed with a view to great Tuan-kill-
ing power, such as a form of segment shell similar to the shell
introduced in other armies previously referred to yielding a large
number of fragments, and a shell with a high explosive effect for
the destruction of earthworks, houses, obstacles, etc. The old
common shell is of the nature of an explosive shell, but, as we
212
TACTICAL NOTES.
\'l
have seen, a bursting charge of ordinary gunpowder in a field
shell gives very little useful result, their effect is very local and
they yield but few splinters. Recent experiments have however
shown that there may be a possibility of firing shell full of gun-
cotton or some other kindred explosive with safety, and this will
doubtless ere long be a solution to the question. Such a shell will
be most effective against strong earthworks and blinded cover fired
chiefly from the preliminary and first main artillery positions, and
for shelling villages and obstacles of all kinds and at all times.
Whatever be the form of segment shell introduced it should have
a strong bursting charge in the head or body of the shell so as to
have explosive power and to disperse the fragments with effect :
it would be used in the preliminary stages of the attack against
troops under cover, to search out hollows, bombard villages and
woods, and in the defence against troops behind cover. The
reason why shrapnel are not so suitable for these purposes when
fired with percussion fuzes are that at great ranges on impact the
bullets are liable to bury themselves in the ground, whereas in a
proper form of segment shell the fragments will be scattered.
There is, it is evident, a very great objection to having a fourth
description of projectile with field guns which the introduction of
a segment shell would necessitate, and it is not desired here to
settle this question one way or the other, but only to point out
the advantages such a projectile would confer on some occasions.
It may be that the introduction of gun cotton or some other ex-
plosive will settle the difficult}'.
COMPARISON BETWEEN INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY.
Closely allied to the subject of the development of artillery is
the great question of the comparative physical and moral power
of infantry and artillery at the present day, and the moral effect
produced upon one or the other arm by equal losses.
Infantry always has been, and must ever remain, the principal
arm, the mainstay of an army. It is the easiest trained, the
cheapest to place in the field and to keep there, the only arm
which is, equally powerful at rest or in motion, the most easily
concealed, the simplest in its armament and use. Only infantry
can decide battles and secure the ground won ; but on the battle-
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
213
field artiller}' forms a very important auxiliary arm helping and
enabling the infantry to gain these objects, and those who are
inclined to argue that in consequence of the improved weapons
of the infantry it can entirely supersede artillery are jumping at
conclusions which cannot fail, if followed by any country, to lead
to disaster in its first war.
The tools ol a soldier like those of a workman are constructed
each for its own special use, and so the various arms under the
command ot the General are so many means of action, each
destined to complete the work of the others. They have to afford
each other mutual support, but each has to take care not to
encroach on the field of action of the others, for each can only
very imperfectly replace the others and would be using its strength
for purposes for which it could be better employed.
Intantry and artillery have so much in common that both act
by lire, but their fire is as different as possible as well as their
sphere of action and their effects. In order, however, to ascer-
tain the effective results of each arm, comparisons have been
made and statistics compiled to ascertain the proportion of
killed and wounded in different wars from the effects of each arm,
and some of these have been quoted in these pages. The figures
produced however, do in no wise agree, but often differ very con-
siderably ; nevertheless what has been clearly established is, on
the one hand, that in modern warfare fire action is incomparably
more destructive than cold steel, and on the other, that infantry
bullets killed and wounded far more than artillery projectiles.
These results were so evident as not to need the demonstration
of statistics, but they were in many quarters deemed sufficiently
conclusive to regard artillery as an arm of the past. It is how-
ever strange that scarcely any of those who came to this conclu-
sion ever thought of comparing the difference in the effective of
these two arms. For instance, in a recent pamphlet it is stated
that in the war of 1870, in every 100 wounds received by the
Prussian soldiers, 79 were produced by small arms, 15.6 by shell,
5 by sword or lance, and ,4 by bayonet, and such figures have
frequently been quoted with the triumphant conclusion that the
infantry killed nearly five times as many men as artillery. But
it is forgotten apparently that the infantry was perhaps 7 or 8
times more numerous tlian the artillery, and in consequence if it
214
TACTICAL NOTES.
i i
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only did five times greater execution it was relatively less des-
tructive. Besides, other statistics, which have every appearance
of having been compiled with the same care, give the French
losses due to the German artillery as 25 per cent ; and it has
been stated that owing to the greatly increased power of the
present artillery the proportion in the next war will be at least 40
per cent.
Coming now to the results of experiments where the effects of
artillery have been compared with that of infantry, it is found
that the results have also differed very considerably according to
the conditions under which- the experiments took place, and have
sometimes resulted in favour of the artil ry and sometimes in
favour of the infantry ; but in all cases it has admittedly been
found next to impossible to execute the firing under conditions
which would occur in war, nevertheless they have shown that at
1000 yards artillery and infantry can reciprocally destroy each
oth'er in the open. Also from recent experiments made in France
it appeared that the destructive effect of the four batteries of a
French division, armed with a g. c. m. gun, (3.5 in. of about 10
cwt.,) firing a 17^ lb. shell, is equal at a distance of iioo to 1300
yards to that of the infantry of the division in the formation for
attack. Nevertheless the sphere of action of artillery is such
that it is only under certain circumstances that it should allow
itself to come within effective range of infantry.
F'urther, in making these comparisons it is very difficult to
determine the force of infantry to oppose to a battery, also how-
to regulate the expenditure of ammunition, and for what length
of time the firing is to continue. With reference to the force of
infantry to oppose to a battery of artillery the German instructions
direct that when a body of infantry is to be employed against
artillery it should first be ascertained whether the attention of
this artillery is diverted elsewhere. When a battery is engaged
with artillery, a single company (250 men) may be opposed to it
at a range of 850 or 1300 yards. But when a battery is not en-
gaged in a contest on another part of the field, at least four com-
panies, or a whole battalion of 1000 men, must be told off to
engage this single batter}-. These conclusions have been arrived
at after comparative experi;r.ents which have shown that at these
ranges a battery produces respectively double or four times the
m
DEVELOPMENT CF FIELD ARTILLERY.
215
effect produced by a single company of 250 men, i.e. double the
effect at a range of 850 yards and four times at 1,300. In the
same way, whenever infantry wishes to prevent a battery from
taking up a position, it must use for the purpose the tire of at
least a whole battalion in order to create havoc among the men
and horses and throw them into disorder in a few minutes, and
before it can open an effective lire or withdraw out of that of the
infantry. It may be stated that experiments conducted in France
have led the French to exactly similar conclusions.
It is evident that the longer the firing lasts the more favourable
is it for the artillery. At unknown ranges after the first few
trial shots, this arm is better able to ob:ain a correct range than
infantry on account of its being able to watch the burst of its
shells ; the first ten minutes or so from the time of opening fire
are, therefore, unfavourable to the artillery, whereas they are
the most favourable for infantry, for this arm cannot at long
ranges observe the effects of its fire sufficiently to regulate its
range'; besides the fatigue of the men, and the smoke becoming
thicker and thicker must tend to render their fire worse and
worse. Hence, whereas the fire of infantry attains immediately
the full power of which it is susceptible, that of the artillery is
only attained gradually, but when once attained it is able to sus-
tain it better than infantry whose fire if it continues long and
rapid must lose much in precision.
It wil^, however, be needless to continue longer in this en-
deavour to establish a comparison between two things which
cannot be compared. The artillery is not made to serve the
same purposes, to produce the same effects, to satisfy the same
requirements as the infantry. When in spite of these considera-
tions it is still desired to compare them experimentally one is
houiitl to place them in identical situations which are unfavour-
able to the one or the other, or under different conditions in
which case there can be no comparison. Such being the case, it
would seem better not to make comparisons between the two
arms which ail" more apt to deceive than to iiilighten, and the
tiuleavours to measure the relative importance of each arm by
tile number of the enemy each has incapacitated only lead to false
and dangerous conclusions. There is far too great an inclination
2l6
TACTICAL NOTES.
%
9
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:W r
to regard the gun as only a large rifle ranging further, and that is
doubtless why comparisons more or less useless are being con-
stantly made between the two arms; instead of this it would be
far better to bring to light the special features of the fire of
artillery which differ so essentially from those of infantry tire,
features which it is indispensable to recognize if a rational use of
artillery is to be made in order that all the advantage possible
may be derived from this arm.
The following are some of the reasons which enable artillery,
when properly handled, to play the important part in an engage^
ment that has been contended for, even when, as in 1870, it is
opposed to infantry armed with a far ranging breech-loadinf^
arm, provided always that the right principles of offensive artil-
lery tactics are adhered to. From the results r>f this war and of
more recent experiments it may be concluded that 4,000 yards
may be taken as a practicable range for field artillery. This
means that a gun in action under favourable circumstances covers
with its fire about 7 square miles of country, and can change its
object from one point to another more than four miles distant
from the first, by a simple movement of the trail. Under certain
circumstances this distance may even be increased to 6,000 or
even 7,000 yards, so that if guns cannot fight in motion there
seems but little need for them to do so. Since 400 or 500 yards
difference in range now matters little to artillery, the guns have a
larger choice of positions than infantry in ordinary cases, so that
they can generally find fair cover. Moreover, because they need
not move much, they can make more use of artificial shelter,
From such shelter they can act either offensively or defensively:
whereas infantry must move out of its cover to attack, and cavalry
can only attack by exposing itself completely, which is the great
reason why its action on the battle-field is now so restricted.
This quietude of artillery enables it to find the range of its mark
accurately and to fire steadily. The place where its shells burst
can be seen in clear weather up to ,5,500 or 4,000 yards and thu
range corrected accordingly if necessary. No infantry soldier
can tell whether his bullet has gone over or under the enemy, or
struck the mark, except when firing volleys by word of command
when it will be very exceptional if they are able to see the strike
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
217
of twcir bullets up to 1,300 yards, and even then only when the
bullets can throw up dust which is not possible in wet weather or
on stony ji^round, or ground covered with growth of any kind.
Besides the fire of infantry is the collective fire of individual men,
and depends for its steadiness on the nerve of individuals. Hands
will tremble; and bullets go astray after a rapid movement,
even if the soldiers are not under fire. When to this is added the
nervous excitement caused by the bursting of shells in front or in
the ranks, and the sight of huge gaps made in the line or column,
there cannot be much doubt that the average steadiness of nerve
and therefore the average firing must be very small compared
with the steadiness of the same men on the practice ground dur-
inj^ peace. The fire of artillery is not governed by the average
steadiness, but by that of officers and sergeants, and less steadi-
ness is required to lay a gun than to hold a rifle straight with its
sight properly raised. How often do men look to their sights
when advancing under such a fire as guns can now produce ?
Guns have no nerves to be shaken, and the proper orders being
jjiveii, aiming and firing is as much a matter of routine as march-
ing, and besides accuracy at long ranges can be far better secured
by the mechanical laying of guns than with weapons fired from
the shoulder.
The laying too of the artillery is much more under control, the
Commander of a battery regulating it through his officers and
sergeants almost entirely independent of his men, and he can at
any moment alter the direction of fire. The only thing which
need preoccupy him is the observation of the effect of the shell
which enables liim to at once have any error in laying rectified,
moreover the men are not liable to get out of hand.
Then again it is not necessary for the artillery to actually see
the object fired at, intermediate objects may be chosen lo lay the
,i(uns on, which may therefore be placed in a suitable and siielter-
t'd hollow, while the fire may be continued without sensibly di-
minishing the practice, the effect of which may be watched by the
commander from a convenient spot.
Another peculiarity of the artillery is that it is able to fire dift'er-
tnt natures of projectiles, some for the purpose of overthrowing
obstacles, and others for firing against troops and which can either
'•e burst in the air or on gra;^e.
v t
ill
218
TACTICAL NOTES.
Now supposing a battery opposed to 100 infantry who would,
if all are in the shooting line, occupy the same extent of front.
It is clear if each shell yields 150 fragments, which we have seen
the improved shell do, each round is equivalent to a volley and a
half of infantry. Allowing a rate of one round a minute which is
necessary to allow of careful laying, a battery of six guns will in
every minute produce a. physical, not a moral, effect of nine volleys
fired by the infantry. It is necessary then for each infantry
soldier to fire nine rounds a minute for the same number of hits
to be made. Now a fire of nine rounds every minute taking cor-
rect aim is certainly the most rapid firing to be counted upon,
and this cannot be maintained for a quarter of an hour without
the men having to rest, whereas one round a minute for guns is a
very ordinary rate which can be maintained regularly for hours.
This brings before us another important property of artillery,
namely, the length of time during which its fire can be maintain-
ed. At a round a minute from each gun, and supposing each gun
with its wagon to carry, (like the 16 pr.) 100 rounds, a battery
could, without drawing on its reserves sustain this fire for if
hours ; whereas 100 infantry occupying an equal front who desired
in the same time to fire a si/nilar number of effective bullets,
would in less than a (juarter of an hour have expended the 70
rounds each soldier carries, and that without counting the fatigue
to the men, the heating of the rifies, etc., which would render
such a fire impossible; and the fire would besides have to be
partly suspended for an issue of ammunition from the regimental
reserve, which would then only allow of its being sustained for a
few minutes longer. This is certainly a very great property ap-
pertaining to the fire of artillery, but there is another superiority
of this arm which is that it is not so easily silenced as infantry
fire.
In these days owing to the exclusive use of hollow projectiles
the destruction of artillery materiel by the enemy's fire is very
rare, and a gun is not placed out of action practically until the
greater part of its detachment has been placed " lK)rs de com-
bat." It has been noticed that in the battles round Metz the
artillery sometimes held its ground when the infantry had to re-
tire. As regards infantry the loss of onc-ihinl is supposed to be
about as much as it ran bear without retiring, but some of the
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
219
German batteries lost three-fourths of their men and yet held on
and fought their guns. How was this, seeing there was no dif-
ference in the men themselves ? Simply that the guns acted as
anchors to the gunners. Somebody must take the initiative of
giving the order to retire which must then be repeated from mouth
to mouth, rhen the drivers have to perform a complicated move-
ment, if indeed they are not under stress of difficulties because
they have horses falling wounded in the midst of the teams.
Next the gunners must limber up, and only then is the battery as
well able to retire as infantry always is. Then again each gun is
the rival of its companions in the battery, which is not easily de-
serted as a gunner has no other arms, and he therefore fights his
gun to the hst moment, and no matter how many of his comrades
are disabled the power of fire is almost as great as ever ; it is
therefore not difficult to see why a battery should hold its ground
so stedfastly.
But the effect of guns is greatly increased by their employment
in masses. A battery of 200 guns would, roughly speaking, oc-
cupy about two miles of ground, and owing to the great range
and accuracy of the guns of the present day the guns at one end
of the line can easily protect those at the other by flanking fire.
Consider then the overwhelming physical as well as moral effect
which the concentration of such a large number of guns must
produce.
This brings us to another property of artillery, namely, the
greater power conferred by its range of converging its fire on the
proposed point of assault and there overcoming the defender's
resistance.
Moreover artillery is of special value to a General as it is the
arm he can longest call his own, and can direct to his purpose
even when it is in action, which is no longer the case with infan-
try when once engaged. The faculty which pertains specially to
artillery of being at one time engaged and then without great diffi-
culty withdrawn out of fireand manoeuvred is a very important one.
By this the frequent changing and shifting of bi-.teries from one
position to another is not advocated, but it is important to know-
that from the very commencement of an action the whole of the
artillery can be engaged and yet remain disposable for other
i.
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220
TACTICAL NOTES.
purposes ; that is. it can he enj^af^ed and retired without difficulty.
and it is in consequence of this facihty of beinjjf able to manoeuvre
artillery on the field of battle that it is rarely necessary to keep
any batteries in reserve. There is nothing' to prevent a battery
which has been directing its fire on any point for a considerable
time from beinj^ retired out of action in order to be sent to some
other point where most required at the time, so that not only can
the direction of artillery fire be chanj^ed from point to point, but
it can also be itself moved very rapidly. But infantry, once
seriously enjj^af^^ed at any point, can only be withdrawn out of
action with heavy loss, and it can only be directed on another
point with the j^reatest difficulty, and if shifted from one point to
another it would soon become exhausted ; whereas a battery can
be transferred from one end of the battlefield to another witlioiit
fatif^ue to the men and come into action in its new position with-
out any loss of power, which is an attribute of artillery conferriiif;
on it a fi^reat advantage.
Another element is its capabilit}' of being directed at night on
selected areas and along given lines, a power that is wanting with
musketry, and which, owing to the probable development of uij^^ht
attacks, promises to be of some moment.
Lastl}-, it is well known that much depends upon the moral
force of troops in action, and it has never yet been contested that
the moral effect of artillery is very great, an effect which, in some
quarters, has been alone accorded to artillery as a pretext for not
crediting it with others.
Even supposing at any moment artiller}- to only kill five men
in every hundred, they certainly frighten the bulk of the remain-
ing 95. The roar proceeding from a line of guns, and the whiz/iin;,^
of the projectiles even though not very close, impose greatly
upon troops, especially young soldiers ; and moreover there is a
special dread of being hit by an artillery projectile knowing that
its blow is liable to smash the combatant in an instant out of all
semblance of humanity. All this is apt to make men less eager
to leave cover ; and it also tells on their shooting, nervousness
inducing rapid and unsteady firing and to the officers losing con-
trol of their men.
But the j>hysical results of this arm have been clearly dernon-
r
DF-VELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
221
.tiated when properly handled, and with the improved artillery
weapons of the present day havinj,' far j^^reater accnracy, ranj:;[e,
;iii(l power of projectile, this arm cannot fail to rejj^ain its former
jiosition, to which its moral effect will also conduce in no small
di;f,aeL'. Artillery fire has ;' far },neater moral effect than infantry,
it is in fact one of its natural properties, just as much as it is one,
of infantry to be able to traverse difficult {ijround impassable for
horses or vehicles ; and this effect is especially great on armies
composed principally, as they do now, of younfj soldiers.
Briefly then tlie following are some of the properties peculiar
to artillery : power of seeing effect of fire and consequent correc-
tion of aim ; facility and accuracy of laying even on invisible
objects; under complete control of the officer commanding who
ciui alter the elevation and direction by a word : different descrip-
tions of projectiles for different purposes ; possibility of sustaining
the fight for hours with the maximum intensity of fire in spite of
serious loss to the personnel ; physical and moral steadiness in
battle assured ; power of directing its fire upon different objects
and of itself being moved from one point to another ; power of
keeping up an accurate fire at night ; and finally moral effect.
These are all so many properties appertaining to artillery which
are not to be attained by the best infantry, and which show what
an important role this auxiliary arm can play if handled according
to modern tactical principles. It is absurd to endeavour to
make one arm do the work of another, and although infantry will
iver remain the backbone of an army it camiot dispense with the
valuable aid afforded it by artillery. Let infantry then husband
its ammunition for distances at which the effect of its fire will be
unerring instead of expending it at distances at which chance
alone can make it useful, and leave to the auxiliary arm this part
of the work which it is especially constructed to fulfil, " it chacun
m\ metier."
To sum up, the following are some of the definite principles to
be deduced from what has been said : —
I. Since field artillery can move at a trot and even gallop, and
its fire is of great value at all stages of a battle and at all ranges,
a General should endeavour to obtain a superiority of artillery as
•arly as possible. To gain this, his whole or nearly his whole
222
TACTICAL NOTES.
I,
tk
.ti^ -
"4.
fe)/.>
■ -1
1
force of jjfuns should be pushed well forward and massed at the
bep^inuin^ of a combat, so that it may crush the enemy's artillerv
in detail as the latter comes into position.
2. Whether actinj^' offensively or defensively, artillery can pro-
tect its own front in ordinary open country and should not retire
before infantry unless the whole force is retreating. It was an
old maxim of Napoleon's that guns have nothing to fear from a
frontal attack of infantry over ground which can be well swept
by artillery fire, provided their flanks are secure ; and whatever
may be said to the contrary the experience of the Franco-German
war does not lead us to believe that this maxim is rendered obso-
lete by the introduction of breech-loading small arms.
3. But artillery can be sorely annoyed and even caused to retire
by the fire of infantry skirmishers, well concealed in folds of
ground or behind walls and trees. Therefore infantry should only
attack guns in open formation taking all advantage of cover, and
the only reply to such hidden attacks early in the battle before
the friendly infantry has come up, is by the support of cavalry, or
of mounted infantry, on foot, or even of machine guns.
4. Since artillery can take care of itself, provided its flanks are
protected, a line of guns may be deployed opposite to the enemy.
and behind it the infantry may effect turning movements to act on
the enemy's flank. When such a flank attack is ready to be de-j
livered. the mass of guns should concentrate their fire on thatj
part of the enemy's line about to be assailed till it is shaken.
5. A system of signals should be used so as to enable a large |
number of guns to act simultaneously against the same point.
6. When the infantry combat has commenced, as many guns I
as possible should be pushed close up to the enemy, say within
1,000 yards, or to that distance where they will find die best and
nearest positions to the enemy.
7. When artillery advances to close combat, a considerable!
number of men and horses should follow the batteries as near as |
+hey can consistently with keeping under cover. If this be done,
there is no fear of leaving the guns in the hands of the enemy.
In close combat artillery must, like infantry or cavalry, count onal
heavy losses in men and horses, but they must determine to crush
the enemy in that part of the field. To treat artillery as a thing
DEVELOPMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
223
to be protected and kept out of reach of harm, is to make it notli-
iiif,' but an encumbrance, it is either a ^^reat source of strength or
weakness, according to the way in which it is handled.
8. Tiiere must be no waste of ammunition at long ranges, guns
must be moved as soon as possible to decisive range. It should
always be remembered that the moral and material effect of
artillery tire increases as the range diminishes, but great losses in
men and liorses will be unavoidabe if great results are looked for.
An experiment already referred to has shown that an actual de-
structive effect of artillery hre increased steadily from 18 percent
per minute killed at 1,000 yards to 75 per cent at 100 yards, and
this though the number of gunners was diminished to represent
losses from the fire of the infantry.
9. Since a frontal attack can be beaten off at any range, artil-
jlerv, if it has a clear field of fire up to 1,000 yards in front and
scouts on the flanks, should not allow itself to be turned from its
I immediate purpose by the reported approach of large bodies of
I infantry. Such attacks may be neglected till the enemy comes
[within 1,000 yards.
10. Guns must no longer be regarded as colors, they must be
[fought to the last, even at the risk of being lost.
11. Range-finders, telescopic sights, and scouts, are indispens-
lable to the developement of the full power of artillery ; the same
Imay be said of spare men, horses, and ammunition. The front
lline of the battery should have as few men and horses as possible
land should be fed from the rear, two or three times over if neces-
Isary. Portable steel shields would also be of great service in
Idiminishing the losses of both men and horses, l^ut the great
[principle of all, and that which must undcrl\- all miner ones, is
pat artillery is well able to shift for itself. This does not mean
(that it is independent of the other arms but that it is only depen-
dent on them in the same sense that they are dependent on it.
pvahy should feel the way and be ready afterwards to support
pe other arms ; artillery prepares tiie way and gunners are dying
pat the infantry may live and win the day. And it may be
[iroadly stated that, wherever ground favours the action of artil-
py on ;i large scale whether in attack or defen.i', no increase in
penumbers of infantry or cavalry, or of both arms in combination.
^ill siifhce to make up for the absence of guns.
CHAPTER VI.
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY L\ THE
FIELD.
This subject is considered to some extent in Chapter X on the
"General Course of an Enjj^agement " and consequently onl\- some
additional features on the eniplo> nient of this arm are dealt with
here.
EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IX THE ATTACK.
The useful co-operation of the artillery of an attackinj; force
rests in these days mainly on the following; ihree peculiar con-
ditions arising; out of the increased powers of musketry fire :
1. Infantry cannot possibly advance aj^ainst hostile infantry in
position equal in stren^^th without extraneous assistance. The
only effective and ever- ready method of afford inj,' such assistance
is the application of artillery Hre, to subdue the artillerv of the
defence, to prepare the way for the infantry attack by K'velliiif;
defences when possible, by dri\ in;^^ out and disorf^ani/iiif,^ the
defenders, and be keepinj,^ down the enemy's fire duriii,i: the
advance of the infantry.
2. Infantry becomes so far loosened and disordered by the con-
fusinj; nature of a closely contested musketry enjj;'a},'ement, that
the support of a steady artillery r^stablished in position is more
than ever necessary for the protection, the encouraj^ement, aiiJ
even the rallyinj^^ of the wavinj^^ and intermittent liiu.'s of batth.
J. Modern fire i^ so destructively decisive, and the periods dm
iuf,' which it is possible for any troops to remain unbroken wIkii
fairlv exposed to it so brief, that affairs conu* to be decided ai
critical moments; and tlierefon; the assistance of artiHirv tin, i"
i ■ 1'
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD.
225
be effective, must be essentially timely. If the action of the artil-
lery be too slow the decision will have been achieved without its
co-operation, a decision which on that account may have been an
adverse one.
Further, it may be laid down generally that in proportion as the
power of hre of every kind becomes developed, the more are de-
cisive effects produced at peculiar instants, and the more does it
become desirable for all the jiarts of a force to combine, as mucli
as possible, their action at the decisive point and moment. Im-
proved weapons lead to improved combinations of the three arms ;
and the necessity of an intimate acquaintance, of secure tactical
connection, and of ready reciprocation of assistance between
them, is more urgent than ever.
The great importance of the initiative of fire was well under-
stood by Napoleon and was one of the causes of his great successes
with artillery, and in the campaign of 1866 the initiative of fire
established by the Austrian artillery was one of the causes of the
comparative failure of the Prussian artillery.
In taking up a position which should have been previously
selected and reconnoitred, it is important to do so quietly with-
out attracting notice, and although when not exposed to the view
of the enemy artillery should move with the utmost rapidity pos-
sible, yet, if it does so when in sight, it may attract the enemy's
attention and several guns may be put "hors de combat ' before
they even unlimber. The actual movement of artillery under fire
and into position should therefore be done with the greatest
rapidity possible it is true, but also with deliberation in order that
there should be the least }ios.sible exposure to men and horses.
Every fold and dip of the ground must be taken advantage of to
secure the easiest and most sheltered line for the movement, as
by so doing the guns may be able to open fire before they are dis-
covered, and this should always be sought for in order, lor one
thin^f, to secure the initiative of fire and take the enemy by sur-
pri?e which has always a demoralizing tendency, but to do this
several batteries will have to open fire simultaneously.
J of the disadvantages the artillery of the attack labours
under is that the positions available will probably be less advan-
taf,'eons than those of the dofenro. Thus it may have lo occupy
I ^'1
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226
TACTICAL NOTES.
f
J
heights opposing those occupied by the defender and either com-
manded by them, as was the case in the German artillery posi-
tions at Spicheren, or so far removed from them that the guns
must be brought down the front slopes, as were the German guns
on the heights between Obersdorf and Gorsdorf at the battle of
Woerth ; or level ground commanded by the heights occupied by
the enemy, as the plain to the east of the French position at
Weissenburg where many of the German guns were placed ; or
the lower slopes of heights so occupied, as in the attack on St.
Privat at the battle of Gravelotte.
In all these cases the attacking artillery is at r. disadvantage,
but the disadvantage is not in all cases so great as it appears at
first sight. The fact of being commanded will evidently be less
disadvantageous in proportion as the range is greater. If a posi-
tion on a hill which is commanded by the defender be occupied,
the reverse slopes may be dangerous if they conform to the tra-
jectory of his projectiles, in which case it would be better to move
the guns to the front slope where, although fully exposed to view.
the enemy's fire is plunging. In these cases of firing up hill,
although the actual trajectory and force of impact are but little
affected, yet he who has the commanding position has generally
a great advantage both actively and passively. His fire ought to
be more effective because he sees his target clearly and in some
cases the trajectory of his projectiles conforms more or less to the
surface of the ground on which the enemy is placed, while his
own artillery, withdrawn a little behind the crest, can generally
be placed in the desirable position of seeing without being seen
even should artificial cover not have been made for the guns.
Whereas when guns fire up hill the projectiles go up into the air
and clear the heads of the supports and reserves as happened at
St. Privat. In defending a selected position the artillery can
generally be placed under the above :r.ost favourable conditions:
but in the attack to see is the great object, and the disadvantage
of being also seen must generally be ccMinter-bahmced as far uj
possible by superior uumbtns of giuis and concentration of fire:
sometimes by a movement to a Hank so as to bring an oblique
fire on the enemy, as was done i)y the Germans at Spicheren,
ever bearing in mind that in attack the great object is to break
and demoralise the infantry defence at particular partsof the line
Li
^■mi4a
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD.
227
in order to prepare the way for the infantry, and then to support
them in their advance step by step towards the final consummation.
The tactics of the artillery in the attack will be to have a
superior artillery fire quite at the beginning of an action, which is
obtained by placing the artillery near the head of the column of
march and by massing guns very early in action. But this early
deployment must not be carried to an extreme. Hence it would
be a mistake to push artillery in advance on to a field of battle
without ensuring a sufficient protection for it, or to place artillery
prematurely in advanced and isolated positions which it could not
hold against the enemy's skirmishers.
For attack then the greatest number of guns available must be
employed to force an entrance at the selected point or points, as
artillery masses, if allowed sufficient time to act, can break down
the resistance of the defender at any point (provided he is not
intrenched in permanent or semi-permanent works with plenty of
bomb proof cover) and allow the infantry to advance into the
position without very heavy loss. This was exemplified at Sedan
where the heavy artillery fire so demoralized the French that
when the German infantry advanced on the Calvaire d'llly they
were not opposed. But although the heaviest fire of artillery
should be brought to bear on the point or points to be attacked,
yet it is obviously advisable to keep the enemy as long as possible
in ignorance of the real points of attack, for which some artillery
should be directed to fire on parts of the position it is not in-
tended to attack.
This artillery mass, however large, must be under the command
of one officer who directs the fire of the whole to produce the
effect required. In practice the senior officer of the artilleries
massed from different divisions or corps would take command.
Unity of direction on the field of battle is essential for artillery,
the tactical bonds must. therefore not be loosened unless the form
of the ground or the object to be obtained demand it. In some
cases it may be necessary to envelop some tactical point with fire
and thus a scattering of guns may be necessary. This happened
in the attack of the Rotherberg at Spicheren where the Germans
by keeping their guns massed could not overcome the I'rench
resistance, but when they enveloped the position b} scattering
their guns it soon gave in. But " massing artillery is an economy
^ill
III! mt
^mm^
228
TACTICAL NOTES.
of time and of costly human life." The system has j^jained so
much importance and massed artillery has become so self-reliant
that it forms the principal arm during many periods of the battle.
As the extent of these artillery masses will frequently be very
large it will be impracticable for the commander to exercise more
than a general supervision. This is obvious when it is borne in
mind that the space occupied is frequently one or two miles. But
an efficient control of the firing is of the utmost importance. The
whole of the field to be cannonaded should be told off in sections
of three or more batteries by lines parallel to the lines of fire, the
limits of these sections being indicated by conspicuous objects on
the ground. Measures are taken from the very first to concen-
trate a continued fire on one object, and pass to others in suc-
cession as demanded by their importance. As has been pointed
out the first efforts will be aimed at subduing the artillery of the
defence, then some of the batteries will concentrate their lire
against advanced posts which, having been shaken, are to be
carried by infantry as soon as possible ; subsequently decisive
points in the enemy's main position will form the chief objects.
In addition however to this " big battery " some batteries should
if possible be disposed so as to bring an enfilading or at least an
oblique fire on the defender's works, and if this cannot be done
by gun:i forming part of the artillery mass, some batteries may
have to be detached for this purpose.
Care should be taken to place the limbers and teams under
cover, for which purpose they may be removed beyond the rej::[u-
lated distance. Artificial cover for guns and detachments is
thrown up during the intervals of firing, which at this period
should be deliberate. It may frequently be necessary to clear a
field of fire for guns as it will often happen that trees or other
obstructions impede the view. For an effective fire a clear view
of the objects aimed at is of course essential. Such clearances
may have to be done by the gunners themselves if close to the
guns, otherwise by engineers or other arms under instructions
from the officer in charge of the batteries at that part of the battle-
field. In making these clearances care should be taken to remove
nothing that only conceals without impeding fire, while objects
such as trees which the defender may have used as range points,
II t|
nes mav
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 229
,hould be got rid of at once, as also any cover close to the guns
which would conceal the approach of skirmishers.
In considering the employment of artillery in the field it must
be remembered that nearly all countries possess two descriptions
known respectively as horse artillery, and field artillery, not to
mention artillery of position. The necessity of the former has
been at times contended, and in Italy some years ago they abol-
ished all their horse artillery, but this mistake is now being recti-
fied. A slight consideration of the respective uses of horse and
field batteries will show that they stand upon different ground,
and that the necessity for both is unassailable.
Horse artillery is required to act with cavalry, to support this
arm or to be supported by it according to circumstances, to ac-
company it in long and rapid reconnaissances, to execute long
flanking movements extending over many miles of ground, and
fjenerally to act with freedom and rapidity on the flanks, in pursuit,
and in retreat. The special employment of horse artillery in
conjunction with cavalry will be considered presently.
Field batteries should be equally mobile on a confined area,
and mounted detachments would be superfluous for all the or-
dinary purposes of a battle and for working generally with in-
fantry. Fewer horses are exposed to fire and the cost of raising
and maintaining, and difficulty of foraging, is greatly diminished.
lor these reasons the bulk of artillery must always be field artil-
lery especially as their guns can be more powerful.
Changes of artillery j)- sitions are of course rendered necessary
at times by the course of the fight; but if made frequently they
are detrimental to effect and should be avoided if for a few
hundred yards only, unless indeed it is desirable to make a short
movement to the front or rear in consequence of the opponent
having got the range accurately, and so mislead him or force him
t3 obtain it afresh. Nevertheless as a general rule artillery
when once in position should be moved as seldom as possible,
hence positions should always be well reconnoitred before hand
and the very best spot for each gun carefully chosen that there
may be no huther movement afterwards. In the attack, there-
fore, before bringing guns into the first main position the
'■^neral should previously have reconnoitred the enemy's position
■: ;!:•■
230
TACTICAL NOTES.
and decided on what points to concentrate his fire, and where
he will place his guns. The positions for the guns should then
be reconnoitred and ranges ascertained by means of range-
finders before the guns are moved into them. As many guns as
possible should then be brought up at the same time, so that
they may open fire as simultaneously as possible in order to
avoid the danger of being crushed in succession.
The following are the chief requisites of a good position for
artillery in the attack : It should have a moderate command over
the object to be fired at as observation of effect will be assisted
thereby and it assists in concealing the guns, but too great a dif-
ference of level is to be avoided. It is a popular notion that
guns should always be on the tops of hills and never far removed
from the other arms. Now a little consideration will show that
rifled guns have to some extent given artillery a new sphere of
action, at first in front, and subsequently behind and on the flanks
of the other arms, in which it is entirely unhampered and free to
select any ground. The position should be easy of access from
the direction of approach, afford direct cover for the limbers and
horses as well as protection from being easily taken in flank or in
reverse by the enemy's artillery. The ground in front should be
unfavourable for the enemy's projectiles; for instance, with a steep
bank or declivity in the immediate front which would catch many
shells falling short, broken ground, or marshy ground; but if the
guns may be called upon to advance such ground would be liable
to hinder them and should for that reason be avoided. Moreover
the ground selected for the guns should, if possible, be fairly even
and not too soft to permit of their being easily worked and readily
laid.
In disposing the guns in position they should be placed to the
best advantage as regards suitability of the ground for working
them, taking advantage of cover, etc., without reference to in-
terval or line, provided only that their connection as parts of a
unit supporting each other and under one command be not
severed.
It is a great mistake to place more guns into a position than it
will bear, and guns should rarely be placed at closer than full in-
tervals because the effect of the enemy's fire becomes propor-
tionately more destructive as the intervals are diminished. If,
^mrnw^
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD.
231
suppose, the crest of a hill affords good positions for 4 guns at
intervals of 20 or 25 yards but no other place except spots for
one gun each 80 or 100 yards on either flank, it would be a mis-
take not to place the two remaining guns here and to crowd the
hill with the six guns, for two guns well placed, carefully served,
with every round telling, are worth six exposed to fire and
hurriedly served. Special circumstances may, however, occasion-
ally render crowding of guns unavoidable, as, for instance, when
the only position available for the artillery of the attack is so re-
stricted as to make it impossible to bring a sufficient force of
artillery into action without reducing the intervals. In such
cases a double tier of guns may even be employed as was the case
in the attack at Gravelotte in 1870.
Few positions are good in all respects, the choice requires a
{;ood tactical eye which is able quickly to decide on the points
which ought to have most weight. For instance, when near the
enemy and apprehensive of attack by infantry, broken ground
in front would afford cover to the attack and would cease to be a
favourable element in the position. The most perfect shelter for
[juns and gunners and easy ground for retreat become then pre-
dominant considerations.
While the battery is corning into position all important ranges
must be ascertained by means of range-finders and then checked
by trial shots with common shell, as owing to variations in the
quality of ammunition etc., the elevatio'- may re(]uire some altera-
tion.
Owing to the great advantages derived by massing guns, the
action of single batteries should be the exception and only in case
of necessity, while the divisional artillery should act as far as
possible united. It is always advisable, if possible, to bring three
batteries into action together, and generally manoeuvre them to-
;,'ether on account of the mutual support they offer each other,
and in fact to make a "division" of three batteries the tactical
unit of this arm, and this also facilitates the transmission of
orders and concentration of fire. 'J'o obtain perfect unity a
'uixing up of different natures of guns should be avoided as
far as possible and, in order to minimi/e the incoiivenieiu:e re-
sulting from the mixing of batteries of difieient calibres, it is
a question whether the three divisional batteries of a division
11
232
TACTICAL NOTES.
should not have the same guns instead of, as at present, consisting
of one 9 pr. and two i6 pr. batteries.
The general limits of range for ordinary artillery fire in the at-
tack are ruled hy the considerations that guns should be brought
into action within their effective range, and not only so but, for
decisive effect, at as short a range as is obtainable.
Now we have seen that the effective range of modern artillery
is not limited by the power of the piece but by the power of sight
and observation, and the introduction of telescopic sights have
again made the latter practically unlimited. Nevertheless the
state of the atmosphere, the direction of the light, colour, etc.,
will cause the limit of effective range to vary very considerably.
Artillery has doubtless a natural tendency to open fire at too
long ranges, yet it must never forget that although it can now do
great execution at distant ranges the nearer it can get to the
enemy the more efficacious will its fire be, and it should conse-
quently push on as far as it can possibly do so without heavy loss :
but this will of course depend to a great extent on the nature of
the ground and the position and strength of the enemy. The short-
ness of range attainable by artillery is governed by the considera-
tion that, as far as may be, guns should not be brought within
that distance at which they are likely to suffer very considerable
loss while coming into action from the opposing artillery in posi-
tion, and again that they should if possible be outside the destruc-
tive zone of the enemy's infantry fire.
We find it stated that the experience of the war of 1S70-71
shows that the advance of guns into action at a mean range of
about 1,600 yards could always be effected without much loss.
This arises partly from the great mobility of a battery, and partly
from the difficulty which the enemy will experience in firing at a
long range against a moving object.
From the war of 1877-78 we do not learn much in this respect.
the Russians usually coming into action against intrenched posi-
tions at excessive ranges except in one or two cas(,'s when they
came into action at about 1,800 yards, 'leaking into considera-
tion that the French artillery was very inferior in 1870, and that
since that time then; has been a great imj)rovemcnt in guns and
small arms, also that in 1870 guns often optmed fire consideralily
-rryr^mm^
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD.
233
within 1,600 yards, the limit may now be placed at about a mile
with a margin either way, according to circumstances, of 400 or
500 yards. This then may be considered the average range at
which artillery will ordinarily come into action for definite attack
in its first main position. But these first positions should always
be as near to the enemy as the nature of the ground will admit of
consistent with security.
The value of artillery fire consists in its power of shaking the
enemy and throwing him into disorder, " to t'^rn this disorder to
account is the province of the other arms." The infantry attack
Is in fact the object and practical outcome of the action of the
artillery.
In the attack then, artillery ranges cannot sometimes be less
than 1,800 or 2,000 yards when opposed by unsubdued artillery,
and 1,300 or 1,500 yards when by unbroken infantry. These
[greater limits should be reduced when possible in order to secure
more destructive effect and greater facilities of laying and obser-
ation. But in the " preliminary " artillery position when it takes
part in the preparatory reconnaissance of the enemy, whether this
be dune by the advanced cavalry or by the advanced guard in
order to force the enemy to display his position, and to cover the
deployment of the main body, it may have to open fire at some
5.000 yards range although this distance should be reduced if
circumstances will permit.
During this reconnaisance the plan of attack is resolved upon,
when the batteries will advance to the " first main position " to
fire on the points chosen for attack. This position may, as we
have seen vary from about 1,300 to 2,000 or even 2,200 yards from
the enemy, and from it the artillery must prepare the attack con-
centrating its fire on the points chosen for assault and maintaining
it with vigour over the heads of the advancing infantry as long as
they can do so with safety. When this is impossible the fire should
he directed on any of the enemy's guns that are effective, or
upon any reserves in sight according to circumstances. The
accuracy of rifled guns enables the fire to be kept up over the
heads of the; assaulting troops almost to the moment of assault.
At the conunencement of an attack the artillery fire should be
i»pi<l or slow according to circumstances. If the enemy is not
m
1'tt.iLi
. m
i^
234
TACTICAL NOTES.
I
stroiif^ in troops or position, the fire should be rapid and the attack
made brusquely without delay or too much method, attempting,
as it were, to impose upon and surprise the hostile force. If, on
the contrary, it is evident that serious resistance has to be en-
countered, the guns should fire slowly and with f^reat care. In
the case of batteries attached to the advanced f^uard they are
constantly liable to be enj^aged, and when seriously so remain in
action longer than the artillery of the main body ; and, as a con-
sequence, their ammunition should be husbanded as much as
possible, as there is often difficulty "n replacing it. Though slow,
the fire should continue without intermission the object being to
make the enerir^' display his strength, at the same time exposing
one's own as little as possible.
What the artillery should fire upon has always been a mooted
point. It has been said that in each phase of a fight some one
arm of the enemy is the most effective and on that arm the artil-
lery fire should be directed ; a good rule douBtless, but somewhat
difficult of application. The maxim of Prince Hohenlolie is
simpler, i. c, only fire at the enemy's artillery when there are no
other troops to fire at, a principle which may be considered as
true in the main.
In the prehminary artillery position in order to make the enemy
reveal his position, fire will be chiefly directed on his artillery for
the purpose of drawing his fire, though whenever possible other
arms should be fired upon in preference ; and when moved into
the first main position, forasmuch as the infantry cannot advance
to the attack until the enemy's artillery fire is subdued, the fire
will at first be directed principally on his artillery it being gradu-
ally turned more and more on his infantry.
It is not intended here to enter into the descriptions of artil-
lery projectiles and their uses, but as the employment of intrench-
ments has very much increased of late years it may be stated
that in the attack of field intrtinchments by artillery these (sup-
posing the guns are sufficiently powerful to do so, which the most
modern guns are) must hv. partly destroyed by fire being opened
with common shell with percussion fu/cs and clianged to tiirn
shrapnel as socni as the cover is somewhat reduced so as to
search out the intrcnchments. lint all natures of blindfd eovei
^m
TACTICAI- KMIM.OVMKNT OF ARTILl-KRY IN THE FIELD. 235
and the deep trenches for supports can alone be efficiently at-
tacked by percussion common shell, or by a kind of segment
should such a projectile be introduced. While firinj:^ common
shell frontal fire is most effective as with an obliciue line of fire
the thickness of parapet becomes increased, but when shrapnel is
used the latter enables the trench to be more effectively searched
out.
These desiderata are conflictinj^:, and that line should be taken
which, other thinj^'s beinj^ equal, is most suitable for the projectile
which will have to do the principal work. It would rarely be
worth while to incur the disadvantaj^es which a chanj^^e of position
usually entails. Generally then, from the first position the fire
of the batteries against intrenchments will mainly consist of com-
mon shell, but from the second position, the defences being partly
reduced and the infantry defenders keeping up a continuous fire,
will be the opportunity for shrapnel and for taking an oblique line
of fire, the latter not only increasing the fire effect of the projec-
tile but also suiting the placing of the guns on the flanks of the
advancing infantry so that they may not be masked by them.
In preparing the attack from the first main position great im-
portance is laid on the concentration of fire. When firing against
artillery it is advisable for a battery to direct the fire of several
guns against one till it is silenced, then concentrate fire on the
next and so on. In the case of firing against a line of infantry in
position a rapid fire concentrated on a line about equal in length
to the front of the battery, or in round numbers about loo yards,
will be most effectual, and as the assault advances the fire should
be intensified.
As the fire of the defence is becoming subdued the infantry of
the attack will enter upon its advance, and its own artillery will
be^in to devote an ever increasing attention to the infantry of the
defence. But to give effective support to the infantry advance a
good portion of the artillery will have to push forward to closer
ranges, and by the time that the fighting line of the attacking
infantry comes under the aimed musketry fire of the defence, as
much of the artillery of the attack as the ground will allow must
have been already advanced into its last and decisive positions
bearing directly on the actual points to be assaulted and on the
• Wi
236
TACTICAL NOTES.
1-1
collateral lines, enHladiiif? the enemy's lines when possible and
regardless of losses, straining every nerve, at snch short ranges thai
none of its efforts will be wasted, to overwhehn with its fire, to
disorganize, and quell the defenders, daring everything in the
intention of bearing the infantry through the last arduous crisis
and of thus securing the success of the whole.
General Skobeleff, in the instructions issued before Geok-Tepe
on referring to " the solemn hour for the attack," goes on to say:
" In this supreme moment the artillery must absolutely lose all
thought for itself, and be prepared to sacrifice itself entirely to
supi^ort its comrades. It must at all hazards precede the attack-
ing troops, and thereby by means of its fire, which is so terrifyin;(
at close quarters, shake the courage of the enemy." " Then
all purely technical considerations must be laid aside. In these
decisive moments the artillery must have a soul, for the gunner is
not simply a mechanic." " The artillery must allow itself to
be destroyed, if necessary, to ensure the success of the attack, as
absolutely as the infantry sacrifices itself when it rushes on the
enemy. The troops charged with the duty of protecting the
artillery will not abandon it. If the guns are lost, no disgrace is
attached to the artillery but to the corps supporting it."
The distance of these second main artillery positions from the
enemy must be such that his works and their occupants may be
clearly discriminated. A range of i,ooo yards with a margin
either way of 400 or 500 yards, according to the ground and atti-
tude i)f the enemy, will probably represent the average distance.
This advance of the artillery to their nearer positions must
always be executed as rapidly as possible, consistent with taking
advantage of any natural cover available, and if successive parts
of the artillery to be moved are advanced in open order they will
frequently be able to enter upon their new positions with but little
loss, as small moving objects such as guns present a difficult mark,
Both in attack and in defence it is a rule that as long as any
guns remain effective in a battery it should continue in action if
the artillery contest is to be maintained. Partially disabled
batteries should be reinforced, but Jiot relieved by fresh batteries, as
every gun tells in an artillery contest. There will often be long
intervals of silence in the fire which should be employed, if the
mmm^mr
TACTICAL KMI'LOYMKNT Ol- AUTILI.KRY IN TUM MKLD.
■^i7
action if
disabled
tteries, as
I be long
;d, if the
,iitiliti>' is at all aimoycid by the ciiciiiy's tirt\ in dbtainin}^ cover,
wliicli ini/^lit also bu done vvliilo the rtriuf^ is f^oiuf,' on only a few
men heinj; detailed for the work. W'lien a battery ceases fire
from want of ammunition it remains under hostile tire while a
supply is being obtained. Even silent batteries are not without
their effect, for the enemy is ignorant of the cause and whether
they will not re-open at the decisive moment.
It is most important to keep batteries well supplied with
iiminunition up to the latest stages of an action ; for this the
commander of the artillery reserves must use every exertion to
brinj,' up his amniunition within reach of the batteries, even of
those ])ushed forward into the second main position, failure in
this has frequently restricted the employment of artillery.
To obtain a tactical success guns must sometimes be sacrificed ;
the preservation of the unit must be ever subordinate to the suc-
cess of the army, and for this the prejudice must be got rid of
tliat the loss of guns must be avoided at any price and be regarded
in the same light as the loss of regimental colours. In the critical
staj^es of the attack opportunities will occur for a bold use of
artillery. It has not yet been settled how far artillery may, under
usual circumstances, venture within the range of the effective fire
of infantry ; whatever this range may be, it cannot be denied that,
under certain circumstances, artillery may and must be pushed to
close quarters at all hazards. Suppose for instance an infantry
iittack to be taking place. Up to a certain point it progresses
rapidly, and with every prospect of success. At length comes
hesitation, a check, a tendency to lie down and fire. All supports
and reserves have been absorbed into the firing line. The attack
wavers between success and failure, and an impetus is needed to
carry it forward again. This is the opportunity for the artillery,
and especially for the most mobile batteries such as horse artil-
lery. A swift advance on the Hank of the wavering infantry will
f,'ive the desired impetus. The infantry will be encouraged by the
close support of the guns, and the latter, even supposing they
should effect little by their fire, will at any rate relieve the pressure
on the infantry by drawing on themselves the enemy's fire. It is
liardly possible to study the history of battles without being
struck hv the almost infinitesimal difference which frequently
.■;;(ji
'•M
•'f:-iii<til
'^y.-.
238
TACTICAF. NOTES.
^i
:]
separates success from failure. This leads to the conclusion that
the close support of artillery at critical moments will often be the
means of enabling mfantry to achieve a success which would
otherwise have been inipossible, and will justify almost any
sacrifice.
But for such a use of artillery several conditions are indispens-
able. The commander must be on the watch for the right
moment, and must be careful neither to anticipate it nor to ad-
vance when the fate of the attack has been already decided. The
ground over which the advance has to be made should have been
previously reconnoitred, and the advance must be made very
rapidly, simultaneously, and as on broad a front as possible.
Whenever an artillery commander has established a number of
guns in a position within the effective range of the infantry fire of
the enemy without suffering great loss, he has gained an advan-
tage both moral and material, which cannot fail to produce some
effect upon the operation in which he is engaged.
Artillery frequently suffers the greatest loss when limbered up
and out of action. Too great stress, therefore, cannot be given
to the necessity of devoting time and study to the art of leading
a large force of guns into action when under the effective fire of
an enemy in position.
If the position is carried, the guns will have at once to advance
and occupy it, both for the purpose of defence against re-capture
and to fire On the retreating enemy. The serious effect of losses
thus produced on a retreating enemy and the influence on the
moral of the troops was amply exemplified in 1870. If the attack
is unsuccessful the guns will have to check the advance of the
enemy and cover the retreat of the infantry. Where the adoption
of the defensive is thus forced upon it, the artillery must be pre-
pared to hold its ground as long as possible and not think of
its own safety, on the contrary it must run every risk to enable
tlie infantry to disengage itself.
But if the attack is successful, the advance of the artillery into
the position after it has been stormed is rendered more difticult
by the increased range of guns. When guns used to fire at only
a few hundred yards it was easy to see when to limber up and
advance. Now that the guns are probably firing at greater
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD.
339
ranges they may eii er not see the right moment to advance,
or be delayed uy the difficulty of the ground they have to
traverse, so that the infantry, after their first success, may
find themselves again in face of the enemy exposed at perhaps
short range to artillery fire without the support of their own artil-
lery.
One of the most difficult problems for the Commander of the
artillery lies in these successive advances of the batteries : — to
provide for the effective cannonade from the first position ; to
cover or check a repulse ; to move forward to the second position
at the right moment, not too soon lest the batteries be decimated,
nor to late lest the infantry suffer for want of the close support of
the artillery ; and finally, the proper timing of tl j advance into
the position if captured.
The rule cannot be enforced too strongly that during an attack
or retirement guns should never be in the same line with infantry,
but that they should manoeuvre with great independence. Es-
pecially is it in retirements that this must be understood, for
nothing is a more common error in manoeuvres than the way in
which skirmishers retiring, retire at once to the the guns in action
instead of holding their ground in advance of the flanks; the re-
sult is that just when guns are most useful in checking the
enemy's advance they are perhaps forced to retire because pressed
by his skirmishers. Then the guns retire again and immediately
the skirmishers retire again to them, and so on.
The German school are almost unanimous in advocating the
continued employment of artillery in masses and it has certainly
been successful when put to the test : nevertheless Colonel
Smythe in his R. A. Prize Essay of 1876, and others, combat
these artillery tactics and object to long lines of guns chiefiy be-
cause, as they urge, they then only obtain a direct fire on the
object, they hamper the other arms, are less protected by tlicni,
and cannot support their attack so efficiently, and unless the
country is very open and jiractirabh* lor all arms the gnus must
i-'ither arrive unsupported or l)r late in coniing u}).
riic successes of the (ierman artilh ry in 1870 Km] to the Icacli-
iiiK on the ta.ctieal cmplox nu'nt of artillery: " ICstahlish youv
■superiority in artilh'rv effect as eail\ ;is possil>le and keep it
Wm^
240
TACTICAL NOTES.
throughout." But how was this to be done? "Push forward all
your artillery as far as you can, into action as early as you can,
every individual gun not in position from the very beginning of
the action represents, during inaction, just so much of victory un-
applied." And therefore "Consider the whole of your artillery,
corps as well as divisional, absolutely as advanced guard, mass it
at the very beginning and so anticipate the enemy's development
of artillery. All the support needed at this period will be easily
furnished by a few cavalry squadrons. Especially avoid that
most mischievous fault of keeping any guns whatever as a reserve."
Thus, whilst this advanced mass of artillery is shattering the
dispositions of the enemy and concentrating its fire on the critical
points as they become more evident, the other arms are brought
up secured from interruption behind the screen of guns. Few-
technical details are necessary to this simple system. To concen-
trate all the available guns on the batteries of the advanced guard
forming one long line (which may be echelonned where the ground
requires it) combining their action under one command, is the
most urgent recommendation ; to depend for escort on the con-
tinual arrival of the rest of the troops, and on an intimate tacti-
cal relation with them, to change position rarely but then effec-
tively and ever nearer to the object, and to keep the ammunition
columns well up for the supply of ammunition, men, and horses,—
are the principal heads of the teaching of the German school from
the war of 1870.
In spite of what is urged to the contrary the above principles
seem to be the right ones and c'-.re certainly justified by brilliant
success. But the absolute necessity for bringing every gun into
one long line is not contended for.
The artillery of the advanci.-d guard will not be sufficiently pow-
erful by itself to fulfil its mission of com})clling the enemy to
show his hand, and must therefore be reinforced by the artillery
of the nearest infantry divisions. Whilst this artillery is engagin,i:
the enemy, more and mori' information will be gained of his dis-
positions and strength, so that the rest of tln' aitillerx- as itcdiiies
up can at once be mancenvred into such positions, out ol sight o\
the enemy if possible, that, at a given signal, the whole mav move
forward together to the first main position and bring a converging;
ll
^^^i
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD.
241
or flanking fire to bear from the most suitable positions upon
those points which offer the greatest prospect of success to the
infantry attack. But, as already noticed, the smallest force of
artillery so manoeuvred together should not be less than a division
of three batteries, and generally it would be better for the different
parts of the broken artillery hne to consist of several such divisions
massed together if the force engaged is considerable. And further,
it is maintained, in order to subdue the fire of the defence as
speedily as possible, that every available gun should, if suitable
ground offers, be pushed into position. The war of 1870 has
shown clearly that guns can easily be withdrawn from this first
position in order to employ them in another part of the field, and
when disposed in action they are just as likely to be as speedily
available for any special requirements as if kept out of action in
rear.
Another objection urged against pushing artillery to the front
in this manner to cover the deployment of the main body and
prepare the way for its action by shattering the dispositions of the
enemy and establishing an artillery superiority from the com-
mencement, is that it involves some peril as the enemy, by an
enerfi;etic attack on the small covering forces and on the flanks of
the line of guns, might suddenly capture many of the guns and
compel the others to withdraw rapidly. But it must be remem-
bered if the guns are sufficiently massed, they can, on ordinary
ground, defend their own front against an infantry or cavalry
attack, and it is only on the outer flanks that they would need the
support of other troops, and it is here that the covering force of
cavalry, or of mounted infantry who could intrench themselves,
would be disposed so as to protect the flanks of the artillery line ;
I'lit this would only be needed at first as the main force of infantry
will he rapidly coming up in formation for attack.
The "Grande Batterie" advocated so strongly would then ap-
pear to be right in principle, although that it should form one con-
Itinuous 11. le is hardly necessary, as concentration of fire can be
[ftbtained by divSposing the mass in several parts so that some
k'linsat least may be able to deliver a flanking fire. In the time
iif Napoleon it was necessary, in fuder to bring the fire of a large
11 unber of guns to boar on one point, to plant them as near to
"no another as the principles of formation would allow; in fact
242
TACTICAL NOTES.
concentration of fire demanded concentration of guns. But now
that is not necessary, and the nearness of artillery units to one
another should be determined on other grounds, such as the
facilities of command ?nd control and combination of fire, as also
of conferring and comparing experience gained in the course of
the practice.
EMPLOYMENT OF AliTILLERY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
In the defence of a position the part artillery has to play is
most important. The position of the guns must be carefully
chosen so that every inch of the ground over which the enemy
can advance may be seen from the batteries, and particularly that
a strong fire should be concentrated on the roads and the ground
on which it is probable the mass of the force will advance ; whilst
at the same time the guns must be protected, if possible, by the
natural formation of the ground ; but when this is not possible
then by artificial cover.
