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Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mAthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 1"^*- A ■■ ,-L^jm^^ PARTY SPIRIT In TIME of PUBLICK DANGER, CONSIDERED. f.^. [Price One Shillicg.r •*' 4 ! V -,*v... Ijl I w^mmm^mi^^^^^^^^ f -■ f V'*.'*^. ■* . t ,*'. irv'-^Sj ';.■■■» . -* -. - r ^^w PARTY SPIRIT I/i T I M p of PUB LICK DANGER, CONSIDERED. WHEREIN, The EfFeds of the National Debt; the Neceflity of our Connections on the Continent ; with the Nature of our Prefent Subsidy Forces, and the Antient Mercenaries; Are fully Discussed. LONDON: Printed for T. Waller, oppofite Fetter -Lane^ Beet-Street. MDCCLVI. / if.. ■ ^^"T" ^^ «:t k r . •*■ /-* -f ti- nJ.l] ■ J . - ., ■ '.I ? ^PWPI PARTY SPIRIT in TIME of ,1 h .. PUB LICK DANGER, CONSIDERED. HO EVER has attentively con- iidered the Turn which Affairs have lately taken^ with the Caufes which have long been operating to produce it, will fee very clearly, that our Fate as a Nation, muil in a great Meafure, depend upon the Ufe we make of the prefent Conjunfture. Great Britain and France are the iirft Movers, by whofe Condud: and Fortune thofe of all the other States in Europe are now conftantly determined. The great Ob- ject of the Policy of Britain, is to preferve her own Freedom and Importance, by pre- ferving the Independency and the Balance of all the others 5 the Drift of the Frend Poli- B ticks I 7 'I ill [ 2 ] • - ticks Is to overturn this Balance, by dimlnifliing that Power, whofe Weight abnc can prcferve it. Great DifHculties always attended the Defigns of France when they were purfued in Europe; the Alarm was eafily taken; all Advances were flow, and dearly bought ; and after a long War, and the Wade of infinite Blood and Treafure, a Peace left their Land- marks juft where they were before ; one Trea- ty, for fome few Family Honours, but no foiid national Advantage, deftroyed the EfFedt of fo many profpcrous Sieges and fuccefsful Battles. They had felt a Wound too in a Part, which mewed them mote clearly than ever that their firft Plan was ill laid. Foiled therefore in their diredl Defigns upon the Liberties of Europe, they took a Com- pafs, to come with the more Certainty, becaufe lets Sufpicion at their purpofed Point. The Way they took was by encreafing their own Strength, and leflTening ours upon the Continent of Nortl> America. The Wealth France had already drawn from the Weji-Indies, and her confiderable Efl:ablifliments there, made her feel the Neceflity of a Force upon the Con- nent, for turning thofe Eftablifliments to the beft Account, and for drawing new and great- er Advantages from a Country, whofe Situa- tion deftined it the Seat of the mofl: extenfivc and beneficial Commerce. It was obvious, that a mighty Augmentation of naval Strength, muft be the certain Confequence a of Superio- rity in America-, and a naval Strength muft -Tf^^i""^ p ■■ pi^i ■■ [ 3 ] be every Thing to France in her Scheme o^ Aggrandifement in Europe, What added to the Advantage of extending herfelf upon that Side, was the Eal'e with which it might be ac • complifheJ. England had been fupinc enough with Regard to the Colonies ; they grew to what they are, more from their own excel- lent Situation, and the Influence of the Eng- lijb Liberty and Laws, which they carried into the Defarts, than by any extraordinary Encou- ragement from Home ; and as for the other Powers of Europe^ they expetlled but little Oppofition from them ; as the Objedt was very remote, and none of them had any immediate Concern in it; add to this, that the grolTeft Ignorance of American AfFairr, prevailed almoft univerfally. In many of thefe Points, France was undoubtedly not at all miftaken ; fhc made an infenfible, but not an inconfiderableProgrefs; her Encroachments were very great ; and fhc fupported them with Forts and Garrifonsj gain- ed the Natives to their Interefts, and omitted nothing to extend and fecure their SettJemeots upon every Side. The Importance of our Colonies and their Danger appeared to us at the fame T-me ; this brought on a Quarrel between us and France j and this Quarrel brought the Refl of Europe to attend to America and to be interefted in the Succefs of the contending Parties there. America^ is now added to the Syftem of Europe, This is a real Revolution, and begins a new and a memorable iEra in Po- B z liticks [I /! ' \ [ 4 1 lltlcks. It is not long fince this Part of the World has been much attended to, and much of the prefent Trouble arofe from this Inat- tention. In Treaties, the Regulation of Rights there was generally poftponed ; it was looked upon as little more than a Station for the Fur Trade, and France would have it ftill confidcr- cd in no other Light ; but the Extent and Firmnefs of the Roots fhe has caft there, 'hews fhe likes the Soil; this Quarrel is really fome- thing more than a&out the making a few Hats. Indeed this Part of the World is luch a Fund of Commerce, fupplies fo many new Articles, and fo connects and binds together the detach- ed Parts of its Syftem, abounds with fuch an Exuberance of all Sorts of Provifions, and is fuch a natural Magazine of all Sorts of naval Stores, that the Power of any State there mud be, in a great Meafure, the Standard, which will regulate the Rank it is to hold in Europe, We are now at the Point of this Ad- juftment, and the Event of the impending War muft finally determine, whether we muft be a precarious Power, fupported only by the contending Interefts of the others, and ever fubfervient to the Uppermoft ; or whether we iliall fit at the Head of Europe, with Authority •to give the Law and Power to enforce it, as the general Safety, and our own 'Dignity may re- quire. It is therefore no Wonder, that the Attention of every Body is turned to the Pub- lick Tranfadlions ; but it is therefore of the greateft Moment for every Body to be cautious, and ii#BaKifet 'I [ 5 ] and to keep as detached as pofTible from all fucb private or party Confidcrations, as might influence them to form Judgments contrary to the real Nature of Things, or to take Steps prejudicial to the general Interefl. We play at prefent for a very great Stake ; and every Difturbance our Paflion may give thofe, who manage the Game for us, mufl be productive of our own Ruin. It is not only the Greatnefs of the Intereft we contend for, but the Party too with whom we contend, which makes it incumbent on every Body to think and to vlO: with particular Mode- ration at this Time. On the Eve of a War with one of the moft powerful Monarchies the World ever faw; with a State doubly exafpc- rated, by having its Views to our Prejudice difcovered and difconcerted, and by having itfelf received Provocations, which for fome Time they could neither refent with Prudence, nor pafs by with Honour. And what is yet of further Confideration ; we are on the Point of engaging with this moft powerful and moft exafperated of all Enemies, on this moft in- tercfting of all Caufes, with fome internal Difadvantages j we are conliderably in Debt ; and this Circumftance, which thofe who wifti ill to the Publick, make frequent Mention of to difunite us, ought really, in a Time of Danger, to be the ftrongeft Bond of our Union. A little before the Opening of this remark- able Scene, we loft a Minifter of long Experi- ence in Affairs ; they are now partly in new Hands, n 1 ■--'»..fc_«*i- - '^'*MWi»»t-T" ^^sm I [6]. Hands, andanOppofition is formed from a new Quarter, which has joined itfelf to the old One, and both proceeded with much Violence though hitherto, I think, with but little Succefs. They bave excepted againft the Capacity and Inte- grity of the now Miniftcr; they have con- denvned every Step he has taken in the Con- du<^ of Affairs, and have added to their par- ticular Objedtions all thofe Complaints, which for many Years have been common in our Mouths, of the general Corruption, the De- cay of publick Spirit, the national Weaknefs, and otlier popular Topics, which give a Cur- rency to more refined Notions, and fuch Ar- guments, as are of a Nature too remote from common Apprehenfion. ^^^/u -n-t ua:^-t /, J at» very far from thinking that we do not want fome Reformation in many Things j the People is perhaps much corrupted, and the Britijh Spirit lowered. Thefe are Evils, which all good Men feel very fenfibly ; and they complain of them with perhaps more Sincerity, though with Lefs Violence, than many of thofe who have winked at this Cor- ruption and Degeneracy, and fometimes even contributed to them, to ferve one Set of Ends, and now rail at them to ferve another. There is a great and a material Diiierence, between tiiofe, who fpcak of our Faults or our Weak- nefs to amend as, and thofe, who only call them up,, with a Dcfign to confound us in our En- deavours to get clear of their ill Confequences. I have a Nephew who, by his Vices and Ex- ^..