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 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
POLITICAL 
 
 REFLECTIONS 
 
 ON THE LATE 
 
 COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
 
 IN WHICH 
 
 Their original Constitutional Defects 
 are pointed out, and ftiown to have na- 
 turally produced the Rebellion, which 
 has unfortunately terminated in the Dif- 
 memberment of the British Empire. 
 
 BY AN AMERICAN. 
 
 , €jf.' 
 
 LONDON: 
 Printed for G, Wilkie, No. 71. St. Paul's 
 
 Church-Yard, mdcclxxxiii. 
 
 [Price 3 s. fewed.] 
 
i' 
 
 \ 
 
 A V 
 
 I 
 
w 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 THE following Reflections contain 
 a brief Hiftory of the Condud of the 
 American Colonies, from their Firft Settlement 
 to the late Diflblution of their feveral Govern- 
 ments. The Author, in committing them 
 to paper, had two objedls in view. He hoped 
 that the power of Great Britain, which he 
 knew was abundantly fufficient if wifely 
 directed, would have foon reduced the Rebel- 
 lion. In that cafe, the old Colonial Govern- 
 ments being entirely diffolved, he conceived 
 that new ones muft be eftabliflied.. To un- 
 fold the defedts of the former fyft^^ms — to trace 
 their incongruity and repugnancy to the 
 principles and nature of the Government to 
 which they ought to have been made fubor- 
 dinate, and to prove that thofe defeds were 
 the true caufes of the revolt, he thought^ 
 might contribute to a more permanent union 
 between the Two Countries ; becaufe it would 
 
 9 enable 
 
"il'I'P-HiP" ■■'■ * ' ' 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 enable the Politicians who fhould be concerned 
 in forming it, to avoid thofc defcds, and to 
 found it on more rational and folid principles. 
 Befides, he confidered, fhould not that for- 
 tunate event take place, thofe Refledions 
 might be of importance to mankind ; and, in 
 particular, to thofe Hiftorians who may here- 
 after undertake to unfold the latent principles 
 which have gradually and imperceptibly pro- 
 duced an event that has terminated in the 
 Difmemberment of a great Empire, if not in 
 its final Ruin. 
 
 i 
 
 11 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 cerned 
 ind to 
 ciples, 
 t for- 
 idions 
 nd, in 
 here- 
 iciples 
 r pro- 
 1 the 
 lot iu 
 
 i 
 
 . Page 
 f\ F the general Principles of Govern-^ 
 
 menty - - S 
 
 Of the fundamental Principles of the Brltl/Jj 
 Government^ 
 
 Of the Right of the Crown to efahlijlo in- 
 ferior Societies^ - « 
 
 Of the Right of Property in the 7'errltory 
 of the Amtrican lolotiies^ 
 
 Of the Royal Governments ^ 
 
 Of the obfolete Charters granted for the 
 Settlement of America^ 
 
 Of the Charter of Maryland^ • 
 
 Of the Charter of Pennfylvania^ - 1 1 r 
 
 Of the Charters of Rhode- I/land and Con^ 
 ne&iciity - - 187 
 
 Of the Majfachi/Jfifs Charter^ - 2o(> 
 
 12 
 21 
 
 42 
 48 
 
 ^^ 
 
 8j 
 
!P f-''>V 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 ^ 
 
r O L I T t C A L 
 
 REFLECTIONS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 ROYAL, PROPRIETARY, AND 
 CHARTER GOVERNMENTS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 AMERICAN COLONIES, &c. 
 
 C H A P. I. 
 
 On the general Principles of Government, 
 
 AS I intend to treat of the nature of 
 inferior and fubordlnate focieties, and 
 of the laws by which they ought to be con- 
 flituted, pointing out, at the fame time, the 
 advantages or mifchlefs which muft enfue from 
 a ftridt adherence to, or a deviation from, thofe 
 laws ; it w^ill be neceflary, in order to take up 
 the fubjed: from its proper foundation, to fay 
 fomething on Government in general, the 
 great principle by which the union of every 
 fociety is formed and preCerved. 
 
 B Civil 
 
4 General Principles 
 
 Civil focicty is a politiciil fydcm, formccl 
 by the union of indivicluaLs, wlio, putting 
 tticir i'cvcral powers under one fovcrcign 
 dircdion for their better feeurity, agree to 
 yield obedience to it. In order to form tliis 
 politic body, certain fundament'd laws muft 
 be eftablillied, and proper pcrfons appointed 
 to fuperintend the execution of them, and 
 empowered to compel the obedience of every 
 individual. 
 
 The various forms of Government are 
 cither funple or mixed. The lirft are efta- 
 bliihed on principles peculiar to themfelves j 
 and being different from each other, are con- 
 llituted by different modifications of the 
 principles of civil fociety, and the variant 
 conftrud:ions of the legiflative and executive 
 powers, from whence they/affume the mo- 
 narchical, ariftocratical, or democratical cha- 
 radters. The latter are produced by au 
 affemblage of the principles of the former. 
 
 All Governments, of whatever form, arc 
 founded on the following general laws, whicli 
 are effential to their exiftence, and without 
 
 which 
 % 
 
 1 
 
 4| 
 
 i 
 
 A--^ 
 
hf GovcrmnenV, 3 • 
 
 which there could be no liich tiling as civil 
 fbcicty. 
 
 I. Tliat there mufl: be fomc fupreme willj 
 or legiilative authority, competent to the 
 regulation and ^uial dccifion of every mat- 
 ter fufceptible of human diredlion, which 
 relates to the fafety and happinefs of the 
 fociety* 
 
 • 2. That every membei: and part of the 
 fociety, whether corporate, oificial, or indi- 
 vidual, mud be fubordinate and fubjed to 
 this fupreme will and direction. 
 
 3. That there mufl: alfo be a fupreme 
 executive pdwer^ to fuperintend and enfofce 
 the adminiftration and execution of the laws. 
 
 au 
 
 But befides thefe general principles, which 
 are eflential to all Governments, of what- 
 ever form or confl:rudion, there are certain 
 laws and eftabhfhments which are peculiar to 
 each particular form, on which its confl:itu- 
 tion and eflence depend, and vs^hich aiw' aS 
 inconfifl:ent with thofe of a different form, as 
 the rules peculiarly neceffary in building a 
 
 B 2 .. houfe 
 
Tr» 
 
 1! 
 
 i} 
 
 !ii 
 
 ^ Gateral Principles 
 
 houfe are with thofe in building a fhip^ 
 When, therefore, it is determined to eftablifh 
 one particular form of Government, whether 
 It be monarchical, ariftocratical, democratical, 
 or mixed, care muft be taken, in forming it> 
 that fuch materials, and fuch order of con- 
 ftru£tion, are not ufed, as are adapted to a 
 different form, and which muft defeat the 
 intention. A monarchical, ariftocratical, or 
 mixed fcheme of Government, formed on; 
 democratical principles, would be a grofs po- 
 litical abfurdity ; and the terms can prove no 
 more, than that what was intended for a 
 monarchy, an ariftocracy, or a mixed go- 
 vernment, turns out to be a democracy. 
 
 In every production, either of divine or 
 human invention, to be found among the 
 works of natnre or of art, whether in the 
 rational, animal, vegetable, or inanimate 
 world, there is a fyftematical combination and 
 arrangement of principles and parts, which 
 determine its fpecies, conftitute its nature, and 
 preferve its identity. Should this order be 
 violated in the produdions of nature, could 
 we fuppofe the proj»erties and principles of 
 things to be ftaifting and IMfted from one to 
 7 " another. 
 
 ^1 
 
<jf Goverume?ih .5 
 
 another, without reference or regard t' . their 
 original intention ; what a confufion of qua- 
 lities! what monftrous and ufelefs produc- 
 tions, would be the confequence! and how 
 fhort the duration of the fyftem, where fuch 
 confufion exills ! In like manner, if, in 
 works of human conftrudion, we Ihould join 
 the diftinguiihing principles and parts of one 
 fyftem to another of a different ciafs, with- 
 out regard to its propriety or end., it w^ould 
 be as abfurd and ridiculous as Horace's image, 
 Hum (mo capitiy &c. 
 
 This is as true with regard to the different 
 forms and conftitutions of Government, as in 
 any other inftance. The genius and character, 
 the fundamental laws and principles, of that 
 particular form w^e mean to eftablifh, muft 
 always be regarded in the conftrudtion ; and if 
 we mean to preferve it, care muft be taken 
 that no heterogeneous ingredients or prin- 
 ciples be admitted, becaufe they muft tend to 
 change its nature, and in the end to deftroy it. 
 
 But, although the fundamental laws of the 
 three fimple forms of Government are eften- 
 tially different in their own natures, and can- 
 
 B 3 not» 
 
I 
 
 6 General Pr'mciples 
 
 rot, with any degree of propriety, belong to 
 each other, and if introduced muft weaken, 
 and in the end deftroy them ; yet experience 
 has proved, that the fundamental principles of 
 thefe diiferent forms may be brought to a 
 friendly co-operation for the public good. 
 They may be fo combined and tempered, as 
 it were, into one fyftem, as to form a coun- 
 terpoife to each other, and a remedy againft 
 the mifchiefs which are naturally produced 
 by each fyftem in its feparate ftate. Such a 
 fyftem has been eftabliftied by the wifdom of 
 our anceftors. An enquiry into its excellence 
 has led authors, both foreign and domeftic, 
 to celebrate its cpnftitutipn, as the beft adapt- 
 ed to maintain the reafonable liberty of man 
 to the longeft period of exiftence ; and our 
 own experience of its happy effedis has led 
 every Engliftiman to admire it, and wifh for 
 its continuance, always excepting thofe who 
 prefer their own private views to the happi- 
 nefs of the public, and who expedl to fmd 
 their account in changes and revolutions. 
 
 Taking it therefore for granted, that we 
 mean t- fupport and preferve that excellent 
 fyftem of Government which has been efta- 
 bliftied 
 
of Government, j 
 
 bllfhed by the experience and wifdom of our 
 anceftors, and maintained at the expence of 
 much blood and trcafure, it follows, that we 
 fhould carefully avoid every thing that has a 
 tendency to weaken and deftroy it. The 
 political, like the natural body, is liable to 
 diflblution, either by external violence or 
 internal decay and difeafe. Its exillence may 
 be prolonged or fhortened, by the means 
 which fhall be ufed by reafon or folly to pre- 
 ferve or deftroy it. ; 
 
 ■:A 
 
 The health, vigour, and duration of every 
 fyftem, depend on a ftri(ft attention and ad- 
 herence to thofe original laws and principles 
 by which it was formed. Every deviation 
 from them, every change in the lb udure of 
 its parts and members, every introdudion of 
 heterogeneous matter, muft produce difordcr 
 and confufion. 
 
 Thus in the political fyftem, whatever 
 be its form, whether monarchical, ariftocra- 
 tical, democratical, or mixed, by the admifiion 
 of laws, inferior politic bodies, public boards 
 or offices, eftabliihed on principles diflimilar 
 and repugnant to the eflential and funda- 
 
 B 4 mental 
 
^ 
 
 s 
 
 General Principles 
 
 H! 
 
 mental laws of the State, and to the nature 
 and genius of the fociety, that original polity 
 upon which it was founded, muft, in the 
 nature of things, become changed and cor- 
 rupt. The principles of each different form 
 will find their advocates. Some men will 
 adhere to one form, other j^ to another. Dif-^ 
 ferent and oppofite opinions, attachments, and 
 averfions, will become fixed. Fadlions, and 
 a perpetual competition for power, will fuc- 
 ceed ; which cannot fail in the end to deftroy 
 the unity and harmony of the fociety. 
 
 We have feen, more than once, the excel-* 
 lent ftrudure of the Englifh conftitution 
 nearly overturned by the too great prevalence 
 of thefe different principles. At fome times, 
 the ariftocratic and democratic influence has 
 been nearly lofl under the too great weight of 
 the monarchic; at others, the monarchic and 
 democratic have been nearly fw^allowed up by 
 the ariftocratic ; and at another, the mo-^ 
 narchic and ariftocratic have beea totally 
 deftroyed by the democratic. 
 
 » 
 
 Men educated under one form of govern- 
 ment can rarely, if ever, be i*econciled to the 
 
 manners. 
 
■"**^^ 
 
 (jf Government, ^ 
 
 manners, laws, and principles of another. 
 It is education alone which forms and fixes 
 human habits, manners, attachments, and 
 averfions. This is as true in public as in 
 private life, in politics as in religion. Train 
 up a child in a particular mode of faith, and 
 he will diflike and reject all others. So men, 
 educated in the principles of one form of 
 government, will ever efteem and prefer it, 
 becaufe it is from that they have derived their 
 fafety and happinefs : and not knowing tha 
 bleffings which others afford, they believe 
 that thofe they poffefs are the moft valuable, 
 and prefer them, however inferior, to others 
 they know little or nothing of. Thus politi- 
 cal opinions, public affedion and averfion, 
 and the national attachment, in every fociety, 
 become eftabliflied and fixed. And hence it 
 is, that a republican prefers the diforder and 
 confufion to which he has been familiarifed 
 by education, to the fubftantial fafety and 
 bleffings of a mixed monarchy; and the en- 
 flaved Spaniard or Turk, the cruel defpotifm 
 of their refpedlive tyrants, to the mild and 
 certain protedion of the bed formed govern- 
 ments. 
 
 To 
 
'4 
 
 I 
 
 lO 
 
 General Principles 
 
 To illuflrate this truth yet further, let 
 us fuppoic, that Charles the Second had, at 
 the Refloration, done what his pr'^lecefTor 
 James the Firft did in America, Wz. that he 
 had eftablifhed all the corporations, and in- 
 ferior focietlcs in Britain, on principles merely 
 monarchical, declaring, that the people with- 
 in them fliould he governed by " fuch laws, 
 ** ordinances, and inftitutions," as fliould be 
 made and given by himfelf and his fucceffors, 
 to the exclufion of the authority of Parlia- 
 ment ; or that he had in Britain, as he did in 
 America, inftituted throughout the kingdom, 
 a number of democratical focieties and cor- 
 porations independent both of the Crown and 
 Parliament ; it is eafy to perceive what muft 
 have been the unhappy confequences. In 
 the firfl inftance, the Britifh Government 
 would have been changed from a mixed form 
 into an abfolute monarchy, and the people 
 fubjeded to the defpotic will of their Prince ; 
 in the fecond, into a number of diminutive 
 democracies, perpetually liable to all the mif- 
 chiefs of fa(f^ion, difcord, and confufion. 
 And in both inftances, thofe principles of 
 polity upon which the beautiful and excellent 
 fabric of the Britifh Conftitution is founded, 
 
 would 
 
■V 
 
 of Government. \ i 
 
 would have been long ere this time totally 
 eradicated. Education, that tyrant of the 
 human mind, which feldom f4ils to bind it in 
 fetters never to be loofened, would have 
 rendered Britons as fond of their tyranny or 
 anarchy, as the Spaniard or the Swifs, 
 
T 
 
 12 
 
 Principles of 
 
 C H A P. II. 
 
 On the fundamental Principles of the Britifi 
 
 Government, 
 
 'W': 
 
 TN every fociety, I have already obferved, 
 there are certain peculiar and eflential prin- 
 ciples. Thofe principles are the original decrees 
 and fundamental laws which precifcly defcribe 
 the form of its Government, create all the va-r 
 rious parts and members of the politic fyftem, 
 and fettle and define the powers, duties, 
 rights, and privileges, of every member, 
 whether corporate, official or individual, mark-j 
 ing their limitations, extent, and different 
 ufes. It is thefe decrees w^hich form the 
 great bafis of the State, upon which the 
 ftrudure of its Government is eflablifhed, 
 and by ftri6t adherence to which it caa 
 alone be preferved. And as they are the 
 fundamental rules by which the particular 
 form of the focietv is to be ever maintained, 
 they are in their niture unalterable, except by 
 general confent, or by the fupreme authority 
 of the State. 
 
 7 " The 
 
 
V- 
 
 the Br'iUjli Government. 13 
 
 The Britilh Government is of a mixed 
 kind, and may be j.ullly flylcd a mixed mo- 
 narchy, formed by a different modification, 
 and a profoundly wife adjuftment and coun- 
 terpoife of the great effencial principles of the 
 three fimple forms, with a Monarch at its 
 head. Its fundamental laws and effential prin- 
 ciples are to be feen in the great charter of 
 rights, often before, but particularly and 
 clearly fettled and confinned at the Revolution. 
 Much might be juftly faid in the ftyle of 
 panegyric on the wifdom which formed it, and 
 on the excellence of its ftrudlure. But it 
 muft here fuffice to obferve, that the greatelt 
 authors of credit, whether Britifh or foreigners^ 
 acknowledge, that of all fyftems of polity, it is 
 the bed calculated to preferve and fecure the 
 natural and reafonable rights of mankind. 
 
 In the conftrudtion of this moft excel- 
 lent fabric, if we may decide on the motives 
 of our anceftors from evident hiftorical fad:s,. 
 we may conclude, that either from reafon or 
 experience, or perhaps from both, they per- 
 ceived the mifchiefs incident to the fimple 
 forms of Government. 
 
 I. That 
 
n 
 
 >t 
 
 •i 
 
 14 Priticiples of 
 
 1 . That the tranfition from monarchy to 
 tyranny was eafy, natural, and certain. 
 
 2. That arlftocracy was ever produdlive 
 cither of defpotifm, or of wild and confufed 
 dominion; that when union and harmony 
 cxifted in its fupreme council, it often de- 
 generated into tyranny ; and whenever 
 jealoufy, divifions, and competition for power 
 arofe, into debility and anarchy. And 
 
 3. That democracy was ever tumultuous, 
 feditious, and weak ; incapable of preferving 
 its internal peace, or defending its fubjeds 
 againfl an external enemy. That a frequent 
 change of rulers alternately contending for 
 power over their competitors, as well as over 
 the fociety in general, created a perpetual 
 difcord and animofity among the members of 
 the State, introduced a diverfity ahd inftabi- 
 lity in their laws, and cOnfequently in the 
 habits, manners, and attachments of the peo- 
 ple ; rendered the Government itfelf fadious, 
 weak, and confufed, and fubverted that fecu- 
 rity of the natural rights of man, which is 
 the fole aim and end of their entering into 
 civil focietT* 
 
 *' ' ' imprefled 
 
 Hi 
 
 •'i'',' 
 
 ;* 
 
f'fvl 
 
 the BrhiJJj Govcnvnent, 
 
 15 
 
 Iinprellcil with thcTc jud ideas of the m'lf- 
 cliicfs incident to the llire* limple forms of' 
 ^ (iovernmcnt, our anccftors, like the fkilful 
 phyfician, who mixes up medicinal fimplcs of 
 different and opponent qualities, in order to 
 moderate their violent and dangerous ex- 
 tremes, and to produce from the whole a 
 falutary effeO:, judicioufly tempered the prin- 
 ciples of the frniple forms of Goverrnnent 
 together, fo as to ohtain what mankind have 
 in view by entering into civil fociety, namely, 
 natural liberty perfectly and juflly regulated 
 and fecured by political laws, or, at lealt, as 
 much {o as human wifdom could diredt. 
 They placed monarchy and democracy, the 
 two dangerous extremes of civil, policy, in 
 oppofite fcales, as a check and balance to each 
 other. 
 
 But wifely refleding that two oppofite and 
 independent principles, adirig within the fame 
 fphere, would loon become competitors for 
 fuperiority, and naturally lead them to invade 
 the rights of each other; and that this muft 
 throw the fociety into diforder, and in the 
 end dcftroy it, they yet more judicioufly 
 added to the fyftem, an indifferent, difm-* 
 
 tereflcd 
 
irt Pniidplcs of 
 
 Icrcflotl, and Independent power, wliicfi 
 fl\ould Ice and feel it to be both its interefl 
 and duty, ro throw its weight into the fcale 
 oppofite to that which lliould be found ex- 
 ceeding its prcfcribed bounds, and ad:ing in- 
 confiflently with the fafety and dcfign of its 
 inflitution; and to rcftore, at all times, when- 
 ever enervated, tlie true principles of the 
 conftitution to their perfed balance and former 
 energy. 
 
 Upon thefe principles the Britilh State, 
 confifting of three different independent or- 
 ders, was eftablifhed. And to prevent all 
 contrariety and confufion in the laws, they 
 were incorporated with each other by a funda- 
 mental decree, that the aHent of all fhould be 
 ever neceffary to the validity of every adt, or 
 final decilion, by which the fociety fhould in 
 future be governed. And the more effedlual- 
 ly to enable them to maintain thefe refpedlive 
 fliares of power in the State, and ::o check 
 and balance the excefs of legal authority in 
 each other, they were veiled with certain 
 diftin<^ and independent rights, powers, and 
 privileges, perfedly limited and defined, and 
 adapted to their refpedive eftablifhments. 
 
 And 
 
.^^ 
 
 'I 
 
 4 
 
 wliicli 
 
 intere/l 
 
 he fcalc 
 
 Lind ex- 
 
 ling in- 
 
 1 of its 
 
 wlien- ' 
 
 of the 
 
 former 
 
 State, 
 
 •nt or- 
 
 ent all 
 
 , they 
 
 funda- 
 
 uld be 
 
 ad:, or 
 
 Lild in 
 
 rdual- 
 
 edivc 
 
 check 
 
 ity in 
 
 2rtain - 
 
 , and 'M 
 
 ) and il 
 
 fljt' B,iti:r Cuvcrnmsnt, 
 
 ^7 
 
 And 
 
 And as nil laws m\\^ he ni!p;atory and 
 inciTc(^Uuil without execution, the & was, ot 
 necclllty, appointed a ruprcmc executive au- 
 thority, the rcprcfentatlve and truflce of the 
 Icgiflaturc, to rupcrintcnd tlic prcfervatloii 
 of the ibcicty, hy carrying into execullo:i 
 the fundamental decrees of the fociety, as 
 well as the fupreme will of tlie Icgifla- 
 turc, from time to time fignliied by its 
 laws; to appoint and regulate, agreeably to 
 their direction, and the Tpirit of the conRi- 
 tution, the feveral inferior orders and mem- 
 bers of the State, whether political, ofFicial, 
 or individual ; and to fupcrintend the alle- 
 giance and obedience of the fubjedl: to what- 
 ever the cnnftitution and its laws com- 
 manded. 
 
 To be more clrcumRantial, it is evident 
 from an examination of the Britlfh Govern- 
 ment, that its fundamental principles and 
 laws are, 
 
 I. That the fupreme legiflatlvc authority 
 fhould confift of three orders or eftates : A 
 Monarch, who fhall hold his office in here- 
 ditary fuccclTion ; a Houfe of Lords, who 
 
 ^ ' C fhall 
 
 " 4^ 
 
I 
 
 J? 
 
 Fr'itu'iptes of 
 
 Ihall derive their dignity and power from that 
 monarch, and yet be equally independent of 
 him and of the people, holding their dignity 
 and rank in hereditary fucceffion ; a Houfe 
 of Commons, the reprefentatives of the peo- 
 ple, deriving from them their authority ; and 
 that the monarch fhould be the fupreme or 
 firft in dignity in the Supreme Legtjlative 
 CounciL 
 
 ^HW- 
 
 , 2. That each of the three orders fhould 
 poflefs their peculiar and independent rights, 
 powers and pr.vrileges, to enable them to fup- 
 port their relpedtive ranks and power in the 
 
 State. , : " ■" 
 
 3. That their joint concurrence and afTent 
 Ihould be neceflary to the validity of all 
 leglflative adts and regulations, becaufe, upon 
 this joint concurrence, the unity of the State, 
 and the uniformity and harmony of its con- 
 dud, and confequently its ftrength, fafety, 
 and happinefs, depend, 
 
 4. That there fhould be one fovereign 
 reprefentative of the three leglflative br<iiiches 
 of the State, whofe office and duty it 
 
 fhould 
 
the Brll'i/Ij-^Goverumcfit, - 19 
 
 fliould be to fuperintend the prefervation of 
 the fundamental principles and laws of the 
 fociety, to conflitute the inferior political 
 bodies and offices, agreeably to thofe princi- 
 ples and laws ; and to carry into prefent exe- 
 cution all their joint decifions throughout all 
 its territories and dominions. 
 
 5. That neither the King, Lords, nor Com- 
 mons legiflative, nor the King, \ht\r fovereign 
 reprefejitatlve^ Ihould poflefs a power to alter 
 or weaken the conftitution of the State, or to 
 do any a£l inconfiftent with its fundamental 
 laws, or diveft either himfelf or his fucceflbrs, 
 or either of the Houfes of Pa:rliament, of 
 their diftindl and leparate rights, powers, and 
 privileges ; becaufe they were veiled in them 
 for the prefervation, and not the, deftrudlion, 
 of the State, and becaufe they are not their 
 private rights, but an unalienable trufl in them 
 for their fuccelTors. 
 
 6. That thefe fundamental laws ihould 
 ever be in their nature unchangeable, and not 
 be violated or impaired by any of the diftind 
 orders of the State, and only by the general 
 
 C 2 
 
 confent 
 
^ •> 
 
 20 Principles of the Britlfj Government, 
 
 confent of the fociety, or by its fupreme 
 legiflative authority. 
 
 7. That the common law, which has been 
 fandioned by ancient ufage, and the ftatutes 
 enadted by the legiflature, fhould be the great 
 lines by which the conduct of the whole fo- 
 ciety, and the obligations of duty and obe- 
 dience, fhould be meafured and directed. 
 
 Having this abftra£t view of the Britifli 
 Government before us, which I have thought 
 a neceflary foundation for my fubfequent 
 arguments, it will enable me to draw nearer 
 to the matter I mean to examine, which will 
 be feen in the following Chapters. 
 
 T% 
 
■tSJP 
 
 I 
 
 » ^ 
 
 ( 2' ) 
 
 L •. L:, 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 On the Extent and Limitations of the Rights 
 vcjied in the Crown^ to ejiablijjj inferior 
 Societies or Corporations, 
 
 TH E right of conftltuting inferior fo- 
 cieties, as I have before fhewn, is 
 lodged in the Crov/n ; but it is unfortunate, 
 that of all the prerogatives this has been the 
 leafl afcertained. Very little refpedling it 
 is to be found in, the authors who have treated 
 on the fundamental or general laws of the 
 Britifh conftitution. It therefore feems, that 
 the condudt of the Kings of this realm, in 
 the exercife of this right, has not been called 
 in quelu 3n. They have been left to exercife 
 it in a manner altogether arbitrary, without 
 oppofition. That this fhould be the cafe in a 
 free Government, where the illegal condudt 
 of the feveral orders of the State has been fo 
 conftantly w^atched and oppofed, upon firft 
 confideration, appears a Uttle ftrange. The 
 feader will exped an attempt at leafl to ac- 
 count for this political paradox. 
 
 C 3 The 
 
II' 
 
 22 On the Right of the Crown 
 
 The exercife of this prerogative is local. 
 It does not, like many others, immediate- 
 ly affeft the Ibciety in general. None are 
 concerned in it but the Crown and the 
 individuals incorporated. The concurrent 
 aflcnt of the King, and of thofe individuals, 
 is therefore only necelTary to the ufe of it ; 
 and it is not rcafonably to be expeded, that 
 the latter will complain of it, however ille- 
 gally exerclfcd ; becaufe the privileges granted 
 are always more extenfive than thofe held 
 under the general eflablilhments of the prin- 
 cipal foclety. Befides, the mifchiefs arifing 
 from an illegal exercife of it to the fociety at; 
 large, are fo remote, fo gradual in their in- 
 creafe, fo fecret in their operations and effedts, 
 that they are fcarcely perceived, and therefore 
 do not alarm the people, nor become the 
 fubjed of legal difcuflion. To which I may 
 add, that the moft licentious and arbitrary 
 ufe of this prerogative having been made in 
 the ir ftitutions of the inferior communities in 
 our foreign dominions, its mifchievous and 
 dangerous effeds to the union and welfare of 
 the principal fo:'iety have been concealed from 
 the jealous eyes of Britons. ''' '"" ' -<^' •- 
 
 But 
 
 V 
 
 'ji 
 
to ejlahlijli inferior Societies, 
 
 23 
 
 But although we have not legal adjudica- 
 tions to alcertain the extent of this preroga- 
 tive, yet principles from which it may be 
 traced, and laws by which it may be perfedly 
 known, are not wanting. Its true limitations 
 are ^ be found, clearly defined, in the ori- 
 ginal decrees and fundamental laws of the 
 Britifh Government, liere every right, power, 
 and privilege, veiled in the feveral orders of 
 the State, is conferred for the fame intent 
 and purpofe ; namely, to ftrengthen, not to 
 weaken, to preferve, not to deftroy, the efla- 
 bliihed conftitution. By this iirft and great 
 law, which is ell'ential to every civil fociety, 
 and cannot be abrogated, the powers of 
 every eftablifliment, from the fovereignty 
 down to the loweft minifterial aflice, is limit- 
 ed and reftraincd. And if on any occafion 
 their adls fhould have z, different tendency, 
 they are void in themfclves. If this was not 
 the law in every fociety, the rights and 
 powers, which, by the original decrees of the 
 State, were created and eftablifhed to preferve 
 the civil conftitution, might, at the pleafure of 
 the perfons holding them, be deftroyed *. 
 
 The 
 
 • Although the truths contained in this paragraph are 
 felf-evidfenT', it may not be difpleafing to the reader to know, 
 
 C 4 that 
 
(I 
 
 24 On the Right of the Croivn 
 
 The monarch in the Britifii Government as I 
 have flicwn, poflcfTcs two capacities. In one, he 
 
 that thry arc cnnfiimcd by every author of credit on politic 
 law ; f'ucli a:" Pufrendori]', Monrcfquicu, Vattel, Burla- 
 iiKiqui, &c. Tlie opinion of the laft, becaufe delivered 
 ■v.ith the nioft concilVncfs and pcrfpicuity, 1 fliall here add. 
 This ingenious aiitlior, treating " of the e/Icntial Charadlers 
 of Sovereignty, it:, Modiilcaticns, Extent, and laniits," tells 
 us, " That it entirely d'.-pends on a free people to invert 
 '• the fovefcigr.s, whom they place over their heads, with an 
 authority either olfclule, or limited hy certain Iwws, pro- 
 *' vidcd thcfe laws contain nothing contrary to juftice, nor 
 *' to the ci;d of Govcriinieirt. Thefe regulations, by which 
 ** the fuprcme authority is kept within bounds, are called 
 *« ihefutuuimsnial !r.-Lvs of the State." 
 
 ** T\\k: funilafneuial la-x'.'s of a State are not only the decrees 
 ** by which the entire Icdy of the nation determine the form of 
 ** Government, and the manner of fucceeding to the Crown ; 
 *' but are likewife t!ie covenants betwixt the people and the 
 *' perfons on whom they confer the fovereignty, wohich re- 
 ** gulatc the }nanner cf Go'vernmenty and by which the Jupreme 
 *' authority \& limited J^ , I ■- ,r..i\.. 
 
 *' Thefe regulations are called fundamental lat'jSy becaufe 
 *• they are the bafsy as it were, and foundation of the Statty 
 ** on v/hich the firucaire of its Government is raifed ; and 
 ** becaufe the people look on them as their principal Jirengtb 
 ** and fitpport.'''' 
 
 *' I'he fundamental laws are the precautions taken by the 
 ** people to oblige fovereigns to employ their authority, 
 ** agreeably to l\\'^ general rule oi t\\e public good.** > ' 
 
 And in another place he adds, " After the King has 
 «* aflumcd his authority, whatever he attempts afterward^, 
 <' contrary to the formal engagement he has entered into, 
 *' fliall be null and 'void. And even if there fhould happen 
 *< an extraordinary cafe, in which the fovereign thought it 
 
 " conducive 
 
to cJlahUjh Inferior Societies, 
 
 25 
 
 is the rirft and moft dignllied of tlie three or- 
 ders of the fupreine authority. In this capacity, 
 it is his right, after deUberation, to difapprovc, 
 or finally to give validity to all a£ts intended 
 for the regulation and government of the fo- 
 ciety. In the other capacity, he is the fovereign 
 executive authority, bound to obferve himfelf, 
 and to compel the obedience of all the mem- 
 bers to the original decrees upon which the 
 llrudure of the Government is raifed, and to 
 carry every other fubfequent law of the fupreme 
 authority, made for the prefervation and fafety 
 of the fociety, into perfcdl execution. To 
 enable him to do this, certain peculiar rights 
 and powers, called prerogatives^ and among 
 others, thofe for conftituting inferior com- 
 munities or corporations, have been vefted in 
 hirn ; all of them for the purpofe of main- 
 taining the rights, powers, principles, and 
 particular polity eftablifhed in the form and 
 
 *• conducive to the public good to deviate from the funda. 
 
 ** mental laws, he is not allonjoedto do it, of his envn head, in 
 
 *' contempt of his fokmn engagement ^ but in that cafe, he ntuji 
 
 ** con/ult the feople, or their reprcfentati'ves. Otherwife, under 
 
 *• pretence of fome necefiity or utility, the fovereign might 
 
 •' eafily break his word, and fruftrate the efFefts of thofe 
 
 •* precautions taken by the nation to limit his ponver.^* • f 
 
 > ^ flrudurc 
 
±6 
 
 On the Ri^ht of the Crown 
 
 I 
 
 (Irudure of the mixed Government of which 
 he is the fovereign executive head. ' 
 
 ' I 
 
 Tn a politic capacity thus limited and re- 
 trained, it is not difficult to mention a variety 
 of ads, which the monarch cannot, i. e. ought 
 not, becaufe forbid by the fundamental laws 
 to do, and which when done, arc void in 
 themfelves. It is a maxim of the Britiih 
 conftitution, that " the King can do no wrojtgy 
 This maxim, when rightly explained by the 
 laws, of which it is a part, means no more 
 than this. The King, in his natural capacity 
 as a man, is liable to human frailties, and 
 therefore may err ; but in his politic capacity, 
 in which the conftitution alone confiders his 
 adts, where he has the aid of wife men, and 
 the certain rule of the original decrees and 
 general laws to dired his adtions, it fhall be 
 prefumed that he will not violate his truft, 
 nor deviate from the fundamental decrees 
 prefcribed for the rule of his condud: ; and 
 if he fhould be led into an error, it fhall 
 rather be imputed to his counfellors than to 
 him ; and principally, becaufe every a£t of the 
 King, which is inconfiflent with the law, is 
 
 void 
 
to cjlahllfj inferior Societks^ CLJ 
 
 void in Itfelf ; and an a£t void can neither 
 injure the orders of the State, nor any of its 
 poUtical members, nor even any individual of 
 the fociety, inafmuch as the Government is 
 eflabUlhed on principles which give to every 
 member a perfedl remedy for every wrong 
 received. Upon this confidence and policy, 
 in order to preferve the dignity of th$ 
 monarch, and to fecure his condu(St from cen-? 
 fure, and his perfon from danger, which is 
 of the firft importance to the fafety of the 
 fociety, this maxim has be^n wifely adapted. 
 If this mode of reafoning be juft, as I truft 
 it is, this maxim amounts to no more than 
 that, when th^ King ftridly coiiforms to thjQ 
 original decrees, and the fubfequent laws of 
 the fociety, " he can do no wrong." And when 
 he does not conform, in the exercife- of his 
 royal prerogatives, his a£ts, though void in 
 themfelves, fhall not be imputed to him, 
 neither in his natural nor political capacity ; 
 becaufe the law gives to the party injured by 
 a violation of his political truft, a perfe<3: 
 remedy. Under, this conftrudipn the maxim 
 is reconciled to reaibn j to that profound wif^ 
 dom upon which our truly excellent fyftem 
 T .. of 
 
 "t, 
 
28 On the Right of the Crown 
 
 of polity IS founded. Bat wlicn we con- 
 tend, as has been contended, that every 
 charter granted by the Crown to individuals, 
 mufl, by the fandity of the compadt, how- 
 ever dilTonant to the original decrees of the 
 fociety, and inconfiftent with its fafety and 
 happinefs, remain valid and inviolable ; it in- 
 volves the mofl evident of all political abfur- 
 
 . * 
 
 dities 
 
 r.i J. 1.^ 
 
 c '.. 
 
 ■ Under this expofition of the maxim, there 
 are many a6ts which a King cannot do 
 legally ; or, if ' he fhould do them contrary 
 to law, they are void in them/elves^ ought 
 to have no legal effed^ and are to be con- 
 fldered as //c^/ ^/?^. ''^^ ^''^ r >"i- :..^*; 
 
 I.J 
 
 
 '■^ I. A King cannot alter the eflablifhed 
 conllitution of the Government, nor do any 
 ad which has that tendency, becaufc he is ap- 
 pointed to maintain it. . , ■,, • , 
 
 ij 
 
 • In this light the learned Burlamaqui under/lands this 
 maxim : for, fpeaking of limited fovereignty, he fays, *' It is 
 •* a hajJpy incapacity in Kings, not to be able to a£i contrary 
 ** to the taivs of the land,''* , . , _. ^l 
 
 lo- 
 
 2. He 
 
to ejlahl'ijlo itiferior Societies, 
 
 29 
 
 2. He cannot take away tlie rights of either 
 of the Houfes of Parliament ; nor even thofe 
 properly belonging to the lowed in order of 
 the members of the fociety ; bccaufe they are 
 not his, but the rights of others, and vefted 
 in them for the prefervation of the Govern- 
 ment. Nor can he dived the Crown of any 
 of its prerogatives, bccaufe they are veded 
 in him in trud for the public fafety, and are 
 not only his, but the fiduciary rights of his 
 fuccedbrs, and are therefore in their nature 
 unalienable. 
 
 3. He may conditute courts of judice 
 within the dominions of the State, wherever 
 ncceifary ; but he cannot ere£t a new one to 
 interfere with the jurifdidtion of another 
 already edablidied, or in mode or fubdance 
 variant from the edablidied law and cuftom 
 of the realm. . • . 
 
 4. He may appoint to odices known to 
 the laws, but he can neither conditute a 
 new olTice unknown in the Conditution, 
 nor grant to an old one new principles or 
 powers, inconfident with its laws. There 
 
 ..^ ... ■.' "- ■ . .: . , , -.....* . are 
 
 m 
 
'f 
 
 30 Ofi the R'l^ht of the Crown 
 
 are fomc ofliccs grantabic durinp; good be- 
 haviour, bccaiife intended by tbe ipirit of the 
 conftitution to be independent of the Crown ; 
 and others during pleafure, becaufe meant to 
 be dependent on it. The nature and I'afety of 
 the fociety requiring it ; he cannot, therefore, 
 gi'ant the llrft during pleafure^ nor the lall 
 during good behaviour. He may conllitutc a 
 Lord Lieutenant of Irehind, or of a county, 
 ot a governor of a province, but he cannot 
 grant to them an eftate for life, in tail or in 
 fee, in thofe offices, becaufe it would deprive 
 the fovercign executive power of the State 
 of its fuperintendence, check, and controul, 
 over the illegal and licentious conduct of the 
 fervants of the Crown, and of compelling 
 them to adl agreeably to the elTential and 
 flmdamental laws. He would be no longer 
 the igreat confervator of the peace and har- 
 mony of the fociety which is placed under 
 his immediate care and direction. 
 
 5. For reafons equally evident, he can- 
 not conftitute inferior communities with 
 rights, powers, and privileges independent of 
 the State; becaufe this would be either to 
 difmember them from it, or to eftablifh an 
 3 imperium 
 
to tjlahll/h inferior Societies, 31 
 
 impcrtm7i in imperio^ a State \/ithin a State, 
 the greateft: of all political Monsters * ! nor 
 with llich privileges as are repugnant to, or 
 variant from, the filcntial principles of the 
 focictv ; bccaufe this vvrould beget competition, 
 and difcord, and throw the fyitcm of Govern- 
 ment into irretrievable confulion. 
 
 6. He cannot do any ad: whatever, by 
 which the fubordi nation and obedience of tho 
 inferior politic focieties to the fupreme autho* 
 rity fhall be relinquifhed, or in any degree 
 diminifhed j and confequently he cannot 
 
 * The learned PufteniloriF, in treating of the edablifliment 
 of inferior focieties, tells us, ** That they may be either law, 
 •• fully or unlawfully conftituted. And that with regard to 
 *♦ all lavuful bodies t it is to be obferved, that whatever rights 
 *• Kings poflefs, or whatever power they hold ovi-r their 
 ** members, is all under the determination of the fnpreme 
 " authority, which it ought, on no account, to ojipo/e or 
 ** on: er balance. For oiherwife, if there could be a. body of 
 ** men, not fill je£i to the regulations of the ci<vil Government , 
 " there would be a State 'within a State. If we look on thefe^ 
 •' bodies or fy Items in a State already fettled, we are then 
 " to confidcr what was the intent of the fupreme Governor 
 •* in founding or confi-ming f:ch a Company ; for if he hath 
 ** given or akertalned to them, in cxprcfs words, an abfolute 
 " independent right with regard even to fame particular affmrs, 
 *' then hs hath plainly abdicated his authority, and, by admit- 
 ** ting /wo heads in the conftitution, hath rendered it irregular 
 ** and MONSTROUS." 
 
