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I — 71 This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ \^\ Ca document est U\m6 au taux de reduction indiqu6 ci-dessous. 10X 14X 18X 22X 26X 30X ^ 12X 16X 20X 24X 28X 32X The copy filmed here has been roprofJuced thanks to the generosity of: Douglas Library Queen's University L'exemplaire film6 fut reproduit grdce d la g6n6ro8it6 de: Douglas Library Queen's University The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications. Les images suivantes ont 6t6 reproduites avec te plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteti de l'exemplaire filmd, et en conformity avec les conditions du contrat de filmage. Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. 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Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratiofi. Those too large to be entirely Included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper 'lOft hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The followinfj diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartes, planches, tablee'j.*:, etc., peuvent dtre filmds d des taux de reduction diff6rents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour &tre reproduit en un seul clichd, il est film6 d partir de I'angle sup6rieur gauche, de gauche d drolte, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images ndcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 F( R Pro TACTICAL NOTES COMPILED FOR THE USE of the GENTLEMEN CADETS OF THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA, BY MAJOR DOUGLAS JONES, R.A., Professor of Military History, MUitary Administration and Law. KIN(JSTON: I'KINTKU AT •I'HE.l.XIl.Y NEWS STEAM rfilNTINO HOlTSf 1882. ;«* l^ ii \bsJiq PREPACK. This compilation contains some lectures it was considered desirable to prepare for the Gentlemen Cadets of the Royal Military Colle<^e of Canada so as to supplement the text books in use. which it is by no means intended to super- sede. The sole object of printinti^ these lectures, which have been made more complete, is to save the great labour of taking copious notes which greatly hinders the intelligent following of a lecturer. The endeavour has been made to adduce the latest development in the art of tactics and not to repeat what already appears in the text books and official drill books ; and, as it is intended to have only a small number of copies printed at one time, it is proposed that future reprints should embody current changes in tactics. Illustrations from war. though of the highest importance, have been omitted as such are useless without diagrams. and plates to illustrate the operations of troops on fields of battle would have increased the cost of this work consider- ably. Examples of modern battles will therefore be reserved for viva voce lectures, and the battles chosen for illustration will be varied from time to time. Many authors have been consulted and reference made to various works English. French, and German. Among the former may be named : Home's Precis of Tactics ; Defence and Attack of Positions and Localities by Colonel 510 n IV PREFACE, Schaw, R.E. ; Modern Tactics by Major W Shaw Ak pn.e essays by Colonel Smythe' Ma or Frater Cp^X Clanon, Ljeutenant Gould Adan.s. iieucenant A ' M Murray, and others. After Thnnf^r r • ui -^uer \^napter 1 was written i vnl,, abe paper on the tactics of infantry in battle by Co o i S.r Lumley Graham, Bart., came to hand, as well a^ ' pamph et on the Attack Formation of Infant , I^ Ld ,' the Inte hgence Departme.u, War Office a^d as the e contamed more detailed information than was obtlab they have been partly embodied in that Chapter ' Kingston, Canada. 1 ■'' November, 1881. I r # CONTENTS. INTRODUCTORY. (Pai^-e 1-2) Importance of tlu' study of tuctics ; hut u thooretical study not sutticient, knowlodgo gained must be applied pnictically. CHAPTER I. INFANTRY TACTICS. (3-62) PAGE. Modern system compared with the past. — (roneral ])i'inci])les on which the modern system is based; development of iiidi- vidualit}' among both officers and men. Necessity of thoi- ough training 3 Attack Formation for intantry in the German Army; the com- pany and I)attali()n 10 Attack Formation of the French intanti-y ; the company and battalion 17 Attack Ff)rmation of the Austrian infantry; the company and battalion 23 Advance U|) to storming distance of the above infantries. The Assault. Summary ol the several stages in an offensive ac- tion of a single battalion 29 Att;ick formations of larger units: — lit'ginu'nt, Mrig.'ide, and Di- vision, — in (Jermany, France and Austria 42 Infantry on the Defensive. — A single battalion acting alone. The Counter-attack 47 Battalions on the defensive forming pai't of a lai-ger body, — in Germany, France and Austria 52 Infantry against Cavalry 54 New Infantry Tactics in Russia based on the experiences of the late Jiusso-Turkish wai- , 55 VI CONTENTS. CHAPTER II. MODI'RN INrANTKV IIRE. Long range mushetrij fire, ami wIhmi it luJiy Ito omployeil liotli in uttiU'k and (leteiicc : ai'cjuiiKMits tor and at;"ainst its oini»lov- inciit. Expenditure and su]>j)ly of aninmnition. ^^Fire Dis- cipline,'' how to Ik^ maintained in action. Limits of loni^ rim^e tire. Effect of tire at ditfcrent ranijes. Eoni>; range fii-e to l»e properly controlled 6.3 Different himh of fire. — [ndejx'ndent tiriiii;, (iroii]) tirini;-. (Irou]) volleys, Iia])id tirinu'. Kapid independent tirino-. W lien each kind may be em])loyed, at what i-ani^es, by what units, and how to bo kept under ecmtrol ; relative advantatit wars Success of ArtUli rij in 1S70: — Matties of Marw-la-Toiu'. (IravolotU'. So< Ian Failure of ArtUleri/ in 1877: — Hattlo ot Zcwin. Attacks on Plevna, Nikopolis and Lovlcha. Battle of Aladja J)a, ) Employment of Artilhry in the Attach. — KtVeclixe e(i-(»|ici alion of artillery with int:mlr\ essential. .Vrlillery tactics, ('oiieeii- Iration and dis|ie;>ioii of guns. Necessity of both horsi' ai'- tillerx' and tii'ld aitilli'i'v. Kcipiisites of good artillery posi tuMis. Preliminary artillery position. Kiist main position. Second main position. Theii' (listanees trom ciieniN . .Advance 1.53 163 172 1H(» 191 191 19(1 197 199 1:04 207 210 212 216 VIII CONTENTS. !i' of arfillery iiilo the jtosition It (•ii))turoen employed with it on in- dependent enterprises 247 CHAPTER VII. MACHINE C.U NS, AND THEIR TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT ON THE FIELD OF B.\TTLE. (256-2«J5) Employment of these weaptms for tield service, for foi-tresses and si(^ge works, and t!)r naval jiurposi's 25(1 For field service, two general Jiefpiirernents of a (jood defensive posi f inn: — (a). With reference to the enemy ; (/>). with rclcrcncc to thedel'endcrs. Positions (»f artiller\- liolh for attack and d(•ft■nc(^ arc important consider- ations. ( 'Icar tield of tire essential ; cov«'r:iVc 277 CONTKNTS. IX 224 242 244 247 256 258 259 264 LE. 2(iG 268 27(1 274 276 277 Natural olwtucles. iiiid difVorent 'onus ot jLfi'oniul, how to bo t.ealcd 282 Proportion of troops to space. — Dosii-aMc to oxteiul jtositiiMi to utmost consistent with safotv. As torco incivascs so c i i less ground ho occiiniotl. F be replaced by outposts. Distances from main position 297 Dispositions of the infantry ami formation of the several lines re- quired. — Shooting line has to hear the brunt of the fighting, SupiDorts to feed shooting line, strength, and position. Local reserves, strength and jiosition ; to nuds. — \ction divided i nto three stages: — First stcye of the attack. — from the tirst cavalry encounters to the advance of the iniunti-y up to about SOO yards ot the position prior to being finally clan of attack. Attack on flanks facili- tated by modern weajxuis. Advance of ai-tillery into its first Tuain j)Osition. \aturc of orders to be issued by the (Jcner- al. infanti'v to support the fire of artillery at long i-angis. As a rule no guns to be kept in reserve. Advance of the Infantry ;J7H Secoml stage of the attack,- — from the infantry being tinally iaunchetl at the selected ])oints of attack up to the moment which immediately precides final successor failui-e. Infan- try now ])lays principal part. Method of advanct dC the fii-st liiu': — shooting line, su]»])orfs,atul nuiin body. Advance never 1o be allowed to flag for want of reinfbi-cemenl. formations adopted and mode of advance dependent on the nature ot ground 'ind the distance from tlu' eiu'my. Ditl'eri'Ut /ones of fire. Tactics of the Artillery: guns moved ti]) into tlu^ second main position. Hmployinent of ('avalry and Kngin- eers. Flank attacks how execulcd. Action ot force lett to contain enemy in front. Frontal attack to have every ap- pearance of a rea 1 attack 38id successi(»n, aided by the tiro of »'very available gun. Fmjdoyment of the sc'wn(/ //«(; of the attack. The Assault. Duties of Artillery. ( 'avali-y, and Enginciors during this stage. in case ot' success and of liiilure (00 The Active Defence of an enemy in Position against attack.-- 1 >ivid- ed into three stages as for the attack : — l(K{ Fir.ft stage of the Defence.- Preliirunary actions by cavali-y. ifx'connaissancc of the enemy siippoi-led by artillery. ()rdeis to be iss)ied by the (.'omtuander. Position to be oiil\ occu- pied in skeleton at lirsl : when the troops are to be brought up. Tactics of Artillery antl <'niployiiient olCavalry JO t 4 11 w XII CONTENTS. ! r Second stage of the Defence. — Reinforcing of point threatened. Tactics of the Artilkwy. Delivciy of counter-xti-okoM. Em- ployment of ( 'iivalry 407 Third stage of the Defence. — Final i-epulse of assailant, or enfoir- od retreat of dcfendoi-. Kvery gun to lie conciMit rated on the advancing infantry. Proceedings in case of line being pierced at any point. Kmployment of the (ieneral Keserve. Action of Cavalry and Artillery 40!' Precautions against attacks l>i/ night. — Troops practisetl to fall in on sound of an alartn. Firing hy volleys recommended. Lighting of tires. Connter-attacks necessary 410 CHAPTER XI. COUNTER .\TT.\CKS AM) OFFENSIVE RETURNS. ( 412-41 !V) Defender always to turn the defensive into offensive action Avhen possible. Varions modes of makini" counter- strokes: — Local counter-attacks outsi(k' the jiosition ; local counter-attacks inside the position ; general counter-attack inside tlu> position ; the decisive Offensive Peturn by the (ieneral Reserve. Discussion as to when. how. where, and Avith what troops, each is to be executed. Ti'oojts in shooting line sliould rarely take part in tliem. F^xecution of the de- cisive offensive return more difticull than foi-mei'ly ; as a rule to be made only after assailants repeated attacks have failed 412 CHAPTER XII. NIGHT .\TTACKS. (420-420) Night attacks in fornun- years consisted chiefly of attacks on localities m. le by small bodies. — Advantages of night attacks increased owing to improvement in weapons. I'robable use on a large scale in the futun'. Assault of Kars by night. Night attacks on villages in IH70. Colonel J{oguslawski a strong advocate for night attacks, also (reneral Brialmont. How to be executed. Clo^c fornnitions necessar}', also false demonstrations. Precautions to be taUen 420 CHAPTER XIII. USE OF FIELD FORTIFICATION BV THE ASSAILANT. (427-4: U) ) Issue of intrenching tools to soldiers as])art of their e<|nipnu'n( liable to have a direct bearing on tactics. X'abic of Ihespade as exeiuplilicd in thi' .Anicricau ('ivil wai- and the wars of l.S70and IH77 : — fully appi-ccialed by the Turks. Want of in- trenching tools tcK by (he I'ussiaiis : and al-o at Majuba Hill. ( 'ircuiiislMiices iMidi-r which assailant ni..,' throw up intrenchments. Danger oi' losing rapiilily of movement and dash. Necessity of jtrevious training in the useofthe spade. 127 CONTENTS. XIII CHAPTER XIV. TENDENCY OF MODERN TACTICS. (437-464) Suggestions for rcHtraining the individual initiative of the iowor ranks which has had too much fi-eedom of late, and for enabling the higher Commanders to retain more eoui- plete control over their commands in action. Thestatenent. that all nianaMivi'ing under tir>3 is almost impossihle, coiihat- ed. In the attack one conij)any to send forward first skir- mishers (not two), and this company to he the company of direction of a battalion ; similarly for larger units. The Commander to attach himself to the uni'. of direction which he will direct, other units adapting their movements to it. Discussion of the proposal to separate the work of ])repara- tion from that of actual execution of tiie attack, different troops having these distinct tasks assigned to them Latest development of tactics in (lermany as evinced in the recent autumn mano.nivres. (/onn)arison between the Fi-ench, Austrian, and German methods of executing an in- fantry attack 437 449 'I I! Hi w r A of p( cieiK inga most appli guan Th ingh the e Soi shoul branc chara point the ki to vvh tactic large, with t TACTICAL NOTES. INTRODUCTORY. M A battle is in tliese days but the attack and defence of a series of positions, and therefore one of the first requisites for the effi- ciency of an army is thorough acquaintance with the art of attack- ing an enemy or defending itself with real skill, so as to make the most of numbers under all circumstances that may arise. This applies equally to large forces, composed of all arms, as to a small guard or patrol of only a few men. This art, added to the equally necessary requirements of know- ing how to guard against surprise and to obtain information about the enemy, is called "tactics." Some knowledge of tactics is of the greatest importance, and should be attained by every officer ; for, whereas the other branches of the military sciences are more or less technical in their character, tactics embrace all arms and all ranks. From one point of view tactics may be regarded as the putting in practice of the knowledge of drill and formations learnt on the drill ground, to which must be added the application of field fortification ; for tactics simply mean the art of handling bodies of men, small or large, in the presence of an enemy, so as tc obtain the best results with the least loss w TACTICAL NOTES. Until recently the study of tactics was considered of little import in the British Service. So long as an officer had a good know- ledge of drill, was smart, and a good disciplinarian, with an apti- tude for managing men, and was well acquainted with interior economy, he possessed all the requirements that could be expect- ed. Gradually, however, the successes of the German armies have forced the conviction that these would not have been gained had not all officers been obliged to study all branches of the art of tactics, and so efficient had they become in the practical execution of any orders they might receive, and of acting independently in unforeseen circumstances, that officers could be trusted to carry out in the right spirit any general instructions given them, since they had been taught in barracks and in peace manoeuvres what would be required of them in war. The lamentable ignorance in the art of tactics, and fear of assuming due responsibility, display- ed by the generality of French officers in 1870-71, and by the Russian officers in 1877-78, forms a striking contrast to the tho- rough grounding of the Germans, and resulted, as might have been expected, in the loss of many an action which might have ended otherwise had the troops been better handled by their officers. But it must be understood that, although a theoretical study of this military art is absolutely necessary as a ground work, it is not all that is required, for the profession of a soldier is emi- nently a practical one. The knowledge gained by officers by study must be applied on the ground in what is termed "Reconnaissance"; and must also be put in practice by commencing with elementary tactical exercises on a limited scale, first by handling one or more companies, squadrons, or batteries, and finally in peace man- oeuvres or camps of instruction. Such knowledge and practice is now regarded by foreign armies as absolutely essential to success in war ; to which may be added the necessity of officers and men learning unquestioning obedience to the orders of their superiors. Unless to a technical knowledge of one's own arm and to a thorough spirit of discipline be added a knowledge of tactics there must be failure in the day of battle. Bravery may be taken for granted, but bravery is not all that is required, it must be assisted in a very high degree by cultivating self-reliance based on knowledge. CHAPTER I. INFANTRY TACTICS. Systems of Tactics have from time to time been completely altered, but no chanj^es have perhaps been so radical as those which the general introduction of arms of precision combined with rapidity of fire have brought about in the tactics of infantry. The wars of the last fifteen or twenty years have produced a mass of literature on the subject resulting in much discussion and at first in much variety of opinion. But all the great continental Powers have during the past few years taken part in great wars, and all appear finally to have come to the same conclusion with regard to the general principles to be observed by infantry in battle, although they differ considerably as to details. The present system was introduced after the war of 1870, and it does not seem likely that the; will be any further very great changes for some time to come, although doubtless further tech- nical improvements will probably lead to modifications in matters of detail. The war of 1877-78 has cast no new light on infantry tactics but has served to confirm views previously held, although it has certainly brought the value of intrenchments and of long range infantry fire more prominently into notice, the former point- ing to the necessity of making a soldier carry an intrenching tool as part of his equipment. The modern system of infantry tactics, which has prevailed in spite of much opposition, is entirely at variance both in tenor and tendency to the old system of which the Duke of Wellington's school may be taken as a type. The stern discipline and iron rule of the great Duke allowed no freedom of thought or assumption of m TACTICAL NOTES. responsibility among his subordinates, he reproved sharply all officers who acted without orders, even thouf,di their action might be justified by success, and his pupils have to this day endeavour- ed to suppress independent thought and stifle all criticism on existing drill books and regulations. Meanwhile, while this system of stern discipline and implicit machine like subordination was in force, the modern system grew up at first unnoticed and then only noticed with contempt. The school of Von Moltke and his immediate predecessors, — the first organizers of the modern system, — hold opinions which are the exact reverse of those handed down from the Duke. The essence of the modern system is to develop individuality instead of crush- ing it, to make every officer and man a thinker as well as a fighter, and, while enforcing strict discipline, to encourage ideas instead of suppressing them. It is probable that such a system could never have become preval it but for the organi;iation which turns a whole nation into a huge army, thereby filling the ranks with men of high intelligence and education. The youngest officer is enjoined to exercise his faculties and show his originality, if he has any, as early as possible ; and to such an extent is this carried that in inspections and examinations an answer, though not orthodox, is allowed to pass provided it shows signs of original thought. Yet the discipline in the German army is as strict as ever, only the crime of a few years ago has become the virtue of to-day. " The result of this system is that while individual faculties are developed, the greatest possible amount of intelligence is brought to bear on every military question, which is turned over, sifted and resifted by thousands of minds, and the richest grain so select- ed is always being laid before the Chief of the great General Staff. The officers, thus encouraged to think and act with originality 'according to circumstances,' are ever ready to accept responsi- bility. To wait for orders when they ought to be acting would be visited with rebuke." But this system of individuality which prevails among officers of all ranks does not stop here. The same idea, with the modifi- cations necessary for different levels of intelligence, prevails throughout the whole military body, descending from rank to rank INFANTRY TACTICS. les are )rouj^ht sifted select- Staff, iiialitv )fhcers iioditi- revails () rank to the private soldier, who is tau^'ht by his officers self-reUance and to act and think as an individual. In fact, while the Duke of Wellington was ready to handle the whole military apparatus, from a general down to a sergeant-major, the new school has recognized that military genius is rare and cannot be counted upon, while training may be universal and present so solid a force that genius itself may be broken by it. A modern battle is a series of isolated combats over a wide field which cannot be oveiseen by the most keen-sighted commander-in-chief. Therefore the new system trains every officer and even man to be, as far as possible, a student of generalship. You may break up a German army as you will, when each fraction is prepared to act for itself in at- tack, defence, pursuit, or retreat. Yet it is not to be supposed that a thorough grounding in a long course of drill is not as essential now as before. However neces- sary it may be that troops when under actual hre should work in open order, yet the practical experience of war has clearly shown that no bodies of men can move without confusion and danger in loose formations till they have been long and carefully practised in close order ; in fact it has been often proved that troops who have not been first drilled into perfect steadiness on parade become a mere rabble when, in the presence of an enemy, they attempt extended movements. The following extract from the remarks of the general officer commanding at Aldershot on a field day held in the autumn of 1881 will also show the absolute necessity of proper training. An attack was made on an enemy in position, and the General says : " The front attack was not carried out with the order and discip- line that the general officer commanding expected to see. The advance across the valley to the position held by the enemy was, in one instance, made in no recognized form of attack ; the men simply crowded forward in an uncontrolled mob, firing uselessly in the air as they marched, regardless of the heavy fire of artillery on their flank. In real warfare few would have reached the heights, and the final charge, if it had ever taken place, would have been very different from what it appeared on that occasion. The general officer commanding must once more call the serious attention of officers to the necessity of keeping their men in hand. TACTICAL NOTES. i 4 m In this case, the officers of the battaUon seemed to have lost all control, and to have made no effort to regain it." This necessity for thorough training is clearly recognized in Germany, and the groundwork of the whole military system of the German Army is to be found in the most methodical accurate bar- rack yard drill. When companies (or squadrons) can once work without the s^lightest error or confusion in closed ranks they can easily adopt, and practise without disorder, the looser formations rendered necessary in modern war. There is a great danger of this necessity being overlooked by auxiliary forces, who are apt not to pay sufficient attention to the dry groundwork of drill, and the temptatit)n to attempt more showy exercises with still crude recruits is not always resisted. It is being recognized more and more every day that success in modern war depends in the first place on the rudimentary instruction of the drill-sergeant. In Germany this is fully recognized, and it is allowed that the skill of Von Moltke would have been of little effect had not each battalion, each company, and each squad been long, patiently, and thorough- ly practised in the most elementary principles of the barrack yard. The power to march long distances and then win a difficult battle comes from perfect di ill and unswerving steadiness, and not so much from the genius of the commander. These then are the general principles on which the modern tactical principles are based, and as a sound system of infantry tactics is a most important element in any force it will be useful to become acquainted with the systems in vogue in the armies of the principal Military Powers. The British system is given in the "Field Exercise" so will not be considered here. But a comparison between the British system and the continental regulations here described will show that our Field Exercise book would appear to need revision. The important principle of preventing the mixing up of units arid the training of non-commissioned officers to take charge of small groups of men, into which men in dispersed order will from the necessities of the ground be sure to form themselves, are not sufficiently recognized. It would seem too that the front of the battalion is too wide, and the depth too shallow, and although a deeper formation is per- missible, it is evidently not intended to be the rule. From the INFANTRY TACTICS. very coinnienceinent of a fi^'ht a inixitif,' up of different companies must inevitably take place, as no company reinforces its own men, and soon after there cannot fail to be a mixture of bat- talions. Then ^Toups of men will be formed and the non-com- missioned officers, not beinjj trained to take charj^^e of such j^Toups, will act with hesitation and look for orders, resulting:; in slowness and confusion and want of dash. The general principles which have been pretty universally ac- cepted are summarised as follows by Sir Lumley Graham : 1. The relative value of the firearm (cannon and musket) and of the sidearm (sword and bayonet) has been much affected by modern technical improvements. The firearm is now undoubted mistress of the battle-Held, where everythinj^' is subordinate to it. 2. The formation of infantry for battle must be such as to favour to the utmost the effect of its own lire, and to minimize the dam- ap;e done by that of the enemy. Within effective ranjji'es every- thiuf^f else must ^ive way to these two considerations. 