-....;. . . travagance. N^ [ 7 } travagance, has drawn himfcif into indigent and almoil defperatc Circumftanccs; but I have fomc Regard for his Family, which is my own ; when therefore he came to me fome Time ago, expreffing a Senfc of his former Errors, (hewed me that he was entering into a Courfe of Indiiftry, which might redeem what he had, loft by his ill Condodl, I advanced him fuch a Sum, as, with the Advice I gave him, might pi)t him once again in the Way of being a Credit and Advantage to his Family. But had I, when he applied to me, fcverely reproach- ed his former Life, ridiculed and thwarted his Schemes for repairing his paft Follies, and turn- ed him out of Doors without a Penny of Money; had I done this, I had certainly done as a great Part of the World would upon the like Occafion 5 but as certainly, no- body in his Senfes could fay I was a Friend to this young Man, notwithftanding the Gravity of my Sentences^ or the Severity of my Re- flection upon his ill Conduct. Such is alway, the Difference between the Advice of a Friend, and the Reproacues of an Enemy, in publick and private Life 5 in States, and in Families, For good Senfe and good Policy are the fame Things adting only upon different Objects. Confefling then, that the publick Debt is great 5 that publick Spirit has decayed j that the Nation ib upon the Brink of Ruin, and that our Patriot Orators are ferioufly inter* upon preferving us from it. What Infercpce fhall we draw from this ? Shall we^ becaufe we are perhaps ^ I I i I f. \ . I \ [ 8 1 perhaps lefs able to refent Injuries than for- merly, fufFer Injuries that muft further difable us? Shall we, becaufe we are a corrupted Na- tion, and deferve Punilhment, draw down that Puniftiment upon our own Heads, and in- flidt it with our own Hands ? Or (hall we wifli for a Change of Miniftry, until we wifli for a Change of Meafures, and until the Candidates for the Succeflion can plead fome better Title than their Difcontent, and their Deiire of fuch a Change ? .,.,..^ ... . » . Undoubtedly, before we made any Prepara- tion for War, we ought to have been well convinced that it was extremely neceflary; and that a Peace, though with a fmoother and more flattering Appearance, would be finally more prcjudical to the Nation. And in Fad: we were convinced of this 5 the ge- neral Opinion was, that for many Years before the Spanijh War, we had been diredled by a pufilanimous Syftem of Politicks, which was detrimental to our Credit; and ^ruinous to our Interefts abroad. We faw, with great Uneafi- nefs, the RivaKhip of the French Commerce : We complained of the Injuries our own had tamely fufFered in the Spanijh Weji-Indies ; we were exafperated at the Length and Fruitleff- nefs of the Negotiations, which was the Way then taken to redrefs them 5 the Light this Conduft appeared in, was, what gave a Colour to the Oppofition which Ihook the then Mirti- nifler, and occafioned the Spanijh, ,and by Degrees all the fubfcquent Wars. We have been ^W"l^ n for- difable edNa- down nd in- e wifli 1 for a iidates Title re of we r 9 ] been accufed of Pufilanimity in the Treaty of Aixt I dont enquire with what Reafon, I think with very little, but it was blamed j and the defedtive Execution of it was no lefs com- plained- of afterwards. The Timidity of our Miniftry, and the national Difgrace were con- ftant Topics; we were alarmed by the Progrefi the French had made m America ^Tindhy the At- tention they gave to the Encreafe of their Marine. The debauching our India Allies, the conftant Hoftilities of thofe in NovaScofia, the Forts eredled in that Province, aswell as in New England and Virginia^ gave us the greateft Un- ealinefsfor the Prefent; but the Profpedl was worfe for Futurity; the Extention of the French Settlements from the Gulph of St. Lawrence to the Mouth of the Mijjtjippi ; the Ruin this muft bring on the moft valuable Parts of our Trade; a Confinement within a narrow Trad ; a vaft Frontier to defend; future and worfe En- croachments encouraged by pafl: Impunity ; thefe were Things which made the Nation demand a War ; the Miniftry adled from the fame Spirit, and the whole People, as a Man, feemed to think that, the only Step which could reftore us to a refpe(3:able Condition. ■ .r^fvi Some Wars we have had, into which a regal or minifterial Ambition had betrayed the Peo- ple ; others into which popular Fury had forc- ed the Minifter ; we have often miftaken our Interefts, or purfued them by miftaken Mea- fures ; but this is a War, called for by the De- fires of the People, confirmed by the Judg- C me '? TJiJIP^iPW^ ; ft I i 11 Iinent of the Miniilry, wai'rantcd by our Iii- tercll, fiinditied by ihe Juftice of the Motives, and carried on in a Manner, of all others, bed adapted to our own Circumftances, and the moll effedual to oppofe the Defigns of the Enemy. I do not think that any Body, at that Time, •teftified the leall Difpleafure at the Prepara- tions which were rViade for a War, nor at the Manner of making them. They were indeed carried on with great Vigour, and Difpatch j and to this Vigour, we muft probably owe a great Part of what Advantages, we may hope i'rom the Continuance of the War with Suc- cefs J or the Prevention of it, by reafonable ■ Conceflions from the Court of France j we were not wanting to ourfelves, either in Eu- roJ)e, or in jimerka j though in the latter Part, ;we had not all that Succefs, which we promifed ourfelves ; for to fay the Truth, Affairs in that Part of the World were then, as at moft other Times, carried on without a fufRcient Know- lei'ige of the feveral Circumftances of the Country, which is a new Scene of Operation; therefore it is no Wonder that fome Errors have been committed j but ihey are neither very great, nor irreparable, nor in any Sort fit to balance the Advaatages, we derive from the vigorous and effecftive Steps we have taken. Thefe have always very remarkable •Effe(fts J they ftrike a Dread into the Enemy, and they create a refpedable Opinion of us in our o\Vn Minds, and in thofe of our Allies ; "W^ f r we give them a Pledge, by this refolute Fx- crtion of our Strength, that we are not willing to compound our Claims, or to leave them to the Iffue df tedious and unfruitful Negotiati- ons j befides that, fuch a Beginning makes the Breach between us and the Enerny fo wide; that it can never be repaired, but upon Terms very advantag^^ous to us, or very deftruiftivc *, and this Gircumft'ance is a further Security for a vigorous Pr^oceeding. Therefore, as we were to a man: convinced of the NecefTity^of thofe MeafureSji as we thought them to be truly Bhifijhy and for ari Intereft trt:ily Britifs-, and as we had Reafoh to be pleafed with the Splf fit which animated all our Proceedings, wi fl.Vall for ever renounce our Eiiglijb Spirit, if we fufFer ourfelves to fall into fuch Difcontent and murrnuriti^ upon this Occafion, as may throw us dnce ihore upon fuch dilatory and in- cff€d:ual Meafures, as we ourfelves were for- merly fo loud in condemning. Parties, which in Time of publick Tranqui- lity are ufeful, and perhaps effential to our Con- flitution, are as deftrudtive when we are threat- ened by a foreign Enemy. In War it is una- voidable, that Trade muft fufFer fomething; that publick Credit (hould be occalionally damped j pubiick Impofitions muft encrcafe j and fome ill bdcceffes muft happen in the Courfe of the moft profperous Wars, which are apt to difpirit the Pebple ; if to thefe necelTary In- conveniencics, a factious and difcontented Un- eafinefs be added, . it is not difficult to perceive, •• -• C 2 what I ( -"- *-." ^*- , . -;'{^»-i-- '■*»■ lt\ «■ ; [ 12] what a Clog the whole mufl be upon all our Operations. Whereas a national Union dif- fufes a Life and Spirit into every Member of the State ; it difFufes a Satisfaction and a Firm- nefs into the Military, even to its minuteft Parts; and it encourages every Pcrfon in civil Life to bear his Part of the Burthen, when he fees all the reft drawing chearfully along with him. / But belides the Humour of the People,- which in all Affairs of Moment is ever of the greateft Moment, it is highly neceflary, when all the Care and Attention of the Miniftry, is not more than fufficient to fupport the Nation, :hat no confiderable Part of that Care (hould be diverted to fupport itfelf j whilft they •have Fadtion at home, as well as an Enemy abroad to rriariage. Experience has abundant- ly fliewn, that fuch Fa(5tions, at critical Tinges, have always operated to the Ruin of the Nation which nourifhed them ; fcmetimcs by forcing a Minifter to pafs by every Infult rather than engage in a War, whilft he was torn by an in- teftine Divilion j fometimes to run raftily upon, a War, to avail himfelf of the Confulion ; fometimes to patch up a Peace, more ruinous than any War 5 fometimes to precipitate, and fometimes to delay Matters, direded not by the Exigencies of Affairs abroad, but by thofe at Home, v If the vigorous Steps we have already taken fhould not prevent the Neceflity of a War, the next Point to be confidered is, how the l^urthen jof it is to be fupported. Some of tho/e 4 fc^. T^fci^-^iWrHW* [ '3 ] thofe who allow, that we ought to right our- felves by Arms, from every other Confideralion, objed; to it becaufe we are unable to bear the Expence. vj A^mM^^tm ■ ^ « To form a folid J-idgment upon this Point,' we ought not to coniider our own Condition on- ly without any further View. The Condition of the Enemy muft be conlidered. It is true we are very coniiderably in Debt, but with that Debt, it is certain that we are better able to bear any Expence than any other Power now in Europe, None but France can come into any Competition with us. But is France not in Debt ? Are not their neceflary Charges in- comparably greater than ours } Are not their People loaden vyith Taxes, oppreffive in their Quantity and their Kind, and yet more op- preflive, by their Manner of laying them on ai^d colleding them ? Have they been the beft Oeconomifts in the World ? Or has any publick Money been raifed