 ■ ^ ^ . * ■»- 
 
 exempt 
 
3* 
 
 Ott the Ri^ht of the Crozvn 
 
 exempt them from that authority in any 
 .cafe, and more efpecially in matters of taxr.- 
 tion, upon which the defence and fafety of 
 every part of the empire materially and 
 eflentially depend. ' '' ^''' ' ^ 'v " ' < 
 
 t.i.; 
 
 y. Although he may grant to them a right to 
 make municipal laws, for the better profecu- 
 tion and advancement of their particular dc- 
 figns, and for local purpofes, yet he cannot 
 difcharge them from the force of the general 
 laws of the land, from the common and ftatute 
 law. They are the general inftitutes which 
 were intended to pervade the whole fociety, 
 for the government of its morals, and to pre- 
 ferve an unifon of opinion and attachment in 
 all the members in regard to the State. The 
 firft has been fettled and confirmed by an- 
 cient ufage and immemorial confent ; and 
 the fecond confifts of ads of the fupreme 
 authority ; and ^.o inferior power can, with- 
 out a palpable abfurdity, be prefumed to have 
 a right to abrogate or alter fuch ads. ;. -■ 
 
 • 8. A King may grant to an inferior com- 
 munity a power to raife money for the fupport 
 of its members, for the prefervatiou of the 
 
 order, 
 
 it.^ 
 
to eflahlijh inferior Societies. 3^ 
 
 order, peace, and oeconomy of the body 
 politic, and to promote the pahiciilar defigns 
 6f its inftitution ; but he cannot give to it a 
 right to grant, raife, and levy national aidsj 
 libr feven its pioportion of themi ' ^ 
 
 i. Becaufe this right does not belong to 
 him, and neither a King nor a man can give 
 what he has not. It is the peculiar riglit of 
 the fupreme authority, to ivhofe care and 
 fiiperintendance the protedloh and defence 
 of the fociety are in the i^rft inftance com- 
 mitted, and which, of necefliry fconfeqiiencej 
 ought alone to poflefs the right of taking front 
 Individuals a juft proportion of their property^ 
 fo; the fafety of the reft, and the fecurity of 
 their perfons. . 
 
 ^. Becaufe this would be a diminution of 
 the rights of the fupreme legiflature in a point 
 inoft effential to the fafety of fociety, and in 
 a matter upon v/hich that authority, and none 
 other, can pdifibly bfe competent to judge and 
 decide. . 
 
 3. Becaufe no inferior Ibciety ever was,* 
 lior can be, made competent to the exercife 
 
 D of 
 
34 On the Right of the Crown 
 
 of this right. They cannot poflcfs a capacity 
 to judge either of the occafion, or neceffity, 
 or of the quantity of aids neceflary to the 
 national defefice, nor to obtain that informa- 
 tion which is neceflary to enable them to 
 afcertain their own proportions, as they can- 
 not poflefs a power over the other parts of the 
 ibciety. ^,. .■.t;.-,-^ -^ . . . : ^i,. : , ■• . ,:,: 
 
 I- 
 
 4. Becaufe thofe inferior focleties, having 
 local, partial, and different interefts and pre- 
 judices, and being 1 -^i * 1 their deliberations 
 and docifions to the influence of thofe in- 
 terefl:s and local prejudices, there can be no 
 certainty, no confidence repofed in them, that 
 they will difcharge whenever neceffary, or 
 with equity and juflice to the refl of the 
 nation, this primary and moft eflTendal of all 
 political duties. .^" " ■ . : -^ 
 
 . '. .'. ',; . J -M ■. .. .JU,..> . '.':.■ i ' 
 
 5. If the executive authc ■r; may grant 
 fuch a privilege to one inferici ibciety, it 
 may to a hundred, or to all, and by thefe 
 means effedtually divefl: the Parliament of the 
 right to determine on the occafion, the ne- 
 ceflity or quantity of aids requifite to the 
 general fafety; a right wh:.!; forms the firfl 
 \, I and 
 
to ejlahhjh inferior Societies, ' 3^ 
 
 ft rid greateft check againfl: the abfolute autho- 
 rity of the Crown, and is indifpenfably ne- 
 ceflary to the fafety of the fociety, 
 
 Ahhough a King may incorporate infe- 
 rior focieties, or bodies poUtic, yet he cannot 
 confer a right to another to make fuch in- 
 corporation, becaufe the right is a royal 
 and unalienable franchife ; nor can he by 
 his own didiy much lefs by a delegated au- 
 thority, conftitute them in any form, ot 
 Upon any principles of polity, repugtlant to, 
 or variant from, the form and fpirit of the 
 Britifh conftitution ; for this would fiibvert 
 its different eftablifhments, and deftroy theiif 
 union and harmony* 
 
 iz*'vi ^>i*.» 
 
 
 iTioi'i 
 
 Laftly, this prerogative Is fettled in thef 
 Crown, to enable it to maintain, not td 
 weaken^ to preferve, not to deftroy, the or- 
 der, unity, and fpirit of the Government; 
 The Government is a mixed moharchy, 
 fo formed and eftablifhed as to check and' 
 fupprefs the licentioufnefs dnd arbitrary 
 power of the three fimplc forms of civil 
 fociety, and to reduce their excefies to that 
 balance which is necefiary to human liberty 
 
 D 2 and 
 
\^ 
 
 ^6 On the Right of the Crjwn 
 
 and happinefs. It is therefore a conclufion drawn 
 from the ftrongefl principles of rcafon, that a 
 King cannot conftitute thefe inferior ibcieties 
 ■without thofe checks and that balance ; nor 
 on principles purely monarchical, ariflocratical, 
 or democratical, or in fuch manner as to ren- 
 der the principles of either fo predominant, 
 as to be able to fupprefs the due weight a: id 
 influence of the others in the fcale of Govern- 
 ment : for by this means he may imper- 
 ceptibly efface all refped and attachment to 
 the form of our excellent civil conilitution, 
 throw it into diforder and confufion, and 
 in the whirlwind dire<St the ftorm to abfolute 
 
 jnonarchy. 
 
 «■> -t 
 
 \t- 
 
 From thefe limitations of the prerogative 
 qf the Crown, we may eafily perceive what 
 ought to be the forms of the inferior focieties 
 in a mixed monarchy. But to make the 
 argument more evident, I fhall firft explain 
 what they ought to be, agreeably to the fun- 
 damental rules of the three fimple forms of 
 civil fociety ; for all of them have their fun- 
 damental laws, from which the fovereign 
 authority, or its executive reprefentative, 
 
 ought 
 
 I'^l" i'" •;ti' ' 'i. 
 
 -"ty^- 
 
 J 
 
to ejlahlijld inferior Societies*. ^7 
 
 ought never to deviate. In a monarchy, 
 thefe inferior focieties, by the fundamental 
 laws of its conftitution, ought to be governed 
 by a fingle perfon appointed by the mo- 
 narch, and removable at his pleafure. This 
 perfon ought to hold both the legiflative and 
 executive authority within the corporation. In 
 an ariftocracy, they fliould be governed by a 
 feledl dignified few ; and in a democracy, by a 
 number of perfons often eleded by the people 
 to reprefent them. In this manner only can 
 the nature, uniformity, and fpirit of each 
 fyflem, and the fubordination of its members 
 to the State, be duly preferv^d, , 
 
 In a mixed monarchy, the ftrudure of its 
 inferior focieties ought in like manner to 
 correfpond with that of the State. It fhould 
 confift of a governor, or chief magiftrate, 
 appointed by the Crown, and removeable at 
 its pleafure ; of a council, deriving their dig- 
 nity and power alfo from the Crown, but 
 after appointment, equally independent of it 
 and the people ; and of a body of men eledled 
 by the people to reprefent them in the inferior 
 body politic ; and each of them fhould be 
 veiled with their diftindt independent fights, 
 
 I> 3 but 
 
 
 vV 1 
 
ill 
 
 ' ' Ji 
 
 38' 
 
 On the Right of the Crown 
 
 s* > 
 
 \\ i 
 
 h 
 
 f' 
 
 but only with one joint legiflative authority 
 over the fociety, and that for local purpofes \ 
 and the chief magiftrate ought to hold the 
 executive rights and powers, fubjedt to the 
 dircdions of the fupreme executive ma- 
 giftrate. The body politic thus fubordi-^ 
 natc, muft be fubjed ir all things, in its 
 legiflative capacity, to the fupreme autho-^ 
 rity of the State. In fhort, to make a per- 
 fedl corporation under any Government, be 
 its form what it may, it ought, in all found 
 policy, and muft be, if agreeable to the 
 fundamental laws of the State, eftabliflied on 
 iie fame principles with thofe of the great- 
 politic body to which it belongs. In this cafe 
 the powers, rights, and privileges of the. 
 inferior community, will accord with, and 
 ftrengthen thofe of the State, be produdlive 
 of the fame fpirit of laws and cuftoms, and 
 inculcate and lix in the people the fame man-^ 
 ncrs, habits, political opinions, averfions, and 
 attachments. They will be daily inftrud:ed 
 to love and venerate the principles of the 
 chief Government, becaufe they receive their 
 general protedion and their particular pri- 
 vileges from them. All repugnant prin- 
 ciples 
 
to (JlahUJI} inferior Societies* 
 
 59 
 
 ciples will be excluded, and indeed unknown ; 
 and all the members of the foclety, however 
 difperfed, will be led to ad in a conftant and 
 uniform manner, with one will, diredled 
 to the fame ends, the fafety of the Govern- 
 ment, and tlie public happinefs. 
 
 ■)7 
 
 ^^0:1' :.]• 
 
 To place this truth in a light yet more 
 evident, let us fuppofe that a King of Eng- 
 land, who is the fupreme reprefentative of the 
 three feveral orders of lae State, and bound 
 to preferve their balance, influence and au- 
 thority throughout its dominions, under pre- 
 text of his prerogative, fhould conftilute all 
 the inferior focietles within the realm on 
 monarchical principles, by conferring on a 
 fmgle perfon the fole power of making 
 laws for the corporation, and fuperintend- 
 ing the execution of them ; or Hiould he 
 eftablifh them on the pri iciples of an arifto- 
 cracy ; would not every candid and fenfible 
 man, who knows the nature and excellence 
 of our prefent Government, pronounce with 
 one voice, that it was an ad inconfiftent with 
 the fundamental laws of our fociety, done 
 %mthotit authority^ and void from the hcg'in- 
 
 P 4 
 
 ning \ 
 
 
A0 Oft the Right of the Crown 
 
 nlng ? And would not even the republicans, 
 ■who have ftood forth the zealous advocates of 
 the democratical American charters, be the 
 loudeft in their clangours againft fuch inn 
 novations ? 
 
 / 1 
 
 To conclude thefe refle£lions : If the pre** 
 j-ogatives of the Crown, in a mixed monarchy, 
 are limited, in o|ie refpeft, by the fundamental 
 ^decrees of the fociety, they are in all. And 
 if they are conferred on the Monarch for the 
 purpofe of preferving the uniformity of th^ 
 State, and an harmony in the opinions of its 
 members refpe£king its excellence, that which 
 relates to the inftitution of inferior politic focie- 
 ties muft be confined to the principles and re-r 
 ftridions I have before laid down. For if the 
 Crown may deviate in any degree from the ori-? 
 ginal polity and fundamental laws of tjie princi-?. 
 pal fociety in the eftablifhment of its fubordi* 
 nate members, there are no other lines by 
 which it may be reftrained, none by which it{$ 
 extent may be decided. It is fuffered to paf^ 
 over the only boundaries fettled by the con- 
 ftitution, into a field unlimited, and becomes 
 linreftrained and arbitrary. And to fuppofe 
 
 thi^ 
 
to eftablijb inferior Societies, ^\ 
 
 this in a fociety where the rights and powers 
 of every member of the State, from the 
 fovereign authority down to a petty con- 
 ftable, are precifely afcertai^ed and limited, 
 18 what all common fenfe will rejedt, and 
 no fophiftry can fupport. 
 
 
t 4« ) 
 
 . , r. 
 
 r. 
 
 it 
 
 C H A P. IV. i 
 
 On the Right of Property in the Territory of 
 ' the ylmerican Colojiies, , , • 
 
 TT THz\TEVER has been hitherto ob- 
 V\ lerved on the General Principles of 
 Government, on ihofe of the Britilli State, 
 and on the Right and Prerogative of the 
 Crown to conflitute inferior Societies, is in- 
 tended as a foundation to fupport the fubfe- 
 quent refledlions on the Provincial Govern- 
 ments ; and yet one thirg more remains 
 to be added, before I proceed to them. 
 A quefllon has been made, in whom the 
 property and dominion in the Colonies is 
 rightfully veiled? whether in the King, in 
 fome capacity dilHndl from, and independent 
 of, his truft and political relation to the 
 Britilh State, or in him as the monarchical 
 and executive reprefentative of it \ 
 
 This diftindion has been invented by that 
 part of the Colonics, w^ho had refolved, in 
 defpite of the moll extenfive benefits re- 
 ceived, and the awful obligations of their 
 
 oaths, 
 
On the Right of Property^ l^c, 43 
 
 oatTis, to throw off their allegiance to the 
 Britifli Government, and to form themfelves 
 into independent States. For this purpofc, they 
 have acknowledged that their allegiance was 
 due to the King in fome capacity diftindl: 
 from his relation to the State, while they have 
 denied it to be due to the Parliament. They 
 artfully and wifely concluded, that fhould 
 they fucceed in breaking the harmony be- 
 tween the Crown and the Parliament, and in 
 rendering their powers independent of eaph 
 other, jealoufies would enfue, and that the 
 latter would never affifl the former in fup- 
 porting his power over al people, who might 
 be made the inftruments of their own deftruc- 
 tion. Upon this firm ground they further 
 concluded, that when this feparation of in-» 
 terefts between the King and the Parliament 
 Ihould be effeded, the tafk of throwing off 
 their allegiance to the King would become 
 eafy. And therefore, to fupport this novel 
 diftindion, they have contended, that the 
 difcovery and fettlement of America was 
 made to the ufe of the King only^ and not 
 to the ife of the State ^ nor for the benefit of 
 the Britifh fociety^ 
 
 However 
 
:ii 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 44 On the Right of Property 
 
 However novel and ftrangc this difllnc- 
 tion may appear to thole who are ac- 
 quainted with the prineiples of our Govern- 
 ment, we have {q^w it warmly adopted by a 
 number of men who ftyle themfelves Patriots, 
 fome of them of no lefs dignity than Britilh 
 Senators, and particularly by one of their 
 mofl fenfible leaders. This Gentleman §, in 
 a plan laid before the public, has propofed, 
 upon the imaginary juftice and equity of this 
 mode of reafoning, to ere£t each provincial 
 Afl'embly into an independent Legiflature, 
 depriving the Parliament of all authority over 
 it, and leaving it fu' 'St only to the prero- 
 gatives of the Crown. That a man of fenfe 
 fliould be fp loft to confiftency of charader, as 
 in the fame breath to profefs the warmeft at- 
 tachment and love for his country, and tQ 
 prppofe a plan fo ruinous to its true intereft 
 ^nd welfare, is really aftoniihing. 
 
 However, ill-founded and abfurd as this 
 diftindion may be, feeing it has been made 
 tp juftify rebellion, and has been warmly 
 
 % Mr. Burke. 
 
 
 efpoufed 
 
i/t the American Colonies* 
 
 AS 
 
 efpoufed by fome of thofe who are entruflcd 
 with the facred rights and welfare of tlieir 
 country ; it calls for fome attention. A little 
 will fliow its fallacy. The manner of the dif^ 
 covery of America, the authority under which 
 it was made, and the right of property and 
 dominion acquired by it, afford unequivocal 
 and perfect evidence of the truth. 
 
 The Colonies were difcovered at the clofe 
 of the fifteenth century, by Sebaftian Cabot, 
 under a commillion granted by Henry the 
 Sevei th* Henry poflcfTed only two capaci- 
 ties in which he could acquire property, one 
 private as a man, the other public as the fu- 
 preme executive repref^ntative of the King, 
 Lords, and Commons, of England. In the 
 firft, he could take property to his own ufe • 
 in Jie fecond, territory and dominion to the 
 ufe of the State. The commiffion was ifTued 
 under the great fed of the State ^ the fy mbol of 
 its fovpreign authority, which proves, that he 
 a£ted in his politic^ and not in his private ca- 
 pacity. The language of the Commiffion, in 
 every claufe, fpeaks the fame truth. It is» 
 " We"* in his politic^ and not in his private 
 capacity, give a:-d grant licence to fail in 
 , .. ^ purfuit 
 
4 J On the Right of Property 
 
 purfuit of difcoveiies, under " our,'* not un- 
 der " my ^ banners^ Jlatidards^ and infigniay^ — 
 " to allix our aforefaid banners^ ftandards, 
 " and infignia, on any ifland or continent 
 *' newly difcovered;" and to poflefs and oc- 
 cupy " fuch difcovered territory as our vafllils'* 
 (that is fubjeds) " obtaining for /// the domi^ 
 *' nion, title andjurifdidionof the ifland and 
 *' continents fo difcovered." 
 
 Had Henry given this commifJion in his 
 private capacity, as an individual member of 
 the Britifh Statt, the language of the patent 
 would have been, " I give and grant, &c.'* 
 and not " We ;'' he w^ould have fpoke in h's 
 Private, and rot in his politic capacity; or if 
 fuch was his intention, whence did he derive 
 his right ? The moment he laid rifide his po- 
 litic capacity, he beca-ne a fubjedl, to be go- 
 verned and diredted in his actions by the laws 
 of the fociety ; and a fubjedt could have no 
 right to affix the feal of the State to his deed j 
 no right to grant to others a licence for the dif- 
 covery of countries ; nor to change and tranf- 
 fer the allegiance of fubjeds due to him in 
 his politic capacity as Sovereign of the Britifh 
 State, to himfelf, in his private, or any other 
 
 I capacity^ 
 
 I 
 
in the American Colonies. ^j 
 
 capacity. From all which it is evident, if 
 there had been no exprefs declaration of the 
 life of the territory difcovered, that the dif- 
 jovery would not be to the ufe of the man 
 who then was, or the man who fhould there- 
 after be the King of England, but to the ufe 
 of the State Uiider whofe commiffion it was 
 made by one of its fubjeds. And therefore, 
 upon the difcovery, the territory became le- 
 gally veiled in Henry and his fucceflbrs, the 
 fupreme reprefentative of the King, Lords, 
 and Commons, the politic truftees and guar- 
 dians of the people of Great Britain. Thus 
 poflefTed of the Colonies, they became in- 
 vohed with his other political trufts, and 
 infeparably annexed to the realm 5 and confe- 
 quently they defcended to his fucceflbrs in 
 like trufl, and fubje£t to the fupreme legifla- 
 tive authority of the State, whcfe agent hq 
 W.33, and by virtue of whofe authority h€ 
 acquired the property* . 
 
 •),, ■ 
 
 T.,..l/i 
 
 1 j. ■ 
 
 K ' ' . ; ,; 
 
 I • . > Z. 
 
 
 : r 
 
 \ 
 
( 48 ) 
 
 t 
 
 C H A P. V. 
 
 On the Royal GovernmentSi 
 
 AMERICA being thus annexed to the 
 kingdom of England, became an ob- 
 jed: of its Government, and confequently of 
 the exercife of the royal prerogative. The 
 fettlement, and government of the coun- 
 try required a divifion of it into diftridts, 
 and the eftablifhment of a number of in- 
 corporated and fubordinate focieties. The 
 fuperintendence of the Crown and Par-^ 
 liament over them, and their conftitutional 
 relation and fubordination to the State, re- 
 quired that they fhould be veiled with certain 
 limited powers and rights, to make bye-laws 
 and ordinances for promoting the particular 
 defighs of their inftitution, fubjedl always to 
 the controul of the fuprenie LegiflatUfe* • 
 
 The rules by which this ought to have 
 been done ; or, to be more explicitj the 
 rights, powers, and privileges, which ought 
 to have been granted, with their modifica-»* 
 tions and fpeicial limitations, are clearly de- 
 fined in the nature of the Britiflx Govern- 
 ment, 
 
On the Royal GoveruiHents. 
 
 49 
 
 ment, and the fundamental laws which I 
 have briefly recited in the fecond chapter. 
 Henry VII. under whcfe authority America 
 was difcovered, did not perform the talk ; 
 he left it to his fucceflbrs. But whether 
 they have, in their grants, confined them- 
 felves to the bounds prefcribed by the 
 fundamental laws of the State, which are 
 the only proper tefts by which the lawful- 
 nefs or illegality of the royal condud: muft 
 be decided in all cafes whatever, are queftions 
 of which the future fafety of the Britifh 
 Empire feems to demand an immediate 
 difcuffion. 
 
 To do this with candour, and to tread 
 with caution in a path which has been almoft 
 une.v|)'nred, it will be neccflnry to take a view 
 of the principles contained in the feveral pro- 
 clamations and charter , under which the in- 
 ferior focieties in Americ have been fettled, 
 and by comparing them with the fundamental 
 laws of the State, to determine whether they 
 are lawful or not. 
 
 And although not firft in time, yet becaufe 
 firft in order, we will here confiderthe ftrudure 
 
 E of 
 
50 
 
 On the Royal Governments* 
 
 of the Governments rilled Royal. Thefe 
 have been formed by royal proclamations, on 
 principles, which, though not fo repugnant 
 to the fundamental laws of the State as the 
 proprietary and charter governments, yet are 
 not calculated to fupport the prerogatives of the 
 Crown, nor the ariftocratic influence of the 
 Britilh Conflitution, r.or do they by any 
 means harmoniie with the fyflem to which 
 they belong. 
 
 Upon a firll view of thefe Governments, 
 one would imagine, that they were intended 
 by the politicians who formed them, to con- 
 tain the feveral political checks, and that 
 balance of power which is fo efl'ential and 
 beneficial in the principal fociety; to carry 
 the Hime policy down from the State to 
 its inferior politic members ; and to make 
 the feveral branches of their legiflature, as 
 they ought to be, perfed: reprefentations 
 of thofe of the State. But upon more 
 intimate examination, we fnall find, that 
 the royal and ariftocratical branches are little 
 more than faint refemblances, the rights of 
 which are uncertain, and their powers and 
 influence in the fociety enfeebled in the mo- 
 dification jf their eftabliihments ; while the 
 
 demo- 
 
 lli 
 
On the Royal Governments* r i 
 
 democ .ttical affemblies have poflefTcd all the 
 rights, powers, and privileges, of the Houfe 
 of Commons, to as great an extent, within 
 the colony, as the Houfe of Commons itfelf 
 within the realm. 
 
 Under the Royal Proclamatloifs, there is a 
 Governor appointed by the Crown, who 
 holds his commiffion dm*ing its pleafure. This 
 officer was certainly intended to be a perfedl 
 reprefentative of the Monarch; and to fup- 
 port the fame proportion of weight and in- 
 fluence in the inferior fociety, as the King 
 does in the State; and therefore he ought, 
 like his royal Mafter, to be one of the 
 checks in the' inferior conftitution againfl: 
 an excefs of the ariftocratic, but principal- 
 ly of the democratic influence, and con- 
 fequently independent of the other or- 
 ders. And yet this officer is a perfed 
 dependent for his fupport, not on his royal 
 Mafter, whofe power and influence he is 
 intended to preferve, but on the people, 
 whofe licentioufnefs he is appointed to check. 
 In fome of the Colonies, his falary is un- 
 fettled, and in others incompetent to the fup- 
 port of his rank and dignity ; and therefore 
 
 E 2 he 
 
I' : 
 
 52 
 
 On the Royal Governments, 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 
 he IS dependent on his AfTembly, In a matter 
 wliicli miift, human nature eonfidered, bias 
 his judgment, and weaken, if not totally 
 dellroy, his jufl influence. 
 
 There is alfo a council, or middle order of 
 the inferior legiflature, appointed under thofe 
 proclamations, but very diffimilar to the ari- 
 ftocratic order of the Britifh conftitution. 
 The members are taken from the com- 
 mon rank of people, there being no other. 
 They are invelled with no dignity, nor any 
 thing elfe, to raife them above that rank, or 
 to give them weight or refped in the fo« 
 ciety. They have a temporary commiflion, 
 which may be fufpended at th'e pleafure of a 
 Governor, and revoked at the pleafure of the 
 Crown. Thus, this branch of the colonial 
 legiflatures has not that dignity, independence, 
 and influence, which is neceflary to check the 
 illegal attempts of an arbitrary governor, or 
 the ambitious and licentious defigns of a po- 
 pular aflfembly ; both of which are abfolutely 
 neceflary in a mixed monarchy, to preferve the 
 peace and harmony of the inferior Govern- ' 
 ment. For, as a friend to truth and my 
 country, I mufl: fay, that former adminiftra- 
 
 tioas 
 
On the Royal Governments* 
 
 S2i 
 
 tions have appointed Governors, whofe ig- 
 norance and arbitrary difpofitions have wan- 
 tonly fported with the rights of the people, 
 and greatly diminifhed their allegiance to their 
 Sovereign. But when I fay this, I n^ aft de- 
 clare that inftances of this kind have been but 
 rare, when compared with thofe where the 
 licentioufnefs of the popular aflemblies has 
 attempted to invade the rights of the State. 
 Thus the ariftocratic balance, which confti- 
 tutes the ftrength and excellence of the Britifli 
 Government, is wanting in thefe inferior fo- 
 cieties, while the principles of monarchy 
 weakly, and democracy firmly, eftabliihed> 
 remain mod injudicioufly mixed, and oppofed 
 to each other. The ronfequence of which 
 18, that thefe two oppofite principles are 
 often at Vctriance, and one of them, to in- 
 creafe its own power, frequently invades 
 the rights of its antagonifts with fuccefs ; 
 there being no indiiTerent and difinterefted in- 
 fluence to accommodate the diflference, and 
 check their illegal defigns. ; . : [ 
 
 But it much oftener happens, as I have al- 
 ready hinted, that the rights of the Crown are 
 invaded by the people, than thofe of the 
 people by the Governor. The latter, too 
 
 E 3 often 
 
^^ On the Royal Governments, 
 
 often more indifFerent about the rights of the 
 Crown than his annual fupport, when it de- 
 pends on the pleafure of his aflenibly,is general" 
 ly cautious of incroaching on their privileges. 
 And he is fo far from extending the pre- 
 rogative beyond its juft limits, that many 
 Inftances may be produced, in which he 
 lias facrificed it to gratify the licentious 
 defigns of the popular aflembly. But, on the 
 other hand, the aflemblies, who are ever 
 watchful over what they conceive to be 
 the rights of the people, and ever ambitious 
 to extend their own powers, feldom mifs an 
 opportunity of wrefting from a Governor the 
 prerogatives of the Crown, and of increafing 
 their own weight in the fcales of government. 
 In thefe attempts, they have been in a variety* 
 of inftances but too fuccefsful. Indeed, it is 
 not to be reafonably expedted, that a Gover- 
 nor thus dependent on the people, and on a 
 council fo truly infignificant, and of the fame 
 rank with them, will hefitate, at times, to 
 facrifice even the rights of royalty to rer 
 publican ambition. 
 
 But fhould every Governor pofTefs a 
 fixed and durable falary, he would be 
 more attentive to his duty, and more firm 
 
 ia 
 
On the Royal Goverumcnis. 5 j 
 
 111 his oppofitloa to popular claims ; bc- 
 caufc he would be altogether independent 
 on the people, and only dependent on and 
 accountable to the Crown, as he ought to 
 be in all reafon, and according to that policy 
 upon whi'^h the Britifh State is founded. 
 
 A Council confifting of men raifed to a 
 degree of dignity, independent, and durable, 
 fo as clearly to diftinguilh their rank in the 
 fociety above the common people, would 
 fee and feel it to be their invariable interell, 
 conftantly to preferve a jufl balance between 
 the excefs of power in either of the other 
 orders of the fociety, to oppofe at all times, 
 as well the licentious attempts of affemblies, 
 as the immoderate exercife of the preroga- 
 tive in Governors, and to preferve the jufl 
 rights of both from violation ; becaufe their 
 rank, dignity, and weight, muft depend 
 on their preferving this balance. For as they 
 would form the arillocratic part of the fociety, 
 a prevalence of democratical power beyond 
 its bounds would be equally dangerous to 
 their rights and influence, as to thofe of the 
 Crown. Being in the fame predicament, 
 and liable to the fame enemy, they would 
 
 E 4 unite 
 
 i' \ . 
 
j'6 On the Royal Governments^ 
 
 unite with the Governor in oppofing it, 
 and maintain the Hime bahince in t' ' in- 
 ferior focicty, as i . maintained in the State. 
 Thus the prerogatives of the Crown would 
 poflefs that fecurity which they have in the 
 principal fociety, and of which they iiavc 
 ever been too long dcftitute in thofe inferior 
 politic bodies. The provincial governments 
 thus coniUtuted, would, as they ought, con- 
 tain their own checks and balance; difcords, 
 dangerous to their internal peace, would be 
 excluded ; harmony would be preferved ; 
 and much trouble faved to thofe who imme- 
 diately fuperintend them. . . • 
 
 . By thefe amendments in the Royal Go- 
 vernments, they would be made to har- 
 nionife with the principal fyftem. Their 
 polity would be the fame, which would con- 
 fequently produce the fame kind of laws, 
 manners, and habits ; the fame principles, 
 opinions, and attachments in the people, in 
 rcfpedt to the excellence of the principal go- 
 vernment ; and as their honours, dignities, 
 and offices, and their protedion and happinefs, 
 would all flow from the fovereign authority 
 of the Parent State, they would foon be com-' 
 
 1 .■ '['K pelled 
 
Ofi the Royal Governments. ^y 
 
 pellcd by the force of education, which 13 
 little fhort of the inftriidion of nature, to love 
 and revere the polity of the State itfclf. The na- 
 tional attachment in England and in America 
 would be the fame. Britons and Americans 
 would have bur one objed:, and be led by edu- 
 cation to look up to one common fovereign for 
 that fecurity, and thofe bleffings, which they 
 expert to receive from civil fociety. Here in- 
 clination and duty, enforced by their own 
 intereft, will lead them to unite, on all oc- 
 cafions, to maintain and defend the State. 
 Thus thefe inferior members of the politic, 
 like thofe of the natural body, when per- 
 fectly formed on their true principles, will 
 harmonife with the principal fyftem, fupport 
 and ftrengthen it. 
 
 But fhould the Royal Governments be 
 continued on their prefent defed:ivc plan, it 
 muft be abfurd to expe(fi, that what has fo 
 often happened will not happen again. The 
 fame caufes fubfifling, we muft look for the 
 fame effeds. The rights of the Crown ?.nd 
 State will continue to be impaired by the ne- 
 gle(^, want of firmnefs, or the private in- 
 - i ►- tereils 
 
J8 
 
 Oft the Royal Govcriim.'mts, 
 
 tercfls of Governors, having no independent 
 ariftocnitic principle to iupport them, or to 
 prevent their yielding to the licentious chiims 
 of the people. Laws and principles yet more 
 dilFonant from thofe of the Britifh Conftitu- 
 tion will take place, and of courfe, manners, 
 habits, op'mions, and attachments ; until all 
 true judgment of, and all affedion and refpedt 
 for, the excellence of a mixed form of go- 
 vernment, are effaced by th*^ over-prevalent 
 principles of democracy. And whenever 
 this fhall happen, it is eafy to perceive that the 
 confequence muft be a total feparation of the 
 two countries. . . 
 
 li 
 
 Confidering thefe defedtj Li the Royal 
 Governments, and the mifchicfs which muft 
 naturally attend them, it is not unreafon- 
 able to expe<3:, that they will become very 
 foon the objeds of the ferious attention 
 of thofe to whom the welfare and fafety of 
 the State are committed. The remedy is ob«r 
 vious, and the mouth of the patient is open to 
 receive it. This will admit of the moft evi- 
 dent demonftration, if the general fenfe of 
 the people of the Colonies, declared ia the 
 
 firft 
 
On the Royal Covcrnmcnts* 
 
 59 
 
 firft Congrcfs, may be deemed fuch demon- 
 flratlon ; — a Congrefs very different from thofc 
 which followed it. It was compofed of many 
 men of the firft abilities and independent for- 
 tunes, who knew the fenfc and wifhes of the 
 people. In this Congrefs, it was 
 
 " Rcfolvcd, N. C. D. 10. It is indlfpen- 
 -* fably neceifary to good government, and 
 " rendered effential by the Englilh Conftitu- 
 ^' tion, that the CGnJlltticnt branches of tht 
 ** Legijlature be independent of each other ; 
 " that, therefore, the exercil'e of legiflative 
 ^* power in feveral Colonies, by a Counc-] ap- 
 ♦* pointed, during pleafure, by the Crown, is 
 ** unconftitutional, dangerous, and deftrudtivc 
 ^' to the freedom of legiflation." 
 
 rlere, not only the mifchiefs I have pointed 
 out in the Royal Governments, but the 
 amendments propofed, are declared to be ne- 
 cefTary to the freedom of legiflation, and 
 rendered effential, by the fundamental laws of 
 the Englifh conflitution, to the good govern- 
 ment of the Colonies by the Americans them- 
 felves. And a little confideration will con- 
 vince 
 
m 
 
 60 0« t/je Royal Govcnwiciifs* 
 
 vince us, that they are equally cllcntial to the 
 preiervation of the rights of the Crown, to 
 the conformity and harmony which ought, 
 in reafon and found policy, to fubfift between 
 the State and its members, and of confe- 
 quence to the general peace and fafety of the 
 Empire. 
 
 This truth ftands further confirmed by daily 
 experience, which has, long fmce, taught us, 
 that thofe inferior focieties and corporations 
 in Britain, as well as in America, which have 
 "been formed on principles the moft variant 
 from the effential polity of the State, have 
 ever been the moft ungovernable and licen- 
 tious, and too oft^n the fcene of groundlefs 
 difcontent, fadion, and tumult. In America, 
 we know, that the internal peace and order 
 of the Royal Governments have been better 
 preferved, and their public affairs have been 
 more eafily tninfadled, w4th much fewer con- 
 tefts and obf4-u£tions to the public v/eal, 
 than in either the proprietary or popular go- 
 vernments. Indeed, it is a fadl W'hich great- 
 ly confirms the argument, that the prefent 
 rebellion arcfe, and firft broke out, in thepo-^ 
 pular governments of New England. Penn- 
 
 fylvania 
 
On the Royal Governments. 
 
 Gi 
 
 Jylvanla next caught the infeclion, Maryland 
 followed, and the Royal Governments, in 
 general, were the laft who embraced the 
 treafon. In Britain, we have long and often 
 feen thofe corporations, whofe conflitutions 
 have been formed on democratical principles, 
 and where popular influence has prevailed, 
 filled with diforder anc tumult ; and of late, 
 they have aimed at nothing lefs, than to make 
 thofe alterations in the State which would re- 
 duce it to their own principles, deftroy the 
 balance of its powers, and throw it into de- 
 mocratical anarchy. Let us fuppofe, that the 
 corporations of London and Briftol had been 
 eftablifhed on the true principles of the 
 mixed monarchy of Britain ; that they had 
 contained the fame checks and balance of 
 power, which are fettled in the Stai:e ; that, 
 inftead of the chief Magillrate being ap- 
 pointed by the Aldermen and Common 
 Council, he had been appointed by the Crown, 
 and held his office daring pleafure; and that 
 the Aldermen had been alio appointed by the 
 fame authority during good behaviour ; is 
 there a perfon of the leaft reflection, who can 
 believe, that • we fhould have feen, within 
 thefe corporations, that licertious fpirit, that 
 
 fadlious 
 
62 
 
 Oji the Royal Governments, 
 
 ml 
 
 fadiotis oppofition to the rcafonable meafure^ 
 of Government, that llipport of, and com- 
 bination with rebelUon, which have too long 
 perplexed the councils of the State ? It is 
 impoffible in the nature of things. The 
 Mayor being independent of the people, and 
 accountable to the Crown, would naturally, on 
 all proper occafions, have fupported its v/eight 
 and authority within the inferior fociety ; 
 and the Aldermen alfo independent of the 
 Common Council, would have thrown their 
 influence into the monarchical fcale, as the 
 only means of fecuring their own independ- 
 ence and dignity, againft the late republican 
 and licentious fpirit of the Common Council? 
 The city of London would have been in pei- 
 fedt tranquillity and fafety at the time of the 
 late dreadful riots and conflagration, when 
 every worthy inhabitant, even thofe that had 
 been deluded by the fadion, thought their 
 final ruin inevitable. 
 
v«-~l^t^'':^ i' 
 
 ' T 'T 
 
 ( 63 ) 
 
 7< 
 
 C H A P. VI. 
 
 Of the ah^'ogated or ohfolete Charters granted 
 for the Settlement of America, 
 
 T T is not my defign to travel minutely into 
 the motives w^hich induced the Sovereign 
 to grant, or the people to accept of, the Ame- 
 rican charters. My principal view^ is to exa- 
 mine their polity, to fhow their difagreement 
 "with the fundamental laws and fafety of the 
 Empire, and to enquire whether our Kings 
 polTefTed a right, under the eftablifhed confti- 
 tution, to grant charters, in the manner, and 
 on the principles, upon which they have been 
 granted. 
 
 In this enquiry, whether we confider thofe 
 charters which have been refumed by the 
 Crown, or thofe that remained in force until 
 deflroyed and forfeited by the rebellion ; it 
 will appear from their own evidence, that all 
 of them were fo many ad:s inconliftent witlj 
 the fundamental laws upon v hich the Britiih 
 government is eftablilhed; that their priuc:-' 
 
 5 pies 
 
64 Of the ohfoleU Charters granted 
 
 clples conduced to render the people who 
 fhould fettle under them, aliens in affcdion, 
 and enemies from principle to the State of 
 which they were fubjetSts j and inftcad of 
 ftrengtheiling and fupporting the mixed 
 monarchy, they, by gradual and infallible 
 means, tended to weaken and deflroy its eflen- 
 tial eflablifliments. 
 
 I Ihall pafs over, in filence, the Charters 
 granted by Elizabeth f, as no fettlement 
 was made under them, and proceed to 
 thofe granted by James the Firil; to the 
 Virginia companies. The firft was granted 
 in the year 1606, to Sir Thomas Gates, and 
 his aflbciates. The territory conveyed, ex- 
 tended from the 34th to the 45th degree of 
 northern latitude, including, what is now 
 called, the Provinces of New Hampfhire, 
 Maflachuflet's, Rhode Ifland, Connedlicut, 
 Mew York, New Jerfey, Pennfylvania, the 
 Delaware counties, Maryland, Virginia, and 
 North Carolina. This extenfive country was 
 divided into two diftrids, to be fettled by dif- 
 ferent companies of adventurers, and to be 
 
 t To Sir Humphry Gilbert in 1578, and to Sir Walter 
 Raleigh in 1585. 
 
 governed 
 
for the SeUhmcnt of America, 65 
 
 governed by the fame general principles of 
 polity. For the government of the people, 
 James referved a power to appoint One execu- 
 tive council in and for each province ; another 
 to be refident in England, for the fupericr 
 management of both, but all under his diredlion, 
 and liable to be removed by the royal pleafure. 
 The abfolute legiflative authority was vefted in 
 the King and his fucceffors. For, in the words 
 of the charter, thefe councils were to " govern 
 " and order all matters and caufes which 
 " fliould arife, grow, or happen to or with- 
 " in the fame feveral colonies, according to 
 ** fuch laivs^ ordinances^ and inJlruElions ^ as 
 {hould be in that behalf given and figned 
 with cur hand^ or fign manual, and pafs 
 under the privy feal of the realm of Eng- 
 land." . . 
 
 t( 
 
 i( 
 
 (( 
 
 - The fecond of thefe charters was alfo 
 granted by James the Firft, in the year 1 6Q9, 
 to Robert Earl of Salifbury, and others. It 
 exprefsly fuperfeded all the powers of govern- 
 ment conferred by the firft, and was founded 
 in principles in the oppofite extreme, and 
 equally inconfiftent with the order, funda- 
 mental laws, and fafety of the State. By this 
 
 F . charter, 
 
 jl 
 
Wi >' 
 
 y 
 
 cc 
 
 «t 
 
 cc 
 
 66 Of the obfolde Charters grafted 
 
 charter, the company named in it, and 
 " fuch, and fo many, as they fhould admit 
 " into their fociety, whether they fettled in 
 " the colony," or " adventured their money, 
 •* goods, or chattels," were formed into a 
 body politic by the name of " The Trcafurer 
 and Company of Adventurers and Planters 
 of the City of London, for the firft Colony 
 of Virginia." For the government of the 
 colony, or of this body politic, a council and 
 treafurer, to be refident in England, were 
 named and appointed in the charter. But it 
 was declared, that " the faid council and 
 treafurer, or any of them, fhould be after- 
 wards nominated, chofen, continued, dif- 
 *♦ placed, changed, altered, and fupplied, as 
 " death, or other feveral occafions fhould re- 
 " quire, out of the company of the faid 
 " adventurers^ by the voice of the greater 
 *' part of the faid company and adventurers ^ 
 *' in their afTembly for that purpofe." And 
 to this council, thus, from time to time, to 
 be conflituted, were granted " full power and 
 " authority to nominate, conflitute, ordain, 
 " and confirm, by fuch name and names, 
 " flyle or flyles, all and fmgular the Gover- 
 " nors, Officers, and Minifters, which fhould 
 
 " be 
 
 «( 
 
 C( 
 
for the Settlement of America, ^7 
 
 " be by tbem thought fit and needful to be 
 " made and ufed for the government of the 
 " colony or plantation." — " And alfo, to 
 " make, ordain, and eftablifh, all manner of 
 " orders^ laws^ direEttons^ InfruElions^ forms^ 
 " and ceremonies of goveninent and magif- 
 " tracy^ fit and neceflary iv ^ and concern- 
 " ing the government of the faid colony or 
 " plantation." ' 
 
 f , . . ., • 1 .■ ; ' • 
 
 By the third American charter, granted by 
 James the Firft, in 161 2, all the iflands fituate 
 in the ocean, within 300 leagues of the coafls 
 of the firft colony in Virginia, were granted 
 to the Treafurer and Company, and the fame 
 fyftem of polity eftablifhed in them. And it 
 further contained a confirmation of former 
 privileges, with this extraordinary claufe, 
 *' diwyjiatute^ a£ly ordinance, provifion, pro- 
 " clamation, or rejlraint^ to the contrary 
 " thereof, heretofore made, ordained, or 
 " provided in any wife nptwithftanding f ." 
 
 f Such was the incompetent and confufed government 
 under thefe charters, that a writ of ^0 ^warranto was iflued» 
 and judgment, declaring them void, was given by the court 
 cf King's Bench, in Trinity-term, 1624. 
 