3. For the front or " firinf( line" the only formation, both in attack and defence, which meets these requirements, is a line of small sections extended in single rank, which we Enj^dish call a line of skirmishers, which from bein}i[ at first very open becomes more and more dense as the antaj^onists come to closer cpiarters, attaining at last almost the consistency of a line in close order. 4. This "firing line" has a very different mission to that of the old " line of skirmishers." The latter had only to prepare the way for the columns or lines and to supplement their efforts ; the former, on the contrary, has to fight the battle out through all its stages to the very conclusion being supported in doing so by the troops in close order. Hence the conditions are reversed. 5. The intermixture of tactical units, which, under the present conditions of warfare, occurs more frequently and on a larger scale than formerly, is an inevitable evil. All that can be done is to put it off to as late a stage of the battle as possible by means of tac- tical displleys, in ine, and d kneel, After a lanies to ine and ion may )n stand- ly move join the nove up or they r to de- r* 14 ATTACK FORMATIONS. 4 GERMAN INFANTRY. J5 |!| il (■! .•'■ i6 ATTACK FORMATIONS. INFANTRY TACTICS. 17 THE ATTACK FORMATION OF THE FRENCIf INFANTRY. Tactical Units. — The Division is composed of 2 Brigades, each of 2 Regiments, each of 3 Battahons, Hence there are 12 Battahons to a Division. Each BattaUon consists of 4 Com- panies of 250 men. The normal division of the Company is into two divisions (Pelotons), each of two sections. On a peace footing each section is divided into two squads, and these eight squads are designated by the uneven numbers from i to 15. On a war footing, each of the above mentioned squads is divided into two, and the new squads receive the even numbers from 2 to 16. THE COMPANY. In forming for attack the Company is divided into three echelons. One section is extended as a "Chain" or shooting line, one section forms a "Reinforcement," and two sections form a "Support." The Captain gives general directions ; the commanders of sub-divisions are responsible for carrying out these orders ; they have no fixed post but place themselves where they can best observe what is going on, and direct their men. The chain is formed of squads, each consisting of from 4 to 7 files at six paces interval. These groups do not at once extend, but at first they remain in close order sending forward one or two scouts ((^claireurs) about 100 metres ahead, the squads on the flanks send two additional scouts to the flanks. The maximum distance between the shooting line and the reinforcement is laid down at 150 metres (165 yards), and be- tween the reinforcement and support at 350 metres (385 yards.) Circumstances decide when the company should adopt the i Attack Formation. The drill book after the preliminary recon- naissance says : — "The battalion commander pushes one company forward towards the point of attack selected. This company begins the engagement, feels the enemy, and obliges him to deploy his forces. A second company follows to prolong the line, to make a flank attack, to make a false attack which may afterwards be converted into a real one, or to support the com- i8 Tactical notes. pany first engaged. The two other companies conform. At the decisive moment one of them is pushed forward to the point where the first effort is to he made, its mission being to carry the first two companies on with it to the assault." The leading company advances to the attack in the order just described until the enemy's fire begins to take effect. The squads are then extended into a line of skirmishers, and the scouts, who are picked marksmen, begin to annoy the enemy with a steady well-aimed fire. If this is not enough, the whole chain moves up into line with the scouts and takes up the firing. The further advance is carried on by rapid advances of about 50 yards at a time. The Reinforcement and Support follow, moving from shelter to shelter, either by squads, by files, or man by man. As the fight progresses the reinforcement is gradually drawn into the shooting line. This reinforcing takes place by regular sub-units, or if necessary, by the whole reinforcement. It may be conducted in three ways : — (i.) If the extended line is not firing, the intervals are dimin- ished by closing to a flank. The reinforcing body extends on the march, and occupies the space left vacant. (2.) If the extended line is firing, the reinforcing body extends on the march, and occupies the intervals of the extended line. (3.) The reinforcing body is brought up on a flank of the ex- tended line and the latter prolonged. But the mixing up of units is to be avoided whenever possible, and only resorted to, as a rule, when the shooting line cannot be prolonged, or the intervals diminished. If it is found impossible to continue the forward movement, a portion of the support is thrown into the shooting line. When the fire has produced sufficient effect to admit of an assault, the remainder of the support is moved forward in compact order to give a fresh impulse to the shooting line. But in delivering the assault a portion of the support is to be always retained in reserve to meet a counter-attack, or to cover a repulse. INFANTRY TACTICS. 19 THE BATTALION. In assuming formation for attack, two companies of the battalion move out to the front and act as described. The extent of front occupied by the shooting line is gov- erned by the condition, that when the whole of eav.h of the two leading companies has been absorbed into the shooting line, there would be a man to every metre of front occupied. It is thus calculated that, after making allowance for casualties, the front of action of a battalion would not exceed 300 metres. The shooting line and reinforcement of each company are both under the command of the same officer. The support is commanded by a different officer, but all are under the command of the Captain. The support is to be kept intact as long as possibi , and when this can be no longer done it is to be loplaced from the Battalion Reserve, which is formed of the two remaining companies of the battalion. The reserve conforms to the movement at 400 or 500 metres in rear ; it is generally broken up into company columns of sections in line at 6 paces interval, but they soon have to open out to deploying interval. The advance is conducted as follows : The squads of the shooting line advance in groups as long as possible, preceded by their scouts. The reinforcement moves in the order most conducive to protection from fire, and to taking advantage of the ground. This order continues up to 800 to 1,000 yards from the enemy. The groups of the chain are then extended. At this stage the scouts only open fire. At about 600 yards from the enemy fire may be opened along the whole line. In reinforcing the mixing of sub-units is to be avoided. The shooting line is strengthened by the advance of regular sub-units from the reinforcement on the order of the Captain. These should be brought forward only as they become actually neces- sary. The support is retained in a formed body in rear as long as possible. r^ 20 TACTICAL NOTES. i ii |l|"'lll When further progress becomes difficult, the advance is to be carried on by fractions of the line at a time. The halted frac- tions cover by their fire those advancing. At this stage it is already sought to bring a converging fire on the position attacked. When no further progress can be made, the shooting line is reinforced from the support up to its maximum of one rifle per metre, and the Battalion Commander orders a rapid fire along the whole line. At this time the shooting line is assumed to have arrived at about 300 yards from the enemy's position. The rapid fire now going on aims at shaking the enemy's moral, and preparing the assault. The remainder of the supports are now moved into the shoot- ing line and subsequently the company of the reserve, which replaced the support, is moved up to the shooting line in close order. The remaining company of the reserve follows the movement of the^leading troops, but is still held in rear as a "reserve." The attack would now be continued by a succession of short rapid advances, the moments of halt being used for rapid fire. But for the execution of this final advance the Regulations state that no rules can be laid down. The attack from the commencement of the rapid fire to the final assault is carried out by the shooting line, reinforcement and support, reinforced by a part of the reserve. The remaining company of the reserve should be close in rear of the front line, and enter the position at the same time. At this moment the dealing with a counter-attack is the chief business of the reserve. Under its protection the remainder should be reformed at the first moment of respite. On all occasions when the Battalion Commander has expended the last company of the reserve, he should immediately inform the second line with a view to a fresh reserve being supplied from it*. e is to be ilted frac- stage it is t attacked, ig line is ii rifle per fire along arrived at 1 fire now )aring the he shoot- /e, which s in close novement rve." I of short apid fire, ons state re to the brcement emaining font line, the chief emainder expended y inform supplied ffr^ 22 ATTACK FORMATIONS. INFANTRY TACTICS. 23 THE ATTACK tORMATlON OF THE AUSTlilAN INFANTRY. Tactical Units. — The Division is composed of 2 Brigades, the strength of which may vary ; but a Brigade usually consists of 6 Battalions, — and therefore the Division of 12, and there are 2 battalions of Rifles in addition. An Army Corps consists of 3 Divisions. The Regiment is composed of 3 battalions, each of 4 Companies of 250 men. The Company is divided into two half Companies or 4 Sections. When skirmishing the section is divided into squads or groups of not more than 7 or less than 4 files. The Austrian Drill Book contains no fixed rules for the attack formation, it only speaks in general terms ot the distribution of a battalion into a "fire-line" and a "reserve" and remarks that the : "battalion commander will dispose of his companies as units in such a manner as to guard his flanks and rear while keeping a sufficient reserve in hand." It lays down, however, minute instructions as to what should be done by commanders of units under the varying circumstances which occur in the field. The general principles insisted on are the following : — The company is divided into the shooting line consisting, of a line of groups or squads, — "schwarm linie," — the support, and reserve. The former two together compose the "fire-line." The extended line forms a line of squads rather than a line of skirmishers. It has a given extent of front to cover, and each man is allowed a front of two paces ; but within these limits the squads, while regulating their advance by the squad of direction, and preserving the general cohesion of the chain, are free to act as circumstances require. Each squad has a leader of its own. Every leader or commander is ordered to carefully study the nature of the ground, and to take every advantage of cover. The fire is to be carefully regulated and adapted to the different ranges passed over. Each unit in the attacking force should endeavour, within the sphere allotted to its action, to act against the enemy's flanks. Frontal attacks should, as a rule, be only made to aid a flank attack. l:r wm 24 TACTICAL NOTES. THE COMPANY. When a company is formed for attack the Captain determines what proportion of the company he will extend, at first, in the shooting line. He is guided by the rule that each man is allowed, in the first instance, a front of about two paces. He also specifies the squad of direction. Squads are required to take every advantage of cover, to pre- serve connection during the advance, and to be always ready to afford support to each other. The supports are under ordinary circumstances about 80 yards in rear of the shooting line. They may move in fours, in line, in single rank, or in open files. They may be in rear of the centre or of a wing of the extended line. While taking all advantage of cover they must be ready to move out quickly to a flank, or to join the shooting line at any moment. In advancing they may move rapidly from cover to cover. In reinforcing the shooting line, supports may either thicken or prolong it. If an immediate assault is to be carried out, they should be brought up in a compact body. Supports are some- times moved forward to stimulate the advance when the shooting line hangs back from any cause. They would then pass through the shooting line who would follow them. All mixing of squads and sections is to be avoided as much as possible. When the company is employed by itself a small reserve, one section at least, is retained under the immediate control of the Captain. THE BATTALION. A battalion forms the order for attack as soon as it comes within the zone of the enemy's artillery fire, but it is not necessary at that period that the troops in the shooting line should be extended. The Commander of the battalion details the companies who are to furnish the shooting line, and indicates the extent of front to be covered, and which company is to direct. If more than one company is to be employed in the front line, the front to be occupied is divided between them. INFANTRY TACTICS. 25 3rve, one Each company employed in the front furnishes a section of the shooting Hne. Thus the supports and shooting hne belong to the same unit (the company). Should this become impossible in practice, then one company must support the one in front of it. There is no fixed rule as to how many companies should con- stitute the shooting line when the nature and strength of the enemy's position has not been yet clearly ascertained. One company may be used in feeling for the enemy before an advance is made in "attack order" on a line that may turn out to be the wrong one. But when a battalion is moving in close connection with others in the line of battle, it is usual to have two companies of each battalion to furnish the shooting line. As a rule the shooting line would extend over a front equal to that of the whole battalion deployed in line. Great latitude is allowed to the captains of companies in the shooting line in conducting the advance, taking advantage of cover, and regulating the fire. The battalion reserve is under the command of the senior Captain with it. He moves it m the formation best suited to the circumstances. The general principles laid down for the move- ments of the supports equally apply to the reserve, regard being had to the special functions of the latter as a "reserve." But no fixed rules are laid down as to the exact position it should occupy or the formation it should move in. "The battalion reserve follows on, as rapidly as possible, to support the attack, to secure any success that may be obtained, or in the event of failure to make it possible to rally the beaten troops." In practice it would be formed up very similar to the reserves of the French and Germans. The opportune employment of the reserve at the proper moment is the important duty of the Commander. Its most efficient use would be in making attacks on the enemy's flanks. It may be required to directly reinforce the shooting line when it would extend, and either fill up intervals or prolong the shoot- i.ig line to a flank. When the reserve is employed to take part in the actual assault, the battalion commander indicates the point it should move to, and the formation it shciuld assume. Rapid fire having been 26 TACTICAL NOTES. carried on along the line, the whole then advance at the double to the assault. In some cases the reserve may be retained in rear during the assault to secure possession of the position when carried, or to cover a repulse. he double luring the ied, or to ^m^B^ 28 ATTACK FORMATIONS. ' i INFANTRY TACTICS. 29 Such are the movements laid down in the different rej^ulations for the company and battahon. We will now see how the attack is conducted in practice by the Infantries of the three nations referred to. THE ADVANCE UP TO STORMINO DISTANCE. It is supposed that the Battalion Commander has sent forward an advanced company to feel the enemy so as to enable him to form his plans. This company will have had to extend one or more sections or ;^Uf;s to accomplish this ; and the Commanding Officer will meanwhile probably have selected one of the enemy *s winj^s as the object of attack and will attempt to outflank it whilst at the same time assailinj^ it in front. The exercise books of all the armies dwell strongly upon the risk of a mere frontal attack. At the same time wide turning movements are to be avoided. A battalion acting by itself has no force to spare for such a purpose. The CommaiKler, therefore, orders up a second company into the fighting line on the flank of the first. Now when infantry wishes to make an attack it will, in most cases, endeavour first to subdue the enemy's fire, and for this purpose to push up its own fighting line to within effective range ; but nations seem to differ as to what effective range is. The actual distance will vary somewhat according to circum- stances, but as effective range will be longer for the defender than for the assailant, the defender will not allow the latter to come up at once to what will be for him an effective range. Germany. — The Germans are in favour of reserving their fire on the offensive and enforce the rule that the moment of opening ftre should be put off as long as possible, and that the enemy's position should be approached as far as possible before doing so. They think it will be generally feasible to get within 550 or 650 yards of the enemy before opening fire, when they fire by volleys or independently, 3 rounds at a time ; it is not till within 450 yards of the enemy that rapid independent firing is allowed. They insist, however, that from the moment fire is opened it should become general, because the object of the assailant being to subdue the defender's fire so as to facilitate his own advance, his 30 TACTICAL NOTES. aim should be to bring a superior force to bear, at any rate upon the special points which he intends to assault, and that this can only be obtained by bringing every available rifle into play and by concentration of fire. The advance of the shooting line is to be made at a brisk pace without doubling, but when an open space has to be crossed under fire to move from one position to another it may be done by a smart rush. At times, too, it will be advisable for the skirmishers to throw themselves down to fire after running 60 or 80 paces, continuing their advance in the same way by successive fractions after a short pause. The attack will, however, evidently be delayed by this mode of progress, which uses up the strength very much, and should thus only be commenced when within 400 yards of the enemy. The supports and reserves are kept in close order as far as practicable, either in company-columns or deployed by companies, and as close up to the front as is compatible with fair immunity from loss. The book says "It mu^t be borne in mind that ground swept by the enemy's fire must needs be traversed in order to arrive at a decisive result, and that a nervous anxiety to keep our troops out of heavy fire is quite out of keeping with the nature of war, in which no success can be gained without sacrifice." France. — The French consider that at 870 yards, rifle fire becoming dangerous, the groups should extend in rear of the scouts, who, being picked marksmen, open fire in reply to that of the enemy. The fighting line pushes on from shelter to shelter, and as soon as it becomes necessary to do so in order to ensure superiority of fire, probably at about 650 yards, the chain joins the scouts. Fire is then opened along the whole front, the Captains bringing up part or even the whole of the supports if necessary. Lately the French have been practising firing voile} s by groups and sections and these are much practised in their manoeuvres; rapid independent firing is only allowed with the 200 metres sight. The skirmishers advance by successive rushes firing between whiles. At the longer distances all the skirmishers of a company advance together. As they approach the enemy, however, the movement is made by alternate half-companies, which run from INFANTRY TACTICS. 31 cover to cover, the halted part firing whilst the other advances. Each fraction should have a front of at least 100 paces. The supports ;ire sent forward from cover to cover, by the leader pointing out the place in front where the men are to assemble, and they run across to it singly or l)y hies, and re-form. They thus approach the chain and groups detached from them are sent to points where an augmentation of fire becomes neces- sary. The supports are sometimes broken up into sections which are distributed along the fighting line. Austria. — As soon as the leading troops enter the zone of artillery fire the reserves close up to supporting distance. The I companies to form the fire line are sent forward, but these move at first in close order with a few skirmishers in front and on the fianks to cover the advance. When the next ;^one, between 1830 and 1660 yards from the enemy's position, called ''long range distance" is entered, the "fire line" companies are kept, as a rule, in close order ; but when this order affords too much of a target to the enemy companies move in separate sections. Long range fire may then be ordered. For this the units to fire must be [closed, the object to be fired at must be distinctly pointed out, the range should be ascertained, and volleys only are fired. In this firing sufficient men should be united to make the results I effective. On entering the next zone, 830 to 400 yartis from the enemy, termed the "mean shooting distance," the advanced companies [throw out the shooting line if this has not already been done. The further advance is made by rushes of from 40 to 50 yards I with intervals of rest between rushes of not less than half a minute. The advance through the next /one, called the "short range [ihstance," constitutes the real attack. During this period the greater parts of the supports will have been drawn into the I shooting line, companies will have been weakened, and sections inixed up. The Austrians consider the system of "sanuneln," i.e. "forward [assembly," practised by the French the best for bringing supports [to the front over ground exposed to fire. The further advance will depend npf)n the arris. il of fresh [tr(X)ps to reinforce and encourage the men, more or less exhaust- 32 TACTICAL NOTES. Pilii ed, in front. For this the reserves must be at hand to prevent the "Fire Line" from beinp; defeated. It is incumbeait therefore on all battalions and refjiments in the first line to so feed the fire line as to bring it up to the "decisive distance," 250 to 160 yards from the enemy's position, where it will deliver its last and more rapid tire preparatory to the assault. The reserves should at this moment be ready to support the movement, and either directly take part in the assault or take post to cover a defeat. The Austrians hold to the principle, like the Germans, of reserving their fire as much as possible, and only admit of the fire becoming general at 250 yards. Beyond that distance, either only the best marksmen are to fire when good marks present themselves, or firing is done by word of command. It may here be stated that General Brialmont of the Belgian Army is in favour of advancing over open ground without hr.lting, and of keeping up a fire the whole time. He says : "We believe it to be easier to carry out the plan of firing as you advance, than of firing between the rushes," (a plan universally adopted at present), "and that the former system exposes troops to smaller loss, because it takes longer to get over the ground by a succession of rushes if you let the men lie down between each rush. It is true, that you make fewer hits at target practice when firing on the move, but shooting in battle can never be accurate. Generally men aim only at the smoke which conceals their enemy, and at the short ranges, the point blank fire of men standing up produces as much effect as that of skirmishers lying down." THE ASSAULT. When the attacking infantry has worked its way up to storming distance, the actual' assault will be made. But what is this storming distance ? the regulations do not define it. The German practice on open ground is to make it not less than 220 yards: the French appear to put this distance at 270 jards, though it is laid down that the assault should commence at the point beyond which the assailant can make no further progress by the effect of his fire arins alone. The Austrians, as we have seen, consider this distance to be between 250 and 160 yards. INFANTRY TACTICS. 