amongft them for a long Time paft, without Murmuring and Difcontent I Is their Credit to raife Money upon an Emergency greater than ours ? And are they without internal Divilions, the more dcftrudive, as they fubfiil in a State where they are unnatural ? It is a great Miftake, that arbitrary Govern- ments are more. abundant in their Refources than free States. I am fnre all Experience is ta the contrary. For free States have always expended more by far, in Proportion to their natural Advantages, than thofe which were not Ml 1/ f t H I not free. In free Nations, wlieii they are not extremely divided, every Individual is con- cerned in the publick Tranfadtionsj and thinks himfelf fo. In Forms of this Kind, there really cxifls fuch a Thing as the Publick, and there- fbrq all Property is in fome Sort publick too, iince every Man is fatisfied, that what is ex- pended, is expended for the Benefit of him- {plf, and his Familv ; and here Self-love for- tifies the general Pi ciple. In arbitrary Go- vernments, it. is true, the Prince may com- ipand at his Pleafure the Lives and Properties of all thofe who are fubjcdted to him. But even the Principle which fupports abfolute Flower, can only, bear a determinate Weight, and thit not a. very heavy ortfc j free Countries are ulually more largely taxed j yet. Taxations- have caufed..more frequent Murmurings, and even Seditions in the Regions of arbitrary ^vwen Here it is, that the great DiflTerence between what is taken^ and what is given makes itfelf to be felt. The People under ar- bitrary Governments are not a proper Objedt of heavy Taxes j and every Body knows, that all Impofitions upon Goods, when carried beyond a certain Point, are fure to contradict their own Purpofes. If fuch be the Condition of Francey feme may, perhaps, imagine we are ourfelves in a yet worfe Condition. In all Queftions concerning the Power of the Nation, the Reafoning is generally influ- enced by a Cguiideration of the Nation Debt; 1v C( n< w ti no ■■"Lr ; '::*ma*^' "«':^"i in a ['5l fib Scheme of Operation is propofed, but this comes like an evil Spirit, to haunt our Imagi- nations, and diftradt us from our Purpofe. It will, therefore, I believe, be far from imper- tinent here, to make fome Remarks upon that Debt, and enquire how far the Confideratibii of it ought to difcourage as upon this inte- refting Occafion ; for, if it can be (hewn, notwithftanding fome Inconveniences, which I mufl naturally wait on all human Inventions, that, upon the whole, the national Debt is ra- ther a Support than a Burthen to us ; and, if it be fufficiently clear, that we bear all the ', indubitable Marks of a moft opulent People, I , fuppofe, it will not be thought impoflible for us ^ to find fuch Refources, as may fupport us in the Profecution of a neceflliry War : I fay ne- ceflary War, becaufe no Nation is, or can be in a proper Condition, to rcjedt reafonable Terms of Accommodation, in the Hopes of getting more by the Iflue of a War, in which there can be nothing certain, but the Bloodftied and !Expence. • " - • ■ ' ^ ' « Our Debt not only anfwcrs that internal End of good Policy, for which it was origi- nally calculated, but it anfwcrs a fimilar End externally too, in attaching many abroad to us, by the Part they take in that Intereft, in which they have embarked their own. A fimilar Policy has been fuccefsfuUy ufed by other States j the Genoefe Nobility, have long, not only been fufFered, but encouraged to acquire large landed Property in the King- I dom \ \ % \i ■. [ .6] ddm of Naples, and in the Spirit of the lame Policy it is, that all Alienation is mod ftridly forbidden them, except in Favour of Nobles of their own Nation j the Rulers of that King- dom do not confider how much of its Reve- nues arc necelTarily carried abroad by this Means : They are glad to purchafe, at fo eafy a Rate, a certain Intereft in a Republick, which, by its Situation, is always of fuch Importance in the Troubles of Italy, ., But our Policy, as it is jufter, fo it is more effectual too, the Freedom of felling out, in our Funds, is, in Reality, one of the prin- cipal Streams that fills them j and by the Cre- dit we have gained from the Strength of our Security, and the Juftice, and punduality of our Payments, we extend our Refources be- yond the Wealth of our own Nation ; and lay foreign States under a Sort of Contribution to us upon an Emergency. .> Suppofe it fliould be found neceflary, at any Time, to make fudden, as well as great Preparations for War : To form a large naval Equipment: To raife a numerous Military, and to enter into expenfive Engagements with Allies abroad : What (liould we do ? impofe what Taxes you pleafe, they, mufl have Time to come in j — but the Exigency prefles. Here, if there was not a Plan, to proceed on, found efFed:ual by Experience, a Scheme, to which money 'd Men might refort ; Ties by which they are united j and a Difcipline, by .which they are perfeded in the Arts and Po- .; ■ licics 4 '^wi e fame ftriaiy blcs of King- Reve- this Co eafy iblick, fucli 1 more g out, e prin- le Crc- of our ality of ces be- arid lay tion to ary, at s great e naval ry, and 5 with impofe : Time s. ;ed on, me, to 'ies by ne, by id Po- licies t '7 ) licies of raifing Money j it would have proved next to impoflible to anfwer, in fo complcat a Manner, the expcnfive and hafty Calls of thofe mighty Wars, which, during almoft all the Jaft Century, have engaged all Europe. And, indeed, if we had not contracted this Debt at the Time we did, the Nation muft neceflarily either have bowed under the Power of France^ or have fubmitted at once to fuch enormous Taxations, as without being fufiicient to an- fwer their Purpofes, would have pump'd out the whole Wealth of the Nation at a few Strokes ; but by chufing rather to go into Debt, our Taxations with a longer Continu- ance have been more moderate ; Peace fliares the Burthen of the War ; and the whole is moderated by being extended. It is true, that the Difcontented never for- get to remind us, that the two laft Princes of the Stuart Family contracted no Debt, and that they left the Nation clear and unburthen- ed at the Revolution. But in Fadt, thofe very Princes are, in a great Meafure, the Authors of the Neceffity of this Debt; for by the Indolence of one, and the falfe Politicks of both, they raifed the Power of France to fuch an im- moderate Height, that no moderate Expence was fufficient to bound it ; had they made an early Oppofition, it might have been a lefs Ex- penlive one ; but at any Rate to make an effec- tual Oppofition, and at the fame Time, not to overftrain the Sinews of the Nation, by a fudden and violent Exertion of its Strength, D a Debt «• [ .8] i Debt muil have been contratfced ; this hu been done fince ; and the Charadler of the Nation abroad, and its flouridiing State at home, juftify us in what we have done. Since the firil Formation of the national Debt, our Commerce has been extending, our Manufactures improving, our Agriculture in- creafing, and with them, our People multi* plying daily ; now it is certain, that a Debt gradually growing for above Half a Century, until it has flretched beyond feventy Millions, can never be a Thing indifferent to a Nation ; it ran never be unoperative, it muft be pro- dudtive of Good, or of Evil ; and if it can be demonflrated, that under this Debt, we have advanced in every Refpedl, and that we have advanced by quicker Steps, than we have ever done, in the fame Length of Time before, it is furely a very fair Prefumption, that our Debt is a principal Caufe of our Increafe ; and I would demand of any Perfon verfed in the commercial and funded Syilems of this King- dom, if the Whole of the Latter (hould ceafe, even by a Payment, whether it would not fcnfibly prejudice the Former ? But befides this, there is another, and as important Confideration, which fhews the Ufefulnefs, and almofl Necefi^ty of a national Debt ; there is fo much Wealth accumulated in many Parts of Europe, as well as among ourfclves, more than can well be employed in Trade, that there muft be a general well efta- bliihed Depofitory of Credit fomewhere, if ;;i:Uji ■ a we I.* v*- haft the e at T '9] we arc not thpt Depofitory, fome other State will be fo ; and whercfocvcr that 'Credit is, there much Wealth, much Influence, much Power, muft be of Courfe. A very dinted Commerce in a barbarous Na- tion, may be fupported by mere Barter ; where the Trade is more inlarged, and the Intercourfe more general, Money is neceflary ; the antient Commerce probably went no further; but could our Trade at this Day ftand on fo narrow a Bottom ? Could it fubfift without Bills of Ex- change, and the Credit from which they grow? By Means of thefe, Traders extend themfelves far beyond what their meer Capi- tals would carry them j funded Securities are national Bills of Exchange, and they, like the former, enable a Government to do what hard- ly any poflible Sums of Money could, at the iamc Time that they add to the Riches of the Nation, a new Kind of Wealth ^ a Wealth, far from Imaginary, as fome have called it, iince it has the whole Strength of this Nation to fupport it, and can even landed Property promife itfelfagreat Security ? And it carries with it an Advantage of its own ; for the Eafinefs of transferring Stock, makes this Property as folid as Land, pafs as readily in all Sorts of large Payments as Mo- ney itfelf: Partaking thus, the Nature and Benefit both of fixt aud moveable Goods. To ferve the Exigences of an extenfive and various Trade, Money itfelf becomes too con- fined, and burthei^fomej and amongft a great D 2 People t . . If. [20] People, where many arc born to Opulence, and many arrive at it, by other Methods than thofe of Trade ; another Credit, bsfidcs ihat of Trade, is wanting : A Credit, that (hall be common to all, and fit to unite the various Syflems, which compote a great, learned, and trading Nation ; and to carry all of them to an Height attainable only by fuch an -Union. ^i'U'" '•" There are no trading and free Nations, which nave not contracted a large Debt ; a- mong other^Caufes to which Sir WHliam ^cm^ pie attributed the Power of the United Pro^ vincesy he mentions their Debt as one and a principal one. Ge?ioa owed the Temperament of its Government, its internal Order, and its foreign Reputation to that Debt which ir -med the Foundation of the Bank of St. George, Machiavel^ one well acquainted with this State, and no mean Perlbn in this Science, exprefsly fays fo j and even in our own Days they have derived all their Nourifhnicnt from this Source, even after the Decline of their Commerce, and the almoft total Extmdion of their Power ;>,-.