 F 3 
 
 The 
 
m \ 
 
 13; 
 
 il 
 
 68 Of the otfolete Charters granted 
 
 The fourtli American charter, rcinmonly 
 called the Grand Plymouth Patent, was granted 
 by Charles the Firft, in the year i62(S. (This 
 charter included the territory granted to the 
 fecond Virginia colony.) The Grantees were 
 verted with power to make free of their fo- 
 ciety, fuch perlbns as *' they fhould think 
 " lit." They were authorifed " to chufe 
 *' annually, their governor, deputy gover- 
 *' nor, and affiftants, out of the perfons io 
 " denizened." On this politic body was 
 conferred all the legiflative and executive 
 rights and powers neceflary to a complete in- 
 dependent fociety. Or, in the words of the 
 charter, they were impowered " to make 
 " laws and ordinances for the good and wel- 
 " fare of the company, and for the govern- 
 ment of the lands and plantations, and the 
 people inhabiting, and to inhabit the fame, 
 as to them, from time to time, fhould be 
 thought meet ; and to fettle the forms and 
 ceremonies of government and magiftracy, 
 and to name and flyle all forts of officers, 
 both fuperior and inferior, diftinguifhing 
 and fetting forth the feveral duties, powers, 
 ** and limits, of every fuch office, and the 
 " forms of the oaths to be rcfpedively 
 
 '* miniftcred 
 
 (( 
 
 (( 
 
 {( 
 
 (C 
 
 tc 
 
 (( 
 
 iC 
 
 cc 
 
 m 
 
 If't V 
 
fur the Settlement of America. 69 
 
 *■ minlftered unto them, and to difpofe and 
 ^^ order the eleftion of all llich offiQers f." 
 
 When we examine thefc charters by the 
 Jaws which conferred the power on James and 
 Charles to eftablifli inferior focieties, it is 
 difficult to determine which of thofe Princes 
 ?i£led moft inconfiftently with his truft, It 
 was certainly their duty, as the politic guar- 
 dians of the Britifli State, vefted with extrar 
 ordinary prerogatives for preferving its uni- 
 formity, and the relation and fubordination 
 of its different members, to eftablifh the 
 inferior focieties on principles which accorded 
 with the general polity of the State, and 
 were direded by its fundamental laws. To 
 have adted within the powers, and confiftent 
 with the fplrit of thole laws, they fhould 
 have eftablilhed the prerogative by the 
 fame rules, and in the fame manner, as 
 it is fettled in the principal conftitution. 
 Their legiflative powers ihould have been 
 founded in the fame mixed polity, /. e, 
 with the fame kind of checks and balance of 
 
 f Upon a writ of ^o luarrantOy ifiued agair.ft this char- 
 ter, judgment was given for the King in the High Court of 
 Chancery, in Trinity-Term 1684, 
 
 F 3 power, 
 
w 
 
 no On the obfolde Charters granted 
 
 power, in a fiibordinato degree, which they 
 faw, were the bafis and ftrength of the prin- 
 cipal government. And above all, becaiifc 
 moft neceflary to the unity and uniformity of 
 the fociety, the fupreme diredlion of the Par- 
 liament fhould have been preferved in as per- 
 fedt right and vigour as in any other part of 
 its dominions. This was not only neceflary 
 to that harmony, which ought ever to fubfift 
 between the State and its members, but to 
 their fubordination and obedience to its fu-« 
 r "erne authority. 
 
 But how different are the fads ! By the 
 firft recited charter, James confidered Ame- 
 rica, contrary to all law and equity, as his 
 private patrimony; and concluded, that he 
 had ri^ht, independent of his political trufts 
 and relation to the State, to govern it by 
 what laws and prerogatives he pleafed. From 
 this miftaken idea, he eftiblifhed within the 
 dominions of the State, ten times more ex- 
 tenfive than Great Britain itfelf, an abfolute 
 monarchy, conftituting himfelf, and his 
 heirs, the abfolute and perpetual monarchs. 
 And in doing this, he totally difregarded 
 every law upon which the executive, as well 
 
 as 
 
Jhr the Settlement rf jimerka, y i 
 
 as legiflative rights, were conftituted. He 
 aiTumed to hiinfelf, and his heirs, a complete 
 an(' independent legiflative fovercignty, and 
 governed the people by ordinances made by 
 himfelf; and thus, mod efFcdiualiy, excluded 
 all the rights and powers of the King, Lords, 
 and Commons, of the Britifh State, over 
 their own dominions. His executive counr- 
 cils refembled more the inferior powers of an 
 ariftocracy, than thofe over which he prtfided, 
 and by which he governed. By all which, 
 he effaced every principle, every trace of that 
 mixed polity, which is the great fupport of 
 the rights of Engliflnmen, and the eifence of 
 their government. But more : Altogether in-i 
 different to the welfare and fafety of the king-.- 
 dom over which he rightfully prefided, in 
 order to populate the country and flrengthen 
 his arbitrary fyftem of government, he gave a 
 general licence to Britilh fubjeds to abandou 
 their allegiance, and emigrate to his new do-? 
 minions, 
 
 It would be more tedious than entertaining, 
 were I to point out, in detail, all the mif- 
 chiefs which muft have naturally flowed from 
 this charter, had it continued in force, and 
 
 F 4 Americ,5^ 
 
7t Oft the ohfolcte Charters granted 
 
 % 
 
 IS'' 
 
 America been fettled under it. I (hall, there- 
 fore, only mention them in general. Long 
 ere this time, the Americans, educated in the 
 principles of monarchy, would have loft all 
 opinion of the excellence of the Britilh Go- 
 vernment, and all their refped: and attach- 
 ments would have been folely devoted to 
 monarchy. Their laws, habits, manners, 
 cuftoms, and ideas of government, would 
 have been difTimilar, and inimical to thofe of 
 Great Britain. A monarchy, tempered by 
 the principles of ariftocracy and democracy, 
 would have been as much an objedt of their 
 averfion as of that of a Spaniard or a Turk. 
 They would now only have had a refpedl for, 
 and attachment to, a monarch refiding in 
 Britain, from whom they would have daily 
 received their public benefits and protection, 
 and to whofe will and pleafurc they would 
 have been confequently devoted. They 
 would have underftood little, if any, of the 
 happinefs and perfedion of liberty enjoyed 
 by Britifh fubjeds, under a Britifli Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Our Sovereign, to whofe integrity and 
 public virtue, if I may judge from the whole 
 
 tenor 
 
for the StitUmctit of jimerka* 73 
 
 tenor of his conduct, I firmly believe t!ua 
 monarchical power might be as fafely in- 
 truded as to any Sovereign in the world, 
 would, at this moment, have pofTefled a 
 diftindt, independent, and abfolute dominion 
 over three millions of people, the rightful 
 fubjeds of the State, and over a t^adt of 
 country annexed to, and a part of, the r^alm, 
 many times larger than Great Britian ;tfelf; 
 The revenues of that country would have 
 been perfedly at his command. A feparate 
 Exchequer from that of the State, and over 
 which it could have no controul, would have 
 been eftablilhed and filled with the treafurc 
 ariling from the commerce, and other re- 
 lb urces of a country, whofe exports were, 
 lately, nearly equal in value to thofe of the 
 foreign exports of Great Britain. To what 
 ufes and purpofes this abfolute and independ- 
 ent dominion might liave been applied, in the 
 hands of a Spvereign of. lefs integrity, and 
 lei's regardful of the fundamental laws of the 
 State, and the liberties of his people, than 
 his prefcnt Majefly, I imagine need not bc^ 
 explained. Every man of fenfe, but mpre 
 efpecially that refllefs oppofition, who have 
 j?ccn long inceflantly exclaiming againft the 
 
 exercife 
 
fl"\ 
 
 I 
 
 74 On the ohfolde Charters granted 
 
 cxercife of the eftablifhed and conftitutional 
 rights of the Crown, will readily perceive 
 them. 
 
 By the three fubfequent charters, James 
 and Charles tranfgreffed the bounds of their 
 authority, in a degree as extravagant as in 
 the lirft. For, if James inftituted the princi-» 
 pies of an independent monarchy in the firft, 
 he and his fucceifor eftablifhed in the others 
 thofe of perfedt democracies \ all of theni 
 equally fubverfive of the mixed monarchy 
 which their trufts obliged them to maintain. 
 For, if the introdudlion of the principles of 
 abfohite monarchy, within a part of the 
 realm, would deftroy the rcfpedt and attach- 
 ments in the fubjed to a mixed form of go- 
 vernment, and throw too much power into 
 the fcale of the monarch ; it is evident to 
 common fenfe, that the eftablifhment cf a 
 number of democracies would have thrown 
 03 much influence into the hands of the peo- 
 ple, deftroyed that balance and check againft 
 their natural and licentious difpofitions, ef- 
 faced all refpedt for, and attachment to, the, 
 mixed form of government, and, in the end^ 
 would have deftroyed it. 
 
 It 
 
 i 
 
for the Settlement of A?nericau y^ 
 
 It cannot be difficult to perceive, in the three 
 laft-mentioned charters, the dawn of that re- 
 publican fpirit which has fo often difturbed 
 the pure ftreams of a mixed monarchy, 
 throughout all the parts of the empire, and 
 been productive of fo many national evils, 
 •The difpofition of James to convert the Britifh 
 Government into an abfolute monarchy, is 
 evident from the firfl charter, as well as from 
 a variety of his other public tranfaQions. 
 The inclination of Charles to effedl: the fame 
 defign, is equally evident from many parts of 
 his condud. The fubfequent charters could 
 not, therefore, be the charters of the royal 
 judgment. Yet we are not at a lofs, having 
 the hiftory of thofe Princes before us, to ac- 
 count for ads fo extraordinary, and fo re- 
 pugnant to their main defign. Both of them 
 intending to enfeeble, and perhaps to diffolve, 
 the fecond and third orders of the State, could 
 not procure the money necelTary to the ac- 
 complilhment of their defign.^ but by the pre- 
 rogative. And this method being unlawful, 
 and unpopular, it was oppofed. It is not, 
 therefore, an improbable conjecture, that 
 thefe democratical charters were commodities 
 purchafed ; that the laft was bought, we have 
 
 proof, 
 8 
 
rm. 
 
 y^ On the oh/okte Charters granted 
 
 proof, as pofitive as the nature and antiquity 
 of the tranfadions wih admit off. Befides, 
 thefe Princes had their moments of embar- 
 raflmcnts in which the/ were off their guard, 
 and loll fight of their principal defign. Art 
 and influence might, at thefe times, get the 
 better of their judgment. And we may per- 
 ceive, not only from the hiflory of thofe 
 Princes, but from their charters thcmfelves, 
 an enthufiafm for colonization equal to that 
 which produced the Croifade. This enthu- 
 fiafm, it is more than probable, added to the 
 other motives I have mentioned, and to a hope 
 that thefe charters would be always controul- 
 able, and liable to be fuperfeded by the pre- 
 rogative, led James and Charles to gratify 
 the republican fpirit of the perfons foliciting 
 for them. Several attempts were made tp 
 refume, thefe charters, and at length Charles 
 fucceeded in the year 1684. 
 
 Tliat Kings, poflefled with high notions of 
 abfolute powex, fliould, of their own mere 
 motion, grant charters fo inconfil^ent with 
 them, is not to be fupj)ofed. Nor is it withr 
 
 ■f- See Hutchinfon's Hiftcry of the Ma/Tachuflets Bay, 
 vol. ii. p. 1. 
 
 in 
 
for the Settlement of America, 77 
 
 In the confines of reafonable conjedliire, that 
 men would accept of patents for carrying into 
 execution an enterprife fo hazardour,, un- 
 certain, and expenfive, as that of fettling a 
 colony, unlefs the powers and privileges c in- 
 ferred, had ftridly accorded with their n\ 
 ideas an 1 principles of civil government» 
 
 What thofe principles were, we cannot he 
 at a lofs to know, when we have recourfe to 
 the hiftory of the patentees of the lafl-recited 
 charter. They were chiefly men of republican 
 principles, haters of monarchy, and perfectly 
 attached to democratical government ; ideas 
 altogether unknown in Britain before the Re- 
 formation, and which were pr\>duced by the 
 too rigid rules and reftridtions eftablifhed by 
 it, for the direction and government of the 
 confciences of men. Thefe lules produced 
 a perfecution againft thofe who diflented from 
 the church eftablifhed, and that perfecution 
 begat an averfion to the principles of the go- 
 vernment which impofed it. Befides, the 
 government which thefe DilTenters, whether 
 called Puritans, Independents, Separatifts, or 
 Prefbyterians, adopted for their refpedive 
 churches, and made a part of their religion, 
 
 was 
 
! M 
 
 II (, 
 
 71^ ■'■1 '1 
 
 p '1 
 
 78 On the ohfokte Charters granted 
 
 was altogether democratical, and excluded 
 every principle of monarchy and ariftocracy, 
 knowing no temporal head but the people of 
 their own churches. From all which, and a 
 view of what has pafled lince the Reformation, 
 we have documents which clearly prove, that 
 thefc charters were founded in that republican 
 ipirit which arofe in Britain, immediately 
 after the Reformation, and produced the 
 ufurpation of Cromwell ; and which being 
 checked and fubdued by the tyranny and op- 
 preffion of that ufurper, made way for the 
 Reftoration ; and I wifh I could not, with 
 equal truth, add, in that republican fpirit, 
 which, under the liberal principles of the 
 prefent eftablifhed government, has been 
 gradually nurfed, and imperceptibly gather- 
 ing ftrength, until it has produced a rebellion 
 in America, created a difaffedion in the 
 minds of too many Britons to their moll: ex- 
 cellent form of government, and threatens, 
 unlefs reftrained by proper laws, in much 
 le(s time than that of half a century to de- 
 ftroy it. 
 
 Thofe who will look back on what they 
 have lately feen and felt, cannot want evi- 
 dence 
 
)f 
 a 
 
 h 
 It 
 
 Jhr the Settlement of America, 79 
 
 dence to convince them of this truth. For 
 although, upon a candid examination of the 
 prefent ftate of the Britifh Government, the 
 fundamental laws of the fociety were never 
 more ftridly, if fo perfedly, adhered-to and 
 preferved, yet ill-founded clamours againft its 
 adminiftration fubfift. Although the ftreams 
 of juftice flow purely and unfullied, and every 
 individual has his remedy for every right in- 
 vaded, for every wrong fuftained, yet much 
 reftlefs difcontent prevails. And although 
 there is truly lefs real oppreiTicn within the 
 dominions of Britain, than in any other fo- 
 ciety upon earth, yet we have feen that reft- 
 lefs republican fpirit^ unopprefTed, and in the 
 pofTeflion of every bleffing, forming in Ame- 
 r' !a feH'*^* »us committees, conventions, and 
 congre 11^ , ibolifhing every fyftem of colonial 
 government, and breaking- out into open re- 
 bellion againft the State to which they owe 
 their exiftence and happinefs ; and in Britain, 
 in ftridl and uniform concert with America, 
 we daily fee it eftablifhing feditious aflbcia- 
 tionsjwith aprofefled intent of making altera- 
 tions in the Government, under the infidious 
 pretence of amending it, but truly, with a 
 
 fecret 
 
I»l 
 
 80 
 
 On the obfolete Charters gra filed 
 
 ii 
 
 fecret defign to overturn the long- eftablifhecl 
 conftitution of our anceftors. 
 
 ' I' • . I ; 
 
 Had the firft Virginia charter continued in 
 force to this day, how diiferent would have 
 been the language of the republicans from 
 that which they have lately held in fupport of 
 the American democratical charters ! We 
 fhould be told by them, that a fociety, infti- 
 tuted on monarchical principles, within the 
 territory of the State, was fundamentally fub- 
 verfive of our mixed form of Government ; 
 that it tended to throw an undue weight in- 
 to the hands of the Crown, and to enable it 
 to deftroy the ariftocratical and democratical 
 checks and balance eflential in the Britilh 
 conftitution ; and that, therefore, no King 
 could poflefs a power to eftablifh it, and C0i\ - 
 fequently it muft be void. That this would 
 have been their language, we may juftly con- 
 clude from their inceifant exertions to wreft 
 front the Crown, even many of its rightful 
 and legal prerogatives. 
 
 But hod the fccond and third of thefe 
 charters been continued in force, they could 
 not in Britain have wanted advocates. Thqir 
 
 demo-' 
 
for the Settlement of America, 8 1 
 
 dcmocratical principles muft have recom- 
 mended them to the republican zealots of the 
 prefent day. For, although they equally 
 tend to deilroy the monarchical and arif- 
 tocratical orders of the State, and to fub- 
 vert the foundations of the Britifh Gonfti- 
 tution, as in the other inflance ; and although 
 the Crown^ in the grants of them, has, 
 to as dangerous a degree, exceeded the 
 bounds of its authority ; yet we have the 
 ilrongefl evidence to induce us to believe, 
 had an attempt been made by Parliament to 
 reduce them to a confiftency with the State, 
 that the republican fadion would have been 
 the zealous oppofers of the amendment. 
 
 I do not aflert this from a miftaken con- 
 clufion. We have i^tvi the fame republican 
 fpirit, contrary to the fundamental principles 
 of the fociety of which they are members, 
 and to whofe State they have repeatedly 
 fworn allegiance, clamouring againft, and 
 reprobating that very amendment. When 
 an ad of Parliament was made to give the 
 Crown the <'ippointment of a Lieutenant Go- 
 vernor of the Maflachufetts Bay, and to take 
 that appointment from the people, the whole 
 fadioa rofe as one man, and united in the op- 
 
 ^ pofition, 
 
82 On the ohf oleic Charters ^ l^i\ 
 
 pofitlon. Charters, however inconrifleiit with 
 the fundamental laws of the State, however 
 independent of its authority, and dangerous 
 to its exiftence, were now hecome ads fo 
 flicrcd in their nature, that, hke the laws of 
 the Medes and Perfians, they were not to be 
 altered or amended, even by the Parliament 
 itfclf. 
 
( S3 ) 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the Charier of Mary laud. 
 
 WE have feen, in the preceding chapter, 
 the ftrange inconfiftency of the 
 firft American charters with the laws of the 
 State, the rights of the Crown, and with each 
 other. In profecuiion of my defign, I fliall 
 proceed to review thofe which have been 
 fmce granted, and were in force at the com- 
 mencement of the prefent rcbelhon. The 
 firft in order of time is that to CeciHiis, Lord 
 Baron of Bakimore, in the year 1632, for 
 the province of Maryland. 
 
 By this Charter, Charles the Firft formed 
 the territory into a principality, and created 
 and conlVituted his Lordfliip, and his heirs, 
 " the true and ahfolule proprietaries of the 
 " country." The title thus conferred, is fo 
 defcriptive of fovereign powers, that if they 
 were not in the following claufes of the char- 
 ter more explicitly granted, they might be 
 juftly inferred from it. But the charter did 
 
 Ct 2 not 
 
S4 Of the Charter of Morylci>ul 
 
 not confer the title only. It granted all the 
 rights ard powers which were ever exercifed 
 hy, or can pofTibly be necefTriry to, a fove- 
 reign State. The defcription of thofe rights 
 and powers is fo general and unlimited, and 
 the eflatc or tenure granted in them fo inde- 
 finite and abfolute, that they at once de-i- 
 ftroy the political relation which ought ever to 
 fubfift between the State and its members. 
 Charles did not even referve to the Crow^n a 
 fmgle prerogative, nor to the Parliament the 
 leafl right of fupremacy. All the rights and 
 powers of the Britifli Government, as well 
 thofe which were pofTeiTcd only in truft by 
 Charles, as thofe which were held by the 
 King, Lords, and Commons, independently 
 of his executive authority, were transferred 
 in alienable ^nd abfriute inheritance. 
 
 I;.- 
 
 In every civil fociety, whatever Se its 
 form, there are, as I have before obfcrved, 
 certain principles peculiar to its ftrudture, 
 w^hich create the relation that ail its different 
 members muft of neceffity bear to the State, 
 This relation is formed by, andconfifts in the 
 cftablifhment of a fupreme authority over 
 the members, and in their obedience to ii. 
 
 Thefe 
 
 Wa 
 
Of the Cbiirta- of Mar^huid. 85 
 
 ^licfe qualUIcs of fupremacy and obedience 
 form that cement of union which binds the 
 members of every fociety together, create 
 their fubordination and fu bjedion, lead 
 them to a£l: in concert, on all occafions, for 
 the common weal, and conflitutc the flrcngth 
 and harmony of the fociety; and without 
 them, we could never form an idea of Go- 
 vernment. Should thefc relations between the 
 foyereign power and the fibordinate mem- 
 bers be univerfally dilfolved, the fociety is no 
 more ; fhould they partially, or in regard to 
 a part of the members^ be broken, the (Irength 
 of the fociety mud be diminifhed in proportion. 
 
 The fame property cannot be poflefTed 
 in abfolute right by two different perfons, 
 nor can the fame fpecific powers of Go- 
 vernment rightfully exift in two different 
 politic bodies of the fame fociety. Every 
 abfolute right implies the abfolute ufe and 
 exerrife of it ; and therefore, whatever were 
 the powers and privileges which Charles 
 gr mted to Lord Baltimore, and his heirs, he 
 deprived himfelf and his fuccelfors for ever of 
 the ufe and exercife of, and of all right of 
 interference in, them. Let us then enquire 
 what w^re the executive rights and preroga- 
 
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 86 Of ibe Charier of Maryland, 
 
 tives granted by the words of the Cliurter of 
 IVlaryhiiid, in abfokitc riglit and tenure. 
 
 (( 
 
 (C 
 
 sc 
 (( 
 (( 
 cc 
 
 His Lordlhip and his iieirs are em- 
 powered " to appoint and eftablifli any Judges, 
 Juftices, Magiftrates, and officers whatfo- 
 cver^ by fea and land^ for what caufcs fo- 
 ever^ and with what power foevcr^ and 
 /';/ fiuh form as to them fhall feem moll 
 convenient. To do all and every thing, 
 or things, which, unto the complete efta- 
 blifhment of juftice, unto courts, prsetories, 
 and tribunals, forms of judicature, and 
 manners of proceedings do belong." — They 
 were conftituted Captaii: -Generals, with all 
 the powers of war and peace, and to declare 
 martial law. They were authorifed " to con- 
 " fer favours, rewards, and honours, upon 
 " the inhabitants, and to inveft them with 
 " what titles and dignities foever, fo as that 
 they fhould not be fuch as are ufed in Eng- 
 land-^'' — and " to incorporate towns into 
 " boroughs, and boroughs into cities, with 
 " fuch convenient immunities and privi- 
 *' leges as to them Ihould feem meet ;" — to 
 conftitute " ports with fuch rights, jurifdic- 
 " tions, and privileges, as to them ihould 
 
 " feem 
 
 cc 
 
Of the Charttr of Maryland, 87 
 
 *' fecm expedient ; and to have and enjoy for 
 " ever the cuftoms and fubfldies in the faid 
 ports. 
 
 Such are the rights and prerogatives of the 
 executive authority of the State granted by 
 this charter. Were there no other ohjedlions 
 to the legaUty of them, than the Unlimited 
 and indefeazable eftate in which they are 
 granted, this alone would certainly, upon every 
 principle of politic law, render them void. 
 But, independent of this, the following rea- 
 fons, founded in the fundamental laws of the 
 Britifh State, may be juftly urged againfl their 
 validity. 
 
 I. The King, by the original decrees of the 
 fociety, is conftituted the fupreme Magiftrate, 
 bound to fuperintend the adminiftration of 
 juftice, and the prefervation of the public 
 peace. For that reafon, he is impowered to 
 judge of the abilities and integrity of the per- 
 fons proper to execute trufts fo important to 
 the rights and harmony of the fociety. He 
 cannot, therefore, confiftently with the nature 
 of his trufi:, give up his right of fuperintend- 
 ing the appoirxtment of judges and conferva- 
 
 G 4 tors 
 
88 Of the Charter of Maryland. 
 
 tors of the peacCj much lefs can he transfer it 
 to another for ever ; for this would be to give 
 up his right of judgment in a matter which 
 the conftitution has intruiled folely to him, 
 to weaken his neceflary weight and in- 
 fluence in the fociety, and to deprive him- 
 felf of the power of fuperintending its pubUc 
 peace. Should a King, by his patent, dele- 
 gate a power to another of appointing the 
 Judges of the King's Bench^ Common Pleas^ 
 and of the Juftices of the Peace within Great 
 Britain, can it be a doubt but that the grant 
 would be illegal, mifchievous and void ? 
 
 2. The King, by the prerogative, is im- 
 powered to conftitute all the fubordinate of- 
 fices neceffary to the adminiftration of juftice, 
 and the prefervation of the peace; but in 
 difcharging this part of his truft, as in every 
 other, he is bound to obferve the fundamental 
 and general laws of the fociety, and to ap- 
 point thofe offices in the manner and form by 
 them prefcribed. He cannot, therefore, con- 
 flitute them with powers and rights variant 
 from thofe laws ; much lefs can he, as he has 
 done in this charter, grant an unlimited and 
 indefinite power to another, and his heirs for 
 
 5 everj 
 
Of the Charter (>f Maryland, 89 
 
 ever, to conliltute them, " for what caufcs 
 *' focvcr^ with what poivers foever^ and in 
 " fucb foniiy as to him or them fliall feem 
 " moft convenient ;" bccraife, under powers 
 fo extenlive, all the fubordinate offices in the 
 fociety might be eftabiiihcd on principles re- 
 pugnant to the fpirit and policy of the go- 
 vernment ; and the uniformity of its inferior 
 orders, which greatly contribute to the 
 ftrength and fupport of the State, might be 
 broken. 
 
 3. The King is vefled with that power from 
 whence the fociety has a right to expert pro- 
 tedion and fecurity. To enable him to fecure 
 that protection, he holds the foederative 
 rights, and all the powers of war and peace 5 
 the appointment and fupreme command of 
 the military force of the nation ; the cuftody 
 and care of all caftles, fortifications, and othef 
 places of ftrength. Were he authorifed to 
 grant thefe rights to another, he might de^ 
 prive himfelf and his fucceflbrs bf their fu- 
 perintending power and charge over the fo- 
 ciety, in a point moft efTential to its fafety 
 and exiftence* 
 
 A. The 
 
90 Of the Charter of MarylaiuL 
 
 4. The King is the fountain of honour; and 
 as he fuperintends the punifhment of the 
 wicked, fo he is the fiipreme judge appointed 
 to reward the virtuous and the brave. He 
 may, therefore, confer titles of nobiUty on 
 whom he may think deferving ; but the grant 
 muft be made, in mode and fubftance, con- 
 formable to the eftablilhed rules and funda- 
 mental laws of the fociety. He cannot, 
 therefore, confer titles and dignities unknown 
 to thofe laws ; and much lefs can he grant a 
 pov/er to another, in fee, to confer them, 
 with an exprefs prohibitory provifo, that they 
 ihall " not be fuch as are ufed in England." 
 
 5. The King may, by virtue of his prero- 
 gative, conftitute inferior focieties, fuch as 
 towns, bcxoughs, and cities, &c. with rights, 
 jurifdidions, and privileges, correfponding 
 with the ftrudure of the principal goverii- 
 ment and its fundamental laws, preferving 
 their due relation to the other members, and 
 their fubordination to the fupreme authority 
 of the State ; but he cannot conflitute them 
 wit'' independent rights, powers, and jurif- 
 didions, becaufe this would dilTolve their re- 
 lation and connedion with the fociety, and 
 
 render 
 
Of the Charter of Maryland, 91 
 
 render them independent States : And much 
 lefs could he transfer to Lord Baltimore, and 
 his heirs for ever, an indefinite power to con- 
 ftitute them with fuch rights, jurifdidtions, 
 liberties, and privileges, " as to them Ihould 
 *' feem convenient." 
 
 6. The prerogatives of the Crown are rights 
 vefted in the perfon of the King, in trujl^ to 
 cxercife them himfelf, and to leave them un- 
 impaired to the exercife and ufe of his fuc- 
 ceflbrs, for the public good and fafety ; he 
 cannot, therefore, transfer them either for 
 Ife^ in tail^ or in fee ; becaufe, in the firft cafe, 
 he deprives himfelf of the power to difcharge 
 his truft and duty to the fociety, and in the 
 others, he robs his fucceffors of moft im- 
 portant rights vefted in them by the conftitu- 
 tion, for the public good and fafety ; and be- 
 caufe, if he might do this, he might alter the 
 fucceflion of the Crown, and give to the peo- 
 ple what King he pleafed. And yet Charles, 
 by the exprefs words of this charter, has con- 
 veyed an abfolute eftate in all the civil, mili- 
 tary, and foederative rights of the Crown, to 
 the proprietary of Maryland, and his heirs. 
 So that, fuppofing the charter to be valid in 
 
 law, 
 
w 
 
 02 Of the Charter of Maryland, 
 
 lav/, he har, deprived his fucccfTors for ever of 
 their right to excrcifc the prerogatives of the 
 Crown, and of interfering, in any refpedt, in 
 the government of Maryland, though a part 
 of their dominions. 
 
 ; .M ' 
 
 > : 1 
 
 Many other objedions may he juftly made 
 to this part of the cjiarter, but thefe are fo 
 Itrong and important as to render the men- 
 tion of others unneceiTary ; we will there- 
 fore pafs to a view of the legiflative powers. 
 And here we ought not to be furprifed, 
 that Charles, who did not hefitate to alien 
 for ever thofe rights which were neceflary 
 to his own dignity and power, fliould, with 
 lefs regret, transfer thofe of the Parliament, 
 w^hich he was endeavouring to weaken, if not 
 to deftroy, in the fame independent arid un- 
 limited tenure. The words of this illegal 
 and extravagant grant are, " We, repofmg 
 " fpecial truft, &c. in the faid now Lord 
 '*■ Baltimore, for us^ our heirsy Siwdfuccejfors^ 
 do grant free, full, and absolute 
 pow^ER, by virtue of thefe prefents, to him 
 and his heirs^ for the good and happy go^ 
 vernment of the faid country, to ordain, 
 make, enad:, and under his and their feals 
 
 "to 
 
 C( 
 
 C( 
 
 u 
 
 iC 
 
 ii. 
 
Of the Charter of Marylatid, c^j- 
 
 to publifh, any laws whatfoever^ appertain- 
 ing either to i\\Q public JIate of the lliiu pro- 
 vince, or unto the utility of particular per- 
 fons, according to their Infl difcretions. by 
 and with the advice, aflent, and approba- 
 tion, of the freemen of the faid province, 
 or the greater part of them, or of their de- 
 legates, or deputies, whom, for the enabl- 
 ing the laid laws, we will, that the faid 
 now Lord Baltimore, and his heirs, fhall 
 aflemble infuchfort and form as to him and 
 ihQVCi fhall fecm befl^ and the faid laws v'nly 
 to execute upon all people within the faid 
 province and limits thereof, by impofition 
 of penalties, imprifonment, or any other 
 punifhment, yea, by taking away member^ 
 or lije^ 
 
 No truth can be more firmly eflablifbed 
 by the pradice of mankind, and the nature 
 and fitnefs of things, than that there mufl of 
 neceflity be, in every civil fociety, one fu- 
 preme will or fovereign power ; a power 
 having a right to command and dire£t the 
 adtions of every member to whatever is ca- 
 pable of human diredion, and relates to the 
 pubU9 interefl, fafety, and happiaefs. It is 
 
 from 
 
1:1 
 
 <J4 Of ^^^' Charter of MarylaitiL 
 
 from this unlvcrral power of dl reeling and 
 commanding, tliat the union of the w ills and 
 ilrength of all the memhcrs arifcs, and the 
 *' body poUtie or date refuUs/' The members 
 cannot polTcfs an ablbhitc and independent 
 right to regulate or dire£l their own condudl, 
 in matters where the public good is concerned, 
 becaufe their dependence on the fupreme au- 
 thority for what relates to their fafety and 
 happinefs, conftitutes their memberfliip, and 
 unites them with the fociety. This fupre- 
 macy in the ftate, and dependence in the 
 members, are fo eifential, that without them 
 " we could ncA^er conceive a civil fociety." 
 For, if it could be lawful for the members of 
 a fociety to dire£t their own anions, inde- 
 pendently of the fovereign will, and at their 
 pleafure to difobey and oppofe it, every one 
 would follow its own judgment in whatever 
 relates to the public welfare. The cement 
 which binds the fociety together would be 
 diflblved, endlefs competition and contefts 
 for power would enfue, with all the mif- 
 chiefs incident to a ftate of nature. 
 
 % 
 
 A necefTary confequence of this fupremacy 
 is, that all the members muft bear a proper 
 
 relation 
 
 liiii 
 
 ;;il 
 
Of the Charter of Maryland* 95 
 
 relation and fubordination to the State, and a 
 perfcdt fubjedion to its will. By their rela- 
 tion and fubordination I mean, that their 
 rights and powers miifl be founded in prin- 
 ciples which correfpond with thofc of the 
 State, and not in fuch as are diflbnant and hete- 
 rogeneous. For, without this, the communi- 
 cations of the fupreme authority could be nei- 
 ther regularly made or received, by its mem- 
 bers, nor the power of the one be executed, 
 nor the duties of the other fulfilled. 
 
 All thefe fundamental and well eftabllflied 
 truths, Charles, in the conftitution of the 
 province of Maryland, totally difregarded. 
 Tnftead of afcertaining the form of this in- 
 ferior politic member, and founding it on 
 principles which agreed with thofe of the 
 State, and its fubordination, its form and 
 powers are totally undefined ; and the 
 Lord proprietary, and his heirs, are au- 
 thorifed to eftabliih it " in fuch form and 
 " fort as to them fliall feem beft." Under 
 this unlimited authority, his Lordfhip might 
 have eftabliflied it on principles entirely ari- 
 ftocratical, or, as has been done in the 
 eaftern Colonies, to the inconceivable detrl- 
 9 ment 
 
96 Of the Chiirter of Maryland, 
 
 ment of the Empire, on principles purely dc- 
 mocratical : and he wanted nothing but thQ 
 afTent of the people to make it ablblutely 
 monarchical. 
 
 In every Government v/hofc rights are 
 fettled, and even in the Britifh (whofe prin- 
 ciples, before the Revolution, were fluctuat- 
 ing), we find the powers and privileges of 
 all the inferior politic bodies reftrained fq 
 to the particular objedts of their inllitu- 
 tions, as to render the powers and inter- 
 ference of the fupreme legiflature perpetually 
 necefTary to their interell, fafety, and hap- 
 pinefs, ever having fomething to afk of, and 
 to receive from it, to which they are incom- 
 petent. Their powers do not, ought not, 
 and cannot, extend to objects of general police 
 and regulation, while they remain fubordinatq 
 members of the fociety, and fubjedt to its 
 legiflature: Becaufe their fubjedion confifls 
 in this dependence on it ; and because, if 
 they were not thus reflrained, but made 
 competent to the making all manner of laws, 
 their legiflative ads would ever interfere with 
 thofe of the fupreme authority, weaken its 
 
 powerS| 
 
Of the Charter of MaryhnuL 97 
 
 powers, and produce the utinofl anarchy and 
 confidlon. 
 
 Now the powers of leglHatlon, granted to 
 the Lord Proprietary and his hoirs, were as 
 extcnlivc as language couU' make tlicni. 
 They are in tlicir tenure unrunl'icd, and in 
 their nature " free, full, and abfolute." No- 
 thing i'i wanting that can be necenary to an 
 independent fovereignty. They extend to 
 the regulation and direction of whatever 
 " appertains to the private utility of indivi- 
 *' duals," or " to the public ftate of the pro- 
 " vince, and to the good and happy govern- 
 " ment of the country." Thus the people 
 of Maryland are left, by the e-xprefs words 
 of their grant, under a neceflity of looking 
 up to Parliament for, or afking of it, no 
 one a(St, matter, or thing, which can be ne- 
 ceffary either to their internal peace and hap- 
 plxiefs, or to their protedion againft a foreign 
 enemy, as foon as their opulence and po- 
 pulation fliall enable them to proted them- 
 felves. 
 
 Where then fhall w^e fmd that fubordina- 
 tion, or thofe political ties which ought to 
 
 H bind 
 
i I 
 
 I, ' 
 
 iii^! 
 
 ;i^" 
 
 ; ! 
 