33 Of course, in all cases it is understood that the above distances should be reduced as far as circumstances will permit. The wliole or parts of a hj^htinj:,' line may, if favoured by the ground, <(et much nearer to the enemy ''cfore makinjj; the final rush. In tile latter case, the more advanced portion will cover the move- ment of the more distant portions before joining in it themselves. The final charge, or rush, must be made in one spurt, and the maximum distance to be traversed must therefore depend upon the physical powers of the assailants, on whether the ground is Hat or steep, or whether, again, the soil is at the time light or heavy, as there must be no check. The Order for the Assault will be given in Austria and Germany by the leaders of the fighting line or foremost bodies, who " can generally form the best opinions as to the proper time for seizing the nearest points in the position assailed, and once seriously engaged, they act in this matter upon their own responsibility." The French instructions do not specify how the assault is to be ordered, though it would appear that the impulse is intended to l)e given by the Battalion Commander. As regards the execution of the assault the Austrian and Ger- man instructions agree in the main, although the former recognize the possibility of part of the fighting line only being employed in charging, while the remainder keeps up a fire, first of all upon the points assailed, and then upon those nearest to them. In Germany it is intended for the whole skirmishing line to take part in the assault, supported by the closed bodies. "If the enemy's infantry appears to be shaken at any point, the fighting line rushes upon that point, together with the nearest supports which have, up to this, been under cover, the whole making a rapid and concentrated onset, and on reaching the point, closing. The officers will then do their utmost to get them in hand, so as to make head against any counter-attack of the enemy." And it is inculcated : " Before undertaking the final assault, make very sure that it is feasible, but make up your mind that if once under- taken, it must be carried out at any cost." The French lay down more definite rules. When the proper ime has come. No. 3 Company is to be brought up in close order nto the fighting line so as to carry the latter forward with it to 34 TACTICAL NOTES. lliij the charge. Drums are to beat, bayonets to be fixed, and the whole line is to rush on the enemy, shouting "En avant /" If, however, the assailants cannot reach the enemy at one bound, they should at least profit by the confusion which the rapid fire has created in his ranks to continue their onward movement. This phase of the engagement must be characterized by the greatest vigour and impetuosity, without hesitation or perceptible check in the general advance. The fighting line, making use of a' er and concentrating during its momentary halts, advances Ca^ jly until near enough to the enemy to gain his position at one bound. All three field exercise books agree in making it the first duty of officers and non-commissioned officers to restore order in their commands as soon as they have gained the enemy's position. They all, moreover, lay down the rule that infantry are not to pursue the retreating enemy, but only to fire after them. If woods or villages are carried, their further border should be at once occupied. The interior should be well searched by a por- tion of the reserves, which should at once rush up to the position, the remainder joining in the fire upon the retiring enemy. A . rencli writer has pointed out that there is every inducement for the assailant to gain the position, about 550 or 650 yards from the enemy, whence he can seriously prepare for the attack and open fire as rapidly as possible, and to economize his ammunition till this position is reached. He will then advance from station to station, halting at each to fire. But he must not only traverse the intervals between the stations rapidly, but the number of these stations must be reduced as far as possible, because every time firing has to be stopped to resume the advance the skirmishers experience they have to make a special effort it is wise to spare them. Up to 500 yards he considers that at each station no more than 2 or 3 cplridges per man siiould be expended, but as the assailant approaches the enemy he will remain longer in each station, when, between unequal pauses, several series of 3 rounds may be fired ; the pause between each series enabling the officers to maintain some control over the fire. INFANTRY TACTICS. 35 At storming distance rapid independent firing would be com- menced without any limitation as to the number of rounds ex- pended. If the defender evacuates his position the task is simple, but if he stands firm and continues a decimating fire it will be a difficult task for the assailant to reach him. " We see no other way out of this difficulty than to run towards the position continuing the fire. In the final crisis then, firing during the advance becomes necessary, if only to mask the assailants advance by smoke and to unsteady the defender in the execution of his fire. At this extreme moment, waste of ammunition has no longer to be dreaded, and besides this fire at point blank range will have its effect even without aiming." "A repeating rifle recommends itself particularly for this decis- ive act to enable the assailant to throw himself against the position while, at the same time, continuing his rapid firing; this is the object to be attained." " In future that army which is supplied with a repeating rifle will have greatest chances of success." The following is a summary of the several stages in an offensive action of a single battalion : — (i.) Opening of the attack by a company divided into skirmish- ers and supports, (2.) Fire is opened as soon as no further progress can be made without it. The fire-line is strengthened, being prolonged by a second company. Attempts are made to outflank the enemy without extending the turning movement too far. The fighting [line gains ground, portions of it alternately firing and moving on. The two remaining companies follow separately in column or [line. (3.) The third company moves up into the fighting line and [prolongs it, as do also any fraction of the first two companies which may still be in support. The fire is increased to the I utmost. (4.) Final rush of the fighting line (portions of it perhaps re- Imaining lying down and firing). The reserve company follows in close order. The whole battalion fires on the retreating enemy [from the position which the latter has evacuated. ,:*'« r ■, I F— 36 TACTICAL NOTES. REMARKS. In the foref^oing outline of the " Formations of Infantry for Attack," it is seen that a uniform type pervades the armies of the principal continental nations, and that the same j^eneral principle serves as a common foundation for the whole. It is well there- fore to note what this j^eneral principle is. Briefly it is : — 1. That the hrst, and perhaps the chief, part of every attack must be carried out by infantry lire. 2. That the final and decisive part of every attack must be earned out by the Shootinji^ Line, reinforced by the reserves, who move in com.bination to the assault. 3. That the saccess of the hnal assault will depend on the effect produced on the enemy by the preparr.tory fire. Certain conditions are observable in the way this mode of attack is conducted. It is sought in the first place, to gradually establish in the Shooting Line the number of men necessary to maintain the most effective hre against the enemy. It is at the same time sought to keep that number at the lowest that will be effective. The formidg.ble objection to this class of "fighting formation"' is the dispersion of the troops in the first line of battle it entails. This disadvantage is so fully recognized that every precaution is taken to diminish as far as may be, and for as long as possible, the extent to which that dispersion is allowed to take place. But the necessity for this dispersion, in order to obtain an adecjuate degree of fire, and at the same time to lessen sufficiently the ex- tent of target offered to the enemy, is now universally, however reluctantly, admitted and accepted by continental nations. Accordingly we find that, in the "Regulations" of these dif- ferent armies, a very small fraction of the force to be engaged is first extended in th2 Shooting Line. When a Battalion is to as- sume the "Attack Order," the G rmans exteml, in the first in- stance, two half"/ugs (subsequently reinforced by remaining half- zugs) or a twelfth part of the l^attalicMi. The French extend two sections or an eighth of the Battalion. But the Austrians allow great discretion to the Company Commander as to how 'aanv men he will extend iii the first instance. Here is visible from the INFANTRY TACTICS. 37 fantry for lies of the . principle /ell tliere- 2ry attack : must be jrves, who I the effect i mode of gradually cessary to t is at the lat will be irmatiou"' it entails, caution is ; possible, \ce. But adequate V the ex- however us. these dif- n gaged is is to as- e hrst in- nmg half- :tend two r.is allow i)\v many from thr outset a close adherence to the principle that is at the root of all power in battle, i.e., the keeping intact und under control the largest possible part of \our force and for the longest possible period. But a closer examination shows that the above disposition must be regarded rather as a preliminary formation previous to I attack than as the actual "Attack Order." It is more a precau- tional order of advance towards the enemy's position previous to carrying out the actual attack. Here it is to be noted that j though there is in this a great similarity to that (^f the olri skirm- lishing line covering the advance of a body of troops in close order, yet the analogy quickly ceases. The busniess of the old skirmishing line was the minor one of clearing the front of [troublesome sharpshooters of the enemy, and then giving way for I the main body to move forward and attack the position with the bayonet. Now, however, the preliminary skirmishing line ii the nucleus jor skeleton of what is to become the Shooting Line in the attack. It is taken from those companies which are to form, in the hrst [instaiice, the front line of battle. This line is never meant to retire or be replaced by other troops, but it is to be reinforced as [required, and it is ultimately to form part of the body to storm the position. The rules for extension in the tirsi instance s'lnply establish a [precautionary order of advance, for it is admitted that when the real attack commences, the Shooting Line should be at once re- inforced up to the full number of rifles that can be effectively used. In (^anying out an aitack on this principle complete uniformity I in the order of battle adopted may be said to exist amongst con- tinental nations, the differences being unimportant and onlv of Idetail. The Hrst line of battle is subdivided into two main l^roui - ,,. , ^. , . ( ShootiuL'' Line 1. iMghtmg Lme ,. .'^ ^ '^ I Sujiports. 2. Reserve. These are, as a rule, furnished bv the same tactical unit. 38 TACTICAL NOTES. A battalion in the first line of battle has in — Fighting Line j battalion. Reserve j battalion. Fighting Line. The Austrians subdivide the Fighting Line into- (i) Shooting Line.) (2) Supports. j The Germans and French subdivide it into — 1. Shooting Line. ) 2. Reinforcements. Fighting Line. 3. Supports. ) This subdivision was probably originally adopted by the French from the Germans. But a Commission of French officers as- sembled in 1879 to investigate the most favourable formations for infantry in the attack were unanimous in recommending the suppression of the "renforts" and for the formation of the com- pany in two (Echelons. Their reasons for this were : 1. The renforts and supports have absolutely the same duties ; to reinforce the fighting line, to gradually increase the intensity of its fire. 2. The reinforcement does not diminish the losses, on the contrary it augments them, and it has also the result of further increasing the depth of the formation and in consequence of in- creasing the difficulties of supervision and command. The peculiar formation of the German company may, perhaps, account to some extent for the order adopted in that army. The normal formation of the German company is in three ranks, but for fighting order this formation is abruptly changed into two ranks. The normal subdivision of the company is into two parts called /ugs, but when it changes to two ranks from three the whole of the rear rank forms a third xug. ' The zug is held to be so important a fraction that the whole battalion is numbered by zugs from one to eight. Hut when the alteration from three ranks to two takes place, numbers have to be provided for the four fresh formed zugs, which strangely enough are numbered from one to four. This parade order in tiiree ranks which is never used in action, and this duplicate numbering of sections of companies, would be probably regarded as both clumsy and confusing if practised by any other nation than the Germans. INFANTRY TACTICS. 39 This formation constitutes for the Company three distinct lunits. Consequently (on the principle of keeping units distinct land intact as long as possible) when a Company in the first line )f battle takes "attack order," one zug is extended, one r,dvanced IS a first support, and the third kept back as a second support or immediate reserve. But it is quite possible that this order is iiade more to conform to the sub-division of the Company than [from any advantage derivable from three lines over two. As regards the extent of front first occupied by the Shooting .ine of a battalion a good deal of uniformity exists. The two half-zugs first extended by the Germans cover only a space equal to half the battalion deployed. But as soon as the remaining half-zugs are moved into the shooting line a front ecjual to the whole battalion deployed is occupied. With the Austrians and French great latitude is allowed in the )reliminary extension of the shooting line, but it is laid down that /hen this line is completed for attack the front occupied should ilso be that of the battalion deployed. With regard to the shooting line, there is an agreement of )pinion in favour of working by groups. In the German Army each extended section of a company forms a fire-group. It is under the command of a non-commis- sioned officer, and it is separated by an interval from the group )n either side. In the Austrian Army a similar system prevails, and from the latitude allowed, would seem to be carried even further. The kciuads or groups form loose links of a general chain which has a jivi-n extent of front to cover. But within that front, while naintaining the general direction of advance, great freedom is plowed them. They look immediately to their own squad leaders or t)r(lers and guidance, and they are allowed to move either klosed in a body, or in extended order, as the groimd and situa- [iou may determine. In the French Army the shooting line advances, in the first in- ance, in a line of stpiads, grouped separately. They retain this kdcr until the enemy's fire checks the advance, when they extend. There is some divergence in the diiferent armies regarding the ^l;u:cs taken by the men of each file within the groups. t '-^ l. ' IH A i ir^ 40 TACTICAL NOTES. Ji II !M The Germans require the two men of a file to be close together, but they may be either side b}- side or one behind the other. In the French Army the rear rank man is required to come up on the left of his front rank man immediately the extension takes place. Similarly, the intervals allowed between the men in the shoot- lug line also vary. The Germans make the intervals first taken dependent on circumstances at the moment, but limit the extent to six paces. In the Austrian army the captain of the company is informed of the extent of front he is to occupy, but the manner of extension is left a j^ood deal to his discretion. He is bound, however, to be guided by the rule that when the shooting line is fully formed, each man in it should be allowed about two paces. As regards the distances between the different bodies behind the shooting line, and their position with regard to the latter, it will be observed that a good deal of difference exists, and that as a rule great latitude is allowed. The Germans object to layinf^ down fixed rules for distances between lines. They work on the principle that behind every extended line there should be a closed body near enough to give timely assistance, but, if possible, not exposed to the same fire. Though in the other armies certain distances are given, it is provided that they are not to be consid- ered binding : while the positions to be occupied by supports and reserve are left entirely to the discretion of the commanders of] these bodies. The general method of advancing to attack is pretty uniform in these armies, but it may be well to notice the manner in which reinforcements arc made to the shooting line. The Germans appear to attacii great importance to the bringin^^ up reinforcements on the ilanks of th(^ extended line, ratlier than in the intervals between its files. This mode of reinforcing they regard as the rule, though circumstances may in special cases require it to be departed from. The b'rench and Austrians, on the other hand, (h) not appear to lay such stress on this mode of reinforcing. All agree, however, on the principle at stake, /.(■., that all reinforcing bodies should j be kept as far as possible intact. iMnthcr, that all reinforcements should be maiU' by regular units (sections, /ugs, cS:c.). INFANTRY TACTICS. 41 The bringing up of reinforcements on the flanks of extended Ibodies tends more t^zn any other method to the prevention of mixing of different u its. The practical action of an extended Hne in action is to close in on its centre. The casualties caused by fire thus leave gaps on the flanks. If, therefore, successive reinforcements can be brought up on the flanks, the mixing of different units would be avoided. And this mixing of different Itactical bodies is one of the great evils of the extended order of I fighting. On the subject of reinforcement a clear distinction should be [drawn between the mode of action in this respect of the "Sup- Iports" and of the "Reserve." Taking a battalion as the foremost [ftghting body in the line of battle, formed as — (i). Shooting Line. (2). Supports. " (3). Reserve. The missions of the "support" is — (i). To feed the shooting line according as gaps are made in I it by casualties. (2). To give a moral support to the shooting line by being close I at hand. (3). To act as occasion may require in covering the flanks of |the shooting line or meeting attacks of the enemy. The mixed role given to the supports can hardly be carried out Im practice. It can only form a reserve of rifles for the shooting lline, which it must join from the moment rapid fire commences, [and it is doubtful even whether it can supply all the casualties. The only duty then and the ultimate mission of the supports is, lit may be said, to be absorbed in the shooting line in extended |iipports is of the closest kind, and its mission to afford the most direct supi)ort to the bodies in front, yet its intervention, when ihe time comes, should be sought to be made without allowing its :^()nipanies to bi-conie extended in the shooting line. The order i»f dispersion is, for all i)in'poses, except fire action, an ordiM" of '1 " M 1 ,1 ■>\ w^ TACTICAL NOTES. I l|||| weakness. The efforts of the commander must be strained in keeping intact, up to the last, as large a part of his force as he can. Hence, when the reserve is brought forward for the final stroke, it should be engaged in such order r.s will, when the assault has been delivered, admit of the commander having some portion of his force under immediate control. Therefore, the reinforcing of the extended line by the reserve should not, if possible, be carried out in extended order, but rather by companies in line, or such other compact formation as the ground and circumstances may admit of. In case of a reverse or serious check in an attack, the extended order contains every element of danger ; and having a formed body of troops well in hand, however small the number, to make a temporary stand with, and enable the rest to rally, is of extreme importance. Hence this principle of bringing the reserve into action as a closed body when possible, is to be strongly inculcat- ed, as is also that of on no account using up the whole of the reserve until fresh troops arrive to take its place. Therefore we find that when a company is acting singly, it is required to keep at least one section in close order as a reserve. Similarly a battalion should keep at least one fourth as a reserve. It is not to be inferred from this that a whole battalion is never to be extended in the shooting line. It may frequently occur, when a considerable force is engaged, that the enemy's resistance has so weakened the attacking force, it becomes necessary, in order to keep the fire of the shooting line effective, to extend the whole of the companies of the battalion. But in this case there would be fresh troops in rear to form a new reserve, to whom in turn the above principle would equally apply. ATTACK FORMATIONS OF LA/{OMIf UmTS : KEUlMENT, BRIGADE, OR DIVISION. (;kkmanv. Bri^fixdc. — The l-?rigade assumes the formation for attack by placing two battalions in the first line (treffen), two battalions in the second line, and two battalions in the third line. The forma- tion of the battalions in the first line have already been described. INFANTRY TACTICS. 43 trained in irce as he the final % ■he assault ne portion M einforcing | jssible, be in hne, or umstances i extended I a formed , to make 3f extreme ^ serve into r inculcat- -1 ole of the ugly, it is I a reserve, a reserve. 41 )n is never tly occur, resistance essary, in xtend the ase there Vvhom in BJilGAUE, ittack by talions in Ihe forma- lescribed. I In the second line they are formed in echelon of half battalions, land in the third in battalion-column. The Regiments of a Brigade may be formed up either side by [side (Flugenweise), or one behind the other (Truppenvveise). If formed side by side each regiment has one battalion in each of the three lines. If formed one behind the other, the first line is formed [of two battalions of the leading regiment, t}ie second line of a [battalion of each regiment, and the third line of two battalions of [the rear regiment. The front occupied by the shooting line would [be about 500 yards, and the total force on that front would give [about 10 men to the pace. But a front of 1,000 yards would be [theoretically admissible as an extreme limit, that is five men to [the pace. Division. — The attack order of a division is based on similar [principles. It would be entirely Truppenweise, or entirely Flu- [genweise, or partly one, partly the other. Thus the brigade might [with reference to the division be Flugenweise, and the regiments [in one or other brigade Truppenweise, or the whole Truppenweise. FRANCE. No binding rules are laid down for the order in which the larger lunits should form for attack. A Brigade would form with one regiment in first line, and the fother regiment in second line, or it may form with one regiment ^alongside the other. The Division may form either with one brigade in first line, and the other brigade in second line, or with both brigades side by side, each having one regiment in the first line, and one in the second line. It is laid down, however, as a general principle, that [he first line of a division would, as a rule, consist of 4 battalions, "hese would be furnished by two regiments, each deploying two )attalions in the first line, while the third battalion is retained as regimental reserve. The regulations prescribe the following maximum distances be- tween lines : the two companies forming the battalion reserve jn first line may be 1,100 yards from the skirmishers. The bat- lions in second line may be 550 yards fmther in rear, id therefore 1,650 yards from the fightinj^ ^ine. It would take i M % It T^"^i^i 44 TACTICAT. NOTKS.