* I know it is objedced, that this Currency of the Stocks is but imaginary ; that whilft the Nation is at Peace, it has the EfFed: of real Money ; but, upon the leaft Danger, it finks into nothing ; and if an Enemy once invades the Kingdom, then, like fairy Money, it would be found but Dufl and Aflies. To this I think the Aniwcr is plain, and in the Affirmative, and hofe t of be nous ned, hem an ions, ; a- [ ■^ I 21 1 Affirmative,— It would fo. But then I would . gladly know, in a Country that is the Seat of War, is there not every where^ and has there not been at all Times, a univerfal Difappear- ance of Money, and a compleat Stagnation of ^11 Bufinefs ? on a Peace, this Money begins gradually to re-appear, and fure it is no worfe in the Cafe of the Funds : When Peace is reftored, publick Credit revives, and the Stocks have their former Value. The riling and falling of Stocks is objedled to them, whereas the Value of Money is faid to be fixed. It is granted-— but in Countries and Times where no publick Funds are found. Complaints of the Deficiency of the Money- are very frequent : Whatever falls the Stocks, is, where there are no Stocks, a Caufe to make money'd Men unwilling to lend out their Money. In both Cafes there is a Lofs, there is an Inconvenience, and but a fmall Difference in their Circumftancgs j in one, the Stock-holder fells under Par 5 in the other, the Borrower gives more than the common Interefl:. I have here, for Argument's Sake, allowed tlic woril that could happen to the Stocks, tho' I do not remember at any Times, no not even at the higheft Pitch of the late Rebellion, I do not remember that the Stocky ever were below Par. I do not know that any Nation has entered into a coniiderable War, to which the Diffi- culty of raifing Supplies to carry it on, has not been made a capital Objection j the Re- fources. I 1 ll * %' [22 ] [fo^ttei did hot always immediately appear, but NecefliCy has been a Mafter^ and the Exi- gencies tliemfelves have taught the Expedients. To enter into a minute Difcuffion of all the Ways and Means Which might be fuggefted for carrying on the War, in Cafe we fhould be obliged to enter into one, would not only be a very uncertain Enquiry, but an imperti- nent one too, when we are not called upon to do it. Let thefe Sort of Things ftand upon What Footing they will, the Attempt always carries with it fomething of Ridicule; and it is no Way furprifing, lince it is hardly pofli- ble to lay down any fure Abftra<5t Plan for Supplies, until the Jundure calls for them ; for it muft not only be confidered, how large a Tax the Wealth of a People can anfwer, and in what Manner it had beft be raifed, but ivhat their Genius and Temper can bear, muft be confidered too ; and 'tis well known thev will bear at one Time, and on one Occafion, what at other Times and Occaiions they would never end'ire ; all thefe Things, and many more, muft be taken into Confi- deration, before the Bufmefs of Calculation can be depended upon ; otherwife 'tis only begging the Queftion ; and with all the Ap- pearance of Mathematical Certainty, is the moft fallacious of all Methods of Reafoning, and the beft adapted to conceal Errors from Vulgar Obfervation. One plain Fadl, one clear Proof that we are a rich Nation, will go further to demonftrate to every Underftand- ing, I , 1 i A*^ T^ wg, i [23I ing, that we are able to carry on the War, even where Ways and Means don't readily appear, than a Thoufand the moft curious Schemes for raifing Money, where that can't be fliewn j if 1 am to undertake an ejcpenfive Building, it will go further to perfuadc my- felf, and others too, of my Ability to carry it on 5 if i can (hew a moral Certainty of my having ten thoufand Pounds in my ftrong Box, though the Key (hould be ioft or mif^ laid, and we ihould be a little puzzled to get at the Money ; than, if a Confultation of the ableft Lock-fmiths in England, had contrived the mpft effectual Ways apd Means to opent the Boxj but that Aill it remained very doubt- ful, whether there was any Thing to be found it it, when opened. It is curious. to hear the Complaints of fome Men, of the MKery to which we are reduced, heggaredy ruineJy undone^ defolatedy es^haufi* fdy you would fancy they were talking of th^ wretched Inhabitants of fome fad Region of Siberia ; but all this is fpoken of England, in the midft of England, in the midlt of the moft exuberant Plenty; the moft flourifhing Trade, the moft unbounded Luxury ^ that has been perhaps ever feen in any Country of the Globe : Is not the Wealth of our Gentry almofl: proverbial all over Europe^ by their Expences abroad, and the Grandeur of their Living at hon^e ? Does not the Subftance of our Tradefmen come to rival it ? Do not our vommon People, even to the lowjeft, partake every li V- I • \ \ ■It ™_ ) ;l 1 1 I H m [24] Ncccffary, and every comfortable Provision of Life, beyond any of their Clafs in the known World ? They too have their own Luxuries, fuited to their Tafle, andji^ite unknown to all of their Rank in othei? Nations ? Our Wealth is difFufed through' dVery Part of the Community, Men and Dogs tnUy drink it till they burft ; and can it be thought in a Nation fo rich, no Means can be found to get Part of that Money for ptiblick and national Ufes, and to divert the Current from idle Luxury, into Channels really beneficial to the Nation. From thefe Confiderations we may depend upon Refources, which, if well ftudied in the Manner of railing, diftributed with Oecono- my, and applied to their Ufes with Vigour and Prudence, may promife all that Succefs, with which Providence is ufually pleafed to crown a juft Caufe, whofe Supporters are not wanting to themfelves 5 and that they will be fo raif- cd, and fo managed, I do not th:nk we have as yet any the ieaft Reafon to doubt. I defy any Body to fhew, in any Country, or in any Age, fuch great Preparations, in fo (hort a Time ; fo many Things carried on by Land and by Sea ; in the Way of open Force, and in that of Negotiation. But we have done more, we have not only been preparing, but we have been afting too. And now, in little more than a Year, fince the iirft Beginnings of this Rupture, have done more towards damaging and difhcartening the Enemy, more towards procuring an ufcful Peace, or defray- ing % T^ iioiiof knowft xuries, 3wn to ' Our of the k it till Nation it Part d Ufes, .uxury, fation. depend i in the >econo* [>ur and s, with crown vanting fo raif" ve have I defy or in (horta y Land ce, and ^e done ng, but in little rinnings towards Y, more defray- I t25J ■ •ng the Expences of a War, than our Ancef- tors have done, in any the moft {hining Period of our Hiftory. With this material Difference befides in our Favour, that, at the Time when they fought fuccefsfully againft France^ they took her at a Time when fhe was much dif- abled, and at beft much lefs extended, and lefs entire than fhe is at this Day. This, with- out Sufpicion of Flattery, may be faid for thofe at the Helm, and cannot, I am fure, be de- uied without Malice. But taking the Neceflity of vigorous Mea- fures for granted, and taking it for granted too, that we are well able to fupport our- felves in them -, a Quellion ftill arifes upon the bed Manner of carrying on the War. There are fome who think we ought to confine our- felves to a naval one, and that it is againft Rea- fon, and Prudence for us to take any Part, in the Tranfadtions on the Continent. I fliall ftate their Arguments with all the Strength and Fairnefs in my Power, and then deliver my own Sentiments upon them in the befl Manner I am able. ^? -■ ^' In the firft Place, they obferve, that we are an liland j that this Circumftance makes it ani extremely difficult, chargeable, and hazardous Undertaking for any foreign Enemy to invade I this Kingdom ; efpecially as we have, for the Defence of our Coaft, a very numerous and % well-appointed Fleet, far exceeding every Thing, which our Enemies could employ a- gainft us of the fame Kind. Whilft we arc E thus . >.