 .'.\ 
 
 . m: 
 
 K 
 
 ■'II 
 ill 
 
 98 Of the Charter of Maryland, 
 
 the politic body of Maryland to that of the 
 State, fo as to enable us to call it, with any 
 degree of propriety, a member or part of 
 the fame fociety? They are not to be found 
 in the confcitution of the legiflative powers, 
 for thefe are indefinite, abfolute, and inde- 
 pendent I Nor in that of the executive 
 powers, for the Proprietary poflelfcs them in 
 abfolute right and property, and can be no 
 more accountable to the Crown for the ufe 
 and exercife of them than he is for the money 
 in his purfe. Shall we look for them in the 
 eflablifhments of the inferior orders, boards, 
 or offices, whether judicial or minifterial, 
 ecclefiaftical, civil, or military I They are 
 not there ; for thefe are the creatures 
 of a Prince, w^ho, under the powers 
 granted, is independent, and to whom 
 all the members owe faith and allegiance. 
 Shall we find them in the allegiance of the 
 people to the Crown, or in their obedience to 
 the laws of Parliament I We fhall not. For 
 if that allegiance is not exprefsly, it is vir- 
 tually and moft effedually, dilTolved. For, 
 by a transfer of the " abfolute powers" to 
 make " all manner of laws, for the good and 
 " happy government of a country," and to 
 
 compel 
 
Of the Charter of Marylatid, gg 
 
 compel the obedience and fubmlirion of the 
 people to them, their allegiance was as ef- 
 fedlually transferred as if it had been done in 
 terms ever fo explicit ; it being impoflible, in 
 the nature of things, for a people to yield 
 obedience to two diftin(S and complete leglf- 
 lative powers, whofe laws muft be ever va- 
 riant from, and often repugnant to, each 
 othen 
 
 
 Having thus before us thofe independent 
 rights which exclude all political relation and 
 fubordination of the Proprietaries and people 
 of Maryland to the State, it will be neceflary 
 to enquire, whether there are any, and what 
 reftridions or refervations in the charter, of a 
 contrary tendency. There is, in the claufe 
 which conftitutes Lord Baltimore and his 
 heirs " the Lords and abfolute Proprietaries 
 " of the country,'* a " faving of the f.iith 
 and allegiance, and fovereign dominion, 
 due to us, our heirs and fucceflbrs." But 
 Charles did net confider, that " no man can 
 " fen^e two mafters ;" that the people of 
 Maryland could not be his fubjeds, and at 
 the fame time the fubjeds of a Prince in 
 whom he had veiled all thofe complete powers 
 
 H 2 to 
 
 (C 
 
 cc 
 
I- 
 
 Hi 
 
 :!\ 
 
 loo Of the Charter of Maryhind. 
 
 to which fubjedlion is due. Had the inferior 
 fociety been formed on the principles of the 
 Britifh Government, with its proper relation to 
 the State ; had a juft and reafonable fubordina- 
 tion and fiibjedionof the body pohtic of Mary- 
 land to the Icgiilative and executive powers of 
 the Britiih fociety, agreeably to its fundamental 
 }aws, been eilabiiihed, this faving would have 
 been unneceflary. The faith and allegiance 
 due to the Crown, and their obedience to ihc 
 laws of the State, would have been fecured 
 by the fame political bonds, and confequent- 
 ly as efFe(ftually in the province as in the 
 kingdom. But the reverfe being the fadl ; 
 and all the powers granted having a manifeft 
 tendency to difTolve that " allegiance and do- 
 " minion," the faving was nugatory, inef- 
 fedual, contradidlory, and abfurd. - 
 
 i 
 
 '■■, • ■; I - ' ' ■ ■ V . ■<• " - ■ ■, 
 
 There is alfo another provifion, that the 
 " laws" of Maryland " be confonant to rea- 
 " fon, and be not repugnant or contrary, but 
 " as near, as conveniently may be, to the 
 " laws, ftatutes, and rights, of this our 
 " kingdom of England." Now let us fup- 
 pofe, that Lord Baltimore had ellablifhed a 
 mixed form of government, the exad: re- 
 
 femblance 
 
Of the Charter of Maryland, i o I 
 
 femblancc of the Britidi State, and had con- 
 formed, in all his laws, to the fpirit of the 
 laws of Enghmd; what would this have con- 
 tributed towards the fubordi nation of the 
 country, or its political relation to, or union 
 with, the Britifh Government ? The anfwcr 
 IS, Nothing. Great Britain and Maryland 
 would, in that cafe, have been two diftintl, 
 though fimilar independent focieties, governed 
 by two diftincl heads, and yielding obedience 
 to laws- made by two different fuprem.e 
 powers, and nothing more. We may there- 
 fore conclude, that this proviiion, like the 
 lafl: I have mentioned, is ineiTedtual and 
 abfurd* 
 
 But w^hen it is confidered, that the Lords 
 Proprietaries are laid under no obligation to 
 return authentic copies of the laws made bv 
 the Maryland legiflature, nor obliged to give 
 any account of their proceedings cither in 
 their legiflative or executive capacities ; 
 that there was no refervation to the Crown 
 of a power of confirmation or repeal of the 
 laws that Ihould be made, fliould the Pro- 
 prietaries condefcend to tranfmit them ; and 
 ih^-it there v/as no right to hear and de- 
 li 3 terming 
 
|_f" I '>"!^''rf"?-".W 
 
 ' « 
 
 H 
 
 ii 
 
 ) . I ■ 
 
 t!i 
 
 
 
 102 Of the Charter of Maryland, 
 
 termine appeals from the judicial dccifions in 
 the plantation ; the provifion under our 
 confidcration appears yet more nugatory and 
 ridiculous. For, let us fuppofe, that a law 
 was made by the Britifli Parliament, to re- 
 gulate fome particular matter in Maryland, 
 or even to repeal one of their provincial laws, 
 becaufe contrary to the laws and rights of the 
 State, and that the Proprietaries and people 
 fhould combine to difobey it. By what means 
 could the Crown, or its fervants, carry fuch a 
 law into execution ? Should they apply to the 
 Proprietary, he is averfe to the meafure, and 
 they have no coercive power over him. 
 Should they apply to his executive officers, 
 they are his creatures and dependents ; their 
 oaths of fidelity and allegiance are taken to 
 him, and not to the Crown. They are fworn 
 to execute the laws of Maryland, not thofe of 
 England ; and their intereft and obligations 
 unite in difobeying the order. 
 
 Indeed, among the many laws which have 
 been made to bind the Colonies, none that have 
 not agreed with the local interefts of the Pro-^ 
 prietary and people have been obeyed. The laws 
 of trade have b^en moft fhamefully violated 
 
 anc} 
 
Of the Charter cf Maryhmd, 103 
 
 and diircgarded, in the Proprietary and Charter 
 Governments. A law has been made to pro- 
 hibit the making of fteel, &c. the eredting of 
 tilting hammers, and Hitting mills. Yet there 
 have been many (leel furnaces, tilting ham- 
 mers, and flitting mills, ered:ed fmce the 
 pafling of the a<fl:, A law has been made 
 to regulate tl\e manufadlure of hats, but it 
 has not been obeyed. Individuals are in- 
 terefted in the tlifobedience, and the Pro- 
 prietaries Vsrill not interfere to enforce an a(£l 
 where neither their own rights nor their in- 
 tereft are concerned, and mor^ efpecially, 
 v\diere it is made to interfere with their power, 
 however neceifary the law may be to the 
 manufactures or commerce of Great Britain. 
 
 There is one more refiraint on the legifla- 
 tive and executive power of the Proprietaries. 
 They are authoriled, as I have lliewn, to 
 conftitute an order of nobility, and " to in- 
 *' veft them with what titles and dignities fo- 
 *' ever, fo as they he not fiich as are now ufed 
 ^' in England''' What the policy of this pro- 
 vilion was, muft reft in conjecture. Did it 
 arife from a diflike in Charles to the ariftocra- 
 tical order of the Britifh State, which had 
 
 H 4 been, 
 
 W' 
 
104 Of the Charter of Maryland. 
 
 Ii; ,1 
 
 \ M I 
 
 W: 
 
 t 
 
 been, and was at the time of the grant, op- 
 poilng his arbitrary mearures • and did he in- 
 tend to prevent the eflabiiihment of that order 
 in America, whofe rights he intended to en- 
 feeble, if not to deftrcy, in Britain ? This 
 conjedlure does not feem void of probabihty, 
 when we recoiled;, that he had conferred all 
 the powers of legiflation on a monarchical 
 and a democratical order, to the exclufion of 
 the arillocraticah Hence, it would feem, 
 that, although he was willing that there 
 fliould be a provincial nobility, he did not 
 chufe it fhould be Icgiilative, or bear any re- 
 femblance to that of the Britifh State. How- 
 ever this may be, it is certain, that this re- 
 rtraint on the Proprietary power did not tend 
 to unite the policy nor the manners of the 
 inferior fociety to thofe of the kingdom, but 
 rather, if it had been poiTible, to make the 
 difunion more complete. 
 
 To point out, in detail, the mifchievous 
 effetHs of this illegal and unconftitutional 
 Charter, would be more difgufting than en-' 
 tertaining, and is not neceflary to my defign. 
 It will fuflice, generally, to mention them. 
 Under fuch a Charter, we are not to be fur^- 
 
 prife4 
 
Of I he Charter of Mcirylivid, 105 
 
 prUed at finding the powers of Government, 
 in the feeble hands of a fubje£t, improperly 
 and injudicioully managed. The rights 
 j^ranted v/ere fo extcnfive, that they were 
 calcidated to alienate the Proprietaries from 
 their attachment and fubjeiflion to tli State, to 
 lead ihem to devote thofe rights to the increafe 
 of their private intercft, and to fill their minds 
 with purpofes of ambition. No lines, no 
 principles, are laid down, nor any fuperior 
 influence cftablifhed, by w^hich that ambition 
 could be checked or controuled. They were 
 conftltuted officers of a Government inde- 
 pendent of its power, and unaccountable to 
 it. Their only connedion, or political rela- 
 tion, was with the people of the province. 
 With thefe they were obliged by the charter 
 to divide the legiflative rights ; but without 
 any intermediate weight or balance to check 
 either their ovv^n ambition, or the licentious 
 deHres of the people they were to govern. 
 
 Thus, left to thcmfelves, difcord and confu- 
 fion naturallv enfued in their leiriflative con- 
 dudt. Perpetual contefts for power fuc- 
 ceeded. A variety of laws was propofed in 
 turn, by the Proprietary, to the conventions of 
 the people, and by them to the Proprietary, 
 
 and 
 
io6 Of the Charter of Maryland, 
 
 and alternately rcjedled, before any fyflem of 
 government could be eftablifhcd. The firil 
 which had any appearance of being fettled, 
 v^as a ftrange jumble of the monarchical and 
 democratical principles, in which the latter 
 were perfectly predominant. A number of 
 perl as eledled by the people, others fum- 
 moned by fpecial writs of the Proprietary, 
 and all thofe who did not chufe to vote at 
 the eledions, with the Proprietary or his 
 Deputy, and his fecretary, fitting and voting 
 in one houfe, formed the firft legiflative au- 
 thority of Maryland. This wretched fyflem, 
 after fome experience of its abfurdity and 
 mifchiefs, was fucceeded by another, which 
 confided of a Governor, an Upper Houfe, 
 dependent, in form, on the Proprietaries, but 
 in reality more on the people, and a houfe 
 formed by the reprefentatives of the people- 
 Under this defective fyftem the province 
 has continued ever flnce, until the fyftcin it- 
 felf became a fuicide. 
 
 m-. 
 
 But neither under the firft or the fecond 
 fyftem of government have any of the duties 
 to the State been obferved, nor have the peo- 
 ple enjoy "d that peace, protedion, and fafety, 
 
 ,3 ^^^ 
 
 f 
 
 
Of the Charter of Maryland, 107 
 
 for which men enter into a ftate of civil fo- 
 ciety, and for which they give up their na- 
 tural rights and independence ; and much lefs 
 liavc they pofleired that fecurity and happinefs 
 which they muft have enjoyed* in a province 
 duly fubordinate to the mofl: perfect fyftem of 
 jiolicy upon earth. The hiftory of this pro- 
 vince is a hiilory of a total difregard to the 
 rights of the Crown and the State, of wars 
 with the natives, and of infurreclions ind re- 
 bellions againft the Proprietary authority ; re- 
 bellions, which have been fupprefTed more 
 by the imaginary power of the Crown, and 
 a remaining attachment to the mixed mo- 
 narchy in the people, than either by the fide- 
 lity of the Proprietaries as fubjeds, or by 
 their judgm*ent in governing, or by their 
 weight and influence in the province. 
 
 But, notwithftanding this imaginary power 
 of the Crown, and this real attachment to the 
 principles of the Parent State in many of the 
 people, thefe perpetual contefts for power, 
 between them and the Proprietaries, have 
 ever tended to enfeeble, and in the end have 
 deftroyed, the peace, good order, and govern- 
 pient, of this inferior fociety, Self-intereft 
 
 and 
 
) .' 
 
 il 
 
 1 08 Of the Charier of Maryland, 
 
 and ambition are pafTions natural to the 
 hearts of men. When pofrcfTed of the means 
 of gratification, they know no bounds. 
 The moral, as well as political obligations 
 generally fall before them. The Proprictarie??, 
 by this Charter, became pofTelled of the 
 means by which they thought they could 
 gratify both. A large extent of territory, 
 and the powers of independent govern- 
 ment, were thofe means. Proprietary inftruc- 
 tions, founded in their private intereft, and 
 their ambitious defigns, without the leaft re- 
 gard to the rights of the Crown or Parliament, 
 or to the intereft of the province, aredigefted 
 in England, and fent over to their Governors. 
 Their Governors, bound by heavy penalties, 
 are obliged to make them the rule of their 
 government. Under their injunctions, many 
 arbitrary and unjuft claims are often made on 
 the people, and many reafonable a£i:s,neceirary 
 to the welfare of the province, have been re- 
 fufed. This has produced difguft, difrefpedt, 
 and contempt, in the people for Proprietary 
 dominion. 
 
 On the other hand, the people are natural-^ 
 ly proud and hcentious, and yield with re-* 
 
 ludance 
 
 W^i 
 
Of the CbiUter nf Marylaud. 109 
 
 ludlancc to the government of a fubjcd): 
 chiiming indcpentlent rights. 'I'hey Ccii». "»t 
 bring themfelves to fear and rcfpcdl him, 
 while they retain the idea of a Sovereign to 
 whom that fear and refpe^ft is only due. 
 Hence they are led to oppofe his condu<ll 
 when unjuft and arbitrary, and fomctimes when 
 not lb, and often in their turn to invade the Pro- 
 prietary rights and prerogatives. In thefe con- 
 tells for power, the Proprietaries fomctimes 
 prevail inlaying a foundation for opprefTmg the 
 people, and at other times the people fucceed 
 in wrefting from the Proprietaries thofe rights 
 which are neceirary to fupport their own power. 
 luom thefe fourccs have arifcn thofe perpetual 
 controverfies between the Proprietaries, their 
 Governors, and their Affemblies : contro- 
 vcrfics which lead the people into cabals, 
 dcftroy the public order, enfeeble the powers 
 of Government, and which have ever proved 
 fo prejudicial to the fervice of the Crown, 
 even when theobjeds of that fervice w^erethe 
 protc£tion and fafety of the province againft 
 its foreign enemies *. 
 
 But, 
 
 • I fliall content myfelf with giving one ir.ftance o^ the 
 mifchievous confequenccs of thefe diflentions, waving 
 
 many 
 
M 
 
 no Of the Charier of Maryland, 
 
 But, although the Proprietaries and pcopit? 
 arc at pcrpctunl variance rcfpedinp; their own 
 powers, yet they feldom fail to unite in op- 
 
 many others, bcc-jfe, if this docs not fatisfy my reader, I 
 iufpcd noiliing can. 
 
 In the lall war, the Colonies implored the proteftion of 
 the State againll the l''rcncli and Indian invaiions. They 
 acknowledged thcmfclvL-s incapa'aie, from their difunion, to 
 repel them. A powerful Hcct and army, at a great evpcnce 
 to the nation, were difpatched to their aflillance. Reqiiifi- 
 tions pafTed from the Crown to the feveral Colonics, for their 
 juft proportion of aids in their own defence, with a parlia- 
 mentary engagement, that a generous retribution fhould be 
 made for their liberal exertions. One would imagine, from 
 thefe fafts, that a province, whofe danger was fo imminent, 
 would fuffcr no intered, no views oi ambition, to obltruil its 
 public duty ; that the Proprietary and his AfTombly would 
 lay afide their political difputes, and unite in the common 
 defence. But the faft was the rcverfc. Thefe juft and rca- 
 fonable rcauifitions furniflied them with new fubjeds of 
 controverfy. Relying on the exertions of the Mother 
 Country, and the other Colonies, their proportion of aids 
 was not granted. And this opu'ent province, during the 
 whole war, was fared from its ravages, and in the end from 
 the mediated conqueft, at the expence of the blood and trea- 
 fure of Great Britain and the other Colonies. This con- 
 duft was certainly inconfirtent with that equity andjulHce 
 which ought to charafterife the policy of every civil focieiy, 
 and in itfelf fufficient to disfranchife any inferior order of 
 it. For, if that inferior order, in times of fuch danger, 
 can neither protcdl itfelf, nor unite, when called upon, 
 with its fellow-members, in the general protection ; it 
 certainly is erroneoufly conflituted, and ought to be 
 made more competent to the difcharge of its duty to 
 the fociety, and to itfelf. 
 
 pofi 
 
 ng 
 
 .^gj^S^ 
 
Id 
 
 Of the Cbjrtsr of Marylat\i, 1 1 1 
 
 pofing thofe of the Crown and Parliament. 
 They confidcr tliefe rights as interfering with 
 their own power, and repugnant to their local 
 intereil ; the inftrudions from the Crown, 
 and even the laws of Parliament, as nol 
 binding on them, hecaufe their allegiance 
 is due to the Proprietaries, and not to the 
 King, and their officers arc fworn to obey 
 tlicir own laws, not thofe of the Parliament. 
 Inftances may be produced of the Proprie- 
 tary himfelf openly oppofmg the laws of 
 trade, and preventing the officers of the 
 cufloms from carr^'^ing them into execution, 
 becaufe he confidered them as reftraints upon 
 the trade of his province. 
 
 There are few general laws made for the 
 public fafety, or any other general benefit, 
 which will fuit the different and local interefts 
 and views of all the members of a fociety. 
 Some will be affe£l:ed by one law, and fome 
 by another ; and perhaps, on the whole, the fa- 
 crifice made to the public fafety will be nearly 
 equal in all ; while the benefits received ever 
 largely compenfate for the injury fuflained. 
 It is therefore a maxim, founded in the nature 
 
 of 
 
u ;r,'!': 
 
 b 1 
 
 112 Ofi/jc Charter of Maryland. 
 
 of civil fociety, that the private intercfl of 
 the Members miift ever give v^-ay to the pub- 
 lic good. Now the laws of trade are the very 
 laws I have dercribed. On them, the num- 
 bers of our feamen, the quantity of our 
 fhipping, tlie commerce of the nation, and 
 its naval ilrength, depend. And yet thefe 
 laws, fo important to the common fafety, 
 and even of the Colonies themfelves, with 
 every other, which afFed: the intereft and 
 views of only a few of the Provincials, have 
 ever been difregarded. Difobedience to laws 
 fo neceflary to the public faffcy, continued 
 upwards of a century, naturally led to a total 
 denial of the rights of the Crown, and of the 
 authority of Parliament. 
 
 From the preceding obfervations, it is eafy 
 to perceive how weak and incompetent to the 
 purpofes of Government, fuch unlimited 
 powers muft be in the hands of a fubjed, 
 who, lliielding himfelf and his property un- 
 der the general protection of the Ibciety, is 
 left to purfue the fmifter defigns of his own 
 intereft and atabition. But, upon a view of 
 the relaxed and enfeebled ftate of the Pro- 
 prietary 
 
Of the Charter of Maryland, \ 1 3 
 
 prietary powers in the province of Penn- 
 fylvania, as well as in Maryland, long before, 
 and at the time, the prefent rebellion broke 
 out ; this truth will be fully confirmed. Thfi 
 frequent attempts of the Proprietaries to op- 
 prefs the fubjed:, in fome of which they were 
 fuccefsful, in others not, added to their con- 
 tinual difputes with their Aflemblies, had 
 rendered their Government weak and con- 
 temptible in the eyes of the people. The 
 adminiftration of juftice was totally relaxed. 
 The laws for the prefervation of the public 
 peace were a dead letter. Their officers were 
 without power, influence, or refped:. In 
 the time of the Stamp-A£t, fmall and infig- 
 nificant mobs, incited by a few feditious men, 
 and which might have been eaiily fupprefled 
 by a fmall exertion of power, rofe in oppofi- 
 tion to it, without a fmgle ftep taken to fup- 
 prefs or check them. Encouraged by this 
 precedent, the fame feditious men refolved to 
 throw off all dependence on the Britifli State. 
 Trifling mobs v/ere, at lirft, incited as before. 
 Thefe mobs produced illegal and feditious 
 Committees; the Committees, treafonable 
 Conventions and Congreffes, until, at length, 
 that l]^irit of liccntioufnefs and revolt, which 
 
 I had 
 
I'-i i 
 
 I., :i. 
 
 114 O/ibe Charter of Maryland. 
 
 had been fo long nurfed and matured under 
 the unjuft and unconftitutional rule of 
 Proprietary power, broke out into open re- 
 bellion, which at once deftroyed the Govern- 
 ment of the province, and its ideal fubordi^* 
 nation to the State itfelf. 
 
 
 .¥'.-^.^: 
 
 : > '* .t i 
 
■ 
 
 ( "5 ) 
 
 CHAP. VIIL 
 Of the Charter of Fennfylvania, 
 
 FROM Maryland, we will ftep over 
 the line, and take a view of the 
 Charter of Pennfylvania. For, although it 
 is not next in order of time, yet, as there is 
 fo much fimilarity in the powers granted by 
 them, that the reader will find but few re- 
 marks made on one which will not apply to 
 the other, it cannot be improper. Indeed, 
 we may fafely conclude, that the fcribe who 
 made the draught of the laft, muft have had 
 the firft before him, as, in many inftances, 
 the rights and powers granted are defcribed in 
 the fame words. • " 
 
 This Charter was granted by Charles the 
 Second, in the year 1 68 1-2, to William 
 Penn, Efq; fon of Sir William Penn. In 
 conftituting this inferior fociety, no regard 
 was paid to the fundamental laws and princi- 
 ples peculiar and eflential to the Britifh 
 Government. The royal pleafure, and the 
 ' I 2 humour 
 
1 1 6 Of the Charter of Pemtfyhama. 
 
 humour and intereft of the patentee, appear 
 to be the only rules by which its rights and 
 powers were adjufted and fettled. Indeed, it 
 is hard to determine, upon a view of them, 
 whether Charles fported moft with the au- 
 thority of Parliament, or with the rights 
 and prerogatives of the Crown, — with thofc 
 rights which he held in truft for the benefit 
 of his people, and for his fuccefTors, or with 
 thofe which belonged tp others, and over 
 which he had not the leaft authority. 
 
 The Patent conveyed a trad: of territory 
 nearly as large as the kingdom of England, 
 which was eredted into a Seigniory. *' Mr. 
 Penn, his heirs and affigns^ were made and 
 ordained the true rnd ahfolute FroprUtaries^^ 
 01 it. . 
 
 i( 
 
 i( 
 
 
 «( 
 
 
 cc 
 
 
 (( 
 
 m-. 
 
 (( 
 
 BS' 
 
 
 B 
 
 (( 
 
 i 
 
 u 
 
 n 
 
 a 
 
 1 
 
 L. 
 
 1 
 
 \ 
 
 i 
 
 
 The legiflative rights granted to " Mr, 
 Penn and his he'irs^ and to hh and their 
 deputies^'' were " free^ fidly and ahfolute 
 power ^ for the good and happy government 
 of the country ; to ordain, make, enadt, 
 and publifli any laws ivhatfoever^ for the 
 raiftng of money for the public ufes of the 
 province, or for any other end^ appertain- 
 
 " ing 
 
cc 
 
 C( 
 
 <( 
 
 C( 
 
 cc 
 
 (C 
 (C 
 
 Of the Charter of Pennfylvania, 117 
 
 ing to the publicT?^/^, peace ^ ^^^d fafety^ of 
 the country^ or unto the private utility of 
 particular perfons, according to their bejl 
 difcretiony by and with the advice, aflent, 
 and approbation, of the freemen of the 
 country, or c^ ':heir delegates and deputies, 
 to be aflembled in fuch fort Tundiform as to 
 him or them fhould feem beft." 
 
 »» 
 
 . No words could have been devifed more 
 proper to enable Mr. Penn and his heirs to 
 conftituts an independent fovereignty, than 
 thofe I have juft cited ; none more proper to 
 difcharge them and the people from every 
 degree of fubordination and obedience to the 
 State. Inftead of incorporating the province 
 into a body politic, giving to it that form, 
 and thofe limited powders, w^hich w^ere ne- 
 cefFary to its juft relation and a conftitutional 
 fubordination to the State ; Charles conferred 
 on a fiibje& and his heirs ^ an " abfolute" 
 right to judge of its form, and to eftablifh 
 it on fuch principles as beft fuited their private 
 interef and ambition. Nor were they under 
 the leaft reftraint in refpedt to the powers 
 upon which they might eftablifti it. On the 
 . - .' I 3 ' contrary, 
 
1^' 
 
 J X S Of the Charter of Pennfylvanla, 
 
 contrary, fpecial care feems to have been taken, 
 that it fhould be both in name and fa£i: inde- 
 pendent of the Britilh Government. For it ap- 
 pears evident, from the words I have cited, 
 that whatever legiflative rights and powers 
 can be neceflary to the private utility of 
 individuals, to the internal order and peace 
 of a civil fociety, to the raifmg money for the 
 fupport of Government, or to the levying of 
 aids for the defence of a country, were con- 
 ferred by the Charter. So that, neither the 
 Proprietaries, nor the people, could ever have 
 the leaft neceffity or occafion to afk of, of 
 receive from, the Parliament, any a£t or 
 thing beneficial or neceflary to their fafety or 
 happinefs. All thofe never-ceafmg benefits, 
 and that continual protection to obtain which 
 men enter into civil fociety, and which form 
 the political cement that binds the inferior 
 orders and members of the politic body to its 
 fupreme head, were, in future, to flow from 
 an independent Government eftablifhed by 
 themfelves. 
 
 The fuperintendence of Parliament being 
 thus rendered ufelefs to the province, it be- 
 canae more efpecially neceflary, in order to 
 
 create 
 
MmiWi 
 
 en. 
 
 Of the Charter of Pennfylvanta, 119 
 
 create fome fmall degree of fubordination in 
 its legiflative powers, and to preferve a con- 
 fiftency in its laws with thofe of the State, that 
 the Crown fliould pofTcfs a right to approve 
 or rejedt its legiflative adts, before they fhould 
 afliime the validity of laws. By this means, 
 a kind cf fubordination to the Crown, though 
 not to the Parliament, might, with proper 
 attention, have been preferved. The ambi- 
 tion and private interefts of the Proprietaries, 
 and the licentious attempts of the people, 
 might have been guarded againft. But, in- 
 ftead of referving a right in the King to ap- 
 point a Governor, accountable to him for his 
 condudl, who fhould judge of the confiftency 
 or repugnancy of the provincial ads to thofe 
 of the principal fociety; Mr. Penn and his 
 heirs are appointed the hereditary Gover- 
 nors, with the fole and abfolute right of ap- 
 pointing Deputies, who are finally to cnadt 
 the laws, and of every other Officer, to cany 
 them into execution. And that thefe laws 
 fhould ever remain fubje<^ to no controul, it 
 is, by a fubfequent claufe, declared, that 
 they ** fhall be mofl abfolute and available in 
 law ;" and " the liege people and fubjeAs 
 of the State" are enjoined to obferve and 
 
 I 4 keep 
 
 C( 
 
 <t 
 
I20 Of the Charier nf Pcnnfylvanul, 
 
 keep the fame inviolably, " under the pain 
 " therein exprefl'ed." . • 
 
 i( 
 
 (( 
 
 A- 
 1 „•■<;■ 
 
 Here then, not only " one abfolute and 
 independent right with regard to fame par- 
 ticular affair s^^ is granted (as in the cafe I 
 have cited from the learned PuffendorfF), but 
 every " abfolute independent right with re- 
 *' gard to every affair" which concerns either 
 the internal order and peace, or the ex- 
 ternal defence of the province; and that 
 too as fully as they are held by the 
 King, Lords, and Commons, over the do- 
 minions of the State. Were there no other 
 objections to this charter, this is fo important 
 to the peace and fafety of the State, that we 
 may fafely affirm, with the author I have 
 juft mentioned, that Charles the Second, in 
 this inftance, " plainly abdicated his authori- 
 " ty," and by admitting two heads in the 
 conftitution, he eftablifhed a Jlate within a 
 JlatCy afid rendered it irregular and Moisfc- 
 STROUS ; and with the judicious Burlamaqui, 
 that this ad being diredlly repugnant to the 
 fundamental laws of the Britifh conftitution, 
 w^hich Charles was bound to fupport, was a 
 2 ,^>*v i^'•.^^.,, ...-. ' dangerous 
 
 ■..» ' 
 
 
Of the Charier of Fennfylvanuu 121 
 
 dangerous violation of his truft, " null and 
 " voidf.'*,.; ! ' _^ .; r ^ , , 
 
 Although we have not, as yet, before us, 
 clll the American Charters, yet it may not 
 be improper here to remark, that this objec- 
 tion will apply, with equal force, to all of 
 them, whether Proprietary or popular. The 
 legiflative, executive, and even the foedera- 
 tive rights and powers, granted by them, 
 are equally indefinite and independent of the 
 Britifh Government. They are fo many 
 mifchievous and dangerous innovations, be- 
 cauie they are not founded in precedents, and 
 are in diretl oppofition to that polity upon 
 which the conftitution of our mixed mo- 
 narchy is eftabliflied. All the charters which 
 
 f This excellent writer further adds, *' This is incontellU 
 bly proved by the very nature of fovereignty, which is 
 no more than the right of determining_/?"««//)> in fociety, 
 and which, confequently, fuffers nothing, not only aba've 
 it, but even, thai is fioi/uiJeS/ to it, and embraces, in the 
 extent of its jurifdiftions, every thing that can intereft the 
 happinefs of the State both facred and profane. 
 
 ** The name of fovereignty cannot ^trmil any thing that 
 isfuhjeSi to human direSiion, to be 'withdran.vn from its au- 
 thority ; for what is v/ithdrawn from the authority of the 
 Sovereign, muft either be left independent, or fubjeded 
 to the authority of fome other perfon diiferent from the. 
 Sovereign hirafelf." ,,....-, ^ .■.'■;t' • '• 
 
 preceded 
 
 «( 
 <« 
 
 C( 
 
 <c 
 
 (( 
 (( 
 ('( 
 « ( 
 
122 Of the Charter of Peunfylvama. 
 
 preceded them, and all which have been fince 
 granted, have limited and reftrained the 
 grantees to the making of bye-laws and ordi- 
 nances, fubje£t always to the controul and 
 repeal of Parliament ; the grant of the Ifle of 
 Man excepted ; and this grant, from its unli- 
 mited and independent rights, has been found 
 fo inconfiftent with the public weal (though 
 by no means fo deftrudive of the peace and 
 fafety of the empire, as the American char- 
 ters), as to be r^ Turned for that reafon by the 
 Crown. 
 
 Vl'"' 
 
 Having before us the legiflativc power of 
 Pennfylvania, it will be neceflary to confider 
 what were the provifional reftridions impofed 
 by the charter on it. There is a provifo re- 
 lative to the making of laws, in the words of 
 the charter of Maryland, that the laws to be 
 made fhall be " confonant to reafon, and not 
 repugnant or contrary to the laws, flatutes, 
 and rights, of the kingdom of England." 
 On this provilion I fhall not repeat my obfer- 
 vations, but refer to thofe made on the fame 
 article in the Maryland charter. But I will 
 take the liberty to remark that, although this 
 charter prohibits a repugnancy and difagree- 
 
 ment 
 4 
 
 t( 
 
 cc 
 
 W 
 
 18 ■ ■ . 
 
Of the Charter of Pennfylvama, 123 
 
 ment in the provincial laws with thofe of the 
 State, yet wc find in it a fubfequent ciaufe of 
 a contrary and moft extraordinary lature. It 
 not only places the legiflature of the inferior 
 fociety on a par of independence with the 
 Britifh legiflature, but renders the laft in a 
 manner fubordinate to the firft. It authorifcs 
 the provincial legiflature to annul the mofl: 
 important laWs of the Englifli Government ; 
 the laws relative to property, real as well as 
 perfonal, and thofe w^hich eflentially concern 
 the confervation of the peace, and the per- 
 fonal fafety of the fubjedt, which, in all good 
 policy, ought to be nearly the fame through- 
 out the dominions of the State. The words 
 of this claufe are, " And our further will and 
 pleafure is, that the laws for regulating and 
 governing property within the province, 
 as well for the defcent and enjoyment of 
 lands, as likewife for the enjoyment and 
 fucceflion of goods and chattels ; and like- 
 wife, as to felonies, fhall continue the fame 
 as they fhafl be for the time being, in our 
 kingdom of Enp;land, until the faid laws 
 fhall be altered by the faid William Penn^ his 
 heirs and affigns^ and by the freemen of the 
 province^ their delegates afid deputies^ 
 
 Thus, 
 
 ({ 
 
 C( 
 
 C( 
 
 u 
 
 ti 
 
 C( 
 
 (C 
 
 (C 
 
 i< 
 
 (C 
 
 C( 
 
1 24 ^f i^JC Charter of rcnnfylvan'uu 
 
 Thus, while the charter prohlhlts a dlfcorJ- 
 ancy between the laws of the interior (ociety 
 and of the fuperior, it fully uuthoriics it, and 
 that legiflature whieh ought to be inferior 
 and fnhord'iuatc^ is impowered to annul the 
 adts of that which is fnprane, . . 
 
 There is alfo another elaufe hitcnded to 
 preferve the faith and allegiance of the Proprie- 
 taries and the people. But this, like the others, 
 will be found, upon inquiry, equally ineffec- 
 tual and futile. It dire£ts, that a tranfcript, 
 or duplicate, of all laws which fliall be made 
 within the province, lliall, within " five 
 " years after the making thereof, be tranf- 
 " mitted to the Privy Council for confirma- 
 " tion, or repeal, within fix months after 
 " trarifmitted." Charles having, in effedt, 
 by the independent powers of the Charter, 
 given up the right of Parliament to make 
 laws for the province, or to repeal its 
 a£ls, ii feems, faw the propriety and ne- 
 ceflity of eftublifliing fomc check on its li- 
 centious condi'fl. This check, he thought^ 
 was fafefl in liis own hands. That he and 
 his predeccffor, James the Firfl:, conceived 
 that the Colonies were their private patri- 
 mony. 
 
Of the Charter of Pcnnfylvama, 125 
 
 mony, and that the Parliament were not to 
 confider them as territory annexed to the 
 realm, or to interfere in their Government, is 
 evident from all their Charters ; and no part 
 of them dcmoiiflrates this fadt more fully 
 than the claufe before us. For, if Ameriea is 
 a part of the dominions of the State, by what 
 right did he afliimc, in his Privy Couneil, the 
 power of repealing the laws of the inferior 
 fociety ? However this may he, the claufe is 
 merely dire£tory, and not compulfory. There 
 is no penalty, no forfeiture impofed on the 
 Proprietaj'ies, nor any mode by which the 
 Privy Council can compel them to tranfmit 
 the laws. And it cannot be reafonably fup- 
 pofed, that men, poflefled of unlimited and 
 indepei\d:nt powers, would not make ufe of 
 them whenever neceflary to gratify their ambi- • 
 tion, or to their private emolument — nor that 
 they would not ufe them to the prejudice of the 
 rights of the Crown, and their dependence . 
 on the State — nor when they were fo ufed, 
 that they would tranfmit the laws to a judi- 
 cature where they were fure they would 
 be annulled, 
 
 
 « • 
 
 But 
 
 t 
 
kV' 
 
 'A 
 
 
 V ■ 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 126 Of the Charter of Tennfylvania. 
 
 But let us fuppofe, that the Proprietaries 
 Ihould feel themfelves difpofed to tranfmit the 
 laws agreeably to the directions of the Charter, 
 we cannot prefume, that they would tranf- 
 mit thofe which they fhould have reafon to 
 believe would be repealed, before the time 
 enjoined by the Charter fhould nearly expire ; 
 And this being five years, the province may 
 be governed by them, during that time, how* 
 ever mifchievous to the trade, interefl, or 
 fafety, of Great Britain, or repugnant to the 
 laws of the State, or injurious to the rights of 
 the Crown. And if near the end of the term 
 limited, they fhould be tranfmitted and re-- 
 pealed by his Majefty in council, that repeal 
 niay be difregarded, and the law be continued 
 in force, without incurring any penalty or 
 forfeiture, there being none impofea ; or laws 
 diflimilar only in form, and not in fubflance, 
 or even the fame laws may be re-ena£led and 
 continued in force for five years more. And 
 I know of no means, fuppofmg tlie charter 
 to be valid, by which l legiflature, whofe 
 powers are fo independent, may be called to 
 anfwer for it. Thus the pri;vince may, by a 
 little art and addrefs, be governed on princi- 
 ples of polity, heterogeneous, and repugnant 
 
 to 
 
C( 
 
 i( 
 
 Of the Charter of Pennfylvania* 127 
 
 to thofe of the principal fociety, and fub- 
 venive of its true intereft and fafety* 
 
 There is alfo another claufe, faving to the 
 King and his fucce.Tors, a right of " receiv- 
 ing, hearing, and determining, of the ap- 
 peal or appeals, cf all or any perfon or 
 " perfons of, in, or belonging to, the terri- 
 " tories granted, or touching any judgment 
 •' to be there made or given.'* If this faving 
 was intended as a check on the laws to b 2 
 made by the concurrent aflent of the Proprie- 
 tary and the people, when injurious to the in- 
 tereft of Britain, or to the rights of the Crown, 
 it was a nugatory and vain intent. Can it be 
 fuppofed, that either the Proprietary or peo- 
 ple, who hav ' aflented to a law, and who, if 
 upon experience they fhould find it mif- 
 chievous, or inconvenient to themfelves, can 
 repeal it by their own legifiaturcj, would ever 
 iippeal from one which they conceive to be 
 beneficial, however derogatory it might be to 
 the intereft of Britain, or the rights of the 
 State ? It is not in reafon to be expeded ; 
 and fa^ts prove the contrary. There are 
 many laws of this province which are of this 
 cprnplexion^ againft the validity of which 
 
 there 
 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
^M 
 
 
 i'k^ 
 
 
 ■'! i 
 
 128 Oy* the Charter of Pennfylvania, 
 
 there has been no appeal; nor ever will be, 
 becaufe they gratify the licentious defires of 
 the people, and deeply affed the rights of the 
 Crown and the Parent State. But, fuppofe 
 fuch appeals fhould be made, and decrees 
 fhould be pafled by his Majefty in Council, 
 to reverfe the judgments founded on the laws 
 tranfmitted, by whom are thofe decrees to be 
 carried into execution ? Every court, and every 
 officer, judicial as well as minifterial, are as 
 independent of the Britifh Crown, as the of- 
 ficers of juftice in France, a i:! ...pendent 
 folely on the Proprietary and the people, and 
 are fworn by their oaths of office to execute 
 the very laws, the validity of which the de- 
 crees fhould oppofe. • i- 
 
 ■f'.H^ it >..r;ii.- 
 
 *:?«.) i .■» v./ 
 
 
 .1 
 
 The claufe by which Charles covenants, 
 that neither he, nor his heirs nor fucceflcis, 
 fhall levy " any cuftoms or taxes on the pea- 
 " pie, unlefs the fame fhould be by the -t it 
 " of the Proprietary, or the Chief Governor, 
 " or Aflembly, or by ad of Parliament," is 
 an additional proof, that he meant nothing 
 lefs, than to pay any regard to the fundamental 
 laws of the State. For, did he imagine, that 
 by thofe laws he held a right to imj^ ib and 
 
 ievv 
 
 ■t i 
 
 ) i 
 
Of the Charter of Pennfylva?iia, i2g 
 
 levy cuftomsor taxes on Britifli fubjcds ? Or 
 did he think he pofTefled authority to enable 
 him, with " the afTent of the Proprietary or 
 " Chief Gov.crnor," to do it ? or that it was 
 neceflary to referve a right in Parliament to 
 raife a rcafonahle proportion of aids in any 
 part of the Britifli dominions ? However, 
 this truth is evident, from the whole tenor of 
 the Charters, that he was totally indifferent in 
 refpedt to the prefervation of his own preroga- 
 tives, and of every other right of the State, Ex- 
 cept that of taxation. This he feems to have 
 determined, as the great objedl of his future 
 defigi;is, to fecure if poflible ; and to ha.ve done 
 it in various modes, that if one fhould fail, 
 another might fucceed. Should his Parlia- 
 ment be intradable on the occafion, he might, 
 agreeably to the charter, apply to the " Prc- 
 " prietary," or to " the Chief Governor," or 
 to " the Aflembly," and, v^ith the aflent of 
 any of them, levy the aids he wanted. But, 
 it appears, he did not confider, or if he did, 
 that he was indifferent about the difficulties 
 he had laid in the way to the cffedtual exer- 
 cife of Parliamentary authority ; and that, in 
 cafe they fhould grant the aids he fhould re- 
 quire, he had deprived himfelf, his fuccefibrs, 
 
 K and 
 
130 Of the Charter of Fcnnfylvania* 
 
 i:nd the Parliament, for ever, of the neccfTary 
 officers and fervants, who were to levy and 
 colle£l the taxes impofed ; and if the im- 
 pofitions fhould be difagreeahl^ to the Pro- 
 prietary and people, which, it is moft na- 
 tural to conceive, they would ever be, that 
 the collediop of them t\^ould be impradi- 
 cable. 
 
 I v'Siil,..''! 
 
 m 
 
 Upon the whole of thefe futile and ab- 
 ilird refervations, the only one that has 
 the refemblance of a clieck on the un- 
 limited powers granted to " Mr. Penn, 
 " his heirs and affigns," the only inftance 
 in which they are made amenable to juftice, 
 is in regard to " the laws of trade and 
 •* navigation." They are diredted to have 
 an agent always refident in fome known 
 place, in, or near, the city of London, and 
 ready to anfwer to the Crown for any 
 mifdemeanors " committed or permitted," 
 by them, againft thofe laws ; to pay the 
 damages afcertained in the courts at Weft- 
 minfter ; — and in cafe of failure in the pay- 
 ment, the Government may be refumed by 
 the Crown until it is made. 
 
 But, 
 
Of the Charter of Petwfylvania, 131 
 
 But, notwithftanding this provlfion, it is 
 well known, that the laws of trade have been 
 in this province, from its earllefl fettlement, 
 moft fhamefully violated. How fhould it be 
 otherwife, when the Crown has the appoint- 
 ment of no officer in the province, except the 
 Colledior of the Cuftoms ? The other officers 
 entrufted to carry thefe laws into execution, 
 are in the appointment of the Proprietaries. 
 It is not their intereft to carry them into exe- 
 cution, and it is the intereft of the people to 
 difobey them. Where then fhall this fnigle 
 officer find protedion and fupport in the dif- 
 charge of his duty, furrounded, as he is, by 
 officers and people, fubjedt to a diiierent 
 maftcr, and ready to oppofe his meafuics ? 
 Should he apply to the Proprietary Gov^crn- 
 ment, it would not be given. TJnder thefe cir- 
 cumftances, his eafe and his intereft lead 
 him to watch the merchant juft fo much as 
 to procure a bribe, which effedtually clofes 
 his eyes againft the moft open impor- 
 tations of cuftomable goods without an 
 entry, and even of thofe that are contraband. 
 This has been fo common, that the art and 
 pra61:ice of fmuggling was never better under- 
 ftood, noi carried on with fo much eafe, in the 
 
 K 2 Ifle 
 

 132 Of the Charter cf Pennfylvanta, 
 
 Ifle of Marij as in the ports of the river 
 and bay of Delaware. 
 