The artillery of the defence, equally with the artillery of the
attack, has the duty of endeavouring to establish the ultimate
success of its infantry, yet there exists a great difference in the
mutual relations and requirements between the artillery and in-
fantry in each case. Whereas, with the attack, it was evident
that the infantry could not attain its end without extraneous
assistance which had to be sought in artillery fire ; so now, with
the defence, it is clear that the infantry will achieve success and
defeat the purpose of the assailant in the absence of this extrane-
ous aid ; and to counteract such interference is the task of the
artillery of the defence.
The first use of artillery in the defence, as in the attack, will be
towards reconnoissance and the compelling of the enemy to de-
clare himself and deploy. For this purpose horse artillery bat-
teries supported by cavalry may be sent to the front to compel
him to deploy as far as possible from the defender and to discover
his strength and dispositions. Eventually this force will be com-
pelled to retire and to seek shelter in the main position, and as
the assailant will now develop a i)owerful artillery fire whose
idtimate object will be the crushing of the infantry defence, the
[)roblem of ef)untera(tin)f it inust l>e nndeitakeri.
TACTICAL EMPLUViMKNT OF AKTlLLliKV IN THE FIELD.
243
It is maintained that nearly if not every tjun of the defence,
except perhaps those batteries posted to defend the flanks if from
their positions they are unable to fire on the enemy, should be
employed in the endeavour to subdue the fire of the attack ;
althoufi;h some batteries should only occupy positions from which
they can be withdrawn rapidly to meet varying phases of the
battle, and owing to their superior mobility these batteries should
be horse artillery.
When an enemy attacks a position along the whole front as
well as in flank, he generally finds one or more weak points into
which, if he succeeds in penetrating, the position must eventually
be abandoned. To the support of these points the horse artillery
batteries must be directed and they will be most likely to hold
the enemy in check by acting offensively and advancing against
the flanks of his attack. The necessity for having some batteries
in hand for such emergencies can hardly admit of a doubt. It
will avail little to the defence to have all its artillery in action in
well chosen positions and to keep the enemy in check along the
whole line, if there be but one point into which he succeeds in
forcing his way ; in fact, one great advantage of the initiative con-
sists in this, that an assailant repulsed at twenty points, and
successful at one, is probably successful on the whole. The
moral of this, as far as *the artillery is concerned, is that a few
mobile batteries should be kept in hand at the critical stages of
the attack, so disposed that any part of the line may be reinforced
at the shortest notice ; but the employment of the fire of these
batteries in the earlier stages of the fight will not, it is urged, pre-
vent their being moved rapidly to the critical points when re-
quired, provided they are judiciously posted with this object in
view.
As the infantry advance to the attack the fire of the artillery
will be principally directed on them, but the movements of the
enemy's artillery should be carefully watched as opportune mo-
ments occur occasionally when a few rounds of shell may prove
very effective, such for instance as a movement to a flank, or a
delay in unlimbering.
As the infantry attack proceeds the fire of the defender's artil-
lery is intensified, and guns must remain in support of the infan-
try up to the last and until the latter are compelled to retire. To
-'Wp^
244
TACTICAL NOTES.
\ i
leave the infantry at the critical stage of the attack, even though
a better position can be found in rear, is to ignore Napoleon's
famous maxim as to the comparative value of moral force. In
the event, however, of the infantry being compelled to withdraw
from the position, the artillery, and notably the horse artillery
batteries, will iiave to cover the retreat of the infantry and disen-
gage it. The superior mobility of the horse artillery will enable
them to remain in action till the last moment, and they must
seek to occupy the enemy whilst the infantry is taking up a fresh
position.
But no defence can be thoroughly efficient without taking ad-
vantage of opportunities of counter-attack. For this purpose
it will be convenient to have the horse artillery supported by
cavalry on the flanks to manoeuvre on the flanks of the advancing
enemy. Occasion may offer of firing on him when massing for
attack behind ground which secures him from direct fire. If the
horse artillery, and indeed all artillery not required in the main
front, is disposed on the flank in echelon, it is not only powerful
for counter-attack but ready also to meet and counter-act the
flank attacks of the enemy to which it is almost certain he will
resort.
When the assailant is about to execute a flank attack, the
cavalry scouts should be able to give notice of the march of his
columns towards the threatened flank, and then horse artillery and
cavalry should be launched against them and endeavour to hinder
their movements. If the French cavalry and horse artillery at
the battle of Gravelotte, had attacked the Saxon army corps when
it was making its flank march to the attack of Roncourt and St.
Privat, and had impeded its progress for but one hour, the result
of the battle might have been very different. This shows the
necessity of defeating or disarranging the plans of the assailant
by a vigorous offensive use of cavalry and horse artillery. This
force niight even-tually be posted on the threatened flank and pro-
long the line so as to throw the enemy further off and to compel
him to make a wider dt^tour in order to envelop the flank.
ESCORTS FOR ARTILLERY.
Connected intimately with the artillery question are the con-
siderations relative to escorts. Their necessity on certain oc-
h«ii
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN IRE FIELD. 245
casions are recognized by all, but how practically to obtain them,
and when they are required, are matters of controversy.
Tlie strength of an escort, and the arm of which it is composed,
must depend upon the particular duty upon which the artillery is
to be employed, the degree to which it is separated from the main
body, and upon the number of guns to In; escorted ; but care
must be taken that the troops from which the escort is furnished
be not unduly weakened ; it follows, therefore, that in the course
if an action an escort may be changed, or even withdrawn.
The subject of escorts is naturally an unpopular one as Com-
manding Officers and Brigadiers dislike their battalions and
brigades being weakened, and the officers who command the es-
corts consider it a disagreeable and inglorious duty. Opinions
differ as to the formation of the escort, some being strongly in
favour of a special and permanent escort, while others are as
strongly against it. The practical difficulties in the way of a per-
manent escort are very great, besides the batteries to which they
may be attached may not throughout a battle be placed in such
a position as to need an escort at all, and it would consequently
appear to be better to form it on the spot for the particular ser-
vice required.
The old system of escorts which was to attach a troop or at
most a squadron, or a company of infantry, as permanent escort
to a battery would seem to need modification. At the present
(lay batteries frequently require no escort at all, and to attach
either infantry or cavalry to them on all occasions is only to fritter
away your force ; and when artillery are so placed as to be liable
to attack, the attack will be made most certainly in superior torce,
when a troop or company will be of little use. There is one
exception to this, namely when the ground in front of the guns is
much broken or very close affording concealment to individual
skirmishers, in which case some skirmishers disposed in front of
the guns will be necessary. When batteries are employed on
duties in which they are much exposed, and when detached, they
should have escorts of both infantry and cavalry attached to them
which should be of sufficient strength to hold the front and flanks of
the battery against sudden attack. Such an escort will serve to pro-
tect the battery and should by its skirmishers search and over-
;t;
I
240
TACTICAL NOTES.
i
look all the s^'ound in the front and towards the flanks so that
the battery commander will he relieved of all fear of a sudden and
nnperceived attack and will be free to devote himself entirely to the
effect of his own fire. Probably, when separated at all, the escort
ought seldom to be less than from 2 to 4 companies of infantry
and one or two squadrons of cavalry ; to give too weak an escort
is plainly a waste of troops. There is no doubt, for instance,
that the artillery of an advanced guard is exceptionally exposed
and in order to play its part boldly it must either risk loss or
capture or be provided with efficient support.
Where batteries have to advance rapidly to the front to gain a
good position it is evidently necessary for them to have a mounted
escort, when they have gained their position, infantry support is
required. Advariced or detached batteries then require a double
escort, both infantry and cavalry, to be efficiently supported.
By using a force capable of acting as mounted infantry the objec-
tion against using a sufficient force of both arms would be ob-
viated.
As the question now stands it is probably best to do what is
done in some foreign armies, to make the commanders of troops
marching nearest the guns responsible to furnish them with an
escort when occasion arises. Daring in attack and persistency
in defence should be the watchword of artillery, and the real
safety of guns should be confided to the other arms who should be
made to feel that the shame in the loss of guns rests on the
brigades and battalions or regiments with which they are placad,
whereas it should be shame to the gunners to allow other troops
to be overwhelmed.
The above compromise is unsatisfactory, as at the time of
greatest need there would be most difficulty in getting troops to
perform this thankless duty. The question is not yet properly
solved, and till it is the artillery of the future must play their
prominent part subject to great risk.
In the ordinary attack and defence on a field of battle escorts
will only be required temporarily. The infantry and cavalry of
the advanced guard will serve as escort to the batteries in the
preliminary artillery position, but for artillery to gain its first
main position it will often have to advance rapidly to the front of
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 247
the other arms to reach some favourable positions. To attain
these with safety there will often be necessity for a temporary
escort, usually cavalry, but as the attack progresses the guns will
be protected by the advance. In the defence guns will be sup-
ported by the other arms and rarely will escorts be required.
These remarks do not of course apply to those batteries employed
to make turning movements on the flanks.
Speaking generally, isolated single batteries will in most cases
require an escort to protect both their front and flanks, whereas
a concentration of several batteries in action can usually protect
their own front and will only need an escort on an exposed flank;
consequently the greater the number of guns the smaller in pro-
portion need the escort be.
A cavalry escort should, as a rule, be stationed in rear of, and
an infantry one in front of, the exposed flank of the batteries, and
the former must secure them against surprise by throwing out
vedettes.
In the case of an infantry escort one writer has advocated that
the infantry be posted 600 or 700 yards in front of the flanks of
the artillery position, or directly in front if the position is exten-
sive. It is difficult to see, considering that artillery in coming
into action should do so as near to the enemy as possible, how
the small infantry escort will be able to occupy a position so far
in advance of the guns until its utility vanishes by the advance of
the main attacking force, and half the above distances, or at most
400 yards or the Russian limit of 450 yards, would seem to be a
more practicable position for an infantry escort.
EMPLOYMENT OF AHTILLEHY JX C'OMB/XATION WITH CAVALRY.
We cannot conclude this chapter without pointing out some of
the combined uses of artillery and cavaliy which have been clearly
brouf:;ht forward in the R. A. Pri^e Essay of 1878 by Lieut.
Trotter, R. H. A., — and tirst in the attack of a position.
The Prussians in 1870 discovered the power and freedon) given
liy rifled guns working on the flanks. Owing to the great sacrifice
"f life which must attend any attempt to pierce the centre of a
position defended by breech-loading rifles, an assailant will liinost
•ways attack one or both flanks. I'oi this, ginis will he- specially
248
TACTICAL NOTES.
useful if pushed round on the flanks so as to overlap the enemy.
Mobile horse artillery batteries will naturally be used and should
be despatched with cavalry (or mounted infantry) during the time
that the artillery of the advanced p;uard is engaginj:^ the enemy.
The cavalry will protect their outer flank and they must endeavour
to get round the flank of the enemy, and even, if possible, to take
him in rear. From this position they will be able to take advan-
tage of a successful attack, or to act against the flank of the enemy
should he attempt to advance, the rifles of the escort,if of mounted
infantry, supplementing the fire of the guns.
The full development of the power of rifled guns will only be
attained by such bold movements on the flanks and rear of an
enemy, sending guns with strong escorts to make long dt^tours to
seize positions from which the whole position of the enemy may
be shaken. Even where the real effect of the fire may be com-
paratively trifling the moral effect created by the sudden and un-
expected appearance of a force of doubtful strength in a danger-
ous neighbourhood will go far to loosen the hold of the enemy on
his main position.
These extended flank attacks will of course be combined with
the determined attack of the main position, but the first con-
sideration of such attacks must ever be the developing of them at
the right moment. In the case of a flank attack it will be neces-
sary not to come into action until the troops destined to assault
the position are sufficiently near to take advantage of the effect of
their fire before the enemy can reinforce his threatened flank.
The remainder of the artillery will co-operate by keeping the
enemy occupied along the whole front and by bringing a cross-
fire to bear upon the points which are to be attacked. If the
enemy's flank is thrown back to meet the flank attack, the heavy
batteries should endeavour to enfilade it.
Such turning movements are no doubt somewhat dangerous.
the force may be thrown upon an eccentric line of retreat, be cut
off from the main body and sometimes sacrificed altogether, but
the possible results are so brilliant that a General who thorouj,'li-
ly understands the power of rifled guns will not fail to (ievcldp
his tactics in this direction.
Another specially important part artillery will play in future
warfare is with the advanced cavalrv of an army. The duties ot
wmm
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 249
this force of cavalry are on all hands admitted to be exceedinf,dy
important, and upon their efficient preformance depend not only
the security and comfort, but also, to a ^reat extent, even the
moral of an army. These duties are dealt with at some lenj^jth in
"Minor Tactics;" they are briefly, to cover the advance of the
main body with a veil of cavalry scouts, and to conceal from the
ememy everything that takes place behind this veil ; to fasten on
the enemy, and to gain all possible information concerning his
strength, movements, etc., to secure the repose of its own main
body, and, where it is possible, to interrupt that of the enemy.
This cavalry force, in an army organized like the British, would
be furnished by the cavalry brigades of each army corps which,
when two or more corps were acting together, would be formed
into a cavalry division. The horse artillery accompanying this
force would consist of the battery attached to each cavalry bri-
^iuk, and to these might be added, if there should be any special
need for their services, one or more horse batteries from the corps
artillery. These batteries may or may not be massed under the
orders of the commander of the whole cavalry division. As a
rule, however, it would be undesirable to attach a large number
of batteries to this force, for its business is not to fight but to
watch and report, and by unnecessarily augmenting the artillery
the services of a considerable force of cavalry would be taken up
in escorting or supporting it, and the commander might be tempted
to assume a role by no means suited to the part of the cavalry
veil. Still it is not to be expected that the ca\'alry of the advance
will be able to carry out its duties without some use of force, as
without it the cavalries of two hostile armies would probably
simply neutralize each other; and it has been recommended to
increase the force of horse artillery with the cavalry of the ad-
vance on the ground that one surplus battery may succeed in
" rending the enemy's strategic veil beyond repair for the cam-
paign."'
The efficacy of tlie employment of artillery under such circum-
stances was made apparent by the brilliant exploit of the German
horse artillery at the battle of Mars-la-Tour. A brigade of cavalry
with four batteries was ordered to advance towards Vionville and
compel the deployment of the French troops. The batteries
galloped boldly ahead of the cavaln,-and unlimbcrcd. The French
■■-Wm
m
250
TACTICAL NOTES.
!i*
outposts had scarcely sifjnalled the approach of the Germans
when the encampments of two of their cavalry divisions were
overwhelmed with shells. Thirty-four French scpiadrons and
four bat ries were so completely surprised that, thouf^h verv
superior in numbers, they retreated as cpiickly as possible. The
enemy was thus induced to deploy two entire corps-d'armt'e on a
line of battle facing west, this being a totally false direction to
give the front as the Prussian main body was advancing from the
south.
The main object of the horse artillery attached to cavalry, as
of the cavalry itself, is the offensive, and it must always act in this
spirit. The effectiveness of artillery will be very great as a pro-
tection during deployment into line, to prepare the way for the
attack, to take advantage of success, to re-establish the tight when
events are unfavourable, and to complete the victory, provided it
knows how to take up positions rapidly and judiciously from
which it can act with effect and for a long time. To prepare for
the cavalry attack the batteries will generally take up positions
in advance so as to bring an oblique fire to bear on the enemy,
and also that its fire be not masked by the advancing cavalry.
A special escort .leed only be given to the batteries when their
isolated position, or the temporary circumstances of the cavalry
fight renders it necessary. As a rule, the bodies of cavalr}' nearest
to the guns are understood to be responsible for their protection,
and they must under no circumstances leave them in the lurch
but must, if necessary, move to their rescue without waiting for
special orders.
These in general terms are the duties of horse artillery when
attached to an independent force of cavalry. When acting with
the cavalry of the advance the horse artillery plays but a subor-
dinate part as such a force should generally avoid tightinj:^ if
possible ; but when a combined force of cavalry and horse artillery
is detached from the m; i body with the purpose of attaininf,^
some specific object, such as the case at Mars-la-Tour just de-
scribed, the artillery will frequciutly become the principal arm and
will have to attack llie enemy undtM" the protection of the cavahy.
Some of tlu; objects which such a force jnay be called upon td
accomplish are: to sei/t; some important strategical point before
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN Till MI I.I). 25I
the enemy can reach it, to put it into a state of defence and hold
it till the arrival of the main body ; to fasten on a retreating
enemy, and to hold him till the infantry can come up and attack
him, as in the case just quoted of Mars-la-Tour ; to protect the
exposed flank of an army making a flank march, or vice versa ; to
threaten the flank and rear of an enemy in position while being
attacked in front : and to check a pursuing, or to pursue, a beaten
eneni}-.
As such a force is essentially a flghting force, it will necessarily
be much stronger in artillery than the cavalry of the advance.
The nature of its duties will almost always render mobility of
primary importance, and therefore horse artillery would generally
be selected ; but, should the particular object which it is called
upon to undertake be one requiring no special display of mobility,
more powerful field batteries would be preferable.
The great increase in the temporary retaining power of rela-
tively small bodies, due to the introduction of breech-loading
small arms, has done much to increase the importance of an inde-
pendent force of artillery and cavalry if the latter can act as
mounted infantry. By seizing some important point, putting it
into a state of defence, and making use of dismounted troopers as
infantry, a greatly superior force could be kept at bay. By thus
developing the defensive powers of cavalry, such a force might
act with far greater boldness than would be justifiable for an in-
fantry force under similar circumstances, for its power of rapid
movement would enable it to be comparatively indifferent about
its flanks and rear, especially if the enemy's force be composed of
less mobile troops.
A force of cavalry and artillery employed to hold an enemy fast
I in a position will naturally be as strong as possible in guns, and
lield batveries may be freely used in combination with the horse
artillery and cavalry. As its object must be to keep the enemy at
a distance and to avoid bringing on a serious engagement, it must
be careful to keep out of the range of the effective fire of infantry,
land must be prepared to withdraw if seriously attacked. It must
Inot, riowever, fall into the error of allowing the enemy, by assum- -
Ps; the offensive, to accomplish his object of withdrawing trom
jtlie position leaving only a rear-guard, and if necessary it must
p prepared to sacrifice much in order to stay his retreat. If
-iT2
TACTICAL NOTES.
protected by cavalry o.i the flanks it should be able to hold its
ground against any infantry attack in front, as the German artil-
lery did at Mars-la-Tour where, as soon as ever the French in-
fantry showed themselves, they were exposed to such an accurate
and destructive artillery tire that they were always obliged to
retire.
The occasion of an enemy's making a flank march is one wliicli
offers great opportunities to the cavalry and artillery, as a flank
attack on troops on the march is so liable to produce confusion
and deniorili;cation among them, and for this reason the army
making the flank march should protect its exposed flank by a
combined force of cavalry and artillery.
The uses of such a combined force in pursuit c.rd to cover a
retreat are so obvious as to need no comment, especially as they
are dwelt upon in " Minor Tactics."
Just before going to press the '* Manual of Field Artillery Ex-
ercises 1881" has come to hand. Part IX "The Employmenv of
Artillery in the Field" has apparently been completely re-written
and brought up to modern tactical ideas which it has been the
purpose of these pages to inculcate. The principles which have
been contended for in these chapters are fully endorsed in this
official manual, as the following extracts will show :
A reserve is "hardly at all" necessary for artillery, "which can
always be withdrawn from action in one part of the fi^ld and sent
rapidly to another. It is more important to act with the wiiole
power of artillery as early as possible than to retain a reserve."
"When the infantry have advanced close to the enemy, and
the decisive struggle is commencing, a portion of the artillery
should be pushed on close to the enemy, on his flank if possible,
so that the guns can fire without danger to their own infantry."
It is directed tliat when a position is captured "artillery slionid
occupy it at 01. ce, and fire at the retreating enemy."
"If the fight has been unsuccessful, artillery must run every
risk to enable the infantry to disengage itself and reform its
ranks."
"Both in advancing and retiring, artillery must remember that
the last fe'v rounds at close quarters are especially telling, and
" 'fM'? I
^
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT Ol' ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 253
that an attackiii;,' enemy will be so shaken by close fire thut any
demonstration of infantry or cavalry against him will _jrobably
cause him to retire."
"Artillery officers mud, above all things, remember that the defeat
of the enemy, not the preservation of their batteries in good condition,
should be the object of their first attention."
It is also directed that in selecting positions, the most impor-
tant consideration is a clear and unimpeded view of the enemy,
cover being only a secondary consideration.
"Artillery should aiivance into action as rapidly as possible,
especially when under fire. Cavalry, when advancing, must save
their horses for a final charge, but the horses of artill<ry are at
rest while the guns are in action."
■'Though a reserve of guns is seldom necessary for the artillery
line, reserves of men and horses should always be left in hand
witli tlie wagons to supply losses in the line of guns,"
"Guns with their carriages are rarely disabled, and seldom
permanently captured, except by bodies of infantry which have
approached unseen to close quarters. A line ot .irtilleiy may
therefore be considered perfectly safe if its front and Hanks are
watched for a distance of 1,000 yards by cavalry or infantry.
This safet\- increases with the nuniber of guns massed together."
"If artillery finds itself in action without support of cavalry or
infantry, a small numi)er of mounted men shouM be sent to points
whence they can see well to each flank and the front."
"On open ground a mass of artillery can generally defend its
o\»:, trout, and if the fianks are not supported by the other arms,
I proportion of the guns in action on either fiank (the number
depending on the circumstances of the case) should be in t^chelon
of subdivisions, so that they may be able to fire in any direction
without limbering up. If a fiank is attacked, the battery or
batteries in «khelon should be supported by ihe direct movement
of one or more batteries from the front line. N ") parade move-
ment of the whole line ..hould be attempted."
"As artillery may often have to act independently on the spur
of the moment, ofiicers commanding artillery, whether corps ^;r
divisional, should be kept fully informed of the intention of the
m
254
TACTICAL NOTES.
.
General officer commanding, and should, in their turn, transmit
such information as they consider necessary to the officers com-
manding batteries."
" Divisional artillery should be kept together as a general rule,
not broken up and attached to brigades. Such breaking up would
sacrifice the special power of artilU ry, its action as a mass under
one direction."
It is thus seen that the value of massing guns is for the first
time in a British official manual fully recognized.
As concerns the subject of "Escorts for Artillery" the manual
has the following:
"Although instances have occurred in modern war, of artillery
when alone, beating off attacks made upon it by the other arms,
such instances are only to be considered as exceptional, and as a
rule, artillery cannot be expected to provide for its own security
when separated from other troops."
"Artillery, when in the neighbourhood of other troops, should
have no need of a special escort. The officer commanding the
nearest troops will be responsible for guarding the front of the
artillery from the enemy's skirmishers, and its flanks from sudden
attack. If such dispositions are not made, the commanding
officer of the artillery may demand a detachment for the purpose,
which will then become an escort and act under his orders."
" In case of emergenc}' the officer commanding the detachment
of artillery may demand an appropriate escort from the nearest
troops. The officer commanding the escort should be junior in
rank to the officer commanding the artillery, and act under his
orders. If on any occasion he happens to be senior, he must re-
member that, as commanding an escort, he should act in subor-
dination to the wishes of the officer commanding the artillery."
"For marches, and generally in open country, cavalry will be
the appropriate escort. If the artillery is to occupy a position in
action for a long time, especially in a close country, the escort
may be of infantry ; but, in that case, it should be relinquished or
exchanged for one of cavalry, as soon as the artillery is ordered
to take up a new position, unless the movement is to be a very
short distance."
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 255
"When artillery is in action, the escort will act on the principle
of outposts. Vedettes or sentries will be posted, or movable
scouts sent out to watch both front and flanks of the guns, while
a reserve at least equal to the force detached as vedettes, etc.,
will be held in hand under cover, if possible, near the guns; but
as a general rule, not either directly in front or in rear of them.
The general tactical knowledge of the commanding officer of
artillery and escort must guide them in each particular case.
The duty of the escort is:
''ist. To guard against surprise.
"2nd. To defend the guns if attacked."
illl
CHAPTER VII.
MACHINE GUNS
AND THEIR TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE.
Having considered the power of field artillery of the future, we
are naturally led to consider the question as to what place
machine guns, of which we are hearing more and more every day,
will take in wars of the future.
It appears that for some years these weapons have been rather
to much discredited owing to the ill-success attending their em-
ployment in 1870. This result was chiefly due to two causes,
namely, the inferiority of the weapon itself, and the faulty tactics
which led the French to pit it at long ranges against the German
field guns, the result being, in most cases, the total discomfiture
of the machine guns. On the other hand, there is no doubt that
it often occasioned most terrible slaughter among the Germans.
They were used, but only to a small extent, by the Russiai ^ in
1877. Recently, however, these weapons of war have again been
attracting considerable attention, and they have been adopted on
a small scale as a part of their armament by most European
Powei-s ; and they have been very much improved since 1870.
Machine guns are by no means a modern conception since fire-
arms having many barrels, intended either to be fired together or
in rapid succession, were used many years ago, although the in-
troduction of rifling has of course revolutionized their nature.
Not to go back to the ])ast it may be said that it was not until
the American Civil W^ar that machine guns were cmploved in the
field. At tlu! siege of Charleston a marjiine gun did good servire,
nevertheless these weapons did not annc into favour. Their
nn'chanisin was still impiirlect, while the wooded rountiy in which
MACHINE GUNS.
257
most of the fighting took place was not suited for their employ-
ment, and they were contemptuously called " coffee grinders."
It was not till 1870 that mitrailleuses were employed in large
numbers by the French who at the commencement of the war
sent as many as igo into the field.
When a new invention is brought to public notice we invariably
find that on the one hand it is unduly extolled, and on the other
decried without much regard to its utility. Such was the case
with the mitrailleur or machine gun. Some supposed, for in-
stance, that its introduction would alter the conditions of attack
and defence, and one writer went so far as to say : " Power will
no longer be exclusively on the side of the big battalions, but as
machinery has rendered industry rich and prosperous, so now,
whilst diminishing, or at least without increasing, a war expendi-
ture, it is about to render small peoples and little States as power-
ful for defence as are the great for attack." Since 1870 the
Catling gun was in favour for several years in England, but now
it appears to be superseded by others, the Nordenfeldt and Hotch-
kiss. Mr. Gatling also considered his gun to be a means of revo-
lutionizing in a great degree the present modes of warfare. A
few men, he stated, furnished with these death-dealing engines,
would be able to defeat thousands armed with ordinary weapons,
and consequently their use would in a great degree supersede the
use of large armies.
On the other hand, prior to 1870, many laughed at the very
idea of using such weapons, and the Prussians in particular spoke
slin^htingly of arms which they knew their probable antagonist,
France, had largely adopted. While the Franco-German war
lasted, it was almost necessary for the Prussian staff to decry
their powers and to disabuse the minds of their men of an ex-
ii;;f,'erated fear regarding the destructive effects of the mitrailleur
which had been much vaunted by the French. The experience,
however, gained during this war followed by other investigations,
have enabled a very fair estimate to be formed as to the value
<'f machine guns.
Their employment will, it may be considered, be restricted to
three sjeneral uses :
''is
"mn'
1. For Field Service. — An addition to an army in the field, either
258
TACTICAL NOTES.
in separate batteries, or attached to batteries of artillery, for
increasing the fire of infantry and artillery at critical moments,
supporting cavalry and artillery against infantry, and for the de-
fence of bridges, defiles, villages, intrenchments, etc.
II. Foy Fortresses and Siege Works. — In kaponiers, breaches,
and flank defence generally, and tor use in advanced trenches.
III. For Naval Purposes. — Firing from ship's tops and in boat
operations.
It is not our purpose to deal with the employment of these
machines under the last two heads, suffice it to say that opinion
seems unanimous as to their importance for flank defence and for
naval purposes, and they have now been largely introduced into
the navy, their want of recoil rendering them available in places
where guns would be unsuitable.
With reference to their employment in the field they may be
called upon to oppose either artillery, cavalry, or infantry. They
are of two general natures :
1. Light machine guns firing the same amimunition as the rifle
of the country, or an ammunition somewhat similar.
2. Heavy machine guns firing shell.
As a type of the first may be taken a light Nordenfeldt machine
gun, two of which were sent to South Africa for service in the
Transvaal in 1881. This machine weighs only a little over one
cwt. and can be drawn by a single horse, or with its carriage car-
ried on the backs of two mules, or by four men. It fires the
Martini-Henry cartridge at the rate of 400 rounds a minute, its
range is about 2,000 or 3,000 yards.
Such a machine is doubtless most adapted for difficult country;
for ordinary purposes great rapidity of movement would be re-
quired and it is considered it should be drawn by two horses.
which would also enable a considerable supply of ammunition to
be conveyed with the gun. ■
As a type of the second class may be taken a Hotchkiss gun
which, with its equipment, weighs about the same as a light field
gun and requires i) horses for its draught. It fires <So rounds a
minute or Oo rounds with deliberrtion, the pnjiectile being an ex-
plosive shell, i^ lb. in weight, with a percussion fuze. Its extreme
'"■.^Tl?;n!!|!
fll^
MACHINE GUNS.
259
effective range is 5,500 yards. Each shell yields about 20 danger-
ous fragments, or 1,200 hits a minute can be produced. By
means of a traversing saddle mere local effect is avoided. These
machines have been introduced for military as well as naval pur-
poses by several countries.
The purposes for which these two natures of machine guns
would be employed in the field are quite distinct, and so must be
treated of separately, and first as to the light machine guns.
Machines of this class represent the fire of a certain number of
infantry in a small space, and are equal to about thirty men
armed with the Martini-Henry, although when the infantry are
armed with a magazine riiie this number would be reduced. Now
the loss of a few of these infantry, when pitted against a machine
gun, would not cripple altogether the efficiency of the whole,
whereas if we seek to obtain the same effect from a machine the
equipment of which, composed of men, horses, and materiel, must
be cumbrous compared to that of an individual, we are liable to
a loss of the whole effect from an accident to one of its parts. In
addition, a machine gun, the range of which is only equal to that
of a small arm, can often be effectively opposed by telling off
several marksmen to fire at it ; and for the sake of facilitating the
supply of ammunition in the field it is frequently urged that the
infantry cartridge should be utilized for these weapons. Although
the supply of ammunition would thereby by facilitated, which in
war is an inimense advantage, it seems doubtful whether this is
wise except against an enemy not provided with modern arms of
precision. The extreme range of the Martini-Henry has been
reached as its recoil is now as great as men can bear, and even
after this arm was first introduced its charge had to be reduced
on account of its excessive kick. But in a machine gun, where no
kick or unsteadiness has to be taken into account, a greater
velocity and consequent flatness of trajectory and range can be
obtained by increasing the charge behind the bullet, and the man-
killing and demoralizing power can consequently be made greater
round for round in the machine gun than in the rifle.
It must be remembered that these machines resemble the infan-
cy rifle with the advantage that they are layed mechanically and
have several of the peculiar advantages applicable to artillery
I
26o
TACTICAL NOTES.
which have been already pointed out in a previous chapter, but
their fire has none of the searching and destructive power of
shells and they should not be therefore employed to attack artil-
lery except under special conditions, as when an enfilading tire
can be poured into a battery at a sufficiently close range to en-
sure effect. They are also quite powerless against woods, walls,
intrenchments, or cover of any kind, and it would therefore be a
great mistake to regard these weapons as guns, and even to
replace a single gun by them ; yet this is the danger to be feared
should such a weapon be introduced into the service to form part
of the regular equipment of an army. Yet if each piece be drawn
by two horses, and with two horse wagons for additional ammuni-
tion, the additional impedimenta of an army would be triiling. It
must be remembered that light machine guns are special weapons
required for special purposes.
Against the horses and men of artillery exposed within their
range to enfilade fire, such mitrailleuses might indeed be formida-
ble, but that would not make up for their impotence in shell tire
for destroying villages or material defences, driving troops out of
cover, etc. Moreover, in 1870, the French mitrailleuses were in-
variably driven off the field the moment the Prussian artillery
could engage them, and when opposed to artillery they always
got the worst of it. The special committee on machine guns
reported in 1870 : " Except against an enemy in the open, the
fire of a mitrailleur is coinparatively worthless, whereas artillery
fire will search out an enemy from almost any position, whether
covered by trees, brushwood, earthworks, or houses, and at dis-
tances far beyond the range of a mitrailleur."
For use against cavalry or infantry a light machine gun would
in many cases prove very useful. So much had been expected of
their new arm by the French in 1870, that when their armies
were vanquished by the victorious Prussians, the mitrailleur, like
all else concerned on the losing side, did not get the credit due
to it, and besides th*^ mitrailleuses they employed were so heavy
as to require six horses, and they were treated as guns. Notwith-
standing this, however, and the imperfect knowledge then
possessed as to their proper tactical employment, they proved at
times of great service as has been fully testified by eye-witnesses.
At the battle of Mars-la-Tour Marshal Bazaine brought up two
M
MACHINE GUNS.
2bl
batteries of mitrailleuses to defend the head of a ravine, of their
effect it is said : *• Any one who has seen that battlefield, who
has seen the way in which the graves are at this point piled almost
one upon another, will see how awful the slaughter must have
been ; and it was due practically entirely to these mitrailleuses."
Again at Sedan : " on the heights close to Fleeing, there was
placed a battery of mitrailleuses. There is, opposite to that, a
round hill with wood on the top, and out of this wood and from
behind this hill came the Prussian columns. As they came out
they were swept down by these mitrailleuses, and they did not
succeed." Again of the defence of the railway bridge at Ba^eilles,
the writer says : " The Bavarian columns came down and en-
deavoured to cross the railway bridge preceded, of course, by their
skirmishers. Two mitrailleuses only, I believe, were placed
behind a garden wall, and they simply swept the bridge so that
the Bavarians could not pass it." Instances might be quoted
without number, but the foregoing are sufficient to show that
uiu'er certain circumstances they can be of the greatest use ;
still it is generally considered that, as a rule, they are more
effective on the defensive than in the attack.
Nevertheless in supporting the attack these weapons may prove
of the greatest ser^'ice and afford a close support to the infantry
if a few of them be ci'ammed up with the infantry of the attack
in rear of their supports. They have a terrific effect at short
ranges, are light, easily moved, and expose but few men and
horses, and they would prove most useful should the attack be
inclined to waver and would materially help in overcoming the
resistance of the enemy and in repelling a counter-attack. Fur-
ther, owing to their mobility they may be employed on both sides
to accompany the offensive action of horse artillery and cavalry,
either in the development of the fight or with flanking parties to
execute or check llank attacks.
Conceding that machine guns should be brought into the field.
It has to be settled whether thev should be attached to infiUitrv
or cavalry or to batteries of artillery, or whether they should
he formed into independent batteries. This brings us to the
'luestion as to what organization would best develop the power of
these weapons with the least corresponding disadvantage.
m
262
TACTICAL NOTES.
To permanently attach initraillcnses to infantry would hamper
the movements of the latter, who would also as a rule select
f^round for advance not suitable to wheeled carriages. Besides,
the duties required of the personnel of mitrailleuses batteries are
quite distinct from those of infantry, and both officers and men
should be highly trained in the tactical use of their particular
arm.
It has been suggested that mitrailleuses should be attached to
each cavalry regiment for use with piquets and in covering an
advance or retreat. Cavalry, it is said, act principally in an open
country where machine guns would be specially effective. But,
on the other hand, in countries sufficiently open for cavalry to
operate in the probability is that horse artillery, with its superior
range, would soon silence them. Yet there is little doubt that
the retaining power and therefore the independence of a combined
force of cavalry and horse artillery would be very greatly increas-
ed by the addition of several machine guns, which would, how-
ever, be specially attached to them for the time and not perman-
ently. They would also be most useful for the protection of
convoys, and on the lines of communication generally, at depots,
bridges, railway stations, etc.
In Austria during the great annual manoeuvres held in 1880,
trials were made to attach some battalions of infantry to cavalry
acting alone to serve as support and rallying points and to de-
fend certain important defiles. War alone will decide whether
this is a happy idea or hot, whether this auxiliary infantry will not
hinder the mobility of cavalry which is one of the principal ele-
ments of its success, and whether horse artillerv batteries could
not easily dislodge this infantry from its positions if left unsup-
ported. The idea of supporting cavalry acting independently by
infantry is no new one as it has been recommended to equip a
sort of light infantry to be transported in carts to support the
action of cavalry ; and in 1870, to support the German cavalry
sent to invest the fortress of Strassburg, a force of infantry was
sent there in carts. This shows the need that is felt of support-
ing cavalry acting independently, and the question arises whether
light' machine guns, which can move wherever the cavalry ammu-
nition cart can, will not prove a less encumbrance than a bqdyot
infantry.
MACHINE GUNS.
263
Af^ain it is urged that if one or at most two mitrailleuses were
attached permanently to each battery of artillery they would
prove most useful in supporting the battery and would render it
more independent of escorts. But, inasmuch as artillery are not
on all occasions in need of an escort, to {)ermanently attach these
weapons to them would be on many occasions to lose so much of
voiir power, and it would appear preferable only to attach ti em
to artillery on special occasions or when the latter may require
an escort. Moreover, the fire of these weapons is most effective
aj,'ainst troops collected either in large or small bodies, but seldom
if ever, on skirmishers, except it be when the line, as in the regu-
lar attack of a position, has been reinforced prior to storming or
charging when a well timed accurate fire may effectually check
any further advance. Now artillery can, if in sufficient force and
on ordinary ground, protect its own front against §uch an attack,
but what it has most to fear is from a few skirmishers creeping
up and causing annoyance to the gunners, and against these
machine guns will not be effective. Also cavalry, when charging
artillery, do so in very open order so that these weapons are not
very suitable as an escort for artillery except to protect the
flanks of an artillery line.
The general prevailing opinion appears to be in favour of mak-
ing machine guns a supplementary arm of the artillery force, and
of organising them in separate batteries, as has been the case so
far when they have been used in actual war. It is considered
that a battery should consist of four mitrailleuses and that each
half battery of two pieces should be complete in itself so as to be
able to act separately, as two machine guns will frcH|uently suffice
to strongly reinforce a position, and in a case of importance a
whole battery might be employed. "On the other hand, circum-
stances are not likely to arise when the employment of more than
four mitrailleuses will be necessary." A l)attery might liave only
two ofticers, and each piece drawn by two horses and worked by
tour men. The long range fire of mitrailleuses, if made so as to
yield a fiat trajectory will be more efiective tlian that of infantry
as they have many of the advantages peculiar to artillery, and as
their effect greatly depends on accuracy of firr tlK>\ slioii'd be
I'lnvided with range-finders and telescopic sights.
lUit it is on the defensive that mitrailleuses will jirove most
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264
TACTICAL NOTES.
advantageous. During the prelimirary artillery combat they
should be kept under cover, but subsequently they may be
brought up into the fighting line and posted in places where they
can most effectively support the fire of the defender's infantry by
sweeping open places which the infantry of the attack will have
to cross, and also whence they can fire on the debouch of woods
or defiles, or on any restricted areas or definite lines. They
would also be of great service if so placed as to aid in bringing a
cross fire to bear on the ground in front of the salients of works
and other comparatively weak places of a defensive position, and
for the close flanking defence of decisive- points. But some bat-
teries of this arm should be kept with the reserves under the
command of the divisional chiefs for the express purpose of
bringing them up rapidly to increase the infantry fire at critical
moments, and to support any part ol the field where the enemy
appears to be gaining an advantage. The attacking troops
would have to face such a withering fire where machine guns are
encountered as to render their further advance doubtful.
Coming now to the consideration of the second class of
machine gun firing shell, it is evident that from its great ranf,'e
and man-killing effect it will be able to take its place side by side
with the artillery guns on many occasions. In 1878 exhaustive
trials were carried on in the United States with the Hotchkiss
machine gun, at ranges varying from 200 to 2,000 yards, and the
official report states : "it is evident that the system gives promise
of proving a valuable auxiliary to the light artillery of our service:
its equality in range, its greater capacity for delivering a deadly,
incessant, and wide spread fire at all field ranges, and with de-
cided superior rapidity ; its stability when fired (the gun liavini,'
no recoil); and its evident superiority in pursuing retreatinj^
columns, give it some decided advantages over ordinary field
guns." l-5ut owing to the want of penetrative, explosive, and
destructive power it cannot on many occasions compete with
field guns.
It is a question yet to be decidtMJ whether these heavy
mitraillenses firing shell should be organized into separate bat-
teries or whether one or two pieces should be attached to cacli
battery of artillery.
The purposes tn which these machine guns may be turned an
w«fff:
MACHINE GUNS.
265
many. In the preliminary stages of the attack they will permit
of a continuous stream of projectiles being poured upon the points
selected for attack; the projectiles acting as percussion shells
lose none of their effect from loss of velocity, and are well suited
to search out cover, such as woods, hollows, etc. They will also
be of great advantage in assisting the artillery to support the
close attack of the infantry, and are specially suited to repel any
counter-attack, their rapid case like fire being most suitable for
such contingencies and generally for the close defence of any
position. As in the attack so in the preliminary stages of the de-
fence, their long range and nature of projectile will enable them
to take part with effect in the general fire. Owing to their ex-
plosive shells the accuracy of their fire can be checked by watch-
ing the explosion of the shells which is a great advantage, and
when the fire is accurate its withering nature must be most effec-
tive. The nature of their fire will also render them extremely
useful in pursuits or in covering retreats.
CHAPTER VIII.
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION,
SELECTED AS A FIELD OF BATTLE.
DIFFERENT KINDS OF BA TTLES.
Of two opposing armies that which deems itself the stronger
from any cause attacks. The moral and strategical advantages
of the attack are very gieat, and history is full of examples of
the success of attacks executed with energy and determination:
but with the small numbers Great Britain and any of her numer-
ous Colonies can dispose of as compared with the large forces of
other countries, a defensive attitude will frequently have to be
adopted by us in the event of our becoming involved in a Con-
tinental war.
A weaker force acting on the defensive, if animated by true
courage and discipline and directed with skill, will fre(iuently
succeed in not only parrying the blow of its adversary but in so
following up its success as to complete his overthrow. This does
not of course apply to our numerous wars against uncivilized
nations when, relying on our superior intelligence, discipline, and
weapons, we have nearly always attacked an enemy vastly
superior in point of numbers : but in the late Zulu war. after the
disaster of Isandlwana had convinced us we had no ordinary un-
civilized nation in arms to deal witli but one with a good organiza-
tion and with troops partially trained and disciplined, altliougli
we penetrated into the enemy's coimtry we then halted in a posi-
tion favourable for the effective use of onr weapons and awaited
at Ulundi. Subsecpient to this, when in the eng.agements aj^ainst
"'"^'!fi*^*M
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
267
the Transvaal Boers, who occupied in force a strong defensive
position guarding the main road leading from Natal across the
range of mountains to the Transvaal, these principles were de-
parted from, we attacked them with a very much inferior force
resulting in defeat and the death of our unfortunate General, Sir
George Colley. Seeing too it is against civilized nations we must
be prepared to act, it is of the last importance to study the
principles on which the defence of positions are based and
how they should be occupied. It must not however be for-
Ljotten that the army capable of taking the offensive is the one
more likely to succeed in obtaining decisive results : but, of two
forces in the field, it generally happens that one is led to act on
the defensive owing to inferiority of some kind, or in order to gain
time or maintain some strategical or other advantage.
There are only two ways in which a battle can arise : —
1. When one army occupies a defensive position, and awaits the
attack of the enemy, or
2. When both armies are on the march and come in contact.
But no matter how the battle begins the role of attacker and
defender will usually fall to one side, sometimes to each side
alternately, and it may vary in different portions of the field the
same army being on the defensive in one place and on the offen-
sive in another.
It has already been considered how, in the second case, the
advanced cavalry of one side will probably be driven in thus forc-
ing the main body to take up a defensive attitude, and it need
scarcely be pointed out how important it is for the troops to be so
disposed in the order of march as to be able to form line of battle
with the greatest rapidity ; for this the troops first required must
be near the head of the column. It is however with the defensive
that we propose now to deal, but in choosing a defensive attitude
it must be recollected that to soldiers of the modern school the
occupation of a defensive position means the acknowledgment of
weakness. It may appear at first sight that with two equal forces
the one which quietly remains on the defensive ought always to
f;ain the victory ; but although this is doubtless the case in general
it is not always so on account of the moral advantages of the
■"Uack being superior to its physical difficulties.
'iiili
268
TACTICAL NOTES.
Speaking generally there are two nat . res of defensive battles :
One when some important point or operation has to be covered,
and the other when a General hopes by accepting battle in a
chosen and favourable position so to break the enemy's strength
as to eventually enable him by taking the offensive to obtain a
decisive success.
There is an essential difference between these two natures of
defensive battles, that is between the defence of a place where the
primary object is to hold a certain locality, and a defensive position
taken up with the primary object of beating the enemy in a
decisive battle : yet in the ever varying phases of a war these
widely different cases merge insensibly one into the other,
approachir>g more nearly to the former as the defenders are
weaker, more nearly to the latter as they are stronger as compared
with their adversary, and it is with the latter it is proposed now
to dwell upon although in so doing the former cannot be entirely
disregarded,
Defensive actions are then either :
1st. Passive, or delaying, in which the object is to ward off a
blow, either to maintain possession of ground or to gain time ; or
2nd. Active, in which the object is to defeat the en( my, the de-
fender fighting in a chosen position with the intention of attack-
ing his adversary when the favourable moment arrives.
Putting aside the case where great disparity of numbers exists
when the passive defence may alone be possible, all defensive dis-
positions should be taken up with the view of drawing all the aid
possible from defensive tactics in the earlier stages of the battle
and then seizing the favourable opportunity to assume a vigorous
offensive. To remain permanently on the defensive will not gain
victories though it may be successful in warding off the attacks of
the enemy who, being allowed to retreat unmolested, will in time
recover his demoralization, repair his losses, and renew the attack
another day ; while if attacked and pursued energetically before
he has had time to recover from his defeat he will probably be
destroyed. Merely to repulse an attack cannot be called winning
a battle. Nevertheless, cases do occur when the passive defence
is alone feasible, as in investing a fortress where the object is to
starve out the garrison, or in covering a siege or investment or
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
269
some important place such as the base of operations, or important
points at the base or on the hnes of communication such as a
point of disembarkation, towns, arsenals, passages of rivers,
defiles, etc. In 1870 Von Werder, who with a comparatively
small force was covering the siege of Belfort, by the careful use
of fieldworks kept the enemy at bay, saved the besiegers from
having to raise the siege, and also prevented results that might
have altered the whole campaign. Rear guard engagements are
a!so generally only passive ; and an inferior army may assume the
passive defence when seeking to establish or regain prestige or
when acting as a retaining force in order to give time for a decision
elsewhere; but even in such cases a purely passive defence is
rarely advisable though counter-attacks would be very local and
not carried too far. There may also be defensible localities, such
as woods, villages, etc., in isolated situations or forming tactical
supporting points in a position, which, being put into a proper
state of defence and a certain force alloted to them as a garrison,
will have to be defended passively.
Nevertheless the general rule remains that vigorous and well
directed local counter-attacks are the life of the defence, they both
aid best to defeat the enemy's efforts to gain the position and to
exhaust his forces, for the loss incurred in falling back from an
attack repulsed is usually the heaviest. These counterstrokes
should be short and rapid and much pursuit avoided until the
enemy's force is considerably broken ; but when that moment
arrives, which would generally be when his reserves have been
all used up, a general and well sustained advance should seek to
complete his defeat ; the time for this can however only be decided
upon by the Commander of the whole force. If his force allows
of it, he should therefore always watch for the favourable oppor-
tunity whenever it presents itself, for assuming the offensive, for
a counter-attack delivered at the right moment will dirconcert
the arrangements of the attack and might often change the fortune
of the day.
Recent wars have shown that in order to secure success the
defender has now more than ever before to assume the offensive,
but the assailant has also frequently to assume the defensive so
as to maintain ground won against the defender's offensive move-
ments, and also owing to the great importance of flank attacks
(i;.. *
<T
m
iln
r
II
zyo
TACTICAL NOTES.
Mi :.i, :,
the ground in front of the position will frequently be occupied de-
fensively by the assailant so as to retain the defender in his
positions. This was particularly exemplified in the American
Civil war.
THE CHOICE OF POSITIONS AS AFFECTED BY CONSIDERATIONS
OF STRATEGY.
The choice of positions too is all important and here considera-
tions of strategy come into play. Battle being the final end of
all military operations, troops are led to the field of battle by
combinations belonging to the province of strategy, whereas the
dispositions on the field of battle itself are essentially questions of
tactics ; hence, when two hostile armies approach each other the
two military sciences of strategy and tactics remain no longer
distinct but become merged in the one great object of defeatinjj
the adversary.
It is supposed that the difference between strategy and tactics
is clearly understood : Strategy is the art of planning the greater
operations of war and conducting them by movements that take
place out of sight of, or at a distance from, an enemy ; while by
Tactics is meant the art of handling troops in the presence or in
the immediate neighborhood of an enemy.
A study of military history shows however that strategy and
tactics are really inseparable, for the influence of any position de-
pends on its importance as well as on its strength. Now its im-
portance results from considerations of strategy whereas its
strength depends upon purely local conditions. A very important
position may be very weak, while on the other hand a very strong
position may have no value whatever. In order then for any
position to have any real influence it must have at the same time
strategical importance and tactical strength. If it is important
and yet not of sufficient strength, the enemy will easily take
possession of it, but if it be very strong yet of no importance the
adversary will avoid it; and the most able Generals have always
been distinguished by the skill with which they judged of the
strategic importance as well as of the tactical strength of certain
localities in the theatre of operations.
The importance of any position is generally due to its being
able to command certain strategic lines of operation, and this is
I ■ 'i,.
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
271
true whether we are deaUng with large armies or with, say, but a
company charged with the attack or defence of a particular post.
A position can only command a strategic line in one of two
ways :
ist. The position may be astride on the line and more or less
perpendicular to its direction, or
2nd. It may be parallel to the strategic line but at such a dis-
tance from it that the enemy cannot pass it without exposing his
tlank to attack from it.
Positions are then generally only of importance when situated
in either of these ways and of such a nature as to prevent the
enemy from passing by them.
A General who decides to meet the enemy on the defensive must
therefore select a favourable position tactically, and so situated
strategically as to render it probable that the enemy will be
oblif,'ed to attack him. These considerations, it is evident, will
allow him considerable latitude in his choice of a position and he
must ever be prepared, should the enemy not attack him but seek
to manoeuvre him out of his position, either to assume the offen-
sive himself or to retreat without compromising his army or the
object of his operations. The movements of the enemy will con-
sequently limit the extent of ground over which positions may be
chosen, and hence the strategical circumstancss of the theatre of
war must always be taken into consideration.
\\'itli reference to the occupation of an extended line for the
purpose of covering territory, — in a close country a continued line
more or less complete l)ecomes essential to prevent the enemy
lireaking through by surprise, such is ;dso the case in countries
where troops can move freely in all directions as the lines by
which the enemy may advance are so numerous : on the other
hand, in countries where the roads are few and troops cannot
manoeuvre freely in the intervening spaces owing to natural ob-
stacles such as impassable forests, the dcifeiuler's forces must be
concentrated on decisive points. Hut it must not be forgotten
that although impassable forests form effectual obstacles against
a hurried attack yet, when the assailant has time, ways can be
nit through them.
vi4^*[i
272
TACTICAL NOTES.
The modern use of intrenchments aided by modern weapons
evidently give an advantage to small mobile armies composed of
well trained and lisciplined troops, as opposed to larger forces of
inferior quality and with less manoeuvring power, on account of
the power they give to a small force to hold its ground ajijainst
superior numbers. Small bodies may then be left in charge of vital
points while the bulk of the army, taking advantage of its superior
mobility and lighting power, can operate against the more cum-
brous masses of the enemy when least prepared. Intrpiichments,
however, to be held against the destructive power of modern
weapons require as highly trained and disciplined troops as those
of an assailant, and it is a grave error to imagine that the use of
intrenchments will make up for inferior quality ; nor, if the qua-
lity of the opponents be equal, can intrenchments make up in
the long run for great inferiority of numbers in a war unless under
the conduct of a General of exceptional ability.
As an invader advances into an enemy's country his army be-
comes more and more weakened on account of the necessity of
securing the occupied territory, guarding his communications,
and investing or masking fortresses. The defending army, if it
does not feel itself strong enough to meet the invader in the open
field, will have to fall back step by step harassing him by con-
tinued checks in strong positions but avoiding pitched battles and,
by a skilful use of the power given by intrenchments and breech-
loading small arms to a small force of holding out for a time by
covering the decisive points with small forces, the defender can,
provided his troops have sufficient mobility, manoeuvre with the
rest of his army on the enemy's flanks aud rear, harassing his
march, endangering his communications, breaking up railroads,
and even at times inflicting severe loss upon him by attacking the
enemy when unprepared. Hut when, on account of reinforce-
ments he has received and of the continued drain upon the enemy,
he considers he can do so with a fair chance of success, he will
determine to flght a pitched battle in a strong position of his own
choosing.
In selecting such positions greater care than ever will have to
be taken to protect the communications ;is the frontal attack of
prepared positions being now so precarious an op(>ration. thy as-
sailant will not fail to nianceuvre so as to avoid the direct attack
t
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
273
of the chosen position and will endeavour to force the defender
out of it by acting on his communications, and this is the chief
reason why the defence of important points now usually resolves
itself into intrenched camps ; but as the lines of communication of
the defenders of such a camp are exposed, for its successful defence
if the defender is not able to defeat the assailant before he sits
down before the camp and constructs his investing line, an active
field force is necessary in addition.
In the war of 1877-78, Rasgrad, holding as it did an important
position on the Rustchuck- Varna railway, had to be treated as
an intrenched camp and was fortified with some care ; while the
effect of the position- of Plevna on the other flank of the Russian
line of advance, Sistova-Tirnova, became at last the turning point
of the war. Placed at the junction of several roads it either
threatened or commanded all the lines of advance that were at
the time available for the invader, and as long as Lovtcha, which
was also placed at the junction of several important roads, was
also held, the pressure it caused the Russians was perhaps worth
the risk of its isolation. Still, though its retention after it had
served its purpose was strategically a great mistake, the tactical
success of its defence has hardly ever been equalled.
Again, if the position taken up presents the appearance of great
strength the invader may consider it more profitable and less
dangerous to endeavour to manoeuvre him out of it than to attack
it. It is consequently very important under certain circumstances
that the works of the defence be concealed as much as possible,
and the front line should therefore chiefly consist of prepared
hedges, walls, shelter trenches, etc., rather than of more elaborite
works which can be distinguished at a distance and give the
position the appearance of great strength, while if strong points
such as villages, woods, etc., are concealed by accidents of the
ground the advantage will be great.
But if a position is taken up, not with the desire of fighting a
battle but for the purpose of covering some important point or opera-
tion, it should be strengthened to the utmost as the Commander
will have gained his point best if he deters the enemy from attack-
ing him, but he will very likely have to spread his army over an
unduly large space to prevent the enemy from outflanking and
• n
274
TACTICAL NOTES.
passinpf him by, as occurred to Von Werdcr before Belfort. In
such a case the uirnost vij^ilance must be exercised to obtain the
earhest information of the direction of the enemy's advance.
Reserves are required, even more than in the ordinary case of a
defensive battle, to be kept in hand to reinforce tlie most danger-
ously threatened points, and {^ood communications between parts
of the position are most important.
DEFENCE OF PLACES.
Important strategic points in the theatre of war, such as
arsenals, harbours, depots, the junctions -of several roads or
railways, etc., will have to be occupied and strongly defend-
ed. The defences of such points will generally have to be,
if a sufficient force is available, of the nature of an intrenched
camp the defensive line being made to envelop the place entirely ;
as an intrenched position, unless its flanks rest on impassable
obstacles such as arms of the sea, will not be secure agamst turn-
ing movements. Also an army .lot capable of coping with the
enemy in the field may seek security inside an intrenched camp.
Thus, not to cite other instances, in the war of 1877-78 Plevna,
placed as it was on the junction of several roads forming the lines
of advance of the invaders, was treated as an intrenched camp.
Intrenched camps belong more to the subject of fortification, still
it is necessary here to point out that to protect an arsenal or other
place, or the main reserves, efficiently from modern long ranj^e
fire of artillery, allowing that the defender's artillery mounted in
the works will keep him at 3,500 yards distance fnnn them, the
diameter of such an intrenched camp should not be less than from
4 to 5 miles ; and to be perfectly safe from even stray projectiles
the enemy must be kept at 10,000 yards from the vulnerable
point. The extent of the defender's works has thus very niiicli
increased since the days of smooth-bores, but on the other hand
the number of men per mile required to defend a line strongly in-
trenched has very much diminished. Formerly, wlien the assail-
ants guns had silenced those of the defence, lie was able to move
them to positions close to the defender's works and bombard
them at close quarters ; now, however, this cannot be done in the
face of an unsubdued infantry fire. Thus, whereas in former da\^
■ i : -i-mf^i M"ii<-
OCCUI'ATION OF A roSITlON.
275
12,000 men to a mile of front to be defended would not have been
considered an excessive force for an intrenched camp, at Plevna
the Turks resistc-d the attack of the Russians, thouf^h more than
double their strenj,'th, with about 2,500 and later 2,000 men to
one mile. Hence in the present day an intrenched camp, for
security, should have a circumference of at least ten miles for
which a garrison of from 18,000 to 25,000 men will be required
for pure defensive purposes according to the nature of the position
and of the defences, but if the main object is to be offensive then
a f,Meater number will become necessary. For complete security
a circumference of fifteen miles would be safer.
The examples of Met/, Paris, and Plevna show that, however
successful the defence of such strategic points may be, they must
succumb in the long run without the co-operation of an active held
force, for the assailant will in his turn invest the place by erecting
defensive works round it gaining thereby the same advantage as
the defender of being exposed to none but frontal attacks. The
extent of the line to be thus defended will necessarily be much
;,TCatcr than that of the defence and will require a greater force
for each mile of front owing to the greater difficulty of assembling
a sufficient force in time to resist a sortie, the defender acting
along a chord while the assailant can only operate along an arc.