• u^ *. k, I [ 1 v; [ 26 ] thus fecured from all Danger at home ! wo are at full Liberty to exert our natural Strength} we can bon"»bard their maritime Towns ; we can block up their Ports ; we can intercept their Commerce, and thus cut off that Nou- rifhment without which War cannot fubfifl in cither Element. Secondly, by this Method of purfuing the War j theExpence, however great, does not exhaufl the Nation. The Money circulates amono; ourfelves ; and fuch a War inftead of draining us of our Ca(h, and caft- ing a Damp upon Bufinefs, really fets many ufeful Trades a-float, and turns a Part of the Money of the Nation into Channels which would otherwife be dry, and ufelefs to the Kingdom. Again they argue j that if v/c meddle upon the Continent, and make the Balance of Power, the Pretext for that med- dling, we muft fuppofe the DuUb, the Ger- manic Body, and other Powers to be in much more immediate Danger than we are j and if they are really in fuch Danger, they muft be fenfible of it; and if they are fenfible of it, they mud join their Forces to guard againft It; and if they join their Forces, they are fufficiently able to defend themfelves, without Armies or Subfidies from usj but that we, by following a chimerical Idea of the Balance of Power, and engj^ing in other, idle political Projedts, have entered into Quar- rels in Favour of Princes, who never thought themfelves Principals in them; and have bribed People with our Money and our JBlood, to the Defence Defence of their own Lives and their own Properties. The Arguments, on which this Notion of our being utterly unconnecfted with the Con- tinent, lire founded, flatter our national Hu- mour, and they derive a Force from thence, ind frdm their being often and confidently aflerted, which they have not from their Reafonablenefs, and which, perhaps, no Rea- foning could give them. Thofe who arc originally at the Trouble of fpreading fuch Opinions, do not themfclves give Credit to them : But they anfwer a prefent End, and form a plaulible Topic, and that is all they defire. I am fully fatisfied, that no Man who has examined this Matter, wants any new Arguments to fatisfy him on which Side of the Queftion he ought to decide. But many take up their Notions upon a very flight Examination, and thefe remain in their Errors; becaufe Men of Refinement have rarely Compliance enough to more common Underftandings, to take Pains to argue parti- cularly upon Points which are to themfclves fufficientfy clear already; it is for this Reafon I {hall fpend a little Time in examining this Queftion, which whether it be of great Dif- ficulty, or not, is certainly of great Importance to us. I readily admit, that if we could detach ourfelves entirely from the Continent, and could terminate all our Difputes in the Man- ner we are beft able, by a maritime War, it E 2 would I [ a8 ] would be Infinitely the mofl cligibk upon all Accounts. But there is a Difficulty in this Cafe. We cannot determine by ourfelves in wh. . Manner we Ihall make War. The Kneniy muft have his Part in the Deliberation. And the Reafons which induce us to wiih for a Niival War, becaufe it is cafieft for us ; will incline him to a Land War, becaufe it is the worll for us, and more convenient for him, 1 The Queftion then is narrowed to one Points whether we, purfuing our Choice, or France proceeding in the Way of her Strength, (he or we be in tlie better Road to that Point, which is the common Aim of both ? Let us fuppofe, that, in Purfuance of the favourite Maxim, we take no Meafures to oppofc the Enemy on the Continent. In thefe Circijm- ftances let us fuppofe War declared, and Hof- tilities commenced upon both Sides. That cur Fleets have put to Sea, and that the French Armies have , taken the Field. It is pretty certain, that whether the French chofe to a(fi upon the Side of the Low Countries, or on that of Germany , they could meet but little efFedtual Refi (lance on either. Thofe numerous and celebrated Fortifications in the former, many ruined, and all neglected, could ferve to no other Purpofe, than to afford an ^xercife t^ their Troops, and an Eclat to the Rapidity of tlieir Conquefls. If, in the laft War, when they were in perfed: Order, were well garrifoned, and had a numerous Army of the Allies in the Field to relieve them, if ' ' , ; then tl ai r=9i "then they could not ward ofF their Fate for above three Campaigns, nor prevent the Mar- ihals Saxe and Lowcudahl from burfting open the Sandtuary of the United Provinces j Is it probable, that now, ungarrifoned, unfortified, negledted, almoft abandoned as they are, they could hold out even for a fingle Campaign ? or prevent the Hollanders^ weakened by a •Series of internal Diforders, and divided by the mofl: ruinous Fadlions, from throwing themfelves into the Arms of France^ and en- tering into fuch Engagements, as the unfortu- nate Circumftances of all, and the Inclinations of but too many amongft them, might induce them to confent to ? Holland^ feeble in itfelf, and a broken Reed for us to lean on, would be a Rod to chaftife all Europe in the Hands of France. If France fhould turn her Arms to the 5ideof the Empire, we have very convincing Experience how little that divided Body, or rather that Chaos of inconfiftent Parts could Tefift fuch a compadled Force. There are Princes in that Quarter who would find their Account in throwing every Thing into the utmoft Confufion. So that, let the Power of France be turned which Way it will, it is next to an abfolute Certainty, that, without our Interpofition, it muft prevail and gain every Day an Acceflion of new Power. All this, and much more might be done, even in one Campaign. Let us fee now, what amends our Naval Force could make for thefe Lofles, 'j-;r> yl fuppofing I 1 ? [3° I fuppofing our Endeavours crowned with all the Succefs we could poflibly wi(h ; fuppofe that not one French Man of War dares put to Sea } or if that be more fav urable, let us fuppofe that they (hould be hardy enough to engage us ; and that by this Rafhnefs, they fhould lofc twenty Ships of the Line ; fup- pofe vaft Numbers of their Merchantmen taken, and their whole Commerce interrup- ted. I will fuppofe too, that we make fuc- cefsful Defcents upon the Coafts, and pillage the Country for a confiderable Way. Will any one fay, we could promife ourfelves a Suc- cefs greater than this ? Yet will any be confi- dent enough to aflcrt, that all this coald ba- lance the Lofs we fliould fuffer, by letting the Frinch take the Courfe they pleafe, to diftrefs our Allies, and in the End our own Nation ? For furely we do not imagine, that France^ by this AccelHon of Territory, and the In- fluence following a Train of Succefs, will not, nay muft not grow into a confiderable naval Strength. She might for a while keep her Fleets at home, and acquiefce under a tempo- rary Lofs for the Sake of a lafting Advantage ; having conquered, cheated, terrified, and bribed half Europe^ might turn the Funds (he now imploys on the Land Service to the En« creafe of her Marine; befides the vafl Sup- plies, which might be drawn fi-om another maritime Power, now become her Friend and Ally. Do we forget the aftonifliing naval Ar- maments of hotih XIV ? Have we taken no 0-- Notice '^ 131] Notice of the prodigious Encrcafc of the French Marine fince the laft War ? Or (liall we pretend Ignorance of the conftant Atten- tion of that Court to encrcafe it yet further ? And if, in the Reign of Lotdi XIV. in the In- fancy of their Commerce, raw as they were in the Art of building Ships, inexpert in their Management, and Ainted to what they are now in the Number of Hands proper to Man them J if then, they terrified us with the Greatnefs of their naval Force, a(ftually under Sail to invade us, and this, at a Time, that Holland war- our clofe Ally, war armed with a real Strength, and was hearty in the Ufc of it ; what ought we to apprehend now from the Marine of France^ already not contemp- tible, encreafed by Alliance, formerly ours, and raifed to fuch a Pitch as the whole Force of that great Empire, diverted into this one Channel, could raife it ? We might then, notwithftanding our Infular Policy, find the Power of France but too near us ; we might then difcover, when the Enemy had penetrated into the Body of the Place, that a Defence of the Out-works was fomething elfe than a waft- ing of our Strength. There is a very material Difference between the Operations of a Sea, and a Land War ; and I am furprifed that it is not confidered in this Cafe, more deeply than it commonly is. At Land, a certain Force may always depend upon a certain determinate Succefs, in Propor- tion to that Force J for an Army greatly inferior can i I 32 J I'Vf can very little check the Career of that which prevails extremely in Number ; it can afford no Relief to the Towns which arc befieged, and may at laft be compelled to fight to its own certain Deflrudtion, or be obliged entirely to evacuate the Country. But at Sea, we can never infure ourfclves even a Meeting with the Enemy ; Fogs, contrary Winds, the Uncer- tainty of the Longitude, all thefe, and many more Auxiliaries may fight for the weaker Side. If you block up a Port, it does not depend upon you, how long this Blockade may continue. A Storm may drive you off the Coaft. Nor is it poffible on Account of the Danger to remain long hovering over any Coaft. Whenever therefore any of thefe Caufes leave the Port open, the inferior Navy fails out, and adts in fuch a Manner, as its Af- fairs require and its Strength can execute. It may tranfport Troops into a diftant Part of the World } ad againft its Enemies in the Eaji or We/l Indies^ fhould they have Settlements there; or fall in upon their Trade, however prote a Meeting with the Enemy j 1.0 that, waving every other Confideration, in a War carried on upon the Principles of fome of our Schemifts j the Frc7ich may depend upon a certain deter- minate Succefs, as if they are not cppofed hy lis nfQ?i the Co?itimnt they undoubtedly may ; - ., . .