 Such being the legiflative powers conferred 
 by this Charter, we will next enquire what 
 were the executive and foederative. Thefe 
 "we fhall lind not lefs indefinite and independ- 
 ent of the Growm, than the former were cf the 
 Parliament. '* Mr. Penn and his heirs, and his 
 *' and their Deputies, and Lieutenants," were 
 vefted with " free^ full^ and abfolute power 
 and authority to appoint any juftices, ma- 
 giftrates, and officers whatfoever^ for what 
 caiifes ooi>^r, and with what powers foever^ 
 and \Vi fiich form as to him or them fhould 
 *' feem moft convenient." May w^e not here 
 enquire, under what law of the State did 
 Charles derive his power to delegate the ap- 
 pointment of all the executive officers of Go- 
 vernment to a fubjedt, and that too in abfo- 
 lute and indefeafible right ? Certain I am, that 
 the fundamental laws which fettled and defin- 
 ' ed his powers forbid it. Had he, under thofe 
 laws, any powers without the realm which 
 
 • he had not within it ? I imagine not. Should 
 
 * he then have granted a power to a fubjedt, 
 ■ and his heirs, to appoint the Judges of the 
 
 King's 
 
 «c 
 
 (( 
 
 C( 
 
 cc 
 
 r. If 
 
I'l 
 
 Of the Charter of Penvfylvania, 133 
 
 King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exche- 
 quer, and the Juftices of the Peace of the 
 feveral Quarter-Seflions within the kingdom, 
 would the grant have been valid in law ? It 
 would not. The right of thefe appointments are 
 perfonal in the King, and fiduciary for the 
 benefit of his people. He cannot, therefore, 
 delegate them to a fuhject for a momctity much 
 lefsy&r ever» 
 
 t( 
 
 (C 
 
 <( 
 
 But this is not the only objet^ion to this 
 extravagant claufe. " Mr. Penn and his 
 " heirs, and his or their Deputies" — that is, 
 the Deputies of Deputies, may appoint " any 
 officers whatfoever, for what caufes foever, 
 with what powers foever, and in fuch form 
 as to him or them fhould feem mofl 
 " convenient." Taking this claufe in the 
 plain import of the words (and fo we muft 
 take it, becaufe there is a declaration in the 
 Charter, that fuch expofition of *).c fhall be 
 made and allowed in the Britifh courts, '* as 
 " fliall be adjudged mofl advantageous and 
 " favourable" to Mr. Penn and his heirs), 
 they have an undoubted right to eflablifh all 
 manner of courts of juflice, offices and of- 
 ficers, totally dijfimilar from thofe to be 
 
 K 3 found 
 
'" :nr 
 
 ^, 
 
 M 
 
 ^^t 
 
 fli 
 
 134. Of the Charter of Fcnnfylvanla, 
 
 found in the conftitution of the principal fOr 
 ciety. They might have adopted the inferior 
 Sanhedrims of the Jewifh theocracy, or the 
 Tribunals and Prsetories of Rome, or the of- 
 fices of the democratical Cantons of Switzer- 
 land, or even the Inquifition of Spain, 
 
 '1 
 
 After fliowlng this abfurdity in the grant 
 of the executive powers of Pennfylvania, 
 I need not be particular in my remarks 
 on the other prerogatives. I fliall, there- 
 fore, only cbferve, in general, they were 
 all that the conftitution had intrufled to its 
 Kings ; fach as, a right to pardon and aboliih 
 *' crimes and offences" — " to do all and every 
 *' thing which, unto a complete eftablifh- 
 '' ment of juftice, unto courts, tribunals, and 
 " forms of judicature, and manner of pro- 
 " ceedings, do belong" — " to incorporate 
 " towns into bcoughs, and boroughs into 
 " cities" — " to conftitute ports, havens, and 
 " keys" — to make " ordinances for the pre- 
 *' fervation of the peace, and better govern- 
 " ment of the inhabitants." To which were 
 added, all the rights of war and peace. Mr. 
 Penn and his heirs were further authorifed 
 to " levy, mufter, and train all forts of men" — 
 / •'■■■■: i ■ « to 
 
(( 
 
 « 
 
 (( 
 
 i( 
 
 it 
 
 Of the Charter of Peiwfylvan'ta, 13^ 
 
 to make war, to purfue the enemies, and 
 to put them to death by the law of war, 
 and to do all and every other thing which 
 " unto the charge and office of a Captain- 
 General of an army belongeth, or hath 
 accuJlo7ned to belong, as fully and freely as 
 any Captain General of an army hath ever 
 " had the fame." Thefe royal prerogatives 
 are the fame, and transferred nearly in the 
 fame words with thofe granted to the Pro- 
 prietary of Maryland. And thefe, I have 
 already fhewn, are rights vefted in the perfon 
 of the monarch in tnijl^ not in ufe^ for the 
 benefit and fafety of the fociety, and there- 
 fore cannot be lawfully granted to another 
 in abfolute tenure and inheritance. Could 
 this poffibly be lawful, a King might, 
 when he pleafed, not only diveft himfelf and 
 his fucceflbrs of all their fiduciary rights and 
 royalties, and give to the kingdom a new 
 King, but veft him with abfolute fovereignty, 
 and thereby deftroy the Government which 
 he is bound by the moft facred of all obliga- 
 tions to preferve. Such a power in a mixed 
 monarchy, or any other fociety, except in a 
 patrimonial kingdom, is inconfiftent with the 
 
 K 4 nature 
 
 (, 1 
 
•■TV 
 
 i 
 
 
 |P:| 
 
 136 Of the Charier of Temifylvcinia, 
 
 nature of its civil confiltution, and cannot 
 exiil. 
 
 It will throw yet more light on my fubjed, 
 and not be ungrateful to the reader, to trace 
 the condudl of Mr. Penn, jvft emerged from 
 the condition of a fubjcdV, into all the powers 
 of royalty and foverelgn dominion. I fhiill, 
 therefore, take a fummary view of his dif- 
 ferent fyllems of Govennncnt, iniVitutcd at 
 different periods. Fcr, veRed with powers 
 fubjcit to no ccntroul, he not only adopted 
 what forms of Government he plcafed, with- 
 out paying the leai; regard to the ftru(Sture 
 and principles of the State, but altered^ or 
 ahol'ijhcd thevi^ at his pleafurc^ and eflabllfhed 
 others in their Jiead, In doing this, we fhall 
 find abundant proof, that private intereft and 
 ambition, w^ithout any regard to his politic 
 trufts, were the great pole ftars by which his 
 public condudt was directed. The fole right 
 and pofieflion of an immenfe country, from 
 every acre of v^hlch he intended to draw a 
 revenue, opened to his view a profpedt of 
 immenfe wealth ; the extenfive royalties, and 
 independent rights, granted by his patent^ 
 
 opened 
 
Of the Charter cfPermfylvania* 137 
 
 opened another objed yet more enclianting to 
 tl)C mind of man, that of becoming an inde- 
 pendent Prince. But, well knowing that wcahh 
 and revenue were neceffary to influence, that in- 
 fluence w^as necefl'ary to power, and that power 
 was the only means by which his ambition 
 could be gratified and fecured ; he devoted, in the 
 firft place, all his talents to the improvement 
 of his eftate and his revenues. Governed 
 by this policy, all his extenfive rights, the 
 prerogatives of the Crown entrufted to his 
 care, and even his ambition itfelf, gave way to 
 the fettlement of his province, and to his 
 fchemes for increafmg his wealth. He pub- 
 lifhed a fplendid account of the excellence of 
 the climate, foil, waters, and other natural 
 advantages, of the countr}\ But the more 
 eflfedually to allure the fubjedts of the State 
 to emigrate to his new dominions, in com- 
 pliance with the humour of the times, and 
 particularly with that of the firft adventurers, 
 he gave up all the royal rights and franchifes, 
 and inftituted a Government on democratical 
 principles, without the mixture of a fmgle 
 ray of monarchy or ariftocracy. 
 
 " The 
 
!f ' ''1^ 
 
 m 
 
 138 Of the Charter of Pcnfifylvattia. 
 
 " The frame of Government," for fo it was 
 called, was truly Utopian. A council, confid- 
 ing of fevcnty-tvvo members, always chang- 
 ing, and yet always in being, was elhibliilied. 
 The members were chofen by the freemen. 
 One third of them were to cont-nue in ofiice 
 for three years ; one-third for two; and one- 
 third for one, in fuch manner, that the offices 
 of one-third fliould ceafe, and their places be 
 fupplied in annual fucceflion. Of this council 
 the Proprietary, or his Deputy, was to be 
 perpetual Prefident, entitled, on a queftion, 
 to three votes only. The Aflembly, or 
 fecond branch, was, at firft, t onfift of all 
 the freemen, afterwards of two nundred, and 
 never to exceed five hundred. In thefe two 
 popular AfFemblies, all the legiflative and 
 executive powers were fettled. By their joint 
 confent, all laws were to be made, all inferior 
 focieties to be incorporated, all offices confti- 
 tuted, all officers appointed, and all the affairs 
 of the province tranfa£ted and directed. 
 Here, furely, Mr. Penn's ambition was afleep, 
 and all fenfe of duty to the Crown, as well as 
 to himfelf, was forgotten, or he could not, 
 at once, have offered up all thofe extenfive 
 franchifcs and royalties which he held in trufl 
 
 for 
 
Of the Charter of Pennfyhauhu 139 
 
 for the Crown, to the humour of the people. 
 For, what could three votes out of fevcnty- 
 five avail hi preiervuig t!ic royal prerogatives 
 in a popular AHcinhly ? Or what fhare of 
 power or influence did he exped to maintain, 
 in a Icgiflature compofed of two democratical 
 houfes, hy his triple vote ? Does not this 
 example of the abufe of the royal rights, in 
 the hands of a fubjed, confii*m-rhe wifdom 
 of tlie law, which has made them iiduciary, 
 and forbids their alienation ? 
 
 !!' 
 
 Mr. Penn, not from any regard to a juft 
 fubordination of his province to the State, 
 but perceiving that his own weight was 
 Jittle more than nominal, wiflied to bring this 
 ftrange jumble of democratical powers into a 
 lefs and more manageable compafs. And it was 
 fortunate, ciiat the people had their reafons 
 for entertaining the fame defire. Their num- 
 bers were few. The attendance of fo many 
 of them on the public fervice was injurious 
 to their private affairs. They were fettled in 
 a wildernefs, and the clearing of their lands, 
 and providing for the fubfiftence of their fa- 
 milies, prevailed over their thirft for power. 
 For, at this time, they v^ jre partly fed by the 
 . . benevolence 
 
f 
 
 h 
 
 liMi 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 I 
 
 ■i.ir 
 
 I 
 
 
 i •; m 
 
 hM 
 
 140 Of the Charter of Pcnnfylvanuu 
 
 benevolence of the natives, whom, in the info- 
 lence of our civilized pride, we call Savages ; 
 but who, confidering the fewnefs of their im- 
 moralities, and their rigid obfer/aliun vof the 
 moral virtues, deferve a better name. In this 
 ftate of the popular temper, Mr. Penn called 
 a Council and Aflembly at Chefler, in 1682. 
 In this general AfTembly, the numbers of the 
 Council were reduced to eighteen, and of the 
 
 AfTembly to thirty- fix. 
 
 - ' ■ I ■ ■, 
 
 In this ftrange fyftem of legiflation, found- 
 ed in no precedent, nor coiifillent with any 
 reafon or policy, we find two popular branches, 
 independent of each other, equal in pov/er, 
 and acting within the fame fphore, without a 
 head, or any thing to check or balance their 
 unlawful purfuits. It is not, therefore, fur- 
 prifing, that, during its continuance, the pro- 
 vince remained a fcene of contefts for power, 
 difconteut, and oublic quarrels; not in re- 
 fpe£t to the prerogatives of the Crown, for 
 thefe were totally deflroyed, but refpecting 
 the democratical rights and influence of the 
 two Houfes. . • . ..-,:., 
 
 Previoufly to the efl:ablifhment of this frame 
 of Government, Mr. Penn had obtained from 
 
 the 
 
 
Of the Charter of PeJinfylvanla, 141 
 
 the Duke of York, a conveyance of the trad 
 of country now called the Territory of Penn- 
 fylvania, for which the Duke had before re- 
 ceived a grant from the Crown ; but, as thefe 
 were mere transfers of the land, the powers 
 of Government over the people remained 
 in the Crown. Yet, encouraged by the un- 
 limited extent and independent tenure of his 
 provincial rights, and concealed, as he was, 
 behind an ocean 3000 miles diftant from the 
 feat and fuperintendence of the Crown, he, 
 without hefitation, veiled all the royal and 
 legiflative rights in the people of the territory, 
 and united them in his provincial legillature. 
 The means by which hfj accompliihed this 
 meafure was artful and deceptive. He pre- 
 vailed on the people, of both places, to be- 
 lieve, that the grants of the territory conveyed 
 the rights of Government, as well as of the 
 foil, and perfuaded them to fend an equal 
 number of delegates to the provincial Council 
 and Aflembly. By this mixture of lawful (if 
 we can fuppofe the provincial Charter to 
 be lawful) and ufurped authority, the pro- 
 vince and territory were governed during eight 
 
 )ears. 
 
 Nothing 
 
-'li 
 
 IS-v"" 
 
 142 Cfthe Charter of Pennfylvama, 
 
 Nothing lefs than a fenfe of the fecurity 
 he derived from the diftance of his Govern- 
 ment from the feat and fuperintendence of the 
 Crown, could have induced him to take this 
 meafure, without its approbation. It was a 
 bold and prefumptuous meafure, which af- 
 fords a ftrong proof of what men, intruded 
 with unlimited powers, at a dillance from 
 the State, wull prcfume to do. Did he 
 reile<3:, that by thus mixing the people of the 
 territory'', over whom he had no powers of 
 Government, with tliofe of the province, ia 
 the legiflative and executive authorities, every 
 law tliey enabled, and every office, judi- 
 cial or miniflerial, they inftituted, was void ? 
 that for every arreft made, for every penalty 
 enforced, and for every life taken, in virtue 
 of fuch laws, they were amenable to the 
 juftice of the State ? and that, by thus ufurp- 
 ing the powers of Government over Britilh 
 fubjedts, without the leaft authority, he was 
 guilty of a high mifdemeanor, if not of high 
 treafon? , , 
 
 However, it was not long before Mr. Penn 
 
 faw the folly of his Utopian fyftem ; and 
 
 that he had given up to the governed all the 
 
 2 rights 
 
Of the Charter of Fennfylvanuu 143 
 
 rights of Government, and reduced himfelf to 
 a cypher in the legiflative and executive coun- 
 cils. He fawhis province, which, being yet in 
 its infancy, required all the aids ofwifdom and 
 harmony to facilitate its future improvement, 
 made, by his own indifcretion, the theatre 
 of political fquabble and confufion. Being 
 obliged to return to England, by a difpute be- 
 tween himfelf and Lord Baltimore, refpedling 
 the boundaries of their patents, he appointed 
 five commifTioners to tranfadt the public af- 
 fairs ; and perceiving the natural turbulence of 
 his new Government, he enjoined them, \Z 
 poflible, to diflblve it. But as thefe men 
 could not fucceed in the meafure, he difTolved 
 the Commiflionj and appointed a Governor. 
 
 If, by thi^ ''^p, he expected to provide a 
 remedy againft the anarchy which was ingraft- 
 ed in his fyftem of Government he was mif- 
 taken. For, no fooner did his Gove^ 'lor call a 
 provincial Council and AfTcmbly, but the 
 t'vo orders of the Government appeared in 
 their native confufion. The Afl' nbly began 
 with infifting on a redrefs of ;^iievances, and 
 the impeachment of minifters. The Gover- 
 nor, in return, wrefted by violence, out of 
 
 the 
 
 i 
 
:h,... 
 
 144 Of the Charier of Pennfyhania, 
 
 ,fii 
 
 n 
 
 •'if 
 
 ■ it 
 
 the hands of the AfTembly, one of the:^ mem- 
 bers, whom he had illegally impriloned, 
 when he was about to be difcharged by 
 habeas corpus. The Council quarrelled with 
 the Aflembly, and the AiFembly quarrelled 
 with the Council. All was anarchy ! And 
 thus were the peace and rifing prolperity of 
 the provice wrecked on the rock of republican 
 polity, eflablifhed by the Proprietary, whom 
 the great but uninformed Montefquieu im- 
 mortalifes in the charadlcr of a fecond Ly- 
 curgus. 
 
 However, under this Government, the 
 province and territories continued until the 
 year 1696. when fuch had been the conduct 
 of Mr. Penn and the people, that William 
 and Mary found it necefTary to refume the 
 powers of Government into their own hands. 
 The reafons given to the AfTembly for this 
 meafure, by the Ro/al Governor, are too 
 chara^terillic of the wretched ftate of the pro- 
 vince, to be omitted. They were, " the 
 " negledt and mifcarriages in the late Pro- 
 " prietary adminiitration — the want of ne- 
 *' cefTary defence againft the enemy — the 
 " danger of the p ovince being loft from the 
 
 Crown" 
 
Of the Charter of 'Peiinfylvania. it 4^ 
 
 "' Crown j" — ailH for that—" the coiiftltutlon 
 ** of their Majejiies Government arid tVat of 
 " A/r. Ptnfis^ were in diredi ofpajition ofie to 
 *' the other ; iinder which circiinift^nces..' 
 "their Majefties aflerted their tindoiihfed right 
 " to govern their fuhjcdls in the province*'' '■' 
 
 After tlii-ee jtirs hard tiekvail, Mi*. Penn' 
 procured a reftoration of his charteir; but it 
 would feerh, that it was upon condition he 
 ihoiild not reftore to the people their former' 
 democratical confufion. And we itiay rek- 
 foiiably conclude, that he had feen the felly' 
 of depriving himfelf and his heirs of the 
 pbWers coriferl-ed by the royal grant, and was' 
 fenfible of the mifchiefs arifing from it. 
 
 His Governor, Markham, called an Affem-' 
 bly, under the powers of the royal grant, 
 but very different from that which had been 
 fettled in the provincial frame of Govern- 
 ment. The AfTembly complained of the 
 change, but they complained in vain. They 
 propofed a new fyftem of fundamental laws, 
 which were no more favourable to the rights 
 of the Crown than the former; but they 
 were not adopted, ... . 
 
 h Oa 
 
m- 
 
 \ 
 
 146 0/' the Charter of Pennfyhania^ 
 
 On the arrival of the Proprietary, and his 
 aflumption of the Government, the delegates 
 of the people were repeatedly convened. The 
 province was now deftitute of any eftabliih- 
 ed form of Government. The rights both 
 of the Proprietaries and the people were un- 
 fettled. They had no body of laws, no fixed 
 rules for the defcent of lands, or the fuccef- 
 fion of property. In ihort, all was con- 
 fufion. And, befides, the Aflembly had dif- 
 covered, that they had been deceived in re- 
 fpe<St to the pretended right of the Proprietary 
 to govern the territories. They faw the il- 
 legality of their union with them, and 
 the impra<Sticability of their former frame 
 of Government. Thefe confidcrations led 
 to a third revolution in their fyftem of 
 polity. ,,. ^ ^. . ^v/t..?;',f ^/ ■■ '.«4^<^.) . 1, 
 
 But before this revolution was effected, 
 much conteft took plade ; Mr. Penn zealouf- 
 ly contending to regain thofe powers he had 
 weakly given up, and the people, for thofe 
 rights and privileges which they had lately 
 pofTefled. Neither of them chofe to appeal 
 to the Crown for a decifion of the contro- 
 verfy. They knew, too well, that both would 
 
 have 
 
Of the Charter of Pennfylvama, \j\rj 
 
 have been equally expofed : Mr. Penn, for 
 having granted to the people all the rights of 
 the Crown, intrufted to his adminiftration ; 
 and both Mr. Penn and his Aflembly, for 
 afTuming a power of life and death over 
 Britifti fubjeds, without the leaft authority. 
 However, at length, the matters in difpute 
 were compounded. It was agreed, that the 
 Aflembly ftiould hold all the rights of the 
 Houfe of Commons, and that the rights 
 of the Crown, and Houfe of Lords, fhould 
 be divided betw^een them. But the parti- 
 tion was not equal, nor confiftent with the 
 nature of mixed Government. The peo- 
 ple had art and addrefs fufficient to fecure the 
 greateft part. This will appear from the pro- 
 vincial charter granted by Mr. Penn in the 
 year 1701, under which, without any fun- 
 damental alteration, the province has been, 
 I can fcarcely fay, governed^ ever fmce, 
 until the late declaration of American inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 By this charter, the provincial Govern- 
 ment was feparated from the territorial. A 
 new charter was alfo given to the territory, 
 formed on the fame model, and in no ef- 
 
 L % fentiul 
 

 $48 O/'/Z?^ Charier of Pcmifylvamd. 
 
 fentlal point dlfTerent from the provinciaf.- 
 Thefe charters were accepted by the people. 
 The fame perfon has ever been appointed 
 Governor of both by feveral commifTions, 
 As provincial, he is appointed by the fole 
 power of the Proprietaries; as territorial, by 
 them, with the approbation of the Crown. 
 
 The fegiflative Council was intirely abolifh- 
 cd, and the territorial, as well as provincial,; 
 Government has, ever fmcej confifted of 
 only two legiflative branches, a Governor 
 and Affembty. The Governor has a right tr> 
 negative all bills. The Aflbmbly is annually" 
 chofen, and when met, for which there is a 
 day fixed in every year, they have power 
 to Jit on their own adjournments, to pre- 
 pare bills, impeach criminals, redrefs griev- 
 ances. With all other powers and privileges- 
 of an AlTenibly, according to the rights of 
 free-born fubjedfs of E?tglandy and the 
 " culloms obferved in any of the King's 
 " plantations." The Governor holds the 
 right of appointing the magiftrates and the 
 judicial officers ; but the executive officers, viz. 
 Sheriffs and Coroners, are annually chofen by 
 the people, and Clerks of the Peace by the 
 7 Juflices- 
 
 <( 
 
 M 
 
 it 
 
 CC 
 
 «( 
 
Of the Charter of PemtJylvaJiia, 149 
 
 Juftices of the Peace in their feflions ; the 
 .Governor having the right to appoint one out 
 of two perfons fo chofen. The commiffion- 
 «rvS and afTeflbrs for the levymg and raifing 
 all taxes, are annually eleded by the people, 
 on which choice the Governor has no nega7 
 tive. The High Treafurer of the province 
 is appointed, annually, by the Aflembly, to 
 •whom alone he is accountable for his conduct. 
 The faiaries of the Governor, and of every 
 officer of Government, are annually fettled 
 and granted by them, and paid by their 
 orders drawn on the Treafury *, Thefe 
 ^"TCi' * ' ^ • ' '• • ^^ "i ' lalalies 
 
 'j/^ 
 
 • A Proprietary Governor, if an hone ft man, is certainly 
 tl;ie moil wretched of htiman beings. It is a maxim of the 
 higheft authority, that ** a man cannot krvt two mailers.'* 
 But this unhappy being is bound to obey threey whofe in- 
 tereft and views are very different from, and often repugnant 
 to, each other. He receives indru^ons from the Proprie- 
 taries, founded in their private intereiil:, and gives bond under 
 a heavy penalty to obey them ; he is dependent on the AC- 
 feipbly for the annual fubfiUence of himfelf and family ; 
 and he receives, occafionally, inHru^ions from the Crown. 
 If he does not rigoroufly fulfil every Proprietary mandate, 
 however injurious to the province, or inconfiflent with his 
 royal inftruftions, he lofes his office, and is liable to tfee 
 penalty of his bond. If he does not gratify the Aflembly 
 in what they think juft claims, he lives in perpetual 
 <j«arrel, if he may be faid to live at all, for he certainly 
 Ipfcs his falary. The yoke of his third xnailej' has ever been 
 
 hi thf 
 
 
 ^t 
 
w 
 
 r: |ijiv 
 
 150 Of the Charter of Pennfyhama. 
 
 falaries they increafe or diminifli, grant or 
 withhold, at their pleafurc. Thus the legifla- 
 tive powers of the monarchical and ariftocra- 
 tical parts of the Britifh conftitution, were 
 divided between the Proprietary and the Peo- 
 ple. The rights of the Crown to call, pro- 
 rogue, or diflblve the Aflembly, and to ap- 
 point and direct the Treafury, were given 
 up to the AfTembly ; the right to appoint 
 Sheriffs and Coroners furrendered to the 
 reople. .:.: - 
 
 f i 
 
 By this Charter, we may perceive, that 
 Mi'. Penn recovered fome of thofe legiflative 
 and executive rights, which he had, to fervc 
 his own intereft, imprudently given up ; fuch 
 as his right of finally aflenting to, or rejedt- 
 
 the moil eafy, not only becaufe mod reafonablc, but becaufe 
 his fins againfl the royal orders are concealed. It is always 
 the intereft of the Proprietaries, and fometimes of the Aflem- 
 bly, to conceal them, and no inquiiition is made after them. 
 The Privy Council, and the Board of Trade, have hitherto 
 relied too much on the integrity of the Proprietaries, and 
 their Governors, in their management and rule of their pro- 
 vinces. Whether this has arifen from their backwardnefs 
 to interfere with the unlimited rights of Proprietary domi- 
 nion, or from their other engagements, I fliall not determine. 
 But, however, the fadl is certainly fo. And to one of theC 
 caufes the continuance of the Proprietary Governments is 
 certainly owing. 
 
 ing, 
 
Of the Charter of Pcnnfylvania, 151 
 
 ing, all legiflative ads, and of appointing the 
 magiftracy, with a number of others of lefs 
 confequence. But, inftead of retaining a 
 right to call the AiTembly, occafionally, by 
 his writ, he made his Charter a perpetual 
 writ for calling an Aflembly annually, with a 
 right to continue fitting the whole year, or to 
 fit occafionally on their own adjournments. 
 He gave up the right of appointing the execu- 
 tive officers pf juftice to the people, and all 
 participation in the provincial treafury. In 
 this ftrange manner were the principles of 
 Government jumbled together, without the 
 leaft regard to the rights of the Crown, or 
 the fubordination of the province to the State. 
 Two independent powers, ading within the 
 fame fphere, and having a right to decide on 
 th^ fam^ flatters, were placed in oppofition 
 to each other, without any intermediate check; 
 or balance There was nothing to curb a 
 lawlefs exercife of their diflind rights ; nor 
 was there even that flender fecyrity which 
 arifes from an equality of pqwer. The Pro- 
 prietary, who was placed in one fcale, re- 
 tained a fmall fhare of thofe rights which he 
 ought to poflefs as a juft dependent reprefent- 
 ativf of the Crown, and which were necel- 
 
 L 4 h\j 
 
^ 
 
 1^2 Of the Charter of FinnJ^lv&nia, 
 
 fary to his weight and influence in th« Go- 
 vernment. To the Afibmbly, which was 
 placed in the other fcalc, he granted many of 
 thofe important rights, without which he 
 could maintain neither the authority of the 
 Crown, nor the public peace. nrifr ) .' • ^ -w 
 
 t\t I ■; I 
 
 .1 
 
 But though Mr. Pefin did not recover all 
 his former unlimited powers, yet he obtained 
 enough to create a thirft for more. From 
 this time, his actions prove, that he invari- 
 ably purfued his private interefl:, and the ob- 
 jeds of his ambition, vyithout regard to any 
 other conildcratipn whatever. Eqyally inat- 
 tentive to his duty to the Crown, anc; to the 
 rights of ' the . p.eople, . which he h^t ■ thus 
 fol^mnly confirmed, his whole conducfl, when 
 prefent, ^nd his inftrudions to the Governors 
 when abfent, bore no other complexion. On 
 his part, attempts to wreft from the peoplq 
 thofe rights which he had conferred on them^ 
 were continually made. On the other hand, 
 the Aflemblies, naturally fond of their rights, 
 and perceiving the danger of fuch extenfive 
 powers as were conferred by the royal patent, 
 pn a fubjed in no refpedl dependent, on^ or 
 
 ■ ' accountable 
 
Of the CharUr cf Panifjlviwia, 153 
 
 ficcountablc to, the Crown, as conflantly op- 
 pofed thole attempts, 
 
 ' • » 
 
 • The hiflory of the firft Proprietary is re- 
 plete with inftances of his violations of public 
 faith with the people f ; of his breaches of 
 contract with the firft adventurers ; of his 
 appropriating the moft valuable lands to his 
 private vife, which had been appropriated to 
 theirs ; of his mifapplications of the public 
 monies, without accounting for them ; and of 
 
 f Mr* Pcnn, nt £rfl, granted his lands to the people for 
 ^ certain Aim of money for each hundred acres, without re- 
 ferving an annual quit-rent. But, foon after his afluming 
 the Governtyient, he began to refervc qri annual rent, pay- 
 able for evcu, in addition to the pujrchafc-mofley. Againfl: 
 this burden the people remonftrated. But Mr. Penn, artful- 
 ly diftinguiftiing between his two capacities of Proprietary 
 and Governor, and inciting that Government ought to be 
 fupported with dignity and fplendor, and that, by applying 
 thefe rents to that fuppprt, the people would be exempt from 
 laves, they agreed to the ineafure. Upon this grousid, the 
 quitrfcnU pught to be confidered as public money, in the 
 nature of the civil lift, and, in all equity, to be applied to 
 the fupport of the King's reprefentative. But the cuftom 
 was no fooner eftablifhed, than Mr. Penn applied them, with- 
 out hefitation, to his private ufe, and has confidered them, 
 ever fince, as a part of his private eilate ; while the people 
 have been obliged to fupport the Governor, and the officer'; 
 of juftice, out of their own purfes. The immenfe re- 
 venues arilLpg £rom thcfe rents, are to 'be fecn in the Ap- 
 pendix. ' * ' ' 
 
61 .■; 
 
 154 ^f ^^^ Charter of Pcnnfylvanta* 
 
 his extortioiivS, and the extortions of his of- 
 ficers, againft whom, fupported as they were 
 by his power, the people could obtain no re- 
 drefs. The officers of the courts of juftice 
 were of his own appointment. They held 
 their commiflions during his pleafure. All 
 fuits brought againft him or them, were de- 
 termined by thefe dependent judges. In 
 Britain, a fubjed: cannot receive an injury 
 from any of the officers of the Crown, or 
 even from the Crown itfelf, without having 
 a perfedt remedy. His claim is examined, 
 and decided, before independent judges. 
 Bulj in this inferior fociety, the Proprietaries 
 and their officers are both judges and parties 2 
 So that no juftice or relief againft their op- 
 preffions can be obtained by the people. Thefe 
 caufes have deftroyed all refped for the Pro- 
 prietary Government. Its influence and power 
 being direded by private inter^ft and am-; 
 bition, and not by the public benefit, has be-? 
 come contemptible, weak, ?nd odious to the 
 people. Hence, parties and public contefts 
 for power took place, the public peace was 
 negletfled, and the public fafety endangered. 
 In this confufion, neither the rights nor in- 
 tereft of the Proprietary or people were fafe. 
 
 And 
 
 ^1 
 
Of the Charter of Pennfylvattta, 155 
 
 And hitherto, neither of them had perceived, 
 that the fecurity they wanted was only to be 
 found in a juil fubordination to the State. 
 
 Mr. Penn was a man of education, and 
 ftrong mental abilities, though by no means 
 verfed in politic law, or the fcicnce of Go- 
 vernment. His genius had led him to ^.he 
 ftudy of religion, and to become a ncccd 
 Preacher and Head of the Quakers. He was 
 alfo a man of uncojinmon application to what- 
 ever he undertook. He had now been in the 
 pofleflion of the Government thirty-fix years. 
 Here experience became his inftrudlor. From 
 thence, he learned, that neither his firft Uto- 
 pian fyftems, nor even that in which he had 
 confounded the principles of monarchy and 
 democracy, were competent to the end of 
 civil fociety. He was convinced, that how- 
 ever great his abilities might be, they were 
 not fufficient to govern the province; and 
 .that it was abfolutely neceflary, not only to 
 its public pea:e, but to the private intereft of 
 his family, to furrender the Government. 
 Strongly imprefled with this truth, and fore- 
 feeing the mifchiefs which would arife to his 
 ilcfcendants, fhould he retain his powers, he 
 
 made 
 
1 56 Of the Charter of Pcnnfylvaniu^ 
 
 made the propolal to the Earl of Oxford, then 
 Prime Mmifter. A contrad: was accordingly 
 made, in which the Crown agreed to give 
 1 2,000 1. for the furrender. Of the pur- 
 chafe-money 2000 1. was paid, and the At- 
 torney General was diredled tq draw the 
 deed f . Mr. Penn being fuddenly feized 
 with a palfy, became infane, and incapable 
 of executing it. But, iurely, under this 
 contrad, the Crown hath an undoubted right 
 to compel the heirs of Mr. Penn, upon a 
 tender of the refidue of the purchafe-mojiiey, 
 to a fpecifie performance of it. , , 
 
 ft 
 
 lit 
 
 
 
 m 
 
 In the year 171 8, Mr. Penn, after linger- 
 ing feVen years under his difeafe, died. But 
 neither his ambition, nor his attachment to 
 his private intereft, nor the turbulence of his 
 Government, died with him. The two 
 former defcended to his fucpelTors, and the 
 feeds of difcord were inherent in the inju- 
 dicious conftitution of his Government. To 
 trace minutely the arbitrary condudl of his 
 fiicceflbrs, and their Governors, acting under 
 
 • '■ .' .:\ . ' . . ;:.;'-.-:•'.• r^' •' ■--■^ .\. 
 
 t An qntry of the contrail and payment, I have been 
 
 informed, is to be feen in the minutes! of the Privy 
 Council. ■ 
 
 theit; 
 
Of the Charter of Tennfylvaiita, i ^f 
 
 their fecret iiiftrudions, their perpetual con- 
 tefts with the Aflembhes for more power, and 
 to fkreen their private eftate from contribut- 
 ing towards its own prote£lion, and the con- 
 iequent mifchiefs and obftrudtions to the fer- 
 vice of the Crown, would be tedious to the 
 reader, and fatiguing to the writer. And 
 yet a brief recital of them is necelTary to my 
 iiibjed:* 
 
 Many inftances may be found, in the 
 hiftory of this province, of a cheerful com- 
 pliance, in the Aflemblies, with the requifi- 
 tions of the Crown, while they poflefTed the 
 Cole right of difpofuig of the public monies. 
 For this right they held under feveral ads of 
 Aflembly, aflented to by the Proprietaries. 
 That the Proprietaries violated their truft, in 
 giving up to the people fo important a prero- 
 gative of the Crown, no one can doubt. 
 However, it was a temporary right ; and 
 while it remained in the Aflembly, they con- 
 tinued to comply with the royal requifitions, 
 until their fund was exhaufted. But, even 
 for this compliance with their duty to the 
 Crown, they were feverely cenfured and 
 abufed by the Proprietary Deputy. 
 
 Their 
 
•WW*5f»lf«n^ww^' 
 
 Hi. 
 
 '58 Of tie Charter of Pemifyhatiia, 
 
 Their own funds being exhaufted, the Pro- 
 prietary aflent became neceflary to their grants. 
 Aids were offered on terms the moft juft^ 
 and in the only modes by which they could 
 be poffibly raifed; but every obflrudion 
 was thrown in their way by the Governors. 
 Nothing would fatisfy the Proprietaries, but 
 a total exemption of their eftate, and an 
 abfolute right to dire<ft the people in the n^an- 
 ner in which their aids to the Crown fhould 
 be given. And upon thefe unjuft principles, 
 no lefs than feven different fupply bills were 
 rejected by them. 
 
 i'j>,j 
 
 b \ 
 
 The Court of France had long meditated 
 the conqueft of North America. The mea- 
 fures taken for that purpofe alarmed the Colo- 
 nies. They implored the protedion of Great 
 Britain. A fleet and army was fent over to 
 their affiftance. And requifitions palled from 
 the Crown, to the feveral Affemblies^ to unite 
 in granting their reaibnable proportion of 
 troops, to co-operate with the King's forces. 
 In confequence of thefe requifitions, and in 
 difcharge of their duty to the Crown, and 
 themfeives, the Affemblies of this province 
 tendered bills to the Proprietary Governors, 
 8 granting 
 
I vkwi'Kttimw^^^^ff^' 
 
 Of the Charter of Pejinfylvaniiu ij^g 
 
 granting to the Crown, at different times, the 
 following fums, viz. 
 
 ^' ' ( To Governor Hamilton. 
 15,0001 ' 
 
 20,000 
 
 25,000 
 15,000 
 
 60. 
 
 •,000 ) 
 ),ooo I 
 ),oooJ 
 
 To Governor Morris. 
 
 £. 195,000 
 
 The firft five of thefe fums were refufe J by 
 the Governors, under a pretence, that the 
 tenor of the bills granting them was contrary 
 to an old royal inftru£tion. This inftruQion 
 had long before been fuperfeded by a provifion 
 in an adl of Parliament, made at the inflance 
 of the Crown, to remedy the mifchiefs in- 
 tended to be prevented by the inflrudion. 
 The bills were by no means inconfiflent with 
 the adt, nor the fpirit of the inftrudion ; and 
 feveral of the Proprietary Governors, when 
 it fuited the intereft of the Proprietarie?., had 
 confidered it as obfolete, and not obligatory. 
 Yet this obfolete royal inftrudion was relied 
 on, and held out to the people, as a juftifica- 
 tion for rcfufing the aids offered. The Af- 
 fembly knew, although they could not prove, 
 i that 
 
m 
 
 
 
 
 1 60 Of the Charter of PenvfylvaJita, 
 
 that the impediments to their grants were 
 fecret Proprietary inftrudLions. They called 
 on the Governor to produce them, that they 
 might know on what ground they Were to adt, 
 iind whether they were to obey the requifi- 
 tions of their Sovereign, made for the fafety 
 of the Province, or the mandates of a fubjedt, 
 founded In his private intereft, and the grofTeft 
 injuftice. But their intreaties were difre- 
 garded, and the inllrudions carefully con- 
 cealed by Governors Hamilton and Morris. 
 However, at length, a Governor (William 
 Denny, Efq;) was found, who, though bound 
 in a penalty of 5000 1. to obey, if not to 
 conceal them, ftruck with their injuflice and' 
 cruelty, at a time the province was in the moil 
 imminent danger, was hardy enough to lay 
 them before the AfTembly. \ _., r .:;.. ,, 
 
 It now appeared, that the only impediment • 
 to the aids granted to the Crown, were thefd <■ 
 latent, illegal, and unjuft inftru£tions,ybr- * 
 lidding the Governors to ajfent to any a6l for : 
 taxing the Proprietary ejlate towards the cofn--^' 
 mon defence, I call thefe inftrudkionSj what 
 ^11 men will call them, illegal and unjuft ; 
 becaufe the bills were land-^tax bills, by which • 
 
 aU 
 
Of the Charter of Pennfylvania, i6i 
 
 all the lands in the province were to be 
 equally rated ; and by the laws of the Britifli 
 conflitution, the hnded eftate of every noble- 
 man in the kingdomj of the Prince of Wales, 
 and even the revenues of the Crown itfelf, 
 in every adt of Parliament for layinc, a tax 
 upon real eftatea, are included. Why then 
 the Proprietary landed eftate, and more efpe- 
 cially their immenfe annual revenues, fhould 
 be exempted, no reafon can be affigried, ex- 
 cept that which arifes from Proprietary ambi- 
 tion, and a thirft for a pre-eminence over their 
 people, which is neither claimed by the no- 
 bility, nor by the King himfelf over his fub- 
 je£l:s? 
 
 At length, more from a dread of the com- 
 plaints of the Aflembly to the Crown, which 
 had been threatened, than from a confciouf- 
 nefs of the injuftice of the inftrudion, the 
 Proprietaries gave way : but not to the taxation 
 of their eftate ; for they dreaded a precedent, 
 however equitable and juft, which fhould 
 place their revenues in the fame ftate with 
 thofe of the nobility, or even with thofe of 
 the Crown ; and therefore, to avoid the pre- 
 cedent, they gave what they called a " free 
 
 M " gift," 
 
1 62 Of the Charter of Pennfylvania* 
 
 *' gift," towards the protedion of their own 
 eflates^ in common with the people's. The 
 Aflembly juftly difdaining the terms, yet, in 
 compliance with their duty to the Crown, 
 palTed the bill for granting 60,000 1. to the 
 King's ufe. This fum, together with the 
 *' free gift," were foon expended. Further 
 fupplies were called for by the Crown. The 
 Proprietary inftrudions remained unrevoked. 
 A bill Ibr granting 1 00,000 1. taxing the Pro- 
 prietary eftatcs, in common with thofe of the 
 people, was prefented to the Governor. The 
 former conteft was renewed, and both parties 
 were pertinacious. The province was in- 
 vaded, and the King's fervice was obftruded. 
 