* them about 20 minutes to cross this distance, a delay sufficient it is considered to allow of a chanfj^e to take place in the situation of the first line before the arrival of the expected reinforcements. But these are maximum distances, and the instructions allow of| their beinf^^ modified according to the requirements of each case, and especially are these intervals to be reduced in broken ground. It is doubtless true that should these wide distances be ever main- 1 tained in practice it would be difficult to maintain connection be- tween the fighting line and the reserves, and that these latter, even j in open and flat country, might easily take a wrong direction and} come upon the reserves or skirmishers of neighbouring baitalions, and especially is this liable to occur in broken and close country and when changes of front are executed on a large scale. AUSTRIA. Regiment. — The usual disposition of the regiment for attack is two battalions in first line, and one in second line. But as there is no fixed rule on this point, the Commanding Officer may reverse i this order, or may place all his battalions in one line, or mayj place them one behind the other in three lines. Brigades and Divisions. — The Austrian Regulations do not lay down fighting formations for units larg i than the regiment. The number of battalions to be used in the front line depends] upon the extent of the enemy's position. The disposition of the troops is therefore made to depend on the circumstances of each case. The following example is given in the drill book : A division places two regiments in first line. Each regiment] has one or two battalions in attack formation and the remainder as a regimental reserve. The rest of the infantry of the division constitutes the divis- ional reserve in second line, and is in battalions either in the \ same alignnient or one behind the other. When it is impossible to outflank the enemy it is recommended I that the main reserves be placed at points where roads or com-j munications cross each other. It is also recommended that the different tactical units, battal- ions, regiments, &c., be formed up, as a rule, on the same alignment I INFANTRY TACTICS. 45 instead of one behind the other. Thus, one rejjjitnent should not fonn the reserve to another regiment, but each regiment having one or more of its battahons in the front hue forms its- own reserve with its remaining battahon or battahons. In this way a mixing up of different units is avoided. The battahons in reserve are bound to move fonvnrd even with- out instructions, so as to conform to tlie movements of the first Hue. The distance between the regimeJital reserves and the at- tacking battalion should seldom exceed 400 yards, and the former should be so placed as to at once support the front line when oc- casion arises. An important duty of the reserves is to protect the flanks of the first line, and to reinforce the attack by acting against the flanks of the enemy's position. On the subject of these flanking movements the Drill H(K)k lays down that "a frontal attack alone shall never take place unless the hostile line is weak and not thoroughly occupied and unless the ground permits of a concealed approach to a point in the im- mediate vicinity of the adversary. In all other cases the enemy's position is to be forced by a surrounding attack." REMARKS. Thus, as a rule, the battalions in first line represent about a third of the whole disposable force, and will be called upon to carry on the fight up to within storming distance of the enemy's position, a part of the troops in rear then coming up to reinforce the first line immediately before the assault, whilst there main- dor follow the stormers in close order. The battalions in first line in all cases engage half their strength in the shooting line and sup- ports, reinforcing them with the other half as the battle pro- gresses. Piefore the actual assault takes place the battalions in first line will almost always be reinforced by those in second line be- fore the assault takes place. There will then be considerable difficulty in controlling and directing the heavy fire which prepares the way for the assault, proceeding, as it does, from such a •% mm 46 TACTICAL NOTES. mingled mass of men. The points to be chiefly insisted on are that the fire be both rapid and yet aimed, and that it be concen- trated on the object of attack. After the assault, the necessity for immediately reforming tactical units will be even greater than in the case of a battalion acting by itself, as tactical order will have been much more seriously disturbed. If the enemy has retired to some distance it may be advisable to relieve the first line. Extent of Front. — As regards the extent of front of a battalion acting with others, all these books agree that the extent of front of the fighting line should be equal to that of the battalion de- ployed. This permits of a very loose line of skirmishers at the commencement of the action with distinctly marked intervals be- t "een both groups (which have almost become the "fire units") and companies, which not only facilitate the work of supervision and command but also help to delay the intermixture of tactical units. The fighting line is gradually thickened by successive re- inforcements until it attains its maximum density of about one man per pace just before the final assault. The French give from 300 to 350 metres (330 to 380 yards) as the proper extent of front. The Austrian and German books name no specific distance : Brialmont gives 360 yards, and others think 440 yards will not be too much, as in a well contested action every rifle of the leading battalions would have to be brought into the firing line before the assault. Intermixing of Units. — Although the intermixture of units must be delayed as long as possible, it must take place sooner or later. The intermixture of groups and sections is of comparatively little importance, but the great difficulty arises when the intermixture extends to companies or battalions, and even to brigades and divisions, which has often happened and will always occur when there is a stubborn fight between two large bodies of infantry. Whenever such derangement occurs, "the senior officer on the spot must take command and must assign to each of his subor- dinates a certain portion of the line, as far as he is able to do so, amidst the battle tumult ;" in which case each officer takes com- mand of the part of the fire line which is immediately before him. INFANTRY TACTICS. 47 "The unqualified subordination of both officers and men is in moments of this sort of the utmost consequence." Battalions in Second and Third Lines. — These battahons have to perform, only on a larger scale, the same tasks as the companies in support and reserve in the case of a battalion acting by itself. j At the commencement of the battle they will be able to remain in [column, but as they approach the enemy each battalion will have to break up into company-columns, which will increase their I intervals as they advance, and will perhaps be deployed. Some- I times a battalion will be spread along the whole fighting front in a line of company columns; sometimes the latter will be concen- jtrated to one flank ; sometimes they will be in one line, sometimes in two ; all will depend upon their situation. In one or other of these formations the battalion follows the first line until called upon [to join the latter or is detached elsewhere. In most cases, as we have seen, battalions in first line will carry on the fighting till [within storming distance (i6o to 360 yards) of the enemy, when Ithey will need assistance. The battalions in second line will then Icome up, pouring some or all of their companies into the fighting jline to join in the rapid firing at this crisis jf the attack. During the assault, if any companies of the second line have Ibeen kept back, they, as well as battalions in reserve, will remain lin close order, continuing to advance and keeping their respect- live distances from the front. Companies as a rule will be de- )loyed. After the enemy's position has been carried, as many battalions IS possible of the two front lines will be brought forward to take )art in the pursuing fire : but they must keep well in hand, so as to be ready for any movement required. Battalions in rear of the second line do not generally take part in the fighting but are held in hand to meet any unforeseen emer- :ncy. INFANTRY ON THE DEFENSIVE.* A SINGLE BATTALION ACTING ALONK. The requisites of a good position are given in the chapter on "The Occupation of a Defensive Position," and all the principal conti- W *]'"r()m tlie Tactics of Infantry in Battle, by Colonel Sir Lumley tJrabani, Bart. I. . I m 48 TACTICAL NOTES. nental nations seem ajjreed as to these as well as to the best mode of occupying a position witii infantry. The principal points to be noted are as follows : 1. The main line of defence havmg been selected, arrange- ments must be made for holding it obstinately, Held works bein^' thrown up where necessary. 2. This line should be from the first occupied in force with sup- ports close at hand. 3. The bulk of the defender's forces should, whenever possible, be massed at certain important points of the line of defence, the intermediate ground being slightly occupied or only observed, as it will be swept by the fire of the principal posts. This system is preferable to that of spreading troops equally along the whole line. 4. Detachments should be pushed forward to the front and flanks to reconnoitre, but not to fight. They should retire as the enemy advances. 5. Immediate supports should be as near as possible to the line of defence and distributed at intervals along it, in greatest force behind the flanks. In third line will be a body in reserve at the disposal of the Commanding Officer of the battalion to assist any part of the first line which may be seriously threatened or to meet a flank attack. These three echelons are intended for purely defensive pur- poses. It is necessary to keep a fourth body in hand to make the countet-attack which must always form part of a defensive scheme. A Commanding Officer has thus to provide a sufficient strong fighting line ) next to feed and reinforce it at need ; thirdly, to keep in hand a general reserve ; fourthly, to set apart a special body to execute the counter-attack when the proper time comes : and, lastly, to make his tactical dispositions in such a manner as to prevent as far as possibe, or at any rate to delay to the utmost, any intermixture of units. The French recommend the employment of two companies in the shooting line and supports, the other two companies being at first kept together in a central position if favoured by the ground. INFANTRY TACTICS. 49 , arrange- reserve at :i.sive pur- The German and Austrian books give no definite instructions lupon this matter and leave full freedom of action to the com- jmanding officer. During the first stages of the attack the object of the defender lis to delay the assailant and to make his approach to storming [distance as difficult as possible. This must be the work of the [rifle, and the question is how best to use it. The subject of [infantry fire opens up such a wide field that it will be discussed [more at length in the next chapter. In Germany it is considered that after 700 or 750 yards infantry [fire will have no great effect unless directed at the same time on [the same point and from a considerable number of rifles ; in fact, [every available rifle should be brought into play, but that it will jbe well in the first place to consider whether the expenditure of [ammunition is justified by the results which may fairly be expected [from it. The general tendency is to fire volleys in the earlier part of an [action when the men are well in hand. Later on, the disturbing [effects of battle are too great for volleys to be possible under or- [dinary circumstances. The volleys will be fired by the shooting jline, in bodies of a "zug," at the same word of command. Of [course, when deep columns expose themselves they will be the [first objects aimed at, after that company-columns and lines, lastly [skirmishers. It may be advisable before the defender's fighting line has been fired upon to bring the supports up into it in close order to fire /olleys, withdrawing them, however, in good time to their original )osts so as to keep them intact. In the French book we read : "As long as the enemy is at a dis- tance, only the scouts who are embusques in front of the line open ire; as the enemy comes on the scouts withdraw, and the whole [ine of skirmishers commence firing, part of them replying to the enemy's skirmishers, whilst the remainder aim at the supports md reserves. Volleys may be fired with advantage upon masses it long ranges." In Austria the general tendency of the instructions is to reserve ire for the shorter ranges, although it also recommends the fire )f masses at long ranges. -^!h 5<^ TACTICAL NOTKS. The closer the enemy v:omes the more frequent the opportuni- ties for effective fire. Volley succeeds volley until ;it last the as- sailant is brou;,'^ht to a standstill and forced to reply. About this time, t(>o, the defenders give up volleys and take to individual fire, as they can no longer be kept to firing by word of command amidst all the increasing turmoil of battle, Thev should not, however, be allowed to pass from one mode of firing to another of their own accord. Officers should, therefore, not delay too long the necessary order. Now comes the time for the supports to be brought into action and much judgment is required in choosing this time. If brought up too early there will be a premature expenditure of fighting power; but better too soon than too late, for the line of defence must on no account be anywhere broken. Supports may be brought up into line either in close order, if only for very temporary use, or in extended order if intended as a permanent reinforcement. Either fashion is recogni;^ed by the different field exercise books. The German says : " When on the defensive it will often answer better ; to prolong the fighting line by occupying ground which fianks the enemy's approach, or to strengthen the most important points and those most favourable for defence than to reinforce the whole \ line." But at the same time the defender nuist not try to gain security for his flanks by an extreme extension of his front, but by placing behind them a powerful force whose business it will he j to oppose any turning movement of the enemy. The supports on coming up will join in the individual firing, which will have, already been substituted for volleys. The fight reaches a climax when the assailant is preparing to I storm. At that moment the defender must bring every disposable rifle into action, except the reserve kept in hand for the counter- attack. Troops brought up at this critical moment should be in I closer order; they risk little, for the enemy will be stopping his fire to make his assault*, and they will be more luider control. Tliej reserve when thus brought into line will fire volleys with advan- tage if the men are sufficiently cool to do so, but this is specially the moment, and one of the few moments, when rapid indepen- dent fire is advisable. - tiring. ' Witii repeiitiug rifles it is probable the ailvance to the jissault will bo made 'NFANTRY TACTICS. 51 opportuni- I ist the as- I About this I individual | command 1 lould not, I to another I delay too I nto action I If broujj^ht I inj,' power; I :e must on I irought up I Y use, or in I it. Either I loks. The I ?\ver better I flanks the I ant points I ; the whole I ty to f,'ain I front, but I it will be I supports I will have I eparinfj;- to I disposable I e counter- 1 ould be in I j)ping his I rol. The I th advan-l specially I indepeii-l h ill be inaiU' I THE COUNTER-ATTACK AND FURTHER MEASURES. The necessity of combining the offensive with the defensive, and of not trusting to a mere passive defence, is universally ad- mitted. The question is, when and how is the defender to take the offensive? There is some difference of opinion upon these points. Germany and A iidria. — A body of troops is told oft" for the special purpose of delivering the counter-stroke, which should be made from a flank either just before or at the very moment of the enemy's assault, whilst the troops in the front line of defence re- double their tire and keep it up as long as they can do so without endangering their friends. Sometimes the counter-attack may be deferred till after the enemy has made his assault without success, when it may be de- livered straight to the front. In no case will it be advisable for infantry to pursue the retreating enemy to any distance. They need only send a shower of bullets after him, the actual charge, I however, having been made with fixed bayonets in close order, or i in line of groups. It will rarely be advisable to occupy any post I in advance of the line of defence after the enemy's repulse, unless I a change in the situation should induce the commander to take I the offensive permanently, or unless experience shows that some I point should be held which has not previously formed part of the defensive position. ' No subordinate officer may take upon himself the responsibility of ordering a counter-attack. This order must proceed from the [ Commanding Officer himself. I France. — -The French are in favour of an early counter-attack, [and of its being made with the whole available force: "If the [enemy continues his approach and is on the point of reaching the position, the Commanding Officer, being under the firm con- viction that nothing will affect the moral of his men so much as to I remain on the defensive whilst the enemy makes his assault, has [recourse to his reserve and boldly takes the oft'ensive. He uses [his whole disposable force to make the counter-attack, which he [(oinbinesas nuich as possible with a movement on the enemy's [Hank, taking care to pri pare the way for this operation by re- m ill ;■+■ I doubling the fire all along his front." 52 TACTICAL NOTES. Three things may happen as a sequel to a defensive action ; either the defender may determine to take the offensive, in which case the parts will be reversed ; or the same positions being re- tained the attack may be repeated ; or the defender may find it advisable to retreat. How is this movement to be conducted? If free to choose his own time a commander will naturally select the moment imme- diately succeeding an attack which he has repulsed, as this will afford the most favorable opportunity for getting clear of thi enemy in good order. This will be facilitated by previously mak- ing a flank attack with part of his force, and by redoubling his I fire. All tacticians are in agreement as to the difficult nature of| the operation in question. Germany and France. — The German and French books do not differ materially as to the details of execution. The retreat will be made by successive dchelons, each body re- 1 tiring to the nearest good position behind the body in rear of it, and then covering the retreat of the other by its fire. Each rear- ward position should be, if possible, clear of that in front of it, or, which amounts to the same thing, the forward t^chelons when it comes to their turn to retire should unmask those in rear. Each echelon should be in extended order, and should, according to the French, not have a shorter front than 80 yards. A Hstria. — The Austrians have views of their own upon this mat- ter : "The movement of retreat should not be commenced simul- taneously by all the groups of a ' 2Ug,' but all sliould act in perfect unison while retiring from position to position, and all the groups of a '2Ug' should reassemble in each new position before the movement is continued." The same principle is insisted upon when dealing with larger bodies. Thus the difficulty experienced on first conmiencing a retreat recurs at each change of position of the retiring force. HATTAl.IONS ON THl- i)i:i'i;nsivi. i'okminc, HODV. I'AKT oi- A i,akc;i:k A battalion acting by itself has to )^o through all the stages of a figlu without external aid, whereas a battalion which forms part of a brigade or larger body h:'s only to undertake a share of thf INFANTRY TACTICS. 53 »ks do not work, larger or smaller according to its proportionate strength to that of the whole force engaged. The larger the share the greater the freedom of action allowed. The distribution of a defensive force into four echelons holds good for the larger bodies as for a single battalion. Each t^chelon will have the same work cut out for it in the former as in the lat- ter case. A counter-attack upon the flank of the assailant will only, however, be possible if the battalion happens to be on the flank of a flank division, or of a division acting by itself. In other cases the defence will be merely frontal. There seems to be little difference of opinion as to the best way of occupying a position. A division will be best disposed if its regiments are drawn up side by side, a certain part, or perhaps the whole of one brigade, being kept back as immediate support. Each regiment will then have its own section of the position to occupy, furnishing fighting line, support, and local reserve. Either one or two battalions of each regiment will be in front (fighting line and support), the remaining battalions or battalion forming the "local reserve." A battalion in front line may occupy its share of the position in two ways : 1. Two companies in fighting line and two in support; 2. Each company extends one or more sections, keeping the [Others in support. Each plan has its advantages and disadvantages. The second I system seems to be the one most favoured. Each companv will then have its own sub-section of the position to guard, and during the first stage of the combat, at least, there need be no intermix- tures of companies, as such intermixtures would occur almost Ifrom the first /ith the other formations. There can be no positive rule as tt) the extent of front occupied Iby each battalion in the line of defence. This depends much more than it it does when on the offensive upon the nature of the ground, because many (juestions are involved, such as: the cover afforded by the ground ; the field of fire to the front of the posi- |ti(iu: the possibilitx' of occupying only certain points in the linr and of commanding intervening si)aces by cross lires, tS:c. ^11 54 TACTICAL NOTES. A battalion may however, as a rule, occupy a broader front when on the defensive than when on the offensive ; a front of 650 yards would, in many cases, be allowable. Battalions in the line of defence carry on the figiit pretty much in the same manner as when acting independently. Battalions in rear are kept quiet and under cover till required to act, when thev will be handled in the same manner as the reserves of a singK battalion. INFANTRY AGAINST CAVALRY. All are agreed that in case of a cavalry attack infantry! should allow itself to be as little disturbed as possible from the formation in which it happens to be at the time. Skirmishers may even receive cavalry without closing if the nature of the ground] be at all favourable to them: if not, they may close to any con- venient point. Supports may often be brought with advantage! close up to the skirmishers on such occasions. A body of troops | in close order had best receive cavalry in line if already deployed,] or if it have time to do so. These rules apply to really good and steady infantry. Should] a commander have reason to doubt the coolness and firmness of! his men, he may lind it advisable to have recourse to formations | calculated to give them the confidence in which they are deficient, that is to say, to the square or column ; but in doing so he will prob-[ ably be playing the enemy's game by delaying his own movements, and by exposing his dense formations to fire. This is especially the case if the enemy has artillery to shake the infantry, and the! Germans hold that cavalry charges against infantry shaken by ar- tillery fire are possible and very effective. Germany. — The Germans know three sorts of squares : battalion! sfjuares, company squares, and, for the skirmishers, group or| rallying scjuares. France. — The I'rench use company scjuares or circles, but nei-| ther battalion nor rallying squares. A battalion in open column forms company -columns and! echelons them, or forms line. A battalion in line of company- columns, or in quarter-column, echelons the companies so that they may support one another, taking rvery advantage of tlu' «:roun(.l. INFANTKV TACTICS. 