- . . .. . whereas [ 33 I whereas our Succcfs muft be as uncertain as the Element in which it is waged. The fecond Objedion to our taking Part upon the Continent from the greater Kxpcnce falls, if the firll cannot ftand. If a War on the Continent be necelfary^ it n^uft be fup- portcd, or wc are adually unequal to our own Protcdion. We are Tenants at Will j being even a Nation, but at the good Pleafurc of our Enemies. Thanks to Providence, this is far from our Cafe j we are well able to traverfe the Defigns of Frafice upon the Con- tinent ; and when we have fecured that Point, and kept their Hands full in that Quarter, we can then employ all the great Power we derive from our Situation to annoy the Enemy. But it will be faid ; if we are thus perpetually to meddle upon the Continent, of what Ad- vantage is our Situation ? What! is the Num- ber of our excellent Ports, which form our Naval Strength, of no Advantage to us ? Is the Difficulty of being invaded no Advantage to us ? And is it no Advantage to be r;«L*mpted from the Neceffity of immenfe (landing Ar- mies, and an extenfive Frontier to be forti- fied and kept up at incredible Charges ? Thefe are Circumftances highly favourable, but they do not by any Means render us abfolutely im- penetrable, and invulnerable, nor exempt us from attending to many other Things, which a fenfible Forefight and Precaution didate. As to the third Objedion, that may appear to have more Weight, which if it rerJly had, i F i( I 34] it would be retroadtive, and ftrengthen the others. The Princes of the Empire, the Dutchy and many other Powers oi Europe, arc nearer the Danger than we are, and if united to prevent it, might very probably be fufficient for the Undertaking ; but the Point is, have we any Reafon to believe they will fo unite ; if their real folid Intereft was clearly and difpaflionately confidered by them, the Confe- quences, it is poflible, might be fuch an Union ; but there are in the Views of all Councils, a neare- and remoter Intereft, which are very frequendy o^ipofed to each other j and in moft Councils the Majority is often operated upon by the nearer ; we have fcarce ever heard of any State which has refufed a prefent glaring Advantage, or refufed to form ConncvSions in Confequence of it j though it might have been demonftrated that this Advan- tage, and thefe Connediions, would, in a Cen- tury, prove the Ruin of that State. It is a great Miftake, that Nation?, any more than private Men, are iolely influenced by a Coniideration of their real Interefts. Thofe who oppofe our prefent Meafures contend, that we are now ading againft our o^^-n j and will they be furprized to find, others adting from no wifer Motives ? .^-, ,„ r But they who reafon upon fuch a fuppofed Union, do not know, or do not at all confider the Nature and Conftitution of the Germanic Body ; in this, there is another Balance, be- lides the general Balance of Europe, which ,. ' , produces M ./ 5^^--.. .-*l.v* ,x=.**r^-. [35] produces other Connedlions, and other En- mities. The Power of France does not ap- pear fo formidable to many of the German Sovereigns, as that of the Houfc of Jujlria, That 01 France is abroad, the other is at home, and to feveral by far more odious. Befides that, their feveral petty Pretcnfions on each other, their mutual Jealoufies, Piques, Refer t- ments, their perfonal Affronts, and national Averfions, muft prove unfurmountable Bars to any Union for their common Defence. The very uniting of one Part of that Body in one Caufe, weld prove a a fufficieni Reafon for a contrary Union in the f^me Body, to oppofe it : Not to mention, that the Intrigues and Money of France have as much Influence in theEripireas ours; 2Xi^ would probably ha've the famey though wejhould never think of doing any T!hing to counter-aSi fhem^ by the Uje of the fame Methods. When was it known, that the Princes upon the Continent of Europe^ or elfewhcre, have always united or divided, as the general Interefl of Europe^ or of any other Syftem, ought to have diredled them. ? In what Conjuncture was fuch an Union more wanting than in the Year 1683, when the Grand Vizier penetrated ^nto the Empire itfclf, and lay with a mighty and vidorious Army before the Walls of Vienna ? At that Time, when a moft potent, and at the fame Time a mofl barbarous Enemy, the Enemy of Li- berty, Learning, Arts, and Induftry, the a- vowed, principled Enemy of the Chrijlian F 2 Name, m [36] Name, was juft on the Point of removing the only Bar, which could hinder him from over- running the greateft Part of Europe ; at that Time, we might have expedted all Germany at lead, as the next in Danger, to be in Arms, and united to a Man j we might have expeded a Confederacy of all the Cbrijlian Princes to guard againft an Evil, fcarce one Degree re- jTJoved from them. But was this the Cafe ? Were fuch Confederacies formed ? Far from it. Almoft all Parties looked on coolly j and waited the Event with the fame Indifference, with which ve attend the Cataftrophe of a Performance at the Theatre. Indeed, who- ever beftows the lead Attention to the State of Europe^ muft eafily and painly fee, that there can never be any reafonable Hope of an Union, fufficient to withfland the Power of Frmice^ unlefs we form the Cement of it. Unlefs we give it a Subftance, and animate it too, it can only be the Shadow, the Picture of an Union. And I much fear, that thofe who are for leav- ing the Princes upon the Continent, to take Care each of his own particular Safety, have very little Regard to ours, whatever they may pretend. Should we follow their Counfels, France might now with 2:reat Reafon boaft that Advantage which Rome had formerly {mc a- lind advcrj'us 'valiLliJjamas nat tones pro nobis ut'ili- n$, quam quod in com7nune non confuhmt) and flie ini^ht moil certainly draw the fame Effects iroiii ;r. Whenever [27 J Whenever a Nation trufts to thofe Advan- tages, which (he owes folely to fome Circum- fiance in her Situation, {he muft infallibly fuffer by it in the End, if fhe is engaged with a bold and vigilant Enemy. For there can be no Advantage of that Sort, which may not be rendered ufelefs by fome Policy of him who attacks. And when we have for a long Time repofed all our Trufl upon any one Bottom, on the firft Failure of tnat, all our Courage is generally loll, and we feem to have no other Refource. Whtn Alexander the Great projeded the Re- dudlion of Tyre-, that common Wealth repofed, 'd not witnout Reafon, a great Confidence'in ner Situation j it was an Illand, ftrongly fortified, ftrongly garrifoned, and abounding with mili- tary Stores and Provifions in the greateft Plen- ty. She had befides a very powerful Navy, and Alexander at this Time had none. But we do not find, that (he had any Allies, or that fhe took any efFedtual Meafures to obtain them, in thefe Circumftances however. Tyre feemed impregnable. But fuch was the Genius and Applir M Aon of Alexander^ that he projefted a Wor' i^'v^^ removed one of the greateft Ad- vanti^ ; :t this City. He made a Mole from the ContiL^nt to the Foot of the Walls of Tyre^ and was thus in a Condition to batter and af- fault the Place diredly. The Aftonifliment caufed by fuch a vaft Work, anfwered half the Purpofe of it. In the mean Time, the rifin^y Reputation of this Conqueror, the Jea- loufy I ' 1 [ 38 ] loufy of other markimc States to that of Tyre, and other Motives now unknown, induced fe- vcral of the Neighbouring Nations to unite their Fleets under his Flag. Thefe Fleets engaged with that of Tyre, and Fortune de- cided the Vidtory in their Favour. Here fell, at once, all the Advantages arifing from the Situation of that City. It was now attacked with the fame Eafe with any other. And, not- withftanding the Obftinacy of the Refiftance, it fell in a {hort Time into the Hands of an incenfed Conq'^^ror. Had this wea^ .: and trading City, when /he was refolved ^v keep no Meafures with Alexander J fent Ambafladors to confederate all the neighbouring States, to join unanimouf- ly and heartily in their common Defence; had they roufed the Phenicians-, had they ani- mated the yews-, had they given proper Suc- cours to the Governor of Mgypt^ and ^enabled all to form a proper Body to a6t on the Land Side, whilft with a powerful Fleet, they had attempted to cut off Alexanders Succours, and over- awed all the Coaft ; had they opened their Treafures to bring a large Body of Arabians, whom their Money would have engaged, to harrafs their Enemy, and retard his Operations. Had they done this, and whatever elfe Pru- dence, and the Circumftances of the Time would have fuggefted, I believe there is no Man who would not have thought they had confultcd their Safety far better, than by con- fiding in their fingle Strength, and the Nature of \ ( 39 ] of their Situation, confiderablc as the one, and advantageous as the other, yiras ; and if, after all, they had fallen, they \yould have had the Honour with all Poflerity of having made i Defence worthy the Grandeur and Antiquity of their City. > . , v .,, .' .. . > In examining ancient Hiftory, one frcr quently meets, in the Accounts of Sieges, that Towns and Fortrefles have been very often taken, in