 * Sir Jeffrey Amherft commanding the 
 King's forces in America, perceiving the im- 
 pediments to his Majefty's fervice, given by 
 fo opulent a province, came to Philadelphia 
 with a defign to remove them. He judicioufly 
 conferred, firft with the Proprietary Governor, 
 and then with the leading members of Aflembly. 
 The King's fervice being the great objed of 
 his duty, he wiflied to prevail on either party 
 to give way. The Aflfembly was obftinately 
 juft ; and the Governor, notwithftanding his 
 
 bond 
 
 1ST: 
 
Of the Charter of rcmfylvama. 163 
 
 Uond to obey the inftrudllons, after much delay, 
 was prevailed on to pals the bill. For this ad': 
 of duty to the Crown, and of jullice to the Peo- 
 ple, Governor Denny was fuperfeded by one 
 of the Proprietaries. On his return to Britain, 
 he was threatened with a fuit on his bond. 
 But taking good advice, he withftood the 
 threat, and nothing was done. The Proprie- 
 taries alfo took advice, and being convinced, 
 that their inftrudlions, and the bond to ob- 
 lerve them, were fundamentally illegal and 
 unjuft, did not prefume to bring them into 
 legal difcuflion. 
 
 Thus did the Proprietaries, relying on their 
 unlimited powers, and the influence of their 
 immenfe eftate, venture to counteract the re- 
 quifitions of the Crown, to obftrudt the aids 
 of the people to their fovereign, for the com- 
 mon defence, to trifle with the fafety of a 
 province committed to their care, and even 
 to throw It into tumult and diforder, when 
 the enemy was within its borders, and when 
 union and harmony was moll necelTary to its 
 prefervation. Regardlefs of their duty to the 
 Crown, of their reciprocal obligation to their 
 fellow-fubjeds, and of the high and im- 
 , Ma portant 
 
 :.. .,,\ic£-U.;.. 
 
164 ^f ^^^ Charier of Pennfylvama, 
 
 portant truft committed to their hands ; they 
 would not fulfer their AfTemblies to grant the 
 aids for the common fafety, unlefs their own 
 enormous eftate was exempted from its rea- 
 fonable contribution* .•, . 
 
 
 V<r 
 
 C« 
 
 r( 
 
 M 
 
 <« 
 
 I (hould not do juftice to the Afltmbly, if 
 I did not add their own concife arguments, 
 and warrat expoftulations with the Governor, 
 in this important coTiteft, They tell him, in 
 arifwer to one of his raeilages, " On our 
 faying, that fome Proprietaries and Gover- 
 nors of ^ 7y colonies aflume more preroga- 
 tives and privileges than were ever claimed 
 by their Royal Majler; the Governor 
 grows warm in behalf of the Proprietaries^ 
 •* and demands, with all the air of a perfon 
 •* confciaas of being in the right ; What in- 
 ** fiances can yon give of that affuming be-- 
 ** haviour of your Proprietaries f We anfwer^ 
 •* The prefent inftance; for the King does 
 •* not ttaim an exemption from taxes for his 
 private eftate, as oxir Proprietaries do. 
 Have they ever claimed any right or prero^ 
 gative^ not granted them by the Royal Char- 
 ter^ or referved by that of their father f 
 •* Yes, the right of being exempt fr6m taxes 
 ' -^ «fbr 
 
 u 
 
 <4 
 
 •( 
 
 W 
 
Of the Charter of Pennfylvanla* i G^ 
 
 ** for their eftate in Pennfylvania, when all 
 " their fellow-fubjeds (for the Proprietaries 
 are fubjed> i, though the Governor feems to 
 difdatn the term) both in England and 
 " America, not excepting even the Lords 
 and Commons, are now obliged to undergo 
 a tax for the recovery of a part^ and de^ 
 " fence of the rejl^ of that very ejlait. This 
 right is not granted by the Royal Charter, 
 nor could it be granted by their father's 
 Charter. Can you lay to their charge otie 
 infance of injujiice or f verity f This is an 
 adt of injujiice and feverity^ to infift, that 
 the people (hall not be allowed to raife 
 *' money for their own defence, unkfs they 
 *' will agree to defend the Proprietary ejlates 
 ** gratis. If this be complied with, and the 
 ** war continues, what ihall hinder theiaj 
 another year, when the 50,000 1. are ex- 
 pended, to require, that before we are al- 
 ** lowed to raife another fum for the fame 
 purpofe, we Ihall agree, not only to defend 
 their lands, but to plough them. Fqj: this 
 their Lieutenant may allege, ** the ufage 
 ** and cuftom in Germany/* and put us in 
 ** mind, that we are chiefly G^rmaris^ Who 
 *^ can aflure us, that their unappropriated 
 
 M 3 . *' lands, 
 
 i( 
 
 <c 
 
 « 
 
 it 
 
 «( 
 
 iC 
 
 <c 
 
 u 
 
 i( 
 
 u 
 
 «c 
 
 it 
 
 <( 
 
 <{ 
 
 <c 
 
"»fpf^ 
 
 «( 
 
 «( 
 
 x66 Of the Charter 6f Feiwfylvauicf. 
 
 •* lands, fo long kept untenanted and idlc^ 
 " are not refcrved in expedation of fomc 
 *' fiich fortunate opportunity ? Can other 
 *' inftances, in anfwer to the Governor's 
 queflions, be necefliiry? If he thinks it 
 difcreet to infift on more, they may be foon 
 " at his fcrvice." Among many of the in- 
 ftances alluded to by the Alfembly, the fol- 
 lowing was one. The Proprietary had, long 
 before, prevailed on the people to pay an an- 
 nual rent for every hundred acres of land, 
 befides the purchafe-money, towards his fup- 
 port as Governor of the province, and other 
 public ufes ; pretending, that it would relieve 
 the people from ta?cesi But, as foon as the 
 Proprietary gave up the Government to a 
 Deputy, he forgot his engagement to the peo- 
 ple, and confidered thefe rents as his private 
 reflate, and left his Deputy to be fupported by 
 taxes on the people. The immenfe fum he 
 thus cajoled the people out of, is to be feen in 
 the Appendix. 
 
 i'^- 
 
 What mifchiefs, lefs than thefe, could any 
 fenfible man expe£t from an imion of im- 
 menfe property, and exorbitant powers, in 
 the hands of a fubjed ? Does not all experi- 
 
 ence 
 
Of the Charter of Pemifylvama, 167 
 
 cncc prove, that property begets influence^ 
 influence power — and that when this artificial 
 power is united with real and unbounded au- 
 thority, it never fails to produce lawlefs am- 
 bition, and a thirfl for ftipremacy and inde^ 
 pendence ? . . ■ 
 
 The mifchicfs arifing from Proprietary in- 
 juftice and ambition, were not confined to the 
 fervice of the Crown. The difpptes between 
 the two branches of the legifluture, have often 
 broke out into the moft dangerous tumults and 
 riots ; riots which ever fprung from very 
 unufual caufes. They were riots, not arifmg 
 from the licentioufnefs of the governed^ but 
 from the ambitious and interefted defigns of 
 the Governors, For thefe riots were raifed, 
 and led by men of their own party, to en- 
 force their own unjuft meafures, while no 
 inftance can be produced, from the firfl fettle- 
 ment of the province, of any riot on the part 
 of the Aflembly, in oppofition to the Pro^ 
 prietary claims. This province was original- 
 ly fettled by Quakers. Many of the efta- 
 blilhod church foon after joined them. Thefe 
 men, while they retained their public influ- 
 . A : ■ ^ M 4 ' ence. 
 
'U 
 
 1 68 Of the Charter of Pennfylvama* 
 
 cnce, were ever averfe to tumults, and con- 
 tented themfelves under their oppreflion, v ith 
 appealing for juftice to the throne. A brief 
 account of thefe riots will not be foreign fron^ 
 my fubjedt. 
 
 So early as the beginning of this century, 
 viz. in the years 1706 and 1710, during the 
 rule of the firft Proprietary, by the tumultuary 
 condud of his partizans, he overawed the 
 general eledions, and procured Affemblies 
 entirely fubfervient to his purpofes, In the 
 year 1740, his fuccefTors, having thefe pre-r 
 cedents before them, and having failed in 
 many arbitrary defigns, founded in their pri- 
 vate interefts, refolved to follow the example 
 of their predecefTor. This could not be done 
 without violating the freedom of the elec-' 
 tions. A mob was raifed in Philadelphia, 
 and led by their own Juftices of the Peace, to 
 drive the Eledors from the place of voting. 
 This was effeded for a time ; but, at lengthy 
 their antagonifls having coliedled their force, 
 repulfed them in their turn. 
 
 In the beginning of the laft war, a mob was 
 raifed in the county of Chefter, and brought 
 ^own to Philadelphia, to compel the AfTembly 
 
 to 
 
 tft>j 
 
 W' 
 
 '™*; 
 
K. iap« j^v-^^^M 
 
 Of the Charter of Fennfylvania* \ 69 
 
 to exempt the Proprietary from its juft propor- 
 tion of aids demanded by the Crown, for the 
 defence of the Colonies againftthe French and 
 Indians. To thefeaids the Proprietaries had for- 
 bid the Governor, by their inftnidlions, to con- 
 tribute, although the French had adlually in^ 
 vaded their province. The AiTembly were 
 obliged to admit this tumultuous body, head- 
 ed by the Proprietary partizans, into the 
 houfe. But, upon having explained to them 
 the offers they had made, in purfuance of the 
 royal requifitions, and the unjuft and arbi- 
 trary obftrudions given to them by the Go- 
 vernor, the people were fatisfied, and no mif- 
 chief enfued. 
 
 I 
 
 Shortly after, another mob, well known 
 in the hiftory of this province by the name 
 of the Paxton Rioters, was raifed on the 
 frontiers for the fame unjuft purpofe. Thefe 
 men were Prefbyterians, who had lately be- 
 come the friends and allies of the Proprie- 
 taries, and whofe enthufiaftic zeal had taught 
 them to hate what they called Savages, Infidels, 
 and Heretics, and that it was lawful toput them 
 to death. In confequence of this opinion, 
 tlicy had lately maffacred all the Indians in the 
 
 town 
 
'i^Tfr™ 
 
 170 Of the Charter of Pennfyl'vajila, 
 
 town of Coneftogo, near Lancafler, where 
 they had lived many years inofFeniively under 
 the protection of the Govtrnment. Of this 
 cruel and unprovoked murder, Uttle notice 
 was taken by Government, although it was 
 warmly prefled by the Aflembly to bring 
 them to juflic;. 
 
 The annals of mankind afford no inftaiirft 
 of a maflacre more horrid and favage than 
 that of Coneftogo. Thefe unhappy Indians 
 were the remains of the nation who received 
 Mr. Penn, on his firft arrival in the Delaware, 
 and with unbounded hofpitality fupplied his 
 people with t-very neceftary their country af- 
 forded, They were fettled on a tra(St of land, 
 given to them by Mr. Penn, as a mark of his 
 gratitude for the beijeflts he had received. 
 Their demeanor had been, from the firft fet- 
 tlement of the province, peaceable and up- 
 right. Bi ; they were infidels, and for 
 that reafon alone became the objedls of 
 Prefbyterian vengeance. A number of thofe 
 enthufialtic fedaries, having do )med thefe 
 inoffenfive people to deftrudtion, came down 
 from Paxton in the night, and, with a 
 zeal equal to their barbarity, murdered all 
 
 the 
 
Of the Charter of Tennfylianla, i y i 
 
 the old men, women, and children, and, fet- 
 ting lire to their houfes, burnt their bodies. 
 The young men and boys, who happened to 
 be ablent in hunting, elcaped their fury. .On 
 their return, they found no remains of their 
 ancient fathers and mothers, of their wives, 
 brothers, lifters, a.id infants, bul their bones 
 and alhes. Not to dwell on a fubjed in w^hich 
 humanity muft be fo much wounded ! The 
 young men and boys fought immediate re- 
 fuge in the gaol and work-houfe at Lanc^fter, 
 hoping to be fafe under tbe eye of the ma* 
 giftracy ; but they fought it in vain. Forty 
 of the fame fecTtaries, not yet fatiated with 
 blood, in a few days after broke open the gaol 
 and work-houfe, at noon-day, and facriticcd 
 thefe unfortunate men in addition to their 
 malTacre atConeftogo. It was remarkable, with 
 what perfe<fl: reiignation theie unhappy vic- 
 tims fubmitted to their fate. Retired to a 
 particular room, wdiich would hold them all, 
 and fallen on their knees, noi; to implore the 
 mercy of their murderers, but that of Heaven, 
 they, without a murmur, and with all the 
 coolnefs of perfect refignation, received the 
 broad fword and tomahawk in their ikulls. 
 A little boy, who efcaped to a neceffary, in 
 
 3 l^opc 
 
172 Of the Charter of Pennfyhjunia, 
 
 hope of fafety, had climbed up to the joifts; 
 but even this infant did not meet with 
 mercy from the furious barbarity of thefe fa- 
 natics. An old grey-headed elder, of their 
 meeting, in his inquifitive fearcb, found him, 
 and, with no more remorfe than he would 
 have deftroyed a wolf, pierced his heart with 
 a ball from a rifle. 
 
 1 ;»,. 
 
 '# 
 
 This cruel and unprovoked maflacre 
 alarmed every honeft man in the province. It 
 called forth the attention of the Aflembly, 
 who finding a Ihameful indolence in the Go- 
 vernment, voted a reward of 500 1. for ap- 
 prehending each of the murderers, and prefTed 
 the Governor to take the proper meafures to 
 bring them to juftice. A proclamation was 
 iffued, offering the reward, but no other ftep 
 was taken f , although the maffacre was com- 
 mitted in the prefence of the Proprietary 
 magiftracy, and the names of many of the 
 murderers ^yere well known j and though the 
 Aflembly and people, in general, were ready, 
 and anxious, to unite with the officers '>f 
 Government in bringing them to juftice, 
 
 f No order to the Sheriff of the county, or warrant, was 
 ever iffued for apprehending thepi. 
 
 Encouraged 
 
Of the Charter of Pennfylvania, IJ3 
 
 Encouraged by this tendernefs in the of- 
 ficers of Government towards thefe enthu- 
 iiafts, fifteen hundred men, armed with rifles, 
 proceeded from the frontiers, towards the city 
 of Philadelphia, where theAfTembly was fitting. 
 Their defign was, to compel them to exempt 
 the Proprietary eftate from taxation. Thus 
 far only the views of the Proprietary party, 
 who had advifed the meafure, extended. But 
 thefe lawlefs men, as foon as embodied, refolv- 
 ed to add to their original defign a mafl!acre of 
 one hundred and thirty friendly Indians, who 
 had taken refuge from the French, in Philadel- 
 phia, under the protedion of Government. 
 The fcheme v/as conduced with fo much 
 fecrecy, that the Aflernbly had no notice of it 
 until the rioters w^^ near the city. It pro- 
 videntially happ' nc. that a fall of rain had 
 rendered the Scnuylkill unfordable. This 
 flopped their progrefs. The Proprietary party 
 finding that they had raifed a Devil which 
 they could neither dired nor appeafe, and the 
 Governor, alarmed at the confequence which 
 might attend the murder of fo many innocent 
 men, under his own eye, and to whom he 
 had pledged the public faith, called on the 
 anembers of AiTembly for their affiftauce. 
 4 Thefe 
 
I. ', 4IJ"»^5P^"^'^''V 
 
 174 Of the Charter of Pcimfylvauia, 
 
 Thefe armed their friends, and, before the 
 rioters could crofs the Schuylkill, the city was 
 in fome pofture of defence. The military 
 array of the citizens intimidated the rioters. 
 .They gave up their coercive power over the 
 AfTembly, and their intended maflacre of the 
 innocent Indians, and contented themfclves 
 with fending two of their number to repre- 
 fent their pretended grievances. 
 
 Thefe inftances of riot are related to fhow, 
 that thofe who were bound to preferve the 
 public peace became the common difturbers 
 of it ; and that where the Governor of a 
 province prefers his own, and the private in- 
 tereft and views of his family, to his duty to 
 his Sovereign and his fellow-fubjed:s, there 
 can be no Government. 
 
 The Aflembly, convinced of this truth, on 
 a retrofped: of the Proprietary condud ever 
 fmce the fettlement of the province ; of the 
 perpetunl difputes between the two branches 
 of the legiflature ; of the dangerous parties, 
 tumults, and riots, occafioned by them ; and 
 of the want of that fccurity of peribn and pro- 
 perty, for which men enter into civil fociety, 
 
 determined. 
 
Of the Charter of Fennfylvan'ia, 175 
 
 determined, if poflible, to get rid of thefe 
 mifchiefs. Untainted in their loyalty (for, at that 
 time,Eaftern fedition had made little impreffion 
 in Pennfylvania), they refolved to petition his 
 Majefty to take the Government of the pro- 
 vince under his royal care, by virtue of the 
 contract which I have before mentioned to 
 have been made with the lirft Proprietary. 
 For this purpofe they adjourned, and having 
 advifed with their conftituents, they returned 
 to their feats perfedly convinced, that they 
 were ading agreeably to xSxq general fenfe ut the 
 people, the Proprietary dependents, and their 
 Prefby terian allies excepted. The petition was 
 accordingly forw^arded, and an agent fent over 
 to profecute it. 'This petitio?i yet remains 
 before his Majefy^ in Council^ undecided. 
 
 T cannot help here remarking, from a per- 
 fed knowledge of the ftate of the province, 
 that, had the people been gratified in this rea- 
 fonable petition, fo confident with the in- 
 tereft oi the Crown and their own fafety, the 
 province of Pennfylvania would not have been 
 brought into the prefent rebellion. And had 
 fo rich and pow^erful a province, to which 
 feveral of the Middle Colonies look up as 
 
 the 
 
176 Of the Charter of Pennfylvanta, 
 
 the rule of their condudl, remained fleady In 
 its allegiance, there is every reafon to believe, 
 that others would have followed the example. 
 Nor would the rebellion have extended further 
 than the New England provinces f . 
 
 This petition for a change of the Govern- 
 ment, from Proprietary to Royal, was truly 
 
 f The force of this argument will be evident, when it is 
 confidered, that, although the Congrefs voted by provinces, 
 a /ingle Delegate of this province gave the cafting vote for 
 i^merican independence. Had this opulent and commer- 
 cial province refufed the American union, and taken the 
 ground of accommodating the difference between Great 
 Britain and America, there mud have been a majority; which 
 would have purfued the fame meafure. That majority 
 would have influenced others. And it is much to be doubted, 
 whether the pride of the Virginians and South Carolinians 
 would not have been reflrained. South Carolina, in the firft 
 Congrefs, was totally averfe to independence. However, 
 it was upon thefe principles that the Author of thefe Reflec- 
 tions exerted his utmofl endeavours to prevail on the Aflem- 
 bly of Penn fy Ivania to withdraw their delegation from the 
 Congrefs. And in this he had certainly fucceeded, had he 
 not met with every poi&ble oppofition from the Proprietary 
 party in the Affembly. The father-in-law of the then Pro- 
 prietary and Governor (Jate Chief Juflice of the province, 
 and the leader of the Preibyterian faction in the Middle 
 Colonies), another judge of the fame court, with every 
 juflice of the peace, and all the members under their in. 
 fluence, united with the Prefbyterian party in oppofing him. 
 And yet he failed in his attempt only by a JlngU 'vote. 
 
 an 
 
 , 
 
Of the Charter of Pcnnfylva7ila* 177 
 
 ■■t 
 
 an unfortunate one. Unfortunate, as it did 
 not meet with fuccefs ; and unfortunate, as it 
 led the Proprietary to take from a number of 
 worthy men who had figned the petition, and 
 had been mofl: adive in the prefervation of 
 the public peace, the offices of magiftracy, 
 and to fupply their places with men averfe, 
 not only to his Government, but to that of 
 the Crown. 
 
 Heretofore the Prefbytevlans had pof- 
 fefied little or no fhare in the magiftracy, 
 which had been chiefly compofed of Church- 
 men and Quakers. To acquire fome {hare 
 of power, they thought the difputes be- 
 tween the Proprietaries and their Aflembly af- 
 forded a good opportunity. They, therefore, 
 devoted themfelves throughout the province 
 to the fupport of Proprietary meafures, how- 
 ever urijuft and arbitrary. In return for their 
 good fervices, the Proprietary filled up the va- 
 cated offices with Prefbyterians ; and to fecure 
 their future fidelity, he created a number of 
 new magiftratej, all of the fame perluafion, 
 to the exclufion of the Church and Quakers, 
 prom this unjuft and impolitic condud, it 
 happened, that, at the time of the oppofition to 
 tilt- Stainj.~Adt began, and ever fmce, to the 
 
 N 
 
 declara- 
 
rf^ 
 
 1 7 S Ofl/jc Charter of Fcnnfylvan'uu 
 
 declaration of American independence, tliefc 
 men, difaifedted, from principle, to the Britilh 
 Government, formed the Proprietary ma- 
 giflracy. 
 
 
 il 
 
 When the ftamped paper arrived, a mob 
 was raifed in Philadelphia, to prevent its 
 landing. The Proprietary officers were in- 
 active fpedtators. On the arrival of the Tea, 
 when the agents of rebellion, from New 
 England, had endeavoured to diffufe its poifon 
 throughout the Colonies, mobs, headed by 
 the Prefbyterians, were again excited ; and, 
 although trifling and infignificant in their 
 numbers, and eafy to be fuppreflcd, they were 
 permitted to prevent the landing of the Tea, 
 to tar and feather the loyal inhabitants, and 
 among them an officer of the Cuftoms whom 
 they nearly murdered ; and \ ct no effay was 
 made to fupprefs them. The powers of Go- 
 vernment, in the hands of the Proprietary 
 and his dependents, were afleep. The former 
 difcovered no concern about them, no fear 
 of them, nor the leaft defire that the tu- 
 mults Ihould be fupprefled j and the latter 
 were the abettors and promoters of the fe- 
 dition. 
 
 The 
 
Of the Charter of Pcnnfylvania, i 75 
 
 The motives which governed the leaders of 
 the fedition were obvious; but, from what prin- 
 ciples this poUtical ftupor in the Proprietary con- 
 dudl arofe, may be thought, by fom e, rather pro- 
 blematical. By candidly canvaffing the adions 
 of men, we may certainly arrive at their fc- 
 crct wifhcs and defigns, and folve the problem. 
 We cannot reafonably impute their apparent 
 indolence and indifference to a fenfe of duty^ 
 or to a defire to fupport the rights of the State, 
 for this would have roufed their powers into 
 exertion. Did it not then ariie, partly from 
 the wretched and confufed form of Govern- 
 ment, which they had themfelves eftabliflied, 
 but principally from their, as yet, unfatisfied 
 ambition ? that ambition which had, upon fo 
 many occafions, rendered the Government 
 r ore weak and confufed than it was in its own. 
 He. 'ure. Ambition is often theprodud: of wealth. 
 It grow: in a p(>or as well as in a rich foil. It 
 is to be tc'und in weak as w^ell as great minds. 
 The immenfe wealth of the Proprietaries na- 
 turally produced their ambition, which was 
 perpetually ftimulated, and kept in vigour^ 
 by their unlimited powers of dominion ; 
 and nothing lefs than perfcd independence 
 on the Britilli Government could tisfy it, 
 
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 W 
 
 ^ 
 
i8o Of the Charter of Pawfylvanla. 
 
 There is fomethirg more than conjec- 
 ture in this afTertion. For, weak as their 
 power and influence were, they will not 
 deny, that, had they exerted their authority 
 at firfl:, the infignificant mobs, compofed 
 of a few men, might have been eafily fup- 
 prefied, and the public peace preferved. 
 Friends to public order, and men attached 
 from principle to iheir Sovereign, were not 
 wanting in this province. They ever formed 
 a great majority of the people. Had thefe 
 men been called on by the officers of juftice, 
 or only informed, thiit they would have been 
 fupported by the powers exifting ; or had they 
 not perceived, that the officers,, holding their 
 commiffions during the pleafure of the Pro- 
 prietaries, and attached to their intereft, were 
 not only inadive in oppofmg thofe tumults, 
 but were the promoters of them, the rifmg 
 'edition could not have broke out into open 
 rebellion in this province. 
 
 We muR not, therefore, conclude, that the 
 triumph of the feditious, in this Govern- 
 ment, was altogether owing to the dipofition 
 of a majority of the people, or weaknefs of 
 tlie Government ; but, on the contrary, that 
 7 Paoprie- 
 
the 
 ern- 
 ition 
 s of 
 that 
 ff)rie- 
 
 Of the Charter of Pcmifylvama, 1 8 1 
 
 Proprietary ambition, which could not bear 
 the charadler of a nominal dependence, was 
 a principal cuufe of the want of exertion. 
 Royal inflrudions had been often fent to Pro- 
 prietary Governors, as w^ell as tothofe imme- 
 diately dependent on the Crown. The Af- 
 femblies, on feveral occafions, had prefumed 
 to appeal to the Crown from their arbitrary 
 and unjuft conduct; the Britifh legiflature 
 itfelf had pafled law^s incompatible with 
 the independent powers and fuprcme jurif- 
 didion of the Proprietary Government ; and 
 feveral attempts had been made by the Crown 
 to refume their Governments, and in one in- 
 llance, it was refumed. Thefe were intole- 
 rable checks to the boundlefs views of Pro- 
 prietary intereft and am^bition, w^hich, neither 
 their immenfe eftates, nor their extenilve 
 power, could gratify. Not content with being 
 Already the moft wealthy fubjeds in the 
 Britifh dominions, they wifhed to become 
 more fo ; and, not content with a nominal 
 dependence on the Britiih State, they wifhed 
 to become perfect and abfolute independent 
 Princes. But this could not be, while the 
 fupremacy of Parliament, and fuperintend- 
 
 N 3 cncc 
 
WW 
 
 iSz Of the Charter of Pennfylvanta^ 
 
 ence of the Crown, extended to their pro- 
 vinces. An oppofition, therefore, which af- 
 forded a profpedl of removing thefe obl^ruc- 
 tions to their ambition, could not be difagree- 
 able to them. Their wifhes, and their intereft, 
 they thought, led them openly to unite in it \ 
 their fears alone prevented it. Should the 
 oppofition fail in the attempt, they concluded, 
 that, by not openly fupporting it, they fliould 
 fave their Government. Should it fucceed in 
 eftablilhing the claim of independence, they 
 believed their Government would remain, 
 and its independence be fecured with the other 
 States. 
 
 We can account for the condu£l of the 
 Proprietaries of this province, on no other 
 principles. What lefs than thefe motives 
 could induce the Proprietary, who was in 
 adtual poifeffion of the powers of Govern-r 
 ment, to fee the rifmg mobs, without call- 
 ing on his officers of juftice to fupprefs them, 
 and even, without fignifying on the occafion 
 the lead difpleafure ? Why did he fuffer a 
 number of the judges of his courts, fuperior 
 as well as inferior, and other officers holding 
 
 commif- 
 
Of the Charter of Pennfylvania, 1 83 
 
 commiffions during his pleafure, openly 
 and adively to fupport the oppofition, witl^- 
 out taking from them their commiffions, or 
 even reprimanding them for their treafon ? 
 We have feen, that figning a petition to the 
 Crown againft the Proprietary Government, 
 was deemed a fufficient caufe to remove a num- 
 ber of worthy men from their offices. Surely 
 the feditious condud of his magiftrates, 
 againft the Government of the State, ought, at 
 leaft, to have produced the fame meafure. 
 Why did another of the Proprietaries, who held 
 an eftate, in remainder, in the Government, 
 publicly avow the meafures of the oppofition 
 both in Britain and America? Deliberate 
 omiflions, and breaches of fuch important 
 duties, muft be founded in ftrong motives; 
 and what motives more powerful than private 
 intereft and ambition? And what was there 
 left to gratify the ambition of men already 
 poffefled of fuch unlimited powers, but a de- 
 liverance from royal inftrudions, and a per- 
 fect independence on the State ? 
 
 But art, where its obje(St is not juft and 
 laudable, often becomes a fuicide. Such was 
 the fa£t in the prefent inftance. The defign 
 of the Proprietaries were not only unattained, 
 
 N 4 but 
 
ff 
 
 ;'i.* 
 
 184 Of the Charter of Pennfylvafila, 
 
 but confequences the moft ruinous to them- 
 felves and families attended thefe flagrant 
 breaches of duty. They did not believe, that 
 the fame licentious fpirit which intended to 
 throw off their obedience to Parliamentary au-' 
 thority, meant alfo to overturn Proprietary 
 Government, but rather imagined, that its 
 feeble fabric would gain llrength by the con- 
 teil, and ride out the ftorm. They did not 
 reflecfl, that their own Government, from its 
 unjuft and arbitrary condud, had become 
 more unpopular than that of the Crown, 
 which was generally revered by all, their own 
 dependents and the Prefbyterians excepted ; 
 and, therefore, while the conduct of the mobs, 
 committees, and conventions, refled only in 
 trcafonable oppofition to the authority of Great 
 Britain, they remained inadive fpe(flators, 
 But as foon as thefe lawlefs combinations dif-» 
 covered a defign to overturn their own Go-* 
 vernment, every nerve was llrained to fave 
 it. They then exerted their whole influ- 
 ence to fupprefs the convention, apd to take 
 the bufmefs out of their hands. For this pur- 
 pofe, a legal Affembly was called; and in order 
 to fecure a determination of the queftion in 
 their favour, in diredt breach of a royal inftrue-^ 
 
 tion, 
 
Of the Charier rfVcnnfylvania. 1 8 * 
 
 tion, an a£t was pafTecl to increafe the number 
 of the members from the Prefbvterian eounties, 
 which were thought moll favourable to their 
 intereft. Thel'c members, it was hoped, 
 would turn the fcale in favour of Proprietary- 
 Government ; but it proved a miftakc. The 
 refult of the bufniefs was, an utter demolition 
 of all their power, and the eftabliflimcnt of a 
 pcrfed: democratical State. 
 
 Thus the Proprietary fcheme to fave their 
 Government proved abortive. Never were there 
 men, who have ad:eda part foundutiful to their 
 Sovereign and country, or who have been fo 
 blind to their own intereft. For, however low 
 their lawlefs ambition might be brought by the 
 lofs of their Government, it was to be reduced 
 yet lower ; for this lofs was foon followed by 
 that of their immenfe property f . The fame 
 republican fpirlt. which they had at firft coun- 
 tenanced and foftered, as foon as the new 
 State was eftablifhed, palTed an ad for apply- 
 ing the Proprietary eftate to public ufes, allow- 
 ing to the family the fmall pittance of 1 20,000 1. 
 to be paid in Congrefs money, and that in four 
 yearly payments, to commence after the in- 
 dependence of America ihould be eftablifhed. 
 
 I See the Appendix. 
 
 Thus 
 
 I 
 
1 86 Of the Charter of Pennfylvan'uu 
 
 Thus have Proprietary power and intereft 
 produced, and fharpened, the inftrument of 
 their own ruin. From hence, both Mini- 
 fters and Proprietaries may learn a lefTon of 
 important inftrudion : the former, that fuch 
 independent powers, and fuch immenfe pro- 
 perty, cannot be lodged in the hands of a 
 fubjed with any degree of fafety, either to 
 the peace of the State, or of the inferior 
 fociety ; and the latter, if they have any 
 judgment left, refpedting the fecurity of their 
 property, mufl be convinced, fhould the 
 province ever be reduced to the peace of 
 the Crown, that they are competent, neither 
 to the prefervatlon of its peace, nor even to 
 proted their own powers or eftates from ufur- 
 pation and ruin. 
 
 
( i87 ) 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 On the Charters of Rhode If and and Con^ 
 
 nccllcut, 
 
 I HAVE before proved, that it is ncccffary, 
 in the conftitution of all inferior focieties, 
 that they fliould be formed on principles 
 fimilar to, and correfpcndent with, thofc ii])on 
 which the Government is eftabliflied, bc- 
 caufe, in this policy, their union and fubor- 
 dination to the State confift. Without a due 
 attention to this law, they can be fitted neither 
 to receive the diredions of the fupreme au- 
 thority, nor to yield obedience to them. But, 
 on the contrary, they muft ever be in con- 
 tinual oppofition to its principles and mea- 
 fures, weaken its powers, and in the end 
 bring on its difTolution. 
 
 We have feen, in the Proprietary Charters, 
 this law entirely difregarded ; and all the 
 powers of the State conferred on a part of its 
 fubjecSts for ever^ with full authority to alter 
 ^nd modify them at pleafure, without the 
 
 leaft 
 

 1 ;:8 Oh I be Charlcrs ofRhmJc JJhiiid 
 
 Icafl rcflridion. In confcqucncc of thefe 
 patents, wc have alio icen, that the Proprie- 
 taries, in thr plcmtude of their pown\ have 
 formed their inferior Governments without 
 the li^A'ii jiul^nient or difcretion, without the 
 lead regard to the fundamental laws of tTie 
 ►State, or to thofc principles by which alone 
 the obedience and fubordination of the peo- 
 ple could be eflablifhed ; infomueh, that the 
 fupreme aiuhority of the State, and fuperin- 
 tendence of the Crown, are entirely \o^ in 
 the independence of their conflitutions. 
 
 Upon a view of the Charters of Rhode 
 iriand and Connecticut, we fhall lind, that 
 Charles the Second granted them on princi- 
 ples equally inconfiflent with his trull^ and 
 yet more fo with any relation or fubordination 
 to the Government of Great Britain. For^ if 
 he conftituted in the provinces of Maryland 
 and Penhfylvania principalities with unlimit- 
 ed powers, l>y thefe Charters, he efiablifhed 
 in Connedicut and Rhode Iiland independent 
 democracies, without a fnigle principle of 
 monarchy or arlftocracy mixed in them. 
 
 The 
 
and Cuntnnlcut, 
 
 1R9 
 
 The people of tliefe provinces were emi- 
 grants from MaH'ichufcts Bay, from wlienec 
 they had been either baiiilliecl, or had lied, to 
 avoid the perrccution of their fanatic l)rethren. 
 They had lived upwards of thirty years, under 
 Governments formed by themfelves, without 
 any authority from the Crown, according to 
 their own political fentiments. They knew 
 no fubordination to, nor political connexion 
 with, the State. 
 
 Various were tlie motives which led thelc 
 Britilh fubjedts to wifli for fome authority 
 from the State to fupport their rights of Go- 
 vernment ; but principally, the dread of tlie 
 encroachments and violence of their MafTa- 
 chufets neighbours. They accordingly folicitcd 
 for, and obtained, Charters from Charles the 
 Second; Connedicut in 1662, and Rhode 
 llland in 1663. Although the forms of their 
 Governments were not left to the difcretion 
 and modification of the patentees, as in the 
 cafes of Maryland and Pennfylvania, yet it is 
 very probuble, they were fettled agreeably to 
 their own ideas of polity ; and that little of 
 the royal conlideration and judgment was 
 exerclfed upon them. Both of them were as 
 
 diffonant 
 
190 On the Charters of Rhode TJJaiul 
 
 diflbnant to the monarchical idcavS of Charles, 
 as they were confillent with the republican 
 principles of the patentees. The grants may 
 be faid to be mere confirmations of thoi'e 
 fyftems of popular rule, which the people 
 themfc' v'es had eftabliihed while they thought 
 themfelves independent. 
 
 iC 
 
 (I 
 
 The perfons named in the feveral Charters, 
 and fuch as Ihould be " admitted free of the 
 " company or fociety," were incorporated 
 into bodies politic ; one, by the name of 
 The Governor and Company of the Englifh 
 Colony of Connecticut in New England ;" 
 the other, by the name of " The Governor 
 *' and Company of the Englifh Colony of 
 " Rhode Illand and Providence." For the 
 Cxovernment of each of thefe inferior focieties, 
 a Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Affift- 
 ants, w^ere appointed by the Charter. But 
 thefe officers, for ever after, were to be an- 
 nually cleded by a General Court or AlTembly. 
 This Court was to confiil of the Gover- 
 nor, Deputy-Governor, and Affiftants, and 
 a number of Delegates elected by the towns.- 
 The Governor, Deputy-Governor, and all 
 other officers, judicial, executive, and mili- 
 ■ a tary. 
 
and CoKtieBicttt. 
 
 191 
 
 tary, were to be annually appointed by this 
 general AlFembly ; but the Delegates, or Re- 
 prel'entatives of the people, who former a 
 part of the Alfembly, were to be eleded 
 every fix mouths. And on this popular Af- 
 iembly, or General Court, deciding all n itters 
 by a majority of votes, all tlie Icgilktive, 
 executive, and federative rights, powers, and 
 privileges, were conferred. They were em- 
 powered to make all manner of laws for the 
 Government of the Colony ; all that were 
 neceffary for regulating the order of the Go- 
 vernment, for direding the morals of tlie 
 people, for protecting them from foreign in- 
 vafions, and for every other purpofe that can 
 be necelfary to an independent civil fociety. 
 And they were further authorifed to fettle 
 " the forms and ceremonies of Government 
 •' and magiftracy, in what manner, and in. 
 " what ftyle," they pleafed, however contrary 
 to the modj-s and principles eftabliflied in the 
 Britifh Government : So that they might, if 
 they thought proper, have inftituted the fame 
 forms and ceremonies of Government and 
 Magiftracy as are to be found in China or 
 Japan. , 
 
 Thu^ 
 
J 9^ ^'^ ^^^' Charters of Rhode T/lafid 
 
 Thus were all the legiflative and executive! 
 li^^hts, which are neceiTary to the conftitution 
 of an independent State, conferred on ademo- 
 cratical Allembly. The civil and military 
 rights of the Crown are granted in terms fo 
 indefinite, as to exclude all poflibility of its 
 fuperintendence ; and the rights of the King, 
 Lords, and Commons, are fo completely tranf- 
 ferred as to render no one adt or regulation of 
 theirs necefTary to the fafety or happinefs of the 
 people. The laws and ordinances to be made by 
 the General Court, are to be ilridlly obeyed ; 
 while there is no mention of any obedience due 
 to thofe of the State. There is, indeed, a pro- 
 vifion, that the law^s of thefe corporations 
 fhall not be repugnant to the laws of Eng- 
 land. But this is yet more nugatory than the 
 like provifions in the Proprietary Charters. 
 For thefe politic bodies are not even direded 
 to tranfmit their laws to the Crown for con- 
 firmation or repeal. Nor is there any appeal 
 cftabliilied from the courts of jullice to his 
 Majefty in Council ; nor any mode fettled, by 
 which the Crown or Parliament can be re-^ 
 gularly informed of their tranfadlions. So 
 that the Crown and Parliament mull ever re- 
 main in the dark refpedting their condudt. 
 
 Where 
 
and Conntcfkut, 
 
 "^9^ 
 
 Where then can be the fubordination of thefe 
 members of the poUtic body to their fuprcmc 
 head, when they are rendered unaccountable 
 and independent, ftand in no need of its di- 
 rcdtion or afTiftance, and are competent in 
 themfelves to the relief of all their own wants 
 and neceflities. Or of what ufe can fuch a 
 member be to the State ? No more than an 
 amputated limb to the human body. But it 
 may be much more mifchievous, as manifeil 
 experience has proved. 
 
 PofTefTed of thefe unlimited powers, and 
 educated in republican principles, they con- 
 fider themfelves difcharged from all fubordi- 
 nation to the Britifh Government, and af- 
 fume all the rights of independent States. 
 Indeed, had education been out of the cafe, 
 thefe powers were irrefiftible temptations to 
 the meafure. But where the natural am- 
 bition of men is worked upon by the influ- 
 ence of both principle and education, it is 
 impoffible that it fliould otherwife happen. 
 Such is the fad, Thefe \r dependent corpora- 
 tions have adhered to the powers of their 
 Charters, or departed from them at their plea- 
 fure. The onlv rule which has dired:ed their 
 
 O condud, 
 
194 ^f i^^^ Charters of Rhode IJland 
 
 comliKft, has been that of their own fupremc 
 wilL Of this truth, the political hiftory of 
 tfiefe colonies affords a continued feries of 
 proofs. 
 