55 Austria. — The Austrians, if forced to adopt any special forma- jtioii a^ifainst cavalry, make skirmishers form rallying square, whilst [supports form company squares. A battalion attacked by cavalry follows the same rules as those |in force amongst the French. INFANTRY TACTICS IN RUSSIA. Russia being the last of the great Europer.n military Powers [which has been engaged in warfare on a large scale, it is both in- Iteresting and instructive to take note of the system of tactics [which their experiences from the war of 1877-78 have led them to [introduce. The infantry tactics in force when they entered upon this war [seemed to place more reliance on shock tactics than on fire tac- Itics, consequently close formations under fire were persevered in, {and it is generally admitted that their system of tactics must have largely contributed to their defeat and to the high percentage of |losses they suffered. The Russian fighting line was practically a skirmishing line, IfoUowed by the main body consisting of one or more lines in a jclose two-deep formation, and the general impression is that the [lessons of the Franco-German war had been very imperfectly llearned. This may partly be due to the fact that since the Crimean war Ithe Russians had never fought against a European arm\-, and their [frequent campaigns against Asiatic tribes tended to the continu- lance of closer forinations. Moreover, the Russian soldiers pos- [sess a lower average intelligence than those of other European larniies, and their officers probably were afraid of letting them get )eyond their immediate control, so that they sought for tactical strength in masses. The battalion organization was in five companies, the fifth, a rifle company, being composed of picked marksmen. This fifth :ompany was being done away with when the war broke out, and was carried out only in the Imperial Guard and the army of the [Caucasus. Now they are etitirely abolished. The Russian order of attack for the battalion prescribed 56 TACTICAL NOTES. two lines of company-columns, the comptinies in first line beinj; either deployed into line or retained in columns of half-companies. The second line was also in columns of companies with a front of] half a company. Each company in the first line extended a half company as I skirmishers, who advanced in groups of four men at a distance of 125 to 160 yards from the supports or first line. The skirmishers I were supposed to advance in rushes of about 50 yards, makiu},' use of cover and lying down to fire; but actually Russian skir- mishers took little advantage of natural cover, a certain indication of faulty training in both officers and men. The second line followed the first at a distance of about 30(1 yards. The formation, therefore, consisted of three lines : the skir- mishers, the supports or first line, and the reserve or second line. Both supports and reserves appeared to retain the close two decii formation. There was also a simpler formation occasionally adopted, which consisted merely of extending the rifle company of the battalion as skirmishers, followed by the remaining com- panies deployed into line. These formations were evidently very different to the dispersed! order now universally adopted. They were quite unsuited when opposed to the breech-loader, and they serve fully to explain the | heavy losses of the Campaign which usually exceeded those of the I Franco-German war. An eye witness of the Russian manoeuvres of 1876, where these] tactics were in force, was much struck by the density of the in- fantry formations, he says : — " They offer an enormous target to fire at. To the very end] tactical bodies are so crowded together that they would all at the same time be under intense fire and form one great line from 300 to 400 metres deep. The skirmishers pass in front of the artil-| lery, and lie down as do the two or three foremost lines. These are so rigid that the men never move to gain shelter ; where they halt they lie down." ^. ^ _.- The Russian attacks have been thus described : " In these engagements, whole companies drawn up in com- pany columns followed the skirmishing line at no great interval.! it 2,00( idversa lalt anc [he firiii Ihe ad\; ^scape /as imp \.s they ( ^ions in l>anies si hot." This d Turkish : The Ri hling t( instead o holding t( INFANTRY TACTICS. 57 It 2,000 yards of the enemy the zone of tire was entered. The idversary's well sustained fire compelled the skirmishing line to lalt and immediately the companies in rear became mixed up in [he firing line, resulting in a pernicious mixing np of units, and [he advance was then continued as rapidly as possible in order to bscape from the heavy loss they suffered. Whenever this advance /as impossible the troops were often unable to do anything : for Is they could not see their adversary, they followed the instruc- lions in their regulations and did nothing ; so that many com- banies suffered considerably even before they had fired a single ihot." This doubtless is one of the chief causes why the long range Turkish fire was so effective. The Russian infantry has with justice been much blamed for [elding to shock tactics which led to the above faulty dispositions, istead of gaining experience from recent wars which have so llearly brought to light the power of fire ; in the haste with which pay carried out their assaults ; and in their infantry allowing itself be led on by a partial success, such as the capture of the first [ne of defence without reassembling their forces before attacking second line of works, a mistake which frecjuently led to heavy 3sses and failures. After the war many Russian officers pointed out the defects in eir system, and one says: "The best way of diminishing the sses of troops attacking under the murderous rifle fire of the resent day, is to have thinner formations, to brake up units into ictions, then to loosen these fractions even to the point of open- g out files, and to increase the distance between lines." This riter recommends a distance of from 400 to 500 yards between e first and second lines. The Russian attacks on Plevna and elsewhere seem to have ien begun at distances of 1,000 to 1,200 yards or even more with [chain of skirmishers leading, but followed closely by the sup- )rts in company-columns, and the reserves in battalion masses [hich soon became more or less mixed up in the fighting line, ul as a natural consequence the advance was often disorderly, lie disorganized swarm passing out of the control of the battalion )ininanders. The losses rapidly accumulated, and the whole 58 TACTICAL NOTES. mass of men would then come to ji standstill, they would try toj obtain cover and would open an ineffective Hre until they couldl be again set in motion, but only by bringing fresh troops into the J fighting line. , General Skobeleff in his attack on the Plevna redoubts on the I nth September, made the best of the faulty tactical system, | Placing himself well to the front, so as to be able to judge person- ally of the exact moral condition of his fighting line, and retaininf;! fresh bodies of men ready to be ordered up directly the critical moment was reached, he succeeded with a relatively small force in carrying two redoubts, and his generalship has deservedly re- ceived universal commendation. Skobeleff's own opinions are worth quoting; "The only forma- tion in which troops can successfully assault intrenched positions! is in successive lines of skirmishers. The Division General must be perfectly thoughtless of his own comfort and safety, and put himself between the skirmishers and the reserves, where he can] feel the pulse of the battle and have his troops in his own hand, and judge himself of the moment when the successive battalions] in reserve should be sent forward. "There are in every command a small percentage of cowards who will slink awc^y at the first opportunity; a certain number of] men of rash bravery who will go too far forward and get killed ; and the great majority of men of ordinary courage, but liable to| waver as the fight gets hot. "The reserves must be sent in at the moment when the reason- ably brave men have been long enough engaged, and have met with I sufficient resistance to begin to feel nervous, but before they have actually begun to retreat ; and it is in deciding upon the oppor- tune moment for sending forward his reserves that the art of aj Division Commander consists." The Russian attacks too were almost always directed frontall against the enemy's position, attempts to turn one or both flanks] of the enemy having been very rare. On the defensive the Russian infantry often proceeded too early to a counter-attack, without beforehand making full use of that | rapid fire, which, if rightly employed, is so destructive at short ranges : the pursuit also of the repulsed enemy was sometimes I INFANTRY TACTICS. 59 carried out with the bayonet where firing would have been far more lefficicaious. The Russians appear to have attaciied little value to infantry [fire in preparing the attack. The fire seems usually to have been wild and ill regulated, and the advance was conducted as if the great idea was to get over the ground as (juickly as possible in order to close with the enemy. When firing did take place, it was not in general a rapid preparatory fire previous to the last rush, [but rather a sign that the force of the attack was already spent, and that a retreat was impending unless fresh troops were at once Ibrought forward. Dragomiroff, one of the best known military writers in the [Russian army, speaks in his orders before the crossing of the Danube of 30 cartridges as the maximum which a soldier should [expend ; this, and the directions not to lie down except under ders, serve to indicate the general backwardness of the Russian tactics at that time. A well matured and carefully taught system |of field firing does not appear to have existed. General Zeddeler writes that it is necessary: "to change gen- erally our ideas of fighting, to place in the first rank fire tactics ind not those of the bayonet, to seek and employ all the means )f giving all possible development to fire, having recourse to the )ayonet only when fire and other measures, among which flank ittacks hold the first place, are insufficient to reduce the enemy." Captain Kouropatkin in pointing out the causes of the failure of ^lie Russian attacks before Plevna says : "even when we had ar- rived within 500 yards of the enemy we made but little use of our rifles, and attempted to advance without firing a shot, without faking advantage of the natural cover which the ground afforded. We mixed up the advance and the charge, and even began the [atter at 1,650 yards. Not content with that, we often deemed it )ossible to make the charge at this distance in a single rush. When heavy losses, physical exhaustion, and moral deterioration lad brought the attacking troops to a standstill before they had [■cached their goal, they did not then hold the best ground when latural cover existed, but remained where they stood, so that they Frequently found themselves in the open at 30 to 100 yards from the enemy when there was acttuUly excellent cover before or bu- liiiKl them." m 6o TACTICAL NOTES. In 1879, after the conclusion of the war, fresh instructions were issued for the guidance of infantry ; the following are some of the points deserving of special notice : Each battalion now consists of four companies ; each company is divided into two half-companies, each of two platoons, each! again of eight sections in war. The sub-division ot the company into groups of four men is done away with, the smallest fraction| being now the section. A battalion formed in two lines, each consisting of two compan- ies will occupy a front of 420 yards, each company in front line| being broken up into line of skirmishers and supports. Before opening fire the formation is two deep whether at the! halt or on the march. As soon as firing commences, rear-rank men come up into line with front-rank men, no firing is to be done] on the move. The distance between a line of skirmishers and the immediate! support should not exceed that between the former and the fight- ing line of the enemy. During the advance every endeavour mustl be made to get over the ground as quickly as possible, and to gain a point where effective fire may be opened; consequently, thej fighting line moves upon it with as few halts as possible, without] being broken up and without running, so as not to tire the menj prematurely. If, during this forward movement, it becomes necessary to make] the whole or any part of the line open fire, it is to be halted to do so. Once within effective range of the enemy, the advance is made by successive rushes, so as to shorten the time during which a visible mark is presented. When the assailants are not firing, all the skirmishers of a company move on together; when! firing they move by smaller fractions, which alternately advance | and fire from the halt. When the ground affords cover to an advancing body, it moves in ordinary quick time, even when at close quarters. The time for commencing the advance by rushes, the length of each rush, and the strength of the fraction which makes it, all depend upon the situation and upon the nature of the groutid. The length of a rush should not exceed from about 80 to 12s xards. INFANTRY TACTICS. 6l On open ground and under fire, supports and reserves are ideployed, and may even loosen their tiles. Once arrived at the second stage of the combat, they, like the skirmishers, advance by rushes. If, however, there is good cover, it will be preferable to keep them in column, as order can be better maintained in Itliis formation. If, after arriving within from 125 to 160 yards of the enemy, he Isliovvs symptoms of retiring, the skirmishers should at once charge, the leaders running to the front and the men rallying on them. Supports and reserves follow the skirmishers without any Icheck. If it does not appear probable that the skirmishers alone can [carry the position, they halt and redouble their fire until the supports come up, as these do in quick time and deployed, the [battalion reserves advancing at the same time. The whole then rush forward, the skirmishers preceding the supports b>' a few [paces. The frontal attack being always a difficult matter, the enemy's Itianks must be threatened. When a position has been carried, it is absolutely necessary to Ipursue the enemy without delay, so as to rout him completely. JThis pursuit must be confided to fresh troops brought up from Ithe rear. The field exercise book gives an example of an attack as it should be made by infantry. FIRST STAGE. Arrived at from 3000 to 2000 paces (2500 to 1650 yards) from the enemy, battalions form company-columns. In order to gain greater facility for directing the operations, the Commander may reduce the interval between the companies, the usual interval being deploying distance. Companies exposed [o fire are deployed, and files open out if cover is bad. A line of Bkirmishers is sent to the front, supported' by the remainder of the companies to which they belong, at 500 paces (400 yards) listance. Battalion reserves are by companies at the same fiistance in rear of the snjiports. The whole advance as far as possible without halting : when, however, good marks offer 62 TACTICAL NOTES. tnemselves, they come to a halt and fractions of the fighting hnej should be S( much strengthened as not to require further rein- ^forcement except in case of extreme necessity. SECOND STAGE, COMMENCING AT FROM 66o TO 500 YARDS. Advance by rushes. The fire is gradually increased, the sup- ports close up to within 160 yards of the fighting line, and asl the latter reaches the furthest point which it can attain before| making the final assault, get as near to it as possible. The signal to charge is given. THIRD STAGE, COMMENCING AT FROM 160 TO I25 YARDS. The supports, preceded by the skirmishers, move on without ai check and closing their ranks. The drums beat a charge. At 50 paces from the enemy the men cheer and bring the rifle downj to the charge. CHAPTER II. MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. In consideriii}^ the question of modern infantry fire it is neces- sary to point out that in no campaif^n yet fought has the fire of infantry been such as we may expect to see in any future war, ;onsidering that the infantry now have an arm which will kill up to 3000 yards and carry with accuracy up to over 2,000. It is true that in 1877 the Turks were armed with weapons which kvere practically equal to those now in possession of any nation, put they were not trained to their use and were opposed to the Russians who had a very inferior arm. So also in 1870 the Tench Chassepot, though inferior to arms of the latest type, was ^ery much superior to the Prussian rifle which had but a com- )aratively short range. The modern infantry rifle has now become such a deadly wea- )on at long ranges that in any future war long range fire will pro- )ably be much used. Hitherto the soldier has been taught that maimed fire is almost useless ; but it is impossible to deny that In all modern wars the accidental destruction caused to troops in [he rear by bullets aimed at the fightinf< line in front was a re- markable feature. It is a curious fact that contending lines when [lose to each other fire for the most part wildly and too high. The |oldier, when his enemy is close to him, is always on the watch )r a rush and is often too nervous to take steady aim. Were it ^ot so, two fighting lines could not approach each other without uitual destruction. On the other hand, at long ranges, the men [an fire with the greatest steadiness and exactly as ordered. The j)ullet of the modern rifle will kill at ranges so great that aiming 6^ TACTICAL NOTES. at a mark becomes quite impossible, but many contend that it is possible so to train the soldier tliat he will by word of command set the sight of his rifle for a certain range and fire by volleys in the direction ordered. Some of the bullets will fly high, others | low, but the general effect of the men's firing is to cover a very large extent of ground which it besprinkles with bullets. Toj ensure this effect some nations have tried a plan of causing part | of the men employed in mass firing to set their sights for high ranges and another part for lower ranges. It has also been pro- posed that troops within intrenchments should have fi'ed boards or troughs placed for them upon which the rifles when laid must have an elevation corresponding with the distance of the enemy's batteries or supporting troops. This question of infantry long range fire, which is exciting a considerable amount of attention, has some stout advocates but also many opponents. The questio^i for decision is, shall infantry fire up to the full rang'^ of the rifle, or shall it reserve its fire ? There can be little doubt that if troops on the defensive are under cover or intrenched, with plenty of ammunition, a good view of the ground in front, and skilled in the use of the rifle, it would be sacrificing the advantages conferred on the defensive atti; wde not to use the powers of the arm at long ranges provided fitting objects, such as the enemy's reserves, present themselves. But rnch fire must always be kept under due control by the offi- cers, and should be regulated by the probablt effect it will pro- duce, and the quantity of ammunition available. In the attack, when troops are in constant movement changing the range every fev minutes and unable to replenish their ammu- nition, it would be unwise to waste cartridges by shooting un- steadily over an ever-changing distance ; for, for long range fire to be effective the ranges must be known with accuracy, and this is an advantage which remains principally with the defence: therefore in the attack it should only be resorted to by troops judiciously posted to cover the advance of the actual attacking colunms. Hut when judiciously kept under control, it must be conceded that vsry serious loss may be inflicted on an enemy by long range fire, altliougli a great difference of opinion exists as to the nature of its employment and the range at which it is to be used. MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 05 Formerly it was considered that beyond 500 or 600 yards fire |vvas thrown away because tfte individual soldier's chance of hit- tiw^ an opponent was small beyond those ranges. In fact the rcrmans in 1870, when on the defensive, v.ere content to have a :lear ranj^e of only about 400 yards and g'enerally reserved their ire to that ranj^e, and yet in every case they were successful in kvardin;^' off the enemy's attack. But this, and the later wars, |iave shown that it is the mass fire of troops and not that of in- [[lividuals which has to be dreaded. Since then, beyond say 600 (•ards, the effect of fire is due to the probability of a certain pro- 3ortion of the bullets fired at a given object taking effect, .-luch ire should not be independent but should be delivered only at the :oinmand of the leaders of the fighting units, namely by volleys )r by independent fire the number of rounds being named. The main arguments advanced by those who are opposed to its Introduction are the following : — ist. That long-range fire necessarily involves the exj cnditure )f a great amount of ammunition, and that, therefore, if men ne allowed to open fire at long distances they will be likely to run short of ammunition before the decisive moment ol battle urives. 2nd. That it will be fatal to the offensive spirit of any force onstantly employing it. That, in other words, it will be found |inpossil)le to rally forward a line of men which hr^s once been illowed to lialt at a great distance from the enemy to open upon liin a long range fire. jrd. That if men are allowed to fire at long ranges they will get jiito the habit of shooting wildly and without aiming, and that, tf>iisequently, thc'r fire will decrease in efficiency as the enemy jpnroaches the position. Now there is doubtless much force in the first and se-^ond ob- Ifctions, but they both aj)ply more to the use of long range fire by jlic assailant than to its employment by the defence. Still it will vv rarely possible, except perhaps in the defence of intrenched [amps covering an arsenal or depot in which the stores of am- |iiiuiition ari' very large. th:'.i -1 defendei', who wishes to retain his uantKUvring power in the field, will be able to expend as many iriiKJ.i^rs as, for instance, the Turks generalK- liiti in the late 66 TACTICAL NOTES. war. If it is admitted that long range fire can inflict serious losses on the enemy, it must also be* acknowledged that such fire will not deter a determined enemy from advancing to close quar- ters, when it would be absolutely fatal for the defender to run! short of ammunition, or at any rate to run so short as to cripple his action after the battle by depriving him of all power of further! resistance until a fresh supply can be obtained. The employment therefore of long range tire by the defence will not be so much in- fluenced by the actual range of the weapon, but by the consider- ation as to how far the losses that may be expected to be inflictedl will justify the expenditure of ammunition, arid this will evidently depend on a variety of considerations such as the nature of the! ground, the quantity of ammunition available, the formations ofj the enemy, &c. . [ \\'ith reference to the attack, having due regard to the supplv of ammunition with the army, these two objections would be mot if the use of long range fire be confined to special troops detailed for tlie purpose and not executed by the assaulting infantry. The extreme range for long ninge fire, according to some advocates,mav[ be taken as 3,000 yards, over which distance the infantry of theat- tack will have to advance under fire. In that distance tiiey must! lie down at frequent intervals. They nnist lie down for fire and also for breath, always under cover if possible. Breathless hastel may for a time avoid loss, steady fire alone can inflict it, but speed of movement and steadiness of aim arc irrciconcilable. llj it is attempted to combine both it will be to the sacrifice of both; and as neither can be dispensed with, it has been proposed tol use them separately by assigning distinct functions to separatel troops, some to yirepare the advance, some to cover its nearerl approach, and some to reach the ultimate goal. But in addition to the exhaustion of the nun tlu' exhaustion ofi the ammunition has also to be cor .dered, and it would seem asl if i* were impossible for the ammunition, with which the infantrv of the atUick is at jHestMit supplied, to last if tl)e\- do all the hrhvA Consequently, in ordiT for the assailant to make full use of hisl rifle it would seem possible for him to supplement the [)reparatory artillery action with infantry liri- which ct.'