The Russians invested Plevna with a force oi" 3,000 to the mile,
their line extending 43 miles, while the Germans before Paris dis-
posed of 4,000 men to the mile on a line of 46 miles.
Should it not be possible to defend such strategic points with
so extensive a line of works nor with such a large garrison, the
area it is wished to preserve must be exposed to the enemy's
artillery fire, and in that case the whole garrison and stores must
be sheltered in works thrown up for the purpose containg suffi-
cient bombproofs for their protection, or behind accidents of
k'round.
Similar posts are required on the line of communications to
protect magazines, depots, railway stations, etc. In order to
weaken the army in the field as little as possible such posts are
•iefended by a minimum garrison, and must therefore be fortified
to the utmost and provided with good fiank defence.
Colonel Schaw gives an example of how natural features can be
ill
-iL
27^
TACTICAL NOTES.
turned to acco'int for the protection of a depot of provisions from
the Civi'. War in America, when General Sherman at Allatoona
formed a large depot in a deep railway cutting secured by two
redoubts, one on each side of the cutting, flanking each other and
looking down on the railway station and stores. The fixed gar-
rison of these redoubts was 890 men, they were armed with artil-
lery and were so near to one another that they afforded each other
mutual support both by musketry and artillery fire. A railway
cutting passing through a range of hills, particularly if there be a
curve in the lir ^ at this point, may often be used to protect long
ranges of sheds containing army stores from destruction by dis-
tant artillery fire, while field works, judiciously constructed and
held by a few battalions with ,.ie aia of heavy artillery, may
secure the position from any sudden attack by an army in the
field.
GENERAL OBJECTS TO BE ATTAINED IN OCCUPYING A POSITION.
It is of the highest importance that the commander of any body
ot troops should have a clear idea of the general objects he has to
attain so that when he comes in contact with the enemy he may
form a correct decision whether he should assume the offensive
or act on the defensive.
As great moral advantages invariably belong to the attack, pro-
vided che assailant is sufficiently strong and other circumstances
favourable, a Commander should generally endeavour to assume
the offensive ; but should a defensive attitude be adopted it should
ever be borne in mind that the great object to be gained in takinj;
up a defensive position is to exhaust the enemy in the stubbor-
ness of the resistance while preserving a sufficiently fresh portion
of the deiensive force with which then to overwhelm him. The
defensive should, therefore, be looked upon as a means to an end,
the first favourable opportunity being seized for turning the de-
fence into the attack so as to inflict a decisive defeat on the
enemy. To effect this, the chief consideration is to prevent the
enemy obtaining superiority of fire for which an extended and
open range is necessary, and positions should always be selected
more with an eye to efficiency of fire rather than to cover ; also
the defence must only be carried on by a portion of the whole
II > I
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OCCU-'ATION OF A POSITION.
277
POSITION.
force (from one-half to three-fourths) in the first part of the action,
so that the remainder may be available to take the offensive when
the favourable moment arrives.
Such an ''offensive-d^^fersive" position would .(generally be taken
up by a Commander whose force is equal or not much inferior to
that of the enemy, and such a position mi^ht be occupied deliber-
ately when one can be found fulfillinfj^ the above strategical con-
siderations, that is which either actually bars or at least threatens
the hostile advance, and at the same time fulfils the tactical one
by having such strong natural features as to enable the defender to
hold it defensively with only a portion of his force and, when the
assailant is shattered from repeated unsuccessful attacks on it,
to fall on him with the remainder of his forces which will hitherto
have been kept out of action, and will therefore be fresh.
The practical difiiculty of the defence is that in addition to the
depressing influence of remaining passive and other disadvan-
tages, no mistakes should be made. The mistakes of an assailant
can easily be remedied, but every error in the defence is at once
taken advantage of by an able opponent.
As the superiority to be attained in occupying a defensive posi-
tion must result in great measure from its extent being suited to
the number of defenders available, and from the advantages at-
tendant upon choice of ground, all the requirements of a good
position need to be well considered. It is most important there-
fore to have clear views of what these requirements are, and al-
thougn all of them cannot be expected to be found in any one
piece of ground yet the skill of a commander will be shown in the
choice of that position which combines most advantages.
REQUIREMENTS OF A OOOD DEFENSIVE POSH )N.
The following are the principal points which have to be atten-
ded to in the selection of a defensive position :
(I. With reference to the enemy.
1. Exposure of his distant movements so that his plan of attack
may be early ascertained.
2. That he should not have good artillery positions nor ground
favourable for the deployment of his artillery, particularly opposite
• . t
278
TACTICAL NOTES.
the weaker parts of the Hne and where the more important roads
traverse it.
3. There should be no ground unseen that the enemy can ad-
vance over, and consequently no convenient cover to protect the
advance of the infantry and to hide their movements.
4. There should be no good defensive positions available for
him to resist counter-attack if that be intended.
5. Nor facilities for moving troops, especially cavalry, unseen
to operate on your communications.
Of these the 2nd and 4th are the most important if there be
time for preparation, because the 3d and 5th can generally be ar-
ranged by a certain amount of labour, and the ist is not in any
case of so much importance as the others.
As regards the ground on which the enemy will have to deploy
his forces for the attack, it is an advantage to the defence if it is
intersected and cut up by woods or obstacles which will liinder
the development of his artillery; and if the lateral communications
are few and bad, especially if some impassible obstacle divides
portions of his front so as to isolate his columns, the advantage
will be great. But such woods and obstacles, if they obstruct the
field of fire, should not be allowed to approach within easy range
of the position.
b. With reference to the defenders.
1. As much open ground in front as possible for a clear field of
fire, so that the enemy may be exposed to it throughout his ad-
vance.
2. Command of view over the country in front and on the
flanks, with good points of observation from which the enemy's
movements can be watched.
3. Good artillery positions opposite those which are available
for the enemy or taking them in iiank, and commanding the ap-
proaches.
4. Main line as even as possible without any marked salient
points.
5. Extent suited to the number^ nd (juality of the defenders.
6. Sufficient depth for the posting of reserves and to admit of
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
279
ked salient
their free movement from one part of the position to another ;
also so that the supporting hnes may be kept clear from and not
be involved in the defence of the main line.
7. Good natural cover for supports and reserves of all arms.
8. Security for the flanks. These should be strong either by
nature or art on account of the modern tendency to outflanking
movements.
9. Free and covered lateral communications throughout the
position, parallel to and behind the front.
10. No cover, such as woods, stretching from the position to-
wards the enemy.
11. Facilities in some one or more parts of the position for de-
livering counter-attacks if they be contemplated, for which the
foreground must be suitable.
12. Facilities for creating strong defensible points and for pro-
tecting the whole or parts of the line by obstacles according to
the circumstances of the case.
13. A surface favourable for moving guns and for intrenching.
14. A second position to aid in recovering any part of the main
position which may be lost, or to cover a retreat.
15. Ample means of retreat.
16. Good camping ground and an abundant water supply.
If it seems probable that time will permit of elaborate works
liein^T erected the necessary timber and brushwood should be
i;isily obtainable.
Where the enemy can place his artillery for attack and where
the defender his own for defence are very important points to bo
considered, and upon the selection of ground most suitable for the
artillery of the main position will in a great measure depend the
«act trace of the hghting line for the infantry: conse(|Ucntly, in
wler that the different arms may be disposed for defence in the
nn'niicr most suitable for their action, the j)ositions for the
hatteries have lirst to ix; cousidercd.
It is of till' highest iuiportancc that tlii' front of a position
lioiild be clear for view and tire at least up to tlu> limits of ef-
280
TACTICAL NOTES.
I -Li.
t
■t
fective musketry fire and if possible further, (the limit of artil-
lery fire is now so great it is almost out of the question,) as should
also the ground in front of the flanks unless they rest on impass-
able obstacles. The importance of removing all cover which
would aid the ^nemy in his attack must always rank higher than
that of providing shelter for the troops, or than that of making
obstacles, but the labour of clearing is often very great. The battle-
fields of Gravelotte and Plevna, not to mention others, have
shown conclusively that this is the most important point and that
above all things a clear field of fire must 1 . o^cured ; where this
cannot be fully obtained it must be regarded as a weak point and
requires special care, it must be occupied by the best and most
trustworthy troops, be protected by obstacles, and supported by
.strong reserves.
It is a question always to be decided on the spot whether
obstructions to the field of fire, such as buildings, embankments,
woods, etc., should be cleared away or the position retired from
them. Positions should not be chosen where there are villages,
woods, or other obstructions within easy range of the position but
which cannot be included in the line of defence ; whenever such
cover comes near the position an obstacle must be created and
direct and flanking fire brought to bear on it.
Next in importance to a clear field of fire is suitable cover for
the fighting line and reserves, afnd in perfectly open country the
preparation of cover is of the first importance. Cover obtained
from the natural features of the ground is the best and next that
afforded by earthworks, but at the present day deep trenches are
necessary well provided in many parts with bombproof cover.
The great strength of the centre and left of the French line at
Gravelotte lay in the effective cover it afforded next to its open
field of fire, the features of the ground covered the reserves,
shelter trenches and quarries covered the fighting line. At Plevna
too the Turkish fighting lines occupied deep trenches and re-
doubts well provided with bombproof and other cover, and the
configuration of the heights afforded situations for the reserves
quite protected from the Russian fiiv. muI facilitating the rapid
reinforcement of critical j)oints. Hare reverse slopes at a cdn-
venient distance in rear of the shooting line, though affording
apparently good cover for the supportr. and reserves, are apttobt
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
281
dangerous if they are liable to be swept by the enemy's fire passing
over the shooting line.
Should there be any marked salient points in the position they
will be weak points on account of the enemy being able to bring
a converging and cross fire to bear on them which may have the
effect of rendering them untenable even before the assault of the
infantry takes place.
The position moreover should be such as to offer facilities for
concealing the strength, composition, and posts of the defenders
from the view of the enemy ; nor should it be anywhere com-
manded and this is especially important on the flanks where it
would be in danger of being enfiladed. Woods, undulations of
<:;round, etc., behind which large bodies of troops may be con-
cealed where wanted form the best natural cover ; houses, rail-
way and road cuttings are also advantageous. It is also im-
portant that the assembly and movement of troops intended for
the counterstroke should be done under concealment.
The movement of artillery into position and the bringing up
of ammunition is much affected by the nature of the surface soil,
whether it is hard or apt to work into mud. Its effect on the rate
of intrenching is also a point to be thought of: sandy soil offers
the best resistance and is easiest drained but will not stand at
steep slopes, while soil which is easily dug and stands at a steep
slope is the most convenient for blindages, deep trenches, and the
larji^er ditches, but it holds water and is difficult to drain.
The effects of the enemy's fire, particularly of his artillery, also
vary with the nature of the surface. Rocky surfaces ensure the
burst and increase the effect of shells, while in soft loose soil shells
are buried in their craters and shrapnel and splinters do not
ricochet much. Bullets, on the other hand, flatten on rock and
the effect of their ricochet is lost for which hard dry earth is best.
The line of retreat is best secured when it runs perpendicular
to the general front about its centre and least so when it lies in
piolongation of the front ; for in the latter case a success of the
meniy on the flank from which it leads would immediately give
liini possession of it.
A position combining all the advantages here enumerated can
282
TACTICAL NOTES.
of course seldom be found, and all that can be done is to choose
one which has the most advantages and the fewest disadvantages,
ever remembering that the most important points to be obtained
are, — extent suitable to the numbers available, open ground in
front, protection for the flanks, good lateral communications and
covei for the reserves.
NATURAL ORSTACLFS.
If the position be for simple defence, then an impassable
obstacle (such as a river) in front and within effective range will
be of great value reducing the action to the defence of the defiles
formed by the great roads and bridges ; but if it be defensive-
offensive with the main object of beating the enemy, then an
obstacle covering the whole front will be disadvantageous as it
will make it too difficult for the enemy to attack the position as
well as for a counter-attack ; but an obstacle covering part of
the position may be useful particularly if it can be concealed
until the enemy has committed himself to an attack. However,
if such an obstacle alike prevents the advance of the assailant as
well as of the defender in front of part of the line the assailant
may neglect this, knowing he need fear no counter-attack from
this direction, and throw the bulk of his forces elsewhere ; but an
obstacle under fire and covering those portions of the front that
are marked out by circumstances for a pure passive defence may
be advantageous.
Should an obstacle exist in front of the position which divides
the enemy's force as he advances to the attack ceasing however
as the position is approached, as for instance an impenetrable
ravine running down from the front of the position, it is of great
advantage to the defenders enabling them to concentrate on either
side while the enemy's forces will be separated ; this occurred at
Torres Vedras where the French were divided by a mountain
chain running from the general line and at right angles to it.
Again at Plevna, while the deep system of valleys protected the
reserves of both armies and the absence of wood on the fighting;
ground gave freedom to the defender's movements, the assailant
had his lines cut up by the numerous luMghts and valli;ys, in many
places covered with wood, which isolated their diflereiit parts.
Should such an obstacle, however, divide the position itselfiti=a
verv great disadvantage enabling the ciicuiy to concfnitratc ainl
:' ' \\M^'^lw,^';"'fH'--
.1
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
283
attack either side. Also in the defence of a great town frequent
communications such as nu nerous roads and railways leading to
it, as at Paris, greatly aid the assailant.
Again, an impassable obstacle in rear of a position is liable to
be fatal in case of a retreat, but if it have numerous passages
across it, by holding these the defender may cover his retreat.
This was the case at the battle of Koeniggratz where the Austrians
fought with a river behind their position across which numerous
bridges had been thrown. In this case, however, the Prussians
did not attempt to follow up their success energetically and their
cavalry was too far back to take part in a pursuit, had it been
otherwise this river might have caused the complete rout of the
the Austrian army.
DIFFERENT FORMS OF GROUND.
In a position extending for many miles all forms of ground may
have to be dealt with, some parts may be on a level plain, others
on elevated ground with gently falling slopes to the front, others
on crests of steep hills, or across ridges, etc. Some command of
ground for infantry and especially for artillery is always advan-
tageous, and a level plain is generally the most unfavourable for
defence as the least obstruction gives cover to the assailant.
Ground falling gently from the position both gives the defender
power of seeing all the foreground and protects the position from
being seen into. The greatest slopes which can be swept by
direct fire are, 7, 8 or 12 degrees for guns, and 45 degrees for in-
fantry, though steeper slopes can of course be swept by the
oblique fire from neighbouring parts of the position ; but for infan-
try steep slopes are not desirable as it is more difficult to fire
down them, the fire is apt to be high, and the men are more
exposed in doing so. Even a comparatively gentle slope ot 5
degrees, if it extend for some hundred yards, is a severe check to
a rapid advance, while on slopes of 10 degrees and upwards a rush
tor any distance is impossible.
The natural form of ground is frequently an increasing slope
from foot to crest, which is a less favourable condition for shoot-
ing than a straight slope and accounts for the diminution of in-
tensity often noticed in the fire of works as the assailants near
them.
rT^TW
V
284
TACTICAL NOTES.
The most favourable j^round for a position is the crest of a broad
ridge not too elevated, with gentle slopes of from 5° to 10° falling
towards the enemy and with the reverse slope not too steep to
allow troops to move freely on it, and open. In such a position
the troops in front line can be well protected without works of
high relief which would attract the enemy's notice and give him
good objects to aim at, the ground over which he will have to
advance to the attack will be most effectually swept by fire,
and there is good cover for the reserves. Where gaps occur in
the ridge the shoulders commanding them become of great im-
portance and must be held in force.
But positions on high and steep ridges are apt to be dangerous
as was shown at the battle of Missionary Ridge (1863) and also
by numerous positions the Turks occupied in the war of 1877-8.
If the crest alone is occupied there will generally be large spaces
but poorly swept by fire, and the assailant will be able to ap-
proach very near the main position without suffering serious loss;
and as has been already pointed out, steep slopes cannot be de-
fended with certainty by direct fire because, even if seen, the
defenders in the effort to save themselves at the moment of
assault fire too high if they fire at all, and such slopes have con-
sequently to be defended by cross fire from neighbouring works
which is not to be depended upon. Again the top of a steep hill
is a most deadly place to be on when an enemy is within range
down the hill as, in order to see the men below, the defenders
have to expose themselves on the sky line. In defending the
deep ravines at Plevna, for instance, the men when required to
shoot at short ranges had to expose themselves most at the mo-
ment the hostile fire was most telling, and in consequence they
naturally fired over. Also at Lovtcha the Russian infantry
suffered most at a distance and lost hardly any men on the steep
bare slope of two hundred yards that rose to the central work on
the Red Hill.
Again, more recently, the extreme difticulty of defending steep
slopes has been exemplified at the unfortunate engagement
against the Boers at Majuba Hill in 1881. This hill was ascend-
ed by a small mixed British force under cover of darkness. Its
slopes were so steep that at times the men had to climb up on all
fours, the ground too was covered with boulders of rock affording
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
285
cover. Early the following inorninj^ this position was attacked
by the Boers. While some maintained a continuous and steady
fire on the British from a distance, others, aided by the cover
afforded by long grass and boulders, were able to creep up nearer
and nearer to the defender's position until within close range
when a few minutes of heavy fire drove the defenders from their
position. It is said that the Boers had only two casualties
which show how inaccurate the iire of the defence must have been.
But, on the other hand, if troops are placed low down on the
slopes they are apt not to hold their ground firmly on account of
the fear of having their retreat to the ridge endangered, and
when they fall back the assailants may follow them up to the
ridge in comparative safety as they will be masked to a great
extent by the fugitives. All this happened at Missionary Ridge
where the Federals drove the Confederates from their lower in-
trenchments and without stopping swept up to the crest, the
rapidity of their advance saving them from severe loss many
shots aimed at them going over their heads. The battle of
Spicheren affords another instance of weakness due to high and
steep ground. The French did not occupy the lower edge of the
woods on the steep slopes on their right flank and the Germans
were able to press up to the top of the slope before encountering
serious resistance or loss.
When the hills to be occupied have steep slopes which are also
much obstructed and the plateau on the top is wide and clear, it
may be best to use this plateau as the foreground. In this case
the attacking infantry will musk its own artillery when it reaches
the plateau, and it will be very difficult for the latter to obtain a
forward position from which it can continue to support its in-
fantry as, in order to do so, it will have to mount the heights
and come within effective fire of the defenders infantry. But in
taking up such a line care must be taken that it is well in front of
the rear brow, at least 500 yards, for, in case of retreat from a
position on that brow, the assailant can at once seize it and fire
from its commanding position on the retreating troops who will
suffer in proportion as the slopes are difficult, bare, or impeded
U' obstacles which hinder the retreat, such as ravines, marshes,
S:c., and without defensible localities for the rear guard to hold.
If the position is on ground sloping upwards to the rear the
286
TACTICAL NOTES.
: i
flefender may secure the advantage of tiers of infantry tire, the
guns being posted on high ground behind the infantry, and the
slope also diminishes the grazing effect of the enemy's fire. The
disadvantages of such ground are that it is difficult to obtain
cover for the reserves and screen their movements, and in case
of retreat the troops will be much exposed, though when once
clear of the slope a favourable rear guard position would general-
ly be obtainable. Nevertheless in spite of these disadvantages,
owing to the deadly fire of a line of infantry, it is believed that in
future two or more fighting lines of infantry will be employed in
tiers when the formation of the ground is suitable, but then it
would probably be advisable to withdraw the infantry in the lower
tier before the assailant ha? approached too close, and it would
certainly be necessary for some special arrangements to be made
so as to avoid masking the fire from the upper tiers while retiring.
A narrow ridge, or a plateau with a thick wood or other im-
pediment behind it, is unsuitable for defence as it will not afford
sufficient depth for manceuvring. When the line of a position
runs across a ridge, the crest should be strongly fortified in a
salient position so as to flank the neighbouring parts of the line,
the latter being somewhat retired where they dip into the valleys.
PROPORTION OF TROOPS TO SPACE.
The extent of the position should not be disproportionate to
the strength of the defenders, for if too much ground is occupied
part or the whole of the front must be weak and if too little
ground is occupied the troops being crowded suffer greater loss
under fire while facility of manoeuvring is impeded. Its extent
should be confined within such limits that the passive defence
can be carried out with a part only (from one-half to three-
fourths) of the whole force leaving the rest available for the
decisive offensive return. It is however desirable to extend the
position to the utmost extent possible, consistent with the above
condition, so as to render turning movements more difficult ; yet
the impulse to stretch the line unduly with regard to the number
of troops available, so as to cover a certain object or render tump-
ing operations more difficult, has to be resisted. But in the
defence of territory the defender cannot retreat or permit the
enemy to get past him without giving up the object of his opera-
imi_.
m
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
287
tions, he will therefore, supposing he is unable to anticipate the
enemy's movements by attacking himself, endeavour to guard all
the routes by which the enemy can advance, and this may lead
him to extend his troops over a much greater extent of ground
than would be generally advisable.
Tiie increased range and accuracy in weapons has given the
assailant the power of selecting far more advantageous positions
for covering and supporting his -attack than formerly. Ciround,
which in the days of short ranges might be ignored, must now be
held by the defender thus compelling him to extend and therefore
weaken his whole line, or such ground must be abandoned to the
enemy who will quickly make use of it as a "point d'appui" for
an attack. The question of holding such detached positions in
front or on the flanks of the main line will be dealt with further
on. but it is evident that in most positions there will be some
•'round in front or in extension of the line it would be advan-
tageous to occupy, yet, owing to the limited number of the de-
fender's troops, he will have to abandon all hope of holding many
points which he nevertheless can distinctly see must be most
beneficial to an assailant ; and this problem often resolves itself
into not what is best to be held, but what it is possible to occupy.
In modern battles the tendency of the attack is to stretch out
the attacking line so as to envelop the defender and avoid his
centre as being the part where the fire will usually be the
heaviest. To meet this, the defender generally stretches out also
iisinj; material obstacles and fortifications as far as possible to aid
him in holding the long line. But one side or the other will gen-
erally stretch out too far, then comes the opportunity for him who
has most men, or who has kept his reserves best in hand, to make
a strong attack on a weak part of the opposing line. This attack
will be a frontal attack and if successful will be extremely disas-
trous to the other side as it will divide his forces in two, one at
least being driven away from its base, while when the flanks are
turned the retreat may gradually be made in good order if com-
menced in time;. Hence, if the defender has been careful not to
ixtend his lin(> unduly and to keep sufficient reserves in hand he
may so(! a favourable opportunity for attacking the weak force in
tront. which, it may be here noticed, will juobably have intrenched
itself and be prepared for such an attack.
288
TACTICAL NOTES.
-i4
But if the assailant is superior this is one of the main difficulties
the defence has to deal with, as the former can then spare troops
for a wide turniufj; movement without weakeninf;^ his force in front
of the centre of the position unduly, and to meet this turninf,'
movement some part of the front of the defender's line is pretty
sure to be dangerously weakened thus affordinfj a chance of
success at all events to a front attack. At the battle of Mis-
sionary Ridge already referred to -General Sherman, owing to his
preponderating force, was able to extend beyond the Confederate
right flank, but his attack here was checked by the intrench-
ments Bragg, the Confederate General, had thrown up; the hitter,
however, to meet this flank attack, had weakened other parts of
his line which was very extensive for his numbers, so that when
the Federals attacked his centre they succeeded in piercing it and
gaining the day.
The above considerations make it clear that there is an advan-
tage in extending a position to the utmost extent possible
consistent with safety because the enemy, in consequence of the
danger of a frontal attack, will generally try and turn one or both
flanks of the p^^sition. If the front is of small extent, a compara-
tively small part of the attacking army will suffice to act against
it leaving a large part available for the turning movement so
dangerous to the defence ; whereas, if the front be extensive, as
the assailant must keep the defenders employed along the whole
of it but a small portion will be available to act against the flanks.
Consequently in determining the extent of ground to be occupied
the strength of the assailant should be taken into consideration,
for the stronger the attacking force the greater should be the
extent of ground that he should be obliged to attack frontally
so that the strength of the force he can use for turning move-
ments may be diminished as much as possible.
Coming now to the question of the proportion of troops to
space, seeing that so much necessarily depends on the object of
the battle, the nature of the ground, the relative strength, quality
and ;»oyrt/ of the opponents, the time available for preparation,
etc., it is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule but it is
generally admitted that the numbers may vary from about 2 to m
mei. to each yard of front including all arms antl reserves. W'lieii
there are less than 2 men per yard, unless the })osition is very
i m
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
289
1 difficulties
pare troops
)rce in front
his turninj,'
le is pretty
chance of
tie of Mis-
:)vvinf^ to his
Confederate
le intrencli-
» ; the latter,
ler parts of
o that when
srcing it and
is an advan-
jnt possible
ence of the
one or both
, a com para-
act af^ainst
ovement so
xtensive, as
the whole
the flanks.
)e occupied
nsideration,
juld be the
k frontally
hung move-
troops to
e object of
gth, (pialit^
ireparation.
I" but it is
bout 2 to III
vc:s. When
ion is vorv
strongly fortified with at least semi-permanent works, a prolonged
resistance cannot be made, whereas when there are more than 10
men to each yard to be defended the movement of troops becomes
much impeded.
In the Regulations (Field Exercise, 1877) it is laid down, as a
rough guide subject of course to modification, that for each yard
of front to be defended five men will be required including all
arms and reserves, or about g,ooo men to the mile. Thus esti-
mating a battalion to furnish 850 bayonets and a regiment of
cavalry 440 sabres, a brigade of infantry of three battalions, having
two battalions deployed with one in reserve, might occupy 500 or
600 yards, or more according to circumstances ; a division of about
7,000 combatants (6,000 infantry, 440 cavalry and 18 guns^ 1,500
yards to one mile; and an army corps of about 24,000 combatants
(18,000 infantry, 2,600 cavalry and 90 guns) about j miles. But
this extent of front may have to be increased or diminished
according to circumstances within the above limits of from 2 to
10 men to the yard.
As the force increases so less ground can generally be occupied
in proportion, for a small force can safely occupy a comparatively
{!;reater space than a large one because the Commander can
overlook the whole field and one General Reserve in a central
position will be sufficient, and even with very small forces, such
as a Brigade acting independently, the local and general reserves
would probably be combined ; whereas in the case of large Iv^rces
the Commander will not be able to personally superintend the
whole field, and two or more large reserves must be formed and
placed at the disposal of the officers to whom may be entrusted
certain portions of the line of battle, and with very large forces
even from 15,000 to 20,000 men to the mile may frequently not
be too many.
If the position be strongly fortified, or if the defence is to be
purely passive and no counterstroke be contemplated, a much
smaller force will generally be sufficient. This is the case too in
covering actions as was exemplified by Von Werder's operations
on the Lisaine when covering the siege of Belfort. His force
consisted of about 42,000 men with which he held a strong posi-
tion successfully, with about 3,000 men to the mile, for 3 days
I
290
TACTICAL NOTES.
against Bourbaki's most strenuous efforts to raise the siege ; but
his force was too small and finally too exhausted for him to un-
dertake any offensive return.
Again, extensive forests or a mountainous character of the
country may modify these rules. Forests in particular limit very
materially the power of artiller}- while they give to the defence,
when time is available, a great facility for extemporizing a line of
works practically impregnable if firmly held by 2,000 infantry to
every mile, provided they are well supplied with ammunition.
It will, however, rarely be the case that a position can be found
exactly fittuig the number of men available but the above consid-
erations give a basis for selecting the nearest approach that can
be found to what would be theoretically advisable. The com-
mander may thus in practice determine approximately what extent
of the position he should occupy. If the position which appears to
him the best to hold is not unsuited for his strength he may occupy
its full extent. If his ibrce would thus be too much scattered, he
must restrict the length of his line defending only that portion of
the position which presents the greatest natural advantages of
ground and which therefore, by its possession, will best enable
him to carry out the purpose of his defensive action.
GENERAL ANRANOEMENT OF THE DEFENCES.
In selecting and occupying a position it is essential to have a
perfectly clear understanding of the object to be attained so as to
make corresponding arrangements, and also to consider well all
the possible modes of attack open to the enemy, particularly
where he can place his artillery, how he can bring up his infantry
under cover, and how he can act on the flanks, in order that tin
best counter-dispositions may be determined on before liand ;ui(l
may be executed promptly.
In occupying an extensive position, with special reference to
the defensive combined with the offensive, there should be a xaricil
character of different parts of the field, the ("()nunand(;r dividin;^
it into sections for offensive and for defensive! pnrpf)si'S. [''orthc
defensive sections the front should be 'oviMcd by natuinl obstacles
such as cliffs, marshes;, streams, etc., or tailiiif,^ these by artitical
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
291
)est enable
obstacles so as to make the advance of t\ui enemy as difficult as
|H)ssible, with stronj; supporting points in the position such as
woods, farmsteads and villages giving frequent opportunities for
step by step defence ; so that here, in the defensive field, an attack
of very superior hostile forces may be successfully resisted by a
small number of defenders. Failing such defensible posts strong
earthworks will have to take their place if time permits of their
erection. For other portions of the battlefield, ground should be
such as to conceal the defenders as much as possible but be open
and passable for all arms and suitable for the assembly and move-
ments of large bodies ; so that here, in the offensive field, troops
may be masK*;d unseen by the enemy and may move out to attack
him in force after his strength has been exhausted in attacking
the decisive points. Favourable situations for the defensive zones
would be advanced and commanding positions drawing on them
the attacks of the enemy, while the offensive zones are well retired.
The general arrangement of the defences required are briefly
as
foil
ow::
ist. A position for the advanced guards or outposts in order that
the assail'^nt may be forced to an early deployment and time may
be gained for making proper counter-arrangements when his plan
of attack becomes known.
The defences required for these advanced guards will be gun-
pits or epaulments in commanding positions enfilading the princi-
pal roads, and for infantry simple shooting trenches and open
works (not enclosures of any kind) which must not be defended
obstinately. The distance might be from i to 3 miles in advance
of the position according to the nature of the ground, and retreat
must be carefully provided for.
Z. The Main Position, the defeiisive portions of which should be
made ^ts strong as time and means will allow with well flanked
obstacles in front; while in the oft'ensive portions strong defensive
posis are prepared with wide intervals between them for the free
movement of considerable bodies of troops. Some advanced posts
or detached posts on the flanks will also be occupied as will be
explained later, and also, as required, a second and perhaps even
a third position in rear of the first.
292
TACTICAL NOTES.
J. A Rear Guard Position, suitable for coverinfj a possible retreat
should be chosen and strongly defended ; any obstacles which may
exist in rear of the position will be strongly defended and fortified
for this purpose, passages being made across them for retreat :
these passages being more numerous in proportion as the obstacles
are near to the main position.
As will be seen when considering the disposition of the different
arms, the infantry will be distributed very much as for the attack.
\iz: in shooting line, supports, and battalion main body or local
reserves, besides general reserves to the whole. In most positions
it will, however, not only be superfluous to guard the whole ex-
tent of front by one continuous shooting line, but most disadvan-
tageous as likely to lead to being weak everywhere. There will
generally be smooth open places affording no cover to the enemy
and which can be well swept by artillery fire, also places where
the ground is nnpassable, and in such parts of the line compara-
tivel}' few men placed behind cover will suffice. The shooting
line will be disposed so as to bring a converging fire to bear on
the enemy's probable lines of approach and when a range of
heights is occupied to flank the neighbouring slopes from t'^eir foot
to the crest ; and in this case it will often be possible to have
several shooting lines one commanding the other, the rear one
being held by the supports or even local reserves who would
only take part in the firing at critical moments. The defenders
of the front trench if compelled to withdraw could do so covered
by the fire from those in rear to which they could then form tlio
supports.
Also in an ^pen country with occasional villages, farms, small
defensible woods or enclosures of various kinds which give cover
and may be fortified, also commanding heights, knolls, or other
suitable ground which may be turned into defensible posts with
but little labour in a short time, the security of the position will
very much depend on the holding of such localities and it is on
them the enemy will be sure to direct his attacks. Where no
such suitable localities exist redoubts may be thrown up to take
their place if time permits.
The attack and defence of points possessing tactical importance
has been always more or less a feature of warfare ; but the fre-
OCCUrATle^N OF A POSITION.
^9A
(juency of such action, more particnlary on the field of battle be-
fore or (luring the progress of an engagement, has much increased
in modern wars. This lias probabl\' arisen from the fact of the
theatre of action being more and more unfrequently selected in
open and sparsely populated countries ; the rapid increase of
cultivation and constant subdivision of property, on the continent
of Europe especially, having tended to render battles on bare
plains or open hills of somewhat rare occurrence. It has therefore
been rather the rule than the exception in modern campaigns in
civili/ed countries, to find the tactical occupation of hamlets,
farm-houses, woods, isolated hills, or even the smallest accidents
of ground eagerly sought for and as eagerly opposed, until each
point has become the scene of a miniature battle in all its various
phases. Points such as these, when presented on the battle-field
itself, are of immense use to the defender, forming advanced posts
for preliminary resistance or rallying posts for l^nal stubborn de-
fence according to their position, and the possession of such a
point may often assure success to the side which can hold it.
These tactical supporting points, or "decisive points" as they
have been called, must therefore be strongly occupied and put
into a proper state of defence, the intermediate spaces, provided
these points support each other and sweep the ground between them
with their fire, being left open would be defended by sufficiently
strong bodies of troops to prevent the enemy spreading round
their fianks, either by fire from shelter trenches or by counter-
attacks on their fianks; but with the present weapons the holding
of such points at considerable intervals apart is often sufficient to
secure the ground between them if such ground be well flanked
and closed when desirable by obstacles. In these intervals, and
probably somewhat retired, the artillery will principally be placed.
Thus the intervals between the tactical points will, accordingto cir-
cumstances, be strengthened by short lines of shelter trenches,
by artillery, or be obstructed by obstacles, or left entirely un-
touched. The tactical points, like that of Saint Privat at
Gravelotte, will naturally be those which from their position in-
vite or even compel attack, and they may therefore be covered in
front by obstacles without impeding the offensive movements of
the defenders which, with a view to striking on the flank rather
394
TACTICAL NOTES.
than encountering the front of the hostile advance, will be made
from between them, not from them.
Such tactical points should therefore be held defensively only,
and by commanding the best lines of approach to the position
they should attract the assailant and be so situated that he will
not venture to advance between them. On those parts of the
line where a counter-stroke may be made these points form pivots
for the manoeuvring troops and, if need be, cover their retreat.
These supporting points should not be too close together or they
will require too many defenders, and besides in the offensive parts
of the line there must be sufficient space between them for offen-
sive returns. On the defensive i^one, and therefore also in case
of a pure passive defence where counter-attacks are made on a
small scale only, clear intervals less than one quarter of a mile are
required, while on the offensive zone in order to allow of an ad-
vance with but the front of a brigade not much more than one-
third of a mile is necessary, but the intervals will, as we shall see,
be almost always more than this and these must be regarded as
minimum distances. These intervals give the defender the great
advantage of being able to act offensively at any point on the
line. As the intervals between the tactical points should be
thoroughly defended by musketry fire there is a limit to their ex-
tent, and here there appears to be a variety of opinion, but taking
the limit of effective musketry fire at 800 or 1,000 yards intervals
of 1,600 to 2,000 yards, if the ground be open, would enable the
intervals to be well defended by musketry fire, and at these dis-
tances the artillery fire of each will i^ank the foreground of those
next to it. Should the decisive points not be able to protect
their own front but have to rely on the cross fire of neighbouring
ones, a dangerous thing to do as the latter may at a critical
moment have to defend their own front, these distances will have
to be halved. Between powerful artillery positions the interval
between these tactical points may with safety be increased to
4,000 or even 6,000 yards when all the ground is open and exposed.
If the ground is much broken all the above intervals may have to
be reduced, and in almost all cases intermediate intrenchments will
be required in addition as otherwise the assailant can in a measure
envelop the main points with his fire, and especially is this the
flJuiJiKi
■^^
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
295
case if the intervals are defended by artillery fire alone as this
cannot be always relied upon to check the advance of skirmishers.
The general idea then of occupying a defensive position is to
mass the bulk of the defender's forces, whenever possible, at cer-
tain important points the intermediate ground being slightly occu-
pied or only observed as it will be swept by the fire of the princi-
pal posts. Care must however be taken that the enemy cannot
spread round the flanks of any decisive point and so bring a con-
verpng fire to bear on it as it must almost inevitably succumb
before a concentric attack. As a rule therefore, instead of merely
i)bserving the intermediate spaces, some infantry in shooting
trenches should be posted in these intervals, which also afford
suitable artillery positions, or sufficiently strong reserves should
be at hand to prevent the enemy spreading round the flanks of
the decisive points, either bj' fire from shelter trenches or by
counter-attacks on their fianks.
On the other hand there will be weak parts of the position
where close ground comes up to it, where ravines run up, or woods,
etc., extend close up to the position into which the enemy can
penetrate, as at Kceniggratz, Spicheren and Wcerth, and here
the defenders must be placed in force, a continuous shooting line
with strong supports and local reserves will be necessary. Also
for the defence of such weak parts of the line the best troops
should be selected with instructions to keep the enemy from pene-
trating through at all hazards, and when possible an open space
should be cleared in front of the shooting line as wide as time will
permit.
Resides these, there may often be certain points or portions of
a position the possession of which would assure the assailant
the j,n-eatest tactical advantages, even though such [)arts may not
lie regular tactical points nor weak localities. In many cases also
the conformation of the ground ai)pears to limit the movements
"fan enemy to certain lines of operation. The (U-fenre slionld
therefore occupy these parts of the i)ositioii in loicc with strong
ascrves in close proximity. Hence in some parts of the line
tlierc will scarcely be oni' man to t 'leh yard o| front whili- in
"tilers the numbers will bi' \c>r\ considerable.
As the enemy will inaki- !iis principal elTorts against the tactical
296
TACTICAL NOTES.
points or against such weak localities, while he only makes feints
against other parts of the line, the energies of the defence must
be concentrated at these points, but it concerns the Commander
of the defensive force to distinguish the true attack from the false
one, for it is in holding the latter in check with a small part of his
force while he concentrates in superior numbers against the other
that he must expect success.
These tactical points will however mvariably draw on them-
selves a concentrated fire of the enemy and, unless they are natur-
ally very strong with plenty of cover for their defenders, it would
appear more advisable in future that such tactical points or keeps
of the position should be generally sheltered by the ground and
so as to be protected from long range aimed musketry fire and
artillery fire andtheir defence reserved. Formerly tactical points
such as redoubts, villages, or other strong posts, had chiefly to
fear the fire of the hostile artillery in the beginning of the fight.
and at that period suffered but little from musketry; but there is
every reason to expect that in future the converging fire of the
artillery will be supplemented by musketry fire from fractions of
the hostile infantry, and consequently if these posts can be seen
from a distance they will be subject to a very searching and
efficient infantry fire in addition to the fire of shells. Lines of
shooting trenches however, which present only a low target and no
area, are not so much affected by long range fire, but with works
of any depth the interior spaces no longer give the same security
as heretofore when exposed from a distance.
It appears therefore preferable in many instances, instead of
choosing such tactical posts in commading situations where they
will attract the fire of the assailant, to assign to the defenders of
the shooting trenches the chief business of combating the assail-
ant's frontal attack with their fire while, should they fail in re-
pulsing him, the more storm proof defences whether villages or
closed earthworks then come into play to resist the final rush.
In 1870 the I'rench attack on the line of investment along thi'
Villejuif plateau south of Paris was accompanied by so powerful a
fire that it cleared the defenders ofl" the plateau, but the ;ttack
was s(jon checked by a (lefendcd ])ost formed by a village sheltered
in a hollow which, c()nse(|uently, offered an unimpaired and un-
expected resistances to the hitherto successful attack.
•♦^I
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
297
It may be argued that the redoubts at Plevna, all situated on
the dominant and exposed points, answered their purpose well
enough. In the first place it is a question whether the suc-
cess of Skobeleff's assault of the two redoubts he captured was
not in a manner due to the continued exposure of their garrisons,
and also it must be borne in mind that these Turkish keeps were
very numerous (three to a mile on an average) and had been the
fruit of months of preparation which resulted in the provision of
cover that met almost all contingencies. It is perfectly true that
works might have been made of equal efficiency in a very short
time, but the capacity for doing this has never yet been exhibited
on a large scale by any army in the held, and as long as, either
from want of skill or want of time, proper preparations cannot be
made except at leisure it will be much better to resort to the
method of concealment for posts of this kind.
There are then two ways of turning defensible posts to account,
either by employing them as decisive points in the front line to
carry on the brunt of the fighting as they will then invariably
draw on themselves the enemy's main attacks, or to use them as
keeps in sheltered positions in rear of the shooting trenches to
which the main defence will then be entrusted, and the circum-
stances of each case and their situation can of course alone de-
cide how such posts are to be made use of.
It sometimes happens that some particular feature of ground
m the position may be so important from one cause or another
as to form what is termed the key of the position and which, if
captured by the enemy, would render the whole position untenable.
It need hardly be said that if such a feature exists the defender
must assure its defence by all possible means, especially as the
enemy will be sure to direct his main efforts on its capture if he
is able to recogni2e the great advantage its occupation will afford
him.
ADVANCED GUARD POSITIONS OR OUTPOSTS.
A line of Advanced Guards or Outposts will of course in nearly
all cases be pushed out to the front and flanks of the main posi-
tion to guard against surprise when the reconnoitring cavalry in
front are driven in, and also to force the assailant to an early
298
TACTICAL NOTES.
deployment and to develop his real attack in time to allow of the
threatened point beinfj^ reinforced. All aj^ree that whether the
troops thrown out are in the nature of advanced guards or out-
posts they should be at least stronj^j enouf^h to act as a screen to
check reconnoissances of the enemy's cavalry or small bodies of
his infantry and to guard the army against surprise after the
cavalry has had to retire. Hut opinions differ very much as to
the nature and position of these advanced troops.
Many modern writers advocate the occupation of an advanced
position, about a mile in front of the main defensive line, in order to
oblige the enemy to force his way through this outerline and so
compel him to show his intentions and commit himself to a par-
ticular line of attack without having been able to make a previous
reconnoissance of the main position, while giving time to the de-
fender to make his arrangements to meet the attack. Others are
strongly opposed to this advanced position because the troops de-
fending it must either retreat, and in doing so suffer heavy loss
which will tend to discourage the defenders, or they will be drawn
into a fight in advance of the selected position necessitating the
sending of reinforcements from it to aid the retreat of the ad-
vanced troops. They advocate, on the contrary, the use of out-
posts placed 2 or J miles in advance with the purpose of delaying,'
an attack and falling back step by step when pressed.
In 1870 the Germans, when acting on the defensive, as a rule
used strong advanced guards on the main roads approaching the
position they occupied. These threw out their own outposts to
protect their own positions, falling back only when very strongly
pressed. Previous to the battle of the Lisaine the German
advanced guards were thrown out along the different roads lead-
ing to Belfort, the point they were covering, and occupied i)osi-
tions at the extreme distance of 6 miles in ad\'ance of the main
position. In one direction, on a front of about 4 miles, 5,000
infantry with 3 batteries and 3 scjuadrons were thus einploywl
with orders to hold their ground until the enemy showed his lull
force, and then to retiic. 1 hey were attacked, fought a delaying:
action and retreated gradual!}' on the main j;'»sitioii. lint th(
advanced guards posted similarly in front oftlic extreme (iennim
right ha(J not been attacked, and consiMiucntK the direction ot tin
prench intended geiieral att:ick becanK' known and the (ieiiiian
A I
OCCUPATION Ol- A POSITION.
299
troops could now be disposed to meet this attack which they did
siiccessfiill\ .
It would seem that the advocates of both these contending views
arc light under certain conditions, and that the method to be
adopted will depend on the nature of the country. It is evident
that in those parts of a position where the country in front is
open and clearly seen for some miles an advanced guard position
would probably be not only useless but hurtful because it would
not impede the enemy's view of the main position ; and the re-
treat from it would certainly be attendetl with heavy loss, and if
close pressed by the assailant might give him great advantages as
the fire from the main position, partly masked by the retreating
advanced guard, could not be directed on him. On the other
hand, if in front of the position on t levated ground is found an
inferior height which would afford a good position for the enemy's
artillery, or good cover behind which he could assemble his infan-
try, it might be advantageous to hold it by a strong advanced
guard of which the ultimate retreat would be comparatively safe
across the intervening valley covered by artillery and long range
infantry fire from the heights in rear. The advanced ground so
occupied would mask the main position and so deceive the enemy
for a considerable time as to its real nature, and such advanced
positions give also great facilities for counter-attack.
It is therefore impossible to lay down any absolute rules as to
the employment of advanced guard or outpost positions, nor
what their distance in front should be, nor how tenaciously they
should hold their ground, all these points depending so much on
the nature of the country, and of the position; but to make a de-
termined stand with a comparatively weak force some dis-
tance in front of the main position, from which it )juist retire, will
only tend to discourage the defenders while encouraging the
enemy by his easy victory and should not be attempted except to
gain some special purpose, or in a close country with few roads
which may be held by advanced guards. As a general rule then,
in most good defensive positions, a simple system of outposts to
guard against surprise and to delay the enemy's approach, and
strong enough to make the enemy show his hand, is all that will
he required.
300
TACTICAL NOTES.
This line of outposts will of course only coinc into pl;iy when
the reconnoitring cavalry has been driven in. It would jjenerallv
consist of infantry with a small force of cavalry, and frequently,
when the ground is suitable, supported by horse artillery. The
troops employed on this outpost duty might, when forced to re-
tire, join the general reserve.
The distance of the outposts in front of the main body may be
from i,ooo yards to 2 or 3 miles. To assist in containing the
enemy they will often strengthen their positions by means of open
intrenchments to resist a front attack, but so as to allow the de-
fenders to move out easily when compelled to withdraw no en-
closed works should be made, nor should their advanced troops
shut themselves up in houses or enclosures of any kind. When
however the opposing forces are in comparatively stationary
positions and near to each other, as in the investment of a for-
tress, a strong ailvanced guard position is generally necessary ; for
as the main position has to be as near the fortress as its artillery
will permit, the outposts cannot be pushed far to the front, hence,
to secure the main body from surprise against sorties and to
give them the necessary rest, the outpost line must be stronger
than usual and fortified with care.
For an army in the field taking up a defensive position to re-
ceive battle, the fortification of the main position is the principal
object in most instances as then the outpost line is not intended
to offer serious resistance ; but there are other cases besides in-
vestments in which the defence of the outpost line is the primary
consideration, as when an advanced guard has been ordered to
sei^e some point or position and hold it until reinforced by the
main body. In an advanced guard position from which the troops
are to retreat when outnumbered and outflanked, the front de-
fence is the main consideration ; but in the fortification of a posi-
tion where a decisive battle is to be fought the security of the
flanks is the most important point.
At night special arrangements have to be made, for owing to
the deadly fire of the defence night attacks are resorted to more
than ever. At night then to guard against surprise, when in
presence of the enemy, the outposts should be numerous and the
ground should be carefully patrolled well to the front, particularly
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
301
before (lawn. The troops must be bivouacked near the defences
they are to hold so as to assemble at the first warning; and man
the works previously occupied by sentries, and to enable them to
see the ground the outposts in retiring should light Hres previously
laid.
wj^mwT
DISPOSITIONS OF THE IN FA NTH Y AND FORMATION OF THE
SEVERAL LINES REQUIRED.
The main line of defence having been selected arrangements
must be made for holding it obstinately.
It is universally admitted that the formation of infantry for
battle must be such as to favour to the utmost the effect of its fire
and to minimize the damage done by that of the enemy, and that
within effective ranges everything must give way to these two
considerations. The only formation which meets these require-
ments is a line of small sections extended in single rank forming
a "firing" or "shooting" line.
Holding fast to the position is the first condition of success,
and hence the brunt of the fighting, as concerns the infantry, will
fall upon the shooting line, and it is here that a vigorous resistance
must be made as it forms the main line of defence and it must
therefore be occupied in force; but as, during the course of the
engagement, this line is liable to suffer heavily and will need
keeping up to its full strength if the utmost effect of fire is to be
maintained from it, "supports" to feed or reinforce it will have
to be kept close at hand. These supports, having continually to
till up casualties in the shooting line, will themselves be dimin-
ishing gradually in strength until perhaps they are entirely drawn
into the shooting line before the assailant has come within as-
saulting distance of the position. Now it is evident that the
single line will not be in a position of itself to resist a determined
assault and it may also require further reinforcing, hence another
body of troops forming a third (Echelon must be held ready in rear
to supply any casualties in, or to move to the aid of, any part of
the shooting line which may be threatened, or to make local
counter-attacks as favourable opportunities present themselves.
The shooting line with the supports is frequently called the
"fighting'' line, and the troops forming the third Echelon the
! :Jf,fl||^
ii
m.
302
TACTICAL NOTES.
"local reserves.'^ These three echelons ;ire intended for ijiirelv
local purposes to carry on the active duties of the defence ; but
with forces of any size another special body, known as the '*f(cu-
cral reserve,'' must be kept in hand under the Commander of the
whole force to execute the final offensive return which we have
seen should always form part of a defensive scheme.
We have then the following formation :
1st. The shooting Hue, which must be carefully sheltered and
every facility afforded to enable it to deliver an effective fire.
Troops in this line are placed as near together as is consistant
with the free use of their weapons ; a single rank of one man t(j
each yard is considered to produce the maximum effect of ritie
fire.
2nd. The supports, to feed the shooting line by replacing casual-
ties in that line. They should be in sheltered positions and as
close as possible to the shooting line for the space to be passed
over under a hot fire should be short ; this distance should not as
a rule exceed 50 yards, whether placed in rear or to one side of
the line they have to support. These supports must be placed
undercover, natural or artificial, in any convenient formation, and
when time permits and no natural cover is obtainable sheltered
approaches may be thrown up between them and the line they
support. The strength of the supports at any given part, putting
aside the question of the quality of the troops, must depend upon
the strength of the position there and upon the weight of the at-
tack to be anticipated. If it is considered probable that the
whole of the shooting line will need to be vt\A'Ace.d, then the sup-
ports must necessarily be equal in strength to it, but a smaller
number will suffice if the losses are likely to be less severe. They
should invariably belong to the same battalion as the part of the
shooting line they support, and it would be very advantageous if
they were to belong even to the same company so that the inter-
mixture of tactical units, which is an inevitable evil under the
present conditions of warfare, may be deferred as long as possible.
The question however is now arising whether, provided the
ground suits, it would not be more advantageous to have a double
or even a triple line of fire than to depend on reinforcing the
front shooting line. For to be free from heavy loss, which He-
^
Pi
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
303
niorali^ces meti unable to return the fire, it would be necessary to
keep the supports under shelter which, unless the ground is very
exceptional, can onl; be done in deep trenches or with blindages
wliich take time to execute ; and even then they must pass over
the fire-swept space which divides them from the shootiuf:; line.
It is therefore thon},'ht that it mi^dit be better to have two fire
lines made up to full strenj^'th from the bej,Mnnin{^ and to use them
simply as fire lines, not replacing losses ; the d.ity of offensive re-
turns would then be undertaken by special reserves kept under
cover in rear.
jid. The local reserves, may, as we shall see, either belong to
the same battalion as the fighti g line when the force is small, or
be composed of '^ther battalions when the force is large. These
reserves will be at first placed in a position central to the line
they have to assist until the direction of the attack is developed,
when they shoukl be moved either in whole or in part in close
formation to a spot whence th(?j' Ciiti make a counter attack, out-
side the position if the enemy's assaulting columns waver or are
driven back or just before they make their final rush; or inside
the position to prevent small ' lies of partially successful troops
of the enemy, who may have succeeded in breaking through the
shooting line at any point from making good their footing ; or in
cdurse of time these reserves may even become absorbed in the
lighting line. In this latter case, to prevent the intermixture of
tactical units, they should be moved into the shooting line in
),Toups and not singly or in files, and this plan should also be
adopted by the supports. With reference to counter-attacks out-
side the position it may be pointed out that it is not desirable to
pass to the offensive prematurely but first to utilize to the full
the power of fire which is now the real strength of the defence.
These local reserves should he kept well sheltered and not at
,i;reater distances than 500 or at most 600 yards, generally half
these distances, as they must be at hand in rear of the shooting
line, neither should they be too close as it may be needful for
thtiii to move, out of sight of the enemy if possil)lc. to any part of
tiu,' liiu'. Th(! strength of the local r«'ser\ts will, like the strength
lit tin; supports, depend chiefly upon the stnnigtli of (hat part of
ilic liiu! and upon the weight of the attack to be aiiticipale<l, if
near u flank they will necessarily lune to be very strong, and
m
304
TACTICAL NOTES.
their strength may be either equal to that in the shootiivfr line and
supports together, or less. Special local reserves may also have
to be posted ready to reinforce the defenders of any tactical points
in the line of battle if required.
In some cases a small body of cavalry, one or two squadrons,
may be attached to any local reserve for purposes of counter-
attack, but the employment of cavalry will be considered later.
«
It is seen that the distances separating the different (Echelons
on the defensive may be considerably less than in the attack, the
only requirement being that they must be posted so as to escape
fire as much as possible.
4th, The general reserve. But the above three echelons, of
shooting line, supports, and local reserves, will only suffice when
the defending force is very small, consisting of not more tluin an
isolated brigade of 3 battalions or less, for with larger forces an
additional body of troops of all arms, called the "general
reserve," must always be retained at the immediate service of
the General Commanding. The position of this general reserve
must depend upon circumstances and upon the course of the
battle : at first it should be near that part of the front line against
which the enemy's main attack will be directed or near a threat-
ened flank, and subsequently it may be moved near to the inqst
favourable place whence to issue for the final offensive return 'or,
should such a course become necessary, near the most favourable
position to (over a retreat of the whole force. Where a second
line of defence lias been provided the general reserve must be
prepared to occupy it.
Seeing how varied the duties of this general reserve may be, it
is evident that with large forces covering an extensive position
against which the enemy is executing more than one :ittark. it
cannot fulfil the duties that may devolve upon it efficiently if kept
massed in one body; consequently the troopsforming this reserve
will have to be divided into several bodies, or kepot in one mass, as
will best fulfil the above conditions. I'or it is evident that the
right use of the offensive eltMiient in the defence, namely the
handling of the reserves, is dependent on the means of inovint;
rapidly and safely, and if possible unseen from the enemy, lor
similar reasons it is impossible to lay down any rules for the
rrnm
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
305
strength of general reserves, but it is considered they may vary
from one-half to one-fourth of the whole force.
In all extensive positions the general front will be divided into
sections and the defence of each section will be entrusted to the
command of a superior officer who should have a portion of the
};[eneral reserve placed under his orders if attacked in force.
Should any part of a section have an important point requiring a
strong reserve to be at hand, or should the enemy attack that
particular section, that portion of the general reserve detached to
support such a point will necessarily be placed for the time being
under the orders of the otiicer charged with the defence of that
section. At any moment these detached bodies of the general
reserve may be united for the offensive counter-stroke or for other
purposes.
Such dispositions have however great defects, first in detaching
portions of the general reserve from the immediate command of
the Commander-in-Chief and in causing them undue fatigue by
long marches, and secondly it is always pernicious to place a body
of troops under tlie orders of any officer charged with an im-
portant duty with the acknowledged intention of removing them
from his conmiand at any moment. Hut the tendency of modern
tactics is to have several reserves divided over different parts of
the field instead ol one large reserve massed in one body.
5th. The Main Reserve— The necessity presents itself then in
very extensive positions, occupied by three or more army corps, of
having a fifth body of troops of all arms under the immediate
orders of the Commander-in-Chief which, for want of a better
name, we will designate the "main reserve." and which will be in
addition to the general reserves at the disposal of the commanders
of tl;e different sections of the defensive line. The duties of these
,i:eneral reserves belonging to the different sections and of the
main reserve will be very much the same as those of the general
reserve referred to under the 4th head, but each general reserve
ill this case will of course confine its action to the support of the
section to which it belongs. When the moment arrives for the
k'eneral offensive return with the purpose of inflicting a decisive
ilefeat on the enemy, all the general reserves, or at least those
I'clouging to such sections as have not been heavily engaged.
3o6
TACTICAL NOTES.
might take part in such a movement acting in conjunction with
the main reserve.
A single battalion on the defensive. — The r'ield Exercise (1877)
directs that a battahon formed for defence will be divided in the
manner as one formed for attack, that is, into shooting line, sup-
ports, and main body (or local reserve); if divided as for attack
there would be two companies in the fighting line, two in sup-
port, and four forming the battalion main body. It also lays
down as a general guide for instruction that the front to be oc-
cupied by a battalion in ordinal y ground, including the supports
and main body, may be calculated at three men to each yard, this
would enable a battalion of 850 bayonets to cover a front of about
280 yards.
Now in extending a battalion for attack, four pices are allowed
for each hie, or two paces (60 inches) for each man in rank entire,
the two extended companies therefore cover 400 paces, or jjo
yards. But on the defensive the shooting line must be as thick
as is compatible with the free use of the rifle at any point that is
threatened as soon as the attacking force comes within effective
musketry fire, and a single rank of one man to the yard (36 inches)
is found to produce the maximum effect of fire, so that if the
battalion be formed as for attack it will only cover a front of 200
yards.
It has been seen that the number of men to be apportioned to
a yard of front at any part of a position must depend chiefly on
the nature of the ground at that part, and 200 yards of front may
be considered the minimum to be allotted to a battalion and only
in very dangerous parts of the line, in others an additional com-
pany might with advantage be placed in the shooting line and
frequently even four companies might be placed in that line.