 They were forbid, by their Charters, X.^ 
 make laws contrary to the laws of England. 
 Yet, in many inftances, their laws have born 
 a nearer refemblance to the code of the Jewifh 
 theocracy, than to that of the Engliih confti- 
 tution. In fome, where life was concerned, 
 the judgment of the court was to be founded 
 on the " rule of the word of God." The 
 Charters conferred no power to inflict capital 
 puniihment ; yet, that punifliment they in- 
 fiid:ed on idolators, blafphemers, confpirators 
 againft their own Government, and even on 
 difobedient and rebellious children. They 
 in^cituted trials by juries, but, in effedt, de- 
 prived the fubjed: of that ineftimable privi- 
 lege, oy giving the court an abfolute power 
 over their verdicts. They adminiftered oaths 
 of allegiance to their Government, but 
 omitted thofe of fupremacy and allegiance to 
 the State, although their Charter exprefsly en- 
 joined it. The Charter granted to the peo- 
 ple liberty of confcience in the fuUeft manner, 
 . • I yet 
 
^nd Co7inc5licut* 
 
 195 
 
 to 
 
 yet they denied the exercife of the religioil 
 of the Church of England, and compelled all 
 the people, under a penalty, to Conform to 
 their own modes of woriliip. Thev violated 
 the laws of trade and navigation openly and 
 without hefitation, and in Rhode Ifland, they 
 would not fufFer their Governor to take the 
 oath injoined by the ad of Parliament, for 
 carrying them into execution. They would 
 not fufFer any cufloms or duties to be collected 
 for the ufe of the Crown, becaufe, they con- 
 ceived, that they were able to raife the aids 
 neceffary to their own protection, and becaufe 
 thofe duties were granted by the Charter* 
 They ever have treated Royal inftrudlions 
 with high corltempt, becaufe they held them 
 inconfiftent with, and violations of, the un- 
 limited and independent rights of their Charter. 
 They would not tranfmit their laws for confir-* 
 mation or repeal, nor allow appeals from their 
 courts of juilice, becaufe no diredion to 
 thofe purpofes was contained in the Charter ; 
 and, becaufe they thought fuch powers in the 
 Crown were incompatible with their independ- 
 ent rights. 
 
 When we enquire into the ftate of the peace 
 
 and order of thefe democratical inftitutions, 
 
 ~ O a we 
 
"fir 
 
 fj'i' 
 
 pp«- 
 
 1 06 ■ On ibi Charters of Rhode Jjland 
 
 we liiid them a fcene of tumult and confufion. 
 'i'lie annual eledlion of the numerous officers 
 of Government, and that of the Delegates in 
 Aflembly, every lix months, induce per- 
 petual Ganvaillng and folicitations for offices. 
 One eledion is fcarcely encied before the com- 
 petition and buftle for the next commence. 
 Some men are ftriving to continue in their 
 offices, others to fupcHede them. Hence, 
 thefe colonies are the perpetual fcenes of 
 parties, public feuds, broils, and breaches 
 of the peace, which altogether deftroy the 
 public tranquility. All that awe and refpedt 
 which are the great i'upport of Government, 
 and which are neceifary to be paid by the lower 
 clafs of people, to perfons in office, are want- 
 ing. The Governor and Magillracy of the 
 colony are upon a level with John the Far- 
 mer, who follows the plow for his daily fub- 
 fiflence, and whenever they meet, the firft 
 falutation of refpect proceeds from the Go- 
 vernor or Magiflrate ; if not, he lofes the 
 Farmer's vote and intereft at the next 
 election. The popular man, though not 
 worth a groat, or the man who commands 
 a number of votes, however undignified by 
 morals, education^ or office, is the man of 
 rank to whom the Officers of Governmert 
 
 mufi: 
 
 
and Connctlicut, 
 
 197 
 
 muft pay refpc^l and honour, or lofe their 
 offices. For the ilime reidbn, juflice is pre- 
 earious, and ieldom fails to preponderate in 
 the fcale of the flidious and popular, how- 
 ever unjuft their pretenfions. To the intcreft 
 and influence of fuch men, the Judges arc 
 indehted for their commiffibns, and they arc 
 liable, every year, to be removed by them. 
 A fear of that removal operating on the Judge 
 corrupts his judgment, and renders his dc-: . 
 cifions erroneous and unju^. 
 
 nds 
 
 by 
 
 of 
 
 ert 
 
 lufl: 
 
 Nor are thefe all the mifchiefs which na-?- 
 turally arife from the unlimited powers and 
 illegal conftitutions of thefe Governments. 
 Frequent contefts for fupremacy liappen, in 
 Connedticut, between the civil and ecclefiafll- 
 cal powers. Indeed, it is difficult to deter- 
 mine, whether the laity or the clergy governs 
 the fociety. The churches, or the minifters 
 and communicants, exercife a right to punifh 
 their difobedient and unworthy members. 
 From their decifions, there is a riglit of ap- 
 pealing to the AffiDciations, and from tliein 
 to an eccleflaftical tribunal, yet higher, 
 the Confociation. By the platform, which 
 contains the fyllem of their eccleluiriical do- 
 
 O 3 mination. 
 
mw 
 
 1 98 On the Charters of Rhode IJland 
 
 mination,thejiidgmentoftheConfociationmuft 
 be final. But it often happens, that the culprit 
 who thinks himfelf injured, will take the liberty 
 of appealing to the General Court or Aflcmbly. 
 The appeal is generally received and deter- 
 mined, notwithftanding the claim of final deci- 
 fion in the Confociation, This is efteemed 
 a high profanation of the facred rights of the 
 platform. And the minifters of the churches, 
 who, with a number of the communicants, 
 form the AfTociations and Confociation, never 
 fail to revenge themfelves lipon the Governor, 
 Deputy Governor, Affiftants, and Delegates, 
 (who had prefumed to profane the rights of 
 the church) by preventing their being chofeu 
 at the next eledion. A layman therefore, 
 who wifhes to obtain an office, mufl apply 
 to the Minifler for his recommendation, 
 and before he can obtain it, muft promife not 
 to violate the facred ordinances of the Plat^ 
 form. And yet fuch is the love of power in 
 the minds of men, that the new members are 
 no fooner elected than their promifes are for-« 
 got ; and fond of controuling the fupreme 
 power of the Confociations, they proceed, as 
 ufual, to determine the appeals. Hence, per-r 
 petual quarrel, and alternate domination, be?- 
 
 tween 
 
a7td Connecticut, 
 
 T99 
 
 tween the civil and ecclefiafticiil jurlfdidions. 
 During the firft fix months after an annual 
 eledion, the power of the laity prevails; and 
 during the next fix months before the eniiiing 
 eledion, that of the Miniilers dominntcs. Thus 
 the two fcales, in this Itrange jumble of poUcy 
 and dominion, are perpetually on the fcelaw. 
 
 One inftance more, of the illegal and fedi* 
 tious condud of the people of Conue^licut, 
 ought not to be omitted. The Charter direfls, 
 that all the Officers of Goveriniient Ihall be 
 appointed, annually, by '^ the greater part of 
 " the company," or freemen, From the 
 date of the Charter to the time of the Stamp- 
 AOi^ the candidate who had the majority of 
 votes had been ever adjudged duly eleded. 
 But, when that a£l w^as paflcd, a novel and 
 unprecedented conftrudion of the words of 
 the Charter was made to ferve the purpofe 
 of oppofmg it. Governor Fitch, a gentle- 
 man of real integrity and loyalty, had given 
 offence by taking the oaths required by the 
 ad ; and yet, at the enfuing eledion, he re- 
 tained fo much influence as to have more 
 votes for the office of Governor than imy 
 pther candidate, and, confequently, w^as duly 
 
 O 4 elcded 
 
200 On the Charters of Rhode Ifland 
 
 elc£led according to the Charter. But the 
 Committee of Eledions, contrary to all for- 
 mer ufage, and the legal conftrudion of the 
 Charter, reported to the General Aflembly, 
 that no Governor had been elected by the free- 
 men ; for tha"" although Mr. Fitch had a greater 
 number of vo^es than any other candidate, yet 
 he had not more than all the other candidates 
 together. This report was approved, and the 
 General Aflembly, ufurping a power not con- 
 ferred by the Charter, declared Mr. Fitch not 
 duly elcded, and appointed Mr. Pitkin the 
 Governor, on whofe fidelity they could rely 
 in oppofmg the adl. Mr. Fitch was then 
 eledled Deputy Governor, by a great majority 
 of votes. The Committee made a like re-p 
 port, and the General Aflembly again rejected 
 his eledlion, and appointed Mr. Trumbull, 
 the prefent rebel Governor, the Deputy Go- 
 vernor, although he had a lefs number of 
 votes than any other candidate. 
 
 At the eledion in 1768, the people were 
 in great divifions and confufion. Trumbull 
 had 2600, Fitch 2550, andfixteen others had 
 each about 2000, in the whole 37,150 votes. 
 The Committee ' ported the numbers of 
 
 votes, 
 
and ComicHicut* 
 
 201 
 
 votes, for each candidate, to the General 
 Court. Mr. Trumbull was a man whole fe- 
 ditious principles fuited their own. The late 
 expofition of the Charter was now to be re- 
 verfed. The treafonable purpofe for which it 
 had been made was fulfilled ; and Mr, Trum- 
 bull declared duly eledted by the freemen. 
 
 James the Second, finding thefe colonies In 
 a ftate of diforder and confufion, without fub- 
 ordination, and tending faft to independence, 
 ordered Sir Edmund Androfs, his tlicn Go- 
 vernor of Maffachufets, to demand a fur- 
 render of their Charters. That of Rhode 
 Ifland was accordingly made in the year 1686, 
 by the Governor, Deputy Governor, and 
 Afliftants, without any coercion. The Char- 
 ter was cancelled in form, and a new fyftem 
 of Government, under the royal autho- 
 rity, immediately inftituted in its ftead. 
 That of Connecticut followed in 1687, v\^hen 
 it was delivered up in form by the General 
 Court, without any threats or menaces on the 
 part of the King, fave that of calling the Go- 
 vernment to anfwer, in a due courfe of law, 
 for its multifarious delinquencies and mifde- 
 A teft which their rulers did not 
 
 choofe, 
 
 meanours. 
 
w^mr 
 
 202 Oft the Charters of Rhone TJland 
 
 choofe, for the mofi: weighty rcafons, that 
 their condiicfl fhoiild undergo. But one 
 Samuel Wadfworth, a fadious and enthufi- 
 aftic republican, at the head of a mob, ru(h- 
 ing into the Court, feized on the Charter, 
 after the furrender, carried it off without op- 
 pofition, and carefully concealed it in the 
 hollow of a tree. However, this adt of vio- 
 lence did not prevent the royal Governor 
 from afluming the Ciovernment, as he had 
 done that of Rhode Ifland. 
 
 Under royal authority, thefe colonies con- 
 tinued until the year 1689, although notfatif- 
 fied, yet without any open refiftance, when 
 hearing of the infurredion of the people of 
 MafHichufets, mentioned in the next Chapter, 
 and the confequent revolution, they refumed 
 the Charter which they had formerly fur- 
 rendered, without any authority from the 
 Crown. 
 
 
 No fooner did thefe republicans return to 
 the powers of their Charters, than their 
 former tumults and confufion were renewed. 
 Their old forms of Government, with their 
 former code pf laws, habits, manners, at-^ 
 
 tachm^nts^ 
 
and Conucdticut, 
 
 203 
 
 taclimcnts, and aveiTions, were adopted. 
 Their former anarchy they preferred to 
 royal rule, bccaufe they had been educated 
 in, and accuftomed to it. The fhort dura- 
 tion of tlie Royal Government had not 
 made imprcfTions fufficicntly llrong to con- 
 quer the force of habit, nor to create a 
 reliih for the more eligible blcffings of order 
 and peace. 
 
 Under this confufed Government, the peo- 
 ple of Connedicut and Rhode Ifland have 
 remained ever fmce, unhappy and miferable, 
 equally difcontented with their own rule, as 
 intolerant of their nominal fubordination to 
 the Britilh State. 
 
 ^o 
 ;ir 
 
 "What could be expelled from a people edu- 
 cated in political principles fo repugnant to 
 thofe of the Britifh Government, but difTaf- 
 fedlion and averfion to it ? What, from a 
 people pofleflcd of unlimited powers, but a 
 third for independence ? Is there a politician 
 who confiders the propenfities of the human 
 mind, and the powerful force of education 
 and habit, who can believe that unlimited 
 pov/ers will not create a delire of independ- 
 
 ence, 
 
r 
 
 204 On the CharUrs of Rhode IJliiud 
 
 cnce, or that a pcop'-!, educated in the Ichool 
 of democracy, can, in the nature of th'ugs, 
 be attached to the principles of a mixed mo- 
 narchy? I'he filh Ipawned and bred in muddy 
 water, abhors the chryftal ftream. The 
 Spaniard, or the Turk, will not change his 
 flavery for the moil: refined and bell re- 
 gulated freecloin. Nor could the adventu- 
 rous Omiah, imprcflcd with the ftrong dcfirc 
 of information and knowledge, be pre- 
 vailed on, in a few years, by the wonderful 
 improvements and refined enjoyments of 
 art, not to return to the principles and habits 
 of his education. 
 
 From the premifea, we muft conclude, that 
 a Government which intends to prefcrve the 
 union and concord of its members, upon 
 which its own ftrength and fafety depend, 
 muft attend to their eonftrudion and educa- 
 tion, by forming them on, and conftantly 
 maintaining in them, thofe principles which 
 correfpond w^ith, and which will always fup- 
 port it. But in thefe inferior corporations, 
 as they are eftablifhed by their Charters, 
 when we look for a political and fubordinate 
 conncflion, either with the fupreme authority 
 
 of 
 
aiul CuuiU'Ci'uiit* 
 
 ^O 
 
 »^ 
 
 of the State, with the powers of the Cruwu, 
 or with anv one of their fcllow-meniberH, we 
 find it does not exilt ; jiid when, for the 
 great purpofcs, to obtain which, incn enter 
 into civil fociety, namely, pcrfonal feciirity 
 and jiiftiee, we iiiul thcni altogether unattain- 
 cd ; and that the condition of the people is 
 little better than it would be in a ftate of na- 
 ture. Indeed, thefc llrange fyftems of Go- 
 vernment, give us the following abliird ideas. 
 
 An inferior member of a State, without 
 fubordination or fubjediou. 
 
 A Government without order, peace, 
 juftice, or fafety. 
 
 A civil Society without a Head, or rather 
 all Head, or a manv-headcd Monster. 
 
 '> 
 
V I ',P 
 
 . ( 106 ) 
 
 l-r 
 
 C H A P. X. 
 
 Oa; ibc Majfachiijfcts Charter* 
 
 IHAVE before made fome remarks on die 
 wrfl MafTachufTets Charter f ; enough to 
 Ihow that its powers were entirely democra- 
 tical; and that the grantees were vefted with 
 all the unlimited rights of an independent 
 fovereignty. This being the fad:, i. was 
 natural to expe£t, that the people educated 
 under it, however Unprejudiced againft 
 any other particular form of Govern- 
 ment, wxuld, in a little time, become at- 
 tached to democracy, and averfe to a mixed 
 monarchy ; and that their extenfive powers 
 would create a defire of abfolute independ- 
 ence. But this is only a part of the fad:. 
 The firfi: fettlers of this province carried over 
 with them a ftrong averfion to the principles 
 of the Britiih Government. They were fome 
 of thofe fedaries, who, not content with that 
 generous relief from Popifh fuperilition and 
 tyranny, w^hich the Reformation gave them, 
 
 t See Chap. VI. 
 
 became 
 
 1 
 
 ^1 
 
 >^Bflr i 
 
 1 ' 
 
 AW^^B ;■ 
 
 1 .^ 
 
 *ffll^ 
 
On the Majfachufds Charter^ 207 
 
 became intolerant of all reftraint in regard to 
 the forms and ceremonies of religion, and in 
 their rage for further reformation, broke off 
 from the eftabliihed church. 
 
 The Reformation which began in the reign^ 
 of Henry the Eighth, and was improved and 
 eftabliihed in that of Elizabeth, was undoubt- 
 edly a real good ; and had it ftopped there, 
 or pafied only a little further, it muft have 
 produced many blefTmgs to mankind. But a 
 rage for further reformation fucceeded, and 
 foon broke out into a variety of fe<fls, who 
 diflented from the Church, and became the re- 
 foniiers of the Reformation. But fome of thefe 
 fedaries, forgetting that the fyftem of Chrifti- 
 anity was founded in univerfal benevolence, 
 adopted principles which excluded all bene- 
 volence, and utterly fubverted thofe of the 
 religion they meant to reform. ' 
 
 Among thefe fedaries were the Brownifts, 
 Congregationalifts, Puritans, and Independ- 
 ents ; thefe different denominations of 
 Chriftians, differed more in name than 
 in fiibftance. They all agreed in the 
 following tenets : " That all power, as 
 
 well 
 
 ; 1 
 
2o8 Oh the Majfachufets Charier, 
 
 w 
 
 (C 
 
 C( 
 
 C( 
 
 cc 
 
 (( 
 
 C( 
 
 (C 
 
 well in civil as ecclefiaftical affairs, could 
 only b^ lawfully placed in the people ; that 
 they could know no temporal Ktng^ be- 
 caufe Jcfus alone was their King both in 
 fpiritual and temporal affairs ; and that 
 they, who were the alone worthy y and the 
 " alone ele£iy were his agents and vicegerents, 
 who were to do his work upon earth, and 
 in the end, alone to receive the benefits of 
 " his crucifixion and death." Tenets which 
 mofl effecStually deftroyed that which renders 
 the Chriflian religion fuperior to all others, 
 and which were as pregnant with perfecution 
 as thofe of the Church of Rome : and tenets 
 which rendered their fubjedion to a mixed 
 monarchy, and indeed to every other kind 
 of Government but democracy, in their opi- 
 nion, immoral and criminal. Poffeffed of 
 thefe feditious principles, they fuffered under 
 thofe penal laws, which, in the infancy of the. 
 Reformation, perhaps were neceffary to its efla- 
 blifhment ; and to guard it againfl the power 
 and influence of the See of Rom«, its con- 
 ftant enemy. Their fufFerings, their enmity to 
 monarchy, and a defire to eflablifh an inde- 
 pendent Government, under which their own 
 . t religion 
 
On the Majfachufets Charter, 209 
 
 Irellgion fliould be alone prcte(^ed, led them 
 to this province. 
 
 The condud of thele fanatics, after their 
 arrival in A: ieric.i, v/ill abundantly prove, 
 that this v^as their greit deOc>;n. So much of 
 it as is neceffary to my fubje^Ti., I iliall briefly 
 lay before the Rcjadcr ; referring him for a 
 more particular information to the hiftories 
 of Governor Hutchinfon, a native of the 
 province, who w^rote from the befl: infor- 
 mation, derived from many original papers, 
 which he had with great induflry col- 
 ledted, and from the records of the pro- 
 vince; and of Mr. Chalmers, who has had 
 the affiftance, not only of former hiHorians, . 
 but of the provincial records in Britain. 
 
 From thefe hiftories, and th. authentic do- 
 cuments to which they refer, it will appear, 
 that the emigrants to this province, before 
 they had obtained their Charter, coniidered 
 themfelves as in a ftate of nature. Although 
 they were Britifh fubjeds, who had fettled on 
 Britifli territories annexed to the realm, they 
 thought themfelves difcharged from the Britifli 
 Government, and its laws. Tliey formed 
 
 P themfelves 
 
n ' ,:m 
 
 w 
 
 u > 
 
 210 On tht Majfachnfds Charter, 
 
 themfelves into a body politic, without the 
 leaft authority from the State, and airumed all 
 the legiflative and executive rights of an in- 
 dependent fociety. The Government which 
 they eftablifhed was entirely democratical, 
 and the rule of their church, congregational. 
 In both cafes the power was lodged in the 
 people. 
 
 
 When they had obtained a charter, they 
 made its diredions the rule of their condud:, 
 or departef! from them, on all occafions, as it 
 fuited with their defigns of independence in 
 Church and State. Religion being the great 
 motive of their emigration, they immediately 
 eftablifhed their own fanaticifm. This was 
 done by a " covenant wi*h the Lord, and 
 " one another." The two great articles 
 were, " That they would walk in all their 
 ways, as he ffiould be plcafed to reveal 
 himfelf to them ; and that they would not 
 deal oppreflingly with any wherein they 
 were the Lord's Jlewart^ And as none 
 but thofe who were of their faith could be of 
 his flock, none others were to be admitted ; of 
 this faith the Elders were to be the arbitrary 
 Judges. K . . • ; . 
 
 la 
 
 (C 
 
 cc 
 
 (( 
 
 cc 
 
 
ately . 
 was 
 and 
 tides 
 their 
 veal 
 not 
 they 
 one 
 e of 
 ;of 
 rary 
 
 la 
 
 On the Majfachttfets Charter, 2 1 1 
 
 In the feveral emigrations there were a 
 number of people belonging to the Church of 
 England. Thefe men juftly conceived they 
 had a right, under their Charter, to liberty of 
 confcience, as well as Li.ofe enthufiafts. And 
 as they could not conform to the bigot'-ed 
 faith and ecclefiaflical tyranny fo lately efta- 
 bliflied, they formed a meeting according to 
 the rites and ceremonies of the Church of 
 England. But this was confidered as an a£t 
 of nonconformity, and inconfiflent with their 
 defign of ellablifliing an exclufive and inde- 
 pendent church. It was declared feditious, 
 and tending to mutiny, and the poor Epifco- 
 palians were banifhed and fent to England. 
 And thus the eftabliflied Church of the nation 
 was, with a prefumption and injuftice unpar- 
 rallelled, fupprefled in its infancy. 
 
 This a(fl was immediately followed by a 
 law, declaring, that in future none fliould be 
 admitted to the freedom of the body politic, 
 but fuch as were members of their own 
 church. By this law, diredly contrary to 
 the words of their Charter, which gave to 
 Pritifh fubjedls, of every denomination of 
 Chriflians, a right to emigrate and fetde 
 
 P 2 within 
 
 i 
 
''T , 
 
 fc- 
 
 212 On the Majfacbufels Charter, 
 
 within its limits, a major part of the people, 
 then refident within the province, was de- 
 prived of their civil rights. This law con- 
 tinued in force upwards of fixty years, unti! 
 the dilTolution of their Charter. 
 
 But further, to fecure the Government and 
 territory of the province to themielves, " the 
 " only chofen people of God," they pafled 
 another law, forbidding all perfons to entertain 
 in their houfes any ftrangeis coming to refide 
 among them, without the aiTcnt of one of 
 the ftanding Council, or two otl^r Afliflants. 
 Thus the foundation was laid for thofe cruel 
 pcrfecutions which gave ri^e to the colonies of 
 Conneduicut and Rhode liland, to the banifn- 
 ment and death of the Quakers, and to the op- 
 prelTion of tlie Eaptifts, which continued until 
 the date of their late declaration of independ- 
 ence. 
 
 The fame motives which induced them to 
 pay no regard to their Cliarter, in fettling 
 their ecclcriallical rights, led them to difregard 
 it in matters of Government, and totally to 
 rejed the principles of their Parent State. 
 Inftead of governing the fociety by the general 
 ftatute and common law, or conforming to 
 
 their 
 
On the Majfachufcts Charter, 2 1 3 
 
 their principles, as the Charter enjoined, 
 they enaded new laws totally repugnant to 
 them. Their code was founded on the laws 
 of Mofes, and much more llmguinary than 
 the laws of England ; they held, that the flatute 
 and common laws were of no force in their 
 fociety, unlefs extended by its Legiflaturc. 
 They made a law to puniili lldition and trea- 
 fon againft their own Government, but omit- 
 ted to punilli feditioii or treafon aeainil their 
 Sovereign. 
 
 
 During the civil war, thefe fanatics, as flir 
 as their infant State enabled them, fupported 
 the pretenfions of the Parliament and of Crom- 
 well. Men or money they had not to ^are. 
 But they aflured the Parliament of their good 
 wifhes and prayers for its fuccefs againft the 
 King ; and their agents, with great induftry 
 and intrigue, fomented the feditious, bccaufe 
 the defign of the Puritans in England ex- 
 actly correfponded witli their own. The aim 
 of both was, the fubvciTion of the Britifn 
 Government, and to fet up one on tlicir ovv n 
 enthufiaftic and democratical pnnci]?les. 
 
 p 3 
 
 As 
 
1* -.I'l' 
 
 214 On the Mojfachufds Charter^ 
 
 As foon as the ufurpat'ion was eftabllflied, 
 the General Court, no longer dreading the 
 powers of royalty, concluded, that the aera of 
 their independence was arrived, and that a 
 little temporary fervility to a Parliament, 
 whofe principles were fo fnnilar to their own, 
 would foon obtain it. A kind of political 
 courtfhip commenced between them. Mutual 
 favours were conferred, but with very differ- 
 ent views ; on the part of Parliament, with 
 defign to fupport its authority over the Colony ; 
 and on the part of the Colonifts, by a tem- 
 porary /"ubmifRon to prevail on the Common- 
 wealth to fuffer them to enjoy their beloved 
 independence. 
 
 • '■%■'■ 
 
 The Parliament parted a law, exempting 
 the New England Colonies from all cuftoms 
 and duties on goods imported to, or exported 
 from them. This law the General Court 
 ordered, without hefitation, to be entered in 
 iheir minutes, " as a proof of the gracious 
 " fivcur of Parliament." And, although 
 they had not parted any adt to punifti feditioii 
 or treafon againfl: the Kings of England, dur- 
 ing their Government, they now ordered, 
 that " whoever dirturbed the peace of the 
 
C« the Majfacbn/ds Charter, 215 
 
 " Common-^vealth^ by endeavouring to draw 
 " a party, under the pretence that he is for 
 the King of England^ fliall be proceeded 
 with either capitally^ or otherwife.*' 
 
 
 But thefc mutual favours between the 
 greater and lelFer ufurpations did not extend 
 fo far as to induce the latter to give up their 
 views of independence in Church and State. 
 This inferior fociety, fliys Mr. Chalmers, 
 *' in conformity to its accuflomcd principles, 
 adted, during the civil wars, almoft alto- 
 gether as an independent State. It formed 
 leagues, not only with the neighbouring 
 colonies, but with foreign nations, without 
 the confent or knowledge of the Govern- 
 ment of England. It permitted no appeals 
 " from its Courts, to the judicatories of the 
 *' fovereign State, it refufed to exercife its 
 *' juriidid:ion /;/ the fiame of the Commotio 
 wealth of England. It afTumed the Go- 
 vernment of that part of New England 
 which is now called New Hampfhire, and 
 even extended its powers further eaftward 
 over the province of Main ; and, by force 
 of arms, it compelled thofe who had fled 
 *' from its perfecution beyond its boundaries 
 
 P 4 " into 
 
 (( 
 
 (C 
 
 (C 
 
 i( 
 
 « 
 
 cc 
 
 a 
 
 (C 
 
 (( 
 
 C( 
 
 (C 
 
 i( 
 
WW 
 
 
 216 On the M^Jfjchi'fcts Charter, 
 
 ** into tlic wllJcrncfs, to Submit to its autho-^ 
 •' rity. I'- crc(*l:cd a Mint at Bollon, impref- 
 " fmg the year i6j.% as the ara oi" their in- 
 '* dependence ; and this pradlicc was con- 
 " tinued until the dilTokition of its Govern-!- 
 " ment." 
 
 All thefe independent power?, utterly in- 
 confiftent with any fubordination to the Com- 
 mon-w^ealth, were exercifed by the General 
 Court, during its continuance. And thus, by a 
 little temporifing, the General Court outwitted 
 even the cunning of Cromwell himfelf. And 
 having thus afted as a State independent of 
 the authority of Oliver, they declined, upon 
 his death, to acknowledge that of Richard his 
 fucceflbr. 
 
 The reftoration of Charles was as un- 
 expedled as it was dilt.efling to thefe fanatics. 
 If they received the news of the ufurpation 
 with inexprefTible joy, they received the ac- 
 count of the Reftoration with as much fear 
 and diftrefs. They dreaded, from the power 
 of Charles, a total lofs of their Charter rights, 
 as a juft punifhment for their difregard of 
 them, for their ufurpation of other tights not 
 
 '" ' granted, 
 
On the Mojfticbufcts Charier, 2 1 7 
 
 granted, for their fiipprefTinp; the Church of 
 England, and for thole cruel pcrfeculions and 
 punifhmcnts which they h:id inflided on all 
 perfons who differed from them in nutters of 
 religion ; and yet, their fondnefs for inde- 
 pendence, and enmity to monarchy, for a 
 time, prevailed overtltcir fears. For, although 
 they were, fo early as in July 1660, pcrfcdly 
 afcertained cf the Reftoration of Charles, 
 they, under various pretences, declined to 
 proclaim him until Auguft 1661. What a 
 contrail did this conduit exhibit to that of 
 Virginia and Maryland \ Thcfe provinces no 
 fooner heard of the Reftoration of their So- 
 vereign, than they proclaimed him with a joy 
 and feftivity which dcmonftrated their fmce- 
 rity and loyalty. But there was another cir- 
 cumftance which further difcovered their 
 enmity to Royalty. Whaley and Goffe, two 
 of the regicides who flerd to this province for 
 fafety, were " courteoufly received by the 
 *' Governor," and treated by the people with 
 univerfal kindnefs, until the warrant arrived 
 for apprehending them. 
 
 Thefe things were known to Charles, and 
 
 yet, with unexampled tendernefs, he en- 
 
 8 deavoured 
 

 218 O/i the Majfachufcts Charter, 
 
 dcavourcd to reclaim them to their duty as 
 fuhjedls. He promiled them a confirmation 
 of their Charter, pointed out the inllances 
 in which they had violated their puhHc duty, 
 and required, tliat they would review their 
 ordinances, and reform their condudl. But 
 this lenity and royal moderation had no 
 effed on the fpirits of men big with an in- 
 fatiable thirft for independence both civil 
 and ecclefiaflical, unlefs it was to render them 
 more bold in their iawlcfs courfe of govern- 
 ing the province. 
 
 A condud fo pcrvcrfe and wicked at 
 length wore out the patience of the Britifli 
 Court. A quo warranto was ifTued againfl: 
 the Charter, and fuch proceedings were there- 
 upon had, that, in the year 1684, it was de- 
 clared forfeited in the High Court of Chancery. 
 The reafons afligned in the WTit for this for- 
 feiture, are fo jui h, fo confonant to law, and 
 fo defcriptive of :he lawlefs and independent 
 defigns of the people, that I cannot omit 
 them. They were, ", i. That they, the Ge^ 
 " neral Court, afTume powers that are Jtot 
 ** warranted by the Charter, which is exe- 
 " cuted in another place than was intended, 
 
 *V2. That 
 
On the MaJfachiiJfcU Charter, 219 
 
 it 
 
 <( 
 
 2. That they make laws repugnant to the 
 laws of England. 3. They levy money on 
 fuhjedls not inhabiting the colony. 4. They 
 impofe an oath of fidelity to thcmfelves with- 
 out regarding the oath of allegiance to the 
 King. 5. They rcfufe juftice, hy not al- 
 lowing appeals to the King in CottnciL 
 •* 6. They oppofc the adl of navigation, and 
 " imprifon the King"*.? officers far doiijg their 
 " duty. 7. They have eftabliflied a naval 
 *' office, with a view to defraud the Cufloms, 
 " 8. No verdi(£ls arc Q\tr found for the King 
 " in relation to cuftoms, and the Courts im- 
 " pofe colh on the profecutors, in order to 
 " difcourage trials, Q. They levy cuftoms 
 *' on the importation of goodsy^o;;/ England, 
 " 10. They do nut adminifter the oath of 
 " fupremacy, as required by Charter. 1 1. 
 " They have ere^Sted a Court of Admiralty, 
 " though not impowcred by Charter. 12, 
 " They difcountenanced the Church of Eng^ 
 *^ land. 1 3. They perfift in coining money, 
 ^y though they had afked forgivenefs for that 
 f< ojfence^^ 
 
 From the time of this forfeiture, to the 
 Revolution in England, the province was 
 
 governed 
 
9«, 
 
 220 Oft f be Majfachujfcts Charter. 
 
 governed by the Royal authority. The 
 powers of Charles and James w txo. arbitrary, 
 yet they were exercifed over the Colonies 
 •with great moueration and jullice ; very 
 different from what they meditated over 
 the fubjedt in Britain. The people poiTeiTed 
 what they had never enjoyed before, equal 
 liberty of confcience, more internal peace and 
 juftice, a.^d a crreater fecurity againft its foreign 
 enemies. And yet the^e reftlefs fpirits, in- 
 tolerant of all rule, except that which agreed 
 with their fanatic principles, no fooner heard 
 of the Revolution, than they entered into 
 open rebellion. They feized on the perfon 
 of the Governor and all his officers, and 
 compelled him to furrender up the Govern- 
 jncnt into their own hands. 
 
 The Hoyal Government being thus dif- 
 folved, after the example of thc> independent 
 brethren in England, at the tim^ of the 
 lifurpation, they appointed " a Committee 
 " of Safety," who publiflried a manifefto in 
 vindication of their rebellion. This Com- 
 mittee, foon after, called *^ a General Court, 
 " who refolved to refume the Government 
 ^' according to their Charter rights," They 
 ' "werq 
 
On the Majfachriftts Charter. 
 
 221 
 
 were now In pofTeflion of the great obje£l oi' 
 their purfuits, independence ; and, therefore, 
 had no thoughts of proclaiming the Prince of 
 Orange. But they foon .^bund, that a Go- 
 vernment thus ufurped, and fo confufed, was 
 feeble and incompetent to the prefervation of 
 the peace. Anarchy, with all the diforders 
 and crimes incident to it, enfued. Befides, 
 the General Court itfelf were confcious of the 
 illegality of their powers, and feared that 
 punifhment which their ufurpation and re-- 
 hellion deferved. In this wretched ftate of 
 their affairs, they received orders from Wil- 
 liam to continue the Government in his name, 
 until he fhoiild give fuch directions for the 
 Government, as fl: ould conduce to his fer- 
 " vice, and the good of hts fubjeds, within 
 " that colony." 
 
 (( 
 
 C( 
 
 This lenity in William was as unexpedled 
 as it was unmerited ; it difpelled the dark 
 cloud of fear which fo lately hung over their 
 minds. And, in proportion as their fear of 
 punifhment vanifhed, a hope arofe, that they 
 fhould fucceed in procuring a confirmation 
 from the Crown of their democratical Go- 
 vernment And, as an introdudtion to its 
 ^' favour. 
 
Si'fpi'.'^ 
 
 ii' /.'■■'. ■ 
 
 1 
 
 at 
 
 2iJ2 * On the Majfachtifets Charter* 
 
 favour, they now, and not before, proclaimed 
 William with that fplendour which they 
 hoped would convince him of, what was moil 
 diftant from their hearts, their fmcerity. 
 
 The Prince being firmly feated on the BritiHi 
 throne, and the Common-wealth abolifhed, 
 they perceived, that the tenure of their power 
 depended on the pleafiare of the Crown, 
 and that prefent fubmiffion and felicitation 
 were the moft prudent plans of policy. j^Tei 
 ther fubmiffion nor folicitation was wanting. 
 Enthufiafm, whether in religion or politics, 
 never wants induftry. Their agents were in- 
 cefTant in their endeavours to procure a re- 
 ftoration of their old republican powers. But 
 William was already too well acquainted with 
 their repugnancy to the fundamental laws of 
 the Government, which he had reftored In 
 England, and with the mifchiefs that had 
 thence arifen to the State, as well as to the 
 colonifts themfelves. He faw that they were 
 incompetent to the prefervation of the order 
 and peace of the colony, that they excluded, 
 in a manner, the authority of the Crown and 
 Parliament over the people ; that they dif- 
 folved all fubordination and relation between 
 ' ; the 
 
Ch the Maffcichujfets Charter, 
 
 
 tlie principal and inferior fociety; between 
 the fupreme will of the State and its members ; 
 and that an inferior fociety, eftablifhed on 
 fuch principles, would be as ufelefs to the 
 State, as an amputated limb to the human 
 body, but by no means fo innocent. For thefe 
 reafons, that wife Prince, we may fafely con- 
 clude, refufed to reflore their old Charter. 
 
 A new Charter was drawn, in which it ap- 
 pears, that the King wifhed to reform pafl 
 errors, and to reduce the colony to fome de- 
 gree of fubordination to the State. Some of 
 the regulations feemed to lead to that meafure, 
 and perhaps, with a people whofe minds had 
 not been long before poifoned with repub- 
 lican principles, they would have had fome 
 effedl. But the force of the remedy applied, 
 was greatly inadequate to the power of the 
 difeafe. To eradicate principles fo deeply 
 rooted in enthufiafm, and confirmed by educa- 
 tion, it was neceffary to make the reformation 
 full and perfed. And this could only be done 
 byeftabhlhing the famepolitical orders, officers, 
 and members, and upon the fame principles, and 
 by governing the people by the fame general 
 law^s, which were eftablifhed in the principal 
 
 fociety. 
 
 ' t 
 
WW 
 
 224 0/i the Miiffachiifds Charter * 
 
 fociety. This, and this only, would, in time, 
 have imperceptibly alienated the minds of the 
 people from their democratical polity, and re- 
 conciled them to a mixed form of Govern- 
 ment. But the regulations of tha Charter 
 fell far fhort of this remedy. The funda- 
 mental laws of the State were not adhered to, 
 but violated. The rights of the Crown, the 
 neceflliry check to popular ambition and li- 
 centi .'^n^fs, and the balance of power be- 
 tween ti. aionarcliical and democratical order, 
 were all fwallowed up in the heterogeneous 
 and repugnant principles of this inferior de- 
 mocratical fyftem. 
 
 To fupport thefe truths, we mufl have re- 
 courfe to the Charter, Here we find the 
 |brm of the old Government was not al- 
 tered. It confifts, as before, of a Gover- 
 nor, Deputy Governor, Counfellors, or Af- 
 fiftants, and an Aflembly. Thefe politic 
 members form three orders or branches. 
 Thus far they refemble the Conftitution of 
 the Britifh State. But the refemblance goes 
 no farther. The principles upon which 
 they ai;e eftablifhed, aie as different, in polity, 
 
 from 
 
 io' .' 1 
 
 i 
 
of 
 
 On the Mcijfachufets Charter, 225 
 
 from thofe of the State, as the principles of 
 democracy are from thofe of monarchy. 
 
 The Governor and Deputy Governor are 
 indeed appointed by the Crown. From 
 whence, one would imagine, without attend- 
 ing to other circumftances, that they were 
 dependent on, and a juft and proper repre- 
 fentation of it. But the fad is far different. 
 Their weight and influence in Government, 
 are little more than a fhadow. The excel- 
 lence of the Englifh Conftitution confifts, 
 ?is I have ihewn, in having three orders, 
 all independent of each other, in their 
 rights, and in their eflates; both being 
 neceffary to a free and unbiafTed exercife 
 of their judgments. And, therefore, the 
 King holds the civil lift, as the fapport 
 of his family and dignity, for life. The 
 Lords have their eftates, and the Commons 
 theirs, independent of each other. Let us 
 fuppofe, that the King, or Lords, were de- 
 pendent on an annual vote of the Commons 
 for the fupport of their dignities and families, 
 what would become of their independence, 
 and how fooii would the ftru£ture of the 
 mixed monarchy be diflblved ? But the intent 
 
 CL of 
 
'226 On the Majfachnfcts Chartef. 
 
 of the coniliitiition goes farther ; for, it is not 
 only necefTary to the maintenance of that 
 check, on the natural licentioufnefs of the 
 people, which is vefted in the King, that he, 
 but that all his officers, fhould be independent 
 of the popular order of the State. And, 
 therefore, in Britain, their fupport is in- 
 cluded in the civil lift, or in the perquifites 
 of office, eftablifhed by permanent laws. But 
 the Governor, and Deputy Governor, the 
 Reprefentatives of the King, in this inferior 
 fociety, have no fettled falaries. They are 
 dependent on the General AfTembly for 
 fuch as it fhall, frc time to time, h^graci^ 
 oujly pleafed to grant. And, if they are de- 
 pendent on the Crown for their appoint- 
 ments, they are dependent on the Aflembly 
 for their dally breads This bread is ever 
 given in proportion as thefe officers gratify 
 the donors in their licentious defigns, or not at 
 all. Hence, it often happens, that the duty 
 and intereft of a Governor are in oppofition 
 to each other. The firft leads him to obey one 
 mafter, while the fecond compels him to fa- 
 crifice his judgrxient to another. If he op- 
 pofes the meafures of the Aflembly, he ftarves ; 
 and if he confirms them, there Js only a 
 
 chance 
 
Ofi the Majfachufds Charier, CL2j 
 
 tKance of his lofing his office. For experi- 
 ence has taught him rather to rely on royal 
 flivour, than on the mercy of an obftinate, 
 clifgurced, popuhir AfTembly, which nevet 
 ceafes to piirfuc its dcfigns while there is any 
 hope of fuccefs. ^ ' • ... 
 