.Jd be dejK'nded upon to hold its ground and |il\- the eiieiiiy witli an eti'ei ti\ e lire uiitiil MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 67 lustioii oil the columns destined for the execution of the assault move up land push the issue to closer quarters. Such a force of infantry jmight be advanced as near as circumstances will allow, say at [first to within 1,300 or even 800 yards of the enemy, its front and manks being protected by the cross fire of artillery. A delib- lerate fire from such troops, who will have thrown up some hasty Icover where natural cover does not exist, will greatly assist the [artillery in its preliminary task of subduing the fire of the defence, land at that range this stationary infantry may be kept supplied with Ifresh ammunition so that its fire need not cease. Subsequently, Ito cover the advance to the attack, this infantry might be pushed [nearer to the eneni} . What is most required at the present day, unless the attack is Ito be overmastered by the defence, is a preponderance of counter- [fire. To establish this preponderance a combination of long jrange rifie fire with the preparatory action of artillery seems re- |([uired to assist the advance of the assaulting columns, who jsliould advance as rapidly as circumstances will allow and reserve their fire until within effective range. How to bring up supplies of ammunition into the firing line in the attack, and how to distribute them to men actually engaged lis udmitedly one of the most difficult, at the same time that it is jone of the most important problems which has yet to be solved in modern warfare. But on the other hand, it ought to be no [(liificult matter to organise arrangements which shall ensure that a stationary line of defenders shall, within certain limits, bcver run short of cartridges. In this the Turks were eminent- ly successful. The number of rounds fired by them during the late war was enormous. In some of the more obstinately con- gested struggles ot the campaign meti fired 200, joc. 400, and ivcn up to 500 rounds in a few hours and yet nc instance appears \() \h: recorded of their running short of ammunition. The Turks were certainly favored in this particular by the cir- cumstance that they stood almost always on the tactical defen- sive, bui even in the few cases where the Turkish infantry carried )nt great offensive movements the good organisation of the am- uniition trains, which extended their operations up to the fire puic, were noticeable. To quote an ins<"ancc', on one occasion the 1 w^ 68 TACTICAL NOTES. Turkish soldiers were provided each with 150 rounds; they carried 50 rounds in their pouches, and the remaining 100 in pockets! made in the breasts of their tunics, in tlieir havresacks mixed \vitli| their biscuits, or in any other place where they could find room. In addition to what was carried by the soldiers themselves there) were 30 ponies for each battalion, each carrying 2,000 rounds, which on some occasions were actually taken up to the line ofj skirmishers to provide them with fresh ammunition : and wheiij on the defensive this was constantly done. Immediately a shooting trench was excavated receptacles werej hollowed out for ammunition barrels or boxes, which were kept constantly hlled with cartridges by mules or ponies laden witli aminunition being led along the shooting lines during the action, In cases where the Turks advanced to attack Russian positions! it has been proved that Turkish soldiers who had established I themselves in front of the Russian position have then fired away in a comparatively short time 120 or 150 cartridges. The Rus- sian assertion that they captured in the course of the war no| less than 500 million cartridges corroberates these statements, especially when it is considered that the war supply of a German! Army Corps including the ammunition columns consists in roundj numbers of 4,500,000 cartridges. With reference to the expenditure of ammunition in the attack,| it may here be noted that some experiments conducted in Ger- many showed that no less than 100 or 120 cartridges were tired as a mean per man within a supposed attack lasting three oil four Hours during which fire was conducted with the greatest calmness and ccono)iiy. If allowances be made for the excitement of battle and conseipient unsteadiness among the men, it would not be too much to allow one-third or even one-half more rounds per man than what the (icrman soldiers found necessary in manoeuvres in time of peace ; and thus as a mininuin 165 01 170 cartridges per rifle should be allowed for a battle. l>oth in the Austrian and in the German armies no reliance is placed on any schemes for supplying attacking troops with fresh ammunition during an action. It is therefore absolutely necessary that ourj soldiers i)i> made to carry more than the 70 rounds now allowed, | and to make such arrangements for maintaining a propter sujtplyj MODERN INFANTRY FIRK. 69 |s() as to ensure the aininimition not runninji^ shc^rt, as a sufficient supply for infantry is "a necessity of its very existence to which [nnist be accorded complete and ample satisfaction." To send men back to the rear with ammunition baj^s to get I them tilled is a swstem adopted by most nations, but is very un- satisfactory considering,^ what a small amount a man can carry, at niost about 240 cartridf^es. If 30 minutes be allowed to bring [the ammunition uj) to the skirmishing line, and 2 men be em- ployed per company, these can only supply about 500 rounds every half hour, or 5 rounds per man, which can be expended if firing [slowly in less than one minute. Seeing then how difficult it is to supply the firing line with fresh ammunition in the attack, the 'troops should be well supplied before commencing the engage- inent,and it is for the above reasons that the German and Austrian regulations direct that before an action the battalion reserves of ammunition should be distributed to the men in whole or in part. A greater supply is usually distributed to them when on the de- Ifensive than in the attack. Since then it is most difficult to supply the assaulting columns [of the attack with fresh ammunition, such troops should reserve their supply to the utmost and not commence tiring until within [effective range. Their advance should be covered and rendered [feasible by a well sustained artillery fire, and also, as already sug- jgested, by fire from lines of infantry at long ranges, disposed lin suitable positions behind cover or hasty intrenchments if pos- Isible, and which can then hv kept supplied with fresh ammunition las in the defence. This replies to the second objection urged. As concerns the last objection, the evil will only make itself licit when the *' fire discipline " of the troops is imperfect, or vdiere jofticers and men have not been sutftciently practised in the use jnf long range fire. Up to the present time long range fire has jtinly l)e;Mi used by the troojis of two armies, the French and the iTiirkish, and of both of these the fire decreased in efficiency, as a jrule, as the enemy drev; nearer to them, because the bullets fired jby tlie defenders Hew over the heads of the assailants as these jlatter advanced to closer (juarters. This doubtless was not al- |\va\s lite case, for General Zeddeler, speaking of the attack on |<"ii>ii;i Dubniak. sa}-s that as the Russian attacking troops drew -^^r:v. 70 TACTICAL NOTES. near to the position, the rain of lead which fell upon them was such that none but those who saw it can form any conception of what it was like; still it happened as a rule though at times it was partly due to the steep slopes in the immediate front of the Turkish lines. But, in any case, it must be remembered that both by the French, and especially by the Turks, long range fire was employed in an unmethodical and reckless manner. There] were no regulations prescribing how, when, or where it should be used, no "fire discipline" had been taught, nor did the officers | exercise any control over the fire; the men simply opened fire, frequently without orders and without the enemy being in sight, but in directions where he was supposed to be, and then kept up rapid independent firing ^vithout any aim whatever and with the muzzles of their rifles, as a rule, well inclined upwards. SuchI shooting must indeed be termed wild, but there is no necessity for long range fire being so. If the manner in which this fire I should be employed has been carefully regulated beforehand, if j the fire of the men be kept under control by their leaders, if, for | instance, they fire by volleys only, or if independently only a cer- tain number of rounds at a time, that is, if "fire discipline" bel properly maintained, it is difficult to see why the fact of men having fired at long ranges should afterwards make their shoot- ing wild at short distances. It would therefore appear that the objections to the employ- ment of long range fire can no longer be maintained, provided al-\ ways it is kept well under conirol, and only resorted to when the resultl is likely to justify the expenditure of ammunition, which will of course be greatly influenced by the supply available at any particular | time or place, and must be judged of by the responsible officers. On the defensive this fire will doubtless prove of the greatest advantage, as, by its employment, and in no other way, can loss] be inflicted simultaneously upon all the lines, upon skirmishers, supports, and reserves of an attacking force. It has been urged that it will often be possible to bring up thej main body in a much closer formation than is often supposed, bei use the fire of the defender will be mainly directed upon the I assailant's shooting line. Another writer argues that "the fire of the defender will be diverted as the attack progresses from that ..' I<,- i MODERN INFANTRY FIRK. 71 portion of the attacking force which comprises the main body or assaulting party, by the necessity of checking the advanced Hne lof attackers ; and it is upon this diversion of the fire from the main body that the possibiHty of an attack mainly rests." But (if the defensive force be disposed, as the Turks frequently were, lin two or more lines, and if, by taking advantage of sloping ground, these lines are posted so that the men in rear can [fire with safety over the heads of the men in front, the troops in jthe rear lines may keep up a high angle and exceedingly effective jfire upon the supports and reserves of the attacker, whilst the Imen in the front line confine their attention to checking the (advance of the skirmishers or foremost fighting line. This will lof course only be feasible at the longer ranges while the enemy is jstill ?t some distance and with troops having "fire discipline." It may then be assumed that in future wars long range fire |will be resorted to by the attacker as well as by the defender. But are the infantry destined to carry out the actual assault not to fire at all until within close range ? The Russians have been uich blamed for pushing on to the attack whilst still 1000 yards lor more away from the defender's position ; for rushing forward jto the final onslaught before the way had been sufficiently pre- jpared by the fire of skirmishers. In other words, they are jcensured for not employing long range fire. That they did not Ido so was owing to the inferiority of the weapons the}' carried, land also to their antiquated system of tactics which taught the Isoldicr to rely more on shock than on fire tactics. When once ■the Russian infantry did open fire the men advanced more Icheerily. A writer in the Russian army, speaking of one of the {attacks upon Plevna, said : "This part of the advance was terri- )le, men were struck down on all sides and we could not reply. I\\'lien once we opened fire it was not So bad ; we were so busily jfiring at the enemy we did not think much of his bullets." Hence, [to loud a moral support to the attacking troops in their advance, it may be desirable to let them occasionally reply to the long lan-^e fire of the defender, but this should he done only with the ^[iX'atest circumspection, as abovr all things, their ammunition |uust not be allowed to run short at the final assault. The necessity for the employment of long range lire being Conceded, the (juestion arises what is long range fire ? At what 72 TACTICAL NOTES. distance from the shooting line of the enemy may long range fire ' be said to commence and when should it cease ? It has already been pointed out that since 1870 the ;cone of| musketry fire has largely increased, and that during the Franco- German war, as far as musketry was concerned, the Germans! were content with a clear field of joo to 400 yards, and when on the defensive they were always successful in heating off the French attacks; whereas the latter, when on the defensive, fired at | far greater ranges, 1200 yards, yet with this greater zone they did not always succeed in warding off a Prussian frontal attack.] Although the difficulty of crossing the short zone of 400 yards, then considered sufficient by the Germans, is now more difficult I than ever, the defender who cannot use his weapon over a much] greater area will not be getting all he can out of his advantages: in fact the power to shoot up to the most effective limit should always be striven for with as little artificial help as ma}' be ; but what this effective limit is is a matter of controversy. We will first consider what the Germans have to say on this subject, for they must still be considered as the great masters in the art of war. They consider that fire at long ranges should be left exclusively to the artillery, infantry fire being employed only at the shorter ranges. For the latter they divide the space in I front of a line of infantry into three zones, which they know- respectively as the short, middle, and long distances. The first j extends to 400 metres from the firing line, the second to 700, and . the tliird to 1,200 metres, or say 450, 750, and 1,300 yards respectively. After the long distance they consider that for all practical purposes fire action must be resigned into the hands of the artillery, on which devolves the preparation of the work which the infantry will have to complete at the right m(Mnent. For, though the rifles will carry much further, distances camiot be judged, and the fire is so uncertain as not to be worth the expenditure of cartridges. The short zoiu- is supposed, as arule,| to be handed over to the free fire of the troops, tliat is each man fires independently, choosing his own mark, because at tiiis range. to obtain an effect, it is not neressar\- to direct several rifles] simultaneously on the objective. Rapid independent fire entails tile largest expenditure of amnumilion, makes the men unsteady, and t>ften renders all aiming nnjiossible, a>;, after a few rounds. h 'iiu nam MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 73 [the whole line is wrapped in smoke. This sort of fire is only to Ibe used exceptionally and very sparin{:,dy, and only therefore Iwithin 450 yards. The middle /one is covered by a carefully Icouccniraicd fire of groups of men in dispersed order upon the same [object under the orders of the officers. After 750 yards it is not Iconsidered worth while to fire at any object which does not pre- Isent a very considerable extent of surface both in breadth and {depth, such as a column of infantry or cavalry, or a battery of {artillery. The distances are partly judged by eye and partly by obscrva- {tion of the strike of bullets fired with a known elevation ; they jdo not appear to make ur.e of range finders, as the Germans do [not seem to think that range finders can be used in practice dur- {ing the din and in the smoke caused by the engagement of large {bodies of troops. When in the proximity of artillery the range ma}' be obtained from this arm, otherwise if distances are judged it is usual to let {several observers, at least four, judge the distances when the Imean is taken. To regulate the fire by watching the strike of the bullets, volleys fired by at least a whole zug are directed on [the objective. It may also be stated that the general principle which guides German infantry fire is that it should be sudden and unexpected md should accomplish a maximum effect in a minimum of time, rather than slow and sustained which entails a considerable ex- )enditure of ammunition, in order that a sort of offensive :liaracter may be given to it, and the nerves of the enemy corres- pondingly impressed. This effect is to be produced by successive xniods of fire but of very short duration separated by certain )auses more or less long during which the smoke will be carried iway ; this time is taken up in transmitting orders relative to the )l)ject to be fired at, the range, the elevations to use etc. But ill this can only be obtamed with troops thoroughly drilled and 33' "fire discipline." What it may be asked is meant by this "fire discipline" about {vliicli so nmch is heard at the piesent day? It consists in so Iiaining the troops as to enable the leader at pleasure to open or [ease liring; to render it more rapid or less so ; to conceni.ate it h any named object, (.\:c. ; in fact for the officers to maintain com- 74 TACTICAL NOTES. plete control over the firin^^ The leader will have to regulate thel tiriiif^ by choosinj^' the objects to be fired at by different fractions| of his command ; to judg^e the distances and regulate the sights to be used ; to estimate the number of cartridges to be consumed inj order to attain a definite object ; to determine whether thel particular phase of the battle, as well as the supply of amn:unitinn,| will justify this expenditure; to regulate the strength to be given! to the firing line in order that the number of cartridges deemedl necessary to attain the desired effect may be fired in the requisitel time ; to prescribe the kind of fire to be used; and, finally, to payf attention to the supply of fresh ammunition. In the German) battalion all this devolves at present on the Company Com- mander, while the 2ug leaders have to see that their men obey thtl instructions given ; but the tendency is to make these leaders ofl zugs direct the firing, leaving it to the non-commissioned officers! to see that their instructions are carried out. The Captain mustl always endeavour to retain control over the fire as long as possible, and, consequently, independent firing is not to be begun untilj absolutely necessary. It will be interesting here to give some 'extracts bearing on this! subject from instructions issued by General Skobeleff to thel troops of the Trans-Caspian expeditionary force sent against thel Akhal Tekkes, who had hitherto successfully defended themselvesj in their stronghold of Geok-Tepe. Two sets of instructions were issued, one in July and the otherl in December, 1880. These instructions show that SkobeleftJ realized fully the necessity of the officers retaining complete con- trol over the fire of their men ; but it must be pointed out that thel troops had not then received any training in fire discipline. Hc| says : " During any engagement I recommend the troops of all thtl three arms not to develop the i"i.'l power of their fire, unless they are forced to do so by the obstinacy of their enem}-." *' Consequently, when fighting in daylight, the infantry audi artillery, and the cavalry as well (when fighting dismounted), should only employ their best shots at long ranges, and, except! in rase of need. I insist that only those who arc the best shot^l should be selected. MODERN INFANTRY I'IRE. 75 'Ajjfain, if the enemy continues to advance, I recommend ,oIley tiring, except in the case of the artillery who will act inde- 3endently. But if the enemy cannot hold together and dissem- inates, then the commanders of companies and squadrons may lennit temporary independent firing on the condition that they )rder ' cease firing ' the moment it becomes imnecessary. '• Even in European wars it is most important to observe the |foremost groups of the enemy ; it is not really the mass of indi- aduals present on the ground that decides the victory, but the progress which, thanks to different circumstances, a few brave lien may make advancing in isolated groups. Consequently, £very attention must be paid to the appearance of groups of this lature, and direct on them, by means of volleys, the full power )f your fire, for if you neglect to inflict great losses ou them, these groups will increase in size in a wonderful way and decide the iffair in their favour. "As we have to deal with a fanatical mob without organisation, counsel the leaders of all fractions to keep a watchful eye on [hese advanced groups ; there is not a doubt but that, in annihil- |iting them, we destroy (in the germ) all the initiative force of the test of the mass. That is why I cannot urge too strongly on the tommandefs to have the fire of their men under control; and in brder that this grand maxim may be a reality and not merely feinpty words, it is necessary that each commander of a unit [hould ' knoia how to make the hearts of his soldiers heat in unison nth his own ' before the battle. " He must have his troops completely in hand at the critical loment of the action, and they must be in his hands an instru- bent which serves him to express with a supreme energy, his [lioughts, will, and feelings." "Though in a battle by day, success is obtained by the gradual ind rational utilization of the ground and resources at our dis- posal, circumstances may so happen during the night that it may [e necessary to produce the maximum effect with one single blow. I'his is why, in night actions, we should always adhere to volley Iriiig. We must remember that, at night, all judging distances illusory, it is also of the first importance to keep impressing \n the men to aim low." n s^a. %.. A^. ,0, IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I 1.25 ^a 1112.8 ■' IIIIIU ti m IS m Hi 1= 2.2 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.6 >) O 7 ///. Photographic Sciences Corporation 4k iV ^ \ \ 6^ % V '9> 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 L* %P< w.. 'iW^T 76 TACTICAL NOTES. In Germany tlie most rigid economy of ammunition is always practised, but in France there is not the same feehng. The French have always wasted and probably always will waste a great amount of ammunition, and they do not appear to have made such stringent regulations on this subject as the Germans, yet it is not made clear how they propose to keep up the shoot- ing efficiency of a huge line of battle, such as that of Gravelotte, where the turning point of the day was the retirement of Can- robert's corps from lack of ammunition. If the Turkish fire at Plevna be urged in reply, it must be pointed out that the rapidity of the German movements were such as to preclude the French from making the elaborate preparations for defence performed by the Turks; and seeing how great is the advantage intrenchments give to the defender, an invader will in future wars endeavour more than ever, by manoeuvring and by the rapidity of his movements, to give the defender's armies in the field no time for preparing an intrenched camp like Plevna nor of supplying it with such an unlimited store of ammunition ; and even should this be done it would in all probability only be masked, like Metz, and not again made the turning point of tlie war. In Germany, the commanders of companies in the first line are not to commence firing when the enemy's fire becomes dangerous but when they are sufficiently near to the enemy as to be able to open an effective fire. In an attack therefore, after the preparatory artillery fire has accomplished its work, the endeavour should be made to approach the enemy up to within effective range as speedily as possible, that is in principle, up to 450 yards, when the shooting line should be reinforced by a second zug, and firing then commenced. "In the offensive, the moral and material superiority consists * * * * in not being afraid to sacrifice the requisite number of men, but in approaching so near to the enemy that the necessary effects of fire be obtained very rapidly by speedily inflicting on the enemy the proportion of losses which will achieve success." Still the greatest advocates for this fire at short ranges admit that the troops in first line will only be able to approach so close to the enemy on ground particularly favor- able, and they consider that generally the assailants will have to open fire at a greater distance than 450 yards, and especially will MODERN. INFANTRY FIRE. n this be the case when advancing over open level ground when tire will have to be opened between 450 and 750 yards. Lieutenant Colonel Clearv,* on the other hand, in his remarks on this Russo-Turkish war speaks of the heavy losses sustained by the Russians from infantry fire at distances up to 3,000 yards, and is of opinion that the employment of infantry fire at this range is a matter of necessity and he adds, "to continue to theorize any longer against long range infantry fire would be to advocate the surrender of an important elemf at in the destructive force of an army." The fact is fully recognized that in the war of 1877-78, the Martini-Henr}', whether aimed or not, unquestionably created a very large number of casualties among the Russians at 2,000 yards and upwards. The same thing happened in France in 1870, where, even by the French Chassepot, men were killed at ranges of 1,600 to 2,000 yards ; but no battle has been, or ever can be, decided at such ranges. But the G'^rmans laugh at the idea of an efficacious infantry fire at ranges beyond 1,300 yards, and in this view they are support- ed by most of the great European military powers. In General SkobelefTs instructions, just alluded to, he directed that against an enemy advancing to attack, volleys were to be commenced at a ran^e of about 500 yards, but the fact was not to be lost sight of that against compact masses volleys were very effective at greater distances, whether they be stationed in open f^round, or even hidden behind walls or parapets. "In a case of this kind, firing by volleys might be commenced at ranges of 2,500 yards by raising the sight to its full e.xtent and aiming at the top of the intrenchment or wall should the enemy be behind these obstacles. A plunging fire of this kind, which is very effective up to 2,500 yards, should never be undertaken by a smaller unit than a company, and it behoves the commander to control it most carefully." But the circumstances here were somewhat similar to the attack of a fortress when plunging fire may indeed be used with effect, as will be pointed out presently. Nevertheless the Russians themselves do not seem as a rule to favour the employment of infantry fire at such very Umg ranges, 'Miuor Tactics, 5th Editiou. 