But although the above formation is suitable for a battalion when
•acting singly it is not so when several are acting together. With
a brigade of three battalions a more usual formation would )»(-■
to extend two battalions to form the shooting line and supports,
holding the third battalion in rear as a local rcserNc, and in soinc
cases a part of the third battalion might also be placed in tlir
fighting line : on tlu' other hand in some cases, only one battah'nii
might be so (>Nteniled. Willi tl.c |)iesciit organi/atiou of N ((Uii-
i
TfTV'^ ■■'?.' ,
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
5^7
panics to a battalion, a l)attalion in the lif^hting line might have
4 companies in the shooting line and 4 in support, or 5 in the
former and 3 in the latter according to circumstances, but should
a new organization of 4 strong companies to a battalion be ever
introduced, to avoid the intermixture of companies as long as
possible, each company should furnish its own shooting line and
supports ; thus each company in the fighting line might extend
one or more sections, keeping the others in support.
It has already been pointed out that no positive rule can be
given as to the extent of front each battalion can occupy in the
line of defence as this so much depends on the nature of the
ground, because the following questions are involved : —
1. The cover afforded by the ground ; hence the probable loss
of the defenders.
2. The field of fire in front of the position ; hence the probable
loss of the assailants.
j. The possibility of occupying only certain points in the line
and of commanding intervening spaces by cross fire.
Battalions acting together on the defensive may generally oc-
cupy a broader front than when on the offensive, and it may be
assumed that when disposed as a shooting line and supports a
battalion may, under ordinary circumstances, cover about 650
yards diminishing in some cases to 400 yards.
A division will be best disposed for the occupation of a position
if its two brigades are drawn up side by side forming the fighting
line and local reserves, the seventh battalion being retained as a
general reserve ; but as in most cases this general reserve would
be too small, a certain part or even the whole of one brigade
would be kept back, the seventh battalion perhaps in that case
forming a part of the fighting line.
With an Army Corps two divisions might be drawn up side by
side the third being held in reserve in whole or in part according
to the requirements of the case.
EMPLOYMENT AND DISPOSITION OF CA VALRY.
The employment of cavalry in the defence, or in a battle gener-
ally, must naturally depend on the nature of the ground, for, as it
;' 1
308
TACTICAL NOTES.
has little or no defensive power except that of counter-attack, the
ground must be suitable for its action ; and, consequently, no
cavalry should be posted near those parts of the position where
the ground is unfavourable. All ground over which cavalry may
be required to act should be reconnoitred previously.
Although the introduction of modern weapons has limited the
employment of cavalry in masses, except against cavalry, yet
small bodies may still be employed with very great advantage on
the defensive to take part in local counter-attacks, as when the
infantry of the attack waver, are driven back, or immediately after
a successful assault when a portion of th( enemy's troops have
gained a footing in the position and are disordered by their own
success. As all these opportunities for the employment of this
arm are transient, it should be kept near at hand but out of sight
and sheltered from fire until the time for action arrives, which
should therefore be anxiously watched for and favourable oppor-
tunities at once seized of attacking the assailant unawares in
flank.
Bodies of cavalry should also be held in readiness to charge
batteries of the enemy which may have been pushed forward too
rashly, or left without sufficient support, and also to restrict the
action of hostile cavalry by well timed charges.
The flanks of a position being usually its weakest parts and the
only parts where cavalry can act without masking the fire of its
own line, should be watched by cavalry so as to give timely notice
of turning movements ; but the bulk of this arm will usually be
kept with the general reserves ready to take part in the assump-
tion of the offensive, in pursuit should the assailant be repulsed
so as to complete his defeat, to cover a retreat if necessary, or, as it
can be rapidly transferred from one part of the field to another,
to support any part of the line which may be in danger and if
necessary to sacrifice itself to gain time for expected reserves to
come up. Some horse artillery, if it can* be spared from the front
line, might be kept with the cavalry reserves. Great protection
may be afforded to an exposed flank by pushing large bodies of
cavalry supported by horse artillery many miles outwards to ob-
serve the enemy, report his movements, break up bridges, block
roads, and otherwise delay him.
) • i
.V »
■'■'feii.i
:[■■■■ ■
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
309
111 all defensive operations cavalry should display the utmost
;ictivity and darinf:^ in endeavouring to detect the movements and
intentions of the enemy and molesting him in his march. They
may also, by excursions into the rear of the attacking army, try
to create confusion and delay among his ammunition and other
trains.
Speaking very generally it may be assumed that in those parts
of the position favourable for the action of this arm, the regiment
forming the divisional cavalry may be posted in single or double
squadrons with its division but under cover ready for any emerg-
ency, while the Cavalry Brigade of the Army Corps, and the
cavalry of those divisions posted on ground unsuitable for its
action, will be posted on the flanks or with the general reserves.
EMPLOYMENT AND DISPOSITION OF ARTILLERY.
The general role of the artillery of the defence is to render the
advance of an enemy a difficult undertaking by keeping ground
over which he has to pass under an effective and, where possible,
a flanking fire, and to oppose him from the first, while he is still
,s;radually developing his attack, with the whole of its available
strength.
Guns should as a rule be placed in action at the full interval
of 19 yards or more so as to reduce casualties ; nevertheless on
restricted sites they may be concentrated in epaulments, the pro-
tection afforded by the earthwork compensating for the disadvan-
tage of reducing the intervals between the guns.
In posting artillery the principal objects of this arm in the de-
fence must be kept in view, these are :
1st. To compel the enemy to deploy his forces at a distance
and show his intentions as soon as possible ; for this artillery
should command the distant approaches by whicli the enemy
must advance, and it should also connnand the ground on which
lie must deploy when he can no longer keep to the roads.
2nd. To prevent the enemy establishing a superiority of artillery
tire and preparing the way for the advance of his infantry especi-
ally opposite the most vulnerable parts of the position ; many
batteries must therefore be placed so as to pour a concentrated
fire upon his probable artillery positions.
310
TACTICAL NOTES.
jrd. To shake and inHict as much loss as possible on the
advancing infantry, for which it should sweep the whole ground
in front of the position (j,ooo yards or more if possible) over which
the infantry can advance from the earliest to the latest moment
of attack.
4th. To protect the flanks from turning movements.
In order to command all the approaches a certain dispersion
of guns becomes necessary ; and if the ground to the front is not
well seen from within the Position itself, artillery, supported by
an escort of cava'ry or infantry, may be pushed to the front in
support of the outposts both to help them back and to oblige the
enemy's artillery to come earlier into action ; when pressed by the
attacking infantry these guns would be withdrawn to positions
prepared for them within the main line to co-coerate in the close
defence.
But to meet the main attack a concentration of fire on the
points where an enemy will mass his guns is essential. For this
batteries must be concentrated, being kept massed in convenient
positions in rear until actually required with good communica-
.tions to the different points they may be called upon to occupy.
Should the features of ground necessitate a certain dispersion of
guns concerted action should be arranged for by signal or telegraph.
The action of artillery then will be at first to force the enemy
to deploy and to endeavour to prevent his establishing a superi-
ority in artillery fire, and later to use all its efforts to aid its own
infantry to ward off the infantry attacks. In performing the latter
task its last positions should be such as, if possible, to sweep witii
cross-fire all the ground in front of the points of attack, and bat-
teries, hitherto held in reserve or withdrawn from other parts of
the field, should be brought up when the assault is expected and
should fight to the last regardless of losses or of coming under
infantry fire so as to co-operate with the infantry when the as-
sault is actually delivered.
On arrival on the ground to be occupied a part of the artillery
should at once be placed so as to command the main approaches
which under all circumstances an enemy must make use of, though
as a rule the actual positions should not be taken up until it is
intended to commence firing, while the other part should be held
liiiL' umler
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
ill
back at points possessing good communications with every part
of the battlefield until the intention of the enemy is sufficiently
recognised. In most cases, however, it will be possible for the
defence to recognise the ground on which the assailant's guns
will most probably be deployed, either through the limitation of
possible artillery positions on the side of the attack by obstacles
such as woods, ravines, etc., or on account of features in the de-
fensive position rendering it certain that the main attacks will be
delivered on particular points. When the flanks of a position do
not rest on impassable obstacles they should be strong in artillery
both as a protection against turning movements and to hinder the
assailant from placing batteries to enfilade the defensive line.
Roughly speaking the divisional artillery would be dispersed
among the divisions to command the approaches or to flank parts
of the line, the corps artillery being massed so as to be moved
rapidly to meet the enemy's artillery on the positions which it can
i^enerally be 'foreseen he will occupy.
The advantages of concentration of guns, as compared with
their dispersion, are that the direction of fire can be regulated by
one responsible officer and quickly changed from time to time as
the incidents of the battle may require. If guns are dispersed
orders have to be sent by mounted men, by signal, or telegraph,
which take time, may be invisible from smoke or other causes,
and are easily interrupted. Also if three batteries, say, are con-
centrated and opposed to three batteries dispersed and having
different ranges, as will almost always happen, the concentrated
batteries concentrating their fire on the nearest of the opposing
batteries should crush it quickl}-. They can then concentrate on
the nearer of the remaining two, and so crush them in detail being
always the stronger, because the three batteries have the same
range while the supporting batteries of the enemy iiave kuiger
ranges than the battery attacked and are acting independently.
Before sending artillery to occupy :i position the ground should
at first be well reconnoitred by the responsible chiiT, and in select-
iaj^' a position it nuist always be borne in mind that tlic power of
keeping up an efficient hre is the first consideration, for which the
i^roiuKl in hont should be such as to afiord a clear field ol liie
^\hi( h can be swept to within close range. Tin- more extensive
^TffVf If; !
312
TACTICAL NOTES.
;! '':!'
i
this field of fire is to the front the better,
tion is security for tlie guns. •
The second considera-
Open ground is necessary for an artillery position of sufficient
extent to deploy the requisite number of guns and easily acces-
sible to wheeled carriages, and the objects to be fired at should
be clearly visible from it. The ground should if possible allow of
a regular alignment of guns not too oblique to the line of fire.
The nature of the soil, too, as affecting both the making of cover
and the bursting of the enemy's shells has to be considered.
Marshy or broken ground in front sufficient to catch the enemy's
shells is advantageous provided the guns will not be required to
advance over it ; but wet or swampy ground where the guns arc
placed is disadvantageous, neither should it be hard, rocky, or
stony, as it increases the effect of splinters and cover is not easily
obtained. Generally smooth ground either level or slopins:
gently, and soft enough to prevent the rebounding of bullets and
pieces of shell is the best, but without being so soft as to hinder
the working of the guns.
Back ground has also to be considered as artillery should not
expose itself to view unnecessarily. For instance, batteries should
not as a rule be placed just in front of a village or on the edge of
a wood as they will then stand out clearly and be an easy mark
for the enemy. Open undulating ground with accidents of
ground close at hand where cover is obtainable for teams and
limbers is best especially if there are no objects near for the enemy
to mark the ranges. On such ground the guns would be placed
just behind undulations descending gently towards the enemy, or
behind a bank or hedge, but not a stone wall if opposed to artil-
lery. It is not however generallyadvantagcousto post guns imme-
diately behind such cover, as they arc objects which facilitate the
enemy's aim. But far better than the direct protection afforded
by cover which can be seen by the enemy is a formation of
ground which perplexesjhis aim. This occurs when banks, houses,
trees, bushes, hedges, cornfields, etc., forming masks between the
contending artilleries, are so situated that our own can see far
over them. In such a case tlir hostile artillery cannot observe
the accuracy of their fiic.
Care must also be taken that the artillery ])osition is secun-
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
3^3
from enfilade fire and hard to assanlt if possible. Well defined
and very elevated points, and isolated positions should be rather
avoided for guns as being too conspicuous ; but the most elevated
points should be used for observation, and no cover for the enemy's
infantry sh( iild be within effective rifle range unless the guns are
completely protected from it.
With reference to the ground in front of an artillery position,
in the days of smooth-bore guns it was considered necessary to
have a gently falling glacis like slope in front. This was then all
important because the effect of artillery fire became more intense
as the range became shorter, and its maximum effect was pro-
duced by case-shot which was superior to any infantry fire at
ranges up to about J50 yarcis ; but breech-loading small arms
have now made the case fire of artillery of much less comparative;
effect. The effective /one of artillery fire, with reference to that
of musketry, may now be said to connnence at about 700 or cSoo
yards from the guns and, as regards the effect of their fire, the
slopes of ground throughout the intermediate distance are not of
such very great consequence provided that this zone is protected
by infantry fire, as would generally be the case ; but if not so
protected then guns should, as of old, have gently falling slopes
in front for them to defend ; and in such favourable circumstances
it would be very hazardous for either cavalry or infantry to attack
a line of guns in front, as they would in all probability be com-
pelled to retire after suffering heavy losses.*
There are reasons, however, which make it desirable that the
slope should be steep immediately in front of the guns because
the effect of the enemy's fire will be thereby considerably reduced,
as shells falling short will bury themselves instead of the splinters
licochetting as they would do were the guns placed at the top of
: gently falhng slope ; also because when thus raised decidedly
above the ground in front they can fire over the heads of
their own infantry with little annoyance to the latter if placed
Well down the slope ; and further, because the enemy's fire will
not he effective at the same time on the advanced line of infantry
aiid the retired line of guns.
Again, unless artillery is posted in the infantry shooting line,
mi
mi
•FicUl
giiiis win 1j»( ilejjruasc'il uj) to 12"
314
TACTICAL NOTES.
which many do not recommend, the action of the guns on the
front hne of the attack when it gets to close (juarters is Hkely to
be impeded, if not altogether stopped, when not placed in elevated
positions. Elevated positions, where guns are secure from being
enfiladed and if possible where they can bring a cross fire to bear
along the general front in the closer stages of the attack, should
therefore be assigned to the artillery so as to aid them in concen-
trating their fire on the lines of approach in order to compel the
enemy to deploy early and then to fire on the reserves ; and also
because retirement above the general level is, as regards safety, in
a measure equivalent to retirement from the front. It is also ad-
vantageous in the present day that artillery should be placed on
high ground whence they can see over and into undulations of
the ground in front which would give cove^' to an enemy were the
guns placed at a lower level. The long ranges now necessary
makes fire delivered from elevated positions less plunging than
formerly when the ranges were shorter, the fall due to the ele-
vated position of the guns being small compared with that result-
ing from the curve of the trajectory.
It is evidently of great advantage for artillery to be able to see
distant objects, and this is the chief advantage to be obtained by
placing it on high ground, but should that high ground be on a
conical hill or a salient spur jutting out from a range of hills en-
abling the enemy to concentrate a heavy fire on it from different
parts of the field, such high ground would be a manifest disad-
vantage, moreover such positions are more difficult to get up to
and advance from. As a rule the best position for artillery is
doubless one which enables the path of the shells to conform as
nearly as possible to the smface of the ground at the end of tht
trajectory. Thus as regards the slopes of ground, artillery posi-
tions are advantageous for defence :
1. When they command all the ground within range.
2. When the curve of the trajectory of the projectiles conforms
approximately to the slopes of the ground they have to defend.
3. When the slopt^s iinmcdiaicly in front of them fin^ so steep
that the enemy's projectiles will bury tlu'mselves.
A commanding site not more than joo feet ;d)ove the ground
to be defended, with a slope behind it to gi\'e rover to limbers.
OCCUrATlON Ol A rosiiioN.
3i5
would he suitable as an artillery position. A greater heij^'ht
would not be advisable, and if the command were reduced to loo
feet or less it would be still more advantaj^eous provided it is
sufficiently high to see over all the ground in front, and un-
less there are undulatio. s in front seen into fror.: the higher
fjround but hidden from the lower slopes, when the higher posi-
tion might be preferable.
Should the ground be nearly level, or should the position be a
;,'eiitle falling glacis to the front with no commanding points for
guns, artillery is placed at a disadvantage, and it may then be
necessary to place guns in the front line, or only slightly retired,
and without any infantry in front of them. Intervals will have
to be left in the line of infantry to allow artillery to fire through
these intervals ; but then some infantry should be kept ready to
take the place of the guns, in the event of these becoming silenced
or having to move to another part of the position, so as to fill up
the gap which would otherwise be left.
As regards the alignment of the artillery, it may advantageouLily
be placed from 400 to 600 yards in rear of the shooting line if
the ground is suitable, otherwise nearer to the front or even in
line with it should favourable accidents of ground secure them in
such advanced positions. Many writers consider that guns should
not be placed in the fighting line if it can be avoided, because as
soon as the enemy's skirmishers come within musketry range of
the position artillery will suffer from their fire, and because the
enemy's artillery fire directed on the infantry shooting line would
also be effective on the defending artillery ; and many of the bat-
teries they consider would probably be silenced just when most
wanted, in which case their place would have to be filled by in-
fantry kept in reserve. Further, the guns of the defence must be
able to meet those of the attack whenever they appear. This
evidently is very difficult to manage if they must be removed from
one part of the infantry line and thrust into another. In any
case, if the ground immediately in front of the guns affords cover
for hostile skirmishers, infantry must occupy it to keep the
enemy's skirmishers at a distance. Frequently the best artillery
tactics in defence, when the defending artillery is comparatively
weak, will be to decline an artillery duel at first and to reserve the
J(uns to crush an infantry attack. In such a case the position in
i ;/•!
316
TACTICAL NOTES.
front line would be extremely inconvenient. Hence it is in every
way best if there be higher ground in rear of the infantry line on
which the artillery can be manoeuvred, but it is then essential
that the guns from such positions be able to bring a powerful
cross fire to bear on the ground in the immediate front of the de-
fensive line.
Ifartillery.be placed in rear of the fighting line it can be man-
oeuvred to meet different phases of the attack without disturbinj^
he front line. It is true that in such retired positions guns can-
not support the shooting line with the direct fire of case when the
assailant advances to within 300 yards or so of the position where
the crisis of the musketry fire takes place, but they can fire on
neighbouring assaulting columns with shrapnel, taking them
obliquely, or on reserves ; and besides, should the shooting line
be carried, they can then fire with case to check the assailant's
further advance. Still, as one of the chief duties of the artillery of
the defence is to sweep the ground over which the enemy must
advance with an effective cross-fire up to the latest moment of
attack, it is evident that, unless the ground is peculiarly favourable
for posting guns in flanking positions where, without being them-
selves exposed to enfilade, they can bring a cross-fire to bear upon
the main attack and a flanking one to protect the immediate front,
.he required conditions can only be fulfilled by the guns being
placed in the front line, and preferably at the salients if not too
pronounced should an irregular line mark the front of the posi-
tion. A position in rear which entails not only a sacrifice of some
hundreds of yards range, but the necessity of firing over the heads
of the defending infantry greatly to their discomfort and demora-
lization unless the guns are at a considerable height above them,
does not appear to many to present commensurate advantages of
safety to the guns. It is evident that artillery so placed would be
comparatively useless during the later stages of the defence when
once the attacking infantry had advanced so close that the fire of
the retired batteries would be masked by the ground and by the
defending infantry lining the position. Guns so placed might be
useful in defending an inner line, or for supporting a counter-
stroke delivered inside the position after the assault has been
made, but their action would be lost almost altogether during the
period immediately preceding the final attack of the position, a
\
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
317
m
IS in every
ry line on
I essential
. powerful
of the de-
n be man-
disturbinj;
guns can-
e when the
tion where
:an fire on
cing them
ootinj; line
assailant's
artillery of
leniy must
moment of
favourable
eing them-
) bear upon
iliate front,
^uns being
if not too
the posi-
ice of some
r the heads
nd demora-
)ove them,
vantages of
:d would be
fence when
t the fire of
\nd by the
d might be
a counter-
has been
(luring the
period when its fire will be most retiuired. l''urtlier, it must not
be forgotten that artillery can, on ordinary ground, defend its own
front against all attacks.
It would appear that a combination of these two plans would
be most advantageous, some guns being placed on the front line
in suitable positions whence they can bring a cross or flanking tire
to bear on the ground immediately in front of the position, while
others are placed in rear of the infantry line.
When a position is taken up on commanding ground broken by
spurs jutting out to the front and valleys running inwards, the
;irtillery may often with advantage be placed in the re-entrants at
the heads of the valleys, the infantry defending the spurs and also
forming a front line lower down the valley if necessary ; but should
the indentations be so marked that the lateral range of the guns
would be much restricted by such a position they must occupy
the crests of the spurs, the infantry line being placed lower down
to defend the underfcatures. When guns of different calibres are
employed, the heavier ones, having longer range and inferior mo-
bility, are put further to the rear than the rest, being placed in
such re-entering angles when they exist.
When artillery is posted on a hill and the ground in front up
to effective musketry range is defended by infantry fire, the guns
should be retired so far from the crest that these can neither see
nor be seen by the enemy's infantry when they have advanced to
within effective musketry range, although they will see all the
(ground beyond that zone and will be able to fire on the attacking
infantry as they approach the position and then on his supports
and reserves.
Whenever yrtillery is used for flanking parts of the front of a
position., or for supporting an advanced post by fire directed on
the ground to the right and left of it, care must be taken that this
tlanking or supporting fire is not injurious to the defenders. For
this purpose the fire should be restricted to shrapnel as the lateral
spread of bullets from these projectiles is not so great as from
common shell, and a definite line must be given for the guns to
enfilade within which they are not to fire. This line should, if
possible, be an obstacle, but it must in any case be clearly defined
■li'J
WM
^ili
position, a H such as a fence, ridge, road, railway, etc. For ranges of 1,000 to
3X8
TACTICAL I.OTES.
1,500 yards this line should be at least 100 yards in front of the
position, and this distance must be increased as the ran^^e in-
creases, but for perfect safety in case of premature bursts it
should be 500 or 600 yards in front.
From the foregoing it is evident that the bulk of the artillery
of the defence would be placed to greatest advantage in slightly
commanding but retired positions between the tactical points,
the close defence of which is left to musketry and to a portion of.
the c^rtillery should the grouna be favourable; sometimes, how-
ever, the formation of the ground may necessitate th-^ bulk if
not all the guns being brought up into the lighting line or ct any
rate very near to it.
Whenever artillery is placed in or near to the fighting line, it is
of the utmost importance to secure the artillery of the main
position against the tire of the enemy's advanced skirmishers or
marksmen and, with this viev. , the batteries ought to be covered
in their immediate front by a line of extended riflemen placed
either in trenches or pits or behind natural cover at a distance of
from joo to 400 yards in advance of the guns which they defend.
If the battery is on a flank, this protection sho'dd also be extend-
ed for a similar distance, or further, to the flank. The infantry
thus posted would remain as long as possible in position and only
retire when, at the final stages, they are driven back by the over-
whelming advance of the assailants. Besides their principal
function of keeping off the enemy's sharpshooters from approach-
ing the batteries of the defence too soon, these advanced infantry
could often bring an irritating fire to bear upon the attacking artil-
lery at its first main position and perhaps even prevent the guns
from approaching to the most telling ranges. This possible action
would of course depend much upon the features of the ground
Sometimes the protecting duty of the infantry m advance of the
defender's batteries would be rendered unnecessary by one or
more advanced posts being held in front of the position.
When the enemy's reconnoissance of the position preliminary
to his attack takes place, t''e defenders must not be tempted to
show more of their force and dispositions than is necessary, hence
only sufficient guns should open fire as -.vill keep him in chock
and consequently batteries should not open fire without orders.
Also the bulk of the defender's guns will not generally open tire
■Ffm?^
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION,
319
front of the
i range in-
ii bursts it
he artillery
i in slightly
ical points,
a portion of,
times, how-
tli- bulk if
le or ct any
ng line, it is
f the main
rmishers or
> be covered
men placed
L distance of
they defend.
3 b3 extend-
rhe infantry
ion and only
by the over-
:ir principal
n approach-
ced infantry
acking artil-
nt the guns
ssible action
the ground
^ance of the
by one or
on.
preliminary
tempted to
;ssary, hence
im in check
liout orders,
ly open tire
except at effective ranges though some of the heavier batteries
may fire slowly and deliberately on the enemy when visible, and
to support the outposts.
Positions for batteries in rear of the main artillery positions
should be selec^^f^d and easy communications between the two
secuied.
Opinions are much divided as to whether any guns should be
kept in reserve. The German school maintain that every gun
should take part in the fight from first to last and that to hold
!,nms in reserve is to weaken your force. Many however consider
that a proportion of guns should be kept with the other arms
with the general reserves, either to reinforce threatened points or
to accompany the offensive return. In weak parts of the position,
and especially on the flanks, gunpits might be prepared for batteries
held in reserve to be occupied or not according to circumstances;
but there would appear to be no valid reason why such batteries
should not be placed in suitable though somewhat retired posi-
tions so as to aid the defence with their fire, whence they can
be easily withdrawn at any moment to join any expected move-
ment of the general reserve. It would appear then that as a
rule guns should not be held in reserve, /. c. kept entirely out of
action, but that all guns should be liable to be employed from the
very earliest stages of the conflict. Still, if the strength of this
arm allows of it, a certain number of guns should be kept separate
as a sort of reserve in order to be ready to meet any sudden
emergency of the action, to oppose surprise on the part of the
enemy, or to support offensive returns on the part of the defen-
ders. It is impossible to lay down any rule for the exact position
nfthe guns forming such a reserve; they should in any case not
l)e too far back so as to lose no ad\;intage in range from the
eiMnniencement of their fire. High ground near an exposed flank,
provided facility of movement therefrom in case of necessity is
presented by its features, would be often suitable.
l'>iit it will always be ;i ipiestioii to be decided in cvcrv case bv
till' (ien;'ral in command whether Iw will ein[)l()y the artillery of
in tlic delcnsive lii
ic, or
-lie reserve troops to reinforce batteries i
1m'(|) it in file res(>rve till the decisive oflensi\i- return is to be de-
livered so as to prepare the \\;i\ for it. If the decisive oflensi\'e
320
TACTICAL NOTES.
counter-stroke can be prepared for from positions in the main
line of defence, it will be best to send the batteries into that line
so as to reduce the danger of its being forced ; but if the counter-
stroke is to be a wide one, then batteries will have to be attached
to the troops destined to execute it in time for them to carry
out the usual artillery preparation.
The object of rear guard positions being to secure the greatest
retaining power, guns are here specially useful to check the hos-
tile artillery, cavalry, and infantry from closing on the retreat ;
and consequently a strong force of artillery should be attached to
the main body of the rear guard when retreat becomes inevitable
and these guns may have to remain till the last and sacrifice
themselves to cover the retreat, as so many Austrian guns did at
the retreat after the battle of Koeniggratz in 1866.
The positions for the different batteries having been chosen
they will throw up gunpits and epanlments, and the commanders
should fully understand the objects they have to fulfil and they
will at once ascertain the ranges to the most important objects.
On every important or exposed points closed and storm proof
gun batteries may be used with advantage if time permits of their
erection. Great care should be taken that the newly broken
earth is concealed or covered in such manner from the enemy's
view that it shall not serve, as it has often fatally done, as a mark
for their artillery more distinct than would otherwise be presented
by the guns alone. Every advantage should therefore be taken
of as much natural cover as possible not only to save labour but
also to make as little mark as possible for the enemy. Positions
hidden from the enemy by hedges, standing corn, etc., are par-
ticularly advantageous. Batteries may fre(iuently prepare mor<!
than one set of emplacements to enable them to take up alter-
native positions and fire in different directions ; for, as in most
cases the enemy will have several directions at his disposal to
attack from, the positions prepared for the artillery should admit
of a larger number of guns being concentrated as may be recjuired
at differi'iit j)oints. Sinking guns in giuipits is the c|uickest and
h'ss laborious mi'thod of obtaining conct but should not !)(• re-
sorted to if tiie groimd is wet, then l)reastwt)rks should be nsed
the guns being worked on the natural surfaee of the groimd.
W:
OCCUPATION OF A POSITION.
And it must never be forj^'otten that protection for the detach-
ments is of far greater importance than cover for the guns.
Arrangements must also be made for protecting the ammuni-
liou and insuring its regular supply. If accidents of ground give
cover to the limbers and horses sufficiently near to the guns noth-
ing further will be required, but should this not be the case one
of the following alternatives must be adopted, viz :
1. The limber boxes must be taken off and placed in recesses
prepared for them in the gunpits, or the ammunition may be taken
out of the boxes and stored in barrels, boxes, etc., under cover
provided for the purpose near the gunpits, the teams and limbers
being moved to some sheltered position to the rear and flank.
2. The limbers may be left near the guns protected by limber
pits, the teams only being taken to the rear.
}. Both limbers and teams may be artificially protected near
the guns.
The first plan involves very little earthwork, and the gun
detachment while serving the gun are saved the labour and ex-
posure of bringing up ammunition, and the replenishing of the
supply need only be done occasionally by bringing up a limber, or
by hand as may be best. The objections to this arrangement are
the time required for detaching, replacing, and securing the boxes
on the limber and removing the anmiunition from them, and the
risk of the ammunition being exploded by a shell, or by accident,
in the gunpit amongst the men.
The second plan was very generally adopted by the Germans
during the war of 1870-71. These pits should be made between
the gunpits and slightly retired behind the general line where they
would be less liable to be hit by projectiles aimed at the guns, and
the supply of ammunition would be carried on with less fatigue
and exposure than if the limbers are placed in the normal position
of 20 yards directly in rear of the guns. The objections to the
system of limber pits are that with horses, possibly restive under
f:re, there might be delay in hooking in the teams, and that the
labour and exposure of the men in supplying ammunition are
f,reater than in the first plan. A limber pit can be made by four
men in about six hours. The labour required for the third system
is so great that it is seldom employed.
:, ;.!i/Mfc!;;
''mm
■ '-^^B
^*^l^'
, 'mK
i ^iii|
-■ ,- ■ : \''-^*. "
ill
M,V
322
TACTICAL NOTES.
Hitherto the custom has prevailed of always keeping the lim-
bers and teams close to the guns and ofteu in very exposed
positions. This was chiefly due to the old custom of regarding
the loss of guns akin to the loss of regimental colours, and the
teams had to be at hand so as to be always ready to withdraw the
guns. Later wars have shown that the great losses of artillery
are in horses and men and that the damage to materiel is com-
paratively very slight, and also that guns have frequently been
captured on account of the destruction of their teams. Experience
then would point to the necessity of removing teams to some
secure spot even though it be at some distance from the guns, and
in spite of the delay that will ensue if the guns have to change
their positions.
"ipip
y the lim-
y exposed
regarding
5, and the
thdraw the
3f artillery
^1 is com-
ently been
Experience
s to some
e guns, and
to change
CHAPTER IX.
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS,
HOW CHOSEN AND PREPARED FOR DEFENCE.
DIVISION OF THE FIELD INTO DIFFERENT LINES AND SECTIONS.
We have seen that when two hostile armies are manoeuvring in
the theatre of operations and come in contact one of them will
},'enerally remain on the defensive so as to gain all the advantages
possible from a defensive attitude, and in that case the most suit-
able ground available close at hand may have to be occupied as
hurriedly as possible, while the advanced guard is keeping the
enemy at bay, and put into as good a state of defence as time will
allow, and such positions may often be very defective. Some
hours at least may in most cases be counted upon as the fighting
portion of an army corps, with two roads for its advance, occupies
eight or nino miles of road and requires several hours after the
advanced guards are engaged for the complete development of its
attack ; and moreover troops may continue to prepare the position
for defence under cover of skirmishers till almost under fire.
But when the Commander of any army intends to select a de-
fensive position as a field of battle and hold it until attacked,
there being time at his disposal, he will generally send officers of
his general staff to make a reconnoissance and sketch of certain
positions which from the study of maps or knowledge of the
I ountry appear to offer the objects to be attained. Whether the
position has to be taken up hurriedly or deliberately he will visit
the ground himself and, assisted by his staff, definitely fix on the
position to be occupied having regard to strategical as well as to
tactical considerations.
324
TACTICAL NOTES.
■t.'-i^;'^'-P''-r'*''
Whenever positions have to be chosen or prepared it should be
done by the staff where all arms are represented, instead of being
left to any one arm of the service, though when the j^eneral line
of defence has been decided upon the actual execution of the irore
important works of defence will be performed under thedin^ction
of the Commanding; Enj^inecr. Before the battle of Kcenij^^gratz
the Austrian engineers constructed some good works of defence
but as these did not meet with the tactical requirements they did
not fulfil their purpose.
After deducting from one-half to one-fourth of the whole force
according to circumstances for general reserves, to meet unex-
pected movements of the enemy and for the decisve counter-
stroke, the Commander-in-Chief will divide the front into sections
and allot a tactical unit to the defence of each section under its
own commander who will then be responsible for its defence.
Each of these sections should include all posts occupied in front
of the general line as well as in rear of it, so that each section may
have its own advanced posts, second line, and line of retreat.
The front of the position will in fact be divided iiito sections by
perpendicular lines, the unit in each section being charged with
the defence of all posts in that section, ['"or convenience these
sections may be termed right, centre, and left, or if more numer-
ous then by numbering them or giving them the name of any
villages, etc., situated in them. The tactical points will be
selected with care, and the ;iones for carrying out counter-strokes
will be indicated to the officers commanding sections.
The commanders of the different sections, after receiving gen-
eral instructions as to the object of the battle and the method of
defence they severally are to adopt, will make their dispositions
accordingly and post tire different arms in the manner most suit-
able for their action. The positions for the batteries will bo
selected first, as upon the selection of the ground most suitable
for the artillery will in great measure depend the exact trace of
the fighting line for the infantry ; but it will depend upon circum-
stances whether the (ieneral-in-Chief or the rcnnmanrlers of
sections post the artillery, as the j)ositions for the several batteries
must be carefully selected within the allotted ground, and it may
be advisable to post them according to the general plan of action
to be adopted rather than to mere jnral defence. The size of earli
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
325
unit to which a certain extent of front is allotted must of course
depend on the size of the whole force ; in large armies it might be
by army-corps, in smaller ones by divisions, brigades, or even
battalions. The commanders of these units will then post their
brigades, battalions, cavalry, and if not posted by a superior also
their artillery, and the commander of a battalion his companies
so as to occupy the ground to best advantage.
A position should at first be only occupied in skeleton at the
most important points until the direction of the enemy's attack
has been made clear, while the main portion of the troops for the
different sections are concentrated in positions central to the line
they have to defend and covered from the enemy. When how-
ever it becomes evident that the enemy is going to attack any
part of the line, the troops in each section threatened must at
once be placed in position and any batteries hitherto kept in rear
must be brought up to cross their fire on all the ground in front.
Altliough then the duty of choosing a position will fall upon
officers of the general staff, it is nevertheless most important tiiat
all officers of whatever branch of the service and of whatever rank
should understand the general principles to be followed so as to
be able to carry out whatever orders they may receive in an in-
telligent manner.
With reference to the division of the front line into sections
i^reat care is required to prevent the junctions of contiguous com-
mands from being weak points, and for this reason the sections
should be so placed that a line of probable attack does not fall
between them. Thus the flanks of tactical units should not be
made to rest on important main issues, such as roads running
from the front through the position and serving as approaches to
the enemy, as then neither unit is responsible for their protection.
Also in posting troops care must be taken not to break up the
lifferent tactical units unnecessarily, thus a section of a company,
i>r half a company, or a whole c<impau\', as the case may be,
iiiifjht hold a house (jr farm ; a battalion a village, etc. The Hanks
"I'each section must be specially strengthened so that tlu; loss
foiatime of the front line of a neighbouring scrlion ni.'cd not
(^^ntail the retirement of the others.
' M
'I
The line of tlie position having been chosen, the ordinaty trench
326
TACTICAL NOTES.
"rTji'i'Jlsat.-'
work required for the protection of artillery and infantry* will be
thrown up by those arms themselves independently of the
engineers who will be detailed, with the assistance of working
parties from the infantry, to erect obstacles here, effect clearances
there, throw up any larger earthworks that maybe required, such
as redoubts for a certian force of infantry, or of infantry and guns
combined, on sites previously fixed upon. The general size,
description, and position of such works would be decided by the
general assisted by his staff, all details and the actual erection of
such works being left to the engineers. But localities such as
knolls, villages, farms, woods, etc., if they exist, will have to have
a special garrison alloted to them and special means of defence will
have to be provided for them under the supervision of the engi-
neers. Where no such defensible posts exist tactical points
will have to be erected by the erection of field-works.
Colonel Schaw% R.E., states that "the onus of the preparation
of the main line of defence now rests on the infantry, not on the
engineers, whose part in the work is not so clearly defined, but
must be determined by circumstances according to the wishes of
the general." Signal posts and field observations will be estab-
lished and the engineers will also be directed, when possible, to
lay telegraph linest from the place chosen for headquarters to the
different parts of the position connecting them with permanent
lines in rear; to destroy, make, or improve communications by
constructing new roads, bridges, ramps, etc., improving and
widening existing roads, cutting paths in woods and markiii},'
tracks in them by blazing trees, obstructing or breaking up exist-
ing roads, mining bridges, etc. ; to place farmsteads, villages and
other such localities into a proper state of defence, and in fact to
perform all those works which a knowledge of fortification and
field engineering may dictate, according to the time and means
available, so as to gain all the advantage possible from the de-
* With our present organization for infantry tools, twi) (^onipanies only from each
battali'in would have the means of working at one time ; tliis is not suHioient, iunl
exp' rience has shown that as the tools are carrieil in tool carts the l;"i() |iieks and l.'iO
s'lovels jirovideil may not he at hand wiien wanted. The artillery carry theirs (iii
ihe lindiers and wagons so t]u:y \\ ill at all times ho at hand hut the proimrtion
allow(!d is too small.
t'Tiie half telegraph troop helonging to an army eorps carries IS miles nf wire, ami
provides six telegraph stations. The wire eau be laid at the rate of two or thret
miles an hour from nuh w.agon.
^ I
^^
wm
DKrUNSlVE POSITIONS.
J-J7
feiisive. The cavalry pioneers heinpf trained to the destruction of
telej^rapiis and railways and to the construction of lij^ht bridp^es
iiuiy afford the enjj^ineers valuable assistance. As every field com-
pany of engineers carries a theodolite and chain, another duty
devolving on this arm will be to measure the ranges from differ-
ent parts of the position to well marked objects in front. Up to
i,ooo yards this can be done by means of a pocket sextant. It is
presumed that artillery batteries will always carry their own
range-finders. The front line having been secured, a second
position will be prepared if time permits, or if sufficient men are
available, the preparation of this second position would proceed
hand in hand with that of the front line.
The distance of this second position in rear of the fighting line
may vary between half a mile and two or even three miles accord-
ing to the nature of the ground as a suitable position must be
found, but it should never be less than 600 yards unless the
i,'round is very steep because artillery fire directed at the shoot-
ing line when the range is 1,400 yards and under is effective to
about 600 yards in rear of it. Also the difficulty of retiring from
captured intrenchments and reforming again a short distance in
rear renders the second line of defence very apt to be rushed by
the assailants following on the heels of the defenders unless suffi-
cient space separates the lines. But on the other hand the
second line should not be so far retired as to prevent artillery
from the second line firing on the first line so as to assist in its
recapture if taken, but owing to the great range of modern artil-
lery the nature of the country will affect this point more than
anything else. Hence if the country is close the second line must
fjenerally be placed closer than in an open country. About
1,000 yards, or the limit of effective musketry fire, would appear
to be the best distance between the two lines.
The object of this second line is to break the strength of the
enemy should he succeed in forcing the first line, but it is on no
account to be treated as one to ichich the defenders of the first
line are to retire, but as positions in and around which portions
of the reserves can be concentrated whilst the fugitives from the
first line rally in rear. There should, therefore, be wide intervals
between its parts by which the defenders of the first line may re-
tire without masking its fire. For this it should consist chiefly
328
TACTICAL NOTES.
of stroiif:;' points such as redoubts, villages, or woods, placed so
as to support the front line either by dominating the tactical
points in that line so as to conmiand them if captured by the
enemy, or by being placed facing the intervals between them.
If such a suitable second line exists it will be necessary for the
whole operation of an attack to be begun anew by troops already
wearied by the exertions of capturing the first position, and a
fresh preparation by artillery fire must be carried out, and if the
previous fighting has been obstinate it is very likely that night
will fall before the second attack can be brought to a success-
ful issue. In such a case the action must be broken off and the
defenders will then have the night to recover themselves,
strengthen their defences and bring up reinforcements, or even
make a night attack and drive the assailant out of the first line.
Even if it be impossible to provide a second line throughout the
position, yet it will be a great advantage to have a second line of
defence at least behind those points most likely to be assailed.
In some cases a third defensive line may be prepared in rear of
the second and similar to it. Thus before Paris, a German division
occupied two sections of about 1,500 yards each along the first
line, there was a second position 1,100 yards in rear, and 700 to
1,300 yards in rear of that again a third line.
In order to provide against every contingency the positions to
be held by the Rear Guards, which would be formed of the last
reserves in case of retreat, should also be fixed upon and prepared.
For this, fortified localities or closed earthworks are very suitable
so situated as to cover the lines of retreat and to prevent the as-
sailant commanding the retreat with his guns, and at least so far
behind the lines in front as not to be silenced by musketry fire
from them if taken. A series of defensible localities to cover the
the retreat, for it to be conducted step by step, will prove advan-
tageous. To prevent the lines of retreat becoming blocked with
trains which might prove disastrous, one or more suitable places
for the baggage trains must be chosen in rear of the position ;
their distances in rear may have to be considerable especially if
there is a defile behind the position as the trains will then have
to be placed beyond it. There should be sufficient lines of retreat
to enable the different fractions of the line to retire without dis-
order, and they should be easily accessible to each section.
!\ i
'Uti
DEFENSIVE POSITION.
329
PREPARATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.
The position beinpf decided on, and the troops apportioned to
the different sections, the first consideration is the amount of
time and means available for putting it in a j^^ood state of defence,
and whether the fortifications must be hasty or deliberate.
The term *' hasty" fortification is applied to those cases which
are far the most common in modern warfare, when the time avail-
able for preparation is from two to six hours, or part of the day
previous to an eni^agement, and when it is important to employ
as few men as possible so as to give rest to the majority to fit
them for the coming struggle, while .by " deliberate " fortification
is understood those cases when the time available is at least three
days or more, and when labour either civil or military is abundant,
and even under such favourable conditions good enclosed field-
works properly provided with bombproof cover require some three
days or more for their construction. However short the time
available, the work of clearing the necessary foreground and of
making the necessary lateral communications such as gaps in
walls, hedges, or woods, must be carried out in preference to
everything else, as on them the tactical conduct of the fight may
often depend. A certain amount c"" c( ver should also be obtained
without delay as the advantages cover confers on the defenders
is very great. Besides its moral effect in giving confidence to
the defender, it diminishes the losses enormously, conceals the
defender's strength and formations, and also the effects of the as-
sailant's fire. In the war of 1870 the French losses on the defen-
sive were only one-half, while on the offensive they were three
and one-third times those they caused the Germans.
When villages, woods, and inclosures are available they can be
turned to account without much labour because the numbers re-
qiiired to defend such posts, about one man to a pace, are about
double what are required for their preparation. Failing such de-
fensible posts earthworks must be used and these take four or five
times as many men to make as to defend. The object then of
earthworks on the field of battle is chiefly to take the place of
defensible posts such as woods, houses, ditches, cuttings, em-
I'nnkriients, etc., in places where these do not exist.
The shooting line would, when possible, occupy the ridge of a
^1
fi
I'
330
TACTICAL NOTES.
hill or line of hills covered by shelter trenches or other earthworks
which would be disposed so as to {,Mve a direct and sweeping firo
to the front. Fiankinj^ fire is, except in exceptional cases as in
restricted areas such as the interiors of villap^es, unnecessary with
the breech-loader and therefore to be avoided as it diminishes the
front fire ; moreover, flankinj,' defence can now in most positions
be afforded by adjacent intrenchments. When the ridf,'e has
deep re-enterinj,' angles it will generally be better not to continue
the trenches too far round them as the fire from them would be
too oblique and they might be enfiladed, unless it is necessary
that they should look into adjacent slopes which cannot be seen
from its own front. A trench may if necessary be made at the
head of such re-entering angles or prtillery may be placed there
if its sweep of fire is not too restricted. It is useful to recollect
that the sweep of musketry fire from a parapet or trench is about
30° right or left of the front, so that considerable latitude in trac-
ing the lines of defence is allowable.
In intrenching heights great care is required in choosing the
exact position on the crest whence the ground in front can be
swept. When the top of a hill consists of a fiat slope breaking
into steeper slopes as it decends, a veiy usual formation, the
nearer the infantry trench is placed to the topof the hill the easier
it will be to obtain cover, but the trench must be placed so far
down the hill that it can see the ground in front and then the guns
could be placed on the brow of the hill; but when the plateau has
a gciitle rise guns ma}' be placed on higher ground in rear of the
edge. A trench somewhat under the crest has the advantage that
if captured by the enemy he cannot use it as cover from which to
fire. The reverse slopes of such a ridge should not be parallel to
the trajectory of the enemy's projectiles as they are then danger-
ous for supports and i"eserves. When so exposed the steeper
they are the better within the limits suitable for secure and easy
movement.*
*A11 arms can move with order on slopes of 0°. On slopes of 10" close movements
of infantry become ditlicult, Cavalry can canter down iiiil and charge up bill.
Artillery can move slowly. <tn slopes of 15' Infantry cannot incne far in onlur.
Cavalry can trot up or walk down, but Artillery moves with difficulty. On slopes df
20" Infantry cannot move in order, Cavalry may ascend at a walk and descend ob-
liquely without order, On slopes of 2.1'' or .Str Infantry cannot move in order, and
Cavalry may ascend one by one obli(|ueIy, and descend in the same way, but at tlif
steeper slope with great <lifliculty.
m
■p
UliltNSIVli POSITIONS.
331
In portions of the line where it is intended that cavalry should
issue, shelter trenches should not be made as the obstacle, though
slight, is sufficient to break the formation of cavalry which it is
necessary to avoid just before a charge. If artillery may have to
pass, gaps in the trenches may also be left although this is not
always necessary as the ordinary infantry shelter trench can easily
be crossed by field guns. But if it is expected time will permit
of deeper trenches being made care must be taken that they do
not interfere with any possible offensive movements. Either in-
tervals must be left in the lines, or their ends may be disposed in
echelon, or in those parts they must be made of such a profile as
not to interfere with the passage of troops. When deep trenches
are made the rear slope of the trench should be cut away so as to
fjive no cover from troops placed further back. If gaps are left
by disposing the trenches in t^chelon they should not be made to
overlap, but such gaps should be left as will allow the fire directed
jO° off the perpendicular from the rear trenches to pass clear of
those in front. When possible the echelons must be made where
spurs run out or valleys intersect the line as these features then
afford the openings required. It may be noted that a battery of
artillery in line at full intervals requires about 100 yards, a regiment
of cavalry 200 to 250 yards, a battalion of infantry in attack
formation about 330 yards ; and for an infantry brigade 600 yards
will suffice.
Supports and local reserves can often find natural cover, but
when this is not the case artificial cover must be provided for
them in spots which should if possible be unseen from the front
so as not to be exposed to the assailant's distant fire ; but when
exposed to his oblique fire overhead cover also becomes necessary.
In hasty fortifications redoubts should not be attempted in the
front line as they do not give a front of fire commensurate with
the labour of making them r.nd are quite untenable unless well
supplied with bombproof cover. The labour and time required
for their construction can in almost every case be more profitably
employed in clearing the ground, making shelter trenches and
obstacles, and improving communications. But in the second
line, or to strengthen flanks, or for special objects, redoubts may
be most useful if time is available for their construction. In
those cases however where hasty fortifications are improved
1
i
p
1
i
332
TACTICAL NOTES.
until they assume the character of dehberate fortification, re-
doubts may be made with great advantage to secure a position
for a certain time with a minimum of defenders ; for as long as
the enemy gives the defender time there should be no cessation
in the latter's efforts to strengthen the position. In hasty fortifi-
cation then trenches and gun-pits, or similar constructions, com-
bined with the preparation of woods, villages, and railway features,
which in most civilized countries will provide the defender the
means of forming strong posts hastily, are the works best fitted for
the time, but where such posts are not available stronger field
works such as redoubts must be resorted to.
If however villages and woods project forward from the general
line they form good objects for the enemy's converging fire and
must be seized by him as they bring a cross-fire on the ground
between ; moreover when captured they give him a foothold in
the line. Now villages, especially in such a position, are apt to
be a source of weakness, for a heavy artillery fire can so shatter
the defenders as to drive them from their lines, and if this fire can
be kept up to the very moment of assault the infantry of the
attack will be ena))led to advance in comparative safety. Straii,dit
lines of earthworks, on the other hand, are not favourable for
attack as it is difficult to silence the fire from them. Closed
earthworks of strong profile are not easily taken by assault, but
their garrisons mny be shut in and forced to surrender if the line
can be pierced elsewhere, but if skilfully used on commandinfj
points to enfilade lines of trenches they will add greatly to the
strength of the position, for it will be very diflicult for the assail-
ants to establish themselves securely in any trenches they may
have captured so long as the works that enfilade them are still in
the hands of the defenders. Direct attacks on such works will be
rendered difficult bj- the fire oi the trenches on either side, and if
the latter are captured the closing of the gorges will prevent these
works from being captured from the rear by the troops who may
have got into the trenches. Mitrailleuses to enfilade the trenches
may be a useful armament for redoubts in such positions.
Frequently when a Dosition is chosen for defence the Com-
mander does not know what time he will be allowed for prepara-
tion, in that case the most important works will have to be under-
taken first and executed roughly, ev(M- remembering that at every
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
353
stage the work 'nust be ready for the fight. At first then, when
it appears Hkely that only two or three hours are available,
trenches and gun-pits may be dug, the immediate front of the
position cleared as far as time will allow, walls, houses, etc.,
roughly prepared, avenues barricaded, and communications made
where most wanted. With woods the salient parts of the borders
may be entangled and shelter trenches thrown up. With a night
available for work the ground may be more extensively cleared,
houses and villages more thoroughly prepared for defence,
trenches deepened, blindages made for supports and reserves and
all defences improved, and the field telegraph laid. When one or
more days are available the above works will be improved upon,
shelter trenches and blindages improved, over-Head cover pro-
vided for them where most needed, a more extended use made of
obstacles, the field of fire carefully cleared, and communications
further improved or more thoroughly impeded, and tra,verses
thrown up in parts of the line exposed to enfilade. As time per-
mits strong redoubts and casemated works may be erected both
for guns and infantry which, if constructed, may render a regular
siege of the position necessary, as at Plevna.
The wars of 1870 and 1877 have shown that the ordinary type
of shallow shelter trench or gimpit do not afford any effectual
cover against the plunging effect of long range musketry fire nor
afjainst the searching effects of oblique shrapnel, or of curved fire
from howitzers, and that works of a deeper type are necessary.
Subject to the power of shooting, shelter trenches and other
works should be concealed as far as possible, but in exposed
positions where this cannot be these works need overhead cover
to keep out bullets and shrapnel.*
Thus one advantage the assailant has now gained is the neces-
sity imposed on the defence of providing more laborious defences,
yet owing to the reliability and range of nuisketry defence the safe
intervals between tne strong tactical points or enclosed earth-
works, on which most labour has to be expended, has been much
increased and their nur.iber has consequently been diminished ;
ind further, the power of Hanking obstacles and bringing a cross-
tire on the ground in front of neighbouring defences can now be
effected at a much greater distance than of old.
4
i
1!^
'Ill
'' m
It' as »5
that at every
'For li)rig range tire eight iuchua of earth will give protection overhead.
334
TACTICAL NOTES.
The relief of the trench necessary for cover is decided by the
drop of the projectiles at the ranges from which the assailant
can fire, and it is plain that the longer the range the more height
and less thickness is necessary.
The Germans at the Lisaine had a few days available for pre-
paration )et they attempted no enclosed works. Whenever en-
closed works are made they should give real security to their
garrisons both from concentrated artillery and infantry fire and
from close infantry attack, as a redoubt, which does not fulfil
these conditions, is a mere trap for its unfortunate garrison if it
be attacked with vigour.
Enclosed works then, in order to be secure against a rush and
with sufficient bombproof cover to shelter the troops against dis-
tant fire, require time and great labour besides suitable material
at hand for their construction and cannot therefore be thought
of unless these are available ; and to be efficient and able to play
a part commensurate to the labour expended on them it is
thought they should allow of a garrison of at least two companies
(200 men) as a minimum allowing four men to every three paces
of perimeter, and even such a work would be very small. Also,
since the direct infantry fire from simple lines of trench is so effec-
tive and difficult to silence, such trenches are preferable to im-
properly constructed redoubts which are only apt to draw on
themselves the enemy's fire resulting in heavy loss to their de-
fenders. But as a support to such lines of trench, redoubts, when
time and means are available for their proper construction, may
prove of the greatest value and if placed in the main line, or in
front of it, they may continue to fire on the enemy after he has
passed them, check his further ad\ance by the fire they deliver
on his flanks and aid the troops in the open in recovering any
ground they may have lost. As a redoubt when captured is a
strong point for the enemy, it is important that they should be so
strong as to be difficult to capture or silence. To be thoroughly
effective, however, as it is rarel}' possible to render field works
free from assault they must be provided with flank defence for
their ditches as otherwise these form places of assembly for
storming the works. ,
The Turkish redoubts at Plevna give but an imperfect indica-
f
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
335
tion of the rapid use of such defences in the field, because they
were the work of much time and of daily experience of what was
wanted and presented the character of rej::^ular forts except that
they were not free from escalade ; but they showed conclusively
the enormous resisting power of such constructions when manned
by determined infantry provided with ample cover : for while
many instances occurred in the war of 1877 of shelter trenches
beinj^ carried, the capture of redoubts was much more rare, and
then, in nearly every case it resulted from troops getting into the
ditches and assaulting from them. Nevertheless, wherever the
Russian attack was carried on in a proper manner it was suc-
cessful. Although their resisting jiower has increased, still the
new development of indirect musketry fire and of fire from how-
itzers, even more than that of direct shrapnel, makes the fighting
of redoubts more dependent than of old on their proper construc-
tion, and their trace must be laid out entirely with reference to
the ground and to the conditions of frontal fire and mutual de-
fence.
Artillery should not as a rule be placed in redoubts but rather
in epaulments retired some 400 yards behind their flanks. The
principal reasons for this are that while the enemy is engaged in
disabling the artillery he will also be disabling the infantry, and
during the close attack the parts of the pnrapet taken up by the
>;uns would be better defended b}' infantry. It is difficult to
withdraw the guns out of redoubts when being attacked, and
doing so has a disheartening effect on the garrison ; moreover
i(un emplacements, having to be low for field guns to fire over, do
not give sufficient cover inside the work unless their platforms are
raised with much labour, b^urther, guns placed in retired positions
can fire into the redoubts if cajitured. Whenever guns are placed in
enclosed works it should be dont; with the clear intention of leav-
ing,' them there throughout the light, whereas if placed in retired
iinplacements guns may be moved when recpiired according to
the various phases of the battle, and many spare emplacements
may be thrown up so as to be able to shift guns rapidly intothetn.
In snch retired positions too they attract Kss attention and are
i'oiisec|nently less often overwhelmed.
The distance to which the grourul slionid br cleared nnisl de-
pend on the time and means a\ailable, but it possible an incmv
ii
^i|
m
336
TACTICAL NOTES.
should be deprived of cover which would enable him to establish
an extensive line of infantry within effective musketry ranf;;e of
the position, and this more especially in front of those parts which
are otherwise most liable to assault from their saliency or from
the existence of convenient cover for the enemy's reserves or
favourable positions for his artillerj-, and every effort should be
made in all cases to clear the front to a distance of at least 400
yards. In 1870, as far as musketry fire was concerned, the Ger-
mans were content with a clear field of 300 to 400 yards, but al-
though the difficulty of crossing this is now greater than ever, the
defender who cannot use his musketry over a much greater area
will not be getting all he can out of his advantages, in fact witii
each arm the power to shoot at least up to its most effective limit
should always be striven for with as little artificial help as may
be.
Should it not be possible to clear away cover to the extent de-
sired, then obstacles must be formed. In default of impassable
obstacles, strong supports and reserves must be posted at such
parts of the line, a second position selected in rear, lines of re-
treat prepared, and arrangements made for immediately attack-
ing the enemy in flank should he gain a partial success at such
points.
Standing crops, tall grass, etc., may mask an enemy's advance
from men in shelter trenches. This may be obviated by march-
ing men in line over the ground in front of the works previous to
the action, or it may be cut down or burnt. If the ground be
covered with heather or withered grass and the weather be hot
and dry, it may be set fire to during the action and great confus-
ion and loss result : to avoid this, a belt sliould be cleared with
sickles in front of the position and the ground on which the troops
are to stand may then be quickly cleared by fire. The ground in
front need not be so cleared as fires created by rockets durui^^
the action would be very disadvantageous to the attack.
Obstacles, although not so important as formerly on account
of the increased dcadliness of musketry fire and the formations
for attack being now less impeded by them, still form in many
cases a valuable auxiliary enabling a weak force to hold ground
against an attack which would inevitably overwhelm them \v<ri'
tliere no obstacles to detain the enemv under fire : and as a meanr.
■■^^ffippi
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
M7
of neutralizing certain areas over which the assailant might ad-
vance, and of defining his lines of advance, their value has in-
creased owing to the necessity for increased extension. Particu-
larly are obstacles useful in close country where a long range
cannot be secured and the enemy in attacking has only a short
distance to traverse under fire, and in case of night attacks.
Obstacles are evidently only to be used extensively in those parts
of a line where offensive movements are not intended, and this
question must always be well considered as it will materially aid
an attack should an obstacle exist in front of the defender's line
precluding the possibility of a counter-attack ; and consequently
when obstacles are used in the offensive zone care must be taken
to leave gaps close to some strong tactical point to allow the re-
serves to debouch.