 The Counfellors, or Aflidants, which forni 
 the fecond branch, and which ought, in an 
 inferior degree, to reprefent tlie fecond order 
 of the State, inflead of receiving their ap- 
 pointments from the Crown, or its Repre- 
 fentative, are annually appointed or removed 
 by the General Court. This Court confifls 
 of the Governor, Council, and AlTembly; 
 the Courtcil of twenty-eight rnembers, and 
 the AfTembly of one hundred and eighty. For 
 the eledion of the members of Council, they 
 meet in one houfe, and the election is made 
 by a majority of votes. The power of elect- 
 ing whom they plcafe, is, therefore, always 
 in the Aflembly, who having near feven 
 votes to one of the Council, can always over- 
 rule their judgments at pleafure. The Go- 
 vernor has the infignificant right to put his 
 negative on any perfon eleded a member of 
 the Council. I call this negative infignificant, 
 \ . 0^2 becaufe 
 
IF 
 ■i 
 
 
 ,■) 
 
 C28 On the Majfacbufds Charter, 
 
 becaufe thefe popular orders having the elec- 
 tion in their own hands, will ever eledl and 
 return to the Governor, for his aflent or ne- 
 gative, fuch men as they conceive will fiip- 
 port their own popular meaf'ures. And flioukl 
 an improper perfon be rejeded by the Go- 
 vernor, another, a third, or a fourth, equally, 
 or more improper, would be eledled and re- 
 turned, until the Governor fhould confirm 
 the eledion. So that the Council, inftead of 
 being an independent order, is entirely de- 
 pendent on the democratical and lowed 
 branch of the Government, and, confequent- 
 ly, morally incapable, and unfit to anfwer the 
 end intended by the inftitution of the middle 
 order. For, inftead of forming an independ- 
 ent check and balance againft the, illegal at- 
 tempts of the other two, it is naturally led 
 to throw Its whole weight into that fcale from 
 whence /'/ receives its exijlence^ and which 
 may take it away at its pleafure* It is fo far 
 from being an indifferent independent power, 
 that it is a weight improperly added to the 
 democratical branch, which muft ever render 
 it too powerful for the monarchical, and 
 above all check or controuL 
 
 , ..: ■ , ■■■ • :. ....': The 
 
Oft the Majfachjifds Charter, 229 
 
 The AiTcmbly, or third order, is eleded 
 by the different towns and diftridts, and in 
 this refpedt, is fubilantiaily a reprefentation of 
 the Houib of Commons. It claims, and 
 cxercifes all the independent powers, rights, 
 and privileges, of that order. But its rights 
 and powers, under the Charter, do not flop 
 here. Befides the right of appointing the 
 middle order of the Government, it partici- 
 pates in many of the executive rights and 
 powers of the Crown, infomuch that the 
 exercife of them muft originate with the Af- 
 fembly, and cannot be carried into effeO: 
 without their confent. 
 
 
 Such is the conflltution of the legiflative au- 
 thority of this Government. What are the 
 powers conferred by the Charter on its feveral 
 orders ? In their legiflative capacities, they fit 
 and a6t as three diftind branches. The Council, 
 or Aflembiy, prepare bills, and having agreed, 
 they fend them to the Governor for his con- 
 currence or difl!ent. The Council being in a 
 manner appointed, and liable to be removed 
 by the AflTembly, once in every year, it is rea- 
 fonable and natural to conceive, that an har- 
 mony in judgment will generally fubfift be- 
 
 Q 3 tween 
 
 •• i 
 
330 On the Majfachufets Charter* 
 
 twecn them ; and that on any favourite bill 
 their united Ibree will be ever exerted againft 
 that of the Governor|. And the Gover- 
 nor being dependent on them for his falary 
 and fubfiftence, it is as natural and reafonable 
 for thofe who confider the frailties of human 
 nature, to believe, that the firmnefs and 
 virtue of a Governor thus circumflanced, 
 are fcarcely to be depended- on. What then 
 can be the weight or importance of the 
 Governor's right of diffent to the laws pro- 
 pofed by the other branches of the Legifla- 
 ture ? The true anfwer is'nothing, or at leafl: 
 next to nothing." The influence and weight 
 of the orders which ought to reprefent the 
 monarchical and arillocratical branches of the 
 State, are chained, like Prometheus, to a rock, 
 never to be efTedually unlpofed while the 
 Charter exifts. ;^ -^^u^.^* ,, . , .,is .(^ ^-> , 
 
 ■-n?r;' 
 
 .*fothe Governor, and this General Court, 
 or Aflembly, the fupreme direction of the 
 Government was granted in the following in-f 
 definite terms; " And we do, for us, our 
 *' heirs and fucceflTors, give and grant to the 
 ^' faid Governor, and the Great and General 
 ^' Qouvi or AiTembly, /((II poiitier and author 
 
'> 
 
 On the Mcijfachnfds Charter, 231 
 
 ** rlly^ from time to time, to make, ordain, 
 *' and eftablllh, all manner of wholcfome 
 *' and reafonable ordeny laws^ Jlatutes^ or^ 
 *' dinancesy dlrcBlons^ and injlru^lons^ either 
 *' with penalties or witlioiit (fo as the fame be 
 " not repugnant, or contrary to the laws of 
 " this our realm of England) as they Ihall 
 *' judge to be for the good and welfare of 
 ^' our faid province and territory, and order- 
 ♦' ing thereof, and of the people inhabiting, 
 " or that fhall inhabit the fame, and for the 
 ^' fiecejfary fupport and defence of the Govern - 
 ♦' ment, And to name and fettle, annually^ 
 *' all civil officers within the faid province 
 *' (fuch officers excepted, the eledlions or 
 *' conftitutlcn of whom we have, by thefe 
 *' pref nts, referved to us, our heirs and fuc- 
 " ceflbrs, and to the Governor of the pro- 
 *' vince), to fet forth their fever at duties ^ 
 ^' powers^ a?td Uinits^ and the forms of fuch 
 *' oaths y not repugnant to the laws of Eng- 
 ^ land,, for the execution of their feveral 
 *' offices ; to levy proportionable and reafon- 
 " able rates and taxes, on the perfons and 
 ^' eftates of the inhabitants, for the necefjaiy 
 *' defence and fupport of the Government. 
 *' And to difpofe of all matters and things^ 
 
 C)j\. ^' whereby 
 
2r2 
 
 On the Majfachufels Charter* 
 
 " whereby our fubjeds, the inhabitants of the 
 •* faid province, may be religioujly^ peace" 
 " ablyy and civilly governed^ protcdicd^ and 
 
 *' defended* 
 
 ri 
 
 1 he modilications and extent of thefe ppw^rs 
 require no comment. The reader will, on the 
 lirfl perufal, perceive, that they are as evidently 
 repugnant to the principles and fundamental 
 laws ol the State, as language can make them : 
 That their ftrudture is, in effedt, that of a per- 
 fedl democracy, while the conftitution of the 
 State is a mixed monarchy : And that there 
 is no matter fufceptible of human direO' , 
 and neceflary to the fefety of an indepenuent 
 fociety, or to fovereignty itfelf, to which this 
 inferior member is not made competent. In 
 what then can confift its fubordination to the 
 State, or its political conr^edipn with it \ 
 
 TTie conftitution of the executive powers 
 was not lefs impolitic and inconfiftepit with 
 the fundamental laws of the State, than the 
 legiflative. The Governor poflefle^ a power 
 to call, prorogue, and diflblve the General 
 Court, within the year. But this right is 
 rendered of littl? confequence by the ar^nual 
 
 eledions, 
 
On the Majfachufets Charter, 433 
 
 elc6tlons, and the fuperior influence of the 
 democratical order of the foclety. For, whoa 
 he has diflblved the General Court, that dil- 
 folution has ever recommended the oki mem- 
 bers to the favour of the people ; and there 
 has been fcarcely an inflance in v^^hich the 
 fame members have not been rc-elcclcd ; and 
 when met they have feldom failed to refume 
 the former fubjevSls of controverfy. Their 
 fcntiments thus confirmed by the voice of the 
 people, their former purfuits are never given 
 Up, however unjuft, or however inconfiftent 
 with the rights of the Crown, or the balance 
 which ought to be preferved between the dif- 
 ferent orders of the fociety, or however mif- 
 chievous to the interefls of the fociety itfelf. 
 And by an obftinate perfeverance in their am- 
 bitious defigns, the Governor, at length, 
 tired with difputes, d.,pendent on them for his 
 falary, and incapable of maintaining the 
 rights of the Crown, yields them up, with 
 his judgment and duty, to an influence which 
 he has not power to controul. 
 
 The Governor has likewife authority to 
 ** appoint Judges, Commiflloners of Oyer 
 ** find Terminer, Sheriffs, ]frovofl:Sj Marfhals, 
 
 " Juftices 
 
w 
 
 II; ., 
 
 
 :f! 
 
 M 
 
 «« 
 
 134 0« //6^ Maffachrfets Charter » 
 
 *' Jufticts of the Peace, and other Officers to 
 the Council and Courts of Ju^ice belongs 
 ing." But even here his judgment is in 
 political bondage. He muft, firft, give feven 
 days notice to the Council to meet ; arid obr 
 tain their " advice and confenf to every ap- 
 pointment. Thus a legiflative populgr order 
 has a negative on the perfon holding the exe- 
 cutive authority, may diflent frcm him as 
 often as they pleafe, and put him under the 
 neceffity of nominating others, until he Ihall 
 fix upon thofe that are under their influence, 
 or of prefidlngover a fociety without Officers to 
 execute the laws, and to tranfad the bufuiefs 
 of Government. The right to coiiftitute 
 all other civil Officers, tind to remove them 
 from their offices, is vefted in the Council and 
 Afiembly, independent of the Governor. So 
 that the Governor, who ought to poffefs th- 
 fole and exclufive right to the executive 
 powers, has not a right to appoint one civil 
 Officer. 
 
 ^. , 
 
 i 
 
 la this flrange and abfurd manner, are the 
 three principal orders of the MafTachufets 
 Government jumbled together, into one poli-^ 
 tical chaos, in direct contradidion to the fun- 
 damental 
 
On the Majfachujfds Charter, 23^ 
 
 damerital laws and polity of the State. Thofe 
 checks, and that balance, which ought to ex- 
 tend through every political member, and 
 which conilitute and lecure the liberty and 
 fafety of the principal fyftem, arc effectually 
 deftroycd. Inflead of a perfeft reprefenta- 
 tion of the monarchical and democratical 
 powers placed in oppofite fcales, nearly ba- 
 lanced, with an indifferent and independent 
 ariflocratical order, ever ready to controul the 
 illegal attempts of the other two, the mo- 
 narchical exifts only in name. The arifto- 
 cratical inuuence is thrown into the demo- 
 cratical, and the democratical, which, from 
 the nature c<f man, ftands mod in need of 
 controul, is thefource of all power ^ and above 
 fill controuL 
 
 
 ts 
 
 al 
 
 Candoiir requires, that I fhould now take 
 notice of thc^e articles which feem to create 
 any degree of fubordination in this inferior 
 fociety. There is, in thivs, as in fome of the 
 ether Charters, a refervatioi of a right to ap- 
 peal from the judgment, or fentence, of any 
 Judicatory or Court within the province, to 
 the King ard his Privy Council. But this 
 appeal is cc ifined to perfonal adions. The 
 
 -v. fubjed: 
 
236 On the Majfachufcts Charter^ 
 
 ■^ ^ ■ >l 
 
 fubjed has no remedy againft an erroneous 
 and unjuft determination in adtions real or 
 mixed, fhould any perfon be found io hardy 
 aci to appeal from a dtcifion given by the Ge- 
 neral Court, where all caules are ultimately 
 adjudged, ; 
 
 
 There is alfo a nugatory injunction, with- 
 out a penalty, to tranl'mit the laws for the 
 ** Royal approbation or difallowance," to 
 which the remarks I have made on the like 
 injundlion in the other Charters will juftly 
 apply. I need not, therefore, repeat tliem 
 here. The Governor holds the right of ap- 
 pointing the military Officers, and of Gom^ 
 manding the military force of the province. 
 But this, of all the numerous rights and pre- 
 rogatives of the Crown, is the only one dele- 
 gated by the Charter to him. The others, 
 we have feen, are veftecl either in him joint- 
 Iv with the Council, or in the Council and 
 AiTembly, fubjed only to his negative. A 
 prerogative thus unfupported, and liable to 
 be controuled by the weight and influence of 
 th^ Council and AfTembly, muft be truly 
 unimportant in the fociety 5 it can never 
 fupport the civil Magiftrate in his endear 
 
 vours 
 
On the Majfacbtifets Charter. 237 
 
 vours to preferve the internal peace, or to 
 repel the force of an external enemy, or to 
 maintain the rights of the principal fociety. 
 
 It is alfo a provifion in the Charter, that 
 the laws made for the regulation of the 
 colony, are not to be " repugnant, or con- 
 " trary" to the laws of England. The intent 
 of this provifion, when we confidcr the un- 
 limited powers granted, feems difficult to un- 
 derftand. Had the fundamental laws of the 
 State been purfued in the ftrudture of the in- 
 ferior fociety ; had the legiflative powers been 
 confined to fuch local laws and regulations, as 
 might be necelTary to promote the defign of 
 the patent, leaving the peo]ile to be governed 
 by the general laws of the fupreme authority ; 
 this provifion would ^vc been intelligible, 
 becaufe it would have confifted with the fun- 
 damental laws of the State, and wich tlofe 
 principles upon which all inferior focicties 
 have ever been, and ought ever to bc» con- 
 ftituted. The Charter would then have fpoken 
 this plain and fenfible language, " The pcj- 
 '* pie of the colony are to be governed L; the 
 " general laws of the fupreme legiflative au- 
 " thority. But they ihall, notwithftanding, 
 
 " poifefs 
 
'■.^^'v^ ^-y- TFyy^^T^vw^'ff^wj- 
 
 438 On the Majfachufets Charter. 
 
 Ar- 
 
 i^ 
 
 (C 
 
 <c 
 
 cc 
 
 iC 
 
 (C 
 
 C( 
 
 iC 
 
 (( 
 
 pofTefs a right to make all fuch laws as may 
 be necefTary to promote the fcttlementj 
 ** cultivation, and improvement of th^ 
 colony, to which they are, from their local 
 and more circumflantial knowledge, rea- 
 fonably prefumed to be more competent^ 
 provided that even thofe laws fhall not be 
 repugnant to the general laws of Eng- 
 land." Here would have been confiftency* 
 The provifion would have agreed with the 
 general regulations. But, inafmuch as the le-» 
 giflative powers granted by the Charter were 
 unlimited, and might be extended even to a 
 rejedion or repeal of the general laws of the 
 State, and to the making any others in theit 
 (lead, and as the Charter ftridly confines the 
 allegiance of the people to the colonial laws^ 
 this provifion is eviclently abfurd and nugatory* 
 It i« abfurd, becaufe it creates no fubordina-* 
 tion ; and it is nugatory, becaufe it is fuper- 
 feded, or rendered ineffedual, by the unlimit- 
 ed powers of the CI: irter. And it is nuga- 
 tory for a yet better reafon, becaufe no King 
 of this realm ever pofleiTed a power to enable 
 the people to make laws " repugnant" to the 
 general laws of the State, nor even to fufpend 
 the force of, or to exempt ^r\X\^ fuhjedis xn-^ 
 
 5 habiting 
 
On the Majfachiifftls Charier, 239 
 
 habiting Britt/Jj territor ^ either within or an- 
 nexed to the realm, from the obedience due 
 to the laws of the BrlbJI^ legijlaturc. It is 
 impoflible to conceive a powtx' more danger- 
 ous to the conftitution, or more inconfillent 
 with the nature of civil fociety, be its fornn 
 what it may. For if the King may dilcharge 
 his fubjeds from their allegiance to the legif- 
 lative power, of which he is only the fupreme 
 truftee, he may apply that allegiance to what 
 mode of Government he pleafes. He may, 
 as ^ames I. did in the Virginia Charters, 
 afTume the complete powers of a defpotic le- 
 giflator, and diredt the allegiance of the peo- 
 ple to himfelf : Or, as Charles I. and II. did, 
 he may grant them to others, in perpetual in- 
 heritance, and thus fubvert that conftitution 
 of Government which he is entrufted to 
 prefcrve. • 
 
 )le 
 
 the 
 
 id 
 
 [n- 
 
 But whatever may have been the intent of 
 this provifion, it is certain, that neither in the 
 Proprietary nor Charter colonies, has it been 
 interpreted, either by the Proprietaries or the 
 people, in a fenfe confiftent with their fubor- 
 dination. Both of them have confidered the 
 word " repugnant," as fo general and inde- 
 
 fin'te. 
 
^I«"«W' 
 
 u 
 
 ^.■/ 
 
 240 On the Majfacbufets Charter. 
 
 finite, that they could apply it, at all times^ 
 to their own finifter views and purpofes. 
 They have faid, that laws may be widely 
 variant from, and yet not " repugnant ^^ 
 or contrary " to the laws of England;" that 
 " no laws can be repugnant," which are 
 not palpably contradidtory and oppojite : and 
 have adled accordingly. 
 
 One example among many will llluftrate 
 their language and condud. The common 
 law declares, that, upon the demife of a parent, 
 his lands, held in common focage, fhall de- 
 fcend to his eldeft fon. Now, to make a law 
 " repugnant" to the common law in this 
 refpedt, it muft be, that the youngeft fon, to 
 the difherifon of the eldeft, fhall take the 
 patrimony. Bjit^that a law which gives to 
 the eldefl fon a part ever fo fmall, is only va-^ 
 riant from, but not " repugnant to," the 
 common law. In this manner, the Colonifts 
 have reafoned, and in conformity to their re- 
 publican principles, which are to deftroy all 
 diftindlions of rank, and reduce every man in 
 the fociety, as nearly as poflfibley to a level, 
 in regard to honours and eftate, they have 
 paifed a6ts for making partition of lands 
 ,. • 6 among 
 
»» 
 
 ■ On the Majfachufcts Charter, 241 
 
 among all the children, allowing the eldcft 
 fon only a double portion. And this, they 
 contend, is no deviation from the fcnfe of the 
 provifion. 
 
 rate 
 non 
 ent, 
 de- 
 law 
 this 
 , to 
 the 
 s to 
 va-^ 
 the 
 ills 
 re- 
 all 
 nin 
 vel, 
 ave 
 nds 
 
 ong 
 
 Nor have they hefitated to go further. The 
 general law^s of England, made for the fecu- 
 rity of the perfons and properties of the fub- 
 jcd, have met with the fame fate. They 
 have altered almoft all the laws relating to 
 felonies, larcenies, and other offences againft 
 the peace of fociety. They have inflicted 
 penalties, in fome inftances, much more 
 fevere ; in others, more mild ; and, in general, 
 widely variant from thofe impofed by the 
 laws of England. In Pennfylvania, noftatu^e, 
 relative to the peace and order of the colony, 
 is adjudged to be in force, unlefs fpecially ex- 
 tended by an ad of the Proprietary Affembly. 
 In the Maffachufets Government, they have 
 declared, that no law of the Britifh Legiilature 
 fhall be of force, unlefs re-enaded, or extend- 
 ed, by their own legiflature : And in all Charter 
 Colonies, they have conduded themfelves a- 
 greeably to this principle. Thus is the polity of 
 all States, whether civilized or Barbarian, re- 
 verfed. The inferiour and fubordinate power 
 
 R ^ gives 
 
^;* V' » 
 
 11 •■" ' 
 
 242 O/i ihc Majfiichujcls Charter » 
 
 gives validity to the a(fls of the fuperiour— 
 of the fupreme authority, or rejeds them at 
 pleafure ! Politicians may look, if they pleafe, 
 for order, confiftency and fiibordination in 
 the inferior focieties, where thefe powers pre- 
 vail ; I fliall leave them to be convinced by the 
 event. That muft fet them right. I wifh it 
 may not be when the mifchiefs arifing to Bri- 
 tain from fuch powers are beyond all remedy. 
 
 
 To thefe unlimited, and, by their feveral 
 conftitutions, fupreme Legiflatures, and to - 
 thefe laws, thus variant from the laws of Eng- 
 land, the ColoniRs, by the Charters, are 
 ilriclly enjoined, under the penalties contained 
 in the laws, to give their allegiance ; and, in 
 confequence of this injunction, they are 
 fworn to do fo. If this is not a diredt dif- 
 chargc of Britiih fubjedls from their allegiance 
 to the Britiih Government, it certainly 
 amounts to one ; and could we fuppofe, that 
 the Chartcis were founded in legal and confti- 
 tutional authority, it might be pleaded in ef- 
 fed:ual bar. For the doctrinal truth, that 
 " A man cannot ferve two mailers," if we 
 had not received it from the higheft authority, 
 is too evident to common fenfe and experi- 
 ence 
 
 
On the Mnjfuchufets Charier. 243 
 
 ence to be denied. A man cannot aflcnt to 
 two repugnant propofitions. How then can the 
 fame men be the fubjedls of the Proprietary 
 and Charter Governments, veiled with the 
 unlimited powers before defcribed, and havin^^- 
 laws fo dilTonant to the laws of England, and 
 yet remain fubjecls of the Government of 
 Great Britain ? It is in the nature and reafon 
 of things impofTible. 
 
 , are 
 ained 
 d, in 
 T are 
 dif- 
 ;iance 
 :ainly 
 that 
 »n{li- 
 in ef- 
 that 
 if we 
 |ority, 
 :peri- 
 ence 
 
 Of this impofTibllity the difaffedcd repub- 
 licans in America, before their declaration of 
 independence, availed themfelves in argu- 
 ment againfl the authority of Parliament. 
 They have contended, that feeing it impoffi- 
 ble to obey two different complete legiflative 
 powers, and that they are fworn to obey that 
 of the Colony, they can owe no allegiance 
 to the Britifli Parliament j and, therefore, that 
 the King, in America, is not a reprefentative 
 of the Britifh State, but only the diftindt re- 
 prefentative of the feveral colonial legiflatures; 
 that though the King was their King, yet 
 the Parliament was not their Parliament, be- 
 caufe they were bound to obey laws different 
 from the laws of Parliament j that w^hen they 
 , . R 3 fwear 
 
 * 
 
■,-r] 
 
 244 On the Majfachti/ds Charter, 
 
 fwear allegiance to the King, it is to him as 
 lupreme reprefentative of the Colonial Legif- 
 latures, and not as reprefentative of the Britiili 
 rarliament ; and that there is " no abfurdi- 
 " ty in fuppofing, that an oath of allegiance, 
 ** taken by the Colonifts, to be taken to him, 
 " to the King as reprefentative of xht fu^ 
 " preme legi/lative power of the Cohny^'' 
 
 
 'fs ^ 
 
 i 
 
 I L' 
 
 This do£lrine, there is much reafon to be- 
 lieve, would have been palatable to James I. 
 The complexion of the Charters, granted in 
 his time, countenances the conjedure. Nor 
 did the public condudl of Charles I. or II. 
 rejedl the idea. All of them endeavoured to 
 increafe their own power at the expence of 
 that of the legiflature. But the whole tenor 
 of his prefent Majcfty's condudl muft con- 
 vince the world, that he ha& a£ted on very 
 different principles. He has rejected and re- 
 probated the offers of the fovereignty of 
 America, independent of his Parliament. 
 Faithful to his royal trulls, and determined 
 to preferve the liberties of his fubje^ts, he 
 has conftantly declared their offers to be trea- 
 fon againft the State. In his fpeeches from 
 the throne, he has pronounced the authors of 
 
 them 
 
Ou the Mciffacbuft'ts Charter. 245 
 
 tlicm rebels, and called on his Parliament for 
 alliftance to enable him to defend their own 
 rights, and the rights of his people, from fo 
 daring an ufurpation. 
 
 To trace, in detail, the turbulent and fedi- 
 tious conduct of the people under this Char- 
 ter, would be more tedious than entertaining. 
 It would protradl this chapter to an inordinate 
 length. Bcfides, this tafk is already per- 
 formed by that faithful Hiftorian, their late 
 Governor, Hutchinfon. To this Hiftory I 
 will prefume to refer the more inquifitive 
 reader, contenting myfelf with only obferving, 
 that the new Charter did not, in any refpedl, 
 change the meafures or opinions of thefe de- 
 luded people. The fame reftlefs and republi- 
 can fpirit — the fame enmity to the conftitu- 
 tional i'uthority of the State — the fame thirft 
 for independence in Government — the fame 
 attempt to wreft from their Governors the 
 few rights and prerogatives which were re- 
 ferved in the Crown, and the fame public 
 commotions and convulfions, continued down 
 to their declaration of independence. Nor 
 could any man of reflection expert it could 
 happen ptherwife. The Charter was not cal- 
 
 R 3 c dated 
 
(it 
 
 !' 
 
 y ; t! 
 
 
 246 On the Miijfiichnfcts Charter. 
 
 culated to produce a change in the manners, 
 opinions, and dcfigns of men, which had hcen 
 fo long confirmed hy education. Nothing 
 fhort of a (Charter founded in the principles 
 of the Britifh Government, and a [\y\0. ad- 
 lierence to thofe principles, could have pro- 
 duced that eflccl. 
 
 ■'* 
 
 
 % 
 
 Had William eonftituted, hy this Charter, 
 an inferior body politic, confiRing of a per- 
 fect reprcfjntation of the Crown, vefted, in 
 a fubordinate degree, with its legiflative and 
 executive rights, and always accountable to it, 
 a middle independent order, reprefenting the 
 Houfe of Lords, and a reprefentation of the 
 people; and had he enjoined a ftrid: obedience 
 to the general flatute and common laws of 
 the realm, reafon, and all experience, mufl: 
 convince us, that thofe republican ideas which 
 had been foflered under their old Charter, 
 muft have been gradually, and long before 
 this time, eradicated, and an attachment to 
 the principles of a mixed monarchy formed 
 in their ftead. Their dcfire of independence 
 would have been loft in a fcnfe of the benefits 
 which they would have received, from their 
 iubprdinatlon and fubjcdion to the moll ra- 
 
 ■ tional 
 
On the Mjjlhbiifcts CbarUr, 2^^ 
 
 llonal lyftciu of profedinn and government. 
 in the world. But the Maliaclmiets Charter 
 was formed on j>rinciplcs fo repugnant to 
 thofe of the St:'tc, that they eould not fail to 
 create in the people an enmity to it, had their 
 minds heen ever To unprejudieed. It wiia 
 perfectly adapted to nourilli and fupport that 
 fpirit of independence, which the lirfl: fettler;. 
 carried over with them, and whicli hecamc 
 daily more confu'med under their hrll: dcmo- 
 cratical Charter. 
 
 Numerous arc the fa£ls which prove, that 
 this inferior focicty has never fiiilcd to take 
 every advantage of the confufion and diilrefs 
 of the Britifh Government, to throw off their 
 dependence. In the time of the civil wars, 
 which produced the ufurpation, they feeretly 
 enjoined their agents to a.Tift in fomenting 
 and increafmg the fcdition. When the iifui- 
 pation was effedcd, they, with infinite ad- 
 dreis and difhmuhitioji, courted and bartered 
 the commonweallh, hut rcfufed to carr) on 
 the bufmefs of their Government in its m me, 
 or under its authority, and aded, during its 
 continuance, as an independent' fovereignty. 
 When Charles was rci'lored, they declined for 
 
 K 4 more 
 
24? On the Mrjfachufcts Charter, 
 
 more than a year to proclaim him, and then 
 did it with the utmofl reluctance, At the 
 time of the Revolution, they fcized the Go- 
 vernor appointed by James, and ufurped the 
 Government ; but not with defign to deliver 
 it up to William, nor to become fubordinate 
 to the conftitution which he had reftored, and 
 therefore they proclaimed him with as much 
 reludlance and chagrin, as they had done 
 Charles the Second. 
 
 The queflion here occurs, what could have 
 induced them fo frequently to return to their 
 rominal fubordir^ation to the Britilh Govern- 
 ment \ The true anfwer is, NecefTity. Their 
 enthufiafm and rage for independence, often 
 led them to attempt it when their own weak^ 
 nefs forbad it. Whenever the Britifh nation 
 was diftradled by internal difcord, or diftrelfed 
 by foreign wars, they thought it the period 
 which Heaven had deftined for their deliver- 
 ance ; and therefore they always embraced 
 fuch opportunities to fet up the ftandard of 
 independence, hoping that thofe difcords and 
 wars v>rould end in the deftru6tion of the Britifli 
 inonarchy; not confidering their own weaknefs, 
 and the f perior power of the Parent State, 
 
 6 when 
 
 m 
 
 it- 
 
On the Majfachufds Charter, 249 
 
 when its peace fhould be reftored. Their hopes 
 led them into rebellion, their difappointmenta 
 into the moiv. abject fubmiflion. 
 
 At the conclufion of the laft "war, much 
 experience had proved, that they had but two 
 diHiculties to furmount ; the power of the 
 Britifh State, and that of the Canadians and 
 Indians. They thought this the proper time 
 to get rid of one of them. Fortunately for 
 their defign. It happened that Dodlor Frank- 
 lin, a Boftonian by birth, a republican in 
 principle, and a pcrfon of great intrigue and 
 abilities, was then a colony agent in London, 
 lliis gentleman was employed to prevail on 
 the Councils of Britain, to give up, in the 
 treaty of peace, fome of the Weft Indian 
 conqueft for the cefTion of Canada. For this 
 purpofe, he publifhed a pamphlet, intitled, 
 ♦' The Intcreft of Great Britain confidered, 
 " occ." The intrigues of this Colony pre- 
 vailed, Canada was ceded to Britain, and the 
 feditious fucceeded in delivering themfelves 
 from one great check to their independ- 
 ence. 
 
 -J 
 
 n 
 
 Upon 
 
mr 
 
 IM 
 
 I 
 
 250 On the Majfachufds Charier. 
 
 • Upon this event, the entliufiafm of thele 
 people immediately pronounced in their pub- 
 lic papers, that " the corner-ftone of a great 
 " American empire was now laid." Freed 
 from their inceflant WMrs with the natives and 
 Canadians, bordering on their territories, they 
 had leifure to brood over, and to carry into 
 execution, thofe other meafures which led to 
 the accomplilhmcnt of their long meditated 
 and fo often difappointed independence. They 
 well knew, that the Middle and Southern 
 Colonies had not yet entertained the thought. 
 They aUb faw, that it would be neceflary to 
 procure the affifiiance of thefe Colonics. To 
 obtain that afliftance from the people of the 
 Chmxh of England, Methodiils, Quakers, 
 Luthen.ns, Swingfielders, Dumplers, Ana- 
 baptifts, Moravians, they knew was impof- 
 fible. The people were, in general, too firmly 
 attached to the principles of the Britilh Go-^ 
 vernment, to enter into rebellion againfh it. 
 
 But there were feclaries whole principles in 
 religion and government were analogous to 
 their own in all the Middle and Southern 
 Colonic:; ; I mean the Iriih Prefbyterians. 
 To tliern tbcy Iccretly communicated their 
 
 defign, 
 
On the Majfachufds Charier, 251 
 
 dcfign, and made their application for aid. 
 But the feveral churches of thefe feaaries, 
 agreeably to the principles of their church 
 government, were difunited. No one had a 
 connedion with another. It was there- 
 fore necefTary, that their union fhould be 
 effeded, in order to enable them to join in a 
 body with the eaftern fedition. This meafure 
 was warmly recommended by agents from 
 Maflachufets. A Synod was formed at Phila- 
 delphia, reprefenting, and uniting, all the 
 Prelbyterian congregations from Georgia to 
 Nova Scotia. For this meafure, religion was 
 made the oftcnfible pretext, though the inde- 
 pendence of America was the fecret and real 
 motive. 
 
 Between this Synod and the Grand Com- 
 mittee, reprefenting all the congregational and 
 independent churches of New England, fitting 
 annually at Bofton, an union was formed 
 not for aflimilating their religious tenets, for 
 that was impoffiblc, and therefore never at- 
 tempted, but to carry their great plan of in- 
 dependence into execution. In lliort, this 
 war. a politlc:il, and not a religious union. 
 This truth apj^ears e\ident from ;i circular let- 
 ter. 
 
wm. 
 
 n-nav^i 
 
 f^^mr^ 
 
 I 
 
 . i! 
 
 
 if-ffl| 
 
 
 Oil the Majfiichufets Charter, 
 
 cc 
 
 C( 
 
 C( 
 
 ter, and the articles of union *. In which 
 their declared purpofe is, to " unite them- 
 " f b'C> more clofely together, fo that when 
 *' there may he a necejfity to a£t as a body^ we 
 may be enabled to do it whenever they 
 may be called together, to defend their civil 
 as well as religious privileges. ^^ This union 
 was formed immediately after the ceflion of 
 Canada. 
 
 Thus united, thefe two lawlefs combina-* 
 tions devoted, annually, a part of their time, 
 to watch over not only the civil authority of 
 their refpedive provinces, but that of Great 
 Britain. V/hen the regulations in the Stamp 
 Ad came to be executed, the right of Parlia- 
 ment to pafs it became a fubje£t of their dif- 
 cuflion. They were not a long time in de- 
 termining, that the Parliament had no autho- 
 rity to pafs it, and therefore, that it was a 
 violation of their civil liberty. And, as the 
 influence of the New England Committee, 
 and the Pennfylvania Synod, over their people, 
 
 * See this letter and articles in a pamphlet, intitled* 
 " Hiftorical and Political Refleftions on the Rife and Pro- 
 •' grefs of the American Rebellion." Publifhed by Wilkie, 
 St. Paul's Ch irch Yard. 
 
 is 
 
On the MaJJachufets Charter, 
 
 
 is little fhort of that of the Pope, they luia- 
 nimoufly joined in oppoling that ad. Their 
 influence had alfo its effedl on fome perfons of 
 other reHgious denominations, who were de- 
 luded with the fpecious name of liberty. But 
 unanimity in the oppofition was the peculiar 
 charaderiflic of thofe people, while a great 
 majority of the members of the Church of 
 England, and many of the Lutherans, Cal- 
 vinifts, and Baptifts, were avcrle to it, and 
 the Methodifts, Quakers, Moravians, Swing- 
 fielders, Men cnifts, and Dumplers, generally 
 avoided all connection with the fedjtion. 
 
 The fuccefs in frightening the fupreme 
 pov/ers of the firft State in Europe into a re- 
 peal of the ad, was a vidory not to be for- 
 got. It convinced them, that induftry and 
 perfeverance in their treafon, would enfure 
 their wifhed-for independence. Nor was their 
 induftry or perfeverance wanting. Between 
 the repeal of the Stamp Ad and the fubfe- 
 quent regulations of Parliament, the Boftonian 
 agents were conftantly employed throughout 
 America, in deluding the people to take part 
 in their future fedition. When the Tea Ad 
 pafled, they were prepared to meet it. An 
 
 union 
 
(iimuiaK 
 
 vi^piivi.'xn .1 
 
 Bli 
 
 254 On the Majfachtffds Charter. 
 
 union of the Congregational, Independent, and 
 Prefbyterian interefts, was now perfedly efta- 
 blifhed. The plans of their future operations 
 were laid. They had made many profelytes 
 to their fedition among people who differed 
 from them in religious fentiments, under the 
 fpecious pretence of defending their liberty. 
 But what they moft relied on was, an alliance 
 which they had now formed with a fadlion in 
 Britain, who, loft to all fenfe of their coun- 
 try's welfare, entered into an agreement, to 
 clog, and, if poflible, to chain down the 
 powers of Government, while it received all 
 manner of unjuft reproaches, infults, and in- 
 dignities, from its rebellious fubjeds. On 
 the Jidclity cf thefe allies re/led the great hops 
 of rebellion. 
 
 'St 
 
 Thus prepared, the fadlion in MafTachufets 
 determined not to be inactive in their fedition 
 in America, while their faithful friends in 
 Britain were taking every meafure in their 
 power to encourage its progrefs, and to pre- 
 vent its being fuppreffed. Their letters mif- 
 five, and their induftrious agents, traverfed all 
 the Britifh Colonies. The defign of their religi- 
 ous combinations could no longer be concealed. 
 
 The 
 
wim 
 
 On the Majfachnfds Charter. 
 
 2j^ 
 
 The word went forth, and idmoft every Con- 
 gregational and Prefbyterian pulpit through- 
 out North America, refounded with the abufc 
 of Majefty, and treafon againft the Britilli 
 Government. Lawlefs Committees and Con- 
 ventions immediately ftarted up, principally 
 compofed of thefe fedaries, and the flame of 
 rebellion was foon communicated in a greater 
 or lefs degree to all the Colonics ; the confe- 
 quence of which is too well knovv^n to be here 
 recited. 
 
 Before I conclude thefe reflcdions on the 
 Colonial Governments, I fliould not do juftice 
 to my fubjed if I did not oblerve, that they 
 do not rell on mere fpeculative arguments. 
 They ftand confirmed not only by the ftrongeft 
 reafons, but very late experience. For they are 
 founded on thefe inconteftible fads, well known 
 to every perfon who is acquainted with the rife 
 and progrefs of the American rehellion : That, 
 in the New England Colonies, from their firfl 
 fettlement, there has been an unremitting op- 
 pofition to the legal exercife of the Royal pre- 
 rogative, and the Parliamentary authority ; 
 whilft that oppofition has been fcarcely known 
 in any other: That the Maflachufets is the 
 
 only 
 
256 On the Majfachiifds Charter, 
 
 only Colony which, before the prefent revolty 
 ever entered into open rebellion ; the Colony 
 which firfl:, in its public councils, denied the 
 authority of Parliament ; and the Colony 
 which firft raifed money, and levied men 
 to oppofe it : That the prefent revolt was firll 
 meditated, and with great facility brought to 
 perfection by the fadious in the three eaftern 
 governments, before it v\ras thought of in any 
 of the other provir.ces : That the principles 
 of the revolt were by the mofl indefatigable 
 induflry propagated by them through the 
 other Colonies : That the Proprietary Govern- 
 ments next caught the infeCtioUj and em- 
 braced the treafon : And that the Royal Go- 
 vernments came into it laft, and then with 
 great reludtance. 
 
 From thefe fadls, and the preceeding ar- 
 guments, fo fully fupportcd by reafon, we 
 may certainly draw the following unerring 
 inftrudtion. 
 
 I. That the ftruflure of all inferior politic 
 focieties ought to be eftablillied on the fame 
 principles of polity with thole of the State, 
 as it was fettled at the Revolution, if we mean 
 
 to 
 
On the Majfachufds Charter, 2^7 
 
 to eftablifli and prefcrvc their fubordination 
 and obedience to the Britifli Government. 
 
 2. That in proportion as this rule fhall be 
 obferved, there will be in the people a greater 
 or lefs attachment, or a greater or lefs pro- 
 penfity to throw ofT their lubordination and 
 allegiance to the State. And 
 
 3. That while they remain eftablifhed on 
 principles fo heterogeneous and repugnant to 
 thole of the principal fyftem, no permanent 
 union nor harmony can exift between them 
 and the State. A diflike to its polity, and a 
 reluctance to be governed by it ; added to an 
 anxious and reftlefs dcfire of independent 
 rights and powers, mull prevail ; and rebel- 
 lion and revolt be the reiterated confequences, 
 until independence is finally obtained. 
 
 If thefe conclufions be juft, we may cer- 
 tainly, without too much prefumption, draw a 
 fourth, That if the Britilh Councils mean, 
 hereafter, to confider the American Colonies 
 as annexed to, and parts of, the realm ; and as 
 fubordinate members of tlie Britiili State j if 
 
 S they 
 

 R' >^ 
 
 m 
 
 ij8 On the Majfachujcts Charter, 
 
 they wifh to dcllroy the caufes of internal 
 clifcord and tumult, .ind to confer on the peo- 
 ple the henelits and bleffings of upright Go- 
 vernment, a reformation in their iVftcnis of 
 polity mufl take place. They mufl be brought 
 nearer to thofe princii)les upon which the Go- 
 vernment of the principal fociety has been 
 cftablilhed, and which alone can mite and 
 bind them to it. For, otherwife, it does not 
 require the fpirit of prophecy to foretell, that, 
 in much lefs time than half a century, or, in- 
 deed, at the fird favourable opportunity, they 
 will renew their clain^ o independence, and 
 again take arms, and foi m foreign alliances to 
 fupport it. The lame caufes muft ever produce 
 the fame efteds ; and when invigorated by ad- 
 ditional powers, effeds much more mifchie- 
 vous and dangerous to the fafety of the empire. 
 The numbers and wealth of the Colonifts will be 
 cncreafed — their refources enlarged, and their 
 powers to accomplilh their defign be beyond 
 prevention. The blood and treafure we have 
 already fpent in foftering, protedlng, and 
 bringing them b.ck to their duty, and perhaps 
 much more, will be wafted. The Colonies 
 will be loft to Britain, and Britain will fink 
 
 8 into 
 
On the Majfachiifcts Charter, 159 
 
 into infignificance among nations, through 
 the negled or want of iirmnefs in the poli- 
 ticians of the prefer, day, fhould they not 
 attempt a meafure of fuch infinite importance 
 to both countries, wliich is eanic/lly dtfired 
 by a great majority of the Colonijis them^ 
 Jelves, * 
 
 FINIS.