78 TACTICAL NOtfeS. although within 3,000 yards range they doubtless suffered some casualties owing to the shower of bullets to which they were ex- posed from the Turks, yf *^ this long range fire did not deter them from advancing when the\ were really prepared to do so. There is little doubt that the Russian losses at this range were chiefly due to their close column formations, and also generally to their endeavour, at first, to undertake an attack with too small a force, and to their neglect of the fundamental principles of the attack, namely, the preparation by a preponderating artillery fire and the attack in front combined with one on a flank. Had the modern recognized rules of warfare been adhered to their losses would have been less, and, as is pointed out else- where, no army desirous of retaining its power of marching or manoeuvring would be able to fire away ammunition as recklessly as did the Turks; consequently, fire at these extreme ranges is not likely to be carried on to the same extent in any future civilized war. Be this as it may, we are thus confronted by two opposite schools; the one, which may be called the German school, regard- ing all who advocate infantry fire at very long ranges as mere theorists, whereas the other retaliates on it in the same strain. It is, therefore, to be expected that military literature will, for some time, be full of discussions on this subject, both sides having much to urge in support of their views, though the matter is not likely to be settled until the next great war ; still it is generally conceded that, though under certain conditions long range fire may exercise great influence on the issue of a battle, yet it cannot be regarded as sufficiently effective to play a really decisive effect in war, and this is apparently the opinion held in Russia in spite of their heavy losses at long ranges. The following are amongst the rules given in the new official Russian regulations to guide the soldier in the use of his rifle, which are instructive, considering how the Russians suffered from Turkish long-range fire : "The accuracy of the arm only shows itself fully when the dimensions of the object aimed at are in keep- ing with the range. You will take advantage of the rapidity with which your rifle can be loaded when you wish to attain a certain resul'^ in a very short time ; for instance, in case of a sudden attack by the enemy, or just before you yourself charge with the bayonet." MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 79 " You must only make use of the long-range power of your rifle with extreme reserve, remembering that close fire alone has any real accuracy and importance in battle, long-range shooting being only allowable when the result is pretty sure to justify the expenditure of ammunition. In such cases two or more sights will be used. It will only be exceptionally advisable for a body of troops to use one single sight in firing beyond 500 yards. In firing with two sights, rear rank men should use that intended for fifty paces beyond the supposed distance, and front rank men that for fifty paces under it. Skirmishers should never fire when on the move because their practice would be completely ineffective. " They may fire either individually or by fractions, if the object aimed at is in keeping with the distance. Individual fire is effec- tive up to 650 or 750 yards, beyond which distance you cannot count upon any but chance effect from this sort of fire, so that to concentrate a certain number of shots upon a special point you employ the fire of fractions at the longer ranges. The latter description of fire is of course equally eifective at the shorter ranges. It is executed by volleys or naming the number of rounds which each man will fire at his own time and with de- liberation. Thus three descriptions of fire are employed by [skirmishers; free individual firing, volleys, and individual firing of a stated number of rounds." With reference to the limits for long range fire it is evident [that the minimum limit must be the range at which individual fire [of one man against another cannot give any effective results. This distance according to French ideas is apparently 650 yards, jwheroas the Germans appear to fix this limit at 450 yards and [beyond this distance the rifle is only considered effective on I larger targets than the surface of a single man, and it then be- jcomes necessary to employ concentration of fire. It is for this reason that the Germans do not approve of single |iiiarksmen being called upon to fire at greater ranges. The extreme limit must be that distance at wiiich, under [favourable conditions, that is with the width and depth of a coni- jpany column, scpuidnm, or battery of artillery, and concentra- jtion of fire, the result becomes insignificant. M'hcn ranges are l< uiliilly measured and other circumstancis are favourable, as at 8o TACTICAL NOTES. target practice for instance, this limit may be said to be the ex- treme range of the weapon at which it will kill, namely 3,000! yards, but in war on varied ground, at unmeasured distances and with perhaps smoke obstructing the view this outside distance will| have to be reduced to 1,300 yards. The German musketry regulations give the effect of experimen-| tal fire at different ranges upon troops in various recognised for- mations. These experiments were carried out by picked marks- 1 men and showed that 250 such, firing three rounds upon targets representing a company of 220 men lying down in close order, at a distance of 430 yards, would hit about 90 of them, and at 650 yards about half that number. If the company fired at is extend- ed, the loss is diminished by about two-thirds. But German writers estimate that the average effect of fire throughout the infantry in peace would be to that of picked marksmen in the proportion of 2 to 5, and that the effect of the fire of infantry in battle would be to that of the same infantry in peace, at target practice, as i to 10 ; hence, from this calculation, it would take six rounds from 250 men to hit one man out of 220 in extended | order at 650 yards. In Germany it has been ascertained that 100 rounds fired against a line of men standing yield the following number of hits; at 450 yards, 20 men; at 750 yards, 10 men; at iioo yards, 5! men. Against a line of men kneeling only one-h"lf of these results are obtained, and lying down one-fourth. Against a line of| skirmishers the results would be half the above, or even one-third according to the density of the chain ; against a company-column the losses up to 750 yards would be greater and beyond that distance they would be double. Experiments conducted in F'rance have shown that a single sharpshooter lying down or half covered cannot be hit at a greater range than 200 yards, kneeling he is nearly safe at 330 yards, and standing at 450 yards. And further it has been shown that the percentage of hits obtained by a single sharpshooter firing at a man at 650 yards distance is as follows : when the latter is standing, 4.6 per cent. : kneeling. 3.7; lying down, 1.7; mean, ^^.^i; and in actual war this result nnist be much reduced, on account of the excitement e the ex- ely 3 ,000 nces and ance will MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 81 |of battle, the varying range, smoke, etc., and it is considered in iFrance as in Germany that only about one-tenth of the results jobtained at peace experiments can be counted on in war. On the field of battle ranges can rarely be ascertained with any iccuracy, and the required elevation to be given varies very much ^vith the weather, wind, etc. Almost exactly similar results were obtained in. Germany, and ^t may therefore be concluded that beyond 450 or 500 yards, if the distance is not correctly known, and the elevation correctly regulated, things very rare in war, that no real effect can be any [longer counted upon unless a considerable number of shots be ired simultaneously. As a result of these experiments, and considering that it is leemed to be waste of ammunition to fire unless a loss of 10 per :ent can be inflicted, the French regulations limit the commence- ment of independent firing to 650 yards, except for picked marks- len who may fire at longer distances, (goo yards), but at knoivn \anj^cs, and even at this range it is laid down that the fire must 36 deliberate, well aimed, and reserved for good shots. In Russia, IS we have seen, the above limit is fixed at 750 yards. But these limitations do not evidently prevent mass firing at greater distances, without however going beyond 1,300 yards A-hich should as a rule be considered the extreme range of in- [fantry fire, and even then only at well marked objects. The following results have been obtained by the fire of 100 ben against a body of 200 men in line two deep on a front of pout 80 yards, and when in column, respectively : At 1,200 yards 20 per cent in line, 65.7 'n column. " 1,600 " 5 " " 16.1 " 1,950 " 3 " "9 " '' 2,600 " o " " 2 to 3 " This latter may then be considered the extreme limit at target Practice. The above results have been adduced to show that the lepth of an object fired at is more important than its breadth ; jnd other results might be shown to prove that the height of the [bjective is also more important than its breadth. The losses jtiffered in the column formation are 3 or 4 times heavier than 82 TACTICAL NOTES. when in line, and when men are lying down their loss is aboutj four times less than when standing in line or in column. For instance, the following results were obtained in Germany! by rifle fire against a company of 250 men in line: Do.* lying down. 5 and 15 4 " ID 3 " 9 2 " 8 Per centage of hits standing At 650 yards between 25 and 50 " 760 " " 18 ■" 35 " 870 " " 15 " 30 " 980 " " 10 " 25 All these results, it must be noted, were obtained in time of| peace without any of the excitement of battle. The range then at which fire may be with advantage openedj on the enemy will therefore greatly depend on his formation^ and as to whether he is infantry or cavalry. Owing to the difficulty experienced in obtaining the range vvithl any accuracy, it is recommended to test the range by firing twol or three volle3's and watch the strike of the bullets, but if the! ground is at all stony or hard or covered with grass, or in wetl weather, the strike cannot be observed at comparatively closel ranges, and even with a good telescope and on favourable groundl the strike cannot be seen beyond 1,300 yards nor consequently! the elevation corrected. To remedy this it has been recommen- ded to employ severf-d elevations varying 50 or 100 yards or more| so as to sweep a greater zone with fire, but even then very littlej effect may be produced, besides at ranges over 1,300 yards even! a light wind causes the bullets to deflect considerably; and it mayf be assumed as a general rule that when the strike of the bullet?! cannot be observed long range fire cannot be depended uponj In the field, therefore, the extreme limit of long range fire mayj be fixed at 1,300 yards as a rule, and then is it only to be employ- ed when the object fired at is of sufficient dimensions, a column! of 200 men, a battery, or a squadron, and it is only up to 1,000! yards that any really serious results need be expected. On the defensive this fire will be principally used at the com- mencemert of the action and its use restricted to small detach- ments whose object will be obtained if they compel the assailant| to assume open formation ]n-ematinely, and the Prussian regula- tions prescribe that before cointiiencing to fire the rommaiKieil ft :;;iiiii!: MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 83 lust always consider whether the expenditure of ammunition re- Ijuired is justified by the result to be expected, by the partitular )iiase of the battle and the supply of amnmnition available, as ' :are must always be taken that there is sufficient for the large expenditure necessitated in the decisive phase of the action. It must ever be borne in mind that ineffective fire weakens the \noral of the troops executing it when they see no resu-ts, while it raises that of the adversary. Assuming then 1,300 yards to be the general limit for long- trange fire, when may this kind of fire be employed within that mge? On the defensive it would appear evident, from what has een said, that only so long as the skirmishing line is 650 yards ff may it be directed on the closer formations of supports and eserves in rear, but as soon as the lighting line of the attack pproaches that distance the fire of the defence must be concen- rated on that line the fire being controlled by the section leaders [and only good shots being allowed to fire. It is urged that- the roops of the shooting line of the defence should not carry on ong-range fire, but that this should be done by advanced troops [or outposts, or by guns supported by an escort of infantry sent* brward to compel the enemy to deploy sooner. These guns and etachments would, of course, have to withdraw when attacked f superior forces, so that the troops destined to carry on the ain defence will be intact when the enemy approaches, and will ave their full supply of ammunition which may not, in conse- uence, require replenishing during the heat of the action. The employment of long-range fire by the attack has already 3een discussed, namely, that it should not be used by the infantry lestined to execute the actual assault, but by lines of infantry Sudiciously posted so as to facilitate by their fire the advance of the former, and especially, as we shall see presently, is long- pnge fire useful in the attack of field works or fortifications. The expenditure of ammunition may be judiciously regulated by firing /olleys. But the effect of the infantry fire at ra^^ges above 450 3r 650 yards, cannot, as we have seen, be depended on for Individual fire ; but at these, and greater ranges, in order to obtain [he full advantage afforded by modern weapons, the want of accuracy of a single rifleman must be made up by placing a large H'rtii 84 TACTICAL N0TF:S. number of rifles in line, concentratinj^ their tire on one and the same objective ; and it is evident that the greater the number of bullets fired simultaneously the j^reater will be the chances of| hittinj^ the objective. This squad or group firing^, as it is called, to be effective, re- quires a large number of rifles to be brought into play, and this I can only be done, as a rule, when the men are formed up in single rank or in double rank. But long lines are difficult to command] with the voice, and the ground rarely lends itself to their move- ments. A foreign company of 250 men is then, in general, too large a unit to execute group tiring by command of its com- mander. A British half-company of 50 rifles, or exceptionally the company of 100 men, and then generally only when in two! ranks, or, also under exceptional circumstances, the section of 25 men are suitable numbers. In having recourse to a lesser! number than 50 the number of rifles become too much reduced at the risk of losing the great etfects which mass firing is destined to bring about, and, besides, the control of the firing would then too frequently fall into the liands of inexperienced leaders. The unit most to be recommended for group firing is, therefore, the half| company of 50 men. This is a very important consideration, as it is very essential that the command of each group, that is, that the direction and mode of fire, the judging of distances, &c., be performed by an officer and that these important duties do not devolve upon non- commissioned officers. Sergeants and corporals should see that the men firing conform to the instructions of the officer, and when necessary they transmit these instructions, especially is this is the case when men are extended. Of the different ways of firing by groups, volleys constitute the most certain means of directing the fire on the object chosen by its leader, and it must be remembered that one essential point to be sought in long-range firing is to concentrate the fire on particular spots and not allow it to be scattered. The point to be fired at is indicated, and che men loading and firing only by word of| command, the consumption of ammunition is strictly regulated and all waste is rendered impossible. But volley firing requires great coolness on the pan of the leaders as well as on that of the troops, and it can, therefore, only be employed at a certain dis- MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 85 taiicc from the enemy unless the troops are covered from view and fire of the adversary ; and unless troops are thorouf;^hly well trained and disciplined it is doubtful whether volley firing can be maintained in action at all and will not degenerate into indepen- (^ent firing. Even the Germans admit that although they practised volley firing in peace time they could not accomplish it in war, although at the time of their wars they had not laid so much stress on the necessity of fire discipline as now ; but if the difficulties of volley firing in war cannot be overcome the only other alternatives are to fire independently a stated number of rounds, or by the section leaders naming the men or the files who are to fire ; but this latter plan does away with the idea of mass- firing. Volley firing has, however, its advantages over indepen- dent firing under certain circumstances. For instance, when the object is a body of troops in movement, especially cavalry, when volleys have a great superiority. When squadrons charge the elevation must be rapidly I'educed at each round, and then volley firing by alternate companies may be resorted to reducing the elevation by about 200 yards at each round since the cavalry may he supposed to be advancing at the rate of 400 yards a minute, and two rounds a minute may be fired with accuracy. If inde- pendent firing were permitted the men could not be trusted to regulate their sights at each round. When the cava'^y has approached up to 300 yards, no further confidence can be placed in the steadiness of the men to fire volleys, and independent firing must be resorted to. Should the cavalry be advancing at a trot only 100 yards difference in range need be made. But the method of firing by volleys necessitates grouping the men in close order of some kind, either in a skirmishing line nearly full, or in one, or even two ranks, shoulder to shoulder. Now, as retaining troops in any formation approaching to close order in the fight, is only possible from about 800 yards upwards, it results that volley firing in close order can only be executed at the longer ranges, and the distance of 600 to 800 yards, or the extreme range of effective individual firing, can be regarded as the minimum distance. The advantages of volley firing, as opposed to independent firing from the point of view of economy of ammuni- tion and supervision of fire, are so evident, that there is every incentive t'o keep up this fire as long as possible. But as close 86 TACTICAL NOTES. formations are impossible at close ranj^es, attempts have been made to make the skirmishers in the fif^^htinj^f line fire by volleys, provided these skirmishers are not too far apart. But brin^inj,' the gun to the shoulder and firing is not, in this case, done by word of command. The leaders only give the necessary caution, care being taken to leave sufficient intervals between each round so as to allow the men to aim and fire at leisure. From what has been already said there is a difficulty at pre- sent experienced in fixing the extreme range at which volley firing should be practised. Some military writers, struck with the results obtained in the war of 1877 by the Turkish ride at distances at which infantry was till then deemed impotent, and captivated principally by the results obtained at target practice, have not failed to proclaim the downfall of artillery and the supremacy of infaivtry (ire on the field of battle up to the ex- treme range of its weapon and to suggest that the infantry soldier should carry a spare sight enabling him to fire up to 2,600 or even 3,000 yards; but this outburst of enthusiasm for the em- ployment of infantry fire at extreme ranges has not been of long duration. The zone of ground effectively swept by musketry fire at differ- ent elevations have been pretty accurately ascertained. For in- stance, at a range of 500 yards the depth of the effective zone is very considerable since at that range the highest point of the trajectory of the Martini-Henry is only about 8 or g feet, that is to say in group firing at an elevation of 500 yards an error in range of alxnit !'"> }.i'^l" will mikf no practical di erence; but at an ele- vation of 1,000 yards the highest point of the trajectory is about 45 feet and the ground is only swept for about 50 or at most 80 yards. This is why at long ranges columns are much more exposed than lines and why it is proposed in France to do away with the re- inforcements which have the same duties as the supports. It has further been shown that group firing between 1,100 and 1,300 yards when directed upon troops in line is in the field practically of no effect, and that against small company columns it is but slight and ceases altogether at 1,500 yards. From this range up, the lateral scattering of the bullets increases sensibly, and without an enormous consumption of ammunition the ground can no longer be properly swept. MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 87 It is by no means intended by, what has just been said to abso- lutely preclude firing at longer ranges against such objects as whole battalions in column, cavalry or artillery in masses, but such opportunities will be rare and would show great laxity on the part of the enemy. Besides, from 1,300 yards up the strike of the bullets cannot be observed, and moreover as a rule the advantage of ricochet fire is lost and the effect of the fire is con- sequently much diminished. It would therefore appear that the extreme range of infantry fire under ordinary circumstances should be 1,300 yards..^ From the foregoing it is evident that with perfect steadiness in tiring, the shooting ought to be fully five times as good at 500 as at 1000 yards, especially when distances are unknown. But in actual service, the near approach of the enemy often causes an amount of unsteadiness sufficient to derange seriously the shoot- ing of even the best marksmen. The German instructions prescribe that on the defensive firing may be commenced sooner than on the offensive, and at a range of 750 yards. This they justify by the following reasons : the ranges are better known and may even be corrected, the supply of amniunition is easier, the firing lines are sheltered and they can use natural rests for their arms. Should the enemy offer very favourable objectives beyond 750 yards, mass firing would be directed on them. On the offensive as well as on the defensive all scattering of fire must be avoided. In consequence, the objectives fired at must be changed as seldom as possible, and should fresh objects of particular importance show. themselves, it will be better, they consider, to reinforce the firing line and assign the new objectives to the fire of the units sent up into the chain for the purpose than to allow the troops previously engaged to alter the direction of their fire. It is particularly directed that all leaders of unita who have not yet arrived within effective range of the enemy must be care- ful to estimate how much ammunition will have to be expended to obtain a certain definite object, and to consider wheth ;r the particular phase of the action, the supply of ammunition avail- able, and the facility of replenishing it, will jnstif}' the expendi- ji t 88 TACTICAL NOTES. ture. In the case of a false attack, or of an engagement under- taken to gain time, it may be indispensable to keep up a well sustained fire or to maintain a fire more or less lively, at distances more or less great, even though one may not thereby expect to inflict any serious losses on the enemy. The result to be obtained, under these circumstances, is to deceive the enemy or to occupy him at any point ; the fire should then be regulated with these objects in view, but the leader must always make the question of ammu- nition a matf-^r of special consideration. Also in the attack if, artillery is not to prepare the way for the infantry, the latter will have to open fire at greater ranges. These considerations of the supply of ammunition must also exercise considerable influence on the question as to when the order to commence firing should be given. It is certain that a force having an unlimited supply of ammunition will not need to fear any waste of amnnmition and can open fire at far greater ranges than those fixed for ordinary circumstances. And besides it must not be lost sight of, that in an attack, if the fire be com- menced too soon, the offensive spirit of the troops will sufter and will give the attacks a prolonged character. F'urther, the moral of troops will suffer as soon as they perceive their own fire to be ineffective while that of the adversary increases in power. DIFFERENT KINDS OF FIRE. This subject has already been referred to, but it is of such im- portance at the present day that it well deserves further consider- ation. Since infantry in action now acts almost exclusively by fire, it results that it can only obtain a superiority over the adversary by means of a superiority of fire. Hut how is this superiority to be obtained ? It is evident that it can only be gained by a numerical superior- ity or by the introduction of a more rapid shooting weapon such as a repeater, in both cases supported by a great consump- tion of annnunition. It is not our purpose now to enter upon the subject of repeating rifles, hut to imagine the opponents armed with e(iually effective fire arms. Numerical superiority is limite available for troops, and the ccjusumpt'ion of annnunition in action as a rule In MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 89 the amount carried by the soldier to which may be added the quantity carried by the regimental reserve. Now supposing we have a line of infantry in double rank, or even in three ranks, the first lying down, and each man to be supplied with 100 or 120 rounds, the maximum in both senses wll have been obtained; but will a superiority of fire have been obtained ? Certainly not, for (such a formation would not be manageable, the losses it would [suffer would be considerable, and the men, escaping from the con- trol of their chiefs, would fire at random straight before them probably without aiming, and would speedily consume all their lammunition without any appreciable result. It is thus seen that numerical superiority and a great consumption of ammunition do Inot suffice of themselves to procure superiority of fire. Infantry fire, in order to be efficacious, must be directed on a {single objective and executed by a number of rifles firing simulta- Ineously : in a word, grouping of skirmishers and concentration lof fire. The great range of modern rifles allows of the concen- Itration on a single object not only of the fire of the troops im- Imediately opposite it, but also of that of neighbouring trcops; and Ithe grouping of these, in placing them under the leading of their lofficers facilitates the direction of fire and permits the needful Iconcentration which is necessary for effect. Besides, the officer [only is capable of appreciating when the opportune moment irrives to open fire, he alone can judge of the results to be ex- jecte 1, and judge whether the consumption of ammunition will he remunerative or not. The following are the different kinds of fire recognized in iGerniany : Independent firing of skirmishers, employed with a '^'igle eleva- tion at distances within 450 yards. The men may choose the ihjects they fire at, but in principle the leader is still supposed to ix the number of rounds to be expended at a time, usually not linore than three. Group firing is also executed by skirmishers, generally with two Isifjhts between 450 and 750 yards, and with three sights between [750 and 1300 yards. The object to be fired at is fixed by the ili'ader. When the number of rifles used at a time is considerable, ii company for instance, it is called mass firing. 90 TACTICAL NOTES. Group volleys, are volleys fired by a line of skirmishers of the strength of a zug at least. These volleys by groups may be used at the middle distances (450 to 750 yards), either with troops liable to get out of hand, or when the view has become obstructed by smoke. The use of this method of firing is becoming more and more restricted and is now almost exclusively used for ascer-| taining the range. Volleys in closed ranks may be employed under special circuml stances, as when troops in close order have successfully assaulted a position and desire to pursue the enemy with their fire, or when troops in second line are threatened by a sudden attack ofj cavalry, &c. These volleys may b ^ executed by any units fromj zugs and companies even up to battalions. Rapid firing, is considered an exceptional kind of fire only to I be used in rare cases, as before the reinforcing of a firing line, before the assault, &c. The number of rounds to be fired must | still be limited. This latter prescription is by many considered as useless since, at short distances, " the fire of skirmishers will degenerate of itself] into rapid firing, and the men will no longer pay attention to the directions of their leaders limiting tli'* number of rounds to be| fired, and so the pauses will disappear." Of the different methods of firing, that one which most facili-l tates due control and supervision is, without gainsaying, volley firing. Its advantages are considerable. Not a round is fired without the orders of an officer, all the rifles are directed on a chosen point. The smoke which is produced in front is allowed time to dissipate during the intervals between the volleys, and these pauses can be lengthened or shortened at the will of the| leader. Firing ceases inmitMliately at an order or whistle, just as it can be moved instantaneously from one objective to another: to oppose an unexpected charge of cavalry for instance, which would take some time to iilating the fire when all means of judging the distances are wanting. The prop(!rties of Nolley Jiring are so seductive that they have led to their freiiueiit use in peace exercises. Its emi)loymenl lia;| MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 91 been so much in favour that volleys have even been practised within the range of effective individual hring, i.e., at distances within 500 or 600 yards ; but this is not to be recommended. Peace exercises should never give to troops or their leaders false lideas of what is feasible in war, when volleys are absolutely im- Ipracticable at short ranges. The noise and excitement of battle Idisconcert the troops ; orders are no longer heard distinctly or [even punctually obeyed ; every man seeks to obtain from the Iground a shelter from the enemy's fire ; the groups break involun- Itarily into skirmishers ; and independent firing supplants that of Ivolleys without any human power being able to prevent it. It (belongs to the leaders to foresee this moment ; recognizing it in time, they will themselves order independent firing to commence jcfore it commences of itself; they can then, perhaps, preserve the direction of fire, limit the number of cartridges to be expended jy naming the number to be fired at each pause, and make these pauses sufficiently long to allow the smoke to disappear and (the sights to be rectified. But, it is simply illusionary to think for a moment that all these results are to be obtained in war ; still they should be aimed at as ^ar as possible, and it is none the less certain that the more troops lave been trained in time of peace to pay attention to the slightest sign or gesture of their leaders, the greater will be the iiscipline and power of control over them in the fight. It is a natter of peace training and constant practice. Troops which have \wt been broken into it will not possess fire discipline however much they may be disciplined in other respects. Independent firing proper, or by limiting the number of rounds. Is then the only fire possible at short ranges, when all efforts must 36 directed to prevent its deviating from the original direction md from its degenerating into a wild irregular fire so wasteful of immunition. Pauses in the firing are therefore very necessary. )n the offensive they naturally occur at every successive rush, )ut on the defensive the limitation by the commander of the lumber of rounds to be fired at each pause will, in practice, be met by insurmountable difficulties, and here a shrill whistle must 3e the signal for firing to cease; but this will only avail on the Supposition that officers and non-commissioned officers have been trained to it in peace. This is, in fact, what the Germans have I- ,'■ '?"• 93 TACTICAL NOTES. I'; h if SO aptly termed " fire discipline," which must be well practised at peace exercises and manoeuvres as it cannot be improvised on the field of battle. The method adopted of keeping the fire under control by the leaders designating the men, or files, who are to fire, cannot either be maintained at short ranges, and at the longer j ranges it cannot be so effective as firing by volleys, as the sud- denness and offensive character of the latter is thereby lost, asl well as the possibility of shaking the mo ' of the enemy which | the sudden loss of a large number of men is liable to produce. This firing can only be recommended at very long ranges, when] picked marksmen might be called upon to fire. It was thought, on the introduction of the individual order of fighting which took place on the introduction of breech-loading weapons, that troops would in future require less training than of old, and that in consequence of the rapidity of fire of modern weapons, raw levies and only partially trained and disciplined militia or volunteers would be more reliable than formerly. Actual experience in war has shown that this is very far from being the case, and that fire discipline is more difficult to regu- late and requires more peace training than the old drill in close order. It was also thought that even the private soldier must be thrown to a great extent on his own responsibility, and be emancipated from that rigid control which would only be cal- culated to check the freedom of action so essential to success under the new order of things. Whilst these ideas were held, there was considerable risk of infantry combats degenerating into disorderly scuffles between armed mobs, and such are almost sure to occur with improperly trained troops. The difficulty of pre- venting the firing becoming wild in the excitement of battle is very great, and it is almost impossible to expect anything else from imperfectly trained troops, who cannot, in consequence, be depended upon in these days so much as formerly. The firing of the French in 1870 and of the Turks in 1877 should be a warnin;; to be taken to heart by all. The men knew their rifle could carry long distances, and with little regard to aiming or to range, they fired away in the direction of the enemy without guidance or control. Although doubtless heavy losses were inflicted such firing can never be expected to beat off a determined attack ; and it is liable, moreover, at the most critical moment, to cause the MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 93 troops usinj^ it to run short of ammunition as so frequently hap- pened to the French, necessitatint; of course tlieir retirement. [The Germans on the other hand, when on the defensive in 1870, never opened fire beyond a range of about 400 yards, yet their iire being steady and well delivered, the result of stern discipline and training, was invariably successful. The Germans say that the independent fire of individuals is of [little value ; the only really effective fire is that which proceeds simultaneously from a great many rifles directed on the same [point. Officers must have clear ideas upon the principles to be observed in directing the firing line, and fire discipline must be sufficiently strict to ensure attention and obedience on the part (if the men to the orders of their officers, even under the disturb- ing influences of battle. It should be remembered by the leaders Jtliat the moral effect of fire upon troops is the greater the more it lis concentrated, not only as to place but also as to time. A whole [company firing five rounds per man will produce a greater im- [pression than the third of a company firing fifteen rounds per man. Another kind of fire, but which is only a variety of independent Ifire, consists in what may be termed rapid independent firing. This Ikind of firing was introduced into the German regulations and [served them well in their wars against Austria and France, but it appears now to have fallen into disfavour. Independent firing knves to a man, when well trained, the means of obtaining from Ihis arm the maximum effect. To desire to further exceed this jmaximum is to practically direct the men to suppress some of the movements indispensable to good shooting, such as bringing the ritlc 'to the shoulder, or taking aim. A man, under fire, has lalready a sufficient inducement to suppress these movements of Ihis own accord for it to be useless to encourage him to it by [regulation. Rapid firing as executed in action, can be nothing jbiit a wild and noisy fire, leading to an enormous consumption of lammunition, depriving the men in an instant of all coolness and Iself {)ossession, and in the end rendering them incapable of obey- \\\\^ the orders of their leaders, in short this is just the kind of fire jit is so important to prevent. There are then only four methods of employing infantry fire : hy naming the men or files, volley firing, independent firing, the luumber of cartridges being limited and the direction of fire and > i t*|. 94 TACTICAL NOTES. elevation kept under control as in the first two methods, and inde- pendent firing,'. The first, as pointed out, is only of real use at lonj^ ranges when particular marksmen may be called upon to fire ; the second by the discipline it allows to be maintained and the resi'lts obtained by it constitutes the firebar excellence, but it necessitates on the part of the men great calmness, which is hopeless to expect as soon as the losses become sensible and ranges short. But so long as volley firing can be continued the men can be kept better in hand, and the fire kept under proper control ; moreover with volleys you can see better where the bullets strike and regulate the sights accordingly. Volley firing, even when executed by skirmishers, becomes impracticable at about 600 or 700 yards. Troops particularly well trained and steady might at times continue this fire at shorter ranges, but this will always be an exception. Firing by volleys will be succeeded by independent firing, the fire being carefully concentrated upon particular objects under the orders of the officers who will also limit the number of cartridges to be expended between each pause, and give the range so as to prevent the fire becoming disorderly; this fire allows the men to fire more at their ease, to assume the positions they find most comfortable, and to make use of all shelter afford- ed by the ground. To expect the men, however, to count the number of cartridges to be expended is not practical if the num- ber named be too many, three rounds would appear to be the outside limit and this caimot be always counted upon; but at all events they must be made to cease fire at the signal of their leader and this must be the object to be attained by all ; for with regular independent firing the smoke which soon gathers about makes aiming difficult, and thus materially reduces the effect; but by ensuring the necessary pauses after say every three rounds, during which the smoke can clear off and orders can be com- municated, will contribute very materially to the effect of the fire. Colonel Boguslawski, a great German writer, does not approve of this method of independent firing by limiting the number of| rounds ; he thus expresses himself: " If you hear the constant monotonous repetition of the ' three rounds individual fire' on the drill ground when no ammunition is being used, and if you watch the behaviour of the men, you are i A MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 95 almost inclined to believe in the efficiency of this method; but the case is very different if you begin to work across country with blank ammunition, or if you practice field-firing at targets with ball cartridge after the fashion now in vogue. One ' zug ' wishes to make a little movement to the front ; another must lie still to take aim ; a third has already aimed and begins firing; a fourth opens fire a good deal later. Each ' zug ' will therefore cease firing at a different time. In real work all this will be moonshine. If the next ' /ug ' goes on firing, if the excitement of battle gains upon the men, if the enemy's bullets come dropping in and the officers are falling, you may repeat your ' three rounds per man ' as much as you like, but you won't produce the shortest pause in the firing. * * The whistle, and one specially constructed for I shrillness, is the only thing which will have any effect at such moments." This may be, still the method is being extensively I practised and will be certain to be attempted in the next war, Iwith what effect remains to be seen. In 1879 at the annual exercises carried out in Germany, the [periods for troops to fire were regulated by whistles which at times created some confusion, and the number of rounds fired in I a single period varied from two to six. When this fire can no longer be controlled independent firing [must per force be resorted to, but all the efforts of the leaders must jbe put forth to limit the consumption of ammunition and to inaintain the fire in the appointed direction. The action of the leaders should be able to make itself felt at any moment, even in [independent firing it must not cease to exist ; but this result can jonly be arrived at by most painstaking training and by repeated [exercises in time of peace. It is with these objects in view that the education of soldiers Ishould be directed as regards their annual practice, and not with jthe sole object of gaining a high figiu'e of merit at target practice Iwith the number of cartridges allowed to be expended annually. Iliistruction in individual firing should also be carried (Ui with the hief object of teaching the men to utilize all accidents of ,T()un(l for shelter and as rests for the rifie, to choose rapidly the •bjective point, to calculate the distance from it, and to judge [whether the distance is within the limits \\ ithin which a single 1 » 1 yWZ mh filial ','f'H 4f 96 TACTICAL NOTES. shot may be expected to yield a result, to choose the elevation to | be given according to the apparent height of the object, to profit by the monrients when the objective is visible, and finally to accus- tom him to regulate his own movements with the rapidity and direction of the advance. These exerci .es should consequently be executed at unknown ranges and within the range when each round may be expected to take effect, i.e., within about 500 yards ; and also at moving j objects. JUDGING DISTANCES. It has been seen that in action, except at close ranges, firing should only be executed by word of command. Soldiers fire on I the objectives indicated to them and with the sight raised as ordered by the officers : they are, consequently, not called upon to judge distances beyond 500 or 600 yards at most. But this is not the case in outpost or reconnoitring duties where a group of| scouts or sentries may find themselves compelled to open fire on the enemy's skirmishers. But, as we have seen, the range of effec- 1 tive individual fire ceases at 500 yards at most, and consequently sentries or scouts should not open fire beyond this range. It is j therefore only necessary for the soldier to be able to appreciate all distances inside this range ; to exercise him in judging longer distances is only liable to mislead and lead him to open fire under unfavourable conditions. The ranges given above are the out- side ranges, for, as a rule, a single soldier should not fire beyond 400 or 500 yards. As for the officers, and even the senior non- commissioned officers, their instruction cannot be too coniplete. They should be able to judge all distances within effective musketry range at least, that is within 1,300 yards, and even! further as many cases may occur when it will be found necessary for them to judge even greater distances. Infantry on account of its frequent movement, and from the I necessity in which it will frequently find itself of opening fire promptly, will rarely be able to have recourse to range finders. | To judge distances accurately, and on every variety of ground, is a very difficult matter especially if these are great ; there will then I remain generally no other means by which certain results are nl)-| tainable than by having recourse to several elevations. MODERN INFANTRY FIRE. 97 THb COMBINED USE OF DIFFERENT ELEVATIONS. The employment of this method is founded on the known zone I of ground which is swept at each elevation. It is known for in- stance that when all the rifles of a group of men are directed on the same object, the ground swept by the fire at the shorter ranges has a depth of say about lOo to 120 yards. Hence if all the sights be raised at one elevation it is sufficient if the distance be judged correctly within 50 or 60 yards for the firing to take effect. At longer ranges errors of judging distances are often 100 yards and even more, but then to obtain any effect it is not sufficient jeven if distances be judged correctly within 50 yards, it is there- jfore seen that the latitude of error allowed must be much greater. Hence recourse is had to the use of two, three, or even four ele- |vations, divided between the men called upon to deliver their fire. For instance, one section may be directed to fix their sights at J8oo yards, another at goo, and another at 1,000 yards. In this lexample the zone of ground swept by fire is about 300 yards in [depth, (from 750 to 1,050 yards), so that the actupJ distance need jin this case be only judged accurately within about 150 yards. |lt must be conceded that such a proceeding is barbarous and wasteful of ammunition, but it is none the less a fact that it yields :ertain positive results. Thus suppose a battalion or other unit )n the defensive to see the enemy in front advancing in formation jfor attack with his skirmisht i s, supports, and reserves. The dis- tance has not been accurately ascertained, nevertheless the enemy's skirmishing line appears to be distant about 700 yards, "he commander of the defence orders: — On the skirmishing line; ^'0. I section, range 700 yards; No. 2 section, 800 yards ; No. 3, 900 yards; No. 4, 1,000 yards. (Or at this range only two eleva- [ions might be given.) "Ready" — "Fire," — or " Fire three rounds Independently; commence firing." Every rifle is directed on the 'hain and the zone of ground swept by the fire is about 350 or \oo yards in depth. Thus the chain and supports may find [heniselves simultaneously exposed to the same shower of lead provided the distance has been approximately judged, and even [he reserves may also suffer. If the skirmishing line is in reality further off than was estimated the sights need not be altered but Ihe fire continued. At the commencement the shooting line ii 98 TACTICAL NOTES. alone will be hit, but as the enemy advances his supports and even reserves will soon come within the dangerous zone. As the | depth covered is about 400 yards every (Echelon of the 'enemy wi remain exposed to the fire of the defenders for 4 or 5 minutes at I least, and there will always be a time when two or even three | <5chelons will be simultaneously exposed to it. It appears that between 450 and 750 yards the Germans I generally use two sights with a difference of 100 yards between them. Beyond 750 yards the use of three sights in a similar manner is recommendetl, but within 450 yards only one sif,'lit| would be used, and it is prescribed that the number of rifles em- ployed must be at least of the strength of a zug (60 men.) But the emj )yment of different elevations is not had recourse] to when the range is exactly known, when the object is immove- able, and when the state of the atmosphere and the slopes of the I ground near the object fired at are such as not to exert mucin influence on the firing. It is difficult to predict what results such a mode of procedure! will give in war. It will doubtless cause a great expenditure of I ammunition, but it is at least incontestable that it does away with all hesitation and trials in the choice of range, and that at| any moment it is calculated to produce a certain percentage. This method of firing has been introduced in the regulations ofl the principal European powers, and will without doubt be put in practice in any future war. Since the above was written some modifications in the German I instructions have come to hand as a result of exercises carried out in 1879. When possible, ranges are to be obtained from the artillery, but when this cannot be done trial volleys are fired, and [ the following methods are adopted : Volleys are only to be fired by the skirmishing line to ascertain I the range, and only when ground is favourable for it. In future, volleys will be, it is directed, rarely made use of during the coursei of an action by skirmishers as they are considered impossible when once within the zone of effective musketry fire of the enemy. | The independent fire of skirmishers, kept under proper control, generally yield better results than volley firing even when smokel has obscured the front. "1! MODERN INFANTRY l-IRK. 99 Before a line of skirmishers open fire the number of rounds each man is to expend is fixed. In this manner it is hoped certain pauses will be secured in the firinj;^, so necessary to allow the smoke to disappear. The most perfect supervision will lead to no result unless it is supplemented by the most strinfjjent fire discipline, and it is only when every soldier has been well /mictised in this that the full effect of modern small arms can be obtained. This can only be done by practisiu}^ the soldier to rapidly correct his elevation and to take careful aim, to rapidly discern certain named objects and to fire on them regulatinj^ the range carefully, and to show instant and complete obedience to all orders received. The idea of making the captain alone direct and supervise the fire of the whole company has been given up, and now it is con- sidered that a zug on a war footing (about 80 men) is the largest unit which can be superintended by an officer in the midst of the excitement of battle. It must be pointed out with reference to the question of doing away with the employment, of volleys by lines or skirmishers, and only usipg them for ascertaining the range, that some emin- ent German writers are much opposed to this and warmly main- tain the great advantage of volley firing if executed with care. The reasons alleged for discontinuing fire by volleys are the necessity for using cover, the tumult in battle, Hie great expendi- ture of ammunition, and finally the superiority of individual fire. They combat these conclusions and affirm that the effect of vol- leys is quite as great as individual fire, and further maintain that the great superiority of volleys is the power it affords of being able to direct the fire of a number of muskets simultaneously on a certain object, to obtain from men the necessary submission to discipline, to drive skirmishers out of any shelter they may have momentarily obtained, and to subject their desire to obtain cover to that of obtaining a good position for firing. In other words, it is owing to volleys that fire can be maintained in the desired direction, which cannot always be obtained from in- dividual fire. It is a well authenticated fact that the skirmisher is, in practice, more preoccupied with seeking to obtain shelter than with obtaining a field of fire, and that careful aiming and 100 TACTICAL NOTES. ; I' ', i