Obstacles may be used any distance to the front within the
limits of the defender's fire, but as a rule when in front of a shoot-
mg line they are best placed rather further forward than the line
the assailant will strive to reach for the last fire contest before his
final rush. This line would generally be from loo to 300 yards
from the position, and hence the line of obstacles may be rather
over 300 yards forward, thus leaving a clear field for the local
counter-attacks of local reserves. If time permits and materials
are at hand, a second line of obstacles may be placed close to the
shooting line with gaps for the passage of local reserves. Of
course if the defence is to be purely passive, the more obstacles
that can be made to impede the enemy's advance and delay him
iinder fire the better.
The communications inside the position must be ample to
allow of reserves being brought up quickly and of moving troops
easily and unobserved by the enemy from one part of the position
to another, and this is of special importance when the general
counter-stroke is to be made. As the line of a position is, as a
rule, astride the lines of approach, in a close country lateral com-
munications are seldom abundant, and even where woods are ab-
sent lateral ravines and streams are apt to cut through the position
md isolate the defensive sections. Kamps, or small bridges
to cross ditches, streams, hollows, roads or embankments, and
k'aps in fences are the most generally rccpiired ; causeways across
>\va?nps, paths through woods, and bridges over rivers are also
■■iilll
• !
338
TACTICAL NQTES.
sometimes necessary. Roads are specially required to enable the
artillery to move to different parts of the line of battle and to en-
sure easy access from the batteries to the ammunition parks.
The communications to the rear must also be considered so as to
afford ample means of retreat.
Outside the position some communications will have to be
destroyed. The demolition of bridges should never be undertaken
without due considcjation and on the special order of the General
Commanding. It will rarely be advisable to destroy a bridge
over a fordable stream in front of a position because it will not
stop the infantry attack but will seriously impede an offensive
return should it become desirable. Occasionally, however, it may
be of importance to do so to delay an enemy in placing his artil-
lery in a good position if it can only be reached by crossing the
stream or other obstacle, such as a deep railway cutting, passable
by infantry but not by artillery.
But the preceding pages will have shown that how to turn such
features in the line of battle as woods, villages, farms, hamlets,
knolls, railway cuttings, embankments, etc., to best advantage or
to least disadvantage is a question of the greatest moment. In
some cases they may be made so strong as to preclude all possi-
bility of successful attack compelling" the enemy to direct his
attack elsewhere, and it is always an advantage to the defenders
to know where the enemy cannot attack with any expectation of
success, and then they would form strong tactical points in the
fighting line, advanced posts, or suitable posts for the second line
or rear guard position according to their situation.
Villages and w-oods in the line of battle must be strongly held
as they will infallibly attract to themselves the enemy's attack,
but it is doubtful whether villages give as much strength now as
formerly as th^y afford an excellent mark for the enemy's artillery,
and if it concentrates its tire upon them it can hardly fail to
render them untenable, whereas mere lines of trenches give but a
poor object to aim at. l-5ut owing to the facilitv with which
villages and walled enclosures general!}' can usually ix; put into a
state of defence, and to the covca" and concealment they affoKl to
supports and reserves, tht!y continue to play ;ni important pait
and are often utilised: \et the balllc t)! (iraNchitte has shown
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
339
that such a locality is a souixe of weakness in a position if it can
be subjected to a concentrated and continuous fire from artillery,
while this battle also shows that earthworks with a clear field of
tire in front are almost imprej^nable. Hence villages in a posi-
tion may be a great source of danger if their loss endangers the
position; especially is this the case when they, or woods, run
down from the position towards the enemy when they may offer
them holding ground and, at all events, buildings are liable to be
set on fire creating confusion and giving the enemy a footing in
the line where he might establish himself and break the front.
The subject of the actual defence and occupation of villages
and woods, etc., is dealt with in the text books so will not be
treated of here except in a very general manner. The situation
of villages makes their defence frequently of the highest impor-
tance lying as they often do astride rivers or across roads.
The general shape and lay of a village in a position is very im-
portant. If it is end on to the front of the general line running
out towards the enemy the main streets will be liable to be en-
filaded, it will show but a poor front, and will lend a hand to him
in his advance. If it be too long to occupy the whole village, a
line of retrenchment must be made across it and the front cleared
as much as possible by gutting houses, etc. If the village is
straggling and runs in tne direction of the line it shows a good
front, but it may be a danger in dividing the front and throwing
the defenders into disorder if set on fire. Compact villages which
can be strongly occupied are generally best.
The concentrated fire of artillery on buildings will render them
untenable for the time but will rarely make them unfit for occupa-
tion when it has ceased unless they can be set on fire or made to
fall in when they are dangerous, though frequently the fires can be
kept under. As a rule, therefore, infantry should not be placed
in exposed buildings nor behind walls or masonry generally when
It can be avoided on account of their liability to splinter, yet with
some labour walls can be made proof against artillery and will
always keep off rifle or shrapnel bullets. In occupying villages
troops should in consequence not be placed in the buildings them-
sehes, but they should be defended by occupying advanced en-
closures, which frequently furnish flanking defence, supplemented
In' trenches, the supports and reserves being sheltered behind
340
TACTICAL NOTES.
houses whence from the upper stories a double tier of fire may be
obtained if not exposed to artillery fire, or as soon as this has be-
come masked by the hostile infantry. A second line, and even a
third line of defence may be prepared by occupying some of the
houses such as churches, public buildings, etc., which from their
position and construction appear suitable ; or if the village is
compact and not too extensive the whole village may form a
reduit. Guns should as rule be placed outside and behind the
flanks of a village and not in the village itself. The communica-
tions inside the village may have to be increased to enable reserves
to move rapidly in all directions.
ADVANCED OR DETACHED POSTS.
Looking beyond the position there are often isolated hills,
churches, hamlets, villages, or woods, which cannot be neglected
as they would offer great advantages to the enemy, and in f;ict they
may form manoeuvring pivots to either side which holds them.
The farm of Hougoumont on tin; field of Waterloo is an instance
of the advantage of such a post to the defenders, for it was the
possession of this farm which enabled the British, when the
French attacking columns had advanced past it towards the main
line, to attack them in flank.
Such points in advance of the general line may then be of the
greatest advantage if they are capable of-defence to the end and
the enemy feels he cannot pass them by, for a direct attack on
them will prove costly, not only on account of the fire of their
garrison but from that of the main position sweeping their front
and flanks and securing their rear ; they should however be
sufficiently near to the main position and have covered communi-
cation cO the rear so that the garrison may be easily reinforced or
relieved, otherwise they are sources of weakness. It is not desir-
able as a rule to have posts strongly garrisoned beyond the reach
of support from the main line as it will not be possible to hold
them permanently, and loss and discouragement will follow their
abandonment after a stubborn resistance, yet it may sometimes be
advantageous to do so, and especially on the flanks. Yet im-
portant posts well to the front may at times be occupied if so
situated as to afford the enemy material support in his attack.
The Germans at the Lisaine occupied such a post consisting of a
wooded hill nearly one mile in advance of the batteries which
DEFENSIVIi POSITIONS,
341
supported it. In such cases the garrison should be prepared to
be cut off for a time and should therefore form an isolated post
and he well su[)plied with provisions and ammunition.
From their importance to both sides the early features of battles
are often isolated struggles to gain or retain possession of such
points. Thus at the battle of Solferino the strongest feature of
fjjround was an isolated hill which was occupied by the Austrians.
Hut it was so far in advance of their general line that it was
probably a great disadvantage for the Austrians to hold it as it
was difficult of access and so steep in rear as to make retreat from
it difficult ; yet had it not been occupied it would have formed
an excellent pivot for the French. The latter, seeing the advan-
tages of its occupation, attacked this position in spite of the
difficulty it presented, and although they lost heavily in doing so
yet its seizure ended in the rout of a portion of the Austrian
army and many prisoners were taken.
Woods in front or on the flanks of a position which give cover
to the attack are generally a source of great danger, but if they
are so thick as to be impassable, or if they can be made so, they
act as impassable obstacles limiting the area for the enemy's ad-
vance and dividing his attack into fractions ; and woods in front
or on the flanks may prove useful in denying to the enemy posi-
tions which would otherwise be favourable for posting his artillery.
Whenever a wood, a village, or other obstacle runs close up to
the position its line should if possible be retired at least 400 or
300 yards from it, or to the distance of effective musketry fire,
and the edge of a wood entangled, and if the intervening ground
is open it will be difficult for the enemy to debouch from it under
a heavy fire.
In all cases where woods are to be defended the great point is
to hold the border and keep the assailant out, hence the edge of
ihe wood must be held in force for which it must not be too ex-
tensive. When a portion of a position, say a flank, has to rest
on an extensive wood, all that can be done in such an unfavour-
able circumstance is to clear as broad a belt as possible, at least
15 or 20 yards, the hither edge of which must be strongly held
and a log parapet erected while an entanglement should be made
at the further edge; on account of the short field of fire arrange-
ments for flank defence should be resorted to as much as possible.
•Hi
'1 BE'
' '''!- WSA
. 1'
342
TACTICAL NOTES.
Tracks in rear to eiuiblu local and other reserves to move rijj[ht
or left to support threatened points nmst be cleared, and furthLi
all the roads and tracks leading' throuf^^h the wood and available
for the eneny should be oi/structed. Some 300 or 400 yards from
the inner edge of the wood, and encircling that part of the wood
contained in the position, intrenchments should be thrown up to
prev(nit the enemy from debouching from it, and abattis or en-
tanglements would also be made use of.
For the defence of woods a clear held of fire in front of its
edge is essential, and a line of abattis would be formed along the
edge and in some parts a trench or log parapet constructed be-
hind it. To economise troops those parts of the edge where en-
tanglements or abattis are made may be protected by flank de-
fence. With reference to the safety of supports it may be noted
that in woods with large trees they are safe if they cannot see the
open, but with young shrubs or brushwood cover must be made.
The question of occupying advanced posts is much affected by
the difficulty of withdrawing troops under fire which has been
greatly increased by modern weapons, and consequently they
should be within easy supporting distance of rifle fire, say 500 or
800 yards from the position, and if so far in advance they should
only be held if they are really strong with every probability of be-
ing held successfully throughout the battle. When these condi-
tions are fulfilled such posts will be a great advantage as they
will increase the difficulties of the attack, for while held they
will take the general line of his advance in flank and isolate his
attacks. Advanced posts on a flank are a great protection against
turning movements, also in the oftensive portions of the line the
occupation of advanced posts is always an advantage as they
protect the flanks and form points of support for the columns of
attack. When advanced posts are either too far to the front to
be occupied, or so weak as not to be capable of a stubborn de-
fence, they should be cleared away if possible or rendered useless
to the assailant as the loss of such a post should never be risked
on account of its moral effect on the defenders, and because the
enemy may, should he capture them, turn them to his advantage.
Woods, as has been mentioned, should have their hither edge en-
tangled, and villages should be gutted if time permits, but feel-
ings of humanity will frequently prevent this being done. In
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
343
1S77 the Turks frequently threw up shelter trenches 400 or 600
yards in front of the main defences, but these proved no substi-
tutes for advanced posts as they had constantly to be abandoned,
which cannot always be done without j^reat risk to the defenders.
Such advanced posts as we have been considering here must
not be confounded with the advanced guard positions referred to
under that head and which will be further to the front.
m\
RAir.WAYS.
On a battlefield features of a railway are sometimes of tacti-
cal importance owing to their bridges, embankments and cuttings.
Within the position embankments may afford good positions for
the shooting line, and they give cover to the supports; for a close
defence, hov/ever, they should have flank defence. Cuttings may
also be used by infantry affording sometimes, when on sloping
ground, two tiers of fire, ^^'itll the shooting line on the advanced
edge cover is obtained for supports in the cutting, and a cutting
may serve as an obstacle in front of an artilleiy position. To
facilitate communication ramps may have to be made to cross
embankments, long cuttings bridged, etc.
In front of the position bridges may have to be blocked up or
destroyed, and rails taken up, but such obstructions should only
be carried out under orders of the General-in-Chief who will have
to decide whether the line of rail is to be permanently destroyed
or only temporarily blocked.
Where positions are occupied deliberately, and if the direction
and position of a line of railway suits, heavy guns may be mounted
on railway wagons and brought up into action when required by
means of engines or horses.
IfALT.OONS.
It has been pointed out that one of the duties devolving on the
defence will be to establish observator\- stations, l)nt in future
wars we may expect to sec balloons used as observatoiie.'s both
ill defence and attack. It can be readily seen what important
information such as llu.' assailant's strtiigtli. dispositions, move-
uiciits and intentions, ran be ascertained b\- means of a fudd bal-
344
TACTICAL NOTES.
loon in those cases where the defensive position does not dominate
the surrounding country.
To the defender such an observatory 600 feet above the ground
would in a great measure disclose the dispositions and therefore
the plans of the attack and so deprive the assailant of the advan-
tage he reaps from surprise. On the other hand the assailant
would often greatly gain by a knowledge of the defender's dis-
positions and resources, the disposal of reserves or of unseen
works, etc.; while in both cases when the curved fire of artillery
is used the balloon observatory would help to regulate it and give;
its use a much wider field ; connection between the balloon and
ground being kept up by means of a telegraph wire. Care must
however be taken in the use of balloons as experiments have
shown that it is not very difficult for artillery to bring them down
at 2,000 yards range.
DISPOSITIONS FOR SECUniNd THE FLANKS.
The natural features of a country generally make it incumbent
on a General acting on the defensive to occupy a position partak-
ing more or less of the character of a straight line, such as one
side of a valley or edge of a plateau, in such a position with refer-
ence to the direction of the adversary's advance as to compel him
to deploy and form an opposing line previous to attacking. In
this usual case the flanks should be well secured, either by resting
on impassable obstacles such as inaccessible heights, a marsh,
river or sea, etc., provided these are sufficiently extensive, or the
conditions such as will not allow the enemy to enfilade the line
from the further side of the obstacle ; or they may rest on a num-
ber of defensive localities such as villages, small woods, redoubts,
etc., which can be held in force, strong reserves being «'cheloned
in rear to support them, b^ven if the flanks do not rest on
obstacles absolutely impassable, they ma}' yet be secure if the
ground presents such difli ilties as to hinder an advance in that
direction. For instance at Chairkeue the turning of the Russian
righ.Uwas rendered very difficult by the fact that the assailant's
advance lav through almost trackless woods. Against a hinricd
attack impassable forests form effectual oi)stacles but, as men-
tioned already, when the attack has time ways can be cut through
them. At any rate if the flanks do not rest o\i impassable
DEFENSIVE TOSITIONS.
J45
obstacles it will of cDurse be a {^'leat aJvantaf^'e if the flank over-
looks the grouiul in front of it over which an effective lire can
then be maintained.
A position to be considered a really },'ooil one should have at
least one flank stronj,' by nature, and it is always a great source
of strength to a defender if he knows that one, or both, of his
flanks is secure as he is then enabled to bring his chief efforts to
bear on the defence of the front. An open flank may be strength-
ened by works judiciously disposed or by the occupation of tacti-
cal points, and its defence aided bv placing troops in I'chelon be-
hind it so as to take in Hank any attack- Troops detailed for the
protection of a flank should be especially well provided with
engineers and intrenching tools in order to be able to intrench
themselves during the action it.self in any situation they may be
forced to assume under unforeseen circumstances ; for every posi-
tion, however well prepared, unless it partake of the nature of an
intrenched camp, can be turned by an adversary capable of be-
coming the assailant owing to his superiority. But although with
a siudU force the flanks may be secured by resting on a single de-
fensive locality such as a village, small wood, or failing these a
redoubt, yet with forces of any size it is evident that such posts
will not eflect their object.
The experience of the wars of the last few years tends to show
that the tactical question on the battlefleld is, which side will
jiirround the other, on both flanks if the forces of one side are
sufficiently preponderating or otherwise only on one, and that the
side which surrounds the other certainly wins the day from the
overwhelming eft'ect of his converging fire and from the demora-
ii;^iii"g effect produced when the opponent's retreat becomes en-
fiangered. Now the ordinary method of carrying out this
ciic ire ling movement is for the assailant to attack all along the
line held by the defender while he moves his reserves round one
0! both flanks, and so eventually surrounds the defender's posi-
tion by a wide arc of fire. If he be so numerous and skilful as to
succeed in completely surrounding the defender, as at Sedan,
Met/, or Plevna, the catastrophe is inevitable as only a timel\
retreat or a skilful counter-attack can preserve the defender from
Jefeat when the enemy has got round his flank. It is evident that
a redoubt or two, or a village, etc., would have but little influence
-J: I
346
TACTICAL NOTES.
on a I'lovement of tliis nature wliicli would only make; such a post
the focus of a concentrated fire probably also enfilading the gen-
eral line. What is wanted is to prevent the enemy from march-
ing round a flank or at least to delay his march as much as
possible. Consequently, if the flanks do not rest on impassable
obstacles the question always arises, how are tiie flanks to he
secured from a turning movement ?
Four courses arc generally open to the defender, namely ;
either :
1. To hold a strong point in advance or in extension of the
threatened flank; or
2. To secure that flank by troops and guns in dchelon behind
ths general line ; or
3. To hold positions both in advance and in rear of the main
line, on the flank ; or
4. To mass strong reserves in rear of the threatened flan!., by
means of which the line may be extended or a counter-attack be
made; the defender taking the enemy's flank attacks them;;elves
in flank.
The features of the ground will generally decide which of these
alternatives to adopt, but it will frequently be of great advantage
to hold a strong advanced post on the flank which will secure the
main roads by which the enemy's turning movement must be
made and compel him first to take this post. A delaying action
fought here may be so prolonged that the enemy's turning move-
ments may be paralysed and the day vasted in gaining this de-
tached position. Another advantage cf such a post is the supjjort
it gives to the outer flank of a counter-attack of the defenders,
against the enemy's troops moving round past the advanced post
to reach the flank of the position: were no such advanced post
held the counter-attack would itself be exposiiig its outer flank to
the main attack of the enemy on the front of the position. Such
a post should be within effective cannon range of the main position
and well supported by artillery fire from it, and the ground between
it and the main position should be sufficiently open to allow of
the free movement of troops while it also gives sufficient co\er
to supports mov'.ng out to the adv.inced post, or to its garrison
when forced to retreat.
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
347
of the main
In a difficult country where the'-e are few roads, -he flank of
an extensive position is best secured by holding a small detached
position from two to four miles in advance or in extension of it
1,'iiardinf^ the roads by which a turninj^ movement may be made.
Information of any wider movement of the enemy would be
secured by cavalry still further advanced and extended beyond
the flank. Such a detached {)ost should be in communication of
the main position by means of the telegraph or heliograph. The
resistance at this point r.liould be as prolonged as possible for
which it should be strengthened by held works, and retreat from
it deferred until dusk as the losses in retreat will be less and
tiiere will be a better chance of recovering the lost ground by a
counter-attack made at night and before the enemy will have had
time to intrench himself. When such a post is :it some dis-
tance from the extremity of the position it may be in a situation
to take the enemy's turning movement in rear.
As regards the position of such posts, if there be defiles in pro-
longation or in advance of the line through which the enemy
must pass to turn the position, these points are cxidently the ones
to hold. If they are naturally so situated that they cannot be
themselves turned they should be defended to the last, but if they
can be turned a delaying fight is all tliat will bi possible, and a
succession of positions must be prepared to be defended step by
step by a strong advanced guard. When a considerable body of
troops is forced to retire from a position, it is considered they
cannot take up a fresh position to be strongly contested at a less
distance than about a mile in rear of the first ; hence the first
positions to secure a flank should be from two to four miles in
advance of the general line if they are to be used in this way.
In an open country, however, such a post from 2 tc< 4 miles
from the main position would be exposed to be surrounded and
the defenders cut off, but a suitable advanced post if not more
than a milt; in front of th<^ exposed flank might b( held with
ad\;uitage, and also ff)r additional security a second post retired
in echelon in rear ot' the flank : but in sucli country strong re-
serves, to act offensively on the assailant outside the position, are
the true source of strength to a flank as without them no Held
works can secure the flank if the enemy envelops it, as it will be
then fxposod to :\ concentric attack.
tm
m
!y
U:l|
N 1
348
TACTICAL NOTES.
The advanced post would be held by infantry. Horse artillery
or light field artillery should only be placed there in the first
instance to bring the enemy under fire as early as possible, but
the guns should be retired to the main position when the enemy's
attack is fully developed. The rc.'tired positicni on the other hand
should be armed with heavy guns, placed if possible on hij^h
ground, to act on the enemy's flank when attempting to turn the
position.
The late Franco-German war affords many instances of the
advantage to the defender when such posts were occupied. An
example of an advanced post on a flank within cannon range of
the main position is that of Stc. Marie-aux-Chenes at the battle of
Gravelotte. This village, held in advance of the right flank of
the French position, obliged the Germans to attack and take it
before the Saxons could execute their turning movement which
decided the day.
The same portion of the same battlefield gives also an ex-
ample of the retired position- on a flank. As soon as Ste. Marie-
aux-Chenes was lost, Marshal Canrobert collected his reserve
artillery, supported by infantry, on the hill above Amanvillers in
rear of St. Privat. The occupation of this retired position secured
his right flank and supported the retreat from St. Privat.
As such an advanced post is sure to be attacked by a heavv
concentrated fire of artillery it should be chosen with reference to
this. Mxposed buildings are emine-ntly unsuitable ; a detached
knoll, or small wood, or a village protected by folds of the ground
or by trees from artillery fire are suitable if found in the right
position. In a perfectly open plain having no natural points suit-
able for the purpose, the movements of an enemy will be so well
seen that there will be ample time to make fresh dispositions to
meet them, and advanced positions on the flanks would be difti-
cult to support or to retire from; and in such an open country a
weaker force nuist inevitably be outflanked and no fortifications
can prevent this result.
As has been already observed it v.ill manifestly be of imntcnsc
advantage to the defender if one or both of his flanks can be in.idi
secure from a turning mf)vement. The cases in which both
flanks can be secured are those in which thev both rest <»n ini
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
349
passable obstacles, such as arms of the sea, provided the obstacle
is so wide that the enemy's artillery cannot reach across it with
their fire, and provided the defender has command of the sea ; or
where the line is a circle as in investments or intrenched camps.
The celebrated lines of Torres Vedras had one flank resting on the
sea and the other on the river Tagus.
If the army on the defensive is strong and is seeking i o beat the
enemy rather than maintain a position, it may be advisable, as
pointed out in the " Operations of War," to leave a wide space
between the flanks and the obstacles to entice an enemy in with
the object of forcing him back on the obstacles. In the case of
a weak force on the defensive, however, this might be a danger-
ous experiment.
• ■ ■
A wood on a flank may be a great danger or a great security.
It is a great danger if it allows the enemy's infantry to approach
the flank under cover and to debouch from it close to the flank, as
happened at Koeniggrat/. Also the Gifert forest at Spicheren
was left without any precautions being made to prevent a flank
attack ; it might have been a great security if the outer edge had
been felled and entangled and defended by a sufficient force. A
wood on a flank may, as we have seen, be advantageous to the
defence if it clothes a hill which might otherwise have given the
inemy an artillery position enfilading the line. In order that
a wood so situated may have its full value to the defender, his
flank should not be within jnuskctr\- range of it and the edge
nearest to his position should be under artillery fire to prevent an
enemy from debouching from it. Atthe same time, when some hun-
dred yards of clear space separate the defender and the border of
the wood from which the attack must debouch unsupported b}-
artillery, its advance ought not to sTicceed.
Of all obstacles cliffs are least reliable, and unless they are
quite inaccessible they will not deter an assailant from advancing
ii|) them and, as it has already been remarked, the defender's fire
will generally hf high so that the losses of the assailant v.ill b(>
comparatively light.
P)nt the best jiossible security for a flank is when it icsts on a.
fortress i)ecause the foi tress has an active as well as a [)assive
iiilliiencc and keeps tlic riicmy at a distantc b\' its artillciy.
t
1
350
TACTICAL NOTES.
Bazaine's left flank at Gravelotte should have given him no uneasi-
ness, because, had the Germans attempted to push in between
his left on the heights above Jussy and Vaux and the Moselle,
they would have come under the fire of the heavy guns of the
Metz forts.
When the defence is to be purely passive it is of course a great
advantage for the flanks, which are the weakest parts of a posi-
tion, to rest on insuperable obstacles; but as it is frequently from
the flanks that the most effective offensive returns can be made,
when the defence is to be active one flank at least should admit
of issue from it though its position should be strong ; and here tiie
troops destined for the counter-stroke should be retired behind
the flank in echelon and under cover, where they will also be
available to resist any turning movements. Impassable barriers
then on the flanks have the great disadvantage of preventing dl
flanking offensive movements on the part of the defender, but if
such obstacles have passages over them which can be securely
held, they will afford him the means of throwing troops across
them rapidly and of taking the assailant in flank or of frustrating
a similar attempt on the part of the attack.
PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE OF A POSITION.
In the choice of a position much time may saved if the ground
can be reconnoitred and sketched before-hand. The rapid re-
connaissance of a position requires practice, great powers of ob-
servation, a capacity of judging distances, etc., and all the differ-
ent requirements of a position have to be well borne in mind, and
also the strength and composition of the force intended for the
defence.
There are numerous points to be considered as all the require-
ments of a position, the principal ones of which have been en-
umerated, amply testify; but it is well on arriving on the ground
to examine it witii some degree of method, and the followin},'
course is recommended :
1st. Consider the front line of the position : —
Note the configuration of this line; its extent, whether suitable
t») the force, whethi'r there arc any breaks in it, and the most com
DEFENSIVIi POSITIONS.
351
nianding points. Also wiicther there are any salients; these should
generally be avoided as they lead to the possibility of being taken
in flank or of a converging fire being brought to bear upon the
troops at the salient ; note also re-entering angles, and places ex-
posed to flank fire if any ; and whether part of the position is com-
manded. Note the slopes, whether fit for inanctuvring or other-
wise, and to what extent.
Obstacles in the line itself such as buildings, woods, railway
embankments or cuttings, their amount, extent, position and
direction. Obstacles on the flanks ; if none, consider how they
are to be supplied. Examine the communications through the
woods, if any, and note the means of communication along the
front.
Extent and position of the requisite intrenchments, where field
works and obstacles are to be constructed and clearances made ;
and note where the continuity of the line may be broken.
Note whether the soil is suitable for intrenchments.
2nd. Adaption of troops to these features natural and artificial: —
Garrisons recjuired for field works, units to be allotted for de-
fence of particular localities.
Where guns should be placed, and what force of infantry should
be allotted for the defence of different parts of the line.
If required, note favourable positions for supports and local re-
serves so that these may be near enough to the shooting line and
at the same time well sheltered. Note where the nature of the
ground makes it advisable for these to be in column or deployed.
jd. Next look at the front of the position : —
Nature of approaches, if swept by fire and easily obstructed ;
also lateral communications.
Tactical points in front whether within reach of support if oc-
cupied and whether tenable in themselves or capable of being
easily r.-.ade so. How troops occupying these are to be withdrawn
or reinforced ; easy access, covered or not. If not to be held,
consider whether they should be destroyed.
Examine probable positions of the enemy's batteries, and ways
suggested to meet them.
'
\
>1i
m
352
TACTICAL NOTES.
Where ground is suitable for movements of cavalry.
Favourable line for outposts and good artillery positions to
support them.
4th. Then turn round and look at the rear of the position : —
Suitable second position; depth whether sufficient; communica-
tions along the rear, if none or bad, how and where to be made.
Lines of retreat, positions in which artillery and other arms
might cover a possible retreat.
Position of general reserves under shelter and easy access for
them to move to the front. Suitable ground for encampinj;^;
nature of soil ; water supply ; whether provisions and forage arc
likely to be obtainable from the neighbouring country, etc.
A sketch on a scale of three 01 four inches to a mile, or even
si.x inches to a mile, should always accompany a report. The
most rapid method is to enlarge the route maps, which would
whenever possible be supplied, marking the roads and other
prominent features. On this skeleton map the slopes and other
military features of the ground nipy then be clearly laid down.
If time permits the reconnaissance should invariably extend to
the ground likely to be occupied by the assailant's artillery, so as
to judge of his probable action with a view both to the protection
and placing of the troops of the defence and to know where the
assailant can mass his troops under cover so that these may be
searched by the artillery fire of the defence. If the enemy's
probable method of attack is not considered there is a risk of not
distributing the troops of the defence in the most advantageous
positions, nor of gaining all the advantage possible from the
position itself.
1
)sitions to
CHAPTER X.
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
THE ATTACK OF AN ENEMY IN POSITION.
DIFFERENT METHODS OF ATTACK.
The General who feels himself in a position to take the offen-
sive has the advantage of choosing' the time and, within certain
limits, the place of attack, his adversary having as it were to
await his pleasure on both these points before the final arrange-
ments for defence can be made.
The assailant can move his forces in any direction either for
the purpose of real attack, or to deceive the enemy by demonstra-
tions or false attacks, while at the same time he can make a real
attack in force against a weak point of the position.
On the other hand, the assailant has to attack on ground
chosen carefully by the enemy which, therefore, rarely presents
advantages to the attacker ; nevertheless features of ground will
doubtless present themselves which may be turned to his benefit,
if the country is at all enclosed, or even undulating without en-
closures, it can hardly happen that there are not sheltered places
affording some sort of cover for troops near to the position, which
would enable a portion of the assailants at all events to take part
in the attack without overwhelming loss. So also elevated ground
v.ithin artillery range of the position, from which guns may be
brought to bear with superior fire as a prei>aration for attack,
would be very important. Such ground must, however, not be
too high, for high ground is only advantageous to artillery inas-
hukIi as it enables distant objects to be seen, otherwise the best
I't
'U'
354
TACTICAL NOTES.
ground for artillery is that which enables the path of the shells to
be approximately parallel to the surface of the ground. Thus at
long ranges, which we are now considering, guns placed low-
would be more likely to sweep the reverse side of an enemy's
position on a hill. .
There are three general modes of executing an attack, namely :
1. Frontal attack upon the whole of the enemy's position. — As a gen-
eral rule this form of attack, which consists of a direct advance
upon the whole of the enemy's line, is unadvisable. The
difficulty of a frontal attack is universally admitted, and
even in case of success the result is not decisive, the enemy's line
of retreat being unnssailed he may simply fall back to another
position in his rear. There may, however, be situations where
the nature of the ground prevents any other mode of operation, or
where the frontal attack may be made use of to feel the enemy
and ascertain his exact dispositions in preparation for a concen-
trated attack upon one of his weak points as sooa as they are dis-
covered.
2. Combined attack upon front and flank. — In this case the enemy
is attacked in front at the same time that a portion of the assail-
ant's force is directed at one of the flanks. An attack upon tlic
flanks by itself unaccompanied by a frontal attack is not advis-
able, except in the case of small detachments acting against one
another or unless the attack can be effected by surprise in which
case the enemy is unable to meet it in time by a change of front.
Were a strong force in position attacked solely on the Hank it
would quickly form up its reserves to a new front, the troops ot
the original front coming up in support. For a flank attack
therefore to succeed it must, as a general rule, be accompanicil
by a frontal attack sufficient to hold the enemy to his original
position.
In small engagements where the numbers are inconsiderable
the flank attack may be made alone. In such a case a ccjnsidera-
tion may arise as to which tlank it may bi' most desirable to
attack where one presents cover for concealing the movement
and the other, though offering no cover, is nearest to the enemy's
lino of retreat which might thus perhaps be f.ut off. Surprisi
being here the clement most essential to success, as rarryingwitli
GENliRAI. COURSE Ol- AN I .N(,A(;E\f ENT.
355
icconipauicd
it the greatest moral effect, that flank should certainly be chosen
which affords the means of approaching unobserved even though
the result of an attack on this flank may not be so decisive as it
would be on the other. Should the attack be of greater dimen-
sions, that is should large forces be opposed to each other, the
element of surprise, and consequently the question of a covered
approach, become of less importance. Here an attack upon the
Hunk nearest the enemy's line of retreat would give the best
results as being more decisive. The moral effect of threatening
the enemy's communications would also in this case be an im-
portant factor.
Hut frequently the movement against a flank would constitute
the real attack, that against the front being only sufhcientl}" main-
tained to hold the enemy in position and prevent his concentra-
tration on the threatened flank. Here the frontal attack has some
of the advantages of the defence together with the moral advan-
tage of an expected diversion to be caused by the flank attack.
The nature of the ground would influence the adoption of this
mode of attack, and in following it the assailant must take care that
his line of retreat is secured in case of his having to fall back,
unless, as sometimes happens, he can retreat in a new direction
and abandon altogether his former communications.
3. Combined attack n^on front and both flanks. — An attack upon
both flanks combined with a frontal attack can only be attempted
under circumstances of great superiority of numbers, without which
it would become a most dangerous operation enabling the enemy
to make an offensive return on a weak part of a straggling line
and beat the attackers in detail by cutting their force in two.
4. Concentrated attack upon a weak point, to break through the enemy's
line, or force his position. — This mode of attack, if the most diflicult
of execution, is undoubtedly in case of success the most decisiv e,
the enemy being broken into fractions which can subsequently be
beaten in detail. The enemy's line of retreat may also thus be
arrived at and his communications cut. The attack must how-
ever alwavs be made with force sufficient to resist a counter
enveloping attack on the part of the enemy, which might other-
wise be disastrous in its results. The increased range and power
of modern guns and rifles have made this attack more hazardous
. M
35^>
TACTICAL NOTES.
than ever, for a concentrated cross fire can now be broup[ht to
boar on the assailant, not only from all parts of the defence in
his innnediate front but in naost cases from either flank as well.
Unless therefore the ground covers the movement in a great de-
gree it should not be attempted.
In addition to the above regular modes of attack a Turning
Movement may also be considered. Tiiis might be looked upon
as almost a form of flank attack were it not that it differs from it
in some essential particulars. The turning movement is more
often a menace than an attack, for it threatens the enemy's line
of retreat so as to force him to change front or shift his position
before he enters into combat. Such a turning movement also
differs from a flank attack inasmuch as it removes the scene of
action from the position held by the enemy, while the flank at-
tack takes place on one of the flanks of the position itself.
The turning movement may be made either with a portion of
the force, or with its whole strength. In the first case the con-
ditions should render it improbable, if not impossible, that the
enemy could act offensively in turn upon each fraction of the divi-
ded force, otherwise the separate movement should not be at-
tempted as it must end in disaster. This does not of course ap-
ply if the force sent on this errand consist entirely of cavalry and
horse-artillery, an operation the assailant will doubtless fre-
quently employ his cavalry upon as this arm is unable to afford
him much assistance on the battle-fieM.
When the ground permits, cavalry and horse-artillery are speci-
ally suited to the turning movement. They would therefore
nearly always form a portion and, as has been pointed out, some-
times the whole of the troops employed in this service, both be-
cause they can by a rapid advance produce the moral effect of
surprise and because they can more easily avoid destruction by
a superior force. Their method of action has been discussed in
another chapter.
The relative proportion of the force detached upon the turning
movement to that retained for the regular attack can only be
decided by the circumstances. If the line of retreat of the as-
sailants mu^t necessarily be preserved in rear of the main force,
the latter must keep the larger portion ; if the retreat can be
GENERAL roTRSE Ol' AN ENGAGEMENT.
357
made equally well to a Hank, th(^ strnnpfest force may be detached
for the tiiniinj^' iiioveiiuMit. in ritluT case it is very desirable
that the detached coiiiinander should have cousiderable latitude
afforded him. The instructions he receives should be to the
effect that a certain result is to be, if possible, attained, and they
should also contain all information necessary to enable the de-
tached force to act in p^eneral concert with the main body. But
precise orders, which may be rendered impossible of execution,
would only tend to mar the enterprise. The operation will be
much facilitated if a held telej,Maph can be laid connectin}^- the
two detached forces, as was done by the Russians at the battle of
Aladja Daj^h.
It is evident that this mode of attack, by which a portion of
the force is detached from the main body, is not generally
suitable for minor operations, but only where large forces are
available ; there may be occasions however when a small force
may with great advantage detach its cavalry and horse-artillery
to threaten the adversary's communications, as already explained.
In the second case, if the turning movement be made with the
whole force of the assailant, it is clear that the former line of re- .
treat must be abandoned altogether, or else there should be such
complete probability of success that the line may for the moment
be laid open to the enemy for the sake of concentrating the whole
force in the attempt to turn his position, as was done by the
Germans at Metz.
ON FLANK ATTACKS AND THE EFFECTS OF THE INCREASED USE
OF INTRENCHMENTS.
Recent wars have made it clear that the local defence having
become so powerful owing to the improvements of modern
weapons, aided by the more frecpient use of intrenchments, an
assailant, who wishes to attack an enem\- in position, will in-
evitably endeavour to direct his chief blows on one or other of '
his Hanks if not on both simultaneously. The reason why a flank
attack is more likely to succeed is both physical and moral.
There are fewer rifles in the flank than in the front and therefore
the fire of the defender will produce less physical effect on the
assailant, and the idea that an enemy is creeping round them
tends to unnerve the defenders. It is ever necessar}' to bear the
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moral effect in iniiul and that physical effect is not all that is
essential, and the efforts must ever be directed towards producing
the greatest physical as well as the greatest moral effect upon the
enemy. It is not so much the number of men killed on either
side in a battle which influences the fate of the day as the moral
effect produced on the survivors. For instance, in the old column
formations of the Continent the head of the column consisted of
comparatively few men, and even if they had all been killed the
physical effect produced during a charge would have been trifling.
But the melting away of the head caused the recoil of those who
remained upon the centre and rear of the column. Terror and
anxiety communicate themselves rapidly, and the whole column
often became a disorganized mass though the centre and rear of
it might never have been actually under fire.
With the improvement in fire arms it was made clear, as early
as the 17th century, that the defence gained much by the losses
it inflicted on the attack before the latter could bring its shock to
bear ; hence the value of mancEuvring with a view to preponder-
ance on the decisive point was early perceived, and the advan-
tage of turning movements and flank attacks became apparent.
From the introduction of rifled arms the lessons of 3ach succeed-
ing war made it more plain that the frontal attack usually
failed, especially when defences had been provided.
This was clearly evident in the American Civil War where in-
trenchments were extensively employed on both sides. In this
war we see attacks on intrenched positions almost always re-
pulsed except when delivered against very demoralized troops or
with overwhelming numbers. The generals on both sides, finding
the difficulty of attacking intrenched positions, were obliged to
seek other methods for dislodging their enemies. Outflanking
movements were therefore largely resorted to. Sometimes an
attack was made in front conjointly with an attempt to turn the
enemy's flank, when it was desired to bring the enemy to action
at all costs. At other times, when it was sufficient to dislodge the
enemy from his position, a defensive attitude was maintained in
front while a force was sent round to menace the enemy's com-
munications. In every case this manoeuvre was attended with
success when the adversary was unable himself to take the offen-
^}jf}'hm
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
359
sive and attack one of his divided portions, either on account of
the inferiority of his troops or on account of his weakness in
numbers.
In this war we find General Lee, by his skiP and the mobihty
and fighting power of his small army, able to keep at bay for a
long time the far more numerous but cumbrous and unwieldy
armies of his adversaries ; and we see in many instances that in-
trenchments, though frontally strong, were unable to equali;je
f(ood and bad troops and generalship when their flanks co ild be
turned either tactically or strategically. General Lee, by his
combination of intrenchments at one point to cover his retreat
and vigorous offensive at another to strike the flank or communi-
cations of his enemy, seems to have hit upon the key to suc-
cessful operations under modern conditions.
In this respect but little is to be learnt from the war of 1866,
but the war of 1870-71 affords many useful lessons.
The old column formation was still prevalent though in a
modified degree during this campaign. It is impossible to say to
what extent the fearful losses of the German army in the first bat-
tles against the French might have been redijced if they had at
that time already adopted the formations which are now popular.
Some officers declare that the slaughter will be quite as great in
the new as in the old formations, and this may be true in the ex-
ceptional cases when tioops have to make a frontal attack over
perfectly level ground where there is no cover. The fact is that
they must arrive in front of the enemy with sufficient numbers to
carry the position before they can charge, and the slaughter at
this point must be fearful, however they arrive there. All military
Powers are, therefore, now agreed that no frontal attack against
;ui enemy who still retains moral tone can be expected to succeed.
Such attacks then must not be made so long as there is any-
thing else possible to be done. Hut no battle can be won unless
the enemy is driven from his position in a uv. iv or k-ss demora-
lized condition. The slaughter of the Curmun troops in the first
battles of 1870 so actcid upon the various units that, as a rule,
tliey ceased to exist utuUir it. ICvery |)ortion of smooth mid h-vel
^'lound was svvt>pt by the fire of the ImcihIi ; no battalion or even
' 'uiipany could advance over it iind li\<'. I')uf the uieii with their
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36o
TACTICAL NOTES.
officers had to push on somehow. The result was they instinct-
ively edj:^ed off away from the front of the enemy and towards
his flanks where his fire waa weaker, or towards whatever cover
might be available in his front. Hence there came )out an ad.
mixture of the different units before the hnal attack, .^o that not
only companies, but battalions, and even brigades became huddled
together in much confusion. Nothing but a great excess of num-
bers, and a bold action of the artillery such as has hardly ever
before been known, carried the German troops into the French
positions, and it became universally acknowledged that no troops
however good could retain any kind of accurate formation under
the tire of breech-loaders and modern artillery.
The Germans were so successful in a large number of instances
in offensive battles that many have been led to magnify the
efficiency of the attack as against the defence. But a careful
study of the battles will show that there were always certain con-
ditions accompanying a successful attack, namely, conspicuous
defects in the defensive position, as at Spicheren ; great superiority
in the quality of the attacking troops as in tne later battles of the
war; or the power of turning one or both lianks of the position as
at W(ertli and Gravelotte.
The power of turning a flank was obtained by the Germans in
various ways ; through possessing great numerical superiority, by
means of whicii they were able to spare considerable forces to
effect the turning movement wiiile holding the enemy fast by
serious and sustained attacks in front, as at Woerth, where also
the French arrangements for protecting the lianks were defective;
or through the weakness of the attacked flank, as at Gravelotte ;
or through their confidence in the superiority of their own
arrangements and fighting p^ower eniDoldening them to expose to
a certain extent their own communications for the purpose of
striking at those of the enenu', as in the great strategical move-
ment to cut off the retreat of tht; Army of the Khint' from Met/.
I'^ront attacks as a rule failed uluni made against positions having;
a clear held of lir -, and gi\iiig good cover to the fighting line and
reserves either 1)\- the natiiial features of the ground or by earth-
works and trenches. They soi ,<'tiii)es however succeeded when
mad(; over broken ground wlu;n' points of vantage could he
seized by a rush and then utilized to [iicpare for a further ail-
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
361
vance ; or where cover could be obtained and the defender's field
of fire was not clear; or where a concentrated fire of artillery
could be brought upon some locality that could be thereby rend-
ered untenable.
When acting on the defensive the Germans were almost in-
variably successful. In the case of the investments of Metz and
Paris the assailants as a rule had not the power of turning a flank,
the investing lines being continuous, therefore they were com-
pelled to attack in front and found themselves unable to break
through the lines carefully fortified.
But whenever there was a flank that could be turned the em-
barrassment caused to the defence was most marked.
On the whole then in this war we see exemplified the frontal
strength of a good position, the necessity for a clear field of fire,
the way in which the strength of a position may be neutral-
ized by its being turned either tactically or strategically ; and in
the latter periods of the war we .learn how troops of superior
quality are able to achieve success under circumstances where
those of inferior quality would fail.
The lessons of the Russo-Turkish campaign are even more
conclusive. In this war the use of field intrenchments was car-
ried to a very great extent. In the passes of the Balkans, on the
banks of the Lom and of the Jantra, armies faced one another,
each covered by field works, and when fighting took place the
assailants, as a rule, got the worst of it except when they were
able to outflank their enemies. But in the theatre in Europe the
frontal attack was, on both sides, the prevailing idea and ihc loss
and failure that followed its use against intrenchments have never
perhaps been equalled. For instarce, Suleiman, in the direct
attacks on the Shipka Pass he persisted in, lost 12,000 of the
best troops though the Russian position might easily have been
turned. In Asia there seems to have been on both sides an ap-
preciation of the value of manoeuvring iliough, owing to the
natnre f)f the countr\-, turning movements had to be very circuitous
which made! the timing of them very difficult and they therefore
;,'enerally fell to cavalry and horse-artillery to carry out which
lessened their striking power. But the defeat of Moukhtar Pasha
ill October at Aladja Dagh, in a position fortilied alike by nature
-I 'fr S
362
TACTICAL NOTES.
and by art was partly due to the wide turninf]^ movement effected
by Lazareff, whose column, detached for three days, reached a
position in rear of the Turkish left which compelled tlie Turks to
fall back, thus allowing the frontal attack to be made with suc-
cess. In former days this feat would have been impossible in a
country the difficulties of which are very fjreat, and it was only
accomplished through the agency of the field telegraph that
linked the operations, since Lazareff's march extended over 40
miles.
But the chief interest of this campaign centres round the de-
fence of Plevna where the Russians failed in carrying the Tur-
kish defences by assault. In the first attacks the Turkish defen-
ces were not strong and had the Russians attacked them in
sufficient force, by proper concerted action between their
different columns and by adhering to modern tactical principles,
they would doubtless have gained the position ; but subsecjuentlv.
when the Turks had had time to convert their hasty intrencli-
ments into semi-permanent works, to attempt open assaults on
these could not but end in failure. Nevertheless, whenever an
attack was delivered by the Russians in anything like the proper
way it was successful: witness Skobelcff's capture of Lovtcha,
his attack on the redoubts of Plevna on the nth of September.
and Schakoffski's attack on the 30th July, although in the two
latter cases the advantage temporarily gained was lost again
through the faulty general arrangements by which no reserve
was available to reap the fruits of an\' success.
And although the usual type of hasty intrenchnients such as
can be thrown up in the ordinary time available for the prepar-
tion of a field of battle v.-ill not render a position impregnable,
vet it must be fulK' admitted that their {udicious use will render
an attack difficidt and costly, if not hazardous. It will therefore
be useful to examine what w<Mild probably be the best course for
a General acting on tlu^ offensive to pursue if confronted by an
enemy in an intrenched position.
As regards this point, as ('aj)tain Clajton points out in liis
prize essay, many lessons nuiy be learnt from the Civil war in
America. In the Atalanta campaign Slu'intau \\as continually
met by Johnston posted bt'hiiid intreiiclinienls wliicli lie cimiM
pw-yw
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ICNGAGEMENT.
363
in the two
no reserve
not assail with success, but he dislodj^^ed Johnston from one posi-
tion after another by operatinjj^ round his flank so as to threaten
his communications. Sherman was j^'reatly superior in numbers
and, therefore, while securinj^^ his own. communications by in-
trenching^ a part of his army in Johnston's front, he was able to
send round his enemy's flank a force iarj^e enouj^h to be (juite
safe even if Johnston could fall upon it whilst detached. Such
an operation will always be practicable when the army operating
on the offensive has a considerable superiority either in numbers,
as in the case of Sherman, or in quality of troops, as in the case
of Lee after the second battle of l^ull Run.
But operations such as Sherman's brought no destruction to
his enemy's army, they only caused the evacuation of territory.
Under some circumstances, that may be all that is required, but gen-
erally the invader wishes to bring his adversary to decisive action
so that he may destroy his armies in the field and prevent them
from gradually gaining strength as they fall back, when they may
in the end obtain a superiority. In such cases General Lee's
method of action before Chancellorsville would be preferable.
He did not remain quietly in his intrenchments while sending a
force round Hooker',s flank but kept up a series of attacks and
demonstrations to hold fast his enemy while Jackson was turning
his flank. Thus the enemy had no chance of escape. He was
held fast to his position b}' the front attack while the flank move-
ment was in progress which, when it burst upon him, inflicted
severe defeat. This was also the method employed by the Ger-
mans in 1870 when they succeeded in inflicting such severe defeats
an the French, though owing to the impetuosity of the German
troops the attack on the centre was generally carried too far at
lirst resulting in heavy losses which might otherwise have been
avoided.
This method of operation has another advantage. It may be
possible to guard against a tactical turning movement within the
limits of the battle-field itself by a judicious use of intrenchments
and a proper disposition of troops ; but a wide turning movement
out of sight and range of the ])osition occupied by an army and
directed against its communications can only be defeated by
counter manceuvres and by throwing a superior force on the
turning body and crushing it whilst separated from the remainder
1
• '■■■
\ '. ■
1
),,:.;: I
364
TACTICAL NOTKS,
of its ririny. If now the part of the iiivadin;:^ army in front of the
defender's position contents itself with remaining- behind in-
trenclmients and only prepares to resist an attack, the defenders
have the opportunity of leaving a small force, sufficient to keep
up the appearance of holding the position, while directing the bulk
of their strenp;th against the turning force obtaining thereby
the best chance they could have of crushing it. But if attacks
are continually directed on the position the defenders cannot
withdraw large forces without leaving weak points which will be
detected and taken advantage of, and therefore the turning force
will be secured and enabled to make its movement with safety
and precision. Moreover, if the General of the defending army
determines not to hold his position but to retreat, he will be much
delayed by the attacks on what will then be his rear, and may
possibly not be able to get away fast enough to escape from the
danger with which the turning force threatens his flank.
A General, confident in the superiority of the fighting and
manoeuvring power of his army over the enemy, can operaie in
this way without anxiety. Even if he does not consider himself
strong enough to divide his force, he may move his army bodily
round the tlank of his enemy, leaving only a ver}' small number
of troops in some strong position on his line of communications
to guard his most advanced magazines, for a time at all events.
The most serious danger that would be run would be if the de-
fenders left their position to attack either the army on its flank
march or the small force covering the communications. But this
is just what the General of the invading army should desire; by
the conditions of the case he is superior in fighting and manceuvi
ing power, and his greatest wish should be to get his enemy to
fight him in the open. And if the arrangements be properly made
the risk run should be small. The power modern weapons cer-
tainl}' give to small bodies of holding out defensively for a cer-
tain time, even against greatly superior numbers, ougb.t to give
security to the flank march if a covering force moves between
the enemy and the main body as suggested in " Operations of
War" for, if attacked, this covering force ought to be able to
check the enemy long enough for the main body to form for bat-
tle, when the result should not be doubtful. And in the same way
the small force covering the magazines, if properly intrenched,
*4...:
^m
'■'?,->, '.
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
365
sliould be able to liold its own till the main body, which would
quickly learn the enemy's movements, could turn back to its
assistance and probably catch the enemy between two fires. It
mif^dit be necessary for the invading General to cut himself off
temporarily from his communications in order to make his Hank
movement, confident of being able to regain them either by the
retreat of the enemy or his defeat if he ventures to give battle.
From what has been said it must be inferred that intrench-
inents will not make up for inferiority in quality of troops, or in
numbers if the quality is the same on both sides, if the position
can be turned. Statements such as that inferior troops "with the
aid of shelter trenches could hold a position against the best
troops in Europe," or, " men with stout hearts and good riHes,
even if they are but roughly drilled, can be trusted to hold their
own," have not been substantiated by facts. On the contrary it
would appear that, however pleasing such allegations may be to
a country like England desiring to rely to a great extent for its
safety on partly trained militia and volunteers, recent wars prove
conclusively that now more than ever perfect drill and discipline
are absolutely essential to success, and to this must be added
"fire discipline," which, to be maintained in the heat of action,
requires the most careful peace training.
A General acting on the offensive will therefore on encountering
an enemy in position ask himself can this position be turned ;
and if it can, will it be best for me to try and turn it, or run the
risk of attacking it?
If the position can be turned the answer would no doubt be
always that it would be best to turn it, were it not for the consid-
eration that in so operating there is always a chance that the
enemy may escape without being brought to a decisive action.
When therefore a (leneral wishes above all things to bring his
enemy to action, and the circumstances of the case are such that
the enemy by retreating can reach some place of safety, as in the
case of a position in front of an intrenched camp, or effect a junc-
tion with another army, then the General will have to accept the
risk of an attack upon the position. Hut if in falling back the
enemy has some considerable distance to traverse before reaching
a place of safety before he is reinforced, then the General of the
advancing army, if he has reason to believe the position to be
• tm
366
TACTICAL NOTES.
1 ,
^
^g J'-Jlll
strongly fortified, will probably manoeuvre the enemy out of it in
hopes of figlitin{^' him in the open if the enemy tries to take the
offensive in his turn or is caught m his retreat ; or it the enemy
succeeds in effecting his retreat from the first position, he will
be able to follow him and bring him to bay before he can reach u
place of safety or aid and can attack any fresh position that may
be taken up before it can be so fortified as to preclude all chance
of the attack being successful, for it is very rarely indeed that ;i
position can be found so perfect that one or two days' work
should suffice to eliminate every weak point in it.
Therefore, a General possessing a superiority over his enemy,
either in his own genius, in the quality of his troops, or in
numbers if the quality of the two armies is equal, will in most
cases be able eventually to fight his enemy on his own terms, and
intrenchments will not, except under unusual circumstances, atone
for inferiority. But although as a rule a General would hesitate
before attacking a position believed to be intrenched, yet at some
time or other it may be necessary to do so, and in that case the
attack should be carried out as described hereafter.
But in the case of a strong intrenched camp, like Plevna, which
cannot be turned, rather than to attempt to capture it by open
assault, which can only be done with heavy loss even if the at-
tempt does not fail altogether, it would seem preferable either to
mask it or to invest it ; and so when, after the Russian imsuccess-
ful attacks on Plevna, General Todleben took the direction of
affairs he very wisely did not attempt any more open assaults but
determined to reduce the place by famine. The defender of
Sebastopol had learnt by experience how a nation, summing up
its whole strength to defend certain strategic points, suddenly
collapses when these are lost; and as it turned out, four days after
the fall of Plevna the invaders commenced the movements which
speedily ended the war. In fact the possession of Plevna was of
less importance than that of preventing Osman's 50,000 excellent
soldiers from furnishing cadres for other armies in point of for-
mation. Besides, the surrender of the best Turkish army could
not fail to have a demoralizing effect on the other armies.
Giving full credit to the Turkish army and its leaders for their
successful defence of the place, an interesting question arises
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
367
whether it will always be possible to repeat elsewhere what
Osman did at Plevna, and being able to, ought his example to be
repeated? In principle we would say no, for the place of an army
in the field is rather in the open than behind fortifications what-
ever these may be, unless it be for a short period for the purpose
of refitting. An intrenched camp should only contain the num-
ber of defenders strictly necessary for its defence if it is not to
succumb to famine, as exemplified previously in the cases of Metz
and Paris. Hence if Osman extended his works round Plevna
to the extent he did, it was because he had a large force, some
50,000, otherwise the purpose the place had to fulfil could have
been accomplished on a more restricted area with fewer works
and fewer troops.
A question which has often been discussed, and which may be
briefly introduced here, is whether the attack or defence has
gained most by the introduction of improved weapons and tlie
more frequent use of the spade. This controversy, wJiich has
been going on for many years, is hardly }et settled r.lthough the
balance of opinion seems to be that the attack has gained s^.rate-
t^ically and the defence tactically.
It has been pointed out that that side which deems itself the
stronger for any cause would generally attack. This is due to
the moral effect which a bold initiative produces on the troops,
and to the great strategical advantages gained thereby. It would
a|ipear that the local defensive has gained considerably in power,
but, in spite of this, the tactical oifensive continues to be more
advantageous whenever a position is open to turning movements
or flank attacks. Nevertheless the last great war has shown that
when tliis cannot be done, and when the defenders are strongly
posted and mean to stay, and can only be attacked " straight,''
the advantages rest with the defence.
A strategical offensive, provided the army is suflicicntly strong
and well equipped, is liable to lead to the most brilliant results,
and a great advantage will have been gained if by means of a
strategical offensive the onus of attacking a prepared position,
the flanks of which can be well secured, has been thrown on the
enemy; for he is thus reduced to a direct attack in which case
the increased power of the local defensive tells against him.
m>«ii!i«
kH.
368
TACTICAL NOTES.
It appears therefore that an intrenched camp should not he-
attacked except by means of a ref(uhir siege, otherwise it should
be only invested and the force it contains starved into surrender.
For this, a blockadinj:;; force must necessarily be superior in num-
bers, but if covered by fortifications the increased power of the
local defensive is in its favour when repelling sorties ; and the
onus of attacking is thrown upon the besieged or on any reliev-
ing force. Moreover, the investing force remains almost intact,
provided the constant exposure does not produce disease, whereas
when the besieged surrender they are lost completely.
It cannot be too strongly enforced that a purely passive defence
to hold a long line is hopeless and can only end in disaster, and also
that an army capable of nianceuvring should never allow itself to
be shut up in an intrenched camp, except temporarily to refit,
unless the latter surrounds a strategic point such as the capital,
on the holding of which the result of the war hinges. In all
other cases intrenched camps should be constructed on suitable
strategic sites for the occupation of limited garrisons only, while
the main armies are operating outside.
A writer on the Russo-Turkish war, in considering the gallant
defence made by the Turks at Plevna, asks whether the strategical
results obtained thereby were favourable to the Turks or to the
Russians. In discussing this question he thinks that had Osman's
Army been in a condition to follow up its successes after defeat-
ing the Russians and assume the offensive which, according to
the numerical strength of the two armies, was quite possible, all
the requisite conditions would have been presented for bringing
on the Russian armies a catastrophe which would have certainly
decided the issue of the campaign for the year. But Osman's
inactivity, after his second victory at Plevna on the joth July,
proves that his army, which had behaved so well on the defen-
sive, was entirely wanting in offensive power ; and the writer
considers therefore that, in spite of all his defensive successes.
his holding fast to Plevna was not only aindcss but a voluntary
surrendering of advantages to Russia. Apart frcjui the ))olitical
iniluence such a step might have had on Constantinople, and
looking at it in tlu; abstract, as Osman could not assume the
offensive would he not have done better to have retired across
the Balkans to say Sophia or Adrianople ? In vitnv of the jire-
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
369
cipitate advance of the Russians with insufficient forces and elated
as they were by their prehminary successes, they would doubtless
have followed Osrnan's retreating army and removed the scene of
action beyond the Balkans, only however to be repulsed whenever
Osman made a stand. Even his obstinate resistance at Plevna
nearly ^'ave to the whole campaign a turning unfavourable to the
Russians, and it cost them heavy sacrifices; but with much
longer lines of communication and particularly with the difficult
passes of the Balkans behind thom their task would have been
far harder. It would then have been very possible that the cam-
paign for the year 1877 might have closed with a manifest
reverse to the Russian arms. The great strategical results of the
fighting round Plevna appears then to be entirely in favour of the
Russians as it opened their eyes in time to the dangers which
threatened them, it compelled them to make in time a suitable
change in their entire plan of campaign, and it finally forced them
to raise the additional troops which were quite indispensable for
a decisive result. When Plevna fell the defence of the Turks
entirely collapsed and nothing remained for the Russians but a
triumphal march on Constantinople.