thpfe Parts, which Nati^rc jccn^ed to- have made impenetrable ; fuch Advantages to imprudent Men are fo many Prejudices, be- caufe they abate the Vigilance of the Defen- ders, and make them negleA other Means of Defence. Modern iStory is not without In- ftances of the fame Kind. Gibralter, fo ie- cured by its Situation, that it might laugh at a Siege, was taken by Surprife by an Handful of Seamen. In (hort, their is always fomc Flaw in all natural Advantages, which no-body fu- fpeds until it is fatally diibovered, and all Hopes of amending it, are utterly gone. So that a prudent Man will make the mofi of all Advantages which Nature has given him ; but at the fame Time he will take all the Steps tq fccure himfelf> that hp fhould, had he thpfp Advantages in a fnialler Degree, or not at all, I mean fo as not idly to diffipatc his Strength, To come home to our own Affairs. Was it, ever known, that we were engaged in a War with France^ that Power with which we ever were, and ever muft be embroiled, when we did not endeavour by every Means, and even 11 of "^ ^ I i . i' [ 40 ] even by Means of our Money, to procure ^s many Allies as we poflibly could ? Were we ever unconnedled even with the minuteft Con- cerns of the Dutchies of Burgundy and Bn'^ tan% whilft thefe States fubfifted ? The firft Eawardy one of the ableft Princes who ever filled the Throne of this Kingdom, knew what a formidable Enemy he had to cope with in France^ even in. the Condition it then v^ras ; and he knew pecfedly well by what Means to cope with her. He did not decline all Engagements on the Continent, and content himfelf with fitting out Fleets to harrafs the Coaft of France j he gained to his Intereft the Earl of FlaiiderSi Ado^hus of Najfau^ the Em- peror, the Duke of Aujlria^ the Archbifliop of Cologne^ and feveral other Princes of Germa- ny ; the Dukes of Brabant^ the Earls of Hol- hnd, yuliers and Luxemburg^ who were (fays the Hiflorian) engaged in the League by the Great Sums Edward wz^ to furnifh them with. The third of that Name, was full as fond of conneding himfelf with the Continent, and for the fameReafons, he fecured (to ufe the Words of the fame Writer) in his Interefts, the Em- peror Lewis of Bavaria, the Duke of Bra- oanty the E^rls of Guilder znd. Hainaulfy his Brother-in-law the Archbifhop of Cologney and feveral other German Princes j he omitted not the private Succours of divers Lords of Germany^ Flanders,, Holland, Brabant, and Gafcoign, who wer6 to furniih him with a Number of Horfe, in Proportion to the Sums he '-. ► -^ ..---;:. -i:. . j^__.- (C cc cc (C (C cc cc cc [ 41 ] he gave them. What a Field would fuch a Proceeding at this Day have opened to the popular Declaimer j how pathetically would he liave complained in every Harangue " to fee not only fo many fovereign, and fo many fubordinate Princes., and not only Princes, but petty Lords, fubfidizcd almoft all over RuropCy in Germany^ in the Low Countries^ in France^ c /ery where ; and the Treafure of Eng/an^t the vital Blood of the Nation, flreaming from a thoufand Wounds, and transfufed into a thoufand foreign Chan- nels." And yet at this Time England bore a much fmaller Proportion in Point of Wealth to thofe Countries, and a much larger one in Point of idle Hands, than fhe does now, with- out all Comparifon; and notwithftand, this Conduct of our Princes, has been cenfured by no Hiftorian ; on the contrary, it has ever been highly and juftly commended, and held up as a Pattern to all fucceeding Monarchs. The Example of Edward I. was followed by Edward III. Henry V. trod in the fame Steps ; and indeed all our Kings, except fuch as were a Difgrace to their Thrones, and a Misfortune to their People, never flighted the Continent, from the earlieft Accounts we have, to the prefent moft interefting Period. And here I appeal to the Hearts of thofe, who oppofe our Treaties, whether they think we could do any Thing more acceptable to our Enemies, than to drop all Connedlion with the Continent, and renounce thefe fubfidiary G Treaties, :?**-£■ [ 42 ] Treaties, which they hold to be fo prejudicial; to us ? . , : Hoc If^ 'cr^ velif, et tnagno merceniur Atrida. I \\\ rhink they would venture to affirm, that Vra/icc widics us the Continuance of tholc Allies upon thole Terms j or, that fhe has never attempted to prevent fuch Alliances, as fo many Hinderances to the Execution of her Schemes. Were they fo ruinous to us, as fome would reprcfent them, and the Proceed- ing fo irrational, the French would certainly rather encourage, or at leaft would wink at (uch a Procedure. We may know whether any Step againft the Enemy be right, as well from his Eagernefs to oppofe, as from our own to take it. Now if our wifeft and befl Princes, in all Times, have judged a Connedlion with the Continent abfolutely neceflary, and Alliances there to be fo valuable, as to be purchafed at the greateft Expence ; (hall we fuppofe, that we are fo much more powerful, and France fo much weaker, and the Nature of all Things fo much reverfed, that we ought now to truft folely to our own Strength, and fufFer the common Enemy, by Force or by Manage- ment, to make what Advances he can, whilft we confine ourfelves to one fingle Method of attacking him ? Again, if this Enemy abroad has fiiewn, by his Oppofition to our Alliances, that he looks upon them as prejudicial to him, and of Courfe ufeful to us, what Jlmll we . ,.. . think f [43 1 think of thfey ivho witbfi much Rancour oppofi thofe Alliances^ at home ^ Perhaps it may be excepted to the Exam^ pies which I have given, that, in thefe early Times, we had lefs Trade, and a fmaller Ma- ritime Force than we now have j and that we were therefore under a Neceflity, of taking the Part, which we then took upon the Continent. But, in anfwer to this, it mufl: not be forgot, that we were then an Ifland, as well as now ; and that we were equally well protected by our Situation from all Danger of an Invafion. If we had not then confiderable Fleets, yet our Fleets, when we thought proper to turn our Strengiii that Way, were more confidera- ble than thofe of France^ as our Trade was, even at that Time. In the Reign of Queen Elizabeth we had a greater naval Force than any Power in Europe after the Defeat of the Armada j and yet that fagacious Princefs, and the wife Advifers (he had, during the long Courfeof her^emorable Reign, never thought they afted weakly in maintaining Armies, and expending coniiderable Sums upon the Con- tinent. Indeed, had our Miniftry deviated from thefe Maxims of found Policy, obferved by all wife States, who never go to War with- out firft looking out for Alliances ; had they, when the Injuries we had fufF^red, and the Refentment of the Nation called upon them to adt in an hoftile Manner, had they, neglec- ted to fecure us one Ally on the Continent ; had they formed no Treaties, flipulated for G 2 no ! ll t \ 44 1 no Succours, but left France to the full Exer- tion of her prodigious Strength, and the full Employment of her dangerous Ini igues ; then, indeed, the Terms of weak and wicked Minijler, which is now but Cant, the Voice of reftlefs Faction, and difappointed Ambi- tion, would have been a Charm to conjure up a deftroying Spirit, to punifh the Advifets of fuch a fool-hardy Proceeding. Thofe who now accufe them fo bitterly for a contrary Condudt, have undoubtedly their own Reafons for doing fo. The Publick has long enter- tained an Opinion, that the principal Men in Oppofition have ever, as one of their chief Ends, if not their fole End, the Removal of the chief Men of the Miniftry ; and of filling themfelves their Places, with Litegrities and Abilities fuperior. This is undoubtedly a laudable Ambition ; but if we judge of the Meafures they would purfue, wnen in Power, as the dire(5t contrary to thofe which they op- pofe when out of Power, I believe few Men, who love their Country and underftand its In- tereft, will wifh for any Change which may put the Game into their Hands. A Clamour is raifed againft the fubfidiary Treaties, upon another Principle j mercenary Troops are condemned, upon the Authority of fome political Writers, and the Example of fome Mirchiefs, which have attended them recorded in Hiftory. They obferve, that when you fufFer your own People to grow into a Dif- uleofArms, and habituate themi to commit their [ 45 ] their Defence to Foreigners, they naturally become effeminate and cowardly, unwilling and unable to protedt thcmfelves from their more avowed Enemies, or the Impofition and Tyranny of thofe whom they have hired to defend them. This Obfervation, as a general one, I allow to be extremely jufl. Thofe who have the Sword in their Hand, and not thofe who have the Purfe, are in Effedl the Mafters j and thofe who pay others to fight their Battles, out of Cowardice, will in the End have nothing left to pay ; becaufc no De- fence is folid, and to be relied on, but that which comes from the proper Strength of a Nation itfelf. T do not controvert the general Principle j but I pofitively deny the Fadt as charged upon us ; we have not truded to foreign Defence, nor to mercenary Forces. Let thofe who reproach us with this pufilani- mous Condud: look over the Votes of this Seflion of Parliament. They will find, that for the prefcnt Year we have thirty-four thoufand Britijh Soldiers on Foot in Great Britain ; we have in Ireland twelve thoufand at leafl, all Britijh too ; we have ten thoufand in the Plantations, Gibraltar and Minorca, befides the Troops raifed in the Colonies j we have ten thoufand Marines, and forty thoufand BritiJIj Seamen in our Navy. We have then upwards of an hundred thoufand Britijh Sub- jects in Arms, in the different Parts of our military Eftablifhment. How then can we fuf- fer the proflitute* Impudence of fome Writers, who ii i i \l A I ( ., 1m u [46 1 who (ay wc have difarmed and difcoiiraged our own People, and committed our Defence to the Hands of mercenary Foreigners ? If wc have engaged with other Powers to furnifli us with Troops, it is becaufe a yet greater Force, than this I have mentioned, is necefliiry to counterbalance that of the Enemy ; that thefe Troops are better Atuated to a6t in our Favour, upon many Occafions, and can be maintained at an infinitely lefs Expence, than would ferve to keep up half that Force of our own Subjedls. But ftill they urge the Danger arifing from Mercenaries j that they are turbulent, difobedient to thcirCommanders, and highly dangerous to the State which em- ploys them. Examples from Antiquity are produced to fupport this. But are there no Examples on the other Side ? Did not the Kings of Pefjia place a great and juft Confi- dence in the Greek Mercenaries ? And did not the younger Cyrus, in his Attempt upon the Throne of that Empire, rely on them above all others ? Was not PerfeuSy King of Macedon, ruined, when, to gratify a mean, avaricious Principle, he broke a Subfidy Treaty, which he had entered into with a neighbouring war- like Peope i* And if the Carthaginian Repub- llck was near being ruined by a Sedition of her mercenary Forces ; let it be remembered likewife, that by its mercenary Forces this Republick was near being carried to univer- fal Empire. ' • • • But [47] But let the Quedion concerning the an- ticnt Mercenaries be decided which Way it will, according to its own Merits ; it haii no fort of Concern with us at this Day. It is unfortunate, that any fhould read Hiftory, who are entirely deficient in Judgment, to apply Fa(fts, and who have not Capacity Ibfficient to take in all that Divcrfity of Circumftances and Relations which are effcntially requilite to the proper Ufe of any hiftorical Example. In Reality, the Mercenaries mentioned in an- tient Writers were altogether of a Nature different from thofe Forces, which confederate Princes engage to furnifli us with, on the Payment of certain ftipulated Sums, at this Time. The antient Mercenaries were gene- rally a Set of Soldiers of Fortune, detached from any Relation to their feveral Countries, often Fugitives from them, who entered into the Service of fome foreign State, hoping to enrich themfelves by Pay or Plunder} and confequently had no Ties which could hold them fleadily to their Duty j fuch were the Mercenaries in the Carthaginian Service, who mutinied under Spcn^ius and Matho. No Man who had not oblique Views, to diftort his Sight, could perceive any effential Likenefs between the Employment of fuch Forces, and a Sub- fidy Treaty. In the Cafe of a Subfidy Treaty, the Soldiers are under Obedience to their pro- per Prince ; they are difciplined by his Gene- rals ; they are paid out of his Treafury ; and they are accountable to him as Subjects for any Dif- 1 '^ ' I ( Jll ■ !■ and as to the moft necefTary Purpofes on the Continent, a Militia is no Afliftance at all. It is an ill Policy to confide all upon one Caft. A Militia might repulfe an Invader j it may be defeated too; and what terrible Confequences might fuch a De- Defeat draw after it within the Kingdom? It is true, that the Circumftance of fighting in ones own Country, in the Prefence of their Families, and Friends, pro. arts &focH^ has often given great Spirit to an Army; but . en the other Hand, it is no way improbable, that the Confideration of the ruinous Confe- quencG attending a Lofs may difhearten them ; and it has often done io in (imilar Cafes. The RoWiVn always fared woril in Italy, Africa. wns the weak Part of the Carthagitiians, And it was the Opinion of AgeJilauSy that the King of Pcrjia could not be hurt but in hiis own Tenitorics. ^* ■ ' ^^ 'I do \ t 5' ] ^ I do riot think, that our own People have generally made a Defence worthy of their great military Charader, when they have been attacked by a foreign Enemy in Rngland. As I believe it is pretty clear, that to do ourfelves Right, indeed to protedt ourfelves, we muft have Conne6lions upon the Conti- nent ; and that the Way of Sublidies is the cheapeft and heft Method of keeping up that Connedtion, and making it effeiiiic:^' — w ^ l\ [52 J leai^j until a more confiderable Succour CQuld arrive. «"H' *,••«♦' . As to Rii/J'M, I think, the Advantages de- rived from that Alliance, as they are greater, fo I think them more eafily difcerned too. For could we fuppofe, that there is any Prince in the Empire of boundlefs Ambition, and who might in part fatibfy that Ambition in a ge- neral Confufion ; I do not know any Power fo capable, by its Strength and Situation, of be- ing a Check upon him. It is faid, indeed, that all the Milchief may be done before the Troops flipulated can pofTibly arrive. I allow it poflible, that much Mifchief may be done, as jnWar how can it be avoided ? But what is pro- pofed, is not to prevent all Sorts of Evils, which would be an idle Undertaking j but to pevent the Defigns of the Enemy from taking a lafting EfFed : We cannot pre- vent all, |he Calamities incident to War; what we ought to aim at is, to guard againft the laft and Nyoril. It is an idle Bufinefs, to fcheme at a Diftance, the Operations of pof- fible Campaigns; but will any fay, that a Force fufficient to make fome Stand, in th^ Electoral Dominions, may not be had toge- ther, until the Ruffian Auxiliaries were tranf- ported by Sea (could no better Means of Paf- fage be had) to his Majeilics Port of Jiar^ boiirg ? And might not this be done in part, at leaft, as foon as ever there was a probable Appearance of a Defign to difturb the Tran- '^ n t quility h ^ y »i^ T 53 J i^uilty of the Empire ? Muf! not the FrencH Army take a Time to mardh ? And if they take Time, in the Execution of their D-figns, is not that Time open for us to oppofe them ? On the whole, we have not the leaft Reafon to apprehend, that thefc Treaties will not anfwer their Purpofcs very fufficiently, fhouli Things come to extremeties, 6ut perhaps they may do more^ and prevent the Neceffity of ever being brought into AB. I am fure, they have 5ilrcady caufed one of the inoft extraordinary Phaenomena, that ever appeared in the poli- ^cal Syftem i and feem to have confounded thofe Heads, whofe Cabals had beien the Caufc of all the Confufion in Europe, The Faa fpeaks itfelf ; I fliall therefore fay no more upon it ; but only intreat my Countrymen, every one to ufe his own Rea- fon, ttf judge for himfelf, and to coniider, ^' This is a Time of Publick Danger ;" and that one Confideration will, I think, at once difcover to every reafonable Man the Pro/r/V- ty of their Reafonings, who, at fuch a Time, do ail they can to infufe Doubts, and raife Dif* contents among the People* So long a Difcuflion indeed was not necef- farv to thofe who fpread Opinions, prejudi- cial to the Publick Peace ; though perhaps it may not be ufelefs to them, who are infeded by them. The Fears of thofe Perjms, are, in Reality, left our Auxiliaries fhould jufti- fy the Steps which have been taken, by being a real 1 ;',( m In n- 1) :^i I' l'» 'if T-54 1 real Advantage to us. They forebode 111 front their Malice, and their Pride makes them fear to be difappointed. They arc a Sort of Men, which grow up in all Commonwealths (of which they are the Peft) Men of an over- weening Opinion of their own Talents, and an infatiable Ambition ; who can think well of ' no Counfels, but their own j and care not what becomes of their Country, when it does not fubmit to be guided by their Direction. Thefe are a People, who when the publick Counfels are unfuccefsful, take an Opportu- nity to triumph over the Nation's Weaknefs, and to extol tl oir own Sagacity. And if the Nation fhould triumph, they have ever the Sagacity to difcern fome latent Mifchiefj even in our SuccefTes. Our prefentjoy is to be pro- ductive of a future Sorrow j fomthing muft be amifs. Either the Advantage was not purfued fufficiently ; or it was carried too far. Phy- ficians, they are, ever reading Ledlures ort the Difeafe, but who fpeak nothing of the Kemedy j Builders, whofe Skill coniifts in demolidiing ; ^ but who know nothing of that noble Architecture, which transforms a little Town, into a great City. Perpetual Dif- tutantSy vfho never can fettle, or decide. So habituated to fearching out Faults, that they have loft all Relifh for Perfedtion. So long enured to Poifon, that it becomes their natural Food. ^ " . .i i:i' -ii»' * »>.«>» i ¥■■# *•■• « Should 1^ Should a Reptile of this Species, whom Fear, Defpair, and Greedinefs had long buried in his Hole, where he lay wound up in himfelf, feeding on Rancour and Difcon- tentj {hould fuch a Reptile, in the adive Seafon, caft off his Slough, and fpring out in the Face of Day, you will know him by thefe Marks. His Charaderifticks are a Rattle and a Sting ; his only Language is an Hifs ; flip- pery and gloffy, and Glittering^ nimble and ready at a Turn-, but without Feature, or Limbs, or Proportion. Should this Monfter attempt to fcatter his Poifon among the Herd Cape Saxa manu. Cape rohora^ p^J^or, T^ollentemqiie Minas^ et Sibila Colla tumentenit Dejice- .}\ FINIS. ^J