But it is not to be supposed that such powerful works as those
established at Plevna will be seen in every war, and even should
they be met with they will very probably not be attacked but only
invested like Metz; and in a campaign between two equally
matched and enterprising opponents it is far more probable that
use will be made of hasty Intrenchments and any natural cover
available than that we shall see armies intrenching themselves
inside huge fortified camps requiring large garrisons which might
be better employed so long as any power of taking the offensive exists.
This being the case it will be useful to consider the value of an
ordinary defensive position under present conditions.
ON THE assailant's CHANCES OF SUCCESS.
It would appear that attacks are not likely to succeed :
■/. When made by raw or undisciplined troops ; when the as-
saihint's artillery is not good or numerous enough, or not properly
liandled to overpower that of the defender; and when the infantry,
from want of training, cannot trust itself to fighting in individual
iirilcr. but must move in ma'^ses: in such a case, as in the battles
'^
370
TACTICAL NOTES.
before Belfort, and in the sorties from Paris, the attack will
probably fail even if made witii greatly superior numbers. Also
when the attack, even though made by troops of superior quality
to the defenders, is carried out in an unsuitable manner, as at
Plevna when the Russians usually attacked in closed bodies and
the fire neither of their artillery nor infantrj' was effective in sub-
duing that of the Turks. The attack of the Prussian guards on
St. Pri\at is another case in point.
b. When made even with superior troops on correct principles
and in superior numbers, if the deiunders have a clear field of
fire and are well covered, and the assailants cannot bring up an
overwhelming artillery mass to concentrate its fire o?' some well-
defined decisive point to prepare the way for and support the
infantry attack, as along the greater part of the lines of battle at
Giavelott^e, and commonly in the American War.
Under any of these circumst'^nces the defence will probably
prove successful, but not otherwise.
It appears that in 1870 the (lermans always managed to drive
the French back whenever they could obtain any cover, as in the
woods at Spicheren, Woerth, etc. Therefore, wherever the fire
of the defenders is not fully effective there the assailants have a
chance of advancing, and there are few positions which will not
afford some cover somewhere and therefore give the assailants ;in
opportunity. Hut further, it would appear that whenever the as-
sailants by an overwhelming concentration of artillery tire.
assisted by long range musketry fire, are able tc render the
defender's fire imperfectly effective, even though the ground be
open, the infantry of the attack will have every chance of success.
Thus it appears that an attack may be delivered with a fair chance
of success wherever the assailants can be saved from the full
effect of the defender's fire, either b\' cover given by the accidents
of the ground or by the defender's fire being subdued bj- that of
the attack.
The question now arises whether, by a proper preparation of
the ground and use of intrenchments, the defenders may deprive
the assailants of both of these chances of success.
If siifticient time is availabU' all coscr can no doubt be c.leart.'d
awa\ . All walls, hedges, trees, biushwood, etc., that can atTonl
iwp
i ]
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
371
cover may be removed, and inequalities in the ground levelled,
and shoo:in^ trenches, batteries, and other earthworks so dis-
posed as to sweep every yard of ground over which the assailant
can advance. Hut it must be remembered that, except in an
unusually good position such as that of Giavelotte, to do this
will be a work not of hours but of days and even weeks.
It has to be considered further whether it is possible to pre-
vent the defender's fire beinj^^ kept under by that of the attack.
In many cases where the j^^ound is favcurable and the defensive
pt)sition well chosen the space available for the assailant to brinj^
up guns to prepare the way for the attack will be limited and
clearly recognisable by the defence. At Gravelotte for instance
woods in the German centre and right limited their artillery posi-
tions very materially. In the Russian attack on the Grivit^a re-
doubt on the 30th July, the ground only permitted 40 guns to be
brought up into action. Whenever the assailant's artillery positions
are thus limited the defenders ought to be able so to arrange
their own batteries as to prevent those of the assailant from ob-
taining a superiority. Again, where artillery positions are limited
suitable infantry positions for long range musketry fire will also
be limited but to a lesser extent, and in such cases if the defen-
der's field of fire is open enough to prevent skirmishers from
stealing up to annoy their artillery, and if they can reply effectively
to the long range musketry hre, the defence ought to have the
best of it.
Having now considered in general terms the different methods
of attacking an enemy in position, or of dislodging him from it,
we will now endeavour to trace the general course of a modern
engagement. And first in the case of infantry attacking alone
unsupported by the other arms.
In every case the assailant, whatever be the forces about to be
engaged, should reconnoitre the enemy's position before advanc-
ing to 'he attack. The Commander will inevitably send out a
portion of his force to feel the enemy and cause him to display
his strength, and this should be done before any final dispositions
are made for the attack. Whatever be the size of this force sent
out as advanced guard, it acts on the same principles by sending
a part only in advance and following with the rest held well in
372 TACTICAL NOTES.
hand. Suppose a brigade acting singly, <>r if forming part of a
larger force tliat it is sent out to feel the enemy. It throws out
one battalion which will then assume attack formation, but send-
ing out only perhaps one company to form fighting line and sup-
ports, and maintaining greater distances between the echelons.
In this formation it will then advance.
The men in the fighting line may be either extended or kept
together in groups under a non-commissioned officer. The enemy,
knowing probably the exact range of every point, will fire steady
volleys at comparatively long distances. The advancing troops
will not at first answer them bat will be more careful to take
advantage of cover. Generally speaking, German troops will
arrive within 500 or 600 hundred yards of the enemy before they open
fire, French troops will fire at longer ranges. As the men ad-
vance they come upon ground which has been cleared by the
enemy, or at any rate they come under his heav}' fire. They feel
themselves checked and will send to the rear to say so, but mean-
while they lie down and open a very slow and steady fire which
causes the enemy to show himself in return and enables the ad-
vanced company to report his position.
As the rest of the battalion or perhaps even the rest of the
brigade comes up it will form to right or left of the advanced
company as may be requisite or most convenient, always how-
ever retaining in hand the supports and reserves which, at this
period, are kept as much as possible out of fire, but not too far
off. Gradually the peculiarities of the case begin to declare
themselves. One part of the enemy's position appears too strong
to attack; another has been less carefull}- prepared. The ground
in one direction offers more facilities for advance under cover,
and perhaps one Hank seems to be weaker than the other. The
Commander begins to have a clear idea of what is best for him
to do and acts accordingly. He will certainly have a force dis-
tributed over the enemy's front and as certainly hi; will tell oft"
another to attack a Hank. But he dare not send a detachment
far from the main body unless he is considerably superior in force
to the enemy, and even then the measure is dangerous. The
liank attack, being once launched, is under the commanu f the
officer who conducts it and who then accepts a large responsibility.
TiV-r't.
GENEKAI. COURSK OF AN KNGAGEMP:NT
373
The collide of ail ciij^'af^'eincnt bctwcuii forces of all arms will
now be considered, and for simplitication the action of the assail-
ant and of the defender may be divided into three staj^es.
FIRST STAGE Ol' THE ATTACK.
An army in the neighbourhood of an enemy will, as we have
already seen, have its front covered by bodies of cavalry whose
duty it is to screen and protect the movements of tiie troops be-
hind them while seeking to obtain all the information possible
about the enemy. As the enemy's cavalry will be similarly
employed, the first phase of a battle will be a series of cavalry
actions. The caxalry that is beaten in these encounters will have
to fall back to the protection of the advanced guards composed of
all arms which always precede the main armies, or outposts if at
the halt, and the victorious cavalry will then have gained its
object of screening its own army and obtaining more or jess in-
formation about the enemy. If the cavalry of the advancing army
is successful, it will continue to push on driving before it the
defeated horse of the defenders. Eventually it will come upon
hostile infantry. If these are only in small force, part of the cav-
alry will dismount and, with the aid of horse artillery, attack and
drive them off; for one duty of the advanced cavalry is to pre-
vent the troops behind from being delayed by insignificant bodies
of the enem)'. Sooner or later, however, the actual position
occupied by the enemy will be approached and the advance of the
cavalry will be entirely stopped by meeting, with hostile posts too
strong to be dislodged without the aid of infantry. \\'hen this
occurs the approach of the advanced guards which will hurry for-
ward must be waited for.
Should the cavalry of the advanced army be defeated in the
preliminary actions, the movements of the main body will be
somewhat retarded as the reconnaissance of the country will have
to be effected by the infantry of the advanced guards, b^ventually
however, as in the former case, the advanced guards will come in
contact with the outposts of the enemy in position.
When the enemy has been discovered it will next be necessary
to reconnoitre his position in order to enable the (ieneral to de-
cide whether he will attack and, if so, in what manner. Under
certain circumstances it may be possible for the cavalry and
', fi
374
TACTICAL NOTES.
horse-artillery to obtain sufficient information, as when only small
forces are enf,'^a^'cd, but with large forctes this is not probable un-
less the enemy is exceedingly unwary and allows himself to be
tempted into showing his hand needlessly. In ordinary cases it
will fall to the lot of the advanced guards to obtain the needful
information. b'or this purpose an attack pushed more or less
home will have to be made. This attack by the advanced guards
will be especially directed towards the Hanks of the enemy's posi-
tion in order to discover where they lie and the chance of suc-
cessfully turning them, for the frontal strength of positions is oo
great with the present weapons that nowadays the assailant will
generally endeavour to use his superiority by trying to turn one
or both Hanks in order to avoid, as far as may be, the loss and
difficulty incident upon attacks in front, while at the same time
holding the front by an attack destined to keep the defender's
troops opposed to it from extending to or reinforcing the flanks.
The artillery of the advanced guards, reinforced with artillery
from the main body, /. c. with the artillery of the army corps and
of the leading divisions, will play a principal part in this prepara-
tory action as its long range fits it for carrying on a demonstra-
tive and delaying action ; but it may be necessary to push on an
infantry attack if the artillery fire from the preliminary artillery
position does not suffice to make the enemy show his dispositions.
The batteries of the advanced guard should take up their posi-
tion to protect the deployment of the advanced guard, if possible
not far from the road by which the troops are coming up but in
such a situation as not to expose the advancing columns to the
danger of being struck by projectiles aimed at the guns. Their
distance from the enemy should be as much under j,ooo yards as
possible. They will fire at the defender's artillery to divert the
attention of the latter from the troops of the other arms as they
come up, and they also co-operate, as may be retjuired, with the ad-
vanced guard in making a reconnaissance of the enemy's position
by inducing him, if possil)le. to open fire along the whole line and
so reveal his dispositions and strength.
Whilst this reconnaissance by the advanced guard supported
by artillery from the main body is proceeding, the General will
make up his mind as to whether he will attack and, if so, on
what portions of the enemy's positions the chief efforts shall be
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
375
directed. Should he find the enemy to be in great force and in
a vary strong position, ere attacking him he may deem it advis-
able to make preparations for securing his retreat in case of a re-
verse. But should he feel himself strong enough he should lose
no time in attacking the enemy vigorously, as such a course will
tend to raise the spirits of his troops and shake the confidence of
the enemy ; still as a matter of precaution, even while the attack
is proceeding, it would be advisable to prepare a rearguard posi-
tion to cover a possible retreat. Such a rearguard position
would be chosen on the same principles as those explained for
the defence.
When however the would be assailant does not feel confident
of success he would probably, before attacking the enemy, him-
self occupy and intrench a suitable defensive position facing that
of the enemy and covering his line of communications ; and only
when this was comj leted would he issue from his lines and at-
tack the defender's position.
After the advanced guards have effected their task of recon-
naissance, they will take up some position with defensive capabil-
ities in order to hold at bay any offensive movements on the part
of the defenders and protect from danger the artillery which will
now be sent forward into its first main })ositions. Seeing whs t a
large force of artillery is recjuired in the earliest stages of t'nc
fight, it is very necessary for the greater part of the artillery of an
;ulvancing army to march near the head of the colunm so that
the necessary preparation for the attack may be made without
delay and while the deployment of the main body is carried on
under cover of the cannonade.
In deciding upon the plan of attack the General will be guided
l>y many considerations. The effect of fire from troops occupy-
ing strong points, such as villages, large buildings, woods, knolls,
or intrenchments, is so great that the efforts of attacking troops
are certain to be attracted towards such points especially as the
capture of any one of them will certainly exercise a great infiucnce
nil contiguous portions of the enem\'s line. Therefore a modern
l»;ittle is sure to resolve itself more or less, accoidiiig to the
nature of the lountry, into a series of lights for localities, and the
I rciieral of the attacking force must bear that in mind when making
'^1^
TACTICAL NOTES.
I ' -.a
his dispositions. If in some part of the defender's hne there is a
portion of open ground between two points, such as a wood and
a village, it will be of no use to direct an attack upon the open
portions of the line, for the troops, as they advance, will come
under a heavy fire from these localities which, if they push on far
enough, will ultimately take them in flank, and they will therefore
be certain to edge off to the attack of these strong points. On
some one or more, therefore, of these strong points of the enemy's
line will the serious attacks have in ordinary cases to be directed.
In the selection of the particular points to be attacked the follow-
ing considerations come into play :
ist. The point selected must be capable of being reached by a
powerful fire of artillery to prepare the way for the assault, as-
sisted now by long range infantry fire.
In the attack of a position, since infantry cannot with any hope
of success attack in front unshaken infantry well posted, the
primary object of the attacking artillery will be to prepare the
way for the attacking infantry by concentrating fire on that part
of the enemy's line where an attack seems most likely to succeed
or where a successful attack will produce the most decisive re-
sults. Probably two or more such points within supporting dis-
tance of one another will be selected by the attacking General to
be assailed, either simultaneously or in succession as the case
may be.
If only only point be selected for the principal attack, mincir
or false attacks will doubtless also be made to distract the atten-
tion of the defenders. On each of these points artillery fire of
greater or lesser weight must be concentrated.
In many cases, as was seen at Woerth and Gravelotte, the
nature of the country will dictate where the first main artillery
positions are to be, but if there is any power of choice then such
positions should be selected as will enable fire to be concentrated
at effective ranges v-)n the points selected for attack and on such
of the enemy's batteries as bear upon the ground tlu' attacking
troops will lia\e to pass over. In sc^lecting them due regard iiuist
therefore l)e had to the direction of the infantry attack so far as
known at the time, and they should be as near to the enem\ as
circumstances will permit l)ctween i.jooand 2,200 yards. Mon-
w^
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
377
over the position chosen ought not to be such that the advance
of the attackinf^ infantry will soon mask the fire of the guns. For
this reason an artillery position on a flank, and preferably on the
pivot flank if a change of front is anticipated, is to be generally
preferred, and such a Hank position has the additional advantage
of enabling an obliijue fire to be brought to bear on the point of
attack. At this stage the artillery need only be protected by
cavalry or by a small force of infantry on its exposed flank, and
perhaps by a few skirmishers being posted some hundred yards
in front as the special danger to be feared is not so much a
counter-attack in force but the unobserved approach within effec-
tive range of some skirmishers or marksmen. In open ground,
therefore, it will doubtless frequently happen that guns will be
sent on in front of the infantry, if the flanks are secured, in the
endeavour to open fire at decisive ranges ; for they defend their
own front against counter-attack, and for them efficient fire is the
tirst, security the second consideration, besides their infantry are
pushing on and will soon be in front.
2nd. The possibility of advancing without suffering excessive
loss must be taken mto consideration, for which the ground must
have some features affording shelter from the defender's fire.
It is evident from what has been said previously that an attack
has little chance of success if delivered where the enemy's fire has
full play. Therefore the first thing to be done is to select some
point for the main attack where the effect of the defender's fire
can be to some extent escaped from, either by making use of cover
afforded by the ground or by subduing its intensity by 3'our own
supc-rior fire, or preferably in both ways. Careful reconnoissance
will generally discover some part of the defensive position which
can be ap[)rc)ached to some extent under cover or against which a
powerfiil converging fire can be brought,
3rd. The possibility of directing a converging fire on the point
of attack gives a great advantage, as well as the impossibility of
the enemy to bring a converging or cross-fire on the attacking
columns. Salient points in the defensive line, or villages and
woods projecting forward from the general line, form good objects
for converging fire; and besides as they bring a cross-fire to bear
upon the ground between them it is impossible to pass them by
378
TACTICAL NOTES.
without first capturinj? them, consequently thej' form suitahle
points for attack. Strai^'ht lines of earthworks, on the other
hand, are not favourable for attack as it is difficult to silence the
fire from them. The fact of generally being able to bring a con-
verging fire to bear on a flank of a position affords of itself a
sufficient reason for endeavouring to carry out a flank attack
irrespective of other advantages.
4th. The question has to be considered how far the capture of
any particular point will repay the probable losses entailed in
taking it, and how far it will further the general scheme of the
assailants. The selection of the particular points chosen for
attack, when several present themselves, will be greatly influenced
by this consideration ; and the results produced by the capture of
any part of a position depend upon the skill shown in the choice
of the points of attack. The position won by Schakoffsky on the
30th July at Plevna, after heavy losses, was comparatively useless
as the Turks possessed other positions behind it, whereas the two
redoubts captured bv Skobeleff on the nth of September would
have enabled him, had he been properly supported, to strike into
the heart of the Turkish intrenched camp.
It has already been mentioned that there will generally be a
great tendency to attack the flanks of a defensive line and if pos-
sible outflank the position and get in rear of it : this tendency
arises from a combination of the above considerations. The
flank of a line is the weakest part, and is most likely to offer tlir
assailants the two advantages of the power of bringing a converging
fire upon it and of advancing with less loss than in a frontal
attack (the same may be said of salient points in the defender's
line), and if it is broken in upon the rest of the line is sure to be
more or less seriously compromised, and an attempt to repair tlir
injury will meet with great difticulties as the reserves will probably
be less favourably placed for immediate action on a flank than in
the centre. For this purpose, however, parts of the line must be
weakened.
In former times tliere was always danger in weakening tlu-
centre of a line of battle for the purpose of making outflanking;
movements, for a vigorous opponent might discover a dangerons
weakening at some point and taking tli(>. oflensi\'e might bn-ak
C.ENEKAL COUKSK OF AN I'NGAC.liMENT.
379
iiii-lit hrt'iik
throu^'h it; but this dan^'cr is now considerably lessened at the
present day. The distance apart at which armies will now form
their lines of battle is so f,aeat that it will Ix; difficult for the de-
fenders to see whether part of the assailant's line has been danj;-
erously weakened or not, and a (General will hesitate to leave his
strong,' position to engage in a counter-attack which will have to
be pushed a ^reat distance to be effective, in ignorance whether
he will not after all find the enemy in sufficient strength to meet
him. Further, unless the a.isailant has a very preponderating
lorce, an attack on one or both wings will compel him tf) weaken
the force left to contain the enemy in front. This force must
therefore be prepared to assume the defensive in case of the de-
fender making an offensive return in this direction ; it should con-
sequently choose a suitable defensive position which should then
be hastily intrenched according to the time and means available.
Now the employment of the spade under such conditions will
enable the attacker to weaken this part of his force, more than he
otherwise could with regard to safety, and employ a larger force
to carry out the real attack on a tlank. Even should the Hank
be found so skilfully posted and protected that it cannot be easily
turned, yet an opportunity of bringing a converging tire upon
some decisive point will very likely be found there.
Again, should circumstances lead to the development of masses
of artillery about the centre of the attacking line, the front will be
so strengthened thereby that other troops may be freely drawn
from this point to strengthen flank attacks, as was shown very
clearly at the battles of Wcierth and Mars-la-Tour.
Upon a review of these considerations the General will deter-
mine on the general dispositions to be made and will indicate the
rtrst main positions for the artillery.
It cannot be too clearly understood that a reconnaissance of
the enemy's position and of the country should always precede
the action of the artillery mass, as mistakes in estimating the
front and extent of the enemy's position involve changes of posi-
tion of the artillery which paralyse the fire and cause generally
j^reat sacrifices in long lines of batteries.
The mass of the artillery will now be pushed forward into the
tirst main artillery positions, the guns in the preliminary artillery
38o
TACTICAL NOTES.
position l)einf( also moved into them escorted by detachments of
the other arms, and some infantry should if possible creep up
gradually within reach of the enemy's position, say within i,oooor
i,joo yards, and if possible they may even push forward as close
as 700 or 800 yards and add their tire to that of the artillery to
prepare the way for the infantry advance. This infantry, unless
natural cover is obtainable, should intrench themselves in favour-
able positions whence they can bring an effective fire to bear on
the defender's line, an oblique fire if possible, and so situated that
their fire will not be soon obstructed by the columns of attack.
The employment of infantry to assist the artillerx' in its pre-
paratory fire from its first main position by means of long range
musketry fire has not yet been put in practice. There can how-
ever be little doubt that in future an infantry force will, at the
commencement of an action, be spccia detailed for this pur-
pose. The infantry destined for the execution of the attack will
advance under cover of this long range musketry fire and of the
artillery fire, after these have sufficiently subdued the fire of the
defence. When the fire from this infantry becomes masked by
the advance of the attacking columns, it might be moved forward
and occupy a fresh line nearer to the enemy's works and so
chosen as to bring a flanking fire to bear on his defences if pos-
sible, or this infantry may remain in position to cover a possible
repulse of the assault, or it may be formed up and held in reserve.
Under this heavy fire it may be presumed that the enemy will
be forced to show his hand more and more, and it will still be
possible for the General commanding the attack to choose other
points of attack than those iirst determined upon should more
favourable points become unfolded.
When the points against which the main attacks are to be
directed have been definitely chosen, the Commander will arrange
his troops so that while providing for demonstrative attacks along
the whole front of the position to prevent the defender from
moving troops from other parts of his line to strengthen the
points seriously menaced, he may yet always have troops under
his hand as a reserve to reinforce the main attacks and take ad-
vantage of any success that may be gained ; or to be employed as
circumstances may render necessary such as to cover a forced
GENERAL COUltSD OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
381
should more
retreat. Therefore, unless he has an enormous superiority of
force, the points chosen should not be so far apart as to prevent
the reserves from being so placed as to be able to reach quickly
any point where their aid may be recpiired without impariu}^ the
unit}' of the action under the Commander-in-Chief. In the second
and tliird battles of Plevna the points of attack were so widely
separated that no combined action could be obtained, each Com-
mander had to act independently, and the reserves were frittered
away.
His plan of attack being fixed the General will issue his orders.
In the case of very small operations, or on suddenly meeting with
the enemy, these would be given verbally ; under other conditions
orders should, if possible, be written. Should the force consist
of different units under various Commanders it would be neces-
sary that there should be a General Order for all, and also a
special order addressed to each Commander where separate action
is required. These Commanders, if in command of any consider-
able force, will in their turn issue similar orders to their subor-
dinates.
The General Order which should be as clear, precise, and short
as circumstances permit, should contain :
1. The conditions or circumstances of the intended action,
with what is known of the enemy.
2. The mode of action determined upon and how to be under-
taken ; thus, for instance, to attack the enemy whenever he is met
with in the direct advance, or, to attack the whole, or a certain
named part of the position.
J. The strength, composition, and general division of the at-
tacking force, with names of commanders.
4. The preliminary positions to be taken up by each distinct
j)art of the force, the hours by which the positions are to be as-
sumed.
5. The directions of attack for each distinct part of the force
and the hours at which the forward movement or attack is to be
commenced.
6. The position where the Commander-in-Chief will be found
during the action, to which all references or reports are to be
made or sent.
'i» J
3«2
TACTICAL NOTES.
jgfB^.'t •'
M n
JL
7. The strength, composition, and position of the general re-
serve, and if it is to be divided into several bodies also their gen-
eral divisifjn, with names of conuiumders.
8. The positions of the annnunition trains, the ambulance, and
field hospitals, and what is to be done with the trains of the
various columns.
The dispositions for the troops as detailed in orders can only
apply for the tirst phases of the engagement, for until the enemy's
counter plans are developed the final movements which depend
thereon cannot be definetl.
The special orders addressed to separate commanders should
contain nothing that may tie their hands too much in matters of
detail. As a rule they should be told the thing to do, not the
manner of doing it which should be left to their discretion on the
spot, and, within certain safe limits to be named, the}- should be
allowed free action.
The orders which are necessarily^ transmitted during an action
by the General-in-Chief are of much importance and should he
given with great care. They should not descend to details which
are better left to conunanders of coips, nor should he interfere in
the execution of his orders further than to assure himself that
they are carried out. He should be satisfied on this point by
means of constant reports and communications which must be
kept up without interruption during the action between him and
the commanders of separate units. When the reports cannot be
sent by an officer they should be written, numbered, and dated,
with the exact hour and minute of despatch. Above all, it is most
important that the (General commanding should be immediately
informed when circumstances prevent a subordinate commander
from carrying out his orders or instructions, as the failure to exe-
cute these may necessitate modifications and fresh orders to re-
place the former ones.
The position chosen by the General for watching the battle,
and which has been announced in the orders, ought if possible to
be on an eminence from whence he can see the principal portion
of ground over which the troops are to advance. He should not
quit this post without exceptionally good reasons, and therefore
it should have been carefully selected ; but if obliged to do so, an
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
383
officer should be left behind to direct all reports or messenp^ers to
the new station of the Commander. As the extent of {,'r()nnd to
he passed over by the troops is ^reat, it is often difficult to find a
suitable position whence the Commander can observe the enemy's
front line and yet be not too far advanced to lose immediate
direction and control over the reserves which it is so important
lie should keep in his own hands. In that case he nnist post him-
self at the most central and important spot and detach two or
more officers, in whom confidence can be placed, to other parts
of the held with directions to keep him constantly informed of
what is passing. The field telef,aaph will be invaluable if it can
be laid.
No attack can by expected to succeed iintil the fire of the de-
fender's artillery has been considerably weakened if not r.bsolutely
silenced, and the points on which the serious attacks are to be
made have been well searched by artillery fire to destroy material
defences and obstacles, render localities such as houses, villages,
and woods, or open redoubts imtenable,and to siiell the defending
troops. In this the artillery will, as we have seen, now be aided
by infantry fire ; but to do the work effectually a considerable
time will be recpiired, and if the defences are earthworks of any
strength well provided with over-head cover' it will be necessary
to have far more powerful guns than those hitherto brought into
the field in order to render such works nntenable or even shake
seasoned troops by a mere bombardment of field artillery. In a
l)revious chapter we have seen that improvements in gunnery
have been st) great of late years that the new guns will doubtless
be able to accomplish the task allotted to them especially if aided
by the vertical fire of field howitzers. That the old natures of
,i,nms could not do this was clearly shown in 11^77-78, but it was
also then shown that the man slaying power of shrapnel, even
from inferior guns, is so great that well aimed artillery fire could
prevent the defender from siiowing himself and therefore also
from taking aim, and that in such a case a long artillerv bonib-
artlment would only be a waste of anniumition since the effect of
driving the defenders frcMii the parapets by shrapnel fire would be
produced as well after a few roimds fired with correct aim as by
a lengthened bombardment.
When the artillery of the attack has been brought up into its
384
TACTICAL NOTES.
first main position, its object being to cover the advance and
development of the infantry to draw the fire of opposing batteries
and to silence them, it follows that an artillery duel, now aided
by musketry, will open and continue the engagement until the
attacking infantry come up to effective rifle range of the enemy's
position. For, inasmuch as the defending infantry ought to be
able to resist any purely infantry attack unsupported b}' artillery
while the combination of the power of the tvvo arms will probably
prevail in overcoming their resistance, it evidently will be best
for the defending artillery to concentrate its fire on the attacking
artillery in order to save its own infantry from this combined
attack. The attacking artillery is, however, itself endeavouring
to silence the artillery of the defence and to draw off his fire from
the infantry, or the infantry attacks will probably fail if the ground
can be well swept by the defender's artillery. Thus the opposing
artilleries will inevitably be drawn into an artillery duel which, in
all ordinary cases, is the first phase in the decisive attack of a
position. In this duel the artillery of the defence ought to have
the advantage, gun for gun, because of their original a(.lvantages
in having presumably better positions, in having been able to
previously intrench themselves and measure ranges; they have
also considered beforehand the positions which the attacking
artillery must occupy and are therefore prepared to concentrate
an effective fire upon them as soon as they appear and while
unlimbering.
Hence in the attack, superior numbers and, if possible, sur-
prise, must compensate for tiiese advantages of the defence. On
the issue of this artillery duel will greatly depend the possibility
of an attack being successfully delivered; the full strength of the
artillery will, therefore, be brought forward at once to endeavour
to obtain the mastery.
The retention of artillery in reserve in the case of the attack
seems neither desirable nor necessary inasmuch as it is (]uitc
})()ssible to withdraw batteries from action and move theni. if re-
(|uiri'd, to other parts of the field even under hostile fire. It
would therefore api)ear that in the attack a reserve of guns should
not remain with the giMieral reserve, although a certain number
of batteries should be warned not to advance too far but be ready
to join the reserv<' or nioN'e lo any ))art of the field, as may be
IW
GENERAL COURSE OF 'A
required, in order to meet the varying phases of the battle. But
although a reserve of guns may not be required, the artillery
should certainly have reserves of men, horses, and ammunition.
With such aid the guns can be withdrawn from action in one part
of the field and sent rapidly to another as required.
On both sides, however, it must be borne in mind that the real
decision rests with the infantry, and should the assailant en-
deavour to push forward his infantry masses under cover of his
artillery fire directed on the artillery of the defence, the latter must
at once turn their full })ower on t!;e attacking infantry regardless
of their own losses from the enemy's artillery.
The artillery of the defence, if it be at all able to cope with that
of the attack, should not decline this preliminary artillery action,
but should it find itself being overpowered it should be withdrawn
under cover until the infantry advance when it should be brought
into position again. So in the attack, however necessary it may
l)e to keep down the artillery of the defence both to enable the
attacking artillery to act and to save its infantry from loss in their
advance, it is not until the infantry of the defence has been shaken
by artillery that the infantry atiack can have any good prospect
of success. Therefore as soon as the artillery fire of the defence
begins to slacken the attention of part of the assailant's guns will
be directed to cannonading the points where the decisive attack
is to be made, either some parts of the main defensive position or
some advanced points which must be captured before the main
position is assailed, to prepare the way for the infantry assault.
In the meantime the deployment of the army has been taking
place in accordance with the plans for attack of the General com-
manding. When it appears to hi:r. that the fire of the defenders
has been sufficiently got under, or that the points selected for
attack have been subjected to an adecjuate cannonade which will,
as we have seen, take several hours at least, then the infantry
will be ordered to advance to tlu^ attack.
While this preparation has been going on the General will have
assigned particular objects to be sought by the different units he
intends to send forward to the attack, be they army-corps,
divisions, or brigades, according to the si;?e of the army. The in-
fantry of each of these units will l>e formed up for attack by their
'M :
■y.
386
TACTICAI. NOTES.
commanders in the several lines, as laid down in the Field
Exercise, and the whole will advance as therein described on
receiving the orders to do so. The Commander of each battalion
in front line will have some definite object in the enemy's position
assif^ned to him as the first thing to be gained. When this is won
the retiring enemy should not be pursued except by fire aided by
that of the artillery, or by cavalry, until the infantry has been
re-formed and new arrangements made for further action. If the
enemy should occupy several lines of defence behind one another
these arrangements must necessarily be with the view of a further
advance against the remaining hostile positions.
The infantry at this period are not so far committed th.it they
cannot be disengaged or their direction of attack diverted, thougii
they may have advanced to within the ;^one of effective ritle fuc,
that is to within 800 yards of the enemy. The reserve is at such
a distance that it can either reinforce the original line of attack
when required, or else be brought up rapidly in part to support a
sudden change of direction should the best point of attack be only
now discovered.
Whenever the ground will admit, the infantry are supported (jn
the flanks by cavalry which advances under cover in small col-
umns with strong supports close at hand losing no opportunity of
attacking any advanced troops of the enemy and warding off flank
attacks. The very fact of the cavalr\- occasionally showing itself
on the flanks gives confldence to the attacking infantry; and
occasions may occur when a timely charge of cavalry may bring
about momentous results if, as at Mars-la-Tour, it is a question
of gaining a certain amount of time. In such a case a noble self-
devotion on the part of the cavalry may change the 'whole aspect
of the battle.
t,( -tfi i.
T:^"«'.^-'rr
SECOND STA<.'E OF THE ATTACK.
Tlic second stage of the attack is now commenced by the in-
fantry being finally launched at the selected points of attack, and
this stage comprises the whole of the real action up to the mo-
ment which immediately precedes finiil success or fiiiliire.
In this stage llu- infantry plays the principal part and is imw
fairly committed to the tight and. lia\ing rereixcd its last impulse
■«:•#
GENERAL COUKSl': OK AN ENGAGEMENT.
387
in the desired direction from the Conimander, no power can alter
or recall it for good during the remainder of the engagement-
Its development of hre-action should rapidly increase as it nears
the point of attack : for upon its weight of hre depends its suc-
cess, as this is its only way of overcoming the defender's power
of resistance until the moment of assault which, according to
existing regulations, it is intended should be delivered, if the enemy
still holds his ground, by the same troops backed up by reserves.
The principles on which the infantry will advance to the attack
are the following : — Experience of recent wars has shown over and
over again that an advance of infantry in closed bodies of any
magnitude is impracticable over ground exposed to an effective
tire from the defender ; it is therefore necessary to advance in
in such a manner as to minimize the effect of hostile fire. This
will in the first place be effected by choosing for advance such
portions of ground as give the greatest cover from view and fire
of the enemy. In a comparatively open country the advancing
columns may have to deploy at J, 000 or even 4,000 yards from
the enemy or they will suffer heavily from his artillery fire, but
this distf'nce may often be considerably lessened in close ground
or in foggy weather, and the assailant should never deploy sooner
than necessary. But at some time or other an advance over open
ground, or at any rate over ground fully exposed to fire, is sure to
be necessary and the best means of effecting this appears to be by
advancing in a line of men at open order.
Ikit it is evident that such an extended line, which forms the
fighting line of the attack, can no longer move forward at the order
of one Commander, as formerly a battalion acted under the
direction of its Colonel, but under the impulse of individual
officers. It follows therefore that these junior officers having
to lead the fighting line, the latter has a tendency to become
a series of fractions, each led by an officer. In order that
these fractions or " fighting units '" may be properly under
control, their siije must be such that they can be led by one
officer. In the hurry and heat of ctunbat it is impossible for an
officer thoroughly to control more than a space of about tSo yards
as an outside limit during the connnencement of the attack, /. c,
al)out 40 yards on each side of him. At one man to two paces
this gives about 50 men, or half a service compan}', us the com-
388
TACTICAL NOTES.
mand of an individual officer. As the enemy is approached
casualties will take place, and the number of men and space to be
controlled will thereby be diminished. In the close attack an
officer cannot efficiently supervise more than about half the above
distance, or 40 yards, and at this statue the men may be as close
as one man to each yard ; and if the men are trained to close in on
one another as casualties occur, as they should be, a fighting unit
of 50 men, or half a company, would seem to be a suitable body
of men to be controlled in action by one officer. When under
fire it is this " fighting unit " that becomes the all important unit
upon the proper manipulation of which good tactical results must
depend.
These units should be kept as far as possible separate, and
a space should therefore be left between them; for otherwise
what happens? Instead of a line of fractions each under the con-
trol of a leader, one continuous line is formed with small intervals
between individual men. Now no such line can advance for a
long distance, say 2,000 yards, without crowding and confusion.
Intervals must therefore be kept as long as possible to prevent
this, and these intervals should be greater between different com-
panies than between the fighting units of one company. More-
over, by keeping the units separate a better control can be kept
over their fire ; for volleys cannot be kept up nor independent
firing controlled if the men do not know under what officer's
command they are, and this they cannot tell if they form one
long line instead of being split up into small units. Admitting
this, the initial formation for the skirmishing line in the attack
should be a line of such units with intervals between them, each
unit being again subdivided into sections or groups supervised by
a non-commissioned officer.
This skirmishing line will at first advance continuously, but as
the enemy's fire becomes heavy and when the assailants also open
fire, say at about 600, 700, or 800 yards from the enemy, they will
have to advance by alternate fractions at a brisk pace at first, and
subsequently by successive rushes executed by alternate com-
panies, or other units, making use as far as possible of any cover
the ground may afford ; these advances will be either for a certain
distance or for an indicated object in front such as a hedge, a
ditch, or a hollow in the ground. Between these alternate advances
wimmifmmmmimmm^
m
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
389
the men will lie down and keep up a steady fire. But, as pointed
out in a previous chapter, it appears to be a necessity arising
from the fearful intensity of modern fire that when within 300
yards, or storming distance, for advancing to the assault the men
must advance firing. This use of the individual order gives the
attack the greatest mobility and security from fire, while develop-
ing its own fire to the utmost.
This chain of skirmishers will be followed by a hue of small
bodies (supports) whose duty it is to continuously feed the first
line and keep its strength up to the maximum that can find space
to use their arms. This, in the Field Exercise, is laid down as 2
paces or if yards but at close ranges may well be increased to a
man to a yard. These small bodies advance in the formation most
suited to each of them at the time, and as the enemy is approach-
ed they may also have to open out but they should ever be kept
jealously in hand. To defer as long as possible an intermixture
of different units the men of each fighting unit in the skirmishing
line should be accustomed to close to a flank as casualties occur,
when whole groups, or even a whole fighting unit, may be sent
forward from the supports to fill up an interval thus made in the
shooting line.
Behind these again will be required a further line, (battalion
main body, or reserve,) to feed the fighting line if necessary, to
prolong it, to ward off a flank attack, or to outflank the enemy as
the case may be ; but when possible it should be kept intact and
be brought up to the firing line at the moment when the assault
is to be delivered to give sufficient weight to the charge. This
line will also be obliged to suit its formation to circumstances,
but a general rule should be observed that extended formations
for the rear lines should only be adopted from necessity, and the
men should be kept in hand as long as possible in such a for-
mation as to render their control easy. Small columns facilitate
this and they can also obtain the best cover in undulating ground.
It would be a mistake to fix any definite distances to be main-
tained between these three echelons as the distances vill vary
very much with the features of the ground. For instance if rows
of hedges, waUs, or banks run parallel to the front of the enemy's
position, the advancing supports would probably be in line with
',i »r
390
CTICAL NOTES.
the shooting line as they would thus obtain the best cover, and
the same with the reserves. This would also be the case if on
the defensive.
Also, the general orders for the attack having been issued, the
superior officers must not attempt to interfere with the details of
the advance. In one part the men may advance by alternate
rushes of small groups or bodies. In another they may move
scattered, almost singly, halting occasionally to lie down and fire.
In a third there may be a piece of open ground so much exposed
to the hre of the enemy that the men have to be sent over it by
driblets, one or two at a time, running from cover to cover. But
the whole will know certainly that its business is to arrive and
establish itself in close proximity to the enemy and in readiness
for a final rush.
It must be the object of the leaders of the shooting line to de-
velop the fire as much as possible keeping control over the firing
and maintaining fire-discipline as long as possible, while the
echelons in rear must think only of the duty of supporting the
chain, of keeping up its moral force by fresh men, and of seeing
that ammunition is brought up.
These three echelons of the first line will gradually press on,
the rear ones at times even surging forward into the shooting line
when the forward movement of the latter is checked, and sweep-
ing it on a little farther.
When several battalions are advancing side by side in the first
line it is not to be expected that they will advance abreast but
bit by bit as opportunity offers, parts being at times driven
back while stationary portions continue firing to keep down the
fire of the defenders and enable their comrades to get on a
little further. Some artillery will also have to advance before
its fire is masked and place itself so that it may continue its
support to the attacking columns so that no cessation shall oc-
cur in its fire and no breathing time be allowed for the defenders
to come out of their shelter. At last the lines, though perhaps at
times brought to a standstill or even compelled to retire, will get
within reach of a rush at the point of attack, and the assault will
be delivered, the assailants having in their favour numbers and
moral force. Circumstances will often allow of the supports and
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
391
reserves firing over the heads of the shooting line at long ranges,
especially early in action when proper objects present themselves.
Meanwhile the superior officers must be keeping a strict watch
on the course of the tight, never allowing it to flag for want of
timely reinforcement but still keeping all the troops they can in
hand to resist counter-attacks so likely at the moment of assault,
and to secure possession of any point won and make use of it
as a vantage point for a further advance.
When, as may frecuiently happen, the advancing infantry are
checked and can proceed no further for the moment until rein-
forced, they will naturally desire to hold the ground won at such
sacrifice and also seek to obtain cover to screen them from the
enemy's fire. Where no natural cover is available they would,
supposing them to be provided with tools, throw up artificial
cover for their protection ; but in any case this would be advis-
able so as to assist them in repelling a possible counter-attack.
The above are the general principles for the execution of an
attack by the first line, we will now briefly consider their action
at different distances from the enemy. The principles of " fire-
discipline" have been gone into in Chapter II, and it may be
stated that the ranges and 2ones of fire mentioned here are by no
means intended to be absolute, but they are given merely to serve
as a guide and must be regarded as susceptible of considerable
modification.
In the advance the attacking infantry first enters the /one of
the defender's unaimed musketry fire at from 1,^500 to 800 yards
from the position. In crossing this zone to that of the outer zone
of his aimed fire, between 450 and 700 or Soo yards from the
}x)sition, speed alone saves loss and the nature of the formation
does not much affect it provided large and deep compact bodies
are not maintained as these suffer most. The same apjjlics to
f,'reater ranges as the attacking infantry will not only be exposed
to the defender's artillery fire but also possibly to his unaimed in-
fantry fire since the modern rifle carries much fiirtlu-r than the
above rangi^s, but inasmuch as tlu^se greater distances cannot be
judged and the musketry lire is uncertain, the defender's fir(> will
Mot become really eftective until within Soo yards. In fart wlu-n
the defender's fire is wild the assailant mav lose niucli uiore
X
- «jjj-«-»'^;ij;-.T"rj^;i^,;i
392
TACTICAL NOTES.
heavily at the greater distances, beyond 1,300 or 1,500 yards, than
at closer ranges.
In crossing the outer zone of aimed fire, 800 to 450 yards, the
advance of the main body was only considered possible owing to
the fact that though the defender would gain most by firing on the
main body and supports he is sure to be tempted into firing mostly
on the shooting line, while his guns may be drawn to fire on those
of the attack. Hut here the results which may be expected to be
produced by much attention being paid to fire-discipline in peace
time come into play. Instead of the defender's fire being inde-
pendent as heretofore, the free fire of troops will in future probably
not be allowed beyond* a range of 400 or 450 yards, and the
defender's fire between the ranges of 450 and 800 yards will be
carefully concentrated on particular objects, notably the main
body, under the orders of the officers, and the main body will in
that case have to be extended.
Advance of the shooting line. — The shooting line moves through
the zone of unaimed fire, firing, if at all, by word of command.
On reaching the zone of aimed fire from about 700 or 800 yards,
they advance by alternate fractions, at first in quick time and
then in rushes of 30 to 60 yards, taking care however to take all
advantage of cover in their front, the fraction not in motion keep-
ing up fire to cover the advance of the remainder. But firinj;^
should not be commenced until it is necessary or advisable. We
have seen that the Germans hope to approach as close to the
enemy as 500 or 600 yards before opening fire. When the line
gets up to the most effective range, 450 yards, it commences rapid
indedendent firing.
Formerly the decision of a fight was said to rest on the fact
that two hostile bodies could not at the same time occupy the
same space. Now-a-days it appears that they cannot both hold
on under fire for many minutes, even when some hundred yards
apart, hence the crisis of the fire contest which now takes place
ends quickly, cither by the repulse of the shooting line now aug-
mented by the supports or by its rapid advance supported by its
main body to the pf)int of assault.
Advance of the Supports. — Up to the zone of aimed musketry fire
the supports follow the shooting line at a distance of about 150
w.\
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
393
yards, approaching to loo yards. As the supports feel the effects
of the aimed fire they form line, and then open line spreading out
or closing in as they best can ; or in undulating or close country
they take advantage of cover by keeping in small compact
bodies. The supports feed the shooting line on which they close
as it approaches the distance for independent firing, and by the
time the storming distance is reached they will all have joined
the shooting line.
Advance of the Main Body. — Up to the unaimed fire zone, 1300
yards, the main body advances in small shallow columns of from
half to a quarter of a battalion ; but the artillery fire may make
it advisable to sub-divide into bodies with a front of 25 or 35 yards
and 40 to 70 yards apart. Some of these, if much exposed, form
open line but get together again where cover permits. In order
to close on the shooting line in time for the assault, the main
body will, at first, keep about 500 yards behind it so that when
tlie chain commences independent firing, at about 450 yards, the
main body will be only about 250 to 350 yards in rear of it. By
the time the chain has been engaging for some minutes in the last
decisive fire contest at storming distance from the enemy, 150 to
joo yards, the main body will have closed up, the moment of the
assault arrives, and the whole rush forward.
Once in the defender's line they will endeavour to gain the fur-
ther border of his defences and will reform as speedily as pos-
sible, but they will not make a further advance until formed up
a.y;ain, which they should do as speedily as possible.
Supporting Lines.— The first line will in all cases have troops in
support when the front is extensive, an intermediate body or sec-
ond line will follow 600 to 800 yards behind the shooting line.
This distance seems most suitable since at about 1400 yards
artillery fire covers a zone of 600 yards.
A reserve or third line, usually one-fourth or one-third of the
I whole, follows at from 500 to 1000 yards in rear of the second line.
The duties of these two lines are laid down in the Field Exercise
las also the mode of advance of the first line, and consequently
lonly general principles have been laid down here. The details
|of formation and arrangement of the attacking infantry appear to
m\'.
m
394
TACTICAL NOTES.
be of secondary importance so long as the correct principles are
followed.
There is, however, one point in the instructions for the attack
of a battalion which appears to need modification. It is appar-
ently intended that when the fighting line is reinforced by the
companies in support, the men who are sent to reinforce should
double in with the men of the companies in the fighting line, thus
mixing companies together. It is no doubt true that this mixing
up cannot be entirely prevented but it is desirable that it should
not take place more than is unavoidable, and it would seem pre-
ferable, instead of distributing reinforcements ecjually along a
fighting line weakened by casualties, to try and take advantage of
the tendency of men to collect in groups by training the non-
commissioned officers to make themselves the centres of these
groups and close them towards the lianks or centre of their com-
panies whereby openings would be left for sending up reinforce-
ments in coherent bodies, and the companies would thus be kept
distinct under their own officers. This principle is carried out
in foreign armies and has been advocated here.
The artillery which, during the first stages of the attack, has
been of the first importance on account of its long range, now
falls into the second place. Circumstances must determine
whether it shall keep up its fire on the enemy's guns to relieve its
own infantry, or whether it shall fire on the enemy's troops. As
the rule to be followed is that it shall fire on that arm which is
for the time the most important, the enemy's infantry will, in all
probability, be now the objective.
But whilst the advance of the infantry just described is takinj,'
place, it will be desirable at some time or other to move guns
forward from the first main position to the second main posi-
tion to prevent their fire being masked and to give more im-
mediate support to the infantry, and also on account of the
cheering effect the close support of guns always has on the other
arms. Since during the ])rogress of the attack the troops gradu-
ally converge round the threatened point, there will probably
only be room for part of the guns in this more advanced position.
The guns to be sent forward should advance rapidh' and be placed
in a good position, especially on a flaid< whence they ran aiM
■,r
•illl
GENKKAL COUKSM OF AN KNOAGKMENT
395
their own tire, the more effective because it is obliciue, to that of
the advancing' troops which are at the moment absorbing the
whole attention of tlie defending,' infantry ; and tlie proximity of
the enemy's hnc from this second main position must not be too
much hmited by ordinary rules of caution. To afford an efficient
support to the infantry, artillery may have to expose itself to the
enemy's musketry fire re;^'ardless of its losses, as did the German
batteries continually as at Wcerth and on the Kotherberg in the
l)attle of Spicheren, and the Russian batteries at Lovtcha.
When the attack and defence are nearly matched it is clear
that'the addition of a close artillery fire on either side may turn
the scale, and artillery must not be chary of venturing even into
effective musketry fire remembering that their losses will be com-
pensated for by a victory gained. The distance at which this
second artillery position should be from the enemy's line has been
variously estimated, some authorities fixing it at about 700 yards
others as far as 1,300 yards, but it would appear, as seen in a
previous chapter, that a range of 1,000 yards with a considerable
margin either way of 400 or 500 yards, according to the ground
and attitude of the enemy, is the nearest limit that can be given.
As this close action of guns may in case of a repulse lead to •
confusion, it would generally be advisable, even if it were possible,
that the whole of the artillery should not be moved up into this
advanced position but that a portion be kept in its first position.
Should the infantry attack be continuous along the greater part
of the field of battle, and it is intended to make a concentric and
enveloping movement, as in the attack of a decisive point, there
will be little room for artillery in the first line, and only so many
batteries should be advanced as will not incommode the infantry.
The guns which remain in the first position will have to cease
tiring when masked by the advancing infantr}-, or they may fire
on the probable positions of the enemy's reserves. They will
refit and be re-supplied with ammunition, and any casualties
in horses, men, or materiel made good from the ammunition
columns so as to be ready to open fire again to protect the troops
falling back in case of a reverse, or to make a forward movement
if the capture of some part of the enemy's position renders it
j)ossible to bring up more guns to prepare the way for a fresh
advance, or to protect the ground won.
I
;!, iv; Mil
396
TACTICAL NOTES.
The second forward position of the batteries which imme-
diately support the infantry attack should be so chosen that the
guns may be able to fire on the point of attack until the infantrv
reaches its last halting place previous to the final rush, and their
fire should on no account cease until it becomes dangerous to the
attacking infantry. The enemy's batteries should be neglected
if they fire only on the attacking artillery, but they must be kept
in check if they direct an effective fire on the attacking infantry.
When the infantry have advanced so far that the point of attack
can no longer be fired at, then fire must be directed on any
reserves that may be visible, and the batteries must be prepared
to resist counter-attacks.
Under favourable circumstances the artillery fire may have
been so effective that when the time comes for the decisive attack,
the infantry may merely have to take possession of the hostile
position instead of storming it.
The first success obtained, if any, will very probably consist in
the capture of one or more tactical points in front of the enemy's
line. To these points some of the attacking guns should at once
be pushed on, both to secure them and also to aid the infantry in
their further progress ; but, as just stated, a portion of the guns
should be retained in the first position or should be moved into
any favourable intermediate positions whence they may aid in re-
pulsing counter-attacks, or support a retirement should it become
necessary.
During the advance of the infantry to the attack, some of the
defender's artillery at least will no doubt open fire on their sup-
ports and reserves, or even sometimes on their fighting line ; to
save them the attacking artillery must concentrate once more on
the defender's guns. It will always be a question to be decided on
the spur of the moment, and according to the circumstances of
the case, whether the whole of the attacking guns should unite
once more in crushing the artillery of the defence or whether a
part should continue to fire on the infantry defenders as long as
they can do so without endangering their own infantry. In most
cases the latter would be the better course.
It is not to be expected that during the progress of this action
much opportunity will offer for the employment of cavalry, but
m
,1
GENKRAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
397
they will have a duty to perforin, as in the first stage, in guardinjj
the flanks of the attack, to discover any signs of movement to
(iistpiiet its rear, and also to cover any tiirning movements of their
own troops.
Cavalry should also sei^e any opportunities of approaching un-
seen the flanks of the opposing infantry or artillery and of throwing
them into disorder or demoralizing them, if not inflicting serious
injury. If repulsed or in its turn disordered, it must rally under
the protection of the other arms and again return to exercise
similar functions. It should also be prepared to act against the
enemy's cavalry and frustrate the latter's movements. Hut
cavalry at this stage can only play a very minor p rt ; with the
exception therefore of cavalry supporvs acting on the flanks of
the attack the remainder of this arm would be kept in reserve,
but not so far to the, rear that it could not be brought up quickly
if required to make a diversion or a demonstration on either flank,
unless of course the bulk of this arm is being employed in a
turning movement in conjunction with horse artiller\- as explained
in a prev' uis chaptei.
Engineers should, if possible, accompany ever\ lumtry attack
in order to perform any field engineering duties that may be re-
quired. These duties may consist in making communications
across any obstacles that may impede the advance of the assail-
ant : thus at the battle of Woerth, the French having destroyed
the bridges over the stream in front of their position, the Prus-
sians constructed hasty ones of hop poles, and subsequently when
the village of Woerth fell into their hands they repaired the per-
manent bridges. In the event of there being woods in front of
the enemy's position, clearances and tracks may have to be made
in them and also openings for artillery fire. Also artificial ob-
stacles such as abattis, entanglements, etc., may have to be sur-
mounted or demolished, passages some 20 yards wide for the as-
saulting columns being made through them ; and finally, should
any advanced post or other part of the defensive line be c^^tured
they will have to be prepared as quickly as may be to repel
counter-attacks.
During this second stage reserves are moved up as required,
and any concerted flank attack carried out along with the frontal
movement.
398
TACTICAL NOTES.
The difficulties and danger of mere frontal attacks have already
been pointed out, and in consequence every assailant will in all
probability attempt to turn one or both flanks of the enemy's
position. When the troops detailed for this task reach the posi-
tion from which the advance against the flank is to be made, it
will be carried out in the same way as an attack in front. It is
not desirable that batteries should at once be s tnt round with the
outer win^'- of the turning force. In the first place sendinj^^ artil-
lery early round indicates the approaching^ attack to the enemy,
and secondly by keeping,' the artiller\- on the pivot flank it has
the opportunity of enfilading,' a retired tiank of the enemy's line,
and the principle is adhered to of keeping; the artillery massed
for the decisive preparatory action. Later on, when the flank at-
tack is developed, batteries may be sent round to the outer wing
with advantage because of the opportunity thus afforded of get-
ting a cross fire on the enemy's position and "of the moral effect
of artillery approaching the line of retreat of the defender. This
does not of course refer to the horse-artillery attached to the
cavalry brigades who will most likely take part in such a move-
ment from the outset.
But even though the principal attack be made on one or both
flanks, an attack of more or less vigour must also be made on the
defender's front so as to prevent him from weakening this part of
his line to reinforce or prolong his flanks. This attack would not
be pushed home till that on the flank, or flanks, is well advanced,
as the assailant plainly puts his stiength to the best use when he
so times his attacks as to engage the whole of the defender's line
tit once. But this can only be done when he has a preponderat-
ing force, and frequently the assailant in front will have to adopt
a more defensive role and intrench himself facing the position.
When therefore the bulk of the assailant's forces are moved to
one or both flanks so as to turn the enemy's position, the troops
left to contain him in front must throw up some hasty defences
such as*shooting trenches and gun pits and clear their field of tire
if circumstances render this possible; but as such works will have
to be made under fire of the defenders they can necessarily be of
only a very hasty description, and they must evidently be suited
for a passive defence against a sudden cor.nter-attack made before
the turning movement has taken eft'ect. lUit. inasmuch as the
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
399
task of the force left in front is to contain the enem^ in his posi-
tions and prevent him from weakening his centre to strengthen
his tlank or Hanks, the frontal attack must have every appearance
of a real attack and must not content itself with merely watching
the enemy or being prepared to resist a counter-stroke, but he
should be really engaged and kept as long as possible in ignorance
of the reat point of attack. It is only by doing this and deceiving
him that the object of containing the enemy can be secured.
As tnerefore the frontal attack will have to be undertaken with
every appearance of energy it is evident, as just pointed out, that a
large force of artillery should still be sent into its first main position
between i;3oo and 2,200 yards of the enemy. This artillery fire
will, as in the case of a frontal attack, be supplemented by the
fire from infantry at from 700 to 1,300 yards from the defender
and the positions occupied by them should be intrenched and
prepared to resist a counter-attack. This line of infantry sup-
ported by the guns will form the defensive line destined to repel
any counter-attacks. Should it be advisable, a second position
some 1,000 yards in rear of the first might be prepared in case cf
the defender making a general offensive return, and as such a
position could be prepared in security and out of fire the defences
could be of a stronger type than those in the first line which are
near enough to the defender for him to be watched, and should
he be found to be unduly weakening his centre to reinforce his
threatened Hank the frontal attack might with advantage be
pushed home.
Hut should the assail;\nt not have such a preponderating force
as to enable him, when attacking a Hank, to do more than leave
sufficient troops in front of the position to cover his connnunica-
tions, these will have to occupy a position fultilling the recjuire-
ments of a pure passive defence, a rear guard position in fact.
As in this case it will be an evident advantage to the assailanl if
the defender can be allured out of his fortified position, such a
position, occupied for passive defence only, may be at a consider-
able distance from the enemy, two or three miles, or less accord-
ing t(/ circumstances. Thus there will be considerable latitude
allowed for the choice of suitable ground.
,, ,|i^<
400
TACTICAL NOTES.
■SJiC"!*; .> 'i
THIRD STAGE OF THE ATTACK.
The third stage is generally a success or a complete defeat,
but possibly may result in an intermediate issue between the two,
a retrograde fighting movement, a retreat in fact, in good order
on the part of the assailants to the original position from which
they had aavanced.
This stage commences by the final reserves, which the Com-
mander thinks fit to engage, being ordered up. It is assumed
that the infantry of the attack have been gradually pressing on
towards the enemy's position ; this they will take some time to
approach, the action swaying backwards and forwards with the
efforts of the two sides.
The reserves of infantry are thrown upon the points of attack,
supported by the massed fire of the whole of the available artillery
of the attack. But little distance of ground or interval of time
should be allowed between the successive attacks of freshly
brought up infantry. The fatal error of allowing a front line to
be ber.ten back before a succeeding one arrives, which the Rus-
sians fell into in their attacks on Plevna, should be guarded
against; and troops should be pushed on in rapid succession,
wave after wave, to carry out the forward movement and to re-
place the enormous losses attendant in modern warfare upon a
frontal assault, and above all things to keep up the moral force of
the attacking troops by preventing a decided check in the advance
at this critical moment.
This is how the second line of the attacking infantry may have
to be employed. It will follow the first line to secure the points
won if the attack is successful and protect the re-formirig of the
troops who actually made the assault ; and if the attack fails, to
cover the beaten troops from an echelon position further back in
conjunction with the artillevy. Under circumstances that require
it however, the second line may be employed to infuse fresii
energy into an attack that seems scarcely strong enough to suc-
ceed without further aid, and even to take its place 'f its force is
expended.
All Olficrr ("ommanding an infantry attack cannot realize too
strongly that although it is desirabli; to keep troops in hand as a
reserve; as long as jiossiblc, yrl lu' should send in his last company
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT. 4OI
^WW
rather than see the attack stopped. It is for the superior General
Officers to see that assistance from the reserves is sent where
necessary ; in fact this is often the only way in which they can
influence a fight when once begun.
Eventual!}', if all goes well, the shooting line will be able to es-
tablish itself within reach of a rush at the enemy's position.
Then a rapid fire will be carried on for a few minutes whilst the
bodies in rear close up. and then the word will be given for the
assault.
If the attack is successful and the enemy retires, either before
tlw2 demoralizing influence of the last steady advance, or broken
by actual assault, some batteries of artillery should gallop up into
the position he occupied, if possible on the flanks of the retreating
troops, and a heavy fire brought to bear on them to complete
their defeat or help in holding the ground won ; while the other
batteries, remaining in their old positions, form the necessary
support in the event of the infantry being again driven out of the
captured position. But should the infantry establish themselves
firmly in the position all the available guns must be hurried up
into it and at once prepare for any further attacks that may be
necessary ; they will harass the enemy with their fire and by
advancing to closest quarters they will endeavour to overwhelm
his supporting batteries, for which purpose guns are massed as
much as possible.
These guns pushed on into the captured part of the enemy's
position will often be too close to their infantry, and otherwise be
l)adly placed ; but the moral effect of their fire combined with the
probable disorganization of the defenders immediately opposed
to them, and the necessity for their co-operation to enable the
infantry to complete their victory, justify the step. Frequently it
will be necessary to bring some guns close up to buildings, etc., to
batter in gates or drive out the defenders from points which could
not be seen or struck from more distant positions. In such cases
the infantry must keep down the fire of the defenders as far as
])ossible while the guns are being brought up and until their fire
lias prepared the way for the final rush of the infantry.
Commanders of artillery batteries if isolated, or of artillery
divisions or other masses, should act independently in the heat of
, ,1.
„: iTSsTf r 1
^
■
4
I1,
t
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it
I.J
■
402
TACTICAL NOTES.
action and not wait for higher authority: and they must ever be
prepared to take the initiative and act in the spirit of the General's
instructions.
The execution of the assault will be sure to throw the troops
that make it into confusion, and a counter-attack delivered at
that moment would be very dangerous unless it was provided for.
Therefore a reserve is necessary which should if possible have
been kept in hand by the Conmiander to repel any counter-
attacks made at this critical moment and to secure the points
won. In case of failure of the assault, such a reserve is equally
valuable and even necessary to secure the retreat of the repulset'
troops. The second line may at times fulfil these duties ; but u
the resistance has been firm this second line will have been used
up in carrying the attack forward, in which case the third line or
reserve will have to be used.
The cavalry which has been protecting the flanks, as well as
that kept in reserve which by this time will have been brought up
from the rear and probably j)osted on the weaker flank, is now-
launched in pursuit accompanied by horse artillery and light
machine guns if any, the superior mobilit}- of both rendering their
use peculiarly well suited to this service.
The engineers who have followed the assaulting columns will
be busily employed in converting the captured works into works
suitable for the occupation of their own arni\- by reversing the
fronts, throwing up fresh works, etc., as circumstances may re-
quire so as to secure the ground won against counter-attack ; but
should the captured position not be tenable the works will be as
far as possible destroyed so as to facilitate any subsecpient attack.
In the different stages of the attack all field engineering duties
have been assigned to the engineers, but it is evident that infantry
will frequently have to execute such works themselves as far as
their means for doing so will allow. This holds good more or loss
for nearly all descriptions of field engineering works, as it would
be a manifest mistake for infantry to have always to depend on
engineers who might not be at hand ; and since most infantries
are now supplied with tools, they, aided by their pioneers, must
be prepared to undertake all such works undei- t\\v instruction of
their own officers.
GENERAL COURSE OK AN ENGAGEMENT.
403
The infantry which had executed the assault will in the mean-
time be recovering from its confusion and will reform its ranks
broken by the assault under cover of artillery fire and fire from
the infantry of the second line, or of a further reserve who may
also take part in the pursuit, and it may be of charges of cavalry.
If, on the other hand, the final assault of the position has been
unsuccessful, the assailant's assaulting columns must retire, cov-
ered in open ground by the lines of infantry in rear supported by
tiie artillery. In some cases it will be possible for the defeated
assaulting columns to retire behind the second line where it will
be formed up again as speedily as circumstances will permit,
while the second line will advance and carry out a fresh attack on
the position. For this the artillery will cover the retreat firing on
whatever arm most endangers the troops in their retrograde
movement and then, reinforced if possible, renew the cannonade
to prepare for a second assault. But if the defeat is so great, or
if the assailant's supporting lines have been drawn into the vortex
of the fight so jis to leave liim no further fresh troops to recom-
mence the attack, he will have to retire under cover of the cav-
alry and artillery and of the least disorganized portion of the in-
fantry. In such a critical moment the cavalry and artillery may
have to play an impoitant part as these arms must run every risk
to enable the retreat to be safely effected until a rearguard can
be organized to protect the movement. With this view, the first
position. where a stand can be made close to the field of action
must be taken up by the freshest of the infantry, and the guns
must be posted in such a manner as not only to support the in-
fantry but also to cover all the necessary dispositions for con-
ducting the retreat in good order.
TIIK ACTIVE DEFEXCE "F AX AR.VV /.V POSITION A<}A[NST
ATTACK.
Should the (ieneral of an army on meeting with tiie enemy (if
he has not previously taken up a strong position with the purpose
of awaiting attack) decide to stand on the defensive, he should
take up the position most suitable for his purpose without delay,
as the superiority to be attained by this course of action nnist re-
sult in great measure from the advantages attendant upon choice
404
TACTICAL NOTES.
of ground and from the time available for turning that ground to
best account.
The occupation of a position, the requirements of a good posi-
tion, and the manner of apportioning the troops to the ground,
etc., have been dealt with in previous chapters, it is now pro-
posed to see how the defender will turn his chosen position to
account against the assailant.
FIRST STAGE OF THE DEFENCE.
As has been seen in considering the attack, the opening of the
first phase of the fight will probably be a series of cavalry actions
followed by an affair of outposts, from which the defender may
be able to form some opinion of the force and intentions of the
enemy.
In minor operations the defender's front would also be covered
by small reconnoitring parties from whose reports he would ar-
rive at the conclusions necessary for arranging the defence.
When the enemy is reported to be advancing, the General, should
the ground admit of it, would probably send forward part of his
artillery, properly supported, to an advanced position to cover
a reconnaissance of the advancing enemy which should generally
be made if possible, and to enable it to be more active and daring.
Another object of sending forward artillery is to compel the
enemy to declare his intentions at an early period and to deploy
at a distance if he intends to attack the position. In this for-
ward position the guns would act much as in the preliminary
position of the attack, and would in a similar manner be pro-
tected by cavalry or infantry, or both, on the exposed flank.
When they have to retire it would usually be by a flank and
under cover of the fire of the guns and infantry of the main posi-
tion.
During the early part of this stage the Commander would no
doubt be able to complete his preliminary plans for defence and
would issue his orders thereon much in the same manner as if
for attack. The mode of operations indicated in the second
clause of the orders (p. 381.) would probably be, in this case, to
await the enemy in a certain position and there to engage him
with such and such intentions. In the fourth clause, the points
to be defensively occupied by each fraction of the force would be
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
405
detailed, and also the relative positions of each portion of the
reserves.
As was seen in a previous chapter, when all dispositions for
the defence are completed, neither the places prepared for the
batteries nor the shooting trenches should be occupied in any
force by guns or troops till the proper moment for action arrives;
but they should be held back under cover in such order as to be
readily moved up to their posts at the proper moment. The
artillery would first take post, but not too soon. No advantage
can be gained by the guns of the main position opening fire upon
small and scattered advanced detachments of the enemy, and the
position of the batteries of the defence would be thereby prema-
turely disclosed to no purpose.
During the reconnaissance of the position by the enemy, the
defenders should not be tempted to show niore of their force and
dispositions than is necessary. The enemy's attacks must of
course be warded off, but only so much infantry and artillery
should be shown as will suffice for this. It will not generally be
possible to prevent the enemy from obtaining a more or less ex-
act idea of the nature and extent of the positions occupied, but
he need not be allowed to find out the position of more guns than
are absolutely required to keep in check those which he brings up,
or to discover the position of the reserves. This is supposing
the enemy has been compelled to deploy by guns being sent to
the front. Should this not have been done, then when the
enemy's main columns can be discerned a,nd are within range, so
that they can be forced to deploy by fire being opened upon them,
the guns should move into position; and as soon as the enemy be-
gins to show signs of preparing for serious attack by developing
large masses of artillery, then all the batteries of the defence
should occupy themselves with trying to prevent the obtaining of
a superiority of fire by the attack.
The greater part of the infantry, with the exception of the
skirmishers in front of the guns, or detachments holding advanced
posts, should not yet be brought up from under their cover.
They can do no good at this juncture in the front line, and their
moral tone will be better preserved by their being saved from the
effects of the preliminary artillery fire. Nevertheless, owing to
the development of long range fire, a portion of the infantry
4o6
TACTICAL NOTES.
might occupy the sliooting trenches to support the fire of its
artillery aj^ainst that of the assailant, the fire being executed by
volleys or at all events kept iDidcr the complete control of the
leaders of the fighting units.
The tactics of the defender's artillery at the beginning of an
action have already been alluded to, vi/: first, to hinder the at-
tacking artillery from concentrating fire on the defending infantry
by engaging and, if possible, crushing them in detail ; secondly,
to fire on supports and reserves of the attacking infahtr}-, or even
on thick lines of skirmishers if they can be taken oblicpiely. This
second use of the defender's artiller}' may be all that is required
of it under some circumstances very favourable for the defence,
as when no position offers itself for the attacking artillery.
This would be the case when the opposing heights are wooded, as
was the case on the left of the French line at Woerth where the
Bavarians could not bring up their artillery in the woods, or when
the defenders occupy a range of heights commanding an exten-
sive plain and the attacking artillery is not sufficiently numerous
or bold to encounter the defender's artillery at such a disadvan-
tage.
That there will be an artillery duel at the commencement of a
battle is therefore exceedingly probable. The artillery of the
attack must silence more or less completely the artillery of the
defence, or no attack can be made with any prospect of suc-
cess, and until this is done it will not be able to direct its fire on
the infantry line of the defence to prepare the way for its own in-
fantry under pain of being itself silenced. On the other hand, if
the artillery of the defence does not engage the attacking artillery,
the latter can accomplish its task unmolested ; and further, at the
commencement of an action in all probability but little will show
itself on the assailant's side except artillery. As soon however
as the assailant's infantry begins to show itself in sufficient force
to present a good object to fire at, which would chiefly be his
supports and reserves at this stage, the defensive artillery should,
without doubt, direct a part at least of their fire at these, as the
grand object of the whole fighting is to beat the infantry. In fact,
at later stages of the action, the artillery of the defence should
direct its whole attention on the attacking infantry.
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
407
The artillery of the defence in this artillery duel will have an
advantage in beinj^ in all probability protected by intrenclunents
while the assailants are comparatively exposed, and in havinj^f had
the opportunity of measurinj^ l^eforehand the ranges to all points
where the artillery of the attai k is likely to place itself, as well as
to various points which nuist be occupied by the enemy in his ad-
vance. With the aid of these advantages it is possible that the
defence may maintain a superiority of fire. If this be the case, it
will be hardly possible for a direct attack to succeed. Hut in all
probability, inasmuch as the assailant can choose the point where
he will attack and b'jn^ np large masses of artillery to bear upon
that point, he will eventually obtain a superiority over the artil-
lery of the defence, and will then begin to direct part of his fire
upon that portion of the main defensive line where his infantry
attack is to be delivered. After this artillery preparation the
infantry attack will begin.
Should it become evidently no longer pt)ssible to cope with the
attacking artillery successfully, it will be for the superior authori-
ties to decide whether any of the batteries of the defence should
be withdrawn temporarily from action in order that they may be
kept in readiness to come forward again later in the action when
the assault is immediately threatened to aid the infantry in the
final struggle. This will probably only be necessary if the bat-
teries run the risk of being entirely disabled if they remain in
action, so that if some batteries were not withdrawn for a time
there would be no artillery to take part in the fight at the critical
period.
By this time the inftmtry of the defence will have been brought
up and will be firing by volleys or limited independent firing on
the advancing enemy up to about 1,300 yards.
til
m
m
A
■ I
;
SECOND STA(;E ()1- THi: DEFENCl-:.
The real point menaced by the attack being made clearly ap-
l)arent, the second stage of the defence may be said toconnnence.
The Commander will reinforce the threateiu;(l point to meet the
assailants with a superif)r fire, and the artillery of the defence
will now (lirc'ct its principal attention to repelling tlie aihaucing
infantry. No definiti- rule can be laid down as to the objects of
4o8
TACTICAL NOTES.
its fire, whether firinfj line, supports, or reserves, any of these may
be the object at various times. If masses of infantry should
however at any time show themselves, they will afford a better
mark than thin lines of men in open order.
When the infantry attack develops itself the skirmishers, that
were originally sent out to keep the enemy's sharpshooters from
annoying the guns of the defence and to keep at as great distance
as possible the attacking batteries, should fall back and clear the
front so that the fire of the main line, which should now be fully
occupied, may be imimpeded. The defenders should remain in
their covered positions as long as the enemy is kept at a respect-
ful distance, for the action has not yet reached the stage of de-
cisive counter-stroke and ^vere they to advance at this stage they
would be giving up the advantage of cover without any corres-
ponding gain.
When the attacking infantry approach the main position and
the attack is clearly developed, the artillery of the defence must
concentrate upon them the fire of every available gun. This fire
must be kept up to the last moment even should the enemy
approach to case shot range. The ground must be held, and the
enemy repelled at any cost. The most effective mode of check-
ing the advance of hostile infantry by artillery fire has
been found to be to concentrate fire on some clearly marked
line parallel to the front of the position which they must cross,
such as a road or path, a fence, stream, ridge, or hollow in the
ground, the range of which has been previously ascertained. Even
should there be no obstacle on this line the losses in passing it
will be so great and so sudden that none but the best troops will
advance beyond it.
Sliould the enemy succeed in approaching within dangerous
proximity so that an assault on an important point may be ex-
pected, portions of the local reserves must be brought up in order,
by counter-attack at favourable optunities, to ward off' the threat-
ened danger. These coiniter-strokes will be delivered with most
effect on the Hanks of the tn)()])s assailing any point, and their
judicious timing will be a matter of good judgment. If delivered
too soon the enemy may be able to repidse them, and if not soon
enough it may be too late to prevent his ingress. Small bf>dies
TT
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
409
of cavalry, if judiciously posted, may also be employed in such
counter-strokes.
This brings us to the subject of counter-attacks and offensive
returns, and to the when, how, and where the^ should be delivered,
and as these are matters of great importance they will be dealt
with in the next chapter.
At this second stage, it would also very probably be necessary
to resist a flank movement of the attacking troops. For this pur-
pose cavalry may be usefully employed if sent forward on the
flanks to seek for opportunities of throwing the flanks of the at-
tacking infantry into disorder, or of capturing guns coo rashly
advanced.
THIRD STAGE OF THE DEFENCE.
This stage comprises the final repulse of the assailant, or of the
defender's enforced retreat from his position. In either case pur-
suit by the victors may ensue. Immediately before and during
the final advance or assault every gun of the defence should con-
centrate its fire upon the attacking infantry in order to check
their advance; and, should the assailants retire, the guns and also
the infantry in the shooting line must continue to fire upon them
and pursue them in retreat by their fire until masked by the in-
terposing troops sent forward in pursuit from the General Re-
serves.
Should the attack succeed so far as to pierce the first line of
defence at any point, the artillery in second line in that part of
the position as well as any infantry that may be available must
continue their fire when not masked by their own troops and sup-
port the counter-attacks of the local reserves. The guns and in-
fantry in the adjoining parts of the position converge their fire on
the supports and reserves of the attack who are striving to pour
in through the gap. The whole or part of the General Reserve
would hasten to the spot to support the offensive action of the
local reserves, and owing to the rapidity of movement of cavalry
this would probably be the first arm from the General Reserve
which will arrive, and it should by gallant charges endeavour to
keep the enemy in check until the infantry can come up. The
[mm
m
410
TACTICAL NOTES.
great advantage of a force of mounted infantry is here apparent
who, on arriving on the scene, would dismount and act as infantry.
Should it not be possible to expel the assailant out of the posi-
tion he has won, and if he is in sufficient force, the defenders will
have to fall back, guns covering the movement to enable the in-
fantry to disengage itself. If there be a second position in rear
the defenders must retire in such a manner as to unmask the fire
from the works in this second line which will now open on the
enemy. The defe "s of the front line will retreat through this
second line which , now contain the assailant and compel him
to make fresh arrangements for attacking it. Should the spirit
of the troops allow of it, the defender should endeavour to re-
capture the front line ere the assailant has had time to intrcncli
himself in it. As he will be acquainted with the ground a night
attack will have the greatest chances of success.
Should the enemy be driven out of the position, the works of
defence must be at once repaired ; if not, the defence of the second
line, or if that be subsequently captured, the defence of the third
line, if any, will be conducted on the same principles as that of
the first line of defence. Should a retreat become inevitable a
rearguard position, '■eviously prepared, must be occupied by the
freshest troops to n- the retirement of the remainder.
In all retirements some troops must seek to cover the move-
ment to enable the infantry to retreat in good order. In an open
country the cavalry of the defence would, with the aid of horse
artillery and also of field artillery if recpiired, assist in checking
the purciiit ; in a close country this service would be undertaken
by infantry and artillery ; in a varied country it would be shared
by all three arms.
PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ATTACKS BY NIGHT.
When the enemy is known to be in the vicinity special arrange-
ments must be made to guard against surprise by ni^ht attacks.
For this the troops shoulu be freciuently practised to fall in and
move rapidly on the sound of an alarm to the positions assigned
to them without noise or confusion ; and means must be devised
by the different bodies or imits to keep up contact with neigh-
bouring fractions. This is most important owing to the danger
GENERAL COURSE OF AN ENGAGEMENT.
411
and consequent confusion of at night firing on your own troops.
Firing by volleys is to be specially recommended in night en-
gagements and, since judging distances at night is illusory, the
men should be constantly enjoined to fire low.
Where materials are available, a line of large fires may be made
to burn throughout the night in front of those parts of the posi-
tion liable to attack and at known distances from the position,
placing outposts and sentries behind these fires.
The defender should be prepared to make counter-attacks on
the assaulting colunms so as to throw them into confusion, but in
doing so care must be taken that the defenders in the shooting
line do not fire on their comrades engaged in the counter-attacks.
In making these counter-attacks it must be remembered that at
night all movements must be made in close formations.
The arrangements for detailing guards, inlying piquets, etc.,
for the defence of field works are generally treated at length in
works on fortification and will not be entered upon here, as the
general arrangements apply equally to an extensive intrenched
position.
CHAPTER XI.
COUNTER ATTACKS AND OFFENSIVE RETURNS.
I
It has been said chat, whenever possible, no defensive position
should be taken up without turning the defensive into offensive
action whenever opportunities offer, and it will therefore be
necessary to consider how and when counter-attacks or offensive
returns may be made; and in preparing a position for defence
the points whence such counterstrokes are to be made must be
well considered.*
There are various modes of making these :
1. A local coui ter-attack out of the position directly to the
front, or a local flank attack made by the local reserves of the
troops holding the part of the line attacked ; either :
a. At the moment when the assailant is about to make his final
rush, in order to avert this danger ; or,
b. When he hi.s begun to waver and fall back overpowered and
demoralized by the fire of the defenders, and in order to complete
and accelerate the repulse ; or,
c. To take advantage of any temporary confusion caused by
mistakes on the part of the enemy.
2. A local counter-attack inside the position by the local re-
serves, immediately after the enemy has gained a footing within
the position, with the object of expelling the hostile troops who
have gained this advantage.
3. A general counter-attack inside the position, made by the
•This chapter is principally taken from "Defence and Attack of Positions" by
Col. Schaw, R. K.
COUNTER ATTACKS AND OFFENSIVE RETURNS.
413
•ositions" by
general reserves on an enemy, after he has penetrated the first
line of defence, and while he is still in confusion.
4. A general offensive movemeni: outside the position by the
general or main reserve, and supported, it may be, by the whole
army after the original assailant has expended his force in unsuc-
cessful attacks.
It may be stated at the outset that troops of the shooting line
of the defence should never or very rarely take part in local
courter-attacks, as the troops so leaving their shelter and ceasing
their elective fire both incur heavier loss themselves and also
fail to inflict as much loss on the enemy as they would do if
they continued to fire steadily from their shelter. Troops of the
fighting line of defence must then trust to fire and fire only, re-
sisting alike the inclination to retire before apparently over-
whelming masses, or to dash out with the bayonet at a wavering
attack. Only in case the enemy should really close and join
issue at close quarters, should the conflict assume the type of a
mele^ ; and at this stage it will really be less dangerous for the
troops of the fighting line to fight hand-to-hand than to attempt
to retreat when they will infallibly be shot down. The examples
from late years are so numerous in which the attempt of the first
line to attack directly to its front proved futile and wasteful of
life, that this mode of action may be considered inadmissible.
French in 1870 and Spaniards in 1874 have alike boldly left their
trenches and rushed at their enemies, and alike they have suffer-
ed for their temerity without deriving any advantage from k".
With reference to the modes of counter-attack under heads 2
and 3, the enemy, if he has gained a footing inside the position,
must of course be expelled at all hazards if the position is to be
maintained ; but every effort should be made to prevent his gain-
ing such a footing and thus the first line of defence must be well
and strongly posted, and the local counter-attack outside the
position (as under head i) should if jiossible be resorted to when
he has succeeded in approaching within dangerous proximity so
that an assault o. i important point may be expected. When
this is the case portions of the troops of the local reserve may be
brought up in order to ward off the threatened danger by counter-
attacks. These counter-attacks will be delivered with most effect
m
II
414
TACTICAL NOTES.
"V
on the flanks of the troops assaihng any point and good judge-
ment will be required to time them so that favourable opportuni-
ties be at onced seized. If delivered too soon the enemy may be
able to repulse them, and if not soon enough it may be too late
to save that part of the position. There is however little doubt
that the defender should, if possible, attack the enemy just before
his final attack, as the moral advantage lies with him who shows
he is not afraid to take the initiative. On this account this
method of counter-attack would be preferable than for the defen-
der not to make a counter-stroke until he has received the attack
andrepulsed it, although there is no great physical advantage to
be claimed by either method.
It is during these local counter-attacks, either when the assault
has failed or when the enemy can be attacked in ilank, that
cavalry, when small bodies can be concealed sufficiently near at
hand, has the best opportunity of useful employment during a
defensive action, provided the ground in front of the position is
sufficiently open and otherwise suitable for its action. Such
counter-attacks nuist be purely local, producing no doubt their
effect in the general result by increasing the losses and demoraliza-
tion of the assailant, but they cannot be pressed home.
Small local reserves, when they engage in local counter-attacks
either inside or outside the position, may inflict great losses on
the enemy by such energetic local action, as they gain a compara-
tive force considerably beyond what their actual numbers seem
to warrant because they attack at the right moment, when the
enemy is either suffering heavily by fire outside the position and
is also attacked in flank, or wlien iiaving forced his way in he is
suffering from the confusion and temporary nervousness con-
sequent upon his attack.
As these counter-attacks have to be properly timed, when the
enemy has approached to within rushing distance of the point
of attack and is pouring in a most deadly fire previous to the
final rush, the troops destined to make the counter-attack should
be brought uj) in close; proximity to the threatened point and
formed ix-ady for immediati; advance but still kept as much as
can be under cover and to one side of the point attacked, if pos-
sible, so as to make a flank attack: then a forward movement
f
% "^
COUNTER ATTACKS AND OFFENSIVE RETURNS,
415
just as the assailants are disordered by their rush to the assault
will very probably be crowned with success. The troops occupy-
ing the main line of defence will not, as has been pointed out,
take part in the couuter-attack but will be prepared to open fire
again as soon as their front is clear by the withdrawal of the
troops executing the counter-stroke.
In this manner the fight will often be continued, the action
wavering backwards and forwards until the strength of one side
or the other is exhausted. Reinforcements, if need be, must be
sent to the defensive line from the general reserves but the latter
should be kept intact as long as possible for the final and decisive
offensive return.
Such are the general principles on which local counter-attacks
are based, but when, where, and how to deliver the decisive offen-
sive return is the most difficult problem for a General acting on
the defensive to decide. In former days, when battles were usually
fought on open plains with the two armies drawn up within view
of one another at no great distance apart, a General could see if
his adversary made any mistake and ga\e him an opportunity of
striking ; but, in these days, it will be very difficult for a General
on the defensive to know whether the assailant has exhausted his
strength at any point so that a counter-attack will have a fail'
chance of success, and he will be liable to let the favourable time
pass by in fear lest he should be drawn from his strong position
and use up his reserves whilst his enemy has still troops in hand
to repel his attack and punish him for his false move. In making
a right decision under these circumstances a General will have
full scope for showing his discernment and genius, and it is im-
possible to give any definite rules by which he may be guided.
One consideration may however be mentioned which might give
a clue to a right judgment. If an attack, which is cvidentlv a
real one and has been pressed on w ith vigour and determination
and continually strengthened by fresh troops from time to time,
begins to slacken in its intensity, it is a fair deduction that there
are no more reserves immediately a\ailal)le on that part of the
field: for it is a maxim that serious attacks once begun should not
be allowed to wane, l)ut should be continuously pushed on to the
end. Tluu-efore, a General conunanding on au\ pait of a fi(;lfi of
battle finding an important attack slackening, will piobably find
:i: . 1 1
i
nil
ill
'!i;
4x6
TACTICAL NOTES.
'
himself in presence of an opportunity when he should, if in accord
with the general plan of the battle, send forward his own im-
mediate reserves to change the enemy's cessation of advance into
a retrograde movement, but he should also send word at once to
the Commander-in-Chief so that the latter may be able to take
further measures to reap full benefit from the new aspect of affairs.
In so acting, however, care must be taken, and careful judgment
exercised not to be deceived by ruses on the part of the enemy.
As a rule then the decisive offensive return should not be made
until the defender has gained all the advantages to be derived
from the defence, and therefore only after the assailant has re-
newed his efforts again and again and has failed, and endeavours to
draw off his shattered and disheartened troops to reorganize and
recruit, oi when the energy of the attack is slackening perceptibly;
then the defender, in order to complete his victory and turn de-
feat into a rout, should assume a vigorous offensive which in great
battles may not take place till the second or even the third day.
From this point of view the object of a defensive battle should
be to wear out the assailant by patiently enduring and repelling
all his attacks and making him suffer as heavily as possible by
accurate fire. But, as already explained, this should on no account
preclude the assumption of the oftensive at an earlier stage of the
battle as the defender nmst ever be ready to profit by any mis-
takes made by the assailant, as for instance when large gaps are
left between the attacking bodies, or when the attack wavers along
a part of the front when a local counter-attack may be turned
into a general offensive return.
Whether the defender waits for the assailant to make successive
attacks or not the most favourable moment for the offensive
movement is immediately after an attack has failed as the dis-
organization of the attack is then greatest and a re-action sets in.
Should the enemy break the line at any point by a successful
local attack, the ground so lost must be regained at once by means
of the local reserves assisted sometimes by cavalry or even by a
part of the general reserve if necessary. When his local attacks
fail, I(um1 reserves, particularly cavalry, may be employed to in-
crease his losses and confusion : occasionally local reserves may
make sorties out of the position to :u(l in repelling or to complete
COUNTEK ATTACKS AND OFFENSIVE RETURNS.
417
in accord
own im-
/ance into
it once to
e to take
; of affairs,
judgment
e enemy.
it be made
e derived
it has re-
javours to
inize and
rceptibly;
turn de-
ll in great
bird day.
:le should
repelhng
ssible by
account
ige of the
any mis-
gaps are
'ers along
)e turned
uccessive
offensive
1 the dis-
)n sets in.
the repulse of a local attack ; but the great offensive return will be
made towards the close of the battle. It may be on the enemy's
Hank by troops detached for the purpose so as to envelop bin; be-
tween the position and the Hank attack ; but the reserves intended
for this counter-attack must be moved during the battle, if pos-
sible out of sight of the enemy, so as to make their attack a sur-
prise, and a Oeneral may often hesitate before he loses his hold
on a large part of his force and determines for a time to maintain
his position with the remainder at all ha;;ards in hope of obtain-
ing a tlecisive victory in the end. The troops so detached for the
Hank attack are also in the somewh.'^.t critical position of exposing
their outer flank to the enemy, and moreover the difficulty of
bringing large bodies of troops from cover and concealment in
extended order, so necessary for attack in the present day, to
attack the assailants in tlank is an additional difficulty to this
mode of offensive return. It is universally admitted that careful
preparation and extended order are essentials to success in attack
and also that attacks must be quick and concentrated, and these
conditions of success are not reversed in the counter-attack,
though if this latter be made after the fire of the defence has pro-
duced its full effect this fire will constitute the preparation needed.
Local and strategical considerations, together with the evident
tactical advantage obtained by this mode of action, may lead to
its adoption in some cases ; in others the offensive return may be
made from the centre of the position, i.e., from between two tac-
tical supporting points, thegro.und having been kept open for that
purpose, straight at the enemv's centre, after which In turning
right and left the enemy's attack may be taken in flank. The re-
sult of such a blow, if successful, will be very decisive throwing
the fractions of the beaten army "i; divergent lines of retreat, but
it has the great disadvantage of masking part of the fire of the
defence. This method has also the recommendation of simpli-
city in execution, of support from the troops occupying the posi-
tion in case of failure, and of preparation by a convergent fire of
all the bj-tteries in the line of battle that can be brought to bear
on the point of attack ; and whenever the form of the ground is sui-
table and other considerations do not proscribe it, it would seem
preferable to an attack from either liank. Nevertheless the fail-
ure of the French counter-attacks in the war of 1870 have been
tl
4i8
TACTICAL NOTES.
ascribed to their exclusive use of the direct offensive, but their
counter-attacks were as a rule badly planned and feebly carried
out. But whether this final offensive return be convergent, or by
an advance from a flank, or from the centre, or by any combina-
tion of these, it must be carried out in every particular with the
preparation and the precautions necessary for a primary attack,
from which it only differs in that the enemy has lost heavily and
is fatigued and disheartened. His losses ought to be much
greater than those of the defending army ; from the nature of the
engagement, the troops of the latter ought to be the fresher; and
if the defensive position be well selected the attacking army will
not have a good position in which to receive the offensive return.
Unfortunately for the defending army their losses, in propor-
tion to their numbers, will often be too heavy, and the exhaustion
of the whole force too great to enable them to attack or pursue
energetically ; but if the advantages of their position have been
such as to enable them to hold the position against all attacks,
and still keep a strong reserve out of the fight fresh and ready to
act offensively when the time comes, the victory ought to declare
itself decisively for the defence. Von Scherff considers an offen-
sive-defensive position to be a bad one if it requires more than
half the force to hold it, and to be good when it can be held suc-
cessfully by one-third leaving two-thirds of the whole force for
the offensive counter-stroke ; but this writer is so much in favour
of the attack as against the defence that his views are apt to be
at times rather extreme.
When comparatively small bodies of troops come into collision
it is evident that the local counter-attack may produce the final
result because it may be relatively strong.
A position, or a part of a position, in front of which there is an
obstacle or cover giving strong defensive ground to the attack
can never be a proper field for offensive returns outside the posi-
tion, and ought not to be prepared with this object. The defence
here should be passive, and counter-attacks, if ever made, should
be by local reserves inside the position against an assailant who
may have forced an entrance at any point, or outside the position,
between it and the obstacle, before the final rush.
Finally, with regard to the employment of the general or main
sive return.
COUNTER ATTACKS AND OFFENSIVE RETURNS.
419
reserves, they should be kept intact as long as possible for de-
cisive counter-strokes, but yet no important point of the defen-
sive line should be permitted to be lost for want of timely aid.
A General's ability will be shown in the management of his re-
serves, so as not to be too late in sending reinforcements while
not using them unnecessarily early. Should an important point
in the defensive line unfortunately be captured, strong efforts
should be made to re-take it before the enemy has time to settle
himself in it : even if the recapture is not effected bucli a course
of action will reduce him to the defensive at that point, and the
battle may be won elsewhere. Troops should, however, not be
wasted in costly efforts to re-take positions in front of the main
line that may have been captured, but whose loss does not neces-
sarily endanger the position.
i'-l;
II
<' i;i
P
I I;
eral or main
CHAPTER XIL
NIC.HT ATTACKS.
1
Military history is replete with numerous incidents of nij,'lit
attacks more or less successful, but they have j^enerally had the
character of simple episodes such as attacks on localities made by
comparatively small bodies ; but the question arises whether, in
wars of the futurt nij^dit attacks will not assume the form of re^-^u-
lar preconcerted and extensive operations designed to annul tlic
crushing superiority which the constant improvement in arms of
precision assure to the local defence. To the increased power of
resistance of modern weapons must also be added the greater use
of intrenchments, and it will often be a (juestion whether the
risks of a night attack, or an attack in a fog, are not less serious
than the certain loss of a frontal attack by daylight. It is not to
be supposed that the defenders can be taken 1)\' smprise if their
outpost and reconnoitring or patrolling duties have been carefully
attended to, but the advantages of night attacks are that the
shooting qualities (apart from rapidity) of the new arms disappear,
and the defence is deprived of an element on which it counted:
for the security of fortified positions against assault depends main-
ly upon the effect of fire-arms, and especially upon those of the
infantrx . If the defenders cannot see or take aim, as is the case
at night or in a fog, and they can only deliver a few shots before
the assailant's storming colunms come to close quarters, security
against assault can hardly l)ti obtained, and they have only the
advantage afforded by obstacles which in field works are generally
easy to overcome.
And it may be asked whether, considering the mideniablc
superiority modern fire arms give to the local defence, by choos-
ing the place and time an ('(iiiality nia\ not Ix^ restored fo the
NIGHT ATTACKS.
421
attack, and whether nij^ht attacks, in spite of their disadvantages
to tlie assailants, may not be employed by them more commonly
than heretofore provided the circumstances are favourable to this
kind of attack. Amonj; such circumstances may be reckoned the
occurrence of an attack upon ground which is well known to most
of the leaders of the attacking troops ; if to this is added a
knowledge of the distribution of the defendets, a night attack
would probably be less disadvantageous to the assailants than an
attack by day, and would therefore be preferred. This knowledge,
both of the ground and of the enemy's dispositions, is however
nearly impossible to be obtained by the assailant of a fortified
.position, for the works cover the position of the army in and be-
hind them so that a general attack on a large scale during the
night, or in a fog, has been considered among the most desj)erate
means of conquering the enemy, l^ut, inasmuch as modern en-
gagements generally turn into desperate attacks upon localities,
such as advanced posts or the decisive points of a defensive
position, it would seem that such points might with advantage be
taken by assault at night. Hut the assailants will probably ex-
perience some difficulty in retaining possession of the position
when won, for the defender, also taking advantage of the night or
the fog and having the further great advantage oi being well
acquainted with the ground and with the defences, will be pretty
sure to return the assault, to resist which the assailants must have
strong reserves ready.
It is well known how the Russian troops, rushing forward to
the assault with incomparable energy, have been time and again
crushed by the formidable fire of the Turks at Plevna. Would
they not have escaped these terrible effects, would it not have
been possible fur them to push on to close (|uarters and engage
in hand to hand combat with the bayonet, had they profited bv
the darkness of night ? It may be thought so, for, in another
theatre, these same Russian troojjs experienced such attacks
several times to their c(»st. More than once the guards in their
trenches before Geok Tepc could not prevent their savage
enemies from throwing tlirmselves upon tlicm in the. darkness
and inilicting heavy losses upon them in spite of their weapons ;
and consecjuenty, when (ieneral Skobcleff took command of the
fxpcflit ion the ft>ll<iwing year he issufi] detailed instrnetioiis for
m
if J
422
TACTICAL NOTES.
■ I
li
' " •fr,'S''>'3
resistinpf such night attacks. But even in 1877 among other
night attacks may be cited the capture of Kars, the works of
which were not storm proof otherwise an open assault would not
have been possible. At 9 o'clock at night, in clear moonlight,
about four or five battalions were directed against each of the five
principal works round Kars. There was hardly any fire contest,
and the assailants lost less than 10 per cent, of the troops engag-
ed, while in the first and second attacks on Plevna their losses
were 32 and 25 per cent, respectively.
The Franco-Cierman war affords several instances of successful
night attacks on villages which, when compared with numerous
attacks by day, tend to show that by day villages, if strongly held
and defended, cannot be assaulted by infantry alone but only after
an artillery bombai'ment, but that infantry attacks by night have
every prospect of success. Considerable village fighting took
place during the great French sortie from Metz on the 31st of
August and ist September, 1870. At night the village of Noisse-
ville, which during the day had been captured by the French, was
retaken by the Germans ; but one hour later it was again car-
ried by the French. So also during the siege of Belfort the Ger-
mans succeeded in capturing several defended villages by night
attacks, and the French in attacking Hericourt on the i6th of
January, 1871, were enabled, under cover of a dense fog, to get
close up to the town.
The Russians have been so imbued with the advantages of
night attacks that, in their recent summer manoeuvres, the General
Commanding directed that during these exercises troops were to
be practised in night operations so as to accustom them to ap-
proach an enemy's positions without being seen or heard.
Two eminent military writers, Colonel Boguslawski and Gen-
eral Brialmont, have also both been drawing attention to the
important role which is reserved for night attacks.
Colonel Boguslawski in a recent work writes as follows : — " It
is particularly important to accustom troops to night attacks and
alarms. I'or some considerable time these exercises have, very
wrongly, Deen allowed to f;ill into disfavour. Without doubt
they were often accompanied with a certain amount of 'humbug'
which seemed to reduce them to a useless comedy, but this must
NIGHT ATTACKS.
423
not allow the necessity to be overlooked of training a young
soldier to fly to his place in the fight at the first sound of alarm."
He points out that it is only by „such exercises that troops will
be able to fall in instantaneously and with perfect order and discip-
line at night. " Night attacks have their advocates and their
adversaries. It is certain that a night attack is difficult of exe-
cution, it is no less certain that if made use of at the proper time
it may bring about a grand and decisive result. Many afhrm that
this mode of attack will be of frequent occurrence in the next
war because the crushing effects of fire will compel attacks to be
made by surprise and under cover of darkness. In any case, it
appears advisable to accustom troops to these attacks so as to
train them to retain the most perfect order.
" What is necessary above all is to make the junior officers and
soldiers clearly understand that tactics in a night engagement,
and especially the tactics of the assailant, must be completely
different to what they are by day. In the latter individual order
is essential, whereas in the former it is close order."
General Brialmont, who is also of opinion that night operations
will become more frequent and that tacticians have hardly as yet
given the subject sufficient consideration, writes : — '-The assail-
ant must retain his troops in close formations and advance in
company columns at deploying intervals. Thanks to the dark-
ness these columns will run but little risk and need not have to
deploy until the moment of assault with the bayonet. . . The
assailant will not commence firing until the defender opens fire,
and even then he should do so in r.:oderation in order to deceive
him as to the point against which the principal effort will be
made. For this purpose, he will only throw out a thick veil of
skirmishers on those portions of his front where he has but a
small force suitable to the execution of a demonstrative action.
With the same object in view, he will direct small detachments
against the wings of the enemy's line or position and even against
his rear which will occupy an extended front and will endeavour
to attract as large a force of the enemy as possible by making a
noise and sustaining a continuous fire.
" Deceived by these demonstrations, the defender will in all
probability send a portion of his reserves towards the flanks of
-^
Ml I
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P
424
TACTICAL NOTES.
hi
his line, or ut least towards a part which the assailant has no in-
tention of forcin^^
" The commanders of battalions or of rej^'iments in the fust line
will, before commencinj]^ the advance, arrange a certain number
of signals among themselves in order to guide them in the dark-
ness and to arrive at the position simultaneously (the signals will
be given by means of whistles, lanterns, rockets, etc.) It is of
course understood that the commanders of battalions will have
had t^he ground they are to cross at night reconnoitred during tlu;
day, or the}- will have done so themselves.
" The greatest precautions must be taken and detailed instruc-
tions given to maintain order and silence, to impress calmness on
the men, to enjoin them to pa}' attention to orders, to be prepared
against false alarms, to avoid losing the right way, not to deploy
before the proper time, and above all that the different fractions
do not tire on each other should the enemy, as he will not fail t(}
do, send forward small columns with the object of creating dis-
order in the assailing line.''
All the various precautions here enjoined point to the inherent
difficulties of attacks made by night or in a fog, and it is a (lues-
tion whether it will be possible in an attack in force to prevent
units from wandering away from their assigned path, to maintain
order, and to prevent different fractions from tiring into each other.
It must be specially not id that formations in cl<)sc order are
strongly recommended for ni^lit attacks, and it woidd seem doubt-
ful whether the formation of small company columns of 250 men
at deploying intervals, recommended by Oeneral l>rialmont, is a
formation sufficiently compact under the circumstances. Owing
to the darkness, and in spite of the rockets, lanterns, <S:c.,the de-
fenders will doubtless remain in suflicient uncertainty as to tlu;
movements of the assailant to be compelled to fire straight to their
front, keeping the rifle horizontal. Thus all the ground in front of
the defenders up to about 400 yards will be a dangerous /one, and
dangerous to an ecjual degree. Hence the assailant should expose
as narrow a front as possible, few columns but deep ones, which
he will not even deploy on reaching the position, or which he
will at any rate not deplox- until after ha has forced his way into
the position-
NIGHT ATTACKS.
425
IS no 111-
The only active measure of defence aj^ainst ni^ht attacks sug-
gested by General Brialmont, is an argument in favour of deep
columns. One of the "most effective means of defence, as re-
marked above, consists in sending forward small columns com-
|)osed of determined soldiers led by picked officers, who" will creep
in between the assaulting columns, fire several volleys at them,
and will then suddenly disappear in the darkness. It is to be ex-
pected that this manoeuvre will often lead several of the assailing
columns to mistake each other for enemies; and in any case it
will lead to the advance being stopped for the moment and will
throw the enemy's line into disorder which, in consequence, will
become disunited and will be unable to execute the assault with
fhe combined action desired."
This is evident, and the sole method for the assailant to avoid
such fatal mistakes is to reduce, as much as possible, the number
of his columns.
Hut in spite of the difficulties accompanying night attacks, and
the means the defender has of frustrating them, it is evident that
if the assailant can once reach his object he will have done so at
a great saving of loss. On a large scale no doubt the difficulties
of finding the way in every case, of timing the strokes of the
different bodies, and of preventing them from falling into confus-
ion are excessive, and there is also the obvious danger of the
assailant being beaten in detail should the defender be prepared
for making offensive returns. But in the case of distinct locali-
ties when boLii sides have been long facing each other and the dis-
tance between them is short, the advantage will be with the attack.
Whenever, as will often be the case, the defender's ground is
known to the assailant or to some of its leaders, the first risks are
much lessen'^d, while fog or moonlight, which hinders shooting
and yet allows the way to be seen in part, to a great extent dim-
inishes the difficulties; still the assailant is met with this diffi-
culty, if he assault just before dawn he has not time to secure his
footing before the defender makes a counter-attack, while if he
gain a footing earlier and s- 1 to work to intrench, the defender,
knowing the ground, can in his turn take advantage of the dark-
ness to close with him, sometimes in superior force.
Nevcrthelesf, it seems probable that in front of strong positions
m
! iMll
■>ji
426
TACTICAL NOTES.
dilficult or impossible to turn a nifjht attack will in future present
itself as a means of overcominjj^ resistance, difficult no doubt, but
tempting' inasmuch as it is liable to afford a possible way of
bringing about an abrupt decision and of avoiding losses.
A night attact then would be made as far as possible an attack
by surprise, and consequently a silent approach by infantry alone
is necessary. They should be formed in deep columns not too
small, and advance rapidly but as noiselessly as possible without
firing. When the advance is discovered the columns of assault
should push on as rapidly as possible, followed by reserves who
will close up and take part in the assault. When the defender
opens fire the assailant will only reply feebly. The tiring should
be more for the purpose of deceiving the enemy and of attracting
his attention away from the main point of attack than of inflict-
ing losses on him.
But if night attacks are to be a feature in future wars, as
General Brialmont wisely points out : "it will be indispensable in
time of peace to practise night engagements in order to accus-
tom troops to the strange and exciting appearance which these
actions present."
CHAPTER XIII,
USE OF FIELD FORTIFICATION BY THE ASSAILANT.
- The issue of intrenching tools to be carried by soldiers them-
selves, which has been effected in most armies, is liable to have a
direct bearing on tactics. The value of field fortification for a
defender has been long recognized, and the fact that infantry
soldiers now carry spades will not affect the principles of defence
except in so far that it will enable cover to be thrown up in a
much shorter time; and during the engagement the defender will
be able to throw up fresh works, or make retrenchments should a
part of the line appear likely to be forced, with far greater facility.
But the frequent use of the spade by the assailant in the field,
apart from siege operations, is a new feature which requires some
investigation.
It is generally conceded that the fire of modern artillery and of
infantry has become so terrible and so far ranging that infantry
must carry some means of protection from the deadliness of an
enemy's fire, and that the only practical way of doing this is for
the infantry soldier to carry his own intrenching tool. The
Turkish defence of Plevna so impressed this on the minds of
several Russian Commanders that they issued spades to their
men for the remainder of the war. Since then all the great
Military Powers have accepted the principle of providing a cer-
tain proportiiMi of intrenching tools to be carried by the soldiers
themselves. With the Austrians and Russians every file of infan-
try carries a spade, that is one spade to rwo men ; the (iermans
carry 400 portable spades, 40 pickaxes and 20 hatchets per bat-
talion, besides a riumber of heavier implements vvhich are tranS'
ported in wagons. The I'lench army has also now adopted the
principle of calling on the soldier to carry his own intreiuhing
I
If
if
«! I'll
ill
!'"m
428
TACTICAL NOTES.
tools. Only in England has this change not been effected, and
intrenching tools are apparently still to be carried in carts or on
pack animals which must of necessity be in rear of the troops
and, it is to be feared, often out of reach at the moment when
they are most wanted, namely, when the fire is hottest.
The value of the spade has been clearly shown in all recent
wars. Throughout the great struggle in America its use was
habitual on every occasion, even by armies which were superior
in force to the enem}' and when taking the offensive. Again, in
1866, the neglect of defensive tem.porary works was felt severely
W the Austrians ; and though during the first part of the Franco-
German war of 1870-71, the rapid advance of the Germans in
overwhelming numbers and their anxiety to crush the French
armies as quickly as possible, for political as well as military rea-
sons, gave them no time for intrenching, yet their immense losses
in the early battles taught them caution. Met2 and Paris were
invested, though not besieged, by armies which used the spade
more than the rifle, and the attempts of the French to break out
were foiled chieflv by the earth works thrown up by the Germans.
Yet none of these wars impressed the imagination so much with
the value of the spade as the Russo-Turkish campaign in which
the Turks generally acted on the defensive while the Russians
attacked. There appears to be two reasons for this ; first, the
Russians attacked recklessly and with little tactical skill, in-
trenchments which they should have either masked or taken by
regular siege; secondly, the Turkish soldiers carried on their own
persons almost unlimited supplies of ammunition, ever}' man
filling liis pouches, his pockets, and his havresack with cartridges,
which he managed somehow to keep replenished. An advancing
army has difficulty in bringing up ammunition quickly enough,
and in this case the Russian anmumition columns could frequent-
ly not be brought up in time owing to the badness of the roads.
The examples of Plevna and Schipka are instances of the use of
intrenchments made on the spur of the moment for resisting the
first onslaughts and, when subsequently strengthened, resisting
for many days the most gallant attempts to carry them.
The Turks fully appreciated the advantages to be derived from
the judicious employment of hasty intrenchments and field fortifi-
USE OF FIELD FORTIFICATION BY THE ASSAILANT. 429'
cation. Immediately Turkish soldiers were ordered to occupy a
position, they at once endeavoured to find cover for their deploy-
ed lines by utilizing the features and accidents of the ground,
supplementing the natural cover, where necessar}-, by excavating
what in the first place were very shallow shelter trenches. Where
the ground permitted, several infantry lines intrenched themselves
behind one another at short intervals on a more or less inclined
slope so as to obtain two or more tiers of fire. As soon as
possible these trenches were extended and enlarged, the excava-
tions were deepened, the parapets increased in thickness and
height. As time went on, traverses were constructed to screen
the defenders against oblicjue or enfilade fire; receptacles were
'hollowed out for food, vessels of water, and ammunition, so that
neither hunger, thirst, nor want of ammunition might oblige the
defenders to even temporarily quit their posts: and finally, bomb-
proof cover was provided. In the general disposition of a defen-
sive line, care was generally taken that a forward line, if it fell
into the hands of the enemy should afford no cover against the
lines in rear. If the position was held for any length of time,
redoubts were constructed on the most commanding points of
the ground, armed with guns, and traced so as tcj give a flank-
ing fire along the front or a cross fire over the ground in
advance of the longer lines of trenches. Also in the construction
of these redoubts the care taken to provide cover for the defen-
ders against hostile fire, not only against frontal or horizontal
fire, but against enfilading, oblique, or curved fire, is ever the
most noticeable feature. Where the works were exposed to artil-
lery fire, where it was to be anticipated that they would be sub-
jected to a prolonged bombardment, or where it was expected
that guns of a larger calibre than ordinary field pieces would be
brought against them, the parapets were made 18 to 20 feet thick
to secure the defenders behind them from the frontal and direct
fire of the enemy. Huge traverses of very substantial profile
were constructed across the interior to screen the defenders from
oblique and enfilade fire ; and finally, behind thes(; traverses in
rear of the parapets, and sometimes under the counterscarps of
the ditches, bombproof accommodation of a very admirable type
was provided for protection against high angle or curved fire.
I
I
.!ti1
The small amount of damage done t" the garrisons of these
430
TACTICAL NOTES.
works by the Russian field artillerv, even when this latter had
been reinforced, as it was at Plevna, by siege guns and guns of
position, proves how excellently well the precautions taken
answered the end in view. Against such works, practically of
a permanent character, except that they were not storm proof,
and were constructed entirely of wood and earth, instead of earth
with brick or stone, the Russians launched their columns to the
assault. Is it an\' wonder that they failed and were driven back
with immense loss? Is it anything new in warfare that works of
this description cannot be taken by open assault but must be ap-
proached gradually by regular siege works? By no means. In
this respect the Russo-Turkish war really teaches us nothing new
but it only confirms the conclusions already arrived at of the
great importance of earthworks in modern war.
It need not be stated that the simplest and best kind of cover
is the natural cover which is to be found more or less on every
battle field, and no training is more necessary than that which
teacher the men to avail themselves of every inequality, every
fold in the ground, every tree and bush which can afford a tem-
porary defence or even momentary concealment. Hut it often
occurs that none such are to be found exactly where it is neces-
sary for the infantry to take up their place, and it may well be
that bad positions are sometimes occupied because they afford the
necessary cover.
In the disastrous fight on the Majuba Hill against the Trans-
vaal Boers the position occupied by our troops was not what
would have been best if means for making artifical cover had been
at hand. The men stationed within the basin could not from its
edge sweep the face of the hill with their fire, and the Boers were there-
fore able to collect almost unperceived close to the lip of the basin,
and no position is good which admits of such a possibility. The
steepness of the slope was an absolute disadvantage to the Eng-
lish on that occasion for it prevented them seeing the enemy.
They ought to have been well over the edge ; but there was no
satisfactory natural cover there, and no means of forming artificial
protection were at hand. Again before this, during the fight on
the Ingogo plateau, the English troops were exposed throughout
all the weary day to the fire of enemies who dared not come to
close quarters, and the nuMi suffered under a fire from which they
USE OF FIELD FOKTIFlCAl ION UV THE ASSAILANT,
431
might have been protected if only the requisite tools and materials
had been at hand. The Zulu campaign is also rich in instances
of the same kind, but it will suffice to name the two most remarkable
examples which show the two sides of the question. At Isand-
Iwana the troops were overwhelmed because they stood unpro-
tected and with weak flanks which rested on no obstacle either
natural or artificial, the rock it is said being close to the surface
and forbidding the use of the spade. Yet that very night a weak
force at Rorke's Drift made a splendid defence, being protected
by improvised obstacles built up on the spur of the moment.
As regards the actual use of the spade on the field of battle, it
is not necessary further to consider its employment on the
'defensive as then the necessity for intrenchments is self evident,
but although in some previous pages the use of intrenchments by
the attack has been referred to, it will be necessary liere to point
out when and how hasty works are to be thrown up in the attack.
To secure ground won by the assailant it is of the greatest ad-
vantage for troops to have tools at hand wherewith to throw up
some cover, b^verywhere in the fights at Plevna, at Lovtcha, and
wherever the attack had to advance and hold its ground, the
want of tools was severely felt by the Russians. In the struggle
to hold the redoubts on the ''(ireen MiJIs,"" taken by Skobeleff,
the men, enfiladed as they were on both flanks, worked all night
with sword-bayonets, canteen-lids, and hands, and even tiucw
up the dead into the gaj)s to bar the Turks. At Lovtcha
also, when the Russian infantry had carried the first works and
got into the town, instead of making for the further border and
holding it, they hung about in ignorance of what to do, caused
l)y their want of training in works of defence.
It is not our purpose here to enter into the much vexed ([ues-
tion of the different methods of providing tools, suffice it to say
that now most foreign armies iiave issued portable tools to the
soldiers to carry which seems to be the only solution to the ijues-
tion ; but these, added to the absolute necessity of convexing more
annnunition, point to the abolition ot the valise as a load lor the
inen, or at any rate to a great reihiclion ol its uiMglit ami tiieie-
fore of its contents which will t heii ha\'e to be can ied in bat tahoii
carts.' In the Kusso- Turkish war ihr tools ol the Knssians wt-re
Ttiis Milijct iis ilrjilt, w ilJi ill till riiiiisi' ill \lilit,ir\ \iliiiiiiistr;iti()ii.
432
TACTICAL NOTES.
**■
carried with the train in wagons and were therefore never at
hand when wanted. With the Turks tools were carried by pack
horses, each of the 8 companies of a battaUon having one horse
carrying tools, and their tools were nearly always at hand.
Still what with ammunition, water, and tools, each battalion re-
quired 40 or 50 animals which was an excessive number. More-
over, because the Turks acted chiefly on the defensive these
desiderata were generally at hand ; but in case of attack these
animals could scarcely have advanced with the infantry to enable
them to intrench at critical moments. Infantry has frequently to
work over ground where neither vehicles nor pack animals can
accompany them, such as over fields and fences, through woods
and enclosures, and what are they to do then if they need impro-
vised defences and \ et have not the necessary tools at hand ?
Now that engagements take place along so great a length of
front, and that the general advance is so slow, and also owing to
the importance of the fights for localities, ground once gained
should be secured instantly by the troops who have won it, leav-
ing perhaps a further advance to fresh troops. If the position be
required for guns, preparations must be made for them as was
done at Lovtcha and also at Plevna where, in the long drawn
fighting that closed the .Russian efforts, it was by such means
alone that any way was made.
Before the attack on Lovtcha General Skobeleff, who was to
lead, was commanded to occupy a chain of heights facing the
Turkish position. He was further ordered to select positions for
the batteries, to fix the number of guns that could be placed in
position on these heights to bombard the enemy's works, to
measure the ranges, and, if possible, to throw up gun epaulments
and shooting trenches for the main body which was to follow.
There sometimes come times in the attack when the assailant's
moral force is for the time expended, when the assaulting coknnns
seem unable to advance further, and all the men can do apparently
is to lie down and fire, fully exposed perhaps to the fire of the
enemy. In such moiiuMits troops, not wishing to give up ground.
it has cost tlu'iii so much to win, yet unable tf) advance, may find
the presence of tools invaluable as enabling them to obtain some
covir from the enemy's fire while waiting for the arrival of rein-
USK Ol- F'Ii;i.l> lOKTII ICATION I5V THK ASSAILANT.
433
never at
forcements ; and besides snch trenches may be necessary to enable
them to repel a counter-attack. But to attempt to make trenches
when troops are quickly advancing and when the natural cover of
the ground can be used is not only held to be a mere waste of
time but pernicious in destroying the elan of the troops; but if it
be desired to hold a position for even a short period a shelter
trench is admittedly of immense value.
When an important point in the enemy's position has been
captured, it should at once be put into a state oi defence so as to
secure it against counter-attack and use it us a base and starting
point for further operations. Under such circumstances time is
all important. Well considered and sufficient preparations should
be made before the attack, and working parties with the necessary
tools should follow closely the attacking troops and instantly
proceed to execute the necessary works which will be of the
simplest character, such as in held works making lodgements in
the parapet or gorge if any, reversing shooting trenches, etc.; in
villages the further houses loopholed, barricading the entrances
on the enemy's side ; in woods a trench at the farther edge and
all entrances barricaded, improving communications on your own
side, etc., as time and circumstances permit or render advisable.
In the event of captured works having tc> be abandoned, they
should of course be destroyed as much as possible to prevent the
defender obtaining any advantage by their occupation.
Artillery should, whenever natural cover does not exist and
when local circumstances permit of it, throw u}) cover for gims
and detachments as in the defence. In many cases in the war of
1870-71 cover for limbers was also provided on both sides, but the
labour entailed is so great that they are out of the (]uestion in a
hasty advance, and in such cases it seems better to keep the bulk
of the teams well to the rear and flank, though the latter is
often impossible when a great line of guns is in action. A large
number of rounds can be kept at hand in the gun pits, and the
replenishing of the supply need then only be made occasionally
either by bringing up a limber or by hand as may be best. Owing
to the old fear of losing guns, limbers and teams have hitherto
been generally kept close to the guns, and therefore in exposed
positions: but here they were liable to heavy losses, and the des-
434
TACTICAL NOTES.
4*
truction of the teams has ever been the most fruitful source of
loss of guns. Far better would it be to trust the guns to defend
their own front which, when several batteries are massed, they
can generally do their flanks being protected by the other arms:
or, in cases where the country favours the approach of skirmish-
ers, by defending the front of the guns by covering parties. Of
course keeping the teams well to the rear causes delay in case of
an advance, but on the other hand casualties may make such an
advance impossible. If the ground in front of the guns is close
it should be cleared ; and clearances should also be made to ob-
tain a clear field of fire for guns.
Also the bodies of infantry destined to combine their long range
fire with that of the artillery on the points of attack, should im-
prove their positions so as to be concealed and protected from
shrapnel and, with a view to volley firing, should lodge themselves
as compactly as possible. The Russians at Tagliier used a screen
of cavalry to conceal an infantry intrenching party at work.
Sometimes, when for instance an action extends over one day,
an occurrence now much more common than of old, the assailant
has time to make artificial cover for reserves. In this way the
Germans sheltered a battalion on the night before the battle of
Gravelotte ; and the Russians, in imitation, made similar ar-
rangements in the open ground west of Plevna for infantry in
fours. It would '='eem advisable, however, that such cover should
be for one rank only as offering a smaller target.
Again, an assailant should, beforehand or during the progress
of the attack, prepare defences to cover a possible repulse and
form a rallying point for beaten troops, and enable- rearguards
to cover the communications in case of retreat or of a successful
counterattack. Closed works or intrenched localities, which com-
mand the roads and prevent them being dominated, are the most
suitable.
The (juestion of intrenching a line in front of a position to
contain the enemy with a small force while executing a flank
attack has already been considered.
The case of the assailant intrenching a position opposite to
that of the enemy in case of a reverse need not be touched upon
as it would be of the same nature as occupying a regular defen-
USE OF FIELD FORTIFICATION BY THE ASSAILANT.
435
sive position, and the works would be executed before he at-
tempted to attack the enemy.
It is seen then that the attack, as well as the defence, must
now in many cases have recourse to the spade, though the use of
intrenching by the assailant will be very limited, especially as the
attack has usually but little time for preparation.
But it is necessary here to draw attention to a possible danger.
The proved value of intrenchments, and the introduction of a
light tool as part of an infantry soldier's equipment may have the
tendency to lead the assailant to give up rapidity for a constant
use of the spade. Rapidity in striking is one of the best weapons
• of the attack, especially if the defenders have not had time to
prepare their defence. In the Turkish advance on Verboka they
advanced step by step using the spade as they wont much after
the manner of a siege, and their advance over a few hundred
3'ards took about a week ; but all that was gained by the consid-
erable labour expended in security was more than lost by the
time allowed to the Russians for completing their preparations
already commenced.
So also in the American Civil War, intrenchments wore greatly
used by the assailant as well as by the defender, the result being
that the movements of the former were apt to be very slow and
characterized by extreme caution. When the Federals were the
assailants they sometimes approached the Confederates, acting
on the defensive, by constructing works of defence along the
whole line somewhat similar to the series of parallels in the siege
of a fortress. In the attack on the Confederate position at
Corinth, the Federate General (Halleck) considered it necessary
to act with extreme caution and, as he advanced, to prepare de-
fences to re' ist offensive operations on the part of the enemy,
although himself considerably superior in point of numbers. The
result was extreme slowness of movement as it took him six
weeks to advance less than fifteen miles, and when at last he pre-
pared to assault the Confederate position, which had meanwhile
been strongly intrenched, he discovered that the Confederate
army had flown leaving nothing but dummy wooden guns and
barren defences as his prize.
The use of intrenchments in this war was carried to an extreme
436
TACTICAL NOTES.
I
on both sides, which was partly due to the Federal armies hein^^
for the most part composed of raw and inexperienced troops, and
to their want of mobility prohibiting^ rapid movements. More-
over the theatre of war was so thickly wooded that some protec-
tion against surprise and sudden attacks was a necessity, but on
the whole the experiences of the American Civil W^ar were so
peculiar that they cannot alone serve as a basis for argument as
concerns the use of intrenchments:
J^ut the two examples (juoted are sufficient to show the daugcr.
when tools are always at hand so that troops have an unlimited
power of intrenching, that the offensive spirit and even the moral
of an army may suffer, and this was realized by Oeneral Sherman
who says: "The hai)it of intrenching certainly does have the
effect of making new troops timid. \\'hen a line of battle is once
covered by a good parapet, made by the engineers or by the
labour of the men themselves, it does require an effort to make
them leave it in the face of danger "
As pointed out in a previous chapter this is one of the reasons
urged against the distances to be crossed by the fighting line of
battalions when advancing in the attack formation from being too
^hort, as every time a fresh advance has to be made the men will
have to make a special effort and, unless well in hand, some may
even remain behind in their shelter for fear of being shot down.
It may be stated that the (lermans trust to the thorough training
of their troops, and to the stern discipline to which they are sub-
jected, to make them (juit cover and advance when ordered by
their company leaders, so that they do not appear to fear any
diminution in the necessary elan or dash of their men by the fre-
quent use of the spade.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the Campaign of 1877-7N
shows that it is not sufficient merely to have organized arrange-
ments which will ensure that a sufficient supply of intrenching
tools shall always be forthcoming. More than that nuist be done.
The men must have betni taught by previous practice how to use
them ; and the officers of an army must understand how to in-
telligently supervise anif direct their employment, and how to
choose suitaJjle ground for their erection. On all these points the
Russian soldiers proved that they hi-A had no previous training
and the work of intrenching was, in consequence, fref|uentlv far
from satisfactorv.
CHAPTER XIV.
TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS.
m*
ic reasons
If in these notes reference has been more frequently made
to the German system of tactics than to any other, it must
not be supposed that the writer desires to advocate a bhnd
adherence to the German system, by no means ; nevertheless it
must be remembered that the German army is viatched by all
other Continental armies as the model to follow and, with very
few exceptions, all Continental manoeuvres are but copies of the
(jerman ; and it is incontestible that of late years the Germans
have taken the lead in the art of war. Three times in this j^en-
eration have their armies appeared in the field and gained aston-
ishing successes, whereas the armies of all the other Powers who
have become engaged in war have met with as cf)nsiderable re-
verses.
With regard, therefore, to the tactics of the near future we
cannot do better than examine what are the actual tendencies of
the German school ; for the German army, not satistied with its
past successes, has been making every effort to move in the path
of progress. If ever an army has avoided falling asleep on its
laurels, it is the army of Germany. Scarcely had the officers re-
turned to their garrisons, after victories almost without precedent,
than many of them fearlessly pointed out any defects that had
been noticeable in their system of tactics or in the employment of
the different arms.
The future emj>loyment of cavalry and artillery on tiie field of
battle has bet^n considered in the chajjters devoted to these arms,
aiul it is more witii the future tactics of infantry that we pro-
pose now to deal.
i
438
TACTICAL NOTES.
i
Many anonymous oamphlets have appeared in Germany from
time to time bearinj^ on tliis important question of infaiitry tactics,
and one of these deserves spec in) attention as it has attracted
considerable notice.*
MiHtary critics have often pointed out that in recent campaif^ns
the initiative and the individual energy of the lower ranks have
fre(]uently had too much freedom, and that the power of direct-
in?^ or restraininj^ these valuable properties should be kept in the
hands of hij^her commanders who otherwise lose all power of
control over their commands. Now it is only by tactical means
that a superior can keep in hand and lead the forces under his
command and direct their efforts on the chosen objective.
An axiom which has perhaps been accepted somewhat too hasti-
ly is that " all manoeuvring under fire is now admitted to be al-
most impossible." It has been considered that troops, once
seriously engaged, can now only move straight to their front or
fall back. Fresh troops may be pushed up to feed the front,
but once launched, no movement to the right or left is any longer
possible. This has doubtless been one of the leading features in
modern battles, yet it has not been proved hat this difficulty can-
not be overcome by tactical training and strict discipline.
On this subject, Colonel Arniin, to whose writings we shall
have again to refer presently, writes : " Oblique movements and
changes of direction, even under the eyes of the enemy, have
shown themselves to be the most effective means of securing vic-
tory ; for the enemy has nearly always recognised their purpose
too late to be able to oppose them in sufficient time by means of
counter measures." "Similar movements were found neces-
sary at the commencement of nearly every engagement in 1870."
And again : " Let it not be said that surprise can only be
brought about by strategical means and that it cannot be done
by tactical preparation. Just the opposite is 'he case. The
superior manoeuvring capabilities permit, in these days, of large
units attempting such movements, which bring about great re-
sults, with every chance of success. An infantry which, in large
bodies, can only march straight to its front and so deploy for
action, will be but an impotent tool in the hands of the ablest
'•Dio Aufgalx! itimcior Intanteric,
TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS.
439
strateji^ist. It is only a superior tactical maiuieuvring power
which enables strategical combinations to be carried out."
Hut how is the necessary control over troops in action to be
maintained ? How is united action on the part of a division, a
brigade, or even a battalion to be secured, in place of the series
of disunited actions without any apparent connection with each
other, on an undetermined front, and engaged in by bodies who
have completely escaped from all control of their superior com-
manders, which have been the leading features in modern battles?
The author of the pamphlet critici;?es in adverse terms many
points in the German regulations, and objects among other things
to the double formation of two and three ranks, as he contends
for the greatest simplicity in all drill formations. When a bat-
talion advances to the attack, he advocates that the centre com-
pany, whether in skirmishing or column formation, should be
named the company of direction ; the Commander of the com-
pany having his objective pointed out to him by the battalion
commander who will remain mounted with the company of direc-
tion, and all the other company leaders must conform their
movements to the company of direction. He also points out that
the method of deployment, now chiefly in vogue, of furnishing
the line of skirmishers at the commencement by the two zugs
taken fioin the wings of the battalion to join at the centre is not
a formation which will lend itself to this, as the centre is then
formed by the junction of two companies. On the contrary, he
urges strongly that the co:r.pany of direction should supply the
first skirmishers ; its leader, remaining on horseback, will form
the centre of his deployed line, direct it on the objective, and thus
he will form the living pivot of direction for the whole line.
Colonel Boguslawski, who comes generally to much the same
conclusions as regards the first line, suggests however that
the regimental colours should be placed in the first line and should
form the pivot of direction, and that the colours should be in the
line of skirmishers and not in rear of the different echelons of the
battalion. It is only by some such means that, in advancing over
ordinar}' undulating ground, the irresolution and uncertainty
which tend to lead troops far away from the objective assigned to
them can be avoided. Larger gnits, he says, should take the
440
TACTICAL NOTES.
same precautions as a battalion. A brij^ade, for instance, would
advance in attack formation in several lines. The Brigadier,
moving with the centre battalion of direction, would h'niself
direct it just as tlie battalion commander does the centre com-
pany of his battalion : or at least he would point out to its com-
mander the objective to make for, and he remains attached to this
battahon during the advance. Thus the brigade* advances, all
the commanders of the different lines and the commanders of
battalions being responsible for maintaining their relative positions
with the centre -.vhich is diiected in person by the superior coni-
mand^^r, wi-.o thus in reality directs his whole force.
But the difficulty of properly directing a force increases with
the extent of front covered. It may become necessary for a
brigade advancing in fighting formation to carry out without
check some change of direction, and for this a new centre or a
new unit of directiou mr\y have to be chosen. Tliis new centre
is at once ascertained by the presence of the commander of the
brigade who now attaches himself to it. For the purpose of trans-
mitting orders the author advocates that tour troopers should be
attached to every brigade commander.
The writer also objects to the system of only forming fighting
formation when under fire, and argues that this should be the
formation assumed as soon as the troops deploy from column of
route. He maintains tnat to make the fall of the first projectiles
the signal to form dispersed order from massive colunms has a
bad influence on the moral of the troops and increases the nervous-
ness a soldier feels at the approach of danger. It is rather in
closing and not in extending that the first shell should be received.
The column of direction should retain its role for the whole
front of attack until within effective range, about 450 yards ; then
it is no longer a cjuestion of maintaining a proper direction for the
advance, it is already secured ; but every effort must now be
directed on a new purpo.'^e, namely, to snatch a victory by means
of a heavy fire wisely directed, and by an undaunted energy.
This method appears simple enough; but to be properly carried
"The brigade here referred to is a Cjenr.ai. Brigade of six battalions, more nearly
equal to the British 1 ufantry Division of seven battalions than to our brigade.
TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS.
441
out in the heat of action it requires constant practice in peace so
that both officers and men may be thoroughly accustomed to it.
The first Hne having advanced to within what the Germans call
effective musketry range, namely the range at which the fire can
prepare for the assault, /. c, within 450 yards of the enemy, the
question arises, by what means can the assault be made successful ?
Fire can only be effective when delivered by troops, calm, dis-
ciplined, and completely in the hands of their chiefs. It is only
under these conditions, and when the commanders of companies
or half companies have full control over their men, that the fire
can effectively prepare for the assault. The success of the assault
itself on the contrary depends on the bravery of the individual, on
his indomitable energy and recklessness.
Now it may be asked, is it not rash to expect at one and the
same moment, and from the same men, this vigorous individuality
and this Uicchanical submission ? In the advance by successive
rushes alternating by volley or independent firing, is there not a
risk of paralyzing the elan of the troops by the frequent halts and
of destroying the useful effect of the fire by their physical and
moral emotion? Would it not be better to confide this double
task to different troops? Should not the Commander who has
to direct an attack, "as soon as possible choose a suit;ible portion
of his forces who, renouncing all idea of taking [)art in the assault,
should occupy favourable positions from whence they can main-
tain a well sustained and accurate fire on every vulnerable part
of the enemy's position, and particularly on his artillery. Pro-
vided with an abu'" 'ant supply of ammunition they could give
themselves up enti ■.;ly to this special task under the direction of
their officers."
It is by the aid of these "living and intelligent mitrailleuses,"
as they are called elsewhere, that it will be found possible to
utilize at the same time the physical power of the fire arms and
the moral force of the soldier; a moral force which, above all
things, it is important not to weaken. "The fire which sucli
troops, if well placed, will i)e able to sustain even after the troops
of the assault have to cease their own, and with which they may
even take the defender's reserves in flank, cannot fail to have
great influence on the tinal result."
ill
442
TACTICAL NOTES.
i
-1
In practice one of these duties will naturally fall to the first line
and the other to the second line. " In war, the first line which
has advanced by dint of its efforts up to the effective range of
musketry (about 450 yards) has suffered considerable losses in its
advance; it is beyond question that it can in no case bring about
a decision.
The practice, therefore, which in peace nuuutuvres frequently
makes this line carry out the attack is, he deems, a faulty one.
The power of its fire nuist be full}' utilised, but not what little of-
fensive power it may still have left. "It should sweep the whole
front of the enemy with a terrific fire, keepiug him in ignorance
as to the real point of attack. Under cover of this fire the second
line, which has received a precise direction, advances while avoid-
ing losses as much as possible, and it is under the protection of
the well sustained fire of the first line that it will deliver the as-
sault."
Thus, supposing the enemy to have taken up a position with a
clear field of fire to his front of 1,500 or 1,600 yards over which
the assailant has to advance, the author advocates the following
method of attack. '■
The General of a Brigade ((German), having fixed on the part
of the position he intends to threaten, will divide his forces into
those intended for the preparation and those for the final execu-
tion ; each line being composed of a regiment of three battalions.
The commander of the first line echelons his battalions, two bat-
talions in front and one in support. The four company cohnnns
of each battali(. 1 arc so placed with reference to each other as to
form the four corners of a ''lo/enge'" (()) one point being towards
the enemy. The company of direction is indicateil, and this
company throws out the first skirmishers. "This formation is
easy to handle, it lends itself with facility to changes of direction
which may be ultimately necessary, it permits of the skirmishers
being depU)yed in succession and only where they will bi; useful,
and it assures an effecti\e j)rotertion to the flanks."
The skirmishing line is n niforced and prolonged. l)\(>iiler of
the ccj.nnander ol the first iini'. 1>\' degrees as it beconu-s ni'ces-
sar\ to reply to the < ih'min's tnr. Tliese skiniiislicis i|o not foiiu
TENDENCY Ol" ^[ODERN TACTICS.
443
a continuous chain, but tlicy {^roup tlu'Uisclvcs behind any cover
afforded by the j^aound, and at this period volley firing is the
most useful.
In rear the second line has also received its point of direction.
This is a weak point in the line of defence if one has been dis-
covered. The battalions advance in line of company-columns at
deploying intervals, their four company-columns forming two
oblique echelons. This second line advances using all the cover
it can and without firing, but preserving itself intact for the ap-
proaching struggle. 1 besides, the advance and fire of the first
line absorbs the attention of the advcrsar}'.
Finally, at 400 or 450 yards from the enemy's position, this first
line is compelled to stay its march ; and at this moment the
volleys of the skirmishers have attained their greatest intensity.
"These group themselves in favourable positions shoulder to
shoulder whence they maintain a heavy fire on the enemy to
draw his attention away from the advancing columns."
The second line continues its advance, " it must not penetrate
through this first line, but advance round its flanks." At the
moment when it is about to pass the first line, all the supports
and reserves of this first line move up into the skirmishing line to
increase the intensity of its fire.
The artillery has of course meanwhile been performing its task
of preparing for the attack and supporting the infantry by ad-
vancing to short ranges.
" The asaulting line is formed up in jtwo echelons of company-
colunms at deploying intervals. A few paces in front of the lead-
ing echelon a dense line of skirmishers stii;uilatcs the energies of
the attack by maintaining a continuous fire. It is the noise, not
the useful effect, which tells. At the moment when this line
passes the first one, which is halted and lying down facing the
enemy, the order is given to bring the rilles down to the charge.
The ('chelons follow one another at a double, at 50 yards dis-
tance as a maximum. At 60 or 70 yards from the enemy, the
skirmishers and the whole of the first ('rhelon execute the assault
siuiultaneously, the remaindi-r follow at the double." " All rush
forward togetluM", the drums l)cat, the bugles ..:.und, and the air
resounds with prolonged cries of hurrah!"
444
TACTICAL NOTES.
If, he adds, the outer wing of the infantry can be followed by
even a small force of cavalry, this cavalry, if it charges at the mo-
ment of assault, may greatly contribute to a success. " Nothing
should be neglected which may throw disorder among the enemy."
Of course a reserve must be kept in hand by the commander
which will follow the attacking troops without taking part in the
assault.
It is to be noted that no mention is here made of the employ-
ment of long range infantry fire to cover the approach, but this
is in accord with the prevailing opinion on the subject in the
German infantry. The employment of long range infantry fire
to supplement the fire of the artillery has been advocated in these
pages and so will not be again referred to here.
The author thus sums up his proposed organi;?ation for the ex-
ecution of the bayonet attack : " occupy the enemy along his
whole front ; ascertain the weak points of his defensive line ;
bring up with skill the second line opposite the point chosen for
attack ; hurl forward all available troops."
The general ideas of this author are similar to those previously
expressed by Von Scherff, when he pointed out the necessity for a
complete severance between the work of preparation and that
of execution, a severance he considers indispensable in order that
the slow, studied, and methodical advance of the one, may not
stiile in its very germ the impetuosity the other requires ; and
also in order that the General, while the preparation progresses,
may have time to direct the execution.
But the question arises, are these results to be obtained by the
method the author proposes? These two lines, which follow each
other at such short intervals, will they not both fall into the vortex
of the fight? And when the first line has succeeded in ariiving
at the distance of effective fire, as prescribed for it, will it be able
to continue its task ; will it not be involuntarily drawn forward
or driven back and must not the final crisis be precipitated ? Be-
sides, is it in the few minutes required for the second line to cross
the 300 or 400 yards which separate it from the first that the
General will be able to recognize and designate the weak points
of the enemy's position ? Certainly not. It will be all he can
do if he is able to direct this second line, as the writer lays down
TENDENCY OV MODERN TACTICS.
445
in two absolute a manner, on a flank of the first line ; more fre-
quently it will advance throug^h the first line which it will carry
forward with it. Now this is just what it is desired to avoid, a
hasty execution after an insufficient preparation, an issue de-
pending^ entirely on the impulse of the lower ranks.
In a work written subse(iuent to the above pamphlet. Colonel
Arnim starts from the same principle when he says: *' If in the
engagement of small units, of a battalion, or even of a regiment
(3 battalions) say, the same troops may be charged with the pre-
paration and with the execution by employing in the firing line
one-fourth or one-half their strength, and reserving the remainder
to execute at the desired moment, in concert icith thcif advanced
echelons, the decisive attack, — in actions between large masses it is
no longer the same, and it must be fresh troops, independent of the
first line, who must execute the final assault."
If the Commander, he says, desires in all the stages of a fight
to retain the legitimate influence which belongs to him and
which he has no right to abdicate, he must guard himsjlf ?gainst
all impatience and repress it among all under him. It is a great
mistake to suppose that the crisis of the struggle must be
reached at once, for to do so is "to bring about what occurred in
the early oattles in 1870, dispersion and disintegration of the
forces, and isolated struggles." It is necessary for the Comman-
der to be able at will to hasten on the preparation or restrain it,
at any rate to prolong it until he has been able, under its cover,
to make his final arrangements. " A General who desires to con-
duct an attack with method cannot resign the power of issuing
orders until he has been able to choose his princi|)al point of at-
tack and to deploy a sufficient force in front of it." Now it is
evident that the time necessary for this cannot be assured by
troops who have arrived within the distance of" decisive range."
He urges that it would be useful, nay that it is even indispen-
sable, "for official regulations to prescribe that whenever troops
are sent forward imder fire of the enemy without any definite
mission, without the distinct order to attack any precise point,
they should never approach the adversary within a distance of
650 or 750 yards, and that there they sht)uld await further
orders." It is consequently necessary that both officers and
446
TACTICAL NOTES.
-f --
men should he well trained to |)eifoini this task, so unassuniinj^'
in appearance, otherwise they will seek " to utilize any favour-
able local circumstances without considering^ whether sucli action
is in accordance with the general plan." They must know that
to advance as skirmishers does not necessarily mean to attack,
that the absence of specific orders does not leave them perfect
liberty of action ; but that " these distinct orders will only be
given when the situation shall have become cler.red up.''
This preparation may last one or two hours, or the whole day;
the troops carrying it out remaining in ignorance on this point,
and they' must therefore utilise the ground to the utmost, " and
eventually cover themselves with hasty intrenchments. Then
they will be prepared to repulse any offensive movement on the
part of the enemy, even if it be made in superior force. They
will, besides, be supported by the close fire of special reserves of
infantry placed in rear of the flanks of the line and by the more
distant fire of artillery."
At this distance of 650 or 750 yards from the enemy, the com-
manders of companies, battalions, or regiments, have still their
respective units completely under control. It is therefore possible
to arrive with deliberation on the ground assigned, to distribute
the troops judiciously over the front of the preparation, and to
profit by their relative calmness to maintain a deliberate and ac-
curate fire which should make up for any loss of effect due to dis-
tance. This distance too, by removing all danger of the projec-
tiles from the artillery falling amidst its own infantry, will permit
of this arm contributing a more efficient supjjort to the prepara-
tory struggle. This preparatory fight will be long and protracted
and cannot be subjected to any precise rule. '■ The troops may
be grouped behind shelter afforded by the ground, or scattered
over a wide front so that they can concentrate their fire on an}'
named point, and detachments may even be sent forward to at-
tack any advanced positions of the enemy with the sole pin'pose
of inducing him to move up his supports so as to bring them
under the fire of detachments specially told oft' for the purpose."
Besides the useful effect to be obtained by the fire, it is neces-
sary to tire out and use up the energies of the defence.
" The decisive attack may and should have quite a different
TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS.
447
issuininfi^
y favour-
:li action
now that
:o attack,
n perfect
only be
lole day ;
is point,
5t, " and
3. Then
it on tlie
2. They
serves of
he more
;he corn-
till their
: possible
istribnte
and to
and ac-
le to dis-
projec-
1 perniit
{)repara-
otracted
ips may
cattered
on any
:1 to at-
II
Mirpose
jj^ them
Lirpose."
neces-
Jifferent
character to that of the preparatory engagement. Different
tactical dispositions must be used. .A line of fresh skirmishers,
without packs, marching without halts, or rather doubling up to
within decisive range, directing thence a heavy fire of masses but
of short duration as a final preparation for the assault of the com-
pany columns following them at the double."
These two kinds of fighting which will, the writer thinks, neces-
sarily follow each other in every battle properly conducted, require
two entirely different ways of employing the troops. Infantry
must be prepared and trained by long practice for the one as well
as for the other, and the)- nnist know that the same amount of
energy will be always required from them ; but in the one case it
will have to be used slowly and patiently, in the other by concen-
trating all its efforts in the few minutes of an assault.
Colonel Arnim considers it unwise to particularize too closely
the plan to be followed, whether the second line is to pass the
first by its Hanks or through its centre when advancing to the as-
sault; it will follow the shortest route to the objective, and this
uncertainty as to the real point of attack is even advantageous at
the commencement of an engagement. " If it is right, during the
first hours of an action, to occupy the enemy along his whole line
without any intention of changing the threat into the execution
every where, it would be dangerous, on the other hand, to fix
beforehand the points where the action will have to remain
demonstrative. In the first place a thousand circumstances may
cause the Commander to change his plans and, besides, its revela-
tion would tlonbtless lead to a different degree of energy being
displayed along the line of preparation which might serve as a
precious index to the adversary."
Thus, as a result (jf this prolonged engagement, the (ieneral
will have formed his j)lans maturely and will know where and
how to strike. He then cnlls up the troops to whom he is going
to confide this task, the troops of the second line— the line of
attack. These hav(> hitherto been grouped as far as possil>le out
of sight of the enemy, :iii<l iie now assigns U) tlu.in their objective
and direction for tlic attack.
Till' following extracts will show how Colonel Arnim proposes
this a(|\anee to be made : —
448
TACTICAL NOTES.
i
The General issues his orders :
To the first line to which is assij^ned the task of preparation,
" Advance up to the distance of effective fire."
To the line of attack : " Advance on such a point."
" The artillery so to speak makes these orders felt immediately
along the whole length of the battlefield by advancing rapidly in
t'chelon to take up positions at a short distance from the enemy
whence it can crush him with its fire."
The first line must advance progressively and carefully : " It
thus throws forward its first echelons, by companies, taking care
to protect its flanks, up to 350 or 450 yards of the enemy ; from
there it must, by means of a terrible fire, render it possible to
execute a further methodical advance."
As for the second line or line of attack, it must advance with
caution at first, the troops in their advance must reduce their
losses as much as possible by taking advantage of all shelter, the
companies marching in column or in line, crossing exposed places
from shelter to shelter at a rush, etc., up to the distance within
which " the losses must no longer be thought of, but the only
consideration must be to reach the objective," i.e. 700 or 800 yards
from the enemy. "From this point the whole of the assaulting
troops will assume the only attack formation suitable for infantry,
companv-columns at deploying intervals. A second echelon but
weaker, also formed in company-columns, follows, part in rear of
the centre part extending beyond the flanks." The whole is
preceded at 200 or 300 yards by a thick line of skirmishers with-
out packs, who advance rapidly and join the first line engaged in
the preparation so as to increase the intensity of its fire in front
of the points of attack.
Thus Colonel Arnim has extended to the whole battle what the
preceding writer had only applied to one part of it. But both
have written constrained by the same feeling of necessity, name-
ly, to give to the Commander, in all its entirety, the chief direct-
ing authority which the increase of numbers, the dissolving effect
of modern fire, and the open order formations which it necessi-
tates, threaten to remove from him l)efore and during the battle.
Also to give him time to mature his plans by clearly separating
the efforts neressaiy for the preparation from those for the exe-
T-
Tivi
TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS.
449
jparation,
mediately
apidly in
le enemy
illy : " It
ving care
ny ; from
)ssible to
nee with
lice their
elter, the
led places
ze within
the only
800 yards
issaulting
infantry,
lelon but
in rear of
whole is
ers with-
igaged in
! in front
what the
But both
y, nanie-
ef direct-
ir.g effect
necessi-
\c battle,
^parating
tJK; exe-
cution, by fixing plainly the distances which must never be cross-
ed by advanced troops, and by thus preventing them from
becoming seriously engaged without a distinct order. And
further, to afford him the means of personally controlling the
masses under his command by enabling him to regulate the pace
of the advance as well as its direction.
Such are some of the numerous opinions which have been
emitted, many others might have been adduced but the above
are sufficient to show the direction in which the opinions of many
officers of note are tending.
Coming now to the lessons to be learnt from recent autumn
manoeuvres in Germany, which are important as teaching us the
tactics this nation will employ in a future war since what is con-
stantly being practised in peace is sure to be carried out on the
field of battle, we find that the old maxim is still being inculcated
into the minds of both officers and men, namely, that the offen-
sive and success are synonimous terms.
The most prominent feature to be noticed in the German
method of attack is the way in which decisive infantry attacks
are made certain of success by concerted action and cohesion,
and by their extraordinary vehemence and impetuosity. What-
ever be the detailed formations (whether deployed lines or small
columns) adopted by the different tactical units, what strikes the
observer most during the execution of the decisive attacks, is the
density of the lines of attack and their want of depth. This was
carried to such an extreme that the formation in open order had
practically disappeared, and instead there were one or two lines
of serried ranks rushing forwards to the attack. Many consider
that if this course is persevered in, the Germans cannot fail to suffer
enormous losses in future wars ; nevertheless others maintain
that the German system is the one of the future.
The following are some of the usual formations of attack of a
German Division and Army Corps. The brigades of a division,
when room permits, nearly always form up side by side in two
lines by regiments one behind the other, but h\ later manoeuvres
it has been specially noticeable that the distance separating these
two lines, as well as the distances between the different t^chelons
450
TACTICAL NOTES.
in the first line, have greatly increased from what they used to
be. The total depth of a regiment of three battalions in the first
line is now generally 650 or 750 yards, and that of the brigade
1 100 yards. Also the brigades assumed fighting formation at a
greater distance from the enemy, at 2000, 2600, and even at 3300
yards, in tact as soon as there was any likelihood of coming un
der the fire of the enemy's guns.
The leading brigade in column of route, when it becomes
necessary to form line of battle, forms up in two lines one regi-
ment in each line. The regiment in the first line itself usually
forms two echelons, two battalions side by side form the fighting
line and are extended in order for attack, while the second «'chelon
is composed of the remaining battalion drawn up in line of com-
pany columns, and forms the regimental reserve: but frequentl}-
the three battalions are all drawn up side by side in formation
for attack without any intermediate reserve until the second line.
Finally, as an exceptional formation and only on the flank of the
battle front, certain regiments only extended a single battalion in
attack order keeping the two others in reserve side by side, or
sometimes even one behind the other.
The general rule for the formation of reserves is that they be as
far as possible broken up into small fractions so as to disperse the
enemy's fire, but cohesion becomes weakened thereby.
The regiment forming the second line has its three battalions
in echelon. These battalions in their turn, as well as the reserve
battalions of tiie first line, were either in lines of company-cohunns
at deploying intervals or much more fretiuently t'cheloned in two
lines of company-col unms.
The second l^rigade when it can do so tleploys to one side of
:he leading brigade in much the same formation', the regiment on
the flank generally extending only one battalion.
The second division of the army corps, wiicn it comes up, alst)
deploys to one side of the leading divisi(Mi so that the army corps
frefpuMitlv finish(\s bv occupying a front of some three miles.
The battalions extended in bout eitluM adopt the normal fight-
ing formation, namelj', two cf)mpanies in front lin<!each deploying
one or two /ugs in the skirmishing line keeping the others in sup-
TENDliNCV Ol MODKKN TACTICS.
45 f
port, while the two reinainiiif,' companies formiiif^ the battalion
reserves are either side by side or in echelon; or at times, these
battalions form np in line of company-columns at deploying,' in-
tervals each of the four companies sendin^'^ a /u}^' int<j the skirm-
ishinf,' line, so that this latter is very dense from the commence-
ment. This formation, habitually adopted by some officers, is
due to the desire to avoid to the utmost the mixint( up of sub-
units; but, on the other hand, it has the serious objection of sup-
pressinj^f the battalion reserves and of over increasing tiie density
of the chain ; for at the moment of assault when the companies
have deployed a second /ug, the battalions of the Hrst line are in
two echelons shoulder to shoulder folhnved by four meagre sup-
ports. With reference to this formation the new Russian regula-
tions state: "The simultaneous deployment of two sections per
company, independently of the advantages it offers as regards
command and power of fire, prevents the premature mixing up
of men. And this method will be generally preferable to the de-
ployment of sections one behind the other."'
Whatever be the battalion formation, the /ugs in the skirmish-
ing line carefully preserve a certain interval between each other in
order to allow the intercolation of zugs subsequently sent forward,
and when the space permits of it, considerable intervals are left
between neighbouring companies. The commanders of com-
panies on foot direct the fight from behind the centre of their
chain of skirmishers.
When the regiments in the second line, in company-columns,
are exposed to long range fire they frequently deploy into line,
but at short distances, within about 550 yards, they reform into
column although the tendency seems to be to do away with
colunni formations as far as possible when under fire. JLxperi-
ments have shown that the formation of a company in line is less
subject to losses than one in company colunni. The only advan-
tage of the latter is the facility it affords to command and move-
ment, but as soon as the enemy's fire becomes sensible these con-
siderations must be subordinated to that of saving losses.
All the brigades echeloned in this manner advance, sometimes
keeping step. Evidently much greater importance is attached to
the maintenance of order and to the effects of working together
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452
TACTICAL NOTES.
than to the taking advantage of shehcr afforded by the ground.
The object of this parade like advance is evidently the hope that
it will act by its imposing nature on the moral of the men and
preserve them from becoming dissolved into an incongruous mass
of skirmishers belonging to different units.
The distances between the several lines, as well as those to be
left between the skirmishers and supports, vary very much though
the general rule is followed, as much as possible, that no two lines
should be so close as to come under the same fire simultaneously,
the second line is generally about 450 yards in rear of the first.
The infantry open fire at varying distances according to the
nature of the ground and the importance of the objectives which
present themselves. Whenever artillery or a line of infantry
not under cover appeared at 750, 1,000, or even 1,300 yards, the
skirmishers would halt, and any groups which are still compact
in the chain together with groups rapidly sent up in close order
from the supports ' > prolong the line, fire deliberate volleys, with
three elevn*^ions for distances beyond 1,000 j-ards, with two eleva-
tion '^ for mferior distances. When the forward movement is re-
newed, the groups which had prolonged the chain allow it to re-
gain its distance and the advance is continued until the enemy's
fire becomes serious; if possible this advance is continued till the
chain arrives within about 450 yards of the enemy's position.
Now the chain opens fire regularly, and commences advancing by
successive rushes. These rushes are executed by echelons of at
least the whole company ; the echelon in rear, formed by the
neighbouring zug, continues its fire until the t^chelon in front has
commenced firing. It was at first feared that the t^chelon in
front might suffer from the fire of the one in rear but this fear
proved to be groundless. Up to about 450 yards the skirmishers
fire standing or kneeling, and they only fire volleys by groups or
by zugs. Within that distance, volley firing, alternated with the
independent firing of a limited number of rounds was practised.
The periods for each echelqn to fire are regulated by whistles
which at times create some confusion, and the number of rounds
to be fired in a single period varies from two to six.
The companies al this period nearly always have two zugs in the
chain the men being then shoulder to shoulder, and the supports are
TENDi:X(V OF MOllKRN TAC:TICS.
45-5
ipjiorts are
reduced as much as possible so as not uselessly to expose the latter
to the same chance of loss as the skirmishing line. The battalion
reserves follow at a distance of about 450 yards. (Formerly,
wher about 500 or 600 yards from the enemy, the company sup-
ports were from 100 to 150 yards from the chain, battalion re-
serves 150 from the supports, and the second line 200 to 300
yards behind the reserves ; but, as mentioned above, these dis-
tances are now usually increased).
It is entirely due to the exclusive use of fire by word of command
or by limiting the number of rounds, that the cloud of smoke fre-
quently rises enabling the officers to ascertain the state of affairs,
and in consequence to properly direct the advance and the fire of
their men. Whenever a reinfoi cement of the enemy appears in
close order, or when his chain advances or retires and is exposed,
the fire, always at the orders of the officers, redoubles in in-
tensity being directed on these temporary objectives. Rarely is
free independent firing directed on the chain ; this is never al-
lowed to commence without orders, and is nearly always stopped
agam as soon as commenced.
The companies in reserve, when the battalion is in the normal
formation, or the last zugs when the four companies are in the
fighting line, draw nearer to the chain during its successive halts.
It is only between 300 and 200 yards from the enemy that the
firing by limiting the number of rounds ceases ; the chain then
halts and pours in on the enemy a rapid independent fire which
precedes the final assault. During this fire the greater part of
the supports join the chain to execute volley or independent
firing ; the second line approaches to within 100 yards of the
battalion main body which in its turn approaches to within 80
yards of the chain.
This rapid firing is barely prolonged for a few minutes when
"cease firing" is ordered by means of whistles; the men fix
bayonets along the whole line, the drums beat the charge, the
bugles sound, and the chain, very dense, officers being in front,
rushes forward to the assault with oft repeated shouts of Hurrah !
— followed closely by the supports and reserves who join in the cry.
This complete abandonment of compact order, this splitting up
into fractions at long distances and before the first cannon shots,
454
TACTICAL NOTES.
show the direction in which the mihtary opinion is tending' in
Germany. But tlie separation demanded ?nd extolled between
the work of preparation and the task of execution does not seem
to be thought of as yet. On the contrary, at the recent mance-
vres the whole brunt of the tij^diting from the very commencement
to the end has rested more tiian ever on the first lines. ' The
second lines follow passively until after the decision.
In case of success, while the disordered mass of troops which
have just charged are being rapidly reformed in the conquered
position, the second lines come up in line with them and pursue
the enemy by firing volleys. The attack formation is then again
resumed by the first line, but generally those ;iugs (if any) which
have hitherto been kept in compact order are made to form the
new skirmishing line while the others form the supports. The
advance of the first line is then continued followed, as before, by
the second line after the full distance has been gained.
In case of a check, the second lines either endeavour to take
up a flank position in order to protect the retirement of the first
line, or sometimes they push forward and, advancing through the
retreating line, relieve it and renew the attack. In all cases
there is a succession but never a combination of efforts.
On one occasion a battalion, forming a reserve to a regiment,
stopped by battalion volleys a counterattack for an instant victo-
rious ; but this kind of fire is very excepti&nal and is only at
times used against artillery.
On the defensive infantry is very rarely posted so as to afford
tiers of fire even when the formation of the ground was most
favourable for its use.
Although indirect fire was never actually ordered, yet the
officers appear to take accoimt of it in placing fractions of sup-
ports and reserves behind crests so as to protect them from this
kind of fire.
The officers at manoeuvres always regulate the fire by judging
distances, there is no attempt made to ascertain the ranges by
trial volleys, or by telemeters, etc., but against this they attach
the highest importance' to the maintenance of *' fire discipline"
up to the very last moment, and this with complete success.
This result attained, they consider they can at any time put into
TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS.
455
by
practice any scientific means whenever it is deemed necessary to
do so.
Since the above was written an account of the Autumn manoeu-
uvres held this year (1881) has come to hand. In these a broader
front for the attack of a brigade was generally adopted. Instead
of having, as formerly, one regiment of a brigade following the
other, the two regiments advanced alongside of each other. Each
regiment sends one battalion to the front, and the skirmishers
from these two leading battalions cover the whole front of the
brigade ; the remaining companies of these battalions follow in
small company columns about 160 yards in rear of the skirmish-
ers. The second battalion of each regiment follows these com-
pany columns at a distance of about 360 yards with its companies
in double echelons, each company being in line. The third bat-
talion of each regiment follows at a distance of about 400 yards,
with its companies in company columns of zugs. When the
skirmishers are checked by the hostile fire the supports close
upon them and over their head fire continuous volleys, and when
the hostile fire is broken the reserves close up and all rush in to
attack with the bayonet.
The main intention of this formation for attack is to give suf-
ficient breadth to allow a wide area of fire, and still to retain
sufficient depth and weight for the final charge of the bayonet.
Since the example of Plevna more attention has been given to the
bayonet than formerly, and the German officers are far from be-
lieving that the days of bayonet fighting are over, but consider
that it must ever remain the supreme arbiter of infantry contests.
Great use was still made of voUcjs. as it is generally-conceded
that the moral effect of volless is more telling than that of file
firing, especially from the German soldier who is most carefiilly
trained to take deliberate aim and is constantly exercised in lay-
ing his ritli; upon moving objects.
Rapidity of fire is naturally ol vuiy great advantagi', and if tire
could be made continuous, bayonet attacks till ammunition fail-
ed, would be almost impossible. Great rapidity of fire has been
obtained by the lireechloiuler. hut it is \eiy probable tli;it the
present rapidity of infantry fire n)ay Ix; still finther developed by
the introduction of a maga/ini' rille. Whenever this takes ()lace
556
TACTICAL NOTES.
the reasons adduced by the advocates for separating the task of
preparation from the actual execution will gain in importance.
In these manoeuvres, after the infantry attack had commenced,
if the enemy was found to be too strong to allow the attack to be
pushed home, the leading skirmishers hastily threw up shelter
trenches with the spades they carried, in which* they then lay
down to wait for reinforcements.
Having considered the employment of infantry, the general em-
ployment of all arms at these manoeuvres will now be briefly
sketched.
When army corps are to be opposed to each other at manoeu-
vres they bivouac for the night at some distance from each other
and are then directed along certain roads which will cause them
to meet.
Both sides march covered by a veil of cavalry who will first
come in contact, and each will endeavour to break through the veil
of the other. These cavalry divisions always march more or less
concentrated and are divided into three bodies which, when de-
ployed, form the three lines of attack. An advanced guard of
varying strength precedes the whole, and a number of patrols and
scouts are sent out enveloping the main body of cavalry and form-
ing round them a wide semi-circle three-quarters of a mile in
radius.
A cavalry duel between the opposing reconnoitring cavalries
always precedes the engagement between the main bodies. That
cavalry which has been m.ost numerous in these engagements, or
which has shown the greatest ability in manoeuvring is considered
victorious and it is allowed to push on to the adversary's main
columns, to reconnoitre them and open fire upon them with artil-
lery. Here termin^vtes the reconnoitring role of the cavalry, and
the advanced guard, which has l)een able to act in accordance
with information fmnished by the cavalry, now makes a recomiais-
sancc of the enemy's position and of his forces, and for this pt;r
pose it employs artillery and musketry fire. It takes the offensi\'e
and by partial attacks' seizes the? advanced points of the enemy's
positit)n. Hy thr tinit- that the main body arrives with its Co:i:-
njander llie situation has frequently been sufficiently cleared;
TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS.
457
sometimes however the reconnaissance has to be completed before
being able to pass from the period of preparation to that of execu-
tion in the attack.
Thus it is seen that the commander of the independent cavalry
ard then of the advanced guard, and finally the commander of
the whole detachment, each in their turn, assume the initiative
without any special orders. There is however a regular method
of sending back information from the most advanced parties to
the Commander-in-Chief in rear.
Now as regards the employment of the advanced guard it is
noticeable that the constant success of three campaigns have in-
spired great confidence and, as a result, an offensive spirit. The
adversary has no sooner shown his infantry or his artillery than
the commander of the advanced guard brings his guns into
action, and covers them by his infantry which advances and
gains as much ground as it can until stopped by the enemy; and
it is only when opposed to manifest superior forces that the ad-
vanced guard confines its action to the fire of the artillery pro-
tected on its flanks by infantry, but never does it stop or delay
this action under the pretext that it might be dangerous.
The Commander-in-Chief arrives at the advanced guard position
always accomt^anied by his artillery Commander, and after re-
ceiving the report of the Commander of the advanced guard, and
after he has examined the enemy's position, he decides on his
plan of attack and commences to put it into execution by deploy-
ing his artillery which places itself alongside the batteries of the
advanced guard, or elsewhere if more suitable positions are to be
found.
To the artillery is assigned the vole of commencing the action
by destroying obstacles, searching all shelter, and by forming sort
of breaches in the defending line by the material as well as moral
effect of their fire. This artillery fire will, after its effect has be-
come perceptible, be supplemented by musketry fire at long
ranges, and under cover of this combined fire the attack will be
begun.
The principles governing the tactical employment of the artil-
lery are still the same as those in force during the war of 1870-71;
action in masses, unity of direction, concentration of fire, changes
458
TACTICAL NOTES.
of position only in case of necessity, and constant co-operation
with the infantry.
Now an attack, to be successful, must be executed by masses
of infantry and hence the necessity for executing the attacks with
all the vigour and celerity possible. Such an attack however is
only attempted after the artillery and long range musketry fire
have had time to take eft'ect, and when once commenced the
necessity of striking home rapidly and violently is fully recogni;jed,
sacrificing everything to concerted action and cohesion, and to the
impetuosity of the advance.
In those parts of the field where a decisive attack is not to be
made, full advantage is obtained from the containing power of
the breech-loader by holding them defensively with only a
small portion of the assailant's forces aided by earth-works, while
concentrating the greatest efforts on the points chosen for the at-
tack.
It has been pointed out that to overcome an enemy in position
he must be attacked by masses who will advance up to point-
blanc range and pour in upon him a decimating fire, the prelude
to the final bayonet attack. But the great difficulty experienced
is to bring these masses within striking distance of the enemy.
Many expedients to secure this end have been attempted; the
exclusive use of the skirmishing line as the fighting line and first
line of attack, the splitting up of units and sub-units into frac-
tions, company columns, successive rushes, taking advantage
of shelter, and more recently still to obviate a new danger, com-
plete control over the firing, and a return to linear formations
under fire, etc. But the (ierman authorities, without despising
all these methods, have solved the problem in their own way, and
notable modifications have of late years taken place in the em-
ployment of the infantry.
The decisive attack is remarkable, like that of the advanced
guard, for resolution and rapidity ; this is manifested by the con-
sistency which, from the very outset, is given to tht- first fine, and
by the rapidity of the forward march which does not however
lead to the complete disappearanrt; of the reserves; for as a rule
at the end of the action some reserves still remain near the decis-
ive points, however small they may be.
TENDENCY OJ' MODERN TACTICS.
459
peration
masses
Lckswith
vvever is
:etry fire
ced the
ojji'ni/ed,
id to the
lot to be
)o\ver of
only a
ks, while
r the at-
position
o point-
; prelude
erienced
; enemy,
ted; the
and first
ito frac-
Ivantaj^c
er, coni-
inations
lespising
vay, and
the em-
dvanced
the con-
line, and
however
IS a rule
le decis-
To facilitate then the approach of the attacking columns by a
serious and laborious preparation and to weaken the fire of the
defence, are purposes entrusted chiefly to the artillery while the
columns of infantry are kept under cover from view and fire of
the adversary as far as possible, and so long as the moment has
not arrived to throw them forward ; but when that moment ar-
rives they must strike with rapidity and simultaneously, and
advance rapidly up to the distance whence they can open a rapid
and decisive fire which is immediately followed by the assault.
Hence it is considered that the skirmishing line must, in such
attacks, be the means by which only the objective can be ap-
proached ; for this purpose it is made to consist of a line of
serried ranks, one, two or three deep, which will permit the full
development of a powerful musketry fire without losing the effect
of a single rifle, and will also afford the moral and material sup-
port necessary to men who are engaged in making a supreme
effort by enabling them to advance arm in arm, resigned to suffer
the serious losses which after all, and in spite of all dispositions
imaginable, must ever remain the price of victory.
Experience having taught the immense cost of frontal attacks,
endeavours are made, when the front is strong, to act on the
flanks and turn the enemy; and for the infantry attack, that
ground which is most cut up, enclosed, and which offers the least
clear field of fire for the adversary, is chosen.
With the constant tendency to enveloping movements which
characterises the offensive action of the Germans, the two
divisions of an army corps nearly always leave between them
a sufficiently wide interval which the iirtillery thus naturally
serves to fill. In the same way on the defensive this big battery,
which occupies generally the centre of the position, permits the
reserves to be massed in rear of the wings to meet the turning
movements of the adversary. This is to some extent a palliative
to the inconveniences, often impossible to prevent, due to the
extension of the front of a corps in line of battle.
One of the most characteristic features in these manoeuvres
is the multiplication of field works. Nearly every day the
orders of the Corps Commanders prescribed the use of hasty
field works, on the line of outposts, on the main line of defence,
460
TACTICAL NOTKS.
and on the line of retreat. Besides, even during the engagement,
the infantry throw up the earth at every step and place the edges
of villages or woods into a state of defence, and this too as much
on the offensive to secure the positions gained, as in the retreat
to hold on to the ground.
The number of tools with a battalion has been increased to
400 light portable spades, 40 pickaxes and 20 hatchets. The
trenches thrown up were generally from 30 to 50 yards in length
with one or two returns forming traverses against enfilade, each
trench being capable of holding a zug in two ranks, guns were
covered by semi-circular pits 6^ feet in thickness. In resorting
so much to the spade the Germans do not appear to fear any
consequent diminution in mobility or elan, relying as they do on
their strict discipline and to the spirit of the offensive continually
inculcated to draw the soldier from his cover whenever necessary.
The artillery made a much less frequent use of gun pits than
the infantry did of shelter trenches, and this arm constantly sacri-
ficed all care for its safety in the endeavour to make its destruc-
tive power felt to the utmost, and its boldness and daring some-
times verged on temerity. The whole of the corps artillery, fre-
quently with that of the leading division, hurried up at the be-
ginning of an action and pushed on in front of the main columns,
protected only by a few zugs of cavalry, to engage the enemy ;
during the action not hesitating to accompany, nay even to pass
to the front of, the advancing lines of infantry in order to ap-
proach the enemy within decisive range; remaining in position in
case of retreat until the assailants had approached within 600 or
700 yards. In so acting in real war this auxiliary arm will cer-
tainly bear much of the brunt of the battle, and wiil take a prom-
inent place in every engagement. Its losses must consequently
be great, and as artillerymen take long to train it is recognized
that this arm must be maintained during peace on a strong footing.
On the line of march the guns aKvays marched near, but not
at the front of the column; they were always used in great force
and in masses during the opening stages, and as far as possible
throughout the engagements. The only detachments from the
masses appear to have consisted of the horse artillery which ac-
companied cavalry divisions, and of a few guns placed with
TENDENCY Ol' MODERN TACTICS.
461
infantry to watch .1 Hank, Isolated batteries were held to be
liable to capture unless protected by an escort; but the mass of
guns was considered capable of crushing the enemy's infantry and
preventing him from advancing against the general line. Speaking
roughly, the tendency was to consider that artillery fire was cap-
able of demoralizing infantry sufficiently to allow of their being
attacked by cavalry.
It must be added that the German artillery appears to attach
far more weight to the rapidity of its movement, to its capabili-
ties for manoeuvring, and to the suddeness of its action, than to
the methodical choice of a position and to the accurate regula-
tion of its fire. The six batteries of the corps artillery remained
usually side by side drawn up in line, and generally even the bat-
teries of the nearest division joined them. This concentration of
guns secured the concentration of fire on the objects chosen by
the commander, but at the expense of cover which, acting with a
little more independence, the batteries might have found in the
accidents of ground.
From the moment when the two opposing cavalries signal each
other by means of their scouts they do not again lose sight of
each other while still following the general course of the action.
Should an adventurous movement of any kind be made by the
hostile infantry or artillery, the divisions of cavalry throw them-
selves on the enemy without hesitation, the enemy's cavalry then
hastens to the rescue, so that each day one or two great cavalry
contests take place, which were executed as explained in a pre-
vious chapter; the charges were made boot to boot, open order
not being in favour.
In the attack cavalry is placed on the flanks and assumes such
a formation as will best favour its eventual action. The Com-
mander of the cavalry receives some general instructions after
which he acts with complete independence, and while at times
making some partial attacks during the course of the engagement,
he awaits the end of the attack to fall on the disordered enemy
and sweep the battle field with his squadrons. At night cavalry
is always retired in rear of the infantry.
But although the above was the use made of the large indepen-
dent, cavalry divisions, the divisional cavalry on the contrary fre-
462
TACTICAL NOTES.
quently marched with tlie advanced jj;uard, slept with the ad-
vanced posts, and before a battle assured the security of its divi-
sion. Durinf,' an enj^af^ement its employment was generally
limited to maintaining connections, nevertheless, whenever occas-
ion presented itself, it took part in the attacks of the independent
cavalry divisions.
This arm seems however rarely to have fulfilled one impor-
tant task allotted to cav^^lry, namely, the exploration of the battle
field.
Finally, the characteristics so noticeable and brought to promi-
nent light in these manceuvres are the stern discipline, the high
instruction of the troops, and the intelligent co-operation of
officers of all grades.
FRANCE.
The French instructions are very similar to those in vogue in
Germany, except that their regulations are, as we have seen, far
more precise and less is left to the initiative of individuals. The
modifications made of recent years are also of a similar nature
and formation for attack is now assumed at about j,ooo yards
from the enemy.
It is a recognized principle in France that when troops in any
formation commence losing 10 per cent the formation must be
modified so as to reduce the losses. Consequently some writers
consider that company-columns must be given up in open coun-
try at about 1,500 yards distance and deployed into line. But as
a company in line cannot advance for any length of time it is
divided into sections at deploying intervals.
The advance is generally conducted too slowly; on this sub-
ject Colonel Boguslawski writes: "It is an established fact that
the rapidity of advance is a great method of reducing the effects
of the adversary's fire. All attacks and movements executed
under fire of the enemy should then be done at the double, or at
least by stepping out if the nature of the ground, or the fear of
fatiguing the troops prevent this."
In comparing the German and French infantry tactics, it will bq
seen that in France (also in Austria) the possibility of a success-
TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS.
4(^3
fill assault is fully allowed, yet it is looked upon as a very hazar-
dous operation to be undertaken and conducted with the utmost
caution. But in Germany, although the difficulty of forcing a
well defended position is fully admitted, the result of an attack is
looked forward to with confidence so long as it is well prepared
and, above all, carried out with thorough energy and impetuosity.
The question of loss seems to exercise but little influence on the
Germans, whilst it seems ever present to the minds of the French
and Austrians.
An experienced French officer, after witnessing the German
manoeuvres in 1S79, wrote as follows: — " If we compare Prussian
infantry with that of France as seen at the manoeuvres, the pro-
ceedings of the former appear very summary, those of the latter
very complicated. German formations for the attack are too
dense, French formations too shallow. There we observe a bold-
ness and straight forwardness of action verging on foolhardiness,
here discretion and prudence resembling timidity. Prussian at-
tacks are perhaps made too brusquely, and as there are no bullets
in the rifles this show of cheap heroism is apt to produce a smile;
but, on the other hand, French attacks are too mild, too slow, too
scientific; in a word, they do not appeal enough to the imagina-
tion and to the heart of the soldier, and the humdrum manner in
which our infantry worms its way along is certainly further from
the truth than the theatrical display of our neighbours.
" The Prussians pay too little regard to the ground and to
the question of loss, they sacrifice everything to the solidity and
vehemence of their attack. The French on the other hand ex-
haust and wear themselves out in striving to utilise the slightest
cover and in avoiding loss; they trust too little to the dash, en-
ergy, and audacity which are absolutely necessary in the decisive
stage of a battle. In short, Prussian infantry goes straight to the
mark like a cannon ball, and in mimic warfare takes no account
of loss nor of obstacles, whilst h^rench infantry makes mountains
out of molehills, is always feeling its way and, as it were, making
a series of tacks till it seems to be mistaking the means for the
end. French infantry exaggerates in one direction, German infan-
try in the opposite one.
I it-
464
TACTICAL NOTES.
"We may be allowed to remark that Pr-.ssian exaggeration
pleases us best, because it is inspired by the sounder and manlier
view of battle and of its true requirements; because, again, it ap-
pears to us more French than do our own actual ways and prac-
tices." "Nowadays French infantry defers its advance
till the enemy is kind enough to retire ; this is not in keeping with
its temperament nor indeed with the nature of things."
Iteration
manlier
I, it ap